alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 60-30.23 Summary judgment. ( a ) *For the Government.* At any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action, or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the respondent, the Government may move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment upon all claims or any part.
( b ) *For defendant.* The defendant may, at any time after commencement of the action, move with or without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in its favor as to all claims or any part.
( c ) *Other parties.* Any other party to a formal proceeding under this part may support or oppose motions for summary judgment made by the Government or respondent, in accordance with this section, but may not move for a summary judgment in his own behalf.
( d ) *Statement of uncontested facts.* All motions for summary judgment shall be accompanied by a “Statement of Uncontested Facts” in which the moving party sets forth all alleged uncontested material facts which shall provide the basis for its motion. At least 5 days prior to the time fixed for hearing on the motion, any party contending that any material fact regarding the matter covered by the motion is in dispute, shall file a “Statement of Disputed Facts.” Failure to file a “Statement of Disputed Facts” shall be deemed as an admission to the “Statement of Uncontested Facts.”
( e ) *Motion and proceedings.* The motion shall be served upon all parties at least 15 days before the time fixed for the hearing on the motion. The adverse party or parties may serve opposing affidavits prior to the day of hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the complaint and answer, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment rendered for or against the Government or the respondent shall constitute the findings and recommendations on the issues involved. Hearings on motions made under this section shall be scheduled by the Administrative Law Judge.
( f ) *Case not fully adjudicated on motion.* If on motion under this section judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a final hearing is necessary, the Administrative Law Judge at the hearing of the motion, by examining the notice and answer and the evidence before him and by interrogating counsel, shall, if practicable, ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. He shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings as are just. At the hearing on the merits, the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the final hearing shall be conducted accordingly.
[43 FR 49259, Oct. 20, 1978; 43 FR 51401, Nov. 3, 1978]
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 644 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 644

To establish requirements for the cancellation of automobile insurance 
                               policies.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 9, 1999

 Mrs. Mink of Hawaii introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                      to the Committee on Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To establish requirements for the cancellation of automobile insurance 
                               policies.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SALES OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES.

    No State shall authorize the sale of automobile insurance policies 
unless such policies are subject to cancellation in accordance with 
section 2.

SEC. 2. CANCELLATION OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES.

    A paid-up policy of automobile insurance may be canceled only if--
            (1) a written notice of cancellation is mailed or delivered 
        to the last known mailing address of the named insured as shown 
        in the records of the insurer at least 180 days before the 
        effective date of the cancellation;
            (2) the insurer shows that the named insured had the 
        insured's driver's license suspended or revoked; or
            (3) the insurer shows that the name insured has been 
        convicted of, or forfeited bail for, any action arising out of 
        or in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle that is 
        grounds for suspension or revocation of a driver's license.

SEC. 3. RENEWAL OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES.

    An insurer shall mail or deliver to an insured a written notice of 
non-renewal of an automobile insurance policy at the last known mailing 
address of the named insured as shown in the records of the insurer at 
least 180 days before the expiration of the policy.

SEC. 4. ENFORCEMENT.

    (a) Insurer.--An insurer which violates section 1, 2, or 3 shall 
with respect to the insured involved in such violation--
            (1) accept an application or written request for automobile 
        insurance coverage at a rate and on the same terms and 
        conditions as are available to its insureds under the insurer's 
        automobile insurance coverage;
            (2) reinstate the automobile insurance coverage for such 
        insured to the end of the applicable policy period.
    (b) Others.--Any person who violates section 1, 2, or 3 shall be 
subject to--
            (1) a cease and desist order issued in accordance with 
        section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45); 
        or
            (2) a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000.
                                 <all>
```
No. 10-11152.

#### Timmons *v.*Lee, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, et al.

C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-rari denied.
#### § 302-9.4 What are the purposes of the allowance for transportation of a POV?

To reduce the Government's overall relocation costs by allowing transportation of a POV to your official station within CONUS when it is advantageous and cost effective to the Government, and to improve our overall effectiveness if you are transferred or otherwise reassigned to a post of duty at which it is in the interest of the Government for you to have use of a POV for personal transportation. For example, your agency may determine that it is both advantageous and cost effective to the Government to allow for transportation of an alternative fuel POV which would be impractical to drive a long distance to the new official station due to vehicle range capability and fueling availability limitations, but has practical use once at the new official station.

[FTR Amdt. 98, 66 FR 58196, Nov. 20, 2001, as amended by FTR Case 2022-03, 89 FR 20860, Mar. 26, 2024]
EXHIBIT 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Emtec, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending November 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Gregory P. Chandler, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




/s/ Gregory P. ChandlerChief Financial OfficerJanuary 14, 2011
No. 11-7553.

#### Yelloweagle *v.*United States.

C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Exhibit 13.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Celulosa
Arauco y Constitución S.A. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Alejandro Pérez, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Alejandro PérezAlejandro PérezChief Executive OfficerDated: June 28, 2004




A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been
provided to Celulosa Arauco y Constitución S.A. and will be retained by Celulosa Arauco y Constitución S.A. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
15 December 2015

050P00-3

#### State v. Albert Lee Stevenson, Jr.

1. Def’s *Pro Se*Motion for Temporary Stay

1. Denied 12/11/2015

2. Def’s *Pro Se*Petition for *Writ of Certiorari*to Review Order of COA (COAP15-610)

2. Denied 12/11/2015

3. Def’s *Pro Se*Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis*

3. Allowed 12/11/2015
# Comments on: 2020-1429: Kilbourne v. Apple Inc.
#### § 51-4.1 General.

To participate in the AbilityOne Program, a nonprofit agency shall be represented by the central nonprofit agency assigned by the Committee on the basis of the nonprofit agency's articles of incorporation and bylaws.

[56 FR 48980, Sept. 26, 1991, as amended at 71 FR 68494, Nov. 27, 2006]
#### § 302-12.120 Under a home sale program, may we direct the relocation services company to pay an employee more than the fair market value of the employee's residence?

No, under a home sale program, you may not direct the relocation services company to pay an employee more than the fair market value (as determined by the residence appraisal process) of the employee's home.

[FTR Case 2022-05, 89 FR 12256, Feb. 16, 2024]
201PA12-3

#### Margaret Dickson, et al. v. Robert Rucho, et al.

1. Pits’ (NAACP) Notice of Piling of Affidavit of John W. O’Hale

1.-

2. Affidavit of John W. O’Hale

2.—

3. Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal by Taking Judicial Notice of Certain Materials

3. Allowed
Associated . > „ 

TRAVEL GROU P 

lAf-A^ : I r e 1.A • 'A•^\•W.I^iGG^AT: i l-'.ro M 

-^RTAI! ( 

419 Rena Drive, Lafayette, LA 70503 

337.233.5521 / Fax: 337.235.0285 

WATS: 800.280.5521 

March 9, 2010 

The Honorable Ray LaHood 

Secretary 

United States Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

Washington, D.C. 

20590 

Subject: Haneda Combination Services Allocation Proceeding DOT-OST-2010-0018 

Dear Secretary LaHood: 

As a dedicated travel partner of American Airlines, I am writing in support of American's application to 

provide new service from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport and Los Angeles 

International Airport to Tokyo International Airport at Haneda. 

I encourage your selection of American Airlines to provide nonstop service from New York and Los 

Angeles to Haneda in order to provide an essential connection between three of the worlds largest 

financial and commerce centers. 

Recent events, including the successful preservation of Japan Airlines' oneworld Alliance membership, 

have underscored American's strong commitment to the trans-Pacific market. American is likewise 

committed to New York and Los Angeles - both vital focal points of business, trade, entertainment, 

technology and education - providing unsurpassed air service since the mid-1900s 

Both the New York and Los Angeles metro areas will gain significant economic benefits from these 

proposed new flights, as will American's customers and employees. However, we need your help to 

make the JFK & LAX/Haneda connection a reality. 
r 

Therefore, I strongly urge you to say yes to American Airlines and its request for slots to fly from 

Kennedy and Los Angeles to Haneda! 

Sincerely, 

Ben Harrington 

GjBfie>ra\ IManaj 

Associated Trayel^roup 

419 Rena Drjye 

Lafayette, La. 70503 

337 769 4778 Direct 

337 233 5521 Ph. 

337 235 0285 Fax
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23

- 1801

KINGSLEY AZUBUIKE ONONUJU , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. VIRGINIA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; TODD OLIFF , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk

. Roderick Charles Young , District Judge. ( 2:20

- cv - 00205

- RCY

- RJK )

Submitted : June 25 , 2024 Decided: June 27, 2024

Before RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges , and TRAXLER , Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Kingsley Azubuike Ononuju, Appellant Pro Se. Edwin Ford Stephens, CHRISTIAN & BARTON, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1801 Doc: 18 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Kingsley Azubuike Ononuju appeals the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. See Aikens v. Ingram , 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (stating standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s order. Ononuju v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., No. 2 : 20

- cv - 0 0205

- RCY

- RJK (E.D. Va. July 19, 2023). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED USCA4 Appeal: 23-1801 Doc: 18 Filed: 06/27/2024 Pg: 2 of 2
DISMISS; Opinion Filed May 30, 2013. 

# S

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 13

- 00099

- CR

ROBERT CLYDE MCMILLE N , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F12

- 59889

- Y

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Evans Opinion by Justice Lang Robert Clyde McMillen pleaded guilty to felony theft. See T EX

. P EN

. C OD E A NN

. § 31.03(e)( 4 )(D) (West Supp. 2012 ). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court assessed
punishment at ten months’ confinement in a state jail and a $1,500 fine. Appellant waived his

right to appeal in conjunction with the plea agreement. See B lanco v. State , 18 S.W.3d 218,

219

– 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The trial court certified that appellant does not have the right to
appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 25.2(d); Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Do Not Publish T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47 130099F.U05 /Douglas S. Lang/ DOUGLAS S. LANG JUSTICE130099.op.docx

– 2

– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

ROBERT CLYDE MCMILLEN, Appellant

No. 05

- 13

- 00099

- CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F12

- 59889

- Y. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Justices Myers and Evans participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Judgment entered this 30th day of May, 2013.

/Douglas S. Lang/ DOUGLAS S. LANG JUSTICE
p. 1



# OAR Box 1384 Prepped by Charmelle Mathews



### Document

Number: 

# 5jH£f)ll-E-15 6 

# n Docket

Number: 

# A-94-5 2

Printed 7/2/2008 8:42:10 AM

Sheet 197 of 264P. 2

JUL-10-199 B 21=4 4 V.^d/^iL 

### A 9 4 5 2 1 

## ' -E-\5(O

From : 

### Date : Contact : Contac tRepor t

Rober tJemison , Pacifi c Environmenta l Services , Inc . (PES ) June 10,199 8 Mr . Ala n Jone s Company : Athen a Marble , Inc . Telephon e Number : (704)636-781 0 Fa x Number : (704)636-318 4 Contac tSummary : Mr . Ala n Jone s wa s contacted o n behalf o f th e U.S . EP

A t o updat

e informatio n provide d i n th e 199 3 EP A Reinforce d Plasti c Composite s Screenin g Surve y submitte d b y Athen a Marble , Inc . fo rthei rfacilit y locate d i n Salisbury , Nort h Carolina . In respons e to m y question s Mr . Jone s indicate d th e following : Th e facilit

y use s polyme rcastin g an d atomized spra

y lay-u p (ge l coats only ) t o produc e bat h tubs , lavatories , an

d showe rstalls . Th e facilit

y use s atomized spra

y lay-up t o apply bot

h clea ran d pigmente d (white ) productio n ge l coats i n ti e fabrication o f th e product

s liste d above . Th e faciht y doe s no tus e toolin g ge l coat s i n th e fabricatio n o f

an y produc

to rmold . Th e clea rge l coatuse d b y th e facilit y contain s 47.25 % HA P b y weigh ta s supplie d (47.25 % styrene an d 0.00 % methy l methacrylate) . Th e pigmente d (white ) ge l coa tuse d b y th e facilit y contain s 35,13 % HA P b y weigh ta s supplie d (35.13 % styren e an d 0.00 % methyl methacrylate) . N o additiona l HA P i s added t o eithe rth e clea ro r pigmente d ge l coa tduring o r priort o th e fabricatio n proces s wit

h th e exceptio n o f

smal l amounts o f

HA P tha tmay (o rmay not ) b e presenti n initiators , promoter s and/o rcatalysts added t o th e clea rge l coat . Th e facility prepare

s th e resin-fille r nuxtur

e use d i n its polyme r castm g operation s a polyeste rresin , filler, an d catalys ti n a batc

h mixer . Th e facility ha s thre e batch mixer s o n site . Th e mixer s ar

e ope n (no tcovere d o

r closed ) whil e th e mixin g proces s i s conducted . Onc e th e mixin g proces s i s completed , th e mixtur e i s poured into a mol d (o r molds) . Th e majorit y o f th e mold s use d b y th e faciliry ar e open , although a fe w ar e partially closed . . . Th e polyeste rresm use d b y thejaritity fo rit s polyme reastin g operation s contain s ________y» HA P b y weigh ta s supplie d (_£i£-3vuWrene ) an d doc s no tcontai n a vapo rsuppressan tN o additional HA P i s added t o th e polyeste rresi n during o r prio r t o th e polyme rcastin g proces s wit h th e exceptio n o f

smal l amount

s o f HA P tha tma y (o rmay not) b e presen ti n initiators , promoters and/o rcatalyst s adde d t o th e resin , INFORMATIO N I S ACCURAT E jd QrtyL. \pflLJ

TOTA L P.0 2
No. 11-118.

#### Martinez *v.*United States.

C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
§ 50-204.1a Variances. ( a ) Variances from standards in this part may be granted in the same circumstances in which variances may be granted under sections 6(b)(6)(A) or 6(d) of the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 655). The procedures for the granting of variances and for related relief under this part are those published in part 1905 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations.
( b ) Any requests for variances shall also be considered requests for variances under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and any variance from a standard which is contained in this part and which is incorporated in part 1910 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, shall be deemed a variance from the standard under both the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act and the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. In accordance with the requirements of § 1954.3(d)(1)(i) of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, variance actions taken under State provisions under a State occupational safety and health plan approved under section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 with regard to State standards found to be at least as effective as the comparable Federal standards contained in this part and incorporated in part 1910 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, shall be deemed a variance action from the standard under both the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
[36 FR 9868, May 29, 1971, as amended at 40 FR 25452, June 16, 1975]
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30616

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JODY RUSSELL,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:06-CR-160-4

Before BENAVIDES, PRADO and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jody Russell appeals the denial of her motion to reduce her sentence

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), in which she argued that her sentence should

be reduced based on the amendment to the Guideline addressing crack cocaine.

The district court denied the motion on the ground that Russell’s original

sentence of 51 months was within the reduced guidelines range of 41 to 51

months in prison. Russell avers that this reason is legally insufficient.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 18, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

Case: 08-30616 Document: 00511029645 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/18/2010
No. 08-30616

2

In her § 3582(c) motion, Russell averred that, in fashioning a reduced

sentence, the sentencing judge was obligated to take into account the prior

sentence imposed and was to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The

district court implicitly had before it those factors Russell now contends it failed

to consider, and this court can assume that it considered those factors prior to

denying Russell’s § 3582(c) motion. See United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667,

673 (5th Cir. 2009). The district court’s failure to provide further explanation

for denying Russell’s § 3582(c) motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

See Evans, 587 F.3d at 672, 674 (holding that a district court need not provide

any reasons at all for denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion).

The sentence is AFFIRMED.

Case: 08-30616 Document: 00511029645 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/18/2010