1 

16-4274-cv 

Vullo v. Baron 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 2nd day of November, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

STEPHEN BARON, 

Defendant-Appellant

CONDOR CAPITAL CORP., 

 Defendant

 v.

MARIA T. VULLO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 16-4274-cv 

DENIS O’CONNOR,

Receiver-Appellee, 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 

 Intervenor.*

 

*

 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption to conform with the 

above. 
2 

 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: PAUL NIEHAUS, Niehaus LLP, New York, 

New York

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: JUDITH VALE, Senior Assistant Solicitor 

General, for Eric T. Shneiderman, 

Attorney General, State of New York; 

FOR RECEIVER-APPELLEE: MARC D. POWERS, Marco Molina (On the 

Brief), Baker & Hostetler LLP, New York, 

New York 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Colleen McMahon, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the November 28, 2016 judgment of the District Court be 

and hereby is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Stephen Baron appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, from the District Court’s 

final postjudgment order terminating the Receivership of Condor Capital, Corp.; discharging the 

Receiver; approving and ratifying all fees requested by and issued to the Receiver and his attorneys 

during the case; and releasing the Receiver, his attorneys, and various other parties for any actions 

taken in connection with the Receivership. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s awarding of receiver’s fees (see S.E.C. 

v. Cap. Counsellors, Inc., 512 F.2d 654, 658 (2d Cir. 1975)), its approval of litigation releases (see In re 

Beck Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 1984)), and its denial of a recusal motion (see United States 

v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 169 (2d Cir. 2003)). “A District Court has abuse[d] its discretion if it based its 

ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence... or 

rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions” In re Sims, 534 

F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Before addressing Baron’s contentions that the District Court improperly permitted the 

receiver to wind down Condor and Wells Fargo to intervene, this Court must consider whether 

some issues raised in this appeal are moot. They are. When a District Court issues a final judgment 

and permanent injunctive relief, as it did here, it renders an appeal from a preliminary injunction 

moot. See Webb v. GAF Corp., 78 F.3d 53, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1996). Baron also failed to appeal the 

preliminary injunction when issued, and voluntarily withdrew with prejudice his appeal from the 

denial of a motion to modify it. In addition, when a case is settled by an agreement on a final 

judgment to be entered on consent, “the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by 

the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari.” LaForest v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 569 F.3d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 

2009) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Bristol Tech., Inc., 250 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2001)). Seven months 

after the District Court issued its preliminary injunction, Baron entered into a final consent 

agreement. In doing so, Baron agreed to waive findings of fact and conclusions of law and any right 

to appeal from the judgment. 
3 

Moreover, this Court cannot provide Baron’s requested relief. Baron requests a general 

declaration that the wind-down of Condor was inappropriate and a warning to future equity 

receivers against liquidation. Yet it is well settled that this Court cannot offer advisory opinions on 

moot questions or abstract principles. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). 

Baron argues that this Court has previously issued advisory opinions with regard to equity 

receivers. Yet he cites only one case, which addressed a different context, where the District Court 

effectively had employed a receivership as a “substitute for bankruptcy.” S.E.C. v. Am. Bd. of Trade, 

Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 437 (2d Cir. 1987). There, this Court did not issue an advisory opinion; rather, it 

affirmed the District Court’s appointing of an equity receiver. Id. In sum, Baron’s contentions with 

regard to the wind-down and the intervention are moot and cannot be the subject of an opinion, 

advisory or otherwise. 

 Some of Baron’s issues raised on appeal are not moot. First, he argues that the District 

Court erred in approving the fees awarded to the Receiver and his attorneys. We disagree. District 

courts retain broad discretion in setting and approving the fees of receivers. See Goldberger v. Integrated 

Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2000). Baron contends that the District Court failed to apply an 

objective standard for determining the Receiver’s fees, either 1) the percentage of recovery method 

or 2) the lodestar method. See S.E.C. v. Byers, 590 F. Supp. 2d 637, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Yet while 

courts may “typically” employ these calculations, as the District Court in Byers noted, they are not 

mandated to do so. Id. Baron also contends that the fees awarded to the receiver are inappropriate 

on their face. Yet there is little in the record to suggest that the District Court exceeded its 

discretion. To the contrary, the District Court appropriately considered that: the issues presented in 

this case were complex, the Receiver recorded his work diligently, and Baron contributed to the high 

fees through his own conduct. Baron alleges several instances in which the Receiver or his attorneys 

either did not properly document billing or did not submit fee requests. But these disputes do not 

give rise to an abuse of the District Court’s ample discretion. 

Baron next argues that the District Court erred in issuing a release of the Receiver, his 

attorneys, and certain third parties from all future liability. Baron points to 28 U.S.C. § 959(a), an 

exception to the Barton rule blocking suits against receivers. See Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881). 

The statute states that “[R]eceivers . . . may be sued, without leave of the court appointing them, 

with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such property.” 

28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (emphasis added). The Receiver in this case, Baron contends, was undoubtedly 

carrying on business by making critical decisions and engaging in complex sales of Condor’s assets. 

This Court, however, has ruled that § 959(a) does not apply where a receiver merely “perform[s] 

administrative tasks necessarily incident to the consolidation, preservation, and liquidation of assets 

in the debtor's estate.” In re Lehal Realty Assocs., 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996). Here, the Receiver 

did not engage in the actual business of Condor, but instead liquidated and wound down. Mere 

liquidation of assets, no matter how critical or complex, does not fall under the § 959(a) exception. 

Baron also claims that the District Court’s litigation release of Och-Ziff, the company that 

purchased a portion of Condor’s loans, improperly expanded a previous Och-Ziff release. But the 

Termination Order merely reaffirmed the District Court’s earlier release of Och-Ziff. We thus affirm 

the District Court with regard to the releases. 
4 

Finally, Baron challenges the District Court’s denial of his postjudgment motion for recusal, 

and he requests that upon any remand, this matter be assigned to a different judge. We see no abuse 

of discretion in the denial of that motion, and we do not intend to remand. Therefore, we need not 

address this unusual request. 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of appellant's arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, the several orders of the District Court are affirmed and the November 28, 2016 

judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk