UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JAMES PRICE,

Plaintiff,

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, et al.,

Defendants. 

Case No. 18-cv-1339 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case began as a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) dispute, in which Plaintiff, 

federal inmate James Price, advanced familiar FOIA claims challenging the adequacy of the 

Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) search for records and the legitimacy of its withholdings. But 

DOJ’s allegedly suspicious responses to Price’s and other inmates’ FOIA requests prompted 

Price to amend his complaint, adding claims that the Attorney General and the Archivist of the 

United States have been violating their statutory duties under the Federal Records Act (“FRA”) 

by permitting the creation and storage of records in a manner that makes retrieving them difficult 

if not impossible. Because Price believes this illicit record-keeping system might cause the 

permanent loss of records relating to his and others’ criminal cases, he seeks a temporary 

restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring the Attorney General and Archivist to put 

an end to it and to recover any missing records. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will 

deny Price’s motion.

I. Background

In June 2012, Mr. Price was convicted by a jury of knowing distribution of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and 2252(b)(1), and knowing possession of 
2

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2252(b)(2). See Minute 

Entry, United States v. Price, No. 12-cr-600016-KMW, ECF No. 92 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012). 

In 2013, he was sentenced to a prison term of 156 months, followed by 25 years of supervised 

release. See Judgment, United States v. Price, No. 12-cr-600016-KMW, ECF No. 122 (S.D. Fla. 

Apr. 11, 2013). Price appealed his conviction to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing among other 

things that the evidence was insufficient to prove the knowledge element for both convictions. 

United States v. Price, 582 F. App’x 846, 846 (11th Cir. 2014). A three-judge panel 

unanimously rejected Price’s arguments and affirmed his convictions. Id. at 853.

Price, however, grew convinced that something was amiss in the government’s 

investigation and prosecution of him and of suspected child pornographers generally. Beginning 

in May 2017, he filed a series of FOIA requests relating to the Internet Crimes Against Children 

Task Force (“ICAC-TF”). Am. Compl., ECF No. 47, ¶¶ 7–12. His first request, for example,

asked for “any and all reports, documentation, and data by the [ICAC-TF] for” a particular case 

number. See ECF No. 13, Ex. A.1 His second request, meanwhile, sought “[a] complete copy of 

the [ICAC-TF] Operations Manual, including all abstracts, annexes, and appendices” and an 

“index of all cases and evidence processed by [the High Technology Investigations Unit].” Id., 

Ex. F. There were many more where those came from. Over nearly two years, Price claims to 

have filed “in excess of 100 FOIA requests to agencies across the Executive Branch to probe the 

agencies’ technological operating methods and related financial structures.” Pl’s Mot. for 

Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Mot.”), ECF No. 52, ¶ 2. In addition to the requests Price 

 

1 This document is titled “Amended Complaint” on the docket but is not the operative 

complaint for purposes of this motion. To avoid confusion, the Court does not provide the 

document title in its citation to this docket entry.
3

filed personally, he “organized a coordinated effort involving multiple parties to make recursive 

requests to ‘cross-check’ the records produced by the Defendants, and the variety of records the 

Defendants could not locate or produce.” Id. ¶ 7. In total, Price “filed and directed the filing, of 

more than 250 requests for records, documents, information, and data to more than a dozen 

federal, state, and local agencies—including the Defendants” in this case. Id. ¶ 8.

In light of what Price believed were untimely, incomplete, and inconsistent responses to 

his and other’s FOIA requests, Price filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District of 

Florida on November 29, 2017. See Complaint, ECF No. 1. That court transferred the case to 

this district in May 2018. See Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer, ECF No. 26. 

But before the Court took any action on Price’s FOIA claims, he apparently had learned 

enough from the DOJ’s FOIA responses to detect what he insists is additional (and connected) 

illegal behavior. He contends that “[t]he Defendants’ responses and statements demonstrated a 

calculated pattern of not mere deception but actual deceit,” TRO Mot. ¶ 3, namely a “stratagem 

to create federal records ‘off-book’ with the specific intent to thwart” federal records law “and to 

mislead the courts as to the true availability of the records” in the government’s custody, id. ¶ 6.2 

So Price moved to amend his complaint to add claims under the Administrative Procedure Act 

(“APA”) and Federal Records Act (“FRA”), and add as defendants the Attorney General and 

Archivist. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, ECF No. 38. After the 

 

2 Price is part of a growing chorus raising concerns about the technology used in child 

pornography investigations. See Human Rights Watch, Letter to US Department of Justice 

About Child Protection System Software (Feb. 1, 2019), 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/03/letter-us-department-justice-about-child-protectionsystem-software#; Jack Gillum, Prosecutors Dropping Porn Charges After Software Tools Are 

Questioned (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/prosecutors-dropping-child-porncharges-after-software-tools-are-questioned.
4

government failed to oppose Price’s motion, the Court granted Price leave to amend and 

accepted for filing his amended complaint. See Minute Order of December 14, 2018; Am.

Compl., ECF No. 47.

In January 2019, Price filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 

injunction, which concerns only the FRA (via APA) claims raised in the amended complaint. 

See TRO Mot. Those claims can be found in Counts 1, 2, and 4. Count 1 alleges that thenAttorney General Jeff Sessions (now William Barr) “violated his duty under 44 U.S.C. § 3106” 

by failing to “notify the Archivist concerning the unlawful removal of the records, and by failing 

to initiate legal action through [the Office of the Attorney General] to recover the records.” Am. 

Compl. ¶ 45. As a remedy for that alleged violation, Price seeks a “declaratory judgment that” 

the Attorney General “is in violation of his non-discretionary, statutory duties under the Federal 

Records Act,” and an injunction requiring him “to recover unlawfully alienated, destroyed or 

removed records[.]” Id. ¶ 50. Count 2 alleges substantially the same against Archivist David 

Ferriero and seeks an order requiring Ferriero to initiate legal action to recover the allegedly lost 

records. See id. ¶¶ 52–57. Count 4 alleges that DOJ violated “the Acts,” including the FRA, “by 

and through the authorization, implementation, and on-going use of a private recordkeeping 

system,” id. ¶ 78, which was “a deliberate means to effect a policy and practice of the alienation, 

removal, and or destruction of federal records,” id. ¶ 80. For that violation, Price requests a 

preliminary injunction requiring DOJ to “cease all unlawful recordkeeping[.]” Id. ¶ 83. 

In essence, Price’s motion asks the Court to enjoin DOJ from using its current 

recordkeeping system and to require the Attorney General and Archivist to take legal action to 

recover records Price fears have been removed from DOJ’s custody. The government has 

opposed Price’s motion, which is now ripe for the Court’s resolution. 
5

II. Legal Standard

“The court considers the same factors in ruling on a motion for a temporary restraining 

order and a motion for a preliminary injunction.” Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. 

Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Vencor Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1, 

7 n. 5 (D.D.C. 1999). A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is warranted only 

when the movant demonstrates “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it 

would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that an injunction would not 

substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by 

the injunction.” Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation 

omitted). The party seeking injunctive relief “must make a clear showing that [the] four factors, 

taken together, warrant relief.” League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 

1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Analysis

Price’s fundamental contention is that DOJ has created and stored records in a manner 

that either makes the records impossible to retrieve or, if they can be retrieved at all, makes their 

recovery too time consuming and unreliable. He maintains that this violates the FRA, which 

imposes upon both the Attorney General and Archivist a mandatory duty to take corrective 

action. According to Price, because both must act but neither has, this Court should compel 

them to do so. The Court begins with an overview of the FRA and the ability of private litigants, 

like Price, to bring claims under it.

A. Private Causes of Action for FRA Violations

The FRA requires heads of federal agencies to “make and preserve records containing 

adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, 
6

procedures, and essential transactions of the agency.” 44 U.S.C. § 3101. It also requires each 

agency head to “establish safeguards against the removal or loss of records the head of such 

agency determines to be necessary and required by regulations of the Archivist,” the head of the 

National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”). Id. § 3105.

“When those safeguards fail, the Act sets forth a structure whereby the Archivist and 

agency heads are to work together to ensure that no documents are unlawfully destroyed.” 

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Tillerson, 293 F. Supp. 3d 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Judicial 

Watch, Inc. v. Pompeo, 744 F. App’x 3, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2018). First, an agency head

shall notify the Archivist of any actual, impending, or threatened unlawful 

removal, defacing, alteration, corruption, deletion, erasure, or other destruction of 

records in the custody of the agency, and with the assistance of the Archivist shall 

initiate action through the Attorney General for the recovery of records the head 

of the Federal agency knows or has reason to believe have been unlawfully 

removed from that agency, or from another Federal agency whose records have 

been transferred to the legal custody of that Federal agency.

44 U.S.C. § 3106(a). And second, if an agency head ignores this statutory mandate, the FRA 

provides that “the Archivist shall request the Attorney General to initiate such an action, and 

shall notify the Congress when such a request has been made.” Id. § 3106(b).

And what if both the agency head and Archivist stand idle in the face of a known FRA 

violation? Although the FRA does not itself empower “private litigants [to] state a direct claim 

for legal relief under the FRA,” the D.C. Circuit has held that, for certain types of claims, “the 

APA can provide a jurisdictional hook for a suit alleging noncompliance with the FRA.” 

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Pruitt, 319 F. Supp. 3d 252, 257 (D.D.C. 

2018) (“Pruitt”) (discussing Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Thus, when 

“both the agency head and Archivist ‘fail[ ] to initiate remedial action in a timely manner, private 

litigants may sue under the APA to require them to do so.’” Tillerson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 37 
7

(quoting Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

527 F. Supp. 2d 101, 110 (D.D.C. 2007)).

The FRA-via-APA private right of action is limited to certain types of challenges. See

Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 291 (“[W]e find that there is APA review of [an agency’s] recordkeeping 

guidelines and instructions, but only limited APA review of claims that records are being 

destroyed in violation of such guidelines.”). As Judge Boasberg explained in Pruitt, Armstrong

considered three types of agency actions under the FRA: “(1) agency employees’ ‘destroying 

records in contravention of the . . . recordkeeping guidelines and directives’; (2) the agency’s 

failure to employ adequate recordkeeping guidelines and directives; and (3) the agency head’s or 

Archivist’s refusal to seek the initiation of an enforcement action by the Attorney 

General.” Pruitt, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 257 (quoting Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 291, 294–95). “While 

the first was not reviewable, [Armstrong] held that the APA provided a private right of action for 

the latter two.” Id. Thus, “courts may not entertain private suits alleging that agencies have 

improperly destroyed or removed records, but they may consider ones challenging whether 

agency guidelines that permit destruction of certain records are adequate under the FRA and ones 

alleging that the agency head or Archivist improperly refused to seek initiation of an 

enforcement action by the Attorney General.” Id. at 258.

So, what has Price alleged here? Count 1, against the Attorney General, is best read as 

raising the second two challenges that Armstrong and Pruitt held are subject to judicial review: 

Price attacks both the Attorney General’s failure to “maintain an active, continuing program for 

the economical and efficient management” of records as required by 44 U.S.C. § 3102, Am. 

Compl. ¶ 44, and his failure to either “notify the Archivist concerning the unlawful removal” or 

“initiate legal action . . . to recover the records” as required by 44 U.S.C. § 3106, Am. Compl. 
8

¶ 45. Count 2 likewise complains that the Archivist violated his statutory duty under 44 U.S.C. 

§ 3106 when he failed to “initiate any legal action to recover the records[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 55.

These are FRA claims that a private individual may properly press through the APA. See Pruitt, 

319 F. Supp. 3d at 257 (recognizing private right of action for (1) “agency’s failure to employ 

adequate recordkeeping guidelines and directives” and (2) “agency head’s . . . refusal to seek the 

initiation of an enforcement action” (citing Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 294–95)).

Count 4, on the other hand, runs afoul of Armstrong. There, Price alleges that DOJ 

violated the FRA “by and through the authorization, implementation, and on-going use of a 

private recordkeeping system, known as the Child Protection System (“CPS”) by the National 

ICAC-TF Program.” Am. Compl. ¶ 78. He contends that DOJ “authorized, funded, and 

implemented the use of an external recordkeeping system as a deliberate means to effect a policy 

and practice of the alienation, removal, and or destruction of federal records.” Id. ¶ 80. And he

demands that DOJ stop using this recordkeeping system, id. ¶ 83, which is akin to “suing directly 

to enjoin agency actions in contravention of” the FRA, Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 294. Armstrong

made plain that judicial review is precluded for such suits. See id.

Price seemingly tries to avoid this conclusion by recasting what appears to be an

improper removal claim, which is not judicially reviewable, as a policy or practice claim, which 

is. But Price points to no official, public policy at the root of this claim, instead complaining of 

“de facto policies and practices,” Am. Compl. ¶ 77, that together “impair [his] lawful access to 

information,” id. ¶ 81. Nor does Price specify the way in which these de facto policies 

contravene agency guidelines or the FRA. At bottom, Count 4 invites “judicial assessment of 

agency compliance in specific factual contexts”—namely, whether the agency has unlawfully 

lost track of records relating to child sex crimes investigations—rather than an assessment of the 
9

adequacy of the agency’s recordkeeping guidelines as a general matter. Competitive Enter. Inst. 

v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 67 F. Supp. 3d 23, 33 (D.D.C. 2014). That species of claim is 

unavailable to private plaintiffs under the FRA, and the APA cannot be leveraged to circumvent 

that limitation. Id. (“[P]rivate plaintiffs cannot rely on the APA to challenge what they are 

expressly prohibited from challenging under FRA, i.e., an agency’s substantive decisions to 

destroy or retain records.”). 

Price’s complaint therefore alleges two judicially reviewable FRA-via-APA claims. His 

motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, however, seems to press 

only one of them: the 44 U.S.C. § 3106 claim that the Attorney General and Archivist must 

initiate action to “seize, secure, or otherwise preserve the status quo of all records removed from 

[their] custody[.]” TRO Mot. at 22. The other two demands in Price’s motion relate to enjoining 

Defendants from using “[Software-as-a-service-based], Could-based, or other non-government 

owned or operated system” that “remove[s] [or] alienate[s] . . . records from the Defendants’ 

custody.” See id. (demands one and two). As the Court explained in the preceding paragraph

discussing Count 4, this is akin to “suing directly to enjoin agency actions in contravention of 

agency guidelines,” and Armstrong made clear that such a claim is unavailable to private 

litigants. 924 F.2d at 294. The motion does not otherwise indicate a desire to press an 

adequacy-of-recordkeeping-guidelines claim under 44 U.S.C. § 3102. For the purposes of 

resolving this motion, then, the Court need only consider the propriety of a temporary restraining 

order with respect to Price’s failure-to-act § 3106 claim against the Attorney General and 

Archivist.
10

B. Whether Injunctive Relief is Warranted

The Court can now proceed to analyze whether Price has established his entitlement to 

either a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction with respect to this claim. 

Although these are ostensibly discrete claims—Count 1 is against the Attorney General, Count 2 

the Archivist—they can be treated together since the same statutory provision governs each. 

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court begins with the first factor for injunctive relief—whether Price has shown a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying claim. There remains some 

“tension in the case law regarding the showing required on the merits” for injunctive relief. 

Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.3d 500, 505 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

(requiring “substantial likelihood”); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 

7, 20 (2008) (requiring “likely” success); Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 398 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (requiring “more likely than not”). There is also some question whether the required 

showing can even be fixed in a vacuum, or whether instead the “necessary showing on the merits 

is governed by the balance of equities as revealed through an examination of the other three 

factors.” Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 

(D.C. Cir. 1977). Under the latter approach, a more persuasive showing on the merits may be 

required where the equities counsel against injunctive relief, while raising only a “serious legal 

question” on the merits may suffice if the other three factors support it. Aamer v. Obama, 742 

F.3d 1023, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Court need not hem and haw over the various standards 

and frameworks, for the result remains the same under any of them: Price cannot establish a 

likelihood of success on the merits. 
11

Price contends that both the Attorney General and Archivist have failed, as required by 

44 U.S.C. § 3106, to initiate action to recover the allegedly unlawfully removed or alienated 

records. To show a likelihood of success on this claim, Price must convincingly (1) identify 

records that fall under the FRA; (2) allege that those records are being removed or destroyed in 

violation of the FRA; and (3) allege that the relevant agency head (here, the Attorney General) 

and/or Archivist knew about the FRA violations and yet failed to initiate corrective action. 

Start with step one. The FRA requires heads of federal agencies to “make and preserve 

records containing adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, 

decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the agency.” 44 U.S.C. § 3101. The FRA 

defines federal records as

All recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics, made or received 

by a Federal agency under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of 

public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its 

legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, 

decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or 

because of the informational value of the data in them.

Id. 

As is already clear, Price is focused on records kept by the Internet Crimes Against 

Children Task Force, a network of law enforcement authorities engaged in investigations and 

prosecution of offenses involving the exploitation of child victims. In a letter Price wrote to the 

Attorney General and Archivist notifying them of alleged FRA violations, Price describes them 

broadly as the “records [the DOJ] relied upon to obtain thousands of criminal convictions.” Pl’s 

Mot. to Extend Time to File Am. Compl., Ex. D, ECF No. 35 at 20. In his amended complaint,

Price says the missing records “include but are not limited to emails, a collaborative message 

exchange, files, administrative subpoena records, 3rd-party database records, IP Address records, 

various ‘hash values’ e.g., SHA-1 values, MD-5 values, etc., and other historical records.” Am. 
12

Compl. ¶ 23. Although the specific Counts alleging FRA violations do not add any more detail, 

his motion for injunctive relief seems to home in on the missing SHA-1 (or “secure hash 

algorithm version 1”) values. See TRO Mot. ¶ 9. SHA-1 values, represented as 40-digit 

hexadecimal numbers, are “used as the basis for the Digital Signature that performs the same 

function as an analog, i.e., pen and ink, signature on physical evidence.” Id. ¶ 10. 

Here it makes sense to briefly describe the role of SHA-1 values in child pornography 

investigations. Law enforcement entities across the country, including federal agencies, use a 

software program called the Child Protection System (“CPS”) to investigate the collection and 

distribution of child pornography through computer users linked via peer-to-peer software. 

United States v. Naylor, 99 F. Supp. 3d 638, 639 (S.D.W. Va. 2015).

3

 In simple terms, CPS 

“allows law enforcement to search peer-to-peer networks for files containing terms associated 

with child pornography.” Id. Files containing depictions of child pornography can be identified 

by their hash value, which is “essentially a digital fingerprint unique to a particular file.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, law enforcement can cross-reference its database of 

hash values known to contain child pornography with those found corresponding to particular IP 

addresses to pursue suspected purveyors and consumers of child pornography. See id.

(describing how a West Virginia police officer “compare[d] the hash value of its holding with 

the hash values for the 29 files” found on suspect’s computer).

Because hash values are essential to the DOJ’s investigation and prosecution of suspected 

child pornographers, Price contends that the FRA requires DOJ to maintain them. Reply ¶ 23.

He points to the definition of “electronic record” in the regulations interpreting the FRA, which 

 

3 CPS was developed by TLO, Inc., though it is now managed by the Child Rescue 

Coalition (“CRC”).
13

state that such a record “includes both record content and associated metadata that the agency 

determines is required to meet agency business needs.” 36 C.F.R. § 1220.18. The regulations 

further define “metadata” as “preserved contextual information describing the history, tracking, 

and/or management of an electronic document.” Id. Price believes the SHA-1 values qualify as 

metadata that are essential to the agency’s functioning: as a “digital fingerprint unique to a 

particular file” of child pornography, Naylor, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 639 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), it is crucial to the agency’s efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute suspected 

offenders.

That brings the Court to step two. Assuming that Price has adequately described the 

missing records, he then must show that such records are being removed from agency custody in 

violation of the FRA. Price argues that the DOJ violates the FRA by using programs like CPS—

what he describes generally as third-party software-as-a-service or cloud-based software

programs—because those programs do not maintain records in the manner required by the FRA 

and other federal records laws. And why did DOJ do this? According to Price, DOJ “devised a 

stratagem to create federal records ‘off-book’ with the specific intent to thwart [federal records 

laws], and to mislead the courts as to the true availability of the records” in the third-party 

software and systems. TRO Mot. ¶ 6. 

The government contests the adequacy of Price’s allegations that DOJ is actively 

violating the FRA through the use of CPS. It argues that Price has failed to identify “the manner 

by which the use of Software-as-a-Service based and cloud-based software violates the FRA.” 

Opp. to TRO Mot., ECF No. 59, at 6. The government’s response on this score highlights a 

larger issue with its struthious approach to this case. The government’s primary litigation 

strategy in this matter appears to be feigned ignorance: if we act like we don’t know what this 
14

pro se plaintiff is arguing, then perhaps neither will the Court. The government repeatedly

asserts that it cannot divine what Price is arguing, thereby avoiding substantive engagement with 

the various statutory provisions in play. But while the government struggles to identify the bases 

for Price’s claims, the Court does not find them all that difficult to discern. For example, the 

government faults Price for allegedly “fail[ing] to explain the ‘non-discretionary duties’ 

compelling” the Archivist and Attorney General to take action, but Price’s complaint cited and

explained the appropriate statutory provision that so compels them. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39–50

(detailing 44 U.S.C. § 3106’s requirement of agency head action in Count 1 against Attorney 

General); id. ¶¶ 51–57 (same in Count 2 against Archivist). 

