### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 18, 200 6 S es sio n MARY CAROLINE PI ERPOI NT v. RODNE Y CRAIG PI ERPOI NT

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Weakley County No. 18821 William A cre e, Judge

No. W2005-01780-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jun e 9, 2006

I n this domestic rela tions case , Husband complains, inter alia, that the t rial court err ed: in awa rding primary custody of the pa

rties’ c hildren, ag es two and f our, to Wife, in the amount of support ob lig a tio ns , a nd in fa ili ng to a wa rdhis a tto rn e y

fe e s. Judg me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is a ff ir me d in pa

rt , vacated in part a nd rema nded. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in Par t, Vacat ed in Par t and Rem anded
W I L L I AM H. I NMAN , S P
. J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS and D A V ID R. F ARMER , J .J ., joined.
Ke nt F . G e ari n, Ma

rt in, Te nn e sse e , a tto rn e y

fo r A pp e lla nt, Rod ne y

Cr a ig Pie rp oin t.
Jame s H . B ra db e rry , D re sd e n, Te nn e sse e , a tto rn e y fo r A pp e lle e , M ary

Caro lin e Pie rp oin t.

OP IN ION The pa rties wer e mar

ried May 11, 2001. They

have two children, e ach of pre- school ag e. Wif e wa s th irty -f

ive y e ars old a t the tim e of he r marria g e , an d Hus ba nd wa s th ir ty -thr e e . Sh e he ld a B ache lor’s deg ree in Ps y ch o l o gy , and wa s g ainfully employ ed by

Gordon’s F ood Service

. Husband wa s a hig h school g raduate with no specific skills and a spottywork re cord.
Eac h party

adduce d protrac ted testimony describing the myriad unpleasa ntednesses visited upon the other. Wife had a pronounce d problem with drinking and g ambling a fter he r sec ond son was born, w hich s he attributes to Husband’s phy sical abuse of her toge ther with his asserted control ov e r h e r d a ily

li fe. Nume ro us wi tne sse s te sti fi e d c on c e rn ing the lit a ny of c omp la int s e a c h p art y lodge d ag ainst t h e other. The Husba nd’s witnesses we re f amily members only , while the Wife’s witnesses touche d upon prac tically every fac et of he r life, a fa ctor whic h understanda bly weig hed-2-

he a vil y in h e r f a vo r. Hu sb a nd ’s his tory a nd pr a c tic e of ke e pin g loa de d g un s in the ho us e ob vio us ly impugne d his parenting ability . His response - or def ense - to this fact was “ the safe ty was on.”
Husband a

rg ues that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ains t t h e judgme nt awar ding primary custody o f t h e ch ildren to the Wife bec ause Wife’ s tempera ment, inattentiveness, lac k of re sp on sib ili ty , d ri nk ing a ndg a mbl ing mil itate d a g a ins t he r p are nti ng abil ity . Sh e arg ue s tha t w hil e her c onduct following the birth of her second child (which resulted f rom a mea sure of

post-partum depre ssion) was not ideal, she attributed various instances of i ll-conduct, including drinking and g a mbl ing , to Hu sb a nd ’s do min e e ri ng a nd abu siv e wa y s. Th e re c or d is re ple te wi th e vid e nc e of the se c ha ra c te r t ra its

. I ssues Presente d
Hu sb a ndpr e se nts the fo llo wi ng iss ue s o n a pp e a l: (1) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in desig nating Wife as t he primary residential pa

rent of the parties’ childre n; (2) Whether the trial court erre d in failing to find that Wi fe ha d dissipated marital property and in fa iling to awa

rd Husband the entire e quity in the marital home; (3) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding that Husband wa s voluntarily unemploy ed; (4) Whether the trial court err ed in de ny ing H usband’s re quests for attorney ’s fe es; and (5 ) Whe the r H us ba ndis e nti tle d to a n a wa rdof a tto rn e y s f

e e s o n a pp e a l.
Standard of Re view
Ou r r e vie w i s d e no vo on the re c or d a c c omp a nie d b y the pr e su mpt ion that th e jud g me nt i s c o rr e c t u n le s s th e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f th e e v id e n c e is o th e r w is e
. T e n n
. R. A p p
. P. 13(d), B u r l ew v. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d 465, (Tenn. 2001). Howeve r, no presumption of corr ectne ss attaches to a trial court’s c onclusions on issues of law. Bo wde n v . W ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000)

