### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Brie fs A ugus t 11 , 200 4 WAY NE DA VID SON v. R ICKY BELL , WA RD EN
Direc t Appeal fromthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 03-C760 Barbara N . Haynes, Jud ge

No. M2003- 01128-CCA -R3-HC - F iled Septem ber 27, 2004
The pe ti ti o n e r , Wayn e D av id s o n , w a s c o n v ic te dinth e M e ig s Co u n ty Crimin a l C o u rt o f

s e c o nd deg ree burg lary

. Upon being found by a jury to be an habitual criminal, the petitioner wa s sentence d to life imprisonment. Subsequently , the petitioner filed in the Davidson County Circuit Court a pro se petition for writ of habea s corpus, alleg ing that the statutes under which he re ceive d a life se ntence wereun c on sti tution a l. T hetrial c ou rt su mma ri ly dis mis se d th e peti tio n, andthepe tition e r time ly appealed. Upon re view of therec ord and theparties’ briefs, we af fi rm the judg ment of the trial c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of theCi r c uit

Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.
N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., joined. Wayne Davidson, Nashville, Tenne ssee, pr o se. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; H elena Walton Ya rbroug h, Assistant Attorney General; and V ictor S. (Torry ) Johns on, III , Di s t ri ct At t orney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound On May 2, 1985, the petit ioner was convicted in the M eig s County Criminal Court of second deg reeburg lary . Upon being found by a jury to be an habitual c riminal, the petitioner wa s sentence d to life imprisonment. This court aff irmed the c onviction and sentenc e on dire ct appe al. State v. Wayne Da v i d s o n , No . 13, 1987 WL 14282 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, J uly 21, 1987). The petitioner subseque ntly

f ile d a petition for post-c onviction relief in the Me igs County Criminal Court and thre e petitions for ha beas c orpus re lief in the Morg an County and RoaneCountyC ri m i nal Courts. This c ourt g rante d relief , in part, pursuant to the petition for post-conviction re lief. WayneT h e pet i t i on er i s c u r r en t l y i n ca r ce r at ed a t t h e Ri v er ben d M ax i mu m Se cu r i t y Pr i s on i n N as h v i l l e; t h er ef or e, by 1 f i l i n g t h e i nst ant p et i t i on i n t h e D av i ds on Coun t y Ci r cu i t Cour t , t h e pet i t i on er c ompl i ed wi t h t h e r equ i r eme n t s of T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 29- 21

- 10 5 (2000 ) , whi ch provi des t hat a pet i t i on for w r i t of ha beas cor pus be f

i l ed in th e c o u rt “m o st c o n v e n ie n t i n p o int o f d istan c e to the a p p lica n t .

. . .” -2- K. Davidson v. State, No. 20, 1989 WL 9628 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J an. 20, 1989). The petitions were otherwise de nied. I d.; Wayne Davidson v. Mill s, No. 03C01-9110-CR-00338, 1992 WL 141807 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J une 25, 1992); Wayne Davidson v. St ate, No. 03C01- 9512-CC-00405, 1997 WL 167215 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Apr. 10, 1 9 9 7 ); W ayne Davidson v. J ones, No. 03C01-9708-CR-00373, 1999 WL 274958 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, May 4, 1999). On M arc h 14, 2003, the petit ioner, a cting pro se, f iled in the Davidson County Circuit Court a fourth p et i t i o n for writ of habea s corpus. The pe titioner arg ued that the Criminal Sentencing 1 Reform Ac t of 1982 and the ha bitual criminal statute under w hich he wa s sentence d to life imprisonment wereunconstitutional as applied to him. The trial court de nied the petition without a he ari ng . T hepe tition e r n ow app e a ls thede nial of his pe titionfo r w ri t of

ha be a s c or pu s. II. Ana lys is When review ing a

peti tion for habe as cor

pus relief , the determination of whether relief sh ou ld b e g rante d is a

qu e sti onof

la w s ub je c t to deno vo re vie w w ith no pre su mptionof c or re c tne ss. McL aney v. Be ll, 59 S.W .3d 90, 92 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Hart v. State, 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)). The burden is on the pe titioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of

the evidenc e that he is entitled to relief. Wy att v. State, 24 S.W .3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000)

. Article I , section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guar antee s the rig ht to seek habe as cor pus relief. However, Tennessee law provides narr ow grounds upon which such relief may be g rante d. McL an ey , 5 9 S

. W

. 3 d at 92. In Tenne ssee, ha beas c orpus re lief may

be soug ht only

when the judgme nt is void, not mere ly voidable. Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W .3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000)

. In other wor ds, habea s corpus re lief will be g rante d “only when it appea

rs upon the fa ce of

the judgme nt or the record of the proceeding s upon which the judgme nt is rendered that a c ourt lacke d jurisdiction or

authority to sentencea def

endant or that the sentenc e has e x pired.” I d. (citing Arc her v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) ); see also State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000). A trial court may summarily dismiss a petition for writ of habea s corpus without a he aring or the a ppointment of counsel if the pe titioner fails to show that he is entitled to relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109 ( 2000); see also McL aney , 59 S.W .3d at 93. On appe al, the petitioner a rg ues that the Criminal Sentenc ing Re form Ac t of 1982 and the habitual criminal statute, as applied in t he ins tant case , violated hi s rig ht to equal protec tion under the Tenne ssee and United States Constit utions. S ee T enn. Code Ann. §§ 39-1-801, et seq. (1982) (repeale d 1989), 40-35- 101, et seq. (1982) . Specifically , the petition er asserts that the prior c on vic tio ns up onwhich hi s c la ssi fi c atio n a s an h abitual c ri min a l w a s b a se d c ou ld h a vea lsoT en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 39- 1- 801 ( 1982) ( r epe al ed 1989) pr ov i ded, 2
Any pe r s on w h o h as e i t h er be en t h r ee ( 3) t i m es co nv i ct ed wi t h i n t h i s s t at e of

fel on i es , n ot l es s t h an t wo ( 2) of w h i ch a r e amon g t h os e s pec i f i ed i n §§ 39- 2- 103, 39- 605 [ r epe al ed] , 39- 2- 111, 39- 2- 112, 39- 2- 640, 39- 6- 417( a) ( 1) ( A), 40- 20- 112 o r w e re fo r a c rim e p u n ish a b le b y d e a th u n d e r e x isting law , b u t fo r w h ic h the d e a th penal t y was not i nf

l i ct ed, or who has been t hr ee ( 3) t i mes convi ct ed un der t he l aws o f any other s t at e, gove rnme nt or co unt ry of cri m es, no t les s t han t wo (2) of whi ch, if the y ha d b e e n c o m m itt e d in th is s ta te , w o u ld ha v e b e e n a m o n g tho se [p re v io u sly] s pec i f i ed

. . . s h al l be con s i der ed, f or t h e pu r pos es of t h i s par t , an d i s dec l ar ed t o be a n ha b itua l cr im ina l .

. . . T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 40- 35

- 10 6(a) ( 19 82 ) provi ded t hat a per s i s t ent offender i s a def endan t wh o has r ec ei v ed: (1 ) T w o (2 ) o r m o re p rio r fe lo n y c o n v ic tio n s fo r o ffe n se s c o m m itt e d w ithin f i ve (5) y ear s i m m ed i at el y prece d i ng t he co m m i ss i o n of t he i nst ant of fen s e; or (2 ) F o u r (4 ) o r m o re p rio r felo n y c o n v ic tio n s fo r o ff e n se s c o m m itt e d w ithin t en (10 ) y ears i m m ed i at el y prece d i ng t he co m m issi o n of t he i nst ant offens e.
O n a p p e a l, th e p e ti ti o n e r a ls o a rg u e s tha t t h e m o tio n to d ism iss fil e d b y the S ta te in the trial c o u rt faile d to 3 compl y w i t h t h e r equ i r eme n t s of Rul e 7. 02( 1) of

t h e T en n es s ee Rul es of Ci v i l Pr oce du r e, w h i ch pr ov i des t h at a mot i on

“ s h al l s t at e wi t h pa r t i cu l ar i t y t h e g r ou n ds t h er ef or , an d s h al l s et for t h t h e r el i ef or or der s ou g h t

. ” T h e pet i t i on er c on t en ds t hat t he St at e’ s mo t i on t o di s mi s s cont ai ned not hi ng mo r e t han concl us ory s t at ement s t hat t he pet i t i oner ’ s s ent enc e h ad no t y et exp i red and t hat t he jud g m ent was not void o n i t s face. H o wever, t hese s t at em ent s, i f t rue, wo ul d s up p o rt t he di s mi s s al of

a pet i t i on for wr i t o f

habeas co r pus . A ccor di ng l y , we concl ude t hat t he St at e’ s mo t i on t o di s mi s s comp l i ed wi t h R ul e 7

. 0 2 (1). -3- sup p o rte da

c la s s if ic ati o na s a

p e r s is te n t o f

f e n d e r . T h e p e ti ti o n e r

c o n te n d s th at, a s a

p e r s istent 2 offe nder, hewould have rece ived a maximum s enten ce o f fifte en y ear s as opposed to the life se nte nc e here c e ive d a s an h abitual c ri min a l. He a rg ue s th at th e rewa s “ no su bs tanti a l r e latio n to public welfa

re w hich re quired [him] . . . to be g iven a life sentenc e.” He further arg ues that he wa s simil arly situated to other def

endants who w erese n ten c e d as per sistent offenders under the 1982 law. The petiti oner claims that the s entenc ing statutes allowed for t he selective and arbitra ry application by the State. The petitioner also claims that the Criminal Sentenc ing Reform Act of 1982 repeale d by implication the habitual criminal statute, thereby depriving the trial court of the authority to enter judgme nt ag ainst the petitioner. 3
We conclude that the petitioner’s c laims are w ithout merit. The courts of this state have repe atedly

held that the habitual c riminal statute did not violate the due process or e qual protec tion provisions o f t h e s t ate or federal c onstitut ions, nor did its i mpositi on result in crue l and unusual punishment. Glasscock v. State, 570 S.W .2d 354, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978); see also St ate v. Rus se ll, 86 6 S. W.2 d 5 78 , 5 80 -8 1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 91 ). Mo re over, th is c ou rt ha s p re vio us ly ob se rv e d th at “ thefa c t th at th e [ha bitual c ri min a l] statut e a llows pr os e c uto ri a l se le c tiv ity in i ts applications create s no constitutional infring ement.” State v. J ackson, 697 S.W .2d 366, 373 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. 19 85 ) ( c iti ng Jano w v. State , 56 7 S.W. 2d 48 3 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 78 )) ; se e a lso Ma rs h-4-

v. State, 561 S.W .2d 767, 771 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977). Reg arding the petit ioner’s claim that the Criminal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1982 repe aled by implication the habitual criminal statute, we note that the 1982 Act expressly provided that “ [n] othing herein shall prohibit the oper ation of the habitual criminal act, provided that if the defe ndant is acquitted of be ing an habitual criminal, the court shall conduc t a sentenc ing he aring on the underlying felony as provided in this chapter.” Tenn. Code An n . § 40-35-203( d) (1982) . Be causethe petitioner ha s failed to demonstrate that he wa s e nti tle d to ha

be a s c or pu s r e lie f, wec on c lude th at th e trial c ou rt c ommitt e d n o e rr or

in s umm ari ly dismiss ing his pe tition. III. Conclusi on Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

irm th e jud g me nt o f thetrial c ou rt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE