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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

 CASE NO. 22-mj-8549-BER 

IN RE: SEARCH WARRANT HIGHLY SENSITIVE DOCUMENT 

___________________________________/ 

 

SEALING ORDER 

 The United States of America, having applied to this Court for an Order sealing the Motion 

to Seal, the Search Warrant and all its accompanying documents, and this order and the Court 

finding good cause: 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Seal, the Search Warrant and its 

accompanying documents, and this Order shall be filed under seal until further order of this Court. 

However, the United States Attorney’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation may obtain 

copies of any sealed document for purposes of executing the search warrant. 

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at West Palm Beach, Florida, this _____day of 

November 2022. 

 _________________________________________ 

 HON. BRUCE E. REINHART 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

TM Nov 28, 2022 West Palm Beach

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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 

AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT 

 I, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

1. I make this affidavit in support of an application under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules 

of Criminal Procedure for a warrant to search the residence located at 

 (“TARGET RESIDENCE”), as described in Attachment A, and 

the following cellular phones: (1) an Apple iPhone 12 Pro Max, , 

associated with phone number (“TARGET PHONE 1”); and (2) an Apple iPhone 

13 Pro Max, , associated with phone number (“TARGET 

PHONE 2”) (collectively, the “TARGET PHONES”) found therein, for the items described in 

Attachment B. 

2. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 

 During this 

time, I have received training at the FBI Academy located at Quantico, Virginia, specific to 

counterintelligence and espionage investigations. 

 Based on my experience and training, I am familiar 

with efforts used to unlawfully collect, retain, and disseminate sensitive government information, 

including classified National Defense Information (“NDI”), and with efforts to obstruct justice. 

3. The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and 

experience, and information obtained from other agents and witnesses. This affidavit is intended 

to show that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested warrant and does not set forth all 

of my knowledge about this matter. 

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4. Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this affidavit, there 

is probable cause to believe that the TARGET RESIDENCE and the TARGET PHONES, as 

described in Attachment A, contain evidence of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (willful retention 

of national defense information); 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (concealment or removal of government 

records); 18 U.S.C § 1519 (obstruction of federal investigation), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (material false 

statement); or 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (perjury), as further described in Attachment B. 

PROBABLE CAUSE 

Background on Investigation

5. The FBI is investigating potential violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e), 2071, 1519, 

1001, and 1623 related to the improper removal and storage of classified national defense 

information in unauthorized spaces, as well as the unlawful concealment or removal of government 

records and obstruction of its investigation. 

6. This investigation began as a result of a referral that the United States National 

Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”) sent to the United States Department of Justice 

(“DOJ”) on or about February 9, 2022 (hereinafter, the “NARA Referral”). The NARA Referral 

stated that on January 18, 2022, in accordance with the Presidential Records Act (“PRA”), NARA 

received from the office of former President Donald J. Trump (hereinafter “FPOTUS”), via 

representatives, fifteen (15) boxes of records (hereinafter, the “FIFTEEN BOXES”). The 

FIFTEEN BOXES, which had been transported from a property owned by FPOTUS at 1100 S. 

Ocean Blvd., Palm Beach, Florida, a residence and club known as “Mar-a-Lago,” were reported 

in the NARA Referral to contain, among other things, highly classified documents intermingled 

with other records. 

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7. After an initial review of the NARA Referral, the FBI opened a criminal 

investigation to, among other things, identify any person(s) who may have removed or retained 

classified information without authorization and/or in an unauthorized space. The FBI’s 

investigation established that documents bearing classification markings, which appear to contain 

NDI, were among the materials contained in the FIFTEEN BOXES and were stored at Mar-a-Lago 

in an unauthorized location. 

8. As further described below, on May 11, 2022, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 

served a grand jury subpoena on counsel for the Office of the Former President (the “Office”) 

seeking “any and all documents . . . bearing classification markings” in FPOTUS’s and/or the 

Office’s possession. On June 3, 2022, FPOTUS’s counsel provided DOJ with a package of 37 

documents bearing classification markings at the Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret levels. 

Counsel for FPOTUS provided DOJ with a written certification, signed by another person who 

was acting as the custodian of records on behalf of the Office for purposes of the subpoena, 

indicating that “a diligent search was conducted,” that the “search was conducted after receipt of 

the subpoena, in order to locate any and all documents that are responsive to the subpoena” seeking 

all documents with classification markings in the custody or control of FPOTUS and/or the Office, 

and that “any and all responsive documents” were being provided. Counsel for FPOTUS indicated 

that all responsive documents had been located in one storage room located on the ground floor at 

Mar-a-Lago (hereinafter, “the storage room.”). 

