alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

     Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Emtec, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the period ending May 31, 2007 as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof  (the “Report”), I, StephenC. Donnelly, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. 

|   | /s/ Stephen C. DonnellyChief Financial OfficerJuly 16, 2007 |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------|

----
§ 102-73.315 What definitions apply to this subpart? *Beneficial owner* means: ( 1 ) With respect to a covered entity, an individual who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise— ( i ) Exercises substantial control over the covered entity; or
( ii ) Owns or controls not less than 25 percent of the ownership interests of the covered entity.
( 2 ) This definition is based on the Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements at 31 CFR part 1010.
*Control* means, with respect to a covered entity: ( 1 ) Having the authority or ability to determine how a covered entity is used; or
( 2 ) Having some decision-making power for the use of a covered entity.
*Covered entity,* as defined by the Secure Federal LEASEs Act, means: ( 1 ) A person, corporation, company, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group; or
( 2 ) Any governmental entity or instrumentality of a government.
*Federal lessee,* as defined by the Secure Federal LEASEs Act, means: ( 1 ) The Administrator of General Services, the Architect of the Capitol, or the head of any Federal agency, other than the Department of Defense, that has independent statutory leasing authority; and
( 2 ) Does not include the head of an element of the intelligence community.
*Highest-level owner* means the entity that owns or controls an immediate owner of the offeror or lessor, or that owns or controls one or more entities that control an immediate owner of the offeror or lessor. No entity owns or exercises control of the highest-level owner.
*Immediate owner* means an entity, other than the offeror or lessor, that has direct control of the offeror or lessor. Indicators of control include, but are not limited to, one or more of the following: ownership or interlocking management, identity of interests among family members, shared facilities and equipment, and the common use of employees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JASON ATHANS,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

WARDEN SCRIBNER,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 10-56232

D.C. No. 2:05-cv-02676-RGK-OP

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2014** 

Pasadena, California

Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, GRABER, Circuit Judge, and ZOUHARY,***

District Judge.

FILED

MAR 14 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge, Northern

District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
Petitioner Jason Athans appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. Reviewing de novo, Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1309

(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), we affirm.

1. California state courts previously adjudicated both of Petitioner’s claims

for habeas relief. See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013). Thus, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) bars relitigation of Petitioner’s claims unless the state courts’

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States.” 

2. The California Court of Appeal applied the correct rule of federal law to

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, and applied a rule of state law

governing a request for a competency hearing that mirrors the correct federal standard. 

Compare People v. Koontz, 46 P.3d 335, 349–50 (Cal. 2002), with Drope v. Missouri,

420 U.S. 162, 172–73 (1975). See also Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per

curiam).

3. Neither of the relevant California appellate decisions contained “an error

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011).

AFFIRMED.

2
§ 302-11.451 What is the maximum amount that we may reimburse for the sale or purchase of an employee's residence? The maximum amount that you may reimburse for the sale or purchase of an employee's residence is: ( a ) Ten percent of the actual sale price for the sale of the employee's residence at the old official station; and
( b ) Five percent of the actual purchase price of the residence for the purchase of a residence at the new official station.
#### § 109-43.5001 Definition.

*Facility in standby* means a complete plant or section of a plant, which is neither in service or declared excess.
# Comments on: 2021-1260: Renesas Electronics v. Broadcom Corporation
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-20325

Conference Calendar

 

LUIS SANTOS LAGAITE, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DALE MYERS; JENIFFER HUDGGINS;

SAM PRESTWOOD,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-97-CV-2710

--------------------

December 14, 1999

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Luis S. Lagaite, Jr., Texas prisoner # 762508, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights

suit following entry of summary judgment for defendant Myers. 

Lagaite argues that the court erred in dismissing his claim that

the defendant denied him access to the courts by interfering with

his legal mail. Lagaite also argues that the court should have

appointed counsel to represent him, erred in denying discovery to

him, and erred in denying his motion for default judgment. 
No. 99-20325

-2-

Lagaite’s right of access to the courts is limited to his

right to challenge his conviction or the conditions of his

confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). The

legal mail at issue in this case is unrelated to these rights. 

Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment

to defendant and dismissing Lagaite’s complaint.

Lagaite did not request that the district court appoint

counsel for him, nor did Lagaite move the district court to

continue Myers’s summary-judgment motion pending discovery, and

thus Lagaite did not preserve these issues for appeal. See Burch

v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 (5th Cir. 1997). The

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lagaite’s

motions to subpoena witnesses for deposition because Lagaite did

not support the need for such depositions. See Feist v.

Jefferson County Comm’r Court, 778 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1985). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Lagaite’s motion for default judgment because defendant Myers had

filed an answer to the complaint. See Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d

343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977). 

Lagaite’s appeal is without arguable merit and is thus

frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.

1983). Because his appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See

5th Cir. R. 42.2.

