. . . to Those Who Served 

Foreword

This volume completes the general survey of combat operations in

Korea that began with the publication in 1960 of Roy Appleman's South to

the Naktong, North to the Yalu. It will be followed by a study of theater

logistics and an order of battle which, along with the recently published

Medics' War, will comprise the series of official Army histories of America's

so-called forgotten war.

Ebb and Flow records an important chapter in the Korean War. It

begins with the last weeks of the pell-mell rush of United Nations forces

to the Chinese border and goes on to describe in great detail the test of

American military leadership and resources posed by the taxing retreat

of the Eighth Army and X Corps across the frozen wastes of North

Korea. It also examines the special problems posed to a fighting army

during the deadly months of stalemate in the summer of 1951.

The part of the war described in this volume raises many questions

for the military strategist and provides a treasure trove of lessons for the

student of the art of war. The book emphasizes the limitations imposed

by terrain and weather on the fighting capabilities of an American army

facing surprise attack from a large, disciplined enemy. The operations it

describes in such careful detail will help vivify the principles of war for

those who would study the profession of arms.

It seems particularly appropriate that this volume is going to the

printer during a year when the Army is emphasizing the theme of training.

It is important to study carefully such a recent and important example of

an American army performing superbly against great odds. I encourage

the military student and veteran alike to take advantage of the insights

into our profession imparted in the pages that follow.

Washington, D.C. WILLIAM A. STOFFT

8 September 1988 Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

A graduate of Wayne State (Nebraska) College, Billy C. Mossman is

the author of studies and monographs on U.S. Army operations in the

Korean War and of two chapters, "Peace Becomes Cold War, 1945-50,"

and "The Korean War, 1950-53," in American Military History, a volume in

the Army Historical Series. He contributed to Origins, History, and Accomplishments of the U.S. Army Reserve, published by the Historical Evaluation

and Research Organization, and to Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, published by the Center for Research in Social Systems, American

University. He is also coauthor of The Last Salute: Civil and Military Funerals,

1921-1969.

During World War II, Mr. Mossman served as a platoon leader with

the 381st Infantry, 96th Infantry Division, and participated in the Leyte

and Okinawa campaigns in the Pacific theater. In the Korean War, he

was a military historian with the Eighth Army; Army Forces, Far East;

and United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission.

Mr. Mossman joined the Office of the Chief of Military History as an

Army officer in 1954 and became a civilian staff member in 1957. As a

civilian staff member, he served successively as historian, deputy branch

chief, branch chief, and acting division chief. He retired in 1983 but

remains active in the field of military history.

viii
Preface

This book describes military operations during the Korean War from

late November 1950 to early July 1951, a period in which battle lines did

indeed ebb and flow in pronounced surges. The volume is one of several

in the United States Army in the Korean War series. In its coverage of

combat operations, the book falls in the series between South to the Naktong,

North to the Yalu by Roy E. Appleman and Truce Tent and Fighting Front by

Walter G. Hermes.

In describing the large-scale engagements that occurred between sizable opposing forces over seven months' time, I had to focus treatment of

the battles at a somewhat high level, often corps or army. I also had to be

selective in the use of detail. While this approach does not fully record

the gallantry, suffering, and achievements of individual men in combat, I

hope that the battle descriptions clearly indicate the substantial measure

of their individual accomplishments and valor.

I wrote this book over many years, interrupting my work on numerous occasions and for long periods to carry out other responsibilities and

assignments. In fact, I gave the account its final touches after I retired

from the Center of Military History. It was also in retirement that I

designed the maps and selected the photographs that illustrate the book.

During the years spent writing the book, I received valuable support

and assistance from many people. Supervisory officials at all levels provided unfailing support. The successive Chiefs of Military History included

Brig. Gen. James A. Norell, Brig. Gen. William H. Harris, Brig. Gen.

Hal C. Pattison, Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., and Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft. Holding the post of Chief Historian during the period of

preparation were Dr. Stetson Conn, Dr. Maurice Matloff, and Dr. David

Trask. I received valuable assistance and guidance from a considerable

number of officers who served as Chief, Histories Division: Lt. Col.

James C. Griffin; Col. Louis G. Mendez, Jr.; Col. Paul P. Hinkley; Col.

Leonard G. Robinson; Col. Albert W. Jones; Col. John E. Jessup,Jr.; Col.

James W. Dunn; and Lt. Col. Richard O. Perry. Wise counsel also came

from my branch chiefs: Charles B. MacDonald, Robert Ross Smith, Robert W. Coakley, and Walter G. Hermes.

Over the course of my research, Hannah M. Zeidlik, currently the

Chief, Historical Resources Branch, was a mainstay in obtaining and

ix
providing essential records, studies, and reports. On the production level,

Joyce W. Hardyman performed the main editing of the volume assisted

by James W. Grandy. Also importantly involved in the production process were John W. Elsberg, the current Editor in Chief, Barbara H. Gilbert, and Rae T. Panella. Arthur S. Hardyman and Linda M. Cajka processed the maps from layout to final form. Howell C. Brewer handled the

acquisition and preparation of the photographs that illustrate the volume.

Notwithstanding the significant contributions of the persons named

above, I alone am responsible for the interpretations made and conclusions drawn in this book and for any deficiencies that it may have.

8 September 1988 BILLY C. MOSSMAN

Washington, D.C.

x
Contents

Chapter

I. THE MISSION

The Battleground .

The Initial Mission

The Mission Expanded.

The Mission Reconsidered

II. THE FORCES AND THE PLANS .

The United Nations Command .

The UNC Plan of Advance .

The Outlook for Victory .

III. THE ENEMY .

The North Korean Armed Forces.

The Chinese People's Volunteers

IV. THE BATTLE OF THE CH'ONGCH'ON .

The Advance to Contact .

The Chinese Attack

The Second Phase Offensive .

The Threat of Envelopment .

V. THE BATTLE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR

X Corps Dispositions, 26 November.

The Advance Toward Mup'yong-ni

The IX Army Group Attacks

The Attacks Widen

The Tokyo Conference

VI. DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST .

The Threat of Envelopment .

The Second Disengagement .

Trouble on the Lines of Communication .

The Sukch'on-Sunch'on-Songch'on Line .

The Roadblock Below Kunu-ri . . .

xi

Page

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51

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65

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105

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116

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Chapter

VII. CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM

New X Corps Orders . . . . . .

Shaping the Hamhung-Hungnam Defense

Concentration at Hagaru-ri ..

Withdrawal From the Reservoir

VIII. REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH .

The Eighth Army Leaves North Korea

The X Corps Evacuates Hungnam .

IX. THE CHINESE THIRD PHASE OFFENSIVE:

THE OPENING.

Ridgway Takes Command.

Defensive Preparations.

The Opening Enemy Assaults.

X. WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL

To the Seoul Bridgehead ·

The Outlook, 2 January

The Evacuation of Seoul .

XI. WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D

Withdrawal From the Han .

Wonju and Hill 247

East of Route 29.

Page

. . . . . . . ...128

. . . . . . . ..128 .

.. .... 130

. . . . 

. . . . . . . ..137 .

149

149

165

. . . . . . . . 177..

. . . . . . . . 177..

. . . . . . . ...184

. . . . . . . ...188

. 192

. 192

. 195

198

209

... . 210

... . 216

... . 223

XII. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 

The Problem of Motivation . .

Allies From North Korea . .

The Evacuation Issue Resolved ·

Operation Wolfhound .

Task Force Johnson.

Operation Thunderbolt.

XIII. ADVANCE TO THE HAN . .

Roundup Preparations.

Thunderbolt Continued .

Operation Roundup.

The Newest Army Estimate . . .

XIV. THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG 

The ROK 8th Division Destroyed .

. . 

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xii

. . . .
Support Force 21

From the Road Junction to Hoengsong .

The Costs.

XV. DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE

The X Corps Position, 13 February .

The West Shoulder, 13-14 February

The East Shoulder, 14-18 February

Chip'yong-ni and Task Force Crombez

A Turning Point .

XVI. THE KILLER OPERATION

The Concept

Intelligence Problems

The Plans .

The Advance.

The Ripper Concept .

XVII. OPERATION RIPPER . .

The Plan

The Advance to Line Albany

The Enemy Buildup .

Hongch'on Cleared

Seoul Retaken .

Ch'unch'on Captured

On the Eastern Front

The Courageous Concept

XVIII. ADVANCE TO THE PARALLEL

Operation Courageous

Ripper Concluded .

The Parallel Question

The Rugged and Dauntless Concept

XIX. OPERATION RUGGED

The Enemy Situation

The Advance to Line Kansas

Change of Command

XX. TOWARD THE IRON TRIANGLE

. . . . . . ...282

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335

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347

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The Enemy's Conspicuous Absence, 11-20 April .

One Day's Notice .

Chapter Page

. . . . . . 269

272

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xiii
Chapter

XXI. THE CHINESE SPRING OFFENSIVE: THE OPENING -

The Enemy Plan .

Panic at the IX Corps Left

Below Ch'orwon and Kumhwa.

Along the Imjin .

Adjusting the Line.

XXII. THE CHINESE SPRING OFFENSIVE: ON THE

CENTRAL AND EASTERN FRONTS .

Attack on the Pendleton Line .

Inje Falls .

Repeat Performance

Censure

XXIII. THE CHINESE SPRING OFFENSIVE: ON THE

WESTERN FRONT .. . . ..

Defending the Kansas Line

Withdrawal to Line Delta .

Page

. . . 378

............ 378

............. 381

............ 384

............ 385

............ 389

............ 398

............ 398

............ 399

............ 401

............ 407

........... 410

........... 410

........... 419

XXIV. THE CHINESE SPRING OFFENSIVE: BATTLE

FOR SEOUL . 430

XXV. BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG .

The Search for the Enemy .

The Offensive Resumed

The Battle Shifts East .

XXVI. THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Stabilizing the Line .

Counterattack .

XXVII. SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY .

Ridgway's Mission Redefined

Operation Piledriver

Armistice Negotiations: The Search for a Beginning

The Question of Future Operations .

Negotiations Begin .

The New Dimensions of Battle.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

...... 438 

...... 439 

...... 444 

...... 460 

...... 465 

...... 466 

...... 470 

...... 488 

...... 488 

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...... 494 

...... 497 

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xiv

.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .

Page

. . . . . . . . 511 

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS . . 513

INDEX ................... ..... 515

Tables

No.

1. Major North Korean People's Army Units, 23 November 1950 . . 52

2. Major Chinese Units in Korea, 23 November 1950 ........ 54

3. X Corps Battle Casualties, 27 November-10 December 1950 . . . 147

4. Losses by Major Unit, 11-13 February 1951 . . . . . . . . . 279

Charts

1. Theater Lines of Command for Operations in Korea,

23 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2. Organization of UNC Ground Forces in Korea,

23 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3. Organization for UNC Air Operations in Korea,

23 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

4. Organization for UNC Naval Operations in Korea,

23 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

5. Enemy Lines of Command, 23 November 1950 .. . . . . . . . 57

Maps

1. East Central Asia

2. Korea ...................

3. The Battlefront, 23 November 1950

4. Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, 25-28 November 1950 ...

5. The X Corps Zone, 26 November 1950

6. 5th and 7th Marines at Yudam-ni, 27 November 1950

7. The 31st RCT East of the Reservoir, 27 November 1950

8. Battle of the Changjin Reservoir, 27-29 November 1950

9. Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, 28 November-1 December 1950

10. The 2d Infantry Division at Kunu-ri, 29-30 November 1950

11. Concentration at Hagaru-ri, 1-4 December 1950 . . .

12. Withdrawal From the Reservoir, 6-11 December 1950

13. Eighth Army Withdrawal, 1-23 December 1950

14. X Corps Evacuation Plan

xv

4

6

46

66

85

91

93

95

. 106

. 110

. 133

. 144

. 152

. 168
No.

15. Enemy Third Phase Offensive, the Opening Effort,

26 December 1950-1 January 1951 .

16. Withdrawal to Line D, I and X Corps, 4-7 January 1951

17. NK II Corps and V Corps Attacks, 7-22 January 1951 ·

18. Operation THUNDERBOLT, 25-31 January 1951.

19. Operation ROUNDUP, the X Corps Plan, 4 February 1951 ·

20. Operation THUNDERBOLT, 1-11 February 1951.

21. Operation ROUNDUP, 5-11 February 1951.

22. Battle for Hoengsong, 11-13 February 1951

23. Chip'yong-ni, 13-14 February 1951

24. Defending the Wonju Line, 13-18 February 1951 .

25. Operation KILLER, 20 February-6 March 1951

26. Operation RIPPER, Western Front, 6-31 March 1951

27. Operation RIPPER, Eastern Front, 6-31 March 1951 .

28. Operation COURAGEOUS, 22-28 March 1951

29. The RUGGED and DAUNTLESS Operations, Western Front,

1-22 April 1951 .

30. The RUGGED and DAUNTLESS Operations, Eastern Front,

1-22 April 1951 .

31. Hwach'on Dam, 9-11 April 1951

32. The Chinese Spring Offensive, the Main Effort,

22-30 April 1951

33. The Eastern Front, 22-24 April 1951 .

34. The British 29th Brigade Sector, 25 April 1951

35. Battle Below the Soyang, 16-20 May 1951.

36. 38th infantry and Task Force Zebra Positions, 16 May 1951 .

37. Eighth Army Advance, 20 May-I July 1951 .

Illustrations

The Axial Taebaek Mountains Along the East Coast ·

Typical Terrain Near the 38th Parallel in the West

The Port of Pusan .

C-46 Pushed to Solid Ground After Runway Collapse

View of Rail Lines and Roads .

Soldier Enduring Winter Weather.

President Harry S. Truman

Secretary of State Dean Acheson .

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

General J. Lawton Collins.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer .

Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy.

xvi

Page

181

215

218

241

250

253

260

267

286

289

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316

318

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357

363

380

390

423

446

449

471

5

8

11

11

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15

16

16
Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker .

Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond .

Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall .

KATUSA Member With American Soldier

UNC-FEC Headquarters, Tokyo .

Maj. Gen. Francis W. Farrell.

3.5-Inch Rocket Launcher.

57-mm. Recoilless Rifle.

75-mm. Recoilless Rifle .

M46 Patton Tank.

Sikorsky H-5 Helicopter .

F7F Tigercat .

A MASH Nurse .

F-80C Shooting Star .

F-84E Thunderjet .

F-86A Sabrejet .

F9F Pantherjet .

The USS Leyte Being Refueled at Sea

Kim I1 Sung .

Lin Piao

Chou En-lai.

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn With Secretary of the

Army Frank Pace, Jr.

Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter .

The Changjin Reservoir .

The Haguru-ri Area.

8-Inch Howitzer and Crew .

East Side of the Changjin Reservoir .

Marines Withdraw From Yudam-ni .

C-47s Evacuate Casualties From Hagaru-ri .

The Destroyed Bridge South of Kot'o-ri .

The Chasm Later Bridged With Treadway Spans .

Task Force Dog Artillery at Chinhung-ni .

Eighth Army Troops Withdraw From Sunch'on . .

Bridges Over the Taedong River at P'yongyang .

Eighth Army Troops Dig In North of Seoul .

Aerial View of Seoul .

Troops Outloading at Hungnam .

Barrels of Aviation Fuel .

3d Infantry Division Troops Leave the Hungnam Beach

Final Demolitions at Hungnam . . . . . . . :

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway .

Ambassador John J. Muccio With President Syngman Rhee

The Uijongbu Area

xvii

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25

27

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87

125

134

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182

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Page

Aged Refugee Carried Across the Han River . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Refugee Children .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

The Last Bridge Over the Han River at Seoul Is Demolished . . . . . 206

Congestion on Route 29 South of Hongch'on . . . . . . . . . . . 211

The Port of Inch'on .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Kimpo Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

2d Infantry Division Troops South of Wonju . . . . . . . . . . 224

General Collins With General MacArthur . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

Close Air Support Near Inch'on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 242

5th Regimental Combat Team Advances Toward the Han River . . . . 257

Chinese Captives Taken During Operation KILLER . . . . . . . . . 309

Air Interdiction of the Rail Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

25th Infantry Division Tanks Cross the Han River . . . . . . . . . 320

Lt. Gen. Nam II . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Peng Teh-huai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

Seoul Residents Reenter the City . . . . . . . . . . . .331

Practice Jump by 187th Regimental Combat Team Members . . . . . 337

3d Infantry Division Troops in the Uijongbu Area . . . . . . . . . 342

General MacArthur and General Ridgway . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

The A-frame .. . . . . . . . . . . . 352

Directing Artillery Fire on Chinese Positions . . . . . . . . . . . 355

Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369

25th Infantry Division Front South of Ch'orwon . . . . . . . . . . 392

24th Infantry Division Forces Withdraw to Line Kansas . . . . . 393

3d Infantry Division Troops Withdraw From Line Utah . . . . . . . 394

Belgian Troops Withdraw From the Hill 194 Area . . . . . . . . . 396

Marines Under Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

British 29th Infantry Brigade Following Withdrawal From the Imjin

River . ...................... . 425

The USS Toledo .................... ... 432

Navy AD Skyraider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440

The Hwach'on Dam Under Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

7th Infantry Division Troops in the Ch'unch'on Area . . . . . . . . 473

The Punchbowl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486

Engineers Search for Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . 492

Marines Advance in the Yanggu Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494

3d Infantry Division Troops in the Sobang Hills . . . . . . . . . . 503

The Kaesong Armistice Conference Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505

Illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

XVIIi
Ebb and Flow

November 1950-July 1951

CHAPTER I

The Mission

By the Thanksgiving holiday in 1950,

an autumn offensive had carried the

United Nations Command (UNC) deep

into North Korea. Opening the advance

in South Korea, UNC forces had moved

some three hundred miles to a front

slanting northeastward across the Korean peninsula from the mouth of the

Ch'ongch'on River on the Yellow Sea

to the southern outskirts of the city of

Ch'ongjin on the Sea of Japan. 1 A full

resumption of the offensive was set for

Friday, 24 November, to clear the remaining hundred miles or less that lay

between the front and Korea's northern border. Despite recent encounters

with fresh forces from Communist

China, there was considerable optimism

for the success of renewed advance and

even some speculation that UNC forces

would reach the border and end the

Korean War by Christmas, the date on

which the war would be exactly six

months old.

The Battleground

Until the war had begun during the

past summer, Korea had received world

attention only briefly, when the Allied

victory over Japan in World War II

1For a detailed account of ground operations in

Korea during 25 June-24 November 1950, see Roy E.

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, U.S.

ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961).

released Korea from forty years of

Japanese rule. After American and Soviet military forces entered the land to

take the surrender of Japanese troops

stationed there, most of the world outside Asia gave scant notice to the further course of events in Korea. When

the outbreak of war in June 1950 again

drew attention, few could recall with

any certainty just where this country

was located or what it looked like.

Shaped much like the state of Florida,

the Korean peninsula, measuring about

two hundred miles at its widest, reaches

some six hundred miles southeastward

from the central Asian mainland.

(Map 1) In the north it borders on

Manchuria, the northeasternmost region of China, and for a few miles in

the far northeast on the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics (USSR). To the west,

the Yellow Sea separates Korea from

north-central China. To the east, the

Sea of Japan stands between the peninsula and the islands of Japan. Less than

a hundred fifty miles off the southeastern tip of the peninsula, across the

Korea and Tsushima Straits, lies Kyushu,Japan's southernmost main island.2

2 So shaped and located, Korea is a strategic crossroads in the Far East, a fact long and well appreciated

by the geopoliticians of the country's stronger neighbors, China, Russia, and Japan. Past rivalries among

these nations for control of Korea are described in

George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1950); Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York: The John Day Co.,

THE MISSION

THE AXIAL TAEBAEK MOUNTAINS ALONG THE EAST COAST

As the UNC troops now deep in

North Korea could attest from experience, Korea's steep, ubiquitous mountains, inferior communications system,

and severe climate sharply inhibited the

conduct of military operations-most

sharply the operations of a modern,

highly mechanized force such as the

United Nations Command. Extending

south from a high, jumbled mountain

mass in the country's far north and

northeast (the Northern Korea Highlands), the main Taebaek Mountains

run the length of the east coast without

interruption except for a narrow northeast-southwest corridor (the WonsanSeoul corridor) in central Korea that

divides the Taebaeks into northern and

southern ranges. (Map 2) From this

axial spine, spur ranges spread southwestward across most of the peninsula.

The few existing lowlands, themselves

dotted by imposing mountain masses,

lie principally along the west coast. This

mountain framework made movement

in any direction difficult, particularly

cross-country and east-west.

Poor lines of communication complicated the movement of UNC troops

1944); M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders

in Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946); and Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan:

The Story of a Nation, rev. ed. (New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1974).

5
MAP 2
THE MISSION

and supplies into and inside Korea. All

harbors were year-round, warm-water

ports, but few were good, and extreme

tidal ranges limited the use of those on

the west coast. Airfields were dated. Although they were numerous and well

located for troop transport and cargo

planes, putting and keeping them in

condition to handle the heavy aircraft

(tactical aircraft, as well) often required

more than available UNC engineer

crews could provide. The railroad,

Korea's chief means of overland commercial transportation, had suffered

from hard use and inadequate maintenance in recent years, and by late 1950

heavy war damage to bridges, tracks,

and rolling stock had further reduced

its capacity. The road net, which had

been designed primarily to serve and

supplement the railways, was a primitive system of narrow, one-lane, mostly

gravel-surfaced roads with steep grades,

sharp curves, and equally narrow bridges with low load capacities. Because of

poor construction, few lateral routes,

and vulnerability to weather damage,

the road system was scarcely suitable

for UNC military traffic.

Hardly a lesser obstacle was Korea's

monsoonal climate with its characteristic reversal of prevailing wind direction

in summer and winter. Marked by variable winds and changeable precipitation and temperature, spring and autumn are transitional periods for the

wind shift. In summer the prevailing

winds generally move northward off

the Pacific Ocean, and in winter the

principal flow of air comes southward

out of the Asian interior. Consequently,

summers are typically rainy, humid,

and hot, winters relatively dry and cold.

But the summer of 1950 had been one

of drought-only about one-fourth the

usual amount of rainfall. This phenomenon had increased the number of

days of high temperatures, many over

100 degrees Fahrenheit and several as

high as 120 degrees. In some summer

actions heat exhaustion caused more

UNC casualties than did enemy gunfire. By late November 1950 UNC

forces also had had a taste of Korea's

winter weather. Snowfall began in midNovember, and in the higher mountains in the far northeast the heaviest

falls made roads dangerous or impassable. Although snow was light elsewhere, bitter cold intensified by brisk

northern winds created problems all

along the UNC front, disabling vehicles and weapons and causing numerous cases of frostbite among the troops.

As UNC forces restarted their advance

toward the northern border, they could

anticipate a winter of few deeper snows

but still stronger winds and decidedly

lower temperatures.3

The Initial Mission

The northern border of Korea was

not the original objective of UNC operations. The initial decision on the

purpose of these operations, made

concomitantly with the fundamental

decisions of the United States and the

United Nations (U.N.) to enter the war,

had limited the mission to repelling the

North Korean invasion of South Korea.

On the ground, this meant driving the

North Koreans back beyond the 38th

3 For additional information on Korea's relief, ports,

airfields, rail system, roadnet, and climate, see Korea

Handbook (Washington: Department of the Army,

Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, September 1950).

For the effect of weather conditions on past operations, see Appleman, South to the Naktong.

7
EBB AND FLOW

TYPICAL TERRAIN NEAR THE 38TH PARALLEL IN THE WEST

parallel of north latitude crossing the

peninsula at its waist. This was the line

that for three years after World War II

had served as a boundary first between

American and Soviet forces taking the

surrender of Japanese troops, then between U.S. and USSR occupation zones,

and finally between the Communist

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

founded by the Soviets north of the parallel and the Republic of Korea (ROK)

established under U.S. and U.N. sponsorship in the south.4

The hardening of the division of Korea at the 38th parallel had begun with

an impasse in U.S.-USSR negotiations

convened in 1946 and 1947 as an early

measure in honoring Allied wartime

4 The two areas of the divided land acquired their

commonly used names, North Korea and South Korea,

during the occupation.

8
THE MISSION

THE PORT OF PUSAN

declarations that Korea, once liberated

from Japanese rule, would eventually

be restored as a sovereign nation. The

final evolution grew out of a Soviet refusal to permit the United Nations to

include the northern people in a U.S.-

instigated 1948 attempt to supervise

the election of a national assembly as

the first step in establishing a government. By autumn of that year the parallel represented a confirmed political

division between two governments of

opposing ideologies.5

5 See Dept of State Pub 7004, Far Eastern Series

101, The Record on Korean Unification, 1943-1960

(Washington, 1960).

The partition of Korea reflected a

broad realignment of international

power resulting from World War II.

Emerging with this realignment was a

cold war between power blocs, West

versus East, anti-Communists against

Communists, nations aligned under the

leadership of the United States confronting those assembled under the Soviet Union. In Europe, the Soviets

opened a campaign of intimidation and

subversion to consolidate control of territories occupied during the war. Whatever the impulse behind that campaign,

whether a search for national security

or a desire to promote Communist

world revolution in keeping with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the strategy ap9
EBB AND FLOW

peared to be one of expansion. In response, the United States adopted a policy of containment and led attempts,

primarily through economic assistance

pacts and military alliances, to prevent

the Soviet Union from expanding its

influence beyond the borders acquired

in wartime military operations.

Although centered in Europe, the

cold war was also visible in Korea. After Soviet and American occupation

forces withdrew in 1948 and 1949, the

regime north of the parallel and the

government in the south competed in

cold war terms for jurisdiction over the

entire peninsula.6 The Soviet Union

assisted its satellite in the north, particularly in equipping and training an

army. The U.S. policy toward Korea,

established in 1948 as cold war tensions

mounted in Europe and after demobilization and budgetary restrictions

sharply reduced American military resources, was to avoid becoming "so

irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction ·in Korea or by any other power in

Korea could be considered a 'casus belli'

for the United States."7 Nevertheless,

the United States provided economic

and military assistance to the southern

republic, and Korea's unification and

full independence remained a matter

of interest, if of little hope, to both the

United States and the United Nations.

6 See D. M. Condit, et al., Challenge and Response in

Internal Conflict, vol. I, The Experience in Asia, ch. 17,

"South Korea, 1946-1954," by B. C. Mossman (Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, The

American University, 1968).

7 State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) 176/39, 22 Mar 48, title: U.S. Policy in Korea. President Truman approved this policy

on 4 April 1948.

The North Korean invasion of the

republic on 25 June 1950 and the inability of South Korean forces to check

it prompted an abrupt reversal of the

American position. Behind the change

was a belief that the invasion was not

simply an extension of a local jurisdictional dispute but a break in the wider

cold war. Viewing the attack in this

light, President Harry S. Truman and

his principal advisers concluded that it

had to be contested on grounds that inaction would invite further armed aggression, and possibly a third world war.

The immediate American response

was to label the invasion as a threat to

world peace before the United Nations.

This step was not taken primarily to

produce troop and materiel support,

although such support was forthcoming. The ease and speed with which the

North Korean invasion force was driving south made clear that there was not

enough time to assemble a broadly

based U.N. force. Only the United

States could commit troops in any numbers immediately, these from occupation forces in Japan. Nor were North

Korean authorities, who anticipated a

quick victory, expected to submit to

U.N. political pressure. Rather, the

United States sought the moral support

of the United Nations and the authority to identify resistance to the North

Korean venture with U.N. purposes.

Resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council on 25 and 27 June 1950,

worded almost exactly as American representatives offered them, gave the

sanction and support desired.

President Truman sought no congressional declaration of war but committed American forces as a response

to the U.N. resolution under his authority as commander in chief of the

10
ALL AIRFIELDS REQUIRED HEAVY MAINTENANCE. Above, loaded C-46 is pushed to

solid ground after runway collapsed. Below, main rail lines were standard gage and

reasonably well built. Roads were narrow and poorly constructed.
WINTER WEATHER WAS ANOTHER PROBLEM
THE MISSION

PRESIDENT TRUMAN

armed forces and under his general

powers to conduct the foreign relations

of the United States.8 Partly out of

these conditions of entry, the president

avoided the word war in references to

operations in Korea in favor of police

action. He also used the euphemism to

dramatize the limited scope of UNC

operations. As formally resolved by the

U.N. Security Council, the purpose was

"to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security

in the area.9 As explained on 29 June

by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, American actions taken in response

8 See J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), pp. 31-35.

9 U.N. doc. S/1511, reprinted in Dept of State Pub

3922, Far Eastern Series 34, United States Policy in the

Korean Crisis (Washington, 1950), p. 24.

SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON

to the U.N. resolutions of 25 and 27

June were "solely for the purpose of

restoring the Republic of Korea to its

status prior to the invasion from the

North."l0 In line with this limitation,

President Truman intended to avoid

heavy commitments of American resources in Korea and to take no steps

that would prompt the Soviet Union or

the People's Republic of China, the

newly risen Communist state on the

mainland, to enter the conflict.

Acknowledging the United States as

the major contributor to the effort in

Korea, the U.N. Security Council on 7

July 1950 recommended that other nations supplying forces and materiel

contribute them to a single command

10 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York:

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 450.

13
EBB AND FLOW

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. Left to right, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, General of

the Army Omar N. Bradley (chairman), General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and General J.

Lawton Collins.

under the United States.11 President

Truman formally accepted the responsibilities of leadership on 8 July.

The evolving command structure

placed Truman in the role of executive

agent for the U.N. Security Council,

although he had no obligation to clear

his decisions with that agency. Assisting him in this role were the U.S. National Security Council and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who helped develop the strategic concept of opera11 The council also authorized the new command to

fly the U.N. flag in the course of operations against

North Korean forces.

tions in Korea. In the strictly military

channel, the Joint Chiefs issued instructions to the unified command in the

field through its Army member. 12 This

12 The Joint Chiefs of Staff included General of the

Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman; General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Forrest P.

Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; and General

Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff. Although the Joint Chiefs instructed the U.N. Command, not all directives originated with them, nor did

the directives in every case represent their recommendations. For an account of operations at the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and U.N. Command headquarters levels during the first year of the war, see James F.

Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, U.S.

ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).

14
THE MISSION

GENERAL COLLINS

method followed an existing Department of Defense agreement whereby

the chief whose service was playing the

primary role in a command area, in this

case Army Chief of Staff General J.

Lawton Collins, would serve as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs. The

command in the field, the United Nations Command, was formally established on 24 July 1950 under General

of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who

superimposed its headquarters over

that of his existing Far East Command

in Tokyo.

While the top echelons of command

were being shaped, General MacArthur

assigned control of air operations in

Korea to the air arm of the Far East

Command, the Far East Air Forces,

commanded by Lt. Gen. George E.

Stratemeyer, and allotted control of naval operations to Naval Forces, Far

GENERAL MACARTHUR

East, under Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy. 13

He assigned all UNC ground forces entering Korea to Lt. Gen. Walton H.

Walker's Eighth U.S. Army, then on

occupation duty in Japan with headquarters in Yokohama. After moving

to Korea in mid-July, General Walker

also assumed control of the operations

of the ROK Army at the offer of South

Korea's president, Syngman Rhee.14

13 It was not until 27 August 1950, however, that

General MacArthur officially designated these air and

naval organizations as parts of the U.N. Command.

He issued this order primarily to clarify the relationship of the air and naval commands to him as UNC

commander in chief. 14 On 15 July 1950 President Rhee wrote to General

MacArthur: "I am happy to assign to you command

authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation

of the present state of hostilities; such command to be

exercised either by you personally or by such military

commander or commanders to whom you may dele15
EBB AND FLOW

GENERAL STRATEMEYER. (Photograph

taken in 1944.)

In the van of forces from other U.N.

members, American ground troops began entering Korea in July to join the

ROK Army in blunting the invasion,

only to be shoved back into the southeastern corner of the country by the

surprisingly strong North Korean People's Army. But there, in defenses based

on the Naktong River and arching

around the port of Pusan, General

Walker through August and the first

half of September successfully countered further North Korean attacks.

General Stratemeyer's air command

meanwhile all but eliminated North

Korea's small air forces and severely

ADMIRAL JOY

interdicted traffic on the enemy's long

overland supply lines. Admiral Joy's

force wiped out what little naval opposition the North Koreans could offer and

clamped a tight blockade on the Korean

coast to prevent the movement of enemy troops and supplies by water.

As the costs of repeated attempts

to penetrate the Pusan Perimeter gradually reduced the North Koreans'

ground strength, the favor of the war

shifted to the United Nations Command. On the west coast, far behind

North Korean lines, the U.S. X Corps,

commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M.

Almond and operating separately from

the Eighth Army, made an amphibious landing at Inch'on on 15 September and drove inland through Seoul,

the South Korean capital. In concert,

the Eighth Army opened an overland

gate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in

adjacent seas." See Dept of State Pub 4263, Far Eastern Series 44, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict,

July 1950- February 1951 (Washington, 1951), p. 10.

16
THE MISSION

offensive on the 16th. The X Corps'

operation and the Eighth Army's frontal effort forced a North Korean retreat

that quickly degenerated into a rout.

By the end of September, although

some bypassed North Korean troops remained in the southern mountains, the

enemy ceased to exist as an organized

force anywhere in the Republic of Korea.

The Mission Expanded

From mid-July into September, President Truman and his aides weighed the

advisability of crossing the 38th parallel.

The principal question before them was

whether such a move might spark the

active intervention of the Soviet Union

or Communist China. Both of these

governments issued warnings against a

UNC entry into North Korea in August and September as the balance of

power in the conflict shifted. But U.S.

intelligence agencies believed that intervention by either was "improbable,

barring Soviet decision to precipitate

global war," and there was some direct,

if ambiguous, evidence that the Soviet

Union would not intervene. 15 At the

end of June the United States had appealed to the Soviets to stop the North

Korean attack. They replied that their

"Government adheres to the principle

of the impermissibility of interference

by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea."16 American officials interpreted the reply as an indication that

the Soviet Union would not actively enter the conflict. In sum, while the possi15 Secretary of State Acheson. quoted in U.S. Con -

gress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Co mmittee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Military

Situation in the Far East ... (hereafter cited as MacArthur

Hearings), 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951. p. 1832.

16 Soviet statement, 29 Jun 50, quoted in Dept of

State Bulletin, vol. XXIII, no. 575, 10 Jul 50, p. 48.

GENERAL WALKER

bility of Soviet or Chinese intervention

remained the chief contra-argument in

deliberations on crossing the parallel,

the warnings heard in August and September were regarded as attempts to

discourage the U.N. Command, not as

genuine threats to enter the war.17

In any case, incentives for carrying

the war into North Korea were strong.

One was a considered need to destroy

the North Korean Army completely so

that there could be no recurrence of

the June invasion. The military occupation of North Korea also could set the

stage for achieving the long-standing

U.S. and U.N. goal of unifying Korea. 18

17 For a full discussion of the decision on crossing

the 38th parallel, see Schnabel, Policy and Direction,

pp. 177-84. For documents pertaining to the matter,

see Dept of State Pub 8859, Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1950. vol. VII, Korea (Washington, 1976).

18 For a discussion of occupation planning, see

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 219-21.

17
EBB AND FLOW

GENERAL ALMOND

Indeed, the possibility of enabling the

United Nations to bring about the unification of Korea under a single, acceptable government provided a powerful

inducement to cross the parallel and

became the theme of deliberations

opened in the U.N. General Assembly

on 19 September to consider a U.S. bid

for specific endorsement of an entry

into North Korea. (General authority

was considered to exist in the phrase

"restore international peace and security in the area" in the resolution of 27

June.) Speaking before the assembly,

Secretary Acheson made clear that he

had dropped his June view by urging

that the future of Korea "be returned

where it belongs-to the custody of its

own people under the guidance of the

United Nations.19 The assembly re19 See Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXIII, no. 587, 2

Oct 50, p. 526.

sponded on 7 October with a resolution recommending that steps be

taken to "ensure conditions of stability

throughout Korea" and to establish "a

unified, independent and democratic

government in the sovereign State of

Korea."20 Thus, tacitly, the General

Assembly recommended crossing the

parallel.

Instructions expanding the UNC

military objective were issued while the

U.N. resolution was being debated. On

27 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff

notified General MacArthur that he was

to destroy the North Korean armed

forces, and on 29 September Secretary

of Defense George C. Marshall supplied

the final word authorizing him to send

troops into North Korea.21 MacArthur

could conduct operations north of the

parallel, however, only if there was "no

entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no

announcement of intended entry, nor

a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea," and he was enjoined neither to cross the Manchurian

and USSR borders of Korea nor to use

other than South Korean forces in

the Korean territory adjacent to the

northern boundary.22 The prospect of

victory, however bright, had not diminished the determination of President Truman, who had personally approved the instructions to MacArthur,

to avoid a battlefield confrontation with

the Soviet Union or China.

MacArthur directed the Eighth

Army, upon moving into North Korea,

20 U.N. doc A/1435, quoted in Dept of State Pub

4263, Far Eastern Series 44, U.S. Policy in the Korean

Conflict, pp. 17-18.

21 Marshall became secretary of defense on 21 September 1950, replacing Louis A. Johnson.

22 Rad, JCS 92801, JCS to CINCUNC, 27 Sep 50.

18
THE MISSION

to capture P'yongyang, the North Korean capital 120 miles north of Seoul,

and ordered the X Corps, still a separate force, to make an amphibious landing eighty miles north of the 38th parallel at Wonsan, North Korea's major east

coast seaport. After seizing these objectives the two ground arms were to

march toward each other over a lateral

road connecting P'yongyang and Wonsan, a move designed to trap any

North Korean forces still straggling

northward through the Taebaek Mountains. But because of the manner and

speed of the Eighth Army's plunge over

the parallel, the latter plan was not

executed.

On the Eighth Army right, a South

Korean corps crossed the parallel on 1

October and started a fast march along

the eastern shore. The corps entered

Wonsan nine days later and by the last

week of October pushed northward another hundred miles to a line reaching

inland from the coastal town of Iwon

to positions within twenty miles of the

huge Changjin Reservoir atop the Taebaek Mountains.23 West of the Taebaek

divide, Eighth Army forces moved into

North Korea between 6 and 9 October,

entered P'yongyang on the 19th, and

by the last week of the month reached

and crossed the Ch'ongch'on River

within sixty-five miles of the Yalu River,

the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. The X Corps meanwhile outloaded for the landing at Wonsan but

did not reach its objective until after

the port had fallen to the Eighth Army.

With an assault landing obviated, the

need to clear the heavily mined Wonsan

harbor prevented the X Corps from

23 UNC forces best knew the Changjin Reservoir as

the Chosin Reservoir, its Japanese name.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MARSHALL

going ashore until the last week of

October.

The Eighth Army's strides into North

Korea stimulated new warnings from

China. At midnight on 2 October, after

South Korean but as yet no American

forces had crossed the parallel, Foreign

Minister Chou En-lai formally summoned Indian Ambassador Kavalam

M. Panikkar to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in Peking. Dismissing the South

Korean advance as inconsequential,

Chou declared that if American or

other U.N. forces crossed the parallel,

China would enter the war.24

After Panikkar relayed Chou's warning through diplomatic channels to

Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

with President Truman's approval, au24 K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London: Allen

and Unwin, 1955), pp. 109-10.

19
EBB AND FLOW

thorized General MacArthur to engage

any Chinese forces encountered in Korea "as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control

offers a reasonable chance of success."

Behind this departure from the president's stand against involvement with

China was a strong inclination to dismiss the threat. Truman distrusted

Panikkar because of the latter's leaning

toward Communist China, and since

the U.N. resolution of 7 October was

then under consideration in the General Assembly, the president believed

that Chou was simply attempting "to

blackmail the United Nations by threats

of intervention in Korea."25

Similar warnings in the Chinese press

and on Radio Peking also were discounted. There was no denying China's

ability to intervene quickly. Twentyfour Chinese divisions had been identified near Yalu River crossing points,

and another fourteen had been located

elsewhere in Manchuria. But the consensus of officials privy to the highest

level of intelligence appeared to be

much as General MacArthur reported

during a conference with President

Truman at Wake Island on 15 October:

there was "very little" chance of intervention. It appeared that both the Chinese and Soviets, "in spite of their continued interest and some blatant public

statements, [had] decided against further expensive investment in support

of a lost cause. " 26

Lending support to this evaluation,

the Eighth Army by 24 October had

25 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 200; Harry S.

Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope

(Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), p. 362.

26 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York:

Macmillan, 1960), p. 115; Appleman, South to the

Naktong, pp. 760-61.

entered Korean provinces adjacent to

Manchuria without discovering any

battlefield evidence that Chinese forces

intended to engage. The North Koreans meanwhile put up little resistance, let alone any cohesive front. The

remnants of the North Korean Army

seemed eager only to escape into the

interior mountains along the Yalu River

in central North Korea or into the sanctuary of Manchuria. These circumstances gave rise to a belief that the war

was all but ended, indeed that it could

be ended before the onset of winter

weather with an accelerated drive to the

northern border.

Maintaining the Eighth Army and X

Corps as separate commands, MacArthur on 24 October drew a boundary

between them generally along the Taebaek divide and, after reassigning the

South Korean corps operating along

the east coast to General Almond, directed Walker and Almond each to proceed to the northern border with all

forces available. His last instruction violated the restriction against using any

but ROK forces along the northern

boundary of Korea, but, although the

Joint Chiefs questioned the order, they

did not countermand after MacArthur

told them that the South Koreans were

incapable of handling the advance by

themselves.27

In the west, the Eighth Army moved

toward the Yalu River in several columns, each free to advance without regard for the progress of the others. On

the opposite side of the peninsula, General Almond sent columns up the east

coast and through the mountains toward the Changjin Reservoir and the

27 For a discussion of this exchange, see Schnabel,

Policy and Direction, p. 218.

20
THE MISSION

Yalu. UNC columns moved steadily

along both coasts, and South Korean

reconnaissance troops with an interior

Eighth Army column reached the Yalu

at the town of Ch'osan. But almost everywhere else, UNC forces encountered

stout resistance and on 25 October discovered they were being opposed by

Chinese. In the X Corps zone, Chinese

defenses slowed Almond's column on

the road climbing the Taebaeks to the

Changjin Reservoir until 6 November,

when the Chinese withdrew from contact. In the Eighth Army zone, Chinese

attacks forced back the columns in the

center and on the east. Although the

columns near the coast were not attacked, the loss of ground elsewhere

compelled General Walker to recall his

western forces lest they be cut off.

Walker's pursuit thus came to a complete halt. As the Eighth Army fell

back to regroup in positions astride the

Ch'ongch'on River, Chinese forces

continued to attack until 6 November

and thenas in the X Corps sector—

abruptly broke contact.

The Mission Reconsidered

In Washington, the twelve-day engagement drew attention to the want

of a precise course of action to be followed if the U.N. Command met Chinese forces. Earlier instructions from

the Joint Chiefs of Staff had authorized General MacArthur to continue

operations against any Chinese encountered if he thought he could succeed,

but they had not prescribed or required

him to develop the exact lines of action

that continued operations against the

Chinese might follow. The Joint Chiefs,

in any case, now considered the actual

introduction of Chinese forces as reason to reexamine and possibly change

the UNC mission.

The reexamination was complicated

by difficulty in judging the extent and

purpose of the Chinese intervention.

Intelligence from the field placed the

Chinese strength involved in the recent

engagement at no more than five divisions, or about 50,000 troops. This relatively small force and its voluntary withdrawal from contact on 6 November

scarcely supported any conclusion that

China had decided on an all-out effort

in Korea, nor could other intelligence

and diplomatic agencies offer conclusive evidence of such a decision.28 The

Joint Chiefs of Staff considered more

limited interests, such as a Chinese wish

to protect Yalu River electric power

plants on which Manchuria heavily

depended, but this reasoning rested

more on speculation than on evidence.

The Joint Chiefs also heard strong

objections to any change of mission

from General MacArthur. In his view,

not only did the reasoning behind the

28 One prophetic warning that seems not to have

received serious consideration came from Karl Lott

Rankin, ambassador to Nationalist China. In a telegram dispatched to the Department of State on 6

November, Mr. Rankin advised: "Chinese military intelligence forwarded to Washington by the Embassy's

service attaches during the past few days lends strong

support to the assumption that the Chinese communists plan to throw the book at the United Nations

forces in Korea and in addition to step up their pressure in Indochina. Allowance evidently should be

made for wishful thinking among the Chinese military,

most of whom regard a general conflict as the only

means of liberating China from the communists. In

the present instance, however, such a caveat still leaves

an imposing array of apparently established facts, as

well as evidence of' sincerity among the best informed

Chinese, such as to render quite possible the correctness of their consensus of opinion that all-out action

in Korea by the Chinese communists should be expected." Quoted in Rankin's book, China Assignment

(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 65.

21
EBB AND FLOW

current mission remain valid, but "it

would be fatal to weaken the ... policy

of the United Nations to destroy all resisting armed forces in Korea and bring

that country into a united and free

nation."29 He considered the existing

situation to be satisfactorily covered by

the earlier instructions allowing him to

judge whether his forces had a reasonable chance of success. He did not claim

to have determined the strength of the

Chinese in Korea with any precision.

On the contrary, he declared that only

by advancing could he obtain "an accurate measure of enemy strength."30 He

nevertheless believed that his command

could defeat the Chinese forces cur29 Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 9 Nov 50.

30 Rad, C 68465, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7 Nov 50.

rently in Korea, and he was certain that

his air power could prevent Chinese reinforcements from crossing the Yalu

into Korea in any substantial numbers.

Unconvinced themselves that China

had decided on full intervention, uncertain about any other purpose of the

Chinese entry, and feeling both justified and obligated to accept their field

commander's appraisal, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff were willing to await clarification of Chinese objectives in Korea before deciding whether to recommend a

change in the UNC mission. President

Truman approved this position, presented in a meeting of the National Security Council on 9 November. MacArthur could continue toward the border,

and the forces and plans for a full resumption of the UNC offensive were

ready by Thanksgiving Day.

22
CHAPTER II

The Forces and the Plans

Notwithstanding the tendency of U.S.

officials to discount a massive Chinese

intervention, the entry of Chinese

forces into the war ended a retrenchment of UNC forces begun when the

complete defeat of the North Korean

Army had seemed at hand. The Army

halted the infant redeployment of major units from Korea, and Department

of Defense and State officials stopped

a move to reduce or cancel further

contributions of forces from other

nations. The Air Force did not return

two groups of medium bombers sent

back to the United States, but the Navy

sharply cut back a redeployment of

ships of the line, particularly fast

carriers.1

Earlier steps that reduced or diverted

materiel originally scheduled for shipment from the United States to the Far

East also were canceled, as was planning for a roll-up of supplies in the

theater. The Army also halted the

release of South Korean troops who

earlier, under a Korean Augmentation

to the United States Army Program

(KATUSA), had been incorporated in

understrength American ground units

as expedient fillers and replacements.

1 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 222-30, 237-39;

Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in

Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,

1961), p. 195; James A. Field, Jr., United States Naval

Operations, Korea (Washington, 1962), pp. 251-56.

Because of a continuing and growing understrength among American

ground units, the Army resumed the

once-curtailed flow of individual replacements and filler units from the

United States at a rate greater than its

earlier norm. The individual replacements were a particular boon to divisions, some of which were as much as

30 percent understrength. Army officials planned to ship 40,000 replacements in November and December and

estimated that all units in the Far East

would reach full strength by March

1951.2

The United Nations Command

With the full effect of these restorations yet to be felt, the United Nations

Command on 23 November 1950 was

a force of some 553,000 men from the

Republic of Korea and thirteen members of the United Nations. Ground

forces in Korea totaled 423,313 men;

air forces based in both Japan and Korea around 55,000; and naval forces,

ashore and afloat, about 75,000. The

ground forces were predominately

South Korean (223,950) and American

(178,464). The American contingent included 153,536 Army and 24,928 Ma2 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 237-39, 295.
EBB AND FLOW

KATUSA MEMBER WITH AMERICAN

SOLDIER

rine Corps troops.3 The remainder represented the United Kingdom (11,186),

Turkey (5,051), the Philippines (1,349),

Thailand (1,181), Australia (1,002), the

Netherlands (636), India (326), and

Sweden (168). The preponderance of

both air and naval forces was American.

Supplementing the air strength were

forces from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the Union of South

Africa, and South Korea; reinforcing

the naval strength were contingents

from South Korea, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, New

Zealand, the Netherlands, and Thailand.4

3The Army's total strength was 1,032,613, with

372,519 posted overseas. Thus, less than half of the

forces overseas and approximately 15 percent of the

total strength had been committed in Korea.

4 The ground strength is from Summary, ROK and

The theater command lines reaching

down to these diverse forces differed

in two major respects from the way they

had been established during the first

month of the war, both changes involving arrangements for controlling and

administering ground operations. In

July General MacArthur had assigned

the Eighth Army to conduct ground

operations and to perform communications zone functions while continuing

to meet responsibilities in the occupation of Japan. General Walker consequently had been obliged to divide his

headquarters, leaving a rear echelon in

Yokohama to carry out logistical and

occupation duties while he and the remainder of his staff entered Korea to

direct the ground campaign.5 To permit Walker to concentrate on operations

in Korea, MacArthur on 24 August had

phased out the Eighth Army's rear

headquarters and established the Japan

Logistical Command, a separate command subordinate to the Far East Command with headquarters in Yokohama.

Walker remained responsible for the

receipt, storage, and forward movement of supplies in Korea itself, while

the logistical command, under Maj.

Gen. Walter L. Weible, absorbed the

U.N. Ground Forces Strength in Korea, 31 July 1950-

31 July 1953, prepared by Program Review and Analysis Division, OCA, 7 Oct 54, and Mono, Hq, FEC,

Maj William J. Fox, "Inter-Allied Co-operation During Combat Operations," copy of both in CMH. The

air and naval strengths are estimates based on Hq,

FEAF, Korean Air War Summary, 25 June 1950-30

June 1951, and Field, United Slates Naval Operations,

Korea, p. 253.

5 During the time that the Eighth Army had forces

in both Korea and Japan, its contingent in Korea was

designated the Eighth United States Army in Korea

(EUSAK). This designation, though appropriate for

only a brief period, was not abolished until 19 February 1953.

24
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

UNC-FEC HEADQUARTERS, TOKYO

missions the Eighth Army had been

performing in Japan. 6

The other change had occurred in

September when the separate X Corps

under General Almond landed at

Inch'on. Until that time, General Walker had commanded or exercised operational control over all ground forces.

As of 23 November Walker was responsible for the logistical support of Almond's forces, but otherwise the Eighth

Army and the X Corps remained separate commands. The centralized control of ground forces within Korea and

6 Mono, Hq, Eighth Army, "Logistical Problems and

Their Solutions," and Mono, Hq, JLC, "Logistical

Problems and Their Solutions," copy of both in CMH.

their operations thus rested in General

MacArthur at theater, or UNC, level in

Tokyo. (Chart 1)

Ground Forces

The heart of the UNC ground combat strength comprised Eighth Army

headquarters, ROK Army headquarters, six corps headquarters, seventeen

infantry divisions (including one of U.S.

marines), three infantry brigades, two

separate infantry regiments (one of

U.S. airborne troops and one of ROK

marines), and three separate infantry

battalions. Among lesser formations

were a number of ROK Army security

battalions and ROK National Police

25
EBB AND FLOW

CHART 1THEATER LINES OF COMMAND FOR OPERATIONS IN KOREA

23 NOVEMBER 1950

battalions, all low-strength units organized primarily for antiguerrilla operations. Also included were a few separate ROK marine battalions, which

came under ROK Army control when

operating on the mainland but under

ROK Navy control when located, as

they were most of the time, on offshore

islands. Still smaller units included a

provisional company of U.S. Rangers,

a company of British marine commandos, and a U.S. special operations

company-a provisional unit of Army

troops originally organized for commando-type operations during the

Inch'on landing.7

By far the larger portion of the

ground strength was vested in the

Eighth Army and was located west of

the main Taebaek spine, where, in the

wake of the drive out of the Pusan Perimeter and the pursuit above the 38th

parallel, General Walker's forces had

become spread from the port of Pusan

northwestward to the Ch'ongch'on

River. Walker also had split his head7 For an account of the unusual activities of this

special operations company during the Inch'on-Seoul

campaign, see Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Victory at High

Tide: The Inch'on-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: J. B.

Lippincott, 1968), pp. 60-61, 79, 145, 186.

quarters during the autumn offensive,

establishing main headquarters in

Seoul while he and a small staff operated from a forward command post in

P'yongyang.

U.S. combat formations of the Eighth

Army included two corps (I and IX),

four infantry divisions (1st Cavalry, 2d,

24th, and 25th), the airborne regiment

(187th Airborne Regimental Combat

Team), and the Ranger company

(8213th).8 Other U.N. forces in Walker's

command accounted for the three infantry brigades (1st Turkish Armed

Forces Command, 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, and 29th

British Independent Brigade Group)

and the three separate infantry battalions (10th Battalion Combat Team,

Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea; 21st Regimental Combat Team,

Thailand Expeditionary Force; and

Netherlands Detachment, United Nations) .9

Most of the ROK Army also was under General Walker's control. The ma8 The 1st Cavalry was an infantry division retaining

its former designation. 9 The 27th British Infantry, which had arrived in

Korea from Hong Kong with only two battalions, had

26
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

GENERAL FARRELL

jor combat units included two corps (II

and III) and eight divisions (1st, 2d,

5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th). To

date, the ROK Army headquarters had

seldom directed the operations of its

combat formations within an assigned

sector or zone at the front. The headquarters functioned more as a clearinghouse for instructions issued to ROK

corps on line by Eighth Army headquarters and did not enter the command picture at all when an ROK unit

was attached to a U.S. headquarters below Eighth Army level. On the other

hand, the headquarters did play a normal role under the ROK Army chief of

staff, Maj. Gen. Chung II Kwon, in

been augmented by the attachment of the 3d Battalion,

Royal Australian Regiment, and 60th Indian Field

Ambulance and Surgical Unit, resulting in its redesignation as a commonwealth brigade. Advance parties

of infantry battalions due from Canada and France

also had joined the Eighth Army by 23 November.

planning and directing operations in

rear-area security missions.

Walker maintained close liaison with

South Korean forces through six hundred officers and men constituting the

U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). Commanded

by Brig. Gen. Francis W. Farrell, this

group guided the ROK Army in both

training and combat and kept Walker

and other American commanders under whom ROK units served informed

of South Korean capabilities and activities. General Farrell's headquarters currently was located with that of

the ROK Army in Seoul, while the remainder of his command was spread,

rather thinly, through the various ROK

Army staffs and technical services and

among the combat units as far down

the chain of command as battalions.10

Eighth Army supplies were handled

by the 2d Logistical Command, under

Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin, and its subordinate 3d Logistical Command, under Brig. Gen. George C. Stewart. As

of 23 November the port, depot, and

transportation units of the 2d Logistical

Command operated in and from the

major port and storage facilities at

Pusan, while those of the 3d Logistical

Command worked in and out of smaller

installations in the Inch'on-Seoul and

Chinnamp'o-P'yongyang areas. Pusan,

the main supply center, was the starting point of three not easily distinguishable but separate supply lines.

Through the principal line, that of the

United States, flowed the supplies for

all American units and, except for a

few items, for all attached U.N. units

other than those of the British Commonwealth. Commonwealth units main10 See Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in

Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

27
EBB AND FLOW

tained their own supply line and, except

for perishable foods and petroleum

products obtained from American

stocks, used only commonwealth supplies and equipment. A supply line for

ROK forces constituted the third system, through which passed, for the

most part, issues of war materials from

the United States. Other supplies for

ROK forces came from local sources,

but, except for food, only in small

amounts because of South Korea's

flimsy economy and limited industrial

development.11 

Besides supply functions, the two

logistical commands handled the confinement of prisoners of war, currently at camps in Pusan, Inch'on, and

P'yongyang holding 130,921 captives.

The 2d Logistical Command also operated the U.N. Reception Center at

Taegu, sixty miles northwest of Pusan,

where arriving UNC contingents received any required clothing, equipment, and training with U.S. Army

gear before joining combat operations.

Also operating as part of the 2d

Logistical Command was Sweden's contribution to the U.N. Command, a 400-

bed Red Cross field hospital. The 160

civilians on the hospital staff had received assimilated military ranks so as

to be "respected and protected" as provided in the Geneva Conventions of

1949.12 Although organized as a mobile evacuation hospital, it had been

augmented by a U.S. Army medical administrative detachment and had become a fixed installation in Pusan han11 See Eighth Army, "Logistical Problems and Their

Solutions." 12 The conventions provide certain protections for

military medical personnel in combat areas and offer

the same to Red Cross members if they ar e subject to

military laws and regulations."

dling not only military but also civilian

patients when the work load permitted.

Dealing with civilians on a larger

scale was a command of some three

hundred officers and enlisted men, the

U.N. Public Health and Welfare Detachment.13 Civil assistance teams of

the command, using foreign aid supplies, worked throughout the Eighth

Army area to prevent disease, starvation, and unrest among the civil population. Theirs was essentially a relief

mission, but some team activity, such as

assisting the movement of refugees, also

was designed to prevent civilians from

interfering with military operations.

Units with the separate X Corps in

northeastern Korea included the ROK

I Corps taken over from the Eighth

Army in late October after General

Almond's forces landed at Wonsan,

three American divisions (3d, 7th, and

1st Marine), two ROK divisions (3d and

Capital), the ROK marine regiment (1st

Korean Marine Corps), the British commando company (41st Independent

Commando, Royal Marines), and the

American Special Operations Company. General Almond also controlled

the U.S. Army's 2d Special Engineer

Brigade, which handled port operations at Hungnam, fifty miles north of

Wonsan, where most of the X Corps'

seaborne supplies, either transshipped

from Pusan or shipped directly from

Japan, arrived. Ten miles inland from

Hungnam, Almond had established X

Corps headquarters in the city of

Hamhung. (Chart 2)

The American predominance in operations was nowhere more evident

than in the organization and equipment

13 In January 1951 this detachment would become

the U.N. Civil Assistance Command, Korea.

28

EBB AND FLOW

of the assorted ground forces assembled under U.S. command. ROK formations and, except for the British

Commonwealth forces, all U.N. units

were structured under modified U.S.

Army tables of organization, and all of

their weapons and almost all of their

other equipment and supplies were of

American manufacture.14

As a result of revised tables of organization and equipment, the structure of

U.S. divisions was distinctly different

in many respects from that of their

World War II counterparts. The modifications affected every unit level from

squad upward; the latest change, to become effective on 29 November 1950,

set the authorized war strength of an

infantry division at 18,855, more than

4,000 greater than that of a World War

II division. A comparable increase in

organic firepower came largely from

an increase in the number of field artillery pieces and the addition of tanks,

antiaircraft artillery, and heavy mortars

that previously had not been included

in a division's own arsenal.15

The weapons being used in Korea,

as well as the vehicles and other equipment, were in the main the same models and types used during World War

II. Large numbers were the very same

weapons. The .30-caliber M1 rifle,

.30-caliber Browning automatic rifle,

and light and heavy .30-caliber Browning machine guns remained basic in14 See Fox, "Inter-Allied Co-operation During Combat Operations."

15 For accounts of the development of postwar tables and the resulting changes in units, see John K.

Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular

Army (Washington: Government Printing Office,

1972), a volume in the ARMY LINEAGE SERIES,

pp. 70-87; and MS, John B. Wilson, Divisions and

Separate Brigades, also to be in the same series, CMH

files.

fantry weapons. Continuing in use were

Colt .45-caliber pistols, .30-caliber carbines, .45-caliber Thompson and M3

submachine guns, .50-caliber Browning

machine guns, and 60-mm., 81-mm.,

and 4.2-inch mortars (but a new model

of the 4.2 with considerably greater

range). Although 2.36-inch rocket

launchers remained standard weapons,

they were being supplanted by a new

and more powerful 3.5-inch version.

Virtually new were 57-mm. and 75-

mm. recoilless rifles tested but used very

little during the last few months of

World War II.

The tank units assigned to infantry

divisions were equipped with light M24

Chaffee, medium M4A3 Sherman, and

heavy M26 Pershing tanks, all World

War II models, and the M46 Patton, a

modified version of the Pershing introduced in 1948. New tank models were

being developed, but none would reach

Korea in time to play a combat role.

British tanks in use included the World

War II vintage Churchill and a new 52-

ton Centurion.

The basic divisional field artillery

weapons continued to be the 105-mm.

and 155-mm. howitzers, but now with

six tubes in each battery instead of four

as in World War II, an increase that

raised a division's total to fifty-four

105-mm. and eighteen 155-mm. pieces.

Nondivisional battalions in Korea also

were equipped with these weapons and

with 155-mm. guns and 8-inch howitzers. Except for the single 8-inch unit

in Korea, their batteries, too, had six

tubes each.

The antiaircraft battalion now organic to division artillery was equipped

with twin 40-mm. guns and quad .50-

caliber machine guns, all self-propelled.

In addition to the same weapons, a few

30
THE 3.5-INCH ROCKET LAUNCHER, a new ground weapon.
EBB AND FLOW

THE 57-MM. RECOILLESS RIFLE

nondivisional antiaircraft artillery battalions in Korea were armed with 90-

mm. guns. Of significant benefit to the

divisions in Korea was the virtual absence of enemy air attacks on UNC

ground troops, which permitted extensive use of divisional antiaircraft weapons in a ground support role. The

value of these weapons in support of

both offensive and defensive ground

operations had been well established

during World War II and was quickly

reaffirmed.

An operational innovation of growing importance was the use of helicopters as ambulances to evacuate seriously

wounded men from the front. This

practice had started in July 1950 with

occasional requests from ground units

to the 3d Air Rescue Squadron of the

Fifth Air Force for the help of Sikorsky

H-5s in evacuating critically wounded

men from forward aid stations. An increasing demand for such assistance

and the success of the squadron in

safely bringing back wounded who

might not have survived a slow, rough

overland move led to the Army's formal adoption of helicopters for medical evacuation. The Army's 2d Helicopter Detachment, the first of four such

units scheduled for deployment to

Korea, arrived on 22 November. Following a two-month training period to

32
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

THE 75-MM. RECOILLESS RIFLE

became familiar with its Bell H-13 craft

and the Korean terrain, the unit was to

become operational as an attachment

to the 8055th Mobile Army Surgical

Hospital.

The mobile army surgical hospital,

or MASH, as it was instantly and permanently dubbed, also was a new kind

of organization conceived soon after

World War II, mainly as a way of bringing emergency lifesaving surgery closer

to critically wounded men. The concept called for placing and keeping a

sixty-bed, truck-borne MASH in a forward location just out of enemy artillery range in support of each division.

Only four of the mobile units were in

Korea, not enough to place one in support of each division; and, because of a

shortage of evacuation hospitals, each

MASH had been enlarged to 150 beds

and was handling more than just surgery patients. But the early treatment

of wounded at a MASH located only

minutes from the battlefield, combined

with the swift, comfortable delivery of

seriously hurt men by helicopter, had

helped to lower the fatality rate for the

Army's wounded. The rate had been

4.5 percent during World War II. In

Korea, it would eventually reach a new

low of 2.5 percent.16

16 The rates cited are from Frank A. Reister, Battle

Casualties and Medical Statistics: U.S. Army Experience in

the Korean War (Washington: Department of the Army,

Office of the Surgeon General), pp. 15-16.

33
EBB AND FLOW

THE M46 PATTON TANK

Air Forces

For air operations in Korea, it had

been necessary at the beginning of

hostilities to make expedient and expeditious changes in Far East Air Forces

dispositions, equipment, and organization. General Stratemeyer's principal

prewar mission of maintaining an air

defense of his theater had compelled

the deployment of subordinate air commands over a wide area. Only the Fifth

Air Force and the Far East Air Materiel Command, which handled air logistics throughout the theater, had been

based in Japan. To create a force capable of operations in Korea, General

Stratemeyer had found it necessary to

pull in units from distant theater locations and adjust the locations of some

units within Japan to bring them within

range of the battle area. Additional

forces and equipment also had had to

be requisitioned from the United States.

The change in equipment had

stemmed from a recent conversion of

Far East Air Forces fighter units from

F-51 Mustangs to F-80C Shooting Stars,

short-range jet interceptors not meant

to be flown at low altitudes in support

of ground operations. The U.S. Air

Force inventory included the F-84E

Thunderjet that was adaptable to airground operations, but its use required

better airfields than those existing in

34
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

THE SIKORSKY H-5 HELICOPTER

Japan and Korea. The immediate alternative had been to return to the F-51

with its longer range and its capacity

for low-level missions and operations

from short and rough fields. In striking a balance to meet all air requirements, Stratemeyer had reconverted

half of his F-80C squadrons to F-51s.

As of 23 November the F-80Cs and

F-51s remained the basic fighter aircraft, but the Far East Air Forces were

in the process of importing both F-84Es

and the high performance F-86A Sabres from the United States and were

improving airfields in Japan and Korea

to handle them.

In organizational changes, two provisional commands subordinated to the

Far East Air Forces had been established, Bomber Command under Maj.

Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., to handle

deep interdiction and strategic bombing operations and Combat Cargo

Command under Maj. Gen. William H.

Tunner to lift troops and supplies.17

Bomber Command currently possessed

ninety-five B-29s, now classed as medium bombers, and included the 19th

and 307th Bombardment Groups based

at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and

the 98th Bombardment Group and 91st

Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron at

17 General O'Donnell was on temporary duty from

his assignment as commander of the Fifteenth Air

Force, Strategic Air Command.

35
EBB AND FLOW

THE F7F TIGERCAT

Yokota, Japan. Combat Cargo Command comprised four carrier groups,

all based in Japan, equipped with C-46,

C-47, C-54, and C-119 aircraft. General Tunner also controlled the operations of a U.S. Marine squadron flying

R5Ds. 18

Tactical air operations were the province of the Fifth Air Force under Maj.

Gen. Earle E. Partridge. By 23 November General Partridge had set up headquarters in Seoul adjacent to the main

18 Canada also had allocated a transport squadron

to support the U.N. Command. Its Royal Canadian

Air Force Transport Squadron No. 426 equipped with

North Star planes flew regularly scheduled flights between McCord Air Force Base, Washington, and

Haneda Airport in Tokyo. Additional transports for

flights within the theater would become available on

26 November upon the arrival from Greece of the

Royal Hellenic Air Force Flight No. 13 with six Dakota aircraft.

headquarters of the Eighth Army, including the Joint Operations Center

and Tactical Air Control Center, which

arranged and dispatched air sorties.

Fifth Air Force units included two light

bomber wings, each with three squadrons of B-26s based in Japan, and five

fighter wings located on Korean fields.

The fighter wings included six squadrons of F-80Cs and eight squadrons and

a separate flight of F- 51s. 19 The F-80C

jets operated from Kimpo Airfield west

of Seoul and a field at Taegu; the F-5 is

flew from North Korean fields, five

squadrons and the separate flight based

on P'yongyang and P'yongyang East

Airfields behind the Eighth Army,

three squadrons stationed at Yonp'o

Airfield near Hungnam behind the X

Corps. Other Fifth Air Force units included a squadron of F-82 all-weather

fighters based in Japan but used sparingly over Korea because the Air Force

possessed so few and supply support

for them was limited. For reconnaissance missions, General Partridge had

two photo squadrons (RF-80 and

RB-26) at the Taegu field and a visual

squadron (RF-51) in Japan. His remaining unit was a squadron of T-6 Mosquitoes based at P'yongyang East Airfield

for the control of close support sorties.20

Additional UNC air strength included the U.S. 1st Marine Aircraft

19 Australia and South Africa had contributed two

of the F-51 units, the 77 Royal Australian Air Force

Squadron and 2d South African Air Force Squadron.

The separate flight belonged to the fledgling ROK

Air Force. Also serving with the Fifth Air Force were

twenty fighter pilots and a number of technicians from

Canada.

20 The above information on UNC air forces is based

on Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea; Hq,

FEAF, Korean Air War Summary, 25 Jun 50-30 Jun

51; and Lt. Col. Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of

Stationery, 1966), pp. 14, 179.

36
A MASH NURSE
(Top to bottom) THE F-80C SHOOTING STAR, F-84E THUNDERJET, AND F-86A

SABREJET
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

Wing with four squadrons of F4U Corsairs and two squadrons of F7F Tigercat

night fighters based on Wonsan and

Yonp'o Airfields behind the X Corps

and on an escort carrier off the east

coast, and two U.S. Navy air groups

aboard carriers, each with five squadrons, equipped with F4Us, F9F Pantherjets, and AD Skyraiders. Naval air

units also included Fleet Air Wing Six,

which, with three U.S. squadrons of

Neptunes and Mariners and two Royal

Air Force squadrons of Sunderlands,

carried out Naval Forces, Far East, air

patrol operations over Japanese and

Korean waters.

21

Given the varied sources of UNC air

strength, effective air operations in Korea had required some form of centralized control. General Stratemeyer during the first days of the war had sought

operational control of all aviation operating from Japan or over Korea except

that employed in purely naval tasks,

such as the patrolling by Fleet Air

Wing Six. Admiral Joy had resisted

giving over that much control of his

aircraft and carriers, judging that

doing so could damage his command's

ability to meet other naval responsibilities. In compromise, General MacArthur had given Stratemeyer "coordination control," a lesser degree of

authority that centralized the conduct

of air operations in Stratemeyer without giving him direct control of Navy

and Marine air units. Stratemeyer, in

turn, had delegated the coordination

of close support operations to the

21 Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 2 7 6 ;

Commander Malcolm W. Cagle and Commander

Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis:

United States Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 374-77, 499,

520-22. The British units were RAF Squadrons 88

and 209.

THE F9F PANTHERJET

Fifth Air Force commander, General

Partridge. Although differences arose

between the air and naval commands

over the exact meaning of coordination control, the system was still in use

in late November.22 (Chart 3)

Naval Forces

UNC naval units currently included

the U.S. Seventh Fleet and three separate task forces. Task Force 96, the

single, small combat force available to

Admiral Joy at the opening of hostilities, now included Fleet Air Wing Six,

an escort carrier group, a submarine

group, and a service group located in

Japan to handle Naval Forces, Far East,

logistical functions in port. The task

22 Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 388;

Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea.

39
EBB AND FLOW

CHART 3-ORGANIZATION FOR UNC AIR OPERATIONS IN KOREA

23 NOVEMBER 1950

force also had a number of Japanesemanned and -supported freighters and

landing ships of the Shipping Control

Administration, Japan, that were employed in the intra-area lift of troops

and supplies.

23 Joy himself was the task

force commander. From a nucleus of

five ships, Task Force 90 commanded

by Rear Adm. James H. Doyle had become a full-fledged amphibious force. 24

So far in the war, Admiral Doyle's

force had participated in three major

landings-at P'ohang-dong, Inch'on,

and Wonsan-and was currently posted

in both Japanese and Korean waters.

Task Force 95, under Rear Adm. Al23 On 25 June 1950, Joy's line ships had consisted of

1 antiaircraft light cruiser, 4 destroyers, I frigate

(Australian), and 1 submarine.

24 The five original vessels were a command ship,

attack transport, attack cargo ship, LST, and fleet tug.

len E. Smith, constituted the U.N.

Blockading and Escort Force. Incorporated with the U.S. contingent of the

force were all line ships furnished by

other U.N. countries and South Korea.

To enforce the blockade of the Korean

coast and to perform bombardment

and minesweeping assignments, Admiral Smith's force was deployed in both

the Yellow Sea washing Korea on the

west and the Sea of Japan on the east.25

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the

Seventh Fleet:, commanded by Vice

Adm. Arthur D. Struble, had been

based in the Philippines. Its operations

at that time were under the control of

Adm. Arthur E. Radford, Commander

25 Another assignment, the escort of convoys between Japan and Korea, was canc eled early in the war

after it became obvious that the North Koreans would

make no effort against shipping.

40
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

THE USS LEYTE BEING REFUELED AT SEA

in Chief, Pacific Fleet, but standing orders passed control to Admiral Joy

whenever the Seventh Fleet operated

in Japanese waters or in the event of an

emergency. When these orders went

into effect after the war started, the Seventh Fleet, at the direction of President

Truman, was assigned both to conduct

combat operations in Korean waters

and to operate in the Formosa area

where its presence and patrolling could

discourage the Chinese on the mainland and the Nationalists on the island

from attacking each other and thus prevent a widening of hostilities.

As of 23 November Fleet Air Wing

One, headquartered on Okinawa, and

surface ships constituting Task Force

72 were handling the Formosa patrol.

Admiral Struble himself and two task

forces were in the immediate battle

area. Task Force 77, a fast carrier force

commanded by Rear Adm. Edward C.

Ewen, was deployed off the eastern Korean coast in the Sea of Japan. Its two

carriers, the Leyte and Philippine Sea,

each carried an air group of five squadrons and, together, were operating with

approximately a hundred fifty planes.

Underway replenishment for Ewen's

ships was provided by a logistical support force, Task Force 79.26 (Chart 4)

26 The information on UNC naval forces is based

on Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea; Cagle

and Manson, The Sea War in Korea.

41
EBB AND FLOW

CHART 4-ORGANIZATION FOR UNC NAVAL OPERATIONS IN KOREA

23 NOVEMBER 1950

The UNC Plan of Advance

With these forces at his disposal, General MacArthur planned to continue

operations by combining his overland

advance with air attacks on the principal Yalu River bridges to shut off Chinese reinforcement from Manchuria.

He also planned to intensify air attacks

opened during the first week of November on North Korean towns judged

to be important centers for enemy supply and communications.

Against the earlier attacks on towns

deep in northwestern Korea, enemy

fighter pilots, some flying Russian-built

MIG-15 jets, had adopted a special

countermeasure, rising from nearby

Manchurian fields and climbing to superior altitudes before crossing the

border, then making diving attacks on

UNC planes and darting back to sanctuary above the Yalu.27 On 7 November,

27 The first MIG- 15 appeared over northwestern Ko- rea on I November. The first all-jet air battle in his

tory occurred on 8 November when Lt. Russell J.

Brown, U.S. Air Force, flying an F-80, shot down a MIG-15 over Sinuiju. In another first, the initial use

of incendiary bombs in the war occurred on 4 November when B-29s of the 98th Group attacked the city

of Ch'ongjin in northeastern Korea.

as MacArthur began to increase air operations in the northwest, he asked the

Joint Chiefs of Staff for instructions on

how to deal with the enemy hit-andrun tactics. There was historical and

legal precedent under which UNC

pilots, once engaged by enemy fliers

over North Korea, could continue the

air battle even though maneuvers carried them into the air space above Manchuria. The Joint Chiefs, Secretary of

Defense Marshall, Secretary of State

Acheson, and President Truman all favored adopting this course, commonly

referred to as "hot pursuit," since it

could not be construed, at least according to precedent, as a violation of

Manchurian territory. They dropped

the idea, however, after encountering

strong objections from officials of other

nations with forces in Korea.28

The Washington reaction to MacArthur's plan to bomb the Yalu bridges

followed an opposite sequence. Because

bridge attacks at the border might

result in inadvertent bombing of Man28 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 247-50; Futrell,

The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 210-11.

42
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

churian territory, thus undermining

forthcoming endeavors to assure China

that the northern border of Korea was

the extent of UNC interest and perhaps

triggering a crisis expanding the war,

President Truman ordered the air plan

canceled. But MacArthur won a reversal from the president by protesting

that unopposed Chinese troop and

materiel movements across the Yalu

bridges threatened to destroy his

command. On 8 and 9 November he

opened air attacks on the Yalu crossings

at Sinuiju, Ch'ongsongjin, Namsan-ni,

Manp'ojin, and Hyesanjin. So as not to

violate Manchurian territory, bombing

runs were made against only the first

overwater spans on the Korean side of

the river.

29

For the ground advance, General

MacArthur initially let stand his order

of 24 October allowing General Walker

and General Almond each to proceed

toward the border independently. In

the northeast, where Chinese had resisted only the X Corps' west flank

forces before breaking contact on 6

November, Almond resumed his advance with almost no perceptible pause,

pushing four divisions over three

widely separated axes. Inland on the

corps left, the U.S. 1st Marine Division

climbed toward the Changjin Reservoir

atop the Taebaek Mountains. The U.S.

7th Infantry Division moved northward

over the next arterial road to the east

leading from Pukch'ong near the coast

to Hyesanjin on the Yalu. On the corps

right, the South Korean Capital and 3d

Divisions of the ROK I Corps followed

the coastal road toward the Tumen

29 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 241-46; Futrell,

The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 209-13.

River, which for eleven miles upstream from its mouth marks the border between Korea and the Soviet

Union. 30

General Walker laid out a new plan

of advance on 6 November but delayed

executing it while he strengthened his

attack force and supplies. In pursuit of

North Korean Army remnants, the

Eighth Army had moved through western North Korea with two corps and

six divisions. Fully expecting to meet

Chinese forces when he again moved

north, Walker intended to increase his

force to three corps, eight divisions, and

three brigades. By 6 November he had

started the additional units forward

and planned to reopen his advance

around the 15th provided he could arrange adequate logistical support by

that date.31

Supply requirements had plagued

Walker from the time he crossed the

38th parallel. For the initial advance

into North Korea, the Eighth Army

was to have received supplies through

Inch'on, but the port had been tied

up during the first half of October by

the X Corps' outloading for Wonsan.

Walker, as a result, had sent forces

across the parallel with only a marginal

store of provisions.32

Replenishing these small stocks had

been another problem. Battle-damaged

rail lines had not been repaired beyond

the Pusan Perimeter at the time of the

30 X Corps operations between 26 October and 26

November 1950 are covered in Appleman, South to the

Naktong, chs. XXXVIII and XXXIX.

31 Eighth Army Opn Plan 14, 6 Nov 50; Memo, Gen

Walker for CinC, FEC, 6 Nov 50; Rad, GX 27681

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 13 Nov

50.

32 Memo, Gen Walker for CinC, FEC, 6 Nov 50;

Eighth Army G4 SS Rpt, 6 Nov 50.

43
EBB AND FLOW

crossing, and at the last week of October train service on the main line had

been restored no farther than the Imjin

River, thirty miles above Seoul and a

hundred fifty miles below the Eighth

Army front on the Ch'ongch'on River.

Even then, Walker's engineers had

pieced together only a single pair of

rails out of a double track system,

which, together with the poor condition of the bridges, sharply limited the

line's capacity. This restriction had

forced extremely heavy supply traffic

onto the roads. Three-fourths of the

Eighth Army's trucks had operated

around the clock out of Pusan and

Inch'on and from railheads and airheads to keep Walker's forces moving.

This support had threatened to wear

out before the Eighth Army reached

the Ch'ongch'on because of too many

deadlined vehicles and too few repair

parts. In fact, only through the addition of a daily airlift of 1,000 tons from

Kimpo Airfield to P'yongyang had the

Eighth Army been able to support its

advance from the North Korean capital to the Ch'ongch'on. 33

Far too few supplies were stockpiled

at the front on 6 November to support

the advance; petroleum products and

ammunition were especially short, the

latter amounting only to a single day of

fire. With winter approaching, Walker

also needed to equip his troops with

heavier clothing. In addition to building up stocks in forward areas, he faced

the necessity of accelerating the northward flow of resupply. His logistics officer, Col. Albert K. Stebbins, estimated

that a daily flow of at least 4,000 tons

was needed to sustain a three-corps

33 Ibid.

offensive. This rate could be established

only by repairing the main rail line

from the existing railhead at the south

bank of the Imjin River into P'yongyang

and by opening the west coast port

of Chinnamp'o on the estuary of the

Taedong River twenty-five miles southwest of P'yongyang. 34

The time needed to meet these requirements, in particular to complete

railroad bridge repairs and to sweep

away mines strewn by the North Koreans at Chinnamp'o, forced Walker to

drop his 15 November target date. By

the 17th, however, five trains were running about a hundred cars with 2,000

tons of supplies into P'yongyang daily,

and at Chinnamp'o the daily discharge

was reaching upwards of 1,500 tons.

With his transportation system moving

into higher gear, Walker was able to set

the 24th as the date for reopening his

offensive.35

During the time used to arrange adequate logistical support, Walker maintained some contact with enemy forces

through patrolling and short advances.

He mounted the advances with the I

Corps and ROK II Corps, keeping the

IX Corps, which only recently had come

forward, to his right rear to secure and

refuse the Eighth Army's east flank. Enemy resistance initially ranged from little or none in the west to sharp local

counterattacks in the rougher ground

to the east, then subsided everywhere

after 12 November. Later, in final preparation for the attack, Walker inserted

34 Ibid.; Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 771.

35 Eighth Army G4 SS Rpts, 7-18 Nov 50; Eighth

Army Trans SS Rpts, 7-18 Nov 50; Rad, GX 27880

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C:/S ROKA et al., 17 Nov

50; Rad, GX 50025 KGLX, CG Eighth Army to

CINCFE, 22 Nov 50.

44
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

the IX Corps in the center of his line so

that the I, IX, and ROK II Corps were

deployed west to east along a seventymile front. As the Eighth Army was

disposed on the eve of the renewed

advance, the Ch'ongch'on River flowing southwestward into the Yellow Sea

split the army position into two nearly

equal parts. (Map 3) The western

half formed a bridgehead above the

Ch'ongch'on, arching from the mouth

of the river to a depth of ten miles

and then returning to the Ch'ongch'on

some thirty-five miles upstream. The

remainder stretched another thirty-five

miles almost due east into the western

watershed of the Taebaek Mountains.36

The Eighth Army Plan

Walker meanwhile revised his attack

plan to include more specific instructions for a coordinated advance. He

originally had directed his forces to

"coordinate their advance with elements

on flanks," otherwise giving them only

the general instruction to advance to

the northern border in zone. In revision, he drew clearly defined phase

lines and restricted to himself the authority to move beyond each.37 This

would keep his forces from dangling

tenuously at the ends of their supply

lines and from inviting ambush by moving independently into enemy territory

as they had done during the October

pursuit.

36 Rad, GX 27333 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S

ROKA et al., 7 Nov 50; Rad, GX 27470 KGOO, CG

Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 9 Nov 50; Rad, GX

27914 KGOO, CC Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al.,

18 Nov 50; Eighth Army WD, Sum, Nov 50; Eighth

Army G3 SS Rpt, 23-24 Nov 50.

37 Eighth Army Opn Plan 14, 6 Nov 50, Opn Plan

15, 14 Nov 50, and Opn Plan 16, 23 Nov 50.

In view of the terrain north of the

Eighth Army, close coordination would

not be easy. Except for the flats and

low hills of the lower Ch'ongch'on valley and a slim band of lowlands on the

west coast, rough mountains filled the

space between the army front and the

northern border. Extremely dissected

ridges trended northwestward above

the western half of the army line, and

the western watershed of the Taebaeks

spread in dendritic patterns beyond

the Eighth Army positions in the east.

Six roads offered the main axes of

movement through this ground. On the

extreme west, Korea's main arterial

road, Route 1, with the main rail line

alongside, moved from Sinanju on

the Ch'ongch'on through the coastal

lowland to Sinuiju on the Yalu opposite An-tung, Manchuria. Another arterial road, with a single-track rail line

paralleling it, ran northeastward from

Sinanju along the upstream trace of

the Ch'ongch'on through the towns of

Anju, Kunu-ri, Huich'on, and Kanggye,

then turned northwest to Manp'ojin on

the border. The other roads passed

northwestward through mountain corridors between these two routes.

Walker intended that his three corps

advance abreast over all six axes. The I

and IX Corps initially were to move to

a phase line some twenty miles out,

which would give them a road to assist

lateral communication and would get

them into the mountain corridors leading to the border. On the right, the

ROK II Corps was to advance through

the mountains east of the Ch'ongch'on

valley road to a phase line arching from

Huich'on east and southeast to the army

boundary at the village of Inch'o-ri.

The South Koreans were to contact

45

THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

General Almond's rear units in the

vicinity of Inch'o-ri and thus, nominally at least, close a worrisome fortymile gap-holding the spine and highest watershed ridges of the northern

Taebaeks-that currently existed, between the Eighth Army and X Corps.

Meanwhile, as Walker issued his final

instructions, Far East Air Forces pilots,

under General MacArthur's orders,

flew night and day reconnaissance

missions over the gap area but sighted

no enemy forces.38

A Change in X Corps Plans

By 23 November the X Corps' assault divisions had advanced against

spotty resistance to separated positions spread over a space of 150 air

miles. The 1st Marine Division held

the town of Hagaru-ri at the lower end

of the Changjin Reservoir. Seventy

miles to the northeast, the 7th Division occupied Hyesanjin on the Yalu.

Thirty miles east and slightly south of

Hyesanjin, the ROK 3d Division had

moved inland to the town of Hapsu;

and some forty miles northeast of

Hapsu, the ROK Capital Division was

at the outskirts of Ch'ongjin on the

coast.

General Almond had given his divisions their border objectives on 11

November. The 1st Marine Division was

to occupy a forty-mile stretch of the

lower Yalu River bank due north of

the Changjin Reservoir; the 7th Division was to hold the region between

Hyesanjin and Hapsu; the two divisions

of the ROK I Corps were to clear the

remaining ground to the east. General

38 Ibid.; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 272.

MacArthur, however, chose to revive

the concept formulated but not used in

October of sending X Corps forces

westward toward the Eighth Army.

Since the UNC front slanted across

the peninsula with the Eighth Army

holding the more southerly portion of

the tilted line, a westward attack by

Almond's forces would place them deep

in the enemy's rear, giving them an excellent opportunity to ease the Eighth

Army's progress. 39

Almond initially proposed that he

could best help the Eighth Army by

continuing northward and then, if

feasible, by attacking west from some

point above the Changjin Reservoir.

This proposal fairly coincided with

what MacArthur had in mind. On 15

November he instructed Almond to

open an attack to the west after his inland flank forces reached the town of

Changjin, twenty-five miles north of the

reservoir. Thirty miles west of Changjin

lay Kanggye and a junction with the

arterial road and rail line connecting

Manp'ojin and Huich'on. The road and

track obviously served as enemy supply

routes, and it was MacArthur's intention that the X Corps' westward attack

would cut them.40

39 X Corps Opn 0 6, 11 Nov 50; Ltr, Gen Wright to

Gen Almond, 10 Nov 50. In reviewing the above discussion of planning for the X Corps' attack to the

west, General Matthew B. Ridgway commented: "I

find it amazing that highly trained professionals with

extensive combat experience could have approved and

tried to execute the tactical plan of operations for the

X Corps in northeast Korea in November 1950. It

appears like a pure Map Exercise put on by amateurs,

appealing in theory, but utterly ignoring the reality of

a huge mountainous terrain, largely devoid of terrestrial communications, and ordered for execution in

the face of a fast approaching sub-arctic winter."

Ridgway, MS review comments, 27 Feb 85.

40 Ltr, Gen Almond to Gen Wright, 15 Nov 50; Rad,

CX 69009, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 15 Nov 50.

47
EBB AND FLOW

Apprehensive, after further consideration, that the supply line of the

attack force would become precariously

extended in any drive westward from a

point as far north as Changjin town,

Almond offered the alternative of an

attack over the road leading into the

Eighth Army zone from Yudam-ni at

the western edge of the Changjin Reservoir. The enemy supply routes were

to be cut at the village of Mup'yong-ni,

fifty-five miles west of Yudam-ni and

forty miles north of Huich'on. Almond

intended that the 1st Marine Division make the westward effort into

Mup'yong-ni and then press an attack

northwestward to the Yalu, pinching

out in the process the ROK II Corps

on the Eighth Army right. MacArthur

agreed to the change and instructed

Almond to begin the attack as soon as

possible.41

Almond set the 27th as the opening

date. The 7th Division meanwhile was

to expand its zone westward, placing

forces on the east side of the Changjin

Reservoir for an advance to the Yalu

through the zone previously assigned

to the marines. The ROK I Corps was

to continue to the border from Hapsu

and Ch'ongjin while Almond's remaining major units, the U.S. 3d Division

and 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, secured the corps rear area between Wonsan and Hungnam. 42

The Air Plan

Believing that the Eighth Army

41 X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn Plan 8,

16 Nov 50; Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps,

23 Nov 50.

42 X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn 0 7, 25

Nov 50.

would encounter heaviest resistance in

the ground bordering the Ch'ongch'on

valley in the center of its zone, General

Walker asked the Fifth Air Force to give

that region priority for close support.

He wanted second priority given to his

inland flank, which was held insecurely

by South Korean forces, and some attention given to the west coast area, although he expected opposition there

to be light.43

In line with these priorities, the Joint

Operations Center arranged 120 sorties for the Eighth Army's opening

advance, these and others that might

be requested during the day to be flown

by the Fifth Air Force squadrons based

in western Korea. General Partridge allotted the Fifth Air Force and Marine

squadrons in northeastern Korea to the

support of the X Corps. The Navy

squadrons aboard the Leyte and Philippine Sea meanwhile were to fly interdiction missions in the Eighth Army zone.

Although Admiral Ewen considered interdictory flights into western Korea

from carriers in the Sea of Japan uneconomical, Partridge turned down as

unneeded Ewen's counterproposal that

the carrier-based planes fly supplemental close support missions for the X

Corps. As planned, Task Force 77 and

Far East Air Forces' Bomber Command

were to strike bridges and lines of communications within a fifteen-mile strip

along the Yalu River.

44 This interdiction would in effect extend the air cam43 Ltr, Maj Gen Leven C. Allen, CofS Eighth Army,

to CG Fifth Air Force, 23 Nov 50.

44 Eighth Army G3 Air Briefing Rpts, 24 and 25

Nov 50; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea,

p. 262.

48
THE FORCES AND THE PLANS

paign launched earlier by General MacArthur against the Yalu bridges and

North Korean supply and communications centers.

The Outlook for Victory

Brightening the outlook for success

in reaching the border during the time

taken to prepare the forces and plans

was the light opposition to the X Corps'

latest advances, in which 7th Division

units near the center of the corps zone

had gone all the way to the Yalu. In the

Eighth Army zone, too, enemy forces

for the most part had remained inactive and inconspicuous since midNovember. Eighth Army patrols ranging deep into enemy territory during

that time had encountered outposts but

no major force or position. In neither

zone was any evidence of offensive

preparations uncovered. It appeared,

rather, that the enemy had adopted a

defensive strategy and that the Chinese,

after breaking off their engagement

on 6 November, had withdrawn into

position defenses some distance to the

north.45

Also encouraging was the estimate

of enemy strength, in particular the

strength of Chinese forces. By 23 November the latest, and highest, estimate of total enemy strength was about

167,000, that of Chinese forces alone

about 70,000.46 The figures represented substantial increases over the

estimates of early November but still

left the Eighth Army and X Corps with

a solid numerical superiority.

45 Eighth Army PIRs 118-135, 7-24 Nov 50.

46 Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 259;

Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 763.

General MacArthur expressed his

confidence when he reviewed operations after flying to Korea to watch

the Eighth Army take its first steps

forward on the morning of the 24th.

He described the advance toward the

border as "massive compression envelopment," and as a "pincer" operation in which his air units were the

"isolating components" for the two

arms of the ground advance, the

Eighth Army and X Corps. In the air

campaign, now more than two weeks

old, the bombing attacks on the Yalu

River crossings had knocked down

spans of the highway bridge at Sinuiju

and two bridges at Hyesanjin, and incendiary strikes against North Korean

towns had destroyed between 20 and

95 percent of the built-up areas. It was

MacArthur's appraisal that this effort

had "successfully interdicted enemy

lines of support from the north so that

further reinforcement therefrom has

been sharply curtailed and essential

supplies markedly limited." In the

ground advance, MacArthur believed

the recent moves of the X Corps had

placed it in a "commanding envelopment position" for the westward thrust

into the Eighth Army zone. Enthusiastic, if less positive, about the Eighth

Army's advance just getting under way,

he believed that "if successful," it

"should for all practical purposes end

the war."47

By appearances and appraisals, a

UNC victory did seem within reach. If

the bright outlook had a drab side, it

was the lack of definite knowledge

47 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea,

pp. 222-29; USAF Historical Study No. 72, pp. 22-32;

GHQ FEC Communique No. 12, 24 Nov 50. The

quotations are from the last source.

49
EBB AND FLOW

about the extent and purpose of Communist China's participation in the

war. Indeed, persisting questions involved the "accurate measure of enemy

strength," which MacArthur intended

to obtain by advancing, and the clarification of Chinese objectives, which the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided they

needed before considering a change in

the UNC mission.

50
CHAPTER III

The Enemy

Kanggye, the town considered but

not selected as the objective of the X

Corps' planned attack to the west, was

now the seat of North Korean government. Forced out of P'yongyang by the

Eighth Army's advance in October,

Kim II Sung, the premier of North Korea and commander in chief of the

North Korean Armed Forces, had established a new capital at Sinuiju, the

Yalu River city opposite An-tung,

Manchuria. When UNC forces moved

toward Sinuiju a short time later, he

took his government to Kanggye, deep

in the mountains of north central

Korea. 1

The North Korean Armed Forces

Also in Kanggye under Kim II Sung

was a recently formed Combined Headquarters staffed by both North Korean

and Chinese officers. Kim was publicized as commanding the operations of

both North Korean and Chinese forces

from this headquarters, but the combined agency was really no more than a

mechanism for coordinating North

Korean operations with those of the

Chinese, and Kim's voice in the conduct of joint operations was no stronger

than the forces he was able to field. As

of 23 November, these forces were few.

North Korean air and naval forces, de1 Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 663-64.

feated early in the war, remained virtually nonexistent, and the North Korean

People's Army, while on paper an impressive organization of eight corps, thirty

divisions, and several brigades, was in

fact a depleted force.2

The only major North Korean unit

actively engaged at the front on the 23d

was the IV Corps employing one division and two brigades, its bulk opposing the ROK I Corps in northeastern

Korea. The II Corps also was active, but

as a guerrilla force operating from a

command post hidden high in the central mountains near the 38th parallel

under the direction of General Kim

Chaek, previously the commander of

Front Headquarters, the now defunct

tactical echelon of the North Korean

People's Army General Headquarters.

Along with bands of South Korean dissidents and North Korean irregulars

who had long populated the Taebaek

and southwestern mountains, four reduced divisions of the II Corps conducted desultory guerrilla operations both above and below the 38th

parallel while they gradually reorganized around their own remnants and

stragglers from other units.3

2 Ibid., p. 769; GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep

51.

3 GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North

Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep 51. See also

Appleman, South to the Naktong, ch. XXXVII, "Guerrilla

Warfare Behind the Front."
EBB AND FLOW

The rest of the North Korean Army

was in north central Korea and Manchuria. Much of the General Headquarters itself had entered Manchuria to direct the reorganization and retraining

of three corps and nine divisions that

had crossed the border during the

earlier UNC advance. Under Marshal

Choe Yong Gun, the minister of national defense and deputy commander

in chief of the North Korean Armed

Forces, and Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho,

the North Korean People's Army chief of

staff, the remainder of General Headquarters was directing the restoration

of three corps and sixteen divisions in

the vicinity of Kanggye. Few of the

twenty-five divisions being refurbished

possessed more than a semblance of

readiness. Least ready were those in

Manchuria.4

TABLE 1-MAJOR NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY

UNITS, 23 NOVEMBER 1950

Location Corps Divisions

Korea . . . . . I, II, III, IV, V 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th,

5th, 6th, 7th,

8th, 9th, 10th,

12th, 15th, 17th,

24th, 27th, 31st,

38th, 41st, 43d,

47th, 105th

Tank

Manchuria . . VI, VII, VIII 13th, 18th, 19th,

32d, 36th, 37th,

42d, 45th, 46th

The Chinese People's Volunteers

While few North Korean forces

4 GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North

Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep 51; Hq, FEC,

History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52, pp. 84,

91-92.

KIM IL SUNG

would oppose the renewed UNC advance, the Chinese opposition, except

at sea, would be of major consequence.

The People's Navy, small and scarcely a

year and a half old, had primarily a

coastal defense mission at home and

would not sortie against the United Nations Command. 5 The People's Air Force,

though also young and small, had entered the fighting to oppose UNC air

operations along the Yalu.6 Apparently

5 The approximate composition of the People's Navy

was a light cruiser, perhaps twenty frigates and destroyers, some landing craft, and a few hundred gunboats and speedboats. See John Gittings, The Role of

the Chinese Army (New York: Oxford University Press,

1967), pp. 141-42.

6 The People's Air Force was organized in 1949. In

early 1950 its aircraft numbered about 100, but purchases from the Soviet Union, according to Far East

Air Forces estimates, raised the inventory to 650 by

December. Of this total, 250 were conventional and jet

fighters, 175 ground-attack planes, 150 conventional

52
THE ENEMY

to reduce the risk of aircraft losses, the

Chinese so far had confined their air

operations to northwestern Korea and

had made no real attempt to establish

air superiority in that region. They

were, however, putting up MIG-15s,

which could outmaneuver the American F-80C Shooting Stars and F9F

Panthers. The MIGs were a particular

reason why the Far East Air Forces

were importing higher performance

F-84E Thunderjets and F-86A Sabres

from the United States.7

Only a fraction of the Chinese People's

Liberation Army had entered Korea.8

Field armies, or "tactical field forces,"

which were the elite of the organization's combat strength, numbered

somewhere between two and three million men. Local garrison armies, which

were second-line troops, numbered between one and two million more. In

addition, a militia, from which the

People's Liberation Army drew recruits,

had a strength of five million. The fraction of the Chinese Army in Korea,

however, was not the 70,000 given in

the latest UNC intelligence estimate.

Over four times that number were

massed in the mountains opposite the

Eighth Army and X Corps.

twin-engine bombers, and 75 transports. See Gittings,

The Role of the Chinese Army. p. 136, and Futrell, The

United States Air Force in Korea, p. 231.

7 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 136-37;

Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 205-07,

210-12, 230-33; Field, United States Naval Operations,

Korea, p. 259.

8 In this volume People's Liberation Army refers only

to ground forces, although by Chinese definition it

includes air and naval forces as well. The term Chinese

Communist Forces, frequently used in official reports

and the press to designate Chinese military formations,

is of U.N. Command origin.

9 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 76-79;

GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, Chinese

Communist Regular Ground Forces (China, Manchuria. and Korea), 9 Dec 51; Appleman, South to the

Naktong, pp. 768-69.

Some 200,000 Chinese constituting

the XIII Army Group of the Fourth Field

Army faced the Eighth Army in western

North Korea.10 With six armies, each

with three infantry divisions and a total

of about 30,000 men, two artillery divisions and the bulk of a third, a cavalry

regiment, and two truck regiments, the

XIII Army Group had entered Korea

during the last half of October, crossing the Yalu at Sinuiju and Manp'ojin.

Forces from four of its armies had

fought the Eighth Army and X Corps

in what the Chinese called their First

Phase Offensive between 25 October

and 6 November. 11 The air attacks on

Yalu bridges opened by General MacArthur on 8 November obviously had

no chance to interdict the group's

movement across the river.

The IX Army Group, part of the Third

Field Army, had entered Korea with

three armies during the first half

of November. The leading army had

crossed the Yalu at Manp'ojin, the other

two at Lin-chiang on a big bend in the

river about sixty miles northeast of

Manp'ojin. Far East Air Forces planners had not selected the highway

bridge at Lin-chiang as a target for the

Yalu bombings, judging it less important than the crossings at Hyesanjin and

over the lower reaches of the river.

With the Manp'ojin crossings (a highway bridge and a railway bridge) standing despite the bombing and with the

Lin-chiang bridge untouched, the IX

10 People's Liberation Army tactical field forces were

organized as four numbered field armies, the First

through the Fourth, and some separate units known

collectively as the North China Independent Unit. In each

field army, the major groupings in descending order

were army groups, armies, and divisions.

11 Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig (Digest), vol. 1, no. 4,

1-15 Feb 53, pp. 26-38; Appleman, South to the Naktong,

pp. 766-68.

53
EBB AND FLOW

Army Group had crossed the river with

little difficulty, then moved southeast

to the Changjin Reservoir in the X

Corps zone. Although a Chinese army

normally comprised three divisions,

each in the IX Army Group had been

reinforced by a fourth, giving it about

40,000 men, and the group a strength

approaching 120,000. The total Chinese commitment in Korea by 23 NoTABLE 2-THE MAJOR CHINESE UNITS IN KOREA

23 NOVEMBER 1950

54
THE ENEMY

vember thus had risen above 300,000

men. 12

A major reason UNC intelligence

failed to reveal more closely the extent

to which the Chinese had entered Korea was their concerted effort to avoid

aerial observation through a rigid

march and bivouac discipline, movements under the cover of darkness, and

substantial use of secondary roads. In

fact, UNC aerial reconnaissance had

made small opportunity to observe the

Chinese. Other than Mosquito control

aircraft operating at the front, the Far

East Air Forces had no planes committed to visual reconnaissance, and as of

8 November available photo reconnaissance aircraft were committed mainly

in support of the attacks on the Yalu

bridges. 13 These aircraft appeared over

Sinuiju and Manp'ojin too late to spot

the crossing of the XIII Army Group and

were in the wrong place to sight the

crossing of the bulk of the IX Army

Group. The area between the river and

the front was not entirely neglected, but

the limited number of reconnaissance

planes largely restricted coverage to

areas adjacent to main roads, and few

sorties were flown at night. Consequently, very little evidence of the Chinese entry was from the air.14

12 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 768; Hq, FEC,

History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52; Hq,

USAFFE, Intel Dig, vol. I, no. 3, 16-31 Jan 53, pp.

32-37; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp.

212-13.

13 The Fifth Air Force's 45th Squadron, the single

visual reconnaissance unit in the theater, apparently

was not employed over Korea until early 1951, and

after 9 November 1950 the B-29 photo planes of

Bomber Command were not used along the Yalu

because they proved to be easy marks for the MIG15s.

14 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 770; Futrell,

The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 216-17.

LIN PIAO

Hiding the fact further were code

designations the Chinese used to identify units. Perhaps most deceptive was

a battalion designation for a division. 15

But even after captives from the initial

engagement had explained the designations and correctly identified their

units, skeptical intelligence officers accepted only parts of the units named as

being in Korea. By 23 November the

U.N. Command had acknowledged the

presence of twelve Chinese infantry

divisions when in fact there were nine

armies with thirty infantry divisions.16

The units committed included the

best in the People's Liberation Army. The

Fourth Field Army, commanded by Lin

15 The 55th Unit, for example, was the 39th Army,

and the 1st Battalion, 55th Unit, was the 115th Division,

39th Army.

16 Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 752-54, 763.

55
EBB AND FLOW

Piao, was the strongest, and its XIII

Army Group included armies honored

for past achievements with the title of

"iron" troops. 17 The Third Field Army,

commanded by Chen Yi, was not particularly strong as a whole, but its IX Army

Group included at least one army considered to be a crack unit. But however

highly rated by People's Liberation Army

standards, the two groups essentially

constituted a mass of infantry with little artillery support, no armor or air

support, and primitive, haphazard logistical support. They were, characteristically, poorly equipped. Individual

and crew-served weapons, from company to army, were a collection of

diverse makes and calibers; other

equipment was equally mixed; and both

weapons and equipment were in short

supply, small arms to such a degree that

as many as two-thirds of some infantry

units lacked them. Their strongest

points were experience and morale.

Most of the troops were veterans of the

recent civil war, and virtually all senior

officers had fought the Japanese during World War II. Their high morale

presumably was the result of effective

political indoctrination, notwithstanding that former Nationalist Army members constituted much of the strength

of the intervention force. It was on a

combination of morale and guerrilla

warfare tactics that Chinese leaders had

long depended to compensate for inferiority in weapons and equipment. Sup17 Officers of the People's Liberation Army were not

designated by nominal ranks as in the U.S. Army.

Troop commanders held positional ranks and staff

officers held equivalent ranks. The commander of a

regiment, for example, held the positional rank of

regimental commander, and a regimental staff officer

held the equivalent rank of assistant regimental commander. See DA Pam 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese

Communist Army, Sep 52, pp. 75-76.

porting the efficacy of this "man-overweapons" doctrine were successes

against the Japanese and Nationalist

Chinese, and most recently against the

United Nations Command.18

Upon leaving their parent field armies in China, the two army groups

had come under Headquarters, Chinese

People's Volunteers, specially organized

for operations in Korea.19 Under the

command of Lin Piao, the special headquarters was located in Mukden, Manchuria. It was Lin in Mukden, not Kim

II Sung at Combined Headquarters in

Kanggye, who made the basic tactical

decisions, including those affecting the

operations of North Korean forces. But

publicizing the Kanggye headquarters

under the North Korean premier as

controlling all military operations lent

support to claims made by both Chinese and North Korean officials that

the Chinese presence in Korea was simply the result of individuals and units

having volunteered to assist the North

Koreans.20 (Chart 5)

18 Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army

in Action (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),

pp. vii-viii, 5-7, 83-84, 173; Samuel B. Griffith II, The

Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, 1967), p. 131; Gittings, The Role

of the Chinese Army, p. 77; DA Pam 30-51, Handbook on

the Chinese Communist Army, 7 Dec 60, pp. 8. 66; ibid.,

Sep 52, pp. 38-39; GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, Chinese Communist Regular Ground Forces

(China, Manchuria, and Korea), 9 Dec 51.

10 The shape of the Chinese field command would

elude UNC intelligence for some time. As late as

March 1951, for example, the Eighth Army intelligence officer could state only that "it is possible that

the XIII CCF Army Group may be the controlling

headquarters of 4 CCF armies.... Unconfirmed." See

Eighth Army PIR 234, 3 Mar 51.

20 A communique released by the North Korean government on 7 November stated that "volunteer units

formed by the Chinese people participated in operations along with the People's Armed Forces, under

the unified command of the General Headquarters."

On 11 November a spokesman for Chou En-lai,

56
THE ENEMY

CHART 5-ENEMY LINES OF COMMAND

23 NOVEMBER 1950

Giving China's entry into the war a

veneer of voluntary participation evidently had two purposes. In China

itself, the image of voluntary action was

projected to gain total popular support,

material and moral, for the commitment in Korea. Otherwise, that image

attempted to reduce the risks of intervention, primarily to mitigate the U.S.

response. According to a former highranking Communist Party member,

concern that Chinese forces might be

defeated in Korea, that American

forces might invade the Chinese mainland, and that the United States might

employ the atomic bomb had permeated deliberations leading to the decision to enter the war.21 Intervention,

according to the same source, had been

stoutly opposed by a number of Peking

authorities, including some People's

Liberation Army officials. They had argued that the newly established regime

needed peace so that it could concentrate on national reconstruction and

that China, in any case, could not afford to accept the risks of waging war

with a first-rate power like the United

States.

22 Officials in favor of entering

the war had insisted that the threat to

China posed by a UNC victory in North

Korea made it necessary to accept the

China's minister of foreign affairs, admitted that Chinese forces were fighting in Korea but denied official

responsibility. As precedents the spokesman cited the

French assistance to the American colonists during

the Revolutionary War and the individual volunteers,

including Americans and British, in the Spanish Civil

War. Captives taken from the first forces to enter

Korea revealed that, before entering, the members of

some units were asked, or, if they refused, pressured,

to sign statements volunteering their service in the

war. See Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 137-38,

and George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action, pp.

156-57.

21 This was Chou Ching-wen, a prominent writer

and scholar and former president of Northwestern

University in Manchuria, who held high party positions for eight years. Chou broke with the Peking

regime and fled to Hong Kong in 1957. See Chou

Ching-wen, Ten Years of Storm (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

22 This account is borne out by contemporaneous evidence. A 6 November 1950 editorial in the Jen-min

Jih-pao (People's Daily), an official Communist Party

organ in China, stated and then refuted the views of

those who had opposed China's intervention.

57
EBB AND FLOW

CHOU EN-LAI

risks. The principal and winning argument for intervention may have been

that China needed a friendly buffer

state along its Manchurian border. A

minimal Chinese goal in entering the

war, then, was to maintain a Democratic

People's Republic of Korea, but not necessarily to restore its 38th parallel

border.23

Whether the Chinese predetermined

a larger military objective is less evident.

Some of the first forces to enter Korea

were told beforehand that the objective was to drive UNC troops out of

Korea and that they could expect a

quick and easy victory. Propaganda appearing on the wider home front soon

after forces crossed the Yalu marked

23 Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp.

575-77; Chou, Ten Years of Storm, pp. 116-17; Whiting,

China Crosses the Yalu, p. 155; Gittings, The Role of the

Chinese Army, pp. 83-86.

the United States as a "paper tiger."

The United States could be defeated,

the claim went, because its strategy

rested on its atomic bomb and air force.

This strategy could not be devastating

to a rural China and left U.S. ground

forces so weak in numbers that they

were incapable of waging ground warfare on a large scale. 24

On the other hand, that the Chinese

believed they could make important

political gains but were uncertain of

achieving any grand-scale military success is perceptible in a retrospective explanation of China's decision for war

attributed to Premier Mao Tse-tung. A

victory, according to Mao, would immediately raise China's international status, a stalemate between backward

China and a power like the United

States would amount to a victory for

China, and a defeat would simply require that China engage in a war of

resistance as it had done against Japan.

Evidencing concern that People's Liberation Army forces might be defeated

in Korea and that the U.N. Command

might carry the war into China, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai in reporting

the international situation to a group

of government officials soon after

China's intervention announced, "We

are prepared to withdraw, if necessary,

from the coastal provinces to the hinterland, and build up the Northwest and

the Southwest provinces as bases for a

long-drawn-out war."25 The Chinese

24 George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action, pp.

164, 187; Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp.

576-78. On page 578, Tang Tsou relates that in a

discussion with Indian Ambassador Panikkar, Nieh

Jung-chen, People's Liberation Army chief of staff,

remarked, "After all, China lives on farms. What can

atom bombs do there?"

25 Quoted in Chou, Ten Years of Storm, p. 117. Chou

writes that he was one of the group to whom Chou

En-lai spoke.

58
THE ENEMY

did in fact remove machinery and other

material, including the huge furnaces

of an important steelworks, from the

coastal provinces. Thus is appears that

the Chinese entered the war not confidently, but gingerly.

2 6

The voluntary disengagement of the

XIII Army Group on 6 November is further evidence of how warily the Chinese entered the war. The disengagement suggests that Lin Piao was

reluctant to continue operations without a greater concentration of force and

ordered a pause while the IX Army

Group completed its move into Korea,

or that the Chinese leadership suspended operations until the UNC response to China's intervention could be

determined.27 These considerations, of

course, could have been restraints only

briefly. The additional army group

reached the Changjin Reservoir by midNovember, and by the last week of the

month it was clear that the U.N. Command would limit its response to bombing Yalu bridges on the Korean side of

the river. However cautiously and tentatively the Chinese may have intervened, their ultimate decision, evidently

made soon after the XIII Army Group

broke off its opening attack, was to resume offensive operations. Perhaps relieved when the U.N. Command did

not carry the war to China, and perhaps encouraged by the confident tone

of field appraisals of the initial battles

especially those with U.S. forces-the

Chinese high command concluded that

the two army groups would be able to

operate successfully against the United

Nations Command.2 8

Earlier, after the XIII Army Group had

26 Tang Tsou, America 's Failure in China, pp. 578-79;

Chou, Ten Years of Storm, p. 117.

27 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 132, 138-39.

28 The field appraisals lauded American equipment,

broken contact, group commander Li

T'ien-yu set out light forces to screen

his major units, which assembled far

north of the line reached during their

initial attack. As disposed on 23

November, the group's six armies were

located ten to fifteen miles north of the

Eighth Army front. The 50th and 66th

Armies stood opposite the I Corps in

the west; the 39th and 40th Armies were

centrally located north of the IX Corps;

the 38th and 42d Armies were above the

ROK II Corps in the east.29 The 42d

Army earlier had opposed X Corps

forces below the Changjin Reservoir but

had shifted west into the Eighth Army

zone after being relieved by the 20th

Army of the IX Army Group. The latter

group, also deployed with major units

assembled behind screening forces, was

now located above and west of the

reservoir. Group commander Sung

Shih-lun had set the 20th Army to the

west and south of Yudam-ni, in the path

of the X Corps' coming westward drive,

and had assembled the 26th and 27th

Armies in the mountains to the north

and northeast of the reservoir. 30

This arrangement of forces followed

a long-existing Chinese concept of mobile defense designed for operations

against a superior force.31 Aimed not

firepower, and air support but depreciated American

infantry and summarized results as satisfactory. See

Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 719-20.

29 The 50th Army was formerly Nationalist China's

60th Army, which had defected en masse during the

civil war. It was kept intact except for being given a Communist cadre. See George, The Chinese Communist

Army in Action, p. 6.

30 Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53,

pp. 28-33, 36-38; ibid., no. 3, 16-31 Jan 53, pp. 34-

37.

31 Chinese defensive tactics would not include the

development of a main line of resistance until later in

the war when the front became stabilized during armistice negotiations. See Mono, Hq, Eighth Army,

"Enemy Tactics," 26 Dec 51, copy in CMH.

59
60 EBB AND FLOW 

to hold ground but to destroy opposing forces in brief actions, the underlying strategy was to invite attack; fight a 

delaying action while allowing the attack force to penetrate deep; then, at a 

point of Chinese choice, counterattack 

suddenly while the opposing force was 

ill-prepared to receive the assault.32 

It was because the Chinese deployed 

32 Like all People’s Liberation Army precepts, the strategy reflected the guerrilla warfare doctrine developed 

by Mao Tse-tung. As Mao expounded it in his classic 

study. On the Protracted War: “To achieve quick decision we should generally attack, not an enemy force 

holding a position, but one on the move. We should 

have concentrated, beforehand under cover, a big 

force along the route through which the enemy is 

sure to pass, suddenly descend on him while he is 

moving, encircle and attack him before he knows what 

is happening, and conclude the fighting with all speed. 

If the battle is well fought, we may annihilate the 

entire enemy force or the greater part or a part of it. 

Even if the battle is not well fought, we may still inflict 

heavy casualties.” See Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, 

pp. 132-33, for a correlation of Mao’s teaching with 

Chinese strategy so far employed in the Korean War. 

major forces well behind screening 

units that Eighth Army patrols and X 

Corps assault forces had encountered 

only outposts after mid-November. 

Showing little awareness of their adversary’s doctrine, however, UNC officials 

had assumed from the light contact that 

the Chinese had withdrawn into position defenses far to the north, and they 

had interpreted the deep, voluntary 

withdrawal as further indication that 

the Chinese were weak in numbers.33

With unwarranted optimism, then, the 

Eighth Army and X Corps started forward on 24 November, believing that 

they comfortably outnumbered enemy 

forces and expecting to encounter these 

in defensive positions that their weakness, and perhaps their mission, had 

forced them to establish. 

33 Eighth Army PIRs 118-335, 7-24 Nov 50; Hq, 

USAFFE, Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53, p. 26. 
CHAPTER IV 

The Battle of the Ch’ongch’on 

The Advance to Contact 

While General Walker fully expected 

the Eighth Army to encounter Chinese 

when it moved north, the lack of revealing contact in his zone left him uncertain about the location of enemy positions. From a study of air sightings, 

aerial photographs, and prisoner of war 

statements, his G-2, Lt. Col. James C. 

Tarkenton, traced two possible enemy 

defense lines. The nearer line curved 

from Chongju northeast through 

T’aech’on and Unsan above the western half of the army front, then extended almost due east into the mountains roughly ten miles above the 

eastern segment of the front. The second line started at Sonch’on, twenty 

miles beyond Chongju, and ran northeast through Kusong, Onjong, and 

Huich’on and into the Taebaeks as far 

as the northern end of the Changjin 

Reservoir. Colonel Tarkenton estimated that the Eighth Army would 

meet some 48,000 Chinese and several 

North Korean units defending important road centers along these lines.1 

Walker distributed assault forces 

evenly for the advance toward the suspected lines. In the west, the I Corps 

comprised the 24th Infantry Division, 

ROK 1st Division, and British 27th 

1 Eighth Army PIKs 118-135, 7-24 Nov 50. 

Commonwealth Brigade. At center, the 

IX Corps included the 25th Infantry 

Division, the 2d Infantry Division, and 

the brigade-size 1st Turkish Armed 

Forces Command, which had not yet 

seen combat in Korea. The ROK II 

Corps, on the east, would operate with 

the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions. 

The 1st Cavalry Division and the British 29th Independent Infantry Brigade 

were Walker’s immediate reserves. 

While in reserve the cavalrymen were 

to protect forward army supply points 

at Kunu-ri, located just below the 

Ch’ongch’on River in the IX Corps 

area, and at Sukch’on, fifteen miles 

south of the river on Route 1 behind 

the I Corps. The British brigade, a recent arrival in Korea, was currently far 

to the south assembling temporarily at 

Kaesong, thirty miles north of Seoul.2 

Eighth Army units with no assignment in the attack included the 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team 

and the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, which were guarding supply 

installations in the P’yongyang-Chinnamp’o area, and the ROK III Corps 

with four recently activated or reactivated ROK divisions (the 2d, 5th, 9th, 

2 Eighth Army Opn Plan 15, 14 Nov 50; Eighth 

Army WD, Sum, Nov 50; Fox, “Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations”; Eighth Army 

G3 Situation Overlay, 23 Nov 50; I Corps POK 216, 

23 NOV 50; IX Corps WD, vol. II, an. 3, Nov 50. 
62 EBB AND FLOW 

GENERAL MILBURN (left) with Secretary 

of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. 

GENERAL COULTER 

and 11th) which was operating against 

guerrillas in central and southern 

Korea. The infantry battalion from 

Thailand had just finished processing 

at the U.N. Reception Center and was 

en route to P’yongyang on the eve of 

the advance. Replacing the Thais at the 

reception center was the Netherlands 

Battalion, which had reached Korea on 

23 November and was to receive two 

weeks’ training before joining operations.3 

On the morning of the 24th Maj. 

Gen. Frank W. Milburn, commander 

of the I Corps, sent his two divisions 

west and northwest toward Chongju 

and T’aech’on, holding his British brigade in reserve. Maj. Gen. John B. 

Coulter, in command of the interior IX 

Corps, kept the Turkish brigade in reserve at Kunu-ri, sent one division 

north astride the Kuryong River toward 

Unsan and Onjong, and moved his 

other division up the Ch’ongch’on valley in the direction of Huich’on. On 

the army right, Maj. Gen. Yu Hae 

Ucng, the ROK II Corps commander, 

started two of his three divisions north 

through the mountains toward terrain 

objectives aligned with those of 

Coulter’s forces.” 

3 Eight Army Opn Plan 15, 14 Nov 50; Eighth Army 

WD, Sum, Nov 50; Fox, “Inter-Allied Co-operation 

During Combat Operations.” 

4 Eighth Army WD, Nar, Nov 50; I Corps Opn O4, 

18 Nov 50; I Corps Opn Dir 23, 19 Nov 50; IX Corps 

Opn Plan 3, 18 Nov 50; IX Corps Opn Dir 8, 20 Nov 

50; IX Corps Opn Dir 9, 23 Nov 50; ROK Opn Plan 5 

(Overlay), and Rpt of Staff Visit to II ROK Corps on 

23 Nov 50, both in IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts, Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 63 

At the I Corps left, Maj. Gen. John H. 

Church’s 24th Division led off with a 

regimental attack over Route 1, its 21st 

Infantry and a company of tanks moving westward toward Chongju, eighteen 

miles out. On the corps right, two regiments of Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup’s 

ROK 1st Division supported by a company of American tanks advanced on 

T’aech’on, moving upstream on both 

sides of the Taeryong River over secondary roads that converged on the objective ten miles northwest. General 

Church’s single regiment marched 

more than halfway to Chongju during 

the day, receiving only a little long 

range small arms fire from the hills 

north of Route 1 as it moved. Two platoons of Chinese infantry and a ditch 

that delayed the tanks were the only 

opposition to General Paik’s forces, who 

established night defenses within four 

miles of T’aech’on.5 

In the left half of the IX Corps zone, 

the 25th Division, commanded by Maj. 

Gen. William B. Kean, moved north 

astride the Kuryong River toward Unsan with two regiments and an armored 

force, Task Force Dolvin.6 General 

Kean’s 35th and 24th Infantry Regiments on left and right, respectively, 

advanced four miles unopposed, while 

Task Force Dolvin in the middle moved 

seven miles along the east bank of the 

Kuryong, receiving only small arms fire 

as it covered the last mile. Four miles 

5 Eighth Army PIR 135, 24 Nov 50; I Corps PORs 

219 and 220, 24 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, Nov 50; 24th 

Div OI 70, 19 Nov 50; 21st Inf Unit Rpts 138 and 139, 

23 and 24 Nov 50. 

6 The task force, led by Lt. Col. Welborn G. Dolvin, 

commander of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, included Company B, the Assault Gun Platoon, and the 

Reconnaissance Platoon of the 89th; the 25th Reconnaissance Company; Company E, 27th Infantry; 

Company B, 35th Infantry; and the 8213th Ranger 

Company. 

southeast of Unsan the Dolvin force recovered thirty members of the 8th Cavalry who had been captured at Unsan 

in early November and then released 

by the Chinese. Most were wounded 

and frostbitten.7 

Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser’s 2d 

Division, at the IX Corps right, sought 

no sweeping first-day gains since it was 

already three miles ahead of the 25th 

Division. Rather than risk an open west 

flank, General Keiser ordered short 

moves by his line regiments, the 9th 

and 38th, to mass along the lower bank 

of the Paengnyong River, a westwardflowing tributary of the Ch’ongch’on.8 

In the ROK II Corps zone, gains by 

the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions ranged 

from a quarter to a full mile but none 

at all against two enemy battalions dug 

in near the boundary between them. 

In one of the deeper gains, the 3d Regiment of the ROK 7th Division at the 

corps left came up to the Paengnyong 

River and tied in with the 38th Infantry of the 2d Division.9 

Chongju and T’aech’on remained the 

immediate I Corps objectives on 25 

November. Chongju, previously tagged 

as a probable center of enemy resistance, was empty when the 21st Infan7 25th Div OI 18, 20 Nov 50; 25th Div Opn O 15, 21 

Nov 50; 25th Div WD, 24 Nov 50; 25th Div Nar Rpt, 

Nov 50; 35th Inf Opn O 19, 22 Nov 50; 35th Inf Hist 

Rpt, Nov 50; 35th Inf Unit Rpt 43, 24 Nov 50; 24th 

Inf Opn O 20, 22 Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, 24 Nov 50; 

24th Inf Unit Rpt 54, 24 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot 

Rpts, Entries 1479 and 1491, Nov 50; IX Corps G2 

Spot Rpts, Entry 241915 Nov 50, Interrogation of 

Released U.S. PW (Capt Ray J. Yantis). 

8 2d Div Opn O 10, 20 Nov 50: 2d Div WD, Nar, 

Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 23-24 Nov 50; 38th Inf Opn O 

20, 22 Nov 50; 38th Inf Nar Sum, Nov 50; 9th Inf 

Hist, Nov 50, Incl H. 

9 Eighth Army POR 406, 24 Nov 50; IX Corps Sit 

Overlay, 242400 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts, 

Entry 1535, 24 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 113, 

24 Nov 50. 
64 EBB AND FLOW 

try entered in midafternoon. In preparation for widening the 24th Division’s 

advance, General Church meanwhile 

moved the 19th Infantry out on Route 

1 to Napch’ongjong, eight miles behind 

Chongju. 10 The ROK 1st Division, on 

the other hand, had found during the 

night that T’aech’on would be harder 

to take when Chinese supported by artillery and mortar fire counterattacked 

along the east bank of the Taeryong 

and forced part of General Paik’s right 

regiment two miles to the rear. Although the Chinese lifted their attack 

after daylight, they allowed the South 

Koreans only to restore and improve 

slightly their previous position. Paik’s 

forces west of the Taeryong held themselves to a small advance while those on 

the east regained lost ground. The 

division was still three miles short of 

T’aech’on at dark on the 25th.11 

Encountering no organized enemy 

positions but receiving considerable 

long range small arms, machine gun, 

and mortar fire, the two IX Corps divisions gained two to four miles on the 

25th. At that rate the 25th Division 

astride the Kuryong on the corps left 

was easily within a day’s advance of 

Unsan. On the corps right, the 9th 

Infantry of the 2d Division moved two 

miles up the Ch’ongch’on valley, 

closing into positions split by the 

Ch’ongch’on with the bulk of the regiment on the west side of the river. The 

38th Infantry meanwhile stayed at the 

Paengnyong except for patrols that 

searched above the river to cover the 

9th’s east flank.” 

10 I Corps Opn Dir 24, 241800 Nov 50; I Corps 

POR 222, 25 Nov 50; 21st Inf Unit Rpt 140, 25 Nov 50. 

11 I Corps POR 222, 25 Nov 50. 

12 25th Div WD, 25 Nov 50; 35th Inf WD, Nar, Nov 

50; 35th Inf Unit Rpt 44, 25 Nov 50; 24th Inf Unit 

The ROK II Corps advanced one to 

two miles against. opposition that varied in much the same pattern as on the 

previous day. The corps center continued to be a trouble spot, and at the far 

right, ten miles to the rear of the South 

Korean front, an enemy force tested 

the 16th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division protecting the corps and army 

east flank from positions some eight 

miles east of the village of Yongdong-ni. 

The force, presumably Chinese and 

possibly a reconnaissance unit since it 

was reported to include a hundred 

horse cavalrymen, struck the easternmost battalion of the 16th and lifted its 

attack only after forcing the South Koreans to withdraw two miles. 13

Although the second day of advance 

had produced heavier enemy fire and 

local counterattacks, General Walker’s 

forces had little reason to lose enthusiasm for their renewed offensive. All divisions had gained ground. In the I 

Corps zone, the 24th Division, having 

occupied Chongju, was on the Eighth 

Army’s first phase line, and the ROK 

1st Division was close to it. In the IX 

Corps zone, the 25th Division was not 

far from Unsan, and the 2d Division 

had made progress in the Ch’ongch’on 

valley. Despite rougher going in the 

Taebaek ridges farther east, the ROK 

II Corps also had pushed forward. 

Rpt 55, 25 Nov 50; IX Corps PIR 60, 25 Nov 50; 2d 

Div WD, Nar, Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Activ Rpt, Nov 50: 

2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 32, 25 Nov 50; IX Corps WD, 25 

Nov 50; IX Corps POR 183, 25 Nov 50: Eighth Army 

POR 408, 25 Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 

1525, 25 Nov 50. 

13 Eighth Army POR 409, 25 Nov 50; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Entry 1955, 25 Nov 50; Eighth Army PIR 

136, 25 Nov 50; Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Nov 50; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Briefing for CG, 25 Nov 50; IX 

Corps PIR 60, 25 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts, 

Entry 1607, 25 Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 65 

Casualties had not been heavy in any 

of the corps zones. The advance, moreover, was soon to be reinforced by the 

X Corps’ attack from the east. Walker 

issued a single order on the 25th, one 

that shortened the final objective line 

of the ROK II Corps to conform with 

the 27 November attack by General 

Almond’s forces. Otherwise, he intended that the Eighth Army would 

continue its advance on the 26th as 

originally conceived. 14 

The Eighth Army’s optimism still 

hinged on the assumption that the Chinese had not tapped their large Manchurian reserve for offensive operations 

in Korea. Although the final army intelligence report on 25 November showed 

an increase in Chinese forces opposing 

the advance, the new figure stood at 

only 54,000, just 6,000 more than the 

pre-attack estimate. In reviewing possible enemy actions, army G-2 Tarkenton 

added only that he now expected enemy forces to employ local counterattacks in conjunction with their 

defense.15

The Chinese Attack 

At dark on the 25th the 2d Division 

occupied a fifteen-mile front centered 

in the Ch’ongch’on valley twenty miles 

north of Kunu-ri. (Map 4) In the 9th 

Infantry sector at the division left, the 

companies of the 3d Battalion and all 

but one company of the 2d Battalion 

occupied separated positions atop the 

first ridges west of the Ch’ongch’on. 

The remainder of the regiment was east 

of the river on a line hooking southeast14 Eighth Army G1 SS Rpt, 25 Nov 50; Rad, GX 

30007 KGOO, CG; Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 

25 Nov 50. 

15 Eighth Army PIR 136, 25 Nov 50. 

ward from the Ch’ongch’on to the lower 

bank of the Paengnyong. Beyond a halfmile gap to the right of the 9th, the 2d 

and 3d Battalions of the 38th Infantry 

carried the division line along the south 

bank of the Paengnyong to the boundary with the ROK II Corps. After a 

daylight patrol, Company A of the reserve 1st Battalion was in perimeter two 

miles north of the Paengnyong.16 

Two miles behind the 9th Infantry, 

the headquarters, tank company, and 

1st Battalion of the 23d Infantry occupied a position arching from the lower 

bank of the Ch’ongch’on eastward 

across the valley road. Col. Paul L. 

Freeman, commander of the 23d, had 

taken these forces forward during the 

day under General Keiser’s order to 

pass through the 9th Infantry on the 

26th. When Keiser later postponed this 

change, Colonel Freeman held his remaining battalions near Kunu-ri and 

deployed his leading units behind the 

9th, amid the firing positions of three 

artillery battalions supporting the division’s advance. 

Between dark and midnight two Chinese regiments struck the 9th Infantry 

in the Ch’ongch’on valley while a third 

hit the center of the 38th Infantry’s 

Paengnyong position. Coming southeast from the area above the 25th Divi16 The account of the opening enemy attacks against 

the 2d Division is based on the following sources: IX 

Corps G2 Spot Rpts 2990, 2997, and 3026, 26 Nov 

50; 2d Div PIR 68, 26 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 

50; 2d Div Arty WD, 26 Nov 50; 2d Div Arty POR 94, 

26 Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, Entry 15, 26 Nov 50; 

9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; 9th Inf PIR 75, 26 Nov 50; 1st 

Bn, 9th Inf, WD, Nov 50; 2d Bn, 9th Inf, Unit Jnl, 26 

Nov 50; 3d Bn. 9th Inf, Nar Diary, 25 Nov 50; 23d 

Inf, Nar Sum, Nov 50; 23d Inf WD, Nov 50; 38th Inf 

Comd Rpt. Nov 50; General Charles D. Palmer, MS 

review comments, 1985. General Palmer was the division artillery commander of the 1st Cavalry Division 

at the time of the action. 

THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 67 

sion, one enemy regiment advanced in 

several columns toward the two battalions of the 9th Infantry west of the 

Ch’ongch’on. Moving mostly over valley trails, the Chinese missed the 2d 

Battalion’s hilltop positions, which 

were farthest north, but found either 

the front or flanks of the three separated companies of the 3d. At the sound 

of bugle signals, the Chinese in file 

changed formation for assaults that 

through the night gradually pressed the 

3d Battalion toward the river. 

Other columns of the same regiment 

infiltrated the gaps between companies 

and waded the cold Ch’ongch’on to hit 

the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, and the 

61st Field Artillery Battalion just north 

of Colonel Freeman’s position.17 The 

strike startled the 61st into retreat, especially the members of Battery A, who, 

after their commander had been killed 

and all other battery officers wounded, 

abandoned both guns and vehicles. A 

few artillerymen withdrew eastward, 

but most of them, with Chinese following, moved south over the valley road 

through Colonel Freeman’s position. 

Though the confused southward rush 

of American artillerymen and Chinese 

infantry complicated the defense, 

Freeman’s forces eventually beat off the 

Chinese without losing ground. Seeking both cover from Freeman’s fire and 

a position on which to reorganize, the 

Chinese pulled away and climbed a low 

but rugged mountain, called Chinaman’s Hat, located northeast of Freeman and immediately below the rearmost position of the 1st Battalion, 9th 

Infantry. 

17 The 61st Field Artillery Battalion was a 1st Cavalry Division unit that had been attached to the 2d 

Division to provide additional direct support to the 

9th Infantry. 

In company with the attack from the 

northwest, a second Chinese regiment 

struck south along the east side of the 

Ch’ongch’on. While some of its searching columns hit and hurt the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, another moved 

behind that battalion through the halfmile gap between the 9th and 38th 

Regiments. Part of the forces reaching 

the rear area overran the 1st Battalion 

command post and aid station, then 

climbed Chinaman’s Hat to join the 

forces who had broken away from the 

1st Battalion, 23d Infantry. Following 

this juncture, the Chinese moved off 

the Hat and again attacked Colonel 

Freeman’s battalion, focusing this time 

on the refused right flank east of the 

valley road. Freeman lost part of his 

flank position but then shifted forces 

to the east and blocked the assault. Near 

dawn, the Chinese again withdrew to 

Chinaman’s Hat. 

Farther east, some of the Chinese entering the gap between regiments discovered and assaulted Company G, 

38th Infantry, holding a detached position at the west end of the 38th’s line. 

About 2330 a third enemy regiment 

opened an attack against the 38th’s 

center, part of it surrounding and engaging Company A north of the Paengnyong, the bulk crossing the river 

to attack at the boundary between the 

2d and 3d Battalions. Pressing frontal 

assaults against the central companies, 

F and L, the Chinese invested portions 

of the company positions, then called 

off their attack near 0230 after suffering heavy casualties. 

Within two hours the Chinese renewed their attacks against the regimental center, this time forcing Companies F and L to withdraw. Their 

withdrawal, although short, isolated 
68 EBB AND FLOW 

Companies I and K to the east. Col. 

George B. Peploe, the regimental commander, countered near dawn, attacking with his reserve 1st Battalion, less 

Company A but with Company C of 

the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion attached as the third rifle company. Starting from a point west of the enemy penetration and moving east into the 

Chinese flank, the 1st Battalion cleared 

the area sufficiently to permit Colonel 

Peploe to restore his central positions. 

slip out of the encirclement and withdraw eastward into the 2d Division 

sector. Against this new threat, Kean 

ordered the bulk of his reserve 27th 

Infantry to assemble behind the weakened position of the 24th. Leaving the 

2d Battalion to back up Task Force 

Wilson, Col. John H. Michaelis, commander of the 27th, started the remainder of his regiment toward the right 

sector around midnight.20 

West of the 2d Division, Chinese also 

struck the 25th Division during the 

night, centering a small but sharp blow 

on Task Force Dolvin on the east side 

of the Kuryong. In a give-and-take battle that ran the course of the night and 

into the morning of the 26th, Colonel 

Dolvin’s forces lost one of two hills at 

their forwardmost position.18 

Although the 25th had not been hit 

in strength, General Kean canceled 

plans for continuing the advance on the 

morning of the 26th. Against a possible renewal of the attack at the division 

center, he merged the 1st Battalion, 

24th Infantry, and all Dolvin elements 

except the ranger company (which 

withdrew from the front) into Task 

Force Wilson under Brig. Gen. 

Vennard Wilson, the assistant division 

commander.19 

In the 2d Division sector, General 

Keiser spent the 26th rebuilding his line 

in the Ch’ongch’on valley. Near dawn 

he authorized Col. Charles C. Sloane, 

commander of the 9th Infantry, to pull 

in the 2d Battalion, which, although it 

had survived the night without difficulty, was precariously separated from 

the remainder of the regiment. Colonel Sloane then established the entire 

regiment in a tight position facing generally northwest on high ground along 

the upper bank of the Ch’ongch’on. To 

compensate losses in the 3d Battalion 

the previous night, Keiser gave Sloane 

all but Company C of the 2d Engineer 

Combat Battalion for use as infantry.21 

A half hour after noon the Chinese 

switched attention to the rightmost position of Col. John T. Corley’s 24th 

Infantry, surrounding two companies 

of the regiment while they were receiving a supply airdrop in somewhat isolated positions at the east flank. Most 

members of the two units managed to 

East of the Ch’ongch’on, Keiser assigned the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 

23d Infantry to defend the ground just 

below Chinaman’s Hat. While Colonel 

Freeman brought the 2d Battalion up 

from Kunu-ri into position at the right 

of the 1st, members of the 61st Field 

Artillery Battalion, at Keiser’s order, returned to the position they had vacated 

during the night, just above Freeman, 

and recovered most of the equipment 

18 25th Div WD, 25-26 Nov 50; 25th Div PORs 64 

and 65, 26 Nov; 25th Div PIR 150, 26 NOV 50. 

19 25th Div WD, 26 Nov 50; 25th Div O1 20, 26 NOV 

50. 

20 25th Div WD. 26 Nov 50; 25th Div O1 21, 26 Nov 

50; 24th Inf WD, 26 Nov 50; 1st Bn, 24th Inf, WD, 26 

Nov 50; 27th Inf Hist. Nar, Nov 50; 27th Inf Unit Rpt 

82, 26 Nov 50. 

21 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50; 

9th Inf Hist Nar, Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 69 

they had left behind. As the other two 

artillery battalions that had been below 

Freeman already had done, the 61st 

then moved south to new and safer 

positions.22 

Keiser gave his sole remaining reserve, the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, a 

blocking assignment behind Freeman’s 

front, placing it a mile east of the valley 

road town of Kujang-dong on a lateral 

road leading to and serving as the main 

supply route for the 38th Infantry. Several times through the day Colonel 

Peploe had asked division to reinforce 

the 38th Infantry with part of the 23d. 

His central companies had been severely reduced by casualties; only a 

handful of Company A’s men returned 

to the regimental line after fighting free 

of encirclement north of the Paengnyong, and Company G, after its engagement at the west end of the regimental line, counted no more than one 

officer and sixty men. But Keiser had 

judged the Ch’ongch’on valley to be the 

more critical area. Although Freeman’s 

3d Battalion could have been sent to 

Peploe, Keiser chose not to commit the 

last of his reserves to the line.23 

Peploe thus was left to his own resources in defending his Paengnyong 

position. However he decided to hold 

his ground, he had to take into account 

that no north-south road served his 

sector. The only accessible road ran laterally close behind his forward units, 

westward to Kujang-dong and southeastward toward Tokch’on in the ROK 

II Corps sector. In setting a defense, 

22 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50; 2d 

Div Arty S3 .Jnl, 26 Nov 50; 23d Inf, Nar Sum, Nov 

50; 23d Inf WD, Nov 50. 

23 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50; 

38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

he had to remain north of this road to 

insure the receipt of supplies and to 

hold open an exit route should a withdrawal be called.24 

By noon Peploe knew that his problem was much greater than just holding a road-poor interior position with 

reduced forces. Fragmentary reports 

made it clear that the ROK II Corps 

had been under attack for some time, 

that the South Koreans were not holding their positions, and that the 38th 

Infantry was fast becoming the right 

flank unit not only of the 2d Division 

and the IX Corps but also of the Eighth 

Army. 

The piecemeal information coming 

out of the ROK II Corps sector left 

obscure the exact chronology of the attacks against General Yu’s forces. It appeared that during the previous night 

a Chinese regiment had skirted the 21st 

Regiment of the ROK 8th Division at 

the far right of the Eighth Army front 

and broken through the flank position 

of the division’s 16th Regiment six miles 

east of Yongdong-ni. A stronger force 

of two regiments at the same time infiltrated the ROK front at the center of 

the 7th Division’s position and at the 

boundary between the 7th and 8th 

Divisions. By 0800 on the 26th heavy 

enemy pressure had developed across 

the entire corps front except in the sector of the 3d Regiment on the west 

flank. By that hour the 8th Division’s 

21st Regiment on the corps east flank 

had given up its position and moved 

south to Yongdong-ni, and its 10th 

Regiment was withdrawing to the same 

area. Elsewhere, as reported at that 

hour by the IX Corps liaison officer 

24 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 
70 

with General Yu, 

confused."25 

"things are slightly 

In the late morning hours the Chinese who had infiltrated the South Korean front moved ten miles south to 

Tokch’on, blocked the road serving as 

the main ROK supply route north and 

south of town, and trapped the 2d Regiment of the reserve ROK 6th Division 

inside. Another Chinese regiment attacked south between the 5th and 8th 

Regiments of the ROK 7th Division, inducing both to withdraw. Since the 8th 

Division already had left its position, 

the withdrawal of the ROK 7th’s 5th 

and 8th Regiments left only the 3d 

Regiment on the original front. The 

3d, too, soon vacated its left flank position and sought safety by sliding westward into the IX Corps sector behind 

the positions of the 38th Infantry.26 

Thus, near noon of the 26th, the 

ROK II Corps front folded. General

Yu attempted through the afternoon 

and evening to establish a new line between Tokch’on and Yongdong-ni but 

was defeated by broken communications, the confusion of the withdrawals, 

and continued enemy pressure. By dark 

the Chinese who had come through the 

center of the corps front fully controlled the Tokch’on area. The smaller 

group that had come in from the northeast had seized Yongdong-ni and 

moved south another four miles to the 

village of Maengsan. Yu planned next 

to defend Pukch’ang-ni, twelve miles 

south of Tokch’on, at the junction of 

25 Eighth Army WD, G3 SS Rpt, 26 Nov 50; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50; Eighth Army POR 410, 26 

Nov 50; IX Corps PIR 61, 26 Nov 50; IX Corps G2 

Spot Rpt 2982, 252255 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot 

Rpt 1692, 260800 Nov 50. 

26 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Briefing for CG, 26 Nov 

50; IX Corps PIR 61, 26 Nov 50; IX Corps PIR 62, 

EBB AND FLOW 

roads leading south from Tokch’on and 

southwest from Maengsan. He intended to hold the Pukch’ang-ni area 

with the remaining strength of the ROK 

6th Division and while holding his position there to reorganize his 7th and 8th 

Divisions as the remnants drifted south. 

But until and unless such a reorganization could be accomplished, the ROK 

II Corps could not be considered an 

effective force.27 

After learning of the collapse of the 

ROK II Corps, Colonel Peploe bent the 

38th Infantry’s line. Retaining his 2d 

Battalion in its western position above 

the road to Kujang-dong, he pivoted 

the remainder of the regiment on Somindong, a village near the center of his 

sector, so as to form a horseshoe-shaped 

arc running from his existing left flank 

eastward to Somin-dong, then southeast along the high ground rising west 

of the road to Tokch’on. Peploe’s forces 

completed this shift by 1800, thus securing the regimental supply route and 

refusing 

flank.28 

the Eighth Army’s new right 

Peploe’s adjustment, of course, protected the flank only at the immediate 

front. As reports of the ROK II Corps 

failure reached army headquarters, 

General Walker moved against the possibility of deeper incursions from the 

northeast. 

From Tokch’on and Maengsan, two 

roads entering the army rear were open 

to the Chinese, one leading west from 

Tokch’on to Kunu-ri, the other running deeper through Pukch’ang-ni to 

Sunch’on. To block the deeper route, 

Walker relieved the 1st Cavalry Divi27 Eighth Army G3 Jn1, 26 Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 

SS Rpt, 27 Nov 50; IX Corps G2 Spot Rpt 3050, 

261505 Nov 50. 

an. 2, 27 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50. 28 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 71 

sion from protecting supply installations in the Kunu-ri and Sukch’on areas 

chopped off by a deep Chinese penetration farther east. Milburn therefore 

(substituting the 187th Airborne Regi- ordered General Church’s attack to a 

mental Combat Team and Philippine halt. Church meanwhile committed his 

10th Battalion Combat Team for that 

mission) and ordered it into position at 

5th Regimental Combat Team to the 

Sunch’on and along the road to the east. 

right of his two regiments on Route 1 

in a gap between his division and the 

Division commander Maj. Gen. Ho- ROK 1st Division, created and widened 

bart R. Gay scheduled the move to begin on the 27th.29 

as they had moved forward on diverTo deny the Tokch’on-Kunu-ri road, 

gent axes. This move protected against 

an enemy strike from the T’aech’on 

Walker instructed General Coulter to area, where General Paik’s forces had 

send the IX Corps reserve, the Turkish 

brigade, from Kunu-ri eastward over 

spent a difficult day beating off several 

strong Chinese attacks.31 

that road and to clear Tokch’on. Once In less that twenty-four hours, ChiTokch’on was retaken, Coulter was to nese attacks thus had achieved effects 

place the Turks in defense of the town 

and tie their positions to those of the 

both wide and deep. The Eighth 

2d Division to the northwest. Coulter 

Army’s advance had been brought to a 

full halt; the ROK II Corps had been 

moved one battalion of Turks to Wa- knocked completely out of position and 

won, about ten miles east to Kunu-ri, almost completely out of action; and 

before midnight and planned to assem- along most of the army line, commandble another battalion there by daylight. ers had been obliged to redeploy forces 

At that time the Turks were to start for in an attempt to prevent further ChiTokch’on. Since employing the Turkish nese gains. By the night of the 26th, 

brigade would leave Coulter with few however, no one at Eighth Army headuncommitted troops, Walker also or- quarters had concluded that the Chidered the British 27th Brigade trans- nese had opened a major offensive. 

ferred to Coulter from the I Corps and 

moved to Kunu-ri.30 

There was concern over the collapse of 

While Walker was able to draw troops 

the ROK II Corps and the possibility 

from the quieter I Corps sector, Genthat the Chinese might exploit the 

South Korean withdrawals. The intellieral Milburn was by no means free of gence staff raised the estimate of Chithe threat posed by the Chinese attacks. 

Although the 24th Division far out on 

nese strength opposite the Eighth Army 

Route 1 appeared to have an open road 

from 54,000 to 101,000. But the predicto the Yalu ahead of it, any advance 

tion of the enemy’s most likely course 

of action continued to be that the Chiwould perch it on a limb that could be nese would “conduct an active defense 

in depth along present line employing 

strong local counterattack.“32 In Tokyo, 

29 Rad, GX 30017 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 13; 

1st Cav Div et al., 26 Nov 50; Eighth Army POR 412, 

Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, the 

26 Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, 26 Nov 50; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 27 Nov 50. 

30 Rad, GX 30019 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG; 31 24th Div WD, 26 Nov 50; 1 Corps POR 22.5, 26 

IX Corps. 26 Nov 50; Rad. GX 30022, CG Eighth Nov 50. 

Army to CG; I Corps et al., 26 Nov 50. 32 Eighth Army PIR 137, 26 Nov 50. 
72 EBB AND FLOW 

At the I Corps right, Su Ching-huai, 

the 66th Army commander, struck hard 

at the ROK 1st. Division in the T’aech’on 

area. Moving strong forces down the 

east side of the Taeryong River after 

dark on the 26th, Su quickly pushed 

the 11th Regiment out of position while 

a smaller force hit and penetrated the 

12th Regiment west of the river. The 

12th counterattacked and restored its 

position by daybreak, and General Paik 

committed the 15th Regiment to help 

the 11th on the east side of the Taeryong. But Su strengthened his attack 

through the 27th and forced the two 

ROK regiments east of the river to withdraw five miles.36 

Su’s attack posed a distinct threat to 

the 24th Division since its continuation 

conceivably could carry the 66th Army 

along the east side of the Taeryong 

through the 24th’s rear area. Such a 

move would cut off General Church’s 

troops, all west of the river. Against this 

possibility, Church on the 27th moved 

the 19th Infantry from Napch’ongjong 

northeastward to Pakch’on, where it 

would be centrally located in the corps 

sector on the east side of the Taeryong 

in good position to block to the north. 

He also pulled back the 21st Regiment 

from Chongju to Napch’ongjong.37 

The 66th Army commander had had 

a good day, advancing five miles, forcing the commitment of the ROK 1st 

Division reserve, and inducing a rearward redeployment within the 24th 

Division. In addition, Su’s forces advancing down the east side of the 

Taeryong had uncovered the left flank 

of the 35th Infantry and created an opFar East Command G-2, tended to 

agree. Reporting to Washington 

around noon on the 26th, he stated that 

“should the enemy elect to fight in the 

interior valleys, a slowing down of the 

United Nations offensive may result.“33 

The Chinese, meanwhile, prepared to 

continue what they called their Second 

Phase Offensive. 

The Second Phase Offensive 

In opening the offensive on the night 

of the 25th, XIII Army Group commander Li T’ien-yu had aimed his main 

attack at the IX Corps, in particular at 

the 2d Division, using units of the 39th 

and 40th Armies. In secondary attacks, 

forces of the 38th and 42d Armies had 

pushed the ROK II Corps out of position in the east while units of the 50th 

and 66th, mainly the latter, had 

launched assaults against the I Corps 

in the west. Li now planned to attack 

in greater strength. His western effort 

was to contain Milburn’s forces while 

he continued his main attack against 

Coulter in the center, and he now planned to exploit the ROK II Corps’ withdrawal and envelop the Eighth Army 

from the east.34 

The XIII Army Group struck all along 

the Eighth Army line during the night 

of the 26th and through the 27th except on the west flank, where the 50th 

Army was under instructions to contain 

the 24th Division. Other than aerial 

observers’ sightings of numerous enemy groups in the high land mass above 

the center of the 24th’s sector, General 

Church’s forces had no contact.35 

33 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 274. 

34 USAFFE Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53. 

35 Ibid.; 24th Div WD, 27 Nov 50. 

36 I Corps PIR 73, 27 Nov 50; I Corps PORs 227 

and 228, 27 Nov 50. 

37 Ibid.; 24th Div WD, 27 Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 73 

portunity to envelop the 25th Division 

from the west. This open flank was only 

one of the problems facing the IX 

Corps: as the threat developed on the 

west, the 39th and 40th Armies pressed 

the main attack against the 25th and 

2d Divisions from the north, and the 

38th Army started west toward the 2d 

Division to exploit its previous successes 

against the ROK II Corps. 

On the west wing of the main effort, 

the 39th Army attacked south astride the 

Kuryong River during the first hours 

of the 27th against the left and center 

of the 25th Division. The 117th Division 

of the 39th moved down the west side 

of the Kuryong toward the 35th Infantry while the 115th and 116th Divisions 

advanced against Task Force Wilson on 

the east side. Light forces leading the 

117th drove in the 35th’s outposts 

around 0300, and an hour later two 

regiments assaulted the 35th’s main 

defenses. Supported by mortars and 

machine guns, the Chinese dented the 

regimental line but lost heavily-374 

Chinese bodies later were counted in 

front of the position-and broke off 

the engagement around 0800.38 

East of the Kuryong, the leading 

forces of the 115th and 116th Divisions 

struck Task Force Wilson at the same 

hour that the 35th Infantry’s outposts 

were hit. The initial assault carried 

some Chinese behind the task force 

line, and after first contact the Chinese 

increased their attack force to two full 

regiments.39 

In response to the intensified assaults 

on the task force, General Kean ordered forward the 2d Battalion, 27th 

38 25th Div PIR 131, 27 Nov 50; 25th Div PORs 67 

and 68, 27 Nov 50; 35th Inf Hist Rpt, Nar, Nov 50. 

39 25th Div WD, Nov 50; 25th Div PIR 131, 27 Nov 

50. 

Infantry, assembled in reserve three 

miles behind Wilson’s front. But before 

the 2d could move, some of the Chinese who had gotten in rear of Wilson’s 

line reached the battalion’s assembly 

area. The battalion held its own in the 

ensuing battle but was unable to move 

north. Others from the same enemy 

group bypassed the 2d and attacked the 

8th Field Artillery Battalion in its firing position near the village of Ipsok, 

another mile south. Electing to withdraw, the artillerymen first lowered the 

tubes of their 105-mm. howitzers and 

fired point-blank into the attackers. The 

howitzer fire along with that of small 

arms and automatic weapons stalled the 

Chinese and enabled the battalion to 

disengage and move to new positions 

four miles to the south without losing 

equipment.40 

Unlike the 117th Division west of the 

Kuryong, the two divisions on the east 

disregarded losses and launched repeated assaults against Task Force Wilson. Judging Wilson’s position no 

longer tenable and wary of the threat 

of envelopment posed by the Chinese 

in the T’aech’on area, Kean in midmorning of the 27th ordered his division to withdraw four miles to an eastwest line running through Ipsok. To 

strengthen his defense, he assigned the 

27th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, to 

a sector of the new line between Task 

Force Wilson and the 24th Infantry.41 

General Wilson used the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, to cover the disengagement of his task force and by 1830 

had his units in the new position. By 

that time the 35th and 24th Regiments 

40 Ibid.; 25th Div PORs 67 and 69, 27 Nov 50; 27th 

Inf Hist Nar, Nov 50. 

41 25th Div WD, 27 Nov 50; 25th Div OI 22, 27 Nov 

50. 
74 

on the flanks had completed their withdrawals, and Colonel Michaelis had 

taken his 27th Infantry to its assigned 

sector. Having reached the Ipsok line, 

Kean once more had his left flank covered by the ROK 1st Division, and his 

forces were free, for the moment at 

least, of the punishing assaults of the 

39th Army.42 

On the east wing of the main attack, 

the 40th Army struck at several points 

along the 2d Division front. Shortly after dark on the 26th, Chinese forces 

came off Chinaman’s Hat in a twopronged assault on the 23d Infantry’s 

position just east of the Ch’ongch’on. 

One prong penetrated the northeastern corner of Colonel Freeman’s line 

and reached the regimental command 

post, forcing Freeman and his staff back 

to the 1st Battalion command post a 

quarter-mile south. Freeman counterattacked, using Company F, in regimental reserve, and the headquarters 

companies of the regiment and of both 

forward battalions. He regained the 

command post area but was driven out 

again almost immediately by fire from 

the surrounding high ground.43 

Electing to await first light before attacking again, Freeman pulled all his 

forces south to positions around the 1st 

Battalion command post. At dawn the 

1st and 2d Battalions returned to the 

former regimental headquarters area, 

found that the Chinese had withdrawn, 

and recovered most of the headquarters equipment intact. Through the reEBB AND FLOW 

mainder of the day, Freeman worked 

to reestablish his regiment in approximately the same position it had held 

the previous evening.44 

An hour before midnight on the 

26th, another strong force of Chinese 

attacked the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, 

near the center of the regimental line 

on the west side of the Ch’ongch’on. 

Supported by fire from mortars, 3.5- 

inch rocket launchers, and recoilless 

rifles, the Chinese loosened the 2d Battalion from its position and pushed it 

against the west bank of the river. In 

disarray, and at the expense of some 

weapons and equipment, the battalion 

forded the river and entered the 23d 

Infantry’s area about the time Freeman 

was making his first attempt to regain 

his command post site. As the battalion 

crossed, Colonel Sloane, the regimental commander, called down artillery 

fire on the area his men had vacated. 

The Chinese neither followed the battalion across the Ch’ongch’on nor 

turned their attack against any other of 

Sloane’s units.45 

After crossing the river, the men of 

the 2d Battalion regained some order 

and reassembled by midafternoon near 

Kujang-dong. Though the battalion was 

by no means primed for further action, 

Colonel Sloane was obliged to recommit it to help protect his left flank, 

which had been made more susceptible 

to enemy attack by the 25th Division’s 

withdrawal to Ipsok. By evening of the 

27th the 2d Battalion again was on the 

west side of the Ch’ongch’on, this time 

42 25th Div POR 68, 27 Nov 50; 25th Div G3 Activ 

Rpt, 27 Nov 50; 35th Inf Hist Rpt, Nar, Nov 50; 24th 

Inf Unit Rpt 57, 27 Nov 50; 27th Inf Unit Rpt 82, 27 

Nov 50; 2d Bn, 27th Inf, Unit Jnl, 27 Nov 50. 

43 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, 26-27 

Nov 50; 2d Div G2 Msg File, Msg 1341, 27 Nov 50. 

44 Ibid. 

45 2d Div WD, 27 Nov 50; 2d Div POR 342, 27 Nov 

50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 197, 26 Nov 50, and Entries 

1,3,7, 16, 17, and 22, 27 Nov 50; 2d Bn, 9th Inf, Unit 

Jnl, 26 and 27 Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 75 

at the extreme left of the regimental 

line.46 

While Sloane and Freeman were able 

to concentrate on well-defined enemy 

attacks, Colonel Peploe to their right 

became embroiled in a melee in which 

the Chinese hit the 38th Infantry from 

several directions. The battle developed 

in a west-to-east pattern around the 

38th’s arch of position at Somin-dong, 

starting after dark on the 26th when 

Company C moved west to restore the 

former Company G position at the regimental left. The company had gone 

only part way when it was surrounded 

and split by Chinese coming from the 

northwest. Some of the Chinese passed 

by the encircled company, moved east 

between the front and the Kujang-dong 

road, and attacked Companies F and 

L, still holding the regiment’s central 

positions, from the rear. At the same 

time, the remainder of the 3d Battalion to the southeast came under intense 

and accurate small arms fire from the 

east.47 

This action opened a series of confused engagements lasting the night 

and the daylight hours of the 27th. 

Units of the 40th Army launched hard 

assaults on the 38th Infantry from the 

north while forces of the 38th Army 

came out of the ROK II Corps sector 

in strong strikes from the east. Both 

attack groups, whose total strength was 

estimated as high as two divisions, tried, 

with some success, to work troops in 

behind Peploe’s lines.48 

46Ibid 

47 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, 

Nov 50. 

48 IX Corps PIR 62, 27 Nov 50; IX Corps G2 Spot 

Rpts 3108 and 3172, 27 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot 

Rpt 1830, 27 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26-27 Nov 50; 

38th Inf. Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

As Chinese appeared behind the lines 

and as companies were penetrated or 

pushed back, Peploe dispatched whatever uncommitted force was available 

at a given moment to clear the rear area 

or plug a gap at the front. Battalions 

gradually lost identity as lettered companies became intermingled. Peploe 

used the ROK 3d Regiment for extra 

help. Instructions down the chain of 

command from army had given him 

control of the South Korean unit after 

it had sideslipped westward out of the 

ROK II Corps sector. Assisted by the 

2d Reconnaissance Company, which 

halted most of the withdrawing South 

Koreans by blocking the Kujang-dong 

road not far behind the 38th’s lines, 

Peploe assembled the bulk of the regiment and inserted it piecemeal in his 

arc of defenses.49 

Notwithstanding these additional 

troops, Peploe lost ground on both the 

north and east, and in the afternoon of 

the 27th he ordered a withdrawal into 

the southwestern portion of the regimental sector. Executing a covered 

withdrawal, the 38th and ROK 3d Regiments at dusk occupied a perimeter two 

miles in diameter centered midway between Kujang-dong and Somin-dong. 

The new position allowed Peploe’s men 

still to cover the Kujang-dong road, and 

the withdrawal gave them a respite 

from attack.50 

General Keiser meanwhile decided 

that the 2d Division could improve its 

chances of stopping the Chinese by 

withdrawing into a shorter and tighter 

49 Eighth Army POR 412, 26 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 

Spot Rpt 1757, i6 Nov 50; 2d Div POR 342, 27 Nov 

50: 2d Div G3 Jnl. 26 Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, 

Nov 50. 

50 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Sit Overlay with 2d 

Div POR 342, 27 Nov 50. 
76 EBB AND FLOW 

Kujang-dong. In the I Corps sector, 

General Milburn had drawn up orders 

for a five-mile withdrawal on the 28th 

by the 24th Division and ROK 12th 

Regiment so that: he would have a more 

closely knit position on line with the 

remainder of the ROK 1st Division, 

which had been pushed back at the I 

Corps right.53 

General Walker’s attention was directed in particular to the threat of envelopment from the east. That the ROK 

II Corps could establish effective defenses at Puckch’ang-ni was a forlorn 

hope. Although General Yu had recovered straggling troops of the ROK 7th 

and 8th Divisions, no organized units 

of the two divisions had reached the 

Pukch’ang-ni area. Yu had new plans 

for establishing a delaying position at 

Pukch’ang-ni and a defensive perimeter three miles south of the town with 

the 7th and 19th Regiments of the ROK 

6th Division. But since Yu’s corps truly 

was defunct, General Walker revised 

his corps sector assignments on the 

evening of the 27th to give General 

Coulter’s IX Corps responsibility for 

Yu’s area.54 

While widening Coulter’s sector on 

the east, Walker reduced it on the west 

by attaching the 25th Division to the I 

Corps. He marked what had been the 

boundary between the 25th and 2d Divisions as the new boundary between 

the I and IX Corps and extended it 

south past Kunu-ri and Sunch’on, with 

the two towns and the connecting road 

resting in the IX Corps sector. To unify 

fully the effort to block enemy incursions from the northeast and east, he 

line centered on the Ch’ongch’on just 

above Kujang-dong and lying across a 

series of hilltops from a point three 

miles west of the river to a point four 

miles southeast of it. The 23d Infantry was to defend the left half of the 

line, including the east bank of the 

Ch’ongch’on, while the 38th Infantry 

refused the flank on the right. The 9th 

Infantry was to assemble in reserve, its 

bulk at Yongdam-ni five miles below 

Kujang-dong and one battalion at Pugwon another five miles south. Keiser 

ordered the move to the new line to 

begin the following day.51 

The Threat of Envelopment 

By nightfall on the 27th there was 

little question anywhere in the Eighth 

Army that the Chinese were on the 

offensive. The army G-2, Colonel 

Tarkenton, hedged a bit, describing the 

simultaneous attacks across the army 

front and especially the strong daylight 

attacks against the 38th Infantry as having the “appearance” of a planned enemy offensive. To Col. John A. Dabney, 

the army G-3, it was “evident that the 

UN offensive of 24 November had 

merely anticipated a similar full-scale 

enemy offensive by about two days.“52 

Plans for continuing the Eighth 

Army offensive were not yet canceled. 

But the adjustment of troop dispositions to block further Chinese gains was 

the order of the day. In the IX Corps 

sector, General Kean already had 

pulled the 25th Division to the Ipsok 

line and General Keiser had ordered 

the 2d Division to consolidate at 

51 2d Div Opn O 11, 27 Nov 50. 

52 Eighth Army PIR 138, 27 Nov 50; Eighth Army 

G3 SS Rpt, 27 Nov 50. 

53 I Corps Opn Dir 25, 27 Nov 50. 

54 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, 27 Nov 50; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, 27 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30039 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to C/S ROKA et al., 27 Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 77 

attached the 1st Cavalry Division to the 

IX Corps and directed General Yu to 

give Coulter his “most effective division, 

or composite . . . equivalent.” With these 

adjustments, the IX Corps order of battle at dark on the 27th included the 2d 

Division, 1st Cavalry Division, Turkish 

brigade, British 27th Brigade, and the 

ROK 6th Division.55 

General Gay meanwhile had placed 

two regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division east of Sunch’on. The 8th Cavalry 

was assembled at Sinch’ang-ni, twelve 

miles east of Sunch’on, and 7th Cavalry was in position astride the Sunch’on 

road at Kujong-ni, fifteen miles east 

and slightly north of Sunch’on. Gay’s 

newest orders, received from Walker 

just before the division was attached to 

the IX Corps, called for a seven-mile 

advance on the 28th to the Pukch’angni area where the cavalrymen were to 

unite with the ROK 6th Division in 

blocking the road to Sunch’on.56 

Northwest of the cavalry division, 

across twenty miles of ridges relieved 

only by a westward-flowing stretch of 

the Taedong River, the Turkish brigade blocked the Kunu-ri road from a 

position at Wawon. Early on the 27th 

the Turks, accompanied by a platoon 

of tanks from the 72d Tank Battalion, 

had started east from Wawon in accordance with Walker’s previous orders to 

clear Tokch’on. But General Coulter, 

with Walker’s approval, halted this 

move near midday after receiving several reports of an enemy regiment 

moving westward from the direction 

of Tokch’on. To forestall a meeting 

engagement between the untried 

Turks and the approaching enemy 

force, Coulter instructed the brigade 

commander, Brig. Gen. Tahsin Yasici, 

to place his unit in defenses seven 

miles east of Wawon. Misunderstanding 

Coulter’s message, General Yasici 

turned his forces around and took 

them to positions astride the Kunu-ri 

road just east of Wawon. This left the 

Turks approximately where they had 

first assembled, ten miles east of Kunuri, and now eight miles south of the 

perimeter into which Colonel Peploe 

had drawn his 38th and ROK 3d 

Regiments.57 

The position of the Turkish brigade, 

regardless of Yasici’s error, and the 

positions of the 1st Cavalry Division 

and ROK 6th Division out along the 

Sunch’on road provided at least some 

protection against an envelopment by 

blocking the likely axes of enemy approach. By morning of 28 November, 

in any case, General Walker’s attention 

was diverted to his northern front 

where during the night and early morning hours his forces again absorbed 

strong attacks near Taech’on, in the 

Ch’ongch’on valley, and at the army 

east flank. 

In the west, the 66th and 39th Armies 

teamed on attack southeast and south 

between the Taeryong and Kuryong 

rivers around midnight on the 27th. 

Each army drove toward Yongsandong, a village centered between the 

two rivers five miles behind the right 

of the ROK 1st Division and the left of 

55 Ibid. 

56 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, 27 Nov 50; Rad, GX 

30039 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 

27 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30038 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

to CG 1st Cav Div, 27 Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl. 

21-30 Nov 50: 7th Cav Regt Hist Rpt. Nov 50. 

57 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 27 Nov 50; IX Corps WD, 27 

NW 50; Rad, IXACT-396, CG IX Corps to Sn Adv 

1st TAFC, 27 Nov 50; Rad, IXACT-390, CG; IX Corps 

to CG 1st TAFC, 27 Nov 50. 
78 

the 25th Division. Situated at the intersection of roads serving the flank units 

of the two divisions, Yongsan-dong was 

a choice objective. Its seizure not only 

would cut both routes but also would 

give the Chinese access to good roads 

leading to Ch’ongch’on River crossings 

some fifteen miles to the south and 

southeast near Anju and Kunu-r-i. 

The 66th Army enjoyed rapid success 

against the reduced numbers of the 

ROK 11th and 15th Regiments. Attacking east and south, the army occupied 

Yongsan-dong and, before easing its attack near dawn, drove the South Koreans one to two miles below the village. 

The ROK ground loss, as on the day 

before, uncovered the left flank of the 

25th Division. The flank was exposed 

at the same time that the 39th Army 

pushed a strong attack down the west 

side of the Kuryong against the 35th 

Infantry. 

In response to both threats, General 

Kean ordered Col. Henry G. Fisher, 

commander of the 35th Infantry, to 

pull his regiment four miles southeast 

behind the Kuryong. This move would 

face the 35th to the northwest, thus 

would refuse the division’s left flank, 

and since the new line crossed the road 

leading southeast from Yongsan-dong, 

would obstruct any Chinese attempt on 

Kunu-ri. After the Chinese assaults 

against the 35th subsided around daylight, the regiment started south, battalions in column, over a route leading 

through Yongsan-dong. Unaware that 

the Chinese had taken the village, the 

column was surprised by enemy fire. 

Casualties were not heavy, but a large 

number of vehicles was lost as the 

battalions fought through, and Colonel Fisher spent several hours reassemEBB AND FLOW 

bling his regiment near the village of 

Yongbyon east: of the Kuryong.58 

The 39th Army also sent forces down 

the east side of the Kuryong against 

Task Force Wilson. By dawn Wilson 

had withdrawn from contact to a position immediately northeast of the 35th 

Infantry’s new location. General Kean 

meanwhile moved the 27th Infantry to 

positions in line with and to the right 

of Wilson’s force.59 

The total result of the Chinese attacks against the I Corps through the 

night of the 27th was a wedge driven 

about five miles between the Taeryong 

and the Kuryong. Any deepening of 

the wedge portended the isolation of 

General Milburn’s forces west of the 

Taeryong and the envelopment of 

those behind the Kuryong. 

In the IX Corps sector, the 40th and 

38th Armies repeated the pattern of their 

previous attacks by launching several 

regimental assaults against the 2d Division during the night and in the first 

daylight hours of the 28th. West of the 

Ch’ongch’on, two Chinese regiments 

concentrated on the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion and 1st Battalion of the 

9th Infantry. Both battalions withdrew 

across the Ch’ongch’on. East of the 

river, three enemy regiments took 

turns hitting the 38th Infantry from 

the north and east, gradually forcing 

Colonel Peploe’s forces toward Kujangdong. As a total effect, the pressure 

58 I Corps PORs 230 and 231, 28 Nov 50; I Corps 

PIR 74, 28 Nov 50; I Corps Intel Sum 222, 28 Nov 

50; 25th Div POR 70, 28 Nov 50; 35th Inf Hist Rpt, 

Nar, Nov 50; 1st Bn, 35th Inf, WD, 28 Nov 50; 2d Bn, 

35th Inf. WD, 27-28 Nov 50: 3d Bn. 35th Inf, Nar of 

Opns, Nov 50. 

59 25th Div POR 70, 28 Nov 50; 27th Inf S3 Jnl, 

27-28 Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 79 

from the northwest against the 9th Infantry and from the north and east on 

the 38th Infantry was folding the wings 

of the 2d Division’s defense.60 

Attacks against the 38th Infantry 

were still in progress at midmorning 

when General Walker radioed withdrawal orders to General Milburn and 

General Coulter. Electing to break 

contact long enough to organize more 

effective defenses, Walker instructed 

Milburn to occupy a bridgehead over 

the Ch’ongch’on from the mouth of 

the river north to Pakch’on, then east 

to the river. Coulter was to defend a 

line from Pugwon, on the lower bank 

of the Ch’ongch’on five miles above 

Kunu-ri, southeast to the village of 

T’aeul-linear the Eighth Army-X Corps 

boundary. The line cut all likely Chinese axes of advance, including a road 

passing through T’aeul-li which might 

be used in a deep strike at P’yongyang.61 

The withdrawal was under way by 

midafternoon. In the I Corps sector, 

General Milburn used the ROK 1st 

Division as cover while the 24th and 

25th Divisions moved back to the 

Ch’ongch’on bridgehead. General Paik 

employed his 11th and 15th Regiments 

in the covering operations while his 

12th Regiment moved to a bridgehead 

sector from the east bank of the 

Taeryong to a point four miles due 

south of Yongsan-dong. Behind Paik’s 

cover, the 24th Division withdrew easily. 

60 2d Div PIR 70, 28 Nov 50; 1st Bn, 9th Inf, Nar 

Diary, Nov 50; 2d Engr Bn, Unit Hist Rpt, Nov 50; 

38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

61 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, 28 Nov 50; Eighth Army 

PIR 139, 28 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30051 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CC IX Corps et al., 28 Nov 50; I 

Corps Opn Dir 26, 28 Nov 50; IX Corps Opn O 5, 28 

Nov 50; 25th Div O1 23, 28 Nov 50; 2d Div Opn O 12, 

28 Nov 50; I Corps POR 231, 28 Nov 50; IX Corps 

POR 192, 28 Nov 50. 

At the new line, the 21st Regiment 

refused the west flank from a semicircular position west of the Taeryong 

that blocked Route 1 at the left and 

touched the Taeryong at the right just 

opposite the ROK 12th Regiment. 

General Church assembled his remaining forces east of the Taeryong around 

Pakch’on.62 

At the I Corps right, General Kean 

broke contact with the 39th Army by 

pulling the 25th Division some two 

miles south. Dissolving Task Force 

Wilson, he faced all three regiments to 

the north astride the Kuryong. The 

35th Infantry returned to the west side 

of the river and occupied positions adjoining those of the ROK 12th Regiment. Eastward from the Kuryong to a 

point just short of the west bank of the 

Ch’ongch’on opposite Pugwon, the 27th 

and 24th Regiments barred the road 

leading southward from Yongbyon to 

the Ch’ongch’on crossing three miles 

below their position and to Kunu-ri 

seven miles south.63 

At nightfall on the 28th, as the I 

Corps completed its occupation of the 

Pakch’on-Pugwon sector of the new 

army line, the South Koreans covering the withdrawal were still forward between the Taeryong River and 

Yongsan-dong. The two regiments had 

fought off forces of the 66th Army 

through most of the day, the 15th Regiment actually managing to regain the 

Yongsan-dong crossroads. General Paik 

kept them where they were, instructing them to withdraw to the bridgehead after daylight on the 29th.64 

62 Corps Opn Dirs 26 and 27, 28 Nov 50; I Corps 

PORs 231 and 232, 28 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, Nov 50. 

63 I Corps PORs 231 and 232, 28 Nov 50; 25th Div 

WD, Nov 50. 

64 I Corps PORs 231 and 232, 28 Nov 50. 
80 EBB AND FLOW 

28th because of the time consumed 

in moving four regiments down the 

Ch’ongch’on valley road. Much of the 

time the road between Kujang-dong 

and Kunu-ri was the scene of a tight 

traffic jam. 

The 38th and ROK 3d Regiments led 

the withdrawal. Breaking away from 

Chinese pressing from the north and 

east, Colonel Peploe took his forces west 

to Kujang-dong, then south to an assembly about a mile east and slightly 

south of Kunu-ri. Since it was then 

2000, he elected to await daylight before occupying his new positions above 

Kunu-ri. 

Behind Peploe, the 9th infantry recrossed the Ch’ongch’on onto the valley road and marched south to Pug-won, 

arriving about 2300. From Pugwon, 

Colonel Sloane deployed his 1st Battalion on the west side of the Ch’ongch’on 

opposite the town and to the immediate right rear of the 24th Infantry, 25th 

Division. Below the river, Sloane’s 3d 

Battalion occupied high ground a mile 

south of Pugwon and the 2d Battalion 

blocked the valley road from positions 

a mile above town. 

At the tail of Peploe’s column and 

again at the rear of Sloane’s forces, 

Colonel Freeman had tacked on a battalion of the 23d Infantry. In preparation for relieving the 9th Infantry, these 

two battalions assembled two miles 

below Pugwon. Freeman’s remaining 

forces, the 1st Battalion and the 72d 

tankers, brought up the division rear, 

fighting off Chinese who sensed 

Keiser’s move and began trailing the 

slow withdrawal. Company A, Freeman’s rear guard, deployed at least five 

times against enemy assaults. With 40th 

Army troops close behind, Freeman’s infantry and armored troops passed beIn the IX Corps sector, General 

Coulter directed the 2d Division to delay the Chinese as long as possible as it 

withdrew to positions between Pugwon 

and the Turkish brigade at Wawon. 

Coulter attached the Turks to General 

Keiser to unify control in the PugwonWawon sector and, as a final feature 

of the corps withdrawal, moved the 

reserve British 27th Brigade from 

Kunu-ri to Chasan, five miles south of 

Sunch’on, where it would be centrally 

located to assist either the 2d Division 

or the 1st Cavalry Division. The cavalrymen were to advance up the 

Sunch’on road, not withdraw, to join 

the ROK 6th Division in defenses near 

Pukch’ang-ni. For the time being, 

Coulter issued no instructions for 

placing troops far out to the east at. 

T’aeul-li.65 

General Keiser planned to occupy his 

new sector by placing the 9th Infantry 

temporarily at Pugwon and the 38th 

Infantry and ROK 3d Regiment about 

four miles north and northeast of 

Kunu-ri between the 9th Infantry and 

the Turks at Wawon. The 23d Infantry and the 72d Tank Battalion were to 

cover these moves and fight a delaying 

action as they themselves withdrew. 

The 23d, once it reached Pugwon, was 

to relieve the 9th Infantry, and the 9th, 

now severely reduced by casualties, was 

then to go into division reserve.66 

Keiser was unable to get all of his 

units into their new positions on the 

65 IX Corps Opn O 5, 28 Nov 50; IX Corps WD, 28 

Nov 50. 

66 The account of the 2d Division operations on 28 

November is based on the following sources: 2d Div 

Opn 0 12, 28 Nov 50; 2d Div WD, Nov 50; Hist, 9th 

Inf. Nov 50; Comd Rpt, 23d Inf, Nov 50; 38th Inf 

Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 72d Tk Bn Comd and Unit Hist 

Rpt, Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH'ONGCH'ON

hind the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, at

2330.

Keiser planned to complete his deployment between Pugwon and Wawon

after daylight on the 29th, but events

dictated otherwise. The 40th Army

forces that had trailed the division's

withdrawal began pushing the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, behind Pugwon

around midnight. At the opposite end

of the division line, the Turkish brigade completed a three-mile withdrawal to the village of Sinnim-ni just

before midnight following a series of

engagements with forces of the 38th

Army at Wawon. 67

Though General Yasici had held his

ground against the Chinese, he chose

to withdraw west to Sinnim-ni at dark—

a move that did not conform with orders for a new line through Wawon. A

lack of communications explained this

second instance in which Turk tactics

were contrary to instructions. When

General Coulter sent the Turks toward

Tokch'on, the brigade had direct contact with Coulter's headquarters by radio and wire. But similar connections

did not exist between Keiser's headquarters and the Turks when the latter

were attached to the 2d Division. Neither Yasici nor his advisers knew of the

brigade's attachment to the 2d Division

until very late on the 28th, and their

wire and radio contacts with corps were

67 At least one of the Wawon engagements proved

to have been a case of mistaken identity when 125

"prisoners" sent to the rear by the Turks turned out

to be members of the ROK 6th and 7th Divisions. The

South Koreans apparently moved west after being

squeezed out of Tokch'on and blundered into the

Turks either ahead of or amidst the Chinese assaults

on the brigade. See IX Corps G2 Spot Rpts 3252, 28

Nov 50, and 3301, 29 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 28 Nov

50; 2d Div G2 Jnl, Entry J-1447, 28 Nov 50; Mono,

"Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 November 1950-13 December 1950," copy in CMH.

out at the time Yasici ordered the withdrawal to Sinnim-ni. 68

Not long after midnight, 38th Army

forces reached Sinnim-ni and reopened

their assaults against the Turks. Hence,

both Wawon and Pugwon, the anchor

points of the line assigned to the 2d

Division, were gone. General Keiser's

alternative would be to organize defenses closer to Kunu-ri, how close depending on the outcome of the continuing attacks on both flanks.

Southeast of the Turks, General Gay

moved none of his cavalrymen forward

to the ROK 6th Division's position three

miles below Pukch'ang-ni. Although

Gay had been instructed to do so on

the 28th, he elected to wait until the

5th Cavalry, then marching south out

of the Kunu-ri area, completed its move

into the division's sector.

The 5th Cavalry had started that

morning, moving south over a road

from Kaech'on, five miles east of

Kunu-ri. Near the village of Samso-ri,

seven miles below Kaech'on, about a

hundred Chinese in the bordering high

ground opened small arms and machine gun fire on the intelligence and

reconnaissance platoon leading the

regiment. Only the platoon sergeant

and three men escaped. The 2d Battalion, following the platoon, deployed

in the high ground on both sides of the

road and attacked south to clear the

enemy block but encountered an even

larger force and failed to advance. Reforming on the road, the cavalrymen

bypassed the enemy roadblock and proceeded toward Sunch'on. Because of

this entanglement at Samso-ri, the regi68 "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov13 Dec 50."

81 THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 81 

hind the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, at 

2330. 

Keiser planned to complete his deployment between Pugwon and Wawon 

after daylight on the 29th, but events 

dictated otherwise. The 40th Army 

forces that had trailed the division’s 

withdrawal began pushing the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, behind Pugwon 

around midnight. At the opposite end 

of the division line, the Turkish brigade completed a three-mile withdrawal to the village of Sinnim-ni just 

before midnight following a series of 

engagements with forces of the 38th 

Army at Wawon.67 

Though General Yasici had held his 

ground against the Chinese, he chose 

to withdraw west to Sinnim-ni at darka move that did not conform with orders for a new line through Wawon. A 

lack of communications explained this 

second instance in which Turk tactics 

were contrary to instructions. When 

General Coulter sent the Turks toward 

Tokch’on, the brigade had direct contact with Coulter’s headquarters by radio and wire. But similar connections 

did not exist between Keiser’s headquarters and the Turks when the latter 

were attached to the 2d Division. Neither Yasici nor his advisers knew of the 

brigade’s attachment to the 2d Division 

until very late on the 28th, and their 

wire and radio contacts with corps were 

67 At least one of the Wawon engagements proved 

to have been a case of mistaken identity when 125 

“prisoners” sent to the rear by the Turks turned out 

to be members of the ROK 6th and 7th Divisions. The 

South Koreans apparently moved west after being 

squeezed out of Tokch’on and blundered into the 

Turks either ahead of or amidst the Chinese assaults 

on the brigade. See IX Corps G2 Spot Rpts 3252, 28 

Nov 50, and 3301, 29 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 28 Nov 

50; 2d Div G2 Jnl, Entry J-1447, 28 Nov 50; Mono, 

“Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 November 1950-13 December 1950,” copy in CMH. 

out at the time Yasici ordered the withdrawal to Sinnim-ni.68 

Not long after midnight, 38th Army 

forces reached Sinnim-ni and reopened 

their assaults against the Turks. Hence, 

both Wawon and Pugwon, the anchor 

points of the line assigned to the 2d 

Division, were gone. General Keiser’s 

alternative would be to organize defenses closer to Kunu-ri, how close depending on the outcome of the continuing attacks on both flanks. 

Southeast of the Turks, General Gay 

moved none of his cavalrymen forward 

to the ROK 6th Division’s position three 

miles below Pukch’ang-ni. Although 

Gay had been instructed to do so on 

the 28th, he elected to wait until the 

5th Cavalry, then marching south out 

of the Kunu-ri area, completed its move 

into the division’s sector. 

The 5th Cavalry had started that 

morning, moving south over a road 

from Kaech’on, five miles east of 

Kunu-ri. Near the village of Samso-ri, 

seven miles below Kaech’on, about a 

hundred Chinese in the bordering high 

ground opened small arms and machine gun fire on the intelligence and 

reconnaissance platoon leading the 

regiment. Only the platoon sergeant 

and three men escaped. The 2d Battalion, following the platoon, deployed 

in the high ground on both sides of the 

road and attacked south to clear the 

enemy block but encountered an even 

larger force and failed to advance. Reforming on the road, the cavalrymen 

bypassed the enemy roadblock and proceeded toward Sunch’on. Because of 

this entanglement at Samso-ri, the regi68 "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov13 Dee 50.” 
82 EBB AND FLOW 

ment was still assembling near Sunch’on 

long after dark on the 28th.69 

As a result of Gay’s decision to wait 

for the 5th, the 7th Cavalry, earmarked to join the South Koreans below Pukch’ang-ni, stood fast at 

Kujong-ni, seven miles below the ROK 

position. The regiment was now to 

move forward on the 29th. The 5th 

Cavalry meanwhile was to organize defenses north of Sunch’on, and the 8th 

Cavalry was to move from Sinch’ang-ni 

to Songch’on and block the area’s main 

lateral road, which passed through 

Songch’on and reached P’yongyang.70 

Gay’s delay in reinforcing the ROK 

6th Division below Pukch’ang-ni, the 

Turk withdrawal from Wawon, and the 

loss of Pugwon in the Ch’ongch’on valley all worked against the rather high 

hopes General Walker held for the line 

he had delineated. While calling for the 

withdrawal to that line, he also had instructed his forces to prepare for “the 

Eighth Army resumption of offensive 

at early date.“71 With a bridgehead over 

the Ch’ongch’on and with all main 

roads blocked, he hoped that he could 

turn back the Chinese and then revitalize his own march to the border. 

Any such achievement, even of turning back the Chinese, began to appear 

doubtful long before the IX Corps’ 

problems arose. By midday Walker had 

ample evidence of a strong Chinese 

push toward Sunch’on. Aerial observers saw at least four enemy regiments 

pass southward through Pukch’ang-ni 

69 5th Cav WD, 28 Nov 50; 5th Cav S2-S3 Jnl, 28 

Nov 50. 

70 IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts 1962 and 1971, 28 Nov 

50; 1st Cav Div POR 378, 28 Nov 50; 7th Cav Hist 

Rpt, Nov 50; 8th Cav G3 Jnl, 28 Nov 50. 

71 Rad, GX 3005 1 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

IX Corps et al., 28 Nov 50. 

toward the ROK 6th Division’s position 

below town. In the hills five miles southeast of Pukch’ang-ni they saw what they 

believed to be two thousand enemy 

cavalrymen, and they reported another 

enemy force to be moving north from 

Songch’on toward the 7th Cavalry at 

Kujong-ni. Although a sortie by General Gay’s 16th Reconnaissance Company revealed no large force in the 

Songch’on area, the reconnaissance 

troops did discover and kill ten enemy 

soldiers in the town.72 

Against this growing threat of a deep 

envelopment, Walker ordered General 

Milburn to transfer all but one regiment of the 24th Division to the IX 

Corps and to dispatch it to Sunch’on as 

soon as all I Corps forces reached the 

bridgehead line to which they were then 

withdrawing. To compensate this reduction of Milburn’s forces, Walker 

alerted the British 29th Brigade for a 

northward move to Anju and attachment to the I Corps.73 

The Turkish brigade’s engagements 

with 38th Army forces at Wawon made 

it clear that the northern wing of the 

XIII Army Group’s enveloping force was 

headed for Kunu-ri. From all the evidence reaching the army G-2 on the 

28th, Colonel Tarkenton judged that 

the Chinese would sustain their pressure against Kunu-ri and would attempt 

to envelop the Eighth Army via the 

Sunch’on road. He placed in a “maybe” 

72 Eighth Army PIR 139, 28 Nov 50; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, 28 Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 28 Nov 50. ’ 

73 Rad, GX 3005 I KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

IX Corps et al., 28 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30053 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 28 Nov 50; 

Rad, GX 30061 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CO 29th 

Brit Brig, 28 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30068 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CG I Corps et at., 28 Nov 50; Rad, 

GX 30068 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et 

al., 28 Nov 50. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CH’ONGCH’ON 83 

category a deep enemy strike at P’yongyang through Songch’on. The possibility of these maneuvers was increased 

by the findings of observers flying over 

enemy territory above Tokch’on. In 

that area they sighted a “continuous 

train” of enemy troops moving south 

in small groups through gullies, down 

ridgelines, and over all roads and 

trails.74 The commander of the XIII 

Army Group obviously knew the maxims 

of offensive operations. Having gained 

an advantage over Walker by turning 

the Eighth Army’s east flank, he now 

was hurriedly reinforcing his effort in 

the zone where so far he had achieved 

the greatest success. 

Tarkenton’s conclusions were almost 

exactly what the enemy group commander had in mind. Li indeed was 

shifting the emphasis of his attack from 

a penetration of the Eighth Army line 

in the Ch’ongch’on valley to the exploitation of his gains in the former ROK 

II Corps sector. His 42d Army, in greater 

strength, was swinging southwest toward Sunch’on, and the bulk of his 38th 

Army was now headed for Kunu-ri, 

from the east and northeast.75 

The 5th Cavalry’s engagement with 

the roadblock at Samso-ri introduced 

an important feature of Li’s plans. The 

cavalrymen estimated the force they 

had encountered at anywhere from a 

battalion to a regiment, but even the 

top estimate was only half what the Chinese intended to emplace there. When 

the 38th Army had turned west to exploit the collapse of the ROK II Corps, 

Li had ordered the entire army to occupy the Samso-ri area and cut off 

UNC forces withdrawing via roads 

leading south out of Kunu-ri. Colonel 

Peploe’s quick action in turning the 

38th Infantry to refuse the army flank 

and General Walker’s employment of 

the Turkish brigade at Wawon apparently had pulled most of the 38th away. 

On the 28th, in any event, just two regiments of the 113th Division remained 

under orders to block the roads below 

Kunu-ri. But two regiments in a wellset ambuscade could raise havoc with 

any withdrawing Eighth Army column, 

and their most likely victim, since it 

probably would move south from 

Kunu-ri in any future withdrawal, was 

the 2d Division.76 

General Walker, understandably, was 

not particularly concerned at the moment over one roadblock that had troubled one regiment. As the situation 

stood late on the 28th, the chances that 

the Chinese pushing in from the east 

could capture Kunu-ri and Sunch’on 

were good. Walker’s problem and 

larger interest therefore was to prevent 

the Chinese from isolating the bulk of 

the Eighth Army by cutting westward 

across its rear. The obvious answer was 

a withdrawal, one deep enough to take 

the Eighth Army below the Chinese 

thrusts from the east. 

74 Eighth Army PIR 139, 28 Nov 50. 

75 FEC Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53. 

76 5th Cav WD. 28 Nov 50; 5th Cav S2-S3 Jnl, 28 

Nov 50; FEC Intel Dig, vol. 1. no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53. 
CHAPTER V 

The Battle of the Changjin 

Reservoir 

General Walker’s 27 and 28 November reports of the Chinese attacks 

on the Eighth Army and General 

Almond’s messages that the X Corps, 

too, had been attacked swept away General MacArthur’s previous certainty that 

the Chinese would not intervene in 

strength. “We face an entirely new war,” 

MacArthur notified the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff on the morning of the 28th. His 

“strategic plan for the immediate future” was to pass to the defensive.1 

To develop defensive moves, he summoned both Walker and Almond to a 

meeting in Tokyo on the night of the 

28th. Listening first to Walker’s appraisal of the threat to the Eighth 

Army, he turned to Almond for a report of developments during and 

following the X Corps’ advance toward 

Mup’yong-ni the day before.2 

X Corps Dispositions, 26 November 

On the eve of Almond’s Mup’yong-ni 

attack, the 3d Infantry Division with 

the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment 

attached was protecting port facilities, 

1 Telecon, Gen Hickey and Co1 Landrum, 1225, 27 

Nov 50, in GHQ, UNC, files; Rad, GX 30065 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 28 Nov 50; Rad, 

C69953, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Nov 50. 

2 Eighth Army WD, Aide-de-Camp Diary, 28 Nov 

50; Interv, Appleman with Gen Almond. 

airfields, and supply routes in the 

Wonsan-Hungnam area. A primary 

task of the division commander, Maj. 

Gen. Robert H. Soule, was to block 

three roads reaching the coastal region 

from the Taebaek Mountains to the 

west, where North Korean guerrillas estimated as high as 25,000 were concentrated. One battalion of the 15th Infantry deployed thirty miles inland from 

Wonsan blocked the lateral P’yongyangWonsan road. (Map 5) Some thirty 

miles north, troops of the 65th Infantry blocked a road from Tokch’on that 

reached the coastal area midway between Wonsan and Hungnam; another 

thirty miles north, a battalion of the 

7th Infantry at Sach’ang-ni cut a lateral 

road permitting access to the Hamhung-Hungnam complex.3 

In the ROK I Corps zone far to the 

northeast of Hungnam, Brig. Gen. 

Song Hyo Chan had taken his Capital 

3 This section is based on the following sources: Sit 

Map, no. 155, Part 1, G3 Sec, CINCFE Comd Rpt, 27 

Nov 50; GHQ, FEC, G3 Opns Rpt no. 156, 27 Nov 

50; X Corps Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-10 Dec 50; 3d Div 

Comd Rpt: Nov 50; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50: 7th Div Action Rpt, From 

Hyesanjin to Hungnam Outloading, 21 Nov-20 Dec 

50; Max Dolcater, ed., 3d Infantry Division in Korea, 

1953; Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 730, 732; 

Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine 

Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, vol. III, The Chosin 

Reservoir Campaign (Washington, 1957). 
MAP 5
86 

EBB AND FLOW 

THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR (NORTH END) 

Division five miles beyond Ch’ongjin, 

the industrial center and port sixty-five 

miles below the USSR border. Having 

met only desultory resistance from the 

North Korean IV Corps, General Song 

intended next to veer inland to Hoeryong, reported to be a mobilization center for new North Korean units, on the 

Manchurian border forty-five miles due 

north. 

Brig. Gen. Choi Suk had sent 

the two forward regiments of his 3d 

Division out of Hapsu at right angles to 

each other. Against light, sporadic 

North Korean resistance, the 23d Regiment had moved six miles north of 

Hapsu toward the border town of 

Musan, and the 22d Regiment had 

traveled fifteen miles west toward 

Hyesanjin. General Choi’s 26th Regiment was in Tanch’on, near the coast 

due south of Hapsu, en route to the 

7th Division zone as a substitute for 

forces of the 7th being shifted to the 

Changjin Reservoir area to accommodate the 1st Marine Division’s advance 

on Mup’yong-ni. 

In the 7th Division’s zone, the 17th 

Infantry occupied Hyesanjin on the 

Yalu and the area ten miles southwest. 

The bulk of the 32d Infantry held the 

Kapsan-Samsu region below the 17th. 

Division commander Maj. Gen. David 

G. Barr was in the process of moving a 

combat team (the bulk of the 31st 

Infantry; the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry; all but one battery of the 57th Field 

Artillery Battalion; and Battery D, 15th 
THE BATTLE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR 

THE HAGARU-RI AREA. East Hill is in the background. 

Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion) into his newly added 

zone at the Changjin Reservoir. The 

1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, commanded 

by Lt. Col. Don C. Faith, Jr., already 

had reached the east side of the reservoir. With Colonel Faith’s battalion was 

a Marine Corps tactical air control party 

commanded by Capt. Edward P. Stamford. Col. Allan D. MacLean, commander of the 31st Infantry and now 

commanding the combat team, was still 

moving the bulk of his regiment and 

the artillery units south from various locations along the Pukch’ongHyesanjin road en route via Hamhung 

to the new zone.4 

4 Prompted by a X Corps warning order on 24 November to relieve Marine forces on the east side of the 

87 

The lower half of the long supply 

road between Hungnam and the 

Changjin Reservoir and a stretch of 

narrow-gage railway lay in the area assigned to the 3d Division. The northern half of the road and the region 

beyond rested in the zone of the 1st 

Marine Division. The 1st Marine Regiment, commanded by Col. Lewis B. 

Puller, held three key points along the 

supply road. Farthest south, the 1st 

Battalion occupied Chinhung-ni, 

Marine railhead and starting point 

reservoir, General Barr had dispatched his nearest 

unit, the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, then at Hamhung 

en route to join its parent unit in the Kapsan-Samsu 

area. The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, stayed on the 

Pukch’ong-Hyesanjin road to help protect the open 

west side of the division’s supply road. 
88 EBB AND FI.OW 

of the road’s twisting ten-mile climb 

through Funchilin Pass to Kot'o-ri, 

where Colonel Puller had established 

regimental headquarters. The 2d Battalion manned a perimeter around 

Kot'o-ri and a small airstrip above the 

village. The 3d Battalion, less Company G still to the south awaiting transportation, was in Hagaru-ri, eleven 

miles north of Kot'o-ri at the lower end 

of the reservoir. The battalion and a 

variety of service and headquarters 

troops were developing a defense of 

the division command post, supply 

dumps, hospital facilities, and airstrip 

in the Hagaru-ri area. 

North of Hagaru-ri, the 5th and 7th 

Marines had extended the division’s 

holdings up both sides of the reservoir. 

The bulk of the 7th Marines, commanded by Col. Homer L. Litzenberg, 

Jr., held Yudam-ni, fourteen miles to 

the northwest, and the 5th Marines, under Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray, had 

gone ten miles north over a road following the east bank of the reservoir. 

Orders for the Mup'yong-ni attack had 

halted the 5th at this point. Considering Colonel Murray’s regiment fresher 

than the 7th, division commander Maj. 

Gen. Oliver P. Smith had designated 

the 5th to open the advance to the west. 

Murray’s forces consequently had begun to shift west to Yudam-ni, the starting point of the attack. The 2d Battalion was in Yudam-ni, having left the 

area east of the reservoir upon the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry. 

The remainder of Murray’s regiment 

remained in place awaiting relief by the 

balance of Colonel MacLean’s combat 

team. 

The Advance Toward Mup'jong-ni 

Near the southwest corner of the 

Changjin Reservoir, roads from the 

west, north, and southeast met just outside Yudam-ni. Because enemy forces 

had not defended this rare road junction, the Marine division G-2, Col. 

Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr., believed the 

5th Marines would encounter only weak 

opposition when they started toward 

Mup'yong-ni. The absence of enemy 

patrolling and the failure of ground 

and aerial reconnaissance to reveal any 

large enemy concentrations nearby 

supported his judgment. Contradicting 

it were reports from civilians of sizable 

enemy concentrations around Yudamni, but these reports were considered 

misinterpretations of North Korean 

Army remnants moving; away from and 

around the Yudam-ni area.5 

The X Corps G-2, Col. James H. Polk, 

expected the enemy to resist the attack, 

especially when the Eighth Army and 

the marines closed on Huich'on and 

Mup’yong-ni. But Polk’s estimate of initial opposition was optimistic. Besides 

remnants of the North Korean 2d and 

5th Divisions withdrawing northward off 

to the west of Yudam-ni, Polk believed 

just two Chinese divisions, the 89th and 

124th, were anywhere near the town. 

The 126th Division as well as the 124th, 

both of the 42d Army, previously had 

been identified in the reservoir area. 

But the 126th had sideslipped southwestward at least as far as Sach'ang-ni, 

as evidenced by a 23 November skirmish between troops of the 126th and 

the ROK 26th Regiment, then holding 

the town. 

5 This section based on X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; 

X Corps Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-10 Dec 50; 1st Marine 

Div Opn O 24-50, 26 Nov 50; 7th Div Opn O 26, 26 

Nov 50; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir 

Campaign. 
THE BATTLE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR 89 

Polk was not sure where the 124th 

was located but believed that the division likely had moved into defenses 

north of the reservoir. The 89th Division, whose army affiliation Polk had 

not yet determined, had briefly opposed the marines at Hagaru-ri on 23 

November. He no longer knew the location of the 89th but considered the 

division a probable opponent in the 

Mup'yong-ni venture. While allowing 

that the 124th and 89th Divisions could 

be reinforced, Polk proposed withdrawal, delaying action, and limited attacks as the extent of enemy capabilities. 

He offered no order of probability, but 

he, as well as Colonel Holcomb of the 

Marine division, seemed to consider an 

enemy withdrawal to be the most likely 

event. 

General Smith, on the other hand, 

believed his marines would meet Chinese in strength west of Yudam-ni, a 

belief that had prompted his decision 

to pass the fresher 5th Regiment 

through the 7th in the opening attack. 

Smith’s more cautious attitude had been 

apparent for some time. He had not 

shared the mid-November optimism for 

an early UNC victory, and from the 

start of his division’s advance toward 

the Changjin Reservoir he had doubted 

the wisdom of stringing forces over a 

long, poor, and unprotected mountain 

road. 

Supporting Smith’s judgment of 

probable resistance, three Chinese captured by the 7th Marines on the 26th 

asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th 

Divisions of the 20th Army were in the 

Yudam-ni area and would move south 

and southeast from Yudam-ni to cut 

the marines supply road. This information, however, had no effect on plans 

for the Mup’yong-ni attack. Neither 

did incoming reports of strong attacks 

against the Eighth Army. 

Smith ordered the 5th Marines to 

strike first for the village of Yongnimdong, twenty-seven miles west of 

Yudam-ni, where the Marines’ route of 

advance joined a road leading southwest along the upper reaches of the 

Ch'ongch’on River to Huich’on. The 

7th Marines, when passed through, 

were to protect the division supply road 

between Yudam-ni and Sinhung-ni, a 

village located in the Toktong Pass midway between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri. 

Smith appointed the 1st Marines, in and 

below Hagaru-ri, as division reserve. 

His reconnaissance company, then pulling west flank security duty off the left 

rear of the division, was to reconnoiter 

north of Yudam-ni; the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines, only 

recently attached to the division, was to 

come forward from Hungnam to protect the marines’ left flank by recosnnoitering southwest of Yudam-ni.6 

In planning the advance, Smith had 

assumed the full relief of the 5th Marines east of the reservoir by noon of 

the 26th. He apparently expected the 

entire 7th Division combat team to arrive by that hour; but General Barr had 

called for the relief of the marines by a 

minimum of one infantry battalion, an 

6 Earlier, on the night of 12-13 September 1950, the 

British company had participated in a landing operation at Kunsan on the west coast of South Korea as 

part of an attempt to distract North Korean attention 

from the coming landing at Inch'on. The unit had 

then returned to Japan and been attached to Naval 

Forces, Far East, until 20 November when, at its own 

request to serve with American marines, it returned 

to Korea and was attached to the 1st Marine Division. 

See Heinl, Victory at High Tide, p. 79, and Montross 

and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, p. 140. 
90 EBB AND FLOW 

order satisfied by the arrival of the 1st 

Battalion, 32d Infantry. In any event, 

the remainder of Colonel MacLean’s 

forces did not reach the new zone by 

noon on the 26th, nor by 0800 on the 

27th, the scheduled hour of the Marine advance. The full 5th Marines consequently did not reach Yudam-ni on 

the 26th, and the plan of attack had to 

be changed. Since Colonel Murray was 

with his forces east of the reservoir, 

Colonel Litzenberg, commanding the 

7th Marines, took charge of the opening effort. 

Forces available to Litzenberg included the bulk of the 7th Marines and 

the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. The 7th 

held a perimeter rimming the valley in 

which Yudam-ni was located. The 1st 

Battalion and two companies of the 2d 

occupied high ground north of town 

and the terminal heights of two ridges 

to the south and southeast overlooking 

the road to Hagaru-ri. The 3d Battalion held the terminal hills of a ridge to 

the southwest. Between the latter and 

an unoccupied ridge to the northwest 

ran the road to Mup’yong-ni. The 2d 

Battalion, 5th Marines, was to attack 

over this road from an assembly at the 

edge of Yudam-ni. 

Litzenberg instructed the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, to seize a pass ten 

miles to the west in its opening attack. 

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was 

to make parallel advances along the 

ridges on either side of the road, and 

Litzenberg’s 1st Battalion was to assume 

the flank security roles originally assigned to the reconnaissance company 

and the 41st Commando, neither of 

which had reached Yudam-ni. 

After an uncomfortable night when 

the temperature dropped to zero degrees, Fahrenheit, and a wind off the 

frozen reservoir intensified the cold, the 

marines had their attack under way by 

0815 on the 27th. (Map 6) On the ridge 

northwest of the axis road, Company 

H, 7th Marines, met no opposition and 

seized the terminal height, Hill 1403, 

by midmorning. Below the road, Company G, 7th Marines, moved unopposed down the southwest ridge and 

within thirty minutes occupied the next 

commanding height, Hill 1426. In the 

middle, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 

moved over the road in a column of 

companies, meeting nothing in the first 

three-quarters of a mile except several 

undefended obstacles across the road. 

The easy march ended there. The 

forces both on the road and on the 

southwest ridge came under fire about 

the time the pilot of an observer plane 

overhead reported Chinese across the 

entire Marine front. Help from the 

ground and air supporting arms allowed the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, to 

move only another quarter mile before 

intense enemy fire forced the battalion 

to discontinue. A similar additional gain 

was all Company G, 7th Marines, could 

manage on the southwest ridge. All 

told, the day’s advance netted a mile. 

The IX Army Group Attacks 

The 124th Division, contrary to X 

Corps and Marine estimates, was not in 

the reservoir area. It had moved southwest into the Eighth Army sector with 

its parent army, the 42d. But the 89th 

Division was present, and the Chinese 

captured on the 26th had truthfully 

identified the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divi- 
MAP 6
92 

sions. These four divisions constituted 

the 20th Army.7 

Sung Shih-lun, the IX Army Group 

commander, launched the 20th and 

27th Armies in attacks on the night of 

the 27th. From the north, the 27th Army 

moved south on the west side of the 

reservoir against Yudam-ni and down 

the eastern side to seize Hagaru-ri. The 

20th struck Yudam-ni from the west 

and made ever-deepening southeastward swings at the Marine positions and 

supply road below Yudam-ni. 

Nieh Feng-chin, commander of the 

27th Army, sent his 79th Division toward 

Yudam-ni and his 80th Division to seize 

Hagaru-ri. The 80th first had to eliminate Colonel MacLean’s combat team, 

most of which had gone into position 

north of Hagaru-ri by dark on the 27th. 

(Map 7) The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, 

sat astride the road ten miles north of 

Hagaru-ri. Four miles south, the 3d 

Battalion, 31st Infantry, and the 57th 

Field Artillery Battalion held positions 

where the road made a hairpin turn 

around a narrow finger of the reservoir at the mouth of the P'ungnyuri 

River. MacLean’s command post and 

tank company were in Hudong-ni, a 

village another four miles south. The 

2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, was still en 

EBB AND FLOW 

route. By orders from X Corps headquarters, which controlled all movement of convoys over the reservoir 

road, the battalion for the time being 

was halted at Hamhung. 

Liu Fei, the 20th Army commander, 

committed all four of his divisions to 

the southeastward attack. At Yudam-ni, 

all but one regiment of the 89th Division moved after dark on the 27th toward the marines on the ridge northwest of the road to Mup'yong-ni. The 

59th Division started a shallow swing below Yudam-ni to cut the fourteen-mile 

stretch of road between Yudam-ni and 

Hagaru-ri. Below the 59th, the 58th Division swung wider to attack Hagaru-ri 

and cut the road immediately below the 

town. The 60th Division took a still 

deeper route through the mountains 

toward Kot'o-ri; and, in the deepest 

move, the remaining regiment of the 

89th Division started over a mountain 

track leading south from Yudam-ni to 

Sach’ang-ni in the sector of the 3d 

Division. 

7 This section and the one following are based on 

USAFFE Intel Dig No. 99, 16-31 Jan 53; Order of 

Battle Information, Chinese Communist Third Field 

Army, GHQ, FEC, 1 Mar 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, 27 

Nov-10 Dec 50; X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; 7th Div 

Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50; Mono, “Chosin Reservoir,” 1st Bn, 32d Inf, 24-30 Nov 50, 3d Hist Det, 

copy in CMH; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Dolcater, 

3d Infantry Division in Koreas; Captain Russell A. 

Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954), pp. 62-87; 7th Infantry Division 

in Korea (Atlanta: Ambert Love Enterprises, n.d.); 

Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign; 

MS, Lt. Col. C. P. Miller, “Chosin Reservoir, November-December 1950,” copy in CMH. 

Yudam-ni 

Colonel Murray had moved the remainder of the 5th Marines to Yudamni on the 27th as more of Colonel 

MacLean’s combat team reached the 

eastern side of the reservoir. Murray’s 

1st and 3d Battalions assembled in the 

valley, creating a substantial reserve for 

the ten companies holding the heights 

north, northwest, southwest, and south 

of town. This reserve, a fairly tight infantry line, and the support of fortyeight artillery pieces and two regimental 4.2-inch mortar companies gave the 

marines a reasonably good defense. 

More precariously situated were Companies C and F of the 7th Marines, 

which had outposted the supply road 
MAP 7
94 EBB AND FLOW 

from Hagaru-ri. Each company held an 

isolated perimeter, Company C on a 

spur five miles southeast of Yudam-ni, 

Company F at Toktong Pass two miles 

farther southeast. 

At 2100, assault troops of the 89th 

Division reached the three Marine companies defending the northwest ridge 

at Yudam-ni. (Map 8) Small enemy 

groups jabbed lightly at the Marine line 

for a half hour; grenades and mortar 

and machine gun fire came next; then 

bugle calls and whistle blasts; and finally a sharp attack on a narrow front 

at the boundary between Companies F 

and E, 5th Marines, the left and center 

companies. The Chinese quickly penetrated but then found themselves 

hemmed in by Marine fire from the 

shoulders of the salient they had 

created. Losing heavily, they called off 

their attack around midnight. Another 

force meanwhile assaulted Company H, 

7th Marines, the rightmost company, 

on Hill 1403. The Chinese knocked the 

right flank platoon out of position 

within minutes but delayed further attempts to advance when Marine artillery and mortar fire came down on 

them. 

Refilling their forward ranks, the 

Chinese renewed their attack at 0300, 

striking all three Marine companies. 

They went nowhere against the left and 

center companies but by dawn forced 

Company H, 7th Marines, off Hill 1403. 

This gain offered the Chinese an opportunity to sweep behind and isolate 

the other two companies. Hence, 

though the Chinese attacks dwindled 

after daylight, the marines were obliged 

to give up the northwest ridge. 

In company with the 89th’s attack, the 

79th Division moved south through the 

mountains confining the reservoir on 

the west. The division commander committed all three regiments, directing 

them first to occupy the high ground 

immediately above Yudam-ni. 

Four heights dominated the 79th’s 

initial objective, Hill 1167 next to the 

reservoir and Hills 1240, 1282, and 

1384 stair-stepped to the west. Companies D and E, 7th Marines, occupied 

the central hills, 1240 and 1282. A platoon from Company I, 5th Marines, 

and an attached platoon of South Korean police held a spur below 1384. The 

237th Regiment moved against Hill 1384 

on the west, the 235th toward Hill 1240 

in the center, and the 236th toward Hill 

1167 nearest the reservoir. But the 

235th and 236th veered too far west and 

climbed toward Hills 1282 and 1240, 

respectively, losing an opportunity to 

flank or envelop the Marine defenses 

via unoccupied Hill 1167. 

Finding 1384 unoccupied, the commander of the 237th sent a company 

down the spur to the south. The company pushed the two platoons off the 

spur, and its fire forced the headquarters and service company of the 3d 

Battalion, 5th Marines, away from a position around the battalion command 

post in a draw below the spur. Apparently unaware that they had exposed 

the command post, the Chinese attempted no further gains. This hiatus 

gave Company G, 5th Marines, of the 

reserve time to organize and launch a 

counterattack which by daylight regained the spur. 

To the east, repeated frontal assaults 

between midnight of the 27th and late 

morning on the 28th failed to win Hill 

1282 but carried the Chinese to the top 

of Hill 1240. High losses so crippled 
MAP 8
96 EBB AND FLOW 

the Marine units that reinforcement or 

replacement was essential if the 79th 

Division was to be held out of Yudam-ni. 

The 59th Division meanwhile completed its short sweep to the southeast, 

slicing across the supply road between 

Yudam-ni and the two Marine companies outposting the road and through 

the two-milt gap between companies 

as well. Once across the road, the Chinese surrounded and assaulted both 

Marine positions but failed to penetrate 

and backed off at dawn. The marines, 

still hemmed in and too burdened with 

casualties to attempt to fight their way 

out of encirclement, could only tighten 

their perimeters and await rescue. 

Colonels Litzenberg and Murray dispatched a rescue force after daylight 

on the 28th and meanwhile realigned 

their units at Yudam-ni. The realignment, interrupted only by harassing enemy fire, was complete by late evening. 

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, anchored the new line at Hill 1426 on the 

southwest ridge. The 2d Battalion, 5th 

Marines, took position on the same 

ridge, facing northwest. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, carried the line northward across the Yudam-ni valley and 

eastward into the northern heights to 

and including Hill 1282. Company B, 

5th Marines, took over the defense of 

Hill 1240 while the remainder of the 

1st Battalion went into reserve. 

Efforts to rescue the two isolated 

companies came from both ends of the 

fourteen-mile stretch of road. From 

Hagaru-ri, a company reinforced by 

three tanks moved toward Company F 

at Toktong Pass while the 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines, struck south out of Yudam-ni toward Company C. The 

Hagaru-ri troops made only half the 

distance to Toktong Pass before small 

arms and mortar fire from Chinese on 

both sides of the road forced their 

withdrawal. At the other end of the 

road segment, stiff opposition on both 

sides of the road so slowed the 1st 

Battalion, 7th Marines, that dark had 

fallen by the time it reached Company 

C. Lest the battalion be trapped in the 

darkness, Colonel Litzenberg ordered 

it back to Yudam-ni. Hence, only Company C was retrieved. Company F’s rescue now rested on an order issued 

by General Smith late on the 28th that 

the entire 7th Regiment attack south 

from Yudam-ni to clear the road to 

Hagaru-ri. 

East of the Reservoir 

On the IX Army Group’s east flank 

the leading forces of the 80th Division 

moved south toward Hagaru-ri shortly 

after dark on the 27th. Liu Yung, the 

division commander, sent some troops 

over the road along the east bank of 

the reservoir, the bulk through high 

ground farther east. The Chinese following the road were to attack the 1st 

Battalion, 32d Infantry, frontally while 

the others came westward off the high 

ground against that battalion and 

against the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, 

four miles farther south. Those moving deeper also were to separate and 

isolate Colonel MacLean’s forces by establishing roadblocks above and below 

the 3d Battalion. 

Having heard from the marines that 

three new Chinese divisions were in the 

reservoir area, Colonel Faith had placed 

his 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, in a tight 

defense. At Faith’s left, Company A 

faced north. On the right, Companies 

C and B held a line curving south to 

face the high ground to the east. As 
THE BATTLE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR 97 

Liu’s forces approached, however, Faith 

was occupied with plans for starting the 

battalion north toward the border at 

dawn next day. Colonel MacLean’s order for the advance had reached Faith 

around 2100, and at 2200 he had assembled his company commanders at 

the battalion command post for instructions. 

Chinese patrols brushed the battalion line while Faith was briefing his 

officers. As company commanders 

scrambled back to their units, an attack 

hit Company A from the north while 

another from the high ground to the 

east struck at the boundary between 

Companies B and C. In assaults that 

lasted the night, the Chinese dented 

each company position, seized a knob 

of ground at the boundary between B 

and C, and managed to move around 

Company A and force the company 

mortars out of position. Yet when the 

Chinese lifted their attacks at dawn, 

Faith’s position was reasonably sound. 

Through the day Faith reclaimed all 

ground lost except the knob on the east, 

which the Chinese, though struck by 

several combinations of air and ground 

attacks, refused to yield. Faith’s casualties through the night and day approached sixty. 

At the lower perimeter, the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, and 57th Field Artillery Battalion came under attack near 

the same hour as Faith’s forces. Companies I and K nearest the high ground to 

the east received the first assaults and 

were pressed southwest toward the 

artillery. Those wounded in the close 

fighting included the commanders of 

both the 3d Battalion and the artillery 

battalion. The Chinese next forced the 

men of Battery A away from their howitzers; but after combining forces 

around the guns of Battery B, the infantrymen and artillerymen finally 

halted the Chinese and turned back further assaults until the Chinese withdrew 

at dawn. Afterward, the 3d Battalion 

and the artillery, harassed only by mortar fire, moved into a tight perimeter 

near the lower bank of the ice-covered 

finger of the reservoir. 

Early in the afternoon of the 28th, 

General Almond flew by helicopter to 

Colonel Faith’s position. He awarded 

Faith and two other men the Silver Star 

and just before leaving appraised the 

Chinese encountered as only remnants 

fleeing north and announced that the 

X Corps attack would continue. But his 

words apparently were an attempt to 

raise morale, not a true appraisal of 

the enemy. On the previous day he 

had visited Yudam-ni, where Marine 

commanders informed him that they 

had encountered strong Chinese forces 

at three points of the compass. On the 

28th, before flying to Faith’s position, 

he had stopped at Hagaru-ri where 

General Smith brought him up to date 

on the Marine division’s situation, and 

he had visited Colonel MacLean’s command post where the combat team 

leader briefed him on conditions east 

of the reservoir. Almond must have 

been aware that the strong attacks on 

the marines and MacLean’s men represented a southerly surge of fresh Chinese forces. 

When he stopped at Hagaru-ri on 

his return flight to transfer from his 

helicopter to an L-17 aircraft, Almond 

may have learned from the marines that 

a Chinese division was marshaling in 

the high ground southwest and south 

of Hagaru-ri. As the L-17 carried him 
98 EBB AND FLOW 

south to his Hamhung headquarters, 

he may have seen, as had other aerial 

observers, that Chinese had blocked the 

road between Hagaru-ri and Kot'o-ri. 

The 1st Marine Division indeed had become a group of isolated garrisons. 

MacLean’s combat team was in the 

same condition. At 1000 on the 28th 

Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, the assistant commander of the 7th Division 

who had posted himself in Hagaru-ri, 

led the 31st Infantry’s tank company, 

an antitank platoon, a platoon of engineers, and members of regimental 

headquarters north from Hudong-ni. 

The small armored force encountered 

a strong roadblock about a mile above 

the village and lost two tanks in an unsuccessful effort to reduce it. 

Later in the day Colonel MacLean, 

who earlier had gone by jeep to Colonel Faith’s position, discovered when 

he attempted to return south that the 

Chinese had set another roadblock between Faith’s battalion and the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry. Unable to proceed, MacLean returned to Faith’s command post and radioed a message to 

the 1st Marine Division for relay to X 

Corps headquarters requesting that the 

2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, be sent 

immediately to clear the road above 

Hagaru-ri. Corps apparently missed the 

urgency of MacLean’s request, perhaps 

because that headquarters already had 

dispatched Company B of the regiment 

up the reservoir road to join the combat team. Corps orders to the 2d Battalion, in any event, called for the long 

move from Hamhung not to begin until the following day. Meanwhile, 

MacLean’s forward battalions remained 

cut off from Hagaru-ri and from each 

other. 

The Attacks Widen 

Fox Hill 

A two-inch snowfall hampered operations during the night of the 28th. The 

89th and 79th Divisions did not contest 

the marines at Yudam-ni during the 

night or during the day of the 29th. 

But forces of the 59th Division renewed 

their night assaults on Company F in 

Toktong Pass. The Marine company 

held its ground, now called Fox Hill, 

but casualties grew to more than a 

hundred. 

In considering General Smith’s call 

for an attack by the 7th Marines to reopen the road to Hagaru-ri, Colonels 

Litzenberg and Murray felt that both 

the 5th and 7th Marines were needed at 

Yudam-ni and therefore substituted a 

composite battalion built from reserve 

units for the rescue mission. The makeshift battalion started south at 0800 on 

the 29th but moved no more than three 

miles before Chinese in the bordering 

heights opened fire and began an encircling move. When this maneuver was 

spotted from the air, Litzenberg ordered the composite unit back to Yudam-ni. The road remained closed as a 

result, and the thinned-out company 

on Fox Hill faced another night of 

isolation. 

Task Force Faith 

East of the reservoir, the 80th Division resumed its assaults on Colonel 

MacLean’s forces, first against the 3d 

Battalion, 31st Infantry, then against 

Colonel Faith’s battalion. For twelve 

hours beginning around 1800 on the 

28th, Chinese jabbed the lower perimeter but made no lasting penetra- 
THE BATTLE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR 99 

tions. High casualties in Companies K 

and L, however, forced the two units 

to combine. 

To the north, the Chinese first struck 

the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, from 

the knob of high ground on the east, 

then opened frontal assaults against 

each of the rifle companies. Company 

B on the right lost some ground but 

regained it. Elsewhere, the battalion’s 

heavy defensive fire beat back repeated 

Chinese rushes. By 0300 on the 29th, 

however, Faith’s forces had used most 

of their ammunition. MacLean hence 

ordered Faith to move south and join 

the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry. Faith 

was to take cargo off battalion trucks to 

make room for the hundred wounded 

he now had. 

As Faith’s forces gained respite from 

assault, but not fire, they fell back to 

assemble on the road. The Chinese did 

not pursue but increased their fire as 

the battalion broke contact. Starting 

south at 0430 with a company stumbling in the darkness over snow-covered 

high ground on either side as flank security for the troops and trucks on the 

road, the battalion covered three-quarters of the way without opposition. At 

daylight, as the leading forces entered 

the upper half of the road segment 

bending around the frozen finger of 

the reservoir, they took fire from Chinese located at the tight turn of the 

road near the P’ungnyuri River crossing. This was the roadblock MacLean 

had encountered the previous afternoon. Faith halted the column directly 

across the narrow expanse of ice from 

the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, ordered 

machine guns and a recoilless rifle into 

position to return the fire, and dispatched the bulk of two companies 

through the high ground to the north 

to flank the Chinese. 

While waiting for the maneuvering 

force to destroy the roadblock, Faith’s 

troops on the road received fire from 

across the reservoir finger. MacLean, 

convinced that the fire was coming 

from his own forces, immediately 

started over the ice to stop the shooting. 

He was mistaken. Hit at least four times 

as he crossed, he walked into the hands 

of the Chinese who had crept in along 

the bank of the far shore, apparently 

in preparation for an attack on the 

lower perimeter. Once Colonel Faith 

realized what had happened, he formed 

a skirmish line and led it across the ice. 

Faith’s men killed at least sixty Chinese 

and drove off others, but a thorough 

search of the area uncovered no trace 

of Colonel MacLean. 

Faith’s flanking force meanwhile 

closed in on the Chinese blocking the 

road and scattered them into the hills 

to the east. Faith’s motor column thus 

was able to proceed, and the last of 

Faith’s men reached the 3d Battalion, 

31st Infantry, by 1230. 

While Faith fought through to the 

lower perimeter, the bulk of the 31st 

Tank Company and a composite company of riflemen again attempted to 

reach it from Hudong-ni. As on the 

previous day, the northward move was 

stopped, this time by two battalions of 

Chinese. A stronger effort clearly was 

required to break through to the isolated force. Now the senior able-bodied 

officer present, Colonel Faith assumed 

command of the two infantry battalions and the artillery, designating the 

consolidated units Task Force Faith. 

Air-dropped rations and ammunition 

(but only forty rounds of artillery am- 
100 EBB AND FLOW 

munition) reached the task force during the afternoon, and Marine aircraft 

orbited its position constantly, striking 

Chinese forces in the surrounding high 

ground with napalm, rockets, and machine gun fire. But while fresh supplies 

and good air support helped, Faith now 

pinned his hopes of avoiding defeat on 

the arrival of the 2d Battalion, 31st 

Infantry. He apparently was not aware 

that the 2d Battalion was held up for 

lack of transportation at Majon-dong, 

more than thirty miles to the south, he 

had not realized the extent of the Chinese roadblocks between him and the 

relief unit, nor had he learned that the 

Chinese attacks had spread during the 

previous night to Hagaru-ri. 

Hagaru-ri 

By evening on the 28th the bulk of 

the 58th Division was concentrated 

about five miles southwest of Hagaru-ri. 

The remainder had crossed the supply 

road to the south where some troops 

blocked the route while others turned 

north and assembled in the heights east 

of Hagaru-ri. 

Lt. Col. Thomas L. Ridge, commander of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and officer in charge of the defense of Hagaru-ri, was well informed 

of the location, size, and intent of the 

58th, though not of its numerical identity. His S-2, 2d Lt. Richard E. Carey, 

had had phenomenal success over the 

past two days with two Korean agents. 

By interrogating civilians coming into 

Hagaru-ri from the countryside, the 

agents learned of the approach of the 

Chinese. By making a circuit of the 

high ground around Hagaru-ri, they 

next determined the enemy’s location 

and approximate size, and while mingling among Chinese troops they heard 

boasts that the division would occupy 

Hagaru-ri on the night of the 28th. The 

roadblock to the south was discovered 

during the afternoon of the 28th by a 

platoon of infantry and three tanks who 

were turned back by enemy fire when 

they attempted to patrol the road to 

Kot'o-ri. 

Figuring the time it would take the 

Chinese to reach Hagaru-ri after dark, 

Carey predicted that the first assault 

would come around 2130. On this and 

Carey’s other findings Colonel Ridge 

based his plan of defense. Using his 

own battalion, which was still short 

Company G, and a hodgepodge of 

other Marine and Army units, he fashioned a four-mile perimeter around the 

Changjin River flats in which Hagaru-ri 

was located. 

To the south and southwest, the most 

likely area of enemy attack and the site 

of airstrip construction, Ridge put his 

3d Battalion on the lower reverse slopes 

of the high ground in which the major 

Chinese strength was located. He faced 

the remaining troops of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and a mixture of 

Marine artillery, service, and headquarters troops northwest toward Yudam-ni 

and north toward the reservoir. Ridge 

considered East Hill, the marines’ name 

for the first mass rising in that direction from Hagaru-ri, to be the second 

most likely point of enemy attack. He 

intended that Company G, once it arrived, would hold the hill. In the meantime, he manned it with Marine service 

units, Company D of the 10th Engineer Battalion (an Army unit), and detachments from X Corps headquarters 

and signal units. 

Liao Chen-chou, commander of the 

58th Division, took longer than predicted to reach the marines. Amid fall- 
THE BATTLE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR 101 

ing snow, his 172d Regiment attacked 

on a half-mile front against the center 

of the 3d Battalion’s line just after 2230. 

Staggered by high losses to the marines’ 

carefully prepared defensive fire, the 

Chinese managed only small penetrations, and those who broke through 

were too disorganized to do much 

damage. By 0400 the regiment was 

beaten, and the marines quickly eliminated the Chinese lingering in rear of 

their positions. Incongruous with the 

fighting taking place only a short distance to the southwest was the engineers’ continuing work on the airstrip, 

part of the time under floodlights. 

Liao had better luck with his secondary effort, driving off the defenders of 

East Hill in a sharp attack at 0130. 

Company D, 10th Engineers, took the 

brunt of the blow. Of the 77 Americans in the company, 10 were killed, 

25 wounded, and 9 missing. Among 90 

South Koreans attached to the company, about 50 were casualties, mostly 

missing. The Chinese, however, either 

had no plans or were too weak to exploit their success and halted their attack after capturing the height. 

By 0630 on the 29th Colonel Ridge’s 

forces on the southwestern arc of the 

perimeter had restored the line everywhere it had been punctured during 

the night. Maj. Reginald R. Myers, 

Ridge’s executive officer, meanwhile assembled a composite company of Marine and Army service troops and tried 

to retake East Hill. But inexperience, a 

slippery and exhausting climb, and Chinese fire stopped the group short. At 

dusk Major Myers set up defenses on 

the near military crest of the hill. 

Considering enemy control of East 

Hill to be a grave threat to Hagaru-ri, 

Ridge intended to replace Myers’ 

makeshift unit with Company G as soon 

as possible. The company, Ridge knew, 

had started north from Kot'o-ri that 

morning in convoy with the British 

41st Commando, an Army infantry 

company, and assorted other troops. 

But word also had reached Hagaru-ri 

that the convoy had come under fire 

and that its commander had requested 

a decision from General Smith on 

whether to continue. 

Task Force Drysdale 

Encounters with Chinese near Kot’ori and at Sach’ang-ni on the 28th heralded the arrival of the 60th Division 

and the regiment of the 89th Division in 

their objectives areas. At Sach’ang-ni, 

prisoners taken by the 1st Battalion, 7th 

Infantry, during a small skirmish first 

identified the 89th, and strong night 

assaults not broken up until after daybreak on the 29th indicated the size of 

the force. Reinforcements and new 

supplies were rushed to the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, lest this enemy regiment gain access to Hamhung over the 

road protected only by the Sach'ang-ni 

position. 

The presence of the 60th Division 

was discovered by Company D, 1st 

Marines, and division headquarters 

personnel who patrolled north from 

Kot'o-ri during the afternoon of the 

28th. The patrol engaged Chinese 

about a mile above town in the ground 

bordering the road. The marines 

fought all afternoon without breaking 

through but returned to Kot'o-ri with 

three prisoners from the 179th Regiment, 60th Division. 

This encounter, the experience of the 

patrol from Hagaru-ri the same afternoon, and air observer reports indi- 
102 EBB AND FLOW 

cated that Chinese positions along the 

reservoir road extended, with gaps, 

south from the outskirts of Hagaru-ri 

to within a mile of Kot'o-ri. At least 

parts of two Chinese divisions, the 58th 

and 60th, held the heights on both sides 

of the road, with their strongest positions on the eastern edge. Any force 

moving north from Kot’o-ri would run 

a ten-mile gauntlet. 

By evening of the 28th Kot'o-ri was 

fairly full of troops who had been ordered north, principally the 41st Commando, Royal Marines; Company G, 

1st Marines; and Company B, 31st 

Infantry. In addition, the Marine division headquarters troops who had 

failed to get through earlier in the day 

with Company D were still wanted at 

General Smith’s command post in 

Hagaru-ri. An Associated Press photographer, Frank Noel, also was trying 

to move north. Colonel Puller formed 

a motorized task force from these units, 

placed Lt. Col. Douglas B. Drysdale, 

the commander of the 41st Commando, 

in charge, and ordered the force to 

make its way to Hagaru-ri on the following day. 

Task Force Drysdale started north at 

0930 on the 29th, the British marines 

in the lead, followed by Company G, 

Company B, and the headquarters 

troops. Chinese dug in east of the road 

about a mile and a half above Kot'o-ri 

offered the first resistance. They were 

eliminated, but a mile farther north, 

fire from a stronger Chinese force in 

the high ground on the east brought 

the task force to a full halt by noontime. 

Colonel Drysdale, near that hour, 

received word from Colonel Puller 

that two Marine tank platoons would 

be available at 1300. Drysdale waited 

for the armor, then with the tanks leading resumed his advance about 1400. 

Heavy small arms and mortar fire 

struck the column almost immediately, 

and progress was slow as tankers and 

foot troops attempted to shoot their way 

through the resistance. By 1615 the task 

force again was stopped after having 

moved only a mile and a half nearer 

Hagaru-ri. 

Two more platoons of Marine tanks 

meanwhile moved out of Kot'o-ri under Puller’s orders to join Drysdale. But 

even though he was to get additional 

armor, Drysdale was uncertain whether 

he should risk moving his men, now 

numbering about a thousand, the remaining seven miles to Hagaru-ri. By 

radio, he posed the question to General Smith. In view of the considered 

need for reinforcements at Hagaru-ri, 

Smith directed him to continue. 

Air-strikes sufficiently dampened 

enemy fire to permit the task force to 

resume its march, but when it entered 

a mile-long valley midway between 

Kot'o-ri and Hagaru-ri, heavy fire 

from the ridges to the east again halted 

the column. As troops jumped from 

trucks to reduce the resistance, a mortar round set fire to a truck near the 

middle of the column. The Chinese 

concentrated small arms and mortar 

fire around the damaged vehicle to 

prevent its removal and thus obstruct 

the road and split Drysdale’s column. 

Ahead of the truck, Drysdale with most 

of his commandos, two platoons of 

tanks, Company G, and a few members 

of Company B managed to move on. 

Drysdale expected the remainder of 

the column to close ranks. But behind 

the burning vehicle, in what Drysdale 

later dubbed Hell Fire Valley, about 

sixty commandos, most of Company B, 

and the division headquarters troops 
THE BATTLE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR 103 

remained pinned down in ditches and 

depressions along the road. 

Only intermittent fire and one strong 

Chinese position about a mile and a half 

below Hagaru-ri obstructed Drysdale’s 

movement north of Hell Fire Valley. 

Drysdale was wounded while fighting 

past the Chinese strongpoint, whereupon the Company G commander led 

the column the remaining short distance to its destination. About an hour 

after dark Drysdale’s four hundred 

men entered Hagaru-ri. They were 

surprised, in view of their own day of 

fighting, to find the town quiet and the 

engineers working under floodlights at 

the airstrip to the southwest. 

The Chinese meanwhile began the 

reduction of Drysdale’s forces caught 

in Hell Fire Valley. Before dark a force 

sliced west across the road between the 

immobilized troops and the two platoons of tanks coming from Kot'o-ri. 

Some of the tail-end armored troops, 

receiving considerable fire themselves, 

returned to Kot'o-ri during the night; 

the remainder went back at dawn. 

To the north, near the damaged 

truck, another pre-dark attack isolated 

about a hundred forty troops from the 

rest of the trapped men while the latter 

gradually gathered in three clusters as 

they sought cover from the fire coming 

in from east of the road. Thereafter 

until midnight the Chinese were content to fire on the four separated 

groups while they looted the trucks on 

the road. 

In the early hours of 30 November 

they sent small forces armed with grenades against the northernmost group. 

The latter, led by Marine Maj. John N. 

McLaughlin, held off the Chinese but 

took high losses and by 0430 expended 

most of their ammunition. During this 

firefight most of the men in the three 

clusters farther south managed to escape into the high ground west of the 

road. Though pursued, they managed 

to reach Kot’o-ri, bringing the total of 

men who escaped south to about three 

hundred. At the northern position, only 

a few British commandos were able to 

slip away toward Kot’o-ri. When photographer Frank Noel and two other 

men jumped into a jeep to make a run 

for it, they were captured before they 

had moved a hundred yards. 

At 0430 the Chinese sent these captives to McLaughlin with a surrender 

demand. Stalling to enable as many 

men as possible to escape, McLaughlin 

finally agreed to surrender himself 

and the forty able-bodied men remaining. The Chinese allowed him to 

place his more seriously wounded men 

in a nearby house as the Hell Fire Valley affair ended. Task Force Drysdale’s 

total casualties exceeded three hundred. About seventy-five trucks were 

lost during the day and night. 

The Tokyo Conference 

Not long after Colonel Drysdale and 

the men with him reached Hagaru-ri, 

they knew they would soon be making 

a return trip through Hell Fire Valley. 

This decision was one result of General 

MacArthur’s conference with General 

Walker and General Almond in Tokyo 

on the night of the 28th.8 

Having heard Walkers and Almond 

on what had happened in their respective sectors, MacArthur judged that the 

Eighth Army was in greater danger 

than the X Corps. But he wanted both 

8 This section is based on Schnabel, s 

tion, pp. 278-79. 
104 EBB AND FLOW 

commands to step back. Walker was to 

make whatever withdrawals were necessary to escape being enveloped. Almond was to maintain contact with the 

Chinese but also was to pull the X 

Corps out of its spread-eagle positions 

and concentrate it in the HamhungHungnam coastal area. 

MacArthur next asked Almond what 

the X Corps could do to help the Eighth 

Army. Almond pointed out that the isolated Marine and Army troops at the 

reservoir had to be retrieved before 

anything else could be done. MacArthur agreed but then restated his question to ask what Almond could do to 

relieve the threat to Walker’s east 

flank. The answer to this question held 

MacArthur’s primary interest. 

General Wright, MacArthur’s G-3, 

suggested that Almond send the 3d 

Division west over the road leading 

through the Taebaeks toward Tokch’on 

to attack the Chinese pressing Walker’s 

right flank. Almond argued that the 

road Wright had in mind did not exist 

(it did, but it was not made for military 

traffic) and that the severe winter 

weather combined with any strong Chinese force in the gap between commands might destroy the division. Almond agreed to the move, however, if 

the Eighth Army would supply the 3d 

Division after it reached the western 

slopes of the Taebaeks. General Walker 

offered no such support, and the conference closed an hour past midnight 

without a final decision on the proposed 

move. But owing to MacArthur’s clear 

interest, such a maneuver would come 

up again after Walker and Almond returned to Korea on the 29th to get their 

disengagements started. 
CHAPTER VI 

Disengagement in the West 

General Walker reached his P'yongyang headquarters from the meeting 

in Tokyo during the afternoon of the 

29th. The Eighth Army at the time was 

making a second short withdrawal, organized by his staff not long before he 

arrived, in response to the threat of envelopment from the east which overnight and through the morning had 

further enlarged. 

The Threat of Envelopment 

Toward Sunch’on 

On the Sunch’on road at the army 

right, General Gay’s decision against 

moving the 7th Cavalry up from Kujong-ni to the Pukch'ang-ni area on the 

28th left the initiative to the Chinese. 

Shortly before daylight on the 29th the 

125th Division, 42d Army, whose regiments air observers previously saw passing through Pukch'ang-ni, sent forces 

against the ROK 6th Division three 

miles below town. (Map 9) The ROK 

troops immediately withdrew five miles 

to Walpo-ri, but pursuing Chinese readily flanked the new position, and the 

South Koreans scattered rearward toward the 7th Cavalry two miles below 

them.1

Col. William A. Harris, the 7th Cav1 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot 

Rpt 2109, 29 Nov 50; 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50. 

alry commander, had his reserve battalion collect South Korean troops as they 

came through his forward line. Refugees streamed south with the ROK 

forces, and either North Korean guerrillas or disguised Chinese regulars who 

had joined the civilians harassed the 

cavalrymen as they entered the regimental position. Hand grenades thrown 

by the infiltrators killed a company 

commander and wounded eight men.2 

The problem of refugees was not peculiar to the 1st Cavalry Division sector. 

Throngs of civilians had begun to move 

south across the entire front. Crowds 

of refugees on the roads threatened to 

interfere with the movement of troops 

and supplies, and drifting columns of 

civilians everywhere offered the enemy 

a vehicle for infiltration. Both dangers 

prompted army orders late on the 28th 

directing that refugees be diverted before they could enter Eighth Army 

lines.3 

The men of the 7th Cavalry found it 

difficult just to halt the early morning 

influx in their sector and had only partially restored order by 0630 when leading forces of the 125th Division opened 

fire from high ground to the northeast. 

Exchanges of small arms fire contin2 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 

Nov 50: 1st Cavalry Division. Korea, June 1950 to January 1952 (Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises, n.d.). 

3 Rad, GX 30074 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

IX Corps et al., 28 Nov 50. 

DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 107 

ued until artillery concentrations silenced the Chinese two hours later. 

ROK troops and refugees continued to 

enter the regiment’s line during the 

firelight. Panic spread through an approaching ROK artillery column when 

its lead vehicle stalled about a quarter 

mile north of the cavalrymen. Instead 

of shoving the obstructing truck out of 

the way, the ROK artillerymen simply 

abandoned guns and trucks and ran 

toward the regimental position. The 

motor officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th 

Cavalry, and six of his men later went 

forward and recovered eight howitzers 

and sixteen vehicles.4 

At midmorning, after the troopers 

finally gathered all South Korean forces 

and cleared their position of refugees, 

General Gay ordered the 7th Cavalry 

to withdraw to Sinch’ang-ni, three miles 

south, unoccupied since the 8th Cavalry had left for Songch’on. The regiment and the ROK 6th Division pulled 

back during the afternoon, the 7th 

Cavalry taking position astride the 

Sunch’on road just above Sinch’ang-ni, 

the South Koreans occupying adjacent 

high ground on the west. Acting on 

Gay’s previous instructions, the 5th Cavalry meanwhile organized defenses 

astride the Taedong River two miles 

north of Sunch’on, aligned with but not 

physically adjoining the ROK 6th Division to its right; the 8th Cavalry, en 

route to Songch’on, placed its leading 

battalion in the new area by nightfall. 

The Chinese on the Sunch’on road did 

not pursue the 7th Cavalry’s withdrawal 

and remained out of contact while 

Gay’s division and the South Koreans 

deployed along the Sunch’on-Sinch’ang-ni-Songch’on line.5 

At Kunu-ri 

On the eastern side of the river in 

the Ch’ongch’on valley, the forces of 

the 40th Army who, beginning about 

midnight on the 28th, had pushed the 

2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry below 

Pugwon, were joined in the town after 

daylight by sister forces that had 

come down the opposite side of the 

Ch’ongch’on. The latter forces had 

turned the right flank of the 24th Infantry, 25th Division, then had moved 

their main strength southeast across the 

river into Pugwon.6 

Ahead of this juncture, Colonel 

Sloane withdrew the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 9th Infantry around 0600, 

first taking them behind defenses hurriedly established by the 23d Infantry 

astride the valley road below Pugwon, 

then moving them to an assembly two 

miles southwest of Kunu-ri. Sloane’s 1st 

Battalion, which late on the 28th had 

taken position at the right rear of the 

24th Infantry on the west side of the 

Ch’ongch’on, rejoined the regiment at 

the assembly area late on the 29th after 

a full day of operations with the 25th 

Division. The 40th Army, after joining 

assault forces at Pugwon, meanwhile 

prepared to attack Kunu-ri on a wide 

front, spreading units from Pugwon 

southeastward over Piho-san Ridge 

four miles above Kunu-ri. This ridge, 

under General Keiser’s plan for defending the Pugwon-Wawon sector, was 

to have been occupied by the 38th and 

ROK 3d Regiments.7 

4 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 

Nov 50; 1st Cavalry Division, Korea, June 1950 to January 1952. 

5 Ibid. 

6 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50. 

7 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 

38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 
108 EBB AND FLOW 

On the right flank of the 2d Division 

sector, the 38th Army assaults opened 

against the Turkish brigade at Sinnimni during the first hours of the 29th 

were still in progress at daylight. Because neither wire nor radio communications existed between the Turk forward units and brigade headquarters 

in Kaech’on, three miles west of 

Sinnim-ni, General Yasici knew nothing of the attack until his artillery battalion pulled back to Kaech’on. According to the artillery commander, the 

three infantry battalions were surrounded. Yasici delayed countermeasures until daylight, then dispatched an 

infantry company from his replacement 

battalion and the platoon of tanks attached from the 72d Tank Battalion to 

clear the road and deliver instructions 

for a withdrawal to Kaech’on. The task 

force reached Sinnim-ni easily, and the 

infantry battalions withdrew without 

interference. But Chinese forces moved 

west with the withdrawal, marching 

over the ridges below the Kaech’on 

River, which coursed westward just 

south of and parallel to the Tokch’onKunu-ri road.8 

of the 3d, blocking a valley approach to 

Kunu-ri.9

Immediately east, the 38th Infantry’s 

new line slanted southeast over lesser 

hills below Piho-san Ridge to the 

Tokch’on-Kunu-ri road at the northeastern edge of Kaech’on. The attached 

ROK 3d Regiment held the left sector 

directly below Piho-san. The 2d and 3d 

Battalions, facing northeast and east, 

carried the remainder of the line to the 

boundary with the Turks at Kaech’on. 

Colonel Peploe kept his command post 

and 1st Battalion in the assembly area 

established the previous night a mile 

east of Kunu-ri.10

The Turks were expected to anchor 

In response to the nighttime and 

morning changes in the 2d Division 

sector-the lose of Pugwon, the enemy’s 

occupation of Piho-san Ridge, and the 

Turk withdrawal to Kaech’on-Genera1 Keiser and his forward unit commanders worked out a new defense line 

by noon on the 29th. At the left, two 

battalions of the 23d Infantry blocked 

the Ch’ongch’on valley road in depth, 

the 2d holding a forward position two 

miles below Pugwon, the 3d astride the 

road two miles north of Kunu-ri. The 

1st Battalion was a mile and a half east 

the 2d Division’s right flank. Some were 

to occupy a bit of high ground at the 

eastern edge of Kaech’on. The rest 

were to move below the Kaech’on River 

to refuse the flank and block a valley 

where the road from Sunch’on, previously cut by the Chinese at Samso-ri 

farther south, made its exit before 

crossing river to enter Kaech’on. But 

regardless of repeated urgings from the 

American advisers, General Yasici 

failed to place troops below the river. 

At noontime two Turk companies occupied the small hill just east of Kaech’on 

town. The remainder of the brigade 

was assembled inside town with sentinels posted along the outer limits.11

At the Bridgehead 

Unlike the enemy efforts toward 

Sunch’on and Kunu-ri, the Chinese 

above the Ch’ongch’on made no concerted daylight attack against the I 

Corps. The 24th Division had no con8 “Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov9 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

10 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

11 “Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov13 Dec 50.” 13 Dec 50.” 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 

tact at all as General Church started his 

forces toward Sunch’on, as ordered by 

General Walker the day before. The 

only enemy action in the ROK 1st Division’s sector was small arms and artillery fire placed on General Paik’s delaying forces in and west of Yongsan-dong 

before they pulled back to the bridgehead during the morning. Eastward in 

the 25th Division’s sector, the 39th Army 

launched local assaults on the 27th Infantry in the division center about the 

same time that 40th Army forces turned 

the 24th Infantry’s right flank. But 

these attacks posed no serious threat to 

the corps bridgehead.12 

The real danger lay below the river. 

By noon on the 29th only two battalions of the 23d Infantry stood before 

the 40th Army forces on the Ch’ongch’on 

valley road. Should these be eliminated, 

a follow-up Chinese thrust down the 

twenty-mile stretch of road between 

Kunu-ri and Sinanju would trap General Milburn’s forces above the 

Ch’ongch’on. 

To respond to this danger and to 

tighten the defense against the two 

arms of the Chinese enveloping maneuver, Colonel Dabney, the army G-3, 

radioed instructions about an hour past 

noon for a withdrawal to a line that 

followed the lower bank of the 

Ch’ongch’on upstream almost to 

Kunu-ri, then curved southeast to join 

the 1st Cavalry Division’s new line from 

Sunch’on through Sinch’ang-ni to 

Songch’on. The bridgehead and Kunuri thus would be abandoned, and the 

Eighth Army’s east flank position would 

become longer than the front.13 

109 

The Second Disengagement 

Kunu-ri Abandoned 

Early in the afternoon of the 29th, 

before General Keiser learned of the 

army order to withdraw south of Kunuri, the 40th and 38th Armies converged 

on his arch of positions north and east 

of the town. (Map 10) Just north of the 

Turks at Kaech’on, 38th Army forces 

moving west along and above the 

Tokch’on-Kunu-ri road attacked the 

3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, quickly 

overrunning its right flank position. 

Sensing the start of a strong enemy 

effort, Brig. Gen. J. Sladen Bradley, the 

2d Division’s assistant commander, radioed orders to Colonel Peploe for relay to General Yasici to attack and reestablish the lost position. But Bradley’s 

order brought no more results than the 

earlier recommendations of Yasici’s advisers that the Turks take position south 

of the Kaech’on River. t4 

Shortly afterwards, mortar fire struck 

the Turks inside Kaech’on, and the 38th 

Army forces who had moved west below 

the Kaech’on River came out of the unguarded valley south of town. Though 

taken under fire from across the river 

by Yasici’s tanks, the Chinese slanted 

northwest toward a hill mass rising 

just north of the river a mile behind 

Kaech’on, where they could block the 

road to Kunu-ri at the western half of a 

pass. Yasici promptly withdrew and 

soon filled the road from Kaech’on 

westward through the pass with a double column of troops and vehicles.15 

To assist the 2d and 3d Battalions of 

12 I Corps Intel Sums 226 and 227, 29 Nov 50; I 

Corps PORs 233 and 234, 29 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, 

Nov 50; 25th Div WD, Nov 50. 

13 Rad, GX 30085 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 29 Nov 50. 

14 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 

"Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 

Dec 50." 

15 "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov13 Dec 50." 
MAP 10
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 

the 38th Infantry, both now engaged 

in a firefight with Chinese to their front 

and both just as much in danger of 

being enveloped as the Turks, Colonel 

Peploe ordered his reserve 1st Battalion, less Company C, to move up on 

the regimental right. But when the battalion mounted trucks and started east 

over the road toward Kaech’on, it 

found the way blocked by the oncoming Turk traffic. Peploe drew the stymied battalion back to a blocking position astride the road a mile east of 

Kunu-ri and instructed his forward battalions to make their way behind this 

position as best they could. Forces of 

the 40th Army meanwhile struck south 

of Piho-san Ridge against the ROK 3d 

Regiment. Peploe pulled the 3d back 

to a position a little over a mile northeast of Kunu-ri and tied its right flank 

to the left of his 1st Battalion to 

strengthen the cover for his forces withdrawing from the east.16 

While Peploe organized the covering position, his 2d and 3d Battalions 

disengaged and filed out of the hills 

above Kaech’on onto the Kunu-ri road 

with the Turks. The Chinese swinging 

in from the southeast by that time held 

the hill mass overlooking the pass from 

the south and soon halted the westward 

flow of traffic with a heavy volume of 

fire. Taking cover north of the road, 

Americans and Turks in the pass area 

returned fire until long past dark. But 

the Chinese fire continued to block all 

movement except for some tanks and 

vehicles carrying wounded that managed to move around the pass over a 

trail to the north.17 

A B-26 strike finally dampened the 

111 

16 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

17 Ibid.; "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 

20 Nov-13 Dec 50." 

Chinese fire. Both the equipment and 

techniques of the Fifth Air Force were 

extremely limited for providing close 

air support at night and in bad weather. 

Although General Stratemeyer and 

General Partridge had tried almost 

from the beginning of the war to obtain sufficient equipment and develop 

effective procedures for furnishing 

such support, they now had only the 

1st Shoran Beacon Unit, whose operations so far had been unsatisfactory, 

and three AN/MPQ-2 radar detachments. The successful, if out-of-theordinary, B-26 strike carefully brought 

in on the pass after dark permitted the 

Turks and Peploe’s troops again to 

move west. Peploe reorganized most of 

his men behind his covering positions 

before midnight, but the Turkish brigade was in disorder, with units disorganized, key leaders missing, and 

Turks scattered in clumps all along the 

way from the pass through Peploe’s 

position and Kunu-ri to the 2d Division command post six miles south of 

Kunu-ri.18 

Amidst this melee east of Kunu-ri, 

General Keiser issued instructions, instigated by the newest directive from 

army, for the 2d Division’s withdrawal 

below the town. Partially covered by the 

ROK 3d Regiment and 38th Infantry 

northeast and east of town, Colonel 

Freeman was to move first, pulling his 

23d Infantry out of position north of 

Kunu-ri and taking it south of the 

Kaech’on River below town. Here, between the Kaech’on and the parallel 

Chot’ong River about a mile farther 

south, a low ridge reached northwestward athwart the Kunu-ri-Sinanju 

18 Ibid Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 

1950-1953, pp. 328-29, 377-78. 
112 EBB AND FLOW 

stretch of the Ch’ongch’on valley road. 

Defenses along this height would block 

the road and would provide excellent 

observation and fields of fire across the 

river flats toward Kunu-ri.19 

After Freeman was in position, 

Peploe was to withdraw to a position 

on the low ridge east of the 23d. But 

since Peploe’s route passed through the 

southern outskirts of Kunu-ri before 

turning south over the Kaech’on, 

Peploe anticipated being cut off if Chinese stormed into Kunu-ri on the heels 

of Freeman’s withdrawal. Against this 

possibility, he arranged for Freeman to 

leave a rifle company and a platoon of 

tanks in Kunu-ri to cover the withdrawal of the 38th and ROK 3d 

Regiments.20 

The disintegration of the Turkish 

brigade spoiled General Keiser’s plan 

to employ the Turks below Kunu-ri 

along the northern six miles of the division supply road. Located along this 

road segment, which followed generally the Kunu-ri-Sunch’on rail line, 

were all the division artillery and, at 

the most southerly point, the division 

headquarters. Keiser had intended that 

the Turks deploy east of this stretch of 

road. But his order giving the brigade 

this assignment was not even acknowledged. While confused Turkish troops 

straggled into and south of Kunu-ri, 

General Yasici headed out over the 

road to Sinanju on a roundabout ride 

to Sunch’on where he hoped eventually to reassemble the brigade. Keiser’s 

supply road, command post, and artillery base meanwhile remained wide 

open to attack from the east.21 

19 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 72, 29 Nov 50. 

20 Ibid.; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

21 Ltr, Lt Col Maurice C. Holden to Maj Roy E. 

Appleman, 26 Feb 52; "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 Dec 50." 

In pulling out of position north of 

Kunu-ri, Colonel Freeman kept his 3d 

Battalion astride the Ch’ongch’on valley road two miles above town as cover 

while he moved the remainder of the 

23d Regiment during the early evening 

hours to the new position south of the 

Kaech’on River. The covering battalion, 

after being hit hard by Chinese coming 

down the valley road, withdrew at 2200. 

Company L and a platoon from the 72d 

Tank Battalion dropped off at the 

northern edge of Kunu-ri while the remainder of the battalion continued to 

the new regimental line.22 

A Chinese battalion caught up with 

Freeman’s force at the upper edge of 

Kunu-ri around midnight. The infantrymen and tankers threw back four 

strong assaults before pulling south and 

so gave Colonel Peploe the time and 

protection needed to move vehicles, 

casualties, and then his main strength 

through the lower edge of town and 

south behind the 23d Infantry. Peploe’s 

rear guard, the 1st Battalion of the 

ROK 3d Regiment, received fire from 

Chinese following the withdrawal from 

the east and northeast but broke away 

in the darkness near 0400 and withdrew cross-country.23 

Through the remainder of the night 

Peploe gradually collected the somewhat scattered units of the 38th Infantry a mile southwest of Freeman’s position but was unable to locate the main 

body of the ROK 3d Regiment. He had 

instructed the South Koreans to take 

position to the immediate right of the 

23d. Instead, they had gathered in 

small groups along the 2d Division 

supply road not far from division headquarters. They intended, according to 

22 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

23 Ibid.; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 113 

orders from their own regimental 

commander, to continue south to an 

assembly in Sunch’on.24 

In the Bridgehead 

Late in the afternoon of the 29th 

General Milburn ordered the I Corps 

to abandon its bridgehead in a two-step 

withdrawal. The ROK 1st and 25th Divisions first were to fall back after dark 

to a line running from a western anchor three miles above the Ch’ongch’on 

northeast to the mouth of the Kuryong 

River, then along the lower bank of the 

Ch’ongch’on to the 2d Division’s left 

flank below Pugwon. The two divisions 

were to pull completely behind the 

Ch’ongch’on at daylight on the 30th. 

This second move would be covered by 

the 5th Regimental Combat Team, now 

detached from the 24th Division and 

under corps control, from positions immediately north and northeast of the 

river crossings in the Sinanju-Anju 

-- 

area.25 

Milburn’s forces occupied the first 

phase line before midnight. At the far 

right, the 3d Battalion of the 24th 

Infantry, which had tied the 25th Division’s position to that of the 2d Division about 2100, was left with an open 

east flank an hour later when the 3d 

Battalion of the 23d Infantry withdrew 

after being hit by the Chinese coming 

down the Ch’ongch’on valley road. 

Near midnight, when the Chinese battalion opened assaults on Colonel 

Freeman’s blocking force at the northern edge of Kunu-ri, part of the enemy 

unit also attacked the command post of 

the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, which 

had been established inside Kunu-ri at 

city hall. The attack came while the battalion commander was talking by phone 

with the regimental commander, Colonel Corley, to arrange a withdrawal 

southwest of Kunu-ri to tie in with the 

23d Infantry’s new main position below the Kaech’on River. Battalion communications with both regiment and the 

frontline companies went out soon, 

thereafter, and the battalion headquarters group withdrew, with some 

difficulty, to the regimental command 

post five miles southwest of Kunu-ri. 

Colonel Corley and the battalion commander then arranged air support and 

placed guides along the Kunu-ri - Anju 

road in an effort to help Companies I, 

K, and L move south past Chinese, who 

meanwhile had swept to behind them 

from the east. The three companies finally got out at 1630 on the 30th at a 

cost of 1 killed, 30 wounded, and 109 

missing.26 

Attack at Sinch’ang-ni 

At the army right, the respite gained 

by the 7th Cavalry when it disengaged 

at Kujong-ni on the Sunch’on road during the afternoon of the 29th lasted not 

quite to midnight. At 2230, heavy small 

arms, machine gun, and mortar fire 

swept the 7th’s new position above 

Sinch’ang-ni; a half hour later, Chinese 

following the road wedged between the 

two forward battalions. Heavy defensive mortar and artillery fire threw back 

the assault, but not before a hundred 

fifty Chinese slipped through the opening in the cavalry line and attacked the 

command posts of both battalions. 

24 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

25 I Corps Opn Dir 28, 29 Nov 50. 

26 I Corps PORs 234 and 235, 29 Nov 50; 24th Div 

WD, Nov 50; 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, 

Nov 50. 
114 EBB AND FLOW 

Some of the attackers made it all the 

way into Sinch’ang-ni.27 

From below Sinch’ang-ni, a rifle 

company, two tanks, and a motorized 

section of heavy machine guns of the 

reserve battalion counterattacked at 

0200 and cleared the forward headquarters areas. Near 0230 the Chinese 

began to pull out of contact, electing 

only to harass the cavalrymen with mortar fire through the remainder of the 

night. The 7th Cavalry suffered 38 

killed, 107 wounded, and 11 missing 

during the engagement. Known enemy 

losses were 350 killed and 10 captured. 

One prisoner identified the assault unit 

as the 37th Regiment of the 125th Division, whose mission, he asserted, had 

been to open the road preliminary to 

an attack on Sunch’on by a larger 

force.28 

Trouble on the Lines of Communication 

On the Anju-Sunch’on Road 

By morning of the 30th the 24th 

Division, less the 5th Regimental Combat Team, was available to help block 

any attempt to seize Sunch’on. General 

Church had started his forces out of 

the I Corps sector near noon on the 

29th. Col. Ned D. Moore’s 19th Infantry and its combat team attachments 

moved first, motoring from Pakch’on 

to Anju and then down a diagonal road 

leading southeast toward Sunch’on. 

Col. Richard W. Stephen’s 21st Regimental Combat Team followed late in 

the afternoon after being relieved at its 

position at the I Corps left by South 

Korean Troops.29 

27 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50. 

28 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 and 30 Nov 50; 7th Cav 

Hist Rpt, Nov 50. 

29 24th Div WD, Nov 50; I Corps POR 234, 29 Nov 

50. 

While the 19th Regimental Combat 

Team was moving the first four miles 

down the diagonal road below Anju, 

Church received aerial observer reports 

that the road ahead of the team was 

blocked in two places. He instructed 

Colonel Moore to destroy the blocks 

with part of his force and to shift the 

remainder westward to take Route 1 

south to Sukch’on, then a lateral road 

east to Sunch’on. Leaving the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, an 

infantry company, and a tank company 

to deal with the roadblocks, Moore took 

the rest of his combat team over the 

new route, assembling it near Sunch’on 

shortly after dark. Colonel Stephens’ 

combat team also used Route 1 and the 

lateral road, taking up the better part 

of the night to reach the Sunch’on 

assembly.30 

Moore’s task force meanwhile encountered the first roadblock about 

1400, after moving three miles farther 

down the diagonal road, and drove the 

Chinese away with only small arms fire. 

Another three miles southeast, the 

force spotted Chinese in high ground 

overlooking the road near an irrigation 

reservoir. Tank fire, mortar fire, and 

an air strike killed several Chinese and 

scattered the remainder. The task force 

then continued to Sunch’on, reaching 

the assembly area at 2300.31 

On the Kunu-ri-Sunch’on Road 

The Chinese on the diagonal road 

evidently had moved in the van of the 

enemy’s westward push toward Kunuri. While they proved no real hindrance 

to the 24th Division’s move to Sunch’on, 

it became clear that forces following 

30 24th Div WD, Nov 50. 

31 Ibid. 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 115 

them had established a much stronger 

block farther east on the 2d Division’s 

supply road between Kunu-ri and 

Sunch’on. 

Before daylight on the 29th, Turk 

soldiers from a convoy carrying supplies to the brigade stopped at the 2d 

Division command post six miles below 

Kunu-ri to report that they had encountered a roadblock while traveling north 

from Sunch’on. At 0900 a patrol from 

the division military police company 

moved south to investigate, came under fire about four miles below division headquarters, and lost one man 

killed and three wounded in attempting to define the enemy position.32 

General Keiser next ordered his 

reconnaissance company to clear the 

obstruction, evidently only a fire block 

centered in a pass four miles south just 

above the village and railroad station 

of Yongwon. Keiser apparently did not 

know at the time that a platoon of tanks, 

attached from the 72d Tank Battalion 

to the British 27th Brigade but not moving with the brigade from Kunu-ri to 

Chasan on the 28th, had just headed 

south over the blocked road. Only the 

protection of armor allowed this platoon to proceed through the pass under intense fire from what appeared to 

be two enemy companies in the surrounding high ground.33 

The reconnaissance company 

reached the pass at midmorning but, 

despite fire support from a battery of 

the 503d Field Artillery Battalion, 

stalled before the Chinese position 

32 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div 

G2-G3 Jnl, Entry J-1456, 29 Nov 50; 2d Div WD, Nov 

50. 

33 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 72d Tk Bn 

Comd and Unit Hist Rpt, Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot 

Rpt 2107, 29 Nov 50. 

around noontime. Keiser then called 

for a rifle company from the 38th Infantry. Colonel Peploe sent Company 

C, now no more than seventy-five men 

who, accompanied by a tank platoon 

from the 72d Tank Battalion, in midafternoon joined the reconnaissance 

force at the pass. This combination also 

was unable to eliminate the fire block, 

and near dusk Keiser ordered the 

force to withdraw into positions around 

division headquarters. The Chinese 

unit in the ass was now believed to be 

a battalion.34 

General Coulter meanwhile started 

part of his reserve north toward the 

roadblock. Earlier in the morning he 

had ordered Brig. B. A. Coad, commander of the British 27th Brigade, to 

send a battalion to Samso-ri to eliminate the Chinese encountered there the 

previous day by the 5th Cavalry. After 

learning of the 2d Division’s predicament about 0830, he redirected the 

British against the newer roadblock. 

The Middlesex Battalion, motorized for 

its mission, headed toward its new destination shortly after 1000 and in the remaining daylight assembled seven miles 

south of the blocked pass.35 

Coulter informed General Keiser that 

the British battalion would move toward the roadblock from the south at 

daylight on the 30th and instructed him 

to mount in concert a vigorous attack 

from the north. The 2d Division commander needed little prompting. To his 

front, the 40th Army was pressing the 

34 Ltr Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div 

G2-G3 Jnl, Entries J-1459, J-1457, and J-1475, 29 

Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot 

Rpt 2114, 29 Nov 50. 

35 Rad IXACT-402, CG IX Corps to CG 27th Brit 

Brig, 29 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts 2101 and 

2110, 29 Nov 50. 
116 EBB AND FLOW 

single battalion of the 23d Infantry still 

north of Kunu-ri; to his right, the 38th 

Army had partially enveloped the 38th 

Infantry and the Turkish brigade; and 

in the immediate rear area, all of his 

artillery and division headquarters were 

vulnerable to attack from the east. (See 

Map 10.) In all likelihood, further withdrawals would become necessary, and 

the road south, if it was to be used, had 

first to be opened.36 

Keiser alerted the 9th Infantry, still 

assembled two miles southwest of 

Kunu-ri, for the next attack on the 

roadblock. When Colonel Sloane reported to division headquarters for instructions around 2000, he advised 

General Keiser that operations over the 

past four days had reduced the 9th Infantry to less than half strength and 

that an attack could be mounted with 

only the four hundred to five hundred 

men remaining in the 2d and 3d Battalions. (The 1st Battalion was then still 

with the 25th Division.) Keiser told 

Sloane to employ all of these men and 

to hit the roadblock at daylight on the 

30th.37 

The Middlesex Battalion, according 

to final plans worked out between 

Keiser and Coulter, would be in position just south of the pass by 0800 but 

would not attack unless Keiser so 

requested. His signal for an attack 

would be radioed to the British. Last, 

Keiser worked out a no-fire line so that 

Sloane’s artillery support would not 

strike the British unit. 

36 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52 

37 Ibid.; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River 

and the Gauntlet, p. 269. 

38 IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2164, 30 Nov 50; Ltr, 

Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52. 

The Sukch’on-Sunch’on-Songch’on Line 

Having returned to Korea from Tokyo with instructions from General 

MacArthur to prevent the envelopment 

of the Eighth Army, General Walker 

late on the 29th called a general withdrawal to a line twenty miles south of 

Kunu-ri and thirty miles above P’yongyang whose general trace connected 

the towns of Sukch’on, Sunch’on, and 

Songch’on. The twenty-mile retirement 

would take his northernmost forcesthe ROK 1st, 25th, and 2d Divisionsout of the path of the Chinese closing 

in on Kunu-ri from the east and north, 

and the resulting consolidation of forces 

would permit a more closely knit defense with which to meet the deeper 

Chinese thrust down the Tokch’onSunch’on road and any similar effort 

over the Songch’on-P’yongyang route. 

Walker instructed the I Corps to face 

north along the Sukch’on-Sunch’on 

segment of the new line, the IX Corps 

to occupy the slightly larger sector 

curving to the southeast between 

Sunch’on and Songch’on.39 

The I Corps Withdrawal 

General Milburn’s move to the rear 

was uncomplicated since the first phase 

of his earlier withdrawal out of the 

Ch’ongch’on bridgehead had taken the 

I Corps out of contact except on the 

extreme right near Kunu-ri. Milburn 

assigned the ROK 1st Division to the 

left half of the Sukch’on-Sunch’on 

sector, the 25th Division to the right. 

Both divisions were to withdraw at daylight on the 30th under cover provided 

by Col. John L. Throckmorton’s 5th 

39 Rad, GX 30090 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGI 

Corps et al., 29 Nov 50. 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 117 

Regimental Combat Team. Throckmorton’s team was to remain in the 

Anju area to protect fords and two 

bridges over the Ch’ongch’on until the 

divisions had cleared the river, then was 

to move into corps reserve at Yongyu, 

eight miles south of Sukch’on.40 

Milburn’s forces peeled off from the 

left, moving west and south over the 

Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch’on route. The 

ROK 1st Division started at 0600 and 

moved slowly but without incident toward an assembly near Sukch’on. The 

25th Division began moving an hour 

later toward an assembly nearer 

Sunch’on. By 1430 all I Corps troops 

who had been above the Ch’ongch’on 

were below the river. Less than an hour 

later 5th Regimental Combat Team 

troops blew one Anju bridge and about 

1800 destroyed the other. Milburn then 

instructed Colonel Throckmorton to 

start his withdrawal to Yongyu. But 

while most I Corps forces by then were 

moving down the Sinanju-Sukch’on 

segment of Route 1 by truck or afoot, 

troops were still coming into Throckmorton’s line from the direction of 

Kunu-ri. Some were from the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, which until late 

afternoon had been blocked off by enemy troops behind its position northwest of Kunu-ri. Others were from 

Company B, 89th Tank Battalion; 

Company F, 27th Infantry; and the 

25th Reconnaissance Company which 

had protected General Kean’s withdrawal from the area nearer Kunu-ri 

not occupied by any of Throckmorton’s 

troops. The remainder were from the 

23d Regimental Combat Team, which 

had been covering the 2d Division’s 

40 Rad, CGI Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 30 Nov 50; 

I Corps POR 236, 30 Nov 50; I Corps WD, Nar, Nov 

50; 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, Nov 50. 

withdrawal over the Kunu-ri-Sunch’on 

road.41 

Throckmorton therefore continued 

to man his covering position past midnight. By the time his combat team finally reached its corps reserve assembly at Yongyu on 1 December, the ROK 

1st and 25th Divisions had left their 

temporary assembly areas to occupy 

their assigned sectors of the new army 

line. 

The 2d Division Plan 

In establishing division sectors along 

the IX Corps’ new defense line, General Coulter attached the British 27th 

Brigade to the 1st Cavalry Division and 

instructed General Gay to organize positions from Songch’on northwestward 

to a point six miles short of Sunch’on. 

The 2d Division was to occupy these 

last six miles once it could disengage 

and withdraw from the Kunu-ri area.42 

In anticipation of such a withdrawal, 

General Keiser and his G-3, Lt. Col. 

Maurice C. Holden, on the 29th had 

considered the alternative of taking the 

2d Division south over the Kunu-riSinanju-Sukch’on route through the I 

Corps sector. This possibility was 

raised when General Milburn telephoned Keiser during the afternoon to 

inquire about the 2d Division’s situation and at that time offered the use of 

the I Corps roads. Colonel Holden and 

the division provost marshal, Lt. Col. 

Henry C. Becker, took immediate advantage of Milburn’s offer to move vari41 I Corps WD, Nar, Nov 50; I Corps WD, 30 Nov 

50: 25th Div O1 24, 30 Nov 50: 5th RCT Unit Rpt 109, 

1 Dec 50; 5th RCT S3 Jnl, 30 Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, 

Nov 50; 89th Med Tk Bn Unit Rpt, Nov 50; 25th Div 

Recon Co WD, Nov 50. 

42 IX Corps Opn O 6 (confirms fragmentary orders 

already issued), 30 Nov 50. 
118 EBB AND FLOW 

ous service units and a large number of 

southbound supply vehicles that had 

collected on the blocked supply road. 

A division headquarters advance party 

joined the column of trucks as it turned 

back north to get on the road to Sinanju 

at a junction just behind the position of 

the 23d Infantry. Colonel Gerald G. 

Epley, the chief of staff, apparently 

judged this to be the only use of the 

road intended by General Milburn: as 

the service train started over the I 

Corps route, he refused a division artillery request to base withdrawal plans 

on that axis on grounds that it was not 

available to the 2d Division.43 

Colonel Holden attempted to make 

it available around 2000 when he radioed the IX Corps G-3 and asked him 

to clear the 2d Division’s unlimited use 

of the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch’on route 

with General Milburn. But although the 

G-3 reported that he obtained the requested clearance with the provision 

that Keiser’s forces “work in on the 

road as they can,” Colonel Holden later denied having received it. The 

question of permission, in any event, 

was soon replaced by doubt that the 

road’s use was possible. Before 2100, 

Colonel Becker, the provost marshal, 

reported that Chinese had cut the 

Kunu-ri-Anju segment. The road actually was still open, but Keiser sought no 

confirmation of the report and, upon 

receipt of the IX Corps order about 

0100 on the 30th, based his withdrawal 

plan on the use of the blocked road to 

the south.44 

In the hour and a half after receiv43 Ltr, Holden to Applemen, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty 

WD, Entry 58, Nov 50. 

44 2d Div WD, G3 Activ Rpt, Nov 50; IX Corps G3 

Spot Rpt 2140, 29 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 

26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Entry 61, Nov 50. 

ing Coulter’s withdrawal instructions, 

Keiser and his staff worked out the 

division’s order of movement. As previously planned, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 9th Infantry were to attack 

to open the road at daylight. When the 

road was clear, the remainder of the 

division was to withdraw in increments: 

the division and division artillery headquarters first, then the engineer battalion, the remainder of the 9th Infantry with its direct support artillery and 

the bulk of the division’s antiaircraft 

artillery attached, the two general support artillery battalions, the various 

pieces of the Turkish brigade, the 38th 

Infantry and its direct support artillery, 

the ROK 3d Regiment, and finally the 

rear guard composed of the 23d Infantry, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, 

72d Tank Battalion, Battery B of the 

Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons 82d Battalion, and 2d Chemical 

Mortar Battalion.45 

All of General Keiser’s plans so far 

were based on the assumption that the 

Kunu-ri-Sunch’on road was blocked 

only at the pass four miles south of the 

division command post and that the 9th 

Infantry would have no particular difficulty clearing it. This assumption was 

challenged during the night when a 

Chinese patrol attacked and took a hilltop from a squad of military police on 

the perimeter protecting Keiser’s headquarters and when mortar, machine 

gun, and small arms fire fell for about 

an hour on both the division headquarters area and the nearby position of the 

503d Field Artillery Battalion. But while 

all of this heralded the westward approach of 38th Army forces north of the 

45 The order of march is given in 2d Div Arty POR 

98, 1 Dec 50. 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 

pass area, it gave General Keiser no 

definite evidence that the Chinese had 

enlarged the fire block. He responded 

to the nighttime activity by moving the 

38th Infantry east and south from its 

location behind the 23d Infantry to an 

assembly near the exposed 15th, 38th, 

and 503d Field Artillery Battalions 

north of the division command post. 

Otherwise, his plans to clear the known 

block to the south using the 9th Infantry, then to dispatch the remainder 

of his division to Sunch’on, remained 

in effect.46 

119 

fire could be dropped on the Chineseheld height, Sloane got his vehicles out 

of range and deployed for assault. The 

2d Battalion and Company I climbed 

the ridge west of the road while the 

remainder of the 3d Battalion moved 

over lower ground on the east. The Chinese gunners on the western height 

pulled away as Sloane’s forces climbed 

toward them, but small arms, machine 

gun, and mortar fire from the next 

height south swept and stopped both 

battalions after their initial rush.48 

When Sloane’s assault foundered, 

General Keiser sent the ROK 3d Regiment to assist. Sloane used the South 

Koreans to relieve his forces west of 

the road. Once the ROK forces passed 

through, he intended to place all of his 

own troops east of the withdrawal route 

and again attack south.49 

Against the possibility that Sloane’s 

renewed effort would not open the 

road, Keiser instructed the 38th Infantry and all division artillery except the 

units attached to the 23d Infantry to 

move to the division headquarters 

area. Only combat equipment was to 

be brought; kitchens, maintenance 

equipment, personal baggage, and all 

other nonessential impedimenta were 

to be left behind. Colonel Peploe’s 

forces, previously scheduled to march 

near the tail of the divisional column, 

were now earmarked to lead the way 

south. Thus stripped and poised, 

Keiser could if necessary fight his way 

to Sunch’on.50 

The Roadblock Below Kunu-ri 

To reach the blocked pass four miles 

south of the 2d Division command post 

around daylight on the 30th, the 2d 

Battalion of the 9th Infantry followed 

in column by the mortar company and 

the 3d Battalion with a platoon of regimental tanks attached, left the regimental assembly southwest of Kunu-ri at 

0330. Colonel Sloane intended to 

march down the supply road two miles 

beyond the division command post, 

then deploy a battalion on either 

side of the road and advance over the 

bordering ridges. (See Map 10.) But at 

0630, no more than a half mile south 

of division headquarters, the leading 

2d Battalion received small arms and 

machine gun fire from the high ground 

to the southwest. This fire was the first 

certain indication that the 38th Army 

had extended the fire block north of 

the pass.47 

While the mortar company pulled 

back slightly to positions from which 

46 Ltr Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div WD, 

Nov 50; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, p.57; 38th 

Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 

47 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the 

Gauntlet, p. 270. 

48 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the 

Gauntlet, pp. 270-72. 

49 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 

26 Feb 52; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 

50 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, 

Entry 63, 30 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 

Feb 52. 
120 EBB AND FLOW 

the 23d Infantry just below the 

Kaech’on River. Although nearcontinuous air strikes on Kunu-ri and 

its vicinity so far had helped materially 

in holding off the enemy, the Chinese 

strength across the river from the regiment was growing. Freeman also had 

observed enemy troops moving around 

his right flank toward Keiser’s units to 

the south.53 

The combination of conditions above 

and below Keiser pushed him to the 

decision to run his forces through the 

roadblock. Whereas speculation had 

continued, especially among artillery 

units, on a withdrawal over the Kunuri-Sinanju-Sukch’on route, the latest 

reports from Freeman discouraged that 

choice as the way out. To get on that 

route, almost all of Keiser’s forces first 

would have to move north to the road 

junction just behind the 23d Infantry 

which now appeared in immediate 

danger of seizure by the Chinese accumulating in Kunu-ri. In view of that 

possibility, the earlier report that the 

Kunu-ri-Anju road segment had been 

cut, and General Coulter’s orders to 

the 2d Division to withdraw over the 

Kunu-ri-Sunch’on road, General Keiser 

dismissed any further consideration of 

using the I Corps route.54 

There were, on the other hand, at 

least two prospects that favored running the roadblock. Although Sloane 

had failed to clear the ridges below division headquarters, the Chinese had not 

exhibited any heavy firepower. The 

near enemy position also appeared to 

be shallow. His forces, Keiser reasoned, 

Apparently unable to raise the British by radio, Keiser sent a request 

through IX Corps headquarters for the 

Middlesex Battalion to strike north into 

the pass area. About the same time, 

Colonel Sloane dispatched his platoon 

of tanks south to contact the British 

unit. Sloane’s tanks, like the platoon 

from the 72d Tank Battalion the previous day, weathered enemy fire without 

loss and reached the British below the 

pass about 1030. The Middlesex Battalion already had tried to clear the pass, 

had been stopped by strong mortar and 

machine gun fire, and had then taken 

position near Yongwon to cover 2d Division forces when they came through 

the pass. Sloane’s tankers remained 

with the British to add their guns to 

the cover.51 

Near the time that Sloane’s tanks 

reached the British, the ROK 3d Regiment passed through Sloane’s 2d Battalion. Supported by an air strike of 

rockets and napalm and by .50-caliber 

machine gun fire from a platoon of 

tanks from the 72d Tank Battalion 

(previously with the Turks) on the road, 

the South Koreans drove a small group 

of Chinese off the first hill south, then 

failed in two assaults to carry the ridge 

beyond. Altogether, the ROK regiment gained just under three-quarters 

of a mile.52 

By noon Sloane’s forces and the 

South Koreans had gained no more 

ground. Equally disturbing to General 

Keiser, Colonel Freeman notified him 

that Chinese were beginning to press 

51 IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2174, 30 Nov 50; 9th Inf 

Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 

309. 

52 9th Int Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 

26 Feb 52; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 

273, 276-79. 

53 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to 

App leman, 26 Feb 52. 

54 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty 

WD, Nov 50. 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 

probably could rush past it and then 

face only the problem of negotiating 

the pass farther south. Even the latter 

problem might already have been 

solved. Having no communication with 

the Middlesex Battalion, Keiser assumed that the British were attacking 

northward. Hence, the pass might be 

clear and a linkup with the British occur 

not far down the road.55 

Before signaling the start of the run 

south, Keiser reversed previous instructions that only necessary battle gear be 

taken. Near noon his assistant, General 

Bradley, passed the word to all units to 

bring out all serviceable vehicles and 

equipment. Keiser evidently believed 

the Chinese opposition below him could 

be handled without stripping to bare 

combat essentials, and for a speedy trip 

to Sunch’on he could use all transportation available. Keiser’s final order of 

march kept the 38th Infantry in the 

lead, followed by division headquarters 

and division artillery headquarters, next 

all artillery battalions except the 15th 

with Freeman’s regiment, then the engineer battalion, and finally the rearguard 23d Regimental Combat Team. 

All other forces-the 9th Infantry, 

Company C of the 72d Tank Battalion, 

the ROK 3d Regiment, and troops of 

the Turkish brigade-were expected to 

work into the column ahead of the rear 

guard, those on foot hitching a ride 

wherever they could. The order to all 

units was to keep moving.56 

Peploe’s 2d Battalion riding trucks and 

regimental tanks passed through the 

9th Infantry about 1300. The lead tank 

bearing three officers and eighteen 

men in addition to the crew received 

intermittent bursts of machine gun fire, 

but no one was hit. The men aboard 

the tank sprayed return fire into the 

heights commanding the road as they 

sped over the first mile and a half, then 

encountered a barricade. Apparently 

between the time that Sloane’s tanks 

moved south during the morning and 

Peploe’s forces started an hour past 

noon, the Chinese had obstructed the 

road with an M39 carrier, an M4 tank, 

and a 21⁄2-ton truck lost by Keiser’s 

forces on the 29th. Although the time 

taken to shove the obstructions off the 

road was brief, the delay started a chain 

reaction of halts to the rear that fixed a 

stop, wait, and go pattern to the entire 

withdrawal.57 

The leading tank and its passengers 

received and returned fire as before 

while negotiating the next two and a 

half miles, including the quarter-mile 

length of the pass. Another quarter 

mile beyond the pass, a second barricade of trucks and assorted equipment 

lay across the road, but the driver kept 

his tank at full speed and rammed 

through it. Around the next turn of 

the road he passed behind the outposts 

of the Middlesex Battalion about 

1400.58 

Keiser instructed Colonel Peploe to 

move about 1245. Since Peploe already 

had organized the 38th Infantry for the 

ride south, there was little delay in 

starting. At the head of the column, 

The tank’s successful one-hour run 

prompted a message from the British 

that when recorded at army headquarters pronounced the "MSR between 

55 Ltr Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Marshall, 

The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 280-81. 

56 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50. 

57 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 

50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 289-94. 

58 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 

Jnl, 30 Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, 

pp. 286-87. 

121 
122 

Kunu-ri and Sunch’on open as of 

1400.” But the scene along the road 

behind the lead vehicle belied this optimism. As Peploe’s 2d Battalion with the 

3d Battalion and regimental headquarters group immediately behind moved 

over the four-mile stretch below division headquarters, the two regiments 

of the 113th Division in the bordering 

heights began strengthening their elongated fire block. The heaviest fire fell 

in the pass, but the Chinese also maneuvered to bring down small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire on much of 

the road above the defile. The Chinese 

placed perhaps thirty or forty machine 

guns and about ten mortars in action. 

Most of the direct fire was delivered 

broadside, and much of it plunged onto 

the road from long range. Peploe’s column nevertheless began to lose men 

and vehicles, especially while at a halt; 

as more trucks were disabled, the frequency of the halts increased.59 

At each halt, riders leapt from tanks 

and trucks for the roadside ditches. 

Some fired into the heights, others only 

sought cover. When able to move again, 

drivers often left passengers behind. Of 

those left afoot by the destruction of 

their transportation or by a driver who 

failed to wait, the able-bodied straggled 

south, some managing to catch another 

ride. Wounded were picked up by 

troops following when there was room 

in their vehicles; for lack of space or 

notice, other casualties were left where 

they had fallen. This scrambling gradually broke down tactical unity and 

troop control. But despite disorganization and casualties, Peploe’s forces, with 

59 2d Div G2-G3 Jnl, Entry J-1490, 30 NOV 50; 2d 

Div Arty WD, Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 30 Nov 

50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Marshall, The River 

and the Gauntlet, pp. 287-88. 

EBB AND FLOW 

some South Korean and Turkish troops 

scattered among them, managed to 

move in spurts and get through the pass 

a little before 1500. By the time the tail 

of Peploe’s serial got through, the Chinese in the pass area had greatly increased their fire and were moving 

guns in an effort to block the quartermile cut completely.60 

Coming next into the pass were the 

2d Battalion and mortar company of 

the 9th Infantry. Colonel Sloane dispatched these two units onto the road 

about 1330 behind Peploe’s lead serial, 

keeping the 3d Battalion deployed 

against the Chinese near the division’s 

point of departure. Part of the ROK 

3d Regiment and some Turks were 

mixed in. On the heels of the 9th Infantry troops came General Keiser’s headquarters troops and the reconnaissance 

company who had begun to move immediately after learning that Peploe’s 

first troops had gone through the pass. 

Right behind were the division artillery 

headquarters, the bulk of the 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons 

Battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 38th 

Infantry, and the division military police company. Besides the division rear 

guard, the division engineers, four artillery battalions, and the rest of the 9th 

Infantry had yet to take to the road.61 

The ride south toward the pass was 

every bit as harrowing for this group as 

it had been for Peploe’s men. Moving 

through the defile was even more painful. As Sloane’s leading troops entered 

the pass, the Chinese loosed efilading 

machine gun fire from both ends of 

60 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Marshall, The River 

and the Gauntlet, pp. 288-90, 306-07. 

61 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 

26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; Marshall, The 

River and the Gauntlet, pp. 318, 326. 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 

the cut as well as plunging fire from 

the embankments on either side. At 

least twenty disabled trucks already cluttered the roadside when the first of 

Sloane’s forces attempted to negotiate 

the pass, and as the enemy fire began 

taking an additional toll of vehicles, the 

wreckage in the roadway became a barrier impassable to trucks to the rear. 

Troops amidst and immediately behind 

the obstructions tried to move afoot 

through the pass, but the machine gun 

fire as well as small arms fire and hand 

grenades pitched down on them from 

above forced them to cover among the 

wrecked trucks. For the first time, 

movement through the pass came to a 

complete stop.62 

Doubling the column then stretching two miles to the rear, General 

Keiser and General Bradley came south 

to the pass shortly before 1530. They 

needed no long study to see that further movement depended first on suppressing the fire being poured into the 

defile. While ground troops in and near 

the cut were making such an attempt, 

strong air attacks seemed the only real 

solution.63 

Fighter-bombers responding to an 

earlier call for air support from Keiser 

began pounding the ground bordering 

the pass about the time the two generals completed their reconnaissance and 

returned to their command vehicles 

now just north of the pass. Near 1630, 

after movement through the pass had 

been blocked for more than an hour, 

Keiser conferred with his G-3, Colonel 

Holden, and momentarily considered 

abandoning all vehicles and taking his 

123 

troops out cross-country. But by then 

the air strikes were beginning to have 

an effect. Mosquito control pilots reported that it was impossible to miss 

the Chinese clustered in the heights on 

either side of the road, and to make 

sure of hitting their targets, pilots flew 

in so low that the men in the pass expected the planes to crash. Machine gun 

bullets from the aircraft struck the 

rocky embankments less than seventyfive yards above the men in the cut, 

and burning napalm spilled onto the 

road to set several vehicles afire. As the 

air strikes dampened the Chinese fire, 

Keiser sent two light tanks from his reconnaissance company to bulldoze a 

path through the wrecked vehicles in 

the pass. The column of troops and 

trucks could move south again, although they continued to receive some 

fire from the surrounding heights. 

Darkness fell and forced away the supporting planes before the last of this 

portion of the division column entered 

the pass, but the column moved steadily toward safety.64 

As the last of the military police company and a few troops of the 38th Infantry at the end of this section descended from the quieted pass, some 

fire ranged in on their left flank. Just 

below the pass, where the road jogged 

west, crossed a stream, then turned 

south again a short distance beyond, 

was the small village of Karhyon-dong. 

After receiving the strong air attacks in 

the pass heights, part of the Chinese 

blocking force took cover in Karhyon62 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 310-311, 

318. 

63 Ibid., p. 320. 

64 Eighth Army G3 Briefing Rpt, 1 Dec 50; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Entry 2147, 30 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to 

Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Futrell, The United States Air 

Force in Korea, 1950-1953, pp. 237-38; Marshall, The 

River and the Gauntlet, pp. 318-19, 326-27, 331-32; 2d 

Div G2 Jnl, Entry 1490, 30 Nov 50. 
124 EBB AND FLOW 

dong and trained a few automatic weapons and mortars to the northwest. This 

fire would be the heaviest faced in the 

pass area by the last section of Keiser’s 

column, which included four artillery 

battalions, the division engineers, and 

the remainder of the 9th Infantry. 

Whereas the 23d Regimental Combat 

Team originally was scheduled to bring 

up the rear over the Kunu-ri-Sunch’on 

road, the long delay caused by the Chinese fire block to the south coupled 

with enemy pressure from the north 

had prompted Colonel Freeman to 

choose another way out; by dusk his 

forces already were moving over the 

Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch’on route.65 

The 17th Field Artillery Battalion, 

the only S-inch howitzer unit in Korea, 

led the last section of Keiser’s column. 

After passing through sporadic machine gun fire, the battalion halted in 

midafternoon just below the village of 

Wa-dong, a little over two miles north 

of the pass. Following one stiff exchange of fire with nearby Chinese 

forces, the 17th started to move again 

at dark. The battalion negotiated the 

pass without trouble, but, on descending and turning west to ford the stream 

west of Karhyon-dong, a howitzer 

tipped over and rolled into a deep 

gulley. When an artilleryman went into 

the gulley to destroy the gun, lights 

turned on to help him see attracted 

mortar fire from Karhyon-dong. Harassed by continued fire, the remaining 

tractors and howitzers crossed the 

stream slowly and one at a time. It was 

midnight when the battalion got out of 

the fire, but losses were light in spite of 

65 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 340; Ltr, 

Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Ltr, Col Paul L. 

Freeman to CG, 2d Inf Div, 9 Dec 50, sub: Withdrawal of the 23d Infantry From KUNU-RI. 

the slowness. The battalion suffered 1 

killed and 16 wounded and lost 1 howitzer, 22 vehicles, and 11 trailers.66 

The 37th Field Artillery Battalion, 

next in column, suffered more than 

double the 17th’s losses. By the time 

the 105s of the 37th cleared the ford 

west of Karhyon-dong, the battalion 

had lost 35 men killed, wounded, or 

missing, and had left 10 howitzers, 53 

vehicles, and 39 trailers strewn along 

the road to the rear. But, like the 17th, 

the 37th was still intact.67 

To the rear, the story was different. 

Whereas the 503d and 38th Field Artillery Battalions, 2d Engineer Combat 

Battalion, and remainder of the 9th Infantry had started down the road behind the 37th, only a trickle of troops 

and trucks would come through the 

pass. Although some of the Chinese 

had climbed down from the bordering 

heights to firing positions nearer the 

road, none so far had made an assault 

on the division column. But after dark, 

just below the division’s point of departure, strong Chinese forces opened 

attacks against the two remaining artillery battalions and the engineers. Vehicles knocked out during the assaults 

blocked the road in considerable depth, 

and enemy fire during and following 

the assaults defeated all attempts to remove the obstructions. Only a few 

troops near the head of the 503d Field 

Artillery Battalion managed to break 

away and continue down the road. The 

others, including the remainder of the 

9th Infantry caught at the very end of 

the division column, abandoned all 

66 17th FA Bn WD, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 

58-60; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 342-44. 

67 37th FA Bn WD, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and 

the Gauntlet, p. 347. 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 125 

AN 8-INCH HOWITZER AND CREW 

guns, equipment, and remaining vehicles and left the road to make their way 

to Sunch’on cross-country. Not all 

succeeded in getting past the Chinese 

around them. Of those who did, the 

last straggler would not reach safety for 

some days to come.68 

In view of this debacle, Colonel Freeman had made a wise choice in electing 

to withdraw over the Kunu-ri-SinanjuSukch’on route. By early afternoon he 

was convinced of the improbability 

that the 23d Regimental Combat Team 

could withdraw via the Kunu-ri68 Comd Rpt, 503d FA Bn, Nov 50; Comd Rpt, 38th 

FA Bn, Nov 50; Hist Rpt, 2d Engr C Bn, Nov 50; 9th 

Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, 

pp. 347-61. 

Sunch’on road before dark and was 

deeply concerned over the pressure 

being exerted against his forces by the 

Chinese concentrated in and around 

Kunu-ri. Twice, at 1430 and an hour 

later, Freeman reported to division 

headquarters-although by feeble and 

interrupted radio contact-that the 

23d’s situation was becoming increasingly precarious. He made the earlier 

report to General Bradley and at that 

time proposed that he be allowed at 

least two hours before darkness or 

when in Freeman’s judgment the situation became critical to withdraw the 

combat team using the I Corps roads. 

Although the weak radio signal caused 

some confusion at division headquar- 
126 

ters as to Freeman’s exact plan, General Bradley at 1600 authorized him to 

put the plan into effect.69 

In preparation, Freeman invited the 

commander of the 38th Field Artillery 

Battalion and the officer in charge of 

the rearmost troops of the 9th Infantry, 

both nearby and not yet able to move 

south over the Kunu-ri-Sunch’on road, 

to join in withdrawing through the I 

Corps sector. Both declined. Therefore, 

only the combat team’s attachmentsBattery B of the 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, the 

72d Tank Battalion less Company C, 

and the 15th Field Artillery Battalionwould accompany Freeman’s infantry. 

With the agreement of the commander 

of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, 

Freeman decided not to take the howitzers out. For one reason, the fewer 

towed pieces on the road, the less 

chance there would be of having the 

column blocked by an accident at a 

sharp turn or defile. Second, he 

wanted the guns in action up to the 

moment of withdrawal to discourage 

any pursuit by the Chinese then pressing his position.70

In the hour and a half before sunset 

Freeman spotted all available transportation on the road behind his rearguard 

position, then began peeling troops 

from the front a battalion at a time, 

beginning with the easternmost. The 

15th Field Artillery Battalion meanwhile began a phenomenal shoot, firing all ammunition on hand in just over 

twenty minutes at deep and close-in 

targets. After gunners exploded therEBB AND FLOW 

mite grenades in the already damaged 

tubes, the artillerymen boarded their 

trucks and joined the withdrawal. A 

noticeable and prolonged lull in enemy 

fire followed the heavy artillery bombardment, and forward observers 

watched the Chinese hurriedly dig in 

to the front of the infantry positions 

being vacated. Colonel Freeman credited the artillery action with having 

made a safe withdrawal possible. Under continued air cover, his leading 

troops made their way behind the 5th 

Regimental Combat Team’s position 

near Anju by sunset; by dark his last 

troops-from the 3d Battalion and 72d 

Tank Battalion-were clear of the 

rearguard position; and just before 

midnight, the combat team closed in 

an assembly area near Sukch’on.71 

A count rendered on 1 December 

listed 2d Division battle casualties at 

4,940 for the last half of November. Of 

these, 90 percent, or about 4,500, had 

been incurred since the 25th. Officer 

casualties alone numbered 237 and 

touched most grades and branches. 

These losses represented one-third of 

the division’s actual strength of 15,000 

on 15 November, and when reconciled 

with non-battle casualties, replacements, and returnees, left the division 8,662 men short of authorized 

strength.72 Equipment losses were 

equally heavy. In addition to hundreds 

of trucks and trailers, the major losses 

included 64 artillery pieces, almost all 

of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion’s 

equipment, and between 20 and 40 per69 Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50; Ltr, 

Maj Gen J. S. Bradley to Maj Roy E. Appleman, 

2 Apr 52. 

70 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 328; Ltr, 

Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50. 

71 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 329; Ltr, 

Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50; 23d Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nov 50; Comd and Unit Hist Rpt, 72d Tk Bn, 

Nov 50. 

72 2d Div Pers Per Rpt no. 12, 1 Dec 50. This report 

shows the following breakdown: 
DISENGAGEMENT IN THE WEST 

Battle 

Casualties Actual 

Unit 

9th Inf 3793 

23d Inf 3793 

38th Inf 3793 

Div Arty 3695 

72d Tk Bn 681 

2d Engr Bn 977 

2d Med Bn 341 

2d MP Co 187 

2d Recon Co 171 

2d QM Co 252 

702d Ord Co 321 

Div Band 70 

2d Rep1 Co 34 

Div Hq Co 190 

Div Hq 233 

2d Sig Co 369 

Med Det Div Hq 14 

CIC Det 17 

15 

3 

10 

1406 

2244 

1762 

1970 

576 

266 

329 

142 

115 

232 

283 

89 

51 

166 

249 

363 

13 

13 

Total 18,931 4,940 10,269 

Auth 

Strength 15-30 Nov 50 

1267 

485 

1075 

1461 

19 

561 

13 

27 

Strength 

1 Dec 50 

127 

cent of the signal equipment carried by 

the various division units.73 

Although this early tally of losses was 

not wholly certifiable, the figures clearly 

showed the 2d Division no longer effective. While the 1st Cavalry Division 

stretched itself thinner to cover the 

sector of the new army line originally 

assigned to the 2d Division, General 

Keiser on 1 December began moving 

his depleted division to Chunghwa, 

about ten miles south of P’yongyang, 

for rehabilitation.74 

73 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50. 

74 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50. 
CHAPTER VII 

Concentration at Hungnam 

By 30 November the changing 

ground situation had in turn altered 

the course of UNC air and naval operations. General Partridge, whose Fifth 

Air Force within its own arena now 

faced a growing challenge from MIG-15 

jet aircraft over northwestern Korea, 

had received a sharp increase in close 

support requirements. Admiral Ewen, 

whose Task Force 77 planes previously 

had been held to interdiction and 

armed reconnaissance, also had begun 

to send close support sorties into both 

the Eighth Army and X Corps sectors.1

To meet any increased demand for 

aircraft carriers and gunfire support, 

Admiral Joy not only had recalled ships 

of the line previously redeployed out 

of the theater but had ordered those 

under way to their first Korean assignments to sail at maximum safe speed. 

He also had deployed Task Force 90, 

dividing Admiral Doyle’s amphibious 

force into one group on each side of 

the peninsula, so as to be able to evacuate the Eighth Army from western 

beaches and the X Corps from the east 

coast.2

Joy’s deployment of Task Force 90, 

for the time being at least, was only 

precautionary. General Walker had 

1 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950- 

195 3 , pp. 230-38; Field, United States Naval Operations, 

Korea, pp. 265-68. 

2 Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 

265-66, 268-69. 

pulled the Eighth Army out of the 

path of the Chinese enveloping maneuver and reduced the likelihood that his 

forces would have to be sea lifted from 

some isolated beachhead deep in northern Korea. Nor was General Almond 

then planning any sea evacuation of 

the X Corps. Almond’s purpose, as 

General MacArthur had instructed, 

was to pull his far-flung forces into 

defenses around Hamhung and 

Hungnam, a task that had its own complications without regard for what 

might come next. His ROK I Corps had 

to backtrack some three hundred miles 

along the coast, 7th Division forces at 

Hyesanjin faced a 200-mile withdrawal 

through the mountains, and the Marine and Army forces in the Changjin 

Reservoir area could expect to fight 

their way out at least as far as Kot’o-ri, 

probably farther. 

New X Corps Orders 

Almond had begun work on plans to 

carry out MacArthur’s instructions, including a westward move to assist the 

Eighth Army, while flying back to Korea from the Tokyo conference on the 

afternoon of the 29th. His staff completed the plans that night.3 

3 This section is based on X Corps Special Report 

on Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov-10 Dec 50; X Corps WD, 

Sum, Nov 50; 7th Div Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50; 
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 129 

Almond’s 30 November order placing these plans in effect left something 

further to be done with the ROK I 

Corps. For the time being Almond directed its commander, Brig. Gen. Kim 

Paik II, only to protect the X Corps’ 

right flank and secure the east coast 

road as he brought his forces south. 

The 7th Division forces in and 

around Hyesanjin were to fall back on 

Hamhung. General Barr was to protect the corps’ northern and northeastern flank, establishing an especially 

strong position around Sinhung, twenty 

miles north of Hamhung, to block roads 

leading south out of the area to be 

vacated. Barr also was to place a regiment and his tank battalion in corps 

reserve. 

Among several assignments given the 

3d Division, General Soule’s forces were 

to protect the Changjin Reservoir road 

from Sudong south to Hamhung and 

to continue to block the road coming 

east from Sach’ang-ni. Almond detached the 1st Korean Marine Corps 

Regiment and one infantry battalion 

from Soule’s division and placed them 

under corps control. These two units, 

designated Task Force C and commanded by Brig. Gen. A. D. Mead, the 

assistant 3d Division commander, were 

to protect Wonsan and the Wonsan 

airfield. Except for one other battalion, Soule was to concentrate the 

remainder of his division between 

Chigyong and Yonp’o, about four 

miles southwest of Hamhung and 

Hungnam. The excluded battalion was 

to head west over the road leading to 

Mono, Chosin Reservoir, 3d Hist Det; 3d Div Comd 

Rpt, Nov 50; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign; Interv, Appleman with General 

Almond; X Corps OI 19, 29 Nov 50; X Corps Opn O 

8, 30 Nov 50. 

Tokch’on. Almond’s written order directed Soule to “attack with strong Task 

Force . . . and assist Eighth Army.” But 

in a conference with Soule and 65th 

Infantry commander Col. William W. 

Harris during the morning of the 30th, 

Almond reduced the mission to a reconnaissance in force by a reinforced 

battalion from Harris’ regiment. 

The separated garrisons around the 

Changjin Reservoir had to be consolidated before any withdrawal from that 

sector could begin. Toward that end, 

Almond late on the 29th had placed all 

forces in the reservoir area, including 

those at Kot’o-ri, under the control of 

the 1st Marine Division. To protect further the vital road junction and supplies at Hagaru-ri, he had ordered 

General Smith to pull in a regiment 

from Yudam-ni. He also had instructed 

Smith to gain contact with Task Force 

Faith, then to work out a coordinated 

defense based on Hagaru-ri, and, 

finally, to open and secure the eleven 

miles of road between Hagaru-ri and 

Kot’o-ri. 

Almond’s order on the 30th enlarged 

these instructions. General Smith now 

was to pull in both Marine regiments 

from Yudam-ni and was to find some 

way to bring Task Force Faith back to 

Hagaru-ri. He also was to secure a 

larger segment of the reservoir road 

from Hagaru-ri south twenty-two miles 

to the village of Sudong. 

During the afternoon of the 30th Almond met with Generals Smith, Barr, 

and Hodes at Hagaru-ri to urge speed 

in falling back on Hamhung. Except 

for the Task Force Drysdale melee in 

Hell Fire Valley, the reservoir area had 

been relatively quiet the previous night. 

But the respite from strong attack likely 

would be brief, and the Chinese were 
130 EBB AND FLOW 

becoming active along the reservoir 

road at and below Kot’o-ri. Just after 

dark on the 29th a Chinese force had 

struck but failed to penetrate the Kot’ori perimeter, and on the 30th the marines at Chinhung-ni discovered and 

drove off a Chinese battalion in the 

heights west of town. Almond consequently wanted Smith to accelerate the 

movement of the Yudam-ni forces to 

Hagaru-ri, and he directed both Smith 

and Barr to come up with a plan and 

timetable for extricating Task Force 

Faith. He authorized Smith to destroy 

all equipment whose removal would delay his consolidation and withdrawal, 

promising him any needed resupply by 

air. 

Despite the requirement for speed, 

neither Smith nor Barr saw any quick 

way of consolidating forces at Hagaruri, especially of retrieving Task Force 

Faith. Almond personally had ordered 

the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, to move 

northward immediately from Majondong to help extricate the task force. 

But in view of Task Force Drysdale’s 

experience, the infantry battalion most 

certainly faced serious trouble in 

running the gauntlet above Kot’o-ri. 

Forces from Hagaru-ri could hardly be 

spared for a rescue mission lest Chinese, known still to be concentrated in 

strength around the town, hit the 

weakened garrison and capture the vital base. The two division commanders 

agreed that a relief force could be 

sent to Task Force Faith only after 

the Yudam-ni marines returned to 

Hagaru-ri, and the latter faced the task 

of fighting over fourteen miles of 

mountain road while bringing out hundreds of casualties. The alternative, 

none too attractive, was to order the 

casualty-ridden task force to fight 

way out. 

Shaping the Hamhung-Hungnam 

Defense 

its 

To protect Hamhung and Hungnam 

while the distant X Corps forces made 

their way south, General Almond had 

moved forces of the 3d Division into 

the port complex. He lost his protection on 1 December when General 

MacArthur took control of the 3d 

Division and ordered Almond to assemble it in Wonsan preparatorypresumably-to sending it westward to 

assist the Eighth Army. Almond complied (dissolving General Mead’s Task 

Force C in the process) but on the 3d 

sent to Tokyo staff members who appealed and obtained a rescission of 

MacArthur’s action. Upon regaining 

the 3d Division, Almond canceled the 

westward reconnaissance previously assigned to the 65th Infantry, a pointless 

venture now that the Eighth Army had 

withdrawn to the Sukch’on-Sunch’onSongch’on line. Except for establishing 

another task force that he kept under 

his own control, Almond returned the 

division to the Hamhung-Hungnam 

area. The task force along with a Marine shore party group was to protect 

Wonsan and outload the supplies and 

equipment stockpiled there, whereupon the port was to be abandoned.4 

For the 3d Division, the changes in 

orders over the first three days of De4 X Corps Opn O 8, 30 Nov 50; X Corps OI 20, 1 

Dec 50; X Corps OI 21, 1 Dec 50; TLCN 558, FEC-X 

Corps, 3 Dec 50; X Corps OI 24, 3 Dec 50; X Corps 

Special Report on Chosin Reservoir. 27 Nov-10 Dec 

50. 
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 131 

cember were confusing, especially for 

the troops of subordinate units who 

without knowing why shuttled like yoyos to, from, and back to the HamhungHungnam complex. But by nightfall on 

the 4th General Soule concentrated the 

bulk of his division in the HamhungHungnam area. With the 1st Korean 

Marine Corps Regiment attached, he 

deployed on the 5th to defend a sector 

anchored below Yonp’o airfield southwest of Hungnam and arching northwest through Chigyong southwest of 

Hamhung to the village of Oro-ri on 

the Changjin Reservoir road eight miles 

northwest of Hamhung.5 

By dark on the 5th the greater part 

of the 7th Division also reached the 

Hamhung-Hungnam area. To assist the 

7th’s evacuation of Hyesanjin, the attached 26th ROK Regiment had taken 

covering positions astride the main 

Hyesanjin-Pukch’ong withdrawal route 

about midway between the terminal 

towns. But General Barr’s forces came 

south without enemy contact. They 

demolished bridges and cratered the 

road behind them as far as the South 

Korean position and in continuing their 

withdrawal prepared similar demolitions to be exploded by the South 

Koreans bringing up the rear. Barr’s 

forces, after completing their withdrawal, put up defenses north and 

northeast of Hamhung adjacent to 

those of the 3d Division. The leftmost 

position was not far east of Oro-ri, 

astride the road leading south from the 

Pujon Reservoir; the rightmost blocked 

the coastal road.6 

Barr’s block at the right was temporary. General Almond’s plan for 

ringing Hamhung and Hungnam now 

called for the ROK I Corps to hold the 

northeast sector, including the coastal 

road. But the nearest ROK I Corps 

troops were still a hundred miles up 

the coast at Songjin, the rearmost another forty miles north in Kilchu. To 

assist the Korean withdrawal, General 

Almond arranged on the 5th through 

Admiral Doyle to send five ships to 

Songjin to pick up the tail-end ROK 3d 

Division. The ROK I Corps headquarters and the leading Capital Division 

meanwhile continued to withdraw 

overland.7 

Concentration at Hagaru-ri 

On 1 December, as General Almond 

began to shape the defense of Hamhung and Hungnam, the marines at 

Yudam-ni and Colonel Faith’s forces 

east of the Changjin Reservoir started 

back toward Hagaru-ri. General Smith, 

now commanding all forces in the reservoir area, had given the two regiments at Yudam-ni their withdrawal 

order the previous evening following 

his afternoon conference with Almond. 

Smith placed neither Colonel Litzenberg nor Colonel Murray in charge but 

merely directed both to “Expedite . . . 

movement RCT-5 and RCT-7 to 

Hagaru prepared for further withdrawal south. Destroy any supplies 

which must be abandoned during this 

withdrawal."8

5 3d Div Comd Rpt, Dec 50; Dolcater, 3d Infantry 

Division in Korea, pp. 88-9 1; X Corps Opn O 9, 5 Dec 

50. 

7 X Corps Opn O 9, 5 Dec 50; Eighth Army Comd 

6 Action Rpt, 7th Div, 21 Nov to 20 Dec 50, From 

Rpt, Dec 50, Briefing for CC, 6 Dec 50; Field, United 

States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 285-89. 

Hyesanjin to Hungnam Outloading; X Corps Comd 8 Msg, CC 1st Marine Div to COs 5th and 7th 

Rpt, Dec 50; X Corps Opn O 9, 5 Dec 50. Marines, 1920, 30 Nov 50. 
132 EBB AND FLOW 

Smith sent withdrawal instructions to 

Task Force Faith at 1100 on the 1st. By 

that time Smith had dropped all plans 

for sending a rescue force to Faith, 

whose forces had taken strong assaults 

around their lakeshore perimeter during the night of the 30th. Although they 

had defeated these attacks, it was doubtful they could withstand more. Hence, 

Smith judged, waiting to dispatch reinforcements to Faith until the Yudam-ni 

troops returned to Hagaru-ri would be 

too late. Nor could he use the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, ordered forward 

from Majon-dong by General Almond 

the day before, since that battalion was 

only at Kot’o-ri and had had to fight to 

get that far forward. The two previous 

failures of the 31st Infantry’s rear 

troops to reach Faith from Hudong-ni 

even when accompanied by tanks 

proved them too weak for a rescue 

mission. In fact, they had been recalled 

to Hagaru-ri on the 30th lest they be 

destroyed by the Chinese below Faith’s 

position. Finally, Smith’s previous judgment that none of the Hagaru-ri troops 

could be spared seemed even more 

sound by morning of the 1st after the 

forces defending the base again had 

beaten back several night assaults at the 

southwestern arc of the perimeter and 

at East Hill. Smith’s only course was to 

arrange ample close air support and 

order Colonel Faith to fight his way 

south.9 

Task Force Faith 

Colonel Faith started south at 1300 

on the 1st, right after his supporting 

9 7th Div Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50, Chosin 

Reservoir; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 240-43; Gugeler, Combat Actions in 

Korea, pp. 75-76; Field, United States Naval Operations, 

Korea. p. 277. 

aircraft came on station. (Map II) The 

1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, now commanded by its former executive officer, 

Maj. Crosby I’. Miller, led the way. 

Then came the 57th Field Artillery 

Battalion, the heavy mortar company 

of the 31st Infantry, and at the tail of 

the column the 3d Battalion, 31st 

Infantry. Battery D of the 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion interspersed its .50-caliber and 

40-mm. guns among the other units. 

Faith kept his column short, taking only 

twenty-two vehicles to carry his six 

hundred wounded. Before moving, 

his troops destroyed the remaining 

vehicles, excess supplies, and the 105- 

mm. howitzers of the field artillery 

battalion. 10

The leading battalion moved one rifle company down the road, the other 

two in column over the high ground 

east of the road as flank security. Faith’s 

column received fire almost from the 

minute it started, and four pilots overhead made the rough start rougher 

when they miscalculated their runs and 

dropped napalm on the leading troops. 

Several men burned to death, and the 

two front companies became disorganized while scattering to escape their 

own air support. 11

After some delay while Colonel Faith 

steadied his force, the column pushed 

past small groups of Chinese along the 

road until midafternoon when the lead 

troops came upon a destroyed bridge 

two miles below the point of departure. 

After a crude bypass was constructed, 

a half-track towed each truck across. 

10 7th Div Comd Rpt. 27 Nov-12 Dec 50, Chosin 

Reservoir; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 77-78. 

See also, MS, Lt. Col. C. P. Miller, Chosin Reservoir, 

November-December 1950. 

11Gugler, Combat Actions in Korea, p78. 
1Y
134 EBB AND FLOW 

AREA ALONG EAST SIDE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR occupied by Task Force 

Faith (viewed from the southeast). 

Small arms fire ranged in during the 

crossing, but by late afternoon the last 

vehicle was south of the stream. A few 

of Faith’s men meanwhile left the 

column, walked westward to the reservoir, and started south over the ice toward Hagaru-ri. The napalm episode, 

the near-constant enemy fire, and the 

delay at the bridge had begun to test 

Faith’s ability to retain control of his 

column. 12

Just below the bridge, the road south 

climbed into the lower northern slopes 

of Hill 1221 for a quarter mile, turned 

east for half a mile for a more gentle 

ascent, then made a hairpin turn at a 

12 Ibid., pp. 80-82. 

saddle and descended to the southwest. 

As Faith moved east over the half-mile 

stretch leading to the saddle, small arms 

and machine gun fire from the sharp 

turn and the high ground on either side 

struck the column head on and broadside, damaging some of the trucks and 

halting all of them. Moving along the 

stalled column, Faith got an attack 

started, first to clear the 1221 mass directly above him from where heavy fire 

was raking his column, then to eliminate the remainder of the Chinese 

blocking force by an enveloping move 

via Hill 1221 and an assault from the 

rear. 13 

13 7th Div Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50, Chosin 

Reservoir; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 8l-82. 
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 

Faith pushed a conglomeration up 

Hill 1221. The first seventy-five to a 

hundred men cleared the peak, a half 

mile west of the hairpin turn in the 

road. Because they believed some of 

the Chinese holding the high ground 

farther east had come in behind them, 

these troops then moved west to the 

reservoir and south on the ice toward 

Hagaru-ri. 14 

Behind the initial assault, Faith 

climbed 1221 with a hundred men; behind him Maj. Robert E. Jones, the S-2 

of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, 

started up with two hundred more. Just 

before dark Major Jones joined Faith, 

who by then had moved down the 

southeastern slopes of 1221 to a point 

on the road perhaps a quarter mile 

south of the hairpin turn. Here Faith 

put troops on both sides of the road 

and attacked north. Faith himself fell 

seriously wounded by grenade fragments before his assault force reached 

the road turn, but his troops fought 

through the Chinese position and 

opened the road so that the trucks again 

could move south.15 

Jones took charge of what was left of 

the column. The dispersion of troops 

during the effort to open the road, plus 

casualties that included leaders from 

platoon to task force level, had now 

nearly completed the disintegration begun when the first troops trickled off 

toward the reservoir. Besides the seriously wounded, Jones had no more 

than two hundred men to take south. 

The others, in small groups and individually, had wandered off to the reser135 

14 Ibid.; Action Rpt, 7th Div, 21 Nov to 20 Dec 50, 

From Hyesanjin to Hungnam Outloading; Mono, 

Martin Blumenson, “Chosin Reservoir,” copy in CMH. 

15 Ibid. 

voir or down the road to find their own 

ways south.16 

Almost all of the trucks had flat tires, 

and several were beyond repair. Jones’ 

men eventually got about fifteen to run, 

not enough to carry all of the casualties. 

Jones made the difficult decision to 

leave guards with the wounded for 

whom there was no room on the trucks 

and to continue south in the hope that 

the marines at Hagaru-ri, once informed of the abandoned men, could 

somehow retrieve them. 17 

Not much beyond a half mile south 

of the hairpin turn, two burned-out 

tanks lost earlier by the 31st Infantry 

troops based at Hudong-ni partially 

blocked the road and slowed Jones’ 

column as the trucks squeezed by. 

Otherwise, the column, except for overtaking several knots of men who had 

started south on their own, moved without incident until 2100 when it reached 

the northern end of Hudong-ni, halfway to Hagaru-ri. Here, fire from Chinese inside the village applied the 

final disintegrant to the withdrawing 

column. Major Jones and about half the 

able-bodied and walking wounded left 

the road and moved west to follow a 

narrow-gage rail line near the reservoir shore. These men followed the 

tracks for perhaps a mile before machine gun fire forced most of them onto 

the reservoir ice. Back on the road, an 

artillery officer led seventy men into 

Hudong-ni but was pushed out. For 

about an hour the troops still with the 

trucks stood fast, then elected to run 

the vehicles through the village. Chinese fire killed the drivers of the first 

three trucks and raked the remaining 

16 7th Div Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50, Chosin 

Reservoir; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, p. 82. 

17 Ibid. 
136 EBB AND FLOW 

MARINES BEGIN WITHDRAWAL FROM YUDAM-NI 

troops and vehicles. Everyone who 

could, scattered. Most of the men 

headed for the reservoir. By midnight 

only the dead and seriously wounded 

remained at Hudong-ni. Among them 

was Colonel Faith, who sat dead of his 

wounds in the cab of a 21/2-ton truck.” 

Survivors straggled into Hagaru-ri 

for the next three days, almost all of 

them coming off the frozen reservoir. 

The Chinese seemed to consider those 

who reached the ice as out of the game 

and molested them little. At Hudong-ni 

the Chinese administered aid to some 

18 Ibid. Colonel Faith was posthumously awarded 

the Medal of Honor. 

of the wounded and released them. After the first survivors reached Hagaruri, motorized Marine parties searched 

the reservoir and brought back others. 

A company-size task force of Army 

troops and tanks also attempted to 

move up the road toward Hudong-ni 

but turned back after meeting strong 

resistance. A few more than 1,000 of 

about 2,500 troops who originally composed Task Force Faith eventually got 

back to Hagaru-ri. Just 385 of the survivors were able-bodied. They received 

new equipment from 1st Marine Division stocks and with the other Army 

troops in Hagaru-ri became a provisional battalion attached to the 7th Marine Regiment after the 5th and 7th 
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 137 

Marines completed their withdrawal 

from Yudam-ni. 19 

Withdrawal From Yudam-ni 

When Colonels Litzenberg and Murray received General Smith’s order to 

withdraw from Yudam-ni, they already 

were regrouping their regiments under Smith’s previous order for one regiment to clear the supply road and 

rescue the marines on Fox Hill. By 

midmorning of 1 December all of Litzenberg’s and Murray’s forces were 

concentrated astride the road about two 

miles below town.20 (See Map 11.) 

The two colonels planned to move 

down the road toward Hagaru-ri as a 

single column during the day of the 

1st, leaving a rear guard to barricade 

the front entrance to their position 

while the main body unlocked the rear 

door. The key was judged to be 

Toktong Pass. The two commanders intended to send one battalion crosscountry east of the road after dusk to 

relieve the Fox Hill troops and secure 

the pass before the main column 

arrived. 

The leading marines started south at 

0900 and by 1930 were four miles below Yudam-ni, having wedged aside 

Chinese forces holding heights flanking the road. An hour and a half later 

the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, started 

through the mountains toward Fox Hill 

and Toktong Pass. Darkness and snow 

cover made maintaining direction 

through the rugged terrain difficult; 

19 Blumenson, “Chosin Reservoir”; Gugeler, Combat 

Operations in Korea, p. 85; Montross and Canzona, The 

Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 244-45, 288. 

20 This subsection is based on Montross and 

Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 249-75. 

climbs and descents exhausted the men, 

and a minus 16” Fahrenheit temperature numbed them, especially when 

they stopped to rest. But after pushing 

Chinese forces off two mountaintops, 

the cross-country force reached Fox 

Hill about 1130 on 2 December and a 

short time later secured the heights 

overlooking Toktong Pass. 

The marines on the road needed a 

day longer to fight their way to the pass, 

reaching it about 1300 on the 3d. After 

a brief rest, and again in single column, 

they continued over the road toward 

Hagaru-ri. Largely because of excellent 

air support, no serious opposition developed on the last leg of the withdrawal, although eight 155-mm. howitzers and the prime movers had to be 

abandoned when the latter ran out of 

fuel. Marine aircraft later destroyed 

them. At 1630 on the 3d, British commandos accompanied by tanks came 

out of Hagaru-ri to clear a short stretch 

of the withdrawal route, and about two 

and a half hours later the leading marines marched in cadence into the 

Hagaru-ri perimeter. The rear guard 

entered at 1400 the next day. Between 

the two regiments were some fifteen 

hundred casualties. 

Withdrawal From the Reservoir 

The Hagaru-ri perimeter had been 

quiet for four days by the time the last 

troops from Yudam-ni arrived. After 

failing to take the base during the night 

of 30 November, the 58th Division had 

made no more attempts to force its way 

in. About fifteen hundred dead Chinese counted so far by the marines 

along with information from prisoners, 

indicated that the enemy division 
138 EBB AND FLOW 

C-47 AIRCRAFT BEGAN EVACUATING CASUALTIES from the Hugaru-ri airstrip on 

1 December. 

needed reinforcement and new 

supplies .21

During those four days and on the 

5th, the evacuation of casualties was a 

major activity at Hagaru-ri. As of the 

1st some six hundred casualties already 

taxed the base medical facilities, a total 

that would enlarge considerably upon 

the arrival of the Yudam-ni force and 

the survivors of Task Force Faith. Evacuation so far had been by helicopter 

and light plane with the highest daily 

total reaching no more than sixty 

casualties. With a view to increasing this 

21 Ibid., pp. 242, 278. 

figure, General Smith on the 1st authorized a trial landing by larger aircraft on the airstrip southwest of town 

even though it was only 40 percent 

complete, the runway measuring 50 by 

2,900 feet. A C-47 landed successfully 

that afternoon, and by dark on the 5th 

some forty-three hundred casualties 

had been airlifted south.22 

General Almond on 2 December 

had ordered General Smith to leave 

Hagaru-ri as soon as the evacuation of 

casualties permitted. Since few casualties remained after the airlifts of the 

22 Ibid., pp. 245-46, 278-79. 
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 

5th and his forces from Yudam-ni had 

had a day of rest, Smith ordered the 

withdrawal to begin the following 

morning.23 

General Tunner, commander of the 

Far East Air Forces’ Combat Cargo 

Command, flew into Hagaru-ri on the 

5th with an offer to lift Smith’s troops 

out-at the expense of Marine equipment. But although Tunner believed 

he could fly ten thousand Marine and 

Army troops out of Hagaru-ri, and although a withdrawal by air might have 

minimized troop losses, Smith refused 

the offer in favor of moving overland 

so that he could take out the bulk of his 

equipment, including about a thousand 

vehicles. General Almond had been 

briefed by Smith on 2 and 4 December, 

and, although he earlier had authorized Smith to destroy equipment, he 

apparently was satisfied with Smith’s 

intention. 24 

To assist the overland withdrawal, 

Smith since the 1st had flown in over 

five hundred replacements on the 

planes coming for casualties and had 

brought in supplies at least sufficient 

to move as far at Kot’o-ri, where resupply would be available. When room on 

the planes permitted, he sent out valuable but unneeded equipment; before 

leaving Hagaru-ri, he ordered the destruction of all items that had to be left 

behind.25 

Smith’s 5 December order detailed 

139 

23 Ibid., p. 399; X Corps OI 22, 2 Dec 50; 1st Marine Div Opn O 25-50, 5 Dec 50. 

24 X Corps Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 

Nov-10 Dec 50; Field, United States Naval Operations, 

Korea, p. 280; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 281, 307. 

25 Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 280-82, 285. 

the withdrawal as far as Kot’o-ri and 

set the scheme for moving all the way 

to Hamhung. In the overall plan, the 

forces at Hagaru-ri were to pass south 

through those at Kot’o-ri and continue 

withdrawing with the Kot’o-ri contingent bringing up the rear. On the first 

leg the 7th Marines, with the battalion 

formed from Task Force Faith survivors and the other Army troops at 

Hagaru-ri attached, would lead the 

way to Kot’o-ri. The 5th Marines, the 

3d Battalion of the 1st Marines, and the 

British commandos would be the rear 

guard and would man the Hagaru-ri 

perimeter until Colonel Litzenberg’s 

forces were clear. Smith divided the remaining division troops and vehicles 

into two trains, attaching one to each of 

the Marine regiments for the withdrawal.26 

To insure constant artillery support, 

the Marine batteries at Hagaru-ri were 

to leapfrog south, about half the guns 

always in firing position. Marine artillery at Kot’o-ri was to provide additional 

support. Overhead, a daytime umbrella 

of twenty-four planes was to cover the 

entire length of the withdrawing column while other aircraft searched the 

ridges east and west of the road. Night 

hecklers were to come on station to insure round-the-clock support.27

Once his Hagaru-ri forces were well 

started, General Smith intended to take 

his staff by air to Kot’o-ri, where he 

would complete the detailed planning 

for the remainder of the withdrawal. 

He already had taken steps to meet two 

problems connected with the next 

phase. By the 6th his intelligence indi26 Ibid., pp. 283-88, 300. 

27 Ibid., pp. 286-87. 
140 EBB AND FLOW 

cated that at least two 26th Army divisions, the 76th and 77th, had moved 

south into the mountains east of the 

Changjin Reservoir road between 

Hagaru-ri and Kot’o-ri. They apparently had relieved the 20th Army’s 60th 

Division near Kot’o-ri, and the 60th in 

turn had moved farther south to block 

the reservoir road in and around 

Funchilin Pass. On the other side of 

the withdrawal route, the bulk and perhaps all of the 20th Army’s 89th Division 

now appeared to be southwest of Kot’ori. Forces of the 89th had followed the 

withdrawal of 3d Division troops from 

Sach’ang-ni when the latter were pulled 

back to Hamhung, and the Chinese 

were reported to be moving east on 

Chinhung-ni and Majon-dong.28 

Because Smith believed the Chinese 

might offer their strongest resistance 

along the winding road between Kot’ori and Chinhung-ni, he wanted to move 

the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, north 

from Chinhung-ni to clear those ten 

twisting miles ahead of the withdrawal 

from the north. To do this and at the 

same time protect Chinhung-ni, Smith 

on the 5th asked General Almond to 

furnish a relief force for the Chinhungni garrison. Almond turned to the 3d 

Division for the needed troops, directing General Soule to shape a motorized force around a battalion of infantry, a battalion of artillery, and a 

complement of engineers. Commanded 

by assistant division commander 

General Mead and designated Task 

Force Dog, this group was to assemble 

in Majon-dong prepared to move forward on six hours’ notice after 0600 on 

28 TLCN 668, FEC-X Corps, 3 Dec 50; Montross 

and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 

285-313. 

the 6th.29 Soule also ordered the 2d 

Battalion, 65th Infantry, and the 999th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion forward to cover Task Force Dog’s advance 

and to protect the reservoir road from 

positions in and north of Majon-dong.30 

Smith’s second problem was a sixteen-foot chasm in the road three and 

a half miles south of Kot’o-ri. Here, 

where the road had been cut into the 

side of a steep slope at the northern 

end of Funchilin Pass, water from the 

Changjin Reservoir poured in warmer 

weather from a pipeline north of the 

road into four penstocks that carried 

the torrent down the mountainside to 

a power plant. A gatehouse covered the 

upper ends of the penstocks, and where 

the roadway crossed the penstocks immediately below the gatehouse now lay 

only the rubble of the original concrete 

bridge, the remains of a wooden crossing, and the broken sections of an M-2 

steel treadway bridge. Since the beginning of their offensive the Chinese had 

successively destroyed all three, knocking down the treadway spans on either 

4 or 5 December.31 

29 Task Force Dog included the 3d Battalion, 7th 

Infantry; 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (selfpropelled); Company A, 73d Engineer Combat Battalion; a platoon of Company A, 10th Engineer Combat Battalion; 3d Platoon, 3d Reconnaissance 

Company; 52d Transportation Truck Battalion; a detachment from division headquarters; a detachment 

from the 3d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (self-propelled); a bomb disposal detachment; a tactical air control party; and a detachment 

from the 3d Signal Company. 

30 X Corps Special Rpt on the Chosin Reservoir, 27 

Nov to 10 Dec 50; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin 

Reservoir Campaign, pp. 308-09; X Corps OI 26, 5 Dec 

50; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Dec 50; Dolcater, The 3d Division in Korea, p. 92. 

31 Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 309-11. 
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 141 

Because the gatehouse and the sheer 

slope prevented the construction of a 

bypass on either side of the gap, new 

bridging had to be installed before 

Smith’s trucks, tanks, and guns could 

proceed below Kot’o-ri. Smith’s engineer officer, Lt. Col. John H. Partridge, 

surveyed the site from the air on 6 

December, then made an unusual request of corps for an airdrop of eight 

2,500-lb. treadway bridge sections at 

Kot’o-ri, where Army engineers had 

two Brockway trucks designed to put 

them in place. After an unsuccessful 

trial drop at Yonp’o airfield in which 

several small parachutes were attached 

to the test span, a special crew of Army 

parachute riggers flown in from Japan 

attached two larger chutes to each section, and on 7 December eight of General Tunner’s C-119s delivered the 

bridging to Kot’o-ri. One span fell in 

Chinese territory, and another was 

damaged; but only four of the remainder would actually be needed to bridge 

the gap. Plywood center sections also 

were dropped so that the bridge could 

carry all types of vehicles.32 

hundred killed before they subsided 

near dawn on the 7th.33 

From the moment they started south 

the 7th Marines met resistance, particularly just below Hagaru-ri and in Hell 

Fire Valley. (See Map 12.) But the air 

umbrella, artillery and tank fire, and 

coordinated assaults by the foot troops 

against Chinese strongpoints-permitted 

steady if slow progress. Behind the lead 

battalion, which reached Kot’o-ri about 

the time the East Hill battle closed, the 

remainder of Colonel Litzenberg’s 

force completed its withdrawal before 

1700 on the 7th. 

By midmorning of the 7th, all of the 

rear guard except a detachment of 

engineers, a tank platoon, and the 2d 

Battalion of the 5th Marines had left 

Hagaru-ri. These last troops set fire to 

the Marine ration dump, which on the 

day before had been smashed and saturated with fuel oil, and touched off explosives to destroy all other abandoned 

supplies. As the last of the rear guard 

withdrew just past noon, small groups 

of Chinese entered Hagaru-ri and began picking over the debris. 

From the Reservoir to Kot’o-ri 

Since some of the Chinese positions 

on East Hill dominated the Marine 

withdrawal route, General Smith’s rear 

guard attacked the height on the morning of 6 December as the 7th Marines 

moved out of Hagaru-ri. The assault 

cleared the hill but also prompted hard 

counterattacks from ground farther 

east that cost the Chinese over twelve 

Hundreds of refugees who had collected in and around Hagaru-ri followed the rear guard, risking their lives 

to cross bridges before Marine engineers destroyed them. Aside from this 

interference with demolitions, the rear 

guard withdrew easily. Chinese opposition amounted only to small arms fire 

as far as Hell Fire Valley and a few 

mortar rounds in the valley itself. Once 

below this point, Colonel Murray’s 

forces met almost no resistance and entered Kot’o-ri before midnight. As the 

first stage of the withdrawal closed 

32 X Corps Special Rpt on the Chosin Reservoir, 27 

Nov to 10 Dec 50; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin 

Reservoir Campaign, p. 311. 

33 This subsection is based on Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 286-303. 
142 EBB AND FLOW 

SITE OF THE DESTROYED BRIDGE SOUTH OF KOT'O-RI 

about thirty-eight hours after it began, before Puller’s force left Kot’o-ri to 

Marine battle casualties totaled 103 b 

dead, 493 wounded, and 7 missing. 

ring up the rear during the last phase 

of the withdrawal.34 

From Kot’o-ri to the Coast 

To permit the rapid evacuation of 

casualties incurred during the move 

from Hagaru-ri, Colonel Puller, the 

commander of the Kot’o-ri garrison, on 

6 December had set his engineers to 

lengthening the Kot’o-ri airstrip to accommodate C-47s. The strip was long 

enough by morning of the 8th, although a heavy snowstorm on that date 

canceled all but one flight. On the following two days the larger aircraft, observation planes, and helicopters took 

out all of the casualties, the last shortly 

General Smith and his staff had 

flown to Kot’o-ri during the afternoon 

of the 6th to complete plans for withdrawing the remaining distance to the 

coast. Late that night he asked General 

Almond to move Task Force Dog to 

Chinhung-ni by the following afternoon. Smith now intended that the 1st 

Battalion, 1st Marines, would move 

northward through Funchilin Pass at 

0800 on the 8th, the same time that the 

34 Ibid., pp. 3O6-35, 356, 382; 3d Div Comd Rpt, 

Dec 50; X Corps OI 26, 5 Dec 50. 
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 143 

THE CHASM LATER BRIDGED WITH AIRDROPPED TREADWAY SPANS 

leading force started south from Kot’ori. The southern force was to clear the 

road and a ridge commanding the pass 

on the east as far as and including Hill 

1081, three miles north. From Kot’o-ri, 

the 7th Marines and a battalion of the 

5th were to move over the road and 

the bordering heights as far as and including the penstocks that had to be 

bridged a short distance above Hill 

1081. Once the withdrawal route was 

clear and the penstocks were spanned, 

the division’s trains and then the trains 

and troops of the 7th and 5th Marines 

were to continue south in that order. 

Colonel Puller’s 1st Marine Regiment 

(less the 1st Battalion), the 2d Battalion 

of the 31st Infantry, and the forty tanks 

of the several armored units were to 

hold Kot’o-ri until all other troops had 

left, then bring up the rear as far as 

Hill 1081. From that point the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was to take rearguard duty until it passed through Task 

Force Dog at Chinhung-ni. 

To assist the withdrawal behind Task 

Force Dog, Smith asked corps to assemble freight cars at Majon-dong to take 

some of his forces to Hamhung over 

the narrow-gage rail line. He also 

asked for as many trucks as could be 

furnished. When Smith’s units passed 

through Task Force Dog, the trucks 

were to come forward from Majondong as far as Chinhung-ni to carry 

the troops either to the Majon-dong 

railhead or all the way to Hamhung. 

After receiving General Almond’s or- 
MAP 12
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 

der to dispatch Task Force Dog, General Soule first moved the 999th Armored Field Artillery Battalion to 

Majon-dong on the morning of the 7th. 

Under the fire support of this battalion, 

Soule next sent the 2d Battalion, 65th 

Infantry, forward to secure high 

ground west of the road between 

Majon-dong and the village of Sudong 

to protect Task Force Dog’s movement. 

Task Force Dog left Majon-dong an 

hour before noon and without encountering opposition reached Chinhung-ni 

about three hours later. The 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry, except Company 

G, then moved back to protect Majondong. 

Task Force Dog’s prompt arrival permitted General Smith to start the second phase of withdrawal on time and 

as conceived. But the snowstorm on the 

8th kept his close air support on the 

ground and, in combination with moderate to strong Chinese resistance, 

slowed the forces approaching each 

other. The 7th Marines, with the Army 

provisional battalion still attached, and 

the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, cleared 

the road and bordering high ground 

south within a mile of the penstock 

bridge site by nightfall; at the same 

time, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, supported by Task Force Dog’s artillery 

and accompanied by General Mead’s 

engineers and self-propelled antiaircraft guns, moved north into Funchilin 

Pass within a half mile of Hill 1081. 

The sky cleared before morning of 

the 9th. With good support from the 

air again available, the 7th Marines 

pushed to the bridge site about. a half 

hour past noon. The marines from the 

south meanwhile fought a stiff battle 

for Hill 1081, capturing the height 

around 1500. Shortly afterward a pa145 

trol from the 7th Marines reached 1081 

to make first contact with the southern 

force. 

Behind this scene Colonel Partridge, 

the Marine engineer, accompanied by 

both Army and Marine troops, the 

Brockway trucks, an the treadway sections, reached the bridge site right 

after the penstock area was cleared. 

Three hours later the bridge was in 

place, and near 1800 the Marine division trains began to cross. 

Only a few vehicles had used the 

bridge before a tractor broke through 

and destroyed the plywood center 

panels. Colonel Partridge’s adjustment 

of the spacing of the steel treadway sections to accommodate the treads of all 

vehicles prevented further difficulty at 

the crossing. Led by the 1st Battalion 

of the 7th Marines, the trains, the remainder of the 7th Regiment, the bulk 

of the Marine artillery, and the 5th 

Marines, with refugees interspersed, 

passed over the span during the night 

of the 9th and the following day. Receiving only a few scattered shots en 

route, the leading battalion reached 

Chinhung-ni at 0245 on the 10th, the 

5th Marines about the same time on 

the 11th. 

The last troops left Kot’o-ri at midafternoon on the 10th. Behind them 

came the bulk of the refugees. Task 

Force Dog’s artillery fired on the town 

after it was vacated, and no serious opposition developed as the last units 

started toward the penstock bridge. But 

progress was slow. By 0100 on the 11th 

tanks and a platoon of the Marine 

division’s reconnaissance company at 

the tail end of the column were still 

more than a mile above the treadway 

span. Frozen brakes halted the ninth 

tank from the rear at that point, and as 
146 EBB AND FLOW 

TASK FORCE DOG ARTILLERY IN CHINHUNG-NI FIRING POSITION 

tankers worked to free the vehicle, Chinese troops among the refugees and in 

the nearby high ground opened fire. 

The last seven tanks, the crews of the 

last two, and three men from the reconnaissance platoon were lost in the melee that followed. 

After the remaining tanks and reconnaissance troops passed over the penstocks, Marine engineers demolished 

the treadway bridge. Denied the use of 

the crossing, the trailing refugees got 

past the gap by walking through the 

gatehouse north of the road. The marines on Hill 1081 were scheduled to 

bring up the rear after all Kot’o-ri 

forces passed by but mistakenly took to 

the road before the last tanks and 

reconnaissance troops reached their 

position. The rearmost troops nevertheless reached Chinhung-ni safely during the morning of the 11th. 

By the time these rear forces passed 

behind Task Force Dog, the deepest 

Chinese effort to obstruct the withdrawal already had been encountered 

at Sudong. Between late afternoon on 

the 10th and dawn on the 11th, Chinese forces struck Company G, 65th 

Infantry, three times in the heights 

west of town, and during the second 

attempt, launched about an hour past 

midnight, opened fire from houses inside Sudong and swarmed onto the 

road as the regimental train of the 1st 

Marines started through town. Lt. Col. 
CONCENTRATION AT HUNGNAM 147 

TABLE 3-X CORPS BATTLE CASUALTIES, 27 NOVEMBER-10 DECEMBER 1950 

John U. D. Page, the X Corps artillery 

officer, who had moved down from 

Kot'o-ri with Colonel Puller’s train, and 

Pfc. Marvin L. Wasson, a Marine driver, 

made a two-man assault against some 

twenty Chinese during the battle, killing about sixteen. But Page himself was 

killed and Wasson was wounded.35 Lt. 

Col. Waldron C. Winston, commander 

of Task Force Dog’s 52d Transportation Truck Battalion, then organized a 

stronger counterattack using both 

Marine and Army troops and finally 

cleared the road and bordering buildings by daybreak. 

35 Colonel Page was posthumously awarded the Navy 

Cross, and also the Medal of Honor in 1956 after 

Congress passed a special bill to allow the award so 

many years past the event. 

No further fighting took place while 

the men from Kot’o-ri completed their 

withdrawal behind Task Force Dog. 

The last of them left Chinhung-ni near 

1300 on the 11th and cleared Majondong by 1730. Freight cars and trucks 

carried all but the tank column to 

the Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter by 

2100; the slower-moving armor closed 

a half hour before midnight. Task 

Force Dog, bringing up the rear from 

Chinhung-ni, reached Majon-dong at 

2000. Here the task force disbanded 

and its units along with the other 3d 

Division forces involved in supporting 

the withdrawal from the reservoir 

moved back to help defend Hamhung 

and Hungnam. 

The Marine division’s battle casualties during the move from Kot’o-ri to 
148 EBB AND FLOW 

the coast numbered 75 dead, 256 

wounded, and 16 missing.36 These 

brought the division’s battle losses for 

the entire 6-11 December period to 178 

dead, 749 wounded, and 23 missing. 

The marines also had suffered 1,534 

non-battle casualties, a very large percentage of whom were frostbite cases. 

Marine losses thus totaled 2,484, or 

just over 20 percent of the 11,686 marines involved in the withdrawal from 

Hagaru-ri. (Table 1) 

Between 27 November and 11 December the Marine and Army troops 

in the reservoir area had met all three 

armies, the 20th, 26th and 27th, of the 

IX Army Group and had engaged eight 

of the twelve divisions constituting these 

armies. They had exacted an especially 

large toll on the 20th and 27th. From 

evidence gained later through captured 

documents and prisoner interrogations, 

high Chinese casualties, both battle and 

non-battle, had “rendered militarily 

non-effective a large part of the 9th 

CCF Army Group.“37 

On 10 December General Smith and 

members of his staff had flown out of 

Kot’o-ri to Hungnam. Until that date 

Smith’s next assignment had been to 

put his division in position on the 

southwestern end of the HamhungHungnam perimeter. But on arriving 

at the coast Smith learned that developments and decisions in the Eighth Army 

sector, in Tokyo, and in Washington 

over the first eight days of December 

had changed the plans not only for the 

1st Marine Division but for the entire 

X Corps; on the 11th he received a new 

corps order that proved Admiral Joy’s 

late November deployment of Task 

Force 90 to have been a well-conceived 

and timely precaution. 

36 No breakdown is available for losses sustained 

among the 2,353 Army troops, 125 Royal Marine 

Commandos, or 40 ROK police. 

37 Marine Corps Board Study, II-C-125, quoted in 

Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, 

p. 356. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Redeployment South 

The Eighth Army Leaves North Korea 

The Chinese did not pursue the 

Eighth Army’s twenty-mile withdrawal 

from the Ch’ongch’on to the Sukch’onSunch’on-Songch’on line. Only light enemy patrolling occurred along the new 

line on 1 December, mostly at its eastern end where there had been no deep 

withdrawal the day before. General 

Walker nevertheless believed that the 

Chinese would soon close the gap, resume their frontal assaults, and again 

send forces against his east flank.1 

Walker now estimated the Chinese 

opposing him to number at least six 

armies with eighteen divisions and 

165,000 men. Of his own forward units, 

only the 1st Cavalry; 24th, 25th, and 

ROK 1st Divisions; and the two British 

brigades were intact. The ROK 6th Division could be employed as a division 

but its regiments were tattered; about 

half the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions 

had reassembled but were far less able 

than their strengths indicated; and both 

the 2d Division and Turkish brigade 

needed substantial refurbishing before 

they could again function as units. Of 

his reserves, the four ROK divisions 

operating against guerrillas in central 

and southern Korea were too untrained 

to be trustworthy on the line. His only 

1 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 

2 Ibid.; Eighth Army PIR 142, 1 Dec 50; Sawyer, 

KMAG in Peace and War, p. 146; Appleman, South to 

the Naktong, pp. 618, 667. 

3 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 

Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50. Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50. 

other reserves were the 187th Airborne 

Regimental Combat Team and its attached Filipino and Thai battalions then 

guarding forward army supply installations; the Netherlands battalion, which 

had just completed its processing at the 

U.N. Reception Center; and an infantry battalion from France, which had 

just debarked at Pusan.2 

By Walker’s comparison of forces, the 

injured Eighth Army could not now set 

a successful, static defense. Considering 

delaying action to be the only course 

open, a course in which he should not 

risk becoming heavily engaged and in 

which he should anticipate moving out 

of Korea, Walker began to select delaying lines behind him. He intended 

to move south from one to the next 

well before his forces could be fixed, 

flanked, or enveloped.3 

Though the XIII Army Group remained out of contact on 2 December, 

Walker received agent and aerial observer reports that Chinese were moving into the region east of Songch’on 

and that either they or North Korean 

guerrillas infesting that area had established blocking positions below 

the P’yongyang-Wonsan road from 
150 EBB AND FLOW 

ch’on line on 2 December, Maj. Gen. 

Doyle O. Hickey, acting chief of staff 

of the Far East Command and United 

Nations Command, arrived with word 

from General MacArthur that, in effect, 

allowed Walker to leave behind any 

equipment and other materiel that he 

chose as long as they were destroyed.6 

Walker, however, planned not to drop 

behind P’yongyang until the army and 

air force supply points in the city 

had been emptied and the port of 

Chinnamp’o cleared. To provide time 

for the removal he ordered a half step 

to the rear, sending his forces south 

toward a semicircular line still twenty 

miles above P’yongyang. (Map 13) 

While service troops rushed to evacuate supplies and equipment from the 

North Korean capital and port, line 

units reached the temporary line late 

on the 3d with no enemy interference 

beyond being harassed by North Korean guerrillas on the east flank.7 

Walker meanwhile pushed reserves 

eastward onto Route 33, the next 

P’yongyang-Seoul road inland from 

Route 1, to protect his east flank and to 

guarantee an additional withdrawal 

route below the North Korean capital. 

He deployed the 24th Division at 

Yul-li, twenty-five miles southeast of 

P’yongyang, and the partially restored 

ROK II Corps at Sin’gye in the Yesong 

River valley another thirty miles to the 

southeast. South and east of Sin’gye, 

units of the ROK 2d and 5th Divisions 

previously had occupied Sibyon-ni and 

Yonch’on on Route 33, P’och’on on 

Route 3, and Ch’unch’on on Route 17 

Songch’on eastward twenty-five miles 

to Yangdok. They could be trying to 

secure a portion of the lateral route in 

advance of a drive toward either or both 

coasts, and should the drive go west 

into P’yongyang, they could trap the 

Eighth Army above the city. In view of 

the latter possibility, Walker elected to 

withdraw before the thrust materialized. P’yongyang was to be abandoned.4 

Walker’s use of relatively slight intelligence information in deciding to withdraw below P’yongyang reflected the 

general attitude of the Eighth Army. 

According to some accounts, Walker’s 

forces had become afflicted with “bugout fever,” a term usually used to describe a tendency to withdraw without 

fighting and even to disregard orders.5 

Because it implied cowardice and dereliction of duty, the term was unwarranted. Yet the hard attacks and high 

casualties of the past week and the apparent Chinese strength had shaken the 

Eighth Army’s confidence. This same 

doubt had some influence on Walker’s 

decision to give up P’yongyang and 

would manifest itself again in other decisions to withdraw. But the principal 

reason for withdrawing had been, was, 

and would continue to be the constant 

threat of envelopment from the east. 

P’yongyang Abandoned 

As Walker started his withdrawal 

from the Sukch’on-Sunch’on-Song4 Ibid.; Eighth Army PIR 142, 1 Dec 50; Eighth 

Army PIR 143, 2 Dec 50. 

5 For example, British historian David Rees, in Korea; 

The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 

on page 171 entitled a section covering the Eighth 

Army’s withdrawal “The Big Bug-Out” and on page 

176 stated, “At the Front throughout December the 

moral collapse of the Eighth Army was complete, as 

bug-out fever raged everywhere.” 

6 General Almond officially remained the chief of 

staff. 

7 Interv, Appleman with Hickey, 10 Oct 51; Eighth 

Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Rad, GX 30141 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 2 Dec 50. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 151 

EIGHTH ARMY TROOPS WITHDRAWING SOUTH from Sunch’on toward P’yongyang. 

in the Pukhan River valley during antiguerrilla operations. Route 33 thus was 

protected at important road junctions, 

and Walker at least had the semblance 

of an east flank screen all the way from 

P’yongyang to Seoul.8 

Walker moved the damaged 2d Division from Chunghwa into army reserve at Munsan-ni on the Imjin River 

twenty-two miles north of Seoul, where 

General Keiser, with priority on replacements, was to rebuild his unit. But 

while Keiser’s immediate and main task 

was to revive the 2d Division, Walker 

wanted him also to reconnoiter as far 

8 Ibid.; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50. 

as Hwach’on, more than fifty miles east 

of Munsan-ni, in case it became necessary to employ 2d Division troops in 

those areas guarded by South Korean 

units of doubtful ability. Walker attached the Turkish brigade to the 

2d Division. Hurt less by casualties 

than by disorganization and equipment losses, the Turks had collected 

bit by bit at several locations, mostly at 

P’yongyang. On 2 December, after General Yasici had recovered some thirtyfive hundred of his original five thousand men, Walker ordered the brigade 

to Kaesong, fifteen miles north of 

Munsan-ni, to complete refurbishing 

under General Keiser’s supervision as 
ryl\4
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 

more of its members were located and 

returned.9 

Walker held the 187th Airborne 

Regimental Combat Team and its attachments in the P’yongyang area to 

protect his supply routes and installations. In preparation for the coming 

withdrawal south of the city, the airborne troops also were to keep civilians 

from moving over four ponton bridges 

spanning the Taedong River, two inside P’yongyang and another pair three 

miles east of the city, and to take whatever other precautions were necessary 

to insure an uninterrupted flow of military traffic over the crossings.10 

On 3 December, after receiving more 

reports of sizable enemy movements 

and concentrations east and northeast 

of the Eighth Army position, Walker 

anticipated not only a westward enemy 

push into P’yongyang but also a deeper 

thrust southwest through the Yesong 

valley and across the army withdrawal 

routes in the vicinity of Sin’gye. Induced to haste by this possibility, he 

ordered his line units to drop fifteen 

miles behind P’yongyang beginning on 

the morning of the 4th, to a line curving eastward from Kyomip’o on the 

lower bank of the Taedong to a point 

short of Koksan in a subsidiary valley 

of the upper Yesong River. Walker 

warned them to be ready to withdraw 

another fifty miles on the west and 

twenty miles on the east to a line running from Haeju on the coast north153 

eastward through Sin’gye, then eastward through Ich’on in the Imjin River 

valley. The latter withdrawal would set 

Walker’s rightmost units athwart the 

Yesong valley in fair position to delay 

an enemy strike through it and would 

eliminate concern for the army left 

flank, which, after the initial withdrawal 

below P’yongyang, would open on the 

large Hwanghae peninsula southwest 

of Kyomip’o.11 

In withdrawing south of P’yongyang, 

the IX Corps, now with the 24th Division attached, was to move on Route 

33, occupy the right sector of the new 

army front, and reinforce the weak 

ROK II Corps in protecting the army 

east flank in the Yesong valley. The I 

Corps was to withdraw to the west sector of the new line over Route 1 and, 

while passing through P’yongyang, destroy any abandoned materiel found 

within the city.12 

General Milburn’s demolition assignment was likely to be sizable. Aside 

from organizational and individual 

equipment lost by the line units, the 

only notable materiel losses since the 

Chinese opened their offensive had 

been fourteen hundred tons of ammunition stored at Sinanju and five hundred tons at Kunu-ri. But now Walker’s 

forces were about to give up the locale 

of the Eighth Army’s main forward 

stockpiles, and although the smaller 

stores at Chinnamp’o might be evacuated, it was less likely that the larger 

quantities brought into P’yongyang 

over the past several weeks could be 

completely removed on such short 

9 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 

Army G1 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, 

Dec 50; “Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 

Nov-13 Dec 50”; Rad, GX 30139 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to CG 2d Div, 2 Dec 50; Rad, GX 30142 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps et al., 2 Dec 50. 

10 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Rad, GX 30146 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 2 Dec 

50. 

11 Eighth Army PIRs 143, 2 Dec 50, and 144, 3 Dec 

50; Rad, CG 30162 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 3 Dec 50. 

12 Rad, GX 30162 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 3 Dec 50. 
154 EBB AND FLOW 

ALL BRIDGES OVER THE TAEDONG RIVER AT P'YONGYANG WERE DESTROYED 

after the Eighth Army withdrew south of the city. 

notice. The improbability of clearing 

the P’yongyang stocks was increased by 

the necessity to give priority on locomotives to trains carrying casualties 

and service units, by heavy demands 

on trucks for troop movements as well 

as for hauling materiel from supply 

point to railroad yard, and by the 

problems of loading and switching 

trains in congested yards that earlier 

had been severely damaged by UNC air 

bombardment.13 

With almost no enemy contact, Walker’s forces moved south of P’yongyang 

13 Eighth Army G4 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army, 

“Logistical Problems and Their Solutions.” 

within twenty-four hours. Much of the 

city was afire by 0730 on 5 December 

when the rear guards destroyed the 

last bridges over the Taedong and set 

off final demolitions in the section of 

P’yongyang below the river. Colonel 

Stebbins, Walker’s G-4 who supervised 

the removal of materiel from Chinnamp’o and P’yongyang, would have 

preferred a slower move by seventytwo or even forty-eight hours. Given 

that additional time, Stebbins believed, 

the service troops could have removed 

most of the eight to ten thousand tons 

of supplies and equipment that now 

lay abandoned and broken up or burning inside P’yongyang. More time also 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 

could have prevented such oversights 

as leaving at least fifteen operable M-46 

tanks abroad flatcars in the railroad 

yards in the southwestern part of the 

city. Fifth Air Force planes struck these 

overlooked tanks on 6 December, but 

differing pilot claims left obscure the 

amount of damage done.14 

Although Chinnamp’o was exposed 

after early morning of the 5th, evacuation of the port continued until evening without harassment from enemy 

forces. Pressed only by time and the 

wide range of the Yellow Sea tides, the 

port troops from 2 through 5 December loaded LSTs, transports of the Japanese merchant marine, a squadron of 

U.S. Navy troop and cargo transports, 

and at least a hundred Korean sailboats. Aboard these craft went casualties, prisoners, and materiel sent from 

P’yongyang; the supplies and equipment on the ground around the port; 

the port service units themselves; and 

some thirty thousand refugees (most of 

them on the sailboats). Four American 

destroyers took station off Chinnamp’o, 

and aircraft from the British carrier 

Theseus appeared overhead on the 5th 

to protect the final outloading. That 

morning the port commander received 

word from Colonel Stebbins to get the 

last ships under way on the favorable 

tide at 1700. The last three ships 

pulled away from the docks near that 

hour. Demolition crews set off their 

last explosives, and shortly afterward 

the last men ashore drove an amphibious truck out to a waiting ship. Some 

two thousand tons of supplies and a 

few items of port equipment, small 

amounts by comparison with the losses 

14 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 

Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army, “Logistical 

Problems and Their Solutions.” 

155 

at P’yongyang, had had to be destroyed 

for lack of time to remove them.15 

The men and materiel sea lifted from 

Chinnamp’o were landed either at 

Inch’on (port personnel, rations, and 

petroleum products) or Pusan (patients, 

prisoners, and remaining supplies). 

Most of the stock evacuated from 

P’yongyang was shipped to depots at 

Kaesong and around Seoul. Some was 

kept forward aboard the railcars on 

which it had been loaded to institute a 

mobile system of meeting day-to-day requirements of the line units. These 

daily needs, mostly rations and petroleum products, were to be issued from 

the cars at railheads whose locations 

could be changed as rapidly as the line 

units withdrew. This system would reduce the likelihood of further materiel 

losses.16 

The trace of the new army position 

vaguely resembled a question mark. 

I and IX Corps defenses between 

Kyomip’o and Yul-li formed the upper 

arc, IX Corps positions on the east flank 

from Yul-li southeastward to Sin’gye 

shaped the shank, and clumps of army 

reserves below Sin’gye supplied several 

dots. The figure traced was appropriate since Walker now had been out of 

meaningful contact with enemy forces 

for five days, had no clear idea of the 

location or movement of the main Chinese body, and could only speculate on 

what the XIII Army Group commander 

could or intended to do next.17 

15 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army 

G4 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army, “Logistical Problems and Their Solutions”; Field, United States Naval 

Operations, Korea, pp. 272-74. 

16 Eighth Army G4 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Mono, Eighth 

Army, “Activities of the 3d Transportation Military 

Railway Service-The Withdrawal From Pyongyang,” 

copy in CMH. 

17 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 

Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50. 
156 

In an attempt to fill the intelligence 

gap deriving from the withdrawals and 

the Chinese slowness to follow, Walker 

on the 5th ordered General Milburn 

and General Coulter to send strong reconnaissance patrols, including tanks, 

north as far as the Taedong River. But 

only the 1st Cavalry Division reported 

any noteworthy deep patrolling, on 6 

December when two battalions sortied 

northeast up the Yesong valley and into 

Kokson, where they fought a minor 

skirmish with North Korean troops, 

and on 7 December when two companies made another, but uneventful, visit 

to the town.18 

Most of Walker’s information continued to come from agents and aerial 

observers. The latter reported on the 

6th that enemy troops were moving into 

Chinnamp’o and south across the Taedong estuary by ferry to the Hwanghae 

peninsula. Agents on the same day verified the presence of Chinese troops in 

P’yongyang and reported that North 

Korean regulars were joining North 

Korean guerrillas to the east and right 

rear of the Eighth Army. To escape 

the trouble these reports portended, 

Walker instructed his forward units to 

withdraw on 8 December to the HaejuSin’gye-Ich’on line and to extend that 

line east to Kumhwa. The west flank 

would again be anchored on the sea, 

and Walker’s forces would be able to 

present a front instead of a flank to the 

North Korean units reported gathering 

on the east.19 

EBB AND FLOW 

But what now worried Walker most 

were the whereabouts and intentions 

of the Chinese he previously had suspected were maneuvering into attack 

position just beyond his east flank. Because his forces at no time since 30 November had captured or even sighted a 

Chinese soldier during the sporadic encounters along the army right, he was 

beginning to believe that all enemy 

troops immediately east of him were 

North Korean. Chinese forces, then, 

possibly were moving south, not into 

position for a close-in envelopment but 

around the Eighth Army some distance 

to the east through the X Corps’ rear 

area. Since General Almond’s forces 

were concentrating at Hamhung and 

Hungnam far to the northeast, any such 

march by the Chinese would be unopposed, and if the Chinese moved 

through the open area in strength, they 

possibly could occupy all of South Korea with little or no difficulty. Walker 

anyway granted the Chinese this capability and against the possibility of such 

a sweep took steps on 6 December to 

deploy troops across the entire peninsula. He planned no static defense. His 

concept of fighting a delaying action 

without becoming heavily engaged remained unchanged except that he now 

would delay from preselected lines 

stretching coast to coast.20 

As a preliminary, Walker obtained 

General MacArthur’s agreement to 

erase the southern segment of the 

Eighth Army-X Corps boundary so 

that the Eighth Army’s sector spanned 

the peninsula below the 39th parallel, 

18 Rad, GX 29613 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps and CG IX Corps, 5 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29660 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps, 5 Dec 50; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 6 and 7 Dec 50. 

19 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 5 Dec 50; Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec 

50; Eighth Army G2 Brief, 6 Dec 50; Eighth Army 

PIR 147, 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29685 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to CG I Corps et al., 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29706 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 6 Dec 

50. 

20 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 5 and 6 Dec 50. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 

more generally south of a line between 

P’yongyang and Wonsan. He also arranged air and naval surveillance of the 

east coast south of the X Corps’ position to detect enemy coastal movements 

while he was extending his line. He 

chose coast-to-coast positions running 

from the mouth of the Yesong River, 

almost forty miles behind Haeju, northeastward through Sibyon-ni, southeastward through Ch’orwon and 

Hwach’on, then eastward to Yangyang 

on the Sea of Japan. This line, later 

designated line A, was roughly a hundred fifty miles long and at its most 

northerly point reached just twenty 

miles above the 38th parallel. Walker 

ordered five South Korean divisionsthe two of the ROK II Corps and three 

others then in central and southern Korea-to occupy the eastern half of the 

line and to start moving into position 

immediately. The I and IX Corps, 

scheduled eventually to man the western portion of line A, remained for the 

time being under orders to withdraw 

only as far as the Haeju-Kumhwa line.21 

CINCUNC Order Number 5 

The apprehensions evident in 

Walker’s appraisals and plans were 

apparent in Tokyo as well. General 

MacArthur, although his main intention may have been to coax reinforcement, already had notified the Joint 

21 Rads, GX 29621 KGOO and GX 29661 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 5 Dec 50; Briefing for 

CG, in Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 6 Dec 50; Rad, CTF 95 to 

CTG 95.7, 070206 Dec 50; Rad GX 29684 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA, 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 

29685 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 

6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29706 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

C/S ROKA et al., 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29733 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps et al., 7 Dec 50; 

Rad, GX 29794 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 8 Dec 50. 

157 

Chiefs of Staff that the United Nations 

Command was too weak to make a successful stand when he informed them 

on 28 November that he was passing to 

the defensive. The Joint Chiefs fully 

approved MacArthur’s adoption of defensive tactics but were not convinced 

that a successful static defense was 

impossible. They suggested that MacArthur place the Eighth Army in a continuous line across Korea between 

P’yongyang and Wonsan. MacArthur 

objected, claiming such a line was too 

long for the forces available and that 

the logistical problems posed by the 

high, road-poor mountains then separating the Eighth Army and X Corps 

were too great. By concentrating the 

X Corps in the Hamhung area, 

MacArthur countered, he was creating 

a “geographic threat” to enemy lines of 

communication that made it tactically 

unsound for Chinese forces to move 

south through the opening between 

Walker and Almond. In any event, he 

predicted, the Chinese already arrayed 

against the Eighth Army would compel 

it to take a series of steps to the rear.22 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed 

that the X Corps’ concentration at 

Hamhung would produce the effect 

MacArthur anticipated. In their judgment, the Chinese already had demonstrated a proficiency for moving strong 

forces through difficult mountains, and 

the concentration of the X Corps on 

the east coast combined with the predicted further withdrawals of the 

Eighth Army would only widen the 

opening through which the Chinese 

could move. They again urged MacAr22 Rad, C 69953, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Nov 50; Rad, 

ICS 97592, ICS to CINCFE, 29 Nov 50; Rad, C 50095, 

CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 30 Nov 50; Rad, C 50105, 

CINCFE to DA, 30 Nov 50. 
158 EBB AND FLOW 

the Eighth Army. General Collins, while 

touring Korea between 4 and 6 December, heard General Walker and General Almond on the best beachheads 

and on how best to handle their respective commands. Almond believed that 

he could hold Hungnam indefinitely 

and wanted to stay there out of certainty that by doing so he could divert 

substantial Chinese strength from the 

Eighth Army front. Walker, on the 

other hand, believed the preservation 

of the Eighth Army required a deep 

withdrawal. Walker attempted to forestall any order to defend Seoul, insisting 

that tying his forces to the ROK capital 

would only allow the Chinese to encircle the Eighth Army and force a slow, 

costly evacuation through Inch’on. He 

favored pulling back to Pusan, where 

once before he had broken an enemy 

offensive and where now, if reinforced 

by the X Corps, the Eighth Army might 

hold out indefinitely.25 

MacArthur’s G-3, General Wright, 

meanwhile recommended Pusan as the 

best beachhead for both the Eighth 

Army and X Corps on grounds that 

should UNC forces be compelled to 

leave Korea, they should leave the distinct impression of having delayed the 

enemy as long and as well as possible. 

Wright also pointed out that defending successive Lines into the southeastern tip of the peninsula would afford 

UNC air forces the greatest opportunity to hurt the Chinese; further, if a 

withdrawal from Korea became necessary during the remaining winter 

months, MacArthur’s command could 

escape extreme weather conditions at 

Pusan; finally, an evacuation at any time 

thur to consolidate the Eighth Army 

and X Corps sufficiently to prevent 

large enemy forces from passing 

between the two commands or outflanking either of them. But MacArthur 

defended his view of a P’yongyangWonsan line, pointing out that he and 

Walker already had agreed that P’yongyang could not be held and that the 

Eighth Army probably would be forced 

south at least as far as Seoul. Turning 

his reasoning in support of a request 

for ground reinforcements “of the 

greatest magnitude,” he emphasized on 

3 December that his present strength 

would allow him at most to prolong his 

resistance to the Chinese by making successive withdrawals or by taking up 

“beachhead bastion positions” and that 

a failure to receive reinforcements portended the eventual destruction of his 

command.23 

The response to MacArthur’s estimate was as gloomy as his predictions. 

Prompted by earlier dismal reports to 

visit the Far East for a firsthand appraisal, Army Chief of Staff General 

Collins informed MacArthur on 4 

December that no reinforcement in 

strength, at least in the near future, was 

possible. The remaining Joint Chiefs 

meanwhile replied from Washington 

that preservation of the U.N. Command was now the guiding consideration and that they concurred in the 

consolidation of MacArthur’s forces 

into beachheads.24 

Beachhead sites that in varying degrees could facilitate a withdrawal from 

Korea were Hungnam and Wonsan for 

the X Corps, Inch’on and Pusan for 

23 Rad, JCS 97772, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50; Rad, 

C 50332, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 3 Dec 50. 

24 Chief of Staff, FEC, Memo for Gen Collins, 4 Dec 

50; Rad, JCS 97917, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Dec 50. 

25 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 283; Ltr, Lt Gen 

Edward M. Almond (Ret) to Col C. H. Schilling, 21 

May 1965, copy in CMH. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 

could be effected faster through the Pusan facilities than through any other 

port. To permit the longest delaying 

action possible and to enable an evacuation from the best port, Wright recommended that the X Corps be sea lifted 

from Hungnam as soon as possible and 

landed in southeastern Korea, that the 

X Corps then join the Eighth Army and 

pass to Walker’s command, and thereafter that the U.N. Command withdraw 

through successive positions, if necessary to the Pusan area.26 

On 7 December in Tokyo, Generals 

MacArthur, Collins, and Stratemeyer, 

Admirals Joy and Struble, and Lt. Gen. 

Lemuel C. Shepherd, the commander 

of all Marine forces in the Pacific, considered the various views generated 

during the week past and agreed on 

plans that embodied in largest part the 

recommendations of General Wright. 

MacArthur set these plans in effect on 

the 8th in CINCUNC (Commander in 

Chief, United Nations Command) Order Number 5. He listed nine lines to 

be defended by the Eighth Army, the 

southernmost based on the Naktong 

River in the general trace of the old 

Pusan Perimeter. But he insisted that 

Walker not surrender Seoul until and 

unless an enemy maneuver unquestionably was about to block the Eighth 

Army’s further withdrawal to the 

south. Related to this stipulation, four 

lines lay above Seoul, the last of which, 

resting on the Imjin River in the west 

and extending eastward to the, coast, 

was MacArthur’s first delineation of positions across the entire peninsula. Here 

the peninsula was somewhat narrower 

than in the P’yongyang-Wonsan region and offered a road net that could 

26 Memo, FEC G3 for FEC C/S, 6 Dec 50. 

159 

accommodate supply movements.27 

Earlier pessimistic reports to Washington notwithstanding, MacArthur apparently believed that the Eighth Army and 

the X Corps combined could man this 

line; indeed, he expected Walker to 

make an ardent effort to hold it. 

Through correspondence and interviews, MacArthur meanwhile had responded publicly to charges appearing 

in a substantial segment of the press 

that he was responsible for the reverse 

his forces were suffering at the hands 

of the Chinese. In defense of his strategy and tactics, he insisted that his command could not have fought more efficiently given the restrictions placed 

upon it by the policy of limiting hostilities to Korea. This criticism of administration policy rankled President Truman, particularly because MacArthur 

voiced it publicly and frequently 

enough to lead “many people abroad 

to believe that our government would 

change its policy. “28 Truman issued instructions on 5 December by which he 

intended to insure that information 

made public by an executive branch official was “accurate and fully in accord 

with the policies of the United States 

Government.“29 Specifically applicable 

to General MacArthur, “Officials overseas, including military commanders, 

were to clear all but routine statements 

with their departments, and to refrain 

from direct communication on military 

or foreign policy with newspapers, mag27 Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 288; 

Rad, CX 50635, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army et al., 7 

Dec 50; Rad, CX 50801 (CINCUNC Opn O No. 5), 

CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army et al., 8 Dec 50. The 

JCS formally approved MacArthur’s plan on 9 Dec 50 

per Rad, JCS 98400, DEPTAR (JCS) to CINCFE, 9 

Dec 50. 

28 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 383. 

29 MacArthur Hearings, p. 3536. 
160 EBB AND FLOW 

azines or other 

United States.“30 

publicity media in the 

The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff forwarded the president’s instructions to MacArthur on 6 December. 

Withdrawal to Line B 

On 7 December General MacArthur 

had radioed a warning to both Walker 

and Almond of the next day’s order 

for successive withdrawals, the defense 

of Seoul short of becoming entrapped, 

and the assignment of the X Corps to 

the Eighth Army. So guided, Walker 

on the 8th laid out line B, which duplicated line A eastward from Hwach’on 

but in the opposite direction fell off to 

the southwest to trace the lower bank 

of the Imjin and Han rivers, some 

twenty miles behind the Yesong River. 

This line was at least twenty miles 

shorter than line A, fairly coincided 

with the northernmost coast-to-coast 

line designated by MacArthur, and now 

became the line toward which Walker 

began to move his forces for the defense of Seoul.31 

On 11 December MacArthur made 

his first visit to Korea since he had 

watched the start of what was hoped 

would be the Eighth Army’s final advance. He was now on the peninsula 

for a firsthand view of the Eighth 

Army and X Corps after their setbacks 

at the hands of the Chinese and for 

personal conferences with Walker and 

Almond on the steps the two line commanders had taken or planned to take 

in carrying out the maneuvers and command change he had ordered three 

days before. 

