alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
S90A0019.

#### McLEROY v. THE STATE.

(387 SE2d 888)

Decided February 7, 1990.

*Allison V. Cobham, A. Nevell Owens,*for appellant.

*Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Leonora Grant,*for appellee.

Hunt, Justice.

Clark Gable McLeroy was tried and convicted in Fulton County for the murder of Michael Williams and sentenced to life imprisonment.1 He appeals, questioning only the sufficiency of the evidence against him.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, was as follows. The defendant and victim were involved in buying and selling drugs and were overheard arguing just prior to the murder. The defendant killed the victim by severely beating him with a wooden board, hitting him on the back and, when the victim fell, continuing to hit him on the head until the board broke. Although the defendant claimed self-defense, several eyewitnesses testified the victim had not provoked the attack. When the defendant was apprehended after fleeing the crime scene, he told police he was strung out on drugs.

Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. *Jackson v. Virginia,*443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); *Crawford v. State,*245 Ga. 89, 90 (263 SE2d 131) (1980).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

 The killing occurred on June 5, 1988. The defendant was indicted by a grand jury on July 26, 1988, and tried before a jury on March 7th through 9th, 1989. The transcript was certified on June 14, 1989. The defendant’s motion for a new trial was timely filed and overruled on July 3, 1989. His notice of appeal was filed on August 30, 1989, docketed in this court on October 25, 1989, and submitted for decision on November 20, 1989.
#### § 302-11.23 When must I request to have my initial time period extended?

To have your initial time period extended, you must submit a request to your agency not later than 30 calendar days after the expiration date unless this 30-day period is specifically extended by your agency.
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<PAGE>   1
                                                                       EXHIBIT 9

                                  July 6, 2000



Jacobson Partners
595 Madison Avenue, Suite 100
New York, New York  10022

RE:      CHILDTIME LEARNING CENTERS, INC. (THE "COMPANY")

Gentlemen:

In connection with the execution and delivery of the letter agreement dated
today between Jacobson Partners ("JP") and the Company regarding your provision
of management and financial consulting services, we have agreed as follows:
1) JP will have the right, subject to compliance with all applicable securities
laws, rules and regulations, to acquire, from time to time, shares of the
Company's common stock ("Shares") owned by KD Partners II or Childcare
Associates (each, a "KD Entity") equal to the (a) number of Shares then owned by
such KD Entity, multiplied by (b) the percentage interest of such KD Entity
owned by the investor or investors then wishing to have such KD Entity sell
Shares on its or their behalf.
2) As a condition to the purchase of any Shares by JP from a KD Entity, JP will,
simultaneously with such purchase, execute and deliver an irrevocable proxy, in
form and substance satisfactory to George A. Kellner, appointing George A.
Kellner, in his capacity as managing partner of Childcare Associates or managing
partner of the investment general partner of KD Partners II, as applicable, as
its proxy to vote such Shares in all instances as Mr. Kellner may deem
appropriate, in his sole discretion.
3) The aggregate purchase price of the Shares acquired by JP from a KD Entity
and pursuant to open market purchases or other private transactions (but
excluding those shares acquired pursuant to the exercise of options granted by
the Company) will not exceed $2,500,000.
4) The agreements set forth herein will expire on the second anniversary of the
date of this letter agreement.

If the foregoing is acceptable, please sign below in the place indicated.
                                  Very truly yours,

                                  CHILDCARE ASSOCIATES



                                  By: /s/ George A. Kellner
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      George A. Kellner, Managing Partner


                                  KD PARTNERS II



                                  By:  KD Special Situation Partners,
                                        Its:  Investment and General Partner


                                  By: /s/ George A. Kellner
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      George A. Kellner, Managing
                                            Partner

Agreed to and Accepted by:

JACOBSON PARTNERS

By: /s/  Benjamin R. Jacobson
    ----------------------------------------
         Benjamin R. Jacobson, Managing
         General Partner
#### § 101-30.401 Data available from the Federal Catalog System.

Federal Catalog System data are available in publications of general interest to Government supply activities and in the form of automated output tailored to meet individual agency needs.

[42 FR 36255, July 14, 1977]
No. 10-10910.

#### Williams *v.*Romanowski, Warden.

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
§ 302-4.701 What PCS travel expenses must we pay? Except as specifically provided in this chapter, PCS travel expenses you must pay are: ( a ) Per diem;
( b ) Transportation costs; and
( c ) Other travel expenses in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 5701-5709 and chapter 301 of this title.
No. 11-9363.

#### Ok *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-rari denied.
#### § 302-11.405 Which agency must review and approve the employee's application when the employee transfers between agencies?

