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SJC-11986

LILIANA MARIBEL RIVERA RECINOS vs. MARIA ISABEL RECINOS

ESCOBAR.

Middlesex. November 5, 2015. - March 4, 2016.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 

Hines, JJ.

Probate Court, Jurisdiction, General equity power.

Jurisdiction, Probate Court.

Complaint in equity filed in the Middlesex Division of the 

Probate and Family Court Department on April 14, 2014.

The case was heard by Patricia A. Gorman, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Elizabeth Badger for the plaintiff.

Mary K. Ryan, Cynthia M. Guizzetti, & Mara O'Malley, for 

American Immigration Lawyers Association & others, amici curiae, 

submitted a brief.

SPINA, J. In this case, we are asked to determine whether 

the Probate and Family Court Department has jurisdiction over 

youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to make 
2

special findings that are necessary to apply for special 

immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)

(2012). Congress created the SIJ classification to permit 

immigrant children who have been abused, neglected, or abandoned 

by one or both of their parents to apply for lawful permanent 

residence while remaining in the United States. See id.; 8 

C.F.R. § 204.11 (2009). "[C]hild" under the Federal statute is 

defined as an unmarried person under the age of twenty-one. 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). Before an immigrant child can apply for 

SIJ status, she must receive the following predicate findings 

from a "juvenile court":

1 (1) she is dependent on the juvenile 

court; (2) her reunification with one or both parents is not 

viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and (3) it is not 

in her best interests to return to her country of origin. 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). Once these special findings are 

made, an application and supporting documents may be submitted 

to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS) agency.2 An application for SIJ status must be submitted

before the immigrant's twenty-first birthday. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 204.11.

 

1 As explained later in this opinion, a "juvenile court" 

includes the Probate and Family Court for purposes of the 

Federal statute.

2 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services is the 

Federal agency responsible for lawful immigration to the United 

States.
3

Liliana Recinos, the plaintiff, was a twenty year old,

3

unmarried immigrant attempting to apply for SIJ status. She 

filed a complaint in equity in April, 2014, in the Middlesex 

County Division of the Probate and Family Court Department. The 

plaintiff requested equitable and declaratory relief in the form 

of a decree of special findings and rulings of law concerning

the findings necessary to apply for SIJ status. She also filed 

various motions, including a motion for special findings. A 

pretrial conference was held in January, 2015, at which the 

plaintiff submitted a stipulation signed by both herself and her 

mother, the defendant.4 In March, 2015, a judge in the Probate 

and Family Court dismissed the complaint, explaining that the

plaintiff was over the age of eighteen and that, therefore, the 

court did not have jurisdiction over her. The plaintiff filed a 

timely notice of appeal. At the plaintiff's request, the 

Appeals Court stayed the proceedings so that she could pursue an 

asylum application; however, in late September, 2015, her asylum 

application remained unadjudicated. The plaintiff informed the 

Appeals Court that she would like to pursue her appeal as 

expeditiously as possible because her twenty-first birthday 

 

3 The plaintiff was twenty years old at the time of oral 

argument. She turned twenty-one on December 5, 2015.

4 The parties stipulated that the defendant did not oppose

an entry of the proposed decree and to facts included in the 

plaintiff's affidavit.
4

would occur on December 5, 2015. We took this appeal on our own 

motion and expedited the proceedings to preserve the plaintiff's 

opportunity to apply for SIJ status. This court heard oral 

arguments on November 5, 2015.

The primary issue raised by the plaintiff on appeal is 

whether the Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction pursuant 

to its broad equity powers under G. L. c. 215, § 6, over 

immigrant youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to 

entertain a request to make the necessary predicate special 

findings under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). On November 9, 2015, 

we issued the following order to the Middlesex County Division 

of the Probate and Family Court Department:

"The judgment of the Probate and Family Court dated 

March 13, 2015, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint is 

reversed. The Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction to 

entertain the plaintiff's case, and the plaintiff is 

dependent on the court for these purposes. The court shall 

conduct proceedings forthwith on the plaintiff's complaint 

and shall act on her requests for relief expeditiously, 

such that, if the requested findings are made, she will 

have time to apply to the Federal authorities for special 

immigrant juvenile status before her twenty-first birthday 

on December 5, 2015. This order will serve as the rescript 

of this court for purposes of Mass. R. A. P. 1 (c), and 

shall issue to the trial court immediately. Opinion or 

opinions to follow. By the Court."

This opinion states the reasons for that order.5

 

5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the New 

England Chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers Association 

and twenty-four others who are legal services providers,

professional associations, and attorneys who advocate and 
5

1. Facts. The plaintiff was born on December 5, 1994, in 

El Salvador. In her complaint and affidavit, the plaintiff 

chronicles a childhood riddled with instances of physical and 

emotional abuse by her father. She also described her mother's 

failure to protect her and her siblings from their father's 

abuse and the chronic gang violence in their neighborhood. She 

came to the United States in 2012, at the age of seventeen, to 

escape the threats from her father and the gang violence that 

overwhelmed her neighborhood.6 At first, she settled in the area 

of Baltimore, Maryland, with her brother. While residing in 

Maryland, she was assigned a volunteer attorney. For 

unexplained reasons, the attorney did not take any action in

helping the plaintiff obtain the findings she now seeks from the 

Probate and Family Court. At the end of 2012, the plaintiff 

relocated to Massachusetts and moved in with a family friend

with whom she still currently lives. While living in the United 

States, the plaintiff has had two children. Preliminarily, the 

plaintiff and her experiences seem to be of the type 

contemplated by the Federal statute.

2. Special immigrant juvenile status. In 1990, Congress 

amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to include the 

 

represent immigrant youth in removal proceedings in various 

courts.

6 The plaintiff's father died on June 25, 2013.
6

SIJ classification to create a pathway to citizenship for 

immigrant children. Pub. L. 101-649, § 153, 101st Cong., 2d 

Sess. (1990). When the SIJ classification was first included, 

the statute required a State court to issue an order finding 

that (1) the child was dependent on a juvenile court and was 

eligible for long-term foster care, and (2) it was not in the 

child's best interests to return to his or her country of 

origin. Id. Since then, the provision of the INA concerning

SIJs has been amended several times. Matter of Marcelina M.-G.

v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 107-108 (N.Y. 2013) (Marcelina M.-

G.) (explaining various amendments to INA concerning SIJ 

status). In 1997, Congress modified the definition of SIJ to 

include a child who was "legally committed to, or placed under 

the custody of, an agency or department of a State" and added 

the requirement that eligibility for long-term foster care be 

"due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment." Pub. L. 105-119,

§ 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997). In 2008, the William Wilberforce 

Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) 

further amended the INA to expand eligibility for SIJ status to 

include immigrant children who were placed in the custody of an 

"individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court" 

and eliminated the requirement of long-term foster care 

eligibility. Pub. L. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044 

(2008). The amendment added the requirement that the 
7

reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to 

abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under 

State law. Id. In its present form, the Federal statute 

requires a juvenile court to issue an order finding that (1) the 

immigrant child is dependent on a juvenile court, or placed in 

the custody of a department or agency of the State, or placed in 

the custody of an individual or entity appointed by the State or 

court; (2) the immigrant child cannot be reunified with one or 

both of his or her parents due to abuse, neglect, or 

abandonment, or other similar basis under State law; and (3) it 

would not be in the child's best interests to return to his or 

her parents' previous country of nationality or country of last 

habitual residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii).

The Federal statute requires a juvenile court to make 

special findings before an immigrant youth can apply for SIJ 

status and lawful permanent residence. Id. The State and 

Federal proceedings are distinct from each other. "The process 

for obtaining SIJ status is 'a unique hybrid procedure that 

directs the collaboration of state and federal systems.'"

H.S.P. v. J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 209 (2015), quoting Matter of 

Marisol N.H., 115 A.D.3d 185, 188 (N.Y. 2013). Pursuant to 8 

C.F.R. § 204.11, "[j]uvenile court" is defined as "a court 

located in the United States having jurisdiction under State law 

to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of 
8

juveniles."7 When determining which court qualifies as a 

juvenile court under the Federal statute, it is the function of 

the State court and not the designation that is determinative. 

R.G. Settlage, E.A. Campbell, V.T. Thronson, Immigration Relief: 

Legal Assistance for Noncitizen Crime Victims 70 (2014)

(Settlage). In Massachusetts, the Juvenile Court and the 

Probate and Family Court both have jurisdiction to make judicial 

determinations about the care and custody of juveniles despite 

only one court being designated as a juvenile court. See G. L. 

c. 119, § 1; G. L. c. 208, §§ 19, 28, 28A, 31, 31A. Therefore, 

in Massachusetts, an immigrant child may petition for special 

findings in either the Juvenile Court or the Probate and Family 

Court. Because of the distinct expertise State courts possess 

in the area of child welfare and abuse, Congress has entrusted 

them with the responsibility to perform a best interest analysis 

and to make factual determinations about child welfare for 

purposes of SIJ eligibility. See H.S.P., supra at 211; Matter 

of Hei Ting C., 109 A.D.3d 100, 104 (N.Y. 2013). Therefore, the 

special findings a juvenile court makes should be limited to 

 

7 The Federal regulations have not been updated to reflect 

the amendments to the special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) statute 

by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 

Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 

Stat. 5044 (TVPRA). See 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978 (2011), to be 

codified at 8 C.F.R. parts 204, 205, and 245. See also Matter 

of Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 109 n.3 (N.Y. 

2013).
9

child welfare determinations. Immigration is exclusively a 

Federal power. See In re Y.M., 207 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908

(2012). It is not the juvenile court's role to engage in an 

immigration analysis or decision. Settlage, supra at 72. 

Special findings by a State court that determine that the child 

meets the eligibility requirements for SIJ status are not a 

final determination. See Marcelina M.-G., 112 A.D.3d at 109. 

It is only the first step in the process to achieve SIJ status. 

Id. Once the child obtains the required special findings from a 

qualifying State court, the child may file an application with 

USCIS. This application must be submitted before the child's 

twenty-first birthday. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. The child will not 

"age-out" of SIJ status on account of turning twenty-one while 

his or her application is under consideration with USCIS. See 

TVPRA, Pub. L. 110-457, § 235(d)(6), 122 Stat. 5044. An 

application for SIJ status consists of a variety of forms, and a 

certified copy of the juvenile court order must be included. 

See SIJ: Forms You May Need, http://www.uscis.gov/greencard/special-immigrant-juveniles/sij-forms-you-may-need

[http://perma.cc/H8TV-UTWH]. In order to provide USCIS with 

sufficient information concerning the applicant's eligibility 

for SIJ status, State courts should provide sufficient detail 

about how they came to their conclusions in their order of

special findings. H.S.P., 223 N.J. at 213-214. An applicant 
10

should include the supporting evidence used in the State court 

proceeding to aid USCIS in its decision-making process. See 

SIJ: Forms You May Need, supra. Doing so may result in a 

quicker decision. See id. Once a child has filed the necessary 

paperwork, an interview between the applicant and a USCIS 

official will be conducted. See SIJ: After You File, 

http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-juveniles/sijafter-you-file [http://perma.cc/4H77-YF3K]. A decision will be 

issued within 180 days from the official filing date. See id. 

See also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11.

3. Jurisdiction. The Probate and Family Court judge 

dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the

plaintiff was over the age of eighteen. We conclude that the 

Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction, under its broad 

equity power, over youth between the ages of eighteen and 

twenty-one for the specific purpose of making the special 

findings necessary to apply for SIJ status pursuant to the INA.

