FILED

June 25, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

AT KNOXVILLE

HELEN EBLEN and KYLE E. BEVERLY,) ROANE CHANCERY

and wife, JUDITH T. BEVERLY; ) C. A. NO. 03A01-9709-CH-00423

 )

 Plaintiffs-Appellees )

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

vs. ) HON. FRANK V. WILLIAMS, III

 ) CHANCELLOR

 )

 )

 )

 )

 )

LUCILLE JOHNSON and CHERYL ) AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

ROUSE, )

 )

 Defendants )

Cheryl Rouse, )

 Appellant )

KATHLEEN E. McGEECHAN, Kingston, for Appellant.

HAROLD D. BALCOM, JR., Kingston, for appellees, Helen Eblen, Kyle

E. Beverly and wife, Judith T. Beverly.

JOHN AGEE, Cooley, Cooley & Agee, Kingston, for appellee, Lucille

Johnson.
2

O P I N I O N

McMurray, J.

Generally stated, this is a boundary line dispute. The

plaintiffs and the defendant, Lucille Johnson, settled all issues

between them. The defendant, Rouse, was the immediate vendee from

t h e v endor, Johnson. Rouse filed a cross-claim against Johnson

seeking rescission and reimbursement for improvements allegedly

made on the property purchased from Johnson. Johnson also filed a

cross-claim against Rouse, alleging that Rouse was trespassing on

her property by virtue of having built a fence on Johnson's

property. She sought damages and injunctive relief. After a bench

trial, the trial court established the common boundaries between

the litigants and dismissed the cross-claims. From the judgment of

the trial court, the defendant, Rouse has appealed. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rouse, prese nts the following issues for our

consideration:

1 . Plaintiffs Beverly, mere pending vendees under a

contingent purchase contract, without possession of

property, did not have standing to bring this cause

and are not proper parties pl a intiff; and having

sought relief jointly, this deficiency is fatal to

the claim, and should therefore be dismissed in its

entirety.

2 . Alternatively, the boundary between Eblen and

Johnson's parcels, as between those grantees, is

d icta ted by the deeds of record from their common
3

grantor, with respect to both the parcels whet her

conveyed by quitclaim or by warranty deed, and upon

which the court should have based its decision; the

m atte r should be remanded for determination by an

impartial survey to establish said line from common

grantor's deeds.

3 . Defendant Rouse's cross-claim against Johnson,

being based upon the covenants and warranties of

title contained in the deed, and clearly evidenced

in the record, should not have been dismissed, nor

shoul d costs have been assessed as were done ,

plaintiff [sic] having done nothing to occasion or

exacerbate this situation, but relying with clean

hands in good faith on the warranties and covenants

from her grantor, whic h should have been specifically performed.

As to the first issue of standing by the Beverleys, we note,

that "[o]ne holding a valid contract for the purchase of realty ...

has an eq uitable interest therein." Land Developers, Inc. v.

Maxwell , 537 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1976). There seems to be no

rational basis why a contingent contract should be treated any

differently than a non-contingent contract. In an y event, this

issue is controlled by Rule 20.01 and Rule 21 of the Ten ness e e

Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 20.01, T.R.C.P., provides as follows:

Rule 20. Permissive Joinder . — All persons may join

i n one (1) action as plaintiffs if they assert any right

t o relief jointly, severally, or in the alternativ e i n

respect of or arising out of the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and

i f any question of law or fact common to all these

persons will arise in the action. All persons may be

joined in one (1) action as defendants if there is

asserted against them jointly, seve r a lly, or in the

alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising

out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
4

transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or

fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

A plaintiff or defendant n eed not be interested in

obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded.

Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs

according to their resp e c tive rights to relief, and

aga ins t one or more defendants according to their

respective liabilities.

Rule 21, T.R.C.P. provides as follows:

Rule 21. Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties.

Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of

a n action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of

the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative

a t any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.

Any claim against a party may be severed and proce ede d

with separately.

 

We find no merit in the appellant's first issue.

Even though a court reporter was present at the trial, no

transcript of the evidence or statement of the evidence has been

filed in accordance with Rule 24, T.R.C.P. Therefore, we are

unable to reach the merits of the remaining issues which were

before the trial court. The issues are not pure matters of law,

but add ress themselves also to the facts as found by the trial

court.

Where the issues raised go to the evidence, there must be

a transcript. In the absen ce of a transcript of the

evidence, there is a co nclu sive presumption that there

was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support

its judgment, and this Court must therefo re a ffirm the

judgment. 
5

Coakley v. Daniels , 840 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tenn. App.

1992). See also Word v. Word , 937 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tenn.

App . 1996); Sherrod v. Wix , 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (T enn .

App. 1992); Irvin v. City of Clarksville , 767 S.W.2d 649,

653 (Tenn. App. 1988).

Since we are unable to reach the merits of the appellant's

remaining issues, we must resolve them against the appellant.

W e affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Costs are assessed to the appellant and this case is rema nded to

the trial court.

 ________________________________

 Don T. McMurray, J.

CONCUR:

___________________________________

Houston M. Goddard, Presiding Judge

___________________________________

Charles D. Susano, Jr., Judge
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

AT KNOXVILLE

HELEN EBLEN and KYLE E. BEVERLY,) ROANE CHANCERY

and wife, JUDITH T. BEVERLY; ) C. A. NO. 03A01-9709-CH-00423

 )

 Plaintiffs-Appellees )

 )

 )

 )

 )

vs. ) HON. FRANK V. WILLIAMS, III

 ) CHANCELLOR

 )

 )

 )

 )

LUCILLE JOHNSON and CHERYL ) AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

ROUSE, )

 )

 Defendants )

Cheryl Rouse, )

 Appellant )

JUDGMENT

This appeal ca me on to be heard upon the record from the

Chancery Court of Ro ane County, briefs and argument of counsel.

Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of opinion that there was

no reversible error in the trial court.

W e affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Costs are assessed to th e app ellant and this case is remanded to

the trial court.

PER CURIAM