In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1181

GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

PAMELA K. ROBBINS, as Administratrix  

of the Estate of Mike Douglas Robbins,

Deceased,

Defendant‐Appellant,

and

WREN EQUIPMENT, LLC,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:13‐cv‐00198 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 9, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 16, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit

Judges.
2 No. 15‐1181

KANNE, Circuit Judge. In January 2011, Defendant Linda K.

Phillips, an employee of Hoker Trucking, LLC, was driving a

semi‐truck that struck a vehicle driven by Mike Douglas Rob‐

bins in Indiana. Robbins died as a result of the injuries he sus‐

tained in the accident. At the time of the accident, the semi‐

truck driven by Phillips was pulling a trailer Hoker borrowed

from Lakeville Motor Express, Inc. Lakeville had purchased

an insurance policy from Plaintiff Great West Casualty Com‐

pany to cover the trailer.  

This case is not about the liability of Phillips or Hoker for

the accident. That action was filed by Robbins’s estate in an

Indiana state court, and Phillips and Hoker were indemnified

by Hoker’s insurance policy. To preempt a possible claim

against Lakeville’s insurance policy, Great West filed this com‐

plaint for declaratory judgment against Hoker, Phillips, and

Defendant Pamela Robbins, as administratrix of Mike Doug‐

las Robbins’s estate, amongst other defendants, seeking an or‐

der stating that it did not have to indemnify Hoker and Phil‐

lips for any liability in connection with the accident. After

Robbins and Great West filed cross‐motions for summary

judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in fa‐

vor of Great West and denied Robbins’s motion. Finding no

error with the district court’s decision, we affirm.  

I. BACKGROUND

On January 4, 2011, a tractor‐trailer driven by Linda K.

Phillips struck a vehicle operated by Mike Robbins in Rich‐

mond, Indiana. Robbins died from the injuries sustained in

the accident. At the time, Phillips was an employee of Hoker

Trucking, LLC, (“Hoker”) and was driving the tractor‐trailer

in the course and scope of her employment when she struck

Robbins’s vehicle. Hoker is incorporated and based in Iowa.
No. 15‐1181 3

Hoker owned the Peterbilt tractor driven by Phillips, but the

trailer pulled by that tractor was on loan to Hoker from Lak‐

eville Motor Express, Inc. (“Lakeville”), a company incorpo‐

rated and based in Minnesota.  

Lakeville, however, was not the actual owner of the trailer.

Defendant Wren Equipment, LLC (“Wren”) owned the

trailer. Like Lakeville, Wren is incorporated and based in

Minnesota. In July 2001, Wren leased Lakeville dozens of

trailers, including the trailer involved in the accident, for five

years. In exchange, Lakeville agreed to pay $22,600 per month

and provide insurance coverage for the trailers. Upon the ex‐

piration of the five‐year term, the lease converted to a month‐

to‐month lease.  

Karen Vanney, Lakeville’s Vice President of Finance,

averred that Lakeville continued leasing the trailer after the

2001 lease expired. In December 2009, Lakeville and Wren en‐

tered into another written lease agreement whereby Wren

agreed to provide trailers to Lakeville, including the trailer

involved in the accident, for a one‐year term. Lakeville agreed

to “provide insurance coverage, at its sole cost and expense,

for public liability [and] property damage ... with a minimum

aggregate coverage of $1,000,000.00 for bodily injury and

property damage per occurrence.” Like the earlier agreement,

the lease converted to a month‐to‐month lease after the expi‐

ration of the one‐year term. According to Vanney, Lakeville

continued to lease that trailer until 2013.  

To satisfy its insurance‐coverage obligations, Lakeville

purchased a Commercial Lines Insurance Policy from Great

West Casualty Company (“Great West”) to provide automo‐

bile coverage. Great West is incorporated and based in Ne‐

braska. Lakeville added Wren as an additional insured party
4 No. 15‐1181

under the policy, which was in effect at the time of the acci‐

dent. Hoker and Phillips were not named as insured parties

under the Great West policy. Hoker was insured at the time

of the accident by Northland Insurance Company (“North‐

land”). Northland provided primary coverage in connection

with the accident.1  

The Great West policy contains an endorsement providing

that the policy’s coverage will conform “with the provisions

of the law or regulation to the extent of the coverage and lim‐

its of insurance required by that law or regulation” for the

states in which Great West filed a “Motor Carrier Certificate

of Bodily Injury or Property Damage Liability Insurance.”

Great West filed this certificate in Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota,

North Dakota, and Wisconsin.  

In December 2012, Pamela Robbins, as administratrix of

the Estate of Mike Douglas Robbins, (“Robbins”), filed a com‐

plaint in Indiana state court against Hoker, Phillips, and Lak‐

eville, alleging negligence. Lakeville has since been dismissed

from that lawsuit.  

Great West filed this action in February 2013 seeking a de‐

claratory judgment that Great West was not liable to defend

or indemnify Hoker or Phillips in connection with the acci‐

dent. After obtaining default judgments in connection with

several other defendants to the first complaint, Great West

subsequently amended the complaint twice. The only rele‐

vant remaining defendants to the current dispute are Robbins

                                                 

1 Northland’s policy has a per occurrence limit of $1,000,000, and Great

West’s policy limit per occurrence is $5,000,000.
No. 15‐1181 5

and Wren. Wren, however, joined in Great West’s arguments

both at the district court and before us.  

In June 2014, Robbins moved for summary judgment

against Great West.2 Great West responded by opposing sum‐

mary judgment and cross‐moving for summary judgment it‐

self. The district court granted Great West’s motion for sum‐

mary judgment and denied Robbins’s motion. In doing so, the

district court determined that Great West’s policy unambigu‐

ously excluded Hoker and Phillips as insured parties under

the policy. This appeal followed.  

II. ANALYSIS

Robbins advances three arguments on appeal: (1) because

Great West’s policy is ambiguous as to whether Hoker and

Phillips were excluded from coverage, we should construe

the policy against Great West and find it covers Hoker and

Phillips; (2) even if we find the exclusions under the Great

West policy are not ambiguous, the policy exclusions never‐

theless do not exclude Hoker and Phillips from coverage; and

(3) regardless of whether the exclusions apply to Hoker and

Phillips or not, such exclusions are invalid under Wisconsin

law, the state where the trailer is registered.

We review de novo a district court’s decision on cross‐mo‐

tions for summary judgment. Hess v. Reg‐Ellen Mach. Tool

Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2005). In conducting this re‐

view, we construe all facts as well as all reasonable inferences

                                                 

2 Another defendant, Continental Western Insurance Company (“Conti‐

nental”), joined in Robbins’s motion for summary judgment. Continental

provided insurance coverage for the vehicle driven by Michael Robbins at

the time of the accident. It has elected not to appeal the district court’s

decision.  
6 No. 15‐1181

derived from those facts “in favor of the party against whom

the motion under consideration was made.” Clarendon Nat.

Ins. Co. v. Medina, 645 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 2011). Summary

judgment is appropriate where, after that review, we deter‐

mine that the movant has demonstrated “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  

Our jurisdiction over this dispute is based on diversity of

citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which means that a federal court

must apply the substantive law of the forum state—here, In‐

diana. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). A state’s

substantive law includes its conflict‐of‐law or choice‐of‐law

rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496

(1941). Although Indiana choice‐of‐law rules apply, the par‐

ties posit that Minnesota law governs interpretation of the in‐

surance contract, which was issued and delivered to a Minne‐

sota‐based company. Because Indiana’s choice‐of‐law rules

give broad discretion to parties to choose the applicable sub‐

stantive law, see, e.g., Barrow v. ATCO Mfg. Co., 524 N.E.2d

1313, 1314–15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), and we see no reason why

Minnesota law should not govern this contract dispute, we

apply Minnesota law in interpreting Great West’s policy.

A. Ambiguity of Great West’s Policy Exclusions

We start with Robbins’s argument that Great West’s policy

is ambiguous as to whether Hoker and Phillips are excluded

from its coverage. Minnesota courts analyze insurance poli‐

cies under general contract law principles. Lobeck v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 582 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 1998).

Whether an insurance policy or particular provision is ambig‐

uous is a question of law. Lott v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 541
No. 15‐1181 7

N.W.2d 304, 307 (Minn. 1995). “Language in a policy is am‐

biguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpre‐

tations.” Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn.

2008). In making that determination, Minnesota law directs us

“not [to rely] upon words or phrases read in isolation, but ra‐

ther upon the meaning assigned to the words or phrases in

accordance with the apparent purpose of the contract as a

whole.” Art Goebel, Inc. v. N. Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567

N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. 1997). If language is susceptible to

two reasonable interpretations, then “it must be interpreted

in favor of coverage.” Wanzek Constr., Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of

Wausau, 679 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Minn. 2004). Language, how‐

ever, that is unambiguous “must be given its plain and ordi‐

nary meaning,” Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308,

310–11 (Minn. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted), as

Minnesota law does not permit a court to “read an ambiguity

into the plain language of a policy in order to provide cover‐

age,” Jenoff, Inc. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn.

1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). If, however, an ex‐

clusion would omit coverage required by applicable law, it

will not be enforced. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 330

N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1983).

The dispute here centers on a disagreement over the effect

of a September 2010 endorsement, which modified the pol‐

icy’s “Coverage” section of “WHO IS AN INSURED.” With‐

out the endorsement, the section read, in relevant part, as fol‐

lows:  

1. WHO IS AN INSURED

The following are “insureds”:  

a. You for any covered “auto”.
8 No. 15‐1181

b. Anyone else while using with your permis‐

sion a covered “auto” you own, hire or borrow

except:  

(1) The owner or anyone else from whom

you hire or borrow a covered “private pas‐

senger type” “auto.”

(2) Your “employee” or agent if the covered

“auto” is a “private passenger type” “auto”

and is owned by that “employee” or agent or

a member of his or her household.

(3) Someone using a covered “auto” while he

or she is working in a business of selling, ser‐

vicing, repairing, parking or storing “autos”

unless that business is yours.

(4) Anyone other than your “employees,”

partners (if you are a partnership), members

(if you are a limited liability company), or a

lessee or borrower or any of their “employ‐

ees,” while moving property to or from a

covered “auto.”

(5) A partner (if you are a partnership), or a

member (if you are a limited liability com‐

pany), for a covered “private passenger

type” “auto” owned by him or her or a mem‐

ber of his or her household.

(6) Anyone described in paragraphs c., d. or

e. below.

The endorsement has a heading that provides in capital

letters: “This endorsement changes the policy. Please read it

carefully. Changes—Who Is An Insured.” The endorsement

goes on to state the following:  
No. 15‐1181 9

The following is added to Section II—Liability Cov‐

erage—Paragraph A.1.b.—Who Is An Insured:

1. Anyone who has leased, hired, rented, or bor‐

rowed an “auto” from you that is used in a busi‐

ness other than yours.  

2. Anyone that is using an “auto” of yours under

a written Trailer Interchange Agreement.  

Great West contends that this endorsement added to the cat‐

egory of persons excluded under subparagraph A.1.b., which

would result in eight enumerated exceptions.  

Robbins argues there is another reasonable interpretation

of the policy exclusions after the endorsement, which is:  

1. WHO IS AN INSURED

The following are “insureds”:  

a. You for any covered “auto”.

b. 1. Anyone who has leased, hired, rented, or

borrowed an “auto” from you that is used in a

business other than yours.

2. Anyone that is using an “auto” of yours under

a written Trailer Interchange Agreement.

Anyone else while using with your permission a

covered “auto” you own, hire or borrow except:  

(1) The owner ...

(2) Your “employee” ...

(3) Someone using ....

(4) Anyone other ...

(5) A partner ...

(6) Anyone described ...
10 No. 15‐1181

According to Robbins, the estate’s interpretation is reasonable

because it avoids “duplication of numbers or renumbering of

paragraphs.” (Appellant Br. 22.) Robbins contends that Great

West’s interpretation requires the reader to “ignor[e] the con‐

flicting numbers” under subparagraph A.1.b., as that subpar‐

agraph already had exclusions numbered “(1)” and “(2).” (Id.)

Further, according to Robbins, the estate’s interpretation is

more reasonable than Great West’s because it adds to and

does not subtract from the definition of who is “insured” un‐

der the policy, which is consistent with Minnesota law con‐

struing ambiguities against insurance policies in favor of the

insured.  

But there is no ambiguity to construe against Great West.

We agree with the district court that Great West’s interpreta‐

tion of this provision is the only reasonable reading. In inter‐

preting the Great West policy and endorsement under Min‐

nesota law, we must read them together “from the viewpoint

of a layperson, not a lawyer.” Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wilson

Twp., 603 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). Robbins’s

interpretation would force us to abandon that position and

read the policy language and endorsement as only a lawyer

construing a contract could—in the most hyper‐technical,

over‐analyzed sense. We refuse to adopt such a reading.  

No reasonable interpretation would construe the endorse‐

ment as doing anything but adding two more enumerated ex‐

clusions under subparagraph A.1.b. The endorsement states

“the following is added” to subparagraph A.1.b., (emphasis

added), and it then provides two numbered provisions that are

worded in a manner similar to the other enumerated exclu‐

sions. Nothing in the endorsement would lead a layperson to

believe that Great West intended to modify the beginning of
No. 15‐1181 11

subparagraph A.1.b. In fact, embracing Robbins’s interpreta‐

tion does the most violence to the policy language as it uses

two “1”s and places two numbering conventions next to each

other, which is not done anywhere else within the policy.

Moreover, additional extensions of coverage are provided in

sections A.1.c–A.1.e. If the endorsement intended to extend

coverage, it could have added lettered subparagraphs to sec‐

tion A.1, rather than adding numbered subparagraphs to sec‐

tion A.1.b, a section that lists exclusions from coverage. Min‐

nesota courts tend to reject interpretations like the one ad‐

vanced by Robbins. See, e.g., Red & White Airway Cab Co. v.

Transit Cas. Co., 234 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1975) (refusing to

adopt an interpretation of an insurance policy that “does vio‐

lence to the plain meaning of the contract language”).  

Also making Robbins’s reading unreasonable is that it

makes the endorsement’s additional language superfluous.

Robbins’s reading purports to add two more categories of in‐

dividuals who are insured under the policy. The problem

with Robbins’s interpretation though is that the policy prior

to the endorsement would have already included the two cat‐

egories listed as insured, making the endorsement completely

superfluous. Some redundancy in insurance contracts is nor‐

mal, see, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 656,

355 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Minn. 1984), while construing an en‐

dorsement to be completely superfluous is not, see Jarvis &

Sons, Inc. v. Intʹl Marine Underwriters, 768 N.W.2d 365, 371

(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation that would

make an endorsement “wholly superfluous or require an ab‐

surd result”).  

Despite the obvious redundancies the estate’s interpreta‐

tion would create, Robbins nonetheless argues that Great
12 No. 15‐1181

West’s interpretation is unreasonable because the endorse‐

ment’s two exclusions could both independently exclude

Hoker and Phillips from the policy’s coverage, making them

redundant. Contrary to Robbins’s position, the exclusions are

not wholly redundant. For example, an individual could be

an independent contractor hired by Lakeville to transport

goods for Lakeville in furtherance of Lakeville’s business. The

first policy exclusion then would not apply. But if the inde‐

pendent contractor had a written trailer interchange agree‐

ment with Lakeville, then the exclusion would not extend the

policy’s coverage to that individual. And even if there is some

overlap, Great West’s interpretation does not make the entire

endorsement itself superfluous. Indeed, it is consistent with

the “belt and suspenders” approach often adopted by insur‐

ance companies in detailing exclusions in their policies. See

Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloydʹs, London v. Stolberg, 680

F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[I]nsurance policies are notorious

for their simultaneous use of both belts and suspenders, and

some overlap is to be expected.”). Great West’s interpretation

is the only reasonable reading of the unambiguous policy and

controls our analysis moving forward.  

B. Application of the Policy Exclusions

Even if we adopt Great West’s interpretation of the policy,

Robbins contends that neither Hoker nor Phillips are ex‐

cluded from coverage by the September 2010 endorsement

because: (1) the trailer interchange agreement did not cover

the trailer involved in the accident and (2) the trailer was be‐

ing used in Lakeville’s business. We address each argument

in turn.  
No. 15‐1181 13

1. Written Trailer Interchange Agreement

Robbins argues that there is insufficient evidence to con‐

clude that the trailer involved in the accident was part of a

“written trailer interchange agreement” between Hoker and

Lakeville, rendering inapplicable the endorsement’s second

exclusion. Robbins is correct.  

The evidence offered by Great West to support the asser‐

tion that the trailer involved in the accident was subject to a

written trailer interchange agreement is: (1) a 2006 trailer in‐

terchange agreement between a “Shipper” and a “Carrier,”

and (2) Robbins’s discovery admission that “the trailer that

Phillips was pulling at the time of the Accident was being

used under a Trailer Exchange Agreement between Hoker

and [Lakeville].” The trailer interchange agreement offered

by Great West does not indicate who the parties to the agree‐

ment are. Illegible signatures and handwriting appear below

the signature blocks for the “Shipper” and “Carrier,” which

make it impossible to determine whether this is a “written

trailer interchange agreement” between Lakeville and Hoker.

As for Robbins’s admission, it did not request Robbins to ad‐

mit that the trailer interchange (“or exchange”) agreement

was written. The agreement could have been oral and there‐

fore would not qualify for exclusion under the Great West

policy.

Reviewing this evidence and drawing all reasonable infer‐

ences in the estate’s favor, we find Great West has not pro‐

duced sufficient evidence so as to leave no genuine issue of

material fact regarding whether the trailer was subject to a

“written Trailer Interchange Agreement.”  
14 No. 15‐1181

2. Trailer Used in a Business Other Than Lakeville’s

This conclusion, however, does not affect our decision to

affirm summary judgment because the Great West policy en‐

dorsement excludes Hoker and Phillips as “[a]nyone who has

leased ...rented, or borrowed an ‘auto’ from you that is used

in a business other than yours.” For this exclusion to apply,

Great West must demonstrate that: (1) Hoker and Phillips

“rented” or “borrowed” (2) an “auto” (3) to be used in a busi‐

ness other than Lakeville’s. It is uncontested that the trailer is

an “auto” under the Great West policy, so we look to the other

two elements of the exclusion.  

Robbins’s own discovery responses confirm that there is

no genuine dispute over the fact that Hoker and Phillips

“rented” or “borrowed” the trailer. The term “borrowed” is

undefined in the policy. Where a term is undefined under a

policy, Minnesota courts permit a court to consult a diction‐

ary to determine the ordinary meaning of a word. See Hubred,

442 N.W.2d at 311; Wakefield Pork, Inc. v. Ram Mut. Ins. Co., 731

N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). Rent means “to take

and hold under an agreement to pay rent.” Webster’s Third

New Int’l Dictionary. Borrow means “to receive temporarily

from another, implying or expressing the intention of either

of returning the thing received or of giving its equivalent to

the lender.” Id.

Robbins admitted in discovery that “the trailer that Phil‐

lips was pulling at the time of the Accident was being used

under a Trailer Interchange Agreement between Hoker and

[Lakeville].” In the same discovery responses, Robbins admit‐

ted that “Hoker was using the trailer owned by [Lakeville]

with [Lakeville’s] permission.” Finally, in response to inter‐
No. 15‐1181 15

rogatories served by Great West, Robbins stated that Lake‐

ville “was being paid for the use of the trailer.” Taken to‐

gether, the only two reasonable inferences from these state‐

ments are that: (1) Lakeville allowed Hoker to use its trailer in

exchange for payment; and (2) Hoker temporarily possessed

the trailer with the intent of returning it to Lakeville.  

Having established that Hoker and Phillips “rented” and

“borrowed” the trailer, we must determine whetherthe trailer

was being used in a business other than Lakeville’s. Robbins

does not dispute that the trailer was being used in Hoker’s

business, which is moving freight. Instead, the estate con‐

tends that it was being used at the same time in furtherance

of Lakeville’s business, which also is moving freight.  

To support its position, the estate relies on Scottsdale Insur‐

ance Company v. Transport Leasing/Contract, Inc., 671 N.W.2d

186 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), forthe proposition that “Minnesota

courts recognize that a vehicle may be used simultaneously in

the business of two trucking companies.” (Appellant Br. 32.)

But, the court held, in order to find that the vehicle was used

simultaneously, evidence must exist that demonstrates the in‐

sured entity had some day‐to‐day operational control over

the other’s business or drivers, including employment deci‐

sions, contact with the other company’s customers, or sharing

of revenue. Id. at 194.

There is no evidence here that Lakeville exerted that same

level of control over Hoker and Phillips. Robbins relies on lan‐

guage from the trailer interchange agreement—the same one

it contends does not apply to the trailer—to support its posi‐

tion that Lakeville had the requisite control. Notwithstanding

the fact that we cannot determine who the parties to the agree‐

ment are, the provisions in the agreement do not establish that
16 No. 15‐1181

Lakeville exerted any control over the manner in which

Hoker moved freight or over its drivers. That Lakeville may

have “assigned” work to Hoker does not mean that it had the

right to determine how that work was performed or have any

say in Hoker’s employment decisions, including the choice of

Phillips as a driver.3  

The only reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the

record is that Hoker “rented” and/or “borrowed” Lakeville’s

trailer and used it in furtherance of its own business, not Lak‐

eville’s. No facts give rise to a reasonable inference that on the

day of the accident, the trailer was being driven in connection

with Lakeville’s freight‐moving operations. Therefore, we

find that this provision excludes Hoker and Phillips from cov‐

erage under the Great West policy.  

                                                 

3 Robbins relies on Canal Insurance Company v. Great West Casualty Com‐

pany, No. 11‐772, 2013 WL 5275789 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2013), to argue that

because the Great West exclusion itself is ambiguous as to whether it ap‐

plies when a vehicle is being used simultaneously in the business of two

parties, it must be construed in favor of granting coverage. But Robbins’s

argument rests on a faulty premise. Accepting the argument that the en‐

dorsement is ambiguous on the point of whether it applies to simultane‐

ous business use does not mean that a court will just “grant coverage” to

anybody. Rather, Robbins must show that she is eligible for having the

ambiguity construed in her favor. The necessary prerequisite then is that

she show the trailer was in fact being used “simultaneously.” It was not.

The court in Canal Insurance found that there was a triable issue of fact on

whether the vehicle was being used “simultaneously” because the insured

company exercised a significant degree of control over the particular ve‐

hicle involved in the accident. Here, however, we have no evidence that

Lakeville exercised any significant degree of control over the trailer after

it was in Hoker’s possession.  
No. 15‐1181 17

C. Wisconsin Law’s Effect on Great West’s Policy Exclusions

Robbins’s final contention is that notwithstanding the un‐

ambiguous policy language, Hoker and Phillips are covered

under the Great West policy because Wisconsin law invali‐

dates the exclusions in the September 2010 endorsement to

the extent those provisions exclude permissive users. We dis‐

agree.  

1. Wis. Stat. § 632.32

Under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(1), (3), “every policy of insurance

issued or delivered in [Wisconsin]” must “provide that: (a)

Coverage provided to the named insured applies in the same

manner and under the same provisions to any person using

any motor vehicle described in the policy when the use is for

purposes and in the manner described in the policy.” (empha‐

sis added). The statute goes on to state that “[a] policy may

limit coverage to use that is with the permission of the named

insured.” § 632.32(5)(a). Wisconsin courts have determined

these two provisions in tandem “effectively impose[d] a per‐

missive user requirement” in every automobile insurance con‐

tract “issued or delivered” in Wisconsin. See Blasing v. Zurich

Am. Ins. Co., 827 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).  

Robbins contends that Great West delivered Lakeville’s

policy for the purposes of § 632.32 when it filed its “Motor

Carrier Certificate of Bodily Injury and Property Damage Li‐

ability Insurance” with the Wisconsin Department of Trans‐

portation. As such, Great West’s policy must conform to Wis‐

consin law and cover permissive users like Hoker and Phil‐

lips, despite policy language that excludes them from cover‐

age.  
18 No. 15‐1181

Wisconsin precedent suggests Robbins’s interpretation is

incorrect. In Danielson v. Gasper, 623 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. Ct. App.

2000), the court was confronted with the question of whether

a policy issued and “delivered” to a Minnesota company nev‐

ertheless had to comply with the § 632.32’s requirements be‐

cause it contained an “Out of State Coverage” provision. The

court found that § 632.32 “does not require a Minnesota in‐

surer issuing a policy in Minnesota to comply with statutes

established for policies issued in Wisconsin” and does not ap‐

ply “to an insurance policy issued in Minnesota to a Minne‐

sota resident.” Id. at 185–86. In so holding, the court found the

contract was “delivered” to a Minnesota resident who kept

the covered vehicle in that state. Id. at 184.  

Here, the insurance policy was issued and delivered to the

Minnesota‐based Lakeville by the Nebraska‐based Great

West. Wren, another Minnesota‐based company, was added

to the list of insureds under the policy. The facts here are suf‐

ficiently similar to Danielson that we see no reason to depart

from it.

Robbins attempts to get around these similarities by sug‐

gesting that the individual in Danielson did not submit his in‐

surance policy for approval with the Wisconsin Department

of Transpiration. Robbins’s position has a fundamental flaw:

Filing a certificate of insurance with the Wisconsin Department

of Transportation is not the same as delivering an insurance pol‐

icy to an individual in Wisconsin. Certificates of insurance

and insurance policies are not one and the same. The Dan‐

ielson court construed the word “delivered” from § 632.32 to

mean that a policy is “delivered” when it is sent to the policy‐
No. 15‐1181 19

holder. We decline to adopt Robbins’s more expansive read‐

ing, as the estate has not directed us to any Wisconsin state

precedent interpreting “delivered” in the way it suggests.

