FAA CONTINUES TO MAKE PROGRESS IN 

IMPLEMENTING ITS CONTROLLER 

WORKFORCE PLAN, BUT FURTHER 

EFFORTS ARE NEEDED IN SEVERAL KEY 

AREAS 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Report Number: AV-2007-032 

Date Issued: February 9, 2007 
i

U.S. Department of 

 Memorandum

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: ACTION: Report on Controller Staffing: FAA 

Continues To Make Progress in Implementing Its 

Controller Workforce Plan, but Further Efforts Are 

Needed in Several Key Areas 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Report Number AV-2007-032 

Date: February 9, 2007 

From: David A. Dobbs 

Principal Assistant Inspector General 

 for Auditing and Evaluation 

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-10 

To: Federal Aviation Administrator 

This report provides the results of our review of the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s (FAA) progress in implementing key elements of its Controller 

Workforce Plan. Our objectives were to (1) evaluate FAA’s progress in 

implementing key staffing and training elements of its Controller Workforce Plan 

and (2) assess the effectiveness of other initiatives designed to increase controller 

productivity. We conducted the review between June 2006 and December 2006, 

which included visiting the FAA Training Academy and 10 air traffic control 

facilities. Exhibit A contains details on our review scope and methodology. 

Exhibit B lists the facilities visited during the audit. 

BACKGROUND 

In response to concerns over an anticipated surge in air traffic controller attrition, 

FAA was directed by Congress in 2003 to prepare a detailed plan to ensure 

adequate staffing within the controller workforce. In December 2004, FAA issued 

the first in a planned series of annual reports outlining FAA’s plans for addressing 

that challenge. The report, entitled “A Plan for the Future: The Federal Aviation 

Administration’s 10-Year Strategy for the Air Traffic Controller Workforce,” (the 

2004 Plan) detailed FAA’s strategy for hiring approximately 12,500 new 

controllers to replace those expected to leave over the next 10 years. The 2004 

Plan also outlined various initiatives for increasing controller productivity and for 

decreasing on-the-job training (OJT) time and costs. 
ii

FAA issued the first installment of the mandated annual update to the Controller 

Workforce Plan on August 24, 2006 (the 2006 Update). The 2006 Update revised 

controller retirement projections and staffing requirements based on actual results 

and changes in air traffic forecasts since 2004. The 2006 Update also projected 

hiring approximately 11,850 controllers over the next 10 years. Additionally, 

FAA revised its retirement projection methodology from the 2004 Plan. 

In May 2005, we published a review1

 of FAA’s 2004 Plan. We found that the 

2004 Plan was a good first step in that it clearly laid out the magnitude of the 

controller retirement issue and established planned actions for meeting the 

challenge. However, we concluded that future reports to Congress would require 

greater detail in terms of FAA’s strategy for executing key elements of the plan, 

such as facility-by-facility staffing levels, the total estimated costs, and the 

Agency’s progress in meeting established milestones. FAA agreed with our 

recommendations and committed to addressing these concerns in its next update of 

the 2004 Plan. 

In June 2004, we reported2

 that FAA had an opportunity to improve the process of 

training and placing air traffic controllers, in light of pending retirements. For 

instance, we found that FAA provided minimal oversight of the OJT process at the 

national level. Even though OJT was the longest part of the training process, FAA 

had no national statistics on key performance measurements, such as delays or 

breaks in the OJT process. We recommended that FAA compile national statistics 

and establish a baseline to better manage the time and costs associated with the 

controller OJT process and include these in developing a centralized tracking 

system for training. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

FAA continues to make progress in implementing a very comprehensive and 

complex staffing plan. In the Department of Transportation’s Performance and 

Accountability Report for fiscal year (FY) 2006, FAA rated itself as having made 

moderate progress in addressing the expected surge in air traffic controller 

attrition. We agree with FAA’s self-assessment. During our audit, we found that 

FAA has made significant improvements by centralizing its hiring process and has 

made progress in reducing the time and costs to train new controllers, primarily 

through greater use of simulator training at the FAA Training Academy and 

implementation of a new national database to track OJT statistics. However, 

further progress is needed in several key areas. 

 

1

 OIG Report Number AV-2005-060, “Controller Staffing: Observations on FAA’s 10-Year Strategy for the Air 

Traffic Controller Workforce,” May 26, 2005. 2

 OIG Report Number AV-2004-060, “Opportunities To Improve FAA's Process for Placing and Training Air Traffic 

Controllers in Light of Pending Retirements,” June 2, 2004. OIG reports can be found on our website: 

www.oig.dot.gov. 
iii

First, FAA is still in the process of developing accurate facility level staffing 

standards, which are a foremost necessity in effectively placing newly hired 

controllers where they will be most needed. Planning by location is critical 

because FAA has over 300 terminal and en route air traffic control facilities with 

significant differences in the types of users they serve, the complexity of airspace 

they manage, and the levels of air traffic they handle. Without accurate facilitylevel planning, FAA runs the risk of placing too many or too few controllers at key 

locations. 

Various groups have repeatedly expressed concerns that some FAA air traffic 

facilities are either under- or over-staffed and that replacing retiring controllers 

one-for-one at each location would simply perpetuate existing staffing imbalances. 

FAA is aware of this concern and is in the process of validating its staffing 

standard models based on data derived at the sector and position levels in order to 

develop accurate staffing ranges for all of its facilities (this process is being 

conducted by FAA’s contractor, MITRE Corp.). FAA expects to complete this 

assessment for its 21 en route centers (its largest facilities) in early 2007. 

However, estimated completion for the entire project is not until the end of 2008. 

Given the goal of increasing controller productivity, the lengthy training time, and 

significant expenditures that will be required to hire and train new controllers over 

the next 10 years, FAA needs to ensure this project remains on track. We are 

recommending that FAA include in the next update of the 2004 Plan its progress 

made in validating facility staffing standards, including the number of facilities 

completed; the staffing ranges established for each of those locations; and the 

estimated completion date for all remaining facilities. 

Second, FAA needs to refine its methodology for projecting controller 

retirements. In FY 2005, actual controller retirements were 36 percent higher 

than FAA projected. FAA significantly changed its retirement projection 

methodology in the 2006 Update—basing its projections on actual monthly 

retirements in FY 2005. According to FAA officials, they plan to use an average 

of all prior years’ data (beginning with FY 2005 actual data) to establish a 

“running trend” for forecasting future retirements. During the first 6 months of 

FY 2006, FAA’s projections were extremely close to the actual number of 

retirements that occurred. 

However, beginning in April 2006, actual retirements began exceeding FAA’s 

projections when negotiations between the Agency and the National Air Traffic 

Controller Association (NATCA) over a new collective bargaining agreement 

reached an impasse. By September, when FAA began unilaterally implementing 

its own proposals for open Articles, actual retirements were nearly three times 

higher than FAA had projected (97 actual retirements compared to 39 projected). 

According to FAA and NATCA officials, the large jump in actual retirements was 
iv

a result of the breakdown in contract talks. In our opinion, those events 

underscore the need for FAA to refine its methodology to consider future events 

that could trigger a similar reaction. 

For example, actual controller retirements may accelerate significantly when many 

controllers will see a reduction in pay as FAA phases out Controller Incentive Pay, 

a second locality pay now received by many controllers. FAA began phasing out 

this additional pay last month. This one-time event could adversely impact the 

retirement estimates for 2007 and beyond. In our opinion, FAA needs to refine its 

methodology so that events that have the potential to significantly impact 

controller retirements (similar to what occurred in September 2006) are taken into 

consideration. 

Third, FAA is making progress in the controller training process, but 

improvements are still needed to reduce OJT time. FAA is making progress in 

the controller training process, but there are still opportunities for improvement. 

We found that the addition of en route and terminal simulators at the FAA 

Training Academy provide more realistic training opportunities for students while 

increasing the training capacity at the Academy. 

As a result of a recommendation from our 2004 report, FAA also established a 

national OJT data tracking system that allows the Agency to collect and analyze 

the data from all air traffic facilities for the purpose of identifying where 

efficiencies and program improvements can be made. However, we found 

inaccurate data in the tracking system because there were no clear instructions to 

the facilities on which data were required and how they should be entered into the 

system. Additionally, as we found in our 2004 audit, excessive gaps still exist in 

the controller OJT program. 

We are recommending that FAA issue conforming instructions to all air traffic 

facilities on exactly which data should be included in the OJT national database 

and begin using the database to identify best practices. 

Fourth, FAA reached its goal of reducing controller staffing by 3 percent for 

FY 2005, but it is unknown whether the initiatives established in the 2004 

Plan were effective in helping achieve that reduction. FAA introduced several 

initiatives in the 2004 Plan that were intended to improve workforce efficiency 

and controller productivity. Those initiatives include efficiencies such as reducing 

the use of sick leave by 8 percent, ensuring appropriate use of workers’ 

compensation benefits, and increasing scheduling efficiencies.

FAA achieved a 3-percent productivity gain in FY 2005 by decreasing total 

controller staffing by 3 percent, a goal established in the 2004 Plan. However, it is 

unclear what, if any, additional impact FAA’s productivity initiatives had on 
v

controller productivity because FAA did not establish baseline metrics for 

measuring the effectiveness of those initiatives (see Exhibit C for the status of the 

productivity initiatives and FAA’s progress as of the 2006 Update). 

As we recommended in our May 2005 report, FAA needs to establish baseline 

metrics for the initiatives, then update the 2004 Plan annually to reflect actual 

progress in achieving each initiative and ultimately in achieving its goal to reduce 

controller staffing by 10 percent. FAA concurred with this recommendation in 

July 2005 and agreed to include the information in the 2006 Update but did not. 

We are requesting that FAA provide us with new target dates for addressing this 

recommendation. 

Finally, FAA has still not identified the total costs associated with the 

Controller Workforce Plan. The cost of hiring and training over 11,800 new 

controllers will be substantial, particularly since it currently takes new controllers 

2 to 5 years to become fully certified. During that time, FAA incurs the cost of the 

trainee’s salary and benefits as well as the cost of the salaries and benefits of the 

certified controllers who instruct trainees individually. 

In our 2005 report, we recommended that FAA develop detailed cost estimates 

and offsets. The offsets are particularly important now that questions concerning 

the new controllers’ salaries have been settled under the new contract for 

controllers.3

 FAA concurred with the recommendation but did not address our 

concerns in the 2006 Update. Accordingly, we are also requesting that FAA 

provide us with new target dates for addressing this recommendation. 

The following chart is our assessment of FAA’s progress in implementing key 

elements of the Controller Workforce Plan. A green rating indicates that 

significant progress is being made in implementing the initiative. A yellow rating 

indicates that moderate progress is being made but significant challenges remain 

to be addressed. A red rating indicates that no progress has been made. 

 

3

 On June 5, 2006, FAA declared an impasse and submitted its last offer to Congress for a 60-day review as required 

by the 1996 FAA personnel reform legislation (49 U.S.C. 106 and 40122). After Congress did not take action during 

the 60-day period, FAA imposed its last offer and began to enforce its terms on September 3, 2006. FAA refers to 

the new personnel system changes as its “contract” with the controllers union. In contrast, the union refers to the 

changes as “imposed work rules.” For the purposes of this report, we will refer to them as a “contract.” 
vi

Table 1. OIG Assessment of FAA’s Progress in Implementing 

Key Elements of the Controller Workforce Plan 

Area of Concern Status Comments 

Staffing Standards Yellow • FAA needs to revise its staffing standard 

models. 

• MITRE Corp. is currently measuring en route 

sector complexities. 

• Various stakeholders are using at least six 

different staffing numbers to determine 

staffing levels. 

Projected Retirements Yellow • Projections need to be refined to account for 

one-time events that could cause a surge in 

retirements. 

• Total losses were revised down significantly 

to correct errors in the 2004 Plan. 

Hiring Process Green • Centralized hiring allows: 

9 management of the process 

9 earlier notice of new hires to facilities and 

9 reduced clearance time. 

Controller Training Yellow • FAA significantly improved its Academy 

simulator training. 

• FAA implemented a national OJT database 

but lacks clear instructions on entering data. 

• FAA is still experiencing excessive breaks in 

the OJT cycle. 

Productivity Initiatives Yellow • FAA achieved its FY 2005 overall goal of a 

3-percent productivity gain. 

• FAA lacks baseline metrics to measure 

success of initiatives. 

Costs Red • FAA lacks detailed cost estimates of the 2004 

Plan. 

• FAA needs to identify offsetting savings from 

the new contract for controllers. 

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data 
vii

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 

Our recommendations focus on the specific actions that FAA needs to take to 

ensure that its stakeholders have a complete and accurate picture of the ongoing 

10-year strategy for the controller workforce and the resources that will be 

required. Specifically, the recommendations include: 

• Reporting on the progress made in validating the staffing standard models and 

in establishing staffing ranges for each location in the next update of the Plan; 

• Refining the methodology for projecting controller retirements so that events 

that have the potential to significantly impact controller retirements are taken 

into consideration; 

• Issuing clear instructions to all air traffic facilities on exactly which data 

should be included in the OJT national database and how those data should be 

entered; and 

• Using the OJT national database to (1) determine whether training resources 

can be used more efficiently and effectively and (2) identify best practices. 

A complete set of our recommendations can be found on page 18 of this report. 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE 

We provided FAA with a draft copy of this report on December 15, 2006, for 

comment. On February 8, 2007, FAA gave us its formal response, which is 

contained in its entirety in the Appendix. FAA concurred with our 

recommendations to include the progress made in validating staffing standard 

models in the next update of the Plan, issue instructions on data to be included in 

the OJT national database, and use the database to improve oversight of the OJT 

process (recommendations 1, 3, and 4). We consider these recommendations 

resolved. 

FAA did not concur with our second recommendation (to refine its projected 

retirement methodology). In its response, FAA stated that in the second half of 

FY 2006, actual retirements versus projections began to diverge, most likely as a 

result of the rhetoric associated with the contract impasse. However, FAA points 

out that it was able to proactively increase its planned new hires during the last 

quarter of the year to compensate for the increased retirements. According to 

FAA, rather than refining the methodology to account for one-time events, it 

believes the ability to adjust the hiring pipeline is a more appropriate way to deal 

with unpredictable events that may affect controller retirements. 
viii

In our draft report, we advised FAA that it could provide alternative courses of 

action that it believes would resolve the issues presented in this report. In this 

instance, the actions proposed by FAA meet the intent of our recommendation, 

which was to ensure that the Agency was adequately prepared to address 

unanticipated increases in controller retirements. FAA’s planned actions should 

address our concerns. Accordingly, we consider this recommendation resolved as 

well. 

A complete summary of FAA’s comments, our response, and the actions required 

can be found on pages 19 through 21 of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of FAA representatives during this 

audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please call Robin Hunt, 

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and Special Program Audits, at 

(415) 744-0420 or Dan Raville, Program Director, at (202) 366-1405. 

# 

cc: FAA Deputy Administrator 

FAA Chief of Staff 

Senior Vice President ATO Finance, AJF-0 

Anthony Williams, ABU-100 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 1

Staffing Standards: FAA Is In the Process of Validating 

Facility Level Staffing Standards....................................................... 1

Projected Retirements: FAA Needs To Refine Its 

Methodology for Projecting Controller Retirements .......................... 5

Hiring Process: FAA Has Made Progress in 

Streamlining the Controller Hiring Process ....................................... 8

Controller Training: FAA Is Making Progress in the 

Controller Training Process, but Improvements Are Still 

Needed To Reduce On-The-Job Training Time to Under 

3 Years. ........................................................................................... 10

Productivity Initiatives: FAA Reached Its Overall Goal 

of a 3-Percent Staff Savings for FY 2005, but the 

Agency Does Not Know Whether the Initiatives 

Established in the 2004 Plan Were Effective in 

Achieving This Productivity Gain..................................................... 14

Costs: FAA Still Has Not Identified the Total Costs 

Associated With Implementing the 2004 Plan................................. 16

RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................ 18

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE........................ 19

ACTIONS REQUIRED ......................................................................... 21

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ..................................... 22

EXHIBIT B. FACILITIES VISITED...................................................... 23

EXHIBIT C. STATUS OF VARIOUS PRODUCTIVITY 

INITIATIVES INCLUDED IN THE CONTROLLER 

WORKFORCE PLAN........................................................................... 24

EXHIBIT D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS.............................................. 26

EXHIBIT E. RELATED OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 

GENERAL REPORTS (2002 – 2006).................................................. 27

APPENDIX. MANAGEMENT COMMENTS........................................ 28
1

Findings 

FINDINGS 

FAA continues to make progress in implementing key initiatives of its Controller 

Workforce Plan. For example, FAA has significantly improved its hiring process 

by centralizing it and has made progress in reducing the time and costs to train 

new controllers primarily through greater use of simulator training at the Academy 

and implementation of a new national database to track OJT statistics. However, 

FAA needs to make further progress in several key areas. These include: 

• Completing the Agency’s validation of more accurate staffing standards for 

its over 300 locations, 

• Refining the Agency’s methodology for projecting controller retirements, 

• Continuing efforts to reduce the time and costs associated with OJT, 

• Establishing baseline metrics to measure the effectiveness of controller 

productivity initiatives, and 

• Identifying the estimated total costs of the Controller Workforce Plan. 

These actions are necessary to ensure that FAA continues to maintain the current 

momentum in addressing a very complex and comprehensive plan for hiring and 

training over 11,800 controllers through FY 2015. These actions are also 

necessary to ensure that the Agency’s stakeholders have a complete and thorough 

understanding of the extent of this challenge, the progress made by FAA in 

addressing it, and the resources required. 

Staffing Standards: FAA Is In the Process of Validating Facility Level 

Staffing Standards 

Area of Concern Status Comments 

Staffing Standards Yellow • FAA needs to revise its staffing standard 

models. 

• MITRE Corp. is currently measuring en 

route sector complexities. 

• Various stakeholders are using at least six 

different staffing numbers to determine 

staffing levels. 

The current staffing standards are generally accurate at the “macro” level and 

can be used for national estimates but they are not as accurate at the facility 

level. FAA is aware of this and is in the process of updating the models used to 

establish the staffing standards. However, the schedule for this program may not 

be completed until 2008. In the interim, at least six staffing numbers are being 

used; this is causing confusion and uncertainty at the national and facility level. 
2

Findings 

FAA has used staffing standard models to determine controller staffing levels 

since the 1970s, and they are the basis for the FY 2006 controller staffing 

standards. However, these staffing standard models were last updated in the 1990s 

and do not include major technology and policy changes that impact staffing at the 

facility level, such as new systems or implementation of the Family and Medical 

Leave Act. The current staffing standards also do not take into account local 

factors such as runway configurations, airspace complexity, or air defense 

identification zone requirements. 

The staffing standards used by FAA are not highly accurate at the facility level in 

part because the staffing models were originally designed to generate national 

estimates. In 1997, the National Academy of Sciences completed a review4

 of 

FAA’s staffing standards and concluded that, “The committee does not believe 

that the current staffing standards can be used to provide highly accurate estimates 

of staffing requirements for individual facilities.” 

FAA is aware that it needs more accurate facility level staffing standards and is in 

the process of validating staffing standards in order to develop staffing ranges that 

can be used at the facility level. As a part of the validation process, the Agency 

has contracted with MITRE Corporation to measure sector complexities at each of 

FAA’s 21 en route centers. This is a huge undertaking that involves the contractor 

measuring the controller workload at each of the 750 airspace sectors in the en 

route centers nationwide. The results of this study should provide accurate 

controller requirements at each of those facilities. FAA also plans a similar study 

for its Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities and a recalibration 

of the model used at air traffic control towers. 

However, new staffing ranges based on validated staffing models have not been 

reported for any location since the validation process began over 1 year ago. The 

latest timeline provided by FAA indicated that staffing standards will be complete 

for the 21 en route centers by early calendar year 2007 and will be complete for 

the TRACONs and tower facilities by the end of calendar year 2008. Given 

FAA’s goal to increase controller productivity through staff savings and the 

significant expenditures that will be required to hire and train controllers over the 

next 10 years, the Agency needs to ensure that this high priority project remains 

on track. 

In the interim, FAA is currently establishing staffing ranges by facility, which take 

into account the existing staffing standard models but also include facility 

manager input and expected productivity improvements. Although these ranges 

 

4

 Transportation Research Board Special Report 250, “Air Traffic Control Facilities, Improving Methods To Determine 

 Staffing Requirements,” 1997. 
3

Findings 

are a step toward more accurate controller levels, they are not a replacement for a 

facility-level staffing range based on validated staffing standard models. 

During this audit, we found many different staffing numbers being quoted at the 

national level and for individual facilities. For example, 

• FAA Headquarters officials quoted either the staffing standards or the 

2004 Plan staffing targets as the staffing level; 

• Union representatives quoted the staffing levels previously negotiated 

between the Agency and NATCA; 

• FAA established yet another number by creating an Interim Staffing Target 

to be used until the staffing standard models are validated; and 

• Other numbers were quoted at facilities and included “the budgeted staffing 

level,” the “finance team staffing level,” and “practical staffing standard 

levels.” 

In some cases, we found these numbers to be significantly different. For example, 

Figure 1 compares the total number of controller requirements according to the 

FY 2006 Staffing Standards, FAA’s Interim Staffing Targets, and the actual onboard number of controllers (as of August 2006). As shown in the chart, the 

various staffing numbers range from a high of 15,057 controllers when using the 

Staffing Standards to a low of 13,502 controllers when using the Interim Staffing 

Standards—a difference of over 1,500 controllers. 

Figure 1. Some of the Various Numbers Used To Define 

National Staffing Requirements 

7760

5695 6603

7807

7676

7297

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

20000

FY 2006 Staffing Standard Interim Staffing Target Actual On Board

Number of Controllers

Enroute Terminal

15,057

13,502 14,279
4

Findings 

When compared at the facility level, the differences are even more apparent. For 

example, Figure 2 shows the different “authorized” staffing levels for both the 

New York TRACON and the Washington En Route Center. When we visited the 

New York TRACON, there were 190 controllers assigned to the facility (actual 

on-board number). When comparing that number to the 2006 Staffing Standard 

(179), the facility appears to be overstaffed by 6 percent (11 controllers). When 

comparing the actual on-board number to the previously negotiated number (270), 

the facility appears to be understaffed by 30 percent (80 controllers). 

We found similar circumstances at the Washington En Route Center. When 

comparing the 371 controllers actually on board to the FY 2006 Staffing Standard 

(485), the facility appears to be understaffed by 24 percent (114 controllers). 

However, when comparing the controllers on board to the Interim Staffing Target 

(337), the facility appears to be overstaffed by 10 percent (34 controllers). 

Figure 2. Various Numbers Used To Define Controller 

Requirements for Two Facilities 

190

371

179

485

199

337

270

412

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

New York TRACON Washington Center

Number of Controllers

Actual On Board FY 2006 Staffing Standard INTERIM Staffing Target Negotiated Number

 Source: FAA 

We found that these various staffing numbers cause confusion and uncertainty at 

the national and the facility level and underscore the need for FAA to complete the 

validation of the facility staffing standard models on time in order to develop one 

credible staffing range for each of its over 300 air traffic facilities. We are 

recommending that FAA include in the next update of the 2004 Plan the progress 

made by the Agency and its contractor in validating the staffing standard models 
5

Findings 

and in establishing staffing ranges for each location and the expected completion 

date for both of these actions. 

Projected Retirements: FAA Needs To Refine Its Methodology for 

Projecting Controller Retirements 

Area of Concern Status Comments 

Projected Retirements Yellow • Projections need to be refined to account 

for one-time events that could cause a 

surge in retirements. 

• Total losses were revised down 

significantly to correct errors in the 2004 

Plan. 

Actual controller retirements during the first 2 years of the 2004 Plan have been 

significantly higher than originally projected. Figure 3 illustrates that the 

2004 Plan projected that 341 air traffic controllers would retire in FY 2005 and 

439 would retire in FY 2006. Actual retirements for FY 2005, however, were 

465 controllers—a 36-percent increase over the projected number. Furthermore, 

the 2006 Update revised anticipated retirements in FY 2006 from 439 to 467. 

However, 583 controllers actually retired during FY 2006—a 25-percent increase 

over the 2006 projection and nearly 33 percent above the 2004 Plan projection. 

Figure 3. FAA’s Controller Retirement Projections 

Versus Actual Retirements 

 Figure 3a. FY 2005 Projections Figure 3b. FY 2006 Projections 

 Versus Actual Retirements Versus Actual Retirements 

 Source: FAA Source: FAA 

In the 2006 Update, FAA also significantly changed its total projected losses over 

the next 10 years. As shown in Figure 4, FAA projected in the 2004 Plan that total 

341

465

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

FY 2005

Number of Controllers

2004 Plan Actual

439 467

583

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

FY 2006

Number of Controllers

2004 Plan 2006 Update Actual
6

Findings 

controller losses from FY 2006 through FY 2014 would be 10,338 controllers. In 

the 2006 Update, FAA projected that only 9,314 controllers would leave the 

controller workforce during the same time period—a reduction of over 1,000 

projected controller losses. 

Figure 4. FAA’s Total Projected Controller Losses* 654 9079671,032 1,144 1,2491,375 1,451

1,559

800

1,007

1,008

1,017

1,051

1,098

1,167

1,107

1,059

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Fiscal Year

Number of Controllers

2004 Plan Total Losses

2006 Update Total Losses

Source: FAA’s 2004 Controller Workforce Plan and 2006 Update 

*Total losses include retirements, resignations, removals, deaths, training failures, and promotions. 

According to FAA, the significant reduction in controller losses in the later years 

of the 2006 Update is due to a change in projection methodology that corrected the 

treatment of mandatory retirements. In the 2004 Plan, FAA estimated that 

25.5 percent of all controllers would retire in the first year they became eligible. 

However, FAA also counted these individuals again when they reached mandatory 

retirement age resulting in “double counting” of controller retirements in the later 

years. The methodology was changed in the 2006 Update to correct double 

counting in the later years. 

The 2004 Plan also estimated controller retirements based on a 3-year increment 

of controller retirement history to project a retirement pattern out to FY 2014. The 

calculation indicated that 25.5 percent of controllers retired during their first year 

of retirement eligibility, and 70.5 percent of controllers retired within their first 

7 years of retirement eligibility. 

In the 2006 Update, FAA changed the methodology for projecting retirements. 

FAA projected controller retirements based only on the pattern established by 

controllers retiring in FY 2005. Retirement projections using only 1 year of 

historical retirement data indicated that fewer controllers would retire during their 

first year of eligibility (23.4 percent versus 25.5 percent). This method also 
7

Findings 

indicated that 87.1 percent of controllers retired within their first 7 years of 

retirement eligibility, compared to 70.5 percent. According to FAA officials, they 

plan to use an average of all prior years’ data (beginning with FY 2005 actual 

data) to establish a running trend for forecasting future retirements. 

During the first 6 months of FY 2006, FAA’s projections were extremely close to 

the actual number of retirements that occurred. However, beginning in 

April 2006, actual retirements began exceeding FAA’s projections when 

negotiations between the Agency and NATCA over a new collective bargaining 

agreement reached an impasse. As shown in Figure 5, by September, when FAA 

began unilaterally implementing its own proposals for open Articles, actual 

retirements were nearly three times higher than FAA had projected (97 actual 

retirements compared to 39 projected). 

Figure 5. FAA FY 2006 Projected Versus 

Actual Retirements 

On April 5, 2006, 

FAA declared 

impasse.

On September 3, 2006,

FAA/NATCA contract 

unilaterally

implemented by FAA.

Controller Retirements

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06

.

Source: FAA

Prior Year 2005 17 25 40 99 21 29 49 23 47 48 26 39

Actual 2006 15 26 23 103 32 26 52 40 64 55 50 97

Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06

According to FAA officials, the large jump in actual retirements was a result of 

the breakdown in contract talks. In our opinion, those events underscore the need 

for FAA to refine its methodology to consider future events that could trigger a 

similar reaction. For example, there may be a significant jump in controller 

retirements during January 2007 when many controllers will see a reduction in 
8

Findings 

their pay checks as FAA begins phasing out Controller Incentive Pay, a second 

locality pay that many controllers now receive. This one-time event could 

adversely impact the retirement estimates for 2007 and beyond. 

We also met with NATCA officials to discuss the projected number of retirements 

in the 2006 Update. Union officials stated that the number of estimated 

retirements was too low. They pointed to the fact that actual retirements in the 

previous 2 years were well above those projected. They also predicted that the 

new contract imposed on the workforce would increase the number of actual 

retirements in the coming years. Union officials advised us that they had also 

hired an independent contractor to conduct a study on staffing standards to 

determine the correct number of controllers required at the facility level. 

Accurate retirement total estimates are an important element of FAA’s Controller 

Workforce Plan. Given the current lack of valid facility-level staffing standards, 

the large percentage of active controllers who are or will become eligible to retire 

in the next 10 years, and the extensive training required to become a controller, 

FAA must refine its methodology for projecting when and where the controller 

workforce will experience losses. This is imperative to ensure that future hiring 

plans will sustain an operationally viable controller workforce. Accordingly, we 

are recommending that FAA refine its methodology so that events that have the 

potential to significantly impact controller retirements (similar to what occurred in 

September 2006) are taken into consideration. 

Hiring Process: FAA Has Made Progress in Streamlining the 

Controller Hiring Process 

Area of Concern Status Comments 

Hiring Process Green Centralized hiring allows: 

• Greater efficiency and better 

management of the process 

• earlier notice of new hires to facilities 

and 

• reduced clearance time. 

In January 2006, the Air Traffic Organization centralized the entire controller 

hiring process. We found that this improves process efficiency by eliminating 

duplication of effort and now allows individual facilities to identify prospective 

new controllers by name as much as 1 year in advance. FAA also anticipates 

making improvements in the time needed for applicants to obtain medical and 

security clearances. 
9

Findings 

In FY 2005 and FY 2006, FAA hired more controllers than had been anticipated in 

the 2004 Plan or the 2006 Update. As illustrated in Figure 6, the 2004 Plan 

projected a need for 435 new controllers in FY 2005. FAA hired 519 controllers, 

almost 20 percent above the 2004 projection. Likewise, FAA’s 2006 Update 

projected a need for 930 new controllers in FY 2006, while 1,116 new controllers 

were actually hired, also about 20 percent above the projection. The increased 

hiring levels were possible because FAA has made progress in streamlining the 

controller hiring process, which will allow the Agency more fluidity in making 

any necessary mid-course hiring corrections. 

Figure 6. FAA’s Controller Hiring Estimates 

 Figure 6a. FY 2005 Estimated Figure 6b. FY 2006 Estimated Hiring 

 Versus Actual Hires Versus Actual Hires 

 Source: FAA Source: FAA 

During our 2004 audit, we found that FAA had no well-defined national hiring 

process. Essentially, FAA hired and placed new controllers based only on where 

and when vacancies occurred. Additionally, in accordance with the 1998 NATCA 

collective bargaining agreement, FAA was compelled to negotiate the national, 

regional, and facility distribution of vacancies. As a result, FAA’s hiring process 

was decentralized and inefficient, as each region duplicated the process with little 

or no communication with other regions. 

In January 2006, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) centralized the entire 

controller hiring process. The Aviation Careers Division in Oklahoma City now 

coordinates all new controller hiring, including processing and evaluating 

applications, tracking medical and security clearances, and assigning individual 

candidates to specific air traffic control facilities. The new contract for 

controllers, implemented in September 2006, also eliminated requirements to 

negotiate staffing levels with the union. 

435

519

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

FY 2005

Number of Controllers

2004 Plan Actual

1,249

930

1,116

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

FY 2006

Number of Controllers

2004 Plan 2006 Update Actual
10

Findings 

We found that centralized hiring improves process efficiency by eliminating 

duplication of effort and now allows individual facilities to identify prospective 

new controllers by name as much as 1 year in advance. During our facility visits, 

all managers knew whether or not they were scheduled to receive new hires and, if 

so, who they were and when they were to arrive at the facility. One facility 

manager even produced a list of 19 new controllers scheduled to arrive at the 

facility during the first three quarters of FY 2007. This was not the case during 

our 2004 audit when we found that managers did not know how many new 

controllers had been hired at their locations or the new hire’s names. They also 

did not know if they were even receiving new controllers at their locations. FAA 

also anticipates reducing the 97-day median time required for applicants to obtain 

medical and security clearances. 

FAA’s new controller hiring procedures are a major shift in policy from those we 

found in place in 2004. The centralized process now in place allows FAA to 

coordinate more efficiently between the service areas and provide—by name—

hiring selections to facility managers up to 1 year in advance. The hiring process 

also provides ATO with the hiring flexibility it needs to ensure new controllers are 

hired when needed despite changing controller requirements. 

Controller Training: FAA Is Making Progress in the Controller 

Training Process, but Improvements Are Still Needed To Reduce OnThe-Job Training Time to Under 3 Years. 

Area of Concern Status Comments 

Controller Training Yellow • FAA significantly improved its Academy 

simulator training. 

• FAA implemented a national OJT database, 

but lacks clear instructions on entering 

data. 

• FAA is still experiencing excessive breaks 

in the OJT cycle. 

FAA is making progress in the controller training process. We found that the 

addition of en route and terminal simulators at the FAA Training Academy 

provides more realistic training opportunities for students while increasing the 

training capacity at the Academy. As a result of a recommendation from our 

2004 report, FAA also established a national OJT data tracking system that allows 

the Agency to collect and analyze data from all air traffic facilities. However, we 

found inaccurate data in the tracking system because there were no clear 

instructions to the facilities on which data were required and how data should be 

entered into the system. Additionally, as we found in our 2004 audit, excessive 

unexplained breaks still exist in the controller OJT cycle, which can needlessly 

extend the certification time for controllers. 
11

Findings 

Academy Training: During our visit to the Training Academy, FAA officials 

showed us the facility’s new simulator training capabilities. FAA completed the 

installation of four new tower simulators (see Figure 7), which doubled the 

training capacity from the previous simulation technology. The Tower Simulation 

Systems (TSS) provide trainees with a combination of high fidelity training and 

the latest in voice recognition technology. In addition, a 20-sector en route lab 

was completed, which enables the Academy to train new controllers on current 

technology being used in the field. 

Figure 7. Picture of a Tower Cab Simulator 

 Source: FAA 

The goals in expanding the simulation capabilities at the Academy are to increase 

the performance of the student through more realistic training, increase student 

capacity at the Academy, and to help reduce the time needed for new controllers to 

become fully certified. As Table 2 shows, the Academy currently has ample 

capacity to handle the number of new controllers projected to be hired in the 2006 

Update. 

Table 2. Training Academy Capacity Versus 

Controller Workforce Plan Forecast 

Fiscal Year Capacity Projections 

2007 2,140 912 

2008 2,140 976 

2009 2,140 1,010 

2010 2,140 1,144 

 Source: FAA Training Academy 
12

Findings 

On-The-Job Training: During our 2004 audit, we found that FAA provided 

minimal oversight of the OJT process at the national level. We found that even 

though OJT is the longest portion of the controller training process, FAA did not 

have national statistics on key performance measurements, including the 

following: 

• Amount of time controllers need to certify, 

• Delays in the OJT process, 

• Where and when training failures occur, and 

• Total costs to provide OJT. 

We concluded that unless FAA accumulated site-specific statistics at the national 

level, it had no means to assess the overall OJT process, determine whether 

training resources could be more efficiently and effectively used, and identify best 

practices. We recommended in our 2004 report that FAA compile national 

statistics, establish a baseline to better manage the time and costs associated with 

the controller OJT process, and include these in developing a tracking system for 

training. 

FAA concurred with our recommendation and implemented a national OJT data 

tracking system in January 2006. FAA currently collects and maintains training 

data from all air traffic control facilities and will be able to analyze this data at the 

national level to provide best practices to all terminal and en route facilities. We 

believe FAA has made a significant step in the right direction in establishing this 

system but caution the Agency on the accuracy of the data currently in the tracking 

system. During a limited review of data in the OJT tracking system, we found two 

areas of concern that warrant further review by FAA. 

First, we found that there are no clear instructions to the individual facilities 

on which training data to enter and how to enter them into the tracking 

system. Thus, we found that some facilities entered the data differently than 

others. For example, we found that the New York TRACON counted a new hire’s 

Academy training as part of the OJT time while all the other facilities we visited 

did not. This resulted in the TRACON showing a longer OJT process for its new 

hires than actually occurs. We also found errors in class length and the number of 

days it took new controllers to complete various stages of the training process. 

FAA needs to ensure that all facilities are reporting their training data the same 

way in order to have accurate statistics. We are recommending that FAA issue 

conforming instructions on exactly which data should be included and how those 

data should be entered into the OJT database. 
13

Findings 

Second, we found that there are still excessive breaks in the training process 

that extend the time required for a new controller to become fully certified. 

This was also a finding in our 2004 audit. For example, at one of the en route 

centers we visited, we found that 6 controllers waited over 100 days to begin their 

OJT. FAA must identify these occurrences and eliminate them in order to 

significantly reduce OJT time for new controllers. We are recommending that 

FAA begin using its OJT database to determine whether training resources can be 

used more efficiently and effectively, identify best practices, and identify and 

investigate instances where excessive breaks in the OJT process occur. 

Although FAA is planning to reduce the average training time it takes to become a 

certified controller, we have concerns about the Agency’s ability to achieve this 

while concurrently increasing the percentage of developmental controllers in the 

workforce. Beginning in FY 2007, FAA is planning to increase the percentage of 

developmental controllers at en route centers to over 25 percent of the total 

workforce. 

FAA projects that developmental controllers will make up 25 percent or more of 

the entire controller workforce until FY 2014. According to FAA, a workforce 

consisting of up to 35 percent developmental controllers is acceptable. However, 

a 35-percent level of developmental controllers would represent the highest 

percentage of the workforce in recent years. We found that only about 15 percent 

of the national controller workforce is currently comprised of developmental 

controllers. The increase in the percentage of developmental controllers is a 

concern because it means there will be fewer certified controllers within the 

workforce to control air traffic and to provide OJT. Air traffic managers and 

NATCA facility representatives we interviewed during this audit indicated that a 

staffing ratio of up to 25 percent of developmental controllers to Certified 

Professional Controllers would still enable effective controller training. 

Because FAA is expecting to increase the percentage of developmental controllers 

to over 25 percent of the workforce as early as FY 2007 in the en route centers, it 

is vital for FAA to have facility level plans for hiring and training controllers so 

that managers can begin planning how to handle the logistics of training the 

increased number of developmental controllers. FAA will also need to continually 

monitor the training results from the individual facilities to ensure the 

developmental controller rate does not adversely impact the overall efficiency or 

safety of operations in the National Airspace System. 
14

Findings 

Productivity Initiatives: FAA Reached Its Overall Goal of a 3-Percent 

Staff Savings for FY 2005, but the Agency Does Not Know Whether 

the Initiatives Established in the 2004 Plan Were Effective in 

Achieving This Productivity Gain 

Area of Concern Status Comments 

Productivity Initiatives Yellow • FAA achieved its FY 2005 overall goal of a 

3-percent productivity gain. 

• FAA lacks baseline metrics to measure 

success. 

FAA achieved a 3-percent productivity gain in FY 2005 by decreasing its total 

controller staffing by 3 percent, a goal established in the 2004 Plan. However, it 

is unclear what, if any, additional impact FAA’s productivity initiatives had on 

controller productivity. The effect the 2004 Plan initiatives had on overall 

productivity gains cannot be measured because FAA has not established baseline 

metrics, as we recommended in our 2005 report. 

FAA introduced several initiatives in the 2004 Plan intended to improve 

workforce efficiency and controller productivity. FAA anticipated that over 

5 years, starting with 3 percent in FY 2005, these initiatives would have the 

potential to yield controller staff savings of about 10 percent, relative to the 

existing staffing standard projections. FAA estimated the initiatives would result 

in a 3-percent staff savings in FY 2005, 5 percent in FY 2006, 7 percent in 

FY 2007, 9 percent in FY 2008, and would maintain a 10-percent reduction each 

year thereafter from FY 2009 through FY 2014. 

FAA’s initiatives include efficiencies such as reducing the use of sick leave by 

8 percent, ensuring appropriate use of workers’ compensation benefits, and 

increasing scheduling efficiencies. The intent of these initiatives is to make more 

controllers available for controlling air traffic. These productivity initiatives and 

FAA’s progress as of the 2006 Update are listed at Exhibit C. 

In our 2005 audit, we found that the implementation of these initiatives was an 

ambitious operational undertaking and that only through continued monitoring 

could FAA determine the final impact of the initiatives. To ensure the initiatives 

were achieving the desired results, we recommended that FAA establish baseline 

metrics for the initiatives, then update the workforce plan annually to reflect the 

actual progress in achieving each initiative and ultimately in achieving the goal to 

reduce controller staffing by 10 percent. 
15

Findings 

In the 2006 Update, FAA stated that the Agency achieved the 3-percent 

productivity goal for FY 2005.5

 In total, FAA handled about the same number of 

air traffic operations with fewer air traffic controllers. Table 3 shows that the 

number of operations per controller increased from 9,537 operations in FY 2004 to 

9,796 operations in FY 2005, an increase of over 250 operations per controller. 

During the same period, the number of controllers went from 14,934 to 14,540, a 

decrease of 394 controllers. However, when asked, FAA officials stated that they 

were unsure how much the initiatives outlined in the 2004 Plan had impacted the 

gain in productivity because metrics for measuring the effectiveness of each 

initiative were not being tracked. 

Table 3. Controller Productivity 

Fiscal Year Combined Activity 

(Operations) 

Number of Controllers 

(Actual On-Board) 

Number) 

Operations 

per Controller 

2004 142,423,848 14,934 9,537 

2005 142,438,471 14,540 9,796 

Source: FAA 

We acknowledge that the impact on productivity gains of some of the initiatives is 

hard to measure. For example, although FAA has completed the deployment of 

CRU-X/ATO Resource Tool, a computer-based tool to record time and attendance 

and labor distribution for operational controllers and supervisors, it is very 

difficult to directly measure the impact the tool has had on productivity gains in 

the controller workforce. 

Some initiatives are easier to measure, and their impact has been measured in the 

2006 Update. For example, by eliminating many workgroups, meetings, and 

conferences, FAA indicated in the 2006 Update that it was able to save almost $1 

million from the previous year. 

Other initiatives, however, may have a quantifiable result, but may not have a 

direct effect on controller staffing. For example, while FAA claims that it realized 

a cost avoidance of $1 million last year through its workers compensation returnto-work policy, this program does not always return a controller back to the radar 

screen. Usually, a controller is returned to work in some lesser capacity, such as 

performing administrative duties. A controller in the return-to-work program must 

still be replaced on radar position by another controller on the schedule. 

 

5

 Since the 2006 Update was released in August 2006, the productivity gains for FY 2006 were not available. 
16

Findings 

Other initiatives could not be measured because they were dependent upon a new 

contract for controllers. At the onset of our review, FAA and NATCA were 

engaged in negotiations over a new collective bargaining agreement. After 

declaring an impasse and submitting all open articles to Congress for a 60-day 

review (as required by 1996 personnel reform legislation) on June 5, 2006, FAA 

imposed its last offer for all unresolved issues and unilaterally imposed a new 

contract for controllers. FAA began implementing terms of the new contract on 

September 3, 2006. With the implementation of the new contract, FAA can begin 

exploring other flexibilities to improve staffing, such as the use of more flexible 

work schedules, part-time controllers and split shifts. New methods for 

scheduling leave under the new contract could also have a significant effect on the 

need for overtime, thus increasing staff savings. 

Overall, we found that FAA is making progress in implementing the initiatives 

from the 2004 Plan, but the impact of each initiative in achieving desired goals is 

unclear. Since FAA did not establish baseline metrics for a majority of the 

initiatives, we could not determine the impact that each individual initiative had in 

increasing productivity and reducing staffing during this review. 

Accordingly, we are reiterating our 2005 report recommendation that FAA needs 

to establish baseline metrics for the initiatives and then update the workforce plan 

annually to reflect the actual progress in achieving each initiative and ultimately in 

achieving its goal to reduce controller staffing by 10 percent. FAA concurred with 

this recommendation in July 2005 and agreed to include the information in the 

2006 Update but did not. We are requesting that FAA provide us with new target 

dates for addressing this recommendation. 

Costs: FAA Still Has Not Identified the Total Costs Associated With 

Implementing the 2004 Plan 

Area of Concern Status Comments 

Costs Red • FAA lacks detailed cost estimates of the 

2004 Plan. 

• FAA needs to identify offsetting savings 

from the new contract for controllers. 

FAA’s 2006 Update does not identify the annual and total costs for hiring, 

training, and certifying new controllers to meet future requirements. In addition, 

FAA needs to estimate any offsetting cost reductions realized with the 

implementation of a new contract for controllers. As we stated in our 2005 

report, without detailed costs, neither Congress, the Department, nor the Office of 

Management and Budget will have a clear understanding of the financing needed 

to fulfill the future air traffic controller requirements as proposed in the 2004 

Plan. 
17

Findings 

FAA submitted some of the cost details associated with the 2004 Plan in its 

FY 2007 budget submission. For example, FAA requested $18.2 million to hire 

and train new controllers in FY 2007. Of that amount, $7.5 million is to hire 

1,136 new controllers in FY 2007 and the remaining $10.7 million is for controller 

technical training, which supports classroom and laboratory training for 

approximately 2,500 controllers hired since FY 2005. However, FAA does not 

provide estimated details for FY 2008 and beyond, when hiring projections remain 

at over 1,000 new controllers per year. 

FAA should also include in the estimates any offsetting cost reductions realized 

from the 2004 Plan. While the largest costs associated with the 2006 Update will 

be hiring over 11,800 new controllers over the next 10 years, FAA has made 

improvements in reducing the training costs and salaries for the new hires. For 

example, FAA is saving $20,000 per trainee while at the Academy because of 

restructured travel and compensation policies for trainees attending initial 

Academy training. 

In addition, the salaries for new hires will be lower with the implementation of the 

new contract for controllers. For example, under the old contract, an Academy 

graduate had an annual base salary of between $38,080 and $53,312. Under the 

new contract, an Academy graduate will earn an annual base salary of $31,700. 

Over time, this will help reduce FAA’s average base salary and, in turn, will help 

reduce the growth of FAA’s operating costs. 

FAA needs to develop detailed cost estimates and offsetting savings before the 

next update of its workforce plan, particularly now that questions concerning new 

controllers’ salaries have been settled under the new contract for controllers. 

These estimates should also be updated annually to reflect the Agency’s progress 

in meeting the requirements of the 2004 Plan, and any changes made to the 

2004 Plan. We also recommended this in our May 2005 report; FAA concurred 

in July 2005 and agreed to include the information in the 2006 Update but did not. 

We are requesting that FAA provide us with new target dates for addressing this 

recommendation. 
18

Recommendations 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

We recommend that FAA: 

1. Include in the next update of the Plan the progress made by the Agency and 

its contractors in validating facility staffing standards including the number 

of facilities completed, the staffing ranges established for each of those 

locations, and the estimated completion date for all remaining facilities. 

2. Refine its methodology for projecting controller retirements so that events 

that have the potential to significantly impact controller retirements (similar 

to what occurred in September 2006) are taken into consideration. 

3. Issue clear instructions to all air traffic facilities on exactly which data 

should be included in the national database and how those data should be 

entered. 

4. Begin using the OJT national database to (a) determine whether training 

resources can be used more efficiently and effectively, (b) identify best 

practices, and (c) identify and investigate instances where excessive time 

lapses in the OJT process occurred. 

In addition, we made the following recommendations in our May 2005 report on 

controller staffing: 

• Establish baseline metrics for all of the initiatives in the 2004 Plan and 

annually evaluate actual progress made in (a) implementing each initiative 

and (b) achieving the anticipated staffing reduction of 10 percent. 

• Develop detailed cost estimates and offsets that identify the annual and 

total net costs associated with the 2004 Plan. 

FAA concurred with these recommendations in July 2005 and agreed to include 

the information in the 2006 Update but did not. Accordingly, we are requesting 

that FAA provide us with new target dates for addressing these recommendations. 
19

Management Comments and OIG Response 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE 

We provided FAA with a draft copy of this report on December 15, 2006, for 

comment. On February 8, 2007, FAA gave us its formal response, which is 

contained in its entirety in the Appendix. 

FAA concurred with our recommendations to include the progress made in 

validating staffing standard models in the next update of the Plan, issue 

instructions on data to be included in the OJT national database, and use the 

database to improve oversight of the OJT process (recommendations 1, 3, and 4). 

We consider these recommendations resolved. 

FAA did not agree with our second recommendation (to refine its projected 

retirement methodology). In its response, FAA states that in the second half of FY 

2006, actual retirements versus projections began to diverge, most likely as a 

result of the rhetoric associated with the contract impasse. However, FAA points 

out that it was able to proactively increase its planned new hires during the last 

quarter of the year to compensate for the increased retirements. According to 

FAA, rather than refining the methodology to account for one-time events, it 

believes the ability to adjust the hiring pipeline is a more appropriate way to deal 

with unpredictable events that may affect controller retirements. 

In our draft report, we advised FAA that it could provide alternative courses of 

action that it believes would resolve the issues presented in this report. In this 

instance, the actions proposed by FAA meet the intent of our recommendation, 

which was to ensure that the Agency was adequately prepared to address 

unanticipated increases in controller retirements. FAA’s planned actions should 

address our concerns. Accordingly, we consider this recommendation resolved as 

well. 

In addition, we made the following recommendations in our May 2005 report on 

controller staffing: 

• Establish baseline metrics for all of the initiatives in the 2004 Plan and 

annually evaluate actual progress made in (a) implementing each initiative 

and (b) achieving the anticipated staffing reduction of 10 percent. 

• Develop detailed cost estimates and offsets that identify the annual and 

total net costs associated with the 2004 Plan. 

FAA concurred with these recommendations in July 2005 and agreed to include 

the information in the 2006 Update but did not. We requested that FAA provide 

us with new target dates for addressing those recommendations. In its response to 

this report, FAA reiterated that it concurred in part with both recommendations. 
20

Management Comments and OIG Response 

However, it is unclear exactly what actions the Agency plans to take. For 

example, concerning our prior recommendation to establish baseline metrics for 

all initiatives in the 2004 Plan, FAA states in its response: 

. . .there were more than 35 separate initiatives listed in the 2004 Plan, most of 

which are interdependent (non-separable) and/or have no costs associated with 

them. Therefore, they cannot be baselined to derive meaningful quantifiable 

measures tied to productivity. In addition, broad changes realized as a result of 

our contract negotiations impact the initiatives identified in the 2004 Plan and 

present new opportunities for improvement. 

We can, however, show that we are achieving total productivity, as measured 

by bottom line improvements. We will continue to provide status updates for 

initiatives that will help the agency achieve the total productivity goal, but 

estimating the contribution of each initiative is labor intensive, costly, and 

would divert resources. 

Concerning our prior recommendation to develop detailed cost estimates and 

offsets that identify the annual and total net costs associated with the 2004 Plan, 

FAA states in its response: 

Determining the total cost of implementing the plan is difficult to calculate 

because the cost to hire and train the new controllers is embedded in the 

agency’s annual budget. Further, since improvements are made each year, 

total 10 year costs would vary from year to year in the plan. Annually, the 

budget identifies training and hiring costs as well as cost savings from some 

FAA initiatives. The previous budget (FY 2006) included a discretionary 

increase to expand Academy training in order for the agency to have adequate 

funding to train new staff consistent with targets set in the plan. In addition, 

developmental controllers in various stages of training actually perform 

controller work as they move towards CPC status, so those salaries are 

included in the PC&B costs of our budget request. In addition, this year’s plan 

will have some cost information. 

We find FAA’s response unclear as to exactly what the Agency plans to do. We 

are requesting that FAA clarify its intentions to (1) show that it is achieving total 

productivity, as measured by “bottom line improvements,” and (2) include in this 

year’s plan “some cost information.” 
21

Actions Required 

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

In accordance with Department of Transportation Order 8000.1C, we are 

requesting that FAA provide us, within 30 calendar days, with a timeframe for 

implementing the planned actions regarding recommendations 3 and 4 (issuing 

instructions on data to be included in the OJT national database and using the 

database to improve oversight of the OJT process). In addition, we are requesting 

that FAA clarify its intentions regarding our prior recommendations to 

(a) establish baseline metrics for all of the initiatives in the 2004 Plan and (b) 

develop detailed cost estimates and offsets that identify the annual and total net 

costs associated with the 2004 Plan. 
22

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology 

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

This audit was conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards

prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States and included such tests 

as we considered necessary to provide reasonable assurances of detecting abuse or 

illegal acts. The following scope and methodology were used in conducting this 

review. 

During this audit, we visited FAA Headquarters, the FAA Training Academy, two 

en route facilities, two TRACONs, and six air traffic control towers. We gathered 

data and interviewed officials at all locations visited. We also reviewed and 

analyzed FAA’s 2006 Update to “A Plan for the Future, The Federal Aviation 

Administration’s 10-Year Strategy for the Air Traffic Control Workforce,” issued 

in August 2006. 

