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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-3515

U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

E UG E N E C L ARKE, also known as Imhotep Bey , also known as Eu gene Clark, Jr., Defen dant-Appellant.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Indi ana, Hammond Di v i sio n. No. 2: 13 -cr- 00 13 9- RL-JE M- 1 — Rudy Loza no , Judg e.
A RGU E D M A

Y 28, 2015

— D E C I D E D S E PT E MB E R 8, 2015

Before B AU E R

, E A S T E R

B R OO K , and R I P PL E, Circ uit Judges.
B AU E R , Cir cui t Judge. On June 2 a nd 3, 2014, defendantappellant, Eugene Clark e, stood tr i al for sev en counts of fi ling a false clai m wi th the Uni ted St ates in violati on of 18 U

. S

. C

. § 287. At the close of the government’s evidenc e, Clark e mov ed for judgment of acquitt a l under Feder al Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arg uing that the government fai l e d t o present2 No. 14-3515

any evidenc e that he knew the clai ms he presented w ere false. The di stric t court deni ed the motion. Cl a r k e a l so requested a jury instructi on on goo d fai th, whi ch the di stric t co ur t also deni ed. The jury ulti mately convic ted hi m on all counts. Clark e now appeals hi s convic tion, as w ell as the di stric t court’s ruling on the j ury ins tr ucti on.

I. BACKGRO UND In Au gust 2009, Clark e sub mi tte d federal tax ret urns for the “Eugene Clark e T

rust” for tax y ears 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each ret urn clai med that the t rust had recei v ed $900,000 in inc ome and e x p e nd ed $900,000 in fi duci ary fees, but di d not i denti fy
a p a rti cu l a r source for the income. Each ret urn further repo rt ed that $300,000 of federal tax had been wit hh e l d and pai d ov er to the Inter nal Rev enue Ser vic e (“IRS”), and each there fore requeste d $ 3 00,000 in refunds. Clark e i denti fi ed the tr ust’s fi duci ary as “Ti mothy F

. Gei ther” (an apparent mi ssp elling of the name of then-Secret ary of the T reasury , Ti mothy Gei thner), whi ch rais ed a red flag at the IRS reg ardin g the legiti macy of the ret urns. As a result, the IRS not ifie d Clark e that the ret urns w ere consi dered fri v olous and w ould not be p ro c e s s e d

. Undeter red, Clark e resubmi tte d the ret ur ns for y ears 2006, 2007, and 2008 in December 2009. The ret urns again asked that the “Eugene Clark e T

rust” be refunded $300,000 for each y ear , but di d not name “Gei ther” as the fi duci ary of the tr ust. Astonis hingly

, the IRS processed all three r eturns and mailed Clark e thre e $300,000 checks on J anuary 5, 2010.
Four days after receiving the chec ks, Clark e atte mpt e d to cash one of them at PLS Check Cashers in Ga r y , I ndi ana. S us p i ci ous of the v ali di ty of the chec k, di stric t manage rNo. 14-3515 3
St ephen Ey abi questi oned Clar k e about how he obtained i t. Clark e explain ed that the chec k w as giv en to hi m out of a tr ust fund from hi s deceased father

. Ey abi then gav e Clark e a partial payment of $2,500 wi th the un derstandi ng that Clark e w ould receiv e the remain ing amount after the chec k cleared (less the 5-10% ch eck cash ing fee). Before the check cleared, Clark e ret urned the $2,500 and too k the chec k back. On January 12, 2010, Clark e o p ened a bank accoun t wi th Harris Bank and deposi ted one of the $3 0 0 , 0 0 0 chec ks. He deposi ted the second chec k into the
accoun t on January 13, 2010, and the th ir d on Februar y 24, 2010. Wi thin months of deposi tin g the chec ks, Clark e spent all of the funds

. It w as not unti l 2013 that Clark e w as indi cted in connecti on wi th the three fraudulent refunds. O n N o v ember 21, 2013, Clark e w as charged wi th a tot al of sev en counts of presentin g false c lai ms to the United Stat es throug h the IRS

. Clark e pleaded no t gui lty to the charges a g a inst hi m and the ca se p ro ceeded to tr i al. The government put on three wi tnesses. Kr i sty Mor gan, a Court Wi tness Coo rdin ator for the IRS , testifi ed reg ard ing the IRS ’s process for exami ning tax ret urns. She also testifi ed that who e ver si gned a tax ret urn form w as declaring that the ret urn contai ned information that

w as tr ue and corr ect. Gerard Hatagan, a Rev enue Agent for the IRS , testifi ed that although a tr ust could be drawn up and not fund ed, as w as Clark e’s alleged fu nd, Clark e’s ret urn lacked
some degr ee of economi c reality

. Lastly , St ephen Ey abi, the di stric t manager of the chec k cashing company where Clark e tr i ed to cash his fi rst $300,000 chec k, te sti fi ed that Clar ke t old4 No. 14-3515
hi m that he came to possess the chec k becau se of “a tr ust fund becau se hi s dad hadpass ed.” At the close of the government’s evidenc e , Clark e mov ed for acqui ttal pursuant to Rule 29, arg uing that the government had not proven one of the elements of the offense—that the defendant knew the c lai m w as false. The di stric t c ourt deni ed Clark e’s motion for acquit t al, on the gr ound that there w as suffi ci ent evidenc e from whi ch a jury could reasonably find Clark e gui lty o n all coun ts. After the parties rested, t he di stric t court di strib uted the propo sed jury instructi ons, whi ch di d not inclu de a goo d fai th instructi on that Clark e had requested prior to tr i al. Objecting 1 to the omi ssi on, Clark e arg ued that the instructi on co mp l ement ed the instructi on on the elements of an 18 U.S.C

. § 2 8 7 offense. When asked whether he pres ented any evidenc e of goo d fai th, Clark e responded t ha t i t w as the government’s burden to prove there w as no goo d fai th. The government di sagree d an d a rg ued that the goo d fai th instructi on sub mi tte d

r e l a t e d to wi llful ness, whi ch i s not an element of a § 287 offense. The di stric t c ourt deni ed the instructi on and gav e the following i nstructi on i nstead: A person acts knowi ngly i f he r e ali zes what he i s doin g and i s aw are of the nature of hi s conduc t, and

Clarke had argued that the instructi on was appropr i ate b ecause he h ad 1 a goo d f aith beli ef tha t the go v ernment owed him the money he r ecei v ed. Though ba rred fro m tri al pur suant to the government’s moti on i n l i mine,
a pretri al psychiatri c repo rt explained tha t Cl arke was of the b el i ef tha t the U nited States i s a b usiness fro nt desi gned to regul ate commerc e and ha s estab l i shed bank accounts in the nam es o f i ts ci tizens

.No. 14-3515 5
does not act thro u gh i gn or ance, mi stake, or acci dent. In deci din g whether the defendant acted knowi ngly , y ou may consi der all of the evidenc e, including what the defendant di d or said. Thereafter

, the j ury conv i cted Clark e on all counts. II. DISCUSSION Clark e rais es tw o challen ges on appeal. First, he arg ues that the di stric t c ourt err ed in denyi ng h i s moti on for j udgment of acqui ttal becau se the government fai led to present any evidenc e of an essenti al element of the charges a g a inst hi m. Second, he arg ues that the di stric t court err ed in rej ecting hi s goo d fai th jury instructi on. W e rev i ew each arg ument in turn. A. Suffici ency of the Evidence Clark e fir st arg ues that the di stric t court err ed when i t deni ed hi s motion fo r j ud g ment of acqui ttal. W e rev i ew a di stric t court’s deci si on to deny a motion fo r judgment of acqui ttal de novo

. United States v
. W esterfield, 714 F .3d 480, 484 (7th Ci r
. 2013). “In consi dering challen ges to the suffi ci ency of the evidenc e, w e ‘view the evidenc e in the li ght most fav or able to the prosecuti on,’ and then ‘ask whether any rat i onal tr i er of fact could hav e found the essenti al elements of a cri me bey ond
a reasonable doubt.’” U n ited States v
. Foley, 740 F .3d 1079, 1082–83 (7th Ci r
. 2014) (quoti ng United States v
. Boender , 649 F .3d 650, 654 (7th Ci r
. 2011)). W e wi ll ov ert urn a gui lty v erdic t only i f t he recor d i s devo id o f evidenc e from whi ch a reasonable jury could find g uilt bey ond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Groves , 470 F .3d 311, 323 (7th Ci r . 2006).6 No. 14-3515
The indi ctment charged Clark e wi th violating 18 U.S.C. § 287. The statute pro vides in pertinent part: Whoev er makes or presents to any person or offi cer in the

... service of the U ni ted St ates, or to any department or agency there of, any clai m upon or again st the Uni ted St ates, or any department or agency there of, knowing such clai m to be false, fi cti tious, or fraudulent, shall be i mpri soned not mo re than fi v e y ears and shall be subject t o a fi ne ... . Thus, to convic t Clark e, the go ver nm ent bore the burden of prov ing t ha t (1) Clark e presented clai ms to the IRS ; (2) those clai ms w ere false, fi cti tious, or fraudulent, and (3) Clark e knew the clai ms w ere false, fi cti tious, or fraudulent. See United States

v. Haddon , 927 F .2d 942, 950–51 (7th Ci r . 1991). Only the thi rd element i s in disp ute. Accordi ng to Clark e, the government di d not prove that he knew hi s clai m w as false becau se i t fai led to p ut forth evidenc e that Clark e wi llful ly presented false clai ms. Clarke clai ms that he had a g ood faith beli ef that the money he requested from t he IRS belonged to hi m, and wi thout ev i dence of wi llfulness negating that beli ef, the go v ernment cannot meet its bu rden of pro of. Contr ary to Clark e’s contention, the government need not prove wi llful ness in a § 287 case. United States v
. Catto n , 89 F .3d 387, 392 (7th Ci r
. 1996); see also United States v
. Fer guson , 793 F .2d 828, 831 (7th Ci r
. 1986). In Catto n , w e stated “[i ]t i s i mpli ci t in the fi ling of a know ingly false clai m that the clai mant intends to defraud the government, and hence unnec essary to charge wi llful ness separately .” 89 F .3d at 392. The governmentNo. 14-3515 7
need only prove tha t C l a r ke made a clai m upon the Uni ted S t a tes knowing that the clai m w as false. Fer guson , 793 F .2d a t 831

. The government has presented suffi ci ent proo f that Clark e k ne w hi s clai ms w ere false; Clark e’s tax ret urns demonstrate that knowledge o n t he i r face. The ret urns li sted $900,000 in income, wi thout i denti fying how t hi s income w as obtained. The fi duci ary fees li sted on the ret urns w ere also in the amount of $900,000, but wi th no explanation for why a fi duci ary , in thi s case “T i mothy F . Gei ther ,” w ould take such a fee. Finally , the ret urns clai med wi thholdi ng of $300,000, but no such fund s
w ere ev er wi thheld. W e hav e held before t ha t “patently false and ut t e rly gr oundless ” tax ret urn forms w ere suffi ci ent to demonstrate the defenda nt ’s knowledge of the falsi ty of her clai ms in violati on of 18 U.S.C. § 287. Fer guson , 793 F .2d at 831. In Fer guson , the defendant fi led sev eral form s t o t he IRS seeki ng tax refunds for taxe s she pai d, as w ell as taxe s wi thheld by her employ er

. 793 F .2d at 831. W e conclu ded that the “forms on their face demonstrate [the defendant’s] knowledge of the falsi ty of her clai ms,” where the name on one form reflected her effort s t o g ain a refund thro ugh her baseles s interpr etat i on o f tax laws and where some of the forms reflected a re fu nd fo r a tax that the defendant w as nev er required to pay

. Id

. Clark e ’ s cl ai ms are si mi larly gr oundless

. Becaus e the information on Clark e’s tax ret urns w as “patently false and utter ly gr o undless, id. , Clark e’s forms prov i de suffi ci ent evidenc e for a jury to conclu de Clark e knew the falsi ty o f hi s cl ai ms.8 No. 14-3515

B. Jury Instruct ion Clark e also contends that the di stric t court err ed in declining to giv e hi s propo sed goo d fai th jury instructi on. W e rev i ew a di stric t court’s refusal to gi v e a jury instructi on for an abus e of di screti on. U n i te d S tat es v
. Morris , 576 F .3d 661 (7th Ci r
. 2009). A goo d fai th theor y i s “essenti ally a clai m that t he d e fendant di d not act wi llful ly .” United States v
. Kokenis , 662 F .3d 919, 930 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (ci tations omi tte d). An instr ucti on on such a theor y i s there fore unnec essary where wi llfulness i s not
an element of the offense charged. As di scu ssed a bo v e, wi llful ness i s no t a n e l ement of a § 287 clai m. See Catto n , 89 F .3d at 392; Fer

guson , 793 F .2d at 831. Therefore , Clark e w as not entitled to an instructi on on g o o d fai th and the di stric t court di d not abuse i ts di screti on i n denying i t.

III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, w e AFF IRM the judgment of the dis tr i ct court and Clark e’s convi cti on.