United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 12, 2016*

Decided December 12, 2016

Before

 MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

 ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 16-1839

KAREN HILL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GERALD ZORE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12-cv-1595-RLY-DML

Richard L. Young,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

After unsuccessfully challenging the establishment of a guardianship over her 

friend Ronald Dawson in state-court probate proceedings, Karen Hill brought this 

federal civil-rights suit against various state and private actors who, she believes, were 

responsible for the outcome of the guardianship process. The district court concluded 

 

* We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without oral argument because 

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral 

argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16-1839 Page 2

that Hill lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of Dawson and dismissed her other 

claims on both immunity and jurisdictional grounds. We affirm. 

According to her complaint, Hill had been granted power of attorney by 

Dawson, her friend and neighbor, upon his admission to a VA hospital. But after 

Dawson was released from the hospital and placed in a nursing home, the nursing 

home’s social service director alerted a hospital social worker of her suspicions that Hill 

was being deceptive about Dawson’s income. This communication set into motion a

series of events that culminated in the Marion County Probate Court’s revoking Hill’s 

power of attorney based on allegations that Dawson was incapacitated and in danger of 

being exploited by Hill. Hill moved to dismiss the guardianship proceedings, but the 

state-court probate judge denied her motion and appointed a permanent guardian ad 

litem. Dawson died several months later, and the Indiana Court of Appeals dismissed 

Hill’s subsequent appeal as moot.

After her state appeal was dismissed, Hill brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against three groups of defendants: the nursing home and several nursing home 

employees; the legal and judicial participants involved in the guardianship 

proceedings; and Dawson’s court-appointed guardian ad litem and guardianship 

managers. Hill asserted numerous claims on Dawson’s behalf, as well as her own,

including violations of the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and

various state tort laws. 

In a series of orders, the court dismissed all of Hill’s claims. First the court 

dismissed Hill’s claims against the State of Indiana and Indiana’s Deputy Attorney 

General on immunity grounds. 

Next the court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by various 

other state-actor defendants (the state-court probate judge and commissioner, Adult 

Protective Services and its senior investigator, and the deputy prosecutor) on multiple 

grounds: that Hill lacked standing to assert a claim on Dawson’s behalf; that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to review the state-court judgment; that the defendants were 

entitled to immunity; that Hill failed to state a Monell claim because she alleged no 

municipal policy or custom that violated her rights; and that Hill’s claims under the 

Indiana Tort Claims Act were untimely.

The court then granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by 

Dawson’s appointed guardian ad litem based on three grounds: that Hill lacked
No. 16-1839 Page 3

standing; that the guardian was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for acts taken 

within the scope of her appointment as guardian ad litem; and that the district court 

lacked jurisdiction to review actions taken by her that were required by the probate 

court.

A few days later, the court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed 

by the financial entity that managed Dawson’s guardianship on similar grounds: that 

Hill lacked standing; that the organization was not a state actor; and that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to review actions taken by the defendants required by the 

probate court.

Finally, the district court entered an order dismissing Hill’s claims against the 

remaining defendants (including the nursing home defendants and other employees of

Adult Protective Services) based on many of the same grounds listed in its prior orders:

that Hill lacked standing; that the nursing home defendants were not state actors; and

that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the state-court judgment. The order 

also concluded that it had supplemental jurisdiction over Hill’s state-law claim for 

defamation and dismissed that claim. 

Hill’s brief on appeal is somewhat sprawling and, significantly, does not 

challenge the finding that she lacked standing to bring claims on Dawson’s behalf. We 

do, however, understand her to challenge the district court’s conclusion that it lacked 

jurisdiction to review claims that related to state-court rulings. She asserts, for example, 

that the state-court probate decision deprived her of a personal property interest in her 

role as power of attorney by revoking and replacing it with a court-appointed 

guardianship (thereby depriving her of nearly $40,000 from Dawson in compensation 

for her services).

But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from exercising

jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see D.C. Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–416 

(1923). The primary source of Hill’s injuries is the probate judge’s ruling that revoked

her power of attorney and upheld the protective order. Hill may not “circumvent the

effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine simply by casting [her] complaint in the form of a 

federal civil rights action.” Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 997 

(7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
No. 16-1839 Page 4

In her reply brief Hill also challenges the district court’s conclusion that various 

defendants were immune as state actors acting within the scope of their official 

functions. But Hill’s arguments address only qualified immunity, not the absolute and 

quasi-judicial immunity upon which the district court based its rulings. Finally, Hill

does not raise—and therefore waives—any challenge to the district court’s finding that 

her state tort claims were untimely. See United States v. Webster, 775 F.3d 897, 904 

(7th Cir. 2015) (arguments not raised in opening brief are waived).

We have considered Hill’s remaining arguments and none has merit. In addition, 

Hill’s pending motion for judicial notice is denied. 

AFFIRMED.