J-A12024-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF EDWARD V. 

SOKOLOWSKI,

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: DAVID SOKOLOWSKI, 

ADMINISTRATOR D.B.N.C.T.A. OF THE 

ESTATE OF EDWARD V. SOKOLOWSKI, 

DECEASED

:

:

:

: No. 1791 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered October 6, 2014,

Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County,

Orphans’ Court at No. 4007-00554

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JULY 09, 2015

David Sokolowski (“Petitioner”), administrator d.b.n.c.t.a.1of the 

Estate of Edward V. Sokolowski (“Decedent”), appeals from the October 6, 

2014 order entered by the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denying 

his petition for the imposition of a constructive trust upon transfers of money 

and property from Decedent to Barbara Stanishefski (“Stanishefski”) made 

in the final year of Decedent’s life. After careful review, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal are as follows. 

During his lifetime, Decedent was a priest in the Roman Catholic Church. 

Sometime in 1967, he became a priest at St. Mary’s Czestochowa (“St. 

Mary’s”) in Swoyersville, Pennsylvania, where Stanishefski had served as a 

volunteer for his predecessors for several years. Stanishefski was 

 

1

 See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3159.
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approximately seventeen years old when Decedent came to St. Mary’s. Her 

responsibilities at St. Mary’s under Decedent involved emptying the money 

from collection envelopes and posting them, compiling reports for the 

Bishop, and balancing the books.

Following her graduation from high school, she began to work at RCA 

in Mountain Top, Pennsylvania, but continued to volunteer at St. Mary’s 

helping Decedent.2 According to Stanishefski, Decedent began having her 

write out, sign his name and distribute checks for certain church functions, 

which she did, at his direction. 

Decedent retired in 1992 at the age of seventy-five. He invited 

Stanishefski to move into his house and live with him in Mountain Top and 

she accepted. In exchange for living there rent-free, Stanishefski was 

responsible for purchasing food and doing the cooking, cleaning, grocery 

shopping, errands and laundry. Decedent paid the utility bills. Stanishefski 

wrote checks and paid bills from Decedent’s personal checking account at 

Decedent’s direction, much like she did when she worked at St. Mary’s. 

Sometimes Decedent signed checks in blank for Stanishefski to fill out and 

other times Stanishefski signed Decedent’s name to checks, at his direction. 

According to Stanishefski, she made payments and filled out checks from 

Decedent’s accounts only when so instructed by Decedent.

 

2

 In or around 1981, the position became a paid one for Stanishefski, with 

her earning $100 per month for her duties.
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In a will executed in 1997, Decedent included a provision providing 

Stanishefski the option to purchase their shared residence for $95,000. In 

this will, Decedent left all of his tangible personal property inside of his home 

to his younger brother, Casimer Sokolowski, and two younger sisters, 

Geraldine Toone and Eleanor Lewczyk (collectively, “Decedent’s siblings”), 

and named his siblings as residuary legatees. He named his brother as 

executor of his estate.

Decedent underwent back-to-back heart surgeries in 2001, following 

which Stanishefski provided greater assistance to him. Also in 2001, 

Decedent sold the house to Stanishefski for $70,000, consideration for which 

included a $40,000 purchase money mortgage. Shortly thereafter, Decedent 

amended his will, removing the then-irrelevant provision regarding the sale 

of the house to Stanishefski. Also in this version of the will, Decedent 

named Stanishefski as the beneficiary of his tangible personal property, 

permitting, but not requiring, her to distribute his personal property to his 

siblings; named his siblings as residuary legatees; and nominated his 

attorney, John D. Sieminski, Esquire (“Attorney Sieminski”) as his executor, 

and Decedent’s brother as successor executor. Decedent further executed a 

durable power of attorney, naming Attorney Sieminski as his agent therein, 

and a health care power of attorney, naming Stanishefski as his agent 

therein. 
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In 2005, Decedent’s health began to deteriorate further, requiring the 

introduction of help from a home healthcare agency. The record reflects 

that Stanishefski signed the intake paperwork on Decedent’s behalf. A few 

months later, Decedent forgave the $40,000 debt owed by Stanishefski for 

the purchase of the house. 

In the final year of his life, Stanishefski deposited into her personal 

bank account several checks written from Decedent’s accounts totaling 

$130,000. Stanishefski also provided payment from Decedent’s personal 

accounts for coins allegedly purchased by Decedent, or by Stanishefski at 

Decedent’s direction, during his lifetime. Decedent and Stanishefski lived 

together in the house until Decedent died on March 8, 2007 at the age of 

eighty-nine.

On October 30, 2008, Attorney Sieminski filed a Petition for 

Adjudication (Statement of Proposed Distribution) in the orphans’ court. 

Pursuant to an agreement reached between Attorney Sieminski and 

Decedent’s siblings, Sieminski requested that the orphans’ court confirm and 

approve his first and final account as executor of Decedent’s will; permit him 

to transfer all information pertaining to the administration of Decedent’s 

estate to Decedent’s brother as successor executor; discharge Attorney 

Sieminski as executor; and issue letters testamentary to Decedent’s brother 

as successor executor of Decedent’s estate. The orphans’ court granted the 

petition on June 22, 2009. On June 29, 2009, however, the orphans’ court 
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vacated the June 22 order as requested by Stanishefski, as Attorney 

Sieminski’s petition erroneously stated that Decedent’s siblings were the 

only parties with an interest in Decedent’s estate, omitting that Stanishefski 

was also a beneficiary under Decedent’s will. Stanishefski further asserted 

that the orphans’ court erred by granting Attorney Sieminski’s petition, as it 

provided for confirmation of the first and final account without first 

conducting an audit by the court. On September 3, 2009, the orphans’ court 

confirmed the audit of the first and final account submitted by Attorney 

Sieminski as executor of Decedent’s estate. 

On March 5, 2010, Decedent’s siblings, as residuary legatees of 

Decedent’s estate, filed a petition seeking the imposition of a constructive 

trust (the “Petition”), naming Stanishefski and Attorney Sieminski as 

respondents. The Petition alleged, in relevant part, that Stanishefski had a 

confidential relationship with Decedent and, to the extent Decedent 

consented to purchases and payments made by Stanishefski on his behalf, 

he was mentally incompetent to do so. In their prayer for relief, Decedent’s 

siblings requested that the orphans’ court do the following:

A. To declare a constructive trust upon the property 

belonging to [] Decedent which was wrongfully

transferred by [] Stanishefski to herself or for her 

benefit and

B. To declare [] Stanishefski as a trustee of said funds 

and other property and to require her to account 

therefore [sic] and to return those funds and other 
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property aggregating $175,490.78[] to [] Decedent’s 

estate and

C. To grant such further relief as the [c]ourt may deem 

just and fair.

Petition, 3/5/10, at 10. Stanishefski filed an answer and new matter on 

March 30, 2010, asserting that the siblings’ failure to challenge the first and 

final account and audit resulted in a bar to the above-claims based upon the 

running of the statute of limitations, res judicata, laches and an absence of 

jurisdiction over the matter in the orphans’ court. Decedent’s siblings filed a 

reply to the new matter on April 19, 2010.

At a proceeding held on July 14, 2011 before the orphans’ court, 

Attorney Sieminski and the Decedents’ siblings entered a stipulation, over 

Stanishefski’s objection, to dismiss Attorney Sieminski as a respondent and 

discharge Attorney Sieminski as executor as Decedent’s estate, replacing 

him with Decedent’s brother as successor executor. On July 26, 2011, 

however, Decedent’s brother renounced his right to serve as executor of 

Decedent’s estate, requesting that the orphans’ court instead issue letters of 

administration d.b.n.c.t.a. to Petitioner. Thereafter, on September 22, 

2011, Decedent’s siblings discontinued the action commenced by the March 

5, 2010 Petition, and in its place, Petitioner filed a nearly identical petition, 

naming Stanishefski as respondent, on September 29, 2011. Stanishefski 

filed an answer on November 9, 2011.
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The case ultimately came before the orphans’ court for a bench trial on 

February 18, March 20, March 21, and April 29, 2014. Petitioner presented 

the testimony of four employees of the home healthcare agencies that 

worked with Decedent prior to his death, Attorney Sieminski and Decedent’s 

brother, and called Stanishefski to testify as if on cross-examination. 

Stanishefski presented testimony from three of Decedent’s friends – all of 

whom saw and interacted with Decedent between thirty days and one-to-two 

weeks of Decedent’s death. Stanishefski testified on her own behalf.

On October 6, 2014, the orphans’ court entered an opinion and order 

denying the request for the imposition of a constructive trust and reaching 

the following conclusions of law:

1. The testimony given by [] Stanishefski is found to 

be credible.

2. [] Stanishefski has established a prima facie case 

for valid gifts with respect to the house, coins and 

cash, and [] Petitioner has failed to rebut the 

presumption of a valid gift by clear, precise and 

convincing evidence,

3. There was no confidential relationship between 

[Decedent] and [] Stanishefski.

4. Since no confidential relationship existed, the 

burden does not shift to [] Stanishefski to show that 

the gifts were not a result of undue influence.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/6/14, at 4-5.
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Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The orphans’ court 

filed a supplemental opinion in response.

On appeal, Petitioner presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did a confidential relationship exist between [] 

Decedent [] and [] Stanishefski?

2. Did [] Stanishefski[] meet her burden of proving by 

clear and convincing evidence that the five transfers 

to her of [] Decedent’s property were valid, inter 

vivos gifts made by [] Decedent?

3. Was [Stanishefski] subject to a duty as agent of [] 

Decedent (1) to account for the coins purchased 

from Mint Fulfillment from January 1, 2006 until the 

death of [] Decedent on March 8, 2007 and (2) to 

justify the expenditures she made to a Discover 

credit card?

Petitioner’s Brief at 2-3.

We begin by stating our standard of review:

The findings of a judge of the orphans’ court 

division, sitting without a jury, must be accorded the 

same weight and effect as the verdict of a jury, and 

will not be reversed by an appellate court in the 

absence of an abuse of discretion or a lack of 

evidentiary support. This rule is particularly 

applicable to findings of fact which are predicated 

upon the credibility of the witnesses, whom the 

judge has had the opportunity to hear and observe, 

and upon the weight given to their testimony. In 

reviewing the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt’s findings, our task 

is to ensure that the record is free from legal error 

and to determine if the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt’s findings 

are supported by competent and adequate evidence 

and are not predicated upon capricious disbelief of 

competent and credible evidence.
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In re Estate of Bechtel, 92 A.3d 833, 837 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

In his first issue on appeal, Petitioner asserts that the orphans’ court 

erred by finding that a confidential relationship did not exist between

Decedent and Stanishefski. Petitioner’s Brief at 22. We have found the 

existence of a confidential relationship “when the circumstances make it 

certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is 

an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or 

trust, justifiably reposed.” In re Estate of Nalaschi, 90 A.3d 8, 15 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A 

confidential relationship is marked by such a disparity in position that the

inferior party places complete trust in the superior party’s advice and seeks 

no other counsel, so as to give rise to a potential abuse of power.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

According to Petitioner, “the uncontroverted evidence” presented at 

trial revealed that “Decedent was in a weakened physical and mental 

condition,” could not care for himself, and was “dependent upon 

[Stanishefski] to provide the assistance necessary to his daily living and the 

management of his financial affairs,” requiring a finding that a confidential 

relationship between Decedent and Stanishefski existed. Petitioner’s Brief at 

23. The record, however, does not support Petitioner’s contentions. There 

is no question that Decedent became weaker physically as he neared the 
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end of his life and needed someone to care for him; Stanishefski admitted 

this in her testimony. See N.T., 4/29/14, at 69. However, while the 

testimony of Decedent’s brother and the employees of the home healthcare 

companies that worked with Decedent suggested that towards the end of his 

life, Decedent suffered from a weakened intellect,3the testimony presented 

by Stanishefski painted Decedent as mentally competent until he died,4and 

 

3

 For example, the registered nurse from Home Sweet Home Personal Care 

testified to her observation that Decedent was “forgetful” during the initial 

evaluation in 2005. N.T., 2/18/14, at 45. The registered nurse from 

Diversified Nursing, Inc. testified to her perception in 2006 that Decedent 

“was not able to make sound decisions regarding his safety,” exhibited 

“episodes of confusion,” and was not oriented as to time. Id. at 56, 70, 71. 

The personal care attendant from Home Sweet Home testified that during 

the construction of the sunroom at his home, Decedent did not seem to 

know what was going on. Id. at 94. Decedent’s brother testified that 

Decedent began having memory lapses in 2000 and was incoherent during a 

visit in 2006. N.T., 3/20-21/14, at 139-40.

4

 For example, Eugene Marshall (“Marshall”), Decedent’s general contractor 

and longtime friend, testified that he saw Decedent often in the months 

leading up to Decedent’s death and that Decedent “was still there” and acted 

like himself. Id. at 224. Lawrence Kansky (“Kansky”), Decedent’s podiatrist 

and close friend testified that he saw Decedent every thirty to sixty days 

between 1997 and the date of Decedent’s death and that Decedent was 

“sharp as a tack” and “always” alert, including the last time he saw him. 

N.T., 4/29/14, at 4, 5, 8, 9. Kansky was a practicing attorney at the time of 

his testimony, and testified that he never had a concern about Decedent’s 

mental competence. Id. at 11-12. Frances Ponko (“Ponko”), a friend of 

Stanishefski and Decedent, also described Decedent as “sharp,” and testified 

that he was able to hold a normal conversation within two months of his 

passing. Id. at 27-28. She visited with Decedent approximately a week or 

two before he passed away and testified that she believed he was mentally 

competent at that time. Id. at 31. Stanishefski likewise testified that she 

never saw any change in Decedent’s mental acuity. Id. at 69.
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as stated above, the orphans’ court found the testimony presented by 

Stanishefski to be credible.

Furthermore, although Decedent depended in large part on 

Stanishefski for his survival, the testimony of Stanishefski and her witnesses 

revealed that it was Decedent, not Stanishefski, who had the upper hand in 

the relationship. Stanishefski testified that anything she did with respect to 

Decedent’s care, his finances and his home were done because Decedent 

told her to do so. She described him as “strict,” and testified, “[I]f he said 

something, you went by it. He told me to do something this way, I would 

just do it, that’s the way he wanted it.” N.T., 4/29/14, at 52-53. She 

recounted one time when he was hospitalized that she had to leave work to 

get him Italian ice because that was what he wanted. Id. at 64-65. 

Stanishefski testified that she never refused to do anything Decedent asked 

of her, dating back to her teen years working for him at St. Mary’s. Id. at 

65. She considered him to be like a father to her. Id.

Marshall also described Decedent as a person who “was going to have 

his way.” N.T., 3/20-21/14, at 217. He testified that he would not 

challenge Decedent – “if that’s what he wanted, he wanted it.” Id. Marshall 

observed Decedent towards the end of his life “still giving his orders,” and 

that Decedent “controlled everything,” including Stanishefski. Id. at 225. 

Ponko similarly testified that “you did not tell [Decedent] what to do. ... 

[H]e had his own mind, set in his ways. He might have listened to you but 
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when it came down to it, [Decedent] did what he wanted to do. He was 

stubborn. ... Nobody talked him into anything.” N.T., 4/29/14, at 28.

Based upon the testimony presented and the orphans’ court’s 

credibility determinations, there is no support for the conclusion that 

Stanishefski had “an overmastering influence” over Decedent or that 

Decedent was the “weaker party” in the relationship. See In re Estate of 

Nalaschi, 90 A.3d at 15. As such, we find no error or abuse of discretion in 

its conclusion that there was no confidential relationship that existed 

between Stanishefski and Decedent.

Petitioner next asserts that Stanishefski failed to satisfy her burden of 

establishing that certain transfers of money from Decedent to Stanishefski 

were valid inter vivos gifts.5 Petitioner’s Brief at 25. Assuming she met this 

burden, Petitioner asserts that he nonetheless sufficiently rebutted the 

presumption of the validity of the gifts by clear and convincing evidence 

 

5

 Petitioner also asserts that Stanishefski failed to establish that the transfer 

of the house and coins from Decedent to Stanishefski were valid inter vivos 

gifts, but he includes no argument in support of these contentions. With 

respect to the house, he subsequently contradicts this claim by stating he 

“did not question in the court below the conveyance by [] Decedent of his 

residence to [Stanishefski] or his forgiveness of [Stanishefski’s] mortgage 

indebtedness,” and that he “does not question” the transfer of the house to 

Stanishefski from Decedent. See Petitioner’s Brief at 25-26, 30-31. 

Petitioner makes no further mention of the coins in his argument of this 

issue. We therefore do not address either transfer herein. See Penn-Am. 

Ins. Co. v. Peccadillos, Inc., 27 A.3d 259, 269 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc) (finding an argument waived based upon the appellant’s failure to 

include any “corresponding discussion in the body of [its] brief”); Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a).
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based upon the existence of a confidential relationship between Decedent 

and Stanishefski. Id. 

“The elements required to establish a valid inter vivos gift are donative 

intent and delivery.” In re Estate of Petro, 694 A.2d 627, 632 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (citation omitted). The burden initially is on the recipient of the 

alleged gift to prove “by clear, precise, and convincing evidence” that it was 

a valid inter vivos gift. Id. Establishing that the donor and donee had a 

confidential relationship at the time of the gift would rebut the presumption 

of validity of the gift. Id. at 634. Where a confidential relationship is 

established, the burden shifts back to the donee “to prove that the gifts 

were fair and free from suspicion.” Id.

Petitioner alleges that Stanishefski failed to prove a valid inter vivos 

gift for the following transfers:

 $50,000 check made out to “cash” from Decedent deposited into 

Stanishefski’s account on or about September 15, 2006;

 $30,000 check made out to “cash” from Decedent deposited into 

Stanishefski’s account on or about October 3, 2006;

 $20,000 of a $30,000 check made out to Decedent from his Wachovia 

Securities account deposited into Stanishefski’s account on November 

16, 2006;

 $30,000 check made out to Decedent from his Wachovia Securities 

account deposited into Stanishefski’s account on March 1, 2007;
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 A check payable from Decedent, signed by Stanishefski, to “Just 

Windows and More” for a renovation to the house.6

See Petitioner’s Brief at 28-29.

The record reflects that Stanishefski sufficiently proved that the above 

transfers were valid inter vivos gifts from Decedent. Stanishefski testified 

that she made all of the above transfers at Decedent’s direction. See N.T., 

3/20-21/14, at 35, 41, 67, 75; N.T., 4/29/14, at 67-68. According to 

Stanishefski, they did not usually talk about money, and when he gave her 

the checks, he told her to put them into her account. N.T., 4/29/14, at 67. 

It was Stanishefski’s understanding that he was giving the money to her as 

a gift. Id. Decedent told Stanishefski he did not want the money left in his 

account and “he wanted to be sure all of the bills were paid.” N.T., 3/20-

21/14, at 35. Stanishefski indicated that the checks made out to “cash” (for 

$50,000 and $30,000, respectively) went to the payment of bills for various 

home improvement projects. Id. She made many of these expenditures 

during Decedent’s lifetime at his direction. See id. at 220, 222. Although 

the house technically belonged to Stanishefski at the time, she testified that 

she always considered it to be their shared home. N.T., 4/29/14, at 77-78. 

