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PROPOSED REGULATION CHANGES

FOR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

PROPOSED REGULATION CHANGES FOR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

FEBRUARY 9, 1982

Serial No. J-97-96

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

11-4170

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON \ 1983
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, Chairman

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL LAXALT, Nevada EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

ROBERT DOLE, Kansas HOWARD M METZENBAUM, Ohio

ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona

JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa MAX BAUCUS, Montana

JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama HOWELL HEFLIN, Alabama

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

VINTON DEVANE LIDE, Chief Counsel

QUENTIN CROMMELIN, Jr., Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming, Chairman

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusette

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona

RICHARD W. DAY, Chief Counsel and Staff Director

DONNA ALVARADO, Counsel

CHARLES O. WOOD, Counsel

ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, Special Counsel

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$2-kci'5St
v

• .ft^^^CONTENTS

OPENING STATEMENTS

Simpson, Hon. Alan K., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming, chairman, P

a

s

e

Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy 1

Hatfield, Hon. Mark O., a U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon 2

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Hawkes, Phillip N, Director, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Department of

Health and Human Services 3

Pingree, David, secretary. Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services,

State of Florida, accompanied by: Barry Van Lare, staff director. Committee on Human Resources, National Governors Association 43

Burns, Jerry, State refugee program coordinator. Department of Human Resources, Salem, Oreg 52

Levy, Susan G, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, State

Refugee Resettlement Coordination 71

Gibbs, Alan J., secretary, Washington State Department of Social and Health

Services 84

Perez, Librado, director. Social Services Agency, County of Alameda, Calif 91

Khoa, Le Xuan, coordinator, Council of Vietnamese Associations in the greater Washington metropolitan area 110

Klein, Wells, C, Committee for Refugees, American Council for Nationalities

Service, on behalf of the Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs,

American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service 112

Herrity, John F., chairman, Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, Fairfax,

Va 114

ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND MATERIALS SUBMITTED

Burns, Jerry:

Testimony 52

Prepared statement 55

Letter to Ellen McGovern, Office of Refugee Resettlement, from Keith

Putnam, Assistant Director, Human Resources, Administrator of Adult

and Family Services, Jan. 11, 1982 63

Gibbs, Alan J.:

Testimony 84

Prepared statement 86

Letter to Hon. Alan K. Simpson, chair. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, from John Spellman, Governor, State of

Washington, February 4, 1982 88

Letter to Hon. Alan K. Simpson, from Charles Royer, mayor, city of

Seattle, Wash 89

Hawkes, Phillip N.:

Testimony 3

Prepared statement 13

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Hatfield 21

Herrity, John F.: Testimony 114

Khoa, Le Xuan: Testimony 110

Klein, Wells, C: Testimony 112

Levy, Susan G.:

Testimony 71

Prepared statement 74

(ill)
IV

Levy, Susan G.•Continued

Letter to Secretary Donald Percy, Department of Health and Social Services, from Donald W. Noltner, president, Wisconsin Social Service Pa

e

e

Board Members' and Directors' Association, January 14, 1982 80

Letter from Yer Vang, Indochinese Refugee Coordinator 81

Perez, Librado:

Testimony 91

Prepared statement 92

Comments on proposed rules for the "Refugee Resettlement Program and

Cuban and Haitian Entrant Programs; Cash and Medical Assistance

Policies" 97

Pingree, David:

Testimony 43

Prepared statement 46

APPENDIX

Prepared statement of City Commissioner Charles Jordan, Portland, Oreg 121

Prepared statement of Greater Miami United, Inc., presented by Laurie A.

Raskin, executive director 122

Prepared statement of the State of Minnesota, by Arthur E. Noot, commissioner 123
PROPOSED REGULATION CHANGES FOR

REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1982

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND

REFUGEE POUCY,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room

2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Alan K. Simpson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Hatfield.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN K. SIMPSON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

Senator SIMPSON. We will proceed with the hearing.

We focus today on proposed changes to current regulations on

Federal reimbursement to the States for cash and medical assistance related to refugee resettlement.

I very much welcome the participation of my good colleague from

Oregon, Senator Mark Hatfield, who is chairman of the Committee

on Appropriations. This issue is a matter of grave concern and interest to him as well as many other Senators.

This active and regular consultation process between the executive and legislative branches is important to us in determining not

only the level of refugee admissions to the United States but also

in promulgating the principles related to refugee resettlement

which are expressed in the Refugee Act.

It is in this oversight capacity, then, that we take the opportunity to hear the testimony of the Department of Health and Human

Services as it relates to the regulatory changes proposed by the administration, as well as to listen to the commentary of representatives of the State and local government agencies which will be

most critically affected by those changes.

Refugee resettlement is a challenging and difficult task and, as

stated in the Refugee Act, requires cooperation among the Congress and various executive agencies. Each has its own unique role

to play.

It is clear that the proposed changes in regulation represent,

hopefully, a step toward greater equity between refugees and citizens in terms of eligibility for assistance programs. This is an important factor which I stressed during the fiscal year 1982 refugee

consultation as a most necessary step in alleviating community

tensions which arise from this discrepancy.

(l)
The proposed regulations also represent a substantial cost savings for the budget of the Office of Refugee Resettlement.

I would say that I have been and continue to be a staunch supporter of the President in his efforts to reduce Government spending, an awesome task that has never been addressed properly in

the last many years, so the issue of the budget is important.

Indeed, the amount of funding has great implications for the

number of refugees we can admit. If the consultation process is to

function properly, we must weigh the amount of our resources that

can be expended for those persons in terms of how many can be

brought in under the consultation process. If we can't care for

them properly because of insufficient resources, then we must address the numbers who can be admitted.

So in order to achieve cost savings, I think we must weigh these

policies which reaffirm that refugee resettlement is primarily a

Federal fiscal responsibility, since both admissions levels and the

goal of promoting refugee self-sufficiency as swiftly as possible are

established by Federal law.

I am stunned at the figures that are presented to this subcommittee which indicate that the dependency rate of Indochinese refugees in the United States has risen continually. Those figures are:

fiscal year 1978, 33 percent dependency; fiscal year 1979, 37 percent

dependency; fiscal year 1980, 49 percent dependency; and fiscal

year 1981, 67 percent dependency. That is not what we intended to

do when we brought these people to our shores.

Then there is an additional item on the agenda for the subcommittee, although we have really not lacked anything to do, I can

assure you. But I believe that by working together we can assure

that these principles of our present law will be carried through for

the benefit of our refugee resettlement effort and, hopefully, then,

for the benefit of citizens, refugees, and all Americans alike.

This is to see that the program promotes equity in eligibility for

assistance and benefit levels between citizens and refugees as soon

as is possible in order to avoid the hostilities which result from

those differences.

So with that, my good colleague from Oregon, it is nice to have

you here. We appreciate your presence and your interest in this

issue.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK O. HATFIELD, A U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my appreciation for your allowing me to join in the hearings here today.

Not only as chairman of the Appropriations Committee will this

have a direct bearing on our future consideration in hearings, but

as a Senator from a State that will be greatly affected by these proposed regulations, I appreciate your acknowledging my interest in

this area and allowing me this privilege.

I also appreciate the support the chairman has provided in correspondence I recently directed to Secretary Schweiker on this

matter, and for the responsiveness to the situation.

One of my concerns about the regulations that we will be discussing today is that there seems to be a lack of consideration given to
3

the impact of these regulations on the States and counties that

have been so generous in opening their doors to refugees, and

Cuban and Haitian entrants.

In Oregon, we have the seventh largest refugee population nationwide, and the third highest refugee population per overall population. The State has been more than willing to assist the Federal

Government in resettling refugees, yet has been virtually ignored

in the drafting of these regulations and it is not alone in this concern.

No consideration was given to refugees residing in States without

general assistance programs. Little thought was directed toward

the ability of States like Oregon with high unemployment, and our

unemployment is now at 11.3 percent and we expect it to reach

perhaps 12 percent by the last of February. We have 40 and 50 percent unemployment in some of our mill towns. I believe these and

other concerns must be addressed before the Department proceeds

with implementation.

I am also very interested in exploring with HHS the fiscal condition of the refugee and the entrant programs, since one of the reasons put forward for the regulations is fiscal austerity. It will be

important to explore the justification for regulations and possible

alternatives.

I trust Mr. Hawkes is prepared to discuss the budgetary impacts

of the regulations and will be able to provide the committee solid

justification for this major change in refugee policy.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to sit in

with your subcommittee today, and for acknowledging my interest

in this matter.

Senator SIMPSON. Indeed, and I thank you.

So our first witness in this hearing will be Mr. Phillip N.

Hawkes, the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement of the

Department of Health and Human Services.

It is good to see you again, sir. We appreciate your appearance

here today, and look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP N. HAWKES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES

Mr. HAWKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hatfield, members of the committee staff.

I have submitted for the record a prepared statement, and I

would like to summarize that, if I may.

We are expecting to finalize and implement a new cash and

medical assistance policy for refugees by the 1st of March. I would

like to briefly outline the steps that were taken in making this

policy change.

In 1980, a decision was made that there needed to be perhaps,

some changes in the refugees program, specifically with respect to

the portion of the refugee assistance program which is available for

refugees who do not meet the categorical requirements for AFDC.

The need was, first of all, to bring some parity into the program

between assistance available to refugees and nonrefugees and
4

second, to try to increase employment incentives for refugees and

reduce Federal costs.

At that time, approximately a third of the refugees in the United

States were on assistance, and more than half of those were employed, but not at a level high enough to support themselves, so

they received supplementary assistance.

There were consultations and national discussions in the late

part of 1980 and early 1981 around such a policy move. There were

some criticisms; however generally there was support for some

kind of change.

In 1981, things began to change rather drastically. First, as you

cited, dependency levels increased, until in August of last year the

dependency of refugees on assistance was about 67 percent. Moreover the refugees had begun to regard the 36-month federally

funded program as an entitlement. The word was out in the refugee camps that you could come to the United States and live on

Government assistance for 36 months. Some refugee groups urged

their members to attend school for 36 months to get as much English and employment training as possible and thereby enter the job

market at the highest possible level. The cumulative effect of this

was to establish in a whole group of refugees the expectation that

they would have 36 months to gear up for life in America. In addition some of the employability programs developed by service providers were actually 30-odd months in duration, and the persons

served were not even expected to go and look for a job during that

period of time.

We considered a variety of policy options, before proposing the

changes that we did. We considered reducing the level and/or the

duration of Federal support for refugee assistance. We also considered reducing the level and/or duration of the refugee cash assistance program•that is, the assistance provided to refugees who do

not qualify for AFDC. We believed that it was most important to

meet the cash and medical assistance costs of refugees incurred by

States for the full 36 months, and we, therefore, tried to stay with

options that recognized that responsibility. We also recognized that

refugees need social services, cash assistance, and medical assistance most severely when they first arrive.

We chose to modify our policies affecting those people do not

qualify for AFDC. We believe that those individuals that can most

easily access the employment market, because they are, basically

single adults, childless couples, and two-parent families. For those

persons who qualify for assistance on the same basis as U.S. citizens qualify under AFDC or other programs, ORR would continue

to reimburse the States for those costs for the full 36 months.

The proposed policy change was part of our budget requests of

January and March of last year. At that time we were considering

a change which would provided for 18 months of full AFDC-level

benefits and 18 months of half of the AFDC benefits for this noneligible population. However, when I informally sent out such a proposed rule through the ORR regional offices in about July of last

year, we received overwhelming and strenuous objections from the

States that a policy modeled on 50 percent of AFDC for the second

18 months was administratively unmanageable.
5

In response, we developed the policy which we are now hoping or

expecting to implement March 1. That is for the first 18 months

that refugees are in this country, they will receive benefits the

same as are currently in force. For the second 18 months, they will

receive benefits only equal to what a U.S. citizen would receive.

Therefore, if, after 18 months in this country, a non-AFDC eligible refugee lives in a State, county, or city which provides general

assistance, the refugee may receive such assistance as long as he

meets all the requirements for the local general assistance program. We cannot legally deny that city, county, or State aid to refugees if they qualify. However, we can pick up the cost for that aid.

Therefore, our proposed policy states that we will reimburse the

States if they wish to be reimbursed for the cost of such programs.

Our proposed policy was also made necessary in part, to meet

our budget requirements. However, we believe that this policy

change is needed in order to send a very firm message to the refugee population that our assistance is not a 36-month entitlement

and to encourage the population that should be able to access employment to do so in less than 36 months.

Comments received on our notice of proposed rulemaking published December 11 in the Federal Register generally addressed

several issues: that the duration and level of assistance were inadequate; that the proposed February 1 implementation date was difficult to meet, that the $30 and one-third rule either should be

changed or left as it was, that the proposal would unfairly affect

the Cuban and Haitian entrants, and that there were problems in

using the general assistance program for Federal reimbursement.

The Department of Health and Human Services is currently finalizing responses to those comments.

Thank you.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Hawkes.

I have some questions.

Would you explain, as your Department sees it, what would be

the long range impact of these proposed changes upon the States,

upon the voluntary agencies, and on the refugees. In your observation of that impact, would you share with us any studies or statistics which would corroborate that impact?

Mr. HAWKES. We would continue to pick up the costs which

States are required to pay by law. That is for the AFDC and general assistance programs that these people are eligible for and access,

we will continue to reimburse States for these costs for the 36

months.

Other costs are harder to define, especially in terms of what the

effect will be for a number of people who will not have any program that they can access. However, we currently have American

citizens in that same condition. Through our programs, we provide

special services to refugees for the first 18 months in this country.

After that, we are proposing that they be required to qualify on the

same basis as citizens for public assistance. However, for the refugee and entrant population, we are picking up the cost to the

States. There is, I believe, some misperception in regard to what

this policy change does. One of the questions that has been directed

to us quite frequently is, "Why do you make assistance available to
refugees in a general assistance State and do nothing in a nongeneral assistance State, county, or locality?"

We are, in fact, only reimbursing costs that we cannot prevent.

If, after 18 months of refugee assistance, a refugee qualifies for

general assistance in his State of residence we will reimburse the

State, if it so chooses, for the provision of GA to that refugee. We

are not creating a system where refugees will get additional aid not

available to citizens because the refugees live in a GA State. It will

do a refugee no good to migrate to a general assistance State unless

he meets the eligibility criteria for general assistance in that State.

At this point, I cannot point specifically to any cost that we are

transferring directly to States.

With reference to impaction, if this policy change is perceived as

the Federal Government backing away from full Federal responsibility, then there perhaps could be some reluctance on the part of

States and localities to continue to accept the current levels of resettlement. We are already working closely with voluntary agencies to manage the levels of resettlement in various areas better.

One of HHS' projects at present is to develop and to implement a

new targeted resettlement program, with assistance from both

public and private sectors to direct refugees away from areas of

heavy impact to other areas in the country where there is more

suitable employment and housing available. So with HHS' current

emphasis on refugee resettlement in new and nonimpacted areas, I

do not see that the impact of our proposed regulation on the voluntary agency effort would be great.

With respect to the refugees themselves, there will undoubtedly

be some degree of hardship. I could not possibly sit here and tell

you that there will be no difficult hardship cases. But the message

has to be sent to the refugee community to make people aware that

they have to adjust to this country, face the difficulties, and go to

work the same as citizens. We believe that there is a mentality

among many refugees that must be changed. Refugees have told

me in person in various areas of this country that they have a 36-

month entitlement to public assistance and that they cannot go to

work and go to school at the same time. This mentality has got to

change. We see our proposed policy as a way to bring that about.

Senator SIMPSON. YOU did think that perhaps there can be a significant change in these levels of secondary migration? Do you

think that that can be brought about? That is a phenomenon that

is very real.

Mr. HAWKES. The draw already exists. There is tremendous difference across the country in general assistance and AFDC levels.

If people are going to move because the benefits are better somewhere else, there is already plenty of incentive to do that. I don't

think that this policy proposal will cause significant additional secondary migration.

Secondary migration, as a result of our new policy, is possible; it

is one solution in extreme hardship cases. But some States already

have programs in operation that are targeted to help those people

who are going to be losing their assistance. When I was last talking to some of these State officials, the February 1 date•which has

been changed to March 1•was already recognized, and they were

particularly targeting assistance and job hunting to those people
affected by our new policy to reduce the number who would be adversely affected.

Senator SIMPSON. Could you just briefly, for the record, describe

the type of coordination that your office has had with other interested Federal agencies or even constituent groups in preparing

these proposed regulations which have caused such concern?

Mr. HAWKES. Senator, I became involved with the HHS refugee

program last February, and I later took this office. The original

cash and medical assistance policy proposal•that is, for non-AFDC

eligible refugees, 18 months of 100 percent of the AFDC-level benefits, then 18 months of 50 percent of the AFDC-level benefits•was

made in November 1980, well before I got here. For the last year

and some months, we at HHS have discussed that policy and variations on that policy with anybody who would listen to us.

In general, when I arrived last year, I perceived that there was

some agreement that there needed to be some change in the existing policy, because it was in fact, encouraging people to remain on

assistance. As the dependency level continued to rise, budgetary restrictions have forced us to be a little more severe than we perhaps

would have been were the dependency level less than what it is. I

have traveled extensively in the United States and have spoken to

regional and national voluntary agency representatives, and State

and local government representatives. There has certainly not been

any overwhelming agreement that this policy was the best possible,

or that there might not be better variations given different circumstances. However I don't think it is any surprise to anybody in the

refugee industry, that whole mass of people nationally concerned

with this program that a change in policy is necessary.

Senator SIMPSON. You call that the refugee industry?

Mr. HAWKES. Yes, Senator, at this point, with the amount of

money involved, the numbers of people, I call it the refugee industry.

Senator SIMPSON. Let me say to you, that was not a flip statement. We find that, indeed, it approaches the size of an industry. It

is something to which the subcommittee has given particular attention. In visiting with the people of the voluntary agencies, even

when we speak about reducing the level of refugee admissions,

there are some within those constituent groups who say, "That

could mean a lack of activity in my particular area." We often

hear that figures for bona fide refugees coming out of Poland are

exaggerated to create new interest, and so on.

It is interesting. I am fascinated by that myself. Leave it as a fascination of the chairman of the subcommittee, I guess, at that.

What I want to address, and then Senator Hatfield has questions,

is the dependency rate. What impact will these existing regulations

have on the refugee dependency rate. Do you think that these regulations will alter that dependency rate in any way?

What data do you have to support those projections The subcommittee, and the full committee, if it is to function properly in the

consultation process, must have the certainty that we have the resources in this country to take care of the numbers of people that

we choose to bring here, or who arrive here under the asylum provisions of our law and under the U.N. protocol.
8

So there we are, and this dependency rate now has gone from 33

percent in 1978 to 67 percent. I don't think that that is what the

American people and the Congress had in mind when they were

talking about transitional support from 18 to 36 months. I would

like your views on that.

Mr. HAWKES. Of course, merely the policy change itself will

change the dependency rate because it will make a certain number

of refugees ineligible for benefits. The dependency rate is the ratio

of the number of refugees on assistance to the number of refugees

in the country within the last 3 years. With the policy change, a

smaller percentage of the refugees will be on assistance, thus

changing the dependency rate.

More importantly, I think, the word is out in the refugee communities, among the mutual assistance associations, and in the political networks that exist among refugee groups, that the dependency

rate has to go down, that ours is not an openended program, and

that refugees are expected to go to work, that entry level jobs are

better than taking English and hoping to get a better job down the

road.

In sum, the immediate impact on dependency is in terms of

eliminating people from the rolls. There will also be a secondary

impact on dependency as the word goes out that the costs of our

program have reached levels which will not be borne.

Senator SIMPSON. I think that it would be helpful to the subcommittee to believe that the dependency rate would come down as a

result of these changes. That might be helpful, yet we must recognize that we must have a transitional program to protect these

people.

I have pursued that in previous hearings, although not to this

degree. Indeed, we could have nothing in refugee resettlement

without the voluntary agencies.

Let me go to Senator Hatfield, I can come back, perhaps. I would

like to stick with the alloted time and the agenda.

Senator Hatfield, please.

Senator HATFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if I could submit a number of my questions to Mr.

Hawkes in writing for some written response, rather than taking

the full time here today.

I would only like to state my reservation about the rate of

dependency. I think we have to consider the great variations

within the refugees themselves.

Seventeen percent of the refugees, who now total some 17,000

that come into Oregon, come from the Hmong tribes. These are

preliterate people in that they have no written language, and we

are in the process of having to write a language phonetically and

create a language, a written language, to make these people literate. Thirty-six months to make them literate beginning from a preliterate status is not, I don't think, an outrageously long period of

time.

So I think if you compare that kind of person to some of the

other refugees who come here as literates, you have to have flexibility in your rules and your regulations to understand and accommodate those variables.
9

I would like to go to the financial relationship between the

change of these regulations and what you anticipate to be your savings.

First of all, I would like to know, as of February 1, what has

your agency distributed to the States under the refugee and

Cuban/Haitian programs. You may provide this for the record, if

you do not have it immediately available at hand.

Second, I would like to know, the figures that you will give me in

that first question, are they given to the committee to reflect all

unobligated balances? Do they include or do they exclude any of

the funds being withheld by OMB? If so, how much is being withheld and why?

Then I would like to know also•I will give all of these to you in

writing, but I want to give you the flavor of what I am trying to

get at•what funds would remain after the funds for the second

quarter have been distributed under the current regulations, and

how much will be left if the proposed regulations go into effect on

March 1.

I would also like to know, are any of these funds being withheld

due to anticipated or unexpected increases in refugee flows? Do you

expect any changes in these flows now, or in the immediate future?

I would like to know what proportion of refugees currently receiving refugee cash and medical assistance would become ineligible for the assistance under the proposed policy change, and how

many of these refugees would qualify for general assistance.

My State does not have AFDC for singles, or for unemployed parents, and it has no general assistance program, yet with 3 percent

of the refugee population, we are expected to bear 15 percent of the

savings under these regulations.

How many of these people do you expect to be picked up by the

States' and counties' general assistance programs? What regulations are you functioning under today, the anticipated changes, or

the existing rules.

Those are 4 or 5 out of about 30 questions that I would like to

submit to you for the record, because I want to accommodate the

timeframe that the chairman has. I don't want to assume to include in this hearing a lot of time taken out for what would be

eventually considered by the Appropriations Committee anyway.

But I want to give you notice with these questions, we are going

to be looking very carefully in the appropriations process for your

requests, and you had better have a pretty good handle on the relationship between those changes in regulations and some very hard

data as to what you can save in the funding or the fiscal picture.

Would you like to make some general comments?

Mr. HAWKES. Senator, some of those questions I could answer

right now, and some I would prefer to give in writing. As there are

so many, perhaps it would be just as well to give them all to you in

writing.

However, I would like to say that this proposed policy change at

this point produces no savings this year. Our fiscal year 1982

budget was predicated on a 49-percent dependency rate for the existing refugee population in the United States, and on implementation of a policy change on October 1. We have delayed implementation until March 1, and we have a dependency rate of 67 percent.
10

We need to make this change to stay within this year's budget, and

we need to make it now. We are faced with that imperative.

Senator HATFIELD. YOU have another assumption on a different

flow of refugees, too. You talk about one budget assumption, but

you had another budget assumption of a refugee flow of about

8,300, which is in reality about 5,000?

Mr. HAWKES. Yes, sir, but the flow coming in this year really

does not affect our cash needs to a great extent. What does affect

our funding need is the accummulated flow of refugees to the

United States over the last 3 years and the percentage of those

people that are on assistance. It is true that fewer refugees have

arrived recently than actually were projected. However, costs have

been so much higher than projected, that they more than offset the

saving.

However, we certainly will provide all that data to you in writing.

Senator HATFIELD. When you are proposing a fiscal 1983 appropriation, you are going to have to come in with some budget assumptions, and one of them is going to have to be the flow.

Mr. HAWKES. That is right.

Senator HATFIELD. My information is that you are off that target

already, so that would have some impact on your preliminary

budgetary assumptions that have comprised the announced budget

by President Reagan this week.

Mr. HAWKES. Yes, sir; it does.

Senator HATFIELD. IS that not true?

Mr. HAWKES. That is true.

Senator HATFIELD. Are you functioning under the anticipated

changes, or are you, as of this moment in your February distribution, functioning under the regulations as in place?

Mr. HAWKES. We issued second quarter grant awards which took

into consideration the policy change.

Senator HATFIELD. SO you are now really in a second quarter distribution on an anticipated change of regulations.

Mr. HAWKES. That is right.

Senator HATFIELD. HOW much does that save in your budget?

Mr. HAWKES. We do not have exact figures, however we estimate

that it would cost us something between about $17 and $25 million

per month not to implement these proposed policies.

Senator HATFIELD. Between $17 and $25 million?

Mr. HAWKES. Yes.

Senator HATFIELD. At what flow rate?

Mr. HAWKES. These costs are based on the current flow rate,

which is down some from the projection.

Senator HATFIELD. It is down from the projection?

Mr. HAWKES. Yes.

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to pursue this

further at this time, but I do want to indicate that I think the

hearings will complement one another as we consider these policy

changes.

I do feel a justification for these policy changes in terms of tightening the budget, becoming more austere, ought to produce some

very solid data and some very solid statistics, so that when we take

up the appropriations process, you can prove your case.
11

Mr. HAWKES. We will.

Senator SIMPSON. The judge has spoken.

Mr. HAWKES. Yes, sir.

Senator SIMPSON. Let me just say, too, I really believe that this

could be a portent of a good opportunity for sharing information.

The Judiciary Committee is required by law to participate in the

consultation process, and the administration presented an original

figure of 173,000 refugee admissions for 1982 on which they went to

work on the budget. At one time, I understood that the budget

would be adequate for that. In the consultation process, we came

up with 140,000 as the final figure, 100,000 of those being Indochinese, and now we find that there is a shortfall in Federal funding

for the refugee program.

So I can assure that as chairman of the subcommittee, I would be

very pleased to work with you this week. When we get to consultation time, let's get to budget time, too, so that when we select our

figure through the consultation process, we fund this humanitarian

venture properly. That is a thought, strange as it is, I realize.

Senator HATFIELD. I think that it might well become a model for

an awful lot of other relationships between the authorizing committees and the Appropriations Committee. As you know, we have

often said that an authorization is but a hunting license, it is

issued by the committee for some agency or some group to go after

some appropriated funds.

With 22 percent of the total budget today only in the discretionary funding level, it makes our base far more competitive, it makes

the demand for accuracy far greater. So I am very anxious to work

with the authorizing committees not only in this area, but in all

the other areas, to reach some kind of common targets and data

base upon which to make some very important judgments.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you.

I just have one other question, and I don't want to leave that inappropriately referenced, and that was in regard to the dependency

rate.

The figures I was using were based upon a dependency rate for

Indochinese refugees. Do you have a dependency rate figure, say,

on Cuban/Haitian entrants?

Mr. HAWKES. NO, Senator, I don't.

Senator SIMPSON. YOU can furnish that for the record.

Mr. HAWKES. I can get you that right away.

Senator SIMPSON. Again, it is the Indochinese and the recent

Cuban/Haitian entrants that seem to require the greater degrees

of public assistance. Whereas, I think in the Polish community and

the Jewish community there is a greater inner-support system

there, with those groups within the United States. Therefore, our

attention has to be addressed to these others. It is unfortunate that

we have to get into numbers per ethnic group, but I guess that is

where we are in our oversight capacity, regrettably.

I thank you. I have some further questions that I will submit to

you in writing.

I will just ask you one further question. When were you first

aware of the shortfall in funding, because during the consultation

process, I did not realize that we were headed there?
12

Mr. HAWKES. Senator, I don't want to be argumentative, but it

wasn't a shortfall. The fiscal year 1982 budget always assumed that

there would be a change in cash and medical policy, going all the

way back to the original 1982 budget submission from the Department. We knew, within the figures that were submitted last spring,

that we could not continue the status quo. We have always known

that there would need to be a policy change. The exact policy itself,

what it would be, has been the matter of debate and discussion for

a year.

Senator SIMPSON. All right. I thank you very much, Dr. Hawkes.

[The prepared statement of Phillip N. Hawkes and responses to

questions by Senator Hatfield follow:]
13

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP N, HAWKES

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be

here to discuss the changes in domestic refugee and entrant

resettlement policy recently proposed by the Department of Health

and Human Services (RHS).

The Department is in the process of finalizing new regulations

on cash and medical assistance policy for refugees and entrants to

be effective March 1, 1982. Today, I will summarize our previous

policies and our reasons for wanting to modify them. Finally, I

will summarize the comments we received on the Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking which was published on December 11, 1981.

CURRENT PROGRAM/BUDGET POLICY

The Refugee Act of 1980 authorizes up to 100 percent reimbursement of cash and medical assistance provided to any refugee during

the refugee's first 36 months in the United States. Refugees who

meet all the eligibility requirements of AFDC, SSI or Medicaid

receive aid under those programs. For the first 36 months that

these refugees are in this country, HHS reimburses the States'

share of costs to assist them under AFDC, SSI, and Medicaid. Also,

HHS provides 100 percent reimbursement for AFDC-level benefits and

medical assistance provided to non-categorically eligible refugees.

These are refugees who do not meet family composition and other

requirements of AFDC, SSI and Medicaid but who would be eligible

based on income. Cash and medical assistance to non-categorically

eligible refugees is called Refugee Cash Assistance and Refugee

Medical Assistance respectively. Thus, States absorb no assistance

costs during the refugees first 36 months in the United States.

11-417 0-63
14

In addition, the Refugee Act permits States without a medically

needy program, to provide medical assistance to medically needy

refugees (during their first thirty-six months) who have incomes

above the Medicaid eligibility standard within certain limitations.

Changes in refugee eligibility for cash and medical assistance

trigger changes in Cuban/Haitian entrant eligibility for such

assistance because the same criteria apply in both programs.

In 1980, HHS decided to implement policy changes in FY 1982

which would have reduced the disparity between benefits available

to refugees and non-refugees, reduced Federal expenditures, and

increased refugee employment incentives. The policy in the FY 1982

budget continued 100 percent reimbursement of State costs and

provided medical assistance to all needy refugees for three years.

Regarding cash assistance, however, the budget assumed the

following changes:

o Refugees categorically eligible for AFDC and SSI would continue to receive full benefits under those programs, with

Federal reimbursement of State costs for the refugee's first

36 months in the United States; and

o Refugees not eligible for AFDC or SSI because of failure to

meet categorical requirements of those programs would

receive benefits on one of two bases: (1) in the States

without an "acceptable- general assistance (GA) program,

refugees who meet the AFDC financial requirements would

receive 100 percent of the State's APDC-level benefit during

the first 18 months after arrival and 50 percent of the

AFDC-level benefit during the second 18 months; (2) in

States with an "acceptable" GA program, refugees who meet

the GA program's financial requirements, but not necessarily

its categorical requirements, would receive GA-level benefits during their first 36 months.
15

Based on concerns raised regarding elements of the proposal,

the Department began to explore additional approaches.

It is important to note that HHS consulted during the 1980

policy deliberation process with individual States, voluntary

agencies, the National Governors Association, the National

Association of Counties and the American Public Welfare Association

among others. In general, the consultations indicated support for

modifying the three-year AFDC-level benefit policy for

non-AFDC/non-SSI eligible refugees.

In addition, the President's Interagency Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy deliberated on cash and medical assitance

policy and supported revising the policy under which all needy

refugees receive full AFDC-level benefits for up to 36 months.

Major factors leading to the consideration of alternative

policies were indications that increasing numbers of refugees were

relying upon cash assistance versus employment. Prior to 1979,

refugee welfare levels stayed around the one-third mark. In

addition, about two-thirds of those refugees who were receiving

assistance also had earnings from employment and were receiving

only partial aid to supplement low earnings in large families.

After the Refugee Act was enacted early in 1980, we began to

notice an increase in the number of refugees relying upon the cash

assistance programs. The reasons for this increase are many, but

no doubt include how the programs were perceived by the refugee

population. We believe that our changes to these programs will

reinforce the time-limited aspect of the special Federal assistance

in this area, and minimize the erroneous notion that these programs

are open entitlements or substitutes for employment earnings.
16

As we proceeded in the policy development process, we attempted

to balance several key factors including: greater equity between

assistance to refugees and non-refugees; reimbursement to States to

offset the assistance cost burdens associated with resettlement;

the need to promote self-sufficiency; and the need to reduce the

administrative burden of implementation for States and localities.

We considered several options. Some would have reduced both

the level and duration of Federal reimbursement. Some would not

have allowed reimbursement for costs incurred to assist refugees

under State and local general assistance programs. Some would have

shortened the period of special refugee cash and medical assitance

to less than 18 months. Still all others would have required

percentage phasedown in the level of benefits and increased the

complexity of program administration.

In considering options, we took into account that the Refugee

Act permits, but does not require. Federal reimbursement of 100

percent of the assistance costs that States would be required to

incur under their ongoing assistance programs during a refugee's

first 36 months in the country.

We concluded that options which met two general criteria were

preferable to those which did not:

o First, that it would be preferable to meet the cash and

medical assistance costs of States for 36-nionth period; and

o Second, that it would be preferable to provide an initial

period of general eligibility for refugees for cash and

medical assistance, in recognition of their need for a

transition period; the fact that they may have initial

health problems; and the fact that the initial need for aid

would not follow the categorical types of assistance which
17

were developed for citizens based on family composition,

age, disability, or previous participation In the labor

force.

Based on our previous consultations with States, we also concluded that, in order to avoid administrative complexity to the

extent possible, policies should be avoided which proposed reductions in the assistance level (for example, to 50 percent of the

AFDC level) or which made it mandatory for States to enter into

relationships with locally funded and administered GA agencies.

We want to re-emphasize that a change in refugee cash and medical assistance policies was identified in the Department's budget

requests submitted to the Congress in January and March 1981, and

was frequently referred to by the Under Secretary during the

September 22, 1981, consultation with this Committee. Given your

acceptance conceptually of changes in cash and medical assistance

policy, we modified our original proposal to compensate for comments received from the States and localities on the administrative

complexities of the original proposal and to live within the limits

of existing appropriations.

We believe the policy we proposed in December represents a fair

and optimal balance of essential program concerns.

PROPOSED POLICY CHANGES

Under the new regulation, a State would continue to determine

eligibility and calculate the Refugee Cash Assistance payment

according to the State's AFDC need standard and payment level

during the 18 month period which begins with the month the refugee

entered the United States. However, a S30 plus one-third disregard

would not be applied in determining the eligibility of refugees.

The $30 plus one-third or other applicable disregards would

continue to apply in determining benefits to refugees receiving

AFDC.
18

Eliminating the $30 plus one-third disregard in determining

Refugee Cash Assistance eligibility would reduce the special

treatment previously afforded to refugees not eligible for AFDC. A

$30 plus one-third disregard is not generally applied in State or

local GA programs on which non-refugees must often depend when they

are ineligible for federally funded programs.

With respect to Refugee Medical Assistance, the new regulation would not change eligibility policy during a refugee's first

18 months in the United States, except with respect to application

of the $30 plus one-third disregard as explained above.

The new policy would make the duration of Refugee Cash

Assistance and Refugee Medical Assistance coincide, and, after a

refugee's first 18 months in the United States, provide for cash

and medical assistance to refugees on the same basis as other needy

State residents.

During the non-categorically eligible refugee's second 18

months, the State would have the option of seeking reimbursement

under the Refugee Resettlement Program for financial or medical

assistance provided under a State or locally administered and

funded GA program to any refugee who is eligible for and receives

aid under such a program. A State could but would not be required

to seek reimbursement for all or any part of State or local GA

program expenditures resulting from provision of assistance to an

eligible refugee. A State could not establish a GA program which

limits eligibility to refugees, but the State otherwise would have

discretion on whether to claim allowable State or local GA program

expenses from Refugee Resettlement Program funds.

The regulations would also establish the rules for federally

reimbursable assistance to Cuban and Haitian entrants under the

Cuban and Haitian entrant program. Pursuant to the Department's

interpretation of legislative intent in the enactment of the
19

Refugee Education Assistance Act, the rule would provide federally

reimbursed cash and medical assistance and services to Cuban and

Haitian entrants under the same conditions and to the same extent

as such assistance and services are made available to refugees.

The new regulation pertaining to Cuban and Haitian entrant

programs also would provide that procedures and requirements

identical to those applicable under the Refugee Program for Federal

reimbursement of State costs, including those relating to the

submission and approval of State plans, are also applicable to

Cuban and Haitian entrant programs.

The regulation also would establish the period of time for

which the Federal Government will reimburse cash arv3 medical

assistance costs incurred on behalf of a Cuban or Haitian entrant.

Under the Cuban and Haitian entrant program, reimbursement starts

from the date on which the entrant first was granted parole status

under the Immigration and Nationality Act or on which an individual

meeting the definition of "Cuban and Haitian entrant" set forth in

the Refugee Education Assistance Act otherwise began residing in an

American community. The basis for this policy is that the Cuban

and Haitian entrants are not all considered to have "entered"

the United States within the meaning of the Immigration and

Nationality Act. Therefore, it is not possible in all cases to

reimburse States for cash and medical assistance provided during a

prescribed period of months after initial "entry" into the country,

as is done for refugees in the Refugee Program. For other Cuban

and Haitian entrants, it is impossible to verify their actual date

of entry into the United States. The Department has determined

that the point in time at which a Cuban and Haitian entrant

residing in an American community was first granted parole or

otherwise issued documentation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service is the most reasonable and appropriate point from

which to count the period of assistance authorized by Congress.
20

We believe the new policy represents a fair balance of

essential program concerns and provides support to refugees during

the transitional period when they have the greatest need. The

policy is intended to promote self-sufficiency and strengthen

employment incentives by reducing the period of special assistance.

The policy shortens the period of special assistance to refugees to

an initial 18 month period after which assistance would be

available to refugees and non-refugees on the same basis.

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED POLICIES

We received letters on all aspects of our proposed policies

from members of Congress, State and local government agencies,

national and local volunatry refugee resettlement agencies, service

providers, refugee advisory boards, coalitions and forums concerned

with refugee resettlement, refugee mutual assistance associations,

refugees, and other individuals. Most of the comments dealt with

six aspects of our proposal; the duration and level of Refugee

Cash Assistance, the duration and level of Refugee Medical

Assistance, the February 1, 1982 implementation date of the

policies, the elimination of the $30 and one-third income disregard

in determining Refugee Cash Assistance eligibility and payment

level, the applicability of the proposed policies to the

Cuban/Haitian entrant program, and the use of General Assistance

programs to serve categorically ineligible refugees and entrants

during their second eighteen months in the United States. We are

now in the process of finalizing our responses to these comments

and will submit them to the Subcommittee as soon as possible.
21

'HICnHeb Pieties Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 17, 1982

THOMAS L. VAH OCH VOOMT, M IHOftlTV

Dr. Phillip Hawkes

Department of Health and

Human Services

Office of Refugee Resettlement

300 C Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Dr. Hawkes:

I am enclosing, per my request at the February 9th Immigration

and Refugee Policy Subcommittee hearing, a list of questions

regarding the budget for the Office of Refugee Settlement,

assumptions for that budget and the proposed cash and medical

assistance regulations. It is my expectation that these

questions will be completed and available to be inserted into the

hearing record on February 23rd. Your assistance in meeting this

deadline would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

Mark

United States Senator

MOH/Jbq

Enclosure
22

ATTACHMENT A

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DR. PHILLIP HAWKES

BY SENATOR MARK 0. HATFIELD

QUESTION: As of February 1st what has ORR distributed to the States under

the Refugee and Cuban/Haitian programs?

ANSWER:

QUESTION:

ANSWER:

As of February 1st, a total of S266,550,008 has been distributed

under the Refugee program which is broken down as follows:

$236,826,258 for cash and medical assistance (and related

administration) and 329,723,750 for refugee social services.

Under the Cuban-Haitian Entrant Program, $47,366,000 has been

distributed for cash and medical assistance (and related

administration) and $175,000 for social services for a

cumulative total $47,541,000.

CO these figures reflect all unobligated balances? Do they include

or exclude any funds being withheld by OMB? If so, how much is

being withheld, and why?

The cumulative totals distributed under the Refugee and Entrant

Programs ($266,550,008 and $47,541,000 respectively) do not include

an unobligated balance of $18,230,000 for Refugee cash and medical

assistance (and related administration), $2,276,000 in unobligated

refugee social service funds and $5,213,000 in unobligated Cuban/

Haitian Entrant dcmestic assistance. These unobligated amounts are

due to the fact that, through the second quarter, the States, in toto,

requested less than was available to ORR under the third Continuing

Resolution in effect through March 31, 1982.

OMB has not withheld any FY 1982 funds.

QUESTIOW;

ANSWER:

Are these funds being distributed to the states under current

regulations or under the proposed regulations? Has ORR or OMB

been withholding any funds in expectation of the implementation

of the proposed regulations?

The awards for refugee and entrant assistance for the first

quarter of FY 1982 assumed continuation of current policy. The

awards for the refugee assistance for the second quarter of

FY 1982 (made on January 4, 1982) assumed that current policy

would be in effect for January and that new eligibility rules would

be in effect for February and March. The second quarter awards

for entrant assistance were made on January 28, 1982. By this

date, it was apparent that the new eligibility rules would not

be put into effect by February 1, 1982. Therefore, second quarter

entrant assistance awards assumed that current policy would be in

place for January and February and that the new eligibility rules

would take effect March 1, 1982.

It is now apparent that the new policy will not be in place in most

States until the beginning of the third quarter. If necessary.

States may request additional cash and medical funds for the

second quarter for either the refugee or entrant assistance programs.

Neither ORR nor CMS has withheld funds to States in expectation of

the implementation of the proposed regulation.

J
QUESTICN: What funds would remain after funds for the Second Quarter have

been distributed under the current regulations? How much would be

left if the proposed regulations go into effect on March 1st?

ANSWER: If second quarter awards to States for the Refugee Assistance Program

had been made on the basis of current policy, ORR would have paid out

5262.5 million to the States. ORR was apportioned only $250 million

through the second quarter under the third Continuing Resolution.

Thus ORR would need to take actions such as requesting an apportionment

of additional funds, a reprogramming of existing funds or an authorization to use unexpended FY 1981 balances.

If funds had been allocated to States on the basis of the proposed

regulations going into effect on March 1, ORR would have paid out

5249.6 million to States, coming within half a million dollars of the

amount apportioned to it through the second quarter.

OUEgriON: Under what assunptions for refugee flews and dependency rates are these

funds being distributed?

ANaffiR: FY 1982 funds are distribued under the budget assumption of a 67%

dependency rate with refugee flews as follows:

Actual

FY 79

94,524

Actual

FY 80

189,727

Actual

FY 81

153,077

Estimate

FY 82

131,000

The 67% dependency rate is an average rate for refugees who have been in

this country for 36 months or less, this figure comes from a refugee

caseload survey carried out by the Department in August, 1981.

QUESTION: For example, if you assumed 8,000 refugees per month and only

6,000 per month were admitted, how much money would be realized in

savings per month under the current regulations?

ANSWER: Under current regulations, reduced admissions of 2,000 per month

would result in an average monthly savings of slightly more than

$1,450,000. Based upon the total number of months on assistance

after the date arrival over a one year period and a total

admissions reduction of 24,000 for the year, total program saving

are $17,384,000. It should be recognized that program savings

realized through reduced admissions will be greater in second half

of the fiscal year rather than in the first half due to the total

length of time of assistance available to any one individual

refugee admission.

QUESTION: For example, if you assumed a 49S dependency rate and the rate was

actually 6751, what is the difference in funding per month under

the current regulations?

ANSWER: If the current policy were in effect for all of FY 1982, a 49S

dependency rate would result in FY 1982 Refugee cash and medical

assistance costs of approximately $450 million. With a 67!,

dependency rate, the estimated FY 1982 Refugee cash and medical

assistance costs would be about $570 million. The difference in

funding under the current policy between the two dependency rates

is $120 million, or an average $10 million monthly (due to the 18S

upward change in refugee cash dependency).
24

QUESTICH: Are any funds being withheld due to anticipated or unexpected

increases in refugee flows? Do you expect any changes in those

flows now or in the future?

ANSWER: No funds are currently being withheld due to anticipated or

unexpected increases in refiqee flows. We are aware of the fact

that the flow of refugees into this country in FY 1982 so far has

been lower than originally anticipated. We have taken this fact

into account in determining which of the policy options are

affordable.

OlESTICN Are any funds being withheld in anticipation or expectation of

increased levels of dependency among refugees?

ANSWER: to

QUESTION: Under the proposed regulations providing for reimbursement of

GA costs, what would be the impact on state and local administrative costs?

ANSWER: Federal reimbursement would be provided for State and local

administrative costs of providing General Assistance to eligible refugees.

Therefore there should be no impact.

QUESTION: Counties and states tell us that medical general

assistance programs are not generally available. Would not

the proposed regulations result in a shift in costs from the

federal government to local public health care facilities,

which will have to provide care to indigent refugees and

entrants who are ineligible for Medicaid?

What would be your objections to continuing the

provision of medical assistance to all refugees and entrants

who meet income requirements for Medicaid for a 36-month

period, as under current policy?

ANSWER:

The availability of medical general assistance (GA) programs

varies from State to State and locally within some States. For

example, we understand that California has a generally available

GA medical assistance program while Florida does not. In recognition of the overall impact of Cuban and Haitian entrants in

Florida, we have proposed a program of targeted assistance which

could be used to offset health care costs, as well as other

costs.
25

*e consider 18 months of special aid to provide sufficient time

for the identification and treatment of most presenting health

problems of refugees. We believe that this policy will provide

an incentive to employment and will reduce that portion of the

refugee population which would have to rely on public health care

facilities. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that a

special eligibility for Medicaid-type assistance can be justified

for refugees beyond 18 months when such assistance is not available

to citizens in the same State or locality. In addition, the

shorter period of special eliKihilitv Is required in order to

control costs.

QUESTION: Under the proposed regulations, local public health costs would not

be reimbursed. What would be the added costs to localities resulting

from these regulations? Please provide the number and percentage of

refugee cash recipients who are not eligible for AFDC. Also, the

number and percentage of non-AFCC eligible refugees who are tw>-parent

families with dependent children, as opposed to single adults or

childless couples.

ANSWER; Under the proposed regulations, local health costs would be reimbursed

if the locality has a program of medical assistance to indigent persons

which qualifies as a General Assistance program under the definition

in the proposed regulations. ORR's policy does provide reimbursement

under such circumstances. ORR calculates that 19 States have such

programs, excluding States or localities which may have only emergency

medical programs.

The FY 1982 bu3get assures that 55%, or 169,800, of the total number

of refugee cash assistance recipients are not eligible for AFDC.

These figures are based on a total refugee population dependency rate

of 67%, and include refugees who have been here 36 nonths or less.

No figures are available for the number and percentage of non-AFDC

eligible refugees who are two-parent families with dependent children

as opposed to single adults or childless couples.

QUESTION: For every month that implementation of the proposed

regulations is delayed, what would be the added cost to the

Federal government?

ANSWER: Based on the current assumptions contained in the

FY 1982 Refugee and Entrant budgets, ORR estimates that each

month's delay in implementation of the proposed regulations

would cost:

Refugee Program $12-$15 million monthly

Entrant Program $ 5-$ 7 million monthly
26

QUESTION! What would be your objections to continuing the provision of

medical assistance to all refugees and entrants who meet income requirements

for Medicaid for a 36 month period, as under current policy?

ANSWER: We believe that uniformity of eligibility standards and services

delivery between refugees and non-refugees can be appropriately attained at

the same time for both cash and medical assistance. Under the proposed

regulation, this would occur 18 months after a refugee's date of arrival in

the United States, during which period there is sufficient time to identify

and treat most pressing health problems. We do not believe it is appropriate

to provide special medical eligibility for refugees for a longer period of

time when such eligibility for citizens of the same communities does not

exist. In addition, the need for Federal fiscal control within the FY 1982

budget requires such a limitation.

QUESTION: The Refugee Act authorizes the Department of Health and Human

Services to provide health benefits to refugees who are not receiving cash

assistance for their first year after entry, but this authority has not

been used. Some believe that this would be advantageous because it vould

keep refugees from having to go on welfare in order to have health care

coverage. Have you considered using the authority provided by the Refugee

Act to separate eligibility for refugee medical assistance from cash

assistance in order to reduce welfare dependency?

ANSWER: The Department has given serious consideration to the question

of using this authority and has decided not to do so because it would

result in a further inequality in assistance between refugees and

citizens.

QUESTION: How many refugees and Cuban/Haitian entrants are currently receiving

refugee cash and medical assistance would become ineligible for

assistance as of April 1st under the proposed policy change?

ANSWER: Under the proposed policy changes, approximately 70,000 refugees

and 42,000 entrants would lose eligibility for the Refugee/Entrant

cash and medical program, and not be eligible for any State or local

General Assistance programs.

QUESTION; How many of these people do you expect to be picked up by the

States' and counties' general assistance programs? Please

provide a breakdown of those States and counties that have

general assistance programs and what level or type of assistance

is provided?

ANSWER; We have examined the nine States that have the largest

concentrations of refugees and entrants. Upon our preliminary

examination, we have found that five States appear to have

General Assistance (GA) programs. They are California, Minnesota,

Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. These five States have

approximately 60% of the total U.S. refugee cash assistance caseload,

while the four States without GA programs (Washington, Oregon,

Florida and Texas) have 18.5% of the total U.S. caseload. (See

attached Tab).
27

Further analysis shows that among the remaining States, 22 offer

significant GA programs to refugees who will be affected by the

18-itonth cutoff and who cannot qualify for AFDC benefits. The type

of aid deemed significant in this review is cash assistance on other

than an emergency basis.

Analysis of GA Programs

Ttie preliminary data collected by ORR Regional Offices were used to separate

the States into four groups:

A. Eleven States were deemed to offer significant GA programs actainistered

at the State level:

Hawaii New Jersey looming

Kansas New York

Massachusetts Ohio

Michigan Pennsylvania

Minnesota Rhode Island

B. Five States offer significant GA programs but have eligibility requirements

judged restrictive enough to effectively bar most refugees:

States Program limited to

Arizona Physically incapacitated

District of Colunbia Uhenployables

Maryland

Missouri Physically incapacitated

Vermont Unemployables

C. Nine States were reported as having GA programs administered by jurisdictions

below the State level. Group Cl shews States with programs judged to be

significant while States' programs in the C2 category do not appear to be

significant.

Cl. California C2. Nebraska

Connecticut Nevada

Illinois

Montana

North Dakota

Virginia

Wisconsin

D. Twenty-six states were judged to offer no significant programs of general

assistance:

Alabama Mississippi

Arkansas New Hampshire

Colorado New Mexico

Delaware North Carolina

Florida Cklaboma

Georgia Oregon

Guam South Carolina

Idaho South Dakota

Indiana Tennessee

Iowa Texas

Kentucky Utah

Louisiana Washington

Maine West Virginia
28

QUESTICW: How much money will be spent under the proposed regulations to

reimburse the states and localities general assistance costs?

Wiat level of secondary migration is anticipated in these cost

assumptions under the proposed regulations? What is your

methodology for determining this level of secondary migration?

ANSWER: The present asstnption in the FY 1982 budget is that 10% of all

non-AFDC refugees here more than 18 months will be eligible for

General Assistance (GA). Based on other assunptions contained in

the budget, and assuming an April 1, 1982 implementation date,

the estimated n 1982 general assistance costs of States and

localities is about $10 million.

No secondary migration factor was built into the cost assumptions.

The principal reasons for this are the lack of data on current

secondary migration and stringent local general assistance

criteria, which may cause large numbers of refugees to be

ineligible for these programs, even if they should move from

non-GA to GA areas.

CUESTION: What percentage of total state population on general assistance

do you anticipate refugees will corprise? Miat are your assimptions

for refugees on general assistance nationwide and in California?

ANSWER; The FY 1982 budget for refugee and entrant assistance assumed that

ten percent of refugees v*o are not eligible for AFDC would be

eligible for State or local General Assistance (GA) programs. We

have no data on how many refugees or entrants will qualify for GA

programs on a State by State basis, due to the variability of State

and local GA programs.

QUESTION: As you know, general assistance programs vary widely among States,

and even within states. Who will be responsible for verifying the

claims for general assistance requested by local governments in

states which the state government has no role in the provision of

general assistance?

ANSWER: Where a State elects to claim reimbursement for locally administered

GA, it would have the same responsibility, as the Federal grantee,

for these funds as1it now has for other sub-contracts or subgrants

for refugee assistance and services. TJiat is, the State agency is

responsible for assuring the correctness of expenditures and

claims under the Federal grant that it receives.

QUESTION: Counties and states inform us that many administrative problems are involved in the reimbursement of general

assistance in states • such as California, Wisconsin and

New Jersey • in which this program is wholly locally administered. How do you see the reimbursement of general assistance

costs working?

ANSWER: In response to consultations with States, we have

made it permissible, but not mandatory, for States to claim

reimbursement for GA. We did so to provide States with

flexibility in administering the program. If a State wishes

to claim such reimbursement, and if GA is locally administered,

the State would need to enter into an agreement with the local

agency.
In some States, the AFDC program is administered by

local agencies with State supervision. Where GA is administered

by the same local agency that administers the AFDC program,

the State-local relationship is already well established.

QUESTION: County governments, which cannot operate in the red

are concerned about cash flow problems related to the provision'

of general assistance to refugees. Will counties have to wait

for several months or more to be reimbursed for general assistance

costs?

ANSWER: ORR attempts to make grant awards to States as close

to the start of each quarter of the fiscal year as possible. Once

the States receive ORR grant awards, they can draw down cash as

needed under their grant authorizations, since they operate under

Federal letters of credit. Dnder this system, States would be

able to provide funds promptly to the counties for GA costs,

thus alleviating the burden.

QUEgTION: Under the proposed regulations, the Department of Health and

Human Services will reimburse states with general assistance

programs. It is also indicated that targeted assistance will

be available for heavily impacted states.

Uhder the proposed regulations, how much money do you expect to

be available for targeted assistance for the Cuban/Haitian

entrant program? For refugees?

ANSffiR: $20,000,000 will be available for Cuban/Haitian Entrant targeted

assistance in Fy 1982. There are currently no plans for refugee

targeted assistance in FY 1982; however, the FY 1983 budget

request includes $20,000,000 in targeted assistance for refugees

and entrants.

We are currently examining options which could increase the anount

available for targeted assistance for both refugees and entrants

in FY 1982. We will notify the Conmittee as soon as our examination is complete.

QUESTION: It is my understanding that this targeted assistance will be made

available only at the conclusion of the fiscal year? If so, why is that

being done?

ANSWER: The targeted assistance will be made available as quickly as possible.

We do not plan to wait until the end of the fiscal year.

QUESTION: How can the program be restructured to provide these funds to

the states up front, rather than having to wait until the end of the

fiscal year?

ANSWER: As indicated previously, we plan to make these funds available

as quickly as possible.

11-417 0-83-3
30

QUESTION: Please describe the various, now discarded, options

presented the Secretary for changing these regulations. What

would have been the projected savings for each option and why

was it rejected?

ANSWER: Three options were considered under which 36 months

of funding would be available to States. Under these three

options. States would be reimbursed for AFDC, Medicaid, and GA

costs for 36 months. Special eligibility for Refugee Cash

Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) would

differ as follows:*

1. Provide RCA and RMA for 12 months. Fund GA during

the latter 24 months. Savings of $76 million.

2. Provide RCA and RMA for 15 months. Fund GA during

the latter 21 months. Savings of $32 million.

3. Provide RCA and RMA for 18 months. Fund GA during

the latter IS months. (This Is the option which

the Department selected and proposed in its Notice

of Proposed Rule Making published in the Federal

Register, December 11, 1981.) Savings of $3 million.

Five options were considered under which States would

be reimbursed for AFDC, Medicaid, and/or GA costs for less than

36 months. These options were as follows:*

1. Provide RCA and RMA for 24 months. Fund AFDC and

Medicaid for 24 months. Do not fund AFDC, Medicaid,

or GA during the latter 12 months. Savings of $18

million.

2. Provide RCA and RMA for 24 months, with the RCA payment level set at the AFDC level (as under existing

policy) during a refugee's first 12 months and at

50% of the AFDC level during the refugee's second 12

months. Fund AFDC and Medicaid for 24 months. Do

not fund AFDC, Medicaid, or GA during the latter 12

months. Savings of $59 million.

3. Provide RCA and RMA for 24 months, with the RCA

payment level set at 75% of the AFDC level throughout

that period. Fund AFDC and Medicaid for 24 months.

Do not fund AFDC, Medicaid, or GA during the latter

12 months. Savings of $52 million.

4. Provide RCA and RMA for 18 months. Fund AFDC and

Medicaid for 36 months. Do not fund GA during the

latter 18 months. Savings of $37 million.

5. Provide RCA for 6 months and RMA for 24 months. Fund

AFDC and Medicaid for 36 months. Do not fund GA

cash assistance during the latter 30 months and do not

fund GA medical assistance during the latter 12 months.

Savings of $84 million.

•NOTE: All savings are against the original FY 19S2 rffu^op

cash and medical assistance budget: about S469 million.
31

In considering these options, we took into account the

fact that the Refugee Act permits, but does not require, that

funding be provided to States to off-set assistance costs during

a refugee's first 36 months or that the funding be provided to

reimburse 100% of the assistance costs That States would be required to incur under their ongoing assistance programs. We

concluded that options which met two general criteria were

preferable to those which did not:

o First, that it would be preferable to meet the cash

and medical assistance costs of States for a 36-month

period; and

o Second, that it would be preferable to provide an

initial period of general eligibility of refugees

for cash and medical assistance, in recognition of

their need for a transition period, of the fact that

many had initial health problems, and of the fact that

the initial need for aid would not follow the categorical types of assistance which have developed for

citizens based on family composition, age, disability,

or previous participation In the labor force.

Based on our previous consultations with States, we

also concluded that, in order to avoid administrative complexity

to the fullest extent possible, options should be avoided which

proposed reductions In the assistance level (for example, rn 505

of the AFDC level) or which made it mandatory for States to

enter into relationships with locally funded and administered

GA agencies. Therefore, the Department's recommended policy

has not required such reductions in the assistance level, and

it permits, but does not require, a State to claim reimbursement

for GA.

QUESTION: If a targeted assistance program were set up for states with a

large number of refugees, how much money might be required for the

last 6 month of FY 1982? To serve how many refugees?

ANSWER: We do not intend to establish a targeted assistance program for

refugees in FV 1982. We are establishing a targeted assistance

program for entrants and have requested $20 million for this program

in FY 1982. It is not possible to estimate the number of entrants

that States will serve under this program because of the flexible

nature of the grants.

QUESTION: Has the Oepartrment considered a "block grant" approach to

refugee funding; that is, making targeted assistance funds available

to high impact refugees states with few or no strings attached?
32

ANSWER: The question of a block grant approach has been considered

by both the Department and the President's Interagency Task Force on

Immigration and Refugee Policy. As a result of these deliberations,

the Administration decided to continue existing categorical refugee

benefit programs (i.e., cash assistance, medical benefits, English

language instruction, and employment services), but to alter the approach

to providing cash assistance payments to those refugees who do not qualify

for AFDC, SSI, adult assistance or Medicaid.

We have, however, made a distinction between "block grant," which

could cover all aspects of refugee assistance and services, and

"targeted assistance," a term which we have applied to the full

range of services permissible under section 412(c) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act. We have announced a proposed targeted assistance

program for Cuban and Haitian entrants in FY 1982, and the budget

request for FY 1983 includes a request for targeted-assistance

funds which could be used for both refugees and entrants.

QUESTION: Has any consideration been given to what might happen to refugees

in states like Oregon and Washington without general assistance programs due

to the proposed regulations? If so, what are your plans to address the needs

of these refugees? If not, what guidance would you give the states to assist

their refugee populations?

ANSWER: Yes. We recognize that any restriction in the availability and

duration of assistance may cause some problems in communities which have

concentrations of refugees and lack GA programs. In some instances, our

Regional Office staffs have met with State and local officials, voluntary

agency representatives, and refugee organizations to aid in planning steps

to help alleviate any emergency situations that occur. In other cases,

States and localities have initiated such activities without our involvement.

The effect of a time-limitation on eligibility for RCA will vary with

respect to the circumstances of individual refugees. Many refugees will be

parts of households whose other income or assistance may not be affected by

the time-limitation. In some instances, members of refugee families will

have reached the U.S. at different times, so that, if receiving assistance,

not all family members are affected by the time-limitation at the same time.
The refugee population affected by the proposed change will consist of

single adults, adult couples, and two-parent families who do not qualify

for AFDC or SSI. They should generally be the most able to become selfsustaining after eighteen months. Therefore employment services to such

refugees will be of major importance, and refugee service funds can

continue to be used for this purpose without regard to a.time limitation

on cash assistance.

QUESTION! Kefugee social service funding is, in the opinion of the

Appropriations Comittee, the key to the successful resettlement

of refugees. This funding provides English language and vocational

training, as well as a number of other services to help refugees

resettle successfully.

How do you explain that funding for refugee social services has

been steadily decreasing over the past several years?

(FY 81 - $93.7 million, Fy 82 - $67.5 million)?

Of the total of $532 million requested in FY 83 for refugee programs,

how much of that would be for social services?

How are you targeting social services dollars to areas where they

are nost needed?

ANSWER: Of the total FY 1983 budget request of $532 million, approximately

$59 million dollars is targeted for social services. The FY 1983

request for social services is less than the Fy 1982 amount because

the number of new refugees expected to arrive in FY 1983 is about

25,000 less than the FY 1982 admissions level. In fact, the budget

assumption that funds will be spent for social services to assist

new arrivals is actually increasing in FY 1983, from $497 to $576

per new arrival. Ihis is about a 16% increase, which is intended

to offset the costs of inflation.

Currently States are targeting their social service dollars on ESL

and employment related services - the two areas of service nost

essential to inproving refugee prospects of self-sufficiency. In

addition, social service funds are supporting projects which

principally serve newly arrived refugees as well as those who are

on the verge of being time expired. Recent analysis of State plans

which reflect projections for use of social service funds for FY 82

indicate that approximately 85% of these funds are either in the ESL

or enployment services related area.
34

ATTACHMENT B

1) The cost of the proposed regulations If Implemented on April 1st.

2) The cost of the proposed regulations if implemented on July 1st.

3) The cost of providing:

•36 months of cash and medical assistance to APDC

eligible refugees.

•21 months of cash and medical assistance to non-AFDC

eligible refugees.

I) The cost of providing:

•24 months of cash and medical assistance to both APDC

eligible and non-AFDC eligible refugees.

5) The cost of providing:

•36 months of medical assistance to both APDC eligible

and non-AFDC eligible refugees.

•24 months of cash assistance to both APDC eligible

and non-AFDC eligible refugees.

6) The cost of allowing the states to choose between:

A. 24 months of cash and medical assistance for APDC

eligible and non-AFDC eligible refugees.

B. 24 months of cash and medical assistance for APDC

eligible refugees.

18 months of cash and medical assistance to non-AFDC

eligible refugees.

36 months of General Assistance Reimbursements

to GA states.

ASSUMING: that states with General Assistance Programs

will choose option "B", and that all other

states will choose option "A".

7) The amount each state would receive if, after second quarter

obligations are met, the money remaining in PY 82 cash and

medical assistance funds were provided in block grant form

to the states, distributed according to the population

eligible for assistance at the beginning of the third quarter.

This assumes that the current full 36 months of assistance is

continued until the end of the second quarter.

RESPONSES TO ATTACHMENT B

1. The estimated FY 1982 Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance costs if the

proposed regulations were inpleraented on April 1st, is approximately

$480 million for Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance (and related

administration).

2. the estimated FY 1982 Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance costs, if the

proposed regulations were implemented on July 1st, is approximately

5525 million for Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance (and related

administration).
35

3. The estimated FY 1982 Refugee Cash and Medical (and related administration)

costs for providing 36 months of aid for AFDC eligibles and 24 months

assistance to non-AFDC eligibles, assuming an April 1, 1982 implementation

date, is about S515 million.

4. Ihe estimated FTf 1982 Refugee Cash and Medical (and related administration)

costs of providing 24 nonths of cash and medical assistance to both AFDC

eligible and non-AFDC eligible refugees is approximately S495 million,

assuming an April 1, 1982 implementation data.

5. The estimated FY 1982 Refugee Cash and Medical (and related administration)

costs of providing 36 months of medical assistance to both AFDC eligible

and non-AFDC eligible refugees and 24 ironths of cash assistance to both AFDC

eligible and non-AFDC eligible refugees, assuming on April 1, 1982

implementation date, is about S525 million.

6. The estimated FY 1982 Refugee cash and Medical costs for the proposed

options, using the given assumptions and an ijiplementation date of

April 1, 1982, is about S470 million.

7. The attached chart represents the amount each state would receive if, after

second quarter obligations are met, the money remaining in FY 82 cash and

medical assistance funds were provided in block grant form to the states,

distributed according to the population eligible for assistance (i.e., those

refugees in the country less than 3 years).

STATE BLOCK GRANT ESTIMATES

(for 3rd and 4th Quarters, FY 1982)

Estimated

36-Mo. Ref. Estimated Funds for

State Population* State % of Total remainder Of FY 1982

Alabama 1,381 .34 S 565,000

Alaska 241 .06 99,700

Arizona 2,691 .67 1,113,400

Arkansas 1,282 .32 531,800

California 131,169 32.64 54,240,500

Colorado 5,643 1.41 2,343,100

Connecticut 3,853 .96 1,595,300

Delaware 151 .04 66,500

Dist. of Columbia 1,151 .29 481,900

Florida 23,917 5.95 9,387,600

Georgia 4,841 1.20 1,994,100

Guam 30 .01 16,600

Hawaii 4,183 1.04 1,728,300

Idaho 326 .21 349,000

Illinois 16,149 4.02 6,680,400

Indiana 2,287 .57 947,200

Iowa 5,498 1.37 2,276,600

Kansas 4,835 1.20 1,994,100

Kentucky 1,148 .29 481,900

Louisiana 5,548 1.38 2,293,300

Maine 710 .18 299,100

Maryland 3,685 .92 1,528,300

Massachusetts 3,805 2.19 3,639,300

Michigan 6,303 1.57 2,609,000

Minnesota 18,607 4.63 7,694,100

Mississippi 774 .19 315,700

Missouri 3,012 .75 1,246,300

Montana 686 .17 282,500

Nebraska 927 .23 382,200

^vada 1,425 .36 598,200
36

STATE BIOCK GRANT ESTIMATES (Continued)

(for 3rd and 4th Quarters, FY 1982)

Estimated

36-Mo. Ref. Estimated Funds for

State Population* State 1 of Total remainder Of FY 1982

New Hampshire 239 .06 99,700

New Jersey 4,226 1.05 1,744,900

New Mexico 2,269 .57 947,200

New York 13,346 3.32 5,517,100

North Carolina 3,388 .84 1,395,900

North Datota 415 .10 166,200

Ohio 4,711 1.17 1,944,300

Oklahoma 3,855 .96 1,595,300

Oregon 12,170 3.03 5,035,200

Pennsylvania 14,391 3.58 5,949,200

Puerto Rico 104 .02 33,200

Rhode Island 2,638 .66 1,096,800

South Carolina 1,340 .33 548,400

South Dakota 562 .14 232,700

Tennessee 2,266 .56 930,600

Texas 30,662 7.63 12,679,400

Utah 5,911 1.47 2,442,800

Vermont 232 .06 99,700

Virgin Islands 10 -

Virginia 10,123 2.52 4,187,700

Washington 19,141 4.76 7,910,100

West Virginia 332 .08 132,900

Wisconsin 7,442 1.85 3,074,300

Wyoming 305 .08 132,900

TOTAL: 401,836 100.00 5166,178,000"

Footnotes:

* Southeast Asian and Cuban refugees who arrived in U.S. October 1, 1978

through September 30, 1981. There are no current data on resettlement

locations for non-Southeast Asian and non-Cuban refugees. This

population base is used in lieu of the estimated 36-month refugee

copulation projected as of April 1, 1982, due to its availability

and the assumption that resettlement patterns for October 1, 198i to

March 31, 1982 will not be different and individual States' share of

the national 36-month refugee population will not vary significantly

from the above percentages.

•• The present FY 1982 Refugee cash and medical assistance budget under

the third Continuing Resolution is S428,fi92,000. Estimated obligations

under current policy, through the end of the second quarter, FY 1982, is

about 5262,514,000. Therefore, the remaining unobligated balance for

Refugee cash and medical assistance for the last half (third and fourth

quarters) of ri 1982 is 5166,178,000.
37

QUESTION: Would you explain the long-range iiipact of the proposed changes

on the States; the voluntary agencies; and on the refugees?

ANSWER: We believe that the long-range inpact of the proposed policy

changes will encourage earlier self-support among refugees and will assist

the voluntary agencies and the States in their efforts to place refugees in

jobs. The policy will continue to provide federal funding during a full

36-iit)nth period for those cash and medical assistance costs v*uch States

are required to incur under the AftC, SSI, Medicaid, and general assistance

(GA) programs. Studies and statistics will depend on nonitoring the effects

of the policy changes after they have occurred. The only available data

bearing en the proposed change has been the effect of the 36-nonth statutory

limitation v*ich went into effect April 1, 1981. The information which

has been reported has shown little negative effect on GA programs after the

36-month point.

QUESTION: Would you describe the coordination of your office with other

interested Federal agencies or constituent groups in preparing

the proposed regulations?

ANSWER: We began consultations on proposed policy changes with public

interest groups, State and local officials, voluntary refugee resettlement

agency officials, and representatives of refugee organizations beginning in

June 1980. A specific proposed change was included in the budget requests

to the Congress for FY 1982 which were submitted in January 1981 and March

1981. A number of possible options were discussed with State, local,

voluntary, and public interest group officials during the sunmer of 1981.

When a notice of proposed rule making (NPRM) was published December 11,

1981, special mailings were carried out to all of these groins and cenments

were requested. The coranents received were carefully considered in the

development of a proposed final rule.

QUESTION: What inpact have existing regulations had on the refugee

dependency rate? How do you think these regulations will change

the dependency rate? Wiat data do we have to support these

projections? How much of this decrease is due to decreasing the

eligible population?

ANSWER: Reports from resettlement workers both overseas and in the U.S.

have indicated that many refugees interpret the 36-inonth limitation

specified in the Refugee Act as an entitlement to assistance during that

period. Based on our estimates, we believe that the proposed changes,

because of the more limited eligibility period, would result in a reduction
38

of approximately 65,000-70,000 refugees and 40,000-45,000 Cuban and Haitian

entrants who are currently receiving assistance. Itiese numbers constitute

an estimated 21%-23% of the current refugee caseload and 73%-82% of the

current entrant caseload. While we also believe that the shorter eligibility

period will generally encourage earlier self-sufficiency and lead refugees

increasingly to accept employment prior to the expiration of the 18-month

period, it is not possible to estimate this in advance of irrplementation of

the proposed changes.

QUESTION: What evaluations do you plan to undertake in the future which

might result in changes in refugee resettlement policies?

ANSWER: Evaluations will cover Biglish-language training, the States'

administration of the refugee program, the relationship between services

and self-sufficiency, and a study of the matching-grant progran administered by the voluntary agencies which serves principally, but not

exclusively, Soviet refugees. In addition, we are developing monitoring

plans for State operations and will also look at the effect of changes in

cash assistance policies. Findings from any of these studies or monitoring

activities could lead to the consideration of changes in refugee resettlement

policies.

QUES1ION: When did your office become aware that a shortfall in funding was

likely without implementation of the proposed regulations?

ANSWER: In July. 1981. 0RR reported to the Senate Appropriations Committee

that the FY 1982 budget request was expected to be adequate to meet

program responsibilities. The budget request included proposed

changes in refugee cash and medical assistance policy, to be effective October 1, 1981. Our report contended that there were many

uncertainties in the factors comprising the 0RR budget: the numbers

of refugees entering the country in a fiscal year is not finally

set until quite near the beginning of that fiscal year; the dependency rate of the refugee population varies depending on the characterisitcs of the incoming individuals; and the level of payments

varies both by where the refugee is resettled and the needs of the

individual. Despite these factors, 0RR judged, at that time, that

the FY 1982 budget request was adequate.

However, in September 1981, 0RR completed a survey with the States

most heavily impacted by refugees and determined the dependency rate

had increased to 61% nationwide. Since the original FY 1982 budget

was based on a rate of U9%, even with the policy contained in that

request, the increase in the dependency rate raised the possibility

of funding difficulties ahead. 0RR and HHS reviewed the situation

and recommended to the Secretary revisions to that (original) proposed policy, which eventually led to the NPRM that was published on

December 11, 1981-
39

QUESTION: Do you expect any significant change in levels of secondary

migration as a result of the proposed changes? Do you think,

as some States have maintained, that refugees in areas without

General Assistance programs will tend to migrate to areas with

General Assistance programs?

ANSWER: The Department's experience in administering the refugee and AFDC

programs is that recipients do not change locations solely because of

benefit levels. Major impacts predicted as a result of the statutory

36-month limit, which became effective in April 1981, did not materialize

and we do not expect significant secondary migrations as a result of the

proposed regulations.

QUESTION: We are very pleased that a U.S. Coordinator for Refugees will

soon be confirmed. What will be your relationship in policy

terms to the Coordinator?

ANSJER: We have already established a working relationship with the

Coordinator-designate. We would expect to have an ongoing relationship

with the Coordinator in his carrying out of his statutory responsibilities

in the develcpnent of overall refugee admission and resettlement policy,

the coordination of domestic and international refugee admission and

resettlement programs, and the develcpnent of an overall budget strategy,

as well as the other specific responsibilities placed on the Coordinator by

the Refugee Act.

QUESTION: In addition to the annual refugee consultation, the Refugee

Act calls for Congressional consultation on changes in refugee

policy to occur through the more informal "periodic discussion."

Is there any reason why Congressional input was not sought last

year with regard to the various options being considered for

proposed regulations?

ANSWER: We endeavored to make clear our intent to revise refugee assistance

policies, beginning with the submitted, of the FX 1982 budget request in

January and March 1981. this matter was covered in appropriation hearings,

and House and Senate Conmittee actions on the budget indicated acceptance

of such a change in the amounts to be appropriated. We also referred to

the fact that a policy change would be made during the course of several

hearings and consultations before the Senate and House Judiciary Conmittees

and before the House Foreign Affairs Ocximittee in connection with the

setting of FY 1982 admissions levels.

(
40

QUESTICN: In jour effort to foster cooperation of States and counties,

how will the proposed regulations promote consistent treatment

of refugees; an avoidance of indue fiscal burdens on a few

States and counties; and a minimizing of administrative red

tape?

ANS-JER: By shortening the period of special eligibility for refugees from

36 to 18 nonths, consistency of treatment between refugees and non-refugees

will be achieved sooner than under the present policy. As we have indicated,

our proposed policy calls for continuing to reintourse for 36 months those

costs which States are required to incur under their cash and medical

assistance programs. We believe that the proposal will reduce potential

administrative red tape by basing the assistance to refugees as closely as

possible on the same rules as apply to assistance to non-refugees during

the first 18 months and entirely on those rules following that initial

period. In addition, in response to comments from some States and in order

to avoid any undue administrative burden, we have made it optional with a

State whether and to what extent the State claims reimbursement for GA

costs.

0OESTION: As I understand it, part of your rationale for reducing the

non-AFDC eligible refugees to 18 months of Federal reimbursement

is that 36 months is too long for these people and promotes

dependency. If it is the case that this 36 month period is too

long, what is the justification for continuing to fund general

assistance for the full 36 months for these people in areas with

general assistance programs?

ANSJER: Refugees are eligible to apply for and receive GA under existing

State and local programs. We have proposed to fund GA in order to avoid

these costs falling on States or localities, and to maintain Federal

financial responsibility for State costs of cash and medical assistance

for refugees for 36 months as authorized under the Refugee Act of 1980.

QUESTICN: How would you describe the comientary of the States and counties

who sent in written comments to the proposed regulation, as

called for in the Federal Register?

ANSJER: Host of the commenters objected to one or nore aspects of the

proposed regulation. Some camenters suggested alternatives, but there was

little uniformity in the suggestions other than a request for a later

effective date. The corments have not led QRR to reccnmend changes in the

final regulation except for the effective date and to make clear that

States may claim the administrative costs of providing assistance to

refugees.
41

QUESTION: Several States have indicated that they are in favor of reducing

the eligibility period for cash and medical assistance, but

state that they will need some kind of transitional assistance

to phase in new rules in the middle of the year. Did you

consider putting such a provision into the proposed rules, and

if so, why was this idea not adopted?

ANSWER: We did not propose some type of transitional assistance because

the intent to revise assistance policies had been known and discussed for a

year-and-a-half, and because, except in the entrant program, funds which

could be used for special assistance are not available. Very few camenters

indicated a problem with iirplementing new rules in the middle of the year,

but many stated that the proposed effective date of February 1, 1982,

provided too little notice after publication of the NPRM. In response to

these coirments, the Department decided to postpone the effective date.

QUESTION: Various States are now calling for ORR and the States to work

together in identifying more acceptable options for regulations,

claiming that they weren't consulted on this proposal. To what

extent did you fcork with the States in developing the options

which were presented to the Secretary? Did you feel that their

involvement was adequate?

ANSWER: As indicated, we worked extensively with States and other interested

parties beginning in the summer of 1980. A specific proposal was included

in the FY 1982 budget presentations early in 1981 and additional options

were discussed with State officials and others in the smmer of 1981. We

considered the involvement of States and others to be adequate, while

recognizing that there were different views among the States as to an

appropriate policy.

QUESTION: last week the Subcommittee staff requested background material

from the Department, including a description of the various

options you considered in the development of these proposed

regulations; the cost savings projected for each; the inpact

which the various options would have on States and counties,

and the justification for choosing the proposed regulations

over the other options. Ttiere were also a number of other

questions. Were these questions addressed in developing the

proposed policies? When might we expect the written answers to

these questions?

ANSWER: Relative cost savings, the inpact on States and oomties, and the

relative merit over other options of the proposed change were considered in

the developmental process. Ttie option proposed in the NPRM took into

account objections which States had raised to other types of options

previously considered. Written answers to the questions referred to will

be provided as soon as Departmental clearance has been received.

(
42

QUESTION: In Iowa there is no general State assistance program. Negotiations

would have to be entered into between the resettlement agency

and ninety-nine separate counties. Eligibility criteria for

cash disbursal differs frccn county to county. Ihere have been

claims that some counties reimburse in a discriminatory manner,

not socially but on the basis of family oonposition. Will the

Federal Government reimburse these counties regardless of their

eligibility criteria systems?

ANSWER: Yes, the State may, but is not required to, claim reimbursement

for any existing State or local GR program which meets the definition set

forth in the proposed regulation. The proposal recognizes that in some

States GA differs from one locality to another. The proposal also recognizes

that a State might find that it would be an administrative burden to enter

into arrangements with all localities to claim reimbursement; therefore

this matter is left to the decision of the State.

QUESTION: When did your office become aware that a shortfall in funding

was likely without implementation of the proposed regulations?

ANSWER: We made clear in the presentation of the proposed budget for Fy

1982, which was transmitted to the Congress in January 1981 and March 1981,

that a change would be made in cash assistance policies and that the Fy

1982 request was predicated on a change occurring. We became aware in the

fall of 1981, as a result of a survey of cash assistance caseloads which

showed a higher dependency rate than had been projected, that a change more

restrictive than that originally proposed in the FY 1982 bu3get would be

required in order to provide sufficient fiscal control.
43

Senator SIMPSON. Our next panel of witnesses, Mr. David Pingree, secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services,

State of Florida; and Mr. Barry Van Lare, staff director. Committee on Human Resources, National Governors Association.

Let me recognize Senator Hatfield, please.

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I am not trying to trespass

upon your good patience, but before I have to depart because of a

conflict in my schedule, I would like to introduce to you the State

refugee program coordinator for the State of Oregon, Mr. Jerry

Burns.

Mr. Jerry Burns has the unfortunate, or the challenging role of

trying to provide help for 17,000 refugees in our State, 11,000 of

which are on public assistance, a State with one of the highest unemployment rates in the Union, as I indicated earlier.

I just wanted to make that presentation of Mr. Burns to you, and

know that I leave him in good hands as I have to depart. I want to

thank you again for granting me the opportunity to come here and

hear Mr. Hawkes today and pose some questions to him.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you very much. Senator Hatfield, and I

look forward to working with you. I think we can tie this together

in a much more complete fashion. Thank you so much.

We do have a time limitation, if you would proceed, please.

STATEMENT OF DAVID PINGREE, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, STATE OF FLORIDA,

ACCOMPANIED BY BARRY VAN LARE, STAFF DIRECTOR, COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES, NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION

Mr. PINGREE. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to

present testimony on behalf of Governor Bob Graham of Florida. I

am representing him both in his role as chairman of the National

Governors Association's Task Force on Immigration and Refugees,

and as Governor of the State of Florida.

The Nation's Governors have been keenly interested in our national refugee program for several years. They have been and are

committed to working toward the rapid assimilation into our local

communities of refugees resettled in the United States. But Governors strongly believe that the Federal Government has the total responsibility to meet the basic needs of refugees and entrants for

the initial 3 years after their status as refugee or entrant is determined.

There is, therefore, a great deal of concern over the regulations

proposed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Since a number of States have stated their concerns directly to the

Department, I shall concentrate on the specifics of Florida's refugee situation.

The past 10 years have seen the State of Florida cast into the

throes of an international drama. What began as a serious concern

over the unexpected arrival of boatloads of Haitians in February

1980, escalated to utter crisis by June when 120,000 Cubans had

sought to embrace American freedom on Florida's shores.

In the aftermath, our State has reeled from the impact of attempting to assimilate an estimated 90,000 Cubans and approxi-
44

mately 40,000 to 60,000 Haitians. This unprecedented immigration

has had grave social and fiscal consequences for our communities

in south Florida. The lack of a clearly and consistently applied national immigration and refugee policy has been central to the problems Florida has had to face as wave after wave of Caribbean refugees have swept across our beaches.

The passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 appeared to bring some

order to the previously chaotic state of immigration policy. A central point in the debate that preceded the passage of the act was

the proper role of the Federal Government in resettlement and domestic assistance funding.

The 1980 law strongly supports the idea that refugees are a Federal responsibility, since the decisions relating to resettlement are

made at the Federal level. In addition, the clear intent of that 1980

Act is for the Federal Government to provide refugees with 100

percent cash and medical services during a full 36 month period

from date of entry.

If the national policy objective is to insure effective and rapid assimilation, then this minimum commitment on the part of the National Government is absolutely essential. Anything less would

leave refugees in great danger of becoming dependent for even

longer period of time, since the struggle to obtain housing and

basic medical care would overwhelm their ability to learn English,

train for a job, and gain productive employment.

The reforms brought about by the 1980 act did not, of course, envision the events that have transpired in south Florida. In March,

1980, the same month in which 2 years of congressional effort was

culminating in the enactment of the new legislation, 1,400 Haitians

arrived by boats up and down the coastline of south Florida, from

Fort Pierce to Key West.

Unfortunately, the new legislation never foresaw the likelihood

of the Cuban and Haitian migration we were about to experience.

It did not anticipate the United States becoming the country of

first asylum for over 100,000 people in a matter of weeks.

It did not anticipate the legal ramifications of over 100,000 persons known to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and residing within our country's border, but without immigration status

and unable to receive services. Thus the special entrant status had

to be granted to these refugees through an Executive order, and additional legislation had to be enacted.

What has resulted is a social crisis in south Florida of major proportions. While the majority of all of the Cubans are self-sufficient

and are already contributing to the economic base of the State,

most of the Haitians and 35 to 40 percent of the Cubans continue

to be poor enough to qualify for public assistance.

Moreover, the community costs of transportation, education,

criminal justice, housing, and related services have been massive

due to large and concentrated numbers of unexpected arrivals.

Most of these costs, although documented, have not been fully reimbursed by the Federal Government. Yet, we are now facing efforts to sharply reduce the basic cash and medical programs which

we fought so hard to continue just a little over a year ago.

The announcement by the Department of Health and Human

Services of its intention to implement regulations on March 1 that
45

limit noncategorical assistance to 18 months, rather than the 36

months authorized and intended by Congress, is a blatant and

overt shifting of costs from the Federal Government to the backs of

the local citizens of south Florida.

In addition, these rules have been promulgated with total disregard for the needs and concerns of State and local governments.

We were never consulted on the impact of these changes prior to

their announcement. In fact, we were never even extended the

courtesy of a reply to a December 18 letter from Governor Graham

to Secretary Schweiker requesting the opportunity for State and

local officials to meet with officials of HHS to review these regulations.

It is imperative, even at this late date, that the Department of

Health and Human Services call

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Pingree, your entire remarks will be

placed in the record. If you could summarize in about 30 seconds, I

would appreciate that very much. I am sorry, but that is our problem.

Mr. PINGREE. It is quite all right.

The fact is that the impact on south Florida is significant. The

results are going to be extremely grave. As of March 1, over 25,000

people in Florida will lose all their cash assistance and all medical

benefits, and this is in spite of the fact that in reality, although

they have been here for 18 months, they have only been receiving

funds for 1 year out of a 3-year program.

This is a short period of time to expect people to assimilate in

any community, within 12 months, I think that it is absolutely

irrational. I think it is irresponsible on the part of the National

Government to expect these people to assimilate in that short

period of time, and to expect the people of south Florida to have to

carry the burden for this Nation's inability to control its own borders.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much. Indeed, your Governor

has shared information and testimony with the subcommittee previously, which bear out all of those serious issues you address.

[The prepared statement of Mr. David Pingree follows:]

11-417 0-83
46

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID PINGREE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to

present testimony on behalf of Governor Graham. 1 am representing him today

both in his role as Chairman of the National Governors' Association Task Force

on Immigration and Refugees and as Governor of the State of Florida.

The Nation's Governors have been keenly interested in our national refugee

program for several years. For those refugees resettled in this country, states

are committed to working toward their rapid assimilation into our communities.

However, Governors strongly believe that the Federal government has the total

responsibility to meet the basic needs of refugees and entrants for the

initial three years. There is, therefore, a great deal of concern over the

proposed regulations. It is my understanding that a number of states have

provided their comments directly to the Department of Health and Human Services.

I would, therefore, like to turn to the specifics of the Florida situation.

The past ten years have seen the State of Florida cast into the throes of an

international drama. What began as a serious concern over the unexpected

arrival of boatloads of Haitians in February 1980, escalated to utter crisis

by June when 120,000 Cubans had sought American freedom on Florida's shores.

In the aftermath, our State has reeled from the impact of assimilating an

estimated 90,000 Cubans and approximately 40-60,000 Haitians. This unprecedented

immigration has had grave social and fiscal consequences for our communities

in South Florida. The lack of a clear and consistent national immigration

and refugee policy has been central to the problems Florida has had to face

as wave after wave of Caribbean refugees have swept across our beaches.

The passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 appeared to bring some order to

the previous chaos through the establishment of a comprehensive United States

refugee resettlement and assistance policy. A central point In the debate which

preceded passage of the Act was the proper role of the Federal government In

resettlement and domestic assistance funding. The 1980 law strongly supports

the idea that refugees are a Federal responsibility since the decisions

surrounding their acceptance for resettlement are made at the Federal level.

In addition, 100 percent of the funding for cash and medical services forrefugees Is clearly intended to be provided by the Federal government for a

full 36 months from date of entry for those individuals and families with real

economic need. This commitment makes sense if the national policy objective

is to ensure effective and rapid assimilation. Anything less would certainly

leave this population in great danger of becoming dependent for even longer

periods of time since the costs of housing and medical care would overwhelm

their ability to learn English, train for a job and gain employment.

The reforms brought about by the 1980 Act did not, however» envision the

events in South Florida. In March 1980, the same month in which two years of

Congressional effort was culminating in the enactment of the new legislation,

1,400 Haitians arrived by boats up and down the coastline of South Florida.

There is irony in the fact that the new legislation never foresaw the likelihood

of the Cuban and Haitian migration we were about to experience. It did not

anticipate the United States becoming a country of first asylum for over one

hundred thousand people in a matter of weeks." It did not anticipate the legal

ramifications of over one hundred thousand people residing In the country,

known to the Immigration and Naturalization Service but without immigration

status and unable to receive services. The citizens of Florida, you may be

sure, certainly did not anticipate that we would be asked to bear the full cost

of these people. However, just to secure the same federal role for this

population, which was accorded to refugees under the 1980 law, a special entrant

status had to be granted through an Executive Order and additional legislation

had to be enacted.
47

All of this was occuring during a period when federal involvement in the

financing of the full range of human services • so desperately needed by a

large proportion of this new population • was beginning to be reduced. The

resulting competition for increasingly scarce resources added additional strain to

already high community tensions.

While a majority of all of the Cubans are self-sufficient and are already

contributing to the economic base of the State, most of the Haitians and

35 - 40 percent of the Cubans are poor enough to qualify for public assistance.

Moreover, the community costs of transportation, education, criminal justice,

housing and related services have been massive due to the large and concentrated number of arrivals.

None of these critical issues, none of these costs have been fully documented

or reimbursed by the Federal government. And yet, we are now facing efforts

to sharply reduce the basic cash and medical programs which we fought

so hard to obtain just a little over a year ago. The announcement by the

Department of Health and Human Services of their intention to implement

regulations on March 1 that limit non-categorical assistance to 18 months •

rather than the 36 months authorized by Congress • is a blatant shifting of

costs from the Federal government to the backs of the local citizens of South

Florida. In addition, these rules have been promulgated with almost total

disregard for the needs and concerns of State and local governments. We were

never consulted on the impact of these changes. In fact, we were never even

extended the courtesy of a reply to a December 18 letter from Governor Graham to

Secretary Schwelker requesting the opportunity for State and local officials

to meet with officials of HHS to review these regulations. It is imperative,

even at this late date, that the Department of HHS call together representatives

of the ten States most affected to review the fiscal, social and environmental

impact of these new policies and fully debate alternative methods for accomplishing

the Department's goals.

The Impact on the citizens and taxpayers of Florida and on the refugees and

entrants affected will be grave. As of January 1982, almost all of those who

came to Florida during the boatlift will have been in this country for 18 months.

On March 1, over 25.000 persons will lose all cash assistance and all medical

benefits. This is in spite of the fact that most have received benefits for

no more than one year since the Cuban/Haitian entrant program did not go into

effect until January 1981.

The State of Florida cannot legally pick up the funding or support for this

population. We have no general assistance or medically needy programs. With

anticipated losses in federal funds resulting from the Omnibus Reconciliation Act

of 1981 in the $70-100 million range for human service programs alone, the State

simply does not have the fiscal capacity to provide the services. The full

impact will fall on local governments, local communities, local taypayers.

The loss in cash benefits between March 1 and the end this federal fiscal

year is estimated to be $25.3 million. While the regulations allow continued

federal support for local cash assistance programs, the existing emergency

program in Dade County cannot possibly handle this population. That program

currently provides only several million dollars in emergency assistance in an

entire year and would be engulfed by 25,000 applicants.

The $111 a month currently provided in federally-funded cash assistance is

meant to meet the basic subslstance of these people. Without it, they will be

unable to afford even the overcrowded, inadequate housing most of them are forced

to live in. Where will they go? Will they wander our streets? Will they head

to states that have general assistance and medically needy programs and where

the Federal government will still be providing 100 percent reimbursement?
48

Tbe loss in medical assistance Is even more alarming. The Cuban/Haitian

entrants, unlike most refugees who came through processing camps outside of

the United States, arrived in Florida with high Incidences of chronic diseases.

Moreover, the Haitians, in particular, are experiencing excessively high birth

rates. It has been estimated that one Haitian baby is bom every 4 hours at

Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami. After March 1, most will be bom at local

expense. Between March 1 and September 30, we estimate a total loss of $11.3

million in medical care alone. Health care is not discretionary; somebody will

pay the bill. That somebody will be the public hospitals and private-paying

patients whose costs will rise to absorb Increased bad debts.

In the process, the Federal budget will be reduced; but the burden will only be

shifted • not eliminated. The residents of Florida will end up paying for

their national government's inability to control its borders.

By September 1982, a total of over 28,000 persons will be affected and $36

million in benefits will be lost. This is in addition to the more than $145

million of documented, unreimbursed expenditures Florida taxpayers have borne

to support education, criminal justice and related services since the start

of the Mariel boatlift in April of 1980. The frustration and anger of our

citizens, the desperation of the refugees and entrants, and the concentration

of these problems In a small strip of land in South Florida have ominous "

potential for long term social chaos.

Therefore, it is imperative that HHS delay the implementation of these regulations

in order to give states and HHS time to agree on alternative approaches which

would be less catastrophic on these individuals and the communities that have

been the primary resettlement areas in this country. Moreover, we demand a

full explanation of why this action is being taken in the first place.

According to officials in the Office of Refugee Resettlement, grant awards for

the first two quarters of Federal fiscal year 1982 total only $47.5 million

under current directives that apply full 36 months of federal funding. This

is far less than one-half of the $130 million which Congress specifically

appropriated for cash, medical and social services for Cuban/Haitian entrants.

It is my understanding that budget figures for the Refugee program raise similar

questions.

We firmly believe that it was this Committee's intent in the passage of the

Refugee Act of 1980 to affirm the Federal Government's responsibility for

meeting the basic needs of these individuals and families. At the State level

we are now looking to you, with less than a month away from March 1, to take the

strongest possible action to prevent the implementation of these particular

regulations.

The leadership you have provided in bringing order to the chaos of Federal

immigration and refugee policy is applauded. Your continued assistance in

carrying through on the commitment of the Federal government is critical.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.
49

The following projections are based on a March 1, 1982 Implementation date of

Che regulation limiting general assistance benefits to the first 18 months that

a refugee/entrant is In the United States.

DIRECT ASSISTANCE (CASH) PAYMENTS

CURRENT REVISED

CASELOAD PROJECTIONS CASELOAD PROJECTIONS TOTAL PAYMENT

MONTH REFUGEES ENTRANTS PAYMENTS REFUGEES ENTRANTS PAYMENTS REDUCTIONS

JAN '82 2,942 27,548 3,703,023 2,942 27,548 3,703,023 -0-

FEB 2,916 27.717 3,998,333 2,916 27,717 3,998,333 -0-

MAR 2,891 27,886 4,018,805 899 4,395 690,973 3,327,832

APR 2,867 27,971 4,028,606 792 3,426 550,533 3,478,073

MATf 2,844 28,056 4,038,597 682 2,906 468,306 3,570,291

JUN 2,822 28,141 4,048,879 552 2,472 394,692 3,654,187

JUL 2,801 28,141 4,047,578 493 1,972 321,732 3,725,846

AUG 2,781 28,041 4,033,596 449 1,715 282,445 3,751,151

SEP •• 2,762.. 27,941 4,019,699 391 1,425 237,024 3,782,675

TOTALS $3 5,937,116 0,647,061 $25,290,055

MEDICAID PAYMENTS *

CURRENT REVISED

CASEL0AI CASELOAIi ?R0JECTIONS TOTAL PAYMENT

MONTH REFUGEES ENTRANTS PAYMENTS REFUGEES ENTRANTS PAYMENTS REDUCTIONS

JAN '82 2,942 27,548 1,776,530 2,942 27,548 1,776,530 -0-

FEB 2,916 27,717 1,784,862 2,916 27,717 1,784,862 -0-

MAR 2,891 27,886 1,793,253 899 4,395 308,460 1,484,793

APR 2,867 27,971 1,796,807 792 3,426 245,766 1,551,041

MAY 2,844 28,056 1,800,419 682 2,906 209,058 1,591,361

JUN 2,822 28,141 1,804,090 552 2,472 176,195 1,627,894

JUL 2,801 28,141 1,802,367 493 1,972 143,626 1,659,241

AUG 2,781 28,041 1,795,845 449 1,715 126,088 1,669,757

SEP 2,762 27,941 1,788,941 391 1,425 108,811 1,680,130

TOTALS $16,143,614 5 4,879,397 $11,264,217

*Medicald assumes a monthly cost of $58,266 to refugees/entrants per case, based

on past experience
50

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Barry Van Lare, please.

Mr. VAN LARE. I do not have any separate remarks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. YOU do not have any separate remarks. I am

sorry, I thought you did.

You state to us that the Federal commitment to 100 percent

funding of cash and medical assistance to all refugees with economic need is essential to insure this rapid and effective assimilation.

What kind of documentation might you furnish to us in our oversight capacity that such a policy, even if for 36 months or even

longer than that, leads to an effective and rapid "assimilation," especially when we see these extraordinary refugee dependency rate

figures?

Mr. PINGREE. I would disagree with Mr. Hawkes, Mr. Chairman,

relative to the ability of the Cuban population to assimilate into

the community. Within 1 year that dependency rate is already

down significantly, below what he cited.

Senator SIMPSON. DO you have that rate? He did not have those

figures.

Mr. PINGREE. Thirty-five to forty percent.

The Haitian community, now that is more difficult. We did not

have as large a Haitian community in south Florida prior to this

flow. The language Creole is not as easy for the community. We

have basically a bilingual community in south Florida, and it is not

as easy for Haitians to assimilate, they do need, I think, more time.

We might compare this to the Cubans coming in the 1960's, at that

point you had an unlimited program for Cuban refugees as far as

funding until they could assimilate.

In fact, in this case, we are only asking for 3 years, and I would

even suggest that one possible compromise that this committee and

the Department ought to look at is simply to continue the funding

through this fiscal year, and then during that period of time, see

what is happening. Take a look and evaluate what is occurring as

far as assimilation.

I don't think they have any facts and figures to bear out their

current policy shift, and saying that these people, in essence, are

lazy, and are going to become welfare recipients.

Senator SIMPSON. I don't think that has entered the debate. I

would rather not pursue those things. No one has brought that forward as part of any testimony.

Mr. PINGREE. That is not my understanding.

Senator SIMPSON. Not here today, certainly. I find, in immigration and refugee policy matters, if we can clean the emotionalism

out of the way and the racism, we may eventually get the task

done, and it is as tough as hell.

Mr. PINGREE. I would agree. Senator, but when you have the detention camp in south Florida, it is hard not to deal with racism

and other problems.

Senator SIMPSON. That is certainly true, and that is why we do

put it up on top of the table and discuss it.

You have an interesting background. You administer a budget in

Florida of some $2 billion and a staff of nearly 35,000. That is an

extraordinary responsibility on you, indeed, and that is why your

testimony is important to us.
51

You indicate in this testimony that the State was never consulted on the impact of the proposed regulations on your State by the

Department of Health and Human Services. Did Florida provide information or suggestions in the formulation of the various options

by ORR, and has your State been in contact at all in this past year

with the Office of Refugee Resettlement with regard to these proposed regulations? I would be most interested in that.

Mr. PINGREE. We have had significant contact with the Department of Health and Human Services on a regular basis, but the

fact is that the proposed regulations came out, and then we were

asked for our comments and feedback.

State and local officials met with them on January 18, in Miami.

We were requesting an April 1 date, not as final, but so that the

Congress would have the opportunity to fully review through hearings such as this, this proposed regulation and its impact. We were

led to believe that, in fact, it would be an April 1 date, and within

a week I received a phone call indicating that it was going to be

March 1.

Senator SIMPSON. There were some serious errors in timing with

regard to the regulations, especially at a time when the Congress

was headed into recess, and very little time was given for responses

not only by agencies such as yours, but by the Congress itself. I

hope that message will be clearly identified in the future. I think

we are ill-served with that type of timetable.

You have indicated the Governor's desire for the delay in the implementation in order to give the State time, which is an interesting thought. Has Florida considered any other alternatives, other

than the one you mentioned about the fiscal year, which might be

preferable from your State's point of view? I ask because yours is a

State whose Governor I never hesitate to have testify. He represents the National Governors Association before the subcommittee

often and does an excellent job.

I would wonder what alternatives or approaches, if you have any

to share?

Mr. PINGREE. Our position is clearly stated. We do believe that it

should be the 36 months. I am, however, realistic enough to understand that maybe something other than that will have to be looked

at.

Our primary concern is that we have approximately $149 million

of unreimbursed State and local costs, and a continuing problem.

We want to do whatever we can to have these refugees and entrants assimilated into our community, and into this Nation. We

are willing to do whatever is reasonable to reach that goal. We

don't think that there has been adequate discussion relative to possible options, which would lead us to that goal.

Senator SIMPSON. What do you think of this targeted assistance

program becoming part of the option, instead of this provision for

reimbursement for general assistance; is that program something

that can be structured to meet the needs of Florida?

Mr. PINGREE. If you are referring to what I know as impact aid,

at least as far as the impact aid proposal that was offered earlier

as far as aid to communities that are heavily impacted by refugees,

our problem with what was proposed was that $20 million was recommended nationwide, and our own costs are running annually
52

$41 million. So we don't think that it is very reasonable to have a

national program that is half of what is our State's annual problem.

Senator SIMPSON. Extraordinary figures. You have helped fill in

some information for us.

May I ask you, do you have a figure on the Haitian dependency

rate?

Mr. PINGREE. That is much higher, and I do not have an actual

fix on it. It is much closer to the higher figures that have been

cited.

Senator SIMPSON. If you could furnish that for the record, that

would be helpful because, as I said, you come well-regarded and respected. With what your agency oversees down there, it really is

extraordinary.

I appreciate your testimony. I have some further questions and I

believe Senator Hatfield may have some, I will submit those to you

in writing. I thank you very much for your willingness to be here. I

appeciate it very much.

The next panel consists of four individuals, Jerry Burns, who was

introduced to you by Senator Hatfield, who is the State Refugee

Program Coordinator of the Department of Human Resources in

Salem, Oreg.; Susan Levy, Wisconsin Resettlement Assistance

Office, State of Wisconsin, in Madison; Alan J. Gibbs, secretary of

the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services in

Olympia, Wash.; and Librado Perez, Social Service Agency, Alameda County, Oakland, Calif.

Nice to have you all here, and I look forward to having your testimony. We do have the time limitation, and ask that you observe

seriously this peculiar battery of bulbs. I thank you. If you would

proceed in the order noted on the agenda, I think that it would be

most appropriate.

STATEMENT OF JERRY BURNS, STATE REFUGEE PROGRAM COORDINATOR, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, SALEM,

OREG.

Mr. BURNS. Senator, I would like to submit my written testimony

for the record, and verbally summarize it here now.

For 6 years Oregon has served as an assertive and effective partner for the Federal Government in the refugee program. We have

continually directed our programs, our priorities, and our funding

at increasing refugee self-sufficiency, and in trying to reduce public

assistance dependency. Some of our efforts have been so successful

with refugees that we have applied them to our nonrefugee population.

CURRENT CONDITIONS

Yet, it is our feeling that over the last 6 years, our initiatives to

be an effective partner for the Federal Government have continually backfired: (A) Oregon now has six voluntary agencies in the

State whereas 6 years ago we had only two. (B) Our refugee population is 17,000, 3 times our per capita share, and the arrival rate

continues at this disproportional level. (C) Eleven thousand refugees in Oregon are on public assistance, two out of every three in
53

the State. (D) Refugee unemployment is now at 49 percent. For

every refugee that is unemployed in Oregon, there are 52 nonrefugees looking for work. (E) This year, our social service funds, the

backbone of our efforts to try and reduce public assistance dependency for refugees, were cut by 54 percent.

We have not sat by idly as our initiatives have backfired. We

have watched and we have protested as Federal funding and Federal commitment to refugees has declined while a needy refugee population in Oregon increased. But our protests have been to no

avail.

Oregon's nonrefugee unemployment rate is now third highest in

the Nation at 11.3 percent. It may reach 13 or 14 percent by this

spring. State social services for nonrefugees in Oregon have been

cut by 40 percent over the last 3 years, and our legislature is now

in special session to deal with another 20-percent cut.

Yet, in the midst of the highest unemployment in Oregon in over

30 years, the Office of Refugee Resettlement is now proposing to

pull the rug out from under refugees in our State.

POLICY IMPACT

Oregon has no general assistance program and no AFDC unemployed parent program; 6,231 refugees would be cut off assistance

on the day of implementation of an 18 month policy, that is 57 percent of the State's refugee assistance caseload, 80 percent of those

cases are unemployed. Of the 20 percent that are employed, their

earnings constitute only one-third of their basic needs.

The Office of Refugee Resettlement has indicated that equity is

one of the objectives of this policy. Yet Oregon, with only 3 percent

of the refugee population, represents up to 15 percent of the anticipated funding reduction as a result of this policy. Oregon and

Washington together, with only 8 percent of the refugee population

nationally, may represent over 40 percent of the anticipated savings. Most other States either have a low number of refugees, a low

unemployment rate, or ongoing programs that refugees can convert

into under continued Federal funding.

STATE ACTIONS

We have offered suggestions to the Office of Refugee Resettlement on how to maintain at least a minimal refugee program in

Oregon, those suggestion's are in my written testimony. Our posture is that if these suggestions are rejected, it does not diminish

Federal responsibility for this program, it only diminishes the

number of States where that responsibility can be met.

If the proposed rules are implemented without change, Oregon

would take two steps in the interest of effective refugee resettlement. First, we would ask for Federal support in our letter to voluntary agencies asking them not to send refugees to Oregon until

our economy improves, and until we have had an opportunity to

assess our capacity to serve refugees given a very limited Federal

program.

Second, we would send a notice to those clients in Oregon who

are being terminated from public assistance indicating our support

for refugee resettlement, but the fact that Oregon cannot continue
54

to meet their needs following Federal withdrawal. As such, the best

assistance that we can provide to those refugees is counseling and

assistance to move to another State where the Federal refugee program and local conditions can be more responsive to their needs.

To this end, we would provide training and information to our program workers and community leaders to direct this effort in the

most expeditious way possible.

ALTERNATIVES

We believe that modifications and alternatives to reduce expenditures are available and these can be both equitable and reasonable.

These include eliminating the general assistance provision of the

current rule, use of a food stamp definition of a household to eliminate multiple grants to a single household, or adjusting the payment level based on length of residency or the eligibility period

based on family composition.

While these may not be possible in every State, it is our belief

that through consultation a process could be developed where one

or more of these alternatives could be implemented in every State

to live within the dollars available.

RECOMMENDATION

While the refugee program is national in scope, the reality is

that 10 States have about 75 percent of the refugee population.

Therefore, it is our suggestion to this committee that you ask the

Department of Health and Human Services to delay implementation of the proposed policy until at least April 1. Second, that you

ask the office of Regugee Resettlement to consult with those 10

States with the highest refugee populations and 5 other representative States to cost-out alternatives that are available, identify the

advantages and problems of each of these and develop a revised

rule that is reasonable and fair.

Without significant changes, the proposed rule will be self-defeating in its efforts to reduce costs because of secondary migration. It

will be destructive to refugee resettlement, and it will be destructive to State and Federal relations.

Thank you.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement and additional material submitted by

Jerry Burns follow:]
55

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JERRY BURNS

Oregon Is in the midst of a severe recession. Our 11.48 uneraployraent rate Is

third highest In the country. Business and personal bankruptcies are being

filed at a rate three times that of two years ago. Economic recovery in

Oregon is expected to be difficult and long.

Oregon did not ask to participate in the federal refugee program. Probably

other states didn't ask to participate .either. Tills decision was made for

Oregon and other states by the federal government by establishing refugee

policy. The decision was shared by the voluntary agencies which decided to

resettle refugees in our state.

However, once refugees were placed in Oregon, we moved Immediately to

establish training and support programs designed to assist them to become

Independent and contributing residents of the state. Oregon has always taken

an active management role in this program. We have aggressively sought

federal social service funds In order to respond to the unique needs of this

population.

Our programs and policies have continually been directed at reducing public

assistance dependency. In 1977, we rejected federal concerns about legality

and implemented Job search requirements and changes in social services for

refugees applying for assistance. As a result, over a two-year period, we

reduced the dependency rate by half while our refugee population tripled.

We have constantly strived to update and improve programs based on experience

and state-of-the-art information. This year Oregon Initiated major program

changes by providing funding and authority to voluntary agencies to provide

case management services to refugees. This will include authority in the case

planning and sanctions process of refugees on assistance, as well as authority

I
56

over the Intake and priorities of other local service providers. We are also

actively pursuing alternatives to the current cash and medical assistance

programs.

However, In retrospect, we feel our Initiatives to be aii effective

partner/manager with the federal government constantly backfire. In six

years, we have watched the number of voluntary agencies In Oregon grow from

two to six. The arrival rate of refugees to Oregon Is three times our per

capita share. Two out of three refugees In the state are dependent on

welfare. While unemployment In Oregon Is now higher than Its been In over 30

years of recorded statistics, our refugee social service funds, the backbone

of our system to reduce dependency, have been cut by 54%.

Over the last few years, we have become Increasingly skeptical and reluctant

about our fiscal and management role on your behalf. We have, for several

years, asked voluntary agencies to reconsider their placement policies which

were directing more refugees to Oregon than we could effectively assist and

absorb. There have been no changes. We have tolerated federal funding

Interruptions ranging from five months In 1977 to almost monthly In 1981. We

have watched and protested as federal funding and federal commitment have

declined while a needy refugee population continues to grow.

Unfortunately, our focus on refugees Is increasingly being diverted from what

Is best for refugees to how much refugees will cost Oregon as the federal

government backs out of Its financial responsibilities. While we have

advocated that the national refugee quota be directly linked to a reasonable

'level of available domestic resettlement funds, we have seen no real progress

In this direction.

Oregon now has 17,000 refugees. 11,000 of them are on public assistance. The

statewide unemployment rate for refugees Is 49X. For every unemployed refugee

seeking work, there are 52 unemployed nonrefugee Oregonlans.
57

Oregon has no AFDC Unemployed Parent Program and no on-going General

Assistance Program. Ohly 15< of the refugees on assistance In Oregon are

eligible for ongoing assistance programs. The proposed rules of the Office of

Refugee Resettlement (ORR) would terminate public assistance to 6,231 refugees

(57S of the total assistance caseload) on the day of Implementation. SOS of

these refugees are unemployed. The 203! that are employed are meeting only

one-third of their basic needs through Job earnings.

ORR has raised the Issue of equity as one argument to justify these rules.

Yet Oregon, with only 3t of the nationwide refugee population, represents

about 15X of anticipated savings In expenditures from this policy. That is a

penalty five times greater than we should bear under an "equitable' policy.

Oregon and Washington together, with only 8X of the total refugee population,

may represent over 40X of the expected expenditure savings of this policy.

That would be unfair and untolerable.

We have offered suggestions to ORR on how to minimize the adversity of these

policies on refugees In our state. These suggestions Include:

1) Allowing an option for two-parent families to continue on assistance

during their second 18 months of residency whether or not a state has an

AFDC/Unemployed Parent Program;

2) Allowing a 12-month phase-in of proposed changes; and

3) Establishing an Impact aid program to be operational when the cuts

occur In order to provide emergency assistance, medical care and

employment services to refugees who have no other resources.
58

These suggestions are essential to maintaining minimum federal responsibility

to refugees In Oregon. If these suggestions are rejected. It does not

diminish federal responsibility; It only reduces the number of states where

that responsibility can be met. Oregon does not have the jobs, the resources

or the Intent to assume the federal burden of responsibility for refugee

resettlement. If additional federal funding through Impact aid or

modifications to the proposed policy Is not available to refugees In Oregon,

we will take two actions In the Interest of effective refugee resettlement.

First, we will ask for federal support when we send letters to voluntary

agencies asking them not to send refugees to Oregon until our economy Improves

and until we've had an opportunity to assess our capacity to serve refugees

within a greatly reduced federal program. Secondly, we will notify refugees

that are being terminated from assistance due to the 18-month policy that the

best help the state can offer Is Information and assistance to move to states

where the federal refugee program and local conditions are more responsive to

their needs. To this end, we would provide training and Information to

program workers and community leaders about the employment opportunities,

service and public assistance programs available to refugees in other states.

We would counsel and financially assist refugees to move to states where their

resettlement prospects are more favorable.

Regrettably this is a radical, but serious, position for us. Oregon supports

refugee resettlement. We have acted as fiscal agent for the federal

government for six years despite our concerns about the number of refugees

coming to Oregon, their welfare dependency, federal administrative problems

and federal funding commitments. However, the proposed policy combined with

our poor economy, create a situation that makes choosing Oregon as a home for

refugees unwise. State acquiescence under'these conditions is

unconscionable.
59

There are modifications to the proposed policy and other alternatives

available which would reasonably and equitably reduce federal expenditures

without undue harm either to refugees or state and local governments. These

Include:

1) Removal of the General Assistance reimbursement provisions of the

proposed policy. Funding could be used Instead to extend the basic

eligibility period or to provide Impact aid either to all states or

targeted areas.

2) Adoption of the concept of a food stamp household definition. Proposed

by California, this would save over $30 million Just in that state.

3] Reduction of cash and/or medical assistance eligibility to singles and

childless couples to some period shorter than 18 months.

4) Reduction of the benefit level from the AFDC standard during part of the

36 months, such as a SOX payment level during the second 18 months.

While these alternatives or others may not be reasonable in every state,

through consultation and flexibility, a policy could be established which

would reduce expenditures while maintaining basic federal responsibility

through a reasonable period for refugee resettlement.

While technically the Refugee Program Is national in scope, the reality Is

that ten states are resettling about 753t of the refugees. Therefore, it is

Oregon's suggestion to this committee and to the Office of Refugee

Resettlement that the following steps be taken:

1) Delay the target date for implementation of policy changes until at least

April 1, 1982.
2)

3)

60

Require the ten states with the largest refugee populations and five

other representative states to develop budget figures and list advantages

and problems of alternate cost-saving policies as Identified by ORR.

Impanel those states as a task force to meet together and, with ORR In

Intensive consultation, to propose a revised policy.

4) Continue that task force in a consultation process during the

re-enactment process of the Refugee Act of 1980.

Without such consultation and change, the policy proposed by ORR will be

self-defeating in its effort to reduce costs and destructive to refugee

resettlement and state-federal relations.

3452A
61

OREGON REFUPEE FACT SHEET

January, 1982

Population - 17,000 Refugees

Oregon's total population is ranked 30th in the United States;

Oregon's refugee population is ranked 9th in the United States;

Oregon has three times its oer capita share of refugees.

Unemployment Data (12/81) Refugee

Persons Percent

•w~

Non-Refugee

Persons Percent

154,000 11.4

Oregon has 52 unemployed non-refugees for every unemployed refugee.

Ethnic Distribution

Vietnamese

Cambodian

Ethnic Chinese

Hmong

Lao

Mien

Others

Total

Public Assistance (12/81)

Aged, Blind or Disabled

Non-ADC (two-parent families,

singles, childless couples)

ADC (single parent familie's)

Total

Persons

Cases

204

3,194

628

Percent

6,800 40

2,300 13

1,530 9

2,840 17

1,700 10

1,530 9

300 2

w.nnn in

Persons

218

4,026

8,829

1,898 lolSis

Percent on

Public Assistance

66

18-MONTH CUTOFF - CLIENT PROFILE

Total Cases: 1,882

Total Persons: 6,231

Sex Marital Status Emoloyment Status

Male Female Sinqle Married Unemployed Employed FT/PT

3,302 2,929 847 1,035

53% 47% 45% 55%

4,673

75%

1,558

25%

Age Group 18 - 21 22 - 30 31 - 40

935 2,305 1,495

15% 37% 24%

41 - 50

811

13%

51 - 60

498

8%

§1 - over

187

331

Family Size 12 3 4 5 6 7 - over

56

3%

1,(554 S4S 207 151

56% 13% 11% 8«

94 75

5% 4%

Ethnic Group Cambodian Laotian

132 1,072

7% 57%

Vietnamese

678

36%

U-417 0-83
62

Skill Level of Refugees In Oregon

Residing In U.S. IS Months

The length of ttM necessary to scgulre English skills, living skills md Job skills Is directly dependent

SCLS^STJ^JS?* 0' Ration 1n th«

mtUe country. Refugees My be divided Into too broad categories:

Those literate In their native language; those not or non-literate In their native language. The followlna

statements are generally true of the typical refugee In each category. Age and position In the native culture also affect the acquisition of skills and perfonwnce. »- J "»- -» F-VWH .« uw nauve cuuure

Profile of a Hon-llterate

Cowprehenslon -slnllar to language developient of American bom 1-3

year old

I -understands single wrd directions with body language

-can comprehend topics pertaining to irrraedlate envlron-

, ment and time

-yesterday, tomorrow or intangible, abstract Ideas are

not comprehensible

Oral

Production •self-Initiated conversation is rudimentary

•uses one to two word sentences I.e. "teacher", "dof

"no school", go 1:00", "she hone"

•can respond to repeatedly drilled simple English

questions and statements

-can name letters of alphabet but limited ability to

associate sound with symbol

-pre-prinary sight words

-limited to specific classroom words and taught sight

words

-can copy alphabet

-can print name and address on a form by copying It fro«

a practice form

-not able to initiate Independent writing

-familiarity with community limited to home/school/work

site

-can Identify money, give correct amount as requested

but cannot make change

-can use telephone for emergencies but not able to understand or make appointments by phone

-able to ride bus on learned route

-able to purchase familiar Items pertaining to food and

clothing

-cannot survive without assistance with family functions

such as getting children to the doctor, dentist, renting apartment, paying bills

-limited to repetitive manual labor tasks which can be

demonstrated and don't require literacy

-Is unable to read street signs, recipes, maps, labels,

warnings

-needs assistance in getting and retaining Job

Profile of a Literate

-similar to language development of American bom 2-6

years old

-can comprehend previously leamed vocabulary and

language patterns - sliple tenses, affirmative/

negative statements and questions

-cannot understand language In unfa»111«r situations

or using complex or conditional sentences

-similar to language development of American bom

2-3 year old

-ability to initiate and respond to conversation

related to dally living In only simple direct

language that has been specifically taught

-conversation Is characterlied by scrambled, fragmented phrases rife with pronunciation errors

-2nd-3rd grade level

-can recognize words and sentencei already practiced

In listening and speaking

-2nd grade level

-can write what he can sty

-familiar with community but cannot function Independently In coanunlty In unforeseen situations

-can function In specific areas If they have been

taught I.e. market, use of telephone, riding the

bus, using postal services, doctor

-is lost and confused If situation differs from

leamed behavior

-can ask for help but often cannot understand

response

-minimal Job skills due to low English level

-restricted to entry level Jobs which are closely

supervised and Instructions are given one or too

at a tine

-unprepared for work in high technological, constmroriented society I.e. quality control

-experience frustration due to misunderstanding of

language and system of wort envlrannent

•have to divide their attention between understanding

directions and performance of skill

-needs assistance In getting and retaining Job
63

Department of Human Resources

ADULT AND FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION

PUBLIC SERVICE BUILDING. SALEM, OREGON 97310

i

January 11, 1982

Ms. Ellen HcHovern

Office of Refugee Resettlement

Room 1229

Switzer Building

330 C Street NW

Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Hs. McRovern:

I am going to divide my comments on the proposed rule change

reducing federal reimbursement for cash and medical assistance under

the Refugee Resettlement Program into four categories:

1. A brief description of the status of Oregon's economy and

of the refugee population here,

2. Federal responsibilities for refugee resettlement,

3. Comnents on the proposed rule,

4. Conclusions.

i. OREGON'S ECONOMIC AND REFUGEE PROFILE

A. Oregon's Economy

Oregon's economy is dependent on the lumber and wood

products Industry. Economic conditions have nearly

devastated this industry over recent months. Oregon's

unemployment rate for November 1981 was 11.1 percent,

fourth highest in the nation. Current trends suggest

unemployment may rise to 13 percent or 14 percent this

winter. Business and personal bankruptcies in Oregon are

mounting at a rate three times that of two years ago.

Housing and building starts have plummeted.

All of this has obviously had severe effects on state and

local governments. The budget of the Oregon Department of

Human Resources has been reduced by approximately 40

percent over the last three years. The State Legislature

begins a Special Session in January to consider even more

program and service reduction in all state agencies.

B. Refugee Profile

1. Refugee Population Demographics

Oregon has 17,500 refugees. While the state's total

population ranks 30th in the nation, our refugee

population is the seventh largest. Oregon has the

third highest refugee population on a per capita

basis of refugees to nonrefugees.

2. Ethnic Breakdown

Just over one-third of our refugee population is

Vietnamese. The other two-thirds are split between

five other ethnic groups, with the Hmong highest at

20 percent of the population and ethnic Chinese

lowest at 10 percent.
64

3. Literacy and Job Skills

About 70% of the refugees entering Oregon over the

last two years are illiterate in their native

language. Few have transferable job skills and many

have little or no sense of American society, values,

and practices.

4. Unemployment Rate

The unemployment rate of refugees in Oregon is 50

percent. For every refugee looking for work, there

are 52 unemployed nonrefugee Oregonians seeking

jobs. When one adds what are generally referred to

as "discouraged workers" (those unemployed, but not

actively seeking work or using othpr than official

counting sources) to this count, each unemployed

refugee may be competing with up to 100 nonrefugee

job seekers. Official counts of unemployed

Oregonians are eight times higher than our total

refugee population. i

5. Welfare Dependency

Over 90 percent of the refugees coming into Oregon

apply for and receive cash and medical assistance

immediately upon arrival. Sixty-three percent of the

refugees in the state are currently dependent on public assistance. Eighty-Five percent of eligible refugees are now receiving public assistance. The number

of refugee cases that reopened increased 73 percent

during 1981. This is due almost solely to loss of jobs

by employed refugees.

II. FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The admission of refugees to America is the sole privilege of

the federal government. Along with that privilege is the

responsibility for funding resettlement services until refugees

can adequately and appropriately continue on their own towards

acculturation and self-reliance. The Refugee Act of 1980

indicates its purpose is to "provide comprehensive and uniform

provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of

those refugees who are admitted." (Public Law 96-212, Title I,

Section 101(b).) Federal responsibility is based on two principles.

1) That refugees will be provided with sufficient resources to achieve economic self-sufficiency and

not be abandoned or subject to undue harm and trauma

in the process of resettlement; and

2) That state and local goven:-ents will not be unduly

burdened by federal decisions to admit refugees.

The proposed rule is contrary to both these principles. As I

will describe, the effect of this policy in Oregon would be

severe. Not only would over one-third of our refugee population be abandoned without jobs or income in the middle of

winter, but state and local governments, hospitals, private

agencies, and others will be overburdened by requests for help

from individuals and families in crisis situations. I cannot

support such an outcome.

The Refugee Act of 1980 established Congressional intent for

36-month funding of necessary cash and medical assistance to

all refugees, the Department of Health and Human Services

supported this position in testimony before Congress. ORR and

HHS must live up to this intent.
65

III. PROPOSED RULE COMMENTS

A. Impact

1) Oregon does not offer the AFDC-Unemployed Parent

Program. The state General Assistance Program is

restricted to single adults medically unemployable

for at least 60 days. It is a very small program.

There are no county or local General Assistance

Programs in Oregon.

2) Implementation of the proposed policy on March 1,

1982 would terminate all assistance to 1,882 refugee

cases composed of 6,231 people. These are refugees

who are not eligible for any other program in the

state. This is 57 percent of our current refugee

public assistance population (11,015 persons) and 36

percent of the statewide refugee populations

(17,600). By March of 1983, 2,762 cases and 8,583

refugees would be cut off assistance. This is 78

percent of our current assistance population and 40

percent of the statewide refugee population.

IMPACT OF PROPOSED RULE - TERMINATIONS

Two-Parent

Families 990 5,248

Single Adults 807 807

Childless

Couples* 85 176

Total 1,882 6,231

March 1, 1982 February 1, 1983

Cumulative

Cases Persons Cases Persons

1,360 7,066

1,284 1,284

118 244

7775? 57531

•Includes some elderly relatives in household.

3) Currently, 603 of the cases (representing 2,309

people) who are to be terminated over the 12-month

period after implementation have jobs. In other

words, 78 percent of the cases losing federal

assistance would have no other means of support. Of

those employed, average earnings per person equals

$52.11, or about one third of the average amount they

received on assistance.

EMPLOYMENT OF CASES TO BE TERMINATED BY MARCH 1983

Cases Cases

Terminated Employed Percent

Two-Parent Families 1,360 386 28J!

Singles 1,284, 200 16X

Childless Couples 118 17 14X

TOTAL 2,762 603 22?

4) Oregon is already facing a 65 percent net reduction

in refugee social service funds for FY 1982. Our

1981 social service allocation from the Office of

Refugee Resettlement was $3,868,000. The most

optimistic projection we have received from ORR for

1982 is just over $1,800,000. This alone represents

a 54 percent reduction in funds. Adjustments for

inflation and new arrivals increase that reduction to

65 percent.

11-417 0
Obviously, we do not have federal refugee funds to

Increase training and job services to refugees

scheduled to lose assistance based on this policy.

Nor does Oregon have the capacity to divert state or

local funds to help these refugees. As 1 mentioned

earlier, state social service budgets have already

been reduced by 40 percent over the last three

years.

5) We are developing plans to track and assess the

impact of final policy regulations. Through our

planning efforts, we have Identified seven categories

to describe what will happen to refugees cut off

assistance in Oregon:

a) Some will simply find work and take care of

their needs. While we can hope all will do

this, given the state employment picture, we

expect very few will be successful in finding

jobs.

b) Some will move into the homes or apartments of

family or friends to reduce costs. Since 50

percent of refugees on assistance already share

housing space, this also will be a limited

option.

c) Some two-parent families will break up in order

for most of the family to continue assistance

through regular programs. Other refugees will

obtain sufficient documentation to qualify for

Social SBcurity.

d) Some refugees will move out of state. This is a

frequently stated option within the refugee

community.

e) Some refugees will "fall through the cracks."

These are refugees who will, through

circumstances, end up In medical or mental

hospitals or simply disappear.

f) Some refugees may commit suicide. While we hope

none choose this action, it is, nevertheless, a

realistic concern. (We have over the past two

months provided suicide prevention training to

over 100 Refugee Program staff.)

g) Some refugees may turn to crime out of

frustration, anger, or most likely, need.

Of the seven categories, six have negative

consequences ranging from minor individual or family

disruption to personal catastrophy. Only one of the

outcomes is positive, those who find work. Your

proposed rule and accompanying discussion does not

reflect understanding, let alone anticipation or

planning for the negative impact of such changes.

Oregon will not be able to Implement policy changes

until April 1, 1982 at the earliest. We have been

and will continue to undergo changes in regular

program services and eligibility based on both

federal changes and state budget problems. I will

not start staff in any part of the agency on

conversion plans for refugee policy until final

regulations are published. Following that, the state

requires at least 60 days to make changes in computer

systems and policy manuals, train staff, and notify

and assist refugees to be terminated.
67

B. Objectives of the Proposed Rule

Three objectives are listed in the Federal Register for

the proposed rule: 1) Reducing unnecessary dependency; 2)

reducing special treatment of refugees; and 3) relieving

state and local government costs during the first three

years residency. The presumption that these are

reasonable and mutually compatible objectives which can be

achieved by the proposed rule for all states is in gross

error.

1) Regarding reducing unnecessary welfare dependency •

Given the number of refugees in Oregon, their

education and skill levels, the reduction in refugee

training and employment funds, and the state's

economy and unemployment rate, unnecessary refugee

welfare dependency is minimal. By no stretch of

anyone's imagination does it equal the 57 percent

caseload reduction that would be affected by this

policy.

I believe we should reduce unnecessary dependency as

much as possible. The Office of Refugee Resettlement

can assist Oregon in this through three actions.

a) Develop and implement reasonable placement

policies that reduce the number of refugees

coming to Oregon;

b) Increase English training and employment funds

so that we can adequately train and place

refugees into work; and

c) Allow tougher sanctions in public assistance

programs for those refugees on assistance who do

not cooperate with training or job search plans

developed.

2) Regarding reducing unequal treatment provided

refugees • Government, at all levels, has always

distinguished the special needs of at-risk

populations and responded based on those

distinctions. Services and benefits provided to

physically handicapped, the elderly, veterans,

mentally ill, and other special groups have to be

based on local conditions and individual needs.

Refugees are an at-risk population. Your reference

to them as simply "among low-income populations"

ignores the multitude of cultural, language, and

skill factors and the very circumstances of their

departure from home countries that makes them an

at-risk population. The Federal Refugee Program

should not and has not been directed at this

population simply based on their low income. It is

directed at all of the other conditions which must be

addressed to assist them in achieving self-reliance.

To the extent there is such a measuring device that

gauges "equal treatment" among special populations,

this proposed rule and federal social service funding

reductions to Oregon drop refugees in this state past

the "equality" level to the point of languishing

without hope.
68

3) Regarding relieving state and local government costs

for the first three years residency • The proposed

policy simply does not meet this objective as it

applies to Oregon. Given the characteristics of

refugees in Oregon and the state's economy, unless

refugees cut off assistance move out of state, they

will most certainly cost state and local government

considerably. Emergency assistance, medical care,

wife and child abuse, job services, community

tensions will all require state and local funds.

Some conditions may be taken care of by refugee

associations and volunteers. Many will not.

Ultimately, the cost of such response will be

reductions in cash and medical assistance and

services intended for nonrefugees. 35 months

reimbursement may be longer than minimally necessary

for refugees. Nobody knows for sure. But I can

assure you from experience that 18 months is far too

short a time.

Suggestions

1) The rule should be modified to allow, at state

option, continued public assistance during the second

18 months of residency to those refugees who would be

eligible for payments under an AFDC-Unemployed

Parents Program, whether or not such a program exists

in the state for nonrefugees.

This would allow states to decide whether equity with

other assistance programs is more Important or

Justifiable under conditions In the state than

refugee Impact and human need.

Without this modification, the proposed rule

penalizes refugees and penalizes states for decisions

states have made in the past about nonrefugees. The

characteristics, circumstances and prospects of

two-parent refugee families are not the same as their

nonrefugee counterparts. Eighteen months of

assistance and services to refugees who arrive

Illiterate In their own language, possessing no

transferable job skills and little understanding of

American society does not make them competitive with

nonrefugee low-income Americans.

2) The rule should be modified to allow, at state

option, continued public assistance during the second

18 months of residency, to refugee single adults and

childless couples 55 years of age and older.

This would be responsive to the unique needs and

characteristics of this subgroup. Because of both

physical and cultural differences In Asian cultures,

55 is generally considered as the retirement age.

Because of these differences and other factors,

elderly refugees require much longer and more

Intensive services than their younger counterparts.

Realistically, It Is also exceedingly more difficult

to place older refugees into jobs.

3) The rule should be modified to allow, at state

option, the phasedown from 36 months to 18 months

eligibility of AFDC benefits to refugee single adults

and childless couples under 55 years of age. A

deadline of April 1, 1983 should be established for

accomplishment of this phasedown for participating

states.
69

Oregon must have a phasedown period in order to

responsibly implement these changes. It would be our

intent to phase down according to the following

schedule:

April 1, 1982 Terminate all cases in the U.S. over 30 months.

October 1, 1982 Terminate all cases in the U.S. over 24 months.

April 1, 1983 Terminate all cases in the U.S. over 18 months.

This would give refugees and local providers ample

opportunity to identify, counsel and assist refugee

clients losing assistance benefits.

4) An Impact aid program should be developed and

available to assist refugees whose termination

presents severe adversity. A per capita dollar

amount based on case or person terminations should be

established. Funding should be directly to voluntary

agencies for their use in providing emergency

assistance or other services to refugees affected by

these policy changes.

0. State Actions

If the Office of Refugee Resettlement concludes that

modifications to this policy, including eligibility

changes, transition phase-in periods, and impact aid are

not possible, it will have a severe and traumatic affect

on refugees in this state. Oregon supports responsible

refugee resettlement. We cannot, however, replace federal

responsibility and federal funds for refugees cut off

assistance after 18 months. In short, Oregon will have

nothing to offer these refugees -- not jobs, not public

assistance, and not services or training to help them to

help themselves.

Therefore, if changes are not possible to respond to the

special needs and circumstances of refugees in Oregon, I

will ask your support in our request to local and national

voluntary agencies to not bring any newly arriving

refugees into Oregon until our economy and employment

improve and we are able to assess our capacity to serve

refugees restricted to 18 months of assistance with

limited training and social service funds. Voluntary

agencies operating in Oregon should, however, be continued

at current staffing levels for at least six months to

assist the thousands of refugees whose assistance will be

terminated.

Additionally, it would be our intent to send a letter to

all refugees in Oregon who will be terminated from

assistance describing the situation that we jointly face,

indicating our basic support of refugees but our

encouragement that they move to another state. We will

provide information and training to refugee leaders,

assistance eligibility workers and others regarding the

employment rate, welfare programs and social services

available to refugees in other states. Given the

situation in Oregon, moving to another state will be the

most reasonable option available to most refugees cut off

assistance. Many other states offer improved employment

opportunities, refugee training and employment programs,

and if nothing else, at least continued financial support

for up to another year and a half.
70

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Refugee Act of 1980 established law and Congressional

Intent that federal funds be available to meet the cash and

medical assistance needs of refugees for the first 36 months of

U.S. residency. Until the provisions of the Refugee Act are

changed, the Department of Health and Human Services should not

alter the program or subvert the intent of Congress. The

proposed rule change during the middle of the fiscal year,

without Congressional direction and without adequate

opportunity for review and implementation, is neither prudent

nor 1s it likely to be cost effective.

Over the last month, we have contacted a number of states and

other sources regarding the impact of this policy. It 1s

explicitly clear that Oregon is one of only three or four

states that will suffer severely and disproportionately under

the proposed rule. The Office of Refugee Resettlement has

continually pushed the issue of equity to justify its actions.

Yet it Is hard for refugees and refugee providers in Oregon to

see the equity with other states of our 55 percent social

service funding reduction. This proposed rule strikes a

similar definition of equity. With the exception of Oregon and

a couple of other states, all other states either have very few

refugees, low unemployment or ongoing General Assistance and/or

AFDC Unemployed Parent programs. The proportionate Impact of

this policy in Oregon is many times that of other states. It

Is not equitable to Impose this burden on our refugees or our

state.

While Oregon fully supports efforts to balance the federal

budget, reductions must be made fairly and responsibly. We

recognize that funding of refugee care and services is drawn

from the same pot that has forced reductions in services and

assistance to needy nonrefugees. It is, therefore, essential

that reasonable and appropriate costs for refugee resettlement

be established and linked to formulation of the annual arrival

quotas. It is unconscionable to bring refugees into this

country under one set of expectations and then capriciously

change the rules and destroy those expectations.

Before the federal government reduces its commitment and

funding of refugee resettlement in Oregon, it should look more

closely at the programs and services provided to nonrefugees in

other parts of the country. Oregon has always been a leader in

the reform and improvement of social welfare programs.

Comparisons and examination should be made before you penalize

Oregon's refugees for the historical innovation and dedication

of this state to meeting legitimate needs through efficient and

effective programs.

In conclusion, I am dismayed and frustrated with the Office of

Refugee Resettlement on the mid-year timing of proposed

changes, the short comment period over a holiday season, the

proposed implement date and the failure to follow Congressional

Intent of the Refugee Act. But most of all, I'm concerned

about the disproportionate burden of suffering this policy

would place on refugees in Oregon.
71

For six years, Oregon has been a full partner with the federal

government in this program. However, as Governor Atiyeh said

in his letter to the President last August, our treatment by

the federal government over the last year is jeopardizing state

commitment to the refugee resettlement process. Your proposed

rule further deteriorates our faith in the process and

principles of federal responsibility for refugees and would be

devastating to thousands of trusting refugees who must look to

the federal government for their future. I hope that you will

respond to their needs.

Sincerely,

^^5^

Keith Putman

Assistant Director, Human Resources

Administrator of Adult and Family Services

KP: amw

2964A

Senator SIMPSON. NOW MS. Susan Levy.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN G. LEVY, WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, STATE REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT COORDINATION

Ms. LEVY. I am Susan Levy, representing the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, where I serve as the refugee

coordinator for the State.

I am here to urge you today to halt the implementation of these

regulations and, as Mr. Burns has indicated, require ORR to sit

down with the States to find an alternative package of cost-saving

options that will meet the budget requirements, but not shift costs

to State and local governments, and not create the massive secondary migration that will result from these proposals. I am also

urging you to provide the social services funding that will lead to

true independence for refugees, so that we do not continue to face

these high dependency rates.

The proposed rules are based on three major fallacies. As a

result, they will not in fact create equity, but inequity, and create

great hardship for refugees. They will not facilitate independence,

but retard efforts to become self-sufficient for refugees. They will

not save money, but potentially may cost more money to provide

less assistance. And, they will not maintain the Federal commitment to funding the refugee program, but will instead unduly

burden States and municipalities.

EQUITY

The first fallacy of these regulations is that a combination of

AFDC and general relief programs can more equitably meet the

needs of refugees. We do have a general assistance program and an

AFDCU program in our State. However, general assistance is

highly variable, often is only an emergency program of less than a

month in duration, or emergency medical care and shelter. Both

need and assistance levels are determined in the discretion of more
72

than 656 different relief officers. There is obviously wide variation

within that program.

More than 3,000 people would be terminated from the program

in Wisconsin under these regulations. Our indication is that the

Federal savings are based on the assumption that 80 percent of

those terminated would not qualify for any assistance. All of that is

going to fall on the back of the refugees. Their need does not disappear.

Of those people who would be terminated: Some are employed;

some are elderly widows whose children have grown; but in our

State a full 84 percent of the refugees who will lose assistance are

stable, intact families with large numbers of children. Fifty-one

percent of those would be terminated from assistance are, in fact,

children.

The reason that those people do not qualify for our AFDCU program is because they are refugees. They spent so long in reeducation camps that they cannot document a work history for assistance that, had they been Americans, they would qualify for. Therefore, they are not being equitably treated under this proposal.

INCREASED STATE AND LOCAL COSTS

The second fallacy of the proposed rules is that this is a cost-effective means of meeting the Federal commitment. In fact, it will

establish a costly administrative nightmare and precipitously shift

substantial costs to State and local units of government.

The variations within the general relief program in our State, especially with 656 administrative units, obviously are going to

create a great administrative problem and incur additional costs.

This is especially true considering all intake staff need to be bilingual, that most of the assistance is vouchered and inkind assistance, and that we have no existing administrative system working

with those general relief agencies.

We will have to set up 14 different administrative systems with

those 700 and some units•when you count the 72 counties that we

will also have to deal with•to administer this program. Obviously,

this is not an administratively feasible cost-effective program.

If you consider the secondary migration that will almost certainly result, the cost savings are likely to be nil. In fact, one of the

tragedies in our State is that, even though assistance levels are

low, because of the administrative costs, we expect this will cost $1

million more in this fiscal year to administer these regulations.

To the extent that any Federal savings are realized, they will

come at the expense of State and local units of government. Administrative costs are not covered. Public health costs currently

covered under the program are not covered. Emergency medical

services are not covered. The care of unaccompanied minors is not

covered under the regulations. All of these costs would have to be

borne by the State and local units of government. It is not a Federal commitment that is being met.

Refugees do, in fact, become self-sufficient. The fact that, after

the 36-month limitation which was initiated recently, very few

people did go on general relief indicates to me that most refugees

do become self-sufficient. There is documentation in my written
73

testimony of further indications that refugees do, in fact, become

self-sufficient within the 36 months.

However, major reductions of the social services funding, the

elimination of the "30-and-a-third work incentive," plus the elimination of a system of mandatory work requirements and training

that we have established under the program, would all be eliminated under the proposal. These regulations would force greater dependency on the refugees.

ALTERNATIVES

We would join with Oregon in the belief that we can find ways of

reducing costs. We have suggested two, and we believe that there

are other ways that this could be found. What we would like to see

is a system where ORR would sit down with the States and allow

the States the flexibility to define measures within their own

States that would, in fact, result in cost savings, without shifting

the cost.

There are two items and written testimony that I would like to

submit for the record.

Senator SIMPSON. If you would, please, I would appreciate that.

[The prepared statement Ms. Levy and additional material

follow:]
74

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN G, LEVY

My name Is Susan Levy, and 1 represent the Wisconsin Department of Health and

Social Services, which administers all refugee and entrant programs. I am the

Coordinator of the State Resettlement Assistance Office, a position I have held

since 1975, when Wisconsin became one of the first states to establish a State

Refugee Coordinator's Office. During that time, I have watched the resettlement

program grow In caseload, grow In the sophistication of local services and grow

In complexity, as the states struggle to cope with conflicting program directives,

shifting international priorities and continuing fiscal uncertainty.

In 1978 and '79, our office and other state and local officials participated in

the development and passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. This Act promised to

establish much-needed rationality and continuity in an area beset by program and

fiscal uncertainties. Less than two years later, we are back urging you to honor

the federal commitment as defined in the Refugee Act of 1980 and halt implementation

of the rules currently proposed by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. The

Refugee Act works, but there are areas where the states could responsibly reduce

costs. We will suggest a number of changes to this Committee, as we have suggested them to the Office of Refugee Resettlement. No one suggestion will be a

workable alternative in every state, but every state could identify a cost-saving

option In its state. I urge that the Committee halt Implementation of this

proposed rule and request the Office of Refugee Resettlement to work with the

states to identify a package of other, responsible means of reducing cash and

medical assistances costs without shifting those costs. I also urge the Congress

to provide sufficient social services funding so that refugees may, in fact,

become contributing members of our communities.

The current policy proposals were developed at the federal level without effective

consultation with the states and counties, and without adequate Information on

general relief and the impact of these policies. They are based on three major,

falaclous assumptions concerning refugee resettlement and local welfare programs.

As a result, they may simultaneously: create great hardship for refugees and

retard their efforts to obtain self-sufficiency, cost more money to provide less

assistance and unduly burden states and municipalities.

1) The first falacy Is that a combination of AFDC and general relief programs

can more equitably meet the needs of refugees.

Any alternative that assumes that the uneven hodge-podge of local General

Assistance programs can somehow provide for the special needs of these newly

arrived people greatly misreads the nature, purpose and availability of such

programs. While Wisconsin does have a General Assistance Statute, General

Assistance is generally available only under very restrictive conditions

and, when available, it is usually limited to very short term (days/ weeks)

emergency assistance such as overnight shelter or medical care.

Both need and assistance levels are determined "in the discretion of the

relief officer". While in some localities, a recipient may get more assistance under General Relief than under ATDC, 453; of the municipal agents

responsible for administering General Relief said they had no active General

Relief program. Of all respondents of a survey of General Relief administrators:

93; reported they did not provide food aid; 18% did not provide aid for

shelter; 533; did not provide for clothing; and 143; did not provide fuel aid.

Half of all General Relief units provide assistance for only one month or

less.

In short, this is not a system designed to provide adequate, ongoing

assistance to dependent families. It is a short-term, stop-gap system to

provide emergency relief until other sources of Income can be obtained.

Furthermore, community and personal resources often available to needy

Individuals are generally not available to refugees. Refugees lack the

language and employment skills necessary for self-sufficiency. They have

no savings nor assets, since these were the price of their escape. They

have no independent friends or relatives on whom to lean for Interim

assistance or moral support. Current AFDC programs provide financial

support for only 12% of Wisconsin's needy refugee and entrant populations;

the remainder, who do meet definitions of need, are excluded from assistance
75

because of family composition or Inadequate documentation of work, history.

Language barriers and educational deficiencies bar refugees from many job

training programs. Lack of employment history In this country excludes

them from unemployment compensation. Finally, effective counseling and

support services are not often available in the refugee's language. In

short, it is simply not fair nor equitable to force these people into a

system which cannot respond to their needs.

A large number of people would be adversely affected by these proposed

policy changes.

In November 1981, the Wisconsin population consisted of nearly 13,000

refugees and entrants, 9,000 of whom had been in the United States 36

months or less. Of the 9,000 potentially eligible clients 5,000 were

receiving cash assistance, 600 under regular AFDC programs and 4,^00 under

special refugee and entrant programs. Upon implementation, more than 3,000

people (or 60% of all the dependent refugees and entrants) would be terminated

from current programs and would have to apply for whatever general relief

was available.

In 1980, the federal government admitted the largest group of refugees and

entrants ever brought to the United States under this program. It is this

"population bulge" which will be directly and immediately affected by the

proposed rules changes. We are, in effect, being penalized for federal

decisions made two years ago. As this population bulge passes through the

resettlement system, costs in the Refugee Assistance Program will decline,

even without rules changes.

Some of those who will be terminated will be the ambitious, who have been

working hard at any job in order to support their families. At least 171

of our current caseload has some earned income. One family I know well has

been here two years. After trying a succession of jobs in the first six

months, the husband finally got a stable job as a dishwasher. He works 30

hours per week and goes to English classes. His English has improved and he

has a good work history so now he has been looking, unsuccessfully, for a

better job. That's how we told him you work your way up here - start small

and make it grow. Because his dishwashing job cannot support his large

family, he gets supplemental assistance from the county. Next month that

will end, his Income will be cut in half, and he will not be eligible for

anything else. If he were not a proud man, his family would be better off

if he quit his job.

Some of those who will be terminated will be the "elderly," men and women

age 50 - 65 who have successfully raised their families. With no formal

education, no English fluency, and no transferable work experience, their

chances of finding work In today's economy are negligible. They may qualify

for some food and rent vouchers and emergency medical care, but in most

municipalities they will not have access to a meaningful level of support.

Some of those who will be terminated will be younger, single people who

could and would find work - if the minority unemployment rate weren't 1351.

For them, the language and job training which would have given them a

meaningful future will be terminated.

A full eighty-four percent (8A%) of the refugees who will lose assistance

are stable, intact families with large numbers of children. In fact 51Z of

those who will be terminated from assistance are children. These families

had been self-supporting in their native lands. If they were Americans,

they would qualify for federal and state assistance for AFDC for Unemployed

Parents. However, because they spent so long in re-education centers or

refugee camps, they cannot prove that they were employed, and therefore

they do not qualify for ongoing assistance. They will be pushed into an

emergency relief system which was never designed to meet their needs.

One of the major arguments put forth by proponents of this new policy is

that it would improve equity. In our state this is not true - most of

those adversely affected would qualify for assistance if they had not been

refugees.
76

2) The second falacy Is the assumption that this Is a more cost-effective

means of meeting the federal commitment to fund the first 36 months of

refugee resettlement costs. In fact, the proposed rules would establish a

costly, administrative nightmare and precipitously shift substantial costs

to state and local governments.

Because the impact of these policy changes depends on the nature of general

relief in each community, I would like to describe general relief in Wisconsin - and the effects of these policies.

There are 656 different General Relief administering units In Wisconsin.

County boards of supervisors determine whether General Relief shall be

administered by local units of government or by county government. At the

present time, there are 48 counties with county-wide administration, two

counties on the group system (whereby the County Department of Social

Services contracts with local units to administer General Relief), and 22

counties on the unit system, meaning each city, town, and village in the

county, regardless of population size and resources Is responsible for

administering relief. A variety of forms of administration exist within

the unit system Including part-time administration by volunteers or public

officials, administration by full town boards or welfare committees, or

agency administration by full-time welfare administrators. In a recent

survey of General Relief by the State Department of Health and Social

Services "staff spent considerable time attempting to Identify and compile

a list of persons responsible for administering general relief In unit

system counties." In many Instances, the difficulty of reaching respondents by telephone during working hours prevented the completion of the

survey. If the State Department of Health and Social Services can't even

find the person responsible for adminlatetlng assistance, how is an illiterate refugee supposed to do so?

The administrative difficulties - and costs - of setting up intake, assistance and reimbursement procedures with 656 general relief agencies - In

addition to the 72 county agencies which are already administering Refugee

and Cuban/Haitian Assistance Programs - are obvious. How expensive only

becomes apparent when you know that:

all of the clients have limited English fluency, necessitating the use

of bilingual Intake staff in both the county and municipal agencies;

most assistance Is vouchered, in-kind or workfare assistance, which

complicates billing and reimbursement documentation (and may not be

reimbursaDle at all); and

the state currently has no existing reimbursement system with most

general relief agencies.

Under the proposed rules, the state will have to have separate administrative

procedures to identify, monitor and reimburse costs for: refugees on AFDC

and MA, refugees on MA only, refugees in the country 0-18 months receiving

refugee cash and medical assistance, refugees here 0-18 months receiving

medical assistance only, refugee unaccompanied minors in foster care,

refugees here 19-36 months receiving general relief, refugees receiving SSI

payments, as well as Cuban/Haitian Entrants in each of the above seven

categories. All these administrative systems are needed to serve approximately 5,000 persons. This is not the way for the federal government to

reduce the administrative burden upon states and localities!

The tragic Irony is that, because of high administrative and medical costs,

current per capita general relief costs are higher Than average Refugee

Assistance Program costs. We estimate that providing assistance to those

recipients who would be terminated under the new regulations would cost the

government more than $1,067,000 more in Wisconsin this fiscal year than if

the current program continued. Unless emergency medical costs, vouchered

and in-kind assistance and administrative costs are made reimbursable under

revised rules, most of this will be local government costs. These regulations

may not save any money. Less money would go to needy recipients, but more

state and local money would go to administrative costs.
77

If refugees and entrants in locations with little or no general relief move

to localities with high benefits, there will be minimal federal savings and

major disruptions due to secondary migration. Secondary migration is

already one of the moat serious impedimenta to effective resettlement since

It breaks the tie with the private sponsor and Increases public assistance,

concentrates refugees in "high impact" areas where refugee services are

inadequate to meet needs, slows the adjustment of individual families, and

Increases community tensions. More than half of all population growth in

Wisconsin in the past two years has been through net secondary inmigratlon.

To the extent that any federal savings are realized, they will come largely

at the expense of state and local governments.

Local general relief agencies would have to begin payments for which they

have not budgeted. In the last year alone, general relief costs In our

state doubled, causing major fiscal crises In many municipalities. These

rules changes would cause an additional, unanticipated burden for these

local governments. For example, Madison's General Relief caseload would

increase by 25Z upon implementation. Milwaukee^ additional costs are

estimated at $2 million annually. The hope of eventual reimbursement will

not relieve the immediate budget problems confronting these agencies next

month. Advance money must be provided to the municipalities.

The substantial administrative costs which would be Incurred under this

program are not reimburseable under the rules and would therefore have to

be borne locally.

The costs of providing health screening and other public health services

would have to be borne locally. In the past year, public health agencies

in Wisconsin screened and immunized more than 1,200 refugees for communicable diseases. These costs are directly related to federal actions in

admitting refugees with TB, hepatitis and parasites and with inadequate

immunizations, but under the proposals, the full costs would have be be

paid by local property taxes.

Emergency medical services currently account for a substantial portion of

the local General Relief budget, yet the Office of Refugee Resettlement

Indicates that these costs would not be reimbursed under the proposed

rules.

The costs of the care of unaccompanied minors are not reimbursable under

the regulations and would fall entirely upon those states who stepped

forward out of humane consideration for orphaned juveniles. The result

will be costly to the states - and devastating to the unaccompanied minors

of Cambodia, Viet-Nam and Haiti who will continue to wait forlornly in

camps with no hope of beginning a new life.

Wisconsin has made a substantial effort to establish a service and social

climate in which refugees are welcome and successful. We have built an

effective service system which has kept dependency rates well below the

national average. As a result our refugee population has grown substantially. Now, we are about to be penalized for our efforts to assist in

this federal endeavor.

3) The third major falacy is that refugees won't work unless we "make them

want to work" by cutting off their assistance. Its corollary is that

sufficient jobs are available for Illiterate, unskilled, non-English

speaking refugees. These assumptions ignore the successes of the refugees -

and the realities of our current economy.

The punitive approach of these rules Ignores the successful history of this

program: most refugees do become self-supporting within the current 36

months of assistance, when given the tools for self-sufficiency. Conversely,

most do not become self-supporting in 18 months, because they lack the

skills to compete in today's economy. The second 18 months Is a critical

"take off" period during which refugees typically put together the skills

accrued and actually achieve Independence.
78

Currently 66% of our assistance caseload has been in the country 19 - 36

months. Most have not achieved Independence in the expected 18 months.

However, the dependency rate during this 19 - 36 month period drops dramatically. In Wisconsin the dependency rate drops more than 43% from 19th to

the 36th month.

Our neighboring state of Illinois has experienced a similar pattern: the

people who have been in the country 19-24 months constitute 25% of their

caseload, whereas those here 31-36 months are only 3% of their caseload.

This pattern has been consistent over time. In addition, the Illinois

job developers report that they have the highest placement success with

those refugees who have been in the country 17 -24 months. The current

framework of 36 months of assistance does accomplish the goal of selfsufficiency for most refugees.

The country is currently facing the highest unemployment rate since the

Depression. As a result, all assistance rolls, from AFDC to umemployment

compensation, have increased dramatically. Refugees, who do not know what

an elevator or bus is, are in the same labor market as unemployed PhD's.

Because they are so well motivated, they will make it. They are using

every minute, and every ounce of their effort, to learn how to survive in

this society. We have developed sophisticated employment and training

programs, which teach them both job skills and job finding skills, and

which insure that they seek and accept employment. These efforts are

succeeding in placing people in jobs. But it is not realistic to expect

that on March 1, 1982 60,000 refugees and entrants will magically find

employment where none was before.

Refugees already have the motivation for independence if they are given the

appropriate skills. Unfortunately, the reductions in social services

funding have reduced training opportunities. The proposed elimination of

the "$30 plus one third work incentive" will further hamper our efforts by

making it fiscally ill-advised for the heads of large households to accept

the entry-level jobs which will eventually lead to self-sufficiency. They

cannot afford to sacrifice medical assistance benefits in order to take

jobs without adequate wages or insurance protection for their families.

In addition, during the 19th-36th month, the system of mandatory work

registration and the employment and training services which have been

developed for the refugee cash assistance program would be lost. The

General Assistance units do not usually have a means of providing the

specialized, bilingual employment services which have been developed within

the refugee cash assistance program. Thus the refugees are even more likely

to become long term dependents in our communities.

Alternatives

We would support efforts to equitably reduce costs in the Refugee and

Entrant programs through means which do not unduly penalize refugees nor

shift costs to state and local governments. In the past, we have suggested

a number of options which we would support to accomplish this. We have

never seen any of these options receive serious consideration from the

Office of Refugee Resettlement. These include:

1) allow refugees to disregard the time spent in flight and/or in refugee

camps in determining the work quarters needed to establish eligibility

for the AFDC-Unemployed Parent Program. This would remove the inequity

in the current system which bars refugee, two-parent families with

small children from qualifying for ongoing programs designed to meet

their needs.

Just as we disregard the time of incapacitatlon of a temporarily

disabled head of household, we would disregard the period during which

a refugee, through no fault of his or her own, is unable to establish

a history of work. By transferring recipients from the Refugee Assistance Program to the AFDC-Unemployed Parent Program, this would provide

greater equity and reduce Refugee Assistance costs.
79

2) define the filing unit according to the Food Stamp definition of

household, as proposed by California. Refugees typically live together

In large, extended family units which may include several nuclear

families. Since AFDC regulations define the filing unit according to

the smaller nuclear family, one household may receive several grants.

Changing the filing unit to Include all dependent members of the

household, as Is done In the Food Stamp program would reduce costs and

Insure greater equity by eliminating double grants now going to a

single household unit.

Other states have suggested other measures which would reduce costs in their

states. No single option is likely to receive the endorsement of all the states,

because of the differences In our systems. However, if you give us the flexibility,

we can and will reduce costs without jeopardizing clients and the communities in

which they reside.
80

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January 14. 1982 "CCSfVEO

Jflf' I 5 1982

Secretary Donald Percy

Dept. of Health and Social Services

1 W. Wilson Street

P. O, Box 7851 Oft^^^ ^

Madison, WI. 53507 DHSS '*

Dear Don:

At our January Executive Board Meeting the matter of the refugee assistance

pro^raa i;as again discussed. We reviewed your December 18, 1981, letter to

Secretary Schweiker and were pleased to see the position that you took,

particularly as it relates to shifting the resettlement cost to GA.

The Association continues to be concerned about the proposed changes and wants

to go on record in the following areas should the Federal changes be implemented.

We feel the state should develop the administrative mechanism to obtain the

ftderal funds the proposed change allows for.

Since local budgets are already established for the year, we feel the funds

should be available on an advance basis rather than a reimbursement basis so

that there is up front monies for the counties to operate on.

We feel that the funds made available in the above manner should cover client

benefits and administrative cost.

Finally we feel that there should be sixty days lead time so that the

transmission can be made in a sound administrative manner.

Please be assured we stand ready to work cooperatively with your department in

formulating policy in this area if the Federal change is implemented.

Sincerely,

;25.-•

Donald W. Noltner, President

Wisconsin Social Service Board Members

and Directors' Association

cc. Bernie Strumbras, D.E,A.

Terry Hottenroth, Wis. Co. Bds. Assn.

Norm Brickl, Director, Calumet Co.
81

EAU CLAIRE AREA INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ADVISORY COMMITiEE

:.n VANG. REFUGEE COORDINATOR. 1223 Menomonie Str. EAU CLAIRE. WISCONSIN 54701

715-834 2046

January 14, 1982

Susan Levy

Wisconsin Resettlement Assistance Office

Division of Community Service

1 W. Wilson Street

P.O. Box 7851

Madison, Wisconsin 53707

Dear Ms. Levy:

We represent 700 Indochinese Refugees who live in the Eau Claire, Chippewa

Falls area of Wisconsin. We want to provide a better life for our families.

We have strong hopes for our fiiture. We are studying English, working in

unskilled jobs, working in skilled jobs, preparing for skilled training,

and pa'ticipating in skilled training. Our children attend local schools.

Please remember us as you make decisions which reduce our opportunities for

self sufficiency, employment, education and quality health care.

We are trying hard to reduce the welfare costs. We work very closely with

the local job service to implement our employability plans. In the past

several months our employment has increased despite a bad economic situation

in our area.

We have taken jobs at 3M Company, Laskers Jewelry, Techtronics, Randalls Foods,

Severson Nursing Home, Eau Claire Leader Telegram, Falls Bart Co., Gramac's

Store, St. Patrick's School, UW Eau Claire, Northern Center, Eau Claire County

Social Services, Dstrict One Technical Institute, Eau Claire County Health

Department, Chippewa County Social Services, Wisconsin Job Service, Xou Grocery

Store, Eau Claire Recycling Center, Project Employment, Kerms Food, Lutheran

Social Services, Eau Claire Public Schools. We are ready and willing to work.

Recently sixteen of us enrolled in a food service helper program at District

One Technical Institute, Over 100 of us study English at the Technical Institute

in Eau Claire anc Chippewa Falls. Another thirty of us are enrolled in a

skilled training program there or at Indianhead Tech in New Richnond or Western

Wisconsin Tech in LaCrosse to study accounting. Machine operation, aui.u mechanics,

welding, data preparation, refrigeration servicing, clerk typist, and media

assistant. Several of us attend UW Eau Claire and Mount Senario College,Ladysmith.

Nearly 300 of our'children are enrolled in the Eau Claire and Chippewa Falls

School System. We are ready and willing to improve ourselves.

Wa care about our families and are working hard to provide them with a good home

and a healthy and safe envii onment. We are members of our churches and of our

community as a whole.

Funding for our educational and employment programs has already been cut by at

least 401 of what was provided last year.

11-417 0-83
82

Remember us as you consider cutting back the special funding for refugees as

proposed in the Federal Register (Social Security Administration 45 CFR Part 400).

If the refugee assistant program is cut back from 36 to 18 months of eligibility

343 of our people will lose their benefits. Also even greater cuts in cash,

medical assistance, educational programs and employment services will be made.

This will have a very negative impact on our area.

We have a high motivation to improve ourselves and we are willing to work hard.

let us know your opinions on how we ought to provide for our families now and in

the future.

Please respond to Yer Vang, Refugee Coordinator, Lutheran Social Services, 1223

Menomonie Street. Eau Claire, Wisconsin 54701. Phone 1-715-834-2046.

Sincerely,

Yer iVan?

Indo'chinese Refugee Coordinator

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84

Senator SIMPSON. NOW Mr. Alan Gibbs.

STATEMENT OF ALAN J. GIBBS, SECRETARY. WASHINGTON

STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a formal statement for the record which I would like to

submit, and I am carrying with me today letters from the Governor

of the State of Washington and the mayor of the city of Seattle,

which I would like to submit for the record.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will not read my full statement to you, I will merely make a

few brief remarks.

Washington is a State with 31,000 refugees, about 16,000 of

whom are on assistance. On March 1, if these regulations go into

effect, we will immediately terminate 9,000 people from all cash

and medical assistance programs. That is going to create an enormous hardship for people who are suffering already.

We have no general assistance program for single adults or childless couples, unless they are physically incapacitated or mentally

incapacitated, and we have no unemployed parent program under

AFDC.

It is not likely that many of these people are going to find employment immediately, or in the very near future, once they have

been terminated. First of all, our State has an unemployment rate

at the moment of 11 percent, and it is climbing. Second, among our

caseload, as we look at the adult population and the job skills that

these refugees have, 40 percent have no identifiable skill at all, 22

percent have previous skills in agriculture, and 20 percent have

previous skills in the military. Third, they have low levels of education. Sixteen percent have no education at all. Another 34 percent

have only between 1 and 6 years of education. A full 50 percent of

that adult population has less than a sixth grade education. Finally, they face severe language barriers. So it is not likely that they

are going to find employment.

It is not likely that community resources are going to be able to

pick up the load for either cash or medical assistance. Our food

bank programs, our community health clinics, our church groups

are all strained already in helping other populations and in helping refugees right now.

It is very likely, in my judgment, that a significant portion of

that population will simply move, and probably move to California

right down Interstate Highway 5, where they may qualify for general assistance. Twenty percent of our caseload now is the result of

secondary migration from other parts of the country. So there is

evidence that it is a mobile population. In fact they can move, and

there is talk in the refugee community in Washington of doing just

that.

Finally, it is likely that families are going to break up in order

that children and mothers will not go hungry, and in order to qualify for the regular AFDC program.

It is interesting to note that in the last year we have done a

study of what happened to families who used to be on Washing-
85

ton's unemployed parent program when that program was terminated.

In the first 6 months following the termination of that program,

15 percent of the families experienced either separation or divorce,

and 4 percent of the teenage children in those households left the

household following termination. So termination of assistance is

going to have enormous consequences, I think, for the refugee population.

I believe, as does the Governor, that the refugee assistance program has been and ought to remain a Federal responsibility. This

is not something that the Federal Government should foresake.

In essence, the policy of the Department of Health and Human

Services now is to say that the duration that a refugee will receive

assistance for integrating into American society is going to depend

on what State he lives in.

We think that this is the wrong policy. We think that the policy

ought to remain a 36-month federally funded program.

Thank you.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Gibbs.

[The prepared statement and additional material submitted by

Mr. Gibbs follow:]
86

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN J. GIBBS

My name 1s Alan J. Gibbs. I am Secretary of the Department of Social

and Health Services, Washington state's primary human services agency responsible

for providing services In the areas of mental health, developmental disabilities,

juvenile rehabilitation, vocational rehabilitation, public health, aging and

adult services, alcohol and drug abuse, children's services. Income assistance, medical assistance and refugee assistance.

I appreciate the opportunity to offer testimony on a proposed rule by the

Department of Health and Human Services that fundamentally changes the role of

the federal government in providing cash and medical assistance to refugees.

Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, without consulting

the Congress or the states, without seeking legislative authorization, proposes

by administrative rule to withdraw federal assistance to refugees.

Until now, it has been federal policy to provide income and medical assistance

to refugees for up to 36 months. Now, the Department of Health and Human Services

proposes to lunit cash and medical assistance under the Refugee Resettlement

Program to 18 months. Assistance will be available for the next 18 months only

as a reimbursement to state and local governments for their costs of providing

General Assistance to refugees.

Washington does not have a General Assistance program for employable persons.

If this proposal is implemented, more than 16,000 refugees in Washington, about

half of the state's refugee population, will be limited to 18 months of assistance.

If this proposal is Implemented on March 1, as seems to be the Intent, more than

9,000 refugees will be terminated from all assistance immediately. By September,

the number of refugees cut off from assistance will reach 11,500. In no other

state will such a high percentage of refugees be so dramatically affected.

What will become of these refugees? What alternatives are available to

them?

It is not likely that very many refugees will find jobs. Unemployment

is more than 11 percent in Washington and expected to go higher. Refugees

with significant language difficulties, low levels of education and no job

skills will not become self-sufficient overnight.
87

It Is not likely that community resources can meet the needs of refugees.

Food banks, emergency housing programs, conmunity health clinics and church

groups are already strained to the limit.

In these circumstances, it is likely that some refugees will move to

another state where General Assistance is available, most probably California.

There is talk of this in the refugee community.

It is likely that some families will break up in order to ensure eligibility

for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) so mothers and children will

not go hungry. A recent study by rny department of the impact of similar

terminations from public assistance found that 15 percent of all families

experienced divorce within six months of termination.

It is likely that some families will withdraw their children from school in

order to find work.

It is likely that even worse consequences will result from adoption of

the department's proposed policy.

Mr. Chairman, the federal government should not foresake its responsibility

to refugees it brought to the United States. The Refugee Resettlement Program

should continue as it was originally established to provide cash and medical

assistance to refugees for up to 36 months, regardless of their location.

Entitlement to assistance should not depend on where refugees are settled as

will happen if the Department of Health and Human Services' proposed rules are

adopted.

The proposed rules should be held in suspension until either the Congress

act to appropriate adequate funds to continue a uniform program or the Department of Health and Human Services works cooperatively with the states to design

a program that will not have disastrous social consequences.
88

State of Washington

IOHN SPEIXMAN, Goverm.r OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

February 4, 1982

The Honorable Alan K. Simpson, Chair

Senate Subconinittee on Immigration

and Refugee Policy

6205 Dirksen Building

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Simpson:

I wish to express my deep concern regarding the Department of

Health and Human Services' proposed policy change for Refugee

Assistance.

I am a supporter of the "New Federalism." However, that concept

involves sorting out appropriate responsibilities for states and

the Federal government. In reviewing the history and development

of the Refugee program. It is clear that Refugee Assistance has

been and must remain a Federal responsibility. The State of

Washington should not and cannot assume responsibility for

providing assistance to refugees.

If appropriations are not adequate to continue the current Refugee

Assistance program, the Department of Health and Human Services

should adopt a flexible approach to redesign assistance programs

so that sudden terminations with disastrous human consequences

do not occur. We are prepared to work with the Department of

Health and Human Services to ensure that does not happen.

Ugislative HUMI'VI • Oiympta, Washington 9B50-4 • 1206) 753-6780 • (Scan) ZM-ti7ftO
89

Office Of The Mayor

City of Seattle

Charles Royer, Mayor

February 5, 1982

Alan K. Simpson, Chair

Subcommittee on Immigration

and Refugee Policy

Senate Judiciary Committee

A-509 Immigration Building

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased that your Subcommittee is taking time today to

hear personally from our State, and others, of the problems

proposed changes in refugee policies present to us.

Secretary Alan Gibbs has testified to you on the impact of

cutting refugee cash and medical assistance from 36 to 18

months. He has proposed some creative alternatives, which

would reduce the disproportionate burden our State would bear

in dealing with federal budget restrictions, and at the same

time, address the very real needs of the refugees and their

families. I support his recommendations and hope that your

committee will give them serious consideration.

Let me address briefly the refugee population and the City

of Seattle.

The greater Seattle area is the home for approximately twothirds of our state's refugees. We are pleased and proud to

have these new members of our community. At the same time,

our City's resources are terribly strained in attempting to

meet their needs and to help them become self-sufficient.

in our direct experience with the refugees, we have found

them to be industrious, eager to learn, and anxious to find

work. However, with our state unemployment rate already at

II percent and still rising, and reduced funding for employment and training, employment opportunities are limited,

especially for refugees with poor English and work skills.

An equal employment ooponunlty - affirmative action employer

1200 Municipal Building, Seattle, Washington 99104 (20f-) 525-4000
90

The proposed cutback from 36 to 18 months of federal cash and

medical assistance would leave approximately 6,000 refugees in

the greater Seattle area with no means of support on March 1,

1982. Major social service funding cuts already adopted for

the first two quarters of FY 82 make the situation all the

more desperate. Services designed to help refugees become

self-sufficient, including English as Second Language courses,

employment training, referral services, and mental health

counseling have been severely curtailed.

These reductions come at a time when other budget cuts have

already shifted numerous burdens to the private sector.

We are concerned about the community's ability to provide

refugees with such essentials as food, shelter, health care

and employment services. We are concerned about the community's continued ability to express a warm welcome, as the

competition for shrinking resources increases.

The Refugee Act of 1980 established for our refugees and

their new American communities the expectation of 36 months

of cash and medical assistance from the Federal government.

The proposed reduction leaves both refugees and community

leaders without adequate time to plan and develop reasonable

solutions.

Considering the circumstances which brought the Indochinese

refugees to America, I believe that the health and welfare of

these refugees must be a matter of continued federal concern

and responsibility. It is vitally important that the United

States government honor its commitment to these long suffering pebple and the communities which welcomed them.

Thank you for your consideration of this important matter.

sincerely.

cJ>|-<^

Charles Royer

cc: Congressional Delegation
91

Senator SIMPSON. NOW, Mr. Librado Perez.

STATEMENT OF LIBRADO PEREZ, DIRECTOR, SOCIAL SERVICES

AGENCY, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, CALIF.

Mr. PEREZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What I would like to do is merely summarize two or three important points in addition to the written comments which we have already submitted.

Of great concern to us in Alameda County, Calif., is the proposed

implementation of these regulations on March 1. That is utterly

impossible to carry out by virtue of the fact that there are specific

legal requirements and civil rights that must be carried out to

advise our clients.

The notice of action, for example, this cannot be done, given the

size of the caseload that we have in Alameda County and other

counties in California.

In addition, there is current litigation in the State that came

about as a result of the implementation of the recent welfare reforms which, in essence, have served to slow down any implementations that bring about massive changes.

I would, therefore, recommend that a more appropriate time

would be at least April 1. To do otherwise, we will have a mandate

that we will not be able to live or abide by.

The second point 1 would like to address is the administration's

intent to save money by reducing the benefit by utilizing general

assistance levels of assistance.

In listening to my peers from the States of Oregon and Washington, it appears that they may have, from a fiscal perspective, less

than we will further south. In any event, one of the things that

must be borne, and is not clarified by the administration, is whether they, in fact, will underwrite the administrative costs of making

these changes and impacting in implementing the general assistance portion of the RCA.

For example, dealing with equity, G&A in Alameda County has a

major workfare component, that is an expensive component, and if

we do not have the Federal support to carry out these changes, in

essence, what we are going to have is an automatic eligibility for

general assistance by refugees without having to go through the

workfare requirements.

What this will do is automatically add several thousand people to

our general assistance workload. In other words, add approximately 50 percent to our existing general assistance caseload.

Those are my summary comments, Mr. Chairman.

[The printed matter of Mr. Perez follows:]
92

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIBRADO PEREZ

MR. CHAIRMAN, HONORED MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I AM LIBRADO PEREZ,

DIRECTOR OF THE ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAT SERVICES AGENCY. 1 AM ALSO A MEMBER OF

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES (NACo) TASK FORCE ON REFUGEES, ALIENS AND

MIGRANTS, AND I SERVE ON THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA'S REFUGEE ADVISORY COUNCIL.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES' PROPOSED REGULATIONS ON REFUGEE AND ENTRANT CASH AND MEDICAL

ASSISTANCE. I AM SUBMITTING FOR THE RECORD NACo'S COMMENTS•WHICH I ENDORSE•ON

THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS.

MY COUNTY AND OTHER COUNTIES ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE OBJECTIVES THAT THE

PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE INTENDED TO ACHIEVE:

0 FEDERAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEE CASH AND MEDICAL

ASSISTANCE COSTS FOR A 36-MONTH PERIOD.

0 THE REDUCTION OF UNNECESSARY WELFARE DEPENDENCY AMONG REFUGEES,

AND

O GREATER EQUITY IN THE TREATMENT OF REFUGEES AND NON-REFUGEES.

HOWEVER, IT IS MY CONCERN THAT THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS, IN FACT, FAIL TO MEET

THESE OBJECTIVES. MY SPECIFIC CONCERNS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WILL RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT IN REFUGEE HEALTH

CARE COSTS FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO COUNTY AND OTHER LOCAL PUBLIC

HEALTH CARE FACILITIES. ALTHOUGH CALIFORNIA HAS GENERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE,

MOST STATES AND LOCALITIES DO NOT. INSTEAD, LOCAL PUBLIC HOSPITALS WILL

HAVE TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING HEALTH CARE TO INDIGENT, NONMEDICAID ELIGIBLE REFUGEES.

2. THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE AN INEFFECTIVE WAY OF REDUCING "UNNECESSARY"

WELFARE DEPENDENCY AMONG REFUGEES. THE PROPOSED 18-MONTH LIMITATION WOULD

APPLY TO ALL REFUGEES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY HAVE A LEGITIMATE NEED

FOR ASSISTANCE, OR EVEN IF THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY AID DURING THEIR

INITIAL 18 MONTHS IN THE U.S.

I WOULD POINT OUT THAT, IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEE CASH

ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS HAS INCREASED OVER 600 PERCENT WITHIN THE PAST THREE

YEARS, NOT BECAUSE OF "UNNECESSARY" DEPENDENCY, BUT BECAUSE OF OTHER

FACTORS:
93

0 RECENT REFUGEE ARRIVALS HAVE FEW EMPLOYABLE SKILLS AND POOR

ENGLISH LANGUAGE ABILITY.

0 VOLUNTARY AGENCIES LACK THE CAPACITY TO ASSIST REFUGEES IN

READILY BECOMING SELF-SUFFICIENT.

0 FEDERAL SUPPORT OF REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT-RELATED SERVICES IS

INADEQUATE.

0 THE LABOR MARKET IN ALAMEDA COUNTY IS POOR, WITH A SCARCITY

OF LOW-SKILL JOBS FOR REFUGEES TO FILL.

3. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WILL NOT RESULT IN EQUITY IN THE TREATMENT OF REFUGEES

AND NON-REFUGEES. EQUITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN EQUAL TREATMENT OF

REFUGEES AND NON-REFUGEES, TO THE EXTENT THAT REFUGEES HAVE SPECIAL NEEDS

AND PROBLEMS DURING THEIR INITIAL PERIOD OF RESETTLEMENT. THE CURRENT

REFUGEE WELFARE DEPENDENCY RATE OF 67 PERCENT, WHICH FAR EXCEEDS THE

NATIONAL AVERAGE OF 5 PERCENT FOR THE GENERAL POPULATION, IS PROOF OF THE

NEED FOR SOME DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT.

4. CUBAN/HAITIAN ENTRANTS IN CALIFORNIA WILL BE ESPECIALLY ADVERSELY AFFECTED

BY THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS. BECAUSE THEIR LEGAL STATUS IS NOT PERMANENT,

THEY ARE NOT ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE STATE.

5. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT OF LOCAL GENERAL ASSISTANCE (GA) COSTS

THROUGH STATES WILL CREATE SERIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS IN STATES,'SUCH

AS CALIFORNIA. IN WHICH GA IS WHOLLY COUNTY-ADMINISTERED AND FINANCED.

CALIFORNIA'S 58 COUNTIES ARE MANDATED BY STATE LAW TO RUN GENERAL ASSISTANCE

PROGRAMS WHICH ARE ENTIRELY COUNTY-ADMINISTERED AND FUNDED. THERE IS NO

UNIFORMITY AMONG GA PROGRAMS WITHIN THE STATE, SO THAT ONE COUNTY, SUCH AS

SAN DIEGO, CAN HAVE A GA PAYMENT LEVEL WHICH IS ONLY HALF THE AMOUNT PROVIDED

BY A NEIGHBORING COUNTY•IN THIS CASE ORANGE COUNTY.

IN CALIFORNIA, WHERE THE STATE HAS NO ROLE IN PROVIDING GENERAL ASSISTANCE,

NEW ADMINISTRATIVE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE STATE AND COUNTIES WILL HAVE TO BE

IMPLEMENTED IN ORDER FOR COUNTIES TO RECEIVE FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT. IT WILL

BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE STATE TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF COUNTY CLAIMS

FOR REIMBURSEMENT, GIVEN THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY AMONG THE 58 COUNTY GA PROGRAMS.

6. CALIFORNIA COUNTIES HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS CASH FLOW

PROBLEMS IF FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT OF GA COSTS IS SLOW IN COMING. UNLIKE THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, COUNTIES CANNOT OPERATE IN THE RED. MORE THAN 95 PERCENT

OF CALIFORNIA'S REFUGEE RECIPIENTS ARE CONCENTRATED IN 8 COUNTIES, AND IN 5
94

COUNTIES REFUGEES ACCOUNT FOR OVER 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL RECIPIENT POPULATION.

THEREFORE. A DELAY IN FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT OF REFUGEE GA COSTS CAN HAVE AN

ENORMOUS IMPACT ON SOME COUNTIES' BUDGETS.

7. THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE NOT CLEAR OS WHAT KINDS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE

COSTS MILL BE REIMBURSED BY HHS. FOR INSTANCE, ALAMEDA COUNTY HAS A WORKFARE

COMPONENT IN ITS GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. AN EXPANSION OF THIS COMPONENT

TO COVER NEW REFUGEE GA RECIPIENTS WILL BE COSTLY. UNLESS ALL CA ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, INCLUDING WORKFARE-RELATED COSTS, ARE REIMBURSED, THE PROPOSED

REGULATIONS WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE FISCAL IMPACT ON COUNTIES AND STATES. ALSO,

IN SOME LOCALITIES, GENERAL ASSISTANCE IS PROVIDED IN THE FORM OF IN-KIND

ASSISTANCE OR VOUCHERS. THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS DO NOT CLEARLY SPECIFY

WHETHER SUCH FORMS OF GA WILL BE FEDERALLY REIMBURSED.

IN SUM, THERE ARE SERIOUS WEAKNESSES IN THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS. I BELIEVE

THAT THERE ARE FAR BETTER ALTERNATIVES FOR ACHIEVING THE THREE OBJECTIVES THAT

THESE REGULATIONS ARE INTENDED TO MEET.

BEFORE DISCUSSING SOME OF THESE ALTERNATIVES, I WANT TO URGE STRONGLY THAT THE

CURRENT POLICY OF PROVIDING UP TO 36 MONTHS OF FEDERALLY FUNDED MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

TO INDIGENT REFUGEES AND ENTRANTS WHO ARE CATEGORICALLY INELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID

BE CONTINUED. THE PROPOSED 18-MONTH LIMITATION WOULD RESULT IN A SHIFT IN COSTS

TO LOCAL HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, WHICH ARE MANDATED TO PROVIDE CARE TO ALL RESIDENTS, REGARDLESS OF EITHER THEIR ABILITY TO PAY OR THEIR ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID.

IN TERMS OF REFUGEE AND ENTRANT CASH ASSISTANCE POLICIES, I BELIEVE THAT AT

LEAST SOME CASH ASSISTANCE SSOULD BE AVAILABLE NATIONWIDE FOR SEEDY REFUGEES AND

ENTRANTS WHO ARE CATEGORICALLY INELIGIBLE FOR AFDC, DURING THEIR FIRST 36 MONTHS

IN THE U.S. BECAUSE OF THE UNAVAILABILITY OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN MOST PARTS OF

THE COUNTRY, THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS WOULD MEAN THAT NO CASH ASSISTANCE WOULD BE

AVAILABLE FOR MANY NEEDY REFUGEES AND ENTRANTS•UNLESS THEY WERE TO MOVE INTO

AREAS WITH GA.

ONE ALTERNATIVE WHICH MIGHT BE RECONSIDERED IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S ORIGINAL

PROPOSED POLICY CHANGES, ON WHICH THE FY 1982 BUDGET REQUEST WAS BASED. BENEFITS

WERE TO BE PROVIDED TO NON-AFDC ELIGIBLE REFUGEES, AS FOLLOWS:

0 IN STATES WITH ONGOING GA PROGRAMS, NON-AFDC REFUGEES WOULD

BE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE GA-LEVEL PAYMENTS DURING THEIR FIRST

36 MONTHS IN THE U.S., RATHER THAN AFDC-LEVEL PAYMENTS, AS

UNDER CURRENT POLICY.
95

0 IN STATES WITHOUT GA PROGRAMS, NON-AFDC REFUGEES WOULD BE

ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE PAYMENTS EQUAL TO THE AFDC LEVEL DURING

THEIR FIRST 18 MONTHS IN THE U.S., AND 50 PERCENT OF THE AFDC

PAYMENT LEVEL DURING THEIR SECOND 18 MONTHS.

THESE CHANGES WOULD ASSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF CASH ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY REFUGEES

FOR THE ENTIRE 36-MONTH PERIOD, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER GA IS AVAILABLE WHERE THEY

RESIDE. MOREOVER, IN JURISDICTIONS WITH GENERAL ASSISTANCE, GREATER EQUITY BETWEEN

REFUGEES AND NON-REFUGEES WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY MAKING THE BENEFIT LEVELS EQUAL.

AS I INDICATED EARLIER, THE PROPOSED 18-MONTH LIMITATION ON AID PROVIDED TO

CATEGORICALLY INELIGIBLE REFUGEES IS AN INEFFECTIVE WAY OF REDUCING UNNECESSARY

REFUGEE WELFARE DEPENDENCY, FOR TWO REASONS:

0 IT APPLIES TO ALL REFUGEES AND ENTRANTS WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE

U.S. FOR MORE THAN 18 MONTHS, INCLUDING THOSE WITH A LEGITIMATE NEED FOR ASSISTANCE.

0 IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM OF UNNECESSARY WELFARE DEPENDENCY AMONG REFUGEES WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE U.S. FOR

LESS THAN 18 MONTHS.

ALTERNATIVE POLICY CHANGES WHICH WOULD MORE EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH REFUGEES

AND ENTRANTS WHO SHOULD NOT BE RECEIVING AID INCLUDE:

0 STRONGER WORK-RELATED REQUIREMENTS, SUCH AS MANDATORY JOBSEARCH REQUIREMENTS, MIGHT BE APPLIED TO NON-AFDC ELIGIBLE

REFUGEES AND ENTRANTS.

0 STATE AND LOCAL WELFARE AGENCIES MIGHT BE PROVIDED THE

FLEXIBILITY TO ESTABLISH WORKFARE OR INCOME SUPPLEMENTATION

PROGRAMS FOR NON-AFDC ELIGIBLE REFUGEES. SOME FEDERAL FUNDING

WOULD BE NEEDED TO OFFSET THE ADDED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF

RUNNING SUCH PROGRAMS.

0 UNDER CURRENT POLICY, ADULT REFUGEES WHO ARE FULL-TIME COLLEGE

STUDENTS CAN RECEIVE CASH ASSISTANCE. I WOULD FAVOR MAKING

FULL-TIME COLLEGE STUDENTS WHO ARE NOT WORKING INELIGIBLE TO

RECEIVE REFUGEE CASH ASSISTANCE.

NOT ALL CURRENT CASH ASSISTANCE POLICIES ARE BIASED IN FAVOR OF REFUGEES.

THE AFDC-UNEMPLOYED PARENT (UP) PROGRAM REQUIRES AN UNEMPLOYED PARENT TO BE

ATTACHED TO THE LABOR FORCE DURING 6 OUT OF THE 13 PREVIOUS CALENDAR QUARTERS.

UNLESS TIME SPENT OVERSEAS WERE TO BE COUNTED, REFUGEES WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE U.S.

FOR LESS THAN 6 QUARTERS•OR 18 MONTHS•CANNOT POSSIBLY QUALIFY FOR AFDC-UP, EVEN
96

IF THEY HAVE WORKED DURING THEIR ENTIRE TIME IN THE U.S. IN A NUMBER OF AFDC-UP

STATES, SUCH AS COLORADO AND MINNESOTA, A MAJORITY OF NON-AFDC ELIGIBLE REFUGEES

ON CASH ASSISTANCE ARE TWO-PARENT FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN WHO DO NOT

QUALIFY FOR AFDC-UP BECAUSE OF THIS REQUIREMENT.

I RECOMMEND THAT THIS AFDC-UP LABOR FORCE ATTACHMENT REQUIREMENT BE MODIFIED

IN ITS APPLICATION TO REFUGEES AND ENTRANTS, IN RECOGNITION OF THEIR SHORT STAY

IN THE U.S. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO APPLY A REQUIREMENT PROPORTIONAL TO A

REFUGEE'S LENGTH OF TIME IN THIS COUNTRY.

IN CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT COUNTY OFFICIALS SHARE THE ADMINISTRATION'S

CONCERN ABOUT BOTH THE HIGH RATE OF WELFARE DEPENDENCY AMONG REFUGEES, AND THE

NEED TO CONTROL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE COSTS. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS ARE

NOT THE ANSWER. WE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING IMPROVED POLICIES.

THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK BEFORE YOU. I AM PREPARED TO ANSWER

ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

mill
97

National Association of Counties

Offices • 1735 New York Avenue N.W.. Washington. D.C. 20006 • Telephone 202/783-5113

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES FOR THE

"REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM AND CUBAN AND HAITIAN ENTRANT PROGRAM;

CASH AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE POLICIES"

(45 CFR, Parts 400 and 401)

The National Association of Counties (NACo) has serious reservations about

the proposed rules governing cash and medical assistance for refugees and Cuban/

Haitian entrants, which were published In the Federal Register on December 11,

1981. In particular, we are concerned about the proposed policy changes which

would severely limit federally funded cash and medical assistance available to

refugees and Cuban/Haitian entrants who have been in the U.S. for more than 18

months, and who are categorically ineligible for AFDC, SSI and Medicaid. The

proposed policies are likely to result in a shift in costs from the federal government onto already strained county budgets. In addition, the subsistence and

medical needs of many refugees and Cuban/Haitian entrants, who have not been

able to become self-supporting, will go unmet because of the reduced duration

of federal assistance. We are also concerned about potential administrative

problems and burdens for county and state governments, which will have to implement the policy changes.

NACo is supportive of the major objectives that the proposed changes are

intended to achieve. These objectives include: (1) to reduce unnecessary welfare dependency of refugees which may result from current refugee cash and medical assistance policies, (2) to achieve greater equity in the treatment of

refugees and non-refugees, and (3) to avoid shifting refugee cash and medical

assistance costs onto states and counties during a refugee's first 36 months

in the U.S.

However, NACo is opposed to the proposed policy changes because we believe

that they, in fact, will not achieve these objectives. For example, the proposed 18-month limitation on federally funded cash and medical assistance for

refugees and Cuban/Haitian entrants who are categorically ineligible for AFDC,

SSI and Medicaid would result in a shift in costs to localities and states.

Included later in these comments are a number of alternatives to the proposed policy changes which we believe may more effectively achieve the above

three objectives. NACo urges that the Department of Health and Human Services

give these alternatives careful consideration, and delay issuance of final regulations governing refugee cash and medical assistance until after a thorough

assessment of the potential impacts of various policy alternatives can be completed. We also recommend that HHS provide state and local officials with the

opportunity to work together with the Department in the development of the final regulations.

Our specific comments on the proposed rules follow,

!• Eighteen months may not be sufficient time in which to expect refugees and

Cuban/Haitian entrants to become economically self-sufficient.
98

The proposed policy changes would limit to 18 months federally funded refugee cash assistance (RCA) and refugee medical assistance (RMA) provided to refugees and Cuban/Haitian entrants who are categorically ineligible for AFDC, SSI

and Medicaid. After refugees and entrants have been in the U.S. for more than

18 months, they must rely on state and/or local general assistance, if available in the areas in which they reside.

Current data indicates that 67 percent of all refugees In the U.S. for less

than 36 months are on cash assistance. We believe that several factors contribute to this extremely high welfare dependency rate, including their inability

to speak English and lack of employable skills, as well as an inadequate supply

of job opportunities in the communities in which they reside. To the extent

that most refugees and entrants are unable to become self-supporting within 18

months after their entry into the U.S., the proposed policy changes will result

in extreme hardships for many of them, who lack other means of financial support.

NACo believes that-the treatment of refugees in terms of cash and medical

assistance should be equitable with that provided to non-refugees. However,

equity does not necessarily mean equal treatment of refugees and non-refugees.

The special needs and problems encountered by refugees during their initial

period of resettlement in the U.S. may require assistance policies for them

which differ froa those aoplied to non-refugees.

2. The proposed 18-month limitation would virtually eliminate federally funded cash and medical assistance provided to Cuban/Haitian entrants.

By the end of FY 1982. all of the approximately 150,000 Cuban/Haitian entrants in the U.S. will have been in this country for more than 18 months.

Furthermore, most Cuban/Haitian entrants who are currently receiving cash and

medical assistance are categorically ineligible for AFDC, SSI and Medicaid.

As of September 30, 1981, only 17.5 percent of the 36,561 entrants on cash assistance in Dade County, Florida were eligible for AFDC.

Therefore, the vast majority of entrants who are receiving federally funded cash and medical assistance will be affected by the proposed 18-month limitation on assistance provided to entrants who are categorically ineligible for

AFDC, SSI and Medicaid.

3- The proposed 18-month limitation would affect a sizable proportion of

Indochinese refugees.

As of February 1, 1982•the proposed implementation date for the regulations•less than one-third of the nation's 575,000 Indochinese refugees will

have been in the U.S. for less than 18 months. By the end of FY 1982, only

172,000 of the projected 648,000 Indochinese refugees in the U.S. will have

been in the U.S. for less than 18 months.

NACo estimates that, on February 1, 1932, approximately 68,000 Indochinese

refugee cash assistance recipients who are categorically ineligible for AFDC

will have been in the U.S. for more than 18 months and, consequently, would be

affected by the proposed 18-month limitation. This estimate assumes that 60

percent of all Indochinese refugees who have been in the U.S. for 18 to 36

months are on cash assistance, and that 55 percent of all refugee cash assistance recipients are not eligible for AFDC. By the end of FY 1982, NACo believes an additional 29,000 Indochinese refugee recipients who are ineligible

for AFDC will be directly affected by the 18-month limitation.

4. The proposed 13-month limitation on assistance provided to categorically

ineligible refugees will exacerbate the adverse fiscal impacts on counties

and states resulting from the 36-month limitation on full federal refugee

funding.

By the time the proposed policy changes are implemented, the fiscal impact

of the 36-month limitation on counties and states is expected to worsen dramatically. The welfare dependency rate of the second major wave of Indochinese

refugees, who began entering the U.S. in mid-1979, is far higher than the dependency rate of previous Indochinese refugee arrivals.

Up until August 1979, the welfare dependency rate of Indochinese refugees

remained at about 30 to 37 percent. However, refugees' dependency on welfare

has risen substantially, so that the current welfare dependency rate is now es-
99

tlmated to be 67 percent for refugees In the U.S. for less than 36 months. Beginning in mid-1982, these less self-sufficient refugees will have been in the

U.S. for 36 months and, therefore, will no longer be eligible for full federal

refugee funding. As a result, the costs of assisting them will be shifted from

the federal government to counties and states.

5. ThP nronosed policy changes will result in a shift in health care costs

TrSmthe federal government to county and other local public health care

facilities.

Under current policy, the federal government provides 100 percent reimbursement to states for medical assistance provided to all refugees and entrants who

have been in the U.S. for less than 36 months, even if they are not categorically eligible for Medlcaid. The proposed rules would limit such medical asslstanQe

to non-Medicald eligible refugees and entrants to an 18-month period, with the

exception of federal reimbursement of state and/or local medical general assistance costs.

NACo objects to this proposed policy change because it will have the effect of shifting the financial burden for providing health care to indigent,

non-Medicaid eligible refugees to local public health care facilities•most of

which are county-operated. In the vast majority of states and localities, medical general assistance is not available. Instead, it is local public hospitals which have the responsibility for providing health care to indigent persons,

regardless of their ability to pay for services. In brief, this proposed policy

change conflicts with the intent of the Refugee Act of 1980•that the costs of

assisting refugees be a federal responsibility for the first 36 months of their

life in this country.

We would point out that the potential shift in costs to counties would be

substantial. Health data indicates that refugees and Cuban/Haitian entrants

have greater than average health problems, and a far higher incidence of tuberculosis and other communicable diseases. Furthermore, according to HHS estimates, 31 percent of all refugees who have been in the U.S. for less than 36

months would be receiving federally funded medical assistance during FY 1982

and 1983, assuming there, is no change In current policy. [Note: 67 percent

would be eligible for federally funded medical assistance.]

The proposed rules would practically eliminate federal financial responsibility for the costs of providing medical assistance to Cuban and Haitian entrants. As noted earlier, all of the 150,000 Cuban/Haitian entrants will have

been in the U.S. for more than 18 months by the end of FY 1982, and the vast

majority of entrants receiving aid are categorically ineligible for Medlcaid.

In Florida and New Jersey, which together account for over 80 percent of

all entrants in the U.S., no general medical assistance Is available statewide.

Instead, the burden of providing health care to entrants in these two states

will fall primarily on a relatively few county-operated hospitals. It should

be noted that Cuban/Haitian entrants are concentrated in the following seven

counties: Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, and Hlllsborough, Florida; and Hudson,

Union, and Essex, New Jersey. These counties•which probably account for 75 to

80 percent of all entrants In the U.S.•will be significantly affected by the

proposed policy changes.

6, There are many administrative problems and issues Involved in federal reimbursement of state and local general assistance costs.

Under the proposed rules, local governments would not be able to seek reimbursement of general assistance costs directly from the federal government.

In states such as California, Florida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, in which

general assistance is locally administered and financed, local governments

must seek federal reimbursement through their state governroeijts.

Administrative problems and Issues involved in federal reimbursement of

general assistance costs Include the following;

o In states in which general assistance is locally administered,

new administrative linkages will have to be established, in

order for local governments to seek reimbursement of general
100

assistance costs through their state governments. In Wisconsin, this means that the state government will have to deal

with hundreds of different local Jurisdictions which operate

general assistance programs.

o It will be extremely difficult for state governments to monitor and verify the validity of claims for reimbursement of

general assistance costs requested by counties and municipalities. One question which is not answered in the proposed

regulations is whether states will be liable for mispayments

or errors made by local governments in seeking federal reimbursement of general assistance costs. NACo believes that it

is unfair to expect a state government to know whether numerous local governments are properly administering assistance

to refugees and entrants•especially in instances in which no

previous relationship exists between the state government and

local general assistance programs.

o The proposed regulations do not specify the reporting requirements tcr-r be used by states and localities in seeking

reimbursement of general assistance costs from the federal

government. States and localities should be provided the opportunity to comment upon such requirements prior to their

issuance in final regulations.

7. The proposed regulations are not clear on what kinds of general assistance

costs will be reimbursable.

The proposed regulations do not specifically state that administrative

costs of providing general assistance will be reimbursed by the federal government. If such costs are not reimbursed, then the proposed rules would result

in significant increased administrative costs for states and counties•a shift

in costs which NACo strongly opposes.

In many instances, county-operated general assistance programs have workfare components. Federal reimbursement should cover all administrative costs,

including workfare-related expenses, in order to avoid imposing additional costs

on counties and states.

8. The proposed regulations contain no assurances that county and municipal

general assistance costs will be reimbursed by the federal government.

As noted earlier, local governments would not be able to apply directly

to the federal government for reimbursement of general assistance costs. NACo

is concerned that states in which general assistance is locally administered

and funded may be reluctant to serve as a conduit for federal reimbursement of

local general assistance costs, because of the many potential administrative

problems Involved.

Local governments with large numbers of refugees and entrants should be

permitted to seek reimbursement of general assistance costs directly from the

federal government. We would point out that approximately 85 percent of all

Cuban/Haitian entrants reside in eight counties located in states in which general assistance is locally administered and funded. These eight counties are:

Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, and Hillsborough, Florida; Union, Hudson, and Essex,

New Jersey; and Los Angeles, California.

In addition, about 40 percent of all refugee cash assistance recipients in

the U.S. live in 10 counties in which general assistance is locally administered. These counties are: Los Angeles, Orange, Santa Clara, San Dtego, San

Francisco, Sacramento, Alameda, and San Joaquin, California; Arlington, Virginla; and Hudson, New Jersey.

It would make sense to permit these heavily impacted localities to seek

federal reimbursement directly. Very few state-administered general assistance

programs would have more refugees and entrants receiving aid than the abovelisted counties.

9. The proposed policy changes will take, at a minimum, several months for

states and localities to implement.
101

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published in the December 11, 1981

Federal Register states that the proposed policy changes are to be implemented

by February 1, 1982. States and counties will require at least several months

to implement these changes. For one, it will take time for them to identify refugee and entrant recipients who will be affected by the proposed 18-

month limitation. In many cases, such identification will have to be carried

out manually, because the date of entry into the U.S. of refugee and entrant

aid recipients is not always retrievable through an automated data information

system. Secondly, states and counties will have to send written notices to refugee and entrant recipients whose assistance would be terminated because of

the proposed policy changes. Thirdly, the administrative arrangements for reimbursement of general assistance costs will take time to implement in states

in which localities administer these programs.

In sum, NACo believes it is unrealistic to expect that states and localities can implement the proposed changes by February 1, 1982.

As stated in our opening remarks, NACo believes that a number of alternatives to the proposed policy changes exist which night more effectively achieve

the following three raajor objectives; (1) to reduce unnecessary welfare dependency of refugees which may result from current refugee cash and medical assistance policies, (2) to achieve greater equity in the treatment of refugees and

non-refugees, and (3) to avoid shifting refugee cash and medical assistance

costs onto states and counties during a refugee's first 36 months in the U.S.

The alternatives we believe merit consideration by the Department of Health

and Human Services include the following:

1. Provide medical assistance for 36 months to all refugees and entrants who

meet minimum income and resource requirements for Medicald, even though

they may be categorically ineligible for Medicaid.

This alternative would continue the current federal policy of providing 36

months of medical assistance to indigent refugees and Cuban/Haitian entrants who

are categorically ineligible for Medicaid.

NACo believes that this alternative would be preferable to the proposed

policy change limiting such assistance for 18 months, for the following reasons:

o Refugees and Cuban/Haitian entrants have greater health problems than the general population.

o An IB-month limitation on medical assistance provided to needy

non-Medicaid eligible refugees and entrants would result in a

shift in costs to county health care facilities which are mandated to provide care to all residents, regardless of their

ability to pay for services. Therefore, the curren;: policy of

36 months of medical assistance is more consistent with the

objective of preventing a shift in assistance costs from the

federal government to states and localities.

2. Revise current cash assistance policies to reduce work disincentives and

welfare dependency which is not the result of che inability of refugees

and entrants to secure employment.

NACo believes that refugee and entrant cash assistance policies should be

designed in a way which will prevent refugees and entrants from unnecessarily

remaining on public assistance. At the same time, it is our position that refugees and entrants who cannot secure employment: and become self-supporting for

legitimate reasons should be provided aid, in order to assure that their basic

subsistence needs are met.

We are concerned that the proposed IS-month limitation would apply to all

refugees and entrants who have been in the U.S. for more than 18 months, regardless of whether they need aid because of a legitimate inability to support

themselves, or whether they had received any aid during their Initial 18 months

In the U.S. As indicated earlier, NACo believes that the welfare dependency

rate of refugees has doubled in recent years because of factors other than the
102

duracion of federal refugee assistance. Reducing the period of federally funded aid merely shifts the responsibility for assisting needy refugees onto counties and states.

NACo suggests that a number of ootlons should be considered which might

more effectively address the issue of unnecessary dependency of refugees and

entrants on cash assistance;

o Under current policy, student financial aid is not countable

income for the purpose of determining the level of assistance

provided to non-AFDC eligible refugees and entrants. As a

result, adult refugees who are full-time college students

have been able to receive cash assistance. Policy changes

might be made which either would include student financial

aid as countable income, or would make refugees and entrants

who are full-time college students ineligible to receive cash

assistance.

o Stronger work-related requirements might be applied to nonAFDC eligible refugees and entrants, to ensure that they do

not remain on cash assistance for long periods without just

cause. One such requirement might be to apply a labor force

participation requirement•similar in concept to that used in

the AFDC-Unemployed Parent program•to refugees and entrants

who have been in the U.S. for more than one year. In addition, mandatory job search requirements might be applied to

non-AFDC eligible refugees and entrants.

o The 18-month limitation might be modified so that it does not

apply to all non-AFDC eligible refugees and entrants. For

instance, two-parent families with dependent children in

states without an AFDC-Unemployed Parent program might be

exempted from the 18-nonth limitation. Also, households

headed by persons ase ^5 or older mi^ht be made eligible for

assistance for up to 36 months after entry into the U.S. Los

Angeles County, California data reveals that over 77 percent

of refugees on general assistance in the county are over 45

years of age (note: these refugee recipients have all been

in the U.S. for at least 36 months). This data indicates

that older refugees may have greater difficulties in becoming self-supporting. Another subcategory of refugees and entrants who might be exempted from an. IS-month limitation

would be former unaccompanied minors who have reached the age

of majority since entering the U.S.

3. Permit refugees to apply the time spent in flight and/or in refugee camps

toward the AFDC-Unemployed Parent CJ?) program work Quarter requirement.

Similarly, Cuban/Haitian entrants should be permitted to apply time during which they vere^in federal custody towards the AFDC-UP program_work

quarter requirement.

The AFDC-UP program requires an unemployed parent to have "six or more

quarters of work within any 13-calendar quarter period ending within one year

prior to application for aid or within such period received or was qualified to

receive unemployment compensation." This requirement is unfair to refugees and

entrants who have been in the U.S. for less than 13-calendar quarters. In

fact, unless time spent in camps is counted, refugees who have been in the U.S.

for less than 6 quarters•or 18 months•cannot possibly qualify for AFDC-UP,

even if they have worked during their entire time in the U.S.

This alternative would reduce this inequity, which currently results in

the placing of many refugees on refugee cash assistance, even though they would

otherwise be eligible for AFDC-UP. We would point out that non-AFDC-eligible

refugees and entrants are not all single adults and childless couples, as is

commonly believed; rather, they include two-parent families with dependent children, in states with or without AFDC-UP programs. Therefore, the proposed regulations will have a significant effect on assistance provided to children as

well as to adults.
103

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Burns, you give us the figures that three out of four refugees

are on public assistance. I would be interested to know briefly why

that is, since we know that Oregon has some of the most particularly excellent social service programs of any State, and I mean

that. That is my background, I knew many of your legislators,

when I was in the Wyoming Legislature, and I know what they did

to put those on the books.

So I would be interested in that and to what extent do you believe that this 36-month eligibility for the cash assistance does promote dependency, or does it, particularly from the view of a progressive social service program State like Oregon. I would like to

have your thoughts.

Mr. BURNS. There are four major reasons why our dependency

rate is so high. The first has to do with the characteristics of the

refugee population. About 70 percent of the refugees who have

come to Oregon over the last years are preliterate. They have no

transferable job skills and no understanding of American culture

and practices.

Second, one must look at the arrival rate of refugees to Oregon.

Oversimplifying, let me say that if Oregon resettled its per capita

share of refugees, our refugee population would now be about

6,000, that happens to be the number of refugees in Oregon who

are not on welfare now. The number of refugees coming to Oregon

is simply more than we can absorb and assist.

The third reason is the State's unemployment rate. There are

155,000 Oregonians out of work. As I mentioned earlier, for every

refugee looking for work, there are 52 unemployed nonrefugee Oregonians, and that ratio does not count the increasing number of

discouraged workers, who are unemployed and probably seeking

work but don't show up in our statistics.

The fourth reason that I would point to, very frankly, is the

sponsorship pattern. Less than a third of the refugees coming into

Oregon are sponsored by American congregations or American

families. They are sponsored by other refugees, most of whom are

on public assistance. Naturally they turn to public assistance at

the time of entrance.

Senator SIMPSON. That is very important. I have heard testimony

to that effect in previous hearings, and it seems to me that the subcommittee is going to pay careful attention to these sponsorship

patterns. I think that people have a different vision of sponsorship

than what is very real out there.

I am very interested in your comments because, indeed, we find

sponsorship by those who are on public assistance and having great

difficulty themselves, so how can they be of assistance to any refugee, especially to someone who would grapple with the difficulties

of preliteracy. It is very critical.

Mr. BURNS. In response to your question about the 36-month

limit, let me say, that as a result of the four conditions that I

listed, it is very difficult for Oregon to indicate whether 36 months

is a reasonable national limit or not.

If we had a smaller number of refugees, we probably could deal

with them in a shorter period of time. But at this point the 36-
104

month limit is reasonable for us. We do not hear of many hardships for those refugees who are cut off after 36 months.

Senator SIMPSON. AS an alternative to the general assistance reimbursement, you favor an impact aid program for States with

these high refugee concentrations. Would you also favor a reduction in the amount of Federal reimbursement for non-AFDC refugees to receive cash and medical assistance?

Mr. BURNS. Let me say that there would have to be a combination of facts to make impact aid provisions viable. These include allocation of adequate funds prior to implementation of a final policy

and assuring flexibility in the use of those funds.

Senator SIMPSON. I understand that the Western States met earlier in the year and discussed proposed changes in the refugee resettlement program. Was there any consensus of action that should

be taken at that time?

Mr. BURNS. There were consenses on the need for ongoing meaningful consultation on the part of the Office of Refugee Resettlement with the States. What we have seen over the last year has

not been consultation, it has been information sharing from ORR

on policy decisions they had already made.

For the last 8 months, the message that we have received is that

the assistance policy decision had already been made. It was simply

a matter of days or maybe of weeks before we received the policy

in final form. What we would like is real consultation. We would

like an opportunity to present our ideas, with the advantages and

disadvantages, and the costs, and then to have the Office of Refugee Resettlement respond in kind.

Senator SIMPSON. Did you have that kind of rapport, say, IVz

years ago or 2 years ago?

Mr. BURNS. We have always complained about the consultation

process.

Senator SIMPSON. I remember that, and I just wanted to touch on

that lightly. But it has been just a continuing problem.

What is your solution to the sponsorship issue? I am curious,

knowing that it is a State Department function, but I would be interested in how you think we might correct some of those abuses of

sponsorship.

Mr. BURNS. There are a number of things that need to take

place, and some of the comments and suggestions that we have offered are very similar to those prepared by an Office of Refugee

Resettlement task force.

The one area that I would stress that was not mentioned in the

ORR task force report is the need for reasonable voluntary agency

caseload standards to be established. Those caseload standards

could vary depending on whether the voluntary agency used congregations, American family sponsors or direct resettlement staff

within the local office. Formalized service definitions should be established for voluntary agencies with staffing adequate to meet

those responsibilities.

Beyond that, we basically support the other suggestions that

were made by the Office of Refugee Resettlement task force. Refugees who are on public assistance and unemployed should not sponsor, family reunification should be very narrowly defined in impact
105

areas, and States must have a legitimate role in setting arrival

rates.

Senator SIMPSON. And followup should be apparent.

Mr. BURNS. There should be monitoring and accountability.

Senator SIMPSON. Indeed, we find shockingly enough that there

is very little followup, would you agree?

Mr. BURNS. I would wholeheartedly concur with that.

Senator SIMPSON. HOW do you explain that? Is it a matter of

keeping the Federal dollars coming in, the desire to just kind of get

it done, then move on to another one. What is your thought on

that?

Mr. BURNS. Very frankly, the voluntary agencies in Oregon have

indicated that the volume of arrivals is more than they can handle

given the staffing and the funds that they have available. If they

can meet the needs of new arrivals for a month or two that basically fulfills their responsibilities.

Beyond that, if refugees have an emergency need or other problem, voluntary agencies are open to requests for assistance, but

there is no active ongoing case management.

Senator SIMPSON. Perhaps that needs reassessment, that attitude,

and we will pursue that at some later time.

Ms. Levy, if eligibility were changed for non-AFDC refugees to

limit them to this 18-month Federal reimbursement, do you think

that an impact aid program or targeted assistance program would

be a feasible alternative for your State during the second 18-month /

period?

Ms. LEVY. I doubt that the impact aid formula is likely to be an

alternative for us.

One of the problems with the impact aid approach is that it goes

against some of the innovations that ORR is trying to make in

terms of placement policy, moving refugees into low impact areas,

such as Wisconsin essentially is. Since you would be funneling

money into high impact States, and especially high impact areas

with high GA•which tend to be California, an already impacted

State•you would find that refugees would continue to impact on

those places even more.

We would favor an approach that dealt with all of the States

equitably. We are particularly concerned that an impact formula is

likely, if available at all, to be available in the next fiscal year,

when we are talking about, on March 1, dumping off assistance

3,000 people in our State, and 60,000 to 80,000 people nationwide.

Senator SIMPSON. I might ask, what is the situation in your State

with regard to unaccompanied minors, how is that handled?

Ms. LEVY. We have a very extensive unaccompanied minors program. We have taken about 50 Indochinese unaccompanied minors,

and all of the Cuban unaccompanied minors who did not have relatives. So the unaccompanied minors program constitutes about half

of our Cuban/Haitian budget at this point.

Senator SIMPSON. Let me ask you this, because I recall testimony

at some hearing in the past. Is there currently any type of tension,

social tension in your State as a result of a perception among the

citizens that refugees have received special entitlement programs?

As we address this issue of equity, is that attitude there?
106

Ms. LEVY. There is some feeling, among the county governments

in particular, that the duplication of grants•where one household

unit would get several grants, because it is an extended family

living together•that that inequity does cause some feeling, harsh

feeling. That is why we would recommend that the filing unit be

defined as the household unit. That is one of the reasons why we

recommended that.

In terms of community tension, I think that community tensions

arise more out of competition for scarce community resources, that

this policy would in fact exacerbate. The competition for housing,

competition for job training, and competition for jobs are where we

see the community tensions.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you.

Mr. Gibbs, you make the statement that changes in the eligibility requirements for AFDC have led to the breaking up of families

in Washington, and you cite some statistics of a previous withdrawal of public assistance. Could you give me a little more information

on that, how you obtained that information?

Mr. GIBBS. Yes; let me explain first that on March 1, 1981, the

unemployed parent segment of the AFDC program was terminated

in the State of Washington. We, in the Department, funded an independent research effort to do a random sample study of the population after 6 months to determine what happened to those

people.

There were 7,700 cases that were terminated on March 1, 1981,

involving some 26,000 people. It was in that context, then, that we

sought data on how many people got jobs, how many people moved

away, what happened to family composition. It was an independent

research effort that we funded.

What we discovered was, as I indicated before, that in that 6-

month period, 15 percent of the families experienced separation or

divorce. About 10 percent of the families moved out of State. The

population as a whole moved 1.7 times in that 6-month period, so

that people had to adjust to their lower living standards in erratical ways, by moving back with other families.

In terms of employment, what we discovered was that on March

1, when that program was terminated, 31 percent of the cases had

one working member already but generally at low pay, hence they

were on public assistance. By August 1, 51 percent of those families

had one member working, but half of those working families were

being supported by one part-time job. Twenty-two percent of those

families in that 5-month period found no job at all.

This is a population in the State of Washington that is basically

white, better than 85 percent would be white, 15 percent or so minority, higher educated; and English speaking. So I say, on the

basis of what has happened in that program, that the consequences

among the refugee population, I think, will be even worse.

Senator SIMPSON. That is helpful.

You have stated, as you said, that this would have disastrous

social consequences.

If we find that it is a policy of the Department of Health and

Human Services to increase the equity in eligibility of benefits

among refugees and citizens, and apparently that is their intent,

what alternatives would you propose to us which might create
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greater equity, without risking the consequences that you express

to us? Do you have any thoughts on that?

Mr. GIBBS. I would like to address the issue of equity.

First, I would say, as the Secretary of the Department of Social

and Health Services, I get a lot of correspondence from people all

over the State complaining about many things, and I get lots of letters complaining about welfare, and welfare cheats. I get very few

letters complaining about refugees getting assistance.

I think the issue of community tensions and the issue of equity

are overstated. I think they are being used as a justification to

reduce the budget.

Senator SIMPSON. Let's just call it equity. I am sure there would

be very few people who would object to supporting assistance to refugees. What I am speaking of is what we are finding, and have

found in previous hearings, that the community objects to see the

refugee population receive greater benefits than the citizen population. That is what I am addressing.

Mr. GIBBS. I am saying that, although we have refugees in the

State of Washington, who are getting assistance, who, if they were

American citizens at the present time, would not be, this is not as

large an issue as some would make it out.

Senator SIMPSON. That is interesting.

Mr. Perez, if I may, it would seem to me that California, obviously, would stand to lose less, I suppose, if that is the word, if these

regulations were implemented since your State is one which,

unlike Oregon and Washington, has a widespread general assistance program. However, you would have this tremendous administrative burden of managing these various county programs.

Would there be any way in which California would favor this

proposal?

Mr. PEREZ. It is my position that we generally agree with the

concept, as stated in my comments to you, as well NACO's comments to your committee, with the thrust of better equity, with the

thrust of getting supportive services whenever that will get the refugee to be self-supporting as early as possible. We have no problem

with that.

In Alameda County, we have demonstrated quite successfully,

working jointly with voluntary agencies, private providers, local

school districts, junior colleges, to get people into the mainstream

of employment. So that is not as big a problem as it may be in

other areas. The problem is that now we are shortening the time in

which we can do this. We feel that the 36 months is a more adequate time.

Now that the administration is, apparently, choosing the option

of reducing the benefits to be able to live within its budgeted

amount, that is going to make the job very difficult for us, and in

quite a few instances impossible for us to do.

To answer your specific question, I would hope that the administration would sit down, and as I understand there are 10 counties

in the Nation that have the preponderance of refugees, and be able

to have some kind of a work session with the local people that are

administering this. I am not just talking about local elected officials and bureaucrats, but the people that are providing the serv-
108

ice, whether it is the private or public sector, and work out regional, joint agreements about how best to do that.

In Alameda County, we feel that we could make a real good stab

at 18 months if we have the assurances that the Federal Government will pay all administrative costs.

Senator SIMPSON. You make the proposal, or you discuss making

full-time college students ineligible to receive the refugee cash assistance. What do you think would be the implications of that

policy?

Could you just elaborate very swiftly on that; I would be interested.

Mr. PEREZ. Yes; what we are addressing here is the area of

equity between a person that would be an adult and it not tied categorically to AFDC, for example, and an adult person that does not

have a family and is not tied categorically to AFDC cannot now,

under Alameda regulations, go to college.

For purposes of equity, we feel that that we need, to the extent

possible, extend that same limitation to a refugee, with some exceptions. I feel that English as a second language, or a specific timelimited training, not the usual automatic 36 months, that exceptions could be made. But that needs to be discussed and agreed to

with the specifics of job opportunity in the community, training in

the community, and the resources in the community.

Senator SIMPSON. One final question. You mentioned your support for continuing to make two-parent families with dependent

children eligible for refugee assistance. As one not totally versed in

the varying local commitment degrees of AFDC, and it certainly

varies all over the United States, I would ask, why is the consideration that a two-parent family qualify, if the parents are employable?

Mr. PEREZ. I don't understand the question. Senator. Why do we

support two-parent families with adult children?

Senator SIMPSON. Why a two-parent family would qualify, if

those parents are employable.

Mr. PEREZ. I am sorry, I don't get the question.

Senator SIMPSON. That is what I am trying to develop. I am not

totally versed on how you handle AFDC in your various counties in

California.

If that is not the case, there is no need to go further with the

question, but I understood that a two-parent family would qualify

for benefits, even if the parents are employable.

Mr. PEREZ. Yes; we have the U program, where they are unemployed.

Senator SIMPSON. The U program?

Mr. PEREZ. Yes; we have an unemployed program in California,

and if they are unemployed, they are employable, they qualify. The

general assistance program, they are employable, they qualify,

however, they must then participate in a workfare program.

Senator SIMPSON. I see, a workfare program. Does that function

properly the workfare program in California.

Mr. PEREZ. In general assistance, we have found that it has

worked well in Alameda County.
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Senator SIMPSON. Let me ask just one other question, and I will

not ask it of the gentleman from Oregon because he has already

answered this.

How does each of you, just very swiftly, respond to the assertion

that one reason the refugee dependency rates are as high as they

are is because of this full reimbursement for the 36-month period

which creates little incentive for States and counties to pursue

other alternatives which might decrease those dependency rates. I

would inquire your thoughts on that.

Ms. LEVY. I think that misreads both the motivation of the refugees and of the State and local units of government. I think that

the refugees are, in fact, very well motivated, do want to get jobs,

and do work themselves off of welfare. Certainly, we have every interest in helping them do so. We do not want to see high dependency rates.

Our counties and our States work very hard at getting people independent. Over half of our social services money goes directly to

employment services which have a case management program

where refugees must find work, do have time limited training, if

training is provided; and our training is not college education.

Our caseload rules do not allow university students to be enrolled in the cash assistance program. In fact, our training is generally in such things as janitorial services, because we are dealing

with Hmong refugees that we have to train in order to get a job as

a janitor.

Senator SIMPSON. Do you have a quick response to that, Mr.

Gibbs, because we do hear this asserted. You get letters, you say,

about your duties, and we get letters on that one. I am just curious

how you would respond to that.

Mr. GIBBS. I don't think that the availability of cash and medical

assistance for 36 months is the main cause of dependency. I think

the main cause of dependency are those factors that we have already listed.

The people in our department, in local government, and in voluntary organizations, I know for a fact, work diligently trying to get

these people on a self-sustaining basis and off of dependency status.

I think that there is, in my own judgment, not enough incentive at

the moment for States to be more diligent in that regard, but I

think that is a problem that can be cured by State administration

and by some closer supervision from the Department of Health and

Human Services.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you.

Mr. Perez.

Mr. PEREZ. Yes; we feel that the reason that those allegations are

made is simply because we, at the local level, are not administering

a local program. We are administering a Federal and State program where we have no aptitude to work dealing with the specific

situation as we do, for example, in the GA program.

I certainly believe that it is not possible for us and it is not legal

for us to be able to, within a Federal statute and a State statute, to

vary between individual clients or individual families, we have to,

therefore, carry out the benefits on a broad base and not on an individual basis.
no

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much. I appreciate the testimony of all of you. It has been very helpful to the subcommittee

and I appreciate it.

The final panel of the afternoon will be Mr. Le Xuan Khoa, Coordinator of the Council of Vietnamese Associations of Washington,

D.C.; Wells Klein of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, American

Council for Nationalities Service, New York, N.Y.; and Mr. John F.

Herrity, chairman of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,

Fairfax, Va.

Nice to have you with us again, Mr. Khoa and Mr. Klein. Nice to

see you, Mr. Herrity.

If you would proceed in the same order as on the agenda.

STATEMENT OF LE XUAN KHOA, COORDINATOR, COUNCIL OF

VIETNAMESE ASSOCIATIONS IN THE GREATER WASHINGTON

METROPOLITAN AREA

Mr. KHOA. Mr. Chairman, I am Le Xuan Khoa, coordinator of

the Council of Vietnamese Associations in the greater Washington

Metropolitan area.

On behalf of the council, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify on an issue which may have strong effects on the

effort toward sociocultural integration and economic self-sufficiency of the refugee population.

Being fully aware of the current difficult situation in the U.S.

economy, we support the idea that appropriate regulatory changes

be made in order to reduce unnecessary welfare dependency of refugees. However, attempt to balance the Federal budget must be

made fairly and responsibly to avoid administrative havoc for the

States and the counties and an abrupt drop in assistance eligibility

of vulnerable persons.

We fear that the general assistance provision of the new policy

will discourage many States which have supported the refugee program in the past from participating in the program in the future.

Over time this could hurt the ability of the United States to accept

the necessary numbers of refugees from life-threatening situations

overseas.

Speaking from the refugee viewpoint, we do not feel it appropriate to discuss here the specific impact that proposed regulations

will have upon State and local governments. Instead, we would like

to focus our comments on those specific areas that directly affect

various groups of refugees.

As proposed, the new regulations may not adequately provide for

the most critical needs of refugees because many refugees do not

have resources available to the general American public, such as

unemployment compensation, insurance benefits, savings, credit,

language, and employment skills, et cetera.

They may well reduce the possibility for refugees to become selfsupporting. For example, removal of the $30 plus one-third work

incentive will discourage refugee heads of households from accepting entry-level jobs that are usually the only available initial step

toward self-sufficiency.

They may speed up the transfer of refugees from AFDC to general assistance programs and, therefore, may encourage secondary
Ill

migration to other States and communities which have GA programs or better employment opportunities, and where there is community support.

In view of the gaps in regulations as proposed, we would like to

offer the following five recommendations:

First, the reduced period of eligibility should be applied flexibly

with special consideration to the following two categories of nonAFDC, eligible refugees: Individuals and couples 55 years of age

and older; and unaccompanied minors who need to be insured of

continuous Federal support. Both of these groups have unusual difficulty finding jobs due to language and lack of marketable skills/

work experience.

Second, the March 1 implementation date leaves little time for

refugees to make plans for their future. Regardless of the period of

eligibility, we suggest a grace period of 3 months for cash assistance and 6 months of medical assistance while affected refugees

find employment and, therefore, may become eligible for private

health insurance programs.

Third, vocational training, English language acquisition, career

counseling, and job development are essential to self-sufficiency.

They must not only continue, but be intensified if refugees are to

become self-supporting within a reduced period of time. The refugee community considers investment in human skills to be no less

important than cash-assistance eligibility.

Fourth, the family unit concept used in the food stamp program

could effectively reduce the number of "split cases," in which adult

children apply for separate cash assistance while the rest of the

family living in the same home receives AFDC.

Fifth, finally, equity need not imply identical treatment of refugees and nonrefugees. Rather, equal treatment should mean insuring an equal opportunity to refugees to pursue their rights to life,

liberty, and happiness. Refugees are an at-risk population with

unique needs to be met during their initial period in the United

States.

They require a reasonable time of support and specially targeted

assistance programs designed to enable them to achieve self-reliance, rather than policies which doom them to becoming a burden

on society as a whole.

We have the experience for cost-effective refugee programing in

the United States. Let us apply that experience as effectively as we

can.

In closing, I would like to say that the refugee community is

committed to achieving self-sufficiency, and welcomes any reasonable plan to reach that goal as mandated by the Congress.

Thank you.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Khoa.

Wells Klein, please.
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STATEMENT OF WELLS C. KLEIN, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, ON

BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION AND REFUGEE

AFFAIRS, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR

FOREIGN SERVICE

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am Wells C.

Klein, executive director of the American Council for Nationalities

Service. I am here today representing the views of the Committee

on Migration and Refugee Affairs of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service [ACVAFS] on the proposed revisions to refugee cash and medical assistance regulations. The

agencies joining in this testimony are: American Council for Nationalities Service; American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees; Buddhist Council for Refugee Rescue and Resettlement; Church World

Service; HIAS; International Rescue Committee; Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service; Migration and Refugee Services,

United States Catholic Conference; Polish American Immigration

and Relief Committee; The Presiding Bishop's Fund for World

Relief/The Episcopal Church; Tolstoy Foundation; World Relief;

and Young Men's Christian Association.

As perhaps you know, the ACVAFS is an umbrella entity of 45

humanitarian and development assistance organizations. Voluntary agencies involved in domestic resettlement of refugees come

together as a Standing Committee of the American Council to promote coordination within the private sector on behalf of sound resettlement. We are, Mr. Chairman, part of a resettlement system

that involves many other parties, including the Federal Government, State and local governments, and refugees themselves. We

seek to foster continued cooperation by all of these parties so that

this Nation can continue to participate meaningfully in resettling

that portion of the world's refugees for whom other viable alternatives do not exist. It is within this framework that we express

today our concerns regarding the proposed regulation changes.

Mr. Chairman, voluntary agencies working in the field of resettlement have long advocated restricting the current easy availability of cash assistance to refugees. We believe that the current

system frequently seduces those who could work or could work

sooner into a lifestyle of dependency. It often has the result of compromising the generally high motivation of refugees to regain selfsufficiency in our society. Therefore, we support the intent of the

proposed regulations. We have, however, some serious reservations

regarding both the content and the implementation of the regulation.

The resettlement system is a complicated one involving a partnership between the public and private sectors. Our colleagues

from State and local governments have provided many knowledgeable and useful comments in their responss to the proposed regulations with which we are by and large in agreement. We will not try

to deal with the technical detail of these issues here. We do, however, want to make several points on behalf of the resettlement agencies, some of which we believe are shared by our public sector partners:
113

First, in admitting refugees, we as a nation make a commitment

to help them overcome the particular disadvantages deriving from

being refugees, and to assist them to achieve economic and social

self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible. We also make a commitment

to insure that refugee resettlement does not place undue or unequal burdens on local communities in which refugees resettle or

on the public services provided by these communities. The admission of refugees for resettlement here is a Federal policy and their

effective resettlement remains a Federal responsibility. While we

support the direction of restricting the availability of cash assistance, our support is only with the framework of responsible implementation of these principles.

Second, most informed participants in the resettlment system

have known for some time that the planned availability of funding

in fiscal year 1982 for the Office of Refugee Resettlement was inadequate to support the continuation of current cash and medical assistance policy. There has been time for HHS to propose modifications in a reasonable and orderly fashion. Thus the unrealistic timelines proposed for implementation, particularly at a time when

the economy at large is strained, recognize neither the delicate

nature of the resettlment system nor the needs of States, agencies,

and dependent refugees. States need time to modify or work out

new systems, particularly where general assistance programs are

locally administered, to resolve issues of liability and in many instances even to obtain legislative authority to exercise the options

available to them under the proposed regulations. As social agencies one of our paramount concerns is for the refugee on the receiving end of these public policy changes. While individual hardships

are the inevitable result of such changes, we urge that these

changes be implemented in such a way that individual refugees

and their families can appropriately plan for their future. A realistic understanding of the administrative needs of States and localities as well as the need for reasonable planning by and with affected refugees can only lead to a more realistic implementation date.

Third, we believe that the circumstances of Cuban and Haitian

entrants represent a unique problem in terms of their resettlement

needs and their impact on local communities. We are very concerned that, in severely impacted States such as Florida, the effective elimination of benefits after 18 months will result in dumping

large numbers of unprepared entrants onto already hurting communities. This is compounded by the lack of clarity within the proposed regulation as to whether or not a needy entrant will be in a

position to participate for a full 18 months in these programs, if

needed, once he or she has left a holding facility and entered an

American community. At what point does the Government begin

counting to 18?

Fourth, we are also deeply concerned that the current proposed

regulations represent a continuation of our piecemeal approach to

refugee resettlement, one which will inevitably result in further

hue and cry across the land. The problem is that we have no clear,

comprehensive, well thought out resettlement policy. The weakness

of these regulations is that they address only one part of a complex

and interrelated system. These proposed regulations are designed

to save money. While this is necessary, our persistent failure to

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114

rethink and rationalize our entire approach to domestic resettlement causes all of the parties to rest uneasy.

Fifth, we believe, taking all these factors together, that the net

result of the current approach will be to erode the support of the

general public and State and local officials for continued admission

of refugees for whom viable alternatives do not exist. The current

approach threatens to undermine the resettlement system, a

system which this country needs for its own longer range foreign

policy and humanitarian interests. Conditions in the world being

what they are, we need that system in place now and in the future

regardless of year to year levels of admissions.

To avoid these negative results we propose the following:

First, a comprehensive rethinking of the system with Federal

leadership and open dialog between all of the system's participants.

We need to examine if the use of the public welfare system as the

lynch-pin for domestic resettlement is programmatically sound and

cost effective. We do not think it is, and we urge a serious examination of alternatives.

Second, a timeframe for implementation of this proposal or any

other significant changes in policy must take into account the realistic administrative and legislative needs of States and localities,

and the case planning needs of the voluntary resettlement agencies.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we support reducing the welfare

portion of this program. Sound rethinking, dialog between the concerned parties, and responsiveness to the real resettlement needs of

refugees can permit us to achieve this goal and still avoid the pitfalls we have enumerated.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Klein.

Now, Mr. Herrity.

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. HERRITY, CHAIRMAN, FAIRFAX COUNTY

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, FAIRFAX, VA.

Mr. HERRITY. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am

John F. Herrity, chairman of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak on behalf of Fairfax County regarding the timely and important issue of refugee resettlement.

Fairfax County has a current refugee population of approximately 6,000 which, if I recall the testimony from Oregon, it is about

the same number as the whole State of Oregon, which represents 1

out of every 100 residents of the county. First migration refugees

are currently arriving in our county at the rate of 70 per month.

Currently, there are 1,500 refugee households receiving public assistance in our county.

Even though practically all new arrivals have had 12 weeks of

language training and cultural orientation while in the refugee

camps, we are finding that they require more intensive and extensive resettlement services than those who arrived in previous

years. This is because of a large percentage come from lower socioeconomic and educational strata.
115

As noted in our comments submitted to the Office of Refugee Resettlement on January 11 of this year, Fairfax County supports the

proposed 18-month limitation on cash assistance benefits for refugees as long as we can be assured that localities will receive

enough funds to provide the social services necessary to assist the

refugees in becoming self-sufficient within the 18 months alloted.

We are in favor of the 18-month limitation for the following reasons:

Our analysis of our current caseload has shown that if Virginia

chooses to seek Federal reimbursement for those costs incurred for

refugees under the Virginia general relief program during a refugee's second 18 months, the fiscal impact upon the county would be

minimal.

Approximately 50 percent of the current refugee recipients

would lose eligibility due to the 18-month limit, but 90 percent of

those affected would be eligible for at least 3 more months of benefits under our general relief program. During this transition

period, we believe that this will allow sufficient time for refugees

to find employment.

Research has shown that most refugees begin in entry level jobs

regardless of length of stay in the United States. A study conducted

by our neighboring county, Arlington, Va., has shown that the job

market dictates employment opportunities for the refugee more

than the training he or she has received. This being the case, we

are doing no favors for the refugee or for the taxpayer by maintaining the 36-month availability of public assistance.

Refugees who are illiterate in their own language can attend free

intensive English as a second language classes for 40 weeks and

possess the minimum language skills necessary to continue their

learning on the job. Thereafter, language skills will improve only

with practice.

We suggest that the marketplace is the best place for such practice. Further, employed refugees can avail themselves of intermediate and advanced level English as a second language classes to improve their language skills.

The elimination of the 36-month eligibility may help reduce the

community tension and prejudices that are developing because of

the special treatment which some members of the community feel

is being given to the newly arrived refugee.

We are concerned about medical coverage for refugees after the

18-month period has expired. Since many of the entry level jobs

that the refugees will be taking do not provide medical benefits, we

fear that strains will be placed upon Virginia State and local hospitalization program for in-patient care and that emergency rooms of

hospitals will become the chief provider of out-patient care. Since

we believe services to refugees to be a Federal responsibility, we believe Federal assistance for medical care should be continued.

While Fairfax County receives a current average of 70 first migration refugees per month, we are experiencing refugee applications for public assistance at the rate of 125 per month. This means

that refugees are moving to Fairfax from other localities because of

the services and cash assistance benefits available.

Continuation of this trend of secondary migration will create a

strain on our ability to provide quality services. Since we know
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that this is also happening in other heavily impacted areas around

the country, we support the implementation of an impact aid program for refugees which will include sufficient funds to meet the

needs of the population.

In conclusion, we in Fairfax County have found refugees to be an

industrious population which is able to quickly become an asset to

our community. We feel it is our responsibility to provide social adjustment, English language training, health services, and employment assistance to these new members of our community.

If these services are available at adequate levels, we feel that an

18-month period is long enough to enable refugees to become selfsufficient. We believe it is a Federal responsibility to provide the

requisite funds to enable us to do our job. To date, the funds have

not been adequate.

Thank you for the opportunity to express our views.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Herrity.

How many members are on that board, is that a three-member

board?

Mr. HERRITY. There are nine members.

Senator SIMPSON. Nine members?

Mr. HERRITY. Yes, Senator, five Democrats and four Republicans.

It is an elected board.

Senator SIMPSON. That is one of the burdens of public life.

Your remarks are very interesting, and I appreciate having

them.

We have a rollcall vote coming up, but I am going to try to proceed with some questions.

While you are here, Mr. Herrity, let me ask you. You indicate

that "Fairfax County is experiencing significant levels of secondary

migration because of the services and cash assistance benefits

available." That is your quote. If general assistance is only provided for 3 months in Fairfax County, what are the additional services and cash assistance benefits which are attracting refugees?

How do you come to feel that this secondary migration is being

stimulated by increased benefits, rather than other factors, say,

such as family reunification?

Mr. HERRITY. I would say that our English as a second language

program is probably a model for the country in terms of its implementation, and that has been one factor. But I there are other factors, probably the economy of Fairfax County. I might quote from a

Washington Post article of January 25, an article on regional business:

The Metropolitan Washington Fairfax has become the indisputable economic powerhouse. To the extent that the area as a whole is protected from the real decline

that would be translated into recession, it is because of continued growth in northern Virginia, and particularly in Fairfax County.

Not only does this county have the highest family incomes overall, it is really an

affluent metropolitan region, and it is also the envy of other jurisdictions in the

metropolitan area in terms of business expansion. In 10 years, from 1971 to 1981,

this growth included 1,075 new companies and $14.9 million worth of business,

building space, and about 55,000 new jobs.

So there is a combination of factors, I believe, in this region that

would attract one to Fairfax County in addition to public assistance.
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Senator SIMPSON. If Fairfax County had a general assistance program which lasted 18 months beyond the Federal resettlement program, would you still favor these regulations?

Mr. HERRITY. I think if we had the 18 months plus the impact

due to the second migration, that would satisfy our needs.

I personally believe, and I believe the board of supervisors believes, that there is some point in time when people have to

become self-sufficient, otherwise they become addicted to the Federal breast. When the addiction occurs at a point in a person's life,

you never get off of it.

As I pointed out in my statement, most of these people are

coming in at low entry level jobs that are not particular attractive

unless you have to go out and look for a job and work at it. I believe that when you spend 36 months in a welfare situation, after a

while you become addicted to it.

So 18 months, in my opinion, makes sense in terms of what is

really happening in the economy. If you ever expect to achieve

independence of these people, you have got to stop at some point.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you.

Mr. Khoa, we have heard testimony today, and in previous hearings, that the 36-month eligibility for benefits currently available

fosters a belief, as Mr. Herrity has mentioned, among all refugees

that there is an entitlement to those benefits, therefore, a discouragement of them to achieve self-sufficiency, this viewpoint comes to

us periodically from witnesses and correspondence stating that current policy discourages refugees to achieve self-sufficiency in a

shorter period of time.

As a recognized leader in the Washington, D.C., area refugee

community, do you find that this perception is in fact accurate

among refugees?

Of course, we are also informed and our correspondence indicates

that high dependency rates are due in part to the practice of allowing refugees who are themselves receiving public assistance to

sponsor additional refugees, as we have heard today. I would appreciate your comments on that.

Mr. KHOA. Yes, Mr. Chairman, as I suggest in one of my recommendations, the period of eligibility of the refugees may be applied

flexibly according to different categories of refugees. Single adults,

for example, I don't think that they need an equal time as the

older people, or AFDC people, or even childless couples but older of

age. That depends on the category, on the capacity of the refugees

where we can apply flexibility.

Senator SIMPSON. We had excellent testimony a few months ago

from an Indochinese refugee sponsorship group attesting to what I

think is an acknowledged fact•inherent and historical work ethic

of the Indochinese refugee.

What have we done in our refugee resettlement policies which

has resulted in the present 67-percent dependency rate?

Mr. KHOA. The high rate of dependency can be accounted for by

the fact that the recent waves of refugees, the newly arrived refugees are much less educated people. They need more assistance in

terms of language and skills training. Many of them, as you might

be aware of, are not only illiterate or less educated people than the

previous waves, but also they are very poor people, having no mar-
118

ketable skills and they have experienced extremely traumatic circumstances during their escape. They depend heavily on their relatives who have been here before for some period of time.

Senator SIMPSON. DO you think we need to take some corrective

measures in eligibility criteria for sponsors?

Mr. KHOA. I beg your pardon?

Senator SIMPSON. Those who sponsor, do you think we need to

take some measures to be sure that those who sponsor these individuals are in every respect capable of sponsoring them and do not

have some of the problems that those they are receiving have?

Mr. KHOA. There is a suggestion that welfare recipients should

not sponsor relatives to this country. I think that the idea is acceptable, but in order to avoid the tragedy of people waiting too

long in the camps, I would suggest that the refugee communities,

the mutual assistance associations sponsor those refugees.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Klein, you indicate in your testimony that the voluntary

agencies in resettlement have long advocated restricting what you

term the "current easy availability" of cash assistance to refugees.

What degree of restriction do you view as acceptable? To what

extent do you believe that limiting access to those benefits will correctly promote refugee self-sufficiency?

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, we have not discussed specific limitations. I will give you some thoughts of my own which I think will

probably be in the ballpark.

I think we feel that those who are AFDC and SSI eligible should

be put on AFDC and SSI immediately, if they are eligible by definition. I think we would like to see a relatively short period of eligibility for those who fall under the waiver of categorical relatedness.

In fact, I think that some of us feel quite strongly that perhaps

those waivers should not exist at all, and that there should be some

other form of interim support to assist these people over the hump,

or the first 6, 8, 10, or 12 months, or whatever it would be, but they

should not enter into the public assistance system except as categorically eligible.

Senator SIMPSON. DO you recall, you may have been testifying

that day, we heard testimony one previous time during the refugee

consultation that 90 percent of new refugees arriving in San Diego

County were going into public assistance within the first 10 days

they were in the United States.

What is the reason for such a high level of dependency during a

period when not only the voluntary agencies but the sponsors are

historically, and we believe to be, caring for the refugee and encouraging him to become self-sufficient?

What effect, if any, would the proposed regulations have on that

kind of occurrence?

Mr. KLEIN. I believe that it will have no effect on that. I think

that occurrence, and it is quite true that in a number of places the

refugees are encouraged to go to the public assistance office soon

after arrival, and that is simply because the period of time it takes

between application for public assistance and receiving the first

check can go 8, 12, or 14 weeks•for the record, I can submit some

information from San Francisco, very precise information on
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that•so that the voluntary agency is in the position of having to

take a gamble.

If they do not register the refugee for public assistance early on,

and if it is not possible to find that refugee a job which that refugee will stay in, at the end of a 4- or 8-week period, you have a

refugee with no support system, and the voluntary agency having

no funding available, and this multiplies many times over, so that

we are caught in a bind there.

It has to do with how long it takes to receive public assistance

once registered. There are many other variables, but that is the

primary one.

Senator SIMPSON. I have a note that they are not going to hold

that vote but for another 3 minutes, so I must wind up. I could

come back. I have some other questions that I would like to submit

to you, Mr. Klein, and you have always been most helpful to the

subcommittee. I will submit those in writing.

I appreciate your testimony, and rather than come back and

delay you all, we will terminate the hearing.

Mr. KLEIN. Could I make one 15-second comment, Mr. Chairman,

on the question of sponsorship.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. I think that it is important to hear that for the

record.

In no case is a dependent family a refugee sponsor. In every case,

it is the voluntary agency or its local affiliate or the church that is

the sponsor. Local refugees are the anchor relatives. The incoming

refugee may go and live with that family, but the responsibility for

that incoming refugee rests with the voluntary agency. If that voluntary agency does not exercise that responsibility, then that voluntary agency is at fault. But the system is that the voluntary

agency itself is the sponsor.

Senator SIMPSON. I think we will want to pursue the relationship

between the sponsoring agency and the anchor relative, that may

be what we want to address.

Thank you so much. I appreciate it very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to

call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

THE CITY OF PORTLAND, OREG.,

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

Portland, Oreg., February 5, 1982.

Hon. ALAN SIMPSON,

Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugees,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SIMPSON: I am enclosing written testimony regarding the effects of

the Office of Refugee Resettlement's proposed rule change.

While I realize that you will hear testimony from the State of Oregon regarding

the change, I hope you will also consider my testimony to the effects of the change

on the City of Portland in your committee deliberations.

There has been a consistent lack of opportunity for local government to participate in the decisions regarding refugee programming. This is most unfortunate as it

is the cities and towns of this country which are doing the day to day work of resettlement.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

CHARLES R. JORDAN,

Commissioner ofPublic Safety.

Enclosure.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CITY COMMISSIONER CHARLES JORDAN, PORTLAND, OREG.

Submitted to: Senator Alan Simpson, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and

Refugees, Room A-509, Senate Annex, 119 D St., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20510.

The City of Portland, Oregon has been participating in the resettlement of refugees since the first Vietnam refugees arrived in 1975. There are now over 12,000

refugees in the city from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Poland and Afghanistan. Our city, and our state rank among the top three in the nation for number of

refugees per capita.

The recent Federal proposal to limit assistance to refugees will have a severely

detrimental effect on the refugees living in Oregon and on the resources and facilities of our community. Washington is the only other state which stands to suffer

such an adverse affect from the policy. The reason Oregon and Washington will be

so devastatingly affected is that neither state has a general assistance welfare program. All of the other states resettling refugees will continue to receive federal reimbursements to their general assistance programs for serving refugees.

The result of the implementation of the new policy will be that 6,000 Oregon and

9,000 Washington refugees will be denied assistance and will not qualify for any

other form of support. To put the impact of this into proper perspective, the following facts are important:

1. 70 percent of the refugees entering Oregon in the last 2 years are illiterate in

their own language. They are without transferable job skills.

2. Oregon's unemployment rate is currently 11.4 percent and rising; The unemployment rate of refugees in Oregon is 50 percent. In other words, for every refugee

seeking a job there are 52 unemployed non-refugees seeking one as well.

3. Over 90 percent of the refugees coming into Oregon apply for and receive cash

and medical assistance. 63 percent of the refugees in the state all currently depend

on public assistance.

4. Oregon's legislature is meeting at this moment to find solutions to a $257 million deficit for the current bienium. Many programs which help needy of our state

are facing massive budget cuts for the second time in less than a year. Economic

factors have similarly affected city and county budgets.

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As a community, Portland has been receptive and helpful to the effort. We

cannot, however, provide that basic support these new residents require. The Office

of Refugee Resettlement obviously has not recognized the unique situation of our

city and state. They are proceeding with the implementation of new policy as

though they are deaf to our concerns. They set aside $20 million for impact aid and

then earmarked that aid for entrants. Refugees will not qualify.

Faced with what seems to be the inevitability of federal abandonment, we are

very concerned. Our refugees face homelessness and fear. They see their options to

be either moving to a general assistance state (California) or divorce or suicide,

which would qualify their families for Oregon Aid to Dependent Children benefits.

We need the help of our representatives in Congress. Will you please speak for

the continued assistance to our refugees or to the provision of funds to assist those

of us who are disproportionately affected by this program.

Thank you for your consideration.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREATER MIAMI UNITED, INC., BY LAURIE A. RASKIN,

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Greater Miami United is a tri-ethnic urban coalition of economic and community

leaders formed following the civil disturbances of 1980 and the refugee influx of

that year. Its purpose is to provide a forum for the discussion, study and resolution

of community problems. The participation of the major ethnic groups is essential as

no aspect of Miami's economic or civic growth can proceed without concern for the

needs and strains in our community.

Federal action and policy with regard to immigration have created a very different Miami over the last twenty years. The first influx of Cuban refugees in the

1960's gave rise to a bilingual, multi-cultural community. Over the years, the

strains of living together were balanced by the benefit of a growing financial and

business community, enhanced by the large Spanish language population. The arrival of Cubans and Haitians in 1980 was a very different matter.

The "Marielitos", over 120,000 strong, were called the "worms and scum" by

Castro. While it is estimated that no more than a few percent were criminals or

social misfits, the small number has been enough to reverse the image and acceptance of the refugees and Cuban Americans.

The backlash from Mariel included a referendum which banned the official use of

any language other than English. Thousands of whites moved away from Miami.

This backlash has shocked and isolated the Cuban community just when they were

becoming a part of mainstream Miami.

The nearly 50,000 Haitians living in Miami have never received the welcome or

experienced the economic success of the Cubans. They are unemployed, intolerably

housed and poor. There are, of course, the 600 Haitians living in the Krome Refugee

Camp. These people have been detained since last summer in conditions worse than

what we provide for convicted criminals in this country. Moreover, the likelihood of

their being released by Executive action is remote and the legal processing of their

asylum claims, including appeal, could drag on for as long as three years. This camp

is an open wound in our community and the source of constant aggravation, turbulence and community disruption. It is considered an example of racist United States

policy by black Miamians and others of conscience.

This is what Federal policy and action have brought Miami.

We urge you to consider Miami in your deliberation on what the immigration law

and policy should be. No other community should be asked to pay this price. We

should not be made to pay this price. The following are areas which should be part

of the protections to states and local communities which you include in the law and

policy.

FEDERAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBIUTY

Sufficient financial support should be provided to communities who welcome and

settle refugees. Federal responsibility should not be forgotten once refugees have entered this country. That responsibility must continue until refugees can become selfsustaining and productive residents and citizens.

In March the Secretary of Health and Human Services proposes to implement

regulations which will shorten the length of time Cuban and Haitian entrants will

receive medical and cash assistance. Taxpayers in Dade County will not be asked to

absorb, not only the social and psychological costs of the refugee influx, but the financial costs as well. Thirty-six million dollars this year! The action is outrageous

and unconscionable!
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We urge the continuance of Federal financial responsibility for Cuban/Haitian

Entrants. We are opposed to the impact aid program being proposed as a substitute

for the existing cash and medical assistance programs. We are opposed to the transfer of Federal funds designed to assist refugees to use for detention and maintenance costs of federal facilities. Finally, we are in favor of full reimbursement to

State and local governments and private agencies for the costs incurred in assisting

refugees and entrants.

THE LEGAL PROCESS

A speedy and non-discriminatory legal process should be employed to determine

asylum claims and otherwise process refugees. A swift legal process would prevent

the long-term detention of refugees which is inhumane and inconsistent with our

fundamental values as a nation.

FOREIGN POLICY

We support foreign policy approaches to the resolution of problems facing nations

in our region. The economic and political problems of Caribbean basin countries will

continue to produce refugees if Federal attention is not considered.

CONCLUSION

Our community is a tinderbox of ethnic tension, a social system in fragile balance.

We are trying to do what we can from within. The Federal government must accept

its share of the responsibility for our situation and make a positive•not a negative•contribution.

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE,

St. Paul, Minn., February 23, 1982.

Hon. ALAN K. SIMPSON,

Chair, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SIMPSON: The State of Minnesota is pleased to present testimony to

the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy.

We appreciate the Committee's February 9, 1982 hearing concerning the proposed

regulations governing the Refugee Assistance Program.

If we can be of further assistance, please let us know.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

ARTHUR E. NOOT, Commissioner.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, REGARDING THE PROPOSED

POLICY CHANGES IN CASH AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR REFUGEES AND ENTRANTS

We appreciate the opportunity to respond in this special hearing to the proposed

"18 month regulations" for the Refugee Assistance Program as outlined in Vol. 46,

No. 238 of the Federal Register, dated December 11, 1981.

Minnesota's statement to the subcommittee is composed of two sections:

I. The Minnesota Situation.

II. Proposed Policy Comments.

I. THE MINNESOTA SITUATION

Minnesota's Indochinese refugee population of 25,000 ranks in the top five impacted states nationally. The Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul are home to 10,000

Hmong refugees from Laos, making that metropolitian area the largest concentration of preliterate refugees in the United States. In the last two calendar years, 1980

and 1981, 41 percent of the new arrivals to the State of Minnesota have been secondary migrants. Most of these persons have become welfare recipients.

The current Minnesota cash assistance caseload

1. Half of the 13,978 Indochinese currently receiving cash assistance in Minnesota

have been in the United States 18 months or longer.
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2. Of the 13,978 Indochinese receiving cash assistance, 10,298 are "special refugee

assistance" (non-AFDC, non-MA) eligible. Of those, only 1,261 are single persons.

The remaining 9,037 are in families. These noncategorically eligible persons are

most vulnerable to the proposed 18 month regulation.

Current public assistance programs in Minnesota

1. While Minnesota's AFDC program does offer a program to intact families

(AFDC-Unemployed Parent), most non-categorically eligible refugee families do not

qualify for AFDC-UP because of the required quarters of work.

2. The General Assistance (GA) program in Minnesota was drastically reduced on

July 1, 1981. Under the new Minnesota law, "unemployable" persons who qualify

for GA may receive assistance for five weeks every calendar year.

3. Exemptions for "unemployability" exist under the new GA law, including inability to speak English sufficiently to be "employable". The state-supervised,

county-administered program permits discretion by the counties in their interpretation of a refugees's eligibility for GA past the five week proviso.

4. In Minnesota, the General Assistance Medical Care (GAMC) reimbursement

rate is 35% less than the established Medical Assistance (Title XIX) rate for inpatient services, and 25 percent less than the established Medical Assistance rate for

out-patient services. Excluded are public health nurse visits which are essential for

monitoring of treatment compliance. It is expected that refugees might not seek

care since they will be billed for services. It is also likely that refugees will be

denied services because of the diminished reimbursement rate.

II. PROPOSED POLICY COMMENTS

1. The objectives of the proposed policy changes (i.e., to reduce unnecessary dependency and special treatment afforded to refugees and to relieve states of costs) are

untested speculations, and obscure the basic federal objective of cutting federal

costs.

2. The Department of Health and Human Services/Office of Refugee Resettlement

has not formally consulted states or local governments in any kind of adequate or

timely process during the development of the proposed regulations.

3. The proposed regulations are extremely shortsighted in terms of their true

impact on refugees as well as state and local governments.

(a) In the attempt to reduce "unnecessary welfare dependency" the proposed regulations neglect the special needs of the Hmong and other pre-literate refugee/entrant populations. These regulations do not allow for adequate time to prepare the

Hmong and others for successful financial independence and increase the likelihood

of a new welfare dependent group in America. The long-term costs for such dependency will far exceed the temporary financial assistance given to pre-literate refugees. Minnesota currently has about 10,000 Hmong. Seventy-five percent are receiving public assistance while they take English classes and learn applicable job skills.

(b) In a time of extensive cutbacks at both the state and local level, shifting the

financial burden from the federal to the local level greatly increase the problems of

community tensions and racial biases. Trying to spread reduced local resources to

cover a new low-income group puts one group against another.

The implementation of such regulations increases the likelihood of the creation of

an additional disadvantaged group in our society.

4. The patchwork of General Assistance throughout the country denies equity to

post-18 month refugee/entrants and could increase secondary migration to the

states and localities with General Assistance programs.

5. The current administration of the Refugee Program by the federal government

is creating unnecessary crises which could be eliminated through:

(a) Annual allocations;

(b) Adequate allocations; and

(c) Funding which arrives prior to the beginning of the period for which it is intended.

6. Congress should give strong consideration to a supplemental appropriation for

the Refugee Assistance Program during fiscal year 1982 to maintain the current 36

month regulations. This relatively modest outlay would allow for phased-in implementation of the 18 month rule or to give further study to alternatives during this

year of reauthorization of the Refugee Act.

7. Social Services are vital to refugees' attainment of self-sufficiency in this country. Particularly in this era of the "non-traditional" refugee, cultural gaps, language

and educational barriers, limited economic opportunities and an underlying racism,

these newcomers need the "advantage" which effective social services can give.
125

8. The great inadequacy in the availability of medical care under most General

Assistance type programs provides additional problems for the health status of refugees. Already compromised by the ravages of escape from their country and long

internments in camp, the prospect for continued improvement in health status is

seriously threatened by the 18 month cut-off of federally funded services.

Many General Assistance programs do not cover the types of health care services

needed (i.e., dental care, health screenings, public health nurse visits in the home,

etc.).

The Refugee Act of 1980 is the enabling legislation for the Refugee Program

today. One of the two major objectives of the Act was to "provide comprehensive

and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted".

The proposed regulations violate this basic objective of the Refugee Act and create

more than one class of refugee under the law. Such policy change represents a dramatic shift from the long deliberations which forged the Refugee Act of 1980. We

appreciate the need to contain costs, however, trimming the federal budget does not

ameliorate the need.

We realize the refugee "problem" is felt most deeply in only a few states. This

must not detract from the critical need for the administration and Congress to recognize their obligations and respond with support.

This program, more than any other operated by the Department of Health and

Human Services exists because of federal decisions and commitments. The major

impact of those decisions is felt at the local•not the national•level. At a time

when greater numbers of refugees with more diversity of cultures, languages, and

needs enter our country and our communities, uneven policies and inadequate, untimely and uncertain resources reduce states' capabilities to deal with this federally

imposed clientele.

We thank you for your leadership and look forward to your support.

Sincerely,

ARTHUR E. NOOT, Commissioner.

o