To evaluate actions taken or planned by FAA to address implementation of key 

staffing and training elements of the Controller Workforce Plan, we conducted 

interviews with managers at all levels of the Agency. We compared staffing 

numbers and projections from the facilities with the numbers from Headquarters to 

determine whether they correspond. We discussed the differences in the controller 

hiring process with the Aviation Careers Division in Oklahoma City to determine 

if improvements were made to the hiring process over the past 2 years. As a point 

of reference for training statistics, we visited facilities that we visited previously 

during our 2004 and 2005 audits. The differences in staffing and training 

processes were then recorded and analyzed. We also reviewed and analyzed the 

2006 Update to determine whether past OIG recommendations were implemented. 

To determine the effects of implementing other productivity initiatives from the 

2004 Plan, we interviewed FAA officials concerning establishing baseline metrics 

for the initiatives and whether impacts of the initiatives are being monitored. We 

also reviewed and analyzed the initiative status FAA provided in the 2006 Update 

to determine whether the productivity initiatives are being measured for 

effectiveness and whether impacts are being properly reported. We also analyzed 

data from FAA Headquarters to determine how air traffic controller productivity 

was being calculated. 

Finally, we conducted a limited review of FAA’s new national OJT database by 

comparing information from the database to actual training statistics from the 

facilities we visited to determine the accuracy of the database. 
23

Exhibit B. Facilities Visited 

EXHIBIT B. FACILITIES VISITED 

En Route Centers 

• Washington Center 

• New York Center 

Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities 

• Potomac TRACON 

• New York TRACON 

Air Traffic Control Towers 

• Dulles Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) 

• Islip ATCT 

• John F. Kennedy ATCT 

• LaGuardia ATCT 

• Manassas ATCT 

• Reagan National ATCT

FAA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

FAA Training Academy, Oklahoma City, OK 

National Air Traffic Controllers Association Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
24

Exhibit C. Status of Various Productivity Initiatives Included in the 

Controller Workforce Plan 

EXHIBIT C. STATUS OF VARIOUS PRODUCTIVITY INITIATIVES 

INCLUDED IN THE CONTROLLER WORKFORCE PLAN 

2004 CWP 

Productivity 

Initiative 

2004 

CWP 

Source 

2004 CWP Goal Target 

Date FAA’s 2006 Updated Progress 

Increased Work 

Efficiency 

3.3.1 

(pp.24-

25) 

10-percent productivity 

/ staff savings. FY 2010 

Achieved 3-percent productivity increase 

based on staff reduction only for 

FY 2005. FAA indicated that it had no 

methodology to measure the impact of 

most other productivity initiatives. 

Flexible Work 

Schedules 

3.3.2 & 

3.3.3 

(pp.25-

26) 

Part-time and splitshifts may reduce labor 

costs and offer 

employees job 

flexibility. 

Unknown 

No progress noted in 2006 Update, as the 

new contract for controllers was 

implemented in Sept. 2006, after the 

2006 Update was issued. 

Overtime 

Management 

3.3.4 

(p.26) 

Reduced overtime 

costs and staffing. FY 2005 Overtime was held to FY 2004 levels with reduced staffing. 

Reduction of 

Sick Leave 

Usage 

3.3.5 

(pp.5 & 

27) 

8-percent reduction 

(Approx equivalent 

savings: 73 

controllers). 

FY 2006 

FY 2005 sick leave usage “slightly 

below” FY 2004 (exact percentage not 

reported). 

Reduction in 

Workers’ 

Compensation 

3.3.6 

(p.28) 

Revised management 

approach will be 

implemented agencywide. 

FY 2007 

New management of claims estimated 

cost avoidance of $5.4 million. Return -

To-Work cost avoidance estimated at 

$1 million 

Limiting Official 

Time to 

Negotiated 

Hours 

3.3.7 

(p.29) 

Reduce official time 

used for union 

representational duties. 

March 

2005 

Official time reporting system 

implemented in FY 2005. ATO to 

ensure all official time in accord with the 

new contract for controllers. Ten fulltime persons returned to the workforce. 

Limiting 

Controller 

Participation on 

Workgroups 

3.3.8 

(p.29) 

Institute more judicious 

use of controller 

participation and 

reduce backfill 

overtime. 

Unknown 

Participation reduced by 23,400 hrs 

(-37 percent from FY 2004). Cost 

savings = almost $1 million. 

Processing 

Unsuccessful 

Developmentals 

3.3.9 

(p.30) 

Uphold policies stated 

in FAPM Letter 330-1 

to help remedy staffing 

imbalance between 

terminal and en route 

facilities. 

Current 

policy 

Developmental performance results not 

yet reported for FY 2006. 
25

Exhibit C. Status of Various Productivity Initiatives Included in the 

Controller Workforce Plan 

2004 CWP 

Productivity 

Initiative 

2004 

CWP 

Source 

2004 CWP Goal Target 

Date FAA’s 2006 Updated Progress 

Scheduling Tool 3.3.11 

(p.31) 

Improve the efficiency 

of facility-based 

controller work 

schedules. 

Unknown 

Vendor selected in April 2006. Pilot 

evaluation started in May 2006. 

National deployment in FY 2007 and 

beyond. 

Implementation 

of Cru-X/ART 

3.3.12 

(p.31) 

More efficient 

controller utilization. 

Final phase 

begins June 

2005 

Deployment to all en route and terminal 

facilities complete. 

Changing 

National 

Airspace 

Technologies 

3.3.13 

(pp.31-

32) 

Improve automation 

and timely availability 

of data to controllers to 

reduce the staffing 

requirement. 

Unknown 

Fielding and implementation of 

numerous technologies is ongoing and 

projected into the future as far as 2025. 

Facility CoLocation and 

Consolidations 

3.3.13.1 

(p.33) 

Consolidate several 

small facilities to 

decrease operations, 

maintenance, and 

infrastructure costs. 

Unknown Terminal and en route co-location and 

realignment studies are in progress. 
26

Exhibit D. Major Contributors 

EXHIBIT D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS 

Daniel Raville Program Director 

Robert A. Romich Project Manager 

Erik Phillips Senior Analyst 

Mi Hwa Button Analyst 

Claudia Estrada Analyst 

Benjamin Huddle Analyst 

Andrea Nossaman Writer/Editor 
27

Exhibit E. Related Office of Inspector General Reports (2002-2006) 

EXHIBIT E. RELATED OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

REPORTS (2002 – 2006) 

• CC-2006-074, “Observations on FAA’s Oversight of Aviation Safety,” 

September 20, 2006. 

• CC-2006-027, “Perspectives on FAA’s FY 2007 Budget Request and the 

Aviation Trust Fund,” March 28, 2006. 

• AV-2006-021, “FAA Has Opportunities To Reduce Academy Training 

Time and Costs by Increasing Educational Requirements for Newly Hired 

Air Traffic Controllers,” December 2005. 

• AV-2005-060, “Controller Staffing: Observations on FAA’s 10-Year 

Strategy for the Air Traffic Controller Workforce,” May 26, 2005. 

• CC-2005-022, “Next Steps for the Air Traffic Organization,” April 14, 

2005. 

• AV-2004-081, “FAA’s Actions To Address Leave and Overtime Abuse at 

Five Locations,” September 9, 2004. 

• CC-2004-058, “Addressing Controller Attrition: Opportunities and 

Challenges Facing the Federal Aviation Administration,” June 15, 2004. 

• AV-2004-060, “Opportunities To Improve FAA’s Process for Placing and 

Training Air Traffic Controllers in Light of Pending Retirements,” June 2, 

2004. 

• AV-2004-033, “Using CRU-X To Capture Official Time Spent on 

Representational Activities,” February 13, 2004. 

• AV-2003-059, “FAA’s Management of Memorandums of Understanding 

with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association,” September 12, 

2003. 

• AV-2003-011, “FAA’s Oversight of Workers’ Compensation Claims in Air 

Traffic Services,” January 17, 2003. 

• AV-2002-064, “Automated Flight Service Stations: Significant Benefits 

Could be Realized by Consolidating AFSS Sites in Conjunction with 

Deployment of OASIS,” December 7, 2001. 

These reports can be found on the OIG website at www.oig.dot.gov. 
28

Appendix. Management Comments 

APPENDIX. MANAGEMENT COMMENTS 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

Memo 

To: Principal Assistant Inspector General for Auditing and Evaluation 

From: Assistant Administrator for Financial Services and Chief Financial Officer 

Date: February 8, 2007 

Re: ACTION: Draft Report: FAA Continues To Make Progress in 

Implementing Its Controller Workforce Plan, but Further Efforts Are 

Needed in Several Key Areas Project Number 06A3010A000 

As requested in your memorandum dated December 15, 2006, the following is the 

Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) response to the subject draft report. 

1. OIG Recommendation: Include in the next update of the Plan the progress 

made by the Agency and its contractors in validating facility staffing standards 

including the number of facilities completed, the staffing ranges established for 

each of those locations, and the estimated completion date for all remaining 

facilities. 

FAA Comments: Concur. As described in chapter 3 of the 2006 Plan, 

staffing requirements are fluid and can be impacted by a number of variables. 

FAA plans to publish staffing ranges for all facilities in the next update of the 

Plan and subsequent plans will be updated with revised ranges as the families 

of staffing models are revised. We will make facility-specific adjustments as 

necessary throughout the year, as we did last year. 

2. OIG Recommendation: Refine its methodology for projecting controller 

retirements so that events that have the potential to significantly impact 

controller retirements (similar to what occurred in September 2006) are taken 

into consideration. 

