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THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION 2012 AGENDA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 29, 2012

Serial No. 112–29

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture 

agriculture.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma, Chairman 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, 

Vice Chairman 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

GLENN THOMPSON, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

SCOTT R. TIPTON, Colorado 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

TIM HUELSKAMP, Kansas 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

ROBERT T. SCHILLING, Illinois 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota, Ranking 

Minority Member 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

JOE BACA, California 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

JIM COSTA, California 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

GREGORIO KILILI CAMACHO SABLAN, 

Northern Mariana Islands 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

NICOLE SCOTT, Staff Director 

KEVIN J. KRAMP, Chief Counsel 

TAMARA HINTON, Communications Director 

ROBERT L. LAREW, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Baca, Hon. Joe, a Representative in Congress from California, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 6

Conaway, Hon. K. Michael, a Representative in Congress from Texas, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 5

Lucas, Hon. Frank D., a Representative in Congress from Oklahoma, opening 

statement .............................................................................................................. 1

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3

Peterson, Hon. Collin C., a Representative in Congress from Minnesota, opening statement ........................................................................................................ 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4

Welch, Hon. Peter, a Representative in Congress from Vermont, submitted 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 49

WITNESS

Gensler, Hon. Gary, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 

Washington, D.C.; accompanied by Hon. Jill E. Sommers, Commissioner, 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission ......................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9

Submitted questions ......................................................................................... 50

(1)

THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION 2012 AGENDA 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

1300 of the Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Frank D. Lucas 

[Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Lucas, King, Neugebauer, 

Conaway, Fortenberry, Schmidt, Thompson, Stutzman, Tipton, 

Crawford, Huelskamp, DesJarlais, Gibson, Hultgren, Schilling, Peterson, Holden, McIntyre, Boswell, Baca, David Scott of Georgia, 

Cuellar, Costa, Schrader, Kissell, Owens, Pingree, Courtney, 

Welch, Fudge, Sablan, Sewell, and McGovern. 

Staff present: Tamara Hinton, Kevin Kramp, Josh Mathis, Ryan 

McKee, John Porter, Matt Schertz, Heather Vaughan, Suzanne 

Watson, Liz Friedlander, C. Clark Ogilvie, John Konya, Jamie 

Mitchell, and Caleb Crosswhite. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK D. LUCAS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM OKLAHOMA 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Committee on Agriculture to 

review the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2012 agenda 

will come to order. 

Good morning, and I would like to thank all of you for being 

here. Today’s hearing will focus on the Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission, the CFTC agenda for the coming year. And I would 

like to thank Chairman Gensler for joining us to share his perspective. 

This is a timely hearing as the CFTC is facing a number of 

issues of concern to our constituents. First and foremost, the 

CFTC’s agenda for the coming year must be its investigation into 

the collapse of MF Global and its missing customer funds. Thousands of customers have yet to receive nearly 30 percent of the 

funds that MF Global should have held in segregated accounts. 

While I commend the Trustee for working quickly to trace the 

thousands of complex transactions that occurred during MF 

Global’s final days, the fact remains that many customers have yet 

to be made whole. Farmers and ranchers across the country continue to face hardships because of their missing funds and have 

lost confidence in the futures system. This raises several key questions about customer protections in place and the CFTC’s role in 

futures markets. Although the CFTC has gained new authority 

2

over the swaps market under the Dodd-Frank Act, the MF Global 

collapse demonstrates the importance of CFTC’s oversight responsibilities in futures market. 

In addition to our concerns about MF Global customer funds, we 

also must address the Dodd-Frank rulemaking process. As the 

CFTC nears the halfway mark in completing the dozens of regulations required by Dodd-Frank, I remain concerned about the 

breadth of those proposals. Instead of focusing resources on the entities and activities that pose the most significant risk to our financial systems, the CFTC is casting a wide net that could needlessly 

catch end-users. 

For example, for months we have been assured by Chairman 

Gensler that the swap dealer definition would not result in unnecessary registration of on end-users, which Congress never intended 

to fall within the swap dealer category. However, as the Commission neared completion of the rule last week, end-users were frantically seeking clarification that their hedging activities would not 

be classified as swap dealing. Now, this doesn’t make sense because 

Congress never intended for hedging to be considered swap dealing. 

Additionally, the CFTC has yet to propose a rule that would clarify the scope of its new regulations for activities that occur outside 

our borders, what we refer to as extraterritoriality. There is a longstanding precedent by both the CFTC and the Prudential Regulators to defer to foreign regulatory authorities in matters concerning foreign entities and transactions. Expanding the reach of 

the Dodd-Frank into activities outside our borders not only ignores 

the principles of international law, but it spreads our agencies and 

resources too thin. It also threatens the international cooperation 

required for global financial reforms as envisioned by the G20. 

Additionally, the lack of clarification on the territorial scope of 

regulations has made it incredibly difficult for market participants 

to prepare for compliance. The confusion over the swap dealer definition and the foreign scope of those regulations are just two examples of many issues which the CFTC has failed to deliver concrete 

answers or policy solutions. Our constituents need more than 

empty reassurances. 

Most of these concerns are rooted in an issue that we have discussed for more than a year now, the need for strong and robust 

economic analysis. The Economist magazine recently highlighted 

the Obama Administration’s tendency to overstate the benefits of 

regulation while underestimating the cost. That has certainly been 

apparent in the Dodd-Frank rulemaking. 

At a public meeting recently, CFTC staffers admitted they simply 

had not calculated the cost and benefits of a rule governing internal business conduct standards. They could not provide substantial 

substantive analysis for the conclusions they drew about how the 

rule would impact our economy and that is unacceptable. 

Even if the CFTC was attempting to conduct economic analyses 

of Dodd-Frank regulations, it would be difficult given the lack of 

clarity about which organizations will be affected by each rule. 

Making policy without regard to the economic consequences is a 

luxury we cannot afford even in the strongest of economies, and we 

certainly cannot afford it right now. 

3

I look forward to hearing Chairman Gensler’s agenda for 2012. 

More than that, I look forward to a time when we can guarantee 

our constituents that they will not be overburdened by regulations 

that were not intended for them. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK D. LUCAS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM OKLAHOMA

Good morning, and thank you all for being here. Today’s hearing will focus on the 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) agenda for the upcoming year. 

I’d like to thank Chairman Gensler for joining us to share his perspective. 

This is a timely hearing, as the CFTC is facing a number of issues of concern to 

our constituents. 

First and foremost on the CFTC’s agenda for the coming year must be its investigation into the collapse of MF Global and its missing customer funds. Thousands 

of customers have yet to receive nearly 30 percent of the funds that MF Global 

should have held in segregated accounts. 

While I commend the Trustee for working quickly to trace the thousands of complex transactions that occurred during MF Global’s final days, the fact remains that 

many customers have not yet been made whole. 

Farmers and ranchers across the country continue to face hardships because of 

their missing funds, and have lost confidence in the futures system. 

This raises several key questions about customer protections in place, and the 

CFTC’s role in futures markets. 

Although the CFTC has gained new authorities over the swaps market under the 

Dodd-Frank Act, the MF Global collapse demonstrates the importance of CFTC’s 

oversight responsibilities in futures markets. 

In addition to our concerns about MF Global customer funds, we also must address the Dodd-Frank rulemaking process. As the CFTC nears the half-way mark 

in completing the dozens of regulations required by Dodd-Frank, I remain concerned 

about the breadth of the proposals. Instead of focusing resources on the entities and 

activities that pose the most significant risks to our financial system, the CFTC is 

casting a wide net that could needlessly catch end-users. 

For example, for months we have been assured by Chairman Gensler that the 

swap dealer definition would not result in unnecessary registration of end-users, 

which Congress never intended to fall within the swap dealer category. 

However, as the Commission neared consideration of the rule last week, end-users 

were frantically seeking clarification that their hedging activities would not be classified as swap dealing. 

This doesn’t make sense, because Congress never intended for hedging to be considered swap dealing. 

Additionally, the CFTC has yet to propose a rule that will clarify the scope of its 

new regulations for activities that occur outside our borders—what we refer to as 

extra-territoriality. 

There is a long-standing precedent by both the CFTC and the Prudential Regulators to defer to foreign regulatory authorities in matters concerning foreign entities and transactions. 

Expanding the reach of Dodd-Frank into activities conducted outside our borders 

not only ignores principles of international law, but it spreads our agencies and resources too thin. It also threatens the international coordination required for global 

financial reform as envisioned by the G20. 

Additionally, the lack of clarification on the territorial scope of regulations has 

made it incredibly difficult for market participants to prepare for compliance. 

The confusion over the swap dealer definition and the foreign scope of regulations 

are just two examples of the many issues on which the CFTC has failed to deliver 

concrete answers or policy solutions. Our constituents need more than empty reassurances. 

Most of these concerns are rooted in an issue that we have discussed for more 

than a year now—the need for strong and robust economic analysis. 

The Economist recently highlighted the Obama Administration’s tendency to overstate the benefits of regulation while underestimating the costs. That has certainly 

been apparent in the Dodd-Frank rulemaking. 

At a public meeting recently, CFTC staffers admitted they simply had not calculated the costs and benefits of a rule governing internal business conduct standVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
4

ards. They could not provide substantive analysis for the conclusions they drew 

about how that rule would impact our economy. That’s unacceptable. 

Even if the CFTC was attempting to conduct economic analyses of Dodd-Frank 

regulations, it would be difficult given the lack of clarity about which organizations 

will be affected by each rule. 

Making policy without regard for the economic consequences is a luxury we cannot afford even in the strongest economy. We certainly cannot afford it now. 

I look forward to hearing Chairman Gensler’s agenda for 2012, but more than 

that, I look forward to a time when we can guarantee our constituents that they 

will not be overburdened by regulations that were not intended for them.

The CHAIRMAN. And with that, I would like to recognize the 

Ranking Member for any opening comments he might have. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM MINNESOTA 

Mr. PETERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Chairman Gensler, back to the Committee for today’s hearing. 

In addition to passing a farm bill, oversight of the CFTC has 

been a top priority of this Committee. It is important for Chairman 

Gensler to provide an update on the agenda of the CFTC for the 

year, along with the Commission’s progress on implementing the financial reforms passed in 2010. Looking at the Dodd-Frank rules 

that have already been finalized by the CFTC, I believe it is safe 

to say that so far the CFTC has done a pretty good job. And in my 

conversations with Chairman Gensler, it seems to me that they are 

on the right track, going forward. 

For example, during a legislative hearing last year, we heard 

concerns about business conduct standards and the potential impact that they could have on pension plans’ ability to use swaps to 

hedge risk. In January, the Commission approved a bipartisan 

final rule establishing business conduct standards, and the general 

feeling I get from the pension plans is that the CFTC got the final 

rule right. 

As the CFTC continues finalizing more rules, I suspect that they 

will continue to get it right and address the concerns that we have 

heard at various hearings. I know that some of you have expressed 

frustration with the CFTC’s process for implementing these reforms. While it has not been a perfect process, we cannot lose sight 

of the importance of their taking the time so that they can, in the 

end, get the right outcome. 

But the CFTC has more on its plate than just Dodd-Frank. It is 

still in the process of investigating what happened at MF Global 

and monitoring our futures market as we watch energy prices continue to climb. The Commission does these things and much more, 

all while being grossly under-funded. 

Today’s hearing will provide Members with an opportunity to ask 

about these and many other issues currently before the CFTC, so 

I look forward to hearing Chairman Gensler’s testimony and I 

thank the chair for holding today’s hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM MINNESOTA

Thank you, Chairman Lucas, and welcome Chairman Gensler to today’s hearing. 

In addition to passing a farm bill, oversight of the CFTC has been a top priority 

for this Committee and I think it’s important for Chairman Gensler to provide an 

5

update on the CFTC agenda for the year along with the Commission’s progress of 

implementing the financial reforms Congress passed in 2010. 

Looking at the Dodd-Frank rules that have already been finalized by the CFTC, 

I believe it is safe to say that, so far, the CFTC has done a pretty good job. And, 

in my conversations with Chairman Gensler, it seems to me that they are on the 

right track. 

For example, during a legislative hearing last year, we heard concerns about business conduct standards and the potential impact they could have on pension plans’ 

ability to use swaps to hedge risk. In January, the Commission approved a bipartisan final rule establishing business conduct standards. 

The general feeling I get from the pension plans is that the CFTC got the final 

rule right. As the CFTC continues finalizing more rules, I suspect they will continue 

to get it right and address the concerns we have heard at our various hearings. 

I know that some have expressed frustration with the CFTC’s process for implementing these reforms. While it has not been a perfect process, we cannot lose sight 

of the importance of taking the time to do this right. 

But the CFTC has more on its plate than just Dodd-Frank. It is still in the process of investigating what happened at MF Global and monitoring our futures markets as we watch energy prices continue to climb. The Commission does these things 

and much more, all while grossly under-funded. Today’s hearing will provide Members with the opportunity to ask about these, and many other issues, currently before the CFTC. 

I am looking forward to hearing Chairman Gensler’s testimony and I thank the 

chair for holding today’s hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair appreciates the gentleman’s opening 

comments. And the chair would request that other Members submit their opening statements for the record so the witness may 

begin his testimony and to ensure that there is ample time for 

questions. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Conaway and Mr. Baca follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today. I look forward to the 

opportunity to hear from Chairman Gensler about the course the CFTC is charting 

over the coming year. In particular, I am interested in hearing more about the 

schedule for rolling out the final rules we are waiting on and the Commission’s 

plans to bolster the cost-benefit analysis that it conducts on those rules still pending. 

For the past year, I have pushed, cajoled, admonished, and begged the CFTC to 

do a better job in estimating the costs and benefits of the rules it proposes. For too 

long, the Commission has hidden behind the letter of the law which says the Commission must only ‘‘consider’’ the costs and benefits of a proposed rule. Often, it is 

left to the commenters to provide the relevant data and perform an analysis of the 

proposed rule. Unfortunately, this misses the point. The analysis is supposed to inform drafters of the proposal. The regulators ought to do their homework before they 

make proposed regulations, not after. 

What is worse, this process is complicated by the continuing issue with the sequence of the rules. For many potential regulated entities, they simply do not know 

if a particular rule will apply to them or not, because we have not yet defined the 

very basic participants and components of the market. 

I am certain the concerns I raise today are a surprise to no one. However, I continue to bring them up and I continue to push on them, because the work the CFTC 

is doing over this coming year holds the potential to make or break the financial 

markets that so many of my constituents depend on to manage their businesses and 

their financial affairs. 

To that end, I was would like to highlight three statements by three of the CFTC 

Commissioners given at the most recent public meeting and enter them into the 

record. I believe together, these three statements ought to continue to guide the 

Commission as it completes its work over the coming year. They are the reasons 

why I demand the CFTC do its due diligence. 

Commissioner Chilton noted correctly, that ‘‘we must, as we go forward, be extremely cognizant that all of these swaps rules are an interdependent set. It is a 

grave error to look at each rule as free-standing—they are not.’’ 

6

Although this idea should surprise no one, the Commission’s failure to adequately 

consider the effects and scope of the rules proposed under Dodd-Frank have lead 

to contradictory mandates, duplicative filings, and sowed needless confusion among 

stakeholders in the derivatives and futures community. Unfortunately, this confusion is wholly self-induced. Better sequencing and a stronger commitment to analysis could have avoided much of the uncertainty that has plagued this process since 

the beginning. 

Commissioner Sommers issued what I believe will be a prescient statement when 

she said, ‘‘I do not believe that these rules have a chance of withstanding the test 

of time, and instead believe that this Commission will be consumed over the next 

few years using our valuable resources to rewrite rules that we knew or should have 

known would not work when we issued them.’’

It is my fear that when we get to the end of the rulemaking process, we are going 

to find the new institutions and systems we have erected are not very good. Should 

that pass, blame will certainly rest with the drafters of the financial reform bill. 

But, our regulators will not have helped the process if they did not strive to understand every facet of every rule, before they were finalized. 

Finally, Commissioner O’Malia’s statement reached straight to the heart of the 

matter when he said: ‘‘Our inability to develop a quantitative analysis, or to develop 

a reasonable comparative analysis of legitimate options, hurts the credibility of this 

Commission and undermines the quality of our rules.’’

The Commission’s failure to articulate economically defensible reasons behind its 

rules damage its reputation as a regulator and strain its relationships with the entities it oversees. Rules that are perceived to be arbitrary or pointlessly burdensome 

are rules that will be avoided or worse, actively circumvented. Bad regulation leads 

to loopholes, shortcuts, and will necessitate constant regulatory intervention to 

tweak and patch the rules for every new eventuality. If this happens, the rules laid 

down under Dodd-Frank will bring more risk and more uncertainty to the market. 

Before I close, I want to commend Chairman Gensler on his openness and attentiveness, both with Members of Congress and market participants. He has engaged 

the Commission in an extraordinary campaign of meetings and public hearings as 

they have undertaken the staggering array of new rules required by Dodd-Frank. 

However, he has consistently left idle the most important tool at his disposal—

cost-benefit analysis. I fear that all his efforts in openness will not result in a better 

final product, because the Commission has not bothered with a sustained effort to 

quantify its proposals or any of their alternatives. 

This analysis is not about making things easier for the bankers of Wall Street, 

it is about creating a regulatory framework in which all market actors can participate. I do not worry about the big banks or the big financial firms; they all have 

armies of lawyers prepared to help them sort through the end result of this process. 

I do fear for the farmer whose local bank will not give him a loan, because he 

can no longer hedge his crop. I worry about the small manufacturer that wants to 

export products, but finds executing an interest rate swap is too expensive. And, I 

agonize over the jobs that will be lost because businesses are no longer able to effectively manage their risks. 

Whether they know it or not, my constituents—the farmers, ranchers, manufactures, and small businesses spread across the 11th District—and all Americans are 

counting on the CFTC. Their ability to manage their financial lives will be impacted 

by the rules the Commission finalizes. To that end, I will continue to insist the 

CFTC utilizes every tool at its disposal to get them right. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BACA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

CALIFORNIA

Chairman Lucas and Ranking Member Peterson:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the ongoing implementation of Title VII 

of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and discuss 

the 2012 agenda for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 

I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for convening this hearing. I also 

want to thank our witness, and recognize the Chairman of the Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission, Mr. Gary Gensler. 

Chairman Gensler, thank you for your efforts—I know you have been working 

very hard to properly implement the regulatory requirements of Dodd-Frank. 

Everyone in this room understands the important balance we need to reach as we 

look at establishing a regulatory framework for the complex area of derivatives and 

exotic futures trading. 

7

We want to make sure our agricultural producers, business communities, and endusers have the flexibility to effectively trade commodities; BUT we also must protect 

the American public from predatory financial risks. 

We all saw what happened the last time our regulators fell asleep at the wheel—

financial institutions across the nation collapsed and our economy fell victim to a 

foreclosure crisis that is still paralyzing many segments of the country. 

As the CFTC moves forward in finalizing the definitions of swaps and swap dealers—I hope it will keep in mind the predicament that many energy providers in my 

home State of California face. 

Moving forward—I hope that any transaction an energy provider makes in order 

to comply with state regulations—is excluded from the process used to determine 

whether an entity is a swap dealer. 

We all must remember the importance of the mission the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform Act laid out. 

The American people must have OVERSIGHT and the ACCOUNTABILITY to ensure that all derivative trading occurs in light of day, and is above the board. 

Again, I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for their leadership 

on this critical issue. 

I look forward to this opportunity to hear about the progress of the implementation of Title VII provisions of the Dodd-Frank bill; and to make sure the CFTC is 

properly following the legislation’s Congressional intent. 

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. With that, I would like to welcome to our witness 

to the table, Hon. Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Washington, D.C. Mr. Chairman, 

please begin whenever you are ready, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GARY GENSLER, CHAIRMAN,

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,

WASHINGTON, D.C.; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. JILL E. 

SOMMERS, COMMISSIONER, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION 

Mr. GENSLER. Good morning, Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member 

Peterson, and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here 

also with my fellow Commissioner Jill Sommers as well. Today, I 

am told it is my 39th time testifying before Congress in this job. 

Apparently, I have been in the job 109 days but I will tell you this 

is the first time I have testified on February 29. 

After a full year in 2011, the CFTC has significant work in front 

of us for 2012. Derivatives markets are critical for farmers, ranchers, producers, and other end-users in the real economy. And as 

this Committee has noted to me, but I would give the statistic: the 

non-financial side of our economy provides 94 percent of private 

sector jobs. That is what the derivatives markets helps: futures and 

swaps, allow these companies to manage risk and focus on what 

they do best, that is, servicing customers, producing products, 

farming, milling, and investing in our economy. 

My written testimony is more complete, but in short, our agenda 

includes completion of the swaps markets rules; clearing mandate 

determinations, which is a big piece of what Congress gave us; implementation of swaps reforms, working with members of the public on that; enhanced customer protections; and adapting oversight 

to changing market structure. 

Last summer, we turned the corner from our proposal phase to 

starting finalizing rules. We have completed 28 rules to date and 

we have just over 20 to go. While the statute generally called for 

us to complete this within 1 year, it has taken us longer. And we 

are completing rules in a thoughtful, balanced way to get them 

8

right, not against the clock. And with 28,000 public comments and 

1,300 meetings with the public to date, there is a lot to consider. 

We are close to finalizing rules with the SEC to further define the 

term swap dealer. I believe we will be responsive to comments from 

farm credit institutions that have been the subject of some of your 

discussions here in bills, agriculture cooperatives, and yes, the commercial end-users and the issue the Chairman raised about hedging. The product definition rules should follow later during the 

spring. But again, we are not trying to rush these. We are trying 

to get them right and listen to the commenters and this Committee. 

We also are looking to soon finalize the Commercial End-User 

Exemption. Our proposal took Congress’ intent to heart. Non-financial companies using swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk 

are out of the requirement for central clearing. The Commission’s 

proposed rule on margin for swap dealers likewise provides that 

such non-financial companies will not be required by Commission 

rules to post margin for uncleared swaps. 

I also want to mention that we are taking the legislative proposals of this Committee into consideration as we complete our 

rules. I view them as pretty serious comments in our comment file. 

The Commission, for example, has already provided for certain exceptions for inter-affiliate swaps from real-time reporting and the 

external business conduct rules that the Ranking Member mentioned. We also look forward to seeking public comment on interaffiliate clearing for financial companies. 

As we finalize reforms, we also have reached out broadly on how 

to best implement them, including last year’s roundtables, public 

comment periods, and many meetings. And I thank you, Congressman Conaway, because we worked a lot with you, in thinking this 

through. In response to this public input, we have included phased 

implementation in many of our rules. We are also working internally to implement the swaps reforms. The Commission published 

a new strategic plan last year; we have restructured some divisions; in particular, standing up the new data and technology division. And given our increasing oversights needs, we are investing 

in updated market technology. 

Before I close, I will mention resources. At about 700 people, we 

are only about ten percent greater than we were in the 1990s, and 

since then of course you have asked us to also cover the swaps 

market, which is nearly eight times the size of the futures market. 

The CFTC is not a price-setting agency. Nevertheless, rising prices 

for basic commodities—agriculture and energy—just remind us 

once again of the importance of having effective market oversight 

that ensures the integrity and transparency of these markets. 

I will conclude just by saying that the derivatives reforms, once 

implemented, will benefit all Americans in the real economy. They 

will benefit the end-users of derivatives, which are responsible for 

most of the job creation in the economy. It will do this through the 

transparency and competition it brings to the marketplace. I think 

also it will benefit the public by lowering risk that Wall Street 

poses to the rest of us. 

I thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gensler follows:]

9

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GARY GENSLER, CHAIRMAN, COMMODITY FUTURES

TRADING COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Good morning, Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Peterson, and Members of the 

Committee. I thank you for inviting me to today’s hearing on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) 2012 agenda. I also thank my fellow Commissioners and CFTC staff for their hard work and commitment to protecting the public 

and promoting transparent and efficient markets. I’m pleased to be here with CFTC 

Commissioner Jill Sommers. 

CFTC Mission 

At its core, the CFTC’s mission is to ensure the integrity and transparency of derivatives markets—both the futures and swaps markets. Each part of our economy 

relies on a well-functioning derivatives marketplace. These markets are critical for 

farmers, producers, ranchers and other end-users in the real economy—the non-financial side of the economy that provides 94 percent of private sector jobs. Endusers can lock in a price or rate and manage their risk through these markets. The 

futures and swaps markets allow companies to focus on what they do best—servicing their customers, producing products, innovating, and investing in our economy. 

These markets are also critical for pension funds, mutual funds, community banks 

and insurance companies, and the Americans who rely upon these entities for their 

savings and financial needs. 

The CFTC has historically been charged with overseeing the commodity futures 

markets. In 2010, Congress expanded the CFTC’s mission to also oversee the previously unregulated swaps marketplace. At approximately $300 trillion, the domestic swaps market is nearly eight times the size of the futures market. Combined these markets help their users hedge or transfer $22 of risk for every 

dollar of goods and services produced in the U.S. economy. Futures and swaps markets touch nearly every aspect of our economy from the food we eat, to the price 

at the pump, to our mortgages and credit cards, and to our retirement savings. 

Thus, it is essential that these markets are transparent and efficient and work for 

the benefit of the American public. And when markets are open and transparent, 

they are safer and sounder, and costs are lower for companies and their customers. 

CFTC 2012 Agenda 

After a very full year in 2011, the CFTC has a significant agenda this year to 

further enhance the futures and swaps markets to better protect the public. To 

start, I’ll review what is ahead with regard to swaps a market reforms. I then will 

discuss further initiatives for enhancing customer protection and touch on some 

steps we are looking at to address changing market structure. I will close by discussing the CFTC’s request for additional resources to best accomplish these goals. 

Completion of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank Act) Rules 

The CFTC has made significant progress in completing the reforms that will bring 

transparency to the swaps market and lower its risk to the rest of the economy. But 

there is much work yet to be done. 

During the rule-writing process, we have benefitted from significant public input. 

CFTC Commissioners and staff have met over 1,300 times with the public, and we 

have held 16 public roundtables on important issues, including a 2 day roundtable 

beginning today on further protections for customer money. 

We substantially finished our proposal phase last spring, and then largely reopened the mosaic of rules for additional public comments. We have accepted further public comment after the formal comment periods closed. The agency received 

3,000 comment letters before we proposed rules and 28,000 comment letters in response to proposals. 

Last summer, we turned the corner and started finalizing rules. To date, we’ve 

completed 28 rules with just over 20 more to go. Attached to this testimony is a 

more complete list of rules we’ve finished, as well as proposed rules. It’s my anticipation that we will finish most of the rule-writing work by this summer; however, 

it’s possible that a handful won’t be finished until later this year. While the statute 

generally called for completion of the rules in 1 year, for most of them, it has taken 

us longer. We are completing rules in a thoughtful, balanced way—not against a 

clock. 

To promote transparent and competitive markets, we’ve been able to complete 

seven key reforms. Among these reforms, the Commission already has begun to receive position information for large traders in the swaps markets for agricultural, 

energy and metal products. Based on completed registration rules, three swap data 

repositories have already filed with the CFTC. In December, we finalized rules for 

10

the reporting of swaps transactions both to the public and to regulators, which will 

begin to take effect as early as July of this year. For the first time, the public and 

regulators will have specific information on the swaps markets, in aggregate and 

transaction-by-transaction. By contrast, none of this information was available leading up the 2008 crisis. 

Looking forward, we hope to complete rules with regard to designated contract 

markets (DCMs), followed later this spring by rules for swap execution facilities 

(SEFs). These rules will be critical to bringing transparency and the benefits of competition to both buyers and sellers in the swaps market before they transact. 

Last week, the Commission proposed a new block trading rule with a revised 

methodology for determining block sizes that benefitted from public input and a review of market data. As we have discussed in this Committee during previous hearings, the Commission is mindful that there are times when a reproposal of a rule 

is necessary to help ensure the Commission gets it right. 

The CFTC also has made significant progress on rules to bring swaps into central 

clearing. We completed rules establishing robust risk management requirements for 

derivatives clearing organizations. We finished a rule on the process for clearinghouses to submit swaps that may be mandated for central clearing. In addition, the 

Commission adopted an important customer protection enhancement, the so-called 

‘‘LSOC rule’’ (legal segregation with operational commingling) for swaps. It prevents 

clearing organizations from using the cleared swap collateral of non-defaulting, innocent customers to protect themselves and their clearing members. 

To further facilitate broad access to these markets and promote competition, the 

Commission hopes in the near term to consider final rules on client clearing documentation, risk management, and so-called straight-through processing, or sending 

transactions immediately to the clearinghouse upon execution. 

We also are looking to soon finalize the end-user exception. Consistent with Congressional intent, our proposal would ensure non-financial companies using swaps 

to hedge or mitigate commercial risk will not be required to bring swaps into central 

clearing. The Commission’s proposed rule on margin for swap dealers likewise provides that such non-financial companies will not have to post margin for uncleared 

swaps. 

The Commission has received substantial public input on the treatment of swaps 

among affiliates of the same business entity. The CFTC’s final rules on real-time 

reporting and external business conduct standards include exceptions for such 

swaps. To address commenters’ questions about a possible clearing requirement between affiliates of financial entities, I expect the Commission to consider a proposal 

and take public comments later this year. 

The CFTC has begun to finalize rules to regulate swap dealers and lower their 

risk to the rest of the economy. First, we finished rules requiring registration of 

swap dealers with the National Futures Association (NFA). Second, we completed 

rules establishing and enforcing robust sales practices in the swaps markets. And 

third, a rule finalized this month requires swap dealers and major swap participants 

to establish policies to manage risk, as well as to put in place firewalls to prevent 

conflicts of interest between trading and research and trading and clearing units. 

Later this year, we will consider final rules on capital and margin rules, which 

will have the benefit of close consultation with other regulators, both domestic and 

international. I also anticipate the Commission will explicitly seek public input on 

the extraterritorial application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. 

The Dodd-Frank Act was clear on the meaning of swap and swap dealer, but the 

law called on the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to act 

jointly in further defining these terms. We have benefitted from significant public 

input on the rule relating to entity definitions, and we are looking to finish it in 

the near term. We are taking into account all public comments, including those from 

farm credit institutions and agricultural cooperatives. The product definitions rule 

will follow in the spring. 

Furthermore, the CFTC is working with participants in the electricity markets on 

possible exemptive orders for rural electric cooperatives, municipal public power providers and regional transmission organizations. 

The Commission also is working with the banking regulators and the SEC on the 

Volcker rule. In adopting the Volcker rule, Congress prohibited banking entities 

from proprietary trading, an activity that may put taxpayers at risk. At the same 

time, Congress permitted banking entities to engage in market making, among 

other activities. One of the challenges in finalizing a rule is achieving these dual 

objectives. It will be critical to hear from the public on how to best achieve Congress’ 

mandate. The CFTC’s comment period closes April 16, and I very much look forward 

to the substantial public input I anticipate we will receive on this rule. 