Robbins also attempts to circumvent Danielson by high‐

lighting that the trailer was registered in Wisconsin. Danielson

is silent on where the vehicle was registered. This fact is a dis‐

tinction without a difference. As discussed above, the policy

itself was not delivered in the state of Wisconsin. It was the cer‐

tificate of insurance that was delivered in Wisconsin.

Alternatively, Robbins contends that even if the policy was

not “issued or delivered” in Wisconsin, the Great West policy

must still conform to Wisconsin statutory requirements, in‐

cluding § 632.32’s requirement that the policy cover permis‐

sive users. For support, Robbins relies on Amery Motor Co. v.

Corey, 174 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1970). There, the Wisconsin Su‐

preme Court invalidated an exclusion in an insurance policy

issued to a Minnesota company based on the fact that the pol‐

icy contained an endorsement stating it would “conform the

policy to the statutory requirements for common motor carri‐

ers of property [in Wisconsin], one of which requires the pol‐

icy to comply with the omnibus statute.” Id. at 542. According

to Robbins, Great West’s policy must also conform to § 632.32

because of the certificate of insurance it filed with the state of

Wisconsin and the policy endorsement stating it would “com‐

ply with the provisions of the law or regulation to the extent

of the coverage and limits of insurance required by that law

or regulation” in Wisconsin.

But the court in Corey observed that “[w]hile these policies

were issued in Minnesota they purport to be governed by

Wisconsin law” as the result of a Wisconsin‐specific endorse‐
20 No. 15‐1181

ment. Corey, 174 N.W.2d at 542. There is no such specific em‐

brace of Wisconsin law contained in the Great West policy. Ra‐

ther, there is a general endorsement that provides the policy

will conform to the motor carrier financial responsibility laws

in any state where the certificate is filed. In this case, this par‐

ticular certificate has been filed in Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois,

Minnesota, and North Dakota. We do not interpret that gen‐

eral contract provision to constitute a wholesale incorporation

of all five of those states’ insurance laws unconditionally. Sec‐

tion 632.32 does not apply to the Great West policy.

2. Wis. Stat. § 194.41

Robbins also attempts to rely on Wis. Stat. § 194.41 to read

a permissive‐user requirement into the Great West policy. Un‐

fortunately for Robbins, it is clear from the face of the statute

that it does not apply to Lakeville’s Great West policy. Section

194.41(1) mandates that motor carriers like Lakeville must

“file with the department [of transportation] ... an approved

certificate for a policy of insurance” in order to obtain and

maintain a valid registration and license for a trailer in Wis‐

consin. This policy must be “in such form and containing such

terms and conditions as may be approved by the department

issued by an insurer authorized to do a surety or automobile

liability business in this state under which the insurer as‐

sumes the liability prescribed by this section with respect to

the operation of such motor vehicles.” Id.

It is not entirely clear whether this particular provision

reads a permissive user requirement into every insurance pol‐

icy that is certified with the Wisconsin Department of Trans‐

portation. We need not decide that question, however, as

§ 194.41 does not apply to Lakeville in the first instance. There
No. 15‐1181 21

is an exception to § 194.41’s compliance requirements for mo‐

tor carriers who are “registered by another state under the

unified carrier registration system consistent with the stand‐

ards under 49 USC 13908 and 14504a.” § 194.41(1). Lakeville

legally possessed the trailer pursuant to a 2009 lease agree‐

ment with Wren and had agreed to register the trailer in Wis‐

consin. Robbins has not provided any evidence to contradict

the sworn statement of Lakeville’s representative concerning

its obligation to register the trailer, and the documentation

from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation indicates

Lakeville is the primary lessee of the vehicle. Because Lake‐

ville was a motor carrier registered under the unified carrier

registration system in Minnesota at the time of the accident,

its insurance policy did not need to comply with § 194.41.  

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied this same statu‐

tory exception in Sisson v. Hansen Storage Company, 756

N.W.2d 667 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008), when it held that § 194.41

did not apply to invalidate an exclusion in an insurance policy

because the insured company had registered under the uni‐

fied carrier registration system in Iowa. We see no reason why

the same logic should not apply here and exempt the Great

West policy from § 194.41’s reach.  

Robbins attempts to avoid § 194.41’s exclusionary lan‐

guage by relying on an unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion in‐

volving the same statute and Great West. In Gulf Underwriters

Insurance Company v. Great West Casualty Company, the Fifth

Circuit assumed that § 194.41 applied to a Great West policy

issued and delivered to a Wisconsin‐based company, and on

those grounds, it invalidated an exclusion contained in the

policy. 278 F. App’x 454, 457–59 (5th Cir. 2008). This case is
22 No. 15‐1181

factually distinguishable. First, the Great West policy was is‐

sued to a Wisconsin‐based company and delivered to that

company in Wisconsin. The insurance policy at issue here was

issued and delivered to a Minnesota‐based company. Second,

there is no indication in the facts that the Wisconsin‐based

company registered under the unified carrier registration sys‐

tem of another state.  

Robbins’s other efforts to have us apply § 194.41 are also

unpersuasive. The estate directs us to Mullenberg v. Kilgust

Mechanical, Inc., 612 N.W.2d 327 (Wis. 2000), for the proposi‐

tion that whenever an insurance company certifies a policy

“as proof of financial responsibility” in a state and the under‐

lying policy states it will conform itself with applicable motor‐

carrier financial responsibility provisions of any states where

the policy has been certified, its policy must conform to the

insurance laws of that state, even if the accident does not oc‐

cur within that state’s boundaries. Of course, Mullenberg does

not stand for this proposition. If it did, it would mean that

Robbins in this case could select from the insurance laws of

Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin, and

ask a court to apply the law of the state that is most favorable,

even if the accident and the parties had no connection to that

particular state other than the insurance company’s certifica‐

tion. That would be an absurd result.  

The issue decided in Mullenberg was whether “the term

‘negligent operation’requires insurers to coverthe loading ac‐

tivities of third‐parties,” which was part of the question certi‐

fied by this court. Id. at 328. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
No. 15‐1181 23

decided it did.4 Importantly, the parties conceded that

§ 194.41 applied, and there was no indication that the insured

was registered with the unified carrier registration system of

another state.  

Robbins also argues that we are focusing on the wrong

company in determining whether § 194.41’s exclusion applies.

Rather than asking if the statute applies to Lakeville—a motor

carrier—we should be determining whetherit applies to Wren

because, according to Robbins, it is a rental company within

the meaning of § 194.41 and decided to register the trailer in

Wisconsin. While it is true that § 194.41 applies with equal

force to a “rental company,” we do not believe § 194.41 applies

to Wren here. The statute states that the motor “carrier or

rental company” must have an “approved certificate for a pol‐

icy of insurance” on file. § 194.41(1) (emphasis added). The

statute does not require both the motor carrier and rental com‐

pany to have an approved certificate of insurance on file.

From the facts in the record, we know that prior to the acci‐

dent Lakeville “was responsible for registration for operation

of the trailer.” The only reasonable inference then is that the

application for registration on file was related to Lakeville’s

use of the trailer, as its obligation to obtain registration pre‐

ceded the accident.  

This conclusion is unaffected by the fact that Wren is listed

as the owner in the 2010 registration because Lakeville is

listed as the primary lessee. For the purposes of § 194.41, a

                                                 

4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to answer our other certified

question, which was “whether Wis. Stat. § 194.41 incorporates the Omni‐

bus Statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.32, so that an insurer who issues and delivers

a policy outside of Wisconsin must comply with the requirements of the

Omnibus Statute.” Mullenberg, 612 N.W.2d at 328.  
24 No. 15‐1181

lessee is considered the owner of the vehicle and the insur‐

ance policy when the lessee assumes all legal liabilities and

control of the vehicle underthe agreement. Maas v. Ziegler, 492

N.W.2d 621, 626 (Wis. 1992); Contʹl Cas. Co. v. Transp. Indem.

Co., 114 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Wis. 1962). The lease agreement here

provided Lakeville with control and legal responsibility for

the trailer, including insuring it. The owner of the vehicle and

the policy for purposes of § 194.41 is Lakeville. Section 194.41

does not apply to Wren here. Therefore, the exception in ques‐

tion works to exclude Lakeville and the Great West policy

from § 194.41’s reach.  

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

judgment.