IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER JOHN TROSPER,

Appellant.

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No. 36063-6-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PENNELL, A.C.J. — Christopher John Trosper appeals his 2018 bail jumping 

sentence. The State concedes error. We accept this concession and remand for 

resentencing.

FACTS

The State charged Christopher Trosper with one count of second degree assault 

and one count of bail jumping. A jury acquitted Mr. Trosper of the assault charge but 

convicted him of bail jumping.

FILED

MARCH 19, 2019

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 36063-6-III

State v. Trosper

2

At the sentencing hearing on May 21, 2018, the court determined that Mr. Trosper 

had an offender score of 10, resulting in a standard range sentence of 51-60 months. The 

court imposed a prison-based drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) sentence of 

27.75 months of incarceration and 27.75 months of community custody. As a condition 

of community custody, the court ordered Mr. Trosper to obtain a mental health evaluation 

and comply with recommended treatment. The court also imposed legal financial 

obligations (LFOs), including a $200 criminal filing fee, $250 court-appointed expert fee, 

and a $100 deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) collection fee.

In determining Mr. Trosper’s offender score, the court relied on the criminal 

history prepared by the State, which included two Oregon convictions: a 2006 conviction 

for VUCSA1 possession and a 2001 conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. 

Clerk’s Papers at 63. The State did not offer evidence to demonstrate that these Oregon 

convictions were comparable to any Washington felony, and the court did not engage in a 

comparability analysis on the record. Mr. Trosper did not object to the criminal history 

offered by the State.

Mr. Trosper’s criminal history included several Washington convictions for 

offenses committed on the same day. On June 18, 2001, he was sentenced for a first 

 1 Violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
No. 36063-6-III

State v. Trosper

3

degree theft conviction and a first degree malicious mischief conviction that were both 

committed on March 23, 2001. On November 16, 1998, he was sentenced for two 

VUCSA possession convictions that were both committed on August 10, 1998. At the

May 2018 sentencing hearing, Mr. Trosper did not object to the calculation of his 

offender score or contend that any of the offenses in his criminal history constituted the 

same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. Trosper claims the sentencing court erred in calculating his 

offender score by failing to make a comparability analysis for the two out-of-state 

convictions and failing to make a “same criminal conduct” analysis for his prior 

convictions. He also challenges the imposition of the mental health community custody 

condition and contends the imposed LFOs should be struck because he is indigent. The 

State concedes remand for resentencing is necessary and we agree.

This court’s review of an offender score calculation is de novo. State v. 

Bergstrom, 162 Wn.2d 87, 92, 169 P.3d 816 (2007). Illegal or erroneous sentences may 

be challenged for the first time on appeal, including challenges to an offender score 

calculation. State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 484-85, 973 P.2d 452 (1999).

To property calculate a defendant’s offender score, the Sentencing Reform Act 

of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, requires that sentencing courts determine a 
No. 36063-6-III

State v. Trosper

4

defendant’s criminal history based on his or her prior convictions and the level of 

seriousness of the current offense. State v. Wiley, 124 Wn.2d 679, 682, 880 P.2d 983 

(1994); RCW 9.94A.510. The SRA also requires that prior out-of-state convictions be 

classified “according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by 

Washington law.” RCW 9.94A.525(3).

A sentencing court begins its analysis of a defendant’s foreign conviction by 

comparing the elements of the out-of-state offense to the most comparable Washington 

offense. State v. Morley, 134 Wn.2d 588, 605-06, 952 P.2d 167 (1998). In the event the 

offenses are not legally comparable, the court must engage in a factual comparability by 

determining whether the defendant’s conduct in the underlying foreign conviction would 

have violated a Washington statute. Id. at 606. Classification of an out-of-state 

conviction is a mandatory step in the sentencing process. Ford, 137 Wn.2d at 483. 

Where the trial court fails to engage in the required comparability analysis, the reviewing 

court may remand to the superior court for a comparability analysis or perform the 

analysis itself where the record contains sufficient information to resolve the issue. 

See In re Pers. Restraint of Canha, 189 Wn.2d 359, 368, 402 P.3d 266 (2017).

Unless the defendant affirmatively acknowledges his criminal history, the State 

bears the burden of proving the existence of any prior convictions. State v. Mendoza, 

165 Wn.2d 913, 920, 205 P.3d 113 (2009) (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Cadwallader,
No. 36063-6-III

State v. Trosper

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155 Wn.2d 867, 876, 123 P.3d 456 (2005). A defendant’s mere agreement with the 

State’s offender score calculation and the admission of the existence of an out-of-state 

conviction is insufficient to constitute an affirmative acknowledgment that a prior 

conviction is comparable, and a defendant’s silence on the issue is not sufficient to 

constitute waiver. State v. Lucero, 168 Wn.2d 785, 788-89, 230 P.3d 165 (2010); 

Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 928.

The parties agree that Mr. Trosper did not affirmatively acknowledge the 

criminal history or waive his right to challenge it on appeal. Here, where the sentencing 

court erred by failing to conduct a necessary comparability analysis and the record is 

insufficient for this court to conduct the analysis, remand for a comparability analysis 

and resentencing is the proper remedy. On remand, both parties may present additional 

evidence with respect to Mr. Trosper’s prior convictions. RCW 9.94A.530(2); see also 

State v. Jones, 182 Wn.2d 1, 10-11, 338 P.3d 278 (2014).

The State also agrees that it appears the sentencing court erred by imposing the 

LFOs and the challenged community custody condition, but contends these issues, along 

with the “same criminal conduct” argument, may properly be addressed at resentencing. 

We agree and decline to reach the remainder of Mr. Trosper’s arguments, but instead 

direct the superior court to address these issues at the resentencing hearing.
No. 36063-6-III 

State v. Trosper 

CONCLUSION 

The sentence is reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent with the terms 

of this decision. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Q_ 

Pennell, A.CJ. 

WE CONCUR: 

Fearing, J. 

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