2015 UT App 203

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

BEATRIZ VALDEZ-SADLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20140061-CA

Filed August 13, 2015

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable James T. Blanch

No. 131900025

Richard G. Sorenson, Attorney for Appellant

Padma Veeru-Collings and Ann P. Boyle, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE JAMES Z. DAVIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE

J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred, with opinion. JUDGE MICHELE M.

CHRISTIANSEN dissented, with opinion.

DAVIS, Judge:

¶1 Beatriz Valdez-Sadler appeals her conviction for

obstruction of justice, asserting that the trial court erred in 

denying her motion for directed verdict. We reverse her 

conviction.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2012, police officers attempted to serve a 

warrant for a probation violation on Valdez-Sadler’s boyfriend 

(Boyfriend) at the apartment where he was living. When they 

knocked on the door of the apartment, Valdez-Sadler answered. 
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Valdez-Sadler let the officers into the apartment to look for 

Boyfriend, but he was not there. The officers discovered that 

Valdez-Sadler was the subject of an outstanding warrant, but 

they decided not to take her into custody.

¶3 Other officers returned several days later in another 

attempt to serve the warrant on Boyfriend. Valdez-Sadler 

answered the door, wearing only a jersey with no pants, and 

informed the officers that Boyfriend was not home. But this time, 

she refused to let the officers search the apartment. There is no 

evidence suggesting that the officers informed Valdez-Sadler of 

their reason for seeking Boyfriend either time they visited the 

apartment.

¶4 When Valdez-Sadler refused to let them in, the officers 

informed her that they were placing her under arrest pursuant to 

the outstanding warrant. Valdez-Sadler asked the officers to let 

her put on some pants before being taken to jail. While ValdezSadler went into the bedroom to retrieve her pants, the officers 

checked the rest of the apartment to be sure that it was secure. In 

doing so, they discovered Boyfriend and placed him under 

arrest.

¶5 Valdez-Sadler was charged with obstruction of justice as a 

class A misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1), (3)(c) 

(LexisNexis 2012). A jury trial was held on October 28, 2013.

After Salt Lake City (the City) had presented its case, ValdezSadler moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the 

motion, and the jury found Valdez-Sadler guilty. She now 

appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 Valdez-Sadler asserts that the trial court erred in denying 

her motion for directed verdict. We review the trial court’s 
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denial of the motion for directed verdict for correctness. State v. 

Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ¶ 15, 167 P.3d 503.

ANALYSIS

¶7 Valdez-Sadler argues that the trial court should have 

granted her motion for directed verdict because the City failed to 

present evidence sufficient for the jury to find that Boyfriend’s 

conduct constituted a criminal offense as defined by the 

obstruction of justice statute.1 A person commits obstruction of 

justice when she engages in one of several enumerated activities, 

such as “harbor[ing] or conceal[ing] a person,” and acts “with 

intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 

apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any 

person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense.” Utah 

Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1) (emphasis added). The statute 

specifically defines “conduct that constitutes a criminal offense” 

as “conduct that would be punishable as a crime,” including 

“any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance.” Id. § 76-8-

306(2)(a).

¶8 The City asserts that we should consider the underlying 

felony for which Boyfriend had been placed on probation to be 

the “conduct that constitutes a criminal offense,” not the 

probation violation itself. Using this approach, Valdez-Sadler’s 

actions in concealing Boyfriend from police would clearly fall 

within the purview of the statute, assuming that the other 

 

1. Valdez-Sadler alternatively argues that the City failed to 

present sufficient evidence of her intent because it did not 

establish that she knew why the officers sought Boyfriend. 

However, because we reverse Valdez-Sadler’s conviction on the 

ground that a probation violation is not a criminal offense for 

purposes of the obstruction of justice statute, we need not 

address this alternative argument.
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elements of the statute were also satisfied. However, we are not 

convinced by the City’s argument. Boyfriend’s probation violation 

may ultimately result in his serving a prison sentence for the 

underlying felony that he might otherwise have avoided. See id.

§ 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) (Supp. 2014) (“Upon a finding that the 

defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may 

order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the 

entire probation term commence anew.”). But Valdez-Sadler’s 

actions did not “hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 

apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment” of 

Boyfriend regarding the underlying felony he committed, 

because he had already been apprehended, convicted, and 

sentenced for that crime. See id. § 76-8-306(1) (2012). Thus, we 

agree with Valdez-Sadler that the conduct for which police sought 

Boyfriend was his probation violation, not his commission of the 

underlying felony.

¶9 While violating probation carries consequences, see id.

§ 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) (Supp. 2014), it is not separately punishable as 

a crime in Utah. In fact, recognizing this, the Utah Legislature 

has made “[o]bstructing service of a Board of Pardons’ warrant 

or a probationer order to show cause” a separate crime from 

obstruction of justice. Id. § 76-8-306.5 (2012); see also Recording of 

Utah House Floor Debates, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 6, 2007)

(statements of Rep. Rebecca D. Lockhart) (indicating the belief 

that the obstruction of justice statute did not apply to obstruction 

of service of Board of Pardons’ warrants or orders to show cause 

for probation violations because violations of probation or parole 

are not separately punishable crimes). Because the police sought 

Boyfriend for a probation violation and violating probation is 

not punishable as a crime, the City failed to present evidence 

from which the jury could have determined that Valdez-Sadler 

“hinder[ed], delay[ed], or prevent[ed] the investigation, 

apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment” of 

Boyfriend “regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal 

offense.” See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1).
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CONCLUSION

¶10 Because the City failed to present evidence that 

Boyfriend’s conduct constituted a criminal offense, the trial court 

erred in denying Valdez-Sadler’s motion for directed verdict. We 

therefore reverse Valdez-Sadler’s conviction for obstruction of 

justice.

VOROS, Judge (concurring):

¶11 I write separately to explain why I believe the text of the 

relevant statutes requires reversal of Valdez-Sadler’s conviction. 

I concur in the lead opinion except insofar as it may be 

inconsistent with this opinion.

¶12 The obstruction of justice statute makes it a crime to 

harbor or conceal a person “with intent to hinder, delay, or 

prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, 

or punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes 

a criminal offense.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1)(e) (LexisNexis 

2012). This provision does not mention probationers or parolees. 

Nevertheless, read in isolation, this statute could, in my 

estimation, reasonably apply to Valdez-Sadler’s conduct here.

¶13 However, we do not read statutes in isolation. Rather, 

“we read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and 

interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the 

same chapter and related chapters.” State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 

¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In addition, “we interpret[] statutes to give meaning to 

all parts, and avoid[] rendering portions of the statute 

superfluous.” State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 23, 309 P.3d 209 

(alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Finally, “[w]hen two statutory provisions appear to 

conflict, the more specific provision will govern over the more 
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general provision.” Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 

214, 216 (Utah 1984).

¶14 These canons of construction require us to read the 

obstruction of justice statute, section 76-8-306, in harmony with 

the following section, section 76-8-306.5. Section 76-8-306.5 

applies specifically to harboring or concealing parolees and 

probationers. In pertinent part, section 76-8-306.5 makes it a 

crime to harbor or conceal a probationer with knowledge that “a 

court has issued an order to show cause regarding a defendant’s 

violation of the terms of probation.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306.5

(LexisNexis 2012). Accordingly, applying section 76-8-306 rather 

than section 76-8-306.5 to harboring or concealing probationers 

would violate two of the aforementioned canons. It would 

render section 76-8-306.5 superfluous, and it would allow the 

more general provision to govern the more specific. Accordingly, 

I do not read section 76-8-306 to apply to harboring or concealing 

probationers.2

¶15 By its own terms, section 76-8-306.5 applies to the typical 

situation where “a court has issued an order to show cause 

regarding a defendant’s violation of the terms of probation.” Id. 

§ 76-8-306.5. And the record here does not indicate that a court 

issued an order to show cause on Boyfriend. But our reading of 

the statutory scheme should not be controlled by the fact that the 

present case arose in an atypical manner. 

 

2. Admittedly, the legislature might have made its intent explicit, 

as it did when it stated that the obstruction statute “does not 

apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed by 

Section 62A-7-402.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(5) (LexisNexis 

2012). But neither did the legislature make a contrary intent 

explicit, leaving us to construe the statutes according to our 

usual canons of construction.
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¶16 In sum, because section 76-8-306.5 explicitly applies to 

harboring or concealing probationers, section 76-8-306 does not.3

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge (dissenting):

¶17 I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority’s 

conclusion that the City failed to present evidence sufficient to 

convict Valdez-Sadler of obstruction of justice. In my view, the 

plain language of the obstruction-of-justice statute is 

unambiguous, and the actions taken by Valdez-Sadler clearly fall 

within the statute’s reach. Accordingly, I would hold that the 

trial court correctly denied Valdez-Sadler’s motion for directed 

verdict in this case.

¶18 The obstruction-of-justice statute is broadly worded and 

criminalizes “harbor[ing] or conceal[ing] a person” or 

 

3. This conclusion rests on my reading of the statutory text, not 

the legislative history. Comments made by legislators or others 

in the course of the legislative process matter far less than the 

text of the legislation itself. “Any suppositions about what the 

legislature may have intended cannot properly override what it 

actually did.” State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 17, 251 P.3d 829. We 

are, after all, “governed by laws, not by the intentions of 

legislators.” Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., 

concurring). In any event,“[t]he best evidence of the true intent 

and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain 

language of the Act.” State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995). 

Consequently, “[i]n the game of statutory interpretation, 

statutory language is the ultimate trump card, and the remarks 

of sponsors of legislation are authoritative only to the extent that 

they are compatible with the plain language” of the statute. 

United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078 (1st Cir. 1997) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“provid[ing] false information regarding a suspect” with the 

intent to “hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 

apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any 

person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense.” 

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1) (LexisNexis 2012). I disagree with 

the lead opinion’s conclusion that Valdez-Sadler’s lies to police 

about Boyfriend’s whereabouts fall outside the ambit of the 

statute. Specifically, I cannot read the plain language of the 

statute in such a way as to support the lead opinion’s conclusion 

that, because Boyfriend “had already been apprehended, 

convicted, and sentenced” for the felony underlying his

probation, “Valdez-Sadler’s actions did not ‘hinder, delay, or 

prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, 

or punishment’ of Boyfriend regarding the underlying felony.” 

Supra ¶ 8.

¶19 The lead opinion appears to interpret the word 

“regarding” as synonymous with “for.” The lead opinion’s

analysis hinges on the fact that “the conduct for which police 

sought Boyfriend was his probation violation, not his 

commission of the underlying felony.” Supra ¶ 8. And the lead 

opinion’s conclusion is couched in terms of official action against 

Boyfriend for commission of a criminal offense: “the City failed 

to present evidence from which the jury could have determined 

that Valdez-Sadler ‘hinder[ed], delay[ed], or prevent[ed] the 

investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or

punishment’ of Boyfriend ‘regarding conduct that constitutes a 

criminal offense.’” Supra ¶ 9.

¶20 However, when interpreting a statute, we must presume 

“that the legislature used each term advisedly according to its 

ordinary and usually accepted meaning.” State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 

19, ¶ 13, 299 P.3d 1133 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The ordinary and usually accepted meaning of the 

word “regarding” is “relating to” or “concerning.” See MerriamWebster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
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regarding (last visited Aug. 6, 2015); Webster’s Third New Int’l 

Dictionary 1911 (1993). In my view, the obstruction-of-justice 

statute should therefore be read to criminalize acts that 

intentionally impede official action “relating to” or “concerning” 

conduct that constitutes a criminal offense. Nothing in the 

statute limits this consideration to conduct for which the 

criminal actor has not yet been prosecuted or punished. Thus, 

although Boyfriend may have been sought due to a violation of 

his probation, his apprehension by police (and whatever 

punishment is imposed upon him as a result) involves official 

action regarding—i.e., relating to or concerning—the underlying 

criminal conduct for which he had been sentenced and placed on 

probation.

¶21 I also cannot agree with Judge Voros’s conclusion that the 

existence of Utah Code section 76-8-306.5 requires us to exclude 

Valdez-Sadler’s conduct from the reach of section 76-8-306. 

Section 76-8-306.5 criminalizes harboring or concealing a 

probationer if the actor knows “that a court has issued an order 

to show cause regarding [that person’s] violation of the terms of 

probation.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306.5(1) (LexisNexis 2012). In 

my view, reading section 76-8-306 to encompass Valdez-Sadler’s 

conduct would neither render section 76-8-306.5 superfluous nor 

create a conflict between the sections.4 The latter statute applies 

 

4. I note that, while Valdez-Sadler discussed section 76-8-306.5 in 

the context of explaining why the legislative history of that section 

should inform our consideration of section 76-8-306, ValdezSadler did not argue that the existence of section 76-8-306.5 

precluded her conviction under section 76-8-306. I would not 

reverse the trial court on the basis of an argument not raised by 

the appellant’s opening brief.

Moreover, I do not think it necessary to guess at the 

legislature’s intent in enacting section 76-8-306. As Judge Voros 

points out, “[t]he best evidence of the true intent and purpose of 

(continued...)
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when the actor knows that an order to show cause has been 

issued while the former applies when the actor does not. Section 

76-8-306.5 thus imposes a different penalty for actively assisting 

a probationer to evade arrest with the knowledge that the 

probationer is being sought for a probation violation. Compare id.

§ 76-8-306(3), with id. § 76-8-306.5. Accordingly, in my view, the 

combined function of these statutes is to punish actors 

differently depending on their level of knowledge.

¶22 It is true that an actor could conceivably be convicted 

under both statutes. Utah law recognizes that “the same act of a 

defendant . . . [may] establish offenses which may be punished 

in different ways under difference provisions of [the criminal 

 

(...continued)

the Legislature in enacting [a statute] is the plain language of 

the [statute].” State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995). When 

the “statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not 

look beyond the language’s plain meaning to divine legislative 

intent.” Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1168 

(Utah 1991); see also, e.g., Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 

763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988); Graves v. North E. Servs., Inc., 2015 

UT 28, ¶ 67, 345 P.3d 619 (noting that “[t]he governing law is 

defined not by our abstract sense of legislative purpose, but by 

the statutory text that survived the constitutional process of 

bicameralism and presentment”); Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, 

¶¶ 69–70, 323 P.3d 998 (Lee, J., dissenting) (cautioning that 

legislators do not necessarily share a unified intent when they 

enact a statute); D.A. v. D.H., 2014 UT App 138, ¶ 18 n.3, 329 P.3d 

828 (noting the “potential pitfalls in attempting to divine the 

intent of a legislative body from a hand-picked selection of 

arguably favorable comments” made by bill sponsors). Because I 

conclude that the language of section 76-8-306 is plain and 

unambiguous, I would decline Valdez-Sadler’s invitation to 

divine the legislature’s intent in enacting 76-8-306.
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20140061-CA 11 2015 UT App 203

code.]” See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (LexisNexis 2012). In 

such cases, the defendant may not be punished under all of the 

implicated provisions, see id., but the overlap between offenses 

does not act as a bar to charges or even convictions for 

overlapping offenses. Rather, whatever convictions are ultimately 

found by the jury are simply subject to merger or related 

doctrines. See State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶¶ 28–32, 128 P.3d 1179; 

State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 147–48 (Utah 1969). Thus, I do not 

believe that section 76-8-306 must be interpreted to exclude the 

harboring of wanted probationers merely because section 76-8-

306.5 could criminalize the same conduct (albeit with a 

heightened mens rea) in a particular case.

¶23 I conclude that the plain language of section 76-8-306, the 

obstruction-of-justice statute, unambiguously encompasses

Valdez-Sadler’s lies about Boyfriend’s whereabouts to the police 

seeking to apprehend him regarding his underlying conviction. 

Because I also conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a 

jury to infer that Valdez-Sadler acted with the intent to hinder 

Boyfriend’s apprehension, I would affirm the trial court’s denial 

of Valdez-Sadler’s motion for directed verdict.