SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

C-JTSCC Has Taken Steps to Improve the Accuracy 

of Its Contract Data, but It Should Assess the 

Feasibility of Correcting Data for Fiscal Year 2009 

and Earlier

April 20, 2012
SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-12-7 April 2012

C-JTSCC Has Taken Steps to Improve the Accuracy of 

Its Contract Data, but It Should Assess the Feasibility of 

Correcting Data for Fiscal Year 2009 and Earlier

What SIGAR Reviewed

Since 2001, the United States has appropriated more than $85.5 billion to the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, the 

U.S. Agency for International Development, and other U.S. agencies for reconstruction in Afghanistan. Within DOD, numerous 

contracting authorities, including the U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command 

(C-JTSCC), use reconstruction funds to implement security and development assistance projects. In 2010, C-JTSCC reported to 

SIGAR that it made about $6.7 billion in contract obligations from Afghanistan-reconstruction related funding sources during fiscal 

years 2007 through 2009. However, in June 2011, Congress questioned the accuracy of C-JTSCC’s fiscal year 2009 data after noting 

that the reported obligations for two contractors appeared overstated. C-JTSCC later confirmed that these records were inaccurate. 

The objectives of this audit were to (1) examine the discrepancies in C-JTSCC’s data to determine how they occurred; (2) evaluate 

the measures C-JTSCC has taken to address the cause of these discrepancies, and; (3) identify what additional steps, if any, C-JTSCC 

needs to take to ensure the accuracy and reliability of its contract data. To accomplish this, SIGAR obtained documentation from 

C-JTSCC on the errors in its initial fiscal year 2009 data and requested revised fiscal year 2009 data of contracts funded with 

Afghanistan reconstruction funds. We selected a subset of 42 C-JTSCC contracts that C-JTSCC reported being supported with 

Afghanistan reconstruction-related sources of funding and compared C-JTSCC’s data to the contract file. We conducted this audit in 

Washington, D.C.; Rock Island, Illinois; and Kabul, Khowst, and Nangahar Provinces, Afghanistan, from July 2011 to March 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found

C-JTSCC officials reported that the query used to generate the data provided to us in 2010 was designed incorrectly and, as a result, 

C-JTSCC overstated its fiscal year 2009 contract obligations by about $2.6 billion. For example, C-JTSCC reported more than 

$690 million in fiscal year 2009 contract obligations to Kabuljan Construction Company, when the actual value was $18 million—an 

overstatement of about 38 times. In addition, C-JTSCC’s data included contracts that were made with non-reconstruction sources of 

funding because C-JTSCC’s contracting officials did not consistently record funding source information when entering in data into 

C-JTSCC’s data system. Based on our review of more than 14,700 fiscal year 2009 contract records, the funding source field was 

blank in more than 5,600 cases. Although contract documents are required to be complete and valid, a C-JTSCC official stated that 

funding source information was not always known when awarding a contract. 

To address our concerns and those raised by Congress, C-JTSCC has taken a number of steps to improve its ability to report accurate 

data. To ensure that C-JTSCC system users generate accurate queries, C-JTSCC officials must complete a training course in query 

design prior to accessing procurement data systems. Additionally, C-JTSCC implemented a three-level process to review data prior 

to providing information to external customers. C-JTSCC has also increased the frequency of Program Management Reviews, which

among other things, assess the extent of data entry errors. Additionally, C-JTSCC has finalized policies and procedures to 

standardize data entry in its data system and officials also conduct bi-weekly “confidence tests” to electronically scan data entered by 

C-JTSCC officials and identify data that do not meet these standards. 

Although C-JTSCC took steps in fiscal year 2010 to help minimize longstanding data entry errors, it has not corrected its data entered 

into its contracts database for fiscal year 2009 or earlier. According to C-JTSCC officials, they are managing more than 

3,600 contracts that have more than $1billion in fiscal year 2009 obligations and were active as of October 2011. These contract 

records were reported to other databases to run standard reports on contracting activity or create ad-hoc reports to meet specific needs, 

such as a request for information from the Congress or other external organizations. C-JTSCC officials stated that correcting these 

records may not be feasible given the volume and age of the contracting data involved. 

What SIGAR Recommends

Because C-JTSCC took steps during the course of our audit to improve the accuracy of its data queries, SIGAR is not making any 

recommendations in this regard. However, C-JTSCC has not taken any actions to correct its fiscal year 2009 and earlier years’ 

contract data. Therefore, SIGAR recommends that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, direct the C-JTSCC Commander to 

assess the feasibility of and the time and resources required to correct C-JTSCC’s fiscal year 2009 and earlier years’ contract records. 

If the assessment determines that prior years’ records cannot be corrected or the expense is not worth the effort, C-JTSCC should alert 

its data users that its historical records may contain errors and is not reliable. Overall, C-JTSCC concurred with our recommendation 

and reported that it has taken steps to determine the feasibility of correcting its fiscal year 2009 and previous years’ data. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

April 20, 2012 

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta 

Secretary of Defense

General James N. Mattis

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

Major General R. Mark Brown

Commander, U.S. Central Command Joint Theater Support 

Contracting Command 

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) audit of U.S. Central Command Joint Theater Support Contracting 

Command’s (C-JTSCC) data quality. This report makes one recommendation to the Commander, 

U.S Central Command, to direct the Commander, C-JTSCC, to assess the feasibility of and the time and 

resources required to correct C-JTSCC’s fiscal year 2009 and earlier years’ contract records to help 

ensure that C-JTSCC reports accurate data to its external customers.

When preparing the final report, we considered comments from C-JTSCC. Overall, C-JTSCC concurred 

with the report’s recommendation and noted that it has taken steps to address it. These comments are 

reproduced in appendix III. C-JTSCC also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated, as 

appropriate. We conducted this performance audit under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as 

amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. 

Steven J Trent

Acting Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background...................................................................................................................................................2

An Inaccurate Data Query And Unreliable Funding Source Data Led To The 

Discrepancies In The Data Provided To SIGAR....................................................................................5

C-JTSCC Has Taken Steps to Ensure Its Data Queries Are Accurate and Has 

taken Some Measures to Minimize Longstanding Data Entry Errors....................................................7

C-JTSCC Has Not Corrected Its Data For Fiscal Year 2009 and Earlier.....................................................9

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................9

Recommendation ........................................................................................................................................10

Comments...................................................................................................................................................10

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology ........................................................................................................11

Appendix II: Comments from CENTCOM / C-JTSCC.............................................................................13

FIGURES AND PHOTOS

Figure 1: C-JTSCC Contract Data Flow and Reporting ..............................................................................4

Figure 2: Errors Made By C-JTSCC In Generating Obligation Data for Kabuljan 

Construction Company...........................................................................................................................6
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page iii

ACRONYMS 

ACBIS Army Contracting Business Intelligence System

ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

BTA Business Transformation Agency

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

C-JTSCC CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FPDS-NG Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation

JCCS Joint Contingency Contracting System

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PMR Program Management Review

RCC Regional Contracting Command

SCO-A Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SPS Standard Procurement System
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 1 

C-JTSCC Has Taken Steps to Improve the Accuracy of Its Contract Data, but 

It Should Assess the Feasibility of Correcting Data 

for Fiscal Year 2009 and Earlier 

Since 2001, the United States has appropriated more than $85.5 billion to the Departments of Defense 

(DOD) and State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other U.S. agencies for 

reconstruction in Afghanistan. For the most part, these departments and agencies use contracts to provide 

a range of services in Afghanistan, including implementing reconstruction programs. Within DOD, 

numerous contracting authorities spend reconstruction funds, primarily from the Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund (ASFF) and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). In 2010, the 

U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) 

reported to us that it obligated about $6.7 billion from Afghanistan reconstruction-related funding 

sources1

As a result, we initiated this audit to examine the accuracy and reliability of C-JTSCC’s data. 

Specifically, we (1) examined the discrepancies in the C-JTSCC data that was initially provided to us to 

determine how they occurred; (2) evaluated the measures C-JTSCC has taken to address the causes of the 

discrepancies; and (3) identified what additional steps, if any, C-JTSCC needs to take to ensure the 

accuracy and reliability of its contract data.

during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. However, in June 2011, the Senate Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, questioned the accuracy 

of C-JTSCC’s data. Specifically, the Subcommittee noted that reported obligations for two contractors 

appeared overstated. C-JTSCC later confirmed that its data was inaccurate and, in the case of one 

contractor, was overstated by as much as 38 times.

To accomplish our objectives, we obtained documentation from C-JTSCC on the errors in its initial fiscal 

year 2009 data and requested a revised fiscal year 2009 data set of contracts funded with Afghanistan 

reconstruction funds. To identify the cause of C-JTSCC’s inaccurate data, we interviewed officials from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Assistant Secretary of the Army – Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement; DOD’s Business 

Transformation Agency (BTA);2

 

1

For the purposes of this audit, we defined a DOD contract obligation as being for the purpose of Afghanistan 

reconstruction if it was made from one of the following funding sources: ASFF; CERP; DOD Counternarcotics 

Fund; National Defense Authorization Act Section 1207 Transfer Funds; Training and Equipment Funds; 

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund; or Afghanistan Freedom and Support Act Funds.

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); the Senior Contracting OfficialAfghanistan (SCO-A); CENTCOM; C-JTSCC; and selected Regional Contracting Commands (RCCs). 

To determine the extent to which C-JTSCC’s revised data was accurate, we reviewed selected data fields 

such as contract number, fund type, fiscal year, and obligation amount, and looked for obviously invalid 

or inaccurate data. We also selected a sub-set of these records to compare the data fields against the 

contract files at the contracting offices. To determine the steps C-JTSCC has taken to improve 

contracting data quality and reliability, we reviewed relevant C-JTSCC policies and procedures and 

statements of data reliability regarding the systems used to maintain and retrieve contract data. To assess 

the steps, if any, that C-JTSCC needed to take to ensure that previous discrepancies were not repeated, we 

2

BTA was established in 2006 to encourage the reform and modernization of DOD’s business practices. In October 

of 2011, the Secretary of Defense recommended that BTA cease functioning as a separate agency and transferred 

most of its functions to DLA. Because we met with and obtained documents from BTA, we refer to them as such 

for the purposes of this report.
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 2 

reviewed C-JTSCC’s mission and fragmentary orders3 establishing C-JTSCC’s responsibilities, the 

Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act,4 and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

standards on ensuring data quality.5

BACKGROUND 

 We conducted our work from July 2011 to March 2012, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I for a more complete 

explanation of our scope and methodology. 

Since 2001, the United States has appropriated more than $85.5 billion to implement security and 

development assistance projects in Afghanistan, with DOD receiving more than 67 percent of these 

appropriations (about $58 billion). In Afghanistan, DOD uses several organizations to manage 

Afghanistan reconstruction contracts, including C-JTSCC.6

 Reviews by the Department of Army and 

CENTCOM identified the need for a centralized contracting organization with complete visibility over all 

contracting efforts within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. In April 2010, CENTCOM issued a 

fragmentary order to transition all current responsibilities with the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq 

and Afghanistan to C-JTSCC. Among other things, this order required C-JTSCC to execute centralized 

contracting oversight for all DOD contracts in Afghanistan, including contracts managed by other DOD 

contracting organizations as part of the Theater Business Clearance process.7

 C-JTSCC is also required 

to directly manage certain contracts on behalf of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and its subcommands, such as 

the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).8

 Further, C-JTSCC is required to 

establish and chair a Joint Contracting Support Board to ensure synchronization and unity of effort for 

contracting, including establishing contract visibility procedures and reports and coordinating the 

enforcement of contract management policies for external support and systems support. As executive 

agent for contracting for Afghanistan and to support C-JTSCC’s expanded mission, the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army appointed the C-JTSCC Commander as the Head of the Contracting Activity for 

Afghanistan, which established C-JTSCC’s overall responsibility for managing the contracting activity.9

The C-JTSCC Commander designated the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan (SCO-A) to serve as 

the principal contracting authority of C-JTSCC’s contracts. The SCO-A has direct responsibility over 

theater support contracting and manages contracts for DOD organizations in Afghanistan. The SCO-A 

has about 150 contracting officers in Afghanistan, who are responsible for entering into, administering, 

and terminating contracts. Many of these officers are deployed to 1 of 14 RCCs performing contracting 

services in various locations throughout Afghanistan. As part of SCO-A’s contract management 

responsibilities, SCO-A reports contracting data to external sources, including the Federal Procurement 

 

In addition to its other responsibilities, C-JTSCC collects contracting data from other DOD contracting 

organizations operating in Afghanistan, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force 

Center for Engineering and the Environment. 

 

3

A fragmentary order consists of a written or oral communication used to direct DOD actions with changes of 

existing orders and brief and specific instructions. 4

See The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, (31 USC 6101, P.L. 109-282, 

September 26, 2006). 5

OMB, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control. Circular A-123 (Washington, D.C., December 21, 2004).

6

These include C-JTSCC, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the 

Environment, and the Space and Missile Defense Command. Additionally, the Army Contract Command-Rock 

Island manages awards and manages the logistics and civil augmentation program contract and Army’s TACOM 

Life Cycle Management Command procures most vehicles for the Afghanistan National Security Forces.

7

According to C-JTSCC officials, the goal of the Theater Business Clearance process is to provide data on 

contractor personnel and materiel arriving in theater and to ensure that all DOD contracts in Afghanistan contain 

documentation required by the Theater Business Clearance regulations.

8

CSTC-A’s responsibilities include training and mentoring the Afghan National Security Forces, which consists of 

the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

9

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operational Contract Support (Joint Publication 4-10, Washington, D.C., October 17, 2008).
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 3 

Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG),10 in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR).11

According to C-JTSCC, its contracting data is entered into the Standard Procurement System (SPS) and 

flows automatically through other information management systems to FPDS-NG. Once information is 

entered in SPS, the data is not altered and cannot be corrected after it passes to the other information 

management systems.

 The FAR requires that all U.S. agencies report contracts worth $3,000 or more to FPDS-NG, 

and to certify that the data reported to the system are accurate and complete.

After C-JTSCC officials enter contracting data in SPS when awarding or modifying a contract, these 

records are sent electronically to the Army Contracting Business Intelligence System (ACBIS), an 

information management system that is mandated for use by all Army contracting organizations. ACBIS 

contains records of contracting actions from more than 250 DOD contracting offices, including C-JTSCC. 

ACBIS provides users the ability to query contract data from these contracting offices as well as other 

external data sources and summarize this data in reports that can be used to make business decisions. 

ACBIS users may run standard reports on contracting activity or create ad-hoc reports to meet specific 

needs, such as a request for information from Congress or other external organizations. According to 

ACBIS officials, C-JTSCC data is routinely accessed in ACBIS, but because C-JTSCC data is mixed with 

data from other contracting organizations, it is not possible to identify the full extent to which ACBIS 

users access C-JTSCC’s data. 

After C-JTSCC’s SPS data is reported to ACBIS, the data passes to the Joint Contingency Contracting 

System (JCCS), where it is reformatted and submitted to FPDS-NG.12

 

10FPDS-NG is used to provide data on Freedom of Information Act requests and address inquiries from other 

contracting organizations. Additionally, Congress, Federal agencies, the auditing community, and the public use 

FPDS-NG to obtain contract data.

