[Cite as State v. Mays, 2014-Ohio-3815.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 100265

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

ARRAN MAYS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-13-571433 

BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Boyle, A.J., and Stewart, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 4, 2014 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Timothy Young 

Ohio Public Defender 

By: Sheryl Trzaska 

Assistant State Public Defender 

Office of the Ohio Public Defender 

250 East Broad Street 

Suite 1400 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Daniel T. Van 

Norman Schroth 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Arran Mays, appeals from his convictions and sentence 

for aggravated robbery, robbery, felonious assault, and receiving stolen property. After a 

careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm appellant’s convictions and 

sentence. 

I. Statement of the Facts

{¶2} Appellant’s convictions stem from the November 4, 2012 robberies of 

victims Rita Stasienko, Kieonna Speights, and Navetta Clark. 

{¶3} Testimony at trial revealed that at approximately 6:00 a.m. on November 4, 

2012, Rita Stasienko walked from her home in Cleveland to a nearby bus stop. When 

she arrived at the bus stop, she was robbed at gunpoint by “two guys.” After her purse 

was taken, one of the individuals hit her in the head with his gun and fired it into the air 

several times. Stasienko testified that she was unable to identify the individuals because 

they were wearing masks. The individuals fled the scene in a small “beige” vehicle. 

{¶4} Approximately 15 to 20 minutes after Stasienko was robbed, Kieonna 

Speights was walking to her bus stop when a silver or gray Toyota Corolla pulled up next 

to her. Speights testified that a man brandishing a gun jumped out of the backseat of the 

vehicle and demanded her purse. 

{¶5} The third victim, Navetta Clark, did not testify in this matter. 
{¶6} Officer Sedlack of the Cleveland Police Department testified that on 

November 4, 2012, he responded to a dispatch for shots fired in the area of East 75th and 

Canton Avenue. When he arrived at the scene, Officer Sedlack conducted an initial 

interview with Stasienko. According to Officer Sedlack, Stasienko provided him with a 

brief description of the culprits and the vehicle in which they fled. While completing his 

investigation into the robbery of Stasienko, Officer Sedlack received a dispatch regarding 

the suspects’ vehicle possibly being involved in a second and third robbery. 

{¶7} Sergeant Leonard Patrick Lentz of the Cleveland Police Department testified 

that he received a dispatch indicating that three males in a silver or gray Toyota had 

committed three robberies in the area. While patrolling, Sgt. Lentz observed a vehicle 

matching the description driving north on East 124th Street. When Sgt. Lentz attempted 

to get closer to the subject vehicle, it “took off” at a high rate of speed. Sgt. Lentz 

testified that he pursued the vehicle for approximately one to five minutes before the 

vehicle stopped near East 129th Street and the three individuals inside the vehicle 

“bailed” and attempted to flee the scene. Sgt. Lentz stated that the driver, later identified 

as codefendant Marcus Beauregard, jumped out of the vehicle holding a firearm in his 

hand as he ran. Sgt. Lentz further identified appellant as the individual who was sitting 

in the back seat of the vehicle prior to his attempt to flee the scene. Ultimately, 

Beauregard and appellant were apprehended and arrested by responding officers. 

{¶8} Finally, Sgt. Lentz testified that further investigation into the matter revealed 

that the vehicle used to facilitate the robberies was stolen. 
{¶9} Once appellant and Beauregard were detained, Speights was brought to the 

scene and asked if she could identify either of the individuals inside the officers’ patrol 

vehicle. Speights recognized one of the individuals, who was wearing a black hoodie, as 

the person who robbed her at gunpoint. She recognized the second individual as the 

driver of the vehicle. 

II. Statement of the Case

{¶10} The 16-year-old appellant was named in a five-count complaint in Cuyahoga 

J.C. No. DL-12-120394, charging him with three counts of aggravated robbery, with 

one-and-three year firearm specifications; one count of receiving stolen property, with 

one-and-three year firearm specifications; and one count of discharge of a firearm on or 

near a prohibited premises. 

{¶11} On December 13, 2012, the state moved for appellant’s case to be 

transferred from the juvenile division to the general division of the common pleas court 

for criminal prosecution. After a joint hearing for appellant and Beauregard on January 

8, 2013, the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction and transferred the case to the general 

division pursuant to R.C. 2152.12. 

{¶12} On February 19, 2013, appellant was indicted and charged in Cuyahoga C.P. 

No. CR-13-571433 with two counts of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(2); 

three counts of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); felonious assault 

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); theft of an elderly person in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(1); discharge of a firearm on or near a prohibited premises in violation of 
R.C. 2923.162(A)(3); receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A); and two 

counts of failure to comply in violation R.C. 2921.331(B). All counts also included 

one-and-three year firearm specifications. 

{¶13} On July 10, 2013, appellant entered a guilty plea to Count 2, aggravated 

robbery, with firearm and forfeiture specifications; amended Count 6, robbery, with 

forfeiture specifications; amended Count 7, felonious assault, with forfeiture 

specifications; and amended Count 10, receiving stolen property, with firearm and 

forfeiture specifications. By recommendation of the state, the firearm specifications 

attached to Counts 6 and 7 were deleted. The remaining counts were dismissed. 

{¶14} On July 15, 2013, the trial court sentenced appellant to three years in 

prison on Count 2, aggravated robbery, to run consecutively to the attached three-year 

firearm specification. Further, the trial court sentenced appellant to two years each on 

Counts 6 and 7, robbery and felonious assault, and six months on Count 10, receiving 

stolen property, to run concurrently to each other and to Count 2, for a total prison term of 

six years. 

{¶15} Appellant now brings this timely appeal, raising seven assignments of error 

for review.1

III. Law and Analysis

A. Mandatory Bindover

 1 Appellant’s assignments of error are included in the appendix to this 

opinion. 
{¶16} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the juvenile court erred 

when it found probable cause that he committed aggravated robbery with a firearm. 

{¶17} “Juvenile courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over children alleged to be 

delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.” 

In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 11, citing R.C. 

2151.23(A)(1). However, under certain circumstances, “the juvenile court has the duty 

to transfer a case, or bind a juvenile over, to the adult criminal system.” Id., citing R.C. 

2152.10 and 2152.12. There are two types of transfers under Ohio’s juvenile justice 

system — mandatory and discretionary. State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 

2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 10. 

 “Mandatory transfer removes discretion from judges in the transfer 

decision in certain situations.” * * * “Discretionary transfer, as its name 

implies, allows judges the discretion to transfer or bind over to adult court 

certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation 

within the juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public safety.” 

Id., quoting State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000); R.C. 

2152.12(A) and (B). When a juvenile court improperly transfers jurisdiction over a 

minor to adult court, any subsequent conviction in the adult court is void for lack of 

jurisdiction. State v. Washington, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20226, 2005-Ohio-6546, ¶ 

14, citing State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). 

{¶18} Mandatory transfer is guided by R.C. 2152.10(A), which provides that, 

under certain circumstances, a juvenile court must transfer cases to adult court for 

criminal prosecution “as provided in section 2152.12 of the Revised Code.” Relevant to 
the case at hand, R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) states that an alleged juvenile delinquent is 

eligible for mandatory transfer when: 

(2) The child is charged with a category two offense, other than a violation 

of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code, the child was sixteen years of age 

or older at the time of the commission of the act charged, and either or both 

of the following apply: 

* * * 

(b) The child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the child’s person 

or under the child’s control while committing the act charged and to have 

displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated possession of the 

firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the commission of the act charged. 

R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b). 

{¶19} R.C. 2152.12(A) establishes the procedure a juvenile court must follow for 

mandatory transfers. Section (A)(1)(b)(ii) of the statute states that: 

(b) After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent 

child by reason of committing a category two offense, the juvenile court at a 

hearing shall transfer the case if the child was sixteen or seventeen years of 

age at the time of the act charged and either of the following applies: 

* * * 

(ii) Division (A)(2)(b) of section 2152.10 of the Revised Code requires the 

mandatory transfer of the case, and there is probable cause to believe that 

the child committed the act charged. R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii). 

{¶20} In the case at hand, there is no dispute that aggravated robbery is a category 

two offense under R.C. 2152.02(CC)(1). Further, it was stipulated that appellant was 16 

years old at the time of the offenses. Thus, the only issue before this court is whether the 

state established the requisite probable cause necessary for a mandatory bindover of 

appellant’s aggravated robbery offenses to the adult court. 
{¶21} The probable cause standard for mandatory bindover requires the state to 

provide credible evidence of every element of an offense to support a finding of probable 

cause to believe that the juvenile committed the offense before ordering mandatory 

waiver of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A). State v. Iacona, 

93 Ohio St.3d 83, 93, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001). Probable cause in this context is not guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt; it is evidence that raises more than a suspicion of guilt. In re 

A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 16. This standard 

requires the juvenile court to “evaluate the quality of the evidence presented by the state 

in support of probable cause as well as any evidence presented by the respondent that 

attacks probable cause.” Iacona at 93. 

{¶22} In challenging the juvenile court’s judgment, appellant argues that the state 

failed to provide credible evidence of every element of the offense of aggravated robbery 

to support a finding of probable cause to believe that he committed the offenses in Counts 

1 through 3 of his juvenile complaint, namely that he personally used a firearm in the 

commission of these robberies. 

{¶23} Our review of the juvenile court’s decision is mixed — we defer to the 

court’s credibility determinations by reviewing for an abuse of discretion, but we conduct 

a de novo review of the legal conclusion of whether there was probable cause to believe 

that the juvenile committed the charged act. In re A.J.S. at ¶ 1. 
{¶24} Pursuant to Iacona, the juvenile court is required to evaluate the quality of 

the evidence presented by the state in support of probable cause as well as any evidence 

presented by appellant that attacks probable cause. Iacona at 93. 

{¶25} In cases involving the use of a firearm during the commission of an 

aggravated robbery, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that 

the mandatory bindover provision of R.C.[2152.10(A)(2)(b)] does not apply 

unless the child, himself or herself, had a firearm on or about the child’s 

person or under the child’s control while committing the act charged and 

the child displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated possession 

of the firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the commission of the act 

charged. 

Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000), at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶26} In the instant case, Count 2 of appellant’s juvenile complaint referred to the 

alleged aggravated robbery of Kieonna Speights. At the probable cause hearing, 

Speights testified that she was robbed at gunpoint by a man who jumped out of the back 

seat of a small gray or silver Toyota. According to Speights, the gunman was wearing a 

“black hoodie,” “khaki colored pants,” and had an “afro” or “dreads.” Approximately 45 

minutes to an hour after her robbery, officers drove Speights to the location where 

appellant was being detained to make a cold stand identification. When Speights arrived 

at the scene, she positively identified the two males being detained by officers as the 

perpetrators of her robbery — one as the driver of the vehicle and one as the gunman. 

Speights further identified Beauregard and appellant in court as the men involved in her 

robbery. While the state could have asked Speights to clarify on the record which of the 

two defendants she was specifically identifying as the gunman, Sgt. Lentz confirmed that 
appellant was the individual who was sitting in the back seat of the vehicle prior to 

fleeing from the police. 

{¶27} Considering the totality of the testimony presented, we find that probable 

cause existed to believe appellant personally possessed a firearm during the aggravated 

robbery of Speights. Accordingly, mandatory bindover on Count 2, aggravated robbery, 

was appropriate. 

{¶28} Moreover, without determining whether there was probable cause to believe 

appellant personally possessed a firearm during the offenses committed against Stasienko 

and Clark, we find that the trial court did not err in transferring Counts 1 and 3 of 

appellant’s juvenile complaint to the adult court. As explained further in appellant’s 

second assignment of error, because the offenses in this matter were committed during the 

same course of conduct,2

 the trial court had the authority to transfer the entire case 

pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(I) once it found sufficient probable cause to warrant a 

mandatory transfer of Count 2 to the adult court. See State v. Brookshire, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 25853, 2014-Ohio-1971, ¶ 14 (holding that when multiple offenses 

arise from the same “course of conduct” and the juvenile court properly transfers the 

mandatory transfer offense to the adult court, all further proceedings on the remaining 

offenses are discontinued in the juvenile court pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(I)). To hold 

 2 Offenses committed during the “same course of conduct” have been defined 

as “offenses that through their similarity, regularity and time between them are 

concluded to be part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” 

United States v. Sheehan, D.Montana No. CR 09-13-M-DWM, 2009 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 99800 (Oct. 27, 2009). 
otherwise would jeopardize judicial economy and would require dual proceedings in two 

separate courts on the same set of facts and circumstances. See Washington, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 20226, 2005-Ohio-6546, ¶ 26. 

{¶29} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

B. Transfer of “Non-Category” Offense

{¶30} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the juvenile court 

committed plain error when it transferred Count 4 of his juvenile complaint, receiving 

stolen property, to the adult court. 

{¶31} Within this assignment of error, appellant argues that, pursuant to R.C. 

2152.12(F)(2), once the juvenile court determined that appellant was subject to mandatory 

bindover based on his aggravated robbery charges, it was then required to comply with 

the amenability procedures outlined in R.C. 2152.12(B) for the discretionary bindover 

offense of receiving stolen property before transferring the charge to the adult court. 

{¶32} In applying the statutory scheme in R.C. 2152.12(F), the Second District has 

held that when a mandatory transfer offense and a “non-category” offense arise from the 

same course of conduct and the juvenile court properly transfers the mandatory transfer 

offense to the adult court, all further proceedings on the discretionary transfer offense are 

discontinued in the juvenile court pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(I), and the juvenile court is 

relieved of the requirements under R.C. 2152.12(F). Washington at ¶ 26; see also State 

v. Henderson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21866, 2007-Ohio-5368. 

{¶33} In pertinent part, R.C. 2152.12(I) provides: 
The transfer [of a case under division (A) of this section] abates the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged 

in the complaint, and, upon the transfer, all further proceedings pertaining 

to the act charged shall be discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case 

then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred as 

described in division (H) of section 2151.23 of the Revised Code. 

{¶34} In this case, appellant’s receiving stolen property charge resulted from his 

act of “receiving or retaining” the stolen 2006 Toyota Corolla used to complete the 

aggravated robberies against Speights, Stasienko, and Clark. Because we find that the 

offenses underlying appellant’s delinquency charges arose from the same course of 

conduct and that the juvenile court properly ordered proceedings on Count 2 transferred 

to the adult court pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii), all further proceedings in the 

juvenile division on the receiving stolen property charge were thereafter discontinued per 

R.C. 2152.12(I), and the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was terminated. Accordingly, the 

juvenile court was relieved of any requirement that R.C. 2152.12(F) otherwise imposes to 

conduct further hearings or to make findings with respect to appellant’s eligibility to be 

tried as a juvenile on the discretionary offense before transferring proceedings on that 

charge to the adult court. 

{¶35} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

C. “Reverse Bindover” Procedure

{¶36} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred when it 

failed to sentence him in accordance with R.C. 2152.121 for Counts 6, 7, and 10, and 

further failed to remand the matter to the juvenile court after imposing a stayed sentence. 
{¶37} Initially, we note that appellant failed to raise this issue before the trial 

court. Accordingly, we are limited to plain-error review. To establish plain error, 

appellant must point to an obvious error that affected the outcome of the proceedings 

below. State v. Rohrbaugh, 126 Ohio St.3d 421, 2010-Ohio-3286, 934 N.E.2d 920, ¶ 6. 

Reversal is warranted only if the outcome “clearly would have been different absent the 

error.” State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 203, 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001). Therefore, any 

error must have affected the outcome of the trial in this matter. 

{¶38} R.C. 2152.121 provides, in pertinent part: 

 (A) If a complaint is filed against a child alleging that the child is a 

delinquent child and the case is transferred pursuant to division (A)(1)(a)(i) 

or (A)(1)(b)(ii) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code, the juvenile court 

that transferred the case shall retain jurisdiction for purposes of making 

disposition of the child when required under division (B) of this section. 

(B) If a complaint is filed against a child alleging that the child is a 

delinquent child, if the case is transferred pursuant to division (A)(1)(a)(i) 

or (A)(1)(b)(ii) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code, and if the child 

subsequently is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense in that case, the 

sentence to be imposed or disposition to be made of the child shall be 

determined as follows: 

(1) The court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the 

offense shall determine whether, had a complaint been filed in juvenile 

court alleging that the child was a delinquent child for committing an act 

that would be that offense if committed by an adult, division (A) of section 

2152.12 of the Revised Code would have required mandatory transfer of the 

case or division (B) of that section would have allowed discretionary 

transfer of the case. The court shall not consider the factor specified in 

division (B)(3) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code in making its 

determination under this division. 

(2) If the court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the 

offense determines under division (B)(1) of this section that, had a 

complaint been filed in juvenile court alleging that the child was a 

delinquent child for committing an act that would be that offense if 
committed by an adult, division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code 

would not have required mandatory transfer of the case, and division (B) of 

that section would not have allowed discretionary transfer of the case, the 

court shall transfer jurisdiction of the case back to the juvenile court that 

initially transferred the case, the court and all other agencies that have any 

record of the conviction of the child or the child’s guilty plea shall expunge 

the conviction or guilty plea and all records of it, the conviction or guilty 

plea shall be considered and treated for all purposes other than as provided 

in this section to have never occurred, the conviction or guilty plea shall be 

considered and treated for all purposes other than as provided in this section 

to have been a delinquent child adjudication of the child, and the juvenile 

court shall impose one or more traditional juvenile dispositions upon the 

child under sections 2152.19 and 2152.20 of the Revised Code. 

(3) If the court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the 

offense determines under division (B)(1) of this section that, had a 

complaint been filed in juvenile court alleging that the child was a 

delinquent child for committing an act that would be that offense if 

committed by an adult, division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code 

would not have required mandatory transfer of the case but division (B) of 

that section would have allowed discretionary transfer of the case, the court 

shall determine the sentence it believes should be imposed upon the child 

under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, shall impose that sentence upon 

the child, and shall stay that sentence pending completion of the procedures 

specified in this division. Upon imposition and staying of the sentence, the 

court shall transfer jurisdiction of the case back to the juvenile court that 

initially transferred the case and the juvenile court shall proceed in 

accordance with this division. In no case may the child waive a right to a 

hearing of the type described in division (B)(3)(b) of this section, regarding 

a motion filed as described in that division by the prosecuting attorney in 

the case. 

* * * 

(4) If the court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the 

offense determines under division (B)(1) of this section that, had a 

complaint been filed in juvenile court alleging that the child was a 

delinquent child for committing an act that would be that offense if 

committed by an adult, division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code 

would have required mandatory transfer of the case, the court shall impose 

sentence upon the child under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code. 
{¶39} Here, appellant entered pleas of guilty in the common pleas court to one 

count of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, as charged in Count 2; one 

count of robbery as amended in Count 6; one count of felonious assault as amended in 

Count 7; and one count of receiving stolen property as charged in Count 10. Within this 

assignment of error, appellant is not challenging his sentence on Count 2, which relates to 

his conduct against Speights and resulted in a sentence of 6 years (3-year firearm 

specification to run prior and consecutive to the 3 years imposed on the base charge). 

Instead, appellant’s argument focuses on his robbery, felonious assault, and receiving 

stolen property convictions, which he maintains would not have been eligible for 

mandatory bindover “had he been charged with those offenses in the juvenile court prior 

to transfer.” R.C. 2152.121(B). However, in sentencing appellant on Counts 6, 7, and 

10, the court ordered those terms to run concurrently to the six years imposed on Count 2, 

which required a mandatory transfer, for an aggregate sentence of six years. Thus, even 

if this court were to find error in the trial court’s application of R.C. 2152.121(B) with 

respect to Counts 6, 7, and 10, appellant’s sentence would not change. We therefore find 

that any alleged error would be harmless and would not have affected the outcome in this 

matter. See State v. Bradford, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013 CA 00124, 2014-Ohio-904. 

{¶40} Moreover, we do not interpret R.C. 2152.121(B) as requiring the common 

pleas court to complete a separate analysis for each charge appellant ultimately pled guilty 

to once it determined under R.C. 2152.121(B)(4) that Count 2, aggravated robbery, 

required mandatory transfer of the entire case. In our view, once the trial court made this 
determination, it was permitted to sentence appellant on each count he pled guilty to in 

CR-13-571433 under Chapter 2929 of the Ohio Revised Code. 

{¶41} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

D. Constitutional Challenges

{¶42} For purposes of convenience, we will address appellant’s fourth, fifth, and 

sixth assignments of error together. Under these assignments of error, appellant argues 

that R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b), which govern the mandatory transfer of 

juvenile cases to adult court, violate his constitutional rights to due process, equal 

protection, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 

{¶43} As an initial matter, we note that “[f]ailure to raise at the trial court level the 

issue of the constitutionality of a statute or its application, which issue is apparent at the 

time of trial, constitutes a waiver of such issue.” In re I.A., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

25078, 2012-Ohio-4973, ¶ 4, quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 489 N.E.2d 277 

(1986), syllabus. In this case, appellant failed to raise his constitutional challenges to the 

mandatory transfer in the juvenile court or the trial court, and therefore waived his 

arguments on appeal. See State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88493, 

2007-Ohio-3265. 

{¶44} In addition, “a defendant who * * * voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 

enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel ‘may not thereafter raise independent 

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of 

the guilty plea.’” State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 
927, ¶ 78, quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 

235 (1973). Because appellant does not challenge the validity of his plea, he waived his 

right to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 by pleading guilty. 

See, e.g., Bradford, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013 CA 00124, 2014-Ohio-904, ¶ 76-79; State 

v. Quarterman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26400, 2013-Ohio-3606, ¶ 3-6 (both cases finding 

that the defendant was prevented from arguing on appeal that R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 

2152.12(A)(1)(b) violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment because the defendant pled guilty to the 

charges against him and did not contest the validity of his plea). 

{¶45} Moreover, even if this court were to consider appellant’s constitutional 

arguments, several appellate districts have already determined that the statutory 

provisions requiring mandatory transfer do not violate due process and equal protection 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Ramey, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 16442, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2617 (May 22, 1998); State v. Agee, 133 Ohio 

App.3d 441, 728 N.E.2d 442 (2d Dist.1999); State v. Kelly, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-98-26, 

1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5630 (Nov. 18, 1998); State v. Lee, 11th Dist. Lake No. 

97-L-091, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4250 (Sept. 11, 1998); State v. Collins, 9th Dist. 

Lorain No. 97CA006845, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2474 (June 3, 1998) (all finding that 

the mandatory transfer provisions in former R.C. 2151.26(B), which is now codified as 

R.C. 2152.12, do not violate a juvenile’s constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection under the law). We will continue to follow the precedent on this issue unless 

otherwise advised by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 

{¶46} Additionally, appellant’s argument that the mandatory transfer statute 

violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is 

unpersuasive. “The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that 

‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 

punishments inflicted.’” State v. Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.2d 

890, ¶ 8. “‘[C]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited 

to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered 

shocking to any reasonable person.’” State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 371, 715 

N.E.2d 167 (1999), quoting McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 203 N.E.2d 334 

(1964). The penalty must be “‘so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the 

sense of justice of the community.’” State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289, 

2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ 14, quoting Weitbrecht at 371. “As applied to 

juveniles, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 

the imposition of the death penalty and the imposition of life without the possibility of 

parole for nonhomicide offenses.” Long at ¶ 8, citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 

125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 

176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). “Most recently, the Eighth Amendment was held to ban 

mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juveniles in Miller [v. Alabama, [567] U.S. 

 , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)].” Id. 
{¶47} The statutory provisions at issue in this case, however, do not govern the 

sentencing of juveniles, but instead govern whether a juvenile case must be transferred to 

adult court for adjudication. As stated in the concurrence in Quarterman, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 26400, 2013-Ohio-3606, “[m]andatory bindover does not equate to 

punishment any more than the mere prosecution of an adult in the common pleas court 

constitutes punishment.” Id. at ¶ 16. Furthermore, appellant provides no support for 

applying Eighth Amendment protections to matters that do not constitute punishment. 

Accordingly, his Eighth Amendment argument is not well taken. 

{¶48} Notwithstanding the fact that appellant waived his constitutional challenges 

to R.C. 2152.12, we find no merit to his challenges, and therefore overrule his fourth, 

fifth, and sixth assignments of error. 

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶49} In his seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that he was denied 

effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to his case being 

transferred to the adult court. 

{¶50} Under this assignment of error, appellant contends that his trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to object to the juvenile court’s transfer of his aggravated robbery 

charges to the adult court. Appellant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to object to the constitutionality of the mandatory transfer of his case. 

{¶51} We review allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the 

two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 

Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, 

appellant must establish that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland at paragraph two of the syllabus. A 

trial counsel’s performance is deficient if the conduct complained of fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. Id. 

{¶52} Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable assistance. Id. As for prejudice, a trial counsel’s 

deficient performance is prejudicial when counsel’s errors are serious enough to create a 

reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the result of trial would have been different. 

 Id. 

{¶53} In this case, we have already concluded that the juvenile court properly 

transferred appellant’s aggravated robbery charges to the adult court pursuant to R.C. 

2152.10 and 2152.12. Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to object to the transfer did not 

fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Likewise, having concluded that 

appellant’s constitutional challenges have no merit, it was not unreasonable for his trial 

counsel to abstain from objecting to the constitutionality of the mandatory bindover 

provisions in R.C. 2152.12. 

{¶54} For the foregoing reasons, appellant has failed to establish that his trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient. Accordingly, appellant’s ineffective assistance 

claim must fail because he cannot satisfy the first prong of Strickland. 
{¶55} Appellant’s seventh assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶56} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR 

APPENDIX 

Appellant’s assignments of error: 

I. The juvenile court erred when it found probable cause that Arran Mays 

committed aggravated robbery with a firearm. 

II. The juvenile court committed plain error when it transferred Count 4, 

receiving stolen property, as a mandatory transfer offense. 

III. The trial court erred when it failed to sentence Arran Mays in 

accordance with R.C. 2152.121 for Counts 6, 7, and 10, and failed to 

remand the matter to the juvenile court after imposing a stayed sentence. 

IV. The juvenile court erred when it transferred Arran Mays’s case for 

criminal prosecution because the mandatory transfer provisions in R.C. 
2152.10(A)(2)(b) and R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b) violate a child’s right to due 

process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution. 

V. The juvenile court erred when it transferred Arran Mays’s case to adult 

court because the mandatory-transfer provisions in R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) 

and R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b) violate a child’s right to equal protection as 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 2. 

VI. The juvenile court erred when it transferred Arran Mays’s case to adult 

court because the mandatory-transfer provisions in R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) 

and R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b) violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment a guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution and Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9. 

VII. Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to 

an unconstitutional transfer and illegal sentence.