UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) DANIEL J. SALAK, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) N o. 15-cv-2237 (KBJ) ) E. SCOTT PRUITT, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, ) ) ) ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Daniel Salak—an employee of the Criminal Investigatio ns Division (“CID”) of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “Defen dant”)—has filed the instant action against the EPA under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. 1 Salak alleges that the EPA unlawfully retaliated against him when his supervisors took affirmative steps to reassign himfrom CID’s Baltimore/Ft. Meade office in Ft. Meade, Maryland, to CID’s reg ional office in Seattle, Washington, immediately after S alak engaged in an activity thatTitle VII protects. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 20.) Specifically, Salak alleges that the day aft er he complained that his supervisor’s refusal to app rove his request to use sick lea ve to care for his wife and

1 Salak’s complaint names former EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy as the defendant in this action ( see Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 18), but McC arthy’s successor in office—EP A Administrator Edward Scott Pruitt—has since been automatically substituted as the defendan t pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Furthermore, b ecause Administrator Pruitt is being “sued in h[is] official capacity only” ( id. ), this suit functions as an action against the EPA, see Cty. Bd. of Arlington v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. , 705 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is a way of pleading an action against the agency which the official heads.”), and will be treated as such for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion.2 newborn child was “disparate trea tment” of him as a “birth fath er” ( id. ¶ 40), he was informed that he was being transferred to the Seattle office ( see id. ¶¶ 40–44). This announced cross-country reassignment plan was eventually cancel led ( see Def.’s Statement of Mat. Facts (“Def. ’s Statement”), ECF No. 19-3, ¶ 7 1; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Mat. Facts & Pl.’s Statement of Genuine Issues (“P l.’s Statement”), ECF No. 20-1, at 35 ¶ 71), but Salak cont ends that the threat of re location under the circumstances presented here constituted actionable retaliationnevertheless. 2 Before this Court at present is the EPA’s motion for summary ju dgment. ( See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 19; Def.’s Me m. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”), EC F No. 19-2.) Among other thing s, the agency argues that the evidence fails to demonstrate that “there is [any] cau sal connection between the claimed adverse action and [Sa lak’s] . . . protected activity.” (Def.’s Mem. at 15; see also Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. f or Summ. J. (“Def.’s Reply”), E CF No. 32, at 8 (characterizing Salak’s inabilit y to “establish causation” as t he “[m]ost fatal” defect in his claim).) For the reasons e xplained below, this Court agree s. In short, because the record clearly establishes that the EPA’s decision to transfer Salak was made prior to Salak’s invocation of his right s under Title VII, no reasonable jury could find that the agency decided to reassign Sala k to Seattle, or took steps to i mplement that course of action, because of his protected activity. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden , 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001). Consequently, t he EPA’s motion will be GRANTED , and summary

2Page-number citations to the doc uments that the parties have f iled refer to the page numbers that the Court’s electronic filing system automatically assigns.3 judgment will be entered in favo r of Defendant on all of Salak’ s claims. A separate Order consistent with this Me morandum Opinion will follow.

I. BACKGROUND A. Basic Facts 3 Salak began working for the EPA in 2002; he served as a Special Agent in CID’s resident office in Baltimore/Ft. Meade (which is in Maryland) a t all times relevant to this case. ( See Compl. ¶ 20.) 4“CID is one component o f the Office of Criminal Enforcement Forensics and Trai ning . . . within EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance[,]” and “[i]t is responsible for conductin g investigations into significant violations of environmental crimes including the Cl ean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, and coordinating with other federal agencies, the Department of Justice, and Assistant United States Attorneys in prosecuting c riminal violations.” ( Id. ¶ 22.) The Baltimore/Ft. Meade office is a “satellite office” of a CID region that is headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. ( Id. ¶ 1.) Salak worked at the Baltimore/Ft. Meade office independently, with supervision comi ng from CID personnel at the regional headquarters in Philadelphia. ( See Def.’s Statement ¶¶ 7–10.) 5

3 The following facts concerning Salak’s employment with the EPA , his protected activity, and the agency’s alleged adverse employ ment action are not disputed, un less otherwise noted.
4Salak “was promoted to the position of Resident Agent in Charg e . . . of the Baltimore/Ft. Meade Resident Office” in June of 2012, r oughly two years after the c onclusion of the events that are relevant to this case. (Pl.’s Statement at 37 ¶ 6.)

