IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Plum Borough, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 179 C.D. 2021

: SUBMITTED: October 18, 2021

Konstantinos Koromvokis and :

Zoning Hearing Board of the :

Borough of Plum :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge 

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 15, 2021

Appellant Plum Borough appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County’s (Common Pleas) February 4, 2021 order, which affirmed the 

Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Plum’s (Board)1July 21, 2020 decision to 

grant Appellee Konstantinos Koromvokis’ request for a dimensional variance. This 

variance retroactively authorized a freestanding garage built by Koromvokis in the 

front yard of his property, located at 140 Beech Road in the Borough (Property), 

which otherwise violated the setback requirements of the Borough’s Zoning 

Ordinance.2 After thorough consideration, we reverse.

1 Though the Board is listed as an appellee in the caption, it has declined to submit a brief 

to our Court.

2 Plum Borough Zoning Ordinance, Allegheny County, Pa., as amended (2017), available 

at https://www.plumboro.com/sites/g/files/vyhlif3686/f/pages/plum_zoning_ordinance.pdf (last 

visited November 12, 2021).
2

I. Background

On October 30, 2019, Heather Oravitz, the Borough’s building code official, 

sent Koromvokis a letter informing him that he had violated the Zoning Ordinance 

by failing to apply for and obtain a building permit for the garage, which 

Koromvokis had built without advance Borough approval. Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) at 90a. As constructed, the garage’s street-facing edge was a distance of 2.72 

feet from Beech Road. Borough’s Br. at 42 (Board’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions 

of Law & Decision); see R.R. at 94a, 109a-10a, 119a-31a (maps and photos of the 

Property showing the garage’s location). Oravitz directed Koromvokis to correct this 

issue by submitting a permit application to the Borough and he complied with her

request on December 27, 2019. R.R. at 90a, 92a. On January 2, 2020, Oravitz 

notified Koromvokis via letter that she had denied his application, explaining in 

relevant part that she could not issue the desired permit because the garage’s location 

violated the Zoning Ordinance’s bar against accessory structures and uses in the

front yards of lots without a 100-foot setback.3Id. at 96a.

In response, Koromvokis filed an application with the Board, through which 

he requested relief from this requirement in the form of a dimensional variance. Id.

at 105a-11a. Koromvokis included a letter to the Board with his application, in which 

he explained why he believed the variance he sought was justified and necessary. Id.

at 107a-08a. Of particular relevance to our disposition of this appeal, Koromvokis 

stated in this letter

that the grade from the street to the house is quite steep. 

The distance from the road to [the] house is approximately 

3 This requirement is found in Section 321(C)(1), which states: “Accessory structures and 

uses, with the exception of authorized signs and fences[,] shall not be located in the required front 

yard of any lot in any zoning district unless a 100[-]foot setback is provided from the required 

front setback line.” Zoning Ordinance § 321(C)(1).
3

50 feet[;] however to build anything on [the] hill [in the 

Property’s front yard] would mean installing a 15-20[-

]foot[-tall] retaining wall that would essentially be right in 

front of the house. Even if all of this was done, the garage 

would only be approximately 30-40 feet from the road, 

I’m sure you will agree this solution makes no sense for 

anybody.

Furthermore, due to the somewhat unique property lines 

([r]hombus shape), I could not put the garage on either the 

left or right side without crossing the property line. If it 

[was] behind the [house’s] deck, it would be on the

neighbor’s property. If it [was] to be in the rear, it would 

essentially be in a swamp and a significant distance from 

the house; the drive would also be right down the property 

line, which would not be practical or aesthetically

pleasing.

Regarding the hardship considerations, the current 

situation has been problematic due to the steep nature of 

the hill. For example:

• My mother once had to get taken away in an 

ambulance, which got stuck and had to be towed up 

the driveway (I have video).

• The next door neighbor has also towed me out on 

several occasions.

• I have a small child (going on 4) who obviously 

requires child care; I have had to miss several work 

days simply because the babysitter can’t get down 

the driveway[.]

• A pizza delivery man slid down the driveway, 

crashing into our shed/storage room[.]

• I have [a] brother who is severely mentally 

handicapped and requires constant supervision. He 

is shuffled between my house and my sister[’]s 

[home] on a daily basis (she lives right down the 

street). In the winter, this causes a real problem for 

him and he has fallen many times. Also, I worry for 

my 63[-]year[-]old sister who frequently has to 

escort him.

The above list details some of the issues we have 

encountered. My biggest concern moving forward is the 
4

risk of a winter storm coming overnight and we are stuck 

in the event of an emergency. The garage eliminates this 

as it sits on the top level [of the Property’s front yard hill], 

and the road is accessible.

Furthermore, I do want to point out that we have always 

parked our cars at the top of the drive. We simply put a 

shelter over the parking pad. We did this for the safety of 

my daughter, brother, sister, and me getting in and out of 

the cars. Furthermore, it provides some protection to our 

vehicle from the snow and salt. Many neighbors have 

commented on how nice the structure is. Please know that 

this is not some sort of dilapidated structure, I paid over 

[$]15,000 for the garage, concrete, and landscaping. As 

you will see in the enclosed pictures, the structure is of 

high quality, was professionally installed, and is very nice 

looking.

. . . .

In closing, I do want to point out that I meant no disrespect 

to the [B]orough, nor did I mean to disrespect the zoning 

rules. I hired a professional garage company [that] assured 

me no permit was needed so long as no one was living in 

the structure. However, I did check with the [B]orough and 

[it] advised that I needed the survey to get the permit. This 

created a problem in that we had a robbery, in which the 

safe deposit box [containing] the deed & survey were 

stolen (incident report on file with [the Borough] Police)[.]

At the same time, the contractor called me with basically 

minimal notice and advised if they couldn’t start [the 

following day], they couldn’t do [the work] until 

springtime and I had already paid a significant deposit, so 

I allowed them to assemble [the] structure. I do apologize 

for this. However, please know no disrespect was 

intended.

Id.

The Board then held a hearing regarding Koromvokis’ variance application 

on July 15, 2020.4 Koromvokis reiterated to the Board that the Property sloped 

4 A Borough official clarified at this hearing that the applicable front yard setback 

requirement was 30 feet, rather than 100 feet, because the Property was zoned SR-Single

(Footnote continued on next page...)
5

sharply downwards from Beech Road towards his house, which he said directed the 

flow of water down the Property’s driveway when it rained and often turned the area 

at the base of the driveway around the house’s storage room into a “swamp.” Board 

Hr’g Tr., 7/15/20, at 5, 7-8, 10, 15-18. According to Koromvokis, this made it very 

difficult for vehicles and people to successfully traverse the driveway, especially 

during the wintertime. Id. Koromvokis stated that this situation, coupled with the 

needs of his young daughter and his mentally disabled brother, rendered the garage’s 

current location the only feasible spot for it on the Property. Id. In addition, 

Koromvokis again maintained that the company he had hired to build the garage had 

initially told him that a government permit was unnecessary. Id. at 6-7. Upon 

learning that a permit was needed, he had intended to obtain it before commencing 

construction, only to be thwarted by the theft of critical paperwork and the 

construction company’s refusal to delay breaking ground. Id. at 6-7, 34-35.

Several other people also gave testimony to the Board. Linda Smith, 

Koromvokis’ next door neighbor, expressed her belief that the garage negatively 

impacted the “open . . . airy feeling” of the neighborhood and obstructed the view of 

both motorists and pedestrians on Beech Road. Id. at 21-24. David Soboslay, the 

Borough’s assistant manager, echoed Smith’s assertions and also stated that the 

garage’s location could interfere with the Borough’s ability to plow snow on the 

adjacent roadway. Id. at 25-29. Koromvokis disputed the validity of these aesthetic 

and public safety concerns, as did Emanuel Mamatas, a physician who cared for

Koromvokis’ brother; Kevin Miller, another of Koromvokis’ neighbors; and John 

Residential. See Board Hr’g Tr., 7/15/20, at 12; Zoning Ordinance § 309, Table 2. Thus, as the 

garage was located 2.72 feet from the front property line, Koromvokis was seeking a dimensional 

variance of 27.28 feet from the setback mandated by Section 309 of the Zoning Ordinance. See

Board Hr’g Tr., 7/15/20, at 3, 12; see R.R. at 116a (Board’s official public notice regarding July 

15, 2020 hearing).
6

Falcone, a Borough resident who lived farther down Beech Road. Id. at 33-34, 37-

41.

5 Mamatas also attested to the hazards posed by the Property’s topography, stating 

that it was necessary to have the garage in that location to ensure that Koromvokis’ 

brother could be transported elsewhere when he needed medical care, concerns that 

were shared by Maria Means, Koromvokis’ sister, who recounted her memories 

about the aforementioned incident in which a tow truck extricated an ambulance 

from the muck at the bottom of the Property’s driveway. Id. at 37, 41-42.

The Board unanimously voted to approve Koromvokis’ dimensional variance 

application at the end of the hearing, id. at 44-45, and formalized that vote through 

a written decision issued on July 21, 2020. Borough’s Br. at 42-44. The Borough 

then appealed the Board’s decision to Common Pleas, which took no additional 

evidence and affirmed the Board on February 4, 2021. This appeal to our Court 

followed.

II. Discussion

The Borough’s argument is, when distilled to its essence, that the Board 

abused its discretion by granting Koromvokis’ request for a dimensional variance. 

See Borough’s Br. at 25-35. We agree.

6

5

In addition, Oravitz briefly testified that she had previously dealt with Koromvokis in 

2019, when he had helped build a porch and deck at his sister’s house in the Borough without first 

obtaining any permits. Board Hr’g Tr., 7/15/20, at 30. Oravitz explained that, at that time, she had 

informed Koromvokis of the need for such permits before commencing with that project. Id. at 30-

31.

6

“Our standard of review, where [a court of common pleas] takes no additional evidence, 

is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, [whether] an error of law was 

committed[,] or whether necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence of 

record.” SSEN, Inc. v. Borough Council of Borough of Eddystone, 810 A.2d 200, 208 n.11 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2002). “By ‘substantial evidence’ we mean such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Valley View Civic Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of 

Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983) (citations omitted).
7

The Borough, through its Zoning Ordinance, has expressly adopted the 

variance test set forth in Section 910.2(a) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities 

Planning Code (MPC).7 See Zoning Ordinance § 1208(A). Under this provision of 

the MPC,

The [B]oard may grant a variance, provided that all of the 

following findings are made where relevant in a given 

case:

(1) That there are unique physical circumstances or 

conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or 

shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional 

topographical or other physical conditions peculiar 

to the particular property and that the unnecessary 

hardship is due to such conditions and not the 

circumstances or conditions generally created by 

the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the 

neighborhood or district in which the property is 

located.

(2) That because of such physical circumstances or 

conditions, there is no possibility that the property 

can be developed in strict conformity with the 

provisions of the zoning ordinance and that the 

authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to 

enable the reasonable use of the property.

(3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been 

created by the [applicant].

(4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the 

essential character of the neighborhood or district in 

which the property is located, nor substantially or 

permanently impair the appropriate use or 

development of adjacent property, nor be 

detrimental to the public welfare.

(5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent 

the minimum variance that will afford relief and 

will represent the least modification possible of the 

regulation in issue.

7 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 

1329, 53 P.S. § 10910.2(a).
8

53 P.S. § 10910.2(a).

We view this language through the lens of our well-established case law in 

this realm.

A variance . . . is issued by a zoning hearing board [and] 

is not provided for in the zoning ordinance, but [rather] is 

permission to deviate from the ordinance in either the 

dimensions of the improvements made to the land or in the 

use of the land. . . . Although zoning ordinances are to be 

liberally construed to allow for the broadest possible use 

of the land, the applicant seeking a variance bears a heavy 

burden. See Beers ex rel. P/O/A Beers v. Zoning Hearing 

Bd. of Towamensing Twp., 933 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2007) (the letter of the ordinance cannot be 

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit). . . .

The reasons for granting a variance must be substantial, 

serious, and compelling. Valley View . . . , 462 A.2d [at] 

640[.]

Nowicki v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of Monaca, 91 A.3d 287, 291 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014).

With regard to dimensional variances in particular, they “involve[] a request 

to adjust zoning regulations to use [ ] property in a manner consistent with [those] 

regulations,” in contrast to use variances, which “involve[] a request to use property 

in a manner that is wholly outside zoning regulations.” Tri-Cnty. Landfill, Inc. v. 

Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d 488, 520 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Dimensional 

variances consequently pose a lesser potential threat to the public interest, as they 

do not create the same degree of deviation from zoning regulations as their brethren. 

Bawa Muhaiyaddeen Fellowship v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 19 A.3d 36, 40 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). In keeping with this, “[t]he quantum of proof required to 

establish unnecessary hardship is indeed lesser when a dimensional variance, as 

opposed to a use variance, is sought.” Hertzberg v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City 

of Pittsburgh, 721 A.2d 43, 48 (Pa. 1998). “To justify the grant of a dimensional 
9

variance, courts may consider multiple factors, including the economic detriment to 

the applicant if the variance was denied, the financial hardship created by any work 

necessary to bring the building [or property] into strict compliance with the zoning 

requirements[,] and the characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood.” Id. at 48.

However, this does not mean that “dimensional requirements . . . [are] ‘freefire zones’ for which variances could be granted when the party seeking the variance 

merely articulated a reason that it would be financially ‘hurt’ if it could not do what 

it wanted to do with the property[.]” Soc’y Created to Reduce Urban Blight v. Zoning 

Bd. of Adjustment of City of Phila., 771 A.2d 874, 877 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).

“Although a property owner is not required to show that his or her property is 

valueless unless a variance is granted, mere economic hardship will not[, in and] of 

itself[,] justify a grant of a variance.” Marshall v. City of Phila., 97 A.3d 323, 330 

(Pa. 2014) (some punctuation omitted). Nor are “personal . . . considerations . . .

sufficient grounds upon which to base the grant of a variance.” Borough of Latrobe 

v. Sweeney, 331 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975). “A variance, whether labeled

dimensional or use, is appropriate ‘only where the property, not the person, is subject 

to hardship.’” Yeager v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of City of Allentown, 779 A.2d 595, 

598 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (quoting Szmigiel v. Kranker, 298 A.2d 629, 631 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1972)) (emphasis in original). The onus is thus on the applicant to firmly 

establish that “a substantial burden . . . attend[s] all dimensionally compliant uses of 

the property, not just the particular use [that the applicant has chosen].” Id. at 598 

(emphasis in original). Accordingly, our appellate courts have “consistently 

reject[ed] requests for dimensional variances where proof of hardship is lacking. 

Where no hardship is shown, or where the asserted hardship amounts to a 

landowner’s desire to [develop a property as they see fit], the unnecessary hardship 
10

criterion required to obtain a variance is not satisfied[.]” Soc’y Hill Civic Ass’n v. 

Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 42 A.3d 1178, 1187 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); accord

Singer v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 29 A.3d 144, 150 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); 

Yeager, 779 A.2d at 598.8

Here, Koromvokis’ own words fatally undermine the idea that he could not 

have built a garage on the Property without variance relief. As already noted, 

Koromvokis informed the Board prior to the variance application hearing that 

“build[ing] anything on [the] hill [in the Property’s front yard] would mean installing 

a 15-20[-]foot[-tall] retaining wall that would essentially be right in front of the 

house. Even if all of this was done, the garage would only be approximately 30-40 

feet from the road[.]” R.R. at 107a. This establishes that Koromvokis could have 

erected the garage at a different location than that which he ultimately chose, one 

which would have fully complied which the Zoning Ordinance’s 30-foot setback 

requirement without the need for a dimensional variance. Furthermore, there is no 

evidence in the record showing that Koromvokis would have suffered financial 

hardship through having to build the garage on this Zoning Ordinance-compliant 

spot. Thus, given the record before us, it is apparent that the challenge facing

Koromvokis here was not that he could not build the garage elsewhere; rather, it was

that he did not want to build it elsewhere, partly because he believed the location he 

8 Furthermore, we note that “[t]here is a strong policy against assisting landowners who 

violate a zoning ordinance, whether negligently or intentionally, long apparent in this Court’s 

jurisprudence.” Appletree Land Dev. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of York Twp., 834 A.2d 1214, 1218 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). “[A] landowner is duty bound to check the zoning status of real estate, and 

the failure to do so, which results in the lack of knowledge, cannot support the issuance of a 

variance[.] . . . One who undertakes to make use of real estate . . . without inquiring as to whether 

the use is permitted by the municipality’s zoning ordinance[] does so at his own peril.” Mucy v. 

Fallowfield Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Washington Cnty., 609 A.2d 591, 593-94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1992). In other words, the aphorism “it is better to ask for forgiveness than for permission” does 

not apply in the realm of zoning law.
11

had chosen better served his family’s needs, partly because he had already paid the 

construction company a deposit for the project, and partly because getting the proper 

permits from the Borough would have prevented the garage from being completed

within his desired timeframe. See R.R. at 107a-08a. Consequently, the Board abused 

its discretion by granting Koromvokis’ variance application, because its conclusion 

that Koromvokis could not build a garage on the Property in strict conformity with 

the Zoning Ordinance’s front yard setback requirements is not supported by 

substantial evidence.

9

III. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing analysis, we reverse Common Pleas’ February 4, 

2021 order, through which it affirmed the Board’s July 21, 2020 decision.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

9 Given our disposition of this matter, we need not determine whether Koromvokis’ 

application satisfied the other prongs of the variance test. We nevertheless note that the Board 

failed to make any factual findings regarding whether granting the dimensional variance would 

change the essential character of the area, substantially or permanently impair the use of nearby 

properties, or harm the public welfare. See Borough’s Br. at 42-44. Thus, in addition to failing the 

second prong of the variance test, it is unclear whether Koromvokis’ application met the 

requirements of the fourth prong.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Plum Borough, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 179 C.D. 2021

:

Konstantinos Koromvokis and :

Zoning Hearing Board of the :

Borough of Plum :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2021, the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County’s (Common Pleas) February 4, 2021 order, through which 

Common Pleas affirmed the Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Plum’s July 

21, 2020 decision to grant Appellee Konstantinos Koromvokis’ dimensional 

variance application, is REVERSED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge