Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 9, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00992-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.C.R. AND A.J.R., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 314th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-00769

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, A.D.L., appeals the trial court’s final decree terminating her 

parental rights to her children, M.C.R. and A.J.R.1 Following a bench trial, the 

trial court (1) involuntarily terminated the parent-child relationship between 

appellant and M.C.R. and A.J.R.; and (2) appointed the Department of Family and 

Protective Services (“DFPS”) as sole managing conservator of M.C.R. and A.J.R.

In one issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually 

 

1 We use initials to refer to appellant and her children in this case. See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 109.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 2012); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
2

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the termination of her parental 

rights is in the children’s best interest.2 We affirm.

Background

Appellant is the biological mother of M.C.R., age five, and A.J.R., age three. 

DFPS received a referral on December 23, 2010, alleging the sexual abuse of 

M.C.R. and that appellant “abuses the drugs ‘sherm,’ cocaine, and marijuana.” 

M.C.R. “received a forensic interview” at the Children’s Assessment Center but 

made no outcry of abuse or neglect. 

Appellant also was interviewed and stated that she is unemployed, has no 

income, and receives food stamps. Appellant stated that she has an 11-year-old 

son, S.R.,3 who lives with her mother Linda Griffin-Shiloh because the school 

system is better in the area where her mother lives. Appellant stated that she has 

“CPS history;” she had been removed from her mother’s home when she was a 

teenager and placed into foster care because her mother was not protective when 

her stepfather sexually abused her. Appellant first denied abusing drugs; however, 

on the way to drug testing, appellant admitted she “might test positive” for PCP 

and marijuana. Appellant tested positive for PCP and marijuana. She also 

admitted smoking marijuana since age 19 and admitted taking an ecstasy pill on 

New Year’s Eve. 

DFPS removed M.C.R. and A.J.R. from appellant’s care because she tested 

positive for drugs, and “there were no viable alternative placements at the time.” 

M.C.R. and A.J.R. were placed in a foster home together on January 5, 2011. 

 

2 Appellant does not appeal the trial court’s appointment of DFPS as sole managing 

conservator of M.C.R. and A.J.R. Therefore, only the trial court’s decision to terminate the 

parent-child relationship of appellant and the two children is addressed in this appeal.

3 Appellant’s parental rights regarding S.R. are not at issue in this case.
3

DFPS filed a “petition for protection of a child, for conservatorship, and for 

termination in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship” on January 6, 2011. A 

family service plan was filed on March 3, 2011. Under the family service plan, 

appellant was required to maintain stable employment and housing; comply with 

her caseworker’s visitation guidelines; maintain monthly contact with her 

caseworker; attend all court hearings and permanency conferences; successfully 

complete parenting classes; seek out drug treatment and admit herself to an 

inpatient drug treatment facility; if recommended, participate in outpatient drug 

treatment after discharge from inpatient treatment; attend an Alcohol 

Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous program and adhere to all recommendations in 

that program; complete a psychiatric evaluation and follow all recommendations 

for further treatment; complete a psycho-social evaluation and follow all 

recommendations, including individual and/or group therapy; complete a substance 

abuse assessment and follow all recommendations; and submit to random urine 

analysis at least three times per month.

A bench trial was held on September 18, 2012. On October 16, 2012, the 

trial court signed its final decree of termination appointing DFPS as sole managing 

conservator of M.C.R. and A.J.R., and involuntarily terminating the parent-child 

relationship between appellant and M.C.R. and A.J.R. The court found by clear 

and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the 

children’s best interest, and that appellant:

engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with 

persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical 

or emotional well-being of the children, pursuant to 

§161.001(1)(E), Texas Family Code; 

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that 

specifically established the actions necessary for the mother to 

obtain the return of the children who have been in the 
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permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the 

Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than 

nine months as a result of the children’s removal from the

parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the

children, pursuant to §161.001(1)(O), Texas Family Code.

Appellant filed a motion for new trial and a notice of appeal on October 29, 2012.4 

Analysis

Appellant raises one issue on appeal, contending that the evidence is legally 

and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her 

parental rights is in M.C.R’s and A.J.R.’s best interests.

Involuntary termination of parental rights is a serious matter implicating 

fundamental constitutional rights. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). 

To terminate a parent-child relationship, a trial court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence that (1) termination is in the best interest of the child; and (2) 

the parent committed one or more of the acts specifically named in Family Code 

section 161.001. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp. 2012). “Clear 

and convincing evidence” is defined as the “measure or degree of proof that will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of 

the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007 (Vernon

2008).

When conducting a legal and factual sufficiency review in a parental rights 

termination case, we must determine whether the evidence is such that the 

factfinder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its 

findings were true. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2002); In re 

C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the 

 

4 Linda Johnson-Shiloh, appellant’s mother and intervenor in the suit affecting parentchild relationship, also filed a notice of appeal; however, she did not file an appellate brief.
5

evidence, we examine all evidence in the light most favorable to the factfinder’s 

findings. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We assume the factfinder resolved 

disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and we 

disregard all evidence that does not support the finding. Id. This does not mean, 

however, that we disregard all evidence that does not support the finding, because 

disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the 

analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence. Id.

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must give due 

deference to the factfinder’s findings and not supplant the judgment with our own. 

In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We examine all of the evidence, 

giving due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could have reasonably 

found to be clear and convincing. Id. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed 

evidence that a reasonable fact finder could not have credited in favor of the 

finding is so significant that the factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm 

belief or conviction in the truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually 

insufficient. Id.; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

On appeal, appellant concedes that legally and factually sufficient evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding authorizing termination under Family Code 

section 161.001(1)(E) and (O); she contends only that the evidence is legally and 

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in 

M.C.R’s and A.J.R.’s best interests.

A strong presumption exists that the best interest of the child is served by 

keeping the child with a natural parent, and the burden rests on DFPS to rebut that 

presumption. In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d 472, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2005, no pet.); In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2003, pet. denied). The factors used in a termination case to determine the best 
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interest of the child include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the present and future 

physical and emotional needs of the child; (3) the present and future emotional and 

physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the persons seeking 

custody; (5) the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in 

promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the 

individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed 

placement; (8) acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate the existing 

parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts 

or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); In re S.M.L., 

171 S.W.3d at 480; In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d at 230; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 

263.307(b) (Vernon 2008) (listing factors to consider in evaluating parent’s 

willingness and ability to provide the child with a safe environment).

This list is not exhaustive, nor is evidence required on all nine of the factors 

to support a finding terminating a parent’s rights. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; In re 

U.P., 105 S.W.3d at 230. No one factor is controlling. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

at 28. Evidence proving one or more of the statutory grounds for termination also 

may be probative in determining that termination is in the best interest of the child.

Id.; In re A.A.A., 265 S.W.3d 507, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. 

denied).

At trial, there was evidence that appellant was using drugs at the time

M.C.R. and A.J.R. were removed, and that appellant’s drug use continued and even 

increased after the children’s removal. Bruce Jeffries, an employee with the 

National Screening Center, testified that appellant tested positive for marijuana, 

PCP, ecstasy, and cocaine when this case began in early January 2011. The 

cocaine level showed that appellant had been “using cocaine quite often.” Six 

months later in July 2011, appellant tested positive for marijuana, PCP, and 
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extremely high levels of cocaine. Jeffries testified: “[B]eing in business for 20 

years at my office and looking at these drug tests, this is the highest level of 

cocaine reading in the urine that I’ve ever seen to this day.” Jeffries also testified 

that, at the time of testing, appellant tried to pull out a bottle containing somebody 

else’s urine out of her bra but was caught by an employee, Jackie Lopez, who 

confiscated the bottle. Jeffries testified that five months later in December 2011 

appellant tested positive for cocaine and PCP; there were other drugs in appellant’s 

system “but there wasn’t enough hair to confirm” which other types of drugs were 

present. Jeffries testified that appellant had increased her drug use since the case 

began. Appellant was tested in May 2012 and again tested positive for cocaine.

DFPS caseworker Desmond Keller testified that M.C.R. and A.J.R. initially

were removed from appellant because of her drug use. Keller testified that both 

children are living with a foster family who wants to adopt them, and DFPS is 

seeking to keep the children in this foster family with the goal of future adoption. 

Keller testified that the children have bonded with the family and are doing well. 

Keller testified that he discussed DFPS’s family service plan with appellant,

and that appellant signed the plan on March 3, 2011. Keller stated that the plan 

required appellant to (1) complete a psycho-social evaluation; (2) participate and 

successfully complete individual counseling; (3) participate and complete 

parenting classes; (4) participate in a drug assessment and follow all 

recommendations; (5) successfully complete an inpatient treatment program; (6) 

maintain stable employment and stable housing; and (7) comply with random drug 

testing.

Keller testified that appellant failed to complete any of the services required 

under the family service plan other than completing a psycho-social evaluation. 

Keller testified that appellant (1) started attending therapy sessions but stopped 
8

attending in July 2011; (2) was discharged from an inpatient and outpatient

treatment program; (3) presented a parenting class certificate, “but the validity of 

that certificate was in question due to the circumstances of her discharge from her 

inpatient treatment;” (4) left the inpatient treatment before being discharged and 

against professional advice; (5) failed numerous drug tests or failed to appear for 

drug testing; and (6) failed to maintain employment.

Keller testified that he had regular contact with appellant until a court 

hearing in August. He testified that he did not know appellant had been arrested 

for unlawfully carrying a weapon, pleaded guilty to the offense, and was sentenced 

to twelve days in jail. Keller testified that this offense and appellant’s habitual drug 

use constituted a violation of the family service plan appellant signed.

Keller also testified that DFPS did not consider appellant’s mother JohnsonShiloh to be a proper placement for M.C.R. and A.J.R., even though appellant’s 

older son had been living with Johnson-Shiloh for several years, because JohnsonShiloh had “significant CPS history.” According to Keller, Johnson-Shiloh

admitted knowing that her husband had been sexually abusing appellant in 1992,

but failed to protect appellant and continued living with the husband. JohnsonShiloh’s current husband was convicted of murder in 1976, served a six-year 

sentence, and was on probation thereafter for ten years. Keller testified that 

Johnson-Shiloh provided appellant with a cell phone during her inpatient 

treatment, which is against program rules.

Keller emphasized that both children have been living with the foster parents 

for approximately eighteen months, are thriving, and are attached to the foster 

parents. The foster parents want to adopt both children and are “willing to foster 

or maintain some type of contact with the grandmother.”

Guardian ad litem Maude Trottie testified that she has been involved in the 
9

case since May 2011. She testified that M.C.R. and A.J.R. are doing “great” and 

progressing well in their foster parents’ care. Trottie opined that the foster family 

is an “appropriate adoptive placement” and asked the court to terminate appellant’s 

parental rights so that the children can be adopted. Trottie also testified that it is in 

the children’s best interest to be adopted.

Appellant argues that “the record is silent as to the relationship between the 

mother and her children. Without testimony as to the bond the children may have 

with their mother, there can be no legal or factual basis to support a finding that 

termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of her children.”

“‘Best interest’ does not require proof of any unique set of factors, and it 

does not limit proof to any specific factor.” In re K.L.A.C., No. 14-08-00960-CV, 

2010 WL 184152, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 21, 2010, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (citing In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d at 480). Further, appellant did not 

attend the trial and offered no evidence of “the bond the children may have with 

their mother,” her ability to care for the children, or her plans to care for the 

children in the future. Appellant’s trial counsel merely stated: “I can sum up my 

testimony. The mother’s not here, so I was going to question her on the record, but 

I’d like to testify and I can sum up my testimony by saying the mother’s 

information she gave to me is entirely consistent with the testimony of the 

caseworker on the record here today in response to my questions.” 

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we 

conclude that a factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that 

termination of appellant’s parental rights was in M.C.R.’s and A.J.R.’s best 

interests. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(2); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265-66. 

Viewing the same evidence in a neutral light, the fact that there was no evidence 

presented regarding the “bond the children may have with their mother” does not
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prevent a factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that termination of 

appellant’s parental rights was in M.C.R.’s and A.J.R.’s best interests. See Tex. 

Fam. Code § 161.001(2); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108. Accordingly, the 

evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that 

termination of appellant’s parental rights was in M.C.R.’s and A.J.R.’s best 

interests. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ William J. Boyce

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Boyce and Donovan.