5 The complaint contains a helpful explanation of the relationsh ip between CID’s “resident” and “regional” offices and the types of supervisors within these of fices: CID is comprised of ten “area” or “regional” offices around the country. Each of these offices is headed by a Special Agent in Charge (“SAC”) who reports to the Deputy Director, and an Assistant Special Agent in Charge ( “ASAC”), who reports to the SAC. Each area office contains a number of smal ler “resident” offices within them, generally hea ded by a Resident Agent in Ch arge (“RAC”). (Compl. ¶ 23.)4 1. Salak’s Supervisors Decide To Tr ansfer Him To An Office Where There Is More Supervision The saga that brings the parties before this Court apparently b egan in conjunction with a dispute between Salak and his second-line supervisor—Special Agent in Charge (“SAC”) David D illon—regarding whether Salak wa s entitled to use accumulated sick leave to care fo r his wife and newborn child a fter the child was born prematurely. In September of 20 09, Salak notified Dillon and h is other immediate supervisor (Assistant Special Agent in Charge (“ASAC”) Christia n Spangenberg) that he intended to use his accumulated sick leave as soon as the ch ild was born, as he believed was his right under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U .S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”). ( See Compl. ¶¶ 26–27.) Wh en the child was born unexpectedly one mon th later, Salak informed Spangenb erg that he would be out of the o ffice on FMLA leave. ( See id. ¶ 28.) When Salak returned to work following the period of le ave, he and Dillon clashed throughout Decemberof 2009 concerning whether t he leave time Salak had taken would be deemed approve d, or whether he would have to use other annual leave to cover the absence retroactively or take leave without pay. ( See id. ¶¶ 29, 31–36.) Dillon retroactively cancelled all but four days of Sa lak’s paid sick leave, and also—over Salak’s objections—rescinded Salak’s temporary detail to the CID resident office in Syracuse, New York. ( See id. ¶¶ 36–37). A series of related meetings a nd communications ensued, some of which were with Salak present, and with thi s FMLA dispute on full display. ( See, e.g. , U.S. Office of Special Counsel Draft Report (“OSC Draft Report”), Ex. 4 to Pl.’s Statement, ECF No. 20-6, at 5 (at a staff mee ting on January 5, 2010, Dillon “ emphasized to [Salak and other] agents the importance of following the chain of command” and Salak “asked5 SAC Dillon what he shoul d do if he had a problem with SAC Dillo n and wanted to file a grievance” under the FMLA); see also Compl. ¶ 38 (Salak “informed” Dillon during the January 5, 2010, staff meeting “that he would be filing a g rievance” under the FMLA “over Mr. Dillon’s continued denial of his sick leave requ ests”).) Other contacts involved various agency superviso rs and focused on Dillon’s cha racterizations of Salak’s general insubordination. ( See OSC Draft Report at 5 (af ter learning on January 5, 2010, that Salak had attempted to arrange a temporary detail for himself in another CID region without Dillon’s kn owledge or approval, Dillon calle d CID Deputy Director Douglas Parker to complain that Salak “[i]s acting as an ‘indep endent operator,’” and to say that they “‘gotta do something’” because Salak’s “behavior need[s] to stop”); see also id. (Dillion emailed Parker, ASAC Sp angenberg, and CID counsel Lau ra Fentonmiller to assert that Salak “thinks he is above everyone else and can do whatever he pleases to get whatever he wants [,]” and had “circumvent[ed] ” the “Chain of Command”).) The record shows th at Dillon’s complaints about Sa lak’s performance stemmed at least in part from Dillon’s conclusion that Salak ha d “fail[ed] to demonstrate the ability to work independently s uch that he shou ld [not] remain in a resident office without day-to-day supervision[,]” and had show n a “pattern of exercising poor judgment as a Sp ecial Agent” which “dictat[ed] [the need for] closer supervision[.]” (Mem. from D illon to Barnes ( Jan. 11, 2010) (“ Final Transfer Mem.”), Ex. F to Def.’s Statemen t, ECF No. 19-10, at 2; see also id. at 3 (identifying specific examples of Salak’s “questionable decisions[,]” including his “ plan[] to do [a] consent search with no operations plan as required by regulations”).)6 Significantly for present purposes, the record evidence demonstrates that Dillon specifically suggested either “ reassigning” Salak or “issuing h im a letter of reprimand” as of January 5, 2010, and that Dillon actually “began putting together paperwork in support of . . . Salak’s reassign ment” on that date. (OSC Draf t Repot at 5.) Additionally, Dillon’s complaints about Salak kicked off a flurry of reassignmentrelated activity that continued throughout the week of January 5th. For example, on January 6th, Spangenberg sent Di llon a draft memorandum “to add ress the issue of . . . Salak being re-assigned to the Philadelphia Area Office.” (Ema il from Spangenberg to Dillon (Jan. 6, 2010) (“Draft Tra nsfer Mem.”), Ex. 5 to Pl.’s S tatement, ECF No. 20-7, at 3.) In this memorandum, wh ich was drafted on Dillon’s behal f, Spangenberg stated that the primary reason for the proposed transfer was to provid e Salak with the “immediate and/or direct supervision” that he lacked in the Bal timore/Ft. Meade office, and Spangenberg “ask[ed] that . . . Salak be re-assigned with[] haste in order to bring command and control to his daily r outine and provide the leader ship he sorely needs.” ( Id. ) Spangenberg also specifically recommended that Salak be reas signed to Philadelphia—the regional headquarters—but stated that he “supp ort[ed] other possible duty location assignment s [beyond the Philadelphia office] base d on the needs of the Division.” ( Id. ) CID management continued revising the draft reassignment memora ndum the following day ( see Emails dated Jan. 7, 2010 (“Jan . 7 Emails”), Ex. 6 to Pl.’s Statement, ECF No. 20-8, at 2–7) , and Dillon wrote that he want ed to inform Salak of the planned transfer the follo wing Monday, January 11, 2010 ( see id. at 6). Deputy Director Parker also sent an e mail to Dillon and Spangenberg, t o “follow up [on] our7 discussions over the past months regarding . . . Salak’s need f or direct supervision in an area office (that needs additiona l staffing),” and to express h is “support [for] such a re-assignment[.]” (Email fromParker to Dillon (Jan. 8, 2010) (“Jan. 8 Parker-Dillon Email”), Ex. 7 to Pl.’s Statement , ECF No. 20-9, at 2.) Parker ’s email further asked Dillon to “finalize and send a mem o to [CID] Dir ector [Becky] B arnes requesting consideration for [the transfer] ” so that they could “work to m ove forward” ( id. ), and Parker also reached out to Barnes directly, saying that he want ed to “talk with [her] . . . re[garding] the possible re-assi gnment of Salak to an area offi ce where he could get appropriate supervision.” (Email from Parker to Barnes (Jan. 8 , 2010) (“Jan. 8 Parker-Barnes Email”), Ex. D t o Def.’s Statement, ECF No. 19-8, at 2). Parker added that he had already discussed the transfer with others, and tha t Dillon wanted to “meet with Salak and advise him [of the reassignment], if approved, b y next Friday[, January 15, 2010].” ( Id. ) The following week—on January 11, 2010—Dillon sent a final, sig ned memorandum to Parker and Barnes in which he recommended that Sa lak “be immediately re-assigned to the Philadelphia Area Office, and th en permanently re-assigned to an Area Office with the need for another agent.” ( See Final Transfer Mem. at 2.) 6Then, on the same day that this final transfer memorandum was

6Salak claims “there is no evid ence that this Memo” was actuall y ever transferred to CID leadership, “or that it was even drafted on January 11.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to D ef.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 20, at 19.) But as the EPA points out, the record in t his case includes “sworn affidavits stating that the memorandum was drafted and sent on January 11, 2010,” as well as “witness testi[mony] stating, under oath, that this memorandum was sent on January 11, 2010[.]” (Def.’s Reply at 11 n.4 (citations omitted); see, e.g. , Dillon Aff. (Feb. 9, 2011), Ex . B to Def.’s Statement, ECF No

