UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

Case No. 

RENÉ GARCIA, JAVIER FERNÁNDEZ,

CRYSTAL WAGAR, MACK BERNARD

and WILLIAM PROCTOR,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

KERRIE J. STILLMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in her official

capacity; JOHN GRANT, CHAIRMAN, FLORIDA

COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in his official capacity; 

GLENTON “GLEN” GILZEAN, JR., VICE CHAIRMAN, 

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in his official 

capacity; MICHELLE ANCHORS, COMMISSIONER, 

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in her official 

capacity; WILLIAM P. CERVONE, COMMISSIONER, 

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in his official 

capacity; DON GAETZ, COMMISSIONER, FLORIDA 

COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in his official capacity; 

WILLIAM “WILLIE” N. MEGGS, COMMISSIONER, 

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in his official 

capacity; ED H. MOORE, COMMISSIONER,

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in his official

capacity; WENGAY M. NEWTON, SR., COMMISSIONER,

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON ETHICS, in his official capacity; 

JIM WALDMAN, COMMISSIONER, FLORIDA COMMISSION

ON ETHICS, in his official capacity; ASHLEY MOODY, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, in her official 

capacity; and JIMMY PATRONIS, CHIEF FINANCIAL

OFFICER, STATE OF FLORIDA, in his official capacity,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS

AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

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Plaintiffs René Garcia, Javier Fernández, Crystal Wagar, Mack Bernard and William 

Proctor (“Plaintiffs”) sue Kerrie J. Stillman, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the 

Florida Commission on Ethics; John Grant, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Florida 

Commission on Ethics; Glenton “Glen” Gilzean, Jr., in his official capacity as Vice Chairman of 

the Florida Commission on Ethics; Michelle Anchors, in her official capacity as commissioner on 

the Florida Commission on Ethics; William P. Cervone, in his official capacity as commissioner 

on the Florida Commission on Ethics; Don Gaetz, in his official capacity as commissioner on the 

Florida Commission on Ethics; William “Willie” N. Meggs, in his official capacity as 

commissioner on the Florida Commission on Ethics; Ed H. Moore, in his official capacity as 

commissioner on the Florida Commission on Ethics; Wengay M. Newton, Sr., in his official 

capacity as commissioner on the Florida Commission on Ethics; Jim Waldman, in his official 

capacity as commissioner on the Florida Commission on Ethics Ashley Moody in her official 

capacity as Attorney General of the State of Florida, Jimmy Patronis in his official capacity as 

Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida (collectively, “Defendants”). 

This lawsuit presents a constitutional challenge to the unprecedented ban on protected 

speech in the form of lobbying by any current elected officials, with a 6-year lobbying ban for all 

former elected officials. This prohibition is imposed by a provision of the Florida Constitution 

that becomes effective December 31, 2022. Because this constitutional provision and its statutory 

implementation infringe on core First Amendment political speech and impose significant 

penalties, immediate relief is required while the Court resolves the claims raised. In support of this 

constitutional challenge, the plaintiffs state:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action to vindicate core First Amendment rights of free speech, freedom 

of association and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, all of which are 

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infringed by overly broad and burdensome provisions of the Florida Constitution, Article 2, 

Section 8(f) and Section 8(h)(2), and certain enabling provisions of Florida Statutes, enacted as 

Section 112.3122, Fla. Stat. (2022).

2. In 2018, Florida voters approved revisions to Article II, Section 8 of the Florida 

Constitution contained in Amendment 12 proposed by the Florida Constitutional Revision 

Commission that impose unprecedented new restrictions on lobbying by current and former public 

officers and take effect on December 31, 2022. 

3. Under this amendment to Article II, Section 8, all current “public officers” are 

prohibited from engaging in compensated lobbying in virtually any capacity. The ban bars 

lobbying with “the federal government, the legislature, any state government body or agency, or 

any political subdivision of this state, during his or her term of office.” Fla. Const., Art. II, § 

8(f)(2). Amendment 12 defines a “public officer” as “a statewide elected officer, a member of the 

legislature, a county commissioner, a county officer pursuant to Article VIII or county charter, a 

school board member, a superintendent of schools, an elected municipal officer, an elected special 

district officer in a special district with ad valorem taxing or other agency head of a department of 

the executive branch of state government.” Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f)(1).

4. The constitutional revisions in Amendment 12 prohibit a public officer from 

lobbying his or her former agency or office for a period of six years after leaving office. Fla. Const., 

Art. II, § 8(f)(3). It also extends the lobbying ban to include all Florida agencies in the case of a 

statewide or legislative officer or executive branch agency head. 

5. The Florida Legislature also enacted an implementing statute that empowers the 

Florida Commission on Ethics to investigate potential violations of Article II, Section 8. 

Violations of this section of the Florida Constitution may result in penalties including (1) public 

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censure and reprimand; (2) a civil penalty of up to $10,000; and (3) forfeiture of any pecuniary 

benefits received for conduct violating the constitutional provision and statute. Fla. Stat. § 

112.3122(4). These penalties may be imposed by the Governor, and both the Attorney General 

and the Chief Financial Officer are authorized to collect the financial penalties. Fla. Stat. § 

112.3122(3) & (5). This statute takes effect on December 31, 2022.

6. These expansive new restrictions on lobbying profoundly and impermissibly 

constrain core First Amendment rights of current and former public officials. Lobbying – that is, 

the practice of directly communicating with government decisionmakers to inform and influence 

government policy and practice – has long been recognized as conduct entitled to robust protection 

under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. 

Cir. 1967) (“every person or group engaged...in trying to persuade [government] action is 

exercising the First Amendment right of petition”). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court 

acknowledged “a speaker's rights are not lost merely because compensation is received; a speaker 

is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to speak.” Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.

Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 

265-66 (1964)).

7. While the term “lobbyist” has unfairly “become encrusted with invidious 

connotations,” Liberty Lobby, 390 F.2d at 491, lobbyists are employed not only by private actors 

but also by nonprofit organizations, advocacy groups, charities and faith-based organizations, and 

even by governments themselves. Lobbying is essential to ensure the exchange of information 

and ideas between government decisionmakers and those segments of the public who may be 

directly impacted by the government’s decisions. Lobbying goes to the heart of the democratic 

process. It is for this very reason that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 

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expressly protects the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, along with the 

rights to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. 

8. The new restrictions on lobbying by current and former public officers in Florida 

contained in Amendment 12 to the Florida Constitution that take effect on December 31, 2022, 

unjustifiably and unconstitutionally restrict Plaintiffs’ core political speech rights, associational 

rights and rights to petition the government in violation of the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, and also unconstitutionally discriminate against the Plaintiffs in violation of 

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

These same protections are contained in the Florida Declaration of Rights, Article I, Florida 

Constitution. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment and injunctive relief enjoining 

Defendants from enforcing against Plaintiffs the provisions set forth in the 2018 amendments to 

Article 2, Section 8, to the Florida Constitution as implemented by Section 112.3122, of the 

Florida Statutes (together, the “Advocacy Restrictions”). For the reasons discussed herein, the 

Advocacy Restrictions are facially unconstitutional and as applied. They should be declared 

invalid by this Court.

THE PARTIES

9. Plaintiff René Garcia is a Miami-Dade County Commissioner elected in 2020, who 

previously served as a councilman with the City of Hialeah and as a State Senator and as a member 

of the Florida House of Representatives. Mr. Garcia is also Executive Vice President of New 

Century Partnership, LLC, a business consulting firm he co-founded whose services include 

lobbying and government affairs advisory services. Mr. Garcia anticipates providing immediate 

lobbying services to his clients with New Century.

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10. Plaintiff Javier Fernández was elected as Mayor of the City of South Miami in 

2022. Previously, he served as a member of the Florida House of Representatives. Mr. Fernández 

is an attorney with the law firm Sanchez-Medina, Gonzalez, Quesada, Lage, Gomez & Machado, 

LLP. As part of his law practice, Mr. Fernández frequently represents clients before county and 

municipal boards and agencies.

11. Plaintiff Crystal Wagar is an elected member of the Village Council of Miami 

Shores, Florida. She is also an employee of the Southern Group, a lobbying and government affairs 

firm with offices throughout the state of Florida. As part of her duties with the Southern Group, 

Ms. Wagar performs lobbying activities within the meaning of Article II, Section 8 of the Florida 

Constitution and Fla. Stat. § 112.3122, and she intends to continue with those activities after 

December 31, 2022. However, the new revisions to the Florida Constitution will not permit Ms. 

Wagar to continue with her work for Southern Group and remain on the Miami Shores Village 

Council.

12. Plaintiff Mack Bernard is a Palm Beach County Commissioner, who previously 

served as a Delray Beach City Commissioner and as a member of the Florida House of 

Representatives. Having served as a County Commissioner since 2016, Mr. Bernard, an attorney

licensed to practice law in the State of Florida, intends to advocate before Palm Beach County and 

its agencies commencing two years after the conclusion of his public service, and more 

immediately with respect to other lobbying activities.

13. Plaintiff William Proctor is a Leon County Commissioner who, among his many 

accomplishments, is a minister and professor at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 

(FAMU) in Tallahassee. Having served as a County Commissioner since 1996, he intends to 

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advocate before Leon County and its agencies starting two years after the conclusion of his public 

service, and more immediately with respect to other lobbying activities.

14. Defendant Kerrie J. Stillman is the Executive Director of the Florida Commission 

on Ethics, a commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 

that is responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public 

trust by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged 

violations of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State 

of Florida for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). She is a defendant only in her 

official capacity.

15. Defendant John Grant is Chairman of the Florida Commission on Ethics, a 

commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 that is 

responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public trust 

by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged violations 

of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State of Florida 

for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). He is a defendant only in his official capacity.

16. Defendant Glenton “Glen” Gilzean, Jr., is Vice Chairman of the Florida 

Commission on Ethics, a commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. 

§ 112.320 that is responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach 

of the public trust by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate 

alleged violations of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of 

the State of Florida for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). He is a defendant only in 

his official capacity.

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17. Defendant Michelle Anchors is a Commissioner on the Florida Commission on 

Ethics, a commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 that 

is responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public 

trust by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged 

violations of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State 

of Florida for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). She is a defendant only in her 

official capacity.

18. Defendant William P. Cervone is a Commissioner on the Florida Commission on 

Ethics, a commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 that 

is responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public 

trust by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged 

violations of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State 

of Florida for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). He is a defendant only in his 

official capacity.

19. Defendant Don Gaetz is a Commissioner on the Florida Commission on Ethics, a 

commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 that is 

responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public trust 

by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged violations 

of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State of Florida 

for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). He is a defendant only in his official capacity.

20. Defendant William “Willie” Meggs is a Commissioner on the Florida Commission 

on Ethics, a commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 

that is responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public 

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trust by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged 

violations of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State 

of Florida for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). He is a defendant only in his 

official capacity.

21. Defendant Ed H. Moore is a Commissioner on the Florida Commission on Ethics, 

a commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 that is 

responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public trust 

by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged violations 

of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State of Florida 

for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). He is a defendant only in his official capacity.

22. Defendant Wengay M. Newton, Sr., is a Commissioner on the Florida Commission 

on Ethics, a commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 

that is responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public 

trust by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged 

violations of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State 

of Florida for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). He is a defendant only in his 

official capacity.

23. Defendant Jim Waldman is a Commissioner on the Florida Commission on Ethics, 

a commission existing pursuant Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(h)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 112.320 that is 

responsible for investigating and issuing public reports on complaints of breach of the public trust 

by public officers and employees. The Commission is empowered to investigate alleged violations 

of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 8(f) and report any such violations to the Governor of the State of Florida 

for enforcement pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122(4). He is a defendant only in his official capacity.

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24. Defendant Ashley Moody is the duly elected Attorney General of the State of 

Florida and is chief legal officer pursuant to Article IV, Section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution. 

Defendant Moody is empowered to enforce any penalties for violations of Fla. Const., Art. II, § 

8(f), pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122. She is a defendant only in her official capacity.

