J-S59041-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL THOMPSON,

 Appellant No. 160 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 27, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-51-SA-0003226-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD,*J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2016

Appellant, Michael Thompson, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he had actual notice of his 

license suspension. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

On January 28, 2014, [Appellant] was operating his 

vehicle on the streets of Philadelphia when he was stopped 

for investigation by police. Officer Matthew Delaney issued 

[Appellant] a citation for driving with a suspended 

license[1]as a result of a DUI conviction within the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1). 
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Trial Ct. Op., 1/19/15, at 1 (citation omitted). On August 19, 2014, 

Appellant filed notice of a summary appeal. A bench trial was held on 

September 19, 2014. 

The Commonwealth introduced Appellant’s PennDOT records, which 

indicated that “at the time of the stop he was suspended for DUI related.” 

N.T., 9/19/14, at 6. The Commonwealth also introduced into evidence 

Appellant’s “criminal extract showing that on [October2] 1st of 2013, he was 

sentenced for a DUI [ ], and with that DUI included a one-year driving 

suspension.” Id. 

Appellant testified as follows:

[Counsel for Appellant]: [D]o you remember being pulled 

over by the police officer?

A: Yes.

Q: At the time did you know your license was suspended?

A: No.

Q: Now, you remember being charged with a DUI?

A: Yes.

Q: Have you ever been sentenced for DUI prior to this?

A: Yes.

 

2 We note the transcript indicated September. However, the court clerk 

clarified the discrepancy and informed the court that Appellant pleaded 

“guilty on September 10th and was sentenced on October 1st.” Id. at 10.
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Q: Now, when you were sentenced at your DUI, can you 

tell the judge, did they tell you that you were under 

suspension on that day?

A: No, they didn’t.

Q: What did they tell you?

A: They said I would receive something in the mail.

Q: Did you ever receive something in the mail?

A: No.

Q: Now, in the past you were─you did have a prior DUI on 

your record, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you served a one-year suspension for that?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you receive something in the mail from PennDOT 

indicating that?

A: Yes.

Q: And when you received that information from PennDOT, 

what did you do?

A: Sent my license in.

 * * *

Q: Now, when you were driving the vehicle on this day, did 

you know that you were under suspension?

A: No, I didn’t.

Q: Can you tell the judge why you didn’t know you were 

under suspension?

A: I didn’t receive nothing in the mail. . . .
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Q: And when you were stopped by the police officer, you 

handed him what would have been a valid driver’s license?

A: Yes.

Q: As far as you were─

A: Yes.

Id. at 8-10. 

On cross-examination, Appellant testified to the following:

[The Commonwealth]: You had a previous DUI prior to the 

negotiated guilty plea on September 10th of 2013?

A: Yes.

Q: And part of that sentence included a license suspension 

on your previous DUI, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you had an attorney for your second DUI, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And that attorney advised you what a pleading guilty 

sentence would include, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you were sentenced in front of a judge, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And that judge, on October 1st, 2013, sentenced you 

and told you what that would include, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And your attorney advised you what the results of that 

sentence would be, correct?
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A: Yes.

Id. at 11-12. 

Defense counsel stated to the court:

At the sentencing date the judge sentences you. They tell 

you you’re sentenced to a one-year license suspension.

Philadelphia County is one of the only counties that 

does not require the defendant to physically hand in his 

driver’s license so the suspension starts that day. In 

Philadelphia, they are told─defendants are told they will 

receive a one-year license suspension. That license 

suspension notice comes in the form of a Notice of 

Suspension, which is sent from PennDOT.

According to his certified driving record[3]from the 

district attorney, the conviction date was September 10th, 

2013. Official notice mailed October 10th, 2013. The 

effective date of the suspension, that’s the date that he 

would technically start being suspended, he could legally 

drive up to that date, November 14th of 2013. [Appellant] 

was pulled over in January of 2014, about two months.

Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).

The trial court found Appellant guilty. Id. at 17. On October 27, 

2014, Appellant was sentenced to sixty days’ imprisonment to be served on 

weekends. N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 10/27/14, at 7. This appeal followed. 

 

3 We note that the driving record was not included in the certified record. 

However, Appellant does not dispute that the certified driving record 

indicated that the official notice was mailed on October 10, 2013.
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Appellant was ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal.4 The trial court filed a responsive opinion.

The trial court opined:

Counsel for [Appellant] claims that [A]ppellant did not 

receive “ACTUAL NOTICE” of his license suspension (even 

though the certified driving record of [A]ppellant, 

introduced at trial, provides the date the notice was mailed 

and the effective date the suspension was to begin).

 * * *

In the instant case, [A]ppellant claims that the 

Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof because it 

failed to establish that PennDOT sent the notice of 

suspension to the correct address or that he received the 

written notice. Appellant urges this [c]ourt, in essence, to 

find that absent such proof, the finder of fact cannot find 

that the accused had actual notice of his suspension. 

However, lack of evidence that a written notice of 

suspension was sent to a defendant’s current address or 

received by the accused does not, as [A]ppellant suggests, 

demonstrate per se that a person did not have actual 

notice.

For the [c]ourt to adopt this bold argument would 

require that a finder of fact literally ignore a wealth of 

other factors which may also serve to demonstrate that a 

defendant had actual notice of a license suspension, many 

of which are present in this case.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4 (citation omitted). 

 

4 The trial court noted that “[t]hereafter a timely concise Statement of 

Issues Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure was received by this [c]ourt, but 

do not appear of record on the current docket sheet.” Trial Ct. Op. at 1-2. 

The Rule 1925(b) statement was attached to the trial court opinion in the 

certified record on appeal.
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Appellant essentially raises a sufficiency of the evidence claim.5 He 

contends the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

he had actual notice of the suspension of his driver’s license.6 We find no 

relief is due. 

Our review is governed by the following principles:

Our scope of review in a license suspension case is 

limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings are 

supported by competent evidence in the record, whether 

the trial court committed an error of law, and whether the 

 

5

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) provides in relevant part: “No question will be 

considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is 

fairly suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).

 

[A]ppellate briefs and reproduced records must materially 

conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. This Court may 

quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform 

to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Id.; Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 

A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2010); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

2111. Instantly, Appellant does not have a statement of questions involved. 

Nevertheless, we decline to find waiver because Appellant’s argument can be 

reasonably discerned from the section of his brief denominated “Discussion.”

 

6 We note that Appellant did not file a post sentence motion. In 

Commonwealth v. McCurdy, 943 A.2d 299 (Pa. Super. 2008), this court 

held that the 

 

[a]ppellant did not waive his sufficiency argument under 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) by failing to raise that issue in the court 

below. Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(7) expressly provides that a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence can be raised 

for the first time on appeal. 

Id. at 301. Therefore, in the instant case, the issue is not waived. See id.
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court’s decision is a manifest abuse of discretion. In 

addition:

[T]he standard applied in reviewing the sufficiency of 

evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence 

admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable 

the fact-finder to find every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, 

the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and 

substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. In 

addition, the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that 

as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the trier of 

fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Herb, 852 A.2d 356, 360–61 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citations omitted).

Section 1543(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code provides as follows:

(b) Certain offenses.─

(1) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway 

or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the 

person’s operating privilege is suspended or revoked as 

a condition of acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative 

Disposition for a violation of section 3802 (relating to 

driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 

substance) or the former section 3731, because of a 

violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension 
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for refusal) or 3802 or former section 3731 or is 

suspended under section 1581 (relating to Driver's 

License Compact) for an offense substantially similar to 

a violation of section 3802 or former section 3731 shall, 

upon conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and 

shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and to undergo 

imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor 

more than 90 days.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1). 

In order to sustain a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1543(b), the Commonwealth must prove that the 

defendant had actual notice that his license had been 

suspended or revoked. Commonwealth v. Kane, [ ] 333 

A.2d 925 ([Pa.] 1975). Merely establishing that notice was 

mailed is not sufficient by itself to show actual notice. Id.

333 A.2d at 926. The Commonwealth must establish 

actual notice “which may take the form of a collection of 

facts and circumstances that allow the fact finder to infer 

that a defendant has knowledge of suspension.” 

Commonwealth v. Crockford, [ ] 660 A.2d 1326, 1331 

([Pa. Super.] 1995).

Commonwealth v. Vetrini, 734 A.2d 404, 407 (Pa. Super. 1999).

In Commonwealth v. Zimmick, 653 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1995), our 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s

claims that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of 

proof because it failed to establish that PennDOT sent the 

notice of suspension to the correct address or that he 

received the written notice. [The a]ppellant urges this 

Court, in essence, to find that absent such proof, the finder 

of fact cannot find that the accused had actual notice of his 

suspension. However, lack of evidence that a written 

notice of suspension was sent to a defendant’s 

current address or received by the accused does not, 

as appellant suggests, demonstrate per se that a 

person did not have actual notice. For the Court to 

adopt this bold argument would require that a finder of 

fact literally ignore a wealth of other factors which may 

also serve to demonstrate that a defendant had actual 
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notice of a license suspension, many of which are present 

in this case.

Factors that a finder of fact may consider in determining 

circumstantially or directly whether a defendant had actual 

notice of his or her suspension include, but are not limited 

to, evidence that the defendant was verbally or in writing 

apprised of the license suspension during the trial or a 

plea, statements by the accused indicating knowledge that 

he or she was driving during the period in which his or her 

license had been suspended, evidence that PennDOT sent 

by mail the notice of the suspension to appellant’s current 

address . . . .

Id. at 1220-21 (emphasis added). 

In the case at bar, Appellant conceded he had a previous DUI and that 

part of that sentence included a license suspension. N.T., 9/19/14, at 11. 

He admitted that when he was sentenced on the second DUI on October 1, 

2013, he was represented by counsel who advised him “what a pleading 

guilty sentence would include.” Id. In the instant case, Appellant’s counsel 

stated to the court: “At the sentencing date the judge sentences you. They 

tell you you’re sentenced to a one-year suspension.” Id. at 12. Appellant’s 

certified driving record indicated that official notice of his one-year 

suspension was mailed on October 10, 2013. 

Appellant avers that he did not know he was under suspension 

because he did not receive any notice in the mail. He contends this 

demonstrates that he did not have actual notice. Our Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court has rejected this argument. See Zimmick, 653 A.2d at 1220-21. In 

the case sub judice, there was evidence of mailing coupled with additional 
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evidence of knowledge that establishes actual notice beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Vetrini, 734 A.2d at 407. Therefore, there was sufficient 

evidence to find that Appellant violated Section 1543(b) of the Motor Vehicle 

Code. See Herb, 852 A.2d at 360-61. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/19/2016