. 19-6, at 5 (Dillon stating that h e sent the memorandum to Direc tor Barnes “[o]n January 11, 2010”); Barnes Aff. (Feb. 15, 2011), Ex. C to Def.’s Statement, ECF No . 19-7, at 5 (Barnes stating that she “received the [January 11th] memorandum from SAC Dillon”); EEOC Hr’g Tr. (Aug. 20, 2015), Ex. H to Def.’s Statement, ECF No. 19-12, at 5 (Parker testifying tha t Dillon sent the January 11th memorandum to Barnes).)8 transmitted to CID leadership, S pangenberg contacted Salak to a rrange the aforementioned meeting with Dil lon in Philadelphia on January 1 5, 2010. ( See Emails dated Jan. 11, 2010 (“Jan. 11 Sala k-Dillon Emails”), Ex. J to D ef.’s Statement, ECF No. 19-14, at 3.) Salak followedup by emailing Dillon to request “a list of specific issues” to be discussed at the meeting, a nd when Dillon declined to pro vide the requested information, Salak replied that he would “be requesting the pre sence [of] counsel” if the “meeting is to address any issues that could lead to a discipli nary action[.]” ( Id. at 2.) Salak asked Dillon to inform him if any such issues would be di scussed, “thus warranting legal counsel bein g present[,]” and Dillon respondedthat “[n]o disciplinary action [would be] involved[.]” ( Id. )
2. Salak’s January 14th Memorandumand The January 15th Meeting On the eve of the January 15th m eeting, Salak wrote a memorandu m to Dillon in which he stated, among other thin gs, that his rights under “Tit le VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” were being infringed by Dillon’s “singl[ing] out [ Salak’s] pregnancy-related conditions for special procedures related to [his] work or sick leave.” (Mem. from Salak to Dillon (Jan . 14, 2010) (“Jan. 14 Salak Mem. ”), Ex. K to Def.’s Statement, ECF No. 19-15, at 4.) In the memorandum, Salak also asserted that “if you continue to deny me the leave requested . . . or attempt to tak e any retaliation against me whatsoever for exercising m y rights, I will pursue all of my rights . . . to appeal your decision, including a complaint to the Office of Special C ounsel and a personal civil suit, if necessary.” ( Id. ) When Salak met with D illon and Spangenberg the next morning in Philadelphia, he was told that a “re-assignme nt to the Seattle Area Office” h ad been “recommended” and “approved by Headquarters[,] ” and that, pending Salak’s per manent reassignment to9 Seattle, he was to report to the Philadelphia office three days a week. (Mem. to File (Jan. 15, 2010), Ex. M to Def.’s Statement, ECF No. 19-17, at 2 .) That same morning, Dillon requested that “the Perma nent Change of Station process for . . . Salak for his directed re-assignme nt” to the Seattle office be “initiate[d].” (Email from Dillon (Jan. 15, 2010), Ex. 8 to Pl.’s Stat ement, ECF No. 20-10, at 2.)
B. Related Administrative Proceedings On January 25, 2010, ten days aft er the meeting in Philadelphia , Salak filed a complaint with the U.S. Of fice of Special Counsel. ( See Def.’s Statement ¶ 69.) 7Over the next two months, not only did the EPA “suspend[] the decisi on to reassign” Salak to the Seattle office ( id. ¶ 70), but Salak was also told that he no longer needed to rep ort to Philadelphia three days a week ( see id. ¶ 72). A year later, in Ap ril of 2011, the agency cancelled the planned reassignment entirely. ( See id. ¶ 71; see also Email from Saunders to Wood (Ap r. 29, 2011), E x. 35 to Pl.’s Statement, EC F No. 20-31, at 2.) In the meantime, however, Salak hadfiled a formal complaint of di scrimination and retaliation with either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis sion (“EEOC”) (according to Defendant) ( see Def.’s Statement ¶ 73), orthe EPA’s Office of Civil Rights (according to Salak) ( see Pl.’s Statement at 35–36 ¶ 73). This complaint, which was filed in March of 2010, “alleg[ ed] disparate treatment, har assment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civ il Rights Act of 1964[,]” on g rounds that “the [a]gency subjected [Salak] to disparate treatment based on sex (male), d isability (associated with a disabled individual) and retaliation based on protected EEO a ctivity when” it

7The Office of Special Counsel is an independent prosecutorial agency that investigates claims by federal employees of prohibited personnel practices by governme nt agencies, including the EPA.10 informed Salak that “he was be ing reassigned to Seattle, Washin gton[.]” (EEOC Order (Sept. 21, 2015), Ex. R to Def.’s Statement, ECF No. 19-22, at 5.) On September 21, 2015, an EEOC Ad ministrative Judge (“AJ”) issu ed a decision that rejected Salak’s retaliation claim. ( See generally id. ) 8The AJ found that, although the agency’s decision to initiate the process to reassign Salakto Seattle qualified as an adverse employment action and Salak had previously engaged in aprotected activity ( i.e. , he had complained about alleg ed discrimination in violation o f Title VII), Salak had failed to establis h that “Dillon was aware of [Salak’s] protecte d EEO activity at the time he proposed [Salak’s] reassignment[,]” or that there was “ a causal connection between [Dillon’s] decision to reassign [Salak] and the purport ed EEO activity.” ( Id. at 13 (emphasis added).) In this re gard, the AJ found that Salak’ s “protected activity did not occur until January 14, 2010[,] when he sent Dillon a memor andum asserting protection under Title VII with res pect to his requests for lea ve related to his wife’s

