SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced 

Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military 

Training Center

October 26, 2011
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page i

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

October 26, 2011

General James N. Mattis 

Commander, U.S. Central Command

General John R. Allen

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and 

Commander, International Security Assistance Force 

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV 

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

Mr. Terry Edwards 

Director, Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s audit of U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) 

infrastructure projects at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). The report includes four

recommendations. These include two recommendations to the Commanding General, Combined 

Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), to strengthen the planning process and two 

recommendations to the Director, AFCEE, to strengthen contract administration and to seek 

reimbursement from one of the contractors for the cost of electrical repairs related to poor 

performance by its Afghan subcontractors. 

When preparing the final report, we considered comments from CSTC-A and AFCEE. These comments 

are reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. CSTC-A concurred with both recommendations 

made to the CSTC-A Commanding General. AFCEE stated that it has taken steps to implement the first 

recommendation regarding contract administration, but disagreed with the recommendation to seek 

reimbursement from the contractor because the contractor had not willfully avoided its responsibility or 

acted in bad faith. Contract performance, including work of the subcontractors, is the responsibility of 

the prime contractor, irrespective of the prime contractor’s conduct. Therefore, we are retaining the 

recommendation. 

A summary of this report is on page ii. We conducted this performance audit under the authority of 

Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General 

Reform Act of 2008. 

Steven J Trent

Acting Special Inspector General

for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page ii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-12-2 October 2011

Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced 

Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military 

Training Center

What SIGAR Reviewed

A key objective of the coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own security by

housing, training, equipping, and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces. The Combined Security Transition 

Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provided $140 million to the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

(AFCEE) to support construction of facilities at the Kabul Military Training Facility (KMTC), Afghanistan’s primary training 

base for new recruits into the Afghan National Army (ANA). KMTC is a critical component of CSTC-A’s training mission 

and the overall strategy to transition security to Afghan security forces. It is being built in phases. AFCEE has awarded 

three task orders, one for each phase. The task orders for Phases I and II were awarded to AMEC Earth and 

Environmental, Inc. (AMEC) and the task order for Phase III was awarded to ECC International (ECC). AFCEE officials 

were responsible for providing contract oversight of construction activities. This report examines (1) construction at 

KMTC, including changes in cost and schedule, the reasons for changes, and whether construction met contract 

requirements, (2) construction oversight and the completeness of contract files, and (3) plans for sustaining KMTC 

facilities once constructed. To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed relevant contract files; performed site 

inspections at KMTC; and interviewed officials from CSTC-A and AFCEE, among others. We conducted our work at AFCEE 

headquarters in San Antonio, Texas; Kabul, Afghanistan; and Washington, D.C., among other places from December 

2010 to October 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found

KMTC has experienced both cost growth and schedule delays. Cost for Phases I and II grew by a total of $12.5 million—

$3.3 million for Phase I and $9.2 million for Phase II. Phase I was completed August 31, 2009, 1 year and 6 months late. 

Phase II, which ran concurrently with Phase I, was completed on January 9, 2010, nearly 2 years late. The cost growth 

and delays occurred due to a variety of factors, including additional work, poor contractor performance, and inaccurate 

site information. Overall, AFCEE data show that the KMTC schedule delays are not unique because the large majority of 

AFCEE projects for CSTC-A—80 percent—experienced similar delays. Oversight weaknesses occurred in Phases I and II 

at KMTC; however, AFCEE has strengthened oversight of Phase III. Although the quality assurance contractor identified 

electrical problems as early as June 2008, AFCEE did not address the problems until fires began to occur at the end of 

that year. Two key factors contributed to the electrical problems—an acceleration of the construction schedule without 

a commensurate increase in oversight and the use of substandard and counterfeit supplies. AFCEE has paid more to 

repair the electrical damage than required under the terms of the contracts—as much as $4.3 million. SIGAR also found 

that, although the Federal Acquisition Regulation directs that contract files contain sufficient documentation to 

constitute a complete history of the transaction, the KMTC task order files contained incomplete or contradictory 

information as to the reasons for modifying the contract. Therefore, it was not possible always to ascertain the reasons 

for increases in costs or schedule.

Sustainment of completed KMTC construction has been transferred to an operations and maintenance contract that

covers the sustainment of multiple Afghan National Security Forces facilities, including KMTC. However, the funding 

under this contract is being expended faster than anticipated. SIGAR has an ongoing audit of the implementation of two 

operations and maintenance contracts for the sustainment of these facilities.

What SIGAR Recommends

SIGAR is making two recommendations to the Commanding General, CSTC-A, in coordination with the Director, AFCEE,

to strengthen the planning process. CSTC-A concurred with both recommendations. SIGAR is also making two 

recommendations to the Director, AFCEE, to strengthen contract administration and to seek reimbursement from one 

of the contractors for the cost of electrical repairs related to poor performance by its Afghan subcontractors. AFCEE 

stated that it has taken steps to implement the first recommendation regarding contract administration. However it 

disagreed with the second recommendation stating that AMEC had not willfully avoided its responsibility. Irrespective 

of AMEC’s conduct, contract performance, including work of the subcontractors, is the responsibility of the prime 

contractor. Therefore, we are retaining the recommendation. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ...................................................................................................................................................2

Construction at KMTC Is Taking Longer Than Planned and Costing More Than 

Originally Budgeted................................................................................................................................5

Quality Assurance Shortfalls In Phases I and II Contributed to Electrical 

Problems, But Oversight Has Improved In Phase III.............................................................................14

KMTC Is Not Sustainable Without Continued U.S. Assistance....................................................................19

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................19

Recommendations......................................................................................................................................20

Comments...................................................................................................................................................20

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology.........................................................................................................22

Appendix II: Comments from The NATO Training MissionAfghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan ...................................................23

Appendix III: Comments from the Air Force Center for Engineering and the 

Environment.........................................................................................................................................28

TABLES

Table 1: Contract FA8903-06-D-8507, Task Order 05 (Phase I, Cost-Plus-FixedFee) and Modifications...........................................................................................................................6

Table 2: Contract FA8903-06-D-8507, Task Order 06 (Phase II, Cost-Plus-FixedFee) and Modifications..........................................................................................................................8

PHOTOS

Photo 1: KMTC Phases I and II Completed Construction of Barracks Buildings...........................................3

Photo 2: KMTC Phase III Ongoing Construction...........................................................................................4

Photo 3: Gymnasium Used as Barracks......................................................................................................10

Photo 4: KMTC Phase III Construction Site ................................................................................................10

Photo 5: KMTC Phase III Construction – Previously Unknown Buried Soviet-era 

Foundation ...........................................................................................................................................13
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page iv

ABREVIATIONS

AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment

AMEC AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc.

ANA Afghan National Army

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

CO Contracting Officer

COR Contracting Officer’s Representative

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan

DNC Discrepancy and Non-Compliance

DPW Department of Public Works

ECC ECC International

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

ITAG Installation Training Advisory Group

KMTC Kabul Military Training Center

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 1

Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and 

Costs at the Kabul Military Training Center

One objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to build the country’s capacity to provide for its own 

security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).1

The Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) is Afghanistan’s primary training base for new recruits into 

the ANA. At the time the first plan for developing KMTC was developed in 2006, the size of the ANA was 

set at 70,000 personnel, but is now planned to grow to approximately 195,000 by December 2013. 

Since 2006, the plans for KMTC have changed three times to accommodate the ANA’s planned growth. 

The number of recruits at KMTC has grown from 4,000-6,000 in November 2006 to almost 11,000 in 

May 2011. As a result of these increases, through August 2011, $140 million has been obligated for 

construction to expand KMTC. 

A key part of this 

mission is the training of new recruits into the Afghan National Army (ANA). Between fiscal years 2005 

and 2011, the U.S. Congress appropriated about $39.5 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 

which provides the funding to train and equip the ANSF. All U.S. funding for ANSF goes through the 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A’s mission includes developing 

the ANA as a self-sustaining, standing army.

Between fiscal years 2006 and 2010, CSTC-A funded three task orders through the Air Force Center for 

Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) to support construction at KMTC. Construction includes 

barracks, classrooms, administration buildings, training facilities, and associated utilities including power 

generation and wastewater treatment. Construction for Phases I and II is complete and the facilities are 

being used by the ANA. A task order was awarded September 29, 2010, for Phase III construction. 

Planning is underway for additional phases. In addition to the $140 million already obligated, CSTC-A 

plans to spend $20 million more for KMTC expansion through fiscal year 2012.

This report is part of a series of performance audits by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) examining contract outcomes, costs, and oversight. This report examines 

(1) construction at KMTC, including changes in cost and schedule, the reasons for changes, and whether 

construction met contract requirements; (2) construction oversight and the completeness of contract 

files; and (3) plans for sustaining KMTC facilities once constructed.

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed relevant contract files, including the statements of work, 

modifications, available construction plans and specifications, and quality assurance plans and reports. 

We examined criteria and guidance defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), as well as 

AFCEE's final and draft policies. We conducted a site visit to KMTC, where we viewed completed and 

ongoing construction, and we interviewed officials from AFCEE headquarters in San Antonio, Texas; 

AFCEE-Afghanistan; CSTC-A; U.S. Army Corps of Engineer Afghanistan; AMEC Earth and Environmental, 

Inc. (AMEC); and ECC International (ECC). We also interviewed officials from Versar, responsible for 

quality assurance at KMTC, and MACTEC, responsible for site conceptual master planning, each under 

 1

ANSF includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 2

separate contracts with AFCEE. We conducted our work at AFCEE headquarters in San Antonio, Texas; 

Kabul, Afghanistan; Washington, D.C.; AMEC’s corporate office in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania;

Versar’s office in Westminster, Colorado; and MACTEC’s office in Kennesaw, Georgia, from December 

2010 to October 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more 

detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is in appendix I. 

BACKGROUND

KMTC is a former Soviet military training base built in the 1980s. KMTC provides the ANA with individual 

training for soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers to supply the ANA with personnel capable 

of conducting successful military operations in defense of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. As stated 

in the conceptual master plan, KMTC facilities include classrooms and barracks, among other facilities,

for personnel stationed there. Training ranges support the full range of live-fire training required for all 

ANA weapons. Maneuver training areas support unit training up to kandak2

AFCEE performs construction contracting services on behalf of CSTC-A. A memorandum of agreement, 

dated August 8, 2006, between AFCEE and CSTC-A delineates the services and the costs of those services 

that AFCEE will provide to CSTC-A, including contracting for real property construction and quality 

assurance services. In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, AFCEE established an 

in-country contracting officer’s representative (COR) and provided contract administration and technical 

support. 

level. Vehicle training 

areas permit operator training on all vehicles used by the ANA.

Through April 2011, AFCEE has obligated approximately $140 million for construction at KMTC for three 

task orders under an indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity contract:

3 Phase I at $41 million, Phase II at 

$28 million, and Phase III at $71 million. AFCEE awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee task orders for Phases I and 

II to AMEC and a firm-fixed-price task order for Phase III to ECC.

4

 2

A training kandak is an ANA military training unit of about 1,200 soldiers.

 Work required under these task orders 

included planning, design, and construction. AFCEE decided to shift from using cost-plus contracts to a 

firm-fixed-price contract in response to the lessons it learned from Phases I and II. Specifically, AFCEE 

found in 2010 that site conditions were known, security conditions were relatively stable, suppliers were 

available, and the scope of work was reasonably defined.

3

Indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity contracts provide for an indefinite quantity of services during a fixed period 

of time. They are used when the government cannot predetermine, above a specified minimum, the precise 

quantities of supplies or services that will be required during the contract period. The government places delivery 

orders (for supplies) or task orders (for services) against a basic contract for individual requirements. Minimum 

and maximum quantity limits are specified in the basic contract as the number of units (for supplies) or as dollar 

values (for services). 

4

Under cost-plus contracts the government agrees to pay all costs associated with the work under a contract or 

task order that are reasonable, allowable under the FAR, and allocable to the contracted work. The government 

bears the risk of any increase in costs. Under firm-fixed-price contracts the contractor agrees to provide the 

contracted goods or services at an agreed upon price and bears the risk of any increased costs. However, if costs 

increase due to unanticipated conditions or incomplete information provided by the government the contractor 

can request an equitable adjustment to cover its increased costs.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 3

Construction at KMTC consists of student barracks, classrooms, administrative office buildings, and 

other training support facilities as follows. Specifically, 

• Phase I, awarded to AMEC, included the planning and construction of four 600-person student 

barracks and two administrative buildings, a 2,736 square meter dining facility, a 6,000 square 

meter multi-purpose gymnasium, and extensive related utility and site work.

• Phase II, also awarded to AMEC, included the planning and construction of two student 

battalion administration buildings, four additional 600-person student barracks, six

classroom/student support buildings, and one Military Police Compound, along with associated 

work such as potable water provision and distribution, storm water management, and asphalt 

roads.

• Phase III, awarded to ECC, included the planning and construction of six barracks buildings, 

two office buildings, an obstacle and training course, post exchange/bank, laundry facility, 

40 classrooms for literacy, a fire station plus other structures, and renovation and modifications 

of existing facilities. 

Photos 1 and 2 show some of the KMTC facilities.

Photo 1: KMTC Phases I and II Completed Construction of 

Barracks Buildings

Source: SIGAR, March 12, 2011
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 4

Photo 2: KMTC Phase III Ongoing Construction 

Source: SIGAR, March 12, 2011

AFCEE Selects Contractors Through a Two-Tiered Approach

AFCEE uses a two-tiered approach to select contractors for its construction projects. First, under its 

Heavy Engineering, Repair, and Construction business model, AFCEE solicits bids, selects contractors, 

and awards multiple contracts, in accordance with the FAR, to provide heavy construction and 

engineering activities worldwide. Second, AFCEE headquarters requests proposals covering potential 

heavy construction and engineering projects exclusively from the Heavy Engineering, Repair and 

Construction prime contractors. Contractors interested in competing for the work provide proposals. 

The AFCEE contracting officer (CO) located in San Antonio, Texas, determines which contractor will 

provide the best value for the dollar, and the selected contractor is awarded the task order.5

AFCEE Outsources Quality Assurance, but the Contracting Officer is Ultimately Responsible for 

Contractor Oversight

The task 

orders for all three phases at KMTC were competitively awarded. 

AFCEE engages engineering contractors to provide quality assurance for its construction projects, but 

the AFCEE CO has final responsibility for monitoring contractor performance and holding the contractor 

accountable for its actions. The CO for KMTC, located in San Antonio, Texas, delegates day-to-day 

oversight to a deployed COR based in Kabul and a COR based in San Antonio, Texas, who administer the 

contracts. Quality assurance services for all phases at KMTC were awarded under contract to Versar, 

Inc.

6

 5

A task order is an order for services placed against an established contract, in this case the Heavy Engineering, 

Repair, and Construction contract.

 The contract was awarded first to Versar, Inc., and subsequently to Jacobs Government Services 

Company. Versar continued to perform the quality assurance function for the project sites at KMTC as 

Jacobs’ subcontractor after Jacobs assumed the role as the primary quality assurance contractor. 

6

This was a time-and-materials task order. According to the FAR, a time-and-materials contract provides for the 

acquisition of supplies or services on the basis of direct labor hours at fixed hourly rates and actual costs of 

materials. The task order covers quality assurance services at multiple AFCEE construction projects, including 

KMTC.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 5

AFCEE’s COR in Kabul is, in turn, supported by the quality assurance contractor, Versar, which maintains 

personnel on-site at KMTC. Versar works with and reports its observations to AFCEE’s COR. AFCEE's 

COR for KMTC is not located on-site and is responsible for multiple projects, which results in Versar's 

personnel serving as the government's continual on-site monitors for the project. Versar acts as AFCEE’s 

eyes and ears at the construction site and reports regularly to the COR. Versar's quality assurance 

activities include, but are not limited to, monitoring contractor performance; reviewing building designs;

inspecting and testing construction materials; analyzing contractor cost and schedule performance; and 

inspecting construction quality through routine, pre-final, and final project assessments. Versar 

documents and provides to the AFCEE COR the results of its oversight activities in daily and weekly 

activity reports, construction deficiency logs, and contractor non-compliance logs, and it provides AFCEE 

recommendations on approval of designs and materials. AFCEE, in turn, reviews Versar’s reporting and 

adds its observations as comments to the Weekly Activity Report. It is the COR’s responsibility to act on 

any concerns identified by Versar. Versar has no authority to direct the contractor; it is up to AFCEE to 

act on Versar’s reporting. 

AFCEE Also Contracts for Site Planning

In 2006, CSTC-A tasked AFCEE with awarding a prime contract to develop and update a master planning 

document for ANSF facilities. AFCEE awarded a time-and-materials contract7

CONSTRUCTION AT KMTC IS TAKING LONGER THAN PLANNED AND COSTING MORE THAN

ORIGINALLY BUDGETED

to MACTEC in April 2006. 

The contract states that MACTEC would develop planning documents for facilities related to CSTC-A’s 

mission as identified by CSTC-A’s Combined Joint-Engineering Office. As of July 2011, MACTEC had been 

paid more than $85.8 million to design ANSF facilities, including conducting site surveys, meeting with 

Afghan military and police officials, and developing the requirements for new facilities, such as the type 

of housing for military and police personnel, the primary purpose of the facility, and the types of 

supplies needed. As part of that contract, MACTEC developed the conceptual master plan for KMTC. 

Both KMTC Phases I and II experienced cost growth and took longer than originally scheduled due to a 

variety of factors. These factors included added work, poor contractor performance, and inaccurate site 

information. Phase III is also beginning to experience some schedule delays due to unanticipated site 

conditions. The planning process failed to identify important site conditions, which, in turn, led to 

delays and higher costs. CSTC-A did not bring together all pertinent information, such as topography 

and location of utility lines, before contractors were invited to bid on work. Therefore, contractors 

awarded the work had limited knowledge of the site conditions until they prepared the detailed 

construction plans. Our review of AFCEE data for all its construction projects in Afghanistan showed that 

KMTC is not unique because most AFCEE construction projects for CSTC-A have experienced schedule 

delays. 

KMTC Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule Delays

Construction at KMTC cost more than originally budgeted and has taken longer than originally planned. 

Work at KMTC is being done in phases under individual task orders. Each task order includes the dollar 

value of the work to be done and a period of performance during which the work is to be completed. 

 7

This was a time-and-materials task order. According to the FAR, a time-and-materials contract provides for the 

acquisition of supplies or services on the basis of direct labor hours at fixed hourly rates and actual costs of 

materials. 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 6

Phase I, originally scheduled to be completed on March 11, 2008, and was not completed until August 

31, 2009, nearly 1 year and 6 months late. Phase II, which ran concurrently with Phase I, was originally 

scheduled to be completed on January 24, 2008, but was not completed until nearly 2 years later, 

January 9, 2010. Cost for Phases I and II grew by a total of $12.5 million—$3.3 million for Phase I and 

$9.2 million for Phase II. Because Phases I and II were constructed under cost-plus task orders, CSTC-A

paid all the additional costs. Phase III, scheduled to be completed by May 22, 2011, is now projected to 

be completed January 29, 2012, which will be 8 months late. 

Delays and cost growth were due to a variety of factors, including additional work added to the task 

orders, unanticipated site conditions at the time the task orders were awarded, contractor performance 

problems, and security. Inadequate planning and oversight contributed to the problems encountered. 

Table 1 outlines the cost, schedule, and scope changes for the Phase I construction. As shown in table 1, 

Phase I had eight modifications, one for a ceiling price increase, one for both a ceiling price increase and 

a task order completion extension, five for task order completion date extensions and one for 

administrative changes. 

Table 1: Contract FA8903-06-D-8507, Task Order 05 (Phase I, Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee) and 

Modifications 

Award Date Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

Basic Contract Nov. 8, 2006 Construction of the student barracks, 

dining facility, and gymnasium for KMTC.

Originally for 

$37.6 million.

Modification (Mod) 1 Feb. 2, 2007 Expanded scope to include additional 

work, including a new site plan, 

unexploded ordnance removal/demining 

operations, scrap removal, and 

installation of four additional buildings 

with all associated electrical and heating 

and cooling work. 

Cost increased by

$1.8 million.

Mod 2 Oct. 24, 2007 Extended task order date. Task order completion 

date extended from 

March 11, 2008 to

July 11, 2008.

Mod 3 Apr. 18, 2008 Revised statement of work and made 

administrative changes.

Mod 4 Apr. 30, 2008 Extended task order date. Task order completion 

date extended from 

July 11, 2008 to 

November 1, 2008.

Mod 5 Sep. 3, 2008 Extended task order date and made 

administrative changes.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

November 1, 2008 to 

January 31, 2009.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 7

Award Date Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

Mod 6 Dec. 2, 2008 Extended task order date and made 

administrative changes.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

January 31, 2009 to 

March 30, 2009.

Mod 7 Jan. 12, 2009 Extended task order date. Task order completion 

date extended from 

March 30, 2009 to 

June 30, 2009.

Mod 8 Jan. 20, 2010 Added funds for electrical repairs caused 

by faulty construction, completion of 

heating and air conditioning for the 

gymnasium, storm drain work, and 

shower drain replacement in two 

buildings; extended task order date.

Cost increased by 

$1.5 million.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

June 30, 2009 to 

August 31, 2009.

Source: SIGAR analysis of Contract FA8903-06-D-8507, Task Order 05, dated November 8, 2006 and all task order 

modifications.

Phase I contract cost grew 9 percent, from $37.6 million to $40.9 million through two increases. 

Specifically, modification 1 in February 2007, added $1.8 million in work and modification 8 in January 

2010, added $1.5 million in work. 

Phase I also included modifications that extended the task order date, but did not add funds (for 

example, modifications 6 and 7.) According to an AFCEE official, these modifications occur because 

under cost-plus task orders, the contractor continues to perform as long as funds remain available. 

Sometimes work progresses more slowly than expected and the contractor incurs costs at a slower pace. 

Consequently, the task order ending date will be reached before the task order fund ceiling is reached. 

In those cases, AFCEE extends the task order dates to allow the work to continue. Factors that led to 

Phase I task order date extensions included unanticipated site conditions; the failure of a subcontractor 

to pay its workers, leading to a shortage of workers; severe weather; and some building redesign.

As shown in Table 2, Phase II had 13 modifications, three for a ceiling price increases, five for both a 

ceiling price increase and a task order completion extensions, three for task order completion date 

extensions and two for administrative changes. The extensions were due to the same reasons as in 

Phase I—the contractor’s progress and spending were slower than expected.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 8

Table 2: Contract FA8903-06-D-8507, Task Order 06 (Phase II, Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee) 

and Modifications 

Award Date Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

Basic Contract Mar. 2, 2007 Construct and renovate student 

barracks, dining facility, and gymnasium 

for KMTC.

Originally for 

$19.6 million.

Modification (Mod) 1 Mar. 9, 2007 Corrected task order dates and made 

administrative changes.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

January 24, 2008 to

January 27, 2008.

Mod 2 Aug. 3, 2007 Increased ceiling price to allow 

movement of power lines, removal of 

hazardous materials, and construction 

of additional unnamed facilities.

Cost increased by 

$388,921.

Mod 3 Oct. 17, 2007 Expanded scope to include electrical 

services to four emergency warehouses,

as well as wastewater plant 

modifications; extended task order date.

Cost increased by 

$2.3 million.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

January 27, 2008 to 

July 31, 2008.

Mod 4 Oct. 23, 2007 Administrative correction.

Mod 5 Feb. 11, 2008 Expanded scope to include additional 

wastewater work and addition of two 

generators to the power supply system; 

extended task order date.

Cost increased by

$2.8 million.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

July 31, 2008 to 

January 3, 2009.

Mod 6 Apr. 3, 2008 Incorporated revised statement of work 

dated February 29, 2008 and made 

administrative changes.

Mod 7 May 30, 2008 Expanded scope to renovate two 

buildings, one to add a wall dividing 

large open area into two smaller areas 

and the other to add a series of interior 

walls to change one large open area into 

multiple smaller rooms.

Cost increased by 

$173,286.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 9

Award Date Purpose Cost/Schedule Change

Mod 8 Sep. 23, 2008 Expanded scope to add walls to one 

building to convert two large rooms into 

12 smaller rooms better suited for 

classrooms and to add hand wash 

troughs to laundry rooms in eight

barracks; extended task order date.

Cost increased by

$606,732.

Task Order completion 

date extended from 

January 3, 2009 to 

January 24, 2009.

Mod 9 Dec. 2, 2008 Extended task order date and made 

administrative changes.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

January 24, 2009 to 

March 24, 2009.

Mod 10 Apr. 1, 2009 Extended task order date. Task order competion 

date extended from 

March 24, 2009 to 

June 30, 2009.

Mod 11 Jan. 15, 2010 Expanded scope to construct a storm 

water management system to protect 

the military police garrison building 

footings and sidewalks from water 

seepage and soil erosion; extended task 

order date.

Cost increased by 

$102,139.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

June 30, 2009 to 

September 30, 2009.

Mod 12 Jan. 25, 2010 Increased ceiling to complete electrical 

repairs and for costs associated with 

extending task order dates; extended 

task order date.

Cost increased by 

$2.2 million.

Task order completion 

date extended from 

September 30, 2009 to 

January 9, 2010.

Mod 13 Aug. 16, 2011 Increased ceiling for previously 

completed electrical repairs.

Cost increased by 

$641,272.

Source: SIGAR analysis of Contract FA8903-06-D-8507, Task Order 06, dated March 2, 2007, and all task order 

modifications.

Phase II contract cost grew 47 percent, from $19.6 million to $28.8 million through eight increases in the 

ceiling price. The principal reason for the cost increases was work added to the task order as additional 

funds became available to CSTC-A and were provided to AFCEE, allowing Phase II to proceed with 

unforeseen construction required by the expanding size of the ANA. For example, modification 3 in 

October 2007 had an increase of $2.3 million to allow construction of four emergency warehouses, as 

well as wastewater plant modifications. Modification 5 in February 2008, had an increase of $2.8 million 

for additional wastewater work and additions of two generators to the power supply system. Other 

modifications increasing price were to allow the contractor to correct issues that had not been apparent 

prior to the start of work due to unanticipated site conditions, such as buried older foundations,

resulting from a lack of detailed site surveys or failure to repair earlier work. According to AFCEE 

officials, because the Phase I and II work was done under a cost plus task order, CSTC-A was responsible 

for paying for repairs to earlier work as long as the costs were within the scope of the contract. Photo 3 

illustrates the use of a gymnasium for housing to deal with the expanding number of recruits.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 10

Photo 3: Gymnasium Used as Barracks

Source: SIGAR, March 12, 2011

Phase III, awarded on September 29, 2010, is also experiencing schedule delays. The initial award was 

for $74.6 million and completion was scheduled for May 22, 2011. The schedule delays are due to site 

conditions that were not apparent prior to the start of work resulting from a lack of detailed site 

surveys. For example, two buildings had to be relocated due to unacceptable terrain slope. The new 

location had poles for power lines located in the middle of a barracks location, which then had to be 

removed concurrent with construction. Photo 4 shows the poles located inside the perimeter of the 

barracks building. At the same time, as discussed below, the contract value was reduced by $3.8 million 

to reflect the removal of some work.

Photo 4: KMTC Phase III Construction Site 

Source: SIGAR, March 12, 2011 

ECC, the Phase III contractor, submitted a proposed modification to AFCEE in January 2011. The 

proposed modification included removing some of the original work from the task order; a request for 

equitable adjustment for the costs associated with the unanticipated site conditions; and a time

Poles for power 

lines located 

middle of barracks 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 11

extension also for the unanticipated site conditions. The proposed time extension was for 62 days or 

through July 2011. On July 5, 2011, AFCEE awarded modification 1 to ECC’s task order. Due to a 

reduction in the amount of work to be done in Phase III, the modification removed $3.8 million from the 

contract. Although Phase III is a firm-fixed-price task order, a contractor is allowed to request equitable 

adjustments (price increases) if it encounters problems beyond its control. Because the proposed 

modification included removing some work from the task order that resulted in an overall credit back to 

AFCEE as well as the increased cost for some of the other work, there was a net reduction in contract 

value.

Further delays are possible. In AFCEE’s Weekly Activity Report for the period May 1-7, 2011, AFCEE 

expressed growing concern with schedule and pace of progress. It stated that the latest contractor 

report indicated a construction completion date of January 19, 2012. AFCEE also noted that although 

the contractor was on double shifts, productivity had not increased enough to compensate for the 

schedule delays. 

Security is also affecting schedule. According to ECC officials, interruptions to construction workers’ 

access to the KMTC site, materials deliveries, ECC staff, and Versar staff are common due to the fact that 

the area surrounding the site remains a prime target for insurgent activities. In April 2011, access to 

KMTC was sharply limited due to demonstrations and a bombing near the main KMTC gate. AFCEE’s 

Weekly Activity Report for May 1-7, 2011 also noted that the KMTC security posture remained high and 

that stringent security measures were affecting labor hours and the delivery of material. Security issues 

along Afghan supply routes and within Pakistan also created challenges and delays in the delivery of 

equipments and materials. The majority of deliveries of the construction materials and equipment have 

to be shipped via supply routes from Pakistan or former Soviet Union countries, and then reach Kabul 

via the “Ring Road”.

8

Construction Quality Met Contract Standards, but a Questionable Construction Practice was 

Observed

 It is not uncommon for key materials to be delayed, including at the border 

awaiting customs clearance.

Other than electrical problems discussed later in this report, the quality of construction at KMTC met 

and is meeting contract standards for Phases I, II, and III. Our engineer inspected KMTC in May 2011,

and found that the buildings were constructed within contract specifications based on the criteria 

described in the contract statement of work and related technical specifications. 

Most of the KMTC Phase III buildings were under construction at the time of our visit. However, 

underground utilities were just getting started. Constructing vertical structures first is a questionable

construction practice. With open trenches around buildings, it can become difficult (and even 

dangerous) for the building construction workers to access the site and move construction materials 

into the structures. Additionally, in some cases, open trenches close to buildings may cause structural 

failures in the building itself. Nevertheless, as stated above, the quality of construction at KMTC met

contract standards.

In commenting on a draft of this report, CSTC-A stated that contractors frequently plan construction 

activities in parallel to drive down the overall schedule, even though individual elements may take 

longer. CSTC-A added that, in the case of KMTC Phase III, the structural features of work was part of the 

 8

Highway 1 or A01, formally called the Ring Road, is a 2,200 kilometer nationwide highway network circulating 

Afghanistan, connecting Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Farah, Heart, and Mazar-e-Sharif. It has extensions that also 

connect Jalalabad, Delaram, Islam Qala, and several other cities.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 12

critical path and needed to start immediately. As such, utility and site work ran in parallel with the 

structural features during some period of time. According to CSTC-A, risks were assessed, mitigation 

strategies were implemented, and the contractor moved forward re-evaluating the risks as construction 

progressed. 

CSTC-A’s Failure to Integrate Site Information Contributed to Schedule Delays and Cost 

Growth

CSTC-A’s and AFCEE’s current planning process failed to identify important site conditions, which, in 

turn, led to delays and higher costs. Facility master planning requires detailed site information. 

Typically, for U.S. military facilities the military services have a Department of Public Works (DPW) at 

each facility that integrates site information, such as the location of existing buildings, topography, and 

utility lines. CSTC-A currently does not provide a capability comparable to a DPW, but is attempting to 

build a public works capability to improve Afghan oversight. In the interim, CSTC-A has a two-phase 

process for planning at KMTC. The first phase is the conceptual master plan. The second phase is the 

detailed plan prepared by the construction contractor. The construction contractors bid on the KMTC 

task orders based on the information contained in the conceptual master plan and a limited tour of the 

construction location. The construction task order then required the construction contractor to provide 

a detailed plan. 

• Conceptual master planning at KMTC had been done by MACTEC through a contract funded by 

CSTC-A and awarded and administered by AFCEE. The KMTC conceptual master plan is a highlevel plan showing the broad outline of how KMTC will be built. Rather than show specific 

geographic coordinates for building locations, the plan shows “bubbles” where certain types of 

buildings, including barracks, offices, and classrooms will be located. Although MACTEC’s 

contract was sufficiently broad to allow it to provide more in-depth planning, CSTC-A did not ask 

MACTEC to complete a detailed site survey. Instead, CSTC-A, through AFCEE direction, had 

MACTEC conduct a limited survey that mainly consisted of “windshield surveys”9

• Although the conceptual master plan is a high-level plan, and as such does not contain the level 

of detail required for actual construction, it does incorporate certain basic geotechnical 

information, such as detailed maps of the area and survey data. The construction task orders 

required the construction contractors to develop the detailed plans. Like MACTEC, the 

contractors competing for the KMTC construction work were afforded limited site visits to KMTC 

as part of the bidding process. Based on this limited information, the competing contractors 

submitted their bids. After contract award, the contractor selected for the construction 

conducted detailed site surveys as required by its task order. 

of the areas at 

KMTC where the facilities were to be developed. AFCEE officials said that the initial site survey, 

which affected Phase I and II planning, was limited because of existing insurgent activity and 

because the site had not been demined. To expedite work at KMTC, demining and site planning 

were done simultaneously. 

 9

A “windshield survey” is a visual inspection generally conducted from a vehicle or cursory walk around the 

building site that does not involve any soil testing, other physical examination of existing buildings, or any other 

more detailed activities.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 13

During detailed site survey work for Phases I and II, AMEC found numerous previously unknown features 

that directly affected construction, including:

• large buried concrete foundations from destroyed Soviet-era buildings and underground storage 

tanks, both of which had to be removed before construction could begin;

• unsuitable building locations because the terrain on which buildings were to be constructed was 

too steep for the selected type of building, requiring the building site to be relocated; and 

• an existing overhead power line that ran through the middle of the site was assumed during the 

solicitation process to be abandoned, but was subsequently found to be active and resulted in a 

significant delay to the project while ownership was determined and approval to move the line 

was obtained.

ECC, the construction contractor for Phase III, also found previously unknown features in conducting 

detailed site surveys, including large buried foundations (see photo 5) and power lines that had to be 

relocated. Consequently, both AMEC and ECC experienced schedule delays.

Photo 5: KMTC Phase III Construction – Previously Unknown 

Buried Soviet-era Foundation (see arrows)

Source: SIGAR, March 12, 2011

The lack of a DPW-like capability to integrate site information before requests for proposals are released 

contributed to the planning shortfalls identified above. CSTC-A officials told us that in January 2010,

CSTC-A established a new organization called the Installation Training Advisory Group (ITAG), which they 

viewed as the answer to the problem. These officials indicated that ITAG has a DPW-like capability and 

needs continued support and resources. In commenting on our April 2011 report on ANA facilities at 

Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, CSTC-A stated that it had recently activated ITAG in order to develop facility 

sustainment capability of the Afghan Army and Police.10

 10SIGAR Audit-11-9, 

 It further stated that this capability is at initial 

operating capacity (six sites) and is waiting for the deployment of additional personnel to expand to 

additional sites. In a May 2011 update, CSTC-A told us that the Department of Defense had provided

26 engineers to assist with establishing ITAG. Two requests for forces totaling 116 ITAG personnel were

ANA Facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat Generally Met Construction Requirements, but 

Contractor Oversight Should Be Strengthened, April 25, 2011.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 14

in the process of being filled as of August 2011. The full complement is expected to arrive no later than 

November 2011.

Schedule Delays Appears to be a Systemic Issue

Schedule delays are not unique to KMTC. In addition to assessing the cost, schedule, and outcomes of 

the task orders for work at KMTC, we reviewed an AFCEE analysis of all its construction projects in 

Afghanistan to see if delays were a more widespread problem. Our review showed that the large 

majority of all construction projects for CSTC-A experienced schedule delays. Specifically, AFCEE data 

showed that 80 percent of AFCEE construction projects for CSTC-A, 33 of 41 in total between 2006 and 

2010, experienced schedule delays. The delays ranged from less than 1 month to 24 months and 

averaged 10 months. As discussed earlier, delays occurred due to a variety of factors, including 

additional work added to task orders, unanticipated site conditions at the time task orders were 

awarded, contractor performance problems, difficulties in delivering materiel, and security concerns. 

Based on meetings with contractors, CSTC-A, AFCEE, and ANA officials, we concluded that aggressive 

schedules driven by mission needs did not take factors that cause delays into account. This sets the 

stage for projects to take longer than initially scheduled. 

We discussed the AFCEE analysis with both AFCEE and CSTC-A officials, who were well aware that delays 

were common on the majority of all CSTC-A construction projects. AFCEE officials told us that they try 

to manage expectations by advising CSTC-A on how long they think it will realistically take to complete 

construction. At the same time, they recognize the key to the transition of security to the ANA is 

meeting its mission needs. CSTC-A tracks project delays and knows which delays are tolerable and 

which are not. CSTC-A said that it is a difficult balancing act to be realistic, but at the same time not give 

the contractors too much time as it could further delay project completions. AFCEE told us that if 

contractors are given more time to construct, they will take the time. Schedules are purposely 

aggressive to push the contractors to complete construction in the shortest time possible so that the 

overall mission is successful. 

QUALITY ASSURANCE SHORTFALLS IN PHASES I AND II CONTRIBUTED TO ELECTRICAL 

PROBLEMS, BUT OVERSIGHT HAS IMPROVED IN PHASE III

Contract oversight was weak in Phases I and II, contributing to electrical problems, but AFCEE has 

strengthened oversight in Phase III. In Phases I and II, the construction contractor (AMEC) and AFCEE, 

failed to provide adequate quality control and quality assurance. For example, although the quality 

assurance contractor (Versar) identified electrical problems as early as June 2008, AFCEE did not address 

them until after fires occurred in November and December of that year. Repairing the electrical 

problems increased the time to complete Phase I and II construction and cost as much as $4.3 million. 

Improvements have been made as a result of these problems and have been incorporated into Phase III 

construction oversight. In addition to reviewing oversight, we assessed whether the task order files 

were complete. We found that the large majority of required documents were in the files, but the task 

orders files contained incomplete and inconsistent information as to the reasons for modifications.

AFCEE Delayed Responding to Indications of Electrical Problems 

Versar identified electrical issues at KMTC, but AFCEE officials did not address them until after fires 

occurred. When AMEC submitted the as-built drawings in June 2008, Versar determined the work was 

not in compliance with the National Electrical Code, as required by the contract. Versar also noted 

electrical problems on June 17, 2008, in the Discrepancy and Non-Compliance (DNC) log, stating that 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 15

electrical panel boards installed at buildings 138, 139 and 140 had no approved submittals. In all, Versar 

logged eight electrical discrepancies for Phase II construction between June and December 2008.

However, AFCEE did not take action on the electrical issues until after five electrical fires occurred in 

four separate buildings at KMTC. Between mid-November and mid-December 2008, electrical fires 

occurred in buildings 138, 139, 140, and 141. Building 138 had a complete burnout of the main 

electrical panel box. On December 16, 2008, an AFCEE COR in Kabul wrote an email to AMEC stating 

that “every time we think we have a resolution we have another fire.” He also stated that “we need to 

continue to take deliberate steps to correct what I believe are systemic problems throughout the project 

site before someone is seriously hurt or worse.” 

In January and August 2009, AFCEE’s CO advised AMEC of AFCEE’s concerns regarding the electrical 

work.

• On January 15, 2009, AFCEE’s CO stated in a memorandum to AMEC that visual inspections of 

conditions at KMTC by AFCEE personnel indicated there were serious electrical problems in 

designated facilities, two of which were barracks housing roughly 600 ANA soldiers each. The 

CO also noted that AMEC had conducted an independent third-party audit that showed an 

alarming lack of quality control by the contractor. The CO stated that the level of craftsmanship 

was completely unacceptable and advised AMEC that it should be preparing a comprehensive 

corrective action plan for AFCEE’s review with a timeline to correct deficiencies that 

incorporates the results of the electrical reviews. The comprehensive corrective action plan that

AMEC subsequently prepared is discussed below.

• On August 21, 2009, AFCEE’s CO issued a letter of concern11

In discussing why they delayed taking action until December 2008, AFCEE officials stated that the 

problems initially identified in June 2008 were not serious deficiencies, but, rather, were typical of 

nearly all construction projects, and that it was not until the electrical fires occurred that the magnitude 

of the issue became apparent. AFCEE officials also told us that the initial installation of the electrical 

work looked sufficient and even had the correct specification requirements stamped on the supplies.

Finally, they stated that deficiencies were not identified until the electrical components began to fail.

to AMEC regarding KMTC Phases I 

and II. It stated that site visits to KMTC by AFCEE personnel indicated insufficient progress had 

been made toward completing the latest corrective action plan briefed to AFCEE on July 13, 

2009. This plan was the third received for the Phases I and II work. The July 2009 plan indicated 

an overall completion date of September 12, 2009, but a related memo noted that Versar 

predicted a completion date of January 1, 2010. The CO stated that the schedule delay was a 

serious concern of AFCEE and must be remedied by AMEC immediately. AFCEE also told AMEC 

that the project was significantly behind schedule and over budget and that AMEC’s unfavorable 

performance had a negative impact on completing the work. 

Limited Oversight and Substandard Supplies Contributed to Electrical Problems 

Two key factors contributed to the electrical problems going undetected before the fires. One was an 

effort to make up for schedule delays without a commensurate increase in oversight. Delays to the start 

of construction resulting from foundation problems and the need to relocate overhead power lines had 

put the work 4 months behind schedule. In an attempt to get back on schedule, CSTC-A, through AFCEE,

instructed AMEC to shorten the time planned in its catch-up schedule to 2 months due to urgent mission 

 11Letters of concern are informal communications between AFCEE and its contractors. 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 16

requirements of the expanding ANA. To shorten the time to 2 months, AMEC went from one shift to 

three shifts. When AMEC went to three shifts, it did not bring on additional quality control personnel. 

AMEC stopped detailed inspection of its subcontractors’ work and only did spot checks instead. The 

COR, the only AFCEE COR in Afghanistan at the time, allowed AMEC to move to three shifts without 

increasing quality control staff to meet the new completion date. Versar officials told us in a January 

2011 meeting that AMEC’s quality control staffing and lack of subject matter experts (licensed 

electricians) contributed to problems since AMEC often did not have a quality control person on site to 

verify that the Afghan subcontractors understood and complied with National Electrical Code

requirements.

When AMEC went to three shifts, Versar requested additional personnel funding to allow for more 

robust oversight through hiring additional electrical specialists. Versar, however, was not given 

additional funding and, therefore, was unable to increase its staff when AMEC went from one to three 

shifts. This resulted in limited review of AMEC’s subcontractor testing of material prior to acceptance 

and no Versar quality assurance inspections on two of the three shifts as work was underway. The 

existing funding provided for only one ex-patriot person (a U.S. citizen working outside the United 

States) for 15 projects underway in Afghanistan. By way of comparison, according to Versar, similar 

projects in Iraq were staffed with 21 ex-patriot persons to oversee 27 projects. 12

A second factor that contributed to the electrical problems was that some electrical supplies were

substandard or counterfeit. AMEC’s quality control plan included preparatory inspections. The 

preparatory inspections included verifying that all material and equipment were available, ensuring that 

conforming documentation was submitted and approved, and physically examining required materials 

and equipment to ensure that they conformed to the plans and were stored properly. AMEC’s quality 

control processes did not detect that its Afghan subcontractors working on fixed-price contracts were 

substituting counterfeit or mislabeled equipment. AFCEE officials told us that the problem resulted from 

CSTC-A’s request to accelerate the construction schedule, which led AMEC to deviate from the normal 

supply chain. These suppliers had not been used before and are no longer being used by AMEC. While 

the subcontractors’ use of counterfeit or otherwise noncompliant equipment raises significant questions 

about AMEC’s oversight of its subcontractors, it also suggests fraud. AFCEE has decided not to pursue 

the possibility of fraud because AMEC is no longer using these suppliers. Regardless of supplier, 

however, if AMEC had followed its quality control plan, it would have physically examined required 

equipment to ensure that they conformed to the plans.

As a result, Versar’s 

day-to-day service on Phases I and II was provided by three local nationals and one third-country 

national. 

13

CSTC-A has Paid More for the Electrical Work than Necessary

 

CSTC-A, which funded Phases I and II work at KMTC through AFCEE, may end up paying for the electrical 

work three times—more than required under the terms of its contract with AMEC. CSTC-A has already 

paid as much as $4.3 million for electrical repairs and may pay more in the future under facility 

maintenance contracts to the extent further repairs are needed. 

• CSTC-A initially paid for the original electrical work as part of Phases I and II construction. 

 12Ex-patriots generally have more training and experience with western construction standards than do 

third-country and local national personnel and, therefore, provide expertise not otherwise available. 13This matter was referred to SIGAR’s Investigations Directorate for further review. 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 17

• To address the electrical repairs for Phase I construction, AFCEE added as much as $1.5 million 

to the Phase I task order for, among other things, completing electrical repairs in the barracks 

buildings and the electrical distribution system; testing following repairs to determine that 

cables, insulation, and connections for power distribution lines were installed properly and did

not have ground faults; and performing additional electrical design reviews and revisions to 

respond to Versar’s comments to the building electrical repair work plans. All these items relate 

directly to repair of the original substandard electrical work. This modification also involved 

non-electrical work, but did not identify the amount of funds allocated for the various work 

elements. Therefore, we could not determine how much of the $1.5 million was for the 

electrical repairs.

• To address the electrical repairs for Phase II construction, AFCEE added $2.8 million to complete 

electrical repairs.

• The electrical repairs were never completed. AMEC’s task order modifications for the electrical 

repairs were eventually canceled by AFCEE due to security issues, the ANA’s decision to occupy 

the building as is, and unauthorized electrical modifications being made by the ANA at the same 

time. CSTC-A took delivery of KMTC Phase I and II construction on December 24, 2010. 

• Facilities built for KMTC Phases I and II were then transferred to a facility maintenance contract. 

Under this separate contract, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is providing operations and 

maintenance for all ANA facilities. As construction projects are completed, they are transferred 

to the maintenance contract. According to AFCEE officials, to the extent further electrical 

problems emerge, repairs will be paid under this facility maintenance contract. This may result 

in the CSTC-A paying yet again for electrical problems resulting from design flaws or iimproper 

materials under Phase I and II construction.

AFCEE’s decision to pay for the electrical repairs was inappropriate. Although AMEC was awarded 

cost- reimbursable task orders, it, in turn, awarded firm, fixed-price subcontracts for virtually all the 

construction work. Under firm-fixed-price subcontracts, the subcontractor commits to performing the 

work at the agreed-upon price and has to absorb any increased cost unless it relates to factors outside 

the subcontractor’s control. At KMTC, the increased costs were due to poor subcontractor performance 

and AMEC quality control. Therefore, AMEC should have demanded that its subcontractors pay the cost 

of the electrical repairs, rather than requesting that AFCEE pay the costs. In discussing this matter with 

AFCEE officials, they said that they lacked the personnel to pursue the matter. They added that the 

government shared the responsibility for what happened, as it directed AMEC to make up for schedule 

delays without providing for increased oversight and that, at the time, AFCEE was focused on supporting 

the troop surge in Iraq. 

In further discussing the results of our work with AFCEE officials, they agreed in principle that CSTC-A 

should not have had to pay for the repairs, but were uncertain as to how they could recoup funds since 

the task orders were complete. In addition, they stated that the Afghan subcontractors lacked the 

financial resources to pay for any repairs, leaving AMEC to cover the costs. Because AMEC’s contract 

with AFCEE is cost-plus-fixed-fee, the AFCEE officials asserted that they had no choice but to provide the 

additional funds to AMEC to cover the cost of the electrical repairs 

However, the completion of the task orders does not necessarily prevent AFCEE from recovering excess 

payments it made to AMEC because the government is never bound to accept fraudulent work. 

Furthermore, AFCEE is not required to pay for the same work more than once, even under a cost-plusfixed-fee contract, because it was AMEC’s responsibility to ensure that the work performed under the 

contract, including the work of its subcontractors, met the terms of the contract. Contractors may only 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 18

request and receive additional funds from the government under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts for work 

beyond what was called for under the original contract or because of conditions beyond the contractor’s 

control. In the case of KMTC, neither of these conditions applied.

AFCEE Strengthened Contract Oversight for Phase III Construction 

Although we identified quality control and quality assurance shortfalls in Phases I and II, we found that 

oversight of Phase III has been extensive. We reviewed daily and weekly activity reports, construction 

deficiency logs, and contractor non-compliance logs and found that they contain considerable 

information on a variety of topics, including quality, status, and key events. An AFCEE official also told 

us that they have learned a number of lessons from the electrical problems experienced in Phases I and 

II. As a result, according to AFCEE, it has changed its procedures to require that construction contractors 

have a full time quality control individual on site and subject matter experts on each construction site to 

oversee the more complicated construction aspects of each project. It is also reportedly providing 

funding for a robust quality assurance presence. We asked for documentation identifying these changes 

and were told that it was an iterative process communicated through individual task orders rather than 

through a single document. In touring KMTC construction in March 2011, we observed a number of 

Versar officials on site.

Contract Files Did Not Always Explain Reasons for Modifications 

Although our review of the KMTC contract files showed that they were largely complete, we also found 

that they did not clearly document the reasons for modifying the contract. According to FAR Subpart 

4.8, contract files shall contain documentation sufficient to constitute a complete history of the 

transaction. This documentation serves to provide a basis for informed decisions, to support actions 

taken, to provide information for reviews and investigations, and to furnish essential facts in the event 

of litigation or congressional inquiries. To that end, the FAR lists 42 items that are normally included in 

the contract file, as applicable. AFCEE expands on that list in its contract file checklist, which listed 

107 items that, if applicable, should be included in the contract file. Applicable items included the 

purchase request or procurement directive, the acquisition plan, the price negotiation memorandum, 

and staff judge advocate coordination.

We reviewed AFCEE’s official contract file for all phases of KMTC construction to determine the extent 

to which items required by the checklist were included in the file. Our review showed that as of 

April 25, 2011, the files were largely complete. However, although FAR Subpart 4.8 directs that contract 

files contain sufficient documentation to constitute a complete history of the transaction, the KMTC task 

order files contained incomplete or contradictory information as to the reasons for modifying the 

contract. The reasons for changes are a key part of the task order history. The modifications simply 

noted the value of ceiling price increases or changes to task order dates. We were able to identify the 

reasons for some of the modifications from a review of other file documentation, particularly the price 

negotiation memorandums, technical evaluations, and email traffic. However, sometimes these 

documents contained contradictory information. Modification 8 to KMTC task order 5, for 

Phase I construction, illustrates the lack of clarity, as follows: 

• The modification itself, dated January 20, 2010, states that it was to increase the ceiling price

and extend the task order dates. 

• The November 10, 2009, technical evaluation for the modification cost proposal states that the 

AMEC proposal was for additional funding and time required to undertake a number of specific 

activities, including completing the gymnasium heating and air conditioning system and 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 19

additional storm water grading, as well as completing electrical repairs and performing 

additional electrical design reviews and revisions. 

• The January 12, 2010, post negotiation memorandum describes the entire modification as an 

estimate for completion because of electrical problems with the buildings constructed by AMEC 

due to faulty construction by local contractors. The overall $1.5 million cost increase provided 

through the modification is broken down by major cost elements, such as labor, subcontracts, 

and indirect costs, but is not allocated to the specific activities identified in the technical

evaluation. 

KMTC IS NOT SUSTAINABLE WITHOUT CONTINUED U.S. ASSISTANCE

CSTC-A funded contracts to sustain KMTC, as well as other ANSF facilities, but the funding under these 

contracts is being expended faster than anticipated, according to U.S. Army Corps of Engineer officials. 

The Afghan government is ultimately responsible for sustaining U.S. funded facilities without U.S. 

assistance. However, the Afghan government does not have the financial or technical capacity to 

sustain KMTC or other ANSF facilities once they are completed. In the interim, the United States and the 

international community have provided funding to sustain ANA facilities, including KMTC, and to train 

Afghans to do so. 

CSTC-A, using Afghanistan Security Forces Funds, provided the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with 

funding to award two sustainment contracts for ANSF facilities. In July 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers awarded two contracts— consisting of 1 base year plus 4 optional years—one for $457 million 

to cover facilities in northern Afghanistan and one for $357 million for facilities in southern Afghanistan. 

The contracts’ fourth option year may be exercised if all the ANSF facilities are not transferred to the 

Afghans by 2014. Both contracts were awarded to ITT Corporation. KMTC facilities are covered under 

the contract for northern Afghanistan and were transferred on a timely basis. This is an improvement 

over prior practices, where we found that AFCEE did not arrange for the facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and 

Herat to be added to the sustainment contract for CSTC-A funded facilities in Afghanistan in a timely 

manner.14

U.S. Army Corps of Engineer officials told us in March 2011 that both sustainment contracts will reach 

their fund ceilings earlier than anticipated, and options for continuing sustainment are under 

consideration. These officials said that in June 2012, they will have to begin the acquisition process to 

award new contracts. In discussing the results of our work with CSTC-A officials, they confirmed that in 

spring 2012 they will take action to ensure continued sustainment of ANA facilities, including KMTC.15

CONCLUSION

As the U.S. military transfers responsibility to the ANA to provide for its own security, KMTC is a critical 

component of CSTC-A’s training mission and the overall strategy to transition security to Afghan security 

forces. However, we identified a number of specific problems with KMTC, and there is a need to ensure 

that the problems we identified at KMTC do not recur in ongoing and future projects. Construction at 

KMTC has taken longer than originally planned and costs more than originally budgeted due to a variety 

 14SIGAR Audit-11-9, ANA Facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat Generally Met Construction Requirements, but 

Contractor Oversight Should Be Strengthened, April 25, 2011. 15SIGAR has initiated an audit of the implementation of the two operations and maintenance contracts for the 

sustainment of ANA and ANP facilities.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 20

of factors. These included, among other things, work added to the original task orders and 

unanticipated site conditions. The current planning process failed to identify important site conditions, 

which, in turn, led to delays and higher costs. We also found that AFCEE has paid as much as $4.3

million for electrical repairs that AMEC’s subcontractors should have been responsible for covering 

through their own funds. Finally, we found that the KMTC task order files contained incomplete or 

contradictory information as to the reasons for modifying the contract. Without complete and 

consistent information it is not possible to ascertain what happened over the life of the work at KMTC. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

To strengthen construction planning for future work at KMTC and future construction projects in 

support of the ANSF, ensure appropriate use of government funds, and strengthen contractor oversight, 

we are making two recommendations to the Commanding General, CSTC-A, in coordination with the 

Director, AFCEE, to: 

1. Direct that site surveys done in conjunction with the KMTC conceptual master plan be more 

detailed, including topography and location of existing utilities, so that a more complete picture 

of additional construction projects can be provided to bidders, thus allowing contract proposals 

to more accurately reflect reality. We support CSTC-A’s efforts to develop the organic capability 

to do this and in the interim recommend that CSTC-A, in concert with AFCEE, use existing 

planning contracts to provide the integration function.

2. Ensure that conceptual master plans for future construction projects in support of the ANSF 

contain more detailed information, including topography and the location of existing utilities, to 

facilitate the preparation of more accurate contract proposals. 

To strengthen contractor oversight and ensure appropriate use of government funds, we are making 

two recommendations to the Director, AFCEE, to: 

3. Ensure that, in the future, KMTC contract and task order files contain complete and consistent 

information regarding reasons for modifications to the contract and task orders.

4. Seek reimbursement from the Phase I and II contractor, AMEC, for the cost of electrical repairs 

related to poor performance by its Afghan subcontractors.

COMMENTS

CSTC-A and AFCEE provided comments on a draft of this report, which are included in appendices II and 

III, respectively. They also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. 

CSTC-A concurred with our first recommendation to strengthen conceptual master planning at KMTC, 

stating that detailed master planning for KMTC is in progress. CSTC-A also noted that because the size of

the ANA is now capped at 195,000, “throughput” should be more easily defined and future 

requirements limited. CSTC-A concurred with our second recommendation, indicating that it is currently 

developing a comprehensive detailed master plan for KMTC via a contractor and that it is actively 

pursuing robust geotechnical and existing utility information, where available. CSTC-A also provided

general comments, some of which provided updated information. We have reflected these comments 

in the report, as appropriate. 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 21

AFCEE responded to our third recommendation by stating that the KMTC task order file has been 

updated and that the file will be reviewed after each modification to ensure that it is complete and 

accurate. In response to our fourth recommendation, AFCEE stated that it will not seek reimbursement 

from AMEC because this was not a case where the prime contractor was willfully avoiding its 

responsibility or acting in bad faith. AFCEE further stated that several other contractors were 

experiencing the same issue with counterfeit parts and that it would be fruitless for AMEC to go after 

the subcontractors because there is no bonding of work in Afghanistan. As a result of AFCEE’s decision,

the contractor will not be held financially accountable for poor contract performance, and the U.S. 

government will pay the bill. We disagree with this decision. AFCEE is not required to pay for the same 

work more than once, even under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. It is AMEC’s responsibility to ensure 

that all work performed under the contract, including the work of its subcontractors, meets the terms of 

the contract. Therefore, we are retaining the recommendation. 
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 22

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) review of three construction task orders at the Kabul Military Training Center 

(KMTC). These task orders were funded by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

(CSTC-A) and implemented by the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE). KMTC 

construction includes barracks, classrooms, and administration buildings, training facilities, and 

associated utilities including power generation and wastewater treatment. This report is part of a series 

of performance audits by SIGAR examining contract outcomes, costs, and oversight. This report 

(1) examines construction at KMTC, including changes in cost and schedule, the reasons for changes, and 

whether construction met contract requirements; (2) assesses construction oversight and the 

completeness of contract files; and (3) evaluates plans for sustaining KMTC facilities once constructed.

To examine whether contract modifications and construction at KMTC met the terms of the task orders, 

SIGAR met with officials from AFCEE headquarters in San Antonio, Texas; AFCEE-Afghanistan; CSTC-A; 

the two construction contractors—AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc. (AMEC) and ECC International; 

the quality assurance contractor, Versar, Inc., and MACTEC, the contractor responsible for site 

conceptual master planning. We reviewed the contract documentation, including statements of work, 

modifications, email documents, and contracting officer correspondence. We conducted a site 

inspection in March 2011, and our engineer inspected the site again in May 2011. During our site visits, 

we inspected the interior and exterior of all buildings, as well as the grounds within the perimeter of the 

construction sites. Site inspections were documented with photography. We also reviewed electronic 

files and correspondence from AFCEE-Afghanistan and CSTC-A. We did not rely on computer-processed 

data to determine construction status. We obtained documentation available on the prime and quality 

assurance contractor Web sites (designed and provided in accordance with AFCEE contracts).

To assess construction oversight, we met with officials from AFCEE, AFCEE-Afghanistan, Versar, Inc., and 

CSTC-A. We reviewed criteria and guidance in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the quality assurance 

reports, and AFCEE guidance for construction to determine if the contracting process and oversight of 

the contracts met AFCEE regulations and contract requirements. Additionally, we reviewed AFCEE 

guidance to determine the roles and responsibilities for AFCEE and AFCEE-Afghanistan personnel.

To examine plans for sustaining constructed facilities, we held discussions with officials from AFCEE San 

Antonio, AFCEE-Afghanistan, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We obtained information on the 

terms of the sustainment contracts and plans for future contracts when the current ones expire. 

We assessed internal controls over contract administration and oversight procedures through interviews 

with contracting officials and reviews of relevant contract files. The results of our assessment are 

included in the body of this report.

We conducted work at AFCEE headquarters in San Antonio, Texas; AMEC’s Corporate Office in Plymouth 

Meeting, Pennsylvania; Vesar’s office in Westminster, Colorado; MACTEC’s office in Kennesaw, Georgia;

Kabul, Afghanistan; and Washington, D.C., from December 2010 to October 2011, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform 

the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This audit was conducted by the 

office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 

110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978; and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 23

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM THE NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED 

SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
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SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 26
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 27
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 28

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE AIR FORCE CENTER FOR ENGINEERING AND THE 

ENVIRONMENT
SIGAR Audit-12-2 Contractor Performance and Oversight / Kabul Military Training Center Page 29

(This performance audit was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-039A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

publically released reports, testimonies, and 

correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

2530 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202