COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Beales, AtLee and Senior Judge Bumgardner 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

TONY LAMONT PUGH 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1299-16-1 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. 

 MAY 23, 2017 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 

Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge Designate 

Sean Domer, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

 Aaron J. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

A jury in the Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk (“trial court”) convicted appellant Tony 

Lamont Pugh of obtaining money or property by false pretenses, forging counterfeit bills, 

uttering counterfeit bills, and identity theft. The jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, 

two years in prison for each conviction, yielding a total active sentence of eight years. On 

appeal, Pugh argues: (1) there was insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud, an element of 

each crime for which he was convicted, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting a copy of the 

forged check over his best evidence objection. For the following reasons, we disagree and 

affirm. 

I. FACTS

 “When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and consider any 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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reasonable inferences from the facts proved.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 131, 155-56, 

688 S.E.2d 220, 234 (2010). “The judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will 

be reversed only upon a showing that it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. 

at 156, 688 S.E.2d at 234 (quoting Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 

28 (2005)). 

So viewed, the evidence shows that on October 8, 2013, Pugh entered a Walmart store to 

cash a check for $1,376.12. The check listed “BBISSETTE’S CONCRETE CO.” as the payor 

and Pugh as the payee. A Walmart employee wrote Pugh’s license identification number in the 

endorsement area on the back, then scanned and cashed the check. 

At trial, an employee of a Chesapeake-based business named Bissette Construction 

testified that no business named “Bbissette’s Concrete Co.” exists and that the routing 

information on the check Pugh cashed was not affiliated with her company. Instead, the check 

drew from a PNC bank account affiliated with a chain of salons, “Hair Salon LP.” The day Pugh 

cashed the check, the owner of Hair Salon LP saw that a check she had not issued had drawn 

from her account. She had not heard of Pugh or Bissette Construction. She reported the 

fraudulent transaction and contacted the police. Using video surveillance from Walmart, police 

identified Pugh as the person who cashed the fraudulent check. Pugh was arrested when officers 

discovered multiple warrants for his arrest during a traffic stop approximately one month later. 

Pugh testified that he cashed the check in question, but maintained that he received the 

check as payment for the sale of a vehicle. He stated he had posted a Craigslist advertisement 

and met with a prospective buyer in the Walmart parking lot. The buyer arrived with the check 

made out to Pugh. Although they had agreed to a sale price of $1,400, Pugh stated he accepted 

the check for a lesser amount as he was eager to sell the vehicle. He did not provide the buyer’s 

name at trial, but described him as a “clean shaven, black guy, little taller than me. Casually 
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dressed.” Pugh claimed that the buyer told him the check was from his employer, who was 

loaning him the money to purchase the vehicle. At the buyer’s suggestion, he and Pugh entered 

the Walmart so Pugh could cash the check at the store’s “money center.” After the check 

cleared, Pugh said he signed the title over to the buyer. 

DMV records associated with the automobile showed that on October 10, 2013, Pugh 

transferred title to someone named Iris Nicole Carver, and listed a sale price for $1,300. Pugh 

admitted at trial that he had been previously convicted of a dozen felonies, including stealing car 

stereos, possessing burglary tools, and twice signing his brother’s name on a traffic ticket. The 

trial court took a recess before closing arguments, after which Pugh did not return, so he was not 

present for the remainder of the proceedings. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Evidence of Intent

Pugh does not contest that he presented a forged check; rather, he argues there was 

inadequate evidence that he knew it was forged, and thus the Commonwealth failed to prove 

intent to defraud, an element of each of his convictions. 

“Possession of a forged check by an accused, which he claims as a payee, is prima facie 

evidence that he either forged the instrument or procured it to be forged.” Walker v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 50, 58-59, 486 S.E.2d 126, 131 (1997) (emphasis omitted) 

(quoting Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 171, 174, 313 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1984)). “Such a 

prima facie showing of guilt does not rise to the level of a conclusive presumption, and it may be 

rebutted, but it will warrant submission of the issue of guilt of forgery to the jury, and will 

support a verdict of guilty if the jury so finds.” Fitzgerald, 227 Va. at 174, 313 S.E.2d at 395. 

It is undisputed that Pugh exchanged the forged check for cash. The only evidence Pugh 

presented to rebut the presumption that he forged the check, or procured its forgery, was his own 
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account of the sale. However, there were numerous reasons the jury could, in its role of judging 

witness credibility, “disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and . . . conclude that 

the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 

500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). 

Under Pugh’s theory of innocence, the buyer was the criminal actor, responsible for Pugh 

facing four felony charges. According to Pugh’s own testimony, he possessed, but did not 

provide, information about the buyer that would have supported his narrative. For example, he 

did not disclose the alleged buyer’s name, although he testified numerous times that the buyer 

gave it to him. He did not provide any contact information for the buyer, despite testifying that 

he had screen shots of text message exchanges containing the buyer’s cell phone number. When 

asked if he attempted to contact the buyer after learning of the charges against him, Pugh 

equivocated: “It’s a -- no. I mean well, later on,” but did not disclose whether he was successful 

despite numerous opportunities to do so. In light of this, a jury reasonably could have questioned 

Pugh’s failure to provide more information about the buyer and concluded that he did not do so 

because he was being untruthful. 

Pugh also failed to present other evidence to corroborate his version of events and rebut 

the presumption that he knew the check was forged. He offered no proof that the Craigslist post 

advertising the sale of the vehicle existed.1

 He provided no evidence to support his claim that he 

met with the buyer in the parking lot, or that they entered the Walmart together, such as 

surveillance footage from when the sale allegedly took place. He did not explain the discrepancy 

between his description of the buyer as male and the new title holder being female according to 

 1

 Craigslist posts are managed either through a Craigslist account, or via a link emailed to 

the poster, and thus would generally be available to the individual who created it even after it 

was no longer viewable publicly. Moreover, Pugh testified that he regularly bought and sold 

cars and had “a long Craigslist account,” suggesting that this failure is not due to his lack of 

familiarity with the website. 
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the DMV records. In short, the jury was entitled to disbelieve Pugh, who had a dozen prior 

felony convictions, including for forgery, and to conclude that his hypothesis of innocence was 

not reasonable. Because Pugh failed to rebut the presumption that he knew the check was forged 

when he cashed it, we cannot say that the jury’s rejection of Pugh’s testimony and decision to 

convict were plainly wrong. 

B. Best Evidence

Pugh also argues that the trial court should have sustained his best evidence objection to a 

copy of the forged check obtained from Hair Salon LP’s online bank account. The best evidence 

rule requires that “where the contents of a writing are desired to be proved, the writing itself 

must be produced or its absence sufficiently accounted for before other evidence of its contents 

can be admitted.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 107, 115, 676 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2009) 

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 374, 379, 429 S.E.2d 

881, 885 (1993)). “A trial court’s decision to sustain or overrule a best evidence objection, like 

other decisions about the admissibility of evidence, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” 

Jennings v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 669, 673, 779 S.E.2d 864, 866 (2015). 

Pugh’s argument on appeal relies on Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:1003, which addresses 

admissibility of “substitute checks” over best evidence objections. The Rule was created in 

response to the “Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act,” a federal law that enables banks to 

process checks electronically through the creation of “substitute checks,” rather than physically 

moving original checks between banks. See Michael J. Weber & Dennis E. McDonnell, Check 

Please? The “Check 21” Act and Its Impact On Check Fraud Claims, 40 Tort & Ins. L.J. 941 

(Spring 2005). 

The Rule states: 

(a) Admissibility generally. A substitute check created 

pursuant to the federal Check Clearing for the 21st Century . . . 
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Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5001 et seq., shall be admissible in evidence in 

any Virginia legal proceeding, civil or criminal, to the same extent 

the original check would be. 

(b) Presumption from designation and legend. A document 

received from a banking institution that is designated as a 

“substitute check” and that bears the legend “This is a legal copy 

of your check. You can use it the same way you would use the 

original check” shall be presumed to be a substitute check created 

pursuant to the Act applicable under subdivision (a) of this Rule. 

Pugh argues that the copy of the check admitted here should have been excluded because 

it does not contain the exact language set forth in quotation marks in Rule 2:1003(b). Instead, 

the check image here contains the following language: “This is an image of a check, substitute 

check or deposit ticket. Refer to your posted transactions to verify the status of the item. For 

more information about image delivery . . . ,” followed by contact information for the bank. 

Pugh’s argument fails for numerous reasons. First, Rule 2:1003 does not set out 

requirements for admissibility of any copy of a check under the best evidence rule; rather, it 

establishes that “substitute checks,” a technical term, are admissible as originals, and sets forth 

conditions that create a presumption of admissibility under the best evidence rule. Nothing in the 

record indicates that the check image here was a “substitute check,” or that its admissibility is 

governed by Rule 2:1003. (In fact, the check image’s express language indicates that it is “an 

image of a check, substitute check or deposit ticket” (emphasis added), belying any inference 

that it was necessarily a “substitute check” because it was an electronically-generated check 

image.) In addition, even if the exhibit is a “substitute check,” the omission of the exact 

language from Rule 2:1003(b) should not require its exclusion — it simply would not receive the 

presumption of admissibility as an original. 

Furthermore, “[t]his Court has noted that proper circumstances exist to treat a photocopy 

as a duplicate original when the accuracy of the photocopy is not disputed.” Allocca v. Allocca, 

23 Va. App. 571, 580, 478 S.E.2d 702, 706 (1996). On direct, Pugh admitted to cashing a check 
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with the same amount, payor, and payee as the check image depicted. When asked “Did you 

cash that check, the check we’re all asking about?” he replied “Yes, sir.” Accordingly, “[w]hile 

this Court has long required proof of a case through the most reliable evidence available, . . . 

[Pugh] has not challenged the content of the [check] as represented in the photocopy.” Myrick v. 

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 333, 339, 412 S.E.2d 176, 179 (1991) (quoting Carmody v. F.W. 

Woolworth Co., 234 Va. 198, 200, 361 S.E.2d 128, 129 (1987)). The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in ruling that the check image was admissible over Pugh’s best evidence objection. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Finding no error, we affirm Pugh’s convictions. 

Affirmed.