NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STAN CHRISTIANSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v.

THE BOEING COMPANY, a Delaware 

company with its headquarters in Illinois 

doing business in the state of Washington,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-35472

D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01349-RSM

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 5, 2023**

Seattle, Washington

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Stan Christianson (“Christianson”) appeals the adverse summary judgment 

in his action against The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) asserting Washington state 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 8 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

claims of employment discrimination due to his sleep-related disabilities of 

insomnia and sleep apnea. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We 

review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment,” Christian v. 

Umpqua Bank, 984 F.3d 801, 808 (9th Cir. 2020), and we affirm.

Christianson cannot prevail on his failure to accommodate claim under 

Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), Wash. Rev. Code 

§ 49.60.180(2) because he failed to provide Boeing “notice of the abnormality and 

its accompanying substantial limitations.” See Gamble v. City of Seattle, 431 P.3d 

1091, 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). Boeing maintains a formal process for 

employees to request disability accommodations that Christianson successfully 

utilized multiple times in the past. Yet, Christianson never submitted a formal 

request for accommodation due to his sleep-related disabilities despite his 

familiarity—and success—with the program. Boeing cannot be held responsible 

for Christianson’s failure to notify his employer that his sleep-related disabilities 

substantially limited his ability to perform his job such that accommodation was 

needed. See id. at 1097. 

Christianson’s disparate treatment claim fails because he does not raise an 

inference of unlawful discrimination. See Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 316 P.3d 

520, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). He provides no evidence that Boeing treated him 

differently than any other employee because of his disability. See Kirby v. City of 
3 

Tacoma, 98 P.3d 827, 834 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). The district court properly found 

that a failure to consistently appear at work in violation of established company 

policy is the type of discharge that “would typically result in discharge in any 

employment setting.”

Even if Christianson established a prima facie case for these claims, he must 

establish either that the asserted reason for his termination was pretextual or that 

“discrimination, retaliation, or violation of public policy also was a substantial 

motivating factor for the termination” to prevail. See Mackey v. Home Depot USA, 

Inc., 459 P.3d 371, 387 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). Christianson cannot do so because 

Boeing presented legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-retaliatory reasons for

Christianson’s termination—namely, his failure to comply with Boeing’s 

attendance policies and failure to communicate appropriately with his supervisor

despite progressive discipline and warnings. See Fulton v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & 

Health Servs., 279 P.3d 500, 506–07 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

AFFIRMED.