[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-12528

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00200-CMS

ISAAC COOK, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

versus

FURNITURE MARKETING DIRECT, LLC, 

 Defendant,

JOSEPH SCOTT HOLLIDAY, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(July 24, 2019)

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Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Joseph Scott Holliday appeals the district court’s order and judgment 

assessing Isaac Cook’s attorney’s fees against him. In the district court, Holliday 

was represented by counsel at the outset of the case, but his counsel withdrew 

while the litigation remained pending. According to Holliday, he received no 

notice of Cook’s motion for attorney’s fees or any of the items filed on the district 

court’s docket after his counsel withdrew and before the court assessed attorney’s 

fees against him. Holliday argues that the district court’s attorney’s fees 

assessment was erroneous based on this lack of notice. Because Holliday failed to 

bring this argument before the district court, however, we are constrained to affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

We limit our recitation of the facts to the procedural history of this case 

because the underlying facts are irrelevant to our disposition of this appeal.

Isaac Cook brought this action against Furniture Marketing Direct, LLC, and

Holliday, alleging claims for employment discrimination and retaliation under 

42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as a claim for retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards 

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Both defendants timely answered. Following 

discovery, Furniture Marketing Direct and Holliday moved for summary judgment.

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Before the court decided the summary judgment motion, Cook filed a 

suggestion of bankruptcy, notifying the court that Furniture Marketing Direct had 

filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and that the action was subject 

to an automatic stay only as to Furniture Marketing Direct, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 

§ 362(a). William Ney, up until this point counsel for both defendants, then moved 

to withdraw his representation for both defendants. The magistrate judge granted 

Ney’s motion to withdraw and ordered Holliday to advise the court as to whether 

he intended to obtain replacement counsel or proceed pro se. After hearing 

nothing from Holliday, the magistrate judge ordered him to show cause why the 

court should not enter a default judgment against him for failing to comply with 

her earlier order. Again lacking any response from Holliday, the magistrate judge 

denied as moot the motion for summary judgment with respect to Holliday only

and directed the clerk to enter default against him. The magistrate judge then

ordered Cook to apply for a default judgment. After Cook filed an application for 

a default judgment, the court granted the application, and the clerk entered a 

default judgment against Holliday.

Following the entry of default judgment, Cook filed a motion for attorney’s 

fees. Cook requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $50,393.75. The magistrate 

judge entered an order assessing Cook’s attorney’s fees of $50,393.75 against 

Holliday. The district court clerk entered a judgment to the same effect. The 

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magistrate judge then ordered the case administratively closed for the pendency of 

Furniture Marketing Direct’s bankruptcy proceeding.

This is Holliday’s appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s award of attorney’s fees. 

Rath v. Marcoski, 898 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the court fails to apply the proper legal 

standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an 

award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Holliday argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 77(d)(1) by failing to provide him with notice of Cook’s motion for 

attorney’s fees, or of any of the proceedings that occurred after Ney withdrew as 

his counsel and before the court entered its judgment assessing attorney’s fees 

against him. After Holliday learned of the district court’s attorney’s fees award, he 

had the option of moving that court for reconsideration of its assessment on the 

same grounds on which he now bases his appeal. Holliday filed no motion for 

reconsideration, however. By forgoing presentation to the district court of the 

notice issue he now raises on appeal, Holliday has left us with no district court 

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determination of that issue to review. Therefore, we cannot say, on the grounds 

urged by Holliday, that the district court committed an abuse of discretion. See, 

e.g., Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The 

district court cannot abuse its discretion by failing to consider arguments that are 

not before it.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s attorney’s fees award. 

We note, though, that nothing in this opinion shall prohibit Holliday from 

seeking relief from the district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b)(4), for the attorney’s fees award. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (“On motion 

and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final 

judgment, order, or proceeding [because] . . . the judgment is void . . . .”); see also

Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom., 771 F.3d 713, 737 (11th Cir. 

2014) (“Voidness for purposes of a 60(b)(4) motion contemplates lack of 

jurisdiction or defects in due process that deprive a party of notice or an 

opportunity to be heard.”); Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 

1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A] district court’s failure to vacate a void judgment is per 

se an abuse of discretion.”); see generally 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (3d ed. 2019) (“[T]here is no time 

limit on an attack on a judgment as void.”).

AFFIRMED.

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