SIGAR Audit-11-11 Cooperative Agreement Oversight & Performance / Development

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

USAID’s Kabul Community Development Program 

Largely Met the Agreement’s Terms, But Progress 

Toward Long-Term Goals Needs to be Better Tracked

June 29, 2011
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Cooperative Agreement Oversight & Performance / Development Page i

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

June 29, 2011

The Honorable Rajiv Shah 

Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

Dr. S. Ken Yamashita

USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) audit of a cooperative agreement between the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and CARE International to provide food assistance relief using cash-for-work 

opportunities to qualified beneficiaries through the Community Development Program-Kabul (CDP-K). 

This report includes four recommendations to the USAID Mission Director to Afghanistan to help track

progress toward long-term program goals, potentially recoup certain expenses from CARE, and address 

certain procedural deficiencies with regards to CARE’s internal controls over cash disbursements.

A summary of this report is on page ii. SIGAR conducted this performance audit under the authority of 

Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector General 

Reform Act of 2008. When preparing the final report, we considered comments from USAID which are 

reproduced in appendix III of this report. USAID concurred with our recommendations and noted a 

range of actions they plan to take.

Herbert Richardson

Acting Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Cooperative Agreement Oversight & Performance / Development Page ii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-11-11 June 2011

USAID’s Kabul Community Development Program Largely 

Met the Agreement’s Terms, But Progress Toward LongTerm Goals Needs to be Better Tracked 

What SIGAR Reviewed

Due to concerns about the possibility of riots over food shortages, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) awarded a cooperative agreement to CARE International in March 2009 to provide cash-for-work to qualified 

beneficiaries in the Kabul area through a number of small scale projects. The first phase of the Community 

Development Program-Kabul (CDP-K) was scheduled to last until March 2010, reach a target beneficiary population of 

50,000, and cost a total of $25 million. USAID modified the cooperative agreement in March 2010 to extend the 

performance for a second phase until September 2011, expand the number of target beneficiaries to 78,000, and 

increase total funding to $60 million. USAID also expanded the program’s goals to, in part, fund long-term projects 

aimed at improving living and working conditions for target communities. This report assesses (1) the processes and 

procedures USAID followed to award this cooperative agreement; (2) whether it is being implemented within the cost, 

schedule, and outcome terms of the agreement; and (3) the implementation of internal controls over cash 

disbursements. To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed the cooperative agreement, associated implementation 

and monitoring documents, and internal controls documentation relating to the cash disbursement process. We 

interviewed officials from USAID, USAID’s third-party oversight support contractor and CARE. We also visited two

project sites to observe the cash distribution process and reviewed related project files covering a 3-month 

performance period. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, from August 2010 to May 2011, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found

USAID followed agency procedures in its decision to award a cooperative agreement on a non-competitive basis to 

implement CDP-K. USAID sought to mitigate the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse that are inherent in cash-for-work 

projects, by providing additional oversights of the projects required for cooperative agreements. SIGAR’s analysis 

indicates that USAID followed its procedures in using a cooperative agreement, rather than a grant. In addition, USAID 

adhered to requirements in documenting the award and expansion of the program on a non-competitive basis.

CARE largely complied with the schedule, cost, and outcome terms under the first phase of the cooperative agreement 

and appears to be on track to meet the terms established for the second phase. However, CARE failed to complete 

certain required studies, such as the impact the program had on food prices in the market, under both phases of the 

agreement. These studies could have provided additional insights to guide project implementation and assess the 

project’s impact. CARE largely met key numerical performance goals for the agreement under both phases. However, 

USAID failed to incorporate other program goals such as creating projects with long-term economic impact into phase 

two of the agreement when it had become clear to both USAID and CARE officials that a shift in program focus had 

occurred. As a result, there has been no reporting on the program’s success in achieving these long-term goals. The 

lack of formal agreement on such long-term goals increases the risk that project activities will not have the intended 

impact beyond just the distribution of cash to target beneficiaries. 

CARE’s cash disbursement process provides numerous checks and balances designed to prevent inappropriate 

disbursements. For example, all cash disbursement are overseen by a committee of four and workers only receive 

payment after showing a CARE-created photo identification. In addition, CARE established a 40 -person unit to visit 

work sites to monitor the implementation of its internal controls process. USAID also contracted with A.F. Ferguson to 

provide third party monitoring and evaluation services, including assessments of the cash disbursement process. This 

company found that although CARE has a reasonable assurance that project funds are only distributed to eligible 

beneficiaries, CARE needs to improve its internal controls over the cash disbursement process to address limited 

irregularities.

What SIGAR Recommends

To ensure that the program’s broader objectives are achieved and appropriate oversight of program funds is provided, 

this report includes four recommendations to the USAID Mission Director to Afghanistan relating to the need to track 

progress toward long-term program goals, recoup certain program expenses, and address certain procedural 

deficiencies with regards to CARE’s internal controls over cash disbursements. USAID concurred with SIGAR’s 

recommendations and noted a range of actions they plan to take.

