i

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy

1965–1968
ii

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Session, March 1968. Left to right: Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations; General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, United States Army; General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant, United States Marine Corps.
iii

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and

National Policy

1965–1968

Walter S. Poole

Office of Joint History

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, DC ♦ 2012
iv

The Library of Congress has catalogued Volume V as follows:

Watson, Robert J., 1920–

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954.

(History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Robert J. Watson; v.5)

Includes index.

1. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff—History. 2. United States—

Military policy. I. Title. II. Series: Watson, Robert J., 1920–

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 5.

UA23.W366 1986 355.3 ́3042 ́0973 86-4621
v

Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic 

direction of US forces in wartime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in 

existence after the conflict and, as military advisers and planners, have played an 

important part in the development of national policy and strategy. Knowledge of 

JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary 

of Defense is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of 

their activity in peacetime as well as times of crisis and limited war provides, moreover, an important chapter in the military history of the United States. For these 

reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the 

record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly 

assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies 

will be readily recognized.

The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of 

the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the sensitivity of the sources, 

the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Volume IX 

describes activities of the Joint Chiefs during the period 1965-1968, except for 

activities relating to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. Between 

1978 and 1982, Walter S. Poole prepared the manuscript that was published in classified form. He reworked that manuscript during 2009–2010 to prepare it for open 

publication. By that time, a large amount of new and unclassified material had 

become available, requiring revision and expansion in every chapter. The passage 

of decades also provided better perspectives upon events, which are reflected in 

the text.

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official 

publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and 

does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

 JOHN F. SHORTAL

Director for Joint History

v

Contents

vii

Preface

This volume covers an unhappy period in US as well as JCS history. As the Vietnam 

War turned into a bloody stalemate, the strategy of “close-in” containment for the 

Far East proved to be unbearably costly. After the Six Day War of 1967, the Middle 

East became increasingly polarized between East and West. NATO had to cope 

with France’s secession from the integrated command. Across a broad range of 

issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves at odds with Secretary of Defense 

Robert S. McNamara. They wanted to escalate sharply the air campaign against 

North Vietnam, preserve superiority in strategic nuclear capability, and restore a 

US-based reserve of conventional units being drained by Vietnam’s demands. Many 

times, their recommendations were rejected by President Lyndon B. Johnson who 

accepted instead those of Secretary McNamara. Indeed, the sidelining of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff emerges as the dominant theme of this volume.

The author owes important debts to a number of individuals. Reviews by 

Robert J. Watson and Kenneth W. Condit, senior historians in what was then the 

Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, considerably improved the original drafts. 

Research in JCS files, constituting the core of the volume, was assisted immeasurably by members of what was then the Records Management and Research Branch 

within the Joint Secretariat. David Humphrey made the author’s visit to the Lyndon 

B. Johnson Library a rewarding experience. Neal Petersen in the State Department and Henry Schorreck of the National Security Agency made very useful 

studies available. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, who was the Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe, during these years, read chapters 6 and 7. General Bruce 

Palmer, Jr., read the portion of chapter 9 dealing with the Dominican intervention. 

Both officers provided worthwhile insights. As the original manuscript was being 

revised and updated in 2009-2010, Dr. Steven Rearden and Dr. Edward Drea in the 

Joint History Office reviewed the chapters and suggested further improvements. In 

no sense, however, did any of these individuals approve what they had read. The 

author alone bears responsibility for the entire volume.

 Walter S. Poole

ix

Contents

1. Overview: Vietnam’s Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Reputations Tarnish. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Decisionmaking Mechanisms Become Muddled. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

The PPBS under Stress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

The “Two-War” Strategy vs. Diminishing Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2. Strategic Nuclear Forces: The End of US Superiority . . . . . . 17

Force Planning in 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Force Planning in 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Refining the SIOP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Force Planning in 1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Force Planning in 1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Perspectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3. Losing the ABM Debate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Force Planning in 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Force Planning in 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Force Planning In 1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Force Planning in 1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4. The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . 41

Force Planning in 1965: Losing the Slack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Force Planning in 1966: Tautness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Force Planning in 1967: Fraying Faster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Force Planning in 1968: The Snap. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Afterthoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Appendix: Forces in Being. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

5. Arms Control Inches Forward. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Killing the Comprehensive and Threshold Test Bans. . . . . . . . . . . 68

Fissionable Material Production: No Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Signing an Outer Space Treaty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Negotiating a Non-Proliferation Treaty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

SALT: Hopes Raised and Blighted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

A Qualified Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

ix
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JCS and National Policy 1960–1968

6. NATO: Surviving Challenges from Within. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Coping with France’s Secession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Re-Cementing the German Connection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

7. NATO’S Flexible Response: Reality or Mirage? . . . . . . . . . . 111

Cross Currents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

The Evolution of MC 14/3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Conventional Capabilities Start to Dwindle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Until Czechoslovakia Compels a Turnabout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

8. Phasing Out the Military Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . 129

The FY 1966 Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

The FY 1967 Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

The FY 1968 Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

The FY 1969 Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Preparing the FY 1970 Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

9. Latin America: The Instruments of Influence . . . . . . . . . . . 137

The Dominican Imbroglio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

A Political Quagmire?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Internationalizing the Occupation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Resolution and Extrication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Panama: Toward a New Canal Treaty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Aircraft Sales: Pro and Con . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

10. Upheaval in the Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Israel and Jordan: An Unattainable “Balance”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Countdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

The Six Day War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

Attack on USS Liberty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

The War’s Aftermath: US Alignment with Israel. . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Iran: Satisfying the Shah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

A Senescent CENTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Summation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

11. Africa: Avoiding Direct Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Southern Africa: White Supremacy under Siege. . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Another Congo Crisis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

What Price Kagnew? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
xi

12. South Asia: US Influence Shrinks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

War over Kashmir. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Pakistan Slips Away. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Will India Join the Nuclear Club?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Seeking an Indian Ocean Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

13. The Far East: The Climax of Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

China, Vietnam, and “Close-In” Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Taiwan: On Hold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Indonesia Changes Course. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

South Korea Becomes a Second Front. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

The Pueblo Humiliation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

Japan: Burden-Sharing and the Reversion Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Catalysts of Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

14. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Principal Civilian and Military Officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy

1965–1968

1

1

Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

The Vietnam War dominated and ultimately consumed Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency. 

In March 1964, President Johnson set the objective of preserving an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam.1 But as 1965 opened, communist forces—Viet Cong guerrillas supported by North Vietnamese soldiers—were close to victory. During March, 

the United States started a systematic bombing campaign against the North and began 

committing large ground forces in the South. Defeat was averted, but steady escalation followed as the communists persevered. By 1968, there were 549,500 US military 

personnel in South Vietnam.

The commitment in Southeast Asia drained resources when challenges loomed 

on other fronts. Despite transfers of experienced personnel to Vietnam and serious 

balance-of-payments deficits, a credible US military presence had to be maintained in 

Western Europe. Moreover, Allied Command Europe faced massive problems when 

France withdrew from the integrated command. In the Dominican Republic, perceived 

danger of a communist takeover triggered US intervention in early 1965. In the Middle 

East, mounting Arab-Israeli tensions led to the Six Day War in June 1967. Growing tensions on the Korean peninsula, partly a spillover from the Vietnam War, culminated in 

January 1968 with North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), these became years of frustration and frequent 

disappointment. They were, by law, the principal military advisers to the President, 

the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Increasingly, however, 

they found themselves marginalized during decisionmaking about strategy, budgets, 

and force levels. Cost effectiveness, a standard applied by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his systems analysts, often conflicted with judgments derived 

from military experience. The Joint Chiefs’ disputes with civilian leaders became 

most acute over waging the Vietnam War, but major differences developed over a 

range of other issues.

The Joint Chiefs’ participation in the Vietnam War differed substantially from 

the JCS role in the Korean War. During 1950–1953, unlike Vietnam, the service chiefs 

1
2

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

(and by extension the JCS) were still part of the chain of command. The Chairman, 

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, had commanded a corps, an army, and an 

army group during World War II. The Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, 

acted as the Joint Chiefs’ Executive Agent for the Far East Command. Collins had 

commanded a division on Guadalcanal and a corps in Western Europe. He visited 

Korea at crucial moments, and each time he brought back an accurate appraisal of 

the battlefield situation. The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act removed the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff from the chain of command and gave unified and specified commanders greater operational control over the forces assigned them.2 Generals Earle G. 

Wheeler and Harold K. Johnson lacked some of the statutory authority vested in the 

Korea-era chiefs, as well as their predecessors’ depth of operational experience, but 

their ability to influence Vietnam matters suffered most because they confronted a 

strong Secretary of Defense.

By 1967, “hawks” in Congress had grown deeply dissatisfied with what they saw 

as Secretary McNamara’s disregard of military advice. On 28 April Representative 

Mendel Rivers (D, SC), Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, introduced 

a bill lengthening the terms of Service Chiefs from two years to four, paralleling 

existing law for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Chairman’s term would 

remain at two years, renewable. Only in time of war or national emergency declared 

by Congress after 31 December 1968 could a Chief or Commandant be reappointed. 

Reporting favorably, Rivers’ Committee stated that “the sole objective . . . is to permit 

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Congress, as well as the President 

and the Secretary of Defense, freely in defense matters.” Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Cyrus Vance countered that this legislation would “restrict the President’s flexibility 

in choosing military advisers and could confront him with the alternative of losing a 

significant part of the military counsel provided by law or of subjecting distinguished 

military officers to the stigma of dismissal.” Nonetheless, the bill passed Congress and 

President Johnson signed it into law on 5 June.3

A Joint Staff, limited by law to 400 officers, supported the Chiefs. Its directorates 

were J–1 (Personnel), J–3 (Operations), J–4 (Logistics), J–5 (Plans and Policy), and J–6 

(Communications). Since 400 were not nearly enough, new agencies were added to the 

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), a usage that evolved to encompass the 

entire structure supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By mid-1968, the OJCS numbered 

1,438 military and 486 civilian personnel.4

Reputations Tarnish

Few Presidents, perhaps, have stood as high in popular esteem as did Lyndon Johnson on 20 January 1965. His work as Senate Majority Leader had marked him as an 

achiever and conciliator; his success in assuring a smooth transition after John F. Kennedy’s assassination and in securing passage of landmark social legislation reinforced 

2
Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

3

that reputation. His electoral victory in November 1964 was overwhelming; his party 

comfortably controlled both houses of Congress.

Very soon, though, President Johnson found himself torn between what he wanted 

to do at home and what he felt compelled to do abroad. Building a “Great Society” was 

his chief ambition, but he was determined not to be the first President to lose a war. 

Trying to deliver guns and butter, President Johnson fell short on both. The hopes he 

raised for social uplift were fulfilled only in part, while the limits he put upon mobilizing, funding and prosecuting the war in Southeast Asia helped bring about a stalemate 

at ever higher cost in lives and treasure. By 1967, President Johnson was under fire 

from “doves” on the left who had turned against the Vietnam War and “hawks” on the 

right who claimed that stronger action could bring success.

During the early 1960s, Robert S. McNamara built an enviable reputation as the 

first Secretary of Defense who truly understood and controlled the Defense Department. He also became pre-eminent among the President’s advisers, overshadowing 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk. McNamara’s years as wartime Secretary were much less 

successful. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated a swift, hard blow by bombing key targets in North Vietnam. Instead, Secretary McNamara abetted the President’s pursuit of 

a strategy of graduated pressure. The air campaign, code-named Rolling Thunder, was 

developed to make the North stop aiding the Viet Cong while minimizing any risk of 

Chinese intervention. Moreover, Rolling Thunder, as civilians shaped it, failed to shake 

Hanoi’s determination to persevere. Secretary McNamara’s intrusions into operational 

matters, particularly selecting the targets for air strikes, galled military men. The Secretary soon lost confidence in a military solution and finally on 1 November 1967 urged 

President Johnson to stop bombing the North and negotiate a power-sharing solution 

for the South. Three weeks later, the President announced that Secretary McNamara 

soon would leave the Pentagon to become president of the World Bank.5

McNamara’s last weeks as Secretary proved traumatic. The administration claimed 

that its search-and-destroy operations in South Vietnam were making slow but steady 

progress. Yet on 30 January 1968, as the Tet holiday started, the communists launched 

a country-wide offensive. The enemy suffered heavy losses, but Tet’s impact upon US 

public opinion was profound; many Americans could see no end to the war. On 29 February, in a ceremony marred by mishaps but charged with emotion, McNamara left the 

Pentagon.6

 President Johnson now faced strong opposition in the presidential primaries 

from anti-war Senators Eugene McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy. On 31 March, the President restricted the bombing of North Vietnam and announced that he would not seek 

re-election. Clark M. Clifford, McNamara’s successor, had been Counsel to President Truman and enjoyed a long acquaintance with President Johnson. Secretary Clifford sided 

with the “doves” in Vietnam debates.7 President Johnson halted bombing of the North 

completely on 31 October, but his hopes for a negotiated settlement went unfulfilled.

The beginning of 1965, which saw US conventional combat forces enter the Vietnam War, marked something of a milestone in the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

On 1 February, General John P. McConnell succeeded General Curtis E. LeMay as 

3
4

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Chief of Staff, US Air Force. Time magazine recorded the significance of the occasion: 

“Omar Bradley, Matt Ridgway, and Max Taylor, Nate Twining and Curt LeMay, Arthur 

Radford and Arleigh Burke—the very names still conjure up images of flaming cannon, of contrails across enemy skies, of destroyers heading into battle at flank speed. It 

detracts nothing from their successors to say that the names of ‘Bus’ Wheeler, ‘Johnny’ 

Johnson, ‘Dave’ McDonald, ‘J. P.’ McConnell, and ‘Wally’ Greene are hardly household 

words.” Time observed that Secretary McNamara wanted “planners and thinkers, not 

heroes . . . team men, not gladiators.”8

The Chairman, General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, perfectly exemplified Time’s 

description. His combat experience consisted of five months as Chief of Staff, 63rd 

Infantry Division, in the European Theater during 1944–45. He made a very good 

impression as Director, Joint Staff, during 1960–62, opening the way to appointment as 

Army Chief of Staff on 1 October 1962 and as Chairman on 3 July 1964. From the Joint 

Chiefs’ standpoint, by this time Secretary McNamara and his analysts were intruding ever more frequently into their domain. Wheeler tried to discourage this trend by 

having the Chiefs present the Secretary with a united front. In this, he had notable 

success. The number of split JCS recommendations fell from forty in 1965 to seven in 

1966 and six in 1967—yet civilian intrusions increased. In 1966, General Wheeler was 

reappointed Chairman. In the summer of 1967, he suffered a heart attack and suggested 

to superiors that he take medical retirement. “I can’t afford to lose you,” the President 

replied. “You have never given me a piece of bad advice.” Since President Johnson had 

rejected a good deal of his advice about waging the Vietnam War, General Wheeler 

likely took these words as an expression of sympathy rather than literal truth. On 19 

January 1968, Secretary McNamara urged the President to extend Wheeler’s service 

through mid-1969.9 President Johnson approved and General Wheeler agreed, evidently 

impelled by his sense of a soldier’s duty.

The Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, had survived the Bataan 

Death March and three hard years in Japanese POW camps. Many fellow officers would 

remark upon the strong religious conviction that emerged from his ordeal. Johnson 

served successfully as a battalion and regimental commander in the Korean War; he 

then progressed rapidly through command and staff positions. In June 1964, at the 

time of his appointment, he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations with three-star 

rank and 44th in seniority.10 Among those senior to him was General William C. Westmoreland, who served as Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

from January 1964 until June 1968. General Johnson would visit South Vietnam nine 

times during his tenure, and on several occasions voiced reservations about General 

Westmoreland’s insight and ability.11 Yet General Johnson never directly challenged 

General Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition through search-and-destroy operations. 

General Wheeler also made periodic visits, and regularly accepted the assessments 

of field commanders.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral David L. McDonald, was an aviator who in 

1963 commanded the Sixth Fleet and had just become Commander in Chief, US Naval 

4
Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

5

Forces, Europe, when Secretary McNamara unexpectedly offered him the CNO’s billet. 

Admiral McDonald had never aspired to the position and preferred to work on Navy 

issues. “I couldn’t get too interested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” he said years later. “I 

didn’t see they were really doing very much.” Increasingly, like his colleagues, Admiral 

McDonald resented the intrusions of Secretary McNamara and his “whiz kids.”12

The Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. McConnell, had been in combat briefly 

as a fighter pilot during World War II before near-sightedness switched him to a staff 

assignment. He later served as Vice Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, 

and Deputy Commander in Chief, European Command. In 1964, President Johnson 

interviewed General McConnell and then selected him to be Vice Chief of Staff, on the 

understanding that he soon would succeed General LeMay. General McConnell got 

a dose of the “Johnson treatment” when he was invited to the LBJ Ranch and served 

breakfast in bed by the Commander in Chief.13 That may have been General McConnell’s most pleasant moment. Later, disputes with civilian leaders about the conduct of 

Rolling Thunder left him professionally frustrated and personally troubled.

