### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 7, 200 3 S es sio n CONSOL IDATE D WASTE SYSTEMS , LLC v . METRO G OVERNMENT OF NA SHV ILLE A ND DA VID SON CO UN TY, TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 01C895 Walte r C. K urtz, Judge

No. M2002- 02582-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jun e 30, 2005

A would-be develope r of a construction and de moliti on landfill sued t he Metropolitan Government afte r its leg islative body

adopted z oning amendments t hat would eff ectively prec lude the propose d landfill on the property

the company

had leased wit h an opti on to purcha se. The c ompany attacke d the ordinanc es on multiple gr ounds and wa s succe ssful in having the trial c o u rt d ec l are them unconstitutional as violative of substantive due proc ess and e qual protec tion. Bec ause of the company ’s limited interest in the rea l property , howeve r, the c ourt ref used to g ran t an injunction prohibiting the e nforc ement of the ordinanc es ag ainst the company or to a war d damag es. The trial court a lso awar ded attorne y ’s fe es to the company . The Metr opolitan Governme nt appea ls the holding that the ordinance s wer e unconstit utional on the m erits as well as on a number of proc edura l gro u n d s an d als o appeals the awa rd of attorney ’s fe es. The c ompany appeals the trial court’s de c isi on that th e or din a nc e s d id n ot c on sti tut e e xclu sio na ry zon ing . We a ff

irm th e tria l c ou rt

on a ll iss ue s. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which B EN H. C A N T RE LL , P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J ., joined.
C. Da w n D e a n e r , D a n ie l C h a mp n e y , T h o ma s Cr o s s , N a s h v il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll a n t, The M e tr o p o l i t a n G o v e r n m e n to f N a s h v i l l e a n dD a v i d s o n C o u n t y.
Jame s L . M ur

ph y , II I ; Co linJ. Carn ahan, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a p p e lle e , Co ns oli date d Wa ste Sy ste ms, LL C.T he t r i al cour t en j oi ned C o nsol i dat ed f r om t aki ng s t eps t o devel op t he C & D l andf i l l on t he bas i s ne w 1
o rdinances de si gned t o ad d res s t he co nst i t ut i o nal cl ai m s m ad e herei n were pro ce e d ing th ro ugh C o unci l

. W e were i nfo rme d at oral argument t hat t ho se ordinances were enacted i nt o l aw wit hi n t he t i m e f ram e est ab l i shed b y t he co urt and t ha t t he y rep l ac ed t he o rd i na nc es c ha l l en ge d i n thi s ac t i o n. T he n ew o rd i na nc es are n o t b efo re us i n t his a p p ea l . B ec au se of t he r epeal or r epl ace ment o f t he ordi nan ces at i s s ue he r e, we ar e awar e t hat our deci s i on may ha ve l i t t l e pr act i cal ef fect on t h e pa r t i es , wi t h t h e e x ce pt i on of our dec i s i on a s t o t h e aw ar d of a t t or n ey ’ s f

ee s
. T h at qu es t i on r equ i r es a r ev i ew of the tr ia l c o u rt’s d e c isio n s o n th e m e rits o f th e su b sta n tive issu e s, a n d w e c a n n o t av o id tha t co m p le x un d e rta k ing . A via b le cl ai m f or damage s s ave s a c as e f r om di s mi s s al as mo ot i n a pp eal s i nv ol vi ng ch al l eng es t o l egi s l at i on t hat ha s been
a m e n d e d

. Khodar a Envi r onm ent al , Inc. v
. Bec kman , 237 F. 3d 18 6, 19 6 ( 3d C i r
. 20 01 ) ( di s t i ng ui s hi ng bet ween t he f aci al chal l enge fo r declar at o ry rel i ef , whi ch was mo o t , and t he as- ap p l i ed cl ai m fo r dam ages, whi ch was not)

. 2 OP IN ION
Th is c a s e ar is e s f

r o m th e p a s s a g e b y th e M e tr o p o li tan G o v e r n me n t o f N a s h ville and Davidson County

Council of two amendments to its zoning ordinance that reg ulated the location of construction and demolition (“C&D” ) landfills within the county . The ordinances ha d the ef fec t of pr e c lud ing thede ve lop me nt o f s uc h a la nd fi ll o n r e a l pr op e rty

that Co ns oli date d W aste Sy ste ms, L .L .C . (“C on so li dat ed”) had lea sed wi th an opt io n to pur chas e forth e pu rpo se o f dev elo pi ng a C &D la nd fi ll p ri or

to the a me nd me nts

. Consolidated filed a lawsuit challeng ing the leg islative amendments to the zoning ordinanc e b as ed o n a n u mb ero f c l ai m s , i n cl u d i n g: (1 ) T hat th e or din a nc e s c on sti tut e d e xclu sio na ry zon ing sin c e the y

we re int e nd e d to a n dh a dt h e e f

f e c to f p r e c l u d i n g C & D l a n d f

i l l s a n yw h e r e i n t h e c o u n t y. (2 ) T hat th e or din a nc e s d e prive d Co ns oli date d o f i ts int e re st in the re a l pr op e rty in vio latio n o f c on sti tution a l pr ov isi on s r e qu iring su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss. (3 ) T hat th e or din a nc e s d e prive d Co ns oli date d o f e qu a l pr otect ionof thela ws in vio latio n o f b oththeTe nn e sse e a ndUn ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on s. (4) That the o rd inance s constituted an unconstitutional taking of Consolidated’s i n t e r e s ti n t h e p r o p e rt y.
Th e tr i a l c o u rtd e c i d e dt h e i s s u e s o n t h e p art i e s ’ c r o s s m o t i o n s f o r s u m m ary

j u d g m e n t, dis po sin g of

theiss ue s a s matte rs of

la w. Th e tria l cou rt he ld that the or din a nc e s d id n ot c on sti tut e exclusionary

zoning and that Consolidated did not have standing to bring a takings claim. However , the court found the ordinanc es fa cially unconstitutional as vio l at i v e of dueproce ss and equa l protec tion. The court f

ound Consolidated was entitled to de clar atory judgme nt on those issues, but was not entitled to an injunction or dama g es. B oth parties ha v e ap p ea l ed p arts the tria l court’s judgme nt as well as subs equent actions by the trial court that will be discussed later in this opinion. 13 I. F A C TS
I n late 19 99 , Co ns oli date d o btaine d an o pti on to pur c ha se 13 8. 6 a c re s inDa vid so n Co un ty and si gned a l ease on th e pro pert y on Febru ary

3, 20 00 . C on so li dat e d i n t e n d e d t o bu il d a C &D la nd fi ll o n th e pr op e rty

a ndha d in ve sti g a te d p ote nti a l si te s o f o ver 10 0 a c re s th a t w e reloc a te d in zoning districts wheresuch use wa s permitted as a matter of right. C onsolidated conc luded that the property at issue was the only appropriate si te i n Davidson C ounty

. At the t ime of t he option, the pr op e rty wa s lo c ate d ina n Ind us tria l Re stric te d ( “ I R” ) zo nin g dis tric t, m e a nin g that C& D l a nd fi lls wer e a pe rmitted use without the require ment of a specia l exception or variance

. The lea se, which was for the period that Consolidated retained the rig ht to purcha se the land, authorized pre paratory wo rk fo r the c on str

uc tio n o f the C& D l a nd fi ll.
On Dec ember

29, 1999, Consolidated a

pplied to the Tenne ssee De partment of E nvironment and Co ns erva ti on for a so li d was te di sp os al faci li ty perm it , and th e perm it forcon st ruct io n o f a C &D landfill was issued on De cembe r 13, 2000.
The fir st of the two ordinanc es at iss u e here in, Bill No. BL 99-86, wa s introduced on November

16, 1999. It prohibited the location of a C&D landfill within thre e (3) miles of a school or pa rk ; ho we ve r, it on ly app lie d in tho se zon ing dis tric ts w he rea C& D l a nd fi ll w a s p e rm itt e d a s a sp e c ia l e xce pti on or

wi th c e rt a in c on dition s.
Be causethe bill was an amendment to the zoning o rd i n an ce , it was ref err ed to the Me tr op oli ta n Pl a nn ing Com mis sio n. Th e Com mis sio n s ta ff re c omm e nd e d d isa

pp ro val o f th e3

- m ile bu ff e ri ng pr ov isi on be c aus e its lim ite d a pp lic a tio n to on ly

c e rt a in zo nin g dis tric ts w ou ld r e su lt i n anomalous situations, because the buff ering require ment did not apply to other types of landf

ills, and beca use therewas no ba sis for establishing the proposed thr ee mile standa rd. The Comm ission voted to rec ommend disapproval of the bill be cause there was no supporta ble basis for c hoosing thre e miles as the buffe r. The Commission stated m ore resea rch was nee ded to determine what distance , if a ny , w ou ld b e app ro priate a nda lso to de te rm ine wh e the r su c h a bu ff e r or re stric tio n s ho uldapp ly to other ty pes of landf

ills. The Council amended the f irst bill t o make the buf

fering r equire ment two miles instead of three . The Planning Commi ssion recommende d disapproval a g ain. On its own, the first ordinanc e would not have a ffe cted the pr operty at issue bec ause e ven tho ug h it wa s le ss than tw o mil e s fr om a pa rk , it wa s loc a te d in a zon ing dis tric t wh e re C& D l a nd fi lls wer e permitted by

rig ht. The second ordinance, BL 2000-171, was introduced on F ebrua ry 1, 2000. It did two things: (1) madeC&D landfills permissible in IR and I G zoning districts only as a PC use, or with ce rtain conditions, and (2) extended the two-mile buff ering require ment established in the fi rs t bi ll t o a ll C& D l a nd fi lls

. Th e Me tr op oli ta n Pl a nn ing Com mis sio n r e c omm e nd e d d i s a p p r o v al o f b o thth eam e n de d f

ir st ordinanc e and the second ordinanc e beca use there was no planning basis to support any incre ased separ ation betwee n landfills and other non-re sidential uses and no planning basis to support further re stric tio n o f C & D l a nd fi lls in the I R a ndI G zo nin g dis tric ts.4

Both ordinances pa ssed in the Council on Marc h 21, 2000 and were signed by the May or on Marc h 27, 2000. I n October of 2000, the Metr o Depa rtment of Co d es Admi nistration notified Con so lid a te d th a t it

wo uldbe un ableto o btain a pe rm it f or c on str uc tio n o f the C& D l a nd fi ll b e c aus e thepr op e rty

wa s lo c a te d w ith in t wo mil e s o f a pa rk

. Th a t le tte r a lso sa id that th e pr op os e d land fi ll me t e very ot her re qu ir e me nt o f a pp lic ablepr ov isi on s o f the zon ing c od e a ndlis te d th os e re qu ir e me nts

. II. T HE C ON STI TUTION A L C H A LL EN G ES
The diff ere nt require ments for diff ere nt types of c halleng es to a zoning or dinan ce are the subject of many

of the a rg uments here in. Traditionally , ordinanc es re g ulating the private use of land have be en subjec t to leg al challeng es by any or all of severa l types of c laims alleg ing violations of Constit utional pr ovisions. A number of courts have attempted, at various tim es, to categ orize the types of a vail ab l e claims. See P earson v. City of Grand Blanc , 961 F.2d 1211 ( 6th Cir. 1992) (d isc us sin g va

ri ou s ty pe s o f “ fe de ral zon ing c la ims ” ); Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter , 59 F.3d 12 08 , 1 21 1 n . 1 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 5) ; Ei de v . Sar as ota Cou nty , 908 F.2d 716, 720- 22 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de nied , 498 U.S. 1120, 111 S.Ct

. 1073 (1991). These have g ener ally included challeng es base d on the Taking s Clause and c hallenge s based on substantive due proce ss and equa l protection g rounds, sometimes with s u b cl as s ifications such a s due proc ess taking . Of c ourse, a zoning ordinanc e is subject to cha lleng e on its fac e or on the eff ect of the ordinance as applied. W e think theEl e ve nthCir c uit ’s mor e re c e nt d e sc ri pti on of th e ty pe s o f c on sti tution a l c la ims a vaila bleto c on te st a la ndus e re g ulatio n, wh e the r an o rd inanc e or a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e de c isi on , is c on sis te nt w ith the deve lopment of the law. In Vi lla s o f Lake J ac k so n, Ltd . v . Le on Cou nty , 121 F.3d 610, ( 11th Cir. 1997), that court stated: Any constitutional right base d upon a zoning r eg ulation gove rning a specific use of re a l pr op e rty , to the e xten t the c la im is ba se d up on thede privatio n o f the ri g ht t o u se the prope rty itself for that specific purpose, is protec table, if it is a rig ht for which the Constit ution gives pr otection at all, by only these c auses of

action: 1. A proc edura l due proc ess claim challeng in g the proc edure s by which the r eg ulation was adopte d;
2. A substanti v e d u e p roce ss claim based upon the arbitra ry and capricious action of the g overnme nt in adopting the r eg ulation;
3. A T akin g s Cl aus e c la im w hic h may seek no t on ly jus t compensation, if the reg ulation am o u nts to a taking , but may seek invalidation and injunctive re lief if the r eg ulatio n ex ceeds what the g overnme n t b o d y

may do under the Taking s Clause of the Constit ution;
4. Claims under some other c onstitut ional provision that give the landowner

a protec table rig ht, not spe cifica lly involved with the rea lT h e tr ia l c o u rt h e ld tha t C o n so lid a te d ha d no t un d e rta k e n su ff ic ie n t ac tio n w ith re g a rd to the p ro p e rty, 2
a c c o m p l i s h e d s u b s t a n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , o r i n c u r r e d s u b s t a n t i a l l i a b i l i t i e s s o a s t o h a v e a v e s t e d r i g h t t o b u i l d a C &D la n d fil l o n th e p ro p e rty u n d e r the z o n ing la w a s it e x isted p rio r to the two a m e n d m e n ts a t i ssu e he re in, re lying p rim a rily
o n S t a t e ex re l . S C

A C h em i ca l W a st e S erv ., In c. v. K o n i g sb erg , 6 3 6 S.W

. 2 d 43 0 (T enn. 19 8 2 ). B ased o n t hat case and
o t her aut ho ri t y , as well as o n i t s f i nd i ng t hat C o nsol i d at ed had not su b st ant i al l y changed i t s p o si t i o n, t he co urt fo und C o n so lid a te d ha d no ve ste d rig h t to g ive it s ta n d ing “ o the r tha n to m a k e a fac ia l ch a llen g e to the o rd ina n c e s.” O n a p p e a l, C o nso l i d ated d o es no t ch all en ge t he t rial co urt’ s f i nd in g t h at i t ha d no st an d i ng t o b ring a taking s claim fo r just
co m p en sati o n o r t o rec eive d am ag es o r i nju nc t i ve reli ef f o r t he d ue p ro ce ss and eq ua l p ro t ec t i o n c l aim s. 5 p r o p e rty r ig h t it s e lf

, . . . [ e.g. ,] a claim alleg ing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitut ion. Consolidated orig inally broug ht a reg ulatory taking s claim as well as a fa cial challeng e to the ordinanc es on substantive due pr ocess and equal pr otection gro u n d s
. The trial c ourt found that Consolidated had no vested right in the pr operty and, consequently , no standing to bring a claim for just compensation for a taking

. I n addition, with reg ard to the substantive dueproce ss and equa l 2 protec tion claims, the trial court de termined that Consolidated did not have suffic ient interest to be e nti tle d to dama g e s o r i mme diate inj un c tiv e re lie f. Th e c ou rt he ld, ho we ve r, that Co ns oli date d c ou ld still challeng e the or dinance s as fac ially unconstitutional, and, if succe ssful, would only be entitled t o p ro s p ec t i v e r el i ef

i n t h e f o rm o f ad ec l ar at o ryj u d gm en t , ci t i n g Y e e v . Ci ty of E

sc on did o, Cal

. , 503 U.S. 519, 534, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992). The court g rante d the declaratory judgme nt finding theor din a nc e s u nc on sti tution a l. On appeal, t he Metropolitan Government arg ues t hat the trial c ourt was in er ror in allowing Consolidat e d to p r o c e e d o n it s s u b s tan ti v e d u e p r o c e s s a n d e q u a l p r o te c ti o n c h a ll e n g e s to the ordinanc e on various g rounds: (1) Consolidated could not bring a fa cial challeng e to the ordina nces on substantive due proc ess g rounds bec ause the true nature of its claim was an unconstitutional taking , and substantive due proce ss claims are subsumed into that more expli cit text ual sourceof protec tion from the con d u ct at i s s ue; (2) a taking claim cannot be broug ht as a substantive due proce ss cl ai m and there by avoid ripene ss require ments and, since the taking claim her ein was not ripe for revie w, neither

wer e the substantive due proce ss and equa l protection clai m s; (3) Consolidated had no vested right in the pr operty and lac ked a suf

ficie n t p ro p ertyinterest to have standing to bring even a

fac ial challeng e to the ordinanc es on substantive due proce ss g rounds. The Metropolitan Government also arg ues that the trial c ourt was wr ong in its decision on the me rits of the constitutional claims because a r ational basis exist s to support the ordinance s. We beg in our ana ly s is w it

hthe law of

substantive due proc ess and e qual protec tion, including the re quirements for

bring ing those claims. Then, because of the a rg uments made, we will ex amine the law of

g overnme ntal taking s and the re lationship betwee n taking claims and the othe r c on sti tution a l c la ims

.Sub st ant i ve d ue p roce ss guarant ees app l y t o gove rnme nt act i vi t y t h ati s bot h l eg i s l at i v e an d e xecut i ve; how ever, 3 t he s t andar d for det er mi ni ng whet her act i on t ake n i n a l egi s l at i ve capaci t y vi ol at es t hos e g uar ant ees i s di f fer ent f r om t hat
a p p lica b le to e x e c u tive c o n d u c t. C o u n ty o f S a c ra m e n to , 5 2 3 U .S . at 8 4 6 , 1 1 8 S . C t. a t 1 7 1 6

.

6 III
. S U BSTAN TI V E D U E P R O C ESS
Th e Du e Pr oc e ss C laus e of theUn ite d St a te s Cons tituti on g ua rante e s mo rethan f

a ir pr oc e ss; its subst antive co m p o n ent prohibits certain g overnme nt actions reg ardle ss of the fairness of the proce dures use d.
Since the time of our early explanations of due proce ss, w e have understood the c ore of the c oncept t o b e protec tion ag ainst arbitra ry action. . . . We have emphasized time and ag ain that the touch s t o n e of due proce ss is protection of the individual ag ainst arbitra

ry action of g overnme nt, whether the fault lies in a denial of fu nd a me ntal pr oc e du ral f a irne ss, or in the e xer c ise of po we r w ith ou t a ny re a so na ble justification in the service of a le g itimate gove rnmental objec tive.
Cou ntyof Sa cra men to v. Le wis , 523 U.S. 833, 845-46, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, a substantive due proce ss c laim is based on the exercise of power without reasona

ble justification. Where g overnme nt action does not deprive a plainti ff of a pa rtic ula r c on sti tution a l g ua

rante e , th a t a c tio n w ill be up he ld a g a ins t a su bs tan ti ve due pr oc e ss challeng e if it is rationally related to a leg itimate state interest. Va lot v
. So uth e as t Lo c al S c ho ol D ist

. Bd. of Educ. , 107 F.3d 1220, 1228 ( 6th Cir. 1997), cert. de nied , 522 U.S. 861, 118 S.Ct . 164 (1997).
This co n s titutional protec tion applies in the context of z oning. “ [C ]i tiz ens havea substantive due proce ss right not to be subjected to arbitrary or irrational zoni ng decisions.” Pearson v. Cit y of Grand Blanc , 961 F.2d 1211, 1 2 1 7 (6th Cir. 1992). Z oning or dinance s and ame ndments thereto, such as the one s at issue in this case , have long been subj ect to constitutional challeng e. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re alty Co. , 272 U.S. 3 6 5 , 3 8 7 , 47 S. Ct . 114, 118 (1926), the U nited States Supreme Court held that zoning or dinance s “must find their justification in some aspec t of t he police power , asserted for the public welfa re.”
A zoning ordinanc e is the product of leg islative action and, befor e it c an b e d ec lare d 3 unconstitutional, a court must find that the provisi ons are clea rly arbitra ry and unre asonable , having no substantial relationship to the public hea lth, safety , morals or g ener al welf are
. Eu c lid , 2 72 U. S. at 395, 47 S. Ct. at 121. A challeng e to a zoning ordinanc e on the ba sis it vi olates substantive due proce ss is analy zed using the r ational basis standar d. Restigouche, I nc. 59 F .3 d at 12 14 . U nd e r this standard, a

leg islative reg ulation of land use will be uphe ld if it has a rational relationship with a leg itimate gove rnmental intere st or public welfa re c oncern. Corn v . City of L auderdale Lake s , 997 F.2d 1369, 1388 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. de nied , 5 11 U. S. 1 01 8, 11 4 S. Ct. 14 00 (1 99 4) ; So uth Cou nty Sand & Grave l Co., Inc. v . Town of South Kingst on , 160 F.3d 834, 836 (1st Cir. 1998). A zoning ordinanc e is unconstitutional as violative of substantive due proce ss if it is arbitrary , capricious or not r ationally related to a leg itimate public pur pose. W MX T echnologies, I

nc. v. Gasconade County,In Ri ggs , a l a n d us e c a se , t h e p a rtie s re c o g n iz e d tha t t h e sta tute d id no t i m p lica te a fun d a m e n ta l righ t. 4 C o nso l i d ated d o es no t assert a fund am en t al ri gh t o r arg ue t ha t an yt hing o t he r t ha n the ra t i o na l b asis t est ap p l i es. 7 Mo. , 105 F.3d 1195, 1198- 99 (8th Cir. 1997).
A l oc a l zon ing or din a nc e su rv ive s a su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c ha lle ng e if the ree xists ar a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e t e r m s o f t h e o r d i n a n c e a n da

l e g i t i m a te g overnme ntal purpose. Se e Be rg e r v . Ci ty of M ay fie ld H e igh ts , 154 F.3d 621, 624 (6 th C ir . 1 99 8) ; see also Curto v. City of Harper W oods , 954 F .2 d 1 23 7, 12 43 (6 th Cir. 1992) (“U nder [ a substantive due pr ocess] analy sis, an ordinanc e or r eg ulation is invalid if it fails to advancea leg itimate gove rnmental intere st or if it is an un reas on abl e me ans of ad van cin g a legit im ate gover nmenta l in tere st. ” ); Pearson , 961 F.2d at 1223 (noting that in substantive due proce ss review of a zoning ordinanc e, “the only permissible inquiry ” for

a fe dera l court is “w h et h er the leg islative action is rationally

related to leg itimate state land use c oncerns”). Richardson v. Township of Brady , 218 F.3d 508, 513 ( 6th Cir. 2000).
The Tennessee Supreme Court has often stated t hat t he due proce ss clause of the Te nnessee Constit ution is sy nony mous with the due pr ocess c lause of the Fourteenth Amendme nt to the United States Cons t i t u t i o n. Gallaher v. Elam , 1 04 S.W. 3d45 5, 46 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Riggs v. Burson , 941 S.W .2d 44, 51 (Tenn. 1997) , cert. de nied , 5 22 U. S. 9 82 , 1 18 S. Ct . 4 44 (1 99 7) . A c c or din g ly , c ou rt s in this state have applied the same substantive due pr ocess analy sis as is applied in such cha lleng es broug ht under the f

eder al Constitut ion. Newt on v. Cox , 878 S.W .2d 105, 110 (Tenn. 1994) , c e rt. denied , 5 13 U. S. 8 69 , 1 15 S. Ct. 189 (1 99 4)

. “ [U]nl e ss a fu nd a me ntal rig ht is impl ic a te d, a statut e 4 comports with substantive due proc ess if it bear s ‘a re as o n ab l e re lation to a proper leg islative purpose’ and is ‘neither

arbitra ry nor discriminatory .’” Gallaher , 1 0 4 S

. W

. 3 dat4 6 3 , q u o t i n g Riggs , 9 4 1 S

. W

. 2 dat5 1 , q u o t i n g Newton , 878 S.W .2d at 110.
Whether or not they use t he term substantive due proc ess, Tenne ssee c ourts revie w zoning ordinanc es under t h e s am e rational basis test. Fa lli n v . Kn ox Cou ntyBd

. o f Co m’ rs , 656 S.W .2d 338, 342-43(Te nn. 1983). The te st is whether the ordinanc e bear s a re asonable relationship t o the p u b li c h e a lth , s a f

e ty , o r w e lf

ar e ; if s o , it is a v a li d e xe r c is e o f p o lice powe r. Da vidson County v. Ro ge rs , 18 4 Te nn
. 32 37 , 33 2, 19 8 S. W.2 d 8 12 , 8 14 (1 94 7) ; Mobile Home City of Chattanooga v. Ha mi lto n Co un ty , 552 S.W .2d 86, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), cert. de nied , 4 31 U. S. 9 56 , 9 7 S. Ct. 2678 (1977).
U n d e r t h e “ l a w o f

t h e l a n d ” p r o v i s i o n o f

t h e T e n n e s s e e C o n s t i t u t i o n , a l e g i s l a t i v e b o d y, throug h enac tment of zoning leg islation:

may impose any

limit ation on the use of pr operty whi ch i t m ay

deem ne cessa

ry or expedient to promote and protec t the safe ty , health, mora ls, comfort, and w elfa re of thepeo pl e, pr ov ide d o nly that th is p ow e r s ha ll n ot b e e xer c ise d a rb itr ari ly ; th a t is ,In Tes t er , our Sup rem e C o urt co nf i rme d t he exi st ence o f a m i d d l e st and ard o f “ hei ght ened ” scr ut i ny , but t he 5
c a se b e fo re us d o e s n o t fa ll w ithin tho se situa tio n s ju stif ying su c h sc ru tiny. Tes t er , 879 S. W

. 2d a t 828. 8 without r easona

ble connec tion or relation be tween the limit ation imposed and the public safe ty , health, or w elfa re, e tc. Sp e nc e r- Stu rla Co. v . Ci ty of M e mp his , 290 S.W . 608, 612 (Tenn 1927)

. The rational basis test is applied with recogni t i o n of the de fer enceto be g iven leg islative decisions. Tenne ssee courts have long rec og nized the broad power s g iven to local leg islative bodies to e nact and amend zoning or land use reg ulations. Fa lli n , 656 S.W .2d at 342. Consequently , the scope of judicial revie w of the exercise of such leg islative p o we r i s limit ed. Id. B e c aus e c ou rt s cannot substitute their judg ment on local land use policy for that of loca l leg islative bodies, they g ive c on side rabl e def

e re nc e to t

he de c isi on s o f s uc h b od ie s if theiss ue s a

refair ly de bata ble . See Mc Cal le n v . Ci ty of M

e mp his , 786 S.W .2d 633, 640 (Tenn. 1990)

. Thus, wher e the que stion is whether t he legislature had a rational basis for the statute, if any rea sonable just ification for the l aw may be conc eived, it must be upheld by the courts. Riggs , 941 S.W. 2da t 48 ; State v. Tester , 879 S.W

. 2 d 823, 830 (Tenn. 1994) . Absent implication of a fundame ntal rig ht, a leg islative act will withstand a substantive due pr ocess c halleng e if the g ov e rn me nt i de nti fi e s a

le g iti mate g ov e rn me ntal in te re st that th e le g isl a tiv e bo dy c ou ld r a tio na lly conclude was serve d by the leg islative act. Pa rk s Pro pe rti e s v. M

au ry Cou nty , 70 S.W .3d 735, 744- 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
I n th e c a se be fo re us , the tria l cou rt fo un d th at th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt h a d “ faile d to connec t a rational relationship betwe en these ordinanc es and a le g itimate gove rnmental purpose .”
IV. E QU A L P ROT E CT I ON
Th e Te nn e sse e Con sti tution ’s equ a l pr ote c tio n p ro vis ion s c on fe r “ e sse nti a lly thesa me protec tion” as the e qual protec tion clause of the United S tates C onstitut ion. Riggs , 941 S.W .2d at 52 ; Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v . McW herter , 851 S.W .2d 139, 152 (Tenn. 1993) . Both g uarantee that all persons who aresimil arly situated will be treated alike by the g overnme nt and by

the law. Id ., a t 15 3; Cityof C le bu rn e , Te x . v . Cl e bu rn e Liv ing Ctr ., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S

. Ct. 3249 (1 98 5) ; Ri c hla nd

Bo ok ma rk , I nc . v . Ni c ho ls , 278 F.3d 570, 574 ( 6th Cir. 2002), cert. de nied , 537 U.S. 823, 123 S. C t. 109 (2002). Equal protec tion challeng es ar e base d upon g overnme ntal classifications. I n considering an equal pr otection cha lleng e to a leg islative act, Te nnessee courts follow the analytical framewor k established by the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court. Riggs , 9 41 S.W. 2da t 52 ; Newton , 878 S.W .2d at 109. Strict scrutiny

is require d only

when the c lassification interf ere s with a fundame ntal rig ht or operates to the pec uliar disadvanta g e of a suspect cla ss. Riggs , 941 S.W. 2da t 52 ; State v. Tester , 87 9 S. W.2 d at 82 8. Th e stand ardof re du c e d sc ru tin y app lie s in mos t othe r s itu a tio ns , re qu iring on ly 5In i t s co m p l ai nt , C o nsol i d at ed al l eged t hat t he o rdinances resul t ed in a t em p o rary taki ng of i t s i nt erest i n t he 6 pr oper t y , i n v i ol at i on of t h e Fi f t h an d Four t ee n t h A men dmen t s t o t h e U n i t ed St at es Cons t i t u t i on a n d Ar t i cl e I , Se ct i on 2 1 of t he T enness ee C o nst i t ut i o n. 9 that a ratio na l ba sis e xist f

or thec la ssi fi c a ti on , or that th e c la ssi fi c a tio n h a ve a re a so na ble relationship t o a leg itimate state interest. Id

. The parties do not disag reethat reduc ed scr utiny is the applicable standard. T hus, as in the su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c ha lle ng e , th e zon ing or din a nc e s must be re vie we d und e r the ratio na l ba sis test. The rational basis analy sis used i n an equal protec tion challeng e does not differ in substantial reg ard f rom the rational basis test used when c onsidering a subst antive due pr ocess c laim. Equal protec tion requires only

that the leg islative classification be ratio n ally related to the objective it see ks to achieve

. W

ilson v. Y aklich , 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998) 52 cert. de nied , 5 U.S. 1139, 119 S. Ct . 1 02 8 ( 19 99 ); Cityof C ha tta no og a v . D av is , 54 S.W .3d 248, 276 (Tenn. 2001) ; Newton, 878 S.W .2d at 110.
Wit h due def

ere nce to leg islative decision m aking , “[i] f some re asonable basis can befound for the c lassification [in the statute] or if any state of f acts may rea sonably

be conc eived to justify it, the classification will be uphe ld.” Riggs , 9 4 1 S

. W

. 2 dat5 3 , q u o t i n g Tennessee Small Sch. Sys ., 851 S.W .2d at 153. Mo resp e c if ic a lly , le g isl a tiv e bo die s are allo we d c on sid e ra blelatitud e in establishing c l as s i fi ca t i ons and there by determining what gr oups are simil arly situated. Plyler v. Doe , 4 57 U. S. 2 02 , 2 16 , 1 02 S. Ct . 2 38 2, 23 94 (1 98 2) ; City of Chat tanooga , 54 S.W

. 3 d at 276; State v. Smok

y Mountain Sec rets, Inc. , 937 S.W .2d 905, 912 (Tenn. 1996). Courts presume that the leg islature acte d constitutionally and will uphold the statute “if any state of f acts c an re asonably

be conce ived to justify

the classific ation or if the unr easona bleness of the class is fairly debata ble. . . .” City of Chat tanooga , 5 4 S

. W

. 3 dat2 7 6 , q u o t i n g Bates v. Ale xander , 749 S.W .2d 742, 743 (Tenn. 1988).
Con so lid a te d a sse rt e d th a t th e or din a nc e s d e prive it o f e qu a l pr ote c tio n o f the la w b e c aus e they treat C&D landf

ills differ ently from other types of landfills and indus trial uses by requiring the two-mile buffe r. The trial court a g ree d and, for rea sons simi lar to t hose underly ing its substantive due proc ess dec ision, held t hat t he ordinances, on their fa ce, violate d Constit utional equal prote ction g ua rante e s.
V. T HE L A W O F G OV ERN M ENTA L T AKI NGS
Ev e n th ou g h Co ns oli date d h a s n ot a pp e a le d th e tria l c ou rt ’s dis mis sa l of its takin g s c la im, 6 the issues raised by

the Metropolitan Gove rnment and issues c reated by the intersec tion of the law of taking s and the other constitutional c halleng es broug ht he rein ne cessitate some discussion of the law of g overnme ntal taking s.T h e T a k ing s C la u se a p p lies to the sta te s thr o u g h the F o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t. Le gal Founda t i on of 7 W as hi ngt on , 5 3 8 U .S . at 2 3 2 n.6 , 1 2 3 S . C t. a t 1 4 1 7 n. 6 ; Pal az z ol o v
. Rhode I s l and , 5 3 3 U .S . 6 0 6 , 6 1 7 , 1 2 1 S .C t. 2 4 4 8 , 2 4 5 7 (2 0 0 1 ); Chi cago, B. & Q

. R. Co. v
. Chi cago , 1 6 6 U .S . 2 2 6 , 2 3 9 , 1 7 S . C t. 5 8 1 , 5 8 6 (1 8 9 7 ).

A go ve rnm en t al t ak i ng o f p rivate p ro p erty f ro m o ne cit i ze n f

o r t he p rivate use o f an o t he r is a l so 8

u n con s t i t u t i on al , r eg ar dl es s of w h et h er c ompen s at i on i s pa i d. H a w a ii H o u s. A u th . v. M id k iff , 467 U

. S. 229, 241, 104 S . C t. 2 3 2 1 , 2 3 2 9 (1 9 8 4 ). T h e tes t i s w h e the r th e tak ing se rv e s a p u b lic p u rp o se
. Kel o v
. New London , __ U

. S. ___, 2 0 0 5 W L 1 4 6 9 5 2 9 (June 23 , 20 0 5 ).

“[ I] t i s f ai r t o s ay [t he regul at o ry t aki ngs co ncep t ] has p roved d i f f i cul t to exp l ai n in t heo ry and t o i m p l em ent 9 i n p ract i ce. C ases at t em p t i ng t o de ci d e when a regul at i o n be co m es a t aki ng are amo ng t he m o st l i t i gat ed and pe rplexi ng i n c ur r ent l aw. ” E ast er n E nt er pri s es v. A pf

el , 52 4 U

. S. 49 8 , 54 1 , 11 8 S.Ct. 21 3 1 , 21 5 5 (19 9 8 ) ( K enned y J. , co ncurri ng in th e ju d g m e n t an d d isse n ting in p a rt). S e e a lso P e n n C e n tra l T ra n sp
. C o
. v . N e w Yo rk C ity , 438 U

. S. 104, 123- 24, 98 S. Ct

. 264 6, 265 9 (1978 ) ( s t at i ng t hat t he ques t i on of wh at cons t i t ut es a r egu l at ory t aki ng “ has prove d t o be a probl em o f co n sid e ra b le d iff

ic u lty”) ; N o l l a n v. C a l i f o rni a C o a st a l C o m m ’n , 483 U

. S. 82 5, 86 6 (St eve ns J. , di s s ent i ng ) ( “ E ven t he wi s es t l awy er s wo ul d hav e t o ack nowl edge gr eat unce r t ai nt y ab out t he s cope of t hi s Co ur t ’ s t aki ng s j ur i s pru dence

. ”) 10 A. F EDER A L H OL DI NGS
The Fifth Amendment to the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion g uarantees that no person shall “be dep ri ved of life , li be rty , o r p ro pe rty , w ith ou t du e pr oc e ss o f l a w” a nda lso pr ov ide s, “ no r s ha ll private pr operty

be taken for public use, wit hout just compensation.” The sec ond provision is called the Taking s Clause, or sometimes the J ust Compensation Clause, and it is predic ated o n the proposition that the g overnme nt should pay for private property it ha s taken for its own use. The 7 purpose of

the Taking s Clause is to prevent the g overnme nt f rom forc ing an individual or g roup of ind ivi du a ls a lon e to b e ar b ur de ns “ wh ic h, in all f a irne ss andjus tic e , s ho uldbe bo rn e by thepu bli c as a w hole.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , 533 U.S. 606, 618, 121 S.Ct

. 2448, 2457-58 (2001) ; Dolan
v . Ci ty of T

iga rd , 5 12 U. S. 3 74 , 3 84 , 1 14 S.Ct . 2 30 9, 23 16 (1 99 4) ; Armstrong v. United States , 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.C t. 1563, 1569 (1960).
A t akin g of

pr op e rty fo r p ub lic us e vio late s the Ta kin g s Cl aus e on ly

if jus t c omp e ns a tio n is not paid. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., I nc. , __ U.S. ___, 125 S.C t. 2074, 2080 (May 23, 2005). “The 8 Fifth Ame ndment does n o t p ro s cribe the taking of prope rty , it proscribes taking without compensation.” W

illiamson C ounty Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton B ank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172, 194, 105 S. C t. 3108, 3120 (1985).
The fe dera l law of re g ulatory taking s has evolved ove r th e y ea rs , i ncluding a number of qualifications and distinctions that we ne ed not examine. At the risk of oversimplify ing a complex are a of the law, some g ener al principles c an be stated. 9
The c ase be fore us initi ally involved a claim of reg ulatory , not phy sical, taking throug h the a do pti on of a zon ing or din a nc e
. Th e Ta kin g s Cl aus e of

theUn ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on wa s g e ne ra llyT h e g ov er n men t e f f ect s a p hy s i ca l t ak i n g w h en i t ph y s i ca l l y oc cu pi es t h e l an d, obt ai n s t i t l e t o t h e l an d, or 10
re q u ire s the la n d o w n e r to s u b m it to th e p h ysic a l o c c u p a tio n o f th e la n d b y o the rs
. Ye e v. Es condi do , 503 U

. S. 519, 527, 11 2 S. Ct

. 15 22 , 15 28 ( 19 92 )

. T hi s i ncl udes s uch ac t s as f l oo di ng t he propert y an d re qui r i ng t he l andowner t o s uf fer the insta llatio n o f ca b le o r sim ilar intru sio n s. Id. 11 un de rs to od to a

pp ly on ly to p hy sic a l ta

kin g s un til theUn ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt he ld i n 10 Pennsylv ania Coal Co. v. Mahon , 26 0 U. S. 39 3, 41 5, 43 S. Ct. 15 8, 16 0 (1 92 2) that “ wh ile pr op e rty may be re g ulated to a c ertain ext ent, if re g ulation goe s too f ar it will be re cog nized as a taking .” The Court ha s repe atedly stated there is no se t formula for determining whe n a re g ulation goe s too far. Lin gle , 1 25 S.Ct . at 20 81 ; Pa lazzo lo , 5 33 U. S. at 61 7, 121 S .C t. a t 24 57 ; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Cou nc il , 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 S.Ct

. 2886, 2893 (1992) (“. .

. we have g ener ally esche wed any set formula f

or dete rmining how far

is too far . . .” ).
Th e princ ipl e s th a t ha ve e me rg e d in takin g s jurisp ru de nc e area tte mpt s to app ly the“ fairne ss and justice” purposes underly ing the Taking s Clause, as explained in Armstrong , su pr a
. See , e.g. , Tahoe-Sierra Prese rvation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Re gional Planning Agency , 535 U.S. 302, 321, 122 S. Ct . 1465, 1478 (2002) ( ref erring to the Armstrong princ ipl e s) . T he Un ite d Stat e s Su pr e me Cou rt ha s d e sc ri be d it s T akin g s o r Jus t Co mpe ns a tio n Cl aus e ho ldi ng s a s f oll ow s:
The text of the Fifth Ame ndmentitself provides a ba sis for dra wing a distinction betwee n phy sical taking s and re g ulatory taki n gs. Its plain lang uag e re quires the payment of compensation wheneve r the g overnme nt acquire s private pr operty for a public purpose, whe ther the acquisition is the result of a condemnation proc eeding or a phy sical appr opriation. But the Constitution contains no compara ble re fer ence to re g ulatio ns that pr oh ibi t a pr op e rty ow ne r f ro m ma kin g c e rt a in u se s o f h e r p ri vate pr op e rty
. Ou r jurisp ru de nc e inv olv ing c on de mnatio ns a ndph y sic a l ta kin g s is a s o ld as the Republic and, for the most pa rt, involves the straig htforwa rd application of per se ru l es
. Ou r r egu l at o ry t ak i n gs j u ri s p ru d en ce , i n co n tra s t , i s o f m o re re ce n tv i n t age and is cha

rac terized by

‘esse ntially

ad hoc, f

ac t u al inquiries,’ de signe d to allow ‘ca ref ul examination and weig hing of all the re levant cir cumstance s.’ Brown v. Legal Foundation of W ashington , 538 U.S. at 2 3 3 , 1 2 3 S

. Ct. at 1417-18, quoting Pa lazzo lo , 533 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring)

. See also Y ee v . Escondido , 503 U.S. at 519, 523, 112 S

. C t

. 1 5 2 2 , 1 5 2 6 (1 9 9 2 ) ( ex p l ai n i n g t h e d i ff er en ce b et we en p h y s i ca l t ak i n gs an dre gu l at o ry taking s and the ne ed for

complex factual a ssessments in the latter).
The ad hoc inquiry

described in Brown was e stablished in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v
. Ne w Y or k City , 438 U. S

. 104, 124-25, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659-60 (1978) , wher ein the Court found that reg ulatory

taking s claims require d “ad hoc, fac tual inquiries” that included a balanc ing of

the p u b li c a n d p r iv a te in te r e s ts in v o lv e d in th e p arti c u la r c a s e. Lin gle , 125 S.Ct . at 2081-82. Unde r Penn Central , the fa ctors to be c onsidered inc lude (1) the economic impac t of the re g ulation, (2) the de g re e to w hic h th e re g ulatio n h as inte rf e re d w iththeow ne r’ s r e a so na ble“ dis tin c t in ve stm e ntbacke d” expectations conc erning the prope rty , and (3) the cha rac ter of the re gu l at o ryaction. 438E ven wh er e t he al l egat i o n i s a d ecr eas e i n pr op er t y ’ s va l ue, t he P e n n C e n tra l an al y s i s w i l l n ot a l wa y s be 11
a p p lied . If a go v e rn m e n ta l re g u la to ry a c tio n e lim ina te s a ll e c o n o m ic va lue fro m a p ie c e o f p ro p e rty b y p ro h ib iti n g a ll
ec on omi ca l l y be n ef

i ci al u s e, t h en a “ per s e” t ak i n g h as oc cu r r ed, a n d s u ch “ t ot al r eg u l at or y t ak i ngs” mu s t be
c o m p e n sa te d un le ss th e go v e rn m e n t c a n sh o w tha t t h e p ro sc rib e d us e s w e re n o t p a rt o f th e o w n e r’s inte re sts u n d e r sta te p ro p e rty a n d nu isa n c e law

. Luc as , 5 0 5 U .S . at 1 0 1 9 , 1 1 2 S

. C t. a t 2 8 9 5 (h o ld ing tha t “w h e n the o w n e r o f re a l p ro p e rty has b een cal l ed upon t o s acr i f i ce a ll e c o n o m ic a lly b e n e ficia l use s in th e na m e o f t h e c o m m o n go o d , t h a t i s, to lea v e his propert y ec onom i cal l y i dl e, he ha s s uf fer ed a t aki ng
. ”)

T he C our t ha s speci f

i cal l y ac kn owl edged t hat gove r nment s may , i n t he exe r ci s e of t hei r pol i ce po wer s , af

fect 12 p ro p e rty v a lue s b y la n d u se re g u la tio n w itho u t inc u rr ing a n o b liga tio n to c o m p e n sa te

. Luc as , 5 0 5 U .S . a t 1 0 2 3 , 1 1 2 S .C t. at 28 9 7

. Jus t how m uch o f a dimi nut i o n i n val ue short of d est ruct i o n of al l val ue , i.e

. a p e r s e ta k ing , i s re q u ire d to cons t i t ut e a comp ens abl e t aki ng i s not cl ear , and t he Supre me C our t has r epeat edl y s t at ed t hat t her e i s no “ s et formul a” fo r m a k ing tha t d e te rm ina tio n
. See , e
. g. , A pf el , 5 2 4 U .S . at 5 2 3 , 1 1 8 S . C t. a t 2 1 4 5 ; Luc as , 4 8 0 U .S . at 1 0 1 5 , 1 1 2 S .C t. a t 2 8 9 3 ; Penn Cent r al , 43 8 U

. S. at 12 4 , 9 8 S

. C t

. a t 2 6 5 9

. A regul at i o n or regul at o ry act i o n t hat af fect s a p rop ert y ’ s val ue do es not cons t i t ut e a t aki ng un l es s i t “ des t r oy s a maj or port i o n o f the proper t y ’ s va l ue. ” Fi r s t Engl i s h Evange l i cal Lut her an Ch urc h v. Co un t y of Los A ng el es , 48 2 U

. S. 3 0 4 , 3 2 9 , 1 0 7 S.C t

. 2 3 7 8 , 2 3 9 3 (19 8 7 ) ( Stevens, J. dis sent i ng). M e re d im inu tio n in v a lue , e v e n w h e re sign ifi c a n t, is insu ff ic ie n t t o e sta b lish a tak ing

. C o n c re te P ip e a n d P ro d s. o f C a l.
v. Cons t r
. Labor er s Pens i on Tr us t f or S. Cal ., 5 0 8 U .S . 6 0 2 , 6 4 5 , 1 1 3 S . C t. 2 2 6 4 , 2 2 9 2 (1 9 9 3 ). See al s o Luc as , 505 U .S . at 1 0 1 6 n.7 , 1 0 1 9 n.8 , 1 1 2 S . C t. 2 8 9 4 n.7 , 2 8 9 5 n.8 (d isc u ssin g lev e ls o f i n te rfe re n c e re su lti n g in lo ss o f n ine ty a n d nin e ty-f

ive p e rc e n t o f va lue .); M ari t r an s , Inc. v. U ni t ed St at es , 5 1 F e d . C l. 2 7 7 , 2 8 3 (2 0 0 1 ), a f f ’d

. 342 F. 3d 1344 ( Fe d. Ci r
. 2003) ( “ Se v er al Su pr eme Cour t de ci s i on s s u g g es t t h at di mi n u t i on s i n v al u e appr oac h i n g 85 t o 90 pe r ce n t do not ne ces s ar i l y es t abl i s h a t aki ng
. ”) 12 U. S. at 12 4- 25 , 9 8 S. Ct. a t 26 59 -60; see also Tahoe-Sie rra Preservation Council, Inc. 53 5 U .S. at 326-27, 122 S. Ct. at 1481.
Where the c laim is based on detrimenta l economic impac t that does not de stroy all benef icial economic use , the Pe nn Ce ntr al analy sis will be applied in a fa ct specific inquiry

. Tah oe -S ie rra 11 Preserv ation Council, Inc ., 53 5 U .S. a t 32 7, 12 2 S. Ct. a t 14 81 ; Pa lazzo lo , 53 3 U .S. a t 61 7, 12 1 S. Ct. a t 24 57 ; see also Legal Foundation of W ashington , 538 U.S. at 234, 123 S. Ct . at 1418. 12
Until very rec ently , another analy sis was applied wher e the claim was based primarily on the g overnme nt’s conduct r ather than t he im pact of that conduct on the value of the prope rty . Two y ear s after Penn Central , th e Cou rt he ld that “ app lic a tio n o f a g e ne ral zon ing la w t o p artic ula r p ro pe rty eff ects a taking if the ordinanc e does not substantially advanc e leg itimate state interests, or de nies an owne r ec onomically

viable use of

his land.” Agi n s v. T

iburon , 4 47 U. S. 2 55 , 2 60 , 1 00 S. Ct

. 2138, 2141 (1980)( involving a f acia l challeng e to a reg ulation). Since Agins , the quoted stateme nt has bee n fre quently used as the beginning point for analy sis of a taking s claim. See , e.g ., Loreto Dev. Co. , Inc. v . Village of Chardon , 1 49 F .3 d 1 18 3 ( 6thCir . 1 99 8) ; Do dd v . H oo d R iv e r Co un ty , 136 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) cert. de nied , 525 U.S. 923, 119 S.Ct

. 278 (1998) ( holding that the Supreme Court’s ruling s require courts to first conside r whe ther the r eg ulation in question substantially

advanc es a le g itimate state interest, and if it does not, to hold the r eg ulation invalid.); Gre ate r At lan ta Ho me bu ild e rs As so c iat ion v . D e Kal b Co un ty , 588 S.E.2d 694, 696-97 (Ga . 2003) (involving a

fac ial challeng e to an or dinance ).So m e co m m ent at o rs had exp res sed d o ub t as t o whet her Agi ns cr eat ed a s epar at e t es t for det er mi ni ng wh et her 13
a tak ing ha s o c c u rr e d a n d a s to w h e the r tha t te st s u rv ive d la te r d e c isio n s b y th e C o u rt. See R .S. R ad fo rd , “O f C o urse A L a n d U se R e g u la tio n T h a t F a ils t o S u b sta n tially A d v a n c e L e g iti m a te S ta te I n te re sts R e su lts In a R e g u la to ry T a k ing ,” 1 5 F o rd h a m E n v tl. L . R e v . 3 5 3 (S p rin g 2 0 0 4 ) (d isc u ssin g tha t p o sitio n a n d the o p p o site)

.

S o m e c o m m e n ta to rs ha d su g g e ste d tha t c h a ll e n g e s to a n o rd ina n c e o n the b a sis it d o e s n o t sub sta n tially 14 advan ce l egi t i mat e publ i c i nt er es t s ar e more properl y broug ht and ana l y zed as a su bst ant i ve due pr oces s cl ai m t han un der the T a k ing s C la u se
. S ee , e.g ., Jo h n D

. E ch ev erria , T a k i n g s a n d E rro rs , 51 Al a. L. Rev

. 1047, 1073- 76 a n d 1080- 86 (20 0 0 ). 13 F or a nu mbe r o f y e ars , th e c on ne c tio n b e tw e e n th e g ov e rn me nt’ s action andits le g iti mate pu bli c int e re sts wa s c on sid e re d a s pr ov idi ng , a t le a st in the ory , a se pa rate ba sis fo r a

takin g s c la im. See Key sto ne Bi tum ino us Coa l A sso c . v . D e Be ne dic tis , 480 U.S. 470, 485, 107 S.C t. 1232, 1241-42 (1987) ( rea ffirming the Agins test); N o l l a n v. C a l i f o r n i a Co a s ta lCommission , 4 8 3 U

. S. 825, 834, 107 S.Ct . 3 14 1, 31 47 (1 98 7) (s tatin g that th e Sup re me Cou rt ha d “ lon g re c og nize d” that a la nd -u se re g ulatio n w a s su bje c t to a taki ng s c ha lle ng e on theg ro un d it didno t su bs ta nti a lly

a dv a nc e le g iti mate g overnme ntal interests); Dolan , 512 U.S. at 385- 86, 114 S.Ct . at 2316-17 (r eaf firming the Agins te st a nd statin g that the fi rs t que sti on to b e de te rm ine d w a s w he the r the ree xiste d th e “ e sse nti a l ne xus” betwee n the leg itimate state interest asse rted and the permit conditions that had bee n exacted by the c ity ); Y ee , 503 U.S. at 530, 112 S.Ct

. at 1530 ( st ating that the effec t of t he re nt control ordinanc e a t is su e mig ht h a ve so me be ari ng we rethe c a se br ou g ht a s a re g ulatory

takin g s c la im s inc e it c ou ld “shed some lig ht on whether there is a sufficient nexus between the e ffe ct of the or dinance and the objectives it is supposed to advanc e.”) Se e als o City of Monte rey v . Del Monte Dunes at Montere y, Ltd. , 526 U.S. 687, 704, 119 S.C t. 1624, 1634-36 (1999), (dec lining to r evisit prior prec edents on 13 the law of

reg ulatory

taking s and applying the Agins te st to jury in st ructio ns ); Tah oe -S ie rra Pre se rv ati on Cou nc il , 535 U.S. at 334, 122 S.Ct

. at 1485 (listing the possible theories under w hich fairne ss andjus tic e c ou ld s up po rt a c on c lus ionthat th e g ov e rn me ntal ac tio ns the re in w e retakin g s, inc lud ing a

su g g e sti on that the pe tit ion e rs c ou ld ha ve arg ue d that thos e a c tio ns “ didno t su bs ta nti a lly advanc e a le g itimate state interest” ).
Howeve r, the Supreme Court very rec ently “cor rec ted cour se” and clea

rly renounc ed or abandone d the “substantially advanc es” test as a stand-alone reg ulatory taking s test, finding it wa s

“ no t a va lidme tho d o f i de nti fying re g ulatory takin g s f or wh ic h th e F if

th A me nd me nt r e qu ir e s ju st compensation.” Lin gle , 1 25 S.Ct . at 20 85 . T he Cou rt no te d th a t th e “ su bs ta nti a lly a dv a nc e s” te st derive d from due proce ss c oncepts and was logic al in that c ontext since it probed the va lidityof a land use re g ulation and sug g ested a means-e nd analy sis. Id . at 2083-84. 14
Be causeC o n s o lidated has not appe aled the dismissal of its taking s claims, we ne ed not e xplor e fu rthe r the ma ny

dis tin c tio ns , e xce pti on s, a nde ma natio ns of the se g e ne ral princ ipl e s. Th is explanation was requir ed by the ar g uments made in this appea l based on the r elationship of various challeng es to a zoning or dinance

.T h u s, un d e r th e T e n n e s s e e C o n s ti tu ti o n , a g o v e r n m e n ta l t a k in g fo r p r iv a te p u r p o s e s is u n c o n s tit u tio n a l. Bar ge , 15 7 0 S .W .3 d a t 6 8 7 a t n.4 ; C ro ss , 8 59 S

. W

. 2d at 3 53

. T he s ame vi ew i s t ake n of t he T aki ng s C l aus e of

t he U ni t ed St at es C o nst i t ut i o n: i t af

f i rms t he go vernm ent ’ s aut ho ri t y t o co nf i scat e p ri vat e p rop ert y , but i m p o ses t wo co nd i t i o ns: t he t aki ng m u st b e fo r a p u b lic p u rp o se , a n d ju st c o m p e n sa tio n m u st b e p a id

. Le gal Foundat i on of Was hi ngt on , 538 U

. S. a t 231- 32, 123 S. Ct

. a t 1417. 14 B. T ENN ESS EE H OL DI NGS
The Te nnessee Constit ution in Article I , § 8 provides that “no man sha ll be . . . deprive d of his life, liberty , or prope rty , but by the judg ment of his peer s or the law of the land.” Article I , § 21 pr ov ide s th a t “ no ma n’ s partic ula r se rv ic e s sha ll be de ma nd e d, or pr op e rty take n, or app lie d to pu bli c use, without the consent of his repre sentatives or w ithout jus t compensation being made there for.” These provisions a

pply to g overnme ntal taking of property

. Barge v. Sadle r , 70 S.W .3d 683, 687 a t n. 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Far Tower Site s, LLC v . Kn ox

Cou nty , 126 S.W .3d 52, 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 03 ); Cro ss v . M

c Cur ry , 859 S.W .2d 349, 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
Article I , § 21, the Tenne ssee Ta kings Clause , has bee n interpre ted as re cog nizi ng the rig ht of e min e nt d omain, bu t a lso a s a lim itatio n on th a t rig ht “ by e nti re ly pr oh ibi tin g thetakin g of

private property for private purposes, and by requiring just compensation when private property is taken for a public use.” J

ac k so n v . M e tro po lit an Kno x v ill e Ai rp or t A uth or ity , 922 S

. W.2d 860, 861 (Tenn. 1996). The Te nnessee leg islature has implemented t his constitutional provision throug h adoption

15
o f e mi n e n t d o ma

in and inverse c ondemnation statutes

. E d w a r d s v. Ha l l s d

a l e- P o w el lUt i l i t

y D i s t rict , 11 5 S. W.3 d 4 61 , 4 64 (T e nn . 2 00 3) ; Jack son , 922 S.W .2d at 8 6 1

. Both statutory proce dures a

re methods by

which a landowner

can e nforc e the right to just compensation. I nverse condemnation “i s a s h o rt h and desc ription of the manner in w hich a landowner rec overs just c ompensation for a taking of property when condemnation pr ocee dings have not been instituted.” Jack son , 922 S.W .2d at 861-62.
The Te nnessee Supreme Court has not y et applied the ta kings c lause of the Tenne ssee Constit ution to z oning or

land use re g ulation. I n fac t, in older opinions, the Court adamantly ref used to apply the taking s clause to the c onsequenc e of le g islative enac tments.
I n Jacks on v . B e ll , 1 43 Te nn . 4 52 , 2 26 S.W. 20 7 ( 19 20 ), theplaintif f c ha lle ng e d a

statut e authorizing the f

ire pre vention commissioner to order the re pair or de moliti on of pre mises

“ e sp e c ia lly

lia bleto f ir e ” a s v iol a tiv e of

Artic le I , s e c tio n 2 1 o f the Te nn e sse e Con sti tutionbe c aus e it authorized the taking of his property without his consent and without compensation. The Court held, “That the s ections of the C onstitut ion relied on by the petitioner do not apply to the taking of service s or prope rty

when the state is pr ocee ding under its police power is de clar ed in many of our case s.” 226 S.W

. at 210 (citations omitted). The court noted that the plaintiff “a rg ues the c ase a s though his prope rty

was be i ng taken unde r the powe r of e minent domain.” 226 S.W. at 209. Clearly , the Court found a distinction betwe en a taking of prope rty and the loss of prope rty

value a s a re sult of leg islative action in furthe ranc e of the police powe r.T h e C o u rt fo u n d tha t t h e “se rio u s q u e stio n ” inv o lve d in th e a p p e a l w a s w h e the r th e a b rid g e m e n t o f p ro p e rty 16

r i gh t s au t hor i zed by t he s t at ut e was properl y wi t hi n t he po l i ce po wer of t he s t at e. 290 S. W

. at 611

. T he C our t he l d t hat t he l egi sl at ure m ay i m p o se any l i m i t at i o n up o n t he use o f p rop ert y t hat i t de em s necessar y or exp ed i ent t o pro m o t e t he saf et y , heal t h and wel f are of t he p eo p l e, pro vi d ed t hat t here was a r easona b l e co nnect i o n or relati o n be t ween t he l i m i t at i o n and t he p ub l i c heal t h, s afet y , or welfare (t he rat i o nal ba si s t est ). 29 0 S.W

. at 61 2

. “ H avi ng reached t he
c o n c lus io n tha t t h e sta tute is a v a lid e x e rc ise o f th e p o lice p o w e r, u n d e r th e C o n stitutio n o f T e n n e sse e , i t ne c e ssa rily
r es u l t s t h at we ov er r u l e t h e f u r t h er con t en t i on of

t h e pl ai n t i f

f i n e r r or t h at t h e s t at u t e i s i n v i ol at i on of t h e f i r s t s ec t i on of t h e Fou r t ee n t h Amen dmen t of t h e U n i t ed St at es
. ” 290 S. W

. at 613.

15 Simi larly , in Sp e nc e r- Str ula Co. v . Ci ty of M e mp his , su

pr a , th e plaintif

f a sse rt e d th a t a zon ing or din a nc e vio late d th e takin g s c laus e of theTe nn e sse e Con sti tutionbe c aus e “ thelim itatio ns , restric tions, and prohibitions plac ed upon the leg al use of property is just as much a ‘taking ’ and an application to a public use as if phy sically taken and appropriated.” 290 S.W

. at 611. The Te nnessee Supreme Court disag ree d, stating that the authoriz ing statute and the zoning ordinance we re a dopted in the exercise of

the police powe r. This being true, t h e v alidity of the statute is not to be tested a ccor ding to the pr ov isi on s o f s e c tio n 2 1 o f artic le 1 of the Con sti tution of Te nn e sse e , f

or a n e xer c ise of thepo lic e po we r, oth e rw iseva lid a ndc on sti tution a l, c a nn ot b e de fe a te d b e c aus e property rig hts are ta

ken or de stroy ed ther eby

without compensation.
290 S.W . at 611. 16
The same rea soning w as applied by the Tenne s s ee S upreme Court in a much later case , Draper v. H

aynes , 5 67 S.W. 2d46 2 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) , w he re in an ord in ance re g ard ing ro a ds in subdivisions was challeng ed on seve ral c onstitut ional bases, including that it repre sented a taking of property

without compensation in violation of Article I , § 21 of the Te nnessee Constit ution. The Court held:
Or din a nc e s r e g ulatin g theus e a ndde ve lop me nt o f pr op e rty are g e ne rally he ld t o li e wi thi n th e po lic e po we r o f mun ic ipal c or po rati on s, andthe ir

a do pti on , w hil e fre quently

aff ecting property

values and restric ting use of prope rty , has g ener ally not been c onsidered to amount to a taking unde r the powe r of e minent domain . . .
567 S.W .2d at 465 (c itations omi tted). Se e als o City of Clar k sv ill e v . M

oo re , 688 S.W .2d 428, 430 (Tenn. 1985) (city ’s orde r for remova l of abandoned ca r wa s not a taking for public or private use, and ordina nce w as an e x erc ise of police pow er)

. I n later opinions, the Te nnessee Supreme Court has on se vera l occa sio n s d es cribe d a “taking ,” most rec ently

stating that “[a] ‘t ak i n g’ of r eal pr operty occur s when a

g overnme ntal de fe nd a nt w iththepo we r o f e min e nt d omain p e rf orms a na u th o rize d a c tio n th a t ‘ de str oy s, int e rr up ts, or interf ere s wi t h the common and ne cessa ry use of r eal pr operty

of anothe r.’” Edwards , 115 S

. W

. 3 dat4 6 5 , q u o t i n g Pl e as an t V ie w U ti li ty Di st . v . V

ra de nb ur g , 545 S.W .2d 733, 735 (Tenn. 1977).P hy si cal oc cup at i o n t aki ngs ari se when a governm ent al de fe n d ant causes ei t her a 17 d ire ct and co nt i nui ng p hy si cal i nvasi o n o f p ri vat e p rop ert y o r a d est ruct i o n o f a p l ai nt i f f ’ s p rop ert y ri ght s.
. . . W e have hel d t hat s uch d i rect and phys i cal i nvasi o ns cons t i t ut e a gove r nment al t aki ng wh en r eal proper t y i s ei t her ac t ual l y appropri at ed
or t h e common an d n ec es s ar y u s e of t h e pr oper t y i s r en der ed i mpos si b l e or ser i o usl y i nt errup te d

. P hy si cal oc cup at i o n t aki ngs m ay al so ari se when a g o v e rn m e n ta l d e fen d a n t ca u se s a d e stru c tio n o f a p la intiff ’s p ro p e rty rig h ts. .

. . T h is typ e o f p h ysic a l o c c u p a tio n c o n stitute s a tak ing w h e n the re is a d im inu tio n in t he val ue of

r eal proper t y pecu l i ar l y af fect ed an d di r ect l y i nv aded t hat i s not s har ed by t he publ i c a t l ar ge. [A nu isa n c e -typ e ] ta k ing o c c u rs w h e n th e g o v e rn m e n ta l d e fen d a n t in te rfe re s w ith a l and o wner’ s b eneficia l u se and enjoyme nt of t he p rop ert y
. . . . In Jac ks on , we es t abl i s hed t he s t andar d f or det er mi ni ng wh et her a nuisanc e- t y pe t aki ng ha s o ccurred: t he p l ai nt i f

f m ust al l ege a d i rect and s ub st ant i al in te rfe re nce wi t h t he b enef i ci al us e and enjoyme nt of t he p rop ert y ; t hi s i nt erf erence m ust be repea t ed and not j us t occas i onal ; t he i nt er fer enc e m us t p ecu l i ar l y af fect t he propert y i n a mann er d i f ferent t han t he ef

fect of t he i nt erf

erence to t he p ub l i c at l arge; and t he inte rfe re n c e m u st re su lt in a lo ss o f m a rk e t va lue

. Edw ar ds , 11 5 S.W

. 3 d at 46 5 (ci t at i o ns o m i t t ed ). 16 I n Edwards , the Court stated that Tenne ssee c ourt s h av e re cog nized two classifications of taking s: phy sical occ upation taking s and nuisance -ty pe taking s. 115 S.W .3d at 465. Reg ulatory

17 takin g s, a s th a t te rm

is u se d inc a se s u nd e r the fed e ral T akin g s Cl aus e , d o n ot o bv iou sly fall i nto either of these c lassifications. B ased on e x isting p recede nt, we cannot say that the Tenne ssee Supreme Court has adopted a r eg ulatory taking s doctrine unde r the Te nnessee Constit ution sim ilar to that developed by

the United States Supreme Court under the United States Constit ution. I nstead, the c ou rt ha s tr a dition a lly e xami ne d landus e re g ulatio n th ro ug h o rd inanc e s u sin g theratio na l ba sis test, as set out ea

rlier in this opinion, or other tests of validity under state law.
The Te nnessee Court of Appea ls has g ener ally followed the analy sis established by the Supreme Court in the ea

rly taking s opinions. I n Copeland v. City of Chattanooga , 866 S.W .2d 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), the develope r claimed a condition of the r e-zoni n g o f h i s property that he dedicate a portion to the city for a rig ht of way was an unconstitutional taking. This court frame d the issue as whe ther the c onditional z oning w as a proper e x erc ise of g overnme ntal power and applied the traditional standar d for judicial r eview of zoning ac tions. 86 6 S

. W

. 2 d at 5 6 6-67. Se e als o Mobile Home City of Chat tanooga , 552 S.W .2d at 89 (finding that the z oning or dinance restric ted landowner s’ use of the ir property without c ompensating them, but stating, “ this however is not the test, because the same can besaid of any zoning re g ulation.”)
I n Ba y sid e W are ho us e Com

pa nyv . Ci ty of M

e mp his , 470 S.W .2d 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971), this court acknow led ged that the judiciary will not subst itute its j udg ment for that of a leg islative body in zoni ng decisions, but held that “whe re the reg ulation g oes so fa r as to deprive the owne r of the bene ficial use of

his property , then the reg ulation be comes confiscatory and g ives rise to judicial revie w.” 470 S.W.2d at 378. I n that case , the re-zoning denied the owner of any benef icial us es, and17

thec ou rt he ld that wh e re , a s in that situatio n, “ the re g ulatio n g oe s too fa r it wi ll be re c og nize d a s a taking .” Id . This court upheld the t rial court’s determination that the re-zoning was arbitra ry and unlawful, and the trial court’s striking down of the ordinanc e under the com m o n l aw writ of
c e rti or ar i standard. T hus, althoug h the court used reg ulatory taking s lang uag e in part of the opinion, it a pp lie d th e tr a dition a l st a nd ardfo r r e vie w o f a dmi nis tr a tiv e de c isi on s.
I n other opinions, the Court of Appea ls ha s appea red to re cog nize a taking s claim, but has not actually

found a taking. Se e The Ro ge rs G ro up , I nc . v . A nd e rso n Co un ty , 113 S.W .3d 725, 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (althoug h the i ssue addressed in the opi nion was a proce dural one, the court noted that the ca se involved a c laim for dama g es for an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff’ s pr op e rty by zon ing c la ssi fi c a tio n) ; se e als o F ar Towe r S ite s, LLC , 126 S.W .3d at 69 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2 0 0 3 ) ( h o l d i n g t h atb ec au s e p l ai n t i ff h ad n o v es t ed p ro p er t y i n t er es t , i t co u l d n o tp u rs u e at ak i n gs c la im ba se d on c hang e s in s e tba c k r e qu ir e me nts ); Vo we ll Ve ntu re s v. Cityof M ar tin , 47 S.W .3d 434, 437 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ( holding that plaintiff’s action for inverse c ondemnation and unconstitutional taking due to denial of building permit wer e time bar red, but noting that application of va lid zon ing or din a nc e s doe s not co ns titute a takin g wi tho ut j us t c omp e ns a tio n) ; MC Pr op e rti e s, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga , 99 4 S.W. 2d 13 2, 13 6 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 99 ) ( ho ldi ng that a re fu sa l to re zon e didno t de privela nd ow ne r of be ne fi c ia l us e of thepr op e rty

a nd , th e re fo re , th e rewa s n o b a sis t o h o l dt h a tt h e r e h a db e e n a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t ak ing ); K n ox Loudon Corporati on v. Town of Farragut , No. E2000-00174-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL 775077, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 16, 2000), perm. a pp. denied ( J an. 2, 2001) ( stating that if the i n i t i al p l an s for improveme nts had met all the zoning re quirements, which they did not, the local g overnme nt’s require ment for de dication of the property would have be en a ta

king)

. C. O T HE R F EDER A L C OU R T R EQ U IRE M EN TS F OR A T A K ING S C L A IM
Th e re g ulatory

takin g s a na ly sis ha s b e e n a pp lie d o nl y to d isc re te , s pe c if ic int e re sts in property

. See A

pfel , 524 U.S. at 541, 118 S.Ct . at 2155 (Ke nnedy , J

. co n cu rr i n g in judgment and dissenting in part) and at 553-55, 118 S.Ct. at 2161-62 (Br ey er, J., dissenting). Ge neraliz ed economic inter es t s arenot protecte d by the Taking s Clause. Id . State law def ines the scope of property rig hts and, thus, is critica l in determining whether a specific rig ht is en t i t l ed t o the protec tion of the Taking s Clause. See Lucas , 505 U. S. at 102 9, 11 2 S. Ct. a t 29 00 (h old ing , ina c a se involving real property , that g ener ally property rig hts will be defined by

ref ere nce to “ the re strictions that the bac kg round principles of the State’s law of

property and nuisanc e alr eady

place upon land ow ne rs hip ” ); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company , 467 U.S. 986, 1010-13, 104 S.Ct . 2862, 2877-79 (1984) ( relying on state law to dete rmine whe ther tra de sec rets are a property rig ht protecte d under the Taking s Clause).
I n Tenne ssee, to pursue a claim for unconstitutional taking, w hether based on phy sical occupancy

or re g ulatory

action, a plaintiff must have a ve sted interest or right in the pr operty

. See Fa r To we r S ite s, LLC , 126 S.W

. 3 d at 6 6-69. The trial court he rein de termined that Consolidated lacke d a suff

icient intere st in the property to have standing to bring a taking s claim. Consolidated d o es n o tap p ea l t h ath o l d i n g.In W ill ia m so n C o u n ty , t he C our t found t hat T enn es s ee had an adequat e procedur e for pur s ui ng just 18
co m p en sati o n thro ug h an inv erse c o nd em na t i o n p ro ce ed i ng . C o nse q ue ntl y, t he l an d o w ne r wa s req uired t o p ursu e tho se r eme di es be for e br i n g i n g a T ak i n g s Cl au s e ac t i on i n f ede r al c ou r t

. 473 U. S. a t 196, 105 S. Ct

. a t 3121- 22. 18 I n addition, the Uni t ed S t ates S upreme Court has adopted pr ocedur al re quirements that restric t fede ral c ourt revie w of reg ulatory taking s claims ag ainst local governments. Relevant to the case befor e us areripene ss require ments. A taking s claim based on the U.S. Consti tution is not ripe for r eview by

fede ral c ourts until (1) the re g ulatory entity has r en d er ed a “fina l decision” on the matter and (2) the plaintiff has soug ht just compensation by means of an available state proc edure

. W illiamson C ounty Regional Planning Comm’n v. H amilton Bank , 473 U.S. at 194, 105 S.C t

. at 3120 (1985).
T h e s ec o n dre q u i re m en ti s b as e du p o n t h e p ri n ci p l e t h att h e F i ft h Am en d m en t ’s T ak i n gs Clause protec ts ag ainst a g overnme ntal taking without justcompensation. Unt i l a landowne r has pursued a vailable methods for o b t ai n i n g compensation, no Taking s Clause injury has occ urre d. 18 473 U.S. at 195, 105 S.Ct . at 3122. B eca use t he F ifth Amendment protec ts onlyg overnme ntal t ak i n gs wi t h o u tj u s tco m p e n s a t i o n , t h er e h as l o n g b ee n a r eq u i re m en tt h ata p l ai n t i ff b ri n gi n g a taking claim show that he or she has be en denie d just compensation. Ruckelshaus , 467 U.S. at 1013- 14, 104 S.Ct . at 2878.
The other ripene ss require ment is based upon the premise that unless the landowne r soug ht a variance , he or she had not re ceive d a “f inal answe r” a s to the application of the land use re g ulation to his property . I f the landow ner soug ht and was g rante d a variance , there would be no nee d for fede ral co u rt s t o “addr ess the diffic ult and vexing questions associate d with reg ulatory taking s.” Mo ntg om e ry v . Ca rte r Co un ty , 226 F.3d 758, 764 ( 6th Cir. 2000).
I n other wor ds, a court cannot determine that a reg ulation or reg ulatory action “g oes too far ” unles s it knows ex actly

how fa r the re g ulation rea ches. Ma cDo na ld, So mm e r & Fr ate s v . Yolo Cou nty , 477 U.S. 340, 348, 106 S.Ct

. 2561, 2566 (1986). Be cause of the fa ctors to be c onsidered under Penn Central

in a re g ulato ry takin g s a na ly sis , w he rethat a na ly sis is the app ro priate on e to ap p l y, t h e c o u rt n e e d s t o k n o w t h e t yp e , i n t e n s i t y, o r l e v e l o f d e v e l o p m e n ta l l o w e do n t h e p r o p e rt y.
Ou r r e luc ta nc e to e xami ne takin g s c la ims un til su c h f inal de c isi on ha s be e n ma de is compelled by t h e v er y

nature of the inquiry

require d by

the J ust Compensation Clause . .

. among the fa ctors of pa rticular sig nificanc e in the [takings] inquiry arethe e c on omi c imp a c t of the c ha lle ng e d a c tio n a nd the e xten t to wh ic h it int e rf e re s w ith rea sonable investment-backe d expectations. . . . Those fa ctors simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative ag ency has ar ri v ed at a fina l, definitive position reg arding how it will apply the reg ulations at issue to the particular land in question.
W ill iam so n Co un ty , 473 U.S. at 190-91, 105 S.Ct. at 3118-19.G r aham i nv ol ved a cl ai m of exces s i ve force b y p ol i ce aga i ns t a f r ee ci t i zen and t he Supre me C our t he l d s uch 19
c l a i ms mu s t be a na l y z e d u n de r t h e F ou r t h Ame n dm e n t ’ s “ ob j e c t i v e r e a s on a bl e n e s s s t a n da r d” r a t h e r t h a n s om e g en er al i ze d s t an dar d u n der s u bs t an t i v e du e pr oce s s
. 490 U. S. a t 394, 109 S. Ct

. a t 1871.

“[ T ]he C o urt ha s a l ways be en rel uct ant t o exp and t he co ncep t of subst ant i ve d ue p roce ss be cause t he 20 gu i depo s t s for r es po ns i bl e deci s i on maki ng i n t hi s un cha rte r ed ar ea ar e s car ce and open- ended. ” C ol l i ns v. H ark er H e ig h ts , 50 3 U

. S. 11 5 , 12 5 , 11 2 S.Ct. 10 6 1 , 10 6 8 (19 9 2 ).

A nu m b e r o f t re a tises a n d c o u rts h a v e c la ssified o r c a te g o riz e d th e c irc u its a c c o rd ing to the ir p o sitio n o n this 21 is s u e a t t h e ti m e o f t h e a rtic le o r o p inio n w a s w ritten

. See , e. g. , Rob e r t As h br oo k , L a n d De v e l op me n t , t h e G r aha m D o c trine , an d the E x tinc tio n o f E c o n o m ic S u b sta n tive D u e P ro c e ss, 1 5 0 U . P a . L . R e v . 1 2 5 5 , 1 2 6 5 -7 6 (A p ril 2 0 0 2 ); 19 VI
. P RE -E M P T I ON O F S U BSTAN TI V E D U E P R O C ESS C L A IM
The Metropolitan Government’s arg ument that Consolidated c ould not bring a substantive due proc ess claim is based upon the principle announced in Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 109 S

. C t

. 1865 (1989), that whe re another provision of the U nited States Consti tution provides an expli ci t source of

protec tion from the conduc t complained of, the “more g ener alized notion” of substantive due proc ess should not be used to ana ly ze the claims. 490 U.S. at 395, 1 0 9 S

. C t. at 1871. Essentially , the Court believed that the protection offe red by substantive due process wa s 19 “at be st redundant” if another provisio n o ff

er ed expli cit protec tion of the same right. 490 U.S. at 395, n.10, 109 S.Ct . at 1871 n.10.
Th e Sup re me Cou rt

ha s si nc e no te d th a t Graham applies “if a constitutional claim is covere d b y a s p e c if

ic c o n s ti tu ti o n a l p r o v is io n.” Un i t ed S t a tes v. Lanier , 5 20 U. S. 2 59 , 2 72 n. 7, 11 7 S. Ct. 1219, 1228 n.7 (1997). I f a substantive due proce ss claim is not otherwise cove red by another , more specific p rovision, it is to be ana ly zed using tra ditional substantive due proce ss standards. See Cou nty of Sac ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 842-44, 118 S.Ct. at 1708, 1715-16 (ana ly zing an e x cessive f orce claim that did not involve a seizure or a sear ch u s i ng substantive due proc ess standar ds). The purpose be h i n d t h e ru le adopted in Graham is to avoid ex panding the conc ept of substantive due pr oc e ss w he repr ote c tio n f ro m th e c ha lle ng e d g ov e rn me ntal a c tio n is pr ov ide d b y a mor e sp e c if ic provision of the Constitut ion. Cou ntyof Sac ra me nto , 5 2 3 a t8 4 2 , 1 1 8 S

. C t

. a t1 7 1 4

. E s s e n t i a l l y, 20

“ to the e xten t th e reis d up lic a tio n, themor e e xplic it textu a l so ur c e of c on sti tution a l pr ote c tio n is to be used to a ssess the validity of the c halleng ed a ct i o n
. ” John Corp. v. City of Houston , 214 F.3d 573, 582 (5th Cir. 2000).
Some fede ral c ircuit courts ha ve applied the Graham principle to claims of unconstitutional takin g a ndvio latio n o f s ub stanti ve du e pr oc e ss. I n pa rtic ula r, the Ni nth Cir c uit

ha s h e ld that be c aus e the Taking s Clause provides an expli cit text ual s ourceof constitutional protection, that clause, rather than substantive due pr ocess, must provide th e analy tical framework f or claims based on g overnme ntal action impacting rea l property

. Armendariz v. Pe nman , 75 F.3d 1311, 1324 (9th Cir. 1996). 21

I n A r m e n d a r iz , the owner s of low income housing claimed that the ove r enf orce ment (thr ou g h s we e ps a ndc los ur e of bu ild ing s) of

theho us ing c od e c aus e d th e m to lose th eir pr op e rty20

throug h fore closure so that the land could be obtained and develope d by a shopping cente r deve loper forpri vat e gain . T he o wne rs c lai med th at t he gov ernm ent ’s a cti on s v io lat ed s ub st ant iv e du e pro cess. Th e y did no t explic itl y bring a takin g s claim, bu t impli e d that th e g ov e rn me ntal a c tio n w a s ta ke n to allow private use of the land. The c ourt interpre ted this aspect a s a private taking claim. The c ourt then held that “the Taking s Clause ‘provide s an explicit text ual s ource of constitutional protection’ ag ainst ‘private taking s,’” Id. at 1324.
Th e Ni nth Cir c uit c on se qu e ntl y he ld that the plaintif fs ’ sub stanti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im w ou ld no t sta nd a ndthat Graham pr ov ide d a n in su rm ou nta blehu rd le to p la intif

fs ’ s ub stanti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im. 75 F .3 d at 13 24 . N oti ng that su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss ana ly sis ha s n o pl a c e in c on te xts alre ady addre ssed by

expli cit Constit utional protec t i o n s , the court held that “eve n if the City ’s a lle g e d c on du c t w a s c le a

rl y arb itr ary a nd un re a so na

ble , h a vin g no su bs ta nti a l r e latio n to thepu bli c he a lth , s a fe ty , mo rals o r g e ne ral w e lf are , th e plaintif

fs ’ su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im f a ils be c aus e it is preempted by

other c onstitut ional claims.” Id . at 1318.
T h e N i n t h C i r c u i t h a s c o n t i n u e dt o ap p l y Ar me nd ar iz . I n Ma c ri v . Ki ng Cou nty , 126 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. de nied , 522 U.S. 1153, 118 S.C t. 1178 (1998) the plaintiffs claimed that t h e co u n t y d en i ed t h e pl ai n t i ffs ’ pl at ap p l i ca t i o n fo r s u b d i v i s i o n wi t h o u ts u b s t an t i al l y ad v an ci n g a leg itimate publ i c purpose and under c ircumstance s that denied them any benef icial use of the property

. T h e p l ai ntiffs attempted to cla ssify their claim as solely

one base d on substantive due pr oc e ss, arg uin g that a n a sserti on th at a g ov e rn me nt’ s a c tio n f a ile d to a dv a nc e a

le g iti mate state interest should be analy zed under due proce ss sta n d ar d s , re gardle ss of whethe r the a ction at issue involved rea l property . The Ninth C ircuit reje cted that a rg ument, noting that the Supre me Court has re pe a te dly

re c og nize d th a t “ a

la nd us e re stric tio n that do e s n ot s ub stanti a lly a dv a nc e le g iti mate state interests or de nies an owner economically viable use of

his land eff

ects a taking ” (the Agins test). 126 F.3d at 1129. Consequently , the court aff irmed t he dis missal of t he plainti ffs’ substantive due proce ss claim and analy zed the caseunder th e T ak i ng s Clause and its ripene ss require ments. See als o B uc k le s v . Ki ng Cou nty , 191 F.3d 1127, 1137 ( 9th Cir. 1999 ) (h o lding that plaintiffs w ere p re cl u d ed fr o m as s er t i n g a su b s t an t i v e du e pr o ce s s cl ai m “i n s t ea d o f, o r i n ad d i t i o n t o , a t a k i n gs claim” whe re p l ai n t i ff s challeng ed a r ezoning of their prope rty

on various g rounds); W

einberg v

. W ha tc om Cou nty , 2 41 F .3 d 7 46 , 7 49 n. 1 ( 9thCir . 2 00 1) (d ism iss ing su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im be c aus e it w as subsu me d in to also fi le d ta kin g s c la im) ; Esplanade Properties, L.L.C. v. Cit y of Se att le , 307 F.3d 978, 983 ( 9th Cir. 2002) cert. de nied , 539 U.S. 926, 123 S.C t

. 2574 (af firming dis mis sa l of

su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im w he replaintif fs c la ime d that c ity ’s de nial of pe rm its to develop shore line property resulted in complete depriva ti o no f e c o n o mi c u s eo f

p r o p e r ty , c o nstitut ing bo th a takin g a nd a de nial of s ub stanti ve du e pr oc e ss) ; Chevron USA, I nc v. B ronster , 363 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2004) ce rt. g rante d Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., I nc ., 125 S.Ct

. 314 (Oc t. 12, 2004) (“ The Ta kin g s Cl aus e su pe rcedes any su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c ha lle ng e s w he n a la w i s c ha lle ng e d a s a reg ulatory

taking .”).
Whether or not the plaintiff actua lly alleg es a violation of the Taking s Clause i s not dispositi ve of the prec lusion iss ue under the Ninth Circuit’s approa ch. Ar me nd ar iz , 75 F.3d at 1324 n. 9. No r i s th e plaintif

f’ s c ha ra c te ri zationof

thec la im. Th e te st a

pp e ars to b e wh e ther th e c la imIn A rm e n d a riz , t h e Cour t e x pl ai n ed t h at t h e f ac t t h at a t ak i n g s cl ai m i s r ej ec t ed or di s mi s s ed does n ot a l l ow 22 the su b sta n tive d u e p ro c e ss c la im . “.

. . G r aham do es not s t and fo r t he p rop o si t i o n t hat a plai nt i f f m ay b ri ng a s ub st ant i ve du e pr oce s s c l ai m wh en ev er h i s pot en t i al c l ai ms u n der mor e s pec i f i c pr ov i s i on s of

t h e B i l l of

Ri g h t s f ai l

. . . . ” 75 F. 3d at 1325.

C o urts in thi s st at e t reat de ci si o ns o f f ed eral dis t ri ct and ci rcui t co urt s as persuas i ve, but no t co nt roll i ng 23
a u tho rity w ith re g a rd to th e in te rp re ta tio n o f t h e U n ited S ta te s C o n stitutio n
. S t a t e v
. C a rru t h ers , 35 S. W

. 3d 516, 561
n. 45 (T enn. 20 0 0 ). 21 challeng es the same conduct a s a taking s claim, Ar me nd ar iz , 7 5 F.3d at 1324 n.9, or whethe r the claims alleg e “g overnme ntal interfe renc e with prope rty rig hts.” M

a d is o n v
. G r

a ham , 3 1 6 F.3d 22 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2002). In Madison , th e plaintif fs a lle g e d th a t a

state statut e a llo wi ng pu bli c us e of a ll w a te rs c apa

bleof re c re a tio na l us e un c on sti tution a lly vio late d th e ir

su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss rig hts. The plaintiffs “strenuously protest[ed] construc tion of their complaint as a taking s claim.” N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e N i n t h C i r c u i tf o u n dt h a tt h e a c t u a l h ar ma l l e g e d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f s w a s t h e i r

i n ab i l i t y, due to the statute, to exclude others f rom their prope rty

. Be cause the right of landowne rs to exclude others is an e ssential private pr operty rig ht, the Court f ound that the alleg ed harms were addre ssed by the Takings C lause and that plaintiffs’ claim mustbe analy zed as a taking s claim. Id . 316 F.3d at 870-71. The court also reje cted the plaintiffs’ arg ument that beca use they soug ht only

decla ratory a ndinj un c tiv e re lie f, no t dama g e s o r c omp e ns a tio n, thei r c omp la int c ou ld n ot b e int e rp re te d a s a takin g s c la im, stati ng th at land ow ne rs area llo we d to se e k s uc h e qu ita blere lie f i n o rd e r t o r e sis t taking s that threaten t o violate t he C onstitut ion. Id

. The court aff irmed dismiss al of the complaint but did not consider the merits of a taking s claim, presuma bly beca use t he plaintiffs did not plead, a ndsp e c if

ic a lly de nie d ma

kin g , s uc h a

c la im.
No t a ll c ir c uit s ha ve re a c he d the sa me c on c lus ion a s the Ni nth Cir c uit

. See , e.g. , Tri C ou nty 23 In du s. , Inc . v. Di str ic t of Col um bia , 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“ [T] he re quirements of the takin g s c laus e c a nn ot b e sa id t o e xhaus t th e F if th Ame nd me nt’ s subs ta nti ve pr ote c tio n of p ro pe rty rig hts from g overnme nt imposi tion.”) Some have simplycontinued to an al y ze the differ ent c h a l l e n g e s s e p ar a t e l y w i t h o u td i s c u s s i o n o f a n y Graham issue or implication. For ex am p l e, the Eleventh Ci rc u i t , althoug h clarify ing and distil ling its appra och to the ty pes of c lams that can be broug ht, has continued to ana ly ze eac h claim ac tually broug ht separately

. See Villas of Lake Jack son, Ltd. , 1 21 F .3 d 6 10 (d e te rm ini ng that th e reis n o in dep enden t “ su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss taking ” ca use of action and separ ately analy zing the plaintiff’ s taking s, substantive due proc ess, and e qu a l pr ote c tio n c la ims ); Restigouche, I nc ., 59 F.3d at 1211-12 (discussing the diffe rent ty pes of Constit utional challeng es, distinguishing t h e re q u irements for eac h type, and e x amining e ach one p re s en ti n t h atca s e) , ci t i n g Ei de v . Sar as ota Cou nty , 908 F.2d 716 ( 11th Cir. 1990), cert. de nied , 498 U.S. 1120 (1991) (discussing four ty pes of co n s t itutional challeng es to a zoning de cision and separ ately examining the ones pr esente d).
Other c ircuits continue to de velop their positions on the issue. For e x ample, in So uth Cou nty Sa nd & Gr

av e l Co ., In c . v . To wn o

f So uth Kin gs tow n , 16 0 F .3 d 83 4, 83 5 ( 1s t Cir . 1 99 8) , th e F ir st Circuit rec og nized a shift in the “leg al t er ra i n” since its earlier holding in Smithfield Concerned Citize ns for

Fa ir Zo nin g v . To wn o

f Sm ith fie ld , 907 F.2d 239, 242 ( 1s t Cir. 1990), where in it had22

allowed an “abstra ct” c halleng e to an a lleg edly irrational zoning pr ovisi o n o n s u b s tantive due pr oc e ss g ro un ds . T he sh if t wa s the pr e fe re nc e of

ma ny c ou rt s to a na ly ze s uc h c la ims un de r t akin g s, rathe r than substantive due proce ss, standards. Howeve r, the court conclude d, “Withal, there is no need to submit to a tyranny of l abels.” The court rea soned that the distinction betwee n the two types of ana ly sis was, in the circ umstances of the case befor e it, lar g ely a matter of semantics. 160 F .3d at 836. Noting that the Supreme Court’s ta k i n gs j u risprudenc e continued to r ely on earlier ca ses establishing the substantial relation test, the court found that a pproac h consistent with the rational basis test applied in Sm ith fie ld Con c e rn e d Ci tiz e ns to a fa cial ch al leng e to a zoning or dinance

. “Thus, althoug h the substantive limits of the Ta kings Clause may

not nece ssarily

coincide w ith the substan t i v e l i m i t s of the Due Process Clause in e very imag inable conte x t, . . . the limit s are cong ruent in this instance.” Id . T he c ou rt the n ana ly zedthec la ims un de r the ratio na l ba sis te st.
Some circuits have specific ally declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s approac h. I n John Corp. v. City of Houston , 214 F.3d 573 ( 5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit held t hat the princ iples of Graham did not mean that the applicabilityof a moreexpli cit provision pre-e mpts the protection of the due pr ocess c lause. Id . at 582. After a thoroug h revie w of the c ircuits on the issue, including the Ninth Circuit’s case s, the court declined to adopt a blanket rule that the Takings Clause subsumes a ny su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im r e latin g to a dep ri vatio n o f p ro pe rty , f ind ing su c h a

ru le inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit’s pre cede nts and with the approa ch take n by a majorityof other ci rc u i ts. Id . at 583. Instead, the c ourt determined that eac h caserequire d a “c are ful ana ly sis . . . to assess the extent to which a plaintiff’s substantive due pr ocess c laim rests on protec tions that are also aff orded by the Taking s Clause. . . .” Id.
The F ifth Circuit later desc ribed J oh n Co rp . a s h old ing that su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss c la ims alleg ing de privations of prope rty ar e n o t nece ssarily

subsumed under the Taking s Clause, that su bs ta nti ve du e proce ss c la ims c a n s urviv e a re late d ta

kin g s a rg ume nt, a ndthat th e c ou rt mus t analy ze whether

a taking s analy sis exhausts all the consti tutional claims. Simi Inve stment Co., Inc.
v . H ar ris Cou nty , 236 F.3d 240, 247- 49 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. de nied , Harris County v. Simi Inve stment Co., Inc. , 534 U.S. 1022, 122 S.Ct

. 550 (2001). In both J oh n Co rp . and Simi Inve stment , the court examined each of t h e cl ai ms propounded by the plaintiff. In John Corp. , the court determined that the complaint included only one due proce ss c laim that w as not a taking claim, and, t h e r e f o r e , u n a f f e c t e db y Graham . That claim was that the demolition of plaintiff’s property was car ried out under

an ordina nce that was unconstitutionally vag ue. The court a l s o found that the plaintiff’s equal pr otection claim asserted rig hts not protec ted by the Taking s Clause and, ther efor e, was not ame nable to tre atment as a taking s claim under Graham

. John Corp. , 214 F.3d at 585.
L i k ew ise, in Simi Inve stment , th e c o u rt d e te r mi n e dth a t th e p lain ti f f ’ s a ll e g a ti o n o f

an arb itr ary a ndill e g iti mate g ov e rn me ntal atte mpt to i nte rfer e wi th p ri vate pr op e rty ri g hts wa s a substantive due proc ess claim to be analy zed under tra ditional standards for such claims, not under the Taking s Clause. Simi Inve stment Co., Inc. , 236 F.3d at 249. See also Vulcan M aterials Co. v. City of T ehuacana , 238 F.3d 382, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2001) (analy zing, without refe renc e to Graham , plaintiff’s claim that an ordinanc e was arbitra ry and unrea sonable and lac ked a r eal and substantial re latio n to the g oa l of the c ity un de r sub stanti ve du e pr oc e ss, wh e replaintif f b ro ug ht f

e de ral a ndstateT he Sixt h C i rcui t dis t i ngui shed t he t y p es of “ fed eral zo ni ng cl ai m s” as i ncl ud i ng: (1) ju s t c ompen s at i o n t aki ngs 24 claim s wh ere i n the re m ed y so u g ht wa s co m p en sati o n for z o ning that co nsti t utes a taking o f p ro p erty; (2 ) d ue p ro ce ss t aki ngs cl ai m s, w here the p l ai nt i f f c l ai m s t hat t he zo ni ng ap p l i cab l e t o hi s p rop ert y goe s t o o f ar and d est roys i t s val ue so t hat it a m o unt s t o a taki ng a nd the rem ed y so ught i s i nval i d at i o n of t he zo ni ng regul at i o n; (3) arbi t rary and cap ri ci o us s ubs t ant i ve due pr oces s cl ai ms, wh er ei n t he pl ai nt i f f cl ai ms t hat t he zoni ng reg ul at i on i s arbi t r ar y and capr i ci ous i n t hat i t does not bear a s ubs t ant i al r el at i on t o t he publ i c h eal t h, s af et y , mo r al s o r ge ner al wel f ar e, an d whi ch may be ei t her an as
- appl i ed or f ac i al c h al l en g e; ( 4) equ al prot ec t i on cl ai ms ; (5) pr oce du r al du e pr oce s s c l ai ms ; a n d, l es s f r equ en t l y , ( 6) F irst A m e n d m e n t vio la tio n s b y the z o n ing o rd ina n c e . 9 6 1 F .2 d a t 1 2 1 5 -1 6

. 23 taking s, substantive due proc ess, proc edura l due proc ess, and e qual protec tion claims).
The Six th Circuit has adopted a somewhat differ ent appr oach to f eder al court review of loca l zoning ac tions. I n Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc , 961 F.2d 1211 ( 6 t h Cir. 1992), that court spec i fi cally

reve rsed the lowe r court’s holding that a ll feder al zoning ca ses should be treated as taking s claims, beca

use that position could not be rec onciled with c urre nt c ontrolling prec edent, 961 F .2 d at 12 13 -1 4, a ndre

je c te d th e arg ume nt that “ a ll a rb itr ary a ndc apric iou s su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss claims aremerg ed” into taking s claims. 961 F.2d at 1216.
I n th a t op ini on , t he court e xami ne d th e dif

fe re nt c ir c uit s’ tr e a tme nt o f zo nin g c a se s w ith reg ard to ripe ness re quirements, due pr ocess standa rds, and other

issues. The c ourt observe d that

24 some courts imposed a ripene ss r equire ment in zoning case s, but e x plained that that require ment was only applicable to takings c laims because fe dera l courts cannot know what has been taken or what compensation has been a ffor ded unless those re quirements ar e met. The court a lso observed that some circ uits im posed a less stringe nt ripeness re quirement on non-ta king zoning case s described as “a s applied substantive due pr ocess c laims.” 961 F.2d 1215.
I n Be rg e r v . Ci ty of M

ay fie ld H e igh ts , 154 F.3d 621 ( 6th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff cha lleng ed, on va ri ou s g ro un ds inc lud ing a

takin g s claim, a n ord inanc e re qu iring ow ne rs of sma ll l ots to c ut the ir pr op e rty to a ma ximum

he ig ht. Th e c ou rt dec ide d th a t th e or din a nc e vio late d th e Du e Pr oc e ss Claus e a ndtheEq ua l Pr ote c tio n Cl aus e be c aus e the rewa s n o r a tio na l r e latio ns hip be tw e e n th e te rm s of the ordinance and a leg itimate public purpose. Id . at 6 25 -6 26 . T he c ou rt fo un d th e oth e r c la ims , inc lud ing thetakin g s c la im, to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.
I n Richardson v. Township of Brady , 218 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff c halleng ed a zoning or dinance on the basis of substantive and proce dural due proce ss, equal prote ction, and taking s. O n ap p e a l t o th e Si xthCi r c u it , h e li mi te dh is c laim s to s u b s tan ti v e a n dp r o c e d u r a l due proce ss, challeng ing the ordinanc e as violative of substantive due proces s both on its face and as app lie d to his pr op e rty . T he c ou rt c on sid e re d e a c h o f the se c la ims

. I n Mo ntg om e ry v . Ca rte r Co un ty , 226 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2000), the Six th Circuit considered the ripeness require ments of W illiamson C ounty in the context of an alleg ed taking for private, ratherO n tha t i ssu e , t h e c o u rt h e ld tha t t h e T a k ing s C la u se p ro h ib its t h e go v e rn m e n t’s t a k ing o f p ro p e rty fo r p riv a te 25 use, a nd just c o m p ensat i o n is no t a n a d eq uat e rem ed y a s i t is in a t aki ng for a p ub l i c p urpo se. C o nsequentl y , t he co urt h el d t h at a pl ai n t i f

f w h o al l eg ed a pr i v at e t ak i n g wa s n ot r equ i r ed t o mee t t h e r i pen es s r equ i r eme n t s
. 226 F

. 3d a t 767.

T h e c o u rt s ta te d , “w h a te v e r th e a p p lica b ili ty o f t h e c o n c e p ts o f p ro c e d u ra l an d su b sta n tive d u e p ro c e ss to 26 ta k ing s c la im s, w e a g re e tho se c o n c e p ts m a y n o t b e u se d in o rd e r t o m o u n t a n e n d ru n a ro u n d the rip e n e ss r e q u ire m e n ts o f W ill ia m so n C o u n ty

. ” 226 F. 3d a t 769- 770. 24 than public, purposes. I n that opinion, however , the court discussed the plaintiff’s c laims that were 25 ba se d o n c on sti tution a l vio latio ns in a dd iti on to he r takin g s c la im. Th e c ou rt a c kn ow le dg e d th a t it s o wn p re ce d en t s , i n cl u d i n g Pearson , a llo we d the plaintif f to a sse rt du e pr oc e ss c la ims in a dd iti on to a taking s claim. 226 F.3d at 768. Howeve r, the c ourt noted that “it is not clear why the conc ept of substantive due process should have any place in takings c ases” and discussed, w ith appare nt approv al , t he Ninth Circuit’s position in Ar me nd ar iz . 226 F.3d at 769. Nonetheless, the c ourt declined to de cide whe ther the Ta kings Clause pree mpts or subsum e s a more g ener alized substantive due proc ess claim in a zoning or land use c ase. 226 F.3d at 769-70.

26
The S ix th Circuit opinions since Mo ntg om e ry requiresome discussion. I n some ca ses, the court c ontinued to u s e the Pearson g uidelines for analy sis. See, e .g., Tri-Corp Management Com pa nyv . P ra zn ik , 33 Fe d. Appx. 742 (6th C ir. 2002) (c onsidering separ ately eac h of plaintiff’s claims of denia l of proc ed u ra l d ue proc ess, equa l protection, substantive due pr ocess a s well as compensatory and due proce ss ta kings claims related to c ity zoning offic ials’ issuance of stop work order and holding that only

the substantive due pr ocess c laim was viable) . I n other c ases the c ourt has applied the Ar

me nd ar iz -re lated dicta in Mo ntg om e ry and stated that the plaintiff’s substantive due proc ess claim wa s subsumed by his taking c laim, at least whe re the claims wer e esse ntially the s ame. See Bu c k le s v . Co lum bu s M un ic ipa l A irp or t A uth or ity , 9 0 F e d

. A p p x. 9 2 7 , 9 31 (6th Cir. 20 04 ) ( ho ldi ng that a

su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im that me re ly re state s a mor e sp e c if

ic takin g s c la im wi ll n ot l ie ); Cho ate ’s Ai r Con dit ion ing & He ati ng , I nc . v . Li gh t, Gas an d W

ate r D iv isi on of t

he City of M e mp his , 1 6 Fed

. Appx. 323 , 3 30 -3 1( 6thCir . 2 00 1) (h old ing that th e plaintif f h a d me re ly “re packa g ed a ta

kings c laim as a substantive due proce s s violation” and dis mis sin g that c la im beca use it was not ripe)

. Ba nk s v. C ityof W

hite ha ll , 344 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2003) , involved a challeng e to enforc ement of loc a l bu ild in g an d fi rec od e s w hic h th e plaintif f c la ime d amou nte d to a

takin g a ndwa s a lso unconstitutionallyselec tive. The trial court held the taking s and inverse condemnation claims were not ripe for revie w, and plaintiff di d not appeal those holdings. Thedeterminative issue in the appea l wa s w he the r the la ws uit

wa s f ile d o uts idetheapp lic able statut e of lim itatio ns , andtheSixth C ir c uit he ld i t w a s. No ne the le ss, thec ou rt dis c us se d th e me ri ts o f the plaintif f’ s su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss claim. Id

. at 554-555. Although the court noted that “the F ifth Amendment, and not substantive due pr oc e ss, is the ba sis up on wh ic h a plaintif f may c ha lle ng e the g ov e rn me nt’ s a c tio ns wi th r e sp e c t to his property ,” Id

. at 554, it also separ ately considere d the pl aintiff’s challeng e to the conduct of local g overnme nt officials, a

pply ing substantive dueproce ss standards. Id . at 554-555.In Ci t y of Cuyahoga Fal l s v. Buck ey e Com m uni t y H ope Foundat i on , 538 U

. S. 188, 123 S. Ct

. 1389 ( 2003) 27 t h e Cour t c on s i der ed wh et h er a c i t y h ad v i ol at ed t h e equ al pr ot ec t i on or s u bs t an t i v e du e pr oce s s r i g h t s of de v el oper s of
a m ul t i f am i l y , l o w- i nco m e ho usi ng co m p l ex when i t s ub m i t t ed t o po p ul ar r eferend um an or d inance repe al i ng t he
co unci l ’ s ap p roval o f

t he p roject. T he C o urt ap p l i ed eq ual pro t ect io n a n d s ub st ant i ve d ue p roce ss anal y ses and st and ards. 53 8 U

. S. at 19 4

- 9 5 , 12 3 S.Ct. at 13 9 4

- 9 8

. I n a co ncurri ng op i ni o n, Just i ce S cal i a no t ed t hat t ho se cl ai m i ng a rb itra ry d e p riv a tio n s o f n o n fun d a m e n ta l lib e rty inte re sts m u st lo o k to the E q u a l P ro te c tio n C la u se a n d tha t G r ah am v. Conn o r p re c lud e s the u se o f a su b sta n tive d u e p ro c e ss an a lysis w h e n a m o re sp e c ifi c c o n stitutio n a l p ro v isio n , i.e

. , equa l p rotect i o n, go verns
. 5 3 8 U

. S. at 2 0 0

- 0 1 , 1 2 3 S.C t

. at 1 3 9 7 (Scali a, J. co ncurri ng). A l t ho ugh t he co ncurrence me nt i o ns t he T aki ng s Cl aus e, i t i s i n t he cont ext of ex pl ai ni ng t hat t hat cl aus e a l l ows conf i s cat i on, wi t h c om pens at i on, as wel l as r egu l at i on of

l and, t hu s demo ns t r at i ng t hat l and us e i s s ues do not i mp l i cat e f un dam ent al l i bert y i nt er es t s
. W e do not r ead tha t co n c u rr e n c e a s ind ic a ting tha t t h e T a k ing s C la u se su p e rc e d e s su b sta n tive d u e p ro c e ss. But se e C ity o f W h iteh a ll , 3 4 4 F.3d at 55 4 (i nd i cat i ng s uch an i nt erpret at i o n).

T he pl ur al i t y opi ni on was aut hor ed by Jus t i ce O ’ C onnor and j oi ned i n by C hi ef Jus t i ce R ehn qui s t and Ju s t i ces 28 S ca l i a a nd T ho m as.

In E spl an ad e Pr op e r t i e s , L

. L. C. , sup ra , t h e N inth C irc u it reje c te d a n a rg u m e n t t h a t t h e S u p re m e C o u rt’s 29 d eci si o n i n A pf

el ov er t u r n ed A rm e n d a riz

. 307 F

. 3d a t 982- 83.

A s t o the C o urt ’ s res o l ut i o n of t he subst ant i ve i ss ues i n A pf el , b e c a u se n o sin g le ra tio n a le e x p la inin g the re su lt 30 was agreed up o n by f

i ve jus t i ces, “ t he ho l d i ng of t he C o urt m ay b e vi ewed a s t hat p o si t i o n taken b y those M em b ers who
concu r r ed i n t he j ud gm en t s o n t he na r r owes t gr ounds

. . . . ” M ark s v. U ni t ed St at es , 430 U

. S. 188, 193, 97 S. Ct

. 990 (1 9 7 7 ). Fed eral co urt s exam i ni ng A p fe l h a v e fo u n d tha t i t d id no t ar ticu la te b ind ing p rin c ip le s o f l a w
. See Asar co Incor por at ed v. D ep’ t

. of

Ecol ogy , 43 P

. 3 d 47 1 , 47 5 n. 9 (W ash. 20 0 2 ) ( l i st i ng t ho se op i ni o ns)

. 25 T h e U n i t e dS t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u rth a s ye tt o ap p l y Graham to prec lude a substantive due pr oc e ss ana ly sis wh e n a taking s claim is a lso ple a d o r i mpl ic a te d. It ha d th e op po rtun ity to d o s o 27 in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfe l , in which the Court consider ed the c onstitut i o n al ity of a f eder al statute that established a

mechanism for funding benef its to coal industry retire es. The plaintiff, w ho under the statute would be re quired to contribute to the fund, sought decla ratory and injunctive re lief an das s er t ed t h att h e s t at u t e v i o l at ed i t s s u b s t an t i v e d u e p ro ce s s ri gh t s an dal s o co n s t i t u t ed a t ak i n g.
Four justices held that the act was unconstitutional because it violated the Taking s Clause, but decli n ed t o addre ss the plaintiff’s due pr ocess c laim. 524 U.S. at 538, 118 S.Ct . at 2153. 28 Justi c e Ke nn e dy

c on c ur re d inthere su lt h old ing thestatut e un c on sti tu ti o n al , b u t fo un d th a t th e statut e s h o u l db e i n v al i d at ed s o l el y u p o n “e s s en t i al d u e p ro ce s s p ri n ci p l es , wi t h o u tre gar dt o t h e T ak i n gs Clause of the F ifth Amendment.” Id. , 524 at 539, 118 S.Ct . at 2154. The r emaining four dissenting justices analy zed the cl ai m s under substantive dueproce ss and found no c onstitut ional violation under that clause. 29
As a re su lt, fi ve jus tic e s he ld the statut e un c on sti tution a l, bu t on dif fe re nt g ro un ds . F ivea lso used a dueproce ss analy sis. For purpose s of t he pre-emption i ssue before us, the sig nificanc e lies in t h e fa ct t h at five justices found a substantive due proc ess ana ly sis appropriate even thoug h a taking s claim had also been alleg ed. None of the j ustices refer red to or applied the princ iples of 30 Graham to the question of which c onstitut ional provision should be used.H is p rim a ry o b je c tio n w a s tha t t h e leg islatio n in q u e stio n d id no t t a k e the p la intiff ’s p ro p e rty b u t sim p ly 31 im p o se d a n o b liga tio n to p e rfo rm a n a c t, i

. e. , p a ym e n t o f b e n e fit s. A d d iti o n a lly, he o b je c te d to the p lur a lit y’s ab and o nm ent o r di sr egard , i n hi s vi ew, o f t he p revi o usl y est ab l i shed req ui rem ent fo r a r egul at o ry t aki ngs cl ai m t hat t he
re g u la tio n o r go v e rn m e n ta l c o n d u c t a ff e c t a sp e c ifi c p ro p e rty rig h t o r in te re st. Id. , 524 U

. S. a t 540- 42, 118 S. Ct

. a t 2154- 5 5

. “ A s t he range of

gove rnme nt al co nd uct s ub ject ed t o t aki ngs anal y si s has exp and ed , ho wever, we have b een caref ul not t o l ose s i gh t of t he i mp ort anc e of i dent i f y i ng t he propert y al l ege dl y t ake n, l es t al l gover nment al act i on be s ubj ect ed t o exa mi nat i on un der t he cons t i t ut i onal prohi bi t i on ag ai ns t t aki ng wi t hout j us t comp ens at i on, wi t h t he at t endan t pot ent i al for money damages

. ” A pf el , 5 2 4 U

. S. at 54 3 , 11 8 S.Ct. at 21 5 6 (K enned y , J. co ncurri ng i n t he judgm ent and dis sent i ng i n pa rt ).

Jo i ni ng i n t hi s d i ss ent were Just i ces St evens, So ut er, and G i nsberg.

32
26 J ustice O’Connor, in the plur ality opinion, stated that a Taking s Clause ana ly sis was corr ect be c aus e that c laus e ha d b e e n us e d pr e vio us ly to e xami ne sim ila r e c on omi c le g isl a tio n. Ce ntr a l to the that examination was the statute’s se vere re troac tive eff ect. Justi ce O ’Connor stated that the statuteb u r d e n e df

o r me r e mp lo y e r s b a s e do n lo n g p a s t c o n d u c t an du n r e late dto a n y c o mmitm ent they made or injury they cause d and, ther efor e, “the g over n m en t al action im plicates fundamental principles of f

airne ss underlying the Taking s Clause.” U.S. at 537, 118 S.Ct. at 2153.
The plurality opinion r ecog nized that the plaintiff had also claimed that t h e l egislation violated substantive due pr ocess , b u t fo u n d it unnecessa ry to consider that c laim in view of the determination that the leg islati o n wa s invalid based on the Ta kings Clause analy sis. J ustice O’Connor noted that there w as a que stion whether the A ct at issue violated due proce ss “in light of the Act’ s sever ely

retroa ctive impact.” Altho u gh t h e J ustice re iterate d the Court’s conc erns a bout using the Due Process Clause t o invalidate economic l eg islation, the reason f or dec lining to re view t h e d u e p r o c e s s c l a i m w a s t h a t s u c h r e v i e w w a s u n n e c e s s ary, n o t t h a t i tw a s p r e c l u d e db y Graham or other pr ece dent. Id. , 524 U.S. at 537, 118 S.Ct . at 2153.
J ustice Ke nnedy , howeve r, t ook the position that the Act was invalid as “ contra ry to essential due proc ess principles,” and that the plura lity ’s Taking s Clause analy sis was not onl y unnece ssary for de cision of the ca se, but also incorr ect. 524 U.S. at 539, 118 S.Ct. at 2154. 31
J u s t i ce Ke n n ed y

s aw t h e p l u ra l i t y

as ad o p t i n g a “ n o v e l an dex p an s i v e” co n ce p to f t ak i n gs la w. Heno te d th a t, t

ra dition a lly , th e Ta

kin g s Cl aus e ha s n ot b e e n s e e n a s a su bs ta nti ve or

abs olu te limit ation on the g overnme n t ’s p o wer, but rather as a c onditional lim itation that allows the g overnme nt to do what it wants so long a s it “pay s the cha rg e.” 524 U .S. at 5 4 4 -4 5 , 1 1 8 S.Ct . at 2157. Be causethe constitutionalityof the legislation at issue appea red to turn on the leg itimacy of the substantive dec ision byCon gre s s ra ther than on the availability of just compensation, Jus tice Kenne dy conclude d that the more a ppropriate analy sis was under due proce ss. 524 U.S. at 545, 118 S.Ct . at 2157.
J ustice B reyer, in dissent, fr amed the question as whether the leg islation place d a burde n on the plaintiff that wa s fundamenta lly unfair. 524 U .S. at 553, 118 S.Ct

. at 2161. He, a long w ith the other thre e justices joining in his dissent, ag ree d with J ustice Ke nnedy that the plurality

viewed the 32
case“throug h the wrong leg al lens.” 524 U .S. at 554, 118 S.Ct . at 2161. Their dissent maintaine dA d d i t i o nal l y , Just i ce B rey er st at ed t hat t he T aki ngs C l ause had al ways fo cused o n a whet her t he go vernm ent 33 had i nvad ed or ap p rop ri ated a s p eci f i c i nt erest i n phys i cal or i nt el l ect ual pro p ert y
. T he st at ut e at i ss ue i n A pf el , he mai n t ai n ed, i n v ol v ed n o s u ch i n t er es t , bu t on l y an or di n ar y l i abi l i t y t o pa y mon ey t o a t h i r d pa r t y
. 524 U. S. a t 554, 118 S.C t

. a t 2 1 6 2

. Se ei ng no ne ed to “t o rt ure” the T aki ngs C l ause t o f i t t he f act s o f

t he case contr ary t o pri o r i nt erpret at i o n, Ju st i ce B reye r fo un d t ha t t he q ue st i o n o f w he t he r t he st atute’s cre ati o n o f retro ac t i ve l i ab i l i t y was u nfair sho uld f i nd “a
n at u r al h ome i n t h e D u e Proc es s Cl au s e. ” 524 U

. S. a t 556, 118 S. Ct

. a t 2163.

In ad d i t i o n t o t he C o urt ’ s t reat m ent o f d ue p roce ss and t aki ngs i n A pf el , th e C o u rt h a s a lso s ta te d tha t “C e rta in 34

w ro ng s aff

ec t m o re than a single right an d , ac co rd i ng l y, ca n im p l i ca t e m o re than o ne o f t he C o nsti t uti o n’s co m m an d s. W h e re su c h m u lti p le vio la tio n s a re a lleg e d , w e a re no t i n the ha b it o f i d e n ti fy in g a s a p re lim ina ry m a tter the c la im ’s

‘ do mi nan t ’ ch ar act er
. Rat her , we exa mi ne eac h cons t i t ut i onal provi s i on i n t ur n. ” S o ld a l v. C o o k C o u n ty , Ill

. , 506 U

. S. 5 6 ,7 0 , 1 1 3 S .C t. 5 3 8 , 5 4 8 (1 9 9 2 ). S e e a lso U n ited S ta te s v . Ja m e s D a n ie l G o o d R e a l P ro p e rty , 510 U

. S. 43, 49, 114 S.C t

. 4 9 2 , 4 9 9 (1 9 9 3 ) (“ W e have reject ed the vi ew t hat t he ap p l i cab i l i t y of o ne co nst i t ut i o nal am end m ent pre- em p t s t he gu ar ant ees of

an ot her

. ”) 27 that the Taking s Clause is conce rned w ith providing c ompensation for le g itimate g overnme nt action that takes private property , not w ith pr eventing arbitra ry or unfair g overnme nt action. 524 U.S. at 554, 118 S.Ct . at 2161. 33
The four justices in dissent found, based on the history of promises and la

bor pra ctices in the past, it was not fundame ntally unfair f or Cong ress to impose upon the forme r employ er liability for future he alth car e costs of miner s it employ ed y ear s ag o. 524 U.S. at 566, 118 S.Ct . at 2167. Although va

rious members of

the Court differ ed on which pr ovision of the United States Constit ution should apply to their revie w of the statute, nonesug g ested that the Ta kings Clause preempted the DueProcess Clause. For ex ample, J ustice S tevens, in di ssent, conclude d that “whe ther the provision in question is analy zed under the Ta kings C lause or the Due Proc ess Clause,” the plaintif f ha d not ove rc ome the pr e su mption of c on sti tution a lity a c c or de d to thele g isl a tio n. 52 4 U .S. at 553, 118 S.Ct

. at 2161. No mention was madeof Graham , althoug h the same c onduct (a doption of the Coal Ac t and its application to former employ ers) was the f

ac t u al basis for both ty

pes of c la ims

. We are persua ded that the United States Supre me Court has not adopted a position t hat s u b s t an t i v e due proc ess claims re lated to a zoning or dinance arealway s subsumed into a takings claim. The Court’s re cent de cision in Lin gle solidifies our conclusion bec ause the Court rejec ted

34 the “substantially ad v an ce s” test as pa rt of a r eg ulatory

taking s analy sis and made it clea r that the validity of a zoning ordinanc e as an exercise of the g overnme nt’s police powe r is to be tested under tr a dition a l due pr oc e ss ratio na l ba sis princ ipl e s. “ We c on c lud e that th is f ormul a [the ‘s ub stanti a lly advanc es’ f

ormula] prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a taking s, test, and that it has no proper place in our taking s jurisprudence .” Lin gle , 125 S.Ct

. at 2083. After explaining the historical basis for the “comming ling” in Agins of due proce ss and takings i nquiries, t he C ourt made it c le ar that th e a na lytic a l un de rp inn ing s o f the c la ims we redif fe re nt:28

The “ substantially

advanc es” f

ormula sug g ests a means-end test: It asks, in essence , wh e the r a re g ulatio n o f p ri vate pr op e rty is e ff e c tiv e in a c hie vin g so me legi timat e public purpose. An inquiry of this nature ha s so m e logic in the conte x t of a due proce ss challeng e, for

a re g ulation that fails t o serve any leg itimate gove rnmental ob je c tiv e may

be so arb itr ary

or ir ratio nal that it

ru ns a fo ul o f the Du e Pr oc e ss Clause. See, e .g. , Cou ntyof Sac ra me nto v . Le wis , 523 U.S . 833 , 8 46 , 1 18 S.Ct

. 17 08 , 1 40 L . E d. 2d 10 43 (1 99 8) (s tatin g that th e Du e Pr oc e ss C laus e is i nte nd e d, in pa rt , to pr ote c t th e ind ivi du a l ag a ins t “th e e xer c ise of po we r w ith ou t a ny

re a so na ble jus tif ic a tio n in the se rv ic e of

a le g iti mate g ov e rn me ntal ob je c tiv e ” ). B ut s uc h a

te st is not a valid method of discerning w hether private pr operty

has b ee n “t ak en ” for pu rp os e s o f the F if

th A me nd me nt.
Lin gle , 125 S.Ct . at 2083-84.
I n contra st, reg ulatory

taking s analy sis under P e n n Ce n tral i n v olves inquiry into the mag nitude and cha

rac ter of the burden imposed by the g overnme ntal action. The means-e nd test that looks at the purpose of the reg ulation and the relationship betwe en that purpose and the ef fec t of the reg ulation adds not hing to the reg ulatory taking s analy sis. Id

. “A test that tells us nothing about the actua l burden imposed on prope rty rig hts, or how that burden is allocated c annot tell us when justice might re quire that the bur den be spr ead among tax pay ers throug h the payment of compe nsation.” Id . at 2084.
Be causethe “substantiallyadvanc es” te st addresse s the validity of a r eg ulation, that inquiry “is log ically

prior to and distin ct fromthe question of whe ther a reg ul at i o n ef

fects a taking .” Id

. Where the g overnme nt’s reg ulation of land use is impermissibl e or inva lid, such as wher e it is not rationally related to a leg itimate state interest or is ar bitrary or ca pricious, the re medy

is invalidation of the re g ulation, and a taking s analy sis or reme dy is inappropriate. Such a finding ends the inquiry beca use the Ta kings Clause presuppose s that the cha lleng ed g overnme ntal action is otherwise valid. I f it is not, the Taking s Clause does not provide a reme dy since “[n] o amount of compe nsation” can authorize an otherwise improper or impermissible g overnme ntal action. Id . at 2084.
The c onsequenc e of the L i n gle ho ld in gs to the iss ue be fo reus is c le ar. Th e Du e Pr oc e ss Clause and the Taking s Clause provide differ ent protec tions fr om g overnme ntal action. Thus, either type of c laim may

be appr opriate de pending upon the governmental action complained of, the right at issue, and ty

pe of injury

alleg ed. Consequently , just because a zon i n g o rd i nanceaff ects re al property , a landowne r is not precl u d ed from bringing a claim challeng ing the validity of that o rd i n an ce o n t h e b as i s i ti s n o tra t i o n al l y re l at ed t o a le gi t i m at e gov er n m en t al p u rp o s e. T h e T ak i n gs Clause does not pre -empt a c halleng e to a zoning or dinance based on substantive due process. To the contra ry , as the Court stated in Lin gle , th e du e pr oc e ss c ha lle ng e pr e c e de s a ny takin g s c la im.
We f indpe rs ua siv e , andmor e c on sis te nt w iththeho ldi ng s o f the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt , th e app ro a c h o f the F if th Cir c uit a nd , to the e xten t we c or re c tly un de rs ta nd it, that of theSixth Cir c uit . T ho se c ou rt s lo ok a t th e a c tual c la ims to d e te rm ineif the su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c la ims29

arein r e a lity

on ly re c a st takin g s claims

. I f not , the y are se pa rate ly re vie we d ac c or din g to a pp lic able princ ipl e s.
As a g ener al theory , the primary purpose of a taking s claim is to enfor ce the constitutional protec tion ag ainst g overnme nt deprivation of private prope rty without just compensation. It is not an at t ac kon the validity

of the g overnme ntal action itself. Se e ge ne ra llyPre se au lt v . I nte rst ate Commerce Commission , 494 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct . 914 (1990) ( holding, in a c ase a lleg ing that a fe dera l statute was unc onstitut ional on its face beca use it took private prope rty without justcompensation, that wher e the law provides a method to se cure just compensation, no Taking s Clause violation can be shown until compe nsation is denied). “ I f the g overnme nt has provided an adequate proc ess for ob ta ini ng c omp e ns a tio n, a ndif re so rt to that pr oc e ss ‘ y ie ld[s ] jus t c omp e ns a tio n, ’ the n th e pr op e rty owner has no claim ag ainst t h e Go v er n m en t ’ for a taking .” Id. at 11, 110 S.Ct. at 921, quoti ng W illiamson C o u n t

y R egional Planning Comm’n , 473 U.S. at 194-95, 105 S.Ct. at 3121, quoting Ruckelshaus , 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21, 104 S.Ct . at 2881 n.21. As the Supreme Court r ece ntly reiter ated in Lin gle , the F if th A me nd me nt “ do e s n ot p ro hib it the taking of private property , but instead pl ace s a condition on the exercise of that power .” Fi rst English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles , 482 U.S. 304, 314, 107 S.Ct . 2378, 2385 (1987). TheTaking s Clause is “desig ned not to limit the g overnme ntal interfe renc e wi th p ro pe rty

ri g hts pe r se , but rather to secure compe nsation in the event of otherwise pr oper interfe renc e amounting to a taking .” Id. at 315, 107 S.Ct. at 238 5 -8 6

. Governmental ac tion that works a taking trig g ers the constitutional oblig ation to pay for the pr operty

rig hts taken. Id

. Lin gle re lie s o n th e se ba sic c on c e pts c on c e rni ng th e pu rp os e a nde ff e c ts o f the Ta

kin g s Cl aus e in i ts rationale of t he inapplicabilityof the “ substantially advanc es” te st. Lin gle , 125 S.Ct . at 2080, 2084.
Ontheoth e r h a nd , an att a c k on a leg isl a tiv e a c tio n o n th e ba sis of su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss direc tly challeng es the va lidityof the e nactment and seeks to h av e i t v o i d ed. Lin gle , 125 S.Ct . at 20 84 . Wh e the r a

g ov e rn me ntal e nti ty

ha s th e auth ority

to t ake thea c tio n at issue is a c omp le te ly separ ate que stion from whether that action resulted in a taking that must be compensate d. Pre se au lt, 49 4 U .S. a t 22 -2 4, 11 0 S. Ct. a t 92 7- 28 (O ’C on no r, J., c on c ur ri ng ); Ruckelshaus , 467 U.S. at 1012, 104 S.Ct . at 2878. The D ue Proce ss Clause “saf eg uar d s ci t izens from arbitra ry or irrational leg islation.” Apfel , 524 U.S. at 556, 118 S.Ct . at 2163 (Stevens, J. diss enting ). See also County of Sa c ra me nto , 523 U.S. at 846, 118 S.Ct . 1708 (stati n g t h at the Due Proc ess Clause prote cts the individual from “the e x erc ise of powe r without any rea sonabl e j u s t i fi cation in the service of a leg itimate gove rnmental objec tive”).
We conclude th a t C o n s o li d a te d ’ s d u e p r o c e s s c laim h e r e inw a s ju s t th a t: a n a tt a c k o n the vali d ity o f th e o r d in a n c e s b e c au s e th e y w e r e n o t r a ti o n a ll y

r e late dto a

le g itim a teg o v e r n me ntal interest. The fac t that the ordinanc es at issue af fec t land use does not eliminate Consolidated’s right to be fre e from arbitra

ry or irrational leg islation. Conseque ntly , we hold that Consolidated was not prec luded from pur suing its substantive due pr ocess c laim simpl y b ecause the or dinance s at issue dealt with prope rty

.S ee a l so , B i gel ow v. M i chi ga n D ep’tof Na t ural R es ou r ces , 97 0 F. 2d 154 , 160 ( 6t h Ci r
. 199 2) ( hol di ng t hat 35 wh en t h e s u bs t an t i v e du e proce s s c l ai m i s a n ci l l ar y or a n a dj u n ct t o a t ak i n g s c l ai m, t h e r i pen es s r equ i r eme n t s of W i l l i am s on Co un t

y w i l l be a pp l i e d s o t h a t pl a i n t i f f s c a n n ot “ c i r c u mv e n t t he r i pe n e s s r e qu i r e me n t for t a k i n g s c l a i ms si m p l y by att ac hing a p ro ce d ura l d ue p ro ce ss c l aim to the i r c o m p l aint. ” W e h av e h eld t ha t C o nso l i d ated ’ s d ue p ro ce ss c la im w a s n o t an c ill a ry n o r a n a d ju n c t t o it s ta k ing s c la im , b u t as se rte d rig h ts no t p ro te c te d b y the T a k ing s C la u se
.

30 Although this discussion addre sses interpre tation of t he United St ates Constituti on, we a re awa re that Consoli dated a lso claimed that the ord i n an ce s v iolated the due pr ocess and equal protec tion clauses of the Tenne ssee Const itution. We know of no State court authority stating that a substantive due pr ocess c laim cannot be broug ht when another provision of the State constituti on c ou ld also app ly

to the con du ct or in

jury a lle g e d. I n p artic ula

r, no State c ou rt

ha s h e ld that a challeng e to a zoning or dinance can only be analy zed as a taking s claim. To the contra ry , Tenne ssee courts have traditionally analy zed zoning ordinanc es under the rational basis test as an exerc ise of the local g overnme nt’s police powe r. We nee d not de cide the state law issue, howeve r, bec ause w e think the fede ral substantive due proce ss claim broug ht here in by Consolidated was not prec luded.
VII. R IP EN ESS
Th e Met ropo lit a n G ov e rn me nt a rg ue s th a t Co ns oli date d w a s n ot e nti tle d to bring its substantive due proc ess claim bec ause its taki n gs cl ai m was not ripe. Thetheory underlying that arg ument was e spoused in Mo ntg om e ry v . Ca rte r Co un ty , su pr a , wher ei n t he Six th Circuit stated that, r e g ard le ss o f the app lic abil it yof thec on c e pt o f s ub stanti ve du e pr oc e ss t o a takin g s c la im i n t er m s of pre clusion, the ripene ss require ments of W illiamson C ounty c o u ld n o t b e a v o id e dby labeling a taking s claim as one for denial of substantive due proce ss. 226 F.3d at 769 (holding that su bs ta nti ve du e proc e ss c on c e pts “ may no t beus e d inor de r t o mo un t a n e ndru n” aro un d th os e require ments”). 35 Ripeness is one of the doc trines re lated to t he is sue of justiciabilit y , and it involves both the c ou rt ’s po we r t o h e ar andde c idea dis pu te a s w e ll a s th e wi sd om o f d oin g so
. Altho ug h it is so me ti mes c omb ine d, a sso c iate d, or c on fu se d w ithstand ing or abs te nti on , ripe ne ss g e ne ra lly involves the question of whe ther a dispute has mature d sufficie ntly to warr ant judicial ac tion. See W ri ght, Mill er & Cooper, 13A F ED ER A L P R AC TI C E AND P ROCE D U RE : J UR I S DI C TI ON 2 d § 3532. “The centr al conc ern is whether the case i nvolves uncer tain or contingent future events that may or may not occur as anticipated, or may

not occur at all.” Id. at 112. The purposeo f t h e ri peness doc trine is to “pre vent the courts, through avoidance of p r e ma turea d ju d ic ati o n , f

r o m e n ta n g ling themselves in abstra ct disag ree ments.” A b bott Labor atories v. Gardne r , 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.C t. 1507, 1515 (1967).
Gene rally , questions of ripene ss involve a two-step analy sis: (1) the f itness of the issue for judicial determination and (2) the ha rdship to the parties of

withholding court consideration. Ab bo tt Labs , 3 87 U. S. at 14 9, 97 S.Ct . at 15 15

. I n mos t situatio ns wh e re ri pe ne ss is a n iss ue , “ Th e c ou rt s wi ll d e c lin e to a c t inc a se s w he rethe reis n o n e e d f or the c ou rt to ac t or whe re the re fu sa l to a c t w ill not preve nt the parties f

rom raising t h e issue at a more a ppropriate time.” Martin v. W ashmaster31

Auto Ctr., Inc ., No. 01A01-9305- CV-00224, 1993 WL 241315, at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 2, 1993) (no Tenn. R. App. P. application filed) (c itations omi tted).
Ho we ve r, a s d isc us se d e arl ie r in this op ini on , f e de ral c ou rt s h a ve de ve lop e d s pe c if ic ri pe ne ss require ments for re g ulatory taking s claims that relate t o state court action and local administrative decisions. The ripe ness re quirements made applicable to takings c laims in W illiamson C ounty re late in pa rt to th e s p e c ial n a tu r e o f a ta k in g s c laim

. T h e r e q u ir e me n t th a t th e lan d o w ner f irst seek compensation though available state proc edure s, for e x ample, is based on the interpre tation of the Taking s Clause as not l imiti ng local governmental action but as requiring that the local g overnme nt pay jus t c omp e ns a tio n. Th us , n o in ju ry c og niza

bleun de r the Ta

kin g s Cl aus e e xists un til jus t compensation has been de nied, making a claim not ripe for revie w until that require ment is met. The Metropolitan Government does not arg ue that Consolidated failed to meet this part of the W illiamson County require ments, often called t he “state court” or “e x haustion” re quirement. Se e Mo ntg om e ry , 226 F.3d at 770.
I nstead, it asserts that Consol idated’s c laim is not ripe for court r eview be causeConsolidated didno t se e k a

va ri a nc e fr om the zon ing c hang e effect ed by theor din a nc e s. Th a t r e qu ir e me nt i s based on the ripene ss the ory that speculative or conting ent eff ects do not pr ovide a justification for court de cision or ac tion. More particularly , as it has bee n expressed, the re quirement is base d on a need f or more de tailed fa cts so that the exte n t o f t h e governme nt’s interfe renc e with the owne r’s economic e x pectations as to the use of the pr operty can bedetermined.
The Metr opolitan Government supplied the affidavit of i ts z oning a dminist rator w ho stated that the B oard of

Z oning A ppeals ha s the power or authority t o gra n t a v ar iance from distance require ments applicable to Class I V C&D landfil ls

. Co nsolidated filed an a ffidavit fr om its president e xpla ini ng wh y

it d id no t seek su ch a

va ri a nc e . H e e xpla ine d th a t se e kin g su c h a va ri a nc e wo uld have be en futile be causeunder a pplicable Z oning Code provisions, the Boa rd could g rant a

variance on ly wh e reun iqu e sh ape , to po g ra ph y , p hy sic a l f

e atur e s, or

sim ila r c ha ract eri sti c s o f the pr op e rty justified the variance in order to alleviate ha rdship. The re levant portions of the Z oning Code wer e a tta c he d to thea ff

idavit

. Th e ri pe ne ss re qu ir e me nt that the Me tr op oli ta n Gov e rn me nt wo uld ha ve us app ly he re in i s applicable to a reg ulatory taking s claim wher e the ad hoc fac tual inquiry established in Penn Central is to be applied. The c ase be fore us, as it now stands, involves a claim for denial of substantive due proce ss by

the ena ctment of the or dinance s at issue. We decline to a pply the W illiam so n Co un ty require ment of a f

inal adm i n i s t ra t i v e dec ision on the deg reeof deve lopment allowed or the application of the ordinanc es for sever al re asons. First, the r equire ment that a landowner seek a final dec ision bythe zoning entity , often c alled the “f inal decision” or

“fina l answer ” req u irement, a s to the application of a reg ulation to the la nd ow ne r’ s p ro pe rty

do e s n ot a

pp ly to a fa c ia l c ha lle ng e to a z on in g o rdi nan c e , e ve n w he n it is broug ht a s a taking s claim. I n Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agenc y , 5 20 U. S. 7 25 , 1 17 S.Ct

. 16 59 (1 99 7) , th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt e xpla ine d th e dev elo pm ent o f the ri pe ne ss32

require ment, beg inning with Agins , wh e re in the Cou rt held that, bec ause the landowner s had not submitt ed a plan for de velopment, therewas “ as y et no conc rete controve rsy rega rding the ap p l i ca t i o n o f t h e s p ec i fi c z o n i n g p ro v i s i o n s
. ” 5 2 0 U. S

. at7 3 5 , 1 1 7 S

. C t

. at1 6 6 6 , q u o t i n g Agins , 447 U.S. at 260, 100 S.Ct . at 2141. Howe ver, the Court also noted:
I n Agins , the landowne rs who challeng ed zoning ordinanc es restric ting the numbe r of houses they could bui ld on their property sued without seeking approva l for any particula r deve lopment on their land. We held t hat t he only issue justiciable at that point was whethe r mereenac tment of the statute amounted to a taking

. Id ., 520 U.S. at 735, 117 S .Ct. at 1665-66. The Suitum court further noted that in Ho de l v . V irg ini a Surface Mining & Rec lamation Assn., Inc. , 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct

. 2352 (1981), it had c oncluded that the as-a

pplied challeng e wa s unripe, but that the fa cial taking s challeng e wa s ripe for revie w. Suitum , 520 U.S. at 736- 37, 117 S.Ct

. at 1666. Ba sed on its prior holdings, the Court explained that “such ‘ fac ial’ cha lleng es to reg ulation are g ener ally ripe the moment the c halleng ed re g ulation or ordinanc e is passed.” Suitum , 520 U.S. at 736 n.10, 117 S.Ct . at 1666 n.10.
Th e dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n f a c ia l a nda s- app lie d ta

kin g s c la ims , inthe c on te xt of theri pe ne ss require ment of a final answe r, was further set out in Y ee v . Escondido

. I n that ca se the Cou rt he ld that while W

illiamson C ounty imp os e s the ri pe ne ss re qu ir e me nt on c la ims that a n o rd inanc e e ff e c ts a ta k i n g as ap p l i ed t o t h e pe t i t i o n er ’s p ro p er t y , i t d o es n o t ap p l y wh er e th e c l ai mi s a f ac i al ch al l en ge a ll e g i n g t h a t t h e o r d i n a n c e d o e s n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y a d v a n c e a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e i n t e r e s t . “ As thi s alleg ation d oes not depe nd on the extent to which petitioners aredeprive d of the e conomic use of their particular piec es of pr operty or the extent to which theseparticula r petitioners a

re c ompensated, petitioners’ fa cial challeng e is ripe.” Y ee , 503 U.S. at 534, 112 S.Ct . at 1532.
I n its most rec ent case i nvolving ripeness i n the contex t of a takings c laim, the Court noted that the fac ial challeng es to the ordinanc e at issue we re, “ of cour se,” ripe, re ly ing on Y ee
. Sam Rem o Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco , __ U.S. __, 2005 WL 1421451, at 12 n.23 (June 20, 2005). The Court r eiterated the re asoning that wher e the c laim alleg es that an or dinance does not substantiallyadvanc e a le g itimate state interest, ripe ness re quirements do not ap p l y s i n ce the economic impac t is not relevant. Id

. . . . petitioners have overstate d the re ach of W ill iam so n Co un ty thr ou gh ou t th is litigation. Petitioners wer e neve r re quired to ripen the heart of their complaint - - the c la im that the [or din a nc e ] w a s fa c ia lly inv a lid be c aus e it faile d to su bs tant ia lly advanc e a le g itimate state interest. . . .
Id ., 2005 WL

1421451, at 14. Consequently , Consolidated’s tak ings c laim itself would have be en ripe for r eview to the extent itwas ba sed, like its due proc ess claim, on a ch al l en ge t o the re lationship between the ordinanc es and a

valid public interest. The arg ument that a due pr ocess c halleng e must be subjectA n a s
- appl i ed ch al l eng e t o a l egi s l at i ve act may be s ubj ect t o ju s t i ci abi l i t y r equi r ement s s i mi l ar t o t he “ f i nal 36
a n sw e r” rip e n e ss r e q u ire m e n t. As ar co Incor por at ed v. D ep’ t

. of

Ecol ogy , 4 3 P

. 3d 471 , 476

- 77 ( W as h. 200 2). I n t hat
cas e, s t at e l aw aut hor i zed s t at e off i ci al s t o re qui r e f

ormer l andowner s t o pay for t oxi c c l ean up. T he former l andowner
a n d the o ffic ia ls w e re un a b le to a g re e o n c le a n up sta n d a rd s. B e fo re the e x te n t an d c o st o f cle a n u p allo c a te d to this fo rm e r o w n e r w e re d e te rm ine d , the fo rm e r l a n d o w n e r b ro u g h t su it, b a se d o n the re c e n t A pf el de ci si o n, al l egi ng t hat t he st at ut e’ s ret roac t i ve ap p l i cat i o n of t he cl eanup res p o nsi b i l i t y was unconst i t ut i o nal fo r vari o us reasons, i ncl ud i ng due pr oc e s s a n d t a k i n g s
. I t wa s cl e a r l y a c h a l l e n g e t o t h e s t a t u t e as ap pl i e d t o t h e f or me r ow n e r
. T h e W a s h i n g t on S u pr e me C o u rt, sta ting it w a s b e ing a sk e d to d e c id e a n a s-a p p lied c h a llen g e “b e fo re a n ythin g ha s b e e n a p p lied ,” he ld tha t state l aw o n de t erm i nat i o n of whether a regul at i o n vi o l at es s ub st ant i ve d ue p roce ss i ncl ud ed co nsi d erat i o n of wh e ther t he reg ulati o n is un d uly o p p ressive to t he l an d o w ne r, w hich i nc l ud ed a nu m b er o f fac t o rs. W i t ho ut e vid en ce o n t ho se facto rs, suc h a s t he av ail ab i l i t y and e f fec t i ve ne ss o f

less d rasti c m ea sure s, the c o urt fo un d t he as-ap p l i ed sub st an t i ve d ue p ro ce ss cl ai m nonjust i ci ab l e. O b vi o usl y , t he d i f ference b et ween as- ap p l i ed and f aci al c hal l enges i s i m p o rt ant i n bo t h t aki ngs and d ue p ro ce ss clai m s. 33 to the same ripe ness re quirements as a t ak i n g s challeng e does not, in this case , mean that Consolidated was re q u i re d to ask the zoning off icials ag ain how the land c ould be used be fore bring ing its substantive due pr ocess and equal pr otection claims. F urther, the holding in Lin gle , su pr a , th a t th e c on ne c tio n b e tw e e n th e g ov e rn me nt’ s inte re st an d the me a ns c ho se n to ac hie ve it i s properly analy zed under due proce ss, not as a taking s claim, makes it eve n clea rer that a fa cial attac k on an ordinance on the basis it is notrationally related to a legitimate governmental intere st can be broug ht without seeking administrative clari fi ca t i on of the e x act e x tent of the loss caused by the ordinanc e.
Se c on d, the re is no re qu ir e me nt that a party c ha lle ng ing a zon ing or din a nc e on theba sis it vio late s su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss o n it s f a c e be c aus e it is no t ra tio na lly re late d to a

le g iti mate g ov e rn me ntal in te re st mus t se e k a fi na l a dmi ni st rat iv e a ns we r a s to theor din a nc e ’s pr e c ise application. To the contra ry , “the ve ry

exis tence of an alleg edly unlawful zoning action, without 36 more, make s a substantive due proce ss c laim ripe for f eder al adjudication.” Pearson , 961 F.2d at 1211. See also Re stigouche, Inc ., 59 F.3d at 1212 (althoug h the tak ings c laim was not ripe, the su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im wa s) ; Eide , 908 F.2d at 720-24 (providing a desc ription of the differing ripeness analy ses, depe nding on the con stitut ional theories a sserted and the re medies so ug ht) ; Chr istop he r La k e De v e lop me nt Co. v St. Lou is Cou nty , 35 F.3d 1269, 1273 ( 8th Cir. 1994) (holding that for a s-applied c laims to be rig ht, there must be a final dec ision).
Th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt a rg ue s th a t th e Sixth Cir c uit a nd oth e rs ha ve mor e re c e ntl y made clear that the final decision ripeness require ment of W illiamson C ounty app lie s to d ue pr oc e ss and equal protection cla ims made in the context of land use issues, re ly ing on Ar ne tt v . M y e rs , 281 F.3d 552, 562 ( 6th Cir. 2002) and Do ug he rtyv
. Town of North He mp ste ad Bo ar

d ofZon ing Ap

pe als , 282 F.3d 83, 88 ( 2d Cir. 2002). This relianc e is misplaced, howe ver, beca use neither of these c ases involved a fa cial challeng e to an or dinance

. Dougherty inv olv e d a c ity c ease and de sis t or de r t o pr e ve nt an o wn e r f

ro m ma kin g i mp rove me nts to h is c oo p, wh ic h th e c ity c la ssi fi e d a s a nonconforming use

. Ar ne tt involved the destruc tion and remova l of duck blinds by a S tate age ncy

beca use they wer e unre g istered as require d by ag ency reg ulations. I n the opinion, the Six th Circuit stated that theA zoni ng o r di nan ce may b e chal l eng ed as vi ol at i ve of s ubs t ant i ve due pr oces s ei t her 37
o n it s fac e o r a s a p p lied to a p a r ti c u la r p a rc e l o f l a n d

. See Pear s on [ v. Ci t y of G r and Bl anc ] , 961 F. 2d [ 12 11 ] at 121 6 [( 6t h Ci r
. 199 2)]

. W hen a l andowner
m akes a fac ia l chal l enge t o a zo ni ng ord i nance, “he o r s he argues t hat any appl i cat i on of

t he ordi nan ce i s un cons t i t ut i onal

. ” SM X Techno l og i es , Inc. v. G a sc o n a d e C o u n ty , 105 F. 3d 1 19 5, 1 19 8- 99 n. 1 (8t h Ci r
. 199 7). “ W hen one mak es an ‘ as ap p l i ed ’ chal l enge, he o r s he i s at t acki ng only t he d eci si o n t hat ap p l i ed t he ordi nan ce t o hi s or her proper t y , not t he ordi nan ce i n g ene r al

. ” Id

.
Ri char ds on , 218 F. 3d a t 513. 34 ripene ss require ments of Will iamson County apply to “proc edura l due process and equal protec tion claims that areancillary

to taking c laim s
. ” 281 F.3d at 562. Howeve r, the c ourt also found that sin c e thebli nd s h a d b e e n re mov e d, the g ov e rn me nt’ s ac tio n wa s mo repr op e rl y c ha ra c te ri zeda s a phy sical taking , not a reg ulatory taking , rende ring the final decision requirement inapplica ble. 281 F.3d at 563.
W e findne ith e r o f the se c a se s p e rs ua siv e a s to theapp lic a tio n o f ripe ne ss r e qu ir e me nts to a fa c ia l c ha lle ng e to a

zon in g o rdina nc e a s la c kin g a ratio na l r e latio ns hip to a le g iti mate g overnme ntal interest. Consolidated br oug ht only a fa cial challeng e to the constitutionalityof the or din a nc e s. 37 Finally , while fe dera l courts have used t h es e re quirements to avoid hea ring local zoning disputes, Tennesse e courts have not imposed similar require ments on parti es ch al leng ing the constitut i o n al i t y o f a z oning or dinance . To the contra ry , parties c halleng ing the validity or constitutionalit y

of a zoning ordinanc e may bring a dire ct ac tion without ex hausting administrative reme dies befor e a loc al zoning boar d. Che ro k e e Cou ntr y Clu b, In c
. v . Ci ty of K

nox v ill e , 152 S.W .3d 466, 479 (Tenn. 2004) (holding that the issuance of a w rit of mandamus wa s proper even thoug h the la nd ow ne r h a d n ot a

pp e a le d th e de nial of a de mol iti on pe rm it to the loc a l bo ard of zon ing app e a ls be c au s e t h e l a n d o w n e r

c h a l l e n g e dt h e v a l i d i t y

o f a n o r d i n a n c e , n o tt h e o f f i c i a l ’ s d i s c r e t i o n in de nying thepe rm it) ; Poteat v. Bowman , 491 S.W .2d at 77, 80 (Tenn. 1973) (stating that a claim that an ordinance on w hich a pe rmit denial is based is unconstitutional is not subj ect to the e x haustion of administrative re medies re quirement).
When decisions ap ply ing zoning ordinanc es ar e made by local zoning a dminist rators and boards, judicial r eview is under the common law of writ of certiorari, which provides a limited scope of re view by t h e courts. Fa lli n v . Kn ox Cou ntyBd

. o f Co m’ rs , 656 S.W .2d 338, 342-43 (Te nn. 19 83 ); Lafferty v. City of W inchester , 46 S.W .3d 752, 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). L ong -st anding po lic y favo rs pe rm it ti ng theloc a l de c isi on -m ake rs , w ho areg rante d b ro a d d isc re tio n inthefi rs t instance, to e x erc ise that discre tion. Mc Cal le n v. Cityof M e mp his , 786 S.W .2d 633, 641-42 (Te nn. 1990). The de terminations made by a local zoning board are administrative determinations, judi cial o r q u as i -j u d i ci al i n n at u re , m ad e a ft era he ar i n g wh er e a re co rd o f t h e e v i d en ce an dt h e p ro ce ed i n gs is made. Fa lli n , 656 S.W .2d at 342-43. Conseque ntly , revie w is by common law writ of certiorari upon the re cord pr oduced by the zoning boar d, and parties must ex h au s t t h ei r admini strativeW i l l i ams on Coun t y di s t i n g u i s h es bet we en r i pen es s an d ex h au s t i on
. 473 U

. S. 192- 93, 105 S. Ct

. a t 3119- 20. 38 T h a t d istinc tio n is no t i m p o rta n t i n the c o n te x t o f t h e issu e a s p re se n te d in this c a se o r to the sta te law a n a lysis.

W e are aware t hat t he M et rop o l i t an G o vernm ent ’ s p o si t i o n i s t hat C o nsol i d at ed co ul d have asked t he B o ard 39 t o rel i eve i t f

rom t he t wo
- m i l e d i st ance r e q ui rem ent , not t hat C o nsol i d at ed co ul d have asked t he B o ard t o de cl are t he
or di n an ce s u n con s t i t u t i on al

. W h er e t h e c h al l en g e i s f ac i al , ra t h er t h an as
- appl i ed, no admi n i s t r at i v e det er mi n at i on of t h e or di n an ce ’ s a ppl i ca t i on t o a pa r t i cu l ar s i t u at i on i s r equ i r ed.

E ven wh er e exh aus t i on i s gen er al l y r equi r ed, t her e ar e exc ept i ons
. A s j us t di s cus s ed, one exc ept i on appl i es 40 wh er e t h e par t y c h al l en g es t h e v al i di t y of a n or di n an ce or s t at u t e t h at w ou l d be a ppl i ed by t h e admi n i s t r at i v e dec i s i on m a k e r. Pot eat , 49 1 S. W

. 2d at 80

. A not her appl i es whe r e t he part y s eek i ng j udi ci al r evi ew r ai s es onl y ques t i ons of l aw 35 reme dies by

pursuing appeals to that board. 38

T h e s am e p o l icies and c ircumstance s are not present in a c halleng e to a leg islative action throug h enac tment of zoning ordinanc es. “[T]he enac tment of ordinanc es or r esolutions, creating or a m en d i n g z o ning r eg ulations, is a leg islative, rather than an a dminist rative, a ction and is not ordinarily acc ompanied b y a re co rd of the e vidence , as is the ca se of an administrative hea ring .” Fa lli n , 656 S.W .2d at 342-43. Conseque ntly , court challeng es to the validity of such or dinance s are g ener ally broug ht as ac tions for dec laratory judgme nt. Id .; Thompson v. Metropolitan Gove rnment of N as hv ill e an d D av ids on Cou nty , 20 S. W

. 3 d 6 5 4 , 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Thereis no require ment of exhaustion of administrative reme dies in a direc t challeng e to the fa cial validity of an ordinance.
Under the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act, any person whoserig hts, status or other leg al re lations are aff ecte d by a statute or municipal ordinanc e “may have de termined any

question of construc tion or validity arising under” the statute or or dinance and “obtain a dec laration of rig hts, status or other leg al re lations thereunde r.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-14-103. The Act nowhe re imposes or pr ovides an administrative r emedy for parties challeng ing the validity of a statute or or dinance . See Thomas v. Stat e Bd. of Equali zation , 94 0 S.W. 2d 56 3, 56 6 (T e nn
. 19 97 ) ( ho ldi ng that if a statut e e xplic itl y provides an a dminist rative r emedy , a party must exhaust this reme dy prior to seeking relief from the courts). N one of the co n s i d erations that would just ify judicial imposit ion of a re quirement of administrative re course exis ts in the case beforeus. See Thomas , 9 40 S.W. 2da t 56 6; Ree ves v
. Olsen , 691 S.W .2d 527, 530 (Tenn. 1985) (explaining the purposes behind the exhaustion doctrine).
I n f a c t, i n v ie w o f the natur e of thec la im m a de by

Con so lid a te d andthere me dy so ug ht, it wo uldbe ina

pp ro priate to re qu ir e it to g o to the B oa rd of Z on ing Ap pe a ls be fo rese e kin g re c ou rs e in the courts. Where a party bring s a fa cial challeng e to the constit utional validityof a statute or ordinanc e, ther e is no requir ement that t h e party first seek a

ruling on that issue from the administrative body

char g ed with applying or enfor cing the leg islation. Richardson v. Tenne ssee 39 Bd . o f D e nti str y , 913 S.W .2d 446, 456 (Tenn. 1995). That is bec ause a dminist rative of ficials and bodies do not have the authority to declar e a statute or ordinanc e unconstitutional. Id. at 452. “The fa c ial c o n s ti tu ti o n a li ty o f a s tatu te may n o t b e d e te r mi n e d b y a n a d mi n is tr a ti v e tribuna l in an administrative proc eeding .” Id . at 454. See also City of Mem phis v. Shelby C o u nty Elec tion Commission , 146 S.W .3d 531, 537 (Tenn. 2004)

. 40ra the r t h a n q u e stio n s o f fac t. B r acey v. Woods , 5 7 1 S .W .2 d 8 2 8 , 8 3 0 (1 9 7 8 ); F e n tre ss C o u n ty B a n k v . H o lt , 535 S. W

. 2d

8 5 4 , 8 5 7 (T e n n . 1 9 7 6 ). A third e x c e p tio n a p p lies w h e re p u rs u it o f ad m inistra tive r e lief w o u ld b e futile o r u se le ss. S ta te
v. Yoak um , 201 T en n. 1 80 , 195 , 297 S. W

. 2d 635 , 642 ( 19 56 )

. St at ed an ot her way , a par t y i s not r equi r ed t o s eek
a d m inistra tive re v ie w o r re lief if the a d m inistra tive p ro c e ss w o u ld ha v e a ff o rd e d no re v ie w “o v e r k e y issu e s” a n d w o u ld h a v e a ff o rd e d no p o ssib le re m e d y. C h e ro k e e C o u n try C lu b , In c ., 1 5 2 S.W

. 3 d at 47 9

. T he U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt h a s a p p a re n tly a d o p te d a “futili ty” e x c e p tio n to the fi n a l d e c isio n re q u ire m e n t. S e e P a la zzo lo , 533 U

. S. at 620- 26, 121 S. Ct

. a t 2459- 63 ( h ol di n g t h e cl ai m wa s r i pe bec au s e t h e s t at e h ad made i t cl ea r n o dev el opmen t wou l d be al l owe d on t he wet l ands po r t i on of a pi ece of propert y whe r e t he l andowner as s er t ed a Luc as - bas ed per s e t aki ng )

. Co ns ol i dat ed rel i ed on t he f

ut i l i t y excep t i o n.

36 We conclude that Consoli dated wa s not preclude d b y an y rip e n e ss require ment from bring ing its fa c ia l c ha lle ng e s to theor din a nc e s b a se d o n s ub stanti ve du e pr oc e ss ande qu a l pr ot e c ti o ng r ou nd s.
VI II. P ROP E RT Y I N TE R EST
Th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt also arg ue s th a t Co ns oli date d la c ke d a su ff ic ie nt p ro pe rty int e re st t o h a ve stand ing to b ri ng e ve n a fa c ia l c ha lle ng e to the or din a nc e s o n s ub stanti ve du e pr oc e ss g ro un ds . T he Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt a sse rt s th a t be c aus e Con so lid a te d d id n ot o wnthepr op e rty in q ue sti on , b ut m e re ly

he ld an op tio n to pur c ha se a nd a le a se ho ld int e re st, it ha d n o c on sti tution a lly protec ted intere st. Consequently , the Metropolitan Gove rnment asse rts, beca use Consolidated had no vested prope rty

rig ht it had no standing to bring a substantive due proce ss c laim at all, whether that challeng e wa s to the ordinance s as written or a s applied.
The trial c ou rt s tated that the ve sted rig ht require ment for standing to seek damag es or injunctive relief

as a r esult of a zoning c hang e wa s much hi g her than the interest re quired to g ive a plaintiff standing to ask for de clar atory prospec tive relief :
Th e Cou rt

ob se rv e s th a t th e fa c ia l c ha lle ng e s to the or din a nc e s ca n b e ma de e ve n if the plaintiff has no ve sted rig ht in the property

. See Y ee v. C i t y o f Es condido , 503 U.S. 519, 534, 112 S.C t. 1522, 1532 (1992). The Metropolitan Government ag ree s that th e fa c ia l c ha lle ng e s to thezon ing or din a nc e s may sti ll b e c on sid e re d a

bs e nt a vested rig ht. A fac ial challeng e will survi v e ev en wh en rights havenot vested beca use “[t] his alleg ation does not depe nd on the extent to wh i ch p etitioners ar e de prive d o f the econ om ic us e of the ir

. . . p ro pe rty

or thee xten t to wh ic h th e se p articula r petitioners a

re c ompensated.” Y

ee , 5 0 3 U

. S. a t 5 3 4 , 1 1 2 S. Ct

. a t 1 5 3 2. Damag es and other

specific relief

requirevesting . Howeve r, fa cial challeng es that seek de clar atoryrelief

aremore re adily

available

. See H

arris v. City of W

ichita, Sedquick County, Kan. , 862 F.Supp. 287, 291 (D. K an. 1994).
The c ourt held that to bring a substantive due pr ocess c halleng e t o the ordinanc es on their f ace , a plaintiff is only

require d to have “a leg itimate c laim of entitlement or justifiable expectation in the use of the pr operty .”D o c u m e n ting it s sta te m e n t re g a rd ing the M e tro p o lit a n G o v e rn m e n t’s ag re e m e n t w ith the c o n c lus io n tha t a 41 f aci al ch al l eng e wa s av ai l abl e, quot ed ear l i er , t he t r i al cour t s t at ed i n a foo t not e:

O n p a g e 5 o f d e fen d a n t’s sur -re p ly an d m e m o ra n d u m o f l a w to p la intiff ’s re sp o n se to d e fen d a n t’s
mo t i on for s ummary j udgment T he M et r op ol i t an G over nment st at es , “[ i ] n our cas e, Co ns ol i dat ed ha s n o ve ste d rig h ts, an d thu s c a n o n ly m a k e a fac ia l ch a llen g e , w h ic h a t b e st c a n re su lt in a ‘re m a n d ’ t o t he M et rop o l i t an G o vernm ent t o co rr ect any co nst i t ut i o nal f l aws t hi s co urt f

i nd s i n t he p res ent zo ni ng o rd ina n c e s.” 37 As t h e t ri al co u rtn o t ed , t h e M et ro p o l i t an Go v er n m en td i dn o to ri g i n a l l y ch al l en ge Consolidated’s rig ht to bring a fac ial challeng e to t he ordinances on the basis it did not have a veste d pr op e rty int e re st. Con se qu e ntl y , Co ns oli date d a rg ue s th a t th e Me tr op oli tan Gov e rn me nt i s 41 prec luded from r aising that challeng e in this court. In fac t, Consolidated states t hat the Metropolitan Government is attempting to re verse its posit ion be cause it concede d in the trial court that the f acia l challeng e wa s proper . Consolidated relies on the we ll-settled principle of a ppellate litigation that “a pa rty on appeal will not be permitted to depart f rom the theory

on which the c ase w as tried in the t ri al co u rt ” and that is sues not raised or complained of

in the trial court will not be conside red on appeal. TAM CO Su

pp ly v . P oll ar

d , 37 S.W .3d 905, 909 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
The Metr opolitan Governme nt r esponds that, althoug h its initial arg uments in the trial court included stateme nts to the e ffect that Consolidated could maintain its facia l challeng es to the ordinanc es, the Metr opolitan Governme nt raised the s t an d ing obje ction in its m otion to alter or amend and, there fore , has not prese nted a diff ere nt theory

on appeal than was pre sented to the trial court. We haverevie wed that motion and, wh i l e i t d o es raise othe r base s for pre cluding C o n s o l i d a t e d ’ s s u b s t a n t i v e d u e p r o c e s s a n d e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a i m s ( d i s c u s s e d e ar l i e r i n thi s opinion), the motion does not mention the insufficient property interest issue. T h e Metropolitan Government did not bring to the tria l court’s attention its curr ent assertion that Consolidated lacked standing beca

use it had n o co n stitut ionally protec ted intere st, clearly a chang e fr om its earlier position.
We ag ree with Consoli dated that the Me tropolitan Governme nt cannot raise an issue for the fi rs t ti me on app e a l. Ge ne rally , thi s c ou rt wi ll n ot e nte rt a in an is su e on app e a l th a t w a s n ot r a ise d in the court below. Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. C redit Union , 810 S.W .2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Lovell v. Me tro. Gov’t , 6 96 S.W.2d 2 ( Te nn . 1 98 5) ); Davis v. Tenne ssean , 83 S.W .3d 125, 127 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. 20 01 ); Harlan v. Hardaway , 7 9 6 S. W. 2 d9 5 3 , 9 5 7 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1990). Numerous Tennessee case s hold that an is sue raised for the first time on appea l is waived. See, e .g., Norton v . M

c Cas k ill , 1 2 S. W.3 d 7 89 , 7 95 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Lawre nc e v . S tan for d , 655 S.W .2d 927, 929 (T e nn . 1 98 3) (n oti ng , “ It ha s lo ng be e n th e g e ne ral ru le that qu e sti on s n ot r a ise d inthetria l c ou rt wi ll not be entertained on appe al . . .”) . An issue not prese nted to, de cided by , or dealt with by the trial court will not be consider ed by appellate courts. In re Ad op tio n o f a F e ma le Chi ld , 42 S.W .3d 26, 32 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Re id v. Sta te , 9 S.W. 3d78 8, 79 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 9) . Co ns e qu e ntl y , w e wi ll not determine that issue.
Nonethele ss, we must observe t h at , as the discussion of the f our dissenting justices and38

J ustice Ke nnedy

in Apfel de mon str a te s, “ pr op e rty ” is de fi ne d mor e br oa dly in a du e pr oc e ss ana ly sis than in a taking s clause analy sis. See Corn v. City of Lauderdale La ke s, supra, 95 F.3d at 1075 (“Prope rty as that word is use d in the ‘Taking s Clause’ is de fined much more na rrowly than in the du e pr oc e ss c laus e s” ; Bryan v. City of Madison , 130 F. Supp. 798, 809 (S.D. Miss. 1999) ( “Eve n if ce rtain prope rty

interests may

not be taken without due proce ss, the y can be taken without paying just compensation”). S e e als o Matthew C. Porterf ield, “International Ex propriation Rules and Fe dera lism,” 23 S TAN
. E NV TL
. L .J . 3, 11 n. 40 (Jan. 2004).
We also no te that th e of

t- re c ite d te st f

or stand ing to br in g a

pr oc e du ral du e pr oc e ss c la im does not nec essarily

apply to a fac ial challeng e to an ordinanc e under substantive due proce ss. See Richardson , 218 F.3d at 513 n. 3 (ac knowledg ing that the property interest standard for substantive due proc ess should be cla

rified, but dec lining to do so) and at 518 (Ry an J ., concur ring ) (stating there is “consider able c onfusion” re g arding the prope rty interest a plaintiff must assert, which “ the Supreme Co u rt has thus far not dispelled,” but ac knowledg ing that some circuits, including the Six th, have r ecog nized a distinction betwe en the kind of property interest prote cted by

proce dural due pro c e s s a n dth a t p r o te c te db y s u b s tan ti v e d u e p r o c e s s )

. “ Re g r e tt ab ly , th e c a s e la w provides relatively littl e spec ific g uidance as to w hat constitutes a property interest worthy of substantive due proce ss protection.” Pa rk s Pr op e rti e s v
. Ma ury C ou nty , 70 S.W .3d 735, 744-45 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2001). Additionally , we must also point out state law in light of the only relief the t rial court ga ve to Consoli dated. In its complaint, Cons olidated specific ally asked that the court issue a dec laratory jud g me nt p ur su a nt t o T e nn . Co de An n. §§ 29 -1 4- 10 1 - 11 3 th a t th e or dinan ces we ree na c te d in violation of the equal protection and due proce ss clauses of both the Tenne ssee and United States Constit utions and were , there fore , invalid and of no e ffe ct.
Te nn e sse e sta

tut e s o n d e c laratory

jud g me nts g ivec ou rt s the po we r “ to de c lareri g hts , s tatus , and other leg al re lations whether or not further

relief is or could be claimed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-102 ( a). Spec ifi c all y , an y p erson, including any

corpor ation, whose rig hts, status or other leg al relations are a ffe cted by

any question of the validity

of an or dinance may

obtain a dec laration of such rig hts, status, or other leg al re lations thereunde r and a determination of the validity or any question of construc tion of the ordinanc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-14- 103. The statutes on declaratory judgme nts are to be construed liber ally to further their purpose of settling and aff ording relief

from un c e rt a inty

a s to ri g hts , s tatus , andoth e r l e g a l r e latio ns . T e nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 14 -1 13. Th us , in the ca se of a challeng e to the validity of an ordinance, standing is de termined by whether the party ’s rig hts, status or other leg al re lations are a ffe cted by the ordinanc e.
Therecan belittl e doubt that C o n s o l i d ated met this low threshold nec essary to obtain a simple declar atory

judgme nt. S e e Robertson County v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc

. , 7 9 9 S

. W.2d 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (althoug h standing was not addr essed, pa rty who obtained a

decla ratory jud g me nt that th e zon ing or din a nc e wa s in va lidle a se d th e pr op ert yin q ue sti on wi th an o pti on to purcha se for

the purpose of

developing a landf

ill).In a fo o t no t e, t he t rial co urt co m p are d t he req uirem en t s fo r t he t w o t yp es o f l an d f i l l s: 42

C h a p te r 1 0 .2 0 o f the M e tro C o d e ind ic a te s tha t a sa n itar y la n d fil l is u se d to d isp o se o f s o li d w a ste
m aterials w hich i nc l ud e all m un i cip al, c o m m erc i al o r i nd ustri al so l i d wa st e, ga rb ag e, rub b i sh, ref use and ot her s uch s i mi l ar an d re l at ed mat er i al s
. Sect i on 17.1 6

. 21 0 of t he C od e pr ovi des t he s peci al excep t i o ns fo r sani t ary and C & D l and f i l l s. A sani t ary l and f

i l l m ust b e o n a m i ni m um lo t o f one hu ndr ed ( 19 9) acr es ; b e o ne hu ndr ed ( 10 0) feet f r om an y proper t y l i ne; t wo hu ndr ed f i f t y ( 25 0) f

eet f r om a n y r e s i de n t i a l z on i n g di s t r i c t bo u n da r y ; a n d f i v e h u n dr e d ( 50 0) f

e e t f r om a n y r e s i den t i al stru c tur e . A lan d sc a p e b u ff e r ya rd is re q u ire d a n d d riv e w a y a c c e ss m u st b e fro m a c o llec to r stre e t.

B y comp ar i s on, t he C & D l andf i l l mus t , al ong w i t h t he t w o (2 ) m i l e buf fer at i s s ue, be one hu ndr ed (10 0 ) f eet f rom any res i d ent i al zo ne d i st ri ct o r d i st ri ct p erm i t t i ng res i d ent i al use. T here must be t he
s ame l andsca p e b uffer y ar d on t he propert y l i nes
. Fi nal l y , t he C & D l andf i l l mus t ha ve dri vew ay ac ce ss o n no nre si d en t i al co l l ec t o r st ree t s. 39 Finally , neither the property interest ar g ument, nor some of the other proc edura l challeng es the Metropolitan Gove rnment has r aised, a pply to claims based on de nial of equa l protection.
IX. M ER ITS OF S U BSTAN TI V E D U E P ROCE S S AND E QU A L P ROT E CT I ON C L A I MS
The trial c ourt did not question the validity of the public interest and we lfarealleg ed to be the purposes of

the ordinanc es. Its rulings ar e base d on its determination that the ordinanc es as draf ted did not furthe r t he stated pur poses and ther e wa s no rational justification for the harshe r treatment affor ded to C&D landfills. Thus, the t rial court’s holding was based on its ana ly sis of the essential nexus betwee n the pu rp o s e an d the leg islation, or the means/end te st, i.e ., whether the ordinanc es we re unr easona ble means of

advanc ing a

leg itimate gove rnm en t i n t erest. See Richardson , 2 18 F .3 d. a t 51 3; Berger , 154 F.3d at 624.
Wit h reg ard to the substantive dueproce ss claim, the trial court found:
Metro has f

ailed to conne ct a rat i o n al re lationship between the se ordinanc es and a leg itimate gove rnmental purpose . Whil e Metro doe s contend that the pr otection of sc ho ols a ndpa

rk s f ro m th e du st, de bris, a ndtr a shis a via bleint e re st, it fai ls t o ov e rc ome the arb itr ary a nd c apric iou s natur e of theor din a nc e s inthat th e y on ly app ly to C & D l a n d f

i l l s a n dn o to t h e r

t yp e s o f l a n d f i l l s a n di n d u s tr i a l u s e s w h i c h po se essentially

the same thre ats. Waste deposited at C& D landfills is d iffer ent from waste d e p o s it e d a t s a n it ary a n d o th e r ty p e s o f lan d f

il ls

. H o w e v e r , a ll ty pes of landfills threate n the safe ty and we lfareof citizens. The dust, noise, traf fic, and other considerations associated with C&D landfills would also be assoc iated wi th other waste f acilities and industrial uses not r es t ri ct ed by the two (2) mile buf

fer

. The 42 ordinanc es at issue arbitra rily single out C&D landfills and Metro ha s articulate d no ratio na l r e a so n h ow thetw o ( 2) mil e bu ff e r f or on ly the se la nd fi lls se rv e s a

le g iti mate g ov e rn me ntal pu rp os e
. Re c a ll that the Pla nn ing Com mis sio n a c kn ow le dg e d th a t it s own staff found “no r ational basis f o r a two mi le standar d” and the Planning Commi ssion disapproved the or dinance s by a unanimous vote finding “no planning40

ba sis ” to s up po rt

thetw o ( 2) mil e bu ff

e r. I n f a c t, thee vid e nc e in the re c or d s tr on g ly indicates that the othe r uses pose a g reater thre at to the public hea lth.
Al so , th e plaintif

f s up po rt s it s p os iti on wi th the arg ume nt that Me tr o h a s f a ile d to instit ute a c ounter-buf

fer require ment for sc hools an d parks. See ge nerally City of Mi am i v . W

oo lin , 38 7 F .2 d 8 93 (5 th C ir . 1 96 8) ; Sa ar v . To wn o f D av ie , 308 F.Supp. 20 7 ( S.D . F la . 1 96 9) . T he Cou rt fi nd s it dif fi c ult to c on c e ive that a

C& D l a nd fi ll cannot be built withi n two (2) miles of a school or par k, y et a sc hool or park may be built withi n t wo (2) miles of an operational C&D landf ill. The same saf

ety and he a lthc on c e rn s w ou ld r e qu ir e a bu ff e r i n b othins ta nc e s.

. . . The two (2) mile buffer

betwee n C&D landfills and schools and parks appea rs many times m o re than a ne cessa ry distance. This re striction is more arduous than that imposed on other ty

pes of even more di sruptive l andfills and schools and parks ar e no t pr e c lud e d f

ro m be ing bu ilt wi thi n tw o (2 ) mil e s of a C& D l a nd fi ll. Cou rt s mu st draw the line betwee n the rational and irrational and while the Riggs helicopter buffe r falls on the side of h av i n g a rational basis, these ordinanc es fa ll on the side of the irrational and arbitra

ry
. One c annot help but conc lude from this rec ord that the two (2) mile buff

er w as not desig ned to protec t schools and par ks but to sim ply

preve nt new C& D landfills in most parts of Davidson C ounty . Thereis no doubt in Riggs that the re striction was designe d to and would be e ffe ctive in protec ting the pe aceand quiet of the Gr eat Smokey Mountains National Park.
As to the equal protec tion c laim, the court a lso found that the Metropolitan Gove rnment had failed to e stablish a rational re lationship between the leg itimate interests propounded an d the dif fe ri ng tr e a tme nt a ff

or de d C& D l a nd fi lls c omp are d to sim ila r f a c ili tie s th a t po se g re a te r thr e a ts.
Th e tria l c ou rt

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t a ll the Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt n e e de d t o sho w w a s a rational ba sis for the sepa rate clas s ification of C& D landfills, but found that the Metropolitan Go ve rn me nt h a d n ot m a de th at show ing . It he ld that th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt h a d f a ile d to artic ulate a

re a so na bleba sis fo r cl a ssi fying , an d s ub je c tin g to s tric te r re qu ir e me nts , C& D l a nd fi lls from other , simil ar use s even thoug h the Metropolitan Gove rnment ac knowledge s t hat other ty pe landfills are more noxious, butdo not have the same buffe ring require ment. The c ourt found:
The same protec tions necessa ry for a C&D landfill would also be present for other types of landfills. Evidence in the rec ord indicate s the C&D landfills pose less of a ri sk than o the rs
. Th e c ou rt

po int e d o ut a ff

idavit te sti mony of a n e ng ine e r w ho op ine d th a t a pr op e rl y constru c te d a n d man a g e d C& D lan d f il l p o s e s le s s r is k to h u man h e a lth a n d th e e n v ir o n me n t than would: a Cl as s I m u n i ci p al solid waste landf ill, a Class I I

medical wa ste proce ssing f acility or41

industrial waste disposal fa cility , or a Class II I farming wa ste disposal fac ility o r l an d scaping and land clea ring waste disposal fa cility . The c ourt fu rt her pointed out that the Me tropolitan Government’s Interim

D ire c to r o f Public Works stated in his deposition testimonythat landfills other th an C &D lan dfi ll s s ho ul d h ave res tr ict io ns si mi lar to th os e th e ord in ances mad e app li cabl e to C&D l a n d f i l l s o n l y.
On appeal, the Metropolitan Government challeng es the trial court’s equa l p ro t ection arg ume nt, fi rs t, b y

arg uin g that C&D la nd fi lls are no t the sa me a s othe r type s o f l a nd fi lls a ndwa ste dis po sa l fa c ili tie s, so the y areno t si mil arl y

situate d. Th e re fo re , o rd inanc e s tr e a tin g the m di ff e re ntl y do no t vi olate e qu a l pr ote c tio n, a ndc ou rt s mu st a ff ord wi de dis c re tio n to le g isl a tiv e bo die s in d e c idi ng wh ic h a c tiv iti e s a rethesa me a ndwh ic h a

redif fe re nt. Th e Me tr op oli tan G ov e rn me nt p oin ts to othe r provisions of

its Code as well as to State re g ulations that impose differe nt require ments on dif fe re nt type s o f l a nd fi lls

. Whil e we ag reethat the Metro Zon i ng Code and Te nnessee Depa rtment of Environment reg ulations define ty

pes of wa ste fac iliti es diffe rently an d may impose differ ent re quirements on them, the oper ational re quirements imposed by the State are tailore d to the specific activities ca rried on at the site. F urther, it appea rs that sanitary landfills and some other ty pes of f acilities aresubject to more string ent re quirements than C& D landfills by b o t h s t ate and local re g ulations. The Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt d oe s n ot d isa g re e that sanit ary la nd fi lls a ndso me oth e r faci li ti es pose g re a te r h e a ltha ndsa fe ty

ri sk s a nd /or dis ru pti on than C& D l a nd fi lls , b ut c a nn ot e xpla in w hy on ly C& D l a nd fi lls mus t beloc a te d mo rethan tw o mi le s f ro m pa rk s a ndsc ho ols

. Secon d , t h e Metropolitan Gove rnment asse rts that, even if differ ent types of landf

ills or simil ar use s of rea l pr operty can be considere d simil arly situated, a rational basis exi sts for imposing the two-mile buff

er r equire ment on C&D landfills. I n support of this arg ument, the Metropolitan Go ve rn me nt po int s ou t that the c on str uc tio n of C& D la nd fi lls c a n be pe rm itt e d wi tho ut C ou ncil app ro va l, wh ile sa nit ary la nd fi lls mus t sec ur e su c h ap pr ov a l. “ Th us , in dra fting the or din a nc e s in question, the Council may have f elt that an additional buff er r equire ment was only

neces sary

for C&D landfills becausethe Council was at that time unable to revie w and control the place ment of such landfills in proxi mityto parks and sc hools.”
T h e M et ro p o l i t an Go v er n m en tm ad e t h i s ar gu m en tt o t h e t ri al co u rt , who foun di tu n av ai l i n g, n o t i n g t h a tw h e n c o n s i d e r i n g a C l a s s I s a n i t ary l a n d f

i l l , C o u n c i l w o u l dn o tb e r e q u i r e dt o ap p l y a two-mi l e b u ffe r. “While the court would anticipate that sound judg ment would war rant g reater pr ote c tio ns in l oc a tin g the se la nd fi lls , th e bu ff e r i s n ot a state d re qu ir e me nt. ” F or sim ila r r e a so ns , we ag ree
. When a leg islative body rese rves the rig ht to apply exis ting zoning ordinanc es and to g rant or deny permits based on those or dinance s, it mustmake any decision under that g rant by apply ing exis ting r equire ments. McCallen , 7 86 S.W. 2da t 63 9. I n th a t c on te xt, th e le g isl a tiv e bo dy wo uld be makin g a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e or qu a si j ud ic ia l de c isi on , r a the r than p e rf ormin g a le g isl a tiv e a c t, beca use it would be executing a law alrea dy in exi stence

. Id

. The Metr opolitan Council, making an administrative de cis i o n o n approva l of a propose d landfill, must apply the re quirements it has enac ted in its legislative r ole and c annot cr eate n ew or additional re quirements in the conte x t of a42

particula r re quest for a

pproval. We fail to see how t he requirement of Council approva l for sanitary landfills is relevant to the question of whether there is a rational ba sis for an or dinance establishing t h e t w o
- m i l e b u f

f e r o n C & D l a n d f

i l l s o n l y. We have revie wed the voluminous filings in the r ecor d and re ach the same c onclusions as the tria l cou rt

. C& D l a nd fi lls do no t po se a s g re a t a ri sk to p ub lic we lf

area s o the r type s o f l a nd fi lls or similar fac iliti es, y et the Metropolitan Gove rnment has not justified impositi on of stricter location re qu ir e me nts on the m. Furthe r, a s the Pla nn ing Com mis sio n fo un d, the re is n o p la nn ing po lic y ba sis fo r c ho os ing tw o mi le s a s o pp os e d to a ny oth e r partic ula

r dis ta nc e ; the reis n o p ro of that a tw o- mil e buffe r m eets the stated goals (pr otecting parks and schools from ef fec ts such as dust, noise, and truc k tr a ff ic ) anda no the r d ist a nc e wo uldno t.
B a se d o n th e re c or d b e fo reus , w e a ff irm t he tria l c ou rt ’s ho ldi ng that th e or din a nc e s in question violate the substantive due pr ocess and equal pr otection g uarantee s i n both the United State s a ndTe nn e sse e Con sti tution s.
X. E XCL US I ONARY Z ONI NG
I n the trial court, Consolidated arg ued that the ordinances were invalid beca use t heir e ffe ct w a s t o p r e c l u d e c o n s tru c t i o n a n do p e r a t i o n o f a l a w f u l b u s i n e s s , a C & D l a n d f

i l l , w i t h i n t h e c o u n t y. It contended that such prec lusion is unl awf ul unless certain showing s are made, r elying on Robertson Co u n ty v
. B ro wn in g - F

e r r is I n d u s tries, Inc

. , 799 S.W .2d 662, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Consolidated did not allegethat the ordinanc es spec ifically prohibited the business in the county , but instead, ar g ued that the ordinanc es as applied had that prac tical eff ect, char acte rizing its c laim as one of d e facto e xc lu s io n ary

zo n in g
. Co n s e q u e n tl y , a lo g ic a l p la c e to b e g inis w ith th e q u e s ti o n of wh e the r, a s a

mat ter of

fa c t, the reis n o lo c a tio n inDa vid so n Co un ty wh e rea ne w C & D l a nd fi ll could be c onstructed and operated in compliance with all applicable state and local reg ulations.
Con so lid a te d p re se nte d a n a ff idavit pr e pare d b y

Cha rl e s H ig g ins , Jr. , an e ng ine e r w ith considera ble e x p er i ence in land use re g ulation of landfills and similar fac iliti es. He identified poten ti a l C & D lan d f

il l s it e s inD a v id s o n Co u n ty u n d e r th e p r e
- a me n d me n t z o n in g r e g u lati o n s as we ll a s u nd e r the tw o- mil e -b uf fe r o rd inanc e s. Suc h s ite s are infl ue nc e d b y a nu mbe r o f f

a c tor s, incl u d in g s o il c o n d itio n s a n d St a te imp o s e d r e q u ir e me n ts s u c h s e tb a c k s f r o m s tr e a ms , e tc . Mr. Hig g ins stated that he conside red six factors: g eog raphy (i n cl u d i n g topogr aphy

and locations of schools and par

ks), transportation, hy drolog y , land use, zoning restric tions, and siz e. He included only s it e s o f a t le a s t te n a c r e s
. O f th e in itial tw e n ty

- n in e p o te n ti a l s it e s e xa mi n e d , ma nywer e e xclu de d b y

top og ra ph y a ndthe c omm on pr e se nc e of str e a ms andlake s ma

kin g thesize of

thetr a c t, wi th the re qu ir e d s e tba c ks , in a de qu a te . A n a dd iti on a l li mit ing fa c tor wa s the loc a tio n o f the sit e in relation to a non-reside ntial collector r oad. The report concluded, i n pertinent part, that the onl y are a identified a s having potential for C&D landfill development u n d er ex isting zoning re strictions were in those districts where such fac iliti es we re SE (pe rmitted by specia l exception) uses. Further,T h a t se c tio n is with in th e a rtic le o f t h e z o n ing c o d e tha t go v e rn s u se s p e rm itt e d b y sp e c ia l ex c e p tio n a n d is 43
en t i t l ed “ W as t e man ag eme n t s pec i al ex ce pt i on s
. ” As t o C& D l an df i l l s , t h er e i s a s et bac k r equ i r eme n t of 100 f ee t f r om any res i d ent i al zo ne d i st ri ct or d i st ri ct pe rmit t i ng res i d ent i al us e. A l and scape buff er i s requir ed

. A d d i t i o nal l y , t he pr ov i s i on a t i s s u e s t at es , “ At a mi n i mu m, t h e con s t r u ct i o n/ d emol i t i on l an df i l l u s es s h al l h av e a dr i v ew ay a cc es s on n o n re sid e n tial c o llec to r stre e ts.” 43 Of the 29 pote n t i al S E u s e sites examined in this process, one site owne d by the Me tr o G o v e rn m e n t h a s c l e ar p o t e n t i a l f o r u s e a s a C & D l a n d f

i l l a n d i s t h e la rg e st. Two other sites a

ppear to have potential ( one on a non-conf orming local collec tor and one not on a c ollector of any kind.)
Tw o s ite s w e re fo un d th a t app e ar t o h a ve po te nti a l f or C& D l a nd fi ll, bu t w ou ld re qu ir e there mov a l of nu me ro us str uc tur e s, inc lud ing po nd s in some c a se s, to o btain an ade quate f

ootprint. One site would be rec ommended for further study to clarify marg inal soil conditions, i f it was located on a non- residential c ollector.
The re port then identified the six potential sit es with their primary cha ra cteristics and conclude d that “No sites we re f ound to be both 2 miles from a park or school and located on anonresidential c ollector.”
It is the“ no n- re sid e nti a l c oll e c tor ” re qu ir e me nt, wh ic h de sc ri be s a ty pe of ro a dw a y , th a t is the basis of t he dis pute herein. Both parties ag reethat Section 17.16.210A.3 of the Z oning Code 43
re qu ir e that C& D l a nd fi lls be loc a te d o n, or ha ve drive way s in to, no n- re sid e nti a l c oll e c tor str e e ts. I n th e tria l cou rt , the Me tr op oli ta n Gov e rn me nt dis a g re e d with Mr . Hig g ins ’s c on c lus ionthat th e six sites identified wer e not locate d on such stree ts, asserting t hat Mr. Hig g ins “misunderstood the zoning code s.”
I n s up po rt

of that c on te nti on , th e Metro po lit a n G ov e rn me nt s ub mitte d th e a ff idavit of its Z oning E x amination Chief, who is also the Secr etary for the B oard of

Z oning A ppeals, Mr. Charles She ph e rd . M r. She ph e rd ’s re sp on sib ili tie s in c lud ed e t ermi n i n g w h e th e r a pr op os e d u se on a

pr op e rty complies with the Z oning Code . He state d that a number of zoning provisions requirethat various uses, in addition to C&D landfills, be located on and/or have driveway acc ess t o a “nonr esidential collector ,” but that that term is not define d in the Metropolitan Code of L aws. Hefurther stated: As such my

department in enforc ing this p r o v is io nh a s followed the f ollowing proce dure: (1) we de termine if the bus i n es s i n question abuts a collec tor stree t as identified on the major stre et and a lley map for Nashville and Davidson County ; (2) we the n ex amine the zoning along this collec tor stree t in both directions from the proposed business until the first major interse ction with a collec tor or arterial; if the zon ing is r e sid e nti a l one ith e r s ideof th e str e e t, the n th e c oll e c tor is n ot a nonresidential collector , if the zoning is anything but r esidential, i n cl u ding ag ricultural, then the street is a nonr esidential collec tor.
I am awa re that the Depa

rtment of Public Works has certain standards f or the44

c on str uc tio n o f a no n- re sid e nti a l c oll e c tor str e e t; the se stand a rd s are no t uti lize d in de te rm ini ng wh e the r a

str e e t is a

no nr e sid e nti a l c oll e c tor

fo r zo nin g pu rp os e s.
Ia m a w ar e th a t th e Pl a n n in g D e p artm e n t h a s c e rtain s tan d ar d s for the construction of non-residential c ollector stre ets within subdivis ions; these standards arenot utili zed in determining whether a stree t is a n o n re s i d enti al collec tor for zon ing pu rp os e s.
A collector street which is entirely contained w ithin an ag ricultural zone fr om major interse ction to intersection, would be considere d a nonre sidential collector f or zoning purposes; re g ardle ss of the width of its pavement or the width of it rig ht-ofway , andre g ard le ss o f the c on str uc tio n o r s ub div isi on stand ard s of oth e r d e pa rtme nts of theMe tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt. On the basis of this testimony , Met ro as serted that a roa d that is a collec tor on the Major Street and A lley

Map of Na shville and Davidson C ounty is a nonreside ntial collector if it is locate d entirely in any nonresidential zone (including ag ricultural)

. Under that definition, acc ording to the Metropolitan Government, the roa ds associate d with the s ix parc els identified i n the conc lusion of Mr . H ig g ins ’s re po rt

are no nr e sid e nti a l col le c tor s bec aus e the y lie e nti re ly wi thi n a g ri c ultur a l zon e s.
Consolidated contended that the Subdivis ion Reg ulations of the Metropolitan Planning C o m m i s sion include standar ds for a “nonre sidential collector stre et” and those standar ds are applicable to the interpre tation of the similar term in Section 17.16.210A.3 of the Z oning Code . As Con so lid ate d frame s th e iss ue , “ I f .

. . theStr e e t Stand ardin the Sub div isi on Re g ulatio ns c on tr ol, as opposed t o t h e d efinition the Metropolitan Gove rnment claimed was a pplicable, the un c on tr a dic te d p ro of

in the re c or d e sta

bli sh e s th a t a do pti on of [the su bje c t or din a nc e s] r e su lte d in the de facto exclusion of construction and demolition landfills in Davidson County .”
Ontheiss ue of

e xclu sio na

ry zon ing , th e tria l c ou rt re c ite d the app lic ablete st f ro m Robertson Cou nty , e xpla ine d th at th e Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt’ s p os iti on wa s th a t th e rewe rea t le a st s ix a vaila blesit e s w he re a C& D la nd fi ll c ou ld b e bu ilt , andthat Co ns oli date d h a d th e bu rd e n to e sta bli sh that C& D la nd fi lls ha d be e n tot a lly e xclu de d fr om thec ou nty . T he c ou rt fo un d th a t th e a ff

ida vit s submitt ed by

eac h party disag ree d on the definition of nonre sidential collector stre ets. I n resolving that disag ree ment, the court stated
The Court believe s that the standar d asserted by Metro is the most tenable. Evide nce in the re cord indicates that repr esentatives of Metro ha ve consistently interpre ted the te rm to i nclud e any st re e t lo c a te d e nti re ly in a no nr e sid e nti a l zon e so that it wo uld a llo w o the r s ite s to se rv e a s C& D l a nd fi lls

. Having determined that the def inition s upplied by

the Metropolitan Gove rnment wa s the corr ect one , t h e court concluded that no exclusi onary zoning had oc curr ed by virtue of the ordinanc es.45

The c onstruction or interpre tation of a statute is a question of law. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 97 0 S. W.2 d 92 0, 92 4 (T e nn
. 19 98 ). Ou r re vie w of a tria l c ou rt ' s d e te rm inatio ns on iss ue s o f l a w i s de novo, with no presumptio n of cor rec tness. Fr

y e v . B lue Ri dg e Ne uros c ie nc e Ce nte r, P. C. , 70 S.W. 3d71 0, 71 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Bo wde n v . W ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn.2000)

. Ou r ro le is t o asce rtain and g ive effec t to leg islative intent, finding that intent, wheneve r possible, in the natura l and ordina

ry meaning of the wor ds used in the statute. My int , 970 S.W .2d at 924. The primary

rule of statutory

construction is “to asce rtain and g ive ef fec t to the intention and purpose of

the leg islature.” L e n s C r a f t e r s , I n c
. v
. S un dq uis t , 33 S.W .3d 772, 777 (Tenn. 2000) ; Mc Ge e v . B e st , 1 06 S.W. 3d48 , 6 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2)

. To de te rm inele g isl a tiv e int e nt, on e mus t look to the natural and ordinary meaning of the lang uag e used in the statute itself. We must ex amine any provision within the contextof the e ntire statute and in lig ht of its over-a rching purpose and the g oals it serves. State v. Flem ming , 1 9 S. W.3 d 1 95 , 1 97 (T e nn .2 00 0) ; Cohen v. Cohen , 937 S.W .2d 82 3, 82 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; T.R . Mil ls Con tra c tor s, In c . v. W

RH En te rp ris e s, LL C, 93 S.W .3d 861, 867 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). The statute should be rea d “without any forc ed or subtle construc tion which would extend or limi t its m eaning .” Nat ion al Gas Di str ibu tor s, In c . v . S tate , 804 S.W .2d 6 6 , 67 (Tenn.1991) . As our Supreme Court has said, “[w]e must seek a rea sonable construction in light of the purposes, obje ctives, and spirit of the statute base d on g ood sound rea soning.” Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Center, Inc

. , 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d 2 8 1 , 2 8 6 (T en n
. 2 0 0 1 ), ci t i n g State v. Turner , 913 S.W .2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995) . Cou rt s are also instructed to “g ive ef fec t to every

word, phra se, clause and sentenc e of the act in orde r to ca rry out the leg islative intent.” Tidw ell v. Collins , 522 S.W .2d 674, 676-77 (Te nn.1975). In re Estate of Dobbins , 987 S.W. 2d 30 , 3 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) . T he sa me rules and principles are applied when construing zoning ordinanc es. Li o n s H e a d H o m e o wn e r

s ' A s s 'n v. Me tropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 968 S.W .2d 296, 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Consolidated arg ues that the sta n d ar d s to be applied a re f ound in Section 2-6.2 of the Subdivis ion Reg ulations. W e haverevie wed the Re g ulations, which wer e put into the re cord by Consolidated, but we areunable to find a definition or standar d for “ nonresidential c ollector stre et.” The g ener al def

initional section for the e ntire set of reg ulations de fines “collec tor street” as “a stre et intended to move tra ffic f

rom local roads to arte rial routes. A collector stree t serves a neig hborhood or larg e subdivision.” “L ocal stre et” is not define d, but “major stre et” and “arterial stre et” a re. Section 2-6.2 of the Reg ulations, the s ection re fer ence d by Consolidated, is entitl ed “Stre et Re q u ir e me n ts ” a n dc o n tain s r e q u ir e me n ts th a t a r e to ap p ly

to a ll s tr e e ts ino r

r e late dto p r oposed subdivisions . Those re quirements include a section on “Stree t Desig n Standards”, s u ch as sig ht distance, gr ad es and cr oss-slopes, vertical desig n, rig ht-of-w ay and pave ment width, horizont al radius of c urved stre ets, turnar o u n d s , i ntersec tion design, numbe r of inter secting streets, and minimum desig n speeds. Seve ral table s in the “Street Des i gn S t andards” sec tion dist inguish the require ments for “ local stree ts” and “ collector s”, or, in some instances, “ minor local”, “ local”, and “collec tor.”W e al s o not e t hat t he Zoni ng C od e’ s sec t i on r ef er r i ng t o s t r eet cl as s i f

i cat i ons al s o re fer s t o t he “ M aj or St r eet 44 P l an. ” M r
. Shephe r d s t at ed t hat i n det er mi ni ng i f a pi ece of

proper t y ha s t he r equi r ed acc es s t o a nonr es i dent i al
conne ct or, hi s depart ment fi r s t d et er mi nes i f t he propert y i s “ a c ol l ect or s t r eet as i dent i f i ed on t he major s t r eet an d al l ey m a p .” A ssu m ing the m a p a n d the p la n a re the sa m e , the z o n ing o ff ic ia ls’ re lian c e o n tha t d o c u m e n t i s c o n siste n t with t hat provi s i on of t he Zoni ng Co de, ev en i f t he s t r eet cl as s i f

i cat i on l ang uag e i s i nt er pret ed as appl y i ng t o any t hi ng ot her t ha n setb ac ks. 46 To ide nti fy the a c tual impo rt of Con so lid a te d’ s ass e rtion s th a t th e Sub div isi on Re g ulatio ns ’ s t a n d ar d s ap p l y, i t i s n e c e s s ary t o c o n s u l tt h e a f

f i d a v i to f C o n s o l i d a t e d ’ s e x p e rt , M r
. H i g g i n s
. In rea ching his conclusion that the six parc els he identified did not mee t the zoning re quirement reg arding nonresidential c ollectors, he use d a table in the “St ree t Desig n Standards” se ction of the Re g ulatio ns a s e sta

bli sh ing thede fi nitionfo r s uc h str e e ts. He int e rp re te d th e ta blea ndre qu ir e me nts in the “ Str e e t D e sig n St a nd ard s” se c tio n a s r e qu iring a min imu m rig ht- of -w a y a nd pa ve me nt w idth for non-residential collectors of 72 fee t and 49 fee t respe ctively “(the larg est ROW and pave ment widths specified) .” He stated that “loc al conne ctors must meet the lesse r standar ds of 60 ft. and 37 ft., respe ctively

. ” He al s o i d enti fied thre e roa ds adjac ent to some of the six parcels that he stated wer e “ty pically classified a s ‘local c onnector s,’ not ‘non-r esidential collec tors.’ Consolidated arg ues that the Subdivision R eg ulations street standar ds apply to the Z oning Code’s use of

the term nonre sidential connec tor by virtue of Section 17.12.030B of the Code, which pr ov ide s:
Street Classifications. All street classifications are established in the “Subdivision Reg ulations of the Metropolitan Gove rnment o f N a s h v il le an d D av id s o nCo u n ty ” and the “Ma jor Street Plan” a s adopted by the Metropolitan Planning Commi ssion.
That sec tion of the Z oning Code is entitled “Street Setbacks,” and the re quirements fornonresidential districts and uses are classified as applying to e ither “N on-Arte rial Streets” or “A rteria l Streets.”
We do n o t nece ssarily

disag reethat this provision m akes the Subdivis ion Reg ulations an a c c e pta blere fe re nc e fo r s omepurpo ses in i nte rp re tin g theZ on ing Cod e , b ut that pu rp os e is established by

the sec tion its el f: determining setba cks. Section 17.12.030B does not use the term “nonre sidential connec tor.” Addition ally , the only “stree t classifications” we find in the Subdivision Reg ulations are the definitions. The standar ds used by Mr. Hig g ins a

re desig n standards. N othing in the reg ulations incorporates those standar ds into the definition of collector or other terms. I n other words, we cannot inter

pret the r eg ulations as establishing that only a stree t with the specified pa ving and rig ht-of-w ay

widths can be called a

connec tor. 44
We conclude that the definition of nonre sidential connec tor supplied by the local zoning officia l and traditionally an d consi stently used to determine compliance with Z oning Code require ments is a rea sonabl e co nstruction in light of the pur poses and objec tives of the zoning ordinanc es and is ba sed on sound rea soning. An ag ency ’s interpre tation of the statutes it is charg ed wi th i mpl e me nti ng , a s w e ll a s it s o wnru le s, is e nti tled to great we ig ht i f that in te rp re tatio n is47

co n sistent with the statutes. See E xxon Corp. v. M

etropolitan Governme nt , 7 2 S. W. 3 d 638, 641 (Tenn. 2002)

. Consequently , we a dopt that interpretation. The result is that Consolidated has not proved that there a

re no a rea s in the county

wher e a ne w C&D l an d fi ll can be c onstructed and op e rate d inc omp li ance wi th thezon ing re g ulatio ns , in c lud ing theor din anc e s th a t trig g e re d th is litigation.
Our c hoice to resolve t he exclusionary zoning issue, like the trial c ourt, on the basis of the arg uments prese nted by

the parties, should not be interprete d as any ag ree m en t b y us with the arg ument t h at even if the roa ds at issue wer e dete rmined not to be nonre sidential connec tors that Consolidated would have established the eleme nts of exclusionary zoning. Fir st, the expert’s report consi d er s fac tors other than State and local re g ulations over which the Metropolitan Government has no c on tr ol. We a

reun a wa reof a ny le g a l princ ipl e that w ou ld r e qu ir e Me tr o, fo r e xamp le , to chang e or le ssen its require ments for a C&D landfill simply beca use topogr aphy , soil c onditions, and thepr e se nc e of

str e a ms l imi t th e pla c e s w he reit i s p ra c tic a l or pr of ita bleto b uil d s uc h a

la nd fi ll. Additionally , Robertson County involved a county zoning ordinanc e that, by its terms, did not allow location of a

landfill within the count y
. T h e Z oning Code of the Metr opolitan Governme nt sp e c if ic a lly a llo ws C& D l a nd fi lls a ndse ts r e qu ir e me nts fo r the m; s ome su c h f a c ili tie s a lr e a dy

e xist and ar e oper ating in the county

. Further, this is not a situation wherethe two-mile buff er or dinance s themselves oper ated to pre clude a ll C&D landfills. I n other words, there is no proof that there is no land in the county

that is more than two miles from a park or school.
We n e e d n ot d e c idetheiss ue s r a is ed by th ese ob se rv a tio ns . We po int the m ou t me re ly beca use we disag ree with Consoli dated’ s arg ument that if the trial court incorre ctly interpre ted the nonreside n ti al c o n n e ctor re quirement, it was e ntitled to sum mary judgme nt that the ordinanc es ef fec t exclusionary

zoning.
XI. P O ST -J U D GM ENT I NJ UNCT I ON
The trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt to Consolidated on the constitutional gr ounds and iss ue d a de c laratory

jud g me nt that th e tw o o rd inanc e s, on the ir fa c e , v iol a te su bs ta nti ve du e pr oc e ss and equal protec tion rig hts. The ordinances w ere , there fore , unenfor cea ble. The c ourt also stated, “As Consolidated has no vested rig hts, as previously determined by

the Court, no other re medies ar e available ,” dec lining to enjoin enf orce ment of the ordinances ( alt h o u gh void ordinance s are unenfor cea

ble).
The Metr opolitan Governme nt then filed a motion to alter or amend the judg ment, or, in the alternative, fo r injunctive re lief. The trial court de nied the motion to alter or amend, but set arg ument on the re q u es t fo r injunctive relief . The Metr opolitan Governme nt sought an order enjoining Consolidated f

rom furthe r deve loping the land at issue until the Metropolitan Government had a rea sonable opportunity to c ure the defe cts of the zoning or dinance s in question by amending those ordinanc es. As g rounds, the Metropolitan Gove rnment asse rted that (1) zoning is a leg islative function and ( 2) the status quo should be maintained in or der to g ive the leg islature time to amend an invalid ordinanc e. Attac hed to the motion w as a copyof an or dinance that had alr eady beenT hi s was a r ed uct i o n f rom t he am o unt request ed , but C o nsol i d at ed do es not ap p eal t he reduc t i o n. 45
48 introduced in the Me tropolitan Council.
After further filings by the parties and a hearing, the trial court de termined that since it had previously

ruled that Consolidated had no ve sted interest in developing a landfill on the prope rty at the time the ordinanc es we re pa ssed, the injunction should issue based in la rg e part upon the holding in R o b e r ts o n Co un ty , supra , 799 S.W .2d 662. Acc ording ly , the court gave the Me tropolitan Government one hundred f ifty (150) day s to amend the ordinances, during w hich time Consolidated w a s e n j o i n e df r o mf u rt h e r a c t i o n t o d e v e l o p t h e C & D l a n d f i l l o n t h e p r o p e rt y.
Con so lid a te d a

pp e a ls the inj un c tio n g rante d a ft e r the c ou rt ’s ju dgmen t ontheme ri ts, asserting that a

post-judgme nt temporary injunctio n that was ne ver r equeste d in the pleading s has no basis in law or a

pplicable pr ocedur e. While in its motion the Metropolitan Governme nt appar ently

asked f or a te mporary injunction pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.04, the trial court base d its ruling on Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 29-14- 110, part of the Dec laratory J udg ment Act, which allows furthe r re lief “w heneve r nec essary or prope r.” Consolidated arg ues (1) any “further” relief g rante d must be based on the de clar atory jud g me nt, no t inc on sis te nt wi th it, a nd c a nn ot nu lli fy it; (2 ) this c a se dif fe rs fa c tually

fr om Robertson County in that the trial court’ s action her ein in decl ar i n g t h e two ordinances unc onstitut ional and un e nf or c e able le ft in pla c e prior zon ing ; a nd(3 ) b y

iss uin g theinj un c tio n, thetria l c ou rt e ng a g e d in zoning, which is a le g islative function. By the time this ap p ea l wa s ar gu ed, the 150 day s had run and the injunction had expired. Th e re fo re , th e iss ue s su rr ou nd ing theinj un c tio n a remoo t.
XI I. A TTOR N EY ’ S F EES
The trial c ourt awa

rded Consolidated attorney ’s fe es in the amount of $ 95,000, pursuant 45 to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and ex penses f or expert witn es s es an d co urt reporters in the amount of $5,277.28, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P

. 5 4

. 0 4 (2). The Metropolitan Gove rnment appe als the attorney ’s fee awa

rd arg uing, first, that Consolidated w as not a prevailing party und er correct interpre tations of the statute. It also arg ues that, even if Consolidated was a prevailing party , the reme dy g rante d it was so nominal that no awar d of fe es wa s rea sonable.
A. N O TIC E O F A P P E AL
Consolid a te dr e s p o n d s th a t th e M e tr o p o li tan G o v e r n me n t i s p r e c lu d e df r o m r a is in g the attorney ’s fe e issue bec ause the fee s and expenses we re a wa rd ed i n an orde r ente red O ctober 16, 2002 , a n d th e M e tr o p o li tan G o v e r n me n t’ s N o ti c e o f A p p e a l, f il e d O c to b e r 1 7 , s tate dit wasT he t rial co urt’ s m em o ran d um an d o rd er o f A ug ust 6 g ran t i ng d ec l ara t o ry reli ef an d ruli ng o n b o t h p arti es’ 46
mo t i ons for s ummary j udgment s t at ed, “ T hi s M emo r andum and O rd er i s a fi nal j udgment , ” but di d not i ncl ude a cert i f i c a t i o n pursuant t o T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 54

. 0 2

. B ecause t he co m p l ai nt asked fo r an award o f at t o rney ’ s fees, t he j u dg men t di d n ot be come f i n al u n t i l t h at c l ai m wa s r es ol v ed.

T he r ul e h as been amended, ef fect i ve Jul y 1, 200 4, r ega r di ng t he nami ng o f p ar t i es wh en one a t t orn ey 47
re p re se n ts m o re tha n o n e p a rty. See Compi l er ’ s N ot es t o Rul e 3.

M any o f t he cases d eal t wi t h t he requir em ent t hat t he no t i ce o f ap p eal s p eci f

y t he p art y o r p art i es t aki ng t he 48
a p p e a l. See , e
. g. Ar ne t t v
. Dom i no ’ s Pi z z a I , L

. L. C. , 1 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 2 9 , 5 3 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 3 ) ( ho l d i ng t hat t he l i st i ng o f o n e o r m o re na m e d p a rty fo llo w e d b y “e t a l.” i s ins u ff ic ie n t t o m e e t t h e re q u ire m e n ts o f T e n n . R . A p p . 3 (f) a n d this
c o u rt c o u ld c o n sid e r o n ly t h e a p p e a l o f th e s o le p a rty n a m e d in the no tice o f ap p e a l); M ai r os e v. Fede r al Expr es s Cor p. , 86 S. W

. 3d 502, 510 ( T en n
. C t

. A pp. 2002)

. T h e r ea s on i n g be h i n d t h es e r u l i n g s w as t h at t h i s c ou r t h as n o j u r i s di ct i on ov er a pe r s on n ot s pec i f i ca l l y n ame d a s a n a ppel l an t i n t h e n ot i ce of a ppea l

. T h es e c as es n o l on g er a ppl y t o t h e s i t u at i on cover ed by t he amendment t o t he r ul e. 49 appealing “ from the f

inal judgme nt entere d on the 6th day of Aug ust 2002. ” Rule 3(f) of the 46 Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edurerequire s that the notice of appeal desig nate the judg ment fr om w hic h r e lie f i s so ug ht:
Th e no ti ce of app eal sh a ll s pe c if y thepa rty or pa rtie s ta kin g theapp e a l,

. . . s ha ll 47 de sig nate thejud g me nt f ro m w hic h r e lie f i s so ug ht, and sh all name thec ou rt to which the a

ppeal is take n. An appe al shall not be dismiss ed for informality of form or tit le of theno tic e of

app e a l.
The Metr opolitan Governme nt maintains that it was not re quired to file a separ ate notice of appeal from the attorne y ’s fe e judg ment and that an a ppealing party

may prese nt any

question of law for r eview unde r Tenn. R. App. P. 13(a ).
Th is c ou rt

ha s c on sid e re d th e con seq uen c e of failu reto c omp ly

wi th the sp e c if

ic require ments of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f) a number of t imes. The failure to specif y a particular orde r 48
a s th e ba sis of

theapp e a l has recei ved dif fe ri ng tr e a tme nt, de pe nd ing on thec ir c ums ta nc e s, p arti c u la r ly , w h e th e r th e n o ti c e o f ap p e a l d e s ig n a te s a n y ju d g me n t. F o r e xa mp le , in Dunlap v. Dunlap , 996 S.W .2d 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), the notice of a ppeal did not spec ify

any particula r judgme n t, b u t th is c o u rt d e te r mi n e d th a t th is f a il u r e to c o mp ly w ith T e n n
. R. A p p
. P. 3(f) did not prec lude the court from re viewing the issues raise d in the appellant’ s brief. 996 S.W .2d at 810. The court re lied on Tenn. R. App. P

. 13(a) , which governs the s cope of revie w on appeal and provide s “a n y q u estion of law may be broug ht up for re view and r elief by any party ” as w ell as on the Ad vis ory Com mitte e Com me nt t o Ru le 13 (a ), wh ic h s tate s, in p a rt :
T h i s s u b d i v i s i o n r e

j e c t s u s e o f

t h e n o t i c e o f ap p e a l a s a

r e v i e w
- l i m i t i n g d e v i c e
. In fe de ral pra c tic e the no tic e of app e a l has lim ite d re vie w i n tw o p ri nc ipal w a y s. Som e courts havelimit ed the questions an appellant may urg e on re view to those af fec ting the portion of the judg men t s p ec i fi ed in t he notice of appeal. Howeve r, since the principal utilityof the notice of appe al is simply to indicate a party ’s intention to takeT h e T e n n e sse e S u p re m e C o u rt a ff irm e d o n th e m e r its th e d e c isio n o f t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls, A nd er s on v. 49 St andar d Regi s t erCo. , 857 S. W

. 2d 555 ( T enn
. 199 3), but di d not addres s t he R ul e 3( f) i s s ue. 50 an appe al, this limit ation seems undesirable. The feder al courts have a lso lim ited the issues an appe llee may raise on appeal in the a bsenceof the a

ppellee’ s own notice of app e a l. H e rea g ain, sin c e ne ith e r the iss ue s p re se nte d f or re vie w n or

thearg ume nts in support of those issues are set forth in the notice of a ppeal, ther e see ms to be no g oo d r e a so n f

or so lim iti ng thequ e sti on s an ap pe lle e may ur g e on re vie w. Th e re su lt of elimi n a ti n g a n y r e q u ir e me n t th a t a n ap p e ll e e f il e th e ap p e ll e e ’ s o w n n o ti c e of appeal is that once any

party files a notice of appeal the appellate court may consider the ca se as a

whole.
I n addition to Rule 13(a ), the c ourt consider ed the Advisory Commi ssion Com ment to the pr ov isi on a t is su e , Ru le 3( f) , w hic h s tate s:
This subdivisi on specifie s the content of the notice of ap p ea l

. The purposeof the notice of appeal is simply to de clar e in a formal way an intention to appeal. A s long as this purpose is me t, it is irr elevant that the paper filed is de ficient in so m e o t her respect

. S i m i larly , the notice of appeal play s no part in def ining the sc ope of a pp e lla te r e v i e w
. S c o p e o f r e v i e w i s tr e a t e d i n ru l e 1 3

. T h i s s u b d i v i s i o n r e a d in conjunction with rule 13(a ) permits any question of law to be br oug ht up for re view as long as any

party formally decla res an intention to appeal in timely fashion.
The Dunlap court also ref

ere nced prior holdings that, in view of the r elationship betwee n the tw o r ule s, a pa rty ’s failu reto c omp ly

wi th T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (f ) d oe s n ot l imi t th e iss ue s th a t pa rty may raise on a ppeal. See Glidden v. Glidden , 1987 WL 9452, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr . 16, 1987) (h o l d i n g t h at ap p el l an t ’s d es i gn at i o n o f t h e f i n al j u d gm en tb u tn o td es i gn at i n g t h e o rd erd en y i n g a po st- jud g me nt m oti on to alte r o r ame ndsu ff ic e d to a ll ow th e ap pe llant t o r a isea ndthi s c ou rt to c on sid e r a ny qu e sti on of

la w o r f a c t inthec a se a s a

wh ole ); Anderson v. Standard Register Co. , No. 01 A0 1 -9 1 0 2 -C V-00035, 1992 W L 63421, at *2-3 (T enn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1992) (holding that 49 wher e the tria l court denied a motion to amend the complaint and subse quently g rante d summary judgme nt for the de fendant and the plainti ff ’s not ice of appeal desig nated the f inal judgme nt dismiss ing the complaint, the notice of appeal me t the purpose of providing notice, the a ppellee w as not prejudice d , the appe al was not hampere d, and Te nn. R. App. P. 3(f) did not prec lude the appellant f

rom cha lleng ing the denial of the motion to amend the complaint).
B ased on all the se auth oriti e s a ndon its de te rm inatio n th a t th e app e llant’ s “ ov e rs ig ht” in failing to desig nate the or der a ppeale d had neither

prejudice d the appe llee nor hampere d the court’s revie w of the appeal, t he court determined that the appellant should be permitted to prese nt in the appeal any

question of law or

fac t involved in the case

. Dunlap , 996 S.W .2d at 811. Se e als o Oakleyv. Oak ley , No. W2002-00095-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 103215, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 8, 2003) (relying on Dunlap and Glidden and holding that the appellant could raise all issues relate d to the only

timely -filed notice of appe al which could onl y relate t o the l ower tribunal’s denia l of the51

app e llant’ s T e nn . R. Civ

. P. 60 motion to se t a sid e jud g me nt, e ve n tho ug h the no tic e of app e a l on ly stated that appe llants “ appeal the dismiss al of this c ase” and the orig inal dismiss al judg ment was not tim e ly app e a le d) ; Strong v. Elkins , 1987 WL 18069, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1987) ( holding that althoug h the notice of appeal did not designate the judg ment app ea l ed , t h ere could be no misunderstanding by appelleethat the appe llant intended to appeal from the su a s po nte dismiss al of his complaint, relying on T enn. R. App. 1 and f eder al authorit y t h at an er ror in desig nating the judgme nt appea led from will not preve nt r eview of the entire a ppeal if the notice manife sts an intent to appea l from the judg ment soug ht to be vacated).
Howeve r, this court has a lso reac hed the opposite c onclusion wherea spec ific judg ment was d e s i g n a t e db u tt h e d e s i g n a t i o n w a s e rr o n e o u s o r d i dn o ti n c l u d e i s s u e s r a i s e db y t h e ap p e l l a n t

. In Ha ll v . H all , 772 S.W .2d 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), the rele vant notice of appeal (as we ll as an earlier one that was dismissed as premature) desig nated a judgme nt of May 13, 1987, and the or der denying a motion to alter or ame nd or for new tria l and stated the a

ppellant was a

ppealing “fr om the ali m o n y , s u p p o rtand prope rty divisions” in the May

13 judgme nt. Howeve r, the a ppellant had included in the re cord a transcript of a contempt hearing held October 7, 1987, and in his brief the appellant c halleng ed a c ontempt finding resulting from that hea ring . This court dete rmined that the October contempt order was not c ontemplated in e ither notice of appeal. Be causeof the de signation require d by

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f) , “[i] nasmuch a s the October, 1987, orde r re lated to a suppleme ntal issue raised afte r entry

of final judg ment (albe it before finalized by the belate d ruling on the “Motion to Amend or Ne w Trial” ), the c lear and spec ific wording of the notice s of appeal limits the issues on this appeal to the judg ment desig nated in the notice s.” 772 S.W.2d at 436. Rely ing on Ha ll , su

pr a , th is c ou rt

ha s h e ld that, w hen a sp ecif ic jud g me nt o r o rd e r i s desig nated in the not ice of appeal, Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (f) limits the scope of a ppellate r eview to the judgme nt or order

desig nated. Goad v. Pasipan o d ya , N o
. 0 1 A 0 1

- 9 5 0 9

- CV

- 0 0 4 2 6 , 1 9 9 7 WL 749462, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 19 9 7 ). I n t h at ca se, the a ppellants’ claims ag ainst two differ ent def

endants we re dismissed by the trial court in two separate orders, one dated Marc h 17, c e rtif y ing thedis mis sa l f

inal un de r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 54 .0 2, a nd the se c on d date d June 19 , 1 99 5, a lso certify ing the di smissal as final. The plaintiff f iled a notice of

appeal on J uly

24 stating he was appealing the trial court’s June 19 order . Not only was the a ppeal dismissed as untimely as to ea ch of the orde rs, this c ourt also held that the appellant had not pe rfe cted an appeal of the earlier orde r be c aus e his no tic e of

app e a l de sig nate d on ly the se c on d or de r. “ Th us , Te nn
. R. A pp . P. 3( f) lim its his appea l to the J une 19, 1995 orde r.” Id ., at *2. Finally , in Ho wse v . Ca mp be ll , No. M1999-01580-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 459106 (Tenn. Ct. App. May

2, 2001), this court dea lt with a prematurenotice of a ppeal de signating a

Marc h 11, 19 99 , o rd e r that di smi sse d one of mul tip le de fe nd a nts

. Th a t ord e r did no t be c omea fi na l, a pp e a la ble order until all remaining claims among all parties we re a djudicated, at which time the pre mature notice of a

ppeal, whic h had not bee n dismiss ed, bec ame timely

. By order dated March 22, 2000, the tria l c ou rt dis mis se d th e c la ims a g a inst a ll the re ma ini ng de fe nd a nts . T he app e llant d id n ot f ile another notice of a

ppeal. Thequestion befor e the c o u rt wa s wh ether the appe llant could pursue app e a l of thedis mis sa l of the de fe nd a nts in the Ma rc h 22 , 20 00 or de r. We de te rm ine d he c ou ld n ot,52

holding that be causehis onlynotice of a ppeal did not state he desired to a ppeal from the Marc h 22 order (and c ould not have, beca use the notice was filed months bef ore that judgment) , the notice of appeal applied only

to the order

it designated and this court would only consider those issues relate d to the dismiss al of the f

irst defe ndant. Id . at *3. In Ho wse , this court discussed the notice purposes underlying T enn. R. App. P. 3(f) and determined that the appe llant’s failure to file a sec ond notice of appe al undermined th e n o t i ce f unction that notices of a

ppeal a re intende d to serve, le aving the other pa rties to g uess whether he intended to appeal either, both, or neither order of dismissal. Id

. I n the ca se bef

ore us, ther e wa s only

one def endant, and the notice of

appeal was timely

filed as to both or ders. Consequently , some of the c omplications and alternative g rounds for limiting the appeal that were prese nt in the case s discussed ar e not involved her e. Howeve r, the Metropolitan Go ve rn me nt c le arl y

ind ic a te d it s in te nt t o a

pp e a l f ro m a sp e c if ic jud g men t w hic h w a s n ot the la st or de r e nte re d inthec a se . T he Me tr opol it an G ov e rn me nt, no t a n u ns op his tic a te d li tig a nt, fi le d it s no tic e of app e a l a ft e r the a tto rn e y ’s fe e or de r w a s e ntered, bu t di d n ot r e fe r t o it . Are a so na ble interpre tation of the notice of appeal is that the Me tropolitan Governme nt said what it meant, i.e. , that it intended to appea l on l y t h e judgment of Aug ust 6. I t could there fore be ar g ued that Consolidated was just ified i n relying on that interpretation, and, under Hall, Goad, andHo wse , th is court’s r eview w ould be limited to the appellant’s desig nation.
On the other

hand, it would not be reasonable to assume that the Metropolitan Gove rnment was not see king to r ever se the a war d of attorne y ’s fe es if it won on the merits of its appea l, since Consolidated could no longe r be considere d a prevailing party . Consequently , it could be ar g ued that Consolidated was on re asonab l e notice that the Me tropolitan Governme nt sought to re verse the awa rd of f ees w hether

or not it was succ essful in overturning thetrial court on the me rits.
We are awa

re of the vary ing inter

pretations of the require ment s of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f ). Further, t h e cl ea r pref

ere nce is for

liberality in interpreting a notice of appeal and the scopeof appeal. Whi le it is true that the Metropolitan Gove rnment’s noti ce o f ap p ea l did not inform Consolidated that it intended to a ppeal the attorne y ’s fe e aw ard, Consolidated c annot point to any prejudiceit suffere d from the f ailure of the Metropolitan Gove rnment to desig nate the attorney ’s fe e judgme nt. I n these circumstance s, we think the better view is that the Metropolitan Gove rnment can raise any issue resulting from the tria l court’s final judgment. Ac cording ly , we will re view the tria l c ou rt ’s a wa

rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
B. P RE VAI L I NG PA R TY
The attorney fee provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 states that a court “in its discretion, may allow the pr evailing party

. . . a re asonable attorney ’s fe e as pa rt of the c osts.” As the lang uag e of the statute makes c lear , the determination of whether to make an a war d of fe es, as we ll as the amount of such f ees, lies within the discre tion of the trial court. A trial court’s decision to gr ant or de ny fee s is r eviewe d for a

buse of discr etion. Fogerty v . MGM G roup Holdings Corp. , 379 F .3 d 3 48 , 3 57 (6 th Cir. 2004). That discre tion is l imited, however , by the re quirement that only a pre vailing pa

rty may qu a lif y fo r a fee award. A dd iti on a lly , if it i s d e te rm ine d th a t a

pa rty me e ts the pr e vaili ng pa

rty53

requirem ent, fees should be aw arde d “unless spec ial circ umstances would r ender such an a war d unjust.” He ns ley v . Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.C t. 1933, 1937 (1983).
The meaning of the term “pre vailing party ” has been the subject of a number of opinions by theUn ite d St a te s Su prem e Co urt

. Re c e ntl y , th e Cou rt ha s in dic a te d th a t th e me a nin g is r e lativ e ly c l e a r
. In B u c k

h a n n o n B o a r

d a n d Ca r e H

o m e s , I n c
. v
. W e s t V ir g in ia D e p a r tm e n t o

f H e a lth and Human Re sources , 5 3 2 U

. S

. 5 9 8 , 1 2 1 S

. C t

. 1 8 3 5 ( 2 0 0 1 ) , t h e C o u rtru l e dt h a ta “ p r e v a i l i n g p art y” d o es n o ti n cl u d e o n e w h o fa i l s t o s ec u re a j u d gm en to r c o u rt -o rd er ed co n s en td ec re e, ev en t h o u gh the desire d result of the la wsuit is achieved be causeof a voluntary chang e in the def

endant’ s conduct, thus dec lining to adopt the “ cata ly st” theory

. I n that opinion, the C ourt made it clear that to be a prevailing party , one mus t rec eive at least som e judicially -sanc tioned relief on the merits of his or her c laim. 532 U.S. at 600-604, 121 S.Ct. at 1838-40.
Desc ribing “pre vailing party ” as a term of a

rt, the Court ref

err ed to the B lack’ s L aw Dictionary definition: “[a] party in whose favor a judgme nt is render ed, re g ardle ss of the amount of damag es aw arde d

. . . A ls o te r me d s u c c e s s f u l p arty

. ” A p r e v a il in g p arty is o n e w h o h a s been awa rded some r elief by

the court. 532 U.S. at 6 0 3 , 1 2 1 S

. C t

. at 1839. In his concurring opinion, Justi c e Sc a lia po int s o ut that “ pr e vaili ng pa rty ” is n ot “ so me ne wf

a ng le d le g a l te rm

inv e nte d f

or us e in late-20th-c entury fee -shifting statutes.” 532 U.S. at 610, 121 S.Ct . at 1843. It has neve r mea nt a pa rty wh o lef

t the c ou rtho us e e mpty -h a nd e d; it has lon g me a nt that a jud ic ia l f ind ing of lia bil ity was re quired. Just ice Sca lia ’s t ra cing of the history of the term of art led him to conc lude that prevailing party has traditionally and “ inv ar iab ly - - meant the pa rty that wins the su it or

ob ta ins a finding (or an admission) of liability .” 532 U.S. at 615, 121 S.Ct. at 1846.
Th is thr e sh old re qu ir e me nt ha s lon g e xiste d. “ On ly wh e re a pa rty ha s pr e vaile d on theme ri ts of a t l ea s t s o m e o f his claims . . . has there been a determination of the ‘substantial rig hts of the pa rtie s, ’ w hic h Co ng re ss d e te rm ine d w a s a ne c e ssa ry fo un datio n fo r de pa

rting fr om the us ua l rule in this country that eac h party is to bear the expense of his own attorney .” Hanrahan v. Ham pton , 446 U.S. 754, 758, 100 S.Ct

. 1987 (1980). I n Hensley , the Court soug ht to clarify the standar d wher e the plaintiff ac hieves only limit ed succ ess. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 431, 103 S.Ct . at 1938. The Court define d a p r e v a il in g p arty

a s o n e w h o s u c c e e d e d“ o n a n y s ig n if ic a n t i s s u e inli ti g a ti o n w h ic h achie ves some of the benef it the parties soug ht in bringing suit.” Id

. I n Tex as Sta te Te ac he rs A ss’ n. v . Gar lan d Ind e pe nd e nt Sc ho ol D ist ., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S.Ct . 1486, 1493 (1989), the Court r esolved a split among the circ uit c ourts and reje cted the standar d r e q u irin g th a t a p arty s u c c e e d o n th e “ c e n tr a l is s u e ” in th e c a s e a n d a c h ie v e th e “ p r im aryrelief soug ht.” 489 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 1493. I nstead, t h e C o u rt reaffirme d the Hensleystandard. The Court also re iterate d that wher e the c laims arise fr om a cor e set of f acts and involve related theories of

law, the deg ree of succe ss the plaintiff attains is rele vant to the size of the fe e aw ard, i.e ., whether the awa rd is rea sonable, not to the elig ibilit y for an awa

rd, i.e. , w he the r th e plaintif f i s a pr e vaili ng pa

rty . 4 89 U. S. at 79 0, 10 9 S. Ct. a t 14 92 ; see also Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 113, 1 1 3 S

. C t

. 566, 574 (1992). The Texas Teache rs Ass’n c a s e e s ta b li s h e d a n e xc e p ti o n w h e re the plaintiff’s succe ss c an be char acte rized as “pure lyt ec h n i ca l o r de mi nim is ;” in that situation, the54

plaintiff is not a prevailing party

. Texas State Teachers Ass’n , 489 U.S. at 792, 109 S.Ct . at 1494. Howeve r, Farrar

c lari fi e d th a t a

pa rty wh o is a wa

rd e d o nly no min a l dama g e s is a

pr e vaili ng pa

rty beca use pre vailing pa

rty status does not turn on the mag nitude of the re lief obtained. Farrar , 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct . at 574.
I n the ca se bef

ore us, Consol idated was succe ssful in obtaining a declaratory judgme nt that the ordinanc es we re unc onstit u t i onal, re ndering them unenfor cea ble ag ainst Consoli dated or any other pa rty . Consequently , it has met the baseline de finition of “pre vailing pa rty .” The Metropolitan Government, howeve r, ar g ues that Consolidated w as not a prevailing party beca use the only

relief g rante d it was a de clar atory judgme nt that did not chang e the leg al re lationship between the parties and did not aff

ect the be havior of the defe ndant towar d the plaintiff.
I nd e e d, theSup re me Cou rt ha s st a te d, “ the tou c hs ton e of the pr e vaili ng pa rty inq uiry

mus t be the mate rial alter ation of the leg al re lationship of the parties in a manner w hich Cong ress soug ht to promote in the feestatute.” Texas State Teache rs Ass’n , 489 U.S. at 792-93; 109 S.Ct. at 1494. It has also held that the r elief g rante d must “aff ect the b eh avior of the defe ndant towar d the plaintiff.” Rh od

e s v . S te wart , 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.C t. 202, 203 (1988). [T]o q ua lif

y a s a pr e vaili ng pa

rty , a c ivi l rig hts plaintif

f mus t ob tai n a t le a st s ome relief on the merits of his c laim. The plaintiff must obtain an e nforc eable judgme nt ag ains t the def

endant f rom whom fee s are soug ht, or compar able r elief throug h a c on se nt d e c re e or

se ttl e me nt. Whate ve r r e lie f the plaintif f s e c ur e s mu st d ir e c tly benef it him at the tim e of the judgme nt o r settlement. . . . In short, a plaintiff “pre vails” whe n actua l rel ief on the me rits of his claim materia lly alters the le g al relationship between the pa rties by modify ing the defe ndant’s behavior in a way that direc tly benef its the plaintiff.
Farrar , 506 U.S. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. at 573. (citations omitt ed).
Whil e a plaintiff who obtains only a dec laratory

judgme nt in his or her favor may qualify as a prevailing party , entry

of such a judgme nt does not automatically compel that re sult. Rhodes , 488 U.S. at 3, 109 S.Ct

. at 203. Rather, the question is w hether the judg ment produce s some action or cessation of action by

the def endant or otherwise a ffe cts the beha vior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. “A decla

ratory judgme nt, in this respe ct, is no differ ent from any other judg ment.” 488 U.S. at 4, 109 S.Ct . at 203.
I n Rhodes , th e tw o p la intif fs ob ta ine d a jud g me nt re qu iring priso n o ff ic ia ls t o c omp ly

wi th proce dures in handling prisoner r equests for mag azines. At the time the trial court’s order was e nte re d, on e plaintif

f h a d d ie d andtheoth e r w a s n o lo ng e r i nc arc e rate d. Th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court reve rsed the awa

rd of attorney ’s fee s because the judg ment aff orded plaintiffs no relief

since they wer e no longer in state custody

. 488 U.S. at 4, 109 S.Ct . at 204. See also He witt v. He lms , 482 U.S. 755, 763 107 S.C t. 2672, 2677 (1987) (holding that a mere favor able judicial state ment of the law during litigation that re sults in j udg ment ag ainst the plaintiff does not m ake the plaintiff aT he p l ai nt i f f , an u n su c cess f

ul bidd er i n t he p ast , was al so award ed $8 , 7 5 0 i n co m p ensat o ry da m ages. T he 50
cour t found work r el at ed t o t he decl ar at ory and i nj un ct i ve r el i ef was s o ent er t wi ned wi t h t he dam age awa r d i t provi ded
a s epa r at e bas i s for t h e aw ar d of f ee s
. 112 F

. Su pp. a t 1348.

55 prevailing party

and plaintiff did not g et re dress fr om the chang e in prison proc edure s since he was no longe r in prison w hen the c hang e wa s made). T hese c ases involved situations wher e the r elief “could not in any

way have be nefitted e ither plaintiff.” Rhodes , 488 U.S. at 4, 109 S.Ct . at 203.
Th e se ho ldi ng s h a ve be e n e xpla ine d, in p art , a s r e su lti ng fr om the fa c t th a t th e jud g me nts did no t a lte r the re latio ns hip be tw e e n the pa rtie s bec aus e , at the tim e of thejud g me nts , n o r e latio ns hip exis ted. See e .g., NationalBlack Police Assoc. v. D istrict of C olumbia Board of Elections and Ethics , 168 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

. I n that case , the court held that even thoug h the ca se wa s moot by the t ime of appeal because the leg islation challeng ed in the l awsuit had been re peale d, the injunction ag ainst its enforce ment was eff ective when issued, and for 52 day s therea fter, and altere d the re lationship between the parties whe n it was issued. Id

. Whil e the r equire d direc t benef it to the pl ai ntiff must ex ist at the time of the judg ment, a plaintiff wh o establishes that he c ontinues to have or is re asonably likely to have some le g al relationship to the defendant can be a pre vailing pa rty

. Barnes v. Broward County She riff’s Offi ce , 190 F.3d 1274, 1278 n.3 ( 11th Cir. 1999) (holding that job applicant who obtaine d injunction prohibiting c ounty

from continuing use of pr eem p loy ment psy cholog ical testing was not a pr evailing party beca use, while it was c onceiva b l e h e co u l d benef

it from the injunction if he re applied for employ ment, he pre sented no e vidence he wa s elig ible or intended to re apply ). The Barnes c ou rt , and other s, rec og nized that other contexts, such as employ ment, may be distinguishable from the prisoner c ontextin He witt and Rhodes in the pl aintiff’s abilityto show a continuing connec tion or relationship even thoug h the immediate re sult of the judgme nt is not a direct bene fit to the plaintiff.
For example, in W

e bs te r G re e nth um b Co . v . Fult on Cou nty , 112 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (N.D. G a. 2000), the c ourt struck dow na c o unty ’s minority

and fe male business ente rprise pr og ram a s violative of the Equa l P ro t ec t i on Cause, ente ring a dec laratory judgme nt and an injunction ag ainst the c ou nty

. Th e c ou rt c on c lud e d that the plaintif f wo ulddir e c tly

be ne fi t f ro m th e inj un c tio n b e c aus e 50 it was still i n business and wa s rea sonably likely to rea pply for c ounty contra cts in the future. 112 F .Su pp . at 13 47

. Con se qu e ntl y , the plaintif f wo uld dir e c tly

be ne fi t inthefu tur e fr om the jud g me nt. The c ourt also discounted the c ounty ’s ar g ument that the plaintiff had obtai ned only “mora l satisfac tion” beca

use the prog ram at issue was up for rene wal in thr ee months a fter the judgme nt was issued and wa s likely

to be allowed to lapse . The c ounty arg ued the soon-to-b e- n o n -e x i s t ent prog ram could not have harme d the plaintiff, so the judg ment did not benefit it. Id

. The c ourt found thi s p os iti on inc on sis te nt w iththec ou nty ’s re qu e st f or a stay of theinj un c tio n p e nd ing app e a l.
I n Mendoza v . Licensing Board of Fall River , _
__ N. E. 2d

__

_, 20 05 WL

10 90 63 0 ( Ma ss. Ma y 1 1 , 2 0 0 5 ) , th e p lain ti f

f w a s s u c c e s s f

u l i n h a v in g a

c ity ’ s p u b li c in d e c e n c y

o r d in a n c e that preve nted nude dancing decla red violative of the state constitution. Howeve r, the court a lso found that the plain t i ff wa s prohibited from off ering nude danc ing at his restaurant/bar bec ause of56

limit ations place d in a pre viously -g rante d zoning variance that allowed ope ration of the restaur ant/bar at its location. As to attorney ’s fe es, the c ity arg ued the plaintiff w as not a pre vailing party beca use he had not obtained the prac tical relief he soug ht: the abilityto present nude dancing at h i s b u s i n ess location. The court found that the decla ratory and injunctive re lief prohibiting e nf or c e me nt o f the or din a nc e s o n n ud e danc ing c on sti tut e d e nf or c e ablejud g me nts that di re c tly benef itted the plaintiff beca

use they provided the plaintiff substantive rig hts to prevent enf orce ment of the ordinances a g ainst his business. 2005 W L 1090630, at *13. The judg ments actively

preve nt the city

and licens i n g board f

rom pursuing unconstitutional courses of a ction, which they defe nded vig orousl y t h ro u g hout the litigation. B eca

use the c ity

and li ce n s i n g b oard a

re no long er a

ble to enfor ce the adult entertainment ordi n an ces or to deny Oliver’s an adult entertainment license, [P laintiff] is n ow elig ible to apply for a zoning variance that would permit nude d an ci n g.
Id

. B a se d o n th e va

ri ou s t each ing s o f the se c a se s, wec on c lud e that Co ns oli date d w a s a prevailing part y
. It obtained a judg ment in its favor dec laring the ordinanc es violative of Co n s ti tu ti o n al p r o t e c ti o n s an d , the re fo re , u ne nf or c e able . H a d th is j ud g me nt s too d a lon e , th e rewo uld be no serious question about C o n solidated’s status as a pr evailing party . The c omplicating f actor is the iss uanc e by

thetria l c ou rt

of theinj un c ti on pro hi bi ting Con so lid a te d f ro m pr oc e e din g wi th development of

the proposed landfill at the site at issue. Predictably and log ically , the Metropolitan Go ve rn me nt ar g ue s tha t bec aus e of that in jun c tio n, Con so lid a te d d id n ot a c hie ve thepr a c tic a l r e su lt it sought, i.e. , the abil ity to de ve lop the C& D la nd fi ll on the pr op e rty it l e a se d; the le g a l r e latio ns hip betwee n the pa rt i es was not chang ed; and the judg ment did not affe ct Metro’ s behavior towa rd Consolidated. We ag reethat the injunction miti g ated the eff ect of the de clar atory

judgme nt. After c are ful consideration, however , we do not think it had the eff ect of rende ring Consolidated a non-pre vailing party . The eff

ect of the decla

ratory judgme nt w as to rende r the ordinances une nforc eable . That wa s one of the primary

benef its sought. The injunction r equire d Metro to adopt ordinances c orre cting the constitutional infirmiti es within a spec ified t i m e. There fore , the judg ment aff ecte d the Metropolitan Government’s behavior toward Consolidated. I f Metro did not ac t within the deadline e sta bli sh e d b y

thec ou rt , it

c ou ld n ot h a ve pr e ve nte d Co ns oli date d f rom c on str

uc tin g thela nd fi ll wher e it proposed.
Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de termination that Consolidated was a pr evailing p art y.In a c o n c u rr ing o p inio n , Ju stice O ’C o n n o r sta te d th a t i f ev e r th e re w a s a p la intiff w h o d e se rv e d no fee s a t all, 51 i t was t hi s p l ai nt iff

a n d e x p l ai ned why

. 50 6 U

. S. at 11 6

- 1 2 2 , 11 3 S.Ct. at 57 5

- 5 7 9

. Fo ur j ud ges di sagr eed wi t h t he
m ajo ri t y de t er mi n i n g t h e amou n t of f ee s du e r at h er t h an r ema n di n g for r ec on s i der at i on of t h e fee a mou n t u pon appl i ca t i on of

r el ev an t f ac t or s
. 506 U. S. a t 123- 124, 113 S. Ct

. a t 579- 80. 57 C. R EASON A BLE F EES
Even a party who qualifies a s a prev ai l i n g party may not be entitled to an aw ard of fee s be c aus e su c h a wa

rdwo uldno t bere a so na

ble . T he Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rnmen t argues that, e ve n if Con so lid a te d is de te rm ine d to be a pr e vaili ng pa rty , it s v ic tory

wa s o nly te c hn ic a l a ndthere lie f i t obtained wa s so nominal in compa rison to the relief

soug ht, that the “only

rea sonable fe e is . . . no feeat all,” r elying on Farrar , 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct . at 575.
As set out earlier, t he nature of relief obtained is rele vant t o the amount of fe es aw arde d and to the exercise of

discretion by

the trial court in determining that amount. Farrar , 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct . at 574. That is bec ause the court must co n s i d er the relationship betwe en the e x tent of succe ss and the amount of the feeawa rd. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 438, 103 S.Ct

. at 1942. The de g ree of ov e rall suc c e ss is an imp orta nt, or e ve n the mos t criti c a l, f a c tor in d e te rm ini ng there a so na ble ne ss of a f ee a war d. Id .; Tex as Te ac he rs As s’ n. , 4 89 U. S. at 79 3, 10 9 S. Ct. a t 14 93 -9 4; Hensley , 4 61 U. S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941.
I n F a r rar , the plaintiff wa s awa rded nominal damag es of one dollar, althoug h he soug ht sevente en milli on dollars, upon a jury finding that the def

endant ha d deprive d him of a unspec ified c ivi l rig ht. Th e tria l c ou rt a wa rd e d $ 28 0, 00 0 infe e s b a se d o n th e tim e sp e nt on the lit ig a tio n a s a whole without considering the relationship betwee n the ex tent of success and the amount of the f ee, th e r e b y f a il in g to e n g a g e in “ a n y me a s u r e d e xe r c is e o f d is c r e ti o n .” F a r rar , 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct . at 575. Althoug h the Supreme Court r ever sed the interme diate appe llate court’s holding that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party , it determined the a war d was improper and that the plaintiff wa s e nti tle d to no fe e s. 51
The Court in Farrar

did no t ho ld that a

plaintif f w ho is a wa

rd e d o nly no min a l dama g e s is never entitled to an award of fee s. I nstead, it held t hat the trial c ourt should consider the de g ree of succe ss in determining what is a re asonable awa rd. I f the sole pur

pose o f a l aw suit is a monetary judgme nt for dama g es, failure to obtain such a judg ment is indicative of lac k of succ ess. Farrar , 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct . at 575. In that situation, a plainti ff m aybe entitled to no fe es, eve n though it wa s a pre vailing pa rty

. Id . I f the lawsuit achie ved other tang ible results, howeve r, a f ee awa rd may be justified. W

ilcox v. City of Reno , 42 F.3d 550, 555 ( 9th Cir. 1994).
I n W ilcox , the plaintiff bro u gh t s u i t for injuries he sustained during an ar rest that wa s captur ed on videotape . In the claim re levant her ein, he challeng ed the city ’s us e of forcepolicy . The jury fo un d th e c ity ’s po li cy

re su lte d intheus e of

e xce ssi ve fo rc e a ndthat th is p oli c y pr oximate ly cause d the plaintiff’s injuries, but aw arde d him one dollar in damag es. The trial court awa rded the plaintif f atto rn e y ’s fe e s o f $ 66 ,0 00 , a r e du c tio n f ro m th e $1 11 ,0 00 re qu e ste d. Th e Ni nthCir c uit58

aff irmed the a war d on the basis the trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion. The t ri al co u rt h el d a hearing, r educe d the re quest, made f indings supporte d by

the reco rd , an d properly analy zed controlling authority . The a ppellate c ourt held that the de termination that t h e p o l icy was unconstitutional was signific ant and that the be nefits from that de t er m i n ation wer e among the purposes of the litiga tion. 42 F.3d at 556-557. Thecourt a lso found that counsel for plaintiff e xpe nd e d s ig nif

ic a nt t ime “ lit ig a tin g a g a ins t a re sis ta nt c ity that st e a df

a stl y de fe nd e d it s unconstitutional use of forc e policy .”
Wit h all these princ iples and holding s in mind, we examine the awa rd at issue he re in view of the a pplicable standa

rd of revie w. A t rial court has broa d discretion in dec iding whe ther to aw ard fee s to a prevailing party and the amount of fee s that are rea sonable. “ It is central to the a war ding of fe es under

§ 1988 that the district judge , in his or her g ood judgmen t , m ak e the assessment of what is a re asonable fee under the circ umstances of the ca se.” Blanchard v. Be rgeron , 489 U.S. 87, 96, 109 S.Ct . 93 9 , 946 (1989). Thetrial court is usually in the best position to m ake f ee a war d decisions bec ause it has moreclosely observe d and g ained a g reater unde rstanding of the litigation, the l awy ering , and the results. Hensley , 4 61 U. S. at 43 7, 10 3 S. Ct. a t 14 91 . “ Th e [tr ia l] c ou rt is i n the best posi tion to ascribe a re asonable value to the law y ering it has witnessed and the results that lawy ering has ac hieved.” W ilcox , 42 F.3d at 555.
I n the ca se bef

ore us, the trial court e ntere d a thoroug h memorandum and order on its fee awa rd dec ision. The order

notes that Consolidated reque sted fee s of $133,541.24. The c ourt found that c ou ns e l ha d ma dea n e ff ort to lim it h is r e qu e st t o fe e s dir e c tly re late d to the pr e vaili ng c la ims , p r e s u m ab l y e l i m i n a t i n g w o rk o n t h e t ak i n g s a n de x c l u s i o n ary z o n i n g c l a i m s , b u t w a s n o ta l w a ys succe ssful. The court found counsel’ s elimination of work on other c laims did not prevent the court from conside ring the sig nificanc e of the overall relief obtained. The court also found t hat some of the work donein the litigation was excessive and duplicative, found lead counsel’s hourly rate to be re a so na ble , b ut e sta

bli sh e d r a te s f

or oth e r c ou ns e l.
The trial c ourt’s orde r sets forth the g uiding leg al principles applicable to fee awa rds and the c ou rt ’s app lic a tio n o f tho se princ ipl e s. Th e c ou rt fo un d th e c ri tic a l f

a c tor wa s th e de g re e of

su c c e ss, weig hed the r esults ag ainst the scope of the litigation, acc ounted for counsel’s leaving out w ork on unsucce ssful claims, and re duced the reque st by almost one-third.
For the same r easons wedetermined Consolidated was a pr evailing party , we c onclude that the re lief Consolidated obtained wa s not so technical or insignificant as to justifyan aw ard of no f e e s
. C o n s o l i d a t e dd e m o n s tr a t e dt h a tt h e o r d i n a n c e s a ti s s u e d e p r i v e d i to f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l yprotec ted rig hts. We do not c onsider such a result insignificant or its benefit neg ligible. While the pr a c tic a l be ne fi t to Con so lid a te d o f the de c laratory jud g me nt w a s d imi nis hed by theinj un c tio n, it was not elim inated unless and unti l new constitut ionally valid ordinanc es wit h the same e ffe ct wer e adopted. We think an awa rd of fe es wa s rea sonable in view of the totality

of the litigation. More corr ectly , we hold the tria l court did not abuse its discre tion in refusing to awar d no fee

.59

Wit h r e g ar dto w h e th e r

th e a c tu a l amo u n t a w ar d e dw a s r e a s o n ab le , th e M e tr o p o li ta n Government has not arg ued that some amount other than zero would havebeen mor e re asonable

. I n any e ve nt, ou r r e vie w of the tria l c ou rt ’s me mor a nd um a ndor de r s ho ws that c ou rt a c te d w ith in its discr etion and considere d all the nec essary fac tors. That court was more f amiliar with the conduc t of thelit ig a tio n a ndthee ff

orts o f the la wy e rs . We wi ll n ot s ub sti tut e ou r j ud g me nt a s to a re a so na ble a mou nt f or thetria l c ou rt ’s

. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

irm th e a wa

rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. C ONCL US I ON
We conclude that Consoli dated wa s not pr eclude d from bring ing its fa cial challeng e to the ordinanc es on substantive due pr ocess and equal protec tion g rounds. We also hold that the trial court corr ectly determined that the ordinanc es violate those Const itutional protec tions. Finally , we a ffirm thetria l c ou rt ’s a wa

rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to the Metropolitan Governme nt of Nashville and D avidson C o u n t y.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE