J-A04010-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MARIE CONVERSANO AND BRAD 

HOYT AND JOHN HOYT 

Appellants

v.

PARKER OIL COMPANY, SYCAMORE 

ENERGY-ROCKAWAY TERMINAL, LLC 

AND SYCAMORE ENERGY-ROCKAWAY 

RETAIL, LLC T/A AND/OR D/B/A 

SYCAMORE COMPANIES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2094 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 26, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2016-Civil-5404

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STRASSBURGER, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: Filed: March 23, 2020

Marie Conversano-Hoyt1, Brad Hoyt, and John Hoyt (collectively, 

“Owners”) appeal from the judgment entered on June 26, 2019,

2

following a 

jury trial in a negligence action resulting in a defense verdict. The Owners 

suggest, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it did not enter judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict (“judgment n.o.v.”) and further erred when it did 

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The caption identifies Ms. Conversano-Hoyt as “Marie Conversano.”

2 See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) (identifying that an order’s entry date is the “day on 

which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the 

order has been given”).
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not give specific jury instructions requested by the Owners. After a thorough 

review of the record, we affirm.

In this matter, the Owners received a delivery of heating oil while they 

were not present at their residence in Monroe County, Pennsylvania. The 

residence’s locked garage held the heating oil tank; however, the delivery 

company, Sycamore Energy-Rockaway Terminal, LLC, (“Sycamore”) accessed 

the tank through pipes that extended outside of the garage. The pipes were 

designed to emit a whistle sound that continued until the tank was full.

Approximately ten days after the oil delivery, the Owners arrived at the 

residence, smelled the odor of oil emanating from the garage, and saw oil 

spilled all over the floor in the garage. The owners contacted Sycamore, who 

sent a recovery/remediation company to inspect the residence. That company 

concluded that oil had soaked through an expansion joint between the floor 

slab and a cinderblock wall. Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Department of 

Environment Protection (“DEP”) received notification of the spill and sent a 

notice of violation to Sycamore requiring the residence to be cleaned within 

fourteen days. 

The Owners instituted the underlying action by filing a complaint 

alleging that Sycamore had been negligent in its filling of the oil tank. The 

complaint asserted that Sycamore caused the tank to rupture because 

Sycamore’s employee either overpressurized or overfilled the tank, resulting

in the spill. Eventually, the case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a 

verdict in favor of Sycamore. The Owners then filed a post-trial motion, which 
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the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, the Owners raise three issues for our review:

1) Did the trial court err when it denied the Owner’s post-trial 

motion to vacate the jury’s verdict and enter judgment n.o.v.?

2) Did the trial court err when it refused to instruct the jury as to 

negligence per se for Sycamore’s admitted violation of the 

Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law?

3) Did the trial court err when it gave the jury a non-standard 

instruction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(b) by indicating 

that Sycamore’s clean-up and remediation of the residence 

pursuant to notices issued by DEP was not an admission of 

liability?

See Appellants’ Brief, at 4.

In their first issue, the Owners contend that they were entitled to 

judgment n.o.v. because they believe testimony presented on behalf of DEP 

representatives in conjunction with Sycamore’s own admissions conclusively 

established Sycamore’s negligence. Our standard of review from the denial of 

a motion for judgment n.o.v. is well-settled: 

A motion for judgment n.o.v. is a post-trial motion which requests 

the court to enter judgment in favor of the moving party. There 

are two bases on which the court can grant judgment n.o.v.: one, 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two, 

the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree 

that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the 

movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes 

that even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the 

movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor, 

whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record 

and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the 

movant was beyond peradventure.

Stange v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 179 A.3d 45, 52-53 (Pa. Super. 
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2018) (formatting altered).

In an appeal from the trial court's decision to deny judgment 

n.o.v., we must consider the evidence, together with all favorable 

inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the 

verdict winner. Our standard of review when considering motions 

for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

are identical. We will reverse a trial court's grant or denial of a 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse 

of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the 

case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the 

same as that for a trial court.

Id., at 53 (formatting altered and citation omitted).