Likewise on this issue, the problem for Price is not (as the government would have it) 

that he has failed to chart a reasonably coherent path to relief. He has. He argues that, assuming 

federal law enforcement can use third parties to create and maintain records used in federal 

prosecutions at all, it can do so only to the extent such records are kept in compliance with 

federal records laws. And here, Price submits, the third parties have not done so, because they 

have (according to him) failed to keep track of essential metadata and various other records 

related to prosecutions. See TRO Mot. ¶ 11 (complaining that Defendants claimed not to possess 

SHA-1 values that “under the statutes [they] were required to have created or received”).

But just as a blueprint does not equal a building, a recognizable theory does not equal a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits. When the Court considers Price’s evidence for 

his claim that the DOJ does not maintain records essential to its prosecutions, it concludes that he

comes up short. Price says his evidence in support of his allegation that the DOJ is actively 

violating the FRA is four-fold: 

(1) the exhibit evidence; (2) the sworn affidavits of Derek Dubner, General 

Counsel for TLO/CRC, and William Wiltse, Director of Law Enforcement 
15

Operations for TLO/CRC regarding the operation of their software exclusively for 

the Defendants’ program participants (law enforcement); (3) the court’s records in 

the cases cited as evidence of the Defendants’ conduct; and (4) the statutes and 

regulations before this Court. 

Reply ¶ 29. The Court examines these in turn.

Exhibit Evidence. Price attached to his motion for injunctive relief roughly 500 pages of 

exhibits. The first two exhibits, totaling well over two hundred pages, are “Standard” 

publications by the National Institute of Standards and Technology that discuss secure hash 

standards, including the SHA-1 values at issue in this case, and digital signature standards. See

TRO Mot., Exs. A–B, ECF Nos. 52-1, 52-2. These documents are part of “the official series of 

publications relating to standards and guidelines adopted and promulgated under the provisions 

of” the Federal Information Security Management Act (“FISMA”), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq. 

Ex. B at 3. While they provide a detailed breakdown of what secure hash values and digital 

signatures are, and how they should be used consistent with FISMA, they do not themselves 

show that DOJ violated the FRA. For the same reasons, Exhibits D and E—which are Wikipedia 

entries for SHA-1 and digital signatures, respectively—also do not provide evidence of an FRA 

violation. See ECF Nos. 52-4, 52-5.

Another set of exhibits attached to Price’s motion for injunctive relief, G through I, 

consists of probable cause affidavits provided in support of search warrants. ECF Nos. 52-7–52-

9. One exemplifies all three. See Ex. I at 19 (“Law enforcement, using investigative software, 

observed IP address 50.143.14.40 advertising approximately thirty-six (36) unique files with 

SHA-1 hash values consistent with child pornography files[.]”). Price, ostensibly, uses these 

affidavits to show the role that third-party software services in general, and SHA-1 values in 

particular, play in the investigation of suspected child pornographers. But as Price himself seems 

to acknowledge, these affidavits, at most, show that SHA-1 values and other information 
16

contained in them likely meet the definition of records in the FRA, not that the DOJ is violating

the FRA. See TRO Mot. ¶ 12 (reciting definition of records in 44 U.S.C. § 3301 and arguing 

that it covers “all items and forms of record referenced in the affidavits”).

Then there are exhibits that Price attached to the various complaints he has filed in this 

case. One of these is a FOIA request, assigned the tracking number (referred to in the party’s 

submissions) 17-00209, in which Price sought “any and all reports, documentation, and data by 

the Internet Crimes Against Children (‘ICAC’) Task Force for case number 11-7890.” See ECF 

No. 13, Ex. A.4 The same request specifically asked for “any and all reports, documentation and 

information specifically regarding SHA-1 data, by the Internet Crimes Against Children 

(‘ICAC’) Task Force for” the same case number. Id. The agency’s search, conducted by the 

Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”), returned 26 pages of responsive records, but yielded no 

responsive documents regarding the SHA-1 data Price sought. See ECF No. 13, Ex. C. In 

addition, Price references several other FOIA requests, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–20 (citing Exhibits H, 

L, and O, available at ECF No. 13), which he says unsuccessfully sought records the DOJ “was 

required to collect and preserve under the statutes.” Am. Compl. ¶ 20.

These exhibits establish at most that Price had ample reason to file his initial FOIA 

lawsuit, but they do not establish that DOJ is likely committing FRA violations. Price has put 

the cart before the horse. Without knowing how DOJ searched for the records Price requested, 

the Court cannot say with any certainty that the agency—again, assuming it must maintain 

them—has lost access to them altogether. Many questions need answering before jumping to 

 

4 This document is titled “Amended Complaint” on the docket but is not the operative 

complaint for purposes of this motion. To avoid confusion, the Court does not provide the 

document title in its citation to this docket entry.
17

that conclusion. What, if any, categories of records did the agency exclude from its searches?5 

What search terms did DOJ use? Were the agency’s searches conducted by the proper 

custodians? Did the agency search the proper locations? Did it request any records from the 

Child Rescue Coalition, who runs the CPS program? Can one even expect metadata, like SHA-1 

values, to be returned via FOIA requests? Until search issues like these are explored through 

ordinary FOIA litigation, it is hard to know whether the DOJ’s responses to Price’s requests to

date reveal much of anything about the agency’s compliance with (or violation of) the FRA. 

The same is true for potential exemptions. Without knowing what responsive records, or 

parts of records, the agency determined were exempt, it is nigh impossible to determine what 

records the agency actually has in its possession. For example, in its response to FOIA Request 

 

5 As one example, OJP informed Price, in responding to FOIA Request No. 17-00209, 

that Congress “excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security 

records from the requirements of the FOIA,” and that its “response is limited to those records 

that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA.” ECF No. 13, Ex. C (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)). 

Section 552(c)(1) provides:

Whenever a request is made which involves access to records described in 

subsection (b)(7)(A) and—

(A) the investigation or proceeding involves a possible violation of criminal law; 

and

(B) there is reason to believe that (i) the subject of the investigation or proceeding 

is not aware of its pendency, and (ii) disclosure of the existence of the records 

could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,

the agency may, during only such time as that circumstance continues, treat the 

records as not subject to the requirements of this section.

Given that Price more than once sought records relating to a specific criminal case, and given 

that many of his requests targeted information relating to criminal investigations more generally, 

it seems possible that the minimal responses he received are explained by the exclusion 

embodied in § 552(c), as opposed to some unlawful and nefarious recordkeeping practice. 
18

17-00209—seeking records relating to a particular case and to the ICAC-TF more generally—the 

agency redacted “jurisdictional identifiers” and “record numbers” pursuant to the personal 

privacy exemption embodied in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), which excepts from disclosure files “the 

disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” See

ECF No. 13, Ex. C. Similarly, in response to a “3rd-Party FOIA request,” in which Price sought 

“case specific records, documents, information, and data regarding” a particular individual, the 

DOJ, according to Price, “refused to produce the records[,] citing exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7)(E) and (b)(7)(F).” Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Those exemptions permit withholding, 

respectively, of information that would “disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement 

investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 

circumvention of the law” or “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical 

safety of any individual.” Given that this case stems from Price’s desire to excavate the 

techniques used by law enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of child sex crimes, and 

that it seeks law enforcement records that are not personal to him, it seems inevitable that the 

privacy and law enforcement exemptions will swallow up massive swaths of the records he

seeks.6 

 

6 The “3rd

-Party FOIA request” raises yet another issue: whether Price would be able to 

access through FOIA many of the records he sought, given that they are law enforcement records 

that may relate to third parties. If any of the records Price seeks contain “information that would 

show that someone else . . . has ever been the subject of a criminal investigation or was even 

mentioned in a criminal file . . . in almost all cases DOJ will respond by stating that it will 

‘neither confirm nor deny’ the existence of responsive law enforcement records.” Department of 

Justice, FOIA Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/making-foiarequest/foia-frequently-asked-questions (response to “What about requirements for obtaining 

records on someone else?”). Just once Price indicates that he obtained a waiver of privacy rights, 

which would obviate that obstacle, but it is unclear how regularly he did so and how often his 

requests would run into this problem—yet another reason why these issues should be vetted 
19

The Court could go on but trusts the point is clear enough: Price can challenge the who, 

what, where, and how of the search, along with the propriety of any exemptions, under FOIA 

law. Depending on how that litigation plays out, Price may come to find that the DOJ in fact 

possesses the very records Price suspects they have failed to keep, but that he also has no right to 

access them. Or he may find otherwise, and in the process gather more potent ammunition for 

his FRA grievances. In any event, until that happens, it would be a fool’s errand to assess 

whether DOJ has complied with the FRA by reference to the scattershot FOIA exhibits attached 

to Price’s pleadings. 

Sworn Affidavits. Price also suggests that two affidavits provided by employees of TLO, 

Inc., the company that developed and used to run CPS, support his claim that the DOJ is engaged 

in ongoing FRA violations. Price is mistaken. In United States v. Ocasio, No. 11-CR-02728-KC 

(W.D. Tx. Mar. 26, 2013), it is true that both Derek Dubner and William Wiltse, then-employees 

of TLO, submitted affidavits at the government’s request, in which they averred that federal law 

enforcement used CPS software to combat Internet-based child pornography. See Ex. M, ECF 

No. 52-13 at 7–9, 14–18. Both Dubner and Wiltse also offered reasons why they did not want to 

subject their software, particularly the “source code,” to forensic examination. Ex. M. at 8. 

These affidavits, however, merely confirm an unremarkable and uncontested proposition: that 

federal law enforcement leverages third-party software programs in its efforts to track down and 

prosecute child pornographers. It does not establish that the use of programs like CPS itself 

 

through full FOIA briefing before trying to glean significant takeaways about the agency’s FRA 

compliance from the FOIA exchanges between the parties.
20

constitutes an FRA violation.7 What Price needs the affidavits to do, but what they do not do, is 

provide evidence that the CPS software suite creates and maintains records in a manner that 

violates federal law.

Court Records. Next, Price cites several federal cases in which the government 

voluntarily dismissed charges when it became clear it would have to subject the third-party

software it used in the investigations to forensic examination. TRO Mot. ¶ 3. In United States v. 

Hartman, No. 15-CR-00063-JLS (C.D. Ca. Jan. 21, 2016), for example, the court granted 

Hartman’s motion to compel discovery of the software. Hartman, Order, ECF No. 87. The 

government requested more time to comply with the order, acknowledging that “items pivotal to 

the required testing are in the possession of a non-governmental entity and the government must 

consult with this private entity” to obtain “the key software and data.” Hartman, Status Report, 

ECF No. 102. But rather than producing that software and data, it opted instead to drop the 

charges. Based on Hartman and other cases like it, Price argues that “[w]hen [criminal] 

defendants moved to compel production of ‘the records alleged’ in the supporting affidavits, 

indictments, and inspection of the software that created the alleged records, the Defendants 

dismissed the indictments to avoid exposure of their violations of the law.” TRO Mot. ¶ 4. 

Although Price has offered one way of interpreting what happened in those cases, the 

Court is not convinced that it is the likely explanation. For one, the government may have 

decided to drop charges in some cases because it feared that forensic examination of its thirdparty software tools would cause the disclosure of confidential techniques that would enable

future criminals to evade capture. See Gillum, supra 3 n.2 (portion quoting cybercrime expert 

 

7 The same is true of Exhibit J, records of a proceeding in United States v. Noden, No. 

8:16-CR-0283-LSC (D. Neb. Apr. 20, 2017). 
21

and professor Orin Kerr). For another, the government may be bound by contract not to make 

certain disclosures that, if ordered by a court in a criminal case, either require it to dismiss the 

underlying charges or breach the contract and lose access to the software systems in the future. 

Id.; see TRO Mot., Ex. M (TLO employee Dubner discussing importance of protecting CPS’s 

source and object code). Yet even if the government did drop charges in those cases to “avoid 

exposure of their violations of the law,” as Price contends, those violations seem far more likely 

to concern the propriety of the government’s investigation under the Fourth Amendment or its 

compliance with federal evidence law than some cover-up of FRA noncompliance. At the end of 

the day, those cases show what the other exhibit evidence (including the affidavits) shows: that 

law enforcement uses third-party software tools like CPS. But they do not show that the use of 

CPS necessarily equates to an FRA violation.

Statutes and Regulations. The finals fragments of proof Price offers in support of his 

motion for injunctive relief are citations to various federal statutes and regulations. For instance, 

Price contends that 18 U.S.C. § 2258A and 42 U.S.C. § 5773(b) require DOJ to submit SHA-1 

values to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, TRO Mot. ¶ 11, and that any 

records the DOJ creates and maintains must comply with the FISMA provisions in 44 U.S.C. §§ 

3551–59, id. ¶ 14. Simply identifying laws that establish recordkeeping requirements does not 

do the trick for Price, since all that may show is that some of the records he complains are 

missing may well qualify as records under the FRA. Take his FISMA argument. Even accepting 

that Price has accurately represented the statutory scheme—that the FRA incorporates FISMA, 

meaning that anything FISMA requires, the FRA requires—that just goes to show that the 

allegedly missing records are subject to federal records laws. Yet as with much of what Price 

has alleged and produced as evidence, it does not show that the DOJ is violating the FRA. The 
22

Court has already indicated that it accepts, at this early juncture and with no counterargument by 

the government, Price’s contention that hash values fall within the definition of federal records 

for DOJ. It also accepts Price’s contention that an amalgam of federal laws mandate the creation 

and maintenance of certain types of metadata. But it cannot accept Price’s contention that the 

records kept by DOJ are not FISMA-compliant or otherwise in violation of federal law just 

because Price says so. 

Therefore, after carefully combing Price’s complaint, the briefs related to his motion for 

injunctive relief, and the copious accompanying exhibits, the Court concludes that Price has 

failed to show the DOJ is actively violating the FRA. For this reason, he has not shown a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

Although the Court could end its analysis of the first factor here, it will explore a further 

reason why Price’s theory of relief may not hold up. Recall what Price must accomplish to 

establish a likelihood of success on the merits on a 44 U.S.C. § 3106 claim. He must make a 

clear showing (1) that the records he is complaining about fall under the FRA; (2) that those 

records are being removed or destroyed in violation of the FRA; and (3) that the relevant agency 

head (here, the Attorney General) and/or Archivist knew about the FRA violations and yet failed 

to initiate corrective action. The Court has already concluded that Price’s argument falters at the 

second step. Yet, even if Price had made an adequate showing that specific types of records 

related to criminal prosecutions were being removed from DOJ custody in violation of the FRA, 

the Court doubts he could carry his burden at step three. 

The core issue here is whether Price can establish that either the Attorney General or the 

Archivist knew of an FRA violation and is therefore under any statutory duty to act. For 

although agency inaction is amenable to judicial challenge under the APA, that is so only where 
23

a particular action is mandated by law and the agency has refused to take it. Judicial Watch, Inc. 

v. Kerry, 844 F.3d 952, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Administrative Procedure Act permits a 

claim ‘that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.’” (quoting 

Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (“The 

reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 

delayed[.]”). 

It is not clear to the Court that either the agency head or the Archivist is yet under any 

duty to act. As the Court understands § 3106, which anchors Price’s attempt to compel the 

Attorney General or Archivist to act, neither individual must act until they know of an actual or 

impending FRA violation. Only then has the Attorney General or the Archivist “failed to take a 

discrete agency action that it is required to take” under the FRA. Kerry, 844 F.3d at 954. A 

short review of § 3106 shows why. It provides that the “head of each Federal agency shall notify 

the Archivist of any actual, impending, or threatened unlawful removal . . . or other destruction 

of records in the custody of the agency” and “shall initiate action through the Attorney General 

for the recovery of records the head of the Federal agency knows or has reason to believe have 

been unlawfully removed from that agency[.]” 44 U.S.C. § 3106(a). Hence, an agency head, 

once he knows records are being unlawfully removed, must (1) notify the Archivist and (2) enlist 

the aid of the Attorney General in recovering the lost records. The FRA further commands that, 

if the agency head does not take such action, the “Archivist shall request the Attorney General to 

initiate such an action, and shall notify the Congress when such a request has been made.” Id.

§ 3106(b). The Archivist’s twin duties in the event of a known (and unresolved) FRA violation 

are to (1) request the aid of the Attorney General and (2) notify the Congress that an agency is 

violating the FRA. But the Attorney General’s duties (as the relevant agency head in this case)
24

to notify the Archivist of the destruction of records and implement remedial action attach only 

after he has identified the unlawful “actual, impending, or threatened” removal of records. See

id. § 3106(a). Ditto for the Archivist’s mandate to request the Attorney General to “initiate such 

an action”—he is under no statutory duty to do so unless he knows of any “actual, impending, or 

threatened unlawful removal . . . of records[.]” Id. Thus, plaintiffs like Price must plausibly 

allege that the relevant agency head and Archivist know about an FRA violation in order to 

plausibly allege that they should be compelled to take action under § 3106; merely alleging an 

FRA violation by itself will not suffice.

Judge Boasberg’s decision in Pruitt reinforces this reading of § 3106. There, the court 

considered whether plaintiffs had adequately stated an APA claim under another section of the 

FRA, 44 U.S.C. § 2115, which provides in relevant part: 

When the Archivist finds that a provision of any such chapter has been or is being 

violated, the Archivist shall (1) inform in writing the head of the agency

concerned of the violation and make recommendations for its correction; and (2) 

unless satisfactory corrective measures are demonstrably commenced within a 

reasonable time, submit a written report of the matter to the President and the 

Congress.

Judge Boasberg concluded that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim under § 2115 because the 

“when” condition had not been satisfied. “Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that the Archivist made 

any actual finding of a violation—the condition precedent for § 2115’s obligations—is fatal to 

Count III.” Pruitt, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 262. As it was with § 2115, so it should be with § 3106: 

“[t]he finding of a violation is . . . a condition precedent to the [Attorney General’s and] 

Archivist’s statutory obligation to act.” Id. at 261. 

To be sure, there are textual differences between § 2115 and § 3106 that, one could 

argue, command different interpretations. Most importantly, the former, unlike the latter, is 

clearly stated in the conditional tense. Compare 44 U.S.C. § 2115 (“When the Archivist finds 
25

. . . .”) with id. § 3106(a) (“The head of each Federal agency shall notify the Archivist of any 

actual, impending, or threatened unlawful removal . . . .”). Even so, the D.C. Circuit in 

Armstrong and other courts in this district appear to construe § 3106 as creating a conditional 

obligation. The Armstrong court explained § 3106 as follows: “[O]nce the agency head becomes 

aware of ‘any actual, impending, or threatened’” unlawful removal of records, “the agency head 

‘shall notify the Archivist’ and ‘with the assistance of the Archivist shall initiate action through 

the Attorney General.’” 924 F.2d at 296 (quoting § 3106) (first emphasis added). In Cause of 

Action v. Pompeo, Judge McFadden read § 3106 similarly: “When the head of a federal agency 

‘knows or has reason to believe’ that federal records ‘have been unlawfully removed’ from 

agency custody, he has a duty to ‘initiate action through the Attorney General for the recovery of 

[the] records.” 319 F. Supp. 3d 230, 232 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting § 3106) (emphasis added and 

alteration in original). The upshot of those formulations? Neither the Attorney General nor the 

Archivist is under any duty to act until the “once” or “when” condition—knowledge of unlawful 

removal of records—is satisfied. Put another way, § 3106 imposes no duty upon either the 

Attorney General or Archivist to find that an agency has removed records in violation of the 

FRA; it does impose mandatory duties upon each of them if they know that such unlawful 

removal of records has occurred, is occurring, or will occur.

Notwithstanding their textual differences, it would make little sense to read § 3106 

differently than § 2115. Both provisions deal with what actions must be taken in the event of an 

FRA violation, although § 2115 applies only to the Archivist, not agency heads, and deals only 

with his obligation to report violations and “make recommendations for [their] correction,” not 

initiate action to enjoin them. If, as Pruitt held, a condition precedent to suing the Archivist for 

violating § 2115’s reporting obligations is an actual finding of an FRA violation by the Archivist, 
26

why would such a finding not be required as a condition precedent to suing agency heads or the 

Archivist for violating § 3106’s recovery obligations? That would mean a private litigant could 

sue for the more drastic remedy—compelling the agency head or Archivist to take corrective 

action, as § 3106 requires—based on their own, unilateral allegation of an FRA violation, but 

that same litigant could not sue to enforce the more modest requirement—compelling the 

Archivist “make recommendations” to the offending agency on how to correct the violation and 

report the violations to the President and the Congress, as § 2115 requires. The Court doubts

Congress envisioned such a peculiar statutory scheme.

The D.C. Circuit’s choice of words in describing Armstrong’s holding that some limited 

judicial review is available under § 3106 provides further support for the Court’s reading. 

Although the court found that § 3106’s “clear statutory language mandating that the agency head 

and Archivist seek redress for the unlawful removal or destruction of records” provided a basis 

for judicial review, the court held that such review was confined to “the agency head’s and 

Archivist’s enforcement actions.” Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 296 (emphasis added). It used similar 

language throughout the opinion. See, e.g., id. at 295 (judicial review permitted for “refusal to 

seek the initiation of an enforcement action”); id. (judicial review permitted for “failure to take 

enforcement action”). The court said nothing about the propriety of judicial review of the

agency head or Archivist’s determination that there was an unlawful removal or destruction of 

records in the first instance.

Finally, a requirement that the agency head or Archivist must first have actual knowledge

that records are being unlawfully removed or destroyed before either can be sued for violating 

§ 3106 ensures that courts don’t entertain the cause of action that Armstrong held was 

unavailable to private litigants. Were it otherwise—if that condition did not need to be 
27

satisfied—a plaintiff could easily circumvent Armstrong’s holding that a direct action to force an 

agency to stop destroying records, or to retrieve ones already lost, is unavailable under the FRA. 

Armstrong made clear that “courts may not entertain private suits alleging that agencies have 

improperly destroyed or removed records, but they may consider . . . ones alleging that the 

agency head or Archivist improperly refused to seek initiation of an enforcement action by the 

Attorney General.” Pruitt, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (discussing Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 294–95). 

Thus, a private litigant cannot sue to stop an agency from removing or destroying certain 

records, but she can sue to compel recovery efforts by an agency head and/or the Archivist.

But, of course, the FRA requires agency heads and the Archivist to take corrective action

only if records have been improperly destroyed or removed. In other words, to succeed on a 

§ 3106 claim, a plaintiff must first establish that records have been destroyed or removed from 

agency custody in violation of the FRA. And if a plaintiff’s unilateral declaration that records 

have been unlawfully destroyed—rather than an agency’s express or implied acknowledgement 

of such a violation—is enough to get a § 3106 claim off the ground, the D.C. Circuit wasted its 

breath when it prohibited private actions “to prevent an agency official from improperly 

destroying or removing records.” Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 294. That is so because a plaintiff

could secure judicial review for that very claim simply by adding the further demand that an

agency head or the Archivist initiate action to recover the allegedly missing records. That would 

require federal courts to decide whether an FRA violation has occurred in the first instance—a 

question not just the D.C. Circuit, but also the Supreme Court has said is unfit for judicial 

review. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 149–50

(1980) (“Thus, regardless of whether Kissinger has violated the [FRA] and Records Disposal 

Act[ ], Congress has not vested federal courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate that question upon 
28

suit by a private party. That responsibility is vested in the administrative authorities.”); accord

True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS, No. CV 13-734 (RBW), 2014 WL 4347197, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 

2014) (“[E]ven if there has been a Federal Records Act violation, the current action before this 

Court is not the appropriate vehicle to determine whether such a violation occurred.”). 

The court in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Archives and Records Administration, 845 

F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.D.C. 2012), recognized, and avoided, this perversity in the PRA context. 

In that case, Judicial Watch sought to compel the Archivist to recover records purportedly 

subject to the Presidential Records Act (“PRA”). Analogizing the PRA enforcement scheme in 

44 U.S.C. § 2112(c) to the FRA enforcement scheme in 44 U.S.C. § 3106, Judge Berman

Jackson declined Judicial Watch’s invitation, reasoning that the “only enforcement tools 

provided to the defendant under the PRA are committed to the agency’s sole discretion.” Id.

The analogy of § 3106 to § 2112(c), for the same reasons explained with respect to § 2115, is not 

a perfect one; the latter two provisions are clearly written as conditionals, while § 3106 is not. 

See 44 U.S.C. § 2112(c) (“When the Archivist considers it to be in the public interest . . . .”).8 

Nevertheless, the court reasoned, Judicial Watch’s request “essentially asks the Court to compel 

defendant to determine that a violation has occurred and enforce the PRA,” which “is not 

permissible under the APA.” Judicial Watch, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 302. The same is functionally

true here of Price’s request: by asking the Court to compel the Attorney General and Archivist to 

take action under § 3106, he is asking them first to determine that a violation has occurred—

which § 3106 does not mandate—and only second to take the enforcement action that § 3106 

does mandate. The APA does not permit a plaintiff to compel agency action unless that action is 

 

8 Again, though, the Court cannot understand what sense it would make for § 3106 to be 

read differently than essentially every other enforcement provision in the FRA and the PRA.
29

mandated by statute. Kerry, 844 F.3d at 954 (“[T]he Administrative Procedure Act permits a 

claim ‘that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.’” (quoting 

Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). Accordingly, the Court concludes 

that a predicate to a viable § 3106 failure-to-act claim is a plausible allegation that the applicable 

agency head or Archivist knows that records are indeed being removed or destroyed in 

contravention of agency policy or the FRA.

On this view of § 3106, Price’s claim is premature. He has not plausibly alleged that 

either the Attorney General or the Archivist found an actual, threatened, or impending unlawful

removal or destruction of records. All he has alleged is that he “provided formal notice of the 

DOJ’s past and on-going violations of the FRA” to the Attorney General and Archivist, and that 

the Chief Records Officer of NARA responded that “he was unaware of the DOJ’s violations.” 

Am. Compl. ¶ 22. After Price followed up with “additional information, including copies of the 

statutes and citations from internal DOJ documents and details of records alienated, removed, or 

destroyed in non-governmental systems,” NARA responded “that based on the additional 

information, further investigation would be required.” Id. ¶ 23. This does not amount to an 

allegation that the Attorney General or Archivist knows that records are being destroyed in 

violation of the FRA. Instead, it is functionally identical to what the Pruitt court found 

insufficient to trigger mandatory action by either the agency head or the Archivist. There, 

CREW “sent a letter notifying [the Archivist] of what it thought were FRA-compliance issues,” 

but the “Archivist [never] replied or indicated in any way that a violation had occurred.” Pruitt, 

319 F. Supp. 3d at 262. That NARA indicated it had investigated the matter and was preparing a 

response to CREW’s concerns was of no moment, because that did not amount to “any actual 

finding of a violation.” Id. Just so here: that the agency responded to Price that it was looking 
30

into his allegations is not tantamount to acknowledging an FRA violation has occurred or is 

occurring.

It might be asked—though it is not discussed by the parties in their submissions, like 

most of the issues pertinent to this motion’s resolution—why this was not an issue in cases like 

Kerry and Pompeo. The reason is simple: both those cases were decided by the district court on 

mootness grounds, on the theory that the agency’s corrective efforts had fulfilled their statutory 

mandate under § 3106. But the very fact that the agency had taken some steps toward correcting 

for the removal of the records at issue (former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s emails in 

Pompeo and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s in Kerry) quite obviously functioned as 

an acknowledgement that those records should be in the agency’s possession. See Kerry, 844 

F.3d at 953 (“Although the current Secretary (with the help of the National Archivist) has made 

efforts to recover those emails . . . .”); Pompeo, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 233 (“The Government then 

requested additional time to respond . . . to enable more extensive efforts to obtain the emails.”). 

