WURTZ v BEECHER METROPOLITAN DISTRICT 

Docket No. 146157. Argued December 10, 2013 (Calendar No. 9). Decided April 25, 2014. 

 Richard L. Wurtz brought an action in the Genesee Circuit Court against the Beecher 

Metropolitan District (a water and sewage district), Jacquelin Corlew, Leo McClain, and Sheila 

Thorn, alleging a violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq., 

and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Wurtz had served as the district’s 

administrator from February 1, 2000, until February 1, 2010, pursuant to a contract he drafted 

earlier while he was the district’s attorney. The individual defendants were those members of the 

district’s five-member board who voted not to renew Wurtz’s contract. The tension between 

Wurtz and the board began in May 2008 when he reported an alleged violation of the Open 

Meetings Act by the individual defendants and continued through November 2009 when he 

reported to the sheriff’s department and the newspaper what he alleged were improprieties in 

reimbursements to the board for attendance at an out-of-state conference. The board voted to not 

renew Wurtz’s contract, but allowed him to finish his full 10-year term, and he received all his 

salary and benefits during that term. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that 

Wurtz had not been fired because his contract expired by its own terms. The court, Judith A. 

Fullerton, J., dismissed the public-policy claim, holding that the WPA provided Wurtz’s 

exclusive avenue of relief. The court also concluded that Wurtz could not satisfy the WPA’s 

elements because he had worked the entire term of his contract and not been discharged. Wurtz 

appealed, and the Court of Appeals, WHITBECK, P.J., and JANSEN, J. (K. F. KELLY, J., 

dissenting), reversed, holding that summary disposition was inappropriate because an employer’s 

failure to renew a contract employee’s fixed-term contract satisfied the WPA’s requirement that 

the employee suffer an adverse employment action. 298 Mich App 75 (2012). The Supreme 

Court granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal. 494 Mich 862 (2013). 

 In an opinion by Justice ZAHRA, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARKMAN, 

KELLY, MCCORMACK, and VIVIANO, the Supreme Court held: 

 Under MCL 15.362, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements to establish a prima facie 

case that the defendant employer violated the WPA: (1) the employee was engaged in a protected 

activity listed in the WPA, (2) the employee was discharged, threatened, or otherwise 

discriminated against regarding his or her compensation, terms, conditions, location, or 

privileges of employment, and (3) a causal connection existed between the employee’s protected 

activity and the employer’s act of discharging, threatening, or otherwise discriminating against 

the employee. By its express language, the WPA applies only to individuals who experience one 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus Chief Justice: 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Stephen J. Markman 

Mary Beth Kelly 

Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack 

David F. Viviano 

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

Reporter of Decisions: 

Corbin R. Davis 
or more of the statute’s enumerated adverse employment actions with respect to their status as 

employees. A contract employee seeking a new term of employment should be treated the same 

as a prospective employee for purposes of the WPA. The WPA has no application in the hiring 

context. It excludes job applicants and prospective employees from its protections and, 

therefore, does not apply when an employer declines to renew a contract employee’s contract. 

Absent some express obligation stating otherwise, a contract employee has absolutely no claim 

to continued employment after his or her contract expires. Wurtz had no recourse under the 

WPA because he alleged only that his former employer declined to renew his contract, not that 

the employer took some adverse action against him during his contractual term of employment. 

Wurtz’s claim failed as a matter of law, and summary disposition was not premature because no 

amount of additional discovery could have shown that Wurtz came within the WPA’s 

protections. 

 Reversed and remanded. 

 Justice CAVANAGH concurred in the result. 

©2014 State of Michigan 
FILED APRIL 25, 2014 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

RICHARD L. WURTZ, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 146157 

BEECHER METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, 

JACQUELIN CORLEW, LEO McCLAIN, 

and SHEILA THORN 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

ZAHRA, J. 

This case requires the Court to consider the application of Michigan’s 

Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA)1

 to a contract employee whose contract is not 

renewed ostensibly because of the employee’s whistleblowing activities. A contract 

employee whose term of employment has expired without being subject to a specific 

 

1

 MCL 15.361 et seq. 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Opinion Chief Justice: 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Stephen J. Markman 

Mary Beth Kelly 

Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack 

David F. Viviano 
2

adverse employment action identified in the WPA and who seeks reengagement for a 

new term of employment occupies the same legal position as a prospective employee. 

The WPA, by its express language, only applies to current employees; the statute offers 

no protection to prospective employees. Because the WPA does not apply when an 

employer decides not to hire a job applicant, it likewise has no application to a contract 

employee whom the employer declines to rehire for a new term of employment. The 

plaintiff in this case has no recourse under the WPA because he alleges only that his 

former employer declined to renew his contract, not that the employer took some adverse 

action against him during his contractual term of employment. Accordingly, we reverse 

the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand this case to the circuit court for entry 

of summary disposition in defendants’ favor. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

The Beecher Metropolitan District (the District) manages water and sewage for a 

portion of Genesee County. The District has five elected board members and also 

employs a part-time district administrator who manages District operations on a day-today basis. The District has 11 full-time employees who do various maintenance and 

clerical jobs. The District’s full-time employees operate under a union contract; only the 

district administrator historically operates under a separate contract with the District. 

Plaintiff Richard Wurtz began his tumultuous tenure as the district administrator 

on February 1, 2000, and served until February 1, 2010. Before becoming district 

administrator, Wurtz was the District’s attorney. In his capacity as attorney, he drafted 

the contract that would govern his term as district administrator. The contract provided 
3

for a 10-year term beginning on February 1, 2000, and ending on February 1, 2010. The 

board approved the contract and Wurtz became district administrator. 

Tension between Wurtz and the board developed in May 2008 when Wurtz 

reported an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA)2

 to the Genesee County 

Prosecutor. In a letter dated May 22, 2008, Wurtz informed the prosecutor that board 

members Sheila Thorn, Leo McClain, and Jacquelin Corlew—the three individual 

defendants in this case—had met with a labor attorney outside of a public meeting to 

discuss retaining the attorney. The prosecutor, however, declined to prosecute. Several 

months later, Wurtz demanded a benefits increase commensurate with those given to the 

District’s unionized employees. He told the board that he was the one who filed the 

OMA complaint and said that he would treat the board’s failure to capitulate as retaliation 

for his reporting the alleged OMA violations. The board granted Wurtz the increase he 

desired, with two of the defendant board members voting against his benefits increase 

and one voting in favor. 

In early 2009, Wurtz sent a proposal to the board regarding his contract. Wurtz 

said he could save the District money by reducing his salary and cutting off all of his 

benefits except life insurance. But the proposal also would have extended Wurtz’s 

already tumultuous term for an additional 21

/2 years. A motion to accept Wurtz’s 

proposal was defeated by a vote of 3 to 2. Thorn, McClain, and Corlew voted against 

Wurtz’s proposal. 

 

2

 MCL 15.261 et seq. 
4

Relations between Wurtz and the board further deteriorated in the spring of 2009. 

The board had plans to attend the American Water Works Association conference in San 

Diego. Wurtz told the board that he had concerns about the cost of the trip and the 

manner of reimbursement. He noted several recreational items that he thought it would 

be inappropriate to subsidize with taxpayer funds. Wurtz nonetheless reimbursed the 

board for the expenses. 

Despite having issued the reimbursement checks himself, Wurtz contacted the 

Genesee County Sheriff’s Department and the Flint Journal regarding the board’s trip to 

San Diego. This resulted in the sheriff’s department raiding the District’s office and 

public outcry about the board members’ actions. Wurtz cooperated with the investigation 

conducted by the sheriff’s department. The board members were criminally charged in 

connection with the trip, but all were acquitted of wrongdoing or had the charges against 

them dismissed. 

Events came to a head in November 2009, several months before Wurtz’s contract 

was set to expire. At the November 11, 2009 meeting, Wurtz warned the board that he 

would consider the board’s failure to extend his contract to be retaliation for the criminal 

investigation. The board, however, refused to heed Wurtz’s warning and voted 3 to 2 not 

to renew Wurtz’s contract and to begin the search for a new district administrator. The 

majority once again consisted of Thorn, McClain, and Corlew. Wurtz’s attorney wrote a 

letter to the board informing it that Wurtz intended to file a claim under the WPA. But 

the board replied that it would not change its mind, citing other, legitimate reasons for 

deciding not to renew Wurtz’s contract. The board explained that the tumultuous 

relationship between Wurtz and the board members far preceded any alleged 
5

whistleblowing activities, and furthermore, that it wished to make the administrator job 

full-time. Wurtz could not hold the position full-time because of his law practice. 

Despite the total breakdown of the working relationship, the board allowed Wurtz 

to finish out his contract. Wurtz’s employment with the District expired on February 1, 

2010, by the terms of the contract. One essential and undisputed fact bears emphasis: 

Wurtz suffered no adverse consequences in the context of his self-drafted 10-year 

contract. He received all of the salary and benefits to which he was entitled, and he was 

employed as district administrator for each and every day of the agreed-to term. 

After his employment ended, Wurtz brought suit in Genesee Circuit Court against 

the District and the three board members who voted not to renew his contract, alleging a 

violation of the WPA and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Defendants 

moved for summary disposition, arguing that Wurtz had not been fired because his 

contract expired by its own terms. Wurtz argued that his employment was terminated 

and, further, that summary disposition was premature because discovery was incomplete. 

But the court agreed with defendants. First, the court dismissed the public policy claim, 

holding that the WPA provided the exclusive avenue of relief to Wurtz. Then the court 

concluded that Wurtz could not satisfy all of the WPA’s elements because he had worked 

through the entirety of his contract and was not discharged. 

Wurtz appealed the circuit court’s decision to the Court of Appeals, which 

reversed in a split opinion.3

 The majority concluded that summary disposition was 

inappropriate because, in its view, an employer’s failure to renew a contract employee’s 

 

3 Wurtz v Beecher Metro Dist, 298 Mich App 75; 825 NW2d 651 (2012). 
6

fixed-term contract satisfied the WPA’s requirement that the employee suffer an adverse 

employment action.4

 The dissent, on the other hand, would have held as a matter of law 

that Wurtz could not satisfy the WPA’s elements based on the nonrenewal of a fixed-term 

contract.5

 Defendants sought leave to appeal in this Court, which we granted.6 We asked 

the parties to address “(1) whether the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action 

under the [WPA] when the defendants declined to renew or extend the plaintiff’s 

employment contract, which did not contain a renewal clause beyond the expiration of its 

ten-year term; and (2) whether there was a fair likelihood that additional discovery would 

have produced evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, MCR 2.116(C)(10), if 

the defendants’ motion for summary disposition had not been granted prior to the 

completion of discovery.”7

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The interpretation of the WPA presents a statutory question that this Court reviews 

de novo.8

 The Court also reviews de novo decisions on motions for summary disposition 

brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10).9

 

4 Id. at 88. 

5 Id. at 91 (K.F. KELLY, J., dissenting). 

6 Wurtz v Beecher Metro Dist, 494 Mich 862 (2013). 

7 Id. 

8 Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013). 

9 Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 173; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). 
7

III. ANALYSIS 

This case invites the Court to decide whether the WPA applies when an employer 

declines to renew an employee’s fixed-term contract following alleged whistleblowing by 

the employee. To answer this question, we first conclude that a contract employee 

seeking a new term of employment should be treated the same as a prospective employee 

for purposes of the WPA. The question then becomes whether a spurned job applicant 

can bring a claim under the WPA. We hold that the WPA, by its express language, has 

no application in the hiring context. Thus, the WPA does not apply when an employer 

declines to renew a contract employee’s contract. 

Absent some express obligation stating otherwise, a contract employee has 

absolutely no claim to continued employment after his or her contract expires.10 Rather, 

the employer must weigh the pros and cons of engaging the applicant for a new 

employment term, just as an employer must weigh the pros and cons of hiring a person in 

the first place. And as with any employment decision, the employer can make its 

decision for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reasons at all, as long as the reasons are not 

unlawful, such as those based on discrimination.11 Therefore, in the context of the 

present case, no relevant difference exists between a new job applicant and a current 

contract employee seeking a new term of employment. 

 

10 Bd of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 578; 92 S Ct 2701; 33 L Ed 2d 

548 (1972). 

11 See Mich Employment Relations Comm v Reeths-Puffer Sch Dist, 391 Mich 253, 259; 

215 NW2d 672 (1974) (“[A]n employee may be terminated for a ‘good reason, bad 

reason, or no reason at all’.”), quoting NLRB v Century Broadcasting Corp, 419 F2d 771, 

778 (CA 8, 1969). 
8

We then ask whether a prospective employee who attempts to blow the whistle on 

a would-be employer may invoke the WPA’s protections. When interpreting a statute, 

this Court must, of course, identify and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. The most 

reliable indicator of the Legislature’s intent is the language of the statute itself. If the 

statutory language clearly and unambiguously states the Legislature’s intent, then further 

judicial construction is neither required nor permitted, and the statute must be enforced as 

written.12

The relevant provision of the WPA, MCL 15.362, states the following: 

An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate 

against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, 

conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or 

a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, 

verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or 

regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political 

subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the 

employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is 

requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or 

inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. 

Drawing from the statutory language, this Court has identified three elements that a 

plaintiff must demonstrate to make out a prima facie case that the defendant employer has 

violated the WPA: 

(1) The employee was engaged in one of the protected activities listed in the 

provision.13

 

12 Whitman, 493 Mich at 311. 

13 The protected activities listed in the act consist of reporting or being about to report a 

violation of a law, regulation, or rule, or being requested by a public body to participate 

in an investigation, hearing, inquiry, or court action. MCL 15.362. See also Chandler v 

Dowell Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 399; 572 NW2d 210 (1998); Brown v Detroit 

Mayor, 478 Mich 589, 594; 734 NW2d 514 (2007). 
9

(2) the employee was discharged, threatened, or otherwise discriminated against 

regarding his or her compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of 

employment.14

 

14 Many courts, including this one, have at times grouped the collection of retaliatory acts 

that an employer might take toward a whistleblower under the broader term “adverse 

employment actions.” See, e.g., Whitman, 493 Mich at 313; cf. Chandler, 456 Mich at 

399 (drawing the second element of a prima facie WPA claim directly from the statutory 

language). But the way that the term has obtained meaning resembles the telephone 

game in which a secret is passed from person to person until the original message 

becomes unrecognizable. The term “adverse employment action” was originally 

developed and defined in the context of federal antidiscrimination statutes to encompass 

the various ways that an employer might retaliate or discriminate against an employee on 

the basis of age, sex, or race. See Crady v Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co of Indiana, 993 

F2d 132, 136 (CA 7, 1993) (“A materially adverse change might be indicated by a 

termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less 

distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material 

responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.”). The 

term “adverse employment action” appeared in this Court’s jurisprudence for the first 

time in an age discrimination case, Town v Mich Bell Tel Co, 455 Mich 688, 695; 568 

NW2d 64 (1997), though the statute at issue in that case, as here, did not contain the 

term. Michigan courts then adopted the federal definition of “adverse employment 

action” in the context of making out a prima facie case under Michigan’s Civil Rights 

Act. Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347, 362-366; 597 NW2d 

250 (1999). Finally, the term crept into WPA cases. See Debano-Griffin v Lake Co, 493 

Mich 167, 175-176; 828 NW2d 634 (2013); Brown v Detroit Mayor, 271 Mich App 692, 

706; 723 NW2d 464 (2006), aff’d in relevant part, 478 Mich 589 (2007). 

 While the term “adverse employment action” may be helpful shorthand for the 

different ways that an employer could retaliate or discriminate against an employee, this 

case illustrates how such haphazard, telephone-game jurisprudence can lead courts far 

afield of the statutory language. That is, despite courts’ freewheeling transference of the 

term from one statute to another, the WPA actually prohibits different “adverse 

employment actions” than the federal and state antidiscrimination statutes. So we take 

this opportunity to return to the express language of the WPA when it comes to the 

necessary showing for a prima facie case under that statute. Put another way, a plaintiff’s 

demonstration of some abstract “adverse employment action” as that term has developed 

in other lines of caselaw will not be sufficient. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate one 

of the specific adverse employment actions listed in the WPA. 
10

(3) A causal connection exists between the employee’s protected activity and the 

employer’s act of discharging, threatening, or otherwise discriminating against the 

employee.15

Significantly, as gleaned from the WPA’s express language, the statute only 

applies to individuals who currently have the status of an “employee.”16 The Legislature 

defined an “employee” in the WPA as “a person who performs a service for wages or 

other remuneration under a contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied.”17 

Noticeably absent from the WPA’s definition of “employee” is any reference to 

prospective employees or job applicants. And indeed, the actions prohibited under the 

WPA could only be taken against a current employee. Only an employee could be 

discharged and only an employee could be threatened or discriminated against regarding 

his or her compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment. Thus, 

the WPA simply excludes job applicants and prospective employees from its protections. 

 

15 MCL 15.362 (stating that an employer may not take prohibited action against an 

employee “because” of an employee’s engagement in a protected activity) (emphasis 

added). See Chandler, 456 Mich at 399; Debano-Griffin v Lake Co, 493 Mich at 175 

(2013). 

16 We recognize that plaintiff was an employee at the time he engaged in protected 

activity. Significantly, however, plaintiff makes no claim that his employment contract 

was in any way breached or that he was subject to a specific adverse employment action 

enumerated by the WPA during his contract term. Rather, plaintiff maintains that 

because he engaged in protected activity during his contract term, he has a right under the 

WPA to renewal of his contract. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reject 

plaintiff’s claim. 

17 MCL 15.361(a). 
11

In this regard, the WPA stands in stark contrast to Michigan’s Civil Rights Act 

(CRA). Whereas the WPA makes no mention of pre-employment conduct, the CRA 

refers to an employer’s failure to hire or recruit someone: 

An employer shall not do any of the following: 

(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise 

discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, 

compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of 

religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital 

status.[18] 

The same is true of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)19 and 

Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act (Title VII).20 Each of these statutes provides 

protection during the recruitment and hiring process; the WPA does not. Moreover, 

whereas the WPA protects “employees,” the CRA, the ADEA, and Title VII protect the 

broader class of “individuals” from prohibited employer actions.21 Thus, when 

discussing the protections afforded prospective employees, any comparison to these 

antidiscrimination statutes offers little help.22

 

18 MCL 37.2202(1) (emphasis added). 

19 29 USC 623(a)(1) (stating that it shall be unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to 

hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s age”). 

20 42 USC 2000e-2(a)(1) (stating that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 

employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 

21 MCL 37.2202; 29 USC 623(a)(1); 42 USC 2000e-2(a)(1). 

22 This, of course, does not mean that courts interpreting the WPA should never look to 

the CRA or federal antidiscrimination statutes for help. But in doing so, courts must be 

cognizant of the textual differences that exist. 
12

In light of this analysis, caselaw applying the antidiscrimination statutes to 

contract renewals offers no insight into how the WPA should operate in the same 

situation. For example, consider Leibowitz v Cornell Univ,

23 a case extensively relied on 

by Wurtz and the Court of Appeals majority, which involved a nontenured professor at 

Cornell.24 The professor sued the school for violation of Title VII and the ADEA after it 

declined to renew her fixed-term contract.25 The Leibowitz court held that “where an 

employee seeks renewal of an employment contract, non-renewal of an employment 

contract constitutes an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII and the 

ADEA.”26 But any reliance on Leibowitz for its application in the WPA context ignores 

the logic that the court used to reach its conclusion. In fact, the court held that 

nonrenewal of a contract fell within the antidiscrimination statutes’ reach precisely 

because the statutes protect new job applicants.27 But the WPA has no application during 

the hiring process. The floor underlying the Leibowitz court’s conclusion collapses when 

 

23 Leibowitz v Cornell Univ, 584 F3d 487 (CA 2, 2009). 

24 Id. at 492-493. 

25 Id. at 495. 

26 Id. at 501. 

27 Id. at 500-501 (“It is beyond cavil that employers subject to the strictures of the ADEA 

and Title VII may not discriminate on the basis of age or gender in deciding whether or 

not to hire prospective employees. . . . Were we to accept defendants’ argument here, we 

would effectively rule that current employees seeking a renewal of an employment 

contract are not entitled to the same statutory protections under the discrimination laws as 

prospective employees. . . . An employee seeking a renewal of an employment contract, 

just like a new applicant or a rehire after a layoff, suffers an adverse employment action 

when an employment opportunity is denied and is protected from discrimination in 

connection with such decisions under Title VII and the ADEA.”). 
13

attempting to apply Leibowitz to the WPA. While the ADEA and Title VII may apply in 

the context of a contract renewal, that fact has no bearing on the application of the WPA 

in the same situation. 

This Court need not inquire why the Legislature chose to confine the WPA’s 

protections by the bookends of employment while extending the CRA’s protections to the 

hiring context. The Legislature elected to craft its legislation that way, and we decline to 

second-guess the wisdom of the Legislature’s policy decisions.28 Indeed, any number of 

policy justifications could be advanced for limiting the WPA’s application to current 

employees.29 The mere fact that the Legislature chose to extend the CRA to the hiring 

context is insufficient to extend the WPA that far too, particularly when the WPA’s 

statutory language requires the opposite result. 

 

28 See Petripren v Jaskowski, 494 Mich 190, 212 n 50; 833 NW2d 247 (2013). 

29 For example, the Legislature might have considered the possibility of a situation like 

that which has arisen under the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 USC 5851, a 

federal whistleblowing statute that has been interpreted to protect prospective hires. A 

single litigant, Syed Hasan, has sued at least a dozen companies that refused to hire him. 

Hasan, who has raised nonmeritorious whistleblowing allegations in the past, 

methodically seeks employment and informs the prospective employers of his 

whistleblowing history. Then, when the companies decline to hire him, Hasan promptly 

brings an action for violation of the ERA’s whistleblowing provisions. Despite his 

unmitigated waste of judicial resources all around the country, this Court has not turned 

up a single case in which Hasan prevailed on the merits. See, e.g., Hasan v US Dep’t of 

Labor, 545 F3d 248 (CA 3, 2008); Hasan v US Dep’t of Labor, 400 F3d 1001 (CA 7, 

2005); Hasan v US Dep’t of Labor, 298 F3d 914 (CA 10, 2002); Hasan v US Dep’t of 

Labor, 301 F Appx 566 (CA 7, 2008); Hasan v Secretary of Labor, 90 F Appx 5, (CA 1, 

2004); Hasan v US Dep’t of Labor, 102 F Appx 341 (CA 4, 2004); Hasan v US Dep’t of 

Labor, 107 F Appx 184 (CA 11, 2004). 
14

Lest today’s holding be misapplied, we find it necessary to mention several things 

that this opinion does not say. While we hold that the WPA does not apply to decisions 

regarding contract renewal, we emphasize that the WPA does protect employees working 

under fixed-term contracts from prohibited employer actions taken with respect to an 

employee’s service under such a contract. Indeed, the WPA’s definition of “employee” 

expressly denotes a person working “under a contract for hire.” Thus, when an employer 

discharges, threatens, or discriminates against a contract employee serving under a fixedterm contract because the employee engaged in a protected activity, the WPA applies. 

Today’s holding also has no bearing on at-will employees. While an at-will 

employee cannot maintain any expectation of future employment, the employment 

continues indefinitely absent any action from the employer.30 Thus, an at-will employee 

does not need to reapply for the job for the employment to continue beyond a certain 

date. Once hired, an at-will employee will not later find himself or herself in the same 

position as a new applicant. A current at-will employee therefore stands squarely within 

the WPA’s protections.31 An employee working under a fixed-term contract, on the other 

hand, essentially becomes a new applicant when seeking a new term of employment. In 

sum, we do not base our decision today on whether a person can maintain an expectation 

of future employment but merely on whether the person falls within the WPA’s 

protections. At-will employees do; contract employees seeking a new term of 

employment do not. 

 

30 McNeil v Charlevoix Co, 484 Mich 69, 86; 772 NW2d 18 (2009). 

31 See Suchodolski v Mich Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 695 n 2; 316 NW2d 710 

(1982). 
15

The WPA’s language governs this case without any additional judicial 

interpretation. The WPA simply does not extend to the pre-employment context. 

Because we discern no legal difference between a contract employee seeking a new term 

of employment and a new applicant, the WPA provides no protection to a contract 

employee in that context. If a contract employee alleges only that the employer declined 

to renew the employee’s contract, and not some action taken against the employee with 

respect to an employee’s service under the contract, the WPA has no application. 

IV. APPLICATION 

Wurtz cannot show any entitlement to relief under the WPA. Wurtz alleges that 

the District violated the WPA by deciding not to renew his contract. In other words, 

Wurtz only alleges that the District took some action against him in his capacity as an 

applicant for future employment. But as this opinion has shown, the WPA does not 

apply to job applicants, nor does it apply to contract employees seeking renewal of their 

contracts.32 The trial court properly granted summary disposition in defendants’ favor. 

During Wurtz’s ten years as an employee—when he enjoyed the protections of the 

WPA—he endured no action prohibited by the WPA. He was not discharged, threatened, 

or discriminated against regarding his compensation, terms, conditions, location, or 

privileges of employment. He served the District for the entire duration of his contract 

 

32 Wurtz’s contract did not contain any renewal clause imposing some obligation or duty 

on the employer to act. Thus, we need not address the effect that such a clause would 

have on our analysis. 
16

and received every cent and every benefit to which he was entitled. Thus, the District did 

not engage in any action prohibited by the WPA. 

Moreover, the circuit court did not prematurely grant summary disposition in 

defendants’ favor. Generally, a circuit court should not grant summary disposition unless 

no fair likelihood exists that additional discovery would reveal more support for the 

nonmoving party’s position. Wurtz argues that additional discovery would have yielded 

employment records showing that the District routinely renewed its employees’ fixedterm contracts. Accepting this as true, no additional discovery would change the 

outcome in this case. Wurtz worked for the District for the entirety of his contract and 

suffered no adverse employment action in the context of that contract. That the District 

may have renewed employees’ contracts in the past does not transform the expiration of 

Wurtz’s contract into a prohibited action. No amount of additional discovery would have 

yielded support for Wurtz’s position, and summary disposition was not premature. 

During his time as an employee, Wurtz experienced no action prohibited by the 

WPA and therefore has no recourse under the statute. As an applicant for future 

employment, Wurtz was not hired. But the WPA does not cover prospective employees 

whom an employer declines to hire, so Wurtz cannot claim relief under the statute. 

V. CONCLUSION 

The WPA does not provide Wurtz any recourse. The WPA does not apply to 

prospective employees and it does not apply to contract employees seeking renewal of 

their employment contract. Wurtz’s only allegation of a prohibited action occurred in the 

context of his application for future employment, so his claim fails as a matter of law. 
17

Moreover, summary disposition was not premature because no amount of additional 

discovery would show that Wurtz came within the WPA’s protections. Accordingly, we 

reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and remand this case to the circuit court for entry 

of summary disposition in defendants’ favor. 

 Brian K. Zahra 

 Robert P. Young, Jr. 

 Stephen J. Markman 

 Mary Beth Kelly 

Bridget M. McCormack

 David F. Viviano 

 CAVANAGH, J., concurred in the result.