No. 05-028 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2006 MT 90

SOMONT OIL COMP ANY, INC., a Montana Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. A & G DRI LLING, INC., CAVAL IER PETR OLEUM, INC., A.G. WALLS a/k/a JOE W A LLS, JOHN WALLS, and STEWART HOWELL, a/ k/a CAVALIER-WALLS JOINT VENTURE, Defendants, Respondents a nd Cross-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, In and For the County Toole, Cause No. DV 98- 020, Honorable Marc G. Buyske, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RE CORD: For Appella nt: Gregory J. Hatley and Jam e s A. Donahue, Davis, Hatley, H a ffe m a n and Tighe, P

. C., Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Douglas C. Allen, Corder a nd Allen, Great Falls, Montana Richard Beatty, Attorney at Law, Shelby, Montana

Subm itted o n Briefs: January 18, 20 06 Decided: May 2, 2006 Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk2 Justice W. William Leaphart delive red the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 This case began in 1998 when Somont Oil Company, Inc. (Somont) sought to quiet its leasehold and/or mineral interest in twenty-eight oil and gas leases located in the Kevin/ Sunburst field, occupied by defendants (C-W), in Toole C ounty, Montana. Somont argued that its leases were valid and

enforceable to the exclusion of an y leasehold interest by C-W becau se, under the agreement terms, CW’s interest terminated due to cessation of produc tion. The District Court entered judgment pursuant to a jury trial, and Somont appealed to this Court. We revers ed and remanded for a new trial. Subsequent to the second trial, the jury returned a ve rdict favorable to Somont as to three of the leases and favorable to C-W as to five of the leases, a nd the court entered judgment accordingly. Somont now appeals, and C-W cross-appeals. ¶2 We state the issues presented by So mont on direct appeal as follows:

1. Did the District Court err in concludi ng that C-W met its burden of proving that cessation of production was temporary and de nying Somont’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law? 2. Did the District Court err in not awarding Somont its costs and attorn ey fees pursuant to § 82-1-201, MCA? ¶3 We state C-W’s issues on cross-appeal as follows: 1. Did the District Court err in concluding as a matter of law that the leases at issue had failed to produce in paying quantities? 2. Did the District Court err in limiting the time frame for which eviden ce could be presented regarding the restoration of production to the leases?3 ¶4 We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND ¶5 In 1991 C-W purchased a number of oil and gas le ases in the Kevin-Sunbu rst oil field in Toole County, Montana. (For a complete discussion of this case’s history, see Somont Oil Co. v. A & G Drilling, Inc. , 2002 MT 141, ¶¶ 5-12, 310 Mont. 221 , ¶¶ 5-12, 49 P.3d 598, ¶¶ 5-12 ( Somont I ).) C-W held these leasehold properties pursuant to the co ntingencies of various habendum clauses, which permitted C-W a viable leasehold in terest as long as C-W produced oil and gas in paying quantities from said leaseholds. Asserting that C-W’s leases had terminated due to lack of production, Somont informed C-W on April 10, 1998, that Somont ha d acquired the leases from the Kevin-Sunburst lessors. Accordingly, Somont demanded that C- W execute lease releases on the twenty-eight properties; C-W refused. Somont co nsequently filed suit in the Nint h Judicial District Court on May 20, 1998. C-W eventually executed releases on twenty of its Ke vin-Sunburst leases, but refused to tender releases on the other eight. The parties th erefore proceeded to trial on whether C-W’s eight remaining leases had terminated due to a cessation of production. ¶6 After the close of evidence, the court denied So mont’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law and instructed the jury to consider “all surrounding circumstances”—oil prices, economic

considerations and C-W’s financia l condition—in determining whethe r C-W’s leases had terminated for a lack of production. Having c onsidered such evidence, the jury returned a verd ict in favor of C-W, finding that none of the eight leases terminated due to a lack of production. Somont renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, and in the alternative, moved for a ne w trial. The District Court denied both requests . In its final judgment, the court orde red both parties to pay attorney fees.4 ¶7 Somont appealed the judgment and the court’ s order denying its motion for a judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the Distri ct Court erred in allowing the jury to consider oil prices, economic

