IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES,

Defendants and Respondents.

S239907

Fourth Appellate District, Division One

D068657

San Diego County Superior Court

37-2014-00005050-CU-WM-CTL

November 19, 2018

Justice Cuéllar filed the opinion of the court, in which Chief 

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 

Kruger, and Meehan concurred. 
1

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE 

MANDATES

S239907

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

When convicted sex offenders have a diagnosed mental 

disorder making it likely they would engage in sexually violent 

behavior if released, they are subject to civil commitment 

proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA; 

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). County governments are 

responsible for filing the commitment petition, providing 

counsel and experts for all hearings on the petition, and housing 

the individual potentially subject to commitment while the 

petition is adjudicated. Carrying out these tasks takes more 

than diligence and organization from counties –– it takes 

money. What we must decide in this case is who pays for the 

duties the SVPA imposes on county governments. 

For the first 15 years of the SVPA’s existence, it was the 

State of California that –– according to the Commission on State 

Mandates (Commission) –– had to foot the bill. But in early 

2013, the Department of Finance (Department) asked the 

Commission to reconsider its earlier decision and declare that 

the SVPA was no longer a state-mandated program. The 

Department argued that the state’s financial responsibility 

ceased on November 7, 2006, when the voters enacted The 

Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law 

(Proposition 83), which “substantively amended and reenacted 

various sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code that had 

served as the basis for the Commission’s Statement of Decision.” 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

2

(See Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (f) [duties that are “expressly 

included in” or “necessary to implement” a ballot measure do not 

constitute “costs mandated by the state”].) The Commission 

approved the Department’s request for redetermination in part 

and identified six county duties (and part of a seventh) that, 

effective July 1, 2011,1 no longer constituted reimbursable state 

mandates. (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, Statement of 

Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), pp. 54-55 

<https://www.csm.ca.gov/decisions/doc96.pdf> [as of November 

15, 2018]; all Internet citations in this opinion are archived by 

year, docket number, and case name at 

<http://www.courts.ca.gov/38324.htm>.) 

Soon thereafter, the counties of San Diego, Los Angeles, 

Orange, Sacramento, and San Bernardino (collectively, the 

Counties) filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate and 

a complaint for declaratory relief against the Commission, the 

State of California, the Department, and John Chiang in his 

then-official capacity as State Controller (collectively, the State 

respondents). The San Diego County Superior Court denied the 

petition and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeal 

reversed, finding that Proposition 83 did not alter in any way 

the state’s obligation to reimburse the Counties for the costs of 

implementing the SVPA. (County of San Diego v. Commission 

on State Mandates (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 12, 18 (County of San 

Diego).). We agree that the Commission erred when it treated 

Proposition 83 as a basis for terminating the state’s obligation 

to reimburse the Counties simply because certain provisions of 

 

1 Under Government Code section 17557, subdivision (e), a 

test claim submitted on or before June 30 following a fiscal year 

establishes “eligibility for reimbursement for that fiscal year.” 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

3

the SVPA had been restated without substantive change in 

Proposition 83. But we also remand the matter to the 

Commission so it can determine, in the first instance, whether 

and how the initiative’s expanded definition of an SVP may 

affect the state’s obligation to reimburse the Counties for 

implementing the amended statute. 

I.

A.

The state has conditional authority to enlist a local 

government in carrying out a new program or providing a higher 

level of service for an existing program. Only when the state 

“reimburse[s] that local government for the costs of the program 

or increased level of service” may the state impose such a 

mandate on its local governments. (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, 

subd. (a).) No reimbursement is required, though, where “[t]he 

statute or executive order imposes a requirement that is 

mandated by a federal law or regulation and results in costs 

mandated by the federal government” (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. 

(c)) or where “[t]he statute or executive order imposes duties 

that are necessary to implement, or are expressly included in, a 

ballot measure approved by the voters in a statewide or local 

election” (id., subd. (f)). 

Predictably, local governments often disagree with the 

state about who is responsible for funding new programs. For 

the first five years after article XIII B was adopted, such 

unresolved disputes ended up in court. This arrangement led to 

unnecessary litigation, burdened the judiciary, delayed 

reimbursement, and injected uncertainty into budget planning 

at both the state and local levels. (See Kinlaw v. State of 

California (1991) 54 Cal.3d 326, 331; Gov. Code, § 17500.) 
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Eventually, the Legislature created the Commission to 

streamline resolution of these disputes (Gov. Code, §§ 17525, 

17551), and adopted procedures for submission and adjudication 

of reimbursement claims (§ 17500 et seq.). So when the 

Legislature now enacts a statute imposing obligations on a local 

agency without providing adequate funding to allow the locality 

to discharge those obligations, the local entity may file a “test 

claim” with the Commission. (§ 17521; see Lucia Mar Unified 

School Dist. v. Honig (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 833.) The 

Commission then decides, after a hearing, whether the statute 

that is the subject of the test claim under review (i.e., the test 

claim statute) mandates a new program or an increased level of 

service and, if so, the amount to be reimbursed. (§§ 17551, 

17557.) Either the local agency or the state may challenge the 

Commission’s decision in court by filing a petition for writ of 

administrative mandate. (§ 17559, subd. (b).) 

In 2010, the Legislature enabled either party to request 

reconsideration of a prior Commission decision. Using formal 

procedures prescribed by statute, an affected state or local 

agency may ask that the Commission “adopt a new test claim 

decision to supersede a previously adopted test claim decision 

. . . upon a showing that the state’s liability for that test claim 

decision . . . has been modified based on a subsequent change in 

law.” (Gov. Code, § 17570, subd. (b).) Section 17570, subdivision 

(a)(2) defines a “ ‘[s]ubsequent change in law’ ” as a “change in 

law that requires a finding that an incurred cost is a cost 

mandated by the state, as defined by Section 17514, or is not a 

cost mandated by the state pursuant to Section 17556.” Under 

the Commission’s regulations implementing these provisions, 

the request for a new test claim decision proceeds in two steps. 

At the first hearing, the Commission decides whether the 
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5

requesting agency “has made an adequate showing” of “a 

subsequent change in law . . . material to the prior test claim 

decision.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 1190.5, subd. (a)(1).) A 

showing is “adequate” if the Commission finds the requesting 

agency “has a substantial possibility of prevailing at the second 

hearing.” (Ibid.) At the second hearing, the Commission decides 

“whether the state’s liability . . . has been modified based on the 

subsequent change in law alleged by the requester, thus 

requiring adoption of a new test claim decision to supersede the 

previously adopted test claim decision.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) If so, 

the Commission “shall adopt a new decision that reflects the 

modified liability of the state.” (Ibid.) 

B.

The SVPA was enacted by the Legislature in 1995 to 

enable the involuntary civil commitment of certain persons. The 

individuals subject to civil commitment under the SVPA are 

those who, following completion of their prison terms, have a 

diagnosed mental disorder that makes them likely to engage in 

sexually violent behavior. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. 

(a)(1); see People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 984.) 

Subsequently, the County of Los Angeles filed a test claim 

seeking reimbursement from the state for the costs of complying 

with the duties imposed by the SVPA. On June 25, 1998, the 

Commission adopted a statement of decision approving 

reimbursement for the following eight specific local government 

duties (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 

CSM-4509 (June 25, 1998) p. 12 <https://csm.ca.gov/matters/

4509/doc1.pdf> [as of November 15, 2018]):

1. Designation by the County Board of Supervisors of the 

appropriate district attorney or county counsel who will be 
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6

responsible for the SVP civil commitment proceedings (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (i));

2. Initial review of reports and records by the county’s 

designated counsel to determine whether the county concurs 

with the state’s recommendation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, 

subd. (i)); 

3. Preparation and filing of the petition for commitment 

by the county’s designated counsel (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, 

subd. (i)); 

4. Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated 

counsel and indigent defense counsel at the probable cause 

hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602); 

5. Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated 

counsel and indigent defense counsel at trial (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§§ 6603, 6604); 

6. Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated 

counsel and indigent defense counsel at subsequent hearings 

regarding the condition of the SVP (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6605, 

former subds. (b)-(d), 6608, subds. (a) & (b), former subdivisions 

(c) & (d)); 

7. Retention of necessary experts, investigators, and 

professionals for preparation for trial and subsequent hearings 

regarding the condition of the SVP (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6603, 

6605, former subd. (d)); and 

8. Transportation and housing for each potential SVP at 

a secured facility while the individual awaits trial on the SVP 

determination. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602.)

The Department then began reimbursing counties in a 

manner consistent with the Commission’s decision. For fiscal 
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7

year 2012-2013, the state reimbursed counties approximately 

$20.75 million to cover the cost of implementing the SVP 

mandate. The Department estimated the mandate costs for 

fiscal year 2013-2014 to be approximately $21.79 million. 

In January 2013, though, the Department sought to 

terminate these payments by requesting that the Commission 

adopt a new test claim under Government Code section 17570. 

In the Department’s view, the state mandate ended when the 

voters enacted Proposition 83 at the November 7, 2006, General 

Election. The Department argued that each of the statemandated duties was now either “expressly included in” or 

“necessary to implement” Proposition 83, “a ballot measure 

approved by the voters in a statewide . . . election.” (Gov. Code, 

§ 17556, subd. (f).)

It is true that Proposition 83 included several of the 

statutory mandates on which the Commission’s 1998 ruling 

relied. But as the parties concede, these provisions were 

reprinted in Proposition 83 solely because the California 

Constitution requires that “[a] section of a statute may not be 

amended unless the section is re-enacted as amended.” (Cal. 

Const., art. IV, § 9.) Both parties admit Proposition 83 made no 

changes to many of the provisions the Commission had 

identified as imposing state-mandated duties on local 

governments and revised the remainder only in nonsubstantive 

ways. Nonetheless, on July 26, 2013, the Commission 

determined that the Department had made a sufficient showing 

of a “ ‘subsequent change in law’ ” within the meaning of 

Government Code section 17570, subdivision (a)(2) to raise a 

substantial possibility of prevailing at the second hearing. (Cal. 

Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 

(July 26, 2013), p. 13 <https://csm.ca.gov/matters/4509/
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8

doc55.pdf> [as of November 15, 2018]; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 

2, § 1190.5, subd. (a)(1).) The Commission deemed it “irrelevant 

. . . whether Proposition 83 made any substantive changes to the 

SVP code sections” and instead found it sufficient that the 

“ballot measure expressly includes some of the same activities 

as the test claim statutes that were found to impose a 

reimbursable mandate” in the Commission’s 1998 ruling. (Cal. 

Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 

(July 26, 2013), supra, at p. 18, italics added.) 

Following the second hearing, the Commission 

determined that Proposition 83 had transformed six of the eight 

listed local government duties (and part of a seventh) from 

reimbursable state-mandated activities into nonreimbursable 

voter-mandated activities. Once again, the Commission deemed 

it “irrelevant . . . whether Proposition 83 made any substantive 

changes at all to the SVP code sections.” (Cal. Com. on State 

Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), 

supra, at p. 39.) What proved pivotal for the Commission 

instead was “that Proposition 83 amended and reenacted 

wholesale most of the code sections that gave rise to the 

mandated activities found in the [original] test claim.” (Ibid.) 

Accordingly, local government duties 1, 2, 3, 6, and part of 

7, which were “expressly included” in the ballot measure, were 

no longer reimbursable. (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, 

Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), supra, at pp. 

23-25.) The Commission further reasoned that local 

government duty 5 (the preparation and attendance at trial by 

the county’s designated counsel and appointed counsel for 

indigents), the remainder of local government duty 7 (the 

retention of necessary experts for trial), and part of local 

government duty 8 (transportation and housing of SVP while 
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awaiting trial) were “required in order to satisfy due process.” 

(Id. at p. 34; see id. at pp. 36-37.) Because these activities were 

“necessary to implement” the ballot measure, they likewise were 

no longer reimbursable. (Id. at pp. 36-37.) Only local 

government duty 4 (preparation and attendance by counsel at a 

probable cause hearing) and the remainder of local government 

duty 8 (transportation to and from a state-mandated probable 

cause hearing) were deemed by the Commission to be 

reimbursable costs: the statutory provisions underlying these 

activities were neither reenacted in the ballot measure nor 

required by due process. (Id. at pp. 33, 37, 54-55.) In declaring 

that local government duties 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and part of 8 were 

no longer state mandates, the Commission did not rely on — let 

alone discuss — the theory that these duties might be 

nonreimbursable because they are necessary to implement 

Proposition 83’s expanded definition of an SVP.2 

The Counties responded by filing a petition for a writ of 

administrative mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief. 

The writ petition sought an order setting aside the 

Commission’s statements of decision issued on July 26, 2013, 

 

2 Proposition 83 expanded the definition of “sexually violent 

predator” to include those who have a diagnosed mental disorder 

rendering them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior and 

have been convicted of a sexually violent offense “against one or 

more victims.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1), italics 

added.) Prior to Proposition 83, an SVP included only those who 

had been convicted of a qualifying offense “against two or more 

victims.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, former subd. (a)(1), italics 

added; Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 53, p. 2661.) Prior law also 

permitted only one prior juvenile adjudication of a sexually 

violent offense to be used as a qualifying conviction (§ 6600, 

former subd. (g); Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 53, p. 2661), but 

Proposition 83 removed that limitation. (§ 6600, subd. (g).)
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and December 6, 2013. The complaint asked for a declaration 

that Government Code sections 17556, subdivision (f) and 17570 

are unconstitutional and that the costs incurred by localities in 

carrying out the SVPA continue to be reimbursable. The trial 

court denied relief. The court reasoned that Proposition 83 

broadened the definition of an SVP and thus “was more than a 

mere restatement” of existing law. Even if Proposition 83 were 

construed as a “simple reenactment,” though, “the effect of 

voter-approval cannot be ignored as transforming certain 

requirements of the Act into voter-approved mandates.” The 

court also rejected the Counties’ challenges to the 

constitutionality of the two statutes. 

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter to 

the Commission for reconsideration. It found that the statutory 

duties identified in the Commission’s 2013 test claim ruling 

were neither necessary to implement nor expressly included in 

Proposition 83 “[b]ecause the duties imposed by the statutes at 

issue were not affected by Proposition 83.” (County of San Diego, 

supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) The court declined to accord any 

significance to the ballot measure’s expanded definition of an 

SVP (see fn. 2, ante) because the Commission’s 1998 decision 

had previously concluded that the definition set forth in Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 6600 “was not a basis for any of 

the duties for which the Counties sought reimbursement.” 

(County of San Diego, at p. 36.) 

We granted the State respondents’ petition for review to 

consider whether Proposition 83, by amending and reenacting 

provisions of the SVPA, constituted a “subsequent change in 

law” sufficient to modify the Commission’s prior decision, which 

directed the State of California to reimburse local governments 
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for the costs of implementing the SVPA. (Gov. Code, § 17570, 

subd. (b).)

II.

To resolve the question before us, we must consider four 

distinct legal principles. First, the state must reimburse local 

governments for the costs of discharging mandates imposed by 

the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. (a).) Second, 

this reimbursement requirement does not apply to those 

activities that are necessary to implement, or are expressly 

included in, a ballot measure approved by the voters. (Gov. 

Code, § 17556, subd. (f).) Third, a statute must be reenacted in 

full as amended if any part of it is amended. (Cal. Const., art. 

IV, § 9.) And fourth, the Legislature is prohibited from 

amending an initiative statute unless the initiative itself 

permits amendment. (Id., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) The 

determination whether the statutes at issue here impose a state 

mandate — and thus require reimbursement — is a question of 

law we review independently. (See Department of Finance v. 

Commission on State Mandates (2016) 1 Cal.5th 749, 762; 

County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 

109.)

A.

We begin with the requirement that the state reimburse 

local governments for costs incurred when the state enlists their 

assistance in implementing a state program. (See Cal. Const., 

art. XIII B, § 6.) The voters added this requirement to the state 

Constitution soon after enacting Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. 

XIII A), a measure that “severely restricted the taxing powers of 

local governments.” (County of Fresno v. State (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
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482, 487.) The purpose of article XIII B, section 63 was to 

prevent the state from unfairly shifting the costs of government 

onto local entities that were ill-equipped to shoulder the task. 

(County of Fresno, at p. 487.) As a result, the state now, with 

certain exceptions, must “ ‘pay for any new governmental 

programs, or for higher levels of service under existing 

programs, that it imposes upon local governmental agencies.’ ” 

(County of San Diego v. State of California, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 

p. 81.) 

Government Code section 17556 outlines six 

circumstances where duties imposed by statute on local 

governments are not deemed “costs mandated by the state.” 

Among these is the circumstance where “[t]he statute . . . 

imposes duties that are necessary to implement, or are expressly 

included in, a ballot measure approved by the voters in a 

statewide or local election.” (§ 17556, subd. (f).) In other words, 

the state must reimburse local governments for mandates 

imposed by the Legislature, but not for mandates imposed by 

the voters themselves through an initiative. (See California 

School Boards Assn. v. State of California (2009) 171 

Cal.App.4th 1183, 1207.) Where the Legislature cannot use the 

ordinary legislative process to amend or alter duties imposed by 

the voters (see Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c)), it can no 

longer be reasonably characterized as the source of those duties. 

 

3 Article XIII B, section 6, subdivision (a) of the California 

Constitution provides in relevant part that “[w]henever the 

Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or 

higher level of service on any local government, the State shall 

provide a subvention of funds to reimburse that local 

government for the costs of the program or increased level of 

service . . . .” 
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The question left unresolved by these provisions is what, 

precisely, qualifies as a mandate imposed by the voters. 

Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f) exempts from 

reimbursement only those “duties that are necessary to 

implement, or are expressly included in, a ballot measure 

approved by the voters.” The boundaries of this subdivision 

depend, then, on the definition of a “ballot measure” in section 

17556. Our reading of the provision’s text, the overall statutory 

structure, and related constitutional provisions persuades us 

that not every single word printed in the body of an initiative 

falls within the scope of the statutory terms “expressly included 

in . . . a ballot measure.” (§ 17556, subd. (f); see People v. Chavez 

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 779.) Discerning the extent of the state’s 

obligation to reimburse local governments for existing state 

mandates in the wake of a voter-approved initiative that 

includes the text of a previously enacted law –– and the 

Legislature’s power to amend any of its provisions — takes a 

more nuanced analysis.

Many voter initiatives (such as Proposition 83) amend 

existing statutory sections. Among these are statutory sections 

that have already been determined to impose reimbursable 

duties on local governments. When an existing statutory section 

is amended — even in the tiniest part — the state Constitution 

requires the entire section to be reenacted as amended. (Cal. 

Const., art. IV, § 9; see Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 

Cal.4th 978, 990 (Yoshisato) [“The effect of this section is that 

voters considering an initiative . . . that seeks to make discrete 

amendments to selected provisions of an existing statute, are 

forced to reenact the entire statute as amended in order to 

accomplish the desired amendments”].) The rationale for 

compelling reenactment of an entire statutory section when only 
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a part is being amended is to avoid “ ‘the enactment of statutes 

in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes 

deceived in regard to their effect’ ” and the risk that “ ‘the public, 

from the difficulty of making the necessary examination and 

comparison, failed to become appr[]ised of the changes made in 

the laws.’ ” (Hellman v. Shoulters (1896) 114 Cal. 136, 152.) 

Consequently, a substantial part of almost any statutory 

initiative will include a restatement of existing provisions with 

only minor, nonsubstantive changes — or no changes at all. 

Proposition 83 is an example. It reenacted verbatim 

subdivision (i) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6601, 

which the Commission’s 1998 ruling had identified as the source 

of local government duties 1, 2, and 3. The initiative made 

changes to individual subdivisions of Welfare and Institutions 

Code sections 6605 and 6608, which the Commission’s 1998 

ruling had identified as the source for local government duties 6 

and part of 7. But the minor changes to the procedures 

governing the filing of a petition for conditional release had no 

effect on those mandated duties. The ballot measure made only 

one minor, nonsubstantive change to section 6608, subdivision 

(a) but otherwise restated the statute verbatim. The voters also 

reenacted verbatim former subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 

6605 and, while amending former subdivision (b), made no 

changes to the mandated duties. Whatever else Proposition 83 

accomplished, it effectively left undisturbed these test claim 

statutes and the various mandates imposed therein. 

The Commission nonetheless found the mere existence of 

Proposition 83 sufficient to transfer fiscal responsibility for the 

costs of these duties from the state to county governments. In 

the Commission’s view, “the extent and degree of substantive 

amendments” made by a ballot measure are “immaterial” to the 
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source of the mandate. (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, 

Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), supra, at p. 

39.) The Commission believed “it is irrelevant to the analysis 

. . . whether Proposition 83 made any substantive changes at all

to the SVP code sections.” (Ibid., italics added.) What mattered 

instead, from its perspective, is that “Proposition 83 amended 

and reenacted wholesale most of the code sections that gave rise 

to the mandated activities found in the [1998] test claim.” (Ibid.) 

Relying simply on the fact that certain SVPA provisions were 

restated in Proposition 83, the Commission concluded that local 

government duties 1, 2, 3, and 6 (as well as part of 7) were 

“expressly included in” a ballot measure within the meaning of 

Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f). 

We conclude that the Commission’s approach is at odds 

with the constitutional requirement that the state reimburse 

local governments for the costs of complying with state 

mandates. (Cf. Yoshisato, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 989 [rejecting 

an interpretation that “assigns undue import to the technical 

procedures for amending statutes”].) If the term “ballot 

measure” in Government Code section 17556 were defined as 

automatically including every provision subject to 

constitutionally compelled restatement in an initiative, it would 

sweep in vast swaths of the California Code. Neither the 

Commission nor the other State respondents point to anything 

indicating that the Legislature intended to terminate 

reimbursement for existing state mandates simply because the 

provisions creating the mandate happened to be restated 

without change in an initiative statute. 

According pivotal significance to a mere technical 

restatement also would prove difficult to reconcile with 

Government Code section 9605. What this statute provides is 
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16

that “[w]here a section or part of a statute is amended, it is not 

to be considered as having been repealed and reenacted in the 

amended form. The portions which are not altered are to be 

considered as having been the law from the time when they were 

enacted; the new provisions are to be considered as having been 

enacted at the time of the amendment . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 9605; 

see People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 44, fn. 4 [where voterapproved amendments “did not substantively change the credits 

provision” in existing law, “there were no reenactments”].) As 

we have long held, “ ‘[t]he portions of the amended section which 

are copied without change are not to be considered as having 

been repealed and again re-enacted, but to have been the law all 

along.’ ” (Vallejo etc. R. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co. (1918) 177 

Cal. 249, 255.) Statutory provisions that are not actually 

reenacted and are instead considered to “ ‘have been the law all 

along’ ” (ibid.) cannot fairly be said to be part of a ballot measure 

within the meaning of Government Code section 17556, 

subdivision (f). 

Nor does the Commission persuasively reconcile a 

sweeping transfer of financial responsibility whenever a ballot 

measure happens to restate a provision containing a state 

mandate with the voters’ intended purpose in California 

Constitution, article IV, section 9. The purpose of the ban on 

unfunded mandates was to protect the strapped budgets of local 

governments in the wake of Proposition 13. (See Ballot Pamp., 

Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979) argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 18 

[“this measure WILL NOT allow the state government to force 

programs on local governments without the state paying for 

them”]; cf. California School Boards Assn. v. State of California, 

supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215 [language of former section 

17556, subdivision (f) “must be limited” because it “so clearly 
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contravenes the intent of the voters in passing Proposition 4”].) 

We have no basis to presume such stark fiscal effects would arise 

from these provisions’ compelled restatement, when those 

provisions are conceded to be bystanders relative to the changes 

wrought by a voter initiative. (See County of Sacramento v. 

Pfund (1913) 165 Cal. 84, 88 [“to construe a statute amended in 

certain particulars as having been wholly re-enacted as of the 

date of the amendment, is to do violence to the code and all 

canons of construction”].)

By treating those untouched statutory bystanders no 

differently from materially changed or newly added provisions, 

the Commission’s approach leads to results “that no one would 

consider reasonable.” (MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 635, 650; see People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 

583, 605.) The Commission’s view implies that merely restating 

a state-mandated duty in a ballot measure to renumber the 

section, correct punctuation or grammar errors, or substitute 

gender-neutral language (see, e.g., Yoshisato, supra, 2 Cal.4th 

at pp. 983, 985) automatically relieves the state of its obligation 

to reimburse local governments for performing their assigned

role. Ironically, such wholesale reallocation of financial burdens 

would occur under the Commission’s theory even if nothing in 

the initiative changed any activities the local governments were 

required to perform. Conversely, if the local government duties 

listed here happened to appear in a completely separate statute 

not subject to technical reenactment rather than appearing in 

the section Proposition 83 amended in other respects, they 

would have remained state mandates. The mere happenstance 

that the mandated duties were contained in test claim statutes 

that were amended in other respects not clearly germane to any 

of the duties — and thus had to be reenacted in full under the 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

18

state Constitution — should not in itself diminish their 

character as state mandates. 

So it is telling that the State respondents conspicuously 

avoid embracing the full scope of the Commission’s reasoning. 

What they argue instead is that the compelled reenactment of 

the test claim statutes transformed the state mandate into a 

voter-imposed mandate because the voters simultaneously 

limited the Legislature’s ability to revise or repeal the test claim 

statutes. They point to Proposition 83’s amendment clause, 

which provides in relevant part: “The provisions of this act shall 

not be amended by the Legislature except by a statute passed in 

each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of 

the membership of each house concurring, or by a statute that 

becomes effective only when approved by the voters. However, 

the Legislature may amend the provisions of this act to expand 

the scope of their application or to increase the punishments or 

penalties provided herein by a statute passed by a majority of 

each house thereof.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 

7, 2006) text of Prop. 83, § 33, p. 138 (Voter Guide).) In their 

view, these provisions no longer qualify as legislatively imposed 

mandates because the Legislature now lacks the power to 

amend or repeal these test claim statutes using the ordinary 

legislative process.

We disagree. The strict limitation on amending initiatives 

generally — and the relevance of the somewhat liberalized 

constraints imposed by Proposition 83’s amendment clause —

derive from the state constitution. Article II, section 10, 

subdivision (c) of the California Constitution provides that an 

initiative statute may be amended or repealed only by another 

voter initiative, “unless the initiative statute permits 

amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.” The 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

19

evident purpose of limiting the Legislature’s power to amend an 

initiative statute “ ‘is to “protect the people’s initiative powers 

by precluding the Legislature from undoing what the people 

have done, without the electorate’s consent.” ’ ” (Shaw v. People 

ex rel. Chiang (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 577, 597 (Shaw).) But we 

have never had occasion to consider precisely “what the people 

have done” and what qualifies as “undoing” (ibid.) when the 

subject is a statutory provision whose reenactment was 

constitutionally compelled under article IV, section 9 of the 

Constitution. 

The State respondents’ argument depends on one crucial 

assumption: that because of article II, section 10, subdivision 

(c) of the state Constitution, none of the technically restated 

provisions may be amended, except as provided in the 

initiative’s amendment clause. Yet the parties and amicus 

curiae California State Association of Counties and League of 

California Cities have identified at least nine legislative 

amendments to statutes technically restated in Proposition 83 

that — under the view espoused by State respondents — would 

be in violation of the initiative’s amendment clause. (See Voter 

Guide, supra, text of Prop. 83, § 33.) These amendments 

contained provisions that neither expanded the scope of the 

initiative, increased the punishment, nor garnered a two-thirds 

vote of each house. (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 443 [amending Pen. 

Code, § 667.5, subd. (a), which was technically restated in § 9 of 

Prop. 83]; Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 468 [amending Pen. Code, 

§ 3000, subd. (b), which was technically restated in § 17 of Prop. 

83]; Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 472 [amending Pen. Code, § 3001, 

subd. (a), which was technically restated in § 19 of Prop. 83]; 

Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 473 [amending Pen. Code, § 3003, subd. 

(a), which was technically restated in § 20 of Prop. 83]; Stats. 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

20

2011-2012, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011, ch. 12, § 10 [amending Pen. Code, 

§ 667.5, subd. (b), which was technically restated in § 9 of Prop. 

83]; Stats. 2012, ch. 24, § 139 [amending Welf. & Inst. Code, § 

6601, which was technically restated in § 26 of Prop. 83]; Stats. 

2012, ch. 24, § 143 [amending Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604, which 

was technically restated in § 27 of Prop. 83]; Stats. 2012, ch. 24, 

§ 144 [amending Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6605, which was 

technically restated in § 29 of Prop. 83]; Stats. 2012, ch. 24, 

§ 146 [amending Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6608, which was 

technically restated in § 30 of Prop. 83].) If the State 

respondents are correct that any amendment to a provision that 

happens to have been technically restated in a ballot measure 

must follow the amendment process provided in the initiative, 

then all of these amendments would be invalid. 

The State respondents take a narrow view of the 

Legislature’s power to amend a statutory provision when its 

reenactment in a ballot measure was compelled by the state 

Constitution. But they concede only “limited authority” 

supports this view. Indeed, the lone case cited by the State 

respondents is Shaw, but that case analyzed a legislative 

amendment aimed at the heart of a voter initiative, not a 

bystander provision that had been only technically restated. At 

issue in Shaw was Proposition 116, a 1990 voter initiative that 

in relevant part amended Revenue and Taxation Code section 

7102, subdivision (a)(1) to direct that a portion of sales and use 

taxes related to motor vehicle fuel (hereafter spillover gas tax 

revenue) be transferred to the Public Transportation Account 

(PTA), which was newly designated as “ ‘a trust fund’ ” within 

the State Transportation Fund. (Shaw, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 588-589.). The trust fund was to be used “ ‘only for 

transportation planning and mass transportation purposes.’ ” 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

21

(Id. at p. 589.) Proposition 116 also added section 7102, 

subdivision (d), which allowed the Legislature to amend section 

7102 by means of a statute passed with a two-thirds vote of both 

houses, but only “ ‘if the statute is consistent with, and furthers 

the purposes of, this section.’ ” (Shaw, at p. 590.) 

Notwithstanding these provisions, the Legislature in 2006 and 

2007 further amended section 7102, subdivision (a)(1) to qualify 

the required transfer of spillover gas tax revenue with the words 

“ ‘except as modified as follows’ ” (Shaw, at p. 601) and added 

other provisions that “[e]ssentially . . . appropriated money that 

was otherwise directed to the PTA to various other government 

sources and obligations.” (Shaw, at p. 592; see id. at p. 602.) 

The new subdivisions added by the Legislature went so far as to 

order these diversions from the PTA “notwithstanding any other 

provision of this paragraph or any other provision of law.” 

(§ 7102, subd. (a)(1)(G) & (H).) 

As the Court of Appeal readily observed, the Legislature’s 

2007 amendment was suspect for a specific reason: it sought to 

undo the very protections the voters had enacted in Proposition 

116. (Shaw, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597-598.) Unlike 

Proposition 83, Proposition 116 had not merely restated a key 

provision without change. Rather, Proposition 116 had added 

language to Revenue and Taxation Code section 7102, 

subdivision (a)(1) designating the PTA as “ ‘a trust fund,’ ” and 

elsewhere stated that the funds were available “ ‘only for 

transportation, planning and mass transportation purposes.’ ” 

(Shaw, at p. 589.) So when the Legislature –– a decade and 

seven years later –– sought to undermine the voter-created trust 

fund by adding new provisions to divert those funds from uses

the voters had previously designated, it was not amending a 

provision that had merely been technically restated by the 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

22

voters. (Shaw, at p. 597; see id. at p. 601 [“The voters’ intent to 

preserve spillover gas tax funding of the PTA would be 

frustrated if the Legislature could amend section 7102, 

subdivision (a)(1) to modify the amount of spillover gas tax 

revenue making it to the PTA.”].) Instead, the 2007 amendment 

sought to alter the voters’ careful handiwork, both the text and 

its intended purpose, and therefore was required to comply with 

the limitations in the initiative’s amendment clause. (Id. at pp. 

597-598.) To grant the Legislature free rein to tinker with 

spillover gas tax revenue and thereby undermine the PTA’s 

integrity would have defeated a core purpose of Proposition 116 

— “to convert the PTA to a trust fund dedicated to supporting 

transportation planning and mass transportation projects, and 

to preserve the funding of the PTA for such projects with 

spillover gas tax revenue according to the formula specified in 

section 7102, subdivision (a)(1).” (Shaw, at p. 601.) 

By contrast, nothing in Proposition 83 focused on duties 

local governments were already performing under the SVPA. 

No provision amended those duties in any substantive way. Nor 

did any aspect of the initiative’s structure or other indicia of its 

purpose suggest that the listed duties merited special protection 

from alteration by the Legislature. According to the Voter 

Guide, the intended purpose of Proposition 83 was to increase 

penalties for violent and habitual sex offenders; prohibit 

registered sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of a 

school or park; require lifetime electronic monitoring of felony 

registered sex offenders; expand the definition of an SVP; and

change the then-existing two-year commitment term for SVPs 

to an indeterminate commitment. (Voter Guide, supra, Official 

Title and Summary of Prop. 83,, p. 42.) Indeed, no indication 

appears in the text of the initiative, nor in the ballot pamphlet, 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

23

to suggest voters would have reasonably understood they were 

restricting the Legislature from amending or modifying any of 

the duties set forth in the test claim statutes. Nor is an 

overbroad construction of article II, section 10 of the California 

Constitution necessary to safeguard the people’s right of 

initiative. (See Bartosh v. Board of Osteopathic Examiners

(1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 486, 491-496.) To the contrary: Imposing 

such a limitation as a matter of course on provisions that are 

merely technically restated would unduly burden the people’s 

willingness to amend existing laws by initiative. 

A more prudent conclusion is to assign somewhat more 

limited scope to the state constitutional prohibition on 

legislative amendment of an initiative statute. When technical 

reenactments are required under article IV, section 9 of the 

Constitution — yet involve no substantive change in a given 

statutory provision — the Legislature in most cases retains the 

power to amend the restated provision through the ordinary 

legislative process. This conclusion applies unless the provision 

is integral to accomplishing the electorate’s goals in enacting the 

initiative or other indicia support the conclusion that voters 

reasonably intended to limit the Legislature’s ability to amend 

that part of the statute. This interpretation of article II of the 

Constitution is consistent with the people’s precious right to 

exercise the initiative power. (See Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 

Cal.3d 492, 501.) It also comports with the Legislature’s ability 

to change statutory provisions outside the scope of the existing 

provisions voters plausibly had a purpose to supplant through 

an initiative. (See Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor

(1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691.) We therefore hold that where a 

statutory provision was only technically reenacted as part of 

other changes made by a voter initiative and the Legislature has 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

24

retained the power to amend the provision through the ordinary 

legislative process, the provision cannot fairly be considered 

“expressly included in . . . a ballot measure” within the meaning 

of Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f).4

With that in mind, we turn to the statutory provisions 

identified by the Commission as the source for local government 

duties 1, 2, 3, 6, and part of 7 — i.e., Welfare and Institutions 

Code sections 6601, subdivision (i), 6605, former subdivisions 

(b)-(d), and 6608, subdivisions (a) and (b) and former 

subdivisions (c) and (d). The State respondents do not dispute 

that each of these provisions was technically restated in 

Proposition 83 under constitutional compulsion. They offer no 

reason — putting aside for the moment the expanded SVP 

definition — why these restated provisions should be deemed 

integral to accomplishing the initiative’s goals. Nor have they 

identified any basis for believing that it was within the scope of 

the voters’ intended purpose in enacting the initiative to limit 

the Legislature’s capacity to alter or amend these provisions. 

The Commission therefore erred in concluding that those 

provisions were expressly included in a ballot measure approved 

by the voters merely because they were restated in the 

initiative’s text. 

B.

Similar flaws afflict the Commission’s analysis of local 

government duties 5, 7, and part of 8, which derive from Welfare 

and Institutions Code sections 6602, 6603, 6604, and 6605, 

former subdivision (d). The Commission erred when it 

 

4 We disapprove Shaw v. People ex rel. Chiang, supra, 175 

Cal.App.4th 577, to the extent it is inconsistent with this 

opinion. 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

25

concluded that these activities were expressly included in the 

ballot measure simply because Proposition 83 had technically 

restated the applicable provisions of sections 6604 and 6605. 

For the reasons stated below, the Commission also erred in 

concluding that sections 6602 and 6603 were “necessary to 

implement” Proposition 83. 

The Commission’s conclusion was based on the theory that 

Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6602 and 6603 were 

indispensable to the implementation of other provisions that 

— according to the Commission –– were “expressly included” in 

Proposition 83. But we have determined that those provisions 

were not part of the “ballot measure” for purposes of 

Government Code section 17556, subdivision (f). And while 

Proposition 83 technically reenacted a provision of existing law 

stating that “[t]he rights, requirements, and procedures set 

forth in Section 6603 shall apply to all commitment proceedings” 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.1, subd. (b)), this did not make 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 6603 “necessary to 

implement” the ballot measure, either. The question here is not 

whether the protections in that section — i.e., trial by jury, 

appointed counsel, assistance of experts — are required by due 

process. The critical question is instead whether the SVP civil 

commitment program, which triggers those procedures, is 

mandated by the state or by the voters. 

We considered an analogous situation in San Diego 

Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2004) 33 

Cal.4th 859 (San Diego Unified). There, we considered whether 

the costs associated with mandatory expulsion hearings for 

students found to be in possession of firearms at school (see Ed. 

Code, § 48915, former subd. (b); Stats. 1993, ch. 1256, § 2, 

pp. 7286-7287) were a reimbursable state mandate. The 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

26

Commission argued that they were not, pointing out that most 

or all of the costs associated with an expulsion hearing were 

required by the federal due process clause. (San Diego Unified, 

supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 879-880; see Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. 

(c).) We disagreed. Federal law, at the time, did not mandate 

expulsion for possessing a firearm at school. (San Diego Unified, 

at p. 881.) While federal due process did afford certain 

protections whenever an expulsion hearing was held, it did not 

require “that any such expulsion recommendation be made in 

the first place.” (Ibid.) Because it was state law — and not due 

process — that required school districts to undertake an 

expulsion hearing in the first place, we held that the mandatory 

expulsion hearing costs were triggered by a state mandate and 

were fully reimbursable. (Id. at pp. 881-882.) Similarly, here, 

federal law does not require any inmate be civilly committed as 

an SVP. That mandate comes from state law. 

Here again, the State respondents avoid defending the 

Commission’s reasoning. Instead, they rely on the expanded 

definition of a “ ‘[s]exually violent predator’ ” in Proposition 83. 

(Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 83, § 24, p. 135.) As they point 

out, the voters broadened the definition of an SVP within the 

meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 in two 

ways. First, they reduced the required number of victims, so 

that an offender need only have been “convicted of a sexually 

violent offense against one or more victims,” instead of two or 

more victims. (Ibid.; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1).) 

Second, the voters eliminated a provision that had capped at one 

the number of juvenile adjudications that could be considered a 

prior qualifying conviction. (Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 

83, § 24, p. 136; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (g).) The State 

respondents contend that the specified local government duties 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

27

became necessary to implement the ballot measure, in that the 

Counties had been under no obligation to perform any duties for 

this class of offenders until the voters by initiative expanded the 

definition of an SVP. 

The Court of Appeal chose to dispose of this argument in 

a single sentence: “The Commission’s 1998 decision . . . 

concluded that Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 was 

not a basis for any of the duties for which the Counties sought 

reimbursement.” (County of San Diego, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 36.) The statement is true, but only to a limited extent. The 

1998 decision, which purported to address Welfare and 

Institutions Code sections 6250 and 6600 through 6608, did

state that “[t]he Commission denied the remaining provisions of 

the test claim legislation because they do not impose 

reimbursable state mandated activities upon local agencies.” 

(Cal. Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. CSM4509, supra, at p. 12.) 

Yet it would be misleading to suggest that Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 6600 was thereby rendered irrelevant 

to the duties set forth in the test claim statutes. None of the 

specified local government duties is triggered until an inmate is 

identified as someone who may be an SVP. (See §§ 6601, 6603, 

6604, 6605, 6608.) Although the SVP definition does not itself

impose any particular duties on local governments, it is 

necessarily incorporated into each of the listed activities. 

Indeed, whether a county has a duty to act (and, if so, what it 

must do) depends on the SVP definition. (See Voter Guide, 

supra, analysis of Prop. 83 by Legis. Analyst, p. 44 [“This 

measure generally makes more sex offenders eligible for an SVP 

commitment”]; cf. San Diego Unified, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 884 

[acknowledging that changes in federal law concerning 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

28

mandatory expulsion for firearm possession “may lead to a 

different conclusion” as to whether expulsion hearings remain a 

state mandate in future years]; Cal. Com. on State Mandates, 

Statement of Decision No. 01-TC-18 (May 20, 2011), p. 39 

<https://www.csm.ca.gov/decisions/052011sod.pdf> [as of

November 15, 2018] [concluding that changes in federal law 

concerning mandatory expulsion for firearm possession made 

the associated hearing costs a federal mandate].) When more 

people qualify as potential SVPs, a county must review more 

records. It must file more commitment petitions, and conduct 

more trials.5 One can imagine that if the roles were reversed —

i.e., if the Legislature expanded the scope of a voter-created SVP 

program — the Counties would be claiming that the burdens 

imposed by the expanded legislative definition constituted a 

state mandate. 

Unfortunately, the Commission never considered whether 

the expanded SVP definition in Proposition 83 transformed the 

test claim statutes as a whole into a voter-imposed mandate or, 

alternatively, did so to the extent the expanded definition 

incrementally imposed new, additional duties on the Counties. 

Its ruling granting the State respondents’ request for mandate 

redetermination instead rested entirely on grounds that we now 

disapprove. Moreover, the parties admit — and the Court of 

 

5 The ballot pamphlet said as much: “This measure would 

also affect state and local costs associated with court and jail 

operations. For example, the additional SVP commitment 

petitions resulting from this measure would increase court costs 

for hearing these civil cases. Also, county jail operating costs 

would increase to the extent that offenders who have court 

decisions pending on their SVP cases were held in county jail 

facilities.” (Voter Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 83 by Legis.

Analyst, p. 45.) 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

29

Appeal found — that the current record is insufficient to 

establish how, if at all, the expanded SVP definition in 

Proposition 83 affected the number of referrals to local 

governments. (See County of San Diego, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 36, fn. 14; cf. San Diego Unified, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 889 

[additional state statutory protections that were “incidental” to 

federal due process requirements, “producing at most de 

minimis added cost, should be viewed as part and parcel of the 

underlying federal mandate, and hence nonreimbursable under 

Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c)”].) Under the 

circumstances, we find it prudent to remand the matter to the 

Commission to enable it to address these arguments in the first 

instance. (See Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig, supra, 

44 Cal.3d at p. 837; California School Boards Assn. v. State of 

California, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1217.)

III.

Constitutional requirements governing matters such as 

voter initiatives and the Legislature’s financial responsibility to 

local governments must be read in context. When a ballot 

initiative is used to amend any part of an existing statutory 

section, the California Constitution requires that the initiative 

include the text of the entire statutory section to enable voters 

to understand the context of the proposed change. (Cal. Const., 

art. IV, § 9.) But this requirement is a modest means of 

informing voters about the proposed change by ensuring there 

is a straightforward before-and-after comparison of the 

statutory text. Neither by its terms nor by implication does it 

prevent a future Legislature from making appropriate 

amendments to the provisions that are merely technically 

restated in a ballot measure. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. 

(c).) Likewise, mere technical restatements do not necessarily 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

30

transform existing state mandates into voter-imposed 

mandates. (See Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (f).) 

Because the Commission erred in concluding otherwise, 

we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it 

reversed the judgment of the trial court. We remand the matter 

to the Court of Appeal, so it can direct the trial court to modify 

its judgment as follows: the trial court shall issue a writ of 

mandate directing the Commission to set aside the decisions 

challenged in this action and to reconsider the test claim in a 

manner consistent with this opinion. 

CUÉLLAR, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

MEEHAN, J.*

 

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 7 Cal.App.5th 12

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S239907

Date Filed: November 19, 2018

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Diego

Judge: Richard E. L. Strauss

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel (San Diego), Timothy M. Barry, Chief Deputy County Counsel;

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel (Los Angeles), Sangkee Peter Lee, Deputy County Counsel; Leon J. 

Page, County Counsel (Orange), Suzanne E. Shoai, Deputy County Counsel; Robyn Truitt Drivon, County

Counsel (Sacramento), Krista Castlebary Whitman, Assistant County Counsel; and Jean-Rene Claude 

Basle, County Counsel (San Bernardino), for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Laura Arnold for California Public Defenders Association and Law Offices of the Public Defender for the 

County of Riverside as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Jennifer N. Henning for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici 

Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, 

Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, Douglas J. Woods and Thomas S. Patterson, 

Assistant Attorneys General, Kathleen Boergers and Michael J. Mongan, Deputy State Solicitors General, 

Mark R. Beckington and Kim L. Nguyen , Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents 

Department of Finance, State Controller and State of California.

Camille Shelton and Matthew B. Jones for Defendant and Respondent Commission on State Mandates.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Timothy M. Barry

Chief Deputy County Counsel

1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355

San Diego, CA 92101-2469

(619) 531-6259

Michael J. Mongan

Deputy State Solicitor General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

(415) 510-3920