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ID CARDS: REISSUING BORDER CROSSING CARDS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

ORGANIZATION, AND PROCUREMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 25, 2008

Serial No. 110–152

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

——— ———

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND PROCUREMENT

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania,

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 25, 2008 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Edson, Tony, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular

Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Colleen M. Manaher, Director, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Customs and Border Protection, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security; and Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability Office ................ 7

Edson, Tony ............................................................................................... 7

Ford, Jess T. .............................................................................................. 27

Manaher, Colleen M. ................................................................................. 19

Fuller, Aaron, president, Computer Sciences Corp., Inc., Enforcement

Security and Intelligence Division; Rick Patrick, senior vice president

for Federal programs, L–1 Identity Solutions, Inc.; and William T.

Alsbrooks, former group vice president, Information Systems Credential

Technology Group, General Dynamics ........................................................ 76

Alsbrooks, William T. ................................................................................ 90

Fuller, Aaron ............................................................................................. 76

Patrick, Rick .............................................................................................. 82

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Alsbrooks, William T., former group vice president, Information Systems

Credential Technology Group, General Dynamics, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 97

Edson, Tony, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of ........................ 9

Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government

Accountability Office, prepared statement of ............................................. 29

Fuller, Aaron, president, Computer Sciences Corp., Inc., Enforcement

Security and Intelligence Division:

Followup questions and responses ........................................................... 94

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 79

Manaher, Colleen M., Director, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,

Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 21

Patrick, Rick, senior vice president for Federal programs, L–1 Identity

Solutions, Inc., prepared statement of ........................................................ 84

Towns, Hon. Elophus, a Representative in Congress from the State of

New York:

Followup questions and responses ........................................................... 58, 69

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

(1)

ID CARDS: REISSUING BORDER CROSSING

CARDS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND PROCUREMENT, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edolphus Towns (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Towns, Bilbray, Duncan, and Platts.

Staff present: Michael McCarthy, staff director; William Jusino,

professional staff member; Kwane Drabo, clerk; John Brosnan, minority senior procurement counsel; Charles Phillips, minority counsel; and Todd Greenwood, minority professional staff member.

Mr. TOWNS. The subcommittee will come to order. Let me begin

by first apologizing for our lateness, but we have to vote around

here. And, of course, we had some votes going on, and that is what

delayed us here.

Welcome to today’s oversight hearing on the border crossing

cards. Today we are examining an issue critical to the safety of our

borders and to national security. Each year, the State Department

issues millions of border crossing cards to Mexican nationals living

near the U.S. border. These cards are visa documents that allow

short-term travel across the border for business and tourism.

Now, visa documents like these allow valuable cultural and economic exchange. We want these documents to be processed and

used as the efficiently as possible so that this exchange happens

smoothly. As millions of border crossing cards expire between now

and 2012, replacing them will put tremendous pressure on our consular office in Mexico. The State Department will have a lot of

work to do to minimize the delays in coming years.

Two years ago, the full committee held a hearing on delays in

visa processing. In some countries, applicants had to wait more

than 5 months to get an interview. We have heard from many people across this land in terms of these delays and how to deal with

the damage to cultural and economic exchange.

Last summer, the State Department had a backlog of several

months in processing U.S. passport applications, which also hurt

tourism and commerce. So, it is with this recent history in mind

that we ask: what is being done to make sure this type of backlog

does not occur again in Mexico? However, we still have to make

certain, make sure we strike the right balance between security

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and openness and ensure that these documents are not abused by

anyone who wants to harm you.

This hearing will continue the subcommittee’s review of identification card programs in the Federal Government. I will let the

State Department’s witness go into detail about their plan. But I

would like to mention one part of it now.

State has contracted with Computer Sciences Corporation for a

pilot program to speed up the application process in Mexico. It will

do this by moving the data collection step, including the application, and fingerprint collection, to privately run offices, instead of

U.S. consulates. I think we should take a hard look at whether this

type of outsourcing will maintain security and government control

of visa issuance.

I look forward to hearing these concerns addressed today.

We will also hear today about the new security technology that

the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security

are using in the border crossing card. They have assured us that

the new card is much more secure than the version it is replacing,

but some critics have said that it is not. I’m glad that we will have

an opportunity today to hear more about the new card from security experts.

I would like to thank the ranking member, Congressman Bilbray

from California, for his work on this issue. He has been working

on it for quite some time. I know it’s very important to his community in San Diego. We also agree that the safety of our borders and

the openness of our travel policies are important issues. That is

why I’m glad we worked together on this hearing today, so we can

make sure that we are doing all we can to protect ourselves while

also allowing full opportunities for cultural and economic exchange.

I now yield to my colleague from California for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elophus Towns follows:]

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Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as you referred to, obviously my district and the

region of San Diego is very interested in this technology. San

Diego-Tijuana happens to be the largest port of entry in the world.

Just as we get news reports here about the commute up 95 or down

the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, in San Diego you get the report of how long the wait is at the border every morning—people

coming in and people going south later in the afternoon. That is

just part of our life that border crossing is not just a luxury; it’s

an essential part of our community.

But, Mr. Chairman, let me just say, I am proud to serve with you

as the ranking member, and I want to say this to the people testifying and listening here. This town right now is full of a lot of

Democrats looking to get Republicans and Republicans looking to

get Democrats. And, the priority of partisanship takes precedence

over so many other things. And, I am so proud to serve with the

chairman on a subcommittee that truly has abandoned that concept.

You do not see a Democrat or a Republican sitting up here today.

You see Americans looking to defend our community and our Nation as Americans. And, I am so proud to be able to be on a committee, that is so rare in today’s world in Washington, and that is

the ability to serve the Nation first and keep partisanship out of

the process as much as possible.

Mr. Chairman, as the 9/11 Commission final report said, for terrorists, travel documents are as important as a weapon. So as we

get to testimony today, I want you to know that this ranking member is looking at the fact that our responsibility as a subcommittee

is to make sure that just as important as it is to make sure that

terrorists don’t get weapons of mass destruction, that terrorists

don’t figure out how to kill our soldiers in Humvees or in vehicles,

just as important as making sure terrorists can’t get on airplanes

to kill another 3,000 Americans, it is just as important that we

make sure that we deny terrorists documents, that they can use as

weapons against the American people.

And it’s not as sexy, and it’s not going to be on the front page,

and it’s not going to be on the evening news, because you don’t

have the visuals that you have with what is going on overseas. But,

this is just as much a part of our national defense and our No. 1

responsibility as a Federal Government as all of those things.

I hope that we can now take the same attitude and same urgency

and the same commitment to quality and safety with armoring our

borders from terrorist attacks and illegal crossings as we would to

armoring our Humvees.

And so, with that, I just want to let the witnesses know ahead

of time, you’re not facing a separated panel in front of you, of a

Democrat and a Republican. You’re facing a united committee of

Americans, who want to make sure we get to the right answer, as

quickly as possible because nothing short of the defense of our

neighborhoods are at stake here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much and let me thank the gentleman for his kind words. Thank you for that as well.

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Let us now turn to the panel. It is a longstanding policy of this

committee that we swear in all of our witnesses, so if you would

be kind enough to stand at this time and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TOWNS. You may be seated. Let the record reflect that the

witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Let me begin with you, Mr. Tony Edson, the Acting Principal

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Consular Affairs with the State Department.

He has a great deal of experience with visa issuance.

We want to welcome you here, and we will begin with you and

then come down the line. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF TONY EDSON, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; COLLEEN M. MANAHER, DIRECTOR,

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE, CUSTOMS AND

BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY; AND JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

STATEMENT OF TONY EDSON

Mr. EDSON. Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Bilbray and distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to discuss what

the Department of State is doing to meet the increased workload

from the border crossing renewal program in Mission Mexico. The

challenging task facing us is clear. Millions of border crossing cards

first issued in April 1998 begin expiring this year.

Between 2008 and 2012, more than 5 million border crossing

cards will expire. By 2012, the workload in Mexico for visas and

border crossing cards resulting from normal demand and the BCC

renewal program could exceed 3 million cases. To meet this temporary and cyclical surge demand, we have developed a three-point

strategy: to implement new staffing programs, increase infrastructure to accommodate larger numbers of visa interviews, and to leverage technology to gain efficiencies and reinforce integrity in the

adjudication process.

To supplement our consular work force in Mexico during the

surge period, we have developed a framework for a flexible and

temporary work force of consular adjudicators, selected from a

highly qualified pools of applicants. This flexible work force will include assigning retired Foreign Service officers for discrete periods

of time, in addition to participants of two new programs, professional adjudication specialists and roving adjudication specialists.

Both of these new programs will hire qualified adjudicators who

have successfully completed all consular officer training and have

the language competency and other prerequisites.

We have also developed a facilities strategy that will increase

space available for BCC adjudication as well as demands for passport and nationality services affected by the Western Hemisphere

Travel Initiative rule. Consulate General Monterrey will serve as

a consular hub by accommodating overflow demand from our consulates in Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo. To accommodate this inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:22 May 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48811.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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crease in Monterrey, the Department is currently expanding interview window capacity from 10 to 26 windows by the end of this

year to perform an estimated 700,000 interviews per year.

We will also open a new, large conflict compound in Ciudad

Juarez in September 2008 and a new consulate compound in Tijuana, to be completed in 2010 in ample time for the BCC surge

there, which according to our projection should peak in 2011.

Innovations in technology enhance our staffing and infrastructure approaches as well as enhance efficiency and security. As you

mentioned, we’re piloting a new concept of visa processing, offsite

data collection, ODC, in Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo whereby a

contractor collects the biometric information from the applicants.

The consular officer then confirms that biometric information during the interview process.

By moving nongovernmental visa processing functions to an offsite contractor, consular personnel can better focus on critical governmental activities such as the security and integrity of the visa

process.

In its July 2007 report, ‘‘Security of New Passports and Visas

Enhanced, But More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use,’’ the GAO recommended that the Department reassess security features and redesign travel documents on a regular basis.

The advent of the BCC renewal program has offered the Department just such an opportunity to redesign the next generation of

BCCs.

Later this fall, we will begin replacing the current border crossing card with this new generation and much-improved card design.

The Department believes that the physical security of the card

itself is paramount. In designing both the passport and border

crossing cards, we reviewed a wide range of available security features and consulted with the interagency community and especially

with the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Forensic Document Lab to make the card as

secure and durable as possible. As a result of this collaboration, the

card’s design includes multiple layers of covert, overt and forensic

security features which provide safeguards against tampering and

counterfeiting and which also provide easy visual and tactile verification to our colleagues in the Customs and Border Patrol at the

ports of entry.

Let me acknowledge the cooperative relationship with the GAO

team and their current review of our plans to prepare for the workload demand in Mexico, generated by the BCC renewal program.

We have learned a lot of from their study and we appreciate it.

Thank you again, and I welcome your comments.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much for your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Edson follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. Ms. Manaher.

STATEMENT OF COLLEEN M. MANAHER

Ms. MANAHER. Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Bilbray and

other distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the security of the border crossing

card, how it compares with previous versions of the card and how

it’s integrated with other Federal identification card programs.

The Department of Homeland Security, in partnership with the

Department of State, is working to secure our homeland by

strengthening our ability to accurately identify all persons, U.S.

citizens and visitors alike, before they enter the United States.

We’re accomplishing this through the implementation of secure

document requirements at all ports of entry.

The Department of State has worked very closely with the Department of Homeland Security to develop a secure, highly tamperresistant passport card that includes vicinity RFID technology and

facilitates real-time verification of the document at land border

ports.

The newly redesigned, Department of State-issued border crossing card is modeled on the passport card and therefore will have

vicinity RFID capability that will contain layers of overt, covert

and forensic security features, making it as counterfeit and tamperresistant as the passport card.

The vicinity RFID capability will provide for the same electronic

verification of the document as the passport card, which means

verifying the document with the issuing source, which is a significant security enhancement over physical features alone. Our decision to adopt vicinity RFID technology for the land border was

based on the need to process legitimate travelers as speedily as

possible without impacting security. Vicinity RFID technology affords the most benefits for the facilitated movements of travelers,

including the ability to read a travel document in advance at the

land border, to verify identity, to pre-position information and,

most importantly, to perform watch list queries.

Our research and testing indicates this RFID technology is able

to accomplish each of these critical business requirements. Both

DHS and CBP have instituted ‘‘best practices’’ for the collection,

the protection and the use of personal information for the Western

Hemisphere Travel Initiative. No personal identifying information

is stored on the RFID tag, and all data is stored at remote locations

on secure storage devices that only can be accessed via DHS’s secure encrypted networks. Implementation of a card-specific tag

identifier number will ensure that cloned or duplicated RFID tags

can be detected electronically and in real time at the border.

On January 22, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security

published a privacy impact assessment for the use of vicinity RFID

technology for border crossings. In preparation for the full implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, we awarded a contract on January 10, 2008, to begin the process of deploying vicinity RFID facilitative technology and infrastructure to 354

vehicle primary lanes and 35 high volume land ports of entry,

which process 95 percent of all land border travelers.

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We have started the actual construction in our land border ports,

and the installation of the integrated solution will commence shortly. However, until that time, we currently have optical character

reader technology in place at air, land and sea ports of entry. This

technology reads any travel document with a machine-readable

zone, including passports, border crossing cards, trusted traveler

cards, permanent resident cards and the new passport card.

All CBP officers are currently trained in the use of this technology and this technology is being used right now. Our trusted

traveler programs, NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST, have a total of

462,000 members, and we expect to more than double that number

by the end of fiscal year 2009.

This year, trusted traveler cards are being upgraded to make

them WHTI-compliant and will included additional security features to make them more tamper-resistant.

These documents will be upgraded with vicinity RFID technology

that will allow them to be verified electronically against secure

DHS data bases.

In closing, these initiatives discussed today are only a portion of

CBP’s efforts to secure our homeland, and we will continue to provide our men and women on the front lines with the necessary

tools to help them gain effective control of our Nation’s borders.

I would like to thank Chairman Towns and Ranking Member

Bilbray for the opportunity to present this testimony today and for

your continued support of CBP. We will be happy to respond to any

questions.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Manaher follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Ford.

STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s ongoing

work being conducted for this subcommittee on the Department of

State’s efforts to prepare for the upcoming surge in its consular

workload in Mexico. We plan to issue our final report on this later,

at the end of July.

The U.S. Mission in Mexico is the State Department’s largest

consular operation in the world. In fiscal year 2007, it processed

about 1.5 million nonimmigrant visas, which is about 20 percent of

the global total. Moreover, its post in Juarez is the largest issuer

of U.S. immigrant visas in the world.

The U.S. Mission in Mexico also provides services, including

passport processing and emergency assistance, to around 20,000

American citizens living in Mexico. This already-significant consular workload is expected to increase dramatically in the coming

years as millions of nonimmigrant visa border crossing cards issued

in Mexico between fiscal years 1998 and 2002 will expire and need

to be renewed.

In addition, the implementation of the new travel requirements

under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative will, for the first

time, require U.S. citizens to carry passports or other approved

documentations when traveling between the United States and

Mexico.

The State Department must expand its consular capacity in Mexico to keep pace with this expected surge in demand. If State does

not take the steps necessary to adequately meet this growth in

workload, travel between the two countries could be significantly

affected, resulting in inconveniences and hardships for individual

travelers and negative consequences for the economies in both

countries.

Today, I will discuss two main observations in our upcoming report. First, I’m going to discuss State Department’s estimates for

its workload in the consulates in Mexico through the year 2012;

and second, I’m going to discuss the actions that the Department

of State is taking to address this increase in demand.

State anticipates that the Mission in Mexico will, through its

passport—excuse me, its NIV and passport workload will double

from fiscal year 2007 to 2011, which will be the peak year of demand.

The Mission in Mexico will experience a substantial growth in

NIV workload primarily due to the need to renew all of the border

crossing cards that are expected to expire. According to State Department forecasts, the Mission in Mexico—the demand will more

than double by the year 2011 to approximately 3 million applications. NIV demand will then begin to decline in fiscal year 2012.

The State Department acknowledges that it is uncertain about

how many actual cardholders will renew their cards and what the

number of first-time NIV applicants will be. However, State officials believe that the forecasts are more likely to overestimate demand. For purposes of planning, the Department is using a worstVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:22 May 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48811.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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case scenario in determining how many people it will need to hire

and how many windows it will have to build.

In addition to the increase in NIV workload, the Mission in Mexico will also face increases in passport workload due to the implementation of the WHTI. The magnitude of the increase in passport

workload is more difficult to forecast because, unlike NIVs, there

is no historical precedent. Also there is a great deal of uncertainty

as to how many U.S. citizens actually live in Mexico or the number

of citizens that are likely to apply for a passport.

Despite these challenges in developing forecasts, the State Department has created some initial estimates of workload increases

caused by these increases in demand. In anticipation of this demand, the State Department is taking several steps to ensure that

the consulates in Mexico keep pace with the projected workload.

The State Department is planning to add several new interviewing

windows at many of its posts, and it also plans to hire as many

as 100 temporary adjudicating officers to handle the workload that

is expected from the demand.

Consular officials we met with at many of the consulates in Mexico generally agree that their plan, if fully implemented, should address any increases in workload demand and not result in backlogs.

However, the State Department is continuing to revise its estimates on future workload, and we plan in our final report to have

the most current information available on that demand.

The State Department’s plan to hire temporary adjudicators will

almost double the number of officers currently in Mexico during the

surge. We identified some posts that may have some difficulties in

meeting demand because of the space that is available from the

windows. The State Department has a plan to address this problem

by having applicants move to another post, where they have expanded the window capacity, and hopefully, there won’t be any

backlogs in those posts.

Finally, the State Department has begun a pilot program that

outsources a portion of the NIV application process that does not

require the direct involvement of consular officers, including biometric data collection at offsite facilities. The pilot began in the

spring of this year in Nuevo Laredo and in Monterrey. Because it

is new, we have not been able to assess the potential impact of this

pilot on productivity, fraud and security.

We note that at this point the State Department has not developed milestones for completion of the pilot nor metrics to measure

the effectiveness of the pilot.

However, in conclusion, we believe the State Department has

done a good job of estimating what the potential demand is likely

to be, and that they have a plan in place that should, if fully implemented, address the potential for backlogs in the future.

This concludes my oral statement. I would be happy to answer

any questions.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Ford.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. Let me thank all of you for your testimony, and let

me move very quickly to you, Mr. Edson. And I would like to start

by saying the State Department plans for handling the upcoming

demand for border crossing cards seems to be a good one, but we

are still concerned about the contract with CSC.

Contracting experts say it’s generally poor practice to use a letter

contract, such as the one between State and CSC, because it does

not specify price or costs. This is the type of contract we generally

associate with concession sales at our national parks, not with anything like the important business of collecting visa application information, and this is a very important and very serious situation.

Why didn’t you take the time to draft a formal contract versus

a letter? This seems to be very important, and I can’t figure out

why you would just do a letter and not a contract.

Mr. EDSON. Thank you for that question.

We actually had a preexisting arrangement with CSC in Mexico

to provide user-paid information services and to assist in managing

our appointment system, so in a sense it was a concession during

the time it was being run as a letter contract. We have amended

that contract to allow for CSC to help with this pilot program.

Because we are interested in a full and open competition with a

regular RFP. We were concerned that we needed to know more

about this new business model, have enough detail concerning this

new business model, so we could do a regular detailed statement

of work in conjunction with a normal contracting model. That

statement of work is being worked on as we gain more experience

with the pilot and as soon as we’re satisfied that the pilot is completed and has been successful, we plan—hopefully, by the end of

the calendar year—to release a regular RFP onto the street.

Mr. TOWNS. We know that the original contract for the call center in Mexico was competed, but then it was extended to include

the work of the offsite data center pilot program.

Why wasn’t a contract for this work competed?

Mr. EDSON. At the time we began working on this new technology, this new business model for us, we were concerned that

competing it would move us too far out into the BCC renewal period. By the time we competed the pilot and then did a full—a regular competition for the worldwide use of this model, if and as appropriate, we thought we would be too far into the BCC renewal

period and that we ran a risk then of not meeting the demand.

So we thought we were better off with an amendment to run a

pilot to get the information we needed for a regular competition.

Mr. TOWNS. I understand that this is a pilot program, and you

may extend this model to other countries if it’s successful. Will

those contracts be competed? Or will they be letter contracts as

well?

Mr. EDSON. We are discussing with our acquisitions folks at the

Department of State the best contracting model to use; that is

something that still has to be determined. We would like to have

something as rigorous and fully and transparently competed as

possible.

Mr. TOWNS. Well, it just seems to me that for something that is

as very serious as this—I mean, that a official kind of contract

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would be drawn up. I don’t understand why you would just do it

by letter.

Mr. EDSON. Right at this point, we’re only doing that because we

extended the existing arrangement for pilot purposes.

Mr. TOWNS. The State Department and Customs and Border Protection—at this point, I’m going to yield to my colleague.

Go ahead. I yield to the gentleman from San Diego.

Mr. BILBRAY. First of all, let me premise this whole discussion

based on—are all three of you aware of what’s going on along the

border right now? Do you realize that 1,300 people have been murdered along our border on the other side? Do you comprehend why

so many people are being killed and what is happening there,

where you have law enforcement officers crossing into the United

States asking for asylum?

I only bring this up to just show you the degree of threat not only

of bad guys getting across the border, but the degree of corruption

and infiltration into our own operations.

Does anybody of the three panelists know what ‘‘silver or lead’’

means, the term ‘‘silver or lead?’’

Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Yeah, I know what it means. We just issued a report

on the problem in Mexico, by the way, last said October that basically the problem with law enforcement there is; and the ‘‘silver

and lead’’ analogy is basically: if you don’t take the payments from

the drug traffickers, they’re going to kill you. So——

Mr. BILBRAY. And that is the point. And I will tell you something. I only—I just wanted to start off with that.

Just understand, this is a pressure cooker of corruption, a threat,

and I just think those of us here in Washington have no idea how

bad it is. And I will say this publicly. It’s so bad that I’m trying

to get my daughter to move away from 2 miles from the border on

our U.S. side.

So that is the precedent. With 1,300 people—murdered it basically means, You take my silver or I’m going to shoot you or your

family.

That can be a very persuasive argument, and my concern is, as

we move forward, we are not naively operating in an environment

that is Peyton-Place-By-the-Sea. This is a very ugly world that

we’re confronting along the frontera.

With that, I think I can’t overstate the threat of our systems

being compromised, and not just our documents, but our entire operations. It’s hard to think that corruption somehow or that influence of ‘‘silver or lead’’ is somehow going to be protected because

of the Mexican border, especially then, because so much of our operations even have to be done in the foreign country where this

battle is going on.

I guess, DHS, my question to you is, if you discover that our security features have been compromised or simulated with relative

ease, are you prepared to make a significant change of security

measures to counter that threat?

Ms. MANAHER. In terms of the document, sir?

Mr. BILBRAY. Document and operations.

Ms. MANAHER. Yes, sir. And I think it’s important to note that

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ally be able to go back to the issuing source. So, right now, our officers, our land border is vehicle-based; it’s not person-based. So once

we deploy to WHTI, we will move from a vehicle-based system to

a person-based, meaning we’re actually going to go back to the Department of State and pull up that information for our officer. All

queries will be done in advance of that vehicle even approaching

that officer.

Mr. BILBRAY. You’re talking about operations. What I’m saying

is, if the documents been compromised, if the procedure for receiving the information and executing it and getting it to whomever is

compromised, do you have a contingency plan to modify the operation in time to protect the American people?

In other words, if you are compromised, if the technology you

have chosen gets compromised, is there a backup plan B?

Ms. MANAHER. Yes. If they could somehow—with the RFID, all

the card readers also have the machine-readable zone that can also

be used.

Mr. BILBRAY. What percentage of machine-readable is going to be

available?

Ms. MANAHER. Right now, almost all of the travel documents

that are issued.

Mr. BILBRAY. I’m talking about ports of entry.

Ms. MANAHER. We have deployed machine-readable technology to

all lanes at all land border ports of entry.

Mr. BILBRAY. Every one? Tecate, all the way down?

Ms. MANAHER. Yes, sir. They all have them.

Mr. BILBRAY. For this technology that is available right now?

Ms. MANAHER. For the current technology on the machine-readable zone.

Mr. BILBRAY. I’m talking about the new technology.

Ms. MANAHER. We are starting that now, sir, and we will have

that fully deployed with our schedule, of course, with construction

limitations by April 2009, sir.

Mr. BILBRAY. So your face-recognition technology will be available by 2009?

Ms. MANAHER. Our RFID technology reader system will be available by April 2009 at the top 39 land border ports of entry, yes.

Mr. BILBRAY. And your technology will have fingerprint and facerecognition technology?

Ms. MANAHER. It will have the facial. It will go back and pull up

the original face of the passport card to the officer—will be our facial biometric picture.

Mr. BILBRAY. Just the picture?

Ms. MANAHER. That’s right, sir.

If the officer feels that there is any type of imposter or any situation going on, he could refer that off of vehicle primary, refer that

to secondary, at which time that officer can do a full biometric

query back to——

Mr. BILBRAY. But that card itself does not have the finger biometric on it?

Ms. MANAHER. It does not.

Mr. BILBRAY. So the facial biometric is the only biometric you’re

using in this technology?

Ms. MANAHER. Correct.

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Mr. BILBRAY. I remember in our REAL ID legislation—that, if

you want to compare this to our REAL ID legislation where—Mr.

Chairman, I remember the debate that we were talking about, two

out of three, so that there were two biometric systems to confirm

within the cards. Has that gotten lost somewhere down in translation?

I remember specifically, there were three debates. I happen to

have worked on this during my sabbatical the voters gave me for

5 years.

Mr. TOWNS. Welcome back.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you. It’s always great to have a environmentally sensitive district that is willing to recycle Congressmen.

But I remember it was either your finger, the face recognition,

or the retina scan. Now, that has gotten lost somewhere down the

line. Now we’re just going to the face recognition——

Ms. MANAHER. I was speaking of the passport card, sir. The border crossing card, as you know, takes a full set of fingerprints, and

those are available to us in the secondary area for the border crossing card, for such a purpose.

Mr. BILBRAY. So, in other words, what—say you want to talk

about, the confirmation of fingerprint is based on data already on

file, and the card then opens up that data file, so then you can

check?

Mr. EDSON. Correct. We collect 10 prints in conjunction with the

application for a border crossing card. The first cards, when they

were originally applied for, two prints were collected beginning of

1998, end of 1998; and then, of course, the photos are there as well.

Mr. BILBRAY. So the code goes in. So, de facto, you have fulfilled

the REAL ID standard.

I want to make sure that—one of the things we have done in our

hearings is found out that the Federal Government has not been

upgrading all our IDs to the minimum standard that we set for the

States, which is kind of hypocritical, and I, for one, have talked to

the President about that.

But now we’re talking about how this card is compatible with

that. That is fine, but there are still major concerns with this. And

my biggest concern is that we have two or three, like we require

the States to have and what you’re saying is, because it’s on file

and this card accesses this file, that fulfills the fingerprint biometric requirement.

Mr. EDSON. Correct. And the photo is on the card itself.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. You know, we didn’t really study this. We issued a report last year on this issue. I think the only comment I would

make is that the potential vulnerability for the biometric fingerprints would be that primary currently can’t access, so—but the

tradeoff there is, if they started to do that, then you would have

traffic issues.

Mr. BILBRAY. Talk about the ones they can’t access.

Mr. FORD. Well, on primary inspection, it’s my understanding,

unless it has changed from a year ago, that the biometric

fingerprinting is not—the primary inspector is not going to have

access to that.

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Mr. BILBRAY. Primary. That segues into secondary. He has to

make that call. I understand that—I can understand procedurally

as somebody who has crossed the border many times—not just to

go surfing down south, either.

But let’s—what happens with the identification of the biometrics,

in other words, the fingerprints themselves? When you get the biometrics, what files or what records are available? You have—FBI

files are available, right?

Mr. EDSON. Correct.

Mr. BILBRAY. Immigration files available?

Mr. EDSON. Correct.

Mr. BILBRAY. So you do not have any fire walls like local law enforcement has. You have access to all State and Federal biometric

records there; California has had biometric fingerprints since 1978.

Mr. EDSON. We are fully integrated with DHS and with IAFIS,

the FBI’s fingerprint management system for criminal records. The

fingerprints we collect are shared immediately with the IDENT

DHS system; they’re all actually stored with IDENT, with USVISIT. A query then takes place against the immigration records,

the DHS records, our own previous visa records, which are stored

there for fingerprint purposes; and then passed through on the

FBI’s IAFIS prints data base. So we’re getting all federally maintained immigration, visa and criminal——

Mr. BILBRAY. What is the possibility of local law enforcement

having access to that data base? Do we have fire walls now

that——

Mr. EDSON. Unless you’re prepared to answer, I would have to

take the question.

It’s an issue that we have been working with law enforcement,

local law enforcement, on through DHS and their colleagues at

CJIC, the Criminal Justice Information Center, in West Virginia,

the FBI operation out there for 4 years or so.

There are some technical issues. There is a lot of sharing going

on. But I just, we would have to take the question to give you

an——

Mr. BILBRAY. I think you understand why the San Diego County

sheriff or the police department at El Paso would feel it’s essential

for them to be able to check, if they have fingerprints that they

need to cross-check, that this be part of the data file that they’re

able to access.

Ms. MANAHER. I actually believe that US-VISIT has entertained

a pilot program, I believe with Los Angeles County. But—we will

take that as for a cue for US-VISIT, but I believe they are moving

in that direction.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Let me come back to you again, Mr. Edson. The Competition in

Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation stipulate

rules for awarding contracts. It appears that they were not followed, because they only apply when the contractor receives appropriated funds. In this case, CSC is providing its services on a userpays system in which they receive payment for service directly

from the application fees.

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Does this mean that CSC has not been paid government funds

of any kind for this contract?

Mr. EDSON. CSC was not paid government funds of any kind for

the preexisting arrangement, the user-pays information services in

Mexico. I am fairly certain that is still the case.

But I would have to take the question to confirm in detail with

one of our acquisition folks.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. Why wouldn’t we have the applicants pay the Treasury for the services and then pay CSC from the Treasury?

Mr. EDSON. That is certainly—that is a central issue as we look

at the release of a request for proposal for a broader application of

this technology and this work process. It’s exactly that question:

How do we fund it? And I think that is where we’re going to end

up with the money going to the Treasury and then the Department

contracting directly in a more traditional model.

Mr. TOWNS. Let me just say that, you know, it’s not legally required in this case probably, but wouldn’t following the procedure

in the FAR and the Competition in Contracting Act be the best

business practice to prevent criticism?

Mr. EDSON. Again, I prefer to take the question. This was about

5 or 6 years ago, and I wasn’t involved in this original award, the

award with CSC for the information services in Mexico.

Mr. TOWNS. I must admit that I have some concerns.

Mr. Ford, let me go to you. It appears that State is taking steps

to make sure that these visas are processed as quickly as possible,

which is a top priority. The committee looks forward to reading a

more detailed review of how well it works once more, as time has

gone by.

How reasonable are State’s forecasts of the demand for visas and

passports?

Mr. Edson, how confident is State in your forecast? I just want

to sort of move along. Both.

Start with you first.

Mr. FORD. We have looked at the methodology that the State Department is using to forecast both the NIV and the passports. We

are much more confident of the NIV forecasts, because the primary

basis for their forecasts are the outstanding border crossing cards

that are already in existence. So they have a solid foundation of

knowing how many cards are already there, and then the rest of

the projection is based on how many new cards they believe they

will need. So we are very comfortable with the projection process

for the NIV cards.

We are less comfortable with the passport estimates, because

there is no historical basis for the new passport requirement, and

so therefore there is not a very good track record or foundation for

basing the forecast.

But the reason we’re a little less concerned about that is because,

when you tie that to the workload requirements for more staff and

for more facilities, the number of passports that are likely to potentially be needed is much, much smaller than the NIV. We’re talking in the neighborhood of tens of thousands versus an increase of

at least a million and a half.

So we’re not super-comfortable with the passport forecasts, but

we’re not as concerned about them, whether—how accurate they

vis-a-vis the overall workload, because the total numbers are not

likely to be anywhere near the same as the border crossing cards.

Mr. TOWNS. OK.

Mr. Edson.

Mr. EDSON. We agree with GAO. We’re not nearly as comfortable

with the passport projections.

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There are a large number of American citizens living on the

Mexican side of the border, who have never had to get a passport

before to travel into the United States. Because of that, we don’t

have any confidence that we know the number of American citizens

that are there. If they never asked us for a passport or asked us

for service, they have never come into contact with us.

We have done our best to estimate, but that estimation, as Mr.

Ford mentioned, has a pretty high fudge factor. We are submitting,

based on the best available data to us and surveys in the border

community, about 40,000 passport applicants. We are planning for

about 60,000 passport applicants. We currently have the capacity

for that higher number which, as you can see, is a 50 percent increase over our original estimate.

On the border crossing card site, though, there were 5 million

cards, give or take, issued during the period when the first border

crossing cards were issued in the late 1990’s, and some percentage

of that 5 million will be the surge workload as it comes in for renewal. So we have a very definite upper end to the estimate with

that estimate.

Mr. TOWNS. We understand that these offsite data centers will

not be marked on the outside as being affiliated with the United

States. We understand that, applicants will require appointments

to enter the facilities. However, we all want to make sure that

these facilities are as safe as possible. It will not be difficult for our

enemies to find out where these facilities are, and they have attacked our offices abroad in the past.

Mr. Edson, how will these offices be kept safe? Will it be the

State Department’s responsibility? Whose responsibility will this be

to protect them?

Mr. EDSON. Thank you for that question.

We are talking to the contractor, and we are certainly looking at

this as one of the issues as we move forward with a request for a

proposal. We have—we believe that the facilities are best protected

at this point by anonymity, even though, as you point out, they will

be well known as part of the visa process. That is just to be expected.

People will have appointments, they will need to go through

them to get the fingerprints collected before their interview, but it’s

an issue that we’re talking to our own computer people about as

we move forward on the contract.

Mr. TOWNS. Let me ask you, Ms. Manaher—and I would like to

get your views on it also, Mr. Ford.

Ms. MANAHER. I don’t really think the Department has an opinion on the offsite application data collection.

Mr. TOWNS. I’m sorry?

Ms. MANAHER. On the offsite data collectionsites. I would have

to take that back as a cue; I am not prepared to answer that, sir.

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Mr. TOWNS. OK, Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Although we are not including that in our current

study, we have done some work in the past regarding our safety

and security of U.S. employees outside of the embassies.

But the Department, as a general rule, wants all of its employees

to work in safe and secure buildings. That is why we’re building

all the new embassies overseas, to meet the new security standards.

With regard to private contractors, I’m not sure what the Department’s policy on that is in terms of what types of security should

be provided. I would think, however—since this is a pilot that could

have global implications, it seems to me that the Department really

does need to take a hard look at the security, particularly if they’re

going to operate these facilities in locations where we have hostile

environments.

So I think it’s something that should be included as part of the

assessment that the Department makes in terms of the determining whether this is a useful thing for the Department to expand

globally.

Mr. TOWNS. At this time, I yield to the ranking member.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you.

I just have to say one thing. If we really think that the bad guys

aren’t going to know where these facilities are, they will know

about it as soon as the wiring starts going in. I just hope we’re not

betting on that.

But the optical strip is being maintained on the green cards. It’s

on the present BCC cards. Why isn’t it being included in the new

card?

Mr. EDSON. Thank you for the opportunity to address that particular issue.

When the competition was let, a wide number of cards were proposed for testing. We were able to select from a wide variety of security features that provide multiple or overlapping layers of security, both overt, covert and then the forensic. In that context, a

number of things were proposed that we believe provide a secure

document.

Our experience with the optical stripe was not uniformly positive

and there were some issues with the stripe over time. But I think,

more importantly, this was 10 years later, and we were looking at

implementing a new card with a new format as a standard. It’s a

standard practice for us in terms of document security that each

generation is altered to improve its security.

Mr. BILBRAY. Why doesn’t the new green card have them?

Ms. MANAHER. I think it’s important to note that the green card

is currently going to have a CBP requirement, which is vicinity

RFID made for Customs and Border Protection. I would have to

take that back to the Department and CIS for the requirement——

Mr. BILBRAY. Is there a reason not to have both?

Ms. MANAHER. For Customs and Border Protection it is no longer

an operational requirement for us for the optical memory stripe.

We found it——

Mr. BILBRAY. The question is, is there a reason not to have both?

Mr. EDSON. On our card, when we looked at it, we believe that

the security features we have are adequate, are more than adeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:22 May 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48811.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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quate, that this is actually a superior product in every way, and

the old style card was easy to wash.

The optical stripe does peel over time. It scratches and it is difficult to read. It requires a proprietary reader that doesn’t always

function as advertised and was never deployed very widely.

As we looked at other options, we thought that the options we

selected for use in the border crossing card provided us with a better package of security features.

Mr. BILBRAY. Has the optical card ever been falsified or used—

has it ever been used to produce a false document?

Mr. EDSON. We have seen counterfeit optical stripes. I don’t believe that they’re readable. So that——

Mr. BILBRAY. So the problem is not that they’re forgeable, the

problem is that they may get destroyed somewhere down the line?

Or is it that the readers are proprietary, and you don’t want to

have to pay the proprietary fee?

Mr. EDSON. Well, no optical stripe was presented for testing as

part of this contracting process, which I guess is core to this particular issue. But there were—again, from our perspective, the security features that were selected provided such deep, overlapping

security to the card that it wasn’t necessary to look at the optical

stripe in addition to those features.

Mr. BILBRAY. That technology was presented, though, for a pass

card wasn’t it?

Mr. EDSON. For the passport card?

Mr. BILBRAY. In the pass card, the optical.

Mr. EDSON. The passport, it was not presented for testing by any

vendor for the passport card, no.

Mr. BILBRAY. Let’s get back to this secondary/primary check.

For the last few months that I have been going through international airports, when I have been coming in from south of the

border or outside, it looked like every window had a finger reader

on it, even the ones we were using as U.S. citizens.

They weren’t using it for U.S. citizens, but was my observation

correct that——

Ms. MANAHER. Yes, sir. It’s correct.

Mr. BILBRAY. The booths are all manned?

Ms. MANAHER. In the air and sea environment, it is in all the

primary lanes.

Mr. BILBRAY. May I make a suggestion, as a frequent user, as

an American, I would like to be able to have the option to go ahead

and go use the reader system somehow like the Clear Card is used.

Because, if you go through international airports now, the system

is working so good for foreign travelers that the backup for Americans is huge, because we’re still using the old system for Americans.

Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. The last time I went through, I experienced what

you’re talking about.

Mr. BILBRAY. Exactly, and I’m just saying that I know we don’t

want to mandate this on U.S. citizens now, for political reasons,

but at least we ought to provide the option so when an American

is sitting there and seeing the foreign-born zipping through—let me

say, the praise of the foreign travelers to our system has been

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great. They love it. Instead of the 30 questions and all the other

stuff about where your aunt is from or whatever, you go in, you get

a positive and you move. And I think it’s a great example that

technology done appropriately can really free up the individual and

avoid problems. And I just want to make that plug that there

ought to be a way for us, like the Clear Card, to be able to access

the system and use it. Because the card, the readers are there, not

being used on the U.S. side.

But that aside, let me take you to task on that. The ports of

entry, the land ports of entry, you’re proposing not to provide

that—only those that are taking the secondary. And the issue is

that it will take too long to use biometric confirmation?

Ms. MANAHER. No, sir. I just don’t think the technology is there

to meet our operational requirements.

We’re still in a land border environment. We have an antiquated

infrastructure. We have weather issues. We have a family of eight.

It’s just——

Mr. BILBRAY. I understand that. Even with the family of eight—

and again as somebody who is going through again and again—we

have the great technology now that while they’re waiting in a line

in a car, we’re reading their license plate, aren’t we? Long before

they pull in, we have the technology, because of the waiting process, to be able to process people in a lot of different ways.

I will be very frank with you. I really don’t think you’re being

aggressive enough at looking at how to use more technology on the

land base and I think it really can help the process. I think it can

speed up the process.

The trouble is changing the operational mind-set from what it

has been since 1950 to what it can be now. And we’re still stuck

in the same border shack that I saw when I was sneaking down

south to catch a couple of beers on Revolucion; and that mind-set

is still there.

And believe me, the people checking there are my friends and

neighbors. They have been my friends and neighbors my entire life,

so I know the people that are in operation there.

But I really think that there is more you can do with technology.

And secondary, as a backup, you still are asking an officer to make

a judgment call at the primary port of entry like you have since

1950. The difference is, you may speed up the secondary check, but

you’re still having a slower process, because I don’t think you’re

utilizing technology.

And I have seen the benefits at our airports. I really ask you to

keep an open mind in applying it to that land base.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you. Thank you very much, and let me just

run through this very quickly.

Ms. Manaher, there have been some who have said that the new

design for the passport card and the border crossing card is not as

safe as the older design. I’m very glad that you’re here today, because there are people on both sides of this that I respect, you

know. So maybe you can sort of straighten it out today and tell us

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sign for the passport card and the border crossing card more secure

than the design it is replacing?

Ms. MANAHER. Yes, in my opinion it is, sir. And remember, our

primary officers have a very limited amount of time to make, you

know, really quick judgments about the admissibility of folks entering the United States. The key to us is not so much the actual document itself, but rather the ability to go back to an issuing source

and pull that information. So even if you have an imposter before

you, you can look and see, well, wait a minute here, that is not the

same guy who applied for this a few years ago. That issuing source,

that ability to go out and pull back, takes away from even—makes

the document through system connectivity a far greater security

feature than an actual physical security feature for us.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Edson, this is my last question. Background

checks for the employees of the data centers, do they receive a full

check or only a name check? Could you tell me? Background check

for the——

Mr. EDSON. I’ll have to take the question. I’m not familiar with

that part of the contract.

Mr. TOWNS. Because information——

Mr. BILBRAY. Anybody familiar with it? That is a big question.

That is a huge question.

Mr. EDSON. They have access—we’ll answer that question.

Mr. BILBRAY. It might affect the efficiency of the system if al

Qaeda is issuing these cards.

Mr. EDSON. These—we are talking only about—I believe we are

only talking about the employees who are checking to ensure that

the applicant completed their on-line application completely, all the

fields were completed and then took the fingerprints. The fingerprints and the data go through a series of security screens before

they are admitted into our—on the other side of the firewall into

our systems. And then when the applicant appears for the interview, their fingerprints are checked on a random basis. Our system

generates a random request for the officer at the time of interview

to reprint the applicant. But at that point the check has already

been done, so the officer is just verifying that the prints that were

collected offsite match the prints on the person in front of them at

the time of interview. But that is why we believe this is perhaps

not as important as it might be, but we will definitely answer the

question.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Edson, how many Mexican applicants are going

to be physically interviewed? Are all the foreign nationals being

physically reinterviewed as we reissue these cards?

Mr. EDSON. Today every applicant is being physically reinterviewed.

Mr. BILBRAY. Where?

Mr. EDSON. In the consulate sections in Mexico, not in the offsite

data center. The law, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, in December 2004, provided the Department of State

with the authority to waive interviews in a very limited number of

cases for applicants applying for renewal of a visa in the same category within 12 months of expiration. We intend to use that capability if there are no other fraud indicators, but all these people

who are renewing with the 10 prints collected offsite—the prints

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will be matched against the two index prints collected at the time

their original border crossing card was processed. There still has

been a biometric confirmation through U.S. controlled data before

we would ever entertain the idea of——

Mr. BILBRAY. From the old file?

Mr. EDSON. Correct, correct.

Mr. BILBRAY. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EDSON. Their biographic data would have to match. If there

is a change in their name or something, we’ll call them in.

Mr. TOWNS. Let me—why wouldn’t the card be more secure if it

included the optical stripe in addition to the other features?

Wouldn’t the card be more secure?

Mr. EDSON. The card—I can’t answer the question simply yes or

no. The card as put together has a number of security features that

security experts, including the forensic document lab at ICE, the

Secret Service, the International Reproduction Resource Center

that is run by a consortium of central banks, including our own

Federal Reserve Board, Sandia Labs—I mean, number of experts

in documents tested these documents as part of the competition

and we believe that we have a more secure document now than we

had with the older card.

Mr. TOWNS. Let me go at it another way. Well, why wouldn’t you

include more security features rather than fewer, especially if they

don’t conflict with each other?

Mr. EDSON. At a certain point—I’m not positive. I don’t know if

we could have fit the optical stripe on this card. At a certain point,

though, the number of features, the nature of those features, there

are unprecedented—the Kinegram, for example, the hologram that

is on the face of this card—if I could perhaps, I could share copies

of the card to look at. The Kinegram is a mixture of transparent

metallic features that is not used anywhere else in the industry.

We’ve integrated into several layers of the card material. It is not

actually pock stamped on top as is usually the case. So that it overlaps with the photo and with the biographic data. The photo and

the biographic data are laser engraved. So once again they go

through several layers of the card material.

This card has been produced in such a way that altering any of

that actually destroys the card. Yes, it could be peeled apart, but

then there would be nothing left. Any card—I showed you the

BCCs we have now can be peeled apart, but then there would be

nothing left of the card, because of the way it is put together. And

we believe we have the best product for the need right now in this

card.

Mr. BILBRAY. You don’t believe that somebody with a hot knife

might be able to have the technique to remove that physically?

Mr. EDSON. They couldn’t. The card would be useless if they did.

I mean, they could split the card into polycarbonate layers perhaps,

but there would be nothing left to do anything with.

Mr. TOWNS. Well, let me thank all of you for your testimony, of

course, and I still feel we have a lot of work to do. I really, really

do. I think that, you know, we are a long ways from being there,

and, of course, we have to continue to do that. And we are going

to be here. We’re not going to go away. I just need to just let you

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know that, of course, so you can continue to work with us. And we

want to be helpful where we can as well.

So thank you so much for your testimony.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the panelists, too.

And let me just say, look, we are going to be working on this, implementing it in the next 6 months, but we’re going to be implementing it over the next couple of years. So it is going to transcend

administrations. And I would just ask that you recognize that we

have major concerns and we want to work with you to make this

happen. And I just have to tell you, the concern we have is about

why not use some of this. If it costs a little more—just understand

this as being like the Kevlar vests that are protecting the neighborhoods instead of soldiers. You don’t want to have to answer to your

right, doggone it, if we just put a little more in, one more layer,

that could have saved the community’s life and then we could have

stopped a breach.

So this thing is really scary. Sometimes I don’t know how to emphasize how important the work you are doing. So that is why,

please, both our offices are available to work with you, to dialog

with you and ask you some tough questions. We want to make you

uncomfortable so that you do the best job you’re capable of doing

so you can be—make sure that your grandchildren are safe.

Thank you.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much. Thank you. Panel No. II,

please come forward. Before you sit, just continue to stand and

we’ll swear you in. Then we won’t have to get back up. Waiting on

Mr. Alsbrooks.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TOWNS. Let me begin with you, Mr. Fuller. Mr. Aaron Fuller,

the President of the Computer Science Corporation Enforcement

Security and Intelligence Division. Welcome. We begin with you.

STATEMENTS OF AARON FULLER, PRESIDENT, COMPUTER

SCIENCES CORP., INC., ENFORCEMENT SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISION; RICK PATRICK, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS, L–1 IDENTITY SOLUTIONS,

INC.; AND WILLIAM T. ALSBROOKS, FORMER GROUP VICE

PRESIDENT, INFORMATION SYSTEMS CREDENTIAL TECHNOLOGY GROUP, GENERAL DYNAMICS

STATEMENT OF AARON FULLER

Mr. FULLER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

Bilbray, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your invitation to testify at today’s hearing. I am Aaron Fuller, President

of CSC’s Enforcement Security and Intelligence Division. I’d like to

say just a few words about CSC followed by an overview of the contractual efforts performed by my organization that may be of interest to you today.

CSC is a leading global consulting systems integration and management services company with approximately 90,000 employees

headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, with reported revenues of

$16.5 billion for the 12 months ended March 28, 2008. I’m President of CSC’s Enforcement Security and Intelligence Division, and

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my clients include Department of State and other U.S. Government

agencies.

We have two contracts with the Department of State in support

of the Bureau of Consular Affairs. The initial CSC contracts for

user paid visa services were competitively awarded in 2000 by GSA

for the Department of State, and from the inception of these initial

contracts, CSC has delivered visa information services and appointment scheduling support to 40 U.S. missions around the world.

CSC’s work in Nuevo Laredo and Monterey is a 1-year effort

under one of the contracts with a period of performance from January 2008 to January 2009. Our Applicant Service Centers [ASCs],

in these two locations in Mexico are paid for by the applicants for

nonimmigrant visas, not with congressionally appropriated funds.

A proof of concept facility was opened in Nuevo Laredo on March

24, 2008 to service up to 65,000 applicants per year as required by

our contract, and a pilot facility was opened in Monterey on April

18, 2008 to service up to 250,000 applicants per year, also as required by the contract.

I’d now like to quickly step through the typical applicant experience in those two facilities. A nonimmigrant visa applicant calls

our visa information service phone number or accesses our selfservice Web site to receive information about the visa process and

to schedule appointments both at an ASC and at the local U.S. consulate. An applicant enters their application information on an

electronic form available through a Department of State Web site.

On arrival at the ASC, there are multiple layers of security to

ensure that each applicant has a scheduled appointment and the

necessary visa application documents with them. A CSC employee

now begins the data collection process. They retrieve the electronic

record from the Department of State using the remote data collection software provided by State. Next the CSC employee checks the

applicant’s passport number and name to see that they match what

the applicant entered online at the State Department Web site. The

CSC employee scans the applicant’s Mexican passport, collects a

digital fingerprint from all 10 fingers and takes a digital photograph of the applicant. This digitized information is now in the applicant’s electronic record in the State Department provided software. At that point, the State Department provided software automatically transmits the updated electronic information via the

Internet to the State Department.

The last step in the ASC process is for the applicant to provide

information to CSC’s courier service for delivery of the applicant’s

approved visa if a visa is approved by the U.S. consulate. The applicant has now completed the ASC experience in CSC’s service

center. The applicant’s next step is to attend their consulate appointment.

Through June 18, 2008, the Nuevo Laredo facility has averaged

50 applicants per day. The Monterey facility has averaged 400 applicants per day. All of our in-country staff members have undergone a Department of State name check by the local U.S. consulate.

Employees of the ASCs are under the supervision of an American

citizen who holds a security clearance issued by the U.S. Government.

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CSC is pleased to be engaged with the Department of State in

efforts to improve the efficiency of visa processing. We fully support

the efforts of Congress and State and other Federal agencies to

oversee, plan and deliver these services.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. I would be

pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fuller follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Fuller.

Mr. Patrick. Push the button. Yes. Good, thank you.

STATEMENT OF RICK PATRICK

Mr. PATRICK. Good afternoon, Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Bilbray, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee.

I’m Rick Patrick, Senior Vice President of Federal Programs for the

Secure Credentialing Division of L–1. I appreciate the opportunity

to appear before you to participate in today’s important discussions.

I plan on using my time to touch on a few highlights from my written testimony.

L–1 Identity Solutions is a portfolio of companies organized along

four primary business areas, secure credentialing, biometrics, enrollment services and intelligence consulting. The Secure

Credentialing Division focuses on creating secure identity documents such as passports and driver’s licenses. We have designed

over 2,000 card types and integrated well over 50 security features

in these ID cards. We produce more than 35 million ID documents

a year.

Most recently we have been awarded the passport card contract

after a full and open competition run by the Department of State.

In fact, we have already delivered the first 125,000 production

cards to them. In addition, our contract calls for the production and

design of the next generation border crossing card using the same

production platform as the passport card.

To be clear, this contract is separate from the one that CSC was

awarded for visa processing. Both the passport card and the border

crossing card are aimed not only at enhancing security, but also at

facilitating commerce and expediting passenger processing.

As set forth by the requirements of the Department of State and

DHS, the two cards contain RFID technology to meet the operational requirements of CBP at land ports of entry.

The cards also incorporate a number of tactile and visual security features that prevent tampering and make it easy for an inspector to quickly ascertain its validity. Among these features are

laser engraved photo and text, rainbow printing, color shifting ink,

laser engraved tactile features, micro printing and an embedded

optical variable device. In addition, there are many classified features we cannot describe in this open forum. Taken together, these

features make it very difficult to counterfeit the card. As a result,

these credentials will be among the most secure in the world.

With respect to privacy, the RFID technology embedded in the

card does not carry any personal or biometric information. The chip

contains only a number which is a pointer to a record in the government data base. Using this number, the traveler’s information

is retrieved from the government’s data base via a secure connection so that the CBP officer has an opportunity to review it before

the traveler arrives at the window. The use of the pointer number

protects personal privacy, because no information is stored on the

card and the data base record can only be accessed when the card

is presented. If the card is lost or stolen, a CBP officer would be

able to determine quickly that an imposter was using it either by

comparing the photograph pulled from the government data base

or as in the case of the border crossing card, by performing a bioVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:22 May 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48811.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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metric match between the traveler’s fingerprint and the one stored

on the government’s data base at secondary inspection.

Finally, as an additional privacy measure, an RFID shielding

sleeve has been provided to U.S. citizens. The work to produce the

credentials is being done here in the United States in a secured facility in Mount Pleasant, TN. The team L–1 assembled for this

project is composed of well-established American companies. The

individuals involved in the production process are vetted through

the criminal background checks. The security materials we use to

create the documents are not readily available in the marketplace

but only to government agencies and vetted security printers.

As I conclude my testimony today, I would like to reiterate that

we at L–1 take great pride in the work that we do in our partnership with the U.S. Government and we look forward to continuing

to be a part of this critical discussion and once again appreciate the

opportunity to appear today. I’d be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Patrick follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Alsbrooks.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM T. ALSBROOKS

Mr. ALSBROOKS. Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Bilbray, and

other distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for

the invitation to appear before you today.

A quick background. I retired from General Dynamics Information Technology in the fall of 2007, and today I run my own consulting firm called Great Bear Solutions Group. In the interest of

full disclosure, I have served as a paid consultant to both OVD

Kinegram and Lasercard. For almost 20 years, I was the Vice

President in charge of the Credential Technology Group. Since

1995, my group deployed over 40 million secure ID cards of all

types containing the most sophisticated security features known.

DHS has stated that RFID infrastructure will be deployed to only

39 POEs. BCC cards will be used for identification where there are

other places where there are no readers.

Given these facts, it is important to understand the following:

these cards must provide for reliable, face value visual authentication. Features that require special readers are of little or no value

to a Tier 1 inspector. If a secure ID card cannot be visually authenticated with an unaided eye, it is poorly conceived and easily compromised.

Unfortunately, the BCC card that the State Department intends

to deploy will effectively lower the bar on ID card security for this

generation of cards, which I believe poses a grave threat to our national security. The most durable, secure and tamper resistant card

available for the American public is the card that has been developed for the permanent resident green card. This advanced technology card incorporates all of the security features specified for

the border crossing and passport cards, including the RFID chip.

However, it is significantly more reliable on face-value inspection

because of the inclusion of the latest state-of-the-art laser engraved

optical stripe. It contains high resolution images, which function at

a forensic level yet offer unsurpassed visual authentication when

used only with an unaided eye.

The new card specifications for the BCC and passport cards do

include overt, covert and forensic features; however, they rely heavily on security features most commonly associated with currency.

Most of these features require the use of specialized tools to validate. All of these features are regularly simulated in counterfeit

currency worldwide every day.

It is the nature of the secure document business and in the best

interest of the American public that the best of breed proprietary

single source technology be utilized in secure ID cards. Most of the

technology that has been specified for the new card is single source.

The OVD Kinegram was chosen by the State Department and separately sole sourced. The artwork is done on proprietary software.

The color changing inks are single source. If scrambled indicia is

used, it is a proprietary technology. Any type of traceable particulate or security threat will be proprietary and require proprietary

readers.

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The optical stripe is a proprietary single source feature. I believe

that it offers a solid and unique security benefit and should be utilized. The Department of State has bet the whole farm on the visual security of the laser engraved personalization and the OVD

Kinegram. Laser engraving on polycarbonate for personalization is

not new technology. It is not unique, nor is it difficult to duplicate.

It is not impossible to alter. And tactile features are not difficult

to create.

I believe that laser should be used for personalization of these

cards; however, it is not a feature that is going to stop a counterfeiter. Laser engravers are readily available, affordable for low volume counterfeiters and can be purchased on eBay.

OVD Kinegram produces an extraordinary optical variable device. It is a unique combination featuring both metalized and transparent materials. It has horizontal and vertical movement, color

defractive light shifting and multiple images. My group has used

Kinegrams since 2002 and I recommend that Kinegram be used on

these cards. It is the best of the breed in the world.

But all that glitters is not gold, and sophisticated holograms,

both authentic and counterfeit, are now widely manufactured and

readily available worldwide. Technology to produce holographic devices is not closely held. Unfortunately, it is a feature that can be

simulated and will not stop an accomplished counterfeiter.

It is important to note that the Kinegram feature is not unique.

It is not unique to an individual. They are visually all alike. Once

the OVD has been compromised, a simulation can be mass produced.

Also of great concern to me is the fact that the Kinegram can be

removed from a real card intact and reapplied to a counterfeit. I

have one here that has been removed intact, this original

Kinegram—and it can be applied to a new card. I would be glad

to show this to you. Even though the card plans to embed the OVD

under the top layer of the card, it can be readily separated using

heat and a knife or any of several solvents, which can be purchased

at local drug or hardware stores. Again, any accomplished counterfeiter will have no problem doing this once he gets his hand on an

authentic card.

Today’s state-of-the-art laser printing is actually being done utilizing an optical stripe. This technology does constitute a huge obstacle to counterfeiters. The new border crossing cards should continue to include an optical stripe. Only then can the State Department legitimately claim to be issuing the most durable, secure and

tamper resistant cards available to the American public.

There are two distinct components to the overt features on the

new cards, common images like portraits and statues that can be

easily seen with a naked eye yet retain their integrity under 400

power magnification. Each optical stripe is now available in a 24-

millimeter width, is uniquely personalized. These features have

been designed in close consultation with a forensic document lab.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Alsbrooks, I hate to——

Mr. ALSBROOKS. I beg your indulgence.

Mr. TOWNS. When we get back, I’m going to ask you some questions. The only thing about it, we have to go vote.

Mr. BILBRAY. But we’ll be back specifically——

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Mr. TOWNS. We will suspend until 4:15. We will come back. OK?

We have to go vote. They’ll criticize you, you know.

[Recess.]

Mr. TOWNS. Let’s continue. Let me begin with you, Mr. Fuller.

Now, we are trying to get a better sense of why this contract was

created the way that it was. Using a letter contract for this deal

seems very unusual. A regular contract would have specified a sum

that CSC would collect for its services, guaranteeing a certain

amount of income. I don’t mean to lecture you on how to conduct

business, but wouldn’t signing a regular contract in which State

specified how much it would pay have been a safer business practice for CSC?

Mr. FULLER. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. CSC responds to a wide range of types of government contracts, has a

wide portfolio of types of contracts that we accept and this falls

into that as a normal practice.

Mr. TOWNS. As a normal practice?

Mr. FULLER. A wide range of government contracts and this is

one of several kinds that CSC responds to.

Mr. TOWNS. OK. Applicants must pay a $26 fee for the data collection at the offsite centers. Who sets that fee?

Mr. FULLER. The fee was set by State Department.

Mr. TOWNS. What is the profit margin on the data collection? Do

you know?

Mr. FULLER. These are pilot programs and we don’t know how

that will turn out yet. We’ve only been operating for 2 months and

don’t know the results.

Mr. TOWNS. We asked Mr. Edson about this on the first panel.

L–1 announced last year that it hired Frank Moss, former Deputy

Assistant Secretary for Passport Services for State Department as

a consultant. Federal law prohibits former Federal employees from

any acts, which gives them the appearance of making unfair use

of prior government employment and affiliations. Mr. Moss’ former

position with the State Department put him in a position where he

could have influence over the awarding of this contract. Do you

agree that this could at least be perceived as a conflict of interest?

Mr. FULLER. Are you asking me, Mr. Chairman? I’m sorry.

Mr. TOWNS. Actually I’m going to ask you and Mr. Patrick. I’m

going to ask both of you.

Mr. FULLER. I’m familiar with any of the contracts that——

Mr. TOWNS. OK. All right.

Mr. PATRICK. We publicly announced that we had hired Frank

Moss has a consultant. As you probably know, we are a worldwide

company interested in electronic passports around the world.

Frank Moss as the ex-director was a very——

Mr. TOWNS. Is your mic on? Is your mic on? Push the button.

Mr. PATRICK. It is on.

Mr. TOWNS. Yeah. Good. Yeah, thank you.

Mr. PATRICK. I’m sorry.

Frank was very experienced in the rollout of the U.S. e-passport

book program. That was one of the key reasons we hired Frank.

As the ex-director, he was a resource that followed all the vetting

and the rules and regulations as laid down by the State Department’s exit or revolving door policy. I’m not sure of the name of it.

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Mr. TOWNS. You know, the press release announcing the hire

says that Mr. Moss will leverage his background to develop relationships with Federal agencies, driving identity-related programs.

What do you mean by that?

Mr. PATRICK. I didn’t write the press release, but I could——

Mr. TOWNS. But you’re familiar with it, aren’t you?

Mr. PATRICK. I read it before I came today. The other agencies

that have credentialing programs going on and, to list a few, the

DOD CAC card, HSPD–12, the TWIC card, passport card, enhanced driver’s license. He had significant experience. So I believe

there is a variety of Federal agencies that would look at him as

somewhat of an expert.

Mr. TOWNS. Yeah. What role did he play in this contract? Do you

know?

Mr. PATRICK. To my knowledge, he was an advisory, helps us understand a little bit about State Department processes, but that

was the extent of it.

Mr. TOWNS. As we said during the first panel, we are concerned

about the security at these offsite centers. Even if they are guarded

and unmarked offices affiliated with the U.S. Government, they

will always be potential targets for attack, whether they are here

or abroad. If the pilot is successful, these offices may be established

in other countries as well. Will CSC be responsible for the security

of the offsite data centers?

Mr. FULLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. CSC

has layered security procedures that—and activities at both of

these pilot locations. I would prefer to describe those in a closed

communication. I would rather not describe what our security processes and procedures are in open session?

Mr. TOWNS. I accept that. I accept that. Again, I understand why

you would not want to.

Mr. FULLER. Thank you.

Mr. BILBRAY. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to

discuss about having a closed session, specifically on these items.

Mr. TOWNS. Right. Without objection, we will do it. So ordered.

Mr. Fuller, we are happy to see that there is a plan in place to

reduce delays in border crossing cards, applications. Even with the

huge expected increase in demand, we do have some questions

about the offsite data centers. Who will be training the employees

at these facilities?

Mr. FULLER. The training is conducted by CSC.

Mr. TOWNS. How would their training compare to the training

that the consulate employees receive and will this matter?

Mr. FULLER. I don’t know the details of that comparison. I will

get that answer for you, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. All right. I appreciate that.

Mr. Patrick, I’m glad that you were able to testify on the security

features of the new passport cards and border crossing cards today.

The security of these documents is a high priority for this subcommittee. There is a lot at stake with the work your company has

done on this project. However, some critics have said that this design is not as secure as the one it is replacing. What do you say

to that?

Mr. PATRICK. As a solutions provider for the Federal Government, we go directly to the spec as written by, in this case DOS

and DHS and we would follow the spec to the letter.

Mr. TOWNS. Well, what—let me put it this way, then: what in

particular makes this new design more secure than the one it is

replacing? Let me try you that way.

Mr. PATRICK. Sure. I believe one of the things that I refer to in

that circumstance is the RFID and the ability to point to a data

base to pull up an actual record. My understanding is, today, there

is not the ability, or very seldom is there the ability to go back to

a data base to confirm the identity of the user. This would allow

the border crossing card holder to be vetted via the RFID pointer

number to the data base.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Alsbrooks, let me get your opinion on this as

well. What advantage did the older design have over this design?

Mr. ALSBROOKS. Over the current one?

Mr. TOWNS. Yes.

Mr. ALSBROOKS. First of all, the optical stripe did contain the biometric and biographic information. It was written to that card 10

times. I have one of the old cards here. The images were etched

into the stripe. It could be used for visual authentication, but the

card can also be used for retrieval of data. It has two biometric

templates usually of the forefingers and it has one full blown WSQ

fingerprint. The weakness of the old card, in my opinion, was the

dye sublimation. It was printed in color and it was a D2T2 process

that, as we talked about earlier, with solvents you can remove that

and reprint it. What you couldn’t do was alter the optical stripe.

And that remains to be true. So from the side of the optical stripe,

this is far more secure than the current design. The addition of the

laser engraved personalization, you know, completes the protection

of the card.

Mr. Chairman, when we interrupted for the vote a while ago, I

had a little bit left on my testimony. So at your convenience, I

would love to finish that.

Mr. TOWNS. I’d be delighted to yield and allow you to continue

at this moment.

Mr. ALSBROOKS. OK. Thank you very much. At the time we had

broke, we had just talked about the fact that we had successfully

removed a real Kinegram from the card intact in a way that it

could be reapplied to another card. And then we started—this—

that by the way was done with a 60 watt bulb and a kitchen knife.

Today’s state-of-the-art laser printing is actually being done utilizing an optical stripe. This technology does constitute a huge obstacle to counterfeiters. The new border crossing cards should continue to include an optical stripe. Only then can the State Department legitimately claim that they are using the most durable, seVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:22 May 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48811.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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cure and tamper resistant cards available to the American public.

Two distinct components of the overt features of the card, common

images like portraits or statues that can be easily discerned from

the unaided eye yet retain their detail and integrity at about 400

power magnification—the optical stripe is now available in a 24-

millimeter width and is uniquely personalized with a larger and

much clearer digital photograph and with the biographical data of

the card holder. The image is prominently burned into the optical

media with a laser into the core of the card. It can be destroyed,

but it can never be altered.

These features have been designed in close consultation with forensic and intelligence officers from DHS’ forensic document lab

and represent an enormous challenge to any level of counterfeiter,

including those State sponsored. The border crossing card today

contains a fingerprint biometric stored in the optical stripe, which

can be validated in a matter of seconds from the card off line. The

specification for the new BCC, however, does not include a fingerprint biometric and will instead rely on visual comparison to the

digital photograph. Visual comparison of a photo retrieved from the

data base by an inspector does not constitute the functional equivalent of a fingerprint biometric verification.

Without question, the optical stripe is the most demonstrably secure overt feature available for secure ID cards. The optical stripe

can easily be added to the new cards specified for BCC and pass.

If it were, inspectors would then be able to rely on the visual authentication of the document. The digital photo and biographical

features on the face of the card would be rendered relevant and

unaltered by simply referring to the optical media on the reverse

side. It is called a reliable flash pass.

Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Bilbray, let me close with a

word of concern. If State and DHS continue on their current path,

they will issue pass and BCC cards that are so insecure that they

will become the terrorist document of choice. They will not leave

home without it.

Thank you for your time. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Alsbrooks follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much for your testimony and I understand that—let me just ask this and then I’m going to yield to

you after this, ranking member. I understand that this optical

stripe technology has been on the current border crossing cards for

the last 10 years. And you’re recommending that it remain on the

new cards?

Mr. ALSBROOKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TOWNS. Why?

Mr. ALSBROOKS. Well, first of all, it gives unparalleled visual authentication. That optical stripe can be destroyed, but it can never

be altered. The images and the data are burned into the card with

a 40 milliwatt semiconductor laser by burning pits and the media

is actually physically deformed. So you can’t go erase it and rewrite

it. By combining that with other security features—I’m all in favor

of layering security features so that one verifies the other. So if on

the face of the card—and I believe you have some samples up there

of this. On the face of the card, if I use the laser engraving and

I burn that into the polycarbonate into the core of the card and

then I put a Kinegram on top of that, which I then burn that into

that until I link it so I can see if it has been moved and then—

I can then reference the front to the back of the card. And if the

photos are the same, then it hasn’t been tampered with.

Now, the other thing I would do is I would put that Kinegram

on top of the card instead of putting it under the layer. Any time

you put it under the layer like this, you can separate it and reuse

it and they will never get away from that. But if you put that on

top of the card, I know it is an abrasive issue and it is a wear issue

and I know why they did this. If you put it on the top of the card

and somebody tampers with it, you can detect it.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much and let me yield to the ranking member.

Mr. BILBRAY. Why don’t we followup on the wear and tear problem, the breakdown of this technology. That is a legitimate concern?

Mr. ALSBROOKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Patrick, would you like to have a chance to respond?

Mr. PATRICK. The card we provided was asked for by State spec

to be a 10-year card. We stand behind that 10-year guarantee.

Mr. BILBRAY. So that is the determining factor? Was just the fact

that if somebody—if this is abused, it won’t last the 10 years?

Mr. PATRICK. Our understanding from the State Department was

they were concerned with people putting it in their shoe, ashtrays,

that they wouldn’t take care of it. They had a 5-year option and

a 10-year option. They chose the 10-year option and we stand behind that. And that is how our contract is.

Mr. BILBRAY. If there was a 5-year option, would the strips still

not qualify under your——

Mr. PATRICK. I’m sorry. Could you repeat the question?

Mr. BILBRAY. If it was a 5-year option, would that change your

perception of the use of the stripe?

Mr. PATRICK. No.

Mr. BILBRAY. Mostly because you can’t guarantee it against

abuse?

102

Mr. PATRICK. Mostly.

Mr. BILBRAY. The chip is guaranteed—you’re comfortable the

chip is guaranteed for 10 years?

Mr. PATRICK. The entire card, the full construction, the chip, the

antenna, the polycarbonate, if it does not perform, we stand behind

it.

Mr. BILBRAY. And there is no concern of the chip at all for 10

years?

Mr. PATRICK. The test that was run by the State Department at

Sandia labs, plus our independent testing, tells us that we are on

solid ground with the 10-year guarantee.

Mr. BILBRAY. OK. You understand my concern or our concern

with the fact that maybe the specs gave precedence to how long the

card was guaranteed and rather than how secure the card being

first priority. I mean, to equate it again to the bulletproof vest, the

best bulletproof vests have—expire much quicker than older bulletproof vests do. But you were going to the specs and that is a 10-

year spec?

Mr. PATRICK. Yes.

Mr. BILBRAY. How about the replacement rate on the existing

BCCs?

Mr. ALSBROOKS. Well, as I said earlier, I retired from General

Dynamic, but I was responsible for that contract for over 10 years.

We never were asked to replace a single card.

Mr. BILBRAY. And how long was that card?

Mr. ALSBROOKS. It was guaranteed for 10 years. Certainly there

were cards that were abused, but we never found a card that had

four corners that we could not read. And I have spent a lot of time

on the border just south of San Diego and if the card had four corners, it would read and we always said that if it was broken we

would replace it, and we were never asked to replace a single card.

Mr. BILBRAY. Just for your record, the incorporated city of San

Diego goes all the way to the border.

Mr. ALSBROOKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BILBRAY. San Ysidro is a community of San Diego.

Mr. ALSBROOKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BILBRAY. We are still arguing over that occupation, but that

is another issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you. Let me thank all of you for your testimony. We really appreciate your time and, of course, we value the

information that you have shared with us as well. So I would like

to at this time, if there is no further question, to——

Mr. BILBRAY. Let me just say—if I can close just with a statement that was given to us from Guantanamo, and that is Abu

Zubaydah is actually quoted in one of those interrogations as the

al Qaeda’s document specialist. And he stated—and I like the way

he uses the English language. It is the way I learned it, too, but

we’ll talk about ‘‘we start work in fake passports. I was famous. I

was me, myself, a big market for fake passports. ‘And this is really

the telling statement.’ I can send anybody to any place. It is easy.

So this is my work.’’

Let us just hope, you know, we don’t hear testimony like that

from the next group of al Qaedas that we capture.

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Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much and, without objection, on that

note the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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