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Cooperative Agreement Oversight & Performance / Development Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ...................................................................................................................................................2

USAID Followed Procedures in Selection and Award of Non-Competitive 

Cooperative Agreement for CDP-K.........................................................................................................5

Requirements for CDP-K’s First and Second Phases Were Largely Met, But 

Progress Toward Long-Term Goals in Second Phase Is Unclear.............................................................6

CDP-K is Subject to Multiple Layers of Monitoring and Evaluation; Some 

Irregularities Were Noted in the Cash Disbursement Process.............................................................12

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................15

Recommendations......................................................................................................................................16

Comments...................................................................................................................................................16

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology.........................................................................................................17

Appendix II: Project Results through the End of Phase One and Phase Two ............................................18

Appendix III: Comments From the U.S. Agency for International Development........................................19

TABLES

Table 1: Base Award and Modifications to USAID Cooperative Agreement No: 

A-00-09-00510........................................................................................................................................4

Table 2: Phase One Results for CDP-K Program (March 15, 2009 to March 15, 

2010).......................................................................................................................................................7

Table 3: Phase Two Results for CDP-K Program (March 15, 2009 thru March 15, 

2011).....................................................................................................................................................10

Table I: CARE Reported Results by Project Category for Phase One (March 15, 

2009 to March 15, 2010)......................................................................................................................18

Table II: CARE Reported Results by Project Category for Phase Two (March 16, 

2010 to March 15, 2011)......................................................................................................................18

FIGURES AND PHOTOS

Photo 1: Canal Cleaning in Mibarchakot District, Kabul ...............................................................................2

Photo 2: Big Canal Construction after Completion in Kabul Municipality....................................................3

Figure 1: CDP-K Internal Control Cycle.......................................................................................................13
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Cooperative Agreement Oversight & Performance / Development Page iv

ACRONYMS

ADS Automated Directives System

AO Agreement Officer

AOTR Agreement Officer’s Technical Representative

CARE CARE International

CDP-K Community Development Program-Kabul

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 1

USAID’s Kabul Community Development Program Largely Met the Agreement’s 

Terms, But Progress Toward Long-Term Goals Needs to be Better Tracked 

In March 2009, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) initiated a cash-for-work 

program—the Community Development Program-Kabul (CDP-K)—to help alleviate food insecurity 

among distressed populations in and around Kabul.1USAID awarded a non-competitive cooperative 

agreement to CARE International (CARE) that was initially scheduled to run from March 2009 to March 

2010 (phase one of the project).2

It is estimated that just over $20 million will be paid out as salaries to cash-for-work beneficiaries by the 

end of the second phase of the agreement.

In March 2010, USAID modified the cooperative agreement (phase two 

of the project) to extend the performance period to September 2011 and increase funding from 

$25 million to $60 million. According to USAID, it extended and modified the project for two reasons. 

First, the U.S. government had continuing concerns about potential political instability resulting from

food insecurity. Second, USAID sought to fund cash-for-work projects that would better serve U.S. 

strategic goals by having a sustainable impact on the local economy. 

3We conducted this audit, in part, due to the high-risk nature 

of cash-for-work programs if appropriate controls to deter fraud, waste, and abuse are not in place. A

recent management letter from the USAID Office of the Inspector General to the Mission Director in 

Kabul highlights the increased risk associated with cash disbursements.4

This report assesses (1) the processes and procedures USAID followed to award this cooperative 

agreement; (2) whether it was being implemented within the schedule, cost, and outcome terms of the 

agreement; and (3) the implementation of internal controls over cash disbursements.

 

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed the cooperative agreement, associated implementation 

and monitoring documents, and internal controls documentation relating to the cash disbursement 

process. We also visited two project sites to observe the cash distribution and monitoring process and 

reviewed related district project files covering a 3-month performance period. We interviewed officials 

from USAID, CARE, and A.F. Ferguson--a contractor hired by USAID to provide additional program 

 1 Originally titled the Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations-Kabul (FIRUP-K) program, the program’s title 

was later changed to Community Development Program-Kabul (CDP-K) at the U.S. Ambassador’s direction to 

reflect the program’s expanded focus under phase two of the program’s implementation.

2

For purposes of this report, we refer to the initial award period as “phase one” and to the extended award period 

as “phase two.”

3 Under both the original cooperative agreement and the phase two modification, USAID stipulated that CARE 

must spend approximately 68 and 63 percent, respectively, of the budget on “project activities” consisting of 

beneficiary’s salaries and the cost of project materials and supplies. 

4 See Review of Cash Disbursement Practices of Selected USAID/Afghanistan Implementing Partners, USAID Office 

of the Inspector General Report, No. F-306-11-002-S, March 7, 2011. Risks associated with cash disbursements 

were also highlighted in April 2010 Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive 

Agriculture (AVIPA) Program conducted by the USAID Office of Inspector General. See Audit of 

USAID/Afghanistan’s Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture (AVIPA) Program, USAID Office of 

the Inspector General, Audit Report No. 5-306-10-008-P, April 20, 2010. 
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 2

oversight of all CDP programs in Afghanistan. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, from 

August 2010 to May 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

BACKGROUND

CDP-K operates in 16 urban districts and 11 suburban areas around Kabul. Under phase one from March 

2009 through March 2010, CARE hired needy Afghan citizens (identified through a consultative process 

involving the communities, government authorities, and project staff) to work on small-scale projects 

such as ditch drainage construction, road surfacing and gravelling, canal cleaning, and cleaning the Kabul 

River. Under phase two of the program-- from March 2010 through September 2011—USAID expanded

the program’s goals to include larger projects aimed at providing an economic benefit to the entire 

community. These projects included the construction of permanent culverts to divert flood water that 

can cause serious damage to a community’s infrastructure. Phase Two also extended the program 

beyond Kabul’s urban districts to suburban areas to help prevent poor workers from migrating to 

Kabul’s overcrowded center. 

Photos 1 and 2 provide views of two cash-for-work projects in Kabul. Photo 1 illustrates the small-scale 

projects funded in phase one of the program. Photo 2 provides an example of the larger, more 

sustainable projects in phase two.

Photo 1: Canal Cleaning in Mibarchakot District, Kabul 

Source: CARE’s Quarterly Report, September – December 2009
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 3

Photo 2: Big Canal Construction after Completion in 

Kabul Municipality

Source: CARE, January, 2011.

As shown in table 1, USAID modified the cooperative agreement five times. Modification 2 provided the 

basis for phase two, which increased time, costs, and the target number of beneficiary households (from 

50,000 to 78,000). Through March 31, 2011, CARE had disbursed nearly $46 million of the $60 million 

authorized for this agreement.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 4

Table 1: Base Award and Modifications to USAID Cooperative Agreement No: A-00-09-00510 

Modification Date Purpose Cost and Schedule Changes

Base Award March 8, 2009 Provided funding for the Food 

Insecurity Response for Urban 

Populations-Kabul program 

(FIRUP-K).a

$25,000,000

Modification 1 March 11, 2009 Revised approval of the 

recipient’s implementation 

plans.

No Change

Modification 2 March 1, 2010 Expanded the program’s 

scope.

Increased cost by $35,000,000 

($25,000,000 to $60,000,000). 

Extended performance period by 

18 months, from March 2010 to 

September, 2011. Total number of 

expected beneficiary households 

increased from 50,000 to 78,000.

Modification 3 June 5, 2010 Incrementally funded the 

agreement by $6,000,000 –

from $25,000,000 to 

$31,000,000.

No Change

Modification 4 August 10, 2010 Incrementally funded the 

agreement by $20,000,000 -

$31,000,000 to $51,000,000.

No Change

Modification 5 September 16, 

2010

Changed name of program to 

“Community Development 

Program-Kabul.”

No Change

Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID Kabul Mission data.

Note: a Original title of the CDP-K program.

USAID’s Agreement Officer (AO), located in the Office of Acquisitions and Assistance in Embassy Kabul, is 

responsible for ensuring that appropriate award procedures, key approvals, and any modifications to 

the cooperative agreement are properly implemented. As noted by one of the AO’s for this cooperative 

agreement, the AO designates an Agreement Officer’s Technical Representative (AOTR), located in the 

relevant program office in Embassy Kabul, to provide on-going contact with the award recipient, review 

filed progress and status reports, and inspect project activities. According to one of the cooperative 

agreement’s AOTRs, because cash-for-work programs potentially pose an increased risk for fraud, USAID 

contracted a third party, A.F. Ferguson to monitor and evaluate program implementation.5

CARE is responsible for the program’s day-to-day operations and has a dedicated office that manages 

and oversees the program. This office includes a chief of party, a deputy chief of party, a program 

manager, district supervisors, a field supervisor, and field officers. CARE also established an independent 

monitoring and evaluation unit staffed with 40 individuals to monitor implementation of the program’s 

 5 In June 2009, USAID contracted with A.F. Ferguson, a Pakistani accounting firm and member firm of 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, to conduct a monitoring and evaluation program over the four USAID-funded CDP 

programs throughout Afghanistan. The cost-plus-fixed-fee contract was originally scheduled to run from June 2009 

to March 2010 at a cost of about $477,000. However, the contract was modified in March 2010, to extend it until 

March 2011, and the cost increased to more than $1.5 million.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 5

internal controls, particularly controls over the cash disbursement process. In total, CARE’s CDP-K staff 

has grown to about 370 individuals comprised of largely local Afghan hires.

USAID FOLLOWED PROCEDURES IN SELECTION AND AWARD OF NON-COMPETITIVE 

COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR CDP-K 

In compliance with agency guidelines and documentation standards, USAID chose to award a 

cooperative agreement on a non-competitive basis to implement the CDP-K program. The program’s 

purpose falls within the definition of when a cooperative agreement should be used. USAID’s award of 

the CDP-K program on a non-competitive basis to CARE International also adhered to U.S. Afghan 

mission award criteria and procedures which permit the expedited award of acquisition and assistance 

instruments under certain circumstances. 

Use of a Cooperative Agreement Was Consistent with Agency Procedures

We found that USAID followed agency procedures in awarding a cooperative agreement--rather than a 

contract or grant—to CARE to implement CDP-K. A grant or cooperative agreement is used when the 

principal purpose of the transaction is to accomplish a public purpose of support or stimulation, as 

authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.6

USAID Followed Agency Procedures in Selecting Non-Competitive Award 

The statutory requirement for choosing a cooperative 

agreement over a grant is that, under a cooperative agreement, “substantial involvement” is expected 

between the executive agency and the awardee when carrying out the activity contemplated in the 

agreement. USAID regulations require that the AO document the selection of an implementing 

instrument with his or her written determination, including the rationale. In a negotiation memorandum 

dated March 11, 2009, the AO documented the basis for selecting a cooperative agreement including 

the need to be substantially involved in the agreement’s implementation. According to USAID officials, 

the agency needed to be substantially involved in the oversight of this cash-for-work program given 

inherent concerns about the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse.

USAID complied with agency requirements to document its decision to award the CDP-K cooperative 

agreement on a non-competitive basis. OMB and agency guidance stresses the need to award 

acquisition and assistance instruments on a competitive basis unless circumstances dictate the need for 

a non-competitive award. Under normal USAID procedures,7

In 2002, the then USAID Administrator approved a series of waivers to permit the use of noncompetitive award procedures in Afghanistan.

the mission is required to seek 

applications from all eligible and qualified entities, conduct an impartial review and evaluation of all 

applications, and make a recommendation to the AO for award.

8

 6 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

According to the policy, USAID may use a noncompetitive award process if the USAID Mission Director agrees that certain emergency conditions exist 

that could threaten U.S. strategic interests if not addressed in an expedited fashion. The policy requires 

7 See USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS), Chapter 303 Grants and Cooperative Agreements to NonGovernmental Organizations.

8 On February 15, 2002, USAID’s Administrator approved a blanket waiver that permits the use of expedited 

acquisition and assistance procedures for the procurement of goods and services for activities in Afghanistan. This 

policy has been subject to annual reviews to determine its continued relevance and the need for any 

modifications.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 6

that USAID document the use of a non-competitive award in the award file. On December 30, 2008, 

USAID’s acting program office director requested the acting USAID Mission Director’s approval to use 

waiver authority to award the CDP-K cooperative agreement to CARE International on a non-competitive 

basis. The memorandum noted that food costs in Afghanistan had increased by as much as 300 percent, 

and that this, combined with a lack of income-generating opportunities, could lead to instability in urban 

centers. The memo cited the government of Afghanistan’s fear that a humanitarian crisis was imminent, 

with more than 1.5 million people at acute risk of malnutrition. According to documentation in the file, 

the acting USAID Mission Director approved the use of the non-competitive award on January 4, 2009.

Non-Competitive Extension Adhered to Agency Justification and Documentation 

Requirements

Using the Afghan waiver policy, USAID extended and expanded the CDP-K cooperative agreement in 

March 2010 on a non-competitive basis. Agency guidance allows non-competitive award extensions if 

the benefits exceed the benefits of a competitive process. The extension of a non-competitive award 

under normal USAID procedures requires a number of administrative steps.9

On December 21, 2009, USAID’s program staff sought approval from USAID’s Mission Director to extend 

the program to September 2011 and increase funding from $25 million to $60 million. Citing a 

continuing food crisis in the Kabul area, the memo stated that the program would continue to link 

vulnerable population centers at risk of acute food insecurity with income-producing programs that 

allow target beneficiaries to purchase food as needed. The memo also states that the extended program 

would support some very important urban development programs which would serve to promote local 

stability and development objectives. According to documentation in the award file, the USAID Mission 

Director approved the extension on December 23, 2009.

 In particular, USAID 

regulations require that the agency justify in writing and with specificity why the benefits of continuing 

the assistance activity with the same recipient exceeds the benefits of a competitive process favored by 

federal law and agency policy. According to USAID officials, this decision potentially eliminated months 

in additional clearance reviews. The normal process for non-competitive follow-on awards in excess of 

$5 million requires that USAID’s General Counsel or Regional Legal Advisor review all justifications that 

support non-competitive procurement. In contrast, the waiver policy in Afghanistan allows up to a 

2-year non-competitive extension of an existing cooperative agreement without these additional 

administrative steps if conditions prevailing at the outset of the cooperative agreement continue.

REQUIREMENTS FOR CDP-K’S FIRST AND SECOND PHASES WERE LARGELY MET, BUT 

PROGRESS TOWARD LONG-TERM GOALS IN SECOND PHASE IS UNCLEAR

CARE largely complied with the schedule, cost, and outcome terms of the cooperative agreement under 

phase one and phase two in terms of the program’s top-level numerical goals, which include the target 

number of beneficiaries, cash disbursed, and total days worked. USAID failed, however, to incorporate 

other phase two program objectives, such as creating projects that would have a long-term economic 

impact, even though it had become clear to both USAID and CARE officials that a partial shift in program 

focus had occurred. Moreover, USAID officials did not require CARE to adhere to the specific 

construction targets described in the cooperative agreement because CARE obtained a better 

understanding of community needs during program implementation and expanded the range of funded 

projects to adjust to these needs. USAID did, however, coordinate with CARE to ensure that only 

approved categories of projects were implemented and the agency hired A.F. Ferguson to provide 

 9 See ADS Chapter 303.3.6.6 (Justifications for Exceptions to Competition).
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 7

on-site verification to ensure that projects were completed as intended. Finally, we found that CARE 

failed to complete certain required studies under both phase one and two of the agreement. 

Key Phase One Results Were Largely Achieved, But Certain Deliverables Were Not Provided

USAID broke the program down into four objectives with associated performance targets and 

expectations.10 These four objectives were (1) provide cash-for-work opportunities, (2) increase 

involvement of women in short term income generating activities, (3) improve the understanding of the 

causes and effects of food insecurity and the impact of project activities on food prices, and

(4) coordinate and collaborate with stakeholders.11

For phase one of the cooperative agreement, CARE reported that it largely met its numerical 

performance targets under objectives one and two with regards to the number of beneficiaries, amount 

of cash disbursed, number of days worked, and number of female beneficiaries. Objectives three and 

four were only partially met since CARE failed to complete certain required studies, including a market 

analysis of the impact of its projects on food prices, an analysis of gender sensitive programming, and a 

stakeholder analysis. Table 2 provides a summary of phase one results.

 The key numerical targets for the cooperative 

agreement are listed under the first objective and include (1) number of beneficiaries reached, 

(2) amount of cash disbursed, and (3) number of days worked. Given the cash-for-work nature of the 

cooperative agreement, USAID officials noted that they focused on CARE’s ability to meet these 

numerical goals. USAID officials stated that their other key focus was to ensure that funded projects 

were actually completed and used A.F. Ferguson to provide on-site, third-party monitoring to verify that 

projects were completed as described in CARE’s quarterly reports to USAID. 

Table 2: Phase One Results for CDP-K Program (March 15, 2009 to March 15, 2010)

Objective Goals Reported Results

Provide CFW opportunities

Number of beneficiaries 50,035 49,207

Project activity spending (salaries 

and cost of materials)

$16.9 million $11.9 million

Days worked 1.9 million 1.4 milion

 10 SIGAR organized the eight performance categories listed in the original cooperative agreement into four related 

categories of activities which CARE also uses to provide its quarterly performance results to USAID. 

11 CARE chose to allocate the cooperative agreements’ budget across these four objectives. USAID officials noted, 

however, that CARE did this on its own initiative and for internal tracking purposes. USAID officials explained that 

they only track CARE’s top-level budget and the line items (such as salaries and project activities) which make up 

this budget. CARE must provide USAID with quarterly reports showing total spending figures and must track 

internally that spending on any given line item does not fall below or exceed stipulated percentage limits.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 8

Objective Goals Reported Results

Project category results The base cooperative agreement 

includes a number of specific goals 

broken down by the following 

project categories: 

• ditch drainage construction, 

• road surfacing and graveling,

• canal cleaning,

• vineyard and orchard 

ploughing,

• tree planting.

All project categories included 

targets for days worked, number of 

beneficiaries, and wages disbursed 

targets. Construction/production 

targets were stated in kilometers, 

number of hectares, and trees 

planted were also specified where 

appropriate. 

Appendix II, Table I provides 

details on project results by 

project category through March 

15, 2010. At USAID’s request, 

CARE added eight project 

categories (such as a park 

rehabilitation and digging water 

wells) to the five included in the 

cooperative agreement. USAID 

officials noted that they chose not 

to update project category 

specific performance targets since 

their focus was on the top-level 

indicators listed above. 

Increase involvement of woman in short term income generating activities

Number of beneficiaries who are

female

11,079 10,027

Identify woman beneficiaries for 

inclusion in cash for work 

opportunities.

As stated. No measureable goals set.

Identify gender sensitive tasks for 

woman beneficiaries.

As stated. No measureable goals set.

Ensure involvement of woman in 

decision making processes on 

projects.

As stated. No measureable goals set.

Conduct an analysis for gender 

sensistive programming

As stated. Assessment not conducted

Improve the understanding of the causes and effects of food insecurity and impact of project activities on 

food prices.

Conduct assesment to verify the 

appropriateness of proposed cash 

for work interventions

As stated. CARE conducted Consumption 

Strategy Index studies in 

September 2009 and February 

2010. The Consumption Strategy 

Index, developed by CARE and the 

World Food Program, measures 

household-level changes in 

response to food shortages.

Conduct market analysis to 

understand the impact of project 

intervention on food prices in the 

market

As stated. Assessment not conducted
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 9

Objective Goals Reported Results

Coordinate and collaborate with stakeholders.

Conduct a stakeholder analysis The project will conduct a rapid 

stakeholder analysis at the start of 

the project to ensure agreement on 

planned initiatives. 

Stakeholder analysis not 

conducted. 

Involve Kabul Municipality, 

Mininistry of Agriculature, and 

Ministry of Woman’s Affairs

Develop memorandums of 

understanding with target ministries 

to guide coordination and 

collaboration terms and 

mechanisms.

Memorandums of understanding 

signed with the Kabul 

Municipality, Ministry of 

Agricultur, Irrigation, and Land; 

and the Ministry of Woman’s 

Affairs. 

Source: March 7, 2009 cooperative agreement with CARE and CARE’s 4th quarterly & end of year 1 report to USAID 

(March 15, 2009-March 15, 2010).

Phase Two Results Did Not Include Reported Progress Toward Longer-Term Goals

For phase two of the cooperative agreement, CARE reported that it is on track to meet its September 

15, 2011 end-of-agreement numerical targets with regards to number of beneficiaries, amount of cash 

disbursed, and number of days worked. We found that CARE and USAID failed to conduct a market 

analysis of the impact of its projects on food prices under objective three and failed to include

performance goals relating to a shift in program focus towards building longer-term, sustainable 

projects with greater economic impact. Table 3 provides a summary of phase two results.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 10

Table 3: Phase Two Results for CDP-K Program (March 15, 2009 - March 15, 2011)

Objective Goal

(thru Sept. 15, 2011)

Reported Results

(thru March 15, 2011)

Provide CFW opportunities 

Number of beneficiaries 77,812 77,497

Project activity spending (salaries 

and cost of materials)

$37.7 million $28 million

Days worked 2.9 million 2.2 million

Project category results The modification mentions seven 

project categories where work 

should be targeted. Unlike phase 

one of the coooperative agreement, 

project category goals are not listed 

such as number of beneficiaries, 

wages disbursed, days worked, or 

construction/production targets 

stated in kilometers, number of 

hectares, trees planted, etc. 

Appendix II, Table II provides 

details on project results by 

project category for the one year 

period from March 16, 2010 

through March 15, 2011.

Increase involvement of women in short term income generating activities

Number of beneficiaries who are 

female

11,079 (target not updated for 

phase two)

13,511

No specific sub-tasks or 

deliverables beyond general 

expectation that CARE continue to 

work towards ensuring the 

participation of woman in project 

activities.

As stated. Not applicable.

Improve the understanding of the causes and effects of food insecurity and the impact of project activities 

on food prices.

Conduct assesment to verify the 

appropriatenes of proposed cash 

for work interventions

As stated. CARE commissioned a third-party 

assessment of its program. 

Building on the results of the 

earlier CSI studies, this December 

2010 “livelihood analysis” study 

provides a more in-depth review 

of the impact of CARE’s cash for 

work projects.

Conduct market analysis to 

understand the impact of project 

intervention on food prices in the 

market

As stated. Assessment not conducted. 

Coordinate and collaborate with stakeholders.

No specific sub-tasks or 

deliverables beyond general 

expectations that CARE would 

continue to coordinate with 

relevant Afghan ministries.

As stated. Not applicable.

Source: Cooperative agreement modification dated March 7, 2010 and CARE’s 8th quarterly report to USAID 

(December 16, 2010 to March 15, 2011).
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 11

Under phase one and phase two of the cooperative agreement, CARE internally allocated nearly 

$3 million dollars to support improved understanding of the causes and effects of food insecurity in 

urban areas. Some portions of these funds would be associated with the costs of producing the studies 

that CARE has not conducted, leading to a potential for cost recovery. 