On 1 August 1967, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer became Chief of Naval Operations. An aviator like his two predecessors, Admiral Moorer had the unique background of having commanded both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. He devoted more 

time to JCS duties than Admiral McDonald and would succeed General Wheeler as 

Chairman in 1970. Admiral Moorer’s dealings with Secretary McNamara, however, 

were relatively brief.

General Wallace M. Greene served as Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1 

January 1964 until 31 December 1967. Early on, he sensed that the war was being mishandled. Determined that the military would not bear blame for failure, General Greene 

kept a daily record focusing upon what he deemed civilian mismanagement of the war. 

In August 1967, as General Greene’s tour neared an end, he and a majority of Marine 

generals recommended General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., as successor. Originally an 

artilleryman, General Chapman had served at Headquarters, Marine Corps, since 

1961, rising to be Assistant Commandant. However, General Wheeler and Secretary 

McNamara proposed Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, who had worked in the JCS 

Organization as Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities and 

currently commanded the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. In mid-December, the President 

selected General Chapman.14

General Johnson was offered a one-year extension. Convinced that he would 

accomplish nothing useful by staying, he elected to retire. On 22 March 1968, the 

President announced that General Westmoreland would become Chief of Staff on 2 

July.15 General Westmoreland’s reputation was clouded by charges that the Tet offensive’s scope and timing had taken him by surprise, and that his search-and-destroy 

campaigns had resulted only in stalemate at ever-higher troop levels. Some observers 

viewed his appointment as compensation for loyal service rather than a reward for 

superior performance. General Wheeler respected him but some other Joint Chiefs, 

Admiral Moorer particularly, came to less favorable views.

5
6

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Decisionmaking Mechanisms Become Muddled

I

n its approach to formulating and executing national security policy, the Johnson 

administration fell midway between the highly structured organization used by 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the informal, ad hoc methods favored by President John F. Kennedy. The National Security Council met, but its purpose usually was 

to ratify decisions worked out in other forums. President Kennedy had done away 

with statements of Basic National Security Policy, and President Johnson did not reestablish them. What might have taken their place were National Policy Papers (NPPs) 

prepared by interdepartmental working groups under State Department leadership, 

then circulated for interagency comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could recommend 

changes, but of course OSD made the final decisions about what criticisms to send 

State. As finally approved by Secretary Rusk, NPPs were supposed to provide comprehensive and authoritative statements of policy and lines of action towards countries 

and, in some cases, regions.16 In practice, however, NPPs were usually treated as reference documents and made little impact upon decisionmaking.

Early in 1964, President Johnson began “Tuesday Lunch” sessions with Secretaries 

Rusk and McNamara, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs McGeorge Bundy. These occurred fairly regularly throughout 1964, rather 

erratically during 1965 and 1966, then nearly every Tuesday from January 1967 until 

January 1969. Secretary McNamara briefed General Wheeler on the outcomes but not 

the discussions. McGeorge Bundy resigned in February 1966; Walt W. Rostow, chairman 

of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, succeeded him. Dr. Rostow would 

check on Monday with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara about what issues merited discussion, then he would prepare an agenda for that evening. From October 1967 onward, 

General Wheeler and the Director of Central Intelligence became regular attendees. 

In Dr. Rostow’s view, eating the President’s food in his home encouraged collegiality 

and candor.17 According to Clark Clifford, however, the Lunches became “a legend and 

a bit of a nightmare.” Although a White House note-taker usually attended, Clifford 

remembered frequent disagreements and misunderstandings when the participants’ 

senior staff set about reconstructing exactly what had been decided.18

There was a recognized need to improve interagency coordination. General Maxwell Taylor, USA (Ret.), a former Chief of Staff and Chairman, drafted an initiative and 

achieved consensus. On 2 March 1966, President Johnson created a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) chaired by the Under Secretary of State. Members included General 

Wheeler, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the 

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The SIG was supported by five Interdepartmental Regional Groups, each headed by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of 

State. Unfortunately, the SIG fell short of expectations, meeting only three times in the 

last six months of 1966 and twice during the first five months of 1967. It devolved into 

handling those issues for which top officials had no time, such as aircraft sales to Latin 

America. In May 1967, General Taylor warned the President that “whatever vitality the 

6
Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

7

new system had at the outset is apparently in decline.” But President Johnson took no 

further action. In October, a Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization recommended 

elevating the Secretary of State into “a Presidential leader and coordinator . . .who can 

both advise and act for him across the whole range of his international responsibilities.” 

Although that recommendation was endorsed by Secretary McNamara and McGeorge 

Bundy, among others, nothing tangible came of it.19

Within the Defense Department, relations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

the Secretary grew strained and distant. In autumn 1965, General Wheeler initiated 

regular Monday sessions with Secretary McNamara. By mid-1967, however, these had 

become infrequent and rather pro forma. As for the Joint Chiefs collectively, Admiral 

McDonald recalled that “instead of saying ‘less frequently’ I’d say [McNamara] spent 

less time with us. Sometimes it seemed that he came down because he was just supposed to show his face.”20

Ultimately, in decisionmaking, personal influence counted more than any organizational arrangements. Secretary McNamara remained the President’s most trusted 

adviser until well into 1967, when he changed course over Vietnam. After Tet, and with 

Secretary McNamara gone, the process of policymaking and Vietnam policy itself 

seemed to lose coherence. During a JCS meeting in April 1968, after Rolling Thunder 

had been curtailed, General Chapman cited the objective of an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam. That was our objective in 1964, General Wheeler replied, 

but it is not our objective now. Wheeler could not define the administration’s current 

objective, however. The rest of 1968 witnessed numerous White House meetings about 

Vietnam, in which the President often leaned toward Secretary Clifford’s dovish views 

but occasionally sympathized with General Wheeler’s hawkish stance. The decisions 

that resulted could be likened to half-lunges, halting the bombing of North Vietnam 

without ensuring that productive peace negotiations would follow.21

The PPBS under Stress

During the early 1960s, Robert McNamara accomplished what some termed a management revolution. He promulgated a planning-programming-budgeting system 

(PPBS) that was designed to integrate strategy, force plans, and budgets. The PPBS 

formed the basis of a Five-Year Defense Program. It also served to centralize detailed 

decisionmaking about policies and force levels in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The JCS were tasked by law with preparing plans and providing for the strategic 

direction of the armed forces. Their Joint Strategic Planning System contained three 

major elements: a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that addressed the forthcoming fiscal year; a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) dealing with the mid-range 

period; and a Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the JSOP as their main contribution to the PPBS. 

Broadly, the JSOP provided information and guidance for the services and combatant 
8

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

commanders pertaining to the mid-range period, intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities, recommendations about allied force objectives, and advice to the Secretary 

for shaping the budget. JSOP-70 consisted of six parts covering the period between 

1 July 1966 and 30 June 1974 (i.e., FYs 1967–74). Parts I–V consisted of a statement of 

purpose, a strategic appraisal, an outline of military objectives, a strategic concept, and 

an allocation of basic undertakings among the unified and specified commands. After 

approving all these in August 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began drafting the crucial 

and much more contentious Part VI which provided force-level recommendations.

A JSCP translated national policies and goals into near-term military objectives, 

concepts, and tasks that were commensurate with actual capabilities. Also, it constituted a directive to unified and specified commanders outlining their conduct of 

operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a JSCP annually, around the end of the 

calendar year. Thus JSCP-66, approved in December 1964, covered FY 1966 which 

then was the period between 1 July 1965 and 30 June 1966. Unlike the JSOP, this Plan 

did not go to the Secretary of Defense. In 1967, action-level planners proposed breaking precedent by sending JSCP-69 to Secretary McNamara. The three-star Operations 

Deputies decided against doing so, on grounds that OSD had never asked for a JSCP 

and they saw “no point in gratuitously providing a document when this would result 

in no foreseeable benefit to either the OSD or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and could very 

well open a new area of problems.”22

A JLRSS forecast future uses of military power and supplied very broad guidance 

for the preparation of specific policies, plans, and programs. JLRSS-76, approved by 

the Chiefs in 1965, applied to FYs 1976–1979; JLRSS 77-86 extended to FYs 1977–1986; 

JLRSS 79-88 covered FYs 1979–1988. But the Studies suffered from a defect inherent in 

long-range forecasting: vagueness. JLRSS 77-86, for example, predicted that the world’s 

salient features would be: a diffusion of current alliances and ideological groupings; 

serious population pressures; volatile socio-economic conditions; nuclear proliferation; constraints on the direct, unilateral use of force by major powers; and advanced 

military technology.23 How useful were these Studies for planning and programming? 

Their impact seems to have been slight.

Secretary McNamara planned that a tentative Draft Presidential Memorandum 

(DPM) would be distributed to the JCS and the Military Departments in June 1965. 

The DPMs, running between twenty and forty single-spaced pages each, were laden 

with cost-effectiveness comparisons of alternative force structures. Growing in number from two in 1961 to sixteen by 1968,24 they became the centerpiece of Secretary 

McNamara’s PPBS. The ones dealing with force-planning issues were drafted by the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis), the ones treating regional issues 

like Western Europe or Asia by the Office of the Assistant Secretary (International 

Security Affairs). After reviews by and discussions with the JCS and the Services, final 

DPMs were supposed to be issued by 30 September.

Instead, the escalating war in Southeast Asia rendered JSOP-70’s appraisals and 

recommendations obsolete and threw OSD’s budget estimates askew. In January 1965, 
Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

9

Secretary McNamara presented Congress with a request for $48.6 billion in new obligation authority during FY 1966.25 Six months later, President Johnson announced that US 

troop levels in South Vietnam would rise from 75,000 to 125,000. The Services priced the 

cost of this buildup at $12.3 billion; Secretary McNamara advised the President that this 

figure was high. In a crucial decision, President Johnson rejected recommendations 

from Secretary McNamara and the JCS to mobilize reserves, raising monthly draft calls 

instead. He also rejected Secretary McNamara’s advice to ask for a tax increase. By 

the year’s end, the budget estimates were rendered completely obsolete as Secretary 

McNamara approved accelerated deployments that increased the buildup to 330,000 

troops in Vietnam during 1966.

Amid this rapidly changing environment, the Joint Chiefs looked for ways to make 

their JSOP more responsive and influential. In July 1965, they approved Parts I–V of 

JSOP-71. Normally, those were not sent to the Secretary until Part VI had been completed, which in this case would have meant March or April 1966. Instead, in December 

1965, Admiral McDonald proposed forwarding Parts I–V immediately and drafting 

a concise version of Parts I–V, following the style of Secretary McNamara’s DPMs. 

General McConnell disagreed. Parts I–V, he argued, were meaningful only insofar 

as they could be related to the force goals presented in Part VI. Therefore, instead of 

forwarding Parts I-V, the JCS should urge Secretary McNamara to prepare a broadgauged DPM defining national security objectives. That paper, in turn, could serve as 

a starting-point for the next series of DPMs.26

On 10 January 1966, after further exchanges, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed 

Secretary McNamara that the JSOP was being changed in several ways. First, it 

would focus on the upcoming budget year and assess goals and risks out to eight 

years thereafter. JSOP-71, consequently, was renamed JSOP 68-75. Second, Parts 

I–V would be forwarded to OSD about 1 February and be accompanied by a brief 

synopsis or “Reader’s Digest” delineating worldwide objectives and strategic concepts. Third, their covering memo transmitting Parts I–V would identify, in broad 

terms, “tentative major decision issues involving force-level objectives.” They wanted 

Parts I–V, together with the Reader’s Digest, to become the “principal statement of 

national military objectives and strategic concepts.” Finally, the rationale supporting force objectives in Part VI would include cost considerations supplied by the 

Services, alternatives, risk assessments, and options relative to force objectives and 

major decision issues.27 But inter-service compromises kept diluting the statements 

of objectives and concepts, while additional Vietnam deployments left force-level 

objectives outdated.

In January 1966 President Johnson asked Congress for an FY 1966 supplemental of $12.3 billion, giving assurance that only $4.6 billion of it would be expended 

during FY 1966. President Johnson decided to repeat this approach for FY 1967, 

holding the initial budget request around $60 billion and seeking a supplemental 

later. Again, the tempo of combat operations and the troop buildup outran early 

projections so that a $12.2 billion supplemental for FY 1967 proved necessary. 
10

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Although the PPBS structure remained basically the same, these supplementals 

rendered it almost useless as an accounting tool, concealing the true cost of the 

war which by then was running around $22-23 billion annually. The Joint Strategic 

Planning System did not, and probably could not, adjust to repeated revisions and 

improvisations.28

A price paid for passage of the FY 1967 supplemental was Secretary McNamara’s 

promise to Congress that, barring unforeseen circumstances, there would be no such 

request for FY 1968. In January 1967, the administration asked for $75.5 billion in new 

obligation authority for FY 1968. In July 1967, Secretary McNamara recommended and 

President Johnson approved raising the troop level in South Vietnam to 525,000. Late 

in September, Congress appropriated $73.4 billion for FY 1968. Two months later, as 

preparation of the FY 1969 budget reached its final stage, Secretary McNamara told 

the JCS to eliminate or defer anything that did not directly contribute to the war. By 

separating the “Normal Budget” ($54–$57 billion) from “Southeast Asia” ($25 billion), 

he offered the President a range of spending options. The Joint Chiefs of Staff filed 

protests over Secretary McNamara’s decisions about 65 budget items. At a meeting on 

4 December 1967, President Johnson told them to “take the lowest priority items and 

see what you can do to forego everything except the pay increase and the men and 

material necessary” for the war.29

On 27 January 1968, Secretary McNamara presented Congress with a proposal for 

$79.576 billion in new obligation authority for FY 1969, with expenditures estimated at 

$77.1 billion. OSD introduced the device of a “zero supplemental,” which involved shifting money among accounts without having to ask for additional appropriations. About 

$4.3 billion was reprogrammed, but emergencies—the Tet offensive and seizure of the 

Pueblo—rendered such devices inadequate. On the one hand, the administration had 

to request another $3.9 billion in new obligation authority for FY 1968 and, just before 

leaving office, seek another $3 billion for FY 1969. On the other hand, looming deficits 

made a tax increase unavoidable. To gain congressional support for a 10 percent income 

tax surcharge, the President had to accept a $3 billion cut in DOD expenditures for FY 

1969. On 17 October, he signed legislation appropriating $71.8 billion for FY 1969. The 

verdict of the OSD history is that “Defense budgets proved as difficult to control as the 

South Vietnamese countryside.”30

The “Two-War” Strategy vs. Diminishing Resources

During the mid-1960s, the instruments for articulating national strategy were the DPMs, the JSOPs, and the JSCPs. As Vietnam commitments expanded, however, 

a gap grew between the requirements described in the DPMs and JSOPs and the 

resources listed in the JSCPs. Defending Western Europe might enjoy first priority in 

theory but in practice, as General Johnson observed years later, “you march toward 

the sound of the guns.”31
Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

11

The Kennedy administration had expanded conventional forces to the point where 

they were deemed able to conduct two operations simultaneously. JSOP-70, drafted 

during the summer of 1964, defined this “two-war” capability as follows:

1. Defend Western Europe against a major assault long enough to force the 

Soviets to face the risks of escalation.

2. Conduct one major non-NATO operation while retaining the ability to accomplish 

(1) above. If hostilities erupted in Europe while this operation was underway, the 

non-NATO effort would be reduced as NATO requirements demanded. If US troops 

already were fighting in Europe, NATO’s needs would determine the conduct of the 

non-NATO contingency. Should Chinese or Soviet forces intervene massively in the 

non-NATO operation, escalation would be required.32

In January 1965, strategic requirements and capabilities appeared to be in balance. The deployable strategic reserve consisted of nine Army divisions, three Marine 

division/wing teams, and 48 tactical fighter squadrons.33 But by December 1965, with 

Vietnam commitments snowballing, the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara 

that they foresaw a loss, likely to last several years, in the United States’ ability to meet 

contingencies and commitments elsewhere.34 In particular deployments to Southeast 

Asia were being met mainly by drawing upon the Continental United States (CONUS) 

strategic reserve.

A widening gulf between strategy and resources quickly became evident in the area 

of logistics. The bombing campaign against North Vietnam soon depleted stocks of air 

munitions. Early in February 1966, Secretary McNamara told Secretary of the Navy 

Paul H. Nitze he was worried that many of the unified commanders’ contingency plans 

no longer could be supported logistically. Paul Nitze relayed this to Admiral McDonald, 

who replied that he did not know whether work was being done to tailor those plans 

within current logistic capabilities. Admiral McDonald promptly advised General 

Wheeler that “we really should take a new look at many of our plans and adjust them 

to the situation which exists today; otherwise, many of them are quite meaningless.”35

Captain J. P. Weinel, USN, of the Chairman’s Staff Group warned General Wheeler 

that Vietnam deployments had created shortfalls not only in logistic support but also 

in units, equipment, personnel, and air and sealift. “The JCS,” Weinel continued, “must 

be able to translate each new commitment in Southeast Asia into terms that speak 

to our strategic concept, our worldwide commitments, risks, force levels, and tasks.” 

Until now, they had tended to assess these shortfalls as separate packages rather than 

a single entity. When they surveyed the cumulative effect, “I believe it will be a rather 

frightening picture.”36

General Wheeler tasked the Joint Staff with preparing a spread sheet portraying 

US capabilities to carry out an assortment of contingency plans. The result, made 

under an assumption that no reserve mobilization would take place, was indeed “rather 

frightening.” Plans to defend Western Europe appeared infeasible because there would 

be significant shortfalls in all categories of ground and air reinforcements (e.g., three 

divisions, fifteen tactical fighter squadrons). Among the plans reviewed, only those for 
12

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Haiti and Bolivia, where the requirements were quite modest, continued to be feasible.37

OSD responded by raising worldwide inventory objectives for critical munitions, but 

substantial shortfalls remained in 1968.

As of 1 January 1966, there were 184,000 US troops in South Vietnam. The Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), wanted 200,000 more by the year’s end, and 

Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to examine ways of doing so without mobilizing 

reserves or extending terms of service. Replying in February, the Joint Chiefs defined 

the problem as meeting CINCPAC’s request while creating, in the following order of 

priority, programs that would: reconstitute an adequate strategic reserve and establish 

an adequate training and rotation base; meet CINCPAC’s non-Vietnam requirements; 

and maintain and/or restore the US military posture in Europe and the Atlantic. Secretary McNamara approved a JCS plan for deploying 200,000 more troops,38 but other 

elements of the problem remained unsolved. Essentially, Vietnam was being accorded 

priority at the expense of everything else.

Through JSCP-68, approved in December 1966 and applicable between 1 July 1967 

and 30 June 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that meeting another emergency 

would require either mobilization and major allied contributions or curtailing operations in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the forces fighting in Vietnam could not be redeployed as rapidly as had been hoped. Thus an ability to fight two wars successfully, 

even with mobilization, struck them as questionable. JSCP-68’s strategic concept read 

as follows:

Without mobilization, continue the Vietnam War at current levels, maintain 

other deployments, conduct a Dominican-style intervention or stabilization 

operation,39 and provide a limited strategic reserve with marginal sustaining 

capability.

With mobilization, either conduct operations in Europe while fighting defensively in Southeast Asia or carry out a major non-NATO task (e.g., countering 

Chinese intervention) while maintaining NATO deployments.40

But JSOP 69-76, approved by the Joint Chiefs in April 1967, spelled out somewhat 

more ambitious objectives:

Without mobilization, meet the initial requirements for defending Western 

Europe while successfully conducting one major operation elsewhere (e.g., 

Vietnam).

With mobilization, either fulfill the initial requirements for Europe while successfully opposing major Chinese aggression or maintain at least a holding 

action against Chinese aggression while successfully resisting a major assault 

in Europe. In addition, conduct specialized counterinsurgency operations or a 

stabilizing action, as in the Dominican Republic.

This amounted to a “21⁄2-war” strategy, which several DPMs issued later that year 

also specified as the strategic requirement. By the Joint Chiefs’ calculation, an active 

force of 26 division-equivalents (ten for Europe, fourteen for the Far East, and two for 
Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

13

a strategic reserve) would provide “a reasonable degree of assurance that the essential 

elements of the strategic concept can be implemented without mobilization.”41 There 

were at that point 22 active divisions, 18 Army and four Marine, some of which would 

have required several months to reach combat readiness.

In July 1967, President Johnson authorized deployments that would raise the 

Vietnam commitment to 525,000. In August, through Volume I of JSOP 70-77, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff submitted what General Johnson called “the most straight-forward and 

succinct expression on the subject that we have produced to date”:

Without mobilization, conduct one major contingency operation outside NATO, 

either nuclear or non-nuclear, directly involving neither Chinese nor Soviet 

forces, while maintaining the capability for an initial defense of Western Europe.

With mobilization, either successfully defend against and terminate a major 

attack by the Warsaw Pact while conducting a holding action against major 

Chinese aggression, or successfully conduct and terminate operations against 

major Chinese aggression, not necessarily limited to one area, while providing 

forces for the initial defense of Western Europe.

General Johnson recommended holding a “philosophical” conversation on the 

subject with Secretary McNamara. Such a conversation did take place on 24 November 1967. The Joint Chiefs complained about the inconsistent strategic concepts set 

forth in various DPMs and proposed either that the JSOP become a common source 

of strategic guidance or that a separate DPM on worldwide strategy be drafted. Secretary McNamara agreed to study whether available forces could cope with two major, 

simultaneous contingencies.42

The answer came in January 1968, before any study was completed. On 23 January, off Wonsan harbor, North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo. On 30 January, in South 

Vietnam, communist forces launched a country-wide offensive. The strategic reserve 

was almost totally depleted. As of 5 February, according to the Joint Staff, deployable 

strategic reserves consisted of the 82nd Airborne Division, 1 1/3 Marine division/wing 

teams, and twelve tactical fighter squadrons, eight of which were second-line aircraft 

just activated to compensate for the aerial reinforcements that were being rushed to 

South Korea.43 Launching another war in Asia was simply out of the question.

On 4 December 1967, at the final budget session, President Johnson had cautioned 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “you must take into account not only what you say but 

the effects of what you say. . . .We do want the understanding of the [Congressional] 

committees, but it does not strengthen our system to air our differences.”44 In midFebruary 1968, with North Korea unyielding and Tet battles raging, General Wheeler 

gave Congressional testimony about the FY 1969 program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had 

stated that, although the overall force structure proposed for FY 1969 did not include 

all their recommendations, they were “in agreement that the program will improve 

the readiness and overall combat effectiveness of our forces.” That was a deliberately 

ambiguous construction. The JCS statement of December 1961, by contrast, had said 

that the proposed force structure would “provide powerful forces in a high state of 
14

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

readiness.” Representative George Mahon (D, TX), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told General Wheeler that “you do not come to grips with whether 

or not the budget . . . is reasonably adequate.” General Wheeler replied that it was 

“reasonably adequate.”45

If the Chairman was hoping to quell outside criticism, his assessment actually 

helped to widen what had become a “credibility gap.” Two weeks later, after a visit 

to South Vietnam, General Wheeler presented President Johnson with a request for 

206,000 more personnel. When that request became public knowledge, anti-war feeling 

received a large boost. If Tet was ending in a communist defeat, as the administration 

claimed, why were large reinforcements needed? After an intense month-long debate, 

President Johnson approved dispatching merely 24,500 more troops, capping the Vietnam commitment at 549,500. Only 22,767 reservists were mobilized.

On 10 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Clifford that “the strategic 

military options now available to the United States are seriously limited by the reduced 

combat readiness of military forces worldwide, other than those deployed to Southeast 

Asia, and by the limited size and reduced combat readiness of our present strategic 

reserve.” One device used to cover global requirements lay in giving double or even 

quadruple assignments to the same unit. The 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), slated 

for commitment to Allied Command Europe by M+30 days in case of war or emergency, 

was preparing one of its three brigades for service in Vietnam. One brigade of the 82nd 

Airborne had just been rushed to Vietnam. The 82nd also had been earmarked to reinforce European Command by M+30. Moreover, the 82nd was the sole division available 

for contingencies in the Western Hemisphere. Dealing with urban riots, such as those 

following the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, was a further contingency.46

The early months of 1968 marked a low point, after which the size and readiness of the strategic reserve slowly improved. But the larger problem of squaring 

requirements with resources came no nearer to a solution. In May 1968, through a 

DPM on Asia Strategy and Force Structure, OSD argued that the strategy of “closein” containment for Asia needed to be reconsidered. The communists could deploy 

in Southeast Asia larger forces than previously estimated, and China could achieve 

over time a capability to fight on several fronts simultaneously. Therefore, US policy 

should shift to stressing military assistance programs, placing maximum reliance 

on allied capabilities, and not being the first to resort to major escalation. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff countered that such a strategy would substantially erode US strength 

and influence. The Military Assistance Program, they maintained, complemented US 

forces but could not substitute for them. The JCS noted that 10 2/3 US divisions were 

committed in South Vietnam even without Chinese intervention, yet OSD claimed 

that seven US divisions plus indigenous ones could hold Southeast Asia against a 

Chinese attack. They deemed the option for initiating escalation still necessary. When 

OSD issued a redraft with many of the same arguments, the Chiefs responded with a 

biting criticism. Decisive results could be achieved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted, 

when forces were used as the military wished. Conversely, long and costly wars of 
Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

15

attrition were virtually assured if we lacked adequate strength for swift commitment, 

unnecessarily restricted the way our forces fought, allowed enemy sanctuaries to 

exist, and forfeited the escalatory option.47

In December 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided President Johnson with a 

decidedly downbeat assessment of the budget and forces being proposed for FY 1970. 

The levels of strategic nuclear forces, compared with growing Soviet capabilities, 

“represent a declining trend in the US strategic position vis-à-vis the USSR. Additionally, we believe that the existing conventional capability of our general purpose forces 

provides only a limited choice of options at the present time outside Southeast Asia. It 

does not provide the capability to reinforce NATO adequately in a timely manner, nor 

of simultaneously providing a response to other than minor contingencies elsewhere.”48

In other words, a two-war strategy was infeasible; the next administration would have 

to reassess the balance between requirements and capabilities.

17

2

Strategic Nuclear Forces: 

The End of US Superiority

During the mid-1960s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the strategic nuclear balance between the superpowers was changing with the Soviet Union steadily gaining 

on the United States. In 1961, the Chiefs believed that the United States would emerge 

from a nuclear exchange with a clear advantage over the Soviet Union, no matter which 

side struck first. That advantage, in their opinion, deterred communist aggression at 

every level. Secretary McNamara, in 1963, described deterrence as the ability to accomplish “assured destruction” of the USSR, which he defined as the ability to absorb an 

attack and then retaliate by destroying 30 percent of the Soviet population, the 150 

largest cities in the USSR, and 50 percent of Soviet industrial capacity.1 Between 1965 

and 1968, as the Soviets pressed ahead with a huge buildup of long-range missiles, the 

Joint Chiefs argued for a very different definition of deterrence: “damage limitation,” 

requiring that the United States be able to emerge from a nuclear exchange in a stronger 

position than the USSR. They were unconvinced that the Soviets were creating both 

“assured destruction” and “damage limitation” capabilities, which ultimately would 

win the USSR strategic superiority and so create opportunities for nuclear blackmail.

Force Planning in 1965

As 1965 opened, US strategic nuclear forces still well exceeded those of the Soviet Union. The Strategic Air Command controlled 59 Titan II and 698 Minuteman I 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers in hardened underground silos as 

well as 626 heavy B–52, 391 medium B–47, and 94 B–58 supersonic bombers. By midyear, the Navy’s Polaris force had grown to 29 fleet ballistic missile submarines, each 

with 16 launchers. Compared to Minuteman, Polaris had less range, reliability and 

17
18

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

accuracy but higher survivability. In October 1965, a National Intelligence Estimate put 

the Soviet force at 224 ICBM launchers which were mostly unprotected, 120–140 SLBM 

tubes which were mostly short-range and surface-fired, and about 200 heavy bombers.2

Secretary McNamara planned to level off Minuteman at 1,000 launchers and Polaris 

at 656 tubes in 41 fleet ballistic missile submarines.3 Even before all these missiles 

could be deployed, however, qualitative improvements became imperative. When the 

Soviets put their ICBMs into hardened underground silos, as US intelligence expected 

them to start doing in the late 1960s, Minuteman would need greater yield and accuracy 

to remain a counterforce weapon. Minuteman II, first flight tested in September 1964, 

would meet these requirements and have a capacity to be launched against any of 

eight pre-programmed targets.4 What could defeat both Polaris and Minuteman I or II, 

at least theoretically, were anti-ballistic missile systems which the Soviets had begun 

building around Moscow and Leningrad. The answer to missile defense appeared to 

lie in multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), able to put one or 

more re-entry vehicles over several geographically separated targets. Thus the number 

of warheads could rise dramatically even if the number of launchers remained steady. 

During 1963, the Air Force started developmental work on a MIRVed ICBM and the 

Navy on a MIRVed SLBM.5 This was an area of technology in which the United States 

ran several years ahead of the Soviet Union.

JSOP-70, submitted to Secretary McNamara on 1 March 1965, covered FYs 1967–

1974. At the time of submission, several re-entry vehicles were under development: 

Mark 12, capable of delivering three warheads against three separate targets; Mark 18, 

small enough to be employed in clusters; and a high-yield Mark 17 designed for precise 

delivery of a single warhead.6 It was expected that Mark 12s and Mark 17s would be 

retrofitted into Minuteman IIs and that MIRVed Poseidon missiles could be put aboard 

Polaris submarines. The Joint Chiefs recommended maintaining Titan II levels, completing the program for 41 submarines carrying 656 Polaris missiles, and replacing all 

Minuteman Is with 1,200 Minuteman IIs.7 As for bombers, the Chiefs recommended 

gradually attriting B–58s down to 64, holding B–52s at 600 through FY 1970 then reducing them to 495 by FY 1974, and developing an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft 

(AMSA), deploying 39 by FY 1974.

Secretary McNamara agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the great value of 

Poseidon. During 1964, however, he had concluded that MIRVs made more launchers 

unnecessary and that AMSA failed the test of cost-effectiveness. In rebuttal, JSOP-70 

cited claims by General Wheeler’s Special Studies Group that 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs 

and a sizable AMSA force were needed for either pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes. The 

Group also measured what an all-missile force could accomplish against what missiles 

supplemented by AMSA could achieve. With AMSA, the Group calculated, US fatalities 

could be cut by 13 percent and losses to the US industrial base reduced by 11 percent. 

All the Chiefs wanted AMSA to proceed with engine and advanced avionics development; General Wheeler excepted, they further recommended moving from concept 

formulation into the next phase of the acquisition cycle, which was contract definition.8

18
Strategic Nuclear Forces

19

In mid-July, Secretary McNamara proposed capping the Minuteman force at 1,000 

launchers. He noted that by 1970, according to intelligence projections, American 

superiority would diminish but still remain substantial (for hard-silo ICBMs, 1,054 

versus 272–537; for SLBMs, 656 versus 194-249).9 For Secretary McNamara, numbers 

alone were not crucial; what mattered was maintaining enough strength to accomplish assured destruction. According to OSD analyses, assured destruction could be 

accomplished completely with only a fraction of the force programmed through 1970.10

Secretary McNamara agreed that the ability to limit damage inflicted by “light” 

attacks should be improved. At this point, though, he rejected pursuing a “high-confidence” damage-limiting posture. After 1970, the Soviets might deploy MIRVed missiles 

that were accurate enough to destroy Minuteman silos. MIRVed Poseidons impressed 

him as the most efficient counters to Soviet offensive or defensive advances; their 

planned availability could, if necessary, be advanced from 1971 to 1970. If the Soviets 

emphasized ballistic missile defense, development of an Improved Capability Missile 

could be accelerated. In JSOP-70, General McConnell had recommended making an 

Advanced ICBM available by FY 1973.

As in past years, Secretary McNamara disagreed sharply with the Chiefs about 

the value of manned bombers. He wanted to start mothballing early-model B–52s 

sooner, bringing the B–52 force down to 255 by mid-1970, and retire all B–58s by then. 

Most importantly, he disapproved full-scale development of AMSA. By his calculation, dispersing 200 AMSAs would cost three to four times as much as a comparable 

deployment of Minuteman. He acknowledged that bombers forced the Soviets to split 

their defensive resources and provided a hedge against unexpectedly poor missile 

performances. The Secretary settled, however, upon what he deemed a cost–effective 

alternative to AMSA. Secretary McNamara had been promoting the F–111 fighterbomber as a showpiece of commonality to be used by the Navy as well as the Air 

Force. He now added a strategic bomber variant, the FB–111, proposing to deploy 60 

by mid-1969 and 210 by mid-1974.11

During the give-and-take over the budget, the Joint Chiefs faulted Secretary 

McNamara’s proposals for failing to maintain “a consistent margin of offensive and 

defensive superiority vis-à-vis the enemy threat.” They especially objected to what 

struck them as his emphasis upon “the need to pace our weapons system development 

and deployment programs with known changes in Soviet posture.” Using that yardstick 

assumed the availability of extraordinarily accurate US intelligence. Relying upon 

estimates of Soviet intentions, rather than Soviet capabilities, “increases the risk factor significantly, including the possible loss of US pre-eminence in capability to wage 

general war.” Safeguarding against a strategic surprise required “sequential decisions 

which take full advantage of our technological advancements” that should be pursued 

regardless of how far along the Soviets appeared to be.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked again for 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs. Their main 

complaint, however, concerned manned bombers. Secretary McNamara wanted to 

lower B–52 levels from 600 to 465 by mid-1967 and retire B–58s by FY 1970. The Chiefs, 

19
20

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

instead, recommended retaining B–58s and keeping early-model B–52s in service 

until FY 1968. Reducing the bomber force before FB-111s became available—at a time 

when B–52s were being diverted to conventional missions in Southeast Asia—would 

make execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) more difficult and 

reduce the hedge that B–52s provided against any missile vulnerability. The Chiefs also 

recommended retaining B–58s. As for AMSA, they wanted to proceed with systems 

studies and developing advanced subsystems, permitting initial availability in FY 1974. 

Admittedly, these steps would amount to authorizing contract definition. The Chiefs 

denied, nonetheless, that they amounted to “a commitment, conditional or otherwise, 

to develop the AMSA as a weapon system.”12

Secretary McNamara gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised proposals in midOctober. Accommodating the Mark 12 MIRV by using a maneuvering platform that 

would release one re-entry vehicle (RV) at a time from different planes required a 

wider and more powerful third stage of the rocket.13 Consequently, the MIRVed ICBM 

was renamed Minuteman III, which Secretary McNamara planned to begin deploying 

during FY 1969. He also wanted to assure the MIRVed Poseidon’s initial availability 

by August 1970. Further, Secretary McNamara authorized development of penetration 

aids for the Mark 11, 12, and 17 RVs intended for Minuteman III and Poseidon. Finally, 

he slowed B–52 retirements: 465 instead of 405 by mid-1967, 405 instead of 285 by mid1969. A spur to these changes came from fresh intelligence estimates that the number 

of Soviet ICBMs in mid-1970 would run between 460 and 650, significantly higher than 

the July projections.14

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by repeating their pleas for 555 B–52s in FY 

1967 and for 1,200 Minuteman launchers. General McConnell urged the other Chiefs to 

press for even higher B–52 and FB–111 levels. Ultimately, in mid-December, the OSD 

Comptroller decided to retain 555 B–52s through mid-1967 but slowed FB–111 procurement to 15 in FY 1967 and 105 by FY 1970. In sum, Secretary McNamara’s program 

would bring Minuteman III into service during 1969 and Poseidon in 1970. He held the 

Minuteman force to 1,000 launchers, projecting 700 Minuteman IIs and 300 Minuteman 

IIIs during 1972–1974.15 The Secretary refused, however, to approve development of 

either AMSA or an Advanced ICBM.16

Force Planning in 1966

I

n JSOP 68-75, submitted to the Secretary on 22 March 1966, the Joint Chiefs again 

urged adding AMSAs and Advanced ICBMs to the inventory but—for the first time—

did not challenge the Minuteman ceiling of 1,000 launchers. Comparing their recommendations with Secretary McNamara’s December 1965 levels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

once more attacked what struck them as the fallacy of basing calculations upon enemy 

intentions rather than enemy capabilities. They did not believe that US intelligence 

could make high-confidence predictions about Soviet weapon systems more than three 

20
Strategic Nuclear Forces

21

years ahead. Even medium-confidence forecasts, in their judgment, could not exceed 

more than four or five years. Since developing US counter-systems would take more 

than three years, adequate responses “cannot await high confidence warning of Soviet 

capabilities and often will be marginal even if based upon medium confidence warning.” That was why they urged pressing ahead with full-scale development of AMSA, 

equipping late-model B–52s with short-range air-to-surface missiles (SRAMs), assuring availability of the first Poseidons in FY 1970, developing small ballistic missiles to 

complement Poseidon, and deploying an Advanced ICBM by FY 1973.17

Already, in fact, Secretary McNamara was doing some rethinking about Soviet 

capabilities. He worried particularly that the ICBM force he had projected for FY 

1970—250 Minuteman Is, 570 Minuteman IIs, 180 Minuteman IIIs18—might not provide 

enough warheads and decoys to overcome Soviet missile defenses. Minuteman II carried a Mark 17 consisting of one re-entry vehicle with a large-yield warhead; Minuteman 

III’s Mark 12 RV would contain three warheads. What, Secretary McNamara asked 

General Wheeler in January 1966, would be the best Minuteman II-Minuteman III mix 

and how many Mark 12s and Mark 17s should be procured?19 In June, the Chairman’s 

Special Studies Group concluded that more Mark 12s were needed and recommended 

deploying more Minuteman IIIs than previously projected. Agreeing, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that Mark 12 production could be raised without 

major disruption. The Secretary concurred.20

Secretary McNamara made adjustments in the DPM that he circulated on 28 

July 1966. The first Minuteman II squadron had become operational in April. For FY 

1975, Secretary McNamara projected more Minuteman IIIs and Poseidons than previously, but he continued deferring decisions about developing an Advanced ICBM and 

a small ballistic missile. For AMSA, he disapproved its initial availability by FY 1974, 

believing that late-model B–52s could continue operating effectively even after 1975. 

He also postponed SRAM procurement, cut B–52 crew-to-aircraft ratios, and reduced 

the ground alert rate from 53 to 43 percent. Secretary McNamara’s program, which 

substituted accuracy for throw-weight, would increase the number of weapons in the 

alert force during the 1970s but decrease the number of megatons.

Intelligence estimates forecast a further diminution of the US advantage in hardsilo ICBM launchers, with the Soviets deploying somewhere between 639 and 900 in 

1970. Secretary McNamara remained convinced that the US missile force programmed 

for 1972 could achieve assured destruction levels. He noted that, as insurance against a 

higher-than-expected Soviet threat, all 31 Polaris submarines stationed in the Atlantic 

and Mediterranean could be modified so that the SLBM force could deliver a good deal 

more than its current payload.21

In their critique, dated 31 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the “fundamental issue” of what struck them as Secretary McNamara’s constant underestimate and 

understatement of the risks being run. The Soviets, they repeated, were building both 

assured destruction and damage-limiting capabilities—and doing so from a smaller 

economic base. They cited a study by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha 

21
22

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

concluding that, for the first time, Free World casualties would almost equal those of 

the Communist Bloc even in a US pre-emptive attack. If the Soviets struck first, the 

casualties in the Free World would “greatly exceed” those of their adversaries.22 Thus 

the United States was losing a credible first strike option, thereby giving Moscow 

growing opportunities for nuclear blackmail. Since the Chiefs’ objections were more 

philosophical than programmatic, they lodged few objections to Secretary McNamara’s 

near-term decisions, asking him to delay Titan retirements, obtain firm contractor 

proposals for AMSA, and maintain B–52 alert rates and crew-to-aircraft ratios. Secretary McNamara made only one change, agreeing to keep the Titans through FY 1975.23

When Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with President Johnson for the final budget wrap-up, on 6 December 1966, their main topic was whether 

to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.24 The Secretary strongly opposed 

doing so. The Chiefs just as strongly pressed for going ahead, General Wheeler observing that “deterrence was not only technology, it was a state of mind. Our having an 

ABM system would increase our deterrence capability, no matter what [the Soviets] 

did.” AMSA also was brought before the President. Apparently trying to anticipate 

Secretary McNamara’s objections, General McConnell moved the most likely date of 

AMSA’s initial operational capability back from 1974 to 1976. President Johnson asked 

General McConnell to compare AMSA with the FB–111. General McConnell said that it 

would have slightly higher speed, more range, and—most importantly—a substantially 

greater bomb-carrying capacity. But Secretary McNamara still doubted the need for a 

new manned bomber, citing difficulties in penetration expected by the mid-1970s, and 

in any case saw no need to move as fast as the Air Force wanted.25 Subsequently, the 

President sided with the Secretary on both ABM and AMSA.

Meantime, in September 1966, General Wheeler had tasked his Special Studies 

Group with assessing the adequacy of US strategic forces through the early 1970s. 

This exercise sparked the most detailed exchange yet between the Chiefs and Secretary McNamara over what constituted deterrence. Answering General Wheeler in 

mid-November 1966, the Group anticipated a Soviet superiority in total megatonnage 

by 1967. The United States, on the other hand, would retain an advantage in megatonequivalents delivered and widen its lead in numbers of warheads as MIRVs began 

entering the inventory. Neither side could prevent the other from inflicting heavy 

damage; programmed forces would not provide the United States with a first-strike 

capability. Nonetheless, the appearance of Soviet missile defenses would introduce 

uncertainties that could profoundly affect US planning and reduce confidence in US 

retaliatory capability. Those defenses would have to be overcome by still-unproven 

penetration aids, in which the Group professed “low confidence.” If the Soviets 

thought that US forces could not carry out a pre-emptive attack without suffering 

unacceptable damage in return the American deterrent would lose effectiveness, 

especially in dealing with non-nuclear aggression. And, if the Soviets ever concluded 

that they could limit damage to the USSR to an acceptable level, they might well 

consider making a first strike. Thus, to the Group, the value of creating US missile 

22
Strategic Nuclear Forces

23

defense appeared obvious. In forwarding these “valuable” findings to the Secretary, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the position enjoyed by the United States since 

1945 had been “eroded seriously” by the Soviet buildup. Deploying missile defenses, 

even on a modest scale along with other offensive and defensive improvements, 

“would contribute to the US deterrent posture by introducing further uncertainties 

in Soviet plans and evaluations.”26

Secretary McNamara rejected these findings virtually in toto. He deemed it “unfortunate” that the Group concentrated on a comparison of US and Soviet total megatonnage, which he did not consider a good measure of capabilities. Moreover, the Group 

wrongly included Soviet cruise missiles and medium bombers in its tabulation, while 

making US bomb loadings too low. With appropriate additions and subtractions, “the 

US does much better.” And, in the megaton-equivalent category, Secretary McNamara’s 

calculations showed US superiority to be even greater than the Group supposed. Most 

of what the Group said about Soviet missile defenses was accurate, he acknowledged, 

“but the sense is misleading.” Even assuming that Soviet defenses would be perfectly 

effective and heavily deployed, “we will almost certainly have much more capability 

for assured destruction than we will require.” Moreover, according to OSD analysts, 

penetration aids should prove quite effective. The continuing ability to accomplish 

assured destruction impressed him as the fact worth stressing. In fact, “by any relevant 

measure of strategic force,” the United States should maintain a position of “significant 

strategic superiority” through 1975. Since “we cannot hope to erode the USSR’s own 

assured destruction capability, . . .we would be foolish to count on strategic forces 

to deter aggression at much lower levels. This, I believe, illustrates the correctness 

of our emphasis in the past six years on conventional forces to counter conventional 

aggression.”27

Refining the SIOP

Should deterrence fail, and nuclear exchanges begin, a Single Integrated Operational Plan would govern the execution of the US strategy. The first step in SIOP 

preparation—drafting guidance about tasks, options, and damage criteria—was done 

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then approved by the Secretary of Defense. Next, this 

guidance was given to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) in Omaha. 

The Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), who was a four-star 

Air Force officer, acted as the Director of Strategic Target Planning; a vice admiral 

served as his deputy. The JSTPS drew up target lists, grouped targets into categories, 

and matched weapons against targets. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and 

approved the resulting plan.

Since the early 1960s the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense had been trying to widen the range of options and choices in the SIOP, the 

aim being a more controlled response and greater discrimination in the selection of 
24

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

targets. In October 1961, Secretary McNamara had approved the guidance for SIOP-63 

that first defined controlled response. The next plan—SIOP-64, which the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff approved in October 1963 and which took effect on 1 January 1964—derived 

from this same guidance. SIOP-64 contained three tasks—Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie—

with five options that were combinations of those tasks. In December 1964, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff issued guidance for preparing a plan that would supersede SIOP-64. 

Since its basic philosophy did not depart from what was used in preparing SIOP-64, 

Secretary McNamara’s approval was unnecessary. The three tasks were reworded and 

a fourth—Delta—added; options were recast to cover changes.

The JSTPS then set about preparing a detailed plan. In the spring of 1966, as a new 

SIOP neared completion, General John D. Ryan (CINCSAC and Director, JSTPS) submitted an encouraging report. Since January 1964, when SIOP-64 became effective, missile 

reliability had risen from 35 to 64 percent; the number of missiles on alert status had 

increased, and their average accuracy had improved. Thus, although the number of 

Soviet ICBMs in hardened silos had risen from 25 to 229, damage expectancy inflicted 

by the alert missile force executing one of the tasks had grown significantly higher.28

On 6 May, General Ryan submitted a draft plan for Joint Chiefs of Staff approval. 

Twelve days later, they approved SIOP-4 (the revision of SIOP-64) and announced that 

it would become effective on 1 July 1966. The new plan, they assured General Ryan, 

represented “a significant improvement over SIOP-64, particularly with regard to the 

targeting of the non-alert force and the increased emphasis given to Communist China.” 

The Joint Chiefs did make some alterations, telling General Ryan to continue efforts 

at improving targeting against China.29

On 6 June, Secretary McNamara was given a briefing on SIOP-4. He indicated a 

desire to inflict more casualties under one option, particularly against China, and to 

achieve a more favorable ratio of Free World versus Communist casualties under all 

conditions. General Ryan investigated the Chinese problem and his report was not 

encouraging. Secretary McNamara also asked whether it was possible, without executing the SIOP, to carry out a small number of strikes against either China or the Soviet 

Union. The J–3 opposed limited attacks against the USSR because of the possibility 

that doing so would provoke a major Soviet response. Indeed, the mere existence of 

such plans might harm the SIOP’s credibility.

General McConnell proposed replying that the United States possessed “the most 

flexible, responsive, and capable force in the world.” General Johnson, apparently 

less amenable to Secretary McNamara’s idea, argued that small-scale attacks would 

conflict with “a basic principle of general war,” that the greatest resources should 

be employed at the earliest time. Doing what Secretary McNamara proposed could 

provoke major Soviet retaliation under conditions less favorable to the United States. 

Admiral McDonald suggested replying that, while a capability for small strikes did 

exist, the Joint Chiefs of Staff “probably would have serious reservations” about exercising it.30 The outcome of these exchanges, however, was a brief and bland memorandum forwarded on 22 September. Procedures were available, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Strategic Nuclear Forces

25

assured the Secretary, for directing the execution of “individual or small numbers of 

strikes against enemy countries.” No specific plans of that sort pertaining to the USSR 

had been prepared.31

In July 1966, just after SIOP-4 became effective, General Ryan asked that Task 

Delta be eliminated. The small loss of flexibility, he claimed, would be more than 

offset by decreasing the complexities of targeting, decisionmaking, execution procedure, and maintenance of the plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and, on 15 

September, issued appropriate guidance.32 SIOP-4 was still in effect when Lyndon 

Johnson left office.

Force Planning in 1967

The Joint Chiefs explained to Secretary McNamara how JSOP 69-76, which they sent him on 19 April 1967, differed from the previous year’s JSOP. Rather than 

hypothesizing what the Soviets might achieve by fully exploiting their technological 

potential, the document cited actual Soviet capabilities and what war games had shown 

about US ability to wage general war. That led to an ominous conclusion. By deploying 

ABMs, improving the quality of their bomber defenses, and accelerating construction 

of hardened and dispersed missile silos, the Soviets had set in motion an erosion of 

US strategic power that even the introduction of FB–111s in FY 1969, of Minuteman III 

in FY 1970, and of Poseidon in FY 1971 would not reverse. After 1971, in fact, adverse 

trends would accelerate. Accordingly, the Chiefs advocated: proceeding with full-scale 

development of AMSA; equipping B–52s with SRAMs starting in FY 1970; and proceeding, after the successful completion of contract definition, to make an Advanced ICBM 

available by FY 1973.33

One month later, findings from the Chairman’s Special Studies Group reinforced the 

JSOP’s recommendations. Back in autumn 1966, when the issue of increasing Mark 12 

production was being debated, Deputy Secretary Vance asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

describe desirable levels during 1972–74 of (1) MIRVed Mark 3s for Poseidon, (2) Mark 18s 

for Minuteman II, and (3) SRAMs. In May 1967, the Special Studies Group concluded that 

equipping all Poseidons with Mark 3s would be the best way to overcome strong Soviet 

missile defenses. If no such defenses existed, half the Poseidons should have Mark 3s 

and half should have single-warhead Mark 17s. Since penetration aids seemed so vital 

to success, the Group recommended acquiring additional RVs by equipping Minuteman 

IIs with Mark 18s rather than Mark 17s. As for SRAMs, the Group judged that requirements varied widely according to the effectiveness of air defenses. The important thing, 

therefore, was to create a production base that could be adjusted according to need. On 

21 June, the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara that these findings buttressed the 

recommendations in JSOP 69-76. His program, by contrast, failed to furnish high assurance that a nuclear war could be concluded on clearly advantageous terms—which, to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the essence of deterrence.34
26

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Secretary McNamara, however, saw no reason to make drastic changes. By 1972, 

according to intelligence projections, the Soviets might take a small lead in hard-silo 

ICBMs and a large lead in alert force megatons. Even so, he insisted that numbers of 

launchers and bombers were poor measures of relative capabilities; total megatons 

were worse. In determining whether forces could accomplish assured destruction 

and carry out damage-limiting attacks on Soviet forces, factors such as accuracy, 

reliability, survivability, and control impressed him as “the most decisive” in calculating effectiveness. “Our missiles,” he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “appear to be more 

reliable than Soviet missiles; they are more than twice as accurate. . . . Therefore, the 

best way to increase the effectiveness of our forces is by further reducing our large 

warhead forces . . .while putting MIRVs on Poseidon and Minuteman.” Only against 

Soviet offensive and defensive forces that exceeded any intelligence forecasts would 

US retaliatory strength require major additions. Since that eventuality seemed so 

unlikely, the United States could afford to select options with small initial costs and 

delay full development until necessary. Consequently, Secretary McNamara kept the 

AMSA and the Advanced ICBM within the stage of concept formulation by approving 

only advanced development. He also deferred SRAM production.35

Still hopeful, the Joint Chiefs of Staff renewed their argument that, since major 

uncertainties probably would remain unresolved a year hence, delaying decisions 

until precise intelligence appeared would invite unnecessary risk. How could the 

Secretary be sure that Soviets would think and act “like us,” limiting their forces to 

“arbitrary and static levels of assured destruction?” Already, they reminded Secretary 

McNamara, studies had documented the trend toward “significant relative decline” 

in US capabilities—a trend that was not being recognized and reflected in the Secretary’s decisions. By late 1967, in fact, some areas of target coverage probably would be 

affected. Specifically, they pressed for: retaining Titan IIs until a new ICBM with large 

throw-weight entered the inventory; procuring high-yield Mark 17 RVs for Minuteman 

III; authorizing contract definition for the Advanced ICBM; retrofitting all submarines 

still carrying A–2 missiles with A–3s that had almost twice the range and delivered a 

multiple RV in which three warheads separated into a triangular pattern centered at 

one target; retaining options to employ penetration aids on A–3s, Mark 17s on Poseidon, and more lower-yield Mark 3s on each Poseidon booster; preserving the option 

of a ballistic missile ship; equipping B–52s with SRAMs; and completing the contract 

definition phase of AMSA’s development.36

Intelligence now forecast, fairly definitively, a 1972 force of Soviet ICBMs numbering between 950 and 1,369 launchers. Early in October 1967, Secretary McNamara 

agreed to retain all Titan IIs and approved, as an alternative to the Advanced ICBM, 

developing super-hardened silos for Minuteman IIIs. The latter step, he claimed, 

“removes much of the pressure to develop additional land-based capability.” Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained sufficiently concerned to seek face-to-face 

discussions with the Secretary. They contrasted his position with theirs in the manner 

shown as follows:
Strategic Nuclear Forces

27

1. “Assured destruction” versus “a comprehensive approach to the mission and 

tasks of strategic nuclear forces.”

2.“Population fatality assessments” versus “war-waging and war-termination 

scenarios.”

3. Deferment of SRAM deployment pending “positive evidence of a new Soviet 

low-level air defense system” versus SRAM production commencing in FY 1970.

4. Foreclosure for Poseidon of the Mark 17 RV versus “preservation of the option 

pending demonstration of MIRV performance and accuracy.”

5. Fewer versus more Mark 3 warheads for each Poseidon booster.

6. Confining AMSA to advanced development versus moving AMSA into contract 

definition in FY 1969 and, “dependent upon favorable review, full-scale development to preserve an initial operational capability in FY 1976.”

7. Disapproval of a ballistic missile ship versus proceeding with concept formulation and, “dependent upon favorable review, procurement of prototypes for 

tests and timing.”37

The showdown came on 4 December at a White House meeting attended by the 

President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Going into the meeting, in a minor concession to the Joint Chiefs, Secretary McNamara authorized the 

modification of thirty B–52s to carry SRAMs38 but, otherwise, he remained firm in 

opposing the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals. For strategic retaliatory forces, the discussion focused on whether to proceed with AMSA. Secretary McNamara observed 

that in 1976, under his program, we would have 465 B–52s and FB–111s, 1,542 missile 

launchers on line,39 and 8,190 separately targetable bombs or warheads. Should a 

greater-than-expected threat emerge, possible responses included building more Minuteman silos and missiles, adding point defenses for Minuteman fields, and equipping 

B–52s with newer missiles. Speaking for the Chiefs, General McConnell replied that 

acquiring new bombers was better than having to modify the system if a greater-thanexpected threat emerged. Procuring 150 AMSAs would cost as much as $7.5 billion, 

he acknowledged, but in FY 1969 only $40 million was needed for contract definition. 

Bombers, McConnell claimed, were superior to missiles in achieving “sure destruction.” Secretary McNamara, calling the threat level needed to justify AMSA unrealistic, 

proposed spending only $25 million for advanced aircraft technology and penetration 

aids; President Johnson accepted his advice.40

Force Planning in 1968

J

SOP 70-77, submitted in April 1968, recited a familiar litany of recommendations 

(full-scale development of AMSA, SRAM production, contract definition of an 

Advanced ICBM, funding of a ballistic missile ship prototype, planning more RVs 

for Poseidon boosters) and added new ones that included: concept formulation for 

an air-launched missile to defend bombers; contract definition for a subsonic cruise 

armed decoy (SCAD); and full-scale development of the powerful Mark 18. Again, too, 
28

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

it warned that the approved program put worldwide US interests at increasing risk 

because confidence was decreasing in America’s capability to emerge from a nuclear 

war in “a position of strategic advantage.”41

Even though Secretary McNamara was gone, replaced in March 1968 by former 

Truman administration advisor Clark M. Clifford, sentiment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for holding the line on strategic nuclear forces remained as strong 

and determined as ever. Accordingly, in addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze offered little optimism that they would 

receive a favorable hearing, except for the contract definition of SCAD. Looking to 1972, 

the latest National Intelligence Estimate forecast a small Soviet lead in ICBMs (1,054 

versus 1,020–1,251) and a US advantage of almost two to one in SLBMs (656 versus 

267–318). But even with greater megatonnage, according to Secretary Nitze, the Soviets 

could not take away US ability to accomplish assured destruction, “largely because 

we will maintain a commanding lead in the number of weapons available and because 

our forces are relatively invulnerable to a Soviet first strike.” Only if the Soviets spent 

$20 to $30 billion above the “high” estimate would major additions become necessary 

and, in that case, “we have many options . . . that do not require a major effort now.” A 

decision on the least expensive of these options, adding five Poseidon boats and putting terminal decoys on all Poseidons, could be postponed for four years. Secretary 

Nitze intended to maintain “nuclear superiority” in numbers of warheads but doubted 

whether that superiority could be “converted into meaningful political power.”42

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rebutted that “we are compromising US strategy to accommodate to the Soviet improved posture.” OSD’s rationale and recommendations implied 

that the United States had neither the capacity nor the intent to acquire capabilities 

needed “to pursue effectively a complete military strategy.” A Soviet decision to initiate 

hostilities, the Chiefs argued, would be influenced by expected US as well as Soviet 

losses and by estimates of relative surviving military capabilities. “If they sustain 20 

percent fatalities43 as compared to 80 percent for the United States, for example, they 

might not be deterred from initiating an attack . . . .” Further, judgments about what 

constituted deterrence should include evaluations of possible Soviet attacks involving 

“pindown” of Minuteman fields,44 fractional orbital bombardment systems, submarines 

launching cruise missiles, and medium bombers. As US superiority eroded, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff perceived two principal dangers: first, increasing confidence by the Soviets leading them into high-risk courses; and second, the possibility that such course 

would escalate into strategic nuclear war. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed 

as “essential” the proposals set forth in JSOP-70-77.45

In his final DPM dated 9 January 1969, Secretary Nitze made minor program 

changes, modifying all B–52s and FB–111s to carry SRAMs and SCADs, and retaining B–58s in service until SCADs became available for B–52s. Also, he considerably 

reduced production targets for the FB–111 and slightly raised the number of B–52s 

staying in service. His supporting rationale was recast to say that “the relationship 

of ‘nuclear superiority’ as such to our military and political objectives is debatable. 
Strategic Nuclear Forces

29

Strategic nuclear forces do not have the capacity to seize territory, even when they 

are superior in numbers. They can only destroy it. As a consequence, we know of 

no feasible way of ending a strategic nuclear war, short of the total destruction and 

exhaustion of both sides, except through mutual control and restraint. Thus, while 

‘nuclear superiority’ appears attractive, we do not know how to take advantage of 

it to achieve our national security objectives.”46 Here, though, Secretary Nitze was 

refuting an argument that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had never presented. The Chiefs 

had justified preserving nuclear superiority in negative terms of what it would prevent, not in positive terms of seizing territory.

As the Johnson administration ended, Strategic Air Command controlled 59 Titan 

IIs, 967 Minuteman Is and IIs, 579 B–52s, and 76 B–58s.47 The SLBM force comprised 

41 submarines carrying 656 Polaris missiles. On 16 August 1968, at Cape Kennedy, a 

Minuteman III and a Poseidon C–3 were test-fired successfully from separate pads. 

The first Polaris-to-Poseidon conversion, USS James Madison, began in February 

1969 and finished in March 1971. The Soviets did not successfully test a MIRVed missile until 1973.

Perspectives

Who had the best of these debates over the nature of deterrence and the value of nuclear superiority? Secretary McNamara remained wedded to assured 

destruction because he did not see how either side could attack the other without suffering massive damage in return. When the Chiefs cited calculations from war games, 

Secretary McNamara perceived no meaningful difference because the millions killed 

in any scenario were wholly disastrous. What the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated, in 

essence, were programs that would preserve commanding leads in all categories. But 

what that promised, in Secretary McNamara’s view, was an endless upward spiral 

creating greater danger rather than greater security. He could claim vindication in 

that the Soviets avoided nuclear adventurism even after US superiority in launchers 

and megatonnage disappeared.

On other aspects, however, Joint Chiefs of Staff views found a fair measure of vindication. “Clearly,” Secretary McNamara argued in a 1967 speech, “the Soviet buildup is 

in part a reaction to our own buildup since the beginning of the 1960s. Soviet strategic 

planners undoubtedly reasoned that if our buildup were to continue at its accelerated 

pace, we might conceivably reach, in time, a first-strike capability.”48 In mid-1968, US 

intelligence estimated that the Soviets would deploy, by mid-1972, 1,020–1,251 hard 

ICBM and 267–318 SLBM launchers. Actually, by mid-1972, the Soviet inventory included 

1,618 ICBM launchers, either operational or under construction, and 950 SLBMs.49

As the Joint Chiefs had foreseen, the Soviets were not thinking and acting “like us.” 

Quite possibly, the Soviets always intended to deploy a massive force but, when their 
30

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

early-model missiles proved so poor, delayed doing so until they developed ICBMs 

comparable to Minuteman.

Secretary McNamara remained confident that a capability to accomplish assured 

destruction, using criteria measurable through statistical analysis, constituted deterrence. General Wheeler, by contrast, spoke for the Chiefs in describing deterrence as “a 

state of mind.” In September 1967, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown articulated 

this argument perhaps more cogently than the Chiefs had themselves. “My feeling,” 

Secretary Brown warned Secretary McNamara, “is that we have become too theoretical—that our calculations are too removed from the most likely patterns of admittedly 

unlikely wars, and hence from the probable Soviet judgments which determine deterrence.” In some future equivalent of the Cuban missile crisis, a capability to inflict 

20 percent fatalities on the Soviets might not be enough if US losses would reach 80 

percent. In those circumstances, Secretary Brown argued, Soviet leaders might believe 

that the United States would cease to exist while the USSR could successfully recover, 

using its surviving nuclear forces to dominate the European industrial complex. Hence 

Secretary Brown put forward a new criterion: make sure that Soviet losses would be at 

least as severe as US ones, and that the postwar military balance would not favor the 

Soviets.50 Later, as Secretary of Defense in the 1970s Secretary Brown would refine this 

view and call it the “countervailing strategy,” taking the assured destruction concept 

a step further in refinement.51 Thus Secretary McNamara’s assured destruction was 

eventually supplanted by criteria that drew upon Secretary Brown’s proposal.
31

3

Losing the ABM Debate

As 1965 opened, an increasingly acrimonious debate centered upon the feasibility 

of ballistic missile defense. In 1959, the Army put forward a plan to deploy a NikeZeus anti-ballistic missile system but President Eisenhower refused to move beyond 

research, development and testing. Nike-Zeus had two main drawbacks. First, the 

mechanically-steered radar had a limited target-handling capability, rendering 

defenses vulnerable to a saturation attack. Second, the intercepting missile’s slow 

speed meant that it had to be fired long before a target re-entered the atmosphere 

where real warheads could be distinguished from decoys. During 1961–62, the Army 

worked on an improved system Nike-X. A phased-array radar structure covered with 

thousands of sensors would remain stationary while an electronic beam rotated a 

million times faster than a mechanical structure and thus could handle many more 

incoming objects. A Sprint missile was developed for high-acceleration terminal 

defense (5,000 to 100,000 feet at a range of 25 miles), able to wait until warheads 

had penetrated well into the atmosphere and separated from decoys. In the spring 

of 1965, the Army initiated development of Spartan, an extended-range interceptor 

supposed to climb 80,000 feet in ten seconds, reach out 400 nautical miles, and hit 

objects as high as 280 nautical miles.1

By then, however, Secretary McNamara harbored grave doubts about the feasibility of ballistic missile defense. According to his analysts’ calculations, every 

defensive deployment could be overcome by offensive improvements costing only 

a fraction as much. He therefore held Nike-X at the developmental stage. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, conversely, rated Nike-X an indispensable element of deterrence and 

pressed for pre-production funds. They saw “damage limitation” as the essential 

counterpart of “assured destruction.” Without ballistic missile defenses, they asked, 

how could the United States emerge advantageously from a nuclear exchange? And 

in that case, might not the concept of deterrence itself be fatally weakened?

31
32

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Force Planning in 1965

Through Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP-70), forwarded to Secretary McNamara in March 1965, the JCS assessed an Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI), a 

surface-launched Surface-to-Air Missile, Development (SAM-D) capable of downing 

bombers at all altitudes, and Nike-X. On IMI, General McConnell wanted the 2,000-mph 

F–12 to begin entering the inventory during FY 1969. General Wheeler also wished to 

have an IMI by that date, but he was willing to accept whatever aircraft further analyses might favor: the F–12; the dual-purpose F–111 intended to reach Mach 2.2; or the 

F–4 Phantom designed as a long-range Navy interceptor but being adopted by the Air 

Force. However, Admiral McDonald, General Greene, and General Johnson wanted to 

defer a decision, believing the need for IMI was not immediate and noting that development of the F–12 and F–111 was essentially complete. On Nike-X, all except General 

McConnell favored starting deployment, with the exact scope to be decided later. The 

lone dissenter supported sufficient funding to permit initial availability in FY 1970 but 

wanted a deployment decision to await progress on development and testing.2

Secretary McNamara saw no point in making a major effort to achieve damage 

limitation. Existing air defenses, he found, had been created to meet an attack by 

hundreds of bombers but, since no Soviet force of this size had materialized, available 

SAMs and interceptors struck him as “quantitatively excessive in relation to their cost 

and effectiveness.” Therefore, he intended to start retiring F–102s and disapproved F–12 

procurement because (1) either F–111s or new SAMs might be equally effective and (2) 

doing so would make sense only in conjunction with ABM deployment and a fallout 

shelter program. As to Nike-X, he still found no justification for full-scale deployment. 

If the United States spent $30 billion on a comprehensive damage limitation program, 

the USSR could overcome it by spending only $6 billion for improved ICBMs carrying penetration aids. But he acknowledged that China, by exploding its first nuclear 

device in October 1964, had changed the equation. Whatever ICBMs the Chinese might 

deploy would be relatively unsophisticated. Tentatively, therefore, he planned a light 

anti-Chinese defense which would allow him to postpone a deployment decision for 

at least one year. The JCS replied by repeating their JSOP recommendations—save 

for Nike-X, where they reserved judgment pending review of the Army’s forthcoming 

deployment plan.3

The Army’s “DEPEX” plan, which appeared soon afterward, was designed to 

provide high-altitude area protection for the entire United States and short-range or 

“terminal” defense of high-value targets. Phase I costing $9.5 billion would protect 

sixteen cities by FY 1973. Phase II costing another $3.5 billion would shield 25 cities 

by FY 1975. For a further $13.5 billion, Phases III and IV would cover 51 cities by FY 

1982. Defenses created during these two final phases would be able to deal with a 

sophisticated attack.4

The President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) approved a report by its 

Strategic Military Panel that found scant merit in DEPEX. A simple area defense 

32
Losing the ABM Debate

33

against Chinese missiles, using off-the-shelf hardware, could be built rapidly for as 

little as $1 billion. But the Panel judged that approach “more effective than necessary” 

against early Chinese ICBMs, yet inadequate against short-range SLBMs with low trajectories and air-breathing cruise missiles. Surely, in the face of massive US strategic 

offensive forces, a few soft and easily located Chinese ICBMs “would not constitute a 

very plausible blackmail threat or deterrent capability.”5 The Soviets, seeing DEPEX as 

being ultimately directed against them, might respond by deploying full-scale missile 

defenses and acquiring enough penetration aids to overcome an area defense—putting 

pressure upon the United States to expand its strategic forces again. Consequently, the 

Panel opposed making a deployment decision “this year.” Instead, DOD should intensify its study of ways to counter short-range SLBMs and air-breathing missiles, design 

and evaluate a cheap and rapidly deployable area defense, and vigorously pursue its 

efforts on penetration aids.6

The Joint Chiefs viewed matters quite differently. In their judgment, the need for 

an effective ballistic missile defense was “very real and urgent”; DEPEX represented 

“a logical approach,” providing a basic defense and permitting controlled growth at 

fairly level rates of expenditure. They dismissed off-the-shelf area defense as inadequate and disagreed with PSAC’s argument for delaying a deployment decision. The 

report, they claimed, had overstressed the limited nature of the Chinese threat and 

based its conclusions upon “incomplete military and political considerations that go 

beyond the scope of scientific appraisal.”7 The Soviets might see in US failure to deploy 

missile defenses an opportunity to redress the strategic balance and would, accordingly, accelerate their offensive and defensive efforts. By targeting their larger missile 

payloads against undefended American urban concentrations, they might outdistance 

US forces in casualty-causing capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore endorsed 

Army plans for protecting 25 cities, and strongly supported allocating $188 million 

in pre-production funds so as to preserve the option of starting Nike-X deployments 

during FY 1970.8

Already, though, Secretary McNamara had sided with the scientists. His final DPM, 

distributed on 1 November, recommended $403 million for Nike-X’s development but 

nothing for its deployment. Taking that approach, he argued, still would make possible 

a “light” defense against small or unsophisticated attacks during the middle and late 

1970s. Previous intelligence had estimated that Soviet ABM systems might become 

operational around Leningrad as early as mid-1965 and around Moscow by about mid1967. But now, Secretary McNamara noted, numerous indications pointed to Soviet 

difficulties, construction at the sites was sporadic, and the Leningrad installation 

might prove to be a long-range air defense system.9

The Joint Chiefs made one last bid on Nike-X’s behalf, putting their case before 

President Johnson early in December 1965. Soviet attacks, they told him, could kill 40 

percent of the US population in 1970 and 50 percent by 1975. DEPEX coverage, however, 

could be accelerated so that US survivors in 1975 could total 75 to 90 percent of the 

population, 35 to 50 million of whom could be directly attributable to ballistic missile 

33
34

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

defenses. “These added survivors could spell the difference between national survival 

and collapse.”10

Their plea changed nothing. In January 1966, Secretary McNamara informed the 

Secretary of the Army that a procurement decision on Nike-X could be postponed for 

at least another year. He did, however, award highest priority to developing (1) a short 

lead-time system to cope with a minimum threat, (2) a defense against more sophisticated attack, (3) a major damage-limiting capability aimed at the Soviet threat, and 

(4) a “point” defense of Minuteman fields.11 To sum up, the Secretary’s plan for FYs 

1967–1974 retained nearly all Hawk and Nike-Hercules fire units and gradually reduced 

“Century” interceptors to about 600; it excluded IMI and Nike-X.

Force Planning in 1966

I

n JSOP 68-75, circulated on 22 March 1966, the Joint Chiefs proposed giving Nike-X 

the highest priority in order to permit the earliest possible production. In 1966, they 

estimated a Soviet attack could kill 50 million Americans; by 1975, that figure could 

reach 100 million. Phase II of DEPEX, covering 25 cities, was attainable by mid-1975 

and would allow a “balanced” defense against a light attack, a “reasonably good” 

protection against a low Soviet threat, and a foundation for expansion. SAM-D, a necessary adjunct, would be effective against all Soviet bombers, cruise missiles, and 

air-to-surface missiles. All the Chiefs agreed upon the F–12 as the most cost-effective 

interceptor of high-speed aircraft. But General Wheeler and Admiral McDonald would 

go no further than buying twelve aircraft in FY 1972, letting further procurement await 

an accumulation of operational experience and further evaluation of Soviet bomber 

strength. For the same reason, General Greene confined his recommendation to 24 

F–12s by FY 1973. Finally, the Joint Chiefs noted the advent of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft. These modified Boeing 707s, loaded with radars and 

communications equipment, would vastly improve the effectiveness of manned interceptors. They wanted the first 24 AWACS to be available in FY 1972 and that number 

increased to 42 by FY 1973.12

In his tentative DPM, dated 27 July, Secretary McNamara proposed simply continuing the current program. The Soviets, he calculated, could overwhelm DEPEX II by 

adding 200 missiles to their attacking force. He also deferred a decision on modernizing 

air defenses. In justification, he cited studies showing that either 32 F–12s or 48 F–111s, 

both supported by AWACS, could destroy as many bombers as the Century interceptors. Since F–111s already were in production, they obviously would be cheaper than 

F–12s.13 Replying one month later, the Joint Chiefs protested that Secretary McNamara’s 

program would produce an increasingly obsolete defense and ever smaller damagelimiting capabilities. The United States, they insisted, could and should maintain an 

overall strategic advantage: “Further, because the survival of fundamental US values 

and institutions are involved, . . . increased priority should be given . . . to military 

34
Losing the ABM Debate

35

risks, operational capabilities, and, in particular, means of limiting damage to the 

United States.” They claimed that, according to data in Secretary McNamara’s DPM, 

adequate damage-limiting measures could result in (1) the survival of 150 to 200 million Americans in a nuclear war and (2) the preservation of industrial potential and 

material resources superior to those of any other nation.14 Here, apparently, they were 

picking particular figures from the DPM’s estimate that US fatalities in 1976 would be: 

22 to 45 percent under Secretary McNamara’s program; 5 to 34 percent if ABMs and 

expanded fallout shelters protected 25 cities; and 3 to 22 percent if ABMs and fallout 

shelters covered 52 cities.

Late in November, Secretary McNamara circulated a DPM dealing exclusively with 

Nike-X. He noted that the Soviets had accelerated their ICBM deployments, definitely 

begun building an ABM system around Moscow and perhaps started a second one, 

dubbed the Tallinn Line, in the northwestern USSR that featured improved anti-air and 

perhaps ABM potential.15 Still, Secretary McNamara opposed deploying an anti-Soviet 

ABM system “at this time.” An assured destruction capability remained the foundation 

of US security, and the same held true for the USSR: “It is the virtual certainty that the 

Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent that casts such grave doubts on the advisability of deploying the Nike-X system. . . . In all probability, all we would accomplish 

would be to increase greatly their defensive expenditures and ours without any gain 

in real security on either side.” China had launched a 400-mile missile and might be 

preparing to test an ICBM booster. Even so, Secretary McNamara felt certain that the 

United States could construct ballistic missile defenses faster than the Chinese could 

deploy significant ICBM forces. Therefore, he disapproved preparations for production 

but held open an option for action later.16 Responding on 2 December, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff urged Secretary McNamara to bear in mind the need for a “suitable interrelationship” between assured destruction and damage limitation capabilities. Again, they 

reaffirmed their recommendation to deploy Nike-X, starting in FY 1972.17

On 6 December, at the budget wrap-up with President Johnson, Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs debated the merits of a heavy versus a thin defense. General 

Wheeler disputed Secretary McNamara’s argument that deploying heavy defenses 

would compel the Soviets to increase their offensive forces.18 For the Soviets, Wheeler 

said, the cost of deploying an ABM system would constitute an important diversion of 

resources. MIRV technology would reduce the kilotonnage of their payloads, so they 

faced grave uncertainties in targeting against our ABMs. Since deterrence involved 

not only technology but also a state of mind, he continued, US deployments would 

increase our deterrent capability no matter what the Soviets did. Conversely, absence 

of an ABM defense might increase the possibility of war by accident, create a sense of 

imbalance between the superpowers, suggest that the United States was interested 

only in offensive missile forces, and indicate that we were unwilling to pay to maintain 

our current nuclear superiority.

What, President Johnson asked, determined the difference in judgment between 

the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs? Secretary McNamara replied that it “lay less in 

35
36

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

rational calculation than in the inherently emotional nature of the issue.” The Soviets, 

he contended, had spent two or three times as much as the United States to create 

defenses that were “not worth a damn.” Following their lead would trigger a costly 

action-reaction cycle leaving neither side any better off. But Secretary McNamara did 

see justification for a limited system capable of protecting offensive forces, notably 

Minuteman, and of defending against a small Soviet blackmail attack, accidental firing 

of a single missile, and Chinese ICBMs during 1975–85. On the basis of that system, 

he said, we could explore whether the Soviets were willing to negotiate a freeze on 

ABM deployments.

Was there, the President asked, “any middle ground in this debate?” Secretary 

McNamara emphasized that emotionalism surrounding the issue made middle ground 

hard to find. Wheeler wanted to begin building factories for those ABM components 

about which we were technically sound; Secretary McNamara countered that many 

of the system’s parts still had to be tested. When General Johnson argued that ABM 

defenses cut casualties, Secretary McNamara replied that he completely disagreed. 

President Johnson wondered whether the conferees could reach consensus to “move 

ahead” with a limited system while trying to reach agreement with the Soviets. Admiral 

McDonald replied that the Soviets already were “moving ahead” with offensive and 

defensive increases. Secretary McNamara repeated that their defensive effort was 

wasted. Not so, General McConnell retorted; “[t]hey had imposed heavy costs on the US 

to assure our continued penetration capability.” He added that “we are dealing with the 

descendants of Genghis Khan. They only understand force.” Secretary McNamara and 

Deputy Secretary Vance answered that was why, “at whatever cost,” we must maintain 

an assured second-strike capability, using Poseidon and other means to penetrate ballistic missile defenses. There the discussion ended.19

Consensus remained out of reach. Through a DPM circulated on 22 December, 

Secretary McNamara recommended initiating only the “light” Nike-X deployment. 

Replying one week later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave a highly qualified endorsement. 

They supported light deployment as a first step while “emphasizing that the ultimate 

deployment of Nike-X must be predicted on present and future developments in offensive and defensive strategic systems.” On 4 January 1967, President Johnson reviewed 

options with Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs, and civilian scientists. The President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Donald Hornig, said he would 

“tend to support” a thin system that helped negotiate an ABM freeze. All the other 

scientists strongly opposed taking even that first step in deployment. That evening, 

Secretary McNamara telephoned the President. “So,” President Johnson observed as 

the conversation ended, “. . . if you were in my position, you’d do nothing.” Secretary 

McNamara answered, “I’d go down fighting, and I’m damn sure I’d go down.”20 A main 

reason was that Congress, for the first time since 1959, had voted appropriations for 

pre-production.

In his budget message of 24 January, President Johnson proposed continuing “intensive development” of Nike-X but postponing any deployments. He also recommended 

36
Losing the ABM Debate

37

opening discussions with the Soviets about an ABM freeze. Against the eventuality that 

talks would fail, President Johnson wanted $375 million allocated for Nike-X production. 

Testifying in March before the House Committee on Appropriations, General Wheeler 

and Secretary McNamara stated their arguments for and against DEPEX II, protecting 

25 cities. Most Congressmen found Wheeler’s brief more persuasive.21

Force Planning in 1967

The Joint Chiefs used JSOP 69-76, submitted in April 1967, to reiterate their positions on all the pivotal issues, again giving top priority to building heavy ballistic missile defenses. Very soon, events impelled the administration to announce 

a decision. On 17 June, China exploded its first thermonuclear device. Over 23–25 

June, President Johnson and Chairman Alexei Kosygin conferred at Glassboro, New 

Jersey. At this summit Secretary McNamara argued that both countries should limit 

their development of offensive and defensive ballistic missile weapons. The Soviet 

premier rebuffed President Johnson’s overtures about opening Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. The Soviet Premier told the President he was shocked by a recent speech 

given by Secretary McNamara in which he claimed that offensive missile systems 

were much cheaper than defensive ones. He regarded that “as a commercial approach 

to a moral problem which was by its very nature invalid.” Thus no concrete results 

came out of Glassboro.22

Llewellyn Thompson, the United States ambassador to the USSR, gave the Joint 

Chiefs his insight that the Soviets would avoid discussing strategic arms limitations 

until separate negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty were completed.23 Accordingly, 

on 27 July, the Chiefs reminded Secretary McNamara that among their recommendations in JSOP 69-76 “no other action is considered more necessary than the deployment 

of Nike-X.” The USSR was continuing its offensive and defensive buildup; China might 

field an ICBM as early as 1970. Thus, as matters stood, they suspected that the Soviets 

enjoyed a “considerable incentive” to engage in protracted and indecisive discussions. 

In these circumstances, “a Nike-X deployment decision would either stimulate Soviet 

participation in meaningful negotiations or disclose their lack of serious interest in 

this matter.”24

In the meantime, OSD, Army Materiel Command, and the Nike-X project office 

tasked contractors with preparing a model for light or “thin” deployment. The upshot, 

in July, was “Plan I-67 Area/Hardsite Defense.” Secretary McNamara ordered a quick 

evaluation of Plan I-67’s ability to cope with the Chinese threat, which determined 

that it did constitute an adequate basis for proceeding.25 On 2 August, the Secretary 

circulated a tentative DPM advocating a light Ballistic Missile defense to deal with the 

Chinese threat. He employed a familiar type of cost-effectiveness calculation to demonstrate that heavy anti-Soviet defenses would be useless. The Secretary estimated 

that in 1976, if the Soviets struck first but had not reacted to Nike-X deployments that 
38

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

protected 25 cities, US fatalities would be 20 million. But if the Soviets felt compelled 

to respond to Nike-X, they would add 250 ICBMs. This would result in the Soviets 

inflicting 90 million fatalities. Turning to air defense, Secretary McNamara proposed a 

drastic reduction in the active force, transferring F–102s and F–106s to the Air National 

Guard and leaving only 24 F–104s. No AWACS were included.26

Secretary McNamara’s plan, the Joint Chiefs countered, would leave the United 

States without effective anti-air and ballistic missile defenses by the early 1970s. While 

accepting anti-Chinese deployment as a first step, they insisted upon the essentiality of 

DEPEX II. Indeed, “No other single action is more necessary for the defense of the United 

States.” They also argued that a premature phase-down of air defenses could tempt the 

Soviets to build new bombers and then launch a missile attack aimed at pinning down 

Minuteman ICBMs until the bombers could strike them in their silos.27 The right answers, 

in their opinion, were F–12 production and expedited AWACS development.28

On 18 September, in a well-publicized speech, Secretary McNamara announced 

that “we have decided to go forward with this Chinese-oriented ABM deployment, 

and we will begin actual production of such a system at the end of this year.” Then he 

added the crucial caveat: “There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry. If a system works—and works well—there is 

strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all 

proportion to the prudent level required. The danger . . . is going to be that pressure 

will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet–oriented ABM system. We must resist 

that temptation firmly.”29

A consensus about near-term needs did emerge. The JCS supported FY 1969 appropriations for “Sentinel,” which the light deployment was now called, as being a sufficient 

first step toward heavy anti-Soviet defenses. Beyond that, Secretary McNamara told 

President Johnson during the budget review on 4 December, “the Joint Chiefs are saying that they haven’t seen anything to change their views and I certainly have not seen 

anything to change mine.” As to bomber defense, Secretary McNamara accepted an 

Air Force plan that involved: producing 200 F–106s with advanced air-to-air missile 

and fire control systems, 42 AWACS, and two radically new over-the-horizon (OTH) 

radars; examining the possibility, during periods of tension, of adding 300 Tactical Air 

Command, Navy, and Marine Corps fighters; and retiring other Century interceptors. 

OSD discontinued development of the F–12. In mid-1972 there would be 134 F–102s, 

26 F–104s, and 398 F–106s; in mid-1976, 238 F–106s, 46 AWACS, and two OTH radars. 

Reductions of Hawk and Nike-Hercules would proceed slowly, although keeping 

fewer fire units in service than the Chiefs wished. Although this force was estimated 

to reduce US fatalities by less than five to eight million, Secretary McNamara listed 

other worthwhile purposes: defending against countries other than the USSR; protecting strategic retaliatory forces being withheld during a controlled nuclear conflict; 

patrolling air space in peacetime; discouraging the Soviets from building new types 

of bombers; and using air defense forces outside the continental United States. This 

became the program presented to Congress.30
Losing the ABM Debate

39

Force Planning in 1968

J

SOP 70-77, early in April 1968, argued for reorienting Sentinel toward “a balanced 

urban-industrial defense against the Soviet threat.” Through a DPM dated 27 July, 

Deputy Secretary Nitze prescribed instead a continuation of the program outlined 

above. That involved obligating procurement funds for one site in FY 1969 while preserving the option for a light defense of Minuteman. He advanced two main arguments 

against the claim that heavy ABM defenses were an essential element of deterrence. 

First, even a greater-than-expected Soviet threat could be countered by putting more 

warheads and penetration aids on Poseidons and raising the bomber alert rate to 60 

percent. Second, Deputy Secretary Nitze presented “an important and paradoxical 

result regarding first strikes.” The calculations of OSD analysts showed that, contrary 

to common thinking, the number of Americans killed by a Soviet first strike would only 

equal, and might even fall below, the fatalities resulting from US pre-emption followed 

by Soviet retaliation. Previously, the country that struck first could expect to achieve 

some strategic advantage. Now, since both sides possessed relatively invulnerable 

offensive forces, “the country that strikes second, facing an enemy that has partially 

disarmed himself, is likely to concentrate on attacking cities with its surviving force 

because there is little to be gained by firing back at empty missile silos and air bases . . . .

This result strengthens our belief that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 

stands to benefit by striking first.”31

The Joint Chiefs phrased their rebuttal in general terms, deeming it unlikely that 

the Soviets “could completely nullify the effectiveness of US defenses or be able to 

restore completely the confidence they now have in their potential for inflicting major 

damage upon an undefended United States.” They dismissed, as overly simplistic, Deputy Secretary Nitze’s claim that the side striking first would lose more than it gained. 

The Chiefs did not, however, try to prove their point through calculations similar to 

those in the DPM. One reason may have been their hostility to OSD’s cost-effectiveness 

approach, much of which they had come to regard as advocacy in the guise of objectivity. In any case, Deputy Secretary Nitze’s final recommendations and rationale dated 

9 January 1969 remained basically unchanged.32

Aftermath

Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff spent these years talking past each other. The Chiefs’ argument, that creating heavy defenses would reinforce 

deterrence by lowering Soviet confidence in a successful attack, simply did not address 

the Secretary’s concerns. At the core of Secretary McNamara’s case was his claim 

that every extension of missile defense could be offset, at considerably less cost, by 

improving and enlarging offensive capabilities. As he announced on 18 September 

1967, “the money in itself is not the problem; the penetrability of the proposed shield is 
40

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

the problem.” The Chiefs did not present proofs to the contrary. So, backed by nearly 

all the scientific community, Secretary McNamara kept President Johnson on his side.

Subsequently, the ABM story followed a tortuous path. The climate in Congress 

became much cooler toward ballistic missile defense, which was in good part a spillover from disillusionment with the Vietnam War.33 Early in 1969, President Nixon 

approved a “Safeguard” program confined to protecting Minuteman fields. Strategic 

arms limitation talks with the USSR opened in 1969 and culminated three years later 

with an Interim Agreement capping offensive systems and an Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Treaty allowing each country to have one site shielding its capital and one protecting 

a missile field. Essentially, during the 1970s, ballistic missile defense disappeared from 

the strategic nuclear equation.
41

4

The Overstretching of 

Conventional Capabilities

During the early 1960s, national strategy switched from massive retaliation—reliance 

on nuclear weapons—to flexible response, which assigned much more importance to 

conventional capabilities. General purpose forces expanded to a point where, in theory, 

they could conduct an initial defense of Western Europe while simultaneously carrying 

out one major operation elsewhere. As 1965 opened, the combat-ready strategic reserve 

included nine Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, and 48 USAF tactical 

fighter squadrons—a level never before equaled in peacetime.1

The scope of limited war remained undefined, and much of this carefully accumulated capital would be expended in Vietnam, which ultimately required half again as 

many personnel as the Korean conflict. During the Korean War, the Army grew from 10 

divisions to 20, the Marine Corps from 2 division/wing teams to 3, the Air Force from 

9 to 23 tactical wings.2 During the Vietnam War, the Army increased only from 16 to 

19 divisions, the Marine Corps by one division without its air wing, the Air Force from 

22 wings in 1965 to 25 in 1967 and then to 29 in 1968 with the USS Pueblo mobilization. 

The Truman administration resorted to an extensive mobilization of reserves, calling 

World War II veterans to the colors and sending a good many into combat.3 During 

the Vietnam conflict, even small numbers of reserves were not mobilized until 1968 

and none saw combat. Instead, the active force met Vietnam’s demands by practically 

denuding the strategic reserve in the continental United States.

Force Planning in 1965: Losing the Slack

During February 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan covering 30 June 1967 through 30 June 1974. They forwarded JSOP-70 to 

41
42

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Secretary McNamara on 1 March.4 This proved to be the last peacetime JSOP because, 

simultaneously, decisions were taken to start sending ground combat troops to South 

Vietnam and begin the systematic bombing of North Vietnam. The first strikes of 

Rolling Thunder, the air campaign, took place on 2 March; the first Marines landed 

at Da Nang, about 100 miles below the Demilitarized Zone dividing North and South, 

six days later.

JSOP-70’s force-level recommendations flowed from the two-war strategy 

described above. All Service Chiefs, except the Air Force Chief of Staff, favored continuing the current level of 16 Army divisions and three Marine division/wing teams; 

General McConnell proposed cutting the Army to 14 by mid-1968. In Western Europe, 

according to intelligence estimates, the Warsaw Pact could attack with 50 to 60 divisions. General Wheeler, Admiral McDonald, and General Greene believed that 40 NATO 

divisions (30 active and 10 reserve), 11 of them American, could conduct a successful 

initial defense, with each division covering a 30-kilometer front. General McConnell 

considered that frontage estimate was conservative because NATO divisions were 

qualitatively superior; on the other hand, General Johnson rated the divisional total 

inadequate because no allowance was being made for Soviet reinforcement capability. 

Outside Western Europe, for the second war, danger areas included the Middle East, 

Southeast Asia, and Korea. JSOP-70 calculated that 8 US divisions would be needed 

in Iran, 6 in Southeast Asia, and 10 1/3 in Korea.5 Overall, General Wheeler, Admiral 

McDonald and General Greene believed that a total of 19 active and 7 reserve Army and 

Marine divisions were “within acceptable limits of risk.” General Johnson judged this 

overly optimistic because 8 to 14 US divisions fighting outside the NATO area might not 

be able to disengage and redeploy to Europe fast enough to make a difference. General 

McConnell, on the contrary, argued that the flexibility and striking power of recently 

reorganized ROAD divisions justified a reduction to 14.6

On 8 July 1965, Secretary McNamara endorsed 16 Army and 3 Marine divisions. 

Recent Army war games had matched cost-equal US and Soviet forces and concluded 

that they contained about the same combat power. Since US divisions had twice the 

manpower and cost twice as much, Secretary McNamara argued, should not one US 

division be deemed equal with two Soviet ones? Intelligence estimated the Soviet Army 

to contain 65 divisions at full strength, 41 at two-thirds strength, and 32 at one-fifth 

strength. Deducing that the Pact could not support many more than 65 divisions in 

combat, Secretary McNamara saw no reason to increase the 11-division commitment 

to NATO. In their critique, the Joint Chiefs of Staff differed with Secretary McNamara’s 

assessment that the enemy’s offensive strength in Europe was limited to 65 divisions. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the Soviets could deploy more divisions 

because they were maintaining, at reduced strength, support units for more than 65 

divisions—a fact that was more compatible with current intelligence.7

Meanwhile, the commitment of ground combat troops into South Vietnam grew 

steadily. By the end of May, the 3rd Marine Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade had 

arrived in country. A brigade of the 1st Infantry Division and a brigade from the 101st

42
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

43

Airborne Division also had been alerted for deployment; their sea movement started 

during late June and early July. But these were not enough. On 7 June General William 

Westmoreland (Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) cabled an 

urgent warning. The armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam stood on the verge of 

collapse; another 100,000 ground and air personnel were needed promptly, lifting the 

number of US maneuver battalions to 34 and the personnel total to 175,000. Eleven days 

later, the President approved deploying the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).8

On 8 July, Secretary McNamara told the Joint Chiefs that President Johnson had 

approved General Westmoreland’s request. The Marine Corps, Secretary McNamara 

added, would activate the 4th Marine Division and its air wing; the Army would mobilize 

27 reserve battalions, to be replaced eventually by 27 new regular ones. On 20 July, 

Secretary McNamara—with General Wheeler’s concurrence—sent President Johnson 

the following recommendations: increase the regular establishment by 375,000 (Army, 

250,000; Marine Corps, 75,000; Air Force, 25,000; and Navy, 25,000); ask Congress to 

authorize the call-up of 235,000 reservists (Army, 125,000; Marine Corps, 75,000; Air 

Force, 25,000; and Navy, 10,000). General Wheeler later explained that the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff saw three compelling reasons for a call-up. First, virtually all contingency plans 

assumed that reserve units would be mobilized to reconstitute the strategic reserve; 

second, relying entirely upon active forces required much larger draft calls that would 

expand the training establishment, spreading officers and NCOs thin; and third, calling 

reservists to the colors would make people aware that the country was truly at war.9

Pushing Great Society legislation through Congress remained President Johnson’s 

first priority, at least emotionally. Possibly he was encouraged by General Wheeler’s 

predictions, during White House discussions over 21–22 July, that sending larger bodies of North Vietnamese troops south “will allow us to cream them,” that Hanoi dare 

not risk moving more than one-quarter of its forces into South Vietnam, and that there 

would be “definite progress in three years.” President Johnson chose a course designed 

to hold down “the political noise level” at home, which meant meeting General Westmoreland’s request without mobilizing any reserves or extending terms of service. 

Conveying this decision to the Chiefs on 23–24 July, Secretary McNamara claimed 

the 4th Marine Division could be mobilized in two weeks, not the 90 days planned by 

the Marine Corps.10 On 28 July, at a televised press conference, President Johnson 

announced that the Vietnam commitment would rise from 75,000 to 125,000 and more 

“will be sent as requested.” Subsequently, in a background press briefing, the President 

said that reserves would need several months of training to become fully effective, 

whereas the 1st Cavalry Division and units from Okinawa were already combat-ready.11

Years afterward, General Johnson speculated why the President decided against 

any call-ups. He must have remembered that the last mobilization, during the 1961 

Berlin crisis, provoked adverse public reactions. Also, as the law then stood, reservists 

had no further obligation after completing their tours, so that units reverting to inactive 

status would have no personnel left and need a long time to rebuild. General Johnson 

thought, too, that the President hoped to fight in Vietnam without intruding upon the 

43
44

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

peacetime life of the nation—and that, he reflected, was the administration’s greatest 

mistake.12 Clearly, in any case, July 1965 marked the beginning of what some would 

term the “erosion” and others the “disintegration” of the US Army.13

The 175,000 ceiling proved very short-lived. In August, after General Wheeler 

conferred with General Westmoreland, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended and 

Secretary McNamara approved raising it to 210,000. On 24 September, the Joint Chiefs 

recommended organizing a fourth Marine Expeditionary Force.14 Instead, in midOctober, Secretary McNamara directed the temporary addition of one Army infantry 

division, raising the total to 17.15

General Westmoreland envisaged a three-phase campaign. Phase I, to “stem the 

tide,” required 219,000 personnel; Phase II, to “start winning the war,” would raise that 

figure to 359,000. A final Phase III, destroying the enemy’s remaining forces and base 

areas, would require even more US and third-country troops. Carrying out the first two 

phases, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Secretary McNamara on 10 November, would 

render US forces unable to execute a “21⁄2 war” strategy: maintain a NATO-committed 

reserve; be able to halt Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia or Korea; and conduct a 

minor contingency operation, like the Dominican Republic operation, in the Western 

Hemisphere.16 As matters stood, CONUS-based Army divisions were being depleted by 

the demands of Phase I; they might return to combat readiness between March 1966 

and March 1967. The Marine Corps also needed another brigade. To fulfill Phase II, the 

active force must be increased by two infantry divisions and one Marine Expeditionary 

Force. Mobilizing reserves, the Chiefs added, would accelerate this expansion considerably. Again, however, there was no call-up. On 24 November, Secretary McNamara 

approved (1) adding the ground elements of a fourth Marine Expeditionary Force and 

(2) increasing the Army’s personnel ceiling by about 46,000, so divisions that were part 

of Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) could be made combat-ready without mobilizing 

reserves. Thus in FY 1967 ground forces would total 21 divisions (17 Army and 4 Marine 

Corps); thereafter, they would revert to 19 (16 Army and 3 Marine Corps).17

Tactical air strength also felt the pinch of Vietnam. As 1965 opened, there were 22 

USAF wings and 15 attack carriers. In JSOP-70, a majority of the Chiefs recommended 

continuing those levels, totaling about 3,200 planes for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

Corps. Alone again, General McConnell wanted 23 wings in FY 1967 and 34 by FY 1974, 

while cutting the Navy’s carriers to 13 in FY 1967 and 12 thereafter. Drawing upon 

World War II and Korean War experiences against the Warsaw Pact, the Joint Staff 

proposed a 1:2:1 ratio among air superiority, interdiction, and close support missions; 

however, none of the other Chiefs accepted that rationale. Admiral McDonald, for 

example, argued that it ignored contributions made by heavy and medium bombers, 

and overlooked the fact that Navy and Marine Corps aircraft had flown more than 

one-third of the missions in Korea. General McConnell observed that the number of 

aircraft needed to gain air superiority depended largely upon the size of the enemy’s 

inventory. According to Air Force intelligence, the Warsaw Pact possessed between 

4,425 and 8,100 tactical aircraft, active and reserve—totals that justified a steady 

44
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

45

increase of USAF wings. Turning to the annual debate about land-based versus seabased air power, which split the Chiefs again on Service prerogatives, General McConnell argued for fewer attack carriers because they had been withdrawn from the SIOP 

alert and he believed they were unsuitable for supporting conventional operations in 

Central Europe. But Generals Johnson and Wheeler cited growing instability in the 

Third World as a reason for maintaining 15 carriers.18

Through DPMs dated 26 June and 6 July, Secretary McNamara proposed that there 

be 23 USAF wings in FY 1967 and 24 thereafter; carriers would stay constant at 15. For 

the Air Force, he planned to procure seven F–111 and 15 F–4 wings, both being highperformance multipurpose aircraft. For the Navy he planned to build three carriers, 

starting the first in FY 1967, the second in FY 1969, and the third in FY 1971. Relying 

upon Defense Intelligence Agency estimates, Secretary McNamara anticipated a growing numerical superiority in aircraft over adversaries: in mid-1965, 9,967 for the Free 

World versus 9,259 for the Sino-Soviet Bloc; in mid-1971, 9,269 versus 7,124.19 Using 

cost-effectiveness comparisons, he calculated that the opposing sides’ inventory values 

were roughly equal in FY 1965 but in FY 1971 would reach $14 billion for the Free World 

against $9.7 billion for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Since Mr. McNamara viewed replacement 

costs as an approximate indication of relative effectiveness, he found in those figures 

evidence of the Free World’s qualitative edge. In fact, he believed that the number of 

carrier aircraft—17 wings for 15 ships—could be cut by about 8 percent. Normally, after 

all, three carriers were in port undergoing overhaul. Additionally, carriers on routine 

cruises could carry under-strength wings that would be augmented by ground-based 

naval air units whenever necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by voicing 

reservations about Secretary McNamara’s cost-effectiveness comparisons, a criticism 

similar to those of past years. While qualitative advances undoubtedly would occur, 

even “moderate” improvements by the other side would cancel any gains.20

Inevitably, the Vietnam buildup eroded the premises upon which these force levels 

were based. General Westmoreland wanted 26 USAF squadrons during Phase I and 

nine more for Phase II. In July, President Johnson agreed to send 777 tactical aircraft. 

On 10 November, the Joint Chiefs analyzed for the Secretary of Defense the impact of 

that deployment. The Navy was running short of pilots, and the Air Force would have 

in CONUS only three to five tactical fighter squadrons that were combat-ready. The Air 

Force needed 456 more tactical fighters, while the Navy required 212 A–4 Skyhawks21

plus an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) carrier modified for an attack role. Rolling 

Thunder, the air campaign against North Vietnam, required that five attack carriers 

operate in the Western Pacific. The Joint Chiefs urged that two ASW carriers be brought 

out of mothballs, one for training and one for NATO reserve.22 Those reactivations 

were disapproved. Early in December, for FY 1967, Secretary McNamara settled upon 

23 wings and 15 carriers, with a total of 3,017 aircraft (1,584 Air Force, 990 Navy, and 

443 Marine Corps). For later years, he planned 24 USAF wings.23

The prospect of moving divisions and their supplies across the Pacific to Vietnam 

highlighted the importance of strategic mobility. JSOP-70 analyzed transportation 

45
46

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

requirements for contingency plans pertaining to Southeast Asia and Western Europe. 

The Joint Staff concluded that, with the capabilities available in March 1965, two emergencies occurring together would overtax capabilities. A combination of airlift (swift 

but costly), sealift (economical although slow), and pre-positioned equipment (cheap 

but vulnerable and inflexible after being put in place) appeared to be the best solution. 

General Johnson commented that the Joint Staff, by measuring distances from the 

center of the United States rather than the coasts, had understated US capabilities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, for FY 1974, airlift composed of 256 propellerdriven C–130s, 208 jet C–141s that were just entering production, and either 128 (Air 

Force) or 48 (Army, Navy, Marine Corps) of the supercargo C–5As still in the developmental stage. The Air Force also wanted 80 CX-VSTOLs able to make very short 

takeoffs and landings. For sealift in FY 1974, the Chiefs recommended between 110 

and 114 ships, including 17 forward floating depots, 12 roll-on/roll-off cargo, and 4 fast 

deployment logistics (FDL) ships.24 An FDL’s payload would be 8,000 to 10,000 tons, 

deliverable either at ports or over the beaches.

In his October DPM, Secretary McNamara outlined an FY 1974 force with somewhat more aircraft and fewer ships. He was much impressed with work done by the 

Chairman’s Special Studies Group. It showed that slower deployments to Iran, Korea, 

and Southeast Asia, trading space for time, ultimately would create greater requirements. Consequently, Secretary McNamara intended to produce 224 C–141s, plan for 96 

C–5As, confine the CX-VSTOL to advanced development, and augment airlift manpower 

by 20,000 to increase utilization rates. Also, he projected an FDL fleet of 18 ships.25

The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported Mr. McNamara’s FY 1967 recommendations 

but not his later ones, because they ran below JSOP-70 levels. His final DPM, showing 

only minor changes, read as follows:

FY 1967 FY 1974

C–130 472 256

C–141 188 224

C–5A — 96

Tankers 26 22

Cargo ships 67 38

Roll-On/Roll-Off 3 2

Forward floating Depot 19 —

FDL Ships — 18

Troopships 6 —

Sources: JCSM-748-65 to SecDef, 12 Oct 65, JCS 2458/4-1; Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Nov 65, JCS 2458/4-

5; JMF 7000 (4 Oct 65).

Navy submarine and surface warfare forces felt the impact of Vietnam far less. A 

large and growing Soviet submarine fleet posed the greatest threat to American maritime supremacy. The best way to “kill” Soviet submarines was to create, in the Barents 

46
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

47

and Norwegian Seas, the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, and La Perouse Strait 

in the North Pacific, barriers patrolled by US attack submarines. American submarines, 

being quieter than Soviet ones, had superior “secure sweep width,” which was the 

distance at which a searcher could detect a target without being discovered itself. The 

total number of US submarines needed to assure 25 percent attrition at each barrier 

came to 26 diesel and 97 nuclear. In JSOP-70, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged 

that the cost of such a force was prohibitive. Instead, all save one favored 40 diesels 

and 65 nuclears in FY 1967, changing ultimately to 23 diesels and 82 nuclears. General 

McConnell would endorse only 59 nuclears until the effectiveness of Soviet efforts to 

silence their own submarines became clear. If the Soviet effort failed, General McConnell argued, fewer submarines would be needed; if it succeeded, the barrier strategy 

might have to be abandoned. Also, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff majority favored 

increasing ASW carriers from nine in FY 1967 to 11 in FY 1974, General McConnell 

wanted to hold steady at nine.26

In his DPM, circulated on 28 June, Secretary McNamara took a more conservative 

view of ASW capabilities. Navy studies showed to his satisfaction that currently programmed forces would destroy 77 percent of the Soviet submarines trying to cross the 

Barents and Norwegian Sea barriers, and sink another 18 percent as they attempted to 

recross them and return to port. In the Pacific, these figures would be 60 percent and 

24 percent.27 Since the enemy knew that US forces could kill even more submarines if 

the Soviets built them, “it does not pay the Soviets to increase their forces.” Given these 

conditions, Secretary McNamara saw no reason to raise US force levels. He decided, 

in fact, to reduce ASW carriers to eight in FY 1967 and seven thereafter, on grounds 

that they were very expensive to operate and their fixed-wing aircraft were relatively 

ineffective. For new construction, Secretary McNamara intended to start five nuclear 

attack submarines and 10 destroyer escorts.28

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded that this program was “substantially lower 

than the least” of their recommendations. They particularly objected to the belief that 

cost-effectiveness considerations precluded either side from increasing its forces. In 

response, the Secretary raised surface ship levels during FY 1967. He increased the 

number of destroyer escorts from 29 to 43, adding 11 ships to support Navy operations 

in Southeast Asia. He also decided to keep nine ASW carriers in service, justifying his 

change by citing the benefits from improved helicopters, radars, and sonobuoys. As 

for submarines, Mr. McNamara listed 65 diesels and 40 nuclears in FY 1967, the mix 

favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff majority, which would change to 37 diesels and 68 

nuclears in FY 1974.29

The ASW program had to clear one unexpected hurdle. McGeorge Bundy, Budget 

Director Charles Schultze, and Donald Hornig, the President’s Special Assistant for 

Science and Technology, all opposed building ten destroyer escorts because they saw 

little likelihood of a long war at sea for which these ships were designed. For the same 

reason, they recommended starting three rather than five nuclear submarines. Mr. 

Hornig advised the President that “I have seen no evidence . . . to indicate that barriers 
48

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

cannot . . . be penetrated readily [and] successfully by a resourceful enemy.” Nonetheless, President Johnson asked Congress to fund construction of five submarines and 

ten escorts.30

Amphibious assault forces were an area in which JSOP-70 recommendations for FY 

1967 proved to be practically identical with those in Secretary McNamara’s tentative 

DPM: 137 amphibious assault and six gunfire support ships. The objective lay in creating by FY 1972 a capability for carrying 1 1/2 Marine divisions at 20 knots, retaining 

until then enough older ships to keep total capacity as near two divisions as possible. 

In July, General McConnell urged that all the gunfire support ships, eight-inch gun 

cruisers, be retired. Secretary McNamara ignored this Service parochialism, labeling 

as imprudent an exclusive reliance on air support. In September, after the Secretary 

approved reactivating 12 Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) for use in Southeast Asia, the 

total reached 154. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now asked that an eight-inch gun cruiser 

be brought out of mothballs, to compensate for Vietnam diversions, but Secretary 

McNamara declined.31

All in all, 1965 became a watershed year as the buildup of 1961–64 turned into a 

drawdown. Early in December the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned of a loss, likely to last 

several years, in ability to meet non-Vietnam contingencies and commitments. Worse 

was to come, as Secretary McNamara warned the President of “dramatic” changes to 

the situation in Vietnam. Infiltration from the North had risen sharply, and the communists showed greater willingness to stand and fight, even in large-scale engagements. Secretary McNamara recommended, and General Wheeler endorsed, putting 

approximately 400,000 personnel into Vietnam by the end of 1966. Another 200,000 

or more might be needed in 1967. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe additional 

deployments could be accomplished without mobilizing reserves, but Secretary McNamara disagreed.32

Force Planning in 1966: Tautness

During 1966, the Vietnam commitment approached massive proportions. As of 1 January, there were 184,000 US personnel in South Vietnam. General Westmoreland and Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, wanted 79 

US battalions, adding about 200,000 Americans by 31 December. President Johnson 

and Secretary McNamara promised to provide all the battalions but cautioned the 

commanders that a reserve call-up would be politically impossible.33 On 17 February, 

Secretary McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine ways of meeting the 

field commanders’ request without mobilization. In reply, the Chiefs recommended 

stretching out the augmentation through mid-1967. Otherwise, without a reserve callup, extensive drawdowns would create serious risks. The shortfalls would include four 

infantry divisions, 15 tactical fighter and six tactical reconnaissance squadrons, one 

attack and one ASW carrier, one cruiser, and 24 destroyers.
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

49

The Joint Chiefs of Staff defined the problem as meeting Vietnam requirements 

while establishing programs to achieve other critical goals. Their priorities were to 

reconstitute a strategic reserve as well as create an adequate training and rotation 

base. The Army had 5 1/3 divisions, none of them immediately deployable, and wanted 

9 1/3. Another requirement was to meet Admiral Sharp’s non-Vietnam requirements in 

the Pacific area. Finally, they had to maintain and/or restore the US posture in Europe 

and the Atlantic.34 Although formally, the Europe-first strategic concept did not change; 

for practical purposes, it did. East Asia, where there was a war, came ahead of Europe, 

where there was none. Nor did Secretary McNamara, allow a stretch-out. On 11 April, 

he approved a plan submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would put 376,350 personnel into Vietnam by the year’s end.35 The 1st Marine Division and the 25th Infantry 

Division came in the spring, but deployment of the 4th Infantry Division was spread 

between February and August. The 9th Infantry Division arrived between December 

1966 and January 1967.36

JSOP 68-75, submitted on 24 March 1966, made a case for maintaining 21 Army 

and 4 Marine divisions on active service as long as the war lasted. Three of the Army 

divisions, though, would be mobilized reserves—a solution already rejected by the 

President. The Joint Staff computed divisional requirements as: 19 for Europe; six 

(the number then in or deploying to Vietnam) for a second conflict; two in CONUS 

reserve; four for the Pacific area; and one to deal with a minor contingency. Although 

the Joint Staff calculated that 32 to 34 divisions were needed to execute this 21⁄2 war 

strategy, it stated that 30 (21 active and 9 reserve) would fall within “acceptable limits 

of risk”—provided seven reserve divisions could reach the theater of operations 30 to 

60 days after mobilization began. But more than 30 divisions were needed, the Joint 

Staff believed, as long as the Vietnam War lasted.

In August 1966, Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance circulated a DPM proposing 21 

active divisions (17 Army, 4 Marine) in FY 1968 and 19 (16 Army, 3 Marine) thereafter. 

Uniquely, this DPM contained no supporting rationales for these choices; it offered only 

tabular comparisons of Free World versus Sino-Soviet Bloc strength. Commenting in 

mid-September, the Chiefs repeated their JSOP recommendations. They protested, 

too, that OSD was being premature in dropping temporary augmentations after FY 

1968. Substantial commitments, whether for combat or postwar “stabilization,” might 

continue for some years, and an overly hasty return to the 19-division baseline would 

risk shortfalls in procurement.37

Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland wanted 12 more maneuver battalions 

during 1967. Early in October 1966, the Joint Chiefs sent Secretary McNamara a “preliminary assessment” that the Army could fulfill their requests, although six to eight 

months later than the field commanders desired. But doing so would strip the Army’s 

strategic reserve down to two combat-ready brigades through mid-1968. US Army, 

Europe, would be hurt by the transfers of skilled officers and NCOs, and reserve units 

in CONUS would lack about 30 percent of their equipment. All told, the Army needed 

another 3 2/3 division-equivalents to satisfy its strategic reserve and sustaining base 
50

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for prompt action to obtain more funds 

and accelerate procurement authorizations. Selective reserve mobilizations, they 

observed, would hasten the process.38

Secretary McNamara’s final DPM, issued late in November, contained no concessions: 17 Army and 4 Marine divisions in FY 1968, 16 and 3 after the war. This force 

structure was a topic at the budget session with President Johnson on 6 December. 

Mr. McNamara framed the discussion by saying that the Army proposed to add two 

brigades and possibly another division by equipping them from reserve unit stocks. 

The effect, he argued, would be merely to substitute the shorter deployment time of 

active forces for the longer ones of reserve units. General Johnson pointed to certain 

“bills” that the Army was responsible to fill: a three-division commitment to reinforce 

Allied Command Europe; 40,000 men to maintain a proposed anti-infiltration barrier 

in South Vietnam; and a three-division corps for contingencies. Yet only five divisions 

were available in CONUS to cover these bills. If members of Congress inquired about 

the adequacy of ground forces, General Johnson continued, he would have to say they 

were “very thin.”

He wanted to expand the active Army by two divisions now and one brigade later, 

outfitting them with equipment borrowed from reserve units. Secretary McNamara 

countered that the only advantage from shifting equipment lay in slightly reducing reaction time. The alternative would be calling reservists to active duty. Yet very recently, 

the Secretary continued, he and Mr. Vance had polled JCS members and none spoke 

in favor of mobilization. President Johnson then asked the Chairman and the Service 

Chiefs whether they wanted to activate reserves; none did. Subsequently, in Congressional testimony, General Johnson stressed that the employment of mobilized reserves 

must be correlated with the timing of an operation. Some reservists would resent being 

called to active duty: “So one must, then, weigh . . . the unrest this tends to create within 

the force . . . against the loss in time that it requires to expand the Active Army.”39

The Air Force experienced a similar drain of active forces to Southeast Asia, as the 

pace and scope of Rolling Thunder gradually increased. Through JSOP 68-75, appearing in March 1966, all the Chiefs recommended 24 USAF tactical fighter wings in FY 

1968. For later years, however, they split: General McConnell favored expansion to 34; 

Admiral McDonald, to 31; General Wheeler, to 30; Generals Johnson and Greene, to 27. 

As for attack carriers, they all supported 15 in FY 1968 and 16 thereafter.

The Joint Staff calculated that sustaining 18 divisions in combat for 30 days would 

require about 5,200 Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft, active and reserve. 

Staff officers justified this total by allocating 100 daily sorties to each division: 25 for 

air superiority, 50 for interdiction, and 25 for close air support. That was the same 1:2:1 

ratio that had caused so much controversy the year before, but it fared a bit better this 

time. General McConnell and Admiral McDonald agreed with the analysis, but Generals Johnson and Greene believed that 4,600 would be enough.40

Secretary McNamara’s tentative plan, issued in July 1966, ran below even the smallest Service proposal: excluding reserves, there would be 3,165 aircraft in FY 1968 and 
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

51

2,967 in FY 1975. The comparable JSOP recommendation for FY 1968 was 3,239; for FY 

1975, proposals ranged from a low of 3,675 (Army, Marine Corps) to a high of 4,107 (Air 

Force). Mr. McNamara, however, believed that the Free World enjoyed a “large and growing superiority.” In 1966, inventories would total 13,704 for the Free World versus 11,128 

for the Sino-Soviet Bloc; in FY 1975, 12,387 versus 9,927. Qualitatively, the Free World’s 

payload capabilities were twice as large in 1966 and would be four times as great by 1971.

Analyzing requirements for Europe and the Far East, Mr. McNamara judged his 

programmed forces entirely adequate. By his reckoