J. S66031/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.Q.D., 

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: R.D., MOTHER : No. 1306 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 4, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0001187-2017,

CP-51-DP-0001365-2014, FID#: 51-FN-001324-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.R.D., 

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: R.D., MOTHER : No. 1308 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 4, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000912-2017,

CP-51-DP-0001364-2014, FID#: 51-FN-001324-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2018

R.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 4, 2018 decrees entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court Division, 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her dependent children, 

Z.Q.D., male child, born in June of 2003, and Z.R.D., male child, born in May 

of 2009 (collectively, “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). After careful review, we affirm. 
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The trial court set forth the following:

The family became known to the Department of 

Human Services (“DHS”) on March 18, 2014, when 

DHS received a substantiated General Protective 

Services (“GPS”) report, which alleged that Mother 

physically abused the Children and that Mother had a 

history of drug use, and untreated bipolar disorder. 

On June 4, 2014, DHS learned that the Mother and 

Children were homeless. DHS also learned that 

Mother continued to physically abuse the Children 

and take illegal drugs. DHS obtained an Order of 

Protective Custody (“OPC”) on the same day. 

Following a hearing on June 20, 2014, the Children 

were adjudicated dependent by the Honorable

Jonathan Q. Irvine.

After the adjudication of dependency, Mother tested 

positive for marijuana on twenty separate (20) 

occasions between August 1, 2014 [and] May 19, 

2017. On September 27, 2016, the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) held a Single Case Plan 

(“SCP”) Meeting. The parental objectives for Mother 

were (1) to maintain sobriety; (2) to comply with all 

treatment recommendations from mental health 

evaluations; (3) to comply with all court ordered 

drug random drug [sic] screens; (4) to enroll and to 

complete a drug treatment program; (5) to maintain 

a personal relationship with her Children; (6) to visit 

the Children weekly and (7) maintain stable 

employment.

The underlying Petition to Terminate Mother’s 

Parental Rights was filed on September 27, 2017 due 

to Mother failing to meet her SCP objectives. She 

failed to complete a substance abuse treatment 

program or fully participate in mental health 

treatment. Mother also continued to test positive for 

controlled substances. On April 4, 2018, this court 

ruled to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the 

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)[,] 

(2)[,] (5)[,] (8) and found that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of 

the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 
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Mother filed the instant Notice of Appeal on April 25, 

2018.

Trial court opinion, 7/25/18 at 2-4 (record citations omitted).

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating 

the parental rights of [M]other pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) without clear and 

convincing evidence of [M]other’s intent to 

relinquish her parental claim or refusal to 

perform her parental duties[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating 

the parental rights of [M]other pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2) without clear and 

convincing evidence of [M]other’s present 

incapacity to perform parental duties[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating 

the parental rights of [M]other pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(5) without clear and 

convincing evidence to prove that reasonable 

efforts were made by Department of Human 

Services to provide [M]other with additional 

services and that the conditions that led to 

placement of the [C]hildren continue to 

exist[?]

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating 

the parental rights of [M]other pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(8) without clear and

convincing evidence that the conditions that 

led to placement of the [C]hildren continue to 

exist when [M]other presented evidence of 

compliance with the goals and objectives of her 

family service plan[?]

5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating 

the parental rights of [M]other pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) without clear and 

convincing evidence that there is no parental 

bond between [M]other and [C]hildren and 
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that termination would serve the best interest 

of the [C]hildren[?]

Mother’s brief at 7.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. 

“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, 

should not be reversed merely because the record 

would support a different result. Id. at 827. We 

have previously emphasized our deference to trial 

courts that often have first-hand observations of the 

parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
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The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of 

the child.

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have 

long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need 
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only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), 

as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the trial court’s termination decrees

pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
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We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 

(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 

2002). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness 

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected 

as untimely or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children, the trial 

court credited the testimony of Shavan Johnson, the CUA case manager. 

Ms. Johnson testified that the Children were removed from Mother’s care 
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because of Mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues. (Trial court 

opinion, 7/25/18 at 6; notes of testimony, 4/4/18 at 23-24.) Ms. Johnson 

further testified that Mother failed to complete drug and alcohol treatment, 

which was a parental objective for reunification; Mother consistently 

produced positive drug screens; Mother was inconsistent with her mental 

health treatment; and Mother admitted that she did not take her medication 

for bipolar disorder. (Trial court opinion, 7/25/18 at 6; notes of testimony, 

4/4/18 at 25, 27-28.) Additionally, Mother testified that she smokes 

marijuana without a prescription in order to self-medicate because that is 

“the only way [I] can deal with stuff.” (Trial court opinion, 7/25/18 at 6;

notes of testimony, 4/4/18 at 56.)

We have reviewed the record and conclude that it supports the trial 

court’s factual findings and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). The record 

demonstrates that the conditions that existed upon removal establish 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of Mother that 

caused the Children to be without essential parental care, control, or 

subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being. The record 

also supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother continued to lack 

capacity to parent the Children.
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We now turn to whether termination was proper under 

Section 2511(b). As to that section, our supreme court has stated as 

follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). 

The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In 

In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this 

Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the 

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The 

“utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. 

However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s 

bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any 

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on 

the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 

762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, 
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While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) 

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster 

parent. . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33 

A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that 

courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are 

in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.” T.S.M., 73 A.3d at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the 

bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the 

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court 

observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have 

an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail 

. . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights favored the 

Children’s needs and welfare, the trial court again credited Ms. Johnson’s 

testimony. With respect to Z.Q.D., Ms. Johnson testified that he has a 

strong bond to his foster parents who satisfy his individual, educational, 
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therapeutic, and general medical needs. (Trial court opinion, 7/25/18 at 7;

citing notes of testimony 4/4/18 at 11-14.) Ms. Johnson also testified that 

she has spoken with Z.Q.D. and he has stated his preference to be adopted. 

(Trial court opinion, 7/25/18 at 7; notes of testimony, 4/4/18 at 11.) 

Ms. Johnson further testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights to 

Z.Q.D. would be in his best interests and would not cause him irreparable 

harm. (Trial court opinion, 7/25/18; notes of testimony 4/4/18 at 12,

29-32.) Our review of the record supports this determination, and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

Z.Q.D.

With respect to Z.R.D., Ms. Johnson testified that he is currently 

placed in pre-adoptive kinship care with his maternal aunt. (Notes of 

testimony, 4/4/18 at 30-31.) Ms. Johnson testified that Z.R.D. is bonded to 

his caregiver who satisfies his individual, educational, therapeutic, and 

general medical needs. (Trial court opinion, 7/25/18 at 7; notes of 

testimony 4/4/18 at 29-32.) She also testified that Z.R.D. has expressed his 

preference to be adopted. (Trial court opinion, 7/24/18 at 7; notes of 

testimony, 4/4/18 at 34.) Ms. Johnson further testified that termination of

Mother’s parental rights to Z.R.D. would be in his best interests and would 

not cause him irreparable harm. (Trial court opinion, 7/25/18 at 7; notes of 

testimony 4/4/18 at 12 29-32.) Our review of the record supports this 
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determination, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Z.R.D.

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s 

parental rights to the Children under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and 

(b).

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/8/18