THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Casablanca Conference: January 1943 

During the first month of 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister 

Winston S. Churchill met at the Anfa Hotel in Casablanca in French Morocco for a ten day 

conference to plan the next stages of the war against the Axis. Accompanied by the French 

generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud, the two leaders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

(CCS) mapped out the grand strategy for both the European and the Pacific theaters. (Soviet 

premier Joseph Stalin was invited but unable to attend because of the ongoing Battle of 

Stalingrad.) Held just two months after the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa and 

known as the Casablanca Conference, the meeting lasted from January 14 to 24 and addressed 

several key issues of the conflict. 

 One major issue was the opening of a second front in France, something that Stalin had long 

pressed for. General George C. Marshall, the US Army chief of staff, wanted to land troops in 

France as soon as possible, but the CCS decided instead to invade Sicily and then the Italian 

mainland in order to drive Italy out of the war. The German U-boat threat on convoys in the 

Atlantic was also assessed, and antisubmarine warfare was discussed at length. Other topics for 

deliberation included material assistance to Russia and China, and the campaign against the 

Japanese in the Solomon Islands. On the final day of the conference, Roosevelt and Churchill 

announced their decision to pursue the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, which was 

the most far-reaching policy decision made at Casablanca. This, in Roosevelt’s words, did not 

“mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it [did] mean the 

destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the 

subjugation of other people.” 
Casablanca was one in a series of high-level conferences held by the US and British 

leaders in Washington, DC; Morocco; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to 

formulate the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet 

leader Stalin was also in attendance and played an important role. Reports, memorandums, 

position papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for the conferences, and minutes were 

taken at the accompanying CCS meetings. The Casablanca documents also contain the minutes 

from the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings held at the conference. Taken together, these documents 

address virtually every policy and strategy issue of the war, from troop deployments, to debates 

about the location and timing of key Allied offensives, to discussions about postwar occupation 

boundaries. Thus, they record the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as an 

indispensable primary source on the planning and conduct of World War II. 

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 

In addition to Casablanca, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, 

and PDF formats: 

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 

978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF) 

Post-Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), January 23–May 19, 1942: ISBN 978-0-

16-093890-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093889-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093891-7 (PDF) 

Trident Conference (Washington, DC), May 12–25, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093879-5 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093878-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093880-1 (PDF) 
Quadrant Conference (Quebec City, Canada), August 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-

093882-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093881-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093883-2 (PDF) 

Sextant Conference (Cairo, Egypt), Eureka Conference (Tehran, Iran), and the Second 

Cairo Conference (Egypt), November 22–December 7, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093885-6 (Mobi); 

ISBN 978-0-16-093884-9 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093926-6 (PDF) 

Octagon Conference (Quebec City, Canada), September 12–16, 1944: ISBN 978-0-16-

093925-9 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093927-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093928-0 (PDF) 

Argonaut Conference (Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union), January 30–February 11, 1945: 

ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2 

(PDF) 

Terminal Conference (Potsdam, Germany), July 17–August 2, 1945: ISBN 978-0-16-

093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 
CASABLANCA CONFERENCE 

JANUARY 1943 

PAPERS 

AND 

MlNUTES OF MEETINGS 

Edited and firintea in the 

Office, U. S. Secretary, 

Office of the Combined ChCefs of Staff 

1943 

Tbis voluqe Mas prepared under the auspices of 

the United States Ghiefs of Staff who dedicate it to 

the qenory of the late Brigadier Vivian Dykes, GBE, 

who served iq Washington as the British Secretary 

of the Goqbiqed Ghiefs of Staff froq the tiqe of 

organization, Jaquary, 1942, through tha Gasablanca 

Gonfereqce , Jaquary, 1948 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

75/3 System of Command for Combined U. $.-British Operations a 3. 

153 Situation? To Be Created In The Eastern Theater 

(Tacific And Burma) In 1343 (Revised) . 153/1 Situation To Be Created In The Eastern Theater 

(Pacific And Burma) In 1943 . 8 

154 Operations In Burma, 1943 . 11 

155 Conduct Of The War In 1943 . 15 

155/1 Conduct Of The War In 1343 . P 

156 Suggested Procedure For Dealing With The Agenda 

Of The Conference . 157 Allied Plans Xelating To Turkey . 23 

158 Axis Oil Position . 159 The Bomber Offensive From North Africa (See Note 159/1) 

lb0 

161 6 SKY * 58 

161/1. Operation HUSKY 63 

162 U. S. Aid To Russia . 72 

162/1 U. S. Aid To Russia 75 

163 System Of Air Command In The Mediterranean '78 

154 Operation ANAKIhG-Provision Of Forces . 80 

164/1 Operation ANAKII&I--Provision Of Forces . 82 

165 Draft Telegram To Premier, Stalian (See Note 165/2) . 84 

165/1 Draft Telegram To Premier Stalin (See Note 165/2) 84 

165/2 Draft Telegram From The President Of The United 

States And The Prime Minister Of Great Britain 

To Premier Stalin . 166 The Bomber Offensive From The United Kingdom . 166/1/D The Bomber Offensive From Tne United Kingdom 

167 Continental Operations In 1943 . 168 Conduct Of The War In The Pacific Theater In 1943 . 169 Proposed Organization Of Command, Control, Planning 

And Training For Operations For A Reentry To The 

Continent Across The Channel, Beginning In 1943 99 

159/1 Th ffensive From Norlth Africa . %& 

V 
U. So SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

170 Report To The President And Prime Minister 

Draft Report On The Work Of The Conference u 102 

170/1 Report To The President And Prime Minister . a 109 

170/2 Symbol--Final Report,To The President And 

Prime llinister Summarizing Decisions By 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff . 117 

17I Directive--Operation HUSKY a 0 125 

171/1/D Directive To Commander-In-Chief, Allied 

Expeditionary Force In North Africa--

Operation HUSKY (See Note 171/2/D) . * 127 

171/2/D Directive To Commander-In-Chief, Allied 

Expeditionary Force In North Africa--

Operation HUSKY . . 127 

172 Shipping Capabilities For BOLERO Build-up 129 

MINUTES 

ANFA 1st Meeting . 134 

Situation in North Africa 

ANFA 2nd Meeting . . 142 

The General Strategic Policy for 1943 

ANFA 3rd Meeting . . 154 

Security of Sea Communications 

Assistance to Russia 

Operations in the Mediterranean 

Operations in and from the United Kingdom 

Pacific and Far East Theater 

C.C.S. 55th Ateeting . . 169 

General Discussion of Allocation of Resources Based 

on Enemy Situation 

CoCoS. 56th Meeting . . 183 

Combined Strategy Pertaining to the Pacific Situation 

vi 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 57th Meeting . . 195 

Ant isubmarine Warfare 

Situation in North Africa 

Strategy in the European Theater 

C.C.S. 38th hleeting . .. . 207 

The North African Situation 

The Strategic Concept for 1943 in the European 

Theater 

Supplies to Russia 

Employment of French Forces in North Africa 

C.C.S. 59th Meeting . 225 

The Eastern Theater 

Iceland 

Russian Air Assistance for P.Q. Convoys 

C.C.S. 60th Meeting . . 232 

Operations in Burma 

The Situation to be Created in the Eastern Theater 

(the Pacific and Burma) in 1943 

Escort Vessel s 

Potentialities of Polish Forces 

Raids on Berlin 

Naval Situation in the Western Mediterranean 

C.C.S. 61st Meeting . . 248 

Conduct of the War in 1943 

Suggested Procedure for Dealing with the Agenda of 

the Conference 

Strategic Responsibility and Coinmand Set-up for 

Dakar-Fr ench West Af rica 

Publication of Results of the Conference 

C.C.S. 52nd Meeting . . 254 

Axis Oil Position 

Allied Plans Relating to Turkey 

Meeting with General Giraud 

vii 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISR lrlOST SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

C.CoS. 63rd Jfeeting . U. s. Aid to Russia 

British Zesponsibility for Turkey 

The Bomber Offensive from North Africa 

Command in the Mediterranean 

C.C.S. 64th Meeting 

HUSKY 

Future Business 

C.C,S. 65th Xeeting . The U-Boat War 

The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom 

Draft Telegram to X - Stalin 

ANAKJM 

BOLERO Suild-up 

Report to the President and the Prime Minister 

C.C.S- 66th Meeting . Draft Telegram to M. Stalin 

HUSKY 

c cos,57th hfeeting 

Conduct of the !Yar in the Pacific Theater in 1343 

Press Communique 

Continental Operations in 1943 

Organization of Command, Control, Planning and 

Training for Cross-Channel Operations 

Landing Craft . System of Command for Combined U, S. and British 

Oper ations 

C.C*S. 58th Xeeting . EOLEXO Suild-up 

Continental Operations in 1043 

Xeport to the President and Prime Minister 

Operation HUSKY--Directive to General Eisenhower 

Landing Craft 

C.C.S. 59th Meeting . Xeport to the President and Prime Minister 

Operation HUSKY--Directive to General Eisenhower 

Assault Shipping 

Conclusion of the Conference 

PAGE 

263 

272 

276 

292 

300 

3 10 

3 14 

INDEX viii 

3 19 


IT. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 75/3 October 24, 1942 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SYSTEM OF COMMAND FOR COMBINED U. S,-BRITISH OPERATIONS 

(Previous reference: (a) C.C.S. 38th Meeting, Item 3) 

Report by Combined Staff Planners 

1. The enclosure, preparedbythe Combined Staff Planners in accordance with reference (a), is presented for consideration by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. Annex "A", attached thereto, presents graphically the 

principles of unified command as contained in the report. 

2. The U. So Navy members of the Combined Staff Planners state that 

while this paper does not in its entirety accord with their views, it is 

believed that it presents the best agreement which can be reachedatthis 

time. The U. S. Navy members believe that the statusofthe assistants to 

Supreme Commander, because of the possible interpretation of their functions, may result in actually interposing an additional element in the 

chainofcommand which would limit the authority ofthe Supreme Comnander. 

ENCLOSURE 

SYSTEM OF UNIFIED COMMAND FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS 

DEFINITIONS: 

1. Unified command is the control, exercised by a designated commander, over a force integrated from combined and joint forces allocated 

to him for the accomplishment of a mission or task. This force will 

include all the means considered necessary for the mission's successful 

execution. Unified command vests in the designated commander, the responsibility and authority to control the operations of all armsand 

services composing his force, by the organization of task forces, assignment of missions, designation of objectives, and the exercise of 

such control as he deems necessary to insure the success of his mission. 

Unified command does not authorize the commander exercising it, to 

control the administration and discipline of any forces of the United 

1 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Nations composing his command, beyond those necessary for effective 

control. 

2. The term "joint" refers to participation of forces from two or 

more of the arms (U. S.) or servrces (British) of one nation. 

3. The term ncombinedn refers to the participation of forces of two 

or more of the United Nations. 

SUPREME COMMANDER: 

1. In cases where the governments concerned so decide, a Supreme 

Commander will be appointed for operations when forces of more than one 

of the United Nations are to be employed on a specific mission or task. 

5. He will be appointed by agreement between the governments concerned at the earliest possible moment after the decision to undertake 

an operation has been made. 

6. Be will exercise unified command over all forces of the United 

Nations allocated to his operation. 

7. He will be the recipient of all major directives pertaining to 

the arms and services of his force. 

8. Out of the means allocated to him, he will organize task forces 

as necessary, designate their commanders, and assign the major tasks to 

be performed by each9. He will be assisted by asmall composite staff which will include 

in principle a Chief of Staff, a Planning Division, an Operations Division, an Intelligence Division, a Logistical Division, and a Communications Center, Each nation involved and each of the several component 

arms or services of the force will be represented on the staff in order 

to insure an understanding of the capabilities, requirements, and limitations of each component. 

LAND, NAVAL AND AIR COMMANDERS: 

10. The officer appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the 

Senior Officer ofeach combined arm or service not specifically allocated 

to task forces by the Supreme Commander, will advise the Supreme Commander on the best use of his own combined arm or service. 

11. These Commanders will carry out their duties at the headquarters 

of the Supreme Commander unless specifically ordered otherwise by him, 

TASK FORCE COMMANDERS : 

12. Task Force Commanders will organize their commands as may be 

necessary for the execution of the tasks assigned- Sub-Task Force 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH ,YOST SECRET 

Commanders will be designated asmay be necessary for the execution ofthe 

subordinate tasks assigned. The principle of unified command will apply 

throughout ~ 

13. The organization of task forces will be governed by the nature 

of the operations to be performed. The task forces will include all the 

elements--land, air and naval--necessary for the accomplishment of the 

task. The appointment of the Task Force Commanders, subordinate as well 

as major, will be governed by the nature of the task assigned, and the 

major arm or service involved in its performance, i.e., whether preponderantly land, air or naval. 

INTEGRITY OF NATIONAL UNITS: 

14. Insofar as conditions will permit, task forces will be composed 

of units of the same nationality. When organizations of one nation serve 

under the command of an officer of another, the principle will be maintained that such organizations shall be kept intact and not scattered 

among other units. 

3 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX "A" 

I SUB TASK FORCE COMDR. 

I L 

-

NOTE.'

INDICATES U.S. 

0INDICATES BRIT. 

I 
January 17, 1943 

U. S - SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 153 (Revised) 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SITUATION TO BE CREATED IN THE EASTERN THEATER 

(PACIFIC AND BURMA) IN 1943 

Note by the Secretaries 

At their 56th meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the 

Combined Staff Planners "to report, on the basis that Germany is the 

primary enemy, what situation do we wish to establish in the Eastern 

Theater (i.e , the Pacific and Burma) in 1943 and what forces will be 

necessary to establish that situation," 

Enclosure "A" is a partial report on the above directive prepared 

by the Joint U, S. Staff Planners which has been discussed at a meeting 

of the Combined Staff Planners 

Enclosure "B" is a continuation of the partial report given in 

Enclosure "A" prepared by the Joint U S. Staff Planners 

V DYKES, 

J R DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat 

ENCLOSURE "A" 

SITUATION TO BE CREATED IN THE EASTERN THEATER 

(NAMELY PACIFIC AND BURMA) IN 1943 

ASSUMPTIONS: 

1. The Combined Planners assume 

that the ultimate objective of the basic global strategy is 

to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest 

practicable date; 

that in gaining this objective efforts must be made toward 

the destruction of the economic and military power of all our 

adversaries at a rate exceeding their power of replacement; 

that Germany is recognized as the primary or most powerful 

4 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

and pressing enemy; 

and that the major portion of the forces of the United 

Nations are to be directed against Germany insofar as it is consistent with the over-all objective of bringing the war to an 

early conclusion at the earliest possible date. 

2. Tentative assumptions are made 

that the present situation as between Russia and Japan will 

continue, 

and that the Chinese will continue in the war if sufficient 

support is furnished by Great Britain and the tlnited States in 

the way of supplies and equipment. 

SITUATION TO BE CREATED: 

3. he consider that the accomplishment of the over-all objective, 

as well as the maintenance of the security of our position in the Pacific, requires that the Japanese be kept under continual pressure sufficient in power and extent to absorb the disposable Japanese military 

effort 

4. The United Nations' positions in the Pacific are extended over a 

line roughly 12,000 miles long--fromtheBering Sea, through the Hawaiian 

Islands, Samoa, Fiji, New Guinea and Korthwest Australia, to Singapore. 

The Japanese, strongly established, occupy interior lines which permit 

offensive action by their mobile forces against any of the Allied positions --unless these mobile forces are denied freedom of action 

5 The l'nited Nat,ions' positions have depth at certain points, as 

in Alaska, Hawaii, and New Caledonia, New Guinea. The positions between 

Hawaii and New Caledonia have little depth and are susceptible to successful enemy attack, if these attacking forces are free to move, Some 

of the United Kations' positions (ioe,yon the larger islands) are 

capable of strong defensive establishments Other positions such as the 

smaller islands, like Canton, cannot be strongly defended Economy in 

defensive strength of the larger islands, and security of the smaller 

islands? require that we maintain the initiative by offensive action, 

This offensive action must be directed against Japanese objectives of 

sufficient importance tothe Japanese as to cause Japanese counteraction; 

they must be sufficient in power to combat successfully this Japanese 

counterac ti on I 

6 By this process we intend toprevent the Japanese the opportunity 

5 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

for consolidating (digging in), thus strengthening their positions, tOan 

extent that would permit them to initiate offensive action at times and 

places of their choosing 

7. We consider that Japanese power In respect to shipping and aircraft has been getting progressively weaker; that our attacks against 

shipping, particularly by submarines, should be pushed to the maximum 

extent possible; and that our offensive action should be designed to 

effect a continuing decrease in Japanese naval and air power 

8 To maintain the security of our possessions in the Pacific and 

to contain in the Pacific area the Japanese Fleet, it is necessary to 

continue in that area the major portion of the United States Fleet TO 

give full implementation to this naval force, it is necessary that sufficient mobile ground forces, air forces, and shipping be available in 

that area to undertake continuing limited offensives against Japanese 

possessions- The character of these offensive actions envisaged for 1943 

are set forth in subsequent paragraphs 

9 In planning these offensive operations in the Pacific, we take 

note that the ability of the United Nations to project military actions 

against the enemy in all areas is limited by shipping In the Atlantic 

there is a further serious limitation caused by the lack of adequate 

numbers of escorts Until the escort problem is improved, the amount of 

shipping which can be moved in the Atlantic is definitely limited This 

same consideration of limitation of escort capacity does not at present 

apply to the Pacific, because of comparative absence of submarine menace 

in that area at this time 

10 The adverse situation in regard to the number of escorts available in comparison to the number of submarine packs operating in the 

Atlantic, and to the convoy needs in the Atlantic, will not begin to 

show relative improvement before October 

OPEFlAT IONS : 

11- The prospective operations to create and maintain the situation 

in 1943 set forth above are: 

(a) Seizure and consolidation of United Nations forces in the 

Solomon Islands, Eastern New Guinea up to Lae Salamaua peninsula, New Britain New Ireland (Rabaul) area. 

(b) Seizure and occupation of Kiska-Agattu (Western Aleutians) ~ 

(c) Seizure and occupation of Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, 

6 
IT. S. SECRET 

BRITISH XOST SECRET 

Caroline Islands, up to and including Truk. It is planned 

that these operations will be undertaken subsequent to 

Rahaul. 

(d) Extension of occupation of Kew Guinea up to approximately 

the Dutch border. This will be an extension of the Truk 

campaign for the second part. 

ENCLOSURE "B" 

(3) Burma campaign. Limited operations during present favorable 

weather conditions such as to permit improvement of communications from India to China, to he followed by more extended 

operations towards the end of the year with the objective of 

reestablishing the communications along the lower Burma Road. 

The objective of this campaign is to strengthen forces in 

China with the view to keeping China in the war, keeping 

pressure on the Japanese in this area, and to the establishment and operation of air strength OIL Japanese shipping in 

Chinese and Indo-China ports a6 well as on the flank of 

Japanese sea communications along the China coast. 

12. The increase of forces in the Pacific-Burma area in 1913 for the 

operations listed above will depend largely on the strength of Japanese 

dispositions. They will be of this general order: 

Ground Forces, including air personnel - 250,000 troops 

T.J. S. and U. K. - 500 airplanes 

Ravy - The major portion of additions (by new construction) to 

the U. S. Fleet, while maintaining in the Atlantic present 

large ship strength and increasing destroyer and antisubmarine escort in the Atlantic. 

Increase in strength of the British Eastern fleet sufficent to 

support operations against Burma. 

Shipping 1,250,000 tons 

7 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 153/1 January 17, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SITUATION TO BE CREATED IN THE EASTERN THEATER 

(PACIFIC AND BURMA) IN 1943 

Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff 

1. Me have been instructed by the British Chiefs of Staff to comment on the paper by the Joint U. S. Staff Planners on the situation to 

be created in the Eastern Theater (Pacific and Burma) in 1543 (C.C.S. 

153). 

2. Our comments are as follows: 

ASSUMPTIONS: 

(a) faragraph 1: 

ke feel that this should be reworded as follows: 

"The Combined Planners assume that the ultimate objective 

of the basic global strategy is to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest practicable date. The 

quickest way of achieving this will be to concentrate on 

defeating Germany first and then to concentrate our combined 

resources against Japan. h!eanwhile such pressure must be 

maintained in Japan as will prevent her from damaging interests vital to the Allies, and will hinder her from consolidating her conquests." 

(b) Paragraph 2: 

We concur. 

SITUATION To BE CREATED: 

(c) Paragraphs 3-10: 

We agree in principle with this expression of the strategy 

required, provided always that its application does not 

prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany. 

OPERATIONS : 

(d) Paragraphs 11-12: 

Re suggest the following alternative: 

The operations which are certainly required in 1943 to create and maintain the situation set forth above are: 

8 
[I. S. SECRET 

BRITISH XOST SECRET 

(a) Feizure of, and consolidation ofunited Nations forces in 

the Solomons, Eastern New Guinea up to the Lae-Salamaua 

peninsula, New Britain-New Ireland (Rabaul) area. 

(b) Burma--Limited operations during the present favorable 

we at her period : 

(1) To recapture and establish air forces at Akyab 

(Cannibal). 

(2) To estab1.ish a bridgehead in the Chindwin Valley so 

that, when an attack on Rangoon ismade, simultaneous 

pressure can be exerted on Mandalay (Ravenous). 

(3) To construct the Hukawng Valley road from Led0 to 

Mijitkyina and Lungling. 

The additions to present forces in the Pacific theater required 

for these operations must depend upon the strength of Japanese dispositions but will be of the following general order: 

Ground forces ..:........ 

Aircraft. ............... Navy .................... Amphibious forces ....... Shipping ................ No forces additional to those now present will be required in 

Burma. 

12. With the successful completion of the operations outlined in the 

preceding paragraph, a new offensive will be necessary if we are to retain the initiative and thereby contain disposable Japanese strength. 

Detailed plans for undertaking the following further operations, 

though not necessarily in the order given, should therefore be mad.e; 

but, since the timing must depend upon the speed with which the earlier 

operationsin the Rabaul-New Guinea area are concluded, a decision whether or not to launch these further operations should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff later in the year. 

(a) The seizure and occnpation of Kiska-Agattu (Western Aleutians). 

(b) The seizure and occupation of the Gilbert Islands, b!arshall 

Islands, Caroline Islands up to and including Truk. 

(c) Extension of occupation of New Guinea up to approximately 

the Dutch border. This will be an extension of the Truk 

campaign. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

For these operations the additional forces required will be of 

the order of: 

Ground forces.. ..... Aircraft ............ Navy ................ Amphibious forces.. . Shipping ............ 13. Detailed plans for operations to reopen the Burma Road (ANAKIkl) 

during the winter of 1913-44 will also be made. It is not possible at 

this stage tosay by when the forces required for this operation could be 

provided without detracting seriously from the defeat of Germany. Orders 

for the completion of full administrative preparations by October 1, 

1943, have, however, already been given and planning is proceeding in 

India. 

The forces additional to those now in the theater required for 

this operation must depend upon enemy strength and dispositions at the 

time hut will be of the following order: 

Ground forces....... Nil 

Aircraft............ 18 squadrons 

Rival forces.. ....Covering forces as may be found necessary in the light of the naval situation at the time. As much as practicable would be found from British resources. 

6-8 Escort Carriers 

40 Destroyers or Escort Vessels 

Amphibious forces... Assault shipping and landing craft sufficient to lift 4 Inf. Brigade Groups 

and 1 Armored Brigade. 

Shipping ............ •60 MT ships 

20 Personnel ships 

14. It is certain that the provision of the naval and amphibious 

forces required for simultaneous Truk and Anakim operations cannot but 

react adversely on the early defeat of Germany. It may be possible to 

carry out one of these operations without such a violation of our agreed 

strategy. The decision as to the right course of action should be taken 

later in the light of the development of the war. 

10 
0. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 1.54 January 17, 1913 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS IN BURMA, 1943 

Report by British Joint Planning Staff 

THE BURMA ROAD: 

1. The reconquest of Burma should be undertaken as soon as resources within the existing strategic priorities permit. 

2. The outstanding topographical feature governing operations in 

Burma is that all main communications run north from Rangoon. 

Prior to the Japanese occupation, supplies reached China by the 

so-called "Burma Road" : 

(a) ~angoon-~~andalay-Lashio(river, rail and road) . 

(b) Lashio-Lungling-Yurinanyi-Iiunming-Chungking (road) . It is the only trans-Burma route by which China can receive substantial 

supplies. The capture of i:angoon and Mandalay must be effected before it 

can be reopened. 

JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS: 

3. The Japanese rely on sea communications to Rangoon to maintain 

the 4 to 5 divisions they now have in Burma. They are, however, developing overland routes--rail and road--from Thailand, and these are already 

sufficient to enable them to maintain 3 divisions operating in Burma. 

Communications in Burma allow the Japanese to maintain larger 

forces in the Mandalay area than the British can maintain across the 

Assam frontier. 

OPERATIONS JANUARY-APRIL 1943: 

4. Field ?;arshal Navel1 is now carrying out certain operations 

which are necessary preliminaries to the reconquest, of Burma. These are: 

(a) Operation CANNIBAL for the recapture of, and establishment 

of air forces at, AKYAF- This operation has started. 

(b) Operation RAVENOUS for the establishment by IV Corps (two 

divisions) of a bridgehead in the Chindwin valley so that 

when an attack on Rangoon is made, simultaneous pressure can 

be exerted on hiandalay. (The routes from Assam south to the 

Chindwin River will ngt support more than two divisions.) 

11 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Certain Chinese forces were tohave cooperated in this operation, but their cooperationnow appears uncertain. The operation by IV Corps will start in February 1943, 

Both these operations should be completed before the monsoon breaks in 

May 1943. It is hoped that RdVENOUS will draw off some Japanese pressure 

from the Southwest Pacific.. 

OVERLAND COMMUNICATIONS WITH CHINA: 

5. Neither of these preliminary operations will however reestablish 

land communication with China, whose retention in the war is agreed to 

be of great importance. 

Apart from the Burma Road proper, the only methods by which 

supplies might reach China appear to be: 

(a) The Hukawng Valley route from Led0 via Shingbwiyang and 

Myitkina to Lungling--thence northeastwards by the "Burma 

Road" proper. 

An all-weather, one-way road has been started and the intention is to improve it to two-way as help from U.S.A. 

technicians and equipment become availableLatest advices are that the all-weather route--one or twoway--will not reach Shingbwiyang until the winter of19.13-44; 

although it may be possible to push through a dry-weather 

track as far as Myitkina after the monsoon of 1943, 

During construction it will not be possible to maintain more 

than one brigade group (or two Chinese divisions) on this 

road in addition to labor" There will therefore be great 

difficulty in arranging its protection, especially in the 

Myitkina area where Japanese forces can be maintained by 

rail and all-weather road, 

(b) •Air transport: 

It is recommended that the air transport route shouldbe 

maintained since it is the most immediate means of bringing 

aid to China. 

RECONQUEST OF BURMA (Operation ANAKIM) : 

6. The reconquest of Burma will not be possible before the winter 

of 1943-44 at the earliest, It involves: 

(a) The recapture of Rangoon.. 

(b) The capture of the Moulmein area with a view to blocking 

12 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH IYOST SECRET 

Japanese overland reinforcements from Thailand. 

(c) Concurrently with (a) and (b) above, pressure by British 

forces from Chindwin River bridgeheads, and if possible by 

Chinese forces from Ynnnan, against Mandalay. 

(d) The defeat of the Japanese forces in Lower Burma, i.e., the 

Rangoon-Mandalay area. 

Plans for this reconquest are known as Operation ANAKIM. 

forces required for ANAKIM are approximately: 

Naval 6-6 Escort Carriers 

40 Destroyers and escorts 

8 Submarines 

6 Fleet mine sweepers 

in addition to such cover by heavy forces as is required by 

the situation at the time. 

Army 8 Infantry Divisions 

1 Armored Division 

Air 28 Bomber Squadrons 

17 Fighter Squadrons 

4 Coastal Squadrons 

Assault Shipping ) (4 inf. bde. groups) assault 

and Landing Craft) to lift(larmored brigade ) 

loaded. 

The assault shipping and landing craft for these assaults 

amount to: 

9 L.S.I. (L) 

10 L.S.T. 

4 L.S.D. or L.S.G. 

inn L.C.A. 

1c, :> C.P. 

120 L.C.E. 

16 L.C.S. 

NOTE: (1) If L.C.T. can be made available the numbers of 

L.S.T. could be reduced in the proportion ofone 

L.S.T. for every four L.C.T. 

(2) Landing craft additional to the above will probably be required for maintenance of forces ashore 

until it is possible to bring ports into use. 

13 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH WOST SECRET 

(e) Shipping 60 MT ships 

20 Personnel ships 

POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT "ANAXIM" IN WINTER OF 1943-44: 

heather: 

8. Operations cannot start before about November 1, 1943, and must 

be concluded by April 30, 1911, on account of the monsoon. To take 

Rangoon and hloulmein, clear the whole of Southern Burma up to Mandalay, 

and reopen the Burma Road from klandalay to Lashio, it is estimated that 

the assault must take place at the latest in early December 1943. 

To seize and consolidate the Rangoon-Moulmein area only, the 

initial assault might be postponed until the end of January 1911. 

Availability of British I'orces: 

9. (a) Kaval 

The British might be able to find the capital ships and carriers required for this operation, provided no other amphibious operations were being carried out concurrently in 

the European or Mediterranean theaters, 

They would however require, under all circumstances, considerable help from American light naval forces. 

Subsequently, it will be necessary to keep open the sea communications to Rangoon~, 

(b) Army 

These will be available in India by October 1943--including 

the brigades required tobe trained for the initial assaults. 

(c) Air 

The air forces required could be made available in the 

Indian theater by November 1913. 

(d) Assault Shipping and Landing Craft 

(1) If NO major amphibious operations are carried out elsewhere in 1943, the assault shipping and landing craft 

could be found by the British by October 1, 1913, 

(2) If Operation BRIMSTONE is carried out not later than the 

end of June 19133 and no other amphibious operation 

takes place, the assaulvshipping and landing craft 

could be found by the British by December 1, 1943, in 

Indian waters. This would permit of an assault on Rangoon about December 30, 1943. 
U. S. YECRET 

BRITIM .YOST SELI ET 

(3) If HUSKY is carried out after cJurre 19?2--or any ot,her 

operation, such as the Dodecanese, in addition t,n HKI?>fSTONE--it will riot tie possible t,o provide t,he assault 

sklippirlg ail(? landing craft for ANAKIM from liritish 

sources until about rebruary 19M. 

(?) If Operation AKAKIbl is carried out witli Hritisli assault 

shipping an6 landing craft at any time during the wint,er 

1943-4!:, it would seriously curtail the British share of 

any cross-charniel operations in the earlp spring of 194%. 

(e) Shipping 

Tile availability of' shipping cannot be forecast now, but the 

U.S.A. will have to provide a part. 

15 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 155 January 18, 1913 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 

Note by the Secretaries 

In accordance with the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff at their 6Otkl meeting, a draft memorandum setting out the tentative agreements already reached has been prepared and is circulated 

herewith for consideration at the next meeting. 

DYKES, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat 

ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT MSMORANDUM 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to submit the following recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943. 

1. SECURITY: 

The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Kations. 

2. OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER: 

Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the 

object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be 

brought to bear upon her by the United Nations. 

3. The five main lines of offensive action will be: 

In the Mediterranean: 

(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of: 

(1) Eaking the Mediterranean line of communications more 

secure. 

(2) Diverting German pressure from the Russian front. 

(3) Intensifying the pressure on Italy. 

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as 

16 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITIS8 MOST SECRE? 

an active ally. 

In the 11. I<. : 

(c) '!tie heaviest possible bomber offensive against Germany. 

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable 

with the forces available. 

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) 

and (b) above and paragraph 5 below) to re-enter the continent as soon as German resistance isweakened to the required 

extent. 

4. In order to insure that these operations and preparations are 

not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse 

situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific 

arid Far Eastern Theaters. 

5, OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST: 

(a) Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces 

allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, 

retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United 

rations as soon as Germany is defeated.. 

(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will 

not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, prejudice the capacity of the Cnited Nations to take advantage of 

any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the 

decisive defeat of Germany in 1943. 

(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations 

shall be made for: 

(1) The recapture of Burma (ANAXIM) beginning in 1943. 

(2) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the 

Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow 

without prejudice to ANAKIM 

6. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA: 

The resistance of the Soviet forces must be sustained by the 

greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Russia, without 

prohibitive cost in shipping. 

17 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 155/1 January 19, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to submit the fcllowing 

recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943. 

1. SECURITY: 

The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations. 

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA: 

The Soviet forces must be sustained by the greatest volume of 

supplies that can be transported to Russia without prohibitive cost in 

s hipping. 

3. OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER: 

Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the 

object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be 

brought to bear upon her by the United Nat'rons . 4. The main lines of offensive action will be: 

In the Mediterranean: 

(a) The occupat.ion of Sicily with the object of: 

(1) Making t,he Mediterranean line of communications more 

secure. 

(2) Diverting German pressure from the Russian front. 

(3) Intensifying the pressure on Italy. 

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an 

active ally. 

In the U.K.: 

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the Germail 

war effort. 

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with 

the amphibious forces available. 

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) 

and (b) above and paragraph 6 below) in constant readiness 

to reenter the Continent as soon as German resistance is 

18 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH VOST SECRET 

weakened to the required extent. 

5. In order to insure that these operations and preparations are 

not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse 

situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific 

and Far Eastern Theaters. 

6. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST: 

(a) Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces 

allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, 

retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japanby the United 

Nations as soon as Germany is defeated. 

(b) These operations mustbe kept within such limits as will not, 

in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize 

the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any 

favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1043. 

(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations 

shall be made for: 

(1) The recapture of Burma (ANAKIM) beginning in 1943. 

(2) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the 

“arshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow 

without prejudice to ANAKIM~ 

19 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 156 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

January 18, 1943 

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE AGENDA 

OF THE CONFERENCE 

Note by the Secretaries 

The Combined Staffs, at an informal meeting on January 18, 1043, 

prepared the attached note suggesting the procedure to be followed for 

dealing with the major questions on the agreed Agenda of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 140). 

They suggest that it, should be considered by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff at their next meeting. 

V. DYKES, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

1. The next stage of the discussions should be to examine each of 

the operations set out in the (C.C.S. 155) draft proposals for the conduct of the war in 1043, with a view to determining: 

(a) The resources of all kinds required for each. 

(b) How they are to be made available. 

(c) Target dates, where practicable. 

2. &BOAT WARFARE: 

The naval and air forces required to defeat the U-boat are already under examination by the Combined Staff Planners whose report 

should form the agenda for an early meeting. 

3. MEDITERRANEAN: 

(a) Organization of Command, and establishment of spheres of 

responsibility in the Hediterranean. 

(b) HUSKY: 

(Reference: Paragraph 3 (a), C.C.S. 155) 

The resources required for HUSKY have been assessed by the 

20 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH YOST SECQET 

British Joint Planning Staff. A summary of this and of the 

outline plan will be circulated for discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement should be reached as to the 

resources to be provided by U. S. and 3. K. respectively and 

on the arrangements for planning and command. 

(c) Air offensive from North Africa against Italy, Balkan objectives, and Axis shipping. 

4. TURKEY: 

(Reference: Paragraph 3 (b), C.C.S. 155) 

A draft paper by the British Joint Planning Staff on Allied 

Plans relatingtoTURKEY which has not yet been considered by the Britisn 

Chiefs of Staff will be circulated as a basis for discussion. British 

Chiefs of Staff to circulate a note on the Axis oil position for discussion in connection with this item. 

5. THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINCDOB: 

(Reference: Paragraph 3 (c), C.C.S. 155) 

British Chiefs of Staff to indicate the present and projected 

build-up of the R.A.F. Bomber Comnand and the British conception of the 

general plan for its employment in 1923.. Agreement should be reached on 

the program for the build-up of U S Bomber forces in the United Kingdom and on the general lines of employment of Allied Bomber forcesfrom 

the U. K. against Germany. 

6. LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS FROM THE U. K. : 

(Reference: Paragraph 3 (d) , C.C.S. 155) 

British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper outlining their 

conception of the limited offensive operations possible in 1913 under 

the terms of C.C.S. 155 and the resources available. 

7. BOLERO BUILD-UP: 

(Reference: Paragraph 3 (e), C.C.S. 155) 

British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper showing the forces 

which in their view could be made available for a return to the Continent in 1943 under the terms of C.C.S. 155. Agreement should be reached 

on the general concept of the circumstances which would make such an 

operation feasible. 

8. ANAKIM. 

(Reference: Paragraph 5 (c) (1) , C.C.S. 155) 

British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper giving the broad 

21 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

concept for operation ANAKIM, with M indication of the forces considered 

necessary. Agreement should be reached as tothe resources to be provided 

by U. S. and U. K. respectively. 

9. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC: 

(Reference: Paragraph 5 (c) (Z), C.C.S. 155) 

U. S. Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper giving the broad concept for operations in the Southwest Pacific with indications of the 

forces involved. 

10. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA: 

(Reference: Paragraph 6, C.C.=. 155) 

Agreement should be reached on the probable effect of the operations agreed at the conference upon supplies to Russia in 1913. 

11. The following items which appear in the agreed Agenda of the 

conference have not been dealt with above: 

(a) Strategtc Responszbtlzty and Command Set-up for DakarFrench West Pfrzcan Area required to be settled as early as 

possible. Admiral King to be invited to make proposals. 

(b) Increased efftctency in the case of Shzpbing. 

Lord Leathers and General Somervell to be invited to discuss 

and make appropriate recommendations to the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. 

22 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 157 January 18, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ALLIED PLANS RELATING TO TURKEY 

Ifemorandurn by British ,Joint Planning Staff 

PART I 

ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE WAR ON THE SIDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

1. The following extract from C.C.S. 135/2 has been taken as the 

basis for our further examination of the problem of inducing Turkey to 

join the Allies and of using that country for the development of of'fensive operations against the Axis. 

"Our motives in inducing Turkey to join us in the war would be: 

(a) To use Turkey as a base for air attacks 011 important objectives, such as the Rumanian oilfields and Black Sea 

conimurric a t ions 

(b) To close the Dardanelles to the Axis and open them to t,he 

I!n it ed Fat ions 

(c) To force an increased dispersal of German forces by using 

Turkey as a base for potential threats in the Balkans and 

South Russia 

(d) To deny Turkish chrome to (lermany,." 

INDUCEMENTS TO TORKEY: 

2. The two main factors upon which Turkey's entry into the war de.. 

pend are: 

(a) Her fear of tiermany now; 

(b) Her fear of Russia after the war.. 

In order to make Turkey ent,er actively into the war at an early 

date, we must convince her t,iiat (a) is unfounded, and at the same time 

exploit her fear of (b) 

FEAR OF GERMANY: 

3. Turkey's anxieties under (a) will only be assuaged when she is 

satisfied either that the Allies have so stretched the Axis as to re.­

strict the latter's ability to hurt her, or that material provision of 

23 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH .YOST SECRET 

the Allies to defend her against Axis air or land attack is forthcoming 

in time. The former may result from a development ofour existing strategy 

in the :Xediterranean and from continued Russian suc.cesses. The latter is 

examined in Part 11. 

FEAR OF RUSSIA: 

4. With regard to (b), Turkey must now appreciate that her hopes of 

a weak Russia are not likely to be realized. Consequently, her best 

chance of post-war security lies in obtaining for herself a place and 

support at the Peace Conference. She is particularly afraid that Russia 

may spread her influence through Rumania aiid Bulgaria and confront her 

with the fact of being the power in control at Turkey's western door 

into Europe as well as at her back door into Asia. She also fears that 

Russia, having secured complete control of the Black Sea, will demand 

unrestricted rights of passage through the Dardanelles. She would look 

to the Allies, and especially to the British Fhpire, to support her in 

resisting .exaggerated Russian claims in regard to .passage of the Straits. 

5. \<'hether it would be wise for His Najesty's Government to oppose 

Russian desires regarding passage of the Straits seems a matter for 

urgent consideration, for if we thwarted Russia in that respect we should 

probably be confronted with a claim for rights of transit through Persia 

to a port on the Persian Gulf. This, from our point of view, would be 

most undesirable. 

6. British and Ameri.cail diplomacy. should be directed to exploit 

Turkish fears of Russia. It should be made clear that public opinion 

will have little sympathy, when peace comes, for a country which remained aloof when we needed her aid. 

ECONOMIC AND TERRITORIAL INDUCENENTS: 

7. Guarantees of continued firiarlcial and economic assistance, of 

whickl details are given in Enclosure "A", might be a useful weapon, particularly in view of the deterioration of the Turkish position. 

8. There are certain t,erritorial adjustments by which Turkey sets 

store. Firstly, she is determined to kiave complete control of the raiiway which at present runs out in Syrian territory at Aleppo. Secondly, 

she requires some material facilities in, arid some guarantees for, the 

Turkish population of the Ilodecanesc Islands. Thirdly, she desires a 

rectification of her front,ier with Bulgaria. \Ye can see no strategical 

objection to their real.ization after the war provided we can retain 
II. S. SECRET 

BRITISH XOST SECRET 

certain rights to use the Aleppo-Mosul railway, but we must not lose 

sight of the fact that thereisa strong French interest in this railway. 

We have also guaranteed the future integrity and independence of Syrian 

territory. 

Creek interest would be directly affected by the realization of 

the second aim and it would be difficult for the Allies to encourage thr 

appetite of an allied but still neutral country at the expense u ' R 

fighting ally. 

We doubt whether these three sops would materially affect Turkey's decision on the main issue. 

SUMMARY OF DIPLOMATIC POLICY: 

9. We should exploit Turkish fears that she starids to lose if she 

remains out until the eleventh hour, making it clear through diplomatic 

channels that the extent of Allied support for Turkey at the Peace Conference will be conditioned by her entry into the war without delay. 

PART I1 

INITIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKFl 

10. An undertaking to assist Turkey against Axis aggression has 

already been given. This includes a plan for establishing certain forces 

in Turkey (Sprawl Plan) arid the provision of equipment and supplies to 

augment Turkish resources. A summary of these measures is givclr a.3 

Enclosures "B", "C" and "D", from which it will be seen that a subst,aritial quantity of material together with some aircraft have already 

reached Turkey. 

11. The roles of the force earmarked under the Sprawl Plan were: 

(a) To gain and maintain air superiority. 

(b) Assist Turkish land arid air forces in the defense of Thrace 

and Western Anatolia~. 

(c) Provide support for Turkish forces against seaborne attack 

in the Izmir area. 

(d) Assist in the defense of Ankara. 

(e) Attack strategic objective3 in Southeast Europe. 

(f)Protect base ports. 
LJ. S. SECRET 

BRITISH ,YOST SECRET 

CHANGED CONDITIONS: 

12. Existing plans assume that Turkey had already been attacked. 

The conditions under review are somewhat different. In the first place 

the threat we are now considering is potential rather than actual, although there is still a possibility that If the Germans believed that 

Turkey was about to enter the war they would try to overrun Thrace and 

at the same time bomb vital areas. In the second place Turkey is not 

compelled to fight but must be induced to come in of her own free will. 

As already stated, this she is unlikely to do unless she is satisfied 

that the general situation severely restricts German offensive potentialities in the Balkans. 

THE AIR THREAT: 

13. The ability of the Axis to deliver a heavy air offensive against 

Turkish vital areas cannot be forecast. It is certain, however, that 

Turkey will require the provision of air and ground defenses. The extent to which she will regard these as an inducement to fight will depend upon the rapidity with which they can be rendered effective. Should 

Turkey be prepared to take the plunge it would be to her advantage to 

augment her defenses with Allied help before she actually declares war. 

he can, however, undertake--provided ground equipment is installed and 

preparations made in Turkey beforehand--to have operational about 6 

Fighter squadrons with limited antiaircraft defenses within three days 

of the Turkish invitation. To achieve this, approximately 100 transport 

aircraft would have to be made available. 

THE THREAT THROUGH THRACE: 

14. The Turks at present intend, if attacked in Thrace, to hold a 

forward linenear the frontier until a "scorched earth" policy has been 

effected, and then to withdraw to the Catalja and Bulair lines. These 

are sound defensive positions, and we see no object in persuading the 

Turks to establish a main position forward, as this would be weak in 

defense. If, on the other hand, the attack does not develop, the forward 

area will remain available for the subsequent concentration of our 

offensive forces. The Turks will have, in any case, to rely initially 

on their own resources, since communications prevent any substantial 

Allied military assistance reaching Thrace quickly. 

ALLIED MILITARY WLICY: 

15. The force which we should establish in Turkey, in the first 

26 
LI. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

place, should comprise the minimum defensive element to satisfy the 

Turks, and the maximum offensive element, within the limits of communications, to meet our own future requirements. 

16. We consider that the following constitute a suitable defensive 

offer to the Turks: 

AIR: 

26 squadrons. Of this force,6 Fighter squadrons would constitute the immediate air defense contingent referred to in paragraph 13 

above. The types of the remaining squadrons proposed in the Sprawl plan 

may require adjustment in the light of changed conditions, but since a 

total of 25 squadrons has been offered to Turkey and the arrangements 

for the installation of this force are in hand, we consider thaL the 

total figure of 28 squadrons should stand. Additional aircraft for use 

by the Turks can be supplied from resources in the Middle East if priority over other commitments is considered to justify such a cnurse. 

LAYD; 

72 H.A.A. guns for defense of Istanbul, etc. 

96 H.A.A. guns ) for airfield defense. 

215 Lt. A.A. guns) 

4 Battalions for defense of the L. of C. 

It is possible that the Turks will regard the provision of armored 

fighting vehicles as an added inducement. In view ofthe Turks' inability 

to use or maintain armored fighting vehicles we should prefer to supply 

complete armored formations with our own personnel, and this we should 

be prepared to do. 

NAVAL: 

1 striking force ofsubmarines, M.T.B.'s and possibly destroyers. 

17. The next step is to build up forces to undertake offensive

operations and to secure air bases in Turkey. This is considered in 

Part 111. 

PART 1x1 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFENSIVE 

18. Turkey will be of value to the Allies as an offensive base for 

air rather than land operations. Owing to the initial defensive needs of 

27 
the Turks it will be impossible to include in the first air contingent a 

st,riking force adequate for a widespread heavy and sustained offensive. 

Since, however, trans-Anatolian communications will be stretched to the 

limit of their capacity, the first step must be to open up the Aegean 

sufficiently to make use of Turkish ports. For our use Smyrna is Of 

primary importance. 

19. Any land offensive we may wish to mount from Turkey mustbe based 

011 Thrace, but the Turks themselves will be making great demands on 

tile limited Tkiracian ports and commimications for their own maintenance. 

PXASE I - OPENlNG TEE AEGEAN 

20. It is considered that the opening ofthe Aegean could be achieved 

by the capture of the Dodecanese. With air protection based on Turkey 

and the Dodecanese it should then be possible to pass sufficient shipping through to make full use of Turkish port capacities in spite of the 

Axis threat from Crete and Greece. 

t?l. The capture of t,he IJodecanese is at present being studied by the 

Yiddle East.:' \Ye est,imate that. a force oi' some three divisions will be 

required, supported by 1%squadrons of aircraft operating from Southwest 

.ina~olia.These sqimclrons will have t,o be included in the initial force 

sent to Turkey. Airfields in the coast,al area opposite Xhodes will have 

to be constructed in advance and stocked with supplies so that operat,ions can begin as early as possible. The subsequent garrisons might be 

f'ound by our Balkan allies 

PKOTECTION OF SHIPPING: 

22. As soon as the Dodecanese have been captured it will be necessary 

to provide for the protection of our shipping through the Aegean. The 

estimated forces required for this purpose are given below. 

NAVAL: 

23. With Crete still in enemy hands, shipping must be routed as far 

ea.st of that island as possible. It is not likely that the threat .in the 

Aegean will exceed that of submarines, E-boats and aircraft. It is estimated that S-knot convoys of 30 ships running every 14 days between 

Alexandria and Istanbul will meet requirements and would need an escort 

::: Videast telegram CC 1136 dated 29/12/42 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH XOST SECRET 

group of about 8 ships. 

AIR: 

24. A regrouping of the squadrons already in Turkey should suffice 

both for protection of shipping and general defensive requirements. The 

necessary airfields exist but must be developed and supplied in advance. 

LAND: 

25. KO additional land forces will be required other than a few 

L. of C.. battalions and antiaircraft protection for the new ports and 

airfields brought into use, for which about 19 Heavy and 84 Light A.A. 

guns will be needed. 

PHASE I1 SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS 

THE TASK OF OFFTNSIVE FORCES 

AIR: 

26. Air forces operating from Turkey will be required for: 

(a) Attacks on Rumanian oil refineries and their communications. 

This is the primary task. 

(b) Attacks on Icalkan chrome mines and communications generally, 

both of Hhich are difficult targets. 

(c) Attacks against Axis shipping in the Black Sea and the 

Aegean. 

(d) Support of any Allied land operations. 

(e) Assiqtance to the Russians in the Ukraine. 

For these purposes a force of 15-20 Heavy Bomber squadrons will 

be required and could be maintained through Smyrna. Existing airfields 

in Northwest Turkey will require development. 

NAVAL: 

27. While the Black Sea should become a Russo-Turkish sphere of responsibility, British light naval forces will berequired for the attack, 

in conjunction with the Turks, on Axis communications in the Aegean. 

LAND: 

28. The object of a land offensive from Thrace would be to stretch 

Axis forces and tosupport Balkan patriots. The mounting of any offensive 

is dependent on the Turks holding an adequate bridgehead in Europe. 

29. There are two alternative lines of advance from Thrace into the 

Balkans: horth into Bulgaria; or West into Macedonia. 
ii. 5. SECOET 

3QITISV (YOST SECQET 

NORTH INTO BULGARIA: 

30. The objectives for a northward drive would be Axis communications in the Danube Basin and the oilfields of Ploesti, which are so 

vital to Germany that she would defend them if necessary at the expense 

of other areas. The line of advance would be through a hostile country, 

where communications, which always strongly favor the enemy, are initially so bad as probably to prevent much progress being made. This 

course might contain some Axis forces, but would have little effect on 

the Balkans generally. 

WEST INTO MACEDONIA: 

31. The objective for a westward drive would be Salonika. Once 

established there, further forces could be landed and arms for patriot 

forces of Greece, Albania, and Southern Yugoslavia imported. It should 

then be possible, in conjunction with the patriots, to sever Axis communications with Southern Greece and to gain control of the whole area. 

32. This should result in the abandonment of Crete by the Axis. 

Alternatively, it might be desirable to capture Crete at an earlier 

stage to assist in operations on the Greek mainland. Such an operation 

would be best mounted in Africa, though some air support could be given 

from the Dodecanese and Southwest Anatolia. 

33. The capture of Salonika from Thrace will, however, be a formidable and lengthy operation if the enemy puts up much resistance. Communications are bad, but not so greatly in the German's favor as those 

into Bulgaria. By supplementing road communications with coastwise 

shipping it should be possible to maintain 2-1/2 divisions, but in 

winter conditions this would be very difficult. A further 2-1/2 divisions could be maintained by rail as far forward as railhead, but the 

line is an easy one for the enemy to disrupt and repairs might take a 

very long time. 

31. A further adverse factor is that while the line of advance 

itself is badly served with airfields, it is flanked by a limited number 

of indifferent airfields in enemy hands within S. E. fighter range. 

Therefore, airfields will have to be provided in Turkish Thrace before 

operations can start, and others constructed as the advance progresses. 

This will take time. 

35. It is impossible to assess the chances of success of land operations through Vacedonia without making a detailed study, and without a 

30 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

firmer forecast than is now possible of the Axis military position as it 

will then be. The prize is great but the prospects are poor. 

SUMMARY 

COURSE OF OPERATIONS: 

36. Offensive operations might take the following course: 

(a) The capture of the Dodecanese and the establishment of naval 

and air forces for the protection of shipping to Istanbul, 

in order to open the Eastern Aegean, 

(b) The assembly of air forces in Anatolia for offensive operations against the Balkans and sea communications. 

(c) A possible land offensive from Thrace directed against 

Salonika. 

(d) After reinforcement through Salonika, the severance of Axis 

communications with Southern Greece and assistance to guerrilla forces in Greece, Albania, and Southern Yugoslavia. 

(e) The elimination of the Axis from Greece and Crete. 

PART IV 

SUMMARY OF FORCES REQUIRED 

AIR: 

37. Immediate Air Defense 

6 Squadrons 

Balance of Defensive Requirements 

20 Squadrons 

Opening of the Aegean and Support of Land Offensive 

12 Squadrons (additional to those above) 

Bomber Offensive 

15-20 Heavy Bomber Squadrons 

LAND: 

38. Defensive Requirements 

4 battalions for local defense 

168 Heavy A.A. guns ) For ports, airfields and 

215 Light A.A. guns ) vital areas. 

31 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Opening the Aegean 

3 divisions 

3 battalions for local derense 

18 tieavy A.A. guns ) For ports and airfields. 

84 Light A.A. guns ) 

Operations in Greece 

2-1/23 to 5 divisions, including ) With possible subsequent 

at least 1 Armored division ) reinforcement of up to 4 

divisions (to include 

Crete) 

NAVAL: 

39. Forces as necessary to assist, in t,he capture of the Dodecanese. 

A striking forceofdestroyers, submarines, M.T.B.'sandM.G.B.'s. 

A commitment of about 8 escort, vessels for shipping in the 

Aegean. 

PART V 

CONCLUSIONS 

40.. (a) We do not consider that, 'Turkey will enter the war unless the 

general situation is such that. she is satisfied that she can 

initially hold Thrace wi1,hoiil. Allied assistance and that immediate air defense is f'rlrt,Iicoming 

(b) Turkey will be of value to the Allies as an offensive base 

for air rather than land operations" 

POLICY TO HASTEN TtRKEYOS ENTRY INTO THE: WAR: 

41.. (a) Political: 

We should make clear to Turkey that our good offices at the 

Peace Conference will deperid upon her entry into the war 

without delay. 

(b) Financial and Economic: 

Turkey should be assured of' the continuance of our present 

economic and financial assistance. This might be extended 

to the provisions of wheat, and sugar in the near future, 

but our commitments elsewhere in the Middle East may prevent 

this 
II. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(c) Eilitary: 

We should offer: 

(1) An "iminediate air defense" contingent for the protection 

of vital centers in Western Turkey (paragraph 16). 

(2) The balance of forces up to the limit of trans-Anatolian 

communications (paragraph 16) I 

(3) Military equipment to bring all Turkish infantry formations in Thrace up to a satisfactory scale of weapons. 

(4) Armored fighting vehicles only if these are considered 

necessary from the psychological point of view^ We should 

prefer to send armored formations since the Turks cannot 

be relied upon to operate or maintain armored fighting 

vehicles efficiently, 

ALLIED MILITARY POLICY: 

42. (a) The provision of assistance to Turkey as in paragraph 11 (c) 

above. 

(b) Onening of the Aegean by the capture of the Dodecanese,, 

(c) Gevelopment of the air offensive from Turkey 

(d) If practicable, to open up and rearm the Balkans by an advance westwards from Thrace with limited forces directed on 

Saloni kaPREPARATORY MEASURES IN TURKEY: 

43. (a) Airfield Development 

Certain airfield developments are already included in the 

Sprawl Plan,, We should press for further development of air 

fields and supplies in the following areas: 

(1) In the Istanbul and Ankara areas to operate fighters for 

the defense of those sites.. 

(2) In the Southwest of Turkey to assist our capture of the 

Codecanese ., 

(3) In Anatolia and Armenia to operate bombers against 

Rumanian oil, Balkan communications, and in support of 

the Russian southern front, 

We must insure that the air defense equipment, including 

A.A. guns, ammunition and R,,D..F., necessary for the defense 

of at least those airfields which will be used by our initial 

air contingent, is ready in Turkey for immediate operation. 

33 
I'. S. STCYET 

31ITI.V VO.ST SEClET 

(b) Personnel: 

\Ye should send in to Turkey under cover the following personne 1: 

(1) Such specialists as are acceptable by the Turks to insure proper instruction in the maintenance and use of 

the Allied military equipment. 

(2) Reconnaissance parties for preparing the layout of airfield defenses and for studying the administrative and 

transportation problems. 

A number of Turkish-speaking liaison officers should be 

collected in the Yiddle East. 

(c) Communications : 

We should continue and, where necessary, augment supplies%of 

locomotives, rolling stock and port facilities. The provision of coal dumps at strategic centers is important for the 

operation of communications. 

RECOMMENDAT IONS 

44. We recommend that: 

(a) The Foreign Office be invited to examine the possibilities 

of diplomatic action in the light of the suggestions contained in this paper. ,Ye particularly urge that a firm 

policy should be decided with regardto our post-war attitude 

on the Dardanelles question and other matters of a primary 

interest to the Turks. 

(b) A copy of this paper should he sent to the Commanders-inChief, Viddle East, in reply to their telegram (C.C./166 

dated December 29, 1942) and that they should be invited to 

comment on the proposals contained herein. 

ENCLOSURE "A" 

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY 

FINANCIAL: 

1. Under the Agreements made after the collapse of France in 1940 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the United Kingdom assumed liability for the unutilized French share of 

the 25 million Pound credit for the purchase of war material, which was 

agreed under the Special Agreement of 19.19. Under this credit we are now 

supplying Turkey with all the arms, etc., which are available. 

2. As regards non-military supplies, we have offered to lend Tun.­

key sterling to enable her to pay for her essential needs from the 

sterling area. She is at present availing inersr.lf of Lhese facilities to 

the extent of approximately 2 million Pounds., 

3. Turkey's existing financial difficulties are those of intelnal 

finance. In regard to this we can give no rcal help. 

ECONOMIC: 

4. Our economic assistance is as great as our shipping resources 

and the limitations of available points of entry iniu Turkey will perrnitThere is, however, one form of assist.mice which is now under act,ive COII-. 

sideration, namely, the supply of' wheat., of which Turkey is in urgent 

need to the extent of 1.50,noo- 2nn,o0n tons for 13.31 Sugar is also n 

vital necessity and she has asked for about 20,CJOO t,or:s Success iii prn 

viding these two essentials would do much Lo hirid Turkey to us 

5. A form of assistance rvhjch would prove of ereat value in the 

future would be the supply of lororriot,i~vesand rcrl~liilg stock, of whirh 

the Turks are in great need IVe are doi~rng t,hr? best, we can to supply 

Turkey's needs, but our own demands for mj~litarypurposes are natural!y 

making this difficult, (See Enc:losure "D" paragrq1i:s 3 and 4 J 

1. As a result of the staff conversat,ions in 4nkar;i ~iiiCicr.ot>ei 

1941, we have promised to assist, t,he .Turks 1*it~tr the folicwirrg for-(:<, 

should Turkey be attacked: 

2 Armored DiTJisiollS 

2 Army Tank Ilrigadcs 

4 Infantry Divisions 

25 Squadrons R. LF. 

With the exception of four squadrons R.A F ~ which are to be 

dispatched to Western Turkey immediately the Turkish frontier is crossed. 

35 
ti..;. .-.~.sEt';.r :vas mads subject to our operational requirements elsewhere 

and Lk provision of adequate maintenance facilities. 

2. A plan (Sprawl Plan) has already aeen worked out for the move of 

:,:i?~.! a.ir contingent of 26 squadrons to airfields in Turkey south of a 

line ;iea of ~larmnra-Alexandretta (See Map "C") , accomp8nied by an Army 

cor,!ponrnt of four brigade groups for the protection of airfields. The 

ntairitendnce @f this force is equivalent to that of 2-1/2 divisions., The 

air t'orce consists of: 

12 Sho:t-range Fighter Squadrons 

I I,or.g-range Fighter Squadroil 

ti I.ig ht, il ombe r Squadroris 

2 :.'c(>?mi: 1:omDer Squadrons 

7, Ar'eix Cooperation Squadrons 

1 General Reconnaissance Squadron 

1 lorpedo Eomber Squadron 

3. It is estimated that moving by road and rail in summer t.he whole 

:iirl Sorce could be establisheJ in about 45 days, while the first 

gi'oiij! r,f' 6 fight,er squadrons with 6,ccompanyirig units woiild be ill position at nandirma and Balekesir in about tnelve days. 

1. This plan was designed to assist in the Turkish defense of 

Tk!re.:e arid Xestern Anatolia. It was not intended to he a prelude for. 

offenskit? operat.ions which we ourselves might wi.sh to undertake in the 

Fa 1ks I??, 

36 
-- 

-- 

U, S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE "C" 

R-A=F. AND ARiMy STOWS AUIEADY DUMPED INTO TURREY 

R,A.F. (in tons) Army (in tons) 

R.E. 

P.O.L. Bombs Amn. Sups. P.O.L. Amn. Stores Sups. 

Balikesir Area 483 ... 18.2 455 322 326 ... 112 

Kutahya iirea 1,785.1 181 21.9 ... 1,288 1,047 ... 658 

Bfyon Area 5,466.7 773.2 83 3,367.3 728 457 .-- 224 

Adam Area 357 ... ... ... 1,022 366 ... 392 

illuklsla Area 231 ... 9 639.9 735 284 5,000 280 

8,322.8 954.2 135.1 4,462.2 4,095 2,480 5,000 1,666 

Total R.A.F. 13,874.3 tons 

Total Army 13,241 tons 

27,115.3 tons 

37 
U. S. SECRET 

BFITISK VOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE "D" 

SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT 

1. The following table shows the number of certain main items of 

equipment which had been shipped to Turkey up to irovember 20, 1912 

(column (b)), and the number allocated or ordered to be sent to Turkey 

up to date (column (c)) . Column (d) gives an indicationof the quantities 

which might be allocated to Turkey if her priority vis-a-vis other theaters remains unchanged. 

2. Allocated up to 

end of 1912 but Possible future 

I tem Shipped not yet shipped allocation 

(a) (b) (C) (d) 

Stuart light tanks 40 171 

Valentines 2 00 

37-mm. A/Tk. guns 116 ?92 50 per month 

3.7-in. A.A. guns 208 l? 3 per month 

40-mm A .A. guns ... I s9 18 per month 

Searchlights 111 ... Field guns 101 25 

Uedium hows. GO ... Medium machine guns 1,075 205 50 per month 

Light machine guns 5,450 ... \fiddle East told 

to supply 150 

per month 

Sub-machine guns G ,500 2 .so0 

Anti-tank rifles 673 275 51) per month 

81-mm mortars 300 Order completed 

R.D.F. light warning 

sets 25 

This additional allocatian (in column (c) above) includes the 

following special offer made by the rrime Yinister in September: 

Stuart light tan!.-s .3G 

Infantry tanks 200 

37-mm. anti-tank guns 13s 

40-mm. Bofors 25 

3s 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

3. The fol.lowing items have been promised to Turkey by the United 

Kingdom : 

(a) Aircraft 

Tomahawks 

Elenheim IV's 

Doniini e 

Rurricanes IIG 

or IIC 

@) P.C.F. F,et? 

Promises Fulfilled 

76 + Vastage 

4 

4 by end of 

l'arch 1942 

li: bovember 

10 receniber 

42 

4 

.. 

.. 

.. 

'Twelve mobile sets are now being packed in United Kingdom 

for dispatch to Turkey b> sea via biiddle East, and a further 

thirteen have been promised. 

(c) Petrol 

Yidrlle Easl. have iindertaken to ntai~ntainsix months' supply 

for the Turkifki Air T-orrc.. 'io in:Tilenierit this abont 3,000 

tons are sent pack qiiart.t=r. 

4. The following locon!otiv?s arid rolling stock have been ordered 

and shipped, as shown, for 'rurkey: 

(a ) Locomotives 

C'hipped~?5 

(b) Wagons 

Ordered l,2l? of rliici, 

792 have been skinped 

5. If full benefit is to be gained by the entry of Turkey into the 

war, the supply of locomotives and rolling stock must keep pace with the 

development of railways. Tlie commitment would be considerable and might 

have to be at the expense of other theaters. 

39 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 158 January 19, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

AXIS OIL POSITION 

Note by Assistant Chief of the British Air Staff (Intelligence) 

1. Reproduced below are statements from: 

(a) "The Axis Oil Position in Europe, November 1942," by the 

Hart ley Commi t te e . (b) "German Strategy in 1943, " by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee in London, December 3rd, 1942. 

2. Extracts from the Hartley Committee's Report: 

Statistical Review of the Position from May 1st to October lst, 1942. 

Tons 

Production during period: 7,895,000 

Consumption by Armed Forces: 4,510,000 

Balance available for civilian consumption:3,355,000 

According to previous estimates, the non-military requirements 

for the period should have amounted to 4,334,000 tons, if industrial efficiency was to be maintained. To this should he added, say, 150,000 

for Occupied Russia making an apparent total deficiency of about 1,150,000 

tons. 

This deficiency might have been met by: 

Tons 

Reduction of consumption in Germany 

and Occupied Territories GL50,000 

Withdrawal from stocks 500,000 

TOTAL 1,150,000 

Evidence confirms that stocks have already been so reduced that 

distribution is becoming difficult and that the danger level has been 

reached. A reduction by ,500,000 below this level would impose a great 

strain on the distribution system which consequently is likely to be 

exceptionally sensitive to dislocation. 

Future Trend of Oil Position: 

During the six months November 1942 to May 1943 the situation 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH YOST SECRET 

may improve by: 

(a) Increased production: 

Increase from Synthetic Plants 

Exploitation of Waikop oil field 

(b) Reduced consumption: 

Military - by reduced activity in Russia 

Civil - by use of producer gas 

TOTAL 

Balance Sheet November 1912 - May 19.13 

The approximate balance sheet for the next 

basis of the above figures would therefore be: 

Produc t ion 

Less Service consumption 

Ieaving balance for civilian consumption 

Estimated minimum civilian requirements 

(assuming restrictions continued and producer gas further exploited) 

SURPLUS: 

Tons 

100,000 

100,000 

500,000 

180,000 

880,000 

six months on the 

Tons 

8,100,000 

,I,m0,ooo 

2,060,000 

3, G54,OOO 

406,000 

Assuming, therefore, reduced activity on the Eastern Front, exploitation of Maikop, continuance of present restrictions and increased 

use of producer gas, Germany might be able to replenish her stocks by 

some 400,000 tons during the next six months. She would be unlikely, 

however, to be in a position to restore the cuts in civilian consumption 

or to undertake the mechanized exploitation of Russia for the 1943 harvest. In the meantime, the Rumanian oil fields, which contribute 33 per 

cent of total Axis supplies, would remain of vital importance to her. 

The production trend is increasing. By the middle of 1943, 

additional production at the rate of one million tons per year may be 

expected from synthetic oil plants now in course of erection. This will 

possibly be increased by a further 500,000 tons annual capacity by the 

end of 1913. 

3. Extracts from Joint Intelligence Subcommittee's Report: 

Germany's oil situation is critical. She cannot hope to obtain 

any substantial additimal supplies from her present resources before 

the middle of 1943, even if she retains Vaikop. Despite ruthless economies in service and civilian use, there are already distributional 

41 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH KOST SECRET 

breakdowns which are beginning to affect military operations. During the 

next six months at least her oil situation will continue to embarrass 

her operations and restrict her plans. It will prevent her from providing the oil necessary for the 1943 Ukrainian harvest, without which her 

food position will remain precarious, and will continue to depress her 

industrial capacity. If, in these circumstances, she is forced this winter to consume oil for military purposes at the same rate as in the winter of 1911-42, she will be increasingly handicapped in holding her 

present position and will be unable to undertake an offensive against 

South or even North Caucasia in the summer of 1913. In these circmstances she may be forcedormay decide to shorten her line. On the other 

hand, if she is allowed to remain inactive during the winter, the resultant saving in oil, plus the new source of domestic supply that will 

become available to her in the middle of 1943, should enable her to 

undertake the military effort necessary at least to complete the occupation of North Caucasia. 

If Germany is given the opportunity to complete next year the 

occupation of North Caucasia and secures the sea passage across the 

Black Sea, she should command enough oil (including increased domestic 

supplies, which are expected in mid-1943) to meet her future military 

commitments, to insure a substantial grain surplus from the Ukraine in 

the 1944 harvest and to provide her industry with the minimum requirements for her war effort. If, on the other hand, she has shortened her 

line and abandoned hope of Caucasian oil and is heavily engaged by the 

Allies, her supplies will be so limited as to deprive her of all power 

of undertaking major offensive operations. 

4. Since the two above papers were written, there have been the 

following developments: 

The Russian counteroffensive is forcing the Germans to retreat 

on almost every section of the Eastern Front, including the Caucasus. 

Not only, therefore, are the chances of Germany obtaining oil from 

Maikop during 1913 remote, but it now appears unlikely that any respite 

will be given to the Germans this winter to remain inactive in order to 

conserve their oil supplies for a new offensive in the North Caucasus 

during the summer of the year. Fven a withdrawal to a shorter line will 

result in a heavy expenditure of oil resources. 

Germany in her campaigns in 1913 will, therefore, have to rely 

42 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

on: 

(a) The lxumanian Oil tields 

(b) Synthetic Production 

(c) Producer Gas 

She will be unable up to Xay 1943 to make the saving of 500,000 tons by 

a reduced activity on the nussian Front, nor will she have available the 

100,000 tons from the Caucasus. Her assets during this period will, 

therefore, be 600,000 tons less than those estimated in the Hartley 

report . 5. It,is of interest that instances have already occurred of flying 

training being disorganized and curtailed by shortage of fuel. 

43 
January 20, 1943 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 159/1 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA 

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

1. The objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa will be, 

in order to time: 

(a) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all Axis 

forces from Africa. 

(b) When (a) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation 

for "HUSKY", including bombing required by cover plans. 

(c) The direct furtherance of operation "HUSKY". 

(d) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti. 

2. So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of 

objects (a), (b) and (c) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with 

a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war. 

NOTE: This paper is identical to C.C.S. 159 except for deletion of "The 

proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff are as follows," at heading of paper; and addition of "including bombing required by cover 

plans," following "HUSKY" at close of paragraph l(b) 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 1m January 19, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINIMUM ESCORT REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN THE SEA 

COMMUNICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

Report by the Combined Staff Planners 

PART I - ATLANTIC 

Us K. DRY CARGO IMPORT SITUATION: 

1. The minimum import requirements for the United Kingdom during 

1943 are 27 million t,ons. It is estimated that with U. S.. assistance on 

the scale envisaged it should he possible to import 12 million tons during the first six months leaving a balance of 15 million tons to he imported in the second half of the year 

2. It is of primary importance that U K, imports in the first half 

of the year should not fall short of the target figure of 12 million 

tons, since any deficit will be carried into the second half of the year, 

and will thus impose an even more severe strain on United Nations resources, which will he severely taxed in order to achieve the balance of 

15 million tons. An additional reason for maintaining the rate of im-. 

ports is that a decision to remount BOLERO would involve the movement of 

an additional 100-200 ships a month in the latter half of the year, 

which will still further increase our escort requirements 

3. If, by the provision of improved protection, the average rate of 

loss in the North Atlantic were reduced by 25 percent, from February it 

is estimated that by the end of June the gain in U. X. imports would he 

450,000 tons: A further gain could he obtained by closing the transAtlantic convoy cycle in February from 10 to 8 days-. This would amount 

to 150,000 tons, making a total of 600,000 ton% Further, the 25 percent 

reduction referred to above would preserve 3/4,million d-w t.. of shipping in the whole Korth Atlantic which will otherwise be lost 

U. IE, AND NORTH AFRICAN OIL IMPORT SITUATION: 

4. The measures recently agreed to remedy the serious oil position 

in the U. K. include the running of (a) a direct tanker convoy from the 

Dutch West Indies to U. K. on a 20 day cycle; @) a direct fast tanker 

45 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH WOST SECRET 

convoy from the Cutch West Indies to the TOUCH area. These commitments 

will continue throughout the year since they do not suffice to build up 

stocks but merely to meet consumption. 

CONVOYS TO NORTH RUSSIA: 

5. With the increasing hours of daylight and the more southerly 

limit reached by the ice in the spring, it is essential to increase the 

scale of escort to convoys to Korth Russia, in order to deal with the 

threat of attack from German surface and air forces. It is considered 

that in the circumstances prevailing, a minimum striking force of 15 

Fleet destroyers is required in addition to the convoy escort. 

U.. S~ EAST COAST: 

6. Although U-boat activity on the east coast of the United States 

and Canada has recently been much reduced, the volume of shipping in 

this area presents such a vulnerable target that it is essential to provide for its protection against a renewal of heavy attack. 

CARIBBEAN AREA AKD GULF OF MEXICO: 

7. The protection of shipping employed in the transport of vital 

oil supplies from the oil ports t,o the eastern seaboard is one for which 

adequate provisions must be made. 

TRINIDAD SOUTH ATLANTIC SHIPPING: 

8. Vie have suffered heavy loss in this area through which a large 

volume of shipping to and from the United States, South America and 

South Africa must pass. Adequate provision must be made to safeguard 

this vital route, which carries among others the important bauxite 

supplies 

UNITED KINGDOM-WEST AFRICAN CONVOYS: 

9. These convoys were temporarily suspended in order to provide escorts for TORCH- It was not, however, practicable to suspend the flow 

of shipping to and from West and South Africa and South America since 

this shipping carries military supplies to the Middle East and brings 

back about one-third of the United Kingdom imports. The experiment of 

sailing such outward bound shipping in southerly routed trans-Atlantic 

convoys and breaking it off in mid-.Atlantic has proved too costly and 

has been discontinued. Similarly the necessity for homeward bound shipping to return via the east coast of the United States, has resulted in 

a most uneconomical use of tonnage and heavy losses in the Cape San 

Roque area. It is therefore necessary to reconstitute these convoys on a 

46 
minimum cycle of 20 days. 

REOPENING TiB \IEDITEKRANEAN: 

10 The shipping running to 

considerably. 

! M ' East has already been reduced 

It is proposed, when the !'editerranem route is reopened, to run 

a convoy of thirty cargo ships every ten days to supply and replenish 

the 'diddle hast and lndia. '?he escort commitments involved can be met by 

the forces available locally supplemented by small savings which will be 

available from the reduced scale of escort required on the Freetown 

route when the 'Yediterranean is opened to cargo ships. 

11 Although the protectior. of' slijppin,< in the Pacific has not yet 

become a problem of great magnitude, it may be expected to develop. The 

expanding campaign will require increased shipping to sustain it The 

submarine and air threat against this increased shipping will grow in 

intensity in proportion to the progress of' the campaign. Escort requirements for protection will increase correspondingly. 

PAXT I11 - T!IE U-BOAT THREAT 

12 The scale of LI-boat threat against which North Atlantic convoys 

require to be protected is steadily increasing. U-boats are now operating in groups of 12-18; hence the scale of attack against any convoy 

may be taken as about 15 U-boats. 

13 The scale of surface escort required to secure convoys against 

attack of this intensity is greater than we can hope to meet by the provision of surface escorts alone. Further, it has been proved that a combination of air and surface escort is more economical and efficient than 

surface escort alone. It is, therefore, necessary to make provision for 

air cover to all ocean convoys. Since neither shore base nor carrier 

borne aircraft can be relied upon to be always operable, both forms of 

air cover are required. 

A program of construction of escort carriers to meet our needs 

is already in hand and cannot be greatly accelerated For the immediate 

future, therefore, air escort can only be insured by the provision of 

47 
U. S. SECRET 

3RITIS.H MOST SECRET 

shore based aircraft 

14. In assessing the scale of escort, required for the various convoys account must be taken of: 

(a) The distance of the convoy route from the U-boat bases 

(b) The availability of shore based air cover 

(c) The availability of escort carriers. 

The following scales of ocean-going escort vessels (over 200 feet in 

length) are corisidered to be the minimum acceptable: 

(1) For convoys operating in areas where packs of U boats 

are likely to be encountered and assuming adequate air 

cover the minimum escort is assessed as 3 plus 1 for 

every 10 ships in the convoy, 

(2) For convoys operating in areas where pack tactics are 

unlikeiy and assuming adequate air escort is available 

minimum escort 1 plui 1 for every 10 ships in the convoy 

(3) Par convoys operating in areas where pack tactics are 

unlikely, strong air support is normally available and 

escorts can be strengthened by vessels under 206 f'set in 

lengCh %iriimum escort 1 plus 1 for every 20 ships in 

con ..oy 

(4, The tables ha>ie been prepared on the basis that adequate 

air cover is available Th minimum escort given &me 

should be doubled j~fadequate air cover is not a-vailable 

In other words, escort strength (with particular regard 

1.0 (1)) is dependent upon visibility and weather condi... 

Lions in which air coverage can be considered effective 

1:uririg the winter months in North Atlantic, with long 

nights arid unfavorable weather conditions, it is to be 

anticipated that the effective use of escort carriers 

will be very much restricted, and that shore based Air 

will. riot fully provide for air escort in the Middle At 

lantic Llnder such conditions escort strength as calcu.. 

lated under (1) must be increased 

15. The above assumptions in regard to escort strength contemplate 

as stated, the minimum acceptable Operating with this minimum it is not 

felt that measures can be taken to accomplish destruction of submarines 

at the desired rate (i e , in excess of the production rate) 

48 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

16. If convoys are operated with escorts in strengths less than that 

given in paragraph 14, increased losses are to be expected. The acceptance of increased losses must be balanced against the importance of 

other activities that necessitate the interference. 

17. Taking into account all the points discussed, the scale of escorts requiredforthe major ronvoys has been calculated in Enclosure "An. 

In Enclosure "B" wehave presented these same assessments as part 

of a world-wide estimate of the Fleet Destroyers and ocean-going escort 

vessels required to operate wjth the major naval forces, secure important focal points outside the general convoy system and conduct coastal 

traffic. 

In Enclosure "C" the forces available are compared with the 

requirements calcalated from Enclosure "B" 

In Enclosure "E" the reqLirements and availability of escort 

carriers is considered 

In Enclosure "En consideration is given to the world-wide requirements of shore based aircraft for the protection of trade cornmunications 

18 CONCLUSION: 

On the basis of the tables included in the enclosures it will be 

seen that minimum acceptable requirements as to escort craft will be met 

approximately in August and September We will not he in a position, 

however, to give fully adequate protection to ocean-going convoys to the 

extent of sinking attacking submarines at a rate even comparable to 

their production output before the end of the year 

49 
U. S. SECRET 

JRITISK MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSUXE "A" 

DETAILED ESTIMATE OF CONVOY ESCORT REQUIREMENTS 

(Vessels over 200 feet in length) 

North Russian 

U.S .-U. K. 

S.C. & H.X. \lid-Ocean 

S.C. & 1i.X. Western 

Local 

Canadian Local Convoys 

D.W.1.-U.K. Tanker 

D.W.1.-TORCH Tanker 

U.K. -Gibral tar (OG/HG) 

U.K. TORCH (KMF/WS) 

(ms) 

U.K. -Freetown 

U.S.-TORCH (Troop) 

U.S. -TORCH (Cargo) 

New York-Key West 

Guantanamo-New Yor k 

Guantanamo-Key West 

Guantanamo-Tr inidad 

Guantanamo-Panama 

Key West-Galveston & 

Pi1ottown 

Trinidad-Baia 

U.S.-Iceland Shuttle 

Service 

U.S. Pacific Convoys 

Days 

30 Special 1 0 3 1s 

(Note: iiussian convoys are supported by fleet 

destroyer striking forces) 

40 4 A 7 11 10 110 

40 % B 5 8 864 

.. .. .. .. .. 24 

40 20 A 

6 to 10 24 A 

30 30 A 

30 16 A 

60 16 A 

40 20 A 

20 25 Special 

45 25 A 

18 8 C 

30 4 C 

10 8 C 

23 4 C 

14 8 Special 

24 4 Special 

38 10 C 

8 10 3 30 

3 4 2 8 

6 9 1 9 

6 9 2 18 

9 12 3 36 

7 11 3 33 

7 9 2 18 

7 10 3 30 

2 3 3 9 

2 3 5 15 

1 .. 2 3 

2 3 5 15 

1 .. 2 3 

1 .. 1 6 

3 4 5 20 

6 .. Special .. .. .. 6 

.. .. .. .. .. 36 

511 

50 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH XOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE "B" 

WORLD-WIDE ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS OF 

FLEET DESTROYERS AND OCEAN- GOING ESCORT VESSELS 

(Over 200 feet in 

PRESENT BRITISH RESPONSIBILITIES: 

Home Fleet 

North Russian Convoys 

Transatlantic Convoys 

\lid-ocean escorts 

Wester-n Local escorts 

Canadian Local Convoys 

Freetown Convoys 

DWI-UK Tanker Convoys 

UK- Gibr a1t ar Convoys 

UK-Torch and lli S. Convoys 

UK-Local Escorts 

East Coast Convoys 

Local !iome Commands 

Minelaying Squadron 

Eas tern Mediterr anean Squadron 

length) 

Fleet Escort 

Destroyers Vessels 

- 30 

- 18 

- ­

110 

- fx - 24 

- 33 

- 30 

0 

- 54 

- 52 

- 28 

- 7 

15 -

Gibraltar Local Escorts & Inshore Sq.. - 39 

Freetown Local escorts - 18 

South Atlantic Local escorts - 6 

Eastern Fleet 

East Indies Local Escorts 

East Medi terr anean 

Red Sea 

Australia 9r Pacific 

PRESENT U. S. RESPONSIBILITIES: 

Pacific Fleet 

U - S. Pacific Convoys 

Atlantic Fleet 

U. S.-Torch Troop Convoys 

- 18 

- 20 

9 28 

- 3 

-

9 3 - ­ t a1 74 545 

- 125 

- 36 

48 I 

- 18 

51 
rscort 

iiessels 

i~.T. Torch Car50 Convoys 3':

i:bI--'?orcii Tanker ionvoys ­

h-ew York--Ney hest 9 

Cuai?taiiaii;o--~~ewYork 15 

Guantanaino--Key \lest 3 

Guant anamo--'Tr inid ad 15 

Cuantananlo--!ariama 3 

Key \$est--Galveston and Pilottown 6 

Trinidad--Baia 20 

U. S.--Iceland Shuttle Service 6 

Total 107 

ENCLOSURE "C" 

FLEET DESTROYERS AND OCEAN-GOING ESCORT VESSELS 

(Over 200 feet in length) 

COMPARISON OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY 

The sum of minimum requirements shown in Enclosure 

Fleet 

Destroyers 

Presently under British responsibility 74 

Presently under U. S. responsibility 235 

Total 309 

"Bn is: 

Ocean Going 

Escort Vessels 

546 

107 

653 

The forces auailable during each month of 1943 have been estimated in the table hereunder: 

(a) Allowance is made for a period of one months working up between completion and ready for service. 

(b) Allowance is made for a number of vessels being withdrawn 

from operational commands for extensive repairs or modernization (U.S.-33. BR.-21) 

(c) Attrition rates are based on previous experience, namely: 

Fleet Destroyers - 5 per month 

Escort Vessels - 5 per month 

52 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Fleet Destroyers Ocean-Going Escort Vessels(over200 ft.) 

us BR ri I 

rd .d "C 

OC3

uo '3 0 a** m 0.3 c To service u L QI o 

idUrl.4 

.lJan 1943 186 72 <zzz 

E riZ 

us BR 3m.4 

um id@ 

Constr Constr uoi > Gi rd Q 

January 10 

February 10 

March 10 

April 12 

May 10 

June 12 

July 11 

August 13 

September 10 

October 3 

November 11 

December 10 

1 264 

1 270 

1 276 

3 286 

1 292 

1 300 

3 309 

1 318 

2 325 

3 326 

5 337 

1 343 

us RR dl 

6 .3 u c 0 c3 

uo .3 0 a-0 m oi.3 c

To service ULoiO 

CdUri'3 rlunu 

us 

Constr 

RR 

Constr 

2 

uoi> 

S @

oi *d d.u 

January - 5 500 

February - 1 496 

March - 5 496 

April 5 3 499 

May 8 8 510 

June 16 17 538 

July 26 9 568 

August 32 12 607 

September 38 11 651 

October 37 13 696 

November 49 18 758 

December 56 20 829 

1 Jan 1M3 63 437 SCdL32 

ENCLOSURE "D" 

UNITED NATIONS REQUIREMENTS OF ESCORT CARRIERS 

REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVOY ESCORT: 

It is considered that every ocean convoy escort should include 

an escort carrier in areas where attacks by packs of U-boats may be 

expected On this basis the following is the estimated number required. 

North Atlantic. 

Transat lant ic convoys 10 

Freetown cony oys 3 

DWI-UK Tanker convoys 3 

DWI- Torc h Tanker convoys 3 

The North Russian convoys have to be fought through a heavy 

scale of air attack during the months when hours of daylight are long. 

It can be assumed that such attack will be concentrated largely on the 

53 
LJ. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

escort carrier. The probable loss of all fighter protection if only one 

escort carrier were sent with each convoy would have such consequences 

that it is considered that two escort carriers should be provided for 

each convoy. The requirement is therefore: 

North Russian convoys 6 

Total Requirements of Convoy 

escort 25 

AVAILABILITY: 

After allowance is made for working up and attrition it is estimated that the following number of escort carriers will be available for 

service: 

End January 

End February 

End March 

End April 

End May 

End June 

End July 

End August 

u. s. BRITISH TOTAL 

7 4 11 

8 5 13 

8 5 13 

11 8 19 

18 8 26 

21 11 32 

24 13 37 

28 14 .22 

Apart from offensive operations allowance must be made for a 

number of these carriers being employed on training, anti-raider duties 

and aircraft transporting, while 20 percent will be undergoing refit at 

any one time. 

ENCLOSURE 'E" 

UNITED NATIONS REQUIREMENTS OF SHORE BASED 

AIRCRAFT FOR THE DEFENSE OF TRADE COMMUNICATIONS 

SECTION 1 - THE NORTH ATLANTIC: 

1. The V.L.R. Area: 

Very long range aircraft are required to escort convoys and 

operate against U-boats in the North Atlantic at ranges greater than 

500 miles from airdromes in Great Britain, Iceland (C) and Newfoundland. 

This area is known as the V.L.R. Area. 0 They are also required to escort convoys as far south as 52 N. 

54 
[I. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

so that flexibility may be given to routing. 

It must be assumed that any convoy passing through this area is 

liable to be picked up and shadowed by a U-boat. It is essential to make 

the shadower dive. IVe should therefore be able to escort every convoy 

during daylight hours. Within the V.L.R. area this probably means about 

three convoys daily. 

The operation of three strong packs of U-boats simultaneously in 

the North Atlantic is well within the enemy’s resources. We must be prepared for two convoys to be attacked simultaneously and should be able 

to reinforce each of these with long range aircraft to harass and sink 

the U-boats These aircraft would also be used for sweeps for the same 

purpose 

For these tasks it is estimated that 80 V.L.R. aircraft are required, of which GO might be based in the United Kingdom and 20 in North 

America. 

2. The Bay of Biscay Area: 

The requirements in the Bay area are based on the development of 

a strong offensive against U-boats on passage to and from their bases, 

the escort of convoys passing inthat area and fleet reconnaissance duty. 

3 Northern Approaches: 

It is necessary to have enough air activity to the approaches to 

the Minches and St GeorgePs Channel to insure that U-boats cannot close 

In and operate in our focal points with impunity. The passage of new 

U-boats around the North of the Faroes provides opportunities for interception Fleet operations in the Northern area require reconnaissance 

and escort aircraft, An aircraft striking force for the North Sea and 

Northern waters is also necessary. 

4, East Coast: 

be h: R Squadron is required in the East Coast to assist in the 

protection of our convoys against U-boat attack. 

5. Gibraltar: 

The defense ofthe focal points in the approaches to the hlediterranean requires the allocation of suitable reconnaissance and antisubmarine aircraft able to undertake day and night operations. 

SECTION 2 EAST COAST OF U S, AND CANADA: 

The focal points of trade routes on the U. S. Atlantic seaboard 

require a large scale of air protection Practically all Atlantic convoy 

55 
C. S. SECRET 

BPITISR ,h:OST SECKX 

routes converge in this arcla. 

SECTIOK 3 - THE CARIBBEAN: 

The shipping routes to the oil fie Is of Venezuela an Trir lad 

and to the Panama Canal cross this area. These same routes converge in 

the various passages tkirough the West Indies, producing many focal points 

which require air covcrage. 

SECTION 4 - NORTHWEST AND WEST AFRICA: 

Shore based aircraft are required to secure the focal areas off 

the Nort,liwest and West, African ports, t,o escort the convoys moving in 

the Atlantic in these latitudes and t,o maintain control of the narrows. 

SECTION 5 ~ SOUTH AMERICAN EAST COAST AiVD AqCENSION ISLAND: 

Due to distances, the submarine menace here is considerably reduced. However, surface raiders operate continuously in this area and 

air patrols are required to guard against them. 

SECTION 6 - THE MEDITERRANEAN [EXCLUDING GIBRALTARj : 

In the Mediterranean the sea communications are controlled to a 

major degree by shore ba.sed aircraft. Requirenients for all types of aircraft for cooperation over the sea are considerable. 

SECTION 7 - INDIAN OCEAN: 

The situation in the Irtdian Ocean has generally improved. We are 

however face2 with: 

(a) A surface and submarille threat in the Bay of Bengal. 

(b) A submarille threat ill the Indian Ocean generally but particularly in the Mozambique Charmel and in the oil route 

from the Persiarr Gulf. 

SECTION R ~ THE SOLTII PACIFIC: 

No figures available. 

SECTION 9 - THE SO1JTIlWE:ST PAC.IFIC: 

No figures available. 

SECTIOK 10 - THE WEST COAST OF NORTI1 AIIERICA: 

Tile subriiarine menace off the three major ports in this area has 

been relieved by active operations in the Far East. However, these areas 

must be patrolled particularly against surface raids on large convoys. 

SECTION 11 - ALASKA: 

No figures available. 

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS: 

The shore based aircraft required to meet the commitments stated 
U. S. SECRET 

BG'ITISH MOST SECRET 

in the above sections are set out in the following schedule: 

SCHEDULE V 

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS OF SHORE-BASED AIRCRAFT 

FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE COMMUNICATIONS 

Section Area F'B VLR LR 31R MR/TB SR T/F 

1 North Atlantic to 2S0iY. 

and European (incl. Gib) 108, 140 . 180 . 200 

S- 21 in North Africa 

2 North Atlantic, East 

Coast 1J.S. & Canada 96 72 . 150 250 

3 Caribbean 120 18 . 72 180 

1 West Africa 2G01<. to 

Portuguese West Africa .45 . 12 32 

5 East Coast S+uth America 48 24 . 80 

6 Xedi terranean 1s . 80 80 96 

7 Indian Ocean 117 a 24 . 96 . 95 

8 South Pacific Iio data available 

9 Southwest Pacific 140 data available 

10 Hest Coast of .America 72 30 . . 110 

11 Alaska No data available 

12 South Africa . 120 . Flying Boats ) 

Very Long Range ) Estimated for convoy coverages at sea. 

Long Range ) 

All other planes required for coverage of harbors, straits 

and focal points of trade routes. 

57 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH NOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 161 January 20, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATION "HUSKY" 

Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff 

OUTLINE PLAN: 

1. The main features of the plan are: 

(a) British assaults: 

(1) On the southeast corner of the island by three divisions' 

on D day to secure the airfields in that area and the 

ports of Syracuse and Augusta. These airfields are required to enable the assault on Catania to be protected. 

(2) On Catania by one division on D 3 to secure the port and 

airfields. 

(b) American assaults: 

(1) On the southwest shore by one division on D day to secure the airfields in that area. These airfields are 

required to cover the assaults on Palermo 

(2) On the Palermo area by two divisions on D 2 to capture 

the port of Palermo and adjacent ports and airfields. 

Escort carriers will provide additional support for the 

assault. 

(c) Follow-up: 

One British division will be landed through Catania and one 

American division through Palermo. 

FORCES REQUIRED: 

2. The forces required are shown in Enclosure subdivided into American and Britisri commitments. 

MOUNTING OF BRITISH PORTION: 

3. It is assumed that the USSOASwill require French North African 

ports for the mounting of their share of the operation. Such part of the 

British expedition as is mounted inside the Yediterranean mus't therefore 

De mounted from Middle East ports, e.g , Haifa, Alexandria, Port Said, 

Malta. Limitations of port capacity make it impossible to mount the 

whole of the British share from the Middle East under any conditions. 
U. S, SECRET 

BRITTSH MOST SECRET 

4. In ordeF to use battle-experienced troops of the Eighth Army, 

they would have to be moved back to Egypt for training arrl loading after 

the conclusion of operations in Tunisia If the expedition is to be 

mounted within reasonable time, it will not be possible to employ more 

than about one battle-experienced division in HUSKY 

PROVISION OF ARMY FORCES: 

5 There are two alternative methods: 

A To find the three division assault from the U X and the 

Catania assault (one division) and the follow-up (one division) from the Middle East 

B To find the three division assault and the follow-up (one 

division) from the hliddle East and the Catania assault (one 

division) from the U. K. 

ALTERNATIVE A 

6 (a) Advantages: 

(1) Provided North Africa is cleared of the enemy by April 

3Oth, it enables the British assaults to be carried out 

in late July, 

(2) It is more economical in shipping. 

@) Disadvantages : 

(1) It does not use forces in the Middle East which are 

available over and above security commitments 

(2) It involves the passage of a large assault convoy through 

the Sicilian narrows in mineable waters and under air 

attack. This is an unacceptable risk to the spearhead of 

the attack. 

ALTERNATIVE B 

7 (a) Advantages: 

(1) It permits a slight reduction in escort. 

(2) It obviates the disadvantages of A, and, therefore, 

gives the operation greater chances of tactical success. 

@) Disadvantages: 

(1) Provided North Africa is cleared of the enemy on April 

59 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH <YOST SECRET 

30th, the British assaults could take place at the end 

of September. This is near the time when the weather 

breaks. 

(2) It involves the dispatch of 16 personnel ships to the 

Middle East which are not otherwise required in that 

area. 

(3) It is wasteful of shipping and will prevent us making 

any appreciable British cargo shipping contribution to 

Bolero. 

(4) Without reference to the Middle East we cannot state 

whether the port and transportation facilities in the 

Middle East are capable of mounting an assault of this 

size. 

PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES: 

8. The British Naval forces can be provided. 

0. In the case of escorts, by the end of August the United Nations 

expect to be at least 16 escorts below our minimum escort requirements. 

Thus they can only provide the escort required if the increased risk involved in taking them off convoy protection for the period of the operation can be accepted 

10. Even if it were possible, the mounting of all assaults from 

North Africa would not result in any further reduction of escorts, as 

the limiting factor is the number required for the protection of shipping and craft off beaches. 

PROVISION OF AIR FORCES : 

11. The British air forces required will be available in North 

Africa and the Middle East. 

PROVISION OF LANDING CRAFT: 

12. British landing craft requirements can be made available provided expected deliveries from the U. S. are punctual. There may,however, be difficulty in getting the required number shipped to the Middle 

East in time.. This will require detailed examination. 

13. Any large increase in the use of L.C.I. (L) and L.S.T. for the 

American assault will probably have to be at the expense of the present 

British allotment. This would prevent our assaults being undertaken as 

proposed. 
li. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

PROVISION OF SHIPPING: 

14. The shipping can be provided. 

AMERICAN SHARE OF THE OPERATIOX: 

15. The American share of the operation is shown in the Enclosure. he 

have not attempted to estimate whetkier this can bc met but must point 

out that if the Italian Fleet is not driven up the Adriatic, the United 

States will have to provide a heavy naval covering force in addition to 

the forces shown. 

Battleships 

rleet Carriers 

Escort Carriers 

Crnisers 

Pestroyers 

Escorts 

C E LAMBE, 

G M STEWART, 

W ELLIOT 

ENCLOSLijRE 

F0INX.S IILQLiIRF.;> 

XAVAL 

ilritish 

2 

0 

10 

30 

69 

-

British 

1 1/3 

1 

3 

1 

U.S. Total 

u 4 

O 2 

8 8 

4 14 

20 50 

55 124 

- ­

us Total 

3 7--1/3 

1 2 

2 5 

1 2 

Minesweepers S small craft 

ARMY 

(a) ,Assault. 

Infantry Divisions 

Armored Regiments 

Parachute Srigades 

(b) Fa 1 1 ow -Up 

Infantry Civisions 
U. S. SECRET 

SPITISH MOST SECRET 

AIR FORCES 

British American m-L-’ I”Lill 

S.E.F. 51 

T.E.F. (day) 2 

T.E.F. (P-38) 12 

T.E.F. (Xight) 3 

Light-Vedium Bombers 2c 

!ieavy Bombers (Day) Ill 

G.R. 

Fighter Xecre. 

P .it. u. 

Transport 

Torpedo Bombers 

l~i. 0. Ship 

L.S.I. (L) 

1..S.I. (I?) 

L.S.2. 

L.S.T. 

L.C.A. 

L.C.P. 

L.C.S. 

I.. C .!i. 

L. C .I. (I.) 

L.C.T. 

Personnel Ships 

H.T. Ships 

3 

2 

1 

2 

SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT 

British American rota1 

3 2 5 

b 13 21 

3 ‘i 5 

0 5 

56 11 100 

98 c, 

C?i 150 

100 190 2 90 

14 12 2fi 

?00 71 271 

3U 3u 120 

7” 0 72 

?O 23 Ill 

31 77 171 

r 

62 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH YOST SECRET 

C.C.S. lOl/l January 21, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPE RAT I ON " IIUSKY" 

Report by Eritish .ioint, Planning Staff 

EARLIEST DATE FOit TM! A'iSAirLT: 

1. After further examination we have concluded:: that the earliest 

safe date on which we can rely for the Rritish assaults is August 30th 

addo not consider that this date can be advanced unless operations in 

Tunisia conclude considerably earlier than anticipated. 

The use of air transport to move the leading brigade of the 

division from Tunisia to ligypt for training might, enable us to advance 

the assault date from August 30th to ahout August 15th. This is, however, 

the date of fill1 moon. 

2. If the British could use Algiers and a sector of the east coast 

of Tunisia for the training and loading of one of their divisions, t,he 

earliest date by which the Eritish could assanlt conld he advanced by 

one month. Further examinationby the U. S. Planning Staffs may? however, 

show that Tunisia is essential for the'Americans to mount their twoshore 

to shore assaults. In this event the ship-borne portion of the Eritish 

assault (about 40 ships) would have to pass the Siciljan Narrows on 1) 

day. 

.3. The U. S. Planning Staff have not had time to assess in detail 

how their portionofthe operation will be carried out and in conseqmnce 

the types and numbers of landing craft they will useg or the date on 

which they can mount the operation.'The limiting factors are t,he provision of training establishments and organizat'ion and early provision 

of landing craft, and not the availability of army forces Landing craft 

must in any case be delivered in North Africa in advance of present 

scheduled dates. 

PROVISION OF RESOURCES: 

4. The U. S. Planners consider from preliminary examination that 

the first flight of the American assaults should be in armored craf't 

* Vide tinclosure "A" 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

other than L.C.I. (L) supported by L.C.S. No craft of this type exist 

except British L.C.A. and L.C.S., but sufficient could probably be made 

available for the British and American assaults at the cost of crossChannel operations. 

IMMEDIATE ACTION: 

5. Beach reconnaissance, expansion of training facilities in North 

Africa and Middle East, and a comprehensive program of airfield construction must be put in hand at once. 

ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND: 

6. We consider that a Supreme Commander must at once be appointed 

for Operation HUSKY. 

7. Navy, Army and Air Commanders should also be appointed subordinate to the Supreme Commander. Under these Commanders will be two 

Task Forces--a Western and an Eastern. The appointments of these Commanders and their Staffs should be made at once. 

8. The operation should in the main be planned from North Africa. 

9. The Joint U. S. Staff Planners have informed us that they agree 

with paragraphs 6 to 8 above. 

(signed) C. E, LAMBE 

G, M, STEWART 

W, ELLIOT 

ENCLOSURE "A" 

OPERATION HUSKY 

OUTLINE PLAN: 

1. The main features of the plan are: 

(a) British assaults: 

(1) On the southeast corner of the island by three divisions 

on D. day to secure the airfields in that area and the 

ports of Syracuse and Augusta. These airfields are required to enable the assault on Catania to be protected. 

(2) On Catania by one division on D 3 to secure the port 

and airfields. 

64 
[I. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(b) American assaults: 

(1) On the southwest shore by one division on D day to secure the airfields in that area. These airfields are 

required to cover the assaults on Palermo. 

(2) On the Palermo area by two divisions on D 2 to capture 

the port of Palermo and adjacent ports and airfields. 

Escort carriers will provide additional support for the 

assault. 

(c) Follow up: 

One British division will be landed through Catania and one 

American division through Palermo. 

FORCES REVJIRED: 

2. The forces required are shown in Enclosure "B" subdivided into 

American and British commitments. 

MOUNTING OF BRITISH PORTION: 

3. It is assumed that the U.S.A. will require French North African 

ports for the mounting of their share of the operation. Such part of the 

British expedition as is mounted inside the Mediterranean must therefore 

be mounted from Middle East ports, e.g., Haifa, Alexandria, Port Said, 

Tripoli and Malta. Limitations of port capacity make it impossible to 

mount the whole of the British share from the Middle East under any 

conditions. 

PROVISION OF ARMY FORCES: 

4. The risk involved in passing a large convoy (some 90 ships) from 

the U. K. through Sicilian narrows in mineable waters and under air 

attack is unacceptable for the initial assaults. The three division 

assault on D day on to the S.E. corner of the island must therefore be 

mounted in the Middle East. The follow up must be mounted from TRIPOLI 

or nearby ports if landing craft are to be used and economy of shipping 

is to be effected. 

Thus the Catania D + 3 assault (onedivision) can only be mounted 

from the U. K. and we must accept the risk of passing this assault convoy through the Sicilian narrows on about D + 2. 

It might be possible to train and mount one of the above British 

divisions in Algeria and Tunisia, but this will seriously curtail the 

American facilities for mounting their share of the operations, and will 

complicate the organization of the assault. 
U S, SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

This alternative of mounting two divisions from the Middle East 

and four divisions from North Africa would result in the British share 

of the assault being ready by August 1st. It may, however, well result 

in the American share of the assault being delayed beyond August 31st. 

No advantage in date would therefore be gained, and considerable complications would be added. 

The mounting of the British share must therefore take the following form: 

3 divisions (initial assault) from Middle East 

1 division (D + 3 assault) from U. K. 

1 division (follow up) from Tripolitania 

PROVISION OF ARMY FORCES FOR INITIAL ASSAULT: 

5, There are four possibilities: 

(A) Use 5th and 56th from Persia-Iraq and N.Z. division or 78th 

division from Tunisia 

(B) Use 5th division from Persia-Iraq 

N.Z. division ) from Tunisia 

78th division ) 

(C) Use 5th Division from Persia-Iraq 

1 division ) from U. K. shipped round Cape to Egypt 4 division ) 

@) Use 5th Division from Persia-.Iraq 

1 Division or 4 Division from U. K. shipped round Cape 

to Egypt. 56th, N.Z. or 78th divisionESTIMATED TIME TABLE: 

6. The limiting factorsindeciding the earliest date of the assault 

are the time required for training and inthe case ofalternatives (C) and 

(D) the time needed to move the formations to the Middle East.. These are 

examined in Enclosure "C" from which we conclude that the earliest dates 

of assault are: 

(A) August 30th 

(B) August 30th 

(C) September 25th 

@) September 10th 

7.. There is no advantage in moving formations from U.. K,, to Middle 

East via the cape^ Thus, we must adopt case (A) or (B) , Although Case (B) 

employs two seasoned formations, we recommend Case (A) because: 

66 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

(a) Only one instead of two brigades must be back from Tunisia 

in time to start training on June 1st. It may be possible to 

withdraw one brigade in time to do this. 

(b) Only one instead of two divisions will have to be refitted 

in Egypt after return from Tunisia. 

(c) Two out of three instead of one division will be available 

for planning from March onwards. With Case (B) two division 

staffs could not arrive in Egypt more than about one month 

before the detailed plan must be completed. 

8. We, therefore, recommend Case (A) be adopted and the target date 

for the assault be fixed at August 30th. This will mean the three division D. day assault should be mounted with: 

5th and SGth Divisions from Persia-Iraq. 

N 2 and 78th Divisions from Tunisia. 

PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES. 

9 The British Naval forces can be provided 

10. In the case of escorts, by the end of August the United Nations 

expect to be at least 46 escorts below our minimum escort requirements. 

Thus they can only provide the escort required if the increased risk 

involved in taking them off convoy protection for the period of the 

operation can be accepted. 

11. Even if it were possible, the mounting of all assaults from 

North Africa would not result in any further reduction of escorts, as 

the limiting factor is the number required for the protection of shipping and craft off beaches. 

PROVISION OF AIR FORCES: 

12. The British air forces required willbeavailable in North Africa 

and the Middle East. 

PROVISION OF LANDING CRAFT: 

13. British landing craft requirements can be made available provided expected deliveries from the U, S. are punctual There may, however, be difficulty in getting the required number shipped to the Middle 

East in time. This will require detailed examination 

14. Any large increase in the use of L.C.I.(L) and L,S.T. for the 

American assault will probably have to be at the expense of the present 

British allotment. This would prevent our assaults being undertaken as 

proposed ~ 

67 
U. S. SECIiET 

BQITISB MOST SECRET 

PROVISION OF SHIPPING: 

15. The shipping can be provided. 

AMERICAN SHARE OF THE OPERATION: 

16. The American share of the operation is shown in Enclosure "B*. 

We have not attempted to estimate whether this can be met but must point 

out that if the Italian Fleet is not driven up the Adriatic, the United 

States will have to provide a heavy naval covering force in addition to 

the forces shown. 

Battleships 

Fleet Carriers 

(Signed) C.E. LAMBE 

ENCLOSURE "B" 

FORCES REQUIRED 

NAVAL 

British U.S. 

1 0 

G .W . STEWART 

W. ELLIOT 

Total 

4 

2 

e 

14 

50 

124 

Total 

7-1 /3 

2 

5 

2 

Escort carriers 

Cruisers 

Destroyers 

Escorts 

(a) Assault.: 

2 0 

0 8 

10 .1 

30 20 

60 55 

Minesweepers 

& small craft 

ARMY 

Brit ish U.S. 

Infantry Divisions 4-1/3 3 

Armored Regiments 1 1 

Parachute Brigades 3 2 

(b) Follow-up: 

Inf antrg L)ivisions 1 1 

68 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

AIR FORCES :* 

S.E.F. 

T.E.F. day 

T.E.F. night 

Light Bombers 

British u. s. 

Squadrons U.E. Groups U.E. 

21 432 6 480 

3 54 3 240 

3 54 - ­

6 108 1 57 

U. S. Groups 

P-38. 

Exc lud ing 

defense North 

Africa. 

Includes 

observation & 

Army support 

Squadrons. 

8-26 Torpedo 

Bombers. 

Medium Bombers 

Heavy Bombers 

G.R. (V.P.B.) 

Torpedo 

PRU 

Total Combat 

Transport 

* These figures 

5 90 5 285 

2 36 7 215 

3 48 - -

% 80 1 57 

3 35 - 13 

- 938 - 1,376 

5 80 G 312 

are for all Allied aircraft concentrated in 

the Central Mediterranean for offensive operations preparatory to and during BCJSKY. They exclude aircraft for defense, 

protection of shipping, reserves for Turkey, etc., elsewhere 

in the Mediterranean. 

SHIPS AND LANDING CRm 

H.2. Ship 

L.S.I. (L) 

L.S.I. (M) 

L.S.D. 

L.S.T. 

British American':'" Total 

3 2 5 

8 13 21 

3 2 5 

5 O 5 

56 44 100 

59 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH /*fOST SECRET 

SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT 

(Continued) 

L.C.A. 

L.C.P. 

L.C.S 

L.C.M. 

L.C.I. (L) 

L.C.T. 

British 

59 

100 

14 

200 

90 

72 

Personnel Ships 20 

'V.T. Ships 91 

American':" 

52 

190 

12 

170 

30 

0 

20 

77 

Total 

150 

290 

26 

370 

120 

72 

40 

171 

::"American figures are given in terms of British 

types of landing cra 

E"-LOSURE "C" 

EXAMINATION OF EARLIEST DATE OF ASSAULT 

ALTERNATIVES : 

Divisions from: 

Persia-Iraq Tunisia U.K. via Cape 

2 1 (h.Z. or 78th) 0 

1 2 fLJ.2. & 78th) 0 

1 0 2 

1 1 1 

The Overseas Assault Force cannot arrive in the Hiddle East 

before Yay 15th. 

Training facilities in the h!iddle East can if necessarybe 

expanded by \lay 1st to deal with the basic training of two 

brigade groups at a time. 

Final rehearsal can if necessary be carried out by twobrigade groups at a time in the Overseas assault Force. 

Priority must be given for the shipment of landing craft to 

the 'diddle East from both U. I{. and U.S.A. 

We have assumed that the New Zealand and 78th divisions in 

70 
U. S, SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Tunisia can be released in time to start training in Egypt 

by June 1st­

(f) We have assumed that none of the shipping saved as a result 

of the recent cut on Middle East and Indian maintenance can 

be used for transporting the U. K. divisions round the Cape. 

In consequence, the sailing date of these divisions is dependent upon the completion of the Torch build up. 

CASE A 

h’arch I-April 30 (a) Basic training first division from P.A.I.C. 

Ma) 1-June 30 (b) Easic training second division from P.A.I.C. 

71 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 162 January 19, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF' 

Us S - AID TO RUSSIA 

Joint Memorandum agreed by Lord Leathers and 

Lieutenant General Somervell 

1. Existing U. S. estimates on the availability of shipping and the 

possibility of moving troops, naval forces, supplies and equipment during 

1043 allow for the following U. S. sailings for Russian aid. 

TABLE I 

Jan Feh Mar Apr May June Total 

(a) To North Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

(b) To Persian Gulf 15 15 15 15 15 15 90 

(c) In Pacific 

(Average from U. S 

and Russian Pool) 31 31 31 31 31 31 186 

46 46 46 46 46 46 276 

Shipments beyond June are estimated at the same rate 

2, Owing to limited capacity of Persian Gulf ports and the discontinuance of the North Atlantic route, U S commitments under the 

existing Protocol have been only ahout 50 percent of requirements for 

the last six months, necessitating the shipment of three-fourths of the 

year's total during the first half of the year 1943. This will require a 

total of 132 sailings from the UL S, to Russia prior to July 1, 1943. 

If Protocol commitments after July 1 are at the same rate as for the 

year prior to that time, two-thirds this number, or 288 sailings, will 

be required. 

3. $s the route through the Pacific is subject to interruption by 

the Japanese at any moment and as arms and ammunition do not move via 

that route, it cannot be relied on for any great increase above the 

present sailings. 

4. It is expected that the capacity of Persian Gulf ports can be 

expanded to handle a total of 26 ships per month by June 1943. 

5. For the northern route on the basis of 12 British cargo ships 

and two tankers there would remain available 16 sailings from the U. S. 

72 
U. S., SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

every convoy. Owing to the restricted supply of escorts, it seems that 

the convoy interval will not be reduced below 42 days. With ice hazards 

and the menace of submarines and air attacks, it is hardly possible that 

total sailings will exceed this rate. 

6. The total sailings for the year could therefore be on the following order: 

TABLE I1 

NORTH RUSSIA 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 

16 16 - 16 16 - 16 16 - 16 16 - 128 

PERSIAN ROUTE 

16 18 20 22 24 26 16 16 16 16 16 16 222 

PACIFIC ROUTE 

31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 372 

TOTAL 

63 65 51 69 71 57 63 63 47 63 63 47 722 

Sailings on this order would fail to meet Protocol requirements in July 

by 56 ships, but would permit meeting full commitments by the end of the 

calendar year. 

7. It will be noted from Tables I and I1 that the following addi 

tional sailings would be required for such a program resulting in the 

necessity for the use ofadditional cargo ships for the period of a year., 

TBBLE I11 

ADDITIONAL SAILINGS REQUIRED 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 

17 19 5 23 25 11 17 17 1 17 17 1 170 

8. The effect of meeting the Russian Protocol on the movement of 

U. S. troops overseas and maintaining them thereafter would be on the 

following order: 

TBBLE IV 

1943 

1st Quarter 

2nd Quarter 

3rd Quarter 

4th Quarter 

TOTAL 

No, of troops 

46,000 

82,000 

55,000 

4,000 

187,000 

73 
17. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

9. As requirements for other theaters are more or less fixed, the 

blow would fall on movements to the U. K. Some adjustment might be 

necessary in timing of Russian shipment to avoid interference with 

special requirements. 

10. Additional tonnage above that assumed in existing estimates 

might be made available: (a) by reduction in the rate of submarine 

losses below the 2.6 percent assumed in these calculations; (b) by 

eliminating conversion of 100 EC ZSs into transports; (c) by savings 

through the use of the Mediterranean route; (d) release of U. S. from 

obligation to replace British losses in like amount. 

11. A reduction in rate of loss of United Nations shipping from 

2.6 percent per month to only 2.0 percent per month would increase the 

troop carrying capacity in 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a third of this, 

or a reduction of the loss rate to 2.4 percent, would make these shipments to Russia possible, without lessening troop movements, With the 

measures projected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such an improvement is 

a possibility. 

12. If conversion of EC ZSs were stopped at the end of February, a 

gain in transport capacity of 153,000 would be possible. If losses are 

not reduced or no assistance from British sources for this purpose can 

be obtained, such a course would be desirable. 

13. The British have already discounted the estimated gain in t,he 

Mediterranean by diverting this tonnage to British imports 

14. Supplement British assistance, as previously agreed, up to 

300,000 tons per month, cumulative. Even on this basis, with a reduction 

in sinkings, there may be some relief on this score" 

15. It is concluded from the above that the possibility exists of 

meeting Russian Protocol deliveries on the present scale during 1943 

without reducing tentative schedules, but that the possibility exists 

that movements to the U. K. may be reduced by as much as 100,000 men. 

The advantages of furnishing aid to Russia are such that this hazard 

should he accepted. Owing to the scarcity of shipping, there should be 

a general agreement that all tonnage above minimum requirements shouid 

be assigned to U. S. troop movements. 

74 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 162/1 January 20, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

U. S. AID TO RUSSIA 

Memorandum prepared by Lieutenant General Somervell 

1. Existing U. S. estimates on the availability of shipping and the 

possibiJity of moving troops, naval forces, supplies and equipment 

during 1943 allow for the following U. S. sailings for Russian aid. 

TABLE I 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May June Total 

(a) To North Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

(b) To Persian Gulf 15 15 15 15 15 15 90 

(c) In Pacific 

(Average from U. S. 

and Russian Pool) 31 31 31 31 31 31 186 

46 46 46 46 46 46 276 

Shipments beyond June are estimated at the same rate. 

2. Owing to limited capacity of Persian Gulf ports and the dis 

continuance of the horth Atlantic route, U. S. commitments under the 

existing Protocol have been only about 50 percent of requirements for 

the last six months, necessitating the shipment of three-fourths of the 

year's total during the first half of the year 1943. This will require a 

total of 432 sailings from the U. S. to Russia prior to July 1, 1943. 

If Protocol commitments after July 1 are at the same rate as for the 

year prior to that time, two-thirds this number, or 288 sailings, will 

be required. 

3. As the route through the pacific is subject to interruption by 

the Japanese at any moment and as arms and ammunition do not move via 

that route, it cannot be relied on for any great increase above the 

present sailings 

4. It is expected that the capacity of Persian Gulf ports can be 

expanded to handle a total of 26 ships per month by June 1943. 

5. For the northern route on the basis of 12 British cargo ships 

and two tankers there would remain available 16 sailings from the U. S. 

75 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

every convoy. Owing to the restricted supply of escorts, it seems that 

the convoy interval will not be reduced below 42 days. With ice hazards 

and the menace of submarines and air attacks, it is hardly possible that 

total sailings will exceed this rate. 

6. The total sailings for the year could therefore be on the following order: 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May 

16 16 - 16 16 

16 18 20 22 24 

31 31 31 31 31 

63 65 51 69 71 

TABLE I1 

NORTH RUSSIA 

June July Aug 

- 16 16 

PERSIAN ROUTE 

26 16 16 

PACIFIC ROUTE 

31 31 31 

TOTAL 

57 63 63 

Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 

- 16 16 - 128 

16 16 16 16 222 

31 31 31 31 372 

47 63 63 47 722 

Sailings on this order woilld fail to meet Protocol requirements in July 

by 56 ships, but would permit meeting full commitments by the end of the 

calendar year. 

7. It will be noted from Tables I and I1 that the following addi 

tional sailings would be required for such a program resulting in the 

necessity for the use ofadditional cargo ships for the period of a year. 

TABLE I11 

ADDITIONAL SAILINGS REQUIRED 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Bug Sep Oct Nov Dee Total 

17 19 5 23 25 11 17 17 1 17 17 1 170 

8. The effect of meeting the Russian Protocol on the movement of 

U. S. troops overseas and maintaining them thereafter would be on the 

following order: 

TABLE IV 

1943 

1st Quarter 

2nd Quarter 

3rd Quarter 

4th Quarter 

TOTAL 

No of troops 

46,000 

82 000 

55,000 

4,000 

187,000 

7fi 
[I. S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

9. As requirements for other theaters are more or less fixed, the 

blow would fall on movements to the U. K. Some adjustment might be 

necessary in timing of Russian shipment to avoid interference with 

special requirements. 

10. Additional tonnage above that assumed in existing estimates 

might be made available: (a) by reduction in the rate of submarine 

losses below the 2.G percent assumed in these calculations; (b) by 

eliminating conversion of 100 kC 2's into transports; (c) by savings 

through the use of the Yediterranean route; (d) release of U. S. from 

obligation to replace British losses in like amount. 

11. A reduction in rate of loss of United Nations shipping from 

2.6 percent per month to only 2.0 percent per month would increase the 

troop carrying capacity in 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a third of this, 

or a reduction of the loss rate to 2.4 percent, would make these shipmnts to Russia possible, without lessening troop movements. With the 

measures projected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such an improvement is 

a possibility. 

12. If conversion of EC 2's were stopped at the end of February, a 

gain in transport capacity of 153,000 would be possible. If losses are 

not reduced or no assistance from British sources for this purpose can 

be obtained, such a course would be desirable. 

13. The British have already discounted the estimated gain in the 

Mediterranean by diverting this tonnage to British imports. 

14. The U. S. is committed to replace losses in British tonnage in 

accordance with an agreement dated November 30, 1942. If there is a reduction in the number of sinkings the assistance required will be reduced. As a reduction is expected in some measure there will be a credit 

on this account. 

15. It is concluded from the above that the possibility exists of 

meeting Russian Protocol deliveries on the present scale during 1943 

without reducing tentative schedules, but that the possibility exists 

that movements to the U. K. may be reduced by as much as 100,000 men. 

The advantages of furnishing aid to Russia are such that this hazard 

should be accepted. Owing to the scarcity of shipping, there should be 

a general agreement that all tonnage above minimum requirements should 

be assigned to combined troop movements. 

77 
ll S SECRET 

BRIlISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 163 January 20, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SYSTEM OF AIR COMMAND IN THE MDITERRANEAN 

Proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. There shall he appointed an Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole 

h!editerranean Theater with his headquarters at Algiers under whom will 

he the A.O.C. in C. Northwest Africa (General 'Spaatz), the A.O.C. in C 

Piddle East (Air Chief Marshal Douglas) and A.O.C. Malta. 

2. The relationship and mutual responsibilities ofthe Air Commanderin Chief, h'rediterranean, and the Commander- in-Chief, Northwest African 

Theater, are defined as follows: 

(a) The Air Commander-in Chlef is subordinate to the Commanderin- Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force jn Northwest Africa, in 

respect of: 

(1) The air forces stationed from time to time in the Northwest African Theater and their operations 

(2) The operations of other Mediterranean air forces in conjunction with operations conducted in or from the Northwest African Theater 

(p) The Commander- in-Chief, A.E.F, in Northwest Africa, will 

afford to the Air Commander- in. Ch-ef, Mediterranean all 

possible support and facilities in the Northwest African 

Theater for the operation of the Mediterranean air forces 

and for their efficient cooperation with the land and sea 

forces in the theater 

3. NORTHWEST AFRICA: 

This will be divided into three suhcommands: 

(a) Iieavy and medium bombers and appropriate escort fighters 

(h) General reconnaiskance and fighters for the defense of ship 

ping, ports and hack areas. 

(c) An Air Support Command, which is dealt with in detail in 

paragraph 4 below. 

The detailed organization of the Command must, however, he left 

to the decision of the Air Commander-in-Chief when he is appointed 

78 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Air Force supply, maintenance, and repair arrangements in the whole of 

Northwest Africa shall be centralized under one control, direct under 

the A.O.C. in C. Northwest Africa. 

4. In order that land operations may be effectively supported by 

the Combined air forces there must be one Army Commander or Depnty Commander-in-Chief appointed to coordinate the operations of all three 

armiesinthe Tunisian Theater--the British 1st Army, the American-French 

Army under General Fredendall, and the British 8th Arw. The Air Officer 

Commanding the Air Support Command must similarly coordinate the opera 

tions of the Air Forces supporting all three armies, and will share an 

advanced headquarters with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, whence he can 

direct the operations of the Air Fopces to the best advantage of the land 

battle. 

Army Support Wings will be attached to each of the three armies 

The Wing Commanders will act as Air Advisers to the Army Commanders and 

will command such air forces as may from time to time be assigned to 

them by the A.O.C. Army Support Command in consultation with the Deputy 

Supreme Commander. 

5. MIDDLE FAST: 

Theorganization of Middle East will remain as it is at present 

except that Malta will be detached and come direct under Air Commander 

in-Chief, Mediterranean. Further, certain air forces employed in close 

support of the 8th Army will pass under the commard of the A.O.C. Air 

Support under A.O.C. in C. Northwest Africa. 

79 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. lfi4 January 20, 1913 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATION ANAKIM--PROVISION OF FORCES 

Report byBritish Joint Planning Staff 

1. The general conception of Operation ANAKIM has already been set 

out in C.C.S. 151. 

ASSUMPTION: 

2. It is assumed that Operation ANAKIM will be launched in November 

1913, so giving five to six months of dry weather in which to reopen the 

Burma Road. 

AVAILABILITY OF FORCES: 

3. Until an outline plan is received from India no accurate estimate can be made. The forces required and their availability, as now 

forecast, are: 

REQUIRED 

(a) Naval Forces: 

G-8 Escort carriers 

40 Destroyers and escorts 

8 Submarines 

6 Fleet minesweepers and 

cover by heavy forces 

depending on the situation at the time. 

(b) Army: 

8 Infantry df--isions 

1 Armored division 

(c) Air: 

28 Bomber squadrons 

17 Fighter squadrons 

4 Coastal squadrons 

AVAILABLE FROM 

BRITISH RESOURCES REMARKS 

Submarines and mine- The provision of naval 

sweepers will prob- forces must be decided 

ably be available upon at a later date 

Of the remainder 

the British are un 

likely to be able to 

provide more than 

half. 

Will be available in 

Yes India by October 1, 

including sufficient 

assault trained troops. 

Yes Will be found from air 

forces already in India, raised to requisite strengthbytransfer from Middle East 

SO 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

REQUIRED 

(d) Assault shipping and 

Landing Craft: 

1 H.Q. Ship 

9 L.S.I. (L) 

40 L.S.T. (2) 

5 L.S.5. 

10 L.C.T. (5) 

120 L.C.M. 

40 L.C.P. 

100 L.C.A. 

16 L.C.S. 

(e) Shipping: 

20 Personnel ships 

60 M.T. ships 

CONCLUSION: 

AVAILABLE mOM 

BRITISH RESOURCES REMARKS 

Yes 

Yes 

From 7-13 

NO from British resources 

No will require tobe pro100 only vided and manned by 

.$.A. 

Yes 

Yes 

10 This deficiency will 

have to be met by improvisat ion. 

No estimate This requirement has 

yet possible not yet been confirmed 

by C--in-C India. 

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are asked to: 

(a) Approve November 15, 1943, as provisional date for ANAKIM 

assault 

(b) Approve provisional schedule of forces laid out in paragraph 3 

above, it being recognized that actual provision of naval 

forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping must 

depend on situation in late summer of 1943. 

(c) Agree to confirm in July 1943 decision to undertake or to 

postpone Operation ANAKIM. 

81 
li S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 164/1 January 21, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPEIIAXON INAXI6i--PROVISION OF FORCES 

Report by British Joint Planning Staff 

1. The general conception of Operation ANAKIM has already been set 

out in C.C.S. 154. 

ASSUMPTION: 

2. It is assumed that Operation ANAKIM will be launched in November 

1943, so giving five to six months of dry weather in which to reopen the 

Burma lload.. 

AVAILABILITY OF FORCES: 

3 Until an outline plan is received from India no accurate estimate can be made. The forces required and their availability, as now 

forecast, are: 

REQUIHED 

(a) Naval Forces: 

6 Escort carriers 

40 j!estroyers and escorts 

8 Submarines 

6 Fleet minesweepers and 

cover by heavy forces 

depending on the situation at the time. 

(b) Army: 

8 Infantry divisions 

1 Armored division 

(c) Air: 

28 Bomber squadrons 

17 Fighter squadrons 

4 Coastal squadrons 

AVAILABLE FROM 

BRITISH RESOURCES REMARKS 

Submarines and mine- The provision of naval 

sweepers will prob- forces must be decided 

ably be available. Of upon at a later date. 

the remainder, the 

British are unlikely 

to be able to provide 

more than half. 

Will be available in 

Yes India by October 1, including sufficient assault trained troops. 

Yes Will be found from air 

forces already in India, raised to requisite strengthby transfer from the Mediter. 

ranean. 

82 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

AVAILBBLE FROM RE$ U I RED REMARKS

BRITISH RESOURCES 

(d) Assault shipping and 

Landing Craft,: 

1 H.Q. Ship Yes Ex IIusky or other Med9 L.S.I. (L) Yes iterranean Operations. 

40 L.S.T. (2) From 7-13 Balance not available 

5 L.S.D. KO from British resources 

10 L.C.T. (5) YO will reyuire to be pro120 L.C.M. 100 only 1vided and manned b y

u. s .A. 

40 5.C.P. Yes 

100 L.C.A. Yes 

16 L.C.S. 10 This deficiency will 

have to be met by improv isat ion. 

(e) Shipping: 

20 Personnel ships No estimate This requirement has 

60 M.T. ships yet possible not yet been confirmed 

by C-in-C India. 

CGYCLUSIOK: 

4. The Combined Chiefs of Ftaff are asked to: 

!a) Approve Vovember 15, 1943, as provisional date for AFAKIhI 

assault. 

(b) Approve provisional schedule of forces laid out in paragraph 3 

above, it being recognized that actual provision of naval 

forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping must 

depend on situation in late summer of 1943. 

(c) Agee to confirm in July 1943 decision to undertake or to 

postpone Operation AkAKIV. 
January 22, 1943 

U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 165/2 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DRaFT TELEGRAM 

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN TO PREMIER STALIN 

Prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the 

past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in 1943. We think that you would 

wish to know our intentions at once. 

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate 

on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive 

victory in the European Theater. At the same time, we must maintain 

sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and 

Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their 

aggression to other theaters such as your Maritime Provinces. 

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting 

strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending 

to Russia the maximum flow of supplies, consistent with equally urgent 

requirements in other theaters. We shall spare no exertion to send you 

material assistance by every available route, but it would be no more 

in your interest than ours to do so at a cost which would cripple our 

capacity to relieve pressure on you by continuing an intensified offensive effort on our part. 

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa 

and set up the naval and air installations to open: 

(a) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military 

traffic, and 

(b) An intensive bombardment of important Axis installations in 

Southern Europe. 

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious oper 

ations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping 

84 
ll. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

in Egyptian and North African ports. This concentration will certainly 

be known to our enemies, hut they will not know where or when, or in 

what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, he compelled 

to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, 

Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete, and the 

Dodecanese 

6~ These operations may result in the collapse of Italy. The defec-. 

tion of other German satellite states would probably follow. Germany 

would then he faced with the choice of shortening her eastern line by a 

major withdrawal on your front, or of accepting a shortage of some fifty 

divisions and 2,000 aircraft in her global requirements, 

7? In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the 

U, K - against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be 

more than double its present strength., Our experiences to date have 

shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to 

large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft We believe that an increased 

tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German 

flghter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are 

aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in 

Western Europe and the Mediterranean,, We have no doubt that our greatly 

intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which 

we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and 

other forces from the Russian front.. 

8<, We shall also concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum 

American land and air forces that shipping will permit These, combined 

with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will he held in constant 

readiness to reenter the Continent of Europe as soon as this operation 

offers reasonable prospect of success., 

9. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from 

Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our 

operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China, 

We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize 

our capacity to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may 

present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.. 

NOTE. C.C.S. 165 and C.C.S. 165/1 were withdrawn inasmuch as the infor-. 

mation contained in these papers was included in C.C.S. 165/2.. 

85 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 166 January 20, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

It is suggested that the following directive be issued by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate British and U. S. Air Force 

Commanders to govern the operations of the British and American Bomber 

Commands in the United Kingdom. 

DRAFT DIRECTWE 

1 Your object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation 

of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. 

2. Within that general concept, your primary objectives, subject to 

the exigencies of weather and of tactical feasibility, will for the 

present be in the order of priority set out below. This order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the 

strategic situation It is not to be taken to preclude attacks on Berlin 

when conditions are suitable for the attainment of specially valuable 

results unfavorable to the morale of the enemy or favorable to that of 

Russia. 

(a) German stbmarine operational bases and construction yards. 

(b) The German aircraft industry. 

(c) Transportat ion. 

(d) Synthetic oil plants. 

(e) Other targets in enemy war industry. 

3. There may be certain other objectives of great but fleeting 

importance for the attack of which all necessary plans and preparations 

should be made. Of these, an example would be important units of the 

German Fleet in harbor or at sea. 

4. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to 

destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain 

86 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force, and to contain German fighter strength away from 

the Russian and Mediterranean theaters of war. 

5. If and when it is decided that the Allied armies should reenter 

the Continent, you will afford them all possible support in the manner 

most effective. 

6. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time by His 

Majesty's Government through the British Chiefs of Staff. 

87 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MUST ShCHli'1' 

C.C.S. 166/1/0 January 21, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFT 

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

Directive to the appropriate British and U. S. 

Air Force Commanders, to govern the operation of the 

British and U. S. Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom 

(Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 

65th Meeting on January 21, 1943) 

1. Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dis.~ 

location of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the 

undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their 

capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. 

2. Within that general concept, your primary objectives, subject to 

the exigencies of weather and of tactical feasibility, will for the 

present be in the following order of priority: 

(a) German submarine construction yards. 

(b) The German aircraft industry. 

(c) Transportation. 

(d) Oil plants. 

(e) Other targets in enemy war industry. 

The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according to 

developments in the strategical situation. Moreover, other objectives of 

great importance either from the political or military point of view 

must be attacked, Examples of these are: 

(1) Submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast. If these can 

be put out of action, a great step forward will have been 

taken in the &boat war which the C.C.S. have agreed to be a 

first chargeonour resources. Day and night attacks on these 

bases have been inaugurated and should be continued so that 

an assessment of their effects can be made as soon as pos 

sible,, If it is found that successful results canbe achieved,. 

these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary. These ob~­

jectives have not been included in the order of priority, 

88 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

which covers long-term operations, particularly as the bases 

are not situated in Germany. 

(2) Berlin, which should be attacked when conditions are suitable for the attainment of specially valuable results unfavorable to the morale of the enemy or favorable to that of 

Russia . 3. You may also be required, at the appropriate time, to attack 

objectives in Northern Italy in connection with amphibious operations in 

the Mediterranean theater. 

4. There may be certain other objectives of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary plans and preparations 

should be made. Of these, an example would be the important units of the 

German Fleet in harbor or at sea. 

5. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to 

destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German 

day fighter force, and to contain German fighter strength away from the 

Russian and Mediterranean theaters of war. 

6. When the Allied armies reenter the Continent, you will afford 

them all possible support in the manner most effective. 

7. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time for political reasons by His hlajesty's Government through the British Chiefs of 

Staff. 

89 
U S SECRET 

BRITISA MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 167 January 22, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS IN 1943 

lleport by British Joint Planning Staff 

1. In view of the recommendations approved by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff in C.C.S. 155/1, for the "Conduct of the War in 1943," we ex 

amine below the possibilities of cross-channel operations in 1943. 

OBJECT OF 0PEI:AlIONS: 

2. The objects of cross--channel operations in 1943 maybe set down as: 

(a) Xaids with the primary object of provoking a major air battle 

and causing the enemy loss. 

(b) @perations with the object of seizing and holding a bridge 

head and, if the state of German morale and strength of her 

resources permit, of exploiting success, 

(c) Operations on a larger scale to take advantage of German 

disintegration. 

ASSUMPTION AS TO DATE: 

3. I'ihere figures are quoted, we have assumed a target date of 

August 1st. 

RESOURCES: 

4. The number of divisions available will be twelve British, in, 

cluding one airborne, and about four American. 

5 - Training of naval crews will be the limiting factor in the pro.. 

vision of landing craft for the initial assaults It is estimated that, 

without U. S. assistance, the maximum lift which canbe provided willbe: 

Initial assault force: Two brigade groups, with proportion of 

armor and commandos. 

Total lift including Two infantry divisions and one armored 

initial assault force: brigade on light scales, of which two 

brigade groups and a proportion of armor 

can be mounted in the initial assault. 

NOTE: This isonthe assumption that the British are not required 

to provide the U-. S, with armored landing craft for Xed.. 

iterranean operations,, 

90 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. There will by August 1943 be sufficient air forces, British and 

American, to support a limited cross-channel operation either against 

the Pas de Calais or the COTENTIN PENINSULA, provided operations in the 

Mediterranean have not drawn too heavily on our Fighter reserves. The 

decision to carry out such an operation would, however, entail a reorganization of part of the Metropolitan Air Force with a consequent brake 

on its expansion and operational effort. 

ESTIMATED SCALE OF GERMAN RESISTANCE: 

7. It may be assumed that the Germans will continue todevelop their 

system of coast defenses, but it is fair to expect that the formations 

holding these defenses will be of poorer quality than at present. 

8. The reserves which the Germans will he able to bring against us 

must depend entirely on the progress of operations elsewhere in Europe. 

In the worst caseg if they succeeded without heavy losses in 

stabilizing their Eastern front on the shortened line of R. DNIEF’ER, and 

in checking our operations in the Mediterranean, they might rebuild 

their reserves in Northwest Europe to approximately the level of November 1942, i.e , 41 divisions 

It is possible, however, that they may be forced to make further 

substantial reductions in the number of their reserve formations in 

Northwest Europe, and that their capacity to reinforce Northwest France 

rapidly may be decreased. 

9 It is improbable that the strength of the German Air Force on 

the Western Front will be less than it has been during the last six 

months, iae~9about 1,000 first line aircraft of all types In the event 

of a clear threat of a large scale landing by our forces in North France 

or in the Low Countries, the G A.F. might be prepared to withdraw forces 

both from the Mediterranean and Russia to increase this strength to 

1,500. 

POSSIBLE AREAS FOR RAIDS: 

10. Raids of which the primary object is to provoke an air battle 

would best be conducted against the Pas de Calais, but the nature of the 

defenses would be extremely costly to the assault forces 

POSSIBLE AREA FOR A LIMITED BRIDGEHEAD OPERATION: 

11. The COTENTIN PENINSULA is the only possible objective for offensive operations of which the object is to remain on the Continent, 

as it is the only area with a short and easily defensible line within 

91 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

reasonable distance of the beaches, and one which, at the same time, 

permits reasonable air support. 

COMBINED COMMANDERSb PLAN FOR ASSAULT OF THE 

COTENTIN PENINSULA (OPERATION HADRIAN) : 

12. In November 1942 the Combined Commanders in London made a de 

tailed study of the problems involvedinan assault to seize and hold the 

COTENTIN PENINSULA, onthe assumption that theGermans could bring up to 

15 reserve divisions against the assaulting force during the first fourteen days. They concluded that the minimum requirements for success were: 

(a) Initial assault to be made by 5 brigade groups.. 

(b) Assault to be supported by 10 parachute battalions and an 

airborne division, less one parachute brigade, for lifting 

which 847 transport aircraft would be required. 

(c) The total force, including assault forces, to be appro xi,^ 

mately 8 divisions. 

(d) The build-up of fighting troons to be substantially complete 

by evening of I! + 1. 

General Eisenhower did not himself see the plan, but his representatives collaborated in its preparat,ion and fully concurred in the 

conclusion as to minimum requirements. 

PRACTICABILITY OF OPERATION WITH FORCES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 5' 

13. With the resources available in 1943, neither the size of the 

seaborne andairborne assault forces nor the rate ofbuild up can approach 

the requirements of the Combined Commanders It is clear, therefore, 

that no operation to seize and hold a footing in the COTENTIN PENINSULA 

has any prospect of success unless the German reserves have been very 

greatly reduced. Similar considerations would apply to a limited opera^ 

tion anywhere on the French coast. 

14. There is, however, a good prospect that the German reserves will 

in fact be greatly reduced by August-. It will, therefore, be necessary 

to make a detailed examination to determine: 

(a) Whether with the small assault forces available, it is possible successfully to assault the COTENTIN PENINSULA 

(b) If such ah assault is practicable, to what level German re. 

serves in Northwest France must be reduced in order to give 

our forces a reasonable chance of holding the PENINSULA 

15. It can, however, be said at once, without further examination, 

that: 

92 
IT. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(a) A minimum of four brigade groups in the initial assault will 

almost certainly be necessary. 

(b) Shortage of seaborne assault troops will make provision of 

airborne troops the more necessary. 

(c) To insure the success of the initial assault against the 

strong defenses of the French coast, and to reduce casualties 

among the assaulting troops, maximum allotment of support 

craft will be necessary. 

(d) The limiting factor in the rate of subsequent build-up is 

availability of ve hi cle-carr ying craft . POSSIBILITY OF EXPLOITING A LIMITED OF'ERATION: 

16. In view of the limited capacity of the port of CHERBOURG, operations to exploit success must be designed to secure additional port fa-­

cilities so as to permit the maintenance of larger forces. Such operations might take the form of an advance by a mobile force, supported by 

seaborne and airborne assaults, either eastwards to capture the SEINE 

ports or southwestwards to secure the BRETON ports. In either instance, 

preliminary operations would be necessary to expand the bridgehead so as 

to obtain the use of the port of CAEN and the group of airfields in that 

area. 

17. The practicability of undertaking such subsequent operations 

will, however, depend entirely on the state of German morale and on the 

extent to which they are able to concentrate reserves to oppose our firther advance. The rapidity with which such operations can be undertaken 

will in any case depend on the rate at which we are able to reconstruct 

the ports and to build up our own forces and reserves. Even if German 

opposition is negligible, progress will be slow onaccount of our limited 

resources in vehicle-carrying craft suitable for landing over beaches ~ 

OPEFLATIONS ON A LARGER SCAIE TO TdXE 

ADVANTAGE OF GERMAN DISINTEGRBTION: 

18. The return to the Continent in the case of German dislntegration will be primarily an administrative problem. The Combined Corn-. 

menders in London should therefore be instructed to make the necessary 

plans 0 

CONCLUSIONS: 

19. (a) Unless the Germans are forced to reduce their reserves end 

93 
U. S. SEC8ET 

BRITISIj YOST SECRET 

their beach defenses in Northwest Europe substantially, no 

limited operatibn to seize and hold a footing in France is 

practicable with the resources likely to be available in 

194.1. 

(b) A detailed plan for an operation toseize and hold the COTENTIN PENINSULA should be made on the basis of resources likely 

to be available. 

(c) An examination should be made to determine to what level 

German reserves in Northwest Europe must sink in order to 

give such an operation a reasonable chance if success. 

(d) Preparations should be made to mount the operation by August lst, but the decision to put this plan into execution 

should be 4eferred until a reasonably firm estimate of the 

German reserves on that date can be made. 

(e) Outline plans should be made for further operations to exploit success in the event of a breakdown in German morale, 

e.g., to extend the bridgehead to include CAEN and subsequently to secure either the NORTH SEINE or BRETON groupof 

ports. 

(f) The Combined Commanders jn London should be instructed to 

draw up plans f‘or a return to the Continent in the case of 

German disintegration. 

(9) U. S. Government will have to provide: 

(1) Assault shipping and landing craft, manned by U. S. 

crews, to carry at least two brigade groups at assault 

scales” 

(2) Such additional parachute battalions and transport aircraft as may be necessary. 

(h) All possible steps should be taken to provide: 

(1) Support craft for the assault. 

(2) The maximum number of improvised craft for carriage of 

vehicles. 

(Signed) C. E. LAMBE 

G. M. STEWART 

W. ELLIOT 

94 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C C.S, 168 January 22, 1943 

COMBINEB CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC THEATER IN 1943 

Memorandum by Joint L'. S. Chiefs of Staff 

1. Japan has expanded the scope of tier occupation so that it in 

cludes not only her former holdings of (1) Korea and Manchuria on the 

mainland of Asia and (2) a considerable part of China (including all of 

the coast), but in tkie past year, (3) all of Indo-China, Malaysia, Thailand, most of Burma, arid as well, (1)all of the Fhilippines and (5) the 

Dutch East Indies. 

2. The ultimate defeat of Japan proper will be accomplished by 

measures which greatly resemble those which would be effective against 

the British Isles- blockade (attack on ships and shipping), bombing 

(attack on forces, defenses, industries, and morale), and assault (attack 

via the sea). Of these measures, attacks on ships and shipping along 

enemy lines of communications are inherent in all offensive operations; 

it is our purpose during 1W3 to work toward positions from which Japan 

can be attacked by land based air; assault on Japan is remote and may 

well not be found necessary. Allied offensive measures in 1913 comprise 

continued and intensified attacks on enemy ships and shipping, in the 

cutting or threatening to cut enemy lines of communication between Japan 

and Japanese holdings, and inattacks onenemy sea, air, and ground forces 

by obliging them to fight to retain their holdings and to maintain their 

lines of communication. 

3 The scope and intensity of the Allied war effort in the Pacific 

during 1913, while conditioned on the premise that Germany is the prin 

cipal enemy, requires that sufficient means be in hand surely to counter 

enemy potentialities (paragraph 1 to follow) and, further, must take 

care that the means in hand are actively employed to best advantage The 

general capabilities ofthe Allied effort in the Pacific in 19-13 comprise: 

(a) Keep Japan from further expansion, and from consolidating and 

exploiting her current holdings-. 

(b) Maintain the vital Midway Hawaii line (key to the Pacific) 

(c) Secure the 1ineofcommunicationstoAustralia and New Zealand 

95 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(d) Block enemy approaches to Australia (1) from the Northward 

'via Elabaul; (2) from the Northwestward via the Malay barrier, 

(e) Attain positions which menace enemy line of communication 

with the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and the South 

China Sea. 

(f) Open the line of communications with China via Burma--in 

order to make use of Chinese geographical position (as to 

attack enemy line of communication in Formosa Straits and 

along the coast of China, perhaps to bomb Japan) .. 

(9) Make ready to support Russia in case of war with Japan. 

(h) Continue and intensify attrition of enemy strength by land, 

air, and sea (including submarine) action, 

4. Japan's potentralitzes for offensive action during 1943 embrace: 

(a) The h:aritime Provinces (Eastern Siberia) -.Russia. 

@) Alaska via the Aleutians­

(c) The h:idway-Hawaii line-. key to the Pacific 

(d) The Hawaii-Samoa- F:iji-New Caledonia line, which covers the 

line of communications to Australia and New Zealand.. 

(e) Australia and New Zealand-via theBismark Archipelago and/or 

the Solomons. 

(f) Australia--.via the Malay barrier 

(g) India-.-.via Burma. 

(h) China, 

(i) Of the.above (a) is static unless and until war takes place 

between Hussia and Japan; (b) has proved, and will continue, 

unprofitable to Japan; (c) has been tried and may be tried 

again but is unlikely to succeed; (d) is now unprofitable 

except via the Gilbert and Ellice Islands toward Samoa (the 

Jaluit-Samoa line); (e) isnow under contest by United Nations 

forces; (f) is unprofitable except to forestall Allied advance from Northwest Australia; (g) is feasible except that 

enemy position is already well extended; (h) same as (g)-­

profitable chiefly to forestall Allied action. 

5. Allied seizure and occupation, now in progress, of the New Caledonia-New tiuinea line has for objectives: 

(a) Securityofthe line ofcommunications from U. S. to Australia 

and New Zealand; 

96 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

(b) Blocking of enemy approaches to Eastern Australia; 

(c) Points d'appui for further action; 

(d) Attrition of enemy forces which oppose our occupation. 

6. Additional to the objectives attained by the seizure and occupation of the New Caledonia-New Guinea line (paragraph E. above), the other 

feasible objectives for us appear to be: 

(a) Japan via the Maritime Provinces (Eastern Siberia) noted 

only for record to offset 4 (a) above. 

(b) Japan via the Aleutians and Xuriles--from Alaska. 

(c) Advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam line via Wake and 

Korthwesterly Marshall Islands. 

(d) Advance on the Samoa-Jaluit line via Ellice and Gilbert 

I sl ands. 

(e) Advance from Rabaul area on Truk-Guam line. 

(f) Dutch East Indies via \falay barrier (as Timor). 

(9) Participation in AKAKIY. 

(h) of the above (which are set down to match the items of paragraph 4 above): 

(a) Is merely potential unless and until war takes place 

between Japan and Hussia; 

(b) Is unprofitable with meam in sight in 1943 and is best 

undertaken, if at all, in connection with (a); 

(c) Is most useful, not only as to 

(I) Retention of initiative; 

(2) Partial counter to enemy potentialities of para ­

graph 4 (c) ; and, particularly, 

(3) To draw off enemy forces involved in holding Rabaul 

area; 

(d~) Is effective 

(1) To forestall enemy potentialities in paragraph4 (d) ; 

(2) To make tie. line of commnications to Australia and 

Yew Zealand fully secure; and 

(3) To draw off enemy forces involved in Rabaul area; 

(e) Cannot be done until after consolidaticn of the Rabaul 

area upon completion of operations now in hand--see 

paragraph 5 above--but should, perhaps must, eventually 

be undertaken; 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(f) Useful on limited scale 

(1) To counter enemypotentialities of paragraph 4 (f); 

(2) To draw off enemyforces elsewhere in the Pacific j 

(3) To employ forces available in Australia [after 

completion of paragraph 5) which would not otherwise be employable; 

N.B. - Attacks are not to be developed fully, as 

this might lead to extensive operations 

of the nature of frontal attacks.. 

(g) Not effective before November though forces contri-. 

buted would likely have to be made available in 

October--but ANAKIM is of such importance inrespect of its objective (bringing Chinese manpower 

and geographic position to bear on Japanese forces 

and positions) as to merit that priority which may 

be found indispensable to mount it. 

7. Referring now tothe general capabilities of Allied action listed 

in paragraph 3 above, set off against enemy potentialities in paragraph 

4 above, we intend, as to the feasible objectives of paragraph 6 aboveadditional to those of paragraph 5 above- ~ to: 

(a) and (b) Make the Aieut.ia.n as secure as may be I which will 

implement 3 (a). (gj . (h); 

N.B. - Germany can be expectedtointensify pressure on Japan 

to attack Russia in Siberia (Maritime Provinces) 

(c) Undertake advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam line as 

practicable--to implement 3 (a)7 (bj. (e), (h) and, particularly, when 6 (e) is undertaken; 

(d) Undertake advance along Samoa-Jaluit line to implement 3 (a). 

(C) f (h) ; 

(e) Refrain from advance from Rabaul area towards Truk-.Guam line 

unless and until forces are in hand to enable it to be capried through and followed up. Noted that it implements 3 (aj 

(b), (d) il),(e), (h); 

(f) Undertake advance on the Malay barrier (as Timor) on limited 

scale to counter enemy capabilities and divert his forcesto implement 3 (a), (d) (2), (e) , (h) j 

(9) Participate in ANAKIMasmay be found indispensable to mounting it. 

98 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 169 January 22, 1943 

COMBIKZD CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROPOSED OFCAN12ATIO?‘ OF COVilAb’E, COKTEOL, PLANKING 

AKC TTAINIPti FOE. OPEFATIOKS FOR AEEEKTFY TO THE 

CONTIKEE:T ACrOSS THE CHANNEL, BEGIPFIE’G IF 1943 

(hote by the Combined Ftaffs) 

1. Strategic Basis: ‘The Combined Chiefs of Ftaff agree that there 

is no chance of our being able to st8ge a large scale invasion of the 

Continent against unbroken onposition during 1947. Their policy is, however, that we should: 

(a) [Jndertake such liniited operations as may be practicable with 

the forces available and 

(b) Assemble the strongest Fossible force (subject to certain 

prior commitments in other theaters) in constant readiness 

to reenter the Continent as soon as German resistance is 

wemakened to the required extent. 

2. The organization should therefore provicge for: 

(a) Small scale amphibious operations, such as the progressive 

reoccupation of the Channel Islands. 

(Note: Raids are already adequately taken care of by the 

existing organization.) 

(b) The need to reenter the C,ontinent with all available forces 

at the shortest possible notice in the event of a sudden ad 

unexpected collapse of German resistance. The aim would be 

to seize critical political and military centers in Germany 

in the shortest possible time. 

(c) Operations to seize a bridgehead late in 1923, leading Up to 

a rapid exploitation or 

(d) An invasion in force in 1944. 

3. Need for a Directive: The first thing that is essential, whatever organization is set up, is a clear directive from the combined 

Chiefs of Staff setting out the objects of the plans and the resources 

likely to be available. In this latter connection sane inevitable difficulty arises from the fact that--except for the operation in paragraph 

99 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

2 (a)-preparations for the other possible operations must he based, not 

on any given strength of forces available nor on any fixed estimate of 

enemy opposition to he encountered, but on the maximum forces that are 

likely to be available in the U. K. at any given time. Moreover, it Is 

virtually impossible to fix a date, because that must depend entirely on 

the state of enemy resistance on the Continent. 

All plans and preparations must therefore be extremely flexible, 

4. Training: In order that training and preparation of the forces 

may not be unduly hampered by the maintenance of an unnecessarily high 

state of readiness, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should issue instructions on this point In the first instance, the degree of notice might 

be fixed at three months. But planning for the operation described in 

paragraph 2 (h) above must be on the basis of immediate reentry into the 

Continent at the shortest possible notice with whatever resources are 

available at the time 

5. Principles of Command and Planning: It is suggested that 2 (a), 

small scale operations, such as the Channel Islands, should they be considered desirable either separately or as part of a larger operation, 

could adequately he dealt with by C'C.0 's organization on the same 

lines as was the Dieppe raid 

6 - As regards the larger operations in 2 (b) (c), and (d) the 

governing principle should he that the responsibility for planning and 

training should rest with, or under the direction of, the Commanders who 

will have to carry out the plans? who will be the same Commanders for 

all three operations, These should be designated at once^ 

7; Supreme Command: This raises the questionofa Supreme Commander.. 

It is considered that when the operations in 2 (b) to (d) become reasonably imminent, a Supreme Commander must be appointed, He should have a 

small combined staff of British and American officers of all three 'services, and under him will be subordinate commanders, air, land and seai 

corresponding to the organization just approved for the operations in 

the Mediterranean I 

It is considered desirable that the Supreme Commander should be 

appointed at once Jf this is not feasible, his Chief of Staff or Ueputy 

and a nucleus of the combined staff should be appointed immediately to 

give the necessary impetus and cohesion to planning. 

8. The present "Round-up" Planning Staff: For some months a special 

100 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

inter-Allied staff drawn from all three services has been in existence 

working together in one building in London, studying the problem and 

planning for a return to the Continent. In this way much specialized experience has been gained and planning has progressed far beyond the 

staff study stage. In particular, a great deal of administrative work 

has been done and measures--such as the acquisition and preparation of 

airfields--actually put in hand. 

9. This special planning staff should be adapted to the new conditions and strengthened by the addition of American personnel. They 

should work, under the direction of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy 

until he is appointed), in conjunction with the nucleus of his combined 

staff in London. 

Administrative planning will have to be done very largely by the 

normal administrative staffs in the Service Departments and in H.Q. 

E.T.O. U.S.A. These Headquarters should, however, appoint representatives to form, together with the Administrative Staff in Norfolk House, 

a joint administrative planning staff for the reentry to the Continent. 

One of the first tasks of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy) 

should be to simplify the existing system of interdepartmental administrative planning which, at present, is unduly cumbersome 

101 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISS MOST SECRET 

c.c.3. 170 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

January 22, 1913 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Note by the Secretaries 

In accordance with the directions of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff at their fi5th Meeting (Item 6), a draft report to the President 

and Prime Minister of the decisions reached subsequent to the submission 

of C.C.S. 153/1 is circulated herewith for approval. 

V. DYKES, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat 

ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 155/1) the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct ofthe War in 1313. These 

proposals were in broad outline, and we have subsequently examined them 

and reached certain conclusions onpoints of detail. We have also studied 

a number of matters closely related to these proposals. The present memorandum contains a summary of what has been accomplished. 

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS: 

A close examination of the minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations has been completed 

(C.C.S. 1GO). In the course ofthis examination we have laid down certain 

scales of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable. Our 

broad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort 

craft will not be met until about August or September 1943. We shall not 

be in a position toaccomplish the destruction of submarines at a rate in 

excess of the production rate before the end of the year- If it is desired to provide escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of 

increased losses must behalanced against the importance ofthe operations 

102 
[I. S. SECRET 

BRITISF MOST SECRET 

in question. We have adopted the following resolutions onmeasures necessary to intensify the anti-U-boat war. (C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 1) 

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IN RELATION TO OTHER COMMITMENTS: 

We have examined the extent of the shipments to Russia required 

to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1943 with a 

view to estimating the effect of these shipments on other commitments. 

Our conclusion is that, provided a shipping loss rate of not more than 

2.4% per month can be relied on, itwill be possible to meet full commit-. 

mnts by the end of the calendar year 1913; and we have approved a program of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies to 

Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to t,he United Nations 

effort. 

An essential point is that an agreed loss pate for lW3 shall be 

established so that all British and American calculations can be made on 

the same basis. We have accordingly directed the Combined Military Trans-~. 

portation Committee to make an agreed estimate 

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with 

Russia (should this be necessaryj tocover the period after July 1, 1943, 

a clause should be inserted to the effect that the commitments included 

in the Protocol may be reduced if the shipping losses OP the necessities 

of other operations render their fulfillment prohibitive (C..C ,S~63rd 

Meeting, Item 1, and C.C<S. 162) 

3. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: 

(a) Operations for the Capture of Sicily. 

We have carefully examined possible operations in the Mediterranean theater and we have recorded the following conclusions: (C-C.S, 66th Meeting, Item 2, and C.C S. 161/1) 

(1) To attack Sicily in 1943 with the favorable July moon as 

the target date 

(2) To instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than 

March 1: first, whether any insurmountable difficulty 

as to resources and training will cause the date of the 

assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon; 

and, secondly, in that event to confirm that the date 

will not be later than the favorable August moon, 

(3) That the following should be the Command set-.up for the 

operat ion : 

103 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

a. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with 

General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsible for the detailed planning and preparation 

and for the execution of the actual operation when 

launched. 

h. Admiral Cunningham to be Naval Commander, and Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander 

c. Recommendations for the officers tobe appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted 

in due course by General Eisenhower 

(4) That General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up 

forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a 

special operational and administrative staff, with its 

own Chief ofstaff, for planning and preparing the operat ion 

The necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the 

above decisions has been drafted, 

@) Cover Plans: 

We intend to instruct the appropriate agencies in Washington 

and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary 

Force in North Africa, to draw up a comprehensive cover plan 

for the Mediterranean The possibilityofcarrying out feints 

or minor operations in the Eastern Mediterranean will be 

examined 

(c) Command in the Mediterranean Theater: 

We have agreed to the following Command arrangements in the 

Mediterranean: (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 4 and C.C.S 163) 

(1) Sea: 

For Operation HUSKY the Naval Commander Force X will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean" The 

present Commander-in-Chief, Eediterranean, willbedesignated Commander-in-Chief', Levant The boundary between 

the two Commands will be drawn from Zanti to Bardia The 

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will, however, be responsible for naval matters which affect the Mediterranean 

as a whole. 

104 
u. s. SECPE"7 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(2) Land: 

At a moment to be determined after the British 8th Army 

has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will 

become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, 

the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General 

Eisenhower's command. Subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary task will 

be to command the ellied forces on the Tunisian front 

with a small Headquarters of his own provided from the 

Middle East. After t,he conclusion of these operations, 

he will take charge of Operation HUSKY, The boundary 

between the ?'orth efrican and Middle East Commands will 

be the Tunisian-Tripolitania frontier, 

(3) Air: 

re have agreed that Air Chief Larshal Sir Arthur Tedder 

shall be appointed Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole 

Hediterranean theater with his Headquarters at Algiers,. 

Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, 

Korthwest Africa (General Spaatz), and the Air Officer 

Commanding i~iiChief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir 

Sholto Douglas) We have defined the relationship and 

mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander .in-Chief, 

Mediterranean, and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Ex. 

peditionary Forces in Northwest Africa, and we have laid 

down certain principles for the organizationof the Mediterranean Air Comnard subject to any minor changes which 

the Air Commander-.-in-Chief may find necessary after his 

appointment 

(d) The Bomber Offensive from North Africa: 

We have laid down the following as the objects of the bomber 

offensive from North Africa in order of time: (C,C.S- 159/1) 

(1) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all 

Axis Forces from Africa. 

(2) When (1) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest 

possible losseson the Axis Air and Naval Forces in preparation for HUSKY, including bombing required by cover 

plans 

(3) The direct furtherance of Operation HUSKY. 

105 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(4) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti 

So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement 

of objects (l), (2), and (3) above, hombing objectives will 

he chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war 

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM: 

(a) The Operation of Air Forces from the United Kingdom: 

We have agreed that t,he United States Heavy Bombardment Units 

in the United Kingdom shall operate under thestrategical direction of the British Chief of the Air Staff Under this 

general direction the United States Commanding General will 

decide upon the techniaue and method to be employed (C.C.S.> 

65th Leeting, Item 2) 

he have agreed upon a directive to he issued to the British 

Commander- in-Chief Bomber Command and to the Commanding General United States Air Forces inthe United Kingdom to govern 

the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom; a copy of this 

directive is at Annex *A' (C.G.S. 166/1/3) 

@) BOLERO 

(c) Amphibious Operations in 1943 from the United Kingdom: (C 

C.S, 167 and 169 and C.C.S. 68th Meeting, Item 2) 

We have examined the problem of amphibious operations from 

the United Kingdom in 1943 There are three types of opera.. 

tion for which plans and preparations must now he made: 

(1) Raids with the primary object of provoking an air battle 

and causing enemy losses 

(2) Operations with the object of seizing and holding a 

bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and the 

strength ofher resources permit. ofexploiting successes 

(3) A retiirn to the Continent to take advantage of German 

disintegration 

Plans and preparations for (1) above will proceed as at pfes 

enc An attack on the Channel Islands is an example ofthet 

type of operation which we have in mind 

We propose to prepare for an operation against the Cotentin 

Peninsula with resources which will he available, the target 

date being set at August 1, 1943. This operationcomesunder 

106 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISR MOST SECRET 

type (2) above. 

'l'e have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under 

a British Chief of Staff until such time as a Supreme Commander is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is 

in course of preparation. !Ye intend to include in this di-. 

reCtiVe provision for a return to the Continent under (3) 

above with the forces which willbeavailable for the purpose 

in the United Kingdom month by month. The directive will 

also make provision for the planning of an invasion of the 

Continent in force in 1941 

5. PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER: 

(a) Operations in the Pacific Theater: 

(C.C.!; 168 and C C S 67th Meeting, Item 1) 

The following is an outline of the operations which it is 

intended to carry out in the Pacific in conformity with the 

provisions of our previous report (C C S 15.5/1): 

(1) Operations to make the Aleutians as secure as may be 

(2) An advance from Midway towards Truk Guam as practicable 

and particularly in conjunction with the operations now 

in hand for the capture of Rabaul 

(3) An advance along the line Samoa~Jaluit 

(4) An advance on the Malay Barrier (as Timor) on a limited 

scale tocounter enemy capabilities anddivert his forces 

(5) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in 

hand to enable the advance tobe carried through and followed up. 

(b) Reconquest of Burma: 

We have approved November 15, 1913, as the provisional date 

for the ANAKIM assault. It will be necessary to decide in 

July 1943 whether to undertake or to postpone the operation, 

(C.C.S. 65th il4eeting, Item 1) 

We have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces required 

for the operation and have investigated the possibility of 

their provision The land and sea forces canbeprovided. The 

provision of naval forces- assault shipping, landing craft 

and shipping cannot be guaranteed so far in advance and must 

107 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

depend upon the situation existing in the late summer of 

1943. (C.C.S. 164) 

6. THE AXIS OIL POSITIOh: 

We have had laid before us certain information from British 

sources on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158). It is believed that additional information available in Washington may modify the conclusions 

which have been drawn by the British. We have accordingly directed the 

Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed 

assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information 

available from both British and United States sources. In the meanwhile, 

we have taken note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it 

is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis 

oil, nemely, the Rumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and 

the synthetic and producer gas plants in Germany, be undertaken as soon 

as other commitments allow (C.C.S. 62nd D'eeting, Item 1). 

7. NAVAL AND AIR COMMAND IN WEST AFRICA: 

We have agreed upon the following naval and air arrangements to 

cover the French West African Coast (C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 3): 

(a) That the Hest African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador 

(Rio d'0ro) southward shall be an area under command of a 

British haval Officer for naval operations and of a British 

Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval 

forces ~ 

(b) That subject to (a) a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador 

to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command. 

(c) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable 

French air units to take over air dutiesas rapidly as equipment and training permit 

8.. TURKEY: 

We have agreed upon the administrative measures necessary to give 

effect to the decision that all matters connected with Turkey should be 

handled by the British (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 2). 

108 
January 23, 1943 

U. S. SECQET 

BRlTISY NOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 17011 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

:lemorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 155/1) the Combined Chiefs Of 

Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct of the War in 1913. 

These proposals were in broad outline and we have subsequently examined 

them and reached certain conclusions on points of detail. We have also 

studied a number of matters closely related to these proposals. The 

present memorandum contains a smmary of what has been accomplished. 

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS: 

A close examination of the mihimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communication5 of thp United Nations has been completed 

(C.C.S. 160). In the course of this examination we have laid down certain scale\ of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable. Our 

Lroad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort 

craft will not be met until about uugust or September 1943. We ought not 

to count on the destruction of submarines at a rate in excess of the 

production rate before the end of the year. If it is desired to provide 

escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of increased losses 

must be balanced against the importance of the operations in question. 

We have adopted certain resolutions on measures necessary to intensify 

the anti U-boat war (C.C.S. 65th Ueeting, Item 1). 

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IN iU3LATION TO OTHER COMHIT%3NTS: 

We have examined the extent of the shigments to Russia required 

to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1913 with a 

view to estimating the effect of these shipments on other commitments. 

Our conclusion is that, provirled a shipping loss rate of not more than 

2.4 percent per month can be relied on, it will be possible to meet full 

comitments by the end of the calendar year 1943, and we have approved a 

prograi:] of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies 

to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United 

iqations effort. 

An essential point is that an agreed loss rate for 1943 shall be 
[I. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

established so that all British and American calculations can be made on 

the same basis. We have accordingly directed the Combined Vilitary Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate. 

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with 

Russia (should this be necessary) tocover the period after July 1, 1913, 

a clause should be inserted to the effect that the commitments included 

in the Protocol may be reduced if the shipping losses or the necessities 

of other operations render their fulfilment prohibitive (C C.S. 63rd 

Meeting, Item 1, and C.C.S. 162). 

3. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: 

(a) Operations for the Capture of Sicily: 

We have carefully examined possible operations in the Mediterranean theater and we have recorded the following conclusions: (C.C.9 66th Meeting, Item 2, and C.C.S. 161/1") 

(1) To attack Sicily in 1313 with the favorable July moon as 

the target date 

(2) To instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than 

March 1st: firstly, whether any insurmountable difficulty 

as to resources and training will cause the date of the 

as5ault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon; 

and, secondly, in that event to confirm that the date 

will not be later than the favorable August moon 

(3) That the following should be the Command set-up for the 

operation: 

a. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsible for the detailed planning and preparation and 

for theexecution ofthe actual operationwhenlaunched. 

b_. Admiral Cunningham to be Naval Commander, and Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander. 

c_. Recommendations for the officers tobe appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted 

in due course by General Eisenhower. 

(1)That General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up 

forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a 

special operational and administrative staff, with its 

own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the 

operat ion 

110 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the above 

decisions has been drafted. 

(b) Cover Plans: 

V:e intend to instruct the appropriate agencies in Vashingtm 

and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary 

Force in Korth Africa, to draw up a comprettensive cover plan 

for the ilediterrctnean. The possibility of carrying out feints 

or minor operations in tkie Eastern Vediterranean will be 

examined. 

(c) Command in the h’iediterranearl Theater: 

We have agreed to the following Command arrangements in the 

Mediterranean: (C.C.?. 63-d Veeting, Item A, arid C.C.S. 163) 

(1) Sea: 

For operation W>KY the ?aval Cor!tmander Force X will 

assume the titlp of Commarider-in-Cliief, Fediterranean. 

The present Commarider-in-Cliief, Xediterranean, will be 

designated C.~”,,‘arider-in-Ct,ief, Levant.. The boundary 

between the two Commands will be drawn from Zanti to 

Eardia. The Commader-in-Chief, Vediterranean, will, however, be responsible for naval~matters which affect the 

Mediterranean as a whole. 

(2) Land: 

At a moment to be determined after the British 8th Army 

has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will 

become Ceputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, 

the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General Eisenhower’s command Subject to the concurrence of 

General Eisenhower, General Alexander’s primary task 

will be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian 

front with a small Headquarters of his own provided from 

the Middle East and after the conclusion of these operations to take charge of Operation HI!SKY. The boundary 

between the Forth African and Hiddle East Commands Will 

be the Tunisian-Tripolitania frontier. 

(3) Air: 

l;e have agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder 

shall be avT-ointed Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole 

111 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST 'SECRET 

4. 

Mediterranean theater with his headquarters at Algiers. 

Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, 

Northwest Africa (General Spaatz), and the Air Officer 

Cornanding in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir 

Sholto Douglas). We have defined the relationship and 

mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander-in-Chief, 

Mediterranean, and the Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Forces in Korthwest Africa, and we have laid 

down certain principles for the organization of the 

Mediterranean Air Command subject to any minor changes 

which the Air Commander-in-Chief may find necessary after 

his appointment. 

(d) The Bomber Offensive from Korth Africa: 

We have laid down the following as the objects of the boder 

offensive from North africa in order of time (C.C.S. 159/1): 

(1) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all 

Axis Forces from Africa. 

(2) When (I) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest 

possible losses on the Axis Air and Kaval forces in 

preparation for HUSKY, including bombing required by 

c over plans. 

(3) The direct furtherance of Operation HUSKY. 

(4) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti. 

So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievementof objects (I), (2) anl (3) above, bombing objectives 

will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will 

to continue the war. 

OPEWICNS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM: 

(a) The Operation of Air Forces from the United Kingdom: 

We have agreed that the hited States Heavy Bombardment Units 

in the United Kingdom shall operate under the strategical 

direction of the, British Chief of the Air Staff. Under this 

general direction the United States Commanding General will 

decide upon the technique and method to he ewloyed (C.C.S. 

65th Meeting, Item 2). 

We have agreed upon a directive (C.C.S. 166/1/0) to be issued 

to the British Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and to the 

112 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Commanding General United States Air Forces in the United 

Kingdom. 

(b) BOLERO: 

(C.C.S. 172 and C.C.S. 68th Meeting, Item 1.) 

A study hasbeen made of the shipping capabilities for BOLERO 

build-up in 1M3. 

With the data available at the conference and making a number 

of assumptions which are set out in full in C.C-S. 172, 

Enclosure "C", we calculate that the U. S. forces as shown 

in the following table will be available for Continental 

operationsinthe U. K on the dates shown. The figures given 

in the last column include the build-upofthe air contingent 

to 172,000. 

Total Numbers 

Division Equipped 

By August 15 4 384,000 

September 15 7 509,000 

October 15 9 634,000 

November 15 12 759,000 

December 31 15 938,000 

This is based on (1) the figures of 50,000 troops per division with supporting troops; (2) 45 days allowance between 

sailing date and availability date. 

As the movement proceeds the over-all number of men per 

division will decrease and by the end of the year it may be 

down to 10,000, in which case the number of divisions available on December 31st may be 19 instead of 15.. The number of 

divisions earlier in the year is unlikely to be increased. 

(c) Amphibious Operations in 1943 from the United Kingdom: 

(C.C.S. 167 and C.C,.S. 68th Meeting, Item 2 ) 

We have examined the problem of amphibious operations from 

the United Kingdom in 1943. There are three types of operation for which plans and preparations must now be made: 

(1) Raids with the primary object of provoking air battles 

and causing enemy losses­

(2) Operations with the object of seizing and holding a 

bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and resources permit, of exploiting successes. 

113 
U" S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(3) A return to the Continent to take advantage of German 

disintegration. 

Plans and preparations for (1) above will proceed as at 

present. An attack on the Channel Islands is an example 

of the type of operation which we have in mind, 

We propose to prepare for an operation against the 

Cotentin Peninsnla with resources which will be available, the target date being set at August 1, 1943- This 

operation comes under type (2) aboveWe have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff 

under a Rritish Chief of St,aff until such time as a 

Supreme Commander is appointed. A directive togovern the 

planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a return to the 

Continent under (3) above with the forces which will be 

available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by 

month. The directi.ve will also make provision for the 

planningofan invasionofthe Continent in force in 1944" 

5. PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER: 

(a) Operations in the Pacific Theater: 

(C.C.S. 1C8 and C.C.S. G7th Meeting, Item 1.) 

The following is an outline of the operations which it is 

intended to carry out in t,he Pacific in conformity with the 

prdvisions of our previous report (C.C.S. 155/1),: 

(1) Operations t.o make the Aleutians as secure as may be. 

(2) An advance from llidway towards Truk- Guam as practicable 

and parl.icularly in conjunction with the operations now 

in hand for the capt,ure of nabaul.. 

(3) An advance along t,he line Samoa-Jaluit 

(4) An ad~vance on the hfalay Earrier (as Timor) on a limited 

scale to counter enemy capabilities and divert his 

forces, 

(5) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Gum line unless and until forces are in 

hand to enable the advance to be carried through and 

followed up. 

114 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(b) Xeconquest of Burma: 

We have approved November 15, 1943, as the provisional date 

for the ANAKIM assault^ It will be necessary to decide in 

July 1943 whether to undertake or postpone the operation 

(C.C.S. fi5th Ueeting, Item 4). 

Be have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces required for the operation and have investigated the possibility 

of their provision. The land and air forces can be pro 

vided. The provision of naval forces, assault shipping, 

landing craft and shipping cannot be guaranteed so far in 

advance and must depend upon the situation existing in the 

late summer of 1943 (C.C.S. 164). 

6 THE AXIS OIL POSITION: 

M'e have laid before us certain information from British sources 

on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158). It is believed that additional 

information available in Washington niay modify the conclusions which 

have been drawn by theBritish: Xe have accordingly directed the Combined 

Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assess.­

ment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available 

from both British and United States sources., In the meanwhile, we have 

taken note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decid,. 

edly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources ofAxis oil, namely, 

the Xumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic 

and producer gas plantsinGermany, be undertakenas soon as other commitments allow (C,,C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 1) ~ 

7, NAVAL AND AIR COMMAND IN WEST AFRICA: 

We have agreed upon the following naval and air arrangements to 

cover the French West African Coast (C ,C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 3): 

(a) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador 

(Hi0 d'Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a 

British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British 

Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval 

forces. 

(b) ,That subject to (1) a suh..area extending from Cape Bojardor 

to the western boundary of Sierra Leoneand all forces oper.­

ating therein shall be under French Command. 

(c) That in the [bench sub -area the intention will be to enable 

115 
11 S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

brench air unitstotake over air duties as rapidly as equip 

ment and training permit 

8 TURKEY: 

We have agreed upon the administrative measures necessaPytogive 

effect to the decision that all matters connected with Turkey should be 

handled by the British (C C S 63rd Meeting Item 2j 

116 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 17O/Z January 23, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SYMBOL 

b'inal Iieport to the President and Prime Minister 

Summarizing Decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 155/1) the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct of the War in 1943.. 

These proposals were in broad outline, and we have subsequently examined 

them and reached certain conclusions on points of detail- \lie have also 

studied a number of matters closely related to these proposals The present memorandum contains a summary of what has been accomplished 

1 SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS: 

A close examination of the minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations has been completed 

(C.C.S. 160) In the course of this examination we have laid down certain scales of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable Our 

broad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort 

craft will not be met until about August or September 1943 We ought not 

to count on the destruction of U-boats at a rate in excess of the production rate before the end of the year If it is desired to provide 

escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of increased losses 

must be balanced against the importance of the operations in question 

We have adopted certain resolutibns on measures necessary to intensify 

the anti-U-boat war. (C.C.S. 65th hfeeting, Item 1 ) 

2" ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IN RELATION TO OTHER COMMITMENTS: 

We have examined the extent of the sliipments to Russia required 

to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1943 with a 

view to estimating the effect of these shipments on other commitments 

Our conclusion is that, provided a shipping loss rate of not more than 

2,4 percent per month can be relied on, it will be possible to meet full 

commitments by the end of the calendar year 1943, and we have approved a 

program of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies 

to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort 

An essential point is that an agreed loss rate for 1943 shall be 

117 
U S SECRET 

SRITISH MOST SECRET 

estahlished so that all British and American calculations can be made on 

the same basis Vie have accordingly directed the Combined Military 

Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimat,e 

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with 

Russia (should this be necessary) to cover the period after Juiy 1, 

1943. a clause should be inserted to the effect t,hat the commitment,s included ih the Protocol may he reduced if the shipping 7osse; or the ne-­

cessities of other operations render their fulfilment prohibitive. 

(C C-S 63rd Heeting, Item 1, and C C.S. 162,) 

3 OPERATIONS Ih- THE ME1)ITERRANEAN: 

(aj Operations For The Capture of Sicily: 

We have carefully examined possible operations in the Illedi.. 

terrariean theater and we have recorded the following con-.. 

clusions (C C S 66th Meet,ing., Item 2, and C C..S 161/1)2 

(1) To attack Sicily in 1943 with the favorable July” moon 

as the target date 

(2) To instruct. General Eisenhower to report not later than 

March 1st.’ firstly, whether any insurmountab7.e diffi~. 

culty as to resources and training will cause the date 

of the assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July 

moon, and, secondly in that event to confirm that the 

date will not be later than the favorable August moon 

(3) That the following should be the Command set up for the 

operation: 

a General Eisenhower to he in Supreme Command with Gen-. 

era1 Alexander as Deputy Commander-in--Chief, charged 

with the detailed planning and preparation and with 

the execution of the actual operation when launched 

h Admiral Cunningham to he Naval Commander,, and Air 

Chief Varshal Tedder the Air Commander 

C- We have agreed that without prejudicing the July date for the operation, an jntense effort will he made during the next three weeks to 

achieve by contrivance and ingenuity the favorable Jme moon period as 

the date for the operation If at the end of the three weeks our ef 

forts have proved successful, the instructions to General Eisenhower 

will he modified accordingly 

118 
c. Recommendations for the officers tobe appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted 

in due course by General Eisenhower. 

(4) That General Eisenhower should he instructed to set up 

forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a 

special operational and administrative staff, with its 

own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation. 

The necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the 

above decisions has been drafted. 

(b) Cover Plans: 

We intend to instruct, the appropriate agrncies in Washington 

and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary 

Force in North Africa, to draw np a comprehensive cover plan 

for the Yediterranean. The possibility of carrying out 

feints or minor operations in the Eastern !:fediterranean will 

he examined. 

(c) Command in the Mediterranean Theater: 

We have agreed to the following Command arrangements in the 

\fediterranearl: (C.C.S. 63rd fleeting, Item 1 and C.C.S. 163). 

(1) Sea: 

For operat,ion HUSKY the Naval Commander Force X will 

assume the title of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. 

The present Commander-i+Chief, Xediterranean, will be 

designated Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary between the two Commands will be determined later. The 

Commander-in-Chief, Wediterranean, will ~ however, be responsible for naval matters which affect the Wediter ­

ranean as a whole. 

(2) Land: 

At a moment to he determined after the British 8th Army 

has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will 

become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, 

the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General Eisenhower's command. Subject to the concurrence of 

General Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary task 

will be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian 

119 
U S, SECRET 

BRITISH <MlrOST SECRET 

front with a small Headquarters of his own provided from 

the ?.fiddle East and aft,er the conclusion of these opera-. 

tions to take charge of Operation HUSKY The boundary 

between the North African and Middle East Commands will 

be the Tunisian-Tripolit,ania frontier 

(3) Air: 

We hue agreed that. Air. Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder 

shall be appointed Air Commander-in- Chief 0.f the whole 

Mediterranean theater with his Headquarters at Algiers~ 

Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, 

Northwest Africa (Gene]-a1 Spaatz) and the Air Officer 

Commanding in Chief Middle East, (Air Chief Marshal Sir 

Sholto Douglas) We have defined the relaCionship and 

mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander in. Chief, 

Mediterranean and the Commander-in-Chief All.ied Expeditionary Forces in Northwest Africa. and we have laid 

down certain principles for the orgwizar.lon of the %fed-­

it,erranean Air Command sllbjec.t, to any minor changes 

which the Air Commander in ChJef may find nec.essary 

after his appoiniment 

jd) The Bomber Offensive from Nort,h Africa. 

We have laid down 1.he following as t,he objects of the bomber 

offensive from North Afrlca in order of time (C C S 159,'l): 

(lj The furt,heranLe of operaT,ions for the e,<irl,ion of' all 

Axis Fort-es from Africa 

(2j \\'hen (1) ht>.s been achieved,, infliction of the heaviest 

possib:le losses on the Axis Air and Naval for~cesin 

preparat,ion for HUSKY., including bombing required hy 

cover plans 

(3) The direct. furtherance of Operation HUSKY 

(4) The desr,ruci,ion of the oil refineries at Ploesii 

So far as is possible without, prejudice to the achievement 

of 0bjeet.s (1) (2). and (3j above, bombing objectives willbe 

chosen wit.h a view to weakening the Italian will t.0 continue 

the war 

120 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH .YOST SEC7ET 

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM: 

(a) The Operation of Air Forces from the United Kingdom: 

We have agreed that the United States Heavy Bombardment 

Units in the United Kingdom shall operate under the strategical direction of the British Chief of the Air Staff. Under this general direction the United States Commanding Cenera1 will decide upon the technique and methcd to be employed. (C.C.S. 65th Veeting, Item 2.) 

We have agreed upm a directive (C.C.S. 166/l/D) to be issued to the British Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and to 

the Commanding General United States Air Forcesin the United 

Kingdom. 

@) BOLERO: 

(C.C.S. 172 and C.C.S. 68th I'eeting, Item 1) 

A study has been madeof the shipping capabilities forBOIERO 

build-up in 1913. 

Vith the date available at the conference and making a number of assumptions which are set out in full in C.C.S. 172, 

Enclosure 'C", we calculate that the U. S. Forces asshownin 

the following table will be available for Continental operations in the U. I<. on the dates shown. The figures given in 

the last column include the build-up of the air contingent 

to 172,000. They may be regarded as the minimum, and every 

effort will be made to increase the number of trained and 

equipped divisions in the United Kingdom by August 15th. 

By August 15 

By September 15 

By October 15 

By November 15 

By December 31 

Division 

4 

7 

9 

12 

15 

Total Numbers 

Equipped 

384,000 

509,000 

634,000 

759,000 

938,000 

This is based on (1) the figures of 50,000 troops per division with supporting troops; (2) 45 days allowance between 

sailing date and availability date. 

As the movement proceeds the over-all number ofmen per division will decrease and by the end of the year it may he 

121 
6' S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

down to 40,000 inwhich case the number ofdivisions available 

on December 31st may be 19 instead of15. The number of divisions earlier in the year is unlikely to be increased 

(c) Amphibious Operations in 19.13 from the United Kingdom: 

(C.C.S. 167 and 169 and C.C.S 68th Meeting, Item 2.) 

Ve have examined the problem of amphibious operations from 

the United Kingdom in 1043 There are three types of operation for which plans and preparations must now be made: 

(1) Raids with the primary object of provoking air battles 

and causing enemy losses 

(2) Operations with the object of seizing and holding a 

bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and resources permit, of vigorously exploiting successesI 

r3) A return to the Continent to take advantage of German 

disintegration 

Plans and preparations for (1) above will proceed as at present An attack on the Channel Islands is an example of the 

type of operation which we have in mind 

We propose to prepare for an operation against the Cotentin 

Peninsula wjth resources which will be available, the target 

date being set at, August 1: 1943 This operation comes under 

type (2) above 

We have agreed t.0 establish forthwith a Combined Staff under 

a British Chief of Staff until such time as a British Supreme Commander, with an American Deputy Commander, j~sap.-. 

pointed A direct.ive to govern the planning is in course of 

preparat,ion We intend to include in this directive provi-­

sion for a retur-n to the Continent under (3) above with the 

forces which will be available for the purpose in the United 

Kingdom month by m0nr.h 

9 PACIFiC AND FAR EAST THEATER: 

(a, Operations in the Pacific Theater: 

(C.C S. 168 and C C S~ 67th Meeting, Item 1 j 

The following is an outline of the operations which it is 

intended to carry out in the Pacific in conformity with the, 

provisions of our previous report (C C S 155/1): 

(1) Operat,ions to make the Aleutians as secure as may be 

122 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(2) An advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam as practicab’le 

and particularly in conjunction with the operations now 

in hand for the capture of Xabaul. 

(3) An advance along the line Samoa-Jaluit. 

(4) An advance on the Malay Barrier (as Timor) on a limited 

scale tocounter enemy capabilities anddivert his forces. 

(5) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in 

hand to enable the advance to be carried through and 

followed up. 

(b) Support of China: 

(1) Immediate Operations: 

Subsequent to the operations now in progress which are 

aimed at the capture of Akyab, a limited advance from 

Assam will be carried out to gain bridgeheads for further 

operations; to improve the air transport route to China 

by enabling aircraft to fly at lower altitudes; and, if 

Chinese cooperation is available, to gain ground for 

additional airfields andtoextend theairwarning system. 

(2) Operations In China: 

In order to support the Chinese war effort, to provide 

means for intensifying attacks on Japanese shipping, and 

to strike at Japan herself when opportunity offers, it 

is intended to improve air transportation into China by 

supplying additional transport aircraft, and to build up 

the U. S. Air Forces now operating in China to the maxi 

mum extent that logistical limitations and other important claims will permit# We hope that more sustained 

operations with increased Air Forces may begin in the 

spring, and we regard this development as of great im 

portance in the general scheme. 

(3) Reconquest of Burma and Reopening of The Burma Road: 

We have approvedNovember 15, 1943, as the provisional 

date for the ANAKIM assault. It will be necessary to decide in July 1943 whether to undertake or to postpone 

the operation (C,C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 4). 

We have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces 

123 
0 S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

required for the ope?ation and have investigated the 

possibility of their provision The land and air forces 

can he provided. The provision of naval forces, assault 

shipping, landing craft and shipping cannot he guarantesed 

so far in advance and must depend upon the situation existirig in the late swmer of 1913 (C.C.S. 164). 

6-, TIIE AXIS OIL POSITIOK: 

We have had laid before us certain information from British 

sources on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158). It is believed that additional information available in Fashington may modify the conclusions 

which have been drawn by the British, We have accordingly directed the 

Combined Iritelligerice Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed 

assessment of the Axis oil situation based on t,he latest information 

available from both Eritish arid 1:niterl rtates sources; In the meanwhile, 

we have taken note that the Axis oil sit.iiat,ion is so restricted that it 

is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis 

oil, namely, the Rumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and 

the syrithet,ic and producer gas plants in Cermany, he undertaken as soon 

as other commitments allow (C.C~F. 62nd Veeting, Item 1) 

7 YAVBL AIW AIR C Ph'O IN 1WST AFPICA: 

We have agreed upon the following naval and air arrangements to 

cover the French Hest African Coast (C*C.S- 61st 'rleeting, Item 3): 

(a) That the V$est African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador 

(Ria d'0ro) southward shall he an area under command of a 

British Kaval Officer for naval operations and of a British 

Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval 

force's 

@) That subject to (a) a sub area extending from Cape Eojador 

to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces oper. 

ating therein shall be under French Command 

(c) That in the French sub.-area the intention will be to enable 

French air unitsto take over air duties as rapidly as equip 

ment and training permit 

8 TLTIKEY: 

We have agreed upon the administrative measures necessary to give 

effect to the decision that all matters connected with Turkey should he 

handled by the British (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 2)" 

124 
U. S. SECRET 

BtITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 171 January 22, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DIRECTIVE 

OPEPATIOh’ HlJSKY 

Enclosed is a draft directive to General Eisenhower regarding 

Operation Ht’SKY which is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for 

approval 

\7. DYKES, 

,J. R. DEANE, 

Combined S,ecretariat ~ 

LliC1,CST:rE 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved thatan attack against 

Sicily will be lsunched in 1943. 

The Combined Chiefsof Staff have further agree3 that the following command set-up shall be established for the operation: 

(a) You are to be the Supreme Commander with General Alexander 

as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsible for the detailed 

planning and preparation and for the 

operation when launched. 

(b) Admiral of tk Fleet Cunningham is to 

and Air Chief h’arshal Tedder the Air 

You will submit to the Combined Chiefs of 

tions for the Officers to be appointed hestern 

Commanders ~ 

execution of the actual 

be the Naval Commander 

Commander. 

Staff your recommendaand Eastern Task Force 

In consultation with General Alexander you will set up at once a 

special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of 

Staff, for planning and preparing the operation. 

The provision of the necessary forces and their training in time 

for the assault on the target date given above have been the subject of 

exhaustive study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their Staffs, A 

Memorandum setting out the various considerations and the outline plan 

125 
IT'. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

for the operation which formed the basis of this study, is attached for 

your information (C.C.S. 161/1). Case A (vide C.C.S. 161/1, Enclosure 

"A," paragraph 5) was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the 

provision of the British Ground Forces. The details of the additional 

forces which will be made available toyou for the operation will be communicated separately by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff. 

A copy of the Minutes of the 66th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff held at Casablanca on January 22, 1943, which led to the above 

decisions, is attached for your information. 

You are to report to them not later than March lst, whether any 

insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the 

date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon. In the 

event of there being such a delay you will confirm that the assault date 

will not be later than the favorable August moon. 
U. S. SECRET 

SRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 171/2/~1 January 23, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATION HUSKY 

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANIER IN CHIEF, 

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FOHCE IN NORTH AFKICA 

(Approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 69th Meeting) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an attack against 

Sicily will be launched in 194.3, with the target date as the period of 

the favorable July” moon (Code designation HUSKY). 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have further agreed that the fol-. 

lowing command setup shall be established for the operation: 

(a) You are to be tile Supreme Commander with General Alexander 

as Deputy Commander inChief, charged with the detailed planning and preparation and with the execution of the actual 

operation when launched, 

(b) Admiral of the 1,leet Cunninghahi is to he the Naval Commander 

and Air Chief hlarshal Tedder the Air Commander. 

You will submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your recommenda 

tions for the Officers to he appointed Western and Eastern Task fiorce 

Commanders 

In consultation with Seneral Alexander you will set up at once 

a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of 

Staff, for planning and preparing the operation, including cover plans 

The provision of the necessary forces and their training in time 

* The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that without prejudicing the 

July date for the operation, an intense effort will be made during the 

next three weeks to achieve by contrivance and ingenuity the favorable 

June moon period as the date for the operation, If at the end of the 

three weeks their efforts have proved successful, your instructions 

will be modified accordingly 

NOTE: This paper is identical with C~C.S,171/1/D dated January 23, 1943, 

except for addition of above footnote. 

127 
U,.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

for the assault on the target date given above have been the subject of 

exhaustive study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their staffs. A 

Memorandum setting out the various considerations and the outline plan 

for the operation which formed the basis of this study is attached for 

your information (C.C.S. 161/1). Case A (vide C.C.S. 161/1, Enclosure 

"A," paragraph 5) was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the 

provision of the British Ground Forces. The details of the additional 

forces which will be made available to you for the operation will be 

conmunicated separatelybythe United States and British Chiefs of Staff. 

A copy of the Minutes of the 66th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff held at Casablanca on January 22, 1943, which led to the above 

decisions, is attached for your information. 

You are to report to them not later than March 1st whether any 

insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the 

date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon. In the 

event of there being such a delay you will confirm that the assault date 

will not be later than the favorable August moon. 

The code designation to be communicated to you later will apply 

to all general preparations for HUSKY in the Mediterranean Theater, including training, cover plans and preliminary air operations. Specific 

openations will be given special code designations. 

128 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 172 January 22, 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SHIPPING CAPABILITIES FOR BOLERO BUILD-UP 

Note by Lieutenant General B. B. Somervell 

1. The attached tables (Enclosures "A" and "B") show the possibilities with existing and presently projected shipping of moving troops and 

equipment from the U. S. to the U. K. Estimates of capability of British 

shipping have been prepared on the basis of ship sailings provided by 

the !,!inistry of War Transport; estimates on American shipping have been 

prepared by the Commanding General, Services of Supply, United States 

Army. The assumptions on which these tables have been prepared are shown 

In Enclosure "C". 

2. There seems little possibility in the first half of the year to 

improve the situation. By coriversion, increasing the capacity of troop 

ships and other combinations there does seem to be the possibility of 

some increase in the latter half of the year. This possibility is restricted in the winter months by the limitations on U.. X, port and railway capacities under blackout conditions. 

3. ConCinuing study will be given to securing such increases as may 

be possible 

4. In terms of divisions available for Continental operations, the 

U. S. Forces in the U. K. over and above the build-up of the air contingent to 172,000 are as follows: 

Total Numbers 

Division Equipped 

By Aug. 15 4 384 000 

Sept, 15 7 509,000 

Oct. 15 9 634,000 

Nov. 15 12 759,000 

Dec. 31 15 938,000 

This is based on (1) the figure of 50,000 troops per division 

with supportjng troops; (2) 45 days allowance between sailing date and 

availability date. 

129 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SHIPPING CAPABILITIES ON BOLERO BUILD-UP 

Present or &route Quarterly Increments during '43 

Dec. 31, 1942 1st Q 2d Q 3d Q 4th Q 

Capability of U. S. Cargo Ships 80,000 116.000 369.000 491.000 

Capability of U. K. Cargo Ships 53,000 15,000 63.000 

Total Capability of Cargo Shipping 80,000 169,000 384,000 554,000 

I- Capability of U. S. Troop Ships 103.000 105.000 235,000 299,000 

:: 

Capability of U. K. Troop Ships 40,000 105,000 140.000 60,000 

Total Capability of Personnel Shipping 143,000 210.000 375,000 359,000 

Rate of hild-up in U. K. 80.000 169,000 375,000 359,000

Cunulated Strength in U K. 135,000 215,000 384.000 759,000 1,118,000 

* It is estimated by British Ministry of War Transport 

that the above figures muld involve approximately 150 

BOLERO cargo ships per month in the last quarter of the 

year. Provided U. S. dock labor and locomotives are 

forthcoming as stipulated, this rate is possible during 

the summer but not during the winter months. 
U S SECRET 

RRITISH MOST SECRET 

PROJECTED U S TROOP MOVEMENTS IN 1943 

Present or 

Elroute Total 

'heater Dec. 31, 1943 1st a 2nd Q 3rd (2 4th 0 19

S. and S.W. Pacific 224,000 48,700 30. son 24,500 7,SO0 111

ma 31 000 7,500 7 500 15 000 30

?'" Africa and Husky 216,000 58,000 116,0Cfl* 184

F 

Bases 454 000 4 on0 4,000 4,000 5,400 17

UK 135.000 80,000 16Q,OOO 375.000 359.000 983

Totals 1,060,000 208,200 327 no0 418.500 371,900 1,32S

* One division (16,000 troops) cmbat loaded from U. S 

0 
U., SI SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

ENCLOSURE "C" 

ASSUMPTIONS FOR CALCULATIONS OF 

U. S. SHIPPING CAPABILITIES 

UNDER PLAN ADOPTED BY C ,C. S, FOR 1943 

1,. Loss rate in dry cargo ships taken at 2.6$ per month., 

2, U. S. controlled dry cargo shipping taken at. 9,185,000 DWT on 

October 1, 1942. 

3, British controlled dry cargo shipping taken at 19,700,000 DIVT on 

October 1, 1942. 

4. U. S. construction program for 1343 as reported in Anfa No, 339, 

i-e., 15,440,000 DWT of dry cargo ships, of which 357,000 UiVT will be 

converted to tankers. Construction 

lowing rate: 

Nov. 15 Program 

is estimated to proceed at the folJan. 16 Program Increase 

1st Qtr. .1,2s5,000 3 519,000 254,000 

2nd Qtr- 3,222,000 4,106,000 aw,ooo 

3rd Qtr.. 2,214,000 3,745,000 531,000 

4th Qtr, 3, 1~1,000 3,717,000 526,000 

Total i)ry Cargo 12,802,000 i~.o87,000 2,19.5,000 

Tankers :{, 118,ooo :J ,475,000 357,000 

Total 16,(;i0,000 18,562,000 2,552,000 

5. British and Canadian construction programs as furnished by blunitions Assignments Board. 

6. Excess of British losses over construction in U. K and Canada 

replaced from U. S. construction. This will permit the reestablishment 

of the British Import Program at a level considered as meeting their 

minimum requirements. 

7, No ECZ's converted to transports through 1943. 

8. Five cargo ships converted to combat loaders by Navy each month, 

November to April, inclusive., 

9. Shipping employed on an average turn--around of 2 1/23 months, 

10. Repair rate taken at 12-1/2$ of total dry cargo fleet.. 

11. Initial movement based on 8 ship tons per manc 

12. Maintenance based on 1.3 ship tons per man per month except for 

U. K. where it is reduced to 1.0 ship tons per man per month., 

132 
IT. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

13. Navy employment of dry cargo tonnage in 4th Quarter of 1942 

averages 1,160,000 DWT and is increased by 300,000 DWT each quarter of 

1943 as assumed in J.P.S. 57/3. 

14. The transfer of vessels between oceans to meet theater requirements. 

15. U. S. shipping for war economy and defense aid takenat4,000,000 

tons supplemented by 170 voyagesinitussian aid accordingtoC.C.S. 162/1. 

16. Lift ratio between North Atlantic andSouth and Southwest Pacific 

taken at 1.4 to 1. 

17. British aid reckoned as follows: 

SHIPPING 1st 2 2nd (4 3rd Q 4th 3 TOTAL 

Personnel (lift) 40,000 105,000 140,000 60,000 345,000 

Cargo (1000 shpg tons) - 500 no0 800 1,600 

ivOTES: 

(a) The figures are based on a very rapid estimate and must, of 

course, be subject to check after detailed examination­

(b) The assistance shown is dependent on the following assump. 

tions: 

(1) That no shipping can be taken from the U. K. Import Program. 

(2) That TORCH build-up ceases with DlSllandthatthereafter 

the British shipping released ,from TORCH can be employed 

on BOLERO assistance except for the demands of IIUSKY and 

ANAKIM. 

(3) That the KinistryofWar Transport are able tocontinue to 

provide shipping to cover all other military requirements 

on the agreed minimum level without encroaching on the 

TORCH poolo 

(4) That it is possible to find escorts for the convoy pro. 

gram involved, 

18. Idovements to U. S. bases will be restricted to 17,400 to Iran.. 

19. ktequirements for HUSKY as decided in C,C.S. 161/1 (Plan A) j, 

20. Any excess movements to South and Southwest Pacific and Burma 

over 141,200 to be by Navy tonnage 

21. U. S. movements to North Africatocease when total of 400,000 is 

reached. One division (16,000 troops) tobe combat loaded from the United 

States. 

22. Escorts are not limiting factor. 

133 
CASABLANCA CONFERENCE 

JANUARY 19113 

MINUTES OF ANFA MEETINGS 

(Presided Over By The President And The Prime Minister) 

PAGE 

ANFA 1st Meeting ........... 139 

ARFA 2nd Meeting ........... I112 

ANFA 3rd Meeting ........... I59 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANFA 1st kleeting 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp, 

on Friday, January 15, 1943, at 1730. 

PRESENT 

The President 

General G. C. 

Admiral E. J. 

Lt. General H. 

Lt. General D. 

Marshall 

King 

H. Arnold 

D. Eisenhower 

The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill 

[Prime h!inister and Minister of 

Defense) 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Uudley 

Pound 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal Sir C. Portal 

General the Hon. Sir Harold 

Alexander 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur 

Tedder 

Vice-Admiral the Lord Louis 

Mountbatten 

Lt., General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

hlr. Harry Hopkins 

Lt. Colonel Elliot Roosevelt 

Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 

USNFI 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig General J. Re Deane 

Brigadier E,, I.. C. Jacob 

134 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA 

GEWERAL EISENHOWER gave a review of the situation on his front. 

He explained that the Allied forces which landed in French Vorth Africa 

were equipped to cauture three ports. They were not a mobile army and 

had little strength for offensive operations. This arrangement had been 

necessary since the attitude of the French was an unkmw quantity. General Anderson had advanced with great boldness and rapidity taking every 

kind of risk in an attempt to get into Tunis and Rizerte in the first 

rush, He had finally been stopped by dive bombing when he got into the 

open country near Tunis, and by wet weather which hampered movement off 

the roads. Every effort had then been made to reinforce the forward 

troops, units being moved from Oran and from Casablanca. It was hoped 

to launch an offensive on Gecember 22nd to capture Tunis, making use of 

superior gun Power. The weather had turned against us and it had proved 

necessary to call off the offensive. A means of carrying out operations 

in the drier country in the south had then been sought and an operation 

had now been planned for the capture of Sfax which would begin on January 24th. He had been waiting, however, for a chanceof coordinating action with General Alexander, as it was important that the timing should 

fit in with the movements of the 8th Army 

GENERAL EISENHOWER then gave details of how it was proposed to 

conduct the forthcoming operation and of the forces to be employed It 

was intended to use the American First Armored Division (less one light 

batcalion), a regimental combat team and additional units of artillery, 

and also to use the airfieldsin the Gafsa ad Tebessa areas for Supporting aircraft. The Germans had disposed their armor northeast of Pont du 

Fahs, and it would be necessaryto guard against a counter stroke towards 

the rear of the forces attacking Sfax. It was hoped to put supplies into 

Sfax by sea from the eastward to ease the maintenance problem. It was 

hoped that this operation would beof real assistance to the 8th bmy because the Germans were sending supplies by rail to Sfax whence they were 

sending small coasting vessels to Romel. The Sfax force would be separated by 75 miles of rough country from the British 1st Army, in which 

there were two critical points: Pont du Fahs and Foudouk, which were 

held by the French, Apart from one regiment in Algiers, and part of a 

I35 
U S SECRE7' 

BRITISH MOST smefir 

division in Orari, the5.e was virtually nothing between the t,roops in the 

front line and :lorocco Troops in the latter place were too far away to 

move up over the long and difficult line of communications. TheIst. Army 

had 7 to 10 days' suppliesofall kinds, and so if an opening were off'cred by the !:errnaris t,hq could 1aurlt:h an attack. In t,he whole t,heater of 

Mar there were now alionr. :??0,000 troops. ?uppl ies were ample in the 

Casablaivn area, but, again diff'icul t,y of trensport.atiol1 prevented much 

being moved i'orvord. 

CIEKERAL EISE3'HOWK t,hen gave EI desC~'iptiOll of the various airfields being used by the Al~Ji~d Air T'orcQs, and of the difficult,ies of 

keeping them serviceable, fie t,hrn referred to the poll tical situation 

and pointed out t,hat it was vex->-closely related to the miljtary situation in view of the very v:ili~~rablenature of t,he line of coniniunications 

for the guarding of which French t.roops were responsible. Keturning to 

t,he air situatiorihe said that Air rhief Marshal Tedder had t.wice visited 

Algiers and detailed plans had been workd out to insure the coordinated 

action of the Air Forces from t.hc Viddle E;ist,, Valta and French Worth 

Africa \!ediuni bombers based on PhillippevDle were now being rised with 

e f f ec t against, shi ppi rig 

GENERbL NZXAh'Pl.11 their ga've an account of the operat,ioris of the 

8th Army He said that the El Alamein position was about 40 niiles long 

and uas occupied by the German 15th I'anzer, 21st Parrzer, 90t,h 1.igt:t and 

1Mt.h Infantry Rivisioris which were at full strength in men and equip^. 

merit and by 10 Italian Uivi+iorrs The position had no open flank so 

the problem was one of punching a hole through which the armor could be 

launched The attack went in wider a very heavy barrage of 500 guns on 

O.:tober 24th Infantry advanced through deep minefields for 4,000 to 

6 ,000 yards For the next ten days there was severe fighting designed 

io eat lip the enemy's reserves and prepare the WRY for the final breakthrough On November 4th. the front was broken and the opportunity came 

for the fine American Skierman tanks to pour through In two weeks Tobruk 

was reached and by the end of a montli the army was at Agheila They had 

the satisfaction of advancing twice as fast as Rommel had been able to 

moue during our retreat The Germans had not enough transport to go 

round and so they had made certain that what there wa5 was used for the 

German units Our casualties in twelve days were 16,000; the enemy's 

136 
U. S, SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

must have totalled between 60,000 and 70,000 and Rome1 must have lost 

nearly 5,000 vehicles. None of this would have been possible had it not 

been for the air superiority gained by the Air Forces who had throughout 

done magnificent work. 

For the further advance beyond Agheila everything depended upon 

the use of Benghazi. The harbor was left by the Germans in a terrible 

mess However by dint of fine work on the part of the Navy, a flow of 

3,000 tons per day was reached. A severe gale which again breached the 

mole and sank several ships interrupted the flow, but it was now back 

again to 2,000 tons per day. Sirte was useless but there was a mall 

place near Agheila where 400 tons per day had been unloaded. 

The plan of the operations which had now begun was an attack by 

the 7th Armored Division, the New Zealand Division and the 51st Highland 

Division who were carrying with them 10 days' supplies and 500 miles of 

petrol. It was hoped to reach Tripoli by January 26th. 

The enemy's fighting value was hardtoassess but he was believed 

to have at his disposal the following forces: 

15th Panzer Division with 30 tanks ) 50 additional 

21st Panzer Division with about 27 tanks) tanks were believed to be 

ready in Tunisia. 

'90th Light Division ) both weak in strength 

164th Division ) and short of artillery. 

Ahout 9 Italian Divisions. 

The total strength might be assessedat50,OOO Germans and 30,000 

Italians, though only about 20,000 of the former were strictly fighting 

troops The enemy's organization was much broken up and he was very 

short of artillery. Furthermore, his army had retreated 1,000 miles, 

which must have had its effect on morale. Our superiority rested in 

tanks and guns, of which we had ample. General LeClerc's advance through 

Fezzan had been a fine piece of work but would not exercise an influence 

on the present battle 

137 
11 S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

If we got to Tripoli according to plan the 8th Army would be 

quite immobilized until the port was open, This would take probably 

seven or ten days, though in the worst case it might take three months. 

J t was hoped to work up to 3,000 tons a day and if this was achieved it 

wwld be possible to attack the Xareth Line towards the middle of b’arch 

with 2 Armored and 4 Infantry Divisions. We were getting photographs of 

the Mareth Line, which was certainly a nrepared position, thotgh lacking 

in depth It should be realized that the distances involved were very 

great From Buerat to Tripoli was 248 miles and from Tripoli to Gabes 

was 220 miles It would, of course, be possible, if the enemy’s resistance proved weak, to advance to the Mareth Line with very light forces 

somewhat earlier 

Discussion then turned upon the coordination of the operations 

of Dhe 8th Army and of those of General Eisenhower’s command, GXNERAL 

EISENHOWER inquired what Rommelss position would be if the 8th Army captured Tripoli and if he captured Sfax Could the 8th Army keep Rome1 

engaged so that the forces at Sfax could neglect its right flank and 

turn all its attention towards the North? 

GENERAL ALEXAb’DER said that Rommel was living very much from 

hand to mouth for supplies andif he lost all his ports he would certain. 

ly be trapped; nevertheless, it would be necessary to give very careful 

study to the Sfax operation It should be realized that if a force advanced on Sfax, Rommel would react like lightning and his plan would be 

the best possible Great care would be necessary to insure that undue 

risks were not taken 

SIP ALAN BROOKE said that a great deal depended upon the timing 

of the Sfax operation It might be unfortunate if the force arrived at 

Sfax just at the time that the 8th Army had reached Tripoli and were 

immobilized for lack of supplies 

It was generally agreed that the coordination of the action of 

the two armies was a matter of the highest importance and the present 

opportunity should be utilized to the full 

t 38 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Discussion then turnedonthe strength required to hold the North 

African shore when it had been completely cleared of the enemy. GENERAL 

ALEXANDER said that he had calculated that two divisions with a mobile 

reserve would be sufficient for Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. GENERAL 

EISENHOWER said that he considered four divisions should be held to watch 

Spanish Moroccoand that one infantry and one armored division would cer 

tainly be necessary in Algeria and Tunisia. There were at present six 

U. S. divisions in French North Africa and three more were set up in the 

original plan to come. If these were shipped there would be three IJ- S 

divisions over and above defensive requirements. He thought it would be 

unwise to hand over the defense of Tunisia too early to the French. The 

PRIME MINISTER agreed. He said that it appeared that there would be 

some thirteen divisions in the whole North African theater available for 

future operations. 

In reply to an inquiry SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that he was of the 

opinion that convoys could be passed through the Mediterranean when air 

fields had been established and when the Tunisian tip hsd been cleared 

SIB DUDLEY POUND agreed. He reckoned that ifthirty ships couldbe passed 

through every ten days the whole of the Cape traffic could be done 

away with and 225 ships would thus be released for other uses. It was 

hard to estimate the relative losses which might be incurred, but though 

the percentage of loss might be slightly higher through the Mediterra 

nean the total would be less as fewer ships would be involved. The hledi 

terranean route would be more expensive in escorts, but there would be a 

saving in the time of voyages. 

The PRIME MINISTER said that the opening of the Mediterranean 

would have its effect on the attitude of Turkey; moreover, the British 

10th Army, consisting of six divisions, which had been established In 

Persia with the object of meeting the threat through the Caucasus, was 

now available to encourage and support the Turks. 

In discussion it was suggested that it might be worth while cal 

culating what specialized units would be required to round out the 

Turkish Army. SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that up to the present the 

Turks had been supplied with technical material and arms, but although 

their Army consisted of first-rate material, as infantry, they tended to 

139 
li S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

misuse technical equipment and allow it to deteriorate He did not think 

their army would ever be fit to operate offensively outside Turkey. It 

might, however, serve to hold Turkey as a base from which our forces 

could operate 

SIR AHTHUR TEDDER said that the Turks had a small air force to 

which we gave a limited number of aircraft; it would never be fit to 

fight Our plan was to operate initially some twenty.five fighterand 

bomber squadrons from airfields in Turkey which had been prepared and 

stocked. Further airfields wouldbe required if we were to operate offensively and plans were all drawn up for their preparation. It was intended to move antiaircraft defenses in with the squadrons 

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER then gave an account of the part played by 

the Air Force in the recent victories in the Kiddle East He emphasized 

that their task began during the British retreat from Gazala Since that 

time the enemy air force had been beaten down and great efforts had been 

made to stop !:ommel's supplies The action of an air force in operations 

of this kind was difficult toexplain concisely, extending as it did over 

great areas and diverse tasks The Middle East Air Forces had first 

struck at Xommel's supplies and then at the supplies to Tunisia; for the 

latter purpose Malta had been reinforced to the utmost and aircraft had 

been transferred to Tunisia The coordination of the Air Forces of the 

Middle East, hlalta and Tunisia was a complicated problem and he was very 

glad to have the present opportunity of meeting General Eisenhower and 

discussing it 

GENERAL EISENHOWER explained the difficulties under which the 

Air Forces in Tunisia were operating in support of the Army There were 

only two airfields available for fighters arid even these were 100 miles 

from the front line The Germans, on the other hand, had two all weather 

airfields in Tunis In the early stages U a= units from the Western 

Zone had been moved up and placed under Sritish command; Air Marshal 

Welch kiad disposed them in the Tebessa area For the operation now con 

templatedtneBritish fighter force would operate from Souk El Arba under 

Lawson and the U S. fighters would operate in the South under General 

Crane His own conception of the layout on this front was that the Brit 

ish Army Commander should control it all since there wasno sound arrange.. 

mentby which the front couldbe divided The French, however, had refused 

140 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

to serve under British command. This had meant that he had had to establish a Command Post from which to direct operations. He hoped to 

overcome this kind of difficulty in the near future. 

The PRIhlE MIKISTET inyuired whether there was any danger of the 

Germans striking through General Anderson's left flank rather in the 

manner adopted by the 8th Army at El Alameln. GEKEFAL EISZNHOWER said 

that t,he 1st Army had such superiority over the enemy in artillery that 

he did not think there was rmch fearof this. Though the enemy's specialist and tank units were good, his infantry had not seemed to be up to 

the same standard, 

In conclusion it was emphasized that events had reached a crucial stage in the North African Theater and that the events of the next 

two or three weeks would be of vital importance. The present was the 

time at which to consider what action should be taken when the North 

African shore had finally been cleared. 
0. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANFA 2nd Meeting 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp, 

on \!onday, Janiiary 18, 1913, at 1700. 

PRESENT 

The President The Ft. lion. Minston S. Churchil: 

General G.C. liarshall (Prime Vinister and Vinister of 

Ce fense)

Admiral E.J. King Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudlej

Lt. General H.H. Arnol~d Pound 

\fr FIarry Ilopkins Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal Sir C. Portal 

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Wountbat ten 

Lt. General 5ir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Hrig. General J. R. Deane 

Erigadier h. I. C. Jacob 

142 
il. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER asked the Chiefs of Staff 

for a report of progress regarding the current conferences. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE stated that after seven days of argument he felt 

that definite progress had been made. A document is now being prepared 

setting forth the general strategic policy for 1943. This will be gone 

over in detail at the C.C.S. meeting on the morning of January 19th. 

EIFf ALAh BPOOKr summarized the document as follows: 

1. A statement that the measures to be taken to combat the 

submarine menace are a first charge on the resources of the 

United hations and provide security for all of our opsations. 

2. A statement that we shall concentrate on the defeat of 

Germany first which will be followed by the defeat of Japan. 

3. Our efforts in defeating Germany will be concerned first 

with efforts to force them to withdraw ground and air forces 

from the Russian front. This will be accomplished by operations 

from North Africa by which Southern Europe, the Dodecanese 

Islands, Greece, Crete, Sardinia, and Sicily will all be threatened, thus forcing Germany to deploy her forces to meet each 

threat. The actual operation decided upon is the capture of 

Sicily. 

At the same time, we shall go on with preparing forces 

and assembling landing craft in England for a thrust across the 

Channel in the event that the German strengthin France decreases, 

either through withdrawal of her troops or because of an internal 

collapse. 

4. Operationsin the Pacific are to be continued to include 

the capture of Rabaul and Eastern New Guinea while plans are to 

be prepared to extend the operations to the Marshall Islands and 

the capture of Truk if the situation permits. 

5. Plans and preparations to undertake Operation ANAKIM 

late in 1943 are to be instituted at once with the understandirlg 

that the United States will assist to make up deficiencies in 

landing craft and naval vessels needed for this operation. The 

operation is to be planned for December of 1943 with the view to 

capturing Burma andopening the Burma road prior to the monsoon 

season of 1944. 

143 
P. S. CECWT 

90TTISY 6fOCT SECOET 

0. The maximnm combined air offensive will be conducted 

against Germany from the Jnited Kingdom. By this and every other 

available means, attempts will be made to undermine Germany's 

morale 

7, Every effort will be made, political and otherwise, to 

induce Turkey to enter the war in order that we may establish 

air bases there for operations against Rumania. 

e. Operation RAVENOUS will be undertaken for the purpose of 

establishing bridgeheads over the Chindwin River, and also to 

prepare roads and airfields in northern Burma which will facilitate the mountingofOperation ANAKIM toward the end of the year. 

In this connection, Operation CANNIBAL is now being undertaken 

with a view to securing air bases in the Akyab area. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that Chiang Kai-shek wishes to postpone nis part of Operation RAVENOUS until there is more naval support in 

the Bay of Fengal. iie added that this was strategically sound as the 

Chinese operation would be more effective if coordinated as a part of 

ANAKIM He said RAVENOUS requires no Naval support. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then explained that while that part of the 

Chinese operation which was to consist of an advance from Yunnan could 

be advantageously postponed, the advance from Ramgarh could well be initiated as part of operation RAVENOUS in order to provide security for 

the construction of a road southward from Ledo. However, this will have 

to have the approval of the Generalissimo. 

The PRIME UINISTER then stated that he wished it made clear that 

if and when Hitler breaks down, all of the British resources and effort 

will be turned toward the defeat of Japan. Iie stated that not only are 

British interests involved, but her honor is engaged. If it were thought 

well for the effect on the people of the United States of America, the 

British Government would enter into a treatyorconvention with the U. S. 

Government to this effect 

The PRESIDENT stated that a formal agreement regarding British 

efforts against Japan was entirely unnecessary. ile said, however, that 

efforts shoulfi be made to obtain an engagement from Russia to concentrate on the defeat of .Japan after Germany had been eliminated from 

144 
ll. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the war. He thought that Russia would probably want to come in with the 

United Nations in that event, but he would like to have an expression 

from them as to whether they will come in and how. 

MR. CHURCHILL then discussed operation SLEDGEHAMMW. He thought 

it should be given a “sharper point” and that plans should be made to 

undertake it, including the appointment of a Commander and the fixing of 

a target date. He had not been in favor of such an operation in 1942 but 

he felt that it was our duty to engage the enemy on as wide a front and 

as continuouslyaspossible, and as the only way of stopping an operation 

with the full force of the British Metropolitan air forces and the U. S. 

sir forces in Great Britain is to do a SLEDGEHAMMER, he thought we 

shoulddoeverything we could to make the operation possible this summer” 

The PRESIDENT agreed with the Prime Minister and further suggested that we join together to build up forces in the United Kingdom. 

He said that it would be desirable to prepare a schedule of the build-up 

of forces by month in order that we would know what the potential effort 

might be at any time, and plans should be made for utilizing this poten6ial at any time that there are signs of Germany’s deterioration. 

The PRIME MINISTER then discussed possible operations from the 

Mediterranean against the Dodecanese He considered that these might be 

developed either as feints in order to conceal the location of the main 

effort against Sicily, or perhaps as a real attack He had received a 

message from the three Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East informing 

him that plans to this effect were under way He desired that the final 

document prepared by the Chiefs of Staff covering the strategy for 1943 

should include some mention of the Dodecanese. 

The PRIME MINISTER said that he felt that General Chennault*s 

air force in China should be reinforced. He stated that General Wave11 

concurred in this view. 

The PRESIDENT stated that the effects of help to China would be 

largely political. A small effort to send aid would have a tremendously 

favorable effect on Chinese morale. The Generalissimo has been disappointed with regard to the Burma operations. He has considerable difficulty in maintaining the loyalty of some of the Chinese provinces. Anything that we can do to help China and to hurt JEpan will have a heartening effect on him. 

145 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The PRESIDENT stated that reinforcing our air power in China 

would also be a severe blow to Japan. He said that the Japanese people 

panic easily. This was especially true at the time of their earthquake. 

Mr Grew, tho United States Ambassador, in reporting this incident, 

stated that it was necessary for the Japanese broadcast to adopt every 

means possible to quiet the people. 

The PRLCIDfNT considered that we should send from 200 to 750 

planes to China. This should include heavy bankers which, because of the 

difficulties of supply, could be based in India. They could be used to 

operate in raids over Japan proper by refueling in China on their way to 

and from such missions. 

He thought that the United Kations should commit themselves to 

this line of action and that whoever of the Chiefs of Staff was next to 

see the Generalissimo, should inform him to this effect. 

The PRESICEKT then discussed operations in the Mediterranean. 

He said we had been extremely fortunate in Operation TORCH. He was worried, 

however, about news concerning the operations against Sicily reaching 

Germany. To prevent this, he thought that we should give the operations 

in the Mediterranean some such name as "UNDERBELLY" and continually 

think of them as being aimed at any one of a number of objectives, knowing secretly all the while, that they were to be toward Sicily. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that deception could be well achieved by the 

use of cover plans,, He said that the document that is now in preparation 

and will be discussedon January 19th goes a long way toward establishing 

a policy of how we are to win the war. It has taken some days for the 

Chiefs of Staff to express themselves but in principle they are all 

agreed. He expressed the opinion that the document being prepared Would 

be approved after a short discussion and with minor amendments. He said 

that he personally would like to have had it expanded to present a complete concept for concluding the war but that he was well pleased with 

it as it is, 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that when the United States Chiefs of 

Staff came to the conference, they preferred to undertake Operation 

ROUNDUP in 1943. The decision, however, has been made to undertake 

Operation HUSKY because we will have in North Africa a large number of 

146 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

troops available and because it will effect an economy of tonnage which 

is the major consideration. It is estimated that possession of the north 

coast of Africa and Sicily will release approximately 225 vessels which 

will facilitate operations in Burma, the Middle East, and the Pacific.He 

felt that the captute of Sicily would do much to imprdve the air coverage for our shipping in the Mediterranean. This will add considerably to 

the safety of the passage. He said that Admiral Cunningham and other 

naval officers had indicated that the capture of Sicily would not be of 

great benefit in the protection of our corlvoys, Admiral Cunningham having stated that the possession of Sicily would only make us 5 percent 

more effective in the protection of convoys. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL thought there had been a misunderstanding of 

Admiral Cunningham's views. He feels that without Sicily we will lose 15 

ships out of 100, or be 85 percent effective. We will lose only 10 ships 

out of 100, 90 percent effective, with Sicily in our possession. The 

number of the ships lost is therefore 50 percent greater with Sicily in 

possession of the Axis. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said the second consideration which brought 

a,bout the decision to operate against Sicily was the possibility of 

eliminating Italy from the war and thus necessitating Germany's taking 

over the present commitments of the Italians. 

GENEHAL MARSHALL emphasized that ROUNDUP would be a difficult if 

not impossible operation to undertake once we have committed ourselves 

to Operation HUSKY, He said that the United Kingdom maintains a small 

spearhead of amphibious forces consihting of about 20,000 troops which 

are available at all times for an operation across the Channel. This 

force could be augmented by follow-up troops carried in small craft 

which might be available in England. Unless there is a complete crack in 

German morale, operations across the Channel will have to be extremely 

limited. It will be fully as difficult to assemble landing craft following Operation HUSKY and send them to England as it will be to assemble 

them after the capture of Rabaul and send them to Burma. Probably three 

months will be required to accomplish this in either case. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that sudden signs of deterioration of the 

Axis forces might take two forms; first, a collapse in the interior with 

147 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISP NOST SECRET 

the troops initially holding fast; and, second, by the withdrawal of 

troops from France. In the latter case, we should make every effort to 

cross the Channel and in doing so, utilize any means that are available. 

He said the greatest difficulty in setting up strength for ROUNDUP in 

addition to Operation HUSKY is the lack of escort vessels and landing 

craft. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then discussed increasing the air force in 

China. The United States now has an agreement to increase the Chinese 

air force to the extent to which it can be supplied. The increase will 

be much more than the force is now. It is contemplated sending a group 

of heavy bombers which may be used to shuttle back and forth from China 

to India. There will be 25 to 30 additional medium bombers with the 

appropriate aircraft to furnish them fighter protection. tie emphasized 

that while we are committed to the build-up of the Chinese air forces, 

it is a tremendously expensive operation. The air transport planes which 

must be utilized in their supply could be utilized with great effect 

elsewhere. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the agreements reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, effective measures had been adopted to improve 

the situation in the Pacific. He said he hoped these were sufficient to 

insure that we would not again be threatened by a series of crises, 

since sufficient forces would be made available to insure our maintaining pressure on Japan. 

GENERAL MARSHALL. said that as summer approaches, the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff should meet again to make the necessary readjustments 

in the decisjons made now. 

He then discussed the use of United States bombers in England. 

Ile thought that they should be under the operational direction of the 

British, who should prescribe the targets and the timing of attacks. 

Control of operational procedure and technique should remain under the 

United States Commanders. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will attempt to 

prescribe general priorities of bombing objectives 

GENERAL MARSHALL said we should coordinate and improve our 

methods in combating the submarine menace and that this also would be a 

subject of discussion during the conferences. 

148 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISY I'OST SECPTT 

Another vital question before the Combined Chiefs of staff is 

how to maintain the Russian forces at their maximum effort both by 

forcing a withdrawal of German pressure on their front and also by insuring the flow of munitions to them. It is questionable to what extent 

the United Nations can take the losses of tonnage incidental to escorting the northern convoys. It may be possible to decrease the intervals 

between convoys or add to the strength of their escorts. However, it is 

entirely within the power of Germany to administer such losses as to 

make it necessary to discontinue this route to Russia. 

GENERAL MARSIUL said that he does not believe it necessary to 

take excessive punishment in running these convoys simply to keep Mr. 

Stalin placated. In any event, he feels that it would be necessary to 

inform Mr. Stalin that the convoys would have to be discontinued during 

Operation HUSKY. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the agreements tentatively arrived at 

would be very helpful from the air point of view. They will facilitate 

the allocationof aircraft and the development of procedure and technique. 

The PRIME MINISTER said that since we have surveyed the whole 

field of strategy, it will now be necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to 

go into ways and means bywhich the adopted strategy canbe accomplished. 

They must determine where risks should be incurred and where the reduction of forces is necessary. This may take several days. It will involve 

the broad distribution of our resources. !Ie agreed with General Marshall 

that another meeting should be held before summer and expressed his 

pleasure to the President of the United States, and to the U. S. Chiefs 

of Staff, for arranging to attend this conference. 

The PRESIDENT said that he particularly appreciated having Sir 

John Dill at the conferences since he would be the individual who would 

carryonthe liaison between the Chiefs of Staff in London and the Chiefs 

of Staff in Washington between whom he constituted an indispensable link. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND. then said that we must go into ways and means 

Of implementing our agreed decisions. Two problems involved are the 

security of the Atlantic convoys and the extent to which it will be 

necessary to decrease such security when Operation HUSKY is undertaken. 

149 
C S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

He said that increased pressure against the submarine menace must be 

maintained by adequate coverage of our convoys and by striking at places 

where submarines are manufactured and assembled. If this is done, the 

situation may be considerably improved by the time operation HUSKY is 

undertaken tle agreed with General Marshall that it will be necessary 

during Operat,ion HGSKY to discontinue the northern convoys 

The �%I$!”VIKISTEF said that this would be an added reason for 

increasing the tonnage sent to Russia prior to Operation HUSKY 

SIR DUDLEY POIJW replied that this could be done provided the 

United States would help in the escort problem^, 

The PRESIDENT then discussed the possibility of assembling a 

large number of river and lake craft available in the United States and 

sending them quietly to Europe in order to transport troops across the 

Channel in case Germany cracks 

L0R.D h!OUKTEiATTEK stated that five Great Lakes steamers had al-­

ready been sent 

The PRESIDENT told Admiral King to survey the situation and see 

what could be done in this respect 

SIR JOHN DILL expressed his satisfaction over the progress of 

the present conferences 

The PRIYE MIKISTER then discussed the situation in Turkey, He 

said that the British had some right to expect Turkey to enter the war 

when the Balkans were invaded, but in view of our own weakness to help 

Turkey they did not press it Turkey will be in a weak position at the 

peace table following the war if she has not participated in it It was 

possible to give them a guarantee for existing territory, and for their 

rights over passage through the Dardanelles“ The United Nations should 

be prepared to provide Turkey with antiaircraft, flak, tanks and other 

mechanized vehicles and also be prepared to send some of this equipment 

manned with units, since Turkish troops do not handle machinery pWtiCUlarly well, He feels that Turkey might be influenced to enter the war by 

the successes of Russian troops on the north and those of the United 

States--United Kingdom troopson the south, At present they are angry with 

the Bulgarians and it would not be surprising if they did enter the War.. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

The PRIME MINISTER said that since most of the troops which 

would be involved in reinforcing Turkey would be British, he asked that 

the British be allowed to play the Turkish hand, just as the United 

States is now handling the situation with reference to China. The British would keep the United States advised at all times as to the progress 

being made. 

The PFESIDEPT concurred in this view and also said that if 

ROUKDUP should be undertaken, he felt that it should be under British 

c ommand . 

The PRIME MIFISTER said that he thought the question of command 

in ROUNDUP operation might be determined later, but he agreed that it 

would be advisable to designate a British commander at this time who 

could undertake the planning of the operation. In his view, the command 

of operations should as a general rule be held by an officer of the 

nation which furnishes the majority of the forces. 

He said that in perhaps five weeks six divisions of the 8th Army 

would enter Tunisia, and it was understood that they would, of course, 

come under command of General Eisenhower. He thought, however, it would 

be advisable for General Alexander to be designated as the Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces 

The PRESIDENT and GFNEFd HAFSHALL both expressed agreement, and 

the latter said he thought it would be particularly desirable since 

there would be two British armies involved in the Tunisian front. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested the possibility of unifying command prior 

to the 8th Army‘s entry into Tunisia, feeling that there were many matters common to both the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the 8th Army 

which should be coordinated. After discussion, it was agreed that date 

of appointment should be left for future decision. 

GENERAL MAFiSHALL informed the bime Minister and the Chiefs of 

Staff of the great contribution that Admiral Cunningham had made to the 

smcess of Operation TORCH. He wished to express the appreciation Of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff not only for the skill that Admiral Cunningham had displayed, but also for his spirit of helpfulness and for 

his cooperation. 

152 
11 S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The PRIME MIRISTEH thanked General Marshall and directed that 

General Marshall‘s comments be included in the minutes in order that he 

could present them to the Cabinet 

After being informed that the agreements arrived at at the conference would be included in a paper, the PRIVE MINISTM suggested that 

one should be drawn up for presentation to Premier Stalin. He felt that 

the Soviet is entitled to know what we intend to do, but that it should 

be made clear thatthe paper expressed our intentions and did not constitute promises 

The PRESIDENT brought up the subject of press releases concerning the current conferences He said that a photograph should be made of 

the participants in the conference and be given out with a release date 

which might be set as the day that he and the Prime Ministerdeparted, 

The PFISE ?‘PIFTIF suggested that at the same time we release a 

statement to the effect that the Ilnited Nations are resolved to pursue 

the war to the bitter end, neither party relaxing in its efforts Until 

the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan has been achieved, He 

said that before issuing such a statement, he would like to consult with 

his colleagues in London 

FIELD MARSHAL FILL then asked the President if there were any 

information concerning General re Gaulle. 

The PRESIDENT replied that he had arranged to have General Giraud 

come here for a conference, but that so far the Prime Vinister had been 

unable to effect such arrangements with General De Gaulle. 

The PRIME h!IhISTIi5\ said that General De Gaulle had refused, saying that if the President wished to see him, he would no doubt invite 

him to come to Washington De Gaulle had said that he would not meet 

Giraud in an atmosphere dominated by the High Command of the United 

Nations The Prime Minister said that he had sent an invitation to De 

Gaulle to come, and the invitation had been sent in the name of the 

President and himself He indicated to General De Gaulle that if he refused the invitation, it would be necessary for him and the President to 

consider whether or not he was a leader who merited their support 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

The PRESIDENT stated that General Giraud had informed him that 

there were sufficient French officess and noncommissioned officers in 

North Africa to enable the French to raise an army of 250,000 meno He 

thought General Giraud should be instructed to raise such an army, and 

that we should make every effort to provide him with equipment. He said 

that General Giraud was desirous of being relieved of sme of his civilian responsibilities. 

The P5Ib:E MINISTEP said that he thought the political represmtatiVes of the United States andthe United Kingdom should be at all times 

represented in whatever controlling machinery is set up, and that even 

General Eisenhower should present his demands to the French Government 

through civilian representatives, except in those cases where he wished 

to exercise his prerogatives as a military commander of an occupied 

country. 

SIR ALh\ BFOOKE said that the French have a considerable number 

of French 75 mm. guns on hand together with ammunition. They were to receive the tanks from the British 6th Armored Division when this unit 

received its Sherman tanks from the United States. He said that there 

were also some antiaircraft, weapons available which can be given to 

the French. GENEKAL MARSHALL stated that he thought it necessary to give 

the French the best equipment obtainable, and that he proposed to do so 

from United States resources subject to shipping limitations. His idea 

was that if we are to equip the French, we must make good units of them 

The PRESIDENT thought it would be desirable to utilize some 

French units in Operation HUSKY even if only as a reserve, 

The PRIhlE MINISTER then expressed the hope that the United 

States would bring to Forth Africa the remaining three divisions which 

are scheduled to come here. 

GEEETIAL VAFSHALL replied that there had been no change in schedule yet, but that after the complete details for Operation HUSKY had been 

worked out, a determination could be made as to what divisions should be 

brought or what other changes might be made. 

153 
ANFA 3rd ‘!eeting 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp, 

on Saturday, January 23, 1943, at 1700. 

PRESENT 

TIW IVesj~dent 

itr:nerxl C. C. Marshall 

,Admiral E. J. King 

1.tI General 11. fi. Arnold 

1 L, Ccnrral R. R. Somervell 

afr, Larry Eopkins 

Commander R. F. Libby 

The ilt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill 

(Prime Winister and Minister of 

Defense) 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Pound 

Field Varshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Air Chief Marshal Sir C. Portal 

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Mountbat ten 

Lt, General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

brig^ General J. n. Deane 

Brigadier 8. I. C. Jacob 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The PRESIDENT suggested discussing the report submitted to him 

and the Prime Minister in C.C.S. 170/1, paragraph by paragraph. 

Both the President and the Prime Minister, before starting the 

discussion, said that they wished to congratulate the Chiefs of Staff 

on the character of the work which had been done during the conferences. 

The Prime Minister said it was the first instance he knew of when military leaders had remained together so long, free from political considerations, and had devoted their full thought to the strategic aspects 

of the war. 

The PRESIDENT agreed to this and recalled an incident in the 

last war when Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Haig and General Pershing had 

had a similar conference which lasted but 5 hours. 

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS. 

In discussing the security of sea communications, the PRIME 

MINISTER indicated that he wished German submarines to be referred to as 

TJ-Boats" rather than dignifying them by calling them "submarines." 

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA. 

A discussion regarding assistance to Russia in relation to 

other commitments then followed 

The PRESIDENT said that in March we will be faced with the 

recessity of arranging to extend the Russian Protocol. He thought the 

last sentence in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 170/1 which provides that "supply 

to Russia will not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations' efforts" should stand and asked hlr. Hopkins for his view on the 

abject. 

MR HOPKINS said that the present Protocol has such a clause 

but that, of course, it cannot be exercised without raising violent 

objections from Premier Stalin. 

The PRIME MINISTER said that aid to Russia must he pushed, and 

no investment could pay a better military dividend. The United Nations 

cannot let Rwsia down. Ile said that the Chiefs of Staff had been considering whether or not 16 destroyers could be made available from the 

United States in order to reduce the length of the convoy turnaround 

from 40 to 27 days. 

1.55 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING said that the destroyers simply were not available., 

The escort vessel situation is so tight as to make it necessary to 

eliminate the 5ussian convoys starting about June 14th in order to take 

care of the needs of Operation HUSXY He pointed out that there is already a shortage of G5 escorts to protect the convoys in the At,lantic 

service and that the HUSKY operation wjll make this shortage more acute. 

MR HOPKINS suggested the possibility of stopping the convoys 

entirely if we could give Russia something that she had not previously 

expected and suggested that this be airplanes, 

The PRESIDENT asked what new escort construction would be available by June of 1943, 

ADMIRAL KING replied that there would be 100 escort 'vessels 

completed but that,, if the present loss rates continued, this number 

would represent only a small ne.t gain 

SIR DUDIEY POUND said there is no substitute for destroyers in 

protecting convoys. At the present time we are u-ilizing 16 destroyers 

and 8 ships of other types with the convoys running on a 40-day cycle 

If this were to be reduced to 27 days, it would be necessary to double 

this force in order to have two convoys in operation 

MH 'HOPKINS asked whether the destroyers and escort vessels that 

are now with these convoys could not he released for use elsewhere if 

the convoys were eliminated entirely 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said the escort 'vessels would be released, except fop the Home Fleet destroyers which must be kept available to -#watch 

for a break-.out into the Atlantic of the German fleet: 

MH HOPKINS repeated that some consideration should be given by 

the Chiefs of Staff regarding the entire elimination of the Russian con­

'voys via the northern route He said that it might be possible to 

increase the delfvery of munitions to Russia Over the Persian route and 

via Alaska although the Russians obJect to handling some types of munitions Over these routes.. At the same time, we could increase the Protocol in certain types of munitions such as aircraft-, If this were done, 

there would be a saving in the use of the 500,000 tons of shipping from 

156 
U, S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the Russian convoys. The considerable losses of shipping connected with 

the northern convoys would be eliminated, as well as the cargoes which 

are lost when ships are sunk. He felt that the Chiefs of Staff have been 

inclined to consider aid to Russia as a political expedient and that 

actually the question should be'viewed from the standpoint of military 

necessity . 

The PRIME MINISTER said it would be a great thing if we could 

continue the Russian convoys throughout the HUSKY Operation. 'He thought 

it better to continue them on a 40-day cycle rather than attempt the 27­

day cycle prior to HUSKY and then stop the corivoys while'HUSKY was being 

undertaken. He said we have never made any promises that we would take 

supplies to Russia" We have merely committed ourselves to making munitions available to them at our ports, 

GENERAL SOMERWELL said that by July lstwewill be able tosend 30 

shfps a month to the Persian Gulf ports, and this would offer good prospects for increasing the supply to Russia. 

The PRESIDENT said that supplying Russia is a paying investment,. 

Stopping the convoys in July and August would occur just at the time 

when the Russians would be engaged in their most severe fighting- He 

pointed out that it is difficult to say now just what the situation 

regarding shipping losses will be in July or August, or what the conditions will be along the route of the northern convoys, He said, for 

example, at the time of the last conference in June 1942, the United 

States was suffering great shipping losses along her eastern coast This 

area has now been almost cleared of submarines, and the greatest losses 

are now occurring off the coast of South America, 

ADMIRAL KING said that we are definitely committed to mounting 

Operation HUSKY and that everything must be done to insure its success, 

including the elimination of the Russian convoys if that be necessary,, 

GENERAL MARSHALL, in referring to hlr. Hopkins' opinion of the 

Chiefs of Staff's atbitude towards aid to Russia, said that in the current conferences, it had been decided that the first charge against the 

United Nations was the defeat of the submarine menace and aid to Russia 

had to come next. He said that if we had to take the losses which had 

157 
ll S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

been suffered in the Murmansk convoys, they would hurt Hussia as much as 

the U. S. and U. K. Such losses make it impossible for us to attack on 

other fronts and thus eliminate the possibility of forcing the Germans 

to withdraw ground and air troops from the Iussian front. Fie said these 

losses last year came just at the time that we were laboring to build up 

BOLERO. It must be made certain that we do not hazard the success of 

Operation HUSKE, 

The PRIME MINISTER agreed that if passage of convoys on the 

northern route were prohibitive in cost, they must be stopped. Me thought 

it would be right to have in our minds the possibility of continuing 

convoys through the HUSKY period, but to make no promises to Stalin. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said this must be the case because if we were 

committed to continuing these convoys, the !ioyal Navy could not play its 

part in Operation HUSKY. 

The PRIME MINISTER said that the discussion should rest on the 

point that the discontinuance of these- convoys will depend upon the 

losses that are suffered. He said we must tell Mr. Stalin the facts, 

that he must rely on a 40-day schedule. Also that we cannot promise the 

continuance of the convoys while Operation HUSKY is being undertaken, He 

said it should also be made clear to hIro Stalin that the U. S. and U. K. 

are under no obligation to continue the convoys. 

The PRESIDENT said that the draft message to blr. Stalin would 

require some revision. It must be remembered that the Russian General 

Staff are making plans on the assumption that the munitions called for 

in the Protocol will be available. In justice to them, they should know 

just what is intended. lie asked how a 2.4yL per month loss rate would 

relate to the 700,000 tons loss of shipping per year. 

ADMIRAL KING said he thought the loss rate of 2.4% would reduce 

the losses in shipping to less than 700,000 tons. He recalled the Prime 

:v!inister's having said before the Eouse of Commons that if our losses 

could be reduced below 500,000 tons per year, the shipping situation 

would be satisfactory. 

The PRESIDENT said that the shipping situation is bound to 

improve during the coming year as a result of nearly doubling the 

158 
U~ S, SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

construction program and by reason of the more effective 

measures which are to be taken. 

antisubmarine 

ADMIMI KING agreed with this and said that the great losses on 

the eastern coast of the United States were possible in large measure 

because of a lack of effective means to combat the submarines. He said 

that great improvement has been made in this respect. 

The PRIME MINISTER suggested that it should be decided that if 

the shipping situation is better than we expect, we shall continue the 

40-day convoy throughout Operation HUSKY, but that we should not commit 

ourselves either way. He said that, while it might be possible to continue the convoys, they must be stopped if the losses are too great. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that before deciding on discontinuing the 

convoys, the situation should be reviewed as of the first of May. 

3 OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

The discussion then turned to Operation HUSKY 

The PRIME MINISrER said he wishedtoset the target date as the 

period of the favorable June moon rather than that of July. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the matter of training must be con 

sidered as well as other features in connection with the preparations 

for Operation HUSKY. He said that all training and preparations must be 

scheduled, and that if an impossible or improbable target date was set 

and then later changed to one that was practicable, all of the schedules 

would be out of adjustment This might result in compromising ourselves 

with regard to every aspect of the operation. The subject of the target 

date had been quite exhaustively studied, and it isgoing to be difficult 

to mount Operation HUSKY with properly trained forces even in July. 

The PRESIDENT asked if the fixing of the target date in July was 

made on the assumption that the Axis forces would be driven from Tunisia 

by the end of April. He asked what the effect would be if they were to 

be eliminated from Africa by the end of hlarch. 

GENERAL MARSHAIL replied that success in Tunisia at the end of 

March would improve the situation somewhat but was not the limiting fac 

tor. The limiting factor wasonthe naval side with respect to organizing 

159 
U S. SECRFT 

BRITISH MOST SECRFT 

crews and assembling landing craft. After this has been accomplished, 

the naval crews and landing craft must be made available for the training of the troops. He said that the situation in Tunisia might result in 

delaying Operation HliMKY but that an earlier success there would not 

help in movirg the target date forward. 

ACMIFAL ICIFC said it was a question as to whether the assault on 

Sicily should be made by partially or fully trained forces. 

The PRLSIiXb'T suggested that the operation might be easier than 

Operation TOFCH in view of the better weather foundin the Nediterranean. 

IQPD MOWlllATTEh' said that the difficulty of the HUSKY Operation 

was not in the weather but the excelience that might be expected in the 

e nemy s defenses . 

GE:.E!ERBZ, MARSHALL pointed out some of the errors that had been 

made in the TOnCH operation through lack of adequate training, Some of 

the landing boats went to the wrong place. One Ranger unit had the 

mission of taking a shore battery and clearing a certain area. It actually landed 18 miles away from its objective. 

The PFESIDEhT said he thought this mi@t have been the result of 

poor navigation rather than a lack of adequate training. 

GENEFAL MAPSHALL replied that while we do have divisions with 

amphibious training, we do not have the landing craft or crews-. The 

craft must be built and the crew must be trained 

The PFIME MIKISTER agreed that reneral h!arshall's point that the 

target date for HUSKY did not depend on the Tunisian operations but 

rather on the necessity of training was a good one. 

He said, however, that the British are to send their overseas 

assault force which has a capacity of 7 brigade groups to participate in 

Operation HUSKY- He had been told that this could not leav? England 

until March 14th and then must undergo some trainingin the eastern Mediterranean.. He said he felt sure that the force could be sent earlier. In 

this connection, LORE LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that he had been informed 

that it could be sent by the end of February. 

160 
U. S. SECQET 

SeITISi' MOST SECrlET 

The PRIME MINISTER said that this would he done. lie then discussed the question of navigation. When operations of the importance of 

HUSKY are to he undertaken, no effort should be spared to obtain capable 

navigators. He suggested the possibility of combing the navy, particularly the "R" class battleships, with the purpose of setting up a special group of navigators. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that skilled navigators could not he taken 

from the navy without serious effects and, in any event, they would have 

to he supplemented by inexperienced men and the training period could 

not therefore be shortened. 

The PRIME MINISTER said that he feared the gap of perhaps four 

months during the summer when no U. S. or British troops would be in 

contact with the Germans. 

The PRESIDENT agreed and said that this gap might have a serious 

effect all over the world. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had examined the timing of the operation most carefully. September was the 

first date that had been put forward and this they had rejected. Further 

study had brought the date back to the end of August. The Combined Chiefs 

of Staff had then put on the same kind of pressure that the President 

and the Prime Minister were now applying, with the result that July had 

been tentatively fixed, though August remained a more likely date. He 

was in agreement with General Marshall that to try and fix too early a 

date would prejudice the preparations. It was impossible to shorten the 

loading period, and thus the only process off which time might be lopped 

was training. If this were curtailed, the result might he disastrous. 

The PRIME MINISTER thought that by intense efforts the loading 

might be accelerated. Similarly if landing craft now employed in maintaining the 8th Army could be recovered forthwith, training might start 

earlier. All these points must he rigorously examined before the July 

date could be accepted. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that if the date were to be made 

earlier, it would have to he by a complete four weeks unless the added 

risks of rroonlight were acceptable. 

161 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The PRESIDENT said that the present proposals were based on a 

large number of factors which might well prove correct, but which were 

estimates. Another estimate which must be taken into account was the 

state of morale in Italy, which recent reports showed to be deteriorating. If this process continued, the Germans might be faced with an Italy 

in revolt, anditwould then be essential for us to have our preparations 

far enough advanced to be able to act, not necessarily in Sicily but 

perhaps in Sardinia, or even in Italy. For this reason he would like to 

set the date of the operation in June, it being understood that it might 

have to be carried out in July if the enemy's strength remained as at 

present. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that to bring back the date at the 

expense of adequate preparation would not make it any easier to stage an 

improvised operation during the intervening months. The troops would 

have been moved into place quite early in the preparatory period, so 

that they would be standing ready if required. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed and pointed out that we should probably 

get some advance indication of an Italion collapse which would enable us 

to speed up the lau&hing of a smaller force. It would be quite wrong to 

risk a costly failure by unduly curtailing the period of preparation. 

The PRIME MINISTER said that General Marshall was pleading for 

the integrity of the operation, and the arguments which he had employed 

were most convincing. Nevertheless, he was not himself yet corlvinced 

that the integrity of the operation could not be maintained with a June 

date. Some quicker methods might be found of moving troops into place. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this also had been examined. He pointed 

out that the period after the fall of Tunis would not be one of inactivity, as a growing air bombardment of Italy would be launched. We ought 

to place ourselves in a position to do the hard operation against Sicily 

while being ready to improvise if the enemy weakened. The initial landing in Sicily wasona larger scale than had been envisaged for Operation 

ROUNDUP. 

The PRESIDENT inquired whether any easement could be secured if 

the Spanish situation cleared still further during the Spring. 

162 
0 S SECRET 

BRITISB ,MOST SECRET 

GEFERAL MARSHAIL said that in any case the troops standing ready 

to move into Spanish Morocco wouldbe simultaneously training for Sicily 

ADMIRAL KIKG said that one of the innimierable item; which had to 

be considered j~nthis operation was t,he provision of armored landing 

craft, which he and Lord 1,ouis broiJntbatteri agreed were esserit,ial None 

of t.liese was at present available for the TI. S.. forces. lie agreed t,hat 

the ideal method o'f launching the operation would be to follow in on the 

heels of the Germens fleeing f'rm Tuiiis. !:e was coiivinced, however, that 

the closest we could come to this ideal wes July. I:e would have liked 

June, but felt it impossible t,o nromise such a date. 

The PRESIELFT said that the important point was to retain a 

flexible mind in the matter so that, advantage could be taken of every 

opportunity I 

GLFEPAI, 4lAI?CtiBLL said t,hat he iiad f'el t ritiinrrassed over the date 

of this operatior, remembering as iie did the incentive wiiicli had existed 

for hast,enirrg TCFCI' ju view of t,ie I:. .C~. elecl.inris. In siiit,c (if that, it 

had not proved possible to advaricc, the dat,e. 

The PT;T!% iiIhT F said tiiere had beer! nnicti admiration j~nFngland 

of the fact that thci elect,ion iiad !lot bcen allowed t,o infl~iiericein (fie 

s 1ip;htest t,he course of mil itarj events. 

After sor!c further di:<cnssion, il was agreed that: 

(a) O?erarioris for t,he Ca~.tnreof Sicily: 

The ,July dat,e stiniild starid suijjwt to an inst,riictjon t.hat in the. 

next t,hree weeks, witt?oiit, prejudiw Lo tiie .July date, tlierc should be all 

int,ense effort, made to try and aci;ieve tiie favoralile ,?line mom as the 

da.te of' the operat,ion if at. t.tir pnd of t.Iiis t,hree weeks. ti,(. ,inrle tiat#: 

co:ild he fixed, General kiscnhower's instrllctinns could be modified io 

conform 

(b) Cover Plans: 

'i'lic r?'Ii:L ~:IYILTT' siiggest,ed t,iiat !~orP-a5 S~i<J?I~d again playa pwt 

in the cov~rplans. 

::In bLAt: EI:Oi!HL poiritrri out, that it mjglrt be awkirzard for the 

tiussian convoys if we gave tile (;ermarr; cause for reinforciug Korlvay 

thought that mch the best cover wolrld be give1, by t,he active preparations 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISR NOST SECRET 

going on all over the North African shore. These would not only disguise the objective, but would cause dispersion of enemy forces. 

The PR.ESIRENT thought that the creation of General C,iraud's 

French army might also play a part in making the enemy think that the 

southern coast of France was our objective. 

(c) Command of the Mediterranean Theater: 

The PEIME VIFISTER said that he thought the United States had 

been very generous and broad-minded in the command arrangements" He 

thought that the most natural method of procedure would be at the appropriate moment to announce that the 8th Army, on entering Tunisia, had 

passed under the commandof General Eisenhower, and that Ceneral Alexander 

had been appointed as his deputy. 

(d) The Bomber Offensive from Eorth Africa: 

The PRIM3 VIFIIETER thought that it would be advisable to maintain the threat of bombardment against Rome, but that it should not 

actually be carried out without further consultation. 

The PRESIDENT agreed. 

4 OPERATIONS IN A" FROM 'rm UKITZI? KJFFTOM. 

(b) BOLERO: 

The PRIME MINISTLE thought that it was very disappointing that 

there would only be 4 11. S. divisions equipped in the U. K. by August 

15th. He inquired whether by using the Queens, the number for September 

could not be achieved in August. 

GENERAL SOMER\'EI,I, said that the 1,imiting fector in the first 

half of the year was cargo ships, and in the second half of the year it 

was personnel ships, To move more men over in the first half would only 

result in their arriving in England with no equipment, and thus their 

training would be interrupted. The Queens were all fully employed in 

various parts of the world. 

GENETiAL MAPSHALL pointed out that the figures in the table were 

a minimum, and the 4 divisions shown for August 15th would probably 

be 19 rather than 15. Allowance had to be made in the early build-up for 

the Air Corps personnel 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the initial equipment of 8 

tons per man, and the maintenance cf 1.3 tons per man per month, could 

not be reduced; similarly, could not savings be made on reserves and on 

vehicles. For the type of operations which would be undertakeninFrance 

in 1913, a big advance was not likely. Fighting men for the beaches were 

the prime essential. 

GEhTRAL SOMERVELL said that the calculationofthe rate of build 

up had been made on the basis of one ton per man per month. The other 

factors mentionedbythe Prime Minister had also been taken into account, 

and everything would be done to reduce any unnecessary volume to be 

transported. He pointed out that there was a 45-day interval between the 

arrival of a division and its availability for operations; thus, the 

divisions which were shown as being available on August 15th would have 

sailed by July 1st. If the British could lend additional cargo shipping 

in the early part of the year, the flow of troops could be increased 

The PRIME MINISTER said that it was in the early part of the year 

that the British shipping shortage would be most acute" He suggested 

that it should be recorded that the figures shown in the report were a 

minimum and that every effort would be made to increase them 

(c) Amphibious Cperations in 1%3 from the U. K 

The PRIME MINISTER suggested that the word "vigorously" should 

be inserted before the word "exploiting" in subparagraph (2) of this 

section of the report. This was agreed to. 

The PRESIDENT inquired whether an operation against the Brest 

Peninsula could not be staged instead of against Cherbourg- The advan 

tages of the former were very much greater. He also inquired about the 

date proposed for the operations. 

LORD MUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that the date for the Channel Island 

operations had been chosen so as to fit in with Operation HUSKY A dif 

ficulty had arisen in that the armored craft required by the Americans 

for HUSW would have to come from the British Channel Assault Force A 

telegram had been sent to the Admiralty asking that the output of these 

craft should be doubled soas to produce 160 more in the next four months 

This might be done provided 400 additional Scripps Ford conversion 

165 
U: S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

engines were allocated to the U., K., from the U %A, Ile understood this 

point was under investigation. 

The PRESIDENT inquired whether some Ford tank engines could not 

be produced and taken by air transport from the U,.S.A. to the U.K, He 

understood that the engine was much the same. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that there was adifference in the engines, 

though the same facilities were required to produce both. Ile could not 

at present state the production possibilities. 

The FRIME MINISTER suggested that some reduction of tank engine 

output could be accepted if necessary. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed. 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that the landing craft resources 

would only permit of an initial assault by 2 brigade groups with an immediate follow up of one brigade group and some armor. This could only 

be increased with U.. S. help. 

ADMIRAL KING said that all available U. S. resources would be 

devoted to Operation HUSKY I 

On the question of command the PmSIDENT inquired whether sufficient drive would be applied if only a Chief of St,aff were appointed. 

He hoped there would not be a long delay before a Supreme Commander was 

selected 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood it was a question of the 

availability of the right man 

SIR ALAN BROOKE thought that the Chief of Staff, if a man with 

the right qualities were chosen, could do what was necessary in the 

early stages 

Tne PRIME MINISTER suggested that in any case an American Deputy 

to the Supreme Commander should be appointed. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE and GENERAL MARSHALT, agreed 

The PRESIDENT suggested that the last sentence of this section 

should be pmitted. This was agreed to. 

166 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

5. PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER. 

The PRESIDENT said that he was disturbed to find that this section contained no reference to operations in or from China. Operations 

in Burma, though desirable, would not have the direct effect upon the 

Chinese which was necessary to sustain and increase their war effort 

Similarly, an island-to-island advance across the Pacific would take too 

long to reduce the Japanese power. Some other methodofstriking at Japan 

must be found. The opportunity was presented by Japari's shipping situation. She began the war with 6,000,000 tons. In the first year of the 

war 1,000,000 tons net had been sunk, leaving her with 5,000,000, When 

thZs was reduced to 4,000,000, Japan would be hard pressed to maintain 

her garrison in the chain of islands stretching all the way from Burma 

to New Guinea and would have to start pulling in her lines. The most 

effective weapon against shipping was the submarine, and the U. S, submarines were achieving notable results. There was another method of 

striking at the Japanese shipping, and that was by attacking the routes 

running close to the Asiatic shore from Korea down to Siam. This could 

be done by aircraft operating from China. He thought that 200 aircraft 

should be operating in China by April. They could spend most of their 

time in attacks on shipping, but occasionally they could make a special 

raid on Japan. There seemed to be two methods of achieving this object: 

either the planes could be based and maintained in China or else they 

could be based in India, moving to China each time for a mission, returning to their bases in India on completion An indication of the 

shortage of Japanese shipping was the fact that they were buying up 

junks to replace coastal steamers, so that they could employ these on 

their maintenance routes. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he was fully aware of the need for reinforcing the U. S. Air Force in China. One group of aircraft was just 

preparing to leave the U.S.A.; and he would examine, when he got to 

India, the best methodofoperating the aircraft. He hoped that effective 

operations would start before April. It should be remembered, however, 

that there were large demands for transport aircraft in other theaters, 

and these could not be neglected. Nevertheless, he hoped to have 135-150 

transport planes operating on the India-China routeby the endoftheFall. 

167 
0. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST. SECRET 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the provision of transport planes for 

India competed with urgent requirements for HUSKY, and for cross-channel 

operations. Nevertheless, he felt it was vital to step up the effort in 

China, and this would be done. 

The PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with the President's 

proposals. He suggested that the document should now be reconsidered by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and amendments arising out of the present 

discussion should be incorporated in a final edition. The docunent rould 

then fittingly embody the results of a remerkable period of sustained 

work. 

The PRESIDENT agreed with this proposa�, and expressed his congratulations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the results which they 

had achieved. 

168 
CASABLANCA CONFERENCE 

JANUARY 19113 

MINUTES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETINGS 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 55th Meeting ........... 169 

C.C.S. 56th Meeting ........... 183 

C.C.S. 57th Meetin, ........... 195 

C.C.S. 58th Meeting ........... 207 

C.C.S. 59th Meeting ........... 225 

C.C.S. 60th Meeting ........... 232 

C.C.S. 61st Meeting ........... 248 

C.C.S. 62nd Meeting ........... 254 

C.C.S. 63rd Meeting ........... 263 

C.C.S. 64th Meeting ........... 272 

C.C.S. 65th Meeting ........... 276 

C.C.S. 66th Meeting ........... 292 

C.C.S. 67th Meeting ........... 300 

C.C.S. 68th Meeting ........... 310 

C.C.S. 69th Meeting ........... 314 
0. S. SECRET 

BRITISB NOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 55th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Thursday, January 14, 1943, at 1030. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

P. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt, General B. B. Somervell, USA Field hlarshal Sir John Dill 

Rear Admiral C. hl. Cooke, Jr , USN Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA Mountbat ten 

Lt, General Sir Hastings L Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

169 
U S SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

GENEHAL MARSHALL, outlined the broad problem facing the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff as the allocation of resources between the two major 

theaters of war--the Atlantic (which included for this purpose the Mediterranean) and the Pacific. He suggested as a concept on which to work 

that this broad allocation should consist of 70 percent in the Atlantic 

theater and 30 percent in the Pacific theater. 

ADMIRAL KING said that according to his estimates we were at 

present engaging only 15 percent of our total resources against the Japanese in the Pacific theater, which for this purpose included the Indian 

Ocean and Burma. In his view this was not sufficient to prevent Japan 

consolidating herself and thereby presenting ultimately too difficult a 

problem. The Japanese were fighting a delaying action in the Solomon Islands and digging in along the whole line of the Netherlands East Indies 

and the Philippines. They were shipping back raw material into Japan as 

fast as they could, He felt that before the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

turned to the discussion of particular operations they should first fix 

the general proportion of effort to be applied in the two main theaters. 

SIR ALAN BnOOKE suggested that in fixing this balance of effort 

between the two theaters, it would be wise first to try and weigh up the 

enemy situation as both the U. S. and British ChiefsofStaff saw it. The 

U. S. Chiefs of Staff would naturally know moreofthe situation in Japan 

than the British. He expressed the admiration of the British Chiefs of 

Staff on the magnificent work of the U. S. Forces during the last twelve 

months after the early disasters of the war against Japan, At one time 

it seemed as if nothing would stem the tide of the Japanese, but the position was now very different. The Japanese were definitely on a defensive 

basis and *om intelligence received it appeared as if they were taking 

quite a different outlook on the war now from what they had been some 

months ago. They were worried about the situation of their European 

allies. 

The security of the United States and the United Kingdom had always been basic factors in our strategy. The threat to the United Kingdom had been at one time serious, but as a result of our latest review 

of this danger it was felt that the forces in the United Kingdom could 

be reorientated from a defensive to an offensive basis. The greatest 

danger at the present time was to our communications. The shortage of 

170 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

shipping was a stranglehold on all offensive operations and unless we 

could effectively combat the U-boat menace, we might not be able to win 

the war. 

Germany’s situation was undoubtedly developing favorably from 

our point of view. She was staggering under the failure of her second 

offensive against iiussia, and fkeling must be growing in that country that 

it was impossible for her todefeat i:ussia. Her successes in 1942 against 

Russia had been very much smaller in scale than in 1941. She had failed 

in her main object of the 1942 campaign, the capture of the Caucasus oil. 

By failing to capture even the port of Tuapse, she had failed in secur~. 

ing the facilities to export such oil as she had captured at Grozny, 

Her northern flank was in danger as also were the troops in the Caucasus 

salient. 

The ltussian offensive had been well carried out and had now 

reached within fifty miles of Llostov. Germany had only two courses open 

to her, either to push back the ilussians into Stalingrad, which would be 

almost impossible during the winter, or to shorten her line. The latter, 

therefore, was themore probable course; and that would involve revertirg 

to the 1941 line, The psychological effect of this withdrawal would be 

very serious in Germany. 

Germany was thus on the defensive both in liussia aud in North 

Africa. In the operations which had led to the defeat of the Germans in 

North Africa after the British defeat at Tohruk very great assistance 

had been given by the timely arrival of American Sherman tanks and S.P 

guns.. 

Germany was already having trouble among her allies. The Xuman 

ians had suffered severely in the Crimea but had been forced to carry on, 

although greatly weakened in strength. The Italian troops on the lcussian 

front had also suffered heavy losses and the Hungarian forces, which had 

never had much stomach for the fight, were also in bad shape- Italy was 

becoming more and more shaky; andifshe collapsed, Germany wouldnotonly 

have to bolster up Italy by sending troops into the country but would 

also have to replace the numerous German divisions in Yugoslavia and in 

Greece. Alternatively she would have to withdraw altogether from the BaL 

kans and Italy, and leave it open to the Allies. 

171 
U S SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

All indications showed that Germany's manpower was failing and 

that some cannibalization of her divisions would have to be carried out. 

The latest estimate was that she would lose ten divisions in this way 

during the first quarter of 1943. Lack of oil was another of Germany's 

major difficulties which would hit her particularly hard during the next 

six months. 

Taking all these factors into account, it seemed at least possi-­

ble that the precarious internal situation of Germany might make it possible to achieve a final victory in the European theater before the end 

of 1943. The immediate problem was how best to apply our available resources in order to take advantage of Germany's present situation. 

The means we had at our disposal were broadly three in number. 

First there was Russia, which constituted the largest land power; her 

efficiency was rising and the work of moving !:ussian manufacturing plats 

to the eastward away from the German invasion had been very well carried 

out,. Russia's oil situation was now more satisfactory than had seemed 

likely earlier in the year, but she was short of grain. In order to get 

the best value out of itussia, we must support her in every way we could. 

Our second main weapon was air bombardment, by U. S. and British forcesThis we must kxploit to the maximum. Our third means of striking at Germany was by amphibious operations wriich included invasion of the Continent The possession of sea power enabled us to threaten the enemy at 

several points and thereby compel him to disperse his forces,. Once commited to a point of entry, however, the enemy would be able to c0ncen.h 

trate his forces against us, and it was therefore necessary to choose 

this point of entry with the greatest care at the place where the enemy 

was least able to concentrate large forces. 

As a point of reentry to the Continent, France had great advantages. In the first place the sea--crossing was short, and we had better 

facilities for giving air support to our invasion. Onthe other hand the 

German defensesinthis area were most strong and Germany's power of cow 

centrating against us was greatest, A recent study had shown that the 

East--West communications across the Continent enabled Germany to move 

seven divisions simultaneously fromthekssian front tothe West in about 

twelve to fourteen days. The North-South communications on the Continent 

172 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

were not nearly so good. Not more than one division at a time could be 

moved from the North to the Mediterranean front. The Italian railways 

were close to the coast and vulnerable to interruption from the sea, and 

in the Balkans there was only a single line of railway passing through 

Nish. From this point of view, therefore, the Southern front seemed to offer 

better prospects for amphibious operations. 

TORCH operations in North Africa had been an outstanding example 

of successful cooperation between U. S. end British forces, andtheBritish Chiefs of Staff wished to express their admiration of the very able 

manner in which General Eisenhower had overcome the extremely difficult 

problems with which he had been faced. horth Africa would provide a valuable base from which either to threaten Southern Europe or to undertake 

offensive operations. By this usewecould compel the Germans to disperse 

their forces in order to reinforce threatened points. In this way we 

could probably give greater assistance to Russia than if we committed 

ourselves definitely to Northern France. Once we had captured Bizerte, 

we could pass merchant ship convoys through the Xediterranean. Their very 

passage would compel the Germans to fight in the air, since if they let 

them pass through unmolestedtheeffectoftheir U-boat operations against 

our shipping would be largely nullified. These air battles against the 

German Air Force would be of the greatest importance. Already more than 

half the German Air Force was deployed on fronts other than the Hussian., 

In all Mediterranean operations Spain, of course, was a most im 

portant factor. There must be always some anxiety that Spain would close 

the door behind us, but all recent opinion tended to show that Spain was 

turning away from Germany and that it was at least highly improbable 

that she would ever grant free access to German forces. The more successes 

we had in the Mediterranean the more likely it was that this favorable 

tendencyinspain would continue. Spain knew that from the economic point 

of view she must depend primarily on the Allies. Against this there was, 

of course, the fear of Communism in Spain if the Allies were victorious 

and Aussia overran Germany. Generally speaking, however, the feeling of 

the British Chiefs of Staff was that we had no cause for anxiety about 

Spain at the present time. 

Another important factor in the Mediterranean was Turkey' That 

country no doubt would either try and keep out of the war altogether or 

173 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

at least join in on the side of the Allies onfy at the eleventh hour. 

There were, however, reasons to hope that if well handled, Turkey might 

be brought in earlier. As an inducement we should have to give her equipment, technical personnel and instructors. It did not seem wise to press 

Turkey to undertake an advance into the Balkans but rather to hold her 

position and afford us bases from which to attack Germany, in particular 

the Xumanian oil. lVe might also obt,ain a free passage to the Black Sea 

as another means of striking at Germany. 

Summing up prospects in the European Theater, SIR ALAN BROOKE 

said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that we should first expand 

the bomber offensive against the Axis to the maximum and that operations 

in the lediterranean offered the best chance of compelling Germany to 

disperse her resources,. Kith this end inview we should take as our immec.~. 

iate objective the knocking out of Italy. At the same time, we should try 

and bring in Turkey on our side.. By this means we should give Germany no 

respite at all in 1943 and we should give the best aid to Hussia, whom 

we must continue to supply with all the equipment which we could send., 

The difficulty, of course, was that many of these operations were mutu.. 

ally exclusive For example, to send large supplies to itussia used up 

great quantities of available escort vessels.. This naturally cut down 

our capacity to undertake amphibious operations. A balance would have to 

be struck between these various commitments, and we should have to face 

the necessity for accepting considerable losses in shipping, providing 

these paid a good dividend. 

We must be in a position to take advantage of a crack in Germany 

in the late summer. There were already indications of considerable Ger.­

man withdrawals from France to the eastward. If Germany were compelled 

to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from France, the possibilities 

of an invasion across the Channel would be much greater,. The estimate of 

the British Chiefs ofstaff was that by August 1943 there would be avail.. 

able for cross channel operations some 13 British and 9 U.. S. divisions 

whether or not we undertook limited operations in the Mediterranean. 

Mediterranean operations, however, would produce other shortages, notably 

in Assault Shipping; and it might be difficult, if not impossible, to 

transfer landing craft from the hlediterraneantothe United Kingdom or to 

the Burma front in time, 

174 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

In all amphibious operations the provision of landing craft was 

the critical factor. Not only had the crews to be, provided but the naval 

crews to man them hadto be trained and the land forces had to be trained 

to work from them. This training was a slow process. 

The British landing craft resources were being formed into two 

main forces, one earmarked for operations on the Continent and one for 

operations further afield, such as Burma. As regards operations in Burma, 

a limited offensive was n.ow being undertaken with the objectof capturing 

Akyab, on which the 1.4th Indian 1Division was now closing. Operations 

in tkfNorth of Eurma presented very difficult logistical problems owing 

to the absence of roads. 

The complete conquest of Burma was a much bigger problem, and 

naval supremacy in tke Fa.y of EengaJ w,ould be rquired for it. It would 

be necessary to uridertake sinniltanenus offensives against Pangoon and 

Moulmein since Pangoon could not be taken if the 'Vooulmein airfields 

were in the hands of the Japs. Pail communications between Thailand and 

Burma were being improved and it might be necessary to extend the occupation of Burma by going some distance into Thailand as well. For this 

major operation seven divisions were being prepared in India; and two 

African divisions, one from the East andone from the West, couldbe found, 

both composed of seasoned native troops well adapted to jungle fighting, 

If the, Germans were compelled to abandon their Caucasus offensive', troops 

could also be, found from Iraq and Persia. There appeared, therefore, no 

particular difficulty in finding the land divisions; the difficulty lay 

rather in the provision of the necessary naval forces. It must be realized, however, that once started operatiom for the recapture of Burma 

would develop into a full-scale campaign. 

SIR DTJDLEY POUND stated that in the Atlantic the greatest concerns to the Home Fleet were: first, to prevent a break-out of the German naval forces; and, secord, to provide protection for convoys toNorth 

Russia. 

At first, the Wssian convoys ditl not present any great difficulty. Their early success gave everyone a false sense of security. German interference, however, has been increasing constantly, culminating 

with the concentration of their surface vessels on the coast of Norway; 

17.5 
Ll. S SECRET 

B PITISH MOTd SECRET 

namely, the TIRPITZ, LUTZOW, HIPPER, ECHAFA'HORSI', and PRINZ EUGEN, all of 

which have now been completely repaired. A force of 20 U-boats was maintained in northern waters, as well as considerable air force. The security of Russian convoys is- affected chiefly by tte hours of darkness and 

the ice limit. For the next three mnths, the ice limit will only permit 

utilizing a channel about 220 miles in widtli whjch can be kept under 

close air reconnaissance by the, Germans. The passage occupies about 

twelve days, and vessels are under attack all but two of them. 

For the last convoy of 1C. strips there were 12 escort vessels of 

the corvette type and 4 destroyers. Two six-inch cruisers were employed 

to give cover against surface attack; the Commander of the convoy had 

placed the cruisers between the vessels being escorted and the operational 

base of the German surface vessels. However, the HIPPER and LUTZOW 

attacked from the other side and came into contact with the 4 British 

destroyers. llntil joined by the two cruisers, the destroyers prevented 

an attack on the convoy for some forty minutes and drove the enemy ships 

out of gun range of the convoy, although one of our destroyers and a 

minesweeper were sunk. As soon as the cruisers app?,ared, the HIPPER and 

LUTZOW withdrew. The Germans thus sacrificed a splendid opportunity to 

effect some serious damage on an inferior force. 

It was first thought that the German Admiral commanding had made 

an error in judgment, but it was later learned that he had received orders 

from the German authorities ashareto expedite his withdrawal. This would 

seem to indicate that the Germans are following a policy of preventing 

their ships from receiving any damage. It can possibly be explained by 

their desire to keep them intact preliminary to a break-out into the 

Atlantic 

SIR DUDLEY POUKSC stated that before such a break-out into the 

Atlantic could be effected, the Germans must send out oilers which will 

enable them to refuel at sea, since he doubted if the Germans would 

again attempt to retire to Brest in view of their previous experience 

there 

Euring the months of long daylight, the danger of air attack 

precluded the useof cruisers with the Pussian convoys; and their escorts 

consisted only of a powerful destroyer force. Convoys can then only be 

176 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

run every thirty-six to forty-two days. Twelve days are required for the 

journey, three days for refueling, twelve days for the return journey, 

and the remainder for boiler cleaning, etc. The Royal Navy does not httve 

sufficient destroyers to operate two convoys simultaneously. If, therefore, it is necessary to send more than thirty ships to Russia every 

forty days, it will he necessary for the United States to furnish some 

assistance in escort vessels. 

SIR DUDIEY POUND then stated that there was considerable traffic 

between Japan and Germany, Japan sending to Germany rubber and other raw 

materials obtained in the Far East in return for machinery and machine 

parts. It was important to stop this traffic at once, There are two 

places from which this can he best accomplished: first, in the Bay of 

Biscay by air and submarine action, and second, in the Atlantic narrows. 

For the latter a British task force was being built up on the east side 

and a U. S. task force was operating from the United States on the west 

side a 

SIR DUDLEY POUND then discussed the situation in the Indian 

Ocean. It had at first been hopedtocreate a considerable Eastern Fleet, 

but this has been seriously reduced in size by TORCH and other operations; and it now appears that its remaining carrier, the Illustrious, 

may be needed for future operations in the Mediterranean~ If this is soj 

now wmld he an opportune time to withdraw it from the Indian Ocean for 

repairs and the installationofthe most modern fighter direction devices 

Without the protection of carrier aircraft, the Eastern Fleet is unable 

to operate in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean against Japanese naval 

forces accompanied by aircraft carriers. 

In the Mediterranean area, Admiral Cunningham has a force of 

three battleships and two aircraft carriers. One of the duties of this 

Task Force consists in containing three modern Italian battleships which 

are at present unlocated. In the Eastern Mediterranean, British naval 

forces had been heavily engaged in the supply of the 8th Army in the 

Eastern North African ports. What the future redistribution of the Mediterranean naval forces will he must he based on the future strategy to 

be adopted. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND then disciissed the German U-boat situation, 

At the present time the Germans have one hundred and ten submarines in 

177 
U. S. SECRET 

BPITISH MOST SECRET 

the Atlantic in addition to those in the Mediterranean and off the coast 

of Norway. It isanticipated that new production will go to the Atlantic. 

The Germans are apparently concentrating their submarines into 

large groups, each of which is responsible for a certain area. One of 

these has been located off the coast of hewfoundland, one inthe Central 

Atlantic, and one off Southwest Ireland. It is possiblethata convoy may 

at any time blunder into a pack of German submarines if our intelligence 

is at fault. 

Recently there were two convoys from the United States, each 

attackedby a considerable number of German submarines, one convoy losing 

two vessels and the other losing none. This was accomplished by providing air coverage for the convoys with Liberator airplanesnhichresulted in keeping the U-boats down during the day. While they were down, 

the convoys were able to alter thei- course and, by nightfall, leave the 

submar ines behind. 

SIR DUDLEY F'OUND then described an experiment which had been made 

owing to shortage of escorts due to TORCH, in sending cargo vessels 

bound for Freetown out with a trans-Atlantic convoy, the vessels bound 

for Freetown breaking off from the convoy at a suitable moment and proceedingtotheir destination independently. The experiment was unsuccessful and the loss amounted to ten percent. Seventeen out of forty-four 

ships were lost in one convoy. The British have, therefore, found it 

necessary to resume the Freetown convoys. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND stated that escorts to convoys must be sufficiently large to deal with a heavy attack. He said our aim must be to 

get a long-range air protection and additional escort vessels. He added 

that it would be desirable to obtain more long-range aircraft protection 

to escorts from the United States. 

SIR DUDLEY WUND indicated that we must make special efforts to 

provide adequate protection in the early part of 1943 in order that we 

may be able to meet the great demands in the build-up of BOLERO in the 

latter part of the year. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then discussed the air situation. He stated 

that our experience so far has been that the German operations are definitely tied up with tke adequacy of their air power. He felt that this 

178 
IT. S. SECQET 

BRITISH VOST SKCPVT 

will be as true with regard to the German defensive operations as it has 

been in their offensive operat ions 

The present stateofthe German air force is critical. The stamina 

of the airplane crews is decreasing; the crews lack interest and are 

less determined, and their trainingisdeteriorating. One explanation for 

this is that training units and personnel are being used for cmbat purposes because of a shortage of aircraft. Ke felt that there is no depth 

behind the German front line of aircraft. The British Intelligence Service is of the opinion that if the United Nations can keep Germany fighting with aircraft, they will suffer losses from whicfl they cannot recover. 

Ye felt certain that they are incapable of conducting large scale 

operations on two fronts and that if they are kept fighting through the 

winter and spring they will have in the summer a shortage of from seven 

hundred to two tbousand first-line aircraft below what will be necessary 

for all fronts. 

lie stated that German prodiictiorr for next year will be about 

twenty-three thousand aircraft; Italy will produce three or four thousand; and .Japan will produce ahout seven thousand. On the other hand, 

the lowest estimates for the ilnited Xations' aircraft production will be 

one hundred thousand combat airplanes or about four times that of the 

Axis powers. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that our greatest need is to force the 

Germans to extend the use of their aircraft to as many areas as possible 

and thus destroy and bleed them. The best ways to accomplish this are: 

(1) to engage them while they are in support of land operations (flowever this is only possible at present on the Russian front.); (2) to meet 

them while they are attempting to stop our amphibian operations; and (3) 

by directing operations directly at Germany. 

lie stated that one of the most pressing questions was how we 

should accomplish our air attack against Germany. The United Kingdom is 

the most advantageous base for such operations and one of the most important questions before the present, conference is to decide on where 

the United States bombers are to be used. 

He indicated that daylight attacks by United States bombers 

should be continued, as this has a serious effect on the German Air Force, 

179 
(I. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

on their industries~,and on their morale. The question of whether to 

strike Italy from the United Kingdom or from North Africa is still an 

open question; but before deciding to build up a strong bomber force in 

North Africa, it is desirable to be certain that this action is more advantageous than concentrating them in the United Kingdom. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that insofar as the estimates presented 

by the British Chiefs of Staff concerning Germany, Russia, and the occupied countries are concerned, the United States Chiefs of Staff are in 

full accord. 

He also expressed concurrence in the idea that the U-boat menace 

is the paramount issue and that everything must be done to combat it by 

directing our attacks against it from the place of manufacture of submarines to the places where they are used. 

He state,' that the Japs are digging in, in an effort t,o build up 

a defensive front from the Solomons, through New Guinea and Tirnor, par 

ticularly with their air forces. 

He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff are anxious 

to find some method whereby they can strike in the rear and against the 

flank of the Japanese defenses. In thisconnection, they feel thatoperations in Burma will serve to weaken the Japs' defensive front and that, 

therefore, they are most anxious to undertake Operation RAVENOUS 

They feel that a reverse inthis operation would notbe a calamity 

but that a success would bring advantages all out of proportion to the 

risks involved. It would have an effect not only in the South Pacific 

area but would enable us tofurnish strong support to China A successful 

Operation RAVENOUS would result in an eventual economy of tonnage by 

relieving the Japanese pressure in the Southwest pacific^ 

GENERAL MARSHALL then stated that the United States Chiefs of 

Staff are concerned as to whether operations in the Mediterranean area 

would bring advantages commensurate with the risks involved, He said that 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff are inclined to look favorably on an operation 

from the United Kingdom because of the strong air support that can be 

furnished from that base as well as the relative ease with which it can 

be supplied from the United States. 

180 
U. S. SECPET 

BRITISH MOST SECRtT 

He repeated that our first concern must be the defeat of Germany’s submarine warfare. 

SIR CHARLEF WET& then said that the British Chiefs of Staff 

also felt that the defeat of the submarine menace must be given first 

priorit> in the use of air power, particularly in the protection of our 

1ine of communications. 

For long range antisubmarine operations not only the provision 

of suitable aircraft had to be considered but slso the bases from which 

they are to be used. The Elritiski are considering the advisability of 

establishing an air base in Greenland for this purpose. They were most 

grateful for the 21 Liberat,ors provided by the t..S.A. for the Ray of 

Biscay. There are three possible met,!!ods of attack on submarines: (1) 

along the sea lanes; (1) against, bases iii the Eay of‘ Bisctly; and (3) 

against factories in which submarines are built. The Eritish now propose 

making air attacks in sufficient force to dest,roy the entire port in 

which the submarines are based rather than confining their attacks to 

the submarine, pens alrd surrounding installations. Ilo pointed out that no 

one can be certain as to how much damage can be done in the port towns 

themselves and that the method proposed will be in the nature of an experiment, the results of which will not be known for five or six months. 

ADMIrAL KIF’G then asked whether the possibil ity of concentrating 

all air attacks on the building yards had been considered. 

SIP C,HAFLLF POPTAL replied that the building yards are not sufficiently large to be certain of hitting them at night,. 

AEMIEAL KIFC said that he felt the most favorable targets against 

the submarine menace were the yards at which they are assembled and at 

thir bases. He said that he had the personal impression that there has 

not been a program undertaken there that, has ken consistently followed 

He felt that the attacks had been sporadic. Iie thought that attacks 

should be aimed: first, against factories where component parts are made; 

secondly, at yards where the submarines are assembled; thirdly, at bases; 

and fourthly, at sea. 

GENERAL Al?XOLE said he felt we should attempt to find what component partor partsof submarines constitute a bottleneck and then Strike 

at factories where they are made. 
U. S. SECVET 

YQITISH VOST SECqGT 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL stated that the greatest bottleneck was the 

hall bearings, but pointed out that it would be tactically impossible to 

destroy the factories. 

GENERAL ARNOLD drew attention to the necessity for a decision as 

to where airplanes are to be utilized before they left the factory. This 

is sohecause different theaters require different equipment on aircraft. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the United States is now in the 

process of recasting its troop deployments. As an example, he indicated 

that it had become possible to reduce the size of the Caribbean garrison 

considerably. He stated that the United States is also considering reducing the size of the Iceland garrison and in that connection he thought 

it would be desirable to have opinions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

on the hazards that now face Iceland. The purpose of this scaling down 

of forces wherever it can be accomplished is for saving shipping. 

182 
II. S. SECRET 

SRITISB MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 56th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Ahfa Camp 

on Thursday, January 14, 1943, at 1430. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General 11. H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA Mountbat ten 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier 'V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

183 
0. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

COMBINED STRATEGY 

SIR ALLEN BROOKE said that he would like to hear the'views of 

the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the situation in thepacific. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that of the nine fronts on which the United 

Nations are now engaged, four are in the Pacific. These include the 

Alaska-Aleutian area, the Hawaiian-Midway area, the South and Southwest 

Pacific areas, and the Burma-China area. 

He said that when he took office as Commander-in-Chief of the 

United States Fleet on December 30, 1941, he immediately sent a dispatch 

to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission 

was, first, to hold the Hawaiian-Midway line and the communications with 

the Pacific coast; and, secondly, to hold the remainder of the line of 

communications to Australia and New Zealand. 

The N&vy had already established a refueling point at Bora Bora 

which was sufficiently far to the rear to insure its being held. hlarines 

had been sent to Samoa and there were also troops in the Fiji Islands. 

Steps had been taken to esteblish three strong points on the line of 

communications: Samoa, the Fiji Islands, and New Caledonia. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff had then established a base for the Navy in Auckland 

with an advanced base at Tongatabu. As time went on, the United States 

forces went into the New Hebrides to Efate and Esperitu Santos. 

Meanwhile, there had been engagements with the Japanese near the 

biarshall Islands, the Island of Wake, and in the Coral Sea. 

The Japanese had advanced as far south as Tulagi with the apparent intent of using it as a base from which to operate against our line 

of communications. 

ADMIRAL XING said that had we been set at the time of Midway, 

we could have made great progress in an attack on the Solomon Islands. 

The operation was in preparation inJuly and took place on August 7th but 

we did not have sufficient force evenat that time to exploit our success 

beyond the occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The Japanese reaction 

there was more 'violent and sustained than had been anticipated. Another 

reason why we could not proceed further with the Solomon operations was 

184 
ll, S'. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

that Operation TORCHhadbeen decided upon andmuch of our available means 

had to be diverted to it. 

ADMIRAL KING stated, however, that we have attempted to go on 

with theSolomon operations. The Japanese reaction was, at first, probably 

designed to "save face"buteventua1ly that became a minor consideration. 

The Japanese have a long line of communications, and it soon became 

apparent that they were fighting a delaying action to cover the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines where the "treasures" are to be 

found. 

He pointed out that we have had some success in the attrition of 

the Japanese forces but not as much as has been claimed. At present, the 

Tulagi area is pretty well stabilized and General \lacArthur has driven 

the Japanese out of the Papuan Peninsula on Mew Guinea. The enemy is 

reinforcing Lae and Salamaua. 

The main object of the operations has been the safety of the 

approaches to northeastern Australia, and the key to the situation is 

Rabaul I 

The campaign in the Solomons was to be divided into three parts: 

(1) the capture of Tulagi, (2) securingthenortheast coastofNew Guinea, 

and (3) the capture of Rabaul. The process has been slow hut the United 

States forces are going on with it. The immediate question is where to 

go when this campaign has been completed, 

ADMIRAL KING stated that he felt the Philippines should be our 

objective rather than the Netherlands East Indies, The Philippines could 

be captured by a flank action whereas the capture of the Netherlands 

East Indies must of necessity be the resultofa frontal attack The most 

likely intermediate objective, once Rabaul is captured, is Truk and 

thence to the Marianas, 

Prior to the war, every class at the Naval War College was 

required to play the game of the Pacific Islands irivolving the recapture 

of the Philippines. There are three ways in which the Philippines may be 

taken: first,, the direct route which would constitute a frontal attack; 

second, the southern route which is outflanked by the enemy along much 

of its course; and third, the northern route through the Aleutians to 

185 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the northern tipofthe Island of Luzon. The northern route would include 

establishing a base in the northwestern Marshall Islands and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas. The Marianas are the key of the situation because of their location on the Japanese line of communications. Any line of action decided upon requires considerable force, 

especially air strength. All of the necessary operations are amphibious. 

ADMIRAL KING said that Mr. Stalin had been good enough to say 

that the Solomons operations have been of Considerable assistance to 

Russia. 

He pointed out the importance to the Japanese of occupying the 

h!aritime Provinces in order to secure the Japanese Islands,; He felt that 

such action would be necessary and that the Japanese should attach more 

importance to them than holding the Netherlands East 'Indies. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that the Japanese are now replenishing Japan 

with raw materials and also fortifying an inner defense ring along the 

line of t,he Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. For these 

reasons, he believed that it was necessary for the United Nations to 

prevent the Japanese having time to consolidate their gains. He compared 

this situation with the present desire of the United Nations to avoid 

giving Germany a respite during the winter months~ 

ADMIRAL KING then said that the idea of utilizing 30 percent of 

the United Nations war effort against Japan was a concept rather than an 

arithmetical computation. He had caused studies to be made of how much 

of the total war effort is now being applied to Japan and found it to be 

approximately 15 percent. He said that this is not sufficient to do more 

than hold; it is not enough to permit maintaining pressure on the 

Japanese. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that we are continuously exploring possibilities of anattaek against Japan by thenorthern route andcalled attention to the fact that theunited States forces had just captured Amchitka-. 

All operations in the Pacific are limited by the amount of available 

shipping" 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Japanese route for a na'rall 

effort against Siberia is secure He said that he had recently had a 

186 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

survey made of ParamushirOIsland, thenorthernmost of the Kurile Islands. 

This revealed that it would be unsatisfactory as a base for operating 

against Japan. 

It would be desirable to have the cooperation of the Russians 

in this respect but there has been difficulty in obtaining any information from them. The best means of obtaining information so farhas been 

by direct correspondence between the President and Mr. Stalin. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then reviewed the deployment of the United 

States troops in all of the islands of the Pacific, giving the strength 

of each in ground and air troops and in aircraft. He pointed out the 

logistical difficulties of supplying these forces. 

ADMIRAL KING then gave tne disposition of the Marine forces 

which amount to approximately 60,000 men in the area from Midway to the 

South Pacific Islands. 

GENEXAL MARSHALL said that in the light ofthelogisticalrequirements in the Pacific, the United States' interest in undertaking an 

operation to open the Burma Roau could be well understood. General 

Stilwell and Field Uarshal Wave11 would have to determine t,he logistical 

requirements of such an operation but, in any event, they would be minor 

in comparison to the requirements in the Operation TORCH Any success in 

the Operation RAVENOUS would have a tremendous effect in the Pacific 

chiefly by making it necessary for the Japanese to divert forces to the 

Burma operations, thus lessening the pressure in the South Pacific and 

the consequent demands on our available shipping 

GENERBL MARSHALL stated that the peace of mind of the United 

States Chiefs of Staff was greater now than it had been a year ago. The 

Japanese are now on the defensive and must be careful of a surprise move 

from us. However, he pointed out that we must still worry about the 

locations of the Japanese aircraft carriers because they constitute a 

constant threat against our line of canmunications and for raiding pur 

poses against our west coast. 

We must not allow the Japanese any pause. They fight with no 

idea of- surrendering and they will continue to be aggressive until 

attrition has defeated them. To accomplish this, we .nust maintain the 

initiative and force them to meet us. 

187 
U S SECRET 

BRlTISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL ARNOLD t,hen discussed the United States efforts to obtain 

information concerning Hussia He stated that when theGermans threatened 

to capture the Caucasus, the Russians began to be fearful that thesupply 

of airplanes from the United States via the southern route would be 

eliminated, They, therefore, requested the United States to start deliv 

ery of airplanes from Alaska at once, The United States agreed to this 

providing the Russians would demonstrate that there were sufficient 

facilities available to make possible the delivery of one hundred and 

fifty planes a month The Russians did not have these facilities at the 

time bxt, built them rapidly~At thepresent time, both the southern route 

and the Alaskan route are in use. In the coming year, the delivery to 

Russia amounts Lo four hundred airplanes a month. These wj~llbe divided 

over the two routes Bombers are flown Lo Basra but the flight is so 1.ong 

that the Russians refuse to accept the engines and this necessitates 

replacing them The northern route will be used for this purpose as much 

as possible inasmuch as it eliminates fifty hours of flying Lime on the 

journey 

GENERAL ARNOLD then stated that the U. S.. Chiefs of Staff were 

desirous of lolowing what facilities were available in southern Siberia 

and Vladivostok in order Lo see if they could be of assistance Lo Hussia 

in case Russia was attacked by the Japanese 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that hfr Stalin had finally given General 

Bradley permission tomake a survey.. General Bradley, however, considered 

that it would be better to present theRussians with a specific proposal 

He returned to the United States, and it was decided to offer Russia one 

hundred heavy bombers seventy.two days after the outbreak of war between 

Russia and Japan Mr Stalin had rejected this offer and said he would 

like 100 aircraft at once for use against Germany. 

GENERAL MARSHALL also stated that the Russians object Lo the 

presence of "gossipy" people from the United Nations and that they were 

afraid that the IJnited Kations personnel could not put up with the 

conditions which are imposed on Russian troops. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL stated that the British had operated success 

fully with the Russian navy in the Murmansk area but that they had the 

same experiences With the Russian army as the U - S, had, 

188 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL MARSHALL then described the difficulties which theunited 

States Cniefs of Staff had had concerning sending air units to the 

Caucasus, The Hussians had stated definitely that they did not desire 

units but airplanes only. There had been some sentiment amongtheunited States authorities to furnish sufficient airplanes for tne purpose of 

placating Mr. Stalin, However, to do so, especially in the case of heavy 

bombers, would necessitate immobilizing these airplanes for as much as 

six months while the Russians were learning to operate them and estab 

lishing ground crews for their maintenance General Marshall stated that 

in his opinion it was unwise to withhold this striking power against the 

enemy for so long a period. 

ADMIRAL KING then asked t,he British Chiefs of Staff if they had 

the impression that the Russians were unwilling to help themselves The 

Germans were successfully operating air forces out of the northern part 

of Norway and the Russians had apparently made no effort, to stop them 

although they were well within range 

SIR DUDLEY POUND stated that the Russians do send destroyers out 

to meet convoys They invariably state; however, that they have run out 

of fuel before completing their task and then leave the convoy for home 

at a rate of 28 knots, which is hardly consistent with a shortage of 

fuel. Their Air Force has not furnished much protection. 

SIR CliAHLES PORTAL stated that he felt the reason for this was 

that their air personnel is not properly trained The Russians had made 

some attempts to strike at the German forces but had been unsuccessful 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked why the Russians were willing to risk 

whole divisions but not their naval forces 

SIR DUDU3Y POUND replied that they are continental people who do 

not understand naval action Their submarines have been the only effect 

ive units of their navy 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed with this statement and added that while 

they do not know what dangers are involved in escorting convoys, they 

are very free to offer silly advice as to how security should be attained 

GENERAL MARSHALL then described the development of troops of the 

United States, whichwas proceeding very well He addedthatunited States 

189 
U S SECRET 

BRITISE UOST SECRET 

troops, both in this and the last war, appeared to "veteranize" quickly 

in the field. The young officers andnon-commissioned officers had exhibited a remarkable facility for eliminating errors rapidly. We may expect 

their effectiveness to increase enormously in a short time. 

He thought we were particularly fortunate in the deadly character of the Pacific fight, since our forces which have been engaged in 

the Pacific have become imbued with the idea that it is "kill or be 

killed"; and this attitude gives promise of tremendous power for future 

operations. The staffs are sound and the engineers are particularly 

effective. He recalled a remark that hadbeen made in the War Department, 

when Field Marshal Wavell questioned the possibility of building a road 

which could support the Burma operations, to the effect that "Wavell does 

not know General Wheeler," the United States engineer in this theater. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE inquired how far forward the U, S" Chiefs of 

Staff envisaged it would be necessary to go in order to prevent the Japanese from digging themselves in He feared that if operations were too 

extended it would inevitably lead to an all-out war against Japan and it 

was certain that we had not sufficient resources toundertake this at the 

same time as a major effort against Germany. Would itbepossible for the 

forces at present in the Pacific to hold the Japanese without incurring 

the additional drain on our resources which would result fren pushing 

forward our present defensive positions? 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that it had been essential to act 

offensively in order to stop the Japanese advancing. For example, in 

New Guinea it had been necessary to push the Japanese back to prevent 

them capturing Port Moresby. In order to do this, every device for reinforcing the troops on the island had had to be employed, The same considerations applied in Guadalcanal. It had been essential totake offensive action toseize the island Short of offensive action of this nature, 

the only way of stopping the Japanese was by complete exhaustion through 

attrition, It was very difficult to pause; the process of whittling away 

Japan had to be continuous. 

SIR CHAHLES PORTAL asked whether it was not possible to stand on 

a line and inflict heavy losses on the Japanese when they tried to break 

through it, From the very fact that the Japanese continued to attack, it 

190 
U. S.,SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

was clear that they had already been pushed back further than they cared 

to go. Re also inquired whether the U. S. Chiefs of Staff thought it 

would be possible to gain a decision by air bombardment of Japan alone. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific were now operating from the t,ips of two narrow salients. 

The Japanese had greater width in their line and could therefore operate 

on a larger scale than the forces which we could bring to bear. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in Papua it would be possible to gain 

additional airfields alongside our present position, but this was not 

the case in Guadalcanal where only a small strip of suitable territory 

was available. To broaden our base there, we should have to have New Britain and New Ireland. As regards air bombardment of Japan, the U. S. view 

was that Japanese industries were so vulnerable to the air that heavy 

attack would ultimately destroy her capacity to maintain her war effort ~ 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that it should be possible to deter-. 

mine what it was that we had to prevent the Japanese from doing, and 

what forces we should require for the purpose. We should then see what 

forces remained for use elsewhere in the world. 

ADMIRAL KING observed that unless some effort was made to assist 

Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese might pull out of the war. The 30 percent 

effort to which he had referred would, of course, include operations in 

Burma I 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that operation RAVENOUS might be success.. 

ful but when we had reached the objective we should still have to defend 

our line of communication against Japanese attack from the flank. It was 

calculated that the route would only suffice to maintain two Divisions, 

and this would leave little if any capacity for the supply air forces 

operating in China 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that in addition to opening the supply 

route to China, RAVENOUS would gain the territory necessary to secure 

the air supply route from India to China, 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that it would be well worth while taking 

a risk on RAVENOUS since it would not cut across the main effort against 

Germany, whereas ANAKIM would. 

191 
U S SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the Chinese only required about 

half the maintenance tonnage requiredbywhite troops. In any event, even 

a small residual tonnage for supplies to China would probably be far 

greater than could be transported by air. Twelve bombers in China under 

General Chennault had done wonderful work; and if he had even 50, the 

results they might achieve wouldbevery great. For this reason the U. S. 

Chiefs of Staff thought that RAVENOUS was a gamble well worth while. It 

should also be remembered that any help given to China which would 

threaten Japan might have a most favorable effect on Stalin. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that General Cliennault claimed he could drive 

the Japanese Air Force out of Chinaif he had 175 aircraft. This might be 

an exaggerated claim, but there was no doubt additional air forces in 

China would have a very great effect. By Leccmber itwas hoped tohave 150 

transports working from IndiatoChina, nith a maximum delivery estimated 

at 10,000 tons per month. 

ADMIRAL KING asked on whom would fall the principal burden of 

heating Japan once Germany had been knocked out. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that once Germany was defeated, practically 

all the Sritish naval forces wouldbereleased for the war against Japan. 

Forces destined for the recapture of Burma and Malaya were already forming in India. He did not think it wise, nowever, to embark on Operation 

ANAKIM unless we were quite prepared for a full-scale campaign, 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that India had already been asked toprovide airfields for double the number of air forces we were ever likely to 

have available before the defeat of Germany.. These were intended for the 

campaign against Japan. He had no doubt that as soon as Germany was 

defeated the British Government would turn the whole of their resources 

against Japan. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that to depend on sea operations 

alone against Japan was hazardous, owing to the rapidity with which the 

balance of sea power could change in the eventofa reverse. For example, 

in the Widway battle the U. S. Forces had been able toget all their aircraft into the air before the Japanese attack developed. In consequence, 

the Japanese hadlost four carriers as against one American. Nithalittle 

192 
U S SECRET 

BPI7 1Sri MOST SECQET 

ill-.fortune the reverse might have taken place; and in that case, the 

whole of the west coast of America would have been open to Japanese 

carrier-borne attack The Japanese territories were not nearly so vulnerable in this respect 

AT'JiIkBL K1F.i: said that the 2apanese might well strike again at 

Midway. They werp on interior lines, and it was easier for tliem to take 

the initiative against us; At t,he present time it, looked as if their 

carriers were beirrg prepared for another attack somewhere, perhaps on 

Midway or Samoa. It was essrntial, therefore, to maintain the initiative 

aga~8stthe Japanese and not wait f'or t,hem to come against us. 

L;r;?LT.U 5;AF5VAl.I, exnlai!!ed tile dirficul ties with which he had 

been faced in finiiirrg even tlir small forcps rt?qi!ir~trlby General St,ilwell 

to support r. ?Cb. 5:iinping colild riot be sparal for them in the absence 

of some definit,e assurerice from Ciliang :<ai-stioL and agreement wit11 Field 

Marshal. Wave11 on the operations to tie undertaken. Ry the time these had 

been obtained mucki time had been lost arid shipuing had to be found by 

drawing it away from other commitments in the Pacific snch a? Alaska and 

Hawaii, General MacArthur was some 20,000 men sbort of his requirements, 

and provision of' tlrese reinforcement,s liad hacl tobe deferred, By the most 

rigid economy sufficient shipping had at last been found to move 6,000 

men to General Stilwell In order to cot down numbers to tho minimum, 

units had been stripped to the bone of all personnel which werenot absolutely essential It was certainly fortunate t,hat losses sustained in 

the Pacifi'c from submarines had been so small 

AEMIFAI., KIVG said he was puzzled to know why these losses had 

been so small and what, the ..Japanese were keeping their submarines for,, 

SIF, DrmLEY POtiP-i! said that, in nritish experience, .Japanese submarines were much less of a menace than the German They were less effi-­

ciently onerated, and quite small escorts were sufficient to drive them 

away. He pointed out that it was in a way to our advantage to allow the 

Japanese to dig in well in places whichaedid not mean to attack as this 

dispersed their forces. Tu recapture the Philippines before the defeat 

of Germany was impossible; arrl it was, therefore, all to the good if the 

Japanese locked up troops in these Islands The quickest way of recap 

turing the Philippines would be to defeat Germany It seemed to him that 

193 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the correct strategy was to establish a line where we had better air 

facilities than the Japanese and then to allow them to wear out their 

air forces by attacking w on that line, Would it be of any advantage to 

go as far forward as Truk inthe immediate future rather than just before 

the main attack on the Philippines? Even if we had Truk he questioned 

whether we could operate surface forces against the Jananese lines of 

communication at the present time. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed that the recapture of the Philippines must 

probably await the defeat of Germany. On the other hand, he would be in 

favor of seizing Truk ad going forward to the tiarianas in order to dom 

inate the Japanese sea routes to the eastward thus freeing our submarines 

for the more covered Japanese supply route to the westward He felt it 

was necessary to soften up the Japanese before making our main effort 

and not simply to allow them to do what they wanted, while we held a 

static position The 30 percent allocation of resources which he had 

suggested would certainly suffice for the recapture of Rabaul. 

After some further discussion, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to report, on the 

basis that Germany is the primary enemy, what situation do we 

wish to establish in the Eastern Theater (i-e-, the Pacific and 

Burma) in 1943, and what forces will be necessary to establish 

that situation, 

194 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 57th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Friday, January 15, 1943, at 1430. 

PRESENT 

General G.C. Marshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. H, Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt- General B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. General D. D. Eisenhower, USA Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

(For Item 2) Mountbat ten 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Lt.. General Sir Hastings L Ismay 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA Captain C E Lambe, RN 

Brigadier G M Stewart 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V DykeRrig General J i3 Deane, USA 

195 
U. S- SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. AA'TISUEMAXIt!E WARFARE. 

SIR DLDLEY Wm!D said that the four points at which the U-boats 

could be attacked were the factories and building yards, the operating 

bases, the routes to their hunting grounds, and the hunting grounds 

themselves. He had sent for ck tailed information concerning the construetion bottlenecks. As regards the operating bases, the British Government 

had agreed to intensify air attacks on French ports which were used as 

bases. The only question now at issue was that of giving some warning to 

the French inhabitants. 

At,tacks on the 11-boats on passage to the hunting grounds had been 

successful for a time and considerable damage and delay had been inflicted 

on them as long as the C-boats did not know when the aircraft, were detecting them with their A.S.V. equipment. This equipment was used in conjunction with the Leigh lightat night. Now, however, U-boats were fitted 

with listening devices which cktected the A.S.V. outside the range of the 

light, Ten-centimeter A.S.V's. were now being introd.uced, but no doubt 

in time the Germans would find a counter to them. Nevertheless, if we 

were successful even in compelling them to remain submerged in darkness, 

it would have the effect of making them surface in daylight to recharge 

batteries,. 

For dealing with the submarines on the hunting grounds, the two 

requirements were first: as much air cover as possible, and second: 

adequate escorts. A rough rule of thumb for the nunber of escorts was to 

have three ships with every convoy plus one for every ten ships in the 

convoy. A convoy of forty ships would thus have seven escorts. In practice, however, we were never able to supply this nmber of escorts, and 

as a general rule we never had mre thansix withany convoy. When escorting vessels had to be withdrawn for operations, there was no pool from 

which to replace thew. We had now new commitments in the Sierra Leone 

convoys which had had to be re-started, and the convoys bringing 011 

from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom and to North Africa. As 

a minimum sixty-five more escort vessels were required in the Atlantic 

alone. Before any decisions, were taken on our strategy for 1943, it 

seemed essential to weigh carefully the requirements in escort Vessels 

for any operations to be undertaken. Once an operation was launched and 

escorts were withdrawn frw convoys, they could not be returned usually 

196 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

for four or five months, during whichanacute shortagewas felt. the only 

relief during such a period would be the intake from new construction. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the air had proved the most effective weapon against the U-boat. The estimated German output of U-boats 

was twenty a month. He gave the following figures for attacks on U-boats 

during the last two months: 

Kovember December 

U-Boats sunk ) 8 

U-Boats damaged ) by aircraft 

24 

U-Boats sunk ) 8 

U-Boats damaged ) by other means 7 

Air patrols over the U-boat routes to the hunting grounds were 

very costly in aircraft since it was calculated that there was only one 

sighting for 250 hours flying time. Nevertheless, even if a large number 

of U-boats were not actually destroyed by this means, aircraft patrols 

had a good effect in compelling U-boats to remain submerged and thereby 

reducing their time on the hunting grounds A further method of attack 

on U-boats was the laying of mines from the air at the exits of the 

U-boat bases and construction yards 

GENERAL ARNOLD inquired whether it wasnotpossible to use flying 

boats for anti-submarine work, both over the hunting grounds and on the 

routes to them. This would avoid the use of valuable long range bombers. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the long range bomber was essential 

for work over the convoys, since flying boats, owingtotheir slow speed, 

took too long to reach them after a call for assistance. Moreover, the 

load of the flying boat in bombs and depth charges was less than that of 

the Liberator. In addition they were not processed for the 10-centimeter 

A.S.V. A considerable number of Catalinas were being used in spite of 

these disadvantages It was estimated that the minimum requirements for 

the whole of the AtlanticandBritish Home Waters was between 120 and 135 

long range bombers New devices were being developedtocombat the German 

listening apparatus which detected the presence of A,S.V. aircraft 

ADMIRAL KING asked whether economy in long range bombers could 

not be effected by using Catalinas for patrol lrork and reserving long 

197 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISK <YOSTSECRET 

range bombers for emergency calls when convoys were actually attacked. 

The Catalina had a very long endurance and could be kept in the air for 

twenty-four hours if the crew was large enough to provide two watches. 

One advantage of the flying boat was that any sheltered water could be 

used for a base instead of airfields. 

SIR CHARLES WZTAL said that Catalinas were being used to the 

maximum. A survey had been made of the West African roast and it was 

found that two depot ships for Catalinas would suffice on the northern 

part, but this did not cover the requirements of the Indian Ocean or the 

;out11 Atlantic. 

SIX DUDLEY POUND saidthatanti-submarine aircraft were essential 

in the area north of Freetown. The requirements in long range bombers 

which had been stated were an absolute minimum, even allowing for the 

maximum use of flying boats. 

SIZ CHARLES F'OZTAL asked whether the aircraft inthe Pacific, details of which had been given at a meeting on the previous day, were available for anti-submarine work as well as local defense of the Islands 

themselves, 

ADMIXAL KING said that fortunately the Japanese had not yet made 

any great use of submarines in the Pacific, and it wasg therefore, 

possible to work with only small escorts. If the Japanese submarines 

became more active, aircraft would have to be used against them. fhe 

total resources available, however, were insufficient for security 

everywhere. When Alaska was threatened, forces had to be sent up from 

all quarters. The acute shortage of escort vessels was of course fully 

recognized. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND pointed out that where long range shore based 

aircraft could not be employed to cover thewhole passage, as for example 

in the direct convoys from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom, 

auxiliary aircraft carriers had to be used with the convoys themselves, 

On the northern route it was hoped to establish bases for long range 

aircraft in Newfoundland tojoin up with aircraft working from the United 

Kingdom. 

GENERAL AIINOLD said that Greenland would be of little use for 

this purpose owing tothelong hours of darkness andthe very bad weather. 

198 
U S SECRET 

BRITISB MOYT SECRET 

ADMIRAL COOKE asked whether full use was being made of direction 

finding apparatus to pick up theshort range inter-communication radio of 

U-boats working in packs. The Japanese had developed this technique to a 

high degree. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that all destroyers and most corvettes, 

were fitted with the necessary apparatus for this purpose. This use was 

being developed to the maximum. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that it would be desirable to have 

an assessment made of the total resources required in escort vessels and 

aircraft to combat the submarine menace, inorder that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff should have a picture of what would be left over for offensive 

operations during the coming year. 

THE COMMIlTEE.' 

Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to examine and re 

port the minimum requirements of escorts (including aircraft 

carriers) and aircraft which should be devoted to the security 

of the sea communications of the United Nations during 1943. 

(GENERAL EISENHOWER entered the Meeting at this point.) 

2,. SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER gave a resume of the situation in North Africa 

at the present time-. Operations in December had been held up by bad 

weather and mud which restricted the use of vehicles entirely to the 

roads., Since this check every effort had been made to build up for an 

attack in the North by increasing our air power, improving the communi 

cations to the front and re. equipping the 6th Armored Division with 

Sherman Tanks. By the end of December, however, it was clear that the 

weather conditions would compel postponement ofany attackfor a consider, 

able time, Attention had then been directed to the possibility of an 

attack further to the south where ground conditions were better.. For this 

purpose forces composed of the 1st U, S, Armored Division and two U.. S -

Regimental Combat teams with Anti-Aircraft and Anti ,Tank Units were being 

concentrated, At first operations on the right flank had been looked upon 

primarily as a diversion, but it now seemed probable that it would be 

possible to advance on Sfax and hold it with infantry while withdrawing 

199 
11. 3. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the 1st Armored Division as a mobile reserve further to the rear, where 

it could be maintaimd more easily.. This mobile rcservs wou!d be available, to deal with a threat either from the North or from Rommel's forces 

retiring from the direction of Tripoli. The plan was tolaunch the attack 

on Sfax on January 24th. Although the roecl t,o Gabes was better, the time 

factor made it necessary to go direct for Sfax. There seemed, however, 

every reason to hope that Sfax cou1.d be successfully taken. 

SI:: ALAN XOOKE pointed out the need for careful coordination of 

the attack on Sfax with General Anderson's operations in the North and 

those of the8th Army in the South. If weather conditions made it impossible for General Anderson to move forward, except on the roads, before 

?.larch 15th there seemed to be it danpr that the Germans would thin out 

in the North and defeat thesfax forces indetail, It would take some time 

before the 8th Army could bring pressure to bear from the southward in 

support of this force, since even at the best General Montgomery did not 

expect to reach Tripoli before the middle of Februirry; and before he 

could advance from there the port would have to be cleared in orderto 

supply his forces with petrol for a further advance.. 

GENEXAL EISENII0WE:I agreed th&t it was improbable that any movement off the rosds would be possible in the North before Xarch 15th, 

though General Anderson had seven days' reserves built up which wouldbe 

kept intact for an attsck whenever conditions permitted,, He hoped that 

General. Montgomery would push on through Tripoli as fast as possible. By 

the end of January the 46th Division would be cnncentrhted forward under 

General .Anderson and the 1.8th Regimental Combat Team would be withdrawn 

into reserve, As long as the 1st U. S. Armored Division was kept for 

counterattack, he felt that he could deal with any threat to the Sfax 

force. Ile hoped, however, to he able to discuss the whole problem with 

General Alexander and to make any necessary adjustments in the plan on 

the latter's arrival. 

SIX aAN L1::OOKE pointed out that after twomonths of "an active 

defensive," the 78th Division would not be in very good condition for 

the attack in the North and suggested that it would be better to let a 

fresh division form the spearhead. 

G3NEsa EISENHOWEn said that he was faced with the dilemma of 

either allowing the troops in the Ncrth to deteriorate by remaining 

200 
U. S. SECRET 

39ITIS.q XOST SECFET 

inactive in the mud or suffering some lossestothem through keeping them 

more active. In his opinion the latter was the lesser of two evils. Also 

that active patrolling would reveal any thinning out of the Axis force 

in the North. 

The latest intelligence reports place the Axis strength in North 

Africa at about 65,000.Every effort had been made to retard their buildup but the appalling conditions of the airfields and the bad weather 

had largely closed down air operations against them recently. At the 

present time it was calculated that the Axis were getting in about 750 

men a day with the necessary supplies for them, in addition to a certain 

amount of supplies for Rommel. 

The French forces in the middle of the front were playing a most 

important part since they were holding the line between the British in 

the North and the American forces in the South. Unless they held firm, 

a serious situation would develop. Moreover, he was completely dependent 

on them for the working of his long line of communication and the ports. 

These considerations necessitated careful handling of the French. The 

French units themselves were badly equipped and some of themwerepow 

ly trained.TheFrench troops from Tunisia were somewhat unreliable since 

their families were now in the German area. In one battalion there had 

been 132 desertions.The French Generals Barre and Juin were cooperating 

excellently with General Anderson and General Fredendall. Unfortunately, 

General Juin was not being given very much scope by General Giraud. The 

latter might be a god Division Commander but he had no political sense 

and no idea of administration. He was dictatorial by nature and seemed 

to suffer from megalomania. In addition he was very sensitive and always 

ready to take offense. He did not seem to be a big enough man to carry 

the burden of civil government in any way. It had been far easier to 

deal with Admiral Darlan. 

Civil affairs, which included economic as well as political 

matters, had of course, given a great deal of anxiety. There were many 

agencies involved but the necessary organization to deal with all these 

problems was being improved. 

Rail communications forward were very limited in capacity at 

present. East of Algiers thedaily tonnage which couldbe carried amounted 

201 
U S. SECRET 

SPITISK MOST SECFET 

to about 2,200 tons but with additional rolling stock and locomotives 

which were being sent from the llnited States, it was hoped to increase 

this to 4,400. From Casablanca to Oran the daily tonnage was only about 

900. Port clearance was improving. At Oran it averaged 5,000 tons a day. 

At Algiers the daily clearance was not so great and initially it had been 

much reduced by the presence of French ships lyingat many of the berths. 

Losses of shipping had been sustained by air attack at Bougie and Bone. 

Air defense of the ports was being steadily improved. All available 

French antiaircraft weapons had been brought into action and night 

fighters had been sent from the United Kingdom. Radar had been installed 

to cover the stretch from Bone to Algiers and some had also been provided 

at Oran and Casablanca. Passive air defense measures in the ports were 

being improved and assistance had been given by an expert sent from the 

United Kingdom who had done very good work at Algiers. One difficulty 

was that there was no rigid control over the French civil population. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Radar cover between Bond and 

Algiers wasnot yet effective below 10,000 feet. �ie had made arrangements 

for additional equipment to be provided to make good this deficiency. He 

inquired what air defense could be provided for Sfax. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that there was good natural cover for 

the troops in Sfax. One airfield there was practically complete and there 

was another at Gabes. The improvement of airfields had been one of the 

greatest problems Approximately 2,000 tons ofsteelmattingwere required 

for a single runway and this quantity used up the complete capacity of 

railroads in the forward areas for a whole day. Every possible expedient 

had been tried to use local material but broken stone merely sankintoth? 

mud. Once the weather improved all these difficulties would vanish 

since there were large areas in the forward zone which could be used as 

airfields with little or no preparation at all. 

(GENERAL EISENHOWER withdrew at this point .) 

3. STRATEGY IN THE EUROPEAN TliEATER< 

SIR ALAN BROOKE outlined two broad policies which should be 

followed in the European Theater during 1943. The first was to close down 

in the Mediterranean as soon as the North African coast had been cleared 

and the searoute throughthe Mediterranean had been opened, and to devote 

202 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH WOST SECRET 

every effort to building up in the United Kingdom for an invasion of the 

North of France at the earliest possible moment. The British Chiefs of 

Staff had examined the possibilities and calculated that 21 to 23 divisions could be made available for this purpose by September 15th. It had 

at first been thought that portand railway capacity wouldbe the limiting 

factor on the build-up of American troops' expansion but it looked as if 

these difficultids could be overcome if the expansion of receiving depots 

for supplies were pushed ahead. As a basis of calculation, a monthly 

movement of 120 merchant vessels from the U. K. to the U.S.A. had been 

taken, the corresponding troop lift being 120,000. This would allow 9 to 

12 U. S. divisions to be transported to the U. K. by September 1st. The 

number of troops which could be put into France was severely limited, 

however, by the availability of landing craft and of administrative 

facilities in France. 

Three possible areas for invasion had been considered: 

(a) The Calais-Boulogneareawhich, although heavily defended, 

was within fighter cover of the United Kingdom; 

(b) Cherbourg Peninsula, which could be seized by a comparatively small force; 

(c) Brest Peninsula, which was a more worth while objective, 

would require a much larger force, say, at least 15 divisions 

to hold the 150 kilometers of front. 

One of the objections to operations against the North of France 

was the excellent railway connections across Europe which would enable 

the Germans rapidly to reinforce the invaded area. Moreover, it would 

not be possible to begin the operation until the early autumn and no 

support would therefore be given to Russia throughout the summer. Thls 

last factor seemed to be the principal objection. A land invasion on a 

small scale would have little more than a local effect except for the 

air fighting which would inevitably ensue from it. 

The other broad possibility was to maintain activity in the 

Mediterranean while building, up themaximum air offensive against Germany 

from the U. K. and putting in as many troops as could be spared with a 

View to undertaking a comparatively small operation such as seizing 

Cherbourg Peninsula. 

203 
U. S. SECFET 

BilITISH WOST SECYET 

The Mediterranean offered many choices: Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, 

and the Dodecanese. Our amphibious power enabled us to threaten all these 

points simultaneously and thereby cause the Germans to disperse their 

forces. Unless they were to risk the loss of these islands, they would 

be compelled to reinforce them as well as the coasts of Italy, Greece, 

and France. If Italy could be knocked out, Germany would be involved in 

large new commitments in an attempt to bolster her up and replacing 

Italian troops in the Balkans. Other German satellites might also fall 

out. The British Chiefs of Staff considered that our best policy would 

be to threaten Germany everywhere in the Mediterranean, to try to knock 

out Italy, and to bring in Turkey on our side. It was not, of course, 

certain that we could bring Turkey inbut by a combination of inducements 

and pressure we might be successful. With Turkey as a base, we could 

attack the Rumanian oil fields and open uptheBlack Sea Route to Russia. 

If this policy was adopted, we shall have to make a careful 

choice of our objective. The main choice seemed to lie between the capture of Sardinia and Corsica and the capture of Sicily. Sicily would be 

the bigger prize but would be a bigger undertaking and the operation 

could not be staged until late in the summer. The threat, however, would 

compel dispersion on Germany long before the operation itself was 

launched. As for Sardinia and Corsica, these increased the possibilities 

of air attack against Italy by providing bases for fighter escorted 

bombers. The operation might be combined with operations from the Widdle 

East against the Dodecanese. 

One of the great advantages of adopting the Jiediterranean policy 

was that a larger force of heavy bombers could be built up in the United 

Kingdom for tne attack on Germany than if we concentratedforan invasion 

of France. For the latter purpose, a much larger proportionofthe lighter type of bomber and ground support planes would be needed and the 

number of heavy bombers would suffer accordingly. 

ADMIRAL KING pointedout that themore troops that we concentrated 

in the Mediterranean, the more likely Germany was to move into Spain in 

order to cut our line of communications through the straits of Gibraltar. 

An invasion of Northern France such as the seizure of the Brest Peninsula 

would not nearly so likely precipitate such an event. He doubted whether 

204 
ll S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the Spaniards could be relied upon to offer anything more than guerilla 

resistance to a German invasion. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff did not 

consider it was at all probable that Spain would permit free passage to 

the German forces. It was calculated that some 20 divisions would be 

necessary to occupy the country if the Spaniards resisted at all. This 

would be a very large commitment for Germany. In any event, we would he 

able to secure the south side of the Straits of Gibraltar by occupying 

Spanish Morocco and this would prevent the complete rlosure of the sea 

route. He did not think it would be possible for Germany to seize the 

Spanish airfields in theSouth by parachute troops. The problemofsupply 

ing them by air would be extremely difficult, 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that if the Spaniards allowed the 

Germans fFee passage we should declare war on Spain which was depending 

on us for many of thenecessities of life Even if the Germans did go in, 

we should be better able toafford aircraft forthe protection of shipping 

through the Straits of Gibraltar than could the Germans for its attack 

It would be much more advantageous for the Germans if we built up against 

France and left the Mediterranean alone They would then he able to with 

draw large numbers of air forces fromtheMediterranean and reinforce the 

Russian Front, relying on the strong defenses of Northern France to 

resist an invasion, On theother hand if we kepttheMediterranean active, 

they would be compelled to keep large air forces there the whole time 

This was of the greatest importance since Germany's main shortages were 

air forces and oil. 

Considerable discussion followed on the details and timings of 

operations against Sicily and Sardinia in which the following were the 

principal points made: 

(a) If thecapture of Sicily was mounted from the United King 

dom and the United States, it could be carried out early in August, but would require some 190 escort vessels If it was mounted 

from North Africa some 65 escorts would be saved, but its launching would be delayed about one month. This delay was due to the 

time required for amphibious training in North Africa where 

facilities were extremely limited, 

205 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(b) The capture of Sardinia could be undertaken in about May, 

i.e , three months earlier thanSicily Air cover for the Sardinia 

operation, however, would be more difficult owing to its greater 

distance from North Africa., 

(c) The total coastline of Sicily was about 500 miles and it 

was anticipat,ed that some 7 to 8 enemy divisions wouldbedefending the island. This compared very favorably with the coastline 

of Northern France which was the same length, more strongly 

fortified and would be defended by 15 divisions. 

(d) Part of the air cover for operations against Sicily could 

be provided from Malta from which about 300 fighters could be 

operated. Additional fighter protection couldbegivenifPantel1­

aria was seized in a preliminary operation. The troops required 

for the operation amounted to some 9 divisions, 10 to 12 brigade 

groups being employed as assaulting troops. 

(e) It was doubtful whether thewhole operation against Sicily 

could be undertaken by troops already in the Mediterranean owing 

to the difficulties of training them in time in North Africa. 

Assembly and repair of landing craft was another bottleneck,, 

SIR DUDIEY POUND estimated that once the North African Coast had 

been cleared, even without having Sicily in our possession, it would be 

possible to run a convoy of thirty ships once every ten days through the 

Mediterranean, in substitution for the present shipping to the Middle 

East, Persian Gulf and India, which moved via the Cape,. This would ef-­

fectasaving of some 225 ships. The average losses per month on the Cape 

route are at present about 15 ships” The estimated losses if the Medi.. 

terranean route were used should only be about 9 a month even allowing 

a higher percentage of loss,^ He understood, however, that the United 

States estimate was 18. 

206 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 58th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Saturday, January 16, 1943, at 1030. 

PRESENT 

General C. C. harshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudlej 

Lt. lienera1 H. H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. 111. Cooke, Jr.,USN 

(For first half of meeting) 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer,USA 

(For first half of meeting) 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

(For first half of meeting) 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

h!ountbat ten 

Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Jsrnay 

Major General J. N. Kennedy 

Air Vice Marshal J. C. Slessor 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. H. Deane, USA 

(The meeting adjourned from 1300 to 1530) 

207 
U. S. SECRET 

BeITISK MOST SECRET 

1. THE NORTH AFRICAN SITUATION. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave an account of a conference between General 

Alexander and General Eisenhower regarding the coming operations in 

Tunisia and Libya. General Eisenhower had planned an offensive against 

Sfax tobelaunchedonJanuary 24th. The plan presented some difficulties. 

The 1st Army cannot attack prior to March 15th. The British 8th Army expects to take Tripoli by January 24th. At that time they will be out Of 

fuel for their vehicles and a certain amount of reorganizing will be 

necessary. It is probable that the 8th Army will not be able to attack 

Rommel's forceson the Mareth line prior to February 15th. Thus they Will 

be too late to take advantage of the favorable situation created by 

General Eisenhower's attack on Sfax and consequently Rommel will be free 

for a period of time to operate against General Eisenhower's southern 

forces and perhaps force him towithdraw from Sfax. This might be coupled 

with a German attackfromthe northwhichwould place General Eisenhower's 

southern forces in an extremely precarious position. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE stated that it had been decided that the Sfax 

attack would be canceled. Instead, raids would be conducted against the 

German line of communications from Sfax but the bulk of General Eisenhower's forces consisting of the 1st Armored Division, reinforced, would 

be held in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist General Alexancer 

in his attack on Rommel's forces or to assist the 1st Army to the north. 

The Sfax attack mightbeaccomplished later and, if so, it would be timed 

by agreement between General Alexander and General Eisenhower who will 

confer frequently. 

2. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR 1943 IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

were anxious to learn the British concept as to how Germany is to be defeated. It has been the conception of the United States Chiefs of Staff 

that Germany must be defeated by a powerful effort on the continent, 

carrying out the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plans. Aid to Russia is regarded as 

being of paramount importance in order to assist the Russian Army to absorb the strength of the German ground and air forces. 

He said we must devise means to enable Russia to continue aggressively through 1943 by providing them with supplies. The amount of such 

supplies and the methods of delivering them must be determined upon. The 

208 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

German air and ground forces brought to bear against Russia must be reduced. Any method of tccomplishing this other than on the Continent is a 

deviation from the basic plan. The question is then to what extent must 

the United Nations adhere to the general concept and to what extent do 

they undertake diversions for the purpose of assisting Eussia, improving 

the tonnage situation, and maintaining momentum. 

In commenting on the British presentation of their plans for the 

Mediterranean, CEhEFAL MARSHALL stated that the United States Chiefs of' 

Staff would like to have further information on the following points: 

(a) Wre not the East-best canmunications in northern Europe, 

which the British consider capable of moving seven divisions 

every twelve days, subject to severe interference by heavy air 

attacks from England? 

@) If the Mediterranean operations were undertaken and there 

were a break in the German strength, might it occur so rapidly 

that full advantage could not ke taken of it? It was, therefore, 

desired that the British Chiefs of Staff expand on what the tonnage savings from the Mediterranean operations might be in order 

to determine if they were worth the costs involved­

(c) What would be the effects of Mediterranean operations on 

the timing of the United Nations concentrations in England? In 

General Eisenhower's opinion, it was unwise to count on further 

use of landing craft used in the initial landings for any other 

operation A fifty or seventy-five percent loss should be antici 

pated General Eisenhower also thought that operations on the 

Continent to establish a bridgehead would require more divisions 

than had originally been thought necessary 

(d) What were the relative merits of undertaking an operation against Sicily or Sardinia, particularly in regard to the 

effects on tonnage, and the development of forces in the United 

Kingdom? 

(e) Was an operation against Sicily merely a means towards 

an end or an end in itself7 Is it to be a part of an integrated 

plan to win the war or simply taking advantage of an OpportIInity? 

GENERBL MARSHALL said the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed 

that every effort must be made to build up forces to support Turkey in 

order to be able to reinforce her for resistance against the Axis powers 

209 
li S. SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

and to secure the use of her airfields for bombing operations by the 

United Nations.. 

He thought that if operations are to be undertaken in the blediterranean, they should be financed by the troops now in North Africa. 

One of the strongest arguments for undertaking such an operation is that 

there will be an excess of troops in North Africa once Tunisia has been 

cleared of the Axis forces. 

AI?k!IRAL KIKG stated that he thought it most important to determine how the war is to te conducted. The percentage of the war effort to 

be applied to Germany and to Japan must be determined as well as over-all 

plans for the defeat of each. He asked if Russia is to carry the burden 

as far as the ground forces are concerned; also, if the United Nations 

were to invade the Continent, and when. He said that since Europe is in 

the British areaof strategic responsibility, he would like to hear their 

Views on these questions. He thought it should be decided whether a 

planned step-by-step policy was to be pursued or whether we should rely 

on seizing opportunities. 

GENERAL &FOLD stated that he was interested to know whether an 

attack on Sicily was to be a means to an end or an end in itself and what 

relation such an attack would have to the whole strategic conception, 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that, when planning for GYMKAST, we were 

attempting to undertake an operation "on a shoe string." He said we then 

changed to the IIOIXFO-ROUP~UP concept and hadtoprepare for SLEDGEHAMMER 

because of the strong possibility of a Russian collapse last autumn. 

Troop concentrations had been started and production programs rearranged 

for BOLERO* This created difficult complications. The naval program was 

upset because of the necessity to undertake the construction of landing 

craft^, It was then decided to undertake Operation TORCH in which great 

risks were involved but in which we have been abnormally fortunate, 

GENERAL MARSHALL described the difficulties with which the United 

States Chiefs of Staff were faced over questions of priorities in production.. It was essential to fix our strategic policy as carefully as 

possible in order to avoid production difficulties. 

GENERAL WSHAIL thought it important that we now reorient ourselves and decide what the "main plot" is to be. Every diversion or side 

210 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

issue from the main plot acts as a "suction pump." He stated that the 

operations against Sicily appeared to be advantageous because of the 

excess number of troops in North Africa brought about by the splendid 

efforts of the British 8th Army. However, before deciding to undertake 

such an operasion, he thought it necessary to determine just what part 

it would play in the over-all strategic plan. 

SIE ALAK DEOOKE said that on the Continent Russia is the only 

ally having large land forces in action. Any effort of the other allies 

must necessarily be so small as to br unimportant in the over-all picture 

He felt that ground operations by the rlnited States and the Ihited Kingdom would not exert any great influence until there were definite signs 

that Germany was weakening. 

GENERAL MAPSHALL stated that it was desirable to force the enemy 

to meet usinair combat. He asked Sir Alan Brooke to discuss the effects 

of air superiority of the United Nations on the operations of ground 

troops of the Continent, He felt that if a bridgehead were established 

and Germany did not attempt to meet our air superiority, the bridgehead 

could be expanded, On the other hand, if they did meet our air superiority, It would necessitate withdrawing large air forces fran the nussian 

front. 

He referred to a suggestion by Mr, Molotov that we send a ground 

force to the Continent sufficient to divert forty German divisions from 

the Russian front, He said that this was out of the question and that our 

aim should be to weaken the German air power in the Russian theater 

rather than the ground forces. 

SIC ALAN BROOKE stated that with limited ground forces, he did 

not believe that we could constitute sufficient threat in Korthern France 

to the Germans to force them to withdraw much of their air power from 

the Russian front. The Germans have forty-four divisions in France, son13 

of which have been moved south as a result of Operation TOFCH. However, 

the Germans still have sufficient strength to overwhelm us on the grourrl 

and perhaps hem us in with wire or concrete to such an extent that any 

expansion of the bridgehead would be extremely difficult. Moreover, 

we cannot undertake any operation in Korthern France until very late in 

the summer of 1933. Since, therefore, we cannot go into the Continent in 

211 
U S, SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

force until Germany weakens, we should try to make the Germans disperse 

their forces as much as possible. This can be accomplished by attacking 

the German allies, Italy in particular. This would result in a considerable shortage of German troops on the Russian front. An effort should be 

made to put Italy out of the war, largely by bombing attacks on the north 

from the United Kingdom and in the south from North Africa and Sicily. 

Our policy should be to force Italy out of the war and bring 

Turkey in. If Italy were out ofthe war, Germany wouldbe forced to occupy 

that country with a considerable number of divisions and also would be 

forced to replace Italian divisions in other Axis occupied countries SUCII 

as Yugoslavia and Greece. 

Freparations for an attack against Sicily would be known to the 

Germans and would necessitate the dispersing of their forces to meet any 

of the capabilities of our amphibious forces. They would have to be pre-. 

pared to meet us in Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, Greece and the Dodecanese, 

and this would give great opportunity for deception plans. He felt that 

this would cause a much greater withdrawal of strength from the Russian 

front than any operations which we might undertake across the channel, 

The protection of the sea route alone would bring on a considerable air 

battle in the Mediterranean which will give relief to the Russian front. 

Airplanes which normally leave Russia during the winter months and participate in operations in the Mediterranean would be unable to return to 

the Russian front in the spring. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at the same time as operations against 

Sicily were being undertaken, there must be a continued build--up of the 

United Nations forces in the United Kingdom. These must be prepared to 

undertake the final action of the war as soon as Germany gives definite 

signs of weakness. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE did not believe we could undertake any further 

operations in Italy from Sicily in 1943, unless Italy collapsed corn.^. 

pletely, We shouldbevery careful of accepting any invitation to support 

an anti-Fascist insurrection. To do so might only immobilize a considerable force to no useful purpose, 

SIR ALAN BROOKE did not feel that air operations against the 

German and French railway systems in the north would be particularly 

212 
U, S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

effective or do anything morethan impose delay. There were somany alternative routes. On the other hand, operations against the north-south 

railway lines, particularly those in Italy, could be made effective 

because of the close proximity of the lines to theshore which makes them 

vulnerable to commando raids as well as to air action. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND discussed the effects that taking Sardinia and 

Sicily would have on thepassage of corlvoys. He said that securing either 

of these islands will not have as much effect as securing Tunisia, He 

anticipated that when Tunisia is gained, we shall be able to corlvoy 

thirty cargo ships through the Mediterranean every ten days which will 

result in the release of two hundred and twenty five ships for other 

purposes The route would notbesafe for personnel ships or tankers. The 

capture of Sardinia would have little effect on the movements of shipping. On the other hand, the capture of Sicily would enqble us to move 

troop convoys as well as cargo convoys through the Mediterranean with 

relative safety- The troop convoys, however, will, in the future, be 

limited almost entirely to replacement troops for the Middle EastHe stated that there will also be a saving in tankers because of 

the possibility of supplying the necessities for oil in theMediterranean 

from Haifa rather than bringing oil from the United States, 

SIR ALAN BROOKE recapitulated the comparative merits ofan attack 

on Sardinia and Sicily as follows- The loss of Sicily would be a much 

heavier blow to Italy than Sardinia and would effectively secure the sea 

route through the Mediterranean On the other hand, it was a much more 

ambitious operation and would have to be mounted later, Sardinia was a 

smaller undertaking, and could be mounted earlier It would provide an 

excellent air base for attackonIndustria1 Italy, particularlyffcopsioar 

were taken as well. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that if Sicily had to be taken 

later in the year and if the Germans in consequence were able to reinforce it more strongly, it would be a much tougher nut to crack On the 

other hand, once in possession of the Sicilian airfields we could make 

it very difficult indeed for the Axls to reinforce the island The railways along the Italian coasts in the two were vulnerable to' air attack 

and raiding; and there were narrow defiles leading from the port of 

hlessina in the island itself. 

213 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR CHARLES WRTAL referred to the suggestion that we might be 

able to offset inferiority in land forces in Northern France by the 

greatly superior air forces which couldbeoperated from the United Kingdom. So far as the Brest Peninsula was concerned, no fighter support 

could be given from the United Kingdom, since it was out of range. The 

Cherbourg Peninsula was better from this point of view and offered some 

possibilities as a preliminary operation. Nevertheless, with the limited 

air facilities in the Peninsula we should probably find ourselves pinned 

down at the neck of the Peninsula by ground forces whose superiority we 

should be unable to offset by the use of air. We should certainly be 

opposed by strong German air forces there. Once we were committed in 

Northern France the Germans would quickly bring up their air forces from 

the Mediterranean, realizing that wecouldnotundertake amphibious operations on a considerable scale both across the channel and in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, by threatening in the Mediterranean we 

should cause a far greater dispersion of German air forces. 

SIR CHARLES WRTAL said that in his view it was impossible to 

map out a detailed plan for winning the war, but Germany's position, if 

we knocked out Italy, would undoubtedly be most serious. Her ability to 

continue the fight depended on (a) the possession of the necessary resources and (b) the will to fight on. As regards resources, her main 

Shortages at present were oil and air power. We had no exact knowledge 

of her oil position, but ifshe had not succeeded in gaining the Caucasus 

oil, and if her synthetic oil plants were attacked by precision bombing 

in daylight, there could be little doubt that her forces would rapidly 

become immobilized from lack of oil. 

As regards her air forces, calculations had been made by the 

British Air Intelligence StaffsofCerman deficiencies under the following 

hypotheses : 

Case A - Italy fighting and Germany continuing the offensivein 

Caucasia . Case B - As for A, but Italy knocked out. 

Case C - Italy fighting and Germany holding a shortened line in 

Russia by withdrawing to Rostov. 

Case D - As for C, but Italy not fighting. 

214 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

German deficiencies in June 1943 were calculated as follows: 

Deficiencies in Deficiencies in 

Case 

First Line Aircraft Divisions 

A 1700 34 

B 2250 54 

C 700 9 

D 1250 30 

Germany's will to fight depended largely on her confidence in 

ultimate success. If we and the hussians began to score continual suc 

cesses against Germany, which she could not defeat owing to her lack of 

means, she would begin to realize that the prospects were hopeless. She 

might be faced with the dilemna of withdrawing all her troops from France 

and concentrating in the East against Russia. The way to defeat Germany, 

therefore, seemed to be to take every chance of attacking her oil sup 

plies; to increase the air bombardment of Germany itself with its inevi 

table results on German morale, andonindustrial capacity and its effect 

in producing heavy casualties in her population and great misery by the 

destruction of their dwellings. If we could achieve as well a series of 

successes, even though these might be comparatively small in extent, it 

seemed fairly certain that a point would be reached at which Germany 

would suddenly crack. No one, however, could say precisely when or how 

the collapse would come. 

ADMIRAL KING saidheunderstood the general concept ofthe British 

Chiefs of Staff was to make use of Russia's geographical position and 

her reserves of manpower to make the maineffort on land against Germany 

and to support Russia by diverting as many German forces as possible 

from the Eastern front. This raised the question as to whether we should 

not give Russia larger supplies of equipment 

Once the North African coast had been cleared it seemed that we 

should have a surplus of troops in North Africa and the Mediterranean 

whom we could not readily move elsewhere It seemed therefore economical 

to use them in that area if possible. Sicily seemed undoubtedly to offer 

a greater dividend though its cost would be higher than Sardinia 'Phc 

question was whether we could afford to delay so long before taking fur 

ther offensive action against Germany and whether the Russians would be 

satisfied unless a "second front" was opened inFrance The chief bottle 

neck seemed to be the provision of landing craft. Operations in horway 

21s 
ti. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

seemed to be worth examining though they would almost inevitably lead to 

a demand from Sweden for assistance and equipment. 

As regards the Brest Peninsula, it was worth noting that once we 

were established there, U. S. troops could be moved in direct from America without the need for trans-shipment inthe United Kingdom. The effect 

of capturing Brest on the U-boat war needed careful consideration. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Brest was one of the four Biscay 

ports used by the Germans as U-boat bases, but he doubted whether the 

possession ofthe peninsula would greatly assist theproposed heavy bomber 

attacks on Lorient, La Pallice and Bordeaux. All these were within easy 

range of the United Kingdom and to operate against them from the Brest 

Peninsula would involve putting in additional facilities there, The airfields in the peninsula were likely to be fully employed in the air defense ofthe area and direct support ofthe army, leaving nothing to spare 

for fighter escorts for daylight bombing attacks on the Biscay ports. 

The next point discussed was the effect of Mediterranean operations on BOLERO. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the number of divisions which 

the British Chiefs of Staff calculated could be made available by September 15th for operations from the United Kingdom into Northern France 

were: 

21-24 if the Mediterranean were closed down, 

16-18 if Mediterranean operations were undertakenIf the captureofSicily were undertaken, the number oflanding craft left 

available for operations in Northern France would be less, SIR WDLEY 

POUND observed that all calculationsofthe number of divisions available 

for operations inNorthern France were based onthe date ofSeptember 15th. 

In his view this was too late since the weather was liable to break in 

the third week in September and it was essential to have a port by then. 

The first assault should not be later than August 15th 

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired whether considerable numbers oflanding 

craft would not be required for the maintenance of Sicily after it was 

taken, 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that once Sicily had been occupied the 

air defense of the ports should presentnoparticular difficulty. We were 

able to put large ships into Malta which was very exposed to air attack. 

216 
U,. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The number of enemy airfields inthe toe of Italy was small, and fighters 

on the Sicilian airdromes should be able to deal with dive bombers. 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN then reviewed the British landing craft 

situation. Available landing craftwerebeingallocated broadly as follows: 

(a) A group in the United Kingdom of the smaller typesof 

cross-channel craft sufficient to lift 4 brigade groups with 

their vehicles, or 7 brigade groups loaded for raids when very 

few motor vehicles would be taken. 

(b) A group in the Western Mediterranean sufficient tolift 

1 brigade group complete. 

(c) A similar group in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

(d) A group in India sufficient to train 1 brigade group,but 

not enough to lift the brigade group if it had to undertake 

actual operations. 

(e) An oversea assault force, as a strategic reserve, sufficient to lift 6 brigade groups. The personnel would be carried 

in combat loaders but they could not all be put ashore in the 

first flight as the ships could not carry sufficient landing 

craft for the purpose. 

Every attempt was being made to organize landing craft bases in 

the U. K. so as to give the maximum flexibility and thus allow for a 

change of plan. The switch over from ROUNDUP to TORCH had caused great 

difficulties owing to the fact that bases prepared for ROUNDUP were in 

the South of England whereas Scottish bases had to be used for TORCH. 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN observed that hewas working onthe assumption that any U. S. troops would be carried in landing craft manned by 

the U. S. In the TORCH landings the majority of U. S. forces at Oran and 

Algiers had been landed in British manned craft. He emphasized the need 

for working out allocations oflanding craft well ahead owing to the long 

time involved in training the necessary crews. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the introduction of the L.S.T. and 

the L.C.I. necessitated considerable change in our ideas about landing 

craft; the former carried some 150 infantry as well as tanks, and the 

latter 250 infantry. He calculated that ifall theavailahle landing craft 

were concentrated in North Africa we should be able to lift a total of 

some 80,000 men by April. Allowing for the use of 105-foot and 50-foot 

217 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

craft as well, this lift would probably increase toabout 90,000 in June. 

If this force of landing craft were used for a second and third ferrying 

flight, ona short sea crossing, their lift would probablybeabout 60,000 

in the second flight and 45,000 in the third flight, allowing for inevitable casualties in craft. He considered the use of these landing craft, 

workingtobeaches, a sounder proposition than the risking of large ships 

under air attack. The latter should be reserved for the long ocean hauls. 

To transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean to the United 

Kingdom for a subsequent operation later in the year presented considerable problems, It was certainly essential to have considerable numbers 

of landing craft in the United Kingdom well in advance for training purposes. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Joint Planners had calculated August as the earliest date for the attack on Sicily. If the whole 

operation were mounted from North Africa in order to save escorts, the 

date would be postponed until the end of August. His own view was that, 

even under the latter condition, the date might be advanced to July. 

Assuming that the attack be launched about July ZOth, he expected that 

we might gain control of the Island within about six weeks. 

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired when, on the above assumptions, there 

would be sufficient landing craft inthe United Kingdom to take advantage 

of a crack in Germany. 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that three months would have to be 

allowed from the time when the landing craft could be dispensed with to 

the time when they wouldbe ready for action again in the United Kingdom. 

The large types of sea-going landing vessels presented no difficulty but 

small 50-foot craft were essential for the assault landing. Both the 

United States and British Planners were agreed that it was not possible 

to use the large craft forthe first flights. These small craft had to be 

collected from the site of operations, transported to Scotland, distributed for repair, reassembled and then again transported by ship to the 

South of England Par a Continental operation. 

There would be in England, however, at all times the assault 

force to which he had previously referred which could lift 4 Brigade 

Groups with their transport for an assault against heavy opposition. 

218 
0. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In sddition, for the follow-up troops, a great number of landing barges 

and small coasting vessels were being prepared. The spearhead wouldnotbe 

affected at all by operations in the Mediterranean and would always be 

kept intact. Any landing craft recovered from the llediterranean would 

therefore be in the nature of a bonus. 

ADhlIBAL KING said that the intended use of combat loaders for an 

assault on Sicily greatly disturbed him. He had hoped that it would be 

possible to use the larger typesoflanding craft instead. lle feared that 

a large number of these valuable combat loaders would be lost in the 

operation. 

MRD MUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that in the HUSKY plan all available 

I.,.S.T.'s and L.C.I.'s would be used, but in addition, 26 combat loaders 

were required for the assault troops. Oft,hese, the British could provide 

half. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the two main factors in winning 

the war were manpower and munitions. In respect to military manpower, 

the British Commonwealth had presumably mobilized practically up to the 

limit. The United States at the present time had reached about 60% of 

their contemplated strength in military manpower though the position 

had not yet completely stabilized. His own guess at :iussia's position 

was that she had mobilized about NO$ of available military manpower. 

China's resources in manpower were st,ill relatively ~~ntouched,and India 

likewise was scarcely tapped. 

As regards munitions, the greatest potential 1a.y in the United 

States. Xext came Great Britain, hut she could not supply the full needs 

of the Eritish Commonwealth forces. Ilussia was more self- supporting than 

at first appeared likely but had to receive a considerable amount of 

assistance from the Allies. I-rom the munitions point of view, China and 

India were liabilities since their available manpower enormously exceeded their industrial production. 

In the European theater ;:ussia was most advantageously placed for 

dealing with Jermany in view of her geographical position and manpower; 

in the kacific, China bore a similar relation to the Japanese. It should 

be our basic policy to provide the manpower resources of Russia and 

China with the necessary equipment to enable them to fight. hith this in 

mind, the :Inited States Chiefs of Staff set great store by Operation 

219 
5'. 5. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST CTCRST 

JAVENOUS. It seemed likely that oiie of' the major British contributions 

to the defeat of Japan would be to cortiplet,e the reconquest of Burma and 

the opening of the Ihrrna had. 

GENERAL. MARSIIALI, observed that, witrr regard to Opcration RAVENOUS, 

Chian:: Kai-snek kiad now wit:iilraw~i front his undertaking to move in from 

Yunnari on tlie grounds that Field \larshal 'Vavell could nnly provide very 

limited British forces and there would be no I%ritisnuaval strength in 

the Bay of 9etigal to cut tiic .Japauese reinforcements route to Xangoon. 

General Stilwell was certainly placed in n very difficult, position at 

the present time. 

Discussioir ttieri turned on tlie need for long-range planning in 

order that production policy could be coordinated witii strategy. 

GENERAL ARVOLD pointed out that if operations ill the :[editerranem 

were undertaken, the seizure of Drest, in tlie British view, would not be 

possible this year. Further, that even if Cherbourg or Brest were taken, 

our forces would not be able to break out for a further invasion of the 

Continent. It looked very rnncli as if no Continental operations oti any 

scale were in prospect before the spring of 134. iYe should :lave t,o decide not only what we were going to do in 13.13 but also irr 1'144 since 

otherwise, owill: to tire t,inie lag, our priorities in prixiui!tior~ might be 

wrongly decided. 

313 ALAX fi11OOI<Ii: i:xpre.ssed t,:ie view t,,int. wr siioiil cl ilc?i!iitel)­

count on reeirt,ering the Continent in 11JM oti a lar~escalc. 

SIR CII.UUES PORTAL pointed out, t,iiat producttion plans coulil iicver 

f'ollow strategy precisely sirice the situation chaiiged so frequelit,iy in 

war. ?he best that could be hoped for was to take broad decisions on 

inajor questions and these would always be in tlie uat,ure of romprimises. 

For example, when coilsidering the possibility of reentering t,he Zontineiit, 

it had been decided that we must treat it as a fortress and that heavy 

initial bombardment would be required to break into it. It iiad t:ierrt'orc 

been decided to Tive very high priority to the production of heavy bombcrs 

whicii would be iised to soften up Germany before tile iiivasiori of' t,lie 

Continent. 
0. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Further discussion then followed on the possibility of a German 

crack in 1943. 

SIE JOHN TILL felt that there was quite a possibility of beating 

Germany this year. We should therefore strain every nerve t,o effect t,tiis 

since the sooiler we beat Germany the sooner we could turn on .Tapan. we 

must not let Japan consoJ idate her position for too long. ,Japan certainly 

could not be beaten this year, but Cerniariy might. 

AJNIFAL K1h.C. doubt4 wliether 1:eriiiany could be defeated before 

1944. He felt that her defeat could orily be effert,ed by direct military 

action rather than by a failure inher morale. Vas it necessary, however, 

to accept that we could do nothing in Yortliern France before April 19441 

SIF CHAPLE5 PG1:'TiiI. said th%t this denended entirely on Germany's 

power of resistaiice. If we conceiitrat.er! everytliing we could OU Germany 

this year, it was yossjbl~ti,at we irtigiit, cause her to criimbJ~eand thus 

be able to move into ;ermariy witii cowyaratively rntall forces. !!nt,il this 

condition iiad been produced, tiowever, SOII!~ ?!: divisions would get us 

nowhere on the C.ontirient,. A factor which must not be forgotten was the 

terrific latent power of the onpressed people wiijch could only cane into 

play when the crumbling process started. at that moment, tiowever, their 

efforts might contribute greatly to the final collar~se. Ile did not see 

Germany fighting on arid on, complet,ely surroundrc! by the armed forces of 

the Allies. A point would come at which the whole struct,ure of Germany 

and the Nazi Party would collapse, arid this moment, niight well come during 

the current year. It was essential therefore to have ready a plan and 

some resources in the Thit,er! Kingdom to t,ake advantage of a crack In 

order to produce tbe crack, however, wemust keep up the maximum pressure 

on Germany by land operations; air bombardment alone was not sufficient 

In further discussion the importance of deciding the requirements 

and availability of escort vessels was emnhasjzerl. 'These appeared to be 

one of the principal limiting fact,ors. 

AnVIKbL KI?T said ttist, tliere was no reserve of escort vessels 

but if Operation HlItW were derided iinon: t,he V,ited ? tat,es and Eritish 

Navies would have to find the escort, vessels somehow just as t,hey had in 

the case of TOECH. 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

After some further discussion, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to reexamine the 

British plan for HUSKY in the light of the American and British 

resources of all kinds that can be made avaiIahle for it, and to 

calculate the earliest date by which the Operation could be 

mounted. 

3, SIIFPLIES. TO EIIFEIA. 

SIII DUDLEY POTJh’D recapitulated the factors governing PQ convoys 

to North Russia. With the present resources of the Home Fleet not more 

than one 30-ship convoy could be run every 40 to 42 days. Each convoy 

had to contain two oilers, leaving a net total of 28 cargo ships. With 

more destroyers it would be possible to “double-end“ the convoys, re.. 

ducing cycle to 27 days instead of 40-42. For this purpose about 12 

destroyers wouldbereyuired from tbe TI. r;. Kavy. He wished to emphasize, 

however, that if the Germans employed their surface ships boldly and kept 

up the same amount of air and Ti-boats as layt year, it was within their 

power to stop the PQ convoys altogether. 

6LNERAL SOMERVLLL reviewed t,he general problem of supplying 

H:r;sia The northern route vas at present the best since the turwround 

was shortest The turn-round on the Persian Gulf route was about five 

months Some fifteen ships a month are now being used on this route but 

the flow was restricted by port and inland transportation deficiencies 

Once the Mediterranean was opened some relief might be given by the use 

of HAIFA ,and the overland route from there to Bagdad. For this purpose 

additional heavy trucks for the road haul would be needed U. S, Tech 

nical troops were being dispatched to Persia to improve the trans-Persian 

transportation facilities, and it was hoped to increase these to about 

20,000 tons pr day. If this could be achieved, 40 ships a month instead 

of 15 could be sent into the Persian Gulf,. 

The sea route from Seattle to Vladivostok was also being used 

for nonnilitary supplies and raw materials. Twelve ships manned by the 

FUssians were now working this route, an3 it was hoped to add 10 ships a 

month in the future. The use of this route naturally depended on noninterference by the Japanese. 

222 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

A11 these potential increases in shipping to Pussia naturally 

would have to be found by cutting down elsewhere. If the opening of the 

Hediterranean saved some million and a half tons of shipping, this would 

provide a surplus for the purpose; but there appears to be no other 

sources. It shouldbepossible for Great Britain and the United States to 

keen the pipeline full even if these potential increases were made. The 

maximum tonnage might be as highas 10 million tons per annum; the target 

for the current year was 4 million but it was doubtful if it would be 

reached. One million deadweight torisot' snppl~iesfor Fussia were awaiting 

shipment now in IT. S. ports. 

SI�: U' BTOOKf observed that one uvsatisfactory feature of the 

whole business of supplying l.ussia was their refusal to put their cards 

on the table. It might well be that we were straining ourselves unduly 

and taking great risks when tliere was no real necessity to do so. 

4. EwLoY\!n;?' OF FrLbcii NFCZ I? WCTH GT,ICA. 

GEPJ3AL MAJSIIALL asked for t,he views of the British Chiefs of 

Staff on the employment of French dlvisions. The kited States Chiefs of 

Staff felt that they can be effectively used and that their use will 

effect a considerable economy of force. The French divisions regarded as 

being the best must be reeyuipped as soon as practical. This, however, 

has political complications which must be resolved. 

SIT mar; 8T;OOIiE agreed that we should exploit the use of French 

troops in ?orth Africa to the maximum, particularly for garrison work.. 

We should have to provide them vith a considerable quantity of antiair-. 

craft weapons. Their usefulness would depend greatl~yon whether we could 

establish a satisfactory French government. Good leadership was required 

to rekindle in them the desire to fight. Too marly of the French were Only 

waiting for the end of the war. 

GENEXAL MARSHALL asked what the effect would be on Spain if French 

troops were stationed opposite the borderof Spanish Morocco. There seemed 

no doubt that some very useful French divisions could be formed in North 

Africa. 

SIR ALAN BEOOKE thought that it would be wise to keep U. S. 

forces on the $panish border as well as French troops. This would tend 
U S SECRET 

R RITISH MOST SECRET 

to allay Spanish suspicionsof the French intentions and at the same time 

remove any temptation from the Spanish to cross the frontier if they 

thought the French troops of inferior quality. 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 59th b:eeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Veeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Sunday Janrrarv 17, 1043, at 1030 

PRESENT 

General C,. C. Uarshall. IjSA General Sir Alan 1.. Brooke 

Admiral E J King, IJSN Admiral of the Flee1 Sir Diidley 

Lt General 11. ti. Arnold, TjSA Pound 

Air Chief h!arshal Sjr Charles 

F A ?orr,aP 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO 1'RESENT 

Lt C-?neral FJ1 R Somervell IJSA Pleid i:arshal Sir -John Dill 

Rear admiral^ C h:. Cooke. Jr .VSN Vice Adniiral the Imrd Idorris 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer,:iSA h: oiintba ft,en 

Commander R. E. I,ihby, CYg 1.t Gerrrraj Sir ijast,ings 1. Ismag 

hlnjor General .J N Kennedy 

Air Vlee Marsllal'l %J, C Sl.essor 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V Dykes 

Brig. General J FI Deane, USA 

225 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. THE EASTERN THEATER, 

GENERAL MARSHALL proposed discussing a paper prepared by the 

United States Joint Staff Planners regarding the forces needed in the 

Pacific Theater in 1943. 

The Hritish Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like to have 

an opportunity to study the paper before discussing it in detail. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that in their discussions with the 

I~iritishPlanners, the United States Planners were told that the British 

<id not feel that ANAKIM was possible of accomplishment during the dry 

season of 1913-1911. lie said that the United States Chiefs of Staff are 

iiart,jcularly concerned about the timing of this operation because of the 

seriousness of the situation regarding China' 

ADMIRAL KING added that Operation ANAKIM was also of importance 

with regard to our strategy in defeating Japan., 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there were two stumbling blocks to 

Operation ANAKIM in 1943.. These are naval cover and the assemblage of 

landing craft in sufficient time topermit adequate training, He felt the 

la.nd forces could be found but that it, would be difficult to assemble 

t;iv ldnding craft, following Operation MISKY 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that in order to do Operation TORCH, it 

had been necessary to withdraw a considerable force from the Eastern 

Ileet and that it was probable the same conditions would pertain in 

operatjons undertaken in other theaters in 1943. 

ADMIRAL KING said that ANAKIM was at least ten months off. He 

added that to postpone the date would put us in a critical situation. It 

is absolutely essential that we utilize China's geographical position 

and their manpower and ANAKIhI is a step in this direction. 

ADMIRAL COOKE said that he felt the operation could be started 

in Xovember or December of 1943 and the actual landings be made in 

January Fle said that there wouldbe considerable landing craft available 

from production between April of 1943 and January of 1944. Some of this 

additional landing craft will be available for Burma in October. Therefore, the requirements for landing craft could probably be met. As 

for the naval force, he considered that we would only need carriers, 

226 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

destroyers, and cruisers. Re did not feel that battleships would be 

necessary if the Japanese were being contained by the United States 

Fleet inthe Pacific. The real bottleneck is the availability of shipping 

ADMIRAL XING said that he definitely considered that Operation 

ANAXIM must be aimed at in 1943 and carried through if the situation 

permits. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND considered in such an important operation that 

battleship cover would be necessary. 

ADMIRAL KING again pointed nut that the operation would not be 

undertaken for at least ten months 13y this time the destroyer program 

should be well along, the submarine menace should be reduced, and the 

shipping situation much improved through increased production and the 

opening of the Uediterranean To postpone the operation in 1943 would 

result in not undertaking it for almost two years. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then informed the Chiefs of Staff of a message 

which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had sent to the President in which 

he regretted that Chinese troops would not be able to participate in 

Operation RAVENOUS, the reasons being that the British ground forces are 

inadequate and that theBritish will not agree toengage the Eastern Fleet 

in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications. 

MRD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN stated that the British Chiefs of Staff 

agree that the Burma road must be opened and that the entire question is 

one of the availability of resources 

ADMIRAL KING said that the llnited States Chiefs of Staff recognize Germany isour prime enemy and that their strategy does not envisage 

a complete defeat of Japan before defeating Germany. He added, however, 

that every effort must be applied which will put us in a position of 

readiness from which we can operate against Japan after Germany has been 

defeated. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed to this unless the attainment of such 

positions of readiness would delay or jeopardize the defeat of Germany 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt it was a question of creating 

more than positions of readiness as far as the Japanese are concerned. 

227 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

We must maintain the initiative against them by offensive moves on our 

part. The present operations in the South Pacific are tremendously expensive in merchant vessels, naval vessels, and escorts. The situation 

is also fraught with the possibility of a sudden reverse and the consequent loss of sea power. He said that he is most anxious to open the 

Burma Road, not so much for the morale effect on China as for the need 

to provide air support to China for operations against Japan and Japanese 

shipping. He said the expensive operations in which we are now engaged 

in the South Pacific react on everything else the United Nations attempt 

to do whether it be in the Mediterranean, the United Kingdom, or elsewhere. He discussed the situation in the Pacific as being so critical as 

to make it appear at one time that Operation TORCH would have to be 

called off. He also stated that unless Operation ANAKIM could be undertaken, he felt that a situation might arise in the Pacific at any time 

that would necessitate the United States regretfully withdrawing from 

the commitments in the European theater. 

GENERAL MARSHALL spoke of our commitments in the Pacific, of our 

responsibilities, with particular reference to the number of garrisons 

we have on small islands and the impossibility of letting any of them 

down. lie insisted that the United States could not stand for another 

Rataan, Ee said that he is desirous of undertaking the 19urma operation 

in order to reduce our hazards in the Pacific and thus undertake the 

campaign against Germany. 

GENERAL MARSHALL spoke of other commitments in the Pacific that 

are serious hut in which we have been willing to accept the hazards In 

this connection he pointed to the Japanese operation in the Aleutians 

and the necessity of protecting the Hawaiian-Midway line of communications. In these instances he felt that, while we were vulnerable to Japanese attack, support from the united States could be furnished quickly 

because of the relatively short distances involved. 

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Chiefs of Staff that the President 

is desirons of giving additional air support to China. This will bedone 

because of the psychological results to be achieved despite the fact 

that it is a tremendously expensive operation. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the demands in the Pacific are 

enormous and continuous. hiany of the demands are made by Australia, 

228 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

a,Cominion of the British Commonwealth. Australia is in the area of the 

:;nited States strategic responsibility and most of our efforts have been 

devoted to protecting its line of communications. Re said, in this connection, that the political and military situations are interlocked and 

these factors must he considered together when deciding what operations 

are to he undertaken. He repeated that we must place ourselves in positions of readiness for the time when all the resources of the United 

Nations will he brought against Japan. 

2. ICELAND 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked for the views of the British Chiefs of 

Staff on the size of t,he garrison which should he maintained in Iceland. 

At the present time there were some 40,000 (United States' ground troops 

in the island and two squadrons of fighter aircraft, together with a 

squadron of naval patrol craft. lie was anxious to cut down these numbers. 

SIR DUDLET POUND said that the nritish garrison had been about 

22,000 men. In his view an invasion of Iceland by the Germans was quite 

out of the question. Taking into account, the general attitude of the 

Germans and their unwillingness to risk their ships without heavy air 

cover in Northern waters, he did riot think even a tip and run raid was 

at all likely. It was possible, of course, that they might change their 

policy, hut the only object of a German attempt to seize the island 

would be to deny it to us as an air base Our possession of it made our 

control of the Northern exit to the Atlantic more secure It seemed much 

more likely that if the Germans wished to adopt a more active policy, 

they would use their surface ships against our convoys rather than for 

a hazardous expedition against Iceland. These were his first thoughts 

and he would like to have a more considered opinion prepared for the 

bnited States Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL KING was in general agreement with the views of Sir 

Dudley Pound. He pointed out that the German situation had greatly 

changed during the last six months, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Took note that the Rritish Chiefs of Staff would prepare for the 

information of thp United States Chiefs of Staff a memorandum 

setting out their views on the defense of Iceland 

229 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH ,MOST SECRET 

3. :WSSIAN AIR ASSISTANCE FOR P. Q. CONVOYS. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that more should be done to induce the 

:Iiissians to attack the 'erman air forces in Northern Norway which were 

such a menace to the !.lurmansk convoys. The Serman air bases were out of 

range from the United Kingdom hut the Russiams could undoubtedly do 

something if they wished to. The Xurmansk route was the most important 

of the four routes for Xussian supplies, and he felt we ought to press 

the Aussians to give us more assistance. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the British had pressed the Xussians 

in 3.342 to assist with escorts and with air attack. They did provide 

some assistance with escorts, hut always found some reason for not sending t,heir surface ships out as far as Bear Island where the danger was 

greatest. Whatever they might undertake to do, however, it would be 

quite unsafe to rely on their promises, and reduce the scale of our own 

protection. 

As regards air, the ?ritish ?!issiorr had pressed the lussians 

hard for assistance, and the Prime ldinister had also communicated with 

!Jr. Stali.n= In the end some Xussian Army bombers had been sent North to 

aLtack the ;erman airdromes Such action, however, was only of very 

-:mited value. It would be no use asking them to attack the 5erman ships 

since they were untrained in this work. 'Two nriti.sh squadrons of Hampdens 

had bier1 sent up to Uorth Russia last year. At the beginning of the winter the ::ritish personnel had been withdrawn, and these were now manned 

by tlie .:ussians. Recently, however, when the Lutzow and Hipper came out, 

t,he 3iissians failed to take any action against them with these aircraft, 

although asked to do so. 

SIR CHAXES POSTAL said that the Zermans hadsome seven airfields 

bctween 3odo and Petsamo, all well defended. The Russians had three airfields in the :.!urmansk-Archangel area. Bombing of airfields was very un-­

profitable. For example, :lalta had only three airfields within 100 miles 

of Sicily but a very large force of German bombers had been quite unable 

to prevent us using them. Whatever they did, the Xussians would not be 

able to stop the German air reconnaissance., :Xedium bombers and long 

range fighters for their escorts wouldberequired for thepurpose; German 

fields were out of range of dive bombing attack. 

230 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH nlOST SECRET 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the possibility of amphibious opera-. 

tions to capture tkie German airfields had been most exhaustively examined 

by the British Staffs, but they had not been found practicable, The 

effect of TORCH, however, iiad been very great in ca.using withdrawals of 

German aircraft from Sorway. Their present strength was only about 53 

aircraft all told, whereas they had had up to 300 previously. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND pointed out t1:a.t one of the greatest, difficul-­

ties was tnat the convoys were opeii to attack for about ten days. This 

enatlled the Germans to reinforce their airfields in Korthern Norway from 

elsewhere before tile convoy was out of tne danger zone. 
0. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 60th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Monday, January 18, 1943, at 1030. 

PRESENT 

General G" C. Varshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. hl. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brie. General A. C. Wedemeyer.I USA Y -

Brig. General J. E. Hull, USA 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

(for the last item) 

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Mountb at ten 

Lt, General Sir Hastings L Ismay 

Major General J. N Kennedy 

Air Vice Marshal J. C Slessor 

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN': 

Brigadier G. M. Stewart* 

Air Commodore W. Elliott" 

Brigadier 11- W. M. Macleode 

Lt. Colonel W. A. Howkins" 

Brigadier E. I. C" Jacob"" 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

(The meeting adjourned from 1300 to 1500)

* For part of the meeting ** For second part of the meeting 

,232 
U. S~ SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. OPEFiATIONS IN BUFMA. 

(C.C.S. 154) 

At the request of GENERAL MARSHAI ADMIRAL COOKE discusse the 

landing craft situation in regard to Operation ANBXIM. He said the United 

States Planners had estimated th? number of landing craft of types built 

by the United States which would be required for Operation ANAKIM would 

be available in Povember 1943. These requirements can be made available 

fpom United etates production am! they will be in addition to allocations 

of' landing craft already vade. There has been uncertainty as to what the 

production of landing craft would be because of the necessity of revising the whole product,ion rirograni in the IJnited States. 

SI1: AIABE ET!OOXli askt-d if tiiis number of landing craft would be 

available over and above those rieeded in all other operations under consideration, including Fl?lih'IW. 

BDhlIRAL COCKE replied that t,Ilf' landing craft which would be made 

available for AFAKIS' would he from i'nited f:t,ates ?roduct,ion that will be 

too late for other operations in 1949 which are being considered, 

LOPP LOUIS MWFTEATTI3 stated that the British will be unable to 

man additional landing craft beyond those for which they are asking 

SIR ALAK EFOOKE then depcribed the proposed Operation ANAKIM. 

The operation must start by the middle of December in order to clear up 

the communications to the north after the capture of Pangoon. To protect 

the flank it would b? necessary to occupy Moulmein and the airports on 

the west coast of Thailand. It will be necessary to protect the east 

flank to prevent the .Japanese from coming in from Thailand by routes 

that are capabIe of sustaining a maximum of five divisions, in order to 

insure /that once in Burma, our forces remain there. Thereafter, it will 

also be necessary to maintain adequate air and naval cover to keep open 

the lines of communication to Cangoon. 

SIP ALAF BROOKE pointed out that naval forces must be built up 

for the operation. As far as air power is concerned, 18 squadrons will 

be available and can be provided. The lauding craft i.s tk' most ticklish 

question. Landing craft training establishments have now been provided 

for two brigade groups in the Mediterranean and one in India. There is 

also a mobile overseas reserve but it will take three months to move 

2 $3 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

this after it completes operations either in the Mediterranean or operations from the United Kingdom. He believed that th? necessary shipping 

could be made available but that the two main bottlenecks were naval 

coverage and landing craft. 

LDDMIRAL KIFG stated that we can count on shipping some landing 

craft from the Southwest Pacific to Burma together with operating crews. 

These could probably be made available in Burma in November. While the 

operation was at least ten months off, he did not see why necessary naval 

coverage could not be assembled, either by having the United States relieve the Eritish from naval missions elsewhere so that they could furnish the Burma coverage, or by supplying the de'ficiency from the United 

States naval units to participate in the Burma operation. He stated that 

he was willing to commit himself to assisting the British in these 

operations. 

BCMIIiAL. KIXG stated that our use of landing craft in the Pacific 

would be in the Fabaul Operations primarily. Operations beyond Rabaul 

would not require landing craft, of the types needed for Rabaul. The 

Rabaul operations would~becompleted long before ANAKIK would be mounted. 

He added that even though we had gone beyond Rabaul in the Pacific, the 

operations could be curtailed or lessened in order to insure the success 

of ANAKIM in view of its importance. 

LOED LOUIS MOUNTEATTEN said that the possibility of securing 

help from the Pacific altered the whole situation as far as the British 

were concerned and that with the assistance of the T'nited States, he 

thought that the necessary landing craft could be assembled. 

CENEFAL MBRSHaLL then asked Sir Alan Brooke to discuss the relation between Operation RAVEAOZIC and Operation ANAKIM. 

SIR ALAN ER,OOKE said that Operation CMWTIEALnow being undertaken 

was for the purpose of securing the airport in Akyab. This is necessary 

in order to furnish air support for future operations. He described 

Akyab as a locality in no man's land lightly garrisoned by both sides. 

He described Operation RAVENOUS as one to improve the line of 

communications preparatory to Operation ANAKIM, in order to drive in 

from the Northat the same timeas the offensive fran the South. A British 

234 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

corps is to secure bridgeheads over the Chindwin River and improve the 

road between Imphal and Kalewa, to connect it with the Chindwin River 

for use as a supply line to the South., The Famgarh force was to advance 

on MyitKyna from Led0 which will also enable us to build a road between 

these two points. This road will be of value in supplying our forces in 

Operation AXAKIP and also will be used as a connecting road to join with 

the main Burma road into China. 

SIR ALAJ E.FOOK& gave a resume’of the present conditionsof roads 

in Burma which indicated t,hst all. are badly in need of improvement- He 

said that all of the conlponent onerations of RAVEbOUS are independent of 

each other. The operation of the nri~tish2nd Corps from Imphal is thus 

independent of the action taken by the Chinese Famgarh and Yunnan forces 

The improvement of the road frm Led0 was only possible to the extent of 

the advance made by the Pamgarh f’orce. 

SIT, A1J.l’: BFGOKE said that AMKIK is now definitely on the books. 

is being planned, and sIion11J b? put, to the front. V;itlr the assistance 

from the United Ct,ates Favy in providing landing craft, the operation 

would be feasible. 

LORI) ILIUIC. %!OI~iFTELT’E>:t,hen discused again the question of landing craft with particular reference to paragraph I) (d) of C.C.S. 154 In 

reply to a question from 1:EY:EFAl. \:Ai:?liATL, he stated that the assault 

force in England would remain there as a permanent spearhead in case of 

a crack irr German morale. The overseas assault force contains sufficient 

landing craft to undert,ake the operation in Burma by October 1st pro^ 

vided that they had not been used in operations elsewhere If they had 

been so used, their use in Burma would be delayed for a period of three 

mont,hs following the termination of the operation in which they had been 

engaged He added, however, that with the assistance promised by Admiral 

King from the South Pacific, Ire felt that sufficient landing craft could 

be assembled to mount AKAKIY 

FIT CHAFUS POFTAL pointed out that the amphibious operations in 

Ah~AKIh. would have to be simmrted by aircraft, based on carriers 

ADCLIFIAL KIFG said the main point was that, we shoiild plan to do 

ANAKIM in 1943. 
(i S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Agreed that all plans and necessary preparations should be 

made for the purpose of mounting ANAKIM in 194% 

(b) Agreed that the actual mounting of Operation ANAKIM would 

be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the summer 

of 194.7 (preferably not later than July) in the light of the 

situation then existing. 

(c) Took note that if ANAKIhl is mounted in 1943, t,he United 

States will assist iri making up deficiencips in the necessary 

landing craft and naval forces by diversion from the Pacific 

Theater, and in merchant shipping, if rrecessar-3;. 

z,, THE SITIYATION To EL CFLATL~18- YF “a‘l’l;r.F: THLAT~.(THZ PACIFIC 

AND BIBMA) II 194.1. 

(C.C.S. 153 and 15?/1) 

SIF AUK ET001<li gtated that, the British Chiefs of Staff tookex. 

ception to paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 15.1 in that it did not provide that 

Germany must bc3 defeat,ed before uridertaking t,he defeat, of the Japanese 

GENERAL $EAR$HALL stated that, in his opinion, the British Chiefs 

of Staff wished to be certain that we keep the enemy engaged in the 

Xediterranean and that at the same time maintain a sufficient, force in 

the United Kingdom to take advantage of a rrack in t,he German strength 

either from the withdrawal of their forces in France or because of lowered morale He inferred that the Eritish Chjefs of Staff would prefer 

to maintain such a force in the IJnited Rj.ngdom dormant and awaiting an 

opportunity rather than have it utilized in a sustained attack elsewhere. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff know Chat the’y can use these forces 

offensively in the Pacific Theater. He felt that the yuestion resolved 

itself into whether we would maintain a large force in the United King 

dom awaiting an opportunity or keep the force engaged in an active of^ 

fensive in the Pacific 

GENERAL MARCHALL said that the number of troops used in the 

Pacific would not have much effect on the build-up of forces in the 

United Kingdom. The conflict arises chiefly in the use of landing craft 

and shipping. He said that to a large measure the shipping used in the 

Pacific is already committed and, therefore, could not be made available 

for a build-up of forces in the United Kingdom and the necessity of 

236 
17. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

maintaining them, These forces are at the erd of a long line of commications and t,he yuestion arises as to whether we should let them remain 

there, precariously or do something to improve their situation., 

SIP ALAP VFOORT stated that we have reached a stage in the war 

where ve mist, review the corrcct,ness of our basic strat,egic concept 

which calls for the dePe8t of Sermany first. 5e was convinced that we 

cannot defeat Cermany and Janan simiiltaneously. The Eriti.sh Chiefs of 

Staff have arrived at the conclusion that it will be better to concentrate on Germany. Pecanse of the distances involved, the British Chiefs 

of "taff believe that the defeat of' Japan first is impossible and that 

if we attempt to do so, we! shall lose the war. 

Fie said that having decided that it is necessary t,o defeat 

Germany first, the immediate question is whether to attempt to do so by 

an irivasion of Forthern France or t,o exploit our successes in North 

Africa The Fri Lisli Chiefs of' 5.taff consider that an all-out hiediterram 

ear1 effort is best, but that it mnst. be "all-out." 

He said the Eritish Chiefs of Staff appreciate the position .in 

the Pacific and that t,tiey will do everything they can to meet it but 

that t,hey feel we mnst give first consideration to the defeat of Germany. 

This can be, done by finishing Tunisia and then operating in the Mediterranean so as to draw the maximum number of German ground and air forces 

from the Russian front In undertakirig operations in the Filediterranean, 

assistance from the United States is necessary He felt that ifwe do not 

maintain constant pressure on Germany, they will be given an opportunity 

to recover and thus prolong the war 

GTNNEFAI, VAT.SHALL said the Thited States Chiefs of Staff do not 

propose doing nothing in the Mediterranean or in France; they have no 

idea that we, should not concentrate first on defeating Germany. The 

question that is to be decided is how this can best be accomplished. 

On the other hand, it is the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff 

that the war should be ended as quickly as possible, which cannot be 

accomplished if we neglect the Pacific theater entirely and leave the 

Japanese to consolidate' their gains and unnecessarily strengthen their 

position. 

GENEEAL MAESHALL said that he advocated an attack on the Continent but that he was opposed to immobilizing a large force in the United 

237 
U S..SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Kingdom, awaiting an uncertain prospect, when they might be better engaged 

in offensive operations which are possible 

GEKEFBZ, MARSHALL stated that it was apparently agreed by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff to give Russia every possible assistance and to 

endeavor to bring Turkey into the war. His primary concern with the 

operations in the Pacific was to insure that, our positions would be so 

strengthened as to provide us with the means for necessary operations 

rather than to continue conducting them on a ”shoe string.” He felt that 

this would ultimately reduce the necessity for tonnage in the Pacific 

and this was his chief reason for advocating operations in Burma.. 

$IF AIAN BROOKE said that the Pritish Chiefs of Staff certainly 

did not want to keep forces tied up in F.urope doing nothing. Curing the 

build-.up period, however, the first forces to arrive from America could 

not be used actively against the enemy; a certain minimum concentration 

had to be effected before they could be employed. His point was that we 

should direct our resources to the defeat of Germany first. He agreed as 

to the desirability of ANAKIK since it appeared that for this operation 

we could use forces available in the theater without detracting from the 

earliest possible defeat of Germany This conception was focused in paragraph 2 (c) of the British Joint Planning Staff’s paper (C.C.S,. 153/1) 

in which it was stated that we agreed in principle with the U. S. strat-. 

egy in the Pacific “provided always that its application does not prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany,” 

ADMIRBI, KING pointed out that this expression might be read as 

meaning that anything which was done in the Pacific interfered with the 

earliest possible defeat of Germany and that the Pacific theater should 

therefore remain totally inactive, 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this was certainly not the understanding of the British Chiefs of Staff who had always accepted that 

pressure should be maintained on Japan, They had, perhaps, misunderstood 

the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and thought that the point at issue was whether 

the main effort should be in the Pacific or in the United Kingdom The 

British view was that for getting at Germany in the immediate future, 

the k1editerranea.n offered better prospects than Northern France. For 

this purpose th?y were advocating Mediterranean operations with amphibious forces while concentrating, so far as the United Kingdom was 

238 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

concerned, on building up a large heavy bmber force, which was the only 

form of force that could operate continuously against germ any^ 

GEP'EFBL i!AAFS!IALI, said that he was most anxious not to become 

committed to interminable operations in the Xedi terranean. lie wished 

Northern France to be the scene of the main effort against Germany-­

that had always been his conception. 

SIF CHAFLIC POTTAI. said that it was imnossible to say exactly 

where we should stop in the j'editerranesn sirlce we hoped to knock Italy 

out altogether. This action would give the greatest support to Pwssia 

and might open the door to an invasion of France. 

GEKI!BAL YAMHLLI. pointed nut that, extended operations in the Med ­

iterranean as we11 as the concentration of forces in England for the 

invasionof Korthern France might well prevent 11s from undertaking opera.­

tions in Burma; he was not at all in favor of this.. Moreover, American 

forces at present in the Southw?st Pacific were desperately short at 

present of their immediate reyuirements. 

AEYIFAL KINr said that we had on many occasions been close to a 

disaster in the Pacific. The real point at issue was to determine the 

balance between the effort to be put against Germany and against Japan, 

but we must have enough in the Pacific tome.intain the initiative against 

the Japanese. The U. S. intentions were not to plan for anything beyond 

gaining positions in readiness for the final offensive against Japan He 

felt very strongly, however, that the details of such operations must be 

left to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, who were strategically responsible 

for the Pacific theater. He did not feel this was a question for a deci-­

sion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U. S, Chiefs of Staff had not 

been consulted before the British undertook operations in Madagascar and 

French Eomaliland--nor did they expect to be; but the same considerations 

applied to the details of operations in the Pacific. 

In his view there would be plenty of forces in the theater for 

all necessary operations in the Mediterranean aml it was now determined 

that such operations should be, undertaken, The operations contemplated 

in the Pacific, however, would have no effect on what could be done in 

the Mediterranean or from the Irnited Kingdom. 

SIR. CHARIZES POI!TI; said that the British Chiefs of Staff would 

be satisfied if they could be assured of this point, Their fear was that 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the result of extended operationsin the Pacific might be an instfficient 

concentration in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in 

Germany. 

GEhEML UAFSHAIL pointed out that the whole concept of defeating 

Germany first had been jeopardized by the lack of resources in the Pacific. Heavy bombers set up to go to the Ilnited Kingdom had had to be 

diverted to the South Pacific to avoid disaster there. Fortunately 

disaster had been avoided; but if it had occurred, there would have been 

a huge diversion of T!. t. effort to the Pacific theater. The U. S. had 

nearly been compelled to pull out of TOFCH and the decision to spare the 

necessary naval forces from the Pacific had been a most courageous one 

on the part of Admiral King. A hand-to-mouth policy of this nature was 

most uneconomical. He was anxioustoget a secure position in the Pacific 

so that we knew where we were. The reconyuest of Burma would be an 

enormous contribution to this and would effect ultimately agreat economy 

of forces. 

Discussion then turned on the operations proposed to secure the 

Pacific theater, which were set out in C.C.S. 153 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in the British view it would be sufficient to stop at Rabaul and ANAKIM and that to go on to Truk would 

take up too much force. There would inevitably be large shipping losses 

in the course of such operations, which would be a continuous drain on 

our resources 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the proposed operations would be 

carried out one after the other. After Rahaul had been captured, the 

same forces might be employed to go on to the Marshalls. Rabaul might be 

taken by May and ANAKIM could not start before Eovember. During the intervening months, surely the troops in the theater should not be allowed 

to remain idle but should be employed to keepuppressure on the Japanese 

and maintain the initiative. Only by this means could we offset the advantage which the Japanese had in their possession of interior lines. 

Operations into the Marshalls could be stopped at any point desired and 

were not an unlimited commitment which had to be seen through to the 

end, It might well be that Truk would, after all, be found impossible to 

capture this year. 

240 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENEFAL MAESHALL said that there seemed general agreement as to 

the need for the capture of Rabaul and the desirability of ANAKIM.. Could 

it not be agreed that operations should he continued as far as Truk if 

it were possible with the forces available at that time? There should be 

no question of sacrificing AhAKIY for Truk 

SIF; CHAPLEZ PORTAL said he would not like to be committed to 

ANAKIM, even with forces released after the capture of Fabaul, without 

first reviewing whether some other operation more profitable to the war 

as a whole might not be desirable. For example, to take an extreme case? 

suppose after the capture of nabaul a good opport,unity arosei owing to a 

crack in Germany, of breaking into France. Ctiould we refuse to take Rd.­

vantage of it because we were already committed to A!AKIM? 

GEKEPAL I:A�:CHALL felt that if such a situat,ion arose we should 

certainly seize ths opFrtunity. Ile agreed that a furt,Iier meeting of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff might be, necessary in the summer to decide 

these questions 

SIP ALAN BPOOKE proposed that at, the present time we should limit 

our outlook in the Pacific to b.abaul, which should certainly be under 

taken, and to preparations for AKAKIM, the decision to launch this being 

taken later Similarly, any decision on Truk shouid be deferred 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the effect of this wouidhe strictly 

to limit commitments in the Pacific, although the British Chiefs of 

Staff apparently contemplated an unlimited commitment in the European 

theater. 

GXNEEAJ, MARSHALL agreed that a decision on AhAKIM and Truk 

could be left until later He pointed out, that C C S 153 merely pro 

posed a series of operations which might be carried out. in 1943 with the 

means available 

ALIMIPAL KING said that on logistic grounds alone it would be 

impossible to bring forces from the Pacific theater to the European 

theater. AYAKIM was not therefore an alternative to operations in the 

European theater 

GENERAL SOMERVELL supported this view, He pointed out that, once 

Rabaul had &,en seized, ships would be required to maintain the garrison 

241 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

there and these could be mployed to exploit success by minor operations 

against other islands:, 

As regards landing craft, theU. S. Chiefs of Staff had committed 

themselves to supply a large proportion of the craft nceckd for LYAKIM. 

Operations against the Pacific Islands required combat, loaders and not 

the tank-landing ships and tank-landing craft which were needed elsewhere 

ADMIRaL COOKE said that a very large proportion of the U.. S 

shipping in the Pacific was needed for the maintenance of the Fleet, 

which was operating 7,000 miles from its home bases: This requirement 

would continue whether or not operatjons against Truk were undertaken, 

U, S. production of L.S.T.'s would shortly amount, to about fifteenper 

month These could not be ready in time for Mediterranean operations in 

the summerl but would be available for ANAKIX As regards land forces, 

the figure of 250,000 put down in C.C.P. 153 included 150,000 men now in 

movement or set up to move, and another two di~visioriswhichheunderstead 

were already earmarked for operations in Eurma this year from India 

This left a total of only some 50,000 men additional for the whole 

Pacific theater 

SIP, CHAF.LES. PORTAL reiterated that it would be unwise to accept 

a definite commitment for BFiAKIbl now since a favorable situation might 

arise in Europe during the year which would make operations in the Euro 

pean theater more profitable than anything in the Facifiz 

ADMIRAL KING said that forces set out in C C.S 153 constituted 

the minimum necessary to maintain pressure on the Japanese .Aithough the 

forces in the Pacific were primarily for defensive purposes. many of 

them could be med siml taneously for minor offensi-ves. such 9s air bom 

bardment of Japanese bases Favorable opportunities might then be seized 

for exploitation 

GENERAL MAKSHALZ. suggested that paragraph 11 (c) of C C S 153 

could be revised to read "seizure and occupation of Gil.bert Islands, 

Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands up to and including Truk wtth the re 

sources avazlable in the theater n 

(The meeting adjourned at this point ) 

On the resumption of their meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

had before them a draft note setting out tentative agreements which 

appeared to have been reached in the preceding discussion 

242 
IT S SECREI‘ 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

After some further discussion, 

THE C OMi!ITTEE: 

(a) Invited General Ismay and General Hu to redraft t j no .e 

to include further points which had been raised 

(b) Instructed the Fecretaries to circulate this draft for discussion at the next meting. 

3 ZSCORT V3 CSEL! . SIR 01:I:TTY I’CUT emphasized. tht= need for the Combined. Chiefs of 

Staff having before them a moper survey of the escort vessel position 

before taking any final decision onoperations during the coming year He 

recapitulated the 1:ritish needs for addltiorjal escorts in the Atlantic and 

pointed out that considerable T. C. assistance waul dbe reyuired not only 

in the Atlantic but also for WSIWif that operat,ionwere undertaken When 

escorts were withdrawn for anoperat,ion such as TORCH or FIIICKY, they were 

absent from their normal duties for about four months It, took at, least 

one month to collect them beforehand from the various convoys on which 

they were working and a similar period to redistribute them after the 

operation. Experience in TORCH had shown that it was not possible to re.. 

lease them from the operation itself under about two mont,hs 

ADMIRAL KING said that with the U. S, and I;. K construction 

coming out during the next six months, the position should be easier by 

July, when HUSKY was to be launched~ He thought it should be possible to 

find additional escorts for the Atlantic as well as those required for 

HUSKY., If the use of combat loaders for HUSKY could be cut to the mini 

mum, escort requirements would be correspondingly reduced 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that new construction in the U, K, was 

comparatively small during the first half of 1943 and would do little 

more than make good recent heavy losses 

ADMIRfi COOKE said that the emamination of the escort position 

by the British Joint Planning Staff was progressing well but it appeared 

that the total number of I;. 6. and British escort vessels would not be 

sufficientto provide any surplus after providing for normal convoy work 

Any operations undertaken would therefore involve accepting increased 

losses in normal convoys.. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to 

decide what losses would be acceptable, 

243 
c' S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The discussion then turned on the relation of PsQsconvoys to 

Mediterranean operations ,, 

SIR DUDLEY POTIN! said that one problem was whether a 30--ship 

convoy every forty days would be considered sufficient for Russia or 

whether we should be pressed, as we had been in the past, to increase 

Russian deliveries. The worst three mont.hs were from February to the 

middle of Yay when daylight hours were increasing and the channel was 

restricted by ice Later in the year the fce retreated and although the 

days were longer, the passage of convoys became less dangerous. 

WNERAL MARSHALL felt that we should not again risk the same 

heavy losses which had been sustained on the Eussian convoys in 1942. 

Such losses were likely to cripple our whole offensive effort against 

the enemy. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should include 

a reference to this effect in the note which was being drafted One 

alleviating factor was the improvement in the Persian Gulf route which 

would offset reductions on the Murmansk route 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the Prime h!inister had made it clear 

to Mr , Stalin that we might have to call off P.Q. convoys if the scale of 

German attack became too heavy. If warning was givenofour intention to 

stop the convoys, there was likely to be heavy pressure to increase 

deliveries during the early part of the year, when, as he had previously 

explained, conditions were most difficult This meant either increasing 

the size of the convoys or reducing the cycle The dangers which we were 

likely to face this year were much greeter than last year 

4 POTENTIALITIES OF POLISH FORCES. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE', in answer to a question by GENERAL MBRSHALL, 

said that the Polish forces consisted (1) of a "secret" army inside 

Poland and (2) of regular Polish troops outside the country As regards 

the first, there was a definite organization of determined men; with 

leaders, though they were almost entirely unarmed Their intelligence 

service had been good, but recently many of their age,nts had been caught 

by the Germans and less information about German forces was now coming 

out from Poland, C,eneral Sikorski claimed that by the use of this organization he could do great damage on the Polish railways to interrupt 

German communications at a critical m=nt There could be no doubt that 

244 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

this secret army would play a valuable part in the final rising against 

Germany, particularly if combined with similar action in adjacent Balkan 

countries. There was always a danger of a premature rising, however. 

The Polish forces outside Poland consisted of an armored division 

and a parachute brigade with certain other units in the United Kingdom 

and2 divisions and ?brigade groups in the Middle East. General Sikorski's 

conception was to get some of these troops into Poland to supplemnt the 

secret army. The difficulty was the methodof transport, on which General 

Sikorski was rather vague. He envisaged the use of air transport and 

parachutes, but there were obvious limitations in this. 

GEhZFAL b!AF!SHLLI, inquired whether any steps had been taken to 

meet a request of General Sikorski for the bombing of an area in Poland 

from which the Germans were clearing out all Polish inhabitants under 

circumstances of great brutality. 

SIB. CHAPLES PORTAL said the Poles had been informed that this 

operation was impracticable, hut steps would be taken to publicize the 

presence of Polish air forces in the raids on Berlin which might be considered partly as a reprisal on behalf of Poland. 

5 RAIDS ON BERLIN. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL gave details of the recent raids on Berlin, 

and estimated that, making all allowance for the comparative sizes of 

London and Berlin and the time interval, the two raids on Berlin on 

successive nights had hit Berlin about twice as hard as London had been 

hit in the two heaviest raids of April and May 1931. The aggregate losses 

in the two Berlin raids amounted to 6 percent, the figure expecte,d being 

10 percent, The effect of the raids would be largeJy morale though there 

were important electrical works in the area attacked" They would be a 

great encouragement to the Russians as well as the Poles. 

(SIR ANDREW CUTWINGHAM entered the meeting at this point.) 

6 NAVAL SITUATION IN THE WSTERh' MEDITERRANJ3AN. 

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that the Germans might threaten our 

shipping passing through the Straits of Gibraltar by U-boats and by 

aircraft and coast defense guns from Southern Spain. He considered the 

risk from U-boats was comparatively small.. The Germans had never been 

245 
li S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

able to maintain many U-boats in the Straits where currents made their 

operation difficult, The danger from aircraft would be no less than to 

coastal convoys along the east coast of Englard. Provided we had fighters 

established in the airfields of Cpaniski h!orocco, we should he able to 

deal with this threat. Coast, defense guns constituted the greatest 

danger, biv.t onlj experience rwuJd show liow bad t,l-.is would be. The guns 

were sunposeri to have Iadar rar!g,e-findjrig apnarat,us hut we had means of 

jamniing tiij~sviijci! voiild nrobabJ) be txf'fpr:tive. ?he guns would have to 

he neutralized by count,er-battery from the southern shore and by air 

bombardmerit ~ 

:Ie t.Iiougkit, that, ships wit,li a srped of 1~? Imots and upwards would 

get througli the straits wit,hout Iieavy Ins 6 even with the Germans in 

Southern Spain providrd we held Lpanish ::orocco. Even without it, we 

shouJd he able t,o get some convoys through by night. The Planning Staffs 

at Algiers liRd been examining the problem and their greliminary conclusions were that jf we seized Lajorca we should he able to prevent the 

Germans building up a large air st,rength in Southern Spain. 

SIP EI,PL?Y PGUbJ? said that in spite of the German coast defense 

guns on the French shore of the Straits of Dover,we had not lost a ship 

from them The range. however, was some 38,000 yards, whereas the distance across the Straits of Gibraltar was only about half thatSIR AM- HPOOKE said that a plan had been prepared for seizing 

Southern Spain with a force of about six divisions It would not he possible, however, to do this at the same time as HUSKY It must he remembered that even if the Spaniards offered no resistance at, all it would 

take some time for the Germans to become fully established in Southern 

Spain 

AEVIrAI, CTIh'NIh~GIiAhi, referring to the possibility of capturing 

Sicily, said that he did not anticipate, very heavy shipping losses in 

the operation but the actual a-sault of the beaches would he a very expensive operation. He did not consider that the possession of the island 

would very greatly add to the security of the sea route through the Mediterranean. If we were in Cicily, he would estimate this route as being 

90 percent or more secure; without Sicily, it would he about 85 percent 

secure, once we held the whole of the North African coast. 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIF CHBRLPS PORTAL pointed out that from the air point of view 

the possession of Sicily would make a very considerable difference. If 

the Germans were not in the island, it would be difficult for them to 

operate against our shipping at all; they would hav? to use bases in 

Sardinia and the mainland of Italy, which were a considerable distance 

from the Xaarrows. 

C: ':'Il~LLCIIYYIKGFIAM then described the naval situation in the 

Tunisia area. The Germans had made heavy attacks on Eone on three 

successive days damaging four merchant ships and a cruiser, but the 

defenses were now much improved and our cruisers were still operating 

from the port. i,e hadat first sunk about one ship a day, but the Germans 

were getting far too many ships into Tunisia now. We should be able to 

inflict much greater damage on them as soon as we had fully organized 

our arrangements. Steps were now being taken to blockthe channel between 

the Italian minefields with our own mines. 

24 7 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 61st Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of h!eeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Tuesday, January 19, 1943, at 1000. 

PRESENT 

General G. C,, Marshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt General B. B Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Rear Admiral C. hl. Cooke, Jr.,USN Vice Admiral t,he Lord Louis 

Brig. General J. E. Hull, USA Moun tb a t ten 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer,USA Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA Major General J. N Kennedy 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN Air Vice Marshal J~ C - Slessor 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

Lt. Colonel L. T. Grove, USA 

24 8 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1.. CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943. 

(C.C.S. 155) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a draft memorandum pre-­

pared as a result of their meeting the previous day. Certain amendments 

were suggested and agreed. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Approved the memorandum* as amended. 

2., SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE AGENDA OF THE 

CONFERENCE. 

(C .C .S I 455/1) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a note, prepared by the 

Combined Staffs suggesting the procedure to be followed for dealing with 

the major questions on the agreed Agenda of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

(C.C.S , 140) ., Certain alterat,ions were suggested to the tentative program 

of meetings set, out in the annex to these minutes, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Approved the suggested procedure subject to the Annex being 

revised as agreed at their meeting.::::: 

3, STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY AND COMMAND SET UP FOR DAKAR 

FRENCH WEST AFRICA. 

ADMIRAL KING said that no question of land forces was involved 

in West Africa., Admiral Glassford had proposed that the West African 

Coast from Cape Bojador to the Western boundary of Sierra Leone should 

be placed under French naval command The French naval forces should be 

responsible for such operations off shore as might be necessary in that 

area. He understood that M, BoissonandAdmiral Collinet were both agree 

able to this suggestion,, 

The propos.ed arrangement would include the air cover for off 

shore operations. The difficulty would be the lack of equipment of the 

French air forces I He suggested that toovercome this difficultyweshould 

set out to familiarize the French with modern aircraft, To do this it 

would be necessary to give tnem up to-date equipment and adequate 

:: Subsequently issued as C C S 155,’l 

:CV Annex 

249 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

training and to include them, so far as possible, in actual operations 

He said that the Mest African coast from Cape Bojador southwards was a 

British sphere, and his proposalwasthat the French in their area should 

work under Admiral Pegram. Me should have to decide whether to deal with 

the French as full allies or whether it would be necessary to exercise 

some degree of control over them. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that he had formed the impression that 

Admiral Collinet was all out to help and that the arrangement which 

Admiral Glassford proposed was based on the assumption that the French 

would fully cooperate. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was in general agreement with 

the suggestions put forward by Admiral King. 

It was essential that all coastal air operations in Mest Africa 

should be coordinated by the British Air Commander who would be working 

in cooperation with the British Naval Commander Be was fully alive to 

the importance of giving the French airmen at Dakar some equipment to 

enable them immediately to take a share inair operations in the proposed 

French sub-area. For this purpose he proposed, subject to the agreement 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to allot them 2 Sunderland Flying Boats 

and 4 Hudson patrol bombers which, to begin with, would be operated by 

British crews with themore experienced French crews alongside them until 

they were fit to take over themselves 

He was less anxious about the reliability of the French than 

about their technical ability and training \So far, they had neither the 

equipment, training or experience of coastal air operations 'in modern 

war, He proposed, therefore, that the less experienced French air crews, 

together with the appropriate maintenance personnel, should be withdrawn 

to British training establishments, with the object of forming them, if 

they turned out to be any good and as soon as the equipment could be 

made available into two squadrons, one ofcatalinas and one of Wellington 

patrol bombers He agreed that the equipment of these coastal squadrons 

in West Africa should be a British responsibility, but pointed out that, 

owing to present shortage of suitable aircraft and the necessity for 

adequate training of crews, the formation of the proposed two squadrons 

was not likely to be practicable in the immediate future. 

250 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the United States concept was gradually 

to draw in French air force personnel as they became trained andequipped 

for operational work over a period of about a year. He agreed that in 

French Mest Africa this would be a British responsibility. 

GENERAL MARSHAIL said that he was in favor of proceeding with a 

definite program for reequipping the French forces. This would, of 

course, imply French acceptance of our organizationand training methods, 

and would inevitably delay the progress of equipping our own forces,. He 

thought, however, that we should do tr.e thing whole--heartedly; and he 

was prepared, subject to General Eisenhower's views, tomodify the United 

States program in order to equip French forces up to a strength of 

250,000. All the equipment provided for theFrench would be at the expense 

of United States troops forming in America. lie proposed to make use of 

French shipping to bring it, over: 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that General Giraud had agreed to turn 

over 160,000 tons of French shipping t,o the Allied pool. Out of this 

tonriage General Giraud proposed that 85,000 tons should be al~locatedto 

meet French civil requirements, leaving 75,000 tons for shipping equip-. 

ment for tne French forces. General Somervell calculated that this would 

enable them to be equipped at the rate of about one division a month. No 

allowance was made in this program for the carriage of coal and oil which 

was at present being shipped by the British 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Agreed: 

(a) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador 

(Rio d'0ro) southward shall be an area under command of a 

British Naval Officer for naval operationsandof a British 

Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval 

forces. 

(b) That subject to (a), a sub,-area extending from Cape Boja-. 

dor to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces 

operating therein shall be under French Command. 

(c) That in the French sub-area the intention wiIl be toenable 

French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as 

equipment and training permit, 

251 
17 S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

4 PUBLICATION OF RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE 

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew the attention of the Committee to the 

decision which the Fresident and the Prime Minister had made at their 

meeting the previous day that: 

(a) The results of this conference should be communicated to 

Stalin in tkie form of a document setting out our intentions for 

1943. 

(b) A communique should be prepared for issue to the Press 

when the conference is finished.. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that a small subcommittee should be 

appointed to draft a suitable document for approval by the Conunittee at 

the end of the conference. 

THE COMMITTEE 2 

Agreed: 

To appoint a subcommittee for this purpose consisting of: 

United States Representatives: 

Brigadier General Hull 

Colonel Smart 

Commander Libby 

British Representatives : 

Lt. General Ismay 

Major General Kennedy 

Air Vice Marshal Slessor 

252 
17 S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO MINUTES 61ST MEETING 

REVISED PROGRAM OF MEETINGS 

TUESDAY, 19th: 

Liscussion of future procedure. 

System of command in French Nest Africa. 

Turkey and Ayis oil. 

WEDNESDAY, 20th: 

Organization of command and allocation of spheres of responsibility 

in the Mediterranean. 

Assistance to Russia in relation to other commitments. 

HUSKY 

Bomber Offensive from North Africa. 

THIJH.&IAY, 21st: 

U Boat Rar~ 

Landing Craft. 

FRIDAY, 22nd: 

somber Offensive from U. K 

BOLERO Build-up 

1913 Limited Operations from U. K. 

SATURDAY, 23rd: 

ANAKIM. 

SOUTHWE3T PACIFIC. 

253 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 82nd Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Tuesday, January 19, 1943, at 1600. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE AISO PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General J. E. Iiull, USA 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Major C R. Codman, USA :%:% 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Mountbatten 

Lt-General Sir Hastings L Ismay 

Major General J. N. Kennedy 

Air Vice Marshal ,J. C. Slessor 

Air Vice Marshal F. F. Inglis :: 

Lt. Colonel C. E. R. Hirsch : 

General Henri Giraud ++ 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

,: For Item 1 

a* For Item 3 

251 
U.. S. SECRET 

BRITISF MO.CT SECRET 

1. AXIS OIL POSITION. 

(C.C.S. 158) 

THE CObfBlNED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a note by the 

Assistant Chief of British $ir Staff (Intelligence) summarizing the lab 

est British views on the Axis oil position (C.C.3. 158). 

SIZ CIIAXLES PORTAL said that the British had fully realized the 

great strategical importance of oil targets in Germany, but for tactical 

reasons these were extremely difficult to attack. The most important 

targets were the synthetic oil plants and the ilumanian oil refineries. 

Unfortunately the latter, from bases atpresent available, were at extreme 

range of our bombers; and he felt that it would be a mistake tomake light 

and sporadic attacks on Ploesti, which would do little harm and only 

result in an increase of the German air defenses. It would be better to 

wait until we had the Turkish air bases before starting our attacks. The 

synthetic oil plants were in the Ruhr and elsewhere, but they were very 

small targets which needed precision bombing to put out ofaction. Recent 

developments in radio navigation increased the chances of success on 

these targets, and great hopes were placed on the possibility of dayli.ght 

precision bombing by the U. S. Air Forces. When a sufficient force had 

been built up in a few months' time, it might be possible to resume 

attacks on these targets more effectively, provided of course that this 

could be achieved without prejudice to the li-boat warfare. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the Ploesti fields--which were 

roughly equidistant from Sicily, Benghazi, Cdiro, andAleppo--were within 

range of the 6-24 with a load of 4,000 pounds of bombs OT under. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that one ofthechief difficulties 

was getting thenecessary meteorological information, without which long-. 

distance attacks of this nature were unlikely to be successful. It was 

becoming increasingly difficult to obtain information from secret radio 

stations in the Balkans owing to the activities of the Gestapo. 

AIR VICE MARSHAL INGLIS confirmed that in the British view the 

Rumanian oil supplies were vital to Germany. Her stocks were so low that 

she depended on Rumanian oil for about thirty-three percent of her total 

need. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that thelatest American estimate was less 

255 
11. S. SECR5T 

YPITISY YOST SECilET 

optimistic about the shortage of oil in \Germany than the British. It was 

believed that Germany would have a surplus of ahoirt 40,000,000 barrels 

at the end of 1943 instead of the 10,000,OUO barrels which she had at 

the end of 1912, owing to the opening up of new sources in Ilungary and 

elsewhere. It was, therefore, calculated that even if the whole of the 

Rumanian production were knocked out early in the year, she would still 

have enough for operations in 1914. There were two tetraethyl lead 

factories however, the destruction of which would hamstring lie nroduction of German aviation fuel. 

SIR CHARLES WRTAL suggested that this latest 4merican information 

should be immediately given to the British intelligence Staffs with a 

view to the production of an agreeii estimate. 

GENERAL MARSHALL emphasized the importance of making great 

efforts against German oil if we could be sure that it formed a really 

critical target. U. S. aircraft in the Southwest Pacific were bombing 

targets at a greater distance from their base than Humania from the 

present bases available. We might have to wait a long time before the 

Turkish bases could be used. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that we must be sure our bombing would 

be really effective. The value of attacks on German oil had to be balanced 

against the needs of HUSKY, for which we should try to cause the maximum loss to the German air forces in the Mediterranean during the coming 

months Only by this means could we hope to obtain the necessary air 

superiority on which depended the success of the operation 

After some discussion, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Took note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that 

it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the 

sources of Axis oil--namely, the Rumanian oilfields and oil 

traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas 

plants in Germany--be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow. 

(b) Directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as 

early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil 

2 56 
U. S. SECRET 

JRITISY MOST SECIIET 

situation based on the latest information available from both 

British and U. S. sources. 

2. ALLIED PLANS REIATING TO TURKEY. 

(C.C.S. 157) 

In discussing C.C.S. 157, SIR ALAN BROOICE said that, the plans 

for inducing Turkey to enter the war on the side of the United Nations 

were largely political and that the military efforts were designed to 

further the political negotiations. 

He said that Turkey is in need of specialized equipment and that 

it would be preferable to furnish operating units rather than the equipment alone. The Turkish people are not, particularly adeptinhandlingmch 

anized equipment, but they seem to have a strong i\i!sjre to attempt 

it. As a result, we shall probably have to furnish t,he equipment with 

certain personnel to train Turkish troops in its use. 

SJR ALAN BROOKE then presented the following draft resolution 

which he recommended be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.. 

"The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize that Turkey lies within 

a theater of British responsibility, and that all matt,ers connected with Turkey should be handled by the Eritish in the same 

way that all matters connected with China are handled by the 

United States of America. 

"In particular, the British should be responsible for framing and 

presenting to both Assignment Boards all bids for equipment for 

Turkey. The onward despatch to Turkey from the Middle East of 

such equipment will be a function of command of the British 

Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert 

much equipment to other uses except for urgent operational 

reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate 

%{unitions Assignment Board." 

GENERAL SOMERVELL stated that just prior to his departure from 

Washington, an agreement had been reached between the State Department 

and the British Joint Staff Mission as to methods by which munitions 

should be supplied to Turkey. 

257 
ll. S. SECRET 

BRITISH 'IOST SGCRET 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this agreement was not acceptable in 

London. He pointed out that any agreements previously made were superseded by the agreement arrived at on January 18th between the Prime 

Minister and the President which provided that all matters connected 

with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all 

matters connected with China are handled by the United States. 

GENERAL MARSHALL Stated that he desired more time to study the 

resolution referred to above and requested that action with regard to 

it be postponed until the meeting of January 20th. He said that there 

was some confusion in his mind as to just what was intended with regard 

to Turkey. The President had said that he had hoped to arrange for Turkey's permission for the passage of munitions en route to Russia through 

Turkish territory. C.C.S. 157 indicates that certain arrangements have 

already been made regarding the supply of munitions to Russia. In addition, the decision has been reached to make certain troop concentrations 

available to assist Turkey in the event that she enters into the war on 

the side of the United Nations.Ife asked Sir Alan Rrooke what he considered the probabilities with regard to Turkey would be. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Eritish had an agreement to assist 

Turkey if she were attacked. The agreement includes furnishing Turkey 

26 squadrons of pursuit aviation. In order that these squadrons might be 

able to operate quickly, certain necessary equipment had already been 

sent there. This had been a defensive agreement, but the intention is 

now to operate an offensive from Turkey. The present plan is that Turkey 

should merely hold the Axis forces beyond her frontier and thus secure 

air bases from which the United Nations could operate against Rumania. 

He said it was hoped that we could induce Turkey to come into 

the war. This might be accomplishedbypolitical moves. Certain territorial promises might be made to Turkey at this time. For example, they 

might be promised the "Duck's Bill" in Syria, control of the Dodecanese, 

certain parts of Bulgaria, and assurance that her communications in the 

Bosphorus will be unhampered. The more apparent a victory by the United 

Kations becomes, the more will Turkey desire to have a place at the 

peace table. This might be sufficient inducement for her to join the 

United Nations. In any event, our efforts with regard to Turkey will not 

be very costly, but they may provideanopportunityfor appreciable gains. 

258 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had no doubt about the value of 

bringing Turkey into the war. He thought that if she could be induced to 

join us at the right moment, the results might play a determining part 

in the conclusion of the war. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he thought 

Turkey's reaction might be if we effected a large concentration in the 

rear of her borders. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said it would strengthen the United Nations in 

the eyes ofTurkey and give tangible evidence that we are ready to assist 

her. He said that the capture of the Dodecanese by the United Nations 

would give Turkey a feeling of confidenre in their power but that these 

islands could be much more easily captured by an operation from Turkey, 

once she had joined in with US. He added that there is no possibility 

of doing operation HUSKY and capturing the Dodecanese simultaneously. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that holding the Dodecanese would facilitate operations in Turkey by insuring the use of the port of Smyrna. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Agreed to consider the proposed resolution on Turkey, quoted 

above, at the meeting on January 20th. 

(b) Took note of the paper under consideration. 

3. MEETING WITH GENERAL GIRAUD. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were 

much honored by the presence of General Giraud and were very pleased 

that it had been possible to arrange the meeting. He hoped that General 

Giraud would express his views, and in particular that he would indicate 

the present status of the French forces and the rapidity with which they 

could be built up. 

GENERAL GIRAUD said that he was proud at being able to participate in the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff The French army had 

now reentered the war and had not only the will to fight but also the 

experience and knowledge. As an example, he might mention a message 

which he had that morning received on the telephone from his Chief of 

Staff; this was to the effect that the Germans had yesterday attacked 

the junction of the British and French armies between Xedjes el Dab and 

Pont du Fahs with 80 tanks supported by infantry. On the British front 

the attack had completely broken down and 10 tanks had been knocked out. 

259 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

On the French front anattack by 50 tanks had been made against a battalion locality. The battalion had held its ground all day, and it was not 

until the evening that certain advanced posts were evacuated by order of 

the battalion commander. He had not had any further news but he understood that the situation was in hand The action showed the quality of 

the French troops They had not been able to knock out any tanks as they 

had no antitank guns. They had, however, prevented the German infantry 

from supporting their tanks and had held their ground.. Similar examples 

had occurred on the whole front during the last two months: Such troops 

were worthy of modern arms 

On the existing cadres, the French army could form three armored 

divisions and ten mobile infantry divisions It would also be possible 

to raise the following air forcest 

50 fighter squadrons with 500 aircraft 

30 light bomber squadrons with 300 aircraft,, 

200 transport aircraft 

Such a force was an indispensable accompaniment for a modern army The 

French pilots had already given proof of what they could do One squad. 

ronofthe Croupe Lafayette, armed with 12 P~.40aircraft, had been fight 

ing for the last six days; they had shot down five enemy aircraft for 

the loss of one. He was particularly anxious to receive: first, fighter 

aircraft in the supply of which he hoped the British would participate, 

and, subsequently, light bombers so that he could equip the pilots of 

whose quality he had intimate knowledge and who would quickly master the 

new equipment. He realized that there were considerable difficulties due 

to the shortage of shipping and the needs of the Allied forces Some of 

the aircraft, however, could fly from America, and possibly the fighters 

might be flown in from aircraft carriers., He felt confident that the 

French army could make a great contribution to the European campaign if 

it were propeyly equipped, He estimated that the rampaigninNorth Africa 

would be over in two monthss time, and in this campaign he included the 

capture of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, which he regarded as forming a 

direct prolongation of Africa and as bases for further action 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was very glad to have heard '>enera1 Giraudis views. Speakingonbehalfofthe U. S. Army, air and ground. 

he explained that he was going into the details of how quickly modern 

260 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

equipment could be provided for the French Army. He knew that the shipping question was under detailed consideration byAdmiral King and I'rench 

Naval officers. !;enera1 Soniervell, the Head of the Services of' Supply, 

had already called on General "rraud to discuss these matters and ha11 

reported thereon to him. The question of priority of delivery of items 

and the method to be adopted in equipping French [Jnits would be taken up 

with .General Giraud. General Arnold had been conferring with French 

officers to see what could be done to provide air equipment. It was in 

the interests of the U.S.A, to bring the French forces to a high state 

of efficiency, and everything possible would be done to obviate the dif~. 

ficulties of distance. It was not a question of whether to equip the 

French Army, but rather of how to carry it out. Availability of equipment 

was not the limiting factor, but transport 

SIR ALAN BROOKE expressed, on behalf of the !;rit,istr Chiefs of 

Staff, great pleasure at the report which Senera1 Giraud had given of 

the state of the French Army. !Vith the more limited resources at the 

disposal of the British, they would do what they could to help in providing modern equipment. We fully realized the important part which the 

French forces would play in bringing the war to a successful conclusion 

ADMIRAL KING said that arrangements were well in hand for the 

rehabilitation in rotation of the French warships. Resources would not 

permit of them being dealt with all at once- He welcomed the officers 

and men of the French Navy who were now joining in the struggle for 

victory. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the navies of the Allies were now 

fighting in every oceanofthe world and the U-boats were extending their 

activities further and further afield.. The combined British and American 

naval forces were less than we should like to have to meet this menace. 

and the help of the French naval forces would be most welcome From his 

experience at the beginning of the war, he knew the value of French 

naval assistance, and he knew also that this help would be of the same 

quality now as then 

SIR CHARLES POHTAL said that he had the clearest recollection 

from two wars of the skill and high performance ofthe French air forces 

He, therefore, hoped that they could be equipped as soon as possible to 

261 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISK YOST SECRET 

fight once more alongside the Allies. Within the limit of British resources, which were considerably strained, everything would be done to 

hasten the day of this collaboration. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he had been trying for some time to 

find the most effective use for the French pilots, who had proved their 

ability to take over and operate skillfully American equipment. !le hoped 

that this study would soon he completed. 

SIR JOHN DILL said t.mt 'he felt inspired by the presence of 

General Giraud, knowing as he did .how muck! General Giraud had suffered 

for France. It was a matter oI' ;;re;rt pleasure, therefore, to have the 

;enera1 back to lead France to vivtory. 

GENERAL GIRAUO said tirat in the early days of the war he had 

w~rkedin the closest touch with the British Army. The cooperation between all arms at that time, and particularly between the 1st French 

Army and the Second Corps, of vhich Sir John Dill was the distinguished 

Commander, had showed how close such contact could be. how once more 

cooperation had been resumed. In September l!Y%O, when he was in a German 

prison camp, he had told the German generals that they had lost the war. 

?heir attempt to invade Great 3ritain had failed, and though he could 

:rot prophesy how long the war would last, Germany could never win. Sooner 

or ii.Ler the 'J. S. would come to the help of Great Rritain. The Germans 

nail asked him to sign a papor to say that he would not escape during the 

period of* t,wo hours each day when the French generals were allowed outside. He had said that he refused to sign any paper in German. They had 

asked him whether he was planning to escape as he had done in 1915. He 

had said, "Never mind what I am thinking. You are my jailers, I am your 

prisoner. It is your duty to guard me; it is my duty to escape. Let us 

see who can carry out his duty best. It took a year to get away? but now 

I am here amongst you once more." 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed with applause their warm 

approval of the statement made by General Giraud who then withdrew from 

the rneetiiig. 

262 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 63rd Meeting 

CODWINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Wednesday, January 20, 1943, at 1000. 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold,USA 

PRESENT 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA Lord Leathers (For Item 1) 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.,USd Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Brig. General J. E. Hull, USA Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA Mountbatten 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

Lt. Colonel L. T. Grove, USA 

263 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

1. U. S. AID TO XUSSIA. 

(C.C.S. 162) 

GENERAL MARSHALL requested Lord Leathers to give his comments on 

C.C.S. 162. 

LORD LEATHERS stated that the bulk of the munitions sent to 

Sussia under the Protocol arefrom the United States. ?Ie said that C.C.S. 

162 does not constitute a paper with which he is in full agreement as is 

indicated in its heading. He cannot be certain of the basic figures presented because he does not know the backlog of munitions to ilussia that 

are now in the United States. He did, however, concur in .;enera1 Somervell's conclusions of the paper. 

LORD LEATHEXS stated that an agreement had been arrived at 

between the United States and British authorities in Washington, including representatives ofboth Navies, that all calculations for the allocation of shipping in1943 should be basedona loss rate of 1.9%per month, 

whereas General Somervell used a rate of Z.f$%inhis preparationofC.C.S. 

162. He said that if the 1.9%figure works out correctly, more shipping 

will be available than is indicated in this paper. 

ADMIRAL KING said he had no knowledge of such an agreement and 

thought that 1.9%was optimistic. This was the figure for December 1942 

which was particularly favorable. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL agreed that ifwe are able to reduce the losses 

in shipping from 2.6%to2% per mouth, anadditional troop lift of 500,000 

men to England would be possible in 1943. If it were further reduced to 

1.3$, an additional 50,000 could be lifted. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if we accept Genersl Somervell's loss 

rate, the question as to what can be sent to aussia must be reexamined. 

It must also be determined whether we should undertake such a program 

considering its effects on troop lift. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL added that he recognized that there should be 

an improvement in the loss rate in 1943 over that which was sustained in 

1942 because of the more effective anti-submarine measures which are contemplated. tie felt it safer, however, to plan on the continuance of the 

1942 rate until it could be effectively demonstrated that the losses 

264 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH XOST SECRET 

would decrease., Xe said that it, was reasonably certain t,hat tile loss rate 

would drop as low as2.4% per month.. In this case, all of the coirmitmerrts 

under the ::ussian Protocol could be fulfilled. If' the rate improves i 

2.4$, an additional troop lift for BOLE110 will become avaiiidle. 

1.0i:D LE.kT'HEIIS stated that. it is particnlarly i~aport,a~~t, t.0 +,stahlish an agreed esti.mated loss rate for planning purposes. !!,is wiil in.. 

sure that all those concerned wi.tii sllipping proht~w:.s w ;.I I b.! .,,,i.aki:~~!,6x1 

thinkine in the same t,;?rms when planning troop or cargo nioi ,~,mt:itts. 

SIX DUDLEY POTiXI) said that, tl~efigures in the papcr apparpntlq 

are based on the assumpt,ion that the northern routr! to .::issia ail1 be 

opeii throughout t,he year. !:e stated that this will not be the case, particularly during the period of Operation IIUSKY.. I!e fiirLher, t.~~oi~;;ht that 

the paper should include some st.ut,eaicnt indicating trit,?, rniiuni t.;nents t,o 

::ussia will only be fulfilled pi-ouj~dfd tliey will not entai~l$)rohibit 

losses in shipping. 

GENERAL SOMEZVELL said that stopping t,he northcrrr convoys dtipipg 

the period of Operation �Il~S!iI' woiild eliiniiiat,e 54 sailings for which the 

capacity was available on the Persian route. In reply t,o a quest,io!i h:y 

iZrlmiral King as to why tile siiipinents to the Persian ;ul.f dropped off .ill 

June ~ General Sotnerve11 said that the commithents to dussia would llot 

require the total capacity of all routes and tint, titorefore, a reduced 

rat,e had hceii applied t.o the Persian route which had the longest turriaround- This will provide a safety marKiri to take care of contingencies 

such as stopping the northern route during Operat,ion HUSKY. 

LOXD LEATHERS pointed out that C..C.S, 162 applies only to aid 

from the Ilnited States Xe said that theBritish can overtake t,heir backlog of deliveries about the end of June; a relatively small number of 

British shipments is involved Assuming a convoy every 27 days, there 

will be 11 or 12 ships in each, whereas if they were to be run every 43 

days, each convoy must include 15 British ships. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL proposed an amendment to clarify paragraph 14 

of C.C.S. 162,;: He then asked for a careful consideration of the con-. 

clusions contained in Paragraph 15 of the paper 

::Corrected version circulated as C.C,S, 162/1 

255 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

LORD LEATHERS suggested that in the last sentence the phrase 

"assigned to United States troop movements" be changed to "assigned to 

combined troop movements." 

SIR CHLTLES PORTAL asked if it would be possible to frame our 

commitment to Russia so as to make it clear that some curtailment in the 

delivery ofmunitions might berequired because ofoperational necessities. 

He felt that thecombined Chiefs ofstaff were taking a big step in making 

a firm commitment regarding the delivery of munitions to Russia at the 

expense of all operational requirements. 

LOIU) LEATHERS stated that we have re4erved the right in the past 

to curtail shipments of munitions to Xussia but that Russia did not like 

to have such reservations made andalways objected when anactual curtailment became necessary. A notable exception to this was that they agreed 

that the northern convoys be disrontinued during Operation TORCH. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL pointed out that the current Protocol which 

expires in ,June of 1943 does include such a resolution. The new Protocol 

will be framed by the State Department andthe Foreign Office, but actually 

triere will be ample opportunity for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to review it before the negotiations between governments are initiated. It 

will thus be possible to insure that a safety clause is included in the 

basic document. 

THE COkBfITTEE: 

(a) Agreed that a loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month 

could be relied on with sufficient certainty to warrant the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff giving their approval to the total 

shipping commitments set forth in Paragraph 6, Table I1 of 

C.C.9 152. subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia 

shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United 

Nations' effort. 

(b) Took note that the Persian Gulf route could make good the 

loss of 64 North Russian sailings if these had to be eliminated in the latter part of the year owing to other opera 

tions. 
U. S. SECeET 

RqITISI! WOST SECRET 

(c) Agreed to direct the Combined !.lilitary Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate of the rate of United 

Nations' shipping losses in 1913 which can be used by all 

United Kations' Agencies for planning purposes. 

(d) Agreed to amend<: paragraph 15 of C.C.S. 162 SO as to delete 

the words "United States" in the last sentence and substitute 

the word "Combined" therefor. 

(e) Agreed that, in the preparation of the next Protocol with 

Russia, a clause should be included to the effect that the 

commitment,s included in the Protocol ma.y he reduced if shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render 

their fulfillment prohibi t ive . 

-. 3 BRITISH RESPOh'SIBILITY FOR TUKKEY. 

(C.C.S. 62nd Xeeting, Item 2) 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested the addition of the words "tilrough 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff" after "Assignment, Boards" in the first, 

sentence of the second paragraph of the draft resolution proposed by the 

British Chiefs of Staff at their previous meeting. 

BRIGADIER JACOB explained the procedure for the submission of 

Turkish bids to the 'dunitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington. 

Tnrkish requirements were, in the first instance, scrut,inized and coordinated by a Committee in Ankara containing U. S., British and Turkish 

representatives. This Committee transmitted requirements to London. The 

l~.ondon\:unitions Assignments Board passed on to the Washington Roard bids 

for all material which could notbe supplied from the U. K. The bids were 

presented by the British representatives of the Washington Munitions 

$ssignments Board. Difficulty was caused, however, by the fact that the 

Turkish Embassy in Washington was apt to approach the War Department 

simultaneously with requests for equipment and, as a result, duplication 

took place. The object of the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff 

was to canalize all Turkish demands for munitions through London where 

the majority of these demands were met. Turkey was only one of a large 

number of claimants for material, and the general principle followed was 

that all the small European nations dealt with the London Board in the 

first. instance, whereas theSouth American Republics and China dealt with 

.': Corrected version circulated as C.C.S. 16211. 

267 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH #YOST SECRET 

Washington. For example, any demands made by the Chinese in London were 

refused, and the Chinese were told to present them direct to Washington. 

He feared that if all bids had to be passed through the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, they would be smothered in a mass of detail. 

ADMIRAL KING said his only concern was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had an opportunity to exercise control over the 

actions of the Munitions Assignments Boards in connection with Turkish 

bids. 

THE COMXITTEE: 

(a) Agreed that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should 

be handled by the British in the same way that all matters 

connected with China are handled by the United States of 

Amer ica. 

(b) Agreed that, in particular, under the general direction of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards 

all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward dispatch to 

Turkey from the \fiddle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the 

Eiddle East. They will not divert such equipment to other 

uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report 

such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignments 

Board . 

3. THE BOMEiER OFFEKSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA. 

(C.C.S. 159) 

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs 

of Staff setting out in order of time the proposed objectives for the 

bomber offensive from North Africa. 

In discussion certain amndments were suggested and agreed. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Approved the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum as amended in 

the discussion.:? 

* Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 153’1 

2 68 
c'. S. SECRET 

YI1ITISh' MOST SECPET 

4. COMMAND IN THE hlEDITERRANEAN . (C.C.S. 163) 

The Committee had before them a mePorandm by the British Chiefs 

of Staff giving their recommendations for the set-up of air command in 

the \!editerranean. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that with the 8th Army approaching Tunisia 

the time was near when it would he necessary to place it under General 

Eisenhower's command. It was, therefore, proposed that General Alexander 

should come inas Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower with 

the primary taskof commanding the group of armies on the Tunisian front. 

iie would be accompanied by a small nucleus staff with the necessary signals. This proposal, if accepted, would leave General Eisenhower in supreme command over: 

(a) The group of armies on the Tunisian front. 

(b) The 'J. S. 5th Army in 'Jorocco. 

(c) French forces under General Juin. 

He would still have, in addition, his political responsibilities in 

horth Africa. 

The position was slightly complicated by the fact that the 8th 

Army must stillbe supplied fromtheEast. This could, however,bearranged 

and the organization in the Middle East was quite adequate for the task. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then pointed out that responsibilityforplanning 

HUSKY, or whatever operation in the Ifediterranem might be decided upon, 

must soon be fixed. It would probably be thought that General Eisenhower 

was the appropriate man to assume this responsibility. If that were 

decided, he would have General Alexander available to take charge of the 

necessary work. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that intensive air operations in the 

Eastern Wediterranean were coming to an end, but that many of the bases, 

such as Malta, in that area as well as the very large maintenance organization which had been established there, would still be available. It 

was essential that the action of all operational air forces in the !'editerranean area should be coordinated by one Commander. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that certain minor changes in the proposed 

organization would almost certainly be necessary, but the general setup was acceptable to him. 

269 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MCST SECRET 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed and said that such changes could most 

easily be made by the Air Commander-in-Chief once he had been appointed. 

ADMIRAL KING asked what dividing line was proposed between the 

Middle East and Northwest African theaters. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that the British Chiefs of Staff when 

considering this matter had thought that a line from the Tunisia-Tripoli 

tania frontier to Corfu would be most suitable. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND then referred to the question of the naval 

romand which would be necessary for HUSKY. His proposal was that Admiral 

Cunningham should become Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and that 

Admiral Harir.ood should adopt the title of Commander-.in.-.Chief, 1,evant. 

Tkie boundary might be the line Bardia-%anti. Thus Malta would come under 

Admiral Cunningham who would be responsible for coordinating all move-~ 

ments and matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole. He wonld 

also be responsible for the distribution of forces between the blediter 

ranean and Levant Commands ~ 

THE COKMITTEE : 

(a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 163, subject to 

any minor changes which might be found necessary by the Air 

Commander-in-Chief after his appointment ,, 

(b) Took note with approval that it had been agreed that, at a 

time to be determined after the British 8th Army had crossed 

the Tunisian border, General Alexander should become i)eputy 

Commander--in-ChieftoGeneral Eisenhower, and that the British 

8th Army shouldat the same time betransferred to the command 

of General hisenhower, although it would continue to be based 

on the hliddle East. 

(c) Agreed that, subject to the concurrence of General Xisenhower; 

General Alexander's primary task would be to command the 

Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small headquarters 

of his own, provided from the Middle East, and that after 

the conclusion of these operations he should take charge of' 

Operation HUSKY. 

270 
L' S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(d) Took note of the proposals of the First Sea Lord as set out 

above for Naval command in the Mediterranean during HUSKY! 

i.e., Western and Eastern Commands under Commander-.in~Chici' 

:.!edi terranear] arid Commande r-in-Chief Levant, respectively , 

w ith Commander-in-Chief ?ledite rranean responsible for gener a1 

coordination. 

(e) Agreed t,hat General Eisenhower should be informed of the 

above decisions. 

271 
II S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. C5th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINU'rJTES of \leeti!ig Iic.111 at Arifa Carny, 

on Mednesday, January 211, 1!113. at 1130 

PRESENT 

General F. C. Marshall, USA (~erici'al Sir Alan I'. Ijrooke 

Admiral E. J, King, USN Adiiiiva 1 ,>f t,lie I'leet, Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H-.Ii~Arnold, IlSA P<,urlli 

Air Ctriel' Marshal Sir Charles 

F A Por1,a.l 

THE FOLLOWING WRlC AI.SO PRb:SENT 

Lt,. General B, R Somrrvell, USA 1"ield 'Mrstit~l Sir Joiin Dill 

Hear Admiral C. !I. Cooke, Jr , LISN \ice Ailmiral t IP J.ord Louis 

Brig. General J. E.. Hull, I:SA \loi!!it,l~att cii 

General A. ,-,, \?ledemeyer, I;SA 1,t (;t,iicral Sir Ilast,ings L. Ismay 

Colonel J. E, Smart, USA ?fa,jor GPricraI .I N Kerrnedy 

Commander R. E. Libby, I:SN Air 17ii:v Varshal J C Slessor 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier IT I:>krs 

Brig, General J . H, lleanf:, CSA 

Lt, Colonel I,, T, Grove, ISA 

272 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1 HUSKY. 

(C.C,S, 161) 

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Joint 

Planning Staff. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE outlined the British proposals for undertakiil,, 

this operation He said that there were two broad alternatives for carry ­

ing out the British portion of the assault----.eitherto mount the assault 

ing force in the U., K" and bring the fol.low-.up from the Middle East, or 

to mount the major part of the operation from the Middle East.. Tile former 

would enable us to start at an earlier date but, it involved a grave risk 

in passing the spearhead of the assault forces through the Sicilian 

narrows in mineable waters and under air attack, For this reason the 

Hritish Chiefs of Staff considered that the second alternative should be 

adopted 

If the major portion of the assault was to be mounted from North 

Africa, it seemed that training would be the bottleneck. 

LORE MUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that a Brigade required t,hree weeks 

training before it was fit to take part in the assault. A Brigade which 

had had previous training could be "brushed up" in about ten days In 

either case, a further two weeks' training was necessary for final re 

hearsals Time could only be saved by arranging for two or more Brigades 

t,o be trained simultaneously, It was not possible to reduce the training 

periods below the figures he had given.. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that these training times could not be 

further reduced He thought, however, that we could not accept the end 

of September as the earliest date for the operation Various devices 

were being examined, suchas the setting up of additional training estab 

lishmerits and making use of a wider range of ports in the Middle East; 

and it was hoped to bring forward this date to about the end of August 

It was assumed that Tunisia would have been cleared by the end of April. 

ADMIRAL KING asked what divisions were now with the 8th Army and 

whether any divisions were availableinthe Middle East which could start 

training at once 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, although there were some divisions 

273 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

not actively engaged in the present battle, they would all be required 

for operations after the capture of Tripoli.. 

BRIGADIER GENERAL WEDEMEYER said that no difficulty was foreseen 

in finding the land forces required for the U. S. portion of the operation. It was assumed that tne divisions required would be taken from 

Morocco and not from Tunisia. The Airborne Division would have to cane 

from the U.S.A,. Certain types of aircraft would also have to be brought 

over, but the majority were already available in North Africa All could 

certainly be provided. He felt that some date at the end of July or the 

beginning of August should be possible. 

REAR ADMIRAL COOKE: mid that a great deal of research into the 

capacity of Northwest African ports and the provision of landing craft 

would be necessary. This was already in hand On the question of timing, 

his view was about two months before a planning staff could be assembled 

and detailed plans could be produced He agreed that it might be pos-. 

sible to start the operation in .July 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that the operation must depend on 

when the British could be ready and when the Americans could be ready 

and the later date setasD.day. He suggested that these should be worked 

out separately,, It might be found that the later date was too late to be 

acceptable, I-Ie thought that if Tunisia were cleared by the end of April, 

a further two months should be sufficient for the preparation of air 

fields in the Tunisian tip 

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the transport by air of 20,000 

Chinese to Ramgarh and asked whether time might not~besaved by making 

use of air transport to carry personnel from Northwest Africa to the 

Middle East. He suggested that, rather than transport troops to the 

Middle East via the Cape, they might be shipped to North Africa, carry 

out their training there, and then be taken by air to the Middle East ,, By 

that time the passage of the necessary landing craft should have been 

completed- He said that Sicily was our goal and that we ought not to be 

diverted from it by the apparent difficulties of the undertaking 

ADMIRAL KING agreed that, although for the assault the capacity 

of the Northwest African ports might be barely sufficient, it should be 

possible to find room for training Britishaswell as American formations 

274 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

in this area. He asked whether the Tunisian ports were being used for 

the assault, 

BRIGADIER GENERAL WEDEMEYER said that it was intended to make 

use of Bizerte, Tunis, and Sousse for the U. S. portion of the assault. 

For training he agreed that it might be possible to squeeze up fyirther 

west and so leave some of these ports for training British format^:1011.5 

if required. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that every possible permutat.ion must be 

examined and that we should aim at arriving at a starting date in July 

Two points called for early decision-.-first, the set. up of ar? organiza 

tion to plan the whole operation; and, second, the preparationo?a cover 

plan which would need to be integrated between the U.S.A., C-K,, North 

west Africa, and the Middle East and put into effect at an earl) date. 

He pointed out that the Germans would be forced to divert, t,r,oops from 

the Russian front as soon as our preparations made it clear that an 

offensive was impending somewhere. The effect of t.he operation would, 

therefore, be felt long before the actual assault was launched 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(A) Directed the U. S. and British Planning Staffs to: 

(1)Examine all possible expedients for speeding up the 

preparations for HUSKY and to report on the earliest 

possible date by which the operation could be mounted 

(2)Recommend how the organization for planning HUSKY should 

be set up 

2 FUTURE BUSINESS ~ 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it might be possible to bring 

forward certain items on the Agenda so as to complete the conference as 

early as possible. After a short discussion, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Agreed on the following program: 

THURSDAY FRIDAY 

U boat War HUSKY 

Bomber Offensive from Landing Craft ,, 

Great Britain. Limited Operations 

ANAKIM S. W,~Pacific. 

BOLERO (if time permits). 

275 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 65th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Thursday, January 21, 1943, at1000. 

PRESENT 

General G.C. Marshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E.J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H.H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. h!. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Mountbatten 

Lt. General Sir Hastings I,. Ismay 

Major General J. N. Kennedy 

Air Vice Marshal J. C. Slessor 

'SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

276 
il S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1 THE U BOAT WAR 

(C.C.S. 160) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a report, by the 

Combined Staff Planners on minimum escort requirements to maintain the 

sea communications of the United Nations (G.C.S. 160). 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that most of t,he points in the body of the 

paper had been touched on in the course of previous discussions, but he 

drew part,icular attention to paragraph 14 emphasizing the need for 

adequate air cover if the numher of escorts was to he kept to a minimum= 

Schedule V on the last page of the paper showed the large numher of escorts required for this purpose; The table in Enclosure "C" showed the 

small numbers of escort vessels which would be coming out of production 

during t,he first half of 1943. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the categories of aircraft in 

this Schedule were as follows: 

V.L.R. - Aircraft with a range over 2,000 miles, such as Liherators, and specially prepared Halifaxes with a range of 

about 2,100 miles which were temporarily assigned to 

antisubmarine work. 

L.H. Aircraft with a range between 1,200 and 2,000 miles. 

h! R. ~ Aircraft with a range between 600 and 1,200 miles. 

He inquired whether it could be taken that the requirements of 

Section 2inSchedule V (North Atlantic, East Coast U. So and Canada) in­

~jill-ved no commitments for the United Kingdom. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he had not the exact figures, but he had 

no reason to doubt that this commitment would be fulfilled by the U. S. 

and Canada entirely. The Caribbean and the East Coast of South America 

were also, of course, entirely U,. S. commitments. The full details of 

the TJ S figures were not available at the present time, but he suggest.ed that the report should be accepted as a working basis. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the report of the Combined Staff Planners 

on the Whoat war, whlch had been ordered by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff at a recent meeting in Washington, should be ready very shortlyThis would contain the full U. S. figures. 

277 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR DUDLEY POUND pointed out that in their agreed policy for the 

conduct of the war in 1943 (C.C.S. 155/1), the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

had said that the defeat of the U-boat must remain the first charge on 

the resources of the IJnited Nations. Nevertheless, it had been decided 

that the Rabaul and HUSKY operations were to be carried out, and these 

would inevitably detract from the anti-submarine effort. He felt that 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff should clearly record their reasons for 

thus diverging from the anti-submarine effort as a first objective.'He 

passed around draft conclusions on the Combined Staff Planners' report, 

which he had discussed with Admiral King, but suggested that since the 

first two of these were boundupwith the directive for the bomber offensive from the U. K., which was to be discussed next, these should be 

taken up after that item. 

After an adjournment, 

THE COMXITTEE: 

(a) Took note of C.C.S. 160. 

(h) Agreed that: 

(1) Intensified bombing of [!-boat operating bases should be 

carried out. 

(2) Intensified bombing of U-boat constructional yards 

should be carried out. 

(3) U, S. and British Naval Staffs should: 

-a. Scrutinize the dispositions ofall existing destroyers 

and escort craft; 

b. Allocate as much new cor~struction,or vessels released 

by new construction, as possible toconvoy protection, 

The above with a view to each nation providing, to the 

greatest extent possible, half of the present deficiency 

of sixty-five escorts for the protection of Atlantic 

convoys 

(4) U. S. and British Naval Staffs should provide auxiliary 

escort carriers for working with Atlantic convoys at the 

earliest practicable moment ., 

(5) Long distance shore--.based air cover should be provided 

over the following convoy routes as a matter of urgency: 

-a. North Atlantic convoys (U, S,-U,. K.) --from both sides 

of the Atlantic278 
U..S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. D.W.I. oil convoys from the West Indies and U. K,, 

C. TORCH oil convoys from the West Indies and Gibraltar. 

d. U. K.-Freetown convoys from Northwestand!Vest Africa. 

(6) Greenland airdromes should be developed for use by L.R 

or V.L.R. aircraft, 

(7) Non-ocean-going escorts should be used for HUSKY to the 

maximum possible extent. 

2. THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. 

(C.C.S. 165) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive 

for the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom submitted by the Brit-. 

ish Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 156) 

SI3 CHARLES POiITAL, in answer to a question by General Marshall 

on the precise implications of paragraph 5, said that political considerations often override military expediency in the case of objectives 

in the occupied countries. The British Government, on representations 

from one of the exiled Governments, sometimes placed a political embargo 

on some excellent military target. In such cases decisions had often to 

be taken very quickly, and it would not be practicable to deal with the 

matter through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the 

words "for political reasons" should be inserted in paragraph 6 in order 

to make this clear 

In discussion it was also agreed that the word "synthetic' 

should be deleted from paragraph 2 (d). 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred to the difficulty which always arose 

in such directives over the precise interpretation of placing the German 

submarine bases and construction yards first in order of priority. This 

might be held to preclude attacks on any other targets~At the present 

time the U S. 8th Bomber Commwrd had U-boat targets at the top of their 

list and attacked them on every possible occasion with good results 

There had been, however, considerable criticism in the U. K= because 

they never attacked targets in Germany.. If too literal an interpretation 

of the order of priority were taken and the entire weight of our bomber 

effort were placed on the German submarine bases, to the exclusion of 

279 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

targets in Germany, there would be very serious criticism indeed. His 

own view was that other targets besides the submarine bases and yards 

should not be excluded and that paragraph 2 of the paper required some 

redrafting to make it clear that there was no intention to concentrate 

on what were strategically defensive operations to the exclusion of the 

offensive. 

GENERAL MAITSHALL said that he fully appreciated this difficulty. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND pointed out that the acceptance of large-scale 

amphibious operations for 1943 must inevitably detract from the antisubmarine effort and every endeavor should, therefore, he made to offset 

this by a higher concentration of the air effort against &boat targets. 

He believed that if we put the maximum effort onto the Biscny bases now, 

and destroyed all the facilities and accommodations in the towns, we 

should vitally sffect, German capacity to carry on the IT--boat campaign. 

It was no good making sporadic attacks; the pressure had to be continued 

for a considerable period. If t.he Germans had gone on bombing Plymouth, 

Liverpool and Glasgow instead of stopping when they did, we should have 

been placed in a very difficult position indeed, 

He could not see that there was any real difference between 

so-called offensive and defensive bombing Both were directed against 

the power of the enemy to carry on the wari 

ADMIRAL. KING agreed that the bombing of the &boat bases should 

he sustained. His impression was that the bombing of anti-submarine 

targets had so far been sporadic. For example, it appeared that Berlin 

had had in two raids twice the weight of bombs dropped on Lorient 

recently. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that it would he a sound move to 

destroy completely the four Hiscay bases if experience showed this was 

possible.. Attacks would he continued on Lorient, but so far we had no 

information of the result of the recent concentrated bombardments, It 

had had a greater weight of bombs dropped on it than Plymouth. In comparing this with the weight on Derlin, regard must be paid to the comparative size of these two targets. Weight in relation to area was much 

greater at Lorient than Berlin, 

280 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH illOST SECRET 

SIR ALAN BHOOKE did not think that we could win by defeating the 

U-boat alone. 'Ye should be careful, therefore, not to allot more effort 

than was absolutely necessary for this purpose. The bombing of Germany 

contributed directly to the destruction of German power, whereas the 

bombing of TI-boat targets was only an indirect contribution. 

GENEZIAL MAltSHALL recalled that in the bombing directive for the 

Mediterranean the emphasis had been laid on preparations for HUSKY. He 

asked what would be done from the United Kingdom to support an invasion 

of Europe. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this point was covered by paragraph 

5 of the draft directive. Targets would be selected in accordance with 

the plan of the Commander-in-Chief, so as to give the best possible support to the operatioris of the Army. Whenever operations were immediately 

in prospect, attacks on what might be called the long-term targets, such 

as industry, had to give way to immediate operational needs. 

GENEXAL AnNOLD said that no one was keener to go for targets in 

Germany than the IJ. S. Air Commanders in the United Kingdom. They had 

been directed on to U-boat targets by General Eisenhower as a direct 

meansofsupporting TORCH. About half the 17. S. bomber force in the U. K. 

had already been withdrawn from the United Kingdom to North Africa, but 

large increases in its strength were now in prospect. We should soon be 

able to think in terms of hundreds of bombers where we were now thinking 

in tens. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the control of bomber operations by 

the U. S. Air Forces in the United Kingdom would be in the hands of the 

British. It would be a matter of command rather than of agreement with 

the U. S. Commanders. It would be the responsibility of the U. S. Commanders to decide the technique and method to be employed. 

After an adjournment, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Approved, subject to minor amendments, a revised draft directive 

prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff (circulated subsequently 

as C.C.S. 166/1/D) . 

281 
U S SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

3 DRAFT TELEGRAM TO Mc STALINo 

(C.C.S. 165) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that paragraph 5 of the draft telegram 

prepared for the Fresident and Frime Minister to send to Premier Stalin 

be amended Dy changing the first sentence to read, "Me have taken the 

decision to launch wide scale amphibious operations at the earliest possible moment" and to amend the second sentence to read, "the preparations for these operations are now underway and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping 

in North African ports." 

These changes were acceptable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that in paragraph 5 the 5th sentence be 

terminated with the word "subjected" and that the remainder of the sentence be deleted. 

SIR CHARIES PORTAL suggested that paragraph 8 shouldbestrengthened in view of the much greater Allied bomber offensive which will be 

undertaken against Germany as the resultofthe increased bomber strength 

which is in view, The British will increase their heavy bomber strength 

from 600 to 1,000 and the United States' increase will be from 200 to 

900. This will enable the intensity of the bombing attack against 

Germany to be at least doubled, a fact that M. Stalin should be glad 

to learn 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the last two sentences of paragraph 

5 be deleted from that paragraph and amalgamated with the redraft of 

paragraph 8, suggested above by Sir Charles Portal. 

It was agreed that the last two sentences of paragraph 5, paragraph 7, and a more positive statement of paragraph 8 be amalgamated 

into one paragraph. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Directed that representatives of the Combined Staffs be directed 

to revise the draft telegram to M, Stalin in the light of the 

discussion given above 

282 
t. ANAKIM. 

(C.C.S. Ifid) 

GEXEKAL MARSHALL suggested that, in the remarks on the bottom of 

page 80 concerning tile availability of air forces, the last two words, 

":liddle East, I' be deleted and the words, "hfediterranean area" be substit,iited tiieref'or. 

nl . Ailis change was agreed to by tile Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR ALAN 33OO:CE st,ated tiiat iie believed tlie target date of 

November 1943, Aiven as an assumption in paragraph 2, was probably too 

early for actual accooiplisiiiiieiit, but tiiat it should do no harm to let it 

stand as a target date to be aimed at. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Took note of C.C,.S. 164 as amended': and agreed: 

(1) To approve November 15, 1943, as the provisional date 

for the ANAKIM assault. 

(2) To approve the provisional schedule of forces laid out 

in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 161, recognizing that the 

actual provision of naval forces, assault shipping, 

landing craft, and shipping must depend on the situation 

in the late summer of 1943. 

(3) To confirm in July 1943 the decision to undertake or to 

postpone Operation LNAKIM. 

5. BOLERO BUILD-UP. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were informed that a paper on the 

subject, being prepared by the British Joint Planning Staff, was not 

ready for consideration. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that there be some general discussion 

regarding BOLERO prior to receipt of the British paper. He stated that 

it had already been decided to keep plans for a cross-channel operation 

up to date on a month-by-month basis in order to be ready at any time 

to iiiitiate such operations. 

SIR ALAK BROOKE agreed with this statement. 

::: To be subsequently published as C.C.S. 164/1. 
U. S. SECRET 

RYlTISN MOST SECeET 

GENERAL MARSHALL then said he wished to discuss the question of 

organization. iie asked what is to be done in England and also how the 

plans regarding BOLERO are to crystallize 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Sritish can absorb American troops 

at the rate of 120,000 per month. In this connection, GENERAL SOMERVELL 

said that the number to arrive would be somewhat less than 120,000 per 

month up to July but considerably more thereafter. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that one of the greatest difficulties regarding the reception of American troops in England is the lack of sufficient receiving depots for equipment. It would be necessary to construct additional depots. The British have stopped such construction 

because of the manpower situation and because they have only been committed to receive five additional American divisions, or a total of 

427,000 troops. The construction which must be undertaken and the operating force required for new reception depots will require personnel 

from the United States. These should be includedinthe earliest possible 

troop convoys to the U. K. 

An area has been reserved in southwestern England for the United 

States troops which will be next to the area reserved for British troops 

in southeastern England. These areas will face France. The area to be 

occupied by the United States troops is being cleared of British forces. 

Their accommodations, except for some which cannot be moved, such as 

schools, will be available to the American forces. 

He said that the immediate necessity was the appointment of a 

Commanding General and staff. The British are now engaged in reorganizing their forces from defensive organizations, supplied from fixed 

bases, to offensive organizations which include their own mobile service 

elements. It is expected that 12 divisions will be so organized by July 

and 15 by October. The new offensive organizations will be divorced 

entirely from the defensive organizations of the British Isles. Each 

will be under a separate commander. The British offensive forces, 

together with those being built up by the United States, including air 

forces, should come under a supreme commander who should be appointed in 

the near future. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that General Andrews is now going to 

2a4 
U. S. SECRET 

B,?ITISH MOST S.TC'1ET 

England to replace General Hartle and undertake the same duties that 

General Eisenhower performed prior to Operation TORCH. ile will have the 

responsibility of receiving American divisions in England; and, as soon 

as these divisions are ready, General Andrews will turn them over to the 

Supreme Commander for assignment to the cross-channel task force. He 

assumed that although the British contemplated setting up a separate 

Home Defense force, the cross-channel task force would also have to be 

on an alert status and considered as available to participate in the 

defense of the British Isles. 

SIR AIAN BROOKE said that there were two types of planning involved with regard to the cross-channel operations; one was for a limit,ed 

offensive operation which might be expected in 1943, and tne other was 

for the larger task of an all-out invasion of the Continent. In the latter case, the decision must be made as to the direction of the attack 

once the landing was effected. It must be decided whether such an attack 

would be aimed at Germany or at occupied France. Plans might well be 

made to meet both contingencies. 

He said that plans must envisage making the maximum use of 

S.O.E. activities and.that these activities mustbe carefully coordinated 

with the military operations proposed. This has not always been done in 

the past. 

ADMIRAL KING said he considered that the appointmentofa supreme 

commander was urgent. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he had understood Sir Alan Brooke 

to say that the British could ebsorb 120,000 troops per month without 

assistance from the United States. This is contrary to an opinion which 

General Somervell attributed to Lord Leathers, that assistance would be 

required from the United States if the flow of troops to England exceeded 70,000 per month. General Somervell said it would be necessary to 

determine at once which estimate is correct. He also said that he understood it would be necessary for the United States to furnish some locomotives and rolling stock to the British in order to assist in the 

increased traffic resulting from troop movements. 

He pointed out that the speed of sending troops to the U. K. 

would depend largely upon the success attainedincombating the submarine 

2 85 
0 S SUCRET 

BRIlISH MOST SECRET 

menace. He urged that the United Nations concentrate their efforts in 

this respect. 

GENERAL SOMERVFLL said that the location of United States troops 

in England must be made with an eye to training facilities. The troops 

will need amphibious training for which few facilities are available in 

southern England. He concluded that, from a supply point of view, an 

early decision was necessary as to the size of the build-up of United 

Stat,es forces contemplated and the type of operations in which they 

wouldbeengaged, These decisions are particularly necessary with respect 

to the allocation of tonnage 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that any operation in 1943 will of necessity be limited since an all-out offensive across the Channel can hardly 

be undertaken until 1914. With regard to the rolling stock for the railroads, he pointed out that when an invasion of the Continent is undertaken, t,he Germans will make every effort to deny our use of their rolling stork For this reasoni the United Nations must be prepared to 

follow the initial assault with such equipment, 

He stated that the British now send their troops from southern 

England to Scotland or Northern Ireland by brigade groups for amphibious 

training^ IIe suggested the possibility of United States troops stopping 

off in Ireland or Scotland for such training on their way to the final 

assemhling area in southwestern England,, The greatest difficulty is in 

the training of' armored units, and that as far as possible it would he 

better if t,he United States forces could have this training prior to 

t,heir depsrture from the United States, 

GENERAL MARSHALL said t,hat this can easily be arranged. It must 

be remembered that the forces used in the TORCH operation were hurriedly gathered together and that the training of the troops, prior to 

their departure from the United States, had been difficult- The build-up 

for BOLERO can be accomplished more deliberately and will enable the 

armored units to participate in major maneuvers and complete their 

target practice prior to departure, Units will be frozen three months 

prior toleaving the United States, and this will facilitate their training. He pointed out, that firing ranges have been made available for use 

by units in staging areas en route to ports of debarkation. 

286 
U. S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

In reply to a question from Lord Louis Mountbatten, he stated 

that insofar as possible, all units would have had amphibious training 

prior to their departure from the United States. 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that the British had set up an 

amphibious training establishment at Appledore on the Bristol Channel, 

The northern part of this training area has been turned over to the 

Americans for amphibious training. Flat beaches, changes of tides, and 

all means of possible defense are available to insure the thoroughness 

of the training. Another amphibious training establishment will be 

available in the Clyde area in two months and, in addition, one in 

northern Ireland which has been started by Admiral Bennett 

GENERAL \IATSHALL said that he assumed that the American troops 

included in the assault waves of a cross-channel attack would have to be 

rehearsed in amphibious operations, but that the great bulk of American 

troops would not need such rehearsals 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN then pointed out that it would be well 

to arrange to have American forces use landing craft manned by American 

crews, with which General Marshall agreed 

GENERAL SOMEnVELL stated that the movement of American forces to 

England must be considered in connection with the escort vessels available for convoys, 

ADMIRAL KING agreed that the BOLERO troop movements would constitute an additional requirement for escort vessels 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that air forces must be reorganized 

with BOLERO in view. At present the R,A,F operates from static bases. 

Mobile air units must be organized to support cross-channel operations 

He suggested that American fighter aircraft should be under the operational direction of the British in the same manner as had already been 

decided for heavy bombardment aircraft 

SIR CHAI&ES PORTAL called attention to the fact that a decision 

must be made as to whether toutilize troop-lift capacity from the United 

States to Great Britain for ground troops or for the ground echelons of 

the air force. Ile also stated that a decision might be forced on the 

287 
ii S SECRET 

H RITISH YOST SECRET 

Combined Wiefs of Staff with regard to utilizing some of the shipping 

erigaged in the delivery of munitions to Russia in the build-up of a 

I! 01,FPO force I 

GXhXFAl. ',O\fWWLL said that a paper was being prepared, designed 

to slnw llnw inmny trows CWI be t.ransmrted froni t,kie rriited States to the 

r:, K. ?ile riaper hati t,o he Lia.sed on a great man) assumptions and the 

f'igure? which it would contain could not be corrsidered as a reliable 

estimnre iuit,il certain decisions havp been arrived at with reference to 

n lher :,per.a tioris, not,atrlg !Hi5?<1. Assuniing that illrF-KY is mounted in 

liigiist, and that an attack will he mourit,ed Tram i~~gland on August 15th, 

it worilrl he yossiblr to bririg in approximately 400,Ooa troops to England 

by .Jiily 1st This wuuld give them six weeks to settle down in order to 

tie available for an at,t,ack August Wth. The 400,000 troops mentioned 

included those now in Prigland, Cf the total number, approx-iniately 172,000 

ih'ould he air corns troons and t,liere would be five to six ground divis ions lle said t,hat, assuming 150 ship voyages could be made available 

from I.ritish imports, the number could be raised from seven to nine 

di v is ions 

SIR ALAV BROOKE stated that these figures bore out his previous 

est,imates t.hat there would be' from 18 to 21 divisions available in England in the latt,er part of the summer 

GTh-EFAI. S0VEnVU.L said that if the attack from England were' not 

I o be mounted until September 15th, four addit,ional divisions could be 

i,ransported from t,he United States, three in American, and one in British stiipping~ The rate of four divisions per month could be maintained 

thereafter inasmuch as most of the overhead personnel would be included 

i II the earlier sliipmei. ts 

SIF ALAN El:001?E asked what rate of flow could be expected from 

\merica monthly, assuming an attack from England in Sept,ember Would one 

division per month be the maximum? 

?:l?SPI~tAI,FO.IEPVEL1. rep1 ied that the figure would greatly exceed 

this as far as shippirig was concprifed. However, if the troops were to be 

t,ransported t,n France, the number would be 1i.mited by the port facilities 

availaI>Ie ?or this reason, any plans made should envisage the capture of 

s riff i c i eut port fac i1i t ie s 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH .MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL XING agreed that this should be given careful consideration in planning the operation. 

CEKLnAL 11APSHALL suggested that once the operation is initiated, 

it would probably be necessary to conduct separate operations to gain 

additional port, f ac iI itie s . 

SIP ALN r!'OOIiL said iie thought it would be easier to establish 

a bridgehead arid wirlpn it ont by overland operations in order to capture 

the ports that would be riecessary. Iip said that, at least two or three 

ports would be required before ar!y at,tempt could be made to advance 

further inland. tie thonght that t,hr nort,s from Calais to Bordeaux were 

the most desirable. When tile Iirit,ish were jn France, they operated from 

Lorient to Calais and that even with these ports, it required a long 

period of time to build up nine divisions. 

GYKEEAL h!ARSHALL said that after the direct crossing had been 

accomplished, he thought it would be desirable to find some method of 

making a flank attack in order to shorten the operations. In this con-. 

nection, he had considered the possibilities of Holland and Denmark. 

SIR ALAS BPOOXL said that before a sufficient force could be 

built up for a direct at,tack, the Germans, because of their superior 

communications, could concentrate against our forces in superior numbers 

This will be true unless German divisions are forced to withdraw from 

France because the Russian "steam roller" had started rolling. 

SIR EUELEY POIINT: said that Penmark did not offer good oppor.~. 

tunities for hostile landings because of the difficulties of air cover-, 

age and also because of the lack of ports on her western coast. Holland 

is undesirable because of her canal system which favors the defense in 

retarding forward movements,, 

SIn ALAN BROOKE said that it would be necessary to determine 

accurately what flow of reinforcements from the United States could 

be exaected 

GEiWML SOMEDVELL stated that he would be prepared to present 

such data within from 8 to 10 hours after a decision concerning Opera.. 

tion HUSKY had ken made 

789 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING then suggested that limited operations proposed 

from England in 1943 be discussed. 

The British Chiefs of Staff stated that they had a paper on 

this subject in the process of preparation and would be prepared to 

discuss it during the meeting of January 22nd. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE brought up the question of what organizational 

set-up for BOLERO would be. 

Both the United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed that 

they had not discussed this matter among themselves and had not come to 

a definite conclusion. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that there were two methods of organization that might be followed: either a Deputy Commander or a Chief' of 

Staff could be set up with an appropriate staff; or a Commanding General 

could be selected at once and organize his own staff.. In either case, 

the planning and training for these operations should be undertaken at 

once and carried out on a month-to-month basis, ready at any time to 

undertake a cross-channel operation if the opportunity was presented. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE stated that there was a combined staff in London 

now which might be a nucleus around which the BOLERO planning organizacion could be built. 

IQRD MUIS MOUNTBATTEN pointed out that any operations undertaken this year would be very small, 

SIR ALAN BROOKE considered that regardless of how small the 

operations might be, they should be tied in with the dver-.ail plan for 

the all-out inva$ion of the Continent and designed to further those 

operations in some way. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Agreed that representatives of the Combined Staffs should prepare and submit recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

to be ready not later than the afternoon of January 22, relative 

to the command, organization, planning and training set-up 

necessary for entry of Continental Europe from the U. X in 

1943 and 1944. 

290 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

6 - REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TIHE PRIME MINISTER 

hithout discussion, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Directed the Secretariat to prepare a draft report of decisions reached subsequent to the submission of C.C.S. 153/1. 

291 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 66th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Friday, January 22, 1943, at 1015. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of thr Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

near Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General J. E. Hull, USA 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA* 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA * 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Mountbatten 

Lt. Sir 

Major General J. 

Air Vice Marshal 

Air Vice Marshal 

Lt. Colonel C. E. 

N. 

J. 

F. 

R. 

L* Ismay 

Kennedy * 

C. Slessor * 

F. Inglis ** 

Hirsch ** 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

Lt. Colonel L. T. Grove, USA 

* For Part of Meeting :>:> For Item ] 

292 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. DRUT OF TELEGRAM TO Mr, STALIN. 

(C.C.S. 165/1) 

After several minor amendments had been agreed upon, 

THE COIvIMITT%E: 

Directed that the d~raft telegram as amended be submitted to the 

President and the Prime hiinister for their approval. 

2. HUSKY. 

(C.C.S. Ifil/l.) 

F.IF ALfi: f!'(!OKi sajd that the British Flanriers had examined 

various permutations and combinations with reference to assembling and 

training the requisite forces for Cperation HU>KY and concluded that it 

could be. mounted by August IOth, with the possibility of putting the 

date forward to August 15th. The Eritish Chiefs of ltaff were in favor 

of Plan A described in C.C.S. 2.61,'1, Lnclosure "A", paragraph 5. He said 

that August 2md would be the best date because of the favorable state 

of the moon. The date could be set still earli~erif the Tunisian ports 

were made available to the British for loading. 

The Rritish will reyuire 5 divisions in all for the operation,, 

These would probably be the 5th, Mth, 78th for the first assault; one 

division in from U. 1'. for the Catenia assault on r: + 3; and the New 

Zealand divi.sion for the follow-up. It will be necessary to move theover-. 

seas Assault Force from England to the eastern Yediterranean about 

Uarch 15th,. Once this hadbeen accomplished, the British wouldbe commit 

ted to Operation HUSKY to the exclusion of RF.I?iSTO~SE. 

GEE~EPAL \fArc'HAI.I, said that while the U. S. Planning Staff did 

not have complete data ava.ilable at this time, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff 

are of the opinion that as far as the Iinited States forces are concerned, 

Operation HUSKY could be mounted by August 1st or earlier. He referred 

to a statement made in paragraph 4 of the outline plan (mclosure "A" to 

C.C.S. 165/1) that if the British forces used the Algerian and Tunisian 

ports in order to be ready by August Ist, the American share of the 

assault might be delayed beyond August 31sto The United States Chiefs of 

Staff were of the opinion that the British could utilize all the ports 

from Bizerte eastward and the United States forces could still be made 

* Subsequently published as C.C.E.. 165/3. 

2 93 
ll. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ready by August 1st. The only use required by the American forces of 

Rizerte and ports to the eastward would be for refueling purposes, He 

stated that as far as landing craft is concerned, little difficulty would 

be encountered. The limiting factor would be the "degree of finished 

training" that would be necessary. One division to come from tlie United 

States isundergoing thorough amphibious training at this time. The remaining divisions to participate are now in North efrica. They have already 

participated in landing operations, and their further training presents 

no problem. The question of relieving these divisjons which are now 

being held ready for ariy eventuality in Spanish iiorocco will require 

careful planning. 

SIR ALAF BPOOKE said that the Fritish Planners thought that it 

might be necessary for the Frit.isli to have ports somewhat further west 

than Bizerte' in order to meet a target date of August 1st. 

ADh!IFAL COOKE said that the Rritish coiild train at Bougie and do 

their loading in the Tunis area. :!e could see no reason why all the 

forces could not meet a target date of August 1st. Xe realized that the 

Germans might do considerable damage to the ports of Bizerte and Tunis, 

but he est.imated that by hlasting processes the ports could be cleared 

for use by the time the air forces were ready to operate 

SIR ALAb EROORZ pointed ont that the Eri tish prognostications 

f.w the target da.te were based OII an estimate that the Axis forces would 

be driven from Tunisia by kprjl 7Otti. If this is accomplished sooner, 

ihe target date could be moved forward according1y, 

ADMIRAL COOKE pointed oirt that there is still uncertainty regarding the character of the beaches in $.icily. They might not be suitable 

for the new types of landing craft, and this would involve a change of 

plans He also indicated that Admiral C'nnnirigham will be presented with 

some difficulties when landing craft arid combat loaders are moved into 

the Mediterranean- It will be necessary to do this in time for them to 

be available for training The American forces will require some of the 

new type LCA landing craft- These weigh 8 tons empty, 13 tons loaded, 

and carry 36 men. The davits on the IT. S. combat loaders may have to be 

replaced or adjusted in order to be capable of handling such weight,, 

LORD LOI!IS \:OUK'YBATl'EX said the Eritish are building 30 LCA 
U. S. SECRET 

37ITISH MOST SECRET 

type landing craft per monthinEngland. The number needed by the American 

forces could either be sent to America from England or the blueprints 

could be sent to America and the craft could be constructed there. The 

design is comparatively simple, and he thought that they could easily be 

manufactured in the United States. If the craft were to be manufactured 

in England, it would be necessary for the United States t,o furnish the 

engines required. The shipping of some 60 LCA to the Mediterranean, however, would not be an easy problem. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said it was apparent that the whole plan might 

require some changes; there might be some unforeseen and insurmountable 

difficulties which would necessitate the postponing of the target dat,e 

too long. He thought that, in this case, we should be prepared witkr an 

alternative. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that .he understood the only possibltalternative was Operation BRIMSTONE and indicated that he would like to 

discuss frankly the desirability of undertaking that operation. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Operation BRIKSTONE would afford a base 

for the bombing of the whole of Italy; it would be an easier operat,ion 

to undertake; and it could be accomplished earlier. It does not assist 

in clearing the Mediterranean for shipping, and it would not be as great, 

a blow to Italy. However, he felt it essential that consideration of 

Operation BRIMSTONE, as a possibility, be not delayed so long as to 

leave us with no alternative for 1913 if it were found that, HUSKY could 

not be accomplished. 

GENERAL SIARSHALL said it was the opinion of the U. S. Chiefs of' 

Staff that while Operation BRIMSTONE would produce an advantage as far 

as air attack against Italy is concerned, it would postpone IIUSKY. Any 

operation in the Mediterranean would postpone the BOLERO build-up. lle 

considered BRIMSTONE a minor operation which would result in many military restrictions. Either HUSKY or cross-channel operations will produce great results, whereas BRIMSTONE merely gives an air advantage. 

At the same time, it jeopardizes the prospects of either HUSKY or crosschannel operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that German resistance to Operation 

BRIMSTONE could not be discounted. In estimating the capabilitjes of the 

295 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISY M9ST SECRET 

United Nations, it must be assumed that the Germans are aware that 

Sardinia can be undertaken at an earlier date than HUSKY. They will 

undoubtedly make their dispositions accordingly. I!e added that the undertaking of BRI!.ISTONE would destroy the cover for future operatioris unless 

the Germans conclude that we propose to by-pass Sicily entirely and 

attack southern France. iie thought it hardly likely that the Germans 

would come to such a conclusion. 

IIe said the United States Chiefs of Staff are more concerned 

with adding to the security of shipping through the Mediterranean and 

with the immediate effects of our operations on Germany's strength 

against the :lussians than they are with eliminating Italy from the war. 

He thought that to undertake Operation BRIMSTONE would be to seek t,lie 

softest spot before turning to the harder spot and in so doing we might 

make the harder spot harder. 

AtE4I:UL KING pointed out that the airfields in Sardinia have a 

relatively small capacity and that they would have to be developed. 

lVhile the position of Sardinia does bring northern Italy and southern 

France within range of our fighter aircraft, it is, by the same token, 

within range of Axis aircraft based in those areas. 

GENERAL AiWOLD said that in order to get fighter protection from 

Sardinia we must capture Corsica. 

GENERAL !,IASHALL said that the IJnited States Chiefs of Staff are 

very much opposed to the Operation BRIMSTONE. 

SIX ALAN BROOKE said that he agreed with all of these arguments, 

and he felt that we must go all out for Sicily. At the same time, he 

felt that there should be an alternative upon which we could fallback 

in case of absolute necessity. 

AD!,IIRAL KING said that the ideal would be to attack Sicily at 

tkle same time the <Germans were evacuating Tunis. The longer the attack 

against Sicily is delayed beyond that date, the stronger will be tire 

defenses of Sicily. He thought it important, therefore, that every 

effort be made to reduce this lapse of time to the minimum. 

L0I:D LOUIS XOUNTBATTEN said that in his opinion the ideal would 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISB MOST SECRET 

be to take Sardinia during the time that Tunis was being evacuated by 

the Axis forces. I!e felt that the Axis powers would thenbegiving little 

attention to the defenses of Sardinia. He thought that the earlier date 

upon which the Operation BRElSTONE could be accomplished, the securing 

of air bases from which to attack northern Italy, and the possibility of 

conducting Commando raids all along the coast of Italy, combined to make 

Operation BXIhlSTONE very attractive. 

GENEXAL !?IIAnSHALL asked Lord Louis :.fountbatten if the training 

difficulties would be reduced if we were able to attack Sicily at the 

same time that Tunis was being evacuated by the Axis forces. 

LOXD LOUIS MOIJNTBATTEN said he did not think so inasmuch as the 

evacuation would have small effect on the fixed defenses of Sicily. 

SI:( DIJDLEY POUND pointed out that if the operation were to be 

mounted before August ?2nd, it should be moved forward to July 25th in 

order to take full advantage of the favorable stage of the moon. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that for purposes of surprise it might 

be well to mount the operation at a time other than when the moon was in 

its best stage. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that to avoid undue risk of 

aerial torpedo attack the periods of the full moon should be avoided 

and that the assault should be made only when there was moonlight during 

the early morning hours. There was a period of from 5 to 6 days in each 

month which would be suitable. 

ADIIIRAL KING said he thought that July 25th should be set as the 

target date for plarining purposes and that the attack should only be 

postponed to August if J~lyproved to be impossible 

LORD LOUIS XOUNTBATTEN said that a clear statement should be 

made by the naval forces as to when their training can be completed. Ile 

prophesied that naval training will be the bottleneck, 

SIX CHLLES PORTAL agreed with Admiral King that July should be 

set as the target date in order that we might strive for the best. He 

added that we should also be prepared for the worst. :!e pointed out that 

the critical time on the Aussian front is in .4ugust and September. If 

237 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

the target date for HUSKY had to be postponed beyond September, it would 

be of little value, He considered that the collapse of Italy would have 

the most favorable effect on the Russian front. Since this might be 

accomplishedbyOperation BRIMSTONE, he thought that we shouldbeprepared 

to undertake this operation ifHUSKY had to bedelayed too long., BRIMSTONE 

in .June wouldbebetter than HUSKY in September; but a decision to undertake BXIhfSTONE must be made by March 1st; otherwise the landing craft 

would be at the wrong end of the Mediterranean. 

GENERAL. MARSHALL said he thought there should be no looseness in 

our det,ermination to undertake Operation HUSKY. He recounted the diffi.­

culties regarding the changes and delays in BOLERO in 1942. 

SIR ALAN B!IOOKE and SIIl CHARLES PORTAL agreed with this view. 

GENERAL MklSHALL said that we must be determined to do the hard 

thing and proceed to do it^ He did not agree with Sir Charles Portal 

that the elimination of Italy from the war was the most important thing 

that could be done. To accept this premise might make it absolutely necessary to turn to Operation BRIMSTONE in order that Italy could be 

eliminated in time. Ile felt that this should be avoided because Operation 

BRIMSTONE would neutralize the efforts of the United Nations for 1943. 

He said that in BRIMSTONE we should be advancing into a salient with 

limited air support where we might be shot at from three directions, The 

supply of Sardinia entails an increase in our line of communications and 

adds a threat to our limited shipping. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that if Operation BRIMSTONE is undertaken, 

HUSKY would have to be delayed until the periodofbad weather in October 

or later, 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Operation BRIMSTONE would not be an 

easy operation. Fighter support would be inadequate, and it would be 

necessary to fight our way northward through the entire island, He 

believed that we should go bald-headed for Sicily. He felt that the 

capture of Sicily would have more effect on the war.. He added, however, 

that if by March 1st it develops that Operation HUSKY cannot be mounted 

until too late, it was important for us to have an alternative to turn 

to in order that we do not remain idle for the entire year" 

238 
K S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

The discussion then turned on the Command and Staff organization 

which would be required for the operation. 

ADMIRAL COOKE said that thecombined Staff Planners felt strongly 

that one man should be made responsible for thewhole ofthearrangements; 

otherwise, it was very unlikely that the necessary preparations could be 

completed within the short time available. A special staff would be 

required for the purpose 

In the discussion this need was fully accepted, and it was 

recognized that the Chief of Staff must be carefully selected, 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Resolved to attack Sicily in 1943 with the favorable July 

moon as the target date 

@) Agreed to instruct General Eisenhower to report not later 

than March 1st: (1) whether any insurmountable difficulty as 

to resources and training will cause the date of the assault 

to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon; and, (2) in 

that event, to confirm that the date will not be later than 

the favorable August moon 

(c) Agreed that the following should he the Command set-up for 

the operation: 

(1) General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General 

Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsible for 

the detailed planning and preparation and for the execution of the actual operation when launched­

(2) Admiral Cunningham to be the Naval Commander, and Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander 

(3) Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western 

and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due 

course by General Eisenhower 

(d) Agreed that General Eisenhower should be instructed to set 

up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a 

special operational and administrative staff, with its own 

Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation. 

(e) Instructed the Secretaries to draft for their approval the 

necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the 

above decisions. 

299 
U.. S. SECRET 

BRITISR MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 67th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Friday, January 22, 1343, at 14.70. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. 11. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Brig. General J. E. Hull, USA Mountbatten 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA Lt* Sir Ismay 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA Major General J. N. Kennedy 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN Air Vice Marshal J. C. Slessor 

SECRETMIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

Lt. Colonel L. T. Grove, USA 

300 
u. s. smEr 

SRITISH VOST SECRET 

1. CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC THEATER IN 1943. 

(C.C.S. 168) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the 

Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff which Admiral Ring explained with the aid of 

a map of the Pac5fic theater. 

GENEHAL ARNOLD, in reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, 

said that the theoretical radius of action of the B-29 and B-32 was 

1,600 miles. This would be sufficient for the bombardment of Tokyo from 

the Nanchang area. The best bases for the bombardment of Japan were in 

the Maritime Provinces where there were known to be twenty-five airfields. No details, however, were available regarding their condition. 

THE COMMITTEF.: 

Took note of the proposals of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff 

for the conduct of the war in the Pacific theater in 1913, as 

set out in C.C.S. 168. 

2. PRESS COMMUNIQUEo 

(Previous reference C.C.S. 61st Veeting, Item I) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that the Eresident and 

Prime 'Vinister were themselves preparing the communique for issue to 

the press at the conclusion of the Conference, and that it would not, 

therefore, be necessary for them to submit a draft. 

3. CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS IN 1943. 

(C.C.S. 167) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a report by the 

British Joint Planning Staff onContinental operations in1943,C.C.S.167. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that paragraph 2 (c) was somewhat misleading 

in its present form since there could, in fact, be no half-way house 

between the limited operations described in (a) and (b) of the paragraph 

and return to the Continent in full. He proposed that subparagraph (c) 

should, therefore, be amended to read, "Return to the Continent to take 

advantage of German disintegration." 

The policy which the British Chiefs of Staff recommended was 

contained in paragraph 19 of the paper. 

301 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH YOST SECPET 

The provision of additional airborne forces from the U. S. would 

be essential since HUSKY would use up all British resources in this 

respect. 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN agreed and emphasized the need for airborne forcestoturn the beach defenses. Without these and armored forces 

to follow up, the assault on the northern coast of France was, in his 

opinion, quite impracticable. tle drew attention to the note at the end 

of paragraph 5 relating to armored landing craft. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Agreed to defer final acceptance of the proposals of the British 

Chiefs of Staff pending further study. 

4. ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING AND TRAINING ElOR 

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS. 

(C.C.S. 169) 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a note by the 

Combined Staffs, C.C.S. 169. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE thought that it would be premature to designate 

a Supreme Commander for large-scale operations on the Continent at 

present in view of the limited operations which could be carried out 

with available resourcesin1943. A special staff was, however, necessary 

for cross-channel operations and should, he thought, be set up without 

delay. 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that a Supreme Commander would make a 

top-heavy organization at present, but thought that it was desirable to 

put a special staff under a selected Chief of Staff of sufficient standing; such an officer would perhaps suffice for the cmmand of limitedcperations during the summer. This special staff could work out their 

plans on the basis of certain forces being available, even though they 

were not in actual control of the troops themselves. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the staff which was at present working 

on cross-channel operations belonged to various Commanders in the United 

Kingdom. It would be necessary to take them away from their present 

Commanders and set them up independently. 

302 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 169, except for 

the immediate appointment of a Supreme Commander. 

@) Agreed that a Supreme Commander will ultimately be necessary 

for the reentry to the Continent, but that he should not be 

appointed at the present time. 

(c) Agreed that a British Chief of Staff, together with an 

independent U. S.-British staff should be appointed at once 

for the control, planning and training of cross-channel 

operations in 1943. 

(d) Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to prepare for their 

approval a draft directive togovern the planning and conduct 

of cross-channel operations in 1943 in accordance with the 

decisions to be reached on C.C.S. 167. 

(e) Agreed that the above directive should make provision for a 

return to the Continent with the forces that will be available for this purpose in the United Kingdom month by month. 

5. LANDING CRAFT, 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN gave an account ofthe British experiences 

in building up an Assault Fleet. He described how the L.C.I. (L) had been 

produced and explained the dislocation which had been caused by TORCH. 

For that operation it had been necessary to stop the entry and training 

of British crews so that U. S. combat teams could have the use of the 

training center at Inveraray, As a result, a situation had arisen in 

which the British were temporarily unable to man all the landing craft 

at their disposal. The position was now in hand, and there would be no 

difficulty in manning all the landing craft expected by next August, 

He drew attention to the shortage of spare parts which had 

recently forced him toconsider the cannibalization of 25% of the landing 

craft at his disposal. This position, according to Admiral Cooke, also 

was now improving; but he emphasized the very great importance of providing ample spares parallel with the production of craft. 

He described the organization of the British Assault Fleets. 

Broadly speaking, there were local forces organized for operations in 

home waters, western and eastern Mediterranean, and India. Besides these 

local forces, there was an overseas Assault Force with a lift of 30,000 

303 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

personnel, 3,300 vehicles and 200 tanks. The purpose ofthisForce was to 

reinforce the local Assault Fleet in whichever theater might be the center of active operations. This Force would be ready to sail for the 

Mediterranean by March 15th, to take part in HUSKY. 

IIe described three important lessons of amphibious operations 

which had so far emerged: 

(a) For any amphibious campaign involving assaults onstrongly 

defended coasts held by a determined enemy, it is essential that 

the landing ships and craft shall be organized well in advance 

into proper assault fleets. Thesemusthave a coherence anddegree 

of permanence comparable to that of any first-line fighting formation. Discipline, training, and tactical flexibility are just 

as necessary for assault fleets as for naval, military and air 

combat formations. This was the overriding lesson of Dieppe. 

(b) No combined operation can be carried out with reasonable 

hope ofsuccess without adequate beach reconnaissance beforehand. 

He had now organized specially trained beach reconnaissance parties which had already done most valuable work. 

(c) Adequate fire support for the assault against a strongly 

defended coast was most essential. A scale of 100 guns (48 selfpropelled in L.C,T. and 52 in t,he new gun craft to be known as 

L.C.G.) for each assault brigade had been recommended. He handed 

around drawings of a type of amphibious close support vessel 

which had been designed for this purpose. These special assault 

craft were primarily intended forROUNDW, and none couldbeready 

in time for HUSKY. 

IIe then handed around a table* showing the estimated availability 

of British and American built landing ships and craft. Referring to this 

table, he pointed out that the main British deficiencies by next August 

would beinL.S.T. and L.C.I.(Lj. He urged most strongly that allocations 

to the British of both these types should be increased to make up these 

deficiencies He confirmed that provisions had already been made for 

manning the full number of all types of craft which had been asked for 

by next August together with 50 percent spare crews, 

::ANNEX 

304 
U. S. SECRET 

SIITISH !?OST SECrlET 

GENERAL SOMERVEU confirmed that, so far as could be foreseen, 

sufficient landing craft could be made available for both the U. S. and 

British portions of HUSKY as now planned. 

ADMIRAL KING drew attention to the great diversity of types of 

British built ships andcraft. He asked whether a greater degree ofstandardization would not he possible. In reply LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN explained that different types had been developed independently by the two 

navies; improvements had been made as a result of experience. Some Of 

those shown in the table were now out of date. 

ADMIRAL COOKE expressed the view that the production of landing 

craft would be at least as great as the ability of the U. S. and British 

Navies to man them. He explained the heavy demand for the Pacific where 

rate of wastage was high and maintenance facilities extremely limited. 

He confirmed the shortage of spare engines. Spares had been used to fit 

up new hulls which had come out of production in large numbers. 

iie explained that the original split of L.Y.T. for ROUNDUP, as 

between U. S. and British, had beenin the proportion of 125 to be manned 

by the U. S. and 79by the Fritish. Allocations now proposed by the U. S. 

Navy Department gave a higher proportion to the British, half of the 168 

proposed for the European Theater going to the British and half to the 

U. S.; 117 of these craft would he allocated to the Pacific. Ile then 

raised the question of L.C.A., of which the U. S. had none at all. He 

understood that 96 of these craft were required for the British portion 

of HUSKY, and he thought that a similar number would be required for the 

U. S. portion as well. 

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that the provision of these craft 

would need careful examination. It might he found best to send the 

drawings to America so that they could be built in U. S. yards. 

THE COMNITTEE: 

(a) Agreed that the question should he reviewed by July 1, 1943, 

whether the number of L.S.T.(2) to he allocated to the 

British from the total U. S. production of 390 can be raised 

from the figureof120 now proposed by the U. S. Navy Department to 150 which was the full British requirement. 

305 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(b) Took note that the U So Navy Department would investigate 

whether the follow-up order for 44 L.C.I.(L) can be restored 

and half of this production allocated to the British 

(C) Took note that the greatest needs of the British Combined 

Operations Naval Command were for: 

(1) L.C.M. (3) ofwhich 646 had been asked for by the British 

by August 1, 1943, but the detailed allocation of which 

was not yet available.. 

(2) Scripps-Ford conversion engines for L.C.A., of which a 

large additional number would he needed if L.C.A. were 

built in the United Kingdom for the U. S 

(0) Spare parts, as a matter of great urgency, for landing 

craft in the United Kingdom, to be supplied in the first 

instance on the requisitions already submitted to the 

U. S. Navy Department by Comamphoreu. 

6. SYSTEM OF COMMAND FOR COM31NED U S AND BRITISH OPERATIONS 

(C.C.S. 75/3) 

(Previous reference: C.C.S. 45th Meeting, Item 1) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the intention of the paper under consideration was to lay down general principles for the organization of 

command where U. S. and British forces were engaged in combined operations under a Supreme Commander. The systems of command employed by the 

two nations for their own forces differed fundamentally, He recalled 

that when Field Marshal Wave11 had been suddenly called upon to form a 

combined headquarters at short notice in the Southwest Pacific he had 

had considerable difficulties in arranging satisfactorily the general 

organization of his command Similar cases might occur in the future, 

and it would he of great assistance to have guiding principles agreed 

beforehand. 

Discussion followed on the precise channels for the communication of orders which would be used in the organization shown in the diagram attached to the paper. 

ADMIRAL KING said that in considering the chain of command shown 

in the diagram, it must he remembered that all Subordinate Commanders 

act as the agents of the Supreme Commander. The authority of Task Force 

Commanders was complete in respect of their own task forces It would 

not be necessary, however, for the Naval Commander always to transmit 

306 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

orders affecting naval forces through the Supreme Commander, and the 

Task Force Comander to the naval component. of the task force. He would 

be an officer of experience a.nd discretion and would avoid issuing orders 

which would encroach upon the authority of Task Force Commanders. Tlie 

channels were not rigid. Taking the example of' I~I~Sl~Y, he explained that

the Air Comnander with Geueral I-isenhower woul(1 have t,wo main functions 

apart from advising the Supreme Commander. He vould arrange for the air 

bombardment reyuired to soften the defenses of tile island, and command 

the air forces allotted to this task. He ir'oulr! also answer calls for 

assistance frm the task forres. There would be 110 objection to such 

calls being passed direct from the Air Conimanders in t,he task forces to 

the Air Commander at the main headquarters. 

THL COXhlITTEE: 

Accepted the basic system of unified command in combined U, S 

British operations as set out in C.C.S. 75/.1. 

207 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT 

Estimated Availability of British Types 

Numbers Estimated Total Availsble, 

existing allowing for attrition, on 

TYPE OF SHIP OR CRAFT December 

1, 1942. April 1, 1943 Aug. li 1943 

Landing Ships Infantry (Large) 

White Ensign 

In fant ry (Large ) 

Red hsign 

Infantry (Medium) 

" (Small) 

" (IJand hoisting: 

Headquarter 

Tank, Class I 

Stern 

Gantry 

Tank, Mark I 

" I1 

I " I11 

" " IV 

Mechanized, Mark I 

Infantry (Small) 

Assault 

Personnel (Small) 

(Medium) 

Flak (Large) 

support (L8 r ge ) 

(Medium) 

4 (a) 5 5 

10 15 15 

2 2 2 

5 5 5 

13 15 22 

2 2 2 

3 6 6 

2 2 2 

3 4 4 

15. 4 4 

55 13 38 

102 109 119 

44 142 233 

125 161 201 

15 32 

274 402 (b) 624 (c) 

1 195 195 

4 55 55 

5 16 26 

5 7 12 

24 49 69 

380 380 380 

" 

" 

" 

Landing Craft 

I 

" " 

n " 

I 

Landina Barges 

NOPE (a) Two of these ere undergoing long repairs. 

(b) Includes 30 building in India. 

(c) Includes 150 building in India. 

308 
U. S, SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX 

LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT (Cont'd) 

American Built Types to be Manned by British 

Lsndlng Shrps, Tank, Class 2 

" Dock 

* Craft Tank Mark V 

Mechanized. Mark I11 

" Infantry (Large) 

11 " Personnel (LargeFSRarnped) 

Vehicles 

* Vehicles & Personnel 

-

April 

A1loca1, 1' 1 --

P ust 

A1loca 

1. 

­

1 3

-

sked tion ksked tion 

proposed Short proposed Short 

for by USN for by VSN 

- Dept. Dept.

105 68 37 150 84 66 

5 5 

150 150 150 150 

501 ? ? 646 ? ? 

150 150 194 150 44 

762 762 832 ? ? 

293 299 299 299 

- - -

160 ? ?

NOTE It is hoped that the target figure of 150 for L.S.T. (2) may be completed 

during 1944, if it cannot be reached in 1943. 

Unless adequate spare parts can be provided with high priority, up to 25% 

of Landing Craft with American engines will have to be cannibalized to keep 

the remainder running. 

309 
L’. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 66th Meeting 

COMBINED CHXEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Sat.urday, January 23, 1943, at 1000. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. blarshall, USA General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, IJSA Pound 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Lt, General �3. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA Mountbat ten 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Major General J. N. Kennedy 

Air Vice Marshal J. C. Slessor 

Air Vice Narshal F. F. Inglis 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

310 
U S SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SFCRET 

I ixmro UIJ I LO-UP . (C.C.S. 172) 

GEKERAL SOjiEP\'i:LL sai~dthat his paper had been prepared in 

collaboration witti Lord L.eathers, and the figures of Ii. 9. troops to 

arrive in t,he I'ni terl Kingdom in 1943 were dependent on certain assistance 

being provid~ilby tiie 1:ritish. A figure of 50,000 nien Per division had 

been l,a!ierl as a liasjs of calculation, but, this was verj high owing to 

I hr. inclusion of a large overliead in the first. ilalf year The figures 

would be rediiced t.o about, A0,OOO in the lat,ter part of the year In this 

cvent. the total number of divisions might rise frm! fifteen to nineteen 

by the end of the year. ivcrh virar!s woirld be used of increasing the 

nunllier of t,roops siiipne(! by adrlitiortal loadings in personnel ships 

during the suiiiiwr niont,lis and t,li~f'it,ting, of Fnre cargo ships for troop 

c nrry i rig 

TlIL CCi'. ',iI'j-TLL: 

Took note of ?lamer (.~.('.!.t~T;>. 

9 

(C .c I 5.. lf7) 

(Previous rpference C.C,.F. C7th Ileeting, Item 3) 

(X?IU!AL \.'BPMAJ.I. said that the proposals in t,he paper by t.he 

Britjsti -Joint Plannirig Lt,af'f were accentable t,o thr 1'. S, Chiefs of 

Staff subject to the f'ollou'ing conimerits: 

It appeared t,l,at the availability of tiie i-rit,isli airborne divi 

sion referred to j~iparagravi! WBC !.o!' doiibtf'i!I in view of the demands 

nf HI?,IiY 7'1:e disnatcii of an b.n:~rirais airborr:e division to the Ihited 

Kingdom. nossibly in .Tune, was, therefore, heirig considered by the U S 

Chief's of Staff '!'lie first, airborne djvision which would be ready for 

<,verseas nonld be required for !II:?KY The chief difficulty lay in the 

provision of the necessary air transports, but these could be moved 

across t,o the U. R more quickly than the personnel, who would have to 

go by sea 

The IJ. S Chiefs of Staff considered it most desirable that any 

operation of the type mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of the paper; e g ,, 

against the Channel Islands, should be coordinated in time with HUSKY 

As regards the larger operation against the Cotentin Peninsula, 

for which the target date, given in paragraph 19 (b) was August 1st. it 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH KOST SECRET 

must be made clear that the plan was only to be based on the U. S. 

resources available at that time in the United Kingdom. First priority 

was given to HUSKY, and the U. S. did not wish to accept any additional 

commitment for operation HADXIAN beyond what was at present envisaged. 

It was highly improbable that any U. S. landing craft crews would be 

available for operations from the IJnited Kingdom this summer. 

SIR ALAN BBOOKE said that, as a result of the decision on HUSKY, 

paragraph 4 was not now correct. There would onlybell British divisions 

and a part of one British airborne division available. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Approved the proposals contained in C.C.S. 167 subject to the 

reservations of the TJ~ S. Chiefs of Staff recorded above. 

3. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRI!dE bIINISTER. 

(C.C.S. 170) 

THE COX+IIIITTEE: 

(a) ~4pprovedthe draft submitted by the Secretaries, subject to 

minor amendments agreed in the discussion, and the inclusion 

of a paragraph on the BOLERO build--up based on C.C.S. 172.” 

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to prepare and submit a final 

draft forthwith. 

”,. OPEXATION HUSKY--DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER. 

(c.c.s. 171) 

GENEIlAL. MAXSHALL proposed certain amendments to the text of the 

draft directive, which were accepted Q:: 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Approved the directive as amended and instructed the Secretaries 

to transmit it to General Eisenhower 

5. LANDING CRAFT. 

LOXD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that the Admiralty had been asked to 

complete another 150 L.C.A. during the next four months to provide 

American requirements for HUSKY and training. He might have to send 

British L.C.A. from Force J (the Channel Assault Force) for the U. s. 

* Subsequently published as C.C.S. 172/1.

*:: Subsequently published as C.C.S. 171/1. 

3 12 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

share of HUSKY, but it was essential that these should be replacedin 

time to enable cross-channel operations to be undertaken this summer. 

All L C.A. engines come from America; and he would, therefore, require 

400 Scripps-Ford conversion engines at the rate of 100 a month for the 

next four months. Each craft had two engines, and 25 percent spares were 

required. It was of great importance that the Channel Assault Force 

should be kept in being, even though temporarily short of L.C.A. to make 

up U. S. requirements. Otherwise, there would be no force available for 

cross-channel operations. Once broken up, this force would be very 

difficult to re-form again. 

ADXIRAT, KING said that no firm promise could be given that this 

large number of engines would be provided from the U S where production resources were already strained 1:e undertook to see what could be 

done 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Agreed that it was most desirable for the Channel Assault 

Force to be kept in being for cross-channel operations this 

summer. 

(b) Took note that the U. S. would endeavor to provide the necessary engines for any L.C.A. hulls produced in Great Britain during the coming months.. 

3 13 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 53th Meeting 

COSIBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

!JINUTES of !deeting held at Anfa Camp 

on Saturday, January 23, 1343, at 2130. 

FI1ESENT 

General G C Marshall, USA General ?ir Alan P. Brooke 

Admiral E. J. King, IJSN Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Pound 

Air Cnief ilarshal Sir Charles 

F. A. Portal 

THE FOLLOViINCr NERE ALSO PZESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, ::SA Field ?darshal Sir John Dill 

?,ear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., ZISY Vice Admiral the Lord Louis 

Brig. General J. E. Hull, USA Mountbatten 

~~i~.wedemeyer, USA Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay cenera1 A. C. 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

SECRETAn IAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. General J. 3. Deane, USA 

3 14 
I . REPORT TO TEE PXESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. 

(C.C.S. 171) I) 

T!IE C03NITTEE: 

(a) AArePd, after discussion, to a number of a.mendments to 

C.C.S. 170j'l. 

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to incorporate these amendments 

in a final report::: to be submitted to the President and 

prime Vinister. 

2. OPERATION IlUSKY--DIRECTIVE TO GEKERAL EISENHOWER. 

(C .C .S . 171/1 /C) 

TIE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Agreed to an amendment to the directive to General Eisenhower 

(C .C.S. 171il/D) consequent upon the amendments agreed to 

in C.C.S. 17012. 

(b) Directed the Secretaries to transmit the amended directive::":: 

to General Eisenhower. 

3. ASSAULT SHIPPING. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE read a note by Lord Leathers expressing concern 

at the use of large passenger ships as assault shipping. (A copy of this 

note is attached as an Annex to these ?>inutes.) 

ADMIRAL KING said that it was this consideration which had moved 

him to suggest that the assault in Operation HUSKY should be carried out 

as far as possible in the larger type of landing craft andnot in assault 

shipping. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Took note : 

(a) Of the note by Lord Leathers. 

(b) That the British Chiefs of Staff would submit proposals for 

reducing to the minimum the use of large passenger ships as 

assault ships. 

4. CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE. 

GENERAL MARSIiALL, at the conclusion of the conference at Casablanca, expressed his appreciation of the readiness of the Eritish 

* Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. l';u;2. 

%:: Yubsequently circulated as C.C.S. T7FlXI .. 

315 
U.. S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

Chiefs of Staff to understand the U. S. point of view and of the fine 

spirit of cooperation which they had shown during the discussions. He 

felt sure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would greatly profit by 

their contacts with their colleagues and the mutual understanding of 

each other's problems which had been insured. He paid a tribute to the 

work of the British 8th Army and expressed his admiration of their energetic prosecution of the operations in Tripolitania. He went on to thank 

Sir John Dill for accompanying the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to the conference and for paying a visit to India to continue his valuable work as a 

link between the U. S. and British Staffs. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE thanked General Marshall for his words and said 

that he reciprocated most whole-heartedly General Marshall's expression 

of the great benefit which had accrued from the conference. Mutual 

appreciation of each other's problems was only possible through personal 

contacts. Sir John Dill was performing a great service as a link between 

the British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff. A great step forward had been 

taken in agreeing upon a basic strategy for the future prosecution of 

the war. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he was sure he was speaking on behalf of 

all the British Chiefs of Staff in expressing his appreciation of the 

great hospitality which had been given by the U. S. Forces and of the 

excellent arrangements for the conference which had been made by General 

Patton and the troops under his command. 

SIR JOHN DILL thankedthecombined Chiefs of Staff and emphasized 

the great value of the frank discussions which had been held. 

ADMIRAL KING said he fully agreed with Sir Alan Brooke as to the 

great value of the basic strategic plan which had been worked out at the 

conference. In his view this was the biggest step forward to the Winning 

of the war. Much had already been done to fill in the details of this 

plan and more would be done in the future, but the discussions which had 

been held had enabled a true meeting of minds to take place between the 

British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he fully associated himself with these 

views. 

3 16 
GENERAL MAKSHALL said that before the conference broke up he 

woiilil like to pay tribute to the very valuable services performed by the 

Combined Staff planners and the Secretariat. 

317 
U. S. SECPET 

BtITISH NOST SECPET 

ANNEX 

I and my advisers are much concerned by the present policy of 

using large passenger ships as L.S.I. (L) Is. 

I know that L.S.I.(L)'s are essential to the success of large 

amphibious operations; and in the absence of any more suitable shipping, 

large troopships have had to he converted for this use. Thirteen such 

ships were employed in the TORCH assault, and 3 were lost. We have now 

had to select 5 more for conversion. 

Apart from the loss of 3 L.S.I.(L)'s in TORCH, we alsolost 5 

other large troopships in the operation; the total trooping capacity of 

the 8 ships was over 21,000. 

The lossestobe expected in future assault operations on a large 

scale against determined opposition are bound to be much higher. We must 

realize that further heavy losses of this type of ship would have a 

crippling effect on our strategy by destroying our ability to carry out 

large-scale trooping movements, as replacement of this type of ship is 

impossible. 

I wonder whether it would be possible for the V.S.A. to help 

us out with Combat Loaders, whichare replaceable from current production, 

while the big troopships are not replaceable. 

We could, of course, make up to the Americans the loss in their 

trooping capacity by lending them some of our troopships. 

(Signed) LEBTHERS 

January 23, 1913. 

318 
17 S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

A 

Aegean, Opening the, 28 

Agend~aof the C,onference 

Suggested procedure for dealing 

with the, 20, 2.19 

Agreements on North Africa coast 

command, 251 

Agreements reached as to conduct of 

war in 1943, 16, 18 

Aid to Russia, V.S., 17, 22, 72, 75, 

1492 255, 264 

Aid to China, 145 

Air Command 

Mediterranean, System of, in, 78 

West Africa, Waval and, in, 115, 

124 

Aircraft 

Requirements of share-based aircraft far the defense of Trade Communications, United Nations, 54, 57 

Air Forces in Tunisia, 140 

Alexander account of 8th Army operation, 136 

Allied 

Yanpower, 219 

Plans relating to Turkey, 23, 257 

Allocation of adeqnate forces in 

Pacific, 17, ig 

Allocation of resources outlined by 

General Marshall, 170 

Amphibious operations from the 

United Kingdom, 122 

ANAKIM, 21, 283 

Burma, Reconquest of, 12 

Forces, Provision of, 80, 82 

ANFA Conference 

Meeting, Minutes of, 134 

Annex 

Minutes 61at Meeting, 253 

Minutes 67th Meeting, 308 

Minutes 69th Meeting, 317 

Antisubmarine Warfare, 196 

Assault shipping, 315 

Assistance to Russia in relation to 

other commitments, 109, 117 

Atlantic, 45 

n 

Berlin, Paids on, 245 

BOLERO, 113, 121 

Build-up, 21, 311 

Shipping capabilities for, 129 

Enclosure I'AI', 130 

F,aclosure "B", 131 

Enclosure IICII, Assumptions for 

calculations of 11. S. shipping 

capabilities under plan adopted 

by C.C.S. for 1943, 132 

Bomber offensive from North Africa, 

The, 44, ue, 266 

Bomber offensive from the I!nited 

Kingdom, The 21, 86, 88, 279 

Bombing Axis oil source%, 124 

British agreement for British 

efforts against Japan unnecessary, 

244 

British responsibility for Turkey, 

267 

British will handle Turkish matters, 

124 

Burma, Operations in, II 

Reconquest of, 12 

Burma Road, The, 11 

Business, Future, 275 

C 

Calcolations of Turkish equipment 

and needs, 139 

Capture of Dodecanese, 28, 145 

Cxang Xai-shek desires postponement of Operation RAVENOUS, 144 

China 

Communications, Overland, with, la 

Improvement of air transportation 

into, 123 

NOTE: Numerals in Italics refer to rages in Minutes of Meetings 

Numerals in plain type refer to Pages of C.C.S. Papers. 

319 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET Imm 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Final report to The President and 

Prime Minister summarizing decisions by the, 117 

Memorandum by the, 109 

Minutes of meeti.ngs, 269 

Papers, I 

Combined Strategy, 184 

Command 

Dakar, French Vest Africa, strategic responsibility and setup for, 

249 

Mediterranean, in the, 269, iig 

Naval and air, in West Africa, 115, 

124 

System of 

Air, in the Mediterranean, 78 

Combined l:.S.-British Operations 

for, 1, 306 

Vnified command for combined operations, I 

Command, control, planning and 

training for operations for a reentry to the Continent across the 

Channel, beginning in 1943, Proposed organization of, 99, 302 

Commanders 

Land, naval and air, 2 

Supreme, 2 

Task farce, 2 

Commitments 

Turkey, Our military, to, 35 

Communications 

China, Overland, with, 12 

Defense of trade, United Nations' 

requirements of share-based aircraft for the, 54 

Japanese, II 

Sea, of the rlnited Nations, Minimum 

escort requirements to maintain 

the, 45, 57, log 

Enclosure IfA", 50 

Enclosure "B", 51 

Enclosure "C", 52 

Enclosure "DIf, 53 

Enclosure IfEI', 54 

Sea, Security of, 1x7, 155 

Communique, Press, 301 

Conclusion of the Conference, 315 

Conduct of the War in 1943, 16, ~b, 

249 

Pacific Theater, in the 95, ?a1 

Conference 

Conclusion of the, 315 

Draft report on the work of the, 

102 

Publication of results of the, 252 

Continental operations in 1943, go, 

301, 311 

Convoy, 46 

Vscort requirements, lietailed estimate of, 50 

Russian air assistance for P.C., 

230 

Coordination of 8th Army and risenhower Army, 138 

Craft, Landing, 303, 312 

D 

Dakar, French Weest Africa, Strategic 

responsibility and command aet--up 

for, 249 

Defeat of the ['Boat, 16, 18 

Defensive Pequirements of North 

Africa, 139 

Destroyer (see Fleet Destroyer), 51 

Development of the Offensive, a7 

Directive 

Allied Fxpeditionary Force in North 

Africa, To Commander-in-Chief, 

General Eisenhower, to 312, 31.5 

Operation HUSKY, 125, 127 

Podecanese, Captnre of, 28, 145 

Draft--Operation HUSKY, 125 

Draft report On the work of the 

Conference, 102 

Draft telegram from the President 

of the United States and the Prime 

Minister of Great Britain to Premier Staiin, 84, 282, 293 

Dry cargo import sitnation, U.K,, 45 

E 

Eastern Theater, 226 

NOTE: Numerals in Italics refer to Pages in Minutes of' Meetings. 

Numerals in Plain Type refer to Pages of C.C.S. Papers. 

320 
LT. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET INDEX 

Situation to be created in, 4, 236 

Enclosure "A", 4 

Enclosure %",7 

Eisenhower, General, Directive to, 

3122315 

Description of airfields used by 

Allied Forces, 136 

Proposal forconduction of forthcoming operation, 135 

Review of situation on his front, 

135 

Employzent of French Forces in North 

Africa, 223 

Enemyls fighting value, 137 

Entry of Turkey into the War on the 

side of the United Nations, 23 

Equipment, Supply of (Turkey), 38 

Escort 

Carriers, United Nations I requirements of, 53 

Convoy, requirements, Detailed estimate of, 50 

Requirements to maintain the sea 

communication8 of the Unit& 

Nations, Xinimam, 45 

Enclosure "A", so 

Enclosure "Bit; $1 

Enclosure FIG", $2 

Enclosure "D", 53 

Enclosare 'lE"; 54 

Requirements, World-wide estimate 

of, of Fleet Destroyers and ocean-. 

going escort vessels, 51 

Vessels, 243 

Enropean Theater 

Strategic concept for 1943 in the, 

208 

Strategy in the, 202 

F 

Final Report to the President and 

Prime Minister summarizing decisions by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, 117 

Financial and economic assistance 

for Turkey, 34 

Fi~emain lines of action in Enropean theater, 16, :.8 

Fleet Destroyers 

Requirerents of, and ocean-going 

escort vessels, World-wide estimate 

of, 51 

French Forces in North Africa, Employment of, 223 

Fnture business, 275 

G 

Girand, General, Meeting with, 259 

H 

Eartley Committee, The, 40, 43 

EUSKY, Operation, 58, 637 273 

Date for the assault, Earliest, 63? 

70 

Directive, IZS 

Allied Expeditionary Force in 

North Africa, to Commander-in-. 

Chief, 127 

General Eisenhower, to, 312 315 

Draft? rag 

Enclosure "A", 64 

Enclosure "B", Forces Required, 68 

EnclosnPe "C", Examination of Ear-. 

liest Date of Assault, 70 

Iceland, 229 

Indian Ocean Situation, 177 

J 

Japanese 

Communications, 11 

Strategy, 184 

Joint Intelligence Subcommittee 

Report, Extracts from, 41 

L 

Landing Craft, 303> 312 

NOTE: Numerals in Italics refer to Pages in Minutes of ?Xeetings. 

Numerals in plain type refer to Pages of C.C,S. Papers. 

321 
i; S SECRET 

BRITISH IIOST SECRET INDEX 

!1 

Meeting 

P'FP, '34 

Annex to 51st, Xinutes, 25.7 

Annex to 67th, Minutes, ,308 

Annex to 69th, Minutes, 317 

c.c.s., 1Sq 

General Giraud, with, 250 

SYYHOL, 117 

Mediterranean, 20 

Air command, System of, in the, 78 

Command in the, 260 

Naval situation in the Western, 215 

Operations in the, 110, 118, 159 

Yeopening the, 47 

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, 109 

Military 

Assistance to Turkey, Initial, 25 

rommitments to Turkey, Our, 35 

liinutes of Meetings, 114 

Annex to, 61st, 257 

Annex to, h7th, 308 

Pnnex to, Ogth, 317 

N 

Naval and air command in West 

Africa, 1x5, 124 

Naval situation in the Western 

Mediterranean, 24~5 

North Africa 

Bomber offensive from, The, 44, 

268 

rmployment of French Forces in, 223 

Sitnation in, The, 135 199; 208 

0 

Offensive 

Bomber, from North Africa, me, 44, 

2 68 

Bomber, from the linited Kingdom, 

21, 86, 88, 279 

Pevelopment of the (Tnrkey), 27 

Oil 

his, position, 40, 115, 124, 255 

NOTE: >umerals in Italics refer 

Operation 

ANAKTM, 12, 14, 21, ho, ba, 

BOLPFO, 113, LZL, 24'1, 911 

Shipping capabilities for, build-~ 

129 

Fnclosure IIAII, '~30 

mlclosnre "B", 13, 

EIICIO~~T~ itril, ~ ~ ~ for ~ ~ p t i 

calculations of 11. S. shipping 

capabilities under plan adopted 

by C.C.S for ~94~3,132 

HUSKY, 58, 03, 27; 

Alternative jCA'l, sg 

Alternative IIHII, sy 

Directive, 12s 

Allied Pxpeditionary Force in 

North Africa, t.o Commaocler- in 

Chief, 127 

Draft, 125 

?nclosure "AtI, 64 

~~~h~~~~ lwti, iwpiwa ~ h,, 

Enclosure "Ctl, I'xamina.tion of lar~ 

liest Date of Assault, 70 

Target date, 1i;S 

SLEDGEtlkWTQ, 1.: '1 

UNDERBFILY, 146 

Operations 

Rurma, January-Pprll, ,943, in, 11, 

213 

Continental, in 1n.1~~ go, :lol. ~(11 

Cotentin Peninsula. 722 

Eastern Theater, 6, 8, ~xg 

European Theater, in the, 18 

Mediterranean, in the, 'LIO, 118, 

1 ';9 

Southwest Pacific, ~n the, 22 

System of command for combined 

I!, S.-.British, ii 306 

System of uotfied command for 

combined, 1 

Tnrkey, subsequent, ag 

United Kingdom, in and from the, 

112, 121. 164 

Organization of command, control, 

planning and training for cross-­

channel, 99, 302 

Overland communications with China, 

12 

to pages in Minutes of Meetings 

Knmerals in Plain Type refer to pages of C C S Papers 

322 
U S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET INDEX 

P 

Pacific, The, 47 

Pacific Theater 

Conduct of the War in the, gSr 114, 

1.22~301 

Far East and, 167 

Plans 

Sprawl, The, zsl 27> 33s 36 

Turkey, Allied, relating to, 23? 

257 

Polish Forces, potentialities of, 

244 

Press Communique, 301 

Prime Ministerts appraisal of Tnrkish situation, 150 

Program of Meetings, revised, 253 

Proposed organization of command, 

control, planning and training for 

operations for a reentry to the 

Continent acrosa the Channel, beginning in 1943~ggl 302 

Provisional date for ANAKIM assault, 

123 

Publication of results of the 

conference, 252 

R 

Raids on Baplin, 245 

Recapture of Philippines, discussion 

of, ’93 

Reconquest of Burma, la 

Reentry to the Continent across 

the Channel, beginning in 1943? 

Proposed organization of command, 

control, planning and training for 

operations for ai 9gr 302 

Report to The President and Prime 

Minister, loap 109, 291 312. 315 

Enclosute, Draft Report on thework 

of the Conference, 102 

Final, summarizing decisions by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 117 

R..A.F. and Army stores dumped into 

Turkey, 37 

Russia 

Assistance to, 17, 2er 72, 7S1 155 

264 

Russia-continned 

Relation to other commitments, in, 

109, 1x7 

Russian air assistanoe for P.Q. 

convoys, 230 

5 

Sea eoimnnicatians, security of 

1x7, 155 

Shipging 

Assault, 315 

BOLERO build-up, capabilities for, 

129 

Enclosure “A”, 130 

Enclosure “B“, 131 

Enclosare “C“, 132 

Capabilities under plan adopted by 

C.C.S. for 1943~Assumptions for 

calculations of U; S., 132 

HUSKY, provision of, 61 

Situation in North Africa, The, 135J 

1997 208 

Situation to be created in Eastern 

Theater, 4 

Enclosure “A”, 4 

Enclosure “B”, 7 

Pacific and Burma in 1Q43s 236 

SLEDGEHAMMER, Operation, 145 

Somervell, Lieutenant General, T5.B.-

Note by (BOLERO), 129 

Sprawl Plan, as> 17, 33, 36 

Stalin, Premier 

Draft telegram from the President 

of the United States and Prime 

Minister of Great Britain to, 84, 

282, 293 

State of German Air Force, 179 

Strategic concept for 1943 in the 

European Theater, The, 208 

Strategic responsibility and command 

set-up for Dakar, French West 

Africa, 249 

Strategy 

Combined, 184 

European Theater, in the, 202 

NOTE: Numerals in Italics refer to pages in Minutes of Meetings. 

Numerals in Plain Type refer to pages of C.C.S papers. 

323 
U S SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET INDEX 

Summarizing decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Final report 

to The President and Prime Minister, 117 

Summary of current conferences by 

Sir Alan Brooke, 143 

Supplies to Russia, 222 

Supply of equipment (Turkey), 38 

SYMROL, 1.17 

System of 

Command, air, in the Mediterranean, 

78 

Command for combined U.S.-Britinh 

operations, I>306 

[Jnified command for combined 

operations, 1 

T 

Telegram from The President of the 

United States and the Prim Minister of Great Britain to Premier 

Stalin, 849 282, 293 

Theater 

Eastern, sitnation to be created 

in, 4, 226 236 

Enclosure "A", 4 

Enclosure "B", 7 

European 

Strategic concept for 1943 in the, 

208 

Strategy in the, 202 

Pacific and Far East, LL+? 122, 167 

Pacific, conduct of the War in the, 

9Sj 301 

Turkey, zip 116, 124 

Aegean, Opening the--Phase I, a8 

Allied plans relating to, 23r 257 

British responsibility for, 267 

Commitments, Onr military, to, 35 

Conclusions, 32 

Dodecanese, Capture of, 28, 145 

Entry of, into the War on the side 

of the United Nations,, 23 

Equipment, Supply of, 38 

Financial and economic assistance 

for, 34 

Military assistance to, Initial, 25 

Military commitments to, Oar; 35 

Turkey--continned 

Offensive, Development of the, 27 

Phase I--Opening the Aegean, 28 

Phase 11--Subsequent operations 

29 

Recommendations, 34 

Stores, R.A.F. and Army, already 

damped into, 37 

Slrbaeqnent operations 

Phase I, a8 

Phase 11, ag 

Summary, 31 

Enclosure "A", 34 

Enclosure "B", 35 

Enclosure "C", 37 

Enclosnre "D", 38 

U 

U-.Boat 

Threat, The, 47 

Warfare, ao , 277 

United Kingdom 

Bomber offensive from the, 21, 86 

88, 279 

Dry cargo import situation. 45 

Operations in and from the: I 12 

1~1~ 164 

United Nations 

Aircraft for the defense of 1ra.dc ommnnications, requirements rrf 

shore--based, 54 

United States, aid to Russia, 17, 

2a1 72, 75, 155 264 

United States Forces for Continental 

operations, IZL 

United States troops to U K., 284 

Iv 

War 

Conduct of, in 1943~1.6, 1.8, 249 

301 

U-Boat, The, m, 277 

Warfare, Antisnbmarine, 196 

West Africa 

Naval and air command in, xis9 1.24 

Dakar, Strategic responsibility 

and command set-up for, 249 

Nm: Numerals in Italics refer to Pages in Minutes of Meetings 

Numerals in Plain Type refer to Pages of C C S Papers 

324 
CASABLANCA CONFERENCE 

JANUARY 19U3 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

Edited and Printed in the 

Offrce, U. S. Secretary 

Office of the Combaned Chrefs of Staff 

1w3 

SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

J.C.S. 50th Meeting (Casablanca) . . 1 

President's Visit 

Agenda for Coming Conferences 

Further Conferences 

Admiral Glassford's Report 

J.C.S. 51st Meeting (Casablanca) . . s 

Operation Sritish Eastern Fleet 

Assignment of Keavy Bombers to China 

Procedure to Adopt at Forthcoming Conference 

Operations in the Mediterranean 

Operations in and from the United Kingdom 

Priority Bombing Programs 

Proposed Operations and Commands 

J.C.S. 52nd Meeting (Casablanca) . ~ 13 

Priority Rombing Program 

Command in England 

Operations in the Mediterranean 

Landing Craft 

General Strategic Policies 

J.C.S. 53rd Meeting (Casablanca) . 22 

Pacific and Far East Theater 

Attitude of Stalin towards U. S. 

Landing Craft 

Continental Operations 

Operations in Sicily 

U. S. Aid to Russia 

J.C.S. 54th Meeting (Casablanca) . 27 

Synthetic Rubber Program 

Report of Conversation between the Prime Minister 

and Admiral King 

General Somervell on Tonnage, Visit to Russia, and 

Command of Eisenhower 

Operation in Far East and Mediterranean 

Objections to British Concern in our Strategic Theater 

Strategic Policy Considered in Mediterranean & Far East 

iii 
SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

J.C.S. 55th Meeting (Casablanca) . I 32 

Conduct of War in 1943 

Synthetic Rubber Program 

Command Set-up for Dakar-French North-West Africa 

Required Presidential Action 

Planning Staff for HUSKY 

Army and Navy Command Set-up in Hediterranean 

J.C.S. 56th Meeting (Casablanca) . . 37 

Commitments to Turkey 

Dodecanese Operation 

U. S. Aid to Russia 

General Strategic Plan for 1943 

Shipping for 0pera.tion in the Pacific 

Proposed Mediterranean Army and Air Command Set-np 

J.C.S. 57th Meeting (Casablanca) . 41 

Despatches from' Eisenhower and Hurley 

Anti suhmar ine :car fare 

The Bomber Offensive from the Ihited Kingdom 

ANAKIM 

Draft Telegram to M. Sta1i:i 

Assault Date for Operation HUSKY 

Routes through the Levant 

Eviction of Axis from Tunisia 

Training of French Pilots 

J.C.S. 58th Xeeting (Casablanca) . ~ 45 

Draft Ileply to M. Stalin 

Operations in the Southwest Pacific 

HUSW 

J.C.S. 59th Meeting (Casablanca) . . 47 

Continental Operations in 1943 

Shipping Capabilities for BOLERO Build-up 

Operation HUSW 

Report to the President and Frime Minister 
SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Meetings 

(Presided over by the President) 

Minutes of Conference, January 15, 1943 . . 51 

Visit of General Nogues and the Sultan of Morocco 

with the President 

The President's Program 

The British Strategic Concept 

Antisubmarine Warfare 

Operation RAVENOUS 

Command Situation in Europe 

Operations in Tunisia 

Minutes of Conference, January 16, 1943 . . 58 

Strategic Concept for 1943 

Operations in the Mediterranean and on the Continent 

Position of Turkey 

British Strategic Concept 

Aircraft to China 

President's Suggestion of Proposed Plans 

Aid to Russia 

Information from Southern Europe 

Equipment for the French 

Operations in Tunisia 

Supply Situation 

French Shipping in Martinique 

Operations in Pacific 

INDEX . .. . 67 

V 
SECRET 

J.C.S. 50th Meeting 

(Casablanca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held on Wednesday, January 13, 1943, at 1500 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, IJSA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Lt. General M. W. Clark, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

and 

Mr. Reilly 

1 
SECrlET 

1. P!ESIDENT'S VISIT. 

GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING discussed with h!R. REILLY 

certain security measures with reference to the President's Visit in 

North Africa. They decided that his party should come directly to Anfa 

Camp and not delay at Marrakech. A telegram to this effect was sent to 

Admiral Leahy. 

They then discussed the possibility of the President's visiting 

Marrakech for a few days and indicated that the Prime Minister might 

urge such a visit. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that security measures 

were not sufficient in %!arrakech and that to make them sufficient would 

necessitate the sending of additional troops and that would be unsound 

from a tactical point of view. Yr. Reilly agreed. 

The question of the President's visit to the front was then discussed, and GENERAL MARSHALL proposed that.he leave .here by motor to 

Rabat where .he would see two divisions and speaktocertain selected men. 

He would then proceed to Port Lyautey and see a division there. From 

Port Lyautey.he could proceed to General Clark's headquarters. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that certain selected men might be flown 

from the Tunisian front to meet the President at General Clark's .headquarters. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt the President, on the return 

trip, should return to Marrakech and remain there long enough to change 

planes and then have a night flight to Liberia. 

MR. REILLY asked if the Liberian trip was necessary, and all 

agreed that the President would insist upon it. 

All agreed that it would be desirable if the President and the 

Prime Minister went separately after leaving the meetings at Anfa Camp. 

2. AGENDA FOR COMING CONFERENCES. 

GENERAL MARSHALL raised the question of.how to proceed with the 

business of the coming conferences. 

ADVIRAL KING implied that he thought they should first discuss 

world-wide strategy, our basic strategic concept. 

2 
GENERAL MARSHALL was concerned as to how he should approach the 

discussion, feeling that the British had their minds set on the operation 

BRIMSTONE and that their whole thought would be turned towards this. 

ADMI!IAL KING then presented some notes regarding what he thought 

should be discussed initially. He divided the initial discussion into: 

(a) Manpower. 

(b) hfunitions and equipment. 

(c) Manpower vs. munitions and equipment. 

(d) That part of the total effort that should be directed 

against Germany and against Japan. 

These suggestions were further subdivid.ed in the notes which he 

presented to the Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that hebelieved we should discuss world-wide 

strategy first before getting to specifkc operations and that we should 

resist any effort on the part of the Dritish to deviate from this. 

GENERAL MARSHALL repeated that he believed that even in the case 

of world-wide strategy, the British thought would be at all times directed towards Operation BRIMSTONE while he, personally, could not help 

but have the question of tonnage uppermost 3.n his mind. 

GENEXAL AEtNOLD said that the British were not thinking world 

strategy but only of the next operation. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then discussed the question of Operation BRIMSTONE. 

GENERAL SOXERVELL said that if we can clear the Mediterranean, 

he estimated that we could save infive months 1,825,000 tons ofshipping; 

that the blow we can strike anywhere depends on available tonnage; that 

at the present time, the balance between capital-loaded transport and 

capital-loaded cargo vessels is such that we can move more troops than 

supporting cargo; and that if we can institute tank sailings from Haifa 

or from the eastern Mediterranean to the North African theater, we can 

save considerable additional tonnage. 

He said that, figuring the losses onthe same rate that they were 

sustained in the TORCH Operation, Operation BRIMSTONE could be accomplished with the loss of 45 ships. He also thought that securing Sicily 

would be essential to opening traffic in the Mediterranean. 

3 
SECRET 

GENERAL CLARK questioned this, stating that he felt we could 

protect traffic through the Mediterranean by air coverage from Tunisia. 

GENERAL ARNOLD asked what the British losses had been in the 

Ma1 t a operation. 

GENERAL CLAFtK stated that they had suffered a 60 percent loss 

but that it must be remembered that they had had no fighter coverage. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that he thought the basic proposition as far 

as the Mediterranean is concerned is to open it, thus saving the long 

voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. He felt that this was much more 

important than eliminating Italy from the war. 

GENERAL CLW said that Admiral Cunningham felt that traffic 

between SicilyandTunisia couldbeprotected once Tunisia is inour hands. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the effects of the German bombing on Bone 

and Algiers. 

GENERAL CLm replied that Bone is within reach of German dive 

bombers and that we had suffered rather severe losses there. He felt, 

however, that the situation is now much improved because of antiaircraft 

and fighter protection and also because of the installation of radar 

equipment. The bombing of Algiers has been considerably lessened since 

we have employed night fighters to protect it. 

ADMIRAL COOKE said that at present it looked as though we would 

not expel the Germans from Tunisia until spring by which time we would 

have some 500,000 troops in Africa. The question would then arise as to 

whether we should use shipping to send some troops elsewhere or to use 

them directly from North Africa. In any event, we must make our plans at 

least three months in advance. The capture of Sardinia or Sicily would 

probably involve some shipping losses, but these would probably he offset by increased safetytosubsequent shipping through the Mediterranean. 

ADMIRAL KING then asked why we should create such a large excess 

force in North Africa. 

GENERAL CLARK replied that it would not be necessary to do so 

unless we were going to use them in this area. He pointed out, however, 

4 
SECRET 

that the occupation of Sardinia or Sicily would be a mch more difficult 

operation than TOKH had been 

AnMIRAL fOOKE said that he felt that we could mount an operation 

against Sardinia largely by using landing craft of the larger types in 

which we could afford to take some losses. In reply to Admiral King's 

yuestion regarding the necessity for building up an excess force in 

Forth africa, he stated that some excess was necessary because it would 

take many more troops to expel the Axis from Tunisia than it would to 

simply hold North Africa orwe the Axis powers were driven out; also, 

that tke hazard with regard to Spanish borocco was greater prior to our 

capture of Tunisia and more t,roops would be required to safeguard our 

interests in that area. 

CEYEFAL CLAI'K said that it was now evident that the earliest 

date for an all-out offensive against Tunisia was lfarch 15th and, in 

view of this, an operation againFt either Sardinia or Sicily could 

scarcely be undertaken before slimmer. 

CENERBI. MARSHALL asked Ceneral Clark what number of troops he 

thought would be necessary to maintain in Forth Africa once the Axis 

forces were expelled 

tiENERAL CLARK replied that four divisions would be sufficient, 

This, including the service troops and the Air Force, would mean a force 

of about 250,000 men., 

GENERAL KATSHALL. pointed out that the exuess force that we'would 

have after Tunisia had been captured would amourit to about three U. S. 

divisions and the British T.st Army 

GENERAL MlnRSHALL asked General Clark for his views on the training necessary for the Operation BPIMSTONE, 

GEfiG?EBT. CLAEX replied that he thought it should be accomplished 

in Africa and that it should be completed at the rate of about one division per month after the Army and Favy had completed certain basic 

training. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then asked if the supply of the troops in 

Sardinia would present any great difficulty. 
SECRET 

GENERAL CLARK thought it could be accomplished almost entirely 

by air and landing craft. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the fighter aircraft based in 

North Africa could only operate for about one-half hour over Sardinia 

even with the installation of belly tanks. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked General Clark if he thought it was necessary for the 4th Division to come to North Africa in view of the excess 

number of troops that would be available here, 

GENERAL CLARK replied that if no further offensive operations 

were contemplated after the capture of Tunisia, it would notbenecessary 

for it to come. Be stated, however, that there were still lg British 

divisions to arrive in North Africa and that it was necessary for these 

to come. He pointed out that in the next few months the German threat to 

Spain would be critical. Spain is, at the present time, a doubtful 

quantity-. They are waiting to see the results ofour Tunisian operations. 

This being the case, it is necessary for us to maintain a large force 

available to act against Spanish Morocco, He felt that once the Axis 

powers had been pushed out of Tunisia, Spain will definitely resist a 

German invasion and the danger in so far as Spanish Morocco is concerned 

will be decreased 

GENERAL SOMERVELL asked General Clark if any German troops had 

come from Sicily, to which GENERAL CLARK replied that he thought not 

ADMIRAL COOKE pointed out that regardless of the decision, 

whether it be to undertake Operation BRIMSTONE or some other operation, 

it should be firm and that we should not permit ourselves to be forced 

into an operation without sufficient time for preparation 

GENERAL, SOMERVEIL asked General Clark when it was expected that 

the British would have possession of Tripoli, to which General Clark 

replied that the operation should be completed on February 1st. 

3. FURTHER CONFEFU3NCES 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet 

at 0830 and that arrangements be made to meet with the British at 1030, 

January 16th, to which all agreed 

6 
,! E CR E T 

4. AIXXPAL GLASSFORDsS FEPORT. 

AEMIRAL KING stated that the Glassford Commission had just about 

completed its work and that their report had been blocked out. Re said 

that it would be sent first to General Eisenhower for approval and then 

it would be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff either at Anfa Camp 

or in Washington. 

Be stated that there was one point upon which the entire Corn-. 

mission agreed; j .e<, the desirahilityof givirig the Iirrnch certain tasks 

to perform and then letting them perform them. He stated that the French 

are willing to operate under Bdmirsl i'egran wlio had been made a Vice 

Admiral. He said that tkie Eritisif had agreed to permit tbe French to 

undertake the inshore naval defenses of ;'ambia as part of French West 

Africa, but that the)- were riot irfclirred t.o permit t,Iie 1~'rencIit,o under.. 

take the air protection of t.his area. 

!le suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Itaff' irisist on making the 

maximum use of French forces by giving t,l!em airl'ropriat~r. tasks and then 

trusting them to accomplish them. 

He felt that we woi11tl &et SOIT'P o~i!osit,ioiiiii tliis respect from 

the Rr it ish. 

7 
SECRET 

J.C.S. 51st Meeting 

(Casablanca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held on Thursday, January 14, 1943, at 1030 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PPESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Lt. General M. W. Clark, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 
SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING stated that the Prime Minister and the First Sea 

Lord had, in conversation with him, deplored the present state of the 

British Eastern Fleet, which they said was immobilized because it had 

been stripped of its destroyers and carriers. Just where the carriers 

are was not stated. H.M. S - Victorious, which was sent to the United States 

with nothing but green pilots, cannot be ready before the 1st of February. 

It is possible that they may have 1oanedusH.M.S. Victorious and offered 

us another carrier to further their apparent desire to keep this fleet 

immobilized. Admiral King feels that the British must make the naval 

effort to cut the Japanese lines of communications to :Iangoon--which 

they now show no disposition to do. Although it is doubtful that tlie 

"limited objective" operations now contemplated are so dependent on the 

operations of the British Eastern Fleet as China appears to think, 

nevertheless these operations would greatly facilitate snipping to 

Calcutta. If the Chinese make movement of the British Eastern Fleet conditional to the undertaking of the contemplated operation, there is no 

question but that the British should make this move. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that although the operation might possibly be supported by rail from Bombay, such support would be very slow 

and probably dangerous to rely upon. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Chinese feared .Japanese seaborne re.. 

inforcement via Xangoon and inquired what was needed to counter this 

threat. 

ADMIRAL KING replied that the British Eastern Fleet should be 

sufficient, particularly as we are keeping t,he :Japanese well occupied 

elsewhere. He felt that the British should move as nraiiy elements of this 

Fleet as they could cover with their available destroyers. Admiral 

Helfrich had told King that he kiad been urged by the British to 

go to Australia, where he has two cruisers and two or three destroyers 

operating under Admiral Carpender. 

He had inquired as to what the British Eastern Fleet could be 

expected to do. Admiral King had replied that he had 110 information, 

but that when and if this Fleet moved to Trincomalee, 'LLniral King would 

send him back the Dutch ships. Such a move would klelp to clarify the 

complicated command set-up in the Southwest ?acific. 

9 
SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING further remarked that the British Eastern Fleet 

served no purpose, so far as he could see, basing at Kilindini, but that 

the British would probably insist that they could not be moved because 

of a lack of destroyers. He felt that pressure should be brought on them 

to cover the shipping lines to Calcutta necessary for the projected 

operation. 

With regard to submarines in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of 

Bengal, the British and Dutch together have a limited number--less than 

10. In anticipation of a British demand for additional submarines, 

ADMIRAL KING is willing to base six at Trincomalee. Before this can be 

done, a tender should be sent there. 

Further discussion developed that U. S. submarines basing at 

Fremantle could probably operate inthe Bay of Bengal as well as in their 

present operating areas. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he believed an additional group of 

heavy bombers should be sent to General Stilwell in order to build up 

his available heavy bombers to a total of two groups. He believes that 

these bombers will return more dividends operating in this theater than 

in the eastern Mediterranean. 

ADMIRAL KING remarked that jt was of great importance to open up 

a lower altitude route to China and that an increase in the number of 

medium bombers assigned this theater would make it possible to attack 

Japanese shipping in occupied Chinese ports. 

In discussing the best line of procedure to adopt at the forthcoming conference, ADMIRAL KING stressed the importance of maintaining 

the initiative in our hands. He believes that it is essential to agree 

upon Anglo-American world-wide strategy, the basic concept, before permitting any discussion of details. The United Nations are now in a position to take the initiative in the war; it is essential to fix in the 

minds of the British the fact that the basic issue must be determined 

before going into details. The United States now has theprincipal power; 

therefore, we should take the lead. 

GENERAL CLARK, in reply to a question from General Marshall, 

said that although it was not possible to dispose landing craft along 

the Mediterranean coast unknown to the Germans, in his opinion this did 

10 
SECRET 

not preclude their use for the BRIMSTONE operation, inasmuch as the Axis 

could not know the objective specifically. While they would undoubtedly 

be under occasional attack, the real danger is from dive bombers; if 

disposed west of Algiers, they would be immune from these aircraft. He 

agreed with Admiral King's impression that there was a number of usable 

small ports where these craft might be loaded. Installation ofadditional 

airfields in North Africa will not disclose our intentions, inasmuch as 

General Eisenhowerhasbeen instructed that these fields shouldbespotted 

for general use and not specifically for the operation. 

A!lMIW KING remarked that the British concept of bringing troops 

from the U. K. and from the U. S. for such an operation was designed for 

surprise, but that it also resulted in building up a greater exces4 of 

troops in North Africa with a corresponding diminution of troops which 

could be based in the U. K. for projected operations on the Continent. 

He felt that the British were fully aware of this fact and, in view of 

their known opposition to any Continental operations, this gave them a 

good "out." 

GENEXAI. CLARK said that itwas his belief that operations against 

the Brest Peninsula would be very hazardous, would require overwhelming 

air support, extensive naval support, and immediate and heavy follow up 

Such an operation should not be undertaken without adequate preparation. 

Although many of our troops needed battle training, he believes that 

they were fully capable of standing up tothe German defense. He believed 

that, if successful, operations against the Brest Peninsula would have 

far greater results than a successful BRIMSTONE operation. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that maximum air effort from England could 

seriously limit the German air effort against the Brest Peninsula operation. Current German tactics in opposition to Flying Fortresses was producing a heavy attrition of the German Air Forces. If they persist in 

these tactics, the German Air Force will be practically eliminated 

within a year. 

GENERAL SOSIERVELL stated that it probably would he possible to 

transport 300,900 U. S. troops to the IJ. K. by September provided movements to Africa were suspended. He believes this a more accurate figure 

than the 150,000 estimatedbythe British. He stated that based on 

present submarine losses, we shall be able to move fewer troops in 1944 

11 
SECRET 

than we can in 1943 despite the shipbuilding program, and that unless 

every possible means--including an effective air offensive against submarine bases, building yards and assembly points, and effective commando 

raids in force against the bases--is used, we shall be faced with a 

diminishing effort. If we succeed in opening the Mediterranean, we can 

probably increase present estimates of 1,000,000 troops moved this year 

by 150,000. He pointed out that stabilizationofthe North African situation would not greatly reduce shipping commitments in the Middle East 

area because of forthcoming commitments in support of Turkey, movement 

of U. S. troops into Bum+ and supply ofexisting positions. Hejustified 

his average turn-around of 2& months on the basis that in 1943 Pacific 

troop movements will require approximately the same tonnage as those in 

the Atlantic. 

GENERAT, ARNOLD said that he did not believe that the British had 

ever had a definite bombing pk-ogram. In view of the large build up with 

U. S. bombers in the U. I(. to a force which will greatly exceed the 

British bombing force, he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should 

establish a priority bombing program. 

After considerable discussion of the existing command set-up in 

the European Theater of Operations, it was agreed: 

(a) That the Joint Chiefs of Staff should recommend that the 

Combined Chiefs ofstaff establish a priority bombingprogram; 

(b) That Air hlarshal Harris should operate the bombers in the 

U. K. (all under his command) under a directive from the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff setting forth objectives and 

technique; 

(c) That upon the successful conclusion of the Tunisian operation, it will probablybedesirable to establish two separate 

theaters in Europe (the Mediterianean and the U. K.-French 

theaters) ; 

(d) That any operation against the Continent must be a combined 

operation which must receive thefull cooperation and support 

of the British. 

12 
SECRET 

J.C.S. 52nd Meeting 

(Casab1anca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held at Anfa Camp on Saturday, 

January 16, 1913, at 0915. 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

13 
SECRET 

GENERAZ, ARNOLD stated that priorityofbombing targets was determined in Britain by a committee composed of RAF officers, RAF Economic 

Warfare Representatives, plus one United States Army Air Forces Representative. The list of targets so determined was then sent to General 

Eisenhower for approval and after approval toGenera1 Eaker, who selected 

objectives from this list which weather and other conditions made it 

possible for him to reach. As to choosing between targets in France or 

in Germany, the bombers preferred targets inGermany because they encountered considerably less fighter opposition than they did over target,s 

in France. General Eaker already has eight airplanes equipped with the 

new H2SL device, which is the forerunner of the latest precision bombing 

by radio beam equipment. It is expected that use of this equipment will 

permit precision bombing regardless of weather and will enable new low 

altitude bombing above the overcast when such weather conditions occur. 

In answer to a question from Admiral King, General Arnold stated that 

there were eight radio stations in southern England from which the 

necessary radio beams were transmitted. 

With respect to night bombing, GENERAL ARNOLD said that two 

groups of United States bombers in the United Kingdom were now equipped 

with flame dampers, but that much more training was required for night 

bombing than for day bombing in order to keep the losses down to a 

reasonable figure; therefore, our forces were not yet fully prepared for 

night bombing. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was satisfactory to General Eisenhower to transfer General Andrews to England at any time inorder to take 

command there; it was contemplated that General Brereton would relieve 

General Andrews of his present command. All that remained to do was to 

prepare a directive for General Andrews. Under this directive Air Ilarshal Portal would be given operational control (i.e., designation of 

objectives and times of attack) over United States Air Forces operating 

from the United Kingdom. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that it was essential in framing this 

directive that "operational control" be clearly defined. 

During discussion as to how best to present the views of the 

Joint linited States Chiefs of Staff regarding proposed Mediterranean 

operations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ADMIRAL KING said that the 

14 
Combined Chiefs of Staff should note that there is now in North Africa 

a large number of troops--probably sufficient for the contemplated 

operation. These troops should not sit idle. Timing of the proposed 

operation is of great importance. lie believed that troops iniiorth Africa 

now not actively engaged in Tunisia could be trained in amphibious warfare, in oriler to advance the dat,e by which we could undertake either 

the operations against Sardinia or the operation against Sicily, wtiichever might be decided upon. Of the two, he felt Sicily was much more 

decisive and more complete in itself, inasmuch as little was to be 

gained by the Sardinian operation. If the premise that the Sicilian 

operation can be done by the troops now in horth Africa is accepted, it 

should be possible to continue the flow of troops to the United Kingdom. 

On this basis, we could both advance the date of the Siciljan operation 

and continue our preparations for a Continental operation, continuing to 

send troops and landing craft to the United Kingdom. 

GENERAL NARSHALL said that General Eisenhower had changed his 

viewpoint as a result of his experiences to date and now felt that it 

was imperative that we organize for ROUNDUP on a large scale He now 

feels that approximately twice the force he originally contemplated will 

be required He feels it unsound to count on more than one trip from 

landing craft used in the first wave? as only a very small proportion of 

the initial wave is likely to bc available for a second trip; therefore, 

the numbers of landing craft initially provided must be many more than 

originally conceived 

GE,NERAL SOMERW1.L said that General Patton informed him that 

losses in small landing craft were about 20 percent in the Casablanca 

landing. 

ADMIRAL COOXE informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the British 

Planners have made detailed st,uriies of bot,h the Sardinia and Sicily 

operations, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff should see. iie felt it 

essential to bring some additional troops from the United States, even 

if they were used only as rep1acement.s for troops now in North Africa 

after the latter had been trained in amphibious operations. It is necessary to retain a strong IJnited States force on the border of Spanish 

iloroc co. 

The greatest bottleneck appears to be lack of harbor space for 

assembl ing landing craft in the I'rditer rariean. Pre 1iminar y investigations 

15 
indicated that not more than 34 LST's could be accommodated west of 

Tunisia; the remainder would have to be east of there. These investigations had included eight ports. Admiral Hall was making a survey of chipossibilities of accommodating LST's on the west coast. 

ADMIRAL KING said that, if necessary, the risk of nesting or 

banking the landing craft should be accepted. 

ADMIRAL COOKE said that, inasmuch as an amphibious division was 

already here and in view of the possibility of t,raining troops not now 

operating in Tunisia, he felt the British estimate of a three-mont,li 

differential between mounting of the Sardinian and Sicilj~anoperations 

was too large, particularly if t.ne Tunisian operatjons are not completed 

before nay. 

GENERAL. ARNOLD questioned the Rritish st.atement, that a I3rest 

operation meant fewer heavy bombers i.n Knglancl lh?cause ot' additional 

requirement for light arid medium bonihrs. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL, responding to a request from Senera1 h'arshal i 

that lie outline tkie mechanics of the Sicilian operat,ion, said that. (Jie 

Key t.o the situation was to make heavy use of landing cr&ft.. M'e now kmve 

available 300-footI ISO-foot, and 105fe;it. craft wliich wc did not 110 

before. The facL iiiat these can be urriiaded over rhi Ue 

materially changes tkie type of' the operation iriasmncli as por~facilit,ies 

are not required. lie felt tkrat by June it should be possiblt to j ;I' 

90,000 troops in the initial assault. These craft. roiil8l theii reiiirii i .. 

North Africa for reloading. Allowing for losses, the se(:ond IVYII:'~ bli( 

he able to expeditiously lift 60,000 troops and somc equipment,. If tiif: 

Navy concurs in the use of combat-loaded transports sufficient, to lil'l 

32,000 additional troops, the requirement during the following foui- t (i 

six weeks would be reduced to approximately 38,000 troaps. This method 

requires unloading lots of equipment, over the beachcs, hut increases t.lie 

strength of the first wave by 32,000 troops. Once the landing had hern 

accomplished, supply would be by means of coasters from tkie Ijnited Kingdom and from East Africa in order to permit the use of hig ships elsewhere and to reduce losses of cargo. 

He agreed with Admiral Cooke regarding the trainiug possihili ties. 

with General Clark regarding possibilities of training in the Casab1anr:n 

16 
SECRET 

area, and with General Patton as to the expected reaction of Spanish 

Morocco, He felt that the troops now in the Casablanca area were retrograding and should be actively employed by training themfor these operations in order to keep them fit. 

Once the landing was accomplished, the landing craft should be 

removed from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom, which movement 

should require about one month. It is essential to keep enough landing 

craft in the United Kingdom so that training can continue. If we send 

only fifty LST’s to the Pacific, we should be able to accomplish the 

foregoing; however, if operations in the Mediterranean will prevent 

operations against the Continent, he felt that they should not he 

undertaken 

ADMIRAL COOKE said that the LST program should furnish 198 LST s 

by March 15 and 15 a month thereafter, One hundred were now allocated 

to the Pacific and 107 to the Atlantic, including British allocations 

More than 50 will be required in the Pacific. At least two months were 

required after completion to make these craft ready for operations The 

British now have no crews with which to man 11 craft which will be 

finished this month and have offered them to us for a month toheused 

in training He felt that as many landing craft as the ports would 

accommodate could be gotten here 

ADMIRAL COOKE cautioned against the tendency to “look back ” 

saying that promising developments in amphibious weapons--the Army 

amphibious truck, the amphibious tractor, etc --greatly accelerated 

unloading Unloading of IST’s and XI’S over the beaches is complete,y 

practicable, but he felt it would be disastrous to attempt to do so in 

the case of combat-loaded transports, which would undoubtedly be sunk by 

submarines or by air before they could be unloaded. 

GENERAL WEDEMEYER said that he believed that, if we subscribed 

to the British concept, we should disperse our forces in an area which 

was neither vital nor final, We should examine a proposition to determine how success in the proposed operation would improve our position 

The effort could be justified if it resulted in a material saving in 

shipping. Admiral Cunningham had stated that he would run Mediterranean 

convoys as soon as Tunisia had been cleared--that Sicily was not essential He felt the Sicilian operation would require up to 12 divisions 

17 
SECRET 

The British arguments as to Axis capabilities for moving reinforcements 

south were, he felt, specious. He believed a ratio of three to seven 

more nearly accurate than the one to seven ratio which they advanced 

Should the Germans move five to ten divisions into Italy, operations in 

chat part of the Mediterranean would, he believed, require a major 

effort on our part which would 'vitiate a Continental operation lie felt 

our best procedure was to continue a heavy bombing offensive against 

Germany's lines of' communication across France, concentrating particu 

larly on eight marshalling yards. After that, we should proceed with an 

operation against the Brest Peninsula. 

ADhlIRAL KING said tha.t he understood that Admiral Cunningham 

would undertake Mediterranean convoys once Tunisia had been cleared, but, 

anticipated heavy losses.. Fle felt we should determine first. what con 

stitutes the "General Flan" for the defeat of Germany, and thereafter 

determine how the Sicilian operation fits into this plan Perhaps the 

bridgehead should be at Brest, perhaps elsewhere innorthern Europe The 

Sicilian operation is opportune but not definitive, It is also essential 

that we work out a "General Plan" for the defeat of Japan 

ALMIR4L COOKE said that the British view was that Germany could 

be defeated on land only on the Russian front and that, therefore, it 

was essential that we assist the Russians by operations this summer As 

to Japan, they say they will use the British Fleet after the defeat of 

Germany but do not say how or where 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that we wanted to keep the German Army 

engaged with the Russian Army and we wanted to make a landing on the 

Continent Can we do that in time to support Russia this summer? Will 

any other operation destroy our ability to make a Continental landing 

our main objective? We must insure that it does not. If we do Sicily we 

might not have the means to do anything on the Continent before October 

We must determine what must be done to support Russia this summer IT 15 

is essential that we attack, we must determine where Everythingnon. 

building up in the United Kingdom is composed of raw troops, which, ho#­

ever, are better than previous unseasoned troops. Some loaders could be 

moved from the African theater- Although he favored the Continental 

operation, he believed it impossible before August,, 

GENERAL il'EDEhfEYER said that, after the completion of the TORCH 

operations, approximately 250,000 troops wouldbe required to consolidate 

18 
SECRET 

from the Atlantic to Tunisia. The British reyuire about the sanie froni 

Tripolitania to Cairo. They must in addition move troops iii beliiitil 

Turkey. These dispsitions will leave no troops for the Cent,ral \:miitc,rranean. We do riot desire t,o put more troops ther?. If wi. unilrrt.aht. Iliv 

Sicilian operation, it must be in sufficient streiigtli to assure% sii~:ccss 

He estimated that almost a million troops would be reqirireil ill tli,, 

African theater. 

WLI. said that the big gaiu to be expwt,rrl f'rw t.tir 

Sicilian operation was a saving of 1,800,000 tons of shipping resiil t,irip 

from opening the hiediterrariean; tkiat tkie Cerntairs coificl be Pxpect6.d to 

make a determined effort again-t I'editerraneai, roiivoj-s froni Cicil y and 

elsewhere. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said t,hat if an air umbrella vies niairitniiird ov?r 

t,he convoys (which would reyuire fighter bases rvprj 100 niilcs aloiig ?lit. 

b!edit.erranean coast) , the losses should be low; hut t,liat at nigiit and 

during bad weather the fighters could offer I ittle protrrt,iori. 'I'h ~ 

ture of Sicily would remove an imntiiierit threat, to thes? roiivobs. 

AJMIRAL KIKG poir,ted out tiiat or:e of' 1,lie Diirpnsrs or t nkirip 

Sicily was to push the &xisBir back. It would hrcome a liase f'ron; wltii-l~ 

to inlerdict. hxis Air frorii i.arr1ii:ia ai8d f'roir: 11 aly. T'urt,t,?r. il riiiiii, 

the danger of' dive bon'hers. lir said that, in cnrrsidt?ririg, the Jik?liiioocl 

of getting convoys through the h!editerraneai: wit,lc Livil? in "is l!aiiiih~ 

tli? Britiski record in keeping the Engl~ishChaniiel open s110uld not ?IP 

taken too seriously. inasmuch as the t.yw of skijnpiirg was niateriii! I) 

different. In his opinion, the S.iciliarr operat,ioii was wortit rlie <.f'!'ort; 

the Sardinian operation is not. lie is opnosed to tile I!SP ol' ronibat. 

loaded transports in either operation. l?he main question js oiie 01' 

timing--the balance is delicate--but he thinks the operation canbe riurit~ 

In response to an objection from General Wedemeyer that, up to I2 iiivi 

sions would be required, he pointed out, that adequate forces sl~oiildl~t. 

available from those already in Korth Africa; divisjons now orellpied in 

Tunis could be moved to the Spanish hioroccan front,ier for rest, arid 

rehabilitation; and we should be able to utilize Frerich trnops It is 

esser,tial that we convince the Rritish that they must fully t,rnst t,tie 

French troops. 

GENERAL WEDEMEYER said that we would have seven divi7iiibs aiid 

the British about four divisions between Tunisia and the Atlantic 
Placing four French and two U,. S, divisions near the Moroccan border 

would release three [I. S, arid possibly four British divisions. General 

Alexander !;as approximately ten, three of which he needs in Libya and 

three in Cairo; he should send at least an armored corps to General 

Wilson in the 'Turkish rear. fie probably could give us two divisions for 

the Sicilian operation.. 

ADMIRAL KING proposed that before the Joint Chiefs of St.aff 

agreed to the Sicilian operation, British concurrence to our plans in 

the Pacific should he assured. Therefore, the objectives of the Sicilian 

operation should be specified and the point emplrasized that it must be 

mounted in time to offer real assistance t.o Russia, remembering that, 

e?ven if coniplet,ion of the Tunis operation were delayed, that operation 

still engaged German forces and contributed toward opening the Mediter-­

ranean 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that, in view of the Jiritish at,titude toward 

operations on the Continent in 1M3 he doubted t,hat any could bemounted 

this year; therefore, a Vediterranean operation of some sort was a 

necessity in order to keep the Russians encouraged 

ADMIRAL KING, agreeing, said that this emphasized the necessity 

of obtaining from theBritish their genera.1 plan. i e what they proposf 

to do, when they propose to do it ,...in particular as to Continental 

ope c a t i011s 

GENERAL SOHERVEIL said that, iri order to inccease material aid to 

Eussia effort, was being made to acid 25 shi~psper month to shipping to 

Russia to a tot,al of 150. and that t,Iiis shipping apparently can come 

only from savings resulting from opening the Vediterranean The British 

have already taken from Indian Ocean shipping to the $rmy there, 52 

ships for civilian trade Ile fee1.s it. essential that additional ships 

for Russia must come from Eritish shipping 

ADMIRAL KING recommended that we obtain from the Sritish their 

general plan arrd let tneni take the initiative in the discussion of 

operations in t,heir strategic sphere Ve must also present to them our 

general plan for the Pacific, a large consideration of which must be the 

possibility of war between Russia and Japan As to that, Russia will not 

force the issue; however, it, is vital to ,Japan that she seize the Maritime Provinces in order that she niay be secure The key to our successful 

20 
SECRET 

attack on the Japanese homeland is the geographical position and the 

manpower of China; if we attempt to beat our way up through the Netherlands East Indies, we shall make extremely slow progress. England can 

best operate against Japan in Burma, Thailand, andIndo-China, and should 

leave to the United States the "managing" of China. 

In response toa question as to the ability of the United Nations 

promptly to direct their forces against Japan in the event of the defeat 

of Germany, ADMIRAL KING remarked that Great Britain might send herFleet 

and could use some Indian divisions, but could do little else until the 

European situation was stabilized. Therefore, unless the U. S. and 

Britain make some definite move toward the defeat of Germany, Russia 

will dominate the peace table. 

21 
SECRET 

J,C.S. 53rd Meeting 

(Casablanca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held at Anfa Camp on Sunday, 

January 17, 1943, at 0930. 

hEMBERS PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

22 
SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING read a despatch, summarizing the situation in the 

Aleutian Islands and in the South Pacific, which said, among other 

things, that 30 Japanese aircraft had been shot down. 

GENERAL ARNOLD remarked that British estimates placed the current Japanese airplane strength at 2,500 first-line aircraft, about 500 

below the number estimated by our Intelligence Services. Both British 

and our estimates of current Japanese strength indicate a rapid decline 

in their air strength. Continued attrition at present rates will seriously affkct future Japanese operations. 

ADMIRAL COOKE reported that the Combined Staff Planners .had 

agreed upon the Pacific concept for 1943 except as concerned operations 

in Burma, which they believe could not be mounted this year. Admiral 

Cooke feared that if the operation is not planned for 1943 China may 

drop out of the war; therefore, in his opinion ib is essential that the 

operation be planned to commence not later than November, 1043. 13e had 

informed the Combined Planners that it was not the intention of the 

United States to undertake all the operations set forth in the plan 

simultaneously, although some part of the Gilberts-Marshalls-Truk operation might be initiated during the progress of the Rabaul operation, 

which is estimated to require from two to five months. The British 

Planners proposed to furnish specific information as to what they proposed in Burma, both now and in the future, for the information of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. The British contention is that sufficient, 

naval forces and landing craft cannot be made available. Admiral Cooke 

disagreed and .had told the British Planners that by the time the operation was to be mounted, .he felt that sufficient landing craft would be 

available. 

In answer to General Marshall's question as to the effect failure to do Operation RAVENOUS would have on Operation ANAKIM, ADMIRAL 

COOKE stated that our air activity would be greatly hampered inasmuch as 

one of the purposes of Operation RAVENOUS was to establish airfields in 

the region for our prospective use. As he understood the British proposals, they were that nothing be done until Xovember, 1944. Although he 

had agreed to list forces required for the ANAKIM operation, he would 

prefer not to.have this list appear in the plan. 

ADXIRAL KING remarked that we should certainly include Operation 

ANAKIM in the Pacific plan. Whether or not it is carried out fully will 

23 
SECRET 

depend upon the situation then existing, but at any rate it should be 

planned. General Brooke had said that two African divisions were being 

shifted Lo the Indian Theater and preparations for the utilizatiOn of 

the Indian troops were in hand; Vice Admiral Mountbatten .had said that 

landing craft were being provided in India; there must be some objective 

for these moves. ile proposed to ask Admiral Pound Lo base part of the 

Eastern Fleet at Ceylon and would release the Dutch cruisers and destroyers now operating through Sicily to support the Eastern Fleet. if they 

moved there; he would also arrange that six U. S. submarines now operating from Fremantle cover the northern end of the Straits of hlalacca. He 

feels it essential to get some British naval activity under way In the 

Bay of Bengal. Since the Japanese Fleet is now largely conta.ined in the 

Pacific, it is unlikely that they can detach much naval strength for 

operations in the Bay of Bengal. He suggested that the Pacific situation 

should be discussed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this morning's 

meeting when the United States Chiefs of Staff should insist that Operation RAVENOUS be carried out and that Operation ANAKIM be initiated not 

later than November 1, 1943. This operation is essential because of its 

importance toChina and because the geographical position and manpower of 

China is the key to the defeat of Japan, just as the geographica.1 position and manpower of Russia is the key Lo the defeat of Germany. Therefore, it is impossible to omit these operations from our Pacific concept. 

Even if the question is not t,obe settled at this time, he felt it necessary to keep the British fully aware of the Pacific, The British proposal 

Lo do nothing in Burma until the end of next Far he characterized as 

fantastic. The diminishing prospect of being able to use any air bases 

in Russia was a further reason which compelled us Lo operate in Burma. 

GENERAL WEDEMEYER said that the British were firmly convinced 

that Germany would be defeated in 1913 and were, therefore, reluctant to 

take any resources away from the United Kingdom, in hopes that they 

would be able to conduct a successful Channel operation. He personally 

felt it essential that such an Operation RAVENOUS be done now when possible. The further they go with the operation, the less danger they will 

suffer from malaria when the rainy season starts. He felt it essential 

that the British be pressed to do everything they possibly could now. 

GENERAL K4FtSliAI.L said that we were still faced with the Chinese 

reluctance to do anything. To carry out Operation RAVENOUS, the Chinese 

24 
must start first. The target date for the completion of the deployment 

was March 1st. It would soon be too late to meet this date. 

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Stalin 

had informed the President that he desired no U. S. personnel in Russia. 

The reconnaissance and survey contemplated by General Bradley could not 

now be carried out. Stalin does not wish to see General Marshall. The 

Russians will accept planes and materiel but no U. S. or British survey 

parties . 

GENERAI, SOMERVELL said that he and Admiral Mountbatten had discussed the British landing craft situation in detail since the last 

meeting. The principal contribution by Great Britain to the landing 

craft pool was some 600 L.C.A. (armored craft). Mountbatten concluded 

that 150 of these would be required for the Sicilian, operation, leaving 

450 in the United Kingdom for training and other purposes. Lord Mountbatten had not fully understood the decisionoftime required to rehabilitate landing craft--he had been talking about small craft whereas we 

had been talking about landing ships. Re had had no knowledge that the 

engineers' amphibious force had completed repairs here in North Africa 

of landing craft utilized in the Operation TOiX!! British training and 

combined operations were dislocated by the TO::C!I Operation and were now 

three months in arrears, but by August Admiral Mountbatten felt confident that he could man all available landing craft. 

In Lord Mountbatten's opinion, any land attack must be led by 

L.C.A.'s, the tactics being to seek out a "soft spot" by a reconnaissance in force, and then to pour forces through the "soft spot" once 

found. It is apparent that more landing craft will be available than 

Lord Mountbatten had believed. Probably we can armor a considerable number of our smaller landing craft by September, but the number we could 

build by June would be insignificant. However, t,he British capacity in 

that direction should suffice. 

GENERAL. SOhIERVELL said that he had reviewed with Lord :.fountbatten certain plans for operations on the Continent. Planning for the 

Brest Peninsula had been investigated by considering four lines of 

opposition which might be reached, i.e., initial and expanded positions. 

For each line, more forces were required than could be supplied by the 

available ports. Therefore, it was concluded that the Brest plan was 

25 
SECRET 

impracticable from a supply standpoint. The situation is becoming absolutely impossible if the report that the Germans had mined all the docks 

in the proposed area is true. On the other hand, operations at Cherbourg 

would be possible; the same factors which would make it relatively easy 

to hold, once captured, would make exploitation and expansion very difficult. Lord Mountbatten was in favor of capturing the Channel Islands 

both as stepping stones toward a prospective continual operation and as 

a base from which tooperate against sea-borne supply to German submarine 

bases 011 the French coast. Lord Mountbatten stated he could capture the 

Channel Islands without help from the United States. 

With respect to Sicily.. discussion revealed that the batteries 

there were 4.6 inch and that the most feasible means of reducing them 

would be by parachute attack. These parachute troops would probably have 

to be carried in U. 5. transport planes. Use of the L.C.A.,'s would require moving them by combat--loaded transports. It was agreed that it was 

preferable that the landing craft should start from North Africa, and 

that it was not essential to use armored boats if full advantage was 

taken of the possibility of surprise. It is probable that all troops 

encountered in Sicily would be either first-class German troops or 

Italian troops heavily leavened with German troops so that they would 

be effective. There does not appear to be room in the Islbnd for more 

tnan two additional divisions 

ADXIIU KING, pointing out that the key to the European situation was Russia, suggested coordinating all supply to Russia under one 

head and under one code name, placing one officer in general charge,. 

This officer would then have the task of emphasizing the necessity for 

air action against German airfields in northern Norway. 

After some discussion, it was.agreed that the Russians would 

undoubtedly ask for additional heavy bombers, ostensibly for this purpose, and that the airfields could not be rendered ineffective by means 

other than a combined operation against them. 
SECRET 

J.C.S. 54th Meeting 

(Casablanca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held at Anfa Camp on Monday, 

January 18, 1943, at 0930. 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. 

Brig. General 

Brig. General A. 

Colonel J. 

Commander R. 

M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

J.E. Hull, USA 

C. Wedemeyer, USA 

E. Smart, USA 

E. Libby, USN 

27 
SECRET 

GENERAL MARSHALL read a despatch which said that the proposed 

freeze on 55 percent of the synthetic rubber program would reduce the 

high octane gasoline program by 5,000,000 barrels, the airplane program 

by 10,000 airplanes, and would delay the escort vessel program from two 

to three months. He recomnended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff present a 

memorandum to the President and ask him to instruct Mr. Nelson not to 

authorize Alr. Jeffers' proposed procedure. 

ADMIRAL KING remarked that he doubted that the President would 

agree to freeze the synthetic rubber program at the 20 percent level, 

inasmuch as political questions were involved. 

ADMIRAL KING, recounting his conversation with theprime Minister 

the previous evening, said that Mr. Churchill had committed himself to 

undertake ANAKIMin1943 and that he was agreeable to Operation RAVENOUS, 

concerning which there still remains the questionofChinese cooperation. 

They had thoroughly discussed the submarine situation; and Mr. Churchill 

appeared agreeable to giving highest priority to bombing the submarine 

bases, building yards, and assembly points, although he said the United 

States must help. The Prime Minister objected to our "putting the cart 

before the horse" with respect to Pacific operations, and said we had 

refused to give the British accurate information as to our landing craft 

program and as to our dispositions in the Pacific. He appeared greatly 

concerned over our stand with respect toPacific operations. With respect 

to the Burma operation, Admiral King had tried to explain to the Prime 

Minister his concept regarding the geographical position and manpower of 

China. The President was anxious to get additional airplanes to General 

Chennault, which could not be supplied unless the upper Burma Road is 

opened. Admiral King understands the purpose of RAVENOUS to be to open 

this upper Burma Road in order to improve communications to China. He 

feels that Chiang Kai-shek should be urged to move at once. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the tonnage question had been under 

discussion; that in view of the message the President had received from 

Stalin, General Marshall ought not to go to Moscow; that Mr. Hopkins had 

informed him that command of the 8th Army would pass to General Eisenhower as soon as this Army got into the Tunisian battle, Alexander becoming Eisenhower's Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the period of the 

actual battle, but that this proposal must come from the British. 

28 
GENERAL MARSHALL, referring to the Burma operation, said that 

Sir John Dill believed General Wavell could move even if the Chinese did 

not; General Wavell might possibly he better off in this case in view of 

the limited logistic facilities available to his forces. He believed 

the Generalissimo might reverse his present stand provided he receives 

reassurances from the Prime llinister rather than from General Wavell-­

that the deal was not completely closed. Two cargo ships have already 

sailedforGenera1 Stilwell, and the remainder will depart shortly. Troop 

ships are sailing today. 

GENERAL WEDEYEYER said if the Ramgarh force were to come down 

at this time, building the road as they progressed, it would greatly 

facilitate later coordinated action. Any landing fields that Wavell can 

establish by this movement will he of great assistance to a later advance. As to the Mediterranean operation, .he said the British Planners 

now tended to urge Sardinia in lieu of Sicily, contending that Sardinia 

would accomplish as much toward the security of !Aediterranean shipping 

as will Sicily. If the First Sea Lord's statements in the minutes of 

yesterday's meeting are correct, General Wedemeyer does not believe we 

are justified in undertaking either operation. 

ADMIRAL COOKE pointed out the necessity of discussing with the 

British Chiefs of Staff, points in which the President is intimately 

concerned, inorder that his stay here need not be prolonged. He objected 

to the British tendency to go into detail and to concern themselves with 

operations in our strategic theater which were really not their concern. 

The Kiska operation is an example. They argue that after we have seized 

Kabaul, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should then dictate future operations arid their timing. Admiral Cooke objects to this. They have rightly 

kept us in the dark as to certain of their operations in their own 

theater, and should accord us the same privilege. They insist that we 

set forth in detail the forces we propose to employ, and, yet, do not 

use the same system in listing their forces as we do. As far as the 

Planners are concerned, the main point at issue seems to be: "Shall we 

defeat Germany first?" or: "Shall we bring the war to a successful conclusion expeditiously?" The British desire to assemble in the United 

Kingdom sufficient landing craft to move on to the Continent should 

Germany crack. Admiral Cooke objects to having forces static in the 

United Xingdom instead of employing them actively against Japan, and has 

29 
SECRET 

made landing craft allocations on that basis. These craft are badly 

needed in the Pacific for General MacArthur and for our planned operations. Because of shortage in naval ships and landing craft, the British 

demur at the Burma operation. Admiral Cooke thinks that we can make 

landing craft available by that time and that some auxiliary aircraft 

carriers will also be available. We have allocated nothing in landing 

craft not scheduled to be completed before the 15th of March. It is difficult to specifically allocate forces in advance for each separate 

operatipn in the Pacific. All that can be done practically is to allocate our production to areas and not to specific campaigns. Although 

deliveries have been delayed, he believes present allocations t,o be 

sufficient for planned Operations. As a matter of actual fact, the British cannot use inthe United Kingdom as many landing craft as are already 

allocated there. 

ADMIRAL COOKE reiterated that he saw no reason why the British 

should examine our proposed Pacific campaign in detail, and that if they 

insist on doing so, we should pin them down as to what forces they will 

contribute toward the defeat of Japan. He felt that we should take the 

position that details of our operations were not a proper subject for 

the Agenda of these meetings as it was essential that we get on with 

combined considerations. 

ADMI"& KING said that we felt it necessary to take act,ion to 

secure Mediterranean communications and that the British were anxious 

to do something quickly in order to satisfy the Russians. He feared t,hat. 

if we undertook the Sardinia operation, we would be asked to do the 

Sicilian operation later. As to our Pacific strategy, we should stanti on 

the paper we have submitted. The British have always been opposed to our 

Pacific proposals; nevertheless, in spite of our Pacific operations: we 

can bring against Germany, either in Sicily or on the Brest Peninsula, 

everything that the British are willing to do. They have not yet clarified their own position as to what they propose on the Continent. The 

Burma operation is at present a long-range concept. He expects the Brit-. 

ish to make an issue of the shipping to the Pacific and to attempt, to 

continue to sit in review on our operations. Inasmuch as the Prime 

Minister has committed himself to RAVENOUS and to ANAKIM and to put.ting 

the maximum practicable air force into China, Admiral King feels that no 

effort should be spared to carry out these operations as planned.. 

30 
SECRET 

The President and the Prime Minister should inform the Generalissimo 

that RAVENOUS is not the all-out Burma campaign, that this will be set 

up ata later date, and that by this time naval forces will bemade available. With respect to the Mediterranean, Admiral King is utterly opposed 

to the Sardinian operation, but feels that the Sicilian operation should 

be undertaken since troops and means will be available, since Sicily is 

the strategic location, and since the alternative--sending excess troops 

from the Mediterranean Theater to the United Kingdom--accomplishes no 

real result. 

31 
SECRET 

J.C.S. 55th Meeting 

(Casablanca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held at Anfa Camp on Tuesday, 

January 19, 1943, at 0930. 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General J.E. Hull, USA 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

32 
SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that 11 destroyers 

had been transferred from escort duty in the Sea Frontiers for use as 

ocean escorts, in order to improve the position with respect to ocean 

escorts. 

The .Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed C.C.S. 155, the draft memorandum of "Conduct of the War in 1343," and agreed upon certain modifications which they would present to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. During 

the discussion, ADMIXAL KING remarked that he saw no objection to co~itinuing in the Mediterranean beyond Sicily if such operations required 

no more resources thau were then present in the Mediterranean Theater. 

GENERAL MARSHALL read a revised draft of the memorandum to the 

President from! tire .Taint Chiefs of Staff concerning the synthetic rubber 

program which was approved and which is attached hereto as Annex "A~" 

ADMIRAL KING outlined his proposals as to the command set--up in 

West Africa which he favored as a result of his conversations with 

Admiral Glassford. He would propose to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 

Vice Admiral Collinet, now in command of the naval forces at Dakar, 

assume the status of a Naval District Commander and that the limits of 

his command extend from t.he northern boundary of Sierra Leone to Cape 

Bojador. \'ice ndmiral Collinet, in his status of Yaval District Corn 

mander, would operate directly under Vice Admiral Pegram who, from his 

headquart,ers at Freetown, would have command of the West African Sea 

Frontier. Admiral King pointed out that Gambia, lying in Vice Admiral 

Collinet's district, would be under his command. Admiral King foresaw 

some difficulty with the British concerning control of air activity in 

the French district, and said that the British probably would insist on 

putt'ing in their own aircraft because they did not trust the French. He 

urged the necessity of placing full trust and confidence in the French 

Army, Navy, and Air Forces and in equipping ttiese forces as rapidly as 

may be^ 

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed, saying that he thought it impracticable 

to go halfway with the French. They must either be trusted completely or 

not at all. He had every reason to believe that certain French divisions, 

when equipped, would be excellent. He felt the objections to placing 

full trust in the French were more with respect to technical equipment 

than anything else. He foresaw difficulties as tocontrol, i.e., command, 

but felt that tkiese problems could be handled as they arose. 

33 
SECRET 

During a discussion as to when the President would be able to 

leave, it was concluded that Presidential action would be required upon 

the following four items: 

(a) Approved strategy. 

(b) Attitude toward the French. 

(c) Aid to Russia. 

(d) Turkey. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the President had not disagreed to 

the proposal of the Prime Minister that operations in support of Turkey 

be entirely British. The President would be interested in the proposals 

concerning aid to Russia, but General Marshall believed he should be 

informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to "destroying ourselves" in the attempt to get ships to Murmansk against extremely strong 

opposition. In reply to a statement by Admiral King that the President 

wanted Turkey in the war as a passive rather than an active belligerent, 

in order that the United Nations might utilize her air bases to attack 

the Axis and her territory toexpedite supplying Russia, General Marshall 

said that this passive attitude on the part of Turkey was purely a diplomatic question; if and when they enter the war, it will be a military 

matter to see to it that they do not advance. 

ADMIRAL KING remarked that he expected that political problems 

concerning the French would delay the President longer than would the 

business of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff next considered C.C.S. 156, "Suggested 

Procedure for Dealing with the Agenda of the Conference." ADMIFLAL COOKE 

said that it was important to set the target date for Operation HUSRY, 

and that the plan should be set up well in advance of preparation and 

training of the forces involved. In view of the complicated nature of 

the operation, it is essential to indicate, insofar as we can, who will 

provide the forces in specific areas. One of the difficulties with TORCH 

has been that the plans were not adequate, and that many changes had 

been made while the operation was being mounted. A planning Staff, not 

preoccupied with the battle in Tunisia, should be set up now for this 

operation. 

He said that item 2 could produce no more than a study which 

would result in an approximation of what additional losses will result 

34 
i~nconvoys caused by escort requirements for HUSKY. With respect to 

command organization in the Mediterranean, Admiral Cooke had informed 

the Combined Planners as to the proposed command arrangements on which 

the Combined Chiefs of 3taff must reach general agreement concerning 

spheres of influence, etc. 

AMIKAL KING said he proposed a western Mediterranean area under 

commiuid of a [Jnited States Yavy Flag Officer who will operate directly 

nnder Admiral Cunningham. Western North Africa would be included in this 

command. The British had approved this proposal. 

GZNERAL MARSHALL reviewed the proposed army command set-up in 

the Tunisiari area, arid said that it was highly desirable that, after 

completion of the Tripoli operation, the French occupy that country. 

When the Axis had been cleared from North Africa, General Alexander will 

cease to be Deputy Commander-in-Chief; the 8th Army will probably move 

to the rear of Turkey. He agreed that it was necessary to establish a 

planning staff for HUSKY, and to determine where and when training for 

t,his operation should be set up. 

"ANNEX A" 

January 18, 1943 

M~MORAXDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: 

1. The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have received information tkiat 

:Ir. Celson has recommended the outright allotment of all materials and 

equipment, necessary for the construction of 55 percent of the entire 

syiit,lietic rubber program and that Justice Byrnes is about to render A 

decision in the matter. In the fall Mr. Nelson made such an allotment 

for 20 percent of materials and equipment necessary for the rubber pro^ 

gram. The ,Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their approval to this allotment 

even tkiough it was realized that it might interfere with other strictly 

inilit,ary programs. We are convinced, however, that the effect of the 

proposed increase to 55 percent of the program will have serious effects 

on tkie high octane gas, escort vessel and aircraft programs. 

2. Just prior to our departure from the United States a memorandum 

to you was prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which remained unde-. 

livered by reason of Admiral Leahy's illness. In this memorandum we 

called attention to the fact that an extension of the present allocation 

35 
SECRET 

beyond 20 percent would bring about a loss in delivery in 1943 of 

approximately 5,000,000 barrels ofhigh octane gas, over 10,000 aircraft, 

and two to three months delay inthe completion of the escort vessel program, all vital tothe war effort. We are convinced that the result would 

very seriously jeopardize the effective prosecution of the war. For 

instance, the most serious doubt at the present moment is whether or not 

sufficient escort vessels can be provided during the next five months: 

(1) to permit the Russian convoys to be stepped up from 42 days to 2%­

which now appears practically impossible; (2) to enable the HUSKY (S) 

Operation to be mounted; and (3) to permit HUSKY to be mounted without 

necessitating the running of the Freetown convoys without escort--as 

TORCH compelled us to do, resulting in heavy losses. A delay ofaronth 

in the present escort program would have most serious consequences. The 

dangers of reductions in high octane gas (already a shortage) and planes 

on the eve of heavy operations are evident. 

We, therefore, recommend that Justice Byrnes be issued instructions in accordance with the telegram suggested below: 

TELEGRAM TO BYRNES, WASHINGTON: "Proposed extension of freeze in 

rubber program from 20 to 55 percent of total will have serious 

effects onother programs whose successful completion isnecessary 

for the effective prosecution of the war. Over-riding priorities 

will not be granted to more than 20 percent of the rubber program above escort vessels, aircraft, high octane gas, and other 

items in the number one group of the military program of the 

Chiefs of Staff." 

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

(Signed) G. C. MARSHALL, 

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. 

36 
SECRET 

J.C.S. 56th Meeting 

(Casablanca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTFS OF MEETING 

Held at Anfa Camp on Wednesday, 

January 20, 1943, at 0900. 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USE 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USh 

Brig. General J.E. Hull, USA 

Brig. General A. C. Hedemeyer, USA 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

37 
SECRET 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed certain possibilities in 

connectitxn with the proposed movements of the President. 

GENERAL MARSHALL gave some background information on the LendLease situation with respect to Turkey. It is proposed that the Prime 

llinister will proceed to Cyprus to meet Turkish authorities there. It is 

hoped that he can induce Turkey to enter the war on the side of the 

United Nations. Our objection to the proposed method of handling LendLease commitments is that we are, in fact, surrendering control of U. S. 

allocations to Turkey since we have no assurance of where the material 

is ultimately sent. He remarked, however, that the main purposeofbringing pressure to bear on Turkey was to ultimately permit the operation of 

American bombers from Turkish soil; since the object at stake was so 

important, we could afford to make concessions concerning the method of 

allocating material to this theater. He felt that, in any event, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff should have an opportunity to see requests submitted to the C.hl.A.B.bythe British, in order that after General Brooke 

and General Marshall had determined what they were shortly to undertake 

to provide Turkey, the C.M.A.B. could inform the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff as to the practicability of these proposals. 

ADMIRAL KING said that in addition to our present commitments to 

furnish equipment to the FrenchinNorth Africa, to Russia, and to China, 

and supplying our own needs, we were apparently about to undertake additional commitments to Turkey. He inquired what we should do 'in order to 

insure that Turkey understood the real source of this material. He wonders if a U. S. representative should not accompany the Prime Zlinister 

in order to handle American interests and point up the fact that the 

United States is directly involved. If Britain assumes responsibility 

for processing bids for supplying Turkey, they should properly deal with 

the Combined Munitions Assignments Board. In Admiral King's opinion, 

these requests should go through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He is 

opposed to permitting the British to go direct to the Combined Munitions 

Assignments Board, obtain a decision from that Board, and then inform 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff what had been done. His main concern is to 

insure that all material allocated for this purpose is put to use against 

the enemy. 

ADMIRAL COOKE was of the opinion that if requests from Turkey 

were to continue, they should process their own. He felt, however, that 

for initial bargaining the proposed arrangement was satisfactory. 

38 
GEXEHtV, MARSHALL said that he thought the British might undertake operations in t.he Dodecanese concurrently with our operations 

against Sicily, utilizing landing craft assigned to the Middle East, for 

this purpose. It, was brought out in subsequent discussion that the iliddle 

East at present has landing craft sufficient only to train one brigade 

troop, and that the U. s. could not supply additional landing craft for 

Ilodecariese operations while the Sicilian operation was in progress. If 

tile Dodecmese operation is undertaken as a follow-up to Sicily, one 

result would be that, the residual landin& craft earmarked for the U. K. 

rvonld never reach tllere. 

GEKERAL SOYERVJ~I,L,discussing C.C.S. lfi2, "U. S. Aid to Russia," 

said t,tiat siiice the paper was prepared, Lord Leathers had withdrawn his 

concurrence to it as a joint, paper because he did not have first,-hand 

knowledge of the U. S. production back-log. He did, however, accept 

General Somervell's figures. U. S. calculations of loss rate for dry 

cargo shippifig are 2.6 percent. This figure is based upon the actual 

loss rate during 1342. The British figure of 1.9 percent is an attempt 

at. f'orecastiiig expected losses for 1947, arid U. S. authorities believe 

it too low. General Soinervell recommended changing the first sentence of 

paraqravli 1.1 to read: "Supplement British assistance, in accordanre wit.h 

IJ. S.~~Britishagreement of November 13, 1942." He believes that, the 

ilussiari .?rot,orol should be regarded in t,he same status as any uthcr 

up<1rat,ioii; that, it should not be sacrosanct, but susceptible of rediict,ion 

i f such be necessary because of other operations of equal importance 

Tile !'resident, is beginning to believe that itmay be well to have a showilonn wit,ti Stalin concerning the necessity of suspending Murmansk convoys, 

particularly since other means of supply to Xussia are still availableknernl Sonrervell pointed out tkie importance of the last sentence in 

C.C. S. 162 arid suggested that the particular attention of the Combined 

Ckiiefs of Staf'f be invited to this sentence. 

AD?IIK.AL KING, summarizing the general strategic plan for 1943. 

poirit,ed ont t,hat our main reliance in Enrope was placed on !lussia 

TLieret'ore, he felt that. no effort should be spared to place in Russian 

hands every possible t,ool of war. The question was not one of placating 

Stalin but of iinplenientirig the ilussians to our own interest. He agreed 

with General \farshall that it was not wise to attempt to continue Hurniansk convoys when the loss becomes prohibitive. 

39 
SECRET 

GENERAL SOMERVELL and ADMIRAL COOKE informed the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that necessary shipping for operations in the Pacific had 

already been allocated. They agreed that no accurate determination of 

the effect on loss rate produced by the new Air and Escort program could 

be determined before June because of the necessity of integrating the 

effect over an appreciable time. 

GENERAL MARSHALL, disaussing the proposed Army and Air Command 

set-up in the Uediterranean, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he 

had received a draft plan for subdividing the North African and European 

Theaters, and that General Andrews was working on the proposal. General 

Marshall said he had discussed with Sir John Dill the question of 

Britain's control over U. S. heavy bombers in England in operations 

which might involve .heavy losses; the U. S. Commander would always have 

the right to appeal. He believes British Command is logical until such 

time as our forces outnumber the British and until we have demonstrated 

the efficacy of our day-bombing methods. When this time arrives, a 

reexamination of the command arrangements will be in order. 
SECRET 

J.C.S. 57th Meeting 

(Ca sab1anca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held at Anfa Camp on Thursday, 

January 21, 1913, at 0900. 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General J.E. Hull, USA 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

41 
SECRET 

GENERAL MARSBALL read a despatch from General Eisenhower reporting an enemy attack in Tunisia which resulted in some disorganization of 

the French defense lines, and said that Eisenhower was proceeding to his 

advance command post; Admiral Cunningham would be senior officer at 

Algiers until his return. General Marshall also read a despatch containing a report by General Hurley which emphasized the absence of German 

air from the Russian front. 

ADMIRAL KING informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they could 

expect Admiral Pound to propose a modification of the phrasing of the 

paper on "Conduct of the Mar in 1943" concerning antisuhmarine warfare. 

Admiral King said that Admiral Pound had discussed with him recommendations he felt should be made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding 

this subject, but that these recommendations were largely a summary of 

actions which had already been taken. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the British were constantly raising 

objections to our proposals that bombing of submarine targets be intensified on the ground that the manufacturing points of certain items 

essential to submarine construction were extremely difficult targets. 

GENERAL MARSHALL remarked that he had been given to understand 

that a British Captain had been given the task of surveying the general 

antisubmarine warfare situation, and that he felt it essential that 

some similar procedure with regard to this important problem be adopted 

by us. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff next considered C.C.S. 160, "Minimum 

Escort Requirements to Maintain the Sea Communications of the United 

Kations." It was agreed that the paper could be accepted as a premise 

for verification at a future date, noting that this was only one phase 

of a parallel study of the over-all antisubmarine position which was now 

being completed in the United States, 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff next considered C.C.S. 166, "The 

Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom." 

GENERAL MARSHALL did not clearly understand the meaning of 

paragraph 6 and suggested that we get the British to explain the meaning 

of this paragraph. It appearedtoGenera1 Illarshall that theprime Minister 

had probably instigated the paper. 

42 
SECRET 

ADMIRAL KING said that he understood the paragraph to imply that 

before laying waste to whole cities in occupied territory, it would he 

necessary to obtain the approval of the British Cabinet because of the 

political implications of such an act. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL suggested elimination of the word "synthetic" 

in paragraph 2 (d) of the paper, pointing out that the two tetraethyl 

plants in Germany were vital objectives. 

Discussing C.C.S. 164, ANAKIM, it was agreed that it probably 

would be necessary to supply supplementary forces required from the 

Pacific. It was further agreed that it is essential that it appear in 

the minutes of' the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting that the LSD may not 

be ready in time for this operation, and that it is probable that TJnited 

States forces will have to be shifted to the theater in October. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S, 165, "Draft Telegram 

to M. Stalin," but took no action" 

ADMIRAL KING remarked that he was dissatisfied with the late 

date proposed for operation HUSKY He felt it indicative that nothing 

would be done on the Continent during 1943" He agreed with General 

Marshall Is assertion that the Prime Minister was anxious to mount BRIM.-. 

STONE and that the late date for HUSKY may have been influenced by this 

desire. He feels BRIMSTONE to be "doing something just for the sake of 

doing something"; that even if BRIMSTONE is accomplished, HUSKY will 

have to follow, thus further deferring Continental operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in his opinion any forces deployed in 

Sardinia were in an extremely vulnerable position in case the Germans 

advanced through Spain; that the Axis might permit us to occupy Sardinia 

with little opposition, in order that they might occupy Spain and completely flank our forces in the Mediterranean, On the other hand, they 

would be forced to resist strongly in Sicily. 

ADMIRAL COOKE said that it shouldbereemphasized that the entire 

problem for either operation will be one oftraining and that the British 

are fully cognizant of the difficulties ofthe Sicilian operation, partly 

as a result of their exhaustive study of Operation BRIMSTONE" They have 

consideredandevaluated the difference inair coverage obtainable between 

43 
SECRET 

Sicily and Sardinia, but, even so, appear to favor the Sardinian operation. Our calculations for HUSKY are based upon completion of operations 

in Tunisia by April 1. The British insist that LCA(L) must be used for 

the assault stage. They admit to having 400 of these craft and probably 

have more. We have none. We should ascertain from them how many they 

will give us for the assault. The disadvantage is that they can be 

carried only by British combat-loaded transports, inasmuch as our davits 

cannot handle them. They have a radius of approximately 50 miles. He 

agreed with a suggestion by General Somervell that their radius might be 

increased by installing auxiliary tanks, with a slight loss of personnel 

capacity. 

GENERAL SOM3RVELL, summarizing the capacity of various routes 

through the Levant, said that noneofthem looked very promising. Turkish 

railways are inadequate. All routes require a large number of heavy 

trucks and rolling stock. He said that the route via the Persian Gulf, 

expected to have a capacity of 10,000 tons per month but so far only 

able to handle from 4,000 to 5,000 tons per month, would improve as soon 

as the necessary personnel (due at the end of January) arrived. 

COLohEL SMART suggested that, inasmuch as the final eviction of 

the Axis from Tunis and Bizerte might take on the characteristics of 

another Dunkirk, it might be advisable to delay this eviction until such 

time as we were prepared to mount Operation HUSKY in order to take ad 

vantage of the confusion and disorganization resulting from the Axis 

evacuation of Tunisia" 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he had settled the question of training 

French pilots with General Eisenhower; that training of one fighter 

group and one bombardment group in the rear areas was now in hand. There 

is an adequate number offighter aircraft already in Africa; the question 

is one of deploying them in the correct spots, 

44 
SECRET 

J.C.S. 58th Meeting 

( Casab1anc a) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held at Anfa Camp on Friday, 

January 22, 1943, at 0900. 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General ti. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General J.E. Hull, USA 

Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Colonel J. E. Smart, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

45 
SECRET 

1. CoCsSo 165/1--DRAFT REFLY TO Ma STALIN. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed upon certain modifications to 

be proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

2. C-CoS- 168--OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. 

GENERAL MARSHALL questioned the desirability of declaring our 

intention to clear the Aleutians of the enemy. He said that the British 

have been informed of the magnitude of the Kiska operation, and that 

this gave them a yardstick by which they might attempt to judge the 

magnitude of‘ other operations in the Pacific Theater. He felt it essential that they understand that we will not commit ourselves to become 

involved in any large-scale operation in Alaska. 

After some discussion, it was agreed: 

To change the paper to read, “make the Aleutians as secure as 

may be,” and to issue it as C.C.S. 168. 

3. C C S.. 161/1--HUSKY. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disciussed this paper by the Combined 

Staff Planners with a view to determining how it might be possible to 

mount the operation earlier than proposed in the paper. ADMIRAL KING 

remarked that it appeared that it would be necessary to utilize combatloaded transports; that the British, although maintaining that convoys 

could be passed through the Mediterranean without occupying Sicily, 

still were reluctant to send assault convoys by this route, which prevented training and loading combat-loaded transports in the United Kingdom Considerable work remains tobe done as to reconnaissance of beaches. 

It was agreed: 

That the Joint Chiefs of Staff would inform the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff that they did not favor a late HUSKY, and were unalterably opposed to Operation BRIMSTONE at any time. 

The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff believe that Operation HUSKY can 

be mounted by the 1st of August without undue difficulty although the 

necessary documents are not available here to sustain this belief. 

ADMIRAL KING remarked that we should meet this date and should do whatever has to be done to accomplish it. 

ADMIRAL COOKE pointed out that if the Italian Fleet had not been 

driven into the Adriatic before the operation was launched, it would be 

necessarytoprovide two naval covering forces; but that theBritish hoped 

to have dealt with the Italian Fleet before theoperation was scheduled. 

46 
I.( .S. 59th Meeting 

i(n~at11anca) 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETING 

Held at Anf’a Camp on Saturday, 

January 23, 1913, at, own. 

MEMBERS PRESENT 

General f.i” C, Marshall, IlSA 

Admiral E J - King, USN 

Lt. General H. It. Arnold. CSA 

SECRETARY 

Brig. General J R. Deane, USA 

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT 

1,t. General B. B. Somervell, 1:SA 

Rear Admiral C., \f, Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. General J. E.. Hull, ITSA 

Brig. General A. C,. Wedemeyer, I!SA 

Colonel J. E~ Smart, IJSA 

Commander R~ I?. Libby, T!SK 

47 
SECRET 

1. C.C.S. 167--CONTINENTAL OERATIONS IN 1913. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL remarked that he believed the number of U. S. 

divisions should properlybestated as five instead of four, on the basis 

of 40,000 men per division. One of these divisions will probably be airborne. He pointed out that the British reservation concerning the Metropolitan Air Force was introduced for the first time in this paper, and 

that this was the first intimation that there might be any difficulty 

with respect to air. 

ADMIRAL KING remarked that if the provisions with regard to the 

U. S. furnishing assault craft were interpreted literally, it might cut 

into what we were able to furnish in the Pacific. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that we must, in accepting the paper, note 

the reservation that we would furnish only the resources remaining after 

mounting HUSKY and filling Pacific requirements, and that we see no 

prospect of providing U. S. crews or the totals of assault shipping and 

landing craft set forth in this paper by August 1st. 

It was agreed: 

(a) That in regard to paragraph 4, other commitments must be 

first met; 

(b) That on our basis of calculation, the number of U. S. divisions would be five in lieu of four; 

(c) That of these five U. S. divisions, one will probably be 

airborne. 

2. C.C.S. 172--SHIPPING CAPABILITIES FOR BOLERO BUILD-UP. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL explained the basis on which this paper had 

been produced, emphasizing that it made provision for sending 1G,000 

troops from the U. S. in combat-loaded transports, and that these had 

been computed on the basis of one trip only so that the transports 

might be held as long as necessary without detriment to other calculations. A balance of combat loaders to give 23,000 troop lift remains for 

the Pacific. 

3. C.C.S. 171--OPERATION HUSKY. 

After discussion, it was agreed: 

(a) That the first paragraph should include, "with the target 

date as the period of the favorable July moon. Code designation, HUSKY"; 

48 
SECRET 

(b) Under paragraph 1 of the command set-up, the words, "responsible for," should be replaced by "charged with"; 

(c) The directive should provide for immediate preparation of 

cover plans; 

(d) An overall code designation for all Mediterranean operations 

should be made. 

4. C.C.S. 170--REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. 

During the discussion of this papr, the question arose as to 

what duties General Eisenhower would perform during the carrying out of 

Operation HUSKY. GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would be responsible for 

all of Africa, for issuing directives to Air Marshal Tedder having no 

immediate application to HUSKY, etc. He felt the command relationship to 

be a formal one in view of the preponderance of British forces. 

ADMIRAL KING said that this was in accordance with the general 

principle that immediate command vested in the nation having a preponderance of forces; but that the principle should not be rigidly applied 

and, in fact, C.C.S. 7513 shouldberevisedbyinserting the qualification 

that this would be a normal, rather than a required arrangement under 

these circumstances. 

49 
CASABLANCA CONFERENCE 

JANUARY 1943 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

(Presided Over By The President) 

PAGE 

ECinutes of Conference, Janaury 15, 1943 . . . . 5i 

Minutes of Conference, January 16, 19113 . . . . 58 
SECRET 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE 

Held at Anfa Camp, January 15, 1943, at, 1000 

PRESENT 

The President 

General Marshall 

Admiral King 

Lt. General Arnold 

Mr. Harry Hopkins 

Hr. Averill Harriman 

Brig. General Ueane 

51 
SECRET 

1. VISIT OF GENERAL NOGUES AND THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO WITH THE 

PRESIDENT 

The PRESIDENT asked as to the advisability of his seeing General 

rogues and possibly the Sultan of Morocco. GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIW 

KING both stated they felt that General Eisenhower was in a better position to advise the President on t,his subject and he would^ no doubt do so 

when he arrived at Anfa Camp. Admiral King, however, questioned whether 

or not General Nogues merited the honor of visiting the President of the 

United States. 

2. THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that it, had at first been thought the 

President would stay here for about four or five days; then leave by 

motor for Rabst and Port Lyautey, where he would visit three divisions 

and interview certain selected officers and men; then proceed by air to 

Oran, observe the troops there and also visit a hospital. From Oran, it 

was planned that he should go tohfarrakech, change planes at the airfield 

there and then return to the Unit,ed States. He stated that, in view of 

the fact that the conference would probably last about ten days, these 

plans would of necessity have to undergo some change. He said that, it is 

not desirable for the President to visit Marrakech and he should refuse 

any invitation of the Prime Minister to do so. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that hlarrakech is inland, that its 

airfield is entirely open. No one knows how many Axi.s agents may be 

included in the civilian populations. He also said that it would be 

unwise to have the President of the United States in a city that contained about one and one-half French divisions which have recently been 

hostile to us and only one regiment of American troops. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that if the Prime Minister desired to 

visit Marrakech, he might do so with Mr. Hopkins; and this would furnish 

god cover for the real location of the President. 

It was decided that the President would remain here and that if 

there was any indication that his presence here had become known, he 

would immediately start on the inspection tour which had been previously 

planned to start at the conclusion of his stay in Africa, except that, 

when he returned to the Marrakech airport, he would change planes and 

leave the Marrakech airport as though returning to the United States. 

52 
Actually, he would return to the Anfa Camp in time to be here to finish 

up such business as might he necessary in connection with the conference 

In disctussing the protection available at Anfa Camp, GEWRAL 

ARNOLD brought out the fact that there was a French squadron equipped 

with our P-40 airplanes; and, at the request of the President, he explained something of our program for eouipping French air wits. 

3. THE BRITISH STRATEGIC CONCEPT. 

GENERAL MARSHALL gave the Fresident a brief summary of the 

Rritish Chiefs of Staff concept regarding the prospects in the European 

theater. They believe that we should first expand the bombing ct'fort 

against the Axis and that operations in the Mediterranean offer the best 

chance of compelling Germany to disperse her air resources. He ex~:lained 

that the British are now in favor of an attack against Sicily rn?,Iinr 

than Sardinia and that this change of' attitude was probably inspired t,y 

the Prime Minister. 

At the same time, the United Piations should try t,n bring Turkey 

in on our side. Continued aid should be given to t,he Russians. A balance 

will have to be struck between these various commitmerits hecause they 

are mutually conflicting. 

They also feel that we must be in a position to take advantage 

of any weakness developing in Germany by being prepared for operations 

across the English Channel. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that bot,h Lord Mountba.t.ten and General 

Clark agreed that there must be a long period of training beforc any 

attempt is made to land against determined resistance. General C,lark had 

pointed out many of the mishaps that occurred in the landing in North 

Africa which would have been fatal had the resistance been more determined. General Clark was also apprehensive about our atjility to maintain 

a surprise because of the necessity of locating landing craft along the 

northern coast ofAfrica prior to initiating operations. General Marshall 

stated that General Clark felt that, while this presented some diffi-. 

culties, they could be overcome. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the British are extremely fearful 

of any direct action against the Continent until a decided crack in the 

German efficiency and morale has become apparent. The British point out 

53 
that the rail net in Europe would permit the movement of seven divisions 

a day from east to west, which would enable them to reinforce ttrir 

defenses of the northern coast of France rapidly. On the other hand, 

they can only move one division from north to south each day in order to 

reinforce their defense of southern Europe. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Clark had expressed the 

opinion that operations in the Mediterranean could be mounted more 

efficiently from North Africa. His reasoils are that the lines of communication would be shorter there, that the troops in North Africa have 

had experience in landing operations, and that there will be an excess 

number of troops available for the operation once the .his have ':i.eii 

forced out of Tunisia, and finally that training will^ be inon? effective 

if undertaken in close contact, with the enemy. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that, while the Critish u-ish to build 11p 

a strong force in the United Kingdom for possible nperBtions rrg-ainst 

Germany in case a weakness develops, it must i'c understood that a.iiy 

operation in the Mediterranean will definitely retard BOLERO. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the line of i:ommunication is the 

bottleneck in any operations in the Mediterranean. 

MR, HOPKINS asked if the British Chiefs of St.af~'f Pelt that. the 

lines of communication are sufficient. GENERAL hZAHsHALI. said that the 

two critical factors in the decision as to whet,her the operation is t,o 

be in the north or the south were: (1) the safet,y of the line of communications and (2) the fact that there will be an excess of veteran 

soldiers available in North Africa to mount an operation. 

In discussing Turkey, GENERAL MARSHALL said that t,he British 

8th Army would be^ prepared to send a considerable force there or near 

there. The aim of the United Nations should be to have Turkey resist 

Axis aggression and at the same time permit and protect our use of their 

airfields. 

The PRESIDENT said that the question of bringing Turkey into the 

war is one for the diplomats to settle. In conducting negotiations, he 

stated that he and the Prime Minister should be given information as to 

how much military support the United Nations should be prepared to offer 

Turkey in order to accomplish what is desired. Re stated that, he did not 

M 
SECRET 

want to be in the position of overpromising anything to the Turkish 

Government. (The Joint Staff Planners have been directed to investigate 

how much aid it would be necessary for us to furnish Turkey in order to 

enable them to provide effective resistance to an Axis invasion.) 

It was agreed that, regardless of whether Turkey came into the 

war on the side of the United Nations, we should assemble sufficient 

force to the east of the Turkish boundary to enable the United Katiom 

to reinforce Turkey as soon as she did become involved in the war. This 

can probably be accomplished by using part of the Rritish 8th Army. 

4. ANTISUBhlARINE WARFARE. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then pointed out that both the American and the 

British Chiefs of Staff agreed that effective measures must be taken 

against the Axis submarines. He said that Admiral King had pointed out 

that the most effective targets would be at the places where the sub-. 

marines are assembled. He agreed with the statement, which he attribut,ed 

to Sir Charles Portal, that we must keep hammering on one link in the 

chain, whether it be the factories which manufacture component parts, 

the submarine assembly yards, submarine bases, or submarines along t.he 

sea lanes. 

5. OPERATION RAVENOUS. 

GENERAL MARSIIAIL informed the President of the Brit.ish attitude 

concerning the Operation RAVENOUS. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that he had the impression that the British 

were coming around to the idea that it would be a profitable gamhle. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that there were hazards, particularly 

from Japanese action against the southern flank, but that if the operation was successful, it would secure favorable results far out of proportion to the risks involved. The most important benefit to be hoped 

for would be a decrease in the Japanese pressure in the southern Pacific 

by forcing the Japanese to divert their attention to the Burma theater; 

and, even in the event of failure, it would almost certainly result in a 

junction of the Chinese forces now in Burma with those from Yunnan; and, 

if a retirement became necessary, a trained Chinese army would withdraw 

into China. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then spoke of the Generalissimo's refusal to 

mount the operation. One reason given bytheGeneralissimo is the failure 

55 
SECRET 

to secure British cooperation in assembling naval forces in the Bay of 

Bengal, which he felt was a definite British commitment. 

It was agreed that an effort should be made to obtain firm 

British support for the operation before requesting the President to 

discuss the matter further with the Generalissimo. 

The PRESIDENT added that for psychological reasons he thought it 

would be advisable to double General Chennault's force in China and also 

to bomb Japan proper. GENERAL ARNOLD replied that he agreed that it 

would be wise to increase General Chennault's force and expressed great 

confidence in his ability to operate effectively against the Japanese. 

He stated, however, that the difficulty of supplying gasoline, spare 

parts, and other maintenance necessities prevented doing this at this 

time. He indicated that this was one of the most urgent reasons for 

opening the Burma Road. 

MR, HOPKINS asked General Marshall what he thought the prospeczs 

of success in Operation RAVENOUS were. 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he thought they were better than 

fifty-fifty. lie said the British presented all sorts of' difficulties 

which must be overcome but that he personally did not feel any of them 

were insurmountable. The tactical operations involved would not be of 

long duration, but itwould be necessarytobuild an improved road rapidly 

before the rainy season set in. He felt that our engineers could do 

this, but the British were inclined to doubt it. The British also feared 

the effects of malaria, but GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that their 

malaria preventive methods did not approach the effectiveness of ours. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that he thought it was most essential to 

undertake Operation RAVENOUS, particularly for its effect on the Japanese 

in the South Pacific. He stated that they are operating on interior 

lines, and it was difficult to understand why they did not make some 

serious thrusts at Midway or other points on our line of communications.. 

6. COMMAND SITUATION IN EUROPE. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he had learned that the Prime 

Minister was concerned over the effectiveness of our bombing operations 

in Europe. The utilization of our bombing force is tied up with the 

question of command. At the present time General Eisenhower controls the 

56 
Air Force, both in North Africa and in England. We are cooperating with 

the British in selecting the bombing objectives, but we are not subject 

to their orders. GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt the time had come 

when we should establish a separate United Kingdom theater. He stated 

that he had sent General Andrews to Cairo to give him some experi.ence in 

an active theater of operations and that he now proposed to put him in 

command of the American troops in the United Kingdom. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that so far as operational directiou of 

bombing, i.e., time and mission, our bombers inEngland should Lie subject 

to British command. So far as technique, etc., they should not, be permitted to dictate our procedure. 

7. OPERATIONS IN TUNISIA. 

GENERAL MARSHALL indicated that there may be a change in the 

British command in the operations in Tunisia. He said that. Admiral 

Cunningham agreed that the command had not been well handled. Instances 

occurred in which trained United States coml~atteams loaned t,o the 

British were broken up, thus reducing their effectiveness. There had 

also been instances of' the misuse of British parachute troops. This 

situation is now being corrected. 

57 
SECRET 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE 

Held at Anfa Camp, January 16, 1943, at 1700. 

PRESENT 

The President 

General Marshall 

Admiral King 

Lt. General Arnold 

Lt. General Somervell 

Rear Admiral Cooke 

Brig. General Wedemeyer 

Ib. flarry Ilopkins 

Vr. Averill Harriman 

Brig. General Deane 

58 
ADMIRAL KING informed the President that the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff have been attempting to obtain the British Chiefs of Staff's concept as to how the war should be won. He said that the British have 

definite ideas as to what the next operation should be but do not seem 

to have an over-all plan for the conduct of the war. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the Planners are making a study of 

what is required in the Pacific in order to maintain constant pressure 

on the Japanese and keep the initiative in that theater. The Combined 

Chiefs of Staff have been particularly concerned with the strategic concept for 1843. They have had discussions on the Burma operations and 

also whether an immediate operation should be planned for the Mediterranean or for the Continent or both. He stated that the Planners had 

been instructed to estimate the earliest possible date that an operation 

against Sicily could be mounted in order that the Chiefs of Staff could 

determine what residue of force would be available for operations on the 

Continent and if such operations would be advisable this year. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the most critical factors in the 

coming operations are the availability of landing craft, the time necessary for amphibious training, and the availability of escort vessels. 

He stated that there will be excess troops available in North 

Africa when the Axis powers have been expelled from Korth Africa and 

that this is one of the chief reasons why Operation HUSKY appears to be 

attractive. 

The British have estimated that the operations against Sicily 

cannot be mounted prior to August, but feel that there is a possibility 

of moving this date up to some time in July. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the question being determined is 

whether we can undertake an operation against the Continent together 

with Operation HUSKY or separately and at a later date. The British 

maintain a spearhead in the United Kingdom for an operation against the 

Continent in the event of a crack in German morale. This includes enough 

landing craft tomove four brigade groups; and, additionally, the British 

are putting motors in approximately 1,000 barges which they will use, 

together with other small craft, to bring in troops following the spearhead. 

59 
SECRET 

The PRESIDENT asked how many troops were inEngland at this time, 

to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that there were one trained division 

and about 140,000 to 150,000 men. He said that by next summer we can 

have six to nine divisions in the United Kingdom, and the British will 

have thirteen. 

GENERAL MEWHALL quoted Sir Charles Portal as saying a crack in 

Axis morale may come at any time because of the explosive elements existing in the populations of the occupied countries. Sj.r Charles Portal 

feels that, if such an explosion comes, it will start in the interior of 

Germany but will finally reach the front-line troops who will desire to 

return to their families. In this case, an occupation of the Continent 

would be comparatively simple. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that training for amphibious operations is 

the most critical factor which we have to face. The training must be of 

much higher quality than that given for TORCH. He quoted Generel Eisenhower as saying that he believed that there must be an invasj~onon the 

Continent but that it would require a minimum of 12 divisions, which is 

double previous estimates. General Eisenhower al~sofeels that there is a 

need for more training. Other limiting factors to any proposed. operation 

are the necessities of combating the submarine menace and for the delivery of supplies to Russia. 

An operation against Sardinia can be accomplished about six 

weeks earlier than one against Sicily, but t,he results will have little 

effect in improving the shipping situation through the Mediterranean 

The only positive result to be received from the capture of Sardinia 

would be the ability to bomb Italy and perhaps the southern coast of 

France. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that there would be much better air 

coverage for Operation HUSKY than could be given to Operation BRIMSTONE. 

The PRESIDENT asked where the Germans had the best defense. 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that their defense in Sicily was better 

than that in Sardinia and that by summer it might be expected that the 

Germans would have six to eight divisions there. General Marshall said 

that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed on the necessity of 

placing adequate troops in rear of Turkey to be prepared to reinforce 

her for a resistance to Axis invasion. 

60 
SECRET 

The PRESIDENT remarked that Turkey's entry into the war was a 

diplomatic question, to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he felt that 

the concentration should be made regardless of whether Turkey came into 

the war or not. 

ADMIRAL KING said that, in our endeavors to obtain a definite 

strategic concept from the British Chicfs of Staff, it had become apparent that they intknded using the geographic and maupower position of 

Russia to the maximum. This necessitates making every effort to maintain 

the flow of supplies to Russia and also to divert German air and grounri 

troops from the Russian front. Re added that the British make no mention 

of where or when a second front on the Continent should be est,ablished. 

The PRESIDENT said that we now have a Protocol with the Russians which 

involves a certain delivery of munitions to them arid that t,his shall 

probably be continued on the same scale when the present Protocol expirei. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that British convoys hy the northern rmte 

are set up for 30 ships every 42 days. With an additional 12 destroyers 

this could be improved to a rate of 30 ships each 27 days. He st,al,ed 

that he did not believe we should base our plans toc largely on a contemplated German crack-up. It now appeared that a real ROUFLXT opera.­

tion is not feasible before April 19-24 becanse of Urjtish lack of 

enthusiasm. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that.t,he British would undertake an Opera-. 

tion SLEDGEHAMMER if they saw signs of a break in German morale. This 

would be followed by a makeshift ROUNDW operation. He said the British 

feel that they cannot gather themeans for a real thrust against the Continent in 1943, and that Admiral Pound states that nooperation should be 

undertaken after August. It is apparent that British cooperation cannot 

be obtained unless there are indications of the Germans weakening. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that, if the operations on the Mediterranean 

and on the Russian front caused the Germans towithdraw their forces from 

France, the British would be willing to seize this opportunity to invade 

the Continent. 

GENERAL. MAHSHALL informed the President that the British were 

not interested in occupying Italy, irrasmuch as this would add to our 

burdens without commensurate ret.urns. 

61 
SECRET 

The PRESIDENT expressed his agreement with this view. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that in his opinion we may be able to 

obtain a decision from the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerningthe operations in the Pacific by January 17th and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

had come to the conclusion that Operation HUSKY should be undertaken, 

but they had not yet informed the British to this effect. 

The PRESIDENT stated that from the political point of view he 

thought it would be extremely wise to send more airplanes to China. He 

felt that they could be used to great advantage there; and if periodic 

bombing raids over Japan could be undertaken, they would have a tremendous morale effect on the Chinese people. GENERAL ARNOLD stated that. he 

agreed with this view but wished to see for himself whether or not, an 

increased air force in China could be supplied. 

The PRESIDENT then stated that he thought it was desirable to 

set up additional transport planes to insure a supply of a 1a.rger air 

force in China. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that transport planes now allocated to 

China are sufficient and that we must be extremely careful about making 

additional allocations. fie pointed out that, in addition t,o China, we 

would receive demands for transport planes from Russia. We would need a. 

considerable number for the Operation HUSKY and also for General WacArthur's forces in the Pacific. 

The PRESIDENT suggested the possibility of preparing two or 

three plans and making all preparations to carry them out, but leaving 

the decision as to the objective until a later date. 

ADMIRAL COOKE pointed out that, if plans were made for Operation 

HUSKY, the objective could readily be changed to either the Dcdecanese, 

Crete, or Sardinia. 

The PNBIDENT said he would like to have some flexibility to the 

plans in case it became apparent that Turkey might enter the war. In 

that case we could then adopt the objective which would fit in best with 

this development. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated he did not feel that the Operation HUSKY 

would interfere with Turkey's entering into the war, but rather that a 

success in Sicily might be an added inducement to her to join with us. 

62 
SECRET 

The PRESIDENT then directed the discussion to Russia. He said 

that he had received information that the Russians did not desire any of 

our personnel and also indicated that they would not welcome General 

Bradley's mission to make a survey of the available air facilities in 

Siberia. 

He asked General Somervell about the supply situation to Russia. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL replied that the Persian port is capable of 

handling 15 ships per month. The road and rail facilities are capable of 

handling about 10,000 tons per day, which are sufficient to handle the 

freight from 40 ships per month; and efforts are now being made to expand the port facilities to make this possible.. He then went on to describe to the President several overland routes to Russia, all of which 

are limited by the avai.lability of truck transport,at,lon. 

The PRESIDENT asked what might. happen if Turkey remained neutral 

but permitted our transporting mwiit.ions and bombs through her territory, 

GENERAL SOMERVELL replied that certai~nroutes could be made 

available by this means; but, if they wei'e used, it. wou16 be necessflrg 

to establish a truck assembly plant in that, areii.., He added that he 

thought this should be done and that all available routes into Russia 

should be used. 

The PRESIDENT asked General Somervell if truck bodies could be 

manufactured in the Near East, to which GENERAL SOKERVELL replied that 

lumber would have to lie obt.ained from India 

MR.. HARRIMAN stated that, until a truck assembly plant could be 

constructed, the one now at Cairo could be used, 

ADMIRAL KING stated that the last convoy to Murmansk arrived 

without loss of any of its 16 cargo ships, but that one destroyer had 

been sunk and another damaged. He stated that we could help Fbmsia more 

if they would help us to do so. 

The PRESIDENT asked if we were getting as much information from 

southern Europe as are the British. GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he 

would have this investigated. (A message was sent to G-2, Allied Force 

Headquarters, asking for a report as to the amount of intelligence received out of southern Europe by U. S., Intelligence agencies and how our 

efforts in this regard compared with those of the British.) 
SECREl 

GENERAL MARSHALL then informed the President that the British 

had agreed to transfer their Valentine tanks from the 6th Armored Division to the French as soon as the British had recetvedourSherman tanks. 

He also stated he thought it necessary to equip the best French divisions rapidly. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then informed the President regarding a decision which had been made by General Eisenhower concerning the Tunisian 

operations. A drive towards Sfax, whichhadbeen plannedforJanuary 24th, 

has been called off. Thiswasnecessary because the British 1st Army on 

the north could not attack nntil March 15th and General Alexander could 

not attack Rommel's forces on the south until February 15th. It was decided that the attack against Sfax might be premature and expose them to 

an attack from the north by German Tunisian forces and from the south 

by Hommel. Instead, General Eisenhower is t,o hold his 1st Armored Division in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist either Alexander's 

forces in the south or t,he 1st British Army in the north; and the at.tack 

against Sfax will be made by infantry units at a later date, to be coordinated by General Eisenhower and General Alexander I 

The PRESIDENT then asked General 'Somervell about the general 

supply situation. GENERAE SOMERVEIL replied that the greatest, shortages 

in North Africa were in r0a.d machinery and motor transportation. Both of 

.these are now being sent to horth Africa. The machinery i.s needed to 

improve the railroads and also for the construction and improvement of 

airfields. Efforts are also being made to bring in needed locomotiveso 

The PRESIDENT then asked about the civilian supply situation. 

GENERAL SOMEItvELL replied that it was being handled satisfactorily, 

except that valuable cargo space was being utilized by some of the 

civilian agencies in the United States in sending unnecessary and ridiculous items. 

The PRESIDENT then informed the Chiefs of Staff that Admiral 

Robert in Martinique had received a message from Laval to sink his ships 

immediately upon receiving evidence that the United States intended 

action against Martinique. Lava1 required Robert to give him an answer 

at once. Robert informed Laval within four hours that he would comply 

with his orders. This definitely eliminates the possibility of our obtaining the use of French shipping now in Martinique. 
ADMIRAL COOKE then informed the President that the British were 

becoming conscious of the fact that the United States was engaged in a 

war in the Pacific and described his discussions with the British Staff 

Planners, who recognized the necessity for adequate means being provided 

to handle the Pacific situation. He stated, however, that he did not 

feel that the British Chiefs of Staff were as yet convinced of this 

necessity. The Chiefs of Staff feel that we should maintain the status 

quo and simply hold, whereas the Planners recognize that a constant 

pressure must be kept on the Japanese and that every effort must be made 

to keep China in the war. The Planners admit the possibility of the 

Chinese dropping out of the war. 

The PRESIDENT then discussed the proposed operations jn Burma. 

GENERAL MARSHALL informed him that just as he felt that we had convinced 

the British that Operation RAVENOUS should be undertaken, the Generalissimo had declined to participate. The reason given by the Generalissimo 

is that the British refuse to place a naval force in the Bay of Berigal 

to interrupt the Japanese line of communications. The Generalissimo 

feels that a definite commitment to this effect had been made by the 

Prime Minister in a talk last year before the Pacific Council, GENERAL 

MARSHALL said that the Prime Minister probably had the ANAKIM operation 

in mind. 

ADMIRAL COOKE stated that theBritish have no intention of undertaking an operation to recapture Burma in the present dry season, 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the Chinese, particularly 

General Hsiung, had been loud in their complaints about failures to 

assist them; and now that we offer them assistance, they refuse our 

help. 

65 

SECRET 

INDEX 

A 

Admiral Glassfordla report, 7 

Agenda 

For coming conferences, a 

Saggested procedure for dealing with 

the, 34 

Aid to Russia 

Balance of commitments to Russia and 

Turkey, 53 

Coordination of supply, a6 

General Sonervell'e discussion 0% 39 

Througb Continental landing, 18 

Aid to Turkey, 55 

Air forces in China, 56, 62 

Aircraft over Tunisia, 6 

Aleutian Islands, 23 

Operations in, 46 

Algiers, Air situation at, 4 

Allocation for shipping in the 

Pacific, 40 

Allocation of forces and production, 

Discussion of, 30 

Amphibious weapons, 17 

ANAKIM, Ope rat ion 

C.C.S. 164, Discussion of, 43 

Affect of RAVENOUS on, 23 

Initiation of, 24 

Prime Minister's agreement, 28 

Andrews General--proposed for command 

of troops in United Kingdom Theater 

by General Marshall, 57 

Anfa Camp, Protection available, 53 

Pnnex "A" to J.C.S. 55th Meeting 

Minutes-Xemorandnm for the 

President, 35 

Pntisnbmarine warfare survey, 41, 55 

Approach to the discussion 

Admiral King's, 3 

General Marshall's, 3 

B 

BOIERO build-up 

Shipping capabilities for, 48 

Bombing in occupied territory and 

political implications, 43 

Bombers to General Stilwell, 10 

Bone, Air sitnation at, 4 

Brest Peninsula 

Operations against, 26 

BRIMSTONE, 3, 6 

Comparison of, with results of 

Brest Peninsula operation, 11 

Deception of land craft, 11 

Training, 5 

British 

Convoys, 61 

Eastern Fleet, 9 

At Ceylon, a4 

Possession of Tripoli, 6 

Strategic concept of conduct of 

war, 39, 53, 61 

Burma 

Admiral Xingts concapto3 explained 

to Prime Minister, a8 

Britiah can operate against, regardless of China, a9 

Plan for operation, a3 

Burma Road, Reason for opening, 56 

Byrnes, Telegram to, 36 

C 

Channel Islands 

Lord Monntbattenls plan for 

capture, 16 

Chennanlt General, Air forces 

under, 56 

China 

Air forces in, 56 

Transport plsnes to, 6a 

Chinese reluctance to begin 

RAVENOUS, a4. 28 

CiviLian supply sitnation, 64 

Clearing the Mediterranean, 3 

Combined Staff Planners 

Pacific concept for 1943, 23 

Requirements in Pacific, 59 

Strategic concept of war in 

Pacific, 59 

Command 

Amy and Air, in Mediterranean, 40 

Discussion of, in Enropean theater, 

I2 

England, in, 14 

set-up in mnisia proposed by 

General Marshdl, 35 

67 
SECRET 

Command-continued 

Set-up in West Africa proposed by 

Admiral King, 33 

Tunisian set-up following Tripoli 

operation, 35 

Command situation in Europe, 56 

Communications, Mediterranean, 54 

Conduct of the war in 1943, Discussion of, 33 

Conferences 

Agenda for coming, 2 

Further, 6 

Suggested procedure far dealing with 

the Agenda of the, 34 

Continental invasion, Forces for, 60 

Continental lending, 18 

As aid to Russia, 18 

Operations in 1943, 48 

convoys 

British, 61 

Continuing, in Mediterranean, ~n 

Cooke, ndmiral, C. M., Jr. 

Date suggested' for Operation 

BUSKY, 34 

Craft, landing, 17 

Assembly in U. K., pg 

Contribution by British, 25 

Discussion of, by General Marshall 

and Lord Mountbatten, 25 

For India, 24 

D 

Decisions reached concerning command 

set-up in Europeaa theater, 12 

Defeat of 

Germany, Key to, 24 

Jhpan, Key to, 24 

Destroyers transferred to ocean 

escorts, 33 

Discussion 

Admiral Kingla 

Approach, Method of, 2 

Procedure, Method of, a 

General Marshall Is 

Approach, Method of, 2 

Procedure, Method of, 2 

Dodecanese, plans for, 67 

E 

Eastern Fleet, British, 9 

At Ceylon, 24 

68 

INDEX 

Eighth Army command to Eisenhower. 28 

Europe 

Bombing operations effectiveness 

in, 56 

Command situation in, 56 

European theater 

Decisions as to command set-up, 12 

Expelling theGermans from Tnnisia, 4 

F 

Fighter aircraft over Tanisia, 6 

Forces 

Allocation of ~ Discuvsion of ~ 30 

Continental operations, for, 6n 

Listing of, by U. K. and U. s., 1g 

Fourth Division to Yorth Africa. 6 

French 

Pilots, Training of, 44 

Ships at Martinique to be sunk, 64 

Fxrther conferences, 6 

F 

German threat to Spain, 6 

Glassford, Admiral, report, 7 

I1 

Iligh octane gas production affected 

by synthetic rubber program, 36 

HUSKY, Operation 

Agreement following discussion, 48 

Calculations for, 44 

Date proposed objectionable to 

Admiral King, 43 

Disqussion of mounting, 46 

Target date suggested by P'dmiral 

Coake, 34 

I 

Information from Southern Furope, 63 

J 

Japan 

Operations against, 56 

Supplies to, 56 

Japanese air strength, 23 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Opposition to shipping via 

Murmansk, 34 
SECRET 

Joint Chiefs of Staff--continued 

Presidential movements, Piscussion 

of proposals of, 38 

Pecommendatians for instructions to 

Justice Byrnes regarding synthetic 

rubber freeze, 36 

Synthetic rubber material allotments 

recommendation of Mr. Nielson approved by, 35 

I( 

Xing, Admiral E. J -

Appraisal and observation of United 

$!ationst ability to take initiative 

and Vnited States' power to lead, 10 

Approach to the discussion, His, 3 

Attitude toward Sardinian and Sicil..~ 

ian operhtions, 31 

Nediterranean command proposal, 35 

Summary of gceeral strategic plan 

for 2943, 39 

I!. S. representative to accompany 

Prime Minister to Tnrkey proposed 

by, 38 

West Africa command set-up proposals, 33 

Kiska operation, Presidentls objection to Rritish interest in, 29 

L 

Landing craft 

Assembly in U - K., 29 

Contribution by British, 25 

Ciscussion of, by General Marshall 

and Lord Mountbatten, 25 

niaposition foll~owingSicilian landing, r7 

?or India, 24 

Landing on the European Continent, 18 

As aid to Dussia, 18 

Lend-Lease to Torkey, 38 

Levant, Capacity of routes throagh, 

44 

Listing of forces by U. K. and U.S., 

29 

M 

Marrakech, Conditions in, 52 

INDEX 

Marshall, General G. C. 

Agreement to Admiral King's proposal for full trust in French, 33 

Approach to the discussion, :j 

Tunisian command set-up following 

the Tripoli Operation, 35 

Turkish Lend-Lease situation revealed by, 36 

Yartinique, Lava1 1s message to Admiral Pobert, 64 

Me d it err an e an 

Army and Air command in, no 

Clea.ring and opening, 3 

Command proposal by Admiral King, 

35 

Commnnicaticns, 54 

Continuation of convoys by iiritisb, 

18 

Memorandom for the President, Annex 

"AN' to J.C.S. 55th Meeting Minutes, 

35 

Xinntes of Meetings, I 

Modifications to C-C. S. 155, 33 

Morale of the Axis, 60 

N 

?\elson reconmenda,tion for synthetic 

rubber material ajlotnents, 3s 

Fogues, General, Visit with the 

President, 52 

North Africa 

Supply situation: 6q 

Training in, for landings, g:j 

Troops in, :sg 

Norway, Bombing of airfields, 26 

0 

Objections to British concern in our 

strategic theater, zg 

Operation 

Aleutians, 46 

ANAKIM 

Prime Minister's agreement, 28 

Relation to RAVENOUS, a3 

BOLERO build-up, Shipping capabilities for, 48 

Brest Peninsala, 26 

BPIMSTONE, 3, 6 

Comparison of, with results of 

Brest Peninsula operation, II 

69 
SECRET 

Operation-continued 

BRIMSTONE--continned 

Deception of landing craft, 11 

Training, 5 

Burma, 13 

Admiral King's concept explained 

to Prime Minister, 28 

British can operate against regardless of Chinese, 89 

Continental, in 1943, 28 

HUSKY 

Agreement fallowing discussion, 48 

Calculations for, 44 

Date proposal objectionable to 

Admiral Xing, 43 

Discussion of mounting operation, 

46 

Target date suggested by Admiral 

Cooke, 14 

Xiska 

President's objection to British 

inrerest in, r9 

Southwest Paci.fic, Operations in 

the, 46 

Korway 

Bombing of airfields, 26 

Pacific 

concept for 1943, 23 

Prime Ministerfs objection to operation, 28 

Shipping, 40 

RAVENOUS 

Chinese reluctance to begin, 24, 65 

Prime Xinister's agreement, -28 

Prospects for success, 56 

Purpose of, 28 

Relation to ANPXIM, 23 

ROUNDUP 

nate feasible, 61 

Forces needed, 1s 

Sicilian 

Date for, 59 

Hechanics and key to, 16 

SLEXFXA?fMER 

British will undertake, 61 

TORCI3 

Available troops following 

completion, 18 

united Kingdom, in and from the, 13 

Operations 

Continental and HUSKY combined, 5s 

Landing barges for, 59 

Japan, Against, 56 

Sardinian, Advantagesofsuccess, 60 

Tunisia, In, $9 

INDEX 

P 

Pacific 

Allocation for shipping, 40 

British recognizance of necessary 

Allied action, 65 

Concept for 1943, 13 

Prime Xinisterls objection to 

operation, 28 

Peace table, Domination of, 21 

Possession of Tripoli by British, 6 

President, The 

ktion required prior to departure, 

34 

Memorandum for, Jnnex ".4" to 3.C S. 

55th Meeting Minutes, 32 

Ob jecti.on. to British interest 

U S strategi~rtheater, 2g 

Report to, and Prime Minister, 

Visit( 2 

Visit of General K-ogurs air6 

Sultan of Morocco with, 52 

President's Program, The, 52 

Prime Minister's 

iigreement to Operations ANAXIM 

RAVENOTIS, 28 

io 

4~ 

the 

and 

Objection to Pacific operation, 28 

Report to President and, 49 

Priority bombing program, IY 

Protection available at Anfa Camp, 53 

RAVFNOUS, Operation 

Brztish attitude concerning, 55 

Chinese reluctance to begin, 2h1 65 

Effect on AhuKLM, 23 

Inttiation of, 24 

Prime Minister's agreement, 28 

Prospects of Success, 56 

Purpose of, 28 

Report to the President and Prime 

Minister, 49 

Resources tu be furnished following 

mounting IIUSKY, 48 

Robert, Admiral, Message regarding 

ships from Laval, 64 

ROWDUP, Operation 

Feasible date for, 61 

Forces needed for, 15 

Russia 

Aj.d to 

Continental landing, 18 

Coordination of, 26 

Opposition of Joint Chiefsof Staff 

to shipping via Murmansk, 34 

70 
SECRET 

Russia-continued 

Aid to--continued 

Pacific plan, zo 

Rejection of U. S. and British personnel, 25, 63 

Supply to, 63 

S 

Sardinia 

Advantages of capture, 60 

Mounting and operation against, 5 

Operation favored over Sicily, 29 

Sfax, British drive on, canceled, 64 

Shipping capabilities for BOLERO 

build-up, 48 

Shipping for operations in Pacific, 40 

Sicily 

Date for operations against, 59 

Means of reducing fortifica,tians, 26 

One of purposes of capture, 19 

Strength in, 26 

Situation in the air at Algiers and 

Bone, 4 

SLEDGEF'P?!MER, Operation 

British to undertake, 61 

Somervell, General B. R 

Pid to Russia discussed hy--C.C,,S,. 

162, 39 

Ontiine of mechanics of Sicilian 

operation, 16 

Southwest Pacific, Operations in, 46 

Spain, German threat to, 6 

Stalin rejects U. S. and British 

personnel, 25 

Strategic policies, General, 17 

Submarines 

Bombing of, 28 

Indian Ocean, In, 10 

1J. S. loan of six, 10 

Sultan of Morocco, Visit with the 

President, 52 

Summarizing of general strategic 

plan for 1943 by Admiral King, 39 

Supplies to General Stilwell, 29 

Supply situation 

Civilian, 64 

In North Africa, 64 

To Russia, 63 

Synthetic ruhher program, 28 

Effects on military programs including high octane gas and plane 

production, 36 

Material allotment recommended by 

Mr. Nelson, 35 

INDEX 

T 

Tanks of British to French, 64 

Telegram to Byrnes, Washington, 36 

Theater, European 

Decisions reached at discussion of 

command set-up in, 12 

TORCH, Operation, Available troops 

following completion of, 18 

Training 

In North Africa for landings, 53 

Of French pilots, 44 

Transport planes for China, 62 

Tripoli, British possession of, 6 

Troops 

Movement of, 12 

North Africa, formaintaining, Sr 19 

To General Stilwell, 29 

To United Kingdom, 11, 60 

Truck assembly plant, 63 

Tnnisia 

Expelling the Germans from, 4 

Operations in, 57 

Turkey 

Aid to, 55 

British 8th Army Force for, 54 

Lend-.-Lease situation with respect 

to, 38 

Passive belligerency, 34 

U S representative to accompany 

Prime Minister to Turkey proposed, 

38 

U 

United Kingdom, Operations in and 

from the, 11 

v 

VisitofGeneral Nogoes andthe Sultan 

of Morocco with the President, 5% 

W 

West Africa, Command set-up asproposed by Admiral King for, 33 

71