The hiring agency in the locality of the employee's old official station must review and approve the employee's application when the employee transfers between agencies, unless the hiring agency does not have an appropriate installation there. In that case, the losing agency at the old official station must review and approve the expenses.
§ 109-38.5103 Motor vehicle utilization standards. ( a ) The following average utilization standards are established for DOE as objectives for those motor vehicles operated generally for those purposes for which acquired: ( 1 ) Sedans and station wagons, general purpose use—12,000 miles per year.
( 2 ) Light trucks (4 x 2's) and general purpose vehicles, one ton and under (less than 12,500 GVWR)—10,000 miles per year.
( 3 ) Medium trucks and general purpose vehicles, 11 ⁄ 2 ton through 21 ⁄ 2 ton (12,500 to 23,999 GVWR)—7,500 miles per year.
( 4 ) Heavy trucks and general purpose vehicles, three ton and over (24,000 GVWR and over)—7,500 miles per year.
( 5 ) Truck tractors—10,000 miles per year.
( 6 ) All-wheel-drive vehicles—7,500 miles per year.
( 7 ) Other motor vehicles—No utilization standards are established for other trucks, ambulances, buses, law enforcement motor vehicles, and special purpose vehicles. The use of these motor vehicles shall be reviewed at least annually by the motor equipment fleet manager and action shall be taken and documented to verify that the motor vehicles are required to meet programmatic, health, safety, or security requirements.
( b ) When operating circumstances prevent the above motor vehicle utilization standards from being met, local use objectives must be established and met as prescribed in § 109-38.5105 of this subpart.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN MANUEL COLINDRESCOMELLI,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-73571

Agency No. A072-295-405

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 13, 2010** 

Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Juan Manuel Colindres-Comelli, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions

pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing

his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying deferral of removal under

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by

FILED

SEP 23 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-73571

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey,

518 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the

petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of deferral of removal on

the ground that Colindres-Comelli did not establish it is more likely than not he

would be tortured if returned to Guatemala by or at the instigation of, or with the

consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in official

capacity. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a); see also Arteaga v. Mukasey,

511 F.3d 940, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2007).

We decline to consider Colindres-Comelli’s contentions concerning the

BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider because the court previously rejected

them in Colindres-Comelli v. Holder, No. 09-72963 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2010). See

Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1991) (under the “law of the case

doctrine,” one panel of an appellate court will not reconsider questions which

another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case).

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review Colindres-Comelli’s contention that

he qualifies for humanitarian asylum because he failed to exhaust this claim before

the agency. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 124 (Tuesday, June 27, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39601-39602]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-16213]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

United States Patent and Trademark Office


Reopening of the Time Period for Acceptance of Comments on Issues 
Related to Policies and Agenda for the National Intellectual Property 
Law Enforcement Coordination Council

AGENCY: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Co-Chair, National 
Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council.

ACTION: Reopening of time period for acceptance of comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On Monday, June 5, 2000, the members of the National 
Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (the 
Council) published a Notice seeking public comment on issues associated 
with the Council's mission (65 F.R. 35611 (2000)). Interested members 
of the public were invited to present written comments on the topics 
outlined in the

[[Page 39602]]

Supplementary Information section of the Notice by June 20, 2000. This 
notice reopens the time period for submission of comments. Comments 
will be accepted through July 7, 2000.

DATES: All comments are due by July 7, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Persons wishing to offer written comments should address 
those comments to Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property 
and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Box 4, 
Washington, DC 20231, marked to the attention of Elizabeth Shaw. 
Comments may also be submitted by facsimile transmission to (703) 305-
7575, or by electronic mail through the Internet to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fc999095869d9e998894d28f949d8bcebc898f8c8893d29b938a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="20454c495a41424554480e534841571260555350544f0e474f56">[email protected]</span></a>. All comments will be maintained for public 
inspection in Room 902, Crystal Park II, 2121 Crystal Drive, Arlington, 
Virginia.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Shaw by telephone at (703) 
305-1033, by fax at (703) 305-7575, or by mail marked to her attention 
and addressed to Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property 
and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Box 4, 
Washington, DC 20231.

    Dated: June 22, 2000.
Albin F. Drost,
Acting Solicitor.
[FR Doc. 00-16213 Filed 6-26-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-16-U


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
June 15, 2015 

Mr. Rodolfo Lomeli Quevedo 

185 Bricknell Lane 

Coppell, TX 75019 

Dear Mr. Quevedo: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your May 13, 2015, exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-

1640), but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does 

not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request 

any further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division 

Enclosure
46952.

#### AARON v. IRVIN.

(381 SE2d 35)

Clarke, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from a grant of a permanent injunction by the Superior Court of Toombs County. Appellant is the owner and operator of the Racket Town Wildlife Club. The purpose of the club is the processing of meat and game for its members. There was testimony *354that while the members may use the facility to process their own meat, employees are available to process meat for them for a fee. Appellant contends that the club is not subject to licensing and inspection because the meat is processed for consumption by members and not for sale.

Decided July 13, 1989.

*Hudson & Galloway, William T. Hudson,*for appellant.

*Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, J. Michael Davis, Assis*
      *355
      *tant Attorney General,*for appellee.