considerations and C-W’s financia l condition in determining whether the leases terminated due to a lack of production. We agreed with Somont on this issue. We further concluded that Somont established that the leases failed to produce in paying quantities and rema nded for retrial on the question of whether cessation was permanent or temporary. ¶8 This Court noted in Somont I , that Montana is an “ownership-in- place state with regard to oil, gas and other minerals, . . . [which] means oil and gas leases transfer to the lessee a fee simple

determinable estate with the lessor re taining a possibility of reverter.” Somont I , ¶ 26. Automatic termination takes place when payi ng quantities cease to occur. Somont I , ¶ 26. We reiterated that “paying quantities” is defined as the “amount of production which wo uld pay a small profit over the cost of operation of the well, ex cluding from consideration the initial cost of bringing the well into production.” Somont I , ¶ 27. In order to mitig ate the harshness of automatic termination, we adopted

the temporary cessation of production doctrine . “Pursuant to this doctrine, once a plaintiff establishes that an oil and gas lease has halted production, the burden shifts to the defend ant to prov e that the cessation was temporary and not perm anent. A temporary cessation in production will not trigger an

automatic termination of the lease as c ontemplated in the habendum clause.” Somont I , ¶ 28. ¶9 In determining a judicial test for the temporary cessation doctrine, we looked to Texas—also an ownership-in-place jurisdiction—for guidance, and held that “actions commenced to terminate oil and gas leases invoke two distinct inquir ies: (1) Is the lease producing in paying quantities? ; and (2) If not, was the cessation in production permanent or temporary?” Somont I , ¶ 33. With regard to the first5 inquiry, we concluded that “Somont established at trial that the l eases failed to produce in paying quantities during the acco unting period prescribed by the District Court.” Somont I , ¶ 30. As to the second question, we determined th at “cessation in production will only be deemed temporary when it is caused by a sudden stoppage of the well or a mechanical breakdown of the equipment used in

connection with the we ll, or the like.” Somont I , ¶ 33 (emphasis added). C onsequently, we held that the District Court abused its discretion by allo wing the jury to consider oil prices, economic considerations, and C-W’s financial condition in de termining whether C-W’s ce ssation was justified as temporary. Somont I , ¶ 36. We ordered a new trial, noting that C-W deserved “an opportunity to present its evidence in acco rdance with the temporary cessation of production factors adopted herein.”

Somont I , ¶ 38. We also noted that the District Court would have to reconsider the attorney fee issue

on remand. ¶10 During the second trial in June 2004, the court granted Somont ’s motion to preclude C-W from offering evidence not previously prod uced at the Rule 30(b)(6), M.R.Ci v.P., deposition of the corporate designees. Consequently, the court limited C-W’s ev idence to its Exhibit 538 and the explanations provided by C-W designees, John Wa lls (Walls) and Karie Frydenlund. Although Joe Walls (Joe) also testified, the court specifically precluded C-W from offering any te stimony from Joe that contradicted its Rule 30(b)(6) designees. The trial resulted in a 459-page transcript of fact-intensive testimony regarding the eight leases at issu e and their wells: Leach Lease (one well); A. Lorenzen Lease (twentythree wells); Hurley Lease (three wells); Haugen-Fee Lease (six we lls); Bluhm Lease (twenty-three wells); Allen 3 & 17 Lease (twenty-seven wells); Rice-Bluhm Lease (seventeen wells); and Caine6 Lease (thirty-seven wells). 1 While Exhibit 538 and the accompanying testimony from Walls and Frydenlund explained the reason so me wells stopped operating and wh ether repairs were undertaken, the jury was provided no information rega rding the majority of down wells. ¶11 C-W designees acknowledged throughout trial that even though C-W had the capabilities to repair down wells, it often did not un dertake such repairs. Walls furthe r testified that C-W chose to let frozen gun barrels thaw in the spring, rather than wa rm them in the winter. Cumulatively, the evidence before the jury showed that the majority of wells on each lease were down during the period in question, January 1, 1996, through April 10, 1998. ¶12 Following the close of ev idence at trial, Somont moved the court to enter judgment as a matter of law, arguing that C-W failed to meet its burden of proving that the producti on temporarily ceased: Your honor, we would like to make a Motion for a Directed Verdict, pursuant to Rule 50 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. I th ink it has been quite clea r that the burden of proof in this matter, as the Court has alre ady ruled, has been upon the Defendants to prove that the cessation of production, as es tablished by the Court, was not temporary in nature, as the Court has indicated in its rulings . In order to establish whether or not it was temporary it’s necessary that you show: why the lease shut down, whether it was due to a sudden stoppage of the well, mechanical breakdown, or the like. On a vast majority of each and everyone [sic] of the leases, Your Honor, there’s no informa tion, whatsoever, as to why any of those wells shut down or why they were shut down. And on that basis, with regards to each lease, Your Honor, there’s just no evidence for this jury to determine that the lease shut down, not a ny particular one well, but that the lease shut down due to a sudden stoppage of the well, mechanical breakdown, or the like. ¶13 The court denied Somont’s motion, stating that “there’s suffici ent evidence to prohibit . . . granting [the] motion, and to allow this matter to go to the jury.” The jury re turned a verdict favorable

to C-W on five of the l eases (A. Lorenzen Lease, Bluhm Lease, Allen Lease, Rice-Bluhm Lease, and Caine Lease) and favorable to So mont on the remaining three. Somont renewed its motion for a

1 See Appendix 1 for a chart summary of Exhibit 538.7 judgment as a matter of law with regard to the five leases on which it did not prevail; it also requested attorney fees and costs pursuant to § 82-1-202(1), MCA. The court denied both motions.8 DISCUSSION

APPEAL ¶14 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that C-W met its burden of proving that cessation of production was temporary and deny ing Somont’s motion for judgment as a matter

of law? ¶15 This Court’s standard of review of appeals from district court orde rs granting or denying motions for judgment as a matter of law is identical to that of the district court. Judgment as a matter of law is properly granted only when there is a complete absenc e of any evidence which would justify submitting an issue to a jury. A ll such evidence and any legitimate inferences that might be drawn

from that evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Williams v. Union Fidelity Ins. Co ., 2005 MT 273, ¶ 19, 32 9 Mont. 158, ¶ 19, 123 P.3d 213, ¶ 19. We review a district court’s decision regarding a moti on for judgment as a matter of law to determine

whether the district court abused its discretion. Glacier Tennis Club v. Treweek Const. Co. , 2004 MT 70, ¶ 46, 320 Mont. 351, ¶ 46, 87 P.3d 431, ¶ 46. ¶16 At the close of evidence, Somont moved the court to enter judgment as a matter of law, arguing that C-W failed to meet its burden of proving that the cessation of production was temporary. We agree with Somont and therefore hol d that the District Court should have entered judgment as a matter

of law. ¶17 “A cessation in production will only be deemed tem porary when it is caused by a sudden stoppage of the well or a mechani cal breakdown of the e quipment used in connection with the well, or9 the like.” Somont I , ¶ 33. “The diligent lessee who takes immediate steps to rectify a sudden halt in production will not lose his or her investment,” Somont I , ¶ 32, during such a temporary stoppage. ¶18 C-W bore the burden of proving th at the cessation of production on all eight leases at issue was temporary. See Somont I , ¶ 28 (“once a plaintiff establishes th at an oil and gas lease has halted production, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the cessati on was temporary and not permanent”). In other words, C-W ha d to prove at trial that all cessations in production were caused by sudden involuntary stoppages or mechanical br eakdown of the wells on the leases, and that C-W engaged in diligent efforts to im mediately restore production. ¶19 Somont argues that “C-W failed, totally and completely, to meet its burden. . . . C-W’s evidence

was limited to information contained in its Exhibit 538, which showed neither the reason(s) that wells were down nor any effort(s) to restore production from those wells.” Acco rding to Somont, “C-W failed to even begin establishing a prima facie case . . . .” ¶20 In response, C-W argues that it presented substan tial evidence during trial, both testimonial and documentary, demonstrating that all down wells were caused by involuntary sudden stoppage, mechanical breakdown, or the like. In support of this assertion, C-W cites Joe’s testimony that the devastating November 1996 ice storm “affected all of the leases.” C-W also quotes Joe as stating that C-W “never” shut the wells down. Walls, C-W’s desi gnee, however, testified that the November 1996 ice storm had no affect on the majority of wells (and therefore leases) and that he did not know why the majority of wells were not operating. Given that the District Court specifically precluded any testimony from Joe that contradicted Walls, C-W’ s reliance on Joe’s testimony is misplaced.10 ¶21 By utilizing C-W’s evidence and witnesses, Somont established at trial th at each lease had one or more periods of consecutive months of no produc tion from January 1, 1996, to April 10, 1998.

Leach Lease : The 1 well down August 1996 through April 1998; no information why it stopped operating or of repair efforts.

A. Lorenzen Lease : All 23 wells down, except for 2 th at operated for ten days in May 1997; except for 1 well, no information why th e wells failed to operate or of repair efforts. Hurley Lease : Of the 3 wells, 2 operated periodic ally; no information why the wells failed to operate or of repair efforts. Haugen-Fee Lease : All 6 wells down, except 1 well th at operated for five days in 1997; no information why the majority of wells fail ed to operate or of repair efforts.

Bluhm-Lease : All 23 wells down, except 1 well that operated for a few months; no information why the majority of wells failed to operated or of repair efforts. Allen Lease (Allen 3 & Allen 17) : Of the 27 wells, 3 operated intermittently and for only days at a time; no information why the majority of wells faile d to operate or of repair efforts.

Rice-Bluhm Lease : Of the 17 wells, only 4 operated in termittently for brief periods; no information why the majority of wells failed to operate or of repair efforts.

Caine Lease : Of the 37 wells, 13 ope rated sporadically and fo r very brief periods; no information why the majority of wells failed to operate or of repair efforts. ¶22 In light of the fact that the ev idence failed to account for why th e majority of wells on the eight leases failed to operate and/or whether repair efforts were un dertaken, C-W failed in its burden to establish that production ceased be cause of a sudden stoppage of th e well or a mechanical breakdown of the equipment used in connection with the well, or the like. Moreover, C-W failed to show that it diligently took immediate steps to rectify the halt in production since it provided no information whether it undertook repair effort s on the majority of wells.11 ¶23 Given the complete lack of ev idence as to why the majority of wells failed to operate and whether repairs were undertaken, there was no basis for submitting the question of whether cessation was temporary to the jury. Considering all of the ev idence and the legitimate in ferences in a light most favorable to C-W, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Somont’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law. ¶24 2. Did the District Court err in not awarding Somont its costs and a ttorney fees pursuant to § 82-1-201(1), MCA? ¶25 Our standard of review of a trial court’s order granting or denying attorn ey fees and costs is

whether the court abused its discretion. Gullet v. Van Dyke Const. Co. , 2005 MT 105, ¶ 12, 327 Mont. 30, ¶ 12, 111 P.3d 220, ¶ 12. ¶26 Somont moved the District Court to include in its final judgment an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to § 82-1-202( 1), MCA, which provides: If the lessee or assignee thereof neglects or refuses to execute a release as provided by this part, the owner of the leased premises may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain the release, and in such action he also may recover from the lessee, his successor, or assigns the sum of $100 as damages, all costs, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee for preparin g and prosecuting the suit , and any additional damages that the evidence in the case warrants. [Emphasis added.] ¶27 Following the second trial, the District Court denied both partie s any attorney fees or costs, rationalizing that no “prevailing party” existed, as “both Somont and C-W ga ined and both Somont and C-W lost in this litigation in relation to the original complaint.” We disagree. ¶28 Somont originally filed suit to compel C-W to execute releases on tw enty-eight leases at issue. Although C-W initially refuse d, it eventually executed releases on twenty of the leases, leaving eight12 for the jury to addre ss in the first trial. 2 Thus, prior to the initial trial, Somont had prevailed on twenty of the twenty-eight leases at issue. At the second trial, Somont prev ailed on three more leases. Even

before our decision to reverse on th e five other leases, Somont was the prevailing party on twenty-three

leases when the District Court issued its order and th erefore, we hold that it abused its discretion in not granting Somont reasonable attorney fees. ¶29 Reversed and remanded for determina tion of reasonable attorney fees.

CROSS-APPEAL ¶30 1. Did the District Court err in concluding as a matter of law that the leases at issue had failed to produce in paying quantities? ¶31 Our review of a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo

. Therefore, we apply the same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., criteria as applied by the district court. Pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., the movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burde n then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the lega l determinations made by a distri ct court as to whether the court

erred. Howard v. St. James Community Hospital , 2006 MT 23, ¶ 14 , 331 Mont. 60, ¶ 14, 129 P.3d 126, ¶ 14 (citation omitted).

2 The District Court stated in its October 26, 2004, judgment that the pa rties initially disputed twenty-five leases, resolv ing seventeen before the first trial. Because Somont I and the parties’ briefs state that Somont commenced litigatio n on twenty-eight leases and C- W released twenty prior to the first trial, we have chosen to ap ply these latter figures. In any ev ent, the result would be the same.13 ¶32 Prior to trial, Somont sought summary judgment on the theo ry that C-W had forfeited and terminated all eight leases based u pon evidence produced at the firs t trial and this Court’s opinion in

Somont I . The District Court granted th e motion in part, concluding that “[s]ummary judgment that the leases in question failed to produce in paying quantities is appropriate as is an order limiting the scope of the evidentiary inquiry at the second trial in this matter.” ¶33 As previously noted, we established in Somont I that “actions commenced to terminate oil and gas leases invoke two distinct inquir ies: (1) Is the lease producing in paying quantities? ; and (2) If not, was the cessation in production permanent or temporary?” Somont I , ¶ 33. C-W argues that the District Court incorrectly interpreted our holding in Somont I when it limited re trial to the second inquiry. According to C-W, this Court specifically did not limit the new trial issues to consideration of the second prong of the Somont I test. Therefore, C-W contends, the District Court should have denied summary judgment altogether and allowed the jury to address both prongs of the test. We disagree

with C-W’s assertion that this Cour t did not answer the first inquiry of the two-part test established in

Somont I

. ¶34 In Somont I , we concluded that the District Court abus ed its discretion in allowing the jury to consider oil prices, economic considerations, and C-W’s financial co ndition in determining whether oil and gas leases had terminated due to a lack of production. Somont I , ¶ 23. In reachin g this conclusion, we “adopt[ed] the temporary cessati on of production doctrine as it a pplies to the oil and gas arena,”

Somont I , ¶ 28, thereby expanding up on our earlier decision in Christianson v. A.A. Oil Corp. and Byrne (1973), 161 Mont. 420, 506 P.2d 1369. Somont I , ¶¶ 30 and 35 (“[t]he equitable notions contemplated [in Christianson ] remain valid considerations but a pply only to the ‘producing in paying14 quantities’ prong of the two-part test”). In adoptin g the second inquiry and thus instituting a two-part test, we specifically concluded that Somont answ ered the first inquiry when we stated that “ Somont

established at trial that the leases failed to produce in paying quantities . . . .” Somont I , ¶ 30 (emphasis added). ¶35 In addition to concluding that Somont satisfied th e first inquiry in the initial trial, we noted in our summary to the second issue that “C-W has not yet had an op portunity to presen t its evidence in accordance with the temporary cessation of production factors adopted herein.” Somont I , ¶ 36. Given that we had previously adopted the fi rst inquiry of the two-part test in Christianson , the factors adopted

in Somont I related to the second inquir y and the way in which we d eemed that question should be answered—that is, whether cessation of production was caused by sudden in voluntary stoppages or

mechanical breakdown of the wells on the leases, and whether C-W engaged in dilig ent efforts to immediately restore production. ¶36 In light of the above holdings, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted partial summary judgment, limiting retrial to the second inquiry articulated in Somont I (whether the cessation in production was temporary or permanent). ¶37 2. Did the District Court err in limiting the time frame for which evidence could be presented regarding the restoration of production to the leases? ¶38 When reviewing a district court’s evidentiary rulin g, our standard of review is whether the court

abused its discretion. The dist rict court has broad di scretion in determining the admissibility of

evidence. We will not reverse the dist rict court unless the error is of su ch character to have affected the15 result. Payne v. Knutson , 2004 MT 271, ¶ 20, 323 Mont. 165, ¶ 20, 99 P.3d 200, ¶ 20 (citations omitted). ¶39 At retrial, the District Court chose January 1, 1996, to April 10, 1998, as the examination period for determining whether th e non-producing leases resumed producti on. The court selected April 10,

1998. as the final date because it was the day Somont wrote C-W a lette r stating that five of the eight leases had terminated. C-W argues that the court abused its discretion in se lecting this period of

examination because C-W should ha ve been allowed to submit evidence that some of the leases resumed production after April 10, 1998. 3 ¶40 In light of our conclusion on Issu e I of Somont’s appeal—that C- W failed to meet its burden of proving that the majority of leas es failed to operate du e to a sudden stoppage of the wells or a mechanical breakdown of the equipment—we do not need to reach the question of whether the District Court erred in limiting the time frame for which eviden ce could be presented re garding the restoration of production to the leases. ¶41 Affirmed.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

3 Notably, while the District Cour t chose April 10, 1998, as the end date, the court still permitted C-W to introduce evidence of any e fforts it made to restore production after that date, so long as C-W showed that the effort resulted fro m a course of action taken prior to April 10, 1998. C-W offered no such evidence at trial.16 We concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ JIM RICE /S/ BRIAN MORRIS17 Period 1996-April 10, 1998 Leach 1 well A. Lorenzen 23 wells Hurley 3 wells HaugenFee 6 wells Bluhm 23 wells Allen 3 & 17 27 wells RiceBluhm 17 wells Caine 37 wells

Up 1/31-2/7/96, 5/9-5/31/96, 6/1- 6/30/96, 7/1- 7/27/96.

Down 8/96— 4/98. All wells Down, except: #1 & 24A Up 10 days 5/97. Repairs 5/97: #24 Clean well, tubing leak, swabbed, pulled rods & tubing run. Well #42 Up 1/96-8/96.

All wells Down 9/96-1/97. #42 Up 2/24- 8/6/97; #52 Up 5/20- 5/30/97.

All wells down 8/97-4/98. All wells Down 1/96-4/97. #1 Up 5/28-6/3/97, leaking Gun Barrel.

All wells down 7/97-4/98. Repairs5/2/97 & 6/4/97: Pull rods, 6’ insert, change out 15 rods, pumped oil of top of leaking GB, pumped bottom of GB after water drained, unloaded vac truck into stock tank. All wells Down 1/96-6/97. #1 Up 7/9- 9/15/97.

All wells down 10/97-4/98, except #1 Up 2 days in 11/97 & 4 days in 4/98. Allen 3 : All wells down 1/96—4/98.

Allen 17 : All wells Down 1996, except those listed below. All wells Down 1/97-3/97 & 8/97-12/97. All wells Down 1/98-4/98 # 6 Up 1/25/96, then Frozen, Up 4/18-10/17/96, 10/23-10/31/96, 11/1-11/13/96, Electrical problem. Froze 1/26/96, Replaced belt 9/96, Replaced king nipple 10/96. Repairs 4/29/97 Rod Job, replace 27 rods #9 Up 1/1-1/5, 1/11-1/16/96, 4/18-5/14/96, 5/17-11/13/96 & 12/96. Electrical problem. Froze 1/16/96, Replaced belt 9/5/96. Replaced gate valve 4/24/97 #10 Up 8/14- 11/13/96. Electrical problem. 4/30-7/22/97 Rod Job, replace 27 rods, greased #6, 9 & 10, Nipple for GB, #9 flow line leak by GB, #6 & 10 need gear All wells Down 1996, except those listed below. #8, Up 1/1/96, 5/7-10/15/96. #10 Up 1/31 & 2/1/96 #11 Up 1/1- 3/3/96, 3/29- 6/18/96, 6/21- 7/5/96, 7/19- 11/13. Down 12/96 for electrical. Repairs 1996: Broken burn stack, #11 down fuse trons 6/10, broke unit 7/6 #8 replaced belt 9/3.

All wells Down 1997-April 1998, except #8, 9, 10, 11 in 5/97, then Down for flow line leak.

1997: Series of repair efforts on #8, 9, 10, 11 and 24. All wells Down except: #4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 28, 30, 31, 36, 40, 42, 45, 49, Up sporadically and mostly for very brief periods. Repairs 1996: Replaced belt #4, 5, 19, 28, 42, 45 #19 Changed belt #49 gate valve riser Repairs 1997: #7 & 28 gear oil #28 belt change #4 greased #36 plunger insert #5 90 degree elbow & line rope #4 belt #6 powered off #49 Rod job #33 Rod job #45 parted rods, pull tubing, sandpump, bail replace tubing, cleaned well, pulled rods & tubing. #28 Rodg job#5 purchased vbelt Repairs 1998: #45 V-Belt #31 belt #7 v-belt18 oil, gas line