If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re Guardianship of LISA BROSAMER.

PATRICIA BROSAMER, Guardian of LISA 

BROSAMER, a legally protected person,

Petitioner-Appellee,

FOR PUBLICATION

May 16, 2019

9:00 a.m.

v No. 346394

Lenawee Probate Court

LENAWEE COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 

AUTHORITY,

LC No. 79-033680-DD

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and MARKEY and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this guardianship case, respondent appeals as of right the probate court’s order 

enjoining respondent from transferring a protected individual, Lisa Brosamer (Lisa), from one 

community residential placement—College Avenue—where Lisa has resided since 2009, to 

another residential placement—Westhaven. Respondent contends on appeal that (1) the probate 

court erroneously applied MCL 330.1536 and effectively rewrote the statute, and (2) the probate 

court abused its discretion by granting permanent injunctive relief. We disagree and affirm. 

I. BASIC FACTS

Lisa is severely intellectually disabled and unable to care for herself or manage her estate. 

Her mother, Lucille, was Lisa’s predecessor guardian and cared for Lisa in her home from Lisa’s 

birth on February 22, 1961 through October 3, 2006, when, based upon Lucille’s declining 

health, Lisa transitioned to a residential treatment facility at 3376 Marvin Drive, Adrian, MI 

49221. On March 7, 2008, Lisa was transferred to another facility at 451 South Main Street, 

Adrian, MI 49221. Finally, on March 1, 2009, Lisa was transferred to her current residence at 

College Avenue. Petitioner was appointed successor plenary guardian of Lisa on December 2, 

2009.
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On September 26, 2018, petitioner filed the petition that led to this appeal. Petitioner 

contended that respondent was planning to transfer Lisa from College Avenue to another 

community placement at Westhaven, and sought an ex parte order denying the transfer on the 

ground that it would be detrimental to Lisa pursuant to MCL 330.1536. The probate court 

granted ex parte relief and later held a full hearing. In lieu of testimony, respondent presented 

three affidavits from its employees indicating that the transfer would not be detrimental to Lisa, 

and therefore, respondent was statutorily entitled to move forward with the transfer. Petitioner 

presented four witnesses familiar with Lisa’s situation who all testified that such a move would 

be detrimental to Lisa. Lisa’s lawyer-guardian ad litem indicated that, in his opinion, the probate 

court should favor the testimony of petitioner because of petitioner’s heavy involvement in the 

welfare of Lisa, and because petitioner’s history with Lisa made petitioner the most capable of 

predicting the outcome of a transfer. The probate court summarized the affidavits provided by 

respondent and the testimony from the evidentiary hearing and concluded that the “move 

certainly does appear to be something that would be detrimental to Lisa.”

II. APPLICATION OF MCL 330.1536

On appeal, respondent argues that the probate court clearly erred in determining that 

transferring Lisa from College Avenue would be detrimental to her wellbeing. It argues that the 

probate court judicially revised MCL 330.1536 and created a right for plenary guardians to veto 

the decisions of mental health authorities where the Legislature did not intend for such a veto to 

exist. We disagree. Although respondent frames its argument on appeal as one regarding 

statutory interpretation, respondent’s argument actually concerns the probate court’s factual 

findings.

The probate court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its dispositional 

rulings for an abuse of discretion. In re Lundy Estate, 291 Mich App 347, 352; 804 NW2d 773 

(2011). A finding is clearly erroneous when, even though there is evidence to support it, “a 

reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re 

Vansach Estate, 324 Mich App 371, 385; 922 NW2d 136 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). “An 

abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and 

principled outcomes,” or when the court fails “to operate within the correct legal framework.” 

Vansach, 324 Mich App at 385 (quotation marks omitted). Further, “[t]he reviewing court will 

defer to the probate court on matters of credibility, and will give broad deference to findings 

made by the probate court because of its unique vantage point regarding witnesses, their 

testimony, and other influencing factors not readily available to the reviewing court.” In re 

Erickson Estate, 202 Mich App 329, 331; 508 NW2d 181 (1993). 

MCL 330.1536 provides: 

(1) A resident in a center may be transferred to any other center, or to a hospital 

operated by the department, if the transfer would not be detrimental to the resident 

and the responsible community mental health services program approves the 

transfer.

(2) The resident and his or her nearest relative or guardian shall be notified at 

least 7 days prior to any transfer, except that a transfer may be effected earlier if 
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necessitated by an emergency. In addition, the resident may designate 2 other 

persons to receive the notice. If the resident, his or her nearest relative, or 

guardian objects to the transfer, the department shall provide an opportunity to 

appeal the transfer.

(3) If a transfer is effected due to an emergency, the required notices shall be 

given as soon as possible, but not later than 24 hours after the transfer.1

The evidence in this case primarily came from seven people: three affiants and four 

testifying witnesses. Of those seven people, only four of them provided evidence that they had 

either a history with Lisa or daily interaction with Lisa such that they might reasonably be 

capable of opining as to how the proposed transfer might affect Lisa’s wellbeing. All four of the 

witnesses demonstrated a personal history with Lisa, and all of them concluded that transferring 

Lisa to Westhaven would be detrimental. 

Petitioner testified that Lisa had thrived at College Avenue largely because of the 

relationships she had formed with residents and staff, including forming a close bond with a 

resident that had resided at College Avenue even longer than Lisa. Petitioner was able to testify 

that, in light of her history with and personal knowledge of Lisa, starting anew at Westhaven 

would be detrimental to Lisa and would cause her to regress. Notably, Lisa’s lawyer-guardian ad 

litem, who has been involved in the case since at least 2011, reported that, due to petitioner’s 

“extensive involvement with [Lisa] over the years,” petitioner was in a superior position to any 

of the other witnesses or affiants “to know what [would] be detrimental to Lisa.” 

Lisa’s doctor of 14 years testified that Lisa relies on familiarity with those around her to 

comfort and calm her, and that given Lisa’s age and disability, Lisa would “not be able to adjust”

and did not have the “coping mechanism” to handle a transfer from College Avenue. A direct 

care staff at College Avenue, who had known Lisa for 16 years and worked directly with Lisa on 

a regular basis for one year, testified that Lisa relied upon familiarity with staff and peers, that 

Lisa would not respond well to significant changes, and that transferring Lisa would be to Lisa’s

detriment. Finally, a former manager at Westhaven testified that she had known Lisa for 20 

years, that Westhaven was not as well suited for Lisa as College Avenue, and that there was a 

particularly high risk of Lisa having altercations with an aggressive individual at Westhaven 

were Lisa to be transferred. 

None of the affidavits provided by respondent suggested that the affiants had a history 

with Lisa comparable to petitioner’s witnesses. Respondent’s executive director reported that 

she was responsible for over 1,850 mental health consumers, and that the determination that Lisa 

was prepared to transfer to Westhaven was not personally made by the executive director, but by 

unnamed “expert” staff. In another affidavit, respondent’s supervisor of developmentally 

disabled consumers did not speak to her level of personal knowledge of Lisa, and instead spoke 

 1 MCL 330.1536 has been amended and, effective March 28, 2019, the word “center” in 

subsection (1) changes to “facility,” and the word “prior” in subsection (2) changes to “before.” 

MCL 330.1536, as amended by 2018 PA 596. 
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primarily to the fact that the supervisor had communicated with petitioner on several occasions 

about the proposed transfer. Finally, Lisa’s case manager testified that she had only been 

assigned to Lisa’s case since June 18, 2018, which, coincidentally, was the same month that 

respondent determined that another consumer needed a bed at College Avenue and the same 

month that respondent determined Lisa could be transferred. Petitioner testified that the case 

manager was assigned to the case after Lisa’s former case manager of 10 years retired, and 

testified that she asked respondent’s executive director to replace the new case manager because 

petitioner could not understand how the case manager could conclude that a transfer was 

appropriate while being so new and unfamiliar with Lisa. 

That the case manager was not as familiar with Lisa as petitioner’s witnesses is evidenced 

by comparing the case manager’s affidavit with the testimony of petitioner, the former 

Westhaven manager, and the direct care staff at College Avenue. As the only evidence that one 

of Lisa’s visits to Westhaven had gone well, Lisa’s case manager stated that “Lisa came into the 

home and gave everyone hugs.” However, the former Westhaven manager described Lisa as a 

“hugger,” and the College Avenue direct care staff indicated that Lisa giving “a couple of the 

staff members that worked for Westhaven a hug” was not indicative of Lisa being interactive or 

otherwise having a productive visit at Westhaven. Additionally, petitioner characterized the case 

manager’s statement as an exaggeration, noting that Lisa hugged the manager at Westhaven—the 

same manager that testified at trial—because Lisa recognized her. 

Overall, witnesses deeply familiar with Lisa testified that transferring Lisa from College 

Avenue would be detrimental to her wellbeing. Far from judicially revising MCL 330.1536 or 

creating a “veto right,” the probate court narrowly tailored its role in the case to the only issue it 

was statutorily authorized to determine: whether respondent’s proposed transfer of Lisa would be 

detrimental to Lisa’s wellbeing. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake was made. To the contrary, the probate court’s finding with respect to detriment was 

well supported by the evidence.

III. PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Respondent argues that the probate court abused its discretion by granting a permanent 

injunction, and that the injunction went too far because it enjoined respondent not just from 

transferring Lisa to Westhaven, but from transferring Lisa anywhere else in the future. We 

disagree. 

As a preliminary matter, we note that the parties disagree about whether the probate 

court’s order serves as a permanent injunction. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that 

the order serves as a permanent injunction from transferring Lisa to any facility at any time 

without court approval.

“A trial court’s decision to grant or deny injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion.” Janet Travis, Inc v Preka Holdings, LLC, 306 Mich App 266, 274; 856 NW2d 206 

(2014). The court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome outside the range of 

reasonable and principled outcomes. Vansach, 324 Mich App at 385. “The Court of Appeals 

has succinctly stated that injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that issues only when 

justice requires, there is no adequate remedy at law, and there exists a real and imminent danger 
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of irreparable injury.” Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v Pontiac, 482 Mich 1, 8; 753 

NW2d 595 (2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In determining whether a permanent 

injunction was properly issued, this Court considers: 

“(a) the nature of the interest to be protected, (b) the relative adequacy to the 

plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies, (c) any unreasonable delay by the 

plaintiff in bringing suit, (d) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, (e) 

the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted and to 

plaintiff if it is denied, (f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and (g) 

the practicability of framing and enforcing the order of judgment.” [Janet Travis, 

306 Mich App at 274, quoting Wayne Co Employees Retirement Sys v Wayne Co, 

301 Mich App 1, 28; 836 NW2d 279 (2013), aff’d in part and vacated in part 497 

Mich 36 (2014).] 

“Additionally, ‘[c]ourts balance the benefit of an injunction to a requesting plaintiff against the 

damage and inconvenience to the defendant and will grant an injunction if doing so is most 

consistent with justice and equality.’ ” Dep’t of Environmental Quality v Gomez, 318 Mich App 

1, 34-35; 896 NW2d 39 (2016) (alteration in original), quoting Janet Travis, 306 Mich App at 

274-275. 

The probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent injunctive relief. 

With respect to the nature of the interest the injunction serves to protect, it was Lisa’s overall 

wellbeing. There was a substantial amount of testimony that Lisa’s transfer to Westhaven would 

be detrimental to her wellbeing, not simply because Westhaven was less suited to Lisa’s needs 

than College Avenue, but because Lisa was well adjusted, familiar, and thriving at College 

Avenue, and thus, transfer of Lisa to any other facility would be detrimental. With respect to the 

relative adequacy of the permanent injunction versus other potential remedies, respondent 

continues to argue, in contradiction to the evidence, that Lisa’s transfer from College Avenue 

would not be detrimental, and thus, the injunctive relief would seem the most adequate means of 

ensuring that respondent does not transfer Lisa to the detriment of her wellbeing. There is no 

evidence that petitioner made any unreasonable delays in filing her petition for an injunction, nor 

is there evidence that petitioner engaged in any form of misconduct. 

Being sensitive to the fact that respondent must walk the tightrope of balancing the needs 

of consumers—sometimes against one another—with the limited resources that it has, MCL 

330.1536 is clear that respondent cannot transfer a consumer if the transfer would be detrimental 

to that consumer. Thus, the relative hardship on respondent that the injunction imposes is no 

greater than the hardship imposed by MCL 330.1536 itself. Contrarily, the hardship Lisa may 

endure if she were to be transferred to the detriment of her wellbeing is significant. Additionally, 

although third parties and the public have an interest in respondent’s ability to transfer 

consumers and balance its resources for the benefit of the community, Lisa has the right to be 

free of detrimental transfers, and with respect to MCL 330.1536, the interests of third parties in 

transfers that might be detrimental to Lisa are not relevant to whether the transfer is permissible;

and, we note that nothing bars respondent from seeking to have the injunction lifted if a transfer 

that would not be detrimental to Lisa’s wellbeing arises. Finally, the injunction will not be 

impractical to enforce. 
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Based upon the above factors, and considering there was no adequate remedy at law to 

ensure that respondent would not be transferred, the probate court’s injunction was not outside 

the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ James Robert Redford 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly