Filed 12/30/14 In re Valentina R. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b) . This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re VALENTINA R. et al., Person s Coming Under the Juveni le Court Law. B25 4588 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK9 06 9 8 )

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T

. R. , Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of th e Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Philip Soto, Judge . Affirmed.

______ Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Richard D. Weiss
, Acting County Counsel, Dawy n R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, Jackl yn K. Louie
, Principal Deputy Co unty Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

______2

Mother T

. R. appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court declared her daughter s , Valentina and Ava R ., two

- year

- old twins, dependent s of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) 1 , and removed the child ren from her custody . Mother contends substantia l evidence does not support
the jurisdictional finding against her and , even if jurisdiction were proper, substantial
eviden ce does not support removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). We disagree with mother’s contentions and thus affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
1. Jurisdiction Under Section 300, Subdivision (b) “The purpose of section 300 is ‘to identify those childre n over whom the juvenile court may exercise its jurisdiction and adjudge dependents.’ [Citation.]” ( In re A.O. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 103, 110.) To declare a child a dependent under section 300, the juvenile court must find by a preponderance of the evi dence that the allegations are true. ( In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318; see § 355, subd. (a).) We review the court’s findings under section 300 for substantial evidence and will affirm the judgment based on those findings if they are sup ported by reasonable, credible evidence of solid value. ( Matthew S. , at p. 1319.) Under section 300, subdivision (b), the juvenile court may adjudge a child a dependent of the court when “[t]he child has suffered, or t here is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .”
“A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)[,] requires: ‘“(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the child, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” ( In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1 29, 135.) When the jurisdictional finding is “based on the parent’s ‘inability . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child[]’” the Department of Children and Family Services ( DCFS ) must show

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare an d Institutions Code.3

“parental unfitness or neglectful conduct.” ( In re Preci ous D. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1254.) The juvenile court declared the children dependents by sustaining the section 300, subdivision (b), allegation against mother that mother and her male companion “have a history of engaging in violent altercatio ns in the children’s presence. On 10/23/2013, the mother repeatedly struck the male companion’s face, with the mother’s fists, inflicting lacerations to the male companion’s lips and swelling to the male companion’s face.
The mother scratched the male co mpanion’s neck and chee k, i nflicting scratches to the
male companion’s neck. The mother brandished two knives at the male companion and threatened to stab the male companion with the knives. The male companion required medical treatment for his injuries. The mother broke the male companion’s telephone. On a prior occasion, the mother threw the male companion’s bicycle and cloth es off the balcony. On 10/23/2013, the male companion attempted to kick [in] the mother’s front door and pushed his []way into the home, causing the mother to sustain injuries to her fingers. On prior occasions, the mother and male companion engaged in physical altercations. The mother failed to protect the children in that the mother allowed [her] male companion[] to reside in the children’s home
, resulting in ongoing incidents of domestic violence. On 10/23/2013, the mother was arrested for [i]nflicting [c]orporal [i]njury [on a] . . . [c]ohabitant. Such violent conduct [o]n the part of the mother against the male companion a nd mother’s failure to protect the children[] endangers the children’s physical health and safety and places the children at risk of physical harm, damage and failure to protect.” Mother contends the evidence is insufficient to support this allegation. W e disagree. According to the evidence, mother has a significant history in dependency court in Alameda County regarding three older children. From 2006 to 2009, 13 referrals were made about the children. In 2008 mother voluntarily placed the children in foster care
when she was hospitalized. I n 2009 mother initiated independent adoption procedures
when she was ill. The children were adopted by a family in North Carolina in 2011. Mother reported that, before their adoption, the children were exposed to domestic4

violence between her and the father and that the father’s criminal history involved domestic violence, which caused her to suffer posttraumatic stress disorder. The oldest child was reported to have punched his younger sister in the face multipl e times and
broken the neck of a kitten , having witnessed domestic violence in the household and been affected by it. All three children were reported to be “suffering from Reactive Attachment Disorder as a result of early neglect and trauma. All three h ave delays in emotional and social development.” With respect to the two children at issue in the current petition 2 , a referral was made shortly before their birth in October 2011 . According to the caller , mother said she had been pregnant with triplets , although she later gave birth to twins and reported that one baby did not survive . The caller said that “[m]other states on a regular basis ‘how much she hates the babies’ and ‘what she is going to do as soon as the babies are born.’
She states that sh e is going to ‘throw them away.’ She also states ‘how much she wants
the m dead.’ . . . According to the caller, the neighbors in the apartment building are so concerned with the mother . . . [that] they have posted ‘Safe Surrender ’ signs/posters on
their apartments.” The referral was “ [ e ] valuated out.” Another referral was made about five days after the children’s birth in which the caller reported that when pregnant mother “often talked about wanting to give up the baby or get rid of the baby or kill the baby.” This caller also reported that mother had stated she was pregnant with triplets. A removal warrant was granted on November 5. On November 28 a petition was dismissed for insufficient evidence, and the children
were returned to mother.
Just more than a month later, on January 3, 2012, when the children were two months old, a third referral was made from a “caller who reported ‘having serious concerns over the mother leaving the children inside her home for at least thirty minutes

2 The court named a presumed father for the two children. He was not part of the dependency proceedings, as his whereabouts were unknown. He is not the father of mother’s three older children.5

while she s tays in the basement laundry room.” Mother refused to cooperate in an investigation, and the referral was deemed inconclusive.
A fourth referral was made on August 23, 2013 , based on emotional abuse and general neglect . One of the children suffered a burn mark on her foot while under the

care of a woman who was residing in mother’s home. Mother asked the woman and her male companion to leave the residence after learning her children had been removed from her due to domestic violence. The investigatio n revealed that mother’s explanation for the injury, that the child was burned when she accidentally had touched the woman’s flat iron, was consistent with the burn mark, and the child did not require medical attention. Although mother was not compliant i n multiple respects with DCFS, the referral was deemed inconclusive based on the fact that “no child safety factors exist at this time.” About two months later, the instant petition was filed after mother had been
arrested on October 23 based on an incid ent of domestic violence that morning with her then boyfriend. Mother reported to police that the boyfriend’s injuries were self

- inflicted to make up an “‘attack.’” The boyfriend, however, told police that mother “ went to the kitchen and grabbed two kitc hen knives. [She] scraped the knives against one another and told [the boyfriend ] that she would stab him and doesn’t care if she goes to jail. [The boyfriend] pleaded for her to calm down and that he was not doing anything wrong. [Mother] then dropped both knives and ran toward[] [the boyfriend]. [She] proceeded to punch [him] numerous times (closed fist) in the face and scratched him on his neck and chest area.” The police found the boyfriend “crying and visually upset. . . . He had multiple scratche s throughout his face and was swollen.” The boyfriend “had multiple visible injuries . [He] had numerous small cuts above his lip, on his neck and torso area. [He] also had swelling to both sides of his cheek bones and scratches around his neck.”
A tena nt in mother’s apartment building reported to the police that “she has witnessed mother throw [the boyfriend’s] bike and clothes off the balcony.” Two tenants told the police that on the night of October 22 “they [had] heard loud banging noises (as if
fur niture was being thrown) and yelling coming from upstairs [where mother’s apartment was located]. The neighbors text messaged [mot her] and asked her to keep the noise6

down and asked if there were any problems. There was no response.” Although mother
sai d the children were not home during the incident on October 23, the boyfriend reported that they were in the bedroom. The boyfriend also said that there had been prior physical altercations, but this was the first time he had reported one. Both children were assessed as having attachment issues.
This evidence demonstrates that m other has a repeated pattern of domestic violence, which led to attachment issues with her older children that also were present
with the children at issue here at their young age

. The juvenile court found incredible
mother’s version that the boyfriend’s injuries were self

- inflicted . The police’s
observation of the boyfriend’s appearance physically and emotionally supported his account of the incident. The evidence pointed to ot her incidents of physical altercations between mother and the boyfriend. The children were young toddlers and unable to report mother’s actions or protect themselves in the case of violence in the home. They already were suffering attachment issues, as h ad their older half

- siblings when
in mother’s care and exposed to domestic violence. Although mother had obtained a restraining order against the boyfriend, and the boyfriend said he would not see mother, the pattern of domestic violence , the mother’s res ponse and the needs of the children support a determination of a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to the
children Mother contends the evidence is not substantial because the juvenile court should have sustained her objections to admiss ion of evidence of the boyfriend’s statements in the police and social worker report s

. Under section 355, subdivision (c) (1) , “ If any party to the jurisdictional hearing raises a timely objection to th e admission of specific hearsay evidence contained in a social study, the specific hearsay e vidence shall not be
sufficient by itself to support a jurisdictional finding or any ultimate fact upon which a jurisdictional finding is based, unless the petitioner establishes ” one or more of several exceptions. Th is provision “does not bar hearsay evidence at a jurisdictional hearing but, if a timely objection is made and no hearsay exception applies, the evidence must be corroborated. [Citation.]

. . . [¶] Corroborating evidence is evidence [that] supports a7

logi cal and reasonable inference that the act described in the hearsay statement occurred. [Citation.] The quantum of corroboration necessary to support a jurisdictional finding is ‘somewhat analogous to the rule in criminal law requiring independent corrobo rative proof of accomplice testimony,’ that is, direct or circumstantial evidence , even if slight, is
sufficient if it tends to connect the accused with the act. [Citation.] ” ( In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280

- 1281.) The boyfriend’s statement s about his version of the incident were corroborated by the police’s observations of his emotional state and injuries when they saw him after the incident. The court thus did not err in relying on the boyfriend’s statements to determine jurisdiction, and they need not be ignored to
determine substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding.
2. Removal Mother also argues that, even if jurisdiction were proper, the juvenile court erred in removing the child ren from her custody because the standar d for removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), was not met

. Substantial evidence supports t he court’s finding under s ection 361, subdivision (c)(1), of clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical h ealth, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there

are no reason able means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s

. . . physical custody

. ” ( In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529 [review standard for removal decision under § 361,
subd. (c)(1), is substantial evidence].) In addition to the evidence supporting jurisdiction, during a monitored visit, m other took the children into a bathroom, and they were heard screaming while in the bathroom. M other brought them in to a toilet stall and took pictures of the children’s buttocks and labia areas. Days later, she produced the pictures, claiming they showed marks evidenc ing abuse while the chi ldren were in foster care. The pictures, however, did not reveal the marks claimed by mother, and the foster mother did not observe any marks. A follow

- up investigation revealed mother’s claims were unfounded. Under these circumst ances, the court did not err in removing the child ren from mother’s custody.8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:

CHANEY, J.

JOHNSON, J.