FAA Comments: Non-Concur. As noted in the Inspector General’s report, 

the FAA made improvements to its methodology for projecting controller 
29

Appendix. Management Comments 

retirements. In the first six months of FY06, FAA’s projections tracked very 

close to actual retirements. However, in the second half of FY06, actual 

retirements versus projections began to diverge, most likely as a result of the 

rhetoric associated with the contract impasse. Even so, the FAA was able to 

proactively increase its planned new hires during the last quarter of the year to 

compensate for the increased retirements. Rather than refining the 

methodology to account for one-time events, the FAA believes the ability to 

adjust the hiring pipeline is a more appropriate way to deal with unpredictable 

events which may affect controller retirements. 

We note that for the first quarter of FY07, actual retirements are running about 

42 per month, which is in line with projections. We do expect a significant 

spike for the month of January, as this is typical in previous years as well. In 

October 2006 we set up our pipeline to accommodate more new hires than 

expected losses in the event that projections are inaccurate or other unforeseen 

circumstances occur. 

Finally, with respect to the 20% reduction in CIP, it is the agency’s intent to 

replace CIP with a more focused program designed to address retention and 

recruitment at hard to staff facilities. We believe this will mitigate the effect, 

if any, on retirements as a result of changes in the CIP program. 

3. OIG Recommendation: Issue clear instructions to all air traffic facilities on 

exactly what data should be included and how those data should be entered 

into the OJT national database. 

FAA Comments: Concur. 

4. OIG Recommendation: Begin using the OJT national database to (a) 

determine whether training resources can be used more efficiently and 

effectively, (b) identify best practices, and (c) identify and investigate 

instances where excessive time lapses in the OJT process occurred. 

FAA Comments: Concur. 

While the IG pointed out a single facility where training gaps were still 

occurring, we note that since we have begun focusing on the OJT process, 

there have been improvements at various facilities. ATO has implemented the 

OJT database in both Enroute and Terminal training operations. Enroute has 

two training metrics in the FY07 Strategic Management Plan (SMP) which 

rely on queries from the database. The first metric measures the "three years 

to CPC" guidance in the FAA flight plan and the second measures progress in 

the individual stages of training: "90% of our developmentals must be on 

track in their stage training." Enroute is reviewing these measures monthly 
30

Appendix. Management Comments 

with all 20 centers and questioning individual facility training efficiency and 

practices. 

• OIG Recommendation: Establish baseline metrics for all of the initiatives in 

the 2004 plan and annually evaluate actual progress made in (a) implementing 

each initiative and (b) achieving the anticipated staffing reduction of 10 

percent. 

• FAA Comments: Concur, in part. The Controller Workforce Plan was 

developed at the request of Congress to ensure that we have a plan to replace 

retiring controllers. As part of the Plan, there were more than 35 separate 

initiatives listed in the 2004 Plan, most of which are interdependent (nonseparable) and/or have no costs associated with them. Therefore, they cannot 

be baselined to derive meaningful quantifiable measures tied to productivity. 

In addition, broad changes realized as a result of our contract negotiations 

impact the initiatives identified in the 2004 Plan and present new opportunities 

for improvement. 

We can, however, show that we are achieving total productivity, as measured 

by bottom line improvements. We will continue to provide status updates for 

initiatives that will help the agency achieve the total productivity goal, but 

estimating the contribution of each initiative is labor intensive, costly, and 

would divert resources. 

• OIG Recommendation: Develop detailed cost estimates and offsets that 

identify the annual and total net costs associated with the 2004 Plan. 

FAA Comments: Concur, in part. Determining the total cost of 

implementing the plan is difficult to calculate because the cost to hire and train 

the new controllers is embedded in the agency’s annual budget. Further, since 

improvements are made each year, total 10 year costs would vary from year to 

year in the plan. Annually, the budget identifies training and hiring costs as 

well as cost savings from some FAA initiatives. The previous budget (FY 

2006) included a discretionary increase to expand Academy training in order 

for the agency to have adequate funding to train new staff consistent with 

targets set in the plan. In addition, developmental controllers in various stages 

of training actually perform controller work as they move towards CPC status, 

so those salaries are included in the PC&B costs of our budget request. In 

addition, this year’s plan will have some cost information. 
The following pages contain textual versions of the graphs and charts found in this 

document. These pages were not in the original document but have been added here 

to accommodate assistive technology. 
The Federal Aviation Administration Continues To Make Progress in 

Implementing Its Controller Workforce Plan, but Further Efforts Are Needed in 

Several Key Areas 

Section 508 Compliant Presentation 

Figure 1. Some of the Various Numbers Used To Define National Staffing 

Requirements 

Controllers by Facility Type Fiscal Year 

2006 Staffing 

Standard 

Interim 

Staffing 

Target 

Actual On 

Board 

Number of En Route Controllers 7,760 5,695 6,603

Number of Terminal Controllers 7,297 7,807 7,676

Total 15,057 13,502 14,279

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Figure 2. Various Numbers Used To Define Controller Requirements for Two 

Facilities 

Controller Locations Actual On 

Board 

Fiscal Year 

2006 

Staffing 

Standard 

Interim 

Staffing 

Target 

Negotiated 

Number 

Number at New York 

TRACON 

190 179 199 270

Number at Washington 

Center 

371 485 337 412

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Figure 3. The Federal Aviation Administration’s Controller Retirement 

Projections Versus Actual Retirements 

Figure 3a. Fiscal Year 2005 Projections Versus Actual Retirements 

Controller Retirement Fiscal Year 2005 

2004 Plan Retirement Projections 341 

Actual Retirements 465 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

 Figure 3b. Fiscal Year 2006 Projections Versus Actual Retirements 

Controller Retirement Fiscal Year 2006 

2004 Plan Retirement Projections 439 

2006 Update (Anticipated Retirements During FY 2006) 467 

Actual Retirements 583 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 
The Figure 3 charts illustrate that the 2004 plan projected that 341 air traffic 

controllers would retire in fiscal year 2005, and 439 would retire in fiscal year 2006. 

Actual retirements for fiscal year 2005, however, were 465 controllers. The 2006 

update revised anticipated retirements in fiscal year 2006 from 439 to 467. However, 

583 controllers actually retired during fiscal year 2006. 

Figure 4. The Federal Aviation Administration’s Total Projected Controller 

Losses*

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 2004 Plan and 2006 Update. 

 *Total losses include retirements, resignations, removals, deaths, training failures, 

 and promotions. 

Figure 5. Federal Aviation Administration Fiscal Year 2006 Projected 

Retirements Versus Actual Retirements 

Month and Fiscal Year Projected Fiscal 

Year 2006 

Actual Fiscal 

Year 2006 

October 2005 17 15 

November 2005 25 26 

December 2005 40 23 

January 2006 99 103 

February 2006 21 32 

March 2006 29 26 

April 2006 49 52 

May 2006 23 40 

June 2006 47 64 

July 2006 48 55 

August 2006 26 50 

September 2006 39 97 

 Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Fiscal Year 2004 Plan 

Total Losses 

2006 Update 

Total Losses 

2006 654 800 

2007 907 1,007 

2008 967 1,008 

2009 1,032 1,017 

2010 1,144 1,051 

2011 1,249 1,098 

2012 1,375 1,167 

2013 1,451 1,107 

2014 1,559 1,059 
During the first 6 months of fiscal year 2006, the Federal Aviation Administration’s 

projections were extremely close to the actual number of retirements. However, 

beginning in April 2006, actual retirements began exceeding the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s projections when negotiations between the Agency and the National 

Air Traffic Controllers Association over a new collective bargaining agreement 

reached an impasse. By September, when the Federal Aviation Administration began 

unilaterally implementing its own proposals for open Articles, actual retirements were 

nearly three times high than the Federal Aviation Administration had projected, which 

underscores the need for the Agency to refine its methodology to consider future 

events that could trigger a similar reaction. 

For example, there may be a significant jump in controller retirements during January 

2007 when many controllers will see a reduction in their pay checks as the Federal 

Aviation Administration begins phasing out, a second locality pay that many 

controllers now receive. 

Figure 6. Federal Aviation Administration’s Controller Hiring Estimates 

 Figure 6a. Fiscal Year 2005 Estimates Versus Actual Hires 

Controller Hiring Fiscal Year 

2005 

2004 Plan Hiring Projections 435 

Actual Number of Controllers Hired 519 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

 Figure 6b. Fiscal Year 2006 Estimates Versus Actual Hires 

Controller Hiring Fiscal Year 

2006 

2004 Plan Hiring Projections 1,249 

2006 Update (Anticipated New Hires Needed During Fiscal Year 

2006) 

 930 

Actual Number of Controllers Hired 1,116 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Because actual controller retirements were more than the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s projections in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006, FAA hired more 

controllers than they had anticipated. As illustrated in Figure 6, the 2004 plan 

projected a need for 435 new controllers in FY 2005. The Federal Aviation 

Administration hired 519 controllers. Likewise, the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s 2006 update projected a need for 930 new controllers in fiscal year 

2006, while 1,116 new controllers were actually hired. The increased hiring levels 

were possible because the Federal Aviation Administration has made progress in 

streamlining the controller hiring process.