Docket No . 108441.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS, Appellant, v.

SAMUEL A

BSHER, Appel

le e. Opinion filed May 19, 2011.

JUSTICE FREEMAN del iv ered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, wi th op inion. Chi ef Justic e K

i l bri de an d Jus tic es Th omas, Ga rm an , Ka rmeier, Bur ke, and T heis co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

Fo llowing a s t ipu lat ed be nc h t r ial, t he cir cu it co ur t o f St

. Cla ir Cou n ty conv i cted de f endan t, S am uel Ab sher, of un

authorized pos se ss i on

of a contr olled sub stance (720 I LCS 570/402( c) (West 2002) ). The appel

la te court reversed. No. 5–04–072 9 (u npubl is hed order under S upre me Court Rule 23). We grant ed t he St ate ’s pe ti ti on f or le ave to appeal an

d now reverse the j udgme nt of the ap pel la

t e cou rt.

I. BACKG ROUND On March 18, 2004, pursuant to a full y n egotiated guil

ty plea, defend ant was co nvicte d in t he c i rcu i t cou rt of St. C l ai r Cou nty of
r et ail theft. In exchange for hi s p le a, de f en da nt waspl

ac ed on1 Defendant was a lso cha rged with one count of misdemeanor poss ession of ca nna bis (7 20 IL CS 55 0/ 4( c) ( Wes t 2 00 2) ). T his cha rg e was la ter di sm iss ed by the State

. -2- prob ati on fo r a period of two years. The a greeme nt provided that defend ant wa s to se

rve th e f i rs t y ear in a cc o r da nc e w it h S t

. Cla ir Co un t y’s “I nt en sive Pr o ba t io n S up er visio n” pr o gr am, fo llo we d b y a sec ond year o f “sta ndar d” p ro bat ion. Dur ing the period of “in

tensi ve” pr oba t ion, defen

dant agreed to ab ideby a n umb er o f co nd it io ns in addi ti on to the general

probation restrictions. The probation order sta ted , i n re l ev an t pa rt: “9. *** [Y]ou shall

further obey

and compl

y w ith s uch ot her reasonabl

e rules and regul ations as ar e d efin ed in a r t icle #10. 10. SPEC I FIC RULES A ND REGULATIONS OF INTENSIVE PROBA

TION SUPERVISION : * * * (c) subm it to searches of y

our person, residence , papers, au t o mo bile a nd /o reffe ct s a t an y t ime suc h
re qu ests ar e made by the Pro b ati on Of f i cer, a n d c on se n t to t he us e of

any thi ng s ei zed as ev

i den ce i n C ourt proceedin gs.” On May 17, 2004, a St . Clai

r Coun t y pro ba t ion d epa rt ment off ic er–assi sted by o ffi cer s fro m the B ellevi lle p o lic e department–search

ed def en da nt’ s res i denc e p urs

ua nt to th i s p rob ati on con di ti on and dis covered cocain

e and m arij uana. Def

endan t was thereafter char ged wit h one cou

nt of f el ony unau thor ize d pos se ss i on of a control l ed subs tanc e (720

ILCS 570/4 02(c) (We st 2002 )). 1 Pri orto trial , defen

dant fi le d a m ot ion to supp ress the evi

dence
r ec o ve r ed fr o m his resi dence. Def endan t contended that altho ugh he agreed to the suspici onle ss search condi tion contain

ed i n articl e 10(c)
o f th e p rob ati

on ord er , the s ea

rc h n ev er th el es s v i ol ate d h i s r i gh t to priv acy in hi s residence

b ec au se it wa s no t ba se d u po n r ea so na ble
sus pi cion an d he had not con sen

ted to the of

f i cers ’ en try. At th e s uppr es si on h ea ri n g, S t. C l ai

r C oun ty pro bation offi

cer E. J. Ja rvis testifi

ed that on March 18, 200 4 , he met w ith d efenda nt and-3- expl ai ned to hi m the c ondi

tions of his pr oba t ion, including t he prov i si on contain ed i n articl e 10(c) al l owi ng su sp i ci onl es s s ea rch esof defendant’s resi dence. Jarv is stated t hat defend ant po sed no que st ions
r eg ar ding t he ag r ee men t as a w ho le n o rwit h r es pe ct t o an y sp ec ific pro vi sion pri or t o signi

ng i t. In relation to Jar vi s’ testimony, defense
counse lsti

pula ted that t here was n

o dispute that defen

dant had kn o win gly

an d v ol un tar i l y ag re ed to the i nte ns i ve prob ati on cond i tions. George Chester, the

su pervi sor of the in tensi ve probation program at t he St . C lair Co unt y pro bat ion d epa rt ment, t est ifi ed t o o bser ving defen dant on May

17, 2004, when def

endan t vis ited the probat io n of fice fo r a regularl

y s chedul ed m eetin g. Defen dant’s conduct led Chester t o s usp ect t hat defend ant may have been under the i

nf lue nce of drugs. Based upo n t hi s ob serv ati on, com bi ne d w i th a rev i ew of defendant’s fi

le , Chester bel

ie ved that de f en da nt “ wa s i n p oss es si on of
a con trolle d substanc e at hi s residence.” Pursuan t t o t he search
con di ti on co ntained i

n a rtic l e 10(c ) of d

ef endan t’s pr obati on order, Chester con tact ed the State’s Atto rney ’s off ic e and obtai

ned authorization to search

defen dant’s h ome. Che ster the

n a rra ng ed f or off i cers fr o m t he Be lleville po li ce de pa r t men t t o ac co mp an y a prob ati on off ic er in executi ng the search

of def endan t’s resi dence l

ater that eveni ng. St

. Cl ai r County Probation Of

fi cer Burdett Rice testif

ie d that Chester inst ruc t ed him

to search def

endan t’s home la ter that eveni

ng. Ri ce and off

ic ers from

the B elle vi

ll e poli ce departmen

t arrived at defendant’s resi dence

at ap pr o ximat ely

10 p .m. Rice k noc ked on t he door and i

nf ormed def

endan t t hat t he off i cers were there to perf orm a “routi ne sea rch .” Defend ant re plied, “no, you a re not t onig ht ,” and t r ie d t o c lose t he do or . R ice pr event ed d efenda nt fro m closing t he door, and forced entry in to defendan

t’s home. The offi

cers secured defend ant and se arch

ed th e prem

i ses , r eco ve rin

g a bag of c

rack cocai ne , a b ag of

mari j uan a, an d several li ghters an

d pi pes
. In denying de fendant ’s suppres sion m otion , the c i

rcui t court observed t hat “defend ant canno t , a t his co nvenience and perh aps because h e is i

n an un ten ab l e p osi ti o n, ma ke a dec larat ion t hat he revokes a term

of hi s p rob ati on. ” Th e terms of

the prob ati on ag re em en t, co mbined wit h t he t es t imon y of C h es te r, re nder ed t he
sea rch reas onab l e.2 Wha t wa s r efer red to as “parol e” in Ill in oi s prior to

February 1, 1978, is now termed “manda tor y supe rvis ed release” ( MS R). 730 ILC S 5/ 5–8 –1( d) (We st200 6); see also Wilson , 22 8 Ill. 2d at 37 n. 1. F or cla rity, Illinois defendants on MSR shal l be refer red to a s “ pa rolees” in t his opinion.
-4- The reaf ter, a stipul ated bench

t rial was co nduc t ed, and d efenda nt was found gui

lty of unauthori

zed pos se ss i on of

a controlled s

ubstance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2002)), an d senten ced to two years’ i m pri sonm en t. The appella

te court reversed. No. 5–04–0729 (unpublis hed order under Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 23) . R elying upo n ou r d ecisio n in People
v. Lampito k , 20 7 I ll. 2 d 2 31 (2 00 3) , w hich h eld t hat a s ea rc h o f a pro bationer ’s re sidenc e must be su ppo rt ed by r eas ona ble susp icion, t he panel determi

ned that t he warrantless and su sp i ci onl es s s ea rch of defendant’s hom

e w asi m prop er, an

d that the c i

rcu i t cou rt e rr ed in den y i ng d ef endan t’s s uppre ssi on m otion

. The State f i l ed a p eti

tion f or l eav e to a

pp ea l to thi s c our

t. Al thoughwe deni

ed the State’s petition, we di re cte d th e a pp el l ate cou rt, pu r su an t t o o ur su pe rvis o ry au t ho r it y, to v ac ate its o rd er and reconsider

it s r uling in light o f People v. Wilson , 228 Ill . 2d 35 ( 2008) , whi ch was i ss ue d du ri ng the pend en cy of t his app eal and held t hat t he f our th am en dm en t al l owsa suspici

onl es s s ea rch of a parolee. 2 The appe l l ate court agai

n revers ed the ci

rcuit court’s denial

of defendant’s
su ppr es si on motion . No. 5–04

–0729(unpub li

shed order under Su pr eme Court Rul e 23 ). The pa n el h el d th at “ Wilson doe s n

ot chan ge the Lampitok

test for det ermi

ni ng the reasonabil

ity for a search of a probationer’s

resi dence.” We gr ant ed t he St at e’s p et itio n for leave to appeal. Ill . S. Ct . R. 315(a ) (ef f . Au g. 15, 20 06).

II. AN AL YSIS When re viewing a circui

t co urt ’s ruli

ng on a motion to suppress evi dence, t hat ru ling is asses sed unde r t he t wo -p ar t t est ado pt ed by t he Supr eme Co ur t in Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996 ). People

v. Harr is , 228 Ill . 2d 22 2, 230 ( 20 08 )

. T he cir cu it
cou rt ’s factual

fi ndi ngsare up he l d un l ess they areagains

t t he m ani fest weight of the ev

i den ce. People v. Sorenson , 19 6 I ll. 2d 42 5, 431-5- (2001 ). The revi

ewi ng court t hen

assess es t he es t ab lishe d fa ct s in
re l ati on to t he issue s pr ese nt ed a nd may d r aw it s o wn co nc lus io ns in de cid ing wh at r elie f, if

an y , shoul d be

gran ted. Harri

s , 22 8 I ll. 2d at 230. Acco rd ing ly , t hi s court reviews de novo the ulti ma te legal que sti on of whether s

uppression is

warranted. People v. Luedemann , 222 Il l . 2d 530 , 542-4 3 (200 6). The fourth am

endm ent to t he Un

ited States Constitution guards t he “r igh t o f t he pe o ple t o be se cu r e in t he ir persons, ho uses, papers, and eff ects, ag ainst unreasonab le searches and se izures .” U.S. C onst., am end. IV ; ac cord I l l . C on st. 19 70 , a rt. I, §6. A “s earch” occurs whe n “an expectat ion of pri

vacy that so ciety i

s prepared t o co nside r r ea so na ble is

in fri nged.” United States v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984 ). Altho ugh t he fourt h amendm ent pr ot ect s an indi

vidual’ s priv acy i n a v ari ety of s ettin gs, “ [i ]n n one is the zone of pri vacy m ore cle ar ly defi ned than when bounded b

y the un am bi gu ous physi cal dimensions of

an in divi dual’s home .” Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 589 ( 19 80 )

. Be ca us e o ne ’s r igh t t o r et r ea t int o his o rhe rho me withoutun r ea so na ble go ve rnme nt in terf ere nc e i s a core pri nc i ple of t he f our th am en dm en t (Kyllo v. U

nited States , 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001 )), law enfo rc ement of f i cers gene ral l y may not enter, much less
sea rc h, a pe rso n’s ho me witho ut a wa rr ant abse nt e xigent ci rcum stan ces
. Payton , 445 U .S. at 590. The Su pr eme Cou

rt, h owev er , has

set f orth l i m i ted ex ce pti on s to t he w arrant requirem

ent. For exam

ple , consent has l

ong been a n exce ption to the ne ed f

or a sea rch warra nt. Schneckloth v. Bustamont

e , 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973 ). In addition, a warrantless search may be co nsid er ed r ea so na ble upo n a showi ng of “ special

la w enfo rc ement needs, di

m i ni sh ed ex pe cta ti ons of priv acy , [and] mi

ni ma l i ntrus i ons.” Illinois v. McArthur , 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). Indeed, wh erean i ndi vi dual –such as defend ant –is ser vinga t er m of pr oba t ion, t he restri cti on s p lac ed up o n his co nduc t du e t o t he t er ms o f his prob ati on agreem ent resul ts in hi s hav in g a “si gnifi cantl y di mi ni shed”
ex pe cta ti on o f p r iva cy. United Sta tes v. K nights , 534 U.S. 112, 119- 20 (20 01). The St at e c o nt en ds t ha t be ca us e d efe nd an t , as pa r t o f a fu lly negotiated

guil ty plea, freel

y a greed to t he sus

pic ionl ess search
con di ti on co nt ain ed in a r t icle 10 ( c) o f his proba tion order, he t her eby kn o win gly

wai v ed h i s r i gh ts un der the f our th am en dm en t to chal le nge-6- t he re as on ab l en

es s of an y se arch con ducte d in a cc o r da nc e w it h t his pr ovisio n. Al

thoughthe Stat e acknowledges th at Lampitok hel d that t he sp ec ific p r o ba t io n se ar ch co nd it io n in that ca se di

d n ot co n sti tute such a wai ver, i t as se

rtsth at a pp l y i n g th at h ol di n g u n der thes e f

acts provides de f en da n t wi th the b enef i t of the ba rgai n, i.e. , serv

i ng a term of pro bat ion ra t her t han impriso nment, but st rips t he St at e o f the be ne fit t ha t mad e p r o ba t io n r at he rt ha n imp r iso nme nt a mu t ua lly advan tageous o pt io n: it s a bility t o clo se ly sup er vise de fe n da n t to en sure succ es sf ul com pl eti on of h i s prob ati

on period a n d th e n ee d to prot ect t he pu blic while defenda nt is on p ro bat ion. Ac co r di ng ly, t he St at e r equ est s t hat we r evisit t his issue, and ado pt t he hold ing o f the Uni ted Stat es Cour t of Ap pea ls for t he Se vent h Circu it in United States v. Barnett

, 415 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005), whi ch concl uded that
a probationer’s agreem

ent to t he i

den tica l s uspi ci onle ss search
con di ti on at is sue i n thi s appeal

constituted a prospective wai ver o f his priv acy righ ts. We agree wi

th the Stat e. The fact s in Barnett

mirro r t hos e in t he ins tan t ap pe al . B ar n ett, si mi la rt o de fen da nt , ple d g uilt y t o cr im in al o ffen se s in t he cir cu it courtof St. C l ai

r Coun ty. United Sta tes v . Bar nett , No. 03–CR–30170, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3089, at 2(S.D. Ill. F eb. 27, 2004)

. As part of hi

s f ull y n egotiated guil

ty plea, Barnett–li

ke defen dant–agreed

t o ab id e b y certai n co ndit ions o f “intensive p ro ba ti on supervisi on” i

n l ie u of pri son, in

cl udin g the ide ntica l
su sp icio nle ss se ar ch pr o visio n a t iss ue in t his a pp ea l, which was al so la bel ed as a rtic l e 10(c ) i

n B arnett’s probati

on order. Id . at 2-3. Furth er, like defend ant , B ar ne tt ’s b eh av i or d uri n g a v i si t to the S t. Cla ir County probation of

fi ce was observ

ed by Chester, who bel

ie ved it in di ca t ed Ba rne t t wa s in vo lve d i n ille ga l ac t ivit y. Id . a t 4. Again, mirro ring t he inst an t ap pe al, Ch es t er lo oked in to Barnett’s crim

in al background, determi

ned that ill ega l cont ra band or act ivity was t o be f ou nd at Barnett’s home, an

d directed a probation of

fi cer to sea rc h Barn ett’s re siden

ce l ater tha t eve ni ng. Id . That offi

cer, accompan

ie d by two sheriff

’s depa rtm en t deputi es , con duc ted a s ea rch of Barnet t’s ho me and f

ound weapons, whi

ch l ed to Barnett faci

ng f ederal charges f orbe i ng a f elon i n pos ses sion of

a f i rearm
. Id . a t 5. Bar ne tt fi le d a
moti o nto sup pr ess e vidence , a lleging t hat t he se ar ch violat ed t he f our th amendment beca use it w as c ond uct ed w itho ut a wa rr ant and the of f i cers ha d nei the r proba bl e c au se nor reason ab l e suspici

on that-7- he was involved in cr imi

nal act ivity or co nduc t which violat ed t he terms of his prob ati on. Id . at 1-2. The Uni ted St ates district court rejected Barnet t’ s arguments. Instead, t he co ur t agr eed wit h t he go ver nment t hat , by ac cep t ing t he t er ms of i nte ns i ve prob ati on s upe rvi si on as p artof his f

ull y n egotiated gui l ty plea, Barnett vo lun

tarily and knowingl

y wai ved hi s f ourt h amendment right s in exchang e fo r no t having t o s er ve t ime in priso n. Id

. at 7- 11. Acco rd ingly, the dist rict co ur t denied Bar ne t t’s suppress i on m

otion

. The Seve nt h Circu it affirmed. The co ur t first not ed t hat t he Supreme C ourt has m

ade i t clear that where a probationer accepts a broadprobation condi

tion–s u ch as i n the m atter at ba

r–he the ref ore hasa s ign ifica nt ly

dim inis he d e xp ec t at io n o f p r iva cy. Barnett, 415 F.3d at 691 (c iting Knights , 534 U.S. at 119, 122). A probationer m ay waive this

al ready di mi ni shed ex p ectati on of pri v acy , a cc ordi

n g to Barnett, “provi ded that the waiv er is knowin g and i ntell ige nt.” Id

. Barnett gr o un de d t his h o ldin g in i ts ob serv ati

on t hat plea ba rg ains
area f orm of con tra ct, an d “l i ke oth er con tra cts are p re su med to ma ke b oth parties b etter off

and do no harm

to third parti es .” Id . a t 692. The cou rt e x pl ai n ed th e b en ef i ts re ape d by bot h Bar net t and th e S tate as a res ul t of th ei r agr eemen

t:

“ Ba rnett di dn ’t wan t to go to pri son . H e p re f

er re d to sacri fi

ce the li mi ted privacy

to whi ch h e would h ave b een entitled *** just ascon vi ct ed de f en da n ts pre f er h om e c on f i n em en t to confi nem en t i n a jail or pr ison e ven if the home c onfinement in volv ed monitor ing the defendant’s activ ities insid e t he ho me and thus i

nva des his priv

acy . And s inc e imp risonm ent is a greater in vasi on of personal

priv acy than b ei ng exp ose d to searches of o ne’s ho me on d emand, t he bar gain t h at B ar n ett struck wa s no t o nly ad va nt ag eo us t o him b ut actual l y more pr ot ect iveof Fo ur t h Amendment values t han t he al tern ati ve of prison wou l d h av e b een . It was

also a dvan ta geous t o t he gov er n men t, whi ch wouldn’t hav

e agreed to it ot herwi se. ***
*** Not hin

g is m or e co mm

on t han an i

ndivi dual’s
co nsent ingto a search that wo uld otherwise v i ol ate th e F our th A men dm en t, t hinking t hat he will be bet t er off t han he wo uld be st and ing o n his r ight s. Oft en a big p ar t o f t he v alu e o f a right is what one can get i n exchan ge for gi vi ng i t up. Here,-8- gi ve n th e al tern ati ve f ac i ng hi m of a p ri son se n ten ce , B ar n ett gave up n othi ng.” (Em phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Id . at 691-9 2. The co urt al so rejected Barne tt ’s contenti on that enforci ng a bl anket consent inv

ites abuseon t he par t of law enfo rc ement , st at ing that thi s n ot onl y i gn or es t he even

greater deprivation of pri vacy Ba rnett face d if he were to be i

mprisoned, but al so that because a ple a ba r ga in is a contract, it contain

s i mpl ic it terms wh

ic h neces sa r ily pr event absurd resul

ts. The court found that the purpose of the wai ver “was not to perm

it p ro ba ti on

of f i cersto h aras s prob ati

on er s, b ut to excuse the

of f i cers f rom hav in g to jus tif y a search b y e stablis hi ng that it wa s ba se d o n p r o ba ble ca us e, s uspici on, orsome other standard that mightin vi te li tigation,” an

d that it is reasonabl

e t o assu me tha t “the ‘c on tra ct’ implicit ly fo r bid s– eq ui v al en tl y , the w ai

v er of Fo ur th Amendment righ

ts doesnot

ext end t o –s ea r ch es t ha t ha ve no po ss ible law- enfo rc ement obje ctive , or t hat so far exceed an y l eg i ti mate en fo r ce me nt need s as t o c omp el an infere nce t hat t he pu rp os e and
o nly e f fect were harassm

ent.” Id . a

t 69 2. A cc ordi n gl y , the S ev

en th Cir cu it aff

irm ed the di strict court ’s den i al of Ba rnett’ s s uppres si on moti on. Barnett ’s con

tract l aw an al y sis a nd con cl us i on is supported by our
ownprecedent. Begi

nni ng wi th our 1996 dec ision in People v. Evans , 174 Ill . 2d 320 (1996), we ha ve r ep ea t ed ly held that ful ly negotiated gui l ty pleas su ch

as th e on

e a t ba r are g ove

rned by pri nc i plesof contract la

w. Accordin

gly , we have

de t er mined that to all ow a defend ant t o un ilat er ally mo dify t he t er ms o f a fu ll y neg o t ia ted plea agree ment whi le h o ldin g t he St at e t o it s p ar t o f t he ba r ga in “flie s in th e face of contract law pri

nci ple s” ( id . at 327), because “the gu ilt y ple a an d t he se nt en ce ‘g o ha nd in ha nd’ a s mat er ial elements of t he ple a ba rgain

” ( id . at 3 32) . Con

se que ntl y , i n or der to av

oi d

“‘gam esm ansh ip o f a most off

ensi ve n ature’ ” ( id

. at 32 7) , we he ld that a d efe nd an t may no t se ek t o un ilat er ally reduce his s en t en ce wh ile hold ingt he St at e t o it s pa rt of t he bar gain ( id .). Ap ply in g contract princi ples, we determi

ned that a def

en dan t, th eref ore , m ay se ek to mo dify t he t er ms of a fu lly

nego t iate d gu ilty plea o nly by wit hdr awing that ple a and va cat ing t he judg ment, t her eby re tur n i n g th e p ar ti es to3 We co nt rasted t he ne go tiat ed pl ea at issu e w ith an “open” plea, in which
a defendant plea ds guilt y without receivingany pr omises fr om the Sta te in ret urn
. Evans , 17 4 Ill. 2d

at 33 2. We

he ld that i n t he case of an o pe n p lea, b ec ausethe St at e offers t he defendant no inducements to p lead guilt y, defe nd antswho ent ersuch p leas m ay challenge their s entences without being req uired toals o w ith draw thei r gu il ty pl ea s. Id

. -9- t he status q

uo an te. Id . at 332. 3 Subsequen t to Evans , w e have
r ep ea t ed ly held t hat it is t he ex i stenc e of a s en ten ci ng con ce ss i on on t he part o f the State which triggers the a ppli cation of contrac t princi ples. See, e.g. , People

v. Morris , 2 36 I ll. 2d 3 45 ( 201 0) (no t ing th at Evans he ld

t hat unde r p rinciples o f co nt ra ct , bo t h t he St at e and defend ant are bound to t he terms of a plea agree ment) ; P eople v. Di az , 1 92 I ll. 2 d 2 11 ( 20 00 ) ( pr inc iple s o f co nt r ac t law se t fo r t h in Evans appl

y where State ag ree d n ot to seek ex tended-term

sen tenc es); People v. Linder , 186 Ill . 2d 67 (1999) (co ntract princi ple s di scussed in Evans appl

y w here def endan t pled gui lty in exch angef or aca p on t he length o f hi s sent ence) ; People v. Clark , 183 Il l

. 2d 2 61 (1998) (Evans ’ contract analy

si s appl ie s where de fend an

t n eg oti ate d h

i s g ui l ty ple a, but parti es di sagreed on whethe r sentences

would be

served
co nsecut ively

); c. f. People v. Lu mzy , 191 Il l . 2d 182(2000 ) (Evans ’ contract pri

nc i pl es d o not appl

y wh eret he ag r ee men t co nc er ns o nly charges and not se

nten ces ). We f i nd thi s c as e to b e anal og ousto Evans and, theref ore, simila r ly govern ed by pri nc i plesof contract law. Her e, defend ant and t he Stat e entered i

nto a fully negotiated pl ea agreem ent in whi ch defend ant ple d guil

ty to a charge in

exch ange for t he St ate ’s
rec om men da ti on o f a sp ec i f i c s en ten ce : tw o y ea rs ’ prob ati

on , w i th t he fi rst ye ar bei

ng “ in tensi ve.” Fac ed

wi th th e p oss i b i l i ty of impriso nment and a complete loss of f

reedo m an

d privacy rights, de f

en da n t opte d to
av o id incarc er at ion and agr ee t o p ro bat ion, including a year of t he
more re st rict ive “intens ive” ver sion a nd it s gr ea t er inv as io n o f p r iva cy. Thi s bargai

n was adv antageous to defen

dant, as he av

oided jail t ime and gave up not hing by agr eeing t o p ro bat ion and its r est rict ions. The ba r ga in was also adva ntageo us to the Stat e, in that it assured that defend ant was requi

redt o c omp ly with t he mor e r est rict ive co ndit ions of in tensi ve probation f

or t he first year. It is undisp ut ed t hat t he agr eement was explained t o d efenda nt , he un ders tood its p ro visions-10- an d h e fr ee ly sig ne d t he fo rm. Defend ant ’s ac t ions in su bseq uent ly chall enging t he validity o f the search of hi s ho me c o nd uc t ed pu r su an t t o ar t icle 10 ( c) o f his prob ati on agreem ent are anal

ogous to those of a

def endan t who en ters i n to a f ul l y n eg oti ate d g

ui l ty pl ea an d th ereaf ter se ek s to un ilat er ally reduce hi s sen

ten ce by fi

li ng a m ot ion f or reco nsi

deration wi

thout wit hdr awing t he ple a. I n bo t h ins t an ce s, t he de fen da nt wis he s t o ho ld t he St at e t o it s p ar t o f t he ba r ga in wh i l e n ot adh eri ng to h i s own part of t he ag re ement , t her eby raising t he sp ec ter of gam esm ansh ip s im il ar to that discu ssed in Evans . Ju st as t he spe cific sent ence and p lea we nt

“ha nd i n h an d”asmaterial

el em en ts of t he plea bar gain in Evans , so, too, did th

e pl ea a nd th e con di tions of proba tion at i ssue here. De f en da n t, in hi s brief , do es not add ress Barnett su bs t an t ive ly, but asks that we

ad he re to ou r pos i ti on in Lampitok

that the pr obat ioner’s agr eement i

n th at c as e to a

wa rra ntl es s s ea rch con di ti on d i d n ot con sti tute prosp ecti v e c on se n t. We fi nd Lampitok

to b e f actu ally d is

tingui shab le from this case. Fi rs t, we note the sign

ificant dif

f ere nc esbe twe en the prob ati on con di ti on at issue thereand the condi

tion agreed to by de fen

dant at ba r. In L amp itok, the probationer was sub je ct to a probation order whi ch pr ovi ded t hat she “sha ll submit t o a sea rc h of he r p er so n, resi dence, or aut omo bile at a ny ti me a s d i rected by he r Proba ti on Off ic er to v eri f y com pl i an ce wi th th e c on di

ti on s of th is P rob ati

on Order .” (In

terna l quotati on m

arks omi tted.) Lampitok , 207 Ill . 2d at 236. Re vie win g t he “sh all s ub mit ” la ng ua ge us ed in that provisi

on, we he ld t ha t it did not co nst itu t e a p ro spe ct iveconsent, as i t o nl y c harged th e p rob ati

on er wi th th e d uty to s ub m i t to a s ea rc h wh en di re cte d to do so , a nd

she retai ned an el em ent of choice as t o wh et he rt o co mply wi th t he cond i tion or fa ce pos si bl e rev ocati on of her proba tion

. Id

. at 261-62. In contrast, the la

nguage used

in defen dant’s probation order i s f

ar mo r e re stricti

ve wi th reg ards

to def endan t’s c onduc

t, and f ar m ore re st rict ivewi

th res pe ct to i ts s cop e. D ef

en da nt i s req ui red to “ ob ey and co mply” wit h t he “r ule s a nd r eg ula t io ns o f int en siv e probat io n supe rvision,”including t hat he “[s ]u bmit t o s ear ches of [ his] pe rso n, resi dence, pa pe r s, au t o mo bile and/or eff ects at an y ti me s uch re qu ests aremade b

y the Prob ati on Of f i cer, a n d c on se n t to t he us e o f anything sei zed as evi dence in court proceedin

gs.” Unl ike in Lampitok wh ere4 We note tha t this cas e does not pr esent the sit ua tion where a defenda nt was in volu ntari ly pl ace d o n p robation , re quired to s ubmit t o conditions impos ed by t he sent encin g ju dge, orhad no opti on to re fuse the con di tion s. Ourdecis ion t oda y is limit ed to t he spec ific f

ac ts pr esented, and we expre ss no opi ni on wi th re spec t to o the r factual si

tuation s. -11- we hel d that t he search

co ndi ti on“af

fi rmati vel y requi red [the] prob ati on off ic er to ask [the probationer’s] cons en t” to a search li mi ted to v eri f

y h er com pl i an ce wi th con di ti ons of her pr oba t ion ( id

. at 262), here, defen

dant has a gr eed t o o bey and c omp ly with any search conduct ed by

a pro bation offi

cer, and has also e

xplicitly provided “ con

se n t” to t he us e o f anything sei zed durin g such s earch
as evi dence i

n court pro ceedi

ngs. It is cl

ear that defen

dant’s search
con di ti on impli cat es far mor e t han o nl

y the prob ati on r ev oca ti on dis cussed in Lampitok

. Ac co r di ng ly, t he se ar ch co ndit ions se t fo r t h in these cases

are factuall

y di stin guis hab le

. Lampitok is furt her dist inguishable t o t he ext ent that, unli ke here, defend ant Lampi

to k was not

th e p robationer subj ect to the search
co ndit ion. Inst ead , La mpito k wa s an a cqu ainta nce w ho occupi ed a
motel room wi th the p robati

oner a t the ti me prob ati on of

f i cers searched t he premi ses , a nd who was ar re st ed a s a r esu lt o f the dis covery of

drugs and wea

pons
. Id. at 2 35 -3 7. F i

n al l y , w e a l so n ote th at Lampitok

preceded Barnett, and, therefore, we d id no t have t he bene f i t of i ts an al y si s at the tim e of that de ci sion. Thus, we ha ve no t ha d p r io ro cc as io n t o an sw er t he qu es t io n sq ua r ely presented i

n thi s appeal . Because Barnett not only addresses ide ntica l f ac ts to th os e in the cas e at bar, but als o mi rrors o ur own pre cedent es t ab lishin g t ha t co nt r ac t pr inc iple s g o ve rn a fully
n eg oti ated g uil

ty plea, we fi

nd Barnett

persuasi ve. In addi

tion, we believe t ha t o n t he se fac t s t his a pp r o ac h a ls o pr o mo tes the dual purpo se of

the prob ati on s y stem : the re

ha bi l i tati on of the probationer and the protecti on of

the publ i c. Griffin v. Wisconsin , 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987 ). We

there f ore hol d tha t unde r the spec ific fa ct s in t his ap pe al, defendant’s agreement to the suspicionlessse ar ch co nd it io n in
ar t icle 10(c) of

hi s p rob ati on ord er con sti tute d p rospe cti

v e c on se n t. 4 Because we find t hat defend ant waived his four t h amendment ri gh ts by fr ee ly

ag re ei n g to th e s us pi ci onl es s s ea rc h con di ti on set f orth-12- in ar t icle 10( c) of his pr oba t ion o rd er , w e nee d no t add re ss t he
rem ai nd er of th e S tate ’s

argu men ts i n su pp ort of i ts po sitio n t hat t he search was

val id.

CONCLUSION Fo r the f

or ego ing re aso ns, w e r ever se t he judg ment o f the appe l l ate cou rt a n d a f f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e c i rc ui t cou rt.
Appel la te court judgm

ent reversed; ci rcuit court judgm

ent aff irm ed.