NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee

v.

LARRY LLOYD CARVER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0074

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. 2011-007932-001

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Advocate’s Office, Phoenix

By Consuelo M. Ohanesian

Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. CARVER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Larry Lloyd Carver appeals his convictions and sentences 

for first-degree murder, burglary in the first degree, aggravated assault, 

and attempted first-degree murder. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

¶2 In December 2006, police officers found H.Q. dead and R.W. 

seriously injured from gunshot wounds. State v. Carver, 227 Ariz. 438, 439, 

¶ 2, 258 P.3d 256, 257 (App. 2011). The officers arrested Carver after his 

wife, Cheryl, told them that Carver made incriminating statements to her 

during their marriage that implicated him in the crimes. Id.

¶3 Shortly before Carver’s trial, Cheryl invoked the marital 

communications privilege and refused to testify about Carver’s alleged 

statements to her. Id. at 440, ¶ 3, 258 P.3d at 258. At the time Cheryl 

invoked the marital privilege, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 

13-4062 “provided, in pertinent part, that ‘[e]ither spouse, at his or her 

request, but not otherwise, may be examined as a witness for or against 

the other in a prosecution[.]’” Carver, 227 Ariz. at 440, ¶ 3 n. 1, 258 P.3d at 

258 n.1. The State dismissed its case against Carver without prejudice. Id.

¶4 After the dismissal, the legislature amended A.R.S. § 13-

4062, which now reads as follows:

A person shall not be examined as a witness in the following 

cases:

1. A husband for or against his wife without her consent, nor 

a wife for or against her husband without his consent, as to 

events occurring during the marriage, nor can either, during 

the marriage or afterwards, without consent of the other, be 

examined as to any communication made by one to the other 

during the marriage. . . . Either spouse may be examined as a 

witness for or against the other in a prosecution for an 
 STATE v. CARVER

Decision of the Court

3

offense listed in § 13–706, subsection F, paragraph 1, . . . if 

either of the following occurs:

(a) Before testifying, the testifying spouse makes a voluntary 

statement to a law enforcement officer during an 

investigation of the offense or offenses about the events that 

gave rise to the prosecution or about any statements made to 

the spouse by the other spouse about those events.

(b) Either spouse requests to testify.

(Emphasis added).1

¶5 In December 2009, the State re-filed the murder, burglary, 

and aggravated assault charges against Carver. Carver, 227 Ariz. at 440, ¶ 

6, 258 P.3d at 258. Carver moved to preclude the State from compelling 

Cheryl’s testimony, arguing the 2009 amendment could not be applied 

retroactively to communications he made during their marriage and 

before the amendment. Id. The trial court granted the motion and the 

State, after dismissing the case without prejudice, filed an appeal. Id.

¶6 Addressing the 2009 amendment, we held that “the law in 

effect at the time the evidence is sought by discovery or trial testimony, 

not the time the offense was committed or communications made, governs 

the admission of testimony subject to the marital communications 

privilege.” Id. at 442, ¶ 14, 258 P.3d at 260. Accordingly, because the 

amendment “became effective before Carver’s retrial,” the State could 

compel Cheryl to testify against Carver. Id. We also concluded that the 

amendment is procedural, not substantive, in nature and “therefore does 

not need express legislative statements that it is to be applied 

retroactively.” Id. at 445, ¶ 30, 258 P.3d at 263.

¶7 Following the issuance of our opinion, the State filed a new 

indictment against Carver, alleging first-degree murder, burglary, 

aggravated assault, and attempted first-degree murder. After a twelveday trial, the jury found Carver guilty on all counts. The trial court 

sentenced Carver to a term of natural life on the count of first-degree 

murder and a total sentence of twenty-one years on the remaining counts, 

 1 The exception currently found in (1)(b) existed prior to the 

amendment. The 2009 amendment added what is now exception 1(a) and 

moved the reference to a spouse requesting to testify to exception 1(b).
 STATE v. CARVER

Decision of the Court

4

to be served consecutive to the natural life sentence. Carver timely 

appealed.

¶8 Carver argues the trial court erred by permitting the State to 

compel Cheryl’s trial testimony because the 2009 legislative amendment to 

A.R.S. § 13-4062 should not have been applied to his case. This issue, 

however, was squarely addressed in our prior opinion. Carver, 227 Ariz. 

at 442, ¶ 14, 258 P.3d at 260. Carver had the opportunity to challenge that 

opinion by filing a petition for review with the supreme court, which he 

did not do. This court’s ruling therefore became the law of the case. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.1(d) (“Except for good cause, or as otherwise provided

by these rules, an issue previously determined by the court shall not be 

reconsidered.”); see also State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 278, 883 P.2d 1024, 

1034 (1994) (explaining that an appellate decision “is the law of that case 

on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings”)

(internal quotation omitted). Carver has not identified any facts or issues 

that have substantially changed since issuance of our opinion addressing 

the State’s appeal. Because Carver’s argument is barred by the law of the 

case doctrine, we affirm his convictions and sentences.