SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases Risks 

for $11.4 Billion Program

January 26, 2011
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

January 26, 2011

General James N. Mattis

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

General David Petraeus 

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV 

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/ 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of a performance audit concerning U.S. funding and planning for 

Afghan National Security Forces facilities. This report includes two recommendations to NATO Training 

Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) to maximize 

the use of facilities construction and maintenance funding and ensure that these facilities address 

strategic goals and objectives for the Afghan National Security Forces. 

When preparing the final report, we considered comments from the Commanding General, 

NTM-A/CSTC-A. While NTM-A/CSTC-A did not fully concur with our recommendation for a long-range

facilities construction plan, NTM-A/CSTC-A noted it can improve the identification of future projects and 

better document its priorities. NTM-A/CSTC-A fully concurred with the need to develop a long-range

operations and maintenance plan. The comments are reproduced in appendix III.

A summary of this report is on page iii. This performance audit was conducted under the authority of 

Public Law 110-181, as amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform 

Act of 2008. 

Kathryn H. Bernet

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning ii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-11-6 January 2011

Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities 

Increases Risks for $11.4 Billion Program

What SIGAR Reviewed

From fiscal year 2005 to 2010, Congress appropriated about $28 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. The 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), under the direction of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

(USFOR-A), uses this funding to equip, train, base, and sustain the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), which 

includes the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). ANSF personnel strength is planned to 

reach 305,600 in October 2011 and, according to CSTC-A may go to 400,000 in October 2013. Additional facilities and 

infrastructure are needed. In previous SIGAR audits, CSTC-A was not able to provide planning documents describing the 

size, location, or use of ANSF facilities, such as ANA garrisons. As a result, SIGAR initiated this audit to (1) determine the 

U.S. funding provided or planned for ANSF facilities construction and (2) assess CSTC-A’s overall planning for ANSF 

facilities construction and the maintenance of them. To accomplish these objectives, SIGAR reviewed numerous 

documents identified by CSTC-A. In particular, SIGAR examined CSTC-A’s August 2010 ANSF Comprehensive Plan for 

Facilities Development. This plan was prepared by MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. (MACTEC) under a contract 

through the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE). SIGAR also interviewed officials from 

CSTC-A, AFCEE, and MACTEC. SIGAR conducted its work in Washington, D.C., from July 2010 to January 2011, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found

Based on CSTC-A documents, it has provided or plans to provide a total of $11.4 billion through fiscal year 2012 for 

construction of nearly 900 ANSF facilities, including over $7 billion in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. In addition, up to 

$800 million may be provided for operations and maintenance over the next 5 years.

Despite the considerable funding and large number of facilities involved, CSTC-A has not developed a long-range 

construction plan, placing its $11.4 billion ANSF facilities’ construction program at risk of building facilities that are 

inadequate or do not meet ANSF strategic and operational needs. In 1998, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, created an executive guide that identified best practices for 

planning construction of capital assets. The guide states that a long-range construction plan is necessary to ensure that, 

as conditions change, plans can be adapted as needed, and resources can be prioritized and used effectively to achieve 

applicable strategic goals. As part of its contract, MACTEC was tasked to develop the ANSF Comprehensive Plan for 

Facilities Development. Although portions of the plan were out of date and most ANSF facilities plans were not 

completed, it was the most complete listing and analysis of ANSF facilities that CSTC-A provided. While the plan 

addressed a number of desired elements for long-range capital planning, CSTC-A should, for instance, identify how 

current ANSF facilities are meeting Afghan security objectives, identify gaps, and evaluate how planned facilities will 

help to eliminate those gaps. CSTC-A recognizes that long-range operations and maintenance of ANSF facilities needs to 

be addressed. According to CSTC-A’s 2008 Campaign Plan, sustainment costs may continue through 2025. However, 

CSTC-A does not have a long-range maintenance plan linking requirements to construction plans. Such a plan would 

allow CSTC-A to identify and rationalize maintenance requirements across the hundreds of completed and planned 

ANSF facilities to help ensure the most effective and efficient use of maintenance funding.

What SIGAR Recommends

To ensure that CSTC-A maximizes the use of facilities construction funding and that these facilities address ANSF 

strategic goals and objectives, SIGAR recommends that CSTC-A, (1) develop a long-range planning document that 

incorporates, among other things, updated requirements and justification for all ANSF facilities to meet CSTC-A’s 

projected 400,000 ANSF personnel in 2013. In addition, to help ensure these facilities can be utilized as intended, 

SIGAR recommends that CSTC-A, (2) develop a long-range operations and maintenance plan for all ANSF facilities that is 

linked to its construction plan.

While CSTC-A did not fully concur with our recommendation for a long-range facilities construction plan, it noted it can 

improve the identification of future projects and better document its priorities. CSTC-A fully concurred with the need to 

develop a long-range operations and maintenance plan. CSTC-A outlined several steps it has taken or plans to take that 

will substantially address SIGAR’s concerns.

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Background ................................................................................................................................................... 2

CSTC-A Estimates That $11.4 Billion Is Needed for ANSF Facilities Construction ........................................ 3

CSTC-A Has Not Developed a Long-Range Construction Plan That Meets U.S. 

Government Capital Planning Guidance and Best Practices.................................................................. 3

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................10

Recommendations......................................................................................................................................11

Comments...................................................................................................................................................11

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology.........................................................................................................13

Appendix II: Planning Documents Provided to SIGAR................................................................................14

Appendix III: Comments From NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan(NTM-A/CSTC-A)...............................................................16

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: ANSF Personnel Levels Approved by JCMB.................................................................................... 2

Table 2: Facilities with Completed Components in the ANSF Comprehensive Plan 

dated August 2010 ................................................................................................................................. 6

Table 3: Principles and Practices for Making Capital Investment Decisions and 

Those Practices Met by the ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities 

Development, August 2010.................................................................................................................... 8

Figure 1: Funding Provided through Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for ANSF 

facilities Construction, Fiscal Years 2005-2012 (dollars in billions)........................................................3
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning iv

ACRONYMS 

AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces

ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund 

JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

MACTEC MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. 

NTM-A/CSTC-A NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command- 

 Afghanistan 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 1 

Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases 

Risks for $11.4 Billion Program

From fiscal year 2005 to 2010, Congress appropriated about $28 billion for the Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),

1 under the command 

of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A),2 uses this funding to equip, train, base, and sustain the 

Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 

Afghan National Police (ANP). According to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB),3

In our previous audits of construction contracts for ANA garrisons located in Kunduz, Gamberi, and 

Farah, we attempted to determine the manner in which the contract requirements were developed.

total 

ANSF personnel are planned to reach 305,600 in October 2011. According to CSTC-A, this number may

increase to 400,000 by October 31, 2013. As a result, additional facilities and infrastructure are needed. 

4

 

However, CSTC-A was not able to document the U.S. plans and justification for the number and types of 

ANA facilities, including documents delineating the size, location, or use of the garrisons.5

As a result, we initiated this audit. Our objectives were to (1) determine the U.S. funding provided or 

planned to be provided for ANSF facilities construction and (2) assess CSTC-A’s overall planning for ANSF 

facilities’ construction and the maintenance of them. To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed all 

planning documents, strategies, operational orders, a fragmentary order, and other documents 

identified by CSTC-A. In particular, we examined CSTC-A’s ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities 

Development. This plan was prepared for CSTC-A by MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., 

(MACTEC) under a contract with the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE). We 

also interviewed officials from CSTC-A, AFCEE, and MACTEC. We conducted our work in Washington, 

 As we noted,

such planning documents are critical for CSTC-A to ensure that, as requirements change, plans can be 

adapted as needed, resources can be prioritized and used to achieve strategic goals, and potential waste 

can be minimized. 

 

1 CSTC-A is a joint command with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). Because CSTC-A distributes 

and manages all U.S.-provided funding to support ANSF, this report refers to CSTC-A. 2 USFOR-A is the command and control headquarters for U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. The Commander of 

USFOR-A is also the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force. USFOR-A oversees CSTC-A’s efforts 

to develop the ANSF.

3 The Afghan government and the international community agreed in 2006 to create the JCMB. The JCMB is a 

high-level, decision-making body focusing on resolving strategic problems arising from the implementation of the 

Afghanistan Compact. It consists of 28 members; seven are from the Afghan government consisting of the Senior 

Economic Advisor to the President, who is also a co-chair of the JCMB; the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, 

Economy, Education, and Justice; and the National Security Advisor. The remaining 21 JCMB members are from the 

international community. 

4 As mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, Sec. 842(g)(1). 5 SIGAR, ANA Garrison at Farah Appeared Well Built Overall but Some Construction Issues Should Be Addressed, 

Audit-10-14 (July 30, 2010); SIGAR, ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight 

Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed, Audit-10-09 (Apr. 30, 2010); and SIGAR, ANA Garrison at 

Gamberi Appears Well Built Overall but Some Construction Issues Need to Be Addressed, Audit-10-10 (Apr. 30, 

2010).
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 2 

D.C., from July 2010 to January 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology. 

BACKGROUND

ANSF facilities and infrastructure requirements have increased dramatically over the years as ANA and 

ANP planned personnel end-strengths have more than tripled. In 2001, the Bonn Agreement set initial 

ANA troop levels at 50,000 and ANP personnel levels at 62,000, for a total of 112,000. As shown in 

table 1, since 2006, the Afghan government and international community through the JCMB have 

agreed on successive increases to ANSF personnel with the current approved end-strength totaling 

305,600 in October 2011. 

Table 1: ANSF Personnel Levels Approved by JCMB

Date 

Issued ANA ANP

Total 

ANSF 

EndStrength

Notes

Feb 2006 70,000 62,000 132,000

May 2007 70,000 82,000 152,000

Feb 2008 80,000 82,000 162,000

Sept 2008 134,000 82,000 216,000

Apr 2009 134,000 86,800 220,800 (added 4,800 Kabul police)

Jun 2009 134,000 96,800 230,800 (added 10,000 provincial police)

Jan 2010 134,000 109,000 243,000 (as of Oct. 31, 2010)

Jan 2010 171,600 134,000 305,600 (by Oct. 31, 2011)

Source: SIGAR analysis of CSTC-A documents entitled ANSF Force Structure Growth, as of January 30, 

2010, and ANA Force Generation, as of May 15, 2010.

According to CSTC-A, the personnel levels for the ANA and ANP may increase to 240,000 and 160,000, 

respectively, for a total of 400,000 in October 2013. In addition, and adding further pressure to the 

need to plan for and provide ANSF facilities, the International Security Assistance Force reports that as 

of September 2010, the ANA had increased to 138,200 and the ANP to 120,500. This resulted in a total 

of 258,700 ANSF personnel—exceeding the JCMB planned end-strength for October 2010 by more than 

15,000 personnel.
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 3 

CSTC-A ESTIMATES THAT $11.4 BILLION IS NEEDED FOR ANSF FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION

Based on CSTC-A funding data, it has provided or plans to provide a total of $11.4 billion for ANSF 

facilities construction for fiscal years 2005 through 2012, including over $7 billion in fiscal years 2010 

through 2012. Figure 1 shows CSTC-A facilities funding by year for fiscal years 2005 through 2012.

Figure 1: Funding Provided through Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for ANSF facilities 

Construction, Fiscal Years 2005-2012 (dollars in billions)

Source: SIGAR analysis of CSTC-A funding data, January 16, 2011.

Note: Funding for fiscal years 2011 and 2012 has not been appropriated and is indicated in red. 

According to a November 2010 CSTC-A briefing document, 884 ANSF construction projects are planned

through fiscal year 2012—673 projects have not started, 78 are under construction, and 133 are 

completed. In its July 2010 ANSF Force Generation Plans, CSTC-A stated that current and planned force 

structure will require new facilities or sharing/expansion of those already planned. It also noted that at 

least 12 months is required for new facilities.

CSTC-A HAS NOT DEVELOPED A LONG-RANGE CONSTRUCTION PLAN THAT MEETS U.S. 

GOVERNMENT CAPITAL PLANNING GUIDANCE AND BEST PRACTICES

CSTC-A has not developed a long-range construction plan for ANSF facilities. In 1998, the 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) created an executive guide that identified best practices for planning construction of capital 

assets. The guide states that a long-range construction plan is necessary to ensure that, as conditions 

change, plans can be adapted as needed and resources prioritized and used effectively to achieve 

applicable strategic goals. Moreover, CSTC-A does not have a long-range maintenance plan linking 
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 4 

requirements to long-range construction plans to help ensure the most effective and efficient use of 

maintenance funding.

CSTC-A Has Not Developed a Long-Range Construction Plan that Addresses Strategic 

Objectives

In conducting audits of construction contracts for ANA garrisons located at Gamberi and Kunduz, CSTC-A 

provided us a number of documents related to ANSF facilities planning, but none addressed the overall 

justification or rationale for these facilities or provided details on long-range plans to expand, share, or 

construct new facilities to meet additional requirements. The documents CSTC-A provided, others we 

reviewed, and our assessments of them are addressed in appendix II. As we noted in July 2010, without 

a facilities plan that reflects current requirements, CSTC-A runs the risk of building facilities that do not 

meet ANSF needs or are inadequate for projected personnel end-strengths.6

CSTC-A tasked AFCEE with awarding a contract to develop and update a master planning document for 

ANSF facilities. AFCEE awarded a time-and-materials contract to MACTEC in April 2006.7

As part of the contract, MACTEC was also tasked to develop the ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities

Development, which is updated monthly. According to the executive summary, it “is a living document 

that will be regularly updated as the plans for specific locations are updated or as new sites and missions 

are identified.” We analyzed the August 2010 plan in detail and found that portions of the plan, such as 

the strategic and operational analysis sections for the ANA and ANP, were out of date. For example, the 

ANA operational section referred to ANA personnel end-strength figures from April 2007—namely, that 

the ANA would increase to 70,000 troops rather than the current ANA end-strength of 240,000 troops in

October 2013. Nevertheless, this plan was the most complete listing and analysis of ANSF facilities that 

CSTC-A provided. It contained 632 facility design plans.

 The contract 

states that MACTEC would develop planning documents for facilities related to CSTC-A’s mission as 

identified by CSTC-A’s Combined Joint-Engineering office. To date, MACTEC has been paid more than 

$33.1 million to design ANSF facilities, including conducting site surveys, meeting with Afghan military 

and police officials, and developing the requirements for new facilities such as the type of housing for 

military and police personnel, the primary purpose of the facility, and the types of supplies needed. 

8

• A conceptual master plan and supporting information, including (1) an introduction and 

planning process section; (2) a mission, vision, and charette

 According to the contract, the ANSF plan

should include one of the following for each facility: 

9

 

6 See SIGAR Audit-10-14. 

section; (3) a discussion and 

tabulation of existing and required facilities section; ( 4) a design-build scope of work section; 

and ( 5) an estimate section.

7

A time-and-materials contract provides for the acquisition of supplies or services on the basis of direct labor hours 

at fixed hourly rates and actual costs of materials. See the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 16.601(b).

8 In some cases, MACTEC noted that design plans could be used for similar facilities in multiple locations; thus, it 

had plans for more than 1,500 ANSF facilities. 9 According to MACTEC officials, master planning charettes (or meetings) are conducted with as many stakeholders 

as possible to discuss the planning for a specific ANSF site. Stakeholders include officials from CSTC-A and other 

U.S. officials depending on the type of facility, the Afghan Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior, as 

appropriate. 
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 5 

• A conceptual master site plan and abbreviated information section, including a summary of 

planning information currently available and a statement outlining the path forward for 

planning.

• A conceptual master plan template that would provide a prototype for sites that are similar in 

nature. Such templates include an estimate for the prototype, a design-build scope of work, and 

information for further planning or execution. 

For the purposes of our analysis, we separated the facility design plans into eight key components:

• introduction and planning; 

• mission, vision, and charette; 

• existing condition of component; 

• required facilities and assumptions; 

• conceptual master plan; 

• implementation program, including cost;

• scope of work; and 

• reference figures. 

As shown in table 2, we found that for 255 of the 632 design plans (40 percent), none of the eight 

components had been completed; another 113 design plans (18 percent) addressed four or fewer of the 

eight components. Only 24 design plans (less than 4 percent) addressed all eight components.
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 6 

Table 2: Facilities with Completed Components in 

the ANSF Comprehensive Plan dated August 2010

Number of 

completed 

components

ANA ANP ANSF 

total

Percentage 

of total

8 10 14 24 3.8

7 13 107 120 18.9

6 8 92 100 15.8

5 5 15 20 3.2

4 3 5 8 1.3

3 1 1 2 0.3

2 21 1 22 3.5

1 74 7 81 12.8

0 75 180 255 40.3

Total 210 422 632 100.0

Source: SIGAR analysis of the ANSF Comprehensive Plan for 

Facilities Development, August 2010.

According to MACTEC officials, the majority of the ANA and ANP design plans were not completed 

because CSTC-A had not tasked MACTEC to do so. However, a CSTC-A official stated that the ANSF plan 

was not meant to be a strategic planning document for facilities but rather a document that allows 

CSTC-A to keep track of facilities planning. According to this official, it is not a “forecasting document” 

that CSTC-A uses to provide a strategic rationale for the location of new facilities constructed for the 

ANSF. However, as we describe below, the ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities Development

includes a number of desired elements for long-range capital planning. 

GAO and OMB Have Developed Best Practices for Capital Investment that Could Improve 

Planning for ANSF Facilities

In 1998, GAO reported that leading private sector firms and state government organizations rank their 

future capital projects based on applicable criteria and prepare long-range capital plans based on 

preliminary assumptions and estimates to identify specific planned projects, plan for long-range

resource use, and establish priorities for implementation.10 Moreover, OMB encourages federal 

agencies to develop long-range capital plans as part of their capital planning process.11

 

10 GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making, GAO-AIMD-99-32, Dec. 1998. GAO 

developed this executive guide in conjunction with OMB. 11OMB, Capital Programming Guide, Version 2.0, Supplement to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, 

Part 7: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital Assets, June 2006. 
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 7 

According to the GAO guide, these plans usually cover 5-, 6-, or 10-year periods and are updated 

annually or biennially. The guide also notes that industry and state government leaders have found that 

long-range plans help control capital costs, and that developing long-range capital plans enables 

organizations to review and refine a proposed project’s scope and cost estimates over several years, 

which helps reduce cost overruns. The guide describes five principles and twelve best practices for 

making capital investment decisions. 

The ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities Development addresses some of the principles and best 

practices outlined in the GAO guide. According to SIGAR analysis, it incorporates project management 

techniques, involves stakeholders, uses a cross-functional team to plan for projects, monitors project 

performance, and budgets for segments of projects. However, it does not address principles that relate 

to long-range planning. For example, CSTC-A has not done a comprehensive needs assessment of the 

Afghan security goals that is linked to the construction of ANSF facilities and how they would help 

achieve those goals. Additionally, CSTC-A should identify how current ANSF facilities are meeting 

Afghan security objectives, identify gaps in current facilities’ ability to meet security objectives, and 

evaluate how planned facilities will help to eliminate those gaps. Table 3 illustrates the best practices 

outlined by GAO and whether CSTC-A’s planning document met those practices. 
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 8 

Table 3: Principles and Practices for Making Capital Investment Decisions and Those Practices 

Met by the ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities Development, August 2010

Principles Practices

Practice met?

Yes No

I. Integrate 

organizational goals into 

the capital decisionmaking process. 

1. Conduct comprehensive assessment of needs to meet 

results oriented goals and objectives. √

2. Identify current capabilities, including the use of an 

inventory of assets and their condition and determine if 

there is a gap between current and needed capabilities.

√

3. Decide how to best meet the gap by identifying and 

evaluating alternative approaches. √

II. Evaluate and select 

capital assets using an 

investment approach. 

4. Establish review and approval framework supported by 

analysis.

√

5. Rank and select projects based on established criteria. √

6. Develop a long-term capital plan that defines capital 

asset decisions. √

III. Balance budgetary 

control and managerial 

flexibility when funding 

capital projects. 

7. Budget for projects in useful segments. √

8. Consider innovative approaches to full up-front funding. √

IV. Use project 

management techniques 

to optimize project 

success. 

9. Monitor project performance and establish incentives for 

accountability. √

10. Use cross-functional teams to plan for and manage 

projects. √

V. Evaluate results and 

incorporate lessons 

learned into the decision 

making process. 

11. Evaluate results to determine if organization-wide goals 

have been met. √

12. Evaluate the decision-making process, reappraise, and 

update to ensure that goals are met. √

Source: SIGAR analysis of GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making, Dec. 1998, and CSTC-A’s

ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities Development, August 2010.

The GAO guide further states that although cost estimates contained in long-range capital plans are 

preliminary, they provide decision-makers with an overall sense of a project’s funding needs. 

Developing preliminary cost estimates for planned ANSF facilities would help commanders determine 

the total cost for a specific facility and apply it to similar facilities.
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 9 

Other U.S. departments and agencies have prepared long-range capital plans. In response to a January 

2001 GAO report,12 for example, the Department of State developed a Long-Range Overseas Buildings 

Plan.

13 It is a comprehensive 6-year plan documenting State’s overseas buildings program for the 

replacement of the least secure embassies and consulates around the world. Additionally, State 

developed a Long-Range Overseas Maintenance Plan in recognition of the importance of planning for 

the maintenance and sustainment of completed facilities.14

Long-Range Maintenance Plan Would Help CSTC-A Plan for Sustainability of ANSF Facilities

 State notes that these two volumes provide 

a more complete picture of what is needed to fully respond to each facility’s needs and protects its 

facilities and property investments. Moreover, State adds that proper maintenance of its multi-billion 

dollar investment in buildings will ultimately save the taxpayers money.

CSTC-A recognizes that long-range operations and maintenance for ANSF facilities need to be addressed. 

However, it does not have a separate plan to identify and rationalize ANSF maintenance requirements 

across the hundreds of ANSF facilities completed or planned. As State notes, its long-range

maintenance plan for embassies and consulates around the world has allowed it to prioritize 

maintenance requirements to help ensure the most effective and efficient use of appropriated 

maintenance funding.

As we previously reported, according to CSTC-A officials, the government of Afghanistan does not have 

the financial or technical capacity to sustain ANSF facilities once they are completed.15

In July 2010, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District, awarded two 

new contracts for operations and maintenance for ANSF facilities. These contracts cover ANA and ANP 

facilities in northern and southern Afghanistan for $450 million and $350 million, respectively. These 

indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts are for 1 base year plus 4 optional years.

 Since 2002, the 

United States and the international community have provided funding for sustainment of ANSF facilities. 

According to the CSTC-A 2008 Campaign Plan, future costs of sustainment may continue through 2025. 

In September 2006, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District, awarded an operations 

and maintenance contract for $200 million to Contrack International, Inc., to provide for the 

sustainment of ANSF facilities. When the contract expired in October 2009, it exercised an option to 

extend the ANA contract with Contrack International, Inc., until a new contract was awarded.

16

 

12 GAO, Embassy Construction: Better Long-Term Planning Will Enhance Program Decision-making, GAO-01-11 (Jan. 

22, 2001). 

 According to 

the program manager, these contracts may cover more than 660 sites. As sites are completed, they will 

be added with task orders as warranted.

13 The most current version is Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, FY2010-2015, 

Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (March 2010). 14 The most current version is Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, FY2010-2015, 

Long-Range Overseas Maintenance Plan (March 2010). 15 See SIGAR-Audit-10-09, SIGAR-Audit-10-10, and SIGAR-Audit-10-14. See also SIGAR, ANP Compound at 

Kandahar Generally Met Contract Terms but Has Project Planning, Oversight, and Sustainability Issues, Audit-10-12 

(July 22, 2010).

16Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts may be used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact 

times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award. See the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 16.5.
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 10

According to the program manager, the new contracts require a training program for Afghan workers in 

all aspects of operations and maintenance. The program will be expanded with each additional year to 

include all regions in Afghanistan. CSTC-A plans to transfer responsibility for all operations and 

maintenance for the ANSF facilities to the government of Afghanistan by 2013. The additional optional

years for the contract would be included if all the ANSF facilities are not turned over by 2013.

CONCLUSION

Although the rapid pace of operations in Afghanistan and changing ANSF requirements are fluid and 

difficult to predict, these conditions also reinforce the need for overall planning and justification for 

both planned ANA and ANP facilities and those completed or under construction. Our prior audits of 

ANA and ANP infrastructure projects have highlighted shortcomings in facilities planning and 

maintenance. CSTC-A reports that over $7 billion is needed for ANSF facilities construction in fiscal years 

2010 through 2012; and we note that up to $800 million may be provided for operations and 

maintenance over the next 5 years. 

However, despite the considerable funding and the large number of facilities involved, CSTC-A has not 

prepared a long-range capital construction plan that supports strategic objectives; maximizes the 

strategic effectiveness of the ANSF; and, in the end, will meet the Government of Afghanistan’s security 

objectives. A long-range capital construction plan would improve accountability and transparency over 

CSTC-A’s decision-making for ANSF facilities construction that will be ongoing through 2012 and beyond, 

as well as help CSTC-A and the government of Afghanistan to ensure that, as requirements change, plans 

can be adapted as required and resources can be prioritized and used effectively to achieve overall 

strategic goals. Other U.S. departments and agencies have prepared long-range capital plans—State has 

done so for its multiyear, multibillion dollar worldwide embassy construction program. Industry and 

state government leaders have found that long-range plans help control capital costs, and that 

developing long-range capital plans enables organizations to review and refine a proposed project’s 

scope and cost estimates over several years, which helps reduce cost overruns. Without an ANSF 

facilities plan that reflects current requirements, CSTC-A puts its $11.4 billion ANSF facilities construction 

program at risk, including building facilities that are inadequate for the projected 400,000 ANSF 

personnel in 2013 or do not meet the ANSF’s strategic and operational needs. 

In addition, although the United States has a contract for operations and maintenance of ANSF facilities

potentially through 2015, CSTC-A does not have a long-range maintenance plan linking requirements to 

long-range construction plans. Such a plan would allow CSTC-A to prioritize requirements to help ensure 

the most effective and efficient use of maintenance funding and help ensure that ANSF facilities are 

available for use as intended and, with proper maintenance of the multi-billion dollar investment in 

ANSF facilities, ultimately save the taxpayers money. 
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 11

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that CSTC-A maximizes the use of facilities construction funding and that these facilities 

address ANSF strategic goals and objectives, we recommend that the Commanding General, CSTC-A: 

1. Develop a planning document that incorporates updated requirements for ANSF facilities; 

addresses the justification for and location of all ANSF facilities; determines how they meet 

strategic objectives for security; and discusses how facilities will be shared, expanded, or 

constructed to meet CSTC-A’s projected end strength of 400,000 personnel in October 2013. 

This plan should address the principles and best practices identified in the December 1998 

Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making. 

In addition, to help ensure these facilities can be utilized as intended, we recommend that the 

Commanding General, CSTC-A: 

2. Develop a long-range operations and maintenance plan for all ANSF facilities that is linked to a 

long-range construction plan.

COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this report to USFOR-A and CSTC-A for their comments. CSTC-A provided us 

written comments through USFOR-A and CENTCOM (see appendix III). We also met with CSTC-A 

officials to discuss their comments. 

Overall, CSTC-A agreed with the report’s findings. In addition, CSTC-A noted several steps it has taken or 

is in the process of taking to enhance its planning effort, including expanding its engineering capability 

and establishing the Strategic Basing Executive Board to oversee the development of a “holistic” basing 

concept that includes coalition, U.S. Forces, and ANSF construction. Once this and the other steps 

outlined in CSTC-A’s comments have been completed, CSTC-A will have substantially addressed our 

concerns.

CSTC-A did not fully concur with our recommendation to develop a long-range facilities’ construction 

plan, but CSTC-A noted that it can improve the identification of future projects and better document its 

priorities. However, CSTC-A questioned the applicability of the GAO/OMB Executive Guide’s suggested 

approach for developing a long-range facilities’ construction plan in a war zone. In the report, we cited 

the example of the Department of State and its long-range facilities construction and operations and 

maintenance plans because we considered it particularly relevant. The Department of State has 

thousands of facilities around the world, with some in contingency environments, including Afghanistan. 

While we understand the exigencies and demands of operating in a contingency environment, these 

conditions reinforce the need for an overall planning document and justification for the hundreds of 

ANSF facilities CSTC-A has built or plans to build. Such a document is important for CSTC-A and the 

Afghan government to ensure that, as requirements change, plans can be adapted as needed and 

resources can be prioritized and used effectively to achieve overall strategic goals.

In regard to our recommendation to develop a long-range operations and maintenance plan, CSTC-A 

stated that it completely agreed, and added that it has asked for additional staff from DOD to form the 

Infrastructure Training and Advisory Group. The Group will implement a long-range operations and 
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 12

maintenance plan for all ANSF facilities. According to CSTC-A, the current operations and maintenance 

contract is meant as a bridge to span several years until this effort is resourced.

Finally, CSTC-A provided us with updated funding figures for ANSF facilities construction, which we 

incorporated into the final report.
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 13

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s audit of the U.S. overall planning process for the construction of the Afghanistan 

National Security Forces (ANSF) facilities in Afghanistan. SIGAR initially contacted the U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM) to begin this audit, but CENTCOM directed us to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

(USFOR-A), which in turn directed us to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

(CSTC-A).

To identify the funding provided and planned for ANSF facilities, we reviewed documents that CSTC-A 

provided on the ANSF facilities and infrastructure cost; we also addressed these matters with CSTC-A 

officials.

To assess CSTC-A’s planning for the construction of ANSF facilities, we interviewed officials at CSTC-A, 

Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE), and MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, 

Inc., (MACTEC). MACTEC provided us with the ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities Development, 

August 2010. We reviewed the comprehensive plan to determine how many of the eight key 

components MACTEC considered for each facility planning section. Based on our analysis, the eight key 

components were (1) introduction and planning; (2) mission, vision, and charette; (3) existing condition 

of component; (4) required facilities and assumptions; (5) conceptual master plan; (6) implementation 

program, including cost; (7) scope of work; and (8) reference figures. Additionally, in response to our 

inquiries, CSTC-A provided other documents that it asserted addressed ANSF facilities planning 

(see app. II). We also reviewed several U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports addressing 

long-term capital planning and met with its subject matter experts to determine the applicability of its 

December 1998 Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making to ANSF facilities 

planning. We used the GAO guide’s descriptions of the principles and practices to determine which ones 

the ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities Development addressed. 

To assess CSTC-A’s planning for the maintenance of ANSF facilities, we confirmed that a facilities’

operation and maintenance contract was entered into by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Afghan 

Engineering District. In connection with other audits, we discussed the contracts with the project 

manager to help ensure we understood the contracts’ provisions and requirements.

We conducted work in Washington, D.C., from July 2010 to January 2011 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit 

to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit was conducted by the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, 

as amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. 
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 14

APPENDIX II: PLANNING DOCUMENTS PROVIDED TO SIGAR 

Since February 2010, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has provided us 

with numerous documents that it asserted addressed the planning for Afghanistan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) facilities. However, we determined that none of these documents addressed the overall 

justification or rationale for these facilities or provided details on how CSTC-A plans to expand, share, or 

construct new facilities to meet ongoing and future requirements. The documents CSTC-A provided, 

others we reviewed, and our assessments of them follow.

• United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008. We 

reviewed this plan in January 2010. We found that it details how CSTC-A would work with the 

Afghan Ministry of Defense and Afghan Ministry of Interior to increase management and 

assessment procedures for the ANSF. Also in January 2010, we reviewed the CSTC-A Campaign 

Plan for the Development of Afghanistan National Security Forces, September 2008. It

addressed goals to build and develop Afghan ministerial institutional capability and to generate 

and develop fielded forces. However, neither plan provided information on how current and 

future Afghanistan National Army (ANA) personnel will be deployed or the rationale and longrange plans for ANA garrisons. 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 2008, Security Forces Fund Justification for Iraq 

Security Forces Fund (ISFF) and Aghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). CSTC-A provided this 

document in February 2010. We found that this funding document addressed several ANSF 

facilities, including several ANA garrisons, and cited an ANA Master Plan for Facilities 

Development, October 2005, as justification. However, CSTC-A officials were not aware of this 

“master plan” and could not locate a copy. 

• Conceptual Master Plan for the ANA. CSTC-A provided this document in April 2010. We found 

that it addressed the mission and facility requirements for a number of ANA command-level 

sustainment organizations—including the Kabul Military Training Center, a Ministry of Defense 

compound, a medical command, an acquisition agency, and an Afghan National Army training 

command. The planning and analysis of these ANA facilities appeared detailed and 

comprehensive. However, the plan provided to us did not address the ANA Corps, was not 

signed or dated, and was missing numerous pages. 

• Operations Order #01/2010. CSTC-A provided this document in June 2010. We determined that 

the order appeared to be an overall statement of CSTC-A’s role and its relationship with other 

organizations. 

• ANA Fielding Plan (Annex K), Version 20. CSTC-A provided this to us in June 2010. We 

determined that Annex K was a spreadsheet listing numerous ANA kandaks (battalions) and the 

dates they were scheduled to attend training and deploy to a garrison or other facility. 

• Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Campaign Plan for the Development of Enduring National 

Security and Police Forces. MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., (MACTEC) provided us this 

plan in September 2010. We found that the document was not dated or signed, and referred to 

ANA and ANP personnel levels from 2007. It did not address ANSF facilities planning.

• MOI Internal National Security Strategy, dated September 2006. MACTEC provided this strategy 

document in September 2010. We found that it had not been updated since 2006 and did not 

provide information on the justification for ANSF facilities.
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 15

• Afghan National Army Force Generation Plan and support documents to this plan, dated May 

2010. CSTC-A provided us this plan in November 2010. We found that it did not address how 

ANSF facilities will support planned troop increases.

• The U.S. Basing Strategy-Afghanistan. CSTC-A provided this strategy in November 2010. It was 

created in response to a March 2010 U.S. Central Command tasking that stated that United 

States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) had no U.S. basing strategy that outlined the planned 

expansion of infrastructure in Afghanistan to support Operation Enduring Freedom. The U.S. 

Basing Strategy-Afghanistan provides base planning criteria for USFOR-A to use to locate a new 

base or expand an existing base but did not address any ANSF facilities. 
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 16

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN(NTM-A/CSTC-A)
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 17
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 18
SIGAR Audit-11-6 Security/ANSF Facilities Planning 19

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-028A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan. 

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its 

Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983 

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202