9. After developing additional evidence that the June 3 production did not contain all 

of the documents with classification markings located at Mar-a-Lago, on August 8, 2022, the FBI 

executed a search and seizure warrant issued by a Magistrate Judge of the U.S. District Court for 

the Southern District of Florida. During the search, the FBI recovered from the storage room as 

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well as FPOTUS’s office at Mar-a-Lago over 100 documents bearing classification markings, 

which had not been produced on June 3. The documents appeared to contain NDI. The search also 

yielded apparent government and/or Presidential records subject to the Presidential Records Act, 

44 U.S.C. § 2201. 

Background on NAUTA 

10. NAUTA began his career in the U.S. Navy 

 NAUTA transitioned to work as a valet, 

or personal aide, for FPOTUS during FPOTUS’s Presidential Administration (hereinafter 

“Administration”). 

 In or around the summer of 2021, 

NAUTA retired from the military and went to work as a civilian for FPOTUS as his “body man” 

or assistant. According to publicly available information filed with the Federal Election 

Commission, the Save America PAC, a political action committee created by FPOTUS, paid 

NAUTA $149,167 between August 26, 2021, and August 30, 2022, which included $6,375 in 

“advance consulting” fees. 

11. NAUTA was involved in at least two key movements of FPOTUS’s boxes at Mara-Lago: (1) in the weeks leading up to the provision of the FIFTEEN BOXES to NARA in January 

2022, NAUTA and two other FPOTUS employees brought, at FPOTUS’s request, the FIFTEEN 

BOXES from their location in a storage room at Mar-a-Lago to FPOTUS’s residential entryway at 

Mar-a-Lago for FPOTUS’s review; and (2) in the week before FPOTUS’s representatives claimed 

on June 3 that they had conducted a diligent search for classified documents, NAUTA moved 

approximately 64 boxes out of the storage room at Mar-a-Lago and returned only about 25-30 

prior to the review of the storage room for records responsive to the May 11 subpoena. 

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12.

 

13.

 

14.

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15.

16.

 The door to the storage room was painted gold and had no other markings on 

it. 

17. In addition to the approximately eighty-five to ninety-five FPOTUS BOXES 

located in the storage room, there were also other boxes in the storage room with merchandise 

such as challenge coins, garment bags, memorabilia from Mar-a-Lago such as photograph frames, 

and other décor items. 

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Provision of the Fifteen Boxes to NARA

18. Over the course of 2021, NARA endeavored to obtain what appeared to be missing 

records subject to the Presidential Records Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. § 2201. On or about May 6, 2021, 

NARA made a request for the missing PRA records and continued to make requests until 

approximately late December 2021, when NARA was informed twelve boxes were found and 

ready for retrieval at Mar-a-Lago. 

19.

 

20. took a photograph of the storage room and provided it to FPOTUS 

sometime between January 1-17, 2022, to show FPOTUS the number of boxes that were in the 

storage room. The storage photo, which appears below 

 captures approximately sixty-one of the FPOTUS BOXES located in the storage 

room: 

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21.

22.

 

23.

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24.

25.

26.

27. From May 16-18, 2022, FBI agents conducted a preliminary review of the 

FIFTEEN BOXES provided to NARA and identified over 100 documents with classification 

markings in fourteen of the FIFTEEN BOXES. Several of the documents also contained what 

appears to be FPOTUS’s handwritten notes. 

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28. On May 11, 2022, an attorney representing FPOTUS, “FPOTUS COUNSEL 1,” 

agreed to accept service of a grand jury subpoena requesting “[a]ny and all documents or writings 

in the custody or control of Donald J. Trump and/or the Office of Donald J. Trump bearing 

classification markings.” The return date of the subpoena was May 24, 2022. 

29. After an extension was granted for compliance with the subpoena, on the evening 

of June 2, 2022, FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 contacted DOJ COUNSEL and requested that FBI agents 

meet him the following day to pick up responsive documents. On June 3, 2022, three FBI agents 

and DOJ COUNSEL arrived at Mar-a-Lago to accept receipt of the materials. In addition to 

FPOTUS COUNSEL 1, another individual, hereinafter “INDIVIDUAL 2,” was also present as the 

custodian of records for FPOTUS’s post-presidential office. The production included a single 

Redweld envelope, wrapped in tape, containing documents. FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 relayed that 

the documents in the Redweld envelope were found during a review of the boxes located in the 

storage room. INDIVIDUAL 2 provided a Certification Letter, signed by INDIVIDUAL 2, which 

stated the following: 

Based upon the information that has been provided to me, I am authorized to certify, on 

behalf of the Office of Donald J. Trump, the following: a. A diligent search was 

conducted of the boxes that were moved from the White House to Florida; b. This search 

was conducted after receipt of the subpoena, in order to locate any and all documents that 

are responsive to the subpoena; c. Any and all responsive documents accompany this 

certification; and d. No copy, written notation, or reproduction of any kind was retained 

as to any responsive document. 

