UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-1047

MIRIAM GRICE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND; FRED HOMAN, Individually and in 

his official capacity; SUZANNE BERGER, Individually and in 

her official capacity, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. 

(1:07-cv-01701-JFM) 

Argued: October 28, 2009 Decided: December 3, 2009 

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and AGEE, Circuit 

Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Kathleen Mary Cahill, LAW OFFICES OF KATHLEEN CAHILL, 

Towson, Maryland, for Appellant. Jeffrey Grant Cook, BALTIMORE 

COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. ON 

BRIEF: John E. Beverungen, County Attorney, BALTIMORE COUNTY 

OFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

I. FACTS 

 The appellant, Miriam Grice, worked as a claims manager for 

Baltimore County, Maryland (“the County”) from March 1998 until 

August 2005, when her position was converted from a part-time 

classification to one within the County’s merit system. During 

the relevant timeframe, co-defendant Fred Homan was a senior 

administrator with the County and co-defendant Suzanne Berger 

was employed as an attorney with the County. Before 

transitioning to the County’s merit system in 2005, Grice held 

the title of “Claims Manager” and was responsible for handling 

workers’ compensation claims for the County. 

 As required during the transition to the merit system, the 

County reclassified and “posted” the job of Claims Manager for 

competitive application.1 Co-defendants Homan and Berger, along 

with the County’s Insurance Administrator, Bob Behler, 

interviewed the candidates.2 Despite Grice’s rating by the 

County’s human resources department as the best qualified 

applicant prior to the candidates’ interviews, she was not 

 1

 To avoid confusion due to the pre- and post-merit system 

job titles of “Claims Manager,” we will refer to the merit 

system position as that of “Claims Manager” and to Grice’s 

former job as her “former position.” 

2

 The County’s procedure in hiring for a “posted” position 

was to interview the top three candidates. 

2 
hired. Instead, the County hired Kent Underwood, a male who had 

no prior experience handling government claims but who had 

twenty-three years as claims manager and assistant vicepresident at a large private insurer. 

 Grice was appointed Assistant Claims Manager, in which she 

remained the supervisor of workers’ compensation claims for the 

County and reported to Underwood. Grice viewed this position as 

a demotion because the salary was less than her salary prior to 

the transition to the merit system.3 Her salary was, however, 

the highest allowed for her pay grade under the legislatively 

enacted pay scale applicable to the merit system and, unlike her 

former position, had additional benefits including a property 

interest in her employment. 

 A month after taking the job as Assistant Claims Manager 

Grice complained to the County Executive that she had been the 

 3

 The County contends that the Claims Manager position under 

the merit system was, in fact, Behler’s former job (previously 

titled Insurance Administrator) which supervised not only 

workers’ compensation claims but also all the general liability 

claims involving the County. As such, the County insists the 

Claims Manager position would have been a promotion for Grice. 

Grice insists the Claims Manager position was, in fact, her 

“old” position supervising the unit handling worker’s 

compensation claims. We do not consider this factual dispute 

important, however, because if the County unlawfully 

discriminated against Grice in the selection process, it is 

immaterial whether the job was the same or would have been a 

promotion. Nonetheless, the County’s position appears to be 

correct. 

3 
victim of sex discrimination due to Underwood’s selection for 

the Claims Manager position. She also filed a complaint with 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. As a result of the 

charges, Homan removed himself as Grice’s supervisor and 

appointed another employee, Keith Dorsey, to supervise Grice. 

In response to a complaint from a co-worker that Grice had been 

harassing her for information about Underwood, Dorsey placed 

Grice on paid leave pending the outcome of an investigation. 

Grice was subsequently issued a written reprimand. As a result, 

Grice amended her EEOC charge to allege a claim of retaliation. 

 On June 13, 2007, Grice was called to a meeting with Dorsey 

and Mary Ellen Niles, who had replaced Underwood as Claims 

Manager (and thus became Grice’s supervisor). When Grice 

arrived she saw disciplinary papers on the desk and immediately 

asked that her lawyer be present for the meeting, as Dorsey had 

previously allowed.4 Dorsey acquiesced to this demand but 

directed Grice to take the disciplinary papers with her for 

review in preparation for the meeting — an order Grice refused. 

For disobeying his order to take the papers, Dorsey suspended 

 4

 The papers included “Supervisor’s Notes on Oral 

Counseling” and a Written Reprimand which documented various 

incidents of sanctionable behavior by Grice between May 22, 2007 

and June 13, 2007. 

4 
Grice and, the next day, terminated her employment for 

insubordination.5

 Two weeks after her discharge Grice filed an Amended 

Complaint in the United States District Court for the District 

of Maryland asserting claims against the County, Homan and 

Berger.6 Count One of Grice’s Amended Complaint asserts claims 

against Homan and Berger, individually and in their official 

capacities, for violation of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Grice contends that Homan and 

Berger violated her civil rights by unlawfully discriminating 

against her based on gender when they did not select her for the 

Claims Manager position. Count Two asserts a claim against the 

County for unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII. 

Grice’s Title VII claims are based on allegations that the 

County discriminated against her by (a) hiring a less qualified 

male, Underwood, as Claims Manager (“non-selection claim”), (b) 

demoting her to Assistant Claims Manager (“demotion claim”), (c) 

retaliating against her by imposing a suspension based upon her 

 5

 At oral argument, Grice confirmed that no dispute exists 

as to this sequence of events at the June meeting. 

6

 Grice originally filed suit on June 27, 2007, but the suit 

was dismissed because she failed to exhaust her administrative 

remedies. Grice subsequently exhausted her administrative 

remedies and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on April 28, 

2008. 

5 
co-worker’s complaints (“retaliation claim”), and (d) by 

terminating her on June 13, 2007 (“discharge claim”). 

 The district court granted summary judgment to Homan, 

Berger and the County on all claims. Specifically, the district 

court found Grice’s non-selection claim under Title VII was 

time-barred based on her failure to file an administrative 

charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged violation.7 

The district court then determined that even if the claim had 

not been time-barred, “the Defendants would still be entitled to 

summary judgment on this claim as well as on Grice’s timely 

filed demotion, suspension, discharge and retaliation claims . . 

. . ” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 748. 

 Grice appeals the district court’s judgment in some, but 

not all, respects. She does not challenge the district court’s 

finding that her non-selection claim under Title VII was timebarred. Nonetheless, Grice asserts the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment on her claims against Homan and Berger 

arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth 

below, we disagree and affirm the district court. 

 7

 Grice learned she had not been selected for the Claims 

Manager position on October 13, 2005 but did not file a claim 

with the EEOC until 349 days later, September 27, 2006. J.A. 

746. 

6 
 As an initial matter we note that Grice’s two “Issues 

Presented for Review” as set forth in her opening brief 

challenge only the non-selection and discharge claims. Although 

the arguments in Grice’s opening brief tend to overlap in 

various respects, her failure to address the demotion and 

retaliation claims results in the abandonment of those claims on 

appeal. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 

(4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he argument . . . must contain . . . 

‘appellant's contentions and the reasons for them, with 

citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which 

the appellant relies.’”) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A)). 

The “[f]ailure to comply with the specific dictates of [Rule 28] 

with respect to a particular claim triggers abandonment of that 

claim on appeal.” Id. Indeed, Grice confirms in her reply 

brief that “[t]here are two issues on this appeal – whether 

summary judgment was properly granted on [her] claims (1) that 

she was denied the Claims Manager position in September 2005 

because of sex discrimination, and (2) that she was fired in 

June 2007 because of retaliation for alleging bias in the Claims 

Manager selection.” Reply Br. at 1. 

 Accordingly, we address only the non-selection and 

discharge claims. 

7 
II. 

 A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de

novo.” Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 1998) 

(citing Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th 

Cir. 1995)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party, demonstrates there are no genuine issues as to any 

material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Id. (citing United States v. Leak, 123 F.3d 

787, 794 (4th Cir. 1997)). The elements of a prima facie case 

under Title VII are the same under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gairola v. 

Commw. of Va. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th 

Cir. 1985). 

 Although at the time she filed her Amended Complaint Grice 

apparently believed that Berger had been involved in the 

decision not to hire her, she admitted during oral argument that 

subsequent evidence shows “there is not evidence that Ms. Berger 

had a role in the sex discrimination and retaliation claim.”8 As 

such, the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of 

Berger was correct. See Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 

 8

 On brief and in oral argument Grice refers to the nonselection claim as the sex discrimination claim and categorizes 

the demotion, suspension and discharge claims as retaliation 

claims. 

8 
F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2007) (employer put forth evidence that 

its decisionmaker fired employee for non-discriminatory reason); 

Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(“Any discriminatory statements must come from decisionmakers to 

constitute evidence of discrimination.”). Thus, the only 

question is whether the district court properly granted summary 

judgment as to Homan on Grice’s non-selection and discharge 

claims. 

A. Grice’s Non-Selection Claim 

 Lacking direct evidence of discrimination, the district 

court assumed without deciding that Grice had made out a prima

facie case under the burden-shifting framework set forth in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which 

required Grice to prove that she (1) was a member of a protected 

class, (2) had suffered an adverse employment action, (3) had 

maintained a satisfactory job performance, and (4) that a 

similarly-situated employee outside the protected class received 

more favorable treatment. White v. BFI Waste Services, LLC, 375 

F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 

411 at 802). Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework the 

district court then found, and the record clearly supports, that 

the County had articulated “legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason[s] for the decision: namely that while both Grice and 

Underwood were strong applicants on paper, Underwood had a much 

9 
better interview; his experience was better suited for the 

position; and he did not have a history of problematic employee 

relations as did Grice.” J.A. 749-50. 

 To rebut the County’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons 

for hiring Underwood, Grice argues that Behler, Homan and Berger 

(the panelists who conducted her interview) were biased against 

her and that their “motivation was discriminatory.” Br. of 

Appellant at 23. However, as the district court found, Grice 

“does not provide any evidence that the bias was based on her 

gender.” J.A. 750. 

 In her Amended Complaint Grice asserts that in 1999 she 

became aware that Behler may have been romantically involved 

with another employee. According to Grice, she reported this 

allegation to Homan who “rebuked [her] for the manner in which 

she had handled the matter, and threatened to abolish her job.” 

J.A. 12. According to Grice, Homan removed Behler as her direct 

supervisor until 2004. When Behler resumed his supervision of 

Grice, she alleges that he “treated [her] disfavorably on 

account of her role in reporting his alleged sexual misconduct.” 

J.A. 12. 

 Grice further asserts in her Amended Complaint that “Homan 

and Berger also had significant bias against [her], rendering it 

impossible for them to fairly consider plaintiffs’ superior 

qualifications for the position.” J.A. 12. However, according 

10 
to Grice, this bias arose because “[j]ust months before the 

selection panel convened . . . [Grice] accidentally interrupted 

[Homan and Berger] in an awkward scene after work hours . . . .” 

J.A. 12. According to Grice, it was “from that point on [that 

Homan and Berger] launched a campaign to get rid of [her].” 

J.A. 13. 

 The general rule is that “a party is bound by the 

admissions of his pleadings.” Best Canvas Products & 

Supplies v. Ploof Truck Lines, 713 F.2d 618, 621 (11th 

Cir. 1983). See also Action Manufacturing, Inc. v. 

Fairhaven Textile Corp., 790 F.2d 164, 165 (1st Cir. 

1986); PPX Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 

746 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Brown v. Tennessee 

Gas Pipeline Co., 623 F.2d 450, 454 (6th Cir. 1980) 

(“under federal law, stipulation and admissions in the 

pleadings are generally binding on the parties and the 

Court.”); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. 

Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 1968) (“. . . 

judicial admissions are binding for the purpose of the 

case in which the admissions are made including 

appeals.”). 

Lucas v. Burnley, 879 F.2d 1240, 1242 (4th Cir. 1989). Grice’s 

allegations establish that any bias on the part of Behler, Homan 

and Berger resulted from her discovery of their allegedly 

inappropriate activities at work. Grice has provided no 

evidence that Homan’s animus towards her, if any, was based on 

gender. In short, the record does not show that the County’s 

explanation for hiring Underwood is a mere pretext for gender 

discrimination. As the district court stated, “[a] showing of 

bias is not sufficient to prove that an employer has violated 

11 
Title VII [or § 1983] unless the bias is based on the 

plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.” J.A. 750-51. 

 For the foregoing reasons the district court did not err in 

finding that Grice failed to establish pretext for the 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for selecting Underwood. 

See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-

53 (1981); Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 

234-35 (4th Cir. 1991). The district court did not err in 

granting summary judgment to the defendants on Grice’s nonselection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

B. Grice’s Discharge Claim 

 The County has not disputed, either in this Court or below, 

that it was aware of Grice’s EEOC claim (and subsequent 

amendments) or that filing the claim constituted protected 

activity. In addition, the district court determined that Grice 

had “alleged sufficient evidence of retaliatory animus . . . to 

meet the minimal burden required . . . .” J.A. 757. Despite 

its finding that Grice had made a prima facie case of 

discrimination, the district court granted summary judgment on 

the discharge claim because, as with her non-selection claim, 

Grice failed to provide a preponderance of evidence that the 

County’s reasons for her discharge were pretextual. For the 

reasons that follow, we agree with the district court. 

12 
 The district court found the County had “consistently 

stated that the reason for termination was Grice’s 

insubordination in refusing to meet with Dorsey and Niles 

without her attorney present and her refusal to take from Dorsey 

the materials to be discussed at the meeting.” J.A. 758. 

Though Grice argued the County had “ever-shifting reasons” for 

firing her, which indicated pretext, the district court 

correctly concluded that the “minor discrepancies” she cited 

were not evidence of pretext. J.A. 757-58. See Holland v. 

Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2007) 

(“‘Once an employer has provided a non-discriminatory 

explanation for its decision, the plaintiff cannot seek to 

expose that rationale as pretextual by focusing on minor 

discrepancies that do not cast doubt on the explanation's 

validity, or by raising points that are wholly irrelevant to 

it.’”) (quoting Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311, 315 

(4th Cir. 2006)). 

 Grice’s Notice of Dismissal states that her “refusal to 

meet with her supervisor . . . as well[] as the refusal to take 

a copy of the items to be discussed in the meeting constitutes 

an act of insubordination.” J.A. 437 (emphasis added). During 

his deposition Dorsey confirmed that after asking Grice to 

attend the meeting several times he acceded to her demands to 

have her attorney present. J.A. 585-86. Grice contends that 

13 
this admission by Dorsey “should have been dispositive of 

summary judgment, because the Appellants did not assert that 

Grice would have [been] fired simply – and solely – because she 

did not take the materials.” Br. of Appellant at 29. Once it 

became clear that Grice was not going to attend the meeting 

without her attorney, we fail to see how Dorsey’s acquiescence 

to a postponement is material in light of her undisputed refusal 

to take the papers as instructed. According to the County’s 

rules, an employee can be “dismissed for cause if she fail[s] to 

obey any lawful and reasonable direction given by [her] 

supervisor.” J.A. 757 (internal quotation marks omitted). Her 

failure to take the documents as directed clearly supports the 

County’s finding of insubordination while Dorsey’s acquiescence, 

under these factual circumstances, does nothing to prove the 

County’s rationale for discharging her was a mere pretext for 

sex discrimination. 

 Aside from her failure to come forward with evidence 

undermining the County’s legitimate reasons for her termination, 

Grice’s discharge claim fails for another reason. As with her 

non-selection claim, her own pleadings and testimony prove 

fatal. Grice asserts in her Amended Complaint that she 

was treated less favorably than other employees . . . 

by defendant Homan because defendants Homan and Berger 

were involved in a close personal relationship . . . 

was treated adversely by defendant Homan in 

retaliation for reporting [Behler’s] alleged 

14 
involvement with a female subordinate . . . and . . . 

was removed from her position . . . by defendants 

Homan and Berger because she discovered their afterhours conduct at a time when their close personal 

relationship was a tremendously sensitive issue in 

county government. 

J.A. 14. Grice is bound by her own allegations. See Lucas, 

supra. 

 In addition to the allegations contained in her pleadings, 

Grice testified that she “firmly believe[d]” her firing went 

“back to April of 2005 when [she] walked in on [Homan and 

Berger] after work” in a compromising position. S.J.A. 180-81. 

When asked why she thought Berger had discriminated against her, 

Grice stated that it was in Berger’s “best interest not to have 

[Grice] there because [she] walked in on Fred Homan and Suzanne 

Berger in a compromising position.” S.J.A. 208. Asked if she 

thought it would have been different “had a man walked in on 

them,” Grice testified that “it would have been the same if it 

had been anyone, but I also think the sequence of events 

afterward were [sic] handled differently with me because I was a 

woman rather than someone else if they had been male.” S.J.A. 

208 (emphasis added). 

 Grice’s belief, however, is insufficient to undermine the 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons put forth by the County, 

particularly in light of the fact that the parties do not 

dispute the sequence of events at the June 13, 2007 meeting. 

15 
See Williams, 871 F.2d at 456 (“[A] plaintiff's own assertions 

of discrimination in and of themselves are insufficient to 

counter substantial evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory 

reasons for an adverse employment action.”) (citing Gairola v. 

Comm. of Va. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1288 (4th Cir. 

1985)). 

 An examination of the record in this matter does not reveal 

evidence to support Grice’s contention that the County’s reason 

for her discharge served as a pretext for discrimination based 

on gender. Indeed, Grice’s own pleadings and evidence indicate 

that Homan’s motivation to retaliate arose, if at all, from an 

entirely nondiscriminatory motive (that Grice allegedly 

interrupted Homan during inappropriate workplace behavior). Any 

such motivation, however, does not support a claim of unlawful 

discrimination. “[W]hen an employer articulates a reason for 

discharging the plaintiff not forbidden by law, it is not our 

province to decide whether that reason was wise, fair, or even 

correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for the 

plaintiff's termination.” Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock 

Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 1997). 

 For the reasons set forth above, the district court did not 

err in granting summary judgment. 

16 
17 

III. 

 For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

AFFIRMED