1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-1988

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Deborah Dorholt, formerly known as *

Deborah Larsen, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Hartford Life and Accident Insurance *

Company, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: June 1, 2007

Filed: June 8, 2007

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Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Deborah Dorholt appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary

judgment in her Employment Retirement Security Income Act (ERISA) action arising

from the discontinuation of long term disability benefits (LTD). Having carefully

reviewed the record, we find that the district court properly applied the abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review, and that summary judgment was warranted. See Torres
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We decline to consider the assertions Dorholt makes for the first time on

appeal. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004).

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v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 405 F.3d 670, 677 (8th Cir. 2005) (reviewing de novo

both grant of summary judgment and district court’s determination as to proper

standard of review).2

 

To justify a less deferential standard of review, Dorholt had to show that

Hartford’s status as insurer and administrator, and the procedural “irregularities” she

cited, had some connection to the decision to discontinue her benefits--a showing that

is a “‘considerable hurdle.’” See id. at 677-79 (citation to quoted case omitted). We

agree with the district court that she did not make the required showing. Irregularities

are external factors which reflect that the administrator’s decision was arbitrary. See

Pralutsky v. Meto. Life Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.

264 (2006). The matters Dorholt complained of were not so severe as to compromise

the integrity of Hartford’s decision-making process or to indicate that a decision was

made without reflection and judgment, see id., and they were not like those this court

has held to trigger a less deferential standard of review, see, e.g., Harden v. Am.

Express Fin. Corp., 384 F.3d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (administrator

failed to obtain Social Security records that claimant was led to believe were being

considered). 

We also agree with the district court that, under an abuse-of-discretion standard,

Hartford’s decision should be affirmed. See Rittenhouse v. UnitedHealth Group Long

Term Disability Ins. Plan, 476 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2007) (evidence did not show

abuse of discretion where administrator’s decision was supported by substantial

evidence, meaning relevant evidence that reasonable mind would accept as adequate

to support conclusion). The court correctly declined to consider the material sent to

Hartford after Dorholt’s case was closed, see id. at 631 (district court should consider

only evidence that was before administrator when claim was denied); and the opinions
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of Dorholt’s treating physicians were not determinative, see Black & Decker

Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 830-34 (2003) (ERISA plan administrator is

not required automatically to give special weight to treating physicians’ opinions, nor

may courts impose on administrator burden of explaining why other reliable but

conflicting evidence was credited). Finally, Hartford did not err in considering the

lack of objective medical evidence. See Pralutsky, 435 F.3d at 839 (it is not

unreasonable for administrator to deny benefits due to lack of objective medical

evidence; there is no universal rule precluding administrator from requiring such

evidence when it is appropriate under plan terms and case circumstances). 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

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