30. During receipt of the production, FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 stated he was advised all 

the records that came from the White House were stored in the storage room at Mar-a-Lago and 

the boxes of records in the storage room were “the remaining repository” of records from the White 

Grand Jury Subpoena, Related Correspondence, and Production of Additional Classified 

Documents

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House. FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 further stated he was not advised there were any records in any 

private office space or other location in Mar-a-Lago. The agents and DOJ COUNSEL were 

permitted to see the storage room (although they were not permitted to look inside the boxes) and 

observed that approximately fifty to fifty-five boxes remained in the storage room. Considering 

that only FIFTEEN BOXES had been provided to NARA of the approximately eighty-five to 

ninety-five FPOTUS BOXES that had been located in the storage room, it appeared that 

approximately fifteen to thirty of the FPOTUS BOXES had previously been relocated elsewhere. 

The FBI agents also observed that the composition of boxes differed such that fewer Bankers boxes 

were visible, while more plain cardboard boxes and storage bins were present. Other items were 

also present in the storage room, including a coat rack with suit jackets, as well as interior décor 

items such as wall art and frames. 

31.

32. A review of the documents contained in the Redweld envelope produced pursuant 

to the grand jury subpoena revealed 37 unique documents bearing classification markings, some 

of which bore classification markings at the highest levels. Based on my training and experience, 

I know that documents classified at these levels typically contain NDI. Multiple documents also 

contained what appears to be FPOTUS’s handwritten notes. 

33. When producing the documents, neither FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 nor INDIVIDUAL 

2 asserted that FPOTUS had declassified the documents.1

 The documents being in a Redweld 

1

 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) does not use the term “classified information,” but rather criminalizes the unlawful retention of 

“information relating to the national defense.” The statute does not define “information related to the national 

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envelope wrapped in tape appears to be consistent with an effort to handle the documents as if they 

were still classified.2

Surveillance Camera Footage Shows NAUTA removing boxes from the Storage Room Area 

Prior to FPOTUS Counsel 1’s Review in Connection with the Subpoena

34. On July 6, 2022, in response to a grand jury subpoena for surveillance video from 

internal cameras located on the ground floor (basement)

representatives of the Trump Organization provided a hard drive to FBI agents. Upon review of 

the hard drive, the FBI determined that the drive contained video footage from four cameras in the 

basement hallway of Mar-a-Lago in which the door to the storage room is located. The footage on 

the drive begins on April 23, 2022, and ends on June 24, 2022. The recording feature of the cameras 

appears to be motion activated, so that footage is only captured when motion is detected within 

each camera’s field of view. 

35. One camera in particular, identified on the hard drive as “South Tunnel Liquor,” 

provides a view of entry and exit into a room (hereafter anteroom) that leads to the storage room. 

The doorway to the anteroom itself is not visible in the camera view, as a refrigerator is directly 

defense,” but courts have construed it broadly. See Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941) (holding that the 

phrase “information relating to the national defense” as used in the Espionage Act is a “generic concept of broad 

connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness”). 

In addition, the information must be “closely held” by the U.S. government. See United States v. Squillacote, 221 

F.3d 542, 579 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[I]nformation made public by the government as well as information never protected 

by the government is not national defense information.”); United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071-72 (4th 

Cir. 1988). Certain courts have also held that the disclosure of the documents must be potentially damaging to the 

United States. See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071-72. 2

 On May 25, 2022, while negotiating for an extension of the subpoena, FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 sent two letters to 

DOJ COUNSEL. In the second such letter, available at 22-mj-8332-BER (D.E. 125), FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 asked 

DOJ to consider a few “principles,” which include FPOTUS COUNSEL 1’s claim that a President has absolute 

authority to declassify documents. In this letter, FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 requested, among other things, that “DOJ 

provide this letter to any judicial officer who is asked to rule on any motion pertaining to this investigation, or on 

any application made in connection with any investigative request concerning this investigation.” 

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between the camera and doorway, but the footage from this camera nonetheless establishes entry 

and exit to the anteroom because it is apparent when persons within the camera’s field of view turn 

directly behind the refrigerator and then disappear from view. The anteroom, in addition to its 

entrance from the South Tunnel, has approximately four doors leading off it, one of which is the 

gold-painted door that leads to the storage room. The anteroom provides the only entrance to the 

storage room; however, other offices can also be entered from the anteroom, so it might be possible 

for persons to enter the storage room from those other offices without being visible in the 

surveillance camera footage. 

36. By reviewing the camera footage provided by the Trump Organization in response 

to the subpoena, the FBI has determined the following: 

On May 24, 2022, NAUTA is observed exiting the anteroom doorway with three boxes. 

On May 30, 2022, four days after NAUTA’s interview with the FBI during which the 

location of boxes was a significant subject of questioning, NAUTA is observed exiting 

the anteroom doorway with approximately fifty Bankers boxes, consistent with the 

description of the FPOTUS BOXES. FBI did not observe this quantity of boxes being 

returned to the storage room through the anteroom entrance in its review of the footage. 

On June 1, 2022, NAUTA is observed carrying eleven brown cardboard boxes out the 

anteroom entrance. One box did not have a lid on it and appeared to contain papers. 

The day after that, on June 2, 2022, NAUTA is observed moving twenty-five to thirty 

boxes, some of which were brown cardboard boxes and others of which were Bankers 

boxes consistent with the description of the FPOTUS BOXES, into the entrance of the 

ANTEROOM. Approximately three and a half hours later, NAUTA is observed escorting 

FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 in through the entrance of the anteroom, and FPOTUS 

COUNSEL 1 is not observed leaving until approximately two and a half hours later. 

On June 3, 2022, FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 is escorted through the anteroom entrance by an 

unidentified individual wearing a jacket with “USSS POLICE” printed on the back. The 

unidentified individual and FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 exit the ANTEROOM entrance 

moments later. FPOTUS COUNSEL 1 appeared to be carrying a Redweld envelope after 

exiting the anteroom. 

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37. According to FBI’s review of video footage, and as detailed in the paragraph above, 

NAUTA can be observed removing approximately 64 boxes from the storage room area between 

May 24 and June 1, 2022, but only returning 25-30 boxes to the storage room area on June 2, 2022. 

Notably, and as described above in paragraph 28, these boxes were removed following service of 

a grand jury subpoena but before FPOTUS COUNSEL 1’s review of boxes in the storage room 

area to locate documents responsive to the subpoena. 

38.

 

NAUTA concealed information during his FBI interview 

39. On May 26, 2022, the FBI interviewed NAUTA and explained that the FBI was 

conducting an investigation as to whether classified documents were stored at Mar-a-Lago and that 

the FBI was particularly interested in where the boxes with classified documents were located and 

whether they had been moved outside the storage room. 

40. . During the 

interview, NAUTA claimed that the first time NAUTA saw the boxes was when NAUTA moved 

them from Pine Hall, the anteroom to FPOTUS’s personal residential suite, to the moving truck to 

provide the boxes to NARA. 

 Further, in NAUTA’s interview with the FBI on May 

26, he had stated that he did not know where the boxes had come from prior to being located in 

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Pine Hall. 

41.

42.

 

Execution of Search Warrant at Mar-a-Lago and Movement of Boxes After June 3 

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43. On August 8, 2022, the FBI executed a search warrant at Mar-a-Lago authorized 

by the Honorable Bruce E. Reinhart, U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Florida. See

22-mj-83332-BER. The search yielded over 100 unique documents bearing classification 

markings, with some indicating the highest levels of classification and extremely limited 

distribution, found in both the storage room and FPOTUS’s office at Mar-a-Lago. Based on my 

training and experience, I know that documents classified at these levels typically contain NDI. 

44.

 

45.

 

46.

 

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The TARGET PHONES 

47. TARGET PHONE 1, associated with phone number , is 

cellular phone and TARGET PHONE 2, associated with phone number , is 

 cellular phone. Verizon records confirm that the phone number associated with 

TARGET PHONE 1 has been effective . Verizon records also show that 

TARGET PHONE 1 is an iPhone 12 Pro Max. The subscriber of TARGET PHONE 1 is listed as 

Apple records list , the phone number associated with TARGET PHONE 2, as the 

telephone number associated with Apple iCloud account, with as 

the email address associated with that iCloud account. Apple records also show that TARGET 

PHONE 2, an iPhone 13 Pro Max, is the device associated with iCloud account 

. 

48.

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49. 

 Therefore, it is likely that relevant emails that sent or received from 

 email account are on TARGET PHONE 1. 

In my training and 

experience, a person using an iPhone often accesses and saves email on their phone. Therefore, it 

likely that relevant emails would also be located within TARGET PHONE 2. 

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50. On September 30, 2022, open-source research revealed that the phone number 

associated with TARGET PHONE 2 was registered with WhatsApp, an encrypted communication 

application. Open-source research also confirmed that the phone number associated with TARGET 

PHONE 1 was registered with both WhatsApp and Signal, another encrypted communication 

application. Accordingly, there may be stored communications through WhatsApp or Signal on the 

TARGET PHONES that pertain to this investigation. 

51. Based upon this investigation, I believe that there may be stored communications 

within the TARGET PHONES that contain evidence detailing the removal of FPOTUS boxes, 

which likely contained classified information and NDI, from the White House to Mar-a-Lago and 

from the storage room at Mar-a-Lago. Furthermore, I believe there may be stored communications 

in the TARGET PHONES detailing efforts to mislead law enforcement. Finally, the data from the 

TARGET PHONES would also provide location information that 

could indicate when and where moved boxes, such as if moved the boxes to a storage facility 

or other location outside of Mar-a-Lago. Apple has location services that could be used to 

determine where a user traveled with the user’s phone. 

TARGET RESIDENCE 

52. Public records indicate that has resided at the TARGET RESIDENCE 

. Recent FBI surveillance has confirmed tha currently 

resides at the TARGET RESIDENCE: 

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. 

53. Based on my training and experience, individuals typically keep their personal cell 

phones and work cell phones that they regularly use on their persons, at their personal residence, 

or in their vehicles when they are driving. 

ELECTRONIC STORAGE AND FORENSIC ANALYSIS 

54. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, I know that cellular telephones 

can store information for long periods of time. Similarly, things that have been viewed via the 

Internet are typically stored for some period of time on the TARGET PHONES. This information 

can sometimes be recovered with forensics tools. 

55. There is probable cause to believe that things that were once stored on the 

TARGET PHONES may still be stored there, for at least the following reasons: 

a. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, I know that computer 

files or remnants of such files can be recovered months or even years after they have been 

downloaded onto a storage medium, deleted, or viewed via the Internet. Electronic files 

downloaded to a storage medium can be stored for years at little or no cost. Even when files have 

been deleted, they can be recovered months or years later using forensic tools. This is so because 

when a person "deletes" a file on a device, the data contained in the file does not actually disappear; 

rather, that data remains on the storage medium until it is overwritten by new data. 

b. Therefore, deleted files, or remnants of deleted files, may reside in free 

space or slack space-that is, in space on the storage medium that is not currently being used by an 

active file-for long periods of time before they are overwritten. In addition, a device/computer's 

operating system may also keep a record of deleted data in a "swap" or "recovery" file. 

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c. Wholly apart from user-generated files, computer storage media-in 

particular device/computers' internal hard drives-contain electronic evidence of how a 

device/computer has been used, what it has been used for, and who has used it. To give a few 

examples, this forensic evidence can take the form of operating system configurations, artifacts 

from operating system or application operation, file system data structures, and virtual memory 

"swap" or paging files. Computer users typically do not erase or delete this evidence, because 

special software is typically required for that task. However, it is technically possible to delete this 

information. 

d. Similarly, files that have been viewed via the Internet are sometimes 

automatically downloaded into a temporary Internet directory or “cache.” 

56. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, I know that cellular telephones 

can store forensic evidence. As further described in Attachment B, this application seeks 

permission to locate not only electronically stored information that might serve as direct evidence 

of the crimes described on the warrant, but also forensic evidence that establishes how the Device 

was used, the purpose of its use, who used it, and when. There is probable cause to believe that 

this forensic electronic evidence might be on the TARGET PHONES because: 

a. Data on the storage medium can provide evidence of a file that was once on the 

storage medium but has since been deleted or edited, or of a deleted portion of a file (such as a 

paragraph that has been deleted from a word processing file. Virtual memory paging systems can 

leave traces of information on the storage medium that show what tasks and processes were 

recently active. Web browsers, e-mail programs, and chat programs store configuration 

information on the storage medium that can reveal information such as online nicknames and 

passwords. Operating systems can record additional information, such as the attachment of 

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peripherals, the attachment of USB flash storage devices or other external storage media, and the 

times the computer was in use. Computer file systems can record information about the dates files 

were created and the sequence in which they were created. 

b. Forensic evidence on a device can also indicate who has used or controlled the 

device. This “user attribution” evidence is analogous to the search for “indicia of occupancy” while 

executing a search warrant at a residence. 

c. A person with appropriate familiarity with how an electronic device works may, 

after examining this forensic evidence in its proper context, be able to draw conclusions about how 

electronic devices were used, the purpose of their use, who used them, and when. 

d. The process of identifying the exact electronically stored information on a storage 

medium that are necessary to draw an accurate conclusion is a dynamic process. Electronic 

evidence is not always data that can be merely reviewed by a review team and passed along to 

investigators. Whether data stored on a computer is evidence may depend on other information 

stored on the computer and the application of knowledge about how a computer behaves. 

Therefore, contextual information necessary to understand other evidence also falls within the 

scope of the warrant. 

e. Further, in finding evidence of how a device was used, the purpose of its use, who 

used it, and when, sometimes it is necessary to establish that a particular thing is not present on a 

storage medium. 

f. I know that when an individual uses an electronic device to illegally solicit another 

to commit a crime of violence, the individual's electronic device will generally serve both as an 

instrumentality for committing the crime, and also as a storage medium for evidence of the crime. 

The electronic device is an instrumentality of the crime because it is used as a means of committing 

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the criminal offense. The electronic device is also likely to be a storage medium for evidence of 

crime. From my training and experience, I believe that an electronic device used to commit a crime 

of this type may contain: data that is evidence of how the electronic device was used; data that was 

sent or received; and other records that indicate the nature of the offense. 

57. Nature of examination. Based on the foregoing, and consistent with Rule 

41(e)(2)(B), the warrant I am applying for would permit the examination of the TARGET 

PHONES consistent with the warrant. The examination may require authorities to employ 

techniques, including but not limited to computer-assisted scans of the entire medium, that might 

expose many parts of the device to human inspection in order to determine whether it is evidence 

described by the warrant. In order to access the phone, it may be necessary to use 

fingerprint or facial recognition, to unlock the phone. Accordingly, we request the authority to 

compel to provide the necessary means to access the TARGET PHONES. 

58. Based on my training and experience and on information I have learned from other 

agents, evidence of who was using a cellphone and from where, and evidence related to criminal 

activity of the kind described above, may be found in the files and records described above. This 

evidence may establish the “who, what, why, when, where, and how” of the criminal conduct under 

investigation, thus enabling the United States to establish and prove each element or, alternatively, 

to exclude the innocent from further suspicion. For example, such evidence could help determine 

whether was the only person using the TARGET PHONES. In addition, information 

about the dates on which used the TARGET PHONES could be relevant to proving 

various elements of the crimes under investigation, as described above. 

59. The stored communications and files contained in the TARGET PHONES may 

provide direct evidence of the offenses under investigation. For example, text messages, instant 

Case 9:22-mj-08549-BER Document 13-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2023 Page 27 of 40
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messages, emails, and voicemails could be direct or indirect evidence of who communicated with 

 before or after the June production and whether anyone 

communicated with . Photos, videos, and other 

documents could show evidence of 

 

60. In addition, the user’s account activity, logs, stored electronic communications, and 

other data on the TARGET PHONES, can indicate who has used or controlled the phone. This 

“user attribution” evidence is analogous to the search for “indicia of occupancy” while executing 

a search warrant at a residence. For example, subscriber information, email and messaging logs, 

documents, and photos and videos (and the data associated with the foregoing, such as geolocation, date and time) may be evidence of who used or controlled the account at a relevant time. 

As an example, because every device has unique hardware and software identifiers, and because 

every device that connects to the Internet must use an IP address, IP address and device identifier 

information can help to identify which computers or other devices were used to access the account. 

Such information also allows investigators to understand the geographic and chronological context 

of access, use, and events relating to the crimes under investigation. 

61. Other information connected in the TARGET PHONES may lead to the discovery 

of additional evidence. For example, the identification of apps downloaded from App Store and 

iTunes Store may reveal evidence of the crimes under investigation or services used to 

communicate with others. Though your affiant knows that uses WhatsApp to 

communicate, the full range of apps that may use to communicate with persons relevant 

to this investigation remains unknown. Searching the TARGET PHONES will help determine 

whether downloaded other apps that could be used for communication. 

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62. Therefore, the TARGET PHONES are likely to contain communications and 

information. In my training and experience, such information may constitute evidence of the 

crimes under investigation including information that can be used to identify the account’s user or 

users. 

63. Unlocking the TARGET PHONES with biometric features. The warrant I am 

applying for would permit law enforcement to obtain from physical biometric features 

(such as fingerprint, thumbprint, or facial characteristics) to unlock the TARGET PHONES. I seek 

this authority based on the following: 

a. I know from my training and experience, as well as from information found 

in publicly available materials published by device manufacturers, that many electronic devices, 

particularly newer mobile devices and laptops, offer their users the ability to unlock the device 

through biometric features in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. These 

biometric features include fingerprint scanners, facial recognition features, and iris recognition 

features. Some devices offer a combination of these biometric features, and the user of such 

devices can select which features they would like to utilize. 

b. If a device is equipped with a fingerprint scanner, a user may enable the 

ability to unlock the device through his or her fingerprints. For example, Apple offers a feature 

called “Touch ID,” which allows a user to register up to five fingerprints that can unlock a device. 

Once a fingerprint is registered, a user can unlock the device by pressing the relevant finger to the 

device’s Touch ID sensor, which is found in the round button (often referred to as the “home” 

button) located at the bottom center of the front of the device. The fingerprint sensors found on 

devices produced by other manufacturers have different names but operate similarly to Touch ID. 

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c. If a device is equipped with a facial recognition feature, a user may enable 

the ability to unlock the device through his or her face. For example, this feature is available on 

certain Apple devices and is called “Face ID.” During the Face ID registration process, the user 

holds the device in front of his or her face. The device’s front-facing camera then analyzes and 

records data based on the user’s facial characteristics. The device can then be unlocked if the frontfacing camera detects a face with characteristics that match those of the registered face. Facial 

recognition features found on devices produced by other manufacturers have different names but 

operate similarly to Face ID. 

d. In my training and experience, users of electronic devices often enable the 

aforementioned biometric features because they are considered to be a more convenient way to 

unlock a device than by entering a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. Moreover, in 

some instances, biometric features are considered to be a more secure way to protect a device’s 

contents. This is particularly true when the users of a device are engaged in criminal activities and 

thus have a heightened concern about securing the contents of a device. 

e. The passcode or password that would unlock the device(s) subject to search 

under this warrant is not known to law enforcement. Thus, law enforcement personnel may not 

otherwise be able to access the data contained within the device(s), making the use of biometric 

features necessary to the execution of the search authorized by this warrant. 

f. I also know from my training and experience, as well as from information 

found in publicly available materials including those published by device manufacturers, that 

biometric features will not unlock a device in some circumstances even if such features are 

enabled. This can occur when a device has been restarted, inactive, or has not been unlocked for a 

certain period of time. For example, Apple devices cannot be unlocked using Touch ID when (1) 

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more than 48 hours has elapsed since the device was last unlocked or (2) when the device has not 

been unlocked using a fingerprint for 4 hours and the passcode or password has not been entered 

in the last 6 days. Biometric features from other brands carry similar restrictions. Thus, in the event 

law enforcement personnel encounter a locked device equipped with biometric features, the 

opportunity to unlock the device through a biometric feature may exist for only a short time. 

g. In my training and experience, the person who is in possession of a device 

or has the device among his or her belongings at the time the device is found is likely a user of the 

device. However, in my training and experience, that person may not be the only user of the device 

whose physical characteristics are among those that will unlock the device via biometric features, 

and it is also possible that the person in whose possession the device is found is not actually a user 

of that device at all. Furthermore, in my training and experience, I know that in some cases it may 

not be possible to know with certainty who is the user of a given device, such as if the device is 

found in a common area of a premises without any identifying information on the exterior of the 

device. Thus, it will likely be necessary for law enforcement to have the ability to require any 

individual, who is found at the Subject Premises and reasonably believed by law enforcement to 

be a user of the device, to unlock the device using biometric features in the same manner as 

discussed above. 

h. Due to the foregoing, if law enforcement personnel encounter a device that 

is subject to seizure pursuant to this warrant and may be unlocked using one of the aforementioned 

biometric features, the warrant I am applying for would permit law enforcement personnel to (1) 

press or swipe the fingers (including thumbs) of any individual, who is found at the subject 

premises and reasonably believed by law enforcement to be a user of the device(s), to the 

fingerprint scanner of the device(s) found at the premises; and/or (2) hold the device(s) found at 

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28 

the premises in front of the face to those same individuals and activate the facial recognition 

feature, for the purpose of attempting to unlock the device(s) in order to search the contents as 

authorized by this warrant. 

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29 

REQUEST FOR SEALING 

64. The United States request that the Court order that all papers in support of this 

application, including the affidavit and search warrant, be sealed until further order of the Court. 

These documents discuss aspects of an ongoing criminal investigation that are neither public nor 

known to the targets of the investigation. Accordingly, there is good cause to seal these documents 

because their premature disclosure may give targets an opportunity to flee, destroy or tamper with 

evidence, change patterns of behavior, notify confederates, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the 

investigation.

FILTER PROCEDURES 

65. has been represented by attorneys in this matter since at least in or around 

 A Filter Team will review seized communications and segregate potentially protected 

materials, i.e., communications that are to/from an attorney, or that otherwise reference or reflect 

attorney advice. The Filter Team will have no future involvement in the investigation of this 

matter. At no time will the Filter Team advise the Prosecution Team of the substance of any of the 

potentially protected materials. The Filter Team then will provide all communications that are not 

potentially protected materials to the Prosecution Team and the Prosecution Team may resume its 

review. If at any time the government identifies seized materials that are potentially attorney-client 

privileged or subject to the work product doctrine (“protected materials”), the Prosecution Team 

will discontinue review until a Filter Team of government attorneys and agents can review the 

potentially privileged documents. If the Filter Team concludes that any of the potentially protected 

materials are not protected (e.g., the communication includes a third party or the crime-fraud 

exception applies), the Filter Team must obtain either agreement from defense counsel for the 

privilege holder or a court order before providing these potentially protected materials to the 

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Case 9:22-mj-08549-BER Document 13-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2023 Page 34 of 40
ATTACHMENT A 

Property to Be Searched 

 The premises to be searched is 

 (“TARGET RESIDENCE”), as well as (1) an Apple iPhone 12 Pro Max, 

 associated with phone number (“TARGET PHONE 1”); and 

(2) an Apple iPhone 13 Pro Max, , associated with phone number 

 (“TARGET PHONE 2”)(collectively, “TARGET PHONES”), found therein. The 

premises is an apartment The front of the apartment 

building is pictured below: 

 

Case 9:22-mj-08549-BER Document 13-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2023 Page 35 of 40
1 

ATTACHMENT B 

Particular Things to be Seized 

The items to be seized by the government are (1) an Apple iPhone 12 Pro Max, 

, associated with phone number (“TARGET PHONE 1”); and 

(2) an Apple iPhone 13 Pro Max, , associated with phone number 

 (“TARGET PHONE 2”)(collectively, “TARGET PHONES”), found therein. 

 During the execution of this warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to (1) press 

or swipe the fingers (including thumbs) of and anyone else who is found with the 

TARGET PHONES and reasonably believed by law enforcement to be a user of the devices, to 

the fingerprint scanner of the devices (TARGET PHONES); and/or (2) hold the device in front of 

the face of and activate the facial recognition feature, for the purpose of attempting to unlock 

the device in order to search the contents as authorized by this warrant. 

 

Case 9:22-mj-08549-BER Document 13-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2023 Page 36 of 40
Case 9:22-mj-08549-BER Document 13-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2023 Page 37 of 40
AO 93 (Rev. 1/13) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return

Case No.: Date and time warrant executed: Copy of warrant and inventory left with:

Inventory made in the presence of :

Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized:

Certification

I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the

designated judge.

Date:

Executing officer’s signature

Printed name and title

22-mj-8549-BER

Case 9:22-mj-08549-BER Document 13-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2023 Page 38 of 40
ATTACHMENT A 

Property to Be Searched 

 The premises to be searched is 

 (“TARGET RESIDENCE”), as well as (1) an Apple iPhone 12 Pro Max, 

, associated with phone number (“TARGET PHONE 1”); and 

(2) an Apple iPhone 13 Pro Max, , associated with phone number 

 (“TARGET PHONE 2”)(collectively, “TARGET PHONES”), found therein. The 

premises is an apartment . The front of the apartment 

building is pictured below: 

 

Case 9:22-mj-08549-BER Document 13-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2023 Page 39 of 40
1 

ATTACHMENT B 

Particular Things to be Seized 

The items to be seized by the government are (1) an Apple iPhone 12 Pro Max, 

, associated with phone number (“TARGET PHONE 1”); and 

(2) an Apple iPhone 13 Pro Max, , associated with phone number 

 (“TARGET PHONE 2”)(collectively, “TARGET PHONES”), found therein. 

 During the execution of this warrant, law enforcement personnel are authorized to (1) press 

or swipe the fingers (including thumbs) of and anyone else who is found with the 

TARGET PHONES and reasonably believed by law enforcement to be a user of the devices, to 

the fingerprint scanner of the devices (TARGET PHONES); and/or (2) hold the device in front of 

the face of and activate the facial recognition feature, for the purpose of attempting to unlock 

the device in order to search the contents as authorized by this warrant. 

 

Case 9:22-mj-08549-BER Document 13-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/28/2023 Page 40 of 40