 Figure 1 illustrates the flow of 

C-JTSCC’s contract data through these information management systems.

11The FAR governs most of the Executive Branch’s acquisition of goods and services and is set forth in Chapter 1 of 

Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations. For agency contract reporting responsibilities, see the FAR, Contract 

Reporting Responsibility, (Part 4.606). 12C-JTSCC officials reported that both SPS and ACBIS have the capability to automatically report data to 

FPDS-NG, satisfying Federal contract reporting regulations. However, because internet connectivity in Afghanistan 

is limited, C-JTSCC was required to send its contract data through multiple systems in order to satisfy these 

regulations.
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 4 

Figure 1: C-JTSCC Contract Data Flow and Reporting

Source: SIGAR analysis of C-JTSCC information.

In 2010, C-JTSCC reported to us that it had obligated about $6.7 billion to more than 6,200 contractors 

during fiscal years 2007 through 2009 for the purposes of Afghanistan reconstruction, of which C-JTSCC 

reported about $4.9 billion were obligated during fiscal year 2009. At the time, we noted that the data 

contained a number of errors, including misspellings and various contractor names that were similar and 

could have referred to the same contractor. 

In June 2011, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on 

Contracting Oversight, questioned the accuracy of the contracting data that C-JTSCC had provided. 

Specifically, the Subcommittee noted that the obligations that C-JTSCC reported for two contractors—

Kabuljan Construction Company and Red Sea Construction Company—appeared overstated. C-JTSCC 

reviewed the data that it provided to us and confirmed that this information and a number of other 

contractor records were inaccurate. As a result, we agreed to identify the errors in C-JTSCC’s data and 

report on the steps necessary to prevent these errors from recurring in the future.
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 5 

AN INACCURATE DATA QUERY AND UNRELIABLE FUNDING SOURCE DATA 

LED TO THE DISCREPANCIES IN THE DATA PROVIDED TO SIGAR

In response to our inquiries, C-JTSCC reported that the query used to generate the data provided to us in 

2010 was designed incorrectly and overstated fiscal year 2009 contract obligations for multiple contracts 

and various contractors by about $2.6 billion. For example, the flawed query resulted in C-JTSCC 

reporting more than $690 million in fiscal year 2009 contract obligations to Kabuljan Construction 

Company when the actual value was $18 million, an overstatement of about 38 times. In addition, 

although C-JTSCC reported that the data represented contracts funded with reconstruction assistance, SPS 

users did not consistently record funding source data in SPS. Based on our review of over 14,700 SPS 

records from fiscal year 2009, the funding source was blank for more than 5,600 records (about 

38 percent), and other records had invalid codes for funding source. In addition, C-JTSCC included some 

obligations in the data provided to us that were not funded with reconstruction assistance. 

C-JTSCC Erred in Generating the Contract Data Provided to SIGAR

C-JTSCC queried ACBIS to identify its fiscal year 2009 Afghanistan reconstruction-related contract 

obligations. However, because C-JTSCC officials incorrectly designed their query, they reported 

inaccurate data to us that overstated the contract obligations by about $2.6 billion. The error affected 

795 contracts or about 7 percent of C-JTSCC’s total contracts.

C-JTSCC designed a query to extract data elements from ACBIS to produce a report of all fiscal year 

2009 Afghanistan reconstruction-related contracts and their contract obligated value. The query included 

two fields—“Purchase Request” and “Obligated Amount”—that led to the error. According to C-JTSCC 

officials, the “Purchase Request” field records each purchase request associated with the contract13

Figure 2 illustrates the effect of using the incorrect field to report total obligations for Kabuljan 

Construction Company. C-JTSCC initially awarded a contract to Kabuljan Construction Company for 

about $18 million and issued 38 purchase requests against that contract. The C-JTSCC query summed the 

values in the “Obligated Amount” column instead of using the “Obligated Amount Change” column, 

reporting contract obligations of more than $690 million. 

 and 

the “Obligated Amount” field is the total amount obligated to that contract as of the date of each purchase 

request. The query incorrectly totaled the “Obligated Amount” field and reported that to us as the total 

amount obligated to the contract. In other words, the obligations for a contract with 10 purchase requests 

was reported as 10 times the contract’s actual obligated amount. A C-JTSCC official stated that 

C-JTSCC should have used the “Obligated Amount Change” field to report contract obligations because 

it equals the total contract obligation amount. 

 

13A contract may have multiple purchase requests associated with it. For instance, a year-long contract to provide 

fuel may incur 12 purchase requests when buying fuel each month. The sum of all purchase requests associated 

with a contract represents that contract’s total contract value.
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 6 

Figure 2: Errors Made By C-JTSCC In Generating Obligation Data for Kabuljan 

Construction Company

Contract Number Vendor Purchase 

Request

Obligated 

Amount

Obligated 

Amount Change

W91B4M-09-C-7218 Kabuljan Construction 

Company

PR No. 1 $18,181,304 $18,181,304

PR No. 2 $18,181,304 N/A

PR No. 3 $18,181,304 N/A

Rows 4-37

PR Nos. 4-37 $18,181,304

(in each row)

N/A

(in each row)

PR No. 38 $18,181,304 N/A

TOTAL 38 $690,889,552 $18,181,304

Information that 

C-JTSCC provided

to SIGAR

Contract Number Vendor Total Contract 

Value*

W91B4M-09-C-7218 Kabuljan Construction 

Company

$690,889,552

Obligations 

that C-JTSCC 

should have 

reported to 

SIGAR

Source: SIGAR analysis of C-JTSCC data.

*Note: C-JTSCC listed this field as “Total Contract Value;” however, the data actually was the sum of the 

“Obligated Amount” column. 

This programming error affected 795 contracts or about 7 percent of the fiscal year 2009 reconstructionrelated contracts within C-JTSCC’s area of responsibility and overstated related obligations by about 

$2.6 billion. 

C-JTSCC Did Not Limit Its Query to Afghanistan Reconstruction-Related Funding 

Sources 

A C-JTSCC official stated C-JTSCC could separate fiscal year 2009 contract obligations made from 

Afghanistan reconstruction-related funding sources from those used to support U.S. military and civilian 

missions in Afghanistan. However, the contract data we received from C-JTSCC contained invalid 

funding source data in some cases and included contracts funded through other sources. For example, 

C-JTSCC originally reported to us that it obligated more than $477 million to Red Sea Construction 

Company, though the actual value was about $13 million. Nevertheless, C-JTSCC should not have 

included Red Sea in the data it provided because it was not funded with reconstruction funds. 
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 7

DOD contracting officers are required by Financial Management Regulations14 to ensure that data 

processed in SPS and used in financial reports is accurate, complete, supportable, and processed timely. 

Specifically, these regulations state that DOD contracting organizations, including C-JTSCC, use tools to 

identify and track the numbers, types, and dollar amounts of transactions submitted, and that C-JTSCC 

edits these transactions to ensure they are accurate. Additionally, C-JTSCC standard operating 

procedures encourage contracting officials to enter accurate line of accounting data15

Although contract documents are required to be complete and valid, a C-JTSCC official stated that 

funding source information was not always known when awarding a contract. In addition, C-JTSCC 

contracting officials did not always use accurate funding source codes when entering contract data in SPS. 

Based on our review of over 14,700 SPS contract records, we found that the funding source data field was 

blank for more than 5,600 records (about 38 percent). In addition, the fiscal year 2009 data that C-JTSCC 

retrieved from ACBIS contained funding source fields with invalid codes. For example, we found that 

the field included “EFT,” “FFP,” and “$,” as well as appropriation terms such as “O&M,A” or military 

construction. According to ACBIS documentation and officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Procurement, the system does not perform any quality control checks on the 

fund type data received from SPS; if funding source data is entered inaccurately in SPS, these records are 

not corrected in ACBIS. According to C-JTSCC officials, the fund code is entered into SPS by the 

contracting officer separately from the line of accounting and, therefore, the fund code does not affect the 

payment of the vendor or the type of funds being used. However, although funding for the contract may 

be properly accounted for, the data in SPS may still be incomplete or inaccurate.

(including funding 

source) in SPS when awarding contracts to facilitate the use of Army’s automated payment systems. The 

line of accounting is provided to contracting officials and cites the allocated funds being used to purchase 

the goods or services. According to C-JTSCC officials, if contract documents do not include a complete 

and valid line of accounting, the documents are returned to the requestor for correction. 

C-JTSCC HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ENSURE ITS DATA QUERIES ARE ACCURATE

AND HAS TAKEN SOME MEASURES TO MINIMIZE LONGSTANDING DATA 

ENTRY ERRORS

To address our concerns and those raised by Congress, C-JTSCC has taken a number of steps to improve 

its ability to report accurate data. To ensure that C-JTSCC system users generate accurate queries, 

C-JTSCC officials must complete a training course in query design prior to accessing SPS and ACBIS. 

Additionally, C-JTSCC implemented reviews over the design of data queries before they are run and 

again before they are provided to external customers. C-JTSCC also has taken some measures to 

minimize longstanding data entry errors. For example, C-JTSCC has increased the frequency of Program 

Management Reviews (PMR), which assesses RCC16

 14Office of Secretary of Defense-Comptroller, DOD Financial Management Regulation (7000.14-R, Washington, 

D.C., August, 2011).

operations and compares C-JTSCC’s data against 

the contract file or other information to reduce data entry errors. Additionally, C-JTSCC has finalized 

policies and procedures to standardize data entry in SPS, including vendor names, addresses, and the 

location where the contract work is to be performed. C-JTSCC officials also conduct bi-weekly 

“confidence tests” on SPS data to identify data that does not meet these standards.

15Lines of accounting provide a uniform system of accumulating and reporting accounting information.

16Regional Contracting Commands are subordinate contracting offices to coordinate contracting activity in 

Afghanistan’s provinces.
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 8

C-JTSCC Has Taken Steps to Ensure That Systems Users Generate Accurate Queries

To ensure that C-JTSCC officials use SPS and ACBIS to report accurate data free of errors, C-JTSCC has 

implemented additional training for users and strengthened its query review process prior to providing 

external customers with data. To ensure that C-JTSCC officials accurately design queries, C-JTSCC 

requires that all systems users complete an initial on-line training course in how to use SPS and ACBIS 

and complete yearly follow-up training to continue accessing these systems. According to C-JTSCC 

officials, all systems users in Afghanistan have completed this training, and new employees are required 

to complete training prior to beginning work. Additionally, C-JTSCC has distributed fact sheets on query 

design to its systems users that are designed to educate users on appropriate query design and how to 

avoid common errors.

C-JTSCC has also revised its standard operating procedures to require a three-level process to review data 

prior to providing this information to external customers. Specifically, this process involves the CJTSCC 

data technicians conducting the query, SCO-A officials, and C-JTSCC operations staff. The purposes of 

this review include ensuring that the query is correctly written, the data produced is accurate, and a spot 

check of the data prior to passing the information to external organizations is conducted. According to 

C-JTSCC officials, these reviews are not designed to check each line of data, but rather to identify 

“obvious errors,” which would indicate that the query design was incorrect. This official stated that the 

total obligations that C-JTSCC reported for Kabuljan Construction Company would be an example of 

such an error that should be discovered, but a smaller overstatement in C-JTSCC’s data would not 

necessarily be found.

C-JTSCC Has Also Taken Actions to Address Data Entry Errors

To help identify the causes of data quality issues, C-JTSCC has increased the frequency of PMRs. These 

reviews assess a variety of issues with RCC operations, including staff training, the organization of 

contract files, and the extent to which contracts are administered in accordance with the FAR and other

standards. These reviews also assess the extent to which data entry errors are made when entering 

contract information in SPS and the extent to which these records contain accurate funding sources. 

According to C-JTSCC officials, they conduct PMRs at an RCC every 90 days, after which a report of 

deficiencies is used to identify specific issues requiring management attention and to prioritize and 

allocate resources at the RCCs. According to these officials, increasing the frequency of PMRs has 

improved RCC operations and reduced data entry errors.

We reviewed the PMR reports for several Afghan RCCs and found that, while the RCCs were in 

compliance with approved policies and procedures in a number of areas, they continued to face come 

challenges in managing specialty contracts and ensuring data quality. Specifically, the PMR reports that 

we reviewed identified deficiencies in maintaining appropriate contract documentation and in managing 

specialized contracts, such as blanket purchase agreements, services contracts, and construction contracts.

In addition, C-JTSCC officials reported that they have finalized policies and standard operating 

procedures to specify how contract information is to be entered into SPS, including vendor names, 

addresses, and the location where the contract work is to be performed. C-JTSCC standard operating 

procedures have been amended to encourage C-JTSCC officials to verify contractor identity in one of two 

externally maintained vendor name databases, such as JCCS or the Central Contractor Registration 

System, as a best practice. The use of these databases will help improve the quality of C-JTSCC’s data 

by ensuring that systems users use a single name to refer to the same vendor and that C-JTSCC data entry 

officials do not make spelling errors when entering contractor names in SPS. C-JTSCC has also instituted 

a practice to run bi-weekly “confidence tests” on the SPS data to help ensure that it complies with 

standards and contains only valid records. For example, these tests determine whether selected 

mandatory fields—such as contract numbers, vendor names, and select vendor identifiers—are entered 

and completed. 
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 9

C-JTSCC HAS NOT CORRECTED ITS DATA FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 AND 

EARLIER

Although C-JTSCC took steps in fiscal year 2010 to help minimize its longstanding data entry errors, it 

has not corrected its data entered into SPS for fiscal year 2009 or earlier. According to C-JTSCC 

officials, they are managing more than 3,600 contracts that have more than $1 billion in fiscal year 2009 

obligations and were active as of October 2011. These contract records were reported to ACBIS, JCCS, 

and FPDS-NG. C-JTSCC officials stated that correcting these records may not be feasible given the 

volume and age of the contracting data involved. 

When we compared C-JTSCC’s electronic records to the contract files for 44 fiscal year 2009 contracts 

that C-JTSCC reported were reconstruction contracts, we found 36 discrepancies. Specifically, the 

obligations for 12 contracts did not match the contract file, 6 vendor names did not match the contract 

file, 15 contracts were made from a funding source that was not Afghanistan reconstruction-related, and 

3 contracts were duplicate records. These discrepancies raise questions over the extent of errors in these 

records.

According to the FAR, agencies are responsible for ensuring timely and accurate reporting of contract 

actions to FPDS-NG.17 To verify that the data is accurate, agencies are required to annually certify to the 

Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the General Services Administration that their previous year’s 

FPDS-NG records are accurate and complete. Additionally, according to OMB guidance, complete, 

accurate, and timely Federal procurement data is essential for ensuring that the government has correct 

information when planning and awarding contracts and that the public has reliable data to track how its 

tax dollars are being spent.18 In 2009, C-JTSCC reported that 100 percent of its fiscal year 2009 data 

submitted to FPDS-NG was accurate.19

C-JTSCC officials told us that correcting these contract records in SPS would require identifying the 

errors and issuing a contract modification for each record that contained an error. These officials stated 

that doing so would place a considerable burden on contracting operations centers and would require 

C-JTSCC to coordinate with ACBIS administrators to correct each individual record. However, 

C-JTSCC did not provide us any estimates of the time and resources required to correct these records. 

Further, these officials said that the corrections could only be made in ACBIS. According to C-JTSCC 

officials, FPDS-NG could not be corrected because the system does not update administrative 

modifications, which these would be.

 

CONCLUSION

In 2010, C-JTSCC reported to us that it made about $6.7 billion in obligations to contractors 

implementing reconstruction-related security and development assistance projects in Afghanistan, but 

because C-JTSCC’s data query was inaccurate, it overstated reported obligations by about $2.6 billion. In 

addition, longstanding data entry errors also led to other inaccuracies in C-JTSCC’s reporting. While 

C-JTSCC has increased training of systems users and now runs confidence tests on its contracting data, 

confidence tests have not been applied to C-JTSCC’s fiscal year 2009 and earlier data. Based on a 

limited review of C-JTSCC’s revised fiscal year 2009 data, we identified a number of discrepancies, 

which raise questions over the extent of errors in these records. 

 17See the FAR, Contract Reporting Responsibility, (Part 4.604).

18See OMB Circular A-123: Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control (Washington, D.C., December 21, 

2004); OMB Circular A-127: Financial Management Systems (Washington, D.C., January 9, 2009); and OMB, 

Open Government Directive – Framework for the Quality of Federal Spending information (February 8, 2010).

19C-JTSCC, “FPDS Data Quality Report,” (Exhibit 1, October 13, 2011).
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 10

This means that the C-JTSCC data in ACBIS and FPDS-NG for fiscal year 2009 and earlier contains

errors and remains unreliable. According to the FAR and OMB guidance, Federal agencies, including 

C-JTSCC, are required to ensure such data is accurate and complete. However, C-JTSCC officials 

contend that correcting the errors in SPS and ACBIS would take considerable effort and resources, and 

the corrections would not flow to FPDS-NG. Nevertheless, ACBIS is used to query contract data from 

C-JTSCC and other contracting offices to run standard reports on contracting activity or create ad-hoc 

reports to meet specific needs, such as a request for information from the Congress or other external 

organizations. While we share C-JTSCC’s concern that correcting its errors would require considerable 

time and resources, C-JTSCC should take steps to correct its 2009 and earlier years’ data to the extent 

possible or, at minimum, alert ACBIS users that its data may contain errors and is not reliable.

RECOMMENDATION

Because C-JTSCC took steps during the course of the audit to improve the accuracy of its data queries, 

SIGAR is not making any recommendations in this regard. However, although C-JTSCC has taken steps 

to correct longstanding data entry errors and minimize them in the future, it has not taken any actions to 

correct its fiscal year 2009 and earlier years’ contract data. Therefore, SIGAR recommends that: 

1. The Commander, U.S. Central Command, direct the C-JTSCC Commander to assess the 

feasibility of and the time and resources required to correct C-JTSCC’s fiscal year 2009 and 

earlier years’ contract records. If the assessment determines that prior years’ records cannot be 

corrected or the expense is not worth the effort, C-JTSCC should alert ACBIS users that its 

historical records may contain errors and is not reliable; in addition, it should report to the Office 

of Federal Procurement Policy and the General Services Administration that its fiscal year 2009 

and earlier years’ FPDS-NG records may not be accurate.

COMMENTS

C-JTSCC provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments are reproduced in 

appendix II. C-JTSCC also provided technical comments on the draft report, which we incorporated, as 

appropriate.

Overall, C-JTSCC concurred with the recommendation and reported that it has taken steps to determine 

the feasibility of correcting its fiscal year 2009 and earlier years’ data. Nevertheless, C-JTSCC 

specifically disagreed with our characterization that its data was not “reliable.” It recommended that we 

characterize it as “incomplete.” We disagree. As we note in the report, we found data elements that were 

incomplete or blank and others that were in error. For example, the funding source data for 14,700 SPS 

records was blank for more than 5,600 records. We also found invalid funding source codes. In addition, 

when we compared C-JTSCC’s electronic files to the contract files for 44 fiscal year 2009 contract 

records, we found 36 discrepancies. For instance, six contractor names in C-JTSCC's electronic data did 

not match the contract file. Because of these discrepancies, C-JTSCC’s contract data for fiscal year 2009 

and earlier cannot be relied upon. 
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 11

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

We reviewed obligations made during fiscal year 2009 against contracts for the purposes of 

reconstruction in Afghanistan. The objectives of this audit were to (1) examine the discrepancies in the 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Theater Support Command (C-JTSCC) computer-processed 

data that were initially provided to us to determine how these discrepancies occurred; (2) evaluate the 

measures C-JTSCC has taken to address the causes of the discrepancies; and (3) identify what additional 

steps, if any, C-JTSCC needs to take to ensure the accuracy and reliability of its contract data.

To identify the discrepancies in the C-JTSCC computer-processed data originally provided to us and 

determine how these discrepancies occurred, we reviewed C-JTSCC responses to requests for information 

which explained how the discrepancies in C-JTSCC’s data occurred. To identify the cause of C-JTSCC’s 

errors, we interviewed officials from the Department of Defense’s (DOD) U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM), Business Transformation Agency, the Office of Secretary of Defense-Comptroller, and CJTSCC officials responsible for collecting, maintaining, and reporting contract data to external 

organizations. We also reviewed the sections of the Federal Funding Accountability Transparency Act 

relating to ensuring that agencies report accurate and complete financial data to external organizations. In 

addition, we also reviewed Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars on establishing and 

maintaining an appropriate internal control environment to ensure agencies have accurate information.20

To evaluate the measures C-JTSCC has taken to address the causes of these discrepancies, we reviewed 

C-JTSCC Standard Operating Procedures governing how C-JTSCC officials are to enter contracting data 

into SPS and ensure that C-JTSCC contracting data are accurate and complete. We also reviewed six 

Procurement Management Reviews (PMR) that assessed operations and data quality at three Regional 

Contracting Commands (RCCs). We reviewed each of the PMRs to assess whether RCC operations and 

data quality had had improved over time. We interviewed C-JTSCC officials in at their headquarters 

(located in Tampa, Florida) and Qatar to identify the steps that C-JTSCC has taken to improve its data 

quality. Additionally, to identify the extent to which these measures have been implemented in 

Afghanistan, we interviewed the RCC Chiefs at selected locations and at the Allied Contracting 

Command, Contingency Contracting Closeout Task Force, located at the Rock Island Arsenal in Rock 

Island, Illinois.

To identify the steps, if any, that C-JTSCC still needs to take to ensure the accuracy and reliability of its 

contract data, we reviewed the Federal Acquisition Regulation on requirements to report accurate data to 

FPDS-NG.21

To address internal controls, we obtained information from C-JTSCC on the measures used to ensure data 

quality. We also reviewed the query that C-JTSCC used to generate its revised data, and confirmed that it 

was written correctly with C-JTSCC officials as well as officials from DOD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of the Army-Procurement, which also uses these systems to query C-JTSCC contracting data. We 

obtained fiscal year 2009 data from C-JTSCC, which C-JTSCC reported its original and revised 

obligation values. To determine the reliability of these records, we identified 42 contracts that C-JTSCC 

indicated were funded with either Afghan Security Forces Funds or Commanders Emergency Response 

Program funds. The other 14,811 contracts in C-JTSCC’s database were identified by C-JTSCC as being 

 We also reviewed standards issued by OMB to ensure that agencies, including C-JTSCC, 

establishes and maintains an internal control environment that can reliably generate accurate and 

complete financial data. We obtained information that C-JTSC reported to FPDS-NG certifying that its 

fiscal year 2009 data was accurate and complete. We interviewed C-JTSCC officials responsible for 

implementing actions to ensure data accuracy and reliability, and met with officials from the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary–Procurement. 

 20See OMB Circular A-123: Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control (Washington, D.C., December 21, 

2004); OMB Circular A-127: Financial Management Systems (Washington, D.C., January 9, 2009); and OMB 

Circular A-130: Management of Federal Information Resources (Washington, D.C., November 28, 2000). 21See the FAR, Contract Reporting, (Part 4.6).
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 12

supported by other funds, or contained invalid or blank codes. We considered internal control elements 

related to fraud, waste, abuse, or compliance with laws and regulations.

To assess the reliability of C-JTSCC’s computer-processed data, we (1) interviewed officials to discuss 

the reliability of the data; (2) conducted electronic testing and checked for missing data, erroneous or 

incomplete entries, and duplicates; and (3) compared system generated data with the contract record. 

Given the errors we identified in these records, discrepancies that we found were sufficient to raise 

concerns about the accuracy and reliability of C-JTSCC’s data. The scope of the data that we reviewed 

was limited to fiscal year 2009 records. The results of our tests of data reliability are discussed in the 

body of this report.

We conducted work in, Washington, D.C, Rock Island, Illinois, and Kabul, Khowst Province, and 

Nangahar Province, Afghanistan, from August 2011 to March 2012, in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This audit was conducted under the authority of 

Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General 

Reform Act of 2008.
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 13

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM CENTCOM / C-JTSCC

See SIGAR 

comment 1.
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 14

See SIGAR 

comment 2.

See SIGAR 

comment 3.
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 15

The following are SIGAR comments on CENTCOM / C-JTSCC’s letter dated April 9, 2012: 

(1) We disagree. As we note in the report, we found data elements that were incomplete or blank 

and others that were in error. For example, the funding source data for 14,700 SPS records was 

blank for more than 5,600 records. We also found invalid funding source codes. In addition, 

when we compared C-JTSCC’s electronic files to the contract files for 44 fiscal year 2009 

contract records, we found 36 discrepancies. For instance, six contractor names in C-JTSCC's 

electronic data did not match the contract file. Because of these discrepancies, C-JTSCC’s 

contract data for fiscal year 2009 and earlier cannot be relied upon. 

(2) We changed the text to reflect C-JTSCC's current statement that correcting its fiscal year 2009 

and earlier years' contracting data “may not be feasible given the volume and age of the 

contracting data.”

(3) We changed the text as suggested, but note that, although funding for a contract may be 

accounted for appropriately by the correct line of accounting, it may still be incomplete or 

inaccurate in SPS, as we found. 
SIGAR Audit-12-7 Contract Performance and Oversight / C-JTSCC Data Reliability Page 16

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-048A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for 

the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent 

and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use 

of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publically 

released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web 

site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations 

of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal contact 

SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-545-5974

• Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

2530 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202