8Salak has filed a contested moti on that requests that this Cou rt strike the AJ’s opinion, and any reference to it, from the record in the instant case, on ground s that it interferes with his right to a trial de novo in federal court. ( See generally Pl.’s Mot. to Strike EEOC Admin. Judge Decision, ECF No. 23; see also Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to S trike, ECF No. 25; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 30.) Salak’s motion to strike will be DENIED , and the AJ’s decision will be deemed admitted for purposes of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, for se veral reasons. First, it is well established that “motions to stri ke, as a general rule, are dis favored.” Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd. , 647 F.2d 200, 201 (D.C. Cir. 198 1). Additionally, the Suprem e Court has found that “[p]rior administrative findings made with respect to an employment discrimination claim may, of c ourse, be admitted as evidence at a federal-sector trial de novo.” Chandler v. Roudebush , 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39 (1976); see also Scott v. Johanns , 409 F.3d 466, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court [in Chandler ] drew no distinction between discrimination claims resolved in favor of the complainant and those resolved against the complainant[; i]n all cases, administrative findings may ‘be admitted as evidence.’”); cf. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co. , 513 F.3d 1261, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n EEOC determination is o rdinarily admissib le.”). Whether or not to admit such findings—including EEOC-related findings in T itle VII cases—is within the “sound discretion of the district court[,]” Barfield v. Orange Cty. , 911 F.2d 644, 650 (11th Cir. 1990), and judges in this district routinely cite to EEOC findings and rel ated proceedings in ruling on motions for summary judgment in Title VII disc rimination and retaliation ca ses, see, e.g. , Walker v. McCarthy , 170 F. Supp. 3d 94, 100 (D.D.C. 2016) (discussing EEOC findings in decision granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on disparate treatment and retaliation cla ims). This Court sees no reason why the AJ’s findings should be deemed inadmissible here.11 pregnancy and child birth[,]” and that “[t]he preponderant evid ence establishes that Mr. Dillon was not aware of [Salak’s ] EEO activity” at the time he proposed Salak’s reassignment, or when he “sent [ the January 11, 2010, final tra nsfer] memorandum to [Director] Barnes with the [form al] reassignment request.” ( Id. ) Moreover, with respect to Salak’s assertion that the transfer was retaliatory because “Dillo n was upset that [Salak] went outside of th e chain of command to independen tly verify Agency policy regarding requests for FMLA leave,” the AJ concluded tha t such alleged retaliation was not actionable un der Title VII because Salak’s “actions in this regard do not constitute protected activity under Title VII[.]” ( Id. )
C. Procedural History Salak initiated the instant Title VII action on December 22, 20 15, three months after the AJ’s decision. ( See generally Compl.) Salak’s complaint alleges that the EPA retaliated against him in violation of Title VII by (1) threate ning to reassign him to Seattle ( see id. ¶¶ 71–78 (Count I)); (2) proceedi ng with the reassignment proc ess, which included executing documents to effectuate his transfer t o Seattle ( see id. ¶¶ 79–88 (Count II)); and (3) failing to cancel the reassignmen t and/or failing to notify him that the reassignment had been cancelled timely ( see id. ¶¶ 89–100 (Count III)). 9 The parties have completed disc overy, and the EPA has now filed a motion for

9In this regard, Salak’s complai nt creatively repackages one al legedly retaliatory act of the EPA—its proposed reassignment of him from the Baltimore/Ft. Meade offic e to the Seattle office—into three separate claims, even though the complaint does not provide any legal or factual basis for doing so. That is, the only retaliatory adverse employment action that is actually alleged in Salak’s complaint is the agency’s decision to transfe r him to Seattle—its execution of the transfer-related documents was merely a means of implementing this decision, and the agency’s failure to cancel or rescind its transfer decision in a timely fashion is, at most, an aggravating factorwith respect to the injury that resulted from the allegedly retaliatory act.12 summary judgment with respect to all of Salak’s claims. ( See generally Def.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mem.) In its summary judgment motion, t he EPA concedes that Salak eng aged in an activity that Title VII protects on January 14, 2010, when he c ommunicated to SAC Dillon that he was invoking hi s rights under Title VII. ( See Def.’s Mem. at 11–12.) But the agency argues that Salak did not suffer an adverse acti on because his reassignment to Seattle was not executed and was ultimately can celled ( see id. at 12–14), and that even if Salak w as subjected to an adverse acti on, the challenged employment decision occurred before he had engaged in any prote cted activity because the reassignment was proposed, deliberated, and approved prior to January 14th ( see id. at 15–18). The EPA further mai ntains that it had legitimate, n ondiscriminatory, and non-pretextual reasons for reassi gning Salak, given his poor jo b performance and the need for more direct supervision. ( See id. at 18–20.) In his brief in opposition to the summary judgment motion, Sala k maintains that the threat to transfer him and hi s family across the country to Seattle was an adverse action under the anti-retaliati on provision of Title VII ( see Pl.’s Opp’n at 39–43), and that regardless of whether the agency had already initiated the process to transfer him to some undetermined office before he engaged in the protected act ivity, the decision to transfer him to Seattle had not already been made, and that location was selected at least in part as retaliation for the protected activity. ( See id. at 34–39.) Salak also contends that he has adduced suf ficient evidence to demonstrate that the agency’s purported reasons for the transfer were a pretext for retaliati on. ( See id. at 43–48.)13 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment beca me ripe for this Co urt’s review on November 3, 2016. ( See Def.