Progress Toward Longer Term Goals Was Not Tracked 

USAID regulations state that USAID missions and offices and their agreement officer teams are 

responsible for measuring progress towards achieving intended program results.12 According to the 

head of USAID office of stabilization programs in Kabul, the mission is broadly seeking to move cash-forwork programs from a focus on immediate distribution of cash to serve an urgent humanitarian 

purpose, such as food relief, to a new focus which includes long term economic impact; local ownership 

for completed projects; capacity development on the part of Afghan government entities; and increasing 

Afghan government responsiveness, accountability, and transparency to its people.13 However, USAID 

failed to incorporate these broader goals into the CDP-K agreement even though a shift in program 

focus had occurred. 14

USAID officials stated that phase two of the CDP-K included the following goals: (1) funding sustainable 

projects with long-term economic impact; (2) increasing the Afghan government’s ownership, 

management capacity, and support for completed projects; and (3) discouraging the flow of poorer 

workers from Kabul’s rural suburbs to its urban center.

As a result, CARE and A. F. Ferguson’s reports to USAID do not explicitly address 

progress towards CDP-K’s newer objectives. 

15

While these broader program objectives are not fully incorporated in the modified cooperative 

agreement, CARE has begun to shift some resources from non-sustainable projects providing low 

economic impact, such as canal cleaning efforts, to more sustainable projects providing an economic 

benefit to the entire community, such as the construction of permanent culverts to divert flood water,

which can cause serious damage to a community’s economic infrastructure. 

 However, USAID’s program description and 

the issued modification for phase two only address the second goal. The modification for phase two of 

the program does not address funding projects which lead to long-term economic impact and which 

discourage the flow of workers from rural to urban centers. Furthermore, the modification does not 

require that CARE or A.F. Ferguson develop and report on related performance indicators and targets for 

any of these goals. Without defining program goals or tracking a program’s impact, there is a potential 

for missed development opportunities and broader goals not being achieved. 

CARE has recognized the need to refine and improve the program’s long-term impact. In October 2010, 

CARE established a new unit called the Learning and New Initiatives Unit, which is examining a number 

of potential steps the program could take to heighten its long-term impact in such key areas as 

economic and infrastructure development. The unit proposes to assess lessons learned from the 

program to apply to current and future program activities. 

 12 See ADS Chapter 203, Section 3.2.1, the Performance and Management Process. 

13 The stabilization unit head noted that a draft paper has been prepared for distribution and comment within the 

embassy community which defines this new direction. His hope is that once fully vetted, this paper will be issued 

as mission policy directive.

14 USAID officials noted, that while the program continued to have a significant cash-for-work focus, USAID and 

CARE officials agreed that the types of projects built with program funds should be expanded to include longerterm, sustainable projects that benefit entire communities and not just the cash-for-work beneficiaries.

15 The addition of these items is reflected in the program’s name change from a food insecurity response program 

to a community development program.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 12

A senior A.F. Ferguson official agreed that the program’s goals have expanded to include the goals 

described above, but the project’s economic impact and sustainability are questionable. The same 

official noted that careful project planning and monitoring is required to achieve these goals. However, 

A.F. Ferguson does not track or report on progress towards these broader objectives. The same official 

suggested that one key reason USAID did not take the time to develop an expanded performance 

framework for the CDP-K program and incorporate such a framework in the cooperative agreement and 

related reporting expectations, is that the agency staff are pre-occupied with the task of disbursing large 

quantities of funds within short periods of time and this can leave program staff with little time for 

conceptual thinking on how best to define and track broader program objectives. 

CDP-K IS SUBJECT TO MULTIPLE LAYERS OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION; SOME 

IRREGULARITIES WERE NOTED IN THE CASH DISBURSEMENT PROCESS

CARE and A.F. Ferguson provide some level of assurance to USAID that program funds have not been 

inappropriately disbursed. These efforts include a system of internal controls, which are overseen by a 

40-person Development, Monitoring, and Evaluation Unit, developed by CARE to provide on-going 

monitoring of cash disbursements. Our assessment of the controls over cash disbursements at selected 

project sites revealed that they were operating as intended and were generally adequately documented, 

although we found limited procedural deficiencies. In addition, as of March 2011, CARE had not yet 

resolved five observations that A.F. Ferguson reported on related to the cash disbursement process. 

CARE Developed a Series of Internal Control Procedures over Cash Disbursements

CARE has developed a system of internal control procedures for the CDP-K program to ensure that cash 

disbursements are distributed to eligible participants. In particular, CARE’s monitoring and evaluation 

unit reviews the cash disbursement process. Figure 1 describes the internal control cycle for the CDP-K 

program. Key elements of the cash disbursement and oversight process include:

• Cash distribution committee. Cash disbursements must be independently witnessed by at least 

four individuals: CARE’s monitoring officer, an Afghan community council member, the 

program’s cashier, and a laborer representative.

• Photo identification. Beneficiaries are issued photo identification cards, which they must bring 

to the job site for identification. The card is punched to reflect every time they get paid–for a 

maximum of 4 times, which equals 40 days of employment under the CDP-K policy.

• Time and attendance verification. CARE monitoring officers review a number of required forms, 

including time and attendance sheets, for completeness and accuracy. CARE officers verify the 

number of days worked by each laborer and ensure that the time sheets are prepared by the 

field officer/engineer and verified by appropriate supervisory staff. 

• Project files. CARE maintains records that include verified time sheets for each employed 

beneficiary, punched and canceled photo identification cards, and associated project tracking 

and monitoring forms for each completed project. 
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 13

Figure 1: CDP-K Internal Control Cycle

Source: SIGAR analysis of CARE data.

Each monitoring officer prepares weekly reports highlighting any problems or concerns that he or she 

encounters. CARE’s management, in turn, provides USAID with quarterly reports summarizing its 

monitoring activities and findings. Our review of quarterly reports filed since June 2009 found only two

substantive instances of reported problems. In both cases, CARE took corrective actions and no U.S. 

reconstruction funds were lost.16

Our field visits to two CDP-K project sites and review of selected files and discussions with CARE officials 

revealed that CARE staff generally followed the control procedures over cash disbursements.

17

 16 Only two instances of reported problems with CARE’s cash disbursement process have been reported. In both 

cases, corrective action was taken and new procedures were implemented. No funds were lost as a result of the 

incidents. In March 2009, a cashier absconded with the equivalent of over $22,000 of project funds that were to be 

paid out as wages. After contacting the cashier’s father, however, all the funds were returned and CARE changed 

the distribution process so that money dealers are now required to bring the cash to the disbursement site where 

the funds are received by a disbursement committee, signed for, and then disbursed. A second incident in 

February 2009, involved beneficiaries who were receiving cash wages without proper identification. CARE monitors 

discovered the irregularity and, as a result, three staff members were fired for not following proper procedures.

 

Although we identified some deviations from established procedures, these exceptions did not 

17We visited two different project sites in separate districts and witnessed the cash disbursement system. We also 

reviewed 3 months of forms and reports filed by CARE’s monitoring and evaluation staff for all projects in these 

two districts.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 14

compromise the basic integrity of CARE’s cash disbursement process, which is centered on the photo 

identification cards, verified time sheets, and a cash distribution committee. We found that, in some 

cases, the beneficiaries lacked national identification cards, some attendance sheets were missing 

skilled laborer’s contract numbers, and some attendance sheets contained smudged fingerprints used to 

acknowledge worker payment.18

Third-Party Contractor Assesses Cash Disbursement Process for CDP-K

 In addition, certain files lacked complete documentation such as 

cancelled checks, authorization letters to the cash distribution committee to receive money from the 

money dealer, and copies of CARE’s cash ledgers. CARE has indicated that it has taken action to address 

most of these discrepancies, including providing better training for record keeping. With regards to the 

issue of smudged fingerprints, CARE officials agreed that greater care should be taken when recording 

fingerprints and that attendance forms would likely need to be re-designed to provide enough space to 

record a fingerprint. 

A.F. Ferguson monitoring and evaluation staff complete a monitoring form for each observed cash-forwork activity, which forms the basis for monthly and quarterly reports filed with USAID’s AOTR. The 

monthly reports cover day-to-day implementation efficiencies and deficiencies, and quarterly reports

cover the overall monitoring results. A.F. Ferguson’s monthly reports describe specific program 

challenges and problems, including any problems noted with regards to the cash disbursement process. 

These challenges and problems are reported to CARE for resolution. USAID’s AOTR receives a complete 

list of all open and closed observations and monitors CARE’s written response to each open challenge as 

identified by A.F. Ferguson staff. A senior A.F. Ferguson official noted that, overall, CARE’s internal 

controls system provides a reasonable level of assurance that project funds are only distributed to 

eligible beneficiaries. The same official added, however, that certain irregularities have been noted with 

regards to CARE’s implementation of its internal controls. These irregularities are reported to CARE on a 

monthly basis and a process exists to track and resolve A.F. Ferguson’s findings and observations, as 

discussed below. 

In March 2011, at the termination of its contract, A.F. Ferguson submitted its final report to USAID. In its 

report, A.F. Ferguson summarized 51 observations that it had made to USAID throughout the course of 

their monitoring and evaluation activities of CDP-K. As of March 2011, there were 21 unresolved 

observations. Of these, five related to the cash disbursement process.19

• A beneficiary on one sub-project did not have a photo on his CARE-issued identification card and 

his national identification number was not listed on the card.

The following are examples of 

the unresolved observations relating to the cash disbursement process: 

• Cash was partly disbursed in the absence of one member of the cash distribution committee on 

one sub-project.

 18 CARE officials noted that fingerprints are used in lieu of signatures to acknowledge receipt of payment but not as 

evidence that only qualified individuals receive payment. They noted that each worker is issued a unique photo 

identification which provides proof of identity. This photo identification must be shown to cash disbursement 

committee members at the time of payment. This photo identification is punched at each payment and taken from 

the worker at the conclusion of their authorized work period. The “canceled” photo identification becomes a part 

of CARE’s documented records for each project.

19 In addition to the cash disbursement process, A.F. Ferguson reported to USAID on other observations, including 

coordination with stakeholders and CARE and CDP-K’s organizational structures. For the purposes of this audit, we 

focused on the cash disbursement process given the potential risks of fraud, waste, and abuse.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 15

• Cash disbursement was not carried out in accordance with the cash disbursement policy since 

the money was not brought by the money dealer to the site, instead it was brought to the site 

by the cashier from the head office.

USAID is pressing for corrective actions in all cases of unresolved observations, but some will remain 

open due to the nature of the finding, according to program officials. For example, according to USAID 

officials, up to 30 percent of Afghans do not have a Tazkira (identification) card and it would be 

unreasonable to expect CARE to resolve this issue on its own. USAID officials acknowledged the 

importance of ensuring that all CARE staff adhere to all internal controls over cash disbursements to 

mitigate the potential risk of distributing funds inappropriately. 

CONCLUSION

Cash-for-work projects involve inherent risks of fraud, waste, and abuse. In planning CDP-K, USAID 

officials acknowledged these risks and required a multi-layered system of internal controls over the cash 

disbursement process. USAID planned to be substantially involved in the oversight of this cash-for-work 

program and, therefore, chose to award a cooperative agreement to CARE International, rather than a 

grant. In accordance with the program design and terms of the cooperative agreement, CARE 

established a monitoring and evaluation unit to track and measure outputs and outcomes of the CDP-K 

project. In addition, USAID contracted with a third-party organization to help monitor and evaluate 

implementation of the CDPs across Afghanistan, including monitoring and reporting on CARE’s systems 

and controls in place to prevent fraud and abuse. CARE has largely met the schedule, cost, and outcome 

requirements of the cooperative agreement under both phases with two notable exceptions. First, 

CARE failed to conduct certain required studies under both phases which were included in the cost of 

the agreement. Second, with the expansion of the program in March 2010 to longer-term, sustainable 

projects, USAID did not define specific objectives and performance metrics to gauge CARE’s progress 

toward achieving these broader goals. USAID’s failure to require that CARE identify, track, and report its 

progress toward achieving these expanded program goals raises the risk that these funds will be spent 

on activities or projects that do not promote long-term economic development or advance U.S. strategic 

interests. Although CARE has established a system of internal controls to mitigate risks over the cash 

disbursement process, USAID’s third party monitoring and evaluation contractor noted certain 

procedural shortcomings that CARE had not fully addressed. Without consistent implementation of 

internal controls over the cash disbursement process, USAID and CARE increase the risks of fraud, waste, 

and abuse of these funds.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 16

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that the program’s broader objectives are achieved and appropriate oversight of program 

funds is provided, SIGAR recommends that the USAID Mission Director require that:

1. USAID and CARE program staff document the specific nature and definition of CDP-K’s expanded 

project goals for this and any potential follow-on awards; 

2. CARE address to what degree these goals were met when it submits its close-out report to 

USAID later this year, along with any lessons learned with regards to why, if applicable, certain 

long-term goals were not met; 

3. USAID and CARE determine to what degree, if any, CARE should reimburse USAID for the costs 

associated with required studies that were not completed; and,

4. USAID and CARE reconcile remaining internal control issues identified by A.F. Ferguson as soon 

as possible.

COMMENTS

USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are included in appendix III. USAID 

concurred with all four of our recommendations. Regarding recommendations one and two, , USAID 

noted it will work with CARE program staff to document the specific expanded project goals under 

phase 2 of the cooperative agreement and ensure that related lessons learned and recommendations 

for further activities are included in CARE’s project close-out report. Regarding recommendation three,

USAID stated it will determine to what degree, if any, CARE should reimburse USAID for the costs 

associated with required studies that were not completed. Regarding recommendation four, USAID

noted it will work closely with CARE to review internal control procedures over cash disbursements and 

promptly rectify any remaining internal control issues.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 17

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report discusses the results of an Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) audit of a cooperative agreement between the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and CARE International to provide food assistance relief using cash-for-work 

opportunities to qualified beneficiaries through the Community Development Program-Kabul (CDP-K). 

This report assesses (1) the processes and procedures USAID followed to award this cooperative 

agreement; (2) whether it is being implemented within the schedule, cost, and outcome terms of the 

agreement; and (3) the implementation of internal controls over cash disbursements.

To examine the processes and procedures USAID followed to award this cooperative agreement, we 

reviewed the award file, the cooperative agreement, its modifications, and supporting documents. We 

also reviewed USAID regulations and guidance and relevant statutory provisions, including USAID’s 

Automated Directives System. In addition, we analyzed policies associated with acquisitions and award 

decisions in Afghanistan. We interviewed officials from USAID, CARE, and an independent contractor, 

A.F. Ferguson, a private accounting firm hired by USAID to provide additional monitoring and evaluation 

of the program. 

To determine whether the cooperative agreement is being implemented within the cost, schedule, and 

outcome terms of the agreement, we examined the cooperative agreement, its modifications, and 

related documents. We reviewed progress reports and related monitoring and evaluation documents 

from CARE and A.F. Ferguson. 

To assess the internal controls over the cash disbursement process, we visited two different project sites 

in two different districts and observed the cash disbursement system to determine if the process was 

functioning as intended. We also reviewed 3 months of forms and reports filed by monitoring and 

evaluation staff for all projects in these two districts. We also reviewed all quarterly and monthly 

reports, issued by CARE and A. F. Ferguson, respectively. Lastly, we interviewed USAID, CARE, and 

A.F. Ferguson officials. 

To assess the reliability of data reported by CARE, we reviewed the results of a data reliability 

assessment conducted in April 2010, by a consulting firm hired by USAID which found that the 

performance data provided by CARE was sufficient and could be relied on to assess program results. 

We conducted work in the city of Kabul and its suburbs from August 2010 to May 2011 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This performance audit 

was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the 

authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector 

General Reform Act of 2008. 
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 18

APPENDIX II: PROJECT RESULTS THROUGH THE END OF PHASE ONE AND PHASE TWO

Tables I and II provide CARE reported results for phase one and two of the cooperative agreement by 

category of project.

Table I: CARE Reported Results by Project Category for Phase One 

(March 15, 2009 to March 15, 2010)

Project Category Results

Road side ditch excavation 95.3 kilometers

Road side drain construction 53.9 meters

Road surfacing and graveling 143.2 kilometers

Canal cleaning 1015 kilometers

Number of vines tended 5.4 million

Number of trees planted 6 thousand

Orchard plowing 316 hectares

Park rehabilitation 43.7 thousand square meters

Boundary wall construction 4.4 kilometers

Culverts construction 3.6 kilometers

Water wells dug 126 wells

Kabul River cleaning 28.3 kilometers

Source: CARE’s 4th quarterly & end of year 1 report to USAID (March 15, 2009-March 15, 2010).

Table II: CARE Reported Results by Project Category for Phase Two

(March 16, 2010 to March 15, 2011)

Project Category Results

Road side ditches excavation 4.3 kilometers

Road side ditch construction 49.0 meters

Road surfacing and graveling 108.0 kilometers

Number of trees planted 113.2 thousand

Park rehabilitation 11.3 thousand square meters

Boundary wall construction 1.9 kilometers

Culverts construction 13.2 kilometers

Irrigation systems 23.6 kilometers

Tree nurseries 7 nuseries

Source: CARE’s 8th quarterly report to USAID (Dec. 16, 2010 to March 15, 2011).

Note: a Certain project categories, such as canal cleaning, were dropped in phase two to place greater emphasis on projects 

with longer-term impact.
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 19

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 20
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 21
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 22
SIGAR Audit-11-11 Contract Audit of Community Development Program Page 23

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-029A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its 

Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202