Concerning any questions of law, our scope of review is plenary. 

Concerning questions of credibility and weight accorded the 

evidence at trial, we will not substitute our judgment for that of 

the finder of fact.... A [judgment n.o.v] should be entered only in 

a clear case. [T]he entry of a judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict ... is a drastic remedy. A court cannot lightly ignore the 

findings of a duly selected jury.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Owners’ position is that “[t]he evidence in this case is overwhelming 

and constitutes admissions by [Sycamore].” Appellants’ Brief, at 10. Further, 

they contend that “[t]he uncontradicted evidence in this case clearly proves 

that [Sycamore] admitted that it overfilled the oil tank causing it to rupture.” 

Id. 

In making these assertions, the Owners rely upon the information 

Sycamore submitted to DEP following the spill’s discovery, Sycamore’s lengthy 

remediation work on the residence, and the fact that Sycamore did not appeal 

nor contest the notice of violation that it received from DEP. See id., at 10-

11. Accordingly, the Owners believe they irrefutably proved Sycamore’s 
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negligence, and in that same vein, the jury’s finding was unreasonable.

The “elements of negligence are: a duty to conform to a certain standard 

for the protection of others against unreasonable risks; the defendant's failure 

to conform to that standard; a causal connection between the conduct and the 

resulting injury; and actual loss or damage to the plaintiff.” Brewington for 

Brewington v. City of Philadelphia, 199 A.3d 348, 355 (Pa. 2018). To 

“prove[] ... negligence,” Appellants’ Brief, at 11, the Owners cite to the 

testimony of six individuals: three DEP officials; one remediation company 

employee; Sycamore’s President and CEO; and the Sycamore employee who 

delivered the oil. See id., at 11-20. 

The Owners first highlight the testimony of DEP Environmental 

Compliance Specialist Susan Thomas. Thomas stated that she had sent a DEP 

notice of violation, which “included Sycamore as the responsible party and 

directed the responsible party to initiate cleanup activities.” N.T., 12/5/18, at 

7 (Testimony of DEP Environmental Compliance Specialist Susan Thomas). 

She further testified that a remediation and consulting company hired by 

Sycamore, Patriot Environmental Management (“Patriot”), wrote a letter to 

DEP stating that the oil storage tank was “reportedly overfilled, causing the 

tank to rupture[.]” Id., at 14.

The Owners also highlight the testimony of DEP Environmental Group 

Manager Thomas Coar. Coar read an email that he had written, which 

identified that an oil storage tank had ruptured during delivery and that 
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Sycamore was the responsible party. See N.T., 12/5/18, at 6 (Testimony of 

DEP Environmental Group Manager Thomas Coar). Coar went on to testify that 

All-State Oil Recovery (“All-State”), another remediation company acting on 

behalf of Sycamore, was the source of the information DEP had received on 

the oil spill. See id., at 7. Furthermore, he agreed that “the actual release of 

oil onto the property ... violate[d] the Clean Streams Law[.]” Id.

DEP Licensed Professional Geologist William Craft confirmed that AllState informed DEP about the oil spill, which resulted in Sycamore being listed

as the responsible party. See N.T., 12/5/18, at 16-19 (Testimony of DEP 

Licensed Professional Geologist William Craft). The description of the oil spill 

specified that the tank ruptured during fuel delivery. See id., at 21. 

Thereafter, Craft informed the jury that a spill’s final report, identified 

as the Act 2 Final Report, is generated by the responsible party and submitted 

to DEP. See id., at 25. Acting under DEP’s guidance, Patriot submitted that

final report on Sycamore’s behalf. See id. Craft then discussed DEP’s notice 

of violation sent to Sycamore and the resulting DEP-required work plans, 

written by Patriot. The violation letter stated that DEP had “been advised that 

... Sycamore ... caused a release of heating oil to the environment[.]” Id., at 

26. Sycamore never appealed DEP’s notice of violation. See id., at 27. As to 

the work plan, it contained reported information and designated that the spill 

occurred “due to an accidental over-pressurization” of the fuel tank. See id., 

at 38.
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The Owners also draw attention to the testimony of Hudson Green, 

Patriot’s President. At trial, Green agreed that there was a sense of urgency 

imbued into Patriot’s consulting and remediation work, as Sycamore wanted 

to avoid a DEP enforcement hearing. See N.T., 12/5/18, at 30 (Testimony of 

Patriot’s President, Hudson Green). He acknowledged that his company sent 

a letter to DEP that described the reported overfilling of the oil tank and stated

that his company was acting on behalf of Sycamore when the document was 

sent. See id., at 31-32. Patriot also mailed a subsequent intent to remediate 

letter, which identified that there had been an accidental release of oil during 

a delivery to the property. See id., at 33.

In addition, the Owners assert that the testimony of Kenneth Morrison, 

President and CEO of Sycamore, establishes that the companies hired by 

Sycamore were authorized to submit communications on the company’s behalf 

to DEP. See Appellant’s Brief, at 18. 

Finally, the last witness relied upon by the Owners, Michael Fiore, the 

Sycamore employee who delivered the oil, admitted that he knew the tank 

was filled when the apparatus started to mist oil out of the whistle pipe and 

onto his person. N.T., 12/5/18, at 34 (Testimony of Sycamore Delivery Driver 

Michael Fiore). Mr. Fiore concluded that “when it mists you in the face, the 

tank is full; you can’t put any more in.” Id., at 35.

Even if we were to assume the jury believed every aspect of the 

testimonies illuminated by the Owners, we cannot conclusively say that they 
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have demonstrated, through uncontestable evidence or as a matter of law, 

Sycamore was negligent in its actions. Specifically, even though the Owners 

do not delve into the elements of negligence in their brief or cite to anything 

other than our judgment n.o.v. standard of review, reasonable minds could

clearly disagree over whether Sycamore actually caused the injury suffered 

by the Owners, and further, even if Sycamore somehow causally affected 

some aspect of the oil spill, those same minds could differ over whether 

Sycamore, in fact, breached its duty of care.

First, DEP did not perform any investigation as to how, if, or why 

Sycamore was responsible for the tank’s failure. See N.T., 12/5/18, at 53 

(Testimony of DEP Licensed Professional Geologist William Craft). Instead, “it 

is DEP’s policy to automatically name the oil delivery company as a responsible 

party[.]” Id. The result is that “the oil delivery company is getting a [notice 

of violation] letter no matter what.” Id. (emphasis added). In fact, it does not 

“matter at all to DEP why the tank failed[.]” Id., at 58. 

Second, when asked who provided the information Patriot relied on 

when it submitted a letter to DEP, Patriot’s President indicated that it could 

have been one of the Owners. See N.T., 12/5/18, at 57-58 (Testimony of 

Patriot’s President, Hudson Green). The cause of the tank’s failure was in no 

way relevant to Patriot’s remediation job, so it did not perform any 

investigative work on the property. See id., at 58.

Third, although they have suggested it to be true, the Owners have not 
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cited to any cases for the proposition that an unchallenged administrative DEP 

notice of violation inherently makes a “violator” liable in a civil action to an 

owner/private plaintiff, even though both have considerably different 

elements that must be proven or established. Presumably, the jury believed 

Sycamore’s President/CEO when he testified that, instead of provoking a 

conflict with either the Owners or DEP, Sycamore chose the path of least 

resistance when it performed cleaning operations on the property. See N.T., 

12/6/18, at 60-62 (Testimony of Sycamore President and CEO Kenneth 

Morrison). 

Additionally, Morrison explained that a functioning vent line, indicated 

by the whistle sound that it produces throughout filling, cannot result in an 

overfilled or over-pressurized tank. See id., at 56-58. Furthermore, misting, 

which the Sycamore delivery driver described as having occurred, can happen

during fuel delivery due to “frothing” if the tank had been sitting undisturbed 

for a while. Id., at 79. The jury was entitled to find this testimony to be 

credible, and if it did, it provided an alternative basis to explain the misting 

distinct from the theory submitted by the Owners.

Fourth, Sycamore’s delivery driver looked into the window of the garage 

and “made sure before [he] left that nothing happened inside.” N.T., 12/5/18, 

at 38 (Testimony of Sycamore Delivery Driver Michael Fiore). Upon looking, 

he noticed “[n]othing on the floor. The tank was dry.” Id., at 38-39 (remarking 

that it was “pretty bright that day” so he “could see clearly”).
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Fifth, the Owners confirmed that they owned a 275-gallon tank, it was 

approximately half full a few days prior to delivery, and Sycamore delivered 

129.7 gallons of oil. See N.T., 12/5/18, at 11, 20-21, 41 (Testimony of Owner 

Marie Conversano-Hoyt). Additionally, the Owners verified that the tank’s vent 

line was fully operational prior to Sycamore’s delivery. See N.T., 12/6/18, at 

62-63 (Testimony of Owner Brad Hoyt).

In viewing the evidentiary record in a light most favorable to Sycamore 

as the verdict winner, we do not find that the trial court either abused its 

discretion or committed an error of law in refusing to grant judgment n.o.v. 

At a minimum, based on the evidence adduced at trial, we cannot say this 

case is one that clearly warrants overturning the verdict of a duly selected 

jury. The jury, sitting as factfinder, was free to make its credibility 

determinations in the manner that it so chose.

None of the evidence now proffered and discussed by the Owners 

irrefutably establishes that Sycamore was negligent in its actions nor has 

Sycamore admitted to being at fault. While, clearly, DEP’s actions and paper 

record can be utilized in a private civil case, the evidentiary value of DEP’s 

information gathering on a pro forma basis, where it 1) does not care how or 

why the oil spill occurred and automatically assigns blame to the company 

providing the fuel, 2) does not investigate nor question the source of the 

material that it receives, and 3) possibly utilized information from one of the 

interested Owners in gathering facts and ascribing fault, is a question of 
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credibility for the jury. Accordingly, the Owners’ first issue fails. 

The Owners’ second suggested error asserts that the trial court erred 

when it failed to “instruct the jury on negligence per se ... despite testimony 

... that [Sycamore] violated the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law[.]” 

Appellants’ Brief, at 20. We disagree. 

When an appellate court reviews a challenge to the trial court's 

refusal to give a specific jury instruction, the court's role is to 

determine whether the record supports that decision. In fulfilling 

this role, we must keep in mind that a trial court should charge on 

a point of law when there is some factual support in the record 

for the charge.

Meyer v. Union Railroad Co., 865 A.2d 857, 866 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Negligence per se is “[c]onduct, whether of action or omission, which 

may be declared and treated as negligence without any argument or proof as 

to the particular surrounding circumstances.” White by Stevens v. 

Southeastern PA. Transp., 518 A.2d 810, 815 (Pa. Super. 1986).

Essentially, negligence per se imputes strict liability on the targeted party.

While it is true that “a violation of a statute or ordinance may serve as 

the basis for negligence per se,” Wagner v. Anzon, Inc., 684 A.2d 570, 574 

(Pa. Super. 1996), such a violation does not automatically establish this 

precept. We have found that if “the purpose of the statute is to secure to 

individuals the enjoyment of rights or privileges to which they are entitled only 

as members of the public[,]” id., that statute cannot serve as the basis of a 

negligence per se determination. While we have found no state court opinions 
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analyzing a negligence per se claim in the context of the Clean Streams Law, 

we find Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 371 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1977) 

instructive. There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the Clean 

Streams Law was not primarily concerned with the source of polluted water, 

but the point where the polluted water is discharged into the Commonwealth’s 

waterways. See id., at 466. As a result, “the Legislature has clearly and 

unambiguously authorized [DEP] to require the correction of water pollutioncausing conditions without regard to the source of the pollution.” National 

Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Environmental 

Resources, 414 A.2d 37, 40 (Pa. 1980). The Clean Streams Law therefore 

imposes liability even in the absence of a showing of the defendant’s 

responsibility for causing the pollution. See id., at 45. This strict liability 

scheme is only permissible as an action taken pursuant to the 

Commonwealth’s inherent police power. See id., at 43.

Pursuant to this precedent, we conclude that, in the absence of an 

explicit directive to the contrary, the Legislature did not intend the Clean 

Streams Law to serve as the basis of negligence per se in private actions. The 

Clean Streams Law evinces no intent to disturb settled common law in the 

area of private negligence actions. Rather, the potential remedies authorized 

by the state’s exercise of its police powers are reserved solely for statutory 

causes of action. Accord Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, 

1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4820, at *59 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) (“Accordingly, 
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this [c]ourt does not believe that the policy of the [Clean Streams Law] would 

be furthered by serving as the basis for a claim of negligence per se.”).

In their brief, the Owners spend eight pages rehashing the same 

testimony that they outlined in their previous issue. See Appellants’ Brief, at 

23-30. Distilled down, the Owners claim that because there has been an 

apparent violation of the Clean Streams Law, they should have been given 

specific jury charges reflecting this violation as a basis for negligence per se

liability.

Assuming, for argument’s sake, that Sycamore did violate the Clean 

Streams Law, the Owners have not established that the law creates a basis 

for finding negligence per se in private, common law actions. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the Clean Streams Law did not establish explicit rights or 

privileges for private persons, but instead was about providing a net benefit 

to the public at large. 

Alternatively, the record does not clearly reflect the fact that there has 

even been a violation of the Clean Streams Law. In fact, the testimony 

adduced at trial would seem to indicate that there has not been a violation.

The Clean Streams Law makes it unlawful for a person to put, place, allow, or 

permit to be discharged “into any of the waters,” 35 P.S. § 691.401, certain 

pollutants as defined by the law. 

At trial, one of the DEP officials explicitly indicated that he did not know 

whether there had actually been a violation of the Clean Streams Law. See 
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N.T., 12/5/18, at 54-55 (Testimony of DEP Licensed Professional Geologist 

William Craft). Moreover, that same official confirmed that “a discharge of oil 

to soil alone is not a violation of the Clean Streams Law.” Id., at 55.

Conversely, DEP sends a notice of violation “where contamination has 

the potential to affect the [w]aters of the Commonwealth[.]” Id., at 54 

(emphasis added). Craft then unequivocally stated that there had not been a 

Clean Streams Law violation in this instance. See id., at 83. Accordingly, in 

the absence of either legal or factual support for the Owners’ requested jury 

charge, we find that the trial court correctly rejected their attempt to add a 

negligence per se instruction. See Schneider v. Lindenmuth-Cline Agency, 

Inc., 620 A.2d 505, 508-09 (Pa. Super. 1993) (“A trial judge is not bound to 

remold points for charge presented to him. If they are not strictly in 

accordance with the facts in evidence or the law of the case, she may refuse 

them.”). Therefore, the Owners’ second issue fails.

The Owners’ third issue suggests that the trial court erred by giving the 

jury a non-standard jury instruction. The Owners take issue with the court’s 

statement that Sycamore’s actions “in cleaning-up and remediation did not 

constitute an admission of liability.” Appellants’ Brief, at 33. In effect, the 

Owners argue that the “improper instruction ... [meant] ... that essentially the 

actions of [Sycamore] performing [remediation work] for over 2 years[] and 

pursuant to a DEP notice of violation[] meant absolutely nothing as far as 

[Sycamore’s] liability is concerned.” Appellants’ Brief, at 34. Implicitly, the 
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Owners are arguing that because Sycamore performed remediation work, that 

activity would therefore make them liable in negligence. The Owners seek a 

new trial based on this purported error.

The at-issue jury instruction indicated that:

Settlement with or any payment made to a person or on 

behalf of others for damages for destruction of property shall not 

constitute an admission of liability by the person making the 

payment or on whose behalf the payment was made, unless the 

parties to such settlement or payment agree to the contrary.

Sycamore and the plaintiffs have not made any agreement 

stating that Sycamore has admitted to liability for any damage 

that was done to the property. As a matter of law, Sycamore’s 

remediation of the property is not an admission of liability.

So please keep in mind when you’re making your 

deliberations in this matter. Just because there was remediation 

efforts undertaken by Sycamore is not an automatic admission of 

liability.

Jury Instructions, 12/6/18, at 19. The court issued this instruction based on 

our law identifying under what conditions a “payment” has the legal import of 

a settlement.

Settlement with or any payment made to a person or on his behalf 

to others for damages to or destruction of property shall not 

constitute an admission of liability by the person making the 

payment or on whose behalf the payment was made, unless the 

parties to such settlement or payment agree to the contrary.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(b); see also Pa.R.E. 408, Comment (noting that 

Rule 408 is consistent with section 6141).

We are unable to say that the trial court’s instruction was misleading or 

that it constitutes a misstatement of law. The Owners claim that “the repairs 
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and clean[-]up attempts ... [were] improperly deemed to be an offer to 

compromise or a settlement.” Appellants’ Brief, at 38. This statement, the 

Owners contend, “not only patently misled the jury into believing that the 

clean-up efforts were not an admission of guilt, but also forced the jury to 

apply incorrect law and find [Sycamore] not liable.” Id. 

To the Owners, Sycamore’s “voluntary clean-up effort for the first two 

months was due to either it recognizing that (a) it was responsible, or (b) that 

there was a violation of the law[.]” Id., at 39. 

However, as noted previously, Sycamore agreed to remediation in order 

to forgo protracted litigation with DEP. See N.T., 12/6/18, at 60-62 

(Testimony of Sycamore President and CEO Kenneth Morrison). Further, we 

find that the trial court’s instruction only connotes that any work performed 

by Sycamore did not constitute an automatic admission of their liability; the 

jury was still free to find them liable based on the totality of the circumstances.

The Owners’ reliance on Hooker v. State Farm Fire and Casualty

Company, 880 A.2d 70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), is wholly misplaced. There, the 

defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling admitting evidence of minor 

repairs performed by the defendant on the plaintiff’s property. Our sister court 

affirmed, concluding that a party “[t]aking responsibility for some items of 

damage while contesting responsibility for others does not suggest that it is 

an offer to compromise a disputed claim.” Hooker, 880 A.2d at 85 

(responding to the appellant’s argument “that the trial court erred by 
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permitting evidence of minor damages ... that were repaired”). Accordingly, 

the court was directly reviewing not a jury instruction, but whether evidence 

of the repairs was admissible.

Here, the court clearly permitted evidence of the remediation efforts 

performed by Sycamore and its hired remediation companies, and the Owners 

are not suggesting that the testimony of that work should not have been 

entered into evidence. Further, as discussed above, an admission of liability 

for clean-up costs under the Clean Streams Law is not equivalent to an 

admission of liability under the Owners’ private negligence action. Even 

assuming that Sycamore admitted liability under the Clean Streams Law 

(which Sycamore denies), it does not follow that Sycamore admitted to liability 

to the Owners. Further, Owners can point to no explicit admission of liability 

by Sycamore towards them. 

In summation, we find that the Owners’ third issue, which contests the 

appropriateness of the jury instruction given on Sycamore’s remediation 

efforts, holds no merit. While the Owners contend that Sycamore’s 

remediation activities should have inherently meant that Sycamore was liable 

to the Owners for any additional damages that they may have incurred, 

Owners have cited to no cases that stand for that proposition. The instructions, 

as given, simply stated that because Sycamore did not agree to a settlement 

or admit to any explicit liability, its clean-up work did not imply or result in a 

legal admission of liability. We can find no abuse of discretion in this 
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instruction under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, the court’s instruction did 

not foreclose on the possibility that the jury could have found Sycamore to be 

negligent. Moreover, the jury was not prevented from considering the cleanup work performed on the Owners’ property and using that as evidence 

against the company; the jury was merely prevented from considering the 

work to be an automatic admission of liability.

In finding none of the Owners’ claims to be meritorious, we affirm the 

judgment entered in this case.

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/23/20