This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1083 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Christopher Ral ph Magnuson, Appellant Filed May 31, 2016 Affirmed Worke, Judge Sherburne County District Court File No. 71-CR-13-685 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Timothy A. Sime, Assistant County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael W. Kunkel, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Schellhas, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N WORKE , Judge Appellant challenges his theft-by-check an d theft-by-swindle convictions, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the state to impeach appellant with2 prior convictions if he chose to testify beca use the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its capacity for unfa ir prejudice. We affirm. FACTS On March 18, 2013, appellant Christop her Ralph Magnuson ex ecuted a personal check in the amount of $36,934.63 for the purchase of a truck at Elk River Ford. Magnuson drove the vehicle off the lot. Magnuson’s check was not honored because the account was closed. Elk River Ford attempted to resolve the issue with Magnuson. Magnuson initially stated that he would call the bank and rec tify the situation. When he failed to do that, he stated th at he would send a cashier’s chec k. When he did not send a cashier’s check, Magnuson stated that his brother would deliver payment. That too did not happen. On April 1, Elk River Ford repossessed the vehicle. Magnuson was charged with felony theft by swindle and felony theft by check. The state moved to admit evidence of so me of Magnuson’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes, includi ng: (1) a 2006 th eft conviction, (2) a 2011 receivingstolen-property conviction, (3) a 2012 fifth-degree controlled-substance-crime conviction, (4) a 2014 theft-by-false-representation conviction, (5) a 2014 receivingstolen-property conviction, and (6) a 2015 issuance-of-a-dishonored-check conviction. The state also sought to offer di fferent instances of behavior as Spreigl evidence to prove intent, knowledge, absence of mistake or accident, or common scheme or plan. At Magnuson’s jury trial, after consid ering the admissibility of the proffered Spreigl evidence, the districtcourt instructed th e jury on how to us e the evidence it determined to be admissible:3 The State is about to introduce evidence of occurrences on July 6th of 2013 at . . . Anoka County . . . July 20th, 2013 at Anoka County, and August 13th, 2013 at Chisago County. This evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of assisting you in determining whether [Magnuson] committed those acts with which [Magnuson] is charged in the complain t. This evidence is not to be used as proof of the character of [Magnuson] or that [Magnuson] acted in conformity with such character. [Magnuson] is not being tried for and may not be c onvicted of any offenses other than the charged offenses. You are not to convict [Magnuson] on the basis of occurr ences on July 6th, July 20th, or August 13th of 2013 in Anoka County or Chisago [C]ount[y]. To do so might result in unjust double punishment. Following consideration of the admissibility of the six prior convictions for impeachment purposes, the district court stated: [H]aving done the Jones anal ysis . . . for purposes of impeachment only . . . I am not going to allow admission of the fifth degree controlled subs tance crime because I think it has limited impeachment value but a strong li kelihood of prejudice. I am going to allo w impeachment through the theft by [false] representation . . . .

. . . . Additionally, I’m allowing [a] receiving stolen property [conviction] . . . because I be lieve that it also has strong impeachment value. It’s di fferent enough to not likely confuse the jury, the time is obviously relevant, and I think it does speak to the issues at ha nd in [Magnuson’s] testimony. I’m also going to allow [the other receiving stolen property conviction]. I’m going to exclude the theft . . . both because of its age and because I don’ t know that it speaks to impeachment. And I’m not going to allow the issuance of a dishonored check, because I thin k it has a lot of potential to confuse the jury with the facts in this ca se and I don’t know that it has impeachment value.4 The district court determined that evidence of three of the six prior convictions was admissible for impeachment purposes—the th eft-by-false-representation conviction and the two receiving-stolen-property convictions. Magnuson waived his right to testify because he wa s subject to impeachment by his prior convictions. The jury found Mag nuson guilty of theft by swindle and theft by check. Based on the jury’s fi ndings that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Magnuson has five or more pr ior felony convictions and th at the current offense was committed as a part of a pattern of crimin al conduct, the district court sentenced Magnuson as a career offender to 120 months in prison. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N Magnuson argues that the district cour t abused its discretion by permitting the state to impeach him with the three prior felony convictions if he chose to testify. This court reviews the district court’s ruling on impeachment by prior conviction for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Ihnot , 575 N.W.2d 581, 58 4 (Minn. 1998). First, Magnuson argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a theft-by-false-representation conviction. The state may attack the credibility of a testifying de fendant by impeaching him with evidence of a prior conviction of an offense that “involved dishon esty or false statemen t.” Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). In his reply brief, Magnuson concedes that this conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes because it involved dishonesty or false statement. We generally accept a party’s concession when there is no fault in the district court’s analysis. State v.5 Werner , 725 N.W.2d 767, 770 n.1 (Minn. App. 2 007). Because Magnuson concedes that the district court could have appropriat ely admitted evidence ofthe theft-by-falserepresentation conviction, his argument is focuse d on the prejudicial impact of the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the two receiving-stolen-property convictions. The state may impeach a testifying defe ndant with evidence of a prior felony conviction if (1) no more than ten years have elapsed since the date of conviction or since the witness was released from confinement for that convictio n and (2) the district court determines that the probativ e value of admitting the eviden ce of conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1), (b); State v. Zornes , 831 N.W.2d 609, 626- 27 (Minn. 2013). To determine whether the probative value of Magnuson’s prior convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect, the district court applied a five-factor test, considering: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater the similarity, the grea ter the reason for not permitting use of the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.
See State v. Jones , 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978). Impeachment value of prior crime The district court found that the rece iving-stolen-propert y convictions have “strong impeachment value.” “[ A ] ny felony conviction is pr obative of a witness’s credibility, and the mere fact that a witness is a convicted felon holds impeachment value.” State v. Hill , 801 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 2011). The convictions have6 probative value because they enable the jury to see Magn uson as a “whole person” and better judge his credibility. See id. at 651 (quotation omitted). Magnuson admits that his prior convictions were relevant to his credibility, but asserts that the state pr esented the jury with Spreigl evidence relevant to his character for truthfulness. However, the district court instructed the jury that the Spreigl evidence, was “not to be used as proof of the character of [ Magnuson ] or that [Magnuson] acted in conformity with such character.” (Emphasis added.) This factor weighs in favor of admission. Date of conviction and defe ndant’s subsequent history The district court found that the time of the convictions “is obviously relevant.” Magnuson’s convictions are not stale because th ey occurred in 2011 and 2014, fewer than ten years before the current crime. See Minn. R. Evid. 609(b). Magnuson concedes that this factor weighs in favor of admission. Similarity of past crime with charged crime The district court found that the recei ving-stolen-property convictions were “different enough to not likely confuse the ju ry.” Generally, the more similar the prior conviction to the charged o ffense the greater the danger that the jury will use the evidence for substantive, rather than impeachment, purposes. State v. Lloyd , 345 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Minn. 1984). Magnuson asserts that “[t]ho ugh the crime of receiving stolen property does not necessarily involve the same acts of dishonesty inherent in a theft offense, it is nevertheless dependent upon and related to an unlawful taking of property that the7 defendant is later foun d to possess.” But in State v. Flemino , this court rejected a similar argument that a prior burglary conviction was similar to a robbery charge because “both involved entering a residence and committing a crime therein,” stating that the crimes were “not similar in name or fact.” 721 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. App. 2006). Here, when the district court considered the prior felonies offered by the state, it excluded the issuance-of-a-dis honored-check conviction because “it ha[d] a lot of potential to confuse the jury with the facts in this case.” Thus, the district court considered the similarity of a ll prior offenses to the current charges. And Magnuson cites no authority to support the position that r eceiving stolen property and theft by swindle and theft by check are similar offenses. This factor weighs in favor of admission, but even if it weighed against admission, it does not preclude admission. See State v. Hochstein , 623 N.W.2d 617, 624-25 (M inn. App. 2001) (stating th at this factor weighed against admission when prior crime was nearly identical to charged crime but affirming admission based on other factors). Importance of defendant’s testimony and centrality of credibility issue The fourth and fifth Jones factors are often considered together. State v. Swanson , 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006). “If cred ibility is a central i ssue in the case, the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions.” Id. Magnuson argues that his “testimony was essential to his defense” because it would have shown his subjecti ve intent in taking the truck—whether it satisfied the permanent-deprivation element. He claims that if he had te stified, the jury would have been able to determine whether he was being tr uthful about his intent. If the jury were to8 consider the truthfulness of his testimony, hi s credibility would be centrally important in this case, which weighs in favor of admission. In sum, the Jones factors weigh in favor of admission; therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that evid ence of Magnuson’s prior receiving-stolenproperty convictions was admiss ible for impeachment purposes. Magnuson asserts that he chose not to testif y because of the district court’s ruling on the admissibility of the im peachment evidence, which pr evented him from presenting a complete defense. But becau se the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the evidence admissible, the district court did not violat e Magnuson’s right to testify and present a complete defense. See State v. Gassler , 505 N.W.2d 62, 68 (Minn. 1993) (stating that “it is only when a [district] court has abused its discretion under Rule 609 . . . that a defendant’s right to testify may be infringed by the threat of impeachment evidence”). Affirmed.