11

The global nature of the swaps markets makes it imperative that the United 

States actively consults and coordinates with foreign authorities. The Commission 

is working with our foreign counterparts to promote robust and consistent standards 

and avoid conflicting requirements in the global marketplace. CFTC staff is sharing 

many of our comment summaries and drafts of final rules with international regulators. We have ongoing dialogues with regulators in the European Union (EU), 

Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Canada. Last week, I met with EU Commissioner 

Michel Barnier during his visit to Washington. Next week, I will be in Basel to meet 

with the Financial Stability Board to discuss timely implementation of swaps reforms in each of the major market jurisdictions. I then travel to Brussels to meet 

with key European officials and industry leaders. 

Clearing Mandate 

Congress gave the CFTC an important role to play in determining which swaps 

must be mandatorily cleared. The clearing of standardized swaps will lower risk and 

make markets more competitive. Under the Congressionally mandated process, the 

Commission will have 90 days to review a clearinghouse’s submission and determine 

whether the swap or group of swaps is required to be cleared. Last year, the CFTC 

finalized a rule on the process for review of swaps for mandatory clearing. Earlier 

this month, we asked each registered clearinghouse to submit for the agency’s review all the swaps that it was clearing as of February 1, 2012, including all preenactment swaps. Staff is now reviewing these submissions and preparing recommendations for the Commission regarding which swaps or groups of swaps 

should be required to be cleared. During the Commission’s review period, there will 

be a 30 day period for the public to provide comments. Though much of the timing 

depends on the clearinghouses, I anticipate that this comment period may begin this 

spring. 

Implementation 

As we move on from the rule-writing process, a critical part of our agenda is working with market participants on phased implementation of these reforms. We have 

reached out broadly on this topic to get public input. Last spring, we published a 

concepts document as a guide for commenters, held a 2 day, public roundtable with 

the SEC, and received nearly 300 comments. Last year, the Commission proposed 

two rules on implementation phasing relating to the swap clearing and trading 

mandates and the swap trading documentation and margin requirements for 

uncleared swaps. We have received very constructive public feedback and hope to 

finalize the proposed compliance schedules in the next few months. 

In addition to these proposals, the Commission has included phased compliance 

schedules in many of our rules. For example, both the data and real-time reporting 

rules, which were finalized this past December, include phased compliance. The first 

required reporting is as early as July for interest rate and currency swaps. Other 

commodities have until October. Additional time delays for reporting were permitted 

depending upon asset class, contract participant and in the early phases of implementation. 

The CFTC will continue looking at appropriate timing for compliance, which balances the desire to protect the public while providing adequate time for industry to 

comply with reforms. Furthermore, to ensure a smooth transition for market participants, we have given them exemptive relief from the effective dates of certain rules 

until July 16, 2012. 

As swaps market reforms are implemented, market participants will continue to 

seek guidance, and in some cases petition for exemptions. The CFTC wants to be 

as responsive as possible to these inquiries, and this is an important part of our 

2012 agenda. In the case of the large trader reporting requirements for the physical 

commodity swaps market, Commission staff worked with market participants and 

delayed requirements for 2 months to accommodate technical requirements. CFTC 

staff also engaged with market participants to ease the process of compliance. In 

addition to regular dialogue, our staff developed a guidebook of data standards, 

which can be found on our website. Just as we did with large trader reporting, staff 

is reaching out to market participants regarding the data rule we completed in December, and we will continue this type of engagement in other areas. 

Another significant agenda item for this year will be the registration of new market participants. This process has already begun for SDRs and foreign boards of 

trade (FBOTs). Since the FBOT rule was finalized in December, three have requested to be registered. We expect other FBOTs that are currently operating under 

staff no-action letters to shortly request to be registered. We also are working with 

two new entities seeking to register with the CFTC as designated clearing organizations. In January, we finalized the registration rule for swap dealers and major 

12

swap participants, and we will be working, along with the National Futures Association, on these entities’ registration and related questions. In addition, Commission 

staff estimates that 20–30 entities will seek to become SEFs, and I anticipate they 

would begin to register later this year. 

The agency also has a lot of work to do internally this year to further prepare 

for the implementation of reforms. A year ago, the Commission published a new 

strategic plan for Fiscal Years 2011–2015 that incorporates the agency’s expanded 

responsibilities to oversee both the futures and swaps markets. Importantly, the 

strategic plan also includes a new and tougher approach to agency performance 

measures to more accurately evaluate our progress. In addition, the CFTC’s new responsibilities necessitated an agency restructuring to ensure the Commission uses 

its resources as efficiently as possible. The Commission created the Division of Swap 

Dealer and Intermediary Oversight and the Office of Data and Technology. The reorganization was put in place last October. 

Our new Office of Data and Technology has a number of critical objectives to 

achieve in support of both swaps and futures oversight. The office will establish connections with SDRs so that the CFTC can collect and analyze swaps data for surveillance and enforcement purposes. It is taking on the challenge of how we aggregate data across SDRs, as well as how we aggregate it with futures market data. 

The office also will be working with the Treasury Department and international regulators on legal entity identifiers. Given our increasing oversight needs and the 

events of May 6, 2010, we will begin collecting daily order books from trading platforms for surveillance and market oversight purposes. The technology office also will 

continue to update and improve automated surveillance, including greater use of 

alerts. 

Building on newly available data to the Commission, the CFTC plans to begin 

publishing aggregated swaps trader data. The public has benefited for years from 

the futures market data we have published in our Commitment of Traders reports. 

Our goal is to provide similar transparency to the public for the swaps market. 

In October, the Commission adopted a final rule to establish position limits for 

physical commodity derivatives. The limits will come into effect once the joint rule 

further defining the term ‘‘swap’’ is completed and the Commission has received a 

year’s worth of data on the relevant swap markets. 

Customer Protection 

Segregation of customer funds is a core foundation of customer protection in both 

the futures and swaps markets. The CFTC already has taken a number of steps in 

this area. The completed amendments to rule 1.25 regarding the investment of 

funds bring customers back to protections they had prior to exemptions the Commission granted between 2000 and 2005. Importantly, this prevents use of customer 

funds for in-house lending through repurchase agreements. In addition, clearinghouses will have to collect margin on a gross basis and futures commission merchants (FCMs) will no longer be able to offset one customer’s collateral against another and then send only the net to the clearinghouse. And the LSOC rule for swaps 

ensures customer money must be protected individually all the way to the clearinghouse. 

We will continue looking at options to further protect customers. Today and tomorrow Commission staff are hosting public roundtable sessions to examine additional enhancements. Also participating are other regulators, including the SEC and 

NFA. Panel topics include protections for the collateral of futures customers, consistent with the already-approved LSOC rule for cleared swaps. Additional discussion topics are alternative custodial arrangements for segregated funds, enhancing 

the controls over the disbursement of customer funds, and increasing transparency 

to customers and to the CFTC regarding the location and investment of customer 

funds. Also on the agenda are revisions to the bankruptcy rules for FCMs, protection of customer funds at FCMs to be traded on foreign futures markets, issues associated with entities dually registered with the CFTC as FCMs and the SEC as 

broker-dealers, and enhancing the self-regulatory structure. CFTC staff is actively 

seeking public input on these topics, and members of the public can submit comments through our website. 

Changing Market Structure 

This year, the Commission also will continue working to adapt our oversight to 

changing market structure, including emerging trends related to electronic trading. 

Instead of being traded in the pits, nearly 90 percent of futures and options on futures are traded electronically. While market participants used to be personally involved in each of their trades, they now often rely on algorithms to execute their 

trades. Humans are much more frequently depending on the judgment programmed 

13

into machines to execute their trading strategies. The makeup of the market also 

has changed. In contrast with the early days of the CFTC, swap dealers, managed 

money accounts and other non-commercial reportable traders make up a significant 

majority of many of the futures markets. Most of the trading volume in key futures 

markets—up to 80 percent in many markets—is day trading or trading in calendar 

spreads. 

I expect the Commission will consider putting out for comment a concept release 

concerning the testing and supervision of automated market participants. These 

concepts will be designed to address potential market disruptions that high frequency traders and others who have automated market access can cause. Furthermore, the Commission’s Technology Advisory Committee has established a subcommittee to specifically examine automated and high frequency trading. 

In addition, the CFTC will continue working with the markets and the SEC on 

recommendations from the Joint-SEC–CFTC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues with regard to cross-market circuit breakers, pre-trade risk safeguards, effective testing of risk management controls and supervisory requirements 

regarding algorithmic trading. 

The Commission staff also is developing proposed rules on the reporting of ownership and control information for trading accounts. These rules would enhance the 

Commission’s surveillance abilities and increase market transparency. 

Resources 

The CFTC is a good investment for the American public. But the agency needs 

sufficient resources to do its job. The CFTC’s budget request strikes a balance between important investments in technology and human capital, both of which are 

essential to carrying out the agency’s mandate under the Commodity Exchange Act 

and the Dodd-Frank Act. 

As we move into FY 2013, the CFTC will need additional resources consistent 

with the agency’s expanded mission and scope. At our current size of about 700 people, we are but ten percent larger than our peak in the 1990s. Since then, though, 

the futures market has grown fivefold, and Congress added oversight of the swaps 

market, which is far more complex and nearly eight times the size of the futures 

market the agency currently oversees. The budget request estimates the need for an appropriation of $308 million and 1,015 staff-years for the agency. This request is a significant increase over the $205 

million FY 2012 enacted appropriations level, but it is much needed given the dramatic growth of the markets we oversee. 

The CFTC will continue working hard to effectively oversee the futures market 

and implement reforms for the unregulated swaps market. Without sufficient funding, however, the nation cannot be assured that this agency can oversee the futures 

and swaps markets, that customers are protected, and that the public gets the benefit of transparent markets and lower risk. 

Conclusion 

The financial crisis brought our economy to a standstill. While there are signs of 

recovery, Americans continue to face a challenging economy and are seeing budgets 

squeezed because of increasing prices at the pump. Thus, it is essential that the futures and swaps markets are transparent, competitive and work for the benefit of 

the America public. 

The financial crisis exposed that swaps helped concentrate risk in the financial 

system that spilled over into the real economy, affecting businesses and consumers 

across the country. The derivatives reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act, once implemented, will lead to significant benefits for the real economy and all the Americans 

who depend on pension funds, mutual funds, community banks and insurance companies. They will benefit from lowering the risk of the swaps market and increasing 

transparency. 

Some have raised cost considerations about these reforms. But there are far greater costs—the eight million jobs lost, millions forced out of their homes, shuttered 

businesses and the uncertainty throughout the economy that came from risk, which 

spilled over from Wall Street. 

Thank you for inviting me today, and I’d be happy to take questions. 

ATTACHMENT

CFTC Dodd-Frank Update 

Final Rules & Guidance 

• Agricultural Commodity Definition

• Agricultural Swaps

14

• Anti-manipulation

• Business Affiliate Marketing and Disposal of Consumer Information

• Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Amendments to 

Compliance Obligations

• Derivatives Clearing Organization—General Provisions and Core Principles

• External Business Conduct Standards

• Foreign Boards of Trade—Registration

• Internal Business Conduct Standards (Duties, Recordkeeping, & CCOs)

• Investment Advisor Reporting on Form PF (Jt. with SEC)

• Investment of Customer Funds (Regulation 1.25)

• Large Trader Reporting for Physical Commodity Swaps

• Position Limits for Futures and Swaps

• Privacy of Consumer Financial Information

• Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing

• Process for Rule Certifications for Registered Entities (Part 40)

• Real Time Reporting for Swaps

• Removal of References to or Reliance on Credit Ratings

• Reporting Certain Post-Enactment Swap Transactions (IFR)

• Reporting Pre-Enactment Swap Transactions (IFR)

• Retail Commodity Transactions—Interpretive Guidance on ‘‘Actual Delivery’’

• Retail Foreign Exchange Intermediaries—Regulations & Registration

• Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions—Conforming Amendments

• Segregation for Cleared Swaps

• Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements

• Swap Data Repositories—Core Principles, Duties & Registration

• Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Registration

• Whistleblowers 

Proposed Rules & Guidance 

• Block Rule

• Capital for Swap Dealers & Major Swap Participants

• Client Clearing Documentation, Straight Through Processing, Clearing Member 

Risk Management

• Commodity Options

• Conforming Rules

• Designated Contract Markets—Core Principles

• Disruptive Trade Practices

• End-User Exception

• Entity Definitions (Jt. with SEC)

• Governance and Conflict of Interest (DCM, DCO, & SEF)

• Harmonization of CPO/CTA Reporting

• Identify Theft (Jt. with SEC)

• Implementation Phasing for Clearing & Trading Mandates

• Internal Business Conduct (Documentation, Confirmation, & Portfolio Reconciliation)

• Margin for Uncleared Swaps

• Process for ‘‘Made Available to Trade’’ Determinations

• Product Definitions (Jt. with SEC)

• Reporting of Historical Swaps

• Segregation for Uncleared Swaps

• Swap Execution Facilities—Core Principles & Registration

• Volcker Rule 

Final Orders 

• Delegation to National Futures Association (NFA)—Certain exemptions for 

Commodity Pool Operators

• Delegation to NFA—Foreign Exchange Intermediary Registration function

15

• Delegation to NFA—Swap Dealer & MSP Registration function

• Exemptive orders—Effective Date for Swaps Regulation

• Treatment of Grandfather Relief Petitions—Exempt Boards of Trade & Exempt 

Commercial Markets

• Treatment of Grandfather Relief Petitions—Transactions done in Reliance on 

2(h) 

Studies 

• Feasibility of Requiring Use of Standardized Algorithmic Descriptions for Financial Derivatives (Jt. with SEC)

• International Swap Regulation (Jt. with SEC)

• Study on Oversight of Carbon Markets (Jt. with various other Agencies)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The chair would like to remind Members that they will be recognized for questioning in the order of seniority for Members who 

were here at the start of the hearing. After that, Members will be 

recognized in order of arrival. And I, as always, do appreciate the 

Members’ understanding of that. 

And I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Chairman, you have recused yourself from the investigation 

of MF Global, correct? 

Mr. GENSLER. That is correct that I am not participating in that 

matter, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And you have not been involved or privy to information regarding new developments in the investigation and relevant enforcement proceedings, correct? 

Mr. GENSLER. That is correct, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. But Chairman, do you plan on being involved in 

any policy response that the Commission makes based on the lessons learned from MF Global. For example, the Customer Protection Roundtable scheduled for the next 2 days, you will be involved 

in those? 

Mr. GENSLER. I have, for a long time, sir, focused along with my 

fellow Commissioners and customer protection was involved last 

summer and last fall when we tightened up the investment of customer funds protections in December when we, through the clearinghouse rules, ensured that margins should be posted on a gross 

basis. And as consensus develops to the extent consensus is developed I would anticipate being involved in some of these matters of 

general rules. 

The CHAIRMAN. So as I understand it, it is your intention that 

the Commission moves forward on proposals potentially as early as 

this spring. So I guess my question would be, Chairman, how can 

you be in a position to lead the Commission in the policy response 

when it should clearly be supported by lessons learned during the 

investigation if you are not a part of the investigation? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, you are right, sir, that I am not part of that 

investigation, but as I mentioned, there are a number of things 

that the Commission laid out even before the matters of the fall, 

like tightening up the investment of customer funds. To the extent 

that a consensus forms through these 2 days of roundtables, 

through a lot of market input and market feedback, I would be involved in that as one of the five members of the Commission. And 

I do believe that there would be significant public input on anything in reaching any changes in the rules to really help the public 

16

and enhance what, as you said, is the core foundation of the futures and swaps market, that customer money is protected. 

The CHAIRMAN. But you would acknowledge not being involved 

in the day-to-day investigation going on now that the lessons that 

hopefully will clearly come from that process will make it more 

challenging for you to be part of the solution? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I think of this, if I might, somewhat as incremental. I think what we did in December was very critical to tighten up some of the loosening that we had frankly done in the early 

years to the investment of customer funds. I think what we have 

done in the clearinghouse rules are very critical as well. But again, 

as the consensus forms—and I don’t know what will come out of 

these 2 days of public roundtables—but we have asked the public 

to weigh in. The public is also not participating in the investigation, nor am I. 

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Gensler, over the next several months, 

you have reassured this Committee that the definition of swap 

dealer will not result in end-users unnecessarily having to register 

as swap dealers, yet last week, it was your intention to propose the 

final rule related to swap dealers and the end-user community was 

frantically working to have an explicit exemption for hedging included in the rule. Chairman Gensler, it was of course never Congress’ intent for the Commission to consider hedging activities to 

be swap dealing. In fact, Congress made every effort to ensure endusers were exempt from clearing and margin, which are only 2 of 

the many regulations associated with being a swap dealer. If you 

intended to make improvements to the rule as you have reassured 

Members of the Committee, and for that matter myself, then why 

were end-users forced to make last-minute appeals to Commissioners for help on something as fundamental as the classification 

that hedging is not swap dealing? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think we have done a good job throughout these 

rulemakings to take into consideration public comment, but I will 

say that normally speaking, in the last 2 to 3 weeks before we vote 

on something, we hear from people reminding us of their comment 

letters, even sometimes when we have taken already and adjusted 

the base text of the rule because these documents are not put out 

again under the Administrative Procedures Act. 

With regard to the actual rule itself, let me speak to the substance. One of the key things in the rule if I might say is marketmaking. There are three or four prongs that Congress laid out. If 

you are ‘‘regularly engaged in swap dealing’’ is one of them; but another one is if you are ‘‘market-making.’’ And we received a lot of 

comments to narrow that, to address that, and I think that we will 

address that, particularly with regard to the word hedging. The CHAIRMAN. I guess the question, Chairman Gensler, is based 

on your assurances in the past and the near panic that was set off 

over this definition issue, how can the Committee be assured that 

assurances given today won’t lead to near panic on other rules as 

the process goes along? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I think just as the Ranking Member mentioned on the pension fund concerns about external business conduct rule, I remember some pension funds being in our building 2 

and 3 days before the Commission vote on our rule. I mean we are 

17

running a very open process and I welcome the commenters coming 

in. I am saying that there are a number of issues on the definition 

that you and I fully agree on and one is that the end-user community banks are not swap dealers. There are some parties that have 

chosen to deal, that make markets on a routine basis. In the energy swap area they actually list themselves as primary members 

of the International Swap and Derivatives Association, which says 

you can only be a primary member if you make markets, not for 

hedging. And that is really the approach. I think there is not a difference between you and I, sir, on this issue. 

The CHAIRMAN. With the indulgence of my colleagues, one last 

question. 

Chairman Gensler, would you say that you are coordinating with 

your international counterparts as required by Dodd-Frank in Section 754? 

Mr. GENSLER. Yes, very much so. We share our draft documents 

with them before we consider proposals and finals, but more than 

that, we meet with them extensively, Commission Sommers and 

myself both. She was just recently in Japan. I will be over in Basel 

and Brussels next week. 

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Gensler, I understand that the European Commissioner for the EEU on this subject matter, Michel 

Barnier, just last week would have said in regards to the U.S. and 

its efforts of coordination, ‘‘it is not acceptable that U.S. rules have 

such a wide effect on other nations and foreign capital markets 

without any international coordination. A unilateral approach is a 

path to fragmentation and inefficiency. We need more international 

cooperation in all of these areas. This is the message I would bring 

to all of my U.S. counterparts. Think internationally.’’

How do you respond to that? 

Mr. GENSLER. Michel Barnier and I had a very good meeting last 

week. His letter was I think specifically about the Volcker rule, 

which he and I had a lively discussion on that. It is a very difficult 

rule and challenging because Congress gave us two pieces—prohibit one thing, proprietary trading; permit another thing, marketmaking. But we have had an ongoing dialogue with Michel Barnier 

and his people, at one point weekly. We looked at gaps and overlaps. And as I say, I am going to meet with him again on Tuesday. 

So it has been a very constructive coordination, a partnership 

with——

The CHAIRMAN. But Chairman Gensler, my understanding of 

Commissioner Barnier’s comments were not limited to the Volcker 

rule. In fact, they were much broader than that. And if leaders of 

one of our primary partners in the global regulatory reform, the 

EEU is concerned that we are taking a unilateral approach to reform, yet you are telling us you are working closely together. There 

is clearly a lack of coordination here and apparent inconsistencies 

with what you have told the Committee. International cooperation 

and coordination is a key to making global reform effective and to 

ensure that we are not unnecessarily building inconsistencies or 

duplications in the regime that will hamper competition growth. I 

just urge you to more carefully consider the feedback from our global partners. 

18

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield to the 

Ranking Member for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PETERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I think everybody should understand that hundreds 

of millions of dollars have been spent over the last year or 2 by 

these folks trying to get around these rules. I think some of the 

concerns are legitimate and some of them aren’t. But, from what 

I can tell kind of where you are heading with the Commission is 

that if you are actually hedging, you are an actual end-user, that 

is not going to trigger this swap dealer designation. But there are 

firms in the electricity area and in the energy gas and oil area that 

are actually dealers like you say. For myself, as one of the sponsors 

of this bill, those folks, the dealer part of their business should be 

regulated. So that is what I think. I guess you guys are sorting 

through that. 

But, when it looks to me like some of the end-users are trying 

to convince Members that we are somehow or another trying to do 

something to them on their end-user status to get out of the other 

part of it where they are clearly dealers. I hope that we get more 

of this out into the public so people can understand what is going 

on. There has been a lot of noise made over all this stuff—and on 

the issue—it looks like a combination of this extraterritorial and 

Volcker rule that some of these folks are using the old saw that 

they are going to move their business overseas and so forth, we 

have heard that. That is part of why we didn’t regulate people in 

the first place. 

I just hope people understand that a lot of what is going on here 

is that people still don’t want to be regulated. They still want to 

do whatever they want, which is what got us in trouble in the first 

place. I for one hope that you look carefully at this. From what I 

understand, the end-users that are actually hedging for commercial 

purposes are probably not going to be swept up in this, is that——

Mr. GENSLER. I agree with that and we can address that because 

Congress laid out one of the prongs to be a swap dealer is marketmaking. And so we can modify the final rule to clearly address—

that it is really about routinely accommodating people knocking on 

your door to hedge their risk, not your risk——

Mr. PETERSON. Yes, they are——

Mr. GENSLER.—somebody else coming with you. 

Mr. PETERSON.—actually competing in the same market as these 

big—Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan and so forth, right? I mean 

they are in the same market. 

Mr. GENSLER. There is a small handful. For the tens of thousands——

Mr. PETERSON. Yes, I mean——

Mr. GENSLER.—of end-users are not going to be caught up in 

this——

Mr. PETERSON. Right. 

Mr. GENSLER.—but there are some who have chosen actively to 

deal. The largest integrated oil companies, some of them have a 

dealing desk that they do because that is a business they choose 

to be in and provide liquidity to others. But it is set up as a regular 

business. 

Mr. PETERSON. Yes. 

19

Mr. GENSLER. And that was another prong that if they set it up 

as sort of a regular business to provide that liquidity and risk management again to others. 

Mr. PETERSON. And it wouldn’t be fair to the people that are 

being regulated to have their competitors not be regulated. I mean 

that just seems to be——

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I——

Mr. PETERSON.—they are actually in the business. 

Mr. GENSLER. I think it is that or we could look back to 2012 and 

then we would call it the BP loophole instead of the Enron loophole. There are very real bylaws of the International Swap and Derivatives Association that say you can only be a primary member 

if you make markets and not for hedging. 

Mr. PETERSON. Right. 

Mr. GENSLER. There are six or eight companies that voluntarily 

choose to do that. Now, maybe they will stop choosing to do that. 

It is really to make sure, as you say, that the tens of thousands 

of end-users, I agree with the Chairman, are not swap dealers. If 

they are entering into a swap—foremost to hedge, if they are not 

routinely, making markets, or accommodating demands of somebody else, they are not a swap dealer. If they are entering into 

swap, really the purpose is to hedge the energy that they are producing or the oil they have in the refinery. That is not accommodating somebody else’s business. 

Mr. PETERSON. One other thing, Mr. Chairman, if I could. 

We have heard various reports from folks that have met with you 

and other Commissioners. These rumors are circulating constantly. 

One of these rumors is that there is some interest in the Commission of exempting high-frequency traders from the definition of 

swap dealer. Until 3 years ago, very few people outside of Wall 

Street had even heard of high-frequency trading and there are 

some indications that it may have contributed to the flash crash of 

May 2010. So I would have concerns about such a blanket exemption. So is this under serious consideration at the Commission, and 

if it is, is it wise? 

Mr. GENSLER. It is something that some high-frequency traders 

have come in to talk about. They actually sometimes tout that they 

make markets. They don’t yet make markets in swaps, but if they 

were to develop to make markets over the next several years, I 

think it is consistent with Congressional intent that if you are 

making markets, actively accommodating demand in the markets, 

that you would register. So I think it would be unwise to somehow 

just leave them out. 

Now, they wouldn’t be necessarily coming under let’s say the 

sales practice regimes or external business conduct rules because 

in January we made sure that those rules don’t cover people anonymously trading on a market. But you are correct. Some of them 

have been making the rounds. One came in this week and said 

they look forward to registering. They are registered in other jurisdictions. So actually it is even amongst that community there is a 

split. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa for 5 minutes, Mr. King. 

20

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Gensler, thank you for your testimony and repeated 

testimony here on the Hill. I understand that you have recused 

yourself from MF Global and I don’t want to press anything on 

that. I just want to ask just a very standard question I think that 

could be reviewed from just reading the papers, but if they had not 

been switching between accounts to keep themselves liquid for the 

day, is it a safe conclusion that they would have gone bankrupt 

earlier, and if so, how much earlier would you guess? 

Mr. GENSLER. I don’t know. I think this might be when I turn 

to Commissioner Sommers. 

Ms. SOMMERS. Congressman, I am not familiar with the press reports that you are referring to, but I guess I would say that our 

current investigation is doing just what you indicated. We are tracing those transactions out of the customer segregated accounts to 

find out where they would have gone. 

Mr. KING. If I could just——

Ms. SOMMERS. I don’t know at this point whether they would 

have gone bankrupt earlier. That——

Mr. KING. May I just say that from where I sit—and I will just 

make this comment then and you can decide whether you would 

like to answer or not—from where I sit, if they hadn’t been using 

segregated accounts to meet their daily call, then my position 

would be that they would have collapsed earlier and gone into 

bankruptcy earlier. That is an observation from what happens 

when you run into a cash flow problem. I thought that was a simple, basic question. So that is my comment on it. If you choose to 

disagree, that is fine. But I don’t want to put you on that spot. 

I would like to instead move on a little bit and direct to the 

Chairman, I have information in front of me that says that of derivatives—well, first, maybe I better ask this broader question. Do 

we know the value of derivatives and the value of swaps, total notional value of each? 

Mr. GENSLER. We have approximations. The size futures market 

runs in the U.S. between $35 and $40 trillion a year depending 

upon the month and the time of year. The total worldwide size of 

the swap market is reported that it is a little over $700 trillion and 

it is estimated a little less than 1⁄2 is in the U.S. So I usually use an estimate of $300 trillion. But it is just that, an estimate. 

Mr. KING. Okay. Well, thank you. That gives us a sense of the 

scope of this. And I have data in front of me that shows that 96 

percent of the value of the derivatives in this country are in the 

hands of the five largest banks or in control of the five largest 

banks, and then if you go to the top 25 banks, you are at 99.86 percent of the notional value of the derivatives. And we have a little 

over 1,000 small institutions that are trading there in that .14 percent. And I would just like to know is it your intent to regulate 

those small banks in the same method as the larger banks? 

Mr. GENSLER. No. 

Mr. KING. Are you concerned—good. What would be your intent? 

Mr. GENSLER. Congress gave us a flexibility to set a de minimis

in the swap dealer definition. And we put out to comment a de 

minimis that many commenters came in and said was too low. And 

so it is under consideration between the Securities and Exchange 

21

Commission and us. But I think we have taken those comments to 

heart. 

Worldwide there is between 35 and 40 large banking enterprises 

that are currently clearing at a London clearinghouse, the big interest rate clearinghouse. Most of those have indicated they will 

probably register. But then when you get beyond that group, depending again where we end up, we will add a couple of key definitions, the de minimis and also something I would like to be asked 

about, about swap dealing in connection with originating loans. I 

think that those thousands of small banks will not be touched at 

all. 

Mr. KING. Would you have an estimate on how many banks 

would be of the—I went to 25. That number, it sounds to me like 

it will grow, but do you have an estimate on how many banks 

would be covered? 

Mr. GENSLER. I don’t sitting here, but the 35 to 40 international 

banks, some of which aren’t in the U.S. that are registered with 

that clearinghouse are the types of banks that are likely to register. 

Mr. KING. So the small institutions have breathed a sigh here I 

think. But I would like to go to——

Mr. GENSLER. That is our goal, sir. 

Mr. KING. Yes. Then I would like to go to Dodd-Frank. And if 

this Congress did the sweeping thing and perhaps not this year, 

perhaps in the next Congress and repealed 100 percent of DoddFrank, what would be the impact from your perspective? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think the public would lose the benefits of trans- parency and competition in this market, this $300 trillion or so notional market. I think end-users would—they may not feel it immediately—but the next time Wall Street spills out risk, they would 

look back and say that wasn’t such a good thing to repeal, Title 

XII. I am just speaking about what this Committee came together 

to do. I really think the public would be more at risk. Let’s not forget eight million jobs were lost largely because of the financial community’s risk spilling out to the economy in 2008. 

Mr. KING. If I could just conclude with this, Mr. Chairman, and 

that is that sometime back in 2007 or perhaps in the late fall of 

2006 when we were first looking at these shifts that were taking 

place financially that brought about this downward spiral that we 

are reacting to now, I remember a conversation with an investment 

banker who said then what you do when you are in this business 

is pretty much what everyone else does. That way if they are making money, you are making money, and if things fall apart and 

there is a bailout, you will be bailed out with the rest of them. I 

make that statement because I wrote that down that day. I remember it clearly, and I think it was a precursor to what actually happened. I think our investors in this country, many of the large institutions were counting on a bailout. I think they knew they were 

running on the edge and taking those risks and the bailout came. 

That prediction came true. 

So I just incorporate that into the process. There are two ways 

to do this. One is let the investors take the risk and evaluate the 

collateral. The other one is to do the regulatory and the expensive 

thing that has not been proven by the Obama Administration. 

22

I appreciate your testimony and the response of the Commissioner as well. And I would yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. HOLDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Chairman Gensler, thank you for being here. I agree with 

the Ranking Member’s opening statement that so far in the rulemaking process, the CFTC has been really attentive to concerns 

that have been raised. I just have one question about farm credit, 

though. Last month, this Committee passed in a very bipartisan 

manner H.R. 3336, Small Business Credit Availability Act. Among 

its provisions, this bill reaffirms Congress’ original intent that farm 

credit institutions qualify for the statutory exemption we provided 

in Section 1(a) of Dodd-Frank, which states, ‘‘in no event shall an 

insured depository institution be considered to be a swap dealer to 

the extent it offers to enter into a swap with a customer in connection with originating a loan with that customer.’’ At a previous 

hearing, you raised a question as to the Commission’s ability to ensure that farm credit institutions would be able to get this same 

exemption granted to insure depository institutions. Do you still 

have those doubts? And do you believe the Commission has the authority to grant farm credit banks this same exemption? 

Mr. GENSLER. I do believe that we have the authority. The hearing was helpful. I don’t remember how many months ago and there 

was a Member over here that asked it but I can’t remember whom. 

Mr. HOLDEN. Yes. 

Mr. GENSLER. And we went back and researched it. I think we 

do have the authority. And though the American Bankers Association recently sent us a letter and pointed out they thought otherwise. So there are comments on both sides of this but——

Mr. HOLDEN. Okay. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Gensler, welcome to the Committee. I am going to return to a topic that is near and dear to my heart and yours as well 

I suspect. I feel a lot like Sisyphus pushing this rock up a hill and 

it rolls back down, push it back up, and that is the cost-benefit 

analysis that the Commission in my view needs to do on each of 

its rules. As you know, we have passed a bill here that would 

strengthen Section 15a of the Commodity Exchange Act prospectively. We are going to have to go back and redo it for these. But 

recently, two of your Commissioners have been pretty critical of the 

cost-benefit analyses that have been done, particularly with respect 

to the business conduct rules, examples of 1 year retention on 

audio conversations that need to be taped whether the technology 

may or may not be available, a 15 year retention on documents 

with respect to swaps, a duplicative requirement on retention of 

documents that swap data repositories in accordance with your 

rules would be required to maintain as well, overlapping requirements. Can you talk to us about why that is cost-effective and/or 

necessary that these duplicative costs need to be put in place under 

the business conduct rules? 

23

Mr. GENSLER. Congress said that records have to be kept, including voice recordings. That is statute. We received a lot of comments 

on that and we actually moderated it. We rolled back in the final 

and said the voice recordings no longer have to be digitized or put 

on an electronic file. And in fact with Commissioner O’Malia’s help 

right there on the dais, we even rolled back a little bit more and 

we assured people all you have to do is keep it and make sure that 

if the enforcement folks request something that you can search it. 

And there is a lot of software to search it by keywords. And so I 

think we clarified that. 

To the second question about keeping books and records. Books 

and records are important whether it is in the futures, securities, 

or now swaps area so that a company can manage its risk and even 

report to its public shareholders and to have a check actually on 

the clearinghouse or somebody else. So, we did come out that they 

have to keep internal books and records and don’t, so to speak, 

outsource that to somebody else. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So part of your analysis will be, then, to check 

records against records——

Mr. GENSLER. No, not that we——

Mr. CONAWAY.—against the internal documents? We are going to 

run into that? 

Mr. GENSLER. It is just that they have to keep books and records 

on their transaction and trading so that they can manage their 

credit risk, manage their interest rate——

Mr. CONAWAY. I understand. 

Mr. GENSLER. Okay. 

Mr. CONAWAY. That is all done while the trade is active. I got 

that. They are going to do that anyway. Fifteen years when most 

other retaining requirements are 10? Why the 15 year retention in 

this area? 

Mr. GENSLER. I would like to get back to you just on that if I 

might——

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Mr. GENSLER.—because I don’t remember the retention period. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me ask you something else. And this came to 

our attention just within the last day or so. Single family offices 

where they are doing a lot of things for really wealthy families 

have enjoyed an exemption under the rule. SEC has recently given 

them an exemption from certain rules. Are you willing to work 

with that community to make sure that they are treated the way 

they have been previously with respect to Rule 413(a)(3) to make 

sure that they can do their business without unnecessary regulations and new layers of cost to these families? 

Mr. GENSLER. Yes, but even further than that, I think there are 

four exemptive letters that we have given over the last 10 or 15 

years, and we said affirmatively that those would apply, as a general matter. But there is always——

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Mr. GENSLER.—things that are different. So yes——

Mr. CONAWAY. My concern, though, is under the Commodity Pool 

Operator rules that that exemption that previously was there was 

not included. It may be an oversight but you are willing to work 

with that community? 

24

Mr. GENSLER. Oh, absolutely. The four letters—you see, they 

were actually letters; they weren’t in our rule. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Mr. GENSLER. So those letters, then, can be relied on by other 

people in——

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Mr. GENSLER.—similar circumstance. It is more a question 

whether it is a little bit different circumstance——

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. 

Mr. GENSLER.—and that is where we would like to work with 

that community. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Well, Mr. Chairman, I continue to be 

concerned that the cost-benefit analysis that is either there or not 

there is not representative and there may be other ways to get at 

some of these regulations and get the industry reactions and their 

responses to these things, that the cost outweighs the benefits associated with what we are doing make sense. So with that, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

holding these hearings and, Chairman Gensler, for your endurance. 

These are really important issues. And coming from Connecticut 

where my local gas station hit $4 a gallon last week, again, the importance of the work your Commission does is in people’s faces 

every single day. I mean the data that we are seeing that is widely 

reported in the media, that supplies are higher than they were 3 

years ago when gas was $1.90, that demand is down from where 

it was a year ago. Yet, we are seeing this spike happening in February of all times of the year at a moment when our recovery is 

finally getting some traction, again, to me just underlines the need 

for the Commission to move forward on what the Dodd-Frank bill 

mandated. 

I have been reading the pleadings in the court challenge that 

somehow suggest that you exceeded your discretion by imposing 

these position limits last October. That is ludicrous. The law is 

crystal clear that this is something that the Commission was required to do. And not just to do it but to do it expeditiously. 

I mean frankly there are a lot of folks in my state who are upset 

with the fact that it took so long for the Commission to extract the 

rule. And again I am not pointing the finger at you. I realized you 

had a juggling act in terms of trying to line up three votes on that 

Commission and you did it and I salute you for it. But obviously, 

we are 5 months out since that vote occurred and yet there are still 

no rules in place again with all of the negative trends that we are 

seeing reemerge again, the very issue which the Dodd-Frank legislation was intended to address. So, number one, I mean if you 

could give us an update because people are anxiously looking to 

you for relief here in terms of where we stand as far as the implementation of the October rule. 

Mr. GENSLER. I think you refer to the position limit rule and that 

rule would go into effect after two important things. First, that we 

finalize jointly with the SEC the further definition of the term 

25

swap, the product definition rule. We have made good progress, but 

as you have seen on the entity definition, we have scheduled that 

once and rescheduled it a couple times so I would think the product 

definition rule is this spring to give you a realistic time frame. Second, that we collect 1 year of data. We started collecting that data 

last fall and I think the year runs through this August if I am not 

mistaken. It needed 1 year of data to collect and then apply the formulas. And then, of course, as you noted, there is this court challenge on the core question that, of course, I think you and I agree. 

I think if there is ever a clearer Congressional intent, this was—

I mean people talk about intent on end-users and intent on the 

Farm Credit Bureau, but if there was ever an intent, I think the 

position limits this Committee had spoken of a number of times 

from 2008 on. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, I know Commissioner Chilton issued a 

statement a couple of days ago again acknowledging the fact that 

you were able to muster the votes to get that measure through last 

October, but frankly, time is the enemy here in terms of trying to 

get a market that is transparent, that has some connection to supply and demand. I would urge you to—and I wrote to you a few 

days ago on this specific point—to get those position limits to follow 

the law, which is what the Congress enacted. You know, this Committee tried to trip up that law with H.R. 1573. Luckily, it has not 

moved forward, the 2 year stay on the Dodd-Frank legislation. But, 

the impact in terms of small businesses, individuals, consumers, 

the payroll tax cut extension which we just passed a few days ago, 

it is just going to go up in smoke literally at the gas pump. And 

it is just critical that we get these rules in place. I don’t know if 

you wanted to——

Mr. GENSLER. I was just going to say I think some of what we 

have done has been very significant. We will have brought greater 

transparency to these markets by this summer when reporting has 

to begin in these markets, energy swap markets included. We have 

passed very strong rules unanimously, I recall, on anti-manipulation to give us new authorities to chase after folks that are manipulating markets. So I think we have done some very good and constructive final rules that are in effect, it will take some time to implement, but you are correct; the position limit rule takes a little 

longer. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And last, the impact in terms of government 

spending as far as these price increases in terms of our military 

dwarf whatever your budget request is that came in. And again I 

hope that this Congress will recognize that you have hard work to 

do and that you need the staff to do it to protect our economy. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Crawford, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your appearance today. I just 

want to ask you in your decision-making process, why have you 

chosen not to convene an Ag Advisory Committee since the grain, 

hog, and beef industries have been so severely impacted by the MF 

Global meltdown? 

26

Mr. GENSLER. We consult with members of the Ag Advisory Committee pretty regularly. Some of them are even participating in this 

2 day roundtable that was referred to. The actual formal meeting 

of the Committee, the last number of years, I think 6 years, has 

been once a year. We are only in February but we are certainly 

going to bring that together as a formal group and have a public 

meeting. We did have Commissioner Dunn, who had so successfully 

chaired it for years, retire, and so we also have to find a way to 

move forward but we are absolutely committed. And we use Members of the Committee as much as we can and seek their advice. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Do you have a timeline on that, when you might 

convene that just yet? 

Mr. GENSLER. I don’t because, it involves a little bit of working 

with the General Services Administration because charters have 2 

year clocks and things like that. But we would be glad to work 

with your office and get you more details. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Okay. Thank you. Of course you know ag co-ops, 

for example, provide swaps to their members and then enter into 

another swap to offset that risk. This is critical to their ability to 

continue to provide hedging tools to members of their co-ops. In 

that scenario, would the offsetting swap make an entity eligible for 

the end-user clearing exemption? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I think that—and I hope as we finalize this 

we have spent a lot of time with the agriculture cooperatives 

around the dealer definition again and if it is an agriculture cooperative that is Capper-Volstead and dealing with another co-op or 

one of its members. It is almost like an inter-affiliate transaction. 

I think we have worked through an approach subject to Commissioners of two Commissions voting on it that they are not going to 

get caught up in the dealer definition. To your question, then, if 

they are not a dealer, they are an end-user. I mean they are just 

then by definition an end-user.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Okay. Would the offsetting swap meet the definition of a hedge of commercial risk?

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I think they would be an end-user if they are 

not a dealer so any of their swaps, they would have a choice whether to come to a clearinghouse. And under our end-user exception 

that I think is what you are referring to, the proposal I believe 

would be a yes to that if that—I am trying to follow the question 

but I think what you are referencing is would they be exempt from 

clearing if they choose to be? And I think the answer is yes. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Right, okay. Let me switch gears to small banks 

real quick. Out in the country it is important for me, farmers, and 

ranchers that they be hedged against commodity price risk in order 

to qualify for loans from their local banks, the relationship between 

commodity hedging and borrowing. It is exactly what Congress intended to preserve in the swaps in connection with loans exemption 

from the swap dealer definition. Will community and mid-sized 

banks that provide commodity swaps to their loan customers be eligible for this exemption under the final swap dealer rule? 

Mr. GENSLER. We have received comments; we are still looking 

at it. Again I think, as I mentioned to other Members, because of 

how we are addressing ourselves to the market-making definitions 

and de minimis definitions, those community banks to which you 

27

refer, I am not aware of any that will probably be above some of 

these numbers. But I am not suggesting there might not be one or 

two. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Okay. And finally, in the little time that I have 

left, if the commodities swaps that small and mid-sized banks provide to loan customers are not covered under the swap dealers definition in connection with loans exemption, continuing to provide 

those swaps will make them swap dealers and subsequently subject 

to Section 716 push-out provisions. So my question is has the 

CFTC examined the impact within the context of the swap dealer 

rule? 

Mr. GENSLER. We are aware of it. It is part of our discussions. 

Again I think, you refer to community banks, particularly because 

there is an interplay between a de minimis, how high to make that, 

the definition of market-making, in essence how tight to make that. 

That, as I said earlier, I think the community banks—I mean if 

there is one that you specifically know of and your staff wants to 

share with us, it would be helpful to understand the issue better. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. All right, thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Vermont for 5 minutes, Mr. Welch. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Chairman Gensler, for being here. I want to talk a 

little bit about gas prices in speculation premium. I have an article 

from Forbes that basically goes through a Goldman Sachs analysis 

that says that there is likely a $23.39 speculation premium in the 

price of a barrel of oil if oil is at $108 a barrel, which when this 

study was done it was at. What it talks about is that the positions 

on NYMEX for future contracts is the equivalent to 233 million 

barrels of oil, which is the equivalent of 1 year’s crude supply from 

Iran to Western European nations like France, Belgium, Greece, 

Italy, and Spain. And it goes on to do an analysis in the careful 

Goldman way to state that if there is a $23 a barrel speculation 

premium, that translates into about 56¢ per gallon of gas. And obviously, that has a brutal impact on our consumers and it has a 

brutal impact on many of our manufacturers that depend on petroleum products. 

Also, this is happening at a time when our production is high, 

our demand is relatively low, and the United States is actually exporting gasoline. Do you have the resources that you need to address the speculation premium that is now injected into the price 

of gasoline at the pump and that is doing so much harm to our 

economy and so much damage to the pocketbook of everyday consumers? 

Mr. GENSLER. I will take a broader question. Do we have the resources we need? No, because Congress just gave us a large task. 

I hope that once we have finalized these rules, which I anticipate 

most will be done by this summer—there will be a handful that 

will take longer—that we can move on and work with this Committee, work with the appropriators and get the resources to move 

the agency close to a 1,000 person agency from 700 person agency. 

I do think that rising energy prices is a reminder as to why this 

is a good investment to the American public. 

28

Mr. WELCH. The point of our legislation I think was to acknowledge that the futures market is absolutely essential for end-users, 

but that to the extent it is manipulated by Wall Street speculators, 

it is for their benefit at the expense of consumers in the productive 

economy. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. GENSLER. Absolutely. We are a good investment for the real 

economy. The real economy is 94 percent of the jobs in this country 

and I sometimes feel that people are trying to tip the scales back 

to Wall Street. 

Mr. WELCH. Do you have any reason to dispute the analysis by 

Goldman Sachs as to how much of a price is being imposed through 

speculation as opposed to supply and demand? 

Mr. GENSLER. I know it has been quoted by many. There are 

other analyses that say other things but I don’t have things to either support it or deny it. 

Mr. WELCH. All right. 

Mr. GENSLER. To support or deny Goldman Sachs’ analysis I just 

don’t know. 

Mr. WELCH. All right. Now, many of us who have supported legislation that would provide a steady and stable funding source for 

you—not you so much as your agency to do the work that needs 

to be done on behalf of consumers in the productive economy, much 

like the SEC, a small fee on transactions. Is this something that 

would be helpful to make certain that your agency had the resources that it needed to act on behalf of consumers and the productive economy? 

Mr. GENSLER. The President referenced this in his recently sent 

budget to the Hill. I think prior Presidents of both parties have 

raised it. I would support whatever this Committee and Congress 

thought would help ensure that we have the adequate resources, 

whether it is out of the general Treasury or if these—I am supportive either way. And if this Committee would like to work on 

it, I would work with you on it. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, I thank you, Mr. Gensler. 

And Mr. Chairman, this seems like an area of common interest 

because all of us represent consumers who are getting hammered. 

We represent Democrats in Republican districts and we represent 

Republicans in Democratic districts and every one of us has been 

hearing from families where they are just wondering why, if the 

demand is going down, the price is going up and how in the world 

they are going to pay for this. And it is hurting our manufacturers 

as well. So if there is any way, Mr. Chairman, that we can find our 

way clear to help get the price down, I think we ought to do it. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s point is appreciated. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Hultgren, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Chairman Gensler, for being here today. I apologize. I had another Committee so I just stepped out for a few minutes, so if any of this is repetitive, I apologize, but they are important questions for my constituents that I wanted just to ask and 

see if we could get some answers for. 

29

One is I am just concerned about the continued delays in rulemaking process that are creating regulatory uncertainty and affecting the ability of especially rural electric and farm co-ops to plan 

for the future, especially with regard to the pending definition of 

swap dealer. After several apparent delayed votes on that rule, I 

am wondering if you could give my constituents any idea of what 

to expect, when to expect it, specifically wondering on what your 

prediction is for the de minimis exception and where that will be 

set. 

Mr. GENSLER. All right. I would like to not get out ahead of not 

just my Commission, but the SEC as well, so it is ten Commissioners’ deliberation. You are right; we had hoped to vote on this 

and then there was more collaboration over at the SEC to go on. 

But in terms of the de minimis, higher than where we were without pinning myself down because it is ten Commissioners weighing 

in. And that with regard to the agricultural co-ops, as we have 

said, we have worked a lot with the community with this CapperVolstead community offering risk management through swaps to 

their members. We are going to do our best to try to treat that like 

it is an affiliate situation. 

And then on the rural electric cooperatives and municipal power 

authorities, we have been working on this, I think it is now for 6 

or 8 months. We are hoping that they will come in and file a petition. We have been working actively with them. And then we will 

put it out to public comment and get what is called a 4(c) exemption, but we have to vote on it, put it out to public comment, and 

then finalize it. We are doing something similar with the regional 

transmission organizations. I hope we are close to them filing the 

actual petition but we are not there yet. 

Mr. HULTGREN. So the delay is their filing or is the delay from 

your office? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, on the rural electric cooperatives I just want 

to say we have been working very cooperatively, but yes, I mean 

because that community is so diverse, in fairness to them to put 

this petition in front of us does take some coordination between a 

lot of actors in their community. But I can’t speak for other Commissioners but I am personally supportive of it. 

Mr. HULTGREN. What is your best guess? You know, is it 30 

days? Is it 90 days? Is it 120 days for that specifically? And then 

also you had talked about dealing with the ten members, waiting 

for them to respond. 

Mr. GENSLER. With regard to the finalizing the definitions, the 

entity definitions, it is my hope that it will be through this coming 

month, March. With regard to the cooperatives, the rural electric 

cooperatives, if we could get back to you but I was hopeful that we 

were going to have a petition in February but I don’t want to speak 

for them. If the petition came in, then we would put it out to public 

comment. So I would say it is probably well into the spring by the 

time we start to get the public comment. And I that, I believe, 

takes 30 days as well. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Well, okay. Again, I wasn’t here for all of the debate on Dodd-Frank, but I am wondering just a little bit. You 

know, getting back to this de minimis exception, the $100 million 

level to start with, was that ever realistic? It just seems like such 

30

a low number and opens it up to so many questions out there, 

again, for my constituents and just wondering again if there is a 

recognition of what I see as just an unrealistic number and hopefully a realization that——

Mr. GENSLER. We have gotten a lot of comments—you are absolutely right on this—from whether it is community banks, endusers, and we are taking them very seriously. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Okay. And maybe again you have already discussed this a little bit but we have been hearing a lot of questions 

about this as well. With commercial hedging, they are wondering 

if that will expressly be excluded from the activities that constitute 

swap dealing under the rule? 

Mr. GENSLER. Congress laid out a number of important prongs. 

Market-making is one of them and regular business is another one 

if I might say. And so a lot of commenters came in and said, well, 

what is market-making? Can you be more specific about that? And 

in my mind—I am just speaking off the top of my mind. It is really 

about routinely making yourself available to others who need to 

hedge, not about your hedging. So it is not about some energy company that the purpose of what they are doing is hedging the oil in 

the refinery. 

In terms of regular business we received a lot of comments about 

that. Can we be a little bit more specific and explicit about that? 

And again I don’t want to speak for other Commissioners but in my 

mind I think there are things we can do there to help people out 

and of course address through the de minimis. Sometimes that is 

just an easy way to help folks. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Well, hopefully it can be both, because I think 

both create that uncertainty and continue that. So my hope is that 

it can be well defined and what I am hearing from you is you are 

pretty much saying you don’t have control of it. We would probably 

argue you have a little bit more control——

Mr. GENSLER. No, no, I——

Mr. HULTGREN.—than you are letting on, but, we want to make 

sure that we are getting that assurance that again there is going 

to be some express exclusion of commercial hedging. People who 

aren’t in the business of that are in the business of trying to serve 

their customers, to run a business and knowing the uncertainties 

of agriculture and the commodities markets. 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that we will sufficiently address the issue 

of hedging in the context of a producer or merchant. That is your 

point——

Mr. HULTGREN. Well, I look forward to seeing that. So thank you 

very much. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. The chair now 

recognizes the gentlelady from Ohio for 5 minutes, Ms. Fudge. 

Ms. FUDGE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Chairman Gensler, for being here. I just have 

two brief questions. 

You may well know that Congressman Steve Stivers and I introduced H.R. 2779, which is a bill that would exempt certain interaffiliate transactions from swap dealers from meeting margin and 

clearing requirements. This would ensure that transactions are not 

31

classified as separate transactions. If these contracts are classified 

as separate transactions, there is a concern that it will increase the 

cost for customers of the products and it will impede the ability of 

businesses to manage their risk. 

I have two questions. The first is that you talked about it, as well 

as in your testimony, you state that the final rules will include exceptions for inter-affiliate swaps. Is that going to be in that group 

that is coming in the summer or when is that? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, some of them have already been completed. 

For instance, in December we completed the reporting rule and I 

know in your bill I think you addressed reporting as well. 

Ms. FUDGE. Right. 

Mr. GENSLER. This is the public reporting or real-time reporting. 

So we addressed affiliate swaps there that are not really arm’s 

length transactions and so forth. We addressed in January in the 

sales practice or external business conduct where again these affiliate transactions that aren’t at arm’s length. So we shouldn’t have 

to protect the sales practices in that regard. 

In most affiliate transactions, if one party is an end-user, there 

will not be any clearing requirement. But what we think we need 

to do is probably publish for notice and comment—and we believe 

we have the authority to do it—but publish for notice and comment 

between a financial company and its financial affiliate where both 

are financial companies. That is the one area. So for the end-user 

community, I truly don’t believe that this is an issue but it is just 

within an insurance company between two of its affiliates, for instance. 

Ms. FUDGE. What do you think that time frame is, I mean, to 

be——

Mr. GENSLER. I need to put out a proposal on this. Given our calendar it is going to be likely in the spring and then we have to put 

it out. Maybe we will decide only to put it out to 30 days comment 

instead of 60 because sometimes where there is more consensus we 

might go a little shorter. And in this whole area we have about 20 

or so more rules. Adding an inter-affiliate, adding others maybe 

there will be 25. As I say, we will be working through the summer 

and fall possibly on some of these. 

Ms. FUDGE. Okay. Thank you. And the second part of my question is I understand that the SEC has suggested that they will 

treat these transactions differently than you may. Can you discuss 

how you plan to address the concerns of market participants when 

they may have to comply with two different sets of rules on the 

same product? 

Mr. GENSLER. We spent a lot of time with the SEC in trying to 

harmonize and sometimes advocate for our point of view. On the 

trades between affiliates I have not been brought—it is just not 

brought to my attention but if your office could help me, if there 

is something that you think the SEC is not doing that I should 

know about, I would like to help you on that. 

Ms. FUDGE. We will certainly be in touch. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska for 5 minutes. 

32

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

important hearing. 

Chairman Gensler, welcome. What is causing the rise of the price 

of gasoline? 

Mr. GENSLER. You know, I am spending so much time thinking 

about enhancing customer funds and working on these rules, but 

what we are, we are not a price-setting agency. It is not what Congress asked us to do. We are an agency that oversees the markets 

to ensure that they are transparent, competitive, and free of fraud 

and manipulation. And so that is what we can best do to ensure 

that these energy markets work and that whatever price, high or 

low, in the energy markets and the agriculture markets reflect buyers and sellers, both hedgers and speculators meeting in that market. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Here is what is at issue: if you look at demand for gasoline, in fact you see lower demand currently. Supply 

disruptions, perhaps volatility in the Middle East are a factor but 

not significant enough to probably correlate directly to this spike 

that we are seeing currently. Back to Mr. Welch’s question earlier, 

it has been suggested by your own Commissioner in a recent article, Bart Chilton, that there is a speculative premium built into the 

price of gasoline that may be as much as 56¢ per gallon. Do you 

agree with that assessment? 

Mr. GENSLER. I agree that we need to make sure that our markets have a strong oversight, that we have a strong anti-manipulation regime, that we have transparency, and yes, that we complete 

position limits. That is where Commission Chilton and I are——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Do you think these——

Mr. GENSLER.—aligned. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY.—current speculative position limits would 

adequately address the problem? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that the whole regime—I must say I think 

that the limits are one part to ensure integrity of a market but I 

think that it is critical that we complete the other rules with regard to transparency. That we actually give the public the benefit 

of this whole work that this Congress did and that we are now 

about a year late on. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. What would you surmise the correlation to be 

between the Federal Reserve’s loose monetary policy is driving 

down the value of our currency therefore increasing commodity 

prices, particularly oil, which tends to lead the other prices. What 

is the correlation there? In other words, our debt and the way in 

which we are printing money to solve it is lending itself to higher 

commodity prices, that is a major factor in this uptick of retail gasoline prices. 

Mr. GENSLER. I have not seen a study on——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I haven’t either. That is why I am asking you 

but we are trying to examine all of factors here that are involved——

Mr. GENSLER. Right. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY.—I mean something is doing it. 

Mr. GENSLER. You are absolutely correct but if I might return. 

I think our role as a Commission, as an agency is not to set a price 

or even that a price is low or high. It is——

33

Mr. FORTENBERRY. No, I understand. 

Mr. GENSLER.—really that the markets are transparent and 

work for the American public. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I understand. You are just an expert in the 

dynamics of these markets so it would be helpful to hear your opinion as to all the factors that are driving up the price in this regard. 

Mr. GENSLER. Though at any one time there are many factors, 

I am not aware of a study—and if there is one, I would certainly 

read it and so forth—but on the specific point that you mentioned 

about the monetary policy and so forth——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. It could be a factor? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, there are many factors that come into markets. These markets, to just give you a sense of the oil market 

today, the oil market today—and we publish these figures every 

Friday—has producers and merchants and that makes up between 

I think 13 to 15 percent of the open futures market. And then there 

are swap dealers that make up a big group. And then the managed 

money, that is the hedge funds, and then other financials. So somewhere between 80 and 85 percent of the futures market are swap 

dealers and what we call managed money or hedge funds and other 

financials and 13 or 15 percent of the futures markets—this is on 

NYMEX and so forth—are the producers and merchants. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. How has that ratio shifted through the years? 

It used to be inverted is my understanding. 

Mr. GENSLER. We have only been breaking out this into four categories. We started doing that about 2 years ago and we have published I think 5 prior years. So over those 7 years it has shifted 

a little less than you said, but yes, it has shifted. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Significantly? 

Mr. GENSLER. A little bit more towards financial——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I am about to run out of time. I am sorry to 

interrupt you. I think the broader point here is we are deeply concerned that a system originally designed to mitigate risk is actually 

creating risk now. 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I think that that is just a keen reminder as 

to why we have to continue to get our oversight right and also that 

we need to be a fully resourced and funded agency. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. The chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Chairman Gensler. Chairman Gensler, let me ask you. 

The whole core of what we are trying to do rests on funding. We 

can write all kinds of laws; we can put out all kinds of regulations. 

Dodd-Frank is a tremendous, tremendous law, very complex and it 

puts a tremendous responsibility on your agency as the regulator. 

So I need to know and I think the Committee needs to know and 

the American people need to know your real serious thoughts on 

the funding of it. And I specifically want to ask you if you do not 

have sufficient funding, could we see delays in reviewing, for example, applications for new swap execution facilities, designated clearing organizations, and swap data repositories? 

34

Mr. GENSLER. I thank you for that question. The answer is yes, 

we could see delays. We are about a 700 person agency, and with 

the help of this Committee and Congress, we have $205 million of 

funding. That is only about ten percent more staff than we had in 

the 1990s. And now, I deeply respect you all have a very hard job 

with the appropriators. We are asking, along with the President, 

for funding to move up to $308 million, a little over 1,000 people, 

300 more people because we are taking on a market eight times the 

size. We do not right now have what I would consider a plan that 

is adequate to address all the registrations that will come in. We 

expect between 20 and 30 swap execution facilities, a handful of 

data repositories, two or three more clearinghouses. We are going 

to rely on the NFA to register dealers. We are probably going to 

borrow some of our enforcement staff and move some enforcement 

staff for 6 months or so to try to deal with some of these registrations. But that is a backup plan at best. It is the plan we have but 

it is not a plan that I think is the best for the American public. 

Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. And this would also apply to delays 

in reviewing swaps to see if the clearing mandate should apply, requests for exemptions to the law’s provisions as well. 

Mr. GENSLER. Hopefully, the clearinghouses will start the review 

of mandatory clearing this spring but you are absolutely correct 

that when people knock on our doors for interpreter letters, no-action letters, exemption petitions, this is a human exercise and we 

do need more technology; but the computers can’t just take an exemptive request and put it one end of the computer and it prints 

out at the other end. 

Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. I think that is very important. And 

I think that we owe it to your agency if we are drafting these major 

pieces of legislation which are needed, certain tweaks certainly 

need to be made here and there. But there are forces at work that 

don’t like Dodd-Frank. There are forces at work to find creative 

ways of trying to do away with Dodd-Frank and there is no more 

clearer way of accomplishing this than starving the very agencies 

and the regulatory people we assign to do the job. It is sort of like 

cutting the legs out from under somebody and then condemning 

them for being crippled. 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I would have to say to you, Congressman, I 

believe working with my fellow Commissioners and an excellent 

staff, we will get the rules finished and then the industry will want 

people there. But you are right; we will not have the people even 

to examine the clearinghouses on an annual basis, on a regular 

basis. 

Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. Let me ask—and I have 1 minute 

to go—and our Ranking Member brought up an interesting subject 

of extraterritoriality. I hope I pronounced that long word right. And 

it is also an issue that you and I have discussed in my other committee, Financial Services. It is my understanding that the SEC 

Chairman Schapiro has announced that the SEC will issue a formal rulemaking related to the extraterritorial application of the 

Dodd-Frank law. Can we expect the CFTC to also issue a formal 

rulemaking on the extraterritorial scope of the Dodd-Frank as the 

SEC has announced? 

35

Mr. GENSLER. Though our statutory situation is a little different, 

we will seek public comment on what is called 722(d) or it might 

be called 2(I) of the Commodity Exchange Act. They don’t have that 

provision but that is basically the core to this question. In addition, 

I am hoping to get public comment through that release on swap 

dealer—where we defer to foreign regulators. We have a long history of deferring to foreign regulators. I am hoping that we can continue to do that but that will be also—and hopefully get public 

comment on it. 

Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. All right. Thank you very much, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

For the benefit of the Members, it is worth noting we will next 

go with Mr. Schilling, followed by Mr. Boswell, followed by Mr. 

Huelskamp, followed by Mr. Thompson, and finally Mr. Tipton. 

With that, Mr. Schilling is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see you again, Mr. Gensler. As you know, Congress provided an exemption for captive finance affiliates from both the definition of major swap participant as well as the definition of financial entity for the purpose of end-user clearing exception. The statutory language, however, leaves room for interpretation by the Commission and the operational realities of the financing provided by 

captive finance companies require additional clarification from the 

CFTC with regard to how they intend to interpret the calculation 

of the 90/90 rule. For example, take a tractor made by John Deere 

in Moline, Illinois. The tractor may have an implement that is not 

made by John Deere. Are they allowed to finance this transaction? 

Mr. GENSLER. Though I am very familiar with the provision and 

we will carry out the intent of this Committee and Congress on the 

captive finance provision, I would like to sort of work with staff 

and get back to you on the specific question of the—I think if I follow the question is if John Deere sells a tractor but there is an implement that they sell with it——

Mr. SCHILLING. Right. Like let’s say they sell a tractor and then 

they have an auger that goes with it——

Mr. GENSLER. Right. Right. 

Mr. SCHILLING.—are they going to be able to do that basically? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I know they will be able to sell it but your 

question about because the provision says that 90 percent of what 

they are financing has to be what they are manufacturing if I remember? 

Mr. SCHILLING. Right. 

Mr. GENSLER. And so it is a question of whether the auger, because it is not something they manufactured, would be counted 

against the 90 percent? 

Mr. SCHILLING. Exactly. 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that our proposal didn’t speak negative or 

positive to it, but I know this question has come up and I don’t 

know how we would address it other than in a facts and circumstances. But certainly if I can talk to staff afterwards and get 

back to you. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Yes, that would be great because as I understand 

many of these companies are already hearing from the other folks 

36

that they do business with and they will demand assurances that 

these captives qualify for the exemption before they will trade with 

them. So it is just another piece of—certainly I think that the John 

Deeres to Caterpillars and other companies out there just really 

need to have some good solid clarification to where it is not going 

to be second-guessing by you guys, so, very good. 

With that I yield back my time. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Boswell, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Chairman Gensler, for your work. It seems to me 

like if we just give you the tools and get out of your way you will 

get on with it, you have lots to do and it is just kind of holding 

you up. 

But we keep discussing it and this is not a criticism, Mr. Chairman. This is just a discussion. It seems like half of our hearings 

have been about this subject, full Committee and probably as much 

on the Subcommittee. And I am sure you will have something to 

say. But I will yield to you momentarily. 

I understand and I support the need for Congressional oversight 

but I believe we must get to other business, too, and I am concerned about the farm bill. Many of us have experienced the handson, you and me, and we know the plan. We have to have a little 

information to plan ahead. And you probably know things I don’t 

know about this farm bill so I just hope we get to it. I think it is 

important and I know you do, too. So you might comment on that. 

Another issue, Mr. Welch touched on it, and this Forbes report 

about speculation in the cost per barrel. Now, I have spent a lot 

of my life in Texas and a lot of my life in Oklahoma and I know 

what those arms going up and down mean. I see them all over the 

place, even I believe where the State Capitol grounds, in Oklahoma, used to be. So I understand that. I am not quarreling about 

that. But I just feel like that this gasoline price impact on our producers, economy, everything about it, we owe it to our people that 

we support that they have other options as well as they go about 

planning their business and not relying on OPEC and Wall Street. 

So could you comment on some of that for my ratification and my 

clarification or whatever? 

The CHAIRMAN. And the gentleman yields and I appreciate that 

yield. To the fine gentleman from Iowa I would note as far as the 

farm bill goes, this is one of those issues where as the pieces come 

together we will move as aggressively together as we possibly can. 

Whether it was last fall in the hurry-up effort for the Super Committee where the chair and the Ranking Member worked very diligently with the chair and Ranking Member of the other body to try 

in a time frame that was very tight to craft policy. Unfortunately, 

the rest of Congress and the Super Committee didn’t match the efforts of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees. Whether it 

was that scenario or the situation we are in this summer, we are 

going to do everything within our power working with every Member of this Committee in regular order to craft that good farm policy and move us forward. 

37

As far as the number of hearings that this Committee has dealt 

with that relate to Dodd-Frank and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, I just simply observe that the very aggressive 

rulemakings process that the Commission has gone on mandated 

by Dodd-Frank has the potential for tremendous effect on the economy, not just agriculture but the entire national and international 

economies. And doing our responsibilities of oversight, looking over 

the Chairman’s shoulder on a regular basis, asking the Chairman 

lots of pointed questions on a regular basis is a part of our responsibility and I believe that helps him and his fellow Commissioners 

do a better job in their important role. And we will continue to 

work that. 

I won’t deny to you for a moment that when all of this is done 

and all the rules are in place and hopefully everyone agrees on the 

same interpretation, if we never have another CFTC hearing as 

long as I live, it will be too soon. But that said, until we reach that 

magic point, we are going to do our job. And I would also note to 

my good colleague from Iowa that very soon we will announce a series of hearings in the field addressing farm bill issues. I suspect 

after that there will be a few more hearings here in this very Committee chamber addressing farm bill issues and we are going to 

load our quiver, we are going to sharpen our blades, and we are 

going to get after that farm bill, sir. 

Mr. BOSWELL. All right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for those questions. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, thank you for the reassurance. 

And thank you, Mr. Gensler, for your work. I know we gave you 

a lot of responsibility and a whole volume of rules to come up with 

and so on but I appreciate your work and the time that you have 

had to spend answering questions from me and so on, thank you 

for that. And I wish you continued success. 

And Mr. Chairman, thanks for your remarks, but speculation is 

going on. I don’t know to what degree out there but I think we 

probably do and I do think we do agree that we have responsibility 

to do everything we can. I know we agree to do everything we can 

to let our producers out there know what they have to deal with. 

Thank you for your efforts, I appreciate it. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the only comment I would add is just let it 

rain in Oklahoma. With that I thank the gentleman and he yields 

back. 

And I now turn to the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Huelskamp, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate the opportunity to visit with you, Mr. Chairman, as well. And I know in one of your previous answers you said 

that your main priority, a top priority was enhancing customer 

funds and I wanted to follow up with a few more questions. I know 

you were unable to make our hearing in November on MF Global 

and I understand. And these questions will be directed—before you 

recused yourself from the investigation, I would like your comments that given that 99 percent of MF Global’s accounts were 

commodity accounts regulated by the Commission, do you think it 

was appropriate the bankruptcy was structured as a SIPA bankruptcy, thereby stripping customers of their priority status? 

38

Mr. GENSLER. If I might just try to answer it in a general question about when futures commission merchants under our jurisdiction and regulation are also broker-dealers under the Securities 

and Exchange, there is the bankruptcy protection of SIPA, the Securities Investor Protection Act, and there is the bankruptcy protection which is in the Bankruptcy Code and so forth and they 

interact. But as I understand it from my knowledge of this from 

staff is that once it is a joint broker-dealer futures commission merchant and there are securities customers at risk the way the law 

interacts is that the Securities Commission and SIPA can put it 

into a SIPA Trustee. The good news though from what I understand is everything that is in the Bankruptcy Code to protect the 

futures customers, Subpart 4 I think it is called, or our code rules 

190, they have to use those same provisions. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Customers with segregated funds that were 

lost, they did lose their priority status, is that correct, with this approach in bankruptcy? 

Mr. GENSLER. I might have to turn to Commissioner Sommers 

because it is about this specific matter, but I don’t know. I mean 

I am able to sort of——

Mr. HEULSKAMP. I have a couple other questions as well. And 

Ms. Sommers, if you would answer that question, I would appreciate that. 

Ms. SOMMERS. Of course. Thank you, Congressman. In the SIPC 

proceeding for MF Global, commodity customers have an exclusive 

right to the customer property that were in the segregated accounts. They did not lose their priority status in that particular 

bankruptcy case. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Okay. Thank you. Second question would be, 

Mr. Chairman, I guess given it was obvious on October 31—and I 

know you weren’t able to make our November hearing I guess on 

this issue—it was obvious by then from the details that we have 

seen that customer funds were missing and likely commingled. 

Why didn’t the Commission move immediately to freeze the assets 

of MFGI and MFGH with that knowledge in hand on October 31? 

Mr. GENSLER. I will try to answer just that what I know about 

from that weekend. I think that is before I recused myself. But just 

from what I know about that weekend, MF Global had filed that 

they were in compliance each day and that weekend, most of that 

Sunday the company, not us, were working to move the customer 

positions to another company, Interactive Brokers. And so there 

were a series of conference calls on that Sunday to help facilitate 

the movement of the positions. And as it has been widely reported, 

somewhere around 2:30 in the morning that I was woken up and 

told, no, that is not the case. And then a few hours later this 

SIPA—I mean the protections of SIPA and the bankruptcy court 

were put in place. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Put in place on what day? 

Mr. GENSLER. The same——

Mr. HEULSKAMP. At 2:30 in the morning? The same day? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, no, they weren’t put in place until whatever—I don’t know if it was 6 or 8 hours later. 

39

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Okay. So you had no knowledge or no one at 

the Commission had knowledge before that that there was a commingling of funds occurring? 

Mr. GENSLER. I can only speak to what I know of. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Well, yes. That is why I am asking you the 

questions. I don’t want to ask anybody else because you are the 

head of the Commission. This is 10 days before you recused——

Mr. GENSLER. I was woken up around 2:30 in the a.m. on the 

31st of October. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. And did they tell you funds were commingled 

at that time? 

Mr. GENSLER. To be more precise I was told that there was—that 

the account was—I don’t actually remember the words but the 

word that you used was not used. It was just that the——

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Well, tell me what word they used, please, if 

you would if you can remember. What, we are talking about billions of dollars. I know we are talking about 2:30 in the morning 

for you but these are billions of dollars for farmers and ranchers 

that have just been lost——

Mr. GENSLER. Absolutely. I recall being woken up and saying—

being informed with a lot of people on a phone call—international 

regulators, the SEC and so forth—that the customer funds account 

was not—that the deal with Interactive was off and the customer 

funds account was not whole. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. So there were customer funds missing. That is 

what you were told? 

Mr. GENSLER. I don’t recall the exact words, sir. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Okay. And, Mr. Chairman, if I might just for 

30 seconds, if I can just figure out—then could you provide for the 

Committee what you were told at that time at a later moment? 

And again this is 10 days before your recusal or whatever you are, 

a nonparticipant——

Mr. GENSLER. I want to work with this Committee but also not 

prejudice an ongoing investigation of the career staff and so forth. 

So——

Mr. HEULSKAMP. So you won’t tell us what you were told then, 

Mr. Commissioner? 

Mr. GENSLER. No, I want to work with this Committee and—but 

it is also what was told to any representative of the CFTC over 

that——

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Okay. 

Mr. GENSLER.—weekend, and I was a representative of the CFTC 

is also a matter of an investigation as well so——

Mr. HEULSKAMP. So are you personally being investigated? 

Mr. GENSLER. No. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Is that why——

Mr. GENSLER. No, it just is a fact——

Mr. HEULSKAMP. So I want to ask you as a Member of the Committee that you will tell us in writing if necessary what exactly you 

were told at that time of the night. 

Mr. GENSLER. And we are just working with the Committee and 

the Division of Enforcement. 

Mr. HEULSKAMP. Well, I don’t care about the Division of Enforcement. This is a request from myself as a Member of this Committee 

40

and I am not asking about the division and I would just like to 

know what you and apparently dozens of other folks were told. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good hearing 

this morning and I have several questions. 

One, and California is specifically related. Last hearing on the 

markup of H.R. 3527 you may or your staff may have informed you 

that there was a California-specific issue that Congressman Baca 

and I raised at the time to the chair and the Ranking Member on 

California’s ability for our energy providers to comply with our 

unique regulatory system. That under the changes it might designate California’s energy companies as swap dealers. The utility 

companies have submitted comments to the CFTC. There has been 

extensive discussions with your staff. We have seen no positive—

at least I have been told that there has been no positive movement 

on the issue. Later today, I am going to be sending you a letter to 

more thoroughly outline my concerns and hoping you might be able 

to speak to whether or not you believe actions that have been undertaken to comply with state or local laws or regulations should 

be specifically included in terms of what is determined as to whether or not an entity is a swap dealer or not. 

Mr. GENSLER. I am trying to recall the hearing to which you are 

referring. Is this related to the municipal power authorities in Los 

Angeles and elsewhere? 

Mr. COSTA. It is related to the major utility companies in California, PG&E, Southern California Edison, San Diego Gas & Electric. We have a deregulated environment under which they purchase and under the H.R. 3527 they may be viewed as a swap dealer and they don’t believe they are swap dealers. But obviously this 

issue has not come to your attention. 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, there were two California issues because the 

Municipal Power Authority of Los Angeles——

Mr. COSTA. This is not Municipal Power Authority’s——

Mr. GENSLER. I just wanted to——

Mr. COSTA. It is needed to ensure that these companies and ultimately California ratepayers are not charged the additional fee on 

this issue. 

Mr. GENSLER. So I believe that we will successfully address 

through the entity definition rule that, as Congress said, if somebody is making markets, it is only if they are accommodating others on a routine basis and I am not familiar enough with 

PG&E’s——

Mr. COSTA. Well, please——

Mr. GENSLER.—business——

Mr. COSTA.—get familiar with it and get back to us. I was going 

to send you the letter this afternoon. We don’t want—because these 

California companies are complying with state law—to be penalized 

by the Federal regulators that ultimately could impact the ratepayers in California. 

Mr. GENSLER. I think they will benefit by this law because it will 

bring transparency and I believe it will——

41

Mr. COSTA. No, that is——

Mr. GENSLER.—address your——

Mr. COSTA.—the largest issue but there is a problem. Get this? 

There is a problem with complying with state law, Federal law and 

we need to work through that problem. 

Mr. GENSLER. I look forward to reading your letter. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay. Thank you very much. 

On the broader set of issues and it has been talked about before 

in terms of the impacts on gas prices and the volatility and the potential speculation, while they are talking about the potential to 

reach $4 a gallon, they have exceeded $4 a gallon in California. I 

was at the pump on Saturday and it was in excess of $4.18 a gallon 

as I saw my fill-up reach almost $70. So we are aware of the BP 

fire in Washington State at the refinery, but other places in the 

West are being similarly impacted. We know from the data at the 

Energy Information Administration that the supply, as has been already stated here this morning, of oil and gas is higher today than 

it was 3 years ago when the national gasoline was below $2 a gallon. 

We know it is a worldwide market, of course, but right now the 

demand for oil in the U.S. is the lowest since 1997. I am not satisfied with the response you have made earlier this morning as to 

whether or not you agree that something else more basic than supply and demand is driving these prices. 

Mr. GENSLER. These markets are made up of hedgers and speculators and at any given time both are part of a market. As I mentioned earlier, in fact, the futures market, over 80 percent of the 

market is swap dealers, hedge funds, managed money, other financial——

Mr. COSTA. So you would say essentially——

Mr. GENSLER.—is less than 20 percent——

Mr. COSTA.—speculation as having some impact; you just can’t 

quantify it? 

Mr. GENSLER. On any given day financial actors, as you are referring to them as speculators, are part of the pricing of energy and 

agricultural products. Our role is to make sure and ensure that 

that market is free of manipulation, it is transparent, and it reflects supply and demand. 

Mr. COSTA. Well, my time has expired but, Chairman Gensler, 

the fact is is that for American farmers and all of the benefit from 

the products that we produce, the CFTC is undertaking with other 

authorities to address the extensive energy speculation that is destroying—I don’t know if you care to comment any further as to 

what specific efforts you are taking under the new Dodd-Frank 

rule. 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, just that there are broad rules, it is new 

anti-manipulation authority, it is transparency authorities, it is 

trying to complete once the data is in, position limits authority, so 

I think it is really the collection that this Committee asked us to 

address the markets with. 

Mr. COSTA. Mr. Chairman, I wasn’t here earlier but is it the desire of the Committee to have the Commissioner to come back and 

report when they have made their findings or to provide it in some 

informative fashion? 

42

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is certainly possible and that can 

be addressed as one of the questions submitted to him, and a response to that would be the report. 

I thank the gentleman from California. His time has expired. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania for 5 minutes, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Chairman Lucas, thank you. 

Chairman Gensler, thanks for coming once again. You had mentioned in your testimony the time constraints for completion of the 

rules and that the CFTC is ‘‘completing rules in a thoughtful, balanced way, not against the clock.’’ Well, how specifically is CFTC 

allowing for flexibility with rulemaking? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, foremost, Congress gave us 1 year to complete which was last July, and of course, here we are 8 or 10 

months later. We put out exemptive order last July to say the 

whole market could rest at ease until December and then again we 

came back in October and November and said rest at ease again 

until this coming July. In addition, in each of the rules we have 

phased in implementation and in some cases it goes out years; 

some cases it is just months. It depends on what comments we 

have heard from the markets. I would be hopeful that we would 

complete most of our rules by this summer, but as I have said in 

my written testimony, some might take longer. We want to get 

these things right. 

Mr. THOMPSON. One of the things I see just burdening our economy is on certainty from many different aspects, and so what is 

your agency doing to help relieve some of the uncertainty that 

many of our banks and financial institutions are experiencing as 

these rulemaking processes continue? 

Mr. GENSLER. You raise a good point because it is balancing lowering that regulatory uncertainty with not trying to rush things. 

And I think this Committee wants us to do both but I have taken 

the Chairman to heart not to rush things. But as we complete each 

rule, I think we do help lower that uncertainty. Beyond that what 

we have tried to do is really reach out and have a lot of work with 

market participants before and after a rule is done through 

roundtables and then, as we have done in some of these data rules, 

to actually have weekly calls with market participants to sort 

through some of their questions. In one case, we put out an over 

100 page topic area on large trader reporting to help describe how 

to get the data in. 

Mr. THOMPSON. You mentioned in your testimony that a motive 

for the current expansion of regulations that you believe failure to 

regulate swaps and future markets led to the 2008 financial crisis. 

Could you please describe a specific regulation that you have added 

since the 2008 financial crisis that significantly reduces the risk of 

future financial crises? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think in a number of places. I do think swaps 

were not the only cause of the crisis but it was part of it. I think 

the overall regime of clearing and central clearing lowers the interconnectedness and I think we will get this right. This Committee 

and Congress want end-users out but the other part of the markets 

to be in clearing. I think transparency, even what we completed in 

43

December. Starting this summer in July of this year, regulators 

and market participants for the first time will actually see the pricing of these transactions. It will be delayed to protect the anonymity, to protect the market, but people for the first time will start 

to see what the pricing of these transactions are. 

Mr. THOMPSON. One of the critical pieces of the mosaic of regulations that you describe in your testimony is the definition of a 

swap. Could you please share with us your preliminary definition 

and indicate areas in which you think changes are likely? 

Mr. GENSLER. In the definition, did you say swap or——

Mr. THOMPSON. Swap, please. 

Mr. GENSLER. We have gotten a lot of questions and comments, 

which I think were very helpful just drilling in on where forwards 

would not be considered to be swaps. And I think it was the intent 

of this Committee—I know there was an important colloquy with 

then-Chairman Peterson on this matter that forwards aren’t treated as futures and they are not treated as swaps. My hope would 

be we give greater clarity on that whole topic. There are similar 

topics that people have raised, concerns about when insurance is 

not a swap, when regular commercial transactions are not a swap. 

So I think the final rule will benefit from those comments and clarity. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now turns to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tipton, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TIPTON. Thank you, Chairman Lucas. And thank you, Chairman Gensler for being here. 

Chairman, we are very aware of the importance for agricultural 

producers to be able to gain access to credit, and quite often an important component of their ability to gain that access to credit is 

to ensure that they are hedged against the risks they face, commodity prices, be it interest rates or currency rates. In recognition 

of this, Dodd-Frank provided an exemption for banks to provide 

swaps in connection with loans from designation of swap dealers to 

ensure the important relationship between risk management and 

flow of credit that it can continue between small- and mid-sized 

banks and businesses. This link I believe is well described in a letter by one of the banking regulators from the OCC that they sent 

to you last year expressing their concerns. With a narrow approach 

to the swaps in connection with loans, the exemption is proposed 

by the CFTC and the impact that this may actually have on our 

banks. 

The OCC—and I will read this—stated specifically in their letter, 

‘‘the statutory language does not limit the loan exclusion with 

swaps that are connected to the financial terms of a loan, nor does 

it require that the swap be entered into contemporaneously with a 

loan origination. CFTC’s proposed implementation of the loan exclusion effectively prevents community and mid-sized banks from 

offering commodity-based swaps to loan customers. We are concerned that this interferes with the bank’s risk management and 

believe that it was precisely this type of risk management that 

Congress intended to preserve through the loan exclusion. Loan unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
44

derwriting criteria for the community and mid-sized banks that 

offer loans to commercial customers engaged in commodity-driven 

business may require as a condition of the loan that the borrower 

be hedged against commodity price risk incidental to its business. 

This hedging activity reduces the bank’s credit risk on the loan 

since the borrower is situated to withstand potentially volatile commodity price fluctuations.’’ 

It did continue on in regards to the restrictions on the timing of 

the swaps relative to the origination of the loan. In their letter they 

stated, ‘‘the loan exclusion should also be implemented in a manner 

that recognizes practical reality of bank and end-user risk management practices.’’ To that end, the loan exclusion should be tailored 

to allow for ongoing hedging throughout the life of a loan, providing 

such hedging is connected to the origination of a loan, as discussed 

above. Eliminating the exclusion to swaps that are contemporaneous to loan origination or close thereto, as is contemplated in the 

proposed rule, would preclude ongoing risk management connected 

to bank lending and increased credit risk for bonds.’’ 

So I am familiar with that. And Mr. Gensler, in light of the fact 

that one of our primary banking regulators expressed concern that 

precluding commodity swaps from the exemption or by placing arbitrary timing restrictions on swaps in connection with loans will 

actually raise credit risk at our banks. Can we expect these restrictions to be omitted from the final rule? 

Mr. GENSLER. I am familiar with the comment letter and other 

comment letters about lending in connection with originating a 

loan. We are taking them all into consideration. We actually asked 

questions of the public on a number of these issues. Let me just 

focus on one. The second that you raised is to what does it mean, 

in connection? Is it contemporaneous? Is it a week before? Is it a 

month before? Et cetera. Is it throughout the life of the loan? We 

received a lot of different—there was a range of feedback on that 

and we will be addressing all of the issues I think in that Comptroller’s letter. Some of them would add clarity but again subject 

to other Commissioners and to Commissions. 

I would say the other piece of this is——

Mr. TIPTON. I am not sure—not to interrupt but I am going to 

run out of time. I am not sure I am hearing an answer to the question. Can we expect that to be omitted from the final rule because 

the primary purpose of Dodd-Frank was to be able to lower that 

risk. 

Mr. GENSLER. I am answering as best I can that in a pack of 

rulemaking that we will take into consideration and I am very familiar with the Comptroller’s letter and his other letters on other 

topics. John and I sometimes talk about these letters as well, and 

I believe the community banks also will ultimately understand that 

as we address ourselves to the de minimis standard as well. But 

I am not able at this stage to say that we are accepting the Comptroller’s letter completely. 

Mr. TIPTON. Okay. You aren’t willing to accept that but you said 

you were reaching out to the market participants and they are directly saying with the backup of the OCC that this is going to raise 

that risk? 

45

Mr. GENSLER. Again, sir, it is the banks who offer swaps in connection with originating loans have raised questions about when 

can they give that. We are going to address that as best we can, 

those comments and the comments of the Comptroller and address 

the comments separate from that letter about the de minimis. 

Mr. TIPTON. Mr. Chairman, if I can just have about 30 more seconds here? 

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty more seconds. 

Mr. TIPTON. I appreciate that. I would really applaud and stand 

behind Mr. Costa in terms of his regard to be able to bring these 

back to Committee because I think the legislative intent is incredibly important. As you are developing these rules and I would join 

myself and associate myself with Mr. Huelskamp’s remarks as well 

in regards to actually having a response back to his request. So 

thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair will now turn to the gentleman for final questions from 

the Republic of Texas for 5 minutes, Mr. Neugebauer. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Gensler, good to have you here today. 

Mr. GENSLER. Good to be with you, sir. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. You had mentioned that Commissioner 

O’Malia last week strongly criticized the final swap dealer business 

conduct rule saying that he felt like the Commission had failed to 

really do a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of that rule. I think 

in fact in some of the discussions with some of the CFTC lawyers, 

they really couldn’t produce any substantial numbers to indicate 

that really any kind of cost-benefit analysis had been done. And I 

believe Mr. O’Malia asked the OMB for independent review of that 

process and to see whether those rules comply with the Obama Administration’s Executive Order. In fact I think he used the word 

that you all had committed regulatory malpractice. That is a pretty 

strong statement from one of your Commission members. 

And I think one of the things that many of us are concerned 

about is we have been tracking the compliance side of Dodd-Frank. 

So it has about 400 different rulemaking requirements. I think we 

reached a milestone the other day—I think we are at 140. I think 

you said you had done about 25 or 26; you had 20 more. So that 

means we are 1⁄3 of the way through this process and the current 

number is that it takes about 21 million man hours to comply with 

the first 140 rules. Now, I want to put that in perspective for you. 

It means that it only took 20 million man hours to do the Panama 

Canal. And so basically what somebody said earlier this week is for 

21 million man hours what we have done rather than connecting 

two oceans and creating a huge economic engine, the only thing we 

have united here is lawyers and billable hours. 

And so I think the importance of these cost-benefit analyses can’t 

be overemphasized. And you must comply with the law because we 

are giving the American people a lot of regulations and we are not, 

one, sure it is going to fix all of the issues that many thought that 

were a part of the crisis in 2008. But the other issue is the huge 

burden that it is going to put on the economy and the financial systems in total. 

46

And so what is your response to ‘‘that you committed regulatory 

malpractice?’’

Mr. GENSLER. I am very proud of the agency’s work, the Commission’s work and I think that we have fully complied with the Commodities and Exchange Act and the Administrative Procedures Act 

on cost-benefit considerations. We take them into consideration on 

each of our rules. The Chief Economist’s Office has to sign off on 

any rule that comes before us, and in many of our internal deliberations it is really very helpful what commenters have come in 

and said to us about this. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. What is your response though that your own 

lawyers admitted they had not crunched the numbers when analyzing the impact or any of the alternatives to that——

Mr. GENSLER. I was at the same hearing and that, with all respect, what they said was to a very specific question about, as I recall, specific numbers on the ability to search voice records, one 

question. Congress mandated that voice records be kept and in our 

proposal we said that it had to be put in electronic form. A lot of 

people didn’t like that so we then said, okay, you do not have to 

put it in electronic form. We rolled back. We dialed back because 

of the cost of that but we said you still just need to be able to 

search it to find a key term. You know, if there is an enforcement 

case later, then somebody has got to be able to search it. And there 

are readily available search tools to just to be able to search and 

find a key term. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So you have a definitive document that says 

cost-benefit analysis for this rule and it has quantitative data in 

it? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, it is actually called cost-benefit considerations because that is what the statute——

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So there is——

Mr. GENSLER. Yes. Oh, yes. That is in each of our rules, absolutely. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Can you furnish me with a copy of that? 

Mr. GENSLER. We will do that. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Do you understand the importance of why this 

cost-benefit analysis is important? Because it is not just what you 

are doing at this Commission but it is what is going on across the 

whole spectrum. And what we are already hearing is in many cases 

there is duplication, there are conflicts of what rules that are being 

put out by you and other regulators. And so it doesn’t appear we 

are moving in a direction that is necessarily positive. 

Mr. GENSLER. I not only understand it; I have found it very, very 

helpful, not just commenters’ views on costs and benefits but our 

own deliberations when somebody in our Chief Economist’s Office 

says, well, how do you justify this? Now, it is only within the discretion we have, but like this example of voice recordings that we 

said, no, do not put them in electronic form——

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. And is the cost-benefit analysis that you do, 

is that done prior to releasing the rule or before the rule is final? 

Mr. GENSLER. There is a cost-benefit consideration section that 

is in a proposal. We ask commenters to comment. We particularly 

ask them if they can send us quantifications. A lot of times we 

don’t get quantities and numbers. And so it may not be as much 

47

quantification as any of us would think about in keeping our own 

bank account or something. But, yes, we get comments through our 

roundtables, through our meetings, and then we include that in the 

final rule as well. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. The feedback I get is that basically the quantification comes from the people commenting that your documents, 

the rules themselves don’t really have very much of a concrete 

quantification or justification of the cost-benefit analysis and that 

you ask for additional information on that aspect. The problem 

with that is then that you take that into consideration; then you 

go out and put out the rule. I would submit to you that if you don’t 

have the data, you are asking for the data, that when you get that 

information back, that you should resubmit the rule with an updated version of the cost-benefit analysis so that then there could 

be comment on that. But if you are mining a lot of data from the 

people on comment, not everybody has the eyes to get to see that 

prior to when you finally—or if you don’t resubmit the rule, then 

it comes in after the fact. 

Mr. GENSLER. The good piece of the process of every agency, and 

ours as well, is everybody gets to see everybody else’s comments. 

So we actually get comments on comments, and we have used our 

discretion to allow people to put in late comments. And often it is 

on cost and benefits and they have been very helpful. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. All time has 

expired. Any closing comments from the Ranking Member? 

Seeing none, the chair simply notes once again we appreciate the 

opportunity to look over Chairman Gensler’s shoulder. We will continue to do that as we work together to make sure the good policy 

is corrected in this process. 

Mr. GENSLER. Could I say, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that 

even when we do finish the rules that we would keep coming in 

front of this Committee, but if you were trying to give us the motivation to slow it down more so that it can always have a reason 

to come in front of you——

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Gensler, you are almost like a member 

of my family we have spent so much time together. And like all 

family members, you will always be welcome——

Mr. GENSLER. Thank you. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN.—to finish this process. 

Mr. GENSLER. All right. 

The CHAIRMAN. With that, under the rules of the Committee, the 

record for today’s hearing will remain open for 10 calendar days to 

receive additional material and supplemental written responses 

from the witnesses to any question posed by a Member. 

This hearing of the Committee on Agriculture is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

48

49

SUBMITTED LETTER BY HON. PETER WELCH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

VERMONT

Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition—An Alliance of Commodity Derivatives End-Users and Consumers 

February 29, 2012

Hon. HAROLD ROGERS, Hon. NORMAN D. DICKS,

Chairman, Ranking Minority Member,

House Committee on Appropriations, House Committee on Appropriations, 

Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.;

Hon. DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hon. THAD COCHRAN, 

Chairman, Ranking Minority Member,

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 

Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C. 

Dear Chairmen Rogers and Inouye, and Ranking Members Dicks and Cochran:

The undersigned members of the Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition write to endorse the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget request of $308 million for 

the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. We believe this funding level is necessary to ensure the oversight, transparency and stability necessary for the proper 

functioning of our nation’s commodity markets and to ensure adequate protections 

for commodity hedgers and commercial end-users. 

The CMOC is an independent, non-partisan and nonprofit alliance of organizations that represents commodity-dependent industries, businesses and end-users 

that rely on functional, transparent and competitive commodity derivatives markets 

as a hedging and price discovery tool. The coalition advocates in favor of government 

policies that promote stability and confidence in the commodities markets, that seek 

to prevent fraud, manipulation and excessive speculation, and that preserve the interests of bona fide hedgers and consumers. 

While we acknowledge the deficit crisis our country faces and commend Congressional leaders for their calls to rein in Federal spending, the Commission must be 

funded sufficiently to exercise its statutory responsibilities. For more than a decade, 

the CFTC has been under-funded, understaffed, and under-resourced. All the while 

it has faced complex new market trends and technologies, a vast expansion of authority over unregulated over-the-counter swaps markets, and challenges to market 

stability and security, including the recent bankruptcy of commodity brokerage firm 

MF Global. The collapse of MF Global illustrates the importance of rigorous market 

surveillance, accountability and consumer protections. 

By CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler’s own admission, the current funding level of 

$205 million is wholly insufficient to meet these challenges. Furthermore, failing to 

provide this important financial regulator with needed funds could further jeopardize security, stability and confidence in the commodity markets and adequate 

consumer protections. 

As businesses that depend on competitive, transparent and functional commodity 

derivatives markets, we urge Congressional appropriators to provide the Commission with the amount of $308 million as requested by the Administration for Fiscal 

Year 2013. 

Thank you in advance for your thoughtful consideration. 

Sincerely,

Airlines for America; 

American Feed Industry Association; 

American Public Gas Association; 

American Trucking Associations; 

Colorado Petroleum Marketers Association; 

Consumer Federation of America; 

Florida Petroleum Marketers Association; 

Fuel Merchants Association of New Jersey; 

Gasoline & Automotive Service Dealers of America; 

Independent Connecticut Petroleum Association; 

Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy; 

Louisiana Oil Marketers & Convenience Store Association; 

Maine Energy Marketers Association; 

Massachusetts Oilheat Council; 

Montana Petroleum Marketers & Convenience Store Association; 

50

National Association of Oil & Energy Service Professionals; 

National Association of Truck Stop Operators; 

National Family Farm Coalition; 

National Farmers Union; 

New England Fuel Institute; 

New Jersey Citizen Action Oil Group; 

New Mexico Petroleum Marketers Association; 

New York Oil Heating Association; 

Oil Heat Council of New Hampshire; 

Oil Heat Institute of Long Island; 

Oil Heat Institute of Rhode Island; 

Organization for Competitive Markets; 

Petroleum Marketers & Convenience Store Association of Kansas; 

Petroleum Marketers & Convenience Stores of Iowa; 

Petroleum Marketers Association of America; 

Public Citizen; 

Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund (R–CALF) USA; 

Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America; 

Vermont Fuel Dealers Association; 

West Virginia Oil Marketers and Grocers Association; 

Wyoming Petroleum Marketers Association.

CC:

Chairman Gary Gensler, Commodity Futures Trading Commission; 

Commissioner Jill Sommers, Commodity Futures Trading Commission; 

Commissioner Bart Chilton, Commodity Futures Trading Commission; 

Commissioner Scott O’Malia, Commodity Futures Trading Commission; 

Commissioner Bart Chilton, Commodity Futures Trading Commission; 

Rep. Jack Kingston, Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture; 

Rep. Sam Farr, Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture; 

Rep. Frank D. Lucas, Chairman, House Committee on Agriculture; 

Rep. Collin C. Peterson, Ranking Member, House Committee on Agriculture; 

Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman, House Committee on Energy & Commerce; 

Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy & Commerce; 

Sen. Richard Durbin, Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial 

Services and General Government; 

Sen. Jerry Moran, Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government; 

Sen. Debbie Stabenow, Chairwoman, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & 

Forestry; 

Sen. Pat Roberts, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & 

Forestry; 

Sen. Jeff Bingaman, Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy & Natural Resources; 

Sen. Lisa Murkowski, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Energy & Natural 

Resources. 

SUBMITTED QUESTIONS

Response from Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank D. Lucas, a Representative in Congress from 

Oklahoma 

MF Global 

Question 1. Please tell us why and what led to your decision as Chairman of the 

CFTC to recuse yourself from the largest failure of a CFTC registrant and arguably 

the largest investigation the Commission has ever had. What are the parameters 

of your recusal? Do you participate in any Commission deliberations or review any 

reports of the investigation?

Question 2. Why does your ‘‘Statement of Non-Participation’’ regarding matters involving MF Global extend to J.C. Flowers & Co.?

Question 3. Please describe the nature of your relationship with J.C. Flowers and 

any and all communications you have had with him while serving as Chairman of 

the CFTC. 

Answer 1–3. For the convenience of the Committee, I include two documents 

which address Questions 1, 2, and 3. The first is the text of my statement of nonVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
51

participation. The second is a Memorandum which includes information detailing 

my activities prior to my withdrawal from participation in the matter. (See ATTACH- MENTS 1–2).

Question 4. You directed the agency’s Division of Swap Dealer and intermediary 

Oversight to find ways to bolster agency regulations for how it oversees and what 

it requires from self-regulatory organizations and futures commission merchants in 

direct response to MF Global. What recommendations did you receive? 

Answer. Commission staff members are reviewing the customer funds protection 

provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and Commission regulations to identify 

enhancements to the protection of customer funds. As part of this process, Commission staff held a 2 day public Roundtable on February 29 and March 1, 2012 to solicit input and to identify enhancements to FCM internal controls surrounding the 

handling of customer funds. Panelist at the Roundtable represented a cross-section 

of the futures industry including academics, consumer groups, agricultural and energy interests, managed funds and pension plans, FCMs, derivatives clearing organizations, self-regulatory organizations, securities regulators and securities self-regulatory organizations, and industry trade associations. 

The Roundtable provided a forum for Commission staff to obtain information and 

views on a range of customer protection issues. Day one of the Roundtable focused 

on customer funds segregation models; FCM controls over the disbursement of customer funds deposited for trading on U.S. futures markets; increasing transparency 

surrounding an FCM’s holding and investment of customer funds; and lessons 

learned from commodity brokerage bankruptcy proceedings. Day two of the Roundtable focused primarily on the protection of customer funds deposited with FCMs 

for trading on foreign futures markets; particular issues associated with entities dually registered with the CFTC as FCMs and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as broker-dealers; and enhancing the self-regulatory structure. 

Commission staff also has held discussions with representatives of the Futures Industry Association (‘‘FIA’’) and the two primary futures markets self-regulatory organizations, the National Futures Association (‘‘NFA’’) and the Chicago Mercantile 

Exchange (‘‘CME’’), regarding enhancing customer protections. Staff is taking into 

consideration the recommendations that FIA issued in its document titled, Initial 

Recommendations for Customer Funds Protection, and in its publication of frequently asked questions regarding the protection of customer funds. 

The Commission recently approved an NFA proposal that stemmed from a coordinated effort by the CFTC, the SROs, and market participants 

The three key areas of reform included in the NFA rules are:

• First, FCMs must hold sufficient funds in Part 30 secured accounts (funds held 

for foreign futures and options customers trading on foreign contract markets) 

to meet their total obligations to customers trading on foreign markets computed under the net liquidating equity method. FCMs will no longer be allowed 

to use the alternative method, which had allowed them to hold a lower amount 

of funds representing the margin on their foreign futures;

• Second, FCMs must maintain written policies and procedures governing the 

maintenance of excess funds in customer segregated and Part 30 secured accounts. Withdrawals of 25 percent or more of excess funds in these accounts 

(that are not for the benefit of customers) must be pre-approved in writing by 

senior management and reported to the NFA; and

• Third, FCMs must make additional reports available to the NFA, including 

daily computations of segregated and Part 30 secured amounts, as well as twice 

monthly detailed information regarding the cash deposits and investments of 

customer funds.

Additional staff recommendations include:

• Incorporating the NFA rules approved recently into the Commission’s regulations;

• Ensuring that SROs and the CFTC have direct electronic access to FCMs’ bank 

and custodial accounts for customer funds, without asking the FCMs’ permission. Further, require that acknowledgement letters (letters acknowledging that 

accounts contain segregated customer funds) and confirmation letters come directly to regulators from banks and custodians;

• Providing that futures customers, if they so elect, to have access to information 

about how their assets are held and with whom, similar to that which is available to mutual fund and securities customers.

Question 5. The CFTC recently concluded an industry-wide spot check of major 

futures brokerages and did not find any material breaches of customer fund protecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
52

tions. The CFTC’s spot check concluded there were no material breaches of customer 

fund protections. Isn’t that what CME found both in the annual audit of MF Global 

that ended August 4th of last year and again in October, just days before the bankruptcy? Did the CFTC use any knowledge it has gained from the MF Global bankruptcy to sharpen its spot check? 

Answer. The CME did not report MF Global being in violation of Commission segregation requirements as a result of its 2011 examination of MF Global, or during 

its review in late October 2011. 

Commission staff, in coordination with the CME and NFA, conducted limited reviews of all FCMs that carry customer funds to assess their compliance with requirements to segregate such funds pursuant to Section 4d of the Act, and to set 

aside in secured accounts funds deposited for trading on foreign boards of trade 

under Section 4(b) of the Act and Part 30 of the Commission’s regulations. The principal goal of the limited reviews was to obtain an appropriate level of assurance that 

FCMs holding customer funds were not in violation of the segregation and Part 30 

secured amount requirements as of the review date. 

DSIO staff conducted the reviews by obtaining from each FCM a detailed listing 

of assets held in segregated and Part 30 secured accounts as reflected in the firm’s 

books and records. The listing of assets was compared to independent third-party 

source documents and reconciliations maintained at the FCM’s offices supporting 

the asset balances. Staff also reviewed the third-party account documentation to determine that the funds were maintained in properly titled segregated or secured accounts, as appropriate. In addition, staff reviewed each FCM’s reported segregation 

and Part 30 secured amount liabilities and reviewed underlying firm records to ensure that the records reflected such liabilities. The staffs of the CME and NFA performed comparable review procedures. Each FCM was determined to be in compliance with the segregation and secured amount requirements as of the respective review date. 

Commission staff is using its experience with the MF Global bankruptcy to develop proposed enhancements to the customer protection regime, including strengthening FCMs’ internal controls surrounding the handling of customer funds.

Question 6. Has there been a drop in trading volume since the MF Global bankruptcy? If so, how much of the drop can be attributed to the collapse of the firm? 

What more could have CFTC done to prevent this disaster? 

Answer. During the first quarter of 2012, aggregate trading volume across all contract markets decreased 5.9 percent relative to 2011. While aggregate trading volume decreased over this period, aggregate open interest in futures and options combined increased 5.4 percent. 

Commission staff is reviewing the facts and circumstances that led to the shortfall 

of customer funds at MF Global and conducting an enforcement investigation. Staff 

will use this information in assisting with the development of proposed enhancements to the protection of customer funds. 

Dodd-Frank Implementation 

Process 

Question 7. For nearly 18 months, the CFTC has been in the process of writing 

rules to govern the swaps market—and you’ve finalized nearly 30 rules. But, the 

very cornerstone of the entire new regime—the definition of a swap—is still not 

final. Why is the definition of swap coming late in the game, when it should have 

been the first rule finalized? 

Answer. The Commission recently finalized the swap definition rule, acting jointly 

with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Commissions benefitted from 

substantial public comment, deliberate consideration of those comments, and frequent and substantial contact between staff of the two agencies.

Question 8. You mentioned in your testimony that there may be times when a reproposal is necessary. Are there particular rules that you believe may require a reproposal? Should we expect a re-proposal on the swap dealer definition in light of 

your assurances that significant changes have been made to improve the rule? 

Answer. On April 27, 2012 the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted joint rules and interpretive guidance on the further definition of ‘‘swap 

dealer,’’ ‘‘security based swap dealer,’’ ‘‘major swap participant,’’ and ‘‘major security 

based swap participant.’’

Question 9. What steps has the CFTC taken to minimize differences with the 

SEC’s proposals on similar provisions related to security-based swaps? 

Answer. The CFTC and SEC consult and coordinate extensively to harmonize 

Dodd-Frank rules. This close coordination will continue and always benefits the 

53

rulemaking process. The two agencies recently adopted joint final rules further defining the terms ‘‘swap’’ and ‘‘security-based swap.’’

Question 10. Recently, the CFTC finalized a rule requiring market participants to 

register as swap dealers with the Commission. However, many of the rules governing swap dealers have not been finalized. How can entities know whether they 

will register if they cannot evaluate the costs associated with the registration because of the various unknown regulatory requirements? 

Answer. The Dodd-Frank Act provides the Commission with ample flexibility to 

phase in implementation of requirements. The Commission has utilized this flexibility where appropriate to allow for phased compliance with specific regulatory requirements.

Question 11. We have stressed to you in numerous hearings the importance of logical sequencing of proposed and final rules. Both to support useful public comment, 

and to minimize disruptions in the markets. In the FY 2012 Agriculture Appropriations bill, you were directed to develop and publish, with a 60 day comment period, 

a schedule of implementation and sequencing of Dodd-Frank rules. Can you update 

us on your compliance with this, and when we can expect the implementation plan? 

Answer. The Commission has taken a number of actions to facilitate implementation of Dodd-Frank regulations in keeping with the instructions with the report language in the FY 2012 House Agriculture Appropriations bill. These include:

March 16, 2011—Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, FIA’s Annual International Futures Industry Conference, Boca Raton, Florida. Remarks of Chairman 

Gary Gensler (as posted on CFTC website and including listing of order in which 

rules might be considered).

April 12, 2011–June 10, 2011—Comment period open (292 written comments 

filed); Concepts document published as a guide for commenters.

May 2, 2011 and May 3, 2011—CFTC–SEC Staff-led Roundtable Discussion on 

Dodd-Frank Implementation.

May 4, 2011—Notice published in Federal Register re-opening and extending 

comment periods (through June 30) in order to ‘‘provide interested parties with 

an additional opportunity to participate in’’ Dodd-Frank Rulemakings. Also requesting comment on the order in which the Commission should consider final 

rulemakings.

June 17, 2011—Commission seeks public comment on proposed order to grant 

exemptive relief from the application of Dodd-Frank Act effective dates.

July 14, 2011—Commission publishes final order providing exemptive relief 

from effective dates of Dodd-Frank Act provisions in order to facilitate a smooth 

transition for market participants (expiring on December 30, 2011; extended on 

Dec. 23, 2011).

September 8, 2011—Outline published of Dodd-Frank Title VII Rules the CFTC 

May Consider in 2011 and the First Quarter of 2012

September 8, 2011—The Commission sought public comment on proposed rules 

specifically to establish schedules to phase in compliance with the swap clearing 

and trade execution requirement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. At that meeting, the Commission also approved a proposed rule to phase in compliance with 

previously proposed requirements, including the swap trading relationship documentation requirement and the margin requirements for uncleared swaps.

December 23, 2011—Commission publishes amendment to July 14 order extending effectivedate relief through July 16, 2012.

January 11, 2012—Update of order of consideration of final rules posted on 

Commission website.

July 3, 2012—Commission approves amendment to July 14 order extending effective daterelief through December 31, 2012. Individual proposed rules specifically request public comment regarding implementation and sequencing. Examples of such rules include: Reporting, record-keeping and Trading Records requirements ; Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data; Registration of 

Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants; and Protection of Collateral of 

Counterparties to Uncleared Swaps

Commission staff—along with staff from the SEC and other implementing agencies—have conducted a number of roundtables (transcripts available on CFTC.gov):

August 20, 2010—Conflicts of interest in the clearing and listing of swaps.

September 14, 2010—Swap Data and Swap Data Repositories

September 15, 2010—Swap Execution Facilities

54

October 22, 2010—Credit Default Swaps

October 22, 2010—Customer Collateral Protection

December 2, 2010—Disruptive Trading Practices

December 12, 2010—Capital and Margin

June 3, 2011—Protection of Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral

June 8, 2011—Swap Data record-keeping and Reporting

June 16, 2011—Definition of Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant

July 6, 2011—Changes related to Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity 

Trading Advisors

August 1, 2011—International issues

January 30, 2012—‘‘Available to Trade’’ Provision for SEFs and DCMs

Feb 29 and March 1, 2012—Roundtables to discuss additional customer collateral protection

May 31, 2012—The Volcker Rule

June 5, 2012—Core Principle 9 for Designated Contract Markets 

Cost-Benefit Analysis 

Question 12. How has the CFTC been able to conduct cost-benefit analysis on any 

of its final rules pertaining to swap dealers or major swap participants if the rule 

defining these terms has not been finalized? How would they know the number, 

type or size of the entities affected by the regulations and how certain costs may 

impact them? 

Answer. The Commission relies on information provided by industry participants, 

the general public, and currently available data to conduct cost-benefit considerations for all its rulemakings. For entity definitions, the Commission used a conservative estimate reported by the National Futures Association that the number 

of swap dealers and major swap participants is anticipated to be 125. Given the lack 

of transparency in the swap markets, it is difficult to accurately predict this number. 

The entity definition rules have been finalized with an interim de minimis threshold of $8 billion notional swaps exposure (as opposed to $100 million in the proposed 

rules). Once the rules have been implemented, the CFTC and SEC will collate information from the swap markets and conduct additional studies regarding the threshold for swap dealers and major swap participants.

Question 13. Has the CFTC undertaken any analysis regarding the cumulative 

impact its rules will have—on particular sectors of the economy or the economy as 

a whole? 

Answer. Two principles are guiding the agency throughout the rule-writing process. First is the statute itself. We intend to comply fully with the statute’s provisions and Congressional intent to lower risk and bring transparency to these markets. 

Second, we are consulting heavily with both other regulators and the broader public. We are working very closely with the SEC, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and other 

prudential regulators, which includes sharing many of our memos, term sheets and 

draft work products. We also are working closely with the Treasury Department and 

the new Office of Financial Research. CFTC staff have held 600 meetings with other 

regulators on implementation of the Act. 

The Commission is bound by the requirements of the Administrative Procedure 

Act, carefully reviews and addresses the thousands of comments received, and 

strives to arrive at a balanced result.

Question 14. How does the Commission ensure its cost-benefit analysis meets the 

standards set forth in Executive Order 13563—President Obama’s Order ‘‘Improving 

Regulation and Regulatory Review’’? 

Answer. The Commission’s guidance on costs and benefit considerations incorporates principles from OMB circular A–4 and Executive Orders 12688 and 13563.

Question 15. You mentioned in testimony that derivative markets help their participant’s hedge or transfer $22 of risk for every dollar of goods and services produced in the U.S. economy. You also mentioned that these markets touch nearly 

every aspect of our economy from the food we eat, to the price at the pump, to our 

mortgages and credit cards, even our retirement savings. 

If market participants—those who use these tools to mitigate risk—are subject to 

unnecessarily higher costs associated with new rules, would your analysis then also 

55

support the fact that the costs will be borne by the customers who use end-users 

products, such as electricity, fuel at the pump, or food at the grocery store? 

Answer. I believe implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act will lower the risk of the 

swaps marketplace by directly regulating dealers for their swaps activities and by 

moving standardized swaps into central clearing. The Act also brings transparency 

to the swaps marketplace. The more transparent a marketplace is the more liquid 

it is, the more competitive it is and the lower costs will be for hedgers, borrowers 

and their customers. 

In addition, the Commission finalized the end-user exception to the clearing requirement for swaps. Congress provided that non-financial entities, such as farmers, 

ranchers, manufacturers and other end-users, should be able to choose whether or 

not to clear those swaps that hedge or mitigate commercial risks. The Commission’s 

final rule implements this exception for non-financial entities, establishing criteria 

for hedging or mitigating commercial risk and imposing minimal reporting requirements for those swaps that come under the end-user exception. 

Entity Definitions/Registration Requirements 

Question 16. We have heard from many end-users that the breadth of the swap 

dealer definition may miscategorize the swaps they enter into for hedging purposes 

as swap dealing. Will the definition of ‘‘swap dealer’’ resolve this issue by providing 

an explicit exemption for hedging?

Question 16a. How will you define ‘‘hedging’’? Will it be consistent with the definition proposed in the Major Swap Participant definition and end-user exemption? 

Answer 16–16a. The statutory definition of ‘‘swap dealer’’ does not specifically address hedging activity. However, the CFTC believes it is appropriate to provide, in 

an interim final rule, that swaps a person enters into for the purpose of hedging 

price risks related to physical positions are excluded from the swap dealer determination. The interim final rule draws upon principles in the Commission’s long 

standing interpretation of bona fide hedging. It excludes swap activity for the purpose of portfolio hedging and anticipatory hedging. If a swap is not entered into for 

the specific hedging purposes identified in the rule, then all relevant facts and circumstances about the swap would be considered in determining if the person is a 

swap dealer. The CFTC is looking forward to receiving comment on whether the interim final rule appropriately excludes swaps for hedging.

Question 17. If the Commission adopts a definition of ‘‘hedging’’ that is specific 

to the swap dealer definition, the Commission will, in three separate rulemakings, 

have three definitions of hedging: one in the MSP rule; another in the position limits rule; and finally another in the swap dealer definition rule. Hedging is a generally understood and accepted term. Why would the Commission have three different definitions for the same activity across regulations that affect the same companies and firms? 

Answer. CFTC rules define how instruments used for hedging are treated for various purposes. For example, where one definition is tailored to give full meaning to 

the end-user exception from clearing, another is crafted in the context of the Volcker 

Rule with its limitation on proprietary trading. (See ATTACHMENT 3).

Question 18. Why is the end-user exemption provided for on a transactional basis 

as contemplated by the Commission’s proposal? Wouldn’t this be unduly burdensome and costly for end-users? Instead, why not allow end-users to make an annual 

declaration to the CFTC that they will transact as an end-user, with an obligation 

to report to the CFTC should their situation change? 

Answer. Under the Commission’s final rule, when reporting a swap in compliance 

with the statutory requirements, the end-user must provide, or cause the swap dealer to provide, notice that the exception is being elected. The end-user has the option 

of providing additional required information in an annual filing or on a swap-byswap basis.

Question 19. Will the CFTC distinguish between trading and dealing activities in 

the swap dealer definition? How? Will such a distinction appear in the Rule itself, 

or in the preamble? 

Answer. The dealer-trader distinction is discussed in the preamble to the CFTC 

and the SEC joint final rules and interpretive guidance on the further definitions 

of ‘‘swap dealer,’’ ‘‘security based swap dealer,’’ ‘‘major swap participant,’’ and ‘‘major 

security based swap participant.’’ The CFTC anticipates that the dealer-trader distinction will be useful as one consideration, particularly in light of the degree to 

which it overlaps with many of the other characteristics identified in the release 

that are indicative of dealing activity.

Question 20. As you know, agricultural co-ops, for example, provide swaps to their 

members, and then enter into another swap to offset the risk. This is critical to their 

56

ability to continue to provide hedging tools to members of the co-op. In that scenario, would the offsetting swap make an entity ineligible for the end-user clearing 

exception? Would the offsetting swap meet the definition of a hedge of commercial 

risk? 

Answer. Under the final rule, the exception is available with respect to a swap 

involving a non-financial entity, where the swap is hedging or mitigating the person’s business risks.

Question 21. The Commission recently voted to propose the ‘‘Volcker rule,’’ and 

it included a definition of what constitutes ‘‘market making.’’ Will the final rule defining swap dealer also define what constitutes ‘‘market making’’ since it is one of 

the key criteria established under Dodd-Frank? 

Answer. True to Congressional intent, end-users other than those genuinely making markets in swaps won’t be required to register as swap dealers. The swap dealer 

definition benefited from the many comments from end-users who use swaps to 

hedge their risk. The final rule defining ‘‘swap dealer’’ includes the provision from 

the proposed rule which incorporates the statutory requirement that this term include a person that ‘‘makes a market in swaps.’’ The preamble to the final rule includes an extensive discussion of what constitutes market making.

Question 22. Before Dodd-Frank, non-financial forward commodity contracts and 

commercial options were excluded from CFTC regulation. This allowed commercial 

commodity transactions to proceed without financial markets regulation. As you 

know, Dodd-Frank repealed these exclusions. Further, in a proposed rule, the CFTC 

deleted the regulatory exemption for commercial options, and has proposed other 

rules that imply physical forward commodity contracts will now be regulated as 

‘‘swaps.’’ In one of our previous hearings, you have stated that the Rural Electric 

Cooperatives are not dealing in swaps, but ‘‘forwards’’ or ‘‘forwards with embedded 

options.’’ Should there be express exclusions from the definition of ‘‘swap’’ for commercial commodity contracts that utilities use every day—such as forward contracts 

for physical power, natural gas, coal and other fuels, and for commercial options, 

such as capacity contracts, reserve sharing agreements, and all-requirements contracts? 

Answer. The Commission recently adopted a final rule to repeal and replace previously existing regulations concerning commodity options. The Commission also 

issued an interim final rule (with a request for additional comment) that incorporates a trade option exemption into the final rules for commodity options. The interim final rule provides a trade option exemption from the general swaps rules, 

subject to certain conditions, for certain physical delivery commodity options. The 

interim final rule was adopted in response to commenters that requested relief from 

Dodd-Frank swaps regulations for commodity options used by commercial entities 

to deliver and/or receive physical commodities in connection with their business. The 

trade option exemption conditions include position limits, large trader reporting, appropriate record-keeping and reporting requirements, anti-fraud and anti-manipulation rules, and the retention of certain swap requirements for swap dealers and 

major swap participants that engage in trade options. The Commission seeks public 

comment on the interim final rule. 

Small Banks 

Question 23. Out in the countryside, it is important for many farmers and ranchers that they be hedged against commodity price risk in order to qualify for loans 

from their local banks. This relationship between commodity hedging and borrowing 

is exactly what Congress intended to preserve in the ‘‘swaps in connection with 

loans’’ exemption from the swap dealer definition. Will community and mid-size 

banks that provide commodity swaps to their loan customers be eligible for this exemption under the final swap dealer rule? 

Answer. The final ‘‘swap dealer’’ definition rule fulfills Congress’s mandate that 

a swap entered into by an insured depository institution in connection with originating a loan is not to be considered dealing activity.

Question 24. According to recent data, 96% of the notional value of all derivatives 

within the U.S. banking system is held by only five of the largest banks. Among 

the largest 25 banks, that percentage increases to 99.86% of the total notional value. 

That means that the remaining .14% of the total notional value is spread among 

1,046 small and community banks. Is it your view that the .14% of notional value 

spread among 1,046 small financial institutions is a threat to the stability of the 

financial system?

Question 24a. Can we expect that in the final rule ‘‘End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing’’, the CFTC will use its authority to exempt smaller financial institutions, farm credit banks and credit unions from the definition of financial entity so 

57

that they are not subject to unnecessary costs—in recognition that they pose no systemic risk? 

Answer 24–24a. The final rule exempts banks, savings associations, farm credit 

system institutions, and credit unions with total assets of $10 billion or less from 

the definition of ‘‘financial entity,’’ making such institutions eligible for the end-user 

exception. 

Extraterritoriality/International Coordination 

Question 25. Will the CFTC issue a proposed rule related to the extraterritorial 

application of Dodd-Frank, as Chairwoman Schapiro has indicated the SEC will do, 

or is it your intent for the Commission to simply issue guidance? How can you ensure two different processes will produce consistent results? Will market participants be afforded the same opportunity to comment on the CFTC’s guidance as they 

will on the SEC’s rule proposal?

Question 26. When should market participants expect the CFTC to provide clarification on extraterritorial application?

Question 26a. If you intend to issue guidance, as opposed to a formal rule, will 

the Commission be obligated to perform cost benefit analysis? 

Answer 25–26a. Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act states that swaps reforms 

shall not apply to activities outside the United States unless those activities have 

‘‘a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the 

United States.’’ Congress included this provision (722(d)) for swaps, but included a 

different provision with regard to the SEC’s oversight of the security-based swaps 

market. In response to many requests, the Commission issued proposed guidance interpreting section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Commission is seeking public 

comment on the guidance and looks forward to the public’s input.

Question 27. Chairman Gensler, you have reassured us that you are well coordinated with international regulators. I’m growing concerned that the international 

community does not agree. 

In a recent article in the Economic Times, the U.S. role in international financial 

reform was described as this—

The United States is coming to be seen as a global threat, acting unilaterally 

with aggressive new market rules that critics say will hurt U.S. firms, foreign 

banks, and international markets in one swoop. 

Despite its talk of a global level playing field, the United States is being portrayed as a rogue country . . .

Please respond to this.

Question 28. What regulatory coordination initiatives are you undertaking with 

your international counterparts with regard to Dodd-Frank and G20 regulatory 

goals? What initiatives are you undertaking with regard to mutual recognition or 

mutual accommodation schemes?

Question 29. In your testimony, you discuss your ongoing dialogues with Japan. 

In April of last year, the Financial Services Agency of Japan sent you a letter expressing concerns with the reach of Dodd-Frank. In fact, the letter states that ‘‘if 

(Japanese financial institutions) were also to be regulated under U.S. DFA framework, this will create an undesirable and redundant effect on these Japanese institutions.’’ 

Based on your ongoing discussions with Japanese regulators, will you take action 

to respond to the concern they’ve raised about the redundancy extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank creates? 

Answer 27–29. As we do with domestic regulators, the CFTC shares many of our 

Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking memos, term sheets and draft work product with international regulators. We have been consulting directly and sharing documentation 

with the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the UK Financial 

Services Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the Japanese 

Financial Services Agency, and regulators in Canada, France, Germany, Singapore, 

and Switzerland. 

Both the CFTC and European Union are moving forward to address the four key 

objectives set forth by the G20 in September 2009, namely clearing through central 

counterparties; trading on exchanges or electronic trading platforms; record-keeping, 

reporting; and higher capital requirements for noncleared swaps. 

Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act states that the provisions of the Act relating 

to swaps shall not apply to activities outside the United States unless those activities have ‘‘a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce’’ of the United States. 

58

Volcker Rule 

Question 30. As you know, the markets for Treasury securities and Treasury futures and options are intertwined. Yet, the proposed Volcker rule excludes treasuries, but not futures and options on Treasuries. Is this purposeful? Will you commit to clarifying in the final rule that market making-related activities in exchangetraded futures and options are among the permitted activities in which a covered 

banking entity may engage, or in the alternative, use your exemptive authority to 

add Treasury futures and options on Treasury futures to the list of permissible proprietary trading activities for covered banking entities? 

Answer. The Commission has solicited public comment with respect to the proposed Volcker rule and looks forward to reviewing submitted comments. The Commission will review, analyze and consider all public comments submitted in connection with this rulemaking before proceeding to issue a final rule. 

CFTC FY 2013 Budget Request 

Question 31. The FY 2013 Budget and Performance Plan details the redeployment 

of resources to process the surge of Dodd-Frank registrations and reviews during FY 

2012. It states that staff will be reassigned from examinations and enforcement as 

necessary to support registration and reviews. The plan also states that the Commission acknowledges that this realignment creates risks in its critical oversight 

roles. Please describe which critical oversight roles will be at risk. How has DoddFrank impacted your ability to effectively oversee the futures markets? 

Answer. The CFTC has been directed by Congress to oversee the swaps market 

as well as the futures market that it has traditionally regulated. The CFTC needs 

additional resources in order to oversee the swaps market, which is eight times larger than the futures market we have traditionally overseen. The National Football 

League would not significantly expand the number of games in a weekend without, 

at the same time, expanding the number of referees to protect the players, ensure 

fair competition, enforce the rules and protect the integrity of the game.

Question 31a. Chairman Gensler, since the bankruptcy of MF Global, has your 

agency refocused its oversight goals? Should it? 

Answer. The Commission has been actively working to improve protections for 

customer funds. This includes:

• The completed amendments to rule 1.25 regarding the investment of funds 

bring customers back to protections they had prior to exemptions the Commission granted between 2000 and 2005. Importantly, this prevents use of customer 

funds for in-house lending through repurchase agreements;

• Clearinghouses will have to collect margin on a gross basis and futures commission merchants (FCMs) will no longer be able to offset one customer’s collateral 

against another and then send only the net to the clearinghouse;

• The so-called ‘‘LSOC rule’’ (legal segregation with operational commingling) for 

swaps ensures customer money is protected individually all the way to the 

clearinghouse; and

• The Commission included customer protection enhancements in final rules for 

DCMs. These provisions codify into rules staff guidance on minimum requirements for self-regulatory organization (SROs) regarding their financial surveillance of FCMs.

In addition, the Commission approved an NFA proposal that stemmed from a coordinated effort by the CFTC, the SROs, and market participants, including from 

the CFTC’s 2 day roundtable earlier this year on customer protection.

Question 31b. Please describe the priorities you have set for the CFTC. Has the 

writing of new rules taken higher priority over examinations and enforcement of the 

futures and commodities markets? 

Answer. The Commission has been directed to promulgate and implement regulations to implement the derivatives reforms of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. That 

direction is in addition to the Commission’s traditional mandate: oversight of the futures market. The Commission is dedicated to carrying out its entire mission.

Question 32a. If yes—has this priority shift affected the Commission’s core mission?

Question 33. Your testimony states that the Commission is completing rules in a 

thoughtful, balanced way—not against a clock. Have you mirrored this approach 

when instituting resources and manpower under the new authority and rule writing 

responsibilities in the Dodd-Frank Act? 

Answer. The Commission has carefully developed a strategic plan which has led 

to the development and execution of a reorganization of the agency’s staff.

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Question 33a. What steps have you taken to become more efficient and effective 

with the resources your agency has in developing rules mandated by the DoddFrank Act? 

Answer. The CFTC is dedicated to using taxpayer dollars efficiently—nearly a 

fourth of our overall budget request is for the development of Information Technology. 

But it still takes human beings to watch for market manipulation and abuses that 

affect hedgers—farmers, ranchers, producers, commercial companies and the public 

buying gas at the pump. 

For example, the Dodd-Frank swaps market transparency rules mean a major increase in the amount of incoming data for the CFTC to aggregate and analyze. The 

agency is taking on the challenge of establishing connections with SDRs and aggregating the newly available swaps data with futures market data. This requires high 

performance hardware and software and the development of analytical alerts. But 

it also requires the corresponding personnel to manage this technology effectively 

for surveillance and enforcement. 

Position Limits 

Question 34. When was the last time the CFTC calculation of deliverable supply 

was done to help set position limits? 

Answer. The CFTC does not routinely calculate deliverable supplies for physical 

commodities. CFTC staff, as part of its due diligence reviews, evaluates related exchange filings. Staff conducts interviews with participants in the cash markets for 

the commodity underlying the contract to understand the production, consumption, 

and distribution of the underlying commodity and underlying deliverable supply. 

The cash market analysis and deliverable supply estimate are used together to assess the contracts’ susceptibility to manipulation and to verify that the position limit 

is consistent with the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations and policy. 

CFTC staff last estimated a commodity’s deliverable supply in 2009 when staff estimated deliverable supplies for crude oil, natural gas, RBOB gasoline, and heating 

oil. Staff concluded that deliverable supplies were adequate. Under the new rules 

recently adopted by the CFTC establishing position limits in 28 physical commodity 

markets, the exchanges and the CFTC would reevaluate deliverable supplies on a 

regular 2 year basis. 

Other Issues 

Question 35. This question is related to the efficient use of CFTC resources and 

judicial review of agency actions. When the SEC adopts a rule, a person affected 

by that rule may file a petition for review directly in a U.S. Court of Appeals challenging the SEC’s rule under the Administrative Procedures Act. That has been true 

for decades. Direct appeals allow for expeditious and efficient review by the courts 

of agency action. The Commodity Exchange Act does not have a similar provision. 

When the CFTC adopts a rule, I understand the CFTC’s position to be that a person 

affected by that rule must file a complaint in federal district court, not in the court 

of appeals. That means the CFTC and the plaintiff must go through two proceedings 

to challenge a CFTC rule—one in district court and one in appellate court—while 

a challenge to the SEC involves only a one step process with the court of appeals. 

In this instance, the SEC process is more direct and less costly for the agency. Do 

you support an amendment to the CEA that would allow direct appeals from CFTC 

rules to the courts of appeals?

Question 35a. If yes, would you favor enactment of such an amendment expeditiously so that it could take effect this year? Would that help to preserve CFTC resources? If no, why not? 

Answer 35–35a. The Commission has not taken a position with regard to this matter. 

Questions Submitted by Hon. Collin C. Peterson, a Representative in Congress from 

Minnesota 

Question 1. Earlier this year, the CFTC published its final rule for real-time public reporting of swap transaction data included the term ‘‘publicly reportable swap 

transaction’’ as defining the types of swaps that would be subject to public dissemination. The rule excluded ‘‘internal swaps’’ or some swaps between affiliates, because such swaps were not arms-length transactions and disclosure would not enhance price discovery. In a footnote, the Commission does say that ‘‘covered transactions between affiliates as described in Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act’’ would be publicly reportable swaps transactions. Can you explain more 

about the nature of these specific covered transactions mentioned in the Federal Reserve Act and why the Commission unanimously voted to require their public disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
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semination despite being between affiliates? Did the Federal Reserve have any input 

regarding this subject? 

Answer. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act refer to transactions 

between a bank and its affiliate. Section 23A relates to all derivatives transactions 

of the bank that create credit exposure to the affiliate. Section 23B sets the ‘‘arm’slength requirement’’ for that section. The Commission determined that it would be 

appropriate to include certain covered transactions as publicly reportable and reflective of the market. The Commission did have the benefit of consultation with the 

Federal Reserve Board regarding this provision.

Question 2. Last month this Committee marked-up H.R. 1840, legislation which 

would amend the CFTC’s legal standard for cost-benefit analysis. You and your staff 

may already be familiar with its contents, but generally the bill matches the directives included in President Obama’s Executive Order ‘‘Improving Regulation and 

Regulatory Review.’’ Do you believe there is a significant difference between the 

cost-benefit analysis conducted currently at the CFTC and the level of analysis that 

would be required by H.R. 1840/the President’s Executive Order? 

Answer. Section 15(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) currently requires 

the CFTC, before it promulgates a regulation, to ‘‘consider the costs and benefits of 

the action.’’ H.R. 1840 would amend section 15(a) to require that such determinations be done through the Commission’s Office of the Chief Economist. It would require that the Commission consider qualitative and quantitative costs and benefits, 

and specify that the Commission could propose or adopt a regulation on a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the costs of the 

intended regulation.

Question 2a. How difficult is it for the Commission to conduct quantitative and 

qualitative analysis on its proposed regulations? 

Answer. The Commission takes very seriously the consideration of costs and benefits of the rules it considers under the Dodd-Frank Act as required under section 

15(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act. The economic costs and benefits associated 

with regulations, especially as they pertain to commenters’ concerns, are of utmost 

importance in the Commission’s deliberation and determination of final rules. 

As noted in the guidance for cost-benefit considerations for final rules memorandum to rulemaking teams from the Chief Economist and General Counsel dated 

May 13, 2011, rulemakings involve consideration of quantified costs and benefits to 

the extent it is reasonably feasible and appropriate. For rules that do not have 

quantifiable costs, the Commission seeks to explain why such costs are not quantifiable and to explain the reasoning and supportive explanation of its predictive judgments using qualitative measures.

Question 2b. How dependent is the Commission on factual data submitted from 

market participants on the costs associated with their market activity in conducting 

quantitative and qualitative analysis; can the Commission require market participants to submit information so you can have better data to guide your analysis? 

Answer. The Commission recognizes the significance of meaningful issues raised 

by commenters regarding costs or benefits and takes those comments seriously as 

it is working on final rules. The Commission does not require that commenters provide data with regard to their operational costs. For those comments which persuade the Commission to modify its proposed rule, the Commission seeks to explain 

why the proposed alternative more effectively furthers the goals of the statute in 

light of the section 15(a) factors, not only in the cost-benefit section but throughout 

the rule’s preamble. In contrast, for those comments which do not persuade the 

Commission to modify its proposed rule, the Commission seeks to explain its adoption of the proposed rule as the most effective means to further the goals of the statute in light of section 15(a). The Commission seriously considers commenters’ concerns regarding costs or benefits and evaluates the alternatives presented.

Question 2c. Would enactment of H.R. 1840 significantly slow down the Commission’s efforts to implement Dodd-Frank? 

Answer. The bill does include provisions that generally would require additional 

steps in the Commission’s regulatory process.

Question 3. One of your fellow Commissioners recently sent a letter to OMB asking them to review some of the CFTC’s cost-benefit analysis to see if it complied 

with various Executive Orders and OMB guidance. But it is my understanding that 

these Orders and guidance do not apply to the CFTC and that the Commodity Exchange Act’s statutory cost-benefit requirements set the cost-benefit standard that 

the Commission is required to meet. Is my understanding correct? Can the OMB 

direct how the Commission conducts its cost-benefit analysis? 

Answer. The Commission is bound by section 15(a) of the Commodity Exchange 

Act in its rulemaking. The statute includes particularized factors to inform cost-benVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
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efit analyses that are specific to the markets regulated by the CFTC. The Commission’s practices are largely consistent with the executive order principles.

Question 4. Last month this Committee passed by a bipartisan vote H.R. 2682, 

legislation to ensure that end-users are not subject to margin requirements for their 

swap transactions. The need for this legislation arose from the Prudential Regulators proposing rules that would require end-users to post margin. During many 

of our hearings, much attention has been focused on regulatory harmonization between agencies. This is an area which could benefit from some harmonization, particularly if was in the direction of the CFTC’s position of not subjecting end-users 

to margin requirements. Have you been in contact with the Prudential Regulators 

to make the case for the CFTC’s position? Do you detect any flexibility in their position on this issue? 

Answer. The CFTC has been working with the Federal Reserve, the other U.S. 

banking regulators, the SEC, and international regulators and policymakers to align 

margin requirements for uncleared swaps. It is essential that we align these requirements globally, particularly between the major market jurisdictions. The international approach to margin requirements in the consultative paper (sponsored by 

the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of 

Securities Commissions) released this month is consistent with the approach the 

CFTC laid out in its margin proposal last year. It would lower the risk of financial 

entities, promote clearing and help avoid regulatory arbitrage. Consistent with the 

CFTC’s proposal, it also excludes non-financial end-users from margin requirements 

for uncleared swaps. 

The CFTC reopened the comment period on our margin proposal so that we can 

hear further from market participants and the public in light of the work being done 

to internationally harmonize margin rules. As we work with international regulators on this coordinated approach, I would anticipate that the Commission would 

only take up the final margin rules toward the end of this year.

Question 5. Last month this Committee passed by a bipartisan vote H.R. 3527, 

legislation to clarify the definition of ‘‘swap dealer.’’ During debate on that bill in 

the Committee, Members raised questions about language in the amended bill 

which would directed the Commission to adopt standards distinguishing the ‘‘dealing’’ activities versus ‘‘entering into swaps for a person’s own account for the purpose 

of achieving one’s own trading objectives.’’ This was an attempt to establish some 

dealer/trader distinction similar to what the SEC has in place. I know you are not 

a lawyer, but to you what does ‘‘achieving one’s own trading objectives’’ mean?

Question 5a. While the goal of this language was to create a dealer/trader distinction, do you believe the language could be read in other ways inconsistent with that 

intent?

Question 5b. Can you again describe the differences between the CFTC and SEC 

proposed rules regarding the dealer/trader distinction in your respective definitions 

of swap dealer and security-based swap dealer? Do you believe such differences are 

reconcilable? 

Answer 5–5b. The dealer-trader distinction is discussed in the preamble to the 

CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission joint final rules and interpretive guidance on the further definitions of ‘‘swap dealer,’’ ‘‘security based swap dealer,’’ ‘‘major swap participant,’’ and ‘‘major security based swap participant’’. The 

dealer-trader distinction will be useful as one consideration, particularly in light of 

the degree to which it overlaps with many of the other characteristics identified in 

the release that are indicative of dealing activity.

Question 6. There have been several press reports for several months now about 

the CFTC and other federal and foreign financial regulators investigating a group 

of banks for using swaps to manipulate the price of the London interbank offered 

rate (LIBOR). While we know you cannot answer questions about the investigation 

specifically, we would like you to answer these more general questions. For the 

record, can you explain the LIBOR, how it affects Americans and the serious implications of this potential manipulation?

Question 6a. Do you have sufficient staff and other resources to conduct this investigation?

Question 6b. A recent Financial Times article (Feb 17, 2012) highlighted the role 

of voice brokers in the LIBOR ‘‘interdealer’’ market in this investigation. Do you believe there are market structures or barriers in place that make it easier for such 

manipulation to occur or harder for regulators to spot it? 

Answer 6–6b. LIBOR and Euribor are indices at the center of the capital markets 

for both borrowings and derivatives contracts. LIBOR is the reference index for the 

largest open interest contracts in both the U.S. futures markets and swaps markets. 

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As of the end of June, the 3 month Eurodollar futures contracts that settle to U.S. 

Dollar LIBOR make up about 70 percent of the notional value of all futures contracts traded on the CME Group exchanges. U.S. Dollar LIBOR’s traded volume in 

2011 on the CME had a notional value exceeding $564 trillion. According to the 

British Bankers Association, swaps with a total notional value of approximately 

$350 trillion and loans amounting to $10 trillion are indexed to LIBOR. 

The CFTC initiated in April of 2008 a review of LIBOR after media reports raised 

questions about the integrity of the index. Thereafter, we began coordinating with 

the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), which helped us facilitate 

information requests. The FSA and the U.S. Department of Justice subsequently 

joined the CFTC with regard to the Barclays matter, and it has been a collaborative 

effort throughout. 

To conduct such a complicated case, the CFTC enforcement staff had to sift 

through a voluminous number of documents and audio recordings that spanned 

many years. 

The CFTC’s Order found that Barclays traders and employees responsible for determining the bank’s LIBOR and Euribor submissions attempted to manipulate and 

made false reports concerning both benchmark interest rates to benefit the bank’s 

derivatives trading positions. The conduct occurred regularly and was pervasive. 

Barclays’ traders located at least in New York, London and Tokyo asked Barclays’ 

submitters to submit particular rates to benefit their derivatives trading positions. 

In addition, certain Barclays Euro swap traders coordinated with and aided and 

abetted traders at other banks in each other’s attempts to manipulate Euribor. 

The Order also found that throughout the financial crisis, as a result of instructions from Barclays’ senior management, the bank routinely made artificially low 

LIBOR submissions. Submitters were told not to submit at levels where Barclays 

was ‘‘sticking its head above the parapet.’’ The senior management directive was intended to fend off negative public perception about Barclays’ financial condition. 

The CFTC’s Order required Barclays to pay a $200 million civil monetary penalty 

for attempted manipulation of and false reporting concerning LIBOR and Euribor. 

In addition, Barclays is required to implement measures to ensure its future submissions are honest. 

Among other things, these requirements include:

• Making submissions based on a transaction-focused methodology;

• Implementing firewalls to prevent improper communications, including between 

traders and submitters;

• Preparing and retaining documents concerning submissions and certain relevant communications; and

• Implementing auditing, monitoring and training measures concerning submissions and related processes, including making regular reports to the CFTC.

The CFTC has and will continue vigorously to use our enforcement and regulatory 

authorities to protect the public, promote market integrity, and ensure that these 

benchmarks and other indices are free of manipulative conduct and false information. The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) is clear in its prohibitions against attempted and actual manipulation of futures, swaps and commodity prices. Further, 

the CEA’s Section 9(a)(2) prohibits knowingly making false reports of market information that affects or tends to affect the price of a commodity. 

Questions Submitted by Hon. Tim Huelskamp, a Representative in Congress from 

Kansas 

Question 1. During the hearing, you stated that you could not exactly recall what 

you were told during the phone call that occurred at 2:30 a.m. the morning of October 31. Were you given any information at all about the possibility of misused, misappropriated, commingled, or missing funds from segregated customer accounts? 

What information were you given during this phone call?

Question 1a. If it was not during the 2:30 a.m. phone call, when did you learn 

that money was missing from customers’ segregated accounts?

Question 1b. Who else was a part of that conference call in the middle of the 

night? Were there any MF creditors on that call? 

Answer 1–1b. During the phone call, staff of MF Global informed regulators that 

there was a significant shortfall in segregated funds. The other participants on the 

call were staff of the SEC [and possibly UK FSA—I have no current recollection]. 

Other participants on the call were the consultants MF Global had retained to support sale of the assets of the company. I am not aware of any knowledge that creditors of MF Global were on the call.

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Question 2. Once you learned that segregated funds were missing, why did you 

not immediately freeze all MF accounts (including those of MF Holdings), to ensure 

that those funds could be returned to the customers? 

Answer. As an initial matter, CFTC has no authority to immediately freeze accounts without a court order. While the CFTC did have the authority to seek a court 

order freezing accounts of, or otherwise seek a receivership for MF Global, Inc., the 

FCM/BD, the Securities Investor Protection Act provides that after a SIPA filing the 

court is to stay any pending related action. Given that a SIPA proceeding for MF 

Global, Inc. was to be brought, it did not seem in the public interest to bring a competing equity receivership proceeding. Moreover, any freeze of MF Global, Inc.’s accounts could not, of itself, recover funds that had already been transferred out of 

MF Global, Inc.

Question 3. In your oral testimony, you said that when the SEC has any regulatory authority over a company, then that company can undergo a SIPA bankruptcy. Is it mandatory that the bankruptcy be processed according to SIPA standards? Why was it decided that the bankruptcy of MF Global undergo a SIPA bankruptcy, rather than a Commodities Exchange Act bankruptcy?

Question 4. Who at the CFTC was involved in making the decision regarding the 

type of bankruptcy that should be used in this particular situation? Who outside the 

CFTC was a part of that decision-making process? Did anyone at CFTC discuss the 

structuring of the bankruptcy with individuals at MF Global, the SEC, SIPC and/

or the DOJ, and/or MF’s creditors such as JP Morgan or Goldman Sachs? If so, who, 

when and with whom? 

Answer 3–4. Futures Commission Merchants (‘‘FCMs’’) are the financial intermediaries for futures market transactions. An FCM or ‘‘commodity broker’’ bankruptcy must proceed as a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than a reorganization under Chapter 11, and the trustee has specified duties. 

Chief among those duties is to endeavor to transfer the positions of customers of 

the FCM to a solvent FCM. The financial intermediaries for securities are known 

as broker dealers (‘‘BDs’’), and the insolvency of a BD proceeds under SIPA. The insolvency of an entity that is both a commodity broker and a BD (a ‘‘BD/FCM’’) will, 

so long as there is at least one securities customer, proceed under SIPA.

Question 5. FCM’s are required to file a monthly report with the CFTC detailing 

the status of segregated customer assets. Did MF Global submit their data for September 2011 within the required timeframe?

Question 5a. When did the CFTC publish this information and/or post it to the 

CFTC website?

Question 5b. Who is responsible for reviewing this information to ensure that segregated funds remain intact? 

Answer 5–5b. Commission regulations require an FCM to file an unaudited 

monthly financial statement with the Commission and with the firm’s DSRO within 

17 business days of the end of the month. MF Global submitted its September 30, 

2011 financial statements to the Commission within the 17 business days required 

by the regulations. 

FCMs file monthly financial statements with the Commission in an electronic format. The CFTC uses an automated program to promptly review each FCM financial 

statement received. The review program immediately alerts an assigned Commission staff member if the financial statements indicate certain regulatory violations, 

including a violation of segregation or capital requirements. 

MF Global’s September 30, 2011 financial statements showed the firm to be in 

compliance with the customer funds segregation and capital requirements. Regional 

examination staff conducts further analysis of FCM financial statements after the 

documents are filed with the Commission. 

The CFTC publishes monthly FCM financial data on its website shortly after it 

receives all filings. October 26, 2011 was the 17th business day during the month 

of October 2011. Commission staff was in the process of compiling the September 

30, 2011 financial data when MF Global filed for bankruptcy on Monday, October 

31, 2011. Staff did not publish MF Global’s September 30 financial data as the firm 

had declared bankruptcy prior to the publication of the information, and questions 

existed regarding the accuracy of the firm’s books and records.

Question 6. Did you speak with or have any other communication with Jon 

Corzine or any other MF Global executives during the period October 24–November 

5? 

Answer. During some calls with regulators on October 29–30 and into the morning 

of October 31, 2011, MFG representatives and representatives of a firm considering 

facilitating the transfer of MFG customer positions also participated. My involveVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
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ment was in furtherance of the CFTC’s effort to ensure to the maximum extent possible the protection of customer property that had been entrusted to MFG. Though 

it was not always apparent which representatives from MFG were present on these 

calls, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, Mr. Corzine was on the line for 

at least part of one of these calls, and discussed matters regarding MFG’s European 

bond positions.

Question 7. After the CFTC was given an investigative role in the bankruptcy of 

MF Global, it took you a week before you made an announcement that you were 

to be a ‘‘non-participant’’ in the investigation. What is a ‘‘non-participant’’ and how 

does that differ from actually recusing yourself from the investigation? What investigatory activities did you participate in or lead before you removed yourself from 

the investigation?

Question 8. Prior to your becoming a ‘‘non-participant’’, what sort of responsibilities did you personally have in the oversight of MF Global? Were you required to 

sign off on any reports? Did you write reports or conduct any audits or investigations regarding anything at MF Global? 

Answer 7–8. For the convenience of the Committee, I include two documents 

which address Questions 7 and 8. The first is the text of my statement of non-participation. The second is a Memorandum which includes information detailing my 

activities prior to my withdrawal from participation in the matter. (See ATTACHMENTS 1–2).

Question 9. The Commission recently finalized a rule setting forth requirements 

for margin segregation for cleared swaps, correct?

Question 9a. And wasn’t failure to properly segregate funds for futures customers 

the problem with MF Global?

Question 9b. Why did you move forward with a segregation rule for swaps, without fully understanding what went wrong with the segregation regime for futures 

customers at MF Global? Couldn’t the rule have benefited from more time to take 

account of what we’re beginning to learn about MF Global? Won’t you just have to 

revisit this rule if new facts come to light so that you can properly protect swaps 

customers—in addition to futures customers? 

Answer 9–9b. The Commission’s adoption of final rules for the segregation of customer funds for cleared swaps carries out the Dodd-Frank Act mandate that futures 

commission merchants (FCMs) and derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs) segregate customer collateral supporting cleared swaps. FCMs and DCOs must hold 

customer collateral in a separate account from that belonging to the FCM or DCO. 

It prohibits clearing organizations from using the collateral of non-defaulting, innocent customers to protect themselves and their clearing members. For the first time, 

customer money must be protected individually all the way to the clearinghouse. 

We received a tremendous amount of public input on this rule, including through 

two roundtables, as well as through comments on an advanced notice of proposed 

rulemaking and a proposal. This rule builds on customer protections included in the 

clearinghouse core principles rule finalized in October requiring DCOs to collect initial margin on a gross basis for their clearing members’ customer accounts. 

In addition, in February, the Commission held a public roundtable on customer 

protection. Among the topics discussed were protections for the collateral of futures 

customers, consistent with the already-approved LSOC rule for cleared swaps.

Question 10. In light of what has happened with MF Global, does the Commission 

intend to recommend changes to the Bankruptcy Code? 

Answer. The Commission has not recommended changes to the bankruptcy code. 

It has adopted important customer protection enhancements and continues to review further improvements. The completed amendments to rule 1.25 regarding the 

investment of funds bring customers back to protections they had prior to exemptions the Commission granted between 2000 and 2005. Importantly, this prevents 

use of customer funds for in-house lending through repurchase agreements. Clearinghouses also will have to collect margin on a gross basis and futures commission 

merchants will no longer be able to offset one customer’s collateral against another 

and then send only the net to the clearinghouse. And the so-called ‘‘LSOC rule’’ 

(legal segregation with operational commingling) for swaps ensures customer money 

is protected individually all the way to the clearinghouse.

Question 11. Segregated funds have been the hallmark of customer fund protection. How do you believe customer funds should be treated in a bankruptcy scenario 

and how do you perceive the SIPC trustee is handling the funds of futures customers? If this was a CFTC led process, would the funds of futures customers be 

treated differently? 

65

Answer. Commodity customers in a SIPA proceeding do not suffer any disadvantage relative to commodity customers in a subchapter IV, Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. 

Questions Submitted by Hon. Randy Hultgren, a Representative in Congress from Illinois 

Question 1. The CFTC recently approved the final rule regarding registration requirements for market participants. However, since the joint rule on entity definitions and a determination of what a ‘‘swap’’ contract will be, many market participants are still unclear if they will have to register with the CFTC. Will additional 

time be provided by the CFTC for participants to comply with new registration requirements? Will the CFTC wait to apply these registration requirements until the 

final entity definitions have been completed? When does the CFTC expect market 

participants to be fully capable of compliance? 

Answer. A swap dealer or a major swap participant is not required to apply for 

registration until 60 days after the joint final rule further defining the term ‘‘swap’’ 

is published in the Federal Register. Staff for the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight has already provided relief for some firms in the form of a ‘‘no-action’’ letter. 

That relief is intended to provide sufficient time for nonclearing member swap dealers to transition. The Commission is working with market participants and will continue to do so.

Question 2. Please describe the challenges experienced by the CFTC and SEC 

when engaging in joint rulemaking and other coordinated efforts. Specifically, please 

explain how agency coordination, or lack thereof, has complicated the process of defining ‘‘swap’’. 

Answer. The CFTC and SEC consult and coordinate extensively to harmonize to 

the greatest extent possible on Dodd-Frank rules. This close coordination will continue and always benefits the rulemaking process. The two agencies recently adopted joint final rules further defining the terms ‘‘swap’’ and ‘‘security-based swap.’’

Question 3. In the CFTC’s efforts to understand high frequency trading, what 

stakeholder groups do you think should be consulted and how involved with market 

participants be in this process?

Question 4. Is proprietary algorithmic trading data necessary to understanding 

the development of high frequency trading practices and what protections will be 

extended to this sensitive information when it is share with the CFTC?

Question 5. When considering high frequency traders, will the aggregate value of 

trades and total volume of trades be considered? 

Answer. 3–5 In analyzing HFT activity, the Commission has consulted stakeholder 

groups with substantial knowledge of these trading practices. The Technology Advisory Subcommittee on High-Frequency Trading of the Commission was established 

in March of 2012, and includes experts from exchanges, clearing firms, sell-side 

firms, buy-side (hedging) institutions, data and technology service providers, academia, SROs and high-frequency firms themselves. A sequence of public meetings 

have been held to present, discuss and debate the findings and deliberations of the 

highly qualified members of the Subcommittee and in the process, help the Commission develop a detailed picture of high-frequency and other automated trading styles 

and their potential impact on the market.

Question 6. Has the CFTC considered how the indemnification provision of DoddFrank could undermine the mitigation of systematic risk and hamper transparency 

in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market? How does the CFTC think these 

negative consequences could be avoided? 

Answer. On May 1, of this year, the Commission issued a Proposed Interpretative 

Statement regarding the confidentiality and indemnification provisions in the DoddFrank Act. The proposal generally exempts foreign regulators from the indemnification and confidentiality provision in the Dodd-Frank Act, and ensures that foreign 

regulators have access to data in Swap Data Repositories (SDR). This exemption 

only applies to data that is required to be reported and if the SDR is recognized 

by the country’s law and regulation.

Question 7. The House Agriculture Committee recently passed H.R. 1810 that 

would require a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis by CFTC of its rules and orders. How would this legislation, if passed, change the cost-benefit analysis currently preformed by CFTC related to the Dodd-Frank Act? 

Answer. Section 15(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) currently requires 

the CFTC, before it promulgates a regulation, to ‘‘consider the costs and benefits of 

the action.’’ H.R. 1840 would amend section 15(a) to require that such determinations be done through the Commission’s Office of the Chief Economist. It would require that the Commission consider qualitative and quantitative costs and benefits, 

66

and specify that the Commission could propose or adopt a regulation on a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the costs of the 

intended regulation.

Question 8. Of the estimated 286 rulemakings requirements with specified deadlines in Dodd-Frank, well over half are still outstanding. While the CFTC has been 

better than some of its sister regulators, statutory rulemaking deadlines have been 

missed or delayed. Is it fair to say that, as passed, Dodd-Frank set an overly ambitious timetable for the development and finalization of the many new rules included? 

Answer. The Commission has made significant progress in implementing Congress’ direction to ensure that common-sense standards are established for the 

swaps market. To date, we’ve completed 36 rules and now have fewer than 20 to 

go. We are working to complete these rules in a thoughtful, balanced way—not 

against a clock.

Question 9. Recently former CFTC Commissioner Sharon Brown-Hruska from 

NERA authored a report that estimated the cost for a non-financial energy firm to 

comply with the obligations of a Swap dealer. The report estimates that non-financial energy firms designated as swap dealers will incur more the $70 million of annual (year-one) costs to comply with the CFTC’s proposed rules. The CFTC estimated the annual cost of compliance with its Swap dealer rules at roughly $2 million. Will the CFTC reexamine its cost-benefit analysis of the Swap Dealer definition to address the omissions cited in the NERA report? How will the CFTC ensure 

that the Swap Dealer definition will not impose an undue burden without a detailed 

reexamination of its cost-benefit studies? 

Answer. The CFTC strives to include well-developed considerations of costs and 

benefits in each of its proposed rulemakings. Relevant considerations are presented 

not only in the cost-benefit analysis section of the CFTC’s rulemaking releases, but 

additionally are discussed throughout the release in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA requires the CFTC to set forth the legal, factual and policy bases for its rulemakings. 

In addition, Commissioners and staff have met extensively with market participants and other interested members of the public to hear, consider and address 

their concerns in each rulemaking. CFTC staff hosted a number of public 

roundtables so that rules could be proposed in line with industry practices and address compliance costs consistent with the obligations of the CFTC to promote market integrity, reduce risk and increase transparency as directed in Title VII of the 

Dodd-Frank Act. Information from each of these meetings—including full transcripts of the roundtables—is available on the CFTC’s website and has been factored 

into each applicable rulemaking. 

With each proposed rule, the Commission has sought public comment regarding 

costs and benefits. The Commission welcomes each comment and incorporates those 

comments—including those relating to costs—in development of its final rule. 

Questions Submitted by Hon. William L. Owens, a Representative in Congress from 

New York 

Question 1. In your testimony, you note that the CFTC intends to follow Congressional intent by ensuring that non-financial companies using swaps to hedge or 

mitigate commercial risk will not be required to bring swaps into central clearing. 

However, you also claim the Commission’s proposed rule adheres to this structure, 

despite many end-users claiming to the contrary. How do you account for this discrepancy? 

Answer. Congress provided that non-financial entities, such as farmers, ranchers, 

manufacturers and other end-users, should be able to choose whether or not to clear 

those swaps that hedge or mitigate commercial risks. The Commission’s final rule 

implements this exception for non-financial entities, establishing criteria for hedging 

or mitigating commercial risk and imposing minimal reporting requirements for 

those swaps that come under the end-user exception.

Question 2. The CFTC has approved the final rule requiring market participants 

to register with the CFTC but delayed a vote on finalizing definitions. Will the Commission be providing additional time for market participants to comply with this 

registration requirement so that this requirement is not effective until the final entity definitions has been completed? 

Answer. A swap dealer or a major swap participant is not required to apply for 

registration until 60 days after the joint final rule further defining the term ‘‘swap’’ 

is published in the Federal Register. Staff for the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight has already provided relief for some firms in the form of a ‘‘no-action’’ letter. 

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ers to transition. The Commission is working with market participants and will continue to do so.

Question 3. In your testimony, you note that you anticipate the Commission will 

seek public input on the extraterritorial application of Title VII. Can you shed some 

light on when the CFTC intends to propose a formal rulemaking process on the 

extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank and if you believe these requirements 

should extend to transactions which are conducted outside of the United States 

through either foreign affiliates of domestic firms or by foreign entities with nonU.S. persons? 

Answer. On June 29, 2012, the CFTC approved proposed interpretive guidance on 

the cross-border application of the Swaps Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 

Commission’s regulations. The proposed guidance interprets Section 722(d) of the 

Dodd-Frank Act, which states that the swaps provisions of the CEA shall not apply 

to activities outside the United States unless those activities have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States. 

The guidance will be open for public comment for 45 days. While the Commission 

is not required to solicit public comment on interpretive guidance, I am particularly 

interested in the public’s input and look forward to comments on the proposed guidance.

Question 4. The House Agriculture Committee recently approved (H.R. 2779) legislation that would exempt certain inter-affiliate transactions of swap dealers from 

meeting margin and clearing requirements. You note in your testimony that you expect the Commission to consider a proposal on this issue later this year. Do you expect the Commission’s rules to mirror the SEC’s? 

Answer. The Commission has benefitted from substantial public input on the 

treatment of swaps among affiliates of the same business entity. To address commenters’ questions about a possible clearing requirement between affiliates of financial entities, I expect the Commission to consider a proposal and take public comments in the near future. The staff recommendation, which would exempt certain 

affiliate swaps from the clearing requirement, is under review by commissioners. 

The Commission will continue to consult closely with the SEC.

Question 5. With respect to the swap dealer definition, will the CFTC clearly define Market Making in a manner that provides clarity to market participants as to 

what distinguishes Market Making from other market activity that end-users engage in, such as hedging risk? Will you support a specific exemption from swap dealing for commercial hedging in the rule? 

Answer. On April 18, 2012 the Commission adopted a joint final rule, required by 

Section 712(d)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act with the SEC further defining the terms 

‘‘swaps dealer,’’ and ‘‘major swaps participant.’’ The rulemaking incorporates an interim final rule, such that swaps a person enters into for the purpose of hedging 

price risks related to physical positions are inconsistent with swap dealing, and are 

excluded from the swap dealer determination. The interim final rule draws upon 

principles in the Commission’s long standing interpretation of bona fide hedging. It 

excludes swap activity for the purpose of portfolio hedging and anticipatory hedging. 

However, the CFTC is not adopting a per se exclusion of all swaps that hedge or 

mitigate risk. If a swap is not entered into for the specific hedging purposes identified in the rule, then all relevant facts and circumstances about the swap would be 

considered in determining if the person is a swap dealer. The CFTC is looking forward to receiving comment on the interim final rule.

Question 6. Will you support a clear distinction between dealing activity and trading activity within the finalized definitions? 

Answer. The dealer-trader distinction is discussed in the preamble to the CFTC 

and the Securities and Exchange Commission joint new final rules and interpretive 

guidance on the further definitions of ‘‘swap dealer,’’ ‘‘security based swap dealer,’’ 

‘‘major swap participant,’’ and ‘‘major security based swap participant’’. The CFTC 

anticipates that the dealer-trader distinction will be useful as one consideration, 

particularly in light of the degree to which it overlaps with many of the other characteristics identified in the release that are indicative of dealing activity. 

ATTACHMENT 1

November 8, 2011

Statement of Non-Participation 

With respect to the recent matters involving MF Global, the staff at the CFTC 

is working hard to recover customers’ funds and to find out what happened to the 

missing customer money and how it happened. The CFTC has a tremendously capaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
68

1Mr. Corzine resigned as President and CEO of MFGI on Friday, November 4, 2011. 

2On November 8, 2011, Chairman Gensler executed a ‘‘Statement of Non-Participation.’’ This 

statement explained the Chairman’s decision: ‘‘With respect to the recent matters involving MF 

Global, the staff at the CFTC is working hard to recover customers’ funds and to find out what 

happened to the missing customer money and how it happened. The CFTC has a tremendously 

capable staff and I do not want my participation to be in any way a distraction in this important 

matter.’’

ble staff and I do not want my participation to be in any way a distraction in this 

important matter. 

Accordingly, I have determined that I will not participate personally and substantially in any enforcement matter involving specific parties MF Global, MF Global 

Holdings Ltd., MF Global Inc., and J.C. Flowers & Co. (the ‘‘specific parties’’), and 

any matter directly related thereto. I will advise my principal subordinates of my 

decision not to participate in these matters. I also will instruct my principal subordinates that all inquiries and comments involving any of the matters described above 

should be directed to Dan Berkovitz, the General Counsel of the CFTC who will act 

on my behalf, without my knowledge or involvement. 

In order to help ensure that I do not inadvertently participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that could have a direct or predictable effect on 

the specific parties with respect to such matters described above, I am directing Mr. 

Berkovitz to seek assistance from the alternate designated agency ethics official if 

he is ever uncertain whether or not I may participate in a matter. 

I have instructed David Stawick, the Secretary of the Commission, to screen all 

CFTC matters directed to my attention that involve outside entities or that require 

my participation, to determine if they involve any of the specific parties and matters 

listed above. If Mr. Stawick determines that a matter involves any of the specific 

parties and matters, he will refer it to the appropriate official to take action without 

my knowledge or involvement.

Hon. GARY GENSLER, Date

Chairman.

ATTACHMENT 2

Confidential Memorandum 

To: Chairman Gensler

From: DAN M. BERKOVITZ,

General Counsel and Designated Agency Ethics Official

JOHN P. DOLAN,

Counsel and Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official 

Date: December 13, 2011

Subject: Participation in Matters Concerning MF Global, Inc. 

I. Introduction and Summary 

Pursuant to 5 CFR § 2635.502, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

(CFTC or Commission) designated agency ethics official (DAEO) has undertaken 

this review of the participation of CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler in certain CFTC 

matters regarding MF Global, Inc. (MFGI), a futures commission merchant (FCM) 

registered with the CFTC. During the 1980s and 1990s Chairman Gensler and the 

former President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of MFGI, Jon Corzine, worked 

together and were partners at Goldman Sachs (GS), an investment bank.1

On November 3, 2011, the General Counsel and DAEO provided Chairman 

Gensler with an oral opinion that the Chairman was not required to withdraw from 

participation in MFGI matters as a result of his prior relationship with Mr. Corzine. 

On that same date Chairman Gensler nonetheless elected to not participate in enforcement matters related to MFGI.2 Following this decision, the General Counsel 


11229001.eps 11229002.eps 11229003.eps
69

3MF Global Holdings Ltd. Form 10–K for fiscal year ended March 31, 2011 at 1, http://

www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1401106/000119312511145663/d10k.htm (accessed November 6, 2011); see Disclaimer, MF Global Website, http://www.mfglobal.com/disclaimer (accessed 

November 6, 2011). 4Disclaimer, MF Global Website, http://www.mfglobal.com/disclaimer (accessed November 6, 

2011). 5MF Global Holdings Ltd. Form 10–K for fiscal year ended March 31, 2011 at 5, http://

www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1401106/000119312511145663/d10k.htm (accessed November 6, 2011). 6 CFTC Press Release, PR6140–11, November 10, 2011. 

7Statement of Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Support of the Trustee’s Emergency Motion for an Order Approving the Transfer of Certain Segregated Customer Commodity 

Accounts of MF Global Inc. and Related Margin and Motion for Expedited Hearing, MFGI Bankruptcy Case, November 2, 2011. 8 Executive Officers Biography, MF Global Website, http://www.mfglobalinvestor

relations.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194911&p=irol-govManage (accessed November 6, 2011). 9 Executive Officers Biography, MF Global Website, http://www.mfglobalinvestor

relations.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194911&p=irol-govBio&ID=198970 (accessed November 6, 2011). 10 Id. 11 Executive Officers Biography, MF Global Website, http://www.mfglobalinvestor

relations.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194911&p=irol-govManage (accessed November 6, 2011). 12 Executive Officers Biography, MF Global Website, http://www.mfglobalinvestor

relations.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194911&p=irol-govBio&ID=204097 (accessed November 6, 2011). 

and DAEO and ADAEO decided to undertake this review to determine whether 

Chairman Gensler’s participation in matters involving MFGI was appropriate. 

Based on the facts and circumstances detailed in this memorandum, and based 

upon the standards set forth in 5 CFR § 2635.502, this review concludes that Chairman Gensler was not required to withdraw from matters involving MFGI. From a 

legal and ethical perspective, Chairman Gensler’s participation in Commission matters involving MFGI was not improper. 

II. Factual Background 

A. MF Global, Inc. 

Subsidiary of MF Global

MG Global is a financial business comprising a holding company, MF Global Holdings Ltd., a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York City, and a variety 

of subsidiaries located in the United States and other countries.3 One of the subsidiaries is MFGI, which is an FCM registered with the CFTC as well as a securities 

broker-dealer registered with the SEC.4 According to the Annual Report (SEC Form 

10–K) filed by MF Global Holdings Ltd. in May 2011, MF Global is a broker in markets for commodities and listed derivatives and a broker-dealer in markets for commodities, fixed income securities, equities, and foreign exchange.5

MFGI Bankruptcy

On October 31, 2011, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) filed 

an application for the entry of a protective order in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court placing MFGI in liquidation under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA). On 

that same date, ‘‘the Commission’s Division of Enforcement opened an investigation 

into whether the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) or Commission regulations were 

violated in connection with MFGI, and the Commission [] authorized the Division 

to issue subpoenas.’’ 6

In a filing on November 2, the Commission informed the Bankruptcy Court that 

it ‘‘intends to take all appropriate action, within the purview of the Bankruptcy 

Code and the [CEA], to ensure that customers maximize their recovery of funds and 

to discover the reason for the shortfall in segregation.’’ 7

Key officials

Jon S. Corzine was the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of MF Global Holdings Ltd. until his recent resignation.8 According to the MF Global website, Mr. 

Corzine also is an operating partner at J.C. Flowers & Co. LLC.9 According to the 

MF Global website, Mr. Corzine joined GS as a fixed income trader in 1975 and subsequently served as chief financial officer and as chairman and senior partner from 

1994 through 1999.10

Bradley I. Abelow is the President and Chief Operating Officer of MF Global 

Holdings Ltd.11 According to the MF Global website, Mr. Abelow previously was a 

partner and managing director of GS, where he managed the operations group.12

70

13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Executive Officers Biography, MF Global Website, http://www.mfglobalinvestor

relations.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194911&p=irol-govManage (accessed November 6, 2011). 16 Executive Officers Biography, MF Global Website, http://www.mfglobalinvestor

relations.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194911&p=irol-govBio&ID=186545 (accessed November 6, 2011). 17 Id. 18 J.C. Flowers & Co. LLC: Private Company Information—Businessweek, (accessed November 

6, 2011) http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcap

Id=1089967. 19J.C. Flowers Fund Said to See $47.8 Million Loss on MF Global—BUSINESSWEEK (November 

2, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-02/jc-flowers-fund-said-to-see-47-8-million-loss-on-mf-global.html (accessed November 6, 2011). 20 Id. 21The facts in this section are based primarily upon an interview with Chairman Gensler conducted on November 4, 2011. 22 Chairman Gensler served as Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets from September 

1997 until April 1999, and as Under Secretary of Treasury for Domestic Finance from April 

1999 to January 2001. 23 By 1997, when Chairman Gensler left GS, there were approximately 190–200 partners at 

GS. 24 Chairman Gensler spent approximately 6–12 months during the 1983–1984 time period on 

the equity trading floor as part of a ‘‘mobility program.’’ 25 Executive functions were shared between Mr. Corzine and Mr. Henry Paulson, who served 

as Chief Operating Partner and Vice Chairman of the Management Committee. Mr. Thain reported to Mr. Corzine and Mr. Paulson. 

Earlier he was responsible for GS’s operations, technology, risk, and finance functions in Asia.13 He joined GS in 1989.14

Laurie R. Ferber is the General Counsel of MF Global Holdings Ltd.15 According 

to the MF Global website, Ms. Ferber worked for GS for over 20 years beginning 

in 1987.16 She held a number of different positions including serving as co-general 

counsel of the Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities Division and launching and 

running the economic derivatives business.17

J. Christopher Flowers is the founder and executive chairman of J.C. Flowers & 

Co. LLC, a private equity firm.18 According to press reports, J.C. Flowers & Co. 

owns preferred stock in MF Global that, if converted to common stock, would 

amount to 6% of the total.19 Also according to press reports, Mr. Flowers worked 

with Mr. Corzine at GS and later recommended that Mr. Corzine take over as MF 

Global’s chairman and chief executive officer in March 2010.20

B. Relationship Between Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine 21

Chairman Gensler’s Employment at GS

Chairman Gensler worked at GS from September 1979 until September 1997, 

when he left to serve as Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Financial Markets.22

In late 1988, when Chairman Gensler became a partner in the firm, there were approximately 128 partners at GS, including Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine.23

From his arrival at GS in 1979 until late 1991 or early 1992, Chairman Gensler 

worked in the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Department.24 In late 1991 or early 

1992, Chairman Gensler and a few other junior partners at the firm were asked to 

transfer to other departments as part of their career development. The transfers 

were suggested by Mr. Robert Rubin (the co-Chairman and Co-Senior Partner of GS 

at the time) and Mr. Corzine (the co-head of the fixed income department (FI) at 

the time). Mr. Gensler was asked to transfer to FI and agreed. 

Chairman Gensler’s initial assignment in FI was in the mortgage trading department. In this capacity, he reported to Michael Mortara, who reported to Mr. Corzine 

and the other co-head of FI, Mr. Mark Winkelman. Chairman Gensler, Mr. Mortara, 

and Mr. Corzine all worked on the fixed income trading floor. 

In January 1993, Mr. Corzine requested, and Chairman Gensler agreed, that 

Chairman Gensler serve as co-head of fixed income trading in the GS office in 

Tokyo, Japan. Chairman Gensler served in this position until late 1994. During this 

two-year period, Mr. Corzine and Mr. Winkelman were Chairman Gensler’s direct 

supervisors. 

In the fall of 1994, Chairman Gensler was asked by Mr. Steve Friedman, who was 

then co-head of GS with Mr. Rubin, to transfer out of FI to be the head of the Operations, Technology, and Finance Division (OTF) in Asia. Chairman Gensler reported 

to Mr. John Thain, head of worldwide OTF. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Corzine became 

the Senior Partner of GS and Chairman of the Management Committee.25

Chairman Gensler returned to New York in November 1995 to become co-head of 

Finance. In this position, Chairman Gensler continued to report to Mr. Thain, who 

continued to report to Mr. Corzine and Mr. Paulson. As co-head of Finance, ChairVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
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26Mr. Corzine subsequently left GS in early 1999. 27 Chairman Gensler believes that he may have spoken with Mr. Corzine once or twice by telephone while serving at Treasury, but cannot specifically recall any such conversations. 28 Chairman Gensler’s contribution was to the New Jersey State Democratic Party, not directly to Senator Corzine’s campaign for Governor. 29 A copy of Chairman’s Gensler’s speech can be found at: http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/

SpeechesTestimony/2010/index.htm. (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 

man Gensler served on various committees of the firm, including the Risk Committee. Mr. Corzine also was a member of the Risk Committee (which had approximately 10–15 members), and sometimes he participated on other committees, too. 

Chairman Gensler served as co-head of Finance until he left GS in 1997 for the 

Treasury Department. Prior to leaving GS, Chairman Gensler visited with Mr. 

Corzine at the latter’s apartment to provide departing observations.26

After Chairman Gensler Left GS

To the best of his recollection, Chairman Gensler believes he did not see Mr. 

Corzine for 3 years after Chairman Gensler left GS.27 While Chairman Gensler 

served at Treasury, the only time that he saw Mr. Corzine was in late 2000 or early 

2001. Then-Senator-elect Corzine had come to the Treasury Department to visit 

with Secretary of Treasury Lawrence Summers, and following the meeting with Secretary Summers, Mr. Corzine stopped by to say hello to then-Under Secretary 

Gensler. 

In early 2002, Chairman Gensler volunteered to serve as an advisor to Senator 

Paul Sarbanes on legislation that eventually was enacted as the Sarbanes-Oxley 

Act. Senator Sarbanes was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 

and Urban Affairs and Senator Corzine was a Member of the same Committee. In 

his role as advisor to Senator Sarbanes, Chairman Gensler occasionally spoke with 

Senator Corzine about the pending legislation. Chairman Gensler also spoke with 

Senator Corzine while Chairman Gensler, Senator Sarbanes, and Senator Corzine 

were on the Senate floor during the consideration of the legislation for final Senate 

passage. 

In 2003–2004, Chairman Gensler served as Treasurer of the Maryland State 

Democratic Party. During the same time, Senator Corzine became head of the 

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. As a result of their fundraising responsibilities, Chairman Gensler saw Senator Corzine at several political events attended by large numbers of people. This included an event to support the campaign 

of Senator Kerry for President in 2004, which was attended by approximately 400 

others, including other Members of Congress. 

In 2005, Chairman Gensler was invited to a fundraiser in Washington, D.C., for 

the New Jersey State Democratic Party. Approximately 100 people attended, including both Senator Corzine and the other Senator from New Jersey, Senator Frank 

R. Lautenberg. At the time, Senator Corzine was campaigning to be elected Governor of New Jersey. As a participant in the fundraiser, Chairman Gensler contributed $10,000 to the New Jersey State Democratic Party (as he similarly contributed 

to the State Democratic Party of several other States), which earned him the title 

of being a ‘‘host’’ of the fundraiser.28 Chairman Gensler did not see Governor 

Corzine for another 3 years. 

During the primary season for the 2008 Presidential campaign, Chairman Gensler 

first served as an unpaid senior advisor to the campaign of then-Senator Hilary 

Clinton. Chairman Gensler recalls speaking with Governor Corzine on a couple of 

occasions to answer Governor Corzine’s questions about Senator Clinton’s positions 

on various policy issues. Chairman Gensler recalls seeing Governor Corzine at a 

fundraising event in New Jersey in either August or September of 2008 for thenSenator Obama.

Chairman Gensler’s Tenure at the CFTC

Chairman Gensler began serving as Chairman of the CFTC in May 2009. At the 

time he joined the CFTC, Chairman Gensler determined not to participate in any 

CFTC matters involving GS. 

Shortly after joining MFGI in March 2010, Mr. Corzine met with Chairman 

Gensler and the Chairman’s staff at CFTC headquarters. Mr. Corzine requested the 

meeting, which Chairman Gensler recalls as a ‘‘meet and greet’’ and that Mr. 

Corzine did not make any specific requests to Chairman Gensler. 

In November 2010, Mr. Corzine asked Chairman Gensler to speak at a seminar 

at Princeton University that Mr. Corzine was conducting on financial institutions 

and regulation.29 Mr. Andrew Ross Sorkin also spoke at this seminar, and Mr. 

Corzine introduced both of them. Following the seminar, Chairman Gensler joined 

72

30Mr. Sorkin was unable to stay for the dinner. 31The firm regularly sponsors such conferences. See, e.g., https://register.sandleroneill.com/

conferences/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 32 A record of this call can be found at http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/

ExternalMeetings/dfmeetingl072011l928 (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). In response to media 

questions as to whether a delay in consideration of this rulemaking showed favoritism to MFGI, 

Chairman Gensler has stated that he has ‘‘been consistent on this rule, and I allowed more time 

for others to continue to look at it.’’ See Silla Brush, Bloomberg, ‘‘MF Global Didn’t Get Preferential Treatment, CFTC’s Gensler,’’ Nov. 7. 2011. 33 It is possible that Mr. Corzine was on the line during other portions of these conference 

calls. 34On November 8, 2011, BNA reported that Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine spoke shortly 

after Mr. Corzine resigned from his positions at MF Global. See Steven Joyce, BNA, ‘‘Gensler 

Says Recusal Decision Made Days Before Corzine Resignation, Grassley Letter,’’ Nov. 8, 2011. 

This report is not accurate; the reported conversation between Chairman Gensler and Mr. 

Corzine did not occur. 35 Chairman Gensler recalls one non-professional interaction that indirectly involved Mr. 

Corzine during his tenure at GS. In 1991, Chairman Gensler learned that Mr. Corzine had registered to run in the New York City Marathon that year. Chairman Gensler recalls that he 

asked Mr. Corzine’s secretary whether Mr. Corzine actually was going to run the marathon. A 

few weeks later Mr. Corzine’s secretary told Chairman Gensler that Mr. Corzine would not run 

in the race and would not use the number he had been provided. Mr. Corzine’s secretary gave 

Mr. Corzine’s number to Mr. Gensler, who then used Mr. Corzine’s bib number in the race. 

Mr. Corzine and approximately 15–20 students for dinner.30 Chairman Gensler and 

Mr. Corzine did not discuss any issues relating to MFGI while Chairman Gensler 

was at Princeton. 

In December 2010, Mr. Corzine and Ms. Ferber met with Chairman Gensler and 

other CFTC staff. Chairman Gensler does not recall the subject of the meeting or 

the matters discussed. 

In June 2011, Chairman Gensler was the keynote speaker at lunch at a conference sponsored by Sandler O’Neill and Partners, an investment banking and 

broker/dealer firm.31 Mr. Corzine was seated at the same table as Chairman 

Gensler during the lunch. The invitation did not come from Mr. Corzine, and Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine did not discuss any issues relating to MFGI while 

Chairman Gensler was at the conference. 

In September 2011, Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine were both wedding guests 

of mutual acquaintances. Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine did not discuss any 

issues relating to MFGI while attending the wedding. 

Chairman Gensler has been on two conference calls with Mr. Corzine during his 

term as Chairman of the CFTC. The first, on July 20, 2011, was a conference call 

to discuss topics relating to a rulemaking regarding CFTC Rules 1.25 and 30.7.32

Second, Chairman Gensler participated in a series of conference calls with other 

regulatory authorities and MFGI during the days leading up to the filing of the 

MFGI bankruptcy proceedings. Chairman Gensler is aware that Mr. Corzine was on 

the line for at least part of one of these calls, regarding the European bond portfolio.33 Since becoming Chairman of the CFTC, Chairman Gensler has not had any 

private telephone conversations with Mr. Corzine.34

Summary

Chairman Gensler worked with Mr. Corzine during the last 6 years of Chairman 

Gensler’s tenure at GS. During two of those years (1993–1994), Chairman Gensler 

reported directly to co-heads Messrs. Corzine and Winkelman; during the other 4 

years, Mr. Corzine was his second-level supervisor. Their relationship during this 

period was solely professional. Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine did not socialize 

or spend time together apart from their mutual professional activities.35

Since the time they worked together at GS over 14 years ago, Chairman Gensler’s 

contacts with Mr. Corzine have been infrequent. Generally, they have met when 

they both were present at a function organized by others. Similarly, Chairman 

Gensler has not socialized with Mr. Corzine after his departure from GS, nor have 

their families socialized with each other. Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine do not 

correspond with each other; Chairman Gensler does not recall any e-mails or other 

electronic communications between himself and Mr. Corzine for at least as far back 

as 10 years. Chairman Gensler does not carry Mr. Corzine’s personal phone number 

in his cell phone directory. 

Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine have never attended any of each other’s major 

non-professional life-events during the entire time they have known each other. Mr. 

Corzine did not attend Chairman Gensler’s wedding (which occurred while Chairman Gensler was at GS), the bat-mitzvahs of Chairman Gensler’s daughters, or the 

funeral of Chairman Gensler’s wife. Similarly, Chairman Gensler did not attend 

Governor Corzine’s inaugural in 2005 or his wedding in 2010. 

73

36The facts in this section are based primarily upon an interview with Chairman Gensler conducted on November 4, 2011. 37 Chairman Gensler did not contact that individual and does not recall his or her name. 

Chairman Gensler did not ask Mr. Corzine for support of his nomination as CFTC 

Chairman. He has never contributed directly to any of Mr. Corzine’s electoral campaigns. He has raised money for several national Democratic figures, but has never 

solicited a campaign contribution for Mr. Corzine. Nor does he recall ever soliciting 

a campaign contribution from Mr. Corzine. 

C. Relationship Between Chairman Gensler and Other Former GS Officials Working 

for or on Behalf of MFGI 36

Certain other current MFGI employees and officials previously worked at GS at 

the same time as Chairman Gensler. Chairman Gensler’s relationship with these individuals is as follows:

Brad Abelow

Mr. Abelow became a partner at GS at around the time that Chairman Gensler 

was leaving GS. At some point, Mr. Abelow became head of OTF in Asia, the position Chairman Gensler had previously occupied. Chairman Gensler recalls that 

when he was in OTF he and Mr. Abelow had a ‘‘weekly to bi-weekly working relationship.’’

After leaving GS, Chairman Gensler did not see Mr. Abelow until August or September 2008, at a fundraiser for the Presidential campaign of then-Senator Obama. 

As previously noted, Governor Corzine also attended this event. At the time, Mr. 

Abelow was Governor Corzine’s Chief of Staff. Chairman Gensler recalls speaking 

to Mr. Abelow for approximately 5 to 10 minutes at this event. 

Chairman Gensler believes it is possible that he may have spoken to Mr. Abelow 

on one or more occasions in his capacity as Governor Corzine’s Chief of Staff to facilitate the discussions with Governor Corzine previously noted during the Presidential primary season prior to the 2008 election. After that, Chairman Gensler did 

not speak with Mr. Abelow again until one of the multi-party conference calls between regulators and MFGI during the weekend prior to the bankruptcy filing of 

MFGI. 

Chairman Gensler and Mr. Abelow did not have a social relationship apart from 

their professional relationship at GS.

Christopher Flowers

Chairman Gensler began working with Mr. Flowers in the M&A department at 

GS upon his arrival at GS in 1979. They worked together in M&A for approximately 

12 years—until Chairman Gensler was transferred from M&A to FI. While Chairman Gensler was in the M&A department, he and Mr. Flowers frequently discussed 

M&A issues and strategies, but Chairman Gensler and Mr. Flowers specialized in 

different industries and, to the best of his recollection, did not work together on any 

specific deals. 

After Chairman Gensler left GS, Mr. Flowers visited him once at the Treasury 

Department. Chairman Gensler recalls that as part of this visit they may have had 

lunch together. 

Chairman Gensler does not recall seeing Mr. Flowers in person since that meeting 

at the Treasury Department. Mr. Flowers called Chairman Gensler twice at the 

CFTC. With respect to the first call, Chairman Gensler recalls that Mr. Flowers expressed condolences that his wife had passed away, and he provided Chairman 

Gensler with the name of an individual who was knowledgeable about financial 

market regulation.37 Mr. Flowers did not ask for any action by Chairman Gensler 

or the CFTC. 

In connection with the MFGI matter, Mr. Flowers called Chairman Gensler on October 31, 2011, before Chairman Gensler arrived at the office. Chairman Gensler returned Mr. Flowers’ call after he arrived at the office. Several other CFTC employees were present in Chairman Gensler’s office for the call and several individuals 

were present with Mr. Flowers, including Mr. Goldfield, Henri Steenkamp (Chief Financial Officer) and another MFGI official. The MFGI officials on the call provided 

the call participants with information regarding MFGI’s financial status. 

Chairman Gensler and Mr. Flowers did not have a social relationship apart from 

their professional relationship at GS.

Laurie Ferber

At the time that Chairman Gensler was in FI at GS, Ms. Ferber was a senior 

compliance officer/attorney at the firm. Chairman Gensler believes that he may 

74

have spoken with Ms. Ferber on one or more compliance matters when he was in 

FI, but he does not recall anything specific. 

After leaving GS, Chairman Gensler did not have any contact with Ms. Ferber 

until he met with the Board of Directors of the Futures Industry Association (FIA) 

in September 2010. At the time, Ms. Ferber represented MFGI on the FIA Board 

of Directors. Ms. Ferber also attended the meeting between Mr. Corzine and CFTC 

officials, including Chairman Gensler, in December 2010. Ms. Ferber also was on 

the July 20, 2011, conference call between MFGI officials (including Mr. Corzine) 

and CFTC officials, including Chairman Gensler, concerning topics relating to a 

CFTC rulemaking regarding Rules 1.25 and 30.7. Chairman Gensler does not believe that he met or spoke with Ms. Ferber after that, until she participated in one 

or more multi-party conference calls between MFGI and regulators prior to the 

bankruptcy filing. 

Chairman Gensler and Ms. Ferber did not have a social relationship apart from 

their professional relationship at GS.

Jacob Goldfield

Chairman Gensler first met Mr. Goldfield in late 1991 or early 1992, after Chairman Gensler began working in FI. Mr. Goldfield also worked in FI, trading options 

on the government bond desk. 

At the time that Chairman Gensler was co-head of fixed income trading in Tokyo, 

he also had co-supervisory responsibility for the trading of Yen currency swaps conducted in Asia. At the same time, Mr. Goldfield, who was located in New York, had 

supervisory responsibility for the worldwide GS swap book. Accordingly, Chairman 

Gensler and Mr. Goldfield had overlapping responsibilities with respect to the GS 

Yen swap book. Chairman Gensler recalls that he and Mr. Goldfield also later may 

have served together on the Risk Committee. 

Mr. Goldfield visited Chairman Gensler on one occasion at the CFTC. During the 

consideration of the Dodd-Frank legislation, Mr. Goldfield met with Chairman 

Gensler and at least one other member of the Chairman’s staff. Mr. Goldfield told 

the Chairman that he was doing good work and if he ever needed anything, to give 

him a call. Chairman Gensler does not recall any other meetings with Mr. Goldfield 

since Chairman Gensler left GS. 

On October 30, 2011, Mr. Goldfield e-mailed Chairman Gensler to inform him that 

he was at MF Global ‘‘in case there are questions.’’ Mr. Goldfield also informed Mr. 

Gensler that he had ‘‘no financial interest in the company and [was] not looking at 

it for investment.’’ Mr. Gensler asked Mr. Goldfield whether there were ‘‘any observations you wish to pass along?’’ Mr. Goldfield replied, ‘‘Not as of now, I want only 

to send along novel insights that are useful.’’ Chairman Gensler responded, ‘‘Novel 

and useful. Now those are limiting conditions, though I would say that most everything you have shared over our long knowing each other has been useful.’’ Mr. Goldfield then stated, ‘‘Also want to make sure that I am right before I comment.’’ Chairman Gensler does not recall any further comments or information from Mr. Goldfield. 

Mr. Goldfield was present at MFGI during one of the conference calls between 

MFGI and regulators on October 30, 2011. To the best of his recollection, Mr. Goldfield did not speak on the call. A participant from another regulatory agency who 

was present at MFGI headquarters in New York and who was on the call relayed 

to Chairman Gensler during the call that Mr. Goldfield walked by and requested 

that he say ‘‘hello to Gensler.’’

Mr. Goldfield also was present at MFGI during a conference call between MFGI 

and regulators on the morning of October 31, 2011. 

Chairman Gensler and Mr. Goldfield did not have a social relationship apart from 

their professional relationship at GS. 

III. Legal Standard 

The standard for determining whether an employee may participate in a matter 

affecting the employee’s financial interests, or involving persons with whom the employee has or has had a professional, business, economic, or personal relationship, 

is set forth in 5 CFR § 2635.502. 

Specifically, § 2635.502(a) provides:

(a) Consideration of appearances by the employee. Where an employee knows 

that a particular matter involving specific parties is likely to have a direct and 

predictable effect on the financial interest of a member of his household, or 

knows that a person with whom he has a covered relationship is or represents 

a party to such matter, and where the employee determines that the circumstances would cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant 

facts to question his impartiality in the matter, the employee should not particiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
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38Section 2635.502(b) provides in full that an employee has a ‘‘covered relationship’’ with:

(i) A person, other than a prospective employer described in § 2635.603(c), with whom the

employee has or seeks a business, contractual or other financial relationship that involves

other than a routine consumer transaction; 

(ii) A person who is a member of the employee’s household, or who is a relative with

whom the employee has a close personal relationship; 

(iii) A person for whom the employee’s spouse, parent or dependent child is, to the employee’s knowledge, serving or seeking to serve as an officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor or employee; 

(iv) Any person for whom the employee has, within the last year, served as officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor or employee; or 

(v) An organization, other than a political party described in 26 U.S.C. 527(e), in which

the employee is an active participant. Participation is active if, for example, it involves service as an official of the organization or in a capacity similar to that of a committee or subcommittee chairperson or spokesperson, or participation in directing the activities of the organization. In other cases, significant time devoted to promoting specific programs of the

organization, including coordination of fundraising efforts, is an indication of active participation. Payment of dues or the donation or solicitation of financial support does not, in

itself, constitute active participation. 

39 Under these circumstances—where no financial interest is affected and no covered relationship exists—the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) does not consider the failure to follow these 

procedures to be ‘‘an ethical lapse’’:

OGE has consistently maintained that, although employees are encouraged to use the

process provided by section 2635.502(a)(2), ‘[t]he election not to use that process cannot appropriately be considered to be an ethical lapse.’ OGE Informal Advisory Letter, 94 x 10(2);

see also OGE 97 x 8 (‘obligation’ to follow process where covered relationships involved, but

employees ‘encouraged’ to use process in other circumstances); OGE 95 x 5 (‘not required

by 5 CFR 2635.502 to use the process described in that section’ where there is no covered

relationship with person who is a party or represents a party); OGE 94 x 10(1) (employee

may ‘elect’ to use process in section 2635.502(a)(2), but ‘election not to use that process

should not be characterized, however, as an ‘ethical lapse’).

OGE 01 x 8, Impartiality and Romantic Relationships, August 23, 2001. OGE has further indicated that in such circumstances, ‘‘even if it were now determined, in hindsight, that a reasonable person with knowledge of the circumstances would question the [person’s] impartiality, we 

cannot say that she violated the impartiality rule.’’ Id. 40OGE, Memorandum dated April 26, 1999, from Stephen D. Potts, Director, to Designated 

Agency Ethics Officials, Regarding Recusal Obligations and Screening Arrangements, 99 x 8. 

Under section 2635.502(a)(2), an employee may determine not to participate in a matter due 

to appearance concerns even if that employee’s withdrawal is not required. Id.

pate in the matter unless he has informed the agency designee of the appearance problem and received authorization from the agency designee in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.

(1) In considering whether a relationship would cause a reasonable person to question his impartiality, an employee may seek the assistance of his 

supervisor, an agency ethics official or the agency designee. 

(2) An employee who is concerned that circumstances other than those 

specifically described in this section would raise a question regarding his 

impartiality should use the process described in this section to determine 

whether he should or should not participate in a particular matter.

With respect to a ‘‘covered relationship,’’ § 2635.502(b)(iv) provides that an employee has a ‘‘covered relationship’’ with any person ‘‘for whom the employee has, 

within the last year, served as officer, director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor or employee.’’ (Emphasis added.) 38

When the circumstances identified in § 2635.502(a) are not present—i.e., there is 

no direct and predictable effect on the financial interest of a member of his household, and there is no covered relationship—§ 2635.502(a)(2) provides that the procedures specified in § 2635.502 should still be followed if a question concerning the 

employee’s impartiality may nevertheless remain.39

‘‘For example,’’ the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) explains, ‘‘if an employee 

believes that a personal friendship, or a professional, social, political or other association not specifically treated as a covered relationship, may raise an appearance 

question, then the employee should use the section 2635.502 process to resolve the 

question.’’ 40

In this event, under the § 2635.502 process, the threshold determination is to 

‘‘consider whether the employee’s impartiality would reasonably be questioned if the 

employee were to participate in a particular matter involving specific parties where 

persons, with certain personal or business relationships with the employee are inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
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41 Id; 5 CFR § 2635.502(c). 42 5 CFR § 2635.502(d). This section provides the following factors that may be considered in 

making this determination:

(1) The nature of the relationship involved; 

(2) The effect that resolution of the matter would have upon the financial interests of the

person involved in the relationship; 

(3) The nature and importance of the employee’s role in the matter, including the extent

to which the employee is called upon to exercise discretion in the matter; 

(4) The sensitivity of the matter; 

(5) The difficulty of reassigning the matter to another employee; and 

(6) Adjustments that may be made in the employee’s duties that would reduce or eliminate the likelihood that a reasonable person would question the employee’s impartiality. 

43 5 CFR § 2635.502(b)(iv). As previously noted, OGE has stated that if no financial interest 

is involved and a covered relationship is not present, a determination not to follow the procedures in § 2635.502—and hence to participate in the matter—cannot be considered to be an ‘‘ethical lapse.’’ Nonetheless, in accordance with OGE recommendations, Chairman Gensler has determined to follow the § 2635.502 process. 44This conclusion is consistent with the OGE position that in circumstances in which no financial interest is involved and a covered relationship is not present, a determination not to 

follow the procedures in § 2635.502 cannot be considered to be an ‘‘ethical lapse.’’

volved.’’ 41 If it is determined that the employee’s participation would ‘‘raise a question in the mind of a reasonable person about his impartiality,’’ the agency’s designated ethics official may nonetheless authorize the employee to participate in the 

matter ‘‘based on a determination, made in light of all relevant circumstances, that 

the interest of the Government in the employee’s participation outweighs the concern that a reasonable person may question the integrity of the agency’s programs 

and operations.’’ 42

IV. Analysis 

Is there a financial interest or ‘‘covered relationship’’?

Neither Chairman Gensler nor any member of his household has a financial interest in MFGI, or in any commodity or security interest held by MFGI. More broadly, 

neither Chairman Gensler nor any member of his household has any other financial 

interest that would be predictably or directly affected by a CFTC investigation involving MFGI or associated CFTC actions, including participation in the MFGI 

bankruptcy proceedings, and the recovery of customer funds. Accordingly, the resolution of the MFGI matter would not have a ‘‘direct and predictable’’ effect upon the 

financial interests of Chairman Gensler or any member of his household. Chairman 

Gensler does not have a ‘‘covered relationship’’ with MFGI or any of its employees, 

officers, directors, or shareholders. Chairman Gensler’s partnership with GS, Mr. 

Corzine, and other partners at GS terminated in 1997, more than 14 years ago. This 

is far beyond the 1 year ‘‘cooling off period’’ provided in § 2635.502(b)(iv) for a person 

who was a general partner with another person to be considered to have a ‘‘covered 

relationship’’ with such other person.43

Is there a reasonable basis to question the employee ’s impartiality?

The sole fact that Chairman Gensler at one time was a business partner with Mr. 

Corzine, without more, does not constitute a reasonable basis, within the meaning 

of § 2635.502, to question Chairman Gensler’s impartiality with respect to matters 

relating to MFGI. 

Once the 1 year cooling-off period has passed, the fact that an employee previously was within a covered relationship with respect to another individual, without more, cannot by itself be the basis to reasonably question an employee’s impartiality. To hold otherwise would, in effect, transform the 1 year cooling off period 

into a lifetime prohibition, for in every such instance the covered relationship within 

the 1 year period could be cited as the basis for disqualification beyond the 1 year 

period.44

The ethics regulations do not require such a result. To the contrary, the procedures in § 2635.502 clearly contemplate that employees who at one time may have 

had a covered relationship with respect to another person or entity, but that no 

longer have such a covered relationship, may participate in a matter involving the 

person or entity that previously was within the covered relationship. 

To constitute a reasonable basis to question Chairman Gensler’s impartiality, 

therefore, there must be some additional indicia of a relationship between Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine, GS, or its partners, beyond the factors that would 

establish a covered relationship—i.e., facts in addition to Chairman Gensler’s partnership at GS some 14 years ago. However, the facts regarding Chairman Gensler’s 

relationship with Mr. Corzine and others at GS who are now associated with 

77

45 Chairman Gensler’s contribution to the New Jersey State Democratic Party at the time Mr. 

Corzine was campaigning for Governor of New Jersey is not sufficient to warrant a different 

conclusion. During this time period, Chairman Gensler was an active fundraiser for and contributor to Democratic candidates for elected office in many states. Chairman Gensler’s contribution 

to the New Jersey State Democratic Party therefore is not sufficient to establish a special relationship between Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine that would warrant a different conclusion. 46This review solely addresses matters before the Commission prior to and at the time of the 

Chairman’s election not to participate and is based on the facts contained herein. 

MFGI—both during the time that Chairman Gensler worked at GS and afterwards—are insufficient to provide such indicia. 

The record set forth above indicates that at all times, both during their partnership and afterwards, the relationship between Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine 

was exclusively a professional relationship. Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine did 

not socialize or meet apart from their professional obligations and interests. The 

record indicates that since Chairman Gensler and Mr. Corzine left GS in the late 

1990s, they have met only infrequently and solely on matters of mutual professional 

interest. Indeed, most of their encounters have occurred when they both have been 

invited to attend an event by others. Although both Chairman Gensler and Mr. 

Corzine have been involved in political fundraising and electoral campaigning, neither has done so on the other’s behalf or at the other’s request. They have not socialized, and they have not been involved in each other’s personal lives. Their infrequent professional contacts, over a 14 year period following their departure from 

their partnership at GS, do not constitute a covered relationship or a similar type 

of relationship that would form a reasonable basis under section 2635.502 to question Chairman Gensler’s impartiality with respect to MFGI.45

Following his departure from GS, Chairman Gensler’s contacts with Mr. Abelow, 

Mr. Flowers, Ms. Ferber, and Mr. Goldfield have been more attenuated than his 

contacts with Mr. Corzine. Based on the highly infrequent nature of Chairman 

Gensler’s contacts with these individuals since he left the GS partnership in 1997, 

Chairman Gensler’s relationships with these individuals, both individually and collectively, are insufficient to constitute a reasonable basis under section 2635.502 to 

question Chairman Gensler’s impartiality with respect to MFGI. 

In sum, this review determines, based on the facts and circumstances stated herein, that there is not a reasonable basis under 5 CFR § 2635.502 to question Chairman Gensler’s impartiality with respect to the Commission’s investigation of MFGI 

and involvement in related matters, such as the MFGI bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, 5 CFR § 2635.502 does not preclude Chairman Gensler’s participation in 

these matters, and Chairman Gensler is not required to withdraw from participation. From a legal and ethical perspective, Chairman Gensler’s participation in Commission matters involving MFGI would not be improper.46

ATTACHMENT 3

Rule 151.5(a), adopted under CEA section 4a(c)(2):

(1) Any person that complies with the requirements of this section may exceed the position limits set forth in § 151.4 to the extent that a transaction or 

position in a Referenced Contract:

(i) Represents a substitute for transactions made or to be made or positions taken or to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel; 

(ii) Is economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct 

and management of a commercial enterprise; and 

(iii) Arises from the potential change in the value of one or several—

(A) Assets that a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or 

merchandises or anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, or merchandising; 

(B) Liabilities that a person owns or anticipates incurring; or 

(C) Services that a person provides, purchases, or anticipates providing or purchasing; or

(iv) Reduces risks attendant to a position resulting from a swap that—

(A) Was executed opposite a counterparty for which the transaction 

would qualify as a bona fide hedging transaction pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(i) through (iii) of this section; or 

(B) Meets the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (iii) of this 

section.

78

(v) Notwithstanding the foregoing, no transactions or positions shall be 

classified as bona fide hedging for purposes of § 151.4 unless such transactions or positions are established and liquidated in an orderly manner in 

accordance with sound commercial practices and the provisions of paragraph (a)(2) of this section regarding enumerated hedging transactions and 

positions or paragraphs (a)(3) or (4) of this section regarding pass-through 

swaps of this section have been satisfied.

(2) ENUMERATED HEDGING TRANSACTIONS AND POSITIONS. Bona fide hedging 

transactions and positions for the purposes of this paragraph mean any of the 

following specific transactions and positions:

(i) Sales of Referenced Contracts that do not exceed in quantity:

(A) Ownership or fixed-price purchase of the contract’s underlying 

cash commodity by the same person; and 

(B) Unsold anticipated production of the same commodity, which may 

not exceed 1 year of production for an agricultural commodity, by the 

same person provided that no such position is maintained in any physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the last 5 days of trading of 

the Core Referenced Futures Contract in an agricultural or metal commodity or during the spot month for other physical-delivery contracts.

(ii) Purchases of Referenced Contracts that do not exceed in quantity:

(A) The fixed-price sale of the contract’s underlying cash commodity 

by the same person; 

(B) The quantity equivalent of fixed-price sales of the cash products 

and by-products of such commodity by the same person; and 

(C) Unfilled anticipated requirements of the same cash commodity, 

which may not exceed 1 year for agricultural Referenced Contracts, for 

processing, manufacturing, or use by the same person, provided that no 

such position is maintained in any physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the last 5 days of trading of the Core Referenced Futures 

Contract in an agricultural or metal commodity or during the spot 

month for other physical-delivery contracts.

(iii) Offsetting sales and purchases in Referenced Contracts that do not 

exceed in quantity that amount of the same cash commodity that has been 

bought and sold by the same person at unfixed prices basis different delivery months, provided that no such position is maintained in any physicaldelivery Referenced Contract during the last 5 days of trading of the Core 

Referenced Futures Contract in an agricultural or metal commodity or during the spot month for other physical-delivery contracts. 

(iv) Purchases or sales by an agent who does not own or has not contracted to sell or purchase the offsetting cash commodity at a fixed price, 

provided that the agent is responsible for the merchandising of the cash positions that is being offset in Referenced Contracts and the agent has a contractual arrangement with the person who owns the commodity or holds the 

cash market commitment being offset. 

(v) ANTICIPATED MERCHANDISING HEDGES. Offsetting sales and purchases 

in Referenced Contracts that do not exceed in quantity the amount of the 

same cash commodity that is anticipated to be merchandised, provided that:

(A) The quantity of offsetting sales and purchases is not larger than 

the current or anticipated unfilled storage capacity owned or leased by 

the same person during the period of anticipated merchandising activity, which may not exceed 1 year;

(B) The offsetting sales and purchases in Referenced Contracts are 

in different contract months, which settle in not more than 1 year; and 

(C) No such position is maintained in any physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the last 5 days of trading of the Core Referenced Futures Contract in an agricultural or metal commodity or 

during the spot month for other physical-delivery contracts.

(vi) ANTICIPATED ROYALTY HEDGES. Sales or purchases in Referenced Contracts offset by the anticipated change in value of royalty rights that are 

owned by the same person provided that:

(A) The royalty rights arise out of the production, manufacturing, 

processing, use, or transportation of the commodity underlying the RefVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:10 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\112-29\74137.TXT BRIAN
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erenced Contract, which may not exceed 1 year for agricultural Referenced Contracts; and 

(B) No such position is maintained in any physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the last 5 days of trading of the Core Referenced Futures Contract in an agricultural or metal commodity or 

during the spot month for other physical-delivery contracts.

(vii) SERVICE HEDGES. Sales or purchases in Referenced Contracts offset 

by the anticipated change in value of receipts or payments due or expected 

to be due under an executed contract for services held by the same person 

provided that:

(A) The contract for services arises out of the production, manufacturing, processing, use, or transportation of the commodity underlying 

the Referenced Contract, which may not exceed 1 year for agricultural 

Referenced Contracts; 

(B) The fluctuations in the value of the position in Referenced Contracts are substantially related to the fluctuations in value of receipts 

or payments due or expected to be due under a contract for services; 

and 

(C) No such position is maintained in any physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the last 5 days of trading of the Core Referenced Futures Contract in an agricultural or metal commodity or 

during the spot month for other physical-delivery contracts.

(viii) CROSS-COMMODITY HEDGES. Sales or purchases in Referenced Contracts described in paragraphs (a)(2)(i) through (vii) of this section may also 

be offset other than by the same quantity of the same cash commodity, provided that:

(A) The fluctuations in value of the position in Referenced Contracts 

are substantially related to the fluctuations in value of the actual or 

anticipated cash position; and 

(B) No such position is maintained in any physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the last 5 days of trading of the Core Referenced Futures Contract in an agricultural or metal commodity or 

during the spot month for other physical-delivery contracts.

(3) PASS-THROUGH SWAPS. Bona fide hedging transactions and positions for 

the purposes of this paragraph include the purchase or sales of Referenced Contracts that reduce the risks attendant to a position resulting from a swap that 

was executed opposite a counterparty for whom the swap transaction would 

qualify as a bona fide hedging transaction pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this 

section (‘‘pass-through swaps’’), provided that no such position is maintained in 

any physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the last 5 days of trading of 

the Core Referenced Futures Contract in an agricultural or metal commodity or 

during the spot month for other physical-delivery contracts unless such passthrough swap position continues to offset the cash market commodity price risk 

of the bona fide hedging counterparty. 

(4) PASS-THROUGH SWAP OFFSETS. For swaps executed opposite a counterparty 

for whom the swap transaction would qualify as a bona fide hedging transaction 

pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section (pass-through swaps), such passthrough swaps shall also be classified as a bona fide hedging transaction for the 

counterparty for whom the swap would not otherwise qualify as a bona fide

hedging transaction pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section (‘‘non-hedging 

counterparty’’), provided that the non-hedging counterparty purchases or sells 

Referenced Contracts that reduce the risks attendant to such pass-through 

swaps. Provided further, that the pass-through swap shall constitute a bona fide

hedging transaction only to the extent the non-hedging counterparty purchases 

or sells Referenced Contracts that reduce the risks attendant to the passthrough swap. 

(5) Any person engaging in other risk-reducing practices commonly used in 

the market which they believe may not be specifically enumerated in 

§ 151.5(a)(2) may request relief from Commission staff under § 140.99 of this 

chapter or the Commission under section 4a(a)(7) of the Act concerning the applicability of the bona fide hedging transaction exemption.

Rule 1.3(z), revised under CEA section 4a(c) to apply only to excluded commodities 

as defined in CEA section 1a(19):

80

(1) GENERAL DEFINITION. Bona fide hedging transactions and positions shall 

mean any agreement, contract or transaction in an excluded commodity on a 

designated contract market or swap execution facility that is a trading facility, 

where such transactions or positions normally represent a substitute for transactions to be made or positions to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel, and where they are economically appropriate to the reduction 

of risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise, and where 

they arise from:

(i) The potential change in the value of assets which a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises or anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, or merchandising, 

(ii) The potential change in the value of liabilities which a person owns 

or anticipates incurring, or 

(iii) The potential change in the value of services which a person provides, purchases, or anticipates providing or purchasing. 

(iv) Notwithstanding the foregoing, no transactions or positions shall be 

classified as bona fide hedging unless their purpose is to offset price risks 

incidental to commercial cash or spot operations and such positions are established and liquidated in an orderly manner in accordance with sound 

commercial practices and, for transactions or positions on contract markets 

subject to trading and position limits in effect pursuant to section 4a of the 

Act, unless the provisions of paragraphs (z)(2) and (3) of this section have 

been satisfied.

(2) ENUMERATED HEDGING TRANSACTIONS. The definitions of bona fide hedging 

transactions and positions in paragraph (z)(1) of this section includes, but is not 

limited to, the following specific transactions and positions:

(i) Sales of any agreement, contract, or transaction in an excluded commodity on a designated contract market or swap execution facility that is 

a trading facility which do not exceed in quantity:

(A) Ownership or fixed-price purchase of the same cash commodity 

by the same person; and 

(B) Twelve months’ unsold anticipated production of the same commodity by the same person provided that no such position is maintained in any agreement, contract or transaction during the 5 last trading days.

(ii) Purchases of any agreement, contract or transaction in an excluded 

commodity on a designated contract market or swap execution facility that 

is a trading facility which do not exceed in quantity:

(A) The fixed-price sale of the same cash commodity by the same person; 

(B) The quantity equivalent of fixed-price sales of the cash products 

and by-products of such commodity by the same person; and 

(C) Twelve months’ unfilled anticipated requirements of the same 

cash commodity for processing, manufacturing, or feeding by the same 

person, provided that such transactions and positions in the 5 last trading days of any agreement, contract or transaction do not exceed the 

person’s unfilled anticipated requirements of the same cash commodity 

for that month and for the next succeeding month.

(iii) Offsetting sales and purchases in any agreement, contract or transaction in an excluded commodity on a designated contract market or swap 

execution facility that is a trading facility which do not exceed in quantity 

that amount of the same cash commodity which has been bought and sold 

by the same person at unfixed prices basis different delivery months of the 

contract market, provided that no such position is maintained in any agreement, contract or transaction during the 5 last trading days. 

(iv) Purchases or sales by an agent who does not own or has not contracted to sell or purchase the offsetting cash commodity at a fixed price, 

provided that the agent is responsible for the merchandising of the cash position that is being offset, and the agent has a contractual arrangement 

with the person who owns the commodity or has the cash market commitment being offset. 

(v) Sales and purchases described in paragraphs (z)(2)(i) through (iv) of 

this section may also be offset other than by the same quantity of the same 

cash commodity, provided that the fluctuations in value of the position for 

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in any agreement, contract or transaction are substantially related to the 

fluctuations in value of the actual or anticipated cash position, and provided 

that the positions in any agreement, contract or transaction shall not be 

maintained during the 5 last trading days.

(3) NON-ENUMERATED CASES. A designated contract market or swap execution 

facility that is a trading facility may recognize, consistent with the purposes of 

this section, transactions and positions other than those enumerated in paragraph (2) of this section as bona fide hedging. Prior to recognizing such nonenumerated transactions and positions, the designated contract market or swap 

execution facility that is a trading facility shall submit such rules for Commission review under section 5c of the Act and part 40 of this chapter.

Rule 1.3(kkk), adopted under the definition of the term ‘‘major swap participant’’ 

in CEA section 1a(33):

For purposes of Section 1a(33) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 1a(33) and § 1.3(hhh), a 

swap position is held for the purpose of hedging or mitigating commercial risk 

when:

(1) Such position:

(i) Is economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct 

and management of a commercial enterprise (or of a majority-owned affiliate of the enterprise), where the risks arise from:

(A) The potential change in the value of assets that a person 

owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises or reasonably anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, 

or merchandising in the ordinary course of business of the enterprise; 

(B) The potential change in the value of liabilities that a person 

has incurred or reasonably anticipates incurring in the ordinary 

course of business of the enterprise; or 

(C) The potential change in the value of services that a person 

provides, purchases, or reasonably anticipates providing or purchasing in the ordinary course of business of the enterprise; 

(D) The potential change in the value of assets, services, inputs, 

products, or commodities that a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, merchandises, leases, or sells, or reasonably anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, merchandising, leasing, or selling in the ordinary course of business of the 

enterprise; 

(E) Any potential change in value related to any of the foregoing 

arising from interest, currency, or foreign exchange rate movements associated with such assets, liabilities, services, inputs, 

products, or commodities; or 

(F) Any fluctuation in interest, currency, or foreign exchange rate 

exposures arising from a person’s current or anticipated assets or 

liabilities; or

(ii) Qualifies as bona fide hedging for purposes of an exemption from 

position limits under the Act; or 

(iii) Qualifies for hedging treatment under (A) Financial Accounting 

Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification Topic 815, Derivatives and Hedging (formerly known as Statement No. 133) or (B) Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement 53, Accounting and 

Financial Reporting for Derivative Instruments; and

(2) Such position is:

(i) Not held for a purpose that is in the nature of speculation, investing or trading; and 

(ii) Not held to hedge or mitigate the risk of another swap or security-based swap position, unless that other position itself is held for the 

purpose of hedging or mitigating commercial risk as defined by this 

rule or § 240.3a67–4 of this title.

Proposed rule 39.6(c), adopted under the end-user exception from the clearing requirement in CEA section 2(h)(7):

For purposes of section 2(a)(7)(A)(ii) of the CEA and Sec. 39.6(b)(4), a swap 

shall be deemed to be used to hedge or mitigate commercial risk when:

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(1) Such swap:

(i) Is economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct 

and management of a commercial enterprise, where the risks arise 

from:

(A) The potential change in the value of assets that a person 

owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises or reasonably anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, 

or merchandising in the ordinary course of business of the enterprise; 

(B) The potential change in the value of liabilities that a person 

has incurred or reasonably anticipates incurring in the ordinary 

course of business of the enterprise; or 

(C) The potential change in the value of services that a person 

provides, purchases, or reasonably anticipates providing or purchasing in the ordinary course of business of the enterprise; 

(D) The potential change in the value of assets, services, inputs, 

products, or commodities that a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, merchandises, leases, or sells, or reasonably anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, merchandising, leasing, or selling in the ordinary course of business of the 

enterprise; 

(E) Any potential change in value related to any of the foregoing 

arising from foreign exchange rate movements associated with such 

assets, liabilities, services, inputs, products, or commodities; or 

(F) Any fluctuation in interest, currency, or foreign exchange rate 

exposures arising from a person’s current or anticipated assets or 

liabilities; or

(ii) Qualifies as bona fide hedging for purposes of an exemption from 

position limits under the Act; or 

(iii) Qualifies for hedging treatment under Financial Accounting 

Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification Topic 815, Derivatives and Hedging (formerly known as Statement No. 133); and

(2) Such swap is:

(i) Not used for a purpose that is in the nature of speculation, investing, or trading; or 

(ii) Not used to hedge or mitigate the risk of another swap or securities-based swap, unless that other swap itself is used to hedge or mitigate commercial risk as defined by this rule or the equivalent definitional rule governing security-based swaps promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 

1934.

Interim final rule 1.3(ppp)(6)(iii), adopted under the definition of the term ‘‘swap 

dealer’’ in CEA section 1a(49):

In determining whether a person is a swap dealer, a swap that the person 

enters into shall not be considered, if:

(A) The person enters into the swap for the purpose of offsetting or mitigating the person’s price risks that arise from the potential change in the 

value of one or several (1) assets that the person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises or anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, or merchandising; (2) liabilities that the person owns 

or anticipates incurring; or (3) services that the person provides, purchases, 

or anticipates providing or purchasing; 

(B) The swap represents a substitute for transactions made or to be made 

or positions taken or to be taken by the person at a later time in a physical 

marketing channel; 

(C) The swap is economically appropriate to the reduction of the person’s 

risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise; 

(D) The swap is entered into in accordance with sound commercial practices; and 

(E) The person does not enter into the swap in connection with activity 

structured to evade designation as a swap dealer.

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The Commission addressed these definitions in its recent release adopting the 

rules further defining the terms swap dealer, eligible contract participant and major 

swap participant.

• Regarding interim final rule 1.3(ppp)(6)(iii), the Commission stated: ‘‘[A]lthough 

the CFTC is not incorporating the bona fide hedging provisions of the CFTC’s 

position limits rule here, the exclusion from the swap dealer analysis draws 

upon language in the CFTC’s definition of bona fide hedging. For example, the 

exclusion expressly includes swaps hedging price risks arising from the potential change in value of existing or anticipated assets, liabilities, or services, if 

the hedger has an exposure to physical price risk. And, as in the bona fide hedging rule, the exclusion utilizes the word ‘several’ to reflect that there is no requirement that swaps hedge risk on a one-to-one transactional basis in order 

to be excluded, but rather they may hedge on a portfolio basis. For these reasons, swaps that qualify as enumerated hedging transactions and positions are 

examples of the types of physical commodity swaps that are excluded from the 

swap dealer analysis if the rule’s requirements are met.’’

• The Commission explained that ‘‘The definition of bona fide hedging in [rule] 

§ 1.3(z), which applies for excluded commodities, is not relevant here, because 

it does not contain the requirement that the swap represents a substitute for 

a transaction made or to be made or a position taken or to be taken in a physical marketing channel, as required by [rule] § 1.3(ggg)(6)(iii)(B). We believe 

that this requirement is an important aspect of how principles from the bona 

fide hedging definition are useful in identifying swaps that are entered into for 

the purpose of hedging as opposed to other purposes.’’

The Commission addressed how the interim final rule compares to the definition 

of hedging or mitigating commercial risk in rule 1.3(kkk), explaining that ‘‘the usefulness of an exclusion of all swaps that hedge or mitigate commercial risk for certain aspects of the major swap participant definition is not a reason to use the same 

exclusion in the swap dealer definition, since the swap dealer definition serves a different function. The definition of the term ‘major swap participant,’ which applies 

only to persons who are not swap dealers, is premised on the prior identification, 

by the swap dealer definition, of persons who accommodate demand for swaps, make 

a market in swaps, or otherwise engage in swap dealing activity. The major swap 

participant definition performs the subsequent function of identifying persons that 

are not swap dealers, but hold swap positions that create an especially high level 

of risk that could significantly impact the U.S. financial system. Only for this subsequent function is it appropriate to apply the broader exclusion of swaps held for the 

purpose of hedging or mitigating commercial risk.’’

Æ