J-S48034-19

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

ANTHONY REED,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2404 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000287-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

ANTHONY REED,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2442 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002951-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 16, 2019

In these consolidated appeals, Anthony Reed (Appellant) appeals from 

the judgment of sentence entered July 24, 2018, after the trial court found 

that Appellant committed a technical violation of his probation. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows. 
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On March 30, 2016, [Appellant] appeared before th[e trial 

c]ourt and pled guilty [at docket number CP-51-CR-0000287-

2016 (287-2016)] to [r]obbery, graded as a felony of the third 

degree. Per his negotiated plea agreement, th[e trial c]ourt 

sentenced [Appellant] to [six] to 23 months[’] county 

incarceration plus [two] years[’] reporting probation, with parole 

at minimum to be determined by the prison. [Appellant] was 

released on parole less than a week later on April 5, 2016. 

On November 11, 2016, [Appellant] was transported by 

the [s]heriffs to Eagleville Hospital. After completing 30 days of 

drug treatment, [Appellant] was transferred to NHS Fresh Start 

Recovery. On January 15, 2017, [Appellant] left Fresh Start and 

never turned [sic]. Wanted cards were issued on January 30, 

2017.

On March 17, 2017, [Appellant was arrested and charged

at docket number CP-51-CR-0002951-2017 (2951-2017)] with 

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (PWID), 

an ungraded felony, after the Philadelphia Narcotics Enforcement 

Team saw [Appellant] sell marijuana to several buyers on Oxford 

Avenue. [Appellant] appeared before th[e trial c]ourt on 

September 20, 2017[,] and pled guilty to this charge. Per his 

negotiated plea agreement, th[e trial c]ourt sentenced him to 

[six] to 23 months[’] county incarceration plus [three] years[’]

reporting probation. That same day, th[e trial c]ourt conducted a 

violation hearing related to [docket number 287-2016]. Th[e 

trial c]ourt found him in both technical and direct violation for 

absconding from Fresh Start and pleading guilty to PWID. Th[e 

trial c]ourt revoked his probation and sentenced him to 111⁄2 to 

23 months[’] county incarceration plus [three] years[’] reporting 

probation, with credit for time served, to run concurrently with 

his [] sentence [at docket number 2951-2017. Appellant] was 

ordered to enroll in drug treatment, and upon release, continue 

to attend outpatient drug treatment through TREE,

[1] seek and 

maintain employment, stop using and selling drugs, and stay out 

of trouble with the law. [Appellant] was further ordered to pay 

all applicable costs and fines at a rate of $25 per month. Th[e 

trial court] warned [Appellant] that he would receive a state 

sentence if he violated his probation again.

 

1 “TREE” is an acronym for Teach Recovery Education Empowerment, an 

intensive outpatient program in Philadelphia.
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On April 24, 2018, [Appellant] was granted early parole 

after he completed drug treatment at Hoffman Hall,[2] with the 

condition that he must comply with all terms and conditions of 

his sentence. [Appellant] immediately absconded from 

supervision and wanted cards were issued on May 22, 2018. On 

July 3, 2018, [Appellant] was apprehended by authorities.

On July 24, 2018, [Appellant] appeared before th[e trial 

c]ourt for his second violation hearing. First, th[e trial c]ourt 

reviewed [Appellant’s] criminal history since his original guilty 

plea in 2016 and incorporated the probation summary into the 

record by reference. [Appellant’s] probation officer 

recommended revocation and incarceration.

Defense counsel stated that [Appellant] had a serious drug

problem and lacked the ability to address it from the street due 

to lack of structure. She argued that 47-y[ea]r-old [Appellant]

lacked the “emotional maturity” necessary to make good 

decisions. She recommended that th[e trial c]ourt order 

[Appellant] to undergo a [f]orensic [i]ntensive [r]ecovery (FIR) 

evaluation and sentence him to county jail with subsequent 

parole to a FIR program. 

The Commonwealth stated that consistent with the new 

policies of the District Attorney’s Office regarding technical 

violations, he recommended a sentence of 6 to 12 months [of]

county incarceration. 

Next, [Appellant] spoke on his own behalf. He stated that 

he started freebasing when he was in the 7th grade and that he 

was unable to adapt to living outside of prison. He stated when 

he was high, he had “no spiritual will” and acknowledged that he 

had “kind of set myself up at this point” for a state prison 

sentence.

Th[e trial c]ourt found [Appellant] in technical violation for 

absconding from supervision and not complying with any of the 

terms and conditions of his sentence. Th[e trial c]ourt

terminated [Appellant’s] parole and revoked his probation. 

[Appellant] was sentenced to [three and one-half to seven 

 

2 Hoffman Hall is a Philadelphia residential reentry center.
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years’] state incarceration [at docket number 2951-2017], and 

[two to four years’] state incarceration [at docket number 287-

2016], to run concurrently with one another, for an aggregate 

sentence of [three and one-half to seven years’] state 

incarceration. Th[e trial c]ourt recommended that [Appellant]

serve his sentence at SCI-Chester or SCI-Phoenix so that he 

could successfully complete drug treatment. Th[e trial c]ourt 

ordered [Appellant] to complete drug treatment and job training 

while in jail, and upon release, seek and maintain employment, 

undergo random urinalysis, and pay costs and fines at a rate of 

$25 per month. Th[e trial c]ourt stated that this sentence was 

absolutely necessary to vindicate the authority of the court. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/2018, at 2-4 (citations omitted). 

On July 26, 2018, [Appellant] filed a “petition to vacate and reconsider 

[s]entence” (post-sentence motion). On August 13, 2018, Appellant filed 

two separate notices of appeal3 to this Court pursuant to our Supreme 

Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018) 

(holding that failure to file separate notices of appeal from a single order 

resolving issues on more than one lower court docket will result in quashal of 

 

3 We recognize that Appellant filed his notice of appeal before the trial court 

ruled on his post-sentence motion. In fact, the docket reveals that, as of 

the date of this memorandum, the trial court has yet to rule on his postsentence motion and no order has been entered denying the motion by 

operation of law. Because of this, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant 

failed to preserve his sentencing issue because he deprived the trial court of 

jurisdiction when he filed his appeal while his post-sentence motion was 

pending. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 9-10. However, pursuant to our 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion to modify a sentence imposed 

following revocation of probation does not toll the appeal period. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E). Thus, Appellant was required to file his notice of appeal 

before the 30-day appeal period lapsed, despite the fact that the trial court 

had yet to address his motion. Therefore, because Appellant timely filed his 

notice of appeal within thirty days of the imposition of sentence as required 

by Rule 708, the appeal herein is ripe for our review.
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the appeal). Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court “abused its discretion, 

and violate[d] general sentencing principles when,” it imposed a sentence 

that 

was manifestly excessive and unreasonable, [and] surpassed 

what was required to protect the public, where the court failed to 

adequately examine and investigate [Appellant’s] background, 

character and rehabilitative needs, failed to state sufficient 

reasons of record for the sentence which was well beyond what 

was necessary to foster [Appellant’s] rehabilitation and failed to 

comply with the requirements of [42 Pa.C.S.] § 9771(c)[.]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We 

consider his issue mindful of the following. It is within this Court’s scope of 

review to consider challenges to the discretionary aspects of an appellant’s 

sentence in an appeal following a revocation of probation. Commonwealth 

v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

* * *

When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider 

the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of 

the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should 
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refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal 

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation. 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an 

appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the 

appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the 

following four factors: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a 

fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(some citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal after preserving the 

issue by filing a post-sentence motion to modify his sentence. Further, 

Appellant’s brief contains a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Thus, 

we now consider whether Appellant has raised a substantial question. Here, 

Appellant claims the trial court did not address “the criteria for total 

confinement, the character of [Appellant] and the circumstances of the crime 

which sentence was being imposed.” Appellant’s Brief at 10 (footnote 

omitted). 
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The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 

825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question exists only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Upon review, we find Appellant has raised a substantial question by 

presenting a plausible argument that his sentence is contrary to the 

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process. See

Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927, 929 (Pa. Super. 2003) (finding 

that Parlante raised a substantial question by arguing that “the trial court 

imposed a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to her crimes and failed 

to consider her background or nature of offenses and provide adequate 

reasons on the record for the sentence”). See also Commonwealth v. 

Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 98 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“An argument that the trial 

court imposed an excessive sentence to technical probation violations raises 

a substantial question.”). Accordingly, we proceed to address the merits of 

Appellant’s claim.

Regarding sentences imposed following the revocation of probation, we 

observe the following. 
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The imposition of sentence following the revocation 

of probation is vested within the sound discretion of 

the trial court, which, absent an abuse of that 

discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. An abuse 

of discretion is more than an error in judgment—a 

sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless 

the record discloses that the judgment exercised was 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

In determining whether a sentence is manifestly 

excessive, the appellate court must give great 

weight to the sentencing court’s discretion, as he or 

she is in the best position to measure factors such as 

the nature of the crime, the defendant’s character, 

and the defendant’s display of remorse, defiance, or 

indifference.

Upon revoking probation, a sentencing court may choose 

from any of the sentencing options that existed at the time of 

the original sentencing, including incarceration. [U]pon 

revocation [of probation] ... the trial court is limited only by the 

maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the 

time of the probationary sentence. However, 42 Pa.C.S.[] 

§ 9771(c) provides that once probation has been revoked, a 

sentence of total confinement may only be imposed if any of the 

following conditions exist[s]:

(1) the defendant has been convicted of another 

crime; or

(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is 

likely that he will commit another crime if he is not 

imprisoned; or

(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the 

authority of the court.

In addition, in all cases where the court resentences an 

offender following revocation of probation ... the court shall 

make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the 

time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the 

sentence imposed [and f]ailure to comply with these provisions 

shall be grounds for vacating the sentence or resentence and 
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resentencing the defendant. A trial court need not undertake a 

lengthy discourse[4]for its reasons for imposing a sentence or 

specifically reference the statute in question, but the record as a 

whole must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the 

facts of the crime and character of the offender.

Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d at 1033, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, in addition to these considerations, a trial court must also 

consider the factors set forth in subsection 9721(b)5 when imposing a 

sentence following the revocation of probation. Commonwealth v. Derry, 

150 A.3d 987, 995 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

 

4 As our Supreme Court has explained:

Simply put, since the defendant has previously appeared before 

the [trial] court, the stated reasons for a revocation sentence 

need not be as elaborate as that which is required at initial 

sentencing. The rationale for this is obvious. When sentencing is 

a consequence of the revocation of probation, the trial judge is 

already fully informed as to the facts and circumstances of both 

the crime and the nature of the defendant[.]

Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 28 (Pa. 2014).

5 That subsection provides, in relevant part, that when imposing a judgment

of sentence, 

the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence 

imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to 

the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).
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Instantly, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

by: (1) imposing an excessive sentence without careful consideration of “the 

factors as set forth in the [s]entencing [c]ode[;]” (2) failing to consider the 

technical nature of Appellant’s violation, his long-standing drug abuse, and 

rehabilitative needs; and (3) failing to provide sufficient rationale for a 

sentence of total confinement for the technical violation committed. 

Appellant’s Brief at 10, 17-18. 

Upon review of the certified record and applicable filings, we find 

Appellant’s claim without merit. In its opinion to this Court, the trial court 

thoroughly addressed Appellant’s arguments as follows. 

In the case at bar, th[e trial c]ourt properly sentenced 

[Appellant] to an aggregate term of [three and one-half to seven 

years’] state incarceration after finding him in technical violation 

of his probation. This sentence was within the statutory limits 

and was reasonable after considering all relevant factors. ... 

[T]he length of incarceration was solely within th[e trial c]ourt’s 

discretion and was limited only by the maximum sentence that 

could have been imposed at the original sentencing. Under 

Pennsylvania law, the maximum sentence for [PWID], an 

ungraded felony, is 10 years[’] incarceration, a $100,000 fine, or 

both. 35 Pa.C.S. 780-113(f)(1.1). The maximum sentence for 

[r]obbery, graded as a felony of the third degree, is [seven]

years, $15,000 fine, or both. Thus, th[e trial c]ourt could have 

sentenced [Appellant] up to a maximum aggregate sentence of 

17 years, minus credit for time [Appellant] already served in 

prison. Th[e trial c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate

term of [three and one-half to seven years’] state incarceration. 

This was well within the statutory limits and was a reasonable 

exercise of th[e trial c]ourt’s discretion in light of [Appellant’s]

continued substance abuse, absconding from supervision, and 

failure to show any meaningful growth and progress towards 

rehabilitation. 
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Indeed, th[e trial c]ourt had tried to allow [Appellant] to 

get drug treatment through county inpatient and outpatient 

programs and [Appellant] was not successful. After his initial 

appearance before th[e trial c]ourt where he pled guilty to 

robbery, [Appellant] only served six days and then was released 

on parole. He later entered drug treatment at Eagleville Hospital, 

and upon completion of a 30 day program, was released to a 

recovery house, after which he absconded. His whereabouts 

remained unknown for the next two months until he was 

arrested and charged with PWID. ... Instead of using this 

opportunity to turn his life around and get the substance abuse 

treatment he needed, [Appellant] absconded from supervision as

soon as he was released on parole. Each time [Appellant] was 

released from custody, he immediately thumbed his nose at th[e 

trial c]ourt and continued doing whatever he wanted to do, 

namely abscond from supervision and continue using drugs.

Furthermore, th[e trial c]ourt properly considered the 

factors set forth in [section] 9721: the protection of the public, 

the gravity of [Appellant’s] offense in relation to the impact on 

the victim and the community, and his rehabilitative needs. As 

discussed above, since his original guilty plea in 2016, th[e trial 

c]ourt had given [Appellant] multiple chances to rehabilitate 

himself through county parole, county probation, county 

incarceration, and inpatient/outpatient drug treatment programs, 

including Eagleville Hospital and Hoffman Hall for treatment.

Unfortunately, [Appellant] once again failed to take his sentence 

seriously and absconded from supervision and continued to use 

drugs. Revocation and a state sentence was an appropriate

sentence under the circumstances in order to vindicate the 

authority of the [c]ourt. In order to make this determination, 

th[e trial c]ourt considered [Appellant] conduct since his original 

guilty plea in 2016, the probation officer’s summary and 

recommendation for revocation and incarceration, argument 

from defense counsel and the Commonwealth, and [Appellant’s]

own allocution. As he was explaining why he believed he failed at 

probation, parole, and outpatient treatment programs, 

[Appellant] admitted that he did not know how to “function 

socially outside of incarceration.” Defense counsel argued that 

[Appellant] was unable to make good decisions without the 

structure of incarceration and that his addiction was “running his 

life.” After taking all of this into consideration, th[e trial c]ourt 

found it appropriate to impose a [three and one-half to seven]

year state sentence, with orders that [Appellant] receive drug 
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treatment while incarcerated. Th[e trial c]ourt stated, “So [I a]m 

sentencing you to a state sentence so you can take the sentence 

[seriously] this time and your drug treatment seriously this time. 

I am recommending SCI Chester because they have a good drug 

treatment program, but I think they have a good program at SCI 

Phoenix, too. So if you take your own treatment seriously this 

time, you will be better when you get out.” ... [T]here is no 

requirement that th[e trial c]ourt impose the “minimum possible 

sentence.” Rather, based upon [Appellant’s] ongoing failure to 

comply with the terms and conditions of probation as well as his 

serious drug problem that had yet to be adequately addressed, 

th[e trial c]ourt found it appropriate to sentence [Appellant] to a 

term of state incarceration.

[Appellant also] argues that a sentence of total 

confinement violated 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c)(3) and the 

fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. This 

claim is without merit. As discussed above, once probation or 

parole has been revoked, a sentence of total confinement may 

be imposed if any of the following conditions exist: the 

defendant has been convicted of another crime; the conduct of 

the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit 

another crime if he is not imprisoned; or, such a sentence is 

essential to vindicate the authority of court. Here, this sentence 

was absolutely necessary to vindicate the authority of the 

[c]ourt.

[Appellant] never took his sentence seriously and thumbed 

his nose at th[e trial c]ourt by absconding from supervision at 

every opportunity. He continued to use and sell drugs, and never 

made any progress towards completing any of the terms and 

conditions of his sentence. As th[e trial c]ourt stated at the 

violation hearing, “This sentence is absolutely necessary to

vindicate the authority of the [c]ourt. You had two opportunities 

to get yourself clean and with this [c]ourt sending you to 

Hoffman Hall. Hoffman Hall has a great drug treatment program, 

but you decided not to follow up with it yourself.” Instead of 

attending drug treatment and working towards achieving and 

maintaining sobriety, [Appellant] decided to disregard th[e trial 

c]ourt’s orders and do whatever he wanted to do. Thus, th[e trial 

c]ourt properly sentenced [Appellant] to a term of total 

confinement in order to vindicate the authority of the court.
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Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/2018, at 6-9 (some citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Furthermore, the trial court set forth the following rationale at the time of 

sentencing.

Sir, I find you to be in technical violation for 

absconding from supervision and not doing anything 

else that I ordered you to do because you’re 

supposed to be looking for a job and maintaining 

your sobriety.

* * *

[Y]ou’ve been using drugs for a long time and every 

time you get out you got some drug treatment and 

you don't follow up on it. That’s your choice. [...] It 

is your personal choice that you and only you can 

make that you do not want to be a drug addict 

anymore. You can’t blame anybody but yourself for 

the condition you’re in.

* * *

Hopefully[,] this sentence will allow you to address 

all of your issues. [...] So I’m sentencing you to a 

state sentence so you can take the sentence 

[seriously] this time and take your drug treatment 

seriously this time. 

N.T., 7/24/2018, at 13-15.

The record supports the foregoing. See Id. at 4-6 (reviewing on the 

record Appellant’s history with the court beginning with his 2016 guilty 

plea); Id. at 12 (Appellant answering in the affirmative when the trial court 

asked if he recalled the court’s warning at Appellant’s previous revocation 

hearing that the trial court “was going to give [Appellant] a state sentence” 
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if Appellant appeared before the court again); Id. at 15 (recommending 

Appellant’s sentence be served at a state correctional institution that has a 

“good drug treatment program[,]” in hopes Appellant would take his “drug 

treatment seriously this time”); Id. (finding the sentence “absolutely 

necessary to vindicate the authority of the court” after the trial court had 

provided previously opportunities for Appellant to reform and address his 

drug abuse to no avail). 

In light of the foregoing, because the trial court’s findings are 

supported by the record and evidence thoughtful considerations by the trial 

court about the specific needs of Appellant, we conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant.6 Probation has proven 

 

6 Lastly, we briefly address Appellant’s reliance on Parlante, supra to 

support his argument that his sentence is excessive. In Parlante, Parlante 

was 

convicted of forgery for purchasing $1000.00 in merchandise on 

a stolen credit card [and] initially received probation. [Parlante]

committed a series of technical violations, and also was arrested 

for drug possession and underage drinking. The trial court 

sentenced [Parlante] to four to eight years of incarceration on 

the forgery offenses. This Court concluded that the length of the 

prison sentence was excessive, given that [Parlante] never 

committed a violent crime and that most of her probation 

violations were technical. 

Schutzues, 54 A.3d at 100. Additionally, the Parlante Court found that the 

trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, and focused “solely on the 

fact that [Parlante’s] prior record indicated that it was likely that she would 

violate her probation in the future[.]” Parlante, 823 A.2d at 930. We find 

Parlante distinguishable from the instant matter for several reasons. First, 

unlike in Parlante, the record here clearly indicates that the trial court took 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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to be ineffective in rehabilitating Appellant, and a prison sentence is 

necessary to help Appellant with treatment as well as vindicate the authority 

of the court. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 

2002) (“Traditionally, the trial court is afforded broad discretion in 

sentencing criminal defendants ‘because of the perception that the trial court 

is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular 

offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it.’”)

(citation omitted). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/16/19

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

into account Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and did not base Appellant’s 

sentence solely on his prior record. Secondly, Appellant’s underlying 

convictions are for robbery and PWID, as opposed to Parlante’s forgery 

conviction. Lastly, the trial court warned Appellant of an impending state 

sentence at a prior revocation, should Appellant violate his probation yet 

again. Thus, we do not believe that this Court’s holding in Parlante

warrants the conclusion that Appellant’s sentence is excessive.