*354Commissioner of Agriculture Thomas T. Irvin sought to enjoin the operation of the club’s meat-processing operation without a license as required by OCGA § 26-2-209. Appellant contends that under an exception to OCGA § 26-2-205 it is not required to have a license. OCGA § 26-2-205 exempts meat slaughtered for home consumption from the inspection requirements otherwise required by that section. Appellant’s insistence upon this exception is the basis for the appeal. However, as the court explained in its order permanently enjoining the operation, being excused from the meat inspection requirements of § 26-2-205 does not relieve one from the licensing requirements of § 26-2-209. We agree. The clear language of the OCGA § 26-2-209 requires that any meat processing plant be licensed by the Commissioner of Agriculture. OCGA § 26-2-205 excepts meat slaughtered and processed for home consumption from the requirement that all meat be inspected by the Commissioner. However, this exception does not apply to the requirement that all processing plants be licensed pursuant to OCGA § 26-2-209.

Appellant argues that the requirement of licensing of the Racket Town Wildlife Club’s game dressing facility would mean that every hunter’s kitchen would be subject to the licensing requirement. However, the definition of “meat, poultry, or dairy processing plant” in OCGA § 26-2-200 (3) does not include the hunter’s kitchen, which is not an “establishment for the killing, storage, dressing, manufacture, preparation, or processing of any animal, fowl, or dairy product or any by-product thereof for human consumption.” The Racket Town Wildlife Club, on the other hand, is such an establishment. Further, the purpose of the licensing requirement of OCGA § 26-2-209 is “[t]o assure the protection of the consuming public. ...” This protection should extend to the members of the club, their families, friends, and anyone else who may consume the meat processed by even a private meat processing facility.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Hunt, J., not participating.*
#### § 101-29.204 Interim Federal specification.

An *interim Federal specification* is a potential Federal specification issued in temporary form for optional use by all Federal agencies. Interim amendments to Federal Specifications and amendments to interim Federal specifications are included in this definition. These documents are issued or controlled by the General Services Administration and are listed in the GSA “Index of Federal Specifications, Standards and Commercial Item Descriptions.”
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1998
<CASH>                                         701,472<F1>
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 17,555,261
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                       5,166,736
<DEPRECIATION>                               8,638,763
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              19,369,285
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                      9,573,861
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        17,500
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,773,628
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                19,369,285
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,546,781
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,503,080
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             8,271,808
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             407,420
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                364,473
<INCOME-TAX>                                   167,845
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            196,628
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   196,628
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Company adopted unclassified balance sheet in 1989.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
,.

+/6..A-20 I ()- Ir7<Z

Contacts. With whom outside tOOFAA has this proposal been dif.cus:sed?

Organization Person Conta:;led o.te Response

Nal/omll Business .'\ir"rafl Assoei1t:fion EliOml 11119110

Rer.ioDlil Airlint' AMociation Dne l.oltrrl'r 1tI19/IO

Connie

Arnold

,~irt'raCiOWlll'lT & Pitols Auociation Robert H.dman 11119/10

ATA Jot White 11119110
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-23753-MOORE/LOUIS

EDWIN GARRISON, et al., on behalf of 

themselves and all other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAM BANKMAN-FRIED, et al.,

Defendants.

/

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Roberto Martínez of the law firm Colson Hicks Eidson, 

P.A. appears as counsel for Defendants Thomas Brady and Gisele Bündchen, and requests that all 

papers served in this case also be delivered to and served at the address set forth below. 

Dated: January 25, 2023. 

Respectfully submitted,

COLSON HICKS EIDSON, P.A.

255 Alhambra Circle, Penthouse

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Telephone: (305) 476-7400

Facsimile: (305) 476-7444

By: Roberto Martínez

Roberto Martínez

Florida Bar No. 305596

Email: bob@colson.com

 Attorney for Defendants Thomas Brady

 and Gisele Bündchen 

Case 1:22-cv-23983-KMM Document 10 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/25/2023 Page 1 of 1
§ 301-53.2 What may I do with promotional benefits or materials I receive from a travel service provider? Any promotional benefits or materials received from a travel service provider in connection with official travel may be retained for personal use, if such items are obtained under the same conditions as those offered to the general public and at no additional cost to the Government. Note to § 301-53.2 :
Promotional benefits or materials you receive from a travel service provider in connection with your planning and/or scheduling an official conference or other group travel (as opposed to performing official travel yourself) are considered property of the Government, and you may only accept the benefits or materials on behalf of the Federal Government (*see* § 301-74.1(d) of this chapter).
[FTR Amdt. 104, 67 FR 17947, Apr. 12, 2002, as amended by FTR Amdt. 2003-04, 68 FR 27936, May 22, 2003]
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

Appellate case name: Joel D. Mallory v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as successor by 

merger to Chase Home Finance, L.L.C., and Codilis & Stawiarski, 

P.C.

Appellate case number: 01-12-00707-CV

Trial court case number: 2010-64487

Trial court: 151st District Court of Harris County

Date motion filed: June 18, 2013

Party filing motion: Appellant

It is ordered that “Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order of Dismissal” is 

denied.

Justice’s signature: /s/ Rebeca Huddle

 Acting for the Court

Panel consists of: Justices Jennings, Brown, and Huddle

Date: July 11, 2013
EXHIBIT 1

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