alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 302-3.401 What is the purpose of a TCS?

A TCS provides agencies an alternative to a long-term temporary duty travel assignment which will increase your satisfaction and enhance morale, reduce your income tax liability, and save the Government money.
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.16
Your Stock Option ("Options") Award
  Performance. Results. Rewards.


	
	
	Name:

	Grant Date:  






About This Statement
This personalized statement shows your Stock Option Award under the United Technologies Corporation Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended (the “LTIP”). The award shown in this statement is subject to the terms and conditions of the LTIP.


Your Stock Option Award
	
						
	Type
	Number of Units
	Grant Price
	Estimated Present Value
	Vesting Date*
	Expiration Date

	Options
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 






*Note: The Award will vest according to this schedule provided you are employed by the Company on these dates.


	
			
	 	Stock Options (“Options”)
How Do Options Work?
A stock option is similar to a Stock Appreciation Right (“SAR”) and delivers equivalent value when exercised.


■ Provides gain equal to the difference in UTC stock price from grant date to exercise date


■ Vests three years after grant date


■ Expires ten years from the grant date, unless exercised


■ No dividend equivalents


■ At exercise, value is delivered in shares of 
UTC Common Stock that can be:
-- Converted to cash, or
-- Held as shares with dividend rights

	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 


	
		
	An Example

	Number of Options granted
	1,000

	UTC stock price at grant
	 $100 per share

	UTC stock price at exercise
	 $125 per share

	Increase in UTC stock price from grant date to exercise date:
	 $125 per share
-$100 per share
=  $25 per share

	Total gain from Option exercise:
	1,000 options
X $25 per share
= $25,000

	Conversion into shares of UTC stock:
	$25,000
÷$125 per share
= 200 shares








You may view your award online at the UBS One Source website.  You can access the UBS One Source website from any computer at http://www.ubs.com/onesource/utx (you will need a User ID and PIN).

HOW TO ACCEPT YOUR AWARD - WITHIN 150 DAYS
You will receive an email from UBS alerting you that your award has posted to your UBS account.  You must acknowledge and accept the terms and conditions of your award electronically via UBS One Source.


If you do not accept your award on-line at UBS One Source within 150 days of the Grant Date, your award will be forfeited.


The award shown in this statement is nontransferable and is subject to the terms and conditions of the United Technologies Corporation Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended.  I acknowledge this statement of award, the 20XX Schedule of Terms describing my award.  I understand that I am accepting this award subject to the 20XX Schedule of Terms and the LTIP.  In accepting this award, I accept responsibility for any tax liabilities associated with this award at the time of grant, lapse, exercise and/or sale.  I authorize the Company, its Affiliates and its third party administrators to collect, use, process, transfer, and hold my personal data, in electronic or other form, as required for the implementation, administration and management of this award and the LTIP within or outside the country in which I reside or work.
§ 102-75.297 Are there any exceptions to when landholding agencies can serve as the disposal agency? Yes, landholding agencies may not serve as the disposal agency when— ( a ) Either the landholding agency or GSA determines that the Government's best interests are served by disposing of leases, licenses, permits, easements and similar real estate interests together with other property owned or controlled by the Government that has been or will be reported to GSA, or
( b ) Government-owned machinery and equipment being used by a contractor-operator will be sold to a contractor-operator.
# Comments on: 23-2123: WILDER v. MCDONOUGH [ORDER], Nonprecedential
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

on Technology (COT) unanimously agreed to recommend to this Court certain amendments

to the Montana Judicial Branch Information Technology Strategic Plan, December 2002 (the

Plan).

Those amendments are to add to Goal 1 on page 11 of the Plan, the following

objectives:

1.7 Complete deployment by June 30, 2005, of Full Court to the Courts of

Limited Jurisdiction to replace existing systems.

Estimated timeframe -- FYE 2005

1.8 The Office of the Court Administrator will establish by June 30,2003, an

accounting structure that will identify the fiscal items of revenue and expenses

and that will generate a semi-annual report relating to information technology

with the Supreme Court, District Courts, Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, Clerk

of the Supreme Court and Clerks of District Courts.

Estimated time~ame--sngoing

Having considered these proposed amendments; good cause shown,

IT IS ORDERED that the Plan is so amended.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court give notice of this Order by

mail to the Chairperson of the Commission on Technology; to the Clerks of the District

Courts; to the President of the Montana Magistrates Association; to Dan Chelini, Director
of Information Technology; to the Executive Director of the State Bar of

the State Law Librarian with the request that they post this order to their respective websites.

DATED this Y of February, 2003. r
#### §§ 105-8.131-105-8.139 [Reserved]
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

October 29, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 134722 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 134722 

 COA: 277627 

Muskegon CC: 06-052938-FC

RICO RASHSON HAYES,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 2, 2007 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that 

the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d1022 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 29, 2007 

 Clerk
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                           UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM NEW CENTURY
ENERGIES,   INC.  CONSOLIDATED  BALANCE  SHEET  AS  OF  DECEMBER  31,  1998  AND
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                               1,000
       
<S>                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                    DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                         DEC-31-1998
<BOOK-VALUE>                            PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>              5,882,023
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>              405,436
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                   802,557
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                 581,948
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         7,671,964
<COMMON>                                 114,491
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>              1,751,895
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                      740,677
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>         2,614,827
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                    294,000
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                   2,169,954
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                        36,438
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                      0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>           487,956
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>            134,005
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                      0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>               35,591
<LEASES-CURRENT>                           4,160
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>         1,895,033
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>          7,671,964
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>              3,610,905
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                     135,596
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>             2,960,404
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>             2,960,404
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                  650,501
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                        31,851
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>           682,352
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 199,467
<NET-INCOME>                             341,957
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                5,332
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                  0
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                 260,330
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                185,745
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                   659,539
<EPS-PRIMARY>                               3.06
<EPS-DILUTED>                               3.05
        

</TABLE>
No. 10-11139.

#### Lynn *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<PERIOD-TYPE>  6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>   DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>   JUN-30-1995
<CASH>         $2,338,160
<SECURITIES>        89,125
<RECEIVABLES>  1,133,082
<ALLOWANCES>   2,183
<INVENTORY>         397,198
<CURRENT-ASSETS>    4,180,828
<PP&E>         663,246
<DEPRECIATION> 789,889
<TOTAL-ASSETS> 4,845,225
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>    243,344
<BONDS>        0
<COMMON>       1,508,180
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>    0
<PREFERRED>         0
<OTHER-SE>          3,043,758
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  4,845,225
<SALES>        2,660,951
<TOTAL-REVENUES>    2,660,951
<CGS>               1,417,793
<TOTAL-COSTS>  1,417,793
<OTHER-EXPENSES>    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>  2,006
<INCOME-PRETAX>     (137,427)
<INCOME-TAX>   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING> 0
<DISCONTINUED> 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>     0
<CHANGES>      0
<NET-INCOME>   (137,427)
<EPS-PRIMARY>  (.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>  (.04)
        

        

</TABLE>
45848.

#### MATHIS v. WATSON.

(376 SE2d 660)

Bell, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error in charging the jury on so-called “magnified” damages. *Mathis v. Watson,*187 Ga. App. 100 (1) (369 SE2d 291) (1988).

This case stems from injuries that James Phillips suffered when he was pinned against a feed mill by a pickup truck driven by Billy Watson. Judith Mathis, the mother of Phillips, sued Watson for Phillips’ injuries in her individual capacity and as the next friend of Phillips. The jury returned a verdict in Watson’s favor.

On appeal, Mathis contended that the trial court erred in giving the magnified damages charge. The charge complained of is as follows:

> I further charge you that if you believe from the entire testimony that the plaintiff has magnified or exaggerated the injuries and/or damages of James Phillips, or the causes thereof, on account of his interest in suit, then you have the right and it is your duty to disregard the evidence given by him insofar as the same is unjustly magnified or unjustly increased either as to the damages or the conduct of the defendant.

The Court of Appeals, implicitly acknowledging that the magnified damages charge was erroneous, held that the charge was not reversible error because it dealt solely with the issue of damages. The court, relying on *Minter v. Leary,*181 Ga. App. 801 (1) (354 SE2d 185) (1987), reasoned that, as the jury ruled against Mathis on the issue of liability, any error in a charge on damages had to be harmless.

We agree with the cases that hold that the giving of a magnified damages charge is erroneous, as such a charge unduly stresses the defendant’s contentions with regard to the evidence. E.g., *Ammons v. Six Flags Over Ga.,*172 Ga. App. 210 (2) (323 SE2d 2) (1984); *Coker v. Casey,*178 Ga. App. 682 (1) (344 SE2d 662) (1986). Moreover, the thrust of such a charge concerns the credibility of witnesses, and can *14be sufficiently covered in the general charge on credibility. See *Ammons,*supra,172 Ga. App. at 211; *Brewer v. Henson,*96 Ga. App. 501, 503 (5) (100 SE2d 661) (1957). We therefore expressly disapprove of the use of such a charge in future cases.

Decided March 2, 1989.

*Blackburn, Bright, Edwards & Joseph, J. Converse Bright,*for appellant.

*Young, Young & Clyatt, F. Thomas Young, Perry, Moore & Studstill, Daniel L. Studstill,*for appellee.

We now move to the question of whether the charge given in this case constitutes harmless error. We conclude it was not harmless. We do so because we find that the charge as given did not deal solely with damages. Specifically, the trial court charged that if Mathis had magnified the injuries of Phillips, *“or the causes thereof,”*then the jury had the right to disregard the evidence given by Phillips either as to damages *“or the conduct of the defendant.”*The highlighted language clearly relates to the issue of liability, and was harmful. Accordingly, we must reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
§ 60-2.12 Job group analysis. ( a ) Purpose: A job group analysis is a method of combining job titles within the contractor's establishment. This is the first step in the contractor's comparison of the representation of minorities and women in its workforce with the estimated availability of minorities and women qualified to be employed.
( b ) In the job group analysis, jobs at the establishment with similar content, wage rates, and opportunities, must be combined to form job groups. Similarity of content refers to the duties and responsibilities of the job titles which make up the job group. Similarity of opportunities refers to training, transfers, promotions, pay, mobility, and other career enhancement opportunities offered by the jobs within the job group.
( c ) The job group analysis must include a list of the job titles that comprise each job group. If, pursuant to § 60-2.1(d) and (e) the job group analysis contains jobs that are located at another establishment, the job group analysis must be annotated to identify the actual location of those jobs. If the establishment at which the jobs actually are located maintains an affirmative action program, the job group analysis of that program must be annotated to identify the program in which the jobs are included.
( d ) Except as provided in § 60-2.1(d), all jobs located at an establishment must be reported in the job group analysis of that establishment.
( e ) Smaller employers: If a contractor has a total workforce of fewer than 150 employees, the contractor may prepare a job group analysis that utilizes EEO-1 categories as job groups. EEO-1 categories refers to the nine occupational groups used in the Standard Form 100, the Employer Information EEO-1 Survey: Officials and managers, professionals, technicians, sales, office and clerical, craft workers (skilled), operatives (semiskilled), laborers (unskilled), and service workers.
# Comments on: 22-2178: In Re NSIXTY, LLC [ORDER], Nonprecedential
# Comments on: 18-1348: INNOVATIVE MEMORY SYSTEMS, INC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. [OPINION], Nonprecedential
No. 10-11154.

#### Bush *v.*Pliler, Warden, et al.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
*

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-20987

Summary Calendar

 

KENNETH ELWOOD NARRON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CAROL VANCE ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-95-CV-327

- - - - - - - - - -

October 21, 1997

Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kenneth Elwood Narron appeals the district court’s dismissal

of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. Narron argues that the district court abused its

discretion in dismissing his Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement and medical claims arising out of his alleged exposure

to the chemical “Scotchlite” manufactured by 3-M Company and used

at TDCJ-ID’s license plate plant. We have reviewed the record and

found no error in the reasoning of the district court in the
No. 96-20987

-2-

dismissal of these claims. See Narron v. Vance, No. H-95-327 (S.D.

Tex., Sept. 13, 1996).

Narron argues that the district court abused its discretion

when it denied him permission to amend his complaint and in

limiting his amended complaint to ten pages. Narron did not in the

district court and still does not on appeal state what he intended

to allege in his amended complaint which would have changed the

outcome of this case. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint. Ashe v.

Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1993).

Narron argues that because 3-M supplied the chemical and

supervised its use, it acted under color of state law for § 1983

purposes. The fact that 3-M had a contract with TDCJ to supply a

chemical does not make 3-M a state actor. See Albright v. Longview

Police Dept., 884 F.2d 835, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1989)(hospital

contracted with state to operate and manage a facility; only

functional interrelationship was the lease; hospital not a state

actor).

Narron raises numerous other issues related to various motions

filed by him in the district court and denied as moot, such as

discovery matters, intervention, class action certification,

medical testing, TRO and permanent injunction, and air, water and

soil testing. Because Narron’s underlying claims were frivolous,

the district court properly denied these motions as moot.
No. 96-20987

-3-

Narron’s appeal is without arguable merit and, thus,

frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.

1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5th

Cir. R. 42.2. Narron is cautioned that any future frivolous

appeals filed by him or on his behalf will invite the imposition of

sanctions. Narron is cautioned further to review any pending

appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are

frivolous.

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
No. 11-8992.

#### Julian *v.*California.

Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
425P15

#### State v. Dwayne D. Knolton

Def’s *Pro Se*Petition for *Writ of Habeas Corpus*

Denied 12/22/2015
#### CHARLES BOSTWICK, as Assignee, etc., Appellant*, v.*GEORGE M. BURNETT, Respondent.

*General assignment*— with *preferences*— void *pm' se under bankrupt act.*

A general assignment, giving a preference to certain creditors, and made in con temptation of insolvency, is void *per se*under the bankrupt act.

*Thrasher*v. *Bentley*(59 N. Y., 649) distinguished.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant, entered upon a dismissal of the complaint.

This action was brought by the plaintiff as assignee of one Woolven, for the conversion of two cows taken by the defendant under an execution issued against the property of the assignor. The defendant claimed that the assignment was void.

*Anthony c&*Losey, for the appellant.

*G. <& G. H.*Williams, for the respondent.

*302Barnard, P. J.:

The assignment made by Jeremiab Woolven to the plaintiff, was one by which the assignor gave preference to certain of Ms creditors in the order of payment ont of the assigned property. It was a general assignment of all the property of the assignor, and was made in view of insolvency as declared therein. Such an assignment is declared to be void by the bankrupt act of the United States. The object of that act was to provide for a ratable, just and equitable distribution of the debtor’s estate among all his creditors. No preferences are permitted by it.

The Court of Appeals has decided that where the debtor has not been proceeded against or taken any proceedings in the bankrupt court, an assignment for the benefit of creditors by an insolvent debtor *“*which gives no preference ” to any creditor, is not an instrument *roid'per se. (Thrasher*v. Bentley, 59 N. Y., 649.)

In a later case, the Court of Appeals say: “ The act was aimed at fraud, and to prevent preferences, and when neither of these are apparent, there is no ground for claiming that an equitable distribution of the insolvent’s estate is in violation of the law.” *{Haas, Assignee,*v. *O’Brien,*opimon by Miller, J.)

The instrument under which th& plaintiff claims title being void, by the provisions of the bankrupt act the plaintiff cannot sustain his claim to the title of the property in question, by or under it. The judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs.

Gilbert, J., concurred; Dykman, J., not sitting.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Exhibit 23.1

         CONSENT OF REGISTERED INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS



TO:   NextPhase Wireless, Inc.

As registered independent certified public accountants, we hereby consent to the
incorporation  by  reference  in the  Annual  Report  on Form  10-KSB  under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of NextPhase  Wireless,  Inc. for the year ended
March  31,  2006  of our  report  dated  July  14,  2006  and  contained  in the
Registration Statement No. 333-130178 of NextPhase Wireless, Inc. Form S-8 under
the  Securities  Act of 1933  insofar as such  report  relates to the  financial
statements of NNextPhase Wireless, Inc. for the year ended March 31, 2006.



                                 /s/ RUSSELL BEDFORD STEFANOU MIRCHANDANI LLP
                                 --------------------------------------------
                                 Russell Bedford Stefanou Mirchandani LLP



New York, New York
July 14, 2006
Attachment 002 – Structure - TS1201UC 

SANITIZED

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