alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 105-64.104 What must the system manager tell me when soliciting personal information?

When soliciting information from you or a third party for a system of records, system managers must: Cite the authority for collecting the information; say whether providing the information is mandatory or voluntary; give the purpose for which the information will be used; state the routine uses of the information; and describe the effect on you, if any, of not providing the information. This information is found in the Privacy Act Statement. Any form that asks for personal information will contain this statement.
#### § 301-51.8 May I use the Government contractor-issued travel charge card for personal reasons while on official travel?

No, you may not use the Government contractor-issued travel charge card for personal reasons while on official travel.

[FTR Amdt. 2010-02, 75 FR 24436, May 5, 2010. Redesignated by FTR Amdt. 2016-01, 81 FR 63138, Sept. 14, 2016]
46597.

#### COX v. BALLARD.

(377 SE2d 842)

Decided April 6, 1989.

*Russell L. Adkins, Jr.,*for appellant.

Clarke, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant Joe Cox is incarcerated under a contempt order because of his failure to pay amounts due under the terms of a divorce decree. We affirm.

The contempt order provides that Mr. Cox may purge himself and secure release by paying the amount found due in the order. Mr. Cox did not seek to appeal the contempt order. Instead, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In this appeal Mr. Cox raises several issues relating to the merits of the initial contempt order. These cannot be reached. Because he did not appeal the initial contempt order, the only matters of state law that could be reached in this action are (1) whether the initial contempt order is void (as for lack of jurisdiction); and (2) whether his current or continued restraint is unlawful. *Wilkins v. Stynchcombe,*238 Ga. 306 (232 SE2d 564) (1977). Mr. Cox does not raise either of these issues.

To the extent that the petition seeks to raise constitutional issues relating to error in the contempt proceedings, we hold that the reasoning of *Valenzuela v. Newsome,*253 Ga. 793 (325 SE2d 370) (1985), applies here. The analysis set forth in *Valenzuela*is pertinent notwithstanding that *Valenzuela*construed OCGA § 9-14-42, which relates to post-conviction habeas cases. Thus, Mr. Cox is barred from raising for the first time in a petition for habeas corpus any claim that could have been raised in the trial court and on appeal, unless he can demonstrate adequate cause for failing to assert the claim and resulting prejudice. If “cause” and “prejudice” are not shown, a claim may be adjudicated for the first time by a habeas court only if a miscarriage of justice would result from the procedural bar. Id. None of these matters are raised or addressed in this appeal.

In sum, Mr. Cox’s best hope for release, short of paying the money he owes, lies in seeking relief from the court that issued the contempt order. *Wilkins,*supra; *Tolleson v. Greene,*83 Ga. 499 (10 SE 120) (1889).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*177
      *Shriver & Earl, Mark 0. Shriver,*for appellee.
| 1.   | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company      as of and for the period covered by theReport. |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | Date:  November      16, 2009 | /s/ DOUGLAS J. ANDREA                                                                                                |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                    | Douglas      J. AndreaChairman      of the Board,President,      Chief ExecutiveOfficer      and Corporate Secretary |
|   |                                    |                                                                                                                 |
|   |                                    | /s/ CORISA L. GUIFFRE                                                                                                |
|   |                                    | Corisa      L. GuiffreVice      President, Chief FinancialOfficer      and Assistant CorporateSecretary              |
# Comments on: 2020-1074: Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi
#### § 302-3.513 May we allow a travel advance for tour renewal agreement travel?

No, you cannot allow a travel advance for tour renewal agreement travel.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 126 (Thursday, June 29, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 40129]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-16479]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Corporation for National Research Initiatives: 
Cross Industry Working Team (``XIWT'') Project

    Notice is hereby given that, on January 12, 2000, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Corporation For National 
Research Initiatives: Cross Industry Working Team (``XIWT'') has filed 
written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the 
Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership status. 
The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, AT&T Laboratories, 
Florham Park, NJ; CitiGroup, New York, NY; MCI Worldcom, Reston, VA; 
Telecordia Technologies, Inc., Morristown, NJ; Enron Broadband 
Services, Inc., Portland, OR; US West, Inc., Boulder, CO; and Virtual 
Networks, Sunnyvale, CA have been added as parties to this venture. 
Also, Citicorp, New York, NY; MCI Communications, Richardson, TX; US 
West Communications, Boulder, CO; Inverse Network Technologies, 
Sunnyvale, CA AT&T Communications, Florham Park, NJ; Bellcore, 
Morristown, NJ; Sun Microsystems, Mountain View, CA; Texas Instruments, 
Dallas, TX; Ameritech, Chicago, IL; Bell Atlantic, Philadelphia, PA; 
Novell, Provo, UT; Southwestern Bell, St. Louis, MO; CyberCash, Reston, 
VA; Houston Associates, Silver Spring, MD; InterTrust Technologies, 
Sunnyvale, CA; Pitney Bowes, Stanford, CT; and The New York Times, New 
York, NY have been dropped as parties to this venture.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and Corporation For National Research 
Initiatives: Cross Industry Working Team (``XIWT'') intends to file 
additional written notification disclosing all changes in membership.
    On September 28, 1993, the Corporation For National Research 
Initiatives: Cross Industry Working Team (``XIWT'') filed its original 
notification pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of 
Justice published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 
6(b) of the Act on December 17, 1993 (58 FR 66022).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on January 20, 
1999. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the Act on May 20, 1999 (64 FR 27603).

Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 00-16479 Filed 6-28-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
Filed 9/14/20 P. v. Mariscal CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOS E MARISCAL

,

Defendant and Appellant. B 302525

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA149858 )

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Jud ge. Dismissed

.

William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________

In 1997, a jury convicted Mariscal of three counts of
attempted premeditated murder, and found true that he2

personally used a firearm, and inflicted great bodily injury in the

commission of each count. The trial court sentenced him to three
consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole plus 39
years and ordered him to pay a $10,000 restitution fine.
In April 2018, Mariscal filed a motion in the trial court
requesting reduction of the $10,000 fine. He argued the fine was

excessive and unauthorized, and his trial counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to raise an objection based on his
inability to pa y the fine. The court summarily denied the motion.
In July 2019, Mariscal filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the trial court seeking a hearing on his ability to pay
the restitution fine. He argued the imposition of the fine without
a hearing on his ability to pay violated his right to due process

under People v. Due ñ as (2019) 30 Cal.App. 5th 1157. The District
Attorney argued the habeas petition should be denied because
Mariscal had waived his right to an ability to pay hearing by
failing to raise the issue at sentencing. The court denied the
petition.
Mariscal appealed the order and this court appointed
counsel to represent him. After examining the record, counsel
filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)

25 Cal.3d 436 th at raise d no issues. On June 18, 2020, we sent
Mariscal a letter advising he could personally submit a
supplemental brief within 30 days. We received no response.

We have examined the record and are satisfied Mariscal’s
attorney on appeal has complied with the responsibilities of
counsel and no arguable issue exists. ( Wende, supra , 25 Cal.3d at

p. 441.) No appeal lies from an order denying a petition for writ

of h abeas corpus. ( Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 836 [“ A
petitioner currently has no right to appeal from a superior court3

denial of habeas corpus relief. Instead, review is obtained by
filing a new habeas corpus petition in a higher court.” ] .)

DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

RUBIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOOR, J

.

KIM, J.
#### § 302-8.301 What obligations do I have if I do not report for service at the beginning of the next school year?

If you do not report for service at the beginning of the next school year, you must repay the Government for the cost of the extended storage of your HHG during the recess. Except for reasons beyond your control and acceptable to DoD, you shall be obligated to reimburse DoD the amount paid for the commercial storage, including related services. If, however, the property was stored in a Government facility, you shall pay DoD an amount equal to the reasonable value of the storage furnished, including related services.
§ 302-15.70 What governing policies must we establish for the allowance for property management services? You must establish policies and procedures governing: ( a ) When you will authorize payment for property management services for an employee who transfers in the interest of the Government;
( b ) When it is appropriate to authorize this service on a reimbursable basis to the employee, rather than paying the property management company directly, as long as any reimbursement is equal to or less than the agency negotiated rate for this service (agencies may require that employees hire only licensed and/or certified property managers).
( c ) Who will determine, for relocations to official duty stations in the United States, whether payment for property management services is more advantageous and cost effective than sale of an employee's residence at Government expense;
( d ) If and when you will allow an employee who was offered and accepted payment for property management services to change the employee's residence at Government expense in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
( e ) How you will offset expenses you have paid for property management services against payable expenses for sale of the employee's residence when an eligible employee who elected payment for property management services later changes their mind and elects instead to sell their residence at Government expense.
[FTR Amdt. 2011-01, 76 FR 18344, Apr. 1, 2011, as amended by FTR Case 2022-05, 89 FR 12256, Feb. 16, 2024]
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4172 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4172

 To amend the Small Business Act to increase authorization levels for 
             the small business development center program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 12, 1994

 Mr. Machtley introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Small Business

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Small Business Act to increase authorization levels for 
             the small business development center program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CENTER 
              PROGRAM.

    Section 21(a)(4) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 648(a)(4)) is 
amended by inserting after ``a $70,000,000 program'' the following: 
``for fiscal year 1994, an $84,000,000 program for fiscal year 1995, a 
$98,000,000 program for fiscal year 1996, a $112,000,000 program for 
fiscal year 1997, a $126,000,000 program for fiscal year 1998, and a 
$140,000,000 program for fiscal year 1999''.