The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a

“strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Lagaite already had at least

two “strikes” in Lagaite v. Hale, No. H-97-2377 (S.D. Tex.

November 25, 1997) and Lagaite v. Hale, No. 97-21034 (5th Cir.
No. 99-20325

-3-

October 22, 1998). Lagaite has now accumulated at least three

“strikes” under § 1915(g). He may not proceed IFP in any civil

action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in

any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury. See § 1915(g).

APPEAL DISMISSED; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) BAR IMPOSED.
#### § 102-34.75 Who is responsible for monitoring our compliance with fuel economy standards for motor vehicles we obtain?

Executive agencies are responsible for monitoring their own compliance with fuel economy standards for motor vehicles they obtain.
#### § 128-1.5004 Basis for delegations of authority and assignment of responsibilities.

Certain personal property management functions can be performed by an individual only under a specific grant of authority to that individual. Other functions may be performed simply on the basis of general instructions or directions or by virtue of an individual occupying the position to which the responsibility for the function is assigned. In either situation, to eliminate excessive delay and to reduce unnecessary involvement of multiple management levels, it is considered generally desirable to place authority and responsibility for and to exercise property management actions at the lowest organizational unit practical. Accordingly, specific redelegations of the authority vested in the Assistant Attorney General for Administration are made to the heads of bureaus for the personal property management functions listed in § 128-1.5005 below. The authority to prescribe and issue Department-wide policies, regulations, and procedures for personal property management is not redelegated and remains solely within the jurisdiction of the Assistant Attorney General for Administration.
§ 302-6.26 May I receive an advance of funds for TQSE? ( a ) *TQSE-LP and TQSE-AE methods.* You may receive an advance of funds if authorized in accordance with your agency policy and § 302-2.24 of this chapter. Your agency may advance the amount of funds necessary to cover your estimated TQSE expenses for up to 30 days. Your agency may subsequently advance additional funds for periods up to 30 days.
( b ) *TQSE-LS method.* You will not receive an advance of funds as your agency will offer a one-time lump sum payment as close as is reasonably possible to the time you will begin occupancy of temporary quarters; no additional payments will be authorized. If your TQSE-LS payment is more than adequate to cover your actual TQSE expenses, any balance belongs to you (*e.g.,* your agency authorizes and you accept a lump sum payment for 15 days of TQSE and you vacate temporary quarters after 10 days, you would retain the remaining balance for the 5 days of TQSE not incurred).
I

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 672

To prohibit the Secretary of the Treasury from issuing regulations dealing

with hybrid transactions.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 10, 1999

Mr. CRANE (for himself and Mr. MATSUI) introduced the following bill; which

was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To prohibit the Secretary of the Treasury from issuing

regulations dealing with hybrid transactions.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. HYBRID TRANSACTIONS UNDER SUBPART F.

4 (a) PROHIBITION ON REGULATIONS.—The Secretary

5 of the Treasury (or his delegate)—

6 (1) shall not issue temporary or final regula7 tions relating to the treatment of hybrid transactions

8 under subpart F of part III of subchapter N of

9 chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 pur10 suant to Internal Revenue Service Notice 98–35 or
2

•HR 672 IH

1 any other regulations reaching the same or similar

2 result as such notice,

3 (2) shall retroactively withdraw any regulations

4 described in paragraph (1) which were issued after

5 the date of such notice and before the date of the

6 enactment of this Act, and

7 (3) shall not modify or withdraw sections

8 301.7701–1 through 301.7701–3 of the Treasury

9 Regulations (relating to the classification of certain

10 business entities) in a manner which alters the treat11 ment of hybrid transactions under such subpart F.

12 (b) STUDY AND REPORT.—The Secretary of the

13 Treasury (or his delegate) shall study the tax treatment

14 of hybrid transactions under such subpart F and submit

15 a report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the

16 House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance

17 of the Senate. The Secretary shall hold at least one public

18 hearing to receive comments from any interested party

19 prior to submitting such report.

Æ
#### § 109-44.702 Donations to public bodies.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-40492

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CLIFTON EARL BERNARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:93-CR-108-1

- - - - - - - - - -

February 21, 1997

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Clifton Earl Bernard was indicted for possession with intent

to distribute cocaine. Following two years as a fugitive,

Bernard pleaded guilty to that offense. In sentencing Bernard,

the district court enhanced his offense level for possession of a

fiream.

Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides

for a two-point upward adjustment in the offense level in a drug

crime if a dangerous weapon was possessed, "unless it is clearly 
No. 96-40492

- 2 -

improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense." 

§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.3); United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 271,

277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 455 (1994). Although

Bernard argues that he had no knowledge of the presence of the

gun, he concedes that it was found in the trunk of his car with

the cocaine. The district court did not err in applying the

enhancement.

The district court also did not clearly err in increasing

Bernard’s offense level pursuant to § 3C1.1 of the guidelines

(obstruction of justice) because he failed to appear in court. 

United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 1829 (1994). 

With respect to his claim that the district court erred in

denying him a reduction in his offense level for acceptance of

responsibility, Application Note 4 to § 3E1.1 of the guidelines

provides that conduct which results in an offense-level

enhancement under § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice "ordinarily

indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for

his criminal conduct" except in "extraordinary cases in which

adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply." Given the

deferential standard of review applied to acceptance of

responsibility findings and the finding that Bernard had

obstructed justice, the district court did not err in determining

that Bernard was not entitled to a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility. See United States v. Ayala, 47 F.3d 688, 691

(5th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JASON ATHANS, Petitioner - Appellant,
v. WARDEN SCRIBNER, Respondent - Appellee. No. 10-56232 D.C. No. 2:05-cv-02676-RGK-OP
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 3, 2014 ** Pasadena, California Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, GR ABER, Circuit Judge, and ZOUHARY, *** District Judge. 

# FILED
MAR 14 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes th is case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge, Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.Petitioner Jason Athans appeals the distri ct court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Reviewing de novo, Dickens v. Ryan , 740 F.3d 1302, 1309 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), we affirm. 1. California state courts previously adjudicated both of Petitioner’s claims for habeas relief. See Johnson v. Williams , 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013). Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) bars relitigation of Petiti oner’s claims unless the state courts’ adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 2. The California Court of Appeal applie d the correct rule of federal law to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial couns el claim, and applied a rule of state law governing a request for a competency hearing that mirrors the correct federal standard. Compare People v. Koontz , 46 P.3d 335, 349–50 (Cal. 2002), with Drope v. Missouri , 420 U.S. 162, 172–73 (1975). See also Early v. Packer , 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). 3. Neither of the relevant California a ppellate decisions c ontained “an error well understood and comprehended in ex isting law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter , 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011). AFFIRMED.
2
No. 10-10991.

#### Reece *v.*Walden Affordable, LLC, et al.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
IB

House Calendar No. 43

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 686

[Report No. 106–109]

To designate a United States courthouse in Brownsville, Texas, as the

‘‘Garza-Vela United States Courthouse’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 10, 1999

Mr. ORTIZ introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Transportation and Infrastructure

APRIL 27, 1999

Additional sponsors: Mr. REYES, Mr. HINOJOSA, and Mr. GREEN of Texas

APRIL 27, 1999

Committed to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

A BILL

To designate a United States courthouse in Brownsville,

Texas, as the ‘‘Garza-Vela United States Courthouse’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

4 The United States courthouse located at the corner

5 of Seventh Street and East Jackson Street in Brownsville,
2

•HR 686 RH

1 Texas, shall be designated and known as the ‘‘Garza-Vela

2 United States Courthouse’’.

3 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

4 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

5 paper, or other record of the United States to the United

6 States courthouse referred to in section 1 shall be deemed

7 to be a reference to the ‘‘Garza-Vela United States Court8 house’’.

House Calendar No. 43

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 686

[Report No. 106–109]

A BILL

To designate a United States courthouse in

States Courthouse’’.Brownsville, Texas, as the ‘‘Garza-Vela United

APRIL 27, 1999

Committed to the House Calendar and ordered to be

printed
[Cite as Am. Fedn. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Local #74 v. Warren, 122 Ohio St.3d 545, 

2009-Ohio-4120.]

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,

LOCAL #74, ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE CITY OF WARREN ET AL., APPELLANTS. 

[Cite as Am. Fedn. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Local #74 v. Warren, 122 

Ohio St.3d 545, 2009-Ohio-4120.] 

Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed on the authority of Lima v. State. 

(No. 2008-1836 — Submitted July 14, 2009 — Decided August 20, 2009.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No. 2007-T-0110, 

2008-Ohio-3905. 

__________________ 

{¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed on the authority 

of Lima v. State, 122 Ohio St.3d 155, 2009-Ohio-2597, 909 N.E.2d 616. 

 MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

LANZINGER, J., dissents. 

__________________ 

Green Haines Sgambati Co., L.P.A., Dennis Haines, and Charles W. 

Oldfield, for appellees American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 

Employees, Local #74, and Warren Management Association. 

 Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 

and Sharon A. Jennings and Pearl M. Chin, Assistant Attorneys General, for 

appellee state of Ohio. 

Gregory V. Hicks, Law Director, and James R. Ries, Deputy Law 

Director, for appellants. 

______________________
#### § 105-51.001 Uniform relocation assistance and real property acquisition.

Regulations and procedures for complying with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894, 42 U.S.C. 4601), as amended by the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (Title IV of Pub. L. 100-17, 101 Stat. 246-255, 42 U.S.C. 4601 note) are set forth in 49 CFR part 24.

[52 FR 48024, Dec. 17, 1987; 54 FR 8913, Mar. 2, 1989]