NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JOSE L. REYES, Petitioner, 

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, 

PINNACLE PEAK COUNTRY CLUB, Respondent Employer,

THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 17-0005 

Special Action - Industrial Commission

ICA Claim No. 20103-140200 

Carrier Claim No. 127-CB-A7N9837-K 

The Honorable C. Andrew Campbell, Administrative Law Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Jose L. Reyes, Phoenix

Petitioner Pro Se

FILED 9-21-2017
2 

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix

By Jason M. Porter

Counsel for Respondent ICA

Lundmark, Barberich, La Mont & Slavin, P.C. 

By R. Todd Lundmark and Danielle S. Vukonich

Counsel for Respondent Employer/Carrier

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Maurice Portley1 joined. 

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of 

Arizona (“ICA”) decision denying Jose L. Reyes his petition to reopen an 

industrial injury claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of 

the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Reyes worked as a groundskeeper for Pinnacle Peak Country 

Club since 2002. On November 4, 2010, Reyes injured his left hand when 

his thumb got caught in the handle of a lawnmower. Reyes’s claim was 

accepted as arising out of his employment and he received compensation

for his injury effective November 4, 2010. On December 15, 2010, Dr. 

Beauchene performed a trigger finger release surgery on his left thumb. 

Reyes was initially placed on full duty effective March 31, 2011, but 

reverted to light duty on April 15, 2011. In June 2011, Reyes was examined 

by Dr. Peter J. Campbell, who opined Reyes “reached a permanent and 

stationary status [if the MRI recommended “to rule out any pathology” 

should prove negative]” and “no physical therapy would be considered 

warranted at this time.” 

 

1 The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge of the Court of 

Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution. 
REYES v. PINNACLE PEAK CC/STANDARD FIRE

Decision of the Court

3 

¶3 Reyes was discharged from his employment on January 11, 

2012, and his claim was closed.2 In his January 2012 medical report, Dr. 

Campbell noted Reyes’s “traumatic stenosing tenosynovitis of the 

thumb . . . had been treated successfully with surgical intervention,” and no 

further treatment was needed. Dr. Campbell also concluded Reyes could

return to work as a groundskeeper without any work restrictions, and that 

“[d]ue to the persistent mild pain at the location of the surgical procedure, 

a permanent impairment of 2% to the nondominant upper extremity is 

reasonable [in accordance with the AMA Guidelines, 6th Edition].” On 

February 7, 2012, Reyes was found permanently disabled with “2% 

functional loss of minor arm,” for which he was fully compensated 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 23-1044(B)(13).3 

¶4 Two years later, in April 2014, Reyes began treatment with a 

hand surgeon, Dr. Paul Zidel. On January 21, 2016, Dr. Zidel made 

“minimal findings” after he performed an exploratory surgical procedure

on Reyes’s scarring. 

¶5 On March 16, 2016, Reyes filed a petition to reopen his 

workmen’s compensation claim, which was denied. Reyes timely appealed,

and a hearing took place on August 23, 2016, and November 28, 2016. The 

ALJ denied Reyes’s request to reopen his claim. The ALJ found “[t]here is 

not a conflict in the medical evidence in this case,” and Reyes “failed to meet 

his burden of establishing a new, additional, or previously undiscovered 

medical condition.” 

¶6 Upon Reyes’s request, the ALJ issued a decision upon review, 

in which he affirmed his previous denial of Reyes’s petition. This special 

action followed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2), 

23-951(A), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 We defer to the ALJ’s factual findings, but review questions 

of law de novo. Lane v. Indus. Comm’n, 218 Ariz. 44, 47, ¶ 9 (App. 2008). “[W]e 

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the award.” 

Id. We will affirm if the award is supported by reasonable evidence. Delgado 

 

2 On January 8, 2015, the parties stipulated that January 11, 2012, 

would be the applicable comparative date. 

3 We cite the current version of applicable statutes and rules when no 

revision material to this case has occurred.
REYES v. PINNACLE PEAK CC/STANDARD FIRE

Decision of the Court

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v. Indus. Comm’n, 183 Ariz. 129, 131 (App. 1994). The ALJ is the sole judge 

of witness credibility and resolves all conflicts in the evidence and draws 

warranted inferences from it. See Malinski v. Indus. Comm’n, 103 Ariz. 213, 

217 (1968); see also Ortega v. Indus. Comm’n, 121 Ariz. 554, 557 (App. 1979) 

(“[I]t is the hearing officer’s obligation to resolve conflicting medical 

evidence, and his resolution will not be disturbed unless it is wholly 

unreasonable.”). 

¶8 We construe Reyes’s opening brief to argue he is entitled to 

compensation for treatment after his workmen’s compensation claim’s 

closure because his subsequent condition is causally related to his industrial 

injury from 2010.4 The Respondents argue the ALJ’s resolution was 

supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 

A. Substantial Evidence. 

¶9 Reyes had the burden to affirmatively show he was entitled 

to compensation. See Malinski, 103 Ariz. at 216. Because the Workmen’s 

Compensation Act “does not contemplate a general health and accident 

fund[,] . . . there must be a causal connection between the employment and 

the injury.” Dunlap v. Indus. Comm’n, 90 Ariz. 3, 6 (1961). 

¶10 Once a claim is closed upon distribution of benefits, an 

employee may reopen a claim to gain additional benefits by filing a petition 

“upon the basis of a new, additional or previously undiscovered temporary 

or permanent condition,” A.R.S. § 23-1061(H), and upon demonstrating “a

causal relationship between [that] condition and the prior industrial 

injury.” Sun Valley Masonry, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 216 Ariz. 462, 465–66, 

¶ 11 (App. 2007). The burden to present sufficient evidence to support 

reopening remains with the claimant. Id. at 465, ¶ 11. An expert medical 

opinion is required to demonstrate a causal relationship between the 

industrial injury and the claimant’s condition when the causal relationship 

 

4 Reyes’s opening brief lacks references to legal authority and the 

record, which could be considered abandonment or waiver of his claim. See

ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) (requiring appellant’s brief to contain arguments with

“citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of 

the record on which the appellant relies”); State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 

(1989) (“Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and 

waiver of that claim.”). However, in our discretion, we decide this appeal 

on its merits based on our own review of the record. See Adams v. Valley 

Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1984) (courts prefer to decide 

each case upon its merits rather than dismissing on procedural grounds).
REYES v. PINNACLE PEAK CC/STANDARD FIRE

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is not readily apparent to a layperson. W. Bonded Prods. v. Indus. Comm’n, 

132 Ariz. 526, 528 (App. 1982). 

¶11 Reyes selected Dr. Zidel, a board-certified plastic surgeon 

with a certificate of additional qualifications in hand surgery, to support his 

petition to reopen. Dr. Zidel testified there was no objective change in 

Reyes’s condition since the closure of his claim in January 2012, including 

the results of Reyes’s second surgery. Dr. Zidel also testified regarding his 

findings from 2014, where he stated it was “difficult to recreate [Reyes’s]

symptomatology,” Reyes’s exploratory surgery had “minimal findings,” 

and his “decreased sensation [was] inconsistent on testing.” Reyes himself 

testified his condition “[is] the same” now as it was when his claim was 

closed in January 2012. 

¶12 Respondents’ medical expert Dr. Campbell, a surgeon

board-certified in hand and orthopedic surgery, reexamined Reyes in July

2016 and noted “[h]is symptoms remain specifically the same as they were 

in 2010.” See Modern Trailer Sales of Ariz., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 17 Ariz. App. 

482, 486 (1972) (when a medical report contains sufficient information, 

medical testimony is not required). Dr. Campbell further concluded “there 

is likely a significant psychosocial or secondary gain component to the 

claimant’s subjective report of pain” and “no objective findings suggest a 

need for any work restrictions.” 

¶13 Because Reyes failed to introduce any medical evidence 

supporting the reopening of his claim, he did not meet his burden of proof.

See Malinski, 103 Ariz. at 216. The evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s

award. See Chalupa v. Indus. Comm’n, 17 Ariz. App. 386, 391 (1972). 

B. Medical Records Provided on Appeal. 

¶14 Reyes argues the ALJ failed to consider his documentation.

As part of his opening brief, Reyes attached: (1) an x-ray of his left hand 

completed on April 25, 2014; and (2) an ultrasound of his left upper 

extremity completed on the same day, with accompanying pictures. The

medical evidence submitted by Reyes on appeal was part of the ALJ’s 

record below. We presume the ALJ considered all relevant evidence before 

rendering his decision. See Perry v. Indus. Comm’n, 112 Ariz. 397, 398 (1975). 
REYES v. PINNACLE PEAK CC/STANDARD FIRE

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CONCLUSION

¶15 Because the evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s award 

and decision upon review, we affirm.