No. 13589 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1977 

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

ADOPTION OF DARLENE 

RAE REDCROW 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Christian, McCurdy, Ingraham & Wold, Polson, Montana 

Donald Peterson argued, Polson, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Richard P. Heinz argued, County Attorney, Polson, Montana 

French and Grainey, Ronan, Montana 

Philip Grainey argued, Ronan, Montana 

Hood and Bradshaw, Missoula, Montana 

Randi M. Hood argued, Missoula, Montana 

Thomas Mahan, Helena, Montana 

Submitted: April 13, 1977 
Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Two couples filed competing petitions to adopt Darlene 

Rae Redcrow, about four yeard old, and an enrolled member of 

the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribe. The district court 

of Lake County, Hon. E. Gardner Brownlee, district judge, granted 

an adoption decree to the Meyer couple and the Rhodes couple 

appeal. 

The child involved had previously been removed from the 

home of her natural parents because of neglect. She was placed 

in the home of appellants Rhodes for 23 months until November, 

1975, when she was returned to the home of her natural parents. 

Six weeks later State and Tribal authorities again found it 

necessary to remove the child from her parental home because of 

neglect. She was then placed in the home of respondents Meyer. 

On December 29, 1975, the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services of the State of Montana (SRS) petitioned 

the district court of Lake County to have the child declared 

dependent and neglected and for temporary custody. On February 

27, 1976, appellants filed a petition for adoption with the 

written consent of the natural parents. On April 8, 1976, respondents Meyer filed this petition for adoption without the 

consent of the natural parents. On April 14, 1976, SRS amended 

its petition to cover permanent custody with right of adoption 

rather than temporary custody. 

The three petitions were consolidated and set for hearing 

on May 12. The SRS and Meyer petitions were continued for hearing 

to a later date to allow clearing up of potential jurisdictional 

defects. The Rhodes petition was heard and taken under advisement pending hearings on the SRS and Meyer petitions and clearing 

up any question of consent by the Tribal court. 

On June 9 the SRS petition was heard at the conclusion 
of which the district court declared the child dependent and 

neglected and placed adoptive custody in SRS. 

The Meyer petition was heard on July 12 and taken under 

advisement. 

On August 11 the district court found both the appellants Rhodes and respondents Meyer suitable parents for the 

adoption and granted the Meyer petition for adoption. Appellants Rhodes have appealed from this order. 

The single issue on appeal is whether the district 

court abused its discretion in delaying determination of the 

Rhodes petition until after the hearing on the SRS and Meyer 

petitions. 

Appellants argue that since their adoption petition was 

jurisdictionally perfected, ready for hearing and heard prior to 

the other petitions it should have been decided first and granted, 

citing In re Koger, 206 Ore. 307, 292 P.2d 791. 

We hold the entire matter was properly treated as before 

the court from beginning to end. See State ex rel. Habeck v. 

Dist. Ct., 157 Mont. 231, 484 P.2d 272. The district court was 

entirely correct in hearing all aspects of the case before making 

any decision on the competing petitions. The court cannot be 

compelled to fragment the case because of different filing dates 

and readiness for hearing of the competing petitions. The court 

cannot be forced to don blinders to other aspects of the case 

on the theory that the early bird should catch the worm or its 

legal equivalent "Between rights otherwise equal, the earliest 

is preferred." Section 49-117, R.C.M. 1947. 

The paramount consideration in deciding between the 

competing parties is what is in the best interests of the child. 

Adoption of Biery, 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377. The district 

court's finding that both competing couples are suitable adoptive 
parents is not equivalent to a finding that each would equally 

promote the best interests of the child. We find no abuse of 

discretion of the district court's determination. 

The order of the district court is affirmed. 

Justice 

Justices