. An a ly sis The princ ipal issue in this di vorce case is whether the t rial court err ed in desig nating Wife a s th e pr ima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 6- 6- 10 6 p rovi des that a custody determination shall be made upon the ba sis of the best intere st of the child, and ten (10) fac tors are enumer ated a s releva nt in making suc h determination. These fa ctors ar e not exclusive, and some may

not be applica

ble in all case s. They

are : (1) The love, a ffe ction and emotional ties exis ting betwee n the pare nts and child;-3-

(2 ) T h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e p ar en t s t o p ro v i d e t h e c h i l d wi t h fo o d , cl o t h i n g, medical c are , education and other ne cessa ry car e and the deg ree to which a pare nt has bee n the primary car eg iver; (3) The importa n ce o f continuity in the child' s life and the le ng th of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment; p rovided, that whe re there is a finding , under § 36- 6-106(a )(8) , of child abuse , as d ef i n ed in §§ 39-15-401 or

39-15-402, or

child sexual abuse, as define d in § 37-1-602, by on e (1 ) p are nt, a ndthat a no n- pe rp e tr a tin g pa

re nt h a s r e loc a te d in ord e r t o flee th e p e rp e tr a ti n g p ar e n t, th a t s u c h r e lo c a ti o n s h a ll n o t w e ig h a g a inst a n a w ar d o f c u s t o d y; (4 ) Th e sta

bil ity of the fa mil y

un it o f the pa

re nts ; (5 ) Th e me nta l a ndph y sic a l he a lth of the pa re nts ; (6) The home, sc hool and community rec ord of the c hild; (7) (A) T he re asonable pref ere nce of the child if twelve (12) y ea rs of ag e or older; (B ) The c ourt may

hear the pref ere nce of a y oung er child upon reque st. The pref ere nces of

older c hildren should normally be g i v en gre ater weig ht than those of y oung er c hildren; (8) Evidence of phy sical or e motional abuse to the child, to the other p ar ent or to any other pe rson; pro v i d ed , t h at wher e ther e ar e alleg ations that one (1) pare nt has committed child abuse, as define d in §§ 39-15-401 or 39-15-402, or child sexual abuse, a s defined in § 37- 1-602, aga inst a familymember, the c ou rt sh a ll c on sid e r a ll e vid e nc e re le va nt to the ph y sic a l a nde mot ion a l sa fe ty of the c hild, and determine, by a cle ar pr epon d era nce of the evidenc e, whet h er s u ch abuse ha s occur red. The court shall include in its dec ision a w r i t t e n f i n d i n g o f a l l e v i d e n c e , a n d a l l f

i n d i n g s o f f a c t s c o n n e c t e d t h e r e t o
. In addition, the court shall, whe re appropria te, refer any issues of abuse to the juv e nil e c ou rt

fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s; (9 ) Th e c ha

ra c te r a ndbe ha vio r o f a ny oth e r p e rs on wh o r e sid e s in or fr e qu e nts the home of a

pare nt and such pe rson' s interac tions with t he child; and (10) Eac h pare nt's pa st and potential for f uture pe rfor m ance of par enting re sp on sib ili tie s, inc lud ing the wi lli ng ne ss a ndabil ity of e a c h o f the pa

re nts to f a c ili ta te a nde nc ou ra g e a

c los e a ndc on tin ui ng pa

re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip-4- betwee n the child and the ot her parent, consistent with the best intere st of the child.

The trial judg e analy zed the proof in unusua l de tail. He found the e vidence respe cting the love, aff ection, and e motional ties between the pare nts and children to be “fa irly evenly divided.” Fa ctor number

two was in fa vor of Husba nd. Fa ctor number three was held to be inapplicable a nd fa c to r s f o u r a n d f iv e w e r e e v e n ly b a la n c e d

. F a c to r s n u mb e r s ix, s e v e n , a n d e ig h t w ere held to be inapplicable by

the trial court, to w hich Wife insists that the trial court e rre d in failing to consider the un dis pu te d e vid e nc e that sh e wa s ph y sic a lly a nde mot ion a lly abu se d b y

Hu sb a nd . We thi nk

thi s ar g u me n t is w e ll

- ta

k e n , b e c a u s e o n a t le a s t o n e o c c a s io n H u s b a n d w a s arr e s te d a n d jailed for assaulting Wife, and the re cord is re plete with convincing evidenc e of his d o m i n ee ring and controlling behavior

to wa rd s Wife. Fa ctor nine w as held to be e venly balanc ed. And f

actor ten, perha ps the all-inclusive fac tor in making a determination of primary custody , was found in f avor of Wife. I n his analy sis of this factor the trial judge stated that this de termination was ba sed upon the de me a no r o f s ome of

the wi tne sse s. Ha vin g ob se rv e d the ma nn e r a ndde me a no r o f the wi tne sse s, the trial judg e wa s in the best position t o evaluate t heir c redibility

. Union Planters Nat’l Bank v. Island Mgmt. Auth., Inc

. , 43 S.W .3d 498, 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). A bsent clea r and c onvincing e vid e nc e t o t h e c o n t r ar y , t h i s C o u r tw i l l n o tr e
- e v a l u a t e a t r i a l j u d g e ’ s a s s e s s m e n to f w i t n e ss cre dibilit y
. W

e lls v . Te nn e sse e Bd

. Of Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999) . Upon our re view of the e ntire re cord in this case and in lig ht of the trial court’s detailed finding s, we f ind the evidenc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th e jud g me nt a s to the iss ue of pr ima ry c us tod y . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13(d).
Hus b a n d ’ s n e xt i s s u e is w h e th e r th e tria l j u d g e e rr e d in f a il in g to f

in d th a t W if

e h ad dissipated marital prope rty to the ex tent that he shoul d be awarde d all of the e quity in their reside nce. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-4-121(c )(5) require s the court to conside r “the contribution of ea ch party

in the acquisition, prese rvation . . . or dissipation of t he marital property .” The Wi fe arg ues th a t s h e w a s th e c h ie f p r o v id e r f o r th e f a mi ly , e ar n in g th r e e ti me s th a t o f H u s band. The Husband c ounters that Wife lost twenty to thirtythousand dollars g ambling - which she admits. The rec ord justifies the finding of the trial judg e that “I ’m not g oing to g ive any cre dit to [Husband] for the g ambling de bt because of his involvement in g ambling, be cause he appar ently took some money him se lf f r o mt h e m ar i t a l m o n e y

a n d d i d s o m e t h i n g w i t h i t

. ” T h e e v i d e n c e d o e s n o tp r e p o n de ra te ag ainst the judg ment on this iss ue.
Th e Hu sb a nd ne xt a

rg ue s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in fi nd ing that he was vo lu nt arily unemploy ed for

the purpose of

fix ing c hild support.
The ne w Child S upport Guidelines, Te nnes see A dminist rative Code Rule 1240- 2-4-.04, allows t ri al courts to impute income for the purpose of

establishing support obligations upon a finding of willful or voluntary unemploy ment or undere mploy ment. A determination of voluntary un e mpl oy me nt o r u nd e re mpl oy me nt c a n b e ba se d o n any int e nti onal c ho ic e or

a c t th a t a ff

e c ts a pare nt’s income.Sho rt l y af t er t he p l ead i ngs were co m p l et e, t he chi l d ren res i d ed wi t h H usband , who was unemp l o y ed , and who 1

s ou g h t c h i l d s u ppor t f

r om W i fe, w h o w as e mpl oy ed. -5- Husband he ld two jobs during this brie f marria g e. He quit his first job a nd acc epted alesserpay ing job ( $8.00 per hour with no benef its) se lling home a

ppliances in the be lief he c ould acquire the business, which soon became insolvent. Husband wa s found to be under employ ed “f or a long time” and, at the time of trial in May 2005, he had be en unemploy ed si nce January 2005. The trial jud ge wa s n o t p lease d, since he stated “ . . . I can’ t understand why

y ou didn’t g et a job betwe en J anuary and April [ 2005]. I know y ou could find one. We ha ve a dr ug court a nd these pe ople have d ru g co n v i ct i o n s an d ar e c o n v i ct ed fe l o n s
. E v er y s i n g l e o n e o f t h em [ h as ] a j o b

. ” T h e j u d ge there upon based H usband’s c hild support obligation on his 2004 earnings.
Husband a

rg ues that no evide nce w as pre sent ed that he wa s qualified for a particular job. He arg ue s th a t he wa s e nr oll e d in a re frig e ratio n co ur se of fe re d b y L ow e ’s wh ic h w ou ld q ua lif y him for g ainful employ ment in six months or so, but in the meantime his income wa s limi ted to $153.00 per w eek, wh i ch wa s unemploy ment compensa tion. Bec ause it does not addr ess the main point raised by the tri al j u d ge, t his arg ument essentially beg s the question: Whydid Husband not find work fr om J anuary to May 2005? He made no signific ant effort t o do so, appar ently content to dra w his c omp e ns a tio n p lus $7 93 .7 0 mo nth ly that Wif e wa s p a y ing him

fo r c hil d s up po rt

. 1
I n light of the fac t that judgment wa s entered M ay 19, 2005, and in orde r to obviate the ne c e ssi ty of a dd iti on a l pl e a din g s, the a mou nt o f the su pp ort ob lig a tio n is va c a te d a nd th e c a se is rema nded to the trial judg e for a dete rmination of the Guide l i n es ’ amount base d upon Husband’s income as of

the date of

the hearing require d to give eff ect to this remand. I f Husband’ s income has not chang ed since May

2005, the judg ment is affirme d. The Husband next arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in re fusing to awar d him attorney fee s beca use he ha s no liquid assets with which to pay these fees, while W ife e arns $40,000.00 y ear ly and is well able to pay

her H usband’s fe es. We note that Wife will acquire the Husband’ s equity in the family residenc e for $13,000.00, and that neither party has any cash assets. Attorney fe es are discretionary

with the trial court, a nd this Court cannot interfe re e x ce pt upon a clea r showing of ab use of that discr etion. Crouch v. Crouch , 3 8 5 S. W. 2 d 2 8 8 ( T e n n , 1 9 6 4 )

. We f in d n o abuse of discretion on the pa

rt of the tria l judge

. The Husband seeks his attorney fee s on appea l. What we have said with respe ct to attorney fee s in the trial court a

pplies with equal for ce to this issue.

Conclusion The judg ment is affirme d as t o the issues of primary custody , awa

rd of e quity

in the residenc e and aw ard of

attorney fee s. The amo u n t of support oblig ation is vaca ted subject to re mand to the trial judg e for

a dete rmination of the Guidelines’ amount based upon H usband’s i n co m e as of the date of the hea ring require d to give eff

ec t t o this remand. I f Husband’ s income has not cha ng ed-6-

since May

2005, the judg ment as to the support oblig ation is af fi rm ed

. C o sts of the appe al ar e a s s e s s e d t o H u s b a n d , R o d n e y C r a i g P i e rp o i n ta n d h i s s u r e t y.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM H. INMAN, SPECI AL J UDGE