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mem.; Pl. ’s Opp’n; Def.’s Reply; Pl.’s Sur-Reply in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Sur-Repl y”), ECF No. 33-1.) Because this Court concludes thatSalak has failed to produce s ufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that th e alleged adverse employment act ions were causedby his protected activity—which is a necessary element of his retaliat ion case, as explained fully below ( see infra Parts III.A–B)—it need not consider whether the threatened (bu t unconsummated) transfer constitut ed an adverse employment actio n under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, or whether Salak has demonstrated t hat the agency’s stated reasons for the transfer were pretextual.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Summary Judgment Federal Rule of Civ il Procedure 56 provides that a court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows t hat there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it might aff ect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict f or a nonmoving party. Steele v. Schafer , 535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008). To make this determination, a court must rev iew all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonm oving party, and n ot only must it draw all justifiable inferences in the non moving party’s favor , it must also accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).14 Importantly, however, the nonmovi ng party has to establish thatmore than a “mere . . . scintilla of evidence” exists in support of its pos ition. Id. at 252; see also Potter v. District of Columbia , 558 F.3d 542, 549 (D. C. Cir. 2009) (“[M]erely colorable or not significantly probative ev idence . . . is insufficient t o defeat a summary judgment motion.” (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted)). Norcan the nonmoving party rely on allegations or conclusory statements; instead, it must present specific evidence that would enable a reasonable jury to find it its favor. Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Blue v. Perciasepe , 970 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The nonmoving party’s oppos ition . . . must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denia ls and must be supported by aff idavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setti ng forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”); cf. Potter , 558 F.3d at 549 (“On summary judgment, the district court is to give credence to uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence supporting the moving party[.]”).
B. Title VII Retaliation And The Plaintiff’s Burden Of Proof Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employm ent practice by [Title VII], o r because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Titl e VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). A plaintiff who seeks to prove that he has been subjected to unlawful retaliati on must show that (1) he engaged in an activity that Title VII protects; (2) his employe r took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) the employer took the action becaus e of the protected activity. See McGrath v. Clinton , 666 F.3d 137 7, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Jones v.
Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D. C. Cir. 2009); see also McGrath , 666 F.3d at 1380 n.315 (explaining these are “the elemen ts that a plaintiff must ultim ately prove in order to win his case”). “It has long been recognized that proving the aforementioned el ements of a Title VII retaliation claim can be quite difficult for an employee wh en, as is often the case, [he] lacks direct evidence of retaliation (or discrimination).” Rochon v. Lynch , 139 F. Supp. 3d 394, 402 (D. D.C. 2015) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 1 21 (1985)), aff’d , 664 F. App’x 8 (D .C. Cir. 2016). Of course, relying on circumstantial evidence is anoth er permissible method of establ ishing one’s case, and the Supreme Court has adopted g uidelines to aid judicial analys is of the strength of a Title VII case that is based on su ch evidence. Un der the famil iar burden-shifting framework that arose from the se minal Supreme Court case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plainti ff alleging retaliation and rel ying on circumstantial evidence first points to evidence of a prima facie case— i.e. , “(1) that he engaged in statutorily protecte d activity; (2) that he suffereda materially adverse action by his employer; and (3) that a ca usal link connects the two.” Jones , 557 F.3d at 677. And if a plaintiff identifies such evidence, the burden of production—but not persuasion—shifts to the defendant to provide “a legitimate, no ndiscriminatory [or non-retaliatory] reason” for its actions. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal quota tion marks and citation omitted) . Then, if the defendant does provide such a reason for the challenged employment action , “the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—disappear[s],” lea ving only the ultimate question of “discrimination vel non [.]” Id. at 142–43 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And on thatquestion, the plaintiff bears the burden of16 showing that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s proffered reasons are pretextual and that the real impetus for the adverse action was discriminatory or retaliatory animus. See Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Morgan v. Fed. Ho me Loan Mortg. Corp. , 328 F.3d 64 7, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Thus, “if the defendant has proffered a non-discriminatory reas on for its challenged decision[,]” then “whe ther the plaintiff really made out a prima facie case is no longer relevant because the di strict court has before it all the evidence it needs to decide whether the defendant intentionally discriminated agains t the plaintiff[,]”
Rochon , 139 F. Supp. 3d a t 403–04 (internal quota tion marks and citat ion omitted), and ultimately, it is the plaintiff’s burden to make that showing, see Brady , 520 F.3d at 494. In other words, summary judgment in the defendant’s favor may s till be warranted “even when a plaintiff sets forth sufficient evidence to rejectthe defendant’s explanation,” if, based on all of the evidence presented, “it i s nevertheless impossible for a rational factfinder to conclude the action was discrimina tory [or retaliatory].”
Rochon , 139 F. Supp. 3d a t 404 (internal quotati on marks and citation omitted); see also e.g., von Muhlenbrock v. Billington , 579 F. Supp. 2d39, 43–45 (D. D.C. 2008) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to a Title VII retaliation claim because the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection b etween protected activity and adverse action).

III. ANALYSIS A Title VII retaliation claim “must be proved according to trad itional principles of but-for causation,” which “req uires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not17 have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar , 133 S. Ct. 251 7, 2533 (2013); see also Ng v.
Lahood , 952 F. Supp. 2d 8 5, 91 n.4 (D.D.C. 2013) (“In order to succee d on a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that retaliation w as the but-for cause of the adverse employment action at issu e.”). This means that the emp loyee’s protected activity must be the impetus for the employer’s adverse and all egedly retaliatory employment action, and the ac tion cannot have already been “co ntemplat[ed]” by the employer “before it learned” of the protected activity. Breeden , 532 U.S. at 272. Consequently, while causation ca n sometimes be inferred from a close temporal relationship between the protected activity and the allegedly a dverse action in retaliation cases, the sequence truly matters—and indeed, the Supreme Court has clarified that “[e]mployers need not suspend previously planned [adverse employment actions] upon discovering that” the employee has engaged in a p rotected activity. Id. In such circumstances, even if the employment action had “not y et [been] definitively determined,” there “is no evidence whatever of causality” if th e employer continues to “proceed[] along lines previously contemplated[.]” Id. Here, the unrebutted evidence de monstrates that the EPA had alr eady decided to transfer Salak out of CID’s Balti more/Ft. Meade office before h e invoked his rights under Title VII, and as explainedbelow, the evidence that the parties have proffered leaves no doubt that the agency’s decision to transfer Salak to Seattle, as opposed to some other duty station, was a mere continuation of this previo usly contemplated course of action. Therefore, this C ourt concludes that no reasonable jury could find that the EPA’s decision to reassign Sala k to Seattle constituted unlawfu l retaliation in violation18 of Title VII— i.e. , that the transfer decision was made because of Salak’s protected activity—and on that basis alone, the agency is entitled to sum mary judgment.
A. Salak Cannot Show Causation Beca use The Record E stablishes That The Reassignment Process Was Initi ated Before He Engaged In Any Title VII Protected Activity Both parties agree that Salak first engaged in activity that Ti tle VII protects on January 14, 2010—when he sent a memorandum to SAC Dillon that s uggested he was the victim of pregnancy discri mination and invoked his rights u nder Title VII. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 40; Def.’s Mem. a t 11–12; Pl.’s Opp’n at 6, 19–20; Def.’s Reply at 5, 8;
see also Jan. 14 Salak Mem. at 4 (allegi ng that the denial of his sick leave request violated the requirement of T itle VII that “an e mployer may notsingle out pregnancy-related conditions for special procedures related to an employee’s work or sick leave”).) Nothing that o ccurred before Salak transmitted that memorandum (including his earlier threat to file a grievance under the FML A over Dillon’s persistent denial of his sick l eave requests) constitu tes protected activi ty under Title VII, nor is the prior FMLA battle relevant to the question of whether Salak ’s Title VII allegation was a but-for cause of the threatened transfer. See Sotomayor v. City of New York , 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 262 (E. D.N.Y. 2012) (“While [plaintiff] allege s that she was retaliated against for taking FMLA leave, t his is not a ‘protected activit y’ under Title VII[.]”); Male v. Tops Markets, LLC , No. 08-cv-6234, 20 10 WL 4319769 , at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2010) (rejecting Title VII re taliation claim because plaint iff’s complaints regarding,
inter alia , FMLA violations were not pro tected activity under Title VII); Saellam v. Norfolk S. Corp. , No. 06-0123, 2 008 WL 5286836, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2008) (“Plaintiff’s taking o f FMLA leave [and/or] his complaints abou t alleged FMLA harassment . . . are not protected activity within the meaning of Title VII.”). Salak has19 brought the instant case only under Title VII, and he does notassert a violation of the FMLA in the context of this action. 10Therefore, the relevant benchmark for the retaliation claim that i s the subject of this lawsuit is Salak’ s invocation of his rights under Title VII on Jan uary 14, 2010. Salak vigorously maintains that “there can be no dispute that [ his] January 14, 2010 email was a determinative factor, and hence a ‘but-for’ ca use, of [the agency’s] decision to select . . . a [tran sfer] location that it knew wou ld be financially and practically unfeasible”— i.e. , Seattle. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 34–35.) But Salak cannot deny that, even prior to his January 14th missive, his supervisors h ad already decided to reassign him from the Baltimore/F t. Meade location to another C ID office, and had taken steps to initiate the transfer process. Specifically, the undisputed evidence shows that, at least as e arly as January 5, 2010—which was more than a week before Salak penned the January 14th memorandum—Dillon wrote to CID counsel and se nior leadership to suggest “reassigning” Salak. (OSC Draf t Report at 5.) Dillon and othe rs within CID, including senior leadership, then spent sev eral days discussing and revis ing a formal proposal for Salak’s reassignment ( see Draft Transfer Mem. at 2–3; Jan. 7 Emails at 2–7; Jan. 8 Parker-Dillon Email at 2; Jan. 8 Parker-Barnes Email at 2), andon January 11th Dillon transmitted a signed memorandum to Deputy Director Parker and D irector Barnes that proposed Salak “be immediately re-assigned to the Philadelphia Area Office, and then permanently re-assigned to an Area Office with the need for ano ther agent” (Final

10In their papers, the parties note that Salak brought (and even tually settled) a separate administrative FMLA claim against the EPA before the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). ( See Compl. ¶¶ 14–15; Def.’s Mem. at 12 n.3; Def.’s Reply at 9–10.) That s ettlement was sealed at the agency’s request, and is not on the record before this Court. ( See Compl. ¶ 15 & n.1; Pl.’s Opp’n at 8 n.2.)20 Transfer Mem. at 2). And this f ormal memorandum was not the on ly affirmative step that Salak’s supervisors took to effectuate his planned reassig nment: they also communicated to Salak that he was required to attend a January 15th meeting in Philadelphia, the purpose of wh ich was (unbeknownst to Salak) t o inform him of the pending transfer. ( See Jan. 11 Salak-Dillon Emails at 2–3.) Indeed, it was not until the evening before the meeting at wh ich the transfer was to be disc losed to Salak that he first invoked his rights under Title VII ( see Jan. 14 Salak Mem. at2–4), and by that time, his transfer was not onl y being contemplated, it was well underway. The fact that the official trans fer announcement may not have b een finalized prior to Dillon’s receipt of Sa lak’s Title VII m emorandum on Ja nuary 14th is of no moment. It is clear beyond cav il that “[e]mployers need not su spend previously planned transfers upon discoverin g” that the employee has made Title VII accusations.
Breeden , 532 U.S. at 272; see also Cruz v. Kelly , 241 F. Supp. 3d 107, 113 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Breeden , 532 U.S. at 272) (rejecting Title VII retaliation claim arisi ng from the plaintiff’s reassignme nt to another position, because “those actions had already been put into motion wit h the decision to remove [the p laintiff] from her position in the first place”), appeal docketed , No. 17-5113 (D.C. C ir. May 22, 2017). Moreover, the reason for this principle is obvious: without su ch a rule, the judicial system risks “ever-increasing frequency” of baseless “claims of retaliation” from employees who hurriedly invoke Title VII and allege discriminat ory treatment ahead of a suspected adverse employment action just to provide a legal b asis for subsequent retaliation claims against their employers. See Nassar , 133 S. Ct. at2531–33. Indeed, with the following hypothetical , the Supreme Court has undersco red this very concern:21 Consider in this regard the case of an employee who knows that he or she is about to be fired for poor performance, given a lower pa y grade, or even just transferred to a different assignment or location. To forestall that lawful action, he or she might be tempted to mak e an unfounded charge of racial, sexu al, or religious discrimination ; then, when the unrelated employment action comes, the employee could allege that it is retaliation. If respondent were to prevail i n his argument here, that claim could be established by a lessened causation s tandard, all in order to prevent the undesired change in employment circumstances. Id. at 2532. The record before this Court strongly suggests that this same cautionary tale is playing out here. It is clear that Salak suspected that he wou ld be disciplined at the January 15, 2010, meeti ng with SAC Dillon in Philadelphia; inde ed, he specifically voiced these suspicions. ( See Jan. 11 Salak-Dillon Emails at 2 (“If this meeting is to address any issues that could lead to a disciplinary action, I will be requesting the presence o[f] counsel. Please le t me know by [close of busines s] today if there will be any issues discussed that could lead to a disciplinary action[. ]”).) And Salak invoked his rights under Title VII on the eve of the very meeting at wh ich he believed that his fate would be determined. ( See generally Jan. 14 Salak Mem.) Thus, far from giving rise to actual retaliation, “the timing of [Salak’s protected] activity appears to indicate that it was a strike against agency officials after learning th at” he would potentially be subject to disciplinary action, in a manner that was designed t o provide him with a basis for claiming retaliation later. Robinson v. Duncan , 775 F. Supp. 2d 14 3, 156 (D.D.C. 2011); see also id. (noting the employer “had already arranged to meet with plaint iff” to “discuss her performance and to inform her that a sixty-day per formance plan was being implemented” on the “very [same day]” that the plaintiff inform ed the employer of her EEO complaint). ( Cf. Jan. 14 Salak Mem. at 4 (warning Dillon that, “if you . . . at tempt22 to take any retaliation against me whatsoever for exercising myrights, I will pursue all of my rights as a federal employee to appeal your decision; inc luding a complaint to the Office of Special Counsel and a personal civil suit, if necessa ry”).) In sum, there is no genuine dispute regarding the fact that CID management had already decided to transfer Salak , and had taken concrete steps to effectuate that transfer, before Salak engaged in any activity that Title VII p rotects. Thus, the evidence does not support Salak’s claim that it was his protect ed activity that caused the allegedly retaliatory transfer. See Cruz , 241 F. Supp. 3 d at 113.
B. The Record Demonstrates That T he EPA’s Decision To Reassign Salak To Seattle Was A Conti nuation Of The Previously Contemplated Course Of Action Salak’s attempt to establish the requisite causal link by asserting that the EPA’s decision to transfer him to Seattle was still pending when he invoked his rights under Title VII, and that thatdecision was made in retaliation for his protected activity ( see Pl.’s Opp’n at 35 (arguing that “reassignment to Seattle was no t considered, much less initiated, until January 15, 2010”); id. at 37 (maintaining that, if not for his asserting his rights under Title VII, the agenc y would have transferred him “ to Philadelphia, . . . which would have been perfectly workable for [Salak] and his fa mily”)), fails for at least two reasons. First of all, the record evidence strongly suggests that the EP A had, in fact, already selected Seattle as the lo cus for Salak’s reassignment by the time he engaged in the protected activity. The tim ing of the announ cement support s this conclusion; it is hard to fathom that a placement in Seattle could have been conc eived of and arranged between Salak’s submission of t he memorandum on the evening of January 14th and the January 15th meeting the following morning at which the transfe r plan was disclosed.23 What is more, Deputy Director Parker repeatedly testified underoath (during a related EEOC proceeding in August of 2015) that he had personally infor med SAC Dillon of the decision to transfer Salak to Seattle “[e]arly in the week of January 11th.” (EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 9; see also id. at 44–45 (testifying that he t old Dillon that Salak would be transferred to Seattle “[e]arlie r in the week of January 11th”) .) Parker also testified that Dillon would have lacked authority to inform Salak of the trans fer to Seattle during the January 15th meeting unless a specific transfer to that office had already been approved by senior CID and EPA leadership. ( See id. at 8–9.) And, when ask ed if “there [was] any doubt in your mind” that Sala k’s “transfer to Seattle was adone deal” before the January 15th meeting in Philadelp hia, Parker answered that “[i] t had been decided prior to that[; i]t was done before th at[;]” and “[t]he decision had been made.” ( Id. at 45–46.) Parker’s EEOC testimony is consistent with an affidavit that Di rector Barnes has offered, in which she states that, “[a]fter receiving the [fina l transfer] memorandum from SAC Dillon, I consulted wit h . . . Parker, to see what CID office needed or could support another [Special Agent] and I determined that the Seatt le, Washington office would be the best location for Mr . Salak and CID.” (Barnes Aff. at 5.) Parker’s testimony is further corroborate d by ASAC Spangenberg’s deposit ion testimony in a related MSPB proceeding, where he too testified that the decisi on to transfer Salak to Seattle was made before Salak s ubmitted the January 14th memora ndum; specifically, when asked about the draft trans fer memorandum that Spangenberg sent to Dillon on January 6, 2010, Span genberg testified that he had discussed Sa lak’s transfer to Seattle with Dillon around the time that h e wrote the memorandum, and “ had information [to24 the] effect” that the permanent reassignment would be to Seattl e, including an understanding “[t]hat SAC Dillon, a long with Laura Fentonmillerand Deputy Director Parker, had knowledge of . . . [Salak’s] reassignment to Seattl e.” (Spangenberg MSPB Dep. (July 9, 2013), Ex. A to Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement o f Genuine Issues, ECF No. 32-2, at 35–38.) 11
Salak does little to cast doubt on t hese sworn accounts from kn owledgeable supervisors regarding the details of the agency’s reassignment decision. For example, while it may be true that Parker stated during a previous depos ition that he “could not recall precisely when he informed Mr. Spangenberg that Mr. Sala k’s reassignment was going to be to Seattle” (Pl.’s Opp ’n at 36 (citing Parker EEOC Dep. (Apr. 25, 2014), Ex. to Pl.’s Statement, ECF No. 20-49, at 27)), Parker’s inabil ity to “recall precisely” the exact date of his transmittal of the information to Spangenberg does not contradict his repeated and unequivocal ass ertion that the agency’s decisi on to transfer Salak to Seattle was made before January 14th. Nor does the fact that D illon and Parker “discussed ways to ‘get rid of’” Salak on the morning of Januar y 15th (Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 2 (citation omitted)) impact t he credibility of Parker’s sta tement that the agency had already decided to transfer Salak to Seattle well before the me eting at which it informed

11 Salak challenges the content of Spangenberg’s testimony in a s ur-reply brief that he has sought leave of Court to file. ( See Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Su r-Reply (“Pl.’s Mot. for Leave” ), ECF No. 33; Pl.’s Sur-Reply.) The EPA opposes Sal ak’s motion for leave, and the motion is ripe for this Court’s review. ( See Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for L eave to File Sur-Reply, ECF No . 34; Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Sur-Reply, ECF No. 35.) Although sur-replies are “generally disfavored,” Banner Health v. Sebelius , 905 F. Supp. 2d 174, 187 (D.D.C. 2012), this Court finds that the EPA cited to Spangenberg’s deposition testimony for the first time in its re ply brief, and that allowing the sur-reply will not unduly prejudice Defendant. See id. (“In exercising its discretion, the court should consider whether the movant’s reply in fact raises arguments or issues f or the first time, whether the nonmovant’s proposed surreply would be helpful to the resolutio n of the pending motion, and whether the movant would be unduly prej udiced were leave to be granted. ”). Therefore, Salak’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply is GRANTED , and the Court has considered t he arguments raised in the sur-reply in this Memorandum Opinion.25 him of that choice. Salak’s co ntention that absent the protect ed activity he would have been reassigned to Philadel phia, instead of Seattle ( see id. at 2–3 (citing Spangenberg EEOC Dep. (Mar. 27, 2014), Ex. to Pl.’s Statement, ECF No. 20-5 1, at 13); id. at 4 (citing Draft Transfer Mem.)), fu rther mischaracterizes the cle ar record evidence, which demonstrates that the agency’s discussion of a transfer to Phil adelphia was in the context of a temporary reassignment; nothing contradicts the testimony and documentary evidence demonstrating that the agency always inten ded for Salak’s
permanentreassignment to be to Seattle ( see Spangenberg EEOC Dep. at 13; Final Transfer Mem. at 2; see also Jan. 8 Parker-Dillon Email a t 2 (supporting Salak’s reassignment to “an area office (that needs additional staffing )”)). Notably, Salak’s causation-related contentions would be unavail ing even if the EPA had not definitively determined that he would be sent to Se attle by the eve of the scheduled meeting to announce the transfer, because Salak has f ailed to show that a selection of the Seattle office on the day after his January 14 th memorandum is at all inconsistent with the agency’s previously contemplated transferplan. See Breeden , 532 U.S. at 272 (holding that, where protected activity intervenes, there is “no evidence whatever of causality” if the a dverse action is “along [the] li nes previously contemplated”); Cruz , 241 F. Supp. 3d a t 113 (explaining that the plaintiff must demonstrate that his “protected activity [somehow] alter[ed] th e course of events” that had already been set in motion). Put another way, the plan tha t Salak’s supervisors had crafted clearly involved his “imme diate[]” reassignment to Phil adelphia on a temporary basis, followed by his “permane nt[] re-assign[ment] to an Area Office with the need for another agent” (Final Transfer Mem. at 2), and Salak has not sh own that a proposed26 final transfer to the Seattle office divergedfrom this plan; say, for example, by pointing to evidence showing that the agency had previously decided notto send him to Seattle, but somehow changed its mind after he engaged in protected acti vity. Properly viewed, then, Salak’s contention that “sending him al most 3000 miles away” ( i.e. , to Seattle) was “not even remotely ‘along’ the same ‘lines’” as the plan to send him to Philadelphia ( see Pl.’s Opp’n at 38) is a red-he rring argument that merely pertains to the adverse nature of the proposed employment actio n, and does not speak to its consistency with the agency’s predetermined reassignment pl an. As such, it is entirely beside the point. Even accepting arguendo that a cross-country reassignment is more adverse than a transfer to nearby Philadelphia, Salak’s causation burden is to establish that the EPA selected Seattle over Philadelphia (or anywhere else, for that matter) because of his protected activity— i.e. , that the agency changed course with respect to what it had previously determined it would do in a m anner that gives rise to a reasonable inference of retaliation. See Nassar , 133 S. Ct. a t 2531–33; Breeden , 532 U.S. at 272; Cruz , 241 F. Supp. 3d at 113; see also Brown v. Diversified Distribution Sys., LLC , 801 F.3d 901, 908 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting plaintiff’s failure to “produce[] [any] evidence to rebut” defend ant’s affidavit and deposition t estimony that the plaintiff’s transfer was “discu ss[ed] . . . before she requeste d FMLA leave” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted )). But, here, the record is abundantly clear that the EPA had planned to transfer Salak to another office, and in fact had already taken concrete steps to effectuate that transfer, before Salak submit ted the January 14th Title VII memorandum, and t here is no evidence to indicate that its a nnouncement of his27 transfer to Seattle on January 15th was anything other than a m ere continuation of that plan. Although Salak struggles valiant ly to argue otherwise, the bott om line is this: courts in this district and elsewhere have routinely rejected a ny “inference of causation” when “the adverse action being challenged is the result of a no ndiscriminatory process that began before the protected conduct.” Bush v. Engleman , 266 F. Sup p. 2d 97, 103 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting summar y judgment on Title VII retaliati on claim because “the uncontradicted record indicates that the decision to implement the transfer resulted from an independent review process that began months before plaintiff’s EEO activity” (emphasis in original)); see also, e.g. , Weston-Brown v. Ba nk of Am. Corp. , 167 F. App’x 76, 82 (11th Cir. 2006) (findi ng no causal link to establ ish Title VII retaliation because “[t]he record evidence es tablishe[d] that” the plaintif f’s immediate supervisor “informed his supervisors . . . well before the” plaintiff enga ged in protected activity “that he felt that it would ‘be prudent to remove [the plaintif f] from’” a particular account); Mianulli v. Potter , 634 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d in part , No. 09-5284, 2010 WL 6 04867 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2010) (finding no c ausal link between protected activity and alleged Title VII retaliation the very n ext day, because “an adverse employment action taken after protected activity is notcaused by the protected activity if the employment action was contemplated prior to the protected activity”); Carter v. Greenspan , 304 F. Supp. 2d 13, 30 (D.D.C. 2004) (rejecting Title VII retaliation claim due to “a lack of evidence of causation” wher e “[t]he sworn declarations submitted by [the] defendant consistently aver[red ] that . . . management had decided to fire [the plainti ff]” before he engaged in prote cted activity, which28 demonstrated that “[the plaintiff’s] supervisors’ dissatisfacti on with his performance and their intentions to terminate him predated his protected ac tivity” and rendered “his retaliatory discharge claim . . . illogical”). And given these well-settled precedents, this Court easily concludes that Salakhas failed to demonstrate tha t his protected activity was a “but-for caus[e]” of the decision to transfer him to Seat tle, Nassar , 133 S. Ct. at 2533, or that the agency’s select ion of Seattle, even if “not y et definitively determined,” was not “along lines previously contemplated[.]” Breeden , 532 U.S. at 272; cf. Samii v. Billington, 195 F.3d 1, 3 ( D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Since the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving retaliation remains with the plaintiff , summary judgment is appropriate when the employee is unable to satisfy this burden. ”).

IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, this Court finds “that there i s [no] evidence (either of a direct or indirect na ture) from which a reasonable jury could find the required causal link between” Salak’s protected activity and th e threatened transfer to Seattle. Jones v. Quintana , 975 F. Supp. 2d 63, 78 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff’d , 621 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir . 2015). Accordingly, and on that basis alone, Defendant’s motion for summa ry judgment wi ll be GRANTED and judgment will be entered in favo r of Defendant on all of Salak’ s claims, as set forth in the accompanying Order.

DATE: September 30, 2017 

## Ketanji Brown Jackson KETANJI BROWN JACKSON United States District Judge