In most circumstances, the Probate and Family Court has 

jurisdiction over children who are under the age of eighteen. 

See generally G. L. cc. 119, 190B, 210. The portion of the INA 

concerning SIJ status provides relief for immigrant children 

until age twenty-one, consequently creating a gap between access 

to our State court and the Federal statutory relief. There are 

some instances where the Probate and Family Court has 
11

jurisdiction over "adult children," namely, individuals between 

the ages of eighteen and twenty-three. See G. L. c. 208, § 28. 

However, these instances involve the maintenance and support of 

children and are not applicable to the present case. See id. 

See also Eccleston v. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428, 434-435 (2003) 

(explaining expansion of jurisdiction over "adult children" in 

matters of maintenance and support). This gap is not unique to 

the Commonwealth. Many States have a jurisdictional age limit 

of eighteen for access to their juvenile courts. In response to 

this gap, some States have enacted legislation to extend the 

juvenile court's jurisdiction to children up to the age of 

twenty-one for certain proceedings.8 Massachusetts has not yet 

passed legislation to extend the Probate and Family Court's 

 

8 For example, the Maryland Legislature amended a statute 

concerning the jurisdiction of that State's equity courts to 

include "custody or guardianship of an immigrant child pursuant 

to a motion for Special Immigrant Juvenile factual findings" 

within the equity court's jurisdiction. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law 

§ 1-201 (LexisNexis 2012). Under the subsection, "child" is 

defined as an unmarried individual under the age of twenty-one. 

Id. The New York Legislature passed a similar amendment to 

address this gap. The statute governing guardianship 

proceedings was amended to extend jurisdiction over an 

individual "who is less than twenty-one years old who consents 

to the appointment or continuation of a guardian after the age 

of eighteen." N.Y. Jud. Ct. Acts Law § 661(a) (McKinney 2008). 

Previously, that statute was only applicable to children under 

the age of eighteen. Matter of Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan W., 73 

A.D.3d 793, 794 (N.Y. 2010).
12

jurisdiction over these individuals.9 The Probate and Family 

Court does, however, have broad equity powers pursuant to G. L. 

c. 215, § 6, and the court may invoke its equity power to fill 

in this gap.

General Laws c. 215, § 6, grants the Probate and Family 

Court equitable jurisdiction, stating in relevant part:

"The probate and family court department shall have 

original and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme 

judicial court and the superior court department of all 

cases and matters of equity cognizable under the general 

principles of equity jurisprudence and, with reference 

thereto, shall be courts of general equity 

jurisdiction . . . ."

"A court with equity jurisdiction has broad and flexible powers 

to fashion remedies." Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. 

Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation (No. 1), 424 

Mass. 430, 463 (1997). "These powers are broad and flexible, 

and extend to actions necessary to afford any relief in the best 

interests of a person under their jurisdiction." Matter of Moe, 

385 Mass. 555, 561 (1982). We turn our attention to general 

principles of equity.

 

9 Although legislation has not been enacted in 

Massachusetts, there has been pending legislation attempting to 

bridge the gap between our State courts and the Federal statute. 

A House bill would confer jurisdiction over persons between the 

ages of eighteen and twenty-one seeking findings in order to 

apply for SIJ status. 2015 House Doc. No. 1418. The bill also 

defines the term "dependent on the court" to mean "subject to 

the jurisdiction of the court for the findings, orders, and 

referrals enumerated in this section but shall not constitute a 

finding of legal incompetence." Id.
13

A fundamental maxim of general equity jurisprudence is that 

equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. 2 J.N. 

Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 363 (5th ed. 1941). In this 

case, the wrong is the abuse, neglect, or abandonment immigrant 

children under the age of twenty-one suffer as a result of one 

or both of their parents' actions. As a policy, the 

Commonwealth seeks to protect children from wrongs that result 

"from the absence, inability, inadequacy or destructive behavior 

of parents." G. L. c. 119, § 1. The wrongs from which this 

policy seeks to protect the Commonwealth's children are the same 

as the wrongs that SIJ status attempts to remedy. Congress 

created this remedy by amending the INA to create a pathway to 

citizenship for immigrant children under the age of twenty-one 

who have suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment by one or both 

of their parents. In order to obtain this remedy, a State court 

must make the necessary findings before the immigrant youth can 

apply for SIJ status. According to general principles of 

equity, if the Probate and Family Court does not exercise 

jurisdiction over the plaintiff, she, as well as any other 

immigrant child between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one in 

the Commonwealth, will have suffered a wrong with no available 

remedy. Such claims fall within the general principles of 

equity, and therefore, the Probate and Family Court may, for 

purposes of the Federal statute, exercise jurisdiction over 
14

immigrant children up to the age of twenty-one who claim to have 

been abused, abandoned, or neglected.

This is not the first time this court has said that the 

general equity powers of the Probate and Family Court reach 

children who are over the age of eighteen. In Eccleston, 438 

Mass. at 438, we concluded that the Probate and Family Court's 

equity jurisdiction extended to adult children until the age of 

twenty-three, even in the absence of statutory authority. 

Similar to the plaintiff in this case, the postminority child in 

Eccleston, due to her unfit parents, was financially dependent 

on an adult and needed a remedy from the Probate and Family 

Court to aid her in her path to self-sufficiency. Id. at 437. 

Despite the absence of specific relief under any statute, we 

recognized that the Probate and Family Court had equitable 

powers to provide a remedy for the postminority child. Id. at 

437-438. As there is also no specific relief afforded by 

statute in this case, the Probate and Family Court may invoke 

its broad equity power under G. L. c. 215, § 6, to provide 

relief to the plaintiff in the form of special findings

necessary for her to make application for SIJ status.

The plaintiff also argues that the Probate and Family Court 

has jurisdiction to enter declaratory relief under G. L. 

c. 231A, § 9, and that it is an appropriate method to enter the 

special findings for SIJ status. We need not decide this 
15

question in light of our conclusion that relief is available 

under the general equity jurisdiction of the Probate and Family 

Court.

4. Dependency. The plaintiff argues that she is dependent 

on the Probate and Family Court by virtue of the Federal 

statute. During the pretrial conference, a Probate and Family 

Court judge equated exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiff 

with a custody determination. The plaintiff contends that the 

Federal statute does not limit the dependency requirement to a 

custody determination. We agree.

One of the three findings that a judge in the juvenile 

court must make includes either a custody determination or a 

declaration that the child is dependent on a juvenile court. 

Specifically, the child must be

"an immigrant who is present in the United States . . . who 

has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in 

the United States or whom such a court has legally 

committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or 

department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed 

by a State or juvenile court located in the United States"

(emphasis added).

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). The presence of the word "or" 

within the subsection indicates that there are three separate 

and distinct alternatives by which a child may satisfy this 

particular eligibility requirement. It follows, then, that the 

subsection must extend beyond a sole custody determination to 

satisfy the language of the Federal statute. If the word 
16

"dependent" was to be equated with custody, the first part of 

the subsection would be mere surplusage. "It is an elementary 

rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to 

every word, clause and sentence of a statute." 2A N.J. Singer & 

J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.6 

(7th ed. rev. 2014). "A statute should be construed so as to 

give effect to each word, and no word shall be regarded as 

surplusage." Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412 

(2009). The word "dependent" must mean something other than 

custody and should be broadly construed because of the 

beneficent and remedial purpose behind the Federal statute.

The question now is whether the plaintiff can be considered 

"dependent" on the Probate and Family Court. The Commonwealth's 

policy is to ensure "that the children of the commonwealth are 

protected against the harmful effects resulting from the 

absence, inability, inadequacy or destructive behavior of 

parents or parent substitutes."10 G. L. c. 119, § 1. We have

often recognized that attaining the age of majority does not 

necessarily mean that one is self-sufficient. See, e.g., 

Eccleston, 438 Mass. at 436. The plaintiff here, who was age 

twenty at the time of oral argument in this appeal, was not 

 

10 In States that define the word "dependent" by statute,

the term is commonly defined as a child who has been abused, 

abandoned, or neglected. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300 

(West 2015); Fla. Stat. § 39.01 (2015).
17

necessarily self-sufficient. In order to attain selfsufficiency, the plaintiff and other youth in her situation need 

the assistance of the Probate and Family Court in the form of 

special findings applicable to SIJ status. If an immigrant 

child is able to show, for purposes of SIJ status eligibility, 

that he or she experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment by one 

or both parents, it follows that the child is dependent on the 

Probate and Family Court for the opportunity to obtain relief. 

The child would be "dependent" on the Probate and Family Court 

for the assistance that is available in applying successfully

for the Federal relief, i.e., SIJ status.

5. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, on November 9, 

2015, we issued an order reversing the dismissal of the 

plaintiff's complaint and remanding the matter to the Probate 

and Family Court for further proceedings consistent with that 

order. The Probate and Family Court has jurisdiction over the 

plaintiff, and the plaintiff is deemed dependent on the Probate 

and Family Court for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). We 

express no view as to what the other predicate findings should 

be.
CORDY, J. (concurring, with whom Lenk, J., joins). I 

concur in the court's conclusion that in this case the Probate 

and Family Court may undertake to make findings necessary to 

enable the plaintiff to apply for special immigrant status under 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). I do so because of our strong 

State policies aimed at protecting children from the effects of 

abuse and neglect, and the apparent gap between the ordinary 

jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court and the benefits 

available under Federal law for immigrant children (between the 

ages of eighteen and twenty-one) who can establish that they 

have been abused, neglected, or abandoned by one or both of 

their parents in their native countries. I do so reluctantly, 

however, because this opinion stretches our equity jurisprudence 

to its outer edge, beyond what the court majority concluded was 

appropriate in Eccleston v. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428 (2003), a 

markedly different case.1

 

1 In Eccleston v. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428, 431-433 (2003), 

the Probate and Family Court had placed the child in the custody 

of the Department of Social Services at the age of eleven 

because of the unfitness of her parents, subsequently appointed 

a guardian with whom the child lived, and ordered her father to 

pay support. Id. at 431-433. The question was whether the 

father could be ordered to continue to provide support for the 

child after she attained the age of eighteen and continued to 

live with her guardian, where she could not live with either 

parent because of abuse, yet had no means of support and was 

plainly "unemancipated." Id. at 428-429, 432. This court 

concluded that where a comprehensive State legislative scheme 

provided for postminority support of a child who was 

unemancipated and who lived with one of her parents, the Probate 
2

In my view, it would have been far preferable if the 

Legislature had, as other State Legislatures have, acted on 

legislation that would have explicitly provided for expanded 

State court jurisdiction to address claims like that of the 

plaintiff. Without such legislation, the court is left to 

engage in gymnastics of logic and circular reasoning to conclude 

that the plaintiff is "dependent" on the court solely because 

she needs the court to declare that she is "dependent" on the 

court in order to meet one of the requirements of the Federal 

statute, and in no other respect.

 

and Family Court could use its equitable powers in order to 

"close an unintended gap" in the scheme and provide for similar 

support for unemancipated children of families disrupted by 

abuse such as the one in that case. Id. at 437. Here, the 

plaintiff was not the subject of court proceedings while she was 

properly within its jurisdiction and is not seeking a guardian 

or order of support, and the gap is between the State courts' 

jurisdictional limits and Federal immigration law.