When MacArthur reached Walker’s 

headquarters (having first stopped in 

northeastern Korea to confer with General Almond), he was able to see not 

only the Eighth Army plan for withdrawing to line B but also Walker’s 

plans in case the Eighth Army again 

was squeezed into the southeastern corner of the peninsula. Reviving an unused plan developed by the Eighth 

Army staff in September, Walker reestablished not only the Naktong River 

defenses but also three lines between 

the old perimeter and Pusan, each arching between the south coast and east 

coast around the port. Nearer Pusan, 

the Davidson line curved northeastward sixty-eight miles from a south 

coast anchor at Masan; next southeast, the Raider line stretched fortyeight miles from the south coast resort 

town of Chinhae; and just outside the 

port, the Pusan line arched twenty-eight 

miles from the mouth of the Naktong. 

Walker instructed General Garvin to 

fortify these lines using Korean labor 

and all other means and manpower 

available within Garvin’s 2d Logistical 

Command.32 

On the day following MacArthur’s 

visit Walker established two more lettered lines. Line C followed the lower 

bank of the Han River just below Seoul, 

curved northeast to Hongch’on, thirty 

miles below Hwach’on, then reached almost due east to the coast at Wonpo-ri, 

fifteen miles behind Yangyang. Line D, 

30 Ibid. 

31 Rad, CX 50635, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army et 

al., 7 Dec 50; Rad, CX 50801 (CINCUNC Opn O no. 

5), CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army et al., 8 Dec 50; 

Rad, GX 29794 KGOO, CC Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 8 Dec 50. 

32 Rad, GX 29857 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG 

2d Log Comd and C/S ROKA, 9 Dec 50; Ltr, CG 

Eighth Army to CG 2d Log Comd, 11 Dec 50, sub: 

Construction of the Naktong River Defense Line and 

Completion of Construction of the Davidson and 

Raider Lines; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 

next south, ran from a west coast anchor forty-five miles below Seoul northeast through the towns of Py’ongt’aek, 

Ansong, Changhowon-ni, and Wonju 

to Wonpo-ri, the same east coast anchor as for line C. These lines were 

to be occupied if and when enemy 

pressure forced the Eighth Army to 

give up Seoul but before any deep 

withdrawal as far as the Naktong was 

required.33 

Amid this contingency planning and 

through 22 December Walker gradually 

pulled his forward units south and 

pushed ROK forces north into positions generally along line B. The I and 

IX Corps, withdrawing over Routes 1 

and 33, bounded in three-day intervals 

through the Haeju-Kumhwa line and 

line A toward sectors along the western 

third of line B. The withdrawal was uncontested except for minor encounters 

with North Korean troops on the IX 

Corps’ east flank, but thousands of refugees moving with and trailing the two 

corps had to be turned off the main 

roads lest they block the withdrawal 

routes. By 23 December both corps occupied stable positions in their new 

sectors. The I Corps, with two divisions 

and a brigade, stood athwart Route 1 

along the lower banks of the Han and 

the Imjin; the IX Corps, with two divisions, blocked Routes 33 and 3 right at 

the 38th paralle1.34 

Spreading ROK forces along the remainder of the line proved more frustrating. Transportation requirements 

exceeded available trucks: resistance 

161 

from North Korean troops in the central region slowed the South Koreans; 

and general confusion among the 

sketchily trained ROK units caused further delay. But by 23 December General Walker managed to get the ROK 

III Corps up from southern Korea 

and, with three divisions, emplaced in 

a central sector adjoining the IX Corps 

on the east. The South Korean front 

lay below line B, almost exactly on the 

38th parallel, with its center located 

about eight miles north of Ch’unch’on. 

In more rugged ground next east, the 

ROK II Corps occupied a narrow onedivision front astride Route 24, which 

passed southwestward through the 

Hongch’on River valley. The corps thus 

blocked what otherwise could provide 

enemy forces easy access south through 

central Korea over Route 29 and to lateral routes leading west to the Seoul 

area.35 

By 20 December the ROK I Corps 

had been sea lifted in increments out 

of northeastern Korea, landed at Pusan and near Samch’ok close to the east 

coast anchor of line B, and transferred 

to Eighth Army control. Walker immediately committed the additional corps 

to defend the eastern end of the army 

line. By the 23d the ROK I Corps, with 

two divisions, occupied scattered positions blocking several mountain tracks 

and the east coast road.36 

Regardless of his success in stretching forces across the peninsula, Walker 

lacked confidence in the line he had 

built. His defenses were shallow and 

there were gaps. He mainly mistrusted 

33 Rad, GX 35046 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 12 Dec 50. 

34 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 

Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Rads, GX 29874 KGOO 

and GX 35071 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 9 Dec and 13 Dec 50, respectively. 

35 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 

Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50. 

36 Ibid.; Rad, AG IN BSF-1305, CTF 90 to CG 

Eighth Army et al., 20 Dec 50. 
162 EBB AND FLOW 

EIGHTH ARMY TROOPS DIG IN NORTH OF SEOUL 

the ROK forces along the eastern twothirds of the line. He doubted that they 

would hold longer than momentarily 

against a strong enemy attack, and, 

should they give way, his forces above 

Seoul in the west would be forced to 

follow suit. It was to meet this particular 

contingency that he had established 

lines C and D on 12 December. On the 

15th he extended his effort by dispatching the 1st Cavalry Division out 

along the connected Routes 2-18-17 

northeast of Seoul as added protection 

against any strike at the capital city from 

the direction of Ch’unch’on.“37 

The same day, he started army headquarters, less a small group to remain 

in Seoul, south to Taegu. He already 

had directed the removal of major supply stores located in or above Seoul to 

safer positions below the Han River and 

had ordered the reduction of stocks 

held in the Inch’on port complex. On 

the 18th he assigned corps boundaries 

along line C and described the deployment of army reserve units to cover a 

withdrawal to this first line below Seoul. 

Two days later he ordered the still-weak 

2d Division, which by then had stepped 

back from Munsan-ni to Yongdungp’o, 

a suburb of Seoul just below the Han, 

to move to the town of Ch’ungju, some 

sixty miles southeast of Seoul. From 

37 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Rad, GX 

there the division was to be ready to 

35176 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps and move against any enemy force breakCG 1st Cav Div, 15 Dec 50. ing through South Korean lines in cen- 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 163 

SEOUL. The capitol is at center. 

tral or eastern Korea and was to protect the flank of Walker’s western 

forces in any withdrawal prompted by 

such an enemy thrust. General Keiser 

in the meantime had been evacuated 

because of illness, and Maj. Gen. 

Robert B. McClure now commanded 

the 2d Division.38 

To General MacArthur, the elaborate preparations for a withdrawal below Seoul indicated that Walker had 

decided against a determined defense 

of the city. When MacArthur raised the 

question, Walker assured him that he 

would hold Seoul as long as he could. 

But, Walker pointed out, sudden col38 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Rad, GX 

35255 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 

18 Dec 50; Rad, GX 35300 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

to CG 2d Div, 20 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 20 Dec 

50. 

lapses of ROK forces twice before had 

placed the Eighth Army in jeopardy. 

Nor had the ROK Army shown any increased stability even after strenuous 

efforts to improve it. If, as he suspected, 

the ROK units now along the eastern 

two-thirds of line B failed to stand 

against an attack, his positions north 

of Seoul could not be held and the 

then-necessary withdrawal would have 

to be made over an obstacle, the Han 

River. In Walker’s mind these two 

dangers, of another sudden ROK Army 

collapse and of making a river crossing 

in a withdrawal, made his extensive 

preparations a matter of “reasonable 

prudence.“39 

39 Rad, CX 51694, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 20 

Dec 50; Rad, GX 35321 KCG, CG Eighth Army to 

CINCFE, 21 Dec 50. 
164 

Walker also was convinced that his 

adversaries were now capable of opening an offensive at any time. He still 

had no solid contact with enemy forces, 

but by pressing intelligence sources over 

the previous two weeks he had obtained 

sufficient evidence to predict an imminent attack and to forecast the strength, 

paths, objective, and even possible date 

of the next blow.40 

Between 8 and 14 December Walker 

caught a southeastward shift of the 

North Korean II Corps, the bulk of 

which previously had been concentrated in and operating as a guerrilla force 

out of the mountains between Koksan 

and Inch’on. Apparently having retaken regular status, the corps paralleled the Eighth Army’s southeastern 

withdrawals below P’yongyang. As 

Walker’s forces spread out along line 

B, the North Korean unit followed suit, 

occupying positions just above the 38th 

parallel in the central sector, principally 

between Yonch’on in the Wonsan-Seoul 

corridor and Hwach’on, due north of 

Ch’unch’on. It also seemed that earlier 

reports of reconstituted North Korean 

units joining the II Corps were correct. 

Several renewed North Korean divisions apparently had assembled immediately behind the II Corps to make a 

total strength of sixty-five thousand 

plausible for the North Korean troops 

directly opposite the Eighth Army’s 

central sector as of 23 December.41 

As late as 17 December Walker was 

still completely out of contact with Chinese forces and by the 23d had encountered only a few, these in the I and 

EBB AND FLOW 

IX Corps sectors in the west. General 

Partridge, who had shifted the emphasis of Fifth Air Force operations to 

armed reconnaissance and interdiction 

about the time Walker had given up 

P’yongyang, was able to verify that 

Chinese forces had moved south in 

strength from the Ch'ongch'on battlefields, but not how far.42 Until midDecember his fighter pilots and light 

bomber crews discovered and attacked 

large troop columns moving openly in 

daylight over main and secondary 

roads between the Ch’ongch’on and 

P’yongyang. But then, to escape 

Partridge’s punishing attacks, the Chinese reverted to their strict practices 

of concealment and camouflage and 

halted virtually all daytime movement.43 

Walker, consequently, had no clear 

evidence that the main body of the XIII 

Army Group had moved any farther 

south than P’yongyang. But on the basis of repeated reports from agents and 

air observers that Chinese troops and 

supplies were moving southeastward 

from the North Korean capital, by the 

23d he considered it possible that three 

or four Chinese armies with about a 

hundred fifteen thousand troops were 

bunched within a day’s march of the 

Eighth Army’s central front. This possibility brought the estimate of enemy 

strength above Walker’s central positions to a hundred eighty thousand. 

Furthermore, Walker judged, these 

troops could be reinforced by any units 

of the XIII Army Group remaining in 

the P’yongyang area within four to 

eight days and by the Chinese and 

40 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army 

PIRs 149-156, 8-15 Dec 50; Rad, GX 35266 KGI, CG 

Eighth Army to CINCFE, 18 Dec 50; Eighth Army 

PIRs 163, 22 Dec 50, and 164, 23 Dec 50. 

41 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army 

PIRs 148-164, 8-23 Dec 50. 

42 Bomber Command meanwhile halted its attacks 

on the Yalu bridges and devoted its main effort to the 

interdiction of rail lines. 

43 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 

243-45. The FEAF estimate of enemy troops killed in 

December was 39,694. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 

North Korean units currently operating in the X Corps sector within six to 

ten days.44 

To Walker, the apparent concentration and disposition of enemy forces 

opposite his central front clearly suggested offensive preparations in which 

the North Korean II Corps was screening the assembly of assault forces and 

supplies. Small North Korean attacks 

below Yonch’on and from Hwach’on 

toward Ch’unch’on seemed designed to 

search out weaknesses in the Eighth 

Army line in those areas and indicated 

the possibility of a converging attack 

on Seoul south along Route 33 and 

southwest over the road from Ch’unch’on. A likely date for opening such 

an attack, because of a possible psychological advantage to the attackers, was 

Christmas Day.45 

Walker’s largest hope of holding 

Seoul for any length of time in these 

circumstances rested on the arrival of 

the remainder of the X Corps from 

northeastern Korea. Once he had 

General Almond’s forces in hand, 

Walker planned to insert them in the 

Ch’unch’on sector now held by the untried ROK III Corps. This move would 

place American units athwart the 

Ch’unch’on-Seoul axis, one of the more 

likely enemy approaches in an attack to 

seize the South Korean capital. 

Whether the X Corps would be available soon enough depended first on 

how closely Walker had estimated the 

opening date of the threatening enemy 

offensive and second on how long it 

would take General Almond to get his 

forces out of northeastern Korea and 

44 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army 

PIRs 148-164, 8-23 Dec 50. 

45 Ibid. 

165 

to refurbish them for employment under the Eighth Army.46 

The X Corps Evacuates Hungnam 

By the time General Almond received General MacArthur’s 8 December order to evacuate the X Corps 

through Hungnam, two sideshows to 

the coming main event were well 

under way. Out of the earlier decision 

to concentrate X Corps forces at 

Hungnam, the evacuation of Wonsan 

had begun on 3 December. In a week’s 

time, without interference from enemy 

forces, the 3d Division task force and a 

Marine shore party group totaling some 

3,800 troops loaded themselves, 1,100 

vehicles, 10,000 tons of other cargo, 

and 7,000 refugees aboard transport 

ships and LSTs provided by Admiral 

Doyle’s Task Force 90. One LST sailed 

north on the 9th to Hungnam, where 

its Marine shore party passengers were 

to take part in the forthcoming sea lift. 

The remaining ships steamed for Pusan on the 9th and 10th.47 

The Task Force 90 ships dispatched 

to Songjin on 5 December to pick up 

the tail-end troops of the ROK I Corps 

meanwhile had reached their destination and by noon on 9 December had 

taken aboard the ROK 3d Division (less 

the 26th Regiment, which withdrew 

to Hungnam as rear guard for the 7th 

Division); the division headquarters, di46 Rad, GX 35226 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG X 

Corps, 17 Dec 50; Rad, GX 35321 KCG, CG Eighth 

Army to CINCFE, 21 Dec 50; Eighth Army PIRs 160, 

19 Dec 50, and 163, 22 Dec 50. 

47 Rad, CX 50635, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army et 

al., 7 Dec 50; Rad, CX 50801 (CINCUNC Opn O No. 

5), CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army et al., 8 Dec 50; 

Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 183-84; 

Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 286-88. 
166 EBB AND FLOW 

vision artillery, and 18th Regiment of 

the ROK Capital Division; and some 

forty-three hundred refugees. This sea 

lift originally had been designed to 

assist the X Corps’ concentration at 

Hungnam, but the intervening order 

to evacuate Hungnam changed the 

destination for most of the South Koreans to Pusan. On 10 and 11 December the convoy from Songjin anchored 

at Hungnam only long enough to unload the Capital Division’s headquarters and artillery for employment in 

the perimeter and to take aboard an 

advance party of the ROK I Corps 

headquarters before proceeding to its 

new destination.48 

On the 11th, as the South Koreans 

from Songjin as well as the Marine and 

Army troops from the Changjin Reservoir came into Hungnam, the perimeter around the port was comprised of a 

series of battalion and regimental 

strongpoints astride the likely avenues 

of enemy approach some twelve to fifteen miles outside the city. The 3d Division still held the large sector assigned 

to it when General Almond first shaped 

the perimeter, from positions below 

Yonp’o airfield southwest of Hungnam 

to defenses astride the Changjin Reservoir road at Oro-ri northwest of the 

port. Battalions of the 7th Division 

stood in breadth and depth athwart 

the Pujon Reservoir road north of 

Hungnam, and three regiments of the 

ROK I Corps guarded approaches near 

and at the coast northeast of the port.49 

Although Almond had begun to pull 

these units into defenses around 

48 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps POR 

74, 9 Dec 50; X Corps G3 Jnl, Entry J-31, 9 Dec 50; X 

Corps G3 Jnl, Entry J-28, 11 Dec 50; Field, United 

States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 286, 288-89. 

49 X Corps POR 75, 11 Dec 50. 

Hungnam at the beginning of December, enemy forces as of the 11th had 

not yet made any significant attempt to 

establish contact with the perimeter 

units. But Almond expected his beachhead defenses would be tested by 

enemy units approaching Hungnam 

along the coast from the northeast, 

from the Wonsan area to the south, and 

especially from the direction of the 

Changjin Reservoir.50 

The likelihood that enemy forces 

pushing to the coast to reoccupy 

Wonsan would block the routes south 

of Hungnam had prompted Almond 

to discard any thought of an overland 

withdrawal to southern Korea. (Nor 

had MacArthur ordered such a move.) 

Almond also considered the roads inadequate to permit the timely movement 

of large forces. His warning order, issued 9 December, alerted his forces for 

a “withdrawal by water and air without 

delay from Hungnam area to PusanPohang-dong area.“51 The larger exodus was to be by sea, with the Hungnam 

defenses contracting as corps forces 

were outloaded, but airlift was to be 

employed for as long as the airfield at 

Yonp’o remained within the shrinking 

perimeter.52 

Evacuation Planning 

In deciding how to evacuate his 

forces and still successfully defend his 

perimeter, Almond considered two 

alternatives. He could place all divisions 

on the perimeter and then withdraw 

portions of each simultaneously, or he 

could pull out one division at a time 

50 X Corps PIRs 74-76, 9-11 Dec 50; X Corps Comd 

Rpt, Sum, Dec 50. 

51 X Corps OI 27, 9 Dec 50. 

52 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 

and spread his remaining forces to 

cover the vacated sector on a shorter 

front. Since some units were more battle worn than others, especially the 1st 

Marine Division, he elected the latter 

method and intended to ship the marines first. They were to be followed 

by the 7th Division, then the 3d Division.53 

Almond planned to phase out the 

ROK I Corps, corps support units, 

bulk supplies, and heavy equipment 

simultaneously with the American 

Army divisions. This was to be done 

carefully enough to keep a proper 

balance between combat and support 

troops and to insure adequate logistical 

support. To maintain this balance 

yet guarantee that the evacuation proceeded as rapidly as possible, he established three points of control. From X 

Corps headquarters, his G-3 and G-4 

together guided the dispatch of units 

to the beach. To supervise the actual 

loading of troops and materiel at 

water’s edge, he organized a control 

group under Col. Edward H. Forney, a 

Marine officer serving as Almond’s 

deputy chief of staff. Under Colonel 

Forney’s direction, the 2d Engineer 

Special Brigade was to operate dock 

facilities, a reinforced Marine shore 

party company was to operate the LST 

and small craft beaches and control the 

lighterage for ships to be loaded in the 

harbor anchorages, and some five thousand Korean civilians were to work as 

stevedores. On the Navy’s end of the 

outloading procedure, Admiral Doyle, 

through a control unit aboard his flagship Mount McKinley, was to coordinate 

all shipments, assign anchorages, and 

53 Ibid.; X Corps Opn O 10, 11 Dec 50; X Corps 

POR 76, 11 Dec 50. 

167 

issue docking and sailing instructions. 

Direct liaison was established between 

Almond’s control group ashore and 

Doyle’s control group at sea to match 

outgoing troops, supplies, and equipment with available ships. Almond also 

dispatched a control group under Lt. 

Col. Arthur M. Murray from corps 

headquarters to Pusan to receive 

troops, supplies, and equipment arriving by sea and air and to move them 

as rapidly as possible to assembly 

areas. 

Including the troops and materiel 

outloaded at Wonsan and Songjin, 

Almond needed shipping space for 

105,000 troops, 18,422 vehicles, and 

some 350,000 tons of bulk cargo. Although Admiral Doyle commanded a 

transport group of over 125 ships, some 

would have to make more than one trip 

to meet Almond’s needs. The Far East 

Air Forces’ Combat Cargo Command 

flying out of Yonp’o airfield was to fulfill airlift requirements.55 

Tactical air support during the evacuation would be a Navy and Marine 

responsibility, the Fifth Air Force fighters previously located in northeastern 

Korea having flown out to Pusan on 3 

December. The 1st Marine Air Wing, 

based at Yonp’o and aboard escort 

carriers, was to devote its full effort to 

supporting the corps operation. In addition, Admiral Doyle was to arrange 

both naval air and naval gunfire support. Reinforced by ships supplied by 

Admiral Struble, the Seventh Fleet 

commander, Doyle eventually was able 

54 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Field, United 

States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 289-90. 

55 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Field, United 

States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 289; Cagle and 

Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 512-14; Futrell, 

The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 241-42. 
168 EBB AND FLOW 

MAP 14 

to employ seven carriers in throwing a 

canopy of aircraft over the corps area 

and to deploy one battleship, two 

cruisers, seven destroyers, and three 

rocket ships in a maneuver area reaching ten miles north and ten miles south 

of Hungnam to answer Almond’s requests for gunfire support.56 

To begin an orderly contraction of 

defenses as the X Corps’ strength 

ashore diminished, the units on the pe56 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 

181-82, 186-87; Futrell, The United States Air Force in 

Korea, pp. 248-49. 

rimeter were to withdraw deliberately 

as the 1st Marine Division embarked 

toward the first of three phase lines that 

Almond drew around Hungnam. In 

the southwest this first line rested generally along the Yowi-ch’on River, just 

below Yonp’o airfield, and elsewhere 

traced an arc about three miles from 

the heart of Hungnam. (Map 14) The 

second line differed from the first only 

in the southwest in the 3d Division sector where it followed the upper bank 

of the Songch’on River close by Hungnam. The 3d Division’s withdrawal to 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 169 

TROOPS OUTLOADING AT HUNGNAM 

this second line, which would mean the 

abandonment of Yonp’o airfield, was 

scheduled to take place as the 7th Division began its embarkation. The third 

and final line was a tight arc about a 

mile outside the limits of Hungnam to 

be occupied by the 3d Division as that 

division itself prepared to outload. 

During this final phase of the evacuation General Soule’s units were to use 

rearguard tactics to cover their own 

embarkation.57 

General Almond published his formal evacuation order on 11 December, 

the date on which General MacArthur 

visited Korea and flew into Yonp’o airfield for a conference with the X Corps 

57 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps Opn 

O 10, 11 Dec 50. 

commander. After briefing MacArthur 

on corps dispositions and the plan of 

evacuation, Almond predicted that the 

evacuation would be orderly, that no 

supplies or equipment would be destroyed or abandoned, and that enemy 

forces would not interfere seriously. 

The redeployment of the X Corps to 

southern Korea, he estimated, would 

be complete by 27 December.58 

The Outloading 

The 1st Marine Division, as it came 

into Hungnam from the Changjin Res58 Ibid.; X Corps Comd Rpt, 11 Dec 50; Memo, Gen 

Almond, 11 Dec 50, sub: Movement of X Corps to the 

Pusan Area: Ltr. Gen Almond to CINCUNC, 11 Dec 

50, sub: Redeployment of X Corps in Pusan - Pohangdong Area. 
170 EBB AND FLOW 

BARRELS OF AVIATION FUEL to be loaded aboard ships at Hungnam. 

ervoir on 11 December, assembled between the port and Yonp’o airfield. The 

division outloaded over the following 

three days and sailed for Pusan at midmorning on the 15th. General Almond 

the day before had designated Masan, 

thirty miles west of Pusan, as the division’s assembly area. Following the voyage to Pusan and a motor march to 

Masan, the marines passed to Eighth 

Army control on 18 December.59 

Some bulk cargo was shipped out 

during the Marine outloading, but the 

heavier evacuation of materiel began 

after the marines sailed. From 15 De59 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps OI 30, 

14 Dec 50; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 33841,345; X Corps POR 83, 18 

Dec 50. 

cember forward, service units gradually 

moved depots and supply points into 

the port area proper, and the bulk supplies and heavy equipment were either 

loaded aboard ships double-banked at 

the docks or lightered to ships in the 

harbor. To save time, ammunition was 

loaded at the docks instead of well out 

into open water according to usual precautionary practice. This constant outward flow of materiel paralleled unit 

embarkations through the final day of 

the evacuation.60

While the marines outloaded by sea, 

the bulk of the 1st Korean Marine 

Corps Regiment, which had been at60X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 171 

Hamhung that the X Corps would provide transportation for all civilians who 

wished to leave North Korea. The intention was to create a mass move to 

cover the infiltration of enemy agents 

and saboteurs. To prevent overcrowding and infiltration, military police, intelligence agents, and perimeter troops 

attempted to block civilian entry, particularly over the Hamhung-Hungnam 

road, which carried the larger number 

of refugees. They were only partially 

successful. Those civilians already in 

Hungnam and those who managed to 

reach the city were screened, then 

moved to the southeastern suburb of 

Sohojin, where corps civil affairs personnel distributed food and organized 

them for evacuation as shipping space 

became available.63 

On the heels of the Marine division, 

the 7th Division began to outload on 

14 December, embarking first the worn 

troops of the 31st Infantry, 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry, and 57th Field 

Artillery Battalion, who had been with 

the marines in the reservoir area. Most 

of the division’s service units went 

aboard ship on the 15th and 16th. The 

17th Infantry and remainder of the 32d 

Infantry meanwhile relieved the ROK 

I Corps on the perimeter and withdrew 

to the first phase line. Hence, the corps 

perimeter on the 16th was divided into 

two nearly equal parts by the Songch’on 

River, the 7th Division in position above 

it, the 3d Division holding the sector 

below. Patrols and outposts deepened 

the defense as far out as the lower edge 

of Hamhung. 

tached to the 3d Division, moved to 

Yonp’o for evacuation by air. General 

Soule had planned to compensate for 

the loss of the South Korean marines 

by pulling his division to the shorter 

first phase line on 16 December. 

But several sharp attacks against his 

positions between Chigyong and Orori during the morning of the 15th 

prompted him to make his withdrawal 

that afternoon.61 

By the 16th the attacks against the 

3d Division on the western and northwestern arcs of the perimeter, enemy 

patrol contact with the ROK I Corps in 

the northeast, and other ground and 

air reports indicated that enemy forces 

were closing in around the X Corps perimeter but not in great strength. Parts 

of the Chinese 81st Division, 27th Army, 

appeared to have made the attacks on 

the 3d Division, and a North Korean 

brigade apparently was moving toward 

Hungnam over the coastal road from 

the northeast. A greater immediate 

problem than the approach of relatively 

few enemy forces was a mass movement of civilians toward the corps 

perimeter. Although General Almond 

had planned to evacuate government 

officials, their families, and as many 

others as shipping space allowed, he 

had not anticipated that thousands of 

civilians would try to reach Hungnam.62 

Besides hampering evacuation operations by overcrowding the port area, 

the large refugee movement posed a 

danger of enemy infiltration. According to corps intelligence sources, the 

enemy was circulating a rumor in 

61 X Corps PORs 79, 14 Dec 50, and 80, 15 Dec 50; 

Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, pp. 97-100. 

62 X Corps PIRs 77-80, 12-l5 Dec 50; X Corps Comd 

Rpt, Sum, Dec 50. 

63 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps PIRs 

77, 12 Dec 50, and 78, 13 Dec 50. 

64 X Corps PORs 79-81, 14-16 Dec 50; X Corps OI 

31, 16 Dec 50. 
172 EBB AND FLOW 

After being relieved by the 7th Division, the ROK I Corps outloaded and 

sailed at noon on 17 December. Although original plans called for the 

South Koreans to go to Pusan, General 

MacArthur, apparently as a result of 

his 11 December visit to Korea, had directed that the corps units then on the 

Hungnam perimeter be sea lifted to 

Samch’ok. These units and those being 

carried to Pusan from Songjin were to 

pass to Eighth Army control upon 

debarkation. This transfer would permit General Walker to deploy the South 

Korean corps immediately, and the 

landing at Samch’ok would put much 

of it close at hand for deployment 

at the eastern end of line B. The landing, actually made at a small port just 

north of Samch’ok, was completed on 

20 December.65 

The ROK I Corps’ departure on the 

17th coincided with the evacuation of 

most X Corps headquarters sections 

and troops. Their final destination wasKyongju, fifty miles north of Pusan, 

where they were to establish an advance 

corps command post. On the same day, 

operations at Yonp’o airfield closed as 

the left flank units of the 3d Division 

prepared to withdraw to the lower bank 

of the Songch’on River behind the field 

the next day. The Marine squadrons 

that had used the field already had 

withdrawn to Pusan and Itami, Japan. 

Last to leave was a Fifth Air Force base 

unit that had serviced the Marine fighters and General Tunner’s cargo aircraft. By the closing date Tunner’s 

65 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Rad, CX 51019, 

CINCFE to CG Eighth Army et al., 11 Dec 50; Rad, 

CX 51102, CINCFE to DEPTAR, 12 Dec 50; X Corps 

PORs 80-83, 15-18 Dec 50; Field, United States Naval 

Operations, Korea, p. 295; Rad, AG IN BSF-1305, CTF 

90 to CG Eighth Army et al., 20 Dec 50. 

planes had lifted out 3,600 troops, 196 

vehicles, 1,300 tons of cargo, and several hundred refugees.66 

The 18 December withdrawal of 

General Soule’s left flank units to the 

lower bank of the Songch’on River was 

a preliminary move in the 3d Division’s 

relief of the two 7th Division regiments 

still on the perimeter. Soule’s forces 

stepped behind the Songch’on to the 

second corps phase line on the 19th 

and on the 19th and 20th spread out to 

relieve the 17th and 32d Regiments. 

General Almond closed his command 

post in Hungnam on the 20th and 

reopened it aboard Admiral Doyle’s 

Mount McKinley in the harbor, leaving 

General Soule in command of ground 

troops ashore.67 

Enemy probing attacks, which had 

slackened noticeably after the 3d and 

7th Divisions withdrew to the first corps 

phase line, picked up again on the 18th 

and became still more intense on the 

following day. Three Chinese divisions, 

the 79th, 80th, and 81st, all from the 

27th Army, were believed to be in the 

nearby ground west of Hungnam, although only the 79th was currently 

in contact. North and northeast of 

Hungnam, a North Korean brigade 

and the reconstituted North Korean 3d 

Division had been contacted, as had another North Korean force, presumably 

a regiment.68 

None of the enemy strikes on the perimeter did more than penetrate some 

66 X Corps POR 79, 14 Dec 50; X Corps Comd Rpt, 

18 Dec 50; X Corps OI 36, 18 Dec 50; Futrell, The 

United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 241, 248-49; X 

Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Cagle and Manson, 

The Sea War in Korea, p. 191. 

67 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps PORs 

83-85. 18-20 Dec 50: Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division 

in Korea, p. 102. 

68 X Corps PIRs 81-85, 16-20 Dec 50. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 

outposts, and counterattacks rapidly 

eliminated these gains. So far, all 

action appeared to be only an attempt 

to reconnoiter the perimeter. Several 

explanations for the enemy’s failure 

to make a larger effort were plausible. The bulk of the Chinese in the 

Changjin Reservoir area apparently 

were taking time-probably forced to 

take time-to recuperate from losses 

suffered in the cold weather and recent battles. All enemy forces undoubtedly were aware that the X Corps was 

evacuating Hungnam and that they 

would be able to enter the city soon 

without having to fight their way in. 

The contraction of the corps perimeter 

probably forced the enemy to repeat 

his reconnaissance. Artillery fire, naval 

gunfire, and ample close air support 

may well have prevented the enemy 

from concentrating sufficient strength 

for strong attacks. Whatever the 

reasons, enemy forces had not yet 

launched a large-scale assault.69 

Although an additional unit, a regiment of the North Korean 1st Division, 

was identified near the northeastern 

anchor of the corps perimeter on 20 

December, enemy attacks diminished 

on the 20th and 21st as the last troops 

of the 7th Division embarked and sailed 

for Pusan. General Barr’s troops completed their redeployment on the 27th 

and moved into an assembly around 

Yongch’on, west of the new X Corps 

headquarters at Kyongju.70 

New but still small attacks harassed 

the 3d Division on the 22d as General 

Soule’s 7th, 65th, and 15th Regiments 

from west to east stood at the second 

173 

corps phase line to cover the outloading 

of the last corps artillery units and the 

first of the division’s service units. On 

the 23d, when Soule pulled his regiments to the last corps phase line in 

preparation for the final withdrawal 

from Hungnam, only a small amount 

of mortar and artillery fire struck the 

perimeter troops. Whatever conditions 

so far had kept the Chinese and North 

Koreans from opening a large assault 

obtained even after the X Corps’ perimeter strength dwindled to a single 

division.71 

The indirect fire received on the 23d 

proved to be the last opposition offered. 

By morning of the 24th the perimeter 

was silent and remained so as the last 

of the 3d Division’s service units outloaded and as General Soule started his 

rearguard action to take out his regiments and artillery. A battalion from 

each regiment stayed on the perimeter 

while the remaining infantry and the 

artillery outloaded and while the division’s 10th Engineer Combat Battalion 

and Navy underwater demolition teams 

prepared port facilities for destruction. 

At the same time, the last corps supplies, the port operating units, and as 

many of the remaining refugees as 

possible were put aboard ship. After 

General Almond made a final inspection ashore, seven platoons established 

strongpoints near the beaches to protect the embarkation of the remainder 

of the covering battalions and the bulk 

of the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion. 

In the final steps, Admiral Doyle’s warships laid down a wide barrage about a 

mile and a half inland as the last pla69 Ibid. 

70 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps PIRs 

71 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps PORs 

87, 22 Dec 50, and 88, 23 Dec 50; X Corps PIRs 87, 

85, 20 Dec 50, and 86, 21 Dec 50; X Corps PORs 85, 22 Dec 50, and 88, 23 Dec 50; Dolcater, 3d Infantry 

20 Dec 50, and 86, 21 Dec 50. Division in Korea, p. 102. 
174 EBB AND FLOW 

REARGUARD TROOPS OF THE 3D INFANTRY DIVISION leave the Hungnam beach, 

24 December 1950. 

toons of the covering force outloaded 

and as the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion and Navy demolition teams blew 

up the port before leaving the beaches 

aboard LVTs and LCMs shortly after 

1430.72 

By Christmas Eve the ships carrying 

the last X Corps troops and supplies 

were well out of Hungnam harbor en 

route to Pusan and to Ulsan, a small 

port thirty miles north of Pusan. They 

left behind no serviceable equipment 

or usable supplies. About 200 tons of 

ammunition, a like amount of frozen 

dynamite, 500 thousand-pound aerial 

72 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps PIR 

89, 24 Dec 50; X Corps POR 89, 24 Dec 50; Dolcater, 

3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 102. 

bombs, and about 200 drums of oil and 

gasoline had not been taken out, but 

“all of this [had] added to the loudness of the final blowup of the part of 

Hungnam. “73 A remarkable number of 

refugees, over 86,000, had been lifted 

out of Hungnam since the 11th. Including those evacuated from Wonsan 

and Songjin, the total number of civilians taken out of northeastern Korea 

reached 98,100. About the same number had been left behind for lack of 

shipping space.74 

73 Col Edward H. Forney, Special After Action 

Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 Aug-Dec 

50, p. 14. 

74 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Field, United 

States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 304. 
REDEPLOYMENT SOUTH 175 

FINAL DEMOLITIONS AT HUNGNAM 

In retrospect, the evacuation of the 

X Corps from Hungnam had proved 

most spectacular as a logistical exercise. 

While the move could be considered a 

withdrawal from a hostile shore, neither Chinese nor North Korean forces 

had made any serious attempts to disrupt the operation or even to test the 

shrinking perimeter that protected the 

outloading. Logistical rather than tactical matters therefore had governed the 

rate of the evacuation. Indeed, the X 

Corps’ redeployment south had been a 

matter of how rapidly Admiral Doyle’s 

ships could be loaded.75 

75 X Corps, Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, 

9-24 Dec 50. 

In announcing the completion of the 

X Corps’ withdrawal from Hungnam 

in a communique on 26 December, 

General MacArthur took occasion to 

appraise UNC operations from the 

time his command had resumed its advance on 24 November and, once again, 

to remark on the restrictions that 

had been placed on him. He blamed 

the incorrect assessment of Chinese 

strength, movements, and intentions 

before the resumption on the failure 

of “political intelligence . . . to penetrate 

the iron curtain” and on the limitations 

placed on field intelligence activities, in 

particular his not being allowed to conduct aerial reconnaissance beyond the 

boarders of Korea. So handicapped, 
176 

his advance, which he later termed a 

“reconnaissance-in-force,” was the 

“proper, indeed the sole, expedient,” 

and “was the final test of Chinese intentions.” In both the advance and the redeployment south, he concluded, “no 

command ever fought more gallantly 

or efficiently under unparalleled conditions of restraint and handicap, and no 

command could have acquitted itself to 

better advantage under prescribed missions and delimitations involving unprecedented risk and jeopardy. 76 

But while MacArthur earlier had pro76 Quoted in MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3536-539. 

EBB AND FLOW 

claimed that only by advancing could 

he determine enemy strength, he had 

not designed or designated the UNC 

attack as a reconnaissance in force. Nor 

was it such. It was, rather, a general 

offensive whose objective was the northern border of Korea. On the other 

hand, except that the operations of his 

command really had nothing to do with 

“conditions of restraint and handicap,” 

MacArthur was correct in his assessment of the quality of UNC operations. 

Indeed, in both advance and withdraw1 

his forces had conducted operations in 

far largest part with efficiency and with 

many demonstrations of gallantry. 
CHAPTER IX 

The Chinese Third Phase Offensive 

The Opening 

On the morning of 23 December 

General Walker left Seoul by jeep to 

visit units above Uijongbu. Ten miles 

north, his jeep started past two 21/2-ton 

trucks halted on the opposite side of 

the road headed south. Almost at the 

same moment, a Korean civilian driving a 3/4-ton truck pulled out from behind the halted vehicles to proceed 

south and partially entered the northbound lane to get past the parked 

trucks. Walker’s driver swerved away 

from the oncoming truck but was unable to avoid a collision. The impact 

threw Walker’s vehicle sideways and 

overturned it, and all occupants were 

thrown out and injured. General 

Walker was unconscious and had no 

discernible pulse when he was picked 

up by escorts in a following vehicle. 

At the 24th Division clearing station 

nearby, he was pronounced dead of 

multiple head injuries.1 

Ridgway Takes Command 

In routine anticipation of casualties 

1 Report of Inquiry Into Accidental Death of Lt. 

Gen. Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army, 11 Jan 51. 

According to a ROK Ministry of National Defense 

publication, Korean War History for One Year: 1 May 

1950 to 30 June 1951. the driver of the truck was 

sentenced to three years' imprisonment. See English 

translation of publication in CMH, p. B-347. 

before Walker’s death, General MacArthur had obtained the agreement of 

the Army chief of staff that Walker’s 

successor, if one was needed, should be 

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, then 

serving on the Department of the Army 

staff as deputy chief of staff for operations and administration. General 

Ridgway’s experience in World War II 

as commander of an airborne division 

and later an airborne corps and his 

strong leadership qualities had MacArthur’s high respect, and his staff assignment in Washington, which had involved visits to the Far East, had kept 

him well informed of operations in 

Korea.2

On receiving word of General 

Walker’s death, MacArthur telephoned 

General Collins in Washington to report the distressing loss and to ask for 

Ridgway. (The I Corps commander, 

General Milburn, temporarily assumed 

command of the Eighth Army.) Near 

midnight of 22 December Collins notified Ridgway that he was the new com2 Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous With History (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 432; 

MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, 

p. 348; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences 

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 383; Schnabel, 

Policy and Direction, pp. 305-06; Rad, Z 30753, CINCFE 

to DEPTAR, MacArthur Personal for Ridgway, 23 

Dec 50. 
178 EBB AND FLOW 

later from General Stratemeyer and 

Admiral Joy. MacArthur’s instructions 

to Ridgway resembled those given to 

General Walker: hold as far north as 

possible and hold Seoul as long as possible. The most to be expected of the 

Eighth Army, MacArthur told Ridgway, 

was an eventual tactical success that 

would clear and secure South Korea. A 

battlefield success of any substance in 

the meantime would help Washington 

answer what MacArthur called the 

“mission vacuum,” meaning the question raised by the Chinese intervention 

of whether UNC forces could or should 

stay in Korea.4 

MacArthur did reveal a new view of 

air power. A month earlier he had 

credited his air forces with a high degree of effectiveness; now he cautioned 

Ridgway that tactical air power was 

much exaggerated, that it could not 

stop the southward flow of enemy 

forces and supplies. When Ridgway 

asked near the close of the meeting 

whether MacArthur would object to a 

decision to attack, MacArthur replied, 

“The Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do 

what you think best. “5 Here was another 

change. Earlier, MacArthur had played 

a key and direct role in planning and 

conducting tactical operations. He 

would do so no longer. General 

Ridgway would make all the decisions 

regarding the employment of the 

Eighth Army with no requirement to 

refer them to MacArthur for approval. 

Ridgway would always inform MacArthur in detail of those decisions, but 

MacArthur would never question him. 

Before leaving for Korea at noon, 

Ridgway radioed his formal assumption 

GENERAL RIDGWAY 

mander of the Eighth Army, and hurried preparations on the 23d put 

Ridgway in the air en route to Tokyo 

that night.3 

Ridgway reached Tokyo’s Haneda 

Airport shortly before midnight on 

Christmas and was met by General 

Hickey, MacArthur’s acting chief of 

staff. En route by sedan to the American Embassy guesthouse, General 

Hickey brought him up to date on 

operations. The enemy offensive previously expected on Christmas Day had 

not materialized. Ridgway received 

fuller briefings the next morning, first 

in private from General MacArthur, 

3 Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous With History, 

p. 432; Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier (New York: 

Harper, 1956), pp. 195-98; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 348. Note that standard Washington time is fourteen hours earlier than 

Korea time. 

4 Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 201-02; MS, Ridgway, The 

Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 349-53. 

5 Ibid. 
CHINESE THIRD PHASE OFFENSIVE: THE OPENING 179 

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO (right) WITH PRESIDENT RHEE 

of command of the Eighth Army with 

instructions that his message, translated 

as necessary, be read by all officers and 

by as many enlisted men as possible. 

“You will have my utmost,” he advised 

his new command. “I shall expect 

yours.“6 

Reaching the main Eighth Army 

headquarters at Taegu late on the 26th, 

Ridgway was displeased at finding the 

bulk of his staff so far to the rear, a 

matter he resolved to correct eventually. 

His immediate step was to get to the 

army forward command post. In battle 

dress for the first time since leaving 

6 Eighth Army GO 215, 26 Dec 50; Rad, H 50965 

KCG, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 26 Dec 

50; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 353-54. 

Washington, at dawn the next day, he 

flew to Seoul, where the handful of staff 

officers he found deepened his resolve 

to remedy the headquarters arrangement.7 He planned not only to redistribute his staff but also to move the 

forward command post to a more central location from where he could reach 

all corps and divisions in minimum 

time.8 

Following a staff conference and 

meetings with American Ambassador 

John J. Muccio and President Rhee in 

7 Later Ridgway’s daily garb would include a grenade hooked to the right suspender of his web equipment and a first aid packet to the left. These items 

became his trademark. 

8 Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 116, 203, 219; MS, Ridgway, 

The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 353, 390. 
180 EBB AND FLOW 

Corps sector. Next east, the Turkish 

brigade overlooked the Han River estuary from the upper end of the Kimpo 

peninsula. Above the Han, the 25th 

Division, to which the Turks and Rangers were attached, straddled Route 1 

along the lower bank of the Imjin River, 

and the ROK 1st Division defended the 

corps right from positions along the 

Imjin reaching northeast almost to 

Route 33 in the Wonsan-Seoul corridor. 

The British 29th Brigade was assembled in I Corps reserve along Route 1 

just outside Seoul. 12 

The IX Corps lay across the WonsanSeoul corridor along the 38th parallel, 

the ROK 6th Division astride Route 33 

at the left, the 24th Division across 

Route 3 at the right. In corps reserve, 

the British 27th Brigade was assembled 

near the junction of Routes 33 and 3 at 

Uijongbu. The 1st Cavalry Division, 

also in reserve, retained the mission assigned to it while under army control 

of blocking the Ch’unch’on-Seoul road. 

Now attached to the cavalry division 

were the Filipino battalion and the 

Greek Expeditionary Force, an infantry battalion that had reached Korea 

on 8 December.13

Near the 38th parallel above Ch’unch’on, the ROK III Corps defended a 

wide sector with the ROK 2d, 5th, and 

8th Divisions on line and the ROK 7th 

Division in reserve. In the narrow ROK 

II Corps sector next east, a single division, the ROK 3d, continued to block 

Route 24 running southwestward 

through the Hongch’on River valley. 

The ROK I Corps defended a gaping 

Seoul, Ridgway began a four-day reconnaissance of the line B front that 

took him to all corps and divisions except the ROK Capital Division on the 

east coast, whose sector was quiet and 

unthreatened by impending enemy 

action.9 

By evening of the 30th he was back 

at Eighth Army main in Taegu, much 

disturbed by what he had learned. The 

Eighth Army was clearly a dispirited 

command. “I could sense it the moment 

I came into a command post . . . I could 

read it in the faces of. . . leaders, from 

sergeants right on up to the top. They 

were unresponsive, reluctant to talk. I 

had to drag information out of them. 

There was a complete absence of that 

alertness, that aggressiveness, that you 

find in troops whose spirit is high.“10 

The attack that Ridgway had hoped 

would be possible he now considered 

plainly out of the question. He also 

considered it imperative to strengthen 

the Eighth Army front if his forces were 

to hold line B. Whether he had time 

enough to do so was questionable. Additional evidence of an imminent enemy offensive had appeared as Ridgway 

reconnoitered the front, and the coming New Year holiday was now a logical 

date on which to expect the opening 

assault. 11 

Unit dispositions along the line had 

changed little since General Walker 

succeeded in manning it. (Map 15) 

The 8213th Army Unit (Eighth Army 

Ranger Company) patrolled Kanghwa 

Island at the extreme west in the I 

9 Ridgway, Soldier, p. 204; MS, Ridgway, The Korean Text 

War, Issues and Policies, pp. 355-57. 

10 Ridgway, Soldier, p. 205. 

11 Ibid., p. 209; Memo, Ridgway for Chief of Staff, 

GHQ, 7 Jan 51, copy in CMH. 

12 Situation Overlay, Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 27 Dec 

50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 28 Dec 50. 

13 Ibid.; Fox, “Inter-Allied Co-operation During 

Combat Operations.” 
Vl\
182 EBB AND FLOW 

THE UIJONGBU AREA 

line at the Eighth Army right, with the 

ROK 9th Division in the high mountains at the corps left, and the ROK 

Capital Division across the slopes and 

coastal road at the eastern anchor of 

the front.14 

Ridgway’s main reserve for strengthening the front was the X Corps. Other 

resources present or scheduled to arrive in Korea by the end of the year 

were exceedingly few. The 2d Division, 

still not fully recovered from its late 

November losses but now reinforced by 

the Netherlands and French battalions, 

was centrally located at Ch’ungju. In 

14 Situation Overlay, Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 27 Dec 

50. 

the west, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, with the Thai battalion attached, was assembled at Suwon 

south of Seoul. Outside these forces, 

the only available unit was the ROK 

11th Division currently operating 

against guerrillas in various locations 

to the south. The 2d Battalion of 

Canada’s Princess Patricia’s Light 

Infantry had reached Korea in midDecember but was at Miryang in the 

southeast for eight weeks of training 

before entering battle. Similarly, the 

16th New Zealand Field Regiment, actually an artillery battalion, due to reach 

Korea on the 31st, would require training before it moved to the front. The 

only units en route to Korea that might 

be able to move forward upon arrival 
CHINESE THIRD PHASE OFFENSIVE: THE OPENING 183 

were two U.S. airborne Ranger companies, the 2d and 4th.15 

Holding against the threatening enemy offensive, Ridgway judged, rested 

on committing most of his reserves 

early and on revitalizing the spirit of 

the Eighth Army. By the time he returned to Taegu on the 30th he had 

taken several steps toward achieving 

both. 16 

Restoring the Eighth Army’s morale 

and confidence, Ridgway believed, depended mainly on improving leadership throughout his command, but it 

was not his intention to start “lopping 

off heads.” Before he would relieve any 

commander, he wanted personally to 

see more of the man in action, to know 

that the relief would not damage the 

unit involved, and, indeed, to be sure 

that he had a better commander available. For the time being, he intended 

to correct deficiencies by working “on 

and through” his current corps and division commanders. One deficiency he 

had noted was that many commanders 

conducted operations from command 

posts far behind the front. To correct 

this practice, he ordered “division commanders to be up with their forward 

battalions, and . . . corps commanders 

up with the regiment that was in the 

hottest action.” 17 

He saw further weaknesses in leadership and staff work in the intelligence 

briefings he received. Confronted during one of the first briefings with a map 

15 Eighth Army G3 Jnls, 27-31 Dec 50; Fox, “InterAllied Co-operation During Combat Operations.” 

16 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 358. 

17 Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen J. Lawton Collins, 8 Jan 

51, copy in CMH; Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and 

Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 

206-07. 

whose main feature was “a big red 

goose egg . . . with ‘174,000’ scrawled 

in the middle of it,” Ridgway was 

astounded. “Here the enemy was leaning right up against us, but we did not 

know his strength, and we did not have 

his location pinpointed.“” He attributed such imprecision directly to the 

Eighth Army’s tendency to “look over 

its shoulder.” As a result of this tendency, the line troops had not maintained proper contact with enemy 

forces or learned enough about the terrain to their front. He promptly rebuked his subordinates for failing to 

meet these two basic combat requirements. They were to patrol until they 

had defined the enemy’s positions and 

determined the strengths of units opposite them, and he warned that he 

“didn’t want to ask any man where a 

trail went and have him tell me he 

didn’t know.“l9 

Ridgway did receive another intelligence report that, if unacceptably 

imprecise, was more than a “goose 

egg” estimate of the opposition. The 

“174,000,” Colonel Tarkenton explained, was the estimated strength of 

the Chinese XIII Army Group. The 

group’s six armies, each with a strength 

of 29,000, were either along the Eighth 

Army front or in the immediate enemy 

rear area. Tarkenton believed three 

North Korean corps totaling 65,800 

men also were at the front and that a 

fourth was approaching it.20 

The greatest enemy strength seemed 

to be massed opposite the Eighth 

18 Ridgway, Soldier, p. 205. 

19 Interv, Mossman, Carroll. and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56; Ridgway, Soldier, p. 206. 

20 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec 50, Enemy Situation-special Report for the Army Commander: 

Ridgway, Soldier, p. 209. 
184 EBB AND FLOW 

Army’s west central sector, an indication that the main enemy attack would 

come through the Wonsan-Seoul corridor over Routes 33 and 3. A strong 

secondary attack farther east also 

seemed probable, either southwest over 

the Ch’unch’on-Seoul axis or south 

through Ch’unch’on and Wonju via 

Route 29, in an attempt to outflank the 

I and IX Corps above Seoul.21 

Two recent attacks by units of the 

North Korean II and V Corps opened 

as Ridgway reached Korea, supported 

Tarkenton’s prediction of a strong secondary effort in the east. Fourteen 

miles northeast of Ch’unch’on, two 

North Korean regiments coming from 

the Hwach’on Reservoir area hit the 

ROK 8th Division at the right of the 

ROK III Corps and gouged a miledeep salient before the South Koreans 

contained the attack. Out of the Inje 

area, twenty-five miles northeast of 

Ch’unch’on, a larger force believed to 

include a division and a reinforced regiment struck southwestward through the 

ROK 9th Division’s flimsy position at 

the left of the ROK I Corps. Entering 

the rear area of the narrow ROK II 

Corps sector, the attack force by 30 

December established a strong roadblock on the central arterial, Route 

29, almost twenty-five miles below 

Ch’unch’on. By extending these gains, 

especially the deeper southwestward 

thrust out of the Inje area, North 

Korean forces conceivably could sever 

the Eighth Army’s main lines of 

communication.22 

21 Ibid. 

22 Eighth Army G3 Jnls, 27-31 Dec 50; Eighth Army 

G2 PIRs 167-172, 26-31 Dec 50. 

Defensive Preparations 

Committing the X Corps 

Ridgway’s first tactical move was to 

counter this threat from the northeast. 

on the 27th, right after hearing Ambassador Muccio give his evaluation of the 

tactical situation, Ridgway ordered part 

of the 2d Division north from Ch’ungju 

into the North Koreans’ projected path. 

General McClure was to move a regimental combat team twenty-five miles 

north to Wonju, from where it could 

oppose any North Korean attempt to 

advance south over Route 29 or west 

along Route 20 and where it could protect a vulnerable link of the central 

Pusan-Seoul rail line, which served as 

an Eighth Army supply route.23 

McClure was in the process of moving the 23d Infantry and the French 

battalion to Wonju on the 29th when 

the North Korean attack out of Inje 

carried behind the ROK II Corps farther north. Ridgway consequently ordered McClure to move the remainder 

of his division to Wonju and to send 

one regiment twenty-five miles north 

of that town to Hongch’on where Route 

29 from Ch’unch’on and Route 24 from 

the northeast intersected. McClure 

complied on the 30th, sending the 23d 

Infantry toward Hongch’on to join its 

South Korean namesake, the 23d Regiment of the ROK 7th Division.24 

Before the 23d Infantry could complete its move above Wonju, the North 

23 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 357; Rad, GX-20178 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

to CG 2d Div, 27 Dec 50. 

24 Rads, GX 20218 KGOO and GX 20253 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG 2d Div, 28 and 29 Dec 50; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 29 and 30 Dec 50; Eighth Army 

G3 Briefing for CG, 30 Dec 50. 
CHINESE THIRD PHASE OFFENSIVE: THE OPENING 185 

Koreans reported by the ROK III 

Corps to number between seven hundred and twelve hundred men, blocked 

Route 29 six miles below Hongch’on. 

The 23d’s advance became a clearing 

operation, made in concert with a battalion of the ROK 23d Regiment, which 

moved south out of Hongch’on and 

with the reserve 5th Regiment of the 

ROK 3d Division, which dropped south 

from Ch’unch’on to a point west of the 

North Korean position and then struck 

eastward against it. The concerted effort cleaned out most of the roadblock 

on the 31st. The battalion of the ROK 

23d Regiment returned to Hongch’on 

while the ROK 5th Regiment and the 

leading battalion of the 23d Infantry 

stayed to clear the remainder of the 

enemy position. The balance of the 23d 

Infantry was strung out on Route 29, a 

battalion at Hoengsong nine miles below the roadblock site, the remainder 

still in Wonju where the rest of the 2d 

Division was now assembling.25 

While installing the 2d Division in the 

Hongch’on-Wonju area might hold off 

the ‘North Koreans currently advancing from the northeast, the defensive 

weakness in the three South Korean 

corps sectors left open the likelihood 

of stronger, more effective enemy penetrations. Against this possibility, Ridgway 

planned to reinforce this portion of the 

front, much as General Walker had decided earlier, by setting the X Corps in 

the Ch’unch’on sector now held by the 

ROK III Corps and by placing the bulk 

of his South Korean forces along a 

narrower, more solid front in the higher 

25 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 31 Dec 50; Situation Overlay with Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 31 Dec 50; Eighth Army 

POR 517, 31 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Briefing for 

CG, 31 Dec 50. 

mountains and coastal slopes to the 

east.26 

Since time was critical, Ridgway on 

28 December pressed General Almond 

and the commander of the 2d Logistical 

Command, General Garvin, to quicken 

the readiness preparations of the 1st 

Marine, 3d, and 7th Divisions. The 

marines, now reattached to the X Corps, 

and the 7th Division were fully assembled but were still refurbishing, and the 

3d Division, last to leave Hungnam, was 

not yet three-quarters ashore. The ships 

carrying General Soule’s remaining 

troops were in Pusan harbor, however, 

and following Ridgway’s 29 December 

order that these ships be unloaded without delay, the balance, of the 3d Division was ashore and en route to the 

division’s assembly area south of Kyongju 

by nightfall on the 30th.27 

Since it was nevertheless obvious that 

the X Corps as currently constituted 

could not move forward for some time, 

Ridgway on the 29th approved plans 

developed by his staff for adjusting 

Almond’s order of battle to permit earlier commitment. Under these plans the 

X Corps headquarters and whichever 

of Almond’s present divisions completed its preparations first would move 

to Wonju, where Almond would add 

the 2d Division and possibly one ROK 

division to his command as substitutes 

for the two divisions left behind. Even 

this arrangement would take time; the 

estimate for moving one of Almond’s 

current divisions from its southern as26 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 28 Dec 50. 

27 Rad, GX 20219 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

X Corps and CG 2d Log Comd, 28 Dec 50; X Corps 

POR 93, 28 Dec 50; Rad, GX 20228, CG Eighth Army 

to CG X Corps and CG 2d Log Comd, 29 Dec 50; X 

Corps POR 95, 30 Dec 50. 
186 EBB AND FLOW 

ble in the west. As soon as General 

Soule finished reorganizing and reequipping his forces he was to move 

them into the P’yongt’aek-Ansong area 

forty miles south of Seoul and prepare 

them for operations in either the I or 

IX Corps sector.30

sembly area to the battle zone was eight 

to ten days. Once forward, the X Corps 

was to operate with the initial mission 

of destroying any enemy penetration 

of the South Korean front above it and 

of protecting the IX Corps’ east flank.28 

Ridgway gave Almond detailed instructions on the 30th. Having learned 

that the 7th Division would be ready 

ahead of the other two divisions, he directed Almond to move one of its regiments the next day to Chech’on, twenty 

miles below Wonju, where Route 60 

and a mountain road coming from the 

east and northeast joined Route 29. 

When Almond could get the remainder of General Barr’s forces forward, 

he was to assemble the 7th near the 2d 

so that both divisions could be deployed 

quickly against any enemy penetration 

from the direction of Ch’unch’on and 

Inje or from the east toward Hoengsong 

and Wonju. Almond subsequently could 

expect to occupy a sector of the front. 

In the meantime, he was to develop 

Route 29 southeastward from Wonju 

through Chech’on, Tanyang, Yongju, 

and Andong as the main X Corps supply route.29 

On the last day of the year Ridgway 

placed the 1st Marine and 3d Divisions in army reserve. When fully refurbished, the marines were to move 

from Masan to an east coast assembly 

in the Yongch’on-Kyongju-P’ohangdong area and prepare to occupy blocking positions wherever needed to the 

north. The 3d Division was to reassem28 Rad, GX 20217 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

Eighth Army Fwd, for Gen Ridgway from Gen Allen, 

28 Dec 50; Rad, G 10014 KCG, Dep CofS Eighth 

Army Adv to CofS Eighth Army Main, 29 Dec 50. 

29 X Corps CG Diary, 30 Dec 50; Rad, GX 20294 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 30 Dec 50; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 30 Dec 50; Rad, GX 20329 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 31 Dec 50. 

Establishing the Seoul Bridgehead 

While reinforcing the South Korean 

sector of the front, Ridgway also deepened the defense of Seoul. After conferences with General Milburn and 

General Coulter on the 27th, he instructed them to organize a bridgehead 

above Seoul along a line curving from 

the north bank of the Han west of Seoul 

through a point just below Uijongbu at 

the junction of Routes 33 and 3 to the 

north and back to the Han east of the 

city. The bridgehead would be deep 

enough to keep the Han bridges below 

Seoul free of enemy artillery fire. The 

position therefore would be suitable for 

covering a general withdrawal below 

Seoul that might accompany or follow 

the occupation of the bridgehead line.31 

Milburn and Coulter each were to 

place a division on the bridgehead line 

if the expected enemy attack forced 

them to vacate their line B positions. 

Ridgway at first restricted any I and IX 

30 Rads, GX 20295 KGOO and GX 20332 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 30 and 31 Dec 50; 

Rad, GX 20335 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 1st 

Marine Div, 31 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 31 Dec 

50. 

31 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 356; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 207-08; Rad, GX 

10009 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I and IX 

Corps, 28 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 28 Dec 50. 

Most of the fortification work at the bridgehead line 

was to be done by South Korean laborers. During the 

meeting with President Rhee on the 27th, Ridgway 

asked him for 30,000 civilian laborers to be employed 

in building fortifications above and below Seoul, and 

Rhee provided the first 10,000 by dawn on the 28th. 
CHINESE THIRD PHASE OFFENSIVE: THE OPENING 187 

Corps withdrawal from the present 

front to his own personal order. But 

on reconsidering the high estimate of 

Chinese strength opposite the two corps, 

the tendency of some South Korean 

units to break under pressure, and the 

demonstrated Chinese preference for 

night attacks, he realized that this restriction could create a costly delay 

should Milburn and Coulter be unable 

to contact him promptly. He therefore 

authorized the two corps commanders 

to withdraw on their own at any time 

they agreed that it was necessary but 

could not reach him.32 

No matter who gave the order, 

Ridgway insisted that a withdrawal to 

the bridgehead be more than a mere 

move from one line to another; both 

corps were to attack enemy forces who 

followed. The terrain could accommodate this tactic, especially in the WonsanSeoul corridor where the enemy would 

be obliged to use routes surrounded by 

higher ground. Ridgway expected 

Milburn and Coulter to leave strong 

forces of infantry and armor posted in 

this high ground as the two corps withdrew; these forces would strike advancing enemy units and disrupt the followup before they themselves moved back 

to the bridgehead.33 

Ridgway Returns to Seoul 

In smaller steps taken before the year 

was out, Ridgway attached the 2d Ranger 

Company to the 1st Cavalry Division in 

the west and the 4th Ranger Company 

to the 7th Division in the east. Since the 

2d Division was operating in the Wonju 

area where the surrounding mountains 

prohibited armor, he ordered McClure’s 

32 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 369. 

33 Ibid., p. 365; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 28 Dec 50. 

72d Tank Battalion to the west for attachment to the IX Corps, which might 

use it to punish an enemy advance on 

Seoul.34 

Anticipating an opening enemy attack toward the capital on New Year’s’ 

Day, Ridgway returned there on the 

afternoon of the 31st.35 According to 

Colonel Tarkenton’s latest intelligence 

estimate, enemy forces were fully deployed. In the west, the North Korean 

I Corps straddled Route 1 at the Imjin 

with the Chinese 50th Army concentrated 

just behind it; the 39th Army had spread 

out near the Imjin between Routes 1 

and 33; the 38th Army sat astride Route 

33 below Yonch'on with the 40th Army 

assembled to its rear; and the 66th Army 

lay across Routes 3 and 17, its forces 

pointed at both Uijongbu and 

Ch’unch’on, with the 42d Army backing 

it up at Kumhwa.36 

Farther east, the full North Korean 

V Corps, previously in the area now 

occupied by the 66th Army, had joined 

the North Korean II Corps in the region between and below Hwach’on and 

Inje. This concentration, the expected 

arrival of the North Korean III Corps 

in the same area, and the probability 

that forces from the Chinese IX Army 

Group would move down into the same 

region from Hungnam represented, in 

Tarkenton’s estimation, a sufficient 

force to exploit successfully the North 

Korean gains already registered in the 

east.37 

34 Eighth Army GO 219, 30 Dec 50; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, 30 and 31 Dec 50. 

response to critical situations, they must be antici35 "It is not enough [for a commander] to move in 

pated.” Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with 

Ridgway, 30 Nov 56. 

36 Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen Collins, 3 Jan 51, copy 

in CMH; Eighth Army PIR 172, 31 Dec 50. 

37 Eighth Army PIRs 171, 30 Dec 50, and 172, 31 

Dec 50. 
188 EBB AND FLOW 

The preponderance of enemy forces 

above Seoul still pointed to a main effort against the South Korean capital 

over the Uijongbu-Seoul axis. In addition, enemy artillery positions sighted 

from the air disclosed a large number 

of guns generally astride an extension 

of the I and IX Corps boundary, all 

well disposed to support an attack 

through the Wonsan-Seoul corridor. 

Further, aerial observers had spotted 

an enemy buildup of bridging materials near the Imjin. Prisoners confirmed 

these indications. Several revealed that 

a main offensive toward Seoul would 

open on the night of 31 December, and 

an officer from the 38th Army said that 

the offensive would begin with a coordinated attack by the 38th, 39th, 40th, 

and 42d Armies.38 

The Opening Enemy Assaults 

Ridgway had judged the signs correctly. As he flew into Seoul and visited 

the western front by jeep during the 

afternoon of the 31st, vanguards of the 

116th Division, 39th Army, moved down 

to the Imjin near Korangp'o-ri and 

forced outposts of the ROK 1st Division to withdraw below the river. Behind a thirty-minute artillery preparation, forces of the 116th then crossed 

the Imjin just after full dark to attack 

the ROK division’s main defenses.39 

From this opening at the I Corps 

right, the XIII Army Group commander 

broadened his attack eastward. Around 

midnight units of the 116th Division and 

of the 113th Division, 38th Army, struck 

38 Ibid. 

39 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 

173, 1 Jan 51; FEC Intel Dig, no. 115, l-15 Feb 53; 

24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Ltr, Ridgway to 

Collins, 3 Jan 51; Ridgway, Soldier, p. 209. 

hard at the ROK 6th Division on the 

IX Corps left while the 114th Division, 

38th Army, opened smaller, intermittent 

assaults against the 24th Division at the 

IX Corps right. Two hours later the 

66th Army sent forces against the ROK 

5th Division in the center of the ROK 

III Corps sector and near 0500 hit the 

ROK 2d Division at the ROK III Corps 

In grand tactics, the Chinese New 

Year’s offensive, or Third Phase Offensive as the Chinese called it, resembled 

their previous effort, strong forces pushing a main attack in the west while other 

forces threatened envelopment in the 

east. The hardjolts of the 38th and 39th 

Armies against the I and IX Corps aimed 

the main Chinese effort generally south 

astride Route 33 toward Seoul. The 

66th Army’s attacks against the ROK III 

Corps farther east widened the Chinese 

advance to a front of forty-five miles 

but were pointed mainly at Kap’yong, 

thirty-five miles northeast of Seoul and 

twelve miles west of Ch’unch’on. Seizure of Kap’yong, situated as it was on 

the Ch’unch’on-Seoul road, could be 

the beginning of a flanking movement 

against Seoul or the start of a deeper 

sweep to envelop the city. It also posed 

the danger of envelopment to the South 

Korean forces defending Ch’unch’on, 

forces whose positions already were 

threatened by the deep North Korean 

salient in the Hongch’on area.41 

The 38th and 39th Armies reinforced 

the main drive during the night but 

kept it massed near the I - IX Corps 

boundary. The 25th Division on the left 

flank of the I Corps was not touched, 

and attacks against the 24th Division 

40 Ibid.; IX Corps PIR 97, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 

293, 1 Jan 51. 

41 Ibid. 
CHINESE THIRD PHASE OFFENSIVE: THE OPENING 189 

on the IX Corps right, though numerous, remained small and ineffective. Either by a decision to single out the interior ROK 1st and 6th Divisions or by 

the coincidence of their adjoining positions athwart Route 33, the Chinese 

concentrated on wedging through the 

South Koreans, particularly the 1st 

Division.42 

The reinforced night attack of the 

116th Division against the ROK 1st Division shoved the 12th Regiment out of 

position on the division right and sent 

its troops streaming to the rear. General Paik tried to refill the vacated sector with his reserve 15th Regiment, but 

that regiment and the 11th on the division left were hit hard and forced back 

to the south and west, leaving much 

ground open to Chinese exploitation. 

The ROK 6th Division fared better, giving little ground to the 116th and 113th 

Divisions, but by daylight faced a threat 

of entrapment, posed to some extent 

by enemy groups who managed to work 

into its rear area but posed most seriously by those forces of the 116th cutting deep through the ROK 1st Division to its left.43 

The deepest point of Chinese penetration by daylight on 1 January had 

been marked by Battery C of the U.S. 

9th Field Artillery Battalion, which had 

been supporting the ROK 1st Division 

from positions behind the 12th Regiment. When the battery withdrew after 

the 12th abandoned its position, the artillery column was caught in an ambush 

about eight miles south of the Imjin 

and lost four 155-mm. howitzers be42 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 

173, 1 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; I Corps POR 

332, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 293, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps 

PIR 97, 1 Jan 51. 

43 Ibid. 

fore it could escape the trap. From this 

point the edges of the V-shaped enemy 

salient driven into the right half of the 

ROK 1st Division sector traced secondary Route 5Y northwestward to the 

Imjin through the middle of General 

Paik’s sector and traced secondary Route 

11 northward, not far west of the I-IX 

Corps boundary.44 

From reports reaching Eighth Army 

headquarters through the night, General Ridgway suspected that the Chinese advance toward Seoul was fast becoming more than the I and IX Corps 

could handle. No more than three Chinese divisions so far had been identified in the assault in the west, but the 

Chinese, in all logic, would exploit their 

gains in the ROK 1st Division sector 

and could commit additional divisions 

with no great delay. A paucity of reports left Ridgway somewhat in the 

dark about what was happening in the 

South Korean sectors farther east. Although American advisers, the main 

sources of information on ROK Army 

operations, were at the principal South 

Korean headquarters, breakdowns in 

communication between front line and 

headquarters seemed to be the rule 

rather than the exception in ROK units. 

Ridgway nevertheless was aware that 

Chinese forces had hit the ROK III 

Corps, a portent that made the I and 

IX Corps positions even less tenable.45 

By the time Ridgway started north 

out of Seoul near dawn on New Year’s 

Day toward the sectors of the ROK 1st 

and 6th Divisions, he had few doubts 

that he would have to withdraw from 

line B. His concern heightened to alarm 

a few miles north when he met trucks 

44 Ibid. 

45 Ibid.; Ridgway, Soldier, p. 210. 
190 EBB AND FLOW 

packed with South Korean troops. No 

weapons other than a few rifles were in 

sight. He sensed immediately that the 

South Koreans were running and 

jumped from his jeep to wave the trucks 

to a halt. But he “might as well had 

tried to stop the flow of the Han.” The 

most he could do was order straggler 

points established where retreating 

troops could be stopped and reassembled.46 

The episode on the road, as Ridgway 

discovered when he visited the I and 

IX Corps headquarters before noon, 

had not signaled the collapse of the two 

ROK divisions. The bulk of both was 

still forward, and both were attempting to erect defenses along the shoulders of the Chinese penetration. General Paik was setting his 11th and 15th 

Regiments across hills overlooking Route 

5Y along the southwestern shoulder, a 

small part of the 15th stood below the 

point of the wedge, and about half the 

12th Regiment was now loosely assembled some two miles below the deepest 

penetration. On the other side of the 

salient, Brig. Gen. Chang Do Yong, 

commander of the ROK 6th Division, 

was moving his reserve 2d Regiment 

into position along Route 33 to refuse 

his left flank. Rearward along this long 

open flank, General Coulter had ordered the British 27th Brigade from 

Uijongbu into blocking positions near 

Tokchong, eight miles north, where a 

road coming southeastward out of the 

area invested by Chinese joined Route 

33.47 

General Milburn, Ridgway learned, 

had started the British 29th Brigade 

46 Ridgway, Soldier, p. 210. 

47 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; I Corps POR 333, 

1 Jan 51; IX Corps G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 

294, 1 Jan 51. 

up Route 1 from Seoul toward a forward assembly behind the 25th Division. 

From there the British were to attack 

northeast into the flank of the enemy 

salient. Ridgway discouraged this move, 

believing a counterattack to have any 

chance at all would require at least a 

full American division. But such a commitment seemed neither wise nor feasible. The two nearest U.S. divisions were 

the 25th and 24th. The 25th, though 

still not directly involved except for having received mortar and artillery fire, 

was the only unit standing before the 

North Korean I Corps and the Chinese 

50th Army. The 24th on the opposite 

flank had been hit hard after daylight, 

apparently by all three regiments of the 

114th Division, and had backed away to 

positions two miles south. Even if one 

of these divisions were to be used, 

Ridgway saw no way, in view of their 

dispositions on the flanks, that a counterattack could be started in less than 

forty-eight ho-m-s. Such an effort, he 

judged, would be too late since the Chinese were not only maintaining strong 

pressure but, according to early morning air reports of heavy troop movements down Route 33 from the direction of Ch’orwon, also were showing 

clear signs of further reinforcing their 

advance.48 

From additional reports reaching 

Ridgway by noon of the 1st, he now 

knew that the ROK III Corps had been 

under attack since early morning, that 

the ROK 2d and 5th Divisions at the 

corps left and center had received the 

attacks, and that the heaviest assaults 

48 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; Msg, G3 I Corps 

to G3 IX Corps, in IX Corps G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; I Corps 

POR 333. 1 Jan 51: IX Corps POR 294, 1 Ian 51: 

Ridgway, Memo for Cofs GHQ, 7 Jan 51, copy in 

CsMH. 
CHINESE THIRD PHASE OFFENSIVE: THE OPENING 191 

had hit the 5th. While these reports still 

gave Ridgway scant information, they 

made plain that the Chinese were moving on a broad front and pointed out 

more sharply the possibility of a flanking or enveloping move against Seoul. 

From this clearer picture of the 

Ch'unch'on sector and the circumstances 

facing the I and IX Corps in the west, 

Ridgway was fully convinced that the 

wisest moves were to withdraw the latter two corps to the Seoul bridgehead 

and to pull all South Korean forces in 

the east to line C. Although having to 

call a withdrawal only six days after he 

had taken command of the Eighth Army 

was disappointing and was certainly 

contrary to his original intention of attacking or at least standing fast, he gave 

General Milburn and General Coulter 

withdrawal orders at noon.49 

49 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; Rad, GX 10023 

KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 2 Jan 51; Ltr, 

Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51. 
CHAPTER X 

Withdrawal From Seoul 

Out of concern for the Eighth Army’s 

lack of spirit and out of conviction that 

recovery depended largely on improved leadership, General Ridgway 

in his noontime withdrawal orders to 

Milburn and Coulter on 1 January emphasized their responsibility to conduct 

strong delaying actions. In particular, 

he wanted them to withdraw in daylight so that they could add air support 

to their attacks against enemy troops 

who followed the I and IX Corps to the 

Seoul bridgehead. 1 

He repeated these instructions during the afternoon and ordered the 

three South Korean corps to withdraw. 

The ROK III and I Corps were to occupy line C from the junction of 

the Pukhan and Han rivers eastward 

through Hongch'on to Wonp’o-ri on 

the coast. As a preliminary to consolidating South Korean forces in a narrower sector in the east and to committing the X Corps in the central region, 

ROK II Corps headquarters was to release its single division temporarily to 

ROK Army control and leave the front 

to help with rear area security. The 

X Corps, whose command group was 

moving northward from Kyongju more 

slowly than anticipated, was now expected to establish a command post at 

Ch'ungju and take control of the 2d 

Division by evening of the 2d.2 

1 Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51. 

2 Rad, GX-l-48 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

Since falling back to the bridgehead 

and line C would endanger the forwardmost army supply points, Ridgway 

ordered the evacuation of all installations located between lines C and D, 

including the Inch’on port complex. 

Though Inch’on was a major installation, the gradual reduction of its stocks, 

under way since the Eighth Army withdrew below P’yongyang, would simplify 

its closing.3 

To the Seoul Bridgehead 

General Milburn started his moves 

in midafternoon on the 1st, holding the 

ROK 1st Division forward as cover 

while setting the 25th Division and British 29th Brigade in the western and 

eastern halves of his bridgehead sector. 

He also withdrew the Rangers and 

Turks from Kanghwa Island and the 

blunt end of the Kimpo peninsula into 

positions just northwest of Kimpo airfield. This move extended the I Corps 

arc below the Han off the left flank of 

the 25th Division but did not uncover 

Inch’on.4 

ROKA et al., 1 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Briefing for 

CG, 1 Jan 51; Rad, AG IN 11626-B, CG X Corps to 

CG Eighth Army, 2 Jan 51. 

3 Eighth Army Admin O 32, 1 Jan 51; 3d Log Comd 

Comd Rpt, Jan 51. 

4 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 1 Jan 51; Courier 

Msg, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 011400 Jan 51; 

25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL 

The British brigade, having moved 

north under Milburn’s previous order 

to counterattack, needed only to march 

east to reach its bridgehead position 

which it occupied by 1800.5 Taking 

longer to make a covered withdrawal 

from line B, although without enemy 

contact, the 25th Division was fully deployed at the bridgehead by midnight 

after establishing outposts astride 

Route 1 some three miles above its main 

position.6 

Milburn inadvertently collided with 

Ridgway by ordering General Kean and 

the British brigade commander, Brigadier Thomas Brodie, to defend the 

bridgehead “at all costs.” Ridgway 

claimed such an order as his prerogative. Milburn’s directive also ran somewhat counter to what Ridgway considered an important step in restoring 

confidence among the rank and file, 

that of assuring them that their safety 

was an immediate concern of their commanders. He expected his command to 

fight hard, but he also was doing 

“everything I could think of to impress 

upon the Corps and Division Commanders that no unit was to be left to 

be overwhelmed and destroyed; that 

any units that are cut off will not be 

abandoned, but will be fought for un5 Brigadier Thomas Brodie, the brigade commander, noted in his order of the day that this was 

the brigade’s first appearance at the front since its 

arrival in Korea: “At last after weeks of frustration we 

have nothing between us and the Chinese. I have no 

intention that this Brigade Group will retire before 

the enemy unless ordered by higher authority in order to conform with general movement. If you meet 

him you are to knock hell out of him with everything 

you have got. You are only to give ground on my 

orders.” Order of the Day, Brig Thomas Brodie, Commanding 29 Independent Infantry Brigade Group, 1 

Jan 51, copy in I Corps G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51. 

6 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 1 

Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

193 

less it is clear that their relief will result 

by [sic] the loss of equal or greater 

numbers.” Ridgway, in any case, had 

not designed the Seoul bridgehead as a 

last-stop position, and he countermanded Milburn’s instructions.7 

Milburn had ordered the ROK 1st 

Division to wait until daylight on the 

2d to withdraw. On the way back General Paik was to drop off a regiment to 

reinforce the British brigade at the 

bridgehead, then take his remaining 

forces into defenses along the lower 

bank of the Han directly beneath Seoul. 

Through the afternoon of the 1st, 

Paik’s forces received several heavy attacks and backed off about three miles 

to the southwest as the Chinese began 

to widen their wedge. After a lull lasting almost to midnight, the Chinese 

again tested Paik’s position, pushing 

light forces south against a battalion of 

the 15th Regiment at the point of the 

salient. This push proved preliminary 

to a hard attack at 0300 that sliced 

through the battalion and carried the 

Chinese two miles south before its impetus faded.8

Though still engaged at daylight, 

the South Koreans had not given any 

more ground. Paik broke contact by 

regiment, sending each southwest to 

Pongilch’on-ni on Route 1 where Milburn had assembled trucks to carry 

Paik’s forces the remaining distance 

south. By midnight the 11th Regiment 

joined the British, and the remainder 

7 Courier Msg, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 

011400 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 1 Jan 51; 

MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, 

p. 368. 

8 Courier Msg, CG I Corns to CG 25th Div et al., 

011400 Jan 51; Msg, CG I Corps to CG 29th Brit Brig 

and CG 1st ROK Inf Div, 011630 Jan 51; I Corps 

PORs 333 and 334. 1 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51. 
194 EBB AND FLOW 

of the division was spreading out to occupy its river position below Seoul. 9 

In the IX Corps sector, General 

Coulter planned to withdraw to the 

bridgehead in two steps: to line Wolf, a 

delaying position fifteen miles below 

line B, then to the bridgehead itself another eight miles south. He opened the 

first step at 1400 on the 1st, leaving the 

move below the Wolf line to be taken 

when mutually agreed by the 24th and 

ROK 6th Division commanders. He directed the 24th Division, reinforced by 

the 7th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry 

Division, to man the bridgehead line 

and the ROK 6th Division and remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division to occupy line C along the lower bank of the 

Han eastward from a point opposite 

the right flank of the bridgehead.10 

Left to their own devices, General 

Church and General Chang planned 

no stay at the Wolf line except that 

Church would leave two battalions 

there to help cover both divisions. They 

also would have cover on the vulnerable west flank from the British 27th 

Brigade now in position just below 

Tokchong near the west end of line 

Wolf. 11 

Each division protected its own initial withdrawal. The 24th, in a column 

of regiments with the covering forces 

falling in at the tail end, moved without contact down Route 3 to Uijongbu 

at the left anchor of the corps bridgehead position. Behind the two battalions left at the Wolf line, Church’s three 

9 I Corps PORs 335 and 336, 2 Jan 5I; I Corps G3 

Jnl, 2 Jan 51. 

10 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Opn 

Plan 6, 29 Dec 50; Change 1 to IsX Corps Opn Plan 6, 

29 Dec 50; IX Corps Opn Dir 20, 1 Jan 51. 

11 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 294, 1 Jan 51; 24th 

Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

regiments manned bridgehead sectors 

before midnight, tying in with the attached 7th Cavalry, which earlier had 

occupied the southeastern end of the 

bridgehead. 12 

In taking the ROK 6th Division 

off line B, General Chang originally 

planned to move cross-country to Tokchong, then use Route 33 to pass behind the British 27th Brigade and 

complete his move. But before the division got under way, Chinese forces 

pushed out of the salient in the adjacent ROK 1st Division area and occupied Tokchong. To avoid having to 

fight through the town, Chang elected 

to withdraw cross-country all the way.13

Unlike the 24th Division’s easy departure from line B, the 2d Regiment 

covering the remainder of the ROK 6th 

from positions facing both north and 

west close by the division and corps 

left boundary suffered heavy casualties 

from hard attacks by Chinese coming 

out of the ROK 1st Division area and 

down Route 33. A prisoner taken from 

a group advancing along Route 33 identified his unit as the 118th Division, 

40th Army, apparently the force sighted 

earlier in the day moving south from 

Ch’orwon.14 

After breaking contact, the 2d Regiment, like the remainder of the division that had started south through the 

hills before it, ran into small groups of 

Chinese who previously had infiltrated 

the division’s lines. For reasons that 

never became entirely clear, but probably because of these encounters and the 

difficulties of moving cross-country, the 

12 IX Corps G3 Msg File, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

13 IX Corpss G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51. 

14 IX Corps G3 Msg File, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 

174, 2 Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL 195 

division broke up into disorganized 

groups before it reached the Wolf line. 

By dark General Chang had lost all control of his forces.15 

To assist the withdrawal, Coulter 

had established an entrucking point on 

Route 33 about three miles north of 

Seoul where Chang’s forces were to be 

directed for motor lift to their line C 

position. By daylight on the 3d only 

the equivalent of four battalions had 

assembled at that point. General Chang 

used a IX Corps plane to search for his 

troops during the morning, and additional entrucking points were set up to 

accelerate the movement of troops as 

they filtered south. About ninety truckloads were carried south of the Han 

through the day, but the head count, 

even at 0900 on 3 January, stood 

at only six thousand, or about half 

the division’s original strength; of 

these, only twenty-five hundred were 

infantry. 16 

As the disorganization of the ROK 

6th Division became apparent, Coulter 

ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to 

spread out into the line C sector previously assigned to Chang. Since 

Coulter had given the 7th Cavalry to 

the 24th Division and also had taken 

the bulk of the 5th Cavalry to reconstitute a corps reserve after moving the 

British 27th Brigade to Tokchong, General Gay hasd to stretch his remaining 

forces thin to cover the two division 

sectors.17 

Meanwhile, between 1700 and 2130 

on the 1st, the British 27th Brigade had 

driven off three small Chinese groups 

at its Tokchong position. But without 

further encounter the brigade and General Church’s two covering battalions 

withdrew from the Wolf line before 

midnight, the battalions rejoining their 

regiments while the British assembled 

near the northeastern limits of Seoul as 

a reserve for the fully committed 24th 

Division. 18 

The Outlook, 2 January 

On the 2d, as the ROK 1st and 6th 

Divisions made their way back to Seoul 

and as the remainder of the I and IX 

Corps settled more solidly into their 

bridgehead and line C positions, the 

deepest known point of Chinese advance had been marked by the previous night’s engagements with the British at Tokchong. Chinese forces were 

at least within nine miles of the bridgehead and probably nearer. In view of 

the rate of advance the Chinese had 

sustained so far, attacks could be expected at the bridgehead on the 3d. 

The next attacks probably would be 

stronger than those at line B. Four divisions now had been identified in the I 

and IX Corps sectors, and a fifth had 

hit the ROK 5th Division in the ROK 

I II Corps sector. These five, while 

not a great number, represented four 

armies, the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 66th. 

These armies could, and very likely 

would, commit additional divisions. 

Moreover, the 50th Army, known to be 

in the Kaesong area, could easily join 

the offensive by moving on Seoul via 

Route 1, and the 42d Army, concentrated near Kumhwa, could advance 

toward Seoul over Route 3 or south 

15 IX Corps G3 Msg File, Jan 51. 

16 Ibid. 18 IX Corps G3 Msg File, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd 

17 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 2 Jan 51; 1st Cav Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps POR 295, 1 Jan 51; 24th 

Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
196 EBB AND FLOW 

toward Kap’yong and Ch’unch’on. 

The Seoul bridgehead was, at best, 

precarious. 19 

Further testimony on just how precarious the position was came from engineers on duty at the Han bridges who 

reported on the 2d that the river was 

frozen solid enough to support foot 

traffic, as evidenced by Korean civilians leaving the Seoul area. The forces 

above the city faced not only the likelihood of strong frontal attacks and the 

chance of being enveloped by enemy 

forces to the east but also the possibility 

of being trapped by enemy forces crossing the ice just outside the flanks of the 

bridgehead.20 

Civilians moving in large numbers toward the bridgehead from the area just 

vacated as well as south out of the Seoul 

area posed additional dangers. Enemy 

forces could use the civilian movement 

toward the bridgehead as cover for 

their own advance, and, to the rear, 

any mass milling on the main lines of 

communication could seriously interfere with troop and supply movements. 

Ridgway consequently issued instructions on 2 January that refugees were 

not to be permitted to pass through a 

forward position and that those moving out of the Seoul-Inch’on area were 

to be levered away from Route 1 to 

lesser roads on either side.21 

By nightfall on the 2d Ridgway completed or started several other moves 

to strengthen his position in the west. 

The Thailand battalion, previously with 

the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team at Suwon, joined the British 

29th Brigade in the bridgehead. En 

19 Eighth Army PIR 174, 2 Jan 51. 

20 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51. 

21 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

route from Kyongju in the far southeast were the X Corps’ 92d and 96th 

Field Artillery Battalions. Reasoning 

that General Almond’s artillery could 

best be used against the main enemy 

effort, Ridgway had ordered the two 

battalions forward in the west; they 

were to be divided between the I and 

IX Corps. He also ordered the 3d Division to move two regiments and a command group to the Ansong-P’yongt’aek 

region on 4 January and to bring its 

remaining units forward as soon as it 

became possible to transport them. All 

but one company of the 72d Tank 

Battalion, previously taken from the 2d 

Division, now had joined the IX Corps 

and been attached to the 24th Division. 

The remaining company was en route 

to Suwon to join the 187th Airborne 

Regimental Combat Team, which 

Ridgway had alerted for counterattacks, 

particularly in the Yangp’yong and 

Yoju areas, two Han River crossing sites 

on the IX Corps right flank twenty-five 

and forty miles southeast of Seoul.22 

Ridgway’s instructions to Brig. Gen. 

Frank S. Bowen, Jr.‘s combat team were 

a hedge against a surprise appearance 

of enemy forces pushing in from the 

northeast or east. Indeed, what had 

happened or was likely to happen in 

the South Korean corps sectors remained difficult for Ridgway to ascertain. From reports reaching him on the 

22 Ibid.; Rad, GX--1-3 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

CGs I, IX, and X Corps, 31 Dec 50; Rid, GX-l-82 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG 

187th Abn RCT, 1 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-101 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG, IX Corps and CG 187th Abn 

RCT, 2 Jan 51; Eighth Army POR 520, 1 Jan 51; 

Rad, GX-1-138 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 3d 

Inf Div, 2 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51; 

Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 3 Jan 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 3 Jan 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL 197 

2d he knew that the ROK Capital Division on the east coast had reached line 

C without contact, but about the most 

that could be positively said of the remaining ROK divisions was that no one 

knew for sure where the 

23 

were or what 

condition they were in. 

The ROK 2d Division on the ROK 

III Corps’ left apparently was in bad 

shape. One regiment was reported to 

be almost completely disorganized. The 

other two were believed to be cut off 

about live miles north of Kap’yong by 

66th Army forces who had moved in behind the 2d after penetrating the left 

flank of the ROK 5th Division. Ridgway 

knew nothing about the ROK 5th and 

8th Divisions but had received an air 

observer’s report that Ch’unch’on had 

fallen during the afternoon of the 2d. 

The one ROK III Corps unit he could 

definitely locate was the reserve 7th 

Division, which, except for a missing 

regiment, was assembling twenty miles 

northwest of Wonju.24 

The most Ridgway knew about the 

ROK 3d Division was that it was slowly 

backing out of its ROK II Corps sector 

and moving southwestward over Route 

24 toward Hongch’on. According to 

plans, the division would continue 

south until it could move laterally 

below the North Korean salient and 

assemble at Pyongch’ang, twenty-five 

miles east of Wonju.25 

In an attempt to stabilize the line in 

the central region, Ridgway ordered the 

X Corps to assume responsibility on 3 

January for a 35-mile sector of line C 

centered approximately on Route 29. 

23 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51; Eighth Army PORs 

521, 522, and 523, 2 Jan 51. 

24 Ibid.; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

25 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51; Eighth Army PORs 

521, 522, and 523, 2 Jan 51. 

The corps lineup was to include the 

U.S. 2d and 7th Divisions and the ROK 

2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions. General Almond was to block enemy advances 

from the direction of Ch’unch’on as 

well as from the northeast and east out 

of the North Korean salient. This assignment gave Almond the immediate 

task of locating and gaining control of 

the three South Korean divisions, and 

he had yet to bring up the remainder 

of the 7th Division from the south. For 

the time being, his defense would depend mainly on the U.S. 2d Division.26 

With the intention of establishing positions below the North Korean salient, 

Ridgway ordered the ROK III Corps 

to take control of the ROK 9th Division 

and use it along with the ROK 7th 

Division to organize a line through the 

steeper mountains between the X Corps 

and the ROK I Corps. But the ROK 

9th Division was scattered, and two 

of its regiments were reported surrounded. This situation and the ROK 

7th Division’s current location far to the 

west in the new X Corps sector posed 

problems of movement and consolidation not easily solved.27 

Similarly, Ridgway directed the ROK 

I Corps to take control of the ROK 3d 

Division and emplace it in the mountains west of the Capital Division. This, 

though, could be done only after the 

3d Division completed its circuitous 

march from the west. In the meantime 

there would be no forces between the 

Capital Division on the east coast and 

the 2d Division in and above Wonju 

capable of withstanding a North Korean push south out of the Hongch’on 

salient.28 

26 Ibid.; Eighth Army Opn 0 109, 2 Jan 51 

27 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jan 51. 

28 Ibid. 
198 EBB AND FLOW 

Faced with these near-chaotic conditions in the east and the imminent 

arrival of Chinese forces at the bridgehead, Ridgway reminded his forces that 

they would defend their positions only 

as long as they could do so without risk 

of being enveloped or trapped. The 

danger of entrapment applied especially to the I and IX Corps. Yet, while 

he attached this limit to the defense of 

the bridgehead, he did not intend that 

Milburn and Coulter adopt only an 

alert wait-and-see attitude. On the previous day, through either lack of effort 

or lack of opportunity, neither Milburn 

nor Coulter had executed the punishing attacks Ridgway had directed. Irritated by this failure, Ridgway personnally made it clear to both corps 

commanders on the 2d that these 

attacks would be made.29 

The Evacuation of Seoul 

The Chinese first hit the Seoul 

bridgehead from the northwest along 

Route 1. The 50th Army sent forces 

against the I Corps left, those in the 

van reaching the outpost line of the 

25th Division just before 0300 on the 

3d. Forced back by the encounter, the 

outpost troops passed behind the main 

division position two hours later. Either 

pursuing troops of the 50th or west 

flank forces of the 39th Army next 

opened small arms fire on the 35th Infantry on the division right.30 

Other forces of the 39th marching 

south through the hills west of Route 

33 meanwhile approached the British 

29 Eighth Army Opn O 109, 2 Jan 51; Ltr, Ridgway 

to Collins, 8 Jan 51. 

30 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR 

338, 3 Jan 51. 

29th Brigade, opening a strong attack 

on the Northumberland Fusiliers at the 

brigade right at 0730 and then striking 

still harder at the Royal Ulster Rifles 

on the left. The Fusiliers gave ground 

and two companies of the Rifles were 

overrun, but counterattacks by infantry and tanks recaptured the lost positions in midafternoon and forced the 

Chinese to disengage.31 

In the IX Corps sector, leading units 

of the 40th and 38th Armies opened light 

jabs and small arms fire against the 

24th Division about 0500. The small 

attacks-the largest by a company at 

the division left-hit but failed to penetrate the 21st Infantry and finally died 

out at midmorning. In the 19th Infantry sector to the east of the 21st, the 2d 

Battalion steadily lost ground to attacks 

that grew from company to regiment 

in size. Counterattacks well supported 

by air and artillery restored the battalion line early in the afternoon, but not 

without a continued contest for the 

ground regained.32 

By noon on the 3d the attacks on the 

bridgehead convinced Ridgway that a 

withdrawal below Seoul had to start 

soon. While the assaults themselves 

were not overwhelming, they laid the 

proverbial final straw on a heavy burden of other problems and disadvantages. The administrative and logistical 

complexity of moving close to seventyfive thousand troops and their equipment across the Han was a prime 

concern. So was the problem of clearing the Seoul area of ROK national, 

provincial, and local government officials, foreigners who included an 

31 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR 

339, 3 Jan 51. 

32 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps POR 

300, 3 Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL 

American Embassy group, and possibly the city’s entire populace.33 

A limited number of bridges would 

complicate the river crossing. All permanent bridges had been destroyed in 

past days, and none had been repaired. 

Just two engineer structures, one 50-ton 

hybrid M4-M4A2 floating bridge and 

one 50-ton shoofly (decked railroad) 

bridge spanned the Han directly below 

Seoul behind the I Corps; just one 50- 

ton M2 floating bridge, four miles east 

of Seoul, crossed the river behind the 

IX Corps. Only five floating footbridges 

were available for the potentially large 

civilian exodus. The ice was solid 

enough to support pedestrians but not 

vehicles.34 

The bridges, moreover, were vulnerable. The Chinese had not yet made 

any lasting penetration of the bridgehead, but if stronger attacks succeeded, 

they could deploy artillery far enough 

forward to destroy the crossings. Since 

the Han in the Seoul area was tidal and 

threw up chunks of ice as the water 

level shifted, the river itself was a threat. 

Although engineers were on round-theclock duty to protect the spans from ice 

damage, the periodic upheavals nevertheless could tear loose the supporting 

pontons at any time. Another danger 

was the possibility that panic-stricken 

civilians might surge from Seoul and 

overwhelm the troops guarding the 

crossings. Either of two results would 

be calamitous: civilian traffic would 

33 MS Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 373; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I 

Corps G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51. General Ridgway estimated 

Eighth Army troops north of the Han to have numbered a hundred thousand, but the records do not 

support this high figure. 

cies, p. 373; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I 

33 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and PoliCorps G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51. 

199 

preempt the bridges, or Ridgway would 

have to employ drastic measures against 

the civilians to regain the crossings for 

military use. 

Enemy operations east of the bridgehead also had a strong influence on 

Ridgway’s decision. In the deep North 

Korean salient extending south from 

Inje, the division and reinforced regiment earlier estimated to be in the 

Hongch’on area were now identified as 

the 2d Division of the North Korean II 

Corps and the 12th Division of the North 

Korean V Corps. According to current 

estimates, these two corps together controlled either ten or twelve divisions. 

Intelligence sources, moreover, continued to report the movement of the 

North Korean III Corps, which had 

three divisions, from the WonsanHamhung region to the Inje area.35 

Apparently shaping up were a North 

Korean attack to seize the Wonju rail 

and road center and a concurrent attempt, as evidenced by strong guerrilla 

operations along Route 29 as far south 

as Tanyang forty miles below Wonju, 

to cut off the forces defending the 

North Korean objective. Since the enemy’s seizure of Wonju would prevent 

the Eighth Army from using the central rail line to support operations in 

the Seoul area, Ridgway now considered the North Korean effort in the 

east to be a well-planned maneuver 

timed and tied to the main Chinese attack in the west.36 

That the X, ROK III, and ROK I 

Corps could establish an adequate defense in the east remained, at best, 

uncertain. General Almond, with characteristic alertness, viewed the presence 

35 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Jan 51; X Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

36 Ibid.; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
200 EBB AND FLOW 

of North Korean forces between his 

three ROK divisions retiring from the 

north and his 2d Division in the Wonju 

area as an opportunity for a hammerand-anvil maneuver with the South Koreans pounding the enemy against General McClure’s positions. But Almond 

had yet to get a grip on the hammer. 

There was still no definite word on the 

whereabouts of the ROK 5th and 8th 

Divisions, and the latest information on 

the ROK 2d Division indicated that two 

of its regiments were still surrounded 

and that the third had been reduced to 

a battalion.37 

Nor had the ROK III Corps commander, Brig. Gen. Lee Hyung Keun, 

yet occupied any part of his line C 

sector. The ROK 7th Division was fully 

assembled but was still northwest of 

Wonju, and the ROK 9th Division was 

still engaged and much disorganized 

north of line C. Brig. Gen. Kim Paik 

Il, the ROK I Corps commander, had 

had no more success in emplacing the 

ROK 3d Division in the mountains adjacent to the Capital Division’s coastal 

position. The 3d Division had been located in perimeter around Hongch’on, 

a long way from the new sector assigned 

to it.38 

In view of the obvious design of the 

North Korean move below Inje, the 

depth of gains already registered, the 

sizable North Korean forces that could 

be added to the operation, and the disarray of Eighth Army units in the east, 

Ridgway doubted that his eastern forces 

could organize and hold line C. His G-3, 

Colonel Dabney, believed they would 

have difficulty even in establishing line 

37 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, 3 Jan 51. 

38 Ibid. 

D defenses. The forces in the west 

therefore faced an increasing threat of 

deep envelopment, a threat that would 

become an immediate danger if Wonju 

fell since Route 20 led some fifty-five 

miles due west from Wonju to an intersection with Route 1 at Suwon.39 

Closer to Seoul, the 66th Army, possibly with help from the 42d Army, 

now had occupied Kap’yong, and at 

0800 on the 3d a long column of Chinese was sighted moving southwest of 

Kap’yong on the Ch’unch’on-Seoul 

road, its head within fifteen miles of 

the 1st Cavalry Division on the IX 

Corps’ right flank. As General Ridgway 

reasoned the possibilities, the Chinese 

could veer to the east around the cavalrymen, then strike west to cut Route 

1.40 

All factors considered, Ridgway concluded that the risk to his command 

had reached the critical point. At midmorning on the 3d he alerted his forces 

that he probably would withdraw the 

bridgehead units later that day and that 

when the bulk of them were south of 

the Han he would pull the entire Eighth 

Army from line C to line D. For the 

move out of the bridgehead, he handed 

General Milburn responsibility for controlling traffic over the Han bridges 

and placed Brig. Gen. Charles D. Palmer, the artillery commander of the 1st 

Cavalry Division, under Milburn for 

that particular duty.41 

39 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 3 Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 373. 

40 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 3 Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The 

Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 373. 

41 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 373; Rad, GX 10026 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

to CG X Corps, 3 Jan 51; Rad, GX 10027 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 3 Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL 201 

Ridgway gave the withdrawal order 

to Milburn and Coulter about an hour 

past noon, instructing them to pull out 

of the bridgehead as soon as they 

worked out a coordinated withdrawal. 

Below the Han, Milburn was to deploy 

to protect the final evacuation of the 

Seoul airport, Kimpo airfield, and 

Inch’on. Coulter was to man the lower 

bank of the river from the eastern edge 

of Yongdungp’o, the industrial suburb 

or Seoul, to the junction of the Han 

and Pukhan eighteen miles east. Both 

were to stand ready for Ridgway’s signal to withdraw to line D.42 

Again because of the prevalent lack 

of spirit within his command, Ridgway 

wrote out instructions on two matters 

usually handled as routine. He specifically directed that no usable equipment 

was to be abandoned and that all sick, 

wounded, and dead were to be evacuated. Still irritated by a general lack of 

tenacity among his principal subordinates, he also explained once more that 

withdrawals would be executed “with 

all necessary coordination, with maximum losses inflicted on the enemy and 

with maximum delay, consistent with 

the maintenance intact of all your major units.“43 

Disturbed also after observing that 

in large part demolitions executed in 

the past appeared to be destruction for 

destruction’s sake, he had announced 

on 2 January a policy that was to govern during this and any future withdrawals. “The execution of demolitions 

and necessary military destruction in 

South Korea,” he insisted, “shall be such 

as to combine maximum hurt to the 

42 Rad, GX-l-236 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA et al., 3 Jan 51. 

43 Ibid.; Rad, GX-1-207 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

C/S ROKA et al., 3 Jan 51. 

enemy with minimum harm to the 

civilian population.” Nothing approaching “scorched earth” tactics would be 

condoned.44 

Milburn and Coulter already had 

prepared and regulated plans for pulling out of the bridgehead, and much 

earlier, while the Eighth Army was retiring to line B, Milburn had devised a 

system for controlling traffic over the 

Han bridges that with one change 

remained workable. The earlier plan 

called for the I and IX Corps to cross 

the river at widely separated points, 

Milburn using the two bridges directly 

below Seoul, Coulter the single bridge 

east of the city. The two commanders 

now agreed that more than half of the 

IX Corps, including the covering force, 

should cross on one of the I Corps 

spans. This would facilitate Milburn’s 

task of controlling all traffic and would 

assist the eventual decision on removing the bridges.45 

To centralize the direction of I Corps 

forces out of the bridgehead, Milburn 

placed the British 29th Brigade under 

General Kean’s control. Once below 

Seoul, the 25th Division was to occupy 

line C above Kimpo airfield between 

the ROK 1st Division and the Turkish 

brigade while the British continued 

south and assembled at Suwon. Kean 

was to set a regiment near Seoul’s 

northwestern edge to cover I Corps 

movements through the city itself, 

coordinating the operations of this 

covering regiment with its IX Corps 

counterpart, the British 27th Brigade, 

44 Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CG 1 Corps et al., 2 Jan 

51, sub: Demolition Policy in South Korea. Ridgway 

also sent a copy of this letter to the Fifth Air Force. 

45 I Corps Opn Dir 34, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps Opn Plan 

7, 1 Jan 51; I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 51, 

‘sub: Corps Control Activities, 2-4 January 1951, with 

Incls, in I Corps G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51. 
202 EBB AND FLOW 

in position at Seoul’s northeastern outskirts. Kean’s covering force, the 27th 

Infantry, also was to protect the passage of the British 27th Brigade and 

the removal of the bridges and was to 

be the last unit out of Seoul.46

By the IX Corps’ withdrawal plan, 

including the change for crossing the 

Han, the 24th Division was to peel off 

the bridgehead line by regiment, beginning at the left. The first two regiments 

off the line and division troops were to 

cross the Han bridge east of Seoul. The 

remaining two regiments and the British covering force were to use the I 

Corps shoofly bridge. After crossing the 

river, the 7th Cavalry was to return to 

its parent division while the 24th Division with the British brigade attached 

passed behind line C and assembled in 

corps reserve. 

The Civilian Exodus 

After giving the word to withdraw, 

Ridgway set 1500 on the 3d as the last 

moment that civilian traffic could use 

the Han bridges. Other than specific 

exceptions he might authorize, the approach and exit roads would be closed 

after that time to all but Eighth Army 

movements. Unsure of the civilian reaction to being ordered off the main 

roads and bridges, he passed instructions through General Milburn to the 

traffic coordinator, General Palmer, 

that the latter’s military police first were 

to fire over the heads of evacuees who 

ers to stop all civilian traffic through 

their sectors, using their own judgment 

in the use of gunfire. When he asked 

ROK government officials to notify 

Seoul citizens of these instructions, he 

explained that the eventual stoppage 

of civilian movement would save Korean lives by preventing enemy forces 

from using refugees, as they had in the 

past, to cover their own advance.48 

As a result of I Corps activity over 

the previous two weeks, the sticky problem of civilian evacuation was not as 

great as it might have been. Under the 

guidance and urging of Milburn’s civil 

assistance officers, most nonessential 

government employees and the families of government officials already had 

left the city. Refugee camps holding Koreans who previously had come into the 

city from the north had been cleared. 

All inmates of Seoul’s prisons and jails, 

the staffs and patients of all but one 

hospital, and the small residents of most 

orphanages also had been sent south. 

Likewise, all ROK currency and money 

plates and the holdings of archives, 

museums, and galleries had been 

shipped out.49 

Still in Seoul were members of the 

ROK national, provincial, and city 

governments, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and U.S. Embassy.” With 

I Corps assistance, they had prepared 

evacuation plans. Arrangements for removing other Americans and foreign 

refused to stay clear of Route 1 and as 

a very last resort fire at them. Similarly, 48 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, RidgRidgway authorized corps command- way, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 374-75; 

General Charles D. Palmer, MS review comments, 

1985. 

46 I Corps Opn Dir 34, 1 Jan 51' I Corps POR 339, 49 I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 51, sub: 

3 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. Corps Control Activities, 2-4 Jan 51, Incl 3. 

47 IX Corps Opn Plan 7, 1 Jan 51; 24th Div OI 84, 2 50 The U.N. Commission (UNCURK) had come to 

Jan 51; I Corps Memo, DCofS for CofS, 9 Jan 51, Korea the past fall when a UNC victory had seemed 

sub: Corps Control Activities, 2-4 Jan 51, Incl 5. near. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL 

nationals still in the city, mostly missionaries and members of missions and 

consulates, were included in the U.S. 

Embassy plan. All these people were 

excepted from the ban on civilian use 

of Route 1 below Seoul and were given 

special vehicle markers to identify their 

status.51 

General Milburn also had deployed 

his traffic control force. On the morning of the 2d, Col. C. H. Unger, I Corps 

deputy chief of staff and officer in 

charge of traffic control, opened the 

main control point on a large sand flat 

just below the two I Corps bridges. 

Unger’s staff included the corps G-l, 

provost marshal, engineer, and a signal officer. To regulate and guide traffic to the proper river crossings, military police, ROK National Police, and 

Seoul metropolitan police took station 

at traffic control points within Seoul. 

To channel civilians away from Route 

1 south of the Han, other police posted 

themselves in Yongdungp’o and along 

Route 1 and lesser roads below the 

Seoul suburb. The corps civil affairs 

officer along with military and national 

police stationed themselves at two areas 

in Seoul where those civilians privileged 

to use Route 1 were to be assembled, 

checked, and dispatched. Finally, corps 

staff officers went to the 25th and 24th 

Divisions to act as liaison between the 

covering forces, which would be last to 

come through Seoul, and the main 

corps control point.52 

By virtue of these I Corps arrangements, the civilian evacuation was well 

under way by the time the overall 

supervisor, General Palmer, arrived at 

the corps control point on the morning 

51 I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 51, sub: 

Corps Control Activities, 2-4 Jan 51; ibid., Incl 3. 

203 

AN AGED REFUGEE gets a lift across the 

Han River south of Seoul, January 1951. 

of the 3d and was largely accomplished 

before the leading bridgehead forces 

reached the Han. Eighth Army civil affairs officers joined the I Corps control 

crew specifically to assist the movement 

of ROK national government officials 

to Pusan, the new seat of government. 

To get these and all of the other officials out, Ridgway’s deadline on civilian use of bridges had to be extended 

to 1800, but the extension created no 

particular problem at the crossings.53 

The one major hitch in plans occurred 

at 2000 on the 3d when Korean utility 

employees, designated to stay on the 

job until relieved and then taken south 

53 Ambassador Muccio’s assistant and a few other 

American officials were still at the U.S. Consulate 

building at 0800 on 4 January. They were evacuated 

within the next hour. 
204 EBB AND FLOW 

on a train standing by for them, shut 

down operations and left on their own. 

They left Seoul without water and electric power.54 

Seoul citizens afoot struggled with 

heavy burdens of personal belongings 

over the footbridges and across the ice 

until about daylight on the 4th. By 0600 

engineers demolished all the footbridges, and at 0800 leaflets prepared 

by the I Corps were dropped from the 

air above the river to advise civilians 

that “further crossing of the Han River 

are prohibited. Anyone attempting to 

cross will be fired upon. By Command 

of the UN Commander.” The civilian 

exodus soon dwindled and stopped; no 

firing was necessary. By that time, Seoul 

had few inhabitants. Some six hundred 

thousand, about half the population, 

had gone south, and most of the remainder had moved to nearby villages 

north of the Han.55 

The IX Corps Withdrawal 

After receiving Ridgway’s warning 

order on the 3d, General Coulter notified General Church to begin withdrawing at noon. Other than this anticipation of Ridgway’s actual starting signal, 

which itself caused no complication, the 

IX Corps’ withdrawal from the bridgehead resembled a well-executed training exercise.56 

The last truck carrying division 

troops and the 21st and 19th Regiments 

passed over the M2 bridge east of Seoul 

at 0200 on the 4th. As the last serials 

began to cross, Brig. Gen. Garrison H. 

54 I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 51, sub: 

Corps Control Activities, 2-4 Jan 51; ibid., Incl 3; Gen 

Palmer, MS review comments, 1985. 

55 Ibid.; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

56 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps POR 

300, 3 Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

Davidson, assistant division commander 

of the 24th and officer in charge at the 

M2 crossing, had the I Corps liaison 

officer, who had posted himself at the 

bridge, radio the main control point for 

permission to dismantle the bridge. 

Hampered by pins and other bridge 

parts frozen in place and by parts 

jammed through long and heavy use, 

troops of the 19th Engineer Group 

worked five hours to disassemble the 

structure but with only partial success. 

Around 0730 General Davidson ordered the remainder of the bridge 

destroyed.57 

Between midnight and 0900 on the 

4th, General Church’s remaining 

units-the 5th Regimental Combat 

Team, 7th Cavalry, and British 27th 

Brigade-passed south of the Han over 

the I Corps shoofly bridge. Throughout the withdrawal neither the line 

regiments nor the British covering 

force were engaged. General Coulter 

later surmised that the Chinese had deployed in front of the bridgehead to 

such an extent that they were unable to 

pursue.58 

The I Corps Withdrawal 

None of the I Corps bridgehead units 

was engaged when General Milburn ordered them to withdraw at 1600 on the 

3d, but the leading forces of the 50th 

and 39th Armies lay just outside the 

bridgehead line. Air observers reported 

large movements of enemy troops and 

equipment, including artillery, toward 

57 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps PORs 

300 and 301, 3 Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 

51; I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 51, sub: 

Corps Control Activities, 2-4 Jan 51, Incl 5. 

58 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps POR 

301, 3 Jan 51, and PORs 302 and 303, 4 Jan 51; 1st 

Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL 205 

A CARTLOAD OF VERY YOUNG REFUGEES 

Seoul over both Routes 1 and 33. 

Though the 38th and 40th Armies 

seemed to have bogged down before 

the IX Corps, the Chinese in front of 

Milburn appeared to be in suitable position and formation to press and pursue his bridgehead forces.59 

Before opening a left-to-right withdrawal, General Kcan placed the 27th 

Infantry, reinforced by the division reconnaissance company and supported 

by a battery of the 8th Field Artillery 

Battalion, in a covering position three 

to five miles northwest of Seoul. One 

battalion sat astride the rail line and a 

secondary road near the Han three 

59 Rad, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 031700 

Jan 51 (confirms oral orders); I Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Jan 51. 

miles above the city to cover the withdrawal of the leftmost 24th Infantry. 

The other two battalions straddled 

Route 1 five miles above Seoul to protect the passage of the 35th Infantry 

and the British 29th Brigade. The reconnaissance company furnished contact between battalions and Colonel 

Michaelis’ command post and with the 

IX Corps covering force.60 

The 24th and 35th Regiments passed 

behind Michaelis’ cover without enemy 

interference and by 0100 on the 4th 

were south of the Han en route to line 

C sectors. When the British 29th Brigade started back at 1845, the prospect 

60 Corps I POR 340, 3 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th 

Inf Opn O 3, 2 Jan 51, and Opn O 4, 3 Jan 51. 
206 EBB AND FLOW 

THE LAST BRIDGE OVER THE HAN RIVER at Seoul is demolished, 4 January 1951. 

was that it, too, would escape engagement. But just before midnight a strong 

39th Army force surrounded and attacked the brigade rear guard, composed of Company B and part of the 

heavy weapons company of the Royal 

Ulster Rifles plus a dozen tanks, and 

blocked its withdrawal.61 

Neither Brigadier Brodie nor General Kean made any immediate attempt 

to rescue the trapped British troops. 

When General Ridgway learned that 

nothing had been done, he sent orders 

that every effort would be made to extricate them. But when all bridgehead 

61 I Corps POR 340, 3 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Jan 51; Brig. Gen. C. B. Barth, “Tropic LightEighth Army G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51. 

ning and Taro Leaf in Korea,” p. 52, copy in CMH 

unit commanders, including those of 

the IX Corps, met at Colonel Michaelis’ 

command post around 0900 and considered sending a rescue force from the 

27th Infantry, Brodie would not permit Michaelis to risk losing troops in an 

attempt to free the rear guard. Nor 

would Brodie himself attempt a rescue. 

The trapped troops, he said, would 

have to “knock it out for themselves.” 

Some of the rear guard did “knock it 

out,” but most, between two hundred 

fifty and three hundred men and at 

least ten tanks, were lost.62 

62 Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56; I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 

51, sub: Corps Control Activities, 2-l Jan 51, 1x1 4; 

Barth, “Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf,” p. 52; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM SEOUL 207 

Brodie’s remaining forces meanwhile 

crossed the Han by 0330, and Colonel 

Michaelis started his own withdrawal. 

Michaelis first pulled his 1st Battalion 

to the northwestern edge of Seoul and 

set the rifle companies in blocking positions at the rail line and road near the 

Han, on Route 1, and on a secondary 

road just above Route 1. This closed 

the three principal entrances to the city 

in the I Corps sector. He next ordered 

his remaining battalions out of their 

Route 1 positions five miles above Seoul, 

instructing them and their supporting 

artillery to assemble below the Han. 

Two companies of Chinese attacked the 

2d Battalion while Michaelis was arranging his withdrawal, but the 2d held 

off the assault while the 3d Battalion 

got onto Route 1, then successfully 

disengaged and followed the 3d into 

Seoul.63 

1. By 0900 the 3d Battalion, too, was 

under attack, but holding.64 

The 2d Battalion meantime completed its move below the Han while 

the reconnaissance company deployed 

as a screen along the northern and 

northeastern edges of Seoul to protect 

the last steps of the IX Corps withdrawal. Michaelis now planned to keep 

his forces on the edge of the city until 

the British 27th Brigade got south of 

the Han. He would then send his own 

forces out except for one rifle company, 

which would deploy above the last 

bridge while the engineers removed it.65 

About the time the two battalions entered the city, Kean instructed Michaelis to cover the withdrawal of the remaining IX Corps units and then to 

protect the engineers when it was time 

to take out the last Han bridge. On the 

heels of this assignment, the 1st Battalion’s leftmost company at the rail line 

received a hard assault from three hundred to four hundred Chinese. They 

were from the 39th Army, which now 

alone was advancing on Seoul while the 

50th Army turned south off Route 1 toward the Han northwest of the city. By 

0700 lighter attacks hit the other two 

blocking companies. Good air support 

helped the left company retain its position while Michaelis halted the withdrawal of the 3d Battalion and put it 

on line between the rail line and Route 

Perhaps because the officer responsible for liaison between the I Corps main 

control point and the IX Corps covering forces was at the IX Corps bridge 

east of Seoul rather than with the British 27th Brigade, none of the officers 

at the control point nor Colonel Michaelis knew that the British unit had 

completed its passage over the shoofly 

bridge at 0900. When he finally became 

aware of that fact around 1100, Michaelis immediately broke contact and withdrew. By 1315 all of his forces, including the company that was to have 

deployed on the north bank of the 

Han, were below the river.66 

General Palmer meanwhile permited 

engineer troops to demolish the shoofly bridge and authorized the I Corps 

engineer to begin removing the balk 

from the M4-M4A2 bridge. At Palmer’s 

request, Michaelis sent Company K 

back to the north end of the brigade 

while the dismantling of the last bridge 

continued, but the company’s stay was 

brief. After about a quarter of the deck63 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf Opn O 

4, 3 Jan 51; I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 51, 

sub: Corps Control Activities, 2-4 Jan 51, Incl 4. 

64 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf Opn O 

5, 4 Jan 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

65 Ibid. 

66 Ibid. 
208 EBB AND FLOW 

ing had been removed, Palmer ordered 

the rest of the structure demolished; 

around 1400, after two charges, the 

bridge began to sink unspectacularly as 

the water that had been kept open 

around it began to freeze. The men of 

Company K, last to come out of Seoul, 

walked south over the ice immediately 

afterward.67 

67 Ibid.; Mono, "Dismantling and Destruction of Han 

River Bridges at Seoul, l-4 January 1951," copy in 

CMH. 

Within an hour of Company K’s withdrawal, air observers sighted Chinese 

patrols inside Seoul. A reconnaissance 

patrol sent into the city a little later by 

the ROK 1st Division observed Chinese 

troops raising a North Korean flag over 

city hall in the heart of town. That 

flourish marked Seoul’s third change 

of hands.68 

68 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army 

PIR 176, 4 Jan 51. 
CHAPTER XI 

Withdrawal to Line D 

Even as his forces were giving up 

Seoul, General Ridgway wrote General 

Collins in Washington that although the 

Eighth Army was in for some difficult 

days, he was certain of its intrinsic ability to perform well against the Chinese. 

Also prompting his confidence was the 

manner in which the Chinese had conducted operations since New Year’s 

Day. “The Chinese probe on a wide 

front,” he told Collins. “When they 

strike resistance their overwhelming 

numbers immediately flow around both 

flanks and join in the rear.“1 As the 

North Koreans had learned when they 

met close-knit defenses for the first time 

at the Pusan Perimeter, this tactic could 

be countered. 

The armament employed by the Chinese had been largely small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars. They had 

used some artillery in breaching line B, 

but problems in moving the pieces and 

in supplying ammunition combined 

with the Eighth Army’s counterbattery 

fire and air support had frustrated fur1 Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 3 Jan 51, copy in CMH. 

Ridgway at this time urged Collins to press for the 

addition of helicopter companies to Army transportation facilities: “Such situations [as the Chinese method 

of attack] could be more effectively met and many 

thousands more of the enemy destroyed, if we had 

the capability of putting down small reconnaissance 

groups on ridges and hilltops, and could withdraw 

them at will. We could also supply temporarily isolated units in a more efficient and economical way 

than by parachute.” 

ther use of the heavier guns. Although 

pilots reported they had sighted and 

attacked tanks behind enemy lines, the 

Chinese had used no armor in their 

recent assaults. Nor had they employed 

air support.2 

In Ridgway’s appraisal, the Eighth 

Army was “opposed by an enemy whose 

only advantage is sheer numbers, whose 

armament is far inferior quantitatively 

and qualitatively, who has no air support whatever, meager telecommunications and negligible armor.” But while 

Ridgway believed the Eighth Army to 

have the strength and means to handle 

the enemy, most of his commandersand so most of his forces-did not share 

his confidence. He had “found only one 

or two cases where a Division has shown 

any appreciable resourcefulness in 

adapting its fighting tactics to the terrain, to the enemy, and to conditions in 

this theater.” His dominant problem 

was “to achieve the spiritual awakening 

of the latent capabilities of this command.” If he could manage this, he was 

certain that the Eighth Army would 

“achieve more, far more, than our people think possible-and perhaps inflict 

a bloody defeat on the Chinese which 

even China will long remember.“3 

For the time being there was no es2 Eighth Army PIRs 173-176, 1-4 Jan 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

3 Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51; Ltr, Ridgway to 

Haislip, 11 Jan 51, copy in CMH. 
210 EBB AND FLOW 

the Han and hold until Air Force and 

Army supplies stocked at Suwon, ten 

miles farther south and about midway 

between Seoul and line D, had been 

removed. Ridgway expected the supplies to be cleared within twenty-four 

to thirty-six hours.6 

Ridgway intended that the starting 

hour of the intermediate move provide 

time for the 3d Logistical Command to 

finish evacuating Inch’on, ASCOM 

City, and Kimpo airfield.7 (The Seoul 

airport already had been emptied.) On 

3 January Ridgway had notified Col. 

John G. Hill, commander of the 3d 

Logistical Command, to cease port operations at Inch’on at noon the next 

day.8 The deadline seemed reasonable

since the gradual reductions of stocks 

at the port and airfield areas since early 

December already had brought items 

on hand to modest quantities. But unforeseen delays in getting some reserve 

stocks released from Eighth Army staff 

officers, too few tankers, too little suitable shipping for such items as long 

lengths of railroad track, and an overestimate of the ammunition that would 

be issued to line troops had prevented 

Colonel Hill from removing all stocks 

by the designated hour.g 

caping further withdrawal. While the 

last steps in evacuating Seoul were 

being taken on the 4th, Chinese patrols 

were observed investigating the Kimpo 

peninsula off the west flank of the I 

Corps and were reported to be crossing the Han to the right rear of the IX 

Corps. This reconnaissance and the 

concentration of Chinese forces above 

Seoul indicated that the enemy would 

advance below the city with hardly a 

pause.4 

It was the shambles farther east, 

however, that made a withdrawal to line 

D mandatory. This segment of the 

Eighth Army line remained a largehole sieve through which an estimated 

seventy thousand North Koreans 

grouped in the Ch’unch’on-Inje-Hongch’on area, and possibly Chinese forces 

as well, could push attacks south on the 

Route 29 axis through Wonju and 

through the undefended mountains 

east of Route 29. Or they could move 

southwestward to envelop the I and 

IX Corps, or both. By pulling back to 

the P’yongt’aek-Ansong-Changho-wonni sector of line D, the I and IX Corps 

would no longer be open to envelopment from the northeast, and the X 

Corps and the two South Korean corps 

might be able to organize a satisfactory 

line in the Wonju-Wonp’o-ri sector.5 

Withdrawal From the Han 

Ridgway warned his forces around 

noon on the 4th to expect orders to 

withdraw to line D, all corps abreast. 

The I and IX Corps in the meantime 

were to pull back at 2000 to intermediate positions six to eight miles south of 

4 Eighth Army PIR 176, 4 Jan 51. 

5 Ibid.; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jan 51. 

6 Msg, CG Eighth Army to CG I U.S. Corps et al., 

041215 Jan 51. copy in IX Corps Comd Rpt. Jan 51; 

Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

7 A former Japanese arsenal area four miles east of 

Inch’on had been christened ASCOM (Army Service 

Command) City by American occupation forces in 

1945 and occupied during recent operations by engineer, quartermaster, ordnance, and signal supply 

depots and by Headquarters, 3d Logistical Command. 

In December Hill had replaced General Stewart, 

who became the assistant division commander of the 

2d Division. 

9 3d Log Comd Daily Opns Rpt 103,4 Jan 51; Eighth 

Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Hq, 3d Log Comd, 

Memo, Col Hill for CG Eighth Army, 9 Jan-51, sub: 

Major Items Destroyed at the Port of Inchon; 3d Log 

Comd G4 Hist Rpt, Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 211 

CONGESTION ON ROUTE 29 SOUTH OF HONGCH’ON during withdrawal in the central sector, 3 January 1951. 

Nor would Hill get everything out. 

After receiving Ridgway’s noontime 

orders, General Milburn, in whose sector the port and airfield lay, instructed 

Hill to execute his demolition plans as 

soon as he had removed all troops other 

than demolition crews. While back shipment at Inch’on did continue through 

the favorable afternoon tide on the 4th, 

Hill’s main attention was diverted to 

rendering the airfield and port facilities useless to enemy forces. 10 

All port units scheduled to travel 

south by road had gone by the time 

10 Msg, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 041300 

Jan 51; IX Corps Opn Dir 21, 041500 Jan 51 (confirms 

oral orders issued 041200 Jan 51). 

Hill received Milburn’s instructions, 

and the last Fifth Air Force unit except 

for Army aviation engineers had flown 

from Kimpo to a new base in Japan. 

Through the afternoon these engineers 

burned the airfield buildings and the 

drums of aviation gasoline and napalm 

remaining at Kimpo while Eighth Army 

engineers from the 82d Engineer Petroleum Distribution Company destroyed the four- and six-inch pipelines 

between Inch’on and Kimpo and the 

booster pumps and storage tanks at the 

airfield. 11 

11 3d Log Comd Engr Monthly Activ Rpt, Jan 51; 

Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 259; 3d 

Log Comd Daily Opns Rpt 104,5 Jan 51. 
212 

Members of the 50th Engineer Port 

Construction Company began demolishing the Inch’on port at 1800. All 

main facilities except one pier and a 

causeway to the small offshore island, 

Wolmi-do, were destroyed. Prime targets were the lock gates of the tidal 

basin, which by compensating the Yellow Sea’s wide tidal range had largely 

given Inch’on the capacity of a principal port. The demolitions at Wolmi-do 

as well as the city itself were completed 

by 0300 on the 5th. Colonel Hill and 

his remaining troops left by water for 

Pusan within the hour.12 

Supplies destroyed at Kimpo, 

ASCOM City, and Inch’on included 

some 1.6 million gallons of petroleum 

products, 9,300 tons of engineer 

materiel, and 12 rail cars loaded with 

ammunition. While time and tide may 

have made the destruction of this materiel unavoidable, the extensive damage 

to port facilities could not be fully 

justified. Denying the enemy the use of 

a port was theoretically sound; on the 

other hand, the United Nations Command’s absolute control of Korean waters made Inch’on’s destruction purposeless.13 

The I and IX Corps left the lower 

bank of the Han while Hill’s engineers 

were still blowing Inch’on, so Hill had 

been obliged to put out his own security above the port. These outposts were 

not engaged. Neither were Milburn’s 

forces as they moved to positions centered on Route 1 at the town of Anyang, 

nor were Coulter’s as they extended the 

12 3d Log Comd Engr Monthly Activ Rpt, Jan 51; 

3d Log Comd Daily Opns Rpt 105, 6 Jan 51. 

13 Hq, 2d Log Comd, Memo, Col Hill for CG Eighth 

Army, 9 Jan 51, sub: Major Items Destroyed at the 

Port of Inchon; 3d Log Comd G4 Hist Rpt, Jan 51; 

Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 312. 

EBB AND FLOW 

intermediate line northeastward to the 

junction of the Han and Pukhan 

rivers.14 (See Map 16) 

Late on the 4th, while the I and IX 

Corps were withdrawing to positions 

above Suwon, Ridgway ordered the 

withdrawal to line D to begin at noon 

on the 5th, by which time he now expected the supplies at Suwon to have 

been removed. All five corps were to 

withdraw abreast, meeting in the process Ridgway’s basic requirement of 

maximum delay and maximum punishment of the enemy. Ridgway speciflcally instructed Milburn and Coulter to 

include tanks in their covering forces 

and to counterattack the Chinese who 

followed the withdrawal.15 

Ridgway learned during the morning of the 5th that the supplies at Suwon 

and at the airfield south of town could 

not be cleared by noon. Creating the 

delay was not only the sheer bulk of 

the materiel but also about a hundred 

thousand desperate refugees from the 

Seoul area who crowded the Suwon railroad yards and blocked the trains. At 

midmorning Ridgway radioed Milburn 

to stand fast until the remaining Suwon 

stocks had been shipped out, and he 

notified Coulter to leave forces to protect the east flank of the I Corps’ forward position.16 

Milburn received Ridgway’s instructions in time to hold the bulk of the 

25th Division and the ROK 1st Division at the Anyang position, and 

14 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 4 and 5 Jan 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 3d Log Comd Daily Opns 

Rpt 104, 5 Jan 51, and 105, 6 Jan 51. 

15 Rad, GX-1-313 KGOO, Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA et al., 4 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-316 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 4 Jan 51. 

16 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Rad, GX-l344 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 5 

Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 213 

THE PORT OF INCH'ON. The tidal basin is at upper right. In foreground is the island of 

Wolmi-do. 

Coulter ordered the ROK 6th Division 

to protect Milburn’s east flank. But 

Coulter did not dispatch his instructions 

until an hour after the ROK 6th had 

started for line D, and General Chang 

did not receive them until midafternoon. It took Chang another half hour 

to get his division stopped. By that 

time his forces were almost due east of 

Suwon, where, with Coulter’s agreement, Chang deployed them astride 

Route 17.17 

During the night of the 5th an enemy regiment crossed the Han and 

assembled east of Yongdungp’o. Patrols from the regiment moved south 

through the hills east of Route 1 and 

reconnoitered the ROK 1st Division 

17 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 5 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 

306, 5 Jan 51. 

front before midnight but somehow 

missed finding the vulnerable east flank 

earlier left open by the IX Corps. By 

daylight on the 6th the patrol contact 

in the center of General Paik’s front 

developed into a general engagement 

between an enemy battalion and the 3d 

Battalion, 11th ROK Regiment, but the 

enemy attempt to dislodge the South 

Koreans eased by noon and ended altogether at 1400. By then supplies had 

been cleared from Suwon and Milburn 

and Coulter could continue south toward line D.18 

The two corps completed their withdrawals on the 7th. Since the 15th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, 

of the 3d Division in the meantime 

18 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 

Sum, 6 Jan 51. 
214 EBB AND FLOW 

KIMPO AIRFIELD, 4 JANUARY 1951 

had arrived from Kyongju and been 

attached to the I Corps, Milburn was 

able to keep a substantial reserve and 

still organize a fairly solid twenty-mile 

line D front from the west coast eastward through P’yongt’aek and Ansong. 

The British 29th Brigade and the Thai 

battalion stood at the far left astride 

Route 1 just below P’yongt’aek. The 3d 

Division held a sector across the hills 

between Routes 1 and 17, which General Soule manned with the 15th Infantry. Lending depth to this central 

position, the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, and the 35th Infantry of the 

25th Division were assembled not far 

behind it. Above Ansong, the ROK 1st 

Division lay across Route 17. The remainder of the 25th Division and the 

Turkish brigade went into corps reserve 

at Ch’onan, thirteen miles south of 

P’yongt’aek. 19 

Along a slightly longer front tipping 

to the northeast and reaching beyond 

Changhowon-ni to the Han River 

Coulter deployed the ROK 6th Division, British 27th Brigade, and 24th 

Division, west to east. Hard against the 

right corps boundary twenty miles behind the front, the bulk of the 1st Cavalry Division was in corps reserve at 

Ch’ungju on Route 13, now the IX 

Corps’ main supply route. To protect 

the route from attacks by guerrillas 

19 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 7 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 5, 6, and 

7 Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 215 

MAP 16 

known to be located in the Tanyang 

area twenty miles farther east, the 5th 

Cavalry had begun to patrol the road 

from Ch’ungju south through a mountain pass at Mun’gyong.20 

The way Milburn and Coulter had 

moved to line D exasperated General 

Ridgway. "Reports so far reaching me," 

he told the two corps commanders on 

the 7th, "indicate your forces withdrew 

to ‘D’ line without evidence of having 

inflicted any substantial losses on enemy and without material delay. In fact, 

some major units are reported as having broken contact. I desire prompt 

confirming reports and if substantially 

correct, the reasons for non-compliance 

with my basic directives.“21 The reports 

20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 7 Jan 

51 Corps and CG IX Corps, 7 Jan 51. 

21 Rad, GX-1-526 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 
216 EBB AND FLOW 

reaching Ridgway were true. Except for 

the clashes between the Chinese and 

the ROK 1st Division east of Anyang 

on the 6th, the I Corps had withdrawn 

from the south bank of the Han without contact, and the IX Corps had not 

engaged enemy forces since leaving the 

Seoul bridgehead.22 

Attempting once more to get the 

quality of leadership he considered 

essential, Ridgway pointed out to 

Milburn and Coulter that their opponents had but two alternatives: to make 

a time-consuming, coordinated followup, or to conduct a rapid, uncoordinated pursuit. If the Chinese chose the 

first, the Eighth Army could at least 

achieve maximum delay even though 

there might be few opportunities for 

strong counterattacks. If they elected 

the second, the Eighth Army would 

have unlimited opportunities not only 

to delay but to inflict severe losses on 

them. In either case, Ridgway again 

made clear, Milburn and Coulter were 

to exploit every opportunity to carry 

out the basic concept of operations that 

he had repeatedly explained to them.23 

The immediate response was a flurry 

of patrolling to regain contact. According to the I Corps intelligence officer, 

the 39th and 50th Armies were now advancing south of Seoul, and their vanguards had reached the Suwon area. 

An ROK 1st Division patrol moving 

north over Route 17 during the afternoon of the 7th supported this assessment when it briefly engaged a small 

enemy group in Kumnyangjang-ni, 

eleven miles east of Suwon. Farther 

west, patrols from the 15th Infantry 

22 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

23 Rad, GX-1-526 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps and CG IX Corps, 7 Jan 51. 

and the British 29th Brigade moved 

north as far as Osan, eight miles short 

of Suwon, without making contact. In 

the IX Corps sector, the 24th Division 

at the far right sent patrols into Ich’on 

and Yoju, both on an east-west line with 

Suwon. Both towns were empty. Shallower searches to the north by the British 27th Brigade in the center of the 

corps sector also failed to reestablish 

contact. (The ROK 6th Division, at the 

corps left, sent. out no patrols while it 

absorbed twenty-three hundred sorely 

needed replacements.)24 

General Ridgway considered the attempts by patrols to regain contact at 

least to be moves in the right direction. 

What he wanted and planned to see 

next in the west was more vigorous patrolling by gradually enlarged forces. 

This patrolling would be the main mission of the larger efforts to acquire better combat intelligence, which in his 

judgment had been sadly neglected and 

which was a prime requisite for the still 

larger offensive action that he intended 

would follow. His attention meanwhile 

was drawn to the east, where the withdrawal to line D was still in progress 

and where North Korean forces, as 

expected, had opened an attack to seize 

Wonju.25 

Wonju and Hill 247 

To promote continuous defenses 

through the mountains east of Wonju, 

Ridgway on the 5th had redrawn line 

D in the ROK III and I Corps sectors, 

replacing the original line stretching 

24 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR 

351, 7 Jan 51; IX Corps PIR 103, 7 Jan 51; IX Corps 

POR 312, 7 Jan 51; IX Corps PIR 104, 8 Jan 51. 

25 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 380. 
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 

northeastward from Wonju to Wonp’ori on the coast with a new trace reaching almost due east of Wonju to the 

coastal town of Samch’ok. (Map 17) 

This 45-degree change in alignment 

dropped the east coast position some 

forty miles.26 

Ridgway expected the shift south to 

give the two South Korean corps additional time and space in which to set a 

defense and to get behind some of the 

North Korean guerrillas and regulars 

who, if the original line D were occupied, would be in the ROK rear areas. 

But as of the 7th his expectation was 

nowhere near realization. In the ROK 

I Corps sector, the ROK Capital Division on the coast was just beginning to 

move from the old to the new line, and 

the ROK 3d Division, while on the 

move from Hongch’on in the X Corps 

area, was only approaching the town of 

Yongwol at the left of the ROK III 

Corps sector.27 

The ROK III Corps had no line at 

all. As could best be determined, the 

ROK 9th Division was fighting its way 

south in the corps sector but was no 

farther than the trace of the old line D. 

The corps’ other division, the ROK 7th, 

was on the way out of the X Corps area, 

but on entering a mountain road leading eastward toward Yongwol from 

Route 29 at a point eleven miles below 

Wonju, the division had run into a large 

force of North Koreans and was currently stalled about six miles east of its 

Route 29 departure point.28 

The continuing lack of defense between Wonju and the east coast left the 

217 

26 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Rad, GX-1- 

403 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA, 5 Jan 51. 

27 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum. 6 and 7 Jan 51. 

28 Eight; Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 7 Jan 51. 

mountains east of Route 29 wide open 

to a southward enemy advance. In the 

X Corps area, as a result, all of the 7th 

Division and part of the 2d had occupied or were currently moving into positions along the fifty-five miles of 

Route 29 from Chech’on south to 

Andong to protect the X Corps’ supply 

route and to refuse the east flank. General Barr’s 17th Infantry and General 

McClure’s 9th Infantry and one battalion of his 23d Infantry were deployed 

in and around Chech’on. Farther south, 

a battalion of the 32d Infantry of the 

7th Division was assembled at Tanyang, 

and the remainder of the regiment was 

moving up from the south to join it. 

Barr’s 31st Infantry was also moving 

north, two battalions headed for 

Yongju, below Tan 

29 

ang, the other battalion for Andong. 

In the western half of the X Corps 

sector, General Almond had manned a 

twenty-mile front from Wonju southwestward to the east flank of the IX 

Corps at the Han. Having gradually 

gained control of the ROK 2d, 5th, and 

8th Divisions as they struggled piecemeal out of the mountains north of line 

D, Almond placed the 5th along the 

western third of the front, the 8th in 

the center, and the bulk of General 

McClure’s 2d Division at Wonju. Since 

the ROK 2d Division numbered less 

than thirty-two hundred men, Almond 

assembled it, nominally in corps reserve, on Route 13 just below Ch’ungju. 

As of the 7th, the 35th Regiment of the 

ROK 5th Division occupied the west anchor of the X Corps front. East of the 

35th, beyond a three-mile gap scheduled to be filled by the 5th’s 27th Regiment, the 16th and 10th Regiments of 

29 Ibid., 6 and 7 Jan 51. 
MAP 17
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 219 

the ROK 8th Division, then the 23d and 

38th Regiments of the 2d Division, carried the front a short distance beyond 

Wonju.30 

Prisoners taken earlier by the 2d 

Division-while wedging aside the remainder of the North Korean force that 

had blocked Route 29 six miles below 

Hongch’on and during later skirmishes 

farther south at Hoengsong-had supplied a fairly clear picture of enemy 

intentions in the east. A boundary between the North Korean V and II Corps 

appeared to parallel Route 29 just to its 

east. On the east, the II Corps,, commanded by Lt. Gen. Choe Hyon and 

operating with the 2d, 9th, 10th, and 

31st Divisions, was to seep south through 

the mountains east of Route 29, avoiding engagements during this move, 

then was to attack Wonju, Chech’on, 

Tanyang, and Taegu. Along and west 

of Route 29, Maj. Gen. Pang Ho San, 

commander of the V Corps, was to employ his 6th, 7th, 12th, 27th, 28th, and 

43d Divisions in frontal attacks to seize 

Wonju and force a general withdrawal 

of the X Corps. Enemy guerrillas, 

numbering between five thousand and 

seventy-five hundred and currently 

massed around Tanyang and along 

the twenty miles of Route 29 cutting 

through a high mountain spur between 

Tanyang and Yongju, were to displace 

south and southeast to disrupt the 

Eighth Army’s Pusan-Andong line of 

communication. The whole operation, 

according to the captives, was to be conducted in conjunction with Chinese advances in the west.31 

30 Ibid. 

31 Eighth Army PIR 176, Incl 2, 4 Jan 51, PIR 177, 

5 Jan 51, PIR 178, Incl 2, 6 Jan 51, and PIR 179, 7 Jan 

51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. 

To seize Wonju itself, the North Korean plan called for a two-division frontal attack by the V Corps. The Wonju 

attack was to be assisted by the enveloping effect of other V Corps attacks farther west and by the II Corps advance 

on the east. Moving down from Hoengsong during the night of the 6th, General Pang’s 6th and 27th Divisions 

before dawn were poised just above 

Wonju for the frontal attack. Ahead of 

these two forces, Pang’s 12th Division, 

previously in the Hongch’on-Hoengsong area, had crossed from the east to 

the west side of Route 29 and had come 

south to a position northwest of Wonju, 

just north of the 10th Regiment of the 

ROK 8th Division. On the opposite 

side of Route 29, General Choe’s 2d 

and 9th Divisions had marched from 

Hongch’on to the area northeast of 

Wonju, and the 10th Division, coming 

from Ch’unch’on, was approaching 

Wonju for the II Corps’ thrust through 

the unoccupied mountains.32 

Wonju sits in the bottom of a bowl in 

the valley of the Wonju River. Hills 

forming the rim of the bowl begin to 

rise about a mile from town. To defend the town and an airstrip at its 

southeastern edge, General McClure 

had established the 23d and 38th Regiments in an inverted U atop the bowl 

rim. The 23d was deployed across 

Route 29 and in an arc to the west and 

southwest, and the 38th was similarly 

aligned north, east, and southeast of 

town. Bulging out as this position did 

at the northeastern corner of the X 

Corps line, and, for the time being, the 

Eighth Army line, McClure’s two regi32 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; X Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 180, Incl 2, 

8 Jan 51. 
220 EBB AND FLOW

Mokkye-dong road. By evening of the

7th the 23d Infantry held a line four

and a half miles below Wonju, and the

38th Infantry was aligned in depth near

the village of Mich'on, another three

miles to the south. From these positions,

McClure's only chance of controlling

Wonju was by artillery fire.35

Almond had no intention of depending on artillery alone. Wonju, in his

judgment, was so important and indeed

so rare a road junction that any force

controlling it had gone far toward controlling central Korea. After learning

of the 2d Division's deep withdrawal

he ordered McClure to send at least

one infantry battalion at first light on

the 8th to clear the town and airstrip,

to occupy the high ground directly

south of Wonju with no fewer than four

battalions, and not to withdraw from

that position unless Almond himself

gave the order .36

McClure gave the Wonju assignment

to the 23d Infantry, instructing Colonel Freeman to use one battalion in the

attack. Lt. Col. James W. Edwards' 2d

Battalion started for Wonju at 0930 on

the 8th, moving over the road in a column of companies with Company E

leading and with four aircraft overhead

in close support. Around noon, as Company E passed Hill 247 overlooking the

road from the east two and a half miles

below Wonju, the leading riflemen

spotted and fired on several North

Koreans, who quickly scattered. A half

ments, in the words of the Eighth Arm~

G-3, occupied an "unenviable salient."33

The leading forces of the North Korean 6th and 27th Div isions punctured

the salient before McClure's men realized it. About 0530 on the 7th, some

four hundred enemy troops disguised

as and intermingled among civilians

merely walked down Route 29, by outposts in other areas, and even through

some main positions. Their identity was

not discovered until they opened fire

on two battalion command posts in the

rear. McClure's forces, once alerted,

rapidly screened out the infiltrators,

captured 114, and broke up several assaults that followed against their main

defenses. But almost simultaneously

with these assaults, the North Korean

12th Division to the west attacked and

pushed the 10th Regiment of the ROK

8th Division out of position, leaving the

2d Division's Wonju salient even more

unenviable.34

As the North Korean attack developed, General McClure sought General

Almond's approval of a withdrawal below town. Almond, having himself foreseen a possible need to adjust the 2d

Division's line, agreed to a withdrawal

provided McClure placed his forces on

the hills edging the town on the south

so that they would still control the road

hub. McClure, however, assumed a latitude of decision Almond had not really

given him and allowed his two regiments to make a substantial withdrawal

to the southwest down the Wonju33 2d Div G3 Jnl, 7 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl,

Sum, 7 Jan 51. 34 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 2d Div PIR 77, 7

Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf POR

118, 13 Jan 51 (covers period 4-11 Jan 51); 38th Inf

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 38th Inf PIR 5, 9 Jan 51

(covers period 5-9 Jan 51).

!l5 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; X Corps 0161,

7 Jan 51; 2d Di v Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 7 Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar,

Jan 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf S3

Jnl, 7 Jan 51; 23d Inf POR 118, 13 Jan 51. 36 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Rad, X 17082,

CG X Corps to CG 2d Di v, 8 Jan 51; 2d Di v Comd

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 

mile farther, they discovered North Koreans asleep in buildings. Finding them 

was like bumping a beehive. Some of: 

the first to awaken gave an alarm that 

stirred a swarm of soldiers out of other 

buildings and carried to troops located 

in nearby heights. The 2d Battalion 

killed two hundred during the melee. 

But Colonel Edwards at the same time 

discovered that he was being flanked 

on both the east and west by what he 

estimated to be a regiment and pulled 

his battalion out of range to a position 

south of Hill 247. To the west, in the 

meantime, the North Korean 12th Division again hit the 10th ROK Regiment 

and forced it back almost on line with 

the 38th Infantry at Mich’on. Since this 

left the west flank of the 23d Infantry, 

above Mich’on, wide open, General McClure instructed Colonel Freeman to 

pull the 2d Battalion all the way back to 

the regimental line and emplace it on 

the exposed flank.37 

Convinced by reports of heavy enemy losses and moderate enemy resistance that a successful attack on Wonju 

could be made, General Almond ordered McClure to resume his effort to 

clear the town and airstrip by noon on 

the 9th. Almond directed that two battalions with air and artillery support 

make the renewed advance and repeated his previous instruction that. 

four battalions occupy positions just 

south of Wonju.38 

McClure attached two battalions of 

the 38th Infantry to the 23d to provide 

Colonel Freeman sufficient forces to 

hold a defensive position as well as 

37 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Opn O 19, 8 Jan 51; 23d Inf 

S3 Jnl, 8 Jan 51; Rad, X 17092, X Corps to Eighth 

Army, 8 Jan 51; Rad, X 17095, X Corps to Eighth 

Army, 8 Jan 51: Eighth Army PIR 180, 8 Jan 51. 

38 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

221 

make a two-battalion advance. For the 

Wonju mission Freeman organized a 

task force with the 2d Battalion of the 

23d Infantry and 2d Battalion of the 

38th Infantry, placing Lt. Col. James 

H. Skeldon, commander of the latter 

battalion, in charge. In snow that canceled close air support, Task Force 

Skeldon started over the road toward 

Wonju at 1000 on the 9th.39 

As Skeldon’s column approached Hill 

247 at noon, fire struck the task force 

from that peak and heights to the west. 

Skeldon deployed a battalion on each 

side of the road and attacked, but by 

late afternoon his forces bogged down 

part way up the near slopes of the enemy position. Colonel Freeman considered Skeldon’s position unsound, especially after learning that North Korean 

12th Division forces to his west again 

had hit the ROK 8th Division and advanced deep to his left rear before the 

South Koreans contained them. But, 

under pressure to clear Wonju and occupy positions just below the town, he 

held Skeldon where he was for the 

night, reinforced him with the bulk of 

the French battalion, and planned to 

resume the attack on the 10th.40 

Frequent snowstorms on the 10th 

again eliminated close air support, and 

the ground troops suffered also from 

far lower temperatures caused by a 

northerly wind shift. Freeman, personally taking charge of the attack, pushed 

his forces another half mile into the 

247 mass but met. increasing opposition and faced a repeated need to 

spread forces farther west and east to 

meet North Korean counterattacks. 

39 Ibid.; 2d Div LOI, 9 Jan 51; 2d Div G3 Jnl. Entry 

J-43, 9 Jan 51; 23d Inf Opn O 20, 9 Jan 51; 23d Inf 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

40 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
222 EBB AND FLOW 

Around noon he notified General McClure of the growing resistance and of 

the constant danger of being outflanked, and he advised against continuing the attack. McClure agreed but 

instructed Freeman to hold his position. 

Freeman could adjust the disposition 

of his troops, but he was to do nothing 

that would appear to be a withdrawal.41 

Freeman’s change to a defensive 

stance was followed by hard North Korean attacks that did not subside until 

well after dark and after Freeman’s 

forces had inflicted, in their estimate, 

two thousand enemy casualties. Although control of Hill 247 vacillated 

through the afternoon, Freeman still 

commanded a good defensive position 

at the close of the engagement.42 

Continuing North Korean attempts 

to shove Freeman’s forces out of the 

247 mass on the 11th and 12th had 

similar results. Reinforced by more of 

the French battalion and part of the 

Netherlands battalion and helped by 

strong air support (including a B-29 attack on Wonju) after the sky cleared 

around noon on the 11th, Freeman’s 

forces broke up the assaults and killed 

more than eleven hundred North 

Koreans. Two weak and failing attempts against Freeman’s position early 

on the 13th ended the V Corps’ effort to 

drive south of Wonju.43 

41 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, 10 Jan 51; Eighth 

Army PIR 182, 10 Jan 51; Technical Report, Weather 

Effect on Army Operations: Weather in the Korean Conflict, 

vol. I (Department of Physics, Oregon State College, 

1956), pp. VII-12-VII-13, copy in CMH. 

42 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 10 Jan 

51. 

43 Ibid.; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, 11 and 12 Jan 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 21 Jan 51. 

Regardless of this stand at Hill 247, 

General Almond was dissatisfied with 

the 2d Division’s performance. Largely 

as a result of the initial withdrawal so 

far south of Wonju and what Almond 

considered to be inefficient staff work, 

poor employment of weapons (especially artillery), improper organization 

of defenses, and an exhorbitant rate of 

non-battle casualties (mostly from 

trench foot, frostbite, and respiratory 

diseases), Almond on the 13th asked 

General Ridgway for authority to relieve General McClure. Ridgway was 

not fully convinced that a relief was 

warranted. His own impression of 

McClure, formed in part after a visit to 

Wonju on 2 January, was of a hardhitting, aggressive commander. He also 

considered McClure’s assignment at 

Wonju to be a “hot potato” that could 

burn a person no matter how he handled it. But he felt more strongly that 

he had to back his corps commander in 

this instance and gave Almond the authority he asked for. He pointed out to 

Almond, however, that one of his own 

guidelines in a decision to relieve an 

officer was that he had to have a better 

man available.44 

Almond believed he had a better man 

in the X Corps chief of staff, Maj. Gen. 

Clark L. Ruffner, and on 14 January 

sent him to take command of the 2d 

Division. Ridgway returned General 

McClure to the United States a few days 

later with the official status of relieved 

without prejudice but was well aware 

that “the 

anyway.“45 

prejudice would be there 

44 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, 2 Nov 51; Interv, Mossman, 

Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56. 

45 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56. 
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 

East of Route 29 

General Pang, the North Korean V 

Corps commander, dropped his push 

against the ROK 8th Division at the 

same time he canceled his attack south 

of Wonju. He had employed at least 

parts of all his divisions against the 

Americans and South Koreans but had 

not won the advantage before casualties and the near exhaustion of his ammunition and other supplies eliminated 

his chances of gaining an edge. His 

divisions, to begin with, had been 

understrength, and his troops were by 

no means of the same high caliber as 

those that had driven to the Pusan Perimeter at the beginning of the war. 

His weapons, too, were limited-mostly 

rifles, with some automatic weapons 

and mortars. Judging it useless to continue until he had reorganized and 

replenished, Pang on the 17th ordered 

his forces, except for the 27th Division, 

to withdraw into defensive positions 

around Hoengsong.46 

Although the North Korean II Corps 

began operations in no better shape 

than the V Corps, General Choe had 

more success infiltrating through the 

mountains east of Route 29. Opening 

his advance concurrently with Pang’s 

attack on Wonju, Choe sent the 2d and 

9th Divisions wide to the east out of the 

Wonju area, then south, through the 

higher Taebaek peaks toward Yongwol. 

Farther west, his first move was to send 

the 10th Division south through the 

heights bordering Route 29.47 

46 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 2d Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. North Koreans captured in January 

reported that many of their weapons were those discarded by Americans and that they preferred these 

because it was simpler to replenish ammunition from 

stores abandoned by Americans. 

47 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

223 

In passing Wonju on the east, part of 

the 10th Division accidently bumped into 

the 2d Division. Under Choe’s order to 

avoid engagement, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Lee Ban Nam, 

shifted his forces farther east to prevent more such encounters but did not 

sidestep far enough to avoid running 

almost head on into the ROK 7th Division then moving eastward toward 

Yongwol eleven miles below Wonju. 

General Lee disentangled the last of his 

forces from this engagement on the 8th. 

On the following day Lee’s leading 27th 

Regiment got past Chech’on but then ran 

into strong patrols from the 7th Division operating east of Route 29 below 

the town. General Barr’s forces killed 

almost five hundred of Lee’s men and 

took fourteen captives, who identified 

their division and revealed its attack objectives to be Tanyang first and then 

Taegu.48 

Behind the 10th Division, the opening through which General Choe could 

infiltrate forces meanwhile had begun 

to narrow. On the 8th, the 10th’s disengagement with the ROK 7th Division 

allowed the latter to complete its move 

to Yongwol, and on the following day 

the ROK 9th Division, finally free of its 

isolation to the north, came in at the 

right of the ROK III Corps sector at 

the upper Han River town of Chongson. With General Ridgway’s approval, 

the ROK III Corps’ new commander, 

Maj. Gen. Yu Jai Heung, faced these 

two divisions to the northwest along the 

Han above Yongwol rather than attempt 

D.49 

to push them forward onto line 

General Yu set the ROK 7th Divi48 Eighth Army PIR 180, Incl 2, 8 Jan 51, and PIR 

181, Incl 2, 9 Jan 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 

51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

49 General Yu replaced General Lee on 9 January. 
224 EBB AND FLOW 

2D INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS south of Wonju, 10 January 1951 

sion in the heights immediately northeast of Yongwol and deployed the ROK 

9th Division in the vicinity of its Chongson assembly. To strengthen the ROK 

III Corps, Ridgway gave Yu the ROK 

3d Division, which also had assembled 

near Yongwol while moving toward the 

ROK I Corps sector. Yu placed the additional division in reserve at Ch’unyang, thirty miles southeast of Yongwol.50 

Although there were openings in the 

line, the ROK III Corps by the 10th 

finally had a position from which to 

oppose North Korean II Corps movements through the steeper heights east 

of Route 29. A fifteen-mile gap in the 

X Corps sector between Chech’on and 

50 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8 and 9 Jan 51. 

Yongwol was now the area through 

which General Choe could most easily 

pass his units. Judging the movement 

of North Korean forces through this 

gap to be the major threat to the X 

Corps, not the V Corps effort then in 

progress at Wonju, Ridgway ordered 

Almond to close the gap and to eliminate all enemy forces who had gotten 

behind Route 60 between Chech’on and 

Yongwol.51 

To assist Almond, Ridgway moved 

the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team to Andong and attached it to 

the X Corps. To hedge any deep 

enemy penetration below the lateral 

Andong-Yongdok road, Route 48, 

51 Ibid., 9 and 10 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-751 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 10 Jan 51. 
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 

Ridgway also ordered the 1st Marine, 

Division to make the move for which 

he earlier had alerted it, from Masan 

to the P’ohang-dong-Kyongju-Yongch’on area.52 

Almond initially ordered the ROK 

5th Division, so far not involved in the 

Wonju fight, to move east and fill the 

Chech’on-Yongwol gap, leaving the 

ROK 8th Division to occupy the 5th’s 

old sector. Since the shift of the 5th 

from corps left to corps right would 

take time, Almond instructed General 

Barr in the meantime to send a battalion of the 17th Infantry eastward from 

Chech’on to make physical contact with 

the ROK III Corps at Yongwol and to 

clear all enemy forces between the 

towns while en route.53 

Almond already had ordered all 

corps units up and down Route 29 to 

institute day and night patrolling to 

clear enemy troops from the bordering 

mountains. Judging that an expansion 

of this patrolling in the rear would 

prove more profitable than a linear defense between Chech’on and Yongwol, 

he reassigned the bulk of the ROK 5th 

Division to clear the region above 

Yongju at the corps right rear. Similar 

rear area assignments to other units by 

14 January spread a network of patrols 

and blocking positions over an area 

forty miles square. The 7th Division 

continued to patrol from Chech’on toward Yongwol and, with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, along 

both sides of Route 29 from Chech’on 

south to Yongju. The remainder of the 

52 Rad GX-1-637 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

187th Abn RCT, 8 Jan 51: Rad, GX-1-661 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG 1st Marine Div. 9 Jan 51; 

Rad, GX-1-860 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X 

Corps et al., 11 Jan 51. 

53 X Corps OI 67, 10 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 

Sum, 11 Jan 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

225 

ROK 5th Division and a regiment of 

the ROK 2d Division covered the lateral road leading west from Tanyang 

to Ch’ungju, joining hands with the 5th 

Cavalry patrolling Route 13 south from 

Ch’ungju through the Mun’gyong pass. 

Almond concentrated the bulk of the 

ROK 2d Division at the lower end of 

the Mun’gyong pass, where it could 

help bottle guerrillas massed in the 

mountains to the northeast around 

Tanyang. Already operating against 

these guerrillas was part of the X Corps 

special activities group, a small provisional force recently formed by X Corps 

headquarters around its special operations company for raids and other missions behind enemy lines. The group 

so far had been fully committed to security missions in the X Corps’ rear area.54 

Deciding on the 14th that getting additional troops into the Tanyang area 

was more immediately important than 

clearing Wonju, Almond pulled the 2d 

and ROK 8th Divisions out of their positions above Chech’on and instructed 

General Ruffner to occupy the entire 

west corps sector, a front of some 

twenty-two miles, on a line extending 

almost due west of Chech’on to the Han 

River. This move freed the ROK 8th 

Division, which Almond dispatched to 

Tan yang.55 

General Choe, aided by the wild terrain and night movements, seemed to 

stay a half step ahead of Almond’s attempt to blanket the corps area. At the 

II Corps left, the 9th Division ran into 

the ROK 7th Division near Yongwol 

and into infantry-tank patrols from the 

54 X Corps OI 64, 8 Jan 51, and 69, 12 Jan 51; X 

Corps POR 110, Annex 1, 14 Jan 51; X Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar. Jan 51. 

55X Corps OI 70, 14 Jan 51, 71, 14 Jan 51, and 73, 

15 Jan 51; Ltr, Almond to Ridgway, 15 Jan 51, copy 

in CMH; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
226 

17th Infantry along the Chech’onYongwol road and got no farther south, 

but the 2d Division, staying to the west 

of Yongwol, managed to seep below the 

road and by 16 January placed its leading troops within sight of Tanyang. 

Similarly, the 31st Division threaded 

troops through the heights bordering 

Route 29 as far as Tanyang, and the 

27th Division of the North Korean V 

Corps, coming south behind the 31st, 

pushed forces as far as the Chech’on 

area. Still in the lead, the 10th Division 

meanwhile changed course after running into 7th Division patrols below 

Chech’on on 9 January and by the 18th 

reached within a few miles of its new 

objective, Andong.56 

By appearances, the daily deepening 

of the North Korean II Corps penetration steadily enlarged the danger of envelopment of the X Corps’ east flank. 

But the heavy patrolling by Almond’s 

forces kept the North Koreans moderately engaged, draining the groups encountered of men and ammunition, 

and the corps’ artillery fire and air support also took a toll. The winter weather 

compounded these losses. To turn the 

snow and temperatures that registered 

as low as twenty-one degrees below zero 

to an advantage, Almond ordered the 

destruction of all buildings that might 

shelter the North Koreans. As many 

structures as could be reached by patrols, artillery, and air strikes were 

demolished. According to captives, 

diseases besides those related to cold 

weather also struck hard among North 

Korean ranks.57 

The progressive weakening of the II 

56 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

57 Ibid.; X Corps OI 68, 12 Jan 51, and 72, 14 Jan 

51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

EBB AND FLOW 

Corps became particularly noticeable 

around 22 January when X Corps patrols began to encounter only stray soldiers and irregular bands instead of organized formations. Almond dismissed 

the enemy corps as an effective force 

on the 25th. “By utilizing armor and 

armored vehicles in our ‘power’ patrols 

where possible, and through systematic 

search of the mountainous recesses by 

dismounted forces,” he reported to 

General Ridgway, “we have completely 

disrupted the cohesion and organization of four North Korean divisions.“58 

These four, the 2d, 9th, 27th, and 

31st, were indeed in bad shape. General Choe recalled them on the 24th, 

instructing them to assemble above 

P’yongch’ang, some fifteen miles north 

of Yongwol. Those surviving the withdrawal, which amounted to an infiltration in reverse, reached their assembly 

area by the end of January. By Eighth 

Army and X Corps estimates, the survivors of an. original four-division 

strength near sixteen thousand numbered, at most eighty-six hundred.59 

The North Korean 10th Division, too, 

had suffered heavy losses en route to 

Andong. General Choe directed General Lee to withdraw to P’yongch’ang 

on the 23d and informed him that if he 

could notify Choe of his escape route, 

other II Corps forces would attempt to 

clear the way. Aware that Lee’s division 

was all but encircled by X Corps forces 

above and by the 1st Marine Division 

below, Choe advised Lee that if he 

could not get his division out, he was to 

58 Ltr, Gen Almond to Gen Ridgway, 25 Jan 51, 

copy in CMH. 

59 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army 

PIR 176, Incl 2, 4 Jan 51, and PIR 188, Incl 2, 16 Jan 

51. 
WITHDRAWAL TO LINE D 227 

stay in the X Corps rear and employ 

his troops as guerrillas.60 

Lee elected to stay where he was but 

made ‘a less than halfhearted attempt 

to conduct guerrilla operations. When 

General Smith’s marines opened a systematic screening operation in the 

P’ohang-dong-Andong-Yongdok area 

on the 18th, they found it harder to 

locate Lee’s forces than to fight them. 

A 10th Division officer captured some 

days later explained that General Lee 

had fallen victim of acute melancholia, 

brooding constantly over his predicament and directing his forces in no 

course of action other than one of alternate hiding and flight. After nearly 

three weeks of combing, General Smith 

notified General Ridgway that his 

forces had scattered the remnants of 

the 10th Division. In Smith’s judgment, 

Lee’s forces were not then capable of 

any kind of major effort, and the situation was sufficiently in hand to permit 

the assignment of a new mission to the 

1st Marine Division.61 

As contact with enemy forces diminished, General Almond meanwhile had 

begun to organize a solid forward line 

from the right bank of the Han opposite Yoju eastward across Route 29 five 

miles below Wonju to a point five miles 

above Yongwol. As of 30 January the 

2d Division was moving onto the line 

between the Han and Route 29 on the 

west, the ROK 8th Division above 

Chech’on in the middle, and the 7th 

Division above Yongwol on the east.62 

60 Lynn Montross, Maj. Hubbard D. Kuokka, and 

Maj. Norman W. Hicks, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 

1950-1953 (Washington, D.C., 1962), vol. IV, The EastCentral Front, p. 51. 

61 Ibid., pp. 42-44, 48, 53, 56. 

62 Rad, X 17435, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 

The 2d Division in fact had instituted 

a program of patrolling and in the process had reoccupied Wonju. Following 

the North Korean V Corps’ withdrawal 

above Hoengsong, a battalion of the 9th 

Infantry on the 23d reentered and set 

up a patrol base in Wonju and on the 

next day began sending infantry and 

armored patrols to the west, north, and 

northeast. At the right, the 17th Infantry of the 7th Division (the division was 

now commanded by Maj. Gen. Claude B. 

Ferenbaugh) had pursued the North 

Korean II Corps' withdrawal above 

P’yongch’ang, sending a battalion of infantry and artillery far enough forward 

to destroy the town with a heavy shelling on the 27th.63 

The patrolling north of the corps 

front during the last week of January 

was largely a result of orders from General Ridgway on the 20th and 23d calling for infantry-armor patrolling and 

for a diversion to prevent enemy movement south of the Yoju-Wonju line. 

These instructions were part of an expanding reconnaissance in force that 

Ridgway had instituted in the west on 

the 15th.64 

25 Jan 15; X Corps OI 84, 85, and 86, 28 Jan 51, and 

87 and 88, 29 Jan 51; 7th Div Opn O 41, 28 Jan 51; 

2d Div Opn O 21, 29 Jan 51. 

63 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 7th Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

64 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Rad, GX-1- 

1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X 

Corps, 20 Jan 51; Rad, GX-l-2270 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to CG X Corps, 28 Jan 51 (confirms Ridgway’s 

instructions delivered orally by the Eighth Army chief 

of staff on 23 Jan 51); X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 

51: Rad, X 17405, CG X Corps to CG 2d Div, 23 Jan 

51; X Corps OI 79, 25 Jan 51 ;2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Jan 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
CHAPTER XII 

Reconnaissance in Force 

Between 7 and 15 January, I and IX 

Corps reconnaissance patrols ranging 

north of line D made little contact with 

enemy forces. IX Corps patrols investigated Ich’on and Yoju several times but 

found the towns empty. In the main I 

Corps attempt, the 27th Infantry came 

out of its reserve assembly at Ch’onan 

to occupy outposts athwart Route 1 generally along the Chinwi River eight 

miles north of P’yongt’aek and five 

miles south of Osan. In extensive 

searches west and east of Route 1 and 

north of the Chinwi within three miles 

of Osan, Colonel Michaelis’ forces encountered few Chinese.1

The patrols were numerous and farranging enough to certify the absence 

of any strong enemy force immediately 

in front of the two corps; yet civilians, 

agents, and air observers in the same 

week reported a steady movement of 

Chinese south from Seoul. The heaviest enemy concentrations appeared to 

be forming along Route 1 between 

Suwon and Osan and around the junction of Routes 13 and 17 at Kyongan-ni, 

sixteen miles northeast of Suwon. General Ridgway considered the nearer 

Suwon-Osan concentration to be a suitable target for an infantry-armor strike 

1 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 25th Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 

51. 

that also could serve as an example of 

the kind of reconnaissance in force he 

wanted both General Milburn and General Coulter afterwards to initiate on 

their own. He ordered the I Corps to 

investigate the Suwon-Osan area on the 

15th with a force that included at least 

one battalion of tanks. General Milburn 

was to punish any enemy groupment 

located there with infantry, tank, and 

air assaults, then was to withdraw, leaving part of his force in the objective 

area to maintain contact.2

The Problem of Motivation 

Although the I Corps reconnaissance 

was a step in Ridgway’s program of 

building up offensive operations, the 

continuing lack of spirit within the 

Eighth Army worked against the prospects of launching larger attacks. Some 

indications of recovery and Ridgway’s 

confidence in the Eighth Army’s inherent ability notwithstanding, his forces 

and staff, in the main, were still not 

“offensive-minded.“” 

2 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Sum, 13 and 14 Jan 51; Rad, GX-l-1066 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX 

Corps, 14 Jan 51; Rad, G-1-1081 KAR, CG Eighth 

Army to CG I Corps, 14 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 

Sum, 14 Jan 51. 

3 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 382; Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, 2 Nov 

51; Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 229 

In his constant attempt to reshape 

the mood of the Eighth Army, Ridgway 

during the first days of January instituted a morale survey in which his 

troops repeatedly raised two questions: 

“Why are we here?” and “What are we 

fighting for?” These questions clearly 

reflected the lack of motivation, and 

both, in Ridgway’s judgment, required 

and deserved well-reasoned replies.4 

His answer to the first question was 

brief and point-blank: “We are here because of the decisions of the properly 

constituted authorities of our respective governments. . . . The answer is simple because further comment is unnecessary. It is conclusive because the 

loyalty we give, and expect, precludes 

the slightest questioning of these orders.” 

He considered the second question 

to have greater significance, and he answered at length: 

To me the issues are clear. It is not a 

question of this or that Korean town or 

village. Real estate is here incidental. It is 

not restricted to the issue of freedom for 

our South Korean allies . . . though that 

freedom is a symbol of the wider issues, 

and included among them. 

The real issues are whether the power of 

Western civilization . . . shall defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men 

who shoot their prisoners, enslave their 

citizens, and deride the dignity of man, shall 

displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred; 

whether we are to survive with God’s hand 

to guide and lead us, or to perish in the 

dead existence of a Godless world. 

If these be true, and to me they are, 

beyond any possibility of challenge, then 

freedom for our Korean allies alone and 

this has long since ceased to be a fight for 

for their national survival. It has become, 

and it continues to be, a fight for our 

own freedom, for our own survival, in an 

honorable, independent national existence. 

The sacrifices we have made, and those 

we shall yet support, are not offered vicariously for others, but in our own direct 

defense. 

In the final analysis, the issue now joined 

right here in Korea is whether communism 

or individual freedom shall prevail.5 

Ridgway published these replies and 

distributed them throughout the command in January. Whether they would 

help to improve the attitude of the 

Eighth Army depended, he believed, 

on whether their sincerity was recognized. In any case, the disciplinary tone 

of the first reply was unmistakable, and 

the second was an eloquent statement 

of the war’s principal issue as Ridgway 

believed his command should understand it. 

Allies From North Korea 

A striking local example of the issue 

as Ridgway summarized it was at the 

time being set on a string of islands 

hugging enemy-held Hwanghae Province on the west coast. Giving up everything but individual freedom, literally 

thousands of anti-Communist North 

Koreans were taking refuge on the 

islands, mainly Ch’o-do and Paengnyong-do, the two largest. Most came 

from western Hwanghae, the region 

between and west of Chinnamp’o in the 

north and Haeju in the south, where 

an anti-Communist underground existed even before the war. Some underground members had attacked retreating North Korean troops in October 

1950 when the Eighth Army moved 

4 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, 5 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and PoliThe Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 369. ties, pp. 370-71. 
230 EBB AND FLOW 

partisans were to be organized, equipped, 

and trained for guerrilla warfare and 

intelligence missions behind enemy 

lines on the mainland. 

Regardless of what the partisans might 

accomplish on the mainland, their occupation of the offshore islands would 

make the Eighth Army’s west flank 

more secure. Their alliance with the 

Eighth Army also would be an ideological and psychological thorn in the 

enemy’s side. The partisans themselves, 

now without status as citizens of either 

North or South Korea, faced an uncertain postwar future. But they meanwhile had gained personal security for 

themselves and the many families who 

had come with them to the islands, and 

they would receive logistical support for 

the fight they seemed eager to rejoin.7 

above the 38th parallel, and after UNC 

forces occupied the region a number 

of anti-Communists had joined UNC 

security units formed to maintain civil 

order. Others had openly professed 

their convictions and thus exposed themselves to retaliation when enemy forces 

reentered the province on the heels of 

the Eighth Army’s withdrawal.6 

The former UNC security groups reinforced by volunteers engaged North 

Korean troops sent to reoccupy western Hwanghae in December. ROK Navy 

ships of Task Force 95 in the Yellow 

Sea, with which the anti-Communists 

established sporadic radio contact, provided gunfire and arranged some air 

support. But this help could not compensate shortages in weapons and ammunition among the anti-Communist 

groups which from the start gave the 

enemy regulars the deciding edge. Some 

Hwanghae defenders hid out, hoping 

that UNC forces would soon return to 

the province. Most decided to escape 

to the coastal islands protected by Task 

Force 95. The exodus, aided by the 

ROK Navy, which sea lifted many escapees, continued until late January 

when North Korean troops closed the 

beach exits. 

The Evacuation Issue Resolved 

After reaching the islands the organized groups of refugees, asking only 

for arms and supplies, offered to return 

to their home area and resume the fight 

they had been forced to give up. At 

Eighth Army headquarters the offer 

stimulated plans for developing these 

allies from North Korea as the United 

Nations Partisan Force. The islands 

were to become base camps, and the 

To the detriment of Ridgway’s efforts 

to restore confidence within the Eighth 

Army and to increase offensive action, 

the question raised by the Chinese intervention of whether the United Nations Command could or should stay in 

Korea had not been resolved by midJanuary. Ridgway personally believed 

the forces arrayed against him did not 

have the strength to drive the Eighth 

Army out of Korea. But as long as the 

7 By war’s end the United Nations Partisan Force 

reached a strength of twenty thousand divided among 

six regiments, one of which had received airborne 

training. Its members at that time included South Korean volunteers who were allowed to join the partisans in lieu of conscription into the ROK Army. Partisan units eventually occupied island strongholds off 

both coasts of North Korea, although the major 

strength remained off Hwanghae Province. Beyond 

harassing the enemy rear along the west coast, the 

value of partisan operations is a matter of speculation. 

6This section is based on Mono, “AFFE Military 

History Detachment, U.N. Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict,” copy in CMH. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 231 

a major buildup of MacArthur’s forces 

out of the question. But the Joint Chiefs 

wanted MacArthur to stay in Korea if 

he could. They directed him to defend 

successive positions to the south, damaging enemy forces as much as possible 

without jeopardizing his own. If his 

forces were driven back to a line along 

and eastward from the Kum River, 

roughly halfway between Seoul and 

Pusan, and the Chinese massed a clearly 

superior force before this line, the Joint 

Chiefs would then order MacArthur to 

begin a withdrawal to Japan. 

MacArthur already had directed his 

staff to develop plans for an evacuation. 

But when the Joint Chiefs asked for his 

ideas on timing a withdrawal, he responded on 3 January that no such decision would be necessary until his forces 

were actually pushed back to a beachhead line. He meanwhile started a new 

round of discussion on how the war 

should be prosecuted by proposing four 

retaliatory measures against the Chinese: 

blockade the China coast, destroy China’s 

war industries through naval gunfire 

and air bombardment, reinforce the 

troops in Korea with part of the Chinese Nationalist Army on Formosa, and 

allow diversionary operations by Chinese Nationalist troops against the China 

mainland. 

These proposals contradicted the established policy of confining the fighting to Korea, a principle that largely 

unified the nations allied with the United 

States in the war. After the measures 

were considered in Washington, the 

benefit of each weighed against the certain escalation of the war and the likelihood of alienating allied powers, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff notified MacArthur on 9 January that there was little 

chance of a change in policy. They reevacuation issue remained undecided 

at the higher military and political levels, 

he was obliged to plan for the contingency of further withdrawals, including a final one from the peninsula. The 

resulting rumors of evacuation scarcely 

helped to rebuild the spirit of his command, and the possibility of an eventual decision to leave Korea made general offensive operations less practical. 

At the higher levels, consideration of 

the question had taken several new 

turns since 4 December, when the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff advised General MacArthur that a major reinforcement was 

physically impossible and that they concurred in the consolidation of UNC 

ground forces into beachheads. The 

great concern in Washington was the 

possibility that China’s entry into Korea was only one step in a Soviet move 

toward global war. Out of this concern, 

all major American commands received 

notices on 6 December to increase their 

readiness, and on 16 December President Truman formally declared a state 

of national emergency. No full mobilization was called, but action was taken 

to increase U.S. military strength and 

to broaden mobilization and production bases.8

Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur on 30 December, 

was not considered the place to fight a 

major war. Consequently, although they 

had concluded from MacArthur’s gloomy 

reports that the Chinese had committed sufficient strength in Korea to drive 

the U.N. Command off the peninsula, 

both the current shortage of combat 

units in the United States and the increased threat of general war now put 

8 For a detailed discussion of the evacuation issue, 

see Schnabel, Policy and Direction, chs. XVI and XVII. 
232 EBB AND FLOW 

peated their 30 December instructions 

that MacArthur was to defend successive positions and inflict the greatest 

possible damage to enemy forces. As 

before, he was to guard against high 

losses lest he become unable to carry 

out his mission of protecting Japan. He 

could withdraw to Japan whenever in 

his judgment an evacuation was necessary to avoid severe losses in men and 

materiel.9 

These instructions elicited questions 

from MacArthur on two points. Although a cautious delaying action in 

Korea could be an initial mission, with 

a withdrawal to and defense of Japan 

its logical sequel, MacArthur interpreted the directive to mean that he had to 

be prepared to carry out both missions 

simultaneously. Since his command was 

not strong enough to do this, he responded on 10 January with a question 

that, in effect, asked which mission he 

was to consider more important. 

His other question stemmed from the 

authority given him to evacuate Korea 

whenever he judged it necessary to prevent severe losses and hinged, in a 

sense, on the meaning of severe. The 

acceptable extent of losses, thus the 

evacuation of Korea, should not be his 

decision, MacArthur contended, until 

there had been a decision in Washington to maintain a position in Korea 

indefinitely, to stay for a limited time, 

or to minimize losses by leaving the peg On 18 December MacArthur had requested that 

four National Guard divisions called into federal service the previous September be moved to Japan to 

complete their training so as to be at hand to protect 

Japan against any Soviet attack. Because no final government decision had yet been made as to the future 

U.S. course of action in Korea, the Joint Chiefs on 23 

December notified MacArthur that no divisions would 

be deployed to the Far East for the time being. Japan 

was left virtually without combat troops. 

ninsula as soon as possible. He was asking Washington to pick one of these 

three courses. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted 

to explain their directive on 12 January. 

While they were not sure how long the 

U.N. Command could stay in Korea, 

they emphasized that it was highly important to U.S. prestige, to the future 

of the United Nations and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization, and to 

efforts to organize anti-Communist 

resistance in Asia that UNC forces not 

withdraw unless militarily forced to do 

so. Again the Joint Chiefs asked for 

MacArthur’s estimate of the timing and 

conditions of a withdrawal. 

As of 15 January the evacuation 

issue remained unresolved. General 

MacArthur wanted the question answered on the Washington level, but 

officials there first wanted him to give 

them the military guidelines. Aware of 

the repetitive interchange between 

Washington and Tokyo, General Ridgway worried that deferring a decision 

would correspondingly reduce chances 

that an evacuation could succeed. Some 

withdrawal actions, logistical arrangements especially, would require sixty 

to ninety days’ advance notice if the 

Eighth Army was to remove the maximum of troops and equipment in minimum time and with minimum loss.10 

Having no clear answer also made it 

difficult to dispel rumors of evacuation 

spreading through the ranks. South Korean forces were especially fearful of 

being abandoned. Ridgway wrote and 

radioed General MacArthur on 6 and 

7 January to deplore any withdrawal 

that would leave ROK forces to face 

the retaliation of the Chinese and North 

10 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 383-84. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 

Koreans. He urged MacArthur to issue 

a public statement assuring the South 

Koreans that they would not be deserted. MacArthur passed Ridgway’s request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with 

the comment that he could not make 

such a statement until and unless a policy basis for one was established at 

governmental level. Ridgway himself 

needed no such backing. On 11 January he informed General Chung, the 

ROK Army chief of staff, that there 

was only one military force fighting the 

enemy, “our combined Allied Army,” 

and that it would “fight together and 

stay together whatever the future 

holds.“11 

Eighth Army plans and instructions 

issued between 8 and 13 January however prudent, tended to support the 

current rumors. On the 8th Ridgway 

traced two new defense lines, E and F, 

located some twenty-five and sixty-five 

miles, respectively, behind line D. (The 

2d Division’s engagement then in progress at Wonju, the fact that the X 

Corps sector east of Wonju was then 

unmanned, and the improbability that 

the ROK III Corps could occupy its 

sector of line D prompted Colonel 

Dabney, Ridgway’s G-3, to predict on 

the 8th that a withdrawal to line E 

would be called in the near future.) Five 

days later Ridgway established priorities for completing the four defense 

lines General Walker had ordered fortified in the southeastern corner of the 

peninsula on 11 December. The Raider 

line arching around Pusan twenty 

miles outside the city received first 

priority. The Peter line (formerly called 

233 

the Pusan line) just beyond the city limits and then the Davidson and Naktong 

River lines farther out were next to be 

completed. l2 

Between these actions Ridgway received MacArthur’s evacuation plan 

and instructions to prepare, as a matter of urgency, his supporting plan. 

Ridgway’s staff completed a broad outline on the 10th. In concept, the Eighth 

Army would fight delaying actions to 

Pusan from the lettered and named 

lines already delineated. No supplies or 

equipment would be abandoned, all 

units would embark at Pusan with basic 

loads, and the entire ROK Army plus 

prisoners of war would be evacuated. 13 

There would be no mass evacuation of 

South Korean civilians. Since features 

of the concept, such as the evacuation 

of the ROK Army, were subject to 

revision, Ridgway insisted that knowledge of the outline and of the operational and logistical details yet to be developed be limited to those American 

commanders and staff members required to participate in the planning. l4 

But from any planning map showing 

the lettered and named lines previously established it was simple to 

project an Eighth Army withdrawal 

through shorter and shorter lines and 

off the peninsula through the Pusan 

port. This picture, available at several 

headquarters, partially nullified the 

11 Ibid.; Rad, G-l-1594 KCG, CG Eighth Army to 

CINCFE, 7 Jan 51; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 

312; Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Maj Gen Chung II Kwon, 

II Jan 51. 

12 Eighth Army Opns Plan 21, 8 Jan 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8 Jan 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army 

to CG 2d Log Comd, 13 Jan 51, sub: Defense Line 

Construction. 

13 Prisoners of war then numbered 137,791, of 

whom 616 were Chinese and 137,175 were North 

Koreans. 

14 DF, Eighth Army G3 to CofS, 10 Jan 51, sub: 

Evacuation Plan; Eighth Army Opn Plan 2-25, Draft 

no. 1, 10 Jan 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d Log 

Comd, 10 Jan 51, sub: Operation Plan 2-25; Eighth 

Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
234 EBB AND FLOW 

special precaution Ridgway had 

applied. 

Some light was shed on the evacuation issue in Tokyo on 15 January when 

General Collins, accompanied by Air 

Force Chief of Staff Gen. Hoyt S. 

Vandenberg, arrived from Washington 

to confer with General MacArthur. Collins informed MacArthur that just before he and General Vandenberg left 

the United States it was agreed during 

a conference with President Truman 

that an evacuation of Korea would be 

delayed as long as possible without endangering the Eighth Army or the security of Japan. In this decision, Collins added, the objective was to permit 

the longest time possible for political 

action by the United Nations and the 

fullest opportunity to punish the 

Chinese. Collins also settled the matter 

raised by Ridgway of the disposition of 

the ROK Army. If an evacuation became necessary, President Truman 

wanted not only the ROK Army but 

also the members of the ROK government and the ROK police force, altogether more than a million people, 

taken out of Korea. 15 

Further clarification of the issue came 

later on the 15th after Collins and Vandenberg flew to Korea for a meeting 

with General Ridgway at Taegu. The 

main discussion centered on Ridgway’s 

current operations and plans and on 

their relationship to the Washington 

concept of evacuation. Ridgway urged, 

lest his forces face a difficult withdrawal, that any high level decision to 

leave Korea be kept a closely guarded 

secret until he could get his forces 

below South Korea’s main mountain 

ridges. Ridgway estimated, and by so 

15 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 313. 

doing answered the Joint Chiefs’ question on timing previously posed to 

MacArthur, that he could stay in Korea at least two or three months. Collins also heard firsthand that the Chinese so far had made no move to push 

south of the Han, that when counterattacked they usually withdrew, that they 

seemed to be having supply and morale difficulties, and that the North 

Korean infiltration in the east was 

being checked. This information was 

encouraging, and quite in contrast to 

the dismal tone of MacArthur’s reports 

to Washington. 16 

On the negative side, Ridgway 

brought up the need to improve the 

leadership of some corps and divisions. 

Except for allowing General Almond 

to dismiss General McClure, Ridgway 

had relieved no one. He had attempted 

instead to better the performance of 

his principal subordinates by exhortation and example. But after observing 

more poor performances during the 

withdrawals from line B to line D he 

was no longer hopeful that encouragement and admonishment would produce the quality he considered essential. 

Writing to General Collins on 8 January, Ridgway had urged the chief of 

staff and, through him, commander of 

Army Field Forces General Mark W. 

Clark, to insist that all general officers 

of combat commands “attain the highest standards for our military traditions. 

Let’s pour on the heat in our training, 

and above all, let’s be ruthless with our 

general officers if they fail to measure 

up? 

16 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Ridgway, 

Aide-Memoire for General J. Lawton Collins, CS, 

USA, 15 Jan 51, sub: Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 

Jan 51; Rad, C-53613, Bradley from Collins for JCS, 

17 Jan 51. 

17 Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 235 

GENERAL COLLINS ARRIVES IN JAPAN on 15 January 1951 for a conference with 

General MacArthur. 

At Taegu on the 15th Ridgway told 

Collins that he could not execute his 

future plans with his present leaders. 

But this statement was hyperbole, not a 

move to sweep the command posts 

clean. Nor was Ridgway recommending disciplinary action. Well aware that 

“not all battle casualties are caused by 

bullets,” he largely attributed the lack 

of aggressiveness of some corps and division commanders to the wearing effect of four to six months of hard fighting and discouraging experience. His 

most pressing need, he told Collins, was 

for a corps commander. Ridgway recommended Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, 

who had served under him in Europe 

and whom he knew to be a man who 

would “keep his feet on the ground and 

turn in a splendid performance at the 

same time.” He planned to give General Moore the IX Corps and to move 

General Coulter to Eighth Army headquarters as deputy army commander 

responsible for maintaining liaison 

and representing Ridgway in dealing 

with the ROK government. In evidence 

that this change was no derogation of 

Coulter’s professional competence, 

Ridgway recommended that he receive 

his third star. Collins approved both 

recommendations.18 

18 Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for Collins, 15 Jan 51, 

sub: Conference at EUSAK Main. 15 Jan 51: Ltr. 

Ridgway to Gen Mark W. Clark, 5 Mar 51; Rad, 

G-1-1299 KCG, CG EUSAK to CS USA, Personal for 

Haislip from Collins, 16 Jan 51; Interv, Mossman, 

Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56. 
236 EBB AND FLOW 

verely any mass enemy attack.21 Before 

returning to the United States, Collins, 

with Vandenberg, met again with 

MacArthur and read this report. MacArthur, who as recently as 10 January 

had described his military position in 

Korea as “untenable,” now agreed that 

the situation had improved enough to 

permit his forces to hold a beachhead 

in Korea indefinitely. But he reiterated 

his strong belief that the issue of 

whether to evacuate Korea was a purely 

political matter and should not be decided on military grounds.22 The issue, 

of course, really had been resolved, and 

on a military basis. 

Three days later MacArthur visited 

Eighty Army headquarters for the first 

time since Ridgway had assumed command. At a press conference there he 

confirmed the decision to stay. “There 

has been a lot of loose talk about the 

Chinese driving us into the sea,” he told 

reporters. “No one is going to drive us 

into the sea.“23 The report Collins filed 

from Tokyo and briefings he and 

Vandenberg gave upon their return 

meanwhile reassured officials in Washington, including President Truman. 

They “were no longer pessimistic about 

our being driven out of Korea,” Collins 

wrote later, “and, though it was realized that rough times were still ahead 

21 Later, after Ridgway saw press reports of Collins’ 

views, he radioed MacArthur: “May I suggest for such 

use as you think it might merit, my firm conviction 

that recently reported press statements that members 

of the JCS had announced 'the Eighth Army has plenty 

of fight left and if attacked will severely punish the 

enemy’ are great understatements. This command, I 

am convinced, will do far more.” See Rad, G-1-2148 

KCG, CG EUSAK to CINCFE, Personal for General 

MacArthur, 26 Jan 51. 

22 Rad, C-53613, Bradley from Collins for JCS, 17 

Jan 51; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 327. 

23 Statement to the Press, General MacArthur, 20 

Jan 51, copy in CMH. 

Ridgway would soon lose two division commanders under a recent Department of the Army decision to rotate senior commanders from Korea to 

training posts in the United States, 

where their recent combat experience 

could be put to good use. Later in January General Barr, commander of the 

7th Division, would leave Korea to 

become commandant of The Armor 

School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and 

General Church would relinquish 

command of the 24th Division to 

become commandant of The Infantry 

School at Fort Benning, Georgia. 

During his conference with General 

Collins Ridgway requested that, in 

the future, any senior commander returned to the United States simply because he was worn out be protected 

under this rotation policy. Collins 

agreed.19 

For all practical purposes, General 

Collins settled the evacuation issue in 

an announcement to the press following his meeting with Ridgway. Imbued 

with the Eighth Army commander’s 

personal confidence and encouraged by 

the report on the Chinese, Collins told 

correspondents that “as of now, we are 

going to stay and fight.“20 When he returned to Tokyo on the 17th after a 

tour of the front that revealed considerable evidence of Ridgway’s strong 

leadership, he sent his views to Washington. The Eighth Army was improving daily under Ridgway’s command, 

he reported, and on the whole was in 

position and prepared to punish se19 Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for Collins, 15 Jan 51, 

sub: Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 Jan 51; Eighth 

Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 257. 

20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 

of us, no longer was there much talk of 

evacuation.” In placing credit for resolving the evacuation issue, Collins 

emphasized that “General Ridgway 

alone was responsible for this dramatic 

change.“24 

Operation Wolfhound 

For Ridgway, the decision to stay in 

Korea underlined the challenge of the 

complete tactical control of ground 

forces given him by MacArthur on 26 

December. During World War II he 

had had the normal experience of operating under higher commanders with 

greater troop resources to whom he 

could turn for assistance. But in the 

present circumstances Ridgway had to 

make tactical decisions in full realization that with the exception of ten artillery battalions earmarked some time 

back for shipment to Korea after training, “what I already had [in combat 

units] was all there was.” Ridgway’s six 

Army divisions were still understrength 

in infantry and artillery troops; indeed, 

the Department of the Army had not 

yet been able to send replacements to 

the Far East at a rate that would raise 

the divisions to full strength by March, 

as predicted earlier.25 (See Chapter II.) 

These limitations by no means ruled 

out offensive operations, but they dictated deliberate, cautious advances. 

Accordingly, Ridgway warned General Milburn against permitting any 

situation to develop during the I 

Corps’ reconnaissance in force on 15 

January that would require additional 

forces to extricate those initially com24 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 255. 

25 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 388-89. See also Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 342-44. 

237 

mitted. Neither was Milburn to attempt 

a large scale exploitation, if that opportunity occurred, except on Ridgway’s 

order. If all went according to instructions, Ridgway estimated, the operation 

would be concluded by dark on the 

15th or, at the latest, on the 16th.26 

Milburn assigned the main task to the 

25th Division, instructing General Kean 

to attack the Suwon-Osan area with an 

infantry regiment and a battalion of 

tanks supported by artillery and engineers. Kean selected as the central force 

the 27th Infantry, from whose nickname the reconnaissance was tagged 

Operation WOLFHOUND. To protect 

the main force on the east, Milburn ordered the 3d Division to send a smaller 

force of infantry and tanks to cut the 

Suwon-Kumnyangjang-ni stretch of the 

lateral Route 20 and instructed the 

ROK 1st Division to send a battalion as 

far as Ch’on-ni, on Route 17 three 

miles south of Kumnyangjang-ni. 

Ridgway notified the IX Corps also to 

provide protection on the east, for 

which General Coulter directed the 

ROK 6th Division to station a battalion in blocking positions just east of 

Kumnyangjang-ni.27 

On the 15th the South Korean battalions reached Ch’on-ni and Kumnyangjang-ni over Route 17 without 

contact. But the 1st Battalion, 15th 

Infantry, and two companies of tanks 

from the 3d Division which followed 

the same axis to Kumnyangjang-ni received small arms and heavy mortar fire 

after turning west for a mile on Route 

26 Msg, Ridgway Personal for Milburn, 150900 Jan 

51, copy in I Corps G3 Jnl file, 15 Jan 51. 

27 I Corps Opns Dir 38, 14 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 

Sum, 14 Jan 51; Rad, CG-l-1066 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, 14 Jan 51; 

Rad, IXACT-697, CG IX Corps to CG 6th ROK Div, 

14 Jan 51; 25th Div OI 46, 14 Jan 51. 
238 EBB AND FLOW 

20 toward Suwon. An exchange of fire 

with some six hundred to eight hundred Chinese held the 3d Division force 

in place for the remainder of the day.28 

WOLFHOUND forces elsewhere met 

no opposition but were delayed by damaged roads and bridges. The bulk of 

the reinforced 27th Infantry moving 

over Route 1 in the main effort halted 

for the night at the northern edge of 

Osan.2g The 1st Battalion of the regiment and tanks following Route 39 near 

the coast stopped at Paranjang, ten 

miles to the west.30 

As Colonel Michaelis’ two columns 

converged on Suwon over Routes 1 and 

39 on the morning of the 16th, General Milburn ordered the WOLFHOUND 

forces to withdraw to the Chinwi River 

at 1400. Having so far met only a few 

Chinese, who appeared to be stragglers, 

Michaelis ordered a motorized company of infantry and a company of 

tanks from each column to sprint ahead 

and inflict as much damage as possible 

on enemy forces discovered in Suwon 

before withdrawing. On the left, after 

the tank-infantry team moving on 

Route 39 to Route 20 and then turning 

east came to a destroyed bridge two 

miles southwest of Suwon, dismounted 

infantry continued the advance and investigated the southwestern edge of 

town without finding enemy forces. On 

Route 1 the tanks and infantry received 

28 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR 375, 15 Jan 51, and 

377, 16 Jan 51. 

29 The 89th Tank Battalion; 8th Field Artillery 

Battalion; Battery B, 90th Field Artillery Battalion; 

Company A, 65th Engineer Battalion; 25th Reconnaissance Company; a detachment of the 25th Signal 

Company; and two tactical air control parties were 

attached. 

30 25th Div OI 46, 14 Jan 51; I Corps POR 375, 15 

Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

fire from a strong Chinese force deployed five hundred yards south of 

Suwon and from machine gunners atop 

buildings inside town. Michaelis’ team 

deployed and returned the fire for a 

half hour, then under the cover of air 

strikes withdrew out of range.31 

The WOLFHOUND forces developed 

a corps outpost line along the Chinwi 

with a westward extension to the coast 

and pushed patrols back into enemy 

territory. Ridgway commended them, 

more for the offensive spirit displayed 

than for results achieved. But General 

Milburn estimated that the two-day 

operation had inflicted 1,380 enemy 

casualties, 1,180 by air strikes, 5 captured and 195 killed by ground troops. 

His own losses were three killed and 

seven wounded. The Chinese captives 

identified three armies, but since the 

27th Infantry had taken these prisoners before running into the Chinese position at Suwon, the identity of the unit 

defending the town was obscure. Most 

pertinent, the reconnaissance revealed 

that no large force was located south of 

the Suwon-Kumnyangjang-ni line but 

that organized groups did hold positions along it.32 

Having served up WOLFHOUND as 

an example, Ridgway on 20 January 

instructed his American corps commanders to devise similar operations. 

General Milburn responded on the 

22d with an infantry-armor strike built 

around the 35th Infantry that in 

concept nearly duplicated Operation 

WOLFHOUND. Two small encounters 

31 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 Jan 51; I Corps POR 

378, 16 Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th 

Inf Unit Rpt no. 16, 16 Jan 51. 

32 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 and 17 Jan 51; Ltr, CG 

25th Div for general distribution, 19 Jan 51, sub: 

Commendation. See also various reports on Operation WOLFHOUND in the 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Jan 51. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 

during the one-day operation resulted 

in three enemy killed and one captured 

with no losses to the regiment. The 

strike confirmed the absence of strong 

enemy forces within ten miles of the I 

Corps front. It also raised the possibility that North Korean forces were now 

operating south of Seoul when the captive identified his unit as the 8th Division, part of the I Corps. 33 

239 

Ich’on with instructions to stay until 

pushed out. At the corps left, the ROK 

6th Division had not established outposts that far forward but had placed a 

battalion at Paengam-ni on secondary 

Route 55, six miles short of the Kumnyangjang-ni-Ich’on 

20. 35 

stretch of Route 

After receiving Ridgway’s instructions on the 20th, Coulter scheduled 

for the 22d a one-day operation built 

around the 70th Tank Battalion in 

which his force was to push north of 

Route 20 between Kumnyangjang-ni 

and Ich’on. The 1st Cavalry Division 

was to mount the operation, developing and punishing the enemy in the 

objective area without becoming heavily engaged.36 

General Gay organized a task force 

under the 8th Cavalry’s Col. Harold K. 

Johnson that added infantry, artillery, 

and engineers to the tank battalion. 37 

Colonel Johnson was to move up Route 

55 through the South Korean outpost 

at Paengam-ni to Yangji-ri on Route 

20, then investigate east and west along 

the road and the high ground immediately above it.38 

Johnson’s principal engagement was 

an exchange of fire with an enemy company discovered on the reverse slopes 

of the first heights above Yangji-ri. The 

task force suffered two killed and five 

wounded, while enemy casualties were 

Task Force Johnson 

During the week before Ridgway issued his 20 January directive he had 

prodded General Coulter to increase 

the strength, continuity, and depth of 

the IX Corps’ reconnaissance. He also 

had directed Coulter to move the 1st 

Cavalry Division’s 70th Tank Battalion 

from its deep reserve location near 

Sangju in the Naktong River valley to 

Chinch’on, fifteen miles behind the 

corps front. From Chinch’on the tankers were to back up the ROK 6th Division and also were to be employed in a 

reconnaissance in force wherever 

Coulter saw an opportunity.34 

Regardless of Ridgway’s dissatisfaction, Coulter was certain that his patrols had shown the IX Corps sector 

below the Kumnyangjang-ni-Ich’onYoju road to be free of any large enemy force. Since 12 January the 24th 

Division had kept a battalion in Yoju, 

and on the 21st General Church dispatched another battalion accompanied 

by tanks and a battery of artillery to 

33 Rad, GX-1-1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 

I, IX, and X Corps, 20 Jan 51; I Corps Opn Dir 39, 21 

Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 20 and 22 Jan 51; Ltr, 

CG 25th Div to CG I Corps, 26 Jan 51, sub: Evaluation 

of the Limited Objective Attack, 22 Jan 51. 

34 Rads, G-1-980 and CG-l-1535 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CG IX Corps, 13 and 19 Jan 51. 

35 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 21 Jan 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 

51. 

36 IX Corps Opn Dir 23, 20 Jan 51. 

37 Task Force Johnson included the 70th Tank 

Battalion, the 3d Battalion and a platoon of the heavy 

mortar company of the 8th Cavalry, a battery of the 

99th Field Artillery Battalion, and a platoon of the 

8th Engineer Combat Battalion. 

38 1st Cav Div Opn Dir l-51, 21 Jan 51; 1st Cav Div, 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; TF Johnson Opn O no. 1, 21 

Jan 51. 
240 

estimated at fifteen killed by ground 

troops and fifty by air strikes. The lack 

of contact before reaching Yangji-ri 

supported General Coulter’s conviction 

that the area below Route 20 was unoccupied, while the Yangji-ri exchange 

supplied further evidence that organized enemy groups were located along 

the road.39 

EBB AND FLOW 

Each corps force was to establish a base 

of operations on the night of the 24th 

along a line of departure ten miles 

ahead of line D, from the coast through 

Osan to Yoju, then advance to the Han 

in multiple columns through five phase 

lines about five miles apart. (Map 18) 

To insure a fully coordinated reconnaissance, Ridgway made Milburn responsible for ordering the advance 

from each phase line in both corps 

zones; to guarantee the security of the 

advance, he instructed Milburn to order each successive move only after he 

had clearly determined that no enemy 

group strong enough to endanger any 

column had been bypassed. Ridgway 

intended that his ground troops would 

have ample air support. He planned to 

postpone the operation if for any reason on the 25th General Partridge 

could not assure two successive days of 

maximum close support. Ridgway also 

arranged for the I Corps to be able to 

call down gunfire from a heavy cruiser 

and two destroyers of Task Force 95 

stationed off Inch’on.41 

The X Corps was to protect the right 

flank of the THUNDERBOLT advance. 

On 23 January Ridgway had his deputy chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Henry I. 

Hodes, deliver instructions to General 

Almond requiring the X Corps to maintain contact with the IX Corps at Yoju 

and to prevent enemy movements 

south of the Yoju-Wonju road. 

Almond, as he had been instructed 

three days earlier, also was to send 

Operation Thunderbolt 

Ridgway, however, wanted a clearer 

picture of enemy dispositions below the 

Han before committing forces to general offensive operations. On 23 January his G-2 reported the bulk of the 

XIII Army Group to be below Seoul in 

the area bounded by Route 20 on the 

south and the Han River on the east 

and north. Air reconnaissance had been 

reporting steady troop movements below the Han but did not confirm the 

presence of such a large force in that 

region. Nor had recent ground contacts 

developed any solid enemy defense at 

the area’s lower edge. Resolving the 

ambiguities, Ridgway judged, required 

a deeper and stronger reconnaissance 

in force, which he scheduled for the 

morning of the 25th under the name 

Operation THUNDERBOLT.40 

In the THUNDERBOLT operation 

General Milburn and General Coulter 

were to reconnoiter as far as the Han, 

each using not more than one American division reinforced by armor and, 

at the discretion of each corps commander, one South Korean regiment. 

39 TF Johnson Periodic Operations Report, 22 Jan 

51; TF Johnson Periodic Intelligence Report, 22 Jan 

51. 

40 MS Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 381; Eighth Army PIR 195, 23 Jan 51. 

41 Rads, CG-l-1895 KGOO, CG-1-1888 KGOO, 

and CC-l-1889 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps and CG IX Corps, all 23 Jan 51; Rad, GX-l1929 KAR, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 24 Jan 

51; Rad, CTF 95 to COMCRU DIV 1, 23 Jan 51; 

Rad, CTG 95.1 to CTE 95.12, 24 Jan 51. 
oo
242 EBB AND FLOW 

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT given the 7th Cavalry near Inch’on, 26 January 1951. 

forces in diversionary forays north of 

this road.42 

In a personal effort to develop the 

disposition of enemy forces before Operation THUNDERBOLT began; Ridgway on the 24th reconnoitered the objective area from the air with General 

Partridge as his pilot. The two generals 

flew low over the territory twenty miles 

ahead of the I and IX Corps fronts for 

two hours but saw no indications of 

large enemy formations. Although this 

flight did not conclusively disprove the 

current G-2 estimate, Ridgway was 

more confident that his reconnaissance 

in force would reach the Han, and he 

also saw possibility of holding the 

ground covered. That night, from a 

forward command post established at I 

Corps headquarters in Ch’onan, he ordered Milburn and Coulter to prepare 

plans for holding their gains once their 

forces achieved the fifth phase line 

stretching eastward from Inch’on. The 

two corps commanders completed these 

plans on the 25th. Thus the THUNDERBOLT reconnaissance tentatively assumed the nature of a general attack 

within a few hours after it started.43 

In the I Corps zone, the first 

42 Rad, GX-1-1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 43 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and PoliI, IX, and X Corps, 20 Jan 51; Rad, GX-l-2270 KGOO, cies, p. 381; Futrell, The United States Air Force in KoCG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 28 Jan 51 (confirms rea, p. 263; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I 

oral instructions delivered by Gen Hodes on 23 Jan Corps Opn Plan “Exploitation,” 25 Jan 51; IX Corps 

51). Opn Plan 11, 25 Jan 51. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 

THUNDERBOLT phase line lay four 

miles short of Suwon in territory already well examined. Milburn picked 

the 25th Division reinforced by the 

Turkish brigade to make the advance. 

According to the scheme of moving in 

multiple columns, General Kean sent 

the 35th Infantry up Routes 39 and 1 

in the west, the Turks over a secondary 

road between Routes 1 and 17 and up 

17 itself on the east. Out along the coast, 

a fifth column made up of the reconnaissance companies of the 25th Division and the 3d Division screened the 

west flank of the advance.44 

The initial phase line in the IX Corps 

zone traced the high ground just above 

Route 20 which included the area previously reconnoitered by Task Force 

Johnson. Coulter again ordered the 1st 

Cavalry Division to advance. Choosing 

to start in two columns, General Gay 

sent the 8th Cavalry north on Route 55 

toward Yangji-ri, where Colonel Johnson had met resistance on the earlier 

mission, and the 7th Cavalry up Route 

13 into the territory above Ich’on.45 

Screening wide to the flanks of each 

axis lest they bypass an enemy force, 

the THUNDERBOLT columns on the 

25th developed islands of opposition, 

mostly light, along or just below the first 

phase line. Sharp counterattacks hit the 

Turks on the secondary road east of 

Route 1 and the 8th Cavalry in the 

Yangji-ri area, but in both instances the 

Chinese eventually broke contact. Captives identified only two divisions of the 

50th Army across the thirty-mile front 

of the advance. This disclosure and the 

general pattern of light resistance indi243 

44 I Corps Opn Dir 40, 23 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

45 IX Corps Opn O 11, 23 Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Opn 

O 1-51, 24 Jan 51. 

cated that the XIII Army Group had 

set out a counter-reconnaissance screen 

to shield defenses or assembly areas farther north. According to the prisoners, 

some positions would be found between 

two and five miles farther north. This 

location would place them generally 

along the second THUNDERBOLT phase 

line, which coincided with Suwon and 

a stretch of Route 20 in the west, then 

tipped northeast to touch the Han ten 

miles above Yoju.46 

On the 26th General Milburn allowed 

the I Corps columns to move toward 

the second phase line while the IX 

Corps forces continued to clear the area 

along the first. Again against light, scattered opposition, the two columns of 

the 35th Infantry converged on Suwon 

and occupied the town and airfield by 

1300. Elsewhere in both corps zones 

the advance became a plodding affair 

as the troop columns searched east and 

west of their axes while driving north 

for short gains through tough spots of 

resistance. The Chinese fought back 

hardest at Kumnyangjang-ni, which the 

Turks finally cleared at 1930, and in the 

heights above Yangji-ri, where the 8th 

Cavalry lost 28 killed and 141 wounded 

while managing little more than to 

hold its position. The inability of the 

8th Cavalry to move forced the 7th 

Cavalry to the east to stand fast along 

the first phase line just above Ich’on.47 

Gains on the 27th were short everywhere, more because of the requirements for close coordination and a 

thorough ground search than enemy 

46 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth 

Army PIR 197, 25 Jan 51: 25th Div Comd Rpt.. Nar. 

Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

47 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 198, 26 

Jan 51. 
244 

resistance. The deepest I Corps advance was on the left, where the 35th 

Infantry moved about two miles above 

Suwon, while the leading Turk troops 

on the right got about a mile above 

Route 20 into the T’an-ch’on River 

valley between Suwon and Kumnyangjang-ni. The heaviest fighting again 

occurred near Yangji-ri when the 5th 

Cavalry passed through the 8th and attacked west. Killing at least three 

hundred Chinese before reaching 

Kumnyangjang-ni, the 5th Cavalry then 

turned up Route 17 to reach the first 

phase line a mile and half to the north. 

The 7th Cavalry, in the meantime, continued to hold near Ich’on.48 

Captives taken during the day identified the third, and last, division of the 

50th Army. The full deployment of the 

50th and the absence of contact with 

any other army on the THUNDERBOLT 

front supported the previous conclusion that the 50th had a screening mission. The intelligence rationale now taking shape assumed the Chinese units 

originally moving south of the Han to 

have started a gradual reduction of forward forces after determining generally the extent of the Eighth Army 

withdrawal. Behind the 50th Army 

screen, the remaining five armies of the 

XIII Army Group and the North Korean 

I Corps apparently were now grouped 

just above and below the Han to rest 

and refurbish those Chinese who had 

been in combat longest.49 

To meet the probability of stronger 

resistance nearer the Han and to prepare for holding all ground gained, 

EBB AND FLOW 

48 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

49 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 26 Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 199, 

27 Jan 51, and 200, 28 Jan 51. 

Ridgway on the 27th authorized Milburn to add the 3d Division to the I 

Corps advance. Milburn gave General 

Soule the Turkish brigade zone east of 

Suwon and sent the Turks west to advance along the coast toward Inch’on. 

On the 28th Soule’s 65th and 15th Regiments moved north astride Route 55 in 

the T’an-ch’on valley while the Turks 

shifted westward and joined the advance of the 35th Infantry. Against 

moderate, uneven resistance, the enlarged I Corps force reached within two 

miles of the third phase line, which lay 

roughly halfway between the line of departure and the Han.50 

To the east, where resistance in the 

Yangji-ri-Kumnyangjang-ni area had 

kept the IX Corps THUNDERBOLT 

forces slightly behind the others, the 

1st Cavalry Division received clearance 

on the 28th to advance to the second 

phase line. In the slow going imposed 

by careful screening and moderate opposition, the 5th Cavalry, moving along 

Route 17, reached the new objective 

while the 7th Cavalry, advancing above 

Ich’on in a wide zone astride Route 13, 

stopped for the night about a mile 

short. The cavalrymen had encountered two new regiments, one athwart 

each axis of advance. These, as identified by Chinese captured later during 

sharp night assaults against the 7th 

Cavalry, belonged to the 112th Division, 

38th Army. Previously assembled in a 

rest area about seven miles above the 

front, the 112th had received sudden 

orders to move south and oppose the 

IX Corps advance.51 

50 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 27 Jan 51; I Corps G3 

Jnl, Sum, 27 Jan 51; I Corps Opn Dir 41, 27 Jan 51; 

25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 

Sum, 28 Jan 51. 

51 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps 

PIR 125, 29 Jan 51. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 

In anticipation of heavier opposition 

to the IX Corps advance and to help 

hold the ground taken, Ridgway on the 

28th instructed General Coulter to commit the 24th Division. Coulter gave Maj. 

Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, who had 

replaced General Church on 26 

January, until the morning of the 30th 

to assemble the 24th behind the Ich’onYoju stretch of Route 20, whence the 

division was to advance on the corps 

right.52 

Also on the 28th Ridgway again instructed General Almond to maintain 

contact with the IX Corps at Yoju, to 

block enemy moves below the YojuWonju road, and to create diversions 

north of the road.53 X Corps forces, 

having only recently check the North 

Korean advance east of Route 29 and 

reoccupied Wonju, were then just beginning to carry out similar instructions 

received on the 20th and 23d. 

Enemy small arms, machine gun, 

mortar, and artillery fire, as well as 

minefields (though neither extensively 

nor well laid) kept gains short in both 

corps zones on the 29th. Information 

supplied by prisoners taken during the 

day indicated that six divisions now opposed the THUNDERBOLT advance. In 

the area between the west coast and 

Route 1, the North Korean 8th Division 

stood before the Turks and the left 

flank units of the 35th Infantry. West 

to east between Routes 1 and 17, the 

Chinese 148th, 149th, and 150th Divisions of the 50th Army opposed the 

25th and 3d Divisions and the left flank 

245 

forces of the 1st Cavalry Division. From 

Route 17 eastward to the Han, the Chinese 113th and 112th Divisions of 

the 38th Army occupied positions in 

front of the remainder of the cavalry 

division.54 

Even though the opposition had 

tripled, the dotted pattern of enemy 

positions, mostly company-size, made 

clear that the THUNDERBOLT forces 

were still battling a counter-reconnaissance screen. There was now some 

doubt that a main enemy line would be 

developed below the Han. Prisoners 

made no mention of one but spoke 

mainly of regroupment. Neither did air 

observers, although they warned of prepared positions along Route 1 north to 

Yongdungp’o. Thus the refurbishing 

needs of the XIII Army Group might be 

great enough to keep it from establishing solid defenses south of the Han, or 

the group commander might have chosen not to stand with the river at his 

back.55 

Exercising a prerogative given in 

Ridgway’s initial order, Milburn and 

Coulter on the 30th each added a South 

Korean regiment to their THUNDERBOLT forces to help push through the 

enemy’s tighter screen. With the opening of the 24th Division’s advance on 

the IX Corps right on that date, the 

additions doubled the forces who had 

begun the reconnaissance five days 

earlier. Ground gains against the six 

enemy divisions nevertheless were hard 

won and measured in yards during the 

last two days of January. Milburn’s 

forces barely gained the third phase 

52 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps 

Opn Dir 25, 29 Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 

51. 

53 Rad GX-1-2270 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

X Corps, 28 Jan 51. 

54 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth 

Army PIR 201, 29 Jan 51. 

55 Ibid.; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jan 51. 
246 EBB AND FLOW 

line on the 31st, and IX Corps forces 

reached little farther than the second.56 

Ridgway in the meantime converted 

his reconnaissance in force to a fullfledged attack. On the 30th, although 

his assault forces were some distance 

short of the fifth phase line, where he 

originally had planned to establish the 

remainder of the I and IX Corps, he 

authorized Milburn and Coulter to 

bring their remaining units forward 

from line D to hold the ground that 

had been gained. He did not release 

these forces for commitment in the advance, but he did take steps to ease the 

progress of the attack by instructing 

Milburn to plan a strong armored 

thrust through the coastal lowland on 

the west flank. Beyond this, he directed 

his G-3 to arrange a maximum air effort 

to isolate the battlefield south of the 

Han.57 

He also began to widen the offensive. 

On the 30th he asked General Almond 

and the ROK Army chief of staff, General Chung, for recommendations on 

sending the X Corps and the ROK III 

Corps forward in the fashion of Operation THUNDERBOLT. The purpose of 

the advance, he explained, would be to 

disrupt the North Korean II and V 

Corps, which were still regrouping east 

of Route 29. On 2 February he ordered 

the ROK I Corps to join the advance. 

The South Koreans were to move as 

far north as the east coast town of 

Kangnung.58 

56 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 

51; I Corps G3 Sit Overlay, 31 Jan 51; IX Corps G3 

Sit Overlay, 31 Jan 51. 

57 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 

58 Rad, GX-l-2257 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

When executed, the instructions 

Ridgway issued at the turn of the month 

would set the entire Eighth Army front 

in forward motion. In terms of ground 

to be gained and held, however, 

Ridgway intended. that this motion 

carry his forces no farther than the 

lower bank of the Han in the west and 

a general line extending eastward from 

the Han River town of Yangp’yong 

through Hoengsong in the center of 

the peninsula to Kangnung on the 

coast. Only if enemy forces elected to 

withdraw above the 38th parallel would 

he consider occupying a defense line 

farther north, and in this context he 

asked his staff near the end of January 

for recommendations on the most advantageous terrain lines for the Eighth 

Army to occupy during the spring and 

summer months. Otherwise, his current 

judgment was that the ground farther 

north, to and including the 38th parallel, offered no defensible line worthy 

of the losses risked in attempting to 

take it.59 

In limiting the Eighth Army’s defense 

line in the west to the lower bank of the 

Han, Ridgway excluded Seoul as an 

objective. Occupying the capital city, in 

his estimation, would provide no military advantage but would, rather, produce the disadvantage of placing a river 

immediately in rear of the occupying 

forces. He had in fact directed his staff 

to prepare plans for crossing the Han 

and capturing the city. But, in line with 

his views, these plans were not to be 

carried out unless there arose an opROKA and CG X Corps, 30 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 

Jnl, Sum, 31 Jan 51; Rad, GX-2-118 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to CG X Corps and C/S ROKA, 2 Feb 51. 

59 Ltr, Ridgway to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51; Eighth 

Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The 

Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 386. 
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE 247 

portunity to destroy a major enemy 

force in which the retaking of Seoul 

was an incidental possibility.60 

In any event, Ridgway entertained 

no thought of a prolonged effort to 

hold any line. Knowing that there 

would be no major reinforcement of 

the Eighth Army and assuming that enemy forces would keep trying to drive 

the Eighth Army out of Korea or destroy it in place, he saw no wisdom in 

accepting the heavy attrition that a static 

defense seemed certain to entail. In 

sum, he considered the permanent 

acquisition of real estate an impractical, 

if not unachievable, objective. In his 

mind, inflicting maximum losses on the 

Chinese and North Koreans, delaying 

them as long as possible if and when 

they attempted to advance, preserving 

the strength of his own forces, and 

maintaining his major units intact remained the only sound bases of planning, both for current operations and 

at longer range.61 

Ridgway informed General MacArthur of these tactical concepts by letter on 3 February. MacArthur agreed 

that occupying Seoul would yield little 

military gain, although he believed that 

seizing the city would produce decided 

diplomatic and psychological advantages. On the other hand, he stressed 

to Ridgway the military worth of nearby 

Kimpo airfield and the port of Inch’on, 

both below the Han, and urged their 

capture.62 These facilities already 

had become objectives of Operation 

THUNDERBOLT. 

To Ridgway’s larger concept. of holding along the Han River-Yangp’yongHoengsong-Kangnung line unless enemy forces voluntarily withdrew above 

the 38th parallel, MacArthur responded in terms of developing the 

enemy’s main line of resistance. If 

Ridgway developed the line below the 

Han, he should not attempt to break 

through it, but if he reached the Han 

without serious resistance, he should 

continue north until he had defined the 

enemy line or discovered that no line 

existed.63 

As a general concept, MacArthur had 

in mind “to push on until we reached 

the line where a balance of strength 

was achieved which was governed by 

the relativity of supply."64 Ridgway, on 

the other hand, was primarily interested in holding whatever line best 

suited his basic plan of punishing the 

enemy as severely as possible at the least 

cost to his own forces. The difference 

in concept was perhaps subtle but was 

substantial enough to prompt Ridgway 

to bring up the matter again when MacArthur next visited Korea. 

60 Ltr, Ridgway, to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51; Rad, 

CICOS-14-376, CG Eighth Army to C/S Eighth 

Army, 26 Jan 51. 

61 Ltr, Ridgway to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51. 

62 Ibid.; Rad, C-54811, CINCUNC to CG Eighth 

Army, Personal for Ridgway, 4 Feb 51. 

63 Rad, C-54811, CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army, 

Personal for Ridgway, 4 Feb 51. 

64 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 384. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Advance to the Han 

Roundup Preparations 

When General Almond 

General Ridgway’s 30 January 

received 

question 

on a X Corps-ROK III Corps operation similar to THUNDERBOLT, he was 

in the process of extending the X Corps’ 

diversionary effort ordered earlier by 

Ridgway. Having achieved the YojuWonju-Yongwol line against little opposition, Almond was planning a strong 

combat reconnaissance fifteen miles 

above this line. Searching that deep at 

corps center and right could apply pressure on the North Korean V and II 

Corps concentrated above Hoengsong 

and P’yongch’ang. At the same time, 

the 2d Division, due to move north 

along the corps left boundary as far as 

Chip’yong-ni, eight miles east of 

Yangp’yong, could protect the right 

flank of the IX Corps as the THUNDERBOLT operation continued.1

In the recent course of protecting the 

IX Corps right, a joint motorized patrol from the 2d and 24th Divisions on 

29 January had moved north out of 

the Yoju area on the east side of the 

Han to a pair of railroad tunnels and a 

connecting bridge standing east and 

west athwart a narrow valley four miles 

south of Chip’yong-ni. Chinese in the 

high ground overlooking the tunnels 

1 X Corps OI 84 and 86, 28 Jan 51, and OI 87 and 

88, 29 Jan 51; X Corps Opn Plan 20, 31 Jan 51; 2d 

Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 2d Div OI 17, 31 Jan 51. 

quickly cut the patrol’s route of withdrawal, forced the group into hasty defenses on the nearest rises of ground, 

and opened a series of assaults. The 

Chinese finally backed away after air 

strikes were called in by the pilot of an 

observation plane who spotted the ambush and after a motorized company 

of infantry reinforced the group about 

0330 on the 30th. The waylaid patrol 

had suffered five dead, twenty-nine 

wounded, and five missing out of a total strength of forty-five.2 

At the discovery of Chinese at the 

twin tunnels General Almond ordered 

the 2d Division to identify and destroy 

all enemy units in that area. The 23d 

Infantry received the assignment. On 

31 January Colonel Freeman sent his 

3d Battalion and the attached French 

battalion to the tunnels after placing 

the 37th Field Artillery Battalion within 

a thousand yards of the tunnel area in 

direct support.3 

The infantry battalions reached and 

established a perimeter around the 

tunnel-bridge complex without sighting enemy forces. But from farther 

north Colonel Freeman’s forces themselves were observed by the 125th Divi2 X Corps Comd Rpt, Incls for Jan 51, Incl 4; Ltr, 

Hq, 23d Inf, 13 Mar 51, sub: After Action Report 

Covering Operations of the 23d Regimental Combat 

Team During the Period 290630 Jan to 152400 Feb 

51. 

3 Ibid. 
ADVANCE TO THE HAN 249 

of a strong enemy force assembling 

around Hongch’on, at the intersection 

of Routes 24 and 29 twenty miles northeast of Chip’yong-ni and fifteen miles 

north of Hoengsong. This force, apparently part of the North Korean V Corps, 

could be preparing to advance southwest on Route 24 through Chip’yongni, then down the Han valley toward 

Yoju and Ch’ungju. Or the V Corps 

might again push forces south on Route 

29 through Hoengsong toward Wonju. 

To spoil either move, Almond considered Hongch’on the proper main objective of a X Corps attack.6 

To disrupt both the V Corps and II 

Corps, he outlined a coordinated X 

Corps-ROK III Corps advance, Operation ROUNDUP. (Map 19) The current 

corps combat reconnaissance limit, generally the Chip’yong-ni-HoengsongP’yongch’ang line, was to be the line of 

departure for ROUNDUP and was to be 

occupied in a preliminary advance by 

the 2d Division on the left, the 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team in 

the center, and the 7th Division on the 

right. This advance would base American units far enough forward to support a thrust at Hongch’on, which Almond planned South Korean forces 

would make.7 

He proposed a flanking operation 

against Hongch’on by the ROK 5th and 

8th Divisions accompanied by artillery 

and armor drawn from the American 

units on the line of departure. From 

behind the 2d Division on the left, part 

of the ROK 8th Division was to advance 

north over Route 29 while the main 

body moved northwest to cut Route 24 

roughly halfway between Chip’yong-ni 

sion, 42d Army. Near dawn on 1 February the 375th and 374th Regiments attacked from the north and northeast, 

respectively, and after daylight the 373d 

Regiment assaulted the perimeter from 

the northwest and southwest. In hard, 

close-in fighting lasting all day, the defending battalions, relying heavily on 

artillery fire and on more than eighty 

air strikes, drew far more blood and 

finally forced the Chinese to withdraw. 

Freeman’s forces counted 1,300 enemy 

bodies outside their perimeter and estimated total enemy casualties at 3,600. 

Their own losses were 45 killed, 207 

wounded, and 4 missing.4 

Judging from the two sharp actions 

at the twin tunnels, the Chinese 

were determined to retain control of 

Chip’yong-ni. They had good reason. 

The town was so situated that the force 

occupying it could control movements 

over Route 2 to the west, over Route 24 

to the northeast, over Routes 24 and 

24A below town, and thus through the 

Yangp’yong-Ch’ungju segment of the 

Han valley stretching to the southeast 

behind it. Eighth Army possession of 

Chip’yong-ni, furthermore, would 

pose a threat of envelopment to enemy 

forces opposing the I and IX Corps 

below the Han. For these same reasons 

General Almond planned to seize 

Chip’yong-ni and incorporated this 

plan in his overall recommendations for 

an operation styled after THUNDERBOLT.5 

Also behind Almond’s proposals 

were late January intelligence reports 

4 Ibid.; Ltr, G3 Eighth Army to CG Eighth Army, 3 

Feb 51, sub: Results of 23d Infantry and French Battalion Action at 010450 February 1951; Study, Col. 

Paul Freeman, “Wonju Thru Chip’yong: An Epic of 

Regimental Combat Team Action in Korea,” Apr 51, 

cop y in CMH. 

5 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

6 Ibid. 

7 Ibid.; X Corps Opn Plan Roundup, 1 Feb 51; X 

Corps OI 92 and 93, 1 Feb 51. 

ADVANCE TO THE HAN 

and Hongch’on, then turned northeast 

to hit Hongch’on itself. On the right, 

the ROK 5th Division was to advance 

north through the mountains east of 

Route 29 through part of the area occupied by the North Korean II Corps, then 

swing west against Hongch’on.8 

The 2d Division was to appoint one 

light artillery battalion, a medium battery, an automatic weapons battery, and 

a motorized infantry battalion to move 

with and directly support the ROK 8th 

Division. These units eventually constituted Support Force 21. The 7th Division was to furnish a similar Support 

Force 7 for the ROK 5th Division. In 

each instance the artillery commander 

of the American division was to coordinate all artillery fire within his own zone 

and within the zone of the South Korean division he was supporting.9 Later, 

because control of the South Korean 

advance was centralized at corps headquarters and did not involve either 

American division headquarters per se, 

a question-warranted or not-would 

arise over who should order the displacement of these support forces. 

Five armored teams, each comprising a company of infantry and a platoon of tanks, also were designated, two 

by the 2d Division, two by the 7th 

Division, and one by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. 10 

Only three were used. Teams A and B 

from the 2d Division were attached to 

the ROK 8th Division at the outset of 

8 X Corps Opn Plan Roundup, 1 Feb 51 

9 Ibid., Annex C, X Corps Plan, and Appendix C 

(Arty) to Annex C: X Corps, Memo for Lt Col Chiles, 

I 

signed S. H. M., 4 Feb 51, giving the composition of 

artillery and armored support. Two other support 

forces, one from each division, were designated but 

never formed. 

10X Corps, Memo for Lt Col Chiles, signed 

S. H. M., 4 Feb 51. 

251 

the advance; Team E from the 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team 

later opened operations under the control of the corps armored officer. 

By 5 February, the date set for opening the Hongch’on strike, General Almond expected the ROK III Corps to 

have come up even with the X Corps’ 

line of departure. On the 5th the ROK 

III Corps should start forward through 

successive phase lines, coordinating 

each phase of movement with the X 

Corps’ progress, to destroy North Korean II Corps forces in zone and to protect the X Corps’ right flank. 11 

General Ridgway approved Almond’s 

plan on 1 February and made Almond 

responsible for coordinating the X 

Corps and ROK III Corps attacks. 

Ridgway cautioned him, however, that 

for the remainder of Operation 

THUNDERBOLT his continuing mission 

of protecting the IX Corps’ right flank 

would be the X Corps’ overriding tactical consideration. The next day Ridgway ordered the ROK I Corps to capture the east coast town of Kangnung 

in an advance coordinated with the 

progress of the ROK III Corps.12 

The X Corps’ preliminary advance 

to the line of departure was largely but 

not fully effected by the target date. At 

the corps west flank, the 23d Infantry 

moved north of the twin tunnels and 

occupied Chip’yong-ni, surprisingly 

against no more than token opposition. 

At corps center, the 38th Infantry, now 

commanded by Col. John G. Coughlin, 

occupied Hoengsong, and the 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team 

11 X Corps Opn Plan Roundup, 1 Feb 51. 

12 Rad, GX-2-118 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X 

Corps and C/S ROKA, 2 Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Feb 51. 
252 EBB AND FLOW 

the ground immediately southeast.13 

The 7th Division at the corps right 

was not yet on the line. Its 17th and 

31st Regiments were still approaching 

over the Chech’on-P’yongch’ang and 

Yongwol-P’yongch’ang roads. Behind 

the line traced by these clumps of 

Americans, the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions were in final assemblies for the 

Hongch’on attack, one on either side 

of Route 29.14 

The assault divisions of the ROK III 

Corps, the ROK 7th and 9th, also were 

somewhat short of the line of departure on the 5th, yet near enough 

to satisfy General Almond. The day 

before, at a corps commanders’ conference at Suwon, he notified General 

Ridgway that he was ready to begin Operation ROUNDUP. Ridgway that day 

ordered a westward shift of the X 

Corps-ROK III Corps boundary to 

give the South Koreans more of the 

territory north of P’yongch’ang. Hence, 

when ROUNDUP opened at 0800 on the 

5th, General Yu’s two divisions faced 

the bulk of the North Korean II Corps 

while General Almond’s two assault 

units confronted the North Korean V 

Corps in the Hoengsong-Hongch’on 

area. 15 

Thunderbolt Continued 

Amid the ROUNDUP preliminaries, 

the I and IX Corps to the west continued their THUNDERBOLT advance, 

13 Colonel Peploe, the former commander of the 

38th Infantry, had been transferred to IX Corps 

headquarters, where he became chief of staff and was 

promoted to brigadier general. 

14 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 1-4 Feb 51; X Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

15 Notes of Corns Commanders’ Conference, Suwon, 

041130 February, 4 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 

Sum, 4 Feb 51. 

pushing infantry and tanks supported 

by artillery and air strikes-and at the 

far west by naval gunfire-through isolated but stubborn defenses. (Map 20) 

The advances, slowed by careful lateral 

coordination and a full search of the 

ground, covered two to six of the remaining fifteen miles to the Han. The 

IX Corps registered the deepest gains 

as General Moore, now in command, 

shoved the 1st. Cavalry and 24th 

Divisions up even with General Milburn’s 25th and 3d Divisions.” The 

THUNDERBOLT front by 5 February 

traced a line running east and west 

through a point not far below Anyang 

on Route 1.17 

As a result of General Ridgway’s 31 

January instructions to his G-3 to arrange air attacks to isolate the battlefield south of the Han, the daily army 

air requests to the Fifth Air Force came 

second only to close support. The requests called for round-the-clock interdiction with special attention to nighttime operations and with the intensity 

to prevent enemy forces from moving 

north or south of the Han. General Partridge worked the army requests into 

his daytime armed reconnaissance program and stepped up a current night 

intruder effort along the Han from a 

point north of Kimpo airfield eastward 

to a point near Yangp’yong. To prevent useless destruction in Seoul, Partridge instructed his pilots not to attack 

residential areas unless military targets 

were discovered within them. 18 

16 General Moore took command of the IX Corps 

on 31 January. 

17 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 1-4 Feb 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

18 Ltrs, Eighth Army G3 Air, signed by Gen Allen, 

CofS, to CG Fifth Air Force, 1-4 Feb 51; Rad, OPC 
cZ

oC
254 

Judging from reported results over 

the first four days of February, the air 

attacks were something less than intensive. Night intruder sorties totaled fiftyfive, ranging from six on the 2d to 

twenty-two on the 3d. Targets reported 

destroyed or damaged included 50 

troops, 1 antiaircraft gun, 14 vehicles, 

4 railroad cars, 13 supply installations, 

and 517 buildings. 19 

Kap'yong.20 

The air effort had little effect on the 

gradual retraction of enemy forces 

from below the Han sensed late in 

January. The screen in front of the I 

and IX Corps by 5 February was one 

division stronger after the 114th Division, 38th Army, appeared opposite the 

24th Division on the IX Corps right. 

The addition raised the divisions in contact to seven: the North Korean 8th on 

the west, the three of the 50th Army in 

the center, and the three of the 38th 

Army on the east. Behind the screen, 

much of the North Korean I Corps’ reserve strength remained below the Han, 

the 47th Division occupying Inch’on, the 

17th Division located in the SeoulYongdungp’o area. But the XIII Army 

Group commander had reassembled almost all of his reserves above the river 

and had shifted the 42d and parts of 

the 39th and 40th Armies eastward 

into the area above Yangp’yong and 

Chip’yong-ni. The 66th Army, whose 

troops had not moved below the Han, 

also was east and north of Seoul. As 

last known, it was assembled near 

676, CG Fifth Air Force to CINCFE et al., 31 Jan 51; 

Rad, OPC 709, CG Fifth Air Force to CINCFE et al., 

1 Feb 51; Rad, OPC 730, CG Fifth Air Force to 

CINCFE et al., 2 Feb 51; Rad, OPC 753, CG Fifth Air 

Force to CINCFE et al., 3 Feb 51. 

19 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, G3 Air Briefing Rpts, 2-5 

Feb 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

EBB AND FLOW 

The newest prisoners and documents 

captured by the I and IX Corps indicated that the enemy units still south of 

the Han would keep only light forces 

engaged and would deploy in depth for 

a leapfrog delaying action pending an 

enemy offensive around 8 February. 

The choice of date seemed to be tied 

either to the opening of the Chinese 

New Year on the 6th or to the third 

birthday of the North Korean Army.21 

The eastward shift of considerable Chinese strength into the territory above 

Yangp’yong and Chip’yong-ni, as did 

the earlier engagements ‘at the twin 

tunnels, pointed to the Han valley below Yangp’yong as the likely main axis 

of an enemy advance. Heavy enemy vehicular traffic also was sighted from the 

air, all of it moving south and over half 

of it moving from the Wonsan area 

toward Ch’unch’on. This shift could 

mean that the IX Army Group was rejoining the battle and was sending forces 

for employment in the central region.22 

The indications that the enemy 

would employ only light forces and delaying tactics in front of the I and IX 

Corps provided some assurance that the 

THUNDERBOLT forces would reach 

their Han objectives. The enemy concentration to the northeast raised the 

same danger of envelopment that had 

partially prompted the Eighth Army’s 

withdrawal to line D a month earlier, 

but it was possible that General 

20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army PIRs 204-208, 1-5 Feb 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

21 The North Korean People’s Army was officially activated on 8 February 1948. 

22 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army PIRs 204-208, l-5 Feb 51. 
ADVANCE TO THE HAN 

Almond’s ROUNDUP advance would 

spoil the enemy buildup and quite 

probable that the X Corps could at least 

protect the IX Corps’ right flank. 

255 

Gains of one to four miles through 

the 8th carried the 25th Division on 

the left within five miles of the Inch’onYongdungp’o road and took the forwardmost force of the 3d Division at 

the right within six miles of the Han 

itself. Beginning on the 6th, Milburn’s 

forces captured troops from the North 

Korean 47th Division in the area north 

and northeast of Anyang. By the 8th it 

appeared that all or part of the North 

Korean 17th Division had relieved the 

47th at Inch’on; that the latter had 

joined the North Korean 8th Division in 

holding back the I Corps, taking up 

positions near the center of the corps 

zone; and that the bulk of the 50th Army 

was sideslipping to the east.25 

The strongest enemy positions facing the I Corps on the 8th lay between 

Routes 1 and 55 across heights centered 

on Kwanak Mountain, due south of 

Seoul, where the North Korean 47th 

Division had been identified. Since the 

Kwanak heights were the last defensible ground on the southern approaches 

to Seoul, their capture could climax the 

I Corps advance to the Han. General 

Ridgway emphasized this probability to 

General Milburn at a meeting of corps 

commanders on the 8th and urged him 

to push vigorously against the Kwanak 

defenses. Earlier, after learning of the 

47th Division’s entry on line, Ridgway 

asked Admiral Joy to arrange an 

amphibious landing demonstration at 

Inch’on to discourage further strengthening of the enemy screen and perhaps 

draw off some opposing forces. Joy dispatched ships from Sasebo, Japan, and 

from Pusan to join those already in 

The I Corps Reaches the Han 

At the resumption of THUNDERBOLT 

on the 5th, the two I Corps assault divisions spearheaded their advance with 

tanks. General Milburn previously had 

arranged but had not yet called for the 

strong armored thrust along the west 

coast ordered by Ridgway on 31 January. On Milburn’s further order, two 

tank battalions, two infantry battalions, 

an artillery battalion, and a company 

of engineers were to assemble under 

Brig. Gen. Frank A. Allen, Jr., assistant 

commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. 

When called, Task Force Allen was to 

exploit any breakthrough that might 

occur, especially in the 25th Division’s 

zone, and was particularly to block the 

lateral Inch’on-Yongdungp’o road and 

cut off enemy forces located west of 

Kimpo airfield.23 

Between 5 and 8 February the 

smaller armored forces ranging ahead 

of the I Corps’ methodical infantry 

advance were frequently delayed but 

seldom hurt by numerous minefields 

located on the curves and shoulders 

of roads and on bypasses around destroyed bridges. The mines, mostly 

wooden boxes with five to six pounds 

of explosives in each, were poorly laid 

and camouflaged. Most were visible, 

and mine detectors picked up the metallic igniters of those more deeply 

buried. 

23 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; I Corps Opn Dir 25 Ibid.; Conference Notes, Conference Between 

43, 2 Feb 51. Eighth Army Commander and Corps Commanders 

24 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. at Tempest Tac, 8 February 1951, copy in CMH. 
256 EBB AND FLOW 

Inch’on waters for a demonstration on 

the 10th.26 

Snow and low-hanging clouds shut 

down air operations on the 9th but had 

little ill effect on the I Corps. The 25th 

Division captured Kwanak Mountain 

and, west of Route 1, advanced its infantry line within two miles of the 

Inch’on-Yongdungp’o road. Armored 

forces from the division reconnoitered 

farther west and north within sight of 

Inch’on and Yongdungp’o. On the 

corps right, the 3d Division moved two 

to three miles north, and a small 

armored column, Task Force Meyer, 

spurted up Route 55 to become the first 

corps troops on the Han. Minefields 

harassed the advance, but assault forces 

otherwise consistently reported “no 

resistance.“27 

General Milburn judged that the 50th 

Army forces previously in the 3d Division’s zone had withdrawn above the 

Han or out of the I Corps zone to the 

east. The North Korean 8th and 47th 

Divisions, on the other hand, might have 

moved northwest to join the North Korean 17th Division just above the Inch’onYongdungp’o road to defend the 

Kimpo peninsula. As part of a plan to 

spoil any such effort, Milburn on the 

night of the 9th called for Task Force 

Allen to assemble behind the 25th Division. The division was to seize the 

Inch’on-Yongdungp’o road by noon on 

26 Ibid: Rad GX-2-621 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

CINCFE, 6 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-699 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to CTG 95.1, 7 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 32110, 

COMNAVFE to CTF 90 and CTF 95, 6 Feb 51; Rad, 

MCN 32674, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 7 Feb 51; 

Rad, MCN 32587, COMNAVFE to COMSEVENFLT, 

7 Feb 51; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, 

p. 324. 

27 Eighth Army G3 Air Briefing Rpt, 10 Feb 51; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 9 Feb 51; I Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

the 10th, and Task Force Allen was 

then to advance above the road in 

multiple columns to clear the Kimpo 

peninsula.28 

The landing demonstration at 

Inch’on scheduled for the 10th now 

seemed apt to hinder rather than ease 

the I Corps advance. The 25th Division armored force that had looked at 

Inch’on during the day had seen no 

enemy activity. The enemy’s abrupt 

withdrawal apparently had included the 

Inch’on garrison. Since a simulated 

landing might prompt the North Koreans to reoccupy Inch’on and in turn 

make the port more difficult for the 

25th Division to capture, the amphibious feint was canceled. The naval force 

assembled off Inch’on, however, did 

plan to investigate the port on the 10th 

using a small party of ROK marines 

acquired from an offshore security 

force on Tokchok-to, an island thirty 

miles southwest of Inch’on.29 

Snow showers through the morning 

of the 10th again canceled most of the 

I Corps’ air support, but again with no 

ill effect. A total absence of resistance 

except for more antitank mines allowed 

the 25th Division to seize the Inch’onYongdungp’o road an hour ahead of 

schedule. Under clearing skies, Task 

Force Allen moved into the Kimpo peninsula in two columns promptly at 

noon. The column on the east aimed 

first for Kimpo airfield due north, then 

for the road leading northwest along 

28 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; I Corps Opn Dir 

44 (Operation PACEMAKER), 9 Feb 51. 

29 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 10 Feb 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Feb 51; Rad, MCN 34233, CTF 95 to CTG 95.1, 

9 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 34279, CTE 95.14 to CTG 95.1, 

9 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 34332, CTG 95.1 to CTE 95.14, 

9 Feb 51. 
ADVANCE TO THE HAN 257 

MEN OF THE 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM ADVANCE toward the Han River, 5 

February 1951. 

the lower bank of the Han. The column on the west pushed up the center 

of the peninsula. The east force occupied the airfield without a contest in 

midafternoon, and by nightfall both 

columns were well up the peninsula, 

eight miles above the Inch’on-Yongdungp’o road. One machine gun 

position, a short fire fight with the 

tail of an enemy column withdrawing 

across the frozen Han, twelve stragglers 

captured, and a little long range fire 

were the only evidences of the North 

Korean I Corps.30 

Behind Task Force Allen the 24th, 

30 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 

Air Briefing Rpt, 11 Feb 51. 

35th, and attached ROK 15th Regiments of the 25th Division moved to 

the Han between Kimpo airfield and 

the edge of Yongdungp’o. In the only 

brush with enemy forces, a South Korean patrol that moved across the ice 

into the lower edge of Seoul was chased 

back by small arms fire. On the corps 

right, the 15th and 7th Infantry Regiments of the 3d Division joined Task 

Force Meyer at the Han, moving onto 

the high ground between Yongdungp’o 

and Route 55. The only contact was an 

exchange of fire with enemy forces in 

position on the north bank of the 

river.31 

31 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 
258 EBB AND FLOW 

less believed his corps could reach the 

Han in a reasonable length of time.34 

Under a wet sky on the 9th, Moore’s 

forces met decidedly stiffer resistance, 

including counterattacks that forced 

some corps units into short withdrawals. 

In sharp contrast to the virtual disappearance of enemy forces before the I 

Corps on that date, the Chinese opposite the IX Corps apparently planned 

to retain a bridgehead below the Han. 

The bridgehead area as defined by 

Moore’s forces on the 9th and 10th was 

about fifteen miles wide, its west anchor located on the Han nine miles 

north of Kyongan-ni, its east anchor 

on the river four miles below Yangp’yong. The U-shaped forward edge 

dipped four to seven miles below the 

Han across a string of prominent 

heights between those points.35 

By holding this position the Chinese 

could prevent IX Corps observation of 

the Yangp’yong area, already recognized as the possible starting point of 

an enemy attack down the Han valley. 

This theory gained support on the 10th 

when in clearing afternoon weather air 

observers sighted large numbers of enemy troops moving east on Route 2 

along the north bank of the Han immediately behind the bridgehead area.36 

On the opposite corps flank, the 25th 

Division’s reconnaissance company and 

the Eighth Army Ranger company had 

moved westward onto the cape holding 

Inch’on in company with Task Force 

Allen’s noontime advance above the 

Inch’on-Yongdungp’o road. Neither 

the Rangers, moving along the southern shore of the cape, nor the reconnaissance troops, heading directly for 

Inch’on, met resistance. The reconnaissance company entered the city at 1700, 

almost simultaneously with eighty ROK 

marines sent ashore in three small powerboats by Task Force 95. As suspected, 

the North Korean garrison was gone.32 

The Rangers found a small spot of 

resistance on the 11th on a ridge a mile 

south of Inch’on. The Rangers and 

some of the reconnaissance troops 

eliminated it early in the afternoon. 

Task Force Allen meanwhile resumed 

clearing the Kimpo peninsula on the 

morning of the 11th, its troops in the 

van reaching the tip before noon. Immediately after General Allen reported 

the peninsula clear, General Milburn 

dissolved the task force and returned 

its components to their parent units 

now consolidating along the Han.33 

The IX Corps Finds a Bridgehead 

IX Corps gains from 5 through 8 

February were slow and short. The resistance emulated that encountered by 

the I Corps, but the terrain was much 

rougher. Methodical coverage of the 

ground consumed considerable time. 

As of the 8th, General Moore neverthe32 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1600 and 1850, 10 

Feb 5 1 ; Eighth Arny Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 5 1; I Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Field, United States Naval 

Operations, Korea, p. 324. 

33 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

Operation Roundup 

As THUNDERBOLT forces came 

up to the Han on the 10th, General 

Almond’s ROUNDUP operation was in 

34 Conference Notes, Conf Between Eighth Army 

Commander and Corps Commanders at Tempest Tac, 

8 Feb 51. 

35 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

36 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 10 Feb 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 
ADVANCE TO THE HAN 

its sixth day. Although the advance 

started in the THUNDERBOLT pattern, 

the harsh mountains ahead of the X 

Corps and ROK III Corps inhibited a 

complete ground search such as the I 

and IX Corps were making. In the X 

Corps zone, the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions advanced in multiple columns 

astride the best roads, tracks, or trails 

permitting passage through the convoluted ground. The ROK troops climbed 

the higher ridges only when necessary 

to reduce an enemy position. The main 

routes for the ROK 8th were Route 29 

and a mountain road-actually a poor 

stretch of Route 2-reaching west from 

Route 29 at a point three miles above 

Hoengsong. (Map 21) The ROK 5th’s 

principal paths followed the upstream 

traces of two small rivers east of Route 

29. Physical contact between columns 

was rare, especially in the ROK 8th Division zone where the columns diverged 

as they proceeded north and northwest. 

After three days Almond perceived 

that the attack on Hongch’on was as 

much a battle against terrain as against 

enemy opposition. Resistance did stiffen after an easy opening day, but the 

defending forces stayed to the tops of 

hills and allowed the South Koreans to 

bring down heavy artillery concentrations and to maneuver around them. 

The ROK assault forces, in Almond’s 

estimation, had gained confidence over 

the three days, substantially from the 

presence and support of the American 

artillery and tanks. As of the 8th the 

success of the advance thus appeared 

largely to depend on overcoming terrain limitations on infantry maneuver, 

tank movement, and artillery forward 

displacement.37 

37 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Conference 

Notes, Conf Between Eighth Army Commander and 

Corps Commanders at Tempest Tac, 8 Feb 51. 

259 

Against the combination of enemy 

hilltop defenses and difficult terrain, 

the two ROK divisions by 8 February 

had moved three to six miles northwest, 

north, and northeast of Hoengsong. Almond decided on the 8th that the ROK 

8th Division’s main effort to envelop 

Hongch’on from the west could be 

eased by committing another division. 

Currently, one of the 8th Division’s 

regiments was moving north astride 

Route 29 while the other two were 

pushing through rough ridges to the 

northwest to cut Route 24. If Almond 

set another force in the center to move 

up Route 29, the ROK 8th could make 

its enveloping move in full strength.38 

Almond mistrusted his own reserve 

division, the ROK 2d, still weak from 

losses in the Chinese New Year’s offensive. He chose not to reduce the 

strength of the 2d or 7th Division defenses along the line of departure, and 

he could not use the 187th Airborne 

Regimental Combat Team. On 4 February General Ridgway had notified 

him that the airborne troops were 

scheduled to be taken off the line and 

that he was not to give them an offensive role.3g 

On the 8th Almond asked Ridgway 

for the ROK 3d Division, then in ROK 

III Corps reserve. Ridgway hesitated 

to take General Yu’s only reserve. On 

the other hand, Yu’s assault divisions 

were reporting good progress through 

light to moderate resistance. Moving 

astride Route 60 from P’yongch’ang toward Ch’angdong-ni, seventeen miles 

to the north, the ROK 7th had advanced one regiment within three miles 

of the latter town. On the corps right, 

the ROK 9th had moved above Chong38 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

39 Ibid.; Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, 

Feb 51. Incl 4. 

ADVANCE TO THE HAN 

son through the upper Han valley for 

almost twenty miles. Since Yu could get 

help from the U.S. 7th Division, whose 

31st Regiment was now following the 

ROK 7th Division above P’yongch’ang, 

Ridgway agreed to the transfer of the 

ROK 3d for the duration of Operation 

ROUNDUP, and Almond instructed the 

division to be in position for an advance 

above Hoengsong on the morning of 

the 1lth.40 

While Almond was arranging to assist the ROK 8th Division’s northwestward swing, a greater problem arose 

east of Route 29. On 7 February the 

ROK 5th Division, then advancing with 

two regiments forward, had encountered a North Korean force estimated 

at four thousand. The division commander planned to eliminate the enemy group on the 8th by bringing up 

his reserve regiment on the left for an 

attack to the east concurrent with attacks to the north and west by the center and right regiments. But his plan 

was spoiled when the right regiment, 

the ROK 27th, was hit on the 8th by 

hard North Korean attacks from the 

northwest and northeast. One battalion was scattered, and the remainder 

of the regiment was forced to withdraw.41 

The regiment continued to receive 

attacks until the early morning hours 

of the 9th when the North Koreans 

pulled away to the northwest. The 

alarming note was that some or all of 

40 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Conference 

Notes, Conf Between Eighth Army Commander and 

Corps Commanders at Tempest Tac, 8 Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 7 Feb 51; X Corps OI 99, 8 Feb 

51. 

41 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 7 and 8 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 

Jnl, Briefing for CG, 8 Feb 51. 

261 

these forces had come out of the ROK 

III Corps zone. The North Korean II 

Corps apparently was shifting forces 

westward to join the V Corps in opposing the X Corps.42 

General Almond was obliged to prevent further incursion on his right if 

the envelopment of Hongch’on was to 

succeed. On the 10th he directed the 

ROK 5th Division to advance and establish blocking positions facing northeast 

near the corps boundary generally on 

the ground held by the ROK 27th Regiment when it was attacked, some thirteen miles northeast of Hoengsong. 

Along with this move, he ordered the 

U.S. 7th Division to send a battalion 

northwest out of the area above 

P’yongch’ang toward a ground objective sixteen miles due east of Hoengsong. This advance, he intended, would 

drive enemy forces located near the 

corps boundary into the path of the 

ROK 5th Division’s attack. Almond also 

ordered a battalion of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team to 

move into position nine miles east of 

Hoengsong to deepen the east flank 

blocking effort at the right rear of the 

ROK 5th Division.43 

The ROK 3d Division, assembling 

just east of Hoengsong, was now to become the right arm of the maneuver 

against Hongch’on. Behind the protection of the ROK 5th Division to the 

east, the ROK 3d was to move north in 

two columns through the heights east 

of Route 29 to a point due east of 

Hongch’on. There the right column 

42 Ibid. 

43 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8, 9, and 10 Feb 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Entry 1305, 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 

Briefing for CG, 11 Feb 51; X Corps OI 101 and 102, 

10 Feb 51. 
262 

was to face east in blocking positions 

while the left column turned west toward the town. Both moves, the ROK 

5th Division’s blocking effort at the 

right and the ROK 3d’s attack to the 

north, were to begin at noon on the 

1lth.44 

Support Force 7 was now to support 

the ROK 3d Division. General Almond 

directed the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team to place its 674th 

Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of the ROK 5th Division and ordered the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, 

a corps unit previously assigned to reinforce the fires of Support Force 7, to 

switch its reinforcement to the 674th.45 

Meanwhile, amid the adjustments in 

the X Corps zone between 8 and 11 

February, the ROK III Corps continued to gain ground. The ROK 7th Division fought through Ch’angdong-ni 

and by evening of the 11th was echeloned left in regimental positions oriented north and northwest from three 

miles above Ch’angdong-ni to seven 

miles below town. On the corps right, 

the ROK 9th Division pushed nine 

more miles up the Han valley, making 

contact with the ROK I Corps’ Capital 

Division in the high peaks rising east of 

the Han. Resistance was light on the 

8th and 9th but stiffened over the next 

two days when General Yu’s forces ran 

into parts of the North Korean 31st Division. Obviously, not all of the II Corps 

had shifted west into the X Corps 

zone.46 

The ROK I Corps, moving up the 

east coast under General Ridgway’s 2 

EBB AND FLOW 

February order to seize Kangnung, 

more than achieved its objective. With 

naval gunfire support from the Task 

Force 95 contingent in the Sea of Japan, 

and against fainthearted opposition by 

the 69th Brigade, a unit of the North 

Korean III Corps that disappeared altogether on the 8th, the Capital Division 

advanced in consistently long and rapid 

strides. In the Taebaek heights rising 

west of the coastal road, one regiment 

by evening of the 11th held positions 

five miles above Route 20, which meandered west and southwest out of Kangnung to Wonju. The remainder of the 

division moving over the coastal road 

occupied Kangnung, then Chumunjin 

eleven miles farther north, and at nightfall on the 11th had forces in position 

three miles above the latter town.47 

Gains in the X Corps zone remained 

much shorter. East of Route 29, the 

ROK 3d Division by dark on 11 February advanced through light opposition 

to positions five miles above Hoengsong. Next east, the ROK 5th Division 

reoriented and moved through moderate resistance within four miles of its 

east flank blocking positions. The 1st 

Battalion, 187th Airborne Regimental 

Combat Team, meanwhile went into 

the position designed to place it at the 

right rear of the ROK 5th Division; 

from the P’yongch’ang area the 2d 

Battalion, 31st Infantry, easily seized 

its terrain objective to the northwest in 

the effort to drive North Korean forces 

into the ROK 5th Division’s path. The 

South Koreans, however, were yet some 

distance from their objectives.48 

44 Ibid. 

45XCorps OI 100, 9 Feb 51, and OI 101, 10 Feb 51, 

Annex B (Arty). 

46 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8, 9, 10, and 11 Feb 

51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Briefing for CG, 9, 10, 11, 

and 12 Feb 51. 

47 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum. 11 Feb 51: Eighth ArmyG3 Jnl, 

Briefing for CG, 12 Feb 51. 

48 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 9, 10, and 11 Feb 51; 

Eighth Army PORs 638, 639, and 640, 10 Feb 51, and 

PORs 641, 642, and 643, 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 
ADVANCE TO THE HAN 

On and west of Route 29, the ROK 

8th Division found lighter resistance, 

enemy forces tending to withdraw before actually obliged to do so. By nightfall on the 11th the 21st Regiment stood 

astride Route 29 nine miles north of 

Hoengsong. To the west, the 10th and 

then the 16th Regiments held positions 

ten miles northwest of Hoengsong 

along the crest of the mountains between Hoengsong and Route 24. A 

three-mile gap separated the 21st and 

10th Regiments, and about a mile of 

open sp 

16th.49 

ace stood between the 10th and 

Two miles behind the 21st, the tanks 

and infantry of Support Team B, which 

had been attached to the ROK regiment, were assembled along Route 29. 

Another mile down the road, the infantry and artillery of Support Force 21 

occupied positions near the town of 

Ch’angbong-ni. Below Support Force 

21, the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, on 

General Almond’s order had moved up 

from Hoengsong into a blocking position at the junction of Route 29 and 

the mountain road leading west. Support Team A, whose tanks and infantry were attached to the 16th Regiment, 

was two miles farther out on the mountain road. Still farther out, between 

Support Team A and the front of the 

16th, which lay across the mountain 

road, were the ROK 20th and 50th 

Field Artillery Battalions and the command posts of both the 10th and 16th 

Regiments.50

263 

The nearest of the 2d Division defenses around Chip’yong-ni now stood 

four miles southwest of the 16th Regiment. After securing Chip’yong-ni 

before the opening of Operation 

ROUNDUP, the 23d Infantry had established a perimeter around the town, 

and Colonel Freeman had run patrols 

east, west, and north. The patrol encounters with enemy forces were mostly 

minor, but by 9 February one particularly strong position was discovered 

on Hill 444 some four miles east of 

Chip’yong-ni. On the 9th Freeman sent 

a battalion east, and the 1st Battalion, 

9th Infantry, came north from the Yoju 

area to reduce the enemy strongpoint. 

The latter battalion occupied the height 

on the 11th and thus held the 2d Division position closest to the ROK 8th 

Division.51

Jnl, Briefing for CG, 10 and 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Entry 2115, 11 Feb 51. 

49 Ibid. 

50 X Corps Comd Rpt, Feb 51, Book of Inclosures, 

Incl 2, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Col Edwin J. 

Messinger, CO 9th Inf, to CG 2d Div, 16 Feb 51, sub: 

Report of Investigation, with Incls 1 and 2; TestiThe Newest Army Estimate 

Given continued reports of eastward 

Chinese shifts and taking them as clear 

signs of an imminent enemy offensive 

in the west central region, General 

Ridgway late on the 11th instructed 

General Almond to patrol but not to 

attempt further advances toward Route 

24 in either the 2d Division or ROK 

8th Division zones until the IX Corps 

had reduced the enemy’s Han bridgehead below Yangp’yong. To move forward while the IX Corps was still held 

mony Before the Eighth Army IG by Maj George 

Kessler, KMAG Advisor to G1 and G4, ROK 8th Div, 

hereafter cited as Kessler Testimony (with overlays), 

15 Feb 51. 

51 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 11 Feb 51; X Corps 

Comd Rpt, Feb 51, Book of Inclosures, Incl 1, Battle 

of Chip’yong-ni. 
264 EBB AND FLOW 

up could isolate and overextend 

Almond’s leftmost units in the area 

where the 39th, 40th, 42d, and 66th Armies were obviously massing.52 

In view of an imminent enemy attack, 

Ridgway also expressed concern over 

Almond’s complex organization for battle in Operation ROUNDUP, referring 

to the intertwined command and control arrangements among corps headquarters, the ROK assault units, the 

American support forces, and the 

latters’ parent units on the line of departure. Ridgway was not sure that 

these measures would provide the tight 

control needed to prevent a confused 

intermingling of units during an enemy attack. 53 

At the time Ridgway called Almond’s 

leftmost units to a halt, he had in hand 

one of the better intelligence estimates 

prepared by his headquarters since he 

assumed command. Always seeking to 

improve intelligence, he had directed 

the preparation of this analysis, stipulating that it contain a survey of enemy 

strategic capabilities as well as tactical 

courses of action.54 

Stimulating Ridgway’s unusual demand for a strategic estimate at field 

army level was the yet unexplained lull 

in Chinese offensive operations that 

had set in on 4 January after the Eighth 

Army gave up Seoul and that now had 

lasted a month. The question was 

52 Rad, GX-2-1214 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

X Corps, 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 11 

Feb 51. 

53 Rad, G-2-1174, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 

11 Feb 51. 

whether the lull represented a changing strategy, from one of destroying 

UNC forces to one of containing them, 

or was merely the result of logistical 

problems. (North Korean influence in 

shaping enemy strategy obviously was 

discounted.)55 

Col. Robert G. Fergusson, the acting 

G-2 who prepared the estimate, told 

Ridgway that the long lull was purely 

the consequence of Chinese resupply, 

transportation, and reinforcement difficulties. The slogan repeatedly given 

in statements by Chinese government 

officials continued to be to drive UNC 

forces out of Korea. Fergusson predicted that once the logistical problems 

were sufficiently relieved-and that 

time appeared to be near-the campaign to push the United Nation Command off the peninsula would be resumed with full acceptance of any 

further heavy personnel losses and 

supply problems that might occur.56 

The concentration of Chinese forces, 

Fergusson pointed out, was in the area 

bordered on the northwest by the 

Pukhan River and on the southeast by 

Route 24 between Yangp’yong and 

Hongch’on. From southwest to northeast, the concentration included the 

42d, 39th, 40th, and 66th Armies, whose 

total strength was around 110,000. He 

was not sure that all of these units had 

completed their shifts to the west central region.57 But with the enemy mass 

centering there, the most likely paths 

of the next enemy advance were down 

the Han valley toward Yoju and down 

54 On 1 February Ridgway personally told President 55 Eighth Army G2, Estimate of Enemy Situation, 

Rhee that both U.S. and ROK intelligence were inade- 10 Feb 51. 

quate and asked Rhee to take all possible steps to 56 Ibid. 

improve the ROK product. See Eighth Army SS Rpt, 57 It was on the 10th that air observers sighted eastOffice of the CG, Feb 51, Nar and Incl 1. See also ward troop movements behind the enemy bridgehead 

Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. in the IX Corps zone. 
ADVANCE TO THE HAN 

Route 29 toward Wonju, with both 

paths then turning toward the same 

deep objective, Ch’ungju. The advance 

might include deep sweeps to the southwest to envelop the I and IX Corps.58 

Because the enemy’s problem of resupply would progressively worsen as 

supply lines lengthened during an advance, Fergusson judged that a sustained Chinese drive was unlikely. More 

probable was a series of shallow enveloping maneuvers interspersed with 

halts for reorganization and resupply. 

265 

He believed that the Chinese would 

not open an offensive until major units 

of IX Army Group moved down from 

the Wonsan area within reinforcing 

range. These, he estimated, could reach 

the central region no sooner than 15 

February.5g 

Fergusson was wrong in considering 

the arrival of IX Army Group units as a 

necessary condition and so was in error 

on the nearest date of a Chinese attack. 

But in measuring all other probabilities, 

he came remarkably close. 

58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 
CHAPTER XIV 

The Battle for Hoengsong 

Much along the lines drawn out for 

General Ridgway by Colonel Fergusson 

on 10 February, the XIII Army Group 

commander opened an attack on the 

night of 11 February toward Hoengsong. In shifting forces eastward he had 

moved the 66th Army from Kap’yong 

to Hongch’on, whence one division 

struck south along Route 29. From 

start points near Route 24 between 

Hongch’on and Chip’yong-ni, a division 

of the 40th Army and one of the 39th 

Army joined the push on Hoengsong by 

attacking southeast.1 In the path of 

these initial attacks lay the ROK 8th 

Division. (Map 22) 

The ROK 8th Division Destroyed 

Moving below Hongch’on astride 

Route 29, the 198th Division, 66th Army, 

hit the front of the ROK 21st Regiment 

about 2030, then sent forces around 

the regiment’s flanks, mainly on the 

west through the gap between the 21st 

and the ROK 10th Regiment. While the 

198th swung behind the 21st, the 120th 

Division, 40th Army, penetrated the line 

of the 10th Regiment, and the 117th 

Division, 39th Army, pushed through the 

left flank of the 16th.2 

1 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps Rpt, 

The Battle of Hoengsong. 

2 Ibid.; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 1 Mar 51, 

sub: Performance of the 5th and 8th ROK Divisions, 

11-13 February 1951. 

When word of the opening attack 

reached ROK 8th Division headquarters in Hoengsong, division commander 

Brig. Gen. Choi Yong Hee ordered the 

21st Regiment. to make a short withdrawal and instructed Support Team 

B to move back down Route 29 and 

join Support Force 21 at Ch’angbongni. The armored team reached the artillery force about 2200. Some of the 

198th Division forces who had swept 

around the 21st meanwhile raced down 

both sides of Route 29, bypassed the 

American position at Ch’angbong-ni, 

and blocked the road near a bridge 

three miles farther south.3 

The 120th Division, about the same 

time, pushed more strength through 

the ROK 10th Regiment, some troops 

turning in behind both the 10th and 

16th, others striking southeast toward 

the mountain road leading west from 

Route 29. Around midnight the latter 

overran the command posts of the 10th 

and 16th Regiments on the mountain 

road and cut off the ROK 20th and 

50th Field Artillery Battalions and 

Support Team A, also on the road, by 

establishing strong blocks between the 

3 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Lt 

Col Harold Maixner, CO 3d Bn, 38th Inf, to CO 38th 

Inf, 15 Feb 51, sub: Summation of Action of 3d 

Battalion. 38th Infantry. During the Period 11-12 February 1951 (hereafter cited as Maixner Ltr); Ltr, Lt 

Col William P. Keleher, CO 1st Bn, 38th Inf, to CO 

38th Inf, 14 Feb 51, sub: Summation of Action of 1st 

Battalion, 38th Infantry During the Period 11-12 February 1951 (hereafter cited as Keleher Ltr). 
c't

co
268 EBB AND FLOW 

support units and Route 29. Below the 

120th, the 117th Division reinforced its 

frontal attack on the 16th Regiment 

and deepened its penetration of the 

regiment’s left flank, sending forces 

eastward through the ground below 

the mountain road directly toward 

Hoengsong.4 

By 0100 on 12 February communications were out between ROK 8th Division headquarters and all regiments as 

well as between each regiment and its 

subordinates. Boxed between frontal 

pressure and Chinese to the rear, the 

three regiments had started to withdraw; but with the main threads of control broken and the better routes of 

withdrawal blocked, units became 

separated and divided, and most were 

surrounded. The rearward move of 

those not trapped steadily disintegrated 

into individual efforts to escape.5 

Members of the 21st Regiment straggled into the Support Force 21 perimeter at Ch’angbong-ni about 0115. 

The support force commander, Lt. 

Col. John W. Keith, Jr., reported the 

ROK withdrawal to Brig. Gen. Loyal M. 

Haynes, the 2d Division artillery commander, and asked permission to withdraw a little over three miles to a position he formerly had occupied just 

above the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, 

at the junction of Route 29 and the 

mountain road leading west. He also 

requested that General Haynes ask the 

ROK 8th Division commander to stop 

the 21st Regiment’s withdrawal until 

Keith got Support Force 21 and Support Team B in march order. Mem4 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Kessler 

Testimony, 15 Feb 51. 

5 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, CG 

Eighth Army to CINCFE, 1 Mar 51, sub: Performance 

of the 5th and 8th ROK Divisions, 1l-12 Feb 51. 

bers of Keith’s own infantry protection, 

Lt. Col. William P. Keleher’s 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, were at the time 

trying to collect the South Koreans and 

deploy them on the American perimeter, but with little success. Haynes 

contacted General Choi, but Choi was 

no longer in communication with the 

21st Regiment and was, besides, under 

the impression that the 21st was making only the short withdrawal he had 

called for earlier. He did nothing. 

Haynes meanwhile hesitated to clear 

Keith’s withdrawal without General 

Ruffner’s approval. When he asked the 

division commander, Ruffner told him 

to check with the X Corps artillery 

commander.6 

Ruffner’s deference to corps emphasized the command and control arrangement for which General Ridgway 

had expressed concern the day before. 

As a matter of orders, and as an eventual matter of practice in controlling 

the artillery support forces, unity of 

command in Operation ROUNDUP was 

vested in corps headquarters, no lower. 

The arrangement worked well enough 

during the advance. But after the Chinese engineered the collapse of the 

ROK 8th Division, corps control inhibited the American commanders of support forces and of units on the line of 

departure in reacting rapidly. How 

much this inhibition assisted the Chinese is moot. Delays and piecemeal 

movements among the smaller American units nevertheless colored the 

course of withdrawal operations. 

6 Ltr, Hq 2d Div Arty to CG 2d Div, 16 Feb 51, sub: 

Responsibility for Losses of Personnel and Equipment 

of Support force 21 (hereafter cited as 2d Div Arty 

Ltr), Incls 1 and 7; Ltr, Maj Warren D. Hodges, S3, 

38th Inf, to CG 2d Div, 17 Feb 51, sub: Report on 

Activities, 12-13 Feb 51 (hereafter cited as Hodges 

Ltr); Keleher Ltr. 
THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG

In one instance, Capt. Sherman D.

Jones, the commander of Support

Team A, scorned any need to get permission to withdraw and fought east

over the blocked mountain road toward

the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry. He

withdrew a little after midnight amid

uncontrolled ROK vehicles, guns, and

troops and under heavy fire from Chinese small arms, machine guns, rocket

launchers, and mortars. The last

A team troops to survive the move

reached the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry,

about dawn. Losses included two tanks.

Jones, the tank platoon leader, and five

others were wounded, and nearly a

hundred fifty men were missing.

7

Similarly, few ROK 8th Division

troops found their way to safety. Most

remained encircled in the mountains

and were eventually killed or captured.

On 13 February, after straggler lines

were set and after General Almond

moved the division into corps reserve

at Chup'o-ri, west of Chech'on, the

division strength stood at 263 officers

and slightly over 3,000 men, of whom

about half were division service troops.

Casualties, either dead or missing,

stood at 323 officers (among them the

commander and entire staff of the

10th Regiment, the executive officer

of the 16th Regiment, seven battalion

commanders, and thirty company

commanders) and 7,142 men. Division equipment losses included 14 artillery pieces, 5 antitank guns, 68 trucks,

249 radios, 87 mortars, 137 rocket

launchers, 164 machine guns, 102 automatic rifles, 2,389 carbines, and 4,096

rifles. 8

7 Ltr, Col Edwin J. Messinger, CO 9th Inf, to CG 2d

Div, 16 Feb 51, sub: Report of Investigation, with

Incis I and 2.

s X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, OfSupport Force 21

Earlier, as the ROK 8th Division began to fall back after midnight on 11

February, the 66th Army commander

widened his advance below Hongch'on,

sending the 197th Division south

through the ground five miles east of

Route 29 against the ROK 3d Division.

In the mold of the attacks along and

west of Route 29, infiltrating Chinese

attacked the command post of the 23d

Regiment and of one battalion of the

22d after engaging the South Koreans

with heavy frontal assaults. Before the

Chinese could get a trap fully set, the

two ROK regiments withdrew to a position about three miles northeast of

Hoengsong.9

A finger of the 197th, about three

hundred men, thrust southwest toward

Ch'angbong-ni during the attack and

near 0230 on the 12th hit Company A,

38th Infantry, holding the northeast

sector of Support Force 21's perimeter.

The company stood its ground but remained under fire. Though still waiting for permission to withdraw, Colonel Keith meanwhile began to put his

artillery units in march order.

Keith received clearance to move

back about 0245, an hour and a half

after he asked for it-good time considfice of the IG, KMAG, to IG Eighth Army, 22 Feb 51,

sub: Losses Sustained in Action North of Wonju, 11-13

February 1951.

9 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Feb 51; ibid., Entries 0600 and 1550, 12 Feb 51; X Corps Rpt, The

Battle of Hoengsong, and Incl 4, Action of the Ith

ROK FA Battalion.

'o X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Lt

Col Milton G. Norum, Exec Off 38th Inf, to CG 2d

Div, 15 Feb 51, sub: Losses of Materiel and Personnel

(hereafter cited as Norum Ltr); Keleher Ltr; Ltr,

1st Lt George W. Gardner, CO Co A, 38th Inf, to CO

1st Bn, 38th Inf, 16 Feb 51, sub: Summary of Combat

Action of Company "A," 38th Inf Regiment, During

11-12 February 1951 (hereafter cited as Gardner Ltr).

THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG 269

In one instance, Capt. Sherman D. 

J ones, the commander of Support 

Team A, scorned any need to get permission to withdraw and fought east 

over the blocked mountain road toward 

the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry. He 

withdrew a little after midnight amid 

uncontrolled ROK vehicles, guns, and 

troops and under heavy fire from Chinese small arms, machine guns, rocket 

launchers, and mortars. The last 

A team troops to survive the move 

reached the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, 

about dawn. Losses included two tanks. 

Jones, the tank platoon leader, and five 

others were wounded, and nearly a 

hundred fifty men were missing.’ 

Similarly, few ROK 8th Division 

troops found their way to safety. Most 

remained encircled in the mountains 

and were eventually killed or captured. 

On 13 February, after straggler lines 

were set and after General Almond 

moved the division into corps reserve 

at Chup’o-ri, west of Chech’on, the 

division strength stood at 263 officers 

and slightly over 3,000 men, of whom 

about half were division service troops. 

Casualties, either dead or missing, 

stood at 323 officers (among them the 

commander and entire staff of the 

10th Regiment, the executive officer 

of the 16th Regiment, seven battalion 

commanders, and thirty company 

commanders) and 7,142 men. Division equipment losses included 14 artillery pieces, 5 antitank guns, 68 trucks, 

249 radios, 87 mortars, 137 rocket 

launchers, 164 machine guns, 102 automatic rifles, 2,389 carbines, and 4,096 

rifles.8 

269 

7 Ltr, Col Edwin J. Messinger, CO 9th Inf, to CG 2d 

Div, 16 Feb 51, sub: Report of Investigation, with 

Incls 1 and 2. 

a X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, OfSupport Force 21 

Earlier, as the ROK 8th Division began to fall back after midnight on 11 

February, the 66th Army commander 

widened his advance below Hongch’on, 

sending the 197th Division south 

through the ground five miles east of 

Route 29 against the ROK 3d Division. 

In the mold of the attacks along and 

west of Route 29, infiltrating Chinese 

attacked the command post of the 23d 

Regiment and of one battalion of the 

22d after engaging the South Koreans 

with heavy frontal assaults. Before the 

Chinese could get a trap fully set, the 

two ROK regiments withdrew to a position about three miles northeast of 

Hoengsong.g 

A finger of the 197th, about three 

hundred men, thrust southwest toward 

Ch’angbong-ni during the attack and 

near 0230 on the 12th hit Company A, 

38th Infantry, holding the northeast 

sector of Support Force 21’s perimeter. 

The company stood its ground but remained under fire. Though still waiting for permission to withdraw, Colonel Keith meanwhile began to put his 

artillery units in march order.10 

Keith received clearance to move 

back about 0245, an hour and a half 

after he asked for it-good time considfice of the IG, KMAG, to IG Eighth Army, 22 Feb 51, 

sub: Losses Sustained in Action North of Wonju, 11-l 3 

February 1951. 

9 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Feb 51; ibid., Entries 0600 and 1550, 12 Feb 51; X Corps Rpt, The 

Battle of Hoengsong, and Incl 4, Action of the 11th 

ROK FA Battalion. 

10 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Lt 

Col Milton G. Norum, Exec Off 38th Inf, to CG 2d 

Div, 15 Feb 51, sub: Losses of Materiel and Personnel 

(hereafter cited as Norum Ltr); Keleher Ltr; Ltr, 

1st Lt George W. Gardner, CO Co A, 38th Inf, to CO 

1st Bn, 38th Inf, 16 Feb 51, sub: Summary of Combat 

Action of Company “A,” 38th Inf Regiment, During 

11-12 February 1951 (hereafter cited as Gardner Ltr). 
270 

ering the route his request and its answer had taken. General Haynes, after 

General Ruffner instructed him to 

check with corps, consulted Col. William P. Ennis, Jr., the corps artillery 

commander, around 0130. Colonel 

Ennis, in turn, spoke to Col. William J. 

McCaffrey of the corps chief of staffs 

office, who asked General Almond 

himself. Almond approved the withdrawal, and his word passed back from 

McCaffrey to Ennis to Haynes to Keith. 

Almond was under the impression, 

however, perhaps because of the several hands through which Keith’s request had passed, that Support Force 

21 would withdraw to Hoengsong, not 

just to a position near the 3d Battalion, 

38th Infantry.11

Keith started his withdrawal about 

0300. Ahead of the main body, two 

tanks and two squads of infantry from 

Support Team B moved to secure the 

bridge three miles south, just above the 

area to be occupied, unaware that the 

Chinese had blocked Route 29 near the 

bridge and that they now had organized additional fire blocks above and 

below the crossing, the latter actually 

in the area Keith intended to occupy. 

Chinese machine gunners overlooking route 29 from the east harassed 

the tank-infantry team the moment it 

started south. The infantry hugged the 

tanks for protection, as did a group of 

South Korean troops trying to stay with 

11 Ltr, Brig Gen George C. Stewart, ADC 2d Div, to 

CG 2d Div, 19 Feb 51, sub: Investigation of Heavy 

Losses of Material and Personnel in 2d Division Task 

Force Operating in Support of 8th ROK Division 

(hereafter cited as Stewart Ltr); Testimony Before 

Eighth Army IG by Col William P. Ennis, Jr., CG X 

Corps Arty (hereafter cited as Ennis Testimony), 16 

Feb 51; Hodges Ltr; X Corps Arty S3 Jnl, Entry, 12 

Feb 51. 

12 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Stewart 

Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-l 1; 2d Div Arty Ltr, Incl 1. 

EBB AND FLOW 

the American force. A mile down the 

road, an explosion under the second 

tank brought 2d Lt. William M. Mace, 

the platoon leader, out of the turret 

even as the tank, undamaged, continued to move. Machine gun fire from 

the left kept Mace from getting back 

inside, and a grenade, apparently 

thrown from the ditch on the east side 

of the road, then blew him off the tank, 

although without wounding him. His 

and the leading tank continued down 

the road, neither crew aware that Mace 

was no longer with them.13 

The two tanks gradually outdistanced 

the infantry that had started with them 

but moved no more than another mile 

before the leading tank was hit by a 

rocket launcher round and ran off the 

steep edge of the road and overturned. 

The following tank attempted to pass 

but was hit in the engine compartment 

by a grenade or mortar round and capsized off the opposite side of the road. 

The two crews fled into the hills to the 

west, then turned south toward the 3d 

Battalion, 38th Infantry. l4 

To the rear, following the same westward drift to escape fire coming in from 

left of the road, Lieutenant Mace, the 

two infantry squads, and a number of 

South Koreans took cover in the 

ground on the right. The group moved 

south after daylight toward the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, but became scattered during several small skirmishes 

with Chinese. The survivors, including 

Mace, finally reached the 3d Battalion 

near 0930.15 

Behind the scattered tank-infantry 

team, Colonel Keith’s main column received heavy small arms and machine 

13 Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-11. 

14 Ibid., Exhibits C-11 and C-12. 

15 Ibid., Exhibits C-11, C-14, C-15, and C-16. 
THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG 271 

gun fire from the heights east of Route 

29 while it formed and stretched out 

on the road below the support force 

perimeter. As Battery A of the 503d 

Field Artillery Battalion, the leading artillery unit, started to get its guns in 

column, a Chinese raiding party dashed 

onto the road from the east, captured 

the battery commander, first sergeant, 

and several men, and took them back 

into the hills. Chinese gunners meanwhile concentrated fire on vehicles, 

damaging many and killing or wounding several drivers.16 

By 0400 the Chinese had stopped 

Keith’s column, actually before it had 

got a full start. Infantry and artillery 

troops at the head of the column 

formed a line facing east along the road 

and returned fire while to the north 

Company A, assigned to be rear guard, 

redeployed facing northwest, north, 

and northeast. Enemy forces reengaged 

the company, but with help from the 

remaining two tanks of Support Team 

B the rear guard troops kept the Chinese from rolling up the column.17 

Colonel Keith put some artillery 

pieces back in action near dawn and 

laid direct fire on the ridges to the east. 

Colonel Keleher then deployed two rifle companies, one into the heights on 

each side of the road, while troops on 

the road shoved disabled vehicles out 

of the way and rounded up replacements for missing drivers of others. 

Stubborn resistance slowed Keleher’s 

infantry east of the road, but the support force was moving before 0600.18 

At the tail of the column, Company 

A backed out of position just after the 

skies lightened but had to fight a run16 2d Div Arty Ltr, Incls 1 and 7; Keleher Ltr. 

17 Ibid.; Gardner Ltr. 

18 2d Div Arty Ltr, Incl 7; Keleher Ltr. 

ning engagement with Chinese who 

followed. As the company prepared to 

move, the commander, 1st Lt. George 

W. Gardner, sighted three 155-mm. 

howitzers attached to their M-5 tractors, 

a full ammunition truck, and several 

jeeps and trailers, all unattached, in a 

roadside paddy southwest of his position. Gardner’s executive officer located 

at least one more howitzer, still in firing position. For reasons not clear, Battery A, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, 

to whom the weapons and vehicles 

belonged, had withdrawn with only 

one tube.19 

Gardner had no men who could 

drive the tractors and had neither time 

nor explosives to destroy them or the 

howitzers. Company A fought briefly 

from the artillery position, Gardner’s 

men using the machine guns mounted 

on the artillery vehicles until the 

ammunition was gone, then left the 

wealth of weapons, artillery ammunition, and vehicles to the Chinese.20 

Gardner found the fifth weapon of 

Battery A, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, on the road where Lieutenant 

Mace’s two tanks had been knocked out 

and where the main body of the support force also had come under heavy 

mortar and machine gun fire. Among 

several vehicles disabled by the fire was 

the tractor pulling the 155-mm. howit19 Gardner Ltr; Ltr, Lt Col William P. Keleher, CO 

1st Bn, 38th Inf, to CO 38th Inf, 15 Feb 51, sub: 

Supplement to Summation of Action of the 1st Bn, 

38th Inf, During the Period 11-12 February 1951. 

Gardner’s executive officer actually reported finding 

two howitzers. Since Battery A, 503d Field Artillery 

Battalion, had only five pieces and had taken one 

south, the count between Gardner and his executive 

officer was off by one. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion later reported the loss of one 105-mm. howitzer 

during the withdrawal from Ch’angbong-ni. Perhaps 

this weapon was one of those reported by Gardner’s 

executive officer. 

20 Gardner Ltr. 
272 EBB AND FLOW 

zer. Gardner’s men had to manhandle 

the abandoned gun off the road to permit the two tanks with them to pass.21 

The support force received more fire 

at the bridge, another mile south, and 

in the area just below the crossing 

where Colonel Keith had intended to 

redeploy. As Keith’s column pushed 

through each fire block, Chinese closed 

in on the road behind it and pressed 

hard against Gardner’s rear guard. 

Keith, judging it impossible to establish 

positions as planned after coming under fire below the bridge, moved on to 

join the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, not 

far beyond, and got the tail of the column inside the 3d Battalion perimeter 

about 1000. No careful muster was 

made after entering, but support force 

casualties so far appeared to exceed 

four hundred. Company A had suffered the highest rate, losing two officers and around a hundred ten men in 

its rearguard action. Keith, after discovering that five 155-mm. howitzers and 

one 105-mm. howitzer had been left 

behind, relayed a request to division 

for air strikes on the weapons.22 

From the Road Junction to Hoengsong 

The 3d Battalion, by the time Support Force 21 arrived, had been under 

fire and periodic assaults from the 

north and northwest for some five 

hours. After clearing with regimental 

commander Coughlin at his headquarters in Hoengsong (although Coughlin 

really had no authority over Support 

Force 2l), 3d Battalion commander Lt. 

Col. Harold Maixner deployed Keith’s 

artillery and Keleher’s infantry to 

21 Ibid. 

22 Ibid.; 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 57, 12 Feb 51. 

strengthen the perimeter against the 

assaults, which were growing stronger. 

Withdrawing the combined force to 

Hoengsong was a logical alternative except that the 3d Battalion remained under X Corps orders to hold the Route 

29-mountain road junction.23 

A second situation now complicated 

a withdrawal to Hoengsong. By the time 

Keith and Keleher joined Maixner, 

those forces of the 117th Division moving east below the mountain road 

reached Route 29 and blocked it between Hoengsong and the road junction three miles north. Colonel Coughlin discovered the new block when in 

response to a request from division artillery he sent the 38th’s headquarters 

security platoon and a platoon from the 

regimental tank company north out of 

Hoengsong to help Support Force 21 

get through the blocks below 

Ch’angbong-ni. The two platoons ran 

into the Chinese position a mile above 

Hoengsong and withdrew after losing 

a tank and half the infantry. Coughlin 

placed mortar and artillery fire on the 

enemy position and called in air strikes, 

the first reaching the target around 

1030. He also asked for the return of 

the 2d Battalion from division reserve 

in Wonju with a view to sending it forward to clear the road, but General 

Ruffner chose not to release it.24 

Ruffner, at the same time, advised 

Coughlin to be ready to assume control 

of Support Force 21 and get it back to 

Hoengsong. Coughlin recommended 

that the 3d Battalion also return whenever he received word to withdraw the 

23 Maimer Ltr; Hodges Ltr. 

24 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong, and Incl 

8, After Action Interview, 38th RCT; X Corps Arty 

S3 Jnl, Entry 11, 12 Feb 51; 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 28, 

12 Feb 51; Norum Ltr. 
THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG 

support force, but his bid was futile. 

Denied use of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 

Coughlin faced the prospect of pulling 

the support force through the intervening roadblock without being able to do 

much more than he already had done 

to help. While he might have used the 

attached Netherlands battalion, currently deployed along the northern limits of Hoengsong, it was the main security force for the headquarters and 

artillery installations in and below town. 

In any case, Coughlin, was under the 

impression that changes in the Netherlands’ assignment could come only 

from corps.25 

Around 1100 2d Division headquarters received instructions from General 

Almond to reconstitute the 38th as a 

regimental combat team with the 2d 

and 3d Battalions remaining in place 

until further orders. Almond lifted the 

restriction on the 2d Battalion not long 

after, but General Ruffner then took 

direct control of the unit. He alerted 

the battalion to be prepared to block a 

Chinese force, apparently from the 

117th Division, observed earlier two 

miles southwest of Hoengsong. In 

transmitting Almond’s reconstitution 

order to the forces at the road junction, 

Ruffner directed Support Force 21 to 

withdraw to Hoengsong. Colonel 

Coughlin was to control the withdrawal, 

but with his use of the 2d and 3d Battalions still restricted, he was too weak to 

help the support force.26 

General Almond meanwhile learned 

of his misconception about Colonel 

Keith’s movement when he asked his 

artillery officer, Colonel Ennis, for the 

273 

current locations of both Support Force 

21 and Support Force 7. The latter, 

Ennis reported, was three miles north 

of Hoengsong and a mile and a half 

east of Route 29 in the initial position 

taken to support the ROK 3d Division. 

Unaware that General Ruffner had 

just ordered Keith to continue his 

withdrawal, Ennis explained that 

Keith’s force had joined the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry. Almond ordered 

both support forces to withdraw to 

Hoengsong immediately, fighting their 

way out if necessary. Ennis relayed the 

order through artillery channels 

around noon.27 

The prescience of Almond’s order to 

Support Force 7 became clear in the 

afternoon. Earlier, sometime around 

0900, the ROK 3d Division had tried to 

advance against the 197th Division but 

moved only a short distance before 

being hit hard by the Chinese unit. By 

1300 both forward regiments of the 

ROK 3d were under attack, one surrounded. Both began to fight back toward Hoengsong. To the ROK 3d’s 

right, the ROK 5th Division also started 

northeast during the morning toward 

its objectives near the corps boundary. 

But the assault regiments ran into hard 

counterattacks by the North Korean V 

Corps, which now appeared to be joining the advance on Hoengsong, and by 

early afternoon were withdrawing to escape being enveloped. With both ROK 

divisions falling back east of Route 29, 

their supporting artillery potentially 

faced a situation similar to that of Support Force 21.28 

25 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 49, 12 Feb 51; 2d Div Arty 

Ltr, Incl 1. 

26 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; 2d Div 

G3 Jnl, Entries 59, 67, 7 1, and 74, 12 Feb 5 1. 

27 Ennis Testimony, 16 Feb 51. 

28 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Feb 51; X Corps PIR 139, 12 Feb 51; 2d Div G3 

Jnl, 12 Feb 51; 2d Div G2 Jnl, 12 Feb 51. 
274 EBB AND FLOW 

Lt. Col. Barney D. White, the Support Force 7 commander, decided 

against withdrawing over the route he 

had used to reach his current position 

since it led west to the bridge on Route 

29 where Keith’s forces had come under fire. White had sent a reconnaissance party west to investigate, and it 

had been ambushed even before it 

reached the bridge. He notified corps 

headquarters that he would move due 

east to the Twinnan-mul River, which 

flowed southwest past the northern 

edge of Hoengsong, then follow a 

primitive road through the Twinnanmul valley. The little-used road was ice 

coated and in poor shape, but White 

had engineers who could make hasty 

repairs. With no interference from the 

enemy, White got his column started at 

1500 and pulled out his rear guard 

about two hours later.29 

At the same time, the 674th and 96th 

Field Artillery Battalions, which had 

been supporting the ROK 5th Division 

from positions six miles east of Hoengsong, moved to new firing positions 

four miles south. At the time, General 

Bowen, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team commander and coordinator of these two artillery battalions, expected the ROK 5th Division 

to make a stand above the new artillery 

positions in defense of Hoengsong. The 

1st Battalion of the combat team, which 

earlier had taken a blocking position 

below the ROK 5th, moved back with 

the artillery units.30 

Colonel Keith meanwhile led Support Force 21 south from the road junction just before noon, two companies 

of Colonel Keleher’s infantry moving 

through the high ground on both sides 

of Route 29 to protect the motor column and remaining foot troops on the 

road. Both Support Team A and Support Team B remained with Colonel 

Maixner to help defend the perimeter 

which was still under assault. Mortar 

and artillery fire and air strikes arranged by Colonel Coughlin pounded 

the ridges ahead of the support force, 

but Keleher’s men almost immediately 

ran into strong resistance and lost momentum after a mile. Keleher committed the remainder of his battalion, 

but it was not enough to revitalize 

his attack.31 

About the time Keleher’s attack 

stalled, word reached Colonel Coughlin that the 18th Regiment, ROK 3d 

Division, assembled about three miles 

east of Hoengsong, would send a battalion north astride Route 29 at 1400 to 

help open the road. General Almond 

had ordered this attack shortly after instructing the artillery support forces to 

withdraw. Support Team E (Company 

G, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat 

Team, and a platoon from the 72d 

Tank Battalion), also assembled nearby, 

was to accompany the South Koreans. 

The assistant commander of the ROK 

3d Division was to head the force, but 

Almond assigned the corps armored 

officer, Lt. Col. Jack F. Wilhm, to coordinate the organization and opening 

of the infantry-armor advance. Coughlin had no part in it at a11.32 

The South Korean battalion was late 

getting started, then advanced only a 

half mile north of Hoengsong onto the 

29 Interv, Eighth Army IG with Lt Col Barney D. 

White, CO 49th FA Bn and SF 7; 49th FA Bn Unit 

Rpt no. 134, 12 Feb 51. 

30 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong. 

31 Keleher Ltr; Hodges Ltr; Norum Ltr. 

32 Interv, Eighth Army IG with Lt Col lack F. Wilhm. 

Actg Armored Off, X Corps; Norum Ltr; Hodges 

Ltr; Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-l. 
THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG 275 

first hills above the Twinnan-mul. Support Team E moved only as far as the 

river’s lower bank. Observing the short 

advance and halt, Coughlin’s operations 

officer, Maj. Warren D. Hodges, sought 

out the South Korean commander and 

argued for continuing the advance. The 

ROK officer refused. His orders, he 

insisted, were to take the hills he now 

occupied and hold them only until 

dark. His one concession was that he 

would remain in position until the 

forces withdrawing from the road junction passed through.33 

Coughlin did not have the authority 

to order the South Korean-American 

force farther up Route 29, but he had 

finally regained his 3d Battalion to assist the withdrawal from the road junction. General Almond released the battalion from its blocking assignment 

at 1430.34 

Just before releasing the battalion Almond had discussed corps operations 

with General Ridgway, who flew into 

Almond’s Wonju headquarters a little 

past noon. Almond announced that he 

now planned to give up Hoengsong and 

defend Wonju. His formal order issued 

late in the day called for the 2d Division, 

with the 187th Airborne Regimental 

Combat Team attached, to defend a 

long line which from an anchor on the 

west at Chip’yong-ni stretched out to 

the southeast and east, passing two 

miles north of Wonju and continuing 

nine miles beyond the town. In the right 

portion of the corps sector, the ROK 

3d and 5th Divisions were to stand between Route 29 and the corps east 

boundary some seven miles farther 

north. Placing the South Koreans on 

this forward line would tie the X Corps 

to the left of the ROK III Corps, whose 

line now bulged out to the north far 

beyond the X Corps front. To back up 

the South Koreans and secure the corps 

east flank in depth, the 31st Infantry 

of General Ferenbaugh’s 7th Division 

was to occupy positions at Todon-ni, 

a road junction four miles below 

P’yongch’ang. Ferenbaugh’s 32d Infantry, still holding positions between 

Chech’on and Yongwol, would lend 

further depth, and the 17th Infantry, 

now scheduled to assemble in corps reserve near Wonju, could be committed 

to help.35 

To improve control, Almond during 

his talk with Ridgway requested that 

the ROK I Corps headquarters be attached to the X Corps to take charge of 

the ROK 3d and 5th Divisions. General 

Kim and his staff, by virtue of past service under Almond in northeastern 

Korea, were experienced in joint operations and were well acquainted with the 

X Corps staff. Ridgway approved. He 

arranged to have General Kim and a 

partial staff flown into the X Corps sector on the 13th and to have Kim’s remaining staff follow by truck. The ROK 

Capital Division, in the meantime, was 

to pass to ROK III Corps control.36 

Colonel Coughlin, after receiving 

word of the 3d Battalion’s release about 

1600, instructed Colonel Maixner and 

Colonel Keleher to drive through the 

roadblock with the 1st Battalion attacking on the east side of the road, the 3d 

Battalion on the west, and the motor 

35 Staff Sec Rpt, Office of the CG Eighth Army, Feb 

51, Incl 12; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Feb 51; 

ibid., Entries 1416 and 1605, 12 Feb 51; X Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps OI 104 (confirms 

oral instructions), 12 Feb 51. 

36 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 5l; Rad, GX-l-1287 

KG, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 

12 Feb 51. 

33s Ibid. 

34 Stewart Ltr. 
276 EBB AND FLOW 

column between them. Maixner disengaged at the road junction and joined 

Keleher in the attack by 1800. The two 

battalions were able to move, but only 

at a costly creep. Chinese mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire meanwhile continued to punish the motor 

column. Coughlin’s inability to assist 

with an attack north out of Hoengsong 

was clearly enfeebling the withdrawal.37 

A little after 1800 Colonel Wilhm, 

the corps armored officer, came into 

the 38th Infantry command post to notify Coughlin to take charge of all 

American troops in the Hoengsong 

area. Wilhm had got this word from 

corps when he called his headquarters 

to report the short South Korean advance above Hoengsong. The restriction to American forces prevented 

Coughlin from using the South Korean 

battalion to help his withdrawing forces, 

but he at least could employ Support 

Team E. He placed his regimental tank 

company commander in charge of the 

support team and ordered him to link 

up with the forces coming from the 

north. The tank company commander, 

spearheading with two of his own tanks, 

started the tank-infantry team up Route 

29 within minutes.38 

Around 1900 Coughlin discovered 

troops of Support Force 7 to be moving through Hoengsong. Lt. Col. Baker, 

commanding the 2d Battalion, 17th 

Infantry, was directing his foot troops 

and the leading serial of artillery into 

an assembly southeast of town. Up to 

this moment, Coughlin had not known 

of Support Force 7’s withdrawal 

through the Twinnan-mul valley, which 

had been worked out with corps 

37 Maixner Ltr; Keleher Ltr; Norum Ltr. 

38 Interv, Eighth Army IG with Wilhm; Stewart Ltr, 

Incl 2, Exhibit C-l. 

through artillery channels. He had believed Colonel White’s force to be somewhere behind his own on Route 29.39 

Under the corps order placing him 

in charge of American troops in 

Hoengsong, Coughlin now could use 

Support Force 7 to help the forces withdrawing over Route 29. He notified 

Colonel Baker (who was unaware of the 

new command arrangement until 

Coughlin told him) that the support 

force artillery should withdraw to 

Wonju but that Baker’s infantry battalion would be sent north to help clear 

Route 29. Baker left Coughlin to give 

these instructions to Colonel White, still 

northeast of town with the remainder 

of Support Force 7, and then to return 

to Coughlin’s command post for further word on the attack north.40 

When Baker radioed Coughlin’s instructions to Colonel White, he learned 

that a 155-mm. howitzer and its tractor 

had slipped off the road about a mile 

northeast of Hoengsong where the road 

was little more than an icy ledge in a 

steep ridge bordering the Twinnanmul. Considerable road work was 

needed at that point before the remainder of the motor column could 

continue.41 

The ROK 3d and 5th Divisions, the 

latter being followed by forces of the 

North Korean V Corps, meanwhile were 

passing south through the area east of 

Hoengsong en route to their newly assigned defense line. Ahead of the South 

Koreans, General Bowen was pulling 

his infantry battalions and the 674th 

and 96th Field Artillery Battalions back 

to Wonju. A KMAG officer with the 

39 Ibid.; 49th FA Bn Unit Rpt no. 135, 13 Feb 51. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Ennis Testimony, 16 Feb 51; 49th FA Bn Unit 

Rpt no. 134, 12 Feb 51, and no. 135, 13 Feb 51. 
THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG 

South Koreans passing nearest Hoengsong informed Colonel Baker that the 

enemy forces following the ROK 5th 

Division had cut the lateral road stretching eastward from Hoengsong which 

the leading troops of Support Force 7 

had used to reach their assembly southeast of town. Although the cut was 

beyond the support force assembly, 

Baker began to pull the leading troops 

and trucks back into Hoengsong and 

reassemble them along Route 29 south 

of town. He was still shifting forces 

around 2200 when the remainder of 

Support Force 7 began to arrive from 

the northeast, and he had yet to return 

to Colonel Coughlin’s command post 

for his attack order.42 

At that late hour an attack up Route 

29 by Baker did not appear necessary. 

Suffering moderate casualties and losing one tank, Support Team E had 

fought forward for about a mile and a 

half and joined Coughlin’s forces coming south around 2100. After the E 

team tanks turned around and took the 

lead, the combined force, though still 

receiving heavy fire from left and right 

and still obliged to attack Chinese positions bordering the road, was able to 

move south at a steady pace. By the 

time the force reached the position 

taken by the ROK battalion a half mile 

above Hoengsong, the South Koreans 

already had withdrawn to rejoin their 

division. But this premature departure 

seemed of no consequence. Before 

2200 the long column began to pass 

behind the Netherlands battalion positions along the upper edge of Hoengsong.43 

277 

Colonel Coughlin intended that the 

forces coming in from the north continue through Hoengsong, reorganize 

in an assembly area three miles south 

of town, then proceed to the new defense line at Wonju. Support Force 7 

was to do likewise as it came in from 

the northeast. Coughlin’s own headquarters and remaining troops, except 

for the Netherlands battalion and part 

of the regimental tank company, were 

already on the way out of Hoengsong. 

The Netherlands battalion was to continue covering the passage of the withdrawing forces, then act as rear guard 

en route to Wonju. The regimental 

tankers were assembled just below 

town, prepared to attack any roadblock 

the Chinese might establish between 

Hoengsong and Wonju.44 

Coughlin’s plan was interrupted not 

long after the leading units coming 

down Route 29 entered Hoengsong, 

when Chinese forces attacked all along 

the line of the Netherlands battalion 

and soon afterward began to press hard 

from the flanks and rear on the withdrawing column still strung out on 

Route 29. Had the ROK battalion not 

withdrawn ahead of schedule, it now 

would have been of considerable help.45 

One of the first enemy jabs at the 

Dutch penetrated their line and 

reached the battalion command post. 

Lt. Col. M. P. A. den Ouden, the battalion commander, led headquarters 

troops in a successful attack to eliminate the penetration but was killed by a 

grenade. Members of Colonel den 

Ouden’s staff also were killed or 

wounded. Despite these grave losses at 

battalion headquarters, the Dutch line 

companies held at the edge of town 

44 Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-l; Hodges Ltr. 

45 Norum Ltr; Maixner Ltr. 

42 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; 49th FA 

Bn Unit Rpt no. 135, 13 Feb 51; Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, 

Exhibit C--l. 

43 Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-l; Norum Ltr; 

Hodges Ltr; Maixner Ltr. 
278 EBB AND FLOW 

with no further encounter. Support 

Force 7 casualties suffered above and 

below Hoengsong totaled 12 killed, 125 

wounded, and 53 missing. The major 

equipment losses were 35 vehicles, the 

155-mm. howitzer that slipped off the 

road, and an M-16 antiaircraft weapon 

that threw a track above Hoengsong.48 

Colonel Coughlin’s column coming 

toward Hoengsong on Route 29 was 

less fortunate. Behind those forces 

leading the column into Hoengsong, a 

mortar round struck a 21/2-ton truck 

towing a 105-mm. howitzer, and the two 

jackknifed across the road. The occupants of the truck were either killed or 

scattered, and an alert Chinese machine 

gunner opened sustained fire on the 

cab to prevent anyone from trying to 

reach and restart the vehicle. The one 

chance of pushing the wreckage off 

the road evaporated when Lieutenant 

Mace’s two tanks, the only ones not already in Hoengsong, merely moved 

around the obstruction through a bordering rice paddy and went into town. 

High paddy dikes made it impossible 

for the trucks, many of them pulling 

howitzers, to bypass the wreckage as the 

tanks had done. Enemy forces meanwhile began to squeeze the column 

from the flanks and rear.4g 

The troops caught behind the obstruction had no alternative except 

to abandon vehicles and guns and move 

south on foot. Many did not reach 

safety, among them Colonel Keith. 

Those able to escape, as they neared 

Hoengsong and discovered the Netherlands battalion engaged, drifted west 

to get away from the fire fight, bywhile Support Force 7 scurried toward 

town from the northeast and Coughlin’s 

other forces struggled to get in over 

Route 29.46 

Support Force 7 received small arms, 

machine gun, and mortar fire as Colonel White led it out of the Twinnanmul valley, and considerable confusion 

occurred inside Hoengsong as White’s 

column merged with the vehicles Colonel Baker was moving through town. 

But Baker pushed part of his infantry 

back toward White to help keep enemy 

forces away from White’s flanks, and 

artillerymen at White’s rear managed 

to ward off enemy troops attempting 

to roll up the column. These efforts 

and excellent covering fire from the 

Dutch kept losses low and allowed Support Force 7 to pass behind the Netherlands battalion by 2330.47 

Baker’s battalion helped cover 

Hoengsong for another hour while 

Colonel White started the artillery units 

down Route 29 toward Wonju. Baker’s 

troops then mounted their own trucks 

to bring up the support force rear. 

Part of the artillery reached Wonju 

without further trouble, but as this segment passed a point about a mile and a 

half below Hoengsong, Chinese forces 

crowded in on the road from the west 

and opened fire. Some twenty vehicles 

ran the gauntlet before the fire grew 

too heavy to risk. Colonel Baker, bringing up infantry and some of Coughlin’s 

tanks from the rear, attacked and destroyed the enemy position, allowing 

the support force to move on to Wonju 

46 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Norum 

Ltr; Ltr, Gen M. B. Ridgway to Mrs. M. P. A. den 

Ouden, 20 Mar 51, copy in CMH. 

47 Ltr, Lt Col Barney D. White, CO 49th FA Bn and 

SF 7, to CG 2d Div, 17 Feb 51, sub: Evacuation of 49th 

Field Artillery Battalion From Osan-ni, Korea; 49th 

FA Bn Unit Rpt no. 135, 13 Feb 51. 

48 49th FA Bn Unit Rpt no. 135, 13 Feb 51; Interv, 

Eighth Army IG with White. 

49 Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibits C-7, C-10, C-11, and 

C-12; Maixner Ltr; Keleher Ltr. 
THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG 279 

passed Hoengsong, then returned to 

Route 29 below town. After reorganizing behind the cover of the Netherlands 

battalion, they moved on to Wonju. 

The Dutch broke contact and followed 

just before 0100. Chinese flooded 

Hoengsong after the Dutch withdrawal 

but made no motion to pursue, and 

since Colonel Baker already had eliminated the only enemy position south 

of town, Coughlin’s forces reached 

Wonju with no further contest.50 

The Costs 

Given the conditions of the enemy 

attack and the corps withdrawal, a 

breakdown of X Corps casualties into 

categories of killed, wounded, and missing was not possible for some units, especially the ROK 8th Division, and 

hardly certifiable for any. Total casualties suffered between nightfall on 11 

February and daylight on the 13th were 

around 11,800-9,800 South Koreans, 

1,900 Americans, and 100 Dutch.51 

(Table 4) 

The equipment toll was correspondingly heavy. Major items lost by the 

ROK 3d, 5th, and 8th Divisions, mostly 

by the last, included 14 105-mm. howitzers, 901 other crew-served weapons, 

390 radios, and 88 vehicles. American 

units and the Netherlands battalion lost 

14 105-mm. howitzers, 6 155-mm. how50 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; 2d Div 

G3 Jnl, Entries 7 and 17, 13 Feb 51; Norum Ltr; 

Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibits C-7, C-10, and C-11. 

51 Figures compiled from X Corps Rpt, The Battle 

of Hoengsong; Ltr, Eighth Army IG to CG Eighth 

Army, 12 Mar 51, sub: Report of Investigation Concerning the Loss of Equipment by X Corps; Lt Col 

Eugene Wolfe, Asst IG Eighth Army, Tabulation of 

Personnel Losses Suffered-by X Corps Units, 11-13 

February 1951; Memo, X Corps G1 to CG X Corps, 

13 Feb 51, sub: Casualties, 11-13 February 1951; Rad, 

X 17780, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 13 Feb 51. 

TABLE 4-LOSSES BY MAJOR UNIT 

11-13 FEBRUARY 1951 

Unit 

ROK 

3d Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5th Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8th Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Total ROK casualties . . . . . . . . 

U.S. and U.N. 

2d Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

(includes 38th Infantry, 

artillery with Support Force 21 

tanks with Support Team B, 

Netherlands battalion, and 

Support Team A) 

7th Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

(Support Force 7) 

187th Airborne Regimental Combat 

Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

(includes Support Team E, 674th 

Field Artillery Battalion, and 96th 

Field Artillery Battalion) 

Total U.S. and U.N. casualties . . . 

Total casualties . . . . . . . . . . 

Total 

1,238 

1,141 

7,465 

9,844 

1,769 

190 

59 

2,018 

11,862 

itzers, 277 other crew-served weapons, 

6 tanks, 195 radios, and 280 vehicles.52 

General Ridgway initially considered 

these high equipment losses evidence 

of weak leadership. “While there is 

nothing sacrosanct about a piece of 

artillery, compared to the loss of the 

lives of men,” he wrote General Almond on the 13th, “I don’t expect to 

hear again of such loss as reported to 

me this morning of five 155 Hows of 

Battery A, 503rd. It is prima facie indication of faulty leadership of serious 

import in some echelon.”53 On the following day he instructed his inspector 

52 Lt Col Eugene Wolfe, Asst IG Eighth Army, Tabulation of Major Items of Equipment Lost by X Corps 

Units, 11-13 February 1951. 

53 Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen Almond, 13 Feb 51, 

copy in CMH. 
280 EBB AND FLOW 

general to investigate all “the circumstances attending the loss by X Corps 

of artillery pieces and other major items 

of equipment on or about 12 February 

1951.”54 

Almond was equally disturbed by the 

faulty leadership, and all the facts on 

this are not evident yet.”56 

heavy loss of equipment, especially the 

loss of fourteen howitzers by the 15th 

Field Artillery Battalion and five by the 

503d, and by what he considered excessive personnel casualties among all 2d 

Division units that had supported the 

ROK 8th Division. Late on the 13th he 

directed General Ruffner to investigate 

and report the underlying reasons. 

He was particularly critical of Support 

Force 2l’s halt at the road junction position of the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, 

believing that losses would have been 

fewer had the support force continued 

directly to Hoengsong. He took this 

preliminary view from an impression 

that Support Force 7, on the other 

hand, had withdrawn immediately after being ordered back and that this 

prompt move accounted for its lighter 

losses. Pending receipt of Ruffner’s 

report, Almond presumed that “aggressive leadership on the part of commanders concerned was lacking.”55 

Recalling Ridgway’s earlier concern 

for ROUNDUP control arrangements, 

Almond assured him that “the operation, as conceived and coordinated, 

included the protection of the U.S. 

artillery units involved and was, in my 

opinion, all that could be desired. It 

worked out as planned except for 2 

battalions of infantry and 1 of artillery 

which became enmeshed in the onslaught of Chinese who poured through 

the ROK formations. There has never 

been any loss of control of the major 

units.”57 

The 2d Division report, rendered 

If in softer terms, he repeated much 

the same view on the 14th when he replied to General Ridgway’s note of 

admonition. Without being specific, but 

obviously referring to Support Force 

21, he told Ridgway that “in only one 

instance, now under investigation, have 

I found loss of U.S. equipment due to 

five days later, absolved Support Force 

21 of any command deficiency. General Stewart, the assistant division 

commander who conducted the inquiry 

for General Ruffner, concluded that 

there had been only “strong, courageous, and aggressive” leadership at 

all levels. Support force commander 

Colonel Keith had withdrawn from 

Ch’angbong-ni as soon as cleared to do 

so, had not yet received orders to proceed to Hoengsong when he stopped 

and joined the 3d Battalion of the 

38th Infantry, and had made every effort to reach Hoengsong as soon as 

such orders reached him. The cause 

of the losses in equipment and personnel among 2d Division units, General 

Stewart testified, was the sudden and 

complete defeat of the ROK 8th Division with little or no warning to the 2d 

Division forces. He recommended that 

there be no similar intermingling of 

54 Memo, Office of the CG Eighth Army for The 

Inspector General, Headquarters, Eighth Army, 14 

Feb 51. 

55 Rad, X 17778, CG X Corps to CG 2d Div, 132321 

Feb 51. 

56 Ltr, Gen Almond to Gen Ridgway, 14 Feb 51, 

copy in CMH. 

57 Ibid 
THE BATTLE FOR HOENGSONG 281 

efforts and to break . . . the roadblocks 

that delayed the withdrawal of the 

friendly units located north.” Hence, 

the heavy toll was a result of enemy 

action and not attributable to the 

“fault, neglect, incompetence, acts or 

omissions of the U.S. Commanding 

Officers concerned.”59 

Ridgway accepted this explanation 

but did not withdraw a warning he had 

issued on the 14th. The “loss or abandonment to enemy of arms and equipment in usable condition,” he notified 

all corps commanders and the KMAG 

chief, General Farrell, “is a grave offense against every member of this 

command. I shall hereafter deal severely with commanders found responsible and shall expect you to do 

likewise.”60 

U.S. and South Korean units in the 

future.58 

The Army investigation confirmed 

Stewart’s findings. All losses, in both 

men and materiel, stemmed from “the 

surprise and overwhelming attack of at 

least four CCF Divisions and two NK 

Divisions . . . against numerically inferior and widely spread forces of the 

8th and 3d ROK Divisions.” In chain 

reaction, the rapid disintegration of the 

ROK 8th Division “exposed the left 

flank of the [X Corps] salient and permitted the enemy forces in strength to 

advance rapidly to positions in the rear 

and along the MSR, thus blocking the 

only route of withdrawal for the tanks, 

artillery and motor elements caught 

north and west of Hoengsong.” In this 

unexpected situation, “there [were] 

insufficient US or other UN forces 

available to the X Corps Commander 

or the 2d U.S. Infantry Division Commander to form a task force of sufficient strength to defeat the enemy’s 

58 Stewart Ltr. 

59 Ltr, Eighth Army IG to CG Eighth Army, 12 Mar 

51, sub: Report of Investigation Concerning the Loss 

of Equipment by X Corps. 

60 Check Slip, Eighth Army Chief of Staff to IG, 22 

Mar 51, sub: Investigation Concerning the Loss of 

Equipment by X Corps; Rad, GX TAC 7 KCG, CG 

Eighth Army to CG I Corps, IX Corps, X Corps, and 

KMAG, 14 Feb 51. 
CHAPTER XV 

Defending the Wonju Line 

The X Corps Position, 13 February 

The Chinese entering Hoengsong 

made no immediate effort to follow the 

2d Division down Route 29. General 

Almond nevertheless expected the next 

hard blow to come at the X Corps center and on 13 February ordered General Ruffner to organize strong positions before Wonju. Given the 18th 

Regiment of the ROK 3d Division as 

well as the 187th Airborne Regimental 

Combat Team by Almond, Ruffner set 

the airborne unit astride Route 29 two 

miles above Wonju and put the ROK 

regiment on its east. Standing to the 

west of the 187th were the 38th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry. 

Thus, the 2d Division’s defense of 

Wonju proper ranged from three miles 

east to eight miles west of town. The 

remainder of the 9th Infantry, in division reserve, manned two blocking positions southwest of Wonju along the 

road to Yoju.1 

To the east, the units of the 7th Division on whom Almond counted to 

deepen the defense in the right half of 

the corps sector also were well established. The 31st Infantry held positions below P’yongch’ang at the corps 

1 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum and Situation Overlay, 

13 Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps 

OI 105, 13 Feb 51. 

east boundary, and the bulk of the 32d 

Infantry was concentrated in Chech’on. 

The remnants of the ROK 8th Division, 

of possible help, remained at Chup’o-ri, 

west of Chech’on. Available for employment either at corps center or in the 

east, the bulk of the 17th Infantry of 

General Ferenbaugh’s division was assembled in Wonju.2 

Almond modified the defense assignments of the ROK 3d and 5th Divisions 

in the east sector early on the 13th after learning that North Korean forces 

were following the South Koreans as 

they withdrew from the Hoengsong 

area and that both divisions needed reorganizing after their punishment 

above Hoengsong. Instead of manning 

a forward line at the X Corps right as 

Almond had ordered on the 12th, the 

two divisions were to occupy positions 

farther south on line with and between 

the 2d Division at Wonju and the 31st 

Infantry of the 7th Division near 

P’yongch’ang. A regiment of the ROK 

5th Division was to occupy Malta-ri, five 

miles above P’yongch’ang, to tie the new 

X Corps line to the bulging front of the 

ROK III Corps. (Almond instructed the 

ROK III Corps also to place a regiment 

near Malta-ri to strengthen the connection.) The two ROK divisions were still 

2 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum and Situation Overlay, 

13 Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 
DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE 

moving toward these new positions at 

nightfall on the 13th.3 

While arranging the deeper withdrawal of the South Koreans, Almond 

decided also that the 23d Regimental 

Combat Team should withdraw from 

its advanced position at Chip’yong-ni 

on the corps west flank to the Yoju area 

fifteen miles south. He could move 

Colonel Freeman’s force that far back 

and still meet his continuing Operation THUNDERBOLT responsibilities of 

maintaining contact with the IX Corps 

at Yoju, preventing enemy movements 

south of the Yoju-Wonju line, and 

making 

north. 

diversionary efforts to the 

Almond’s decision to pull the 23d 

Regimental Combat Team back to the 

Yoju stemmed from General Ruffner’s 

insufficient strength to man all of the 

2d Division’s twenty-mile front between 

Wonju and Chip’yong-ni. There was, 

as a result, a twelve-mile gap between 

the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry, 

the westernmost unit defending Wonju, 

and the 23d. This gap left Freeman’s 

force isolated and in danger of encirclement. The 2d Division reconnaissance 

company, sent out earlier to patrol 

Route 24, the combat team’s main supply route, was some six miles south of 

Chip’yong-ni blocking a pass two miles 

out on a lateral road branching eastward from Route 24 at the village of 

Chuam-ni. But although the company 

thus stood at the midpoint of the gap, 

it could scarcely be counted on to prevent a strong enemy force from mov3 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 13 Feb 51; X Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps OI 105, 13 Feb 51; 

Rad, X 17751, CG X Corps to Chief KMAG, 122201 

Feb 51. 

4 X Corps Rpt, Battle of Chip’yong-ni; Rad, GX-2- 

2270 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 28 Jan 

51 (confirms oral instructions of 23 January). 

283 

ing behind and trapping the combat 

team.5 

Indications that the Chinese would 

exploit the gap already had appeared, 

the first on 12 February when the 1st 

Battalion of the 9th Infantry, then holding Hill 444 four miles east of 

Chip’yong-ni, received an attack by two 

Chinese battalions and withdrew to its 

present position northwest of Wonju. 

Air observers noted other Chinese 

movements toward the gap during the 

morning of the 13th, some toward the 

2d Division reconnaissance company 

east of Chuam-ni. At General Ruffner’s 

direction, Company L of the 9th Infantry reinforced the reconnaissance company around noon, arriving just ahead 

of an attack from the northeast. When 

the Chinese pulled away late in the afternoon and moved north in an apparent attempt to encircle the blocking 

force, Ruffner ordered the two companies west into a new blocking position 

on Route 24 at Chuam-ni.6 

The Chinese, now at least within two 

miles of Route 24, probably would cut 

the 23d Regimental Combat Team’s 

main supply route. An alternative arterial road, Route 24A, lay nearer the 

Han, its lower segment resting in the 

IX Corps sector. But on the 12th Chinese had skirted the Chip’yong-ni position on the west and driven off a 24th 

Division outpost on the alternate route 

5 X Corps Rpt, Battle of Chip’yong-ni; 2d Div POR 

519, 13 Feb 51; Testimony Before Eighth Army IG 

by 1st Lt Vincent W. Lang, 2d Div Rcn Co (hereafter 

cited as Lang Testimony), 4 Mar 51. 

6 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Feb 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Briefing for CG, 1 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 

Entry 2030, 13 Feb 51; Ltr, Eighth Army IG to CG 

Eighth Army, 13 Mar 51, sub: Investigation of 2d 

Infantry Division Incident at Chuam-ni, Korea, with 

12 Exhibits; Rad, X 17780, CG X Corps to CG Eighth 

Army, 12 Feb 51. 
284 

at Koksu-ri, four miles south of 

Chip’yong-ni. Route 24A was now likely 

blocked.7

General Almond’s decision to withdraw the 23d Regimental Combat 

Team, however, was about to be reversed. At noon on the 13th General 

MacArthur landed at Suwon airfield for 

his second visit to Korea since General 

Ridgway had assumed command of the 

Eighth Army. Ridgway took the opportunity to check once more with him the 

fundamental basis of his operations, 

namely that the acquisition of terrain 

meant nothing except as it facilitated 

the destruction of enemy forces and the 

conservation of his own. MacArthur 

agreed-but added that Ridgway should 

hold strongly to the line of the Han 

River.8 

Holding at the Han was part of 

MacArthur’s latest report to Washington, submitted on 11 February, evaluating what could be achieved in Korea 

based on the policy of confining the 

fighting to Korea and on the general 

belief-with which he now agreed-that 

UNC forces could withstand all enemy 

attempts to drive them off the peninsula. “It can be accepted as a basic fact,” 

he reported, “that, unless authority is 

given to strike enemy bases in Manchuria, our ground forces as presently 

constituted cannot with safety attempt 

major operations in North Korea.” His 

long range plan, therefore, was to continue a ground advance until his forces 

developed the enemy’s main line of resistance or determined that no such line 

EBB AND FLOW 

7 X Corps Rpt, Battle of Chip’yong-ni; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Entry 2200, 12 Feb 51, and Entry 0245, 13 

Feb 51; 2d Div POR 519, 13 Feb 51. 

8 Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, 

Incl 13; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and 

Policies, pp. 401-02. 

existed south of the 38th parallel. 

Should the latter prove the case, he 

would request instructions from Washington.9

While he now believed that the Chinese could not achieve a decisive victory, he judged that as long as “Manchuria is immune to our attack,” they 

had enough offensive power to force 

UNC withdrawals. Consequently, his 

immediate plan was to hold the line of 

the Han up to the point of a major and 

decisive engagement. “It is impossible 

to predict where, once we withdraw 

from this line, the situation will again 

stabilize,” he reported, “but stabilization will be certain. The capability of 

the enemy is inversely and geometrically proportionate to his distance from 

the Yalu.“10 

Ridgway assured MacArthur that. he 

fully intended to keep the I and IX 

Corps at the Han. Working against 

Ridgway’s intention was an increased 

likelihood that the Chinese now in and 

west of Hoengsong would attempt to 

enter the Han valley and envelop his 

western forces. A 23d Regimental 

Combat Team withdrawal from 

Chip’yong-ni would remove a principle

strongpoint blocking Chinese access to 

the valley. Ridgway therefore wanted 

Chip’yong-ni held, and so instructed 

General Almond. Next, in countermove against a possible Chinese sweep 

through the gap between Chip’yong-ni 

and Wonju, Ridgway reached for two 

IX Corps units not engaged at the 

enemy bridgehead below the Han. He 

ordered General Moore to move the 

ROK 6th Division and the British 27th 

Brigade to Yoju, where they were to 

9 Rad, G-55315, CINCFE Personal for Gen Taylor, 

G3, DA, 11 Feb 51. 

10 Ibid. 
DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE 

pass to X Corps control and be deployed in the gap.” 

Chip’yong-ni in the meantime was 

likely to become an isolated post under 

siege. Route 24A appeared to be 

blocked at Koksu-ri and Route 24 about 

to be cut at Chuam-ni, and 23d Regimental Combat Team patrols ranging 

up to three miles beyond Chip’yong-ni 

through the day reported enemy forces 

approaching from the north, east, and 

west. Should Colonel Freeman’s force 

be cut off, Ridgway directed, Almond 

was to attack north to relieve it.12 

285 

503d Field Artillery Battalion; Battery 

B, 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic 

Weapons Battalion; and Company B, 

2d Engineer Combat Battalion. He developed a perimeter based on the 

Pongmi mass and Mangmi foothills and 

otherwise tracing lower hills inside the 

dominating heights. So locating his 

main position facilitated the organization of defensive fires, construction of 

obstacles, and resupply. Furthermore, 

Chinese occupying the distant higher 

ground around the position would not 

be able to deliver effective small arms 

fire on the perimeter but would themselves be vulnerable to the combat 

team’s supporting fires.13 

Freeman deployed the bulk of the 

1st Battalion on the northern arc of the 

perimeter, the 3d on the east, the 2d 

on the south, and the French battalion 

on the west. Company B and the 

Ranger company were in reserve close 

behind the 1st Battalion line. Gaps in 

the perimeter were mined, blocked by 

barbed wire, or covered by fire. Twin 

40s, quad 50s and regimental tanks 

were in position to add their direct fire 

to the defense, prearranged artillery 

and mortar concentrations ringed the 

perimeter to the maximum range of 

the weapons, and a tactical air control 

party was present to direct air strikes. 

All day on the 13th Freeman kept 

enemy formations approaching his position under artillery fire and air attacks. Against the probability that the 

The West Shoulder, 13-14 February 

Chip’yong-ni straddles a stream in 

the lower end of a small valley hugged 

on the northeast by a low mountain 

mass, Pongmi-san, and by the foothills 

of Mangmi-san, a higher ridge to the 

south. (Map 23) From a mile out, the 

peak of Mangmi-san, Hill 397, dominates Chip’yong-ni from the south. 

Elsewhere, from one to two miles out, 

Hill 248 dominates from the southwest, 

345 from the northwest, 348 from the 

north, 506 from the northeast, and 319 

from the southeast. Colonel Freeman 

considered the terrain well suited for 

defense by a force the size of the 23d 

Regimental Combat Team, which was 

made up of the 23d Infantry; French 

battalion; 1st Ranger Company; 37th 

Field Artillery Battalion; Battery B, 

11 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 402; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 13 Feb 51; 

Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 

14; Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, 2 Nov 51; Rad, 

GX-2-1414 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps 

and CG X Corps, 13 Feb 51; Ltr, Gen Almond to Gen 

Ridgway, 14 Feb 51. 

12 23d Inf AA Rpt, 29 Jan - 15 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2- 

1414 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps and 

CG X Corps, 13 Feb 51. 

13 The Chip’yong-ni account is based on the following sources: X Corps Rpt, Battle of Chip’yong-ni; 23d 

Inf AA Rpt, 29 Jan - 15 Feb 51; Interv, Appleman 

with Col Paul L. Freeman, 17 Apr 52; Gugelar, Combat 

Actions in Korea, pp. 108-17; Mono, Capt. Edward C. 

Williamson, “Chip’yong-ni: Defense of South Sector 

of 23d Regimental Combat Team Perimeter by Company G, 13-15 February 1951,” copy in CMH; Freeman, “Wonju Thru Chip’yong,” p. 24. 
MAP 23
DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE 287 

regimental tank company. Following a 

strong but failing effort against the 3d 

Battalion at 0630 and another against 

the French an hour later, the Chinese 

withdrew into the dominating heights 

around Chip’yong-ni. 

By daybreak on the 14th Colonel 

Freeman’s casualties numbered about 

a hundred. Freeman himself had suffered a leg wound from a mortar fragment. General Almond had X Corps 

G-3 Col. John H. Chiles flown into 

Chip’yong-ni during the morning to 

take command, but Freeman, though 

he required hospitalization, refused immediate evacuation and remained in 

command.14 

High winds and enemy mortar and 

artillery fire striking the perimeter intermittently through the day inhibited 

and finally stopped the helicopter evacuation of other casualties. The poor 

flying weather also delayed close air 

support. Three flights of fighters eventually arrived after 1430 and in combination with the combat team’s mortars 

and artillery kept Chinese troops digging in on the surrounding high 

ground under fire. Over a three-hour 

period starting around 1500, two dozen 

C-119s of the Far East Air Forces’ Combat Cargo Command flying out of Japan dropped the supplies requested by 

Freeman the day before. The Chinese 

meanwhile opened no daylight assaults, 

but captives taken the previous night 

claimed the attack would be renewed 

after dark. Four regiments appeared 

to have sent assault forces against the 

perimeter during the initial attack. 

Since these regiments represented four 

Chinese would attack after dark and 

the possibility that they would penetrate 

his position, he meanwhile marked out 

a second ring of defenses inside his perimeter to be manned at nightfall by 

Company B of the 2d Engineers and 

by battalion and regimental headquarters troops. Since his main supply route 

appeared about to be cut, he requested 

that a resupply of food, ammunition, 

and signal and medical items be airdropped on the 14th. 

Distance signal flares went up around 

Chip’yong-ni late in the afternoon and 

in the evening. After dark, men of the 

1st Battalion on. the north sighted a line 

of torches about two miles out and 

watched the bearers maintain their line 

despite artillery and mortar fire as they 

brought the torches south within a half 

mile of the perimeter. Just after 2200 

machine gun and mortar fire struck 

Company C astride Route 24 in the valley and on the western nose of Pongmisan. Enemy artillery fire joined the 

bombardment, striking Freeman’s 

heavy mortars, artillery, and regimental command post as well as the outer 

perimeter. A cacophony of whistle, 

horn, and bugle blasts preceded an attack on Company C about 2330. The 

discordant signals later sounded all 

around the perimeter and were followed by attacks on Company G in the 

south, at two points in the French sector on the west, and near the center of 

the 3d Battalion position on the east. 

Freeman’s tight perimeter prevented 

the Chinese from fixing a position and 

flowing around its flanks. Pushing frontal assaults against the wire and through 

heavy defensive fires, they managed 

one penetration in the Company G sector but were blunted by reinforcements 

from Company F and help from the 

14 Colonel Chiles served under General Almond as 

secretary of the General Staff at General Headquarters, Far East Command, and became Almond’s 

G-3 when the X Corps was activated. 
288 EBB AND FLOW 

different divisions, the 115th, 119th, 

120th, and 126th, and, in turn, three different armies, the 39th, 40th, and 42d, 

the renewal predicted by the prisoners 

might be considerably stronger than the 

first attack. 

At Chuam-ni, a regiment of the 116th 

Division, 39th Army, opened an attack 

around 0500 on the 14th against the 

2d Division reconnaissance company 

and Company L, 9th Infantry. After 

about half its troops the day before had 

attacked the two companies at their 

blocking position two miles farther east, 

this regiment apparently swung its full 

strength around the Chuam-ni perimeter during the night.15 

ner position of the 1st Battalion, 9th 

Infantry, Chinese coming out of the 

Hoengsong area meanwhile hit the 38th 

Infantry. (Map 24) The assaults forced 

a short withdrawal by the attached 

Netherlands battalion on the 38th’s left 

and penetrated the 3d Battalion on the 

regimental right, but counterattacks restored the lost ground before noon.17 

At midmorning, after suffering considerable losses to small arms, machine 

gun, and mortar fire and to assaults 

from almost all directions, the two companies withdrew south over Route 24. 

Apparently anticipating such a move, 

the Chinese had set fire blocks along 

the road below Chuam-ni and had 

blown a bridge two miles below town. 

Running the gauntlet and getting 

around the destroyed crossing cost the 

two companies several vehicles as well 

as additional casualties that brought the 

total to 212, of whom at least 114 were 

dead.16 

Captives identified the force moving 

on Wonju to be in division strength and 

to comprise two regiments of the 120th 

Division and one of the 117th. The bulk 

of this force was sighted from the air 

moving in several columns across the 

Som River northwest of Wonju. Taken 

and kept under air and massed artillery attack, the Chinese at first ignored 

losses and continued toward Wonju. 

But as casualties mounted the Chinese 

faltered, and most turned southwest before reaching the Wonju defenses. By 

1500 the air strikes and artillery fire 

stopped the enemy movement altogether.18 

Along the northwestern portion of 

the Wonju defenses, just inside the corChinese losses at Chip’yong-ni, 

Chuam-ni and Wonju between midnight on the 13th and nightfall on the 

14th appeared heavy. Six hundred 

forty-eight bodies were counted; the 

estimate of additional casualties was 

thirty-two hundred killed and twentylive hundred wounded. But in view of 

nearby Chinese reserves, the XIII Army 

Group commander might continue an 

advance on the twenty-mile front 

between Chip’yong-ni and Wonju with 

no delay for regroupment and in even 

15 The Chuam-ni account is based on Williamson, 

“Chip’yong-ni”; Ltr, Eighth Army IG to CG Eighth 

Army, 13 Mar 51, sub: Investigation of 2d Infantry 

Division Incident at Chuam-ni, Korea; Rad, X 17826, 

CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Feb 51. 

16 The Chuam-ni episode led to a report by a Canadian Press correspondent that “68 soldiers were 

slaughtered in a village they had captured because 

they posted only a single sentry and then went to 

sleep.” The report drew a sharp question from Washington and prompted an investigation by the Eighth 

Army inspector general. The implied charge of negligence proved unfounded. 

17 Eighth Army PORs 650, 651, and 652, 14 Feb 51; 

Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 15 Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0415, 0730, and 0830, 14 Feb 

51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps PIR 

141, 14 Feb 51. 

18 Rad, X 17826, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 

16 Feb 51; X Corps PIR 141, 14 Feb 51. 
C\l
290 

greater strength. Considering the 

Chinese failure at Chip’yong-ni and 

Wonju and numerous air sightings of 

Chinese troops between the two X 

Corps strongpoints, the enemy commander might also center his principal 

thrust and aim it at the junction of the 

Han and Som rivers seven miles below 

Yoju.19 

Ameliorating the X Corps’ stance-or 

lack of one-between Chip’yong-ni and 

Wonju, the British 27th Brigade and 

ROK 6th Division were now en route 

to positions in the gap. The British unit 

crossed the Han over a ponton bridge 

near Yoju around 0600 on the 14th and 

passed from IX Corps to X Corps control. General Almond attached the brigade to the 2d Division, and General 

Ruffner ordered it to occupy the upper segment of the gap adjacent to 

Chip’yong-ni. Behind the British, the 

ROK 6th Division crossed the Han and 

passed to X Corps and 2d Division control at 1100. Ruffner directed it into 

the lower section of the gap west of the 

1st Battalion, 9th Infantry. Traveling 

separate trails northeast into the mountains, the two leading regiments of the 

division at dark took up blocking positions some three to four miles short of 

their assigned fronts. The South Koreans thus were near at hand to oppose 

any Chinese push toward the confluence of the Han and Som rivers.20 

As a result of a midmorning conference between General Ridgway and 

General Almond at the main X Corps 

headquarters in Ch’ungju, the British 

brigade received an intermediate mission as it moved north on Route 24 toEBB AND FLOW 

ward its assigned sector. In discussing 

steps to be taken in handling the Chinese offensive, now in its third day, 

Ridgway emphasized that the Chinese 

pushing through the western and central portions of the X Corps sectors represented the bulk of the Chinese opposing the Eighth Army. He wanted these 

as well as the North Koreans farther 

east confined to Almond’s sector by 

holding the shoulders of the penetration. Army orders were, then being 

prepared terminating Operation 

ROUNDUP and taking the ROK III 

Corps from X Corps control. Ridgway 

himself would give the ROK III Corps 

instructions for holding its portion of 

the east shoulder. Almond was to hold 

fast elsewhere, subject to the standing, 

overriding requirement that units be 

maintained intact.21 

As Ridgway and Almond met, Chinese forces stood across Route 24 in 

and below Chuam-ni and the 2d Division reconnaissance company and Company L of the 9th Infantry were fighting their way south. It was also clear by 

then that the Chinese, as suspected, had 

cut Route 24A; a 24th Division patrol 

reinvestigating Koksu-ri ran into Chinese. With both roads to Chip’yong-ni 

interdicted, the 23d Regimental Combat Team was isolated. Ridgway instructed Almond to give priority to 

opening Route 24 since holding the 

western shoulder required an anchor 

at Chip’yong-ni.22 

19 X Corps PIR 141, 14 Feb 51. 

20 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum and Entries 0300, 0430, 

and 1315, 14 Feb 51; Eighth Army POR 652, 14 Feb 

51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

21 Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, 

Incl 14; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 14 Feb 51; Rad, 

GX-2-1513 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 

14 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1469 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 14 Feb 51. 

22 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 14 Feb 51; Eighth 

Army POR 652, 14 Feb 51; Eighth Army SS Rpt, 

Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 14. 
DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE 

The British 27th Brigade consequently received orders to open the 23d 

Regimental Combat Team’s main supply route before moving into position 

in the gap. Continuing north, the British met the 2d Division reconnaissance 

company and Company L, 9th Infantry, about five miles south of 

Chuam-ni. North of that point, the brigade could push only slowly through 

Chinese rimming the road; the 27th 

stopped for the night over a mile short 

of Chuam-ni and some seven miles 

short of Chip’yong-ni.23 

After meeting with Almond, Ridgway 

briefed the IX Corps commander on 

the concept of holding the shoulders 

of the enemy penetration in the X 

Corps sector and opening Route 24 to 

Chip’yong-ni. Two days earlier General 

Moore had assembled the 5th Cavalry 

at Changhowon-ni, the site of IX Corps 

headquarters twelve miles below Yoju, 

in case it became necessary to counterattack enemy forces east of the Han. In 

light of the priority Ridgway had given 

to opening the 23d Regimental Combat Team’s supply road, Moore developed a plan for using the 5th Cavalry 

to clear Route 24A into Chip’yong-ni. 

Moore’s plan called for the 5th Cavalry, 

two companies of tanks, two artillery 

battalions, and a platoon of engineers 

to clear 24A and to set up at Koksu-ri 

a base of operations from which to 

keep the road open.24 

Late in the afternoon, after learning 

that the British 27th Brigade was advancing very slowly up Route 24, Moore 

ordered Col. Marcel G. Crombez, com291 

mander of the 5th Cavalry, to move 

the attack force immediately. Moore 

meanwhile coordinated the movement 

of ambulances and loaded supply 

trucks, most of them from the 2d Division, so they could follow Colonel 

Crombez’ column into Chip’yong-ni. 

Crombez got his units across the Han 

and onto Route 24A before midnight 

but was forced to halt at Hup’o-ri, more 

than eight miles below Chip’yong-ni, 

while his troops built a bypass around a 

demolished bridge. This development 

destined the 23d Regimental Combat 

Team to remain isolated at least 

through the remainder of the night.25 

23 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 14 Feb 51; Eighth 

Army POR 652, 14 Feb 51. 

24 Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, 

Incl 14; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps 

POR 427, 14 Feb 51; Mono, 1st Lt. Martin Blumenson, 

“Task Force Crombez,” copy in CMH. 

The East Shoulder, 14-18 February 

Amid the attempts to fill and hold 

the Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line on the 

west, stabilizing the east shoulder in 

both the X Corps and ROK III Corps 

sectors was proving another problem. 

The ROK 3d and 5th Divisions, ordered by General Almond on the 13th 

to withdraw into positions between 

Wonju and P’yongch’ang, continued to 

withdraw on the 14th somewhat below 

that line. North Korean V Corps forces 

caught up with both divisions during 

the afternoon of the 14th and briefly 

engaged each. The ROK 3d, missing 

its 18th Regiment and otherwise hurt 

by casualties, nevertheless managed to 

put up fair defenses slightly southeast 

of Wonju and twelve miles above 

Chech’on. But the ROK 5th, next east, 

became even more disorganized as it 

withdrew and at dark on the 14th was 

still assembling around Chuch’on-ni, 

ten miles above Chech’on. Its artillery 

was intact, but it had lost half its other 

25 Blumenson, “Task Force Crombez.” 
292 

crew-served weapons and could muster only the equivalent of four infantry 

battalions. This left the division scarcely 

fit to establish defenses before 

Chech’on, let alone send a regiment 

northeast to Malta-ri, as Almond had 

directed, to help tie the X Corps line to 

the extended position of the ROK III 

Corps.26 

Left with a twenty-mile west flank 

neither tied to the X Corps nor solidly 

manned, and feeling some pressure on 

this flank from North Korean II Corps 

forces, especially at Malta-ri, General 

Yu ordered the ROK 7th and 9th Divisions at the left and center of the ROK 

III Corps sector to withdraw near noon 

on the 14th. The ROK 7th moved toward positions adjacent to General 

Ferenbaugh’s 31st Infantry below 

P’yongch’ang, the ROK 9th toward positions at the ROK 7th’s right.27 

General Ridgway earlier had recognized that the enemy attacks in the X 

Corps sector and the X Corps withdrawals might compel some adjustment 

of the ROK III Corps position. Preempting to a degree the authority he 

had given General Almond to coordinate ROK III Corps movements during Operation ROUNDUP, Ridgway on 

the 12th permitted General Yu to halt 

the ROK III Corps advance pending 

the outcome of the attack against 

Almond’s forces. On the 13th, after the 

X Corps had pulled back some fifteen 

miles, he authorized Yu to withdraw 

his three divisions into defenses along 

EBB AND FLOW 

a general southwest-northeast line between P’yongch’ang and Kangnung on 

the coast. But he intended that Yu withdraw only as a result of enemy pressure and then only in a well-fought delaying action, whereas Yu’s order on 

the 14th appeared to be an unnecessary surrender of east shoulder territory.28 

To prevent future ROK withdrawals 

that did not punish and delay enemy 

forces, Ridgway directed the KMAG 

chief, General Farrell, to make a habit 

of posting himself with major ROK 

units when they were withdrawing and 

to insure personally that they stayed in 

contact. In response to the latest ROK 

III Corps move, he flashed a reminder 

to Yu on the 15th that any general withdrawal not forced by enemy pressure 

violated standing instructions. Yu received the admonition in time to hold 

the bulk of the ROK 9th Division generally in its original position. But the 

ROK 7th Division and 30th Regiment 

of the ROK 9th had completed their 

withdrawals, the regiments of the ROK 

7th standing along Route 60 from a 

point six miles above Yongwol north to 

P’yongch’ang, the 30th Regiment extending the line to the northeast. Since 

North Korean II Corps forces from the 

9th and 27th Divisions were then approaching P’yongch’ang from the 

northwest, Yu attached the 30th Regiment to the ROK 7th Division and left 

the force where it was.29 

26 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1947 and 2045, 14 

Feb 51; ibid., Sum, 14 and 15 Feb 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Briefing for CG, 16 Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Feb 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean 

Army, 31 Jul 52. 

27 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1430, 1432, 1931, 

and 2045, 14 Feb 51; ibid., Sum, 14 Feb 51; Eighth 

Army POR 652, 14 Feb 51; Hq, FEC, History of the 

North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. 

28 Rad, GX-2-1311 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA, 12 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 13 and 

14 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1551 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

to C/S ROKA, 15 Feb 51. 

29 Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, 

Incl 14; Rad, GX-2-1551 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

C/S ROKA, 15 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 15 

Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 16 Feb 51; 

Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 

52. 
DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE 

The ostensible aim of the North Koreans moving on P’yongch’ang was to 

drive Yu’s forces out of the town and 

back from Route 60, thereby opening 

the road for a strike south against 

Yongwol. From late afternoon on 15 

February through early morning on 

the 18th, the 9th and 27th Divisions 

launched repeated company and battalion assaults, seized P’yongch’ang itself, 

and, in their best effort, drove down 

Route 60 within eight miles of Yongwol. 

On the 16th, after it was clear that Yu 

would not be able to return the ROK 

7th Division and 30th Regiment to their 

former positions to the north, General 

Ridgway allowed him to pull the remaining ROK III Corps units to the 

P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line and gave 

him specific instructions to stand fast 

in the P’yongch’ang area and hold the 

North Koreans out of Yongwol. Yu 

consequently placed a second regiment 

in the P’yongch’ang area as he brought 

the rest of his forces south. The North 

Korean units, still worn from previous 

operations, could not sustain their drive 

against the strong South Korean position, lost most of their gains to ROK 

counterattacks, and finally withdrew. 

By evening of the 18th Yu’s line units 

were reporting no contact.30 

In the adjacent X Corps sector North 

Korean V Corps forces pushed toward 

Chech’on on 15 February, hitting hard 

at the 22d Regiment in the right half of 

the ROK 3d Division’s sector. The regiment gave way some on the east but 

with fire support from 7th Division artillery near Chech’on otherwise stood 

293 

its ground. With no serious results, a 

few North Koreans reached Chuch’onni to the southeast and briefly fired on 

the ROK 5th Division, which was still 

assembling straggling forces and feebly attempting to establish defenses centered on the town.31 

Under the arrangements made on 12 

February by General Almond and General Ridgway, the ROK I Corps headquarters took control of the ROK 3d, 

5th, and 8th Divisions at 1400 on the 

15th. Almond directed General Kim, 

the ROK I Corps commander, to defend the Wonju-P’yongch’ang line, a 

large order given the debilitated condition of the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions 

and the presence of North Korean 

forces below that line. Because of the 

current threat to Chech’on, Kim’s initial act was to form a provisional battalion from remnants of the ROK 8th Division as corps reserve, which he 

assembled north of Chup’o-ri behind a 

two-mile gap between the two forward 

divisions.32 

Additional V Corps forces from the 

6th, 7th, and 12th Divisions meanwhile 

massed in front of the ROK I Corps 

and early on the 16th opened strong 

assaults against both forward divisions. 

The ROK 3d Division, after the 22d 

Regiment on the right lost some 

ground, contained the attack in its 

sector; but the ROK 5th Division, 

having been able to organize only fragile positions at Chuch’on-ni, withdrew 

after North Koreans penetrated the 

36th Regiment on the division left. 

30 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 15-18 Feb 51; Rad, 

GX-2-1703 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA 

and CG X Corps, 16 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 19 Feb 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North 

Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. 

31 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1050, 1900, and 

2330, 15 Feb 51; ibid., Sum, 15 Feb 51; X Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

32 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 1720, 15 Feb 51; X 

Corps OI 112, 15 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Briefing 

for CG, 16 Feb 51. 
294 EBB AND FLOW 

KMAG advisors with the 5th Division 

and ROK I Corps headquarters notified General Almond that the division’s 

units were not being hit especially hard 

but were being outmaneuvered and in 

the process were disintegrating. Before 

the North Korean attack diminished in 

the evening, the division had fallen back 

five miles and, in the judgment of the 

KMAG advisors, was no longer to be 

counted as an effective force.33 

To ease the danger to Chech’on, only 

five miles behind the ROK 5th Division, 

Almond directed General Ferenbaugh’s 

U.S. 7th Division to move the 31st Infantry from the P’yongch’ang area, 

where the ROK 7th Division was holding its own, to a position behind the 

ROK 5th. While the enemy threat remained potentially serious, the 31st 

Regiment in its new position and the 

32d Infantry in and around Chech’on 

itself considerably increased Almond’s 

chances of holding the North Koreans 

out of the town and off the main X 

Corps supply route. Further improving the defense of Chech’on, the tailend battalion of the 17th Infantry, 

which had been moving up Route 29 to 

the regimental assembly at Wonju, 

halted along the road behind the ROK 

3d Division. In addition, General Kim 

shaped another provisional battalion 

from ROK 8th Division remnants and 

started it forward to assemble with the 

one he had formed the day before below the gap between the two forward 

divisions. That gap had opened to three 

miles when the ROK 5th withdrew.34 

33 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0230, 1000, 1710, 1905, and 

2340, 16 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 Feb 

51; Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 17 Feb 51. 

34 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1000 and 2340, 16 Feb 51; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 Feb 51. 

An even wider gap of about seven 

miles had opened between the right of 

the ROK 5th Division and the nearest 

ROK III Corps position to the northeast. Although General Yu’s left flank 

forces were handling the North Korean 

II Corps units attempting to push down 

Route 60 into Yongwol, the gap offered 

the North Koreans opposite the ROK 

5th Division an opportunity to sweep 

around Yu’s flank. Yu, his leftmost 

forces well occupied and anyway 

obliged by General Ridgway’s orders of 

the 16th to stand fast in the 

P’yongch’ang area, could do nothing 

about filling the gap; neither could any 

of the weak ROK divisions in the X 

Corps sector. Ridgway on 17 February 

consequently directed Almond to push 

American troops northeast to clear out 

the North Koreans and establish firm 

contact with the ROK III Corps.35 

As Ridgway acted to cover the gap 

between corps, it began to appear that 

the hard assaults on the ROK 3d and 

5th Divisions on the 16th had spent the 

North Korean V Corps. Infiltration and 

assaults harassed both South Korean divisions on the 17th and 18th but failed 

to yield any permanent gain, and on 

the 18th even the weak ROK 5th Division was able to make one short advance. As contact diminished on the 

18th, a battalion from the 31st Infantry patrolled five miles ahead of ROK 

lines before encountering a North Korean position. The North Koreans may 

have backed off only to reorganize for 

new attacks; but. in light of what had 

taken place in the meantime along the 

X Corps’ west shoulder, their move was 

35 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 17 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1767 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 17 Feb 51. 
DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE 

more likely part of a general withdrawal.36 

Chip'yong-ni and Task Force Crombez 

Though General Almond, expecting 

a strong Chinese strike south of the 

Hoengsong, had emphasized the defense of Wonju, enemy forces made no 

concerted effort to seize the town after 

failing to do so on the 14th. Local 

skirmishes occurred along the Wonju 

front on the 15th, but on the 16th contact lightened and faded out.37 

To the northwest, the ROK 6th Division and the British 27th Brigade 

also encountered diminishing resistance in the area between Wonju and 

Chip’yong-ni. On the 15th South Korean patrols went out from positions 

the division had reached the night before and reported only light contact. 

On the 16th the two leading regiments 

advanced with no contact within one to 

three miles of their assigned fronts. The 

British, while advancing in column up 

Route 24 toward Chip’yong-ni, were 

held up by an enemy battalion on the 

15th, then found resistance almost nonexistent the next day. Moving with intentional slowness nevertheless, the brigade had not reached Chuam-ni by 

dark on the 16th.38 

The XIII Army Group commander 

clearly had chosen not to push southwest in strength through the gap but 

to concentrate on eliminating the 

Chip’yong-ni position. His forces 

around the 23d Regimental Combat 

295 

Team reopened their attack with mortar fire after dark on the 14th. Near 

midnight both mortars and artillery began an hour-long barrage on the regimental command post and other installations inside the perimeter, and a hard 

assault off Hill 397 to the south struck 

Company G. Assaults next hit Companies A and C on the north, then Companies I and K on the east. Sharp, close 

fighting in the 1st and 3d Battalion sectors abated around 0400 with no more 

than the temporary loss of one position 

by Company I and ceased altogether 

about daylight. But in the south, where 

the Chinese had decided to make their 

main effort, persistant pressure slowly 

carried enemy troops through the Company G area.39 

Weak counterattacks by artillerymen 

from Battery B, 503d Field Artillery 

Battalion, whose 155-mm. howitzers 

were in position close behind Company 

G, and by a squad drawn from Company F on line to the east failed to restore the breaks in the Company G line. 

Around 0300 the company surrendered the rest of its position and withdraw to a rise just behind the 503d’s 

howitzers. The artillerymen followed 

suit, as did tankers and antiaircraft 

gunners, and joined a continuing exchange of fire with Chinese holding the 

original Company G position. The defensive fire discouraged the Chinese 

from advancing on the artillery pieces, 

which rested in a hollow between the 

two firing lines. 

36 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 17 and 18 Feb 51. 

37 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Sum, 15 and 16 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 

Briefing for CG, 16 Feb 51. 

38 Ibid. 

39 The remainder of this section is based on 

the following sources: X Corps Rpt, Battle of 

Chip’yong-ni; 23d Inf AA Rpt, 29 Jan-15 Feb 51; 

Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 117-42; 

Williamson, “Chip’yong-ni”; Blumenson; “Task Force 

Crombez”; Ltr, Lt Col James W. Edwards to Col Paul 

L. Freeman, 7 May 51; copy in CMH. 
296 EBB AND FLOW 

Lt. Col. James W. Edwards, the 2d 

Battalion commander, organized a 

stronger counterattack, reinforcing 

Company G with a platoon of Company F, the total of his own reserve, 

and a platoon of Rangers obtained from 

regiment. Attacking around 0400, the 

composite force regained part of the 

lost ground but then was driven back 

and heavy casualties. By daylight Company G occupied positions on a low 

ridge a quartermile behind the former 

Company G position, as did members 

of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion. The battery’s guns remained 

near the center of the quarter-mile noman’s-land. Immediately west of Company G, French troops, who had attempted unsuccessfully to assist the 

counterattack, also pulled back to refuse the French battalion’s left flank. 

Colonel Freeman, who remained at 

Chip’yong-ni and in command until finally evacuated at midmorning on the 

15th, released Company B and the remainder of the Ranger company 

around 0800 for a stronger effort. This 

release committed all available troops 

save the company of engineers, although by that hour action elsewhere 

on the perimeter had ceased. At 1000, 

behind a mortar barrage and supported 

by fire from tanks and antiaircraft 

weapons, Company B tried to retake 

the Company G position alone but was 

kept off the crest by fire from Chinese 

on the southern slopes where the preliminary and supporting fires had 

chased them. 

Air strikes requested by Colonel Edwards during the morning began somewhat tardily at noon. Edwards meanwhile ordered tanks accompanied by 

Rangers south on Route 24A beyond 

the attack objective so the tank gunners 

could fire east onto the southern slopes. 

After mines previously placed on the 

road were removed and several Chinese 

armed with rocket launchers killed or 

driven off, Edwards’ tanks reached a 

point on the road from where they 

could hit the Chinese. About 1630, as 

the tank fire in combination with artillery fire and air strikes began to break 

up the Chinese position, Company B 

regained the rest of the objective. Almost at the same time, the head of a 

tank column came into view on Route 

24A to the south. After a moment of 

surprise, Edwards’ men realized the 

tanks were part of the 5th Cavalry relief force which had started toward 

Chip’yong-ni the day before. 

Colonel Crombez had renewed his 

advance up Route 24A at 0700 on the 

15th, about an hour after his engineers 

completed the bypass around the destroyed bridge at Hup’o-ri. The 1st 

Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and two platoons 

of tanks in the lead first encountered 

resistance about two miles below 

Koksu-ri where Chinese had dug in on 

Hill 152 bordering Route 24A on the 

east. Crombez deployed the 1st Battalion against 152 and sent the 2d Battalion up Hill 14-3 edging the road on the 

west just opposite. Hill 143 fell easily, 

but the 1st Battalion cleared the 152 

mass only in midafternoon. 

Suspecting that the remainder of the 

road north would be just as stoutly 

defended, Crombez doubted an infantry attack could carry to Chip’yong-ni 

by dark but believed an armored task 

force could. For the armored thrust he 

assembled twenty-three tanks, which included all of Company D, 6th Tank 

Battalion, and a platoon of Company 

A, 70th Tank Battalion. Needing infantry protection for the armor but hav- 
DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE 

ing no armored personnel carriers, he 

instructed the hundred sixty members 

of Company L, 5th Cavalry, to ride the 

tanks. As agreed between the Company 

L commander and the commander of 

the tanks, the infantrymen were to dismount and deploy to protect the tanks 

during any halt and were to remount 

on signal from the tankers when the 

column was ready to proceed. Four 

members of the engineer company 

with Crombez also were to ride a tank 

near the head of the column to lift any 

mines on the road. 

At midafternoon, as Crombez completed preparations for the armored 

thrust, not all the supply trucks and 

ambulances scheduled to follow the 5th 

Cavalry into Chip’yong-ni had reached 

the regiment’s location. Doubting anyway that wheeled vehicles could safely 

accompany the tank column, Crombez 

decided to call the supply train forward 

after he had opened the road. The new 

23d Regimental. Combat Team commander, Colonel Chiles, whom 

Crombez contacted by radio before 

leading the task force forward, did not 

object. Since the 23d at the time was 

having trouble reestablishing the Company G positions on the south, Chiles 

wanted Crombez to come, “trains or no 

trains.” 

Ahead of Task Force Crombez’ departure from behind the 1st and 2d 

Battalions at 1545, artillery fire and air 

strikes pounded the hills bordering 

Koksu-ri. Lest the infantry aboard the 

tanks be hit, Crombez sacrificed any 

further supporting artillery fire on the 

high ground edging Route 24A. 

Despite the heavy preliminary fire, a 

strong Chinese force remained on the 

Koksu-ri heights and twice forced 

Crombez’ column to halt, once as the 

297 

lead tank approached the town, again 

just after the task force passed through. 

No tanks were lost in heavy exchanges 

of fire during the halts, but Crombez 

lost about ninety of his infantrymen 

who, according to plan, dismounted at 

each stop. Some were hit in the firefight; the bulk simply were stranded 

when Crombez, believing the success 

of his task force depended on keeping 

the tanks moving, ordered his column 

forward and the tankers responded 

without allowing time for all members 

of Company L to remount. The ablebodied cavalrymen left behind returned 

south to the regimental line, most of 

them moving through the ground west 

of Route 24A where resistance had 

been lightest. Men in a 21⁄2 -ton truck, 

dispatched by the 3d Battalion commander on his own volition to trail the 

task force (Colonel Crombez had made 

no provision for evacuating casualties), 

picked up some of the wounded. Others were recovered later by tankers of 

Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, not 

taking part in the thrust toward 

Chip’yong-ni. 

Proceeding above Koksu-ri with 

fewer than seventy infantrymen 

aboard, Crombez’ column received almost constant but lighter fire as far as a 

cut through the western slopes of Hill 

397 a mile below Chip’yong-ni. To that 

point no tank had been damaged, but 

more infantrymen were lost, some shot 

off the tanks, a few pushed off as tank 

gunners swung turrets and tubes to return fire, others stranded as before after brief halts. 

Heavy small arms and mortar fire 

struck the column as it reached the road 

cut; as the tanks started through, Chinese atop the steep embankments on 

either side fired rocket launchers and 
298 EBB AND FLOW 

threw down satchel charges. A rocket 

that struck the turret of the lead tank 

wounded the gunner and loader, and 

the road wheels of the second tank were 

damaged, but both got through. The 

third tank was not touched, but the 

fourth, carrying Capt. Johnnie M. 

Hiers, commanding Company D of the 

6th Tank Battalion, took a turret hit 

from a rocket, apparently a 3.5-inch 

round, that penetrated and exploded 

ammunition in the racks. The men in 

the fighting compartment, including 

Captain Hiers, were killed, and the tank 

caught fire. The driver, though severely 

burned, raced the tank through the cut 

and off the road so as not to block the 

remainder of the column. 

As each of the following tanks 

rammed into the cut, crews of tanks 

still to enter and of those already 

through delivered heavy cannon fire 

on the embankments. They dampened 

enemy fire enough to permit all remaining tanks to pass safely. The Chinese, however, further thinned the 

infantry riding the tanks, and the 21⁄2 - 

ton truck at the tail of the column, its 

driver wounded and one of its tires 

flat, rolled to a stop in the cut. Most of 

the wounded who had been riding the 

truck hobbled through the cut and got 

aboard one of the last tanks. 

The leading forces of Task Force 

Crombez and the 23d Regimental Combat Team tankers earlier sent south on 

Route 24A by Colonel Edwards sighted 

each other as the task force reached 

the north side of the cut. In the mutual 

moment of surprise before recognition-a result of not being in radio contact with each other-the commander 

of Crombez’ second tank began calling 

out an order to fire on the armor up 

the road. The Chinese on the upper 

slopes of Hill 397 to the east, already 

loosened from their position by 

Edwards’ counterattack and demoralized by the appearance of Crombez’ 

column, meanwhile began to run. Edwards had never seen “a sight like 

that and never expect to see another 

like it. There were more targets than 

we had weapons.” 

After helping Edwards clean the Chinese from the slopes east of the road 

with high explosive fire from the 90- 

mm. guns, Crombez led his column inside the 23d Regimental Combat Team 

perimeter about 1715. In covering the 

six miles from below Koksu-ri into 

Chip’yong-ni the task force had had 

three tanks and the 21⁄2 -ton truck 

damaged. Casualties among the armored troops were three killed and 

four wounded. Still with Crombez were 

all four engineers but just twenty-three 

members of Company L, many of them 

wounded. Altogether, the rifle company lost twelve killed, forty wounded, 

and nineteen missing-almost half 

its strength. 

Because so little daylight remained, 

Crombez elected to remain in 

Chip’yong-ni overnight. He also considered it advisable to hold the supply 

trucks and ambulances below Koksu-ri 

until after he made the return trip and 

rechecked the road. Air observers 

meanwhile reported the Chinese to be 

moving away from Chip’yong-ni not 

only from the slopes of Hill 397 in the 

south but from all around the perimeter. Colonel Chiles nevertheless anticipated an attack during the night. 

Against this possibility, Crombez placed 

some of his tanks on the perimeter, 

most of them on the north and northwest to help cover the valley approaches 

to Chip’yong-ni. 
DEFENDING THE WONJU LINE 

Small arms and mortar ammunition 

meanwhile had become scarce commodities at the perimeter. The two 

dozen airdrops on the 14th and thirty 

air deliveries during the morning of the 

15th contained mostly artillery rounds. 

In Colonel Edwards’ battalion, which 

had had the hardest fight, men 

searched trailers and truck glove compartments to get two clips to each rifleman. None of Edwards’ rifle companies had more than six rounds of 

60-mm. mortar ammunition, and only 

thirty rounds remained for the 81-mm. 

mortars. Emergency nighttime airdrops 

on zones outlined by truck headlights 

finally replenished the smaller ammunition types between 2130 and midnight. The light guiding the cargo 

planes attracted some enemy small arms 

and mortar fire, which made retrieving the ammunition packages hazardous. This fire proved to be the extent 

of further Chinese action. As reported 

earlier by air observers, the Chinese 

were hurriedly leaving Chip’yong-ni. 

Verification came from patrols moving 

outside the perimeter after daylight on 

the 16th. 

Casualties inflicted on the Chinese by 

the 23d Regimental Combat Team, 

counted and estimated, totaled 4,946. 

Colonel Crombez judged that his task 

force inflicted over 500 more. The perimeter troops also captured 79 Chinese who at interrogation identified five 

divisions from the 39th, 40th, and 42d 

Armies as having taken part in the attacks. The attack force itself, however, 

appeared to have been no more than 

six regiments, one each from the 115th, 

116th, 119th, and 120th Divisions and 

two from the 126th Division. These six 

had not attacked in concert, nor had 

any of them thrown a full strength as299 

sault against the perimeter. Almost all 

attacks had been made by company-size 

forces, some followed by a succession 

of attacks of the same size in the same 

or nearby places. This kind of successive small unit assault had permitted 

the Chinese to invest the Company 

G position on the southern arc of 

the perimeter. 

The remaining regiment of the 126th 

Division had opposed Colonel Crombez’ 

forces at Koksu-ri and along the road 

north. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 

5th Cavalry, after a quiet night on Hills 

143 and 152 below Koksu-ri, advanced 

close to the lower edge of town during 

a snowstorm on the morning of the 

16th, picking up Chinese stragglers who 

identified their regiment and reported 

that it had withdrawn hastily during 

the night. Colonel Crombez confirmed 

the enemy withdrawal during his 

return trip, which he delayed until the 

snowstorm lifted around noon. He 

found the borders of Route 24A 

from Chip’yong-ni to Koksu-ri free 

of Chinese. 

After returning to Koksu-ri with 

Crombez, Capt. John C. Barrett, commanding Company L, went back north 

over the road by jeep in search of any 

wounded members of his company who 

might still be lying along the route. He 

located four between Koksu-ri and the 

road cut below Chip’yong-ni. Behind 

Barrett, Capt. Keith M. Stewart, assistant S-3 of the 5th Cavalry, led the supply trucks and ambulances forward. 

Moving with thirteen tanks, a platoon 

of infantry, and a wrecker in his 

column, Stewart caught up with Barrett at the road cut in midafternoon 

and took aboard the casualties the latter had recovered. Stewart found another wounded man from Company L 
300 

beyond the cut. The wrecker meanwhile towed in the truck and tank that 

had been damaged at the cut. 

Colonel Chiles, having been fairly resupplied with ammunition by airdrop, 

was not so anxious for the arrival of 

Stewart’s supply trucks as he was for 

the ambulances. Casualties in the 23d 

Regimental Combat Team now totaled 

52 killed, 259 wounded, and 42 missing. 

Chiles had been able to evacuate only a 

few of the wounded by helicopter after 

daybreak on the 16th before fog and 

snow grounded the aircraft. He was 

now able to load all remaining wounded 

on a few emptied supply trucks as well 

as the ambulances, and Stewart delivered them to the 5th Cavalry clearing 

station at Koksu-ri before dark. 

EBB AND FLOW 

Eighth Army had reached a turning 

point, that it had substantially regained 

the confidence lost during the distressing withdrawals of December and early 

January. In his judgment, the successful defense of Chip’yong-ni by an isolated combat team without grievous 

losses against a force far superior in 

strength symbolized the revitalization. 

Task Force Crombez, in its relief role, 

epitomized the offensive spirit. Although being forced to place infantry 

aboard the tanks had proved costly, 

Ridgway judged Colonel Crombez’ decision to advance with armor when his 

infantry moved too slowly to be one 

of the best local decisions of the war. 

With renewed spirit, as evidenced at 

Chip’yong-ni, Ridgway considered his 

forces quite capable of further offensive operations, which he immediately 

A Turning Point proceeded to design.40 

As the battle of Chip’yong-ni climaxed, General Ridgway felt that the 40 Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, 2 Nov 51. 
CHAPTER XVI 

The KILLER Operation 

The Concept 

Even before the Chip’yong-ni engagement came to a close, General Ridgway had instigated planning for an 

attack to clear the Chinese from the 

Chip’yong-ni area and the mountains 

to the southeast as far as the Som River. 

He assigned the task to the IX Corps 

on 15 February. On the 17th, after the 

Chip’yong-ni battle had abated, he 

shifted the IX Corps-X Corps boundary eastward almost to the Som, a move 

which returned the ROK 6th Division 

and the British 27th Brigade to IX 

Corps control and, for the time being, 

also placed the 23d Regimental Combat Team under General Moore’s jurisdiction. 1 

General Moore scheduled a relatively 

short advance for 18 February in which 

the 1st Cavalry Division, British 27th 

Brigade, and ROK 6th Division were 

to seize high ground overlooking a segment of the Wonju-Seoul rail line from 

the town of Hajin, three miles northwest of Chip’yong-ni, southeastward to 

the Som. This line of heights offered a 

strong defensive position from which 

to block enemy attempts to drive into 

the Han River valley.2 

1 Eighth Army, SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, 

Incl 15; Rad, GX-2-1171 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

CG IX Corps and CG X Corps, 16 Feb 5l. 

2 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps Opn 

O 12, 17 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jn1, Entry 0805, 18 

Feb 51. 

3 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0200, 18 Feb 51; Eighth 

Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 18. 

The attack was widened to the west 

early on the 18th after resistance in 

Moore’s zone west of the Han, now reduced to include only the enemy 

bridgehead area below the river, 

seemed to have disappeared. Forces of 

the 5th Regimental Combat Team, 24th 

Division, made this discovery when they 

investigated heights inside the lower 

edge of the bridgehead near midnight 

on the 17th. The investigation revealed 

that the Chinese had abandoned the 

heights and in doing so had left behind 

six hundred dead as well as weapons 

and equipment, which indicated a hurried withdrawal. When Moore notified 

Ridgway of this development, Ridgway 

instructed him to seize a line running 

from the corps left boundary eastward 

through Yangp’yong to Hajin. This tactic would clear the bridgehead and help 

block an enemy entry into the valley of 

the Han.3 

Assigning the 24th Division to attack 

through the bridgehead area, Moore 

opened a full corps attack early on the 

18th. The I Corps assisted by sending 

the 25th Division through the western 

third of the bridgehead area. Meeting 

some light, scattered resistance but in 

the main uncovering more indications 

of a hasty enemy withdrawal, all IX 

Corps units were on or very near their 
302 EBB AND FLOW 

objectives by 1800. The 24th Division 

reached the heights overlooking the 

Han at its bend at Yangp’yong. The 1st 

Cavalry Division occupied the HajinChip’yong-ni area. In the process, the 

5th Cavalry relieved the 23d Regimental Combat Team, which then moved 

south into an assembly three miles east 

of Yoju. Slightly above Chuam-ni, the 

British 27th Brigade deployed athwart 

Route 24 (where it would be reinforced 

on the 19th by the Canadian battalion, 

the 2d of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, which had just 

completed its training at Miryang). The 

ROK 6th Division filled in the remainder of the IX Corps front between the 

British and the X Corps positions 

northwest of Wonju.4 

Evidence available by evening of 18 

February, not only from the results of 

the IX Corps advance but also from 

the lull and lack of contact in the X and 

ROK III Corps zones, made clear that 

the Chinese and North Koreans were 

retiring from the salient they had created in the central region. The withdrawal fit the pattern of enemy operations observed before, especially 

Chinese operations, in which assault 

forces were obliged to pause for refitting after a week or so of battle.5 

During the evening of the 18th Ridgway planned an advance designed to 

deny the enemy any respite in which to 

prepare new attacks and, in particular, 

designed to destroy those enemy forces 

moving north out of the Chech’on 

salient. He intended that two principal 

thrusts by American forces, up Route 

29 from Wonju beyond Hoengsong and 

4 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0805 and 2340, and 

Sum, 18 Feb 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 

51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

5 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

up Route 60 from Yongwol beyond 

P’yongch’ang, would block the main 

paths of enemy withdrawal. (Map 25) 

Other forces were to move through and 

clear the adjacent ground. Given the 

particular purpose of the attack, he 

called it Operation KILLER.6 

Intelligence Problems 

Ironically, as Ridgway developed the 

concept of Operation KILLER with 

confidence in the spirit of his line units, 

he found reason still to question the 

attitude of principal members of his 

own staff. On 18 February he received 

the staff recommendations he had 

asked for in late January on the terrain 

lines the Eighth Army should attempt 

to occupy during the spring and summer months. In sum, the staff proposed 

that the Eighth Army abandon offensive operations, defend in place until 

spring, then voluntarily withdraw to the 

old Pusan Perimeter. Astonished that 

his staff would recommend the voluntary and complete surrender of the 

initiative, Ridgway disapproved the recommendations immediately and informed his staff once again that 

they would think primarily in terms 

of attack.7 

Meanwhile, his largest concern as he 

moved to capitalize on the enemy’s 

withdrawal was his want of definite 

knowledge about his adversaries, especially about enemy reserves. His best 

information was an estimate of enemy 

forces at the front prepared by his intel6 Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 108; Eighth Army SS 

Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 18; Rad, GX-2-2002 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 

Feb 51. 

7 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 386-87. 
CL
304 EBB AND FLOW 

troops transferred to the remaining 6th, 

7th, and 12th Divisions. This kind of upto-date information was an example of 

what Ridgway had been urging and 

continued to urge his intelligence 

sources to produce. Beyond the general 

location of the enemy mass at the front, 

he wanted to know its composition and 

strength; the identification, specific 

location, and status of supply and morale of all enemy units; and the trend 

of their movements. In making these 

items the essential elements of an immediate intelligence campaign on 18 

February, he emphasized the influence 

such information could have on plans 

for future operations and insisted on 

its timely dissemination, even in fragmentary form.9 

Of particular relevance to Operation 

KILLER, scheduled to begin at 1000 on 

21 February, was Ridgway’s very limited knowledge about enemy reserves 

except for a rear area buildup that was 

under way. His intelligence officers had 

reported that seven new Chinese armies had entered Korea, four assembling in the P’yongyang-Sinanju area, 

the remainder joining the three armies 

of the IX Army Group in the HungnamWonsan region. But they could not tell 

Ridgway definitely whether any of these 

reserves were moving south. Nor was 

there any helpful response from Tokyo when Ridgway asked UNC headquarters for accurate intelligence on the 

movement of fresh enemy forces to the 

front. As of 20 February none of his 

attempts to obtain precise information 

about the ten Chinese armies now religence staff on 16 February. According to this estimate, five Chinese armies and three North Korean corps 

were on the line, and three Chinese armies and a North Korean corps were 

immediately behind them. In the area 

along the Han from Seoul eastward to 

Yangp’yong the intelligence staff had 

identified the North Korean Z Corps and 

the Chinese 50th and 38th Armies. The 

staff also determined that the Z Corps 

was now composed of the 8th, 17th, and 

47th Divisions and that the 17th Division 

was now a mechanized unit with perhaps twenty tanks. With some uncertainty, the staff placed the Chinese 

42d, 40th, and 66th Armies on line 

between Yangp’yong and Hoengsong 

and, with even less sureness about both 

identification and location, showed the 

37th, 39th, and 43d Armies behind these 

units. The staff estimated that the North 

Korean V and II Corps held the region 

between Hoengsong and P’yongch’ang 

with the North Korean III Corps concentrated in rear of them and identified the North Korean 69th Brigade, 

now controlled by the II Corps, in the 

Kang-nung area on the east coast.8 

Ridgway’s intelligence sources had 

not yet picked up recent organizational 

changes in the North Korean II and 

V Corps made as a result of the high 

casualties incurred over the past several weeks. In the II Corps, the 31st Division was inactivated and its troops distributed among three other divisions, 

the 2d, 9th, and 27th. (The reduced 10th 

Division, behind Eighth Army lines in 

the P’ohang-dong-Andong-Yongdok 

area, also was still carried on II Corps 

roles.) In the V Corps, the 38th and 43d 

Divisions were inactivated and their 

8 Eighth Army G2 Estimate, 16 Feb 51. 

9 GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North 

Korean Army, 16 Sep 51; Rad, GX-2-1812 KCG, CG 

Eighth Army to CG Eighth Army (Forward), CG I 

Corps, CG IX Corps, CG X Corps, CG 1st Marine 

Div, and Chief KMAG, 18 Feb 51. 
THE KILLER OPERATION 305 

ported to be in North Korea had succeeded. Thus, while he proceeded to 

open Operation KILLER, he was forced 

to do so without a full picture of the 

possible opposition and with the realization that the entry of enemy reserves 

in the battle might compel him to cancel his attack.10 

Adopting the prudent course, Ridgway credited enemy reserves with the 

capability of appearing at the front 

within any 24-hour period. In so advising his corps commanders and the 

South Korean chief of staff on 20 

February, he frankly admitted that he 

did not know when or whether a reinforcement of enemy forward units 

would occur. This uncertainty was all 

the more reason, he told them, for taking proper precautions while advancing in Operation KILLER. They must 

maintain major units intact, make proper use of terrain, and carefully coordinate movements within and between 

corps. With the recent experience 

above Hoengsong in mind, he warned 

them against being “sucked in and destroyed piecemeal, whether by ruse, or 

the temptation to your own aggressiveness to pursue beyond your capability 

of providing powerful support, or 

of timely disengagement and local 

withdrawal."11 

Ridgway’s wariness over possible enemy moves increased on 20 February 

when General MacArthur, after learn/- 

ing of the KILLER plan, came to Korea. 

MacArthur characteristically appeared 

on the scene at or near the beginning of 

10 Eighth Army G2 Estimate, 16 Feb 51; Rad, G-2- 

1760 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, Personal 

for Gen Hickey, 17 Feb 51; Eyes Only Memo, Ridgway 

for All Corps Commanders and C/S ROKA, 20 Feb 

51. 

11 E yes Only Memo, Ridgway for All Corps Commanders and C/S ROKA, 20 Feb 51. 

an operation.12 Ridgway met him at the 

X Corps forward command post in 

Wonju, where he gave MacArthur 

fuller details. At a following press conference, which customarily ended each 

of MacArthur’s visits to Korea, Ridgway 

was disturbed to hear MacArthur announce that he had “just ordered a resumption of the offensive.” MacArthur, 

of course, had had no part in conceiving or ordering the operation. More to 

the point, the incident drew Ridgway’s 

attention to the possibility that the predictable pattern of MacArthur’s visits 

to Korea and the open ceremony always attending the excursions would 

alert the Chinese and North Koreans 

to future operations. Here was enough 

danger, Ridgway decided, to risk repercussions and try to discourage MacArthur from appearing in the future to 

sound the starting signal.13 

The Plans 

When the code name Ridgway had 

chosen for the coming attack was heard 

in Washington, he received a courteous but immediate protest from the 

Army chief of staff. The word killer, 

General Collins indicated, was difficult 

to deal with in public relations. Ridgway 

nevertheless kept the name, which fully 

12 General Mark W. Clark, chief of Army Field 

Forces, also was in Korea at this time. He was after a 

firsthand view that would help him improve the training of recruits. He talked with commanders at all levels, 

and they emphasized the Chinese and North Korean 

preference to attack at night and in heavy weather. 

Clark thus saw a need to increase training for nighttime operations, and he did so immediately after returning to the United States. See Mark W. Clark From 

the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper, 1954), pp. 

25-28. 

13 Eighth Army, SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, 

Incl 20; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 108-09. 
306 EBB AND FLOW 

described his main objective.14 He instructed the IX and X Corps to destroy 

enemy forces located east of the Han 

and south of a line, designated Arizona, 

running from Yangp’yong eastward 

across Route 29 three miles above 

Hoengsong and across Route 60 six 

miles above P’yongch’ang. The principal thrust up Route 29 was to be made 

by the IX Corps, the one up Route 60 

by the X Corps. To accommodate the 

scheme of attack, the IX Corps-X 

Corps boundary was to be relocated east 

of Route 29 and the X Corps-ROK III 

Corps boundary shifted to the east side 

of Route 60 when the advance was 

opened on the 21st.15 

Capital Division in a strong perimeter 

around the coastal town, and Ridgway 

would see that the division thereafter 

was supplied by sea or air and supported by naval gunfire.16 

The west flank of the advance would 

be adequately protected by the I Corps 

and 24th Division positions along the 

lower bank of the Han. To protect the 

east flank, the ROK III Corps was to 

send its leftmost division, the ROK 7th, 

north through the heights east of Route 

60, gaging the division’s rate by the 

progress of the X Corps. The ROK III 

Corps’ remaining divisions, the 9th and 

Capital, were to secure the lateral Route 

20 winding southwest through the 

mountains out of Kangnung on the 

coast. If General Yu was unable to develop continuous defenses above the 

road, lie was at least to guarantee possession of Kangnung, the road’s eastern gate. If necessary, Yu was to set the 

During the week past, as Chinese 

forces broke up the X Corps’ ROUNDUP 

advance and threatened to strike deep 

through the Han valley, Ridgway had 

ordered the 1st Marine Division from 

P’ohang-dong to Ch’ungju. With the exception of the 7th Marines, scheduled 

to leave P’ohang-dong on 21 February, 

the division was in Ch’ungju by evening of the 18th.17 For the KILLER 

operation, Ridgway attached the division to the IX Corps. The marines were 

to relieve the 2d Division and 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team in 

the Wonju area, which on the 21st 

would fall within the zone of the IX 

Corps. The 2d Division and the airborne unit then were to shift east and 

rejoin the X Corps.18 

General Moore chose the 1st Marine 

Division to make the IX Corps drive 

16 Rad, GX-2-2202 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA et al., 19 Feb 51; Rads, GX-2-2209 KGOO 

and GX-2-2255 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA, 20 and 21 Feb 51, respectively; Eighth Army 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 

17 The 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, which 

had been attached to the Marine division, joined the 

ROK III Corps in the Yongwol area. The ROK 2d 

Division, which was protecting segments of the X 

Corps supply route, received the added responsibility 

of securing the area vacated by the marines. 

18 Rad, GX-2-1220 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA et al., 12 Feb 51; Rads, GX-2-1247 KGOO 

and GX-2-1268 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA and CG 1st Marine Div, 12 Feb 51; Rad, 

GX-2-1285 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 1st Marine Div, 12 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1424 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 13 Feb 51; Rad, 

GX-2-1942 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps 

and CG 1st Marine Div, 19 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-2002 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 Feb 

51; Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, 

Incl 13; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0923, 20 Feb 51. 

14 Ridgway later wrote, “I did not understand why it 

was objectionable to acknowledge the fact that war 

was concerned with killing the enemy. I am by nature opposed to any effort to 'sell' war to people as an 

only mildly unpleasant business that requires very little in the way of blood.” See Ridgway, The Korean War, 

pp. 110-11. 

15 Rads, GX-2-2002 KGOO and GX-2-2193 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 and 

20 Feb 51, respectively; Rad, GX-2-2195 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps et al., 20 Feb 51. 
THE KILLER OPERATION 

along Route 29. The division initially 

was to seize high ground just south of 

Hoengsong from which it could control that road center. To the west, the 

ROK 6th Division, British 27th Brigade, 

and 1st Cavalry Division were to clear 

the mountains between the marines and 

the Han.19 

In the X Corps zone, the 7th Division and ROK 3d Division were to open 

the advance to line Arizona; they were 

to be joined later by the 2d Division 

after it shifted east from Wonju. The 

damaged ROK 5th and 8th Divisions 

were to move off the line, the 5th to 

help protect the corps supply route, the 

more severely reduced 8th to go south 

to Taegu, where it was to be rebuilt 

under ROK Army control.20 

The 187th Airborne Regimental 

Combat Team, when it moved from 

Wonju, was to assemble northeast of 

Chech’on ready to assist the 7th Division’s attack. General Almond was not 

to commit the unit, however, without 

Ridgway’s approval. Depending on 

the favorable progress of Operation 

KILLER, Ridgway intended to move the 

airborne troops to the Taegu airfield 

for refresher jump training. He was 

looking to possible future operations, 

in particular to plans prepared at his 

direction in January for the seizure of 

Seoul. These plans in part called for an 

airborne landing behind the capital to 

block enemy escape routes.2l 

19 IX Corps Opn O 13, 21 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 

Jnl, Entry 0925, 20 Feb 51. 

20 Corps Opn O no. 14, 19 Feb 51; Rad, GX-Z1987 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CC X Corps, 19 

Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-2205 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 20 Feb 51. 

21 X Corps Opn O no. 14, 19 Feb 51; Rads, GX-2- 

2182 KGOO and GX-2-2293 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to CG X Corps, 20 and 21 Feb 51, respectively; 

Hq, Eighth Army, Outline Plan, Seizure of Seoul, 27 

Jan 51. 

307 

General Almond assigned the 7th Division to make the X Corps’ thrust up 

Route 60 on the corps right. Initially 

the 7th was to clear P’yongch’ang and 

seize the junction of Routes 60 and 20 

five miles north of the town. Almond 

wanted General Ferenbaugh then to 

block Route 20 to the northeast and at 

the same time strike west across the 

corps front along Route 20 to a juncture with the IX Corps to seal off enemy forces remaining in the Chech’on 

salient. At the left of the corps zone, 

the ROK 3d Division was to clear enemy forces from an area narrowing to 

a point on Route 20. The 2d Division, 

less the 38th Infantry (which was to become corps reserve), was to start north 

on 22 February to clear a wide area of 

rough ground in the center of the corps 

zone and to occupy positions commanding Route 20. If the timing was right, 

General Ruffner’s forces could hammer 

enemy units against an anvil provided 

by 7th Division troops driving west over 

Route 20.22 

The Advance 

By 21 February the Chinese and 

North Koreans had had at least three 

days in which to withdraw from the salient and had given no indication that 

they would stop before they had moved 

north beyond line Arizona. If these 

forces were to be destroyed, Ridgway’s 

assault had to advance rapidly. But the 

weather made speed impossible from 

the outset. 

For the first twenty days of February, 

weather conditions in the battle zone 

had been within their normal range. 

22 X Corps Opn O no. 14, 19 Feb 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Entry 0845, 21 Feb 51. 
308 EBB AND FLOW 

The average extremes of temperature 

varied from scarcely a degree above the 

freezing point to fifteen degrees below, 

and precipitation was largely snow that 

remained on the ground, sometimes as 

ice. An abrupt and unexpected change 

accompanied the opening of Operation 

KILLER. The temperature rose to almost 50 degrees on the 21st and that 

night barely fell to the freezing mark. 

The higher temperature range persisted during the remainder of the 

month. The 21st and the three days 

following saw steady to intermittent 

rainfall. Together, the unseasonable 

rain and warmer temperatures changed 

rivers and streams into courses of deep, 

fast water filled with floating ice. Fords 

became unusable, and low bridges were 

washed out or damaged beyond use. 

The rain and daytime thawing made 

quagmires of the roads and countryside, and landslides blocked or partially 

blocked tunnels, roads, and rail lines. 

Night freezes made the roads difficult 

to negotiate, especially where grades 

were step and curves sharp.23 

The KILLER operation, as a result, 

became at once a plodding affair, not 

so much an advance with two main 

thrusts as a more uniform clearing operation in which assault forces fought 

hardest to overcome the effects of 

weather. Ahead of the advance, the 

Chinese and North Koreans concentrated on evacuating the salient, leaving behind only scattered forces to fight 

occasional but strong delaying actions.24 

Ridgway kept a careful watch over 

the operation, reconnoitering much of 

the zone of advance from the air and 

23 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Feb 51. 

24 Ibid. 

questioning corps commanders closely 

during the first three days of the operation on the problems weather had 

created. Although Moore and Almond 

were experiencing difficulty in supplying the operation, neither advocated 

abandoning or postponing the advance. Frequent airdrops kept the supply problem from becoming critical, 

and by 25 February engineers had repaired much of the damage to main 

lines of communication. The advance 

continued, if far more slowly than 

anticipated.25 

As the impeded operation entered 

its fourth day, the IX Corps lost its 

commander. About 1030 on 24 February the helicopter carrying General 

Moore crashed into the Han River. Neither the corps commander nor his pilot was seriously hurt in the crash, but 

General Moore died a half hour later 

of a heart attack.26 

When General Ridgway notified Tokyo of the loss of the officer he personally had selected to command the IX 

Corps, he named Maj. Gen. Joseph M. 

Swing, currently the commandant of 

the Army War College, as his preference to succeed General Moore. While 

his request for General Swing was being 

considered, Ridgway appointed the 1st 

Marine Division commander, General 

Smith, to assume temporary command 

of the corps. As he took the rare step 

of placing a Marine officer in command 

of a major Army unit, Ridgway coun25 Rad GX (TAC) 38 KCG, CG Eighth Army to 

CGs I, IX, and X Corps, 22 Feb 51; Rad X 17970, X 

Corps to Eighth Army, 22 Feb 51; Rad, GX (TAC) 43 

KCG, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps, 23 Feb 51; 

Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 

23; Rad, G-2-3145 KGLK, CG Eighth Army to 

CINCFE, 25 Feb 51. 

26 Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central 

Front, p. 71; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 
THE KILLER OPERATION 309 

CHINESE TAKEN CAPTIVE by men of the 1st Cavalry Division during Operation Killer. 

seled the IX Corps staff and the commanders of the Army divisions in the 

corps to cooperate fully with General 

Smith.27 The interim command arrangement, Ridgway believed, offered 

an excellent opportunity to bring 

the Arm and Marine Corps closer 

together. 28 

27 In other instances of marines commanding major 

Army units, Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune led the 2d 

Infantry Division in World War I and Maj. Gen. Roy S. 

Geiger commanded the Tenth Army during the 

closing days of the battle for Okinawa in World War 

II. 

28 Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, 

Incls 24 and 26. In other command changes in February under the Department of the Army rotation policy, 

General Gay relinquished command of the 1st Cavalry Division to Brig. Gen. Charles D. Palmer, and 

Genera lKean relinquished command of the 25th Infantry Division to Brig. Gen. J. Sladen Bradley. 

Laboring forward through the remainder of February, Ridgway’s central forces largely eliminated the 

enemy’s recent ground gains. From 

west to east, the IX and X Corps front 

on the last day of the month traced a 

shallow concave arc from positions five 

miles above Chip’yong-ni, along high 

ground overlooking Hoengsong and 

Route 20 from the south, to the high 

hills four miles north of the Routes 20- 

60 junction. The two corps thus were on 

or above line Arizona on the extreme 

west and east but somewhat short of it 

elsewhere.29 

29 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 

Army G3 SS Rpt, Situation Overlay, 28 Feb 53; IX 

Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Feb 51. 
310 

Meanwhile, in the ROK III Corps 

zone General Yu opened a lateral attack, sending two regiments of the 

Capital Division from the Kangnung 

area westward over Route 20 across the 

fronts of his other two divisions as a 

preliminary to establishing defenses 

above ‘the road. The regiments, moving in column, advanced easily until late 

in the afternoon of 3 March when the 

leading regiment ran headlong into an 

ambush near Soksa-ri, some twenty-five 

miles west of Kangnung. Hit from both 

north and south by a regiment of the 

North Korean 2d Division, the South Korean regiment lost almost a thousand 

men-59 killed, 119 wounded, and 802 

missing. The damaged regiment returned to the Kangnung area to reorganize and Yu canceled what from the 

outset had been a decidedly risky movement.30 

To the west, in the meantime, those 

IX and X Corps units not yet on line 

Arizona continued their advances to 

reach it. In the IX Corps zone, the 1st 

Marine Division cleared Hoengsong 

against little opposition on 2 March en 

route to Arizona objectives three miles 

north of town. By evening of 6 March 

all IX Corps assault units had established positions near or slightly above 

the Arizona line, the final advances encountering no resistance at all. The X 

Corps units met stiff opposition over 

the first five days of March, particularly the 2d Division as it attempted to 

occupy the high ground just above 

Route 20. But during the night of the 

5th the North Korean defenders vacated their positions, and by 7 March 

General Almond’s forces were for far 

EBB AND FLOW 

30 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, Mar 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, 6 Mar 51; Eighth Army PIR 237, 6 Mar 51. 

the most part in full possession of their 

Arizona objectives.31 

Over the fourteen days the two corps 

took to reach and consolidate positions 

along line Arizona, each reported having inflicted substantial enemy casualties. The IX Corps alone reported 7,819 

enemy killed, 1,469 wounded, and 208 

captured. But from the outset it had 

become steadily clearer that the primary KILLER objective of destroying all 

enemy forces below the Arizona line 

would be only partially achieved. The 

enemy forces’ head start in withdrawing, their disinclination. to take a 

defensive stand below the objective line 

other than in spotty delaying actions, 

and Eighth Army difficulties in negotiating the ground had prevented any 

other result.32 

The Ripper Concept 

As the KILLER operation had entered 

its final week with limited results already predictable, General Ridgway 

published plans for another attack, 

again with the main effort in his central zone but with all units on the Eighth 

Army front involved. As in KILLER, the 

primary purposes of the attack, which 

Ridgway called Operation RIPPER, were 

to destroy enemy forces and equipment 

and to interdict enemy attempts to organize an offensive. A secondary purpose was to outflank Seoul and the area 

north of the city as far as the Imjin 

River. Aware of General MacArthur’s 

interest in recapturing Seoul but pre31 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Mar 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

32 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51; 

IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51; X Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51. 
THE KILLER OPERATION 

ferring to avoid a direct assault across 

the Han into the capital (although plans 

had been prepared for such an operation), Ridgway hoped to gain a position from which he could take Seoul 

and the ground to the north by a flanking attack from the east or simply by 

posing a threat that would induce enemy forces to withdraw from that 

area.33 

Ridgway published the RIPPER plan 

on 1 March but deferred setting an 

opening date because of forward area 

supply shortages, particularly in food, 

petroleum products, and ammunition. 

The shortages resulted partially from 

conscious efforts during February, especially during the enemy offensive in 

midmonth, to hold down stockpiles in 

forward dumps as a hedge against 

losses through forced abandonment or 

destruction. In addition, as stocks were 

expended in the KILLER advance, the 

damage to roads, rail lines, bridges, and 

tunnels caused by the rains and melting ice and snow severely hampered 

resupply. Before setting a date for the 

RIPPER operation Ridgway wanted a 

five-day level of supplies established at 

all forward points. The best estimate at 

the beginning of March was that this 

level could be reached in about five 

days.34 

Regardless of success in meeting this 

logistical requirement, Ridgway intended to cancel the RIPPER operation 

if in the time taken to raise forward 

supply levels new intelligence disclosed 

311 

clear evidence of an imminent enemy 

attack. Neither the capture of new 

ground nor the retention of ground 

currently held were essential features 

of Eighth Army operations as Ridgway 

conceived them. “Terrain,” he maintained, “is merely an instrument . . . for 

the accomplishment of the mission 

here,” that of inflicting maximum losses 

on the enemy at minimum cost while 

maintaining major units intact.35 

Information available at the moment 

indicated that those forces giving 

ground before the KILLER advance in 

the IX and X Corps zones were moving into defensive positions just above 

the Arizona line. Colonel Tarkenton, 

the army G-2, believed these forces 

would tie in with the existing enemy 

front tracing the north bank of the Han 

in the west and passing through the 

ridges above Route 20 in the east. Lending support to this judgment, the Chinese 39th Army had moved up on the 

line in front of the IX Corps, and the 

North Korean III Corps, less its 3d Division, had entered the line before the X 

Corps. Thus, as of 1 March six Chinese 

armies and four North Korean corps 

were arrayed between Seoul and the 

spine of the Taebaek Mountains.36 

On the 1st, as he had earlier, Colonel 

Tarkenton carried the Chinese 37th 

Army in his enemy order of battle, locating it immediately behind the center of 

the enemy front in the vicinity of 

Ch’unch’on. In his earlier estimate he 

tentatively had placed the 43d Army 

in the same area but had since decided 

that this unit was not in Korea at all. 

33 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Ridgway, Tarkenton now also had reports that 

The Korean War, p. 114; Eighth Army Outline Plan, 

Seizure of Seoul, 27 Jan 51. 

34 Rad GX-3-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 

I, IX, and X Corps and 187th RCT, 1 Mar 51; Eighth 

Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51; Eighth Army 

CG SS Rpt, Mar 51. 

35 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51. 

36 Eighth Army PIR 232, 1 Mar 51; Operation 

Ripper, Annex “A” (Intelligence), 1 Mar 51; Eighth 

Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 
312 EBB AND FLOW 

AIR INTERDICTION OF THE RAIL LINES 

two Chinese armies, the 24th and 26th, 

had moved south from the HungnamWonsan region to a central assembly 

just above the 38th parallel north of 

Ch’unch’on. Thus three reserve armies 

might be immediately available for offensive operations in the central region. 

To add substance to this possibility, 

agents recently returning from behind 

enemy lines brought back reports that 

the enemy high command at one time 

had planned to open an offensive on 1 

March, then had postponed the opening date to the 15th. During interrogation, recently taken prisoners of war 

partially substantiated the agent reports 

by stating that their forces were preparing to launch an offensive in the Eighth 

Army’s central zone early in March.37 

It also now appeared that the North 

Korean VI Corps, one of the units that 

had withdrawn into Manchuria the past 

autumn, had returned to Korea and 

was moving toward the front in the 

west. At last report the corps, or a part 

of it, was approaching the 38th parallel 

northwest of Seoul and thus was near 

enough to join an enemy offensive. 

Tarkenton concluded, however, that although the enemy high command was 

37 Operation Ripper, Annex “A” (Intelligence), 1 

Mar 51; Conference Notes, Eighth Army CG with 

Corps Comdrs, 1 Mar 51. 
THE KILLER OPERATION 

preparing an offensive, its opening was 

not imminent. He reached that conclusion mainly on grounds that the bulk 

of the enemy’s reserves were too far 

north for early employment.38 

Amid efforts to acquire fuller information on enemy preparations and 

plans, Ridgway arranged an amphibious demonstration in the Yellow Sea in 

an attempt to fix enemy reserves and 

to distract enemy attention from the 

central zone in which the main RIPPER 

attack was to be made. Minesweepers 

of Task Force 95 began the demonstration with sweeps along the west coast 

and into the Taedong estuary in the 

vicinity of Chinnamp’o. A cruiser and 

destroyer contingent followed to bombard pretended landing areas. Troop 

and cargo ships next left Inch’on, 

steamed part way up the coast, then 

reversed course. On 5 March the same 

ships made an ostentatious departure 

from Inch’on to continue the illusion 

of an impending amphibious landing. 

In the Sea of Japan, Task Force 95 had 

placed the Wonsan area under bombardment in February and continued 

the campaign into March. This bombardment, coupled with the occupation 

of an offshore island by a small party 

of South Korean marines, added to 

the impression of imminent landing 

operations.39 

Ridgway had learned that two recently federalized National Guard infantry divisions, the 40th and 45th, 

were soon to leave the United States 

for duty in Japan. In an attempt to enlarge the amphibious threat, he pro313 

posed to General MacArthur that the 

departure of the divisions be publicized 

and a deception plan be developed to 

indicate that the two units would make 

an amphibious landing in Korea. Extending the idea further, Ridgway also 

proposed creating the illusion of forthcoming airborne operations by having 

three replacement increments of six 

thousand men each put on 82d Airborne Division patches after arriving 

in Japan and wear them until they 

reached Korea. He made this second 

proposal on the basis of intelligence indicating that the enemy thought the 

82d was in Japan. Nothing came of either proposal.40 

A continuing interdiction campaign 

opened by the Far East Air Forces in January and about to be joined by the carriers and gunnery ships of Task Force 

77 offered possible help in blunting enemy offensive preparations.41 In laying 

out this campaign General Stratemeyer 

had emphasized attacks on the rail net 

since its capacity for enemy troop and 

supply movements was much greater 

than that of the roads; he had stressed 

in particular the destruction of railroad 

bridges. To date, results had been less 

than originally hoped for, because of 

both an overestimate of Far East Air 

Forces capabilities and an underesti38 Operation Ripper, Annex “A” (Intelligence), 1 

Mar 51. 

39 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Field, United 

States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 326-31. 

40 Rads, G-3-245 KGOP and G-3-1033 KGO, CG 

Eighth Army to CINCFE, 2 and 6 Mar 51, respectively; Rad, C 57127, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 

7 Mar 51. 

41 Rear Adm. Ralph A. Ofstie now commanded 

Task Force 77. In other naval command changes, 

Rear Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland had replaced Admiral 

Doyle as commander of Task Force 90, and Vice Adm. 

Sir William G. Andrewes, Royal Navy, had replaced 

Admiral Smith as commander of Task Force 95. On 

28 March Vice Adm. Harold M. Martin would replace 

Admiral Struble as commander of the Seventh Fleet. 
314 

mate of enemy countermeasures.42 But 

as the attacks continued, a principal 

point in the selection of targets remained that dropping the railroad 

bridges and keeping them unserviceable would leave the Chinese and North 

Koreans with no usable stretch of rail 

line more than thirty miles long.43 

On 5 March General Ridgway had 

his five-day forward supply levels in all 

items except petroleum products. Severely taxed railroad facilities would 

need two more days to complete petroleum shipments. In the meantime, intelligence operations provided no confirming clues that an enemy offensive 

was an immediate threat. In evaluating 

the enemy’s most likely course of ac42 Because of strong enemy air opposition between 

the Ch’ongch’on and Yalu rivers in the far northwest, 

that area became known as “MIG Alley.” 

43 CMH Study, “Air and Naval Interdiction in 

the Korean War:” 1964, copy in CMH; Futrell, The 

United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 289-92; Field, 

United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 309, 3 18-19, 

328-31, 341. 

EBB AND FLOW 

tion Colonel Tarkenton predicted that 

the Chinese and North Koreans would 

defend the line he had described at the 

first of the month, but with changes in 

the frontline order of battle. The Chinese 39th and 40th Armies appeared to 

have withdrawn from the front. This 

withdrawal left the North Korean I Corps 

and Chinese 50th Army in the western 

sector of the line, the 38th, 42d, and 

66th Armies in the central area, and the 

North Korean V, III, and II Corps and 

69th Brigade in the remaining ground 

to the east. With supply requirements 

all but met, the IX and X Corps finishing their advance to line Arizona, and 

no clear indication of an imminent enemy offensive at hand, Ridgway on 5 

March ordered Operation RIPPER to 

begin on the morning of the 7th44 

44 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army PIRs 233-237, 2-6 Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-884 

KGOO, CG, Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps, 

187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 5 Mar 51. 
CHAPTER 

Operation 

XVII 

RIPPER 

The Plan 

The final objective line of the RIPPER 

operation, line Idaho, was anchored in 

the west on the Han River eight miles 

east of Seoul. From that point it looped 

steeply northeastward through the eastern third of the I Corps zone and almost to the 38th parallel in the IX 

Corps’ central zone, then fell off gently 

southeastward across the X Corps and 

South Korean zones to Hap’yong-dong, 

an east coast town six miles north of 

Kangnung. Since line Idaho traced a 

deep salient into enemy territory, a 

successful advance to it would carry 

the Eighth Army, in particular the IX 

Corps in the center, into an area believed to hold a large concentration of 

enemy forces and supplies.1

Prize terrain objectives in the central 

zone were the towns of Hongch’on and 

Ch’unch’on. (Map 26) Both were roads 

hubs, and Ch’unch’on, nearer the 38th 

parallel, appeared to be an important 

enemy supply center. In the major 

RIPPER effort, the IX Corps, now commanded by Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge, 

was to seize the two towns as it moved 

some thirty miles north to the deepest 

point of the Idaho salient.2 The 187th 

1 Rad, GX-3-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, 

IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 1 

Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

2 General Collins, Army chief of staff, preferred 1 

not to release General Swing, whom Ridgway had requested to take the IX Corps, from his assignment as 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team, 

currently undergoing refresher training at Taegu, was to assist the IX Corps 

attack should an opportunity arise to 

employ airborne tactics profitably.3 

To General Hoge’s right, the X 

Corps was to move to a segment of line 

Idaho whose most northerly point lay 

about twenty miles above the present 

corps front. (Map 27) In clearing 

enemy forces from this territory, General Almond was to pay particular attention to the two principal northsouth corridors in his zone, one traced 

by the Soksa-ri-Pangnim-ni segment of 

Route 20 at the corps right, the other 

by a lesser road running south out of 

P’ungam-ni in the left third of the corps 

zone.4 

Responsibility for the remaining 

ground to the east was once again divided between the ROK III and ROK I 

Corps. Believing that the South Korean 

sector needed to be strengthened, parcommandant of the Army War College. General Hoge, 

Ridgway’s next choice, relinquished command of U.S. 

Army forces in Trieste to take command of the IX 

Corps on 5 March. Hoge was noted for a World War 

II exploit in which forces under his direct command 

seized the Remagen bridge over the Rhine. See Eighth 

Army GO 118, 5 Mar 51. See also Ltr, Gen Mark W. 

Clark to Gen Ridgway, 26 Feb 51, and Ltr, Gen Swing 

to Gen Ridgway, 38 Feb 51, both in private papers of

General Ridgway held by the Military History Institute, 

Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 

3 Rad, GX-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, 

IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 1 

Mar 51. 

4 Ibid. 

OPERATION RIPPER 317 

ticularly after the Capital Division 

lost almost a thousand men in the ambush at Soksa-ri on 3 March, General 

Ridgway had detached the ROK I 

Corps headquarters and the ROK 3d 

Division from the X Corps, sending the 

division to rejoin the ROK III Corps 

and reestablishing the ROK I Corps 

with the ROK 9th and Capital Divisions 

in the coastal zone. The ROK 5th Division, having reorganized after being 

hurt in the enemy’s mid-February offensive, meanwhile rejoined the X 

Corps.5 

During the RIPPER advance the two 

South Korean corps were to secure 

Route 20. In the coastal area, ROK I 

Corps forces already were well above 

this lateral road-in fact, were already 

on or above line Idaho. Inland, the 

ROK III Corps would have to move 

about ten miles north through the 

higher Taebaek ridges to get onto 

the Idaho trace some five miles above 

Route 20.6 

In the I Corps zone at the west end 

of the army front, General Milburn 

was to retain two divisions, the ROK 

1st and U.S. 3d, in his western and 

central positions along the lower bank 

of the Han to secure the army flank 

and protect Inch’on, where five hundred to six hundred tons of supplies 

were being unloaded daily thanks to 

Task Force 90 and the 2d Engineer 

Special Brigade. East of Seoul on the 

corps right, the 25th Division, now 

commanded by Brig. Gen. J. Sladen 

Bradley, was to attack across the Han 

on both sides of its confluence with 

the southward flowing Pukhan River. 

Above the Han, General Bradley’s division was to clear the high ground bordering the Pukhan to protect the left 

flank of the IX Corps and to threaten 

envelopment of enemy forces defending Seoul.7

Except in the South Korean corps 

zone in the east, where the shortest advances were scheduled, the RIPPER attack was to be made through a succession of phase lines. The first of these, 

line Albany, lay five to twelve miles 

ahead of the I, IX, and X Corps. This 

line traced commanding ground that 

in the IX Corps zone dominated 

Hongch’on, six miles farther north. 

The second line, Buffalo, lay ahead of 

the I and IX Corps only. A 25th Division advance to this line in the I Corps 

zone would enlarge the envelopment 

threat to enemy forces defending the 

Seoul area. In the IX Corps zone, the 

main objective would be Hongch’on. 

The last phase line, Cairo, applied 

only to the IX Corps. Its seizure would 

give General Hoge the approaches to 

Ch’unch’on, and Ch’unch’on itself 

would be Hoge’s objective in the final 

drive to line Idaho. 

General Ridgway made a strong bid 

to secure preparations for the advance. 

He began by restricting access to plans 

and orders within his command. To 

forestall a premature press release, he 

personally briefed newsmen on the 

RIPPER concept on 6 March, then 

pressed them not to disclose anything 

about the operation for forty-eight 

7 Ibid.; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; I Corps 

5 Eighth Army G3 Jnls, 2, 3, and 5 Mar 51; Eighth Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Field, United States Naval 

Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. Operations, Korea, pp. 324-26. 

6 Rad, GX-3-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, 8 Rad, GX-3-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, 

IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 1 IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 1 

Mar 51. Mar 51. 
MAP 27
OPERATION RIPPER 

hours.9 Following through on his earlier decision to discourage General 

MacArthur’s publicized visits to Korea 

lest they alert the enemy to impending 

operations, he also sent MacArthur a 

carefully worded message explaining 

the danger and urging him to postpone coming to Korea until Operation 

RIPPER was well under way.10 

MacArthur flew to Korea on the 

opening day of the RIPPER advance but 

in line with Ridgway’s request timed his 

arrival at Suwon airfield for late in the 

morning, several hours after the initial 

assaults. Returning to the field in midafternoon after an inspection of the IX 

Corps zone, MacArthur opened a press 

conference with an announcement 

that UNC operations were progressing 

satisfactorily. But “there should be 

no illusions in this matter,” he continued. “Assuming no diminution of the 

enemy’s flow of ground forces and materiel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation 

upon our freedom of counter-offensive 

action, and no major additions to our 

organizational strength, the battle lines 

cannot fail in time to reach a point of 

theoretical stalemate.“11 

Implicit in his words, which some referred to as MacArthur’s “Die for Tie” 

statement, was an objection to the positions previously taken in Washington 

that denied MacArthur substantial 

319 

9 Judging the enemy’s own communications to be 

very weak, Ridgway was convinced that much of the 

enemy’s intelligence information came from the Stars 

and Stripes and the Armed Forces Radio Service. 

10 Rad, GX-3-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 

I, IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 

1 Mar 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Ridgway, 

The Korean War, p. 110. 

11 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; MacArthur’s 

statement is quoted in MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3540- 

41. 

troop reinforcement and prevented 

him from carrying the war into China.12 

In his own view, as he would write later, 

“a great nation which enters upon war 

and does not see it through to victory 

will ultimately suffer all the consequences of defeat.“13 Having indicated 

that under present circumstances he 

could not lead the United Nation Command to victory, MacArthur, in concluding his Suwon statement, insisted 

that “vital decisions have yet to be 

made-decisions far beyond the scope 

of the authority vested in me as the 

military commander.“14 

Deliberations toward an important 

decision were currently under way in 

Washington, but not in the direction 

of MacArthur’s viewpoint. No one in 

Washington disputed MacArthur’s prediction that a stalemate could develop 

out of the conditions obtaining. But a 

military victory, because of the commitments and risks an attempt to achieve 

it would entail, was no longer considered a practical objective. The preferred course-preferred because it 

would be consistent with the greater 

strategy and ongoing preparations 

against the possibility of world warwas to seek a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of Korean issues. Such 

a course of action was under study in 

the Department of State and Department of Defense. Exactly how to go 

about achieving the desired ends remained undecided at the opening of 

Operation RIPPER, but there was 

general agreement that an attempt to 

achieve them might best be made after 

12 See Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 189. 

13 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 386. 

14 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3540-41. 
320 EBB AND FLOW 

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION TANKS CROSS THE HAN RIVER in Operation Ripper, 

7 March 1951. 

the Eighth Army had driven enemy 

forces above the 38th parallel.15 

Concerned that MacArthur’s prediction of a stalemate might hurt operations by giving Eighth Army forces the 

impression that their best efforts would 

nevertheless be futile, General Ridgway 

put his own, and somewhat different, 

view on public record on 12 March. 

Calling a press conference at his new 

tactical command post, established on 

the 10th in Yoju so that it would be 

more centrally located, he told newsmen that regaining the 38th parallel 

would be a “tremendous victory” for 

the Eighth Army. It would mean that 

the encroachment of communism in 

Korea had been stopped-exactly what 

the U.N. Command had set out to 

accomplish. (In January he had made 

this same point in his “What Are We 

Fighting For” statement to his troops.) 

Conversely, if the Chinese failed to 

drive the U.N. Command out of Korea, 

they would have “failed monumentally.” In any case, he emphasized, “we 

didn’t set out to conquer China.“16 

15 See Schnabel, Policy and Direction, ch. XIX. 

16 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Middleton, The 

Compact History of the Korean War, p. 173; Rees, Korea: 

The Limited War, p. 208. 
OPERATION RIPPER 

The Advance to Line Albany 

The opening phase of Operation 

RIPPER gave promise that the Eighth 

Army might reach its final ground objectives almost by enemy default. Employing only a delaying action by small 

forces, the Chinese and North Korean 

line units frequently offered stubborn 

resistance, including local counterattacks, but more frequently opposed 

approaching Eighth Army forces at 

long range, then withdrew.17 

In the I Corps zone, the 25th Division made a model crossing of the Han 

before daylight on 7 March. Attacking 

with three regiments abreast following 

heavy preparatory fires on the northern bank of the river and in company 

with simulated crossings by other corps 

forces, the division reached the northern shore almost unopposed. Joined 

quickly by tanks that forded or were 

ferried across the river, and helped by 

good close air support after daybreak, 

the assault battalions pushed through 

moderate resistance, much of it in the 

form of small arms, machine gun, and 

mortar fire and a profusion of well 

placed antitank and antipersonnel 

mines, for first-day gains of one to two 

miles.” 

Averaging similar daily gains against 

opposition that faded after 10 March, 

General Bradley’s three regiments 

reached line Albany between the 1lth 

and 13th. The 35th Infantry, first to 

reach the phase line, cleared a narrow 

zone on the east side of the Pukhan 

River. On the west side the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry occupied 

321 

heights in the Yebong Mountain mass 

within two to three miles of the SeoulCh’unch’on road and on line with the 

northern outskirts of Seoul to the 

west.19 

In the main attack, the IX Corps advanced four divisions abreast. In a wide 

zone at the corps left the 24th Division 

attacked through the Yongmun Mountain mass, while in narrower zones in 

the eastern half of the corps area the 

1st Cavalry, ROK 6th, and 1st Marine 

Divisions moved toward Hongch’on. 

Advancing steadily against light to moderate resistance, all but the ROK 6th 

Division, which the cavalrymen and marines on either side gradually pinched 

out, were on line Albany by dark on 12 

March.20 

Accompanying forces of the 1st Marine Division attacking astride Route 29 

above Hoengsong was a recovery team 

from the 2d Infantry Division detailed 

to search for the bodies of men and the 

equipment lost in that area by division 

forces who had been supporting the X 

Corps’ ROUNDUP operation when the 

Chinese attacked in mid-February. By 

12 March the team recovered more 

than two hundred fifty bodies, mostly 

of men who had been members of Support Force 21, and retrieved the five 

155-mm. howitzers left behind when 

the support force withdrew. (The air 

strikes the support force commander 

had requested on the abandoned weapons either had not been flown or had 

not found their targets.) The team also 

retrieved the six M-5 tractors left behind by the support force artillery, evacuated four of the six tanks that had 

been lost, and recovered a number of 

17 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

18 Ibid.; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th Inf 

Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

19 25th Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

20 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 
322 EBB AND FLOW 

damaged trucks that were of value at 

least for spare parts.21 

In the X Corps zone, the 2d, ROK 

5th, and 7th Divisions advanced 

abreast, the 2d moving through the 

P’ungam-ni corridor on the left, the 7th 

along Route 20 on the right, and the 

ROK 5th over the ridges in the center. 

In a well fought delaying action, North 

Korean forces kept gains short until 11 

March, when they began to withdraw 

above the Albany line. Against the diminishing resistance, the 2d and 7th 

Divisions each placed a regiment on 

the phase line on 13 March. At corps 

center, the ROK 5th Division reached 

the line on the following day.22 

Immediately east, the ROK III Corps 

reached and at some points passed 

above Route 20 by dark on 13 March. 

With forces already well above line 

Idaho in the coastal zone, the ROK I 

Corps meanwhile made only minor adjustments to consolidate its forward 

positions. As of the 13th, a regiment of 

the ROK 9th Division and two regiments of the Capital Division occupied 

a line reaching northeastward from the 

Hwangbyong Mountain area to the 

coast near the town of Chumunjin.23 

A problem meanwhile had arisen in 

rear of the ROK I Corps when the 

North Korean 10th Division, isolated behind Eighth Army lines since January, 

opened a bid to return to its own lines. 

Though much reduced by attempts of 

the 1st Marine Division until midFebruary and the ROK 2d Division 

thereafter to destroy the enemy unit in 

the P’ohang-dong-Andong-Yongdok 

21 2d Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

22 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 2d Inf Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 7th Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Mar 51. 

23 Eighth Army G3 Jnls, 7-15 Mar 51. 

area, the division had maintained a formal organization of a headquarters and 

three regiments and with a surviving 

strength of about two thousand had 

managed by the opening of Operation 

RIPPER to slip north through the Taebaeks to the Irwol Mountain region, 

thirty miles northeast of Andong. Easily withstanding further efforts of the 

ROK 2d Division to eliminate it, the 

division by 13 March reached the 

Chungbong Mountain area, about 

twenty-five miles south of Kangnung. 

As the North Korean unit approached 

the ROK I Corps rear, General Kim 

sent two regiments of the ROK 9th Division and a battalion of the Capital Division south to intercept it. The two 

forces clashed briefly in the Chungbong 

heights on the morning of the 13th to 

open what would become a cat-andmouse affair lasting ten days.24 

The Enemy Buildup 

During the evening of the 13th General Ridgway ordered the next phase 

of the RIPPER advance to begin the following morning. On the west, the 25th 

Division was to advance toward a segment of line Buffalo bulging four miles 

above the Seoul-Ch’unch’on road in a 

zone confined to the west side of the 

Pukhan River. In the main attack, the 

IX Corps was to make its major effort 

in the right half of the corps zone, sending the 1st Cavalry and 1st Marine Divisions to clear Hongch’on and then to 

occupy line Buffalo above town to 

block Route 29 leading northwest to 

Ch’unch’on and Route 24 running 

through the Hongch’on River valley to 

24 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army PIRs 236246, 5-15 Mar 51. 
OPERATION RIPPER 323 

all of whom were outside the zone of 

the RIPPER advance, to abandon their 

positions along the Han. Tarkenton 

also believed that enemy forces were 

now prepared, or nearly so, to make 

some form of strong counter effort and 

that they well might open it out of the 

Hongch’on area when Ridgway’s forces 

arrived in that region.26 But on this 

count, as well as in his estimate of 

enemy defensive plans, the continuation of Operation RIPPER would prove 

Colonel Tarkenton in error. 

The evidence of an enemy buildup 

collected by the army intelligence staff 

was nonetheless valid. At the same time, 

it was incomplete and off the mark in 

the identification and location of units. 

To begin with, what the intelligence 

staff had reported in mid-February as 

the entry of seven new Chinese armies 

into Korea was largely the return of 

the three North Korean corps and nine 

divisions that had withdrawn into Manchuria for reorganization and retraining the past autumn. Beginning in 

January, the North Korean VI Corps, 

with the 18th, 19th, and 36th Divisions, 

crossed the Yalu at Ch’ongsongjin, 

thirty miles northeast of Sinuiju. Avoiding Route 1 in favor of lesser roads 

nearby, corps commander Lt. Gen. 

Choe Yong Jin took his divisions south 

into Hwanghae Province and assembled 

them in the Namch’onjom-Yonan area 

northwest of Seoul. On arriving there 

in mid-February, General Choe assumed command of the North Korean 

23d Brigade previously stationed in the 

area to defend the Haeju sector of the 

Yellow Sea coast.27 

26 Eighth Army PIRs 242-244, 1l-13 Mar 51. 

27 Eighth Army G2 Estimate, 16 Feb 51; GHQ, FEC, 

Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army, 

16 Feb 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean 

Army, 31 Jul 52. 

the northeast. Only short advances were 

required in the western half of the IX 

Corps zone, by the 24th Division at the 

left in conjunction with the I Corps advance and by the ROK 6th Division at 

the right to protect the flank of the 

forces attacking Hongch’on. To the 

east, the X Corps and ROK III Corps 

were to continue toward line Idaho 

while, on the flank, the ROK I Corps 

had only to maintain its forward positions in the coastal slopes while other 

corps forces concentrated on eliminating the North Korean 10th Division.25 

Against the continued advance, according to estimates prepared by the 

army G-2 as the initial RIPPER phase 

concluded, the Chinese delaying forces 

backing away from the 25th Division 

and the four divisions of the IX Corps 

were expected to join their parent units 

in defenses in the next good system of 

high ground to the north located generally on an east-west line through 

Hongch’on. Presenting something of a 

barrier to this ground in the IX Corps 

zone was the Hongch’on River, which 

flowed into the zone from the northeast to a bend below Hongch’on town, 

then meandered west to empty into the 

Pukhan. Colonel Tarkenton expected 

the North Korean forces in the higher 

ridges to the east to withdraw to positions on line with those of the Chinese 

in the IX Corps zone but did not expect the North Koreans defending 

Seoul and the ground west of the city, 

25 Rad GX-3-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 

I, IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 

1 Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-2401 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

to CG I Corps et al., 13 Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-2446 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 13 Mar 

51; Rad, GX-3-2480 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 13 Mar 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 

51; IX Corps Opn Dir 27, 12 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; X Corps OI 134, 13 Mar 51. 
324 EBB AND FLOW 

Eighth Army intelligence identified 

and caught the southward movement 

of the VI Corps by 1 March but remained in the dark, even at midmonth, 

about the reentry of the North Korean 

VII and VIII Corps. Crossing the Yalu 

at Sinuiju in January, the VII Corps, with 

the 13th, 32d, and 37th Divisions, proceeded across Korea in a drawn out series of independent movements by subordinate units to the Wonsan area, 

closing there by the end of February. 

In the same time the VIII Corps, with 

the 42d, 45th, and 46th Divisions, reentered Korea at Manp’ojin and, without 

the 45th Division, moved across the peninsula to the Hungnam area. The 45th 

Division proceeded to Inje, just above 

the 38th parallel in eastern Korea, to 

join the North Korean III Corps as a 

replacement for the 3d Division, which 

the III Corps had left in the Wonsan 

area when it moved to the front.28 

some time.29 

Besides the recently arrived VI Corps, 

North Korean reserves in western 

North Korea included the IV Corps, 

whose location and composition Eighth 

Army intelligence at mid-March had yet 

to discover. Operating in northeastern 

Korea until late December, the headquarters of the IV Corps had then 

moved west to the P’yongyang area. 

Since that time, under the command of 

Lt. Gen. Pak Chong Kok and operating with the 4th, 5th, and 105th Tank 

Divisions and the 26th Brigade, the corps 

had had the mission of defending the 

Yellow Sea coast between Chinnamp’o 

and Sinanju.30 

Once in Wonsan, VII Corps commander Lt. Gen. Lee Yong Ho assumed 

command of the 3d Division and also 

the 24th Division, which was defending 

the coast in that area. Similarly, on arriving in Hungnam with two divisions, 

Lt. Gen. Kim Chang Dok, commander 

of the VIII Corps, accumulated two 

other units already in the vicinity, the 

41st Division and 63d Brigade. Thus, by 

the beginning of March North Korean 

reserves in the Hungnam-Wonsan area 

totaled two corps with eight divisions 

and a brigade. As late as the middle of 

the month Ridgway’s intelligence staff 

was aware only of the two divisions and 

brigade that had been in the region for 

With the return of forces from Manchuria, North Korean reserves by early 

March altogether numbered four corps, 

fourteen divisions, and three brigades. 

These and the units at the front, including the 10th Division currently attempting to return to its own lines, gave the 

North Korean People’s Army an organization of eight corps, twenty-seven 

divisions, and four brigades. This force 

was not nearly so strong as its numerous units would indicate. Most divisions 

were understrength, and many of those 

recently reconstituted were scarcely battle worthy. Before March was out, in 

fact, two divisions, the 41st and 42d, 

would be broken up to provide replacements for others. Nevertheless, the 

army had recovered measurably from 

its depleted condition-in early autumn 

of 1950.31 

There was also fresh leadership in 

the North Korean People’s Army high 

28 Operation Ripper, Annex “A” (Intelligence), 1 

Mar 51; Eighth Army PIR 245, 14 Mar 51; GHQ, 

FEC, Order of Battle Information, North Korean 

Army, 16 Feb 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North 

29 Ibid. 

30 Ibid. 

31 GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North 

Korean Army, 16 Feb 51; Hq, FEC, History of the 

Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. North Korean Army, 31 JuI 52. 
OPERATION RIPPER 325 

command. In a recent change, Lt. Gen. 

Nam 11 replaced General Lee as chief 

of staff. General Nam, about forty years 

old, had a background of college and 

military training in the Soviet Union 

and World War II service as a company grade officer in the Soviet Army. 

A close associate of Premier Kim, Nam 

had a solid political, if not military, 

foundation for his new post. Nam’s 

headquarters was in P’yongyang, where 

in December General Lee had reassembled the General Headquarters staff from 

Manchuria and Kanggye.32 

Front Headquarters, the tactical echelon of General Headquarters, was again 

in operation (apparently in the town of 

Kumhwa, located in central Korea some 

thirty miles north of Ch’unch’on). General Kim Chaek, the original commander of this forward headquarters, 

had died in February. Now in command was Lt. Gen. Kim Ung, who during World War II had served with the 

Chinese 8th Route Army in north 

China and more recently had led the 

North Korean I Corps in the main attack 

during the initial invasion of South 

Korea. A solid tactician, he was currently the ablest North Korean People’s 

Army field commander.33 

LT. GEN. NAM IL 

The Chinese forces in Korea also 

were under new leadership. In either 

January or February Peng Teh-huai 

had replaced Lin Piao as commander 

of the Chinese People’s Volunteers.34 In 

company with the change in command, 

a surge of fresh Chinese units from 

Manchuria had begun. During the last 

two weeks of February the XIX Army 

Group, with the 63d, 64th, and 65th Armies, crossed into Korea at Sinuiju, and 

during the first half of March the group 

commander, Yang Teh-chih, assembled 

his forces not far above the 38th parallel northwest of Seoul in the Kumch’onKuhwa-ri area between the Yesong and 

Imjin rivers. Also entering in late February were the 9th Independent Artillery 

Regiment and the 11 th Artillery Regiment 

of the 7th Motorized Artillery Division.35 

32 Ibid.; Hq, NKPA (North Korean People’s Army), Order no. 027, 14 Jan 51, translation in Eighth Army 

PIR 235, 4 Mar 51. 

33 Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 

Jul 52. 

34 Peng meanwhile retained his posts as deputy commander in chief of the People’s Liberation Army and 

As these forces entered, the IX Army 

Group, which had been seriously hurt 

in the Changjin Reservoir engagement 

and which now had been out of action 

35 George The Chinese Communist Army in Action, 

p. 7; Eighth Army PIRs 235, 4 Mar 51, and 239, 8 Mar 

51; USAFFE Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 5, 16-28 Feb 53, and 

no. 26. 1630 Jun 52. _I commander of the First Field Army. 
326 EBB AND FLOW 

PENG TEH-HUAI 

for two months, was well along in refurbishing its three armies, the 20th, 26th, 

and 27th. At the time of this group’s 

entry into Korea, each of its armies 

had been reinforced by a fourth division. The extra divisions had been 

inactivated, and their troops were being 

distributed as replacements among the 

remaining units. By 1 March the 26th 

Army had begun to move into an area 

near the 38th parallel behind the central sector of the front. The Eighth 

Army intelligence staff quickly picked 

up the move of the 26th, but even at 

mid-March the staff had only a few 

reports-which it did not accept-that 

any part of the XIX Army Group had 

entered Korea.36 

As part of the buildup, four armies 

of the XIII Army Group, all in need of 

restoration, were replaced at the front 

during the first half of March. By the 

l0th, the 26th, Army moved southwest 

out of its central reserve location to relieve the 38th, and 50th Armies, which 

had been opposing the 25th Division 

and 24th Division. Upon relief, the 38th 

withdrew to the Sukch’on area, north 

of P’yongyang, where it came under the 

control of Headquarters, Chinese People’s 

Volunteers. The 50th returned to Manchuria, reaching An-tung by the end of 

the month.37 

The 39th and 40th Armies, which had 

left the line before the start of the 

RIPPER operation and had assembled 

in the Hongch’on area, meanwhile begari relieving the 42d and 66th Armies 

in the central sector, completing relief 

on or about 14 March. On being 

replaced, the 42d moved north to 

Yangdok, midway between P’yongyang 

and Wonsan, for reorganization and 

resupply. Like the 38th, the 42d also 

passed to Headquarters, Chinese People’s 

Volunteers, control. The 66th had seen 

its last day of battle in Korea. En route 

to Hopei Province, its home base in 

China, the army paraded through Antung, Manchuria, on 2 Apri1.38 

As these frontline changes were 

made, another complement of fresh 

Chinese forces began entering Korea. 

First to enter in March was the independent 47th Army, commanded by 

Chang Tien-yun. The army was assigned to the XIII Army Group but not 

given a combat mission. Its divisions, 

the 139th, 140th, and 141st, were sent 

to the area above P’yongyang to con36 USAFFE Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 3, 16-31 Jan 53, 

and no. 99, 2 Feb 53; Eighth Army PIRs 232, 1 Mar 

51, and 245, 14 Mar 51. 

37 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99, 2 Feb 53, and no. 115, 

17 Feb 53. 

38 Ibid., no. 115, 17 Feb 53. 
OPERATION RIPPER 327 

struct airfields at Sunan, Sunch’on, and 

Namyang-ni, respectively. Coming into 

Korea at the same time was the 5th Artillery Division, which because of its means 

of transportation was known also as the 

“Mule Division.” This unit, too, was assigned to the XIII Army Group.39 

Following these units into Korea was 

a far larger force, the III Army Group, 

with the 12th, 15th, and 60th Armies. At 

mid-March this group was still in the 

process of entering the peninsula and 

assembling in the Koksan-Sin’ggyeIch’on region north of the area occupied by the newly arrived XIX Army 

Group. The final force due to enter Korea in March made up the bulk of the 

2d Motorized Artillery Division. Entering 

late in the month, the division would 

join its 29th Regiment already in Korea.40 

When all Chinese movements in 

March were completed, the strength of 

the Chinese People’s Volunteers would 

have risen to four army groups with 

fourteen armies and forty-two divisions, 

these supported by four artillery divisions and two separate artillery regiments. As sensed by Eighth Army intelligence, the buildup was in preparation 

for an offensive. But the offensive 

would not originate in the Hongch’on 

area, as Colonel Tarkenton thought 

possible, nor was it imminent. The 

movement and positioning of reinforcements from Manchuria would continue 

through most of March; the remainder 

of the IX Army Group would not be fully 

ready to move south until the turn of 

the month; and the refurbishing of 

other units, both North Korean and 

Chinese, would require even more time. 

In line with the doctrine of elastic, or 

mobile, defense, small forces meanwhile would continue to employ delaying tactics against the RIPPER advance. 

With some exceptions, the delaying 

forces would give ground even more 

easily than they had during the opening phase of the operation as they fell 

back toward the concentrations of major units above the 38th parallel. 

Hongch’on Cleared 

In ordering the second phase of 

RIPPER to begin, General Ridgway allowed for the possibility that the Chinese would set up stout defenses in the 

ground immediately below Hongch’on 

and instructed the IX Corps commander to take the town by double 

envelopment, not by frontal assault. 

Accordingly, General Hoge directed 

the 1st Cavalry Division to envelope it 

on the west and the 1st Marine Division to move around it on the east. 

Hongch’on actually lay in the Marine 

zone near the boundary between the 

two divisions.41 

As Hoge’s forces attacked north on 

the morning of the 14th, it became 

steadily clearer that they would meet 

little resistance in the ground below 

their objectives. Long range small arms 

fire and small, scattered groups of Chinese who made no genuine attempt to 

delay the advance toward Hongch’on 

were the extent of the opposition the 

1st Cavalry and 1st Marine Divisions 

encountered during the morning. The 

24th Division and the ROK 6th Division, which had rejoined the advance 

in a new zone on the right of the 24th, 

39 Ibid., vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53, and no. 26, 16-30 

Jun 52. 

40 Ibid., vol. 1, no. 1, l-31 Dec 52, and no. 26, 16-30 

Jun 52. 

41 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; IX Corps Opn 

Dir 27, 12 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 
328 

met no enemy at all in making their 

short advances in the western half of 

the corps zone.42 

Prompted by the easy morning gains, 

General Hoge recommended to General Ridgway that the 24th and ROK 

6th Divisions extend their advances to 

the lower bank of the Hongch’on River 

and to the Chongp’yong Reservoir, located within a double bend of the Pukhan just west of the mouth of the 

Hongch’on. Ridgway approved, and 

through the afternoon the two divisions 

continued to advance, still unopposed, 

within two to four miles of the river 

line. In continuing the attack on 

Hongch’on, the 1st Cavalry Division advanced against scant resistance and 

reached the Hongch’on River west of 

town late in the afternoon. The 1st Marine Division, moving more slowly in 

descending the Oum Mountain mass 

on the eastern approach, advanced 

within three miles of Hongch’on before 

organizing perimeters for the night.43 

On 15 March the 24th Division at 

the far left of the corps advance moved 

without opposition to the lower bank 

of the Chongp’yong Reservoir while the 

ROK 6th Division in the zone between 

the 24th and 1st Cavalry Divisions also 

advanced against no resistance to high 

ground overlooking the Hongch’on 

River. The 25th Division at the right of 

the I Corps zone moved just as easily 

through the ground west of the Pukhan. By dark on the 15th the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry reached the 

EBB AND FLOW 

Seoul-Ch’unch’on road at the left and 

center of the division zone while the 

attached Turkish brigade, having taken 

over a zone bordering the Pukhan at 

the far right, moved about two miles 

above the road adjacent to the newly 

won positions of the 24th Division.44 

In the Hongch’on area, the cavalry 

division stood fast along the Hongch’on 

River on the 15th to wait for the marines to come up on its right. Strong 

enemy positions on a ridge due east of 

Hongch’on stalled the marines in that 

area, but at the far left of the Marine 

zone the town itself fell to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, at noon. A motorized patrol, first to enter, found the 

town ruined and undefended. On the 

return trip, following an explosion that 

damaged a truck, the patrol discovered 

that Far East Air Forces bombers had 

liberally sprinkled the eastern half of 

the town with small bombs set to explode when disturbed.45 A company of 

Marine engineers began the uncomfortable task of clearing these explosives 

while the 1st Battalion passed through 

and occupied high ground immediately 

northeast of town. 46 

42 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Cav Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, 

Mar 51: 24th lnf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

43 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Comd Jnl, Mar 51; Rad, 

G-3-2599 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I and IX 

Corps, 14 Mar 51; IX Corps Opn Dir 28, 14 Mar 51; 

IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 

Jnl, 14 Mar 51. 

Seoul Retaken 

By the time Hongch’on fell, General 

Ridgway discerned that the enemy high 

command had decided to hand over a 

44 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 15 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 24th Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 

51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th lnf Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

45 M83 fragmentation, or “butterfly,” bombs, so 

called because of whirling vanes that controlled their 

drop and armed them. 

46 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 15 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 

51; 24th Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Marine 

Div Hist Diary, Mar 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, 

Marine Operations in Korea, vol. IV, p. 88. 
OPERATION RIPPER 329 

far bigger prize, Seoul. The first sign 

appeared on 12 March when aerial observers flying over the enemy’s Han 

River positions between Seoul and the 

25th Division’s bridgehead saw a large 

number of troops moving northwest 

out of that area. Patrols from the 3d 

Division, which held positions along the 

Han opposite, crossed the river on the 

night of the 12th and found shoreline 

positions vacant. On the following night 

3d Division patrols moved more than a 

half mile above the Han without making contact.47 

Patrols from both the 3d Division and 

ROK 1st Division crossed the Han during the afternoon of 14 March. One 

from the 3d Division discovered that 

enemy forces had vacated an important defensive position on Hill 348, the 

peak of a prominent north-south ridge 

three miles east of Seoul. Nearer the 

city, another moved as far north as the 

Seoul-Ch’unch’on road without contact; a third found that Hill 175, one of 

the lower peaks of South Mountain 

hugging Seoul at its southeast edge, also 

was vacant. Five patrols from the ROK 

1st Division entered Seoul itself. One 

moved all the way through the western 

portion of the city to the gate on Route 

1 while another reached the capitol 

building near city center and raised the 

ROK flag from the dome. None of the 

patrols received fire or sighted enemy 

troops.48 

In continuing to search the city on 

the 15th, the South Koreans discovered 

only a few North Korean deserters who 

had been away from their units too long 

to provide information of value. Outside Seoul, a patrol from the Belgian 

47 3d Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

48 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 14 Mar 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 

14 Mar 51; 3d Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

battalion, recently attached to the 3d 

Division, checked the ground along the 

eastern edge of the city without making contact; two companies of ROK 

troops moved unopposed through the 

ground just west of the city; and still 

farther west, a South Korean patrol 

crossed the Han and moved more than 

five miles north before running into 

enemy fire. 49 Aerial observers saw no 

enemy activity immediately above the 

northern limits of Seoul but observed 

extensive defensive preparations and 

troops disposed in depth east and west 

of Route 3 beginning at a point five 

miles to the north, roughly halfway between Seoul and Uijongbu.50 

Assured that the North Koreans had 

withdrawn from Seoul and adjacent 

ground, General Ridgway late on the 

15th instructed General Milburn to occupy the nearest commanding ground 

above the capital city. The general line 

to be occupied, which Milburn later designated Lincoln, arched across heights 

two miles to the west and north of 

Seoul, then angled northeast across the 

ridge holding Hill 348 to join line Buffalo in the 25th Division’s zone. 

Ridgway left it to Milburn to decide the 

strength of the forces who would cross 

the river but restricted their forward 

movement, once they were on line 

Lincoln, to patrolling to the north and 

northwest to regain contact. The restriction on further advances applied to the 

25th Division as well. The principal objective at the moment, Ridgway explained to Milburn, was not to attack 

49 The Belgian battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. A. 

Crahay, arrived in Korea on 31 January 1951. 

50 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 15 Mar 51; I Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; I Corps PIR 74, 15 Mar 51; 3d Inf 

Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 
330 EBB AND FLOW 

two hundred thousand of the city’s 

original population of 1.5 million. Soon 

after Seoul was reoccupied, therefore, 

a concerted but not entirely successful 

effort began via the press, radio, and 

police lines to prevent former residents 

from returning to the city while it was 

made livable again and while local government was restored under the guidance of civil assistance teams and ROK 

officials. Pusan meanwhile remained 

the temporary seat of national government.53 

This time there was no ceremony 

dramatizing the reoccupation of the 

capital city as there had been at the climax of the Inch’on landing operation 

the past September. General MacArthur visited Korea on 17 March but 

elected not to enter Seoul and limited 

his inspection to the 1st Marine Division as the IX Corps prepared to move 

forward toward Ch’unch’on.54 

the enemy but simply to follow his 

withdrawal.51 

Assigning the segment of line Lincoln encompassing Seoul to the ROK 

1st Division and the shorter portion east 

of the city to the 3d Division, General 

Milburn instructed General Paik to occupy his sector with a regiment, General Soule to hold his with a battalion 

reinforced by not more than two platoons of tanks. Paik was to send combat 

patrols in search of enemy forces to the 

northwest while Soule sent armored 

combat patrols to regain contact to the 

north. Meanwhile, as bridges were put 

across the river, one in each division 

zone, Paik could place a second regiment on line Lincoln and Soule could 

increase his bridgehead force to a full 

regiment.52 

As expected, there was no opposition when the two division commanders sent forces across the Han on the 

morning of the 16th. By early afternoon the ROK 15th Regiment moved 

through Seoul into position on the far 

side of the city, and the 2d Battalion of 

the 65th Infantry occupied the Hill 348 

area. The capital city, as it changed 

hands for the fourth time, was a shambles. Bombing, shelling, and fires since 

the Eighth Army had withdrawn in 

January had taken a large toll of buildings and had heavily damaged transportation, communications, and utilities systems. Two months of work 

would be required to produce even a 

minimum supply of power and water, 

and local food supplies were insufficient even for the estimated remaining 

51 Rad, GX (TAC) 105 KCG, CG Eighth Army to 

CG I Corps, 15 Mar 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 

51; I Corps Opn Dir 48, 15 Mar 51. 

52 I Corps Opn Dir 48, 15 Mar 51; I Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

Ch’unch’on Captured 

On the morning of 16 March the marines held up the day before by strong 

enemy positions east of Hongch’on discovered that the occupants had withdrawn during the night. They encountered only light resistance as they 

continued toward line Buffalo north 

and northeast of Hongch’on. In the 

western half of the IX Corps zone, patrols from the 24th Division and ROK 

6th Division searching above the 

Chongp’yong Reservoir and Hongch’on 

River encountered almost no opposition. Immediately west of Hongch’on, 

however, the 1st Cavalry Division since 

53 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 16 Mar 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Mar 51; 3d Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar. Mar 51. 

54 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51. 
OPERATION RIPPER 331 

SEOUL RESIDENTS REENTER THE CITY SOON AFTER ITS RECAPTURE 

reaching the Hongch’on River on 14 

March had run into heavy fire and 

numerous, if small, enemy groups while 

putting two battalions into position just 

above the river and sending patrols 

to investigate farther north. This resistance and aerial observation of prepared positions indicated that the Chinese planned to offer a strong 

delaying action in the ground bordering Route 29 between Hongch’on and 

Ch’unch’on.55 

To assist the advance above Hongch’on, General Ridgway on the 16th authorized General Hoge to move all of 

55 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Marine 

Div Hist Diary, Mar 51; 24th Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Mar 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

his divisions forward. The intention 

was that advances by the two divisions 

in the western half of the corps zone, 

in particular by the ROK 6th Division 

in its zone adjacent to the 1st Cavalry 

Division, would threaten the flank of 

the Chinese in front of the cavalrymen. 

Accordingly, Hoge ordered his two divisions in the west and the 1st Cavalry 

Division to advance five to six miles 

beyond their current river positions to 

line Buster, which was almost even with 

the line Buffalo objectives of the 1st 

Marine Division on the corps right.56 

While the 24th Division completed 

56 Rad, GX-3-2925 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

IX Corps, 16 Mar 51; IX Corps Opn Dir 29, 16 Mar 

51. 
332 

preparations for crossing the Pukhan 

at the far left, Hoge’s other divisions 

attacked toward lines Buster and Buffalo on 17 March. Much as anticipated, 

the marines on the right and the South 

Koreans on the left met negligible resistance while the 1st Cavalry Division in 

the center received heavy fire and several sharp counterattacks in a daylong 

fight for dominating heights just above 

the Hongch’on River. But on the 18th, 

with all four divisions moving forward, 

the resistance faded out, and it became 

clear that the Chinese were withdrawing rapidly. Advancing easily against 

minor rearguard action, Hoge’s forces 

were on or near the Buster-Buffalo 

line by day’s end on 19 March. The 

highlight of the advance on the 19th 

occurred in the zone of the ROK 6th 

Division after a patrol in the van of the 

2d Battalion, 2d Regiment, discovered 

a Chinese battalion assembling in a 

small valley three miles above the 

Hongch’on River. Maj. Lee Hong Sun, 

commander of the 2d Battalion, swiftly 

deployed forces on three sides of the 

enemy unit and attacked. Lee’s forces 

killed 231 Chinese, captured 2, and 

took a large quantity of weapons without suffering a casualty.57 

On 18 March, as the rapid Chinese 

withdrawal became evident, General 

Ridgway ordered the IX Corps to continue its attack and take Ch’unch’on. 

General Hoge opened the move by instructing his divisions on the 19th to 

proceed to the next RIPPER phase line, 

Cairo, four to six miles above their 

EBB AND FLOW 

Buster-Buffalo objectives. Once on line 

Cairo, the 1st Cavalry Division would 

be on the southern lip of the basin in 

which Ch’unch’on was located and 

within five miles of the town itself. 

Ridgway meanwhile alerted the 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team for 

operations in the Ch’unch’on area. The 

landing plan, code-named HAWK, 

called for the 187th with the 2d and 

4th Ranger Companies attached to 

drop north of the town on the morning of 22 March and block enemy 

movements out of the Ch’unch’on 

basin. IX Corps forces coming from the 

south were to link up with the paratroopers within twenty-four hours.58 

Easy progress by Hoge’s divisions on 

20 and 21 March and the continuing 

rapid withdrawal of Chinese forces 

made it evident that the projected airborne operation would not be profitable. Ridgway canceled it on the morning of the 21st as the 1st Cavalry 

Division came up on line Cairo without 

opposition. Moving ahead of the main 

body of the division, an armored 

task force meanwhile entered the 

Ch’unch’on basin and at 1330 on the 

21st entered the town itself. It was 

empty of both enemy troops and supplies. The task force made contact only 

after moving ten miles northeast of 

Ch’unch’on over Route 29 in the 

Soyang River valley and then located 

only a few troops who scattered when 

the force opened fire.59 

57 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 19 Mar 51; Eighth Army POR 751, 19 

Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Cav 

Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 24th Inf Div Comd Rpt. 

Nar, Mar 51; 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Mar 51; 

Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 112. 

58 Rad, GX-3-3360 KGOO, Eighth Army to CG IX 

Corps et al., 18 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Mar 51; Rads, GX-3-3469 KCOP and GX-3-3474 

KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG 187th Abn RCT et al., 

19 Mar 51; Rad, GX--3-3682 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

to CG 187th Abn RCT et al., 20 Mar 51. 

59 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 

51. 
OPERATION RIPPER 333 

Reservoir, located almost due north of 

Ch’unch’on, and the east coast.61 

As Ridgway’s forces in the east consolidated positions along line Idaho and 

sent patrols north, the problem of the 

North Korean 10th Division remained. 

On 20 March Ridgway pressed the ROK 

Army chief of staff and the KMAG 

chief to eliminate the enemy unit.62 But 

in the difficult Taebaek terrain, the retreating division, although it lost heavily to air and ground attacks, separated 

into small groups and managed to find 

ways northwest through the mountains. 

After a flurry of small engagements 

while infiltrating the line Idaho fronts 

of the ROK III Corps and ROK I 

Corps, the remnants of the division, less 

than a thousand men, reached their 

own lines on 23 March. In the days 

following, the reduced division moved 

to Ch’ongju, deep in northwestern 

Korea, and began reorganizing under 

the control of the North Korean IV Corps 

as a mechanized infantry division. Still 

later, while continuing to reorganize 

and retrain, the unit was assigned to 

defend a sector of the west coast.63 It 

would not again see frontline duty. 

During this search to the northeast a 

second task force from the cavalry division reached Ch’unch’on in midafternoon, just in time to greet General 

Ridgway, who, after observing operations from a light plane overhead, 

landed on one of the town’s longer 

streets. As a precaution against an enemy attempt to retake the town during 

the night, Ridgway before leaving instructed both task forces to return to 

the cavalry division’s line Cairo positions by dark. The precaution was unnecessary. Ch’unch’on remained vacant 

until the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, set 

up a patrol base in the town on the 

following day.60 

On the Eastern Front 

With the capture of Ch’unch’on, all 

major ground objectives of Operation 

RIPPER were in Eighth Army hands. To 

the east, the X Corps and ROK III 

Corps had reached line Idaho by 17 

March. North Korean forces had offered stiff resistance to the attack on 

only one day, the 15th, and then only 

in the X Corps area. Prisoners taken 

during the advance indicated that the 

V, II, and III Corps were withdrawing 

above the 38th parallel to reorganize 

and prepare for offensive operations. 

Searching to confirm this information, 

General Ridgway on 18 March ordered 

all three corps on the eastern front to 

reconnoiter deep beyond the parallel 

in the area between the Hwach’on 

60 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army 

CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 

114-15. In The Korean War, Ridgway erroneously dates 

the entry into Ch’unch’on as 19 March. 

61 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Sum, Mar 51; Eighth 

Armv G3 Jnls, 14-17 Mar 51; X Corns Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Mar 51; 2d Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 7th 

Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-3266 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X 

Corps, 18 Mar 51. 

62 Coincidentally, a psychological warfare leaflet currently being used to urge all guerrillas in South Korea 

to give up a hopeless fight echoed Ridgway’s sentiments. Translated, the message warned, “The mouse 

has gnawed at the tiger’s tail long enough.” See Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 24 Mar 51. 

63 Eighth Army PIRs 245-254, 14-23 Mar 51; Eighth 

Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Mar 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean 

Army, 31 Jul 52. 
334 EBB AND FLOW 

The Courageous Concept was in the west above the I Corps. AcThe inability of South Korean forces 

cording to patrol results and intellito eliminate the North Korean 10th Divigence sources, the North Korean I Corps 

sion reflected the total result of Operaand the Chinese 26th Army occupied 

tion RIPPER to date. For although the 

that area, generally along and above a 

Eighth Army had taken its principal terline through Uijongbu. Appearing 

ritorial objectives, it had had far less 

most vulnerable were the three divisuccess in destroying enemy forces and 

sions of the I Corps in the region west 

materiel. Through the period 1-15 

of Uijongbu with the lower stretch of 

March, which included most of the 

the Imjin River at their backs. Any withharder fighting, known enemy dead 

drawal by these forces would require 

totaled 7,151; as the Chinese and 

primarily the use of Route 1 and its 

North Koreans accelerated their withcrossing over the Imjin near the town 

drawal after the 15th, that figure had 

of Munsan-ni; thus, if this withdrawal 

not increased to any great extent.64 

route could be blocked in the vicinity 

Ch’unch’on, the suspected enemy 

of its Imjin crossing, the North Koreans 

supply center, had been bare when 

below the river would find it extremely 

entered; although numerous caches of 

difficult to escape attacks from the 

materiel had been captured elsewhere, 

south. With this in mind, General 

these had been relatively small. In sum, 

Ridgway enlarged Operation RIPPER 

the enemy high command so far had 

with plans for an airborne landing at 

succeeded in keeping the bulk of frontMunsan-ni by the 187th Airborne Regiline forces and supplies out of range of 

mental Combat Team in concert with 

the RIPPER advance.65 

overland attacks by the I Corps. He 

As Ch’unch’on fell, one area in which 

called the supplemental squeeze play 

there appeared to be an opportunity to 

Operation COURAGEOUS. 66 

destroy an enemy force of some size 

64 Ltr, Maj Gen Leven C. Allen, Eighth Army Chief 

66 Eighth Army PIRs 247-251, 16-20 Mar 51; I Corps 

PIR 80, 21 Mar 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 20 Mar 51; Eighth 

of Staff, to Maj Gen Doyle O. Hickey, UNC Acting Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-4040 KGOO, 

Chief of Staff, 19 Mar 51. 

65 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 22 Mar 51; 

Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 115. 
CHAPTER XVIII 

Advance to the Parallel 

Operation Courageous 

As a first step in the attempt to block 

and attack the North Korean I Corps, 

Ridgway on 21 March ordered his own 

I Corps to move forward to line Cairo, 

which he extended southwestward 

across General Milburn’s zone through 

Uijongbu to the vicinity of Haengju on 

the Han. (Map 28) At points generally 

along this line six to ten miles north of 

line Lincoln Milburn’s patrols had made 

some contact with the North Korean I 

Corps west of Uijongbu and the Chinese 26th Army to the east. Milburn was 

to occupy line Cairo on 22 March, a 

day ahead of the airborne landing at 

Munsan-ni, and wait for Ridgway’s further order to continue north.1 

Requiring Milburn to stand along 

line Cairo unless instructed to proceed 

stemmed from Ridgway’s not yet having given the final green light to the 

airborne landing as of the 21st. Operation TOMAHAWK, as the landing was 

called, would take place only if Ridgway 

received assurances that weather conditions on 23 March would favor a parachute drop and that ground troops 

could link up with the airborne force 

within twenty-four hours. If these assurances were forthcoming, the 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team, 

with the 2d and 4th Ranger Compa1 Rad, GX-3-3813 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

I Corps et al., 21 Mar 51. 

nies attached, was to drop in the 

Munsan-ni area on the morning of the 

23d and block Route 1. Milburn was to 

establish physical contact with and assame control of the airborne force once 

it was on the ground. At the same time, 

he was to open a general corps advance 

toward line Aspen, which traced the 

lower bank of the Imjin River west and 

north of Munsan-ni, then sloped eastward across the corps zone to cut 

Routes 33 and 3 eight miles north of 

Uijongbu. Once on Aspen, Milburn was 

to expect Ridgway’s order to continue 

to line Benton, the final COURAGEOUS 

objective line, some ten miles farther 

north. Reaching Benton would carry 

the I Corps virtually to the 38th parallel except in the west where the final 

line fell off to the southwest along the 

Imjin.2 

Because the I Corps otherwise would 

have an open east flank when it moved 

to line Benton, Ridgway extended the 

line southeastward into the IX Corps 

zone across the front of the 24th Division and about halfway across the front 

of the ROK 6th Division to a juncture 

with line Cairo. When Ridgway ordered 

the I Corps to Benton, General Hoge 

was to send his western forces to the 

2 Rads, GX-3-3900 KGOO, GX-3-3908 KGOO, 

and GX-3-4040 KGOO. CG Eighth Army to CG 1 

Corps et al., first two 21 Mar and last 22 Mar 51; 

Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army 

CG SS Rpt, Mar 51. 
336 EBB AND FLOW 

MAP 28 

line to protect the I Corps flank. Meanwhile, in concert with Milburn’s drive 

to lines Cairo and Aspen, Hoge was to 

complete the occupation of his sector 

of line Cairo. Elsewhere along the army 

front, the X Corps and the ROK III 

and I Corps remained under Ridgway’s 

order of 18 March to reconnoiter the 

area between the Hwach’on Reservoir 

and the east coast. As yet, neither 

Almond’s patrols nor those of the South 

Korean corps had moved that deeply 

into enemy territory.3 

The three divisions of the I Corps 

started toward line Cairo at 0800 on 22 

March. The ROK 1st Division, advancing astride Route 1 in the west, overcame very light resistance and had 

3 Rads, GX-3-3813 KGOO, GX-3-4040 KGOO, and 

GX-34-4149 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et 

al., first one 21 Mar and last two, 22 Mar 51. 
ADVANCE TO THE PARALLEL 337 

PRACTICE JUMP BY MEMBERS OF THE 187TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM. Aircraft are C-l 19s. 

troops on the phase line by noon. The 

3d Division astride Route 3 in the center and the 25th Division on the right 

also met sporadic opposition but moved 

slowly and ended the day considerably 

short of the line.4 

General Milburn meanwhile assembled an armored task force in Seoul for 

a drive up Route 1 to make the initial 

contact with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team if and after it 

dropped on Munsan-ni. Building the 

force around the 6th Medium Tank 

Battalion borrowed from the 24th Divi4 I Corps Opn Dir 50, 21 Mar 51; I Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 5 1; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 

51. 

sion of the IX Corps, he added the 2d 

Battalion, 7th Infantry, and all but 

one battery of the 58th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion from the 3d Division; from corps troops he supplied a 

battery of the 999th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion and Company A, 

14th Engineer Combat Battalion. 

He also included two bridge-laying 

Churchill tanks from the 29th British 

Brigade, recently attached to the I 

Corps. Lt. Col. John S. Growdon, commander of the 6th Medium Tank Battalion, was to lead the task force.5 

5 I Corps Opn Dir 51, 22 Mar 51; I Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Task Force 

Growdon, in CMH. 
338 

Ridgway made the final decision on 

the airborne operation late in the afternoon of the 22d during a conference at 

Eighth Army main headquarters in 

Taegu. General Partridge, the Fifth Air 

Force commander, assured him that the 

weather would be satisfactory on the 

23d; Col. Gilman C. Mudgett, the new 

Eighth Army G-3, predicted not only 

that contact with the airborne unit 

would be made within a day’s time, as 

Ridgway required, but that the entire 

I Corps should be able to advance 

rapidly.6 Given these reports, Ridgway 

ordered the airborne landing to take 

place at 0900 on the following day.7 

On hearing the final word on the 

Munsan-ni drop, General Milburn directed Task Force Growdon to pass 

through the ROK 1st Division on line 

Cairo early on 23 March and proceed 

via Route 1 to reach the airborne 

troops. His three divisions meanwhile 

were to resume their advance with the 

objective of reaching line Aspen. The 

ROK 1st Division, which would be following Task Force Growdon, was to relieve the 187th Airborne Regimental 

Combat Team upon reaching Munsanni, and the airborne unit then was to 

prepare to move south and revert to 

Eighth Army reserve.8 

Task Force Growdon, completely 

motorized, passed through the ROK 1st 

Division shortly after 0700. No enemy 

forces opposed the armored column as 

6 Colonel Mudgett replaced Dabney, now a brigadier general, on 21 March 1951. 

7 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Sum, 21 Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-4097 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to CG I Corps et al., 22 Mar 51. 

8 Rad, GX-3-4040 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 22 Mar 51; Rad, CIACT 3-30, CG I 

EBB AND FLOW 

it moved ahead of the South Koreans, 

but within minutes the third tank in 

column hit a mine while bypassing a 

destroyed bridge at the small Changnung River. The task force was held 

up while engineers removed a dozen 

other mines from the bypass. Proceeding slowly from that point with a mine 

detector team leading the way afoot, 

Colonel Growdon’s column moved only 

a mile to the village of Sinwon-ni before encountering more mines. As the 

187th Airborne Regimental Combat 

Team began landing at Munsan-ni at 

0900, Growdon’s task force was at a halt 

some fifteen miles to the south.9 

C46s and C-119s of the 315th Air 

Division had begun lifting the airborne 

troops from the Taegu airfield shortly 

after 0700, all heading initially for a 

rendezvous point over the Yellow Sea 

west of the objective area.” The second serial of aircraft, with the 1st Battalion of the 187th aboard, was in flight 

only briefly before engine trouble in 

the lead plane forced the pilot to return to Taegu for a replacement aircraft. The combat team landed before 

the new lead plane, whose passengers 

included the 1st Battalion commander, 

could reach Munsan-ni. The drop, as a 

result, did not come off entirely as 

planned. 11 

General Bowen, commander of the 

187th, had designated two drop zones, 

one about a mile northeast of Munsan9 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army 

Study, Task Force Growdon. 

10 The provisional Combat Cargo Command had 

been discontinued and the 315th Air Division activated to replace it on 25 January 1951. Brig. Gen. 

John P. Henebry had replaced General Tunner as 

commander of the 315th on 8 February 1951. 

11 Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk, in 

Corps to CO 6th Med Tk Bn, 23 Mar 51; I Corps Opn CMH; 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 

Dir 52, 23 Mar 51. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 353-55. 
ADVANCE TO THE PARALLEL 339 

small groups of North Koreans and a 

meager amount of fire from mortars 

located somewhere to the north. Overcrowding caused by the 1st Battalion’s 

misdirected drop complicated the 3d 

Battalion’s assembly, but units managed 

to sort themselves out and secure the 

borders of the drop zone. An unexpected annoyance was created by civilians who appeared in the drop zone 

and began carrying away parachutes. 

Shots fired over their heads ended the 

attempted theft. Against moderate but 

scattered opposition the 2d Battalion 

proceeded to occupy heights northeast 

of the drop zone, and under the command of its executive officer the 1st 

Battalion, less Company B, moved into 

the ground to the north and northwest, clearing Munsan-ni itself in the 

process.15 

Company B went on a rescue mission to the southern drop zone after 

learning that the command group of 

the 1st Battalion had come under fire 

from enemy forces on Hill 216 overlooking the drop zone from the northwest. Company B forced the enemy 

group off the hill, allowing its survivors to withdraw to the southwest, and 

reached the drop zone by 1500. The 

rescue force and the battalion command group arrived at the regimental 

position to the north about two hours 

later. By that time Bowen’s forces had 

secured all assigned objectives.16 

Battle casualties among the airborne 

troops were light, totaling nineteen. 

Jump casualties were higher-eightyfour-but almost half of these returned 

to duty immediately after treatment. 

ni, another about three miles southeast 

of town. The 1st Battalion was to land 

in the lower zone, the remainder of the 

combat team in the one to the north.12 

As planned, the 3d Battalion with the 

4th Ranger Company attached jumped 

first, Bowen having given it the mission of securing the northern drop 

zone. Bowen’s plan went awry when the 

leaderless second serial of planes mistakenly followed the first and dropped 

the 1st Battalion also in the northern 

zone. The 2d Battalion with the 2d 

Ranger Company attached followed not 

long after, then the 674th Airborne Field 

Artillery Battalion, and at 1000 the artillery heavy drop. 13 

In the brief interval between the 

drops of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 

General Ridgway arrived by L-19, landing on a road between Munsan-ni and 

the northern drop zone. En route, he 

had flown over Task Force Growdon 

then held up at Sinwon-ni, a fact he 

passed to General Bowen. Airborne 

again shortly after 1000, Ridgway saw 

a single stick of paratroops jump from 

a plane over the lower drop zone. The 

replacement plane carrying the 1st Battalion commander and party had finally 

reached Munsan-ni, and its passengers 

had jumped in the correct zone not 

knowing that they would be the only 

troops in the area.14 

To the north, resistance in and immediately around the drop zone was 

minor and sporadic, amounting to a few 

12 Accompanying the 187th to provide additional 

medical support was a para-surgical team from the 

Indian 60th Field Ambulance and Surgical Company. 

13 187th Abn RCT Opn O 2, 22 Mar 51; 187th Abn 

RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, 

Operation Tomahawk. 

14 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk. 

15 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army Study, Operation Tomahawk; I Corps POR 576, 

23 Mar 51. 

16 Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk. 
340 EBB AND FLOW 

an earthen road running east from 

Munsan-ni, as far as the village of 

Sinch’on, ten miles away. One patrol 

made contact while checking an Imjin 

ferry site and ford ten miles northeast 

of Munsan-ni. Six enemy were killed 

and twenty-two captured. The patrol 

suffered no casualties, but a tank had 

to be destroyed after it bogged down at 

a stream crossing while approaching the 

Imjin. A few rounds of artillery fire 

meanwhile fell in the northern drop 

zone but caused no casualties.19 

The ROK 1st Division in the meantime had advanced steadily toward 

Munsan-ni without enemy contact. 

Early on the 24th Task Force Boone, a 

division armored column consisting of 

Company C, 64th Tank Battalion (on 

loan to General Paik from the 3d Division), Paik’s tank destroyer battalion 

(organized as an infantry unit), and two 

of his engineer platoons, stepped ahead 

of the division and reached the 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team at 

midmorning. By day’s end the remainder of the division occupied a line extending from positions athwart Route 

1 about three miles below Munsan-ni 

northeastward to Pobwon-ni, a village 

on lateral Route 2Y six miles east of 

Munsan-ni area. General Paik relieved 

General Bowen of responsibility for the 

Munsan-ni area at 1700 and placed 

Task Force Boone in position just above 

the town.20 

The lack of resistance to the wider 

sweep of the ROK 1st Division’s advance confirmed that the bid to block 

Enemy casualties included 136 dead 

counted on the field and 149 taken 

captive. Estimated enemy losses raised 

the total considerably higher. Prisoner 

interrogation indicated that the enemy 

forces who had been in the objective 

area were from the 36th Regiment of 

the North Korean 19th Division and had 

numbered between three hundred and 

five hundred. Most of the remainder 

of the North Korean Z Corps apparently 

had withdrawn above the Imjin well before the airborne landing.17 

The point of Task Force Growdon 

reached Munsan-ni at 1830 on the 23d, 

but the remainder of the extended column took several hours longer. The 

force encountered no enemy positions 

along Route 1 but was kept to an intermittent crawl by having to lift or explode over a hundred fifty live mines, 

some of them booby-trapped, and almost as many dummy mines, including a 

five-mile stretch of buried C-ration and 

beer cans. Casualties were few, but four 

tanks were disabled by mines. As the 

last of these tanks hit a mine a mile 

below Munsan-ni, the explosion attracted enemy artillery fire that damaged two more. The tail of the task 

force finally arrived at the airborne position at 0700 on 24 March.18 

General Milburn’s orders to the 

187th for operations on the 24th called 

only for patrolling. Having been given 

control of Task Force Growdon by 

Milburn, General Bowen built his principal patrols around Growdon’s tanks 

and sent them to investigate ferry sites 

on the Imjin and to check Route 2Y, 

17 Rad, GX (TAC) 124 KCG, CG Eighth Army to 

CINCFE, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Operation 

Tomahawk. 

18 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army 

Study, Task Force Growdon. 

19 I Corps Opn Dir 52, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army 

Study, Operation Tomahawk; ibid., Task Force 

Growdon. 

20 I Corps POR 576, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 

Consolidated Opn Rpt, 24 Mar 51; Rad, CIACT 3-35, 

CG I Corps to CG 1st ROK Div, 24 Mar 51; I Corps 

Comd, Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 
ADVANCE TO THE PARALLEL 

and attack the North Korean I Corps had 

been futile. To the east, that the Chinese 26th Army still had forces deployed 

to delay the advance of the 3d and 25th 

Divisions had become equally clear. On 

the I Corps right, the 25th Division on 

23 and 24 March had run into a large 

number of minefields and small but 

well entrenched enemy groups employing small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire. At nightfall on the 24th General Bradley’s forces held positions 

almost due west of Uijongbu in the 3d 

Division’s zone at corps center.21 

Somewhat unexpectedly, the 3d Division had come up against unusually 

strong Chinese positions. On 23 March 

General Soule’s forces had occupied the 

Uijongbu area with little difficulty. First 

to enter the town itself was Task Force 

Hawkins, built around the bulk of the 

64th Tank Battalion and two platoons 

of tanks from each of the 15th and 65th 

Infantry Regiments. Reaching Uijongbu about 0900 and finding it undefended, the task force reconnoitered 

north several miles on Route 33 before 

returning to the division position. Mines 

disabled two tanks, but otherwise the 

task force made no contact.22 

Though it thus appeared that the 3d 

Division could continue to move forward with relative ease, General Soule’s 

forces came under heavy fire when they 

resumed their attack on the morning 

of the 24th. The Chinese had organized strong positions in the Hill 468 

mass rising three miles northwest of 

Uijongbu and the 337 mass about a mile 

north and slightly east of town. From 

341 

these positions they were in fair condition to block advance on the Route 33 

axis to the north and over Route 3 leading out of Uijongbu to the northeast. 

On the division’s right, the 15th Infantry eventually managed to clear Hill 337 

on the 24th, but the 65th Infantry on 

the left failed in an all-day attempt to 

force the Chinese from the 468 mass.23 

General Milburn viewed the situation 

at corps center as an opportunity to trap 

and destroy the Chinese holding up the 

3d Division. After General Soule’s 

forces encountered the strong enemy 

positions on the morning of the 24th, 

he ordered General Bowen to pull in 

his patrols and prepare the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team for an 

eastward attack on the Route 2Y, axis. 

The objective was high ground abutting Route 33 about ten miles north of 

Uijongbu, thus just above the trace of 

line Aspen, whence Bowen was to prevent the Chinese in front of the 3d Division from withdrawing over Route 33. 

The 3d Division was to continue its 

northward attack in the meantime and 

eventually drive the Chinese against 

Bowen’s position.24 

General Bowen started east at 1800, 

intending to march as far as Sinch’on 

during the night and open his attack 

the following morning. From Task 

Force Growdon, Company C was the 

only unit of the 6th Tank Battalion able 

to move at 1800; all other companies 

of the battalion had too little fuel after 

patrolling and were to catch up with 

Bowen’s column after being resupplied 

from Seoul. The Growdon force now 

21 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

22 I Corps G3 Jnl, 23 Mar 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, 23 Mar 

51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

23 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

24 Rad, CIACT 3-37, CG I Corps to CG 1st ROK 

Div et al., 24 Mar 51; 187th Abn RCT S3 Jnl, 24 Mar 

51, and Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 
342 EBB AND FLOW 

3D INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS MOVE NORTH in the Uijongbu area, 23 March 

1951. 

also was short the 2d Battalion, 7th 

Infantry, which had been sent back to 

the 3d Division.25 

A force shaped around the tanks 

of Company C led the way toward 

Sinch’on. But after seven miles, as 

Bowen’s column moved through a system of ridges, landslides in defiles twice 

trapped the leading tanks, and in the 

second instance no bypass could be 

found. As engineers tried to open the 

road, rain began to fall and became 

steadily heavier. With the rain making 

a poor road even worse, Bowen or25 187th Abn RCT S3 Jnl, 24 Mar 51, and Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Task Force 

Growdon. 

dered the tanks back to Munsan-ni. After the engineers had cleared the road 

sufficiently, his remaining forces proceeded to Sinch’on, arriving about 0600 

on the 25th.26 

A half hour later Bowen ordered the 

2d Battalion, with the 3d Battalion following in support, to seize Hill 228 rising on the west side of Route 33. Running into small arms, machine gun, and 

mortar fire from enemy positions on 

several nearer heights and hampered 

by a continuing driving rain, the two 

battalions at day’s end were some two 

miles short of Hill 228, and Route 33 

remained available to the Chinese in 

26 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army Study, Task Force Growdon. 
ADVANCE TO THE PARALLEL 

front of the 3d Division if they chose to 

withdraw over it.27 

Withdrawal seemed to be the Chinese intention. The 3d Division met 

only light resistance when it resumed 

its attack from the south on the 25th 

and advanced two miles beyond the hill 

masses where strong Chinese positions 

had delayed it the day before. The tank 

company of the 65th Infantry meanwhile moved ahead on Route 3X, a secondary road angling northwest off 

Route 33 to Sinch’on, in an attempt to 

contact the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. Mines along the road 

disabled four tanks and kept the company from reaching its destination, but 

it encountered no enemy positions. The 

withdrawal of the Chinese delaying 

forces was confirmed on the 26th when 

the 3d Division and the 25th Division 

as well moved forward against little or 

no opposition.28 

To the north, the Chinese continued 

to oppose the efforts of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team to 

capture Hill 228. Using Route 33 and a 

lesser road to the west, two tank columns from the 3d Division joined 

Bowen’s forces during the afternoon 

of the 26th, but, even with armored 

support, it was 0900 the following day 

before the 187th captured Hill 228.29 

Using the remainder of the 27th for 

reorganization and resupply, General 

27 187th Abn RCT S3 Jnl, 25 Mar 51; Eighth Army 

Study, Operation Tomahawk. 

28 Eighth Army G3 Consol Opn Rpt, 25 Mar 51; I 

Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Mar 5 1. 

29 On the 26th General Soule reported to General 

Ridgway that one of his tanks had knocked out a T34. 

This piece was the first enemy armor destroyed by 

ground action since Ridgway had taken command of 

the Eighth Army. The T34 may have belonged to the 

17th Mechanized Division of the North Korean I Corps. 

See Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

343 

Bowen attacked the heights on the east 

side of Route 33 early on 28 March 

and occupied them after an all-day battle to eliminate stiff enemy resistance.30 

The 15th and 65th Infantry Regiments of the 3d Division meanwhile 

reached the airborne forces, the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry making first 

contact late in the afternoon of the 

27th. Despite General Milburn’s hopes 

for the operation, the two regiments 

drove no enemy forces into the guns of 

the airborne unit. Either the Chinese 

resisting the eastward attack of the 

187th had kept Route 33 open long 

enough for the forces withdrawing before the 3d Division to pass north, or 

the withdrawing enemy units had used 

another road, perhaps Route 3. Moving 

through spotty resistance, the 25th 

Division on the right had kept pace with 

the 3d Division, and by nightfall on 28 

March both were on or above line 

Aspen.31 

Ripper Concluded 

Late on 26 March, as it became obvious that the Chinese were backing away 

from the 3d and 25th Divisions, General Ridgway had ordered the I and IX 

Corps to continue to line Benton. As 

originally conceived, the IX Corps advance to Benton was limited to General 

Hoge’s western forces and was intended 

simply to protect the I Corps’ right 

flank. But Ridgway had since modified 

his plan of operations, widening the advance to include the entire IX Corps 

and all other forces to the east.32 

30 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 3d Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

31 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 

32 Rad, GX-3-4877 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 

I and IX Corps, 26 Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Mar 51. 
344 EBB AND FLOW 

ing its main forces beyond the reach of 

the RIPPER operation. Equally obvious 

was that only advances above the 38th 

parallel could attack these main forces.34 

On 23 March he had lengthened line 

Benton eastward through the 1st Cavalry Division’s patrol base at Ch’unch’on 

and as far as the 1st Marine Division’s 

zone on the IX Corps right, where it 

joined the last few miles of line Cairo. 

On the following day he had extended 

line Cairo from its original terminus in 

the Marine zone northeastward across 

the remainder of the army front to the 

town of Chosan-ni on the east coast.33 

The final objective line of the RIPPER 

operation thus had become a combination of the Benton and Cairo lines following the upstream trace of the Imjin 

virtually to the 38th parallel in the west, 

hanging slack a few miles below the parallel for almost all of its remaining 

length to the east, then rising to an east 

coast anchor some eight mile above the 

parallel. (See Maps 26 and 27.) 

Ridgway’s forces achieved the adjusted line by the end of March, encountering no more than the sporadic 

delaying action that had characterized 

the opposition to Operation RIPPER 

from the outset. Thus, since 7 March 

Eighth Army forces had made impressive territorial gains, recapturing the 

South Korean capital and moving between twenty-five and thirty miles north 

to reach-or all but reach-the 38th 

parallel. Estimates of enemy killed and 

wounded during the month were high, 

and some forty-eight hundred Chinese 

and North Koreans had been captured. 

Nevertheless, the results in terms of enemy troops and supplies destroyed were 

considerably less than anticipated. The 

clear fact was that the enemy high command had been and still was marshal33 Rad, GX-3-4228 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

I Corps et al., 23 Mar 51; Rad, GX (TAC) 128 KCG, 

CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 24 Mar 51. 

The Parallel Question 

Earlier, as General Ridgway was about 

to open Operation COURAGEOUS, the 

gains he already had registered in his 

KILLER and RIPPER advances had influenced a decision in Washington by 

which operations above the parallel assumed new importance as a political 

question. The decision centered on how 

and when to approach the desired ceasefire. Notwithstanding the building evidence of enemy offensive preparations, 

officials of the Departments of State 

and Defense believed that Ridgway’s 

recent successes might have convinced 

the Chinese and North Koreans that 

they could not. win a military victory 

and, if this was the case, that they might 

agree to negotiate an end to hostilities. 

On the advice of these officials, President Truman planned to make a public 

statement suggesting the United Nations’ willingness to end the fighting. 

The statement was carefully worded to 

avoid a threatening tone and so to encourage a favorable reply. Truman intended to deliver the appeal as soon as 

his statement had been approved by 

officials of all nations that had contributed forces to the U.N. Command.35 

The timing of the presidential announcement was tied also to the fact 

that Ridgway’s forces were fast ap34 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth 

Army G3 and G2 SS Rpts, Mar 51. 

35 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 266; Truman, Years of 

Trial and Hope, p. 440; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 

pp. 517-18; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 357-58. 
ADVANCE TO THE PARALLEL 

proaching the 38th parallel. The consensus in Washington was that the Chinese and North Koreans would be more 

inclined to agree to a cease-fire under 

conditions restoring the status quo ante 

bellurn, that is, if the fighting could be 

ended in the vicinity of the parallel 

where it had begun. Therefore, while 

there was no intention to forbid all 

ground action above the parallel, there 

was some question in the mind of Secretary of State Acheson and among 

many members of the United Nations 

whether the Eighth Army should make 

a general advance into North Korea.36 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified 

General MacArthur of the president’s 

plan in a message radioed from Washington on 20 March. They informed 

him of the prevalent feeling in the 

United Nations that the U.N. Command should make no major advance 

above the 38th parallel before the presidential appeal was delivered and the 

reactions to it determined. They also 

asked for his recommendations on how 

much freedom of ground action UNC 

forces should have in the vicinity of the 

parallel during the diplomatic effort to 

provide for their security and to allow 

them to maintain contact with the 

enemy.37 

MacArthur, of course, had been 

pressing Washington for decisions favoring a military, not a diplomatic, solution to the war. Shortly before he received the Joint Chiefs’ message he 

again had expressed his views in a letter to Republican Congressman Joseph 

W. Martin of Massachusetts, the minor36 Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 263-66; Acheson, 

Present at the Creation, p. 517; Rees, Korea: The Limited 

War, p. 208. 

37 Rad, JCS 86276, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Mar 51. 

345 

ity leader in the House of Representatives. 38 The congress man earlier had 

written MacArthur asking for comment 

on Martin’s thesis that Nationalist Chinese forces “might be employed in the 

opening of a second Asiatic front to 

relieve the pressure on our forces in 

Korea.” MacArthur replied that his own 

view followed “the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum 

counter-force,” that Martin’s suggestion 

on the use of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces 

was in consonance with this pattern, 

and that there was “no substitute for 

victory."39 

Although he had been denied the decisions that in his judgment favored a 

military solution, MacArthur nevertheless wanted no further restrictions 

placed on the operations of his command. In so advising the Joint Chiefs 

on 21 March, he pointed out, as he had 

some time earlier, that under current 

conditions any appreciable UNC effort 

to clear North Korea already was out 

of the question.40 

While awaiting a response, MacArthur informed General Ridgway of the 

new development on 22 March. Although MacArthur expected that the 

response from Washington would be a 

new directive for ground operations, 

possibly one forbidding an entry into 

North Korea in strength, he intended 

in the meantime to allow the Eighth 

Army to advance north of the parallel 

as far as logistics could support major 

38 The Tokyo dateline of MacArthur’s letter was 20 

March. Since Tokyo time is fourteen hours ahead of 

Washington time, MacArthur presumably wrote his 

letter before the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared their 

message of the same date. 

39 Both letters are quoted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 385-86. 

40 Rad, C 58203, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 21 Mar 

51. 
346 EBB AND FLOW 

operations. Ridgway otherwise was to 

be restricted only by having to obtain 

MacArthur’s specific authorization before moving above the parallel in 

force.41 

In acknowledging these conditions 

Ridgway notified MacArthur that he 

currently was developing plans for an 

advance that would carry Eighth Army 

forces ten to twenty miles above the parallel to a general line following the upstream trace of the Yesong River as far 

as Sibyon-ni in the west, falling off 

gently southeastward to the Hwach’on 

Reservoir, then running almost due east 

to the coast. As in past and current 

operations, the objective would be the 

destruction of enemy troops and materiel. MacArthur approved Ridgway’s 

concept but also scheduled a visit to Korea for 24 March, when he would have 

an opportunity to discuss the plans in 

more detai1.42 

Before leaving Tokyo on the 24th, 

MacArthur issued a communique in 

which he offered to confer with his enemy counterpart on arranging a ceasefire. He specified that he was making 

the offer “within the area of my authority as the military commander” and that 

he would be in search of “any military 

means” for achieving the desired result. 

He thus kept the bid itself within the 

military sphere.43 But in leading up to 

his offer MacArthur belittled China’s 

41 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 358-60; Rad, C 

58292, MacArthur for Ridgway, 22 Mar 51. 

42 Rad, G-3-4122 KCG, CG Eighth Army to 

CINCFE, 22 Mar 51; Rad, MacArthur to Ridgway, 23 

Mar 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt. Mar 51. 

43 To this extent, MacArthur’s action was in accord 

with earlier advice a Department of State official gave 

the Department of Defense shortly after the Inch’on 

landing: “A cease-fire should be a purely military matter and . . . the Commanding General of the unified 

command . . . is the appropriate representative to negotiate any armistice or cease-fire agreement.” See 

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 359. 

military power, noting in particular that 

Chinese forces could not win in Korea, 

and made statements that could be, and 

were, interpreted as threatening that 

the United Nations would decide to attack China if hostilities continued. 

These remarks prompted other governments to ask about a possible shift in 

U.S. policy, and in President Truman’s 

judgment they so contradicted the tone 

of his own planned statement that he 

decided not to issue it for fear of creating more international confusion.44 

MacArthur’s announcement thoroughly angered the president. It was, 

he wrote a few days later, “not just a 

public disagreement over policy, but 

deliberate, premeditated sabotage of 

US and UN policy.“45 Moreover, MacArthur had not cleared his communique with Washington as the president’s directive of December 1950 

required for all releases touching on 

national policy. Truman considered 

MacArthur’s violation of the directive 

as “open defiance of my orders as President and as Commander in Chief.“46 

His immediate act was to order the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to send MacArthur a 

reminder of the December directive. 

Privately, he decided that MacArthur 

should be relieved.47 

44 MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 387-88; Truman, 

Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 440-42. 

45 Ltr, Truman to George M. Elsey, 16 Apr 51, 

quoted in D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 

vol. III, Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985), p. 588. 

46 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 441-42. 

47 Ibid., pp. 442-43. When asked some years later 

why he did not relieve MacArthur at the time, Truman replied that he wanted a “better example of his 

insubordination, and I wanted it to be one . . . that 

everybody would recognize for exactly what it was, 

and I knew that, MacArthur being the kind of man he 

was, I wouldn’t have long to wait” See Merle Miller, 

Plain Speaking (New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 

1973), pp. 302-03. 
ADVANCE TO THE PARALLEL 

Included in the reminder sent by the 

Joint Chiefs on 24 March (received in 

Tokyo on the 25th) were orders that 

MacArthur report to them for instructions should his counterpart respond 

to his offer and “request an armistice 

in the field.” No such response was 

expected, however, and since Truman 

had canceled his own cease-fire initiative, operations in strength above the 

38th parallel again had become a tactical question for General MacArthur 

and General Ridgway to answer. MacArthur, in fact, publicly revealed his 

answer before he really knew that the 

diplomatic effort to achieve a cease-fire 

had been canceled. Upon his return to 

Tokyo late on 24 March following his 

conference with Ridgway and a visit to 

the front, he announced that he had 

directed the Eighth Army to cross the 

parallel “if and when its security makes 

it tactically advisable.“48 More specifically than that, of course, MacArthur 

had approved Ridgway’s concept of a 

general advance as deep as twenty miles 

into North Korea. 

347 

large scale offensive in Korea near the 

end of April employing Soviet regulars 

of Mongolian extraction under the 

guise of volunteers. Ridgway doubted 

the accuracy of the report, but as a matter of prudence, since the Eighth Army 

might be ordered out of Korea in the 

event of Soviet intervention, he intended to pass the evacuation plan outlined by the Eighth Army staff in January to corps commanders for further 

development. Lest Eighth Army forces 

start “looking over the shoulder,” no 

word of the course of action or preparations for it was to o beyond those 

working on the plan. 49 

Alluding to past and recent proposals of cease-fire negotiations, Ridgway 

also advised that future governmental 

decisions might compel the Eighth 

Army to adopt a static defense. Because 

of its inherent rigidity, such a stance 

would require strong leadership and 

imaginative tactical thinking, he 

warned, to stand off a numerically 

stronger enemy that might not be similarly inhibited in the choice of tactics. 

The Eighth Army meanwhile would 

continue to move forward and in the 

next advance would cross the 38th 

parallel. Ridgway now agreed with General MacArthur’s earlier prediction that 

a stalemate ultimately would develop 

on the battlefront, but just how far the 

Eighth Army would drive into North 

Korea before this occurred, he informed the assembled commanders, 

could not be accurately assessed at the 

moment.50 

The Rugged and Dauntless Concept 

In advance of issuing orders for attacks above the 38th parallel, General 

Ridgway assembled corps and division 

commanders at his Yoju headquarters 

on 27 March to discuss courses of action that were now open to them or 

that they might be obliged to follow. 

The possibility of Soviet intervention 

again had been raised, he told them. 

According to a reputable foreign 

source, the USSR planned to launch a 

48 Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 270-71; Ridgway, 

The Korean War, p. 116; copy of MacArthur’s 24 March 

statement with Ridgway papers in CMH. 

49 Discussion of the conference is based on MS, 

Ridgway, The Korean War. Issues and Policies, pp. 

405, 407-10; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 121-23, 

157. 

50 The conference had a tragic postscript when the 

light plane returning General Kim, commander of 
348 EBB AND FLOW 

GENERAL MACARTHUR AND GENERAL RIDGWAY meet on the east coast, 3 April 

1951. 

Ridgway had revised his concept for 

advancing above the parallel since 

meeting with MacArthur on 24 March. 

He originally had intended to direct a 

strong attack northwestward across the 

Imjin, expecting that in moving as far 

as the Yesong River the attack force 

would find the elusive North Korean I 

Corps. His intelligence staff later discovered that the bulk of the North Korean 

corps had withdrawn behind the 

the ROK I Corps, to Kangnung crashed in the Taebaeks, killing the general and his pilot. General Paik, 

the excellent leader of the ROK 1st Division, became 

the new commander of the ROK I Corps early in 

April, and Brig. Gen. Kang Moon Bong took command of the 1st Division. 

Yesong and also warned that the attack 

force would be vulnerable to envelopment by a fresh Chinese unit located 

off the right flank of the advance. (The 

unit was the XIX Army Group, which intelligence had not yet fully identified.) 

Ridgway, as a result, elected to limit 

operations northwest of the Imjin to 

reconnaissance and combat patrols.51 

He planned now to point his main 

attack toward the centrally located road 

and rail complex marked out by the 

towns of P’yonggang in the north and 

Ch’orwon and Kumhwa in the south. 

51 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 

120-21; Eighth Army PIR 954, 23 Mar 51, and PIR 

259, 28 Mar 51. 
ADVANCE TO THE PARALLEL 

This complex, eventually named the 

Iron Triangle by newsmen searching 

for a dramatic term, lay twenty to thirty 

miles above the 38th parallel in the diagonal corridor dividing the Taebaek 

Mountains into northern and southern 

ranges and containing the major road 

and rail links between the port of 

Wonsan in the northeast and Seoul in 

the southwest. Other routes emanating 

from the triangle of towns connected 

with P’yongyang to the northwest and 

with the western and eastern halves of 

the present front. A unique center of 

communications, the complex was of 

obvious importance to the ability of the 

enemy high command to move troops 

and supplies within the forward areas 

and to coordinate operations laterally. 

Ridgway’s first concern was to occupy 

ground that could serve as a base both 

for continuing the advance toward the 

complex and, in view of the enemy’s 

evident offensive preparations, for developing a defensive position. The base 

selected, line Kansas, traced the lower 

bank of the Imjin in the west. From the 

Imjin eastward as far as the Hwach’on 

Reservoir the line lay two to six miles 

above the 38th parallel across the 

approaches to the Iron Triangle. Following the lower shoreline of the reservoir, it then turned slightly north to a 

depth of ten miles above the parallel 

before falling off southeastward to the 

Yangyang area on the coast. In the advance to line Kansas, designated Operation RUGGED, the I and IX Corps were 

to seize the segment of the line between 

the Imjin and the western edge of the 

Hwach’on Reservoir. To the east, the 

X Corps was to occupy the portion tracing the reservoir shore and reaching 

Route 24 in the Soyang River valley, 

and the ROK III and I Corps were to 

349 

take the section between Route 24 and 

Yangyang. 52 

In anticipation of enemy offensive 

operations, Ridgway planned to pull 

substantial forces off the line immediately after reaching Kansas and prepare them for counterattacks. The IX 

Corps was to release the 1st Cavalry 

Division. Under army control, the division was to assemble at Kyongan-ni, below the Han southeast of Seoul, and 

prepare to meet enemy attacks aimed 

at the capital city via Route 1 from the 

northwest, over Routes 33 and 3 from 

the north, or through the Pukhan River 

valley from the northeast. In the X 

Corps zone, the bulk of the 2d Division 

was to assemble at Hongch’on ready to 

counter an attack following the Route 

29 axis, and a division yet to be selected 

from one of the two ROK corps in the 

east was to assemble at Yuch’on-ni on 

Route 20 and prepare to operate against 

enemy attacks in either corps sector. 

The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, which on 29 March left the 

I Corps zone for Taegu, meanwhile 

was to be ready to return north to reinforce operations wherever needed.53 

While these forces established themselves in reserve, Ridgway planned to 

launch Operation DAUNTLESS, a limited advance toward the Iron Triangle 

by the I and IX Corps. With the objective only of menacing the triangle, 

not of investing it, the two corps were 

to attack in succession to lines Utah 

and Wyoming. They would create, in 

52 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 

Apr 51. 

53 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 29 

Mar 51. 
350 EBB AND FLOW 

effect, a broad salient bulging above 

line Kansas between the Imjin and 

Hwach’on Reservoir and reaching 

prominent heights commanding the 

Ch’orwon-Kumhwa base of the communications complex. If struck by strong 

enemy attacks during or after the advance, the two corps were to return to 

the Kansas line.54 

To maintain, and in some areas 

regain, contact with enemy forces, 

Ridgway allowed each corps to start toward line Kansas as it completed 

preparations. The RUGGED advance, as 

a result, staggered to a full start between 2 and 5 April. When General 

ROK I Corps zone on the east coast, 

Ridgway brought him up to date on 

plans. MacArthur agreed with the 

RUGGED and DAUNTLESS concept, urging in particular that Ridgway make a 

strong effort to hold the Kansas line. 

At the same time, MacArthur believed 

that the two operations would move the 

battlefront to that “point of theoretical 

stalemate” he had predicted in early 

March. He intended to limit offensive 

operations, once Ridgway’s forces 

reached their Kansas-Wyoming objectives, to reconnaissance and combat 

patrols, none larger than a battalion.55 

MacArthur made his customary appearance on the 3d, this time in the 55 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 2 and 3 Apr 51; Rad, 

GX-4-979 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et 

al., 4 Apr 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Apr 51; MS, 

Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 

54 Rad GX-4-805 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et’al., 3 Apr 51. 

419-20; Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 121; Rad, C 

59397, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr 51. 
CHAPTER XIX 

Operation RUGGED 

The Enemy Situation 

Whether the expected enemy offensive would occur before all RUGGED and 

DAUNTLESS objectives could be taken 

was difficult for the Eighth Army intelligence staff to estimate. Some evidence 

came from recently taken prisoners 

who gave dates between 1 and 15 April 

for the start of the offensive. From an 

involved analysis of enemy logistical requirements and observed southbound 

traffic, intelligence officers concluded 

that the enemy high command had 

completed the necessary supply buildup 

despite the Far East Air Forces’ longterm and continuing interdiction of 

North Korea’s transportation system. 

The attacks had destroyed important 

bridges and, in particular, had interrupted the enemy’s use of the rail 

system. But even after Task Force 77 

joined and intensified the air campaign 

early in March, the enemy had been 

able to make rapid, if crude, repairs; 

to develop. alternate, if roundabout, 

routes; and to combine trains and 

trucks to shuttle supplies through the 

damaged rail and road networks. Moreover, Task Force 77 was about to be 

pulled out of northeastern Korea to go 

to the Formosa Strait. 

Since the turn of the year, intelligence 

reports of People’s Liberation Army troop 

and shipping concentrations in mainland China ports had indicated a possible invasion of Taiwan when weather 

turned favorable in the spring. In a 

show of force aimed at discouraging 

such an operation, Seventh Fleet commander Admiral Martin would take 

Task Force 77 south on 8 April to conduct air parades over Taiwan and along 

a course three miles off the mainland 

coast. No invasion would take place. 

Whether the naval air demonstration 

discouraged the Chinese was unclear; 

what was clear was that by the time 

Task Force 77 returned to Korea and 

resumed its interdictory attacks on 16 

April, much of the earlier damage to 

the enemy's eastern rail net had been 

repaired.1 

In contrast to the evidence of the 

enemy’s logistical readiness and the 

opening dates reported by captives, air 

observers and agents had reported enemy forces to be developing and in 

some areas occupying fortified positions 

along and immediately above the 38th 

parallel. On the basis of these reports 

the Eighth Army G-2 sensed that the 

enemy offensive was not imminent. 

“The pattern of enemy activity,” Colonel Tarkenton observed at the start of 

the RUGGED operation, “continues to 

reflect a defensive attitude with overtones of preparation for an offensive.“2 

1 Eighth Army PIR 258, 27 Mar 51, and PIR 264, 2 

Apr 51; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 

pp. 289-93; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 343-44; Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in 

Korea, p. 236. - 

2 Eighth Army PIR 266, 4 Apr 51. 
352 EBB AND FLOW 

THE A-FRAME 

He considered it possible that enemy 

forces, if only as a “mark time” measure, 

next would make a major defensive effort from the positions being organized 

in the vicinity of the parallel.3 

Tarkenton was right. The enemy 

high command was not ready to open 

the offensive. The North Korean III 

and V Corps, the latter scheduled to take 

part, had withdrawn from the eastern 

front only during the last days of Operation RIPPER and were still refurbishing. The remainder of the Chinese 

IX Army Group, whose 20th and 27th Armies were to participate in the main 

attack, had just started south from the 

Hamhung region toward the Iron Triangle. Now on line to oppose the I and 

IX Corps in the area between the Imjin 

River and Hwach’on Reservoir were re3 Ibid. 261, 30 Mar 51. 

duced forces of the Chinese 26th, 40th, 

and 39th Armies, west to east. Ahead of 

the X, ROK III, and ROK I Corps from 

the reservoir to the east coast was only 

the North Korean III Corps employing 

parts of the Ist, 15th, and 45th Divisions 

and the 69th Brigade.4 These forces, 

contrary to indications that they might 

conduct a strong defense, would put 

up only a delaying action against the 

RUGGED advance, offering islands of 

stubborn resistance but otherwise fading to the rear after briefly engaging 

assault units or without resisting at all. 

Impeding the advance more consistently than enemy delaying forces 

would be the usual logistical problems 

created by mountains and inadequate 

roads, although the difficulties would 

be partially relieved by South Korean 

carrying parties from the new Civil 

Transport Corps. Still being organized, 

the corps eventually would include 

eighty-two carrier companies manned 

by almost twenty thousand porters, 

some from refugee camps but most 

from the ROK National Guard.5 Using 

an A-frame, a wooden backpack common in Korea, each porter on a daily 

average could carry a fifty-pound load 

ten miles. By 1 April the Eighth Army 

transportation officer, who exercised 

operational control of the corps, had deployed sixty-five companies, each with 

4 Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 

Jul 52; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, no. 99, 2 Feb 53. 

5 ROK reserves originally were known as the National (or Korean) Youth Corps, then as the National 

Guard, and later as the V Reserve Corps. Under cadres of regulars, the reserves operated ROK Army induction stations and, armed to some extent from ROK 

sources, took on internal security missions against 

guerrillas. President Rhee tried several times without 

success to coax the United States into arming the reserve units. They exceeded the ROK military establishment that the United States planned to support. 
OPERATION RUGGED 353 

dug in on the crest behind barbed wire 

and antipersonnel mines. The battalion finally cleared the position after air 

strikes and artillery fire had softened it 

on the morning of the 5th. The 5th 

Infantry occupied the Kwanum Mountain mass that same day; slowed by the 

Kungmang battle, the 21st Infantry 

reached line Kansas on the 6th.8 

The adjoining British 27th Brigade 

following the Kap’yong River valley on 

the IX Corps left was stopped by Chinese fire from Kungmang Mountain 

until the 21st Infantry reduced that 

position; then the British marched unopposed to line Kansas on 6 April. 

Flushing scattered Chinese out of the 

IX Corps central zone, the ROK 6th 

Division reached its Kansas objectives 

the same day. On the corps right, where 

the 1st Cavalry Division advanced 

astride the Pukhan River, the attached 

7th Marine Regiment moved easily up 

the west side of the river, but the 7th 

and 8th Regiments attacking through 

cut-up, virtually roadless ground east 

of the Pukhan were slowed by strong 

delaying forces of the 39th Army. On 6 

April the two cavalry regiments were 

still some three miles short of their 

line Kansas objectives adjacent to the 

Hwach’on Reservoir.9 

General Ridgway suspected that the 

stiff resistance to the 1st Cavalry Division was related to enemy plans to obstruct IX Corps movement by releasing the reservoir’s water through the 

Hwach’on Dam and flooding the Pukhan. The water was far from its maximum level, but air observers recently 

two hundred forty porters, to assist the 

RUGGED advance.6 

The Advance to Line Kansas 

In organizing the RUGGED operation, 

General Ridgway had widened the I 

Corps zone eastward to pass control of 

the 24th Division, which had been operating on the IX Corps left, to General 

Milburn. (Map 29) While Milburn’s 

forces along the Imjin stood fast, the 

25th and 24th Divisions in the eastern 

half of the I Corps zone attacked north 

on either side of Route 3 on the morning of 3 April. East of the road, 

the 24th Division moved astride the 

Yongp’yong River valley, the 5th Infantry on the left advancing into the Kwanum Mountain mass abutting Route 3, 

the 21st Infantry striking for Kungmang Mountain just inside the right 

corps boundary. West of Route 3, the 

27th Infantry and 35th Infantry of the 

25th Division advanced toward high 

ground rising between a lateral stretch 

of the Yongp’yong River and the 

Hant’an River farther north.7 

Pushing scattered 26th Army forces 

out of position by’ fire and occasionally 

by assault, and turning back a few light 

counterattacks, the 25th Division took 

the heights overlooking the Hant’an 

River on 5 April. Resistance to the 24th 

Division was desultory except at the far 

right where the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, stalled on the western slopes of 

Kungmang Mountain on 4 April under fire from a strong 40th Army force 

6 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51: Eighth 

Army, “Logistical Problems and Their Solutions”; 

Eighth Army CG SS Rpt. Mar 51. 

7 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 

51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

8 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51: 24th Div G3 Inl. 4-6 Am 51. 

9 IX Corps Opn O 15, 30 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 

51. 
c'
OPERATION RUGGED 355 

DIRECTING ARTILLERY FIRE on Chinese positions near the 38th parallel. 

had noted that the dam’s eighteen sluice 

gates were closed. The Chinese were 

intent on keeping the cavalrymen away 

from the reservoir to give the water 

time to rise before releasing it.10 

Earlier, near the beginning of Operation RIPPER, Ridgway had thought to 

prevent enemy forces from so using the 

reservoir by bombing the dam, releasing the water, and waiting for the Pukhan to recede before starting forward. 

His engineer, Col. Paschal N. Strong, 

had advised him at the time that the 

structure probably could not be demolished by conventional bombing and 

that the enemy also lacked the means of 

10 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 6 Apr 51; IX Corps 

Engr Sec, Study of Hwachon Dam, 4 Apr 51. 

destruction. The most the enemy could 

do, according to Strong, would be to 

destroy or open the sluice gates and 

produce a minor flood. Given this appraisal, Ridgway had let the matter 

drop and did not include the dam when 

drawing objective lines for the RUGGED 

and DAUNTLESS operations. 11 

As the RUGGED advance got under 

way, the IX Corps engineer contradicted Strong’s appraisal. He calculated 

that simultaneously opening all sluice 

gates and penstocks when the reservoir 

was full would raise the Pukhan ten to 

11 Rad, GX (TAC) 58 KCG, CG Eighth Army to 

Eighth Army Engr, 28 Feb 51; Rad, G2-3871 KEN, 

CG Eighth Army Main to CG Eighth Army TAC, 28 

Feb 51; Rad, GX (TAC) 75 KCG, CG Eighth Army to 

CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, 6 Mar 51. 
356 EBB AND FLOW 

twelve’ feet in the vicinity of line 

Kansas and would flood much of the 

Ch’unch’on basin. Although the flooding would not be disastrous, it would 

temporarily disrupt lateral movement 

in the corps zone and north-south 

traffic on Route 17, the IX Corps’ main 

supply route; moreover, this harassment could be repeated as long as the 

dam remained in enemy hands. Ridgway, in light of these prospects, adjusted his plans to include the dam as 

an objective. 12 

The dam stood at the northwest corner of the reservoir, its spillway slanting north into a deep, narrow gorge 

through which the Pukhan at that point 

coursed north and then turned west 

and south to form a horseshoe-shaped 

loop. (Map 30) The structure abutted 

on two narrow-ridge peninsulas, one 

protruding south into the reservoir on 

the east, the other located in the loop 

of the Pukhan on the west. The western peninsula, which offered the only 

overland approach to the dam, jutted 

beyond line Kansas at the right of the 

IX Corps; the dam itself rested above 

Kansas at the X Corps left. Ridgway 

shifted the boundary between the two 

corps eastward to put both approach 

and objective in the IX Corps zone and 

instructed General Hoge to seize the 

dam. With the reservoir level well below maximum, Ridgway attached no urgency to the seizure; he adjusted line 

Wyoming to include the dam, making 

it an objective not of the RUGGED advance but of the DAUNTLESS operation 

to follow.13 As a DAUNTLESS objective, 

the dam’s capture would fall to the 1st 

Marine Division, scheduled to relieve 

the 1st Cavalry Division after the latter 

reached line Kansas. 

General Hoge elected a different 

course after the 4th Ranger Company, 

recently released from the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, 

joined the IX Corps on 7 April. He 

considered the specially trained company the ideal unit to put the dam gates 

out of commission. Hoge visualized a 

raid in which the Rangers would sneak 

to the dam along the reservoir side of 

the western peninsula, immobilize the 

gate machinery with all gates closed, 

and withdraw--all within two to four 

hours. Attaching the company to the 

1st Cavalry Division, he instructed General Palmer to use the Rangers against 

the dam before the division left line 

Kansas but did not specifically direct 

or limit the operation to a Ranger 

raid. 14 

Unaware of Hoge’s concept of a hitand-run attack, General Palmer assigned the mission to Colonel Harris’ 

7th Cavalry, then struggling through 

the rough ground directly below the 

dam, and instructed Harris to immobilize the sluice gates and occupy the dam 

area. Harris assigned the mission to his 

2d Battalion, then in reserve, and on 8 

April assembled the battalion with the 

4th Ranger Company attached close to 

the front almost due south of the peninsular approach to the dam. He left 

detailed planning for later on the assumption that success in achieving the 

Kansas line, and thus the dam opera- 

” IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX Corps Engr 14 Interv, Blumenson with Gen Hoge, 15 Apr 51; 

Sec, Study of Hwachon Dam, 4 Apr 51; Eighth Army Palmer, MS review comments, 1985. All interviews 

G3 Jn1, Sum, 6 Apr 51. cited in this section are inclosures to Study, 1st Lt. 

13 Rad, GX-4-1372 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG Martin Blumenson. CO. 3d Historical Detachment. 

IX Corps et al., 6 Apr 51. “Hwachon Dam,” copy in CMH. 
MAP 30
358 EBB AND FLOW 

tion, was some days away. Increasing 

resistance on 7 and 8 April did portend a slow advance to the line. In an 

attempt to accelerate the attack, General Palmer late on the 8th ordered his 

two assaults regiments to deploy in 

greater strength the following morning. 

Obliged to commit the 2d Battalion, 

Colonel Harris, with the dam operation in mind, gave the battalion line 

Kansas objectives that would carry it 

within a mile of the base of the ridge 

leading to the dam. 15 

Although the reservoir was only half 

full, Chinese troops and Korean employees of the dam power plant began 

opening sluice gates at midnight on the 

8th. With the power plant not in operation, they were able to open only four 

gates fully and raise six slightly. The 

released water cost no casualties or 

supplies since General Hoge earlier 

had warned his forces away from the 

Pukhan bottomland, but the flow gradually raised the river as much as seven 

feet, forcing the removal of floating 

bridges above and below Ch’unch’on 

and destroying another far downstream 

before it could be swung into the 

bank.16 

The only Chinese below the Pukhan 

on the morning of the 9th occupied 

the ridge leading to the dam. Elsewhere, those who had opposed the advance of the 7th and 8th Regiments had 

withdrawn behind the river during the 

night to avoid being trapped below the 

flood. The two regiments were able to 

15 Intervs Blumenson with Col William A. Harris, 

CO, 7th Cav, 18 Apr 51, and Maj James H. Webel, S3, 

7th Cav, 16 Apr 51; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 8 Apr 51; 

Palmer, MS review comments, 1985. 

16 Intervs, Blumenson with Capt Arnold Frank, CO, 

Engineer Tech Intel Team, IX Corps, 15 Apr 51, and 

Capt George Mintz, Engr Intel Officer, IX Corps, 11 

Apr 51. 

reach line Kansas well before noon. Eager to shut down the dam, General 

Hoge ordered General Palmer to open 

the operation immediately. Since Hoge 

also set the 10th as the date the marines would relieve the cavalry division, 

Palmer instructed Colonel Harris to try 

to complete the operation by day’s 

end.17 

Lt. Col. John W. Callaway, the 2d 

Battalion commander, opened a hastily planned attack early in the afternoon. He opened the attack with inevitably reduced fire support since the 

severely convoluted ground for a 

distance of seven miles below the dam 

prevented tank and artillery movements. The single road serving the 7th 

Cavalry-actually no more than a narrow mountain track-branched off 

Route 29 in the adjoining zone of the 

2d Division to the east, entered the 7th’s 

area near the southwest corner of the 

reservoir, ran north along the reservoir shore to a point beyond line 

Kansas, then turned west through a 

small valley at the base of the ridge leading to the dam. Rock outcroppings so 

confined the track at points that jeeps 

could barely negotiate it. With the division artillery positions as far north as 

the terrain allowed, Callaway’s objectives were beyond the range of the 

105-mm. howitzers. After the Chinese 

opened the sluice gates, division artillerymen managed to get one 155-mm. 

howitzer into a position from which 

it could reach the dam at maximum 

range. While the howitzer might discourage the Chinese from further work 

on the dam, its fire at extreme range 

17 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; ibid. G3 Jnl, 

9 Apr 51; Intervs, Blumenson with Hoge, 15 Apr 51, 

Webel, 16 Apr 51, and Frank, 15 Apr 51. 
OPERATION RUGGED 

could not effectively support Callaway’s 

attack.” 

The 2d Battalion advanced with 

Company F leading the attack to clear 

the ridge as far as Hill 454, which overlooked the dam. When Company F 

moved up the ridge, Company E, the 

battalion reserve, was to occupy Hill 364 

at the ridge’s southern end. Once 

Company F occupied Hill 454, the 4th 

Ranger Company was to move to the 

dam following the edge of the reservoir, 

close and immobilize the gates, and 

occupy high ground on the peninsula 

east of the dam. Meanwhile, to assist 

resupply and the displacement of the 

battalion’s heavy weapons, Company G 

began to clear a segment of the regimental supply road running north 

along the reservoir and west through 

the valley at the foot of the approach 

ridge. After crossing the valley road, 

Company F stalled under mortar, small 

arms, and machine gun fire from Hill 

364 and from mutually supporting bunkers on heights above the Pukhan to 

the northwest. A single air strike called 

down by Colonel Callaway did little to 

dampen the fire. Though ample cover 

prevented heavy casualties, Company 

F remained pinned until dark, then was 

able to withdraw south of the valley.19 

Although the 1st Cavalry Division was 

due to leave the line on the 10th, General Hoge and General Palmer wanted 

another attack made on the dam. Hoge 

continued to visualize a raid; Palmer 

359 

was certain that Callaway’s battalion 

could have reached the dam on the 9th 

if more daylight had been available. 

Accordingly, while the remainder of the 

division began to move out of the corps 

zone on the morning of the 10th, the 

7th Cavalry remained on line while 

the 2d Battalion made a second attempt. Believing that the Chinese did 

not hold the ridge in strength and perhaps had withdrawn as other delaying 

forces had done in other instances 

after a single engagement, Colonel 

Callaway did not change tactics. The 

narrowness and steep sides of the 

ridge in any case allowed little room 

for any other formation or maneuver. 

Again his lead company, this time 

Company G, was pinned down by fire 

from the north and northwest after 

crossing the road at the base of the 

ridge. Still without normal artillery support and now denied air support because of mist and low-hanging clouds, 

Callaway was unable to quiet the fire 

and continue north.20 

General Palmer and Colonel Harris 

had expected that the 7th Cavalry, regardless of the outcome of Callaway’s 

second attack, would be relieved by marines immediately afterward. Harris, in 

fact, had allowed his 3d Battalion to 

start assembling for the move to the 

rear. General Hoge, however, viewed 

Callaway’s two attempts as halfhearted 

and ordered a “bona fide” effort against 

the dam before the 7th left the line.21 

18 7th Cav POR 296, 9 Apr 51; lntervs, Blumenson 

with Lt Col John W. Callaway, CO, 2d Bn, 7th Cav, 17 

Apr 51, Maj Russell J. Wilson, CO, 8th Engr Combat 

Bn, 18 Apr 51, Maj Paul Gray, S3, IX Corps Arty, 15 

Apr 51, and Capt William W. Cover, Asst S3, IX Corps 

Ar,ty, 14 Apr 51; Palmer, MS review comments, 1985. 

19 Intervs, Blumenson with Callaway, 17 Apr 51, 

Capt Dorsey B. Anderson, CO, 4th Rgr Co, 13 Apr 

51, and Webel, 16 Apr 51. 

20 Intervs, Blumenson with Hoge, 15 Apr 51, Harris, 

18 Apr 51, Callaway. 17 Apr 51, Lt Col John Carlson, 

G3, 1st Cav Div, 18 Apr 51, and Maj Dayton F. Caple, 

Asst G4, 1st Cav Div, 18 Apr 51; 1st Cav Div POR 

297, 10 Apr 51; 7th Cav POR 299, 10 Apr 51; Ltr, Co1 

John W. Callaway to Maj Gen William A. Harris, 16 

Oct 78, copy in CMH. 

21 Intervs, Blumenson with Hoge, 15 Apr 51, Harris, 

18 Apr 51, Webel, 16 Apr 51, Capt John R. Flynn, S3, 
360 EBB AND FLOW 

In ordering a third attempt to be 

made on the morning of the 11th, General Palmer authorized Colonel Harris 

to commit his entire regiment if he 

thought it necessary. Harris planned to 

launch a stronger effort in the belief 

that the Chinese defense of the dam 

consisted of mutually supporting positions in the heights immediately northwest of the Pukhan and on the two peninsulas on which the dam abutted and 

that reaching the dam required simultaneous attacks in all three areas. But 

he believed that he had neither sufficient supplies, particularly ammunition, 

nor the time to accumulate them for a 

full regimental advance. He planned 

to send a company of the 1st Battalion 

in a diversionary attack northwest of 

the Pukhan, to recommit the 2d Battalion on the western peninsula, and before dawn to dispatch the 4th Ranger 

Company reinforced with heavy weapons from Company M across the reservoir to attack up the eastern peninsula. 

He placed the 3d Battalion on call to 

reinforce the Rangers or pass through 

the 2d Battalion and occupy the dam 

site, whichever proved the necessary or 

better course. Two S-inch batteries of 

the 17th Field Artillery Battalion and a 

155-mm. battery of the 1st Marine 

Division’s 4th Field Artillery Battalion 

were now within range of Harris’ objectives, but worsening weather-a mix of 

rain, sleet, snow, and fog-eliminated 

air support.22 

Colonel Harris had considered a reservoir crossing operation on the 9th, 

2d Bn, 7th Cav, 17 Apr 51, and Capt Thomas J. 

Kennedy, CO, Co I, 7th Cav, et al., 16 Apr 51. 

22 Intervs, Blumenson with Harris, 18 Apr 51, Lt 

Col Charles H. Hallden. CO, 3d Bn. 7th Cav, 16 Apr 

51, Gray, 15 Apr 51, and Cover, 14 Apr 51. 

alerting the 4th Ranger Company to 

that possibility and setting staff members to getting twenty assault boats from 

the division’s 8th Engineer Combat 

Battalion. The engineers earlier had acquired amphibious equipment in anticipation of crossing operations at the 

Pukhan, but before Harris’ request 

reached them they had returned part 

of the equipment to Ch’unch’on depots 

and turned the rest over to the marines 

relieving the division on the 10th. Attempts to retrieve equipment and transport it to the reservoir over the poor 

supply road produced just nine boats 

and four motors by the time set for the 

Rangers’ crossing. Unable to obtain 

boat operators and mechanics in time 

for the operation, Colonel Harris hastily recruited from his own regiment 

men who had had some experience 

with motorboats.23 

The Ranger company commander, 

Capt. Dorsey B. Anderson, embarked 

two platoons, artillery and mortar observers, and a machine gun section in 

the first lift. Concealed by darkness and 

paddling the boats to maintain silence, 

the first-wave forces reached the eastern peninsula undetected but were 

stopped by small arms and machine 

gun fire when they moved onto high 

ground above the landing point after 

daylight. Enemy fire striking the following waves of Rangers as they crossed 

the reservoir in daylight grew heavy 

enough to force part of the last lift to 

return to the south shore. Even with 

the bulk of the company available, Captain Anderson was unable to advance 

and by midmorning used most of his 

23 lntervs, Blumenson with Harris, 18 Apr 51, 

Webel, 16 Apr 51, Wilson, 18 Apr 51, Anderson, 13 

Apr 51, 1st Lt John S. Warren, Exec O, 4th Rgr Co, 

13 Apr 51, and Hallden, 16 Apr 51. 
OPERATION RUGGED 361 

ammunition in beating off counterattacks. Chinese troops meanwhile began 

moving across the dam from the western peninsula to reinforce those holding up the Rangers.24 

As Anderson’s attack bogged down, 

Colonel Harris ordered the 3d Battalion to the eastern peninsula. Company I, which had assembled near the 

Rangers’ embarkation point during the 

night, started across the reservoir about 

1100. Forced by a shortage of boats to 

cross in increments, slowed to a paddling pace when most of the few outboard motors failed, and harassed by 

enemy fire, the company was not on 

the peninsula until midafternoon, and 

only one platoon by that time had 

joined the Rangers. Elsewhere, the diversionary attack across the Pukhan 

ended in its reconnaissance stage when 

intense fire from the northwest blocked 

all early morning attempts by a Company A patrol to search the still-swollen 

river for crossing sites. The 2d Battalion again lost momentum when its lead 

company, now Company E, stalled at 

the base of the western ridge under 

heavy fire from pillboxes above. All attempts to destroy the enemy fortifications with artillery fire failed. With the 

regiment stopped at every point, General Palmer, while Company I was 

crossing the reservoir to join the 

Rangers, authorized Colonel Harris to 

call off the attack. But Harris, though 

he no longer expected to occupy the 

dam area, deferred ending operations 

out of hope that by reinforcing the attack on the eastern peninsula he might 

be able to send Anderson’s company in 

24 Intervs, Blumenson with Anderson, 13 Apr 51, 

Warren, 13 Apr 51, and Webel, 16 Apr 5 51. 

a raid to immobilize the dam’s sluice 

gates.25 

Following Company I’s drawn-out 

reservoir crossing, however, Harris realized that the shortage of boats and 

motors would prevent the remainder 

of the 3d Battalion from reaching the 

peninsula before dark. Fearful of losing the Rangers and Company I to a 

Chinese night attack, he ordered them 

to withdraw. The Chinese made no attempt to follow the Rangers and Company I platoon as they withdrew piecemeal from their high ground positions 

to join the remainder of Company I on 

the beach. Bothered only by sporadic 

enemy fire, the two companies waited 

for darkness before shuttling forces to 

the south shore of the reservoir. Completing the return trip after midnight, 

they moved on to join the remainder of 

the regiment, which Harris had pulled 

back to line Kansas after ordering the 

evacuation of the eastern peninsula.26 

As Harris began pulling his forces 

off the peninsula, General Hoge decided to forego any further separate 

action against the dam and authorized 

the relief of the 7th Cavalry by the 1st 

Korean Marine Corps Regiment on 12 

April. Hoge attributed the 7th Cavalry’s 

failure to reach the dam principally to 

the loss of surprise. Sharing the cause 

were hasty planning; shortages of 

equipment, particularly amphibious 

gear; and lack of normal direct support artillery fire. Certainly the canal25 Intervs, Blumenson with Capt Carl W. Kueffer, 

S3, 1st Bn, 7th Cav, 17 Apr 51, Callaway, 17 Apr 51, 

Harris, 18 Apr 51, and Hallden, 16 Apr 51; Ltr, Maj 

Gen John G. Hill, Jr.. to Maj Gen William A. Harris, 

31 Aug 78, copy in CMH. General Hill commanded 

Company E in this operation. 

26 Intervs, Blumenson with Harris, 18 Apr 51, and 

Webel, 16 Apr 51. 
362 EBB AND FLOW 

ized terrain and the strength and fortified position of the defending forces 

also contributed. In any case, since General Ridgway meanwhile had ordered 

the opening of Operation DAUNTLESS, 

Hoge elected to wait until then, when 

the dam would be an objective of a full 

IX Corps advance to line Wyoming. 

The decision would not prove a great 

gamble. Although the Chinese had 

closed some of the sluice gates late on 

10 April, they would not attempt to 

flood the Pukhan during the course of 

the DAUNTLESS operation.27 

General Ridgway set an opening date 

for the DAUNTLESS advance late on 9 

April after all but the X and ROK III 

Corps had reached line Kansas. (Map 

31) While those two corps continued 

what had proved a battle more with terrain than with North Koreans, I and 

IX Corps forces were to start toward 

the Iron Triangle on the 11th. Utah, 

the initial objective line, arched eleven 

miles above Kansas between the Imjin 

River and the eastern slopes of Kungmang Mountain, its trace resting on the 

prominent Kumhak, Kwangdok, and 

Paegun mountain masses. The opening phase thus would be primarily a I 

Corps operation involving attacks by 

the 3d, 25th, and 24th Divisions while 

requiring only a short advance by the 

British 27th Brigade at the left of the 

IX Corps.28 

Change of Command 

The opening of the DAUNTLESS advance on the 11th coincided with a 

27 Interv, Blumenson with Hoge, 15 Apr 51; Rad, 

GX-4-1978 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corp et 

al., 9 Apr 51; Palmer, MS review comments, 1985. 

28 Rads, GX-4-805 KGOP, and GX-4-1978 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 3 and 9 Apr 51, 

respectively; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X 

Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

three-way change of command set in 

motion a week earlier when Congressman Martin, believing he “owed it to 

the American people to tell them the 

information I had from a great and reliable source,” rose in the House and 

read the 20 March letter in which General MacArthur had reiterated, if mildly, some of his contrary opinions on 

how the war should be prosecuted.29 

President Truman regarded the letter 

as one more instance of MacArthur’s 

willful insubordination, and he reacted 

immediately. Between 6 and 9 April he 

met in closed sessions with Secretary of 

Defense Marshall, Secretary of State 

Acheson, General Bradley, and special 

assistant Averell Harriman to hear their 

views on what action should be taken 

against MacArthur. Truman had already decided that MacArthur should 

be relieved but wanted the record to 

show that he had acted upon the advice and with the support of his chief 

civilian and military aides. Only after 

receiving their unanimous recommendation of MacArthur’s relief did he inform them of his prior decision. At the 

same time, he accepted the recommendations of Secretary Marshall and General Bradley that, General Ridgway succeed MacArthur and that Lt. Gen. 

James A. Van Fleet, currently commanding the Second Army, take over 

the Eighth.30 

Plans completed by the president and 

his advisers on 10 April called for MacArthur to be relieved summarily and 

for the dismissal to be presented to the 

29 Quoted in Trumball Higgins, Korea and the Fall of 

MacArthur (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 

30 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 445-47; 

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 374-76; Acheson, 

Present at the Creation, pp. 521-22; Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 284-85. 
OPERATION RUGGED 

MAP 31 

public as a fait accompli. Behind both 

measures apparently was a desire to 

avoid taking the action amid outcries 

against the relief of a popular war hero, 

especially in the Congress where the 

Republican Party had gained considerable strength in the recent midterm 

election and where MacArthur had a 

dedicated following. The dismissal order was to be delivered to MacArthur 

by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, 

Jr., who had arrived in Japan on 9 April 

for a routine tour of the theater and at 

363 

the moment was in Korea.31 To prevent any embarrassments that might result from a premature disclosure of 

MacArthur’s relief, the dismissal order 

and Ridgway’s reassignment order were 

to be sent in diplomatic code by Secretary Acheson to Ambassador Muccio at 

31 There have been other interpretations of Pace’s 

purpose. In With MacArthur in Japan (New York: W.W. 

Norton & Company, 1965), William J. Sebald, political adviser to MacArthur for the occupation, writes 

that he assumed Pace’s visit was connected with the 
364 EBB AND FLOW 

the embassy in Pusan. Muccio was to 

pass the orders directly to Secretary 

Pace. Accompanying instructions from 

Secretary Marshall would direct Pace 

to return to Tokyo, arrange to meet 

MacArthur at 1000 on 12 April (2000 

on 11 April, Washington time) at the 

general’s American Embassy residence, 

and deliver the relief order personally 

and privately. Pace also was to arrange 

a simultaneous delivery of Ridgway’s 

reassignment order by a Department 

of the Army staff member, Lt. Gen. 

John E. Hull, who was traveling with 

Pace.32 

The careful plans for delivering the 

orders were upset almost immediately. 

Secretary Acheson dispatched the directives via commercial cable late in 

the afternoon of the 10th but at midnight was still waiting for Ambassador 

Muccio’s signal of receipt. Unknown to 

Acheson or the cable company at the 

time, a power failure in Pusan had interrupted transmission of the orders. 

A Chicago newspaperman meanwhile 

asked Pentagon officials to confirm a 

tip from Japan, apparently from his 

paper’s Tokyo bureau, that an important resignation was forthcoming. Either word of the impending command 

Martin incident. The Welsh writer, Rees, in his Korea: 

The Limited War, states flatly that Pace was sent to 

Tokyo to prevent further provocations by MacArthur 

while his dismissal was being organized. In a 1975 

interview conducted under the auspices of the U.S. 

Army Military History Research Collection, Pace himself stated that his Far East tour originally was a 

“routine inspection trip to Japan and Korea.” He did 

add that shortly after reaching Tokyo he received a 

cable from Secretary Marshall instructing him to 

“proceed to Korea where you will wait until you hear 

from me,” but he made clear that he went to Korea 

unaware of MacArthur’s coming relief. 

32 Testimony of Secretary Marshall, MacArthur 

Hearings, pp. 348, 422; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 522-23; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 376. 

change had leaked, or, as General Bradley surmised, earlier press speculation 

and and the White House meetings had led the White House meetings had led 

to "jumping at conclusions.“33 

When Bradley warned the president 

late in the evening of the 10th that the 

Chicago paper might print the story in 

its next edition, Truman instructed him 

to issue new orders immediately, in the 

clear and via the military communications system, one to General MacArthur relieving him, another to Secretary Pace in Korea so that General 

Ridgway could be informed of his new 

post. 34 Truman also directed his press 

secretary, Joseph Short, to call a new 

conference at the White House at 0100 

on 11 April to announce the command 

changes.35 

As intended, Short’s press conference 

virtually coincided with the arrival of 

the relief order in the message center 

of MacArthur’s headquarters shortly 

before 1500 on 11 April, Japan time. 

But a half hour or more before the order was delivered to MacArthur at his 

residence, where he was entertaining 

lunch guests, he learned of his dismissal 

through an aide who had heard the 

news broadcast by a Tokyo radio station. Although accidental, the public 

disclosure in advance of official notice 

added an element of rudeness to the 

procedure of relief, which MacArthur 

viewed in all its aspects as a callous dis33 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 523; Schnabel, 

Policy and Direction, p. 377; Quotation is from Testimony of General Bradley, MacArthur Hearings, p. 747. 

34 As Truman recalled some years later, Bradley 

warned him that if MacArthur learned of his relief 

before he received the official notice, he probably 

would resign. The prospect infuriated the president. 

MacArthur was not “going to resign on me,” Truman 

responded, “I want him fired.” See Miller, Plain Speaking p. 305. 

35 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 449-50; Rees, 

Korea: The Limited War, p. 218. 
OPERATION RUGGED 365 

Van Fleet, scheduled to arrive on 14 

April, could take charge.38 

In winding up affairs on 13 April, 

Ridgway put final touches to plans developed during his term of command 

for rotating Army troops.39 Under the 

rules established, officers and enlisted 

men alike would be eligible to return to 

the United States after serving six 

months in Korea with a division or 

other separate combat unit, a full year 

at higher levels of command or with 

separate service units, or a constructive 

year, such as three months with a combat unit and six months with a service 

unit. An eligible soldier could leave 

Korea, however, only after his replacement joined his unit. Over seventy 

thousand troops already were eligible 

under the length of service criteria. 

This backlog and troops earning eligibility later were to return to the United 

States in monthly quotas established on 

the basis of expected replacements. 

Since replacements currently exceeded 

casualty losses by more than 50 percent, 

Ridgway wanted the rotation processthe “Big R,” as the troops would call 

it-begun before the month was out. 

The first quota of troops would leave 

Korea on 22 April.40 

Ridgway rounded out his last full day 

in Korea by calling a conference at Yoju 

to canvass corps commanders for recent 

evidence of enemy offensive preparations and to discuss a plan completed 

regard for ordinary decencies. Truman 

had ordered MacArthur to pass authority to Ridgway "effective at once.“36 MacArthur thus directed General Hickey, 

the acting chief of staff, to assume 

command in Ridgway’s behalf until 

Ridgway could take over personally.37 

Word of the command changes took 

somewhat longer to reach General 

Ridgway and Secretary Pace, who on 

the morning of the 11th had gone to 

the I Corps front for a daylong tour of 

units involved in the DAUNTLESS operation. The second notice of Ridgway’s 

elevation in command, sent by General 

Bradley over Secretary Marshall’s signature, was relayed to Secretary Pace 

from Eighth Army headquarters late 

in the afternoon while he and Ridgway 

were visiting the headquarters of the 

5th Regimental Combat Team, 24th 

Division. Late in the evening, after 

Ridgway and Pace returned from the 

front to Ridgway’s Yoju command post, 

Pace received a call from the embassy 

in Pusan, which had finally received 

Secretary Acheson’s cable. Ridgway and 

Pace flew to Pusan on the morning of 

the 12th to obtain any further information Ambassador Muccio could provide, 

then went on to Tokyo. There Ridgway 

and MacArthur, in the only conference 

they would have on the change of command, spent the late afternoon discussing the range of Ridgway’s new 

responsibilities. Ridgway elected not to 

take command in person immediately 

but to return to Korea and direct 

Eighth Army operations until General 

36 Rad JCS 88180, Bradley (Personal) for MacArthur, 11 Apr 51. 

37 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 285; Testimony of 

General Bradley, p. 1097, and Testimony of General 

MacArthur, pp. 26, 155, in MacArthur Hearings; 

MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 395. 

38 USAMHRC Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 

Interv, Lt Col J. Lapsey Smith with Mr. Frank Pace. 

Jr., 1975; Acheson: Piesent at the Creation, p. 523; 

Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 12 Apr 51; Ridgway, Soldier, 

p. 223. 

39 The Air Force and Marine Corps already had 

begun, to rotate troops. The Navy rotated ships. 

40 Eighth Army G1 SS Rpt, Mar 51; Mono, 1st Lt. 

Charles G. Cleaver, “Personnel Problems in the Korean 

Campaign,” pp. 93ff., copy in CMH. 
366 EBB AND FLOW 

by his staff the previous day that was to 

govern withdrawals if enemy attacks 

forced the Eighth Army back from line 

Kansas. Three defense lines were established, these patterned much after 

lines B and C and the Seoul bridgehead occupied during the enemy New 

Year’s offensive. Delta, the first line to 

the south, stretched coast to coast, centering on and running almost due east 

and west from Ch’unch’on. Nevada, the 

deepest line, also ran coast to coast, following the lower bank of the Han in 

the west, then sloping northeastward 

to the Yangyang area. For a defense of 

Seoul, which if successful would obviate a withdrawal to the Nevada line in 

the west, line Golden looped above the 

capital from a point on the Han six 

miles west of the city to a juncture 

with line Nevada near the town of 

Yongp’yong to the east.41 

The officers meeting with Ridgway 

could offer little new information about 

the enemy’s readiness to attack. Although the I Corps in pushing toward 

line Utah and the X and ROK III Corps 

in continuing toward line Kansas had 

encountered stiffening opposition over 

the past two days, the assault forces had 

discovered no indication that the enemy offensive was imminent other than 

the filling of tank traps previously dug 

along axes of Eighth Army advance. In 

the absence of other evidence, Ridgway 

and the assembled corps commanders 

agreed that enemy forces had no intention of attacking in the immediate 

future.42 

General Van Fleet arrived in Korea 

41 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 13 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4- 

2554 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 

12 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Apr 51. 

42 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 13 Apr 51; MS, Ridgway, 

The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 423-24. 

at midday on 14 April. Earlier, in notifying General Ridgway of his successor 

in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 

authorized him to employ Van Fleet in 

some other capacity if, because of the 

expected enemy offensive, Ridgway 

wanted to retain direct control of the 

Eighth Army temporarily. Ridgway did 

not postpone Van Fleet’s assumption 

of command, but in turning over the 

Eighth Army officially at 1700 on the 

14th he instructed Van Fleet to inform 

him before sending forces above line 

Utah and reserved the right to approve 

any Eighth Army move in strength 

beyond the Wyoming line. Ridgway 

planned to incorporate the requirement 

for prior approval of operations above 

line Wyoming in a fuller letter of instructions after he established himself 

in Tokyo. He planned also to issue letters to General Stratemeyer and Admiral Joy that would formally place limits 

on air and naval operations.43 

Ridgway arrived in Japan during the 

evening of the 14th. General Hickey 

and William J. Sebald, Department of 

State political adviser for the occupation of Japan, met Ridgway at Haneda 

Airport and accompanied him to quarters in Tokyo’s Imperial Hotel. Ridgway 

considered it a point of courtesy to 

avoid UNC headquarters until General 

MacArthur left for the United States. 

Sebald was present primarily to help 

General Ridgway prepare a statement 

concerning U.S. policy on the occupation and on the negotiations toward 

43 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 14 Apr 51; Rad, JCS 

88374, JCS to CINCFE, 12 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-3070 

KDC, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 14 Apr 51 

(announces change of command); Rad, CX 60388, 

CINCFE to EUSAK, 19 Apr 51 (confirms oral instructions issued 14 Apr 51); Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 

162-65. 
OPERATION RUGGED 367 

a U.S.-Japan peace treaty which had 

opened in January. Apprehensive that 

the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru 

Yoshida and his cabinet would resign 

as a gesture of responsibility for MacArthur’s relief, Sebald had met with the 

prime minister late on the 11th to discourage such a step and to assure him 

that the change of command presaged 

no alteration of policy. Yoshida had 

told Sebald that there would be no 

resignation. Nevertheless, at the direction of President Truman, the U.S. 

representative in the treaty negotiation, 

John Foster Dulles, was currently en 

route to Tokyo to deliver the president’s personal guarantee of no policy 

change. Ridgway’s statement to the 

same effect was delivered to the press, 

Japanese and foreign, late on the 

14th.44 

Ridgway met with his staff for the first 

time on 16 April after attending early 

morning departure ceremonies for 

General MacArthur. Ridgway’s first 

order appointed General Hickey Far 

East Command and U.N. Command 

chief of staff, the post Hickey had 

filled on an acting basis since September when General Almond, the officially designated chief of staff, had 

taken the X Corps into Inch’on. Ridgway felt “much personal pleasure” 

in rectifying what he regarded as a 

marked, if unintentional, slight to General Hickey. As Ridgway wrote later, 

“General MacArthur’s ways were not 

mine.“45 

44 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 14 Apr 51; Ridgway, 

The Korean War, p. 161; Sebald, With MacArthur in 

Japan, pp. 228-31; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 

523-24; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 449. 

45 Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, p. 236; Ridgway, 

The Korean War, pp. 159, 163, 169-70; Interv, Appleman with Hickey, 10 Oct 51. 

Before the month was out Ridgway 

issued instructions that defined, and 

confined, the latitude within which his 

ground, air, and naval commanders 

could operate. Written directives to 

General Stratemeyer and Admiral Joy 

in the main only assigned over Ridgway’s signature the missions previously 

undertaken by UNC air and naval 

forces. Similarly, Van Fleet’s instructions were largely the guidelines under 

which Ridgway himself had operated: 

the general mission was to repel aggression against South Korea; Van Fleet 

could operate north of the 38th parallel but not above the combined trace of 

the Kansas and Wyoming lines without 

Ridgway’s approval; operations were to 

aim not simply at gaining ground but 

at inflicting maximum personnel and 

materiel losses on enemy forces without incurring high casualties or risking 

the integrity of major units. Van Fleet 

also was to assume that he would receive no major reinforcements and that 

he might be ordered to hold a defensive line indefinitely, or to withdraw, 

or even to take his forces out of Korea.46 

Although Ridgway did not alter previous missions in any material way by 

these instructions, he did formally attach a rein to each principal subordinate. He tightened the reins in a 

memorandum accompanying the directives. In marked contrast to General 

MacArthur’s views on how the war 

should be conducted, Ridgway, aiming 

primarily at Stratemeyer and Joy since 

their forces were inherently more mobile than those of Van Fleet, demanded 

that his commanders avoid taking any 

action that might widen the war.47 

46 Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 166-68, 267-68. 

47 Ibid., pp. 165-66. 
CHAPTER XX 

Toward the Iron Triangle 

In leading the Eighth Army according to the uncommon prescriptions of 

his instructions from General Ridgway, 

General Van Fleet would culminate a 

long career already noted for unusual 

episodes. Graduating from West Point 

in 1915 with the class “the stars fell on,” 

he initially matched the rise of classmates such as Dwight D. Eisenhower 

and Omar N. Bradley, commanding a 

machine gun battalion as a very young 

major during World War I and becoming a colonel in command of the 8th 

Infantry, 4th Division, by the time of 

American entry into World War II. A 

hiatus then developed when Army 

Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, 

who mistook Van Fleet for a similarly 

named intemperate officer who had 

served under Marshall years earlier, disapproved his promotion to brigadier 

general. Ironically, Van Fleet was a 

teetotaler.1

Rectification came with remarkable 

swiftness after Van Fleet led the 8th 

Infantry ashore at Normandy on 6 June 

1944. Within five months he rose from 

colonel to major general and within 

nine months from regimental to corps 

command. General Eisenhower later 

rated his battle record as the best of 

any regimental, division, or corps com1 Biog of Gen Van Fleet, prepared by Office of Pub 

Info, DOD, 12 Mar 53, in CMH; Time, vol. LVII, no. 

20, 14 May 1951, pp. 29-31; Collins, War in Peacetime, 

pp. 294-95. 

mander in the European theater. Van 

Fleet received his third star early in 

1948 along with an unprecedented assignment as head of a joint U.S. military 

advisory and planning group in Greece, 

where he received wide acclaim as he 

guided Greek government forces to 

victory over a Communist-supported 

insurgency. After thirty-six years of service and at age fifty-nine, he would receive the additional star of a full general in Korea at the end of July 195l.2 

From Normandy to Korea, Van 

Fleet’s career had benefited from the 

attention of the current Army chief of 

staff. As commander of the VII Corps 

during World War II General Collins 

instigated Van Fleet’s initial rise into 

general officer ranks, as deputy chief 

of staff in 1948 he nominated Van Fleet 

for the post in Greece, and it was Collins who originally recommended Van 

Fleet as Ridgway’s successor. “Van,” in 

Collins’ estimation, “was cast in the same 

mold as Ridgway as a fighting man,” 

and “could take over the Eighth Army 

without a falter in its high morale and 

aggressive spirit.“3 

Van Fleet showed some variation in 

“mold” when asked during his first 

press conference on 22 April to explain 

the goal of Eighth Army operations 

under his direction. Notwithstanding 

2 Ibid. 

3 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 295. 
TOWARD THE IRON TRIANGLE 369 

his rather explicit instructions from 

Ridgway, he replied that he did not 

know. The answer, he said, would have 

to come from higher authority. But if 

he had yet to attune himself to the conditions and requirements of the war as 

Ridgway saw them, from the start he 

otherwise would compare closely with 

his predecessor in attitude and tactics 

as commander of the Eighth Army.4 It 

was perhaps a reflection of his experience in Greece that Van Fleet, in his 

initial inspection of the front, went 

first to the ROK Army zone in the east.5 

In December President Rhee had requested American weapons and equipment to place more South Koreans under arms, an appeal that had generated 

interest in Washington. But General 

MacArthur had twice recommended 

disapproval, most recently on 6 April, 

largely on grounds that the ROK 

Army’s past poor performances raised 

doubt that anything would be gained 

by increasing its size. The need to improve the quality of the ROK Army was 

one reason General Collins had recommended Van Fleet for the ground 

command in Korea. One of Van Fleet’s 

bigger projects, and successes, in 

Greece had been to build its army into 

an effective organization.6 

4 Eighth Army CG Jnl, 22 Apr 51; Rees, Korea: The 

Limited War, p. 255; Middleton, The Compact History of 

the Korean War, p. 188. 

5 Earlier, at General Ridgway’s urging, General 

Chung, the ROK Army chief of staff, had established 

a forward command post at Hajinbu-ri. Thereafter 

the two ROK corps zones in the east were considered 

as the ROK Army zone. 

6 Rad, W99238, DA (G3) to CINCFE, 20 Dec 50; 

Rad, C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan 51; 

Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 169; Collins, War 

in Peacetime, p. 315. 

GENERAL VAN FLEET 

The Enemy’s Conspicuous Absence 

11-20 April 

There was little activity in the South 

Korean Army zone when Van Fleet 

reached Kangnung on 16 April for a 

conference with ROK Defense Minister 

Sign Sung MO; General Chung; General Farrell, the KMAG chief; and General Paik, the former commander of the 

ROK 1st Division now in command of 

the ROK I Corps. Since occupying positions around Yangyang above line Kansas on the 10th, the ROK I Corps had 

had no contact on its front, and on the 

1lth a company from the 29th Regiment, 9th Division, had patrolled some 

fifteen miles north of Yangyang without encountering enemy forces. (See 

Map 31.) (The 69th Brigade, the corps’ 

longtime, if weak, opponent, had been 

taken off the line and disbanded, and 

the North Korean 2d Division, now 
370 EBB AND FLOW 

responsible for the coastal area, had 

yet to deploy forces in contact.) Currently moving to join the corps for 

seasoning- small as that prospect was 

at the time-was the ROK 11th Division, green to combat except for antiguerrilla operations conducted in 

southwestern Korea since October.7 In 

the narrow ROK III Corps zone high 

in the Taebaeks, the ROK 3d Division, 

despite having to be resupplied entirely 

by air and carrying parties in the virtually roadless mountains, had beaten 

back detachments of the North Korean 

45th Division to reach line Kansas on 

the 14th, and its patrols since then had 

encountered few enemy forces above 

the line.8 The scant opposition to the 

South Koreans, and especially the ROK 

III Corps’ want of a good supply road, 

would prompt one of Van Fleet’s first 

operations orders. 

Next to the west, the three divisions 

of the X Corps were just beginning to 

consolidate positions along the Kansas 

line on 16 April. Since the 10th, after it 

became obvious that North Korean 1st 

Division forces opposite the corps left 

were withdrawing hastily eastward from 

the ground below the Hwach’on Reservoir, the 23d Infantry of the 2d Division had swung east along the lower 

shore in pursuit. Abandoned ammunition, food supplies, and a fully stocked 

aid station evidenced the enemy’s haste. 

Ahead of the pursuing forces, the bulk 

of the enemy division’s 1st Regiment (also 

known as the 14th Regiment) crossed 

the reservoir at a narrow point three 

7 The 11th's rear area mission was taken over by the 

ROK 8th Division, now rebuilt after being shattered 

in February. 

8 Eighth Army Comd Rpt , Nar, Apr 51; Eighth 

Army CG Jnl, 16 Apr 51; Hq, FEC, History of the 

North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. 

miles northwest of Yanggu, using boats 

and rafts that were burned after the 

crossing; the remainder moved to 

Yanggu and then north around the 

eastern end of the reservoir. Leading 

forces of the 23d Infantry entered 

Yanggu and reached line Kansas on the 

15th. 

The hard spots of North Korean resistance encountered just above the 

Soyang River by the 7th Division at X 

Corps center and the ROK 5th Division at the right had begun to dissolve 

on 13 April. The 5th Division cleared 

North Korean 45th Division forces out 

of their defenses around Inje on the 

15th, and after artillery pounded the 

ridges north of town during the night, 

dawn attacks carried the South Koreans 

to line Kansas with negligible contact. 

The 17th Infantry, advancing on the 7th 

Division’s left through decreasing opposition from North Korean 15th Division forces, found Route 29 leading into 

Yanggu obstructed by booby-trapped 

fallen trees and cleverly placed wooden 

box mines but gained line Kansas and 

made contact with the 2d Division in 

Yanggu on the 15th and 16th. On the 

division’s right, the 32d Infantry 

pushed through brief but sharp resistance to reach the line early on 17 

April.10 

Beginning on the 17th, X Corps patrols ranging above line Kansas found 

progressively fewer enemy forces. Gen9 Rads, X 18473, and X 18493, CG X Corps to CG 

Eighth Army, 14 and 15 Apr 51, respectively; 2d Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; the North Korean 1st Regiment's 

withdrawal is described in 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, 

Apr 51. 

I 

10 See following Rads from CG X Corps to CG 

Eighth Army: X 18473, 14 Apr 51, X 18484 and X 

18493, 15 Air 51, and X 18505 and X 18513, 17 Apr 

51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 
TOWARD THE IRON TRIANGLE 

era1 Almond attempted to follow the 

North Korean withdrawal by establishing forward patrol bases in all division 

zones, whence strong patrols were to 

advance farther north each day in 

search of enemy positions. As of 20 

April the patrolling had reached a 

depth of about two miles without meeting significant resistance.11

On the opposite side of the Hwach’on 

Reservoir, IX Corps patrols sent forward of line Kansas by the ROK 6th 

and 1st Marine Divisions began to 

bring back reports of Chinese withdrawal when forces engaged in Operation DAUNTLESS to the west drew closer 

to line Utah. (See Map 29.) By 17 April 

the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, 

which had replaced the 7th Cavalry after the latter’s unsuccessful effort to 

capture the Hwach’on Dam, established 

outposts near the dam on the ridge inside the Pukhan loop and on heights 

above the Pukhan to the west. On 

the 18th a Marine patrol crossing the 

Pukhan four miles west of the dam 

found Hwach’on town on Route 17 unoccupied except for eleven Chinese, 

whom the patrol took captive. Intelligence officers appraised the voluntary 

withdrawal ahead of the two IX Corps 

divisions as a realignment of forces with 

those dropping back in the DAUNTLESS 

sector but did not overlook the possibility that the Chinese were coaxing the 

IX Corps into a vulnerable deployment. 

A recently captured document, dated 

17 March, extolled the virtues and 

explained the purpose of “roving defensive warfare,” defined as defense 

through movement without regard for 

the loss or gain of ground which could 

371 

11 Ibid.: X 18513, 17 Apr 51, X 18523, 18 Apr 51, X 

18535, 19 Apr 51, and X 18650, 20 Apr 51. 

“conserve our own power, deplete the 

enemy’s strength, and secure for us 

more favorable conditions for future 

victory.“12 (This scheme of defense had 

a pronounced similarity to the tactical 

concepts General Ridgway set for the 

Eighth Army in February.) 

As General Van Fleet completed an 

east-to-west tour of the front on 17 

April, the first phase of Operation 

DAUNTLESS was a virtual success. On 

the east flank of the advance, the British 27th Brigade of the IX Corps had 

cleared minor 40th Army forces from 

Paegun Mountain above the headwaters of the Kap’yong River to reach line 

Utah the day before. The 19th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division was currently relieving the brigade, which, 

except for the New Zealand artillery 

assigned to stay forward in support of 

the South Koreans, was withdrawing 

into corps reserve near Kap’yong town. 

The relief in part was in preparation 

for the second DAUNTLESS phase in 

which the IX Corps would make a full 

advance with the ROK 6th and 1st Marine Divisions. While in reserve, the 

British brigade also was to begin rotating units under a British policy calling 

for annual replacement. The 1st Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland 

Highlanders, was to be replaced on 23 

April by the 1st Battalion, King’s Own 

Scottish Borders; on the 25th, brigade 

headquarters itself was to leave the line 

and be replaced by a new staff and commander from Hong Kong. The brigade 

at that time would become the 28th 

British Commonwealth Brigade under 

12 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1st Marine Div 

Hist Diary, Apr 51; 1st Marine Div POR 23, 16 Apr 

51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central 

Front, p. 102. 
372 EBB AND FLOW 

the command of Brigadier George 

Taylor.13 

On the west flank of the DAUNTLESS 

attack, at approximately I Corps center, 

the 65th Infantry of the 3d Division, 

reinforced by the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team and two companies of the 64th Tank Battalion, had 

easily defeated 26th Army detachments 

in a narrow zone between the Imjin 

River and Route 33 to reach line Utah 

on 14 April. In the right half of the 

corps zone, delaying forces of the 26th 

and 40th Armies had been more reluctant to give way before the 25th 

and 24th Divisions advancing toward 

Ch’orwon and Kumhwa. The 25th 

Division spent four days crossing the 

Hant’an River and getting a foothold 

in the Pogae-san heights, a series of 

steep north-south ridges between 

Routes 33 and 3, and needed two days 

more to cover half the ten-mile distance 

between the Kansas and Utah lines. 

East of Route 3, the 24th Division attacking through the Kwangdok-san 

ridges shouldering the Yongp’yong 

River gained scarcely a mile in three 

days. But by 17 April resistance weakened in both division zones. On that 

date a company of the 6th Tank Battalion, 24th Division, moved up Route 

3 within seven miles of Kumhwa without contact. On the following day, in 

the 25th Division zone, a battalion of 

the 35th Infantry, two companies of 

the 89th Tank Battalion, and an artillery battery moved through the upper 

Hant’an River valley within five miles 

of Ch’orwon before receiving fire. 

Impeded by rugged ground, heavy 

rains, and somewhat stiffer resistance 

13 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Wood, Strange 

Battleground, p. 79. 

beginning on 19 April, the two divisions were on line Utah on the 20th 

except at the left of the 25th Division 

where enemy delaying forces held up 

the attached Turkish brigade along 

Route 33.l4 

Stretched by the DAUNTLESS gains 

of the 65th Infantry, the western I 

Corps front by 20 April lay along thirty 

miles of the meandering Imjin, from 

its mouth northeastward to a point on 

Route 33 ten miles below Ch’orwon. At 

the left, the ROK 1st Division sat astride 

Route 1 with its tank destroyer battalion (still organized and fighting as an 

infantry unit) and 1lth and 12th Regiments stretched out from the mouth of 

the Imjin to the river’s Korangp’o-ri 

bend fifteen miles upstream. The 3d 

Division occupied the Korangp’o-riRoute 33 sector with the attached British 29th Brigade adjacent to the South 

Korean division and the 65th Infantry 

on the ground taken during its recent 

advance. It was a gaping front, manned 

for the most part in a series of separated battalion strongpoints.15 

As the Imjin River front had developed to its present width since the beginning of the month, the two divisions 

manning it had patrolled extensively 

above the river. The patrols encountered thinly disposed forces of the North 

Korean 8th Division along the far bank, 

most of them ahead of the ROK 1st 

Division, until the 10th, when they discovered that the North Koreans had 

vacated their positions. South Korean 

14 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 

25th Div G3 Jnl, 10-20 Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Apr 51; 24th Div G3 Jnl, 1l-20 Apr 51; Rad, 

CICCG G4, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 11 Apr 

51. 

15 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 
TOWARD THE IRON TRIANGLE 373 

patrols later moved along Route 1 as 

far as Kaesong, the ancient capital of 

Korea some twelve miles above the 

Imjin, without making contact. The 8th 

Division appeared to have joined the remainder of the North Korean I Corps 

west of the Yesong River.16 

Other ROK 1st Division and British 

29th Brigade patrols ranging up to five 

miles above the Imjin after 10 April 

began to encounter a sprinkling of 

Chinese, mostly across the ten-mile British front between Korangp’o-ri and a 

near ninety-degree bend in the river 

where its flow changes from southeast 

to southwest and where it receives the 

water of the westward-flowing Hant’an. 

Although intelligence agents had in the 

meantime identified the XIX Army 

Group in the general Kumch’onKuhwa-ri area and had discovered the 

neighboring III Army Group (but misidentified it as the XVIII Army Group), 

the minor engagements within five 

miles of the river were the first indication that any of these forces had displaced forward. Five captives taken at 

scattered locations between 11 and 14 

April all belonged to the 561st Regiment, 

187th Division, from the 63d Army of 

the XIX Army Group. One prisoner 

stated at interrogation that the 561st 

had a defensive mission pending the 

arrival of reinforcements. The light 

contact and wide dispersion of a single 

regiment did suggest a screen, but as 

South Korean and British patrols continued to probe the thin enemy positions through 20 April, no evidence 

appeared of Chinese forces massing behind them.17 

16 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 

4-3, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 10 Apr 51; 

Eighth Army PIRs 263-279, l-17 Apr 51. 

17 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army 

Perhaps the most dramatic-certainly 

the most visible-evidence of enemy activity to appear as Eighth Army forces 

closed on the Kansas and Utah lines 

were billows of smoke rising at numerous points ahead of them. By midApril, belts of smoke up to ten miles 

deep lay before much of the I, IX, and 

X Corps fronts.18 Air observers confirmed that enemy troops, some in 

groups of fifty to five hundred, were 

setting fire to grasslands and brush. 

Some observers reported that smoke 

generators also were being used. Fires 

doused by rain showers were rekindled. 

Maritime air that frequently stagnated 

over the battlefront, added sea haze and 

moisture to the smoke and produced 

smog. On a number of days-varying 

from sector to sector-rain, haze, fog, 

smog, and particularly smoke hampered ground and air observation, the 

delivery of air strikes, and the adjustment of artillery fire.19 

Though the smoke was intended to 

shield daylight troop movements, there 

PIRs 273-282, l l-20 Apr 51; the following Rads from 

CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army: CICCG 4-4, 11 Apr 

51, CICCG 4-5, 12 Apr 51, CICCG 4-6, 13 Apr 51, 

CICCG 4-7, 14 Apr 51, CICCG 4-8, 15 Apr 51, CICCG 

4-9, l6 Apr 51, CICCG 4-11, 18 Apr 51, and CICCG 

4-13, 20 Apr 51. 

18 The smoke, first noticed about 9 April, apparently was not mentioned on the 13th when General

Ridgway, just before transferring to Tokyo, canvassed 

corps commanders for recent evidence of enemy offensive preparations. 

19 Of seventy close support sorties dispatched on 

one day, all but fourteen had to be aborted because of 

smoke in the target areas. Eighth Army Comd Rpt, 

Nar Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX 

Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Sum, Apr 51; 

Tech Rpt, Weather Effect on Army Operations: Weather in 

the Korean Conflict, vol. II, p. XII-l; Rad, CICCG 4-8, 

CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, 

IXCCG 56, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 

51; Rads, X 18493, X 18505, and X 18523, CG 

X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16, 17, and 18 Apr 51, 

respectively; Eighth Army PIR 285, 23 Apr 51. 
374 EBB AND FLOW 

was not much evidence that enemy 

forces were moving toward the front. 

During the last three days of the advance to line Utah the 65th Infantry 

captured a member of the 181st Division, part of the 60th Army of the III 

Army Group. Two captives taken by the 

24th and 25th Divisions were from different regiments of the 81st Division, 

which belonged to the 27th Army of the 

IX Army Group. One of the latter told 

his captors that his unit would be committed to offensive operations after the 

27th Army finished relieving the 26th. 

By 20 April these three prisoners and 

the sprinkling of Chinese discovered 

above the Imjin were the only indications that fresh forces might have 

moved forward under the smoke.20 

To give some order of probability to 

the opening of the expected enemy 

offensive, Eighth Army G-2 Tarkenton 

advised General Van Fleet on 18 April 

that a “survey of all sources,” while failing to indicate conclusively any specific 

date or period for the initial attack, 

pointed to 20 April through 1 May. 

Tarkenton considered the latter date 

especially significant since it was the 

“most important day of the year to 

International Communism.” Having 

learned that two fresh army groups (the 

XIX and III) were in the general 

Kumch’on-Koksan-Ich’on area, he believed the “greatest enemy potential” 

for a major attack to be from the north 

and northwest across the Imjin. As of 

the 20th, however, I Corps patrols had 

seen no signs of offensive preparations 

in this sector, nor had any evidence that 

the enemy was about to attack appeared 

20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth 

Army PIRs 280-282, 18-20 Apr 51; I Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-12, CG I Corps to 

CG Eighth Army, 19 Apr 51. 

elsewhere. Incoming reports to Van 

Fleet from corps commanders and 

Colonel Tarkenton’s own daily intelligence summaries all described enemy forces as maintaining a “defensive 

attitude.”21 

Since all units were on or near their 

Utah and Kansas objectives, and since 

there was no clear sign that the impending enemy offensive would start 

immediately, Van Fleet elected to open 

the second phase of DAUNTLESS. In notifying General Ridgway that the I and 

IX Corps would move toward line Wyoming on 21 April, Van Fleet also proposed that the X, ROK III, and ROK I 

Corps attack to secure the segment of 

Route 24 running northeast ahead of 

the ROK III and I Corps to a junction 

with the coastal highway near the town 

of Kansong, twenty-three miles above 

Yangyang. This move would give the 

two South Korean corps a supply route 

in the higher Taebaeks, needed in particular by the ROK III Corps. To secure the road, Van Fleet wanted to 

hinge an advance at the eastern end of 

the Hwach’on Reservoir and swing the 

forces between the reservoir and the 

coast northwestward to line Alabama 

seven to fourteen miles above Route 

24. Ridgway approved a sweep that 

would achieve the same end but with a 

substantially shorter eastern arc. Van 

Fleet set the 24th as the opening date.22 

21 Eighth Army PIRs 276-282, 14-20 Apr 51; Rad, 

CICCG 4-7, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 14 Apr 

51; Rad, X 18473, CG; X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 

14 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-8, CG I Corps to CG Eighth 

Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, X 18484, CG X Corps to CG 

Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-9, CG I Corps 

to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rad, IXCCG 56, CG 

IX Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rads, 

CICCG 4-10, CICCG 4-l1, CICCG 4-12, and CICCG 

4-13, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 17, 18, 19, and 

20 Apr 51, respectively. 

22 Rad, GX-4-3900 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 
TOWARD THE IRON TRIANGLE 375 

One Day’s Notice 

The I Corps’ final DAUNTLESS objectives lay in the zones of the 25th and 

24th Divisions stretching north of line 

Utah to Ch’orwon and Kumhwa at the 

base of the Iron Triangle. Ahead of 

the ROK 6th Division and 1st Marine 

Division in the IX Corps zone, line 

Wyoming curved southeast from the 

Kumhwa area to the Hwach’on Reservoir. On the 21st the two IX Corps divisions moved two to five miles above line 

Kansas against almost no opposition. 

Immediately west, the 24th Division 

did not test the opposition below 

Kumhwa but deliberately stood fast in 

the Kwangdok-san ridges to allow the 

neighboring ROK 6th Division to come 

abreast. In the Pogae-san heights, 

the 25th Division attacked toward 

Ch’orwon but made no substantial 

progress after receiving increasing artillery fire during the day and becoming involved in hard fights right at the 

Utah line, especially in the zone of the 

Turkish brigade along Route 33.23 

Neither corps developed evidence of 

enemy offensive preparations during 

the day. The absence of opposition in 

the IX Corps zone only confirmed the 

recent patrol reports of withdrawal. BeI Corps and CG IX Corps, 19 Apr 51; Rad, G-4-3901 

KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 19 Apr 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 19 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-3847 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 Apr 

51; Rad, C 60648, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 21 

Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-4497 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

C/S ROKA et al., 22 Apr 51; Rad. GX-4-4520 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 22 

Apr 51. 

23 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, IXCCG 63, CG IX 

Corps to CG Eighth Army, 21 Apr 51; 1st Marine Div 

Hist Diary, Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 

Rad, CICCG 4-14, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 

21 Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 25th 

Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

low the Iron Triangle, the resistance 

that began to stiffen on 19 April had 

been expected to grow progressively 

heavier as I Corps forces moved above 

the Utah line. On the Imjin front, 

daylight patrols working above the 

river again found only a scattering of 

Chinese. General Milburn concluded in 

an evening wrap-up report to General 

Van Fleet that the “enemy attitude remains defensive.”24 

The only appreciable change in enemy activity on the 21st occurred east 

of the Hwach’on Reservoir in the X 

Corps zone. North and northeast of 

Yanggu, 2d and 7th Division patrols, 

after several days of nearly fruitless 

searches, located several groups of six 

hundred to a thousand North Koreans 

immediately above the corps front. 

These groups suggested, as General Almond reported to Van Fleet, that a relief or reinforcement of enemy units 

was taking place.25 

Summing up the day’s findings late 

on the 21st, the Eighth Army G-2 reported that his information still was not 

firm enough to “indicate the nearness” 

of the impending enemy offensive with 

any degree of certainty. A worrisome 

fact, as he earlier had pointed out to 

General Van Fleet, was that a lack of 

offensive signs did not necessarily mean 

that the opening of the offensive was 

distant. In preparing past attacks, Chinese forces had successfully concealed 

their locations until they moved into 

forward assembly areas immediately before they attacked.26 

24 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-14, CG I Corps to 

CG Eighth Army, 21 Apr 51. 

25 Rad, X 18863, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 

22 Apr 51. 

26 Eighth Army PIR 283, 21 Apr 51. 
376 

The first indication that the enemy 

would repeat this pattern appeared 

during the night when I Corps patrols 

reconnoitering above the Imjin ran into 

Chinese positions that were stronger 

and nearer the river than those encountered during past searches. There was 

no question that the XIX Army Group 

was setting out a covering force.27 

More evidence appeared on the 22d 

as the I and IX Corps continued their 

DAUNTLESS advance toward line 

Wyoming. The progress of the attack 

resembled that on the previous day, IX 

Corps forces making easy moves of two 

to three miles, the two I Corps divisions being limited to shorter gains by 

heavier resistance. On the east flank of 

the advance, the Hwach’on Dam, defended so stoutly by 39th Army forces 

only a few days earlier, fell to the 1st 

Korean Marine Corps Regiment without a fight. But a Chinese captive taken 

elsewhere in the 1st Marine Division 

zone during the afternoon told interrogators that an attack would be opened 

before the day was out. In midafternoon the ROK 6th Division captured 

several members of the Chinese 60th 

Division, and, immediately west, the 

24th Division took captives from the 

59th Division. These two divisions belonged to the fresh 20th Army. The full 

IX Army Group had reached the front. 

In the 25th Division zone on the west 

flank of the advance, six Chinese who 

blundered into the hands of the 

Turkish brigade along Route 33 during the afternoon were members of a 

survey party from the 2d Motorized Artillery Division. The division’s guns, according to the officer in charge, were 

EBB AND FLOW 

being positioned to support an attack 

scheduled to start after dark.28 

For the scheduled advance to line 

Alabama east of the Hwach’on Reservoir, the X Corps-ROK III Corps 

boundary was to be shifted four miles 

west at noon on 23 April to give the 

ROK III Corps, which had been operating with only the ROK 3d Division 

on line, a two-division front. The III 

Corps reserve division, the ROK 7th, 

began occupying the added frontage 

on the 22d, its 5th Regiment relieving 

the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division and the X Corps right early in 

the evening. On the 23d the incoming 

division’s 3d Regiment was to move into 

a two-mile gap directly above Inje between the 5th Regiment and the 35th 

Regiment, now the right flank unit of 

the 5th Division. The latter’s 36th Regiment meanwhile assembled three miles 

below its former position in preparation for moving west into the redrawn 

5th Division zone the following day as 

the remainder of the ROK 7th Division 

came into its new area.29 

A similar shifting of North Korean 

forces above the X and ROK III Corps 

was indicated -when the ROK 5th Division, previously in contact with the 45th 

Division of the North Korean III Corps 

above Inje, captured a member of the 

12th Division, North Korean V Corps. 

Farther east, the ROK 3d Division, which 

had had almost no contact since reach28 Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central 

Front, p. 103; Ltr, Lt Col Willard Pearson (Sr Advisor 

to ROK 6th Div) to Chief, KMAG, 2 May 51, sub: 6th 

ROK Div; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51; I Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Barth, Tropic Lightning and 

Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 78-79. 

29 Rad, GX-4-3847 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA et al., 19 Apr 51; X Corps OI 156, 21 Apr 51; X 

Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 

Sum, Entry 2355, and Briefing Notes for CG, 22 Apr 

51. 

27 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 
TOWARD THE IRON TRIANGLE 

ing line Kansas, received hard local attacks that drove in its outposts and 

pressed its main line before easing in 

the evening of the 22d. Thus the North 

Korean III Corps could be shifting west 

toward the reservoir and the North Korean V Corps returning to the line from 

a point above Inje eastward.30 

Aerial reconnaissance after daybreak 

on the 22d reported a general forward 

displacment of enemy formations from 

rear assemblies northwest of the I 

Corps and north of both the I and IX 

Corps, also extensive troop movements, 

both north and south, on the roads 

above Yanggu and Inje east of the 

Hwach’on Reservoir. Though air strikes 

punished the moving troops bodies, air 

observers reported the southward 

march of enemy groups with increasing frequency during the day. On the 

basis of the sightings west of the 

Hwach’on Reservoir, it appeared that 

the enemy forces approaching the I 

Corps would mass evenly across the 

corps front while those moving toward 

the IX Corps would concentrate on the 

front of the ROK 6th Division.31 

Civilians entering I Corps lines from 

the northwest confirmed the enemy approach from that direction, and 

through the day British 29th Brigade 

forces along the Imjin observed enemy 

patrols investigating the north bank of 

the river for crossing sites. The 3d Division meanwhile found evidence that the 

III Army Group was included in the forward displacement when a patrol operating north along Route 33 above the 

377 

division’s right flank picked up a member of the 34th Division, which belonged 

to the group’s 12th Army.32 

At 1700, 25th Division air observers 

reported a long column of trucks, some 

towing artillery pieces, moving down 

Route 33 toward the Turks. Aircraft 

and artillery attacked the trucks until 

they dispersed off the road into wooded 

areas. By 1800 enemy foot troops were 

seen on Route 33 marching south in 

close column and just before dark were 

observed occupying foxholes along the 

sides of the road. Ten batteries of artillery kept the road and the suspected 

enemy artillery positions under fire.33 

Immediately east, artillery pilots spotted enemy columns nearing 24th Division lines late in the afternoon and 

brought them under fire as they came 

within range. The approaching forces 

simply accepted casualties as they 

massed above the center of the division 

front. At 1900 the division commander, 

General Bryan, notified I Corps headquarters that he expected to be attacked 

in about two hours. “I think this is what 

we have been waiting for,” he added.34 

It was. Bryan’s prediction of attack on 

the 24th Division proved correct almost 

to the exact minute. The initial assault 

of the enemy spring offensive opened 

an hour earlier, however-almost as if 

signaled by the rise of a full moon-in 

the adjacent sector of the ROK 6th 

Division. 

30 Rad, X 18676, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 

22 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 230810 and 

230817, 22 Apr 51; ibid., Sum and Entry 1000, 23 

Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

31 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, X 18676, CG X Corps to CG 

Eighth Army, 22 Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 

Apr 51. 

32 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Brigadier C.N. Barclay, The 

First Commonwealth Division (Aldershot: Gale & Polden 

Limited, 1954), pp. 60-61; Lieutenant General Albert 

Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, 1951-1955 (Brussels: 

Imprimerie Medicale et Scientifique [S.A.], 1967), p. 

75; Captain Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The-Edge of the 

Sword (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1954). p 17: 

3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 

284, 22 Apr 51. 

33 Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf, p 79. 

34 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 
CHAPTER XXI 

The Chinese Spring Offensive 

The Opening 

The Enemy Plan 

The Air Plan 

According to information accumulated by UNC intelligence, the enemy 

high command during the course of 

the New Year’s offensive had decided 

to use the People’s Air Force in support 

of future ground operations.1 In addition to more MIG-15s, the Chinese 

acquired enough Ilyushin (IL- 10) 

ground-attack planes by March to equip 

at least two air regiments, and they held 

a special air-ground training conference 

in Mukden. The air commander, Liu 

Ya-lou, meanwhile had worked to develop Korean airfields on which to base 

supporting aircraft. He began this project at the turn of the year after his superiors forbade him to mount massed air 

attacks on UNC troops and installations 

from Manchurian fields for fear of concerted retaliation.2 To get the Korean 

1 In assessing their New Year’s offensive, the Chinese reportedly attributed its failure largely to the 

absence or air support. With strong air support, a 

Chinese special aviation group concluded, “we could 

have driven the enemy into the sea.” See Futrell, The 

United States Air Force in Korea, p. 265. 

2 General Ridgway received authority for precisely 

such retaliation in late April. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

told him: “he might now use United States forces 

within his command to conduct high altitude reconnaissance of enemy air bases in Manchuria and on the 

Shantung Peninsula, and further, that if United Naair bases he needed, Liu had planned 

to establish air superiority over northwestern Korea and then to repair and 

improve air facilities in the protected 

region. Since the MIG-15s and IL-10s 

were short range aircraft, he also 

planned to restore forward airfields 

near the 38th 

to stage them.3 

parallel through which 

Liu was handed control of the air between the Yalu and Ch’ongch’on rivers 

in January, when the Fifth Air Force 

demolished its forward fields at Kimpo 

and Suwon during the New Year’s offensive and redeployed all jet fighters 

to Japan. Even by staging through other 

fields in southern Korea, the jets’ range 

was too short to hold air superiority in 

the far northwest. Only in the first week 

of March was the Suwon field sufficiently repaired to allow jets to stage 

through it and reenter MIG Alley, and 

only at the end of the month could the 

Fifth Air Force compete with Liu’s 

forces on near even terms. 

tions forces in Korea were subjected to major enemy 

air attacks from outside Korea, he could at his discretion, and without the necessity of securing prior approval of the JCS, or higher authority, attack enemy 

air bases in the areas mentioned above.” See MS, 

Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 

163. 

3 The information in this subsection is based on 

Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 265-78. 
THE OPENING 379 

Enemy troops and civilian labor 

forces meanwhile began rehabilitating 

airfield runways and constructing revetments for aircraft. Under the MIG 

umbrella in the northwest they improved fields at Sinuiju, Uiju, and 

Sinanju. Outside the MIG cover they 

worked on a cluster of fields in and 

around P’yongyang, the fields at Wonsan and Yonp’o on the east coast, and 

four forward fields on the Hwanghae 

peninsula below P’yongyang. 

Far East Air Forces reconnaissance 

discovered Liu’s work in February. 

Bomber Command prepared plans for 

attacks on the fields, but Brig. Gen. 

James E. Briggs (who had replaced 

General O’Donnell in January) believed 

the fields could not be destroyed once 

and for all because of the large repair 

crews available to the enemy high command. He elected to withhold B-29 

strikes until the fields were about to 

become operational. He intended to 

bomb the fields out of action at that 

time and to keep them neutralized with 

attacks just heavy enough and frequent 

enough to offset repairs. Aerial photographs showed the fields almost ready 

to receive aircraft near mid-April, and 

Briggs delivered repeated attacks between the 17th and 23d, concentrating 

on the forward fields and those in and 

around P’yongyang. The strikes stymied Liu’s plans and preparations. At 

least there would be no air support during the spring offensive. 

The Ground Plan 

The immediate objective of the 

ground attack was Seoul, whose capture Peng Teh-huai reportedly promised to Mao Tse-tung as a May Day gift. 

Peng planned to converge on the city, 

employing principally his fresh III, IX 

and XIX Army Groups, a force of about 

two hundred seventy thousand men. 

From above the Imjin on the west wing 

of the main effort, the XIX Army Group 

was to attack southeast toward Seoul, 

crossing the river on a twelve-mile front 

centered on the Korangp’o-ri bend and 

advancing on the capital through a narrowing zone between Routes 1 and 33. 

(Map 32) The group commander, Yang 

Teh-chih, planned to cross the Imjin 

with two armies, the 64th between 

Route 1 and the town of Korangp’o-ri, 

the 63d between Korangp’o-ri and the 

confluence of the Imjin and Hant’an 

rivers. Yang’s deployment would pit the 

64th Army against the bulk of the ROK 

1st Division and the 63d Army against 

the British 29th Brigade occupying the 

left half of the 3d Infantry Division’s 

sector.4 

Out of the ground between the Imjin 

and Ch’orwon, the III Army Group was 

to advance south on the Route 33 axis, 

its three armies attacking abreast in columns of divisions. Nearest the Imjin, 

the 15th Army had a narrow zone between the river and Route 33 projecting through the area occupied by the 

65th Infantry. Along Route 33 and east 

of it, the 12th Army and 60th Army at 

group center and left were to attack 

through ground held by the Philippine 

10th Battalion Combat Team on the 

right flank of the 3d Division and 

through the Pogae-san ridges occupied 

by the Turkish brigade and 24th Infantry in the sector of the 25th Infantry 

Division.5 

4 Griffith, The Chinese People Liberation Army, p. 162; 

USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 96, 16-28 Feb 53; I Corps Rpt, 

The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, April 

1951, copy in CMH. 

5 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 1, l-31 Dec 52. 

THE OPENING 381 

On the left of the main effort, the IX 

Army Group was to advance southwest 

out of the Kumhwa area, guiding on 

Route 3. Sung Shih-lun, the group 

commander, set the 27th Army on his 

right for an attack astride Route 3. The 

27th thus initially would be advancing 

in a zone centered on the boundary between the 25th and 24th Divisions. 

Similarly, the 20th Army on the group’s 

left would attack athwart the I-IX 

Corps boundary through portions of 

the 24th Division and ROK 6th Division sectors.6 

Peng’s plan included auxiliary attacks 

along each flank of the main effort and 

another east of the Hwach’on Reservoir. In the west, the North Korean I 

Corps was to move southeast toward 

Seoul over Route 1 and through the 

ground between the road and the Han 

River, but its leading forces displacing 

forward from behind the Yesong River 

would not reach the Imjin in time to 

participate in the opening attack on the 

ROK 1st Division. In the area adjacent 

to the Hwach’on Dam, the somewhat 

worn 39th and 40th Armies of the XIII 

Army Group were to assist with holding 

attacks on either side of Route 17 in 

the eastern portion of the ROK 6th 

Division’s sector and the sector of the 

1st Marine Division.7 

In what would be essentially a separate effort east of the Hwach’on Reservoir, North Korean forces were to strike 

for Yanggu and Inje, where breakthroughs could open up Routes 29 and 

24 leading southwestward to Ch’unch’on and Hongch’on. The North Korean III Corps, whose 1st, 15th, and 45th 

Divisions had been holding the entire 

6 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53. 

7 Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 

Jul 52; USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 115, 1-15 Feb 53. 

eastern front except for the coastal area, 

had sidestepped westward into a narrow zone abutting on the reservoir for 

the attack in the Yanggu area. Moving 

south through the upper Soyang River 

valley from its assembly at Komisong, 

the North Korean V Corps had deployed 

in the vacated ground for the attack 

toward Inje. The V Corps commander, 

General Pang, chose to attack with his 

seasoned, if understrength, 6th and 12th 

Divisions, keeping in reserve the 32d, a 

nearly full strength but green division 

that had replaced the 7th while the 

corps was in Komisong.8 III Corps commander General Yu elected a different 

course, committing only the 45th Division in what would be its first offensive 

of the war, perhaps because it had the 

virtue of eighty-six hundred men, more 

than twice the strength of either of Yu’s 

other divisions. The deployment of the 

45th Division set it against the 23d Infantry of the 2d Division at the edge of 

the reservoir above Yanggu and the 

17th and 32d Infantry Regiments of 

the 7th Division in the adjacent ground 

to the east. On the opposite wing of the 

North Korean effort, the 6th Division 

faced the ROK 3d Division. At center, 

the 12th Division was poised for an attack in a zone straddling the X CorpsROK III Corps boundary and leading 

directly to Inje.9 

Panic at the IX Corps Left 

During the afternoon of 22 April, IX 

8 The North Korean 7th Division, which had been 

reduced to about regimental strength during recent 

operations, was transferred to the VII Corps in the 

Wonsan area. 

9 GHO, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North 

Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep 51; Hq, FEC, 

History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52; Eighth 

Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51. 
382 EBB AND FLOW 

rear area. The 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion moved up Route 17 and 

out the minor road to the west edge of 

the Marine sector from where its 155- 

mm. self-propelled howitzers could 

support both the marines and the South 

Koreans. The 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and 2d Rocket Field 

Artillery Battery, both equipped with 

105-mm. howitzers, used the winding 

valley road to reach the right half of 

the ROK sector, where they took position behind the 7th Regiment near the 

South Korean artillery and American 

4.2-inch mortars.11 

For reasons that never became clear, 

the 2d and 19th Regiments failed to 

develop the defensive positions ordered 

by General Chang. With numerous 

gaps and open outside flanks, the division front was vulnerable to infiltration, 

and the nearby reserves were almost as 

subject to attack as were the forward 

units. Forces of the 60th Division, 20th 

Army, hit Chang’s lines about 2000. 

Without artillery support and with little other supporting fire, van units of 

the 179th Regiment, 60th Division, struck 

the inside battalion of the 2d Regiment. 

Forces following punched through a 

central gap, some veering west and east 

behind the 19th and 2d Regiments, 

others continuing south toward the 7th 

Regiment. Within minutes both line 

regiments were in full flight. Caught 

up in the rush of troops from the 2d 

Regiment, the 7th Regiment joined the 

wild retreat. Abandoned weapons, 

vehicles, and equipment littered vacated 

positions and lines of drift as the South 

Koreans streamed south, east, and west, 

Corps airborne artillery observers located and brought down fire on a large 

enemy force concentrated ahead of the 

ROK 6th Division. Anticipating an 

attack, General Chang halted his division’s advance toward line Wyoming 

about 1600 and ordered his forward 

regiments, the 19th and 2d, to develop 

defensive positions tied in with each 

other and with the 24th Division and 

1st Marine Division on their respective 

outside flanks. Chang moved his reserve 7th Regiment into supporting 

positions immediately behind the 2d 

Regiment, ahead of which more enemy 

forces had been observed than ahead 

of the 19th Regiment. Placing reserves 

so close to the front went against the 

recommendation of his KMAG adviser, 

but Chang intended that this show of 

support would counter uneasiness that 

had begun to spread among his line 

forces at word of a probable Chinese 

attack.10 

General Hoge moved three corps artillery units forward during the afternoon to help the 1st Marine Division 

and, in particular, to reinforce the support being given the ROK 6th Division 

by the New Zealand artillery; Company 

C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion; and 

the division’s own 27th Field Artillery 

Battalion. The corps’ latest ground 

gains had opened Route 17 in the 1st 

Marine Division’s sector far enough 

north to allow use of a twisting, narrowly confined valley road branching 

west off Route 17 near the village of 

Chich’on-ni into the ROK 6th Division’s 

10 Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951, a special 

file of correspondence and reports on the operations 

of the ROK Division, 22-24 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman 

with Lt Col Thomas E. Bennett, KMAG Advisor to 

7th Regt, ROK 6th Div, in CMH; Eighth Army POR, 

22 Apr 51. 

11 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, IXACT1288, CG IX Corps to CG IX Corps Arty, 14 Apr 51; 

Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951; Gugeler, 

Combat Actions in Korea, p. 155. 
THE OPENING 383 

rapid1 

units.12 

uncovering the fire support 

The New Zealand artillery supporting the 19th Regiment in the west managed to withdraw with guns and equipment intact down the Kap’yong River 

valley to a position four miles north of 

the British 27th Brigade assembled 

near Kap’yong town. To the east, Chinese following the 2d and 7th Regiments caught the ROK 27th Field Artillery Battalion in position. Under 

fire, its members abandoned guns and 

joined the southerly surge of infantrymen. The American support units 

pulled out all weapons and equipment 

but came under fire as they moved east 

on their narrow access road to join the 

92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion. 

Hampered further by ROK troops, 

trucks, and paraphernalia cluttering 

and finally blocking the poor road, 

Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, and the 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery reached the 92d with none 

of their principal weapons, the 987th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion with 

about half its equipment.13 

Having lost radio and wire communications with his regimental commanders soon after the panic began, 

General Chang was hard pressed to 

regain control of his forces, even when 

they outdistanced the Chinese pursuit 

after midnight. Traveling rear areas 

throughout the night, Chang and his 

staff established a degree of order near 

dawn, collecting about twenty-five hundred members of his three regiments 

some ten miles south of the division’s 

12 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army 

AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951. 

13 Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 73-74; Eighth 

Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951; 1st Lt. Martin 

Blumenson, “Artillery in Perimeter Defense, April 

1951,” copy in CMH. 

original front. 14 To the same depth, 

the South Korean rout had peeled open 

the flanks of the 24th Division and 1st 

Marine Division to the west and east. 

At the first indication of the South 

Korean retreat, the 1st Marine Division 

commander, General Smith, had begun 

to shore up his left flank, drawing a 

battalion from the 1st Marines in reserve near Ch’unch’on and sending it 

out the valley road from Chich’on-ni to 

establish defenses tied in with the 92d 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion. En 

route aboard trucks before midnight, 

the 1st Battalion struggled west against 

a current of retreating South Koreans 

and scarcely managed to establish a position before dawn.15 

Operating in a zone coinciding with 

the eastern third of the ROK 6th Division sector and the western edge of the 

Marine sector, the 40th Army of the XIII 

Army Group was well situated to exploit 

the exposed Marine flank. The 120th 

Division at the army’s left, in particular, 

had virtually the entire night to move 

deep into the vacated ROK sector and 

sweep behind the Marine front. But, 

either unaware of the opportunity to 

envelop the marines or, more likely, unable to change course rapidly, the 120th 

attempted only local frontal assaults on 

the 7th Marines west of Hwach’on town, 

none of which penetrated or forced a 

withdrawal. Farther east, forces of the 

115th Division, 39th Army, penetrated the 

1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment 

above the Hwach’on Dam and slashed 

southwestward to occupy heights commanding the town of Hwach’on in the 

5th Marines’ central sector; American 

14 Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951. 

15 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, 22-23 Apr 51: Montress, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp. 

104-05. 
384 EBB AND FLOW 

through the gap and down a ridge behind the inside battalion of the 19th 

Infantry. Pressure on the adjacent battalion of the 5th Infantry forced it to 

withdraw almost a mile. Quick to follow, 

Chinese reengaged the battalion within 

an hour.18 

Regimental reserves took up blocking positions on the flanks of the enemy penetration and helped to confine 

it, but General Bryan’s attempt to move 

part of his reserve 21st Infantry from 

line Kansas north onto high ground at 

the point of penetration failed when 

Chinese occupied the ground first. By 

daylight the Chinese drove almost three 

miles through the center of the division. Bryan withdrew his line regiments 

down the sides of the enemy wedge into 

positions below it, where, though kept 

under pressure at center, they were able 

to stand. Meanwhile, on learning of the 

ROK 6th Division’s retreat on his right, 

Bryan set the 21st Infantry in blocking 

positions along the endangered flank. 

The Eighth Army Ranger Company, 

attached to the 21st, patrolled east in 

search of Chinese approaching the 

flank but made no contact.19 

In the Pogae-san ridges below 

Ch’orwon, the 2d Motorized Artillery Division prepared the way for infantry attacks on the 25th Division with a threehour bombardment, dropping most of 

its fire on the Turkish brigade along 

Route 33. On the east wing of the III 

Army Group, the 179th Division, 60th 

Army, attacked behind the fire about 

midnight, its bulk hitting the Turks, 

some forces spilling over against the 

24th Infantry at division center. The 

latter bent back the left of the 24th’s 

18 Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

19 Ibid. 

and ROK counterattacks eliminated this 

penetration near dawn, and the 115th 

made no further attempt to take the 

dam or town.16 

Eager to close ranks as the IX Corps 

front quieted after daylight on the 23d, 

General Hoge ordered the ROK 6th 

Division to occupy positions on line 

Kansas, which was some three miles 

north of the area in which General 

Chang was reassembling his forces. The 

1st Marine Division was to pull back 

against the Pukhan River to a line anchored near the Hwach’on Dam and 

curving southwest to a juncture with 

the South Koreans.17 Manning the long 

curve would compel General Smith to 

commit his entire division, and even 

then he would not be able to set up a 

solid front. And General Chang faced 

no small task in recovering troops who 

had scattered east and west into adjacent sectors, reorganizing his entire 

division, and then moving his nervous 

forces north toward the enemy. But the 

adjustments, if achieved, would retain 

control of the Hwach’on Dam, eliminate 

the marines’ open left flank, and join 

the two IX Corps divisions with a minimum of movement. 

Below Ch’orwon and Kumhwa 

At the right of the I Corps, the 59th 

Division, 20th Army, though kept under 

artillery fire while massing in the 

Kwandok-san ridges below Kumhwa, 

struck hard at the center of the 24th 

Division. Leading forces opened a gap 

between the 19th and 5th Infantry 

Regiments; reinforcements widened 

the attack but concentrated on moving 

16 1 st Marine Div Hist Diary, 23 Apr 51; Montross, 

Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp. 105-07. 

17 Rad, IXACT-1330, CG IX Corps to CG 1st Marine Div et al., 23 Apr 51. 
THE OPENING 385 

line while the forces attacking the 

Turkish position penetrated at several 

points and so intermingled themselves 

that artillery units supporting the brigade were forced to stop firing lest 

they hit Turks as well as Chinese. 

Further fragmented by persistent 

attacks through the night, the Turkish 

position by morning consisted mainly of 

surrounded or partially surrounded 

company perimeters, and Chinese 

penetrating between the Turks and 

the curled-back left flank of the 24th 

Infantry moved almost two miles behind the division’s front. Ahead of 

the 27th Infantry on the division’s right, 

enemy forces (apparently the westernmost forces of the 27th Army) massed 

and began their approach at first light, 

but heavy defensive fire shattered the 

formation within half an hour, and the 

Chinese attempted no further attack on 

the regiment.20 

Near dawn General Bradley ordered 

the 24th and 27th Infantry Regiments 

to withdraw two miles and instructed 

the Turkish brigade to leave the line 

and reorganize south of the Hant’an 

River. The 35th Infantry came out of 

reserve to take over the Turkish sector. 

The Turks fought their way off the 

front during the morning and, except 

for one company that had been virtually wiped out, assembled below the 

Hant’an in better condition than Bradley had expected. The Chinese followed 

neither the Turks nor the two regiments, and the division sector quieted 

as Bradley developed his new line.21 

20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, 22 Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase 

Spring Offensive, Apr 51. 

21 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, 

The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 

51. 

Along the Imjin 

General Soule considered the 3d 

Division’s front along the Imjin between 

Korangp’o-ri and Route 33 to be particularly vulnerable to attack, not only because the line was long and thin with 

gaps between defensive positions but 

also because it lay generally alongside 

and at no great distance from Route 

33, his main axis of communications. 

The 65th Infantry and the attached 

Philippine 10th Battalion Combat 

Team occupied the right half of the 

line, with the Filipinos on the outside 

flank athwart Route 33 and the 2d and 

3d Battalions facing northwest and west 

along the Imjin. In regimental reserve, 

the 1st Battalion was located along 

Route 33 just above the Hant’an River. 22 

The British 29th Brigade with the 

Belgian battalion attached held the remainder of the division’s line. The 1st 

Battalion of The Gloucestershire regiment (Glosters) anchored the brigade’s 

left flank astride minor Route 5Y near 

the villages of Choksong and Solma-ri. 

The right flank of the ROK 12th Regiment, the nearest position of the ROK 

1st Division, was a mile to the southwest. 

Northeast of the Glosters, beyond two 

miles of unoccupied hills, the 1st Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, 

held a central position below the lower 

arm of the right-angle bend in the 

Imjin. At the brigade’s right, the Belgian battalion occupied Hill 194, a low 

mass located above the Imjin inside the 

right-angle bend. Placing the battalion 

above the river entailed a risk, at least 

to Belgian vehicles. Although the Imjin 

behind Hill 194 was fordable, the east 

bank in that area was almost vertical. 

Vehicular movement to and from the 

22 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 
386 EBB AND FLOW 

position followed secondary Route 11, 

the 29th Brigade’s supply road to the 

south, and depended on two ponton 

bridges, one crossing the Hant’an near 

its mouth, the other spanning the Imjin 

a half mile farther west. The only alternate route was a rudimentary track that 

followed the upper bank of the Hant’an 

and connected with Route 33, and its 

use depended on the Imjin span. Both 

bridges were vulnerable to enemy 

action, resting as they did in a milewide gap between the Belgians and 

fusiliers. Reserves available to the 29th 

Brigade included the 1st Battalion, 

Royal Ulster Rifles, and the 52-ton Centurion tanks of C Squadron, 8th King’s 

Royal Irish Hussars. Both units were 

centrally located along Route 11.23 

Looking at the 3d Division’s line as 

the Chinese might see it, General Soule 

believed the most vulnerable point was 

the Imjin angle: a penetration there 

could easily cut Route 33 and imperil 

the 65th Infantry north of the cut. Because of this danger the British had 

set the Belgian battalion above the river 

inside the angle. Without the 15th Infantry, which was in corps reserve, 

Soule clustered what reserves he had 

behind the Imjin east of the Belgians. 

He set the 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry and the 64th Tank Battalion 

just above the Hant’an, principally to 

thicken the central position, and the remainder of the 7th Infantry below the 

Hant’an for possible employment either 

north in the 65th Infantry’s sector or 

west in the British sector.24 

23 Ibid.; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Barclay, 

The First Commonwealth Division, p. 62: Crahay, Les 

Belges En Coree, pp. 60, 74, 80; Ltr: CG I Corps to CG 

Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves). 

24 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps 

to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of 

Vanguards of the 34th Division, 12th 

Army, and 29th Division, 15th Army, 

opened stinging assaults on the 65th 

Infantry about midnight, driving one 

company of the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team off position almost 

immediately. Through the remainder 

of the night the two enemy divisions 

failed to reinforce their attacks beyond 

replacing losses, and they made no further gains. The attacks subsided after 

an early morning Filipino counterattack 

recovered the ground lost in the initial 

assaults. But the withdrawal of the 

Turkish brigade then under way to the 

east was uncovering the 65th’s right 

flank, and the regiment’s position, as 

General Soule had anticipated, was 

also threatened by XIX Army Group attacks on the British 29th Brigade to the 

southwest.25 

Patrols of the 187th Division, 63d 

Army, approached the three battalions 

on the British front near midnight on 

the 22d. Entering the gap between the 

Northumberland Fusiliers and Belgians, a large patrol moved along the 

Imjin on the Belgian side of the river, 

passed by a Belgian listening post below Hill 194, and continued east toward 

the two unguarded bridges on the Belgian access route. On receiving the 

Belgians’ report of the patrol at brigade headquarters, Brigadier Brodie 

sent a motorized detachment from the 

Ulster battalion to secure the bridges, 

but while moving up Route 11 to the 

Hant’an crossing the detachment drove 

into an ambush and was all but wiped 

out.26 

Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 

(reserves). 

25 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apt 51, 

26 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 22 Apr 51; Crahay, Les Belges 

En Coree, pp. 75-76; 3d Div POR 158, 22 Apr 51; 3d 

Div G3 Jnl, Entries 2 and 24, 23 Apr 51. 
THE OPENING 

A Chinese force following the patrol 

split as it reached Hill 194, some members turning to attack the Belgians, 

the remainder continuing toward the 

bridges. Most of the Belgian front was 

under assault by first light. The Chinese who bypassed Hill 194 meanwhile reached the bridges, crossed the 

Imjin, and attacked Company Z of the 

Northumberland Fusiliers on Hill 257 

bordering the river almost due south 

of the crossings.27 

Company Z was the right rear unit 

of a squarish fusilier position marked 

out by four widely spaced company perimeters at the corners. Well downstream from Z, Company X at the left 

front corner occupied Hill 152, the 

crest of a ridge edging the Imjin. Chinese fording the river and attacking 

Hill 152 forced Company X to withdraw about the same time that the 

attack out of the Belgian area carried 

Chinese inside Company Z’s position 

on Hill 257. Thus Company Y at the 

right front corner, though not under 

assault, was precariously situated, with 

Chinese moving past on left and right.28 

About daybreak, reinforcements, apparently from the 188th Division, 63d 

Army, doubled the strength of the Chinese attacking the Belgians on Hill 194. 

A Belgian patrol slipping off the rear 

of the hill meanwhile confirmed that 

Chinese controlled the two bridges on 

the access route by firing from the 

near slopes of Hill 257. As the Chinese 

stepped up their attack, General Soule 

sent a company of the 2d Battalion, 7th 

387 

Infantry, and two platoons of the 7th’s 

tank company to reclaim the bridges 

and remain in support of the Belgians. 

Reaching the bridge area over the track 

along the Hant’an, the tankers found 

no Chinese at the crossings but came 

under mortar and small arms fire from 

Hill 257, fire which kept the following 

infantry at bay. One tank platoon 

moved to Hill 194 to reinforce the Belgians while the other deployed near the 

bridges and fired on Hill 257. The 

amount of Chinese return fire raised 

doubts that foot troops and wheeled 

vehicles could pass safely through the 

bridge area.29 

Wary of a strike down Route 11 by 

the Chinese attacking the fusilier battalion, in particular by those attacking 

Company Z on Hill 257, Brigadier Brodie after daylight on the 23d organized 

defenses athwart the road about two 

miles below 257. The fusiliers withdrew 

to a ridge bordering Route 11 on the 

west while the bulk of the Royal Ulster 

Rifles battalion occupied positions east 

of the road. The Chinese, as a result, 

gained control of a wide expanse of 

ground between Brodie’s new central 

position and the Belgians. There also 

remained between the fusiliers and 

Gloster battalions a two-mile gap, which 

aerial observers as early as 0830 reported Chinese to be entering. Having 

all but depleted brigade reserves, Brodie asked for help from General Soule, 

who agreed to send the 1st Battalion, 

7th Infantry, to establish positions be27 Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, p. 76; Barclay, The 

First Commonwealth Division, p. 62; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 27, 38, 46, 52, and 65, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 

159, 

28 

23 Apr 51. 

3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 2, 24, 38, 39, 46, and 52, 

23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; Barclay, The 

First Commonwealth Division, p. 62. 

29 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, 

Entries 62, 65, 75, 97, 105, and 114, 23 Apr 51; Ltr, 

CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: 

Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, 

Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 

29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51); Crahay, Les Belges En 

Coree, pp. 76-79. 
388 EBB AND FLOW 

tween Brodie’s central and left flank 

defenses.30 

At the brigade’s left, the Gloster battalion also had had to give ground after a hard, costly battle lasting the night. 

The battalion’s position astride Route 

5Y, as originally developed, was a set 

of company perimeters about a mile, 

and half below the Imjin. From Hill 

148 west of the road and Hills 182 and 

144 east, Companies A, D, and B commanded long spurs sloping toward the 

river. Giving the position some depth 

was Company C, a mile behind Company D on Hill 314 below the towering 

crest of Kamak Mountain (Hill 675), 

easily the dominant height in the entire brigade area. West of Route 5Y 

opposite Hill 314, battalion pioneers 

secured Hill 235. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. James P. Carne, had 

set up headquarters and placed his 

mortars along 5Y where it bent through 

a valley behind Company C and just 

above the village of Solma-ri. After Chinese patrols were observed on the north 

bank of the Imjin during the day, Colonel Carne established an additional position at last light on the 22d. Certain 

that the Chinese had located Gloster 

Crossing, a ford straight ahead of his 

lines, since his sappers earlier had 

marked its course with buoys, Carne 

concealed sixteen men of Company C 

in ambush in ruined buildings at the 

near end of the crossing.31 

30 Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, 

sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 

51, Incl 3 (reserves); 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 

3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 34 and 81, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div 

POR 159, 23 Apr 51. 

31 3d Div Sit Ovlay, 22 Apr 51; E. J. Kahn, Jr., “A 

Reporter in Korea-No One But the Glosters,” New 

Yorker, 26 May 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the 

Sword, pp. 11-13, 16-18. Captain Farrar-Hockley was 

the adjutant of the Gloster battalion during the battle 

at the Imjin. 

Able to see the far bank clearly by 

the light of the full moon, the ambush 

party watched seven Chinese step into 

the water about 2200, allowed them to 

reach the near bank, then shot down 

all seven with a brief burst of fire. Before withdrawing to their company position after exhausting their ammunition, the sixteen Glosters defeated 

three more crossing attempts, killing 

altogether some seventy Chinese. 

The small force itself suffered no 

casualties.32 

On the heels of the ambush party’s 

withdrawal, a battalion of the 559th 

Regiment, 187th Division, forded the 

river at Gloster Crossing and a mile and 

a half west at an underwater bridge that 

past Gloster reconnaissance had somehow failed to reveal. British artillery 

bloodied and delayed the forces at 

Gloster Crossing, but the Chinese approaching from the northwest were already climbing the long spurs toward 

Company A.33 

Company A turned back repeated 

charges until almost dawn, when its 

fifty-eight able-bodied men lost the 

dominant platoon position located 

among the ruins of an ancient castle 

near the crest of Hill 148. Company D 

lost no important ground on Hill 182 

to the Chinese attacking out of the 

Gloster Crossing area but also suffered 

high casualties. Company B on Hill 144 

was no more than brushed by Chinese 

patrols and survived the night intact.34 

32 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 2, 23 Apr 51; FarrarHockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 18-22; Robert O. 

Holles, Now Thrive the Armourers (London: George G. 

Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1952), p. 150. 

33 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 22-25; 

Holles, Now Thrive the Armourers, p. 150. 

34 3d Div POR 159; 23 Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 

52, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, 

pp. 25-31, 36. 
THE OPENING 389 

lery barrages but had made only a few 

local gains against the 32d Infantry on 

the right flank of the 7th Division. On 

the east flank of the enemy attack, the 

North Korean 6th Division was more 

successful in assaults on the ROK 3d 

Division. Forcing its left and center units 

to the southwest, the North Koreans by 

midmorning on the 23d pushed the 

3d Division well back from Route 24, 

partially opening the way to Inje.37 

A bigger threat to Inje materialized 

at the right flank of the X Corps, where 

the North Korean 12th Division caught 

the X Corps and ROK III Corps part 

way through the shift of divisions required for the now canceled advance 

to line Alabama. The 12th Division 

struck the 35th Regiment of the ROK 

5th Division at midnight on the 22d 

and began sliding forces into the twomile gap between the 35th and the 5th 

Regiment of the ROK 7th Division to 

the east. By first light the 35th Regiment abandoned its position and fell 

back in disorder almost to the Soyang 

River below Inje. Taken under frontal 

attack and threatened with encirclement by the North Koreans working 

through the gap, the 5th Regiment followed suit but withdrew in better order, 

falling back gradually while still in contact toward a line two miles above Inje. 

During the day, Col. Min Ki Shik, in 

command of the ROK 5th Division, 

took charge of all forces in the Inje 

area, which now included the 3d Regiment of the ROK 7th Division, and organized defenses above Inje generally 

in the area toward which the 5th Regiment was withdrawing. By evening of 

the 23d Colonel Min set the 27th, 36th, 

Colonel Carne pulled his forward 

companies back to the Solma-ri area 

shortly after daylight, covering their 

withdrawal with heavy mortar and artillery fire and air strikes. West of Route 

5Y, much-reduced Company A occupied Hill 235 and Company D a squarish flattop hill extending east from 235 

toward the position of Company C on 

the opposite side of the road. Company 

B took position just east of Company 

C. Under the pounding covering fire, 

the Chinese went to ground, either to 

take cover or to hold up their attack 

until reinforcements crossed the 

Imjin.35 

Adjusting the Line 

Considering the forward I Corps and 

IX Corps positions untenable, opened 

to envelopment as they were by the 

flight of the ROK 6th Division, General Van Fleet about midmorning on 

23 April ordered General Milburn and 

General Hoge to withdraw and directed 

all corps commanders to develop defenses in depth along line Kansas. At 

the same time, Van Fleet canceled the 

advance to line Alabama which was to 

have been opened on the 24th by forces 

east of the Hwach’on Reservoir.36 

For the forces east of the reservoir, 

the initial task created by Van Fleet’s 

order was to block a North Korean salient being driven into line Kansas. 

(Map 33) Above Yanggu, adjacent to 

the reservoir, the inexperienced North 

Korean 45th Division had attacked during the night behind mortar and artil35 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 74, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 

159, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, 

pp. 30-35. 

36 Rad, GX-4-4635 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 

I Corps et al., 23 Apr 51. 

37 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 7th Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 1000, 

23 Apr 51; Eighth Army POR, 23 Apr 51. 
390 EBB AND FLOW 

MAP 33 

and 3d Regiments on the line while the 

35th Regiment continued to reorganize behind it and the 5th Regiment 

continued to withdraw toward it.38 

As the initial IX Corps step to the 

rear General Hoge let stand his plan to 

pull the 1st Marine Division onto a line 

curving from the Hwach’on Dam southwestward along the Pukhan River and 

to push the ROK 6th Division north 

onto line Kansas. The marines occupied their arching line, designated 

Pendleton, by late afternoon, the 1st 

Marines taking up widely separated battalion positions on the division’s left to 

38 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army 

PIR 285, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Entries 1405, 

1500, 2130, 240905, and 240940, 23 Apr 51, and Briefing Notes for CG; Eighth Army POR, 23 Apr 51. 

refuse the flank and stretch the line 

toward the planned connection with the 

South Koreans. With all regiments on 

line, the division faced as much to the 

west as to the north. The 92d Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion and the units 

that had joined it after scrambling out 

of the ROK 6th Division’s sector withdrew to the vicinity of Chich’on-ni, 

where the bulk of the Marine division’s 

artillery, the 11th Marines, was 

clustered. General Hoge directed the 

92d, which absorbed the members of 

the weaponless 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery, and the half-equipped 

987th Field Artillery Battalion to reinforce the fires of the 11th Marines. 

Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, out of action for lack of weap- 
THE OPENING 391 

ons and equipment, left the division sector for refurbishing.39 

Since the ROK 6th Division had lost 

its artillery support during the debacle 

of the previous night, General Hoge 

directed the British 27th Brigade to recommit the New Zealand artillery and 

transferred the 213th Field Artillery 

Battalion from a reinforcing mission in 

the Marine sector to support the South 

Koreans. During the afternoon the New 

Zealand unit, accompanied by the Middlesex battalion for protection, moved 

up the valley of the Kap’yong River 

while the 213th circled out of the Marine sector and moved up the valley of 

a Kap’yong tributary in the eastern portion of the South Korean sector.40 

Meanwhile, as the day wore on, the 

move of the ROK 6th Division north to 

line Kansas appeared less and less probable. Still reorganizing the division at 

midday, General Chang informed corps 

headquarters that he would have his 

forces on the line by 1700. But as that 

hour approached, no part of the division had yet moved forward.41 

Wary of another failing performance 

by Chang’s division, General Hoge in 

midafternoon ordered the British 27th 

Brigade to block the Kap’yong River 

valley behind the South Koreans to 

39 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51; Montross, 

Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp. 110-13; 

After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Artillery in Perimeter Defense”; 1st Marine Div POR no. 230, 23 Apr 

51; Rad, IX ART-68, CG IX Corps to COs 987th FA 

Bn, 92d AFA Bn, and 11th Marine Regt, 23 Apr 51. 

40 Rads. IX ACT-1338 and IX-ACT 1330, CG IX 

Corps to CG 27th BCB and CG 1st Marine Div, respectively, 23 Apr 51; After Action Intervs, 1st Lt. 

Martin Blumenson, “Tanks Above Kap’yong,” Intervs 

with Maj Don W. Black, Asst S3, IX Corps Arty, and 

Capt Blaine Johnson, Asst S3, 213th FA Bn. 

41 Ltr, Brig Gen George B. Peploe, IX Corps CofS, 

to CC Eighth Army, 5 May 51, sub: Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the Period 22-24 April 1951, in Eighth 

Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951. 

prevent enemy forces from coursing 

down the valley and cutting Route 17 

at Kap’yong town. Brigadier Burke was 

to establish the blocking position along 

the trace of line Delta four miles north 

of town where the Kap’yong River 

flowing from the northwest was joined 

by the tributary from the northeast 

just above a large bend turning the 

Kap’yong southwest toward the Pukhan. From hill masses rising on either 

side of the junction of the Kap’yong 

and its tributary the commonwealth 

forces could cover both valley approaches.42 

Burke organized the block with the 

3d Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, and 2d Battalion, Princess 

Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, setting the Australians in the Hill 504 mass 

on the right to block the valley approach from the northeast, the Canadians on the crest and slopes of Hill 677 

to control the Kap’yong valley. Four 

American units-all but one platoon of 

Company A, 72d Tank Battalion; Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion; 

and Companies B and C, 74th Engineer Combat Battalion-moved up in 

support, the tankers taking position 

with the Australians, the mortarmen 

setting up in a small lateral valley behind Hill 504. The engineers bivouacked along the Kap’yong about a 

mile in rear of the blocking position.43 

The artillery battalions assigned by 

42 Rad, IX ACT-1338, CG IX Corps to CG 27th 

BCB, 23 Apr 51. 

43 Ibid.; Rad, IX ACT-1340, CG IX Corps to CG 

27th BCB, 23 Apr 51; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above Kap’yong,” Intervs with 1st 

Lt Kenneth W. Koch, CO, Co A, 72d Tank Bn, and 

Maj Wade H. Padgett, S3, 74th Engr Cmbt Bn; N. 

Bartlett, ed., With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: 

Australian War Memorial, 1954), pp. 91-92; Wood, 

Strange Battleground, pp. 74-75; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 68. 
392 EBB AND FLOW 

ON THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION FRONT south of Ch'orwon, 23 April 1951. 

General Hoge to support the ROK 6th 

Division were still moving into position 

when reports reaching corps headquarters indicated that General Chang had 

given up attempts to move his division 

to the Kansas line and had deployed in 

the vicinity of his assembly area. Doubtful that the division was in position or 

condition to perform better than it had 

the night before and thus fearful that 

the supporting battalions were out on a 

limb, the corps artillery officer authorized the 213th Field Artillery Battalion 

to withdraw behind the 27th Brigade’s 

blocking position at the first sign of another ROK rout. Alerted to the possibility of a repeat performance by the 

South Koreans, Brigadier Burke prepared to pull out the New Zealanders 

and Middlesex battalion and at dark 

placed the forces at the blocking position on a 50 percent alert.44 

General Chang’s failure to place the 

6th Division on line Kansas also left the 

1st Marine Division vulnerable. Its 

long front along the Pukhan was protected on the east by the barrier of the 

Hwach’on Reservoir, and its west flank 

was no longer wide open as it had been 

the night before, but the nearest solid 

44 Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51; sub: 

Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in 

Military Operations During the Period 22-24 April 

1951, and Overlay, Disposition of 6th ROK Div, 

231800 Apr 51, both in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK 

Div (1 May), 1951; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, 

“Tanks Above Kap’yong,” Intervs with Black and 

Johnson; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 

67; Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 94. 
THE OPENING 393 

FORCES 0F THE 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION WITHDRAWING TO LINE KANSAS 

position was that of the 27th Brigade 

above Kap’yong. The intervening 

seven-mile gap offered the Chinese an 

open southeastward shot at Ch’unch’on 

and the intersection of Routes 17 and 

29 and thus an opportunity to envelop 

the marines or at least cut their lines of 

communications. Balancing this risk 

against that of a nighttime withdrawal 

that probably would have to be made 

while under attack, General Hoge directed the Marine division to withdraw 

to line Kansas the following morning. 

This move would shorten the front 

enough for the bulk of one regiment to 

be taken off the line and sent south to 

defend Ch’unch’on.45 

45 Rad, IX ACT-1339, CG IX Corps to CG 1st Marine Div, 23 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, 

The East-Central Front, p. 117. 

Along the eastern portion of the I 

Corps line, the 25th Division, whose 

front had quieted after daylight on the 

23d, was on line Kansas by midafternoon. The 35th and 24th Infantry Regiments reoccupied the division’s former 

positions on the ridges between the 

Hant’an and Yongp’yong rivers while 

the 27th Infantry and Turkish brigade 

assembled immediately behind the 

Yongp’yong. At the far corps right, Chinese maintained pressure against the 

center of the 24th Division, mainly 

against the 19th Infantry, and attempted to follow the division’s withdrawal but gave up after suffering 

heavy casualties to the covering artillery 

fire. The division occupied line Kansas 

about 1800, the 19th and 21st Infantry 

Regiments on left and right, the 5th 
394 EBB AND FLOW 

MEN OF THE 65TH INFANTRY, 3D INFANTRY DIVISION, WITHDRAWING FROM 

LINE UTAH 

Infantry in reserve about five miles behind the line. Later, on receiving word 

that the ROK 6th Division would not 

move north onto line Kansas, the 21st 

Infantry refused its right as far as possible with its reserve battalion, and General Bryan deepened the protection by 

moving a battalion of the 5th Infantry 

into blocking positions along the east 

flank.46 

Under General Soule’s plan for pulling back the 3d Division’s rightmost 

forces, the 7th Infantry was to occupy 

the division’s eastern sector of line 

Kansas. Protected on the west by the 

46 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

Belgian battalion, the 65th Infantry was 

to leapfrog off line Utah, pass through 

the 7th Infantry via Route 33, and assemble in division reserve near Route 

33’s junction with Route 11. Exactly 

how the Belgians would then get out of 

the Imjin angle was yet to be determined.47 

The battalions of the 65th Infantry 

began bounding off line Utah about 

noon, moving easily as the Chinese opposite made no attempt to follow. Except for the tanks supporting the Belgian battalion, the division reserves 

stationed earlier above the Hant’an 

dropped below the river during the 

47 3d Div OI 15-12, 23 Apr 51. 
THE OPENING 395 

65th’s leapfrog action. No interference 

materialized out of the Imjin angle as 

the Belgians, though heavily engaged, 

held their ground with the assistance 

of air strikes and artillery and tank fire. 

Bringing up the regimental rear, the 

3d Battalion of the 65th, reinforced by 

the 3d Reconnaissance Company and 

64th Tank Battalion, occupied a position blocking Route 33 just above the 

Hant’an, which was to be held until the 

Belgian battalion had withdrawn from 

Hill 194.48 

In considering ways to get the Belgian battalion out of the Imjin angle, 

Brigadier Brodie early in the afternoon 

proposed to General Soule that the Belgians destroy their vehicles and withdraw east across the Imjin off the back 

side of Hill 194. But Soule believed that 

the bridge area could be opened for 

the vehicles by attacking Hill 257 from 

the south. About 1400 he ordered the 

1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, to make the 

attack and instructed the Philippine 

10th Battalion Combat Team, then 

leading the 65th Infantry off line Utah, 

to join the 29th Brigade and take over 

the 1st Battalion’s previously assigned 

mission of occupying a position in the 

gap between the fusilier and Gloster 

battalions.49 

In carrying out its original mission, 

the 1st Battalion, with a platoon of regimental tanks attached, by 1400 had 

moved up Route 11 behind the fusiliers, 

turned its three rifle companies west 

on a wide front, and begun sweeping 

the slopes rising to Hill 675, the peak 

of Kamak Mountain, in the gap area. It 

48 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 112 and 143, 23 Apr 51; 

3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Apr 51. 

49 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 108, 110, 112, and 114, 23 

Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

was 1800 before the commander, Lt. 

Col. Fred C. Weyand, could reassemble the battalion and open the attack 

on Hill 257 to the north. Once above 

the fusilier-Ulster lines, the battalion 

came under heavy fire from the flanks 

and front and had to fight off Chinese 

groups who attempted to knock out the 

supporting tanks with grenades and 

shaped charges. By 2000 the battalion 

had gained no more than a foothold in 

the 257 hill mass.50 

In the Belgian withdrawal, begun as 

the attack on Hill 257 opened, the bulk 

of the battalion moved off the back side 

of Hill 194 and waded the Imjin under 

the cover of artillery fire and air strikes. 

Harassed by mortar fire until they ascended the steep east bank, the Belgian foot troops by 1830 were out of 

contact and en route east to Route 33 

and then south to an assembly area to 

await the battalion’s vehicles. In column, 

drivers raced the vehicles over the Imjin 

bridge while the 7th Infantry tankers 

sent to the Belgians during the morning fired on the slopes of Hill 257 to 

the south and the 1st Battalion, 7th 

Infantry, moved into the hill mass from 

the opposite direction. Incoming fire 

from 257 destroyed four trucks but was 

generally weak. Although it had not 

cleared 257, Colonel Weyand’s battalion apparently had distracted most of 

the Chinese holding the hill. Once the 

last vehicle had crossed the bridge 

about 2000, the motor column followed 

50 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 61, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I 

Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of 

Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB 

Action, 22-25 Apr 51). See also article by two participants in the Hill 257 battle, Capt. William F. Long, 

Jr., and Capt. Walter M. Turner, “Challenge Accepted,” in Combat Forces Journal, January 1952, pp. 

12-16. 
396 EBB AND FLOW 

BELGIAN TROOPS WITHDRAWING FROM THE HILL 194 AREA 

the track along the Hant’an to reach 

Route 33. Troops and vehicles reunited, the Belgian battalion moved 

south and assembled near the Routes 

33-11 junction.51 

Behind the Belgians, the 3d Battalion of the 65th Infantry, 64th Tank 

Battalion, and 3d Reconnaissance 

Company left their Hant’an blocking 

position, the 3d Battalion joining the 

7th Infantry on line Kansas, the tankers and reconnaissance troops assembling close to 3d Division headquarters 

near the Routes 33-11 junction. With 

considerable difficulty the 1st Battalion, 

51 Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 79-8 1; Ltr, CG I 

Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of 

Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 16 (3d 

Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51). 

7th Infantry, meanwhile disengaged at 

Hill 257 and returned to the 7th’s sector of line Kansas, where it went into 

reserve. Ahead of all these movements, 

the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat 

Team, en route to occupy the gap in 

the 29th Brigade’s lines, reached the 

brigade headquarters area along Route 

11 about 2000, too late in the day, 

Brigadier Brodie decided, for it to attempt to take position between the fusilier and Gloster battalions.52 

52 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 139, 141, 148, 157, 180, 

182, and 189, 23 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG 

Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and 

Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 

22-25 Apr 51); 3d Div PORs 159 and 160, 23 and 24 

Apr 51. 
THE OPENING 397 

The withdrawal to line Kansas and 

other force adjustments swung the 3d 

Division south like a gate hinged on 

the west at the position of the Gloster 

battalion, which, after Colonel Carne 

consolidated forces in the Solma-ri area, 

had remained quiet throughout the day 

except for meeting engagements between patrols in Company B’s sector at 

the far right. Both the 64th and 63d 

Armies, however, had built up forces below the Imjin to the front and flanks of 

the battalion.53 

To the left of the Glosters, the 192d 

Division, 64th Army, had begun to 

ford the Imjim at three points on 

the Korangp’o-ri bend by daybreak. 

Sighted by air observers, the crossing 

operation was shut off by 1100 by air 

strikes and artillery fire, and most of 

the Chinese who had crossed by that 

time hesitated in areas not far below 

the river. A few company-size groups 

moved south and tested positions of the 

12th Regiment at the right of the ROK 

1st Division but were turned back by 

noon. Sorties by two task forces of 

South Korean infantry and tanks of the 

73d Tank Battalion, which was attached 

to the 1st Division, punished Chinese 

forces ahead of ROK lines until dusk. 

One task force estimated that it killed 

three thousand Chinese.54 

Gloster forces on Hill 235 meanwhile caught sight of Chinese on the 

near high ground in the gap between 

the battalion and the ROK 12th Regiment. They had come either from the 

Korangp’o-ri bend or out of the Gloster 

53 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 30, 36. 

54 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army 

PIR 285, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps 

Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, 

Apr 51. 

Crossing area, where, despite British 

mortar and artillery fire, the 187th Division, and apparently the 189th Division, 

pushed additional forces over the 

Imjin. To the northeast, units of the 

187th and 188th Divisions continued to 

enter the gap between the Glosters and 

fusiliers, directing their movement 

mainly toward Hill 675. Some forces 

worked through each gap and reached 

Route 5Y early in the afternoon. An 

attack by these forces on the Gloster 

supply point along the road made clear 

that the battalion at Solma-ri had been 

surrounded.55 

Given this penetration and the buildup of Chinese below the Imjin in the 

west and given, in particular, the frail 

central position of the ROK 6th Division and open ground on either side of 

it, which invited envelopments both 

west and east, it was doubtful that the I 

and IX Corps lines as they stood at dark 

on the 23d could be held against the 

next surge of enemy attacks. Earlier in 

the day a number of officers had recommended long withdrawals to General Van Fleet to gain time to organize 

stronger defenses. One division commander in the I Corps had proposed 

falling back to line Golden just above 

Seoul. But Van Fleet had refused to 

give ground voluntarily in deep withdrawals. While by no means assuming 

a stand-or-die position, the enemy, he 

insisted, would have to “take all he 

gets.”56 

55 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, p. 34; 

Holles, Now Thrive the Armourers, pp. 152, 155; Ltr, CG 

I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report 

of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 14 

(Summary of Enemy Operations); Kahn, “A Reporter 

in Korea-No One But the Glosters.” 

56 Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51, copy 

in CMH. 
CHAPTER XXII 

The Chinese Spring Offensive 

On the Central and Eastern Fronts 

Attack on the Pendleton Line 

As the 1st Marine Division drew back 

to the curving Pendleton line at the 

right of the IX Corps sector on 23 

April, Marine aerial reconnaissance disclosed numerous enemy groups moving south through the ground surrendered by the ROK 6th Division the 

night before. They appeared to be van 

forces moving well ahead of main 

bodies, though the latter were not 

sighted. The Marine intelligence staff 

concluded that the groups nearest the 

marines were attempting to get into position for a strike against the division's 

main supply route.1 

If this was the case, the 120th Division, 

40th Army, which had missed the opportunity to enter the marines’ open left 

flank the previous night, also failed to 

find the open path to Ch’unch’on. In a 

shallower southeastward swing out of 

the ground along the division boundary, begun about 2000, the division’s 

359th and 360th Regiments launched repeated frontal assaults behind mortar 

fire against two battalions of the 1st Marines and a battalion of the 7th Marines now covering the division’s left. 

The Chinese made no earnest effort to 

1 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51. 

move through the gaps between battalions, a mistake that allowed the 

marines to concentrate defensive fires; 

the supporting fire delivered by the 

11th Marines and Army artillery from 

Chich’on-ni was particularly effective. 

The Chinese kept heavy pressure on 

the three battalions all night but could 

deliver no penetrating blow. Frequent 

but far weaker attacks in other sectors 

of the Marine front by forces of the 

115th and 116th Divisions of the 39th 

Army faded out at dawn.2

Starting the division’s withdrawal to 

line Kansas about daylight, General 

Smith held to three engaged battalions 

and supporting artillery in position to 

contain the attack from the west and 

cover the units to the east as they vacated their inactive sectors. The artillery was to follow, with displacing units 

spaced to insure continuous support of 

the three battalions bringing up the 

rear. Smith’s air officer requested 

twelve planes an hour to help cover the 

rearguard action.3

As the marines in the east dropped 

off the line in the early light of the 24th, 

Chinese entered Hwach’on town and 

the dam area but did not pursue the 

2 Ibid.; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The EastCentral Front, pp. 113-15. 

3 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51. 
ON THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN FRONTS 399 

withdrawal to the Kansas line. The 

more persistent forces of the 120th Division to the west began to lap around 

one of the covering battalions located 

along the Chich’on-ni road shortly before dawn; two hundred or more 

reached the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion behind the marines as 

that unit was preparing to displace. A 

half dozen crews set up machine guns 

in hills sloping to the battalion’s position while riflemen and grenadiers 

crept into a field and cemetery close to 

the artillery pieces. The first “round” 

fired was a roll of toilet paper flung by 

a startled artilleryman who discovered 

several Chinese crawling toward him 

when he walked into the cemetery. Startled themselves by the unusual missile, 

the Chinese allowed the man to run 

back to his battery; but minutes later, 

machine gunners and riflemen opened 

fire while grenadiers tried to reach the 

nearest self-propelled howitzers.4 

The commander of the 92d, Lt. Col. 

Leon F. Lavoie, a stickler for setting up 

an elaborate defensive perimeter that 

required two or three days to develop 

fully, had established the basic positions 

by dark on the 23d. Most positions had 

been vacated just before daylight as the 

battalion began to get into march order, 

but Lavoie’s forces were able to reoccupy them in time to take on the first 

line of Chinese. Enemy grenadiers 

reaching a howitzer during the battalion’s rush to battle stations were shot 

down before they could damage it; direct howitzer fire blasted the Chinese 

machine guns in the hills; and fire from 

the perimeter, which bristled with .30- 

caliber and .50-caliber machine guns on 

ground mounts and armored personnel carriers, swept the field and cemetery with devastating effect. Fire from 

tanks the marines sent to join the battle 

added to the enemy toll. Within two 

hours the artillerymen destroyed the 

Chinese force and were in march order for the artillery displacement. The 

battalion’s losses in the engagement 

were four killed and eleven wounded.” 

The withdrawal of the rearguard battalions was a costly running battle with 

120th Division forces who followed the 

marines the entire distance to line 

Kansas. Ample artillery fire and numerous air strikes steadily weakened the 

pursuit, although at a price in aircraft. 

Chinese fire downed three Corsairs and 

one observation plane. Much reduced 

by the time the marines were back in 

old positions on the Kansas line, the 

Chinese were unable to mount more 

than mild assaults, all unsuccessful, 

and no reinforcements arrived to 

strengthen them. As indicated when no 

major attack developed anywhere on 

the 1st Marine Division front by daylight on 25 April, neither the 120th Division nor the divisions of the 39th Army, 

whose operations had been minor from 

the start, would attempt further action 

of any scale.” 

Inje Falls 

In the X Corps sector to the east of 

the marines, an attack opened near 

dawn on the 24th by the North Korean 

12th Division thoroughly disorganized 

the ROK 5th Division and carried the 

North Koreans through Inje by mid4 Ibid.; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Artillery 

5 For a detailed account of this battle see Gugeler, 

Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 154-65. 

in Perimeter Defense,” Narrative. 6 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51. 
400 

MARINES UNDER FIRE 

EBB AND FLOW 

morning. (See Map 33.) The North Korean 6th Division at the same time continued to push the left and center units 

of the ROK III Corps away from Route 

24. The two enemy divisions reduced 

the pressure of their attacks only after 

their point units had driven two to five 

miles below Inje. Given some respite, 

the South Korean forces were able to 

organize defenses strong enough to 

hold off the two enemy divisions’ continuing but weaker attempts to deepen 

and widen their salient. To the northeast, the North Korean 45th Division 

again displayed its inexperience on the 

24th in unsuccessful attacks on the 32d 

Infantry of the U.S. 7th Division at the 

immediate left of the ROK 5th Division and against the 23d Infantry of 

the U.S. 2d Division anchoring the X 

Corps’ west flank above the eastern tip 

of the Hwach’on Reservoir. Opposite 

the 23d Infantry, some four hundred 

troops of the 45th made the mistake of 

assembling in a steep-sided draw near 

the village of Tokko-ri in full view of 

an artillery forward observer with Company C. The observer brought down a 

battalion time on target barrage of fifteen volleys using rounds tipped with 

variable time fuses. Afterward the observer saw just two North Koreans 

come out of the draw. The only ground 

gained by the 44th Division during the 

day was a gift from the 32d Infantry as 

the regiment pulled back to ridgetop 

positions that allowed it to tie in with 

the ROK 5th Division below Inje and 
ON THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN FRONTS 401 

thus contain the North Korean salient 

along its southwestern shoulder.7 

As a result of the 1st Marine Division’s withdrawal to line Kansas, General Almond late on the 24th ordered 

changes in 2d Division dispositions. On 

the morning of 25 April the 23d Infantry was to drop back to positions just 

below the eastern tip of the Hwach’on 

Reservoir, a move that would place the 

regiment on the exact trace of line 

Kansas; beginning on the 25th General 

Ruffner was to make daily physical 

contact with the Marine division’s 

right flank located near the village of 

Yuch’on-ni at the western tip of the 

reservoir. The latter step was a hedge 

against the possibility that enemy forces 

might penetrate the right of the Marine line and make a flanking or enveloping move against the X Corps 

through the otherwise unoccupied 

ground below the reservoir. To screen 

this ground and maintain contact with 

the marines, Ruffner organized Task 

Force Zebra under the commander of 

the division’s 72d Tank Battalion, Lt. 

Col. Elbridge L. Brubaker. Included in 

the task force were a platoon of tanks 

from the 72d, the 2d Reconnaissance 

Company, the division’s attached Netherlands and French battalions, and, 

later, the 1st Ranger C0mpany.s 

General Almond on the morning of 

the 25th ordered an afternoon attack 

by the ROK 5th Division to retake Inje 

and the high ground immediately above 

the town as a first step in regaining line 

7 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 24 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 POR, 

24 Apr 5 1; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 5 1; 2d Div 

Comd Rpt, Nat-, Apr 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 

51. 

8 X Corps 01 160, 24.Apr 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Apr 51. 

Kansas. As worked out by Almond with 

General Yu, the leftmost units of the 

ROK III Corps were to join the advance. Yu’s attack-for reasons not 

clear-did not materialize, and although the ROK 5th Division recaptured Inje, enemy pressure forced the 

unit to return to its original positions 

below the town. Ever aggressive, General Almond planned to attack again 

on the 26th. But, as he would soon 

learn, any attempt to retake line Kansas 

was for the time being out of the 

question as a result of a second failing 

performance by the ROK 6th Division 

in the left half of the IX Corps sector.9 

Repeat Performance 

The enemy formations approaching 

the ROK 6th Division on the 23d were 

from the 60th Division, 20th Army, and 

118th Division, 40th Army. The 60th Division, which had stampeded the South 

Koreans the night before, was on a 

southwesterly course as the 20th Army 

continued to guide on Route 3 in its 

advance toward Seoul. That direction 

would take the division into the I Corps 

sector after no more than a glancing 

blow at the ROK 19th Regiment at the 

left of the 6th Division’s front. Forces 

of the 118th Division moved south 

through the right half of the South Korean sector on a line of march that 

would carry them to the ROK 2d and 

7th Regiments and, if maintained, to 

the British 27th Brigade’s blocking position above Kap’yong.10 

When the leading enemy forces 

9 X Corps OI 161, 25 Apr 51; Rads, X 18709 and X 

18718, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 25 Apr 51. 

10 Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Barclay, The 

First Commonwealth Division, p. 69. 
402 EBB AND FLOW 

struck the ROK line just after dark, the 

South Koreans bolted south almost 

immediately, disordered columns of 

troops and trucks flooding the two valleys converging at the British brigade’s 

position. The New Zealand artillery, 

Middlesex battalion, and 213th Field 

Artillery Battalion, which had gone up 

the valleys to support the 6th Division, 

had scarcely deployed before South Koreans began passing through their 

areas. The three battalions withdrew 

behind the Australians and Canadians, 

negotiating the cluttered valley roads 

with no loss of men or equipment except for a howitzer of the 213th Field 

Artillery Battalion which had to be run 

off the road to avoid striking a group 

of milling South Koreans.11 

ROK forces began streaming into the 

27th Brigade’s lines around 2000, the 

heavier flow coming down the northeast valley into the position of the Australian battalion. After a chaotic and 

clamorous passage through the blocking position, ROK leaders were able to 

slow the wild flight-getting safely behind the 27th Brigade seemed to have 

a calming effect-and eventually assembled the forces just off Route 17 

about five miles southwest of Kap’yong 

town. On the morning of the 24th General Chang notified General Hoge that 

he had collected and was reorganizing 

between four thousand and five thousand men, about half the division’s 

strength. 12 

11 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 23 Apr 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth 

Army, 5 May 51, sub: Report on Disintegration of the 

6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the 

Period 22-24 Apr 51; Barclay, The First Commonwealth 

Division, p. 67; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, 

“Tanks Above Kap’yong,” Interv with Johnson. 

12 After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above 

Kap’yong,” Interv with 1st Lt Wilfred D. Miller, Plat 

The 60th Division, keeping to its 

southwesterly course, had not pursued 

the ROK 19th Regiment after putting 

it to rout in the Kap’yong valley. The 

60th next would be in contact with the 

24th Division in the I Corps sector. 

The 118th Division stayed on the heels 

of the South Koreans racing down the 

northeast valley, its 354th Regiment 

reaching the Australian battalion about 

2200 as the din of the South Korean 

retreat through the 27th Brigade began to subside.13 

Intent on pursuing the South Koreans and probably unaware of the Australian position, the van forces of the 

354th Regiment kept to the valley, splitting as they approached a long, low 

north-south ridge rising as an island in 

the valley’s mouth. Company B of the 

Australians and the 1st Platoon of Company A, 72d Tank Battalion, were atop 

the southern end of the ridge overlooking the valley road passing by on the 

east. The remaining three companies 

of the Australian battalion were east of 

the road on the crest and upper slopes 

of Hill 504. To the north, the 4th Platoon of tanks was on outpost, two tanks 

on the nose of the island ridge, three 

astride the road in the flat ground just 

beyond. In the village of Chuktun-ni 

behind the island ridge, the road 

ended in a junction with the Kap’yong 

valley road coming in from northwest. 

Near Chuktun-ni, the Kap’yong road 

reached a ford across the Kap’yong 

Ldr, 1st Plat, Co A, 72d Tank Bn; Bartlett, With the 

Australians in Korea, p. 94; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Apr 51; Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51, 

sub: Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the Period 22-24 

Apr 51. 

13 Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Bartlett, With 

the Australians in Korea, p. 94; Wood, Strange Battleground, p. 74. 
ON THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN FRONTS 403 

River on the upper arm of the large 

bend that turns the river’s flow from 

southeast to southwest. The command 

group and 2d Platoon of the tank company were deployed astride the road 

just below the ford, whence the tanks 

could fire up both the Kap’yong and 

northeast valleys. The Australian battalion’s command post, protected by a 

small group of pioneer, police, and signal troops, was located against some low 

hills not far to the left rear of the tanks. 

With the leading Chinese confining 

their march to the valley, one group 

following the road, the other swinging 

wide through the undefended valley 

floor west of the island ridge and southeast along the Kap’yong, the American 

tankers on outpost and at the ford were 

first to be engaged. The approaching 

Chinese reached the two positions almost simultaneously.14 

Upon a Chinese approach, the 4th 

Platoon had standing orders to withdraw from its outpost to a blocking 

position on the road between the 

forces on the island ridge and those on 

Hill 504, but the tankers were under 

fire before they realized that the oncoming troops were not more retreating South Koreans. A brief exchange 

of fire in which the tank crews fought 

with hatches open for better vision in 

the darkness cost the platoon four 

wounded (two of them tank commanders), and the platoon leader was 

fatally shot as the tanks turned to withdraw. The leaderless survivors pulled 

out in disorder toward the 2d Platoon 

at the Kap’yong ford. The 1st Platoon 

leader, 1st. Lt. Wilfred D. Miller, ran 

14 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 92; After 

Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above Kap’yong,” 

Interv with Koch. 

down to the road from his position on 

the island ridge and stopped the tanks 

at the blocking position, but Chinese 

appearing from the north forced him 

back up the ridge, and the 4th Platoon 

continued toward the river crossing.15 

The ragged withdrawal took the platoon from one fire fight to another. 

Tank company commander 1st. Lt. 

Kenneth W. Koch, afoot and under 

considerable fire, reorganized the platoon under the command of a sergeant 

and deployed it alongside the 2d Platoon against the Chinese attacking from 

the northwest. With the road open as 

far as the ford, Chinese entered the 

battle from the north, and the two leading groups, now joined, widened their 

assault to include the small force of 

Australians defending the battalion 

command post. Numbers of Chinese infiltrating or skirting the ford area settled in the high ground bordering the 

Kap’yong road on the west. Those moving deepest reached and exchanged fire 

with the Middlesex battalion, which had 

taken a reserve position athwart the 

road two miles behind the Australians. 

North of the ford, following formations 

of the 354th Regiment spread out to attack the forces on the island ridge and 

Hill 504.16 

Lt. Col. I. B. Ferguson, the Australian battalion commander, was hard 

pressed to direct the defense. South Koreans charging through his position had 

torn out his wire from command post 

to companies, and he could communicate with the forward units only inter15 After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above 

Kap’yong,” Narrative and Intervs with Koch, Miller, 

Pfc Leroy W. Ritchotte, 4th Plat, and Pvt Robert B. 

Brown, 4th Plat. 

16 Ibid., Intervs with Koch and Lt A. Argent, Intel 

Off, 3d Bn, Royal Australian Regt. 
404 

mittently by radio. Losing all artillery 

support put the Australians at further 

disadvantage as the Chinese enlarged 

their attack. After withdrawing down 

the Kap’yong valley, the New Zealand 

unit and 213th Field Artillery Battalion had established positions between the Middlesex and Australian 

battalions; but when the enemy attack 

intensified, Brigadier Burke ordered 

the two units into safety positions behind the Middlesex. Dawn came before 

they could again answer calls for fire.17 

Nor was support available from the 

4.2s of Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion. Communications had not 

yet been established with the mortar 

position in the valley behind Hill 504 

when the Chinese spread out to assault 

the Australians, and the mortar company, in any case, left its position shortly 

afterward. Fearful of being overrun, 

the mortarmen abandoned thirty-five 

vehicles loaded with equipment and retreated over a minor road ten miles 

east to Ch’unch’on.18 

During a nightlong series of assaults, 

the three Australian companies on Hill 

504, in spite of their lack of artillery 

and mortar support, lost only two platoon positions and later regained one 

of these. Company B and the platoon 

of tanks on the island ridge had little 

trouble holding their ground and took 

a high toll of Chinese crowded along 

the valley road when they were exposed 

in the light of burning buildings set 

ablaze by fire from the tanks. Enemy 

forces got among the tanks at the ford, 

17 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 95; After 

Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above Kap’yong,” 

Interv with Johnson. 

18 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 95-96; 

After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above 

Kap’yong,” Interv with Argent. 

EBB AND FLOW 

but the two platoons stayed in position, 

the tankers firing in all directions, even 

at each other, to keep Chinese from 

getting on the tanks. A 3.5-inch rocket 

fired from the hill above the Australian command post damaged a tank, 

killed one man, and wounded two. Another tanker was wounded when two 

crews drove south from the ford and 

eliminated a block on the Kap’yong 

road that aidmen had discovered while 

transporting other casualties to the rear. 

In exchange for these losses, the tankers killed more than a hundred Chinese before the attack faded out about 

daylight.19 

Well before dawn the Chinese attacking the battalion headquarters area 

were threatening to overrun the command post. In answer to Colonel Ferguson’s request to Brigadier Burke for 

reinforcements, a Middlesex company 

started forward but, on encountering 

resistance by Chinese in the hills edging the Kap’yong road, inexplicably 

turned east and withdrew over the 

route used earlier by the American 

4.2-inch mortar company. Compelled 

to withdraw, Ferguson started his headquarters vehicles and troops toward the 

Middlesex position, using the two tanks 

that had cleared out the roadblock to 

cover the move. Fire from the hills 

above the road forced sections of the 

column to halt. and take cover from time 

to time but caused no casualties and 

was easily silenced by the tanks. The 

only loss during the withdrawal was 

Ferguson’s own jeep, which had a wheel 

blown off by a mortar round. The two 

American engineer companies biv19 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 96104; 

After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above 

Kap’yong,” Intervs with Miller and Koch, 
ON THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN 

ouacked within sight of the road meanwhile mistook the passing headquarters 

forces for the beginning of a general 

withdrawal and themselves pulled out 

in haste and confusion, abandoning 

tentage, several trucks, kitchens, and a 

water point they had installed.” 

From the new battalion command 

post, Colonel Ferguson shortly before 

dawn ordered Company B to leave its 

isolated position on the island ridge and 

join forces with the companies on Hill 

504. The company remained engaged 

until after daylight, when the Chinese 

began withdrawing to the north. Company B and the tank platoon whipped 

the withdrawing troops with fire for 

over an hour. As a sort of finale to the 

engagement, a patrol reconnoitering a 

route to 504 brought back about forty 

prisoners bagged near the northern 

edge of Chuktun-ni. Moving roundabout to avoid Chinese still attacking 

504, Company B, with prisoners in tow, 

occupied a rear position on the hill 

about midmorning.21 

In the continuing engagement on 

Hill 504, daylight and artillery support 

from the New Zealanders gave the Australians the advantage. Although the 

Chinese attacked repeatedly, almost at 

half-hour intervals, they were now fully 

visible, and each dash from cover to 

cover brought down an assortment of 

telling Australian fire. Except for a 

FRONTS 405 

20 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 96, 98-99; 

After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above 

Kap’yong,” Intervs with Cpl William O. Suiter, Jr., Co 

A, 72d Tank Bn, Padgett, and Sgt Harold Burros, Sgt 

John L. Mazyck, Cpl Haywood Butler, Cpl Mason F. 

Scott, Pfc James Jackson, Pfc Johnnie L. Lewis, Pfc 

Johnnie Barksdale, Pfc Arthur Lee Gayles, and Pvt 

Robert J. Booker, all of Co B, 74th Engr Bn. 

21 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 99-100; 

After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above 

Kap’yong,” Interv with Miller. 

misdirected air strike in which Marine 

Corsairs dropped napalm on one 

Australian company, killing two, injuring several, and destroying some 

weapons and equipment, “the situation 

rather resembled sitting in the middle 

of a wheatfield at dawn potting rabbits 

as they dashed hither and thither.” 22 

The battalion nevertheless was potentially in danger of encirclement. A 

three-mile gap between the Australians 

and the Canadians to the west, whose 

position had not yet been seriously 

tested, and a far greater expanse of 

open ground to the east gave the Chinese room to close in. Evacuating Australian casualties and replenishing supplies also became a problem with most 

of the road between Hill 504 and the 

Middlesex position kept under Chinese 

guns from the bordering high ground. 

Wary of losing the battalion if it remained on 504 another night, Brigadier Burke at midmorning ordered 

Colonel Ferguson to withdraw behind 

the Middlesex. The American tankers, 

who had used the morning respite to 

refuel and rearm in the company bivouac area, came back into action, one 

group under Lieutenant Miller initially 

carrying Ferguson and staff members 

over the fire-swept road to 504 to organize the withdrawal. Miller’s group 

also delivered ammunition and brought 

back casualties, making a second trip to 

get all the Australian wounded out. 

Another group, under Lieutenant 

Koch, the company commander, carried volunteers from Company B, 74th 

Engineer Combat Battalion, to the vacated 4.2-inch mortar position and covered them while they drove out the 

22 The commander of Company A, quoted in Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 101. 
406 EBB AND FLOW 

commander, Lt. Col. J. R. Stone, originally had deployed his four companies 

on the crest and northern slopes of 677, 

but after Chinese began moving into 

the hills along the Kap’yong road a step 

that placed them to the right and right 

rear of the Canadians, Stone shifted 

Company B to a southeastern slope 

against the possibility of an attack via 

the battalion’s back door.25 Mortar and 

long range machine gun fire struck the 

company at 2200, one of the machine 

guns firing tracer ammunition to direct an assault by two hundred Chinese 

that followed. A smaller group slipped 

up a gully from the southeast to attack 

the battalion’s command post and mortars located in rear of Company B. A 

larger force, clearly visible to the Canadians in the moonlight, meanwhile began fording the Kap’yong to the east. 

A heavy concentration of New Zealand 

artillery fire broke up the force crossing the river, and, just as effectively, 

Canadian mortarmen and machine 

gunners almost literally blew back the 

Chinese attacking up the ravine. Company B beat off the first Chinese 

charge, lost a platoon position to the 

second, then successfully weathered a 

succession of assaults lasting most of 

the night.26 

A stronger attack about 0200, evidently by fresh forces coming out of 

the Kap’yong valley, hit Company D 

defending the Canadians’ left flank 

from the 677 crest. The first assaults, 

launched across a saddle from the west 

and up steep slopes from the south, 

carried Chinese into the company’s devehicles abandoned by the mortar company. On a final round trip, tankers 

protected the engineers while they retrieved their own equipment left behind 

during their hurried morning withdrawal.23 

After completing the evacuation of 

casualties and equipment in midafternoon, the tankers moved north to the 

ford area to ward off any Chinese moving down the Kap’yong valley while the 

Australians were withdrawing from 

504. The New Zealand artillery blinded 

the Chinese on the slopes of 504 with 

smoke and trailed the Australian rearguard with high explosive rounds as 

the four companies moved one at a 

time down a long ridge sloping southeast to the Kap’yong River. Crossing 

the stream a mile and a half behind the 

tanks, the Australians passed through 

the Middlesex battalion not long after 

dark. The tanks dropped back after the 

rearguard company crossed the river 

but stayed forward of the Middlesex 

until it was clear that no Chinese had 

followed the withdrawal. The night and 

day of battle had cost the Australians 

thirty-one killed, fifty-eight wounded, 

and three missing, the tank company 

two killed, eleven wounded, and one 

missing.24 

Instead of following the Australian 

withdrawal, the 354th Regiment, much 

reduced after its attacks on Hill 504 

but apparently being reinforced by at 

least part of another regiment of the 

118th Division, turned toward the Canadian battalion on Hill 677. The Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 

23 Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 74-76; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above Kap’yong,” 

Intervs with Koch and Miller.. 

24 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 105-06; 

After Action Intervs, Blumenson, “Tanks Above 

Kap’yong,” Interv with Koch. 

25 American tankers making one of their runs on 

the Kap’yong road as the Canadian company took 

position mistakenly opened fire on it and wounded 

one man. 

26 Wood, Strange Battleground,, pp. 76-77. 
ON THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN FRONTS 407 

fenses in such numbers that the Company D commander was able to drive 

them out only by calling down artillery 

fire on his own position. Following 

charges kept pressure on the company, 

nicking its position here and there, but 

gradually wore down under the company’s defensive fire and heavy pounding by the New Zealand artillery.27 

Censure 

Under additional fire from two platoons of Company A, 72d Tank Battalion, which maneuvered within range 

near dawn, the Chinese gave up their 

attacks on the Canadian flanks about 

daylight but stayed in contact with a 

heavy delivery of fire. Since the continuing Chinese control of the Kap’yong 

road as far south as the Middlesex position kept the Canadians from using it 

to bring up a resupply of ammunition 

and rations, Colonel Stone, as the enemy assaults died out, requested an 

airdrop. In remarkable time given the 

long route Stone’s request had to take, 

C-119s from Japan delivered the supplies six hours later. By that time, however, the Chinese fire had begun to 

diminish, and at 1400 Company B patrols found the Kap’yong road open. 

By late afternoon the 118th Division, 

bloodied at Hill 504 and again severely 

punished by the Canadians in exchange for ten killed and twenty-three 

wounded, gave up the battle and withdrew north.28 

27 Ibid. pp. 77-78; 

Division, p. 69. 

Barclay, The First Commonwealth 

28 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Wood, Strange 

Battleground, p. 78; Barclay, The First Commonwealth 

Division, p. 70. For their stand above Kap’yong, the 

Australian and Canadian battalions and Company A, 

72d Tank Battalion. were awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation. For personal efforts in support of 

the Australians, 1st Lt. Kenneth W. Koch and 1st Lt. 

Wilfred D. Miller of the tank company each received 

the Distinguished Service Cross. 

That two battalions and a tank company had withstood attacks no weaker, 

and perhaps stronger, than those that 

twice had routed the ROK 6th Division 

underscored how completely control 

had broken down in the division. The 

huge tally of equipment lost as a result 

of the division’s successive debacles emphasized the breakdown further. Major items lost by the South Koreans included 2,363 small arms, 168 machine 

guns and Browning automatic rifles, 66 

rocket launchers, 2 antitank guns, 42 

mortars, 13 artillery pieces, and 87 

trucks. The three American fire support units-987th Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion; 2d Rocket Field 

Artillery Battery; and Company C, 2d 

Chemical Mortar Battalion-stymied by 

overturned South Korean vehicles and 

other abandoned equipment on their 

withdrawal route during the night of 

the 22d, lost 15 105-mm. howitzers, 13 

4.2-inch mortars, and 73 vehicles. Hundreds of other items-242 radios 

alone-lengthened the list.29 

General Hoge used no euphemisms 

in rebuking General Chang for the conduct of the division, summing it up as 

“disgraceful in all its aspects.”30 Hoge 

nevertheless considered Chang one of 

the better ROK commanders-and the 

6th Division representative of all ROK 

divisions-and did not seek his relief. 

To place blame solely on Chang, in any 

case, would be to make him a scapegoat. 

Lack of leadership and control on the 

part of all grades of officers and non29 DF, Eighth Army G4 to Chief of Staff, 10 May 51, 

sub: Report on Disintegration of ROKA 6th Div, in 

Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951. 

30 Ltr, Gen Hoge to Gen Chang, 28 Apr 51, in Eighth 

Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951. 
408 

commissioned officers had caused the 

division’s disintegration. With exceptions that only proved the rule, deficient leadership indeed continued to be 

the major weakness of the ROK 

Army.31 

The ROK Army chief of staff, General Chung, attempted to explain to 

General Van Fleet that the 6th Division’s breakdown and the wider leadership problem came from a lack of training. He was right to the extent that 

ROK troops and leaders at every level 

and in every unit suffered from sketchy 

military schooling. But Van Fleet refused the explanation, pointing out to 

Chung that the 6th Division had conducted itself creditably in past operations and that the making of officers 

could not be confined to the mastery of 

military skills. A high sense of responsibility, devotion to duty, physical and 

moral courage, and the will to fight for 

homes and families were fundamental 

to competent military leadership; these 

were the attributes, he emphasized, 

that, along with training in military 

science, had to be developed among 

South Korean officers and noncommissioned officers if the ROK Army was to 

be a capable and dependable force.32 

The rout of the ROK 6th Division 

could not have happened at a worse 

time for President Rhee’s attempt to 

put more men under arms. On 18 April 

the ROK representative to the United 

Nations, Col. Ben C. Limb, had asked 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for arms and 

equipment for ten additional divisions, 

EBB AND FLOW 

31 Ltr, Gen Hoge to Gen Van Fleet, 28 Apr 51, in 

Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951. 

32 Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to Gen Chung, 2 May 51, copy 

in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951. 

and on the 23d, following the 6th Division’s first collapse and preceding its 

second by only hours, Rhee had submitted a personal request for the same. 

The request had some appeal in Washington by raising the prospect of eventually using additional South Korean 

formations to replace American units. 

General Ridgway and General Van 

Fleet, however, argued successfully 

against any immediate increase in ROK 

divisions. There was no way, they insisted, that American personnel and 

other resources could be spared to provide the supervision and training for 

an expansion as long as heavy fighting 

continued. In any case, a need to develop competent leadership, not a need 

for more men, was the primary problem of the ROK Army and certainly 

was prerequisite to its enlargement. 

The ROK 6th Division’s dissolution illustrated the point. Creating new divisions without able leaders, Van Fleet 

said, would be “a criminal waste of 

badly needed equipment.”33 

Ridgway, Van Fleet, and Ambassador Muccio personally delivered the refusal to President Rhee. Their message 

was blunt: from the minister of defense 

to the lowest level of command in the 

ROK Army, leadership was inadequate, 

and under this serious weakness was 

eliminated there would be no more talk 

about the United States arming and 

equipping additional divisions. Rhee 

nevertheless continued to lobby for support of a larger army, but he would get 

no substantial help until improved pro33 Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 170; Schnabel, 

Policy and Direction. pp. 394-95; Ridgway. The Korean 

War: p. 176; Ltr; Gen Van Fleet to Ambassador 

Muccio, 3 May 51, copy in Eighth Army AG File, 6 

ROK Div (1 May), 1951. 
ON THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN FRONTS 409 

grams began to produce the professional talent needed to lead existing and 5 May 51, sub: Republic of Korea Army Losses, copy 

additional forces.34 

in Eighth Army AC File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951. 

For detailed accounts of the expansion of the ROK 

Army during 1952 and 1953, see Sawyer, Military Aduisors in Korea, and Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and 

34 Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 161, 176; Ltr, Gen Fighting Front, U.S. ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR 

Van Fleet to Ambassador Muccio, 3 May 51; Ltr, Maj (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

Gen H.I. Hodes, Dep CofS, Eighth Army, to CINCFE, 1966). 
CHAPTER XXIII 

The Chinese Spring Offensive 

On the Western Front 

Since January, after the Fifth Air 

Force evacuated the airfields at Kimpo, 

Seoul, and Suwon, a shortage of fields, 

especially of airstrips near the front, 

had impeded close air support to the 

Eighth Army. Early in March General 

Partridge had approved plans for the 

construction of all-weather fields, including three forward strips, but only 

in June would he acquire enough engineer aviation battalions to begin any 

extensive airfield development. Consequently, at the opening of the Chinese April offensive only three Fifth 

Air Force groups were based in Korea. 

All other groups flew from bases in 

Japan, a situation that raised the related problems of distance and range 

limitations. Staging through Korean 

fields, primarily the airfield at Taegu, 

helped, but the time that aircraft based 

in Japan could spend at the front was 

nevertheless reduced. Compensating 

considerably were the fighter squadrons of the 1st Marine Air Wing, five 

land based in southeastern Korea, another aboard the escort carrier Bataan 

with Task Force 95 in the Yellow Sea. 

To help further, Task Force 77 in the 

Sea of Japan shifted its fast carrier operations from interdiction to close support beginning on 23 April.1 

1 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 

334-35; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central 

Though unable to operate at top 

capacity, the Fifth Air Force alone flew 

some three hundred forty close support sorties on the 23d, a number that 

almost equaled the highest flown during a single day so far in the war, and 

the 1st Marine Air Wing flew over a 

hundred fifty missions. The bulk of the 

air strikes supported the I Corps as 

General Milburn pulled the 24th and 

25th Divisions and the rightmost forces 

of the 3d Division back to line Kansas. 

He judged that the Fifth Air Force and 

Marine attacks, in combination with artillery fire, had been instrumental in 

preventing Chinese forces from following his withdrawal closely.2 

Defending the Kansas Line 

Chinese following the withdrawal of 

the 24th and 25th Divisions finally reestablished contact with small, groping attacks near midnight on the 23d. Almost 

at the same hour, far harder attacks 

struck the ROK 1st Division and British 29th Brigade along the Imjin, particularly their neighboring interior 

Front, pp. 103, 108; Field, United States Naval Operations, 

Korea, p. 346. 

2 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 

336-37; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central 

Front, p. 108; I Corps, Rpt, The Communist First 

Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 18. 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 

units, the 12th ROK Regiment and the 

British brigade’s isolated Gloster battalion at Solma-ri. (See Map 32.) 

The midnight exploratory probes in 

the eastern half of the corps sector developed into stout but not overpowering daytime assaults by three divisions 

against the 24th Infantry on the right 

of the 25th Division and on the entire 

front of the 24th Division. The 179th 

Division seized Hill 664, the highest 

ground in the 24th Infantry sector, but 

failed in daylong attacks to dislodge the 

regiment and two reinforcing battalions 

of the 27th Infantry from a new line 

established in the foothills of the high 

feature. Forces of the 80th and 59th 

Divisions kept the 24th Division’s front 

under pressure all day, but only the 

80th attacking the 19th Infantry made 

any penetrations, all shallow. Counterattacks by regimental reserve forces 

eliminated all of them. Of more concern was a visible enemy buildup in 

front of the division, particularly ahead 

of the 21st Infantry on the right flank.3 

At the Gloster battalion’s Solma-ri position along the Imjin, the 187th Division reopened its attack on the British 

by sending its 559th Regiment up the 

slopes east of Route 5Y toward Company C near the road and Company B 

on the battalion’s right flank. Unaware 

of exactly where or how the two companies were deployed, the enemy 

regiment attacked obliquely across the 

Gloster front, wasting the force of 

repeated assaults and taking heavy casualties from Gloster fire partially enfilading the skirmish lines. Finally correcting the direction of attack, the 

411 

Chinese shoved their way onto the highest ground inside Company C’s position to command the remainder of the 

company’s hill and the valley behind, 

where the mortars and battalion headquarters were located. Expecting that 

the Chinese would quickly exploit their 

advantage, Colonel Carne ordered the 

troops in the valley and Company C to 

withdraw west across Route 5Y to positions between Companies A and D in 

the Hill 235 area. The withdrawal 

would leave Company B isolated on the 

east flank, but Carne doubted that the 

unit could make the long trek to Hill 

235 from its distant position without 

becoming scattered and lost in the 

darkness; he decided to wait until daylight to pull it in.4 

While Carne had few alternatives, he 

had to a degree played into Chinese 

hands. Making no move to follow Company C when it broke away or to move 

into the valley, where much of the 

battalion’s ammunition, food, and other 

supplies lay abandoned after the hasty 

evacuation of the headquarters site, the 

attack force turned its weight against 

Company B, surrounding and squeezing the unit with assaults from all directions. Though steadily weakened by 

casualties, the isolated company turned 

back the repeated rushes until dawn. 

Then the Chinese changed tactics, 

keeping the company encircled and engaged all around but concentrating 

forces on the north for an assault on 

one platoon. Penetrated by the focused 

attack, the Gloster, company had no 

choice but to try to disengage. Colonel 

Carne covered the attempt with every 

weapon he could bring to bear on the 

3 I Corps, Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 19-20; Barth, Tropic Lightning 

and Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 80-81; 24th Div Comd Rpt, 

Nar, Apr 51. 

4 This paragraph and the one following are based 

on Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 35-47. 
412 

Chinese who had hemmed in the company and had left only a path down 

wooded slopes to the south, where the 

Glosters, breaking away in groups, tried 

to get through the smaller ranks of Chinese who had circled behind them. The 

attempt, if unavoidable, was disastrous. 

Only twenty men reached the main 

body of the battalion at Hill 235. 

Along Route 11 northeast of the 

Glosters, forces of the 188th Division 

meanwhile had followed the late night 

withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 7th 

Infantry, out of the Hill 257 mass and 

engaged the Northumberland Fusiliers 

and Royal Ulster Rifles standing across 

the road about two miles to the south. 

Handling the Chinese frontal pressure 

fully occupied the two battalions and 

left them vulnerable to a flanking or 

enveloping attack out of the gap between the fusiliers and Glosters, a gap 

that as a result of the Glosters’ withdrawals to the Hill 235 area had widened to four miles.5 

In a move to fill the gap at least partially and at the same time to restore 

the deteriorating Gloster position, the 

3d Division commander, General Soule, 

early in the morning of the 24th directed Brigadier Brodie to move a reserve battalion into the gap and also to 

send a tank-infantry force up Route 5Y 

to clear the road and reinforce the 

Gloster battalion. For the latter effort 

Brodie added six Centurions from C 

Squadron, 8th Hussars, to the three rifle companies and four light tanks of 

the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat 

Team and sent the force toward the 

Glosters about 0730. Word that reinforcements were on the way reached 

EBB AND FLOW 

5 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Report 

on Action (Johnson, G3), 3 May 51. 

Colonel Carne as the few survivors of 

Company B began to trickle in at Hill 

235. By midmorning, however, perhaps 

because the Glosters had reported a 

large enemy buildup in their area, 

Brodie changed the concept of the 

operation. The 10th Battalion Combat 

Team now was to set up a blocking position at a pass about two miles below 

Hill 235, and from there only tanks 

were to move on to join the Gloster 

battalion. Brodie may not have been 

aware that the big Centurions, leading 

the way up Route 5Y at the moment, 

would be unable to proceed much farther than the blocking position. As the 

hussars had learned during earlier 

reconnaissance, the road beyond became too narrow at defiles to allow the 

nearly twelve-foot-wide tanks to pass. 

The attempt to reach the Glosters, 

in any case, could be made only by 

the 10th Battalion Combat Team’s 

four light tanks. Brodie also gave the 

Glosters the choice of fighting their way 

to safety, apparently visualizing a linkup 

of Glosters and Filipinos at the latter’s 

blocking position. But Colonel Carne, 

doubting that his weakened battalion 

could make it and remaining under 

the impression that the full tankinfantry force would attempt to reach 

him, elected to stay in position in the 

hope that the approaching column 

would succeed.6 

The Belgian battalion, which Brodie 

intended to place in the gap between 

the Glosters and Northumberland 

Fusiliers, had made a second march 

6 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 48, 52, 60, and 69, 24 Apr 

51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, 

sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion. 22-25 Apr 

51, Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 

14 May 51); Interv, Appleman with Maj Henry Huth, 

CO, C Sqn, 8th Hussars, copy in CMH; 3d Div POR 

160, 24 Apr 51. 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 

during the night after withdrawing out 

of the Imjin angle, moving from its initial assembly along Route 33 to an area 

near the 29th Brigade’s command post. 

Tired and somewhat disorganized by 

the Imjin angle battle and disengagement, the Belgians needed rest and 

time to straighten their ranks before 

moving into the gap. The commander, 

Colonel Albert Crahay, informed Brodie that the battalion would be ready 

by the start of the afternoon.7 

General Soule, however, had second 

thoughts about committing the Belgians. Nine Glosters who had been captured during the Chinese attack on the 

battalion’s supply point the day before 

and who had been taken off to Hill 675 

in the gap escaped their captors during 

an early morning air strike (Mustangs 

dropping napalm) and reached the 

29th Brigade command post. They reported at least a thousand Chinese to 

be on Hill 675, an estimate tending to 

confirm other reports that the Chinese 

in the 675 area had reached regimental strength. Reluctant to pit the 

Belgians against that possible enemy 

strength, Soule about noon informed 

Brodie that the Belgian battalion was 

not to be committed to action without 

division approval.8 

Soule did not question Brodie’s decision to stop the 10th Battalion Combat 

Team short of the Gloster battalion. Because of the growing enemy strength 

in the Gloster and gap areas, Soule now 

7 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 52, 24 Apr 51; Crahay, Les 

Beiges En Coree, pp. 8l-82. 

8 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 80 and 96, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, 

CC Eighth Army to CINCFE, 5 May 51, sub: Report 

of Action Involving the Loss of Gloucestershire Battalion, 29th British Brigade, Tab A, I Corps Report 

on Action of Gloster Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 

23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51. 

413 

planned to attack with two battalions of 

the 65th Infantry, the bulk of the 64th 

Tank Battalion, and the 10th Field Artillery Battalion to relieve the Glosters 

and clear the Chinese from Hill 675. 

The 10th Battalion Combat Team, as 

an attachment to the 65th Infantry, was 

to remain in its blocking position until 

the attack force passed through, then 

was to follow the force to its objectives. 

Soule set the attack for 0630 on the 

25th after checking with Brodie to ask 

if that timing was satisfactory in light 

of the Gloster battalion’s overnight reverses and present condition. Brodie 

assured him that the Glosters could 

hold out until relieved by the 65th 

Infantry.9 

In a midafternoon conference at the 

3d Division airstrip, Soule briefed General Milburn, General Van Fleet, and 

General Ridgway (who had arrived in 

Korea at noon) on the attack plan. They 

questioned waiting until morning to 

attack. But Soule told them that the attack could not be made in what remained of the afternoon: the 1st and 

3d Battalions of the 65th Infantry were 

then only beginning to assemble for the 

attack a mile west of the 29th Brigade’s 

command post and two miles southeast 

of Hill 675 and would not complete 

their move until 1730. Soule, in any 

case, had no reason to believe that the 

Gloster battalion could not hold its 

position; he had Brigadier Brodie’s 

assurance. According to a noontime 

report from the 29th Brigade, the battalion’s only critical supply need was 

radio batteries, which, along with a 

9 3d Div OI 15-13, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 

80. 24 Apr 51: Ltr. CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 

15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 

22-25 Apr 51, Incl 13 (Memo to CG fr Brig Gen A. D. 

Mead, Dept CG, 3d Div, 7 May 51). 
414 

resupply of other items, were to be airdropped before dark. The 10th Battalion Combat Team meanwhile had broken through a spot of resistance about 

three miles south of Hill 235 and, with 

its light tanks now leading, the Centurions next in column, and foot troops 

bringing up the rear, was again on the 

move toward the Glosters.10 

By 1530 the tanks leading the 10th 

Battalion Combat Team were climbing 

into the pass where the Filipino force 

was to set up the blocking position. Encouraged by the column’s progress, 

Brigadier Brodie reverted to his original plan and instructed the entire force 

to go on to the Glosters. He had scarcely 

issued the order when the point tank 

lost a track to a mine or mortar round 

in an extremely narrow, steep-sided 

defile. Chinese strung out atop the hills 

bordering both sides of the defile swept 

the road with fire while others armed 

with charges worked down the steep 

banks toward the disabled tank. The 

M24 crews to the rear, evidently believing the road ahead of them to be 

mined, made no attempt to pull or push 

the damaged tank out of the defile or 

to rescue the stranded crew. Two less 

cautious Centurion crews squeezed 

their huge tanks past the Filipino armor and went as far forward as the 

narrowing road allowed. Though they 

stopped short of the disabled M24, their 

covering fire allowed its crew to escape. 

Meanwhile, the Filipino infantry became involved in a fire fight with Chi10 Interv, Appleman with Gen Soule, 8 Sep 51, copy 

in CMH; Eighth Army CG Jnl, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I 

Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of 

Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 13 (Memo to CG fr Brig Gen A. D. 

Mead, Dept CG, 3d Div, 7 May 51); 3d Div G3 Jnl, 

Entry 96, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51; 

Interv, Appleman with Huth. 

EBB AND FLOW 

nese occupying two hills abutting the 

road some two hundred yards to the 

rear.11 

When Maj. Henry Huth, in command of the Centurions, radioed brigade headquarters that the road was 

blocked and that the wide Centurions 

in any case could not get through the 

defile, he was given authority to withdraw. Major Huth understood the 

clearance to withdraw to apply to the 

10th Battalion Combat Team as well as 

his group of tanks, and he gave the 

Filipinos the word to return to their 

assembly area after the combat team 

commander, Lt. Col. Dionisio Ojeda, 

told him that he did not believe his 

three rifle companies could move forward through what appeared to be a 

battalion of Chinese. If someone at brigade headquarters had allowed the 

10th Battalion Combat Team to withdraw, it was only afterward that Brigadier Brodie sought General Soule’s approval of the move.12 At the same time, 

apparently after discussing a breakout 

with Colonel Carne, who began to prepare plans, Brodie requested permission to pull the Gloster battalion out 

after dark. Soule, however, was certain 

the Glosters would suffer high losses in 

a nighttime withdrawal and instructed 

Brodie to hold both battalions in their 

present locations until the 65th Infantry reached them the next day. Brodie 

11 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 109 and 138, 24 Apr 51; 

Interv, Appleman with Huth. 

12 Later investigation of the withdrawal order came 

to no clear conclusion. There was no brigade journal 

record of its issue, and no one at headquarters could 

recall its scope or exactly who gave it. Available evidence indicates that the order did apply to the entire 

force. The 3d Division G-3 Journal for 24 April 1951, 

Entry 129, for example, records an evening report 

from the 29th Brigade stating in part that the “relief 

force of 10th BCT and Tks have been ordered back.” 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 415 

nevertheless permitted the 10th Battalion Combat Team, already en route to 

the rear, to continue its withdrawal. 

Leapfrogging rear guards, alternately 

tanks and infantry, held off Chinese 

who followed part of the way back and 

allowed the force to reach its starting 

point about 1900. General Soule, who 

had gone to the 7th Infantry front after his conference with Brodie, was unaware of the 10th Battalion Combat 

Team’s withdrawal until he returned 

to headquarters about 2100. At that late 

hour he could only accept Brodie’s handling of the matter. A late evening report on the Glosters from Brodie’s 

headquarters reassured him, however, 

that the isolated battalion could hold 

its ground without reinforcement until 

relieved by the 65th Infantry. The 

position, according to the report, was 

“fairly safe,” and although the battalion had had some weapons and equipment shot up, its casualties did not appear to be heavy.13 

If the Gloster position could be called 

“fairly safe,” it was only because the Chinese swarming around Hill 235 had attempted no further daylight assaults 

after destroying Company B. The ablebodied strength of the battalion was 

down to around three hundred fifty 

men. Supplies were so critically short 

that Colonel Carne had had to risk 

sending a carrying party to the former 

headquarters site in the valley. Under 

the concealment of smoke, the group 

13 Interv, Appleman with Huth; Ltr, CG I Corps to 

CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, and Incl (Statement 

of Col O P. Newman, CofS, 3d Inf Div); Interv, 

Appleman with Soule, 8 Sep 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 

129, 24 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with Capt M. G. 

Harvey, CO, Co D, 1st Bn, the Gloucestershire Regiment, 10 Sep 51. 

retrieved a small quantity of food, 

water, ammunition, and radio batteries. 

Carne pounded the remaining supplies 

and several vehicles in the valley with 

artillery fire to prevent them from falling into Chinese hands. The arrangements for resupply by airdrop, under 

way since midmorning, meanwhile 

bogged down in the mix of 29th Brigade, 3d Division, and I Corps channels for lack of an order to execute, 

and the drop finally was postponed to 

0700 on the 25th. A last-minute effort 

to free-drop a few supplies from two 

3d Division light aircraft was only partially successful, much of the material 

landing outside the Gloster position. 

Together, the sortie to the valley and 

the free-drop gave the Glosters scarcely 

enough for another night of modest 

battle.14 

Colonel Carne had given Brigadier 

Brodie a correct appraisal of the battalion’s condition after the brigade 

commander informed him of the 10th 

Battalion Combat Team’s unsuccessful 

attack and relayed General Soule’s order that the battalion was to stay in 

position. While not asking to withdraw, 

Carne warned that his reduced battalion would not be able to handle the 

Chinese much longer. Less lenient than 

he had been with the 10th Battalion 

Combat Team, Brodie insisted that it 

was essential that the Glosters remain 

in position as directed by General Soule. 

Carne chose to make his stand on the 

long, thin crest of Hill 235, where 

extremely steep slopes except on the 

14 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 47-50; 

Holles, Now Thrive the Armourers, p. 163; Ltr, CG I 

Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of 

Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 8 (Memo, 

G4, 3d Div, to CG, 3d Div, 9 May 51, sub: Air Drop 

for Gloucester Battalion). 
416 EBB AND FLOW 

northwest and southeast limited the approaches favoring enemy attacks in 

strength. To prevent the Chinese from 

observing the change of position, Carne 

waited until after dusk to move his 

forces. The Glosters were dug in by 

2100, Company A on the northwest 

and west, Company C and the remnants 

of Company B on the south and southeast, and Company D on the north and 

northeast.15 

To the left of the Glosters, the 64th 

Army had shown little of the clumsiness 

with which its 192d Division opened operations against the ROK 1st Division. 

Driving out of its shallow bridgehead 

inside the Imjin River’s Korangp’o-ri 

bend at midnight on the 23d, the 192d 

slowly, but persistently, forced the 12th 

Regiment at the right of the ROK line 

to give ground. The pressure on the 

South Koreans increased around dawn, 

after the 190th Division crossed the 

Imjin at several points southwest of 

Korangp’o-ri town and sent van units 

down the boundary between the ROK 

11th and 12th Regiments. Also crossing the Imjin during the night in the 

Korangp’o-ri bend area, the 189th Division of the 63d Army advanced southeast on a course taking it into the gap 

between the ROK 12th Regiment and 

the Gloster battalion on Hill 235.16 

By noon a battalion leading the attack of the 190th Division drove a wedge 

more than a mile deep between the 

11th and 12th Regiments. General 

Kang countered by sending a tank15 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 49-53. 

16 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 23; Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 

Apr 51: Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0040, 24 Apr 51; 

3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy Operations in the 

29th BIB Sector During the Period 211800 to 251800 

Apr 51, 9 May 51. 

infantry force--two battalions of his 

reserve 15th ROK Regiment and Company A, 73d Heavy Tank Battalionagainst the penetration. By evening the 

task force drove out the Chinese and 

established defensive positions in the 

gap that had been opened between the 

11th and 12th Regiments. By that time 

the 192d Division had pressed back the 

12th Regiment roughly three miles to 

the southwest of its original positions, 

widening by the same distance the gap 

between the South Korean division and 

the Gloster battalion on Hill 235. The 

189th Division, after brushing the right 

flank of the 12th Regiment, meanwhile 

began passing through the widening 

gap between the South Koreans and 

Glosters.l7 

As the 12th Regiment gave ground 

during the afternoon, General Milburn 

ordered his lone reserve, the 15th Infantry of the 3d Division, out of its assembly on the northwest outskirts of 

Seoul into positions six miles behind 

the South Koreans to block a secondary road, Route 1B, which if the Chinese reached would afford them an 

easy path to Route 1 and Seoul. Milburn 

shortly diverted the 1st Battalion of the 

15th to clear Route 2X, a lateral secondary road connecting Route 1 to Route 

3 at Uijongbu, after receiving a report 

that two hundred fifty infiltrating Chinese had set up a roadblock about seven 

miles west of Uijongbu. The 1st Battalion located the enemy force at 1800, 

killing twenty before the remaining 

Chinese broke away into nearby hills. 

With darkness approaching, the battal17 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0745 and 1515, 24 

Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Eighth 

Army POR, 24 Apr 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 

51. 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 417 

ion commander elected to await morning before attempting to clear the surrounding area. Meanwhile, as General 

Milburn committed his only reserve 

unit, air observers and agents working 

in the area along Route 1 above the 

Imjin reported enemy forces moving 

south toward the river. The North Korean I Corps appeared ready to open its 

supporting attack along the west flank 

of the main enemy drive.18 

Well before daylight on the 25th 

General Milburn became convinced 

that the I Corps would have to give up 

the Kansas line. As suspected, the North 

Korean I Corps was joining the offensive, 

although its initial move ended abruptly 

when its 8th Division attempted to cross 

the Imjin over the railroad bridge near 

Munsan-ni and was blown back with 

high losses from artillery fire and air 

attacks.19 But the 190th and 192d Divisions attacking in strength just after midnight drove the ROK 1st Division back 

another mile before giving respite, widening still more the gap between the 

South Koreans and Glosters. The 189th 

Division continued, if slowly, to pass 

through the gap.20 

Before midnight the entire front of 

the 3d Division was under assault. On 

Hill 235, scarcely an hour after Colo18 15th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, 

The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 

51, p. 23; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 2330, 24 Apr 

51. 

19 Heretofore lacking a truly effective capacity for 

radar-directed night attacks, the Fifth Air Force now 

had an MPQ radar detachment in support of each 

U.S. corps--one north of Seoul, one near Hongch’on, 

and one near Wonju-and the system now worked 

with B-29s as well as B-26s. See Futrell, The United 

States Air Force in Korea, pp. 328-30. 

20 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 23-24; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Apr 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 

1952. 

nel Carne redeployed the Gloster battalion on the crest of the hill, Chinese 

attacked up the more gentle ascents on 

the northwest and southeast. In repeated rushes, with the lulls between 

used to bring up reinforcements, the 

Chinese failed to survive heavy Gloster 

fire concentrated on the two approaches until daylight, when an assault 

from the northwest carried the 235 

peak. But so few Chinese survived this 

assault that a small Gloster counterattack easily restored the peak position. 

While Chinese gunners and mortarmen 

kept the Glosters under fire, another 

assault force began forming on the 

northwestern slopes, only to be almost 

totally destroyed by a flight of F-80S 

answering an earlier Gloster call for air 

support. During what would become a 

long lull, the Chinese began again to 

bring more men forward.21 

Other Chinese forces-from the 

187th and 188th Divisions and possibly 

from the 189th-meanwhile moved far 

enough through the gaps on either side 

of the isolated Glosters to deliver small 

arms and mortar fire on the assembly 

areas of the 1st and 3d Battalions of 

the 65th Infantry, the Belgian battalion, 

the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat 

Team, the British 45th Field Regiment, 

and the command post of the 29th British Brigade. Some forces of the 188th 

Division coming down from Hill 675 

reached Route 11 a mile and a half behind the Northumberland Fusilier and 

Royal Ulster Rifle Battalions while those 

two units were fully engaged in beating 

back frontal assaults by other forces of 

the 188th.22 

21 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 52-64. 

22 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, 

Entries 158, 159, and 165, 24 Apr 51, and Entries 9, 

20, 28, 30, 33, 40, and 50, 25 Apr 51. 
418 EBB AND FLOW 

By dark on the 24th there had been 

no enemy action against the 7th Infantry deployed athwart Route 33 at the 

right of the 3d Division. With the sector quiet, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, 

had no difficulty in replacing the 3d 

Battalion, 65th Infantry, at the center 

of the regimental front in midafternoon 

to allow the latter to join its regiment 

near the 29th British Brigade command 

post in preparation for the scheduled 

attack to relieve the Gloster battalion. 

But after unproductive opening attacks 

on the 65th Infantry and Philippine 

10th Battalion Combat Team and a 

slow approach to line Kansas, the 29th 

Division opened more effective assaults 

on the 7th Infantry between 2000 and 

midnight of the 24th.23 Two regiments 

of the division attacking across the 

Hant’an River hit all three battalions of 

the regiment. Hardest hit was the 2d 

Battalion on the right flank, which by 

0230 on the 25th was surrounded. On 

orders of the regimental commander, 

Colonel Boswell, the battalion gradually 

infiltrated south in small groups and 

reassembled some four miles below line 

Kansas around daylight. The 1st and 

3d Battalions held their ground but remained under pressure throughout the 

night.24 

In the eastern half of the corps sector, 

the remainder of the 29th Division, the 

179th Division, and the 81st Division 

opened and steadily intensified attacks 

on the 25th Division between dusk and 

23 The 7th Infantry later estimated that it had been 

hit by forces from two divisions. See 7th Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. If a second division was involved, it 

probably was the 34th which also had participated in 

the initial attacks at line Utah. 

24 3d Div G2, Summary of Enemy Operations, 21-25 

Apr 51, 9 May 51; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51, and 

161, 25 Apr 51; 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

midnight. Simultaneous with frontal assaults on the 35th Infantry at the left, 

forces of the 29th Division apparently 

coming out of the adjacent sector of 

the 7th Infantry to the west drew close 

enough to place fire on the regimental 

command post and supporting artillery 

units. On the right, Chinese penetrated 

and scattered the 1st Battalion, 24th 

Infantry. Unable to restore the position, 

General Bradley pulled the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry onto a new 

line about a mile to the south but 

gained no respite as the Chinese 

followed closely.25 

In the 24th Division sector at corps 

right, two companies of Chinese infiltrated the positions of the 19th Infantry during the night. But a greater danger was posed by the 60th Division, 

which, after again routing the ROK 6th 

Division, reached and attacked the right 

flank of the 21st Infantry. The 21st 

bent its line and tied it to the position 

of its reserve battalion on the flank. But 

the 60th, if it should shift to the south 

past the refused flank and the blocking 

position set up by the battalion of the 

5th Infantry, could slip into the division and corps rear area through the 

big opening created by the ROK 6th 

Division’s second retreat.26 

Because of this danger on his exposed right flank, the continuing and 

effective heavy pressure on the 25th 

Division, and the threat of a major enemy penetration through the wide gap 

between the ROK 1st Division and 3d 

Division, General Milburn at 0500 on 

25 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 20-21; Barth, Tropic Lightning 

and Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 80-81. 

26 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 19; 24th Div PIR 286, 24 Apr 

51. 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 

the 25th ordered a withdrawal to line 

Delta, which, as set out in previously 

prepared corps plans, lay four to twelve 

miles, west to east, below line Kansas. 

He instructed the 24th and 25th Divisions to begin their withdrawals at 0800 

but directed the ROK 1st Division and 

3d Division not to withdraw until the 

surrounded Gloster battalion had been 

extricated. He specifically instructed 

General Soule to get the Glosters out 

before withdrawing, “even if you have 

to counterattack.”27 

Withdrawal to Line Delta 

East of the Imjin 

With the Yongp’yong River at its 

back, the 25th Division faced a canalized withdrawal over two bridges in the 

southeastern corner of its sector, one 

on Route 3, the other at Yongp’yong 

town two miles to the west. Earlier, after the Chinese had captured Hill 664 

three miles directly north of the Route 

3 crossing, General Bradley had set the 

3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, in a blocking position above the bridge. For the 

withdrawal he ordered all of the 27th 

Infantry to cover both river crossings 

while first the 24th Infantry and then 

the 35th Infantry pulled back, the 24th 

using the Route 3 bridge, the 35th using the crossing at Yongp’yong town. 

To cover the withdrawing 27th Infantry, Bradley deployed his attached 

Turkish brigade astride Route 3 five 

27 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 28 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 24; I Corps Withdrawal Plan Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 20, 26. 

“Golden” #1, 17 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 29 Ibid., p. 24; 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 

0500, 25 Apr 51; Rad, Eighth Army AG In no. 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; 21st 

CX 4329, CG I Corps to CG 3d Div et al., 25 Apr 51 lnf S3 Jnl, Entries 0421, 0650, 0750, and 0820, 25 

(confirms oral orders); 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 40, 25 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton), 

Apr 51. Quotation is from last source. 3d Bn, 5th RCT. 

419 

miles below the Yongp’yong River. Despite the difficulty of withdrawing while 

heavily engaged, Bradley’s forces succeeded in breaking contact with small 

losses. By early evening the 27th Infantry and 35th Infantry were deployed 

on line Delta, left to right, with the 

Turkish brigade and 24th Infantry assembled close behind the line.28 

In the 24th Division sector, General 

Bryan deployed the 5th Infantry astride 

secondary Route 3A three miles behind 

line Kansas to cover the withdrawal of 

the 19th and 21st Regiments. Attached 

to the 5th in support were its usual 

companion, the 555th Field Artillery 

Battalion, and Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion. Also directed by 

Bryan to join the covering force was 

the 8th Ranger Company, which, as an 

attachment to the 21st Infantry, had 

been patrolling to the east in search of 

Chinese coming out of the IX Corps 

sector and currently was in an isolated 

position atop Hill 1010 about a half mile 

off the right flank of the 21st. But before the Rangers could make their 

move, they were surrounded and attacked by forces of the 60th Division. 

The 3d Battalion, 5th Infantry, which 

Bryan earlier had placed in a blocking 

position along his east flank, meanwhile 

observed Chinese moving south and 

west past its position.29 The 60th Division obviously had found and was moving into the open flank. 

First the 19th Infantry, then the 21st 

Infantry, broke contact and withdrew 
420 EBB AND FLOW 

without difficulty. By 1830 both regiments were in position on line Delta 

and were deployed as before, the 19th 

on the left, the 21st on the right. Once 

on Delta, the 21st Infantry was engaged 

by Chinese moving in from the northeast but turned back these forces with 

no loss of ground. Later in the evening 

the 21st made contact with the ROK 

6th Division, which General Hoge had 

managed to redeploy at the left of the 

IX Corps sector of the Delta line.30 

Lt. Col. Arthur H. Wilson, Jr., who 

had recently replaced Colonel Throckmorton as the 5th Infantry commander, 

was forced to delay his withdrawal until the 8th Ranger Company, which was 

attempting to fight its way out of its 

encircled position, reached him. To assist the attempt, Wilson sent five tanks 

toward Hill 1010. En route, the tankers met and took aboard sixty-five 

Rangers, most of t.hem wounded. They 

were all who had survived the breakout attempt.31 

It was late afternoon before the tankers returned with the Rangers and 

Colonel Wilson got his forces in march 

order for withdrawing down Route 3A 

through the positions of the 19th Infantry and into an assembly area four miles 

behind line Delta. The 3d Battalion led 

the way south, followed by the 555th 

Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Battalion, 

2d Battalion, and, as rear guard, Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion. 

A few mortar rounds exploded around 

the 3d Battalion as it cleared a defile 

about a half mile from the Delta front. 

Battalion members assumed that these 

30 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 25; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, 

Apr 51. 

31 New York Post, 26 May 51; Interv, Appleman 

with S2 (Maj Hamilton). 

were registration rounds fired by the 

19th Infantry. Actually, they were the 

opening shots of a large Chinese force 

occupying the ridges along both sides 

of the road from the defile north for 

more than a mile. A crescendo of Chinese small arms, machine gun, recoilless rifle, and mortar fire brought the 

remainder of Colonel Wilson’s column 

to an abrupt halt and began to take a 

toll of men, weapons, and vehicles.32 

Hardest hit was the 555th Field Artillery Battalion. Its return fire, including direct fire from its howitzers, silenced the Chinese along the west side 

of the road; but the fire from obviously 

larger numbers of Chinese on the east 

side grew in volume and kept most of 

Wilson’s column pinned down. Three 

attacks by forces of the 1st Battalion 

were broken up, as was an attempt by 

the 2d Battalion to deploy. An attack 

from the south by Company A, 6th Medium Tank Battalion, and a company 

from the 19th Infantry failed at the narrow lower end of the defile at a cost of 

two tanks and the infantrymen riding 

them.33 

Searching for a way around the roadblock, rearguard tankers from Company D meanwhile found a track 

branching west off Route 3A a mile 

north of the defile and a connecting 

road leading south to be free of 

Chinese. Moving out under continuing 

32 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 25: New York Post, 26 May 51; 

Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton); 555th FA 

Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd 

Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51. 

33 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Interv, 

Appleman with Lt Col Harry E. Stuart, CO, 555th FA 

Bn, 9 Aug 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, 

Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton); 

New York Post, 26 May 51. 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 

fire, but not pursued by the Chinese, 

Wilson’s forces followed the roundabout route and escaped without further losses, reaching the lines of the 

19th Infantry shortly after dark. During the night, aircraft and artillery 

bombarded the weapons, vehicles, and 

equipment left behind: seven tanks, five 

from Company D, 6th Medium Tank 

Battalion, and two from the 5th Infantry’s regimental tank company; eleven 

howitzers from the 555th Field Artillery 

Battalion; and a host of trucks, more 

than sixty from the 555th alone. The 

artillerymen also suffered the most personnel casualties. The initial count was 

one hundred killed, wounded, and 

missing, a figure somewhat reduced 

later as stragglers regained 24th Division lines over the next two days.34 

Hill 235 

No longer concerned with maintaining the 3d Division’s line Kansas positions along the Imjin after receiving 

General Milburn’s early morning withdrawal order, General Soule immediately canceled the attack by the 65th 

Infantry originally scheduled to start 

at 0630 to relieve the Gloster battalion 

and clear enemy forces from the Hill 

675 area. The latest report from the 

29th Brigade, in any case, indicated that 

the Glosters were holding their own, 

that they had “asked for some Arty but 

OK.”35 To rescue the Glosters, the main 

task seemed only to be to clear Route 

5Y and escort the battalion to the rear. 

More worrisome to General Soule was 

421 

a report that a large Chinese force 

(which would have had to be the 189th 

Division) coming through the gap between the ROK 1st and 3d Divisions 

was bypassing the 3d Division on the 

left and moving southeast toward Route 

33, the division’s main line of communication. During the early morning 

Soule dispatched the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 65th Infantry, the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, and 

the 3d Reconnaissance Company to 

take up positions athwart what appeared to be the line of march of the 

enemy force to prevent it from reaching the road. Since the Royal Ulster 

Rifle and Northumberland Fusilier Battalions seemed certain to have difficulty in withdrawing with Route 11 now 

interdicted by Chinese behind them, 

Soule left the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, in position west of the 29th 

Brigade’s command post to help cover 

the two battalions when they came 

south. Brigadier Brodie strengthened 

the cover by deploying the Belgian battalion across Route 11 just north of his 

command post. Except that the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, might be diverted 

from its covering mission, Soule by daylight on the 25th had committed all reserves available to him except the division’s 64th Tank Battalion and the 65th 

Infantry’s tank company. Any force 

formed to rescue the Glosters would 

have to be from these units. Soule assigned that task as a joint venture to 

Brigadier Brodie and Colonel Harris, 

commander of the 65th Infantry.36 

34 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; 

Interv, Appleman with Stuart, 9 Aug 51; Interv, 

Appleman with Lt Edward P. Crockett, Plat Ldr, 5th 

Inf Regtl Tk Co; 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 

51. 

35 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 28, 25 Apr 51. 

36 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Rpt, 

Nar of Opns, Apr 51; 65th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 

51; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 198; Rpt, 

CG 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire 

Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Annex 9, Reserves Available 

to CG, 3d Inf Div. 
422 EBB AND FLOW 

which Brodie agreed, was that the task 

called for light tanks only. Capt. Claude 

Smith, whose 65th Infantry tank company thus was assigned the mission, 

wanted to use his entire company. But 

Harris believed that one platoon was 

all that could be profitably employed. 

Harris assured General Mead, however, 

that he was prepared to follow up with 

greater strength if necessary.39 

The tank platoon, short one tank left 

behind for maintenance, started up 

Route 5Y after 0900. (Map 34) Apparently out of a belated interest in speed, 

the tankers moved out before an observer from the 10th Field Artillery 

Battalion, which was to have supported 

the operation, could join them. Nor 

were the tankers in communication with 

the regimental command post.40 The 

single source of reports on the platoon’s 

progress was a division observer periodically flying overhead.41 

About the time that Captain Smith’s 

tanks began advancing toward the 

Gloster battalion, General Kang, the 

ROK 1st Division commander, attempted a similar but somewhat 

stronger move, sending the 2d Battalion of his 12th Regiment and two 

platoons of Company C, 73d Heavy 

Tank Battalion, north to restore the 

right flank position lost by the 12th 

Regiment on the 24th and then to make 

contact with the Glosters. Under way 

Shortly after giving Brodie and Harris responsibility for organizing the rescue mission, Soule allowed the 7th Infantry, which remained under attack 

by the 29th Division and whose right 

flank would soon be completely uncovered by the withdrawal of the 25th 

Division, to begin its withdrawal. The 

2d Battalion, already off the line, led 

the withdrawal, while the 3d Battalion 

pulled out of its left flank position and 

followed a trail leading southwest behind the covering 1st Battalion to reach 

Route 33 and continue south. Company 

A fought a difficult but highly effective 

rearguard action as the 1st Battalion 

disengaged near noon.37. 

Meanwhile, at 0800 Brigadier Brodie and Colonel Harris were still conferring at Brodie’s command post to 

decide the composition of the rescue 

force. Concerned because the force was 

not yet on the way, Brig. Gen. A. D. 

Mead, assistant division commander, 

joined the conference at that time and 

emphasized the need for speed. Colonel Harris responded that he understood his mission perfectly and that, if 

left alone, he and Brodie would handle 

it.38 

Major Huth, the British tank company commander who had participated 

in the unsuccessful attempt to reach the 

Glosters the day before, tried but failed 

to convince Colonel Harris that tanks 

would not be able to reach the Glosters 

unless accompanied by a strong infantry force. Harris’ final decision, with 

37 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div POR 161, 

25 Apr 51; 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Gugeler, 

Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 144-53 (revised edition, 

1970). See the last for a detailed account and appraisal 

of Company A’s rear-guard action. 

38 Memo Brig Gen A. D. Mead for CG, 3d Inf Div, 

7 May 51. 

39 Ibid.; Intervs, Appleman with Huth, Capt Claude 

Smith, CO, 65th Inf Tk Co, and 1st Lt Myron Dushkin, 

65th Inf Tk Co. 

40 At the end of the slow planning session, Colonel 

Harris explained to General Mead that he had been 

unable to dispatch the tanks sooner because of the 

arrangements that had had to be made for communications and supporting fire. See Memo, Brig Gen 

A. D. Mead for CG, 3d Inf Div, 7 May 51. 

41 Intervs, Appleman with Smith and Lt Col Alvin 

L. Newbury, CO, 10th FA Bn. 

424 EBB AND FLOW 

Brigadier Brodie had taken private 

steps to get the Glosters out. Though 

he had voiced agreement that the employment of a tank platoon was the 

practical solution to opening Route 5Y 

for the battalion, he apparently was 

unconvinced that the small armored 

force could succeed and about 0900 had 

ordered the Glosters to fight their way 

back. Brodie followed with orders to 

the Royal Ulster Rifles and Northumberland Fusilier Battalions to withdraw 

south over Route 11 through the covering Belgian battalion.43 Once the Glosters, Royal Ulster Rifles, and Northumberland Fusiliers reached the 29th 

Brigade command post area, the brigade was to move back to the Delta line. 

But the withdrawals of all three battalions would take decidedly different 

courses. 

From its outset at midmorning the 

withdrawal of the Royal Ulster Rifles 

and Northumberland Fusilier Battalions was a fight to the rear with Chinese storming down on Route 11 from 

the Hill 675 area. To escape the 

Chinese, most of the British troops 

turned east off Route 11 and made 

their way out over open country. Worse 

off were some two hundred wounded 

loaded on the backs and sides of eight 

Centurion tanks, which had no choice 

but to run the gauntlet. Several tanks 

were disabled, and most of their passengers were killed. Caught up in the 

fight, the Belgian battalion became scattered but held its ground. Late in the 

afternoon Brigadier Brodie finally succeeded in breaking contact and started 

before 0900, the ROK battalion and 

American tanks moved up the valley of 

the small Nullori River for perhaps a 

mile before Chinese forces from heights 

edging the valley opened fire and 

brought the advance to a halt. As of 

noon, the fire fight continued, with neither side gaining the deciding edge.42 

But although General Kang’s attempt 

to reach the Glosters had been stopped, 

it would shortly prove not to have failed 

altogether. 

The air observer following the progress of the 65th Infantry’s tank platoon 

on Route 5Y meanwhile reported that 

the tanks had reached the Glosters and 

that they were on the way out. But the 

report was incorrect. The tankers had 

got into a fire fight far short of Hill 235, 

had used most of their ammunition, 

and, fearing they would be cut off when 

they sighted Chinese moving on their 

flanks, had withdrawn, reaching their 

company area between noon and 1300. 

Colonel Harris ordered another try by 

a different platoon, which, accompanied by an artillery observer and tactical air control party and escorted overhead by two flights of fighters and an 

observer, left about 1400. A mile out of 

the company area, the platoon was 

flagged to a halt by Major Huth, the 

British tank company commander, who 

convinced the platoon leader that the 

light tanks could not reach Hill 235. As 

Colonel Harris decided against any further attempt and withdrew his tanks, 

there was, in any case, little reason to 

try again. Hours before, almost immediately after the early morning planning conference with Colonel Harris, 

42 I Corps Report on Action of Gloster Battalion, 

29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51; 

73d Hvy Tk Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

43 Interv, Appleman with Newbury; 3d Div G3 Jnl, 

Entries 90 and 128, 25 Apr 51. See also Intervs, 

Appleman with Smith; Sgt Young Gladden, Jr., 65th 

Inf Tk Co; Dushkin; Huth; and Brig Brodie, 10 Sep 

51. 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 

MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH 29TH INFANTRY BRIGADE REST following their difficult 

withdrawal from Imjin River positions. 

his somewhat tangled forces, including 

the Belgians but not the Glosters, toward line Delta. As the 29th Brigade 

cleared, the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, 

briefly engaged Chinese near its blocking position, then broke away and followed the British brigade.44 The isolated Gloster battalion meanwhile had 

44 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 52 and 93, 25 Apr 51; 3d 

Div, G3, Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51, 

14 May 51; 3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy Operations, 2l-25 Apr 51, 9 May 51; Ely Jacques Kahn, The 

Gloucesters: An Account of the Epic Stand of the Gloucestershire Regiment in Korea (London: Central Office of 

Information, 1951). p. 11: Holles. Now Thrive the 

Armourers, pp. 166-67:Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions 

of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Annex 9, Reserves Available to CG, 3d Inf Div. 

425 

attempted its breakout, the course of 

which was not yet clear to anyone in 

Brodie’s headquarters or that of the 3d 

Division. 

On Hill 235, during the continuing 

quiet that had settled over the Gloster 

position following the devastating air 

strike on the Chinese by the flight of 

F-80S, Colonel Carne had issued orders 

for the battalion’s withdrawal about 

0930. If he knew that the 65th Infantry tank platoon was then starting up 

Route 5Y toward him, he eschewed any 

attempt to move south to meet it. Off 

the left rear of the battalion was a valley leading upslope to a saddle about a 

mile southwest of Hill 235. Carne did 

not know the exact location of the 12th 
426 EBB AND FLOW 

ROK Regiment’s position, nor did he 

know that the 2d Battalion of the regiment and the two platoons of Company 

C, 73d Heavy Tank Battalion, were 

then attacking generally toward him. 

But he believed that moving southwest 

through the valley toward the right 

flank of the ROK 1st Division would be 

the quickest way to reach safety and, if 

the Glosters could make it through the 

saddle, that they would have a good 

chance of making it all the way. With 

the 45th Field Regiment providing artillery support on call, Company A was 

to lead the withdrawal about 1000, 

Company C and battalion headquarters 

and support troops were to follow, and 

Company D was to bring up the rear. 

When Carne announced that he would 

remain on Hill 235 with the severely 

wounded men (about fifty litter cases), 

the battalion surgeon, chaplain, and 

several enlisted medics volunteered to 

stay with him.45 

Since Chinese had been observed in 

that area during the past two days, 

Company D commander Capt. M. G. 

Harvey considered the valley a risky 

route, particularly for his company, 

which would be bringing up the rear of 

the battalion. Even if Chinese were not 

on the heights bordering the valley, he 

reasoned, they might be near enough 

to spot the Gloster movement and set 

up a trap before Company D could 

clear the saddle. He preferred to try 

the unexpected, to move forward off 

the steep northeast side of Hill 235 

where the Chinese had attempted no 

assault, follow Route 5Y for about a 

mile, swing west through a lateral valley around the hill mass through which 

the remainder of the battalion would 

45 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 64-67. 

attempt to pass, then turn south 

through another valley toward the 

ROK 1st Division’s lines. As Company 

A led the rest of the battalion into the 

valley to the southwest, Captain Harvey 

gave his men, including a dozen members of the support company who had 

been operating with Company D, the 

choice of surrendering or going with 

him on the roundabout route. If a man 

went down, Harvey warned, he would 

be left behind. The entire group, about 

a hundred men, elected the escape attempt. If Colonel Carne knew of 

Harvey’s plan, he did not object. All 

Glosters, in any case, would now be entirely on their own since, just as they 

began their withdrawal, Carne received 

word from brigade headquarters-the 

last his feeble radio would pick upthat the 45th Field Regiment was under 

too heavy fire to provide support.46 

A few minutes after the Glosters 

moving into the valley to the southwest 

cleared Hill 235, Captain Harvey led 

his group off the north side of the hill. 

All men had taken off their distinctive 

berets to prevent easy identification by 

Chinese who might observe them. Moving alternately at a trot and fast walk, 

they encountered only two Chinese, 

whom they killed, on the northern leg 

of their route and none on the milelong stretch to the west. At the point of 

turning south, Harvey offered his men 

a breather, but they refused. They were 

determined, he recalled later, “to come 

out or get bloody killed.” Appearing 

overhead as they turned to enter the 

valley leading south was a Mosquito 

46 Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors; 

Interv, Appleman with Harvey, 10 Sep 51; Kahn, The 

Gloucesters, pp. 13-l 5; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the 

Sword, pp. 64-67. 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 427 

plane whose pilot waggled wings in recognition and stayed overhead to guide 

the column toward the 12th ROK 

Regiment.47 

About a mile into the valley, as 

Harvey’s group entered a narrow 

stretch, thirty or more Chinese riflemen and machine gunners opened fire 

from the bordering ridges and chased 

the Glosters into the nearest cover, a 

muddy ditch about a foot deep. As they 

crawled through the ditch, the Mosquito pilot’s call brought in fighter 

planes which worked over the ridges 

but scarcely dampened the Chinese fire. 

At intervals the ditch petered out, forcing Harvey and his men to dash forward to the next segment. In each 

instance, Glosters were hit.48 

either side with heavy machine gun 

fire as they escorted the survivors of 

Harvey’s group to safety behind the 2d 

Battalion, 12th ROK Regiment. A total 

of forty-Captain Harvey, three other 

officers, 

rescued.50 

and thirty-six men-were 

During the time that General Kang’s 

Negotiating a slight bend in the ditch, 

the Glosters were spurred on by the 

sight of American tanks a half mile or 

so down the valley engaged in a fire 

fight with Chinese on the flanking hills. 

Spotting the crawling troops a short 

time later, the tankers-the two platoons of Company C, 73d Heavy Tank 

Battalion-mistook the muddied, hatless Glosters for enemy and opened fire 

with machine guns and cannon. Six 

men were hit before the Mosquito pilot 

overhead could drop a note identifying the approaching troops.49 

infantry-tank group had moved up the 

Nullori valley and returned with the 

Glosters about 1400, his 11th and 15th 

Regiments had fought off hard attacks 

by forces, estimated at three regiments, 

of the 190th and 192d Divisions. As the 

Chinese attacks weakened and then 

faded out around 1630, Kang pulled 

his division back to line Delta, setting 

the tank destroyer battalion, 11th Regiment, and 15th Regiment on line and 

placing the 12th Regiment in reserve. 

To his east was the 65th Infantry, which 

after making no contact with any large 

Chinese force advancing toward Route 

33 had moved on to the Delta line. General Milburn meanwhile released General Soule’s 15th Infantry from corps 

reserve in exchange for the tattered 

29th British Brigade. Soule set the 15th 

next to the 65th Infantry on line Delta 

and placed the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the right flank of the 3d Division front while keeping the remainder of the 7th in division reserve.51 

The tank company commander with 

several tanks set out immediately to 

meet the Glosters. With the wounded 

inside and others either trotting alongside or riding on the rear of the tanks, 

the two platoons sprayed the hills to 

As the 3d Division occupied positions 

along line Delta, General Soule’s only 

information on the condition and location of the remainder of the Gloster 

battalion was a noontime report from a 

47 Interv, Appleman with Harvey, 10 Sep 51; Kahn, 

The Gloucesters, pp. 13-15. 

48 Ibid. 

49 Ibid.; Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the 

Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with 

50 73d Hvy Tk Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rpt, 

CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire 

Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors. 

51 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 26-27; 65th Inf S3 Jnl, 25 Apr 

51, Results of Events; 3d Div POR 161, 25 Apr 51; 

Survivors. 15th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 
428 EBB AND FLOW 

division observer flying over the Hill 

235 area. “At CT 182005,” the observer 

reported, “approximately 225 29th BIB 

soldiers are located. They act. as [if] they 

are lost. They walked to the end of the 

road, found a dead end-returned to 

their present positions and set [sic] 

down.”52 

The observer unwittingly had reported the capture of the Glosters in 

the southwest valley. The “road” he 

mentioned was a trail leading up to the 

saddle, the “dead end” the saddle itself. 

When the head of the Gloster column 

reached the saddle, Chinese machine 

gunners cupped around it opened fire, 

wounding several men but generally 

laying off the column. The fire informed the Glosters that they were 

trapped. On orders from their officers, 

the Glosters laid down arms. Chinese 

appearing from the heights above 

them, uncertain about what to do with 

so many captives, initially took the 

Glosters back down the trail and motioned to them to sit down.53 

At the beginning of the Chinese offensive the Gloster battalion had numbered 28 officers and 671 men. In the 

Solma-ri area to support the battalion 

were 6 officers and 22 men of the 70th 

Battery, Royal Artillery, and 1 officer 

and 45 men of C Troop, 170th Mortar 

Battery, Royal Artillery. In its initial 

accounting of losses, 29th Brigade 

headquarters reported that 622 of these 

forces were “either KIA, WIA, or 

missing.” Most of the reported casualties later proved captured. From the 

Gloster battalion itself, 21 officers and 

509 men were taken captive, of whom 

8 officers and 145 men had been 

52 3d Div G2 Jnl, Entry 828, 25 Apr 51. 

53 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 64-67. 

wounded. Two officers and 24 men 

would die in captivity.54 The high number of Glosters captured served to emphasize how thoroughly entrapped by 

Chinese Colonel Carne’s forces had 

become. 

When General Ridgway demanded a 

formal report on the loss of the Gloster 

battalion, General Van Fleet replied 

that in his opinion, “all reasonable and 

possible courses of action” had been attempted to save the unit. The failure 

of relief efforts he attributed to the 

strength and determination of the Chinese attacks, the Chinese capability to 

exploit early penetrations by infiltration and enveloping actions, and the 

limited reserves available to General 

Milburn, General Soule, and Brigadier 

Brodie with which to counter enemy 

successes.55 While he believed that the 

Gloster position had had to be held as 

long as possible lest Chinese pour into 

the 3d Division and I Corps rear areas, 

Van Fleet privately faulted General 

Soule for tardiness in discovering how 

critical the Glosters’ situation had become and thus for failing to make 

timely decisions on when and how to 

relieve the battalion.56 

General Milburn found little fault 

with either Soule or Brigadier Brodie, 

although in a report to Van Fleet he 

drew particular attention to the confusion of instructions surrounding the 

54 Msg, Maj-Gen Anthony Farrar-Hockley thru British Embassy (Brig-Gen Watson) for author, 10 Aug 

76; Ltr, Maj-Gen Anthony Farrar-Hockley to author, 

16 Sep 76; I Corps Report on Action of Gloster 

Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 

May 51. 

55 Rad, C 61606, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 3 

May 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 26 May 

51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 

Apr 51. 

56 Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51. 
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 429 

on 24 April. In Brodie’s judgment, the 

24th was the latest date on which the 

Glosters could have been rescued. This 

opinion accounted for his disinterest in 

the plan to send a tank platoon forward on the morning of the 25th and 

his consequent order to the Glosters 

to attempt to break out of their surrounded position. Brodie, in reviewing 

the action, was complimentary toward, 

not critical of, American efforts to help 

the Gloster battalion.59 But behind his 

unwillingness to assume full responsibility for informing General Soule of 

the battalion’s critical situation was perhaps a belief that Soule should have 

shown more initiative in finding out for 

himself. 

General Ridgway assessed the operation as an example of the failure of 

a leader to know his men. Brigadier 

Brodie, Ridgway believed, should have 

known that the Gloster commander, 

Colonel Carne, was much given to quiet 

understatement and that his reports 

thus did not reflect the seriousness of 

the battalion’s circumstances. Brodie 

himself should have determined the 

correct situation and should have sent 

or asked for help sooner. In sum, as 

Ridgway told Brodie personally, “the 

Gloster battalion should not have been 

lost.”60 

Philippine 10th Battalion Combat 

Team’s unsuccessful attempt to reach 

the Glosters on 24 April. “It appears,” 

he nevertheless told Van Fleet, “that 

every effort was made to reach the 

Gloster battalion when conditions 

over the remainder of the front are 

considered.”57 

In line with Van Fleet’s private conclusions, General Soule admitted to not 

having been aware of the Glosters’ true 

situation. Had he known the truth on 

24 April, he said later, he would have 

taken command and pushed troops up 

Route 5Y to the battalion’s position. At 

the time, he explained, he had believed 

that Brigadier Brodie had enough force 

in the Filipino battalion and supporting tanks to reach the Glosters, especially since Brodie did not ask for additional help while preparing to send the 

10th Battalion Combat Team forward 

or while it was en route. Soule himself 

could not have taken a hand to prevent 

the withdrawal of the Filipino battalion 

since he was out of touch with Brodie’s 

operation at the time, having gone to 

the sector of the hard-hit 7th Infantry.58 

Brigadier Brodie took, as he put it, 

“50% responsibility” for failing to make 

clear to General Soule how serious the 

Gloster battalion’s situation had become 

57 Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, 

sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 

51. 

58 Interv, Appleman with Soule, 8 Sep 51. 

59 Ibid. with Brodie, 10 Sep 51. 

60 Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56. 
CHAPTER XXIV 

The Chinese Spring Offensive 

Battle for Seoul 

General Milburn intended to make 

no stubborn or prolonged defense of 

line Delta. He considered it only a phase 

line to be occupied briefly in the I 

Corps’ withdrawal to line Golden. He 

planned to mark out additional phase 

lines between Delta and Golden so that 

in each step of the withdrawal displacing artillery units would remain within 

range of the line being vacated and 

could provide continuous support to infantry units as they withdrew. Each 

move to the rear was to be made in 

daylight so that any enemy forces following the withdrawal could be hit most 

effectively with artillery fire and air 

strikes.1 

Milburn ordered the next withdrawal 

at midmorning on the 26th after attacks opened during the night by the 

North Korean I Corps and XIX Army 

Group made inroads along the western 

portion of his Delta front. (See Map 32.) 

Hardest hit were the 11th Regiment of 

the ROK 1st Division astride Route 1 

and the 65th Infantry at the left of the 

3d Division. Chinese also entered a fivemile gap between the ROK 1st and 3d 

Divisions but made no immediate attempt to move deep. The next position 

1 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 28. 

to be occupied by Milburn’s forces lay 

two to five miles below line Delta, generally on a line centered on and slightly 

above Uijongbu.2 

General Hoge ordered conforming 

adjustments of the IX Corps line. The 

ROK 6th Division was to withdraw and 

tie in with the new right flank of the I 

Corps. Eastward, the British 28th Brigade was to reoccupy the hill masses 

previously held by the Canadians and 

Australians above Kap'yong; the 1st 

Marine Division was to pull back from 

line Kansas to positions straddling the 

Pukhan, running through the northern outskirts of Ch’unch’on, and following the lower bank of the Soyang 

River. Since the marines’ withdrawal 

otherwise would leave the X Corps with 

an open left flank, General Almond was 

obliged to order the 2d and 7th Divisions away from the Hwach’on Reservoir and the west shoulder of the North 

Korean salient in the Inje area. The 

new line to be occupied by Almond’s 

forces looped northeast from a junction with the 1st Marine Division along 

the Soyang to a point two miles below 

Yanggu, then fell off to the southeast 

2 Ibid., pp. 28-33; Rad, CIACT 4-15, CG I Corps to 

CG 3d Div et al., 26 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-19, CG I 

Corps to CG Eighth Army, 26 Apr 51; Dolcater, 3d 

Infantry Division in Korea, pp. 203-04. 
BATTLE FOR SEOUL 431 

to the existing position of the ROK 5th 

Division below Inje.3 

Although the I Corps withdrawal, 

and thus the chain reaction eastward, 

was prompted by the heavy enemy 

pressure in the corps’ western sector, 

there was evidence by 26 April that the 

main effort of the enemy offensive was 

beginning to falter. Enemy killed by 

infantry and artillery fire and air strikes 

on the I Corps front were estimated to 

number almost forty-eight thousand 

approximately the strength of five divisions. Intelligence information indicated that the stand of the Gloster battalion against forces of the 63d Army 

and the early fumbling of the 64th Army 

had upset the attack schedule of the 

XIX Army Group and that the group 

commander was committing the 65th 

Army in an attempt to save the situation. 

But in this and other commitments of 

reserves, according to prisoner of war 

interrogations, enemy commanders 

were confused and their orders vague.4 

With only the west sector of the army 

front under any serious threat, and that 

beginning to show signs of lessening, 

General Van Fleet on the 26th established an additional transpeninsular 

defense line that in the central and 

eastern sectors lay well north of line 

Nevada, the final line set out in the 12 

April withdrawal plan. The new line 

incorporated the fortifications of line 

Golden arching above the outskirts of 

Seoul. Eastward, it bulged across the 

3 Rad, IXACT-1355, CG IX Corps to CG 1st Marine Div, 26 Apr 51; Rad IXACT-1356, CG IX Corps 

to CGs 28th Brit Brig and ROK 6th Div, 26 Apr 51; X 

Corps OI 163, 26 Apr 51. 

4 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 38; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, no. 

96, 16-28 Feb 53, p. 27. 

Pukhan River five miles above its 

confluence with the Han, then turned 

steeply northeast, crossing Route 29 ten 

miles below Ch’unch’on and cutting 

Route 24 fifteen miles south of Inje. 

Continuing to angle northeast, the line 

touched the east coast just above Yangyang. Implicit in Van Fleet’s insistence 

on thorough coordination between 

corps during the withdrawal to the new 

line was that its occupation would be 

governed by the movement of the I 

Corps against the continuing enemy 

pressure on its front. Van Fleet’s assignment of corps sectors along the line 

made the IX Corps responsible for defending the Pukhan and Han corridors; 

consequently, the 24th Division, currently located directly above that area, 

was to pass to IX Corps control on the 

27th. When, contrary to custom, Van 

Fleet gave the line no name, it became 

known as No Name line.5 

Of concern to Van Fleet after the I 

Corps pulled back from the Imjin was 

the possibility that enemy forces would 

cross the Han River estuary unseen 

west of Munsan-ni and sweep down the 

Kimpo peninsula behind Seoul, overrunning Inch’on, Kimpo Airfield, and 

the Seoul airport in the process. On 25 

April he had asked the commander of 

the west coast group of Task Force 95 

to keep the possible crossing site under 

surveillance, and on the 26th planes 

from the group’s carriers began to fly 

over the area while in transit to and 

from close support targets. The cruiser 

Toledo meanwhile steamed for the 

5 Rad, GX-4-5200 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

Corps et al., 26 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-5341 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CGs I and IX Corps, 26 Apr 51. 
432 EBB AND FLOW 

THE CRUISER USS TOLEDO IN ACTION 

Inch’on area from the Sea of Japan to 

provide gunfire support.6 

Enemy forces reaching the I Corps 

phase line after dark on the 26th attacked in each division sector except 

that of the 24th on the corps right. On 

the front of the 25th Division, Chinese 

concentrated an assault between two 

companies of the 27th Infantry, some 

reaching as far as a mile behind the 

line before regimental reserves contained them. A radar-directed bomb 

strike brought down at the point of penetration and ground fire delivered un6 Rad, GX-4-5130 KNLO, CG Eighth Army to CTG 

95.1, 25 Apr 51; Rad, CTE 95.11 to CTG 95.1, 26 

Apr 51; Rad, AG In no. CX-4480, CTG 95.1 to CG 

Eighth Army, 26 Apr 51; Field, United States Naval 

Operations, Korea, p. 346. 

der light provided by a flare ship eliminated the enemy force.7 

In a repetition of the pattern of enemy attacks on the I Corps’ Delta front 

the previous night, the hardest assaults 

struck the ROK 1st Division and 65th 

Infantry at the left of the 3d Division’s 

position west of Uijongbu. Telling artillery fire and air strikes helped contain penetrations of the 65th’s line and 

force the Chinese to withdraw. Chinese 

attacking the 15th Regiment at the right 

of the ROK 1st Division’s line forced a 

two-mile withdrawal before the South 

Koreans were able to block the advance. 

North Koreans attacking down Route 

7 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 29-30. 
BATTLE FOR SEOUL 

1 against the 11th Regiment and against 

the tank destroyer battalion west of the 

road broke through the lines of both 

units and took a particularly high toll 

of tank destroyer troops before South 

Korean counterattacks supported by 

American tanks stopped the advance.8 

At 0600 on the 27th, the 24th Division passed to IX Corps control, as had 

been directed by General Van Fleet, 

and what had been the boundary between the 24th and 25th Divisions became the new corps boundary. Shortly 

afterward, General Milburn ordered his 

remaining forces to withdraw to the 

next phase line, which would be the 

last occupied by the I Corps before it 

moved onto line Golden. West to east, 

the phase line lay one to seven miles 

above Golden, touching the Han near 

the village of Haengju located almost 

due north of Kimpo airfield below the 

river, cutting Route 1 and a minor 

road from the north near the village of 

Kup’abal-li, crossing Route 3 four miles 

south of Uijongbu, and also intersecting a minor road along the new corps 

boundary that below the phase line and 

line Golden joined Route 2 reaching 

Seoul from the east. Following suit, 

General Hoge ordered back the left of 

the IX Corps. The 24th Division, to 

which Hoge attached the ROK 6th Division and British 28th Brigade, was to 

take position adjoining the new I Corps 

line and stretching along the lower bank 

of the Pukhan toward the Ch’unch’onSoyang River position of the 1st Marine Division.9 

8 Ibid., pp. 32, 34. 

9 Rad, GX-4-5341 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 

I and IX Corps, 26 Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 29; Rad, 

CIACT 4-172, CG I Corps to CG 3d Div et al., 27 Apr 

51; Rad, IXACT-1366, CG IX Corps to CG 24th Div 

et al., 27 Apr 51. 

433 

On the I Corps right, the two line 

regiments of the 25th Division had 

some difficulty in getting off the first 

phase line. The 27th Infantry ran into 

enemy groups that had got behind the 

regiment during the night, and Chinese closely following the 35th Infantry took that regiment under assault 

when it set up a covering position to 

help the 27th Infantry disengage. It was 

well into the afternoon before the two 

regiments could break away. General 

Bradley deployed the same two regiments on the second phase line. In 

preparation for further withdrawal, 

Bradley set the Turkish brigade in a 

covering position midway between the 

phase line and line Golden and assembled the 24th Infantry behind the 

Golden fortifications.10 

On the 26th General Milburn had 

reinforced the 3d Division with the 

7th Cavalry. In preparation for the 

withdrawal on the 27th, General Soule 

deployed the cavalry regiment at the 

left rear of the division as a precaution-which proved fortuitousagainst a flanking attack by XIX Army 

Group forces who were continuing to 

press hard against the adjacent 15th 

Regiment of the ROK 1st Division. 

The cavalrymen fended off a Chinese 

attack from the northeast that lasted 

into the afternoon. Along the second 

phase line, General Soule meanwhile 

deployed his 7th and 15th Regiments 

at center and right and assembled the 

65th Infantry in reserve. He later set 

the 7th Cavalry on line at the left.11 

The continuing pressure kept the 

ROK 1st Division pinned in position 

10 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 30. 

11 Ibid., p. 32; Rad, CIACT 4-167, CG I Corps to 

CGs 1st Cav Div and 3d Div, 26 Apr 51. 
434 EBB AND FLOW 

until late afternoon, then diminished 

enough to allow the South Koreans to 

begin the difficult task of disengaging 

while under attack. Enemy forces, 

however, failed to follow the withdrawal. Along the second phase line, 

General Kang deployed the 11th, 15th, 

and 12th Regiments west to east and 

set out screening forces well to the 

front.12 

Enemy forces did not regain contact 

during the night. General Milburn nevertheless expected an eventual followup in strength and ordered his forces 

to occupy line Golden on the 28th. 

Again in chain reaction, Milburn’s withdrawal order set in motion the move to 

No Name line by forces to the east.13 

athwart the Pukhan corridor would improve his chances of holding Seoul and 

that the corridor area could be used as 

a springboard to recapture the capital 

if the forces defending the city itself 

were pushed out.15 In the central and 

eastern sectors, where enemy attacks 

had clearly lost their momentum by 26 

April, the occupation of No Name 

would obviate relinquishing territory 

voluntarily, a cession that would occur 

if the forces in those sectors moved back 

to line Nevada as prescribed in the 12 

April withdrawal plan. 

From the outset of the enemy offensive General Van Fleet had believed 

that a strong effort should be made to 

retain possession of Seoul, not only to 

gain the tactical advantage in maintaining a foothold above the Han River but 

also to prevent psychological damage 

to the Korean people. To give up the 

ROK capital a third time, he believed, 

“would ruin the spirit of the nation.”14 

His determination to fight for the city 

lay behind his refusal to allow the 

Eighth Army simply to surrender 

ground in deep withdrawals and behind his order of 23 April directing a 

strong stand on line Kansas. Defeated 

in the latter effort, mainly by the failures of the ROK 6th Division, he had 

laid out No Name line in the belief that 

a successful defense of its segment 

Convinced by the morning of the 

28th that the main enemy effort in the 

west was wearing out, Van Fleet informed corps commanders that he intended to “hold firmly” on No Name 

line. They were to conduct an active 

defense of the line, making full use of 

artillery in conjunction with armored 

counterattacks. Though members of his 

staff considered it a tactical mistake to 

risk having forces trapped against the 

north bank of the Han, Van Fleet insisted that there would be no withdrawal from the line unless extreme enemy pressure clearly imperiled Eighth 

Army positions, and then only if he 

himself ordered it.16 

12 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, p. 34. 

13 Rad, CICCG 4-22, CG I Corps to CG Eighth 

Army, 28 Apr 51; Rad, CIACT 4-179, CG I Corps to 

CG 1st Cav Div et al., 28 Apr 51. 

14 Quotation from USAWC Research Paper, “A Will 

to Win,” based on Intervs, Col Bruce F. Williams with 

In case Van Fleet had to call a withdrawal from No Name line, the Eighth 

Army was to retire to line Waco, a move 

which would still hold the bulk of the 

army well above line Nevada. In the 

west, the new line designated by Van 

Fleet followed the Nevada trace along 

the lower bank of the Han; in the central and eastern areas, it lay nine to 

eighteen miles below No Name line. 

“For planning purposes only,” Van 

15 Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51. 

16 Ibid.; Rad, GX-4-5638 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 

Van Fleet, 6 Apr 73, p. 26. to C/S ROKA et al., 28 Apr 51. 
BATTLE FOR SEOUL 435 

Fleet issued instructions for occupying 

line Waco late on the 28th.17 

As I Corps forces began their withdrawal to line Golden at midmorning 

on the 28th, North Koreans in regimental strength were sighted massing 

near Haengju, the Han River village 

above Kimpo airfield, apparently in 

preparation for crossing the river. The 

massed fire of two artillery battalions 

and 8-inch fire from the cruiser Toledo, 

now stationed just off Inch’on, inflicted 

heavy casualties on the enemy group 

and forced the survivors to withdraw. 

A Chinese battalion attacking the 7th 

Cavalry below Uijongbu early in the 

morning but soon breaking contact after failing to penetrate and patrols investigating the positions of the 25th Division around noon were the only other 

enemy actions along the corps front 

during the day.18 

Soule to return the 7th Cavalry to the 

1st Cavalry Division, to assemble the 

3d Division less the 65th Infantry in 

Seoul in corps reserve, and to prepare 

counterattack plans. Milburn attached 

the 65th Infantry to the 25th Division 

so that General Bradley, using the 65th 

and his own reserve, the 24th Infantry, 

could man the eastern sector of the 

Golden line while the remainder of his 

division was withdrawing.19 

The ROK 1st Division, which had 

scarcely more than a mile to withdraw, 

reached line Golden early in the day. 

Assigned a narrow sector from the Han 

to a point just short of Route 1, General Kang was able to hold his 12th 

Regiment and tank destroyer battalion 

in reserve. The 11th and 15th Regiments manning the Golden fortifications were able to use a battalion each 

in outpost lines, organizing these units 

about two miles to the northwest. Behind the 3d Division, the 1st Cavalry 

Division occupied Golden positions between and including Routes 1 and 3. 

General Milburn ordered General 

As deployed for the defense of Seoul 

by evening of the 28th, the I Corps had 

six regiments on line and the same 

number assembled in and on the edges 

of the city. Below the Han to meet any 

enemy attempt to envelop Seoul were 

the British 29th Brigade at the base of 

the Kimpo peninsula in the west and 

the Turkish brigade on the east flank. 

With adequate reserves, fortified defenses, and a narrower front that allowed heavier concentrations of artillery fire, the corps was in a position far 

stronger than any it had occupied since 

the beginning of the enemy offensive.20 

In contrast, there was further evidence that the enemy’s offensive 

strength was weakening. The most recent prisoners taken had only one day’s 

rations or none at all. Interrogation of 

these captives revealed that local foraging produced very little food and that 

resupply had collapsed under the Far 

East Air Forces’ interdiction of enemy 

rear areas. The steady air attacks also 

had seriously impeded the forward 

movement of artillery. Confusion and 

disorganization among enemy forces 

appeared to be increasing. Command17 Rad, GX-4-5749 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to 

CG I Corps et al., 28 Apr 51. 

18 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 30-34; Rad, CIACT 4-179, 

CG I Corps to CG 1st Cav Div et al., 28 Apr 51; 

Rad, AG In no. CX-5246, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 

19 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 30, 33-34; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, pp. 204, 206. 

20 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

29 Apr 51. Offensive, Apr 51, p. 35 and Map 7, following p. 38. 
436 

ers were issuing only such general instructions as “go to Seoul” and “go as 

far to the south as possible.” On one 

occasion, according to prisoners, reserve forces ordered forward moved 

south under the impression that Seoul 

already had fallen. One factor in the 

deterioration was a high casualty rate 

among political officers-especially 

at company level-on whom the Chinese Army depended so heavily for 

maintaining 

discipline.21 

troop motivation and 

Obviously willing, if growing less 

able, to continue the attack on Seoul, 

the North Korean 8th Division assisted on 

its left by Chinese in what appeared to 

be regimental strength struck the outpost line of the ROK 1st Division shortly 

before midnight on the 28th. Accurate 

defensive fire, especially from tanks, 

artillery, and the guns of the Toledo, 

broke up the attack before enemy assault forces could get through the outpost line and reach the main South Korean positions. Tank-infantry forces 

sent out by General Kang after daylight followed and fired on retreating 

enemy groups for two miles, observing 

between nine hundred and a thousand 

enemy dead along the route.22 

The 8th Division’s attack proved to be 

the only serious enemy attempt to break 

through the Golden fortifications. Another effort appeared to be in the offing during the day of the 29th when 

patrols and air observers reported a 

large enemy buildup on the front of 

EBB AND FLOW 

the 25th Division, but heavy artillery 

fire and air attacks delivered after dark 

broke up the enemy force.23 Division 

patrols searching the enemy concentration area after daylight on the 30th 

found an estimated one thousand enemy dead. Across the corps front, patrols moving as much as six miles above 

line Golden on the 30th made only minor contacts. On the basis of the patrol 

findings, General Milburn reported 

to General Van Fleet that the enemy 

forces on his front were staying out of 

artillery range while regrouping and 

resupplying for further attacks.24 Actually in progress was the beginning of a 

general enemy withdrawal. 

In dropping back to No Name line, 

Eighth Army forces since 22 April had 

given up about thirty-five miles of territory in the I and IX Corps sectors and 

about twenty miles in the sectors of the 

X and ROK III Corps. Logistical planning completed in anticipation of the 

enemy offensive had kept line units well 

furnished with all classes of supplies 

during the attacks and at the same time 

had prevented any loss of stocks stored 

in major supply points during the withdrawal. Gearing removal operations to 

the phased rearward movements, service forces had shifted supplies and 

equipment southward to predetermined locations from which line units 

could be readily resupplied without 

21 Ibid., pp. 35, 38; George, The Chinese Communist 

Army in Action, p. 10. 

22 Rad, CICCG 4-23, CG I Corps to CG Eighth 

Army, 29 Apr 51; Rad, AG In no. CX 5260, CTF 95 

to COMNAVFE et al., 29 Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The 

Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, 

p. 36. 

23 A number of published works on the war report 

that six thousand enemy attempted to ferry the Han 

and attack down the Kimpo peninsula to outflank 

Seoul on 29 April and that air attacks defeated the 

effort. The official records do not support these 

accounts. The authors may have been referring to the 

North Korean effort to cross the river at Haengju on 

the 28th. 

24 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 

Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 36-37; Rad, CICCG 4-24, CG I 

Corps to CG Eighth Army, 30 Apr 51. 
BATTLE FOR SEOUL 

risking the loss of supply points to advancing enemy forces.25 

Steady rail movements and back loading aboard ships had all but cleared 

Inch’on of supplies by the 30th, and 

LSTs were standing by to take aboard 

the 2d Engineer Special Brigade and 

ten thousand South Koreans who had 

been operating the port.26 Against the 

possibility that Inch’on would have to 

be given up, General Ridgway on the 

30th took steps to forestall a repetition 

of the heavy damage done to the port 

when it was abandoned in January, 

damage that had served only to hinder 

use of the port after it was recaptured. 

Ridgway instructed General Van Fleet 

not to demolish port facilities if it became necessary to evacuate Inch’on 

again but to leave it to UNC naval forces 

to prevent the enemy from using the 

port.27 

Among U.S. Army divisions, casualties suffered between 22 and 29 April 

totaled 314 killed and 1,600 wounded. 

In both number and rate, these losses 

were scarcely more than half the casualties suffered among the divisions engaged for a comparable period of time 

437 

during the Chinese offensive opened 

in late November.28 

Among a variety of estimates, an 

Eighth Army headquarters report for 

the eight-day period from evening of 

the 22d to evening of the 30th listed 

13,349 known enemy dead, 23,829 

estimated enemy dead, and 246 taken 

captive. This report included information obtained daily from U.S. and allied ground units only. At UNC headquarters in Tokyo, the estimate was 

that enemy forces suffered between 

75,000 and 80,000 killed and wounded, 

50,000 of these in the Seoul sector. 

Other estimates listed 71,712 enemy 

casualties on the I Corps front and 

8,009 in the IX Corps sector. Although 

none of the estimates was certifiable, 

enemy 

huge.29 

losses were unquestionably 

Notwithstanding the high enemy 

losses, General Van Fleet cautioned on 

1 May that the enemy had the men to 

attack again 

harder.30 

“as hard as before or 

The total strength of Chinese forces in Korea as of that date was 

believed to be about 542,000 and that 

of North Korean forces to be over 

197,000. The 1 May estimate in General Ridgway’s headquarters credited 

the enemy with having 300,000 men 

currently in position to attack, most of 

these on the central front. 25 Eighth Army, “Logistical Problems and Their 

Solutions,” pp. 105-06. 

26 Also Jamming Inch’on in hopes of being evacuated by sea were some two hundred thousand refugees. Most of these had come from Seoul during the 

past week, leaving only about a hundred thousand 

inhabitants in the capital city. 

27 Eighth Army, “Logistical Problems and Their 

Solutions,” p. 107; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 

51; Rad, CX 61384, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 30 

Apr 51. 

28 Reister, Battle Casualties and Medical Statistics, 

p. 30. 

29 Eighth Army G3 PORs, 22-30 Apr 51; Facts on 

File, vol. XI, no. 548,27 Apr-3 May 51, p. 137; I Corps 

Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, 

Apr 51, p. 38; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 

30 Facts on File, vol. XI, no. 548, 27 Apr-3 May 51, 

p. 137. 
CHAPTER XXV 

Battle Below the Soyang 

Intent on confronting enemy forces 

with the most formidable defenses yet, 

General Van Fleet on 30 April ordered 

the length of No Name line fortified 

like its line Golden segment around 

Seoul. Fortifications were to include 

log and sandbag bunkers, multiple 

bands of barbed wire with antipersonnel mines interspersed, and 55-gallon 

drums of napalm mixed with gasoline 

set out in front of defensive positions 

and rigged for detonation from the 

bunkers.1 Van Fleet also wanted provision made for counterattacking quickly 

once the enemy had been turned back. 

Van Fleet expected the enemy’s next 

principal effort to come either in the 

west, as had the main force of the April 

attacks, or on his central front. Judging the Uijongbu-Seoul, Pukhan River, 

and Ch’unch’on-Hongch’on corridors 

to be the most likely axes of enemy 

advance, he shifted forces by 4 May to 

place most of his strength and all U.S. 

divisions in the western and central sectors and aligned the I, IX, and X Corps 

so that each was responsible for one of 

these avenues. Deployed around Seoul, 

the I Corps blocked the Uijongbu approach with the ROK 1st, 1st Cavalry, 

and 25th Divisions on line and the 3d 

Division and British 29th Brigade in 

reserve. The IX Corps, its sector nar1 These improvised flamethrowers, called fougasses, 

threw out a mass of flame some ten yards wide and up 

to forty yards long. 

rowed by a westward shift of its right 

boundary, now had the British 28th 

Brigade, 24th Division, ROK 2d Division, ROK 6th Division, and 7th Division west to east on No Name line and 

the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team in reserve for defense against 

an enemy strike down or out of the 

Pukhan River valley.2 In the left portion of the X Corps sector, the 1st Marine Division and the 2d Division, less 

the bulk of the 23d Infantry in corps 

reserve, covered the Ch’unch’onHongch’on axis. Though the concentration of strength in the western and 

central areas left the remainder of the 

front comparatively thin, Van Fleet believed that the six ROK divisions in the 

east-the 5th and 7th in the right portion of the X Corps sector, the 9th and 

3d in the ROK III Corps sector, and 

the Capital and 11th in the ROK I 

Corps sector--could hold the line since 

opposing North Korean forces were 

2 Since no attempt had been made to put the 

Hwach’on Dam out of commission during the few 

days that the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment occupied that area, Van Fleet meanwhile had asked Task 

Force 77 to destroy at least two sluice gates to bring 

the water level so low that its release would cause no 

serious flooding of the Pukhan. A dive-bombing attack launched from the Princeton on 30 April by AD 

Skyraiders carrying one-ton general purpose bombs 

produced a six-foot hole in one gate. Returning the 

following day with torpedoes set for surface run-the 

only time this ordnance would be used in the war-six 

of eight Skyraiders scored hits that removed one gate 

and destroyed the lower half of another. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 439 

weak and since the terrain barriers of 

the higher Taebaeks favored defense.3 

tempt to establish a patrol base up 

Route 1 on 4 May.4 

The Search for the Enemy 

Along with his 30 April instructions 

for the defense of No; Name line, Van 

Fleet ordered intensive patrolling to locate and identify enemy formations as 

they continued to move out of contact. 

Patrols searching three to five miles 

above the front during the first two 

days of May, however, encountered no 

major enemy force except at the I 

Corps left where ROK 1st Division patrols found the North Korean 8th Division deployed astride Route 1. To 

deepen the search in the west and central areas, Van Fleet ordered patrol 

bases set up five to six miles out along a 

line reaching east as far as Route 24 in 

the X Corps sector. Each division 

fronted by this line was to establish a 

regimental combat team in a base position organized for perimeter defense. 

Patrols operating from the bases could 

work farther north with full fire support, and the forward positions would 

deepen the defense in the sectors where 

Van Fleet expected to be most heavily 

attacked. While the fortification of No 

Name line continued, the front east of 

Route 24 was to be advanced six to fifteen miles to line Missouri, both to restore contact and to clear a stretch of 

Route 24 and a connecting secondary 

road angling east to the coast for use as 

a supply route by the ROK divisions 

defending the sector. Van Fleet also directed a foray to destroy North Korean 

forces in the I Corps’ west sector after 

the 8th Division stopped short the 12th 

Regiment of the ROK 1st Division’s atThe six ROK divisions in the east 

opened the advance toward line Missouri on the 7th. Along the coast, ROK 

I Corps forces met almost no opposition, and on the 9th the ROK 11th 

Division’s tank destroyer battalion 

scooted some sixteen miles beyond the 

Missouri line to occupy the town of 

Kansong, where Route 24 ended in a 

junction with the coastal highway. 

Forces of the ROK 5th Division on the 

left flank of the advance in the X Corps 

zone reached line Missouri the same 

day. The other four divisions, though 

still as much as ten miles short of the 

line on the 9th, had made long daily 

gains against scattered delaying forces. 

In the west, the bulk of the ROK 1st 

Division advancing up Route 1 between 

7 and 9 May levered North Korean 

forces out of successive positions and 

finally forced them into a general withdrawal. Setting the 15th Regiment in a 

patrol base six miles up Route 1, General Kang pulled his remaining forces 

back into his No Name fortifications.5 

3 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 51 

From other bases in the I, IX, and X 

Corps sectors, patrols doubled the 

depth of their previous reconnaissance 

but had no more success in making firm 

contact than had patrols working from 

No Name line. Available intelligence in4 Rad, GX-5-114 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA et al., 1 May 51; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 

51; Rads, CICCG 4-26 and CICCG 5-3, CG I Corps to 

CG Eighth Army, 2 and 3 May 51, respectively; Rad, 

GX-5-340 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and 

X Corps and C/S ROKA, 4 May 51; Rad, GX-5-591 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 4 May 51. 

5 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 5l; Eighth Army 

POR, 7 May 51; Rad, X 19577, CG X Corps to CG 

Eighth Army, 7 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 8 May 

51; Rad, X 19608, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 9 

May 5 1; Eighth Army POR, 9 May 51; 1 Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51. 
440 EBB AND FLOW 

THE NAVY AD SKYRAIDER 

formation indicated that the 64th, 12th, 

60th, and 20th Armies were completely 

off the west and west central fronts for 

refurbishing and that each of the four 

armies still in those sectors-the 65th 

63d, 15th, and 27th-had only one division forward as a screen while remaining divisions prepared to resume the 

offensive. Since there were no firm indications that the resumption was an 

immediate prospect, however, General 

Van Fleet on 9 May issued plans for 

returning the Eighth Army to line 

Kansas. In the first phase of the return 

the I, IX, and X Corps were to attack, 

tentatively on the 12th, toward line 

Topeka running from Munsan-ni east 

through Ch’unch’on, then northeast toward Inje. The ROK III Corps and 

ROK I Corps in the east meanwhile 

were to continue their attack to line 

Missouri, a step which would carry 

them above the Kansas line.6 

Van Fleet decided against the Topeka advance on the 11th after changes 

in the intelligence picture indicated 

that enemy forces were within a few 

days of reopening their offensive. Air 

observation of enemy troops where 

none previously had been seen suggested forward movements under cover 

of darkness, reports told of large enemy reconnaissance patrols, and both 

agents and prisoners alleged an early 

6 Eighth Army G3 and G2 SS Rpts, May 51; Rad, 

GX-5-1483 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et 

al., 9 May 51. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 441 

THE HWACH'ON DAM UNDER ATTACK by Navy AD Skyraiders using torpedoes. 

resumption of the offensive. Extensive 

smoke screens rose north of the 38th 

parallel ahead of the IX Corps and 

above the Hwach’on Reservoir in the X 

Corps sector. Drawing Van Fleet’s particular notice were reports that five 

armies-the 60th, 15th, 12th, 27th, and 

20th-were massing west of the Pukhan 

for a major attack in the west central 

sector. In further instructions for defense, Van Fleet ordered the No Name 

fortifications improved and directed 

General Hoge to give special attention 

to the Pukhan corridor, where the 

heaviest enemy buildup was reported. 

Hoge was to place the bulk of the IX 

Corps artillery on that flank. “I want to 

stop the Chinese here and hurt him,” 

Van Fleet told Hoge. “I welcome his 

attack and want to be strong enough in 

position and fire power to defeat him.”7 

Lavish artillery fire, in particular, was 

to be used. If gun positions could be 

kept supplied with ammunition, Van 

Fleet wanted five times the normal day 

of fire expended against enemy attacks. 

As calculated by his G-4, Colonel 

Stebbins, the “Van Fleet day of fire” 

could be supported for at least seven 

days, although transportation could 

become a problem since Stebbins could 

not haul other supplies while handling 

7 Eighth Army CG and C/S Jnl, May 51. 
442 EBB AND FLOW 

that amount of ammunition.8 Rations 

and ‘petroleum products already 

stocked in corps sectors, however, 

would last for more than seven days.9 

Immediate army reserves for the advance to line Topeka were to have been 

the 3d Division, to be withdrawn from 

the I Corps, and the Canadian 25th Infantry Brigade, which had reached 

Korea on 5 May.10 Having undergone 

extensive training at Fort Lewis, Washington, the brigade would be ready to 

join operations after brief tune-up 

exercises in the Pusan area. Though 

the Topeka advance was off, Van 

Fleet ordered the Canadians to move 

north, beginning on 15 May, to Kumnyangjang-ni, twenty-five miles southeast 

of Seoul, and prepare to counter any 

enemy penetration in the Pukhan or 

Seoul-Suwon corridors. The 3d Division was still to pass to army reserve 

and organize forces capable of reinforcing or counterattacking in the I, IX, or 

X Corps sectors in at least regimental 

combat team strength on six hours’ 

notice. Beginning on the 11th, the 

15th Regimental Combat Team assembled near Ich’on, at the intersection 

of Routes 13 and 20 thirty-five miles 

southeast of Seoul, ready to move on 

call into the X Corps sector; for operations in support of the IX Corps, the 

65th Regimental Combat Team assembled near Kyongan-ni, twenty miles 

southeast of Seoul and directly below 

the Pukhan River corridor; and the 7th 

Regimental Combat Team assembled 

in Seoul for missions in the I Corps 

sector.11 

The six ROK divisions on the eastern front were to stay forward of No 

Name line but were not to make fur8 Van Fleet Day of Fire per Tube ther attempts to occupy line Missouri. 

105-mm. howitzer . . . . . . . 300 rounds 

155-mm. howitzer . . . . . . . 250 rounds 

155-mm. gun . . . . . . . . . . 200 rounds 

8-inch howitzer . . . . . . . . . 200 rounds 

75-mm. howitzer . . . . . . . . 250 rounds 

In the X Corps sector, the ROK 5th 

and 7th Divisions, whose forces had all 

but reached the Soyang River southwest of Inje, were to fortify their pres9 Rad, GX-5-1776 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs ent positions. The ROK III Corps and 

I, IX, and X Corps, 11 May 51; Eighth Army PIR 

302, 10 May 51; Eighth Army G2 and G3 SS Rpts, 

ROK I Corps were to set their four diviMay 51; X Corps PIRs 226, 10 May 51, and 227, 11 sions in fortified defenses between the 

May 51; IX Corps G2 Jnl, Sum, 11 May 51; Eighth lower bank of the Soyang south of Inje 

Army CG and C/S Jnl, May 51; Eighth Army Arty SS 

Rpt, Jun 51. 

and the town of Kangson-ni, five miles 

10 Arriving on 6 May was the Imperia1 Ethiopian north of Yang-yang on the coast, after 

Expeditionary Force to Korea, composed of volunteers from the Ethiopian imperial bodyguard and conconducting spoiling attacks on 12 

sisting of an infantry battalion and a superfluous force 

May in the two principal communicaheadquarters. Also known as the Kagnew battalion, tions centers ahead of them, Inje and 

the force had had only rudimentary combat training 

and arrived without weapons and equipment. The 

Yongdae-ri, the latter located on Route 

Ethiopians were scheduled to spend eight weeks at 

24 fifteen miles northeast of Inje. The 

the U.N. center. Another May arrival would be the 

1st Battalion, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, 

which under the British rotation system would 

11 Rad, GX-5-1483 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 

replace the 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland 

Corps et al., 9 May 51; Fox, “Inter-Allied Co-operation 

Highlanders, in the British 28th Brigade. Due to reach 

During Combat Operations,” pp. 26, 29-30, 47; Wood, 

Japan in late May for a month of training with equipStrange Battleground, pp. 94-95; Rad, GX-5-1450 

ment bought from the United States before moving 

KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps 

to Korea was the staff of a sixty-bed mobile surgical 

and CG 3d Div, 9 May 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 

hospital from Norway. 

9 and 12 May 51; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in 

Korea, p. 207. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 

reconnaissance company of the ROK 

9th Division already had entered Inje 

without a fight during the afternoon of 

the 11th and dispersed an enemy force 

about a mile beyond the town before 

retiring on the 12th, but other forces 

of the two South Korean corps were 

prevented by distance and moderate resistance from reaching the objectives of 

their attacks in the one day allotted for 

them. 12 

Light contact along the remainder of 

the front revealed little about enemy 

dispositions, but the composite of 

reports from air observers, agents, civilians, and prisoners made clear by 13 

May that major Chinese forces had begun to shift eastward from the west and 

west central sectors. Steady rain and fog 

all but eliminated further air observation on 14 and 15 May; poor visibility 

also hampered ground patrols; and 

a IX Corps reconnaissance-in-force by 

the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team up the valley northeast of 

Kap’yong toward what was believed 

to be a large concentration of enemy 

forces had to be canceled shortly after 

it started on the 15th because of the 

rain and poor road conditions. As much 

as could be determined by 16 May was 

that the eastward shift probably extended to the Ch’unch’on area.13 

A few reports tracing the shift indicated that some Chinese units would 

move beyond Ch’unch’on. According 

443 

to a Chinese medical officer captured 

northeast of Seoul on 10 May, the 12th 

Army and two other armies were scheduled to leave the west central area late 

on the 10th, march east for four days, 

then attack the 2d Division and the 

ROK divisions on the eastern front. Another captive taken on the 13th in the 

same general area said that the 15th 

Army was to march east for three days 

and attack the 2d Division in conjunction with North Korean attacks on the 

ROK front.14 Large enemy groups reported by X Corps observers to be 

moving east as far as Yanggu on the 

11th and 12th were believed to be 

Chinese, and a deserter from the engineer battalion of the 80th Division, 27th 

Army, picked up on the 13th in the 

Ch’unch’on area stated that his battalion had been bridging the Pukhan. The 

X Corps G-2 believed it most likely, 

however, that the forces moving east of 

the Pukhan as far as Yanggu were from 

the 39th Army or 40th Army, both of 

which had been in the east central sector for some time. In any event, he considered major Chinese operations on 

the eastern front to be impracticable. 

Given the logistical difficulties the Chinese experienced in supporting offensive operations even in the Seoul area, 

where the distance to their rear supply 

bases was shortest and where the roads 

were more numerous and in better condition than anywhere else, he doubted 

that they would commit a large force in 

the eastern mountains where a supply 

line could not be maintained and 

where living off the land would be al12 Rad, GX-5-1863 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA, 11 May 51; Rad, GX-5-2149 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 13 May 51; Rad, X 

19645, CG X Corps to CGs 5th ROK Div and 7th 

ROK Div, 12 May 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 11 

and 12 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 12 May 51. 

13 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, May 51; “Weather in the 

Korean Conflict,” vol. II, pp. XIII-7- XIII-9; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; Eighth Army PIR 307, 15 

May 51. 

14 The completeness and high degree of accuracy of 

two Chinese documents captured on 19 May, one an 

order of battle of UNC ground forces dated 29 April 

1951, the other a map of their dispositions dated 6 

May 1951, revealed the success of enemy intelligence. 
444 

most impossible. The Eighth Army 

intelligence staff as of 16 May had no 

corroborating evidence of the reported 

movement east of the Pukhan and even 

had some doubt that the Chinese shift 

extended as far east as Ch’unch’on.15 

According to the consensus of current estimates of enemy dispositions as 

of the 16th, the North Korean1 Corps on 

the west had spread forces eastward toward Route 33, taking over ground previously occupied by the XIX Army Group. 

The 65th Army astride Route 33 north 

of Uijongbu and the 63d Army in the 

adjacent ground to the east formed the 

new front of the XIX Army Group. Reports placed the 64th Army northwest 

of the 65th. West to east, the 60th, 15th, 

and 12th Armies were believed to occupy the new front of the III Army Group 

from a point above the Pukhan River 

in the vicinity of Kap’yong eastward almost to Ch’unch’on. More tentatively 

located, the 20th and 27th Armies of 

the IX Army Group were reported to 

be off the front in the area north of 

Ch’unch’on and the group’s 26th Army 

possibly in the same vicinity. The XIII 

Army Group apparently was still on the 

east central front, its 40th Army astride 

Route 17 just above Ch’unch’on and 

the 39th Army next to the east with 

its bulk between the Hwach’on Reservoir and the Soyang River and light 

forces occupying a bridgehead below 

the Soyang between Ch’unch’on and 

the river town of Naep’yong-ni some 

ten miles upstream to the northeast. On 

the basis of these dispositions, General 

Van Fleet continued to believe that the 

main enemy effort would come in the 

EBB AND FLOW 

west central sector, probably toward 

the Han River corridor, and would be 

made by five armies, the 60th, 15th, 

12th, 27th, and 20th. He also anticipated 

strong attacks toward Seoul over Route 

1 and through the Uijongbu corridor 

as well as another on the Ch’unch’onHongch’on axis.16 

15 X Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang 

River,” 30 Jun 51; X Corps PIRs 225, 9 May 51, 228, 

12 May 51, and 229, 13 May 51; Eighth Army PIR 

307, 15 May 51. 

The Offensive Resumed 

The actual extent of the Chinese shift 

from the west had been indicated by 

the few reports of planned and ongoing movements beyond the Pukhan. By 

16 May Peng Teh-huai had moved five 

armies into the area along the Soyang 

River between Ch’unch'on and Inje behind screening forces of the 39th Army 

and the North Korean III Corps. The 

60th Army and 15th Army of the III 

Army Group were in the area between 

Ch’unch’on and Naep’yong-ni. At and 

immediately beyond Naep’yong-ni was 

the 12th Army, organic to the III Army 

Group but now attached to the IX Army 

Group. Farthest east, the 27th Army and 

20th Army of the IX Army Group were 

clustered in the vicinity of Kwandae-ri 

just west of Inje.17 

Peng planned to launch his main attack on a southeastward course below 

the Naep’yong-ni-Kwandae-ri stretch 

of the Soyang. His reason for shifting 

the main effort into the higher Taebaeks despite the portended logistical 

problems may have surfaced when Chinese captured in March, April, and 

16 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army 

PIR 307, 15 May 51; X Corps PIRs 226, 10 May 51; 

227, 11 May 51, and 231, 15 May 51. 

17 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Map 1B, Enemy Redeployment, May 51; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig no. 1, 

1-31 Dec 52, and no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53; Hq, FEC, 

History of the North Korean Army. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 445 

early May were asked about the worth 

of People’s Liberation Army weapons, 

training, and tactics. Almost unanimously the captives considered the 

army’s armament, preparations, and 

precepts to be inadequate for the conditions of battle in Korea. Depreciating the “man over weapons" doctrine, 

they conceded that men in superior 

numbers could defeat an enemy superior in other respects only if the enemy’s 

superiority was not too great.18 Such a 

realization by the enemy high command 

could have influenced the decision to 

move the main effort: perhaps Peng 

chose to attack through some of the 

most difficult ground on the front because the rugged ridges and sparse 

road net would reduce to some degree 

the U.N. Command’s advantage of 

superior mobility, firepower, and air 

power. 

As revealed by the captives taken on 

10 and 13 May, the objective of the 

main effort-to be launched during the 

evening of the 16th by the 15th, 12th, 

and 27th Armies-was to sever the six 

ROK divisions on the eastern front 

from the remainder of the Eighth 

Army, to annihilate them, and to destroy the 2d Division.19 In support of 

the main effort, the North Korean V 

Corps was to attack out of the Inje area 

in the ROK III Corps sector, and the 

North Korean II Corps, which had 

moved down from Hoeyang where it 

had been refurbishing since late March, 

was to attack along the east coast and 

atop the Taebaeks against the ROK I 

18 See George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action, 

pp. 168-75. 

19 Other than the statements of these captives and 

similar statements of others taken during the offensive, 

available enemy sources do not disclose the terrain or 

other tactical objectives set for the main attack. 

Corps. On the west flank of the main 

attack, the 60th Army, less its 181st Division, which had been attached to the 

12th Army to reinforce the main effort, 

was to conduct a holding attack against 

the 1st Marine Division. The XIX Army 

Group, now stretched out from the 

Kap’yong area west to Route 33 above 

Uijongbu, and the North Korean I Corps, 

astride Route 1, were to make similar 

attacks in the IX Corps and I Corps 

sectors.20 

ROK Forces Give Way-Again 

Crossing the Soyang northwest of 

Kwandae-ri with its 81st Division in the 

van, the 27th Army opened against the 

ROK 5th and 7th Divisions with hard 

blows centered at the seam between the 

two divisions that almost immediately 

began to dislodge the line regiments. 

(Map 35) General Almond authorized 

the two divisions to withdraw to No 

Name line around midnight. A successful withdrawal by the artillery of both 

divisions down Route 24 into the sector 

of the 2d Division may have caused erroneous early morning reports that the 

two divisions were regrouping on No 

Name line. Later reports revealed a familiar story of infantry units scattered 

by enemy attacks while they were attempting to disengage, broken communications, loss of control, a search for 

missing troops, and the reorganization 

of those that could be found. Reordered forces of the ROK 5th Division 

were set out in echelon to the southeast 

along the 2d Division’s right flank. By 

noon on the 17th the only infantry units 

20 X Corps Special Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River”; 

X Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River,” 

30 Jun 51; X Corps PIR 243, 27 May 51; Hq, USAFFE, 

Intel Dig no. 96, 16-28 Feb 53; Hq, FEC, History of 

the North Korean Army. 
MAP 35
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 

of the ROK 7th Division that had been 

located were two battalions of the reserve 3d Regiment which were in position and engaged six miles behind No 

Name line near the village of Sangamni on the primitive road whose stretch 

northeast to Hyon-ni and then Northwest to Inje was the single route serving the ROK III Corps sector. Engaging the 3d Regiment were forces of the 

81st Division, whose main body had 

slashed southeast through the ground 

abandoned by the ROK 7th Division to 

block the road just above Sangam-ni.21 

The 30th Field Artillery Battalion of 

the ROK 9th Division discovered the 

roadblock the hard way while displacing as a result of orders from ROK 

Army forward headquarters calling the 

ROK III Corps and the ROK I Corps 

back to No Name line. Though the two 

corps had held up well under attacks 

by the 6th and 12th Divisions of the 

North Korean V Corps and the 27th and 

2d Divisions of the North Korean II 

Corps, General Almond’s midnight 

action allowing the ROK 5th and 7th 

Divisions to retire to No Name line had 

led the ROK Army headquarters to follow suit on the morning of the 17th. As 

the two ROK III Corps divisions drew 

back to No Name positions centered 

above Hyon-ni, staying scarcely a step 

ahead of pursuing North Korean 

forces, their artillery battalions (the 

30th followed in column by the 11th of 

the ROK 3d Division) moved below 

Hyon-ni toward Sangam-ni. The Chinese blocking force waited until the 

30th, filled a narrow stretch of road 

twisting through a steep-sided defile in 

21 X Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang 

River,” 30 Jun 51; X Corps G3 Jnl, Entries J-S and 

J-41, 17 May 51; X Corps PIRs 232, 16 May 51, and 

233, 17 May 51; X Corps PORs 232, 16 May 51, and 

233, 17 May 51; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 51. 

447 

the heart of its position, then blanketed 

the artillerymen with fire. In the scramble out of the trap, only the tailend 

battery saved its guns and vehicles. By 

evening the 11th Battalion and the crippled 30th Battalion returned north to 

firing positions in the Hyon-ni area. 

General Yu meanwhile sent the corps 

reserve, a regiment of the ROK 9th 

Division, south from Hyon-ni to deal 

with the block, but its efforts were futile 

against the stronger Chinese force. 

With the west flank left open by the 

collapse of the ROK 7th Division, the 

ROK III Corps was in danger of being 

enveloped, or, with the Chinese 81st 

Division continuing to block the road 

to the rear and the North Korean 6th 

and 12th Divisions still pushing in from 

the north, of being caught in a costly 

squeeze.22 

The 2d Division-Again 

With the right flank of the 2d Division no more than sketchily protected 

by ROK 5th Division units, General 

Ruffner’s forces also faced the 

prospect of being enveloped. Indeed, 

if any American division seemed destined to be repeatedly involved in hard 

defensive battles, it was the 2d. And, as 

in its difficult engagement along the 

Ch’ongch’on River in late November, 

the division was again to be threatened 

from the east after ROK forces gave 

way while it contended with strong Chinese attacks from the north. 

General Ruffner had manned the left 

and center of the division’s fifteen-mile 

sector south of Naep’yong-ni with the 

22 Eighth Army POR, 16 May 51; Eighth Army G3 

Jnl, Sum, 16 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 17 May 51; 

Eighth Army PIR 309, 17 May 51; Eighth Army Arty 

SS Rpt, Jun 51. 
448 EBB AND FLOW 

Ivanhoe Security Force (a provisional 

company of South Korean troops originally organized for division rear area 

security missions); and the 3d Battalion, 

ROK 36th Regiment, attached from the 

ROK 5th Division. The ROK battalion 

occupied a patrol base along the trace 

of the Missouri line and the Ivanhoe 

Security Force a forward blocking position adjacent to the 38th Infantry’s 

ROK rangers on the west flank. On No 

Name line, the 2d Battalion of the 23d 

Infantry, Company C of the tank battalion, and the ranger company stood 

athwart both Route 24 angling in from 

the northeast through the Hongch’on 

River valley and a minor road running 

down a valley from the northwest and 

joining Route 24 just behind the task 

force position. West to east on ridges 

commanding the two roads were Companies F, E, and G and the rangers. 

The tanks stood behind barricades of 

wire and minefields blocking both valleys, though not the roads, which had 

been left free of obstacles to allow patrols to pass through. Company B of 

the tank battalion, in reserve, and the 

trains and command post of the 2d 

Battalion, 23d Infantry, were at the valley village of Chaun-ni, on Route 24 

two miles behind the lines. Colonel 

Brubaker’s command post was farther 

down Route 24 at the village of 

Putchaetful.24 

Jarring daylight probes of the Zebra 

patrol base and sharp patrol skirmishes 

close to the lines of the 38th Infantry 

were forerunners of attacks by one division of the 15th Army and two divisions 

9th and 38th Regiments and had reconstituted Task Force Zebra, the tankinfantry group that had performed well 

in late April, to occupy the line at the 

right. The French battalion, the only 

division reserve, was at Han’gye on 

Route 24, about five miles behind the 

Zebra line, deliberately set there by 

Ruffner to reinforce quickly the somewhat thin task force position. 

Under earlier orders to send daily 

patrols to the Soyang in the area immediately east of Ch’unch’on, the 9th Infantry’ had deployed one battalion on 

No Name line and two in patrol bases. 

On the highest ground in the division 

sector, two battalions of the 38th Infantry occupied a string of prominent 

heights along No Name line, the 3d at 

the left, the 1st at the right. (Map 36) 

Two miles out on the west, the 2d 

Battalion manned a patrol base that 

blocked ridgeline and valley approaches 

to the 3d Battalion’s position. Above 

the right flank of the 1st Battalion, a 

provisional company of South Korean 

rangers held a blocking position on a 

ridge offering enemy forces a good approach down the boundary between the 

38th Infantry and Task Force Zebra. 

Colonel Coughlin, commander of the 

38th, had set the attached Netherlands 

battalion on Hills 710 and 975 behind 

the 1st Battalion with instructions to be 

prepared to counterattack anywhere in 

the 1st’s sector.23 

Task Force Zebra, led as before by 

Lt. Col. Elbridge L. Brubaker, commander of the 72d Tank Battalion, now 

included all but one company of the 

tank battalion; the 2d Battalion, 23d 

Infantry; the 1st Ranger Company; the 

23 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

24 X Corps Special Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River”; 

2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist 

Det, “Battle of Soyang,” Jun 51. 
\0\
450 EBB AND FLOW 

effort shortly before dawn, enemy bodies hanging in the wire, sprawled in the 

minefields, and lying on the road and 

high ground to the north numbered 

about four hundred fifty.26 

First to feel the sting of hard attack 

in the 38th Infantry’s sector was the 2d 

Battalion. Concentrating on Company 

E on Hill 755 at the center of the patrol 

base, a force from the 45th Division, 15th 

Army, though delayed and hurt while 

breaching minefields and wire entanglements, drove off the company 

with the second wave of its assault. 

About 0230, as the attack spread to 

Company F on the left flank of the split 

position, Colonel Coughlin ordered the 

patrol base force to withdraw behind 

the 3d Battalion. Apparently spent by 

the effort to take Hill 755 and blanketed by covering artillery fire, the Chinese made no immediate attempt to follow the withdrawal.27 

At the right of the 1st Battalion, platoons of Companies A and C occupying Hills 1051 and 914 and a saddle 

between turned back a series of attacks 

opened at dusk by small units of the 

35th Division in concert with the assaults 

that drove back the two provisional 

ROK companies along the 38th Infantry-Task Force Zebra boundary. But 

following these apparent tests of the 

defenses, a full attack by the division’s 

103d Regiment about 0200 shoved 

Company A forces out of the saddle, 

opening the way for a sweep behind 

the 1st Battalion or for a deep penetration down a valley leading southeast to 

of the 12th. In the 12th Army’s attack, launched about dusk, the press of 

35th Division forces along the 38th Infantry-Task Force Zebra boundary 

jammed the Ivanhoe Security Force and 

adjacent company of ROK rangers back 

against Company F, 23d Infantry, before defensive fires smothered the assault. On the 12th’s east wing, the 92d 

Regiment, 31st Division, attacking the 

Zebra patrol base expelled and disorganized the 3d Battalion, ROK 36th 

Regiment. South Koreans streamed 

through the main Zebra line until midnight, most of them down the northwest valley defended by the 3d Platoon 

of Company C, 72d Tank Battalion. 

French troops at Han’gye collected the 

disordered groups as they continued 

down Route 24 and assembled them 

for reorganization and screening for 

enemy infiltration.25 

Shortly after midnight, fifty or sixty 

Chinese leading a column of the 92d 

Regiment in pursuit of the South Koreans charged through the opening in 

the northernmost of two wire aprons 

strung across the valley. Forced off the 

road by fire from the tankers, the Chinese deployed to the left and right, 

exploding mines and setting off trip 

flares. The larger body of enemy to the 

rear deployed under the light of the 

flares, and successive lines of skirmishers attempted to break the wire and 

reach the tanks. The 3d Platoon, reinforced by the 2d Platoon, shot down 

waves of charging troops while artillery fire walked up the valley above the 

wire. When the Chinese gave up the 

25 X Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang 

River,” 30 Jun 51; 38th Inf S2 Jnl, Sum, 16 May 51; 

2d Div POR 611, 16 May 51; 2d Div PIRs 205, 16 May 

5 1, and 206, 17 May 5 1; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, “Battle 

of Soyang,” Jun 51. 

26 AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, “Battle of Soyang,” Jun 51. 

27 38th Inf S2 Jnl, Sum, 16 and 17 May 51; 38th Inf 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; X Corps Rpt, “Operations 

of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 June 

1951”; X Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang 

River,” 30 Jun 51. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 451 

Route 24 at Putchaetful, well behind 

the positions of Task Force Zebra. 

Colonel Coughlin kept the gap under 

mortar and artillery fire for the rest of 

the night and ordered the Netherlands 

battalion to send a company north from 

Hill 975 at first light to close it. General 

Ruffner directed the French battalion 

to send a company up the valley from 

Putchaetful to clean out any Chinese 

who sifted through 

tillery barrages. 

the mortar and arMoving from Hill 975 toward Hill 

1051 on the near side of the saddle, the 

Dutch company lacked the numbers to 

push through Chinese who by daylight 

closed in around a platoon of Company 

A on the 1051 crest. The remainder of 

the Netherlands battalion, under Colonel Coughlin’s order, joined its forward company about 0930, but, finding that Hill 1051 had fallen to the 

Chinese, the Dutch commander, Lt. 

Col. William D. H. Eekhout, held up 

his advance while he softened the 

height and the saddle beyond with artillery. French troops meanwhile advancing up the valley northwest of 

Putchaetful engaged enemy forces less 

than two miles above Route 24. An estimated five hundred Chinese had 

worked their way into the valley. That 

more were on the way became clear 

when a Chinese-speaking radioman 

with the Netherlands battalion at midmorning intercepted a Chinese order 

to “send all troops east of Hill 1051.” 

That neither sender nor recipient of 

the order was identifiable made estimating the strength of the forces involved impossible, but the Chinese obvi28 2d Div POR 611, 16 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, 

Nar, May 51; 38th Inf S2 Jnl, Sum, 17 May 51; 38th 

Inf PIR 115, 17 May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 9 

and 19, 17 May 51. 

ously planned to exploit the breakthrough. Expecting that the Dutch attack to close the gap would start shortly, 

General Ruffner ordered the French 

to assist by reinforcing the drive up the 

valley; he urged speed so that the gap 

would be eliminated before the Chinese 

could pour troops through.29 

Before the Dutch and French were 

able to move, “literally thousands” of 

Chinese, according to 38th Infantry 

estimates, were passing through the gap 

by 1100. Groups moving along the far 

edge of the saddle widened the opening by forcing a platoon of Company C 

off Hill 914. Chinese killed or wounded 

by artillery pounding the saddle and 

the area below it marked the paths of 

the larger number veering east toward 

the front of Task Force Zebra and of 

the remainder heading down the valley toward the French. Viewing this 

scene from the vicinity of Hill 1051, 

Colonel Eekhout continued to hold up 

the Dutch attack.30 

After the opening Chinese attacks 

and South Korean withdrawals had exposed the division’s east flank and 

bared the Task Force Zebra front, General Ruffner had asked General Almond to return the remainder of the 

23d Infantry from corps reserve for use 

in thickening the Zebra position. Almond released the regiment about 1130 

after the Chinese strength on the Zebra front began to build. Taking command of the front, including all Zebra 

forces and the French battalion, at 

29 2d Div POR 612, 17 May 51; 38th Inf POR 115, 

17 May 51; X Corps Rpt, “Operations of 9th, 23d, 

38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 51”; 2d Div Comd Rpt, 

Nar. May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 

38, 17 May 

22, 30, 35, and 

May 51. 

30 2d Div 

51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, 

CofS Jnl, Entries 40, 41, 42, and 44, 17 

May 51. 
452 EBB AND FLOW 

1430, Colonel Chiles concentrated the 

2d Battalion in the left half of the 

sector, put in the 3d Battalion on the 

right, and placed the 1st Battalion in 

reserve just above Han’gye. Except for 

exchanging fire with Company F on the 

left flank, the Chinese moving onto the 

front were inactive throughout the 

afternoon, but their number continued 

to grow as the Netherlands battalion, 

though Colonel Coughlin on orders 

from General Ruffner instructed it to 

attack at 1300, failed to advance.31 

General Ruffner sensed from the 

Dutch failure to move that Colonel 

Coughlin “was looking half way over 

the shoulder” instead of concentrating 

on the essential task of closing the gap.32 

Ruffner again ordered the Dutch to 

attack, this time at 1500, and started 

forward by helicopter to direct the attempt himself, but his craft crashed on 

a hilltop near the 1st Battalion command post. Neither Ruffner nor his pilot was seriously injured, but Ruffner 

was stranded well beyond the time set 

for opening the attack. Hiking to the 

battalion command post to meet a rescue helicopter sent out by the division 

surgeon, he returned to his headquarters after receiving assurances that the 

Dutch had jumped off on time. There 

he learned that Chinese on and around 

Hill 1051 had stymied the Dutch and 

that Chinese on the far side of the gap 

had shoved Company C completely out 

of position and forced its remnants 

back to the position of Company F, 

23d Infantry. Ruffner now considered 

two courses open to him-to commit 

greater strength against the enemy penetration or to set troops along its southwest shoulder, a move which, with the 

French battalion blocking the valley in 

the 23d Infantry sector, would, if somewhat thinly, seal off the penetration. 

He opted for the second course. By evening he had the Netherlands battalion 

on the way to occupy Hill 975 and thus 

extend the right flank of Company A, 

38th Infantry, now on Hill 790 about a 

mile below Hill 1051, and had the 2d 

Battalion of the 38th moving up to defend a ridge curving southeast of Hill 

975 to Hill 691.33 

In search of reserves to back up his 

hard-pressed central forces, Ruffner 

at midmorning had asked General 

Almond’s permission to pull the two 

patrol base battalions of the 9th Infantry out of the left sector, which was obviously outside the zone of the enemy’s 

main attack. Almond instructed him to 

plan the move but deferred a final decision until he (Almond) could determine 

how the removal of the two battalions 

would affect the dispositions of the 1st 

Marine Division. Almond raised the 

matter with General Van Fleet during 

the afternoon while apprising the army 

commander of the corps situation and 

bidding for reinforcement. Given the 

course of enemy attacks and the enemy 

units so far identified, Almond believed 

that Peng Teh-huai was attempting to 

turn the right flank of the X Corps with 

the 27th Army, would wait until the 27th 

seriously threatened the flank, then 

would make his main effort down the 

Ch’unch’on-Hongch’on axis with the III 

31 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; X Corps Rpt, 

“Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May2 Jun 51”; 23d Inf POR 230, 17 May 51; 38th Inf 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

32 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 48, 17 May 51. 

33 Ibid., Entries 67-71, 17 May 51; 2d Div Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 

38th Inf S2 Jnl, Entries 51 and 62, 17 May 51; X 

Corps Rpt, “Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf 

RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 5 1.” 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 453 

organize positions angling southeast to 

a juncture with the ROK III Corps on 

the Waco line above the village of 

Habae-jae.35 

Reinforcements ordered to the X 

Corps sector by Van Fleet included the 

ROK 8th Division, which was to move 

north, initially to Chech’on, as soon as 

security battalions and national police 

could take over its antiguerrilla mission 

in southern Korea. An earlier arrival 

would be the 3d Division less its 7th 

and 65th Regimental Combat Teams. 

Geared for a move to the X Corps sector since 11 May, the leading battalion 

of the 15th Regimental Combat Team 

made the seventy-mile trip from its 

assembly area southeast of Seoul to 

Hoengsong by midmorning of the 17th. 

The remainder of the force, which included the division’s medium artillery 

battalion, completed the move early on 

the 18th. Also sent east by Van Fleet 

were a battery of 155-mm. guns and a 

battery of 8-inch howitzers, both taken 

from the IX Corps. These additions 

gave Almond a total of five battalions 

and four batteries of medium and 

heavy artillery.36 

In shifting marines east into the 2d 

Division’s sector, Almond initially ordered the relief of the 9th Infantry by 

noon on the 18th. Maj. Gen. Gerald C. 

Thomas, the new commander of the 

1st Marine Division, made the move by 

pulling the 7th Marines back from their 

forward patrol base and blocking posiArmy Group. Captives taken during a 

local but stiff four-hour nighttime attack on a battalion of the 7th Marines 

occupying a forward blocking position 

on Route 29 had identified the 180th 

Division of the 60th Army, indicating that 

the full III Army Group was in position 

for an attack such as Almond anticipated. Almond doubted that the X 

Corps could hold against an enemy 

move of this design unless the corps’ 

hard-hit center and tattered right were 

strengthened. In immediate reinforcement he asked for a regimental combat 

team to help stabilize his right flank 

and for one heavy and two medium 

artillery battalions to increase long 

range fire on enemy concentration 

areas.34 

To enable the 2d Division to place 

more of its strength in the threatened 

areas, General Van Fleet moved the IX 

Corps-X Corps boundary four miles 

east. In the resulting shift of units, the 

7th Division on the IX Corps right was 

to take over part of the 1st Marine 

Division’s sector, and marines were to 

relieve the 9th and 38th Regiments, 

freeing them for employment farther 

east. Van Fleet also ordered the ROK 

III Corps and ROK I Corps back to 

line Waco, which he had delineated in 

his withdrawal plan of 28 April, some 

twelve to eighteen miles south of No 

Name line. Allowing the ROK III 

Corps no option, he ordered General 

Yu to eliminate the enemy roadblock 

at Sangam-ni so that all vehicles and 

weapons could be evacuated. On the X 

Corps right, General Almond was to 

34 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, 

Entries 34 and 39, 17 May 51; Rad, X 19711, CG X 

Corps to CG Eighth Army, 17 May 51; 1st Marine Div 

Hist Diary, May 51; X Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle 

of the Soyang River,” 30 Jun 51. 

35 Eighth Army POR 872, 17 May 51; Eighth Army 

G3 SSR, May 51; Rad, GX-5-2977 KGOO, CG Eighth 

Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 17 May 51. 

36 Rad, GX-5-2974 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA, 17 May 51; Rad, GX-5-2964 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CG 3d Div, 17 May 51; Dolcater, 3d 

Infantry Division in Korea, p. 208; Rad, GX-5-2972 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs IX and X Corps, 17 

May 51. 
454 EBB AND FLOW 

tions to relieve the 1st Marines on 

No Name line at the division’s right, 

then by sidestepping the 1st Marines 

onto the 9th Infantry’s front. The 5th 

Marines, on the division’s left flank, 

later were to swing roundabout into the 

38th Infantry’s sector after being replaced by forces of the 7th Division.37 

Meanwhile, late on the 17th Almond 

authorized both divisional and corps 

artillery units to quintuple their ammunition expenditure (the Van Fleet 

day of fire) and directed them to concentrate fire on likely avenues of 

enemy approach within three thousand 

yards of defensive positions. Ammunition expenditure would increase 

dramatically, reaching 41,350 rounds 

and 1,187 tons on 18 May and even 

higher amounts afterward. As had been 

predicted by the Eighth Army G-4, 

sufficient ammunition to support the 

heavy expenditure was maintained at 

the army supply point serving the X 

Corps, but not without difficulty. The 

supply point stocks of two days of fire 

at the Van Fleet rate dwindled to one 

and could not be raised above that 

amount. The high consumption also 

strained corps and unit transportation 

in hauling ammunition from the army 

supply point at Wonju to the base corps 

dump at Hongch’on, a round trip of 

over sixty miles, and from Hongch’on 

to artillery units. But resupply at the 

guns did remain adequate.38 

The use of MPQ radars to direct 

bombers in close support missions at 

37 X Corps OI 174, 17 May 51; Montross, Kuokka, 

and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp. 125-26. 

38 X Corps OI 174, 17 May 51: X Corps Arty Rpt. 

“Battle of the Soyang River: An Analysis of Artillery 

Support, X Corps Sector, 1 May-29 May 1951,” 30 

Jul 51; Eighth Army, “Logistical Problems and Their 

Solutions”; X Corps G4 SS Rpt, May 51. 

night, a technique employed only sparingly until April, also reached a peak, 

particularly in guiding B-29 sorties.39 

On 17 May General Stratemeyer directed that no fewer than twelve of the 

medium bombers be committed to the 

nightly support. Typical of one night’s 

effort was a drop of three hundred fifty 

500-pound proximity-fuzed general 

purpose bombs on twenty targets selected by X Corps headquarters, all of 

them enemy troop concentrations, 

some within four hundred yards of the 

front. Casualty estimates by follow-up 

patrols and the statements of captives 

attested to the precision of the radar 

guided attacks.40 

In the 2d Division sector, the main 

nighttime targets of air and artillery attack-most observed in their approach well before dark on the 17thwere fresh enemy columns coming in 

on the positions of the 38th Infantry, 

passing through the gap, and moving 

east across the front of the 23d Infantry. Crowding the front of the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, forces of the 

135th Regiment, 45th Division, broke the 

wire and penetrated the line, but with 

losses too high to be able to withstand 

counterattacks. Sweeps to clear rear 

areas and a final counterattack to drive 

out Chinese who had occupied some of 

the bunkers restored the battalion’s 

position early on the 18th.41 

39 For an account of the development and use of 

this technique, see Futrell, The United States Air Force 

in Korea, pp. 328-30, 338-40. 

40 Rads: AX 9248 OP-OP2 and AX 9249 OP-OP2, 

CG FEAF to CG BOMCOM et al., 17 May 51; Rad, 

AX 7713, CG FEAF to C/S USAF, 20 May 51; Futrell; 

The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 340. 

41 2d Div PIR 207, 18 May 51. For a detailed account of the defensive operations of the 3d Battalion, 

38th Infantry, especially of Company K, on 18-19 May, 

see Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pages 166-81. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 

To the east, the course of battle 

meanwhile verged on the calamitous 

and chaotic for Chinese and 2d Division forces alike. From late afternoon traffic on the artillery net Colonel Coughlin estimated the strength of 

the new influx of enemy forces in the 

gap area to be three thousand. Early 

evening reports from the Netherlands 

battalion on Hill 975 tended higher. 

The Dutch reported Chinese in waves 

of a thousand each crossing the saddle 

between Hills 1051 and 914 and walking upright through the artillery bombardment rather than in the crouch that 

soldiers tend to assume when moving 

under heavy fire. Those not hit were 

simply stepping over the fallen to continue moving down the valley. On the 

receiving end of the Chinese stream, 

the 23d Infantry commander, Colonel 

Chiles, reported to General Ruffner 

that bombing attacks and artillery barrages rolling up the valley were carpeting the defile with enemy casualties.42 

The estimates of enemy strength and 

losses were not far off the mark. Coming through the fire-beaten gap and valley was the 181st Division, the 60th Army 

unit now attached to the 12th Army. Its 

leading units had the French battalion 

under attack by dark. Sharply hit from 

the front and flanked on the left after 

two hours under assault, the French 

withdrew a mile south to hills edging 

Route 24 just above Putchaetful. The 

battalion gained respite from attack for 

the remainder of the night, but its withdrawal opened the left flank of the 23d 

Infantry and gave the Chinese free access to Route 24 between Putchaetful 

and Chaun-ni. Small enemy groups in42 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 78, 17 May 5 1; 38th Inf S2 

Jnl, Sum, 17 May 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

455 

filtrating Chaun-ni about 0330 harassed 

the command posts of the 2d and 3d 

Battalions, 23d Infantry, and Company 

C, 72d Tank Battalion, and blew up a 

loaded ammunition truck before pulling back into the high ground west of 

the village. Of larger moment, the bulk 

of the enemy division filled the hills 

bordering Route 24 on the west between Chaun-ni and the French battalion. Forces on the south reengaged 

the French while detachments slipping 

out of the hills about daylight mined 

the road a half mile below Chaun-ni 

and at a second point farther south 

within view of the French.43 

Along the front of the 23d Infantry, 

Chinese abused Company F on the left 

flank with fire and assault until about 

midnight, then broke contact and 

moved east. The reach of an apparent 

general enemy movement east and then 

south had been indicated earlier when 

the ROK 5th Division units echeloned 

along the right flank of the 23d reported heavy pressure and, with General Almond’s approval, withdrew behind a lateral stretch of the Hongch’on 

River almost due east of Chaun-ni. 

Leading the southeastward swing was 

the 31st Division, sliding east onto the 

front of the 23d Infantry was the 35th 

Division, and approaching from the 

northwest to join the move was the 34th 

Division, which, when inserted between 

the 31st and 35th Divisions on the 18th, 

would fully commit the 12th Army. The 

4th Platoon of Company C, 72d Tank 

Battalion, moved out to the immediate 

43 X Corps Rpt, “Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th 

Inf RCTs, 16 May - 2 Jun 51”; 23d Inf ISUM, 172200 

May 51; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, Entries 58 and 84, 17 May 51; 

23d Inf ISUM 181000 May 51; 2d Div PIR 207, 18 

May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, “Battle of Soyang,” Jun 

51. 
456 

right rear of the 3d Battalion following 

the South Korean withdrawal, but a 

wide expanse of ground along the right 

of the regiment remained open. With 

an uncovered flank inviting envelopment by the enemy forces sweeping it 

on the ‘east and its withdrawal route 

blocked by the 181st Division, the 23d 

Infantry by daylight on the 18th was in 

a situation similar to that of the ROK 

III Corps.44 

The situation in the sectors of the 1st 

and 2d Battalions, 38th Infantry, by 

morning of the 18th was equally critical. 

Between these two battalions, the position of the Netherlands battalion on 

Hill 975 had crumbled of its own accord early the previous evening when 

most of the Dutch troops, after witnessing the flow of Chinese through the 

gap, streamed off the height. “They 

have seen so many Chinamen and [so 

much] firing today,” Colonel Coughlin 

explained to General Ruffner, and they 

“think that if our air and artillery can’t 

stop them then there’s not much they 

can do.” 45 Though their commander, 

Colonel Eekhout, regained control 

quickly, Colonel Coughlin, at General 

Ruffner’s instruction, sent the battalion into an assembly near Hang’ye for 

rest and reorganization and stretched 

out the forces of Company A and F to 

man the vacated position.46 

Repair of the line at Hill 975 was still 

under way when 44th Division forces 

broke it farther west with a hard punch 

EBB AND FLOW 

at the juncture of Company B and 

Company A. Chinese coming through 

lapped around Company B on Hill 724 

and piled up on Hill 710 behind Companies A and F. Company E, sent west 

from the Hill 975-Hill 691 ridge by 

Coughlin to plug the new gap, bogged 

down in encounters at Hill 710, while 

Chinese moving south off 710 surrounded and attacked the command 

posts of the 1st and 2d Battalions collocated at the foot of the height and 

blocked the regimental supply road a 

mile farther south. In what turned out 

to be an overreaction to the deeper enemy incursion, Coughlin ordered back 

both Company E from Hill 710 and 

Company G from the 975-691 ridge 

and sent a platoon of his tank company 

and a detachment of Dutch troops ‘up 

the supply road to clear the command 

post area. With little help needed from 

the rifle companies, the tank-infantry 

team eliminated the enemy roadblock 

and opened a way out for the beleaguered command post group by morning of the 18th.47 

None of the three forward companies was under heavy pressure at daylight, but Company B remained surrounded, and Companies A and F were 

isolated by the Chinese behind them. 

To the east, the 23d Infantry was 

strained by heavy morning attacks, especially Company F on the left flank 

and Company I on the right. As the 

attacks began to lash the 23d, General 

Ruffner convinced General Almond 

that the 23d and the adjoining three 

companies of the 38th had to withdraw 

immediately if they were to withdraw 

44 23d Inf S3 Jnl, Entries 40, 44, and 47, 17 May 51; 

23d Inf ISUM, 172200 and 181000 May 51; 2d Div 

CofS Jnl, Entry 90, 17 May 51; X Corps G2 Section 

Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River,” 30 Jun 51; X Corps 

Rpt, “Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 

May-2 Jun 51”; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, “Battle of 

Soyang,” Jun 51. 

45 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 89, 17 May 51. 

46 Ibid.; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

47 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf PIR 116, 18 May 51; 38th 

Inf S2 Jnl, Sum, 18 May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 

2, 3, 6, 9, 11, and 16, 18 May 51. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 

in good order. Almond instructed 

Ruffner to establish a line running from 

the still solid position of Coughlin’s 3d 

Battalion in the Hill 800 complex southeast through Han’gye to Hill 693 six 

miles beyond Route 24. To meet General Van Fleet’s earlier order that the 

X Corps tie in with the ROK III Corps 

on line Waco, Almond extended the 

line another thirteen miles to the vicinity of Habae-jae; along the extension 

he planned initially to set up blocking 

positions using available units of the 

ROK 5th, 3d, and ROK 7th Divisions.48 

In earlier moves to deepen the defense in the 38th Infantry sector, General Ruffner during the night had 

shifted the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, 

east to positions behind Colonel 

Coughlin’s 3d Battalion and shortly before daylight had ordered the 2d Battalion of the 9th to move roundabout 

and come up on the right in the ground 

just west of Han’gye. Upon relief by 

the 1st Marines around noon the 9th’s 

remaining battalion was now to insert 

itself between the 3d and 2d as the regiment developed defenses along the divisions modified line between Hill 800 

and Route 24. During the shift of battalions, which would continue well into 

the afternoon, the 3d Battalion and 

later the 2d were to send forces forward to break the ring of Chinese 

around Company B of the 38th and 

clear Hill 710 behind Companies A and 

F to assist their withdrawal. Once the 

three companies were back, the 38th 

Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, was to 

become division reserve.49 

48 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 3, 5, 6, 8, 

and 

49 

10, 18 May 51; X Corps 01 175, 18 May 51. 

2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 84, 91, and 92, 17 May 

51; 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Opns (S3), May 51; 9th 

457 

For the 23d Infantry, assigned to occupy the new line east of Route 24, the 

chief problem in getting back to the 

line was the road block below Chaun-ni. 

Threatened in particular by the block 

were the trains of the 2d and 3d Battalions, Company C of the 72d Tank 

Battalion, and two platoons of the heavy 

mortar company, all located in and 

around Chaun-ni with no alternate 

withdrawal route for wheeled vehicles. 

To the clear the road for the trains, 

Colonel Chiles organized a twopronged attack, the 3d Battalion to 

make sure that the east side of the road 

was clear, the 2d Battalion to take on 

the task of forcing back the Chinese 

occupying the heights bordering the 

road on the west. Company C of the 

72d Tank Battalion was to bring up the 

rear, fending off the Chinese still 

pressing the line if they attempted to 

follow the disengagement. Two platoons of tanks from Company B of the 

72d were to assist the attack of the 2d 

Battalion from firing positions in the 

river bottom east of the road opposite 

the Chinese blocking position.50 

The Chinese let the 3d Battalion go 

when it disengaged, but heavy tank fire, 

time on target artillery fire, and air 

strikes were needed to keep enemy 

forces off the tail of the 2d Battalion as 

it peeled off the line in a column of 

companies. Reaching the Chaun-ni area 

by early afternoon, the 3d Battalion occupied hills opposite the roadblock 

while the 2d Battalion attempted to 

Inf POR 151, 18 May 51; 2d Div OI 71, 18 May 51; 2d 

Div CofS Jnl, Entries 2, 3, 9, and 11, 18 May 51; 2d 

Div POR 613, 18 May 51; X Corps Rpt, “Operations 

of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May - 2 Jun 51.” 

50 2d Div OI 71, 18 May 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, 

Nar, May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, “Battle of Soyang,” 

Jun 51. 
458 EBB AND FLOW 

doned trucks off the road and safely 

bypassed the knocked-out tank but lost 

a track in the minefield near the French 

position. Observing both explosions 

from Chaun-ni, a staff officer of the 2d 

Battalion ordered the remainder of the 

convoy to move east off the road just 

below the village and follow the stream 

bed south. The tanks churned in behind those of Company B, but under 

small arms, machine gun, and mortar 

fire ranging in from the west, panicky 

truck drivers drove helter-skelter into 

the hills beyond the stream bed. Some 

vehicles caught fire; ammunition trucks 

exploded; others eventually were 

halted by one or another accident of 

terrain. Leaving the hillside and draws 

looking like a disorganized salvage yard, 

drivers and riders joined the withdrawal of the 2d and 3d Battalions.52 

Stragglers and abandoned communications equipment, weapons, and personal gear dotted the track of the two 

battalions as they made a tiring march 

under flanking fire from the west for 

part of the way and under drenching 

rainstorms that broke about 1830. By 

midnight both units were behind the 

1st Battalion, which during the afternoon had occupied the first ridge east 

of Route 24 on the new defense line. 

The 3d Battalion filled lower ground 

between the ridge and the road while 

the 2d Battalion and the French battalion, which had disengaged from the 

Chinese roadblock force as the two battalions east of the road had come 

abreast, assembled to the rear for the 

remainder of the night.53 

shove the Chinese away from the road. 

Holding the advantage of superior 

numbers on commanding ground, the 

Chinese within an hour convinced 

Colonel Chiles that his forces could not 

clear the enemy position, at least not 

with any dispatch. The danger of being 

rolled up from the north meanwhile 

was growing as Chinese coming into the 

area vacated by the 3d Battalion joined 

the attempt to follow the rearward 

move. Electing a faster, if riskier, 

course, Chiles ordered the trains to run 

by the roadblock with two platoons of 

tanks from Company C as escort. The 

2d Battalion in the meantime was to 

cross the road at Chaun-ni and withdraw with the 3d.51 

During the morning the intelligence 

officer of the 72d Tank Battalion at 

Putchaetful had received a French 

report that Chinese had mined the 

road, and he had relayed the report to 

an enlisted man at the command post 

of the 2d Battalion of the 23d at 

Chaun-ni. At that point the information had somehow gone astray. A costly 

consequence of the communications 

lapse came when the convoy of wheeled 

vehicles interspersed among tanks traveling in fourth gear attempted its run. 

A mine in a field planted a half mile 

below Chaun-ni disabled the lead tank, 

trucks piled up behind, and enemy fire 

from the hills and draws to the west 

chased drivers and tank crews as they 

dropped down a twenty-foot embankment off the east shoulder of the road 

and splashed across the Hongch’on 

River to reach cover behind the tanks 

of Company B in the stream bed. The 

second tank in column shoved the aban51 2d Div POR 613, 18 May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist 

Det, “Battle of Soyang,” Jun 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, 

Nar, May 51; 23d Inf POR 231, 18 May 51. 

52 AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, “Battle of Soyang,” Jun 51; 

2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

53 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf POR 

231, 18 May 51. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 

To the north, a final mishap occurred 

along Route 24 as the two remaining 

tank platoons of Company C brought 

up the rear of the withdrawal. Ordered 

by the company commander to leave 

the road at Chaun-ni and follow the 

stream bed south, as Company B already had done, one platoon missed 

the turnoff point and came upon the 

disabled tank a half mile below town. 

Unable to turn around in the narrow 

road space between the embankment 

on the east and steep slopes on the west 

and faced with the danger of mines to 

the south, the tankers chose the nearly 

vertical twenty-foot drop on their left. 

Two tanks snapped drive shafts in the 

plunge.54 

The two immobilized tanks raised 

Company C’s tank losses since 16 May 

to five. The trains of Company C, the 

2d and 3d Battalions, and half the 

heavy mortar company-more than a 

hundred fifty vehicles, many with heavy 

weapons, ammunition, or other gear 

aboard-had been left behind and by 

dark were being picked over by 

Chinese. Casualties suffered by the 23d 

Infantry and its attachments totaled 72 

killed, 158 wounded, and 190 missing. 

In return for these losses in men and 

equipment, the regiment exacted an 

estimated 2,228 killed and 1,400 

wounded and took 22 prisoners from 

the Chinese 31st, 35th, and 181st Divisions.55 

West of Route 24, the withdrawal of 

the three companies of the 38th Infantry also took unexpected turns. By late 

afternoon the 9th Infantry reinforced 

by the Dutch battalion and Company G 

54 AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, “Battle of Soyang,” Jun 51. 

55 Ibid.; X Corps Rpt, “Operations of the 9th, 23d, 

38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 51”; Eighth Army G3 

SSR, May 51. 

459 

of the 38th had occupied positions between Hill 800 and Route 24 but had 

not cleared a way through the Chinese 

around Company B and behind Companies A and F. In a new plan for getting the three units out, Colonel Coughlin turned to the old technique of the 

rolling artillery barrage, coupling it to 

an umbrella of circling aircraft. For ten 

minutes ahead of the withdrawal, set 

for 1800, seven battalions of artillery-a 

mix of light, medium, and heavy 

guns-were to fire across the front of 

the companies, then at 1800 were to 

place concentrations on Hill 710 and to 

box in the three companies as they 

shifted east and withdrew down the 

975-691 ridge. A liaison plane overhead was to control the delivery of air 

strikes and adjustment of the box as 

the companies moved and also was to 

relay all other communications.56 

A sudden, severe thunderstorm 

breaking twenty minutes after the start 

of the withdrawal drove all planes back 

to their bases and thus not only eliminated air support but also forced the 

artillery to stop firing the protective 

barrage and interrupted radio contact 

between Coughlin’s headquarters and 

the withdrawing units. Small groups filtering through the lines of the 9th Infantry during the remainder of the 

night were an indication of the final 

disruption caused by the storm. Head 

counts on the morning of the 19th were 

two officers and eighty-one men for 

Company A, no officers and seventyfour men for Company B, and no officers and eighty-one men for Company 

F. Casualties had reduced the other 

companies of both the 1st and 2d Bat56 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Opns (S3), May 51; 38th Inf 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 
460 

talions to similar figures. Officer losses 

in the 2d Battalion were especially high, 

among them the battalion commander, 

battalion executive officer, battalion 

operations officer, and two company 

commanders.57 

The Battle Shifts East 

The X Corps line shaped by the 

withdrawals and shifts on the 18th 

amounted to a deep salient with the 3d 

Battalion, 38th Infantry, at its apex in 

the Hill 800 complex and the 1st Marine Division presenting a solid face 

toward Ch’unch’on on its northwest 

shoulder. Along its upper northeast 

shoulder, the 9th Infantry and 23d Infantry carried the line from the Hill 

800 mass beyond Han’gye to a point 

about three miles short of Hill 683, 

which General Almond had set as the 

eastern limit of the 2d Division’s new 

sector. The 683 height had fallen to 

the Chinese, however, when the ROK 

5th Division forces that had taken position along the Hongch’on River east of 

Chaun-ni were driven back and disorganized during the day by the 34th 

Division. Units regrouped by nightfall-a mix of three battalions of infantry from the 35th and 36th Regiments and a company of engineerswere clustered around the village of 

Hasolch’i located on a lateral mountain 

track two miles south of Hill 683. Pulling out of contact at the southern end 

of the 81st Division’s roadblock at 

Sangam-ni early in the day, the bulk of 

the 3d Regiment engineer battalion and 

the tank destroyer company of the 

ROK 7th Division now defended the X 

Corps’ east flank from positions just 

below the village of P’ungam-ni, six 

miles southeast of Hasolch’i. Of the 

7th’s other forces, about seven hundred 

had been corralled far to the south in 

Chech’on; another group had been 

found at the village of Soksa-ri, located 

on Route 20 over fifteen miles southeast of P’ungam-ni in the ROK III 

Corps sector.58 

South Korean troops straggling into 

the area just north and east of Soksa-ri 

by nightfall attested to the misfortunes 

of the ROK 3d and 9th Divisions when 

they had attempted to withdraw to line 

Waco. In starting the move down the 

road from Hyon-ni, the ROK III Corps 

commander, General Yu, had ordered 

the 9th Division to take the lead and 

deal with the Chinese roadblock at 

Sangam-ni while the 3d Division, bringing up the rear; handled any North Korean attempts to roll up the column 

from the north. By midmorning Yu’s 

forces were caught in the predictable 

squeeze, the 81st Division holding its 

Sangam-ni position against the 9th 

Division’s efforts to reduce it while 

forces of the North Korean 6th Division 

and 12th Division closed in on the 3d 

Division in the Hyon-ni area. Both ROK 

divisions broke away in disorder into 

the heights east of the road, leaving 

behind all remaining artillery pieces 

and more than three hundred vehicles.59 Natural lines of drift through 

the mountains channeled the disorganized troops southeast toward Soksa-ri. 

57 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 9th Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51; 2d Div Cofs Jnl, Entry 8, 19 May 

51; X Corps Rpt, “Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th 

Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 51.” 9. 

58 X Corps POR 234, 18 May 51; X Corps Special 

Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River.” 

59 An officer from the North Korean 6th Division captured later claimed that twelve hundred South Koreans and much materiel were captured in the Hyon-ni 

area. See OB Info, North Korean Army, Charts 4 and 

EBB AND FLOW 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 

Out of radio contact with his forces 

since early morning but informed of 

their southeasterly movement by air 

observers, General Yu air-dropped to 

some groups orders assigning them to 

line Waco positions. He also set up 

straggler lines in the Soksa-ri area but 

by nightfall had regained control of 

forces in little more than battalion 

strength.60 

While Yu struggled to reorder his 

two divisions and deploy them on the 

Waco line, General Almond ordered 

additional modifications of the X Corps 

front to straighten and shorten the line 

and to shift 2d Division forces farther 

east into the weakly defended sectors 

of the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions. The 

5th Marines, now scheduled to take 

over the western portion of the 2d 

Division’s sector during the afternoon 

of the 19th, were to occupy positions 

centered some three miles south of Hill 

800 which would eliminate the bulge 

manned by the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, in the Hill 800 mass and the 

two adjoining battalions of the 9th Infantry. Unaware that the 800 complex 

would be handed over, the 45th Division meanwhile suffered unnecessarily 

in nightlong attempts to take it. Successive assault waves of the fresh 133d 

Regiment were shattered, mainly by 

heavy concentrations of artillery fire. 

On the crest of Hill 800, where the Chinese centered most of their charges, the 

men of Company K, 38th Infantry, in 

fact did little fighting themselves but 

simply sat inside their bunkers and allowed the Chinese to enter their lines, 

then called down a blanket of artillery 

461 

fire. The Chinese pulled back about 

daylight on the 19th, leaving behind 

some eight hundred dead.61

The new line of the 2d Division, to 

be occupied on the 19th, cut Route 24 

just below Han’gye on the west and 

reached across lateral ridges eastward, 

into what had become enemy territory, 

through Hill 683 to the village of 

Nuron-ni, three miles above P’ungamni. General Ruffner assigned the 23d 

Infantry to the central sector centered 

on Hill 683. Given the 15th Regimental Combat Team of the 3d Division by 

Almond as a replacement for the 38th 

Infantry’s going into corps reserve, 

Ruffner ordered the 15th initially 

to occupy the P’ungam-ni area as a 

preliminary to moving forward to the 

Nuron-ni sector of the line. Both the 

9th Infantry and the 15th Regimental 

Combat Team thus faced the prospect 

of having to fight to gain the line they 

were to defend, but, once the two regiments were on the line, the 2d Division 

would hold good positions looking 

down into the valley of the Naech’on 

River, a westward flowing tributary of 

the Hongch’on.62 

To help strengthen the X Corps’ eastern sector, Van Fleet at midnight on 

the 18th ordered the remainder of the 

3d Division eastward from the Seoul 

area, the 7th Regimental Combat Team 

to move on the 19th, the 65th Regimental Combat Team on the 20th. General 

Almond directed the division, less its 

15th Regimental Combat Team, which 

was to remain attached to the 2d Division, to protect the X Corps’ east flank 

60 Eighth Army G3 SSR, May 51; Eighth Army Arty 

SSR, Jun 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0920, 1030, 

and 1615, 18 May 51. 

61 X Corps OI 177, 19 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, 

Nar, May 51; 38th Inf PIR 117, 20 May 51; Gugeler, 

Combat Actions in Korea, p. 180. 

62 X Corps OI 177, 19 May 51; 2d Div POR 614, 19 

May 51. 
462 EBB AND FLOW 

from enemy attacks out of the sector of 

the muddled ROK III Corps. General 

Soule was initially to concentrate forces 

at Pangnim-ni, located on Route 20 fifteen miles south of Soksa-ri, then reconnoiter and set up blocking positions 

in the Soksa-ri area.63 

From Hoengsong, where 3d Division 

headquarters had set up on moving 

east with the 15th Regimental Combat 

Team, Soule moved a tactical command 

post group to the Pangnim-ni area early 

on the 19th and sent his reconnaissance 

company up Route 20 to patrol as far 

as Hajinbu-ri, five miles east of Soksa-ri. 

The company found the road clear 

and made contact with ROK III Corps 

troops in the Hajinbu-ri area. On its 

return run during the afternoon, the 

company left a platoon in Soksa-ri to 

watch a mountain road reaching the 

village from Sangam-ni and Habae-jae 

to the northwest, then moved on to 

Changp’yong-ni, six miles southwest of 

Soksa-ri. There the 3d Battalion of the 

7th Infantry, first to arrive from the 

west, blocked Route 20 and mountain 

trails coming in from the northwest. 

Reaching the area after dark, the 

remainder of the 7th Infantry assembled at Ami-dong, five miles south of 

Changp’yong-ni.64 

At the right of the 2d Division 

fifteen miles to the northwest, the 

15th Regimental Combat Team attacked through the ROK 3d Regiment 

at 1100 to seize P’ungam-ni and high 

ground a mile and half to the northwest along the trail leading to Nuron-ni 

on the modified No Name line another 

63 Rads, GX-5-3166 KGOO and GX-5-3174 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 18 and 

19 May 51, respectively; X Corps OI 177, 19 May 51. 

64 Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, pp. 208-09; 

X Corps POR 235, 19 May 51. 

two miles to the north. Moving against 

light resistance, the combat team consolidated positions on its objective after 

dark. As the l5th moved beyond the 

village, the ROK 3d Regiment and 

smaller units of the ROK 7th Division 

in the area advanced through light to 

moderate opposition to positions north 

and northeast of P’ungam-ni, the latter 

along a trail leading to Habae-jae.65 

At the new left of the 2d Division 

along Route 24, the 181st Division 

wheeling out of its roadblock near 

Chaun-ni reengaged the 23d Infantry 

just above Han’gye shortly before dawn 

and kept the 1st and 3d Battalions 

pinned in position until counterattacks, 

artillery fire, and air strikes called in 

under gradually clearing skies finally 

forced a release about noon. The two 

battalions occupied positions straddling Route 24 on the new line below 

Han’gye by early evening. While the 

2d Battalion moved east to a centrally 

located reserve position along the latera1 track leading to Hasolch’i, the attached French battalion attempted to 

take position on the regimental right 

and make contact with a unit of the 

ROK 36th Regiment located northwest 

of Hasolch’i in the sector to be occupied by the 9th Infantry. But Chinese 

stoutly defending an intervening height 

prevented the French from closing 

ranks with the South Koreans.66 

It was well after dark before the 9th 

Infantry completed its eastward shift 

into its new sector above Hasolch’i. 

First to arrive, the 1st Battalion moved 

65 Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 208; 2d 

Div POR 614, 19 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 19 May 

51. 

66 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 2d Div POR 614, 

19 May 51; 2d Div PIR 208, 20 May 51; 23d Inf 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf ISUM, 19 May 51. 
BATTLE BELOW THE SOYANG 463 

full IX Army Group stood opposite 

the X Corps’ new eastern front between Han’gye and Soksa-ri. Though 

the group remained generally on a 

southeastward course, its attached 12th 

Army was turning more to the south on 

the front of the 2d Division with four 

divisions abreast: the 181st already was 

in the Han’gye area; the 35th was approaching next to the east; the 34th 

was entering the area above Hasolch’i, 

where its leading forces had stopped 

the French battalion at the right of the 

23d Infantry; and the bulk of the 31st 

now was located above P’ungam-ni after being forced out of the village by 

the 15th Regimental Combat Team. 

Making a fast march to the southeast 

of P’ungam-ni, the 93d Regiment of 

the 31st Division was nearing Soksa-ri 

on Route 20. Using the mountain 

road running southeast from Sangamni through Habae-jae to Soksa-ri as its 

axis, the 27th Army also was headed for 

the Soksa-ri area, advancing with its 

three divisions in column, the 81st still 

in the van after helping to rout the 

ROK III Corps, the 79th and 80th trailing in the vicinity of Habae-jae. Behind 

the 27th Army, the 20th Army, in group 

reserve, was beginning to move southeast from the Kwandae-ri area along 

the Soyang River. Coming from the 

Hyon-ni area on a line of march projecting to Hajinbu-ri were the 6th and 

12th Divisions of the North Korean V 

Corps, and moving toward Hajinbu-ri 

on a parallel course just to the east were 

the 2d and 27th Divisions of the North 

Korean II Corps, which, after failing in 

frontal attacks against the ROK I Corps, 

had shifted west in an apparent attempt 

to envelop the South Koreans.69 

up on the right of the ROK 35th 

Regiment into positions northeast of 

Hasolch’i looking down into the valley 

of a small stream that fed the Naech’on 

River. The 2d Battalion took position 

behind the forces of the ROK 36th 

Regiment to await daylight before 

relieving the South Koreans and extending westward toward the French 

battalion. With a similar objective the 

3d Battalion assembled near Hasolch’i 

to await morning before moving up on 

the right of the 1st Battalion to close 

the gap between the 9th Infantry and 

the 15th Regimental Combat Team in 

the P’ungam-ni area.67 

The ROK III Corps sector remained 

a scene of tangled and scattered forces 

throughout the 19th, troops trickling 

into collecting points along Route 20, 

some of both the 3d and 9th Divisions 

taking up random positions. about five 

miles above the road. None, despite 

General Yu’s air-dropped orders the 

day before, stopped on line Waco some 

seven miles farther north. The one fortunate circumstance was an absence of 

enemy contact. In marked contrast, the 

ROK I Corps all but completed an orderly withdrawal to the Waco line, both 

its divisions moving along the coast, the 

Capital in the lead and the 11th, though 

not in contact, prudently bounding 

south by regiment in bringing up the 

rear. Leading the way west along line 

Waco, the 26th Regiment of the Capital Division refused the corps’ inland 

flank left open by the ROK III Corps.68 

In the array of enemy forces east of 

Route 24 by nightfall on the 19th, the 

67 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 9th Inf Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51; 9th Inf PORs 152, 19 May 51, and 

153, 20 May 51. 

68 Eighth Army G3 SSR, May 51; Eighth Army G3 

Jnl, Sum, 19 May 51; Eighth Army PORs, 19 and 20 

May 51. 

69 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army 

PIR 310, 18 May 51; X Corps G2 SS Rpt, May 51; X 
464 EBB AND FLOW 

Enemy action decidedly had slackened on the X Corps front during the 

afternoon of the 19th after the 181st 

Division gave up its attack on the 23d 

Infantry in the Han’gye area. But, with 

Chinese continuing to mass ahead of 

the 2d Division, the slack appeared to 

be mostly a result of attempts to move 

Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River,” 

30 Jun 51; X Corps PIRs 235, 19 May 51, and 237, 21 

May 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army; 

OB Info, North Korean Army, Charts 9 and 15; 

Eighth Army POR, 19 May 51. 

fresh units forward to take over the 

assault. And though the pell-mell withdrawal of the ROK III Corps had taken 

its scrambled forces out of contact, the 

passage of Chinese in strength southeastward through Habae-jae and beyond presaged heavy action along 

Route 20. It seemed that enemy forces 

would not only quickly revive their 

drive against the X an ROK III Corps 

but, with strong Chinese reserves and 

North Korean divisions on the move, 

that they would increase it. 
CHAPTER XXVI 

The Counteroffensive 

On 18 May, after Chinese had 

reached P’ungam-ni, then the deepest 

point of enemy penetration, and as the 

substantial sweep of Chinese around 

the 2d Division into the sectors of the 

collapsing ROK units had become apparent, General Ridgway suggested that 

General Van Fleet attempt to relieve 

the pressure on his forces in the east by 

attacking in the west to threaten enemy 

lines of communication in the Iron 

Triangle. Ridgway recommended a 

two-division attack moving on the 

Route 33 axis toward Ch’orwon. He 

thought such an attack would have a 

good chance of succeeding since intelligence indicated that only four Chinese 

armies occupied the forty-mile sector 

of the front west of Ch’unch’on and 

since Peng Teh-huai would need at least 

a week or ten days to shift any material 

part of his mass from the east to oppose the advance. Nor had enemy 

forces on the western front shown 

much aggressiveness. Enemy attacks 

had forced back some patrol base and 

outpost units and had tested the main 

line in both the I Corps and IX Corps 

sectors, but these attacks had been isolated affairs, not coordinated actions in 

a concerted holding operation.1

1 Rad, C 62789, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 18 

May 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

Judging enemy forces in the east central area to be clearly overextended after he reconnoitered the front on 19 

May, Ridgway enlarged his concept to 

take advantage of their vulnerability 

and ordered Van Fleet to attack across 

the entire front. Agreeing that these 

forces could be trapped, Van Fleet laid 

out an operation that he believed could 

produce decisive results if the attack 

moved fast enough. Though stabilizing the line in the east remained a 

problem, he now viewed that task with 

no great alarm even though enemy 

forces were deepening and strengthening their penetration. If for no other 

reason, he expected their logistical difficulties in the mountains to slow if not 

stop their advance within a matter of 

days; they would have created only a 

“long bag” that could closed behind 

them by rapid drives to block their main 

routes of resupply and withdrawal. 

Van Fleet’s plan called for the I Corps, 

IX Corps, and part of the 1st Marine 

Division at the left of the X Corps 

to advance on 20 May toward the 

Munsan-ni-Ch’unch’on segment of line 

Topeka. Once the Topeka segment was 

occupied, strikes to start closing the bag 

were to be made toward the Iron Triangle, one up Route 3 to secure a road 

center in the Yongp’yong River valley 

some twenty miles above Uijongbu, another up Route 17 beyond Ch’unch’on 

to seize the complex of road junctions 
466 

at the west end of the Hwach’on Reservoir. 

EBB AND FLOW 

Stabilizing the Line 

If General Van Fleet was certain that 

the line in the east would stabilize, when 

and where were still hard questions late 

on the 19th. There were several reasons to doubt that the 2d Division could 

stand on the Han’gye-Nuron-ni line 

in the X Corps sector. (See Map 35.) 

The line was fifteen miles long, there 

were gaps, and Chinese still occupied 

some of the important ground. General Almond consequently ordered the 

2d Division to withdraw further and 

the 1st Marine Division to adjust its 

neighboring positions in accommodation. In anticipation of penetrations of 

X Corps lines, Almond also acquired 

the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team from the IX Corps for use as 

a fire brigade in counterattacks.3 

The passage of 27th Army units 

through the Habae-jae area and, farther north, the movement of 20th Army 

forces in the same southeasterly direction also raised the possibility that the 

Chinese intended to sweep east along 

Route 20 behind the ROK III Corps, 

turn the east flank of the X Corps, or 

both. The 93d Regiment of the 31st Division reinforced this possibility when 

the regiment announced its arrival in 

Soksa-ri by driving the platoon of the 

2 Rad, G (TAG) 172 KCG, Ridgway (Personal) for 

Collins, 20 May 51; Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 

15 Sep 51; Rads, GX-5-3172 KGOP, GX-5-3229 

KGOP, and GX-5-3290 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

CG I Corps et al., 18 May and last two 19 May 51; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 19 May 51. 

3 X Corps PIR 235, 19 May 51; X Corps OI 179, 20 

May 51; Rad, GX-5-3464 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

CGs IX and X Corps, 20 May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, 

Entry 25, 20 May 51. 

3d Division’s reconnaissance company 

out of town during the night of the 

19th and by stopping a battalion of the 

7th Infantry that attempted to regain 

the town on the 20th. The 81st Division 

of the 27th Army also revealed its approach on the 20th by engaging the 

23d Regiment. of the ROK 3d Division 

about five miles north of Soksa-ri.4 

Yet even as the IX Army Group appeared to be bringing up reserves and 

disposing forces for continuing its 

drive, there were indications that the 

offensive was losing impetus. Under a 

pummeling by B-29s, which dropped a 

hundred seventy tons of proximityfused bombs ahead of the 2d Division 

during the night of the 19th, the 12th 

Army developed only one attack of 

any size by daylight, this by a 34th Division force of about five hundred men 

against Company C, 9th Infantry, 

northeast of Hasolch’i. Ground fire, air 

strikes, and a climactic counterattack by 

Company A virtually wiped out the 

force. At the division’s left, large groups 

of Chinese approaching the 23d Infantry at a trot out of the Naech’on River 

valley about midday on the 20th wavered under mortar and artillery fire 

and air attacks and turned back before 

reaching the regiment’s line. Put on the 

run were formations from the 181st Division, whose forces earlier had so stoically endured a heavy air and artillery 

pounding while passing through the 

gap in the 38th Infantry’s lines near 

Hill 1051. Rear rank forces of the 12th 

Army moving up in battalion-size groups 

meanwhile provided deeper targets for 

aircraft and artillery as they approached 

4X Corps PIR 235, 19 May 51, PIR 236, 20 May 51, 

POR 236, 20 May 5 1, and PIR 237, 21 May 51; 

Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 211. 
THE COUNTER OFFENSIVE 

and entered assembly areas in preparation for night attacks. Kept under heavy 

artillery fire and precise B-29 bomb 

runs, none of these forces came in on 

the 2d Division during the night of the 

20th.5 

Now confident that the 2d Division 

could occupy and hold the Han’gyeNuron-ni line, General Almond late on 

the 20th canceled his earlier withdrawal 

order and turned to a greater concern 

of easing the threat of envelopment 

from the east either by a shallow swing 

around the ROK 7th Division forces 

below P’ungam-ni or by a deeper drive 

through the 3d Division sector in the 

Soksa-ri area. Reducing the deeper 

threat somewhat was the arrival of the 

65th Infantry, which allowed General 

Soule to strengthen his blocks and 

recapture Soksa-ri on the 21st. ROK 

8th Division forces also had reached 

Chech’on, from where they could be 

moved up quickly to reinforce the X 

Corps’ east flank defenses. In the 

P’ungam-ni area, reassembled forces of 

the 5th and 7th Regiments of the ROK 

7th Division provided additional protection against a Chinese strike out of 

the Habae-jae area, protection which 

Almond further deepened and widened with the bulk of the still somewhat decrepit 38th Infantry. To relieve 

the threat in both the P’ungam-ni and 

Soksa-ri areas, Almond ordered an attack on the 22d to seize and block enemy movement through Habae-jae by 

Task Force Yoke, a group of infantry, 

tanks, and artillery units that he constituted under the command of 

5 2d Div POR 615, 20 May 51; 9th Inf POR 153, 20 

May 51; 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, Entries 83 

and 92, 20 May 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 

2d Div PIRs 208, 20 May 51, and 209, 21 May 51. 

467 

Col. Lawrence K. Ladue, the deputy 

corps commander.6 

The force of enemy attacks declined 

all across the X Corps front on the 21st 

but grew stronger in the ROK III Corps 

sector and at the left of the ROK I 

Corps. ROK 9th Division forces between Soksa-ri and Hajinbu-ri fell below Route 20 under attacks by the Chinese 81st Division while ROK 3d 

Division units above Route 20 northeast of Hajinbu-ri began to collapse under North Korean V Corps assaults. Near 

Yuch’on-ni, four miles east of Hajinburi, the 20th Regiment of the ROK 11th 

Division holding positions facing north 

and northwest athwart Route 20 to prevent an enemy sweep behind the bulk 

of the ROK I Corps on line Waco was 

hit hard by forces of the North Korean 

II Corps. The enemy pressure continued at all points of attack into the 

evening.7

Despite the enemy action in the 

Hajinbu-ri-Yuch’on-ni area and continuing reports of reserves moving 

south, General Van Fleet was convinced, as he reported to General 

Ridgway, that “the enemy’s initial 

punch in the eastern and central eastern section- is shot.”8 To keep enemy 

forces from slipping out of the bottom 

of their long bag in the Hajinbu-ri area, 

Van Fleet late on the 21st directed the 

ROK III Corps to make no further 

withdrawals and to restore defensive 

6 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; X Corps PIRs 

236, 20 May 51, and 237, 21 May 51: Dolcater. 3d 

Infantry Division in Korea, p. 211; X Corps POR 237, 

21 May 5l; 2d Div POR 616, 21 May 51; X Corps OI 

180, 21 May 51. 

7 X Corps G3 SS Rpt, May 51 ; X Corps PIR 237, 21 

May 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 21 May 51; Eighth 

Army POR, 21 May 51, and PIR 313, 21 May 51. 

8 Memo, Lt Col Paul F. Smith, Eighth Army Liaison 

Officer, to Gen Ridgway, 22 May 51. 
468 EBB AND FLOW 

positions north of Route 20. The ROK 

I Corps meanwhile was to fall back 

from line Waco to positions that would 

secure Route 20 between Yuch’on-ni 

and Kangnung on the coast. Anxious 

to close the top of the bag, Van Fleet 

enlarged and substantially altered the 

concept of the counterattack opened on 

the 20th. The main effort was now to 

be directed toward seizing the road 

centers, with the front otherwise being 

advanced only as necessary to protect 

the main effort. The I Corps, as under 

Van Fleet’s earlier order, was to seize 

the road hub in Yongp’yong River 

valley. His new order shifted the 

IX Corps-X Corps boundary east as 

of 23 May to give the IX Corps 

the Hongch’on-Ch’unch’on-Hwach’on 

road and the road center on the western side of the Hwach’on Reservoir as 

its main objective. The X Corps was to 

open a general advance on the 23d to 

seize the road complex in the YangguInje area east of the reservoir.9 

Even as Van Fleet ordered the ROK 

III Corps to regain positions above 

Route 20, the ROK 3d and ROK 9th 

Divisions again tumbled back under 

enemy attacks that by early afternoon 

of the 22d completely dispersed both 

divisions and overran their command 

posts. KMAG advisers notified Van 

Fleet that the commanders of both divisions and the principal staff members 

of the ROK 9th Division had disappeared. The ROK 3d Division commander, Brig. Gen. Kim Jong Oh, at 

first believed to have been either killed 

or taken captive, was located along with 

many members of the division on the 

23d some fifteen miles southeast of 

9 Rad, GX-5-3699 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 

ROKA, 21 May 51; Rad, GX-5-3721 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 21 May 51. 

Hajinbu-ri. Under the direction of the 

KMAG adviser, troops of the ROK 9th 

Division meanwhile assembled seven 

miles southwest of Hajinbu-ri. With the 

commander, Brig. Gen. Choi Suk, still 

unlocated, General Yu placed the deputy corps commander in charge.” 

Accounting for the chaos as much as 

the force of enemy attacks were General Yu’s never having regained full 

charge of the ROK III Corps after his 

two divisions were scattered at the 

Sangam-ni roadblock and his having 

lost all control of them when they were 

attacked at Hajinbu-ri. Convinced by 

the continuing failure of the corps that 

Yu and his staff could not conduct operations successfully, General Van Fleet 

late on the 22d ordered the ROK III 

Corps headquarters inactivated, the 

ROK 3d Division transferred to the 

ROK I Corps, the ROK 9th Division 

given to the X Corps, and the X Corps 

made responsible for the former ROK 

III Corps sector. He also ordered the 

ROK Army forward headquarters off 

the front and placed the ROK I Corps 

under his own direct command.11

In the Yuch’on-ni area, North 

Korean II Corps forces early on the 22d 

cut Route 20, turned their attack east, 

and dispersed the 20th Regiment of 

the ROK 11th Division. Given the 

stout enemy effort in the Hajinbu-riYuch’on-ni region over the past two 

10 Rad GX-5-3812 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

CINCFE, 22 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 22 May 51; 

Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1707, 1735, and 1755, 

22 May 51, and Entry 

11 Eighth 

1032, 23 May 51. 

Army G3 Jnl. Entry 1755, 22 May 51: 

Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51; Eighth 

Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 22 May 51; Rad, GX-5-3849 

KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps and C/S 

ROKA, 22 May 51; Rad, GX-5-3910 KGOO, CG 

Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and Chief KMAG, 22 

May 51; Rad GX-5-4404 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

C/S ROKA and CG ROK I Corps, 25 May 51. 
THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 

days, the approach of reserves, and no 

evidence that enemy forces were having serious logistical problems, the 

Eighth Army intelligence officer, in 

contrast to General Van Fleet’s sensing 

that the enemy offensive had lost its 

momentum, predicted a continuation 

in force along and below Route 20. The 

location and course of enemy forces 

below Hajinbu-ri convinced Colonel 

Tarkenton that they would attempt a 

deep southwestward push toward 

P’yongch’ang and Yongwol along Route 

20 as a preliminary to the seizure of 

the Chech’on road and rail hub; the 

eastward enemy drive appeared to be 

aimed at enveloping Kangnung.12 

General Van Fleet countered the 

threat to Kangnung with new orders to 

the ROK I Corps, then still drawing 

back from line Waco to positions above 

Route 20 between Yuch’on-ni and the 

coast under his orders of the 21st. General Paik was to organize strong positions facing west astride Route 20 to 

block any eastward enemy drive along 

the road, but if he could not hold a 

continuous line above Route 20 with 

his west flank refused, he was to set 

his forces in perimeter around the 

Kangnung road center.13 

But as Van Fleet dispatched these orders near midnight on the 22d, the 

composite of recent and current reports 

from the front confirmed a general enemy withdrawal. Now three days into 

their advance, the I Corps and the IX 

Corps had found contact progessively 

more difficult. The first indications of 

enemy withdrawal on the X Corps front 

had appeared late on the 21st. Evi469 

dently withdrawal orders had taken 

longer to reach the deeper enemy 

forces in the Hajinbu-ri-Yuch’on-ni 

area, forces who began moving back 

after dark on the 22d.14 

Crippling losses, particularly in the 

12th Army and 15th Army, had forced 

Peng Teh-huai to abandon his offensive. The inability of these weakening 

armies to mount effective attacks 

against the adjusted X Corps positions 

after 19 May had endangered the 

enemy forces farther east since the failure to advance astride Route 24 meant 

that the Chinese and North Koreans 

moving to and below Route 20 in the 

Hajinbu-ri-Yuch’on-ni sector were simply taking themselves farther and farther out on a limb.15 Though fresh 

reserves were available, the casualties 

among the assault echelons had been 

exceptionally heavy, largely as a result 

of the Van Fleet rate of artillery fire 

and round-the-clock air attacks, and 

Peng apparently decided against subjecting his reserves to the same punishment and extreme losses. 

Peng called for a rapid, almost precipitate, withdrawal, with covering 

forces fighting only light delaying actions except where strong blocks were 

needed to keep withdrawal routes open. 

The previous general disposition of 

forces was to be restored, the Hwach’on 

Reservoir again marking the division 

between Chinese and North Korean 

sectors and also marking generally the 

northern limit of the withdrawal. 

12 Eighth Army POR, 22 May 51, and PIR 314, 22 

Ma 51. 

13 Rad, GX-5-3910 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 

C/S ROKA and Chief KMAG, 22 May 51. 

14 Eighth Army PIR 315, 23 May 51; I Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 

Rad, X 19780, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 22 

May 51. 

15 Eighth Army PIR 315, 23 May 51; X Corps G2 

Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River,” 30 Jun 5 1. 
470 EBB AND FLOW 

For the Chinese armies south and 

southeast of the reservoir, plans for getting past the lake were designed to 

avoid a jam-up of troops when they 

reached that obstacle. The 20th and 

27th Armies of the IX Army Group were 

to withdraw around the east end of the 

reservoir, then move along its northern bank to the west end. Leading the 

way, the 20th Army was to set up a blocking position between Hwach’on town 

and the reservoir. The 27th Army, on 

coming out of the Hajinbu-ri area with 

its rear covered by the North Korean II 

and V Corps, was to concentrate behind 

the 20th. The North Korean rear 

guards were to set up defenses east of 

the reservoir, the V Corps between the 

reservoir and the near outskirts of Inje, 

the II Corps from Inje eastward.16 

The III Army Group, with the 12th 

Army returned to its control, was to 

withdraw around the west end of the 

reservoir. From below Ch’unch’on, the 

60th Army, less its 81st Division still with 

the 12th Army, was to fight a delaying 

action along Route 17 to hold the road 

open for the 15th and 12th Armies 

as they withdrew northwest, passed 

through the ground below the reservoir, and moved through Hwach’on 

town into the Iron Triangle. The rearguard 60th Army, on passing behind the 

20th Army at Hwach’on, was to follow.17 

West of the Pukhan River, the three 

armies of the XIX Army Group were to 

withdraw generally northwestward, 

pulling away from the I Corps and the 

IX Corps toward areas located on ei16 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53; X Corps 

G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River,” 30 Jun 

51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army. 

17 USAFFE Intel Dig, vol. I, no. 1, l-31 Dec 52; X 

Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River,” 

30 Jun 51. 

ther side of the upper reaches of the 

Imjin River and in the Iron Triangle. 

Northwest of Seoul, the North Korean 

Z Corps was initially to withdraw behind 

the lower Imjin and was eventually to 

move west beyond the Yesong River for 

rest and rebuilding.” 

Counterattack 

With the objective of reaching the 

main bodies of enemy forces, including reserves, before they could organize for defensive action, General 

Milburn and General Hoge had made 

speed the keynote of the counterattacks 

opened by the I and IX Corps on 20 

May. In setting his three divisions on 

courses for line Topeka some fifteen 

miles above his Seoul defenses, Milburn 

aimed the ROK 1st Division toward 

Munsan-ni, the 1st Cavalry Division 

north through Uijongbu and up Route 

33, and the 25th Division north along 

Route 3 toward the road hub in the 

Yongp’yong River valley. (Map 37) 

Hoge had established an intermediate 

line, Georgia, whose central trace lay 

just above the lateral stretch of the 

Pukhan River dammed on the west to 

form the Chongpyong Reservoir and 

along the upper bank of the Hongch’on 

River emptying into the reservoir from 

the east. A rapid advance to the Georgia line, Hoge had believed, would allow his four divisions (the 24th, ROK 

2d, ROK 6th, and 7th, west to east) to 

reach enemy reserves.19 

Milburn’s forces had gained ground 

rapidly, especially the ROK 1st Division, 

18 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 96, l6-28 Feb 53; Hq, 

FEC, History of the North Korean Army. 

19 I Corps OI 5, 19 May 51; Rad, IX ACT 1515 (IX 

Corps Opn O 20), CG IX Corps to CG ROK 2d Div ct 

al., 19 May 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 
rI
472 EBB AND FLOW 

which entered Munsan-ni at midmorning on the 21st, and all three divisions 

were on or near the Topeka line by 

evening of the 23d. But the attack had 

amounted to a futile chase as the North 

Korea’n I Corps and 63d Army backed 

away far faster than the I Corps advanced. Tank and tank-infantry forces 

probing well to the front of the main 

body of the 25th Division consistently 

failed to make solid contact and raised 

doubt that the Yongp’yong River valley road hub more than ten miles ahead 

of the division could be taken in time 

to block enemy movements through it.20 

Despite light resistance, the IX Corps 

attack’ from the outset had been more 

cautious than aggressive. After a short 

advance on the 20th, General Hoge 

sharply reprimanded his division commanders for failing to push their attacks, but gains on the 21st were even 

shorter. Attempting again to accelerate 

the advance, Hoge directed his forces 

to employ pursuit tactics and move no 

less than six miles on the 22d, a distance that would carry them two to 

three miles beyond the Georgia phase 

line-far enough, if done speedily 

enough, Hoge believed, to break 

through covering forces and make contact with the main bodies of withdrawing Chinese. The attack on the 22d, 

however, took his four divisions no farther than the Georgia line.21 

In new attack orders for the 23d, 

Hoge made zone adjustments, obliged 

to do so on his right by General Van 

Fleet’s orders moving the corps boundary east as the X Corps joined, the 

counterattack. The 7th Division, after 

20 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

21 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; Rads, IXCCG 

103 and IXACT 1527, CG IX Corps to CG 24th Div 

et al., 20 and 21 May 51, respectively. 

advancing in its present zone for most 

of the day, was to relieve 1st Marine 

Division forces straddling Route 29 and 

prepare to attack on the Ch’unch’onHwach’on axis toward the road complex at the west end of the Hwach’on 

Reservoir. On his left, Hoge switched 

the zones of the 24th and ROK 2d Divisions and ordered General Bryan to 

send a task force northeast. up Route 

17 to seize Kap’yong while the remainder of his division followed astride the 

road. The ROK 2d Division, shifting to 

the corps left flank after Bryan’s forces 

passed through it en route to Kap’yong, 

was to attack northwest along secondary Route 15 toward Taebo-ri.22 

Still trying to animate his forces, 

Hoge again directed pursuit tactics and 

authorized them to bypass enemy 

groups up to company in size. His divisions advanced easily on the 23d against 

an accelerating withdrawal by the 64th 

and 63d Armies, but few units gained 

more than five miles. In the deepest 

move, General Bryan’s task force of 

tanks and the 1st Battalion of the 21st

Infantry captured Kap’yong after meeting only a smattering of opposition 

along Route 17. 23 Hoge nevertheless 

now had two American divisions positioned for advances over roads converging near the lower edge of his road center objective, the 7th below Ch’unch’on 

and the 24th at Kap’yong, whence a secondary valley road left Route 17 and 

ran northeast to rejoin it near the village of Chiam-ni. 

General Almond’s plan for the X 

Corps’ counterattack on the 23d 

22 IX Corps Opn O 21, 22 May 51. 

23 Ibid.; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps 

POR 665, 23 May 51; IX Corps G2 Daily Sum, 23 May 

51; Rad, IXCCG 106, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth 

Army, 23 May 51. 
THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 473 

7TH INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS IN THE CH’UNCH’ON AREA, 24 MAY 1951 

amounted to an enlargement of limited attacks launched the day before. 

In the Soksa-ri area, the 1st Battalion, 

7th Infantry, had driven cross-country 

against hard resistance to a position 

commanding the lower end of a pass 

on the Soksa-ri-Habae-jae road about 

midway between the towns. Almond 

ordered the 3d Division to point its 

general attack at the remainder of the 

two-mile pass and, farther north, at a 

road junction some four miles due 

east of Habae-jae where the Soksa-riHabae-jae road connected with another 

road winding northeast through the 

higher Taebaeks to Yangyang on the 

coast. The seizure of these objectives, 

ordered before the withdrawal of 

enemy forces from the Soksa-riHajinbu-ri area became apparent, was 

aimed at blocking the two best roads 

behind the Chinese. Almond reinforced 

the 3d Division by attaching the ROK 

8th Division, now fully assembled in 

Chech’on, and also gave the ROK 9th 

Division (received as a result of the 

ROK III Corps’ inactivation) to General Soule along with the responsibility 

for the additional ground assigned to 

the X Corps in the Hajinbu-ri area. 

About to attack with the approximation of a corps, Soule planned to send 

his 7th and 65th Regiments toward the 

pass and road junction, bring the damaged ROK 9th Division back into action 

in the Hajinbu-ri area, and keep the 

untried ROK 8th Division in reserve.24 

24 X Corps Opn O 22, 22 May 51; X Corps POR 

238, 22 May 51; X Corps OI 183, 22 May 51; Dolcater, 

3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 211. 
474 EBB AND FLOW 

two battalions of the 9th Infantry moving forward on their flanks, had driven 

to their objective easily against light 

opposition. In the counterattack, the 

main effort was to be made on the 

Route 24 axis. The 2d Division, with 

the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team attached, was to drive on Inje, 

the 1st Marine Division to advance on 

Yangugu. Almond’s concept was that 

the two spearheads would trap the enemy forces east of Route 24 and lay 

them open to destruction by 

forces advancing on the right.27 

corps 

In the drive on Yangugu, the opening attack of the 1st Marine Division 

along the west side of Route 24 carried 

the 1st and 5th Regiments into the extremely rough ground rising toward 

Hill 1051. In a gain of about four miles, 

exhausting climbs and descents felled 

more marines than did encounters with 

rearguard forces of the backpedaling 

15th Army. A highlight of the attack was 

the recovery of eleven wounded men 

of the 2d Division by 5th Marine forces 

advancing within a mile of Hill 1051.28 

For the 2d Division’s move on Inje, 

General Rufner assigned the main effort to the 187th Airborne Regimental 

Combat Team. With Company B of the 

72d Tank Battalion attached, General 

Bowen’s combat team was to take over 

the zone of the 23d Infantry, which 

General Almond had ordered into 

corps reserve, and attack up Route 24, 

initially (as Almond also had directed) 

to seize a bridge site on the Soyang at 

Umyang-ni, six miles southwest of the 

Inje road center. On a parallel course 

Task Force Yoke, the mix of forces 

(the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry; the 

bulk of the ROK 3d Regiment; all but 

two companies of the 72d Tank Battalion; ,a platoon of the 15th Infantry’s 

tank company; a battery of the 300th 

Field Artillery Battalion; and a tactical 

air control party) organized by General 

Almond under the deputy corps commander, Colonel Ladue, had attacked 

through the lines of the ROK 7th Division in the P’ungam-ni area to seize the 

Habae-jae road junction. A combination of mean terrain, heavy, if spotty, 

resistance, and a foot-dragging performance by the South Korean troops 

had stopped Ladue three miles short 

of his objective. 25 For the general attack, 

Almond elected to replace the Yoke 

forces with Task Force Able, built 

around the 15th Regimental Combat 

Team, which was to be detached from 

the 3d Division and operate under 

corps control. Once the Able force had 

taken Habaejae and the 3d Division 

coming up from the south had captured the road junction four miles to 

the east, the task force was to be dissolved and the 15th Infantry was to join 

the operations of its own division.26 

In what amounted to the beginning 

of one of two major spearheads of the 

corps counterattack, Almond in the afternoon of the 22d had sent the 187th 

Airborne Regimental Combat Team up 

Route 24 to take the high ground 

around Han’gye. Passing through the 

23d Infantry, General Bowen’s forces, 

with a battalion of the 5th Marines and 

25 The operation had a regrettable postscript. Colonel Ladue died two days later of an apparent heart 

attack. 

26 X Corps OI 180, 21 May 51; X Corps POR 238, 

22 May 51; X Corps Opn O 22, 22 May 51; 2d Inf Div 

CofS Jnl, Entries 15, 18, 23, 26, and 27, 22 May 51. 

27 X Corps OI 182, 22 May 51; X Corps POR 238, 

22 May 51; X Corps Opn O 22, 22 May 51; X 

Special Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River.” 

Corps 

28 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, 23 May 51; 1st Marine 

Div POR 280, 23 May 51. 
THE COUNTER OFFENSIVE 

at the division’s right, the 38th Infantry was to advance along the mountain 

road running northeast from P’ungamni to Hyon-ni and then turning northwest to Inje. The 9th Infantry was to 

sweep the division’s central area.29 

With the entire 12th Army attempting 

to withdraw north between Route 24 

and the P’ungam-ni-Hyon-ni road, 2d 

Division forces advancing in that area 

on the 23d encountered only feeble delaying actions. Somewhat stouter but 

not immovable blocking positions confronted the 38th Infantry on the right, 

where the 80th Division of the 27th Army 

apparently was trying to hold open the 

Habae-jae-Sangam-ni segment of the 

road coming up from Soksa-ri. Yet 

Ruffner’s opening attack was no great 

surge forward. Average gains of four 

miles matched those of the 1st Marine 

Division and took the 2d Division only 

as far as its nearest intermediate terrain objectives in the high ground confining the Naech’on River on the north 

and northeast.30 

As originally constituted for the attack to seize the Habae-jae road junction, Task Force Able included the 15th 

Regimental Combat Team, the bulk of 

the ROK 3d Regiment, and a battery 

of the 300th Field Artillery Battalion, 

the last two units coming from the disbanded Task Force Yoke. With characteristic attention to custom making assault forces, General Almond reshaped 

the force late on the 22d, passing the 

South Koreans back to the ROK 7th 

Division, which was to go into corps 

reserve, pulling the 3d Battalion of 

the 15th Infantry and returning it to 

29 2d Inf Div Opn O 31, 22 May 51; X Corps Opn O 

22, 22 May 51. 

30 2d Inf Div PIR 211, 23 May 51; Eighth Army PIR 

315, 23 May 51; 2d Inf Div POR 618, 23 May 51. 

475 

3d Division control, and adding the 

headquarters and a company of the 2d 

Division’s 72d Heavy Tank Battalion. 

It was midafternoon before Lt. Col. 

Thomas R. Yancey, the 15th Regimental Combat Team and task force 

commander, could organize the Able 

force and open the attack. The late start 

and rugged terrain, more than enemy 

opposition, held Yancey’s gains on the 

23d to little more than a mile, well short 

of Habae-jae.31 

In the 3d Division zone, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, occupied the remainder of the pass north of Soksa-ri 

on the 23d while General Soule maneuvered other units of his “corps” forward for the advance toward the road 

junction east of Habae-jae. The 65th 

Infantry took position west of the 7th 

Infantry while the ROK 9th Division 

brought up the rear in reserve. All contacts during the day were with North 

Korean rear guards covering the Chinese 81st Division and 93d Regiment, 

31st Division, 

Habae-jae.32 

as they withdrew to 

It was obvious, especially in the I and 

IX Corps zones, that a head start and 

fast marches so far had allowed the 

main enemy bodies to ‘withdraw well 

out of the reach of the counterattack. 

General Van Fleet was nevertheless 

confident that his forces, because of the 

light opposition to their advance, still 

had a better than even chance of blocking the enemy’s main withdrawal routes 

and on the 24th pressed Milburn, 

31 X Corps Opn O 22, 22 May 51; X Corps OI 183, 

22 May 51; 2d Inf Div POR 618, 23 May 51; X Corps 

POR 239, 23 May 51. 

32 Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 212; X 

Corps Special Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River”; X 

Corps POR 239, 23 May 51; X Corps G2 Section Rpt, 

“Battle of the Soyang River,” 30 Jun 51. 
476 EBB AND FLOW 

Hoge, and Almond to quicken the pace 

of their attacks to seize their road center objectives. Van Fleet saw a particularly good opportunity to trap and destroy forces of the North Korean II, 

III, and V Corps and Chinese 12th, 20th, 

and 27th Armies in the area east of Route 

24 with a squeeze play by the X Corps 

and the ROK I Corps. Once General 

Almond had captured the Yangu-Inje 

area, he was to mount an attack northeast along Route 24 to the coast in concert with a northwestward drive by General Paik’s forces. Success would 

depend on the speed of the twopronged advance, especially on a rapid 

attack by the X Corps to block enemy 

avenues of escape.33 

General Milburn attempted to hurry 

the I Corps with orders for a top-speed 

move to line Kansas. Driving up Route 

3 ahead of the general advance, the 

89th Heavy Tank Battalion and a battalion of the 27th Infantry blocked the 

road hub on 25 May, and all three of 

Milburn’s divisions reached the Kansas 

line on the 27th. But the attack, as from 

the outset, was a fruitless pursuit. Easily outstripping Milburn’s forces, all major enemy formations on the I Corps 

front had withdrawn above the 38th 

parallel in the east and across the Imjin 

in the west.34 

The IX Corps objective on 24 May 

was the Topeka line, which in the 7th 

Division’s new zone on the east wing 

lay just above Ch’unch’on. Aiming to 

33 Rad, C 63228, CINCFE to JCS, 24 May 51; Rad, 

GX-5-4206 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, 

and X Corps, 24 May 51; Rad, GX-54218 KGOO, 

CG Eighth Army to CGs X Corps and ROK I Corps, 

24 May 51. 

34 Rad, CIACT 5-285, CG I Corps to CGs 25th and 

1st Cav Divs, 24 May 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 

May 51; I Corps G2 Section, Narrative of Enemy 

Operations, 24-27 May 51. 

ease the division’s attack and thus accelerate its coming move on the Hwach’on 

road center, General Hoge ordered 

General Ferenbaugh to lead with a 

fifteen-mile armored drive up Route 

29 into Ch’uncb’on. Following Ferenbaugh’s instructions that the 32d Infantry operating in the area straddling 

the road send a strong tank-infantry 

patrol to develop enemy defenses in 

Ch’unch’on and check the Soyang River 

above town for crossing sites, the commander of the 32d shaped a small task 

force from the attached 7th Reconnaissance Company, a platoon of the regimental tank company, and a squad of 

engineers to be led by the reconnaissance company commander, Capt. 

Charles E. Hazel. Hardly the force 

that General Hoge had envisioned-but 

then he had not been specific about its 

makeup-Task Force Hazel set out under orders simply to reconnoiter the 

Ch’unch’on area and return to regimental lines.35 

Eight miles below Ch’unch’on the 

Hazel force came under heavy small 

arms and machine gun fire from hills 

around the village of Sinjom-ni, where 

Route 29 began climbing to Wonch’ang 

pass cutting through the southern rim 

of the Ch’unch’on basin. The 60th Army 

had set a regiment in blocking positions 

along with winding stretch of road from 

Sinjom-ni through the pass but had not 

employed antitank weapons. His battalion not yet displaced far enough forward to be within range, the artillery 

observer with Captain Hazel was unable to adjust fire onto the hills. After 

searching return fire on the hillsides 

by Hazel’s gunners found few marks, 

35 The account of this task force operation is based 

on 3d Hist Det, AAR, “Task Force Hazel,” copy in 

CMH. 
THE COUNTER OFFENSIVE 477 

Hazel ordered back the members of his 

force riding in thin-skinned jeeps and 

half-tracks and continued up the road 

with eleven tanks. Once through the 

twisting pass under a hard but harmless pelting by rifle and machine gun 

fire, the armored column barreled into 

the Ch’unch’on basin and drove into 

the center of town late in the afternoon. 

Fanning out in twos and threes, Hazel’s 

tankers searched the city and both sides 

of the Soyang, killing, capturing, or 

routing about a hundred Chinese and 

punishing a large force discovered running off the back side of Hill 302 hugging Ch’unch’on on the northeast. In a 

scramble to get away from the probing 

tanks, the Chinese made no attempt to 

return fire. 

As his tank crews cleared Ch’unch’on, 

Captain Hazel received orders from his 

regimental commander to remain in 

town for the night. Two platoons of 

the regimental tank company were to 

reinforce him and bring along a resupply of rations, gasoline, and ammunition. Hazel took his force to the 

airstrip at the western edge of town 

where the flat ground allowed good 

fields of fire. While circling his tanks 

into a tight perimeter, he was asked by 

regiment if General Ferenbaugh was 

with him. The division commander, his 

aide, and escorts had started up Route 

29 in two jeeps some time earlier to 

contact Hazel’s force, but there had 

been no word from the general since 

late afternoon. Hazel knew nothing of 

Ferenbaugh’s whereabouts but could 

have correctly guessed that he had run 

into trouble at Sinjom-ni. 

Ferenbaugh and his group had come 

under the guns of the Chinese blocking force about 1630. Enemy fire swept 

the jeep carrying the escorts, leaving two dead and a third wounded 

sprawled in the road, and chased the 

general, his aide, and driver to cover 

and concealment among rocks and foliage on a hillside to the east. A division 

psychological warfare team en route to 

Ch’unch’on to broadcast a surrender 

appeal came on the scene three hours 

later and turned back to the lines of 

the 32d Infantry, where they reported 

the ambush to 1st Lt. Ivan G. Stanaway, 

a platoon leader of the regimental tank 

company then lining up his platoon on 

the road to join Task Force Hazel. 

Taking his tanks forward immediately, 

Lieutenant Stanaway picked up the 

wounded escort and determined where 

the general was. Stanaway’s crews 

found space to turn around and parked 

as close to the hillside as possible. 

There, under a peppering of small 

arms and machine gun fire, they buttoned up and waited until full dark, 

when Ferenbaugh and the men with 

him worked their way one at a time to 

Stanaway’s tank and got in through the 

escape hatch. The three reached safety 

behind the 32d Infantry’s lines around 

2100. 

Amid-and perhaps because of-the 

anxiety caused by the disappearance of 

General Ferenbaugh, Task Force Hazel shortly before dark received withdrawal orders relayed from division 

headquarters. With the Sinjom-niWonch’ang pass stretch of the road 

bordered by Chinese, the prudent move 

was to pull the force below the enemy 

blocking position for resupply. Hazel 

again worked his column through enemy fire in the pass without harm except to prisoners riding atop the tanks, 

all but one of whom were hit. Hazel 

lost two tanks farther down the road, 

one that its crew put out of commission 
478 EBB AND FLOW 

when it ran out of fuel, another that 

tumbled off the road into a deep gully 

in the darkness. At 32d Infantry headquarters Hazel learned that his force, 

enlarged as arranged earlier, was to return to Ch’unch’on the next morning 

with a battalion of the 17th Infantry, 

coming out of division reserve, following to clear the Chinese out of the pass 

and join the task force in town. 

Though not the operation General 

Hoge had in mind, Hazel’s foray on 

the 24th had accomplished more than 

simply run some Chinese out of town: 

Hazel’s reinforced column returned to 

Ch’unch’on early on the 25th without 

encountering Chinese along the road 

or in town. 36 Air observers scanning the 

ground above Ch’unch’on after daylight found over ten thousand Chinese 

jamming Route 17 and the secondary 

roads and trails leading to it. To the 

west and northwest of town they sighted 

another large mass of Chinese, which 

they estimated in the thousands, moving through the ground between Route 

17 and the Kap’yong-Chiam-ni road. 

Assuming that the tanks of Task Force 

Hazel entering Ch’unch’on on the 24th 

were the point of a large attack force 

following, the main Chinese bodies had 

begun to swarm north during the night, 

36 As the task force reentered Ch’unch’on, the 

pilot of a division observation plane scouting the 

ground a short distance southeast of town saw a-sign, 

“POW 19,” spelled with wallpaper strips and, underneath, “rescue,” spelled with’ shell cases. Dropping a 

note about the sighting to the Hazel force, the pilot 

guided three tanks assembled by Captain Hazel to the 

sign, where the tankers picked up nineteen Americans, 

eighteen enlisted marines and one enlisted Army man. 

All had been taken prisoner on 30 November 1950 at 

the Changjin Reservoir and kept with their captors 

until being left behind when the Chinese withdrew 

from the Ch’unch’on area. 

with escape through Hwach’on town 

their chief interest.37 

Artillery fire and air strikes flogging 

the Chinese with telling effect from 

midmorning on added to the disorder 

of their withdrawal. By 0930 General 

Ferenbaugh had the full 17th Infantry 

motorized and en route to Ch’unch’on, 

whence about noon the regiment attacked north as the pursuit force following the Chinese cramming Route 17 

and as the right arm of an encircling 

move to bottle the Chinese sighted to 

the west and northwest of town. Reaching around these forces on the west 

was the 21st Infantry moving up the 

Kap’yong-Chiam-ni road in the 24th 

Division zone. The juncture of the two 

regiments in the Chiam-ni area would 

place the cork in the bottle, and by dark 

the two forces were within six miles of 

doing so. Earlier, at noon, air observers located forces of the 12th and 15th 

Armies coming out of the X Corps zone. 

The observers reported some ten thousand to twelve thousand troops and numerous vehicles and artillery pieces 

moving in long columns through the 

ground below the Hwach’on Reservoir and heading northwest toward 

Hwach’on town. Artillery and an 

entire fighter group lashed these columns while General Hoge moved to 

strengthen his attack to seize the 

Hwach’on town-Hwach’on Reservoir 

road center and block their escape. 

Hoge’s orders, issued early on 26 May, 

called for the bulk of the ROK 6th 

Division, which was being pinched out 

of its central zone by the converging at37 3d Hist Det, AAR, “Task Force Hazel”; IX Corps 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps G2 Hist Rpt for 

May 51, 14 Jun 51; Rad, IXCCG 108, CG IX Corps to 

CG Eighth Army, 25 May 51. 
THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 479 

tacks of the 17th and 21st Regiments, 

to move to the corps east flank and advance with the 7th Division to seize the 

road center. Leaving the 19th Regiment 

in the central zone to attack directly 

toward Chiam-ni until pinched out, 

General Chang assembled the remainder of his division in the Ch’unch’on 

area in preparation for a move up on 

the right of the 7th Division on the 

27th.38 

The spearheading 17th and 21st 

Regiments joined forces near Chiam-ni 

early on the 26th while in the general 

IX Corps advance the 19th Regiment 

of the ROK 6th Division pushed north 

through scattered resistance and 

reached positions within three miles 

of Chiam-ni. Three regiments thus 

penned the Chinese between Route 17 

and the Kap’yong-Chiam-ni road in a 

rough triangle formed by the two roads 

and the South Korean line. Heavy, lowhanging clouds held aircraft on the 

ground all day, but artillery fire pummeled the Chinese continuously. While 

concentrating on pocketing the enemy 

group, the 17th Infantry sent a tankinfantry patrol up Route 17 toward 

Hwach’on. Four miles below town the 

patrol discovered the rear of the Chinese force observed passing through 

that area the day before. The score for 

the day was thus ‘one prize cornered 

and another, somewhat larger, lost.3g 

In the first of several attempts to 

break out of the trap below Chiam-ni, 

Chinese unknowingly attacked troops 

more accustomed to administrative and 

38 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps G2 

Daily Activities Rpt, 25 May 51: IX Corps PORs 668 

and 669, 25 May 51; 7th Inf Div POR 233, 25 May 

51; IX Corps Opn Plan 20, 24 May 51; Eighth Army 

G3 Jnl, Sum, 26 May 51. 

39 IX Corps G2 Hist Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army G3 

Jnl, Sum, 26 May 51. 

service duties than to close combat. As 

the 21st Infantry completed its advance 

to Chiam-ni, the regimental headquarters company and the medical company 

set up a joint perimeter away from any 

of the rifle companies three miles 

southwest of Chiam-ni. Some three 

hundred Chinese attacking northwest 

after midnight against the arc of the 

perimeter manned by the medical company were thrown back with heavy 

casualties. Survivors withdrew to nearby 

high ground and sprayed the perimeter with machine gun fire, lifting it from 

time to time through the night as more 

Chinese moved forward to attack. Each 

assault was turned back in close fighting. The 5th Infantry, arriving from 

the south about daylight, broke up the 

last force of Chinese to approach the 

perimeter. The defending forces lost 

two killed and twenty wounded during 

the repeated attacks. Enemy losses were 

three hundred killed, an estimated two 

hundred fifty wounded, and four hundred fifty taken captive.40 

Other Chinese groups in battalion 

strength attempted to punch their way 

north out of the trap during the early 

morning of the 27th but were knocked 

back by the forces blocking the way in 

the Chiam-ni area. After these failures 

there were no more organized efforts 

to escape, only confused clumps of Chinese moving around in search of a way 

out. While the 17th and 21st Regiments 

turned north to join the general corps 

advance, mop-up operations by the 5th 

Infantry and 19th Regiment of the 

ROK 6th Division raised the prisoner 

40 Dept of the Army GO 77, 5 Sep 51; Interv, 

Appleman with Col Gines Perez, CO, 21st Inf. For 

their outstanding performance in this action, the 

Headquarters Company and Medical Company were 

awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. 
480 EBB AND FLOW 

toll to around two thousand. During a 

final sweep of the area by the 5th Infantry on 28 May, Chinese taken captive, 

many of whom surrendered in large 

groups, brought the total to near thirtyeight thousand.41 

Action in the general corps advance 

was concentrated along Route 17 where 

Chinese fought hard to hold open the 

Hwach’on town-Hwach’on Reservoir 

escape route for the columns moving 

northwest out of the ground below the 

reservoir. Rain and heavy clouds that 

had kept aircraft on the ground finally 

lightened in the afternoon of the 27th, 

allowing air strikes along with artillery 

fire to take a heavy count of the Chinese scurrying to get above Hwach’on. 

The 17th Infantry meanwhile fought 

up Route 17 through stubborn resistance and entered Hwach’on at 1400, 

but a division of the 20th Army blocked 

the regiment’s attempts to advance 

north of town and east toward the 

reservoir. The ROK 6th Division 

moving up on the right out of the 

Ch’unch’on area met no opposition but 

advanced only a few miles through 

the rough ground below the western 

reaches of the reservoir. Much of the 

enemy’s gateway to safety thus remained open.42 

On 28 May air observers reported 

the ground below the reservoir all but 

empty of enemy forces, and the ROK 

6th Division’s move to the lake’s western edge confirmed the Chinese escape. 

The division of the 20th Army deployed 

north and east of Hwach’on town and 

another division encountered on the 

fronts of the 24th and ROK 2d Divisions to the west meanwhile showed well 

organized defenses and a determination to resist any further IX Corps advance toward the Iron Triangle.43 

Although the IX Corps had gained 

its road center objective too late to trap 

the Chinese coming from the X Corps 

zone, the overall estimate of enemy 

casualties during the corps’ counterattack, including the last three days of 

May, exceeded 62,000. Smaller losses 

during the Chinese offensive raised the 

corps estimate to more than 73,000, of 

which 44,705 were reported killed, 

19,753 wounded, and 8,749 captured. 

During all of May, IX Corps units 

themselves suffered 341 killed, 2,011 

wounded, and 195 missing.44 

General Hoge’s attempt on 24 May 

to quicken the IX Corps’ advance with 

an armored attack into Ch’unch’on was 

matched early the same day by General 

Almond’s order for an armored attack 

up Route 24 by the 2d Division to seize 

the Umyang-ni bridge site on the Soyang. More detailed in his order than 

Hoge had been, Almond directed General Ruffner to assemble a task force of 

two tank companies, an infantry battalion, and engineers at Han’gye and 

start up the road at noon. He instructed 

Ruffner to place the task force under 

the commander of the division’s 72d 

Tank Battalion, Colonel Brubaker, then 

in the P’ungam-ni area where his headquarters and one company had been 

with Task Force Yoke and Task Force 

Able.45 

41 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps G2 

43 IX Corps G2 Daily Activ Rpt, 28 May 51; IX 

Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps G2 Hist 

Daily Activ Rpt, 27 and 28 May 51; Eighth Army G3 Rpt, May 51. 

Jnl, Sum, 27 and 28 May 51. 

42 IX Corps G2 Hist Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army G3 

44 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

45 X Corps OI 184, 24 May 51; 2d Inf Div CofS Jnl, 

Jnl, Sum, 27 May 51. Entry 2, 24 May 51. 
THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 481 

Ruffner was pressed for time to open 

the operation within the few hours Almond allowed. While having Colonel 

Brubaker flown to Han’gye, Ruffner 

assigned the mission to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, already operating along Route 24, and 

the two nearest tank companies; B of 

the 72d, already attached to the regiment, and B of the 64th, a 3d Division 

unit given to the 2d Division earlier in 

one of the many unit shifts made under corps orders. General Bowen selected his 2d Battalion for the operation and placed his executive officer, 

Col. William Gerhardt, in command of 

the task force.46 

Despite all the haste, it was almost 

1100 by the time Colonel Brubaker 

reached General Bowen’s command 

post, half past noon before Colonel 

Gerhardt issued final instructions, and 

1300 when Brubaker started the armored point of the task force up Route 

24. The point commander, Maj. 

Charles A. Newman of Brubaker’s staff, 

led his tank platoon, engineer platoon, 

and reconnaissance squad up the road 

slowly, as directed by Colonel Gerhardt, 

with engineers in the lead probing for 

mines-a prudent precaution given the 

recent experience of Brubaker’s battalion in the Chaun-ni area. Around 1400 

Major Newman halted his tanks about 

six miles above Han’gye while engineers 

checked the road ahead and while he 

took time to correct faulty radio communications with the reconnaissance 

squad. Arriving over the scene by helicopter, General Almond, already unhappy over the tardy start of the operation, landed to learn the reason for the 

halt. He ordered Newman to forget 

communications, to move his tanks at 

twenty miles an hour, and to “keep 

going until you hit a mine.”17 

As Newman took his tanks forward 

in fifth gear, Almond flew south to 

check on the main body of the task 

force, which he found still forming. Exploding with impatience, he ordered 

Colonel Gerhardt to get the tanks moving whether or not they had infantry 

support. When getting trucks out of the 

way and getting the last tanks out of 

the streambed onto the road took even 

more time, Almond relieved Brubaker 

of his battalion command. Despite 

pressure from the general, it was midafternoon before the tanks started forward with the rest of the task force 

following.48 

During this stir to the south, Major 

Newman’s point force drove rapidly 

through clumps of Chinese visibly rattled by the appearance of tanks and 

came up on the rear of some four thousand Chinese scrambling north under 

punishing air attacks about a mile below Umyang-ni. Finding room to deploy in a skirmish line, Newman’s tank 

crews opened fire with all weapons as 

Chinese broke for the hills on both sides 

of the road or fled north across the 

Soyang, leaving behind a litter of dead, 

supplies, pack animals, and vehicles. 

By 1630 Newman’s tankers entered 

Umyang-ni and took up positions to 

continue firing on enemy groups scurrying for safety both below and above 

the river. By the time the main body of 

Task Force Gerhardt arrived two hours 

later, Newman’s point was in full possession of the bridge site.49 

46 8th Hist Det, AAR, “Task Force Gerhardt,” copy 47 8th Hist Det, AAR, “Task Force Gerhardt.” 

in CMH; 2d Inf Div CofS Jnl, Entries 3 and 4, 24 May 48 Ibid. 

51. 49 Ibid. 
482 EBB AND FLOW 

With the Gerhardt force occupying 

the lower bank of the Soyang, General 

Almond late on the 24th issued instructions for attacks to carry out General 

Van Fleet’s earlier order for the twopronged trap by the X Corps and ROK 

I Corps. Coming out of corps reserve, 

the 23d Infantry moving up Route 24 

on the morning of the 25th was to pass 

through the Gerhardt force and establish a bridgehead over the Soyang, 

throwing a treadway over the river, 

then was to seize Inje to block large 

enemy groups that air observers on the 

24th had sighted withdrawing up the 

P’ungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje road. Behind these groups, the 38th Infantry 

was to continue its pursuit. In getting 

within ten miles of Hyon-ni on the 24th, 

that regiment had had as much trouble 

with the roadbed giving way under its 

tanks and with the sharp pitch of the 

bordering ridges as with knots of North 

Korean delaying forces.50 

After the 23d Infantry established 

the Soyang bridgehead, Task Force 

Gerhardt and the remainder of the 

187th Airborne Regimental Combat 

Team were to assemble under corps 

control just south of Umyang-ni to form 

Task Force Baker for a rapid drive over 

Route 24, beginning on the morning 

of the 26th, to seize Kansong on the 

coast. ‘The 2d Division, less the 9th 

Infantry, which General Almond ordered into corps reserve and replaced 

in the area between Route 24 and the 

P’ungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje road with 

the ROK 5th Division, was to continue 

clearing its zone. At the same time, the 

23d Infantry, following Task Force 

Baker, was to give particular attention 

50 X Corps OI 186, 24 May 51; 2d Inf Div OI 75, 25 

May 51, and POR 619, 24 May 51; 38th Inf S2 Jnl, 

Sum, 24 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 

to preventing enemy forces from moving above the Inje-Kansong segment 

of Route 24. In a further remodeling, 

Almond dissolved Task Force Able, as 

previously planned, and reassigned its 

zone to the 3d Division, which, with the 

ROK 9th and 8th Divisions still attached, was to continue clearing its wide 

east flank zone. On the corps’ opposite 

flank, the 1st Marine Division was to 

continue its drive along the west side of 

Route 24, a drive which again on the 

24th had amounted to a plodding short 

advance, to capture the Yanggu area.51 

As part of the operation to seize the 

Umyang-ni bridge site and subsequently the Yanggu-Inje area, General Almond had directed the 1st Marine Division to have a regiment follow 

Task Force Gerhardt up Route 24 as 

far as five miles below Umyang-ni 

where a lateral trail intersected from 

the east and continued northwest toward the Soyang. Veering off at the 

intersection, the Marine regiment was 

to occupy prominent high ground four 

miles west of Umyang-ni to strengthen 

the hold on the bridge site and to control the trail, which Almond believed 

enemy forces would attempt to use as a 

withdrawal route. General Thomas 

pulled the 7th Marines out of reserve 

for the mission, but because of a late 

start, a shortage of trucks, and enemy 

resistance to the leading battalion on a 

hill bordering the road northwest of 

Chaun-ni, the regiment by nightfall was 

still some seven miles short of its objective. Along the east side of the road, 

the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, less its battalion with Task 

Force Gerhardt, also had made only 

short advances against scattered enemy 

51 X Corps OI 186, 24 May 51, and Opn O 23, 25 

May 51. 
THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 483 

groups during the day. Thus the lateral trail, now located about halfway 

between the front of the Marine and 

airborne troops and the Gerhardt force 

at Umyang-ni, remained open.52 

Shortly before dark, air observers 

reported about two thousand enemy 

troops moving west on the trail onto 

Route 24 and beyond. They were from 

12th Army units, which continued to 

cross the road during the night, their 

movement not again picked up by 

observers until noon on the 25th as 

they entered the ground below the 

Hwach’on Reservoir in the IX Corps 

zone. To protect their passage across 

Route 24, the 106th Regiment of the 

34th Division organized a deep position 

extending over two miles below the 

road’s intersection with the trail to hold 

off attacks from the south. With no 

position established to the north, the 

intersection was open to seizure by Task 

Force Gerhardt. But Colonel Gerhardt 

sent no forces down the road, even after all but one of twenty trucks sent 

back for supplies were destroyed and 

all but two of the drivers were killed at 

the Chinese position.53 

Alerted by the ambush of the truck 

convoy, General Ruffner ordered the 

23d Infantry to move forward at daylight to clear the roadblock. At each 

position of the deep block, forces of 

the 106th Regiment fought a dogged defense until virtually annihilated. Regimental tanks broke through on the road 

and reached Task Force Gerhardt in 

the afternoon, but darkness fell before 

52 X Corps OI 184 24 May 51; 1st Marine Div Hist 

Diary, May 51; X Corps POR 240, 24 May 51. 

53 2d Inf Div CofS Jnl, Entries 21, 23, and 25, 24 

May 51; X Corps G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang 

River,” 30 Jun 51; 2d Inf Div PIR 213, 25 May 51, 

and POR 620, 25 May 51; 2d Inf Div CofS Jnl, Entry 

4, 25 May 51. 

the 23d Infantry eliminated the enemy 

regiment and reached the intersection 

to stop for the night. Attacking crosscountry on the west flank of the 23d 

Infantry, the 7th Marines met little resistance but moved no farther than to 

come abreast. Behind the roadblock, 

12th Army forces meanwhile had continued to stream across Route 24 and up 

the trail to the northwest until the 106th 

Regiment was all but wiped out. Then 

they avoided Task Force Gerhardt by 

veering northeast, forded the Soyang, 

and headed toward Yanggu.54 

The 38th Infantry’s pursuit of 

enemy groups escaping up the road 

through Hyon-ni to Inje on the 25th 

was halted by stubborn resistance from 

two North Korean battalions deployed 

at the junction with the road coming 

up from Habae-jae two miles below 

Sangam-ni. Supporting artillery battalions reached out for the enemy withdrawing behind the block, but many of 

the groups were already well up the 

road and out of range. To supply further evidence that the enemy withdrawal was outdistancing the pursuit, 

the 9th Infantry, moving through its 

central zone until relieved by the 35th 

Regiment of the ROK 5th Division, 

made almost no contact, and the reinforced 3d Division encountered only 

light, scattered resistance as the 7th Infantry came up to the division’s road 

junction objectives east of Habae-jae 

and as attached South Korean forces 

on the extreme east flank moved into 

the ground above Route 20.55 

54 2d Inf Div POR 620, 25 May 51; 2d Inf Div 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, 

May 51; 2d Inf Div PIR 213, 25 May 51; 1st Marine 

Div Hist Diary, May 51. 

55 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf S2 

Jnl, Sum, 25 May 51; 2d Inf Div POR 620, 25 May 51; 

9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 
484 EBB AND FLOW 

Still hopeful of trapping and eliminating sizable enemy groups below 

Route 24, General Almond urged General Thomas to accelerate the 1st Marine Division’s advance on Yanggu and 

pressed General Ruffner to bridge the 

Soyang and seize Inje so that Task 

Force Baker could form and open its 

drive on Kansong. Almond also added 

a shallower swing to his attempt to cut 

off enemy forces ahead of the ROK I 

Corps, ordering the 3d Division to organize a reinforced regimental combat 

team as Task Force Charlie and send it 

over the road leading northeastward 

from the Habae-jae area on the morning of 26 May to take Yangyang on the 

coast.56 

There was still one opportunity to 

intercept a sizable enemy force. After 

the rain lightened enough to allow aircraft aloft in the afternoon of the 26th, 

observers scanned the corps zone. The 

Hyon-ni-Inje stretch of road and connecting roads running north and west 

beyond Inje remained aswarm with enemy troops and vehicles. Artillery 

supporting the 38th Infantry was far 

enough forward to fire on the road up 

to two miles beyond Hyon-ni, and 

during the remaining hours of daylight fighter-bombers attacked enemy 

groups in and around Inje while B-26s 

laced the forces between Inje and 

Hyon-ni with thirteen tons of bombs, 

all producing a high score of casualties. 

The pursuit of the 38th Infantry, however, came to an abrupt halt three miles 

short of Hyon-ni in the face of strong 

rearguard action by the 19th Regiment, 

North Korean 13th Division. Below the 

38th, the 3d Division’s Task Force 

Charlie built around the 7th Infantry 

56 X Corps OI 187, 25 May 51; 2d Inf Div Cofs Jnl, 

Entries 22, 23, and 25, 25 May 51. 

moved only four miles toward Yangyang before minefields and a destroyed 

bridge blocked any further advance. To 

the north along Route 24, the attack of 

the 23d Infantry also was stopped 

short. Sweeping one enemy group off 

high ground bordering Route 24 below Umyang-ni, the regiment reached 

and crossed the Soyang before noon. 

Leaving a battalion to protect engineers 

while they bridged the river during the 

afternoon, Colonel Chiles sent the remainder of his regiment toward Inje. 

But the advance ended some five miles 

from the town when stubborn North 

Korean 12th Division forces refused to 

give up blocking positions until well past 

dark. 

A swifter advance was clearly required if enemy passage through the 

Inje road center was to be blocked and 

any substantial part of the enemy 

throng on the Hyon-ni-Inje road 

rolled up from the south. The 27th Army 

was already above Route 24 en route 

through the area above the Hwach’on 

Reservoir to take position behind the 

20th Army along Route 17, and the 

North Korean V Corps was beginning 

to organize defenses between the reservoir and the outskirts of Inje. The latter’s 6th Division entering the Yanggu 

area would oppose the 1st Marine Division, which on the 26th was still moving forces up to the Soyang for its attack 

on the town. As the 23d Infantry had 

discovered, the 12th Division was coming in alongside the 6th to defend the 

ground reaching east to Inje. Still on 

the road below Inje, the 32d Division 

was to move into a corps reserve posi57 X Corps POR 242, 26 May 51; 2d Inf Div POR 

621, 26 May 51, and PIR 214, 26 May 51; 38th Inf 

Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, 

May 51. 
THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 485 

positions and minefields covered by fire 

so slowed the advance that Hyon-ni was 

not occupied until dusk, and the drive 

on Inje was postponed.60 

On Route 24, Task Force Baker 

fought through stubborn resistance and 

entered Inje at 1430, but it was evening before the task force and two battalions of the following 23d Infantry 

cleared the town. No time remained 

for the task force to drive on toward 

Kansong. To the west, the 7th Marines 

crossed the Soyang River to open the 

1st Marine Division’s northward attack 

to seize Yanggu, but though the regiment encountered only scattered enemy groups, it was still six miles from 

the town at nightfall.61 

Since it was obvious by the 27th that 

the slowness of the Eighth Army in seizing its road center objectives had 

allowed most major Chinese units, 

mangled as they were, to escape entrapment, General Van Fleet laid out 

Operation PILEDRIVER to extend the 

reach of the counterattack.62 In the 

west, the I Corps and IX Corps were to 

seize line Wyoming to cut enemy lines 

of communication at the base of the 

Iron Triangle and to block the main 

roads running southeast out of the triangle toward the Hwach’on Reservoir 

and Ch’unch’on. The weight of the 

western attack was to be in the zone of 

tion. Farthest south on the road, the 

North Korean II Corps planned to deploy the 27th Division around Inje, the 

2d Division next to the east, and the 13th 

Division, currently covering the corps’ 

rear, on the east flank. Other than 

this jam of North Korean troops between Hyon-ni and Inje, the only enemy forces still below Route 24 were 

stragglers and isolated groups that had 

become separated from their units in 

the confusion of the withdrawal.58 

Urging speedy attacks to bag the enemy forces remaining below Route 24, 

General Almond directed Task Force 

Baker to lead the attack on Inje on the 

27th, leaving bypassed enemy troops 

to the left and right of the road to the 

following 23d Infantry, and to be prepared to proceed to Kansong in coordination with the advance of the ROK I 

Corps toward the same objective. Since 

General Paik’s forces had entered 

Yangyang on the 26th, Almond meanwhile canceled the Task Force Charlie 

attack toward the town.59 

Rain during the morning of the 27th 

and heavy low clouds throughout the 

day limited flights by air observers, but 

they were able to confirm a continuous 

enemy exodus to the north. They reported one group of some seven thousand moving along the Hyon-ni-Inje 

road ahead of the 38th Infantry. The 

regiment pursued with tanks on the 

road and an infantry battalion moving 

overland on each side. The remaining 

battalion was to move up after Hyon-ni 

was taken and, with the tanks, push on 

to Inje. But North Korean blocking 

58 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53; X Corps 

G2 Section Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River,” 30 Jun 

51; Rad, X 19869, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 

26 May 51. 

59 X Corps OI 188, 27 May 51; Rad, X 19870, CG X 

Corps to CG 3d Div, 27 May 51. 

60 2d Inf Div POR 622, 27 May 51; 38th Inf S2 Jnl, 

Sum, 27 May 51; 2d Inf 

61 

Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 5 1. 

X Corps POR 243, 27 May 51. 

62 The 25th Division, General Van Fleet judged, 

should have taken the I Corps’ road center objective 

below Ch’orwon three days sooner that it did: the 7th 

Division should have occupied the Hwach’on area in 

the IX Corps zone a day earlier; and, while he commended General Almond’s attempts to energize the 

advance of the X Corps, he believed the 1st Marine 

Division and the 2d Division could have made far 

faster moves toward Yanggu and Inje. See Interv, 

Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51. 
486 EBB AND FLOW 

THE PUNCHBOWL 

the I Corps. Reinforced by the 3d Division and its attached ROK 9th Division, 

to be transferred from the X Corps, 

and backed up by the 187th Airborne 

Regimental Combat Team, also to be 

taken from the X Corps and placed in 

army reserve in Seoul, General Milburn 

was to seize the Ch’orwon-Kumhwa 

area. In a narrowed IX Corps zone, 

General Hoge’s forces were to occupy commanding ground beyond 

Hwach’on town to block the roads 

reaching southeast out of Kumhwa.63 

63 LOI, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X 

Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and 2d Inf Div, 27 May 51; 

Rads, GX-5-5055 KGOP and GX-5-5 152 KGOP, CG 

East of the reservoir, after completing operations to capture the YangguInje area and reach Kansong on the 

east coast, the X Corps and ROK I 

Corps were to seize and establish defensive positions along a newly drawn segment of line Kansas running northeast 

from the reservoir across the southern 

rim of a hollow circle of mountains 

aptly called the “Punchbowl” to the 

coastal town of Kojin-ni, five miles 

above Kansong. Following generally the 

same prominent ridge traced by earlier 

phase lines in the sector, the new KanEighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps and 187th 

Abn RCT, 27 and 28 May 51, respectively. 
THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE 

sas segment lay well above Route 24. 

Once on the adjusted line, both corps 

could use the road as their main supply 

route and, in addition, could receive 

supplies through the port at Kansong.64 

Van Fleet had in mind another use 

for Kansong as part of an operation he 

planned to open on 6 June to isolate 

and destroy enemy forces who had succeeded in withdrawing above Route 24 

into the area northeast of the Hwach’on 

Reservoir. Under X Corps control, part 

of the 1st Marine Division was to stage 

through Kansong for a quick shore-toshore movement to establish a beachhead at the junction of Route 17 and 

the coastal road in the T’ongch’on area 

some twenty-eight miles on the north. 

The remainder of the division was to 

join the beachhead by moving up the 

coastal road. Once reassembled, the 

Marine division was to attack down 

Route 17 while the IX Corps drove up 

the same road out of the Kumhwa area 

to seal off the area to the southeast. 

Enemy forces caught in the trap were 

then to be systematically destroyed. 

Van Fleet needed General Ridgway’s 

approval for an operation of these 

proportions beyond the Kansas and 

Wyoming lines, and on 28 May he made 

that request, urging in his message that 

the “potentiality of enemy defeat should 

over-ride any objections.65 

Unconvinced that such was the case, 

64 Ibid. 

65 Rad, GX-5-5099 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to 

CINCFE, 28 May 51. 

487 

Ridgway flew to Seoul late on the 28th. 

There he presented to Van Fleet all of 

the reasons why the T’ongch’on operation should not be undertaken. The 

sum of his reasons was that the possible 

benefits of the operation did not justify 

the risks entailed. The Eighth Army’s 

mission, he reminded Van Fleet, was to 

exact maximum enemy losses at minimum cost while maintaining UNC 

forces intact, and this mission could best 

be carried out in a gradual advance to 

lines Kansas and Wyoming. In that 

connection, Ridgway did approve Van 

Fleet’s adjustment of line Kansas east 

of the Hwach’on Reservoir. Looking 

ahead to the time when the Eighth 

Army reached lines Kansas and Wyoming, Ridgway before leaving Korea 

on 29 May instructed Van Fleet to prepare an estimate of the situation covering the next sixty days along with recommendations on operations. As he 

undertook this contingency planning, 

Van Fleet on 1 June directed his corps 

commanders to fortify lines Kansas 

and Wyoming upon reaching them 

and thereafter to conduct limited objective attacks, reconnaissance in force, 

and patrolling.66 Under the circumstances, at least at the time, he had no 

alternative. 

66 Rad, CX 63580, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army 

Personal for Van Fleet, 28 May 51; MFR (memo for 

the record), 31 May 51, sub: Conference Between 

General Ridgway and General Van Fleet; LOIS (letters of instruction), CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, 

and X Corps, and to CG ROK I Corps, both 1 Jun 51. 
CHAPTER XXVII 

Substitute for Victory 

Ridgway’s Mission Redefined 

General Ridgway, like his predecessor, considered the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

directives governing his duties as Commander in Chief, U.N. Command, and 

as Commander in Chief, Far East, to 

be deficient in important respects. 

Within a week of replacing General 

MacArthur, Ridgway had attempted to 

change one provision that he believed 

diminished his ability to carry out his 

overriding mission of defending Japan, 

specifically of defending the islands 

against an attack by the Soviet Union. 

Since intelligence estimates accorded 

the Soviets the capability of launching 

an attack with little or no warning, he 

asked the Joint Chiefs for independent 

authority to withdraw his forces from 

Korea to Japan should the Soviets 

attack. It was not that Ridgway expected 

an attack but that he considered it just 

as urgent to be prepared to deal with 

what the Soviets could do as with what 

they might do.1 

An ongoing review of U.S. objectives and courses of action in Korea partially conditioned the Joint Chiefs’ response to Ridgway’s request. Although 

1 For more detailed coverage of events described in 

this section, see Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 

382-85, 390-93; Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 298, 

302-05; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 168-69; Rees, 

Korea: The Limited War, pp. 223-27, 264-83; Truman, 

Years of Trial and Hope, p. 456. Unless otherwise noted, 

this section is based on the above sources. 

General MacArthur’s pronouncement 

of late March had spoiled President 

Truman’s initiative to open armistice 

negotiations, examination of the pros 

and cons of a cease-fire and of other 

steps that should be or might have to 

be taken to settle the Korean situation 

continued. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 

submitting recommendations to the National Security Council on 5 April, had 

for the first time declared that the war, 

let alone the whole of the Korean problem, could not be resolved satisfactorily by military action alone. In their 

estimation, the best course for the 

United Nations Command depended 

upon the future action of the Soviet 

Union. If the Soviets did not start 

a general war, the U.N. Command 

should remain in Korea and maintain 

pressure on enemy forces with a view 

to a satisfactory armistice; if the Soviets 

did open a general war or intervene 

in Korea, the U.N. Command should 

withdraw from the peninsula. 

Because these recommendations 

were under review at the time of Ridgway’s request, the Joint Chiefs preferred to retain control of any withdrawal from Korea. On 1 May they sent 

Ridgway new instructions governing 

combat operations in which they also 

restricted the depth of any Eighth 

Army general advance. Ridgway was to 

make no general move beyond the combined trace of lines Kansas and Wyo- 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 489 

ming without prior approval. He could 

go farther north on his own, but only 

in limited operations designed to keep. 

enemy forces off balance, to maintain 

contact, to insure the safety of his command. Ridgway himself had similarly 

restricted general advances in his initial instructions to General Van Fleet. 

But the Joint Chiefs preferred to assume control, in part because their recommendations were still under study 

and in part because they believed that 

potential armistice negotiations could 

develop more easily if the general 

Eighth Army drive into North Korea 

was kept so shallow that Chinese and 

North Korean authorities could see advantages in accepting a line of demarcation along the main line of contact.2 

Ridgway complained to the Joint 

Chiefs that their instructions seriously 

abridged “the authority and freedom 

of action I believe you intend me to 

have in order to discharge assigned 

responsibilities.” Since his military objective in Korea as stated in the 1 May 

directive was to destroy the Chinese and 

North Korean forces operating “within 

the geographic boundaries of Korea 

and waters adjacent thereto,” he believed he should be the one who held 

authority over a general advance above 

the Kansas-Wyoming trace. And since 

his mission as Commander in Chief, Far 

East, of defending Japan had priority 

over his objective as Commander in 

Chief, U.N. Command, in Korea, he 

believed he should be the one who decided when his forces would withdraw 

from Korea to take up the defense of 

Japan. The Joint Chiefs replied that 

strategic considerations (without stating 

precisely what these considerations 

2 Rads, JCS 88950 and JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 

19 Apr and 1 May 51, respectively. 

were) required that they themselves 

control any withdrawal from Korea, 

that Ridgway’s instructions were in 

keeping with existing national objectives, and that, consequently, the instructions would not be altered. The 

Joint Chiefs did emphasize, though, 

that these objectives were currently under review and that Ridgway’s mission 

would be made to accord with President Truman’s action on forthcoming 

recommendations of the National Security Council.3 

The security council first met to consider the Joint Chiefs’ April recommendations on 2 May. On the following day 

the Senate Committees on Armed 

Services and on Foreign Relations convened jointly to inquire into the military situation in the Far East and the 

relief of General MacArthur. Invited 

earlier to speak to a joint session of the 

Congress, MacArthur had made an eloquent and dramatic statement of his 

convictions. He again had proposed the 

retaliatory measures-now softened 

somewhat-against China first recommended to the Joint Chiefs in December and again had insisted, as in his 

March letter to Congressman Martin, 

that there was “no substitute for victory.” First to speak at the Senate hearings, he forcefully elaborated on the 

points he had made before the full 

Congress, and, in urging decisive steps 

to end the war, he explained that there 

was at the present “no policy-there is 

nothing, I tell you, no plan, or anything.” 4 

Media reports of MacArthur’s speech 

and testimony generated considerable 

3 Rad, C 62088, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 9 May 51; 

Rad, JCS 90999, JCS to CINCFE, 12 May 51. 

4 MacArthur Hearings, p. 68. 
490 EBB AND FLOW 

public interest in the issues involved. 

That interest, in turn, spurred the National Security Council to develop a 

clear and practicable statement of military and political policy in Korea. Concluding its deliberations on 16 May, the 

security council produced a statement 

evolved from the recommendations of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other advisory bodies, including allies. On the 

following day President Truman approved the statement, which introduced 

no new concepts but did at last firmly 

and officially declare that the United 

States would seek to conclude the fighting in Korea under suitable armistice arrangements. General MacArthur’s protests notwithstanding, there was to be 

at least an attempt to produce a substitute for victory. 

General Ridgway meanwhile continued trying to clarify his directives, sending two members of his staff to Washington to present his views on what he 

considered to be points of ambiguity 

and conflict. Their consultations coincided with the establishment of the new 

policy: While the policy had little effect 

on revisions made to clarify Ridgway’s 

responsibilities and authorities as Commander in Chief, Far East, it brought 

about a major redefinition of his mission as Commander in Chief, U.N. 

Command. In new instructions sent 

on 1 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

directed Ridgway: 

you will, consistent with the security of your 

forces, inflict maximum personnel and materiel losses on the forces of North Korea 

and Communist China operating within the 

geographic boundaries of Korea and adjacent waters, in order to create conditions 

favorable to a settlement of the Korean conflict which would as a minimum: 

a. Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements. 

b. Establish authority of the ROK over 

all Korea south of a northern boundary so 

located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 

38th Parallel. 

c. Provide for withdrawal by stages of 

non-Korean armed forces from Korea. 

d. Permit the building of sufficient ROK 

military power to deter or repel a renewed 

North Korean aggression.5 

Retaining the authority they had assumed over general Eighth Army advances, the Joint Chiefs further instructed Ridgway: 

With regard to ground operations you will 

obtain approval of JCS prior to undertaking any general advance beyond some line 

passing through the Hwachon Reservoir 

duct such tactical operations as may be necarea. You are, however, authorized to conessary or desirable to insure safety of your 

command, to maintain contact, and to continue to harass the enemy. This includes 

guerrilla o perations and limited amphibious and air 

areas.6 

borne operations in enemy rear 

Although the Joint Chiefs had previously issued similar instructions to 

govern the operations of the Eighth 

Army after it reached the Kansas and 

Wyoming lines, the latest directive at 

least gave the underlying objective of 

those operations more definite shape. 

Their future course, in the main, was 

to be designed to support a negotiated 

end to hostilities. 

Not yet in possession of his new instructions but informed of their development and essential content by his 

staff officers in Washington, General 

Ridgway in assessing the results of recent operations for the Joint Chiefs on 

30 May indicated that conditions in Ko5 Rad, JCS 92831, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Jun 51. 

6 Ibid. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 491 

rea already were favorable, at least on 

a short term basis, for seeking to open 

armistice negotiations. Enemy forces, 

he reported, had suffered a defeat so 

costly that without reinforcement from 

China they would not again be capable 

of attacks as strong as those launched 

in April and May; even assuming-as 

some prisoner and agent reports indicated-that a new Chinese army group 

arrived in Korea, the Eighth Army 

within the next two months could face 

enemy forces no stronger than those it 

had already soundly defeated. Thus, 

for the next sixty days, he predicted, 

“the United States Government should 

be able to count with reasonable assurance upon a military situation in Korea 

offering optimum advantages in support of its diplomatic negotiations.” 7 

Predicting further that as an immediate course enemy forces would attempt 

to put up strong defenses below the 

Iron Triangle and in the ground flanking the triangle on the east and west, 

he outlined General Van Fleet’s preparations to advance through these defenses toward line Wyoming and toward the altered segment of line Kansas 

east of the Hwach’on Reservoir. Barring the arrival and rapid deployment 

of sizable Chinese reinforcements, 

Ridgway expected the Eighth Army to 

reach these lines within two weeks. If 

the attack progressed as he expected, 

he told the Joint Chiefs, he would within a few days give his recommendations 

for operations to follow the Eighth 

Army’s seizure of its Kansas-Wyoming 

objectives.8 

Operation Piledriver 

For advancing the I Corps right to 

line Wyoming, General Milburn on 28 

May laid out an attack by three divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division moving 

along the west side of Route 33 to occupy the segment of the line slanting 

southwest of Ch’orwon to the Imjin 

River, the 3d Division advancing on the 

Route 33 axis to take the Ch’orwon base 

of the Iron Triangle, and the 25th Division attacking astride Route 3 to seize 

the triangle’s eastern base at Kumhwa. 

In the IX Corps zone, General Hoge 

also organized a three-division attack 

to occupy the Wyoming trace reaching 

southeastward from Kumhwa to the 

Hwach’on Reservoir. Nearest Kumhwa, 

the ROK 2d Division and the 7th Division were to seize Wyoming objectives 

along and ‘above the stretch of Route 

17 leading northwest into the Iron Triangle from Hwach’on town. On the 

right, the ROK 6th Division was to advance above the western half of the 

Hwach’on Reservoir between Route 17 

and the Pukhan River.9 

While Milburn and Hoge organized 

full-blown attacks to start on 3 June in 

the I Corps zone and 5 June in the IX 

Corps zone, forces edging above line 

Kansas in preliminary advances in both 

corps zones encountered stiff opposition. As General Ridgway had predicted, the Chinese were determined 

to hold the Iron Triangle and adjacent ground as long as possible. Then 

drenching rains during the last two days 

of May began to turn roads into boggy 

tracks and, along with low clouds and 

7 Rad, C 63744, CINCFE for JCS, 30 May 51. 

8 Ibid. 

9 I Corps Opn O 7, 28 May 51; IX Corps Opn O 22, 

28 May 51. 
492 EBB AND FLOW 

ENGINEERS SEARCH FOR MINES ahead of tank, Ch’orwon area, June 1951. 

fog, limited close air support and both 

air and ground observation. Two clear 

days followed, but as the full attacks 

got under way on 3 June rainstorms 

returned to hamper operations through 

the 5th.10 

Aided by the bad weather, Chinese 

delaying forces fighting doggedly from 

dug-in regimental positions arranged 

in depth held the advance to a crawl 

through 8 June, then finally gave way 

under the pressure and began a phased 

withdrawal, moving north in what air 

observers estimated as battalion-size 

10 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, May 51; Tech Rpt, Weather Effect on Army 

Operations: Weather in the Korean Conflict, vol. II, ch. 

XIV, “Operation Piledriver.” 

groups. Against declining resistance 

and in drier weather, the assault divisions occupied their line Wyoming objectives between 9 and 11 June. In the 

I Corps zone., General Milburn sent 

tank-infantry patrols up each side of 

the Iron Triangle on 13 June to investigate P’yonggang at its apex. The patrols met no resistance en route and 

found P’yonggang deserted. The Chinese defenders of the triangle had 

taken up positions in commanding 

ground northeast and northwest of the 

town. IX Corps forces reconnoitering 

northeast of Kumhwa located Chinese 

defenses below the town of Kumsong. 

Rimmed on the north by Chinese and 

on the south by the I and IX Corps, the 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 

coveted road complex in the Iron Triangle area now lay largely unusable in 

no-man’s-land. 11 

East of the Hwach’on Reservoir, 

North Korean forces opposing the X 

Corps advance gage ground even more 

grudgingly than the Chinese in the Iron 

Triangle. It was the end of May before 

the 1 st Marine Division captured Yanggu and longer before other corps forces 

completed mop-up operations in the 

ground east of Inje and Hyon-ni. Two 

regiments of marines moved north of 

Yanggu on 1 June, but only on the 4th 

could General Almond open a coordinated attack by the 1st Marine Division 

and ROK 5th Division toward line Kansas and the Punchbowl some six miles 

above the corps front. By that date the 

ROK I Corps, advancing three divisions 

abreast along the east coast, had driven 

through spotty resistance and occupied 

its line Kansas segment slanting across 

the first high ridge above Route 24. 

Having far outdistanced the X Corps, 

General Paik was obliged to refuse his 

inland flank in strength against the possibility of enemy attacks from the direction of the Punchbowl.12

The six-mile attack to the Punchbowl 

involved General Almond’s forces in 

some of the most difficult conditions of 

combat. In some areas, sharply pitched 

axial ridges limited advances to extremely narrow fronts; in others, repetitions of steep transverse ridges forced 

assault troops to make arduous climbs 

11 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jun 51; IX Corps Comd 

Rpt, Nar, Jun 51. 

12 X Corps Sp ecial Rpt, “Battle of the Soyang River”; 

Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, 

pp. 133, 141; Rad, X 19979, CG X Corps to CG Eighth 

Army. 3 Jun 51; Rads F747 and F521, ROK I Corps 

to Eighth Army, 28 May and 4 Jun 51, respectively; 

Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jun 51. 

493 

and descents over and over again. The 

two main arterial roads, through the 

Sochon River valley in the west and the 

Soyang River valley in the east, were 

heavily mined. Other access roads-the 

few that existed-winding through the 

mountains were narrow and required 

substantial engineering work before 

supply trucks could use them. Spates 

of rain frequently caused landslides that 

blocked the roads or so slickened them 

that trucks skidded off at hairpin turns. 

From time to time the rain and fog limited air support and observation. Most 

difficult of all were the North Korean 

defenders. They were in well organized 

fortified positions on every ridge; they 

gave no ground voluntarily; and, after 

losing a position, they counterattacked 

quickly in an attempt to regain it.13 

On 8 June General Almond widened 

his attack, inserting a regiment of the 

ROK 7th Division on the left to clear 

the ground above the eastern half of 

the Hwach’on Reservoir while the 1st 

Marine Division concentrated on taking the lower lip of the Punchbowl and 

the segment of line Kansas astride the 

Sochon River valley to the southwest. 

Accordingly, General Thomas, the Marine division commander, committed 

his reserves on the 9th so that he had 

four regiments in the attack. First to 

slug through the bitter North Korean 

resistance was the regiment of the ROK 

7th Division, which reached line Kansas on 10 June. The marines and ROK 

5th Division took a week longer to gain 

full possession of their objectives. 

13 See Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central 

Front, ch. VII, “Advance to the Punchbowl.” 

14 Ibid.; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jun 51; Eighth 

Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jun 51. 
494 EBB AND FLOW 

MARINES ADVANCING IN THE YANGGU AREA,JUNE 1951 

With the seizure of line Wyoming 

and the adjusted segment of line Kansas in the east, the Eighth Army had 

reached its allowed limit of general advance in support of efforts to open 

cease-fire negotiations. As yet there had 

been no clear sign that Chinese and 

North Korean authorities favored that 

kind of resolution, but there had been 

a search for a way to open armistice 

talks, and with some result. 

Armistice Negotiations 

The Search for a Beginning 

When, in mid-May, President Truman formalized the policy of ending 

hostilities under appropriate cease-fire 

arrangements, he and his advisers eschewed any attempt to open negotiations through a direct appeal to Chinese and North Korean authorities lest 

they interpret the initiative as indicating weakness and refuse to talk. Enemy forces, after all, were then on the 

offensive and beginning to make inroads through Eighth Army lines in the 

east central sector. The chosen approach was to try to draw an offer to 

negotiate from the other side by keeping sufficient pressure on enemy forces 

to convince their leaders that they could 

not win and by indicating U.S. and U.N. 

willingness to end hostilities near the 

prewar border between North and 

South Korea. Secretary of Defense 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 

Marshall, testifying on 8 and 9 May during the MacArthur hearings, had been 

asked how he visualized the war would 

be ended. “If it goes on in the manner 

that it has for the last 2 months, and 

particularly in the last two weeks,” he 

replied, with reference to losses suffered by enemy forces during April 

offensive, “it would appear that the 

trained fabric of the Chinese Communist forces will be pretty well torn to 

pieces . . . if we destroy their besttrained armies as we have been in the 

process of doing, then, it seems to me, 

you develop the best probability of 

reaching a satisfactory negotiatory basis with those Chinese Communist 

forces.”15 While not specifically designed for the purpose, the Eighth 

Army’s stand against the enemy’s May 

offensive and its subsequent counteroffensive had suited the approach 

adopted to get armistice negotiations 

under way. 

By both coincidence and design, indications of U.S. and U.N. willingness 

to negotiate came from officials in several forums. On the day President Truman approved the new policy, Senator 

Edwin C. Johnson, Democrat of Colorado, proposed to the Senate that it ask 

the United Nations to call on all belligerent nations to declare a cease-fire at 

0400 on 25 June, the exact hour and 

date of the war’s anniversary. He also 

proposed that U.N. forces withdraw 

south of the 38th parallel beforehand. 

The Senate took no action, but the Indian delegate to the United Nations, 

Sir Bengal N. Rau, spoke to the General Assembly the following day in response to Senator Johnson’s proposal. 

He urged his colleagues to consider 

495 

General Ridgway’s 12 March statement 

that it would be a victory for the United 

Nations if the war ended with U.N. 

forces in control of all territory in Korea up to the 38th parallel. In Moscow, 

Pravda on 20 May played up Senator 

Johnson’s recommendations as a sign 

that the United States was growing tired 

of the war.16 

Lester B. Pearson, Canada’s secretary 

of state for external affairs, defined the 

U.N. objective in Korea in a speech 

broadcast on 26 May during the U.N. 

radio program, “The Price of Peace.” 

The objective, Pearson emphasized, was 

not the complete capitulation of the enemy but solely the defeat of aggression 

against South Korea. U.N. Secretary 

General Trygve Lie reinforced Pearson’s point while speaking to the U.N. 

Association of Canada in Ottawa on 1 

J une. “If a cease-fire could be arranged 

approximately along the 38th parallel,” 

Lie asserted, “then the main purpose 

of the security council resolutions of 

June 25th and 27th and July 7th will be 

fulfilled, provided that a cease-fire is 

followed by the restoration of peace and 

security in the area.” On the same day 

and the one following, Secretary of 

State Dean Acheson authoritatively 

stated the U.S. position in testimony at 

the MacArthur hearings. A cease-fire 

at or near the 38th parallel, provided 

its arrangements supplied reliable assurances that hostilities would not be 

resumed, he said, would “accom plish 

the military purposes in Korea.”17 

Seeking a response to the indications 

being given, State Department officials 

16 New York Times Index, 1951, p. 565; Facts on File, 

1951, p. 162. 

17 Rees, Korea: The Limited War, pp. 261-62; United 

Nations Bulletin, vol. 10 (15 June 1951), p. 559; Mac15 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 365, 430. Arthur Hearings, p. 1782. 
496 EBB AND FLOW 

meanwhile “cast about like a pack of 

hounds searching for a scent.”18 

Contacts with Soviet figures at the 

United Nations and in Paris proved 

fruitless. Another official made himself 

available for contacts in Hong Kong, 

but with no success. Sweden’s delegate 

to the United Nations announced on 23 

May that a Soviet source two weeks earlier had indicated the war might be 

ended if the prewar border between 

North and South Korea was reestablished; but Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, declared 

that the report was completely groundless.19 

Still, it was Malik who provided the 

first positive response. At Secretary 

Acheson’s request and with President 

Truman’s approval, George F. Kennan, 

a State Department official with a profound background in U.S.-Soviet relations, although at the time on leave of 

absence from the department, succeeded in arranging a private meeting 

with Malik at the latter’s summer home 

on Long Island. Kennan’s purposes 

were to make sure that the U.S. desire 

for a cease-fire as soon as possible was 

absolutely clear to the Soviets and to 

obtain Moscow’s views and suggestions. 

As Kennan prepared to meet with 

Malik on 31 May, Secretary Acheson 

sent word of the coming event through 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General 

Ridgway so that he could prepare to 

advise on relevant military matters and 

to take any required action in Korea. 

In response to both Acheson’s message 

and the 1 June directive from the Joint 

Chiefs, Ridgway asked General Van 

Fleet to recommend the best location 

for the Eighth Army during a cease18 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 532. 

19 Ibid.; Facts on File, 1951, pp. 162, 169. 

fire, based not on political implications 

but on purely military considerations.20 

When Kennan raised the cease-fire 

subject at the 31 May meeting, Malik 

predictably avoided answering but 

agreed to meet again after he had considered the matter; that is, after he had 

checked with Moscow. The two met 

again on 5 June. The Soviet government, Malik said, wanted a peaceful solution in Korea as soon as possible but 

could not appropriately take part in 

cease-fire negotiations. His personal advice to Kennan was that American authorities should approach their Chinese 

and North Korean counterparts.21 

On the day of the second KennanMalik meeting, representatives of all 

U.N. countries with forces in Korea met 

in Washington to consider the U.S. 

position. Giving some thought to offering another cease-fire proposal to enemy authorities, they elected instead to 

make the American position known to 

Premier Mao Tse-tung and Foreign 

Minister Chou En-lai through neutral 

diplomats in Peking. This the diplomats 

did in mid-June, but there was no direct response. Reaching London from 

Peking were reports that Chinese publications were reviving Mao’s 1937 statement that “a true revolutionary leader 

must be adept at making himself and 

his followers advance and change their 

views according to changing circumstances.” Some. Britons interpreted this 

revival as evidence of Chinese preparations for a truce in Korea, but no other 

Chinese behavior supported such an 

interpretation. For example, when the 

20 Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 532-33; Ltr, 

Gen Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 9 Jun 51, sub: Location 

of EUSAK During a CEASE-FIRE (Military viewpoint). 

21 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 533. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 497 

But within the limits that had been 

imposed on him by General Ridgway, 

Van Fleet saw distinct advantages in 

conducting future operations along and 

from the Kansas and Wyoming lines. 

In a 9 June reply to Ridgway’s earlier 

request for an estimate of the situation 

and recommendations for operations 

over the next sixty days, he stated his 

belief that, despite the severe punishment enemy forces had absorbed during April and May, they would recover 

sufficiently during the next two months 

to launch at least one major offensive. 

This probability made a strong defense 

mandatory, and the best place to develop it, in Van Fleet’s judgment, was 

along the Kansas-Wyoming trace. To 

begin with, even if he was authorized 

to occupy a more northern line, the 

next terrain permitting a strong line of 

resistance across the entire peninsula 

and allowing the Eighth Army to man 

it in sufficient strength lay as much as 

seventy-five miles above the 38th parallel. Advancing that far could cost the 

Eighth Army considerable casualties. 

Using a more northern line also would 

shorten enemy lines of communication, 

robbing U.N. air forces of time and opportunity to attack enemy supply movements from distant depots. Further, 

Van Fleet’s engineers would face monumental reconstruction work since U.N. 

air and naval forces had destroyed or 

damaged important bridges, rail lines, 

roads, and communications centers 

throughout North Korea. In any case, 

the ground along lines Kansas and Wyoming was well suited for defense and 

was backed up by a road net that would 

allow adequate logistical support.25 

departing Swedish ambassador to Peking made a farewell call on Chou Enlai and asked if there was anything he 

could report to his government or the 

United Nations about Korea, the Chinese foreign minister “replied with an 

irrelevancy about the weather.” 22 

Thus, by mid-June, the only positive 

development in the search for a beginning was Malik’s answer to Kennan. 

U. S. officials had no doubt that Malik’s 

statement was authentic, but, in the 

words of Secretary Acheson, it had “a 

sibylline quality which left us wondering what portended and what we 

should do next.” 23 

The Question of Future Operations 

In a different, yet related, context, 

what to do next had also become a large 

question for General Van Fleet as the 

Eighth Army moved to its limit of advance along lines Kansas and Wyoming. 

Although he said nothing publicly until much later, he was particularly displeased by General Ridgway’s disapproval of the T’ongch’on operation. 

Before the Senate Committee on 

Armed Services after his return to the 

United States for retirement in early 

1953, he testified that enemy forces in 

June 1951 were badly hurt, out of 

supplies, and in a panic and that he 

believed he could have won a decisive, 

if not complete, victory had he been 

permitted to continue his offensive.24 

22 Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 

1950-1953, p. 293; Poats, Decision in Korea, pp. 200- 

201; Facts on File, 1951, pp. 185, 193-94. 

23 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 533. 

24 U.S. . Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services: Ammunition Supplies in the Far 

East, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 5 March 1953, pp. 31-32 

(hereafter cited as Van Fleet Hearings). 

25 Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to CINCFE, 9 Jun 51, sub: 

EUSAK Operations During Period 10 June-10 August 1951; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jun 51. 
498 EBB AND FLOW 

Van Fleet offered General Ridgway 

several plans for limited offensive action to keep enemy forces off balance, 

three of which he proposed to execute 

immediately after the Eighth Army 

reached the Kansas and Wyoming lines. 

Each of the three called for a raid on 

enemy troops and supplies within a 

specific area. In the west, a division was 

to hit Kaesong, the ancient capital of 

Korea on Route 1 some ten miles above 

the Imjin. In the central region, an armored task force was to attack P’yonggang at the apex of the Iron Triangle. 

In a more ambitious move, the 1st 

Marine Division was to make an 

amphibious landing at T’ongch’on and 

attack southwest over Route 17 to regain Eighth Army lines at Kumhwa. 

Ridgway agreed with Van Fleet’s concept of holding the Eighth Army along 

the Kansas-Wyoming front and punishing enemy forces with limited attacks 

but turned down the 1st Marine Division operation, presumably for the 

same reasons he had refused Van 

Fleet’s earlier T’ongch’on landing proposal. He approved the other attack 

plans, but they were to be executed only 

if intelligence confirmed that remunerative targets existed in the Kaesong and P’yonggang areas.26 

In responding on the same day to 

Ridgway’s subsequent request for recommendations on the best location for 

the Eighth Army during a cease-fire, 

Van Fleet assumed that enemy forces 

would violate the terms of an armistice 

by improving their offensive capability 

and renewing operations without warning. On the basis of this assumption, he 

26 Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to CINCFE, 9 Jun 51, sub: 

EUSAK Operations During Period 10 Jun-10 Aug 

51; Rad, CX 64976, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 14 Jun 

51. 

recommended line Kansas because of 

its suitability for a strong defense. Besides the other disadvantages he foresaw in establishing a defense line farther north, he anticipated that during 

a cease-fire the Eighth Army would inherit immense problems of civil relief 

and military government in areas the 

enemy had denuded of food and young 

manpower. In recommending line 

Kansas to Ridgway, however, he pointed out that since a cease-fire agreement 

might require opposing forces to withdraw several miles from the line of contact to create a buffer zone, the Eighth 

Army must be well forward of Kansas 

at the time an agreement was reached.27

Ridgway agreed that line Kansas 

would be the best location for the 

Eighth Army if armistice negotiations 

started soon and assured Van Fleet that 

if possible he would advise him of forthcoming negotiations in time to allow 

him to move at least part of his forces 

to a line of contact twenty miles above 

Kansas. At the same time, since remaining behind a self-imposed line could 

prove exceedingly costly if enemy authorities refused to negotiate or if they 

protracted negotiations while they prepared a major offensive, Ridgway directed his own planning staff to 

explore, as a long range matter, the 

feasibility and possible profits of penetrating more deeply into North Korea. 

The staff considered various schemes 

of maneuver, selecting objective lines 

on the basis of whether they could be 

held as cease-fire lines and weighing in 

particular the logistical problems that 

would attend advancing to them. Of 

several concepts developed, Ridgway 

27 Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 9 Jun 51, sub: 

Location of EUSAK During a CEASE-FIRE (Military 

view point); Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jun 51. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 

favored one posing a three-phase offensive to occupy the P’yongyangWonsan line. The first phase called for 

an advance on Wonsan in two columns, 

one moving up the east coast road, the 

other over the Seoul-Wonsan axis. In 

the second step, an amphibious force 

was to land at Wonsan to assist the overland advance. In the finale, Eighth 

Army forces were to drive northwestward and seize P’yongyang. Ridgway 

passed the outline to Van Fleet and instructed him to submit detailed plans 

for the operation by 10 July. 28 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff meanwhile 

had taken Ridgway’s recent evaluations 

of enemy forces as reason to consider 

revising their 1 June directive. Two 

weeks after telling them that the Chinese and North Koreans over the next 

two months could assemble no force 

greater than that which the Eighth 

Army already had defeated twice, 

Ridgway on 14 June reported that 

“enemy lines of communications are 

overextended [and] his supply situation 

is aggravated by heavy rainfall and air 

interdiction.” These and other encouraging reports convinced the Joint 

Chiefs that it might be wise to remove 

all restrictions on Ridgway’s freedom 

to exploit these conditions.29 

Wanting further justification before 

taking this step, the Joint Chiefs on 20 

June asked Ridgway to inform them 

how an advance into North Korea 

would affect U.N. Command air operations, whether such an advance would 

28 GHQ, FEC, JCPOG Staff Study, 9 Jun 51; GHQ 

FEC, Memo, SGS for CofS, 13 Jun 51; Ltr, CINCFE 

to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jun 51, sub: Planning Directive; Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen Van Fleet, 22 Jun 51, 

sub: Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire. 

29 Rads. C 63744 and CX 64976, CINCFE to DA for 

JCS, 30 May and 14 Jun 51, respectively; Rad, JCS 

94501, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jun 51. 

499 

increase the effectiveness of enemy air 

operations, and how logistics would be 

affected if his lines of communication 

were lengthened. Ridgway agreed immediately to the proposed removal of 

restrictions but deferred commenting 

on the effects of a general offensive 

until General Van Fleet had completed 

plans for advancing to the P’yongyangWonsan line.30 

Negotiations Begin 

On 22 June the U.S. State Department’s Voice of America urged Jacob 

Malik to heed Trygvy Lie’s appeal made 

in Ottawa at the beginning of the month 

and “say the one word the whole world 

is waiting for.” The next day Malik said 

the word during a fifteen-minute recorded speech broadcast on the U.N. 

“Price of Peace” program. After spending most of his time blaming the United 

States for the war, Malik closed with 

the announcement that the Soviets believed the conflict could be settled and 

that, as a first step, the belligerents 

should start discussions to arrange a 

cease-fire and an armistice that provided for the mutual withdrawal of 

forces from the 38th parallel. He refused to elaborate on his speech thereafter, even claiming illness on 25 June 

when Nasrollah Entezam, the Iranian 

president of the U.N. General Assembly, attempted to see him to get more 

details. On 4 July Malik sailed from 

New York for home.31 

The immediate American reaction to 

Malik’s statement was largely skeptical. 

State Department officials advised Gen30 Rad, JCS 94501, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jun 51; Rad, 

C 65529, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Jun 51. 

31 Poats, Decision in Korea, p. 201; Facts on File, 1951, 

pp. 201-02, 218. 
500 EBB AND FLOW 

Ridgway went to Korea, where after 

further discussing the matter with Van 

Fleet he agreed that while a deep advance was tactically and logistically 

feasible, the price would not be worth 

the results.33 

In Moscow, Pravda and Izvestia, the 

party and government newspapers, 

respectively, put an official stamp on 

Malik’s statement by publishing its full 

text on 24 June. In China, the authoritative Peking paper Jen Min Jih Pao 

(People’s Daily) endorsed the proposal 

on the 25th, and Peking radio followed 

suit the next day, but with conditions. 

Although “the Chinese people fully 

endorse” the Malik statement, Peking 

radio announced, the United States 

had to accept the peace proposals “repeatedly” made by China and the Soviet Union, proposals which included 

the withdrawal of all UNC troops from 

Korea, the return of Formosa to Red 

China, and the seating of Red China in 

the United Nations.34 

Malik had included no such demands 

in his proposal, but the question arose 

whether the Soviet position was indeed 

the same as that reported by Peking 

radio. On 27 June, Alan G. Kirk, U.S. 

ambassador to Moscow, sought out 

Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A. 

Gromyko for an answer. Gromyko asserted that the Soviet government had 

no knowledge of Peking’s view of the 

Malik proposal but advised that the armistice envisaged by the Soviets would 

include a cease-fire and would be limera1 Ridgway that the proposal might 

be only an attempt to get UNC troops 

away from the 38th parallel and, further, that intelligence reports in Washington gave no indication of Chinese 

and North Korean readiness to stop 

fighting, but quite the contrary. 

Ridgway himself reminded his principal subordinates of “the well-earned 

reputation for duplicity and dishonesty possessed by the USSR” and of 

“the slowness with which deliberative 

bodies such as the security council produce positive action” and insisted that 

they ward off any relaxation by their 

commands.32 

Following the joint decision of Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet that line 

Kansas would be the best location for 

the Eighth Army during a cease-fire, 

Ridgway had had his planning staff plot 

an outpost line ten miles above Kansas 

and a “cease-fire” line another ten miles 

forward. By occupying the deeper line 

the Eighth Army would be able to make 

a ten-mile withdrawal from the line of 

contact-a withdrawal that an armistice 

agreement might require-and still retain its Kansas positions and a suitable 

outpost line of resistance. Although 

somewhat skeptical of the Malik proposal, Ridgway on 25 June sent a staff 

officer to Korea to get Van Fleet’s views 

on seizing the proposed cease-fire line. 

Van Fleet some two weeks earlier had 

considered such an Eighth Army advance essential, but now, in view of the 

recent hard fighting to reach the Iron 

Triangle and the Punchbowl, he voted 

against the deeper move as potentially 

too costly. On the following day 

32 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 533; Facts on 

Fib, 1951, p. 202; Rad, CX 65667, CINCFE to CG 

Eighth Army, 24 Jun 51. 

33 Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen Van Fleet, 22 Jun 51, 

sub: Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire; 

Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 181-82; Collins, War in 

Peacetime, p. 309; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 403; 

Van Fleet Hearings, p. 651. 

34 Facts on File, 1951, pp. 201-02; Leckie, Conflict; 

The History of the Korean War, 1950-53, p. 294. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 501 

ited to strictly military questions and 

not deal with political or territoral 

matters. Further, military representatives of the United Nations and South 

Korean commands on the one hand 

and of the North Korean command and 

“Chinese volunteer units” on the other 

should negotiate the armistice. Subsequent special arrangements, Gromyko 

added, should be made for a political 

and territorial settlement.35 

By 30 June there had been no further comment from the Chinese, and 

the only North Korean “response” 

had been a 27 June P’yongyang radio 

change of propaganda slogan from 

“drive the enemy into the sea” to “drive 

the enemy to the 38th parallel.” But 

after Gromyko’s confirmation and explanation of the Malik proposal, the 

U.N. legal counsel quickly ruled that 

the United States could conclude an armistice without further authorization or 

instructions from the U.N. Security 

Council or General Assembly. With the 

ambassadors of all U.N. nations with 

forces in Korea giving him their approval to proceed, President Truman 

authorized General Ridgway to tender 

a direct offer to negotiations. U.S. military authorities were not enthusiastic 

about being given responsibility for conducting armistice discussions, but there 

were strong reasons for doing so: (1) 

the United States did not officially recognize Chinese or North Korean authorities, (2) the talks were to shun 

political matters, (3) the prospect of 

negotiations was directly related to 

conditions on the battlefield, and (4) 

China accepted no responsibility for the 

Chinese “volunteer” forces in Korea, 

but their commander could speak for 

them.36 

As instructed by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, General Ridgway broadcast the 

offer from Tokyo at 0800 on 30 June, 

addressing it to the “Commander in 

Chief, Communist Forces in Korea” 

and using a prescribed text: 

As Commander in Chief of the United 

Nations Command I have been instructed 

to communicate to you the following: 

I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for 

the cessation of hostilities and all acts of 

armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for. the maintenance of such armistice. 

Upon the receipt of word from you that 

such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would 

also at that time suggest a date at which he 

could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take Place 

aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan 

Harbor. 

(Signed) M B Ridgway, General, U.S. Army 

Commander in Chief 

United Nations Command 

Both Peking radio and P’yongyang 

radio broke into regular broadcasts late 

on the following day with a joint reply 

from Premier Kim 11 Sung as supreme 

commander of the North Korean People’s 

Amy and Peng Teh-huai as commander 

of the Chinese volunteer forces. They 

agreed to a meeting of representatives 

for “talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace” 

but preferred to meet at Kaesong and 

35 Poats, Decision in Korea, p. 202; Acheson, Present 36 Facts On File, 1951, p. 202; Goodrich, Korea: A 

at the Creation, p. 533; Facts on File, 1951, p. 202; Dept Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations, pp. 183-84; 

of State Bulletin, 9July 1951, p. 45. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 533-34. 
502 EBB AND FLOW 

proposed that the talks begin between 

10 and 15 July. Ridgway accepted Kaesong as the meeting site but urged an 

earlier start so as not to “prolong the 

fighting and increase the losses” and 

offered to send a three-man liaison 

team to Kaesong on 5 July or soon 

thereafter to arrange for the actual 

negotiations. He agreed to a return proposal for an 8 July preliminary meeting. 

Conducting themselves with strict formality when they met on the 8th, the 

two liaison teams had no serious difficulty in reaching agreement to open 

negotiations on 10 July. 37 

The New Dimensions of Battle 

As armistice negotiations opened on 

the 10th, the opposing ground forces 

were almost even in numbers, the 

Eighth Army totaling about 554,500, 

the Chinese People’s Volunteers and North 

Korean People’s Army some 569,200. New 

units had recently joined each side. 

Now a part of the Eighth Army was an 

infantry battalion from Colombia which 

had arrived in Korea on 15 June and 

was training at the U.N. Reception 

Center. Colombia would be the last 

U.N. member nation to contribute 

ground combat forces to the U.N. 

Command.38 With the addition of the 

Colombian unit, the Eighth Army consisted of four corps, seventeen divisions, 

four brigades, one separate regiment, 

37 Facts on File, 1951, pp. 209-10; Goodrich, Korea: 

A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations. p. 184: 

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 403-04; Hermes, 

Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 15-21. 

38 Also arriving in June from the United Kingdom 

were the headquarters and service units of what would 

be the 1st Commonwealth Division. When eventually 

formed in late July 1951, the division would include 

the Canadian 25th, British Commonwealth 28th, and 

British 29th Brigades. 

and nine separate battalions. Among 

enemy formations, periodic inactivations of units to obtain replacements 

for others had reduced the North 

Korean Army to seven corps, twentythree divisions, and two brigades, while 

reinforcements had raised Chinese 

forces to five army groups, seventeen 

armies, and fifty-one divisions. As 

Eighth Army intelligence suspected but 

had not yet confirmed, the Chinese XX 

Army Group with two armies, the 67th 

and 68th, had entered Korea in May 

and June and assembled for further 

training at Yangdok, the centrally 

located town on the lateral P’yongyangWonsan road. In addition, the 50th 

Army, which had returned to Manchuria for reorganization in March, reentered Korea during the first week of 

July. That army, too, remained deep in 

North Korea.39 

Chinese and North Korean casualties by 10 July had reached an enormous figure. Estimates of the total 

varied, but all were close to 1 million. 

Of these, Eighth Army prisoner of war 

compounds held about 163,000, more 

than 85 percent of whom were North 

Koreans. The remaining casualties were 

almost evenly divided between Chinese 

and North Koreans. U.N. Command 

losses after a year of fighting stood near 

294,000. South Korean casualties had 

mounted to 212,500, American losses 

to around 77,000, and losses among 

other U.N. units to about 4,500. Army 

forces had suffered by far most of the 

American casualties: 11,327 killed out39 Summary, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces 

Strength in Korea, 31 Jul 50-31 Jul 53; Eighth Army 

G2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Locations, 1 Jul 

51; Fox, “Inter-Allied Co-operation During Combat 

Operations”; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, no. 96, 16-28 

Feb 53, and no. 115, 1-15 Feb 53. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 503 

TROOPS OF THE 7TH INFANTRY, 3D INFANTRY DIVISION, ADVANCING through 

the Sobang hills in the Iron Triangle, 3 July 1951, 

right; 42,925 wounded or injured in 

action, of whom 1,075 later died; 6,088 

captured, of whom 2,583 eventually 

died in captivity; and 3,979 recorded 

as missing in action, of whom 3,323 

later were declared dead either on direct evidence or under the provisions 

of the Missing Persons Act of 1942. 

Thus, out of a total of 64,319 Army 

casualties chargeable to the first year 

of the war, deaths numbered 18,308.40 

As the first armistice conference 

convened, combat operations con40Facts on File, 1951, pp. 193, 202-03, 218, 234; 

Mono, Hq, USARPAC, Military History Office, “The 

Handling of Prisoners of War,” Jun 60; Battle Casualties of the Army, Office, Asst Chief of Staff, G1, DA, 

31 Mar 54. 

tinued as the diminished pace that had 

set in after the Eighth Army ended its 

general advance at lines Kansas and 

Wyoming. Since that time, Eighth Army 

forces had conducted only extensive 

patrolling and a few limited attacks, the 

two largest an unsuccessful attempt in 

the X Corps sector to establish an outpost on the western rim of the Punchbowl and a successful attempt in the I 

Corps sector to clear the Iron Triangle 

of Chinese who after mid-June had 

crept back into the Sobang Hills, an 

island of mountains within the triangle. 

Otherwise, Eighth Army was preoccupied with developing defenses along the 

Kansas and Wyoming lines. (See Map 

37.) As directed by General Van Fleet 
504 EBB AND FLOW 

on 1 June, line Kansas was being organized as the main line of resistance with 

defensive positions arranged in depth 

and elaborately fortified. Forces deployed on the looping Wyoming line 

were developing hasty field fortifications from which to delay and blunt 

the force of enemy attacks before withdrawing to assigned main line positions. 

To deepen the defense further, patrol 

bases were being established ahead of 

the Kansas-Wyoming front on terrain 

features dominating logical enemy approach routes. To prevent enemy 

agents reconnoitering Eighth Army defenses from mingling with local farm 

folk, the battle area was being cleared 

of Korean civilians from five miles behind line Kansas northward to the line 

of patrol bases.41 

Lending haste to the preparation of 

defenses was an expectation that the 

Chinese and North Koreans would use 

the respite from Eighth Army pressure 

to rehabilitate their units and reconstitute an attack force quickly. Familiar 

signs of enemy attack preparations had 

appeared: main forces were off the line 

for refitting; screening forces on the 

periphery of the Kansas-Wyoming trace 

vigorously opposed the Eighth Army’s 

ground reconnaissance; supplies were 

moved into forward dumps; and some 

captives mentioned a forthcoming 

“Sixth Phase Offensive.” By early July 

the Eighth Army intelligence officer 

was predicting an enemy offensive anytime after midmonth. He revised his 

estimate after armistice negotiations 

started, predicting then that there 

would be no enemy attack unless the 

41 LOI, Gen Van Fleet to CGs I, IX, and X Corps 

and to CG ROK I Corps, both 1 Jun 51; Eighth Army 

Comd Rpts, Nar, Jun and Jul 51. 

negotiations failed, but he expected a 

continuation of enemy offensive preparations.42 

The Eighth Army estimate overrated 

the ability of enemy forces to recover 

from their recent. defeat. As armistice 

negotiations began, both the Chinese 

and North Koreans-especially the 

Chinese-remained occupied with restoring units shattered over the past 

three months, most of which had 

moved far to the north to reorganize, 

and reequip. The immensity of the 

problem of refitting them was indicated 

in estimates placing enemy casualties 

suffered in April, May, and June above 

two hundred thousand and in visible 

battlefield evidence of tremendous 

losses in weapons and equipment. The 

size of the problem was also implicit in 

the 1 July response of Kim I1 Sung and 

Peng Teh-huai to General Ridgway’s 

offer to negotiate: “We agree to suspend military activities [during the 

course of negotiations].” Indeed, the 

Chinese and North Koreans needed 

only to consider the failures and heavy 

costs of their April and May attacks to 

realize that they could no longer conduct offensive operations successfully 

against the Eighth Army. This realization became evident when they agreed 

to enter into armistice negotiations 

without mentioning the conditions that 

Chinese authorities earlier had insisted 

upon.43 

From a purely tactical standpoint, the 

cease-fire during negotiations proposed 

42 Rad, CX 65365, CINCUNC to DEPTAR, 4 Jul 

51; Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Jul 51. 

43 Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, no. 1, 1-31 Dec 52, no. 

96, l6-28 Feb 53, no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53, and no. 115, 

1-15 Feb 53; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean 

Army, 31 Jul 52; Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 258; 

Rad, CX 66183, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 1 Jul 51. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY 505 

THE KAESONG ARMISTICE CONFERENCE SITE, a former teahouse. 

by Kim I1 Sung and Peng Teh-huai was 

unacceptable to General Ridgway because he would not be able to employ 

air and ground reconnaissance to check 

on enemy activity, in particular on any 

preparation for major offensive operations. Beyond that, Ridgway had his 1 

June instructions from the Joint Chiefs, 

confirmed on 10 July, to conduct operations primarily designed to create conditions favorable to concluding an 

armistice. As Army Chief of Staff Collins wrote later, the main purpose of 

U.N. Command operations was “to 

keep pressure on the enemy . . . in order to force an agreement that would 

end the fighting. ”44 Admiral C. Turner 

44 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 306. 

Joy, commander of Naval Forces, Far 

East, whom Ridgway appointed as chief 

of the U.N. Command armistice delegation, set the matter straight at the 

first conference when he announced 

that hostilities would continue until an 

armistice agreement was reached. 

Given the prospect of a unilateral ceasefire, the enemy delegation had no 

choice but to agree.45 

In applying pressure, U.N. naval surface forces would continue to blockade 

both North Korean coasts and keep enemy shore installations under bombardment. U.N. air forces already were 

45 Rad, CX 66188, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 2 Jul 51; 

Rad, JCS 92831, JCS to CINCUNC, 1 Jun 51; Rad, 

JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 JuI 51; Hermes, Truce 

Tent and Fighting Front, p. 23. 
506 EBB AND FLOW 

Wyoming positions and recommended 

that the Eighth Army not carry out the 

plan unless by 1 September there had 

been a major deterioration of enemy 

forces, a change in mission requiring 

the seizure of territorial objectives, or 

an allocation of additional forces to the 

Eighth Army sufficient to ensure the 

success of the offensive.48 

Ridgway shelved the plan, not because of Van Fleet’s recommendations 

but out of the possibility that the two 

armistice delegations would reach 

agreement in the near future. He and 

“ground commanders of all ranks,” he 

wrote later, “hesitated to fight for 

ground that an early armistice might 

require them to relinquish” in order to 

conform to an agreed-upon line of 

demarcation. But more than that, he 

said, “it seemed to me, with a cease-fire 

faintly visible on the horizon, that I 

should do all I could to keep our losses 

at a justifiable minimum.” He consequently elected to conduct no major offensive but to “retain the initiative 

through the use of strong patrols and 

local attacks.” 49 

Thus, there was to be no great 

ground pressure to help persuade enemy authorities to conclude an early 

armistice. And without that pressure, 

neither would there be an early armistice.50 Ridgway’s decision, in any case, 

set the tempo of future U.N. Command 

ground operations. Indeed, the ebb and 

flow of battle had already subsided, and 

the fighting would not again take on 

the scale and momentum of the war’s 

first year. 

48 Rad, JCS 59577, JCS to CINCUNC, 10 Jul 51; 

Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to CINCFE, 5 Jul 51, sub: Advance Beyoud KANSAS-WYOMING Line. 

49 Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 182-93, 187. 

50 For an analysis dealing in part with this possibility, 

see MS, Edwin Augustus Deagle, Jr., The Agony of 

Restraint: Korea, 1951-1953, copy in CMH. 

engaged in Operation STRANGLE, a 

campaign of concentrated interdictory 

attacks on major roads in a one-degree 

latitudinal belt across the peninsula just 

above the battle line, and on 13 July 

General Ridgway directed General 

Otto P. Weyland, the new Far East Air 

Forces commander, to exploit the full 

capacity of his command to punish the 

enemy. 46 General Weyland ordered the 

Fifth Air Force to increase fighter and 

light bomber attacks on enemy troops, 

vehicles, supplies, and installations. 

Within a week Weyland’s staff developed plans for a massive air attack on 

P’yongyang to destroy troops and supply stocks concentrated in the North 

Korean capital city area and to impress 

upon the North Korean government 

the prudence of concluding an armistice quickly.47 

As of 10 July General Ridgway was 

free to continue ground operations as 

he saw fit: on that date the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff lifted both the limit of general 

advance previously placed on the 

Eighth Army and the requirement that 

major offensive action have their prior 

approval. Ridgway had in hand at the 

time the plan he had asked General 

Van Fleet to prepare for an advance 

to the P’yongyang-Wonsan line. In Plan 

OVERWHELMING, Van Fleet tentatively 

set 1 September as the date for opening the operation. But in forwarding 

the plan to Ridgway he repeated his 

earlier conclusion that he could best accomplish his mission of inflicting losses 

on enemy forces from his Kansas46 General Weyland replaced General Stratemeyer 

in June after the latter suffered a heart attack and, 

following hospitalization, returned to the United 

States. 

47 Field, History of United States Naval Operations, 

Korea, pp. 356-58; Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in 

Korea, p. 241; Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 

pp. 400, 403. 
Bibliographical Note 

Primary Sources 

As is evident in the footnote citations, 

this volume is based in far the largest 

part on records, reports, and documents generated in the course of military operations by Army commands 

and units directly involved in the 

Korean War. Foremost among these 

sources are war diaries and command 

reports. Through November 1950, 

Army regulations required that involved organizations issue monthly war 

diaries, these fashioned after the excellent diaries prepared by German Army 

units during World War II. Thereafter, 

new Army regulations required the 

preparation of monthly command reports by United Nations Command-Far 

East Command headquarters and at 

each lower command level down to separate battalions. Each war diary lists 

important developments in a date and 

time sequence, summarizes the developments, and includes documents 

that support the diary entries. Command reports are the main sources for 

this volume; each consists of a detailed 

narrative, supporting documents, and, 

in many instances, maps, overlays, and 

photographs. All war diaries and command reports are now in the custody 

of the National Archives and Records 

Administration, Washington, D.C. Classified secret when prepared, virtually 

all of them have since been declassified. 

During the war, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and Department of the Army 

communicated with the U.N. and Far 

East Commands mainly by radio. The 

National Archives and Records Administration keeps a complete file of the 

messages exchanged; some can be 

found in the supporting documents of 

the monthly UNC-FEC command reports. Messages the U.N. and Far East 

Commands exchanged with their subordinates in the field are in the Far East 

Command adjutant general’s files, these 

also in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration. 

Many of these messages can be found 

in the supporting documents of the 

UNC-FEC and Eighth Army command 

reports. 

Of considerable usefulness were 

Eighth Army operational planning files. 

Most of them classified top secret at 

their origin, their contents did not become part of Eighth Army command 

reports, which by regulation could 

contain information classified no 

higher than secret. Now declassified, 

the planning files currently are kept by 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration. 

As prescribed by Army regulations 

existing in 1950, small (three-man, later 

two-man) historical detachments were 

to be activated in times of war and deployed to combat theaters to help produce a record of military operations. 

Eight historical detachments served in 

Korea. For most of the war they were 

assigned to Eighth Army special troops 

and operated under the control of the 
508 EBB AND FLOW 

Eighth Army historian. During the last 

months of the war they were consolidated as the 8086th Army Unit, a provisional organization of Army Forces, 

Far East, headquartered in Japan, and 

operated under the control of the historian of that command. Detachment 

reports, based mainly on interviews 

with participants, centered on small 

unit combat actions, combat support 

operations, and service support activities. The detachments also produced 

monographs on diverse subjects-personnel problems, logistical problems, 

enemy tactics, among others-all of 

which, as indicated in footnotes, support numerous sections of this book. 

Originals of the detachment products 

are held by the National Archives and 

Records Administration. Microfilm 

copies are located in the Army Center 

of Military History. 

Interviews and correspondence with 

key commanders and staff officers and 

personal accounts written by some of 

them provided important information 

available nowhere else. These transcripts, letters, and accounts are stored 

in the Army Center of Military History. 

Secondary Sources 

The following list is by no means 

complete but notes works that were of 

decided usefulness. 

Books 

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. 

New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969. 

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN 

WAR. Washington, 1961. 

Barclay, C. N. The First Commonwealth 

Division. Aldershot: Gale & Polden 

Limited, 1954. 

Cagle, Malcolm W., and Manson, 

Frank A. The Sea War in Korea. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957. 

Chou Ching-wen. Ten Years of Storm. 

New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 

1960. 

Collins, J. Lawton. War in Peacetime. 

Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969. 

Crahay, Albert. Les Belges En Coree, 

1951-1955. Brussels: Imprimerie 

Medicale et Scientifique (S.A.), 1967. 

Department of the Army. Handbook 

on the Chinese Communist Army, DA Pam 

30-51. Washington, 1952. 

Department of the Army. Handbook 

on the Chinese Communist Army, DA Pam 

30-51. Washington, 1960. 

Department of State. The Conflict in 

Korea. Washington, 1951. 

Department of State. The Record on 

Korean Unification, 1943-1960. Washington, 1960. 

Department of State. United States 

Policy in the Korean Conflict, July 1950- 

February 1951. Washington, 1951. 

Department of State. United States 

Policy in the Korean Crisis. Washington, 

1950. 

Farrar-Hockley, Anthony. The Edge 

of the Sword. London: Frederick Muller 

Ltd., 1954. 

Field, James A., Jr. History of U.S. 

Naval Operations: Korea. Washington, 

1962. 

Futrell, R. Frank. The United States 

Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. New 

York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961. 

George, Alexander L. The Chinese 

Communist Army in Action. New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1967. 

Gittings, John. The Role of the Chinese 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

Army. New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1967. 

Griffith, Samuel B. II. The Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army. New York: 

McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. 

Gugeler, Russell A. Combat Actions in 

Korea. Washington: Combat Forces 

Press, 1954. 

Marshall, S. L. A. The River and the 

Gauntlet. New York: William Morrow & 

co., 1953. 

Montross, Lynn, and Canzona, Capt. 

Nicholas A. U.S. Marine Operations in 

Korea, 1950-1953, Vol. III. The Chosin 

Reservoir Campaign. Washington, 1957. 

Montross, Lynn, Kuokka, Maj. 

Hubard D., and Hicks, Maj. Norman 

W. U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 

1950-1953, Vol. IV. The East-Central 

Front. Washington, 1962. 

Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. 

New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964. 

Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean 

War. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967. 

509 

Sawyer, Maj. Robert K. Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War. 

Washington, 1963. 

Schnabel, James F. Policy and Direction: The First Year. UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR. 

Washington, 1972. 

Tang Tsou. American Failure in China, 

1941-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. 

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years of 

Trial and Hope, Vol. II. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956. 

Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the 

Yalu. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 

Wood, Herbert Fairlie. Strange Battleground. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and 

Controller of Stationery, 1966. 

Manuscript 

Ridgway, General Matthew B. The 

Korean War, Issues and Policies. 

List of Abbreviations 

AAA 

AFA 

ASCOM 

AW 

BCT 

BomCom 

CCF 

CINCFE 

CINCUNC 

ComCarCom 

CPV 

CTC 

DPRK 

EUSAK 

FA 

FAF 

FEAF 

FEAM Com 

FEC 

H&W 

I&R 

JCS 

JLC 

KATUSA 

KMAG 

KMC 

KOSB 

KSLI 

LCM 

LST 

Antiaircraft artillery 

Armored field artillery 

Army Service Command 

Automatic weapons 

Battalion Combat Team 

Bomber Command 

Chinese Communist Forces 

Commander in Chief, Far East 

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command 

Combat Cargo Command 

Chinese People’s Volunteers 

Civil Transport Corps 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) 

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea 

Field artillery 

Fifth Air Force 

Far East Air Forces 

Far East Materiel Command 

Far East Command 

Health and welfare 

Intelligence and reconnaissance 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Japan Logistical Command 

Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army 

U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea 

Korean Marine Corps 

King’s Own Scottish Borderers 

King’s Shropshire Light Infantry 

Landing craft., mechanized 

Landing ship, tank 
512 EBB AND FLOW 

LVT 

MASH 

MAW 

NavFE 

NKPA 

PLA 

POL 

PPCLI 

RCT 

ROK 

ROKA 

RUR 

SAG 

SCAJAP 

TOT 

UNC 

UNCACK 

UNCURK 

UNRC 

USSR 

Landing vehicle, tracked 

Mobile Army surgical hospital 

Marine air wing 

Naval Forces, Far East 

North Korean People’s Army 

People’s Liberation Army (Chinese) 

Petroleum, oil, lubricants 

Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 

Regimental combat team 

Republic of Korea (South Korea) 

Republic of Korea Army 

Royal Ulster Rifles 

Special activities group 

Shipping Control Administration, Japan 

Time on target 

United Nations Command 

United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea 

United Nations Commission for the Unification and 

Rehabilitation of Korea 

United Nations Reception Center 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Basic Military Map Symbols 

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within 

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply 

point. 

Military Units-Identification 

Antiaircraft Artillery .................................. A 

Armored Command ................................... 

Army Air Forces. .................................... 

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery ........... 

Cavalry, Horse ..................................... 

Cavalry, Mechanized. ................................. 

Chemical Warfare Service, ............................ G 

Coast Artillery ...................................... 

Engineers ......................................... E 

Infantry .......................................... 

Medical Corps ....................................... 

Ordnance Department. ................................ 

Quartermaster Corps. ................................. Q 

Signal Corps .... S 

Tank Destroyer, ....................................... TD 

Transportation Corps. ................................ 

Veterinary Corps, .................................... 

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing 

symbol with the arm or service symbol: 

Airborne Artillery. ................................ El 

Airborne Infantry ................................... 
514 EBB AND FLOW 

Size Symbols 

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or 

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying 

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization: 

Squad .......................................... 

Section. ......................................... 

Platoon.. ............................................ 

Company, troop, battery, Air Force Bight ............... 

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron .......... 

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) ......................... 

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force 

Wing ............................................ 

Division or Command of an Air Force. ................ 

Corps or Air Force ................................. 

Army ............................................ 

Group of Armies. ................................ 

EXAMPLES 

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the 

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent 

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below 

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines: 

Company A, 137th Infantry ..................... 

8th Field Artillery Battalion. .................... 

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division. ......... 

Observation Post, 23d Infantry. ..... ................ 

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division ................. 

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry .......... 

Weapons 

Machinegun ...................................... 

Gun. .......... ................................. 

Gun battery 

Howitzer or Mortar 

Tank 

Self-propelled gun 
Index 

Acheson, Dean: 13 

ceasefire: 495 

and MacArthur’s relief: 362, 364 

Manchurian border policy: 42, 43 

negotiated settlement: 496-97 

and 38th parallel: 18, 345 

Air bases. See also Airfields and airstrips; Airports. 

Kadena: 35 

McCord: 36n 

Yokota: 36 

Air detachments, U.S., MPQ radar: 417n 

Air division, U.S., 315th: 338n 

Air flight, Greece, No. 13: 36n 

Air forces, U.S. See also Far East Air Forces. 

Fifteenth: 35n 

Fifth: 32, 34, 36. See also Air operations, UNC; 

Close air support, UNC; Interdiction, UNC; 

Partridge, Maj. Gen. Earle E. 

airfield construction: 410 

control of the air: 128, 378-79 

evacuation of Kimpo: 211 

night-intruder sorties: 252-54 

radar detachments: 417n 

THUNDERBOLT 252-54 

and the withdrawal from the north: 111, 155, 164, 

167 

Air group, U.S., 98th Bombardment: 42n 

Air operations, Communist: 42, 52-53, 313-14, 314n, 

326-27, 378-79 

Air operations, UNC, 48-49. See also Close air support, 

UNC; Interdiction, UNC; Helicopters; 

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 

and air power. 

airdrops: 68, 99-100, 141, 287, 299, 308, 370, 407, 

414-15 

bombing: 222, 484. See also below radar-directed 

night-bombing. 

control of: 36, 39 

defense of Seoul: 417n, 431 

destruction of UNC equipment: 272, 321 

photo reconnaissance: 55, 55n 

radar-directed night-bombing: 111, 417n, 432, 454, 

466, 467 

reconnaissance and observation: 47, 55, 82, 83, 88, 

101-02, 105, 114, 128, 156, 157, 164, 188, 190, 

195, 197, 204-05, 208, 228, 240, 248, 252, 258, 

283, 288, 290, 298, 299, 329, 331, 333, 353-55, 

377, 397, 398, 417, 424, 426-27, 428, 436, 440, 

443, 478, 478n, 480, 482, 483, 485, 492 

and smoke: 373, 373n 

Air power: 16, 22. See also Air operations, Communist; 

Air operations, UNC. 

Air squadron, Australian, 77 RAAF: 36n 

Air squadron, South African, 2d SAAF: 36n 

Air squadrons, U.S. 

3d Air Rescue: 32 

45th Tactical Reconnaissance: 55n 

91st Strategic Reconnaissance: 35 

Air wings, U.S. 

1st Marine: 36, 39, 148, 167, 410 

Fleet Air Wing One: 41 

Fleet Air Wing Six: 39 

Airborne operations: 332. See also Munsan-ni; Operations, TOMAHAWK. 

Aircraft, fixed-wing 

AD Skyraider: 39, 438n 

B-26: 36, 417n, 484 

B-29: 35, 42n, 55, 111, 222, 379, 417n, 454, 466, 467 

C-119: 36, 287, 338, 407 

C-47: 36, 138, 142 

C-54: 36 

C-46: 338 

Dakota: 36n 

F4U Corsair: 39, 399 

F7F Tigercat: 39 

F9F Pantherjet: 39 

F-51 Mustang: 34, 35, 36, 413 

F-80: 42n, 417, 425 

F-80C Shooting Star: 35, 36, 53 

F-82: 36 

F-84E Thunderjet: 34, 35, 53 

F-86A Sabre: 35, 53 

IL-IO: 378 

L-17: 97 

L-19: 339 

Mariner: 39 

MIG-15: 42, 42n, 53, 55, 128, 378-79 

Neptune: 39 

North Star: 36n 

R5D: 36 

RB-26: 36 

RF-51: 36 

RF-80: 36 

Sunderland: 39 

T-6 Mosquito: 36, 55, 123, 426-27 

Airfields and airstrips: 7, 34, 35, 84, 88. See also Air 

bases; Airports. 

construction/repair, Communist: 378-79 

construction/repair, UNC: 410 

Hagaru-ri: 138 

ltami: 172 

Kimpo: 36, 44, 192, 201, 247 

evacuation of: 210, 211, 212, 378, 410 

THUNDERBOLT: 247, 255, 256, 257 

Kot’o-ri: 88, 142 

Manchurian: 42, 378 
516 EBB AND FLOW 

Airfields’ and airstrips-Continued 

Namyang-ni: 327 

P’yongyang: 36 

P’yongyang East: 36 

Pusan: 172 

Sinanju: 379 

Sinuiju: 379 

Sunan: 327 

Sunch’on: 327 

Suwon: 243, 284, 319, 378, 410 

Taegu: 36, 307, 338, 410 

Uiju: 379 

Wonju: 219, 220 

Wonsan: 39, 129, 379 

Yonp’o, and Hungnam evacuation: 36, 39, 131, 141, 

166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 379 

Airports. See also Air bases; Airfields and airstrips. 

Haneda: 36, 366 

Seoul: 201, 210, 431 

Airstrips. See Airfields and airstrips. 

Allen, Brig. Gen. Frank A., Jr.: 255, 258. See also Task 

forces, Allen. 

Almond, Maj. Gen. Edward M.: 16, 20, 21, 25, 43, 47. 

See also Corps, U.S., X. 

and Brubaker: 481 

Changjin Reservoir, and readjustment and withdrawal: 97-98, 103-04, 128-31, 138, 139, 142, 143 

Chip’yong-ni: 283, 284-85 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 290 

Communist Spring offensive: 401, 430-31, 445, 447, 

451, 452-54, 455, 456-57, 460, 461-62, 467 

destruction of enemy shelters: 226 

enemy reinforcements: 375 

and Freeman: 287 

Hungnam: 128-31, 158, 165, 166-69, 173 

Hoengsong: 270, 273, 275, 280. See also Operations, 

ROUNDUP, command and control. 

KILLER: 307, 308 

line B: 185-86 

line C: 197, 199-200 

line D: 217, 224-25, 226, 227 

and MacArthur: 47-48, 84, 128, 160 

and McClure: 220, 221, 222 

patrols north of line Kansas: 370-71 

reconnaissance in force. See below THUNDERBOLT. 

See also Operations, ROUNDUP. 

and Ridgway: 307. See also Ridgway, General 

Matthew B. 

RIPPER: 315 

and ROK forces: 259, 269, 445, 447 

THUNDERBOULT: 240-42, 245, 246, 248, 251, 254-55, 

283 

UNC Spring counter offensive: 466, 467, 472-75, 

476, 480, 481, 482, 485, 485n 

Wonju: 220, 221, 222, 282-84 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 291, 292, 293 

American Embassy, Seoul: 199, 202-03. See also 

Muccio, John J. 

Ami-dong: 462 

Ammunition expenditures. See Van Fleet day of fire. 

Amphibious operations, UNC. See also Inch’on; Kunsan; Naval task forces, 90; P’ohang-dong; Wonsan. 

evacuations: 155, 158-59, 161. See also Hungnam; 

Songjin; Wonsan. 

reservoir clossing: 360-61 

THUNDERBOLT demonstration: 255-56 

T’ongch’on: 487, 497, 498 

An-tung, Manchuria: 45, 326 

Anderson, Capt. Dorsey B.: 360-61. See also Companies, U.S., 4th Ranger. 

Andong: 186, 217, 224, 226, 227, 304 

Andrewes, Vice Adm. Sir William G.: 313n. See also 

Naval task forces, 95. 

Anju: 45, 82, 114, 117, 126 

Ansong: 161, 186, 214 

Antiaircraft artillery 

90-mm. gun: 32 

quad .50-caliber machine gun: 30 

twin 40-mm. gun: 30 

Antiguerrilla operations, UNC: 26, 62, 149, 182, 

214-15, 225, 333n, 370, 453 

Anyang: 212, 252 

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders: 371, 442n. See 

also Brigades, British Commonwealth, 27th. 

Armed Forces Radio Service: 319n 

Armies, Chinese. See also Field Armies, Chinese. 

8th Route: 325 

12th: 327 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 379, 386, 

440, 441, 443, 444, 445, 450, 455, 463, 

466-67, 469, 470, 478 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 475, 476, 483 

15th: 327 

Communist Spring offensive: 379, 386, 440, 

441, 443, 444, 445, 448-50, 469, 470 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 478 

20th: 326, 352 

DAUNTLESS: 376 

Changjin Reservoir: 59, 89, 92, 140, 147 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 382, 384, 

401, 440, 441, 444, 463, 466, 470 

UNC Spring counteroffensive, 470, 476, 480, 

484 

24th: 312 

26th: 59, 312, 326, 374 

Changjin Reservoir: 140, 147 

COURAGEOUS: 334, 335, 341, 342 

DAUNTLESS: 372 

RUGGED: 352, 353 

27th: 59, 326, 352 

Changjin Reservoir: 92, 147 

Communist Spring offensive: 374, 381, 385, 

440, 441, 443, 444, 445, 452, 463, 466, 470 

Hungnam perimeter: 171, 172 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 475, 476, 

484 

37th: 304, 311 

38th: 59, 304, 314, 326 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72, 73, 75, 78-79, 81, 

82, 83, 108 
INDEX 517 

Armies, Chinese-Continued 

38th-Continued 

New Year’s Offensive: 187, 188-89, 195. See also 

below Seoul. 

Seoul: 198, 205 

Sinnim-ni-Kaech’on: 108, 109, 116, 118-119 

THUNDERBOLT: 244, 245, 254 

39th: 59, 264, 304, 311, 314, 326 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72, 73, 74, 77-78, 

79, 109 

Chip’yong-ni: 288, 299 

Chuam-ni: 288 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 383, 398, 

399, 443, 444 

DAUNTLESS: 376 

Hoengsong: 266 

New Year’soffensive: 187, 188-89, 195. See also 

below Seoul; Suwon. 

RUGGED: 352, 353 

Seoul: 198, 204, 206, 207 

Suwon: 216 

THUNDERBOLT: 254 

40th: 59, 264, 304, 314, 326 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72, 73, 74, 75, 78-79, 

80, 81 

Chip’yong-ni: 288, 299 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 383, 398, 

401, 443, 444 

DAUNTLESS: 371, 372 

Hoengsong: 266 

Kunu-ri: 107, 109, 111, 115-16 

New Year’s offensive: 187, 188, 194, 195. See 

also below Seoul. 

RUGGED: 352, 353 

Seoul: 198, 205 

THUNDERBOLT: 254 

42d: 249, 264, 304, 314, 326 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72, 83, 88, 90, 105 

Changjin Reservoir: 59 

Chip’yong-ni: 288, 299 

New Year’s offensive: 187, 188, 195-96, 200 

THUNDERBOLT: 254 

43d: 304, 311 

47th: 326-27 

50th: 59, 59n, 304, 314, 326, 502 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72 

New Year’s offensive: 187, 190, 195. See also 

below Seoul; Suwon. 

Seoul: 198, 204, 207 

Suwon: 216 

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 244. 245. 254. 255 

60th: 327 

Communist Spring offensive: 374, 379, 

384-85. 440, 441, 444, 445, 470 

UNC Spring counteroffensive, 470, 476 

63d: 325, 373, 379, 386, 387, 397, 416, 431, 440, 

444, 472 

64th: 325, 379, 397, 416, 431, 440, 444, 472 

65th: 325, 431, 440, 444 

Armies, Chinese-Continued 

66th: 59, 264, 304, 314, 326 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72-73, 77-78, 79 

Hoengsong: 266, 269 

New Year’s offensive: 187, 188, 195, 197, 200 

THUNDERBOLT: 254 

67th: 502 

68th: 502 

Armistice. See also United States (U.S.), and a negotiated settlement. 

minimum Communist terms: 496, 499, 500-501 

minimum U.N. terms: 490, 494-95 

Armistice conferences: 502, 503 

Armor School, Fort Knox: 236 

Armored teams: 251 

Arms, UNC, lost or abandoned: 407. See also Equipment and supplies, UNC, lost or abandoned. 

Army, Department of the: 237 

Army, Secretary of. See Pace, Frank, Jr. 

Army, U.S., Eighth: 15-17, 26, 88. See also Ch’ongch’on 

River; Corps, ROK, I, II, III; Corps, U.S., I, IX, 

X; Ridgway, General Matthew B.; United Nations 

Command (UNC); Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A.; 

Walker, Lt. Gen. Walton H. 

cease-fire positions: 497-99, 500 

CINCUNC Order No. 5: 157-60 

composition: 26-28, 149, 156, 160, 161, 502, 502n. 

See also specific unit by type and name or number. 

Engineer. See Strong, Col. Paschal N. 

EUSAK: 24n 

evacuation plans: 158-59. See also United Nations 

Command (UNC), evacuation question. 

G-2: 61, 240, 264, 323, 375, 444, 504. See also 

Fergusson, Col. Robert G.; Tarkenton, Lt. Col. 

James C. 

G-3: 76, 246, 252, 338. See also Dabney, Col. John 

A.; Mudgett, Col. Gilman C. 

G-4: 441-42, 454. See also Stebbins, Col. Albert K. 

headquarters: 25, 26, 27, 36, 105, 179-80, 189, 236, 

347. See also P’yongyang; Ridgway, General 

Matthew B., and leadership and confidence, and 

morale; Seoul; Taegu; Yoju. 

investigation of losses, Hoengsong: 280, 281 

line B: 180-83, 187 

Kansas-Wyoming defense: 503-04 

mission and responsibilities: 24, 487. See also under 

United Nations Command (UNC) 

morale: 302, 320. See also Morale, UNC. 

operations to support a negotiated settlement: 494, 

495, 497-99, 500, 505-06 

and partisans: 230 

to the northern border: 19-21, 43-48 

and X Corps: 20, 156-58, 159, 160 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 485 

Army Field Forces. See Clark, General Mark W. 

Army groups, Chinese 

III: 327, 373 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 379, 384, 

444, 452-53, 470 
518 EBB AND FLOW 

Army groups, Chinese-Continued 

III-Continued 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470 

IX: 53-54, 55, 56, 59, 187, 265, 304, 325-26, 327, 352 

Changjin Reservoir: 92, 96, 147, 325 

Communist Spring offensive: 374, 376, 379, 

381, 444, 463, 466, 470 

DAUNTLESS: 374 

THUNDERBOLT: 254 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470 

XIII: 53, 55, 56, 56n, 59, 149-50, 155, 164, 183, 

326-27. See also Li T’ien-yu. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72, 82 

Chip’yong-ni: 295 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 383, 444 

Hoengsong: 266 

New Year’s offensive: 188 

THUNDERBOLT 240, 243, 244, 245, 254 

XVII, and Communist Spring offensive: 325, 326, 

327, 348, 373, 374. 376. 379. 386. 430. 431. 433. 

444, 445, 470 

XX: 502 

Army War College: 308 

Artillery coordination: 251 

ASCOM City: 210, 210n, 212 

Australia, forces of in Korea: 24, 27n, 36, 36n. See 

also Battalion, Australian, 3d, Royal Australian 

Rgt.; Brigades, British Commonwealth, 27th. 

Baker, Lt. Col. Denzil L.: 276, 277, 278, 279 

Barr, Maj. Gen. David G. See also Divisions, U.S., 7th 

Infantry. 

Changjin Reservoir: 86-87, 87n 

departs Korea: 236 

line B: 186 

line D: 217, 223, 225 

Mup’yong-ni: 89-90 

withdrawal to Hamhung-Hungnam: 129, 130, 131 

Barrett, Capt. John C.: 299. See also Companies, U.S., 

L, 23d Infantry. 

Bataan, USS: 410 

Battalion, Australian, 3d, Royal Australian Regiment: 

27n, 391, 402-06, 407n: 430. See also Brigades, 

British Commonwealth. 27th. 

Battalion, Belgian, and Communist Spring offensive: 

329, 329n, 385-87, 394-96, 412-13, 421, 424-25 

Battalion, Canadian, 2d, Princess Patricia’s Light 

Infantry: 182, 302, 391, 402, 405, 406-407: 407n, 

430. See also Brigade, Canadian, 25th Infantry; 

Brigades, British Commonwealth, 27th. 

Battalion, Colombian: 502 

Battalion, Ethiopian: 442n 

Battalion, French: 149, 182, 184 

Chip’yong-ni: 248, 285, 287, 296 

Han’gye: 448, 450, 451, 452, 455, 458 

Hasolch’i: 462, 463 

Hill 247: 221-22 

Task Force Zebra: 401 

Battalion, Netherlands: 26, 62, 149, 182 

Battalion, Netherlands--Continued 

Communist Spring offensive: 448, 451, 452, 455, 

456, 459 

Hill 247: 222 

Hoengsong: 273, 277-78, 279 

Task Force Zebra: 401 

Wonju: 288 

Battalion, New Zealand, 16th Field Artillery: 182, 391, 

392. 402. 404. 405-07. See also Brigades. British 

Commonwealth, 27th; New Zealand, forces of in 

Korea. 

Battalion, Thai: 62, 149, 182, 196, 214. See also Regimental Combat Team, Thai, 21st. 

Battalion Combat Team, Philippine, 10th: 26, 149 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61-62, 71 

DAUNTLESS: 372 

Imjin defenses: 379, 385, 386, 395, 396, 412, 

414-15, 417, 418, 421, 428-29 

line B: 180 

Battalions, British. See also Commando, 41st Independent, Royal Marines. 

11st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders: 371, 442n. 

See also Brigades, British Commonwealth, 27th. 

11st Gloucestershire Rgt.: 385, 387-89, 395, 396-97, 

411-19, 421-29. See also Brigade, British, 29th. 

1st, King’s Own Scottish Borderers: 371 

1st, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry: 442n 

1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers: 198, 385, 386, 

387, 395, 396-97, 412, 417, 421, 424. See also 

Brigade, British, 29th Independent. 

1st, Royal Ulster Rifles: 198, 206, 386, 387, 395, 

412, 417, 421, 424. See also Brigade, British, 29th 

Independent. 

Middlesex. See also Brigades, British Commonwealth, 27th. 

Kap’yong: 391, 392, 402, 404, 405-06 

Kunu-ri: 115-16, 120, 121 

Battalions, ROK 

1st, 3d Regiment: 112 

2d, 2d Regiment: 332 

2d, 12th Regiment: 422-24, 426, 427 

3d, 11th Regiment: 213 

3d, 36th Regiment: 448, 450 

11th Field Artillery: 447 

20th Field Artillery: 263, 266 

27th Field Artillery: 383 

30th Field Artillery: 447 

50th Field Artillery: 263, 266 

Battalions, U.S. 

1st, 1st Marines: 87-88, 140, 142, 143, 145, 383 

1st, 5th Cavalry: 296, 297, 299 

1st, 5th Infantry: 420 

1st, 5th Marines: 90, 92, 96, 145 

1st, 7th Cavalry: 107, 333, 360 

1st, 7th Infantry: 101, 395, 396, 412, 418, 422, 427, 

473, 475 

1st, 7th Marines: 90, 96, 137, 328 

1st, 9th Infantry 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 67, 78, 80 
INDEX 519 

Battalions, U.S.-Continued 

1st, 9th Infantry--Continued 

Communist Spring offensive: 457, 462-63 

Kunu-ri: 107, 116 

ROUNDUP: 263 

Wonju defenses: 282, 283, 288, 290 

1st, 15th Infantry: 237-38, 343, 416-17 

1st, 21st Infantry: 472 

1st, 23d Infantry 

battle of Ch’ongch’on: 65, 67, 68, 74, 80-81 

Chip’yong-ni: 285, 287 

Communist Spring offensive: 452, 462 

Kunu-ri: 108 

1st, 24th Infantry: 68, 418 

1st, 27th Infantry: 207, 238 

1st, 31st Infantry: 87n 

1st, 32d Infantry: 86-87, 87n, 88, 90, 92, 96-97, 171. 

See also Faith, Lt. Col. Don C.; Task forces, Faith. 

1st, 38th Infantry: 68, 108, 122. See also Keleher, 

Lt. Col. William P. 

Communist Spring offensive: 448, 456, 459-60 

Hoengsong: 268, 275-76 

1st, 65th Infantry: 385, 413, 417, 421 

1st, 187th Airborne RCT: 262. 274. 338. 339 

2d Chemical Mortar: 118, 382, 383; 390-91, 404. 

See also Companies, U.S., B, 2d Chemical 

Mortar Bn. 

2d Combat Engineer: 68, 78, 124, 127, 285 

2d, 1st Marines: 88 

2d, 5th Cavalry: 81, 296, 297, 299 

2d, 5th Infantry: 420 

2d, 5th Marines: 88, 90, 96, 141 

2d, 7th Cavalry: 356, 358, 360 

2d, 7th Infantry: 337, 342, 386, 387, 418, 422 

2d, 7th Marines: 100 

2d, 9th Infantry 

Battle of Ch’ongch’on: 65, 67, 68, 74-75, 80, 81 

Kunu-ri: 107, 116, 118-19, 120, 122 

line Waco: 457, 463 

2d, 15th Infantry: 475 

2d, 17th Infantry. See Baker, Lt. Col. Denzil L. 

2d, 19th Infantry: 198 

2d, 21st Infantry: 353 

2d, 23d lnfantry. See also Edwards, Lt. Col. James 

W.: Task forces. Zebra. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 68, 74, 108 

Chip’yong-ni: 285 

Communist Spring offensive: 452, 455, 

457-59, 462 

Hill 247: 220-22 

2d, 27th Infantry: 68, 73, 207 

2d, 31st Infantry: 92, 98, 100, 130, 132, 143, 262 

2d, 38th Infantry 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 65, 67, 70 

Communist Spring offensive: 448, 450, 452. 

456, 459-60. See also Task forces, Yoke. 

Hill 247: 221-22 

Hoengsong: 272-73 

Kunu-ri: 108, 109-11, 122 

Battalions, U.S.-Continued 

2d, 65th Infantry: 140, 145, 330, 385, 421 

2d, 187th Airborne RCT: 339, 342. See also Task 

forces, Gerhardt. 

3d AAA Automatic Weapons: 140n 

3d, 1st Marines: 88, 100-101, 139 

3d, 5th Cavalry: 297 

3d, 5th Infantry: 419, 420 

3d, 5th Marines: 90, 92, 94-96 

3d, 7th Cavalry: 359, 360, 361 

3d, 7th Infantry: 140n, 418, 422, 462 

3d. 7th Marines: 90. 96 

3d, 8th Cavalry: 239n 

3d, 9th Infantry 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 65, 67, 68, 80 

Communist Spring-offensive: 457, 463 

Kunu-ri: 107, 116, 118-19, 122 

3d, 23d Infantry 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 69 

Chip’yong-ni: 285, 287 

Chip'yong-ni railroad tunnels: 248-49 

Communist Spring offensive: 452, 455-56, 

457-59, 462 

Kunu-ri: 112, 113 

3d, 24th Infantry: 113, 117 

3d, 27th Infantry: 207, 419 

3d, 31st Infantry: 92, 96, 97, 98, 99, 132 

3d. 38th Infantry 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 65, 67, 75 

Communist Spring offensive: 448, 450, 454, 

457-58, 460 

Hoengsong: 268, 269, 270, 272-73, 275-76 

Kunu-ri: 108, 109-11, 122, 126 

ROUNDUP: 263 

Wonju defenses: 288 

3d, 65th Infantry 

Imjin: 385, 395, 396, 413, 417-18, 421, 425 

line D: 213-14 

3d, 187th Airborne RCT: 339, 342 

4th Field Artillery, 1st Marine Div.: 360 

6th Medium Tank: 337, 419. See also Task forces, 

Growdon. 

6th Tank: 296, 298 

8th Engineer Combat: 239n. 361 

8th Field Artillery: 73, 205, 238n 

9th Field Artillery: 189 

10th Engineer Combat: 100, 140n. 173-74, 337 

10th Field Artillery: 413, 422 

15th AAA Automatic Weapons: 86-87, 132 

15th Field Artillery: 118, 119, 121, 126, 271n, 280 

17th Field Artillery: 124, 360 

27th Field Artillery: 382 

37th Field Artillery: 124, 248, 285 

38th Field Artillery: 119, 124-25, 126 

52d Transportation Truck: 140n. 147 

57th Field Artillery: 86, 92, 97, 171, 312 

58th Armored Field Artillery: 337 

61st Field Artillery: 67, 67n, 68-69 

64th Tank: 341, 372, 386, 395, 396, 421, 481 
EBB AND FLOW

Battalions, U.S.-Continued

70th Tank: 239-40, 296, 297

72d Tank. See also Brubaker, Lt. Col. Elbridge L.:

Companies, U.S., A, 72d Tank Bn., B, 72d Tank

Bn., C, 72d Tank Bn.; Task forces, Able,

Gerhardt, Yoke.

battle of the Ch'ongch'on: 77, 80

Hoengsong: 274

intelligence: 458

Kunu-ri: 108, 112, 115, 118, 120, 121, 126

Seoul defenses: 187, 196

73d Engineer Combat: 140n

73d Heavy Tank: 416, 422-24, 426, 427

73d Tank: 397

74th Engineer Combat: 391, 404. See also Companies, U.S., B, 74th Engineer Combat Bn., and

C, 74th Engineer Combat Bn.

82d AAA Automatic Weapons: 118, 122, 285

89th Heavy Tank: 476

89th Medium Tank: 63n

89th Tank: 117, 238n, 372

92d Armored Field Artillery: 140n, 196, 382, 383,

390, 399

96th Field Artillery: 196, 262, 276, 274

99th Field Artillery: 239n

213th Field Artillery: 391, 392, 402

300th Field Artillery: 474. See also Task forces,

Yoke.

503d Field Artillery: 115, 118, 119, 124, 271, 271n,

285

555th Field Artillery: 419, 420-21

674th Field Artillery: 262, 274, 276, 339

987th Armored Field Artillery: 382, 383, 390, 407

999th Armored Field Artillery: 140, 145, 337

Batteries, British

70th, Royal Artillery: 428

170th Mortar, Royal Artillery: 428

Batteries, U.S.

2d Rocket Field Artillery: 382, 383, 390, 407

A, 57th Field Artillery Bn.: 97

A, 503d Field Artillery Bn.: 271, 271n, 279

B, 57th Field Artillery Bn.: 97

B, 82d AAA Automatic Weapons Bn.: 118, 126,285

B, 90th Field Artillery Bn.: 238n

B, 503d Field Artillery Bn.: 285, 295-96

C, 9th Field Artillery Bn.: 189

D, 15th AAA Automatic Weapons Bn.: 86-87, 132

Becker, Lt. Col. Henry C.: 117, 118

Belgium, forces of in Korea: 329, 329n. See also

Battalion, Belgian.

"Big R": 365

Blockade: 16, 40, 505. See also Naval task forces, 95.

Bombardment Groups, U.S.

19th: 35

307th: 35

98th: 35

Bomber Command (Provisional): 35, 48, 55n, 379

Bombs

fragmentation: 328, 328n

Bombs-Continued

one-ton general purpose: 438n

proximity-fused: 466

Booby-traps: 340, 370

Boswell, Col. James O.]: 418. See also Regiments,

U.S., 7th Infantry.

Bowen, Brig. Gen. Frank S., Jr. See also Regimental

combat teams, U.S., 187th Airborne.

COURAGEOUS/TOMAHAWK: 338-39, 340, 341-42

Hoengsong: 274, 276

Seoul bridgehead: 196

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 481

Bradley, Brig. Gen. J. Sladen: 3 09n. See also Divisions,

U.S., 25th Infantry.

Communist Spring offensive: 385, 418, 419, 433,

435

COURAGEOUS: 341

Kunu-ri: 109, 121, 123, 125-26

RIPPER: 317, 321

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N.: 14n, 362,

364, 364n, 365, 368

Brigade, British, 29th Independent: 26, 149. See also

Battalions, British, Ist, Gloucestershire Rgt., Ist,

Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, Ist, Royal Ulster

Rifles; Brodie, Brigadier Thomas.

battle of the Ch'ongch'on: 61, 82

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 379, 385-89,

395-97,410-11, 414n, 438

DAUNTLESS: 372, 373

line B: 180

line D: 214, 216

Seoul defenses: 190, 192, 193-94, 196, 198, 201,

205-07, 438

Task Force Growdon: 337

Brigade, Canadian, 25th Infantry: 442, 502n

Brigade, Turkish, Ist Armed Forces Command: 26,

120, 149. See also Yasici, Brig. Gen. Tahsin.

battle of the Ch'ongch'on: 61, 62, 71, 77, 80, 81,

81n, 82, 83. See also below Kaech'on; Kunu-ri.

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 379, 384-85,

386, 393, 419, 433

DAUNTILESS: 372, 375, 376

Kaech'on: 108, 109-111

Kunu-ri: 112, 115, 116, 118, 121, 122

line C: 201

line B: 180

line D: 214

RIPPER: 328

Seoul defenses: 192, 435

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 244, 245

withdrawal from P'yongyang: 151-53

Brigade, U.S.,2d Engineer Special: 28, 167, 317, 437

Brigades, British Commonwealth

27th: 26, 26n. See also below 28th. See also Battalion,

Australian; Battalion, Canadian; Battalion, New

Zealand; Battalions, British, Middlesex.

battle of the Ch'ongch'on: 61, 71, 77, 80

Chinese New Year's offensive: 180, 190, 194,

195, 201-02.

520
INDEX 521 

Brigades, British Commonwealth-Continued 

27th-Continued 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 284-85, 290-91, 295 

Communist Spring offensive: 383, 391-92, 

393, 401-02 

DAUNTI.ESS: 362, 371 

KILLER: 301, 302, 307 

Kunu-ri: 115-16 

line D: 214, 216 

RUGGED: 353 

withdrawal from Seoul bridgehead: 204, 207 

28th: 371-72, 430, 433, 435, 438, 442n. See also 

above 27th. 

Brigades, North Korean 

23d: 323 

26th: 324 

63d: 324 

69th: 262, 314, 352, 369 

Briggs, Brig. Gen. James E.: 379. See also Bomber 

Command (Provisional). 

British Commonwealth units: 27-28. See also specific 

country; specific unit by type and number. 

Brockway trucks: 141, 145 

Brodie, Brigadier Thomas. See also Brigade, British, 

29th Independent. 

Seoul bridgehead: 193, 193n. 206 

Communist Spring offensive; 386-88, 395, 396, 

412-15, 421-22. 424-25. 428-29 

Brown, Lt. Russell J.: 42n 

Brubaker, Lt. Col. Elbridge L.: 401, 448, 480-481. See 

also Battalions, U.S., 72d Tank; Task forces, 

Zebra. 

Bryan, Maj. Gen. Blackshear M.: 245. See also Divisions, U.S., 24th Infantry. 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 384, 394, 419 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472 

“Bug-out fever”: 150 

Burke, Brigadier [B. A.]: 391-92, 404, 405. See also 

Brigades, British Commonwealth, 27th. 

Butterfly bombs: 328n 

Callaway, Lt. Col. John W.: 358-59 

Canada, forces of in Korea: 24, 27, 38n, 182, 442, 

502n. See also Battalion, Canadian. 

Carey, 2d Lt. Richard E.: 100 

Carne, Lt. Col. James P.: 388-89, 397, 411-12, 414, 

415-16, 417, 425-26, 429. See also Battalions, 

British, 1st, Gloucestershire Rgt. 

Carrier forces. See Naval task forces, 77, 95. 

Casualties, Communist: 377, 502 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on/UNC force withdrawal, 

73, 114 

Changjin Reservoir: 137, 147 

Chip’yong-ni railroad tunnels: 249 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju offensive: 288, 299 

Communist Spring offensive: 431, 436, 437, 450, 

454, 455, 459, 461, 469, 480 

Task Force Johnson: 239-40 

KILLER: 310 

RIPPER: 332, 334 

Casualties, Communist-Continued 

THUNDERBOLT: 244 

TOMAHAWK: 340 

WOLFHOUND: 238 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 479, 480, 504 

Casualties, UNC: 502-03 

advance into North Korea: 65 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on/withdrawal south: 113, 

114, 115, 124, 126, 126n-27n, 127 

Changjin Reservoir/withdrawal to the coast: 101, 

103, 136, 138, 142; 147, 147n 148 

Chip’yong-ni: 287, 297, 298, 299, 300 

Chip’yong-ni railroad tunnels: 248, 249 

Chuam-ni: 288, 288n 

Communist Spring offensive: 420, 421, 424, 428, 

437, 459-60, 480 

evacuation of: 138-39, 142, 155, 405-06, 420, 424 

Hoengsong: 269, 277, 278, 279, 280 

Kap’yong: 405-06, 407 

KILLER: 310 

ROUNDUP: 321 

Task Force Johnson: 239 

THUNDERBOLT: 243 

TOMAHAWK: 339 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 480 

WOI.FHOUND: 238 

Cease-fire: 319, 344-47, 488, 494-97, 500-501, 

504-05. See also Negotiated settlement. 

Centurion tank. See Tanks. 

Chang Do Yong, Brig. Gen.: 190, 194-95, 213. See also 

Divisions, ROK, 6th. 

Communist Spring offensive: 382, 383, 384, 392, 

402, 407-08 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 479 

Chang Tien-yun: 326. See also Armies, Chinese, 47th. 

Ch’angbong-ni 

battle for Hoengsong: 266, 268, 269 

ROUNDUP: 263 

withdrawal from: 268, 269-72 

Ch’angdong-ni, and ROUNDUP: 259, 262 

Changhowon-ni: 161, 214, 291 

Changjin Reservoir: 19, 21, 43, 47, 48 

battle of: 84, 103-04, 478n. See also Corps, ROK, I; 

Corps, U.S., X; Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P.; specific 

units by type and number. 

Communist forces: 54. 59. 88-89, 90-92 

Hagaru-ri: 88, 92, 96, 97, 98, 100-101, 131-32, 

136-39. See also below UNC force withdrawal; Task 

forces, Faith, Drysdale. 

Kot’o-ri: 88, 98, 101, 102, 139-40. See also above 

Hagaru-ri. 

Yudam-ni: 88. 92-96. 98. 137 

X Corps disposition: 84-88, 89-90 

UNC force withdrawal: 128-30, 137-47. See also 

Hamhung; Hungnam; Songjin; Wonsan. 

Changjin River flats: 100 

Changnung River: 338 

Changp’yong-ni: 462 

Chasan: 80, 115 

Chaun-ni: 448, 455, 457-59, 462, 481, 482 
522 EBB AND FLOW 

Chech’on: 453, 460, 467, 469 

defense of: 291-92, 293-94 

KILLER: 307 

UNC force withdrawal south: 186, 217, 219, 223, 

224, 225, 227, 275, 282 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473 

Chen Yi: 56. See also Field armies. Chinese, Third. 

Chiam-ni: 472, 478, 479 

Chich’on-ni: 382, 383, 390, 398 

Chief of Naval Onerations, U.S. Navy. See Sherman, 

Admiral Forrest P. 

Chief of Staff, NKPA. See Lee Sang Cho, Maj. Gen.; 

Nam Il, Lt. Gen. 

Chief of Staff, ROK Army: 305. See also Chung Il 

Kwon, Maj. Gen. 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. See Vandenberg, 

General Hoyt S. 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Collins, General J. 

Lawton. 

Chigyong: 129, 131, 171 

Chiles, Col. John H.: 287, 287n, 297, 300, 452, 455, 

457, 458, 484 

China, Nationalist: 41, 59n. See also Formosa. 

China, People’s Republic of: 3, 41 

intervention: 13, 17, 19-20, 21-22, 56n-57n, 57-59 

and negotiated settlement: 489, 494, 496-97, 500, 

501-02 

seating of in U.N.: 500 

China, People’s Republic of, air forces. See Air operations, Communist. 

China, People’s Republic of, Army: 20, 21, 21n, 42, 

43, 49. See also Armies, Chinese; Army groups, 

Chinese: Divisions, Chinese: Logistics, Communist; People’s Liberation Army. 

China, People’s Republic of, navy. See People's Navy. 

Chinaman’s Hat: 67, 68, 74 

Chinch’on: 239 

Chinese Communist Forces (CCF): 53n, 56n 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188-91, 223-24, 254 

Communist forces: 187-88, 195 

UNC force 

disposition: 180-83, 184-87 

withdrawal south: 190-91, 192, 197, 204-08, 

210, 212-16, 225-27. See also Inch’on; Seoul, 

defense of; Wonju. 

Chinese People’s Volunteers: 56, 325-27, 502. See also 

Armies, Chinese; Army groups, Chinese; Divisions, Chinese; Logistics, Communist; People’s 

Liberation Army. 

Chinhae: 160 

Chinhung-ni: 87-88, 130, 140, 143, 145-47 

Chinnamp’o, and UNC force withdrawal south: 27, 

44, 150, 153, 155-56, 229, 313, 324 

Chinwa River: 228, 238 

Chip’yong-ni: 254, 266, 301, 309 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 275, 283-85 

KILLER: 301, 302, 309 

ROUNDUP: 248, 249, 251, 263 

Chip’yong-ni-Continued 

siege of: 285-91, 295-300. See also Chech’on, 

defense of. 

Chip’yong-ni-Hoengsong-P’yongch’ang line: 249 

Ch’o-do: 229-30 

Choe Hyon, Lt. Gen.: 219, 223-24, 225-27. See also 

Corps, North Korean, II. 

Choe Yong Gun, Marshal: 52 

Choe Yong Jin, Lt. Gen.: 323. See also Corps, North 

Korean, VI. 

Choi Suk, Brig. Gen.: 86, 468. See also Divisions, ROK, 

3d, 9th. 

Choi Yong Hee, Brig. Gen.: 266, 268. See also Divisions, ROK, 8th. 

Choksong: 385 

Ch’on-ni: 237 

Ch’onan: 214, 228, 242 

Ch’ongch’on River, and battle of: 3, 26, 44, 45, 89, 

107, 447. See also Corps, ROK, II; Corps, U.S., 

I, IX; specific units by type and number. 

Communist offensive: 65-76, 77-78 

UNC forces 

advance stopped: 71-72, 76 

disposition: 61-62, 76-77, 82 

objectives: 61, 63, 64-65 

withdrawal: 79-83, 103-04, 116, 128, 130, 

149-50. See also Chinnamp’o; Kaech’on; 

Kunu-ri; Line B; Sinch’ang-ni; Sukch’on; 

Sunch’on. 

Ch’ongch’on valley: 45, 47, 48. See also Ch’ongch’on 

River. 

Ch’ongjin: 3, 42n, 48, 86 

Chongju: 63-64, 72, 333 

Chongp’yong Reservoir: 328, 330, 470 

Chongson: 223, 259-61 

Ch’ongsongjin: 43, 323 

Ch’orwon: 157, 190. See also Iron Triangle. 

DAUNTLESS: 372, 375 

PILEDKIVER: 491 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 485n 

Ch’osan: 21 

Chosan-ni: 344 

Chosin Reservoir. See Changjin Reservoir. 

Chot’ong River: 111 

Chou Ching-wen: 57, 57n 

Chou En-lai: 19, 56n-57n, 58, 496-97 

Chuam-ni: 283, 288, 295, 302 

Chuch’on-ni: 291, 293 

Chuktun-ni: 402, 405 

Chuminjin: 262, 322 

Ch’unch’on: 180, 185, 254, 485 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 184, 185, 186, 187, 

188, 190-91, 196, 197, 219 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 383, 393, 398, 

403, 430, 438, 440, 443, 444, 448, 460 

and the Hwach’on Dam: 356, 358 

RIPPER: 312, 315, 317, 330, 331-33, 334, 344 
INDEX 523 

Ch’unch’on-Continued 

taken: 197, 332-33 

UNC force withdrawal south: 150, 161, 164, 165 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 472, 476-78, 

478n, 479, 480, 485 

Chung Il Kwon, Maj. Gen.: 27, 233, 246, 369, 369n, 

408 

Chungbong Mountain: 322 

Chunghwa: 127, 151 

Ch’ungju: 162, 182, 184, 192, 214, 217, 225, 249, 

265, 306 

Ch’unyang: 224 

Chup’o-ri: 269, 282, 293 

Church, Maj. Gen. John H.: 236, 239, 245. See also 

Divisions, U.S., 24th Infantry. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63, 71 

UNC force withdrawal south: 79, 109, 114, 194, 

195, 204 

Churchill tank. See Tanks. 

CINCUNC (Commander in Chief, United Nations 

Command). See MacArthur, General of the Army 

Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B. 

Civil affairs: 28, 202, 203 

Civil assistance teams: 330 

Civil Transport Corps: 352-53 

Civilians: 339, 504. See also Refugees. 

Clark, General Mark W.: 234, 305n 

Close air support, Communist: 378n. See also Air 

operations, Communist. 

Close air support, UNC. See also Radar-directed 

night-bombing. 

battle of Changjin Reservoir/force withdrawal to 

thecoast: 48, 87, 90, 100, 102, 128, 132, 137, 139 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on/ force withdrawal south: 

48, 111, 120, 123, 128 

Chip’yong-ni: 248, 285, 287, 296, 297 

Communist Spring offensive: 389, 395, 398, 410, 

413, 417, 425, 432, 454, 459, 462, 466, 468 

Hoengsong: 272, 274 

Hungnam: 167-68 

Hwach’on Dam: 359, 360 

Kap’yong: 405 

PILEDRIVER: 492 

THUNDERBOLT: 240, 252, 256 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 478, 479, 480 

WOLFHOUND: 238 

Wonju: 221, 222, 288 

Clothing: 28 

Coad, Brig. B. A.: 115. See also Brigades, British 

Commonwealth, 27th. 

Collins, General J. Lawton: 14n 

executive agent for JCS: 15 

and KILLER: 305 

in Korea: 158, 234 

and operations in support of negotiated settlement: 505 

and Ridgway: 177, 209, 234-37 

and Swing: 315n 

Tokyo conferences: 159, 234 

and Van Fleet: 368, 369 

Colombia, forces of in Korea, 502 

Combat Cargo Command (Provisional): 35-38, 139, 

167, 172, 287, 338n 

Combined Headquarters: 51 

Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE). See 

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas; 

Ridgway, General Matthew B. 

Commander in Chief, North Korean Armed Forces. 

See Kim Il Sung. 

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. See Radford, 

Adm. Arthur E. 

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command 

(CINCUNC). See MacArthur, General of the 

Army Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B. 

Commando, 41st Independent, Royal Marines, and 

Changjin Reservoir: 26, 28, 89, 89n, 90, 101, 

102-03, 137, 139, 147, 147n 

Commands, named. See by name. 

Commands, numbered 

2d Logistical: 27, 28, 160, 185 

3d Logistical: 27, 28. See also Hill, Col. John G. 

Communist Springoffensive: 382-85, 389-94, 418-21, 

430-34, 444-45, 447-48, 465, 466-67, 468-69. See 

also Brigade, British, 29th Independent; 

Chaun-ni; Divisions, ROK, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th; 

Han’gye; Hasolch’i; Inje; Kap’yong; Line Kansas; 

No Name line; Regiments, U.S., 9th Infantry, 

23d Infantry, 38th Infantry. 

early warnings: 374, 375-77 

planning 378-81 

Company, Australian, B, Royal Australian Rgt.: 402, 

404, 405 

Companies, British 

A, Gloucestershire Rgt.: 388-89, 411, 416, 426 

B, Gloucestershire Rgt.: 388-89, 397, 411-12, 415, 

416 

B, Royal Ulster Rifles: 206 

C, Gloucestershire Rgt.: 388-89, 411, 416, 426 

D, Gloucestershire Rgt.: 388-89, 411, 416, 426-27 

X, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers: 387 

Y, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers: 387 

Z, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers: 387 

Companies, Canadian 

B, Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry: 406-07 

D, Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry: 406-07 

Company, Netherlands, A: 451 

Companies, U.S. 

1st Ranger: 285, 296, 401, 448 

2d Ranger: 183, 332, 335, 339 

2d Reconnaissance: 75, 283, 288, 290, 291, 401 

3d Reconnaissance: 140n, 395, 396, 421 

3d Signal: 140n 

4th Ranger: 183, 332, 335, 339, 356, 359, 360-61 

7th Reconnaissance: 476 

8th Ranger: 419, 420 

16th Reconnaissance: 82 

25th Reconnaissance: 117, 238n 

25th Signal: 238n 

31st Tank: 99 

50th Engineer Port Construction: 212 
EBB AND FLOW

Companies, U.S.-Continued

60th Field Ambulance and Surgical: 339n

82d Engineer Petroleum Distribution: 211

8213th Ranger: 26, 63n, 180, 192, 258, 384

A, 7th Cavalry: 361

A, 9th Infantry: 466

A, 10th Engineer Combat: 140

A, 14th Enrgineer Combat Bn.: 337

A, 23d Infantry: 80, 295

A, 32d Infantry: 96-97

A, 38th Infantry: 67, 68, 269, 271-72, 450, 452,

456, 457, 459

A, 65th Engineer Bn.: 238n

A, 70th Tank Bn.: 296-97

A, 72d Tank Bn.: 391, 402-06, 406n, 407, 407n

A, 73d Heavy Tank Bn.: 416

A, 73d Engineer Combat: 140n

B, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn.: 391, 404, 406

B, 2d Engineer Combat Bn.: 285, 287, 296

B, 5th Marines: 96

B, 23d Infantry: 296

B, 31st Infantry: 98, 102-03

B, 32d Infantry: 96-97, 99

B, 35th Infantry: 63n

B, 38th Infantry: 456, 457, 459

B, 64th Tank Bn.: 481

B, 72d Tank Bn.: 448, 457, 481

B, 74th Engineer Combat: 391, 404-06

B, 89th Tank Bn.: 117

B, 187th Airborne RCT: 339

C, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn.: 382, 390-91, 407

C, 2d Engineer Combat: 68

C, 6th Tank Bn.: 341, 342

C, 7th Marines: 92-94, 96

C, 9th Infantry: 466

C, 23d Infantry: 287, 295, 400

C, 32d Infantry: 96-97

C, 38th Infantry: 75, 111, 115, 450, 451, 452

C, 64th Tank Bn.: 340

C, 72d Tank Bn.: 121,448,450,455-56,457-59,474

C, 73d Heavy Tank Bn.: 422-24, 426, 427

C, 74th Engineer Combat Bn.: 391, 404-05

D, Ist Marines: 101-02

D, 6th Medium Tank Bn.: 419, 420-21

D, 6th Tank Bn.: 296, 298

D, 7th Marines: 94

D, 10th Engineer Bn.: 100, 101

E, 5th Marines: 94

E, 7th Cavalry: 94, 359, 361

E, 23d Infantry: 220

E, 27th Infantry: 63n

E, 38th Infantry: 450, 456

E, 72d Tank Bn.: 448

Eighth Army Ranger. See above 8213th Ranger.

F, 5th Marines: 94

F, 7th Cavalry: 359

F, 7th Marines: 92-94, 96, 98

F, 23d Infantry: 74,287,295-96,450,452,455,456

F, 27th Infantry: 117

F, 38th Infantry: 67, 75, 450, 456, 457, 459

F, 72d Tank Bn.: 448

Companies, U.S.-Continued

G, Ist Marines: 100, 101, 102-03

G, 5th Marines: 94

G, 7th Cavalry: 359

G, 7th Marines: 90

G, 23d Infantry: 287, 295-96, 297, 299

G, 38th Infantry: 67, 69, 75, 456, 459

G, 65th Infantry: 14'5, 146

G, 72d Tank Bn.: 448

G, 187th Airborne RCT: 274

H, 7th Marines: 90, 94

Headquarters, 21st Infantry 479, 47 9n

1, 5th Marines: 94

I, 7th Cavalry: 361

1, 9th Infantry: 119

I, 23d Infantry: 113, 295, 456

I, 31st Infantry: 97

I, 38th Infantry: 68

K, 23d Infantry: 113, 295

K, 27th Infantry: 207-08

K, 31st Infantry: 97, 99

K, 38th Infantry: 68, 461

L, 5th Cavalry: 297

L, 9th Infantry: 283. 288, 290, 291

L, 23d Infantry: 112, 113, 299

L, 31st Infantry: 99

L, 38th Infantry: 67, 75

M, 7th Cavalry: 360

medical, 21st Infantry: 479, 479n

tank, 15th Infantry: 474. See also Task forces, Yoke.

tank, 65th Infantry: 421, 422, 424, 425

Congress, U.S.: 363. See also Martin, Joseph W.;

Senate, U.S.

Containment: 10

Corley, Col. John T.: 113. See also Regiments, U.S.,

24th Infantry.

Corps, North Korean. See also Divisions, North

Korean; North Korean People's Army.

I: 52, 239, 244, 304, 314, 325, 373

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 417, 430,

444, 445, 4,70

New Year's offensive: 187, 190

and RIPPER/COURAC;EOUS: 334, 335, 340, 341,

348

and THUNDERBOLT: 254, 257

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472

11: 52, 164, 165, 184, 304, 314. See also Choe Hyon,

Lt. Gen.

Communist Spring offensive: 445, 447, 463,

467, 468, 470

Malta-ri: 292

New Year's offensive: 187, 199. See also below

Wonju.

and RIPPER: 333

and ROUNDUP: 246,248,249,251,252,261,262

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 476, 485

Wonju: 219, 223-27

Yongwol: 294

111: 52, 262, 304, 324

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 444

524 524 EBB AND FLOW 

Companies, U.S.-Continued 

60th Field Ambulance and Surgical: 339n 

82d Engineer Petroleum Distribution: 211 

8213th Ranger: 26, 63n, 180, 192, 258, 384 

A, 7th Cavalry: 361 

A, 9th Infantry: 466 

A, 10th Engineer Combat: 140 

A, 14th Engineer Combat Bn.: 337 

A, 23d Infantry: 80, 295 

A, 32d Infantry: 96-97 

A, 38th Infantry: 67, 68, 269, 271-72, 450, 452, 

456, 457, 459 

A, 65th Engineer Bn.: 238n 

A, 70th Tank Bn.: 296-97 

A, 72d Tank Bn.: 391, 402-06, 406n, 407, 407n 

A, 73d Heavy Tank Bn.: 416 

A, 73d Engineer Combat: 140n 

B, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn.: 391, 404, 406 

B, 2d Engineer Combat Bn.: 285, 287, 296 

B, 5th Marines: 96 

B, 23d Infantry: 296 

B, 31st Infantry: 98, 102-03 

B, 32d Infantry: 96-97, 99 

B, 35th Infantry: 63n 

B, 38th Infantry: 456, 457, 459 

B, 64th Tank Bn.: 481 

B, 72d Tank Bn.: 448, 457, 481 

B, 74th Engineer Combat: 391, 404-06 

B, 89th Tank Bn.: 117 

B, 187th Airborne RCT: 339 

C, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn.: 382, 390-91, 407 

C, 2d Engineer Combat: 68 

C, 6th Tank Bn.: 341, 342 

C, 7th Marines: 92-94, 96 

C, 9th Infantry: 466 

C, 23d Infantry: 287, 295, 400 

C, 32d Infantry: 96-97 

C, 38th Infantry: 75, 111, 115, 450, 451, 452 

C, 64th Tank Bn.: 340 

C, 72d Tank Bn.: 121, 448, 450, 455-56, 457-59, 474 

C, 73d Heavy Tank Bn.: 422-24, 426, 427 

C, 74th Engineer Combat Bn.: 391, 404-05 

D, 1st Marines: 101-02 

D, 6th Medium Tank Bn.: 419, 420-21 

D, 6th Tank Bn.: 296, 298 

D, 7th Marines: 94 

D, 10th Engineer Bn.: 100, 101 

E, 5th Marines: 94 

E, 7th Cavalry: 94, 359, 361 

E, 23d Infantry: 220 

E, 27th Infantry: 63n 

E, 38th Infantry: 450, 456 

E, 72d Tank Bn.: 448 

Eighth Army Ranger. See above 8213th Ranger. 

F, 5th Marines: 94 

F, 7th Cavalry: 359 

F, 7th Marines: 92-94, 96, 98 

F, 23d Infantry: 74, 287, 295-96, 450, 452, 455, 456 

F, 27th Infantry: 117 

F, 38th Infantry: 67, 75, 450, 456, 457, 459 

F, 72d Tank Bn.: 448 

Companies, U.S.-Continued 

G, 1st Marines: 100, 101, 102-03 

G, 5th Marines: 94 

G, 7th Cavalry: 359 

G, 7th Marines: 90 

G, 23d Infantry: 287, 295-96, 297, 299 

G, 38th Infantry: 67, 69, 75, 456, 459 

G, 72d Tank Bn.: 448 

G, 65th Infantry: 145, 146 

G, 187th Airborne RCT: 274 

H, 7th Marines: 90, 94 

Headquarters, 21st Infantry 479, 479n 

I, 5th Marines: 94 

I, 7th Cavalry: 361 

I, 9th Infantry: 119 

I, 23d Infantry: 113, 295, 456 

I, 31st Infantry: 97 

I, 38th Infantry: 68 

K, 23d Infantry: 113, 295 

K, 27th Infantry: 207-08 

K, 31st Infantry: 97, 99 

K, 38th Infantry: 68, 461 

L, 5th Cavalry: 297 

L, 9th Infantry: 283, 288, 290, 291 

L, 23d Infantry: 112, 113, 299 

L, 31st Infantry: 99 

L, 38th Infantry: 67, 75 

M, 7th Cavalry: 360 

medical, 21st Infantry: 479, 479n 

tank, 15th Infantry: 474. See also Task forces, Yoke. 

tank, 65th Infantry: 421, 422, 424, 425 

Congress, U.S.: 363. See also Martin, Joseph W.; 

Senate, U.S. 

Containment: 10 

Corley, Col. John T.: 113. See also Regiments, U.S., 

24th Infantry. 

Corps, North Korean. See also Divisions, North 

Korean; North Korean People's Army. 

I: 52, 239, 244, 304, 314, 325, 373 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 417, 430, 

444, 445, 470 

New Year’s offensive: 187, 190 

and RIPPER/COURAGEOUS: 334, 335, 340, 341, 

348 

and THUNDERBOLT: 254, 257 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472 

II: 52, 164, 165, 184, 304, 314. See also Choe Hyon, 

Lt. Gen. 

Communist Spring offensive: 445, 447, 463, 

467, 468, 470 

Malta-ri: 292 

New Year’s offensive: 187, 199. See also below 

Wonju. 

and RIPPER: 333 

III: 

and ROUNDUP: 246, 248, 249, 251, 252, 261, 262 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 476, 485 

Wonju: 219, 223-27 

Yongwol: 294 

52, 262, 304, 324 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 444 
INDEX 525 

Corps, North Korean-Continued 

III-Continued 

and DAUNTLESS: 376-77 

and KILLER: 311, 314 

New Year’s offensive: 187 

and RIPPER: 333, 352 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 476 

IV: 51-52, 86, 323-24, 333 

V: 52, 184, 304, 314. See also Pang Ho San, Maj. Gen. 

Chech’on: 293-94 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 445, 447, 

463, 467, 470 

and DAUNTLESS: 376-77 

Hoengsong: 273, 276-77 

New Year’s offensive: 187, 199 

and RIPPER: 333, 352 

and ROUNDUP: 246, 248, 249, 252, 261 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 476, 484 

Wonju: 219, 222, 223, 227 

and the Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 291 

VI: 312, 323-24 

VII: 324, 381n 

VIII: 324 

Corps, ROK 

I: 28, 43, 48, 52. See also Divisions, ROK, 3d, 11th, 

Capital; Kim Paik Il, Brig. Gen.; Paik Sun Yup, 

Maj. Gen. 

advance to the northern border/withdrawal to 

the coast: 84-86, 128, 129, 131 

Communist Spring offensive: 438-39, 445, 447, 

453, 463, 467-68, 469 

DAUNTLESS: 369-70, 374 

Eighth Army control: 161, 172 

Hoengsong: 275 

Hungnamevacuation: 161, 165-66, 167, 171-72 

Kangnung: 246, 251, 262 

line B: 180-83, 184 

line C: 192, 197, 199-200 

line D: 217 

and NKPA 10th Division: 333 

PILEDRIVER: 486-87, 493 

and ROK III Corps: 468 

RIPPER: 315-18, 322, 323, 336 

RUGGED: 349, 352 

THUNDERBOLT: 246 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 293-94 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 468, 476, 482, 

484, 485 

II: 27, 45-47, 192. See also Divisions, ROK, 6th, 

7th, 8th; Yu Hae Ueng, Maj. Gen. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 

65, 69-70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 83 

line A: 157 

line B: 180, 184 

line C: 197 

withdrawal from the north: 150, 153, 161 

III: 27, 62, 161, 165, 290. See also Divisions, ROK, 

2d, 5th, 9th, 11th; Hoengsong, battle for; Yu Jai 

Heung, Maj. Gen. 

Chinese New Year’soffensive: 188, 189, 190-91 

Corps, ROK-Continued 

III-Continued 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 400, 

401, 436, 438-39, 445, 447, 453, 457, 460-61, 

462, 463, 464, 466, 467-68 

DAUNTLESS: 362, 366, 374 

inactivation: 468, 473 

KILLER: 306, 306n, 310 

line Alabama: 376 

line B: 180, 184, 185-86 

line C: 192, 197, 199-200 

line D: 216-17, 223, 233 

line Kansas: 370 

and NKPA 10th Division: 333 

P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line: 292-93, 294 

reconnaissance in force/ROUNDUP: 246, 248, 

249-51, 252, 259-61, 262, 290 

RIPPER: 315-18, 322, 333, 336 

RUGGED: 349, 352, 362, 366 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 467-68 

Wonju line: 275, 282 

V Reserve: 352n 

Corps, U.S. 

I: 26, 45, 184, 228. See also Milburn, Maj. Gen. 

Frank W. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on; 9, 61, 62, 63, 71, 72, 

76-77, 78. See also below UNC force withdrawal south. 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188, 189, 190, 

191 

civil affairs: 202-03 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 381, 389, 

393-97, 410, 417, 430, 431, 432-33, 436, 465, 

470. See also Brigades, British, 29th Independent; Divisions, ROK, 1st; Divisions, U.S. 

24th Infantry, 25th Infantry; Seoul. 

control of Han River valley: 301 

COURAGEOUS: 334, 335-37, 341 

DAUNTLESS: 349-50, 362, 366, 372, 374, 375, 376 

Han River line: 284 

line A: 157 

line B: 180, 186-87 

line D: 210, 212, 213, 216-17 

PILEDRIVER: 485-86, 491-93 

reconnaissance in force: 228, 237-39, 240. See 

also below THUNDERBOLT. 

RIPPER: 315, 317, 323, 343 

RUGGED: 349, 352, 353 

Seoul bridgehead: 191, 192-94, 196, 198, 201- 

02, 204-08, 210 

THUNDERBOLT: 252, 254-58 

UNC force withdrawal south: 79, 82, 108-09, 

113, 116-17, 153-54, 155, 161, 164. See also 

above Seoul bridgehead. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 468, 470- 

72, 475, 476, 485n 

IX: 26, 45. See also Coulter, Maj. Gen. John B.; 

Hoge, Maj. Gen. William M.; Moore, Maj. Gen. 

Bryant E.; Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P.; Swing, 

Maj. Gen. Joseph M. 
526 EBB AND FLOW 

Corps, U.S.-Continued 

IX-Continued 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 59, 61, 62, 64, 71, 

72, 73, 76-77, 78 

Chinese New Year’soffensive: 188-89, 190, 191 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 381-84, 

389, 390-93, 397, 419, 420, 430, 431, 433, 

436, 438, 453, 465, 470 

control of Han River valley: 301-02 

COURAGEOUS: 335-36 

DAUNTLESS: 349-50, 362, 371, 374, 375, 376 

Engineer: 355-56 

G-3: 118 

Han River line: 284-85 

KILLER: 306-07, 308-09, 310, 311, 314 

line A: 157 

line B: 180, 186-87, 194-95 

line D: 210, 212, 213, 214-16 

PILEDRIVER 485-86, 491-93 

reconnaissance in force: 228, 239-240. See also 

below THUNUERBOLT. See also Task forces, 

Johnson. 

RIPPER: 315, 317, 321, 322-23, 327-28, 331-33, 

343-44. See also Ch’unch’on; Hongch’on. 

RUGGED: 349, 352, 353. See also Operations, 

RUGGED. 

Seoul bridgehead: 184, 191, 192, 196, 198, 

201-02, 204, 210 

THUNDERBOLT: 248, 251, 252, 254-55, 258, 

263-64, 283 

UNC force withdrawal south: 82, 116-17, 153, 

155, 161, 164. See also above Seoul bridgehead. See also Divisions, U.S., 2d Infantry, 

25th Infantry. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 468, 470, 

472, 475, 476, 480, 485n. See also Task forces, 

Hazel. 

WOLFHOUND: 237 

X: 17, 25, 28, 36, 48, 301, 302. See also Almond, 

Maj. Gen. Edward M.; Hoengsong, battle for; 

Onerations. ROUNDUP; Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. 

advance to the northern border: 19, 20-21, 43, 

47-48 

Changjin Reservoir: 21, 87n, 92. See also 

Changjin Reservoir; Divisions, ROK, 3d, 

Capital; Divisions, U.S., 1st Marine, 3d 

Infantry, 7th Infantry; Regiments, ROK, 1st 

Marine Corps. 

Chinese forces opposing: 59, 60 

force distribution: 84-88 

headquarters: 98, 100 

withdrawal: 103-04, 157, 158-59, 165-75 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 290 

CINCUNC Order No. 5: 159 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 399- 

401, 430-31, 436, 438, 443-44, 452-53, 457, 

460, 461-62, 463-64, 466-67, 469. See also 

Regiments, U.S., 9th Infantry, 23d Infantry, 

38th Infantry; Task forces, Zebra. 

DAUNTLESS: 362, 366, 374 

Corps, U.S.-Continued 

X--Continued 

and Eighth Army: 20, 47-48, 49, 84, 103-04, 

129, 130, 156-57, 159, 160 

G-2: 443-44. See also Polk, Col. James H. 

G-3. See Chiles, Col. John H. 

Inch’on: 16 

KILLER: 306, 307, 309, 310, 311, 314 

line B: 185-86 

line C: 192, 197, 199-200 

line D: 210, 217-19, 224-27. See also Wonju. 

line Kansas: 370-71 

PILEDRIVER: 486-87, 493 

reconnaissance in force: 246, 248. See also 

Operations, ROUNDUP. 

in reserve: 182 

RIPPER: 315, 317, 322, 323, 333, 336 

and ROK III Corps: 468 

ROUNDUP. See Operations, ROUNDUP. 

RUGGED: 349, 352, 362, 366 

Seoul, defense of:’ 165 

THUNDERBOLT: 248, 255 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 468, 472, 

473, 476, 482, 485n 

Wonsan landing: 43 

Coughlin, Col. John G. See also Regiments, U.S., 38th 

Infantry. 

Communist Spring offensive: 448, 450, 451, 452, 

455, 456, 459 

Hoengsong: 251, 272-73, 274-78 

Coulter, Maj. Gen. John B.: 62. See also Corps, U.S., IX. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 71, 76, 77, 81 

deputy commander, Eighth Army: 235 

line B: 186-87, 194-95 

line D: 212-13, 214-16 

reconnaissance in force: 228, 239. See also Task 

forces, Johnson; Operations, THUNDERBOLT. 

and Ridgway: 228 

Seoul bridgehead: 190, 191, 201, 204 

UNC force withdrawal south: 79, 80, 115-16, 117, 

118, 120, 156. See also above line B; line D; Seoul 

bridgehead. 

WOLFHOUND: 237 

COURAGEOUS. See Operations, COURAGEOUS. 

Crahay, Col. Albert: 329n, 413. See also Battalion, 

Belgian. 

Crombez, Col. Marcel G.: 300. See also Regiments, 5th 

Cavalry; Task forces, Crombez. 

Dabney, Col. John A.: 76, 109, 200, 233. See also Army, 

U.S., Eighth, G-3. 

DAUNTLESS. See Operations, DAUNTLESS. 

Davidson line: 160, 233 

Davidson, Brig. Gen. Garrison H.: 204 

Defense lines. See line by name. 

Defense, Department of 

command policy: 15 

Korean policy: 319-20, 344-45 

Defense, Secretary of. See Johnson, Louis A.; Marshall, 

George C. 
INDEX 527 

Defense minister, ROK. See Sing Sung MO. Divisions, North Korean-Continued 

den Ouden, Lt. Col. M. P. A.: 277-78. See also Bat- 6th: 219, 220, 293, 304, 381, 389, 400, 447, 460, 

talion, Netherlands 460n, 463, 484 

Denmark, personnel in Korea: 501 

Distinguished Service Cross: 407n 

Division, Commonwealth, 1st: 502n 

Divisions, Chinese 

2d Motorized Artillery: 327, 376, 384 

5th Artillery: 327 

7th Motorized Artillery: 325 

29th: 386, 418, 422 

31st: 450, 455, 463, 466, 475 

34th: 377, 386, 418n, 455, 460, 463, 466, 483 

35th: 450, 455, 463 

44th: 456 

45th: 450, 454, 461 

58th: 89, 90, 92, 96, 100-101, 102, 137-38 

59th: 89, 90, 92, 96, 98, 376, 384, 411 

60th: 89, 90-92, 101-02, 376, 382, 401-02, 418, 419 

76th: 140 

77th: 140 

79th: 92, 94, 96, 98, 172, 463 

80th: 92, 96, 98-100, 172, 411, 443, 463, 475 

81st: 171, 172, 374, 418, 445-47, 460, 463, 466, 467, 

470, 475 

89th: 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 98, 101, 140 

112th: 244, 245 

113th: 83, 122, 188-89, 245 

114th: 188, 190, 254 

115th: 73, 288, 299, 383-84, 398 

116th: 73, 188-89, 288, 299, 398 

117th: 73, 266, 268, 272, 273, 288 

118th: 194, 401-02 

119th: 288, 299 

120th: 266-68, 288, 299, 383, 398, 399 

124th: 88, 89, 90 

125th: 105-07, 114, 248-49 

126th: 88, 288, 299 

139th: 326-27 

140th: 326-27 

141st: 326-27 

148th: 245 

149th: 245 

150th: 245 

179th: 384-85, 411, 418 

181st: 374, 445, 455, 456, 462, 463, 464, 466 

187th: 373, 386, 397, 411, 417 

188th: 387, 397, 412, 417 

189th: 397, 416, 417, 421 

190th: 416, 417, 427 

192d: 397, 416, 417, 427 

197th: 269, 273 

198th: 266 

Divisions, North Korean 

1st: 173, 352, 370, 381 

2d: 88, 199, 219, 223, 226, 304, 310, 369-70, 447, 

463, 485 

3d: 172, 311, 324 

4th: 324 

5th: 88, 324 

7th: 219, 293, 304, 381, 381n 

8th: 239, 245, 254, 255, 304, 372-73, 417, 436, 439 

9th: 219, 223, 225-26, 292, 293, 304 

10th: 219, 223, 226-27, 304, 322, 323, 324, 333, 334 

12th: 199, 219, 220, 221, 293, 304, 376 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 399- 

400, 447, 460, 463 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 484 

13th: 324, 484, 485 

15th: 352, 370, 381 

17th: 254, 255, 304 

17th Mechanized: 343n 

18th: 323 

19th: 323, 340 

24th: 324 

27th: 219, 220, 223, 226, 292, 293, 304, 447, 463, 485 

28th: 219 

31st: 219, 226, 262, 304 

32d: 324, 381, 484-85 

36th: 323 

37th: 324 

38th: 304 

41st: 324 

42d: 324 

43d: 219, 304 

45th: 324, 353, 370, 381, 389, 400 

46th: 324 

47th: 254, 255, 304 

105th Tank: 324 

Divisions, ROK 

1st: 27, 208, 369, See also Kang Moon Bong, Brig. 

Gen.; Paik Sun Yup, Maj. Gen. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61, 63, 64, 71, 72, 

74, 76, 77, 79 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188, 189-90, 194 

Communist Spring offensive: 372-73, 379, 381, 

397, 410-11, 416, 417, 418-19, 421, 426, 

430, 432-34, 435, 436, 438, 439 

COURAGEOUS/TOMAHAWK: 336-37, 338, 340-41 

line B: 193-94 

line C: 201 

line D: 212-13, 214, 216 

Seoul bridgehead: 192 

RIPPEK: 317, 329, 330 

UNC force withdrawal south: 109, 113, 116- 

17, 149, See also above line B, line C, line D, 

Seoul bridgehead. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470-72 

WOLFHOUND: 237-38 

2d: 27, 306n 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 62 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188, 190-91 

Communist Spring offensive: 438 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

ROUNDUP: 259 

UNC force withdrawal south: 116, 150 180, 

197, 200, 217, 225 
528 EBB AND FLOW 

Divisions, ROK-Continued 

2d-Continued 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472, 480 

3d: 28. 43, 47, 185, See also Regiments, ROK, 5th. 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 421, 

430, 438-39, 447, 460-61, 463, 466, 467, 468 

evacuation from Songjin: 131, 165-66 

Hoengsong: 269, 273, 274, 275, 276, 279, 281 

KILLER: 307 

line B: 180, 200 

line C: 197 

line D: 217, 224 

line Kansas: 370, 376-77 

RIPPER: 317 

ROUNDUP: 261-62 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 282-83, 291-92, 

293-94 

5th: 27, 62, 370, 376 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188, 190-91, 195 

Communist Spring offensive: 389-90, 399-401, 

438-39, 442, 445-47, 448, 455-56, 457, 460, 

461 

Hoengsong: 273, 274, 275, 276-77, 279 

KILLER: 307 

PILEDRIVER: 493 

RIPPER: 318, 322 

ROUNDUP: 249, 251, 252, 259, 261-62 

UNC force withdrawal south: 150, 180, 197, 

200, 217, 225 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 482, 483 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 282-83, 291-92, 

293-94 

6th: 27, 195, 301, 302. See also Chang Do Yong, 

Brig. Gen. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61, 70, 76, 77, 80, 

81, 81n, 82 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188, 189-90 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 284-85, 290, 295 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 381, 382, 

384, 389, 390, 391, 392-93, 394, 397, 398, 

401-02, 407-08, 418, 420, 430, 433, 434, 438 

COURAGEOUS: 355 

DAUNTLESS: 371, 375, 376 

KILLER: 307 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

RIPPEK: 321, 323, 327-28, 330, 331, 332 

RUGGED: 353 

WOLYHOUND: 237, 239 

UNC force withdrawal south: 105, 107, 149, 

180, 194-95, 213, 216 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 478-80 

7th: 27 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61, 63, 69, 70, 76, 81n 

Communist Spring offensive: 389, 438-39, 442, 

445-47, 457, 460, 461, 462, 467 

DAUNTLESS: 376 

KILLER: 306 

PILEDRIVER: 493 

P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line: 292-93 

Divisions, ROK-Continued 

7th-Continued 

ROUNDUP 252, 259-61, 262 

UNC force withdrawal south: 149, 180, 184, 

197, 200, 217, 223-24, 225 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 474, 475 

8th: 27, 370n. See also Choi Yong Hee, Brig. Gen 

battle of Ch’ongch’on: 61, 63, 64, 69, 70, 76, 

149 

Communist Spring offensive: 453, 467 

Hoengsong: 266-69, 279, 280, 281 

KILLER: 307 

line B: 180, 184, 200 

line C: 197 

line D: 217, 220, 221, 223, 225 

ROUNDUP: 249-51, 252, 259, 261, 263 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473, 482 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 282, 293, 294 

9th: 27, 62, 369 

Communist Spring offensive: 438-39, 447, 

460-61, 463, 467, 468 

KILLER: 306 

line B: 182, 184, 200 

line C: 197 

line D: 217, 223-24 

PILEDRIVER: 486 

P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line: 292 

RIPPER: 317, 322 

ROUNDUP: 252, 259-61, 262 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473, 475, 482 

11th: 27, 62, 182, 370, 370n, 438-39, 467, 468 

Capital: 28, 43, 47, 84-86, 131, 165-66, See also Song 

Hyo Chan, Brig. Gen. 

Communist Spring offensive: 438-39, 463 

Hoengsong: 275 

KILLER: 306, 310, 317 

line B: 182 

line C: 197, 200 

line D: 217 

RIPPER: 317, 322 

ROUNDUE 262 

Divisions, U.S. 

1st Cavalry: 26, 301, 302. See also Gay, Maj. Gen. 

Hobart M.; Palmer, Brig. Gen. Charles D.; Regiments, U.S., 5th Cavalry, 7th Cavalry, 8th Cavalry. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61, 67n, 70-71, 77, 80 

Communist Spring offensive: 435, 438 

DAUNTLESS: 356 

KILLER: 307 

line B: 180 

line C: 195 

line D: 214 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

RIPPEK: 321, 322, 327-28, 330-31, 332-33, 344 

RUGGED: 349, 353. See also Hwach’on Dam. 

Task Force Johnson: 239 

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 244, 252, 255 

UNC force withdrawal south: 105, 109, 117, 

127, 149, 156, 162, 200 
INDEX 529 

Divisions, U.S.-Continued 

1st Cavalry-Continued 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470 

1st Marine: 28, 48, 89n, 330, 498. See also Regiments, U.S., 1st Marine, 5th Marine, 7th 

Marine: Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P.; Thomas, 

Maj. Gen. Gerald C. 

Changjin Reservoir: 43, 47, 86, 87-88, 97-98. 

See also below Hungnam evacuation; UNC 

force withdrawal. See also Changjin Reservoir. 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 382, 383, 

384, 390-91, 392-93, 398-99, 401, 430, 433, 

438, 445, 452-53, 460, 466 

DAUNTLESS: 356, 371, 375 

Eighth Army control: 170 

G-2. See Holcomb, Col. Bankson T., Jr. 

Hungnam evacuation: 167, 168, 169-70 

Kansong-T’ongch’on operation: 487 

KILLER: 306-07, 310 

line B: 185, 186 

NKPA 10th Division: 226-27 

PILEDRIVER: 493 

RIPPER: 321, 322, 327-28, 331, 344 

UNC force withdrawal: 129-30, 136, 147. See 

also above Hungnam evacuation. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 472, 474, 

475, 482, 484, 485, 485n 

2d Infantry: 26, See also Keiser, Maj. Gen. Laurence 

B.; McClure, Maj. Gen. Robert B.; Regiments, 

U.S., 9th Infantry, 23d Infantry, 38th Infantry; 

Ruffner, Maj. Gin. Clark L. ’ 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61, 63, 64, 65-68, 71, 

73, 74, 75-76, 77, 78-79, 80, 81 

Chip’yong-ni railroad tunnels: 248-49 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 282-83, 290 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 400-401, 

430, 438, 443, 445, 447-48, 453, 454-55, 460, 

461-63, 464, 465, 466-67, 485n 

COURAGEOUS: 337 

G-3. See Holden, Lt. Col. Maurice C. 

Hoengsong: 273, 275, 280 

KLLLER: 306. 307. 310 

line B: 182, 184, 185, 186, 187 

line C: 192, 197, 200 

line D: 217. See also Wonju, battle for. 

line Kansas: 370 

patrols north of Yanggu: 375 

PILEDRIVER: 486 

RIPPER: 321-22 

ROK forces: 447 

ROUNDUP: 249, 251, 259, 263 

RUGGED: 349, 358 

and X Corps: 192 

UNC force withdrawal south: 83, 108, 109, 

111-13, 115-16, 117-20, 126-27, 149, 151, 

162, 196. See also above line B, line C, line D. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474-75, 480 

Wonju: 223, 227, 233. See also above 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line. See also Wonju. 

Divisions, U.S.-Continued 

3d Infantry: 28, 48, 340, 342. See also Regiments, 

7th Infantry, 15th Infantry, 65th Infantry; Soule, 

Maj. Gen. Robert H. 

Changjin Reservoir: 84, 92. See also Changjin 

Reservoir. 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 379, 394-95, 

396, 416, 417-19, 421, 427, 430, 432, 433. 

435, 438, 442, 453, 457, 461-62, 466. See also 

Battalions, British, 1st, Gloucestershire Rgt. 

COURAGEOUS: 341, 343 

DAUNTLESS: 362, 372 

Hungnam evacuation: 166, 167, 168-69, 171, 

172, 173 

line B: 185, 186 

line D: 213-14 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

RIPPER: 317, 329-30 

Seoul bridgehead: 196 

THUNDERBOLT: 243-45, 252, 255, 256, 257 

UNC force withdrawal to the coast: 129, 130- 

31, 140, 147 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473, 474, 475, 

482, 483, 484 

WOLFHOUND: 237-38 

Wonsan: 165 

7th Infantry: 28, 43, 47, 48, 236. See also Barr, 

Maj. Gen. David G.; Ferenbaugh, Maj. Gen. 

Claude B.; Regiments, U.S., 17th Infantry; 31st 

Infantry, 32d Infantry. 

Changjin Reservoir: 86-87, 98. See also Changjin 

Reservoir. 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 400, 

430, 438, 453, 454 

Hoengsong: 275 

Hungnam evacuation: 165, 166, 167, 169, 171, 

172, 173 

KILLER: 307 

line B: 185, 186 

line C: 197 

line D: 217, 223, 225, 227 

line Kansas: 370 

patrols north of Yanggu: 375 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

psychological warfare team: 477 

RIPPER: 322 

ROUNDUP: 249, 251, 252, 259, 261 

UNC force withdrawal to the coast: 128, 129, 

130, 131 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 472, 476, 

479, 485n 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 282, 294 

24th Infantry: 26, 236, 301-02, 326, 365. See also 

Bryan, Maj. Gen. Blackshear M.; Church, Maj. 

Gen. John H.; Regiments. U.S., 5th Infantry. 

19th infantry; 21st Infantry. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61, 63, 64, 71, 72, 76, 

79, 82 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188-89, 190 
530 EBB AND FLOW 

Divisions, U.S.-Continued 

24th Infantry-Continued 

Chip’yong-ni railroad tunnels: 248-49 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 283-84, 290 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 381, 382, 383, 

384, 393-94, 410-11, 418, 419-21, 431, 432, 

433, 438 

COURAGEOUS: 337 

DAUNTLESS: 362, 372, 374, 375, 376 

KILLER: 306 

line B: 180 

line D: 214, 216 

reconnaissance in force: 239. See also below 

THUNDERBOLT. 

RIPPER: 321, 323, 327-28, 330, 331-32 

RUGGED: 353 

Seoul bridgehead: 194, 195, 196, 198, 202 

THUNDERBOLT: 245, 252, 254, 257 

UNC force withdrawal south: 108-09, 113, 

114-15, 149, 150, 153. See also above Chinese 

New Year’s offensive; Seoul bridgehead. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 472, 478, 

480 

25th Infantry: 26, 301, 326. See also Bradley, Brig. 

Gen. J. Sladen; Kean, Maj. Gen. William B.; 

Regiments, U.S., 24th Infantry, 27th Infantry, 

35th Infantry. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61, 63, 64, 68, 73, 

74-75, 76, 78, 79, 80 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188, 190 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 379, 381, 

384, 393, 410-11, 418, 419, 422, 432, 433, 

435, 436, 438 

COURAGEOUS: 337, 341, 343 

DAUNTLESS: 362, 372, 373, 375, 376 

line B: 180 

line C: 201 

line D: 212, 214 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

RIPPER: 317, 321, 322, 323, 328, 329 

RUGGED: 353 

Seoul bridgehead: 192-93, 198 

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 245, 252, 255, 256, 257, 

258 

UNC force withdrawal south: 107, 109, 113, 

116-17, 149. See also above line B, line C, line 

D; Seoul bridgehead. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 472, 485n 

WOLFHOUND: 237-38 

40th Infantry: 313 

45th Infantry: 313 

82d Airborne: 313 

Dolvin, Lt. Col. Welborn G. See Task forces, Dolvin. 

Doyle, Rear Adm. James H.: 40, 128, 131, 167-68, 

313n 

Drysdale, Lt. Col. Douglas B. See Commando, 41st 

Independent, Royal Marines; Task forces, 

Drysdale. 

Dulles, John Foster: 367 

East Hill: 100-101, 132, 141 

Edwards, Lt. Col. James W.: 220-21, 296, 298, 299. 

See also Battalions, U.S., 2d, 23d Infantry. 

Eekhout, Lt. Col. William D. H.: 451, 456. See also 

Battalion, Netherlands. 

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 368 

Engineer group, U.S., 19th: 204 

Ennis, Col. William P., Jr.: 270, 273 

Entezam, Nasrollah: 499 

Epley, Col. Gerald G.: 118 

Equipment and supplies, Communist: 334, 370, 504 

Equipment and supplies, UNC: 28, 30-33 

Communist Spring offensive: 436-37, 441-42. See 

also below destruction of, lost or abandoned, 

recovered. 

destruction of: 130, 131, 139, 141, 150, 153-55, 174, 

201, 211-12, 272, 415, 421 

Hungnam evacuation: 167, 169, 170, 174. See also 

above destruction of, below lost or abandoned. 

lost or abandoned: 124, 126-27, 269, 271-72, 276, 

278, 279-80, 288, 291-92, 298, 383, 404, 407, 411, 

458-59 

recovered: 312-22, 405-06 

withdrawal below the Han: 162, 192, 210-12. See 

also above destruction of, lost or abandoned. 

Ethiopia, forces of in Korea: 442n 

EUSAK (Eighth United States Army in Korea): 24n 

Ewen, Rear Adm. Edward C.: 48, 128. See also Naval 

task forces, 77. 

Expeditionary forces, Greek: 180 

Faith, Lt. Col. Don C.,Jr.: 87, 96-97, 98-100, 136, 

136n. See also Task forces, Faith. 

Far East Air Forces: 15, 34-38. See also Combat Cargo 

Command (Provisional); Stratemeyer, Lt. Gen. 

George E.; Weyland, General Otto P. 

fragmentation bombs: 328, 328n 

interdiction. See Interdiction, UNC. 

and North Korean air forces: 16 

Far East Air Materiel Command: 34 

Far East Command: 15, 24 

chief of staff. See Hickey, Maj. Gen. Doyle O. 

commander. See MacArthur, General of the Army 

Douglas; Ridgway, General Matthew B. 

G-2. See Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A. 

G-3. See Wright, Maj. Gen. Edwin K. 

Farrell, Brig. Gen. Francis W.: 27, 281, 292, 294. See 

also United States Military Advisory Group, ROK 

(KMAG). 

Fatality rates: 33 

Ferenbaugh, Maj. Gen. Claude B.: 227, 307. See also 

Divisions, U.S., 7th Infantry. 

Hoengsong: 275 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 476, 477, 478 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 282, 292, 294 

Ferguson, Lt. Col. I. B.: 403-05. See also Battalion, 

Australian. 

Fergusson, Col. Robert G.: 264-65, 266 
INDEX 531 

Field armies, Chinese 

First: 325n 

Fourth: 53, 55-56 

Third: 53, 56 

Fisher, Col. Henry G.: 78. See also Regiments, U.S., 

35th Infantry. 

Flamethrowers: 438n 

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, commanding general. See 

Shepherd, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. 

Fleets, U.S. See Seventh Fleet. 

Foreign Minister, People’s Republic of China. See 

Chou En-lai. 

Formosa: 41, 500. See also Taiwan. 

Formosa patrol: 41 

Formosa Strait: 351 

Forney, Col. Edward H.: 167 

Fort Lewis, WA: 442 

Fougasses: 438n 

Fox Hill: 98, 137. See also Companies, U.S., F, 7th 

Marines. 

France, forces of in Korea: 24, 27. See also Battalion, 

French. 

Freeman, Col. Paul L. See also Regiments, U.S., 23d 

Infantry. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 65, 74 

Chip’yong-ni: 283, 285-87, 296 

Chip’yong-ni railroad tunnels: 248-49 

ROUNDUP: 263 

UNC force withdrawal south: 80-81, 111-12, 113, 

120, 121, 124, 125-26 

Wonju: 220-22 

Front Headquarters: 52, 325 

Funchilin Pass: 88, 140, 142 

Fusiliers: 167. See also Battalions, British, 1st, Royal 

Northumberland Fusiliers. 

Gardner, 1st Lt. George W.: 271-72 

Garvin, Brig. Gen. Crump: 27, 160, 185 

Gay. Maj. Gen. Hobart M.: 309n. See also Divisions, 

U.S., 1st Cavalry. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 71, 77, 105 

line C: 195 

Task Force Johnson: 239 

THUNDERBOLT 243 

UNC force withdrawal south: 81-82, 107, 1I7 

Geiger, Maj. Gen. Roy S.: 309n 

General Assembly, U.N.: 18, 495, 501. See also 

Entezam, Nasrollah; United Nations. 

General Headquarters: 52, 325 

Geneva Conventions, 1949: 28, 28n 

Gerhardt, Col. William. See Task forces, Gerhardt. 

Gloster Crossing: 288, 397. See also Battalions, 

British, 1st, Gloucestershire Rgt. 

Glosters. See Battalions, British, 1st, Gloucestershire 

Rgt. 

Greece 

army of and Van Fleet: 368, 369 

forces of in Korea: 36n, 180 

Gromyko, Andrei A.: 500-501 

Growdon, Lt. Col. John S.: 337. See also Task forces, 

Growdon. 

Guerrilla forces, Communist: 52, 60n, 62, 84, 105, 

149, 150, 156, 164, 199, 219, 227, 333, 333n 

Guerrilla operations, anti-Communist. See Partisans, 

anti-Communist. 

Guns, 155-mm.: 442n, 453 

Habae-jae 

Communist Spring offensive: 453, 457, 462, 463, 

464, 466, 467 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473, 474, 475, 483, 

484 

Haeju: 153, 229, 323 

Haeju-Kumhwa line: 156, 157, 161 

Haeju-Sin’eve-Ich’on line: 153, 156 

Haengju: 335, 433, 435, 436n 

Hagaru-ri: 47 

battle of the Changjin Reservoir: 88, 89, 92, 96, 

97, 98, 100-103 

readjustments/withdrawal: 129, 130, 131-32, 136, 

137-39, 140, 141, 147 

Hajin: 301, 302 

Hajinbu-ri: 369n 

Communist Spring offensive: 462, 463, 467, 468, 

469 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 473 

Hamhung, and UNC force withdrawal to: 28, 84, 87n. 

92, 98, 101, 128, 130-31, 139, 140, 143, 156 

Han River: 290, 308, 366, 381 

Communist Spring offensive: 433, 435, 436n 

enemy movement south of: 210, 213, 240 

frozen: 196, 199, 257 

RIPPER: 317, 321, 329 

THUNDERBOLT: 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 252 

UNC force withdrawal south: 160, 161, 162, 163, 

192, 193, 201, 217, 223, 225, 227 

Han River bridges: 186, 198, 199 

destruction of: 201, 202, 204, 207-08 

traffic control: 200, 201, 202, 203 

Han River corridor: 431, 444 

Han River estuary: 180 

Han River line: 284 

Han River valley, control over: 249, 301-02. See also 

Operations, ROUNDUP. 

Han River-Yangp’yong-Hoengsong-Kangnung line: 

246-47 

Haneda Airport, Tokyo: 38n, 178, 366 

Han’gye 

Communist Spring offensive: 450, 452, 457, 460, 

461, 462, 463, 466 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 481 

Han’gye-Nuron-ni line: 466-67 

Hang’ye: 456 

Hant’an River: 353, 372, 373, 379, 385, 386, 393, 394, 

395, 396, 418 

Hant’an River valley: 372 

Hapsu: 47, 48, 86 

Hap’yong-dong: 315 
532 EBB AND FLOW 

Harriman, Averell: 362 

Harris, Col. William A.: 105, 129, 356-58, 359-60, 

361. See also Regiments, U.S., 7th Cavalry. 

Harris, Cal. [William W.]: 421-22, 422n, 424. See also 

Regiments, U.S., 65th Infantry. 

Harvey, Capt. M. G.: 426-27 

Hasolch’i: 460, 462-63, 466 

HAWK: 332 

Haynes, Brig. Gen. Loyal M.: 268, 270 

Hazel, Capt. Charles E.: 476-78, 478n 

Headquarters. Chinese People’s Volunteers: 56 

Helicopter detachment, U.S., 2d: 32, 33 

Helicopters: 97, 209n 

H-5: 32 

H-13: 33 

medical evacuation: 32, 33, 138, 300 

Hell Fire Valley: 102-03, 129, 141 

Henebry, Brig. Gen. John P.: 338n 

Hickey, Maj. Gen. Doyle O.: 150, 178, 365, 366, 367 

Hiers, Capt. Johnnie M.: 298 

Hill 143: 296, 299 

Hill 144: 388 

Hill 148: 388 

Hill 152: 296, 299, 387 

Hill 175: 329 

Hill 182: 388 

Hill 194: 385-87, 395 

Hill 216: 339 

Hill 228: 342, 343 

Hill 235: 388, 389, 41l-12, 414, 415-16, 417. See also 

Battalions, British, 1st Gloucestershire Rgt. 

Hill 247: 220-22. See also Wonju, New Year’s offensive. 

Hill 248: 285 

Hill 257: 387, 395, 396, 412 

Hill 302: 477 

Hill 314: 388 

Hill 319: 285 

Hill 337: 341 

Hill 345: 285 

Hill 348: 285, 329, 330 

Hill 364: 359 

Hill 397: 285, 295, 297-98 

Hill 444: 263, 283 

Hill 454: 359 

Hill 468: 341 

Hill 504: 391, 402, 403-04, 405-06, 407 

Hill 506: 285 

Hill 664: 411, 419 

Hill 675: 388, 395, 397, 413, 417, 421, 424 

Hill 677: 391, 406-07 

Hill 683: 460, 461 

Hill 691: 452, 456, 459 

Hill 693: 457 

Hill 710: 448, 456, 549 

Hill 724: 456 

Hill 755: 450 

Hill 790: 452 

Hill 800: 457, 459, 460, 461 

Hill 914: 451, 455 

Hill 941: 450 

Hill 975: 448, 451, 451, 455, 456, 459 

Hill 1010: 419, 420 

Hill 1051: 450, 451, 452, 455, 466, 474 

Hill 1167: 94 

Hill 1221: 134-35 

Hill 1240: 94, 96 

Hill 1282: 94, 96 

Hill 1384: 94 

Hill 1403: 90, 94 

Hill 1426: 90, 96 

Hill, Col. John G.: 210-12 

Hills, named. See East Hill; Fox Hill. 

Hodes, Brig. Gen. Henry I.: 98, 129, 240 

Hodges, Maj. Warren D.: 275 

Hoengsong: 185, 186, 219, 227, 248, 249, 304, 453, 

462 

battle for: 266-281, 282. See also below ROUNDUP. 

KILLER: 307, 309, 310 

occupied by Chinese: 279, 282 

retaken: 310 

ROUNDUP: 248, 249, 251, 261, 262, 263, 264-65. See 

also above battle for. 

Hoeryong: 86 

Hoeyang: 445 

Hoge, Maj. Gen. William M.: 480. See also Corps, 

U.S., IX. 

Communist Spring offensive: 382, 384, 389, 390- 

93, 402, 420, 430, 433, 441 

COURAGEOUS: 335-36, 343 

PILEDRIVER: 486, 491-93 

RIPPER: 315, 327-28, 331-32 

and ROK forces: 407-08 

RUGGED: 356, 358, 359, 361 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 472, 476, 

478-79 

Holcomb, Col. Bankson T., Jr.: 88, 89 

Holden, Lt. Col. Maurice C.: 117-18 

Hongch’on: 160, 197, 200, 217, 219, 264, 266, 326, 

349,417n, 454 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 438, 444 

defense of: 184-85 

RIPPER: 315, 317, 321, 322, 323, 327-28 

ROUNDUP: 249-51, 252, 259, 261-62 

Hongch’on River: 323, 328, 330, 331, 332, 455, 460, 

470 

Hongch’on River valley: 161, 180, 322, 448 

Hopei Province: 326 

Hospitals. See also Mobile Army Surgical Hospital 

(MASH) units. 

Norwegian mobile surgical: 442n 

Swedish: 28 

Hospital ships, Danish: 501 

Howitzers 

8-inch: 124, 442n, 453 

75.mm.: 442n 

105-mm.: 30, 73, 124, 132, 358, 382, 404, 407, 

442n 

155-mm.: 30, 137, 189, 321, 358-59, 382, 407, 

442n, 453 
INDEX 533 

Hudong-ni: 92, 98, 99, 132, 135-36 

Huich’on: 45, 47, 62, 88 

Hull, Lt. Gen. John E.: 364 

Hungnam: 28, 36, 48, 84, 89, 98, 158, 187, 304, 

312, 324 

defense of: 130-31 

UNC force evacuation from: 165-75 

UNC force withdrawal to: 128-31, 156, 158, 165. 

See also Almond, Maj. Gen. Edward M.; Corps, 

ROK, I; Corps, U.S., X; Divisions, ROK, 3d, 

Capital; Divisions, U.S., 1st Marine. 

Hup’o-ri: 291, 296 

Hussars. See Squadrons, British, C, 8th King’s Royal 

Irish Hussars. 

Huth, Maj. Henry: 414, 422, 424. See also Squadrons, 

British, C, 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars. 

Hwach’on: 160, 164, 165, 187, 371. See also 

Hwach’on Dam; Hwach’on Reservoir. 

Communist Spring offensive: 383-84, 398 

PILEDRIVER: 486, 491 

UNC force withdrawal south: 151, 157, 160 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 476, 478-80 

Hwach’on Dam: 371, 376. See also Hwach’on; 

Hwach’on Reservoir. 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 383-84, 390, 

438n 

RUGGED: 353-62 

Hwach’on Reservoir: 333, 336, 346, 350, 352, 377, 

389, 485, 491. See also Hwach’on; Hwach’on 

Dam. 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 392, 400, 401, 

430, 441, 444, 469 

DAUNTLESS: 371, 374, 375 

line Kansas: 349, 486, 487 

PILEDRIVER: 491, 493 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 466, 468, 472, 483, 

484 

Hwangbyong Mountain: 322 

Hwanghae peninsula: 153, 156, 379 

Hwanghae Province: 229, 230, 323 

Hyesanjin: 43, 47, 49, 53, 86, 128, 131 

Hyon-ni: 447, 460, 475, 483, 484, 485, 493 

Ich’on: 153, 216, 228, 239, 243, 244, 327, 374, 442 

Ilyushin aircraft. See Aircraft, fixed-wing, IL-10. 

Imjin angle: 385, 386, 394-95, 413. See also Imjin 

River. 

Imjin River: 44, 348 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 187, 188, 189 

Communist Spring offensive: 379, 381, 385-89, 

395, 397, 410, 417. See also Battalions, British, 

1st Gloucestershire Rgt. 

DAUNTLESS: 350, 362, 372, 373, 375 

ferry sites: 340 

line Kansas: 349-50. See also above Communist 

Spring offensive; DAUNTLESS. 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

RIPPER/COURAGEOUS: 334, 335 

RUGGED: 349-50, 353 

UNC force withdrawal from the north: 151, 153, 

159, 160, 161 

Imjin River-Continued 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 476 

Imperial Hotel, Tokyo: 366 

Incendiary bombs: 42n, 49 

Inch’o-ri: 47 

Inch’on: 27, 43, 44, 155, 158, 162, 164, 201, 240, 

313 

Communist Spring offensive: 431, 435, 437 

evacuation of: 210-12 

landing at: 25, 40, 89n, 330 

NKPA forces at: 254, 255, 256, 258 

port facilities: 192, 21l-12, 247 

prisoner-of-war camps: 28 

RIPPER: 317 

Seoul bridgehead: 192 

THUNDERROLT: 243, 256 

India, forces of in Korea: 24, 27n 

Indochina: 21n 

Infantry School, Fort Benning: 236 

Infantry-armor strikes: 228, 237, 238-39 

Inje: 184, 186, 187, 199, 324, 370, 376, 377, 470 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 399-401, 

430-31, 440, 442-43, 444, 445 

PILEDRIVER: 493 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 468, 474-75, 482, 

483, 484-85, 485n 

Intelligence, Communist: 43n, 171 

Intelligence, UNC: 302-05, 313. See also Air operations, UNC, reconnaissance and observation; 

Fergusson, Col. Robert G.; Holcomb, Col. 

Bankson T., Jr.; Polk, Col. James II.; Reconnaissance; Ridgway, General Matthew B.; 

Tarkenton, Lt. Col. James C.; Willoughby, Maj. 

Gen. Charles A. 

from agents: 100, 312, 373, 417, 440-41, 443, 491 

enemy identification: 439-40. See also below enemy 

strength and intentions; from prisoners. 

enemy morale and organization: 435-36 

enemy strength and intentions: 55, 61, 65, 71-72, 

82-83, 88-89, 100, 114, 139-140, 149-50, 153, 

155-56,164-65,183-84,188,189,199,210,216, 

219, 223, 226, 228, 238-39, 240, 243, 244, 245, 

249, 254, 258, 264-65, 266, 287-88, 289-90, 299, 

311, 312, 323-24, 327, 333, 340, 351-52, 371, 

373-74, 398, 431, 437, 440-41, 443-44, 455, 465, 

469, 502, 504 

and the Hungnam evacuation: 171 

lost communications: 458 

MacArthur and political intelligence: 175 

naval surveillance: 157 

from prisoners: 101, 114, 137, 188, 219, 223, 

238, 243, 244, 245, 254, 287-88, 299, 312, 333, 

340, 351, 373, 374, 376, 377,431, 435-36, 440- 

41, 443,444-l5, 453, 454, 491 

signal: 451 

Interdiction, Communist: 89, 92, 100 

Interdiction, UNC 

air: 16, 42, 48-19, 53, 128, 164, 178, 252, 254, 310, 

313-14, 351, 410, 417, 417n, 435, 506 

ground: 47-48 

naval. See Blockade. 
534 EBB AND FLOW 

Ipsok: 73, 74 

“Iron” troops: 56 

Iron Triangle: 498, 500, 503 

DAUNTLESS: 348-50, 352, 362, 375 

PILEDRIVER: 485, 491-93 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 470, 480 

Irwol Mountain: 322 

Itami, Japan: 172 

Iwon: 19 

Ivanhoe Security Force: 448, 450 

Izvestia: 500 

Japan: 3, 24, 34, 36, 232, 313, 410, 488-89 

defense of: 232, 488-89. See also Ridgway, 

General Matthew B., mission and duties. 

shipping: 40, 155 

Japan Logistical Command: 24, 25 

Japan, Sea of: 3, 41, 157, 262, 313, 410, 432 

Jen Min Jih Pao (People’s Daily): 500 

Johnson, Edwin C.: 495 

Johnson, Col. Harold K.: 239-40, 243 

Johnson, Louis A.: 18 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 366. See also United 

States (U.S.), Korea policy. 

and the bombing of enemy air bases outside 

Korea: 378n 

and cease-fire positions: 496, 499, 505 

chairman of. See Bradley, General of the Army 

Omar N. 

and Chinese intervention: 20, 21, 22, 50 

and defensive tactics: 157-58 

and the destruction of North Korean armed 

forces: 18 

and Eighth Army actions: 488-89, 506 

and the evacuation question: 230-33, 234 

and MacArthur: 20, 157-58, 160, 231-32, 233, 

345, 346-47 

Manchurian border policy: 42, 43 

and a negotiated settlement: 488-89. See also above 

cease-fire positions. 

and Ridgway: 488-89, 499, 506 

and ROK requests for additional equipment: 408 

and UNC: 14, 15, 488 

Joint Operations Center: 36, 48 

Jones, Capt. Sherman D.: 269 

Jones, Maj. Robert E.: 135 

Joy, Vice Adm. C. Turner: 15, 178 

and Ridgway: 366, 367 

and a cease-fire: 505 

control of air operations: 39 

control of Seventh Fleet: 41 

evacuation of X Corps: 147 

evacuation planning: 128 

TF 96: 40, 40n 

THUNDERBOLT: 255-56 

Tokyo conference: 159 

Kadena Air Base. See Air bases, Kadena. 

Kaech’on: 81, 108, 109-111 

Kaech’on River: 108, 109, 111, 112, 113 

Kaesong: 61, 151, 155, 195, 373, 498, 501-02 

Kagnew battalion. See Battalion, Ethiopian. 

Kamak Mtn.: 388, 395 

Kang Moon Bong, Brig. Gen., and Communist 

Spring offensive: 348n, 416, 422-24, 427, 434, 

435, 436, 439. See also Divisions, ROK, 1st. 

Kanggye: 45, 47, 51, 56, 325 

Kanghwa Island: 180, 192 

Kangnung: 304, 306, 315, 369, 468, 469 

Han River-Yangp’yong-Hoengsong-Kangnung 

line: 246, 247 

KILLER: 3 10 

P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line: 292-93 

UNC objective: 251, 262 

Kansong: 374, 482, 485, 486, 487 

Kangson-ni: 442 

Kap'yong: 196, 197, 254, 266, 391, 393 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188, 200 

Communist Spring offensive: 383, 401-06, 430, 

444, 445 

UNC defenses at: 391-93 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472 

Kap’yong River: 371, 402-03, 406 

Kap’yong River valley: 353, 383, 391 

Karhyon-dong: 123-24 

KATUSA. See Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army 

(KATUSA). - 

Kean. Maj. Gen. William B.: 309n. See also Divisions. 

U.S., 25th. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63, 68, 73, 74, 76, 78, 

79 

Seoul bridgehead: 193, 201-02, 205, 206, 207 

THUNDERBOLT: 243 

WOLFHOUND: 237-38 

Keiser, Maj. Gen. Laurence B.: 65, 68. See also Divisions, U.S., 2d Infantry. 

battle of Ch’ongch’on: 63, 65, 68, 69, 75-76 

evacuation of: 162-63 

UNC force withdrawal south: 80, 81, 107, 108, 

109, 111-12, 115-16, 117, 118-24, 151 

Keith, Col. John W., Jr.: 268, 272, 273, 274, 278, 

280. See also Support Force 21. 

Keleher, Lt. Col. William P.: 271, 271n, 272, 274, 

275-76. See also Battalions, U.S., 1st, 38th 

Infantry. 

Kennan, George F.: 496-97 

Kiland, Rear Adm. Ingolf N.: 313n. See also Naval 

task forces, 90. 

Kilchu: 131 

KILLER. See Operations, KILLER. 

Kim Chaek, General: 52, 325 

Kim Chang Dok, Lt. Gen.: 324. See also Corps, North 

Korean, VIII. 

Kim II Sung: 51, 56, 325, 501-02, 504 

Kim Jong Oh, Brig. Gen.: 468. See also Divisions, 

ROK, 3d. 

Kim Paik II, Brig. Gen.: 129, 275, 293-94, 322, 347n. 

See also Corps, ROK, I. 

Kim Ung, Lt. Gen.: 325 
INDEX 535 

Kimpo peninsula: 180, 192, 210, 256-57, 258, 431, 

435, 436n 

Kirk, Alan G.: 500 

KMAG. See United States Military Assistance Group, 

Korea (KMAG). 

Koch, 1st Lt. Kenneth W.: 403, 405-06, 407n 

Kojin-ni: 486 

Koksan: 153, 156, 164, 327, 374 

Koksu-ri: 284, 285, 290, 291, 296, 297, 299, 300 

Komisong: 381 

Korangp’o-ri: 188, 372, 373, 379, 385, 397, 416 

Korea: 3, 5, 7, 8-10 

Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of: 8. See also 

North Korea. 

Korea, Republic of (ROK): 8 

armed forces: 15n. See also Korea, Republic of, 

Army; Korea, Republic of, Marine Corps; 

Korea, Republic of, Navy. 

armistice terms: 490 ’ 

evacuation of officials: 198-99, 202-03 

invasion of by North Korea: 10 

reserve forces. See National Guard, ROK; National 

Youth Corps. 

Korea, Republic of, Air Force: 36n 

Korea, Republic of, Army: 23, 26, 27, 149, 151, 162. 

See also specific unit by type and number. 

headquarters: 25, 27 

and the northern border: 18, 19, 20, 21 

rangers: 448, 450 

security battalions: 453. See also Ivanhoe Security 

Force. 

and Walker: 15 

Korea, Republic of, Marine Corps: 26, 256, 258, 

313 

Korea, Republic of, National Police: 25, 26, 147n, 

203, 453 

Korea, Republic of, Navy: 24, 26, 230 

Korea: The Limited War (Rees): 364n 

Korea Strait: 3 

Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army (KATUSA): 23 

Kot’o-ri 

battle of the Changjin Reservoir: 88, 92, 98, 101-03, 

128, 129 

UNC force withdrawal to the coast: 130, 132, 

139-43, 145-46, 147 

Kuhwa-ri: 325, 373 

Kujang-dong: 69, 70, 75, 76, 78, 80 

Kbjong-ni: 77, 82, 105, 113 

Kum River: 231 

Kumch’on: 325, 373, 374 

Kumhak Mtn.: 362 

Kumhwa: 156, 187, 195, 325, 348, 372, 375, 384, 

486, 491, 498 

Kumnyangjang-ni: 216, 237, 238, 239, 244, 442 

Kumnyangji-ni: 243 

Kumsong: 492 

Kungmang Mtn.: 353, 362 

Kunsan: 89n 

Kunu-ri: 45, 61, 62 

ammunition losses at: 153 

Kunu-ri-Continued 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 68, 70, 71, 76, 78-80, 

82, 83 

UNC force withdrawal south: 107-13, 114-16, 117, 

119-25 

Kup’abal-li: 433 

Kuryong River: 62, 63, 68, 73, 77-79, 113 

Kwanak-Mtn.: 255, 256 

Kwandae-ri: 444, 445, 463 

Kwandok-san (Kwandok Mtn.): 362, 372, 375, 384 

Kwanum Mtn.: 353 

Kyomip’o: 153, 155 

Kyongan-ni: 258, 349, 442 

Kyongju: 172, 173, 185, 186, 192, 196, 214, 225 

Kyushu: 3 

Laborers, use of: 186n, 437 

Ladue, Col. Lawrence K.: 474, 474n 

Lavoie, Lt. Col. Leon F.: 399. See also Battalions, 

U.S., 92d Armored Field Artillery. 

Leaflets: 204 

Lee Ban Nam, Maj. Gen.: 223, 227. See also 

Divisions, North Korean. 10th. 

Lee Hong Sun, Maj.: 332 

Lee Sang Cho, Maj. Gen.: 52, 325 

Lee Yong Ho, Lt. Gen.: 324. See also Corps, North 

Korean, VII. 

Lejeune, Maj. Gen. John A.: 309n 

Leyte USS: 41-42. 48 

Li T’ien-yu: 59, 71, 72, 83. See also Army groups, 

Chinese, XIII. 

Liao Chen-thou: 100-101. See also Divisions, Chinese, 

58th. 

Lie, Trygve: 495, 499 

Limb, Col. Ben C.: 408 

Lin Piao: 55-56, 59, 325 

Lin-chiang: 53 

Line A: 157, 161 

Line Alabama: 374, 376, 389 

Line Albany: 317, 321-22 

Line Arizona: 306, 307, 309, 310, 314 

Line Aspen: 335, 336, 338, 341, 343 

Line B: 160-65, 172, 180-83, 184-87, 189, 193-95, 

234. See also Line C. 

Line Benton: 335-36, 343, 344 

Line Buffalo: 317, 322-23, 329, 330-31, 332 

Line Buster: 331, 332 

Line C: 160, 162, 191, 192, 195, 197-98, 200, 205 

Line Cairo: 317, 332, 335, 336, 338, 344 

Line D: 160-61, 162, 192, 200-201, 233, 234, 240, 

246, 254. See also Yoju-Wonju line. 

extended patrols: 225-27 

organization: 213-15, 216-19 

P’yongt’aek-Ansong-Changhowon-ni sector: 210. 

See also Corps, U.S., I, IX. 

redrawn: 216-17 

Wonju-Samch’ok sector: 217. See also Corps, U.S., 

X, line D. 

Wonju-Wonp’o-ri sector: 210, 216-17. See also 

Corps, U.S., X, line D. 
536 EBB AND FLOW 

Line Davidson. See Davidson line. 

Line Delta: 366, 391, 419-20, 430 

Line E: 233 

Line F: 233 

Line Georgia: 470, 472 

Line Golden: 366, 397, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435, 

436, 438 

Line Idaho: 315, 317, 322, 323, 333. See also 

Operations, RIPPER. 

Line Kansas: 349, 350, 353-62, 366, 367. See also 

Line Wyoming. 

cease-fire positions: 497-99, 500, 503-504 

Communist Spring offensive: 384, 389, 390, 391, 

392, 393-94, 396-97, 398-99, 401, 410-19, 421, 

430, 434, 440 

DAUNTLESS: 369-71, 372, 373, 374, 375 

JCS: 488-89 

operations above: 488-89, 490-91 

PILEDRIVER 486-87. See also Operations, 

PILEDRIVER. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 476 

Line Lincoln: 329, 330 

Line Missouri: 439, 440, 442, 448 

Line Nevada: 366, 431, 434 

Line No Name. See No Name line. 

Line Pendleton: 390, 398-99 

Line Peter. See Peter line. 

Line Raider. See Raider line. 

Line Topeka: 440, 442, 465, 470, 472, 476 

Line Utah 

DAUNTLESS: 349-50, 362, 366, 371-73, 374. 375 

Communist Spring offensive: 394, 395, 418n 

Line Waco: 434-35, 453, 456-61, 463, 467, 468, 469. 

See also No Name line. 

Line Wolf: 194 

Line Wyoming: 349-50, 356, 362, 366, 367, 374-76, 

382. See also Line Kansas. 

cease-fire positions: 503-04 

operations above: 488-89, 490-91 

PILEDRIVER: 485, 487. See also Operations, 

PILEDRIVER. 

Line Zebra: 450 

Litzenberg, Col. Homer L., Jr.: 88, 90, 96, 98, 131, 

137, 139, 141. See also Regiments, U.S., 7th 

Marine. 

Liu Fei: 92. See also Armies, Chinese, 20th. 

Liu Ya-Iou: 378-79. See also People’s Air Force. 

Liu Yung: 96, 97. See also Divisions, Chinese, 80th. 

Logistics, Communist: 42, 43, 47, 48, 188, 443-44, 

465 

Logistics, UNC: 5-7. See also Air operations, airdrops; Airfields and airstrips; Combat Cargo 

Command (Provisional); Commands, numbered; 

Equipment and supplies, UNC; Japan Logistic 

Command; Petroleum, oil, and lubricants; Port 

facilities; Railroads: Roads: Transport. 

air: 34, 35, 36n, 150 

Eighth Army: 27-28, 43-44, 61-62, 68, 69, 70-71, 

151, 153, 184, 311, 436-37, 441-42. See also 

Stebbins, Col. Albert K. 

naval: 39-40, 42 

Logistics, UNC-Continued 

IX Corps: 214 

X Corps: 48, 84, 89, 92-94, 96, 98, 175 

Van Fleet day of fire: 441-42 

LSTs: 155, 437 

M1: 30 

M2 floating bridge: 199, 204 

M3: 30 

M4: 121 

M4-M4A2 floating bridge: 199, 207 

M4A3: 30 

M5 tractors: 321 

M24: 30 

M26: 30 

M39: 121 

M46: 30 

M83 fragmentation bomb: 328n 

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas 

advance to the border: 20, 22, 43, 49 

and air power: 22, 42-43, 47, 48, 53, 178 

and Almond: 47-48, 84, 128, 130, 160, 165 

battlefield visits: 160, 169, 305, 319, 330, 346, 

347, 350 

and cease-fire: 345, 346-47 

and Chinese intervention: 20, 21, 84 

CINCUNC Order No. 5: 159 

and Congress: 489-90. See also below and Martin. 

and defensive planning: 84, 157-58 

and destruction of equipment and supplies: 150 

“Die for Tie” statement: 319 

Eighth Army withdrawal: 103-04, 150 

and Eighth Army-X Corps boundary: 20, 156-57 

and evacuation: 231-34, 236 

fired: 362-65 

and Han River line: 284 

and Han River-Yangp’yong-HoengsongKangnung line: 247 

and Hungnam evacuation: 172 

on intelligence failure: 175 

and the JCS: 42, 84, 157-58, 345, 345n, 346-47, 

489. See also above and evacuation; fired. 

and KILLER: 305 

and Martin: 345, 362, 489 

and misinformation: 313 

and patrols above Kansas-Wyoming: 350 

and the press: 159-60, 305, 319, 364, 489-90 

and reinforcements: 158, 231 

and Ridgway: 177-78, 247, 305, 319, 345-46, 347, 

350 

and ROK forces: 369 

and Seoul: 159, 160, 163, 178, 247, 310 

and the 38th parallel: 18, 19, 345-46, 347 

Tokyo conference, 7 Dec: 159 

and Truman: 42-43, 159-60, 488. See also Truman, 

Harry S. 

and UNC: 15, 22, 175-76, 284 

UNC conference, 28 Nov: 84, 103-04 

and U.S. policy: 319, 488, 489-90. See also above 

and the JCS, and Truman. 

violates instructions: 20 
INDEX 537 

McCaffrey, Cal. William J.: 270 

McClure, Maj. Gen. Robert B.: 163, 184, 200, 217, 

219-22. See also Divisions, U.S., 2d Infantry. 

McCord Air Force Base: 36n 

Mace, 2d Lt. William M.: 270, 271, 278 

Machine guns. See also Antiaircraft artillery; Submachine guns. 

.30-caliber Browning, heavy: 30 

.30-caliber Browning, light: 30 

.50-caliber Browning: 30 

McLaughlin, Maj. John N.: 103 

MacLean, Col. Allan D.: 87, 88, 90, 92, 96, 97, 98, 

99. See also Regiments, U.S., 31st Infantry. 

Maengsan: 70 

Maixner, Lt. Col. Harold: 272, 274, 275-76. See also 

Battalions, U.S., 3d, 38th Infantry. 

Majon-dong: 100, 130, 132, 140, 143, 145, 147 

Malik, Jacob: 496-97, 499 

Malta-ri: 282, 292 

Manchuria: 3, 18, 20, 21, 42, 43, 52, 284, 312, 323, 

325, 326, 502 

Mangmi-san: 285 

Manp’ojin: 43, 45, 47, 53, 55, 324 

Mao Tse-tung, and On the Protracted War: 58, 60n, 

379, 496 

Marshall, George C. 

crossing the 38th parallel: 18 

and MacArthur’s relief: 362, 364, 364n, 365 

Manchurian border policy: 42, 43 

on a negotiated settlement: 495 

and Van Fleet: 368 

Martin, Vice Adm. Harold M.: 313n. See also 

Seventh Fleet. 

Martin, Joseph W.: 345, 362, 489 

Masan: 160, 170, 186, 225 

Mead, Brig. Gen. A. D.: 129, 130, 140, 145, 422, 

422n. See also Task forces, C, Dog. 

Medals 

Medal of Honor: 136n, 147n 

Navy Cross: 147n 

Presidential Unit Citation: 407n, 479n 

Silver Star: 97 

Medical units: 27n, 28, 33, 442n, 501 

Mich’on: 220 

Michaelis, Col. John H.: 68, 74, 205-07, 228, 238. 

See also Regiments, U.S., 27th Infantry. 

Middlesex Battalion. See Battalions, British, 

Middlesex. 

MIG Alley: 314n, 378 

Milburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W.: 62, 71. See also Corps, 

U.S., I. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 71, 76, 79, 82 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 190 

Communist Spring offensive: 389, 410, 413, 

416-17, 418-19, 421, 427, 430, 433-34, 435, 

436 

COURAGEOUS/TOMAHAWK: 335, 337-38, 340, 341, 

343 

demolition at Inch’on: 211 

and enemy intentions: 375 

Milburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W.-Continued 

and the Gloucestershire Bn.: 419, 428-29 

line B: 186-87 

line D: 212-13, 214, 215-16 

PILEDRIVER: 491-93 

and reconnaissance in force: 237, 238-39, 240. See 

also Operations, THUNDERBOLT. 

and Ridgway: 228 

RIPPER: 317, 329-30 

RUGGED: 353 

Seoul bridgehead: 191, 192-94, 200-201, 202 

Task Force Allen: 255, 256, 258 

temporary command, Eighth Army: 177 

traffic control, Han bridges: 201 

UNC force withdrawal south: 109, 113, 116-17, 

153-54, 156. See also above line B, line D, Seoul 

bridgehead. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470-72, 475-76 

Military police: 122, 123 

Miller, Maj. Crosby P.: 132 

Miller, 1st Lt. Wilfred D.: 403, 405, 407n 

Min Ki Shik, Col.: 389-90 

Minefields, Communist: 255, 256, 338, 340, 343, 

370, 458, 484, 485, 493 

Minesweeping, naval: 40, 44, 313 

Miryang: 182, 302 

Missing Persons Act of 1942: 503 

Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) units 

8055th: 33 

Norwegian: 442n 

Moore, Maj. Gen. Bryant E.: 252n, 308. See also 

Corps, U.S., IX. 

Chip’yong-ni: 284-85, 291 

Han River valley: 301 

THUNDERBOLT: 252, 258 

Moore, Col. Ned D.: 114, 306-07. See also Regiments, 

U.S., 19th Infantry. 

Morale, UNC: 150, 180, 183, 190, 192, 198, 201, 

228, 456. See also Ridgway, General Matthew B., 

morale and confidence. 

Mortars 

4.2-inch: 30, 382, 404, 407 

60-mm.: 30 

81-mm.: 30 

Mount McKinley, USS: 167, 172 

Muccio, John I.: 179, 184, 364, 365, 408 

Mudgett, Col. Gilman C.: 338 

Mukden, Manchuria: 56, 378 

“Mule Division”: 327 

Mun’gyong: 215 

Mun’gyong pass: 225 

Munsan-ni: 151, 162 

airborne landing at: 337, 338-40. See also 

Operations, COURAGEOUS. 

Communist Spring offensive: 417, 440 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 470, 472 

Mup’yongni: 48, 84, 88-90, 92 

Murray, Lt. Col. Arthur B.: 167 

Murray, Lt. Col. Raymond L.: 88, 90, 92, 96, 98, 

131, 137, 141. See also Regiments, U.S., 5th 

Marine. 
538 EBB AND FLOW 

Musan: 86 

Myers, Maj. Reginald R.: 101 

Naech’on River: 463, 475 

Naech’on River valley: 461, 466 

Naep’yong-ni: 444, 447 

Naktong River, and defense line: 16, 159, 160, 161, 

233 

Nam 11, Lt. Gen.: 325 

Namch’onjom: 323 

Namsan-n’i: 43 

Napalm: 413, 438 

Napch’ongjong: 64, 72 

National defense, minister of, North Korea. See 

Choe Yong Gun, Marshal. 

National Guard: 313 

National Guard, ROK: 352, 352n 

National Security Council: 14, 22, 488, 489, 490 

National Youth Corps: 352n 

Nationalist China: 231. See also Formosa. 

Naval Forces, Far East: 15, 16, 39, 89n. See also Joy, 

Vice Adm. C. Turner. 

Naval gunfire support: 40, 262, 313. See also Naval 

task forces, 95. 

Hungnam evacuation: 168, 173-74 

THUNDERBOLT-: 240, 252 

Naval task forces 

72: 41 

77: 41-42, 48, 128, 313, 351, 410, 438n 

79: 42 

90: 40, 40n, 128, 147, 165-66, 167, 313n, 317. 

See also Amphibious operations; Doyle, Rear 

Adm. James H. 

95: 40-41, 41n, 230, 240, 258, 262, 313, 410, 

431-32. See also Smith, Rear Adm. Allen E. 

96: 39-40. See also Joy, Vice Adm. C. Turner. 

Navigational aids: 111 

Negotiated settlement: 319, 344, 500-502. See also 

Armistice conferences; Cease-fire. 

Netherlands, forces of in Korea: 24, 26. See also 

Battalion, Netherlands. 

Netherlands Detachment, U.N.: 26 

New Year’s offensive. See Chinese New Year’s 

offensive 

New Zealand, forces in Korea: 24, 182, 371, 382, 

383, 391. See also Battalion. New Zealand. 

Newman, Maj. Charles A.: 481 

Nieh Feng-chin: 92. See also Armies, Chinese, 27th. 

No Name, line: 431, 434-35, 436, 438-39, 440, 441, 

442, 445, 447, 448, 453-54, 462. See also Line 

Waco. 

Noel, Frank: 102, 103 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 232 

North Korea 

air forces: 16, 51. See also Air operations, 

Communist. 

ground forces. See Guerrilla forces, Communist; 

North Korean People's Army. 

invasion of ROK: 10 

naval forces: 16, 51 

and a negotiated settlement: 489, 494, 496, 501-02 

North Korean People’s Army (NKPA): 16, 43, 20, 51-52, 

223, 254, 290, 304, 323-25, 502. See also Corps, 

North Korean; Divisions, North Korean. 

Communist Spring offensive: 376-77, 381, 469-70 

Front Headquarters: 52, 325 

General Headquarters: 52, 325 

Hwanghae: 230 

and line B: 184-85 

and line C: 199-200 

and line D: 217 

PILEDRIVER: 493 

pursuit of U.N. forces: 156, 161, 164, 171, 172, 

239 

P’yongch’ang: 292-293 

resistance to advances to line Kansas: 369-71 

RIPPER: 321, 322, 327, 333 

RUGGED: 352 

tactics and strategy: 305n, 327, 352 

use of American arms: 223n 

withdrawal after Chip’yong-ni: 302, 308 

withdrawal from Seoul: 329 

Northumberland Fusiliers. See Battalions, British, 

1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. 

Norway, medical team in Korea: 442n 

Nullori River: 424 

Nullori River valley: 427 

Nuron-ni: 461, 462, 466 

O’Donnell, Maj. Gen. Emmett, Jr.: 35, 379 

Ofstie, Rear Adm. Ralph A.: 313n 

Ojeda, Lt. Col. Dionisio: 414. See also Battalions, 

Philippine, 10th BCT. 

Okinawa: 35, 41 

On the Protracted War (Mao Tse-tung): 60n 

Onjong: 62 

Operations 

COURAGEOUS: 334, 335-43 

DAUNTLESS: 347-50, 355, 356, 363, 365, 371-73, 

374-76 

KILLER: 301-02, 304, 305-10, 311. See also below 

RIPPER. 

OVERWHELMING: 506 

PILEDRIVER: 485-87, 491-94 

RIPPER: 310-14, 315-19, 321-22, 327-34, 343-44. 

See also Ch’unch’on; Hongch’on; Seoul. 

RUGGED: 347-50, 352-53. See also Hwach’on Dam. 

ROUNDUP: 246, 248, 249-52, 254-55, 258-63, 292, 

306, 321. See also Hoengsong. 

command and control: 264, 268-70, 273, 275, 

279-81. See also Coughlin, Col. John G., 

Hoengsong. 

terminated: 290 

STRANGLE: 505-06 

THUNDERBOLT: 240-46, 247, 248, 249, 251, 

252-58, 283 

TOMAHAWK: 334, 335. See also above COURAGEOUS. 

WOLFHOUND: 237-39 

Oro-ri: 131, 166, 171 

Osan: 216, 228, 237, 238, 240 

Oum Mountain: 328 

Ottawa: 499 
INDEX 539 

Pace, Frank, Jr.: 363-64, 364n, 365 

Paegun Mtn.: 362, 371 

Paengam-ni: 239 

Paengnyang River: 63, 64, 69 

Paengnyong-do: 229-30 

Page, Lt. Col. John U. D.: 146-47, 147n 

Paik Sun Yup, Maj. Gen.: 348n, 369. See also Corps, 

ROK, I; Divisions, ROK, 1st. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63, 71, 72, 79, 109 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 189, 190 

Communist Spring offensive: 469 

COUKAGEOUS: 340 

line B: 193-94 

line D: 213 

PILEDRIVER: 493 

RIPPER: 330 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 476, 485 

Pak Chong Kok, Lt. Gen.: 324. See also Corps, 

North Korean, IV. 

Pakch’on: 72, 79, 114 

Palmer, Brig. Gen. Charles D.: 309n. See also 

Divisions, U.S., 1st Cavalry. 

destruction of Han River bridges: 207-08 

RUGGED: 356-57, 359-60, 361 

traffic control, evacuation of Seoul: 200, 202, 203 

Pang Ho San, Maj. Gen.: 219, 223, 381. See also 

Corps, North Korean, V. 

Pangnim-ni: 315, 462 

Panikkar, Kavalam M.: 19, 20 

“Paper tiger”: 58 

Paranjang: 238 

Partisans, anti-Communist: 229-30, 230n 

Partridge, Maj. Gen. Earle E.: 36, 48. See also Air 

forces, U.S., Fifth. 

airfield construction: 410 

and close air support: 111, 128 

THUNDERBOULT: 240, 242, 252 

TOMAHAWK: 338 

UNC force withdrawal south: 164 

Partridge, Lt. Col. John H.: 141, 145 

Pearson, Lester B.: 495 

Peking radio: 500, 501 

Peng Teh-huai: 325, 325n 

Communist Spring offensive: 379, 381, 444-45, 

452-53, 465, 469 

negotiated settlement: 501-02, 504 

People's Air Force: 52-53, 378-79. See also Air 

operations, Communist; Close air support, 

Communist; Liu Ya-lou 

People’s Liberation Army: 53-56, 56n, 209, 325-27. 

436, 502. See also Armies, Chinese; Chinese 

People’s Volunteers; Field armies, Chinese. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on 

1st phase offensive: 64, 65-68, 69-70, 71, 72 

2d phase offensive: 72-76, 77-78 

3d phase offensive: 188-90, 193, 194-95. See 

also Chinese New Year’s offensive. 

Chip’yong-ni. See Chip’yong-ni, siege of. 

Combined Headquarters: 51 

Communist Spring offensive: 373-74, 376, 377, 

379-81, 465, 469-70 

People’s Liberation Army-Continued 

Hwach’on Dam. See Hwach’on Dam. 

infiltration of refugee columns: 105, 196, 220 

and line Utah: 371, 372 

PILEDRIVER: 491-93 

RIPPER: 321, 327, 331, 332 

RUGGED: 352 

Seoul: 198-99, 200, 204-05, 206, 207, 208 

strategy and tactics: 55, 59-60, 164, 187, 299, 

305n, 327, 352, 371, 373, 373n, 441, 444-45 

training: 445 

weapons and equipment: 56, 209 

withdrawal after Chip’yong-ni: 298, 299, 301, 

302, 308 

People’s Navy: 52, 52n 

Peploe, Col. George B.: 252n. See also Regiments, 

U.S., 38th Infantry. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 68, 69, 70, 75, 77 

UNC force withdrawal south: 80, 83, 108, 109-11, 

112, 115, 121-22 

Peter line: 233 

Petroleum, oil, and lubricants: 28, 155, 210, 211, 

212, 314, 442 

Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea: 26 

Philippine Sea, USS: 41-42, 48 

Philippines, forces in Korea: 24, 26. See also 

Battalion Combat Team, Philippine, 10th. 

Piho-san Ridge: 107, 108, 111 

Pistols, Colt .45-caliber: 30 

Pobwon-ni: 340 

Pogae-san: 372, 375, 379, 384 

P’ohang-dong: 40, 186, 225, 227, 304, 306 

Police action: 13 

Polk, Col. James H.: 88-89 

Pongilch’on-ni: 193 

Pongmi-san: 285, 287 

Ports and harbors: 7, 28, 44, 84, 86. See also 

Chinnamp’o; Hungnam; Inch’on; Kansong; 

Pusan; Songjin; Wonsan. 

Porters: 352-53 

Pravda: 495, 500 

Premier, North Korea. See Kim 11 Sung. 

Premier, People’s Republic of China. See Mao 

Tse-tung. 

President, ROK. See Rhee, Syngman. 

President, U.S. See Truman, Harry S. 

Presidential directive, Dec 50: 346, 346n 

Presidential Unit Citation: 407n, 479n 

Press: 364, 489-90. See also MacArthur, General of 

the Army Douglas, and the press; Ridgway, 

General Matthew B., and the press. 

“Price of Peace”: 495, 499 

Prime minister, Japan. See Yoshida, Shigeru. 

Princeton, USS: 438n 

Prisoners of war 

American: 63, 271, 478n, 503 

British: 428-29 

camps: 28, 155 

Chinese: 101, 344, 459, 479-80. See also 

Intelligence, UNC, from prisoners. 
540 EBB AND FLOW 

Prisoners of war-Continued 

North Korean: 255, 257, 344, 502. See also 

Intelligence, UNC, from prisoners. 

released by Chinese: 63 

Propaganda and the Chinese intervention: 56-57. 

58 

Psychological warfare: 333n 

Psychological warfare teams: 477 

Pugwon: 76, 79-82, 107, 108, 113 

Pujon Reservoir: 131 

Pukch’ang-ni: 70, 76, 77, 80-82 

Pukch’ong: 43, 131 

Pukhan corridor: 431, 438, 441, 442 

Pukhan River: 201, 264. See also Hwach’on Dam. 

Communist Spring offensive: 384, 390, 391, 392, 

430, 431, 433, 438, 438n, 444 

DAUNTLESS: 371 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

RIPPER: 317, 321, 328, 332 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470 

Pukhan River valley: 151, 349, 438 

Puller, Col. Lewis B.: 87-88, 102, 142. See also 

Regiments, U.S., 1st Marine. 

Punchbowl: 486, 493, 500, 503 

P’ungam-ni: 460, 461, 462, 463, 465, 467, 474, 475 

P’ungam-ni corridor: 322 

P’ungnyuri River: 92, 99 

Pusan: 26, 149, 158, 255, 364, 365 

and the Chinnamp’o, Inch’on evacuations: 165, 

212 

defense of: 16, 160, 233. See also Pusan 

Perimeter. 

and the Hungnam evacuation: 161, 165-66, 170, 

172, 174 

logistics center: 27, 44 

medical facilities: 28 

prisoner-of-war camps: 28 

seat of government: 203, 330 

and the Wonsan evacuation: 165 

Pusan line: 160. See also Peter line. 

Pusan Perimeter: 16, 26, 44, 159 

Putchaetful: 448, 451, 455, 458 

P’yongch'ang: 197, 248, 275, 282, 304, 469. See also 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line. 

KILLER: 307 

North Korean assembly area: 226-27 

ROUNDUP: 252, 259, 261 

taken by North Koreans: 292-93 

P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line: 292-93, 294 

P’yonggang: 492, 498 

P’yongt’aek: 161, 186, 214, 228 

P’yongyang: 19, 26, 27, 44, 79, 82, 304, 324, 325, 

506. See also Iron Triangle. 

airfields near: 379 

Eighth Army withdrawal: 105, 116, 127, 150-55, 

157-58 

North Korean government withdrawal from: 51. 

See also Kanggye. 

prisoner-of-war camp: 28 

P’yongyang radio: 501 

P’yongyang-Wonsan line: 499, 506 

Radar guidance: 111, 417n, 432, 454 

Radar-directed night-bombing: 111, 417n, 432, 454, 

466, 467 

Radford, Adm. Arthur E.: 41 

Radio Peking: 20 

Raider line: 160, 233 

Railroads: 7, 44, 45, 47, 311, 437 

battle of Changjin Reservoir: 87-88 

interdiction targets: 313-14, 351 

Iron Triangle: 348-49 

Kunu-ri-Sunch’on: 112 

Majon-dong-Hamhung: 143 

Pusan-Seoul: 184 

P’yongyang: 154, 155 

Suwon: 212 

Wonju-Seoul: 199, 301 

Rankin, Karl Lott: 21n 

Rau, Sir Bengal N.: 495 

Recoilless rifles 

57-mm.: 30 

75-mm.: 30 

Reconnaissance. See also Air operations, UNC, 

reconnaissance and observation. 

extended patrols: 225, 226, 227, 228, 283, 333, 

373, 436, 439-40, 443, 492. See also Ridgway, 

General Matthew B., and reconnaissance. 

in force: 209, 228, 237-46, 443. See also 

Operations, THUNDERBOULT, ROUNDUP. 

Rees, David: 364n 

Refugees: 28. See also Ch’o-do; Paengnyong-do; 

Partisans, anti-Communist. 

battle of the Changjin Reservoir: 141, 145-46 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 105, 107 

Chinnamp’o: 155 

Hungnam: 171, 172, 173, 174 

P’yongyang: 161 

Seoul: 196, 199, 202-04, 437n 

Songjin: 166, 174 

Suwon: 212 

use of by enemy: 105, 196, 220 

Wonsan: 165, 174 

Regiment, Australian, Royal: 391. See also 

Battalion, Australian. 

Regiment, British, 45th Field: 417, 426 

Regiment, Canadian, Princess Patricia’s Light 

Infantry. See Battalion, Canadian. 

Regiment, New Zealand, 16th Field: 182. See also 

Battalion, New Zealand. 

Regimental Combat Team. Thai, 21st: 26. See also 

Battalion, Thai. 

Regimental combat teams, U.S. See also Regiments, 

U.S. 

5th: 71, 113, 116-17, 204, 301, 365 

7th: 442, 453, 461 

15th 

Communist Spring offensive: 442, 453, 461, 

462, 463 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 475. See 

also Task forces, Able. 

23d: 117, 283-88, 290-91, 295-300, 301, 302 

38th: 273 
INDEX 541 

Regimental combat teams, U.S.-Continued 

65th: 442, 453, 461 

187th Airborne: 216, 153, 182, 196, 259, 343, 356. 

See also Bowen, Brig. Gen. Frank S., Jr. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61-62, 71, 149 

Communist Spring offensive: 438, 443 

COURAGEOUS: 341, 343 

Hoengsong: 274, 275 

KILLER: 306, 307 

line D: 224-25 

PILEDRIVER: 486 

P’yongyang: 153 

RIPPER: 315, 332, 334 

ROUNDUP: 249, 251-52, 259, 261, 262 

RUGGED: 349 

TOMAHAWK: 337, 338-40, 355. See also above 

COURAGEOUS. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 466, 474. See 

also Task forces, Gerhardt. 

Wonju line: 282 

Regiments, Chinese 

9th Independent Artillery: 325 

11th Artillery: 325 

37th: 114 

92d: 450 

93d: 463, 466, 475 

103d: 450-51 

106th: 483 

133d: 461 

135th: 454 

172d: 101 

179th: 101, 382 

235th: 94 

236th: 94 

237th: 94 

354th: 402. See also Kap’yong, Communist Spring 

offensive. 

359th: 398 

360th: 398 

373d: 249 

374th: 249 

375th: 249 

559th: 411 

561st: 373 

Regiments, North Korean 

1st: 370 

14th: 370 

19th: 484 

27th: 223 

36th: 340 

Regiments, ROK 

1st Marine Corps: 28, 48 

Changjin Reservoir: 84 

Communist Spring offensive: 371, 376, 383, 

438n 

force withdrawal to Hamhung-Hungnam: 

129, 131 

Hungnam evacuation: 170-71 

KILLER: 306n 

RUGGED: 361 

2d: 70, 190, 194-95, 332, 382-83, 401-02 

Regiments, ROK-Continued 

3d 

advance to line Alabama: 376 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63, 69, 70, 75, 77, 

80 

Communist Spring offensive: 389-90, 447, 

460, 462 

force withdrawal south: 108, 111-13, 118, 

119, 120, 121, 122 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 475. See also 

Task forces, Able. 

5th: 70, 184-85, 376, 389-90, 467 

6th: 107 

7th: 76, 382-83, 401-02, 433-34, 467 

8th: 70 

10th: 69, 217, 220, 263, 266 

11th 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72, 78, 79 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 189, 190, 193 

Communist Spring offensive: 416, 427, 430, 

433, 434, 435 

DAUNTLESS: 372 

12th 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72, 76, 79 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 189, 190 

Communist Spring offensive: 385, 397, 411, 

416, 422, 425-26, 427, 434, 435, 439 

DAUNTLESS: 372 

15th 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 72, 78, 79 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 189, 190, 193 

Communist Spring offensive: 416, 427, 432, 

433-34, 435, 439 

RIPPER: 330 

THUNDERBOLT: 257 

16th: 64, 69, 217, 263, 266 

18th: 166, 254-75, 282, 291 

19th: 76, 371, 382-83, 401-02, 479-80 

20th: 467, 468 

21st: 69, 263, 266 

22d: 86, 269, 293 

23d: 86, 184-85, 269, 466 

26th: 86, 88, 131, 165, 463 

27th: 217, 261, 388-90 

29th: 369 

30th: 292, 293 

35th: 217, 376, 389-90, 460, 463, 483 

36th: 293, 376, 389-90, 448, 460, 462, 463 

Regiments, U.S. See also Regimental combat teams, 

U.S. 

1st Marine. See also Puller, Col. Lewis B. 

Changjin Reservoir: 87-88, 89, 139, 143 

Communist Spring offensive: 398, 454, 457 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474 

5th Cavalry: 302. See also Crombez, Col. Marcel G. 

antiguerrilla operations: 215 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 81-82, 83, 107 

Chip’yong-ni: 291, 296. See also Task forces, 

Crombez. 

line D: 225 

Seoul bridgehead: 195 
542 EBB AND FLOW 

Regiments, U.S.-Continued 

5th Cavalry-Continued 

THUNDERBOLT: 244 

5th Infantry. See also Throckmorton. Col. John L. 

5th 

Communist Spring offensive: 384, 393-94, 418, 

419-21 

RUGGED: 353 

UNC force withdrawal south: 116-17 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 479-80 

Marine. See also Murray, Lt. Col. Raymond L. 

Changjin Reservoir: 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 98. 

See also Yudam-ni. 

Communist Spring offensive: 383, 454, 461 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474 

withdrawal to the coast: 131, 139, 143, 145 

7th Cavalry. See also Harris, Cal. William A. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 77, 82 

Communist Spring offensive: 433, 435 

DAUNTLESS: 371. See also Hwach’on Dam. 

RIPPER: 333, 353 

RUGGED: 356-58. See also Hwach’on Dam. 

Seoul bridgehead: 194, 195, 202, 204 

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 244 

UNC force withdrawal south: 105-07, 113-14 

7th Infantry 

Changjin Reservoir: 84 

Communist Spring offensive: 386, 394-96, 

412, 415, 418, 418n, 422, 427, 462, 466 

Hungnam evacuation: 173 

THUNDERBOLT: 257 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473, 475, 483, 

484 

7th Marine. See also Litzenberg, Col. Homer L., Jr. 

Changjin Reservoir: 88, 89, 90, 94, 98. See 

also Yudam-ni. 

Communist Spring offensive: 383, 398, 453-54 

RIPPER: 328 

RUGGED: 353 

Task Force Faith survivors attached: 136 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 482-83, 485 

withdrawal to the coast: 131, 139, 141, 143, 

145 

8th Cavalry 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 77, 82, 107 

RUGGED: 353, 358 

Task Force Johnson: 239-40 

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 244 

9th Infantry. See also Sloane, Col. Charles C. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63, 64, 65-67, 67n, 

68, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81 

Communist Spring offensive: 448, 452, 453- 

54, 457, 459, 460, 461, 462-63; 466 

line D: 217 

UNC force withdrawal south: 108, 116, 118, 

119, 121, 122, 124, 126 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 475, 483 

Wonju line 282, 283, 288 

Wonju reoccupation: 227 

11th Marine, and communist Spring offensive: 

390, 398 

Regiments, U.S.-Continued 

15th Infantry 

Changjin Reservoir: 84 

Communist Spring offensive: 386, 416-17, 427 

COURAGEOUS: 341, 343 

Hungnam evacuation: 173 

line D: 213-14, 216 

THUNDERBOLT: 244, 257 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474 

WOLFHOUND: 237-38 

17th Infantry 

Changjin Reservoir: 86 

Communist Spring offensive: 381 

Hoengsong: 275 

Hungnam evacuation: 171, 172 

line D: 217, 225, 226, 227 

line Kansas: 370 

ROUNDUP: 252 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 478-80 

Wonju line: 282 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 294 

19th Infantry. See also Moore, Col. Ned D. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 64, 72, 114 

Communist Spring offensive: 384, 393, 411, 

418, 419-21 

Seoul bridgehead: 198, 204 

21 st Infantry 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63-64, 72, 79 

Communist Spring offensive: 384, 393-94, 

411, 418, 419-20 

RUGGED: 353 

Seoul bridgehead: 198, 204 

UNC force withdrawal south: 114 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472, 478-80 

23d Infantry. See also Freeman, Col. Paul L. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 65-67, 68-69, 74, 

76, 80-81 

Chip’yong-ni railroad tunnels: 248-49 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 438, 451- 

52, 456-56, 457-59, 460, 462, 463, 464, 466 

line B: 184-85 

line Kansas: 370 

ROUNDUP: 251, 263 

Wonju: 217, 219-22 

UNC force withdrawal south: 107, 108, 109, 

111-12, 116, 118-19, 120, 121, 124, 125 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 482, 483, 

484, 485 

24th Infantry 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63, 68, 73-74, 79, 

80 

Communist Spring offensive: 379, 384-85, 

393, 411, 418, 419, 435 

RIPPER: 321 

Seoul bridgehead: 205 

UNC force withdrawal south: 107, 109, 114, 

117 

27th Infantry. See also Michaelis, Col. John H. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 68, 73, 78, 79 
INDEX 543 

Regiments, U.S.-Continued 

27th Infantry-Continued 

Communist Spring offensive: 385, 393, 411, 

418, 419, 432, 433 

patrols north of line D: 228 

RIPPER: 321, 328, 353 

Seoul bridgehead: 202, 205-08 

UNC force withdrawal south: 109, 117 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 476 

WOLFHOUND: 237-38 

31st Infantry. See also MacLean, Col. Allan D. 

Changjin Reservoir: 86-87 

Hoengsong: 275 

Hungnam evacuation: 171 

ROUNDUP: 252, 261, 262 

withdrawal to the coast: 132 

Wonju line: 282 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 292, 294 

32d Infantry 

Changjin Reservoir: 86-87 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 

400-401 

Hoengsong: 275 

Hungnam evacuation: 171, 172 

line D: 217 

line Kansas: 370 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 476, 478. See 

also Task forces, Hazel. 

Wonju line: 282 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 294 

35th Infantry: 238-39 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63, 72, 73-74, 78, 

79 

Communist Spring offensive: 393, 418, 419, 

433 

DAUNTLESS: 372 

line D: 214 

RIPPER: 321 

RUGGED: 353 

Seoul bridgehead: 198, 205 

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 244, 245, 257 

38th Infantry: 307. See also Coughlin, Col. John 

G.; Peploe, Col. George B. 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 63, 64, 67-68, 70, 

75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80 

Communist Spring offensive: 448, 450-51, 

453, 454, 4:56-57, 459-60, 461, 466,467 

ROUNDUP: 251, 263 

Hoengsong: 251, 269, 272-73 

UNC force withdrawal south: 107, 108, 109- 

11, 112, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 123 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 475, 483, 484, 

485 

Wonju: 219-20, 221 

Wonju line: 282, 288 

65th Infantry. See also Harris, Col. [William W.]. 

assistance to Eighth Army: 129, 130 

Changjin Reservoir: 84 

Communist Spring offensive: 379, 385, 386, 

394-96, 413, 414, 415, 417, 418, 421, 427, 

430, 432, 435, 467 

Regiments, U.S.-Continued 

65th Infantry-Continued 

COURAGEOUS: 341, 343 

DAUNTLESS: 372, 374 

Hungnam evacuation: 173 

RIPPER: 330 

THUNDERBOLT: 244 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473, 475 

Reinforcements and replacements: 158, 231, 237, 

247, 367 

Republican Party: 363 

Reservoir crossing: 360-61 

Rhee, Syngman: 15, 15n, 179, 186n, 369, 408-09 

Ridge, Lt. Cal. Thomas L.: 100. See also Battalions, 

U.S., 3d, 1st Marines; Hagaru-ri. 

Ridgway, General Matthew B. 

and airborne landings: 332, 334, 335, 338, 339 

and Almond: 47n, 245, 248, 251, 264, 275, 279, 

280, 284, 294 

amphibious demonstration: 255 

assumes command of Eighth Army: 177-80, 183 

bombing of enemy air bases outside Korea: 378n 

and a cease-fire: 504-05 

cease-fire positions: 496, 498-99, 500 

on Chinese Army: 209 

and Chinese New Year’s offensive: 189-91 

Chip’yong-ni: 284-85, 300 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 290 

and Chung: 369n 

and Collins: 234-37 

on conquering China: 320 

control of Han River valley: 301 

and Coulter: 198, 215-16, 228, 235, 239 

COURAGEOUS/TOMAHAWK: 334, 335-36, 339 

and Crombez: 300 

DAUNTLESS: 356, 362, 374 

defense lines: 184-86, 187, 365-66 

enemy defense of Iron Triangle: 491 

and enemy intelligence: 305, 319, 319n 

equipment losses: 212, 279-80, 281 

on general officer standards: 234 

and the Gloucestershire Bn.: 413, 428-29 

Han River, withdrawal from: 210, 212, 215-17, 

224-25 

Han River line: 284-85 

Han River-Yangp’yong-Hoengsong-Kangnung 

line: 246-47 

Hoengsong: 275 

and Hoge: 315n 

Inch’on port facilities: 437 

intelligence: 183, 216, 242, 264, 302-05. See also 

below and reconnaissance. 

issues negotiation offer: 501 

on the issues of the Korean War: 229 

and the JCS: 488-89, 490-91 

and Joy: 366 

Kangnung: 306 

Kansong-T’ongch’on operation: 487 

KILLER: 302, 304, 305-307, 308 

and leadership and confidence: 183, 187n, 192, 
544 EBB AND FLOW 

Ridgway, General Matthew B.-Continued 

and leadership and confidence-Continued 

198, 206, 215-16, 234-36, 279-80, 281, 320. See 

also above and Coulter; and the Gloucestershire 

Bn.; below and Milburn; morale. 

line Alabama: 374 

line C: 197-98, 200 

line D: 200-201, 216-17, 223-25, 227 

and MacArthur: 247, 305, 320, 345-46, 347, 350, 

365, 366. See also below relieves MacArthur. 

and McClure: 222 

and Milburn: 193, 198, 215-16, 228, 237 

and misinformation: 255, 313 

mission and duties of: 488-89, 490 

morale: 180, 193, 198, 201, 228-231, 236n, 302. 

See also above and leadership and confidence. 

and a negotiated settlement: 490-491, 494, 501 

operations in support of: 497-99, 505-06 See 

also above and cease-fire positions. 

North Korean pressure in the east: 199 

and North Korean 10th Division: 333 

and the press: 317, 367 

and reconnaissance: 209, 209n, 227, 228, 237-46, 

333, 348 

and refugees: 196 

relieves MacArthur: 362, 363-64, 365, 366-67 

RIPPER: 310-11, 313, 314, 317-19, 322-23, 327, 

328, 329-30, 331, 332, 333, 343-44 

and ROK forces: 190, 223-24, 232-33, 246, 292, 

333, 369n, 408 

and rotation: 236, 365 

ROUNDUP: 251, 252, 259-60, 263-64, 268 

RUGGED: 353-56 

and Seoul: 186-88, 246-47, 307, 310-11, 328-29 

bridgehead: 186-87, 191, 192, 193, 196, 198 

evacuation of: 198-99, 200-201, 202-03 

and Smith: 308-09 

strategy and tactics: 237, 246-48, 311, 371 

and Stratemeyer: 366 

and Swing: 308 

on X Corps OPLAN: 47n 

on terrain as an objective: 311 

and the 38th parallel: 320, 344-46, 347-50 

and THUNDERBOLT: 246-47, 251, 252, 255, 263-64 

U.N. victory: 495 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465 

and U.S.-Japan policy: 366-67 

and Van Fleet: 366, 367, 487, 489, 496, 497-99 

and widening the war: 366, 367 

withdrawal policy: 198, 201, 206. See also United 

Nations Command (UNC), evacuation question. 

WOLFHOUND: 238 

Wonju: 224 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line: 292, 293, 294 

and Yu: 292, 293, 294 

Rifles 

.30-caliber Browning automatic: 30 

.30-caliber carbine: 30 

.30-caliber MI: 30 

RIPPER. See Operations, RIPPER. 

Roads: 5, 7, 311. See also Routes, numbered 

Anju-Sunch’on: 114 

and bridging: 140-41, 145-46 

Changjin Reservoir road: 129, 130, 166 

Chech’on-P’yongch’ang: 252 

Ch’ongch’otrvalley road: 80, 107, 108, 112, 113 

Ch’unch’on-Seoul: 180, 188, 200 

Habae-jae-Sangam-ni: 475 

Hagaru-ri-Kot’o-ri. See Hagaru-ri; Kot’o-ri; Task 

forces, Drysdale. 

Hamhung-Hungnam: 171 

Hongch’on-Ch’unch’on-Hwach’on: 468 

hubs: 315, 348-49, 465-66, 468. See also Chech’on; 

Ch’ungch’on; Hongch’on; Ich’on; Iron Triangle; Kumhwa; P’yongyang; Wonju. 

Hudong-ni-Hagaru-ri. See Faith, Lt. Col. Don C., 

Jr.; Hagaru-ri. 

Hyesanjin-Pukch’ong: 131 

Hyon-ni-Inje: 447, 484-85 

Inch’on-Yongdungp’o: 255, 256, 258 

Iron Triangle: 348-49 

Kap’yong-Chiam-ni: 478, 479 

Kumnyangjang-ni-Ich’on-Yoju: 239 

Kunu-ri-Anju: 113 

Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch’on: 117-18, 120, 124, 

125-26 

Kunu-ri-Sinch’on: 126 

Kunu-ri-Sunch’on: 76-77, 80, 107, 114-16, 118, 

120-25 

Pujon Reservoir: 166 

Pukch’ang-ni-Sunch’on: 70-71 

Pukch’ong-Hyesanjin: 43, 87 

P’ungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje: 482 

P’yongyang-Wonsan: 84 

Sach’ang-ni-Hamhung: 129 

Seoul-Ch’unch’on: 321, 322, 328, 329 

Soksa-ri-Habae-jae: 473 

Songch’on-P’yongyang: 116 

Taebaek Mountains: 45 

Tanyang-Ch’ungju: 225 

Tokch’on-Hamhung: 129 

Tokch’on-Kunu-ri: 70-71, 108, 109-11 

Tokch’on-Sunch’on: 116 

Wawon-Kunu-ri: 77, 80 

withdrawal planning: 159 

Wonju-Mokkye-dong: 220 

You-Wonju: 240, 245 

Yongwol-P'yongchang: 252 

Yudam-ni-Hagaru-ri: 89, 90. See also Hagaru-ri; 

Toktong Pass; Yudam-ni. 

Yudam-ni-Mup’yong-ni: 90 

Yudam-ni-Sinhung-ni: 89 

Rocket launchers 

2.36-inch: 30 

3.5-inch: 30 

ROK Army zone: 369n 

ROUNDUP. See Operations, ROUNDUP 

Routes, numbered. See also Roads. 

1:45, 349 

avoided by NKPA: 323 
INDEX 545 

Routes, numbered-Continued 

1:-Continued 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 61, 63, 64, 71, 79, 

114 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 187, 190 

Communist Spring offensive: 379, 381, 416, 

417, 430, 432-33, 435, 439, 444, 445 

COURAGEOUS/TOMAHAWK: 334, 336, 337, 338, 

340 

DAUNTLESS: 372, 373 

line D: 213, 214, 217 

RIPPER: 329 

Seoul bridgehead: 180, 193, 198, 200, 203, 

205, 207 

Suwon-Osan: 228 

THUNUERBOLI’: 243, 252, 255 

TOMAHAWK: 335 

UNC force withdrawal south: 114, 117, 150, 

153, 161 

use of by refugees: 196 

withdrawal from the Han: 212 

WOLFHOUND: 238 

1B: 416 

2: 162, 249, 258, 259, 433 

2Y: 340, 341, 416 

3: 180, 184, 186, 187, 349 

Chinese New ‘Year’s offensive: 195 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 401, 416, 

419, 435 

COURAGEOUS: 335, 337, 341, 343 

DAUNTLESS: 372 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

RIPPER: 329 

RUGGED: 353 

UNC force withdrawal south: 150, 161, 194 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465-66, 470, 

476 

3A: 419, 420 

3X: 343 

5Y 

Communist Spring offensive: 385, 388, 389, 

397, 411, 412, 421, 422, 424, 425, 429 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 189, 190 

11: 189, 386, 387, 394, 395, 396, 412, 417, 421, 

424 

13: 

15: 

17: 

18: 

214, 217, 225, 228, 242, 443, 444 

472 

187, 228, 371, 498 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 382, 391, 

393, 402 

line D: 213, 214, 216 

PILEDRIVER: 491 

RUGGED: 356 

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 244 

UNC force withdrawal south: 150-51, 162 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472, 478, 479, 

480, 484 

WOLFHOUND: 237 

162 

Routes, numbered-Continued 

20: 184, 239, 262, 349 

Communist Spring offensive: 442, 460, 462. 

463, 464, 466, 467, 468, 469 

KILLER: 306, 307, 309, 310 

RIPPER: 317, 318, 322 

Task Force Johnson: 239, 240 

THUNDERBOLT: 243 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 468, 483 

WOLFHOUND: 237, 238 

24: 161, 180, 184, 197, 264, 302, 374 

Chip’yong-ni: 249, 283, 285, 287, 290-91, 295 

Chuam-ni: 288, 290 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 400, 

431, 439, 445, 448, 450, 451, 455, 457, 459, 

462, 463, 469 

line Kansas: 493 

PILEDRIVER: 487 

RIPPER: 322-23 

ROUNDUP: 249, 259, 263 

RUGGED: 349 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 475, 476, 

480-84, 485 

24A: 249, 283-84, 285, 290, 291. See also Task 

forces, Crombez. 

29: 161, 210, 227, 249, 264-65, 349. See also 

Hoengsong. 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 393, 431, 

453 

guerrilla operations on: 199 

KILLER: 306, 307 

line C: 197 

line D: 217, 219, 220, 223, 225, 227 

line Kansas: 370 

RIPPER: 321, 322, 331, 332 

RUGGED: 358 

X Corps MSR: 184, 185, 186 

33: 

39: 

48: 

55: 

60: 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472, 476 

165, 180, 184, 186, 187, 349 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 188, 189, 190, 

194, 195, 198, 205 

Communist Spring offensive: 377, 379, 384, 

385, 386, 394, 495, 396, 413, 418, 421, 

422,427,444,445 

COURAGEOUS: 335, 341, 34243 

DAUNTLESS: 372, 375, 376

PILEDRIVER: 491 

UNC force withdrawal south: 150-51, 153, 

161 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 470 

238, 243 

224-25 

239, 243, 244, 255, 257 

186 

Chech’on-Yongwol: 224, 226 

KILLER: 306, 307, 309 

P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line: 292 

P’yongch’ang-Yongwol: 293 

ROUNDUP: 259 
546 EBB AND FLOW 

Roving defensive warfare: 371 Sinanju: 45, 109, 112, 117, 153, 304, 324 

Royal Air Force: 39 Sinch’ang-ni: 77, 82, 107, 109, 113-14 

Royal Australian Air Force: 36n Sinch’on: 340, 341, 342, 343 

Royal Canadian Air Force: 36n Sing Sung Mo: 369 

Royal Hellenic Air Force: 36n Sin’gye: 150, 153, 327 

Royal Marines. See Commando, 41st Independent, Sinhung: 129 

Royal Marines. Sinhung-ni: 89 

Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. See Battalions, 

British, 1st, Royal Northumber-land Fusiliers. 

Royal Ulster Rifles. See Battalions, British, 1st, Royal 

Ulster Rifles. 

Sinjom-ni: 476, 477 

Sinnim-ni: 81, 108 

Sinuiju: 43, 45, 49, 51, 53, 55, 323, 324, 325 

Sinwon-ni: 339 

Ruffner, Maj. Gen. Clark L. See also Divisions, U.S., 

2d Infantry. 

battle for Hoengsong: 268, 270, 272-73, 280 

Communist Spring offensive: 401, 447-48, 451-52, 

455, 456-57 

Skeldon, Lt. Col. James H.: 221 

Sloane, Col. Charles C. See also Regiments, U.S., 9th 

Infantry. 

Chip’yong-ni-Wonju line: 290 

defense of Wonju: 282, 283 

KILLER: 307 

line D: 225 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 68, 74 

withdrawal south: 80, 107, 116, 119, 120, 121, 

122-23 

Smith, Rear Adm. Allen E.: 40, 313n. See also Naval 

task forces, 95. 

RUGGED. See Operations, RUGGED. 

Smith, Capt. Claude: 422 

Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. See also Divisions, U.S., 

1st Marine. 

Sach’ang-ni: 84, 88, 92, 101, 140 

Samch’ok: 161, 172, 217 

Samso-ri: 81, 83, 108, 115 

Sangam-ni: 447, 453, 460, 462, 463, 468, 483 

Sangju: 239 

Sasebo, Japan: 255 

Sebald, William J.: 363-64n, 366-67 

Secretary General, U.N. See Lie, Trygve. 

Security Council. See United Nations (U.N.), Security 

Council. 

Senate, U.S. 

advance on Mup’yong-ni: 89 

Changjin Reservoir: 88, 96, 97, 98, 102 

Communist Spring offensive: 383, 384, 398 

withdrawal to Hamhung-Hungnam: 129, 130, 

131-32, 137, 138-41, 142-45, 147 

and IX Corps: 308-09 

and North Korean 10th Division: 227 

Smoke screens. See People’s Liberation Army, strategy 

and tactics. 

Sobang Hills: 503 

Armed Services Committee: 489, 497 

cease-fire: 495 

Sochon River valley: 493 

Sohojin: 171 

Soksa-ri: 310 

Foreign Relations Committee: 489 

Seoul: 16, 27, 36, 150, 151, 155, 180, 228, 254, 304, 

337, 341, 417n, 486 

bridgehead 

civilian evacuation: 202-04 

collapse of: 198-202, 204-08 

established: 186-87 

strengthened: 196 

withdrawal to: 188, 191, 192-95 

Communist Spring offensive: 379, 381, 397, 401, 

416, 431, 434-38 

defense of: 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165. See also 

above bridgehead. See also Line Golden. 

and Fifth Air Force: 252 

reoccupation of: 246-47, 323, 328-30 

RIPPER: 317, 328-30 

Seventh Fleet: 41. See also Martin, Vice Adm. 

Harold M.; Struble, Vice Adm. Arthur D. 

Shepherd, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C.: 159 

Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.: 14n. 

Shi pping Control Administration, Japan: 40 

Short, Joseph: 364 

Communist Spring offensive: 460, 462, 463, 466, 

467 

RIPPER: 310, 315 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 467, 473, 475 

Solma-ri: 385, 388, 389, 397, 411, 428 

Som River: 288, 290, 301 

Somin-dong: 70, 75 

Song Hyo Chan, Brig. Gem: 84-86. See also Divisions, ROK, Capital. 

Songch’on: 82, 107, 109, 116 

Songch’on River: 168, 171, 172 

Songjin: 131, 165-66, 167 

Soule, Maj. Gen. Robert H.: 343n. See also Divisions, 

U.S., 3d Infantry. 

Changjin Reservoir: 84 

Communist Spring offensive: 385-86, 387, 394-95, 

412, 413, 414-15, 419, 421-22, 427, 428-29, 

433, 435, 462, 467 

COURAGEOUS: 341 

force withdrawal to Hamhung-Hungnam: 129, 

131, 140, 145 

Sibyon-ni: 150, 157, 346 

Sikorsky: 32 

and the Gloucestershire Bn.: 428-29 

Hungnam evacuation: 169, 171, 172, 173 

line B: 185, 186 
INDEX 547 

Soule, Maj. Gen. Robert H.-Continued 

line D: 214 

RIPPER: 330 

THUNDERBOLT: 244 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 467, 473, 475 

South Africa, forces of, in Korea: 24, 36n 

South African Air Force: 36n 

South Mountain: 329 

Soviet Army and North Korean training: 325 

Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR). 

Soyang River: 370, 381, 389, 463. See also Corps, 

U.S., X, Communist Spring offensive; Line 

Waco. 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 476, 477, 

480-84, 485 

Soyang River valley: 332, 349, 381, 493. See also 

Soyang River. 

Special operations: 26, 28 

Spring counteroffensive. See United Nations Command (UNC), Spring counteroffensive. 

Spring offensive. See Communist Spring offensive. 

Squadrons. See Air squadrons; Tank squadrons. 

Stamford, Capt. Edward P.: 87 

Stanaway, 1st Lt. Ivan G.: 477 

Stars and Stripes: 319n 

State, Department of 

ambassador to Korea. See Muccio, John J. 

and Communist intentions: 499-500 

Korean policy: 319-20, 344-45 

and Ridgway: 500 

State, Secretary of. See Acheson, Dean. 

State, Secretary of for External Affairs, Canada. See 

Pearson, Lester B. 

Status quo ante bellum: 345 

Stebbins, Col. Albert K.: 44, 154-55, 441-42 

Stephen, Col. Richard W.: 114. See also Regiments, 

U.S., 21st Infantry. 

Stewart. Brig. Gen. George C.: 27, 210n, 280-81 

Stewart, Capt. Keith M.: 299-300 

Stone, Lt. Col. J.R.: 406-07 

Stratemeyer, Lt. Gen. George E.: 15, 178, 506n. See 

also Far East Air Forces. 

close air support: 111 

control of air operations: 39 

interdiction: 313-14 

radar-directed night-bombing: 454 

and Ridgway: 366, 367 

Tokyo conference; 7 Dec: 159 

Strong, Col. Paschal N.: 355 

Struble, Vice Adm. Arthur D.: 41, 159, 167, 313n 

Su Ching-huai: 72-73. See also Armies, Chinese, 

66th. 

Submachine guns 

.45-caliber Thompson: 30 

M3: 30 

Sudong: 146-47 

Sukch’on: 61, 114, 116, 117, 126, 326 

Sukch’on-Sunch’on-Songch’on line: 116, 149, 150 

Sunch’on 

battle of the Ch’ongch’on: 71, 76, 77, 83, 105 

UNC force withdrawal south: 107, 108, 109, 112, 

114, 116, 117, 119 

Sunch’on-Sinch’ang-ni-Songch’on line: 107, 109 

Sung Shih-Lun: 92, 381. See also Army groups, 

Chinese, IX. 

Supply routes. See Logistics, Communist forces; 

Logistics, UNC; Ports and harbors; Railroads; 

Roads. 

Support Force 21: 321. See also Keith, Col. John W. 

battle for Hoengsong: 266, 268, 269-72, 273, 274, 

280 

ROUNDUP: 251, 263 

Support Force 7. See also White, Lt. Col. Barney D. 

battle for Hoengsong: 273, 276, 277, 278 

ROUNDUP: 251, 262 

Support Team A: 263, 266, 269, 274 

Support Team B: 263, 266, 268, 270-71, 274 

Support Team E: 

Suwon: 252 

274-75, 276, 277 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 196, 201, 210, 212- 

13, 216 

THUNDERBOLT: 243, 244 

WOLFHOUND: 237, 238 

Suwon-Kumnyangjang-ni line: 238 

Sweden 

contribution to UNC: 24, 28 

and a negotiated settlement: 496, 497 

Swing, Maj. Gen. Joseph M.: 308, 315n 

Syngman Rhee. See Rhee, Syngman. 

Tactical Air Control Center: 36 

Tactical air operations: 36, 39 

Taebaek Mtns.: 5, 19-21, 26, 43, 45, 47, 84, 311, 

333, 370 

Communist Spring offensive: 439, 444-45 

guerrilla operations in: 52 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473 

Taebo-ri: 472 

T’aech’on: 63, 64, 77 

Taedong River: 44, 77, 107, 153, 154, 156, 313 

Taegu: 28, 36, 162, 179, 219, 223, 315, 338, 349 

Taegu conference, Ian 51: 234, 235-36 

Taeryong River: 63, 64, 72, 77, 79 

T’aeul-li: 79, 80 

Taiwan: 351. See also Formosa. 

T'an-ch’on: 86 

T'an-ch’on valley: 244 

Tank squadron, British, C, 8th King’s Royal Irish 

Hussars: 386, 412. See also Huth, Maj. Henry. 

Tanks 

Centurion: 30, 386, 412, 414, 424 

Churchill: 30, 337 

lost or abandoned: 458-59. See also Equipment 

and supplies, UNC. 

M-46: 155 

M4: 121 

M4A3 Sherman: 30 
548 EBB AND FLOW 

Tanks-Continued 

M24 Chaffee: 30, 414 

M26 Pershing: 30 

M46 Patton: 30 

recovered: 321 

T34: 343n 

Tanyang: 186, 199, 215, 217, 219, 223, 225 

Tarkenton, Lt. Col. James C.: 61, 65. See also Army, 

U.S., Eighth, G-2. 

enemy offensive strength and intentions: 76, 82- 

84, 187-88, 374-75, 469 

KII.LER/RIPPER: 311-13, 314, 323, 327 

RUGGED: 35l-52 

Task forces. See also Naval task forces. 

Able: 474, 475, 480, 482 

Allen: 255, 256, 256-57, 258 

Baker: 482, 484, 485 

Boone: 340 

C: 129, 130 

Charlie: 484, 485 

Crombez: 291, 296-300 

Dog: 140, 140n, 143, 145-47 

Dolvin: 63, 63n, 68 

Drysdale: 102-03, 129, 130 

Faith: 99-100, 129, 130, 131, 132-37, 138, 139. 

See also Faith, Lt. Col. Don C., Jr. 

Gerhardt: 481-82, 483. See also above Baker. 

Growdon: 337-38, 339, 340, 341-42 

Hawkins: 341 

Hazel: 476-78, 478n 

Johnson: 239-10, 243 

Meyer: 256, 257 

Skeldon: 221-22 

Wilson: 68, 73, 78, 79 

Yoke: 467, 474, 475, 480 

Zebra: 401, 448-51. See also Brubaker, Lt. Col. 

Elbridge L. 

Taylor, Brigadier George: 372 

Thailand, forces of in Korea: 24, 26, 182 

Thailand Expeditionary Force: 26 

Theseus, HMS: 155 

38th parallel: 7, 8, 26, 58, 161, 164, 284, 312, 315, 

324-26, 333, 367, 441, 476 

and armistice: 490, 496, 499-500, 501 

and cease-fire: 495, 499, 500-501 

crossing by UNC forces: 17, 157, 344-47 

guerrilla operations near: 52 

and line B: 180 

and line Benton: 335 

39th parallel: 156 

Thomas, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. See also Divisions, 

U.S., 1st Marine. 

Communist Spring offensive: 453-54 

PILEDRIVER: 493 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 482, 484 

Throckmorton, Col. John L.: 116-17. See also Regiments, U.S., 5th Infantry. 

THUNDERBOLRT. See Operations, THUNDERBOLT. 

Todon-ni: 275 

Tokchok-to: 256 

Tokch’on: 69, 70, 71, 77, 81, 81n, 83 

Tokchong: 190, 194, 195 

Tokko-ri: 400 

Toktong Pass: 89, 96, 98, 137 

Tokyo: 15, 25, 84, 178, 365 

Tokyo conferences, 15, 17 Jan.: 234, 235. See also 

United Nations Command (UNC), Tokyo conferences. 

Toledo, USS: 431-32, 435, 436 

TOMAHAWK. See Operations, TOMAHAWK. 

T’ongch’on: 487, 497, 498 

Torpedoes: 438n 

Training, Communist: 325, 502 

Training, UNC: 27, 28, 305n, 307, 315, 442, 442n, 

502 

Transport: 7, 44. See also Air operations, UNC; 

Airfields and airstrips; Helicopters; Ports and 

harbors; Railroads; Roads. 

Truman, Harry S. See also United States (U.S.). 

on Chinese intervention: 20 

evacuation question: 234 

executive agent for U.N. Security Council: 14 

Japan policy: 367 

Korean policy: 10, 13, 14, 17-20, 22, 344-45, 346, 

347, 489, 490 

and MacArthur: 18, 19, 20, 42, 43, 159-60, 346, 

346n, 362-65 

Manchurian border policy: 18, 42-43 

and a negotiated settlement: 494, 495, 501 

Seventh Fleet: 41 

state of national emergency: 231 

UNC mission: 489 

Tsushima Strait: 3 

Tumen River: 43 

Tunner, Maj. Gen. William H.: 35, 36, 139, 172, 

338n 

Turkey, forces of in Korea: 24, 26. See also Brigade, 

Turkish. 

Twinnan-mu1 River: 274, 275 

Twinnan-mu1 River valley: 276, 278 

Uijongbu: 180, 186, 187, 329, 334, 335 

Chinese New Year’s offensive: 190 

Communist Spring offensive: 416, 430, 432, 435, 

438, 444, 445 

COURAGEOUS: 341 

Seoul bridgehead: 194 

Ulsan: 174 

Umyang-ni: 474, 480, 481, 482, 484 

U.N. Blockading and Escort Force: 40-41, 41n. See 

also Naval task forces, 95. 

Unger, Col. C. H.: 203 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): 3, 13, 

17, 18, 19, 20. 

actions of and UNC: 488 

Army: 325 

and a negotiated settlement: 496, 500-501. See also 

Malik, Jacob. 

and North Korea: 8, 9, 10, 17 
INDEX 549 

United Kingdom 

and Chinese attitudes: 496 

forces of in Korea: 24, 26, 28, 39, 371, 442n. 

502n. See also Battalions, British; Brigade, 

British; Brigades, British Commonwealth; 

Commando, 41st Independent. 

United Nations (U.N.) 

authorization to conclude an armistice: 501 

Commission for Unification & Rehabilitation of 

Korea: 202 

General Assembly: 18 

negotiated settlement: 494-97 

resolutions: 10, 13, 18, 20 

and South Korea: 8, 10, 13, 14 

Secretary General of See Lie, Trygve. 

Security Council: 10, 13, 14, 14n, 501 

and unification of Korea: 9, 10, 17, 18 

United Nations Civil Assistance Command, 

Korea: 28n 

United Nations Command (UNC): 3 

air forces: 23, 24, 34-39, 505-06 

chief of staff. See Hickey, Maj. Gen. Doyle O. 

CINCUNC Order No. 5: 159 

command structure: 14, 15, 15n, 24, 25 

commander in chief (CINCUNC). See MacArthur. 

General of the Army Douglas; Ridgway, 

General Matthew B. 

equipment: 30-33 

establishment of: 13, 14, 14n 

evacuation question: 158-59, 230-37 

force withdrawal south. See Changjin Reservoir, 

battle of; Ch’ongch’on River, battle of. 

ground forces: 25-33, 502 

LOC: 5, 7 

mission: 7, 8, 13, 18, 21, 22, 50, 178, 231, 319, 

367, 487, 490. See also above evacuation question. 

naval forces: 24, 39-42, 437, 505 

response to Chinese intervention: 59 

security units: 230 

Spring counteroffensive. See also Corps, ROK, I; 

Corps, U.S., I, IX, X; Divisions, ROK, 2d, 7th, 

9th; Divisions, U.S., 1st Marine, 2d Infantry, 3d 

Infantry, 7th Infantry; Operations, PILEDRIVER. 

Communist forces, and withdrawal: 466-67, 

469,470-76,481-85 

and cease-fire positions: 496, 497-99, 500 

Communist Spring offensive: 389, 397, 431, 433, 

UNC forces: 465-70 

Tokyo conferences 

28 Nov: 84, 103-04, 128 

29 Nov: 116 

7 Dec: 159 

434-35, 436, 437, 438-42, 444, 452, 453, 457, 

461, 467-68, 469 

United Nations Partisan Force: 230, 230n 

United Nations Public Health and Welfare Detachment: 28 

United Nations Reception Center: 28, 149, 502 

United States (U.S.). See also Truman, Harry S. 

concern over Soviet intentions: 231 

Formosa policy: 41 

Japan policy: 366-67 

Korea policy: 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17-22, 43, 159-60, 

319-20, 344-47, 408-09, 488, 489-90. 494-97. 

DAUNTLESS: 374 

and enemy forces: 497 

and the Gloucestershire Bn.: 428-29 

Hwach’on Dam: 438n 

Kansas-Wyoming defenses: 503-04 

Kansong-T’ongch’on operation: 487 

operations in support of a negotiated settlement: 506 

and Paik: 369 

PILEDRIVER: 485-87 

reconnaissance in force: 487 

and Ridgway: 369, 497 

and ROK forces: 369, 408, 438-39, 467-69 

United States (U.S.)-Continued 

Korea policy-Continued 

See also United Nations Command, evacuation 

question. 

Manchurian border policy: 18, 42-43 

mobilization: 231 

negotiated settlement: 499-502 

post WWII strategy: 9, 10 

United States Air Force: 23, 365n. See also Far East 

Air Forces. 

United States Army: 23, 24, 24n, 365. See also Army, 

U.S., Eighth; Corps, U.S., I, IX, X. 

United States Marine Corns: 24. See also Divisions, 

U.S., 1st Marine. 

aviation: 36-39, 48, 137, 167-68, 405. See also Air 

wings, U.S., 1st Marine; Close air support, 

UNC; Interdiction, UNC. 

engineers: 146. See also Partridge, Lt. Col. John H. 

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific: 159 

officers commanding Army units: 308-09, 309n 

rotation: 365n 

shore parties: 165, 167 

United States Military Advisory Group, ROK 

(KMAG): 27, 294, 382, 468. See also Farrell, 

Brig. Gen. Francis W. 

United States Navy: 23, 365n. See also Amphibious 

operations: Naval Forces, Far East; Naval task 

forces; Seventh Fleet. 

aviation: 39, 41-42, 167-68. See also Air wings, 

U.S.; Close air support, UNC; Interdiction, 

UNC; Naval task forces, 77. 

blockade: 16, 40. See also Naval task forces, 95. 

bombardment: 40. See also below gunfire support. 

gunfire support: 40, 128. See also Naval task 

forces, 90, 95. 

surveillance: 157 

underwater demolition teams: 173-74 

Unsan: 62, 63 

U.S.-Japan peace treaty: 367 

Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A. : 368, 413 

assumes command of Eighth Army: 362, 365, 

366, 367, 371 
550 EBB AND FLOW 

Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A.-Continued 

and the press: 368-69 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465-66, 467-68, 

469, 472, 475-76, 482, 485n. See also above 

PILEDRIVER. 

Van Fleet day of fire: 441-42, 442n, 454 

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.: 14n, 234, 236 

Vehicles, abandoned. See Equipment and supplies, 

UNC. 

Voice of America: 499 

Wa-dong: 124 

Wake Island conference: 20 

Walker, Lt. Gen. Walton H.: 15, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 

28, 43, 48, 233 

battle of Ch’ongch’on: 61, 65, 70-71, 76, 77 

CINCUNC Order No. 5: 159 

death of: 177 

and MacArthur: 84 

and ROK forces: 161-62, 163 

and Seoul: 159. 162, 163, 165 

withdrawal from the north: 79, 82, 83, 103-04, 

105, 109, 116, 149-53, 156-57, 158, 160-65 

Walpo-ri: 105 

Wasson, Pfc. Marvin L.: 147 

Wawon: 71, 77, 80-83, 107 

Weapons: 30 

Weible, Maj. Gen. Walter L.: 25 

Weyand, Lt. Col. Fred C.: 395 

Weyland. General Otto P., 506, 506n. See also Far 

East Air Forces. 

White, Lt. Col. Barney D.: 274, 276, 278. See also 

Support Force 7. 

Wilhm, Lt. Col. Jack F.: 274, 276 

Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A.: 71-72 

Wilson, Lt. Col. Arthur H., Jr.: 420. See also Regiments, U.S., 5th Infantry. 

Wilson, Brig. Gen. Vennard: 68, 73. See also Task 

forces, Wilson. 

Winston, Lt. Col. Waldron C.: 147 

WOLFHOUND. See Operations, WOLFHOUND. 

Wolmi-do: 212 

Wonch’ang pass: 476 

Wonju: 161, 225, 272, 275, 305-07, 417n, 454 

battle for 184, 216-22, 224, 225, 233, 288-89. See 

also Chaum-ni; Chech’on; Chip’yong-ni. 

defense of: 185, 186, 197, 199-200, 210, 282-83, 

288 

importance of: 220 

reoccupied: 227, 245 

withdrawal to: 275-79. See also Wonju line. 

Wonju line: 275, 282-83. See also Wonju, withdrawal 

to. 

Wonju-P’yongch’ang line: 291-92, 293-94. See also 

Chech’on. 

Wonpo-ri: 160, 161 

Wonsan: 19, 28, 48, 84, 158, 254, 265, 304, 312, 

313, 324 

armistice talk site: 501 

evacuation from: 129, 130, 165, 167 

Wonsan-Continued 

landing at: 40, 43 

Woman-Seoul corridor: 180. 184, 188 

Wright, Maj. Gen. Edwin K.: 104, 158-59 

Yalu River, and bridges: 20, 21, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 

49, 52, 53-54, 55, 59, 71, 323, 324 

Yancey, Lt. Col. Thomas R., 475. See also Task 

forces, Able. 

Yang Teh-chih: 325, 379 

Yangdok: 326, 502 

Yanggu: 370 

Communist Spring offensive: 375, 377, 381, 389, 

430, 443 

PILEDRIVER: 493 

UNC Spring counteroffensive: 468, 482, 483, 484, 

485, 485n 

Yangji-ri: 239, 240, 243, 244 

Yangugu: 474 

Yangp’yong, and Han River-Yangp’yong-HoengsongKangnung line: 196, 246, 247, 248, 254, 258, 

263, 264, 304 

Yangyang: 157, 160, 349, 366, 369, 374, 431, 442, 

484, 485, 493 

Yasici, Brig. Gen. Tahsin: 81, 108, 109-11, 112, 151. 

See also Brigade, Turkish. 

Yebong Mountain: 321 

Yellow Sea: 3, 41, 155, 230, 230n, 313 

Yesong River: 157, 325, 346, 348, 373, 381, 470 

Yesong River valley: 150, 153, 156 

Yoju: 196, 216, 228, 249, 264, 302, 320, 347, 365 

Yoju-Wonju line: 282-83, 284-85. See also Brigades, British Commonwealth, 27th, Chip’yongni-Wonju line. 

Yoju-Wonju-Yongwol line: 227, 239, 240, 248 

Yokohama: 15, 24 

Yokota Air Base. See under Air bases. 

Yonan: 323 

Yonch’on: 150, 164, 165 

Yongbyon: 78, 79 

Yongch’on: 150, 164, 165, 186, 187, 225 

Yongdae-ri: 442 

Yongdam-ni: 76 

Yongdok: 227, 304 

Yongdong-ni: 64, 69 

Yongdungp’o, and THUNDERBOLT: 162, 201, 203, 

213, 254, 256, 257 

Yongju: 186, 217, 225 

Yongmun Mtn.: 321 

Yongnim-dong: 89 

Yongp’yong: 366, 419 

Yongp’yong River: 372, 393, 419 

Yongp’yong River valley: 353, 465, 468, 470, 472 

Yongsan-dong: 77-78, 79, 109 

Yongwol: 217, 223, 224, 225, 227, 275, 293, 306n, 

469 

Yongwon: 115 

Yongyu: 117 

Yonp’o: 129, 168. See also under Airfield and airstrips. 
INDEX 551 

Yoshida, Shigeru: 367 

Yowi-ch’on River: 168 

Yu Jai Heung, Maj. Gen.-Continued 

line D: 223-24 

Yu Hae Ueng, Maj. Gen.: 62, 69-70, 76. See also P’yongch’ang-Kangnung line: 292-93, 294 

Corps, ROK, II. ROUNDUP: 252, 259-61 

Yu Jai Heung, Maj. Gen. See also Corps, ROK, III. Yuch’on-ni: 349, 401, 467, 468, 469 

Communist Spring offensive: 381, 401, 447, 453, Yudam-ni: 48, 88, 89, 90, 92-96, 97, 98, 129, 130, 

460-61, 463, 468 131, 137 

KILLER: 306, 310 Yul-Ii: 150, 155 

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1989 222-337