25. Defendant Jimmy Patronis is the duly elected Chief Financial Officer of the State 

of Florida. Defendant Patronis is empowered to enforce any penalties for violations of Fla. Const., 

Art. II, § 8(f), pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3122. He is a defendant only in his official capacity.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

26. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1331, as this action arises under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution; under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), in that it is brought to redress deprivations, under color 

of state law, of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the United States Constitution; under 

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4), in that it seeks to secure equitable relief under an Act of Congress, 

specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for the protection of civil and 

constitutional rights; under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 to secure 

declaratory relief; under 28 U.S.C. § 2202 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to secure 

preliminary and permanent injunctive relief; and under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to award attorneys’ fees 

and costs.

27. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

THE ADVOCACY RESTRICTIONS

28. An examination of the Advocacy Restrictions reveals Florida’s glaring disregard 

for core constitutional principles. Art. II, § 8(f)(1) of the Florida Constitution defines a “public 

officer” with great breadth:

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(f)(1) For purposes of this subsection, the term “public officer” means a 

statewide elected officer, a member of the legislature, a county 

commissioner, a county officer pursuant to Article VIII or county charter, 

a school board member, a superintendent of schools, an elected 

municipal officer, an elected special district officer in a special district 

with ad valorem taxing authority, or a person serving as a secretary, an 

executive director, or other agency head of a department of the executive 

branch of state government.

29. During the time of public service, the officer is prohibited from advocating for 

clients in a vast array of contexts. Art. II, § 8(f)(2) provides:

A public officer shall not lobby for compensation on issues of policy, 

appropriations, or procurement before the federal government, the 

legislature, any state government body or agency, or any political 

subdivision of this state, during his or her term of office.

30. Moreover, following public service, a further prohibition upon advocacy is imposed 

on public officers for six years:

A public officer shall not lobby for compensation on issues of policy, 

appropriations, or procurement for a period of six years after vacation of 

public position. Fla. Const. Art. II, § 8(f)(3).

31. For nearly 70 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly recognized that lobbying 

entails the exercise of fundamental rights protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., United 

States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). While lobbyist registration and disclosure regulations have 

been upheld, Florida’s prohibition on political advocacy requires strict scrutiny because it collides 

with the core values of the First Amendment by burdening Plaintiffs’ political speech. See Fed.

Election Com'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).

32. By prohibiting communications regarding “issues of policy, appropriations, or 

procurement,” the Advocacy Restrictions plainly constitute “content-based” restrictions on speech 

which are subject to strict scrutiny. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854, 862 (11th 

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Cir. 2020) (defining a “content-based law [as] one that applies to particular speech because of the 

topic discussed or the idea or message expressed”) (emphasis added). Moreover, such contentbased restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 

government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. Id. at 868.

33. The constitutional infirmity of “overbreadth” ascends to its zenith when core First 

Amendment rights are at issue, as here. Under this expansive First Amendment doctrine, a law is 

facially invalid if it punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech, judged in relation to 

the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Additionally, under this doctrine, a party may bring a claim 

under the First Amendment even if the statute is constitutionally applied to the litigant but might 

be unconstitutionally applied to third parties not before the court. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v.

City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2006). In the First Amendment context, even 

if a law recites some legitimate scenarios for restriction, it may nevertheless be unconstitutional as 

a whole. If successful, an overbreadth challenge could potentially invalidate some or all of 

Amendment 12.

34. The Advocacy Restrictions contained in Art. II, § 8(f) and Fla. Stat. § 112.3122 are 

extraordinary. Under Amendment 12, a local elected official, such as a school board member, is 

prohibited from lobbying before Congress or a federal agency, even on matters wholly unrelated 

to the official’s role with local government. Similarly, the new restrictions would prohibit a city 

commissioner with a municipality in Palm Beach County from advocating in Orange County or 

elsewhere. A public official who works as a legislative affairs representative for a union or public 

hospital district would be barred from lobbying the Legislature even on issues outside the scope 

of their elected offices.

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35. While the State of Florida has a legitimate interest in preventing quid pro quo 

corruption and the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, its regulations cannot be designed to 

regulate lobbying or political access for their own sake, because, as the Supreme Court has held, 

political access is “not corruption.” McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 192 

(2014). The revisions to Art. II, § 8 of the Florida Constitution contained in Amendment 12 sweep 

too broadly and impermissibly restrict substantial, legitimate First Amendment activity. Very 

plainly, it is a far cry from legislation that is tailored narrowly in its restrictions upon potential 

political speech.

36. Because of its extraordinary scope, Amendment 12 cannot survive a strict scrutiny 

analysis – or even an examination under the lesser standard of exacting scrutiny.

37. The six-year “revolving door” lobbying ban contained in the revisions to the Florida 

Constitution is also unprecedented and unconstitutional. Plaintiffs do not argue that the concept 

of a “revolving door” ban is per se unconstitutional; indeed, a far more limited ban may withstand 

strict scrutiny. A shorter-term prohibition on lobbying immediately after leaving office to prevent 

former officials from taking advantage of the contacts, associations, and special knowledge they 

acquired during their tenure as public servants arguably could be narrowly tailored to serve a 

compelling state interest.

38. Indeed, some states have adopted one- to two-year revolving door bans for 

compensated lobbying. Similarly, United States Senators have a two-year revolving ban (limited 

to lobbying Congress), and Representatives have a similar one-year lobbying ban.

39. Significantly, there is apparently no jurisdiction in the United States with a 

comparable six-year revolving door ban. The Advocacy Restrictions added to the Florida 

Constitution are three times as long as the revolving door policies of any other state. According 

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to the National Conference of State Legislatures, which publishes an online list of revolving-door 

statutes, no state has more than a two-year prohibition on lobbying by former officials. (Florida 

previously had a two-year restriction before the Amendment 12 restrictions were enacted.) Only 

eight states have a restriction as long as two years. See https://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-

state-table-revolving-door-prohibitions.aspx.

40. A six-year ban is equal to three election cycles for many elected public officers. 

Under a strict scrutiny analysis, there are less restrictive means available to prevent undue 

influence or the appearance of undue influence, such as by prohibiting lobbying on matters that 

were before the government body with which the former officer previously served. Florida’s 

former two-year ban on lobbying by former officials was already among the strictest such 

regulations in the United States.

41. In addition to these patent and egregious constitutional violations, the Advocacy 

Restrictions create a chilling and deterrent effect on public service in state and local government. 

Public service is already exacting enough for those willing to make the commitment to hold public 

office, and it is already far from easy to attract honorable candidates to dedicate their time to public 

service. Moreover, many elected offices in Florida are part-time positions, allowing public servants 

to be gainfully employed in other capacities. Ms. Wagar, for instance, earns just $1 a year as a 

Miami Shores commissioner. A constitutional provision that destroys careers and livelihoods by 

unnecessary and overbroad restrictions is manifestly contrary to the public interest.

COUNT I

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTION

(Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 and

28 U.S.C. § 2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65)

42. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the foregoing 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

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43. The Advocacy Restrictions impermissible burden Plaintiffs’ core political speech 

rights, associational rights and petitioning rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

44. The Advocacy Restrictions prohibiting Plaintiffs from lobbying on issues of policy, 

appropriation, or procurement before any state or local government in Florida, or any federal 

agency, irrespective of any connection to their public offices, impermissibly infringe upon the core 

political speech rights, associational rights and petitioning rights of Plaintiffs under the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

45. By prohibiting Plaintiffs from lobbying their respective former agencies or 

government bodies on issues of policy, appropriations or procurement for the unreasonably long 

period of six years, the Advocacy Restrictions impermissibly infringe upon the core political 

speech rights, associational rights and petitioning rights of Plaintiffs under the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

46. The Advocacy Restrictions are also overbroad and not narrowly tailored to serve 

any compelling state interest. For example, under the Advocacy Restrictions a former member of 

the Legislature is not only prohibited from lobbying the Legislature for a period of six years after 

leaving office, but is also barred from lobbying any department or agency of the state government 

for six years. Such onerous and overbroad restrictions are not narrowly tailored to serve a 

compelling state interest, and they impermissibly chill core political speech.

47. As a direct result of the terms of the Advocacy Restrictions, Plaintiffs, and many 

others, face irreparable injury and will continue in the future to suffer irreparable injury, in that 

they have and will be deprived of their core political speech rights, associational rights and 

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petitioning rights as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution.

48. There is an actual controversy between the parties, as the Advocacy Restrictions 

contained in Article II, § 8 of the Florida Constitution and the penalties contained in the enabling 

statute, Fla. Stat. § 112.3122, create adverse legal interests between the Plaintiffs and Defendants, 

and present a substantial controversy between the parties of sufficient immediacy and reality to 

warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

49. To prevent further infringement or restrictions upon the constitutional rights of 

Plaintiffs and others, it is appropriate and proper that a declaratory judgment be issued, pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57, declaring Article II, § 8(f)(1)-(3) of the Florida 

Constitution unconstitutional.

50. The constitutional considerations involved in this challenge favor the relief 

requested, for which plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of prevailing.

51. The interests of the State of Florida and its citizens are furthered by the relief 

requested that protects the guarantees of the First Amendment.

52. The public interest is not disserved by the requested relief.

53. Furthermore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, it is appropriate 

and hereby requested that this Court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the 

Defendants from enforcing the Advocacy Restrictions contained in Article II, § 8(f)(1)-(3) and the 

enforcement provisions contained in Fla. Stat. § 112.3122.

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COUNT II

VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

(42 U.S.C. § 1983)

54. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the foregoing 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

55. All acts alleged herein of the Defendants and their agents, servants, employees, or 

persons acting at its behest or direction, were done and are continuing to be done under the color 

of state law.

56. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have 

suffered additional compensable injury in the nature of constitutional deprivation.

57. The Advocacy Restrictions and the policy, practice and custom (and the 

implementation thereof by the Defendants) violate Plaintiffs’ core political speech rights, 

associational rights and petitioning rights under the First Amendment, as incorporated against 

Defendants by the Fourteenth Amendment, and their rights to equal protection of the laws 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

58. As a proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have been irreparably 

injured, and, together with others seeking to exercise their constitutional rights, will continue to be 

irreparably injured in the future, in that they have been and will continue to be deprived of their 

rights to free speech and association and their rights to petition the government under the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

59. The constitutional considerations involved in this challenge favor the relief 

requested, for which plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of prevailing. 

60. The interests of the State of Florida and its citizens are furthered by the relief 

requested that protects the guarantees of the First Amendment.

Case 1:22-cv-24156-BB Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/21/2022 Page 17 of 19
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61. The public interest is not disserved by the requested relief.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants and that the Court:

A. Declare Article II, § 8(f)(1)-(3) of the Florida Constitution to be in violation of the 

United States Constitution;

B. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendants from enforcing Article II, § 

8(f)(1)-(3) of the Florida Constitution and Fla. Stat. § 112.3122 against Plaintiffs and others 

similarly situated;

C. Enter a judgment against Defendants for compensatory damages in an amount to 

be determined at trial;

D. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other applicable law, award Plaintiffs their costs 

and expenses incurred in bringing this action, including their reasonable attorneys’ fees; and

E. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable, just and proper.

Dated: December 21, 2022.

Respectfully submitted,

COFFEY BURLINGTON, P.L.

2601 South Bayshore Drive

Penthouse One

Miami, Florida 33133

Telephone: (305) 858-2900

Facsimile: (305) 858-5261

By: /s/ Kendall Coffey

 Kendall Coffey, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 259861

Scott Hiaasen, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 103318

kcoffey@coffeyburlington.com

shiaasen@coffeyburlington.com

lperez@coffeyburlington.com

service@coffeyburlington.com

KUEHNE DAVIS LAW, P.A.

Miami Tower, Suite 3105

100 S.E. 2 Street

Miami, Florida 33131-2154

Telephone: (305) 789-5989

Facsimile: (305) 789-5987

By: /s/ Benedict P. Kuehne

Benedict P. Kuehne, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 233293

ben.kuehne@kuehnelaw.com

efiling@kuehnelaw.com

Case 1:22-cv-24156-BB Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/21/2022 Page 18 of 19
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RONALD L. BOOK, P.A.

4000 Hollywood Blvd., Suite 677-S

Hollywood, Florida 33021-6751

Telephone: (305) 935-1866

By: /s/ Ron Book

Ronald L. Book, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 257915

ron@rlbookpa.com

RHF LAW FIRM, LLC

2600 S. Douglas Road, Suite 305

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Telephone: (305) 501-5011

By: /s/ Robert Fernandez

Robert H. Fernandez, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 91080

rfernandez@rhflawfirm.com

Case 1:22-cv-24156-BB Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/21/2022 Page 19 of 19