[Cite as M.A.N.S.O. Holding, L.L.C. v. Marquette, 2024-Ohio-1188.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

GREENE COUNTY

DAVID M.A.N.S.O. HOLDING L.L.C.

 Appellee

v. 

BRANDON D. MARQUETTE 

KORINTHIA I. YOCHUM

 Appellants

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C.A. No. 2023-CA-58

Trial Court Case No. 23 CVG 01097

(Civil Appeal from Municipal Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on March 29, 2024

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BRANDON D. MARQUETTE & KORINTHIA I. YOCHUM, Pro Se Appellants

 

BRIAN D. DOWNING & IAN A. THOMAS, Attorneys for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendants-Appellants Brandon D. Marquette and Korinthia I. Yochum 

appeal from the trial court’s judgment in favor Plaintiff-Appellee David M.A.N.S.O. Holding 

L.L.C.’s on its eviction action. For the reasons outlined below, Appellants’ appeal will be 

dismissed as moot. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} Appellants entered into a one-year residential lease agreement with Appellee 
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in June 2022. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Appellants were to pay $699 per month 

in rent to Appellee. Under Section 17 of the lease, Appellants agreed that, if they were to 

holdover and remain in possession of the leased premises after the expiration of the lease 

without Appellee’s written consent, the lease would not be construed to be renewed or 

extended but, rather, would become a month-to-month tenancy with the same terms and 

conditions as the original lease agreement, subject to a rent increase of $50 per month. 

The month-to-month tenancy would be subject to termination by either party at the end of 

any month with 30 days prior written notice. To give such notice, Appellee was required 

to affix written notice to Appellants’ main exterior entry door or mailbox.

{¶ 3} The relationship between the parties apparently deteriorated following a 

water incident on the property in December 2022. On April 11, 2023, Appellee served 

Appellants with a notice of non-renewal of the lease by affixing the notice to the main door 

of Appellants’ residence; the notice indicated that the lease would not be renewed 

following its expiration on June 1, 2023. Appellants did not vacate the property upon the 

expiration of the lease.

{¶ 4} On August 11, 2023, Appellee’s agent visited the property and discovered 

that Appellants were still living there. At that time, Appellee served Appellants with a 

notice of non-renewal of the lease and termination of tenancy by again affixing the notice 

to Appellants’ door. The notice advised Appellants that the last and final day of their 

month-to-month tenancy as holdover tenants would be on September 30, 2023. 

{¶ 5} On October 5, 2023, Appellee’s agent again visited the property and 

discovered that Appellants were still occupying the residence. Appellee then served 
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Appellants with a three-day notice to leave the premises, again affixing the notice to

Appellants’ door. Appellants once again did not vacate the property as requested.

{¶ 6} On October 18, 2023, Appellee filed a complaint for eviction, seeking to 

recover possession of the premises. Thereafter, Appellants filed an answer and several 

counterclaims, including retaliatory eviction and conduct in violation of R.C. 5321.04. In 

their answer, Appellants admitted that they had entered into a lease agreement with 

Appellee and that Section 17 of the lease agreement set forth the provisions of a monthto-month tenancy with an associated rent increase upon Appellants’ holdover. Appellants 

also acknowledged receipt of the April 11, August 11, and October 5 notices affixed to 

their door. 

{¶ 7} On November 2, 2023, the matter proceeded to a hearing on the eviction 

claim only. During the hearing, Michael Siwo, a member and agent of Appellee, testified 

that Appellee was the owner of the property, and he provided a copy of the deed showing 

Appellee’s ownership. Siwo also testified that Appellee had not accepted any rent from 

Appellants since the three-day notice was served upon them.

{¶ 8} After Appellee’s witness testified but before Appellants presented witness 

testimony or exhibits at the hearing, counsel for Appellee moved for “judgment on the 

pleadings,” arguing that Appellants had admitted in their answer to every element related 

to granting restitution of the premises to Appellee. (Appellant Marquette, acting pro se, 

indicated that the exhibits and witness he intended to present related to his “defense of 

retaliation” rather than restitution of the premises.) The trial court granted Appellee’s 

“motion for judgment on the pleadings” and entered judgment in favor of Appellee for 
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restitution of the premises. 

{¶ 9} Appellant Marquette sought to stay the trial court’s judgment pending appeal. 

We granted Marquette’s request to stay the judgment but only on the condition that he 

post a bond in the amount of $15,486 with the trial court, which he did not do. Thereafter, 

the premises were restored to Appellee when Appellants vacated the property. 

Appellants appeal.

II. Nature of the Judgment

{¶ 10} As a preliminary matter, we note that Appellee’s counsel requested and the 

trial court granted “judgment on the pleadings” after the trial court had heard testimony 

from Appellee’s witness, Siwo. But “[d]etermination of a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings and any writings attached 

to the complaint.” Fabian v. Kettering, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29848, 2024-Ohio-360, 

¶ 10, citing Offil v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25079, 2012-

Ohio-6225, ¶ 14. To enter judgment on the pleadings, the court may not consider 

“[e]vidence in any form[.]” Reeser v. Weaver Bros., Inc., 2d Dist. Darke No. 1359, 1995 

WL 386849, *3 (May 1, 1995), citing Conant v. Johnson, 1 Ohio App.2d 133, 135, 204 

N.E.2d 100 (4th Dist.1964). Although it is unclear the extent to which the trial court 

considered Siwo’s testimony in granting judgment in favor of Appellee on the restitution 

claim, if at all, in our view, the trial court did not properly characterize its decision as a 

judgment on the pleadings after hearing testimony from a witness. However, for the 

reasons discussed below, this error does not affect the outcome of this appeal. 

III. Assignments of Error
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{¶ 11} Appellants assert the following two assignments of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 1923 WITHOUT 

ALLOWING DEFENDANTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR 

CASE, INCLUDING WITNESS TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS, IN 

VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND 

APPLICATION OF THE LAW BY IMPROPERLY DISREGARDING THE 

TENANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF RETALIATORY EVICTION 

UNDER CHAPTER 5321 OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE, 

PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF HOLDOVER TENANCY. 

{¶ 12} In their first assignment of error, Appellants allege that the trial court abused 

its discretion by granting “summary judgment.” As discussed above, the trial court’s 

judgment was not a judgment on the pleadings; similarly, it was not a “summary judgment” 

insofar as no such motion had been filed. However, a forcible entry and detainer action

as authorized in R.C. Chapter 1923 is a summary proceeding in which any judge of a 

county court may inquire into disputes between landlords and tenants and, where 

appropriate, order restitution of the premises to the landlord. Miele v. Ribovich, 90 Ohio 

St.3d 439, 441, 739 N.E.2d 333 (2000), quoting Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson, 

67 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 423 N.E.2d 177 (1981). Thus, the court’s order was entered in a 

summary proceeding, but it was not a summary judgment.

{¶ 13} “The role of courts is to decide adversarial legal cases and to issue 
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judgments that can be carried into effect.” Cerise Cap. LLC v. Dewberry, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 29248, 2022-Ohio-1874, ¶ 11; Cyran v. Cyran, 152 Ohio St.3d 484, 

2018-Ohio-24, 97 N.E.3d 487, ¶ 9, citing Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 257 

N.E.2d 371 (1970); State v. Smith, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27981, 2019-Ohio-3592, ¶ 8. 

“Under the mootness doctrine, American courts will not decide cases in which there is no 

longer an actual legal controversy between the parties.” Id., citing In re A.G., 139 Ohio 

St.3d 572, 2014-Ohio-2597, 13 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 37.

{¶ 14} When a tenant has vacated the premises and the landlord has again taken 

possession of the property, “the merits of an eviction action are generally rendered moot.”

Wise v. Webb, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-50, 2015-Ohio-4298, ¶ 11, citing, e.g., Cherry

v. Morgan, 2d Dist. Clark Nos. 2012-CA-11 & 2012-CA-21, 2012-Ohio-3594, ¶ 4. In Wise, 

we reiterated the only method, as set forth in R.C. 1923.14, by which a defendant 

appealing a judgment of forcible entry and detainer may prevent the cause from becoming 

moot, summarizing:

The statute provides a means by which the defendant may maintain, or 

even recover, possession of the disputed premises during the course of his 

appeal by filing a timely notice of appeal, seeking a stay of execution, and 

posting a supersedeas bond. If the defendant fails to avail himself of this 

remedy, all issues relating to the action are rendered moot by his eviction 

from the premises.

(Emphasis added.) Wise at ¶ 12, citing Cherry at ¶ 5. “If immediate possession is no 

longer at issue because the defendant vacates the premises and possession is restored 
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to the plaintiff, then continuation of the forcible entry and detainer action or an appeal of 

such an action is unnecessary, as there is no further relief that may be granted.” (Citations 

omitted.) Rithy Properties, Inc. v. Cheeseman, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-641, 2016-

Ohio-1602, ¶ 15.

{¶ 15} At the November 2, 2023 hearing, the trial court explained that the only 

claim at issue before the court was Appellee’s eviction claim. After hearing Siwo’s 

testimony and considering the admissions in Appellants’ answer, the trial court found that 

Appellee had sufficiently proven the elements of the eviction claim and granted judgment 

in favor of Appellee. Although Appellant Marquette sought to stay the execution of the 

judgment, Appellants did not post a bond as required to avail themselves of the remedy.

The judgment underlying this appeal was later executed, and Appellants were evicted 

from the property, restoring possession of the premises to Appellee. Because Appellants

vacated the property which was the subject of the eviction action, no actual justiciable 

controversy on the eviction claim remains between the parties. Thus, based on the record 

before us, we conclude that this appeal is moot. Having determined that Appellants’

appeal is moot, we conclude that Appellants’ appeal is subject to dismissal.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 16} The appeal is dismissed as moot.

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TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur. 
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