Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 19 , 2019

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 17

- 00537

- CV

STOCKDICK LAND COMPANY, STEPHEN N. RINER, AND WADE A. RINER , Appellant s V. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS INDENTURE T RUSTEE , AND CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC, Appellee s and DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE , A ppell ant

V. STOCKDICK LAND COMPANY, STEPHEN N. RINER, AND WADE A. RINER , Appellees

On Appeal from the 80th Di strict Court Harris County, Texas T rial Court Cause No. 2008

- 60974A2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case involves a long

- running dispute stemming from a tax foreclosure sale of a residential property. Each party appeal s the trial court’s take

- nothing judgment f

ollowing their motions for summary judgment on opposing parties’
claims. We affirm.

I. B ACKGROUND Most of the history of this case is adequately conveyed in Deutche Bank
National Trust Co. v. Stockdick Land Co. , 367 S.W.3d 308, 309

– 311 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14t h Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (op. o n reh’g). We briefly reiterate some of the pertinent facts in this opinion.
In 2006, Gordon and Susan Wittenberg refinanced a mortgage with New Century Mortgage Corporation. New Century pooled the Wittenberg mortgage
with others and securitized the pool in a trust. Deutche Bank National Trust Company served as a trustee and custodian of documents while New Century acted
as the servicer.
In 2007, Stockdick Land Company purchased the home at a tax foreclosure sale ordered by the 80th District Court

— the trial court in this appeal. The Wittenbergs tried to redeem the property from Stockdick through, in part, a promissory note to Stockdick. Also in 2007, New Century went bankrupt. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC acquired New Ce ntury’s servicing business
and ass ets, including servicing rights related to the trust. New Century authorized John Alkire, an executive vice president of Carrington, to execute documents on behalf of New Century related to Carrington’s new servicing right s. In 2008, Deutche Bank sued Stoc kdick for a declaratory judgment in the 215th District Court, seeking to establish that the l ien on the property had been3

revived by redemption. 1 In 2009, t he 215th District Court rendered a final summary judgment in Stock dick’s favor, and this court ultim ately affirmed the judgment in the prior appeal because the redemption failed.
After the 215th District Court signed its final judgment, the court allowed
D eutche Bank , over Stockdick’s objection, to supplement its petitio n with a new claim for excess proc eeds from the tax sale . The court severed the new claim from the declaratory judgment action into Cause No. 2008

- 60974A and transferred the

case to the 80th District Court.
Following the severance and transfer, Deutche Ban k added Stockdick’s principals

— Ste phen and Wade Riner

— as defendants. Stockdick and the Riners (collectively, the Stockdick parties ) filed claims against Deutche Bank and Carrington (collectively, the Bank parties ) for common law fraud and statuto ry fraud , among other claims

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 12.002 (relating to fraud in real estate transactions).
Over the course of several years, the litigants filed motions for summary judgment on the opposing side ’ s claims, amend ed motions for summary judgment, amended pleadings, and suppl emental evidence. Ultimately, the trial court rendered a judgment dismissing each side’s claims and denying the Bank parties ’ motion for attorney’s fees and sanct ions. Deutche Bank, Carrington, Stockdick, and the Riners all appealed.

1 Mortgages and liens are generally extinguished when a taxing authority forecloses for

non
- payment and sells the property, but such interests can be “revived” if the property is redeemed. See Deutche Bank , 367 S.W.3d at 313.4 II. D EUTCHE B ANK ’ S A PPEAL 2

Deutche Bank contend s that the trial court erred by granting the Stockdick parties ’ motion for summary judgment on Deutche Bank’s claim for the excess proceeds. T he Stockdick parties contend that this court should affirm the summary judgment because Deutc he Bank does not challenge on appeal at least one of the grounds urged in the summary judgment motion . We agree with the Stockdick parties

. In their motion for summary judgment, the Stockdick parties first addressed the preclusive effect of the 2007 judgme nt in the 80th District Court . Then, the y argued, under a separate heading regarding the 2009 judgment in the 21 5th District Court, “Deutche Bank’s claims are also barred by res judicata, judicial estoppel, and collateral estoppel, because of the final tak e nothing judgment entered on April 20, 2009 in Cause No. 2008

- 60974 . . . . After that final judgment was enter ed, Deutche Bank filed a new petition in Cause No. 2008

- 60974 which was severed
into this case. The April 20, 2009 take nothing judgment in Caus e No. 2008

- 60974
bars Deutsche Bank from re

- litigating any claims arising out of the same transaction the subjec t of Cause No. 2008

- 60974 or that could have been litigated in that case prior to the April 20, 2009 judgment. ”

In its brief on appeal, Deutche Bank does not address this argument

. Deutche Bank focuses solely on whether the 80th District Court’s 2007
disbu rsement order precluded the claim for excess proceeds.
An appellant must challenge all possible grounds upon which a summary judgment could have been granted, whether properly or improperly. See, e.g. ,

2 Alt houg h Carrington filed a notice of appeal, Carrington does not assert any issues on appeal specific to Carrington. In their joint brief, Deutche Bank and Carrington only challenge the trial court’s granting of the Stockdick parties ’ motion for su mmary j udgment on Deutche Bank’s c laim for the excess proceeds

.5

FinServ Cas. Corp. v. Transamerica Life Ins. , 523 S.W. 3d 129, 139 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)

. “If the appellant fails to challenge all grounds on which the judgment may have been granted, the appellate court must uphold the summary judgment.” Heritage Gulf Coast Props. v. Sandalwood
A partments Inc. , 416 S.W.3d 642, 653 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ; see also Williamson v. State Farm Lloyds , 76 S.W.3d 64, 67 (T ex. A pp.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)

. Because Deutche Bank does not challenge all grounds upon which the summary judgment may have been granted

— in particular, that the 2009 judgment
bars Deutche Bank’s claim under t he defense of res judicata

— we mus t uph old the summary judgment. See Heritage Gulf Cost Props. , 416 S.W.3d at 653;
Williamson , 76 S.W.3d at 67

. Deutche Bank’s issues are overruled.

III. T HE S TOCKDICK P ARTIES ’ A PPEAL In their second issue on appeal, the Stockdick parties contend that the trial

c ourt erred by rendering summary judgment ( 1) on their claim for statutory fraud
because the Bank parties did not move on it; and (2) on their claims for common law fraud and statutory fraud under Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code because t here are genuine issues of material fact regarding each claim

. In their third issue, the Stockdick parties contend that the trial court erred by refusing to allow them to supplement their summary judgment evidence. In their first a nd
fourth issue s , they co ntend that the 215th District C ourt and 80th District Court each erred by allowing Deutche Bank to supplement and amend its petition.6

A. Procedural Background In their live petition, the Stockdick parties asserted claims for statutory fraud
and common law fra ud ba sed on t he Bank parties ’ use of allegedly “forged”
documents , which resulted in Deutche Bank’s filing of a “fraudulent” lis pendens.
T he Stockdick parties claimed that the Bank parties forged documents and used the forgeries to prosecute this case to conce al Deutche Bank’s lack of a valid chain of assignments, indorsements on the note, or the validity of the note. In particular, the Stockdick parties complained about (1) an October 15, 2008 assignment of the deed of trust from New Century to Deutche Ba nk; ( 2) the indorsements on the note; (3) the original note itself; and (4) an October 15, 2008 lis pendens filed by
Deutche Bank. 3

In its motion for summary judgment, Deutche Bank listed the Stockdick parties ’ claims, including Chapter 12 and fraud, and argue d, “Each of these claims
fails as a matter of law.” Deutche Bank made the following argument regarding the
fraud claims:

C. The Bank did not act fraudulently toward the

Counterclaimants, and the Counterclaimants have no evidence of fraud. To prove an actio n for common

- law fraud, the Counterclaimants must establish the Bank’s representations were false and that the Bank made the represe ntations knowing that they were false or without any knowledge of its truth. Italian Cowboy Partners v. Prudential Ins. , 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011); Landers v. Aurora Loan Servs. , 434 S.W.3d 291, 293

– 94 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2014, no pet.). The Bank ha s not asserted any claim with knowledge that any document is a fraudulent court record or fraudulent lien or claim agai nst r eal property or an interest in real property. The

3 The Stockdick parties also asserte d other claims and various defenses to Deutche Bank’s claims, including that Deutche Bank lacked standing or capacity to bring its claims because Deutche Bank was not the holder of the note.7

Counterclaimants have no evidence that the Note, Deed of Trust, the endorsement to the Note, or the assignment of the Deed of Trust, or any other court record or claim against real property at issue in this case are false, that the Bank knew they were false, or that the Bank represented the documents to be valid without knowledge of the ir validity. Therefore, the Bank is entitled to a no evidence summary judgment on the Counterclaimants’ claim for fraud

. 4

Ca rrington also filed a motion for summary judgment and “incorporate[d] into this
Motion as if set forth word for word herein” each of the arguments made in
Deutche Bank’s motion.

