Filed 5/29/24 Stooks berry v . El Rovia Mobile Home Park CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

FRANKLIN STOOKSBERRY

,

Plaintiff and Responde nt
,

v.

EL ROVIA MOBILE HOME PARK, LLC,

Defendant and Appella nt. B 329202

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV35351 )

APPEAL from a n order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County

, Richard L. Fruin, Jr. Judge. Reversed. FisherBroyles, Pierson Ferdinand and Paul J. Beard II f or Defendant and Appellant. Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County and
D ehsong Matheu for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________2 El Rovia Mobile Home Park, LLC (El Rovia) appeals from an order denying its request for attorney fees under Civil Code section 798.85, a provision of the Mobilehome Residency Law ( Civ. Code, § 798 et seq. ; MRL)

. El Rovia sought those attorney fees after one of its residents, respondent Franklin Stooksberry, voluntarily dismissed a complaint alleging, inter alia, El Rovia had charged fees for late payment of rent in violation of the MRL.
The trial court found that Stooksberry’s third cause of action implicated Civil Code secti on 798.85, but denied the attorney fees
request because

, during the pendency of the lawsuit, El Rovia refunded Stooksberry’s late fees and rescinded its late fees policy. On appeal, El Rovia argues it was the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees under Civil Code section 798.85 by
virtue of the dismissal in its favor , and it is immaterial that it had refunded Stooksberry’s money and rescinded the challenged late fees policy. El Rovia furth er argues the trial court erred in finding Civil Code section 798.85 applicable to just the third
cause of action.
We agree the trial court erred. We conclude two of Stooksberry’s causes of action arose under the MRL, thus implicating Civil Code section 7 98.85

— the third , which expressly invoked the MRL, and the second, which alleged a violation of the
Un fair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq. ; UCL) premised in part on the MRL.
We further hold El Rovia is the prevailing party under Civil
Co de section 798.85 , which deems a party prevailing “where the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor

. ” In light of this language, Stooksberry’s voluntary dismissal in El Rovia’s favor renders El Rovia the prevailing party, without regard for whether3

S tooksberry dismissed the suit after achieving his litigation objectives. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to
determine the amount of attorney fees to award.

BACKGROUND

1. Complaint
On September 24, 2021, Stooksberry filed a complaint against El Rovia

. In the general allegations preceding the causes of action, the complaint alleged El Rovia had violated Penal Code
section 396 , subdivision (e) by raising Stooksberry’s rent by more than 10 percent during a state of emergency de clared by the
Governor

. The complaint further alleged El Rovia had imposed fees for late payment of rent in violation of Civil Code
section 798.31 , a provision of the MRL

. The first cause of action asserted claims under Penal Code section 396, subdivis ion (e) and the UCL for the allegedly
unlawful rent increases.
The second cause of action also asserted violations of the
UCL , reiterating the allegedly illegal rent increase under the first
cause of action and adding the allegedly illegal imposition of late
fees. Stooksberry did not reference Civil Code section 798.31 under this particular cause of action . Stooksberry alleged entitlement to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5 and Civil Code section 798.85.
The th ird cause of action alleged violation of the MRL

, and specifically section 798.31, again based on the allegedly illegal imposition of late fees. The fourth cause of action alleged the imposition of late fees was void under Civil Code section 1671, subdi vision (d)

,4

which concerns the validity of liquidated damages provisions in

contracts for, inter alia, rental of real property. The complaint prayed for an injunction against the rent increases and imposition of late fees, return of overpaid rent

, gener al and specific damages, punitive damages, statutory damages under Civil Code section 798.86, attorney fees “as allowed by law,” and costs.

2. Demurrer
On February 28, 2022, El Rovia demurred to the complaint.
El Rovi a contended the causes of action conce rning late fees were
moot because El Rovia had rescinded its late fees policy in
November 2021 and refunded the late fees Stooksberry had paid. To the extent the issue was not moot, El Rovia further contended Civil Code section 798.31 did not govern late payment charges at mobilehome parks. As for the rent increases, El Rovia argued El
Monte’s rent control law superseded Penal Code section 396 , and Stooksberry had not exhausted his administrative remedies or joined El Monte as an indispensable party

. El Rovia also moved to strike the prayer for punitive damages. In support of its demurrer, El Rovia requested judicial notice of, inter alia, a November 4, 2021 letter from “Harmony
Communities” 1 to Stooksber ry’s counsel stating

, “Management has decided to permanently modify its late

- fee policy from a percentage fee to a flat fee. Accordingly, we are encl os ing a refund of your client’s late fees . . . in the amount of $229.59. Those late fees are hereby canc elled. Further, while management works to develop its new policy, no late fees will be

1 The record does not indicate what relationship Harmony Communities has with El Rovi a.5

applied to tenants, including your client, for November and December. Once finalized, the new late

- fee policy will be properly
notice d as required by law.” The letter expressly disclaimed any admission or concession that the rescinded late fee policy was illegal or improper. Stooksberry opposed the demurrer, motion to strike, and request for judicial notice. He argued , inter alia, the request for judicial notice of the letter purportedly rescinding the late fees policy did not comply with the E vidence C ode and was an improper attempt to introduce facts at the demurrer stage. He contended he had adequately stated a claim under Penal Code section 396, and , because he had not alleged a violation of El Monte’s rent control law or challenged any decisions by El Monte, the city was not an indispensable party. He claimed to have adequately pleaded entitlement to punitive damages.
The trial court overruled t he demurrer on March 24, 2022

. It rejected the mootness challenge to the late fees claims

, ruling it could not take judicial notice of the purported communication
from El Rovia rescinding the late fees policy. It also rejected
El Rovia’s argument that Ci vil Code section 798.31 does not prohibit late fees. The court further found th e arguments concerning the interrelation of El Monte’s rent control law and Penal Code section 398 “goes beyond matters pleaded and judicially noticeable

. ” The court, however, granted the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages.

3. First amended complaint, dismissal, and motion for attorney fees
On April 7, 2022, Stooksberry filed a first amended complaint. Although t he complaint added allegations regarding
the state of emergency and Stooksberry’s payment of rent

, and6

omitted the prayer for punitive damages, it otherwise was largely identical to the original complaint. Stooksberry continued to allege illegal rent increases and imposition of late fees, and

assert ed the same four causes of action as the original complaint, virtually unchanged. El Rovia answered the first amended complaint on May 12,

2022. On August 4, 2022, t he parties filed a stipulation to

con tinue trial in which they informed the trial court they
intended to file cross

- motions for summary judgment. On November 1, 2022, the parties filed another stipulation to continue trial, this time stating the parties “may [ ]be filing motions for summary adjudication or summary judgment.”
On December 9 , 2022, Stooksberry filed a request for dismissal without prejudice , and the clerk dismissed the case

. The record does not reveal why Stooksberry requested dismissal.
El Rovia then filed a motion for attorney fees under Civil
Code section 798.85. El Rov ia argued Stooksberry’s lawsuit “arises predominantly out of the provisions of the MRL,” referencing in particular the second and third causes of action and the prayer for statutory damages under Civil Code
section 798.86. El Rovia contended it was the pr evailing party
under Civil Code section 798.85 because the complaint had been
dismissed in its favor prior to trial.
El Rovia’s counsel submitted a supporting declaration indicating $20,678.40 in attorney fees. Stooksberry opposed the motion , arguing the first and second causes of action alleged price gouging in violation of the Penal Code, and did not arise from the MRL. He contended the
same was true for the third and fourth causes of action

— the
fourth cause of action was based on a statut ory bar to liquidated7

damages unrelated to the MRL, and because of that bar

, the trial
court never would have had to reach the MRL issue in the third
cause of action

. Stooksberry further argued El Rovia was not the prevailing party in any event, because S tooksberry “achieved [his] full legal objective” as to the MRL claim because El Rovia rescinded its late fees policy and refunded his money. Finally, Stooksberry contended El Rovia’s attorney fees were
unreasonable. The trial court denied the request f or attorney fees. The
court found fees recoverable only as to the third cause of action for violation of the MRL. “However, [El Rovia] after the suit was filed refunded to [Stooksberry] the unauthorized fees, so the third

ca u se of action was filed based on [El Rovia’s] statutory violation. [Stooksberry’s] other causes of action do not support a claim for attorneys’ fees.” El Rovia timely appealed from the denial of its fees request.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ ‘ An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review; however, the “ determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs have been met is a question
of law ” ’ ” “subject to de novo review.” ( MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1397.)8 DISCUSSION
On appeal, El Rovia argues the trial court erred i n two ways: first, by limiting application of Civil Code 2 section 798.85

to the third cause of action, and second , by ruling El Rovia

was not entitled to fees under that provision

. We conclude
section 798.85 applies to the second and third cause s of actio n, and El Rovia is entitled to attorney fees on both.

A. The S econd and T hird C auses of A ction A rise U nder
the MRL

S ection 798.85 provides, “ In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter [i.e.

, the MRL] the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney ’ s fees and costs. A party shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or where the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise. ” For purposes of section 798.85, “ a n action arises out of the
MRL when the ‘ foundation of the case [is] grounded in [any portion of] the MRL. ’ [Citat ion.] This is the case where the
claims or defenses in the action ‘ directly involv[e] the application of MRL provisions in specific factual contexts addressed by the
MRL. ’ [Citations.] Put differently, an action arising out of the
MRL ‘ includes all proc eedings, at least to the time of judgment, which are required to perfect the rights [created by the MRL]. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Canyon View Ltd. v. Lakeview Loan

2 Further undesignated statutory citations are to the Civil Code.9

Servicing, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1113

– 1114 ( Canyon
View ) .) The parties debate in thei r briefing whether the

“ ‘foundation’ ” of this case is “ ‘grounded’ ” in the MRL. ( Canyon
View

, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113.) To the extent these
arguments suggest that entitlement to fees under section 798.85 depends on a determination that an entire complaint is or is not grounded in the MRL, we disagree. Rather, the correct approach is to determine whether a particular cause of action arises from
the MRL so as to implicate section 798.85. (See Akins v. Enterprise Rent

- A

- Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 [“When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action

. ”].) To the extent claims subject to
section 798.85 are “separate and distinct” from claims that are not, the trial court must “attempt to apportion fees and costs consistent with the statutory mandate.” ( See Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 688 ( Bell ) .) In this case, the third cause of action arises from the MRL because it alleges El Rovia’s imposition of late fees violate d
section 798.31, a provision of the MRL. Stooksberry does not dispute this on appeal. The second cause of action arises from the MRL in part. The second cause of action allege s a violation of the UCL premised on the rent increases and late fees. The UCL

“ ‘ “ ‘ borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices” that t he [UCL] makes independently actionable. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” ( SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Canyon View Estates, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 663, 67 2
, fn. 810

( SC Manufactured Homes ) .) When the borrowed violation supporting a UCL cause of action is a violation of the MRL, the cause of action “necessarily ” invo lves “ ‘a specific factual situation addressed by the MRL’ ” ( Canyon View

, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1117
, fn. 16 ), thus implicating the right to attorney fees under
section 798.85. Stooksberry’s second cause of action a lleges an unlawful business practice under the UCL by borrowing the purported prohibition on late fees under section 798.31. Although the
second cause of action does not expressly refer to s ection 798.31, it expressly incorporate s all previous paragraphs of the complaint, which include the general allegation that the late fees
violated section 798.31. Also, Stooksberry assert s under the second cause of action an entitlement to attorney fees under
section 798.85 , reinforcing our conclusion that th e cause of action is premised on a violation of section 798.31 , without which he
could not seek fees under section 798.85

. Stooksberry argues the second cause of action does not allege a violation of the MRL, but rather is “based in violation of contract law.” We presume Stooksberry is referring to the

contract claim raised in the fourth cause of action , which alleges the late fee provision is void under section 1671

— the complaint
otherwi se asserts no contractual basis to challenge the late fees

. Section 1671 prohibits liquidated damages provisions in real estate rental contracts absent certain circumstances. (§ 1671, subds. (c)(2), (d).) Although within the Civil Code, it is not part of
the MRL. Stooksberry’s argument ignores the fact that the second cause of action 1) expressly incorporates all prior allegations, including the allegation the late fees violate the MRL , and11

2) invokes the MRL’s attorney fee statute. The first time th e original or first amended complaints mention section 1671 is in the fourth cause of action, after the allegations pertaining to the
UCL

. The complaint cannot be read to premise the UCL claim on section 1671, at least not exclusively. The trial court er red in ruling the second cause of action does not implicate
section 798.85. The first and fourth causes of action, however, do not arise from the MRL. The first cause of action is premised on alleged
excessive rent increases in violation of Penal Code section 396 during a state of emergency. The fourth cause of action , again, is
based on section 1671. Neither cause of actio n requires application of the MRL to resolve. El Rovia appears to argue that the first and fourth causes of action arise from the MRL because the complaint’s prayer
seeks statutory damages under section 798.86. That section allows a homeowner who prevails in an action to enforce rights
under the MRL to recover statutory damages of up to $2,000 “for each willful violation of [the MRL] by the management.” (§ 798.86.) We reject this argument. El Rovia cites no authority that a prayer for statutory damages implicates all causes of action in a complaint, even those for which statutory damages are
unavailable as a matter of law , or that general invocation of
section 798.86 converts all causes of action to MRL claims. The more reasonable reading of the compla int is that Stooksberry seeks statutory damages solely for the alleged MRL violations.

B. El Rovia is the Prevailing Party on the MRL C laims
To recap, section 798.85 grants attorney fees to a “prevailing party” in an MRL action. A party is deemed12

prevailing “if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or

. . . the litigation is dismissed in hi s or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise. ” (§ 798.85.)
A defendant is entitled to attorney fees under
section 798.85 even if the plaintiff dismisses the complaint voluntarily. ( See Del Cerr o Mobile Estates v. Proffer (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 943, 948

– 949 ( Del Cerro ) ; SC Manufactured
Homes

, supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 671, 675

. ) In Del Cerro

, a mobilehome park sued a tenant for , inter alia, public nuisance under the MRL. ( Id. at p. 946.) Th e park later dismissed the suit without prejudice, and the trial court awarded the tenant $8,153.65 in attorney fees. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal held the trial court did not err in
award ing attorney fees under section 798.85 on the nuisance
claim

. ( Del Cerro

, supra , 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 949.) The court
noted that the “express language” of section 798.85 allows for attorney fees in the event of a dismissal in a defendant’s favor,
and there was no “showing that the parties agreed otherwise.” ( Id. at pp. 948

– 949.) The court rejected the argument that the trial court should have “use[d] ‘ a pragmatic approach’ ” to determine who was the prevailing party, noting that cases advocating such an ap proach addressed statutory attorney fee provisions that , unlike section 798.85, do not define “prevailing party” or “the effect of a pretrial dismissal.” ( I d. at p. 949 ; see Coltrain v. Shewalter (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 101

– 102 [although “[t]he vast maj ority of attorney’s fee statutes do not explicit l y provide for the event of a voluntary dismissal,” “the Legislature has headed the issue off at the pass by specifying in13

the applicable statute whether a voluntary dismissal makes the defendant the prevaili ng party ,” including in § 798.85] .) SC Manufactured Homes cited Del Cerro to conclude that defendants dismissed by the plaintiff were prevailing parties
under section 798.85 . ( SC Manufactured Homes

, supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 671, 675.) Here, as in Del Cerro

, Stooksberry voluntarily dismissed
his MRL claims against El Rovia , and the record does not indicate the parties agreed in settlement or compromise to alter
the “prevailing party” definition under section 798.85. El Rovia thus is entitled to attorney fees on the claims arising from the
MRL

. Stooksberry argues El Rovia c annot be the prevailing party because El Rovia revoked its late fees policy and refunded his

money, leaving him “in a superior position with regard to his
MRL claim

, ” a fact not present in El Cerro

. Stooksberry quotes
Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599 ( Santisas ) , in which our Supreme Court stated, “ [I]t seems inaccurate to character ize the
defendant as the ‘ prevailing party ’ if the plaintiff dismissed the action only after obtaining, by means of settlement or otherwise,
all or mos t of the requested relief, or if the plaintiff dismissed for reasons, such as the defendant ’ s insolvency, that have nothing to do with the probability of success on the merits. ” ( Id. at p. 621.) The trial court appears to have agreed with Stooksberry, fi nding El Rovia was not entitled to attorney fees because “after the suit was filed” El Rovia “refunded to [Stooksber r y] the unauthorized
fees.”
Santisas is not instructive, however, because that case
address ed contractual attorney fee provisions under Co de of Civil
Procedure section 1717 that neither defined “prevailing party”14

nor expressly authorized or barred fees upon dismissal of the case. ( Santisas

, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 622. ) In that circumstance, “a court may base its attorney fees decision on a pragmatic definition of the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives, whether by judgment, settlement, or otherwise. ” ( Ibid. ) Santisas did not hold that a court may engage in this “pragmatic” approach when the relevant attorney fee provision defines “prevailing party”

— indeed, the Supreme Court stated courts must “examin[e] the terms of the contract at issue, including any contractual definition of the term ‘prevailing party ’ and any contractual provision governing payment of attorney fees in the event of dismissal.” ( I bid. ) Our holding does not conflict with Santisas

. Further supporting our holding is section 798.85’s implicit recognition that a dismissal may follow a settl ement , a circumstance in which a plaintiff may in fact have obtained “most of the requested relief.” ( Santisas

, supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 621.) Yet section 798.85 provides that, even when the dismissal results from a settlement, the defendant is deemed the prevailing party “unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise.” Under this language, a plaintiff who dismisses
MRL claims after obtaining a favorable settlement , even one that largely achiev es his or her litigation goals, nonethele ss is not the prevailing party absent agreement of the parties

. The Legislature therefore contemplated the circumstance presented here, in which a defendant is the prevailing party by virtue of a15

voluntary dismissal irrespective of whether a party achieved its litigation goals. 3 Stooksberry argues awarding El Rovia attorney fees “would
reward El Rovia for violating the law and then correcting its behavior only after [Stooksberry ] was force d to sue it for its
unlawful behavior.” There has been no determination that
El Rovia engaged in unlawful behavior

— Stooksberry dismissed
his claims before the trial court could adjudicate them , and
El Rovia has never admitted wrongdoing. Thus, assuming arguendo El Rovia’s wrongdoing would override its entitlement to fees under section 798.85, Stooksberry has failed to prove any wrongdoing.

C. The Trial Court May Decide in the First Instance the
A mount of Attorney Fees To Award

El Rovia contends the amount of attorney fees it requested below is reasonable and Stooksberry’s arguments to the contrary

3 In Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 340, the Court of Appeal interpreted a settlement granting the plaintiffs $3 million, including $1.8 million in attorney fees, to establish the plaintiffs as prevailing parties for purposes of section 798.85, although the settlement did not expressly so state. ( Employers Mutual Casualty Co.

, at p. 351.) “To conclude otherwise,” the court held, “would be to exalt form over substance.” ( Ibid. ) We have no cause to dispute that a settlement expressly granting attorney fees to the pla intiff impliedly waives the defendant’s entitlement to fees under section 798.85. Those circumstances are not present here, where Stooksberry dismissed his MRL claims without settlement , and El Rovia never agreed to pay his attorney fees

.16

are unfounded. El Rovia asks that we direct the trial court to grant its attorney fees motion with interest.
We decline to do so. There are questions the trial court has yet to address , including the reasonableness of El Rovia’s requested fees, and whether and how to apportion them given
that not all of Stooksberry’s claims arise under the MRL. These questions normally are left to the trial court’s discretion, and we see no reason to deviate from that approach. ( Cortez v. Bootsma (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 935, 938 [ determination of reasonable attorney fees “is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial court”]; Bell

, supr a , 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 687 [w hether and how to apportion attorney fees “rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court” ].)
El Rovia further asks we award it attorney fees on appeal.
Del Cerro held it was proper to award attorney fees on appeal

u nder section 798.85: “ ‘ “ [I]t is established that fees, if
recoverable at all

— pursuant either to statute or parties ’
agreement

— are available for services at trial and on appeal

. ”

. . . Indeed, appellate courts have consistently permitted a successful

par ty to recover attorney fees incurred on appeal when a statute expressly permits such an award in the trial court or other lower
tribunal. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Del Cerro

, supra , 87 Cal.App.4th at

p. 951.) Stooksberry raises no arguments specific to appellate attorney fees . We therefore award El Rovia its reasonable attorney fees in this appeal “in an amount to be determined by the superior court.” ( Ibid. ; Moore v. Teed (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 280, 299 [“ ‘Although this court has the power to fix atto rney fees on appeal, the better practice is to have the trial court determine
such fees

. ’ ”].)17 DISPOSITION
The order denying attorney fees is reversed , and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

. El Rovia Mobile H ome Park , LLC is awarded its costs and attorney fees on appeal in an amount to be determined by the
trial court

. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY , J.

WEINGART , J.