Likewise in CREW v. SEC, 916 F. Supp. 2d 141, 150 (D.D.C. 2013), the SEC had already taken 

a series of actions in response to the alleged destruction of records, which meant the court had 

only to consider whether the response was sufficient to satisfy § 3106, because the agency’s 

initial response functioned as a de facto finding of an FRA violation. A similar 

acknowledgement—formal or informal, explicit or implicit—is lacking so far in this case. 

Accordingly, Price cannot show that the condition precedent to § 3106’s mandatory duties has 

been satisfied. For this reason, too, the Court would find that Price cannot establish a likelihood 

of success on the merits.

The Court well understands that a plaintiff may be entitled to injunctive relief “based on 

less formal procedures and on less extensive evidence than in a trial on the merits.” Cobell v. 
31

Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 261 (D.C. Cir. 2004). And the Court acknowledges that the bar a plaintiff 

must clear to show a likelihood of success on the merits is in many cases, including this one, far 

from clear. Even so, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be 

granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of 

persuasion.” Id. at 258 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). Here the 

Court is simply unconvinced that Price has made that clear showing on the first factor.

2. Irreparable Harm

Price’s failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits is not necessarily fatal to 

his quest for injunctive relief. Under the traditional sliding-scale approach in this Circuit, Price 

might be able to compensate for his weak showing on one factor by making an “unusually strong 

showing on” another factor. Davis v. PGBC, 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). True, 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), has called into question 

this hydraulic approach and suggested that the merits and irreparable harm factors are 

“independent, free-standing requirement[s],” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 

2011), but the Circuit has yet to take a firm position on the matter—and so neither will this 

Court. 

Assuming Price could salvage his request for injunctive relief with a strong showing on 

this factor, he nevertheless fails to make such a showing. “To be entitled to preliminary 

injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show injury that is certain, great, actual, and imminent.” Mylan 

Labs., Ltd. v. FDA, 910 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Wis. Gas. Co. v. FERC, 758 

F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Price cannot show that, “absent injunctive relief,” he is likely 

to suffer certain harm, so the Court stops its analysis there. Id.
32

Price says his injury is certain because once the records are placed in a third party’s 

custody, they “are no longer available or accessible to the Plaintiff under FOIA/[the Privacy 

Act].” TRO Mot. ¶ 24. This is unconvincing, for the same reasons that plagued Price’s FRA 

argument on the merits. The Court cannot say with any certainty whether the records Price 

sought in his FOIA requests are unavailable because of some unlawful recordkeeping practice 

relating to the DOJ’s use of third-party software systems like CPS. Just as likely, if not more 

likely, is that the records Price sought merely appeared unavailable under FOIA because of 

improper search methods (which Price can probe via his FOIA claims) or that such records exist 

but are exempt from disclosure under FOIA, perhaps because of the aforementioned carve-outs

for records relating to law enforcement investigative techniques, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E), 

and records whose release would amount to an unwarranted invasion of privacy, see id. § 

552(b)(6). See supra 17–18. As a result, the Court cannot conclude that the injunction Price 

seeks—forcing the agency to stop using programs like CPS and to “preserve the status quo of all 

records,” TRO Mot. at 22—will have any effect on the universe of records Price may be able to 

recover via FOIA. It likewise cannot conclude that, absent an injunction, Price is certain to 

suffer the harm he alleges. That dooms his irreparable harm argument. 

3. Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest

The third and fourth factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken 

v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Under these factors, the Court “weighs the harm to [Price] 

if there is no injunction against the harm to the [government] if there is.” Pursuing Am.’s 

Greatness, 831 F.3d at 511. 

As the Court has explained, Price’s harm argument is tenuous. The sinister scenario he

sketches—wherein the government willfully alienates or destroys, or allows to be alienated or
33

destroyed, records relating to criminal prosecutions to conceal its investigative misconduct—is 

hard for the Court to swallow. The government must maintain those sorts of records during 

criminal prosecutions, for if it is unable to produce them or otherwise certify their existence and 

integrity, then it may be forced to drop charges when courts order that such records (or the 

software systems that create and maintain those records) be produced for inspection at trial. The 

several cases cited by Price where the government has been forced into that position show as 

much. See TRO Mot. ¶ 3 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Hartman, No. 15-CR-00063-JLS 

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016)). 

But even if the Court takes it as a given that records relating to child pornography 

investigations will be lost (potentially for good) so long as the government is permitted to 

continue using third-party software programs like CPS, it strikes the Court that there might be 

enormous countervailing costs to requiring federal law enforcement to stop using such programs. 

The Child Rescue Coalition—which owns CPS, one of several third-party software tools used by 

the government—reports that CPS’s technology helped lead to the arrest of over 1,300 child 

sexual predators in 2018 alone. See Child Rescue Coalition, Annual Report 2018, 

https://childrescuecoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CRC_Annual-Report.pdf. 

Although the Court cannot say what number of those arrests (and subsequent prosecutions) were 

carried out by federal authorities, it is reasonable to assume that enjoining the government from 

using CPS and other like programs will hinder its ability to bring child sex criminals to justice.9

 

9 Price asserts without support that any government contention that third-party software 

systems are “necessary to the successful interdiction of drug crimes, financial crimes, crimes 

against children, or any other type of crime is equally self-serving and false.” TRO Mot. ¶ 34. 

Maybe, but maybe not. But the fact that the government chooses to use these tools suggests they 

are at least useful, if not strictly necessary, and Price has provided the Court with no reason, 

beyond his unsupported assertion, to conclude otherwise.
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Price himself argues that the government’s use of these programs is extensive; their widespread 

use implies at least some degree of efficacy. See, e.g., TRO Mot. ¶ 3 (“Defendants routinely 

sought criminal indictments based . . . on records . . . removed or alienated from the Defendants’ 

custody[.]”); id. ¶ 10 n.5 (alleging records are missing for “10s of 1000s of convictions”). Thus, 

while Price tries to reassure the Court that “[t]he relief sought by [him] does not stop the 

Defendants from conducting lawful operations,” but “merely enjoins the Defendants from the 

unlawful use of systems designed to thwart the law,” id. ¶ 37, the Court cannot know to what 

extent the government’s enforcement efforts are dependent on the use of third-party programs 

that Price contends is unlawful. Put simply, even assuming Price has a “right . . . to inspect 

records, documents, information, and data that were created, collected, and required to be 

preserved under the law,” id. ¶ 30, and that the government is violating that right, it is far from 

evident that such an interest is greater than the government’s keen interest in effectively 

combating child sex crimes. 

* * *

Because neither one factor independently nor all four factors taken together counsels 

clearly in favor of granting Price injunctive relief, the Court will deny both his request for a 

temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The Court adds, however, that it will 

expect more from the government as this litigation progresses to briefing on dispositive motions. 

While the government may want to wish away this lawsuit, it would be well-advised to take it 

seriously, because Mr. Price certainly has—and it shows in the quantity and quality of the 

submissions thus far in the case.
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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Mr. Price’s motion for a temporary 

restraining order and preliminary injunction. A separate Order shall accompany this 

memorandum opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

Date: June 19, 2019