T he Stockdick parties responded with evidence and made arguments regard ing b oth Chapter 12 statutory fraud and common law fraud. The trial court granted Deutche Bank’s motion and dismissed with pre judice the Stockdick parties ’ claims against the Bank parties

. B. Standard s of Review The party moving for a traditional summary judg ment has the initial burden
to show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and t hat the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lujan v. Navistar Inc. , 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). If the movant satisfies this burden, then the burden shi fts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Id. To raise a genuine issue of material fact, evidence must transcend mere

4 Deutche Bank also made an argument in the motion that the Stock dick parties lacked standing to challenge the assignments to Deutche Bank or status as holder of the note and deed of trust. This argument, however, was not presen ted as a ground for summary judgment on the Stockdick parties ’ fraud clai ms. It was made only within the section of the motion addressing the Stockdick parties ’ affirmative defenses. For example, Deutche Bank argued, “Defendants lack standing to assert man y of th eir affirmative defenses ”; Deutche Bank “is entitled to summary judgment on the Stockdick Defendants’ affirmative defense of lack of standing ”; and, “Because the Defendants lack standing to challenge the assignments and compliance with the operative securi tization documents, the Bank is entitled to summary judgment that it has standing as the holder of the Note and Deed of Trust to claim the Excess Proceeds.”8

suspicion. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).
Evidenc e that is so slight as to make any inference a guess is no evidence to raise a genuine issue of mater ial fact. See id.

In a no

- evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant contends that no evidence supports one or more essential elements of a claim for which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial. KCM Financial LLC v.
Bradshaw , 457 S.W. 3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) ) . The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant raises a genuine issue of
material fact on each ch allenged element. Id. A no

- evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed ver dict. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez , 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). A no

- evidence point will be sustained if the evidence off er ed to prove a vital fact is n o more t han a mere scintilla. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman , 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). More th an a scintilla of evidence exists when
the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair

- minded people
to differ in their conclusions. Id. ; see als o Kuentz v. Cole Sys. Grp., Inc. , 541 S.W.3d 208, 213 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Less than a
scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion. King Ranch , 118 S. W.3d at 751. We review a grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. KCM , 457
S.W.3d at 79. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable fact finders could, and disrega rding co ntrary evidence unless reasonable fact finders
could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advis ors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); see also King Ranch , 118 S.W.3d at 751 . We must consider a party’s evidence in context with other evi dence. S ee Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Guerra ,9

348 S.W.3d 221, 229 (Tex. 2011) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 812 (Tex. 2005)).

C. Deutche Bank’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment on Statutory Fraud Initially, the Stockdick parties contend t hat we must reverse the summary judgment on the statutory fraud claim because Deutche B ank did not move for summary judgment on this claim. See , e.g. , G & H Towing Co. v. Magee , 347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011)

. Under the fraud statute , the Stockdick partie s had to prove, among other things, that the Bank parties made, presented, or used a document or other record with “knowledge that the document or other record is a fraudulent court record or a fraudulent lien or claim against real or personal property or an int erest in real or personal property.” Tex. Civ. Prac . & Rem. Code § 12.002(a)(1). In its motion, Deutche Bank argued that it ha d not asserted any claim with knowledge that any document was a fraudulent court record or a fraudulent lien or claim agains t real property or an interest in real property

. We

assum e without deciding that this argument sufficed as a ground for traditional summary judgment on the Stockdick parties ’ statutory fraud claim , so we proceed to the merits of the summary judgment on the claim

. See, e.g. , Coleman v. Revak , No. 01

- 07

- 00438

- CV, 2008 WL 2466276, at * 2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)

.
T he Stockdick parties do not dispute that Deutche Bank met its initial
burden to show that it was the owner o f the note and di d not know any of its
documents were fraudulent or used for a fraudulent lien or claim. Rather , the Stockdick parties contend that various discrepancies in documents that Deutche Bank utilized in this litigation raise a genuine issue of ma terial fact about whether
Deutche Bank was an owner or holder of the note

— an allegation essential to10

Deutche Bank’s lawsuit

— and that the Bank parties knew that their documents
were fraudulent.

T he Stockdick parties first point to the fact that the October 15, 2008 assignme nt of the note and deed of trust to Deutche Bank is signed by John Alkire “as EVP of New Century Mortgage Corporation,” although Alkire was actually a Carrington employee when he signed it. T he Stockdick parties do not dispute that
Carri ng ton acquired New Century’s servicing business during New Century’s bankruptcy, and that New Century authorized Alkire to assign mortgages, deeds,
and other such documents. The Stockdick parties contend that the October 15, 2008 assignment is fo rged or fake because New Cent ury ceased to exist at the time Alkire signed the assignment; it had been dissolved during a bankruptcy proceeding. The Stockdick parties contend, but do not support with citation to the record, that Deutche Bank knew of the dissoluti on be cause Deutche Ban k “participated” in the bankruptcy. The Stockdick parties point to a Deutche Bank representative’s testimony that the October 15, 2008 assignment was done “to make ease of lawsuits” and to give “public notice” of ownership. The representat ive insisted that the note had already been conveyed, and ownership transferred, when the note entered the securitized trust.
The Stockdick parties also focus on various copies of the note that were produced during the litigation. One copy had a barcode st icker and hollowe d

- out font on the title, while the alleged original note did not have the sticker or
hollowed

- out font in the title. The Stockdick parties ’ expert opined that there was no evidence that the barcode sticker appearing on t he copy had ever be en placed on
the original, but she also found no evidence to determine the date on which the original note was prepared. The Stockdick parties contend that closing instructions required the title company to generate three certi fied copies of the note, but the11

copies were n ot included with the origination file. The y also contend that Deutche Bank initially produced copies of the note without an indorsement, but the alleged original note includes an indorsement. Furtherm ore, the y dispute Deutche Bank’s

conten tion that Deutche Bank had received the original note on June 7, 2006, because it was “literally impossible” and “defies reason” to believe that the note could have been received, indorsed, and recorded in D eutche Bank’s online system by June 7, 2006

— four days after the cl osing. The Stockdick parties point to some records from Deutche Bank’s “online system” to argue that the records do not show receipt of the not e . But, the records do not affirmativ ely show non

- receipt. The Stockdick parties posit that the records “could me an” there was no
indorsement on the note. The y contend that these discrepancies raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether the alleged original note w as “re

manufactured,” whether the note is authentic, and whether it was ever in dorsed or
deliver ed to Deutche Bank.
Next, the Stockdick parties contend that the indorsement signature on the note by Steve Nagy does not match the signature on anot her document that Carrington produced during the litigation. The y suggest that a “visual examination
of th e two stamps shows they are not the same” and again points to the fact that Deutche Bank produced several copies of the note without Nagy’s indorsement. The Stockdick parties adduced expert testimony that both signatures were from a
rubber stamp but that t hey were not from the same stamp. The expert was not asked to determine whether the note was the original, but the expert opined t hat the other initials and signature on the note (designated as Susan Wittenberg’s) were “original, ink

- on
- pa

per writing execu ted by a person.”
Finally, the Stockdick parties contend that Deutche Bank’s lis pendens was
fraudulent because Deutche Bank did not have a right to a lis pendens against the12

propert y

. The y allege that Deutche Bank “misrepresented ownershi p of the
Wittenbe rg Note, and, together with Carrington, concealed that fact by reliance on a fake assignment, note, and indors ements.”
The Stockdick parties cite to no factually analogous cases to show that the Bank parties knew they were asserting a frau dulent claim base d on forged, fake, or
remanufactured documents. The Stockdick parties rely only on mere suspicious circumstances. Although circumstantial evidence may establish a party’s knowledge by reasonable inference, an inference is not reasonable if it is premised

o n mere suspicion. Suarez v. City of Tex. City , 465 S.W.3d 623, 634 (Te x. 2015). Some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, not
evidence. Id. Nor is an inference reasonable if it is susceptible to multiple, equal ly probable infer ences, requiring the fact finder to guess to reach a conclusion. Id. A n inference stacked only on other inferences is insufficient

. Marathon Corp. v.
Pitzner , 106 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. 2003)
Having reviewed the evidence in the summary judg ment record , w e a gree with the trial court that summary judgment was proper on the Stockdick parties ’
claims because the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion that Deutche Bank was not the owner or holder of the note or that the Bank parties knew their documents were made or used to further
fraudulent claims. Even if the Stockdick parties could have raised a fact issue
about the legal efficacy of the October 15, 2008 assignment, the y have adduced no
more than a mere sc intilla of eviden ce that Deutche Ban k knew it was not the owner or holder of the note and thus entitled to bring its claim and lis pendens for the property.13

D. Deutche Bank’s No

- Evidence Motion on Common Law Fraud

T o prove common law fraud, a claimant must p rove, among other elements , that ( 1) the defendant made a material representation that was false, and (2) when the representation was made, the defendant knew it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion

. See Italian Cow boy Partners, Ltd . v. Prudential Ins. , 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011). Deutche Bank challenged these elements in its no

- evidence motion for summary judgment on the Stockdick parties ’ fraud claim.
In their live petition, response to the su mmary judgment, a nd on a ppeal, the Stockdick parties rely upon the same documents and arguments to support their

common law fraud claim as they do for the statutory fraud claim. As with our review of the statutory fraud claim, we conclude that the Stockdic k parties ’
eviden ce is less than a scintilla because it so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion that the Bank parties made material representations that they knew were false or made them recklessly.

T he Stockdick parties ’ sec ond i ssue is overruled.

E. Supplemental Evidence The Stockdick parties contend that the trial court erred by denying their oral request to supplement their summary judgment evidence at the summary judgment hearing held on January 31, 2017, and sub sequent written m otion f or leave to supplement the summary judgment evidence. The supplemental evidence included (1) a Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10

- Q for New Century dated November 11, 2006; (2) over 150 pages of certified deeds from Harris C ounty, which appe ar to h ave been originally executed in 2006; and (3) excerpts from the second deposition of the Bank parties ’ corporate representative taken on January 5, 2017. To support their motion, t he Stockdick partie s filed a declaration from14

counsel stating that th ey did not intentionally omit the supplemental evidence or
act with conscious indifference because of “ the timing ” of the deposition and the “discovery of the new evidence.”

E xcept on leave of cou rt, a nonmovant’s summary judgment evidence must
be filed se ven day s before the hearing. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) , (d); Williams v.
Huber , 964 S.W.2d 84, 86

– 87 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.);
Bell v. Moores , 832 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Tex. A pp.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). We review for an abuse o f discretion the trial court’s refusal to consider
late

- filed summary judgment evidence. See Williams , 964 S.W.2d at 87.
The parties disagree about whether a trial court must grant leave to supplement a summary judgment response with evidence if the nonmov ant show s good cause for the tardiness

— i.e., that the failure to file the evidence was not
intentional or the result of conscious indifference but the result of accident or
mistake. See Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp. , 98 S.W.3d 682, 688 (T ex. 200 2) (applying the good

- cause standard when a nonmovant sought leave to file an untimely response to a motion for summary judgment). Consistent with t he Stockdick parties ’ argum ent, w e assume without deciding that this standard applies
to a motion for leave to file late summary judgment evidence.

D eutche Bank and Carrington filed their amended motio n s for summary judgment on October 13 and 14, 2016 , respectively, and t he Stockdick parties filed their response on October 28, 2016. The hearing at which t he Stoc kdick parties sought leave to supplement their response was held three months later on January 31, 2017. Review of t he Stockdick parties ’ written motion for leave and the supporting documents show that t he “new” documents ha d been generated about a decade before the hearing and could have been available well before the hearing

. The Stockdick parties took the second deposition of the Bank parties ’ corporate15

representative more than twenty

- five days before the summary judgment hearing. The Stockdick pa rties ’ declaration provides no explanation for why they could not
have obtained th e documents earlier and timely responded to the motion for summary judgment, why they could not have asked the corporate representative the pertinent questions at the earlier deposi tion, or why they could not have supplemented the summa ry judgment evidence seven days before the summary judgment hearing. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that t he Stockdick parties have not demonstrated good cause

. See id. (no abuse of discretion to deny le ave to file late response because there was no explanation for why the party failed to timely respond other than a bare assertion that counsel had “miscalendared” the hearing).
The Stockdick parties ’ third issue i s overruled.

F. Deutche Bank’s Suppl emental and Amended Petitions The Stockdick parties contend that the 215th District Court erred by allowing Deutche Bank leave to supplement its petition with the claim for excess proceeds following the 2009 final ju dgment, and the 80th District Court erred by allowing Deutche Bank to amend its petition to add a request for attorney’s fees. But ultimately, the trial court denied Deutche Bank any relief in this case

— the court dismissed Deutche Bank’s claim for excess p roceeds by summary judgment

an d then denied Deutche Bank’s motion for attorney’s fees . And, as explained above, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on the claim for excess proceeds

. The Stockdick parties do not explain how these alleged error s cau sed the
rendition of an improper judgment , and we see no harm. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1; see also City of Waco v. Tex. Coffin Co. , 472 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Tex. App.

— Waco 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (harmless error to allow amendment of petition to increase damag es from $75,000 to $ 125,000 because jury ultimately awarded only16

$75,000); cf. Lyon v. B ldg. Galveston, Inc. , No. 01

- 15

- 00664

- CV , 2017 WL 4545831, at *13 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 12, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that denial of motion f or leav e to a mend petition to allege presentment of claim for purposes of attorney’s fees probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment because the trial court ultimately denied fees)

. The error, if any, is not reversible. See Tex. R. App. 44.1.

Th e S tock dick parties ’ first and fourth issue s are overruled.

IV. C ONCLUSION Having overruled each party’s dispositive issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Ken Wise Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wi se , Zimmerer, and Spain.