The record reflects that Decedent was the one who wanted the sunroom that 

was added onto the house and that Stanishefski “went along [with] him.” 

Id. at 77; see also id. at 28-29; N.T., 3/20-21/14, at 221-22.

 

6

 The record reflects that Decedent wrote this check after he transferred the 

house to Stanishefski. See N.T., 3/20-21/14, at 12.
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Decedent also stated on more than one occasion that he did not want 

the money to be in his accounts because he did not want his family to get 

the money – “[h]e said he gave them what he thought they deserved and 

that was it.” Id. at 68. As we previously stated, the record reflects that 

Decedent’s siblings stood to inherit the residue of his estate, which would 

have included money left in his personal accounts. He took the money out 

of these accounts and gave it to Stanishefski, instructing her to put it into 

her account because he did not want his family to get the money when he 

passed away, a clear indication that he wanted Stanishefski to have the 

money instead. 

Petitioner asserts that the Decedent’s signatures on the two checks for 

“cash” were “glaringly inconsistent” with his signature on the do not 

resuscitate order he signed on November 10, 2006, Petitioner’s Brief at 29, 

but he presented no evidence at trial or otherwise to contradict 

Stanishefski’s testimony that Decedent signed those checks. See N.T., 

3/20-21/14, at 32-33. We have no information regarding the circumstances 

surrounding Decedent’s signature of the do not resuscitate order – where he 

was, what he was doing at the time, or how he was feeling that day. 

Petitioner further questions the strength of Decedent’s signatures on 

all of the checks, as the evidence of record revealed that Decedent was 

extremely weak during the final months of his life. Petitioner’s Brief at 29. 

Stanishefski testified, however, that Decedent pre-signed checks in blank 
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and left them for her to fill in at his direction, and there is no evidence that 

he did not do so with respect to the two checks made out to “cash.” N.T., 

2/18/14, at 144-45. With respect to the checks Decedent endorsed from his 

Wachovia securities account, Petitioner is correct that the personal care 

attendant from Home Sweet Home testified that because of Decedent’s 

weakened condition, she did not believe he could have signed his name to a 

check towards the end of his life. N.T., 2/18/14, at 96-97. However, there 

was also testimony in contradiction. Ponko, for example, testified that 

Decedent held and blessed her three-month-old grandchild approximately 

two months before Decedent passed away. N.T., 4/29/14, at 28-29. 

Specifically regarding his ability to write, Kansky testified that although he 

did not see Decedent writing during his final days, he observed “letters ... 

and a pen ... and a pad” next to the chair in which the Decedent always sat, 

and it appeared to Kansky that Decedent “was actively writing[.]” Id. at 16. 

Moreover, Stanishefski consistently testified that she never did anything with 

respect to Decedent’s finances unless he told her to and that she always 

followed the Decedent’s instructions. See N.T., 2/18/14, at 135; N.T., 3/20-

21/14, at 34-35, 41, 60, 67, 75. She further testified that Decedent always 

reviewed his checkbook and his financial statements – there were no 

financial transactions made of which he was unaware. N.T., 3/20-21/14, at 

62. Stanishefski testified and her witnesses agreed – “he was the boss” and 
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“controlled everything.” N.T., 2/18/14, at 145; N.T., 3/20-21/14, at 225; 

N.T., 4/29/14, at 28, 53.

The orphans’ court found the testimony presented by Stanishefski 

credible, and this testimony supports a finding that Decedent delivered the 

above-listed money with donative intent. See In re Estate of Petro, 694 

A.2d at 632. The orphans’ court’s findings are supported by competent 

evidence, are free from legal error, and are not based upon a “capricious 

disbelief of competent and credible evidence.” In re Estate of Bechtel, 92 

A.3d at 837. As we have already addressed the question of a confidential 

relationship between Stanishefski and Decedent, concluding that the record 

supported the orphans’ court finding that none existed, no relief is due.

Lastly, Petitioner asserts that Stanishefski had a “duty as agent of [] 

Decedent” to account for coins purchased at Decedent’s request and 

payments made to a Discover card. Petitioner’s Brief at 31-33. Petitioner 

asserts that Stanishefski “acted as agent for [] Decedent” in purchasing 

approximately $90,000 worth of coins in the last year of his life and was 

thus required to account to Decedent’s estate for the coins.7 Id. at 31-32. 

Petitioner further asserts that Stanishefski failed to prove that Decedent was 

 

7

 The record reflects that in the year leading up to his death, either 

Decedent himself or Stanishefski, at Decedent’s direction, made large 

purchases of coins, which it is undisputed Decedent collected. N.T., 3/20-

21/14, at 164, 185-89; N.T., 4/29/14, at 59-60, 74. Stanishefski and Ponko 

both testified that Decedent enjoyed giving coins (and jewelry) away to his 

close friends and family members and that he did in fact give away coins 

that he purchased. N.T., 4/29/14, at 30-31, 59-60.
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the holder of a Discover credit card, and thus failed to prove that the twelve 

checks prepared by her on Decedent’s behalf, paid to Discover, were for 

debts owed by Decedent.8 Id. at 32.

In support of this argument, Petitioner relies upon section 5610 of the 

Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code governing the requirement that a 

person appointed as power of attorney “file an account of his administration 

whenever directed to do so by the court and may file an account at any 

other time.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5610. Petitioner further cites to case law 

involving a power of attorney and executors of an estate, respectively, 

breaching the duty to justify disbursements made by them. See Petitioner’s 

Brief at 33 (citing In re Strickler’s Estate, 47 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1946); In re 

Estate of Bechtel, 92 A.3d 833). The record reflects, however, that 

Attorney Sieminski, not Stanishefski, was appointed by Decedent as his 

power of attorney and executor of his will. Stanishefski was not issuing 

 

8

 We observe that although Attorney Sieminski testified that he was unable 

to locate a Discover card in Decedent’s name, Stanishefski presented 

evidence that Decedent did in fact hold a Discover credit card, and 

Stanishefski testified that the checks written from Decedent’s bank account 

to Discover were for his credit card bills. See Respondent’s Exhibits 4-6; 

N.T., 3/20/21/14, at 116, 120-22; N.T., 4/29/14, at 75-76. Petitioner 

contends that some of the credit card statements bear a different account 

number than are listed in the memo line on the checks to Discover for 

payment. Petitioner’s Brief at 32. Petitioner did not advance this claim 

before the orphans’ court. Furthermore, the credit card number does not 

appear on the Discover statements included as exhibits in the certified 

record on appeal. We therefore have no ability to address this contention. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
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checks or making purchases as part of her legal obligation to Decedent, but 

did so, according to the orphans’ court’s credibility determinations, because 

Decedent asked her to. Apart from his bald statement that Stanishefski 

acted as Decedent’s agent, Petitioner includes no argument equating 

Stanishefski’s role with that of a power of attorney or provides any basis for 

this Court to conclude that section 5610 or the foregoing case law governed 

her actions. 

Moreover, the evidence as it exists in this action indicates that there 

were no coins in Decedent’s estate. The audit of the first and final account, 

confirmed absolutely by the orphans’ court, does not include any coins. The 

only tangible personal property distributed accounted for therein is $1500 in 

“household furniture and personal affects,” and Decedent’s vehicle, worth 

$2,675. Audit, 9/4/09, ¶ 12. Petitioner did not appeal this order. Pursuant 

to section 3358 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, “No decree 

entered pursuant to this code shall be subject to collateral attack on account 

of any irregularity if the court which entered it had jurisdiction to do so.” 20 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3358. Thus, to the extent Stanishefski was, at the time of 

Decedent’s death, in possession of coins that Decedent had owned and 

purchased prior thereto, the only challenge available to Petitioner would be 

to argue that the coins were an invalid inter vivos gift. As stated 

hereinabove, however, Petitioner waived this claim on appeal by failing to 

include any argument in support thereof. See supra, n.5.
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/9/2015