                                 <all>
```
# Comments on: 22-153: In Re MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC. [ORDER], Precedential
Submitted on record and briefs May 19,

reversed and remanded for new trial July 26, 1995

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Respondent, v.*JOHNNY WILFORD DEWEY McBRIDE, *Appellant.*

(M94-01-0026; CA A86031)

899 P2d 1218

John W. D. McBride filed the brief *pro se.*

Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Ann Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Warren, Presiding Judge, and Edmonds and Armstrong, Judges.

PER CURIAM

*691PER CURIAM

In a trial to the court, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of firearms. We reverse and remand.

Defendant raises several assignments of error. Because it is dispositive, we address only his assignment that the trial court erred in trying the case without first determining whether defendant had waived his right to a jury trial.

Defendant correctly observes that there is no evidence in the record that he executed a written waiver. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and ORS 136.001 require a written waiver of a defendant’s right to a jury trial. *State v. McDaniel,*96 Or App 337, 772 P2d 951, *rev den*308 Or 382 (1989).

The state argues that, because defendant did not object to the bench trial, he waived his right to a trial by jury. Alternatively, it asserts that defendant, in fact, executed a written waiver, which is now inexplicably absent from the record. We reject those arguments.

There is no evidence that defendant executed a written waiver. Further, the other evidence in the record referred to by the state that defendant orally waived his right to a jury trial is not persuasive. *See State v. Huntley,*112 Or App 22, 24, 827 P2d 918 (1992).

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
No. 10-10986.

#### Duckett *v.*Tucker, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT SANDR O M E LVIN C A RR ILLOC OC OM , Pe titione r, v. ER IC H. HOLDER , Jr., Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R

e sponde nt . No. 12-73209 Age n c y No. A088-450-111 M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for Re vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a ls Subm itte d

M ay 13, 2014 ** B e fore : C LIFTON, B EA, a nd WATFORD, C irc uit Judge s. Sandro M e lvin C arrillo-C oc o m , a native and c itiz e n of B e l iz e , pe titions for re vie w of the B oa

rd of Im m igration Appe a ls’ (“ B IA” ) orde r dism issing his a ppe a l from an im m igration judge ’ s (“ IJ” ) de c ision de ny ing his a pplic at ion for a sy lum and withholding of re

m o va l . W e have jurisdic tion unde r 8 U.S.C . § 1252. W e 

# FIL ED MAY23 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).re vie w for substa ntia l e vide nc e the a ge nc y ’ s fa c tua l findings, N agoulk o v . IN S , 333 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th C ir. 2003), a n d de novo c la im s of due proc e ss viola tions, C olme nar v . IN

S , 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th C i r. 2000). W e de ny the pe tition for re vie w. Substa ntia l e v i de nc e supports the a ge nc y ’ s de te rm ination tha t the thre ats, roc k -throwing, a

nd e c onom i c de priva

t ion C arrillo-C oc om

e xpe rie nc e d on a c c ount of his m e m

be rship in theFre e m a sons, e v e n c onside re d c um u lative l y , did not rise

to the l e ve l of pa st pe rse c ution. Se e N agoulk o , 333 F.3d a

t 1016 (disc rim ination, ha ra ssm e nt, a

nd phy sic a l e nc o unte rs without a ny signific a nt phy sic a l viole n c e did not c om pe l finding of pa st pe rse c ution). Substa ntia l e vide n c e a lso supports the a ge nc y ’ s de te rm i n ation tha t C arrillo-C oc om

fa ile d to de m onstra

te a we ll-founde d fe ar of future pe rse c ution on a c c ount of his Fre e m a son or politic a l pa rty m e m b e rship. Id. at 1018. W e re je c t C arrillo-C oc om ’ s c onte ntion tha t the B IA’ s de c ision la c ke d s uffic ie nt c la rity , se eLata v . IN

S, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th C ir. 2000) (re quiring e rror and pre judic e to pre va il on a due proc e ss c la im ), and we re je c t his c onte ntion tha

t the IJ a nd B IA ove rlooke d ke y

e vide nc e in the re c ord, se e Almaghzar v . Gonzale

s , 457 F.3d 915, 921-22 (9th C ir. 2006). Ac c ordingly , C arrillo-C oc om ’ s a sy lum c la i m fa ils. B e c a use C a rrillo-C o c om

fa ile d to m e e t the lowe r sta

nda rd of proof for 1 2 - 7 3 2 0 9 2a sy lum , his c la im for withholding of rem ova l ne c e ssa rily fa ils. Se eZe haty ev . Gonzale s , 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th C ir. 2006). PE T IT IO N FO R RE V IE WDE NIE D.

1 2 - 7 3 2 0 9 3
#### § 0.482 Application for waiver of wireless radio service rules.

All requests for waiver of the rules (see § 1.925 of this chapter) governing the Wireless Radio Services (see § 1.907 of this chapter) that require a fee (see § 1.1102 of this chapter) shall be submitted via the Universal Licensing System. Waiver requests that do not require a fee should be submitted via the Universal Licensing System or to: Federal Communications Commission, 1270 Fairfield Road, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325-7245. Waiver requests attached to applications must be submitted in accordance with § 0.401(b) or § 0.401(c) of the rules.

[63 FR 68919, Dec. 14, 1998, as amended at 73 FR 9018, Feb. 19, 2008; 88 FR 44736, July 13, 2023]
[FR Doc. 00-16490  Filed 6-29-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810-35-C
# Comments on: 2018-1300: ABB, Inc. v. US
#### §§ 301-10.182-301-10.189 [Reserved]
Exhibit
10.2


 


July
30, 2016


 


HealthLynked
Corp.


1726
Medical Blvd Suite 101


Naples,
Florida 34110


 


Re:
Conversion of Convertible Preferred Stock


 


To
Whom It May Concern:


 


Please
accept this letter as notice that I am hereby converting my 2,953,840 shares of HealthLynked Series A convertible preferred stock
into 2,953,840 shares of HealthLynked common stock.


 


Sincerely,


 


	/s/
    Dr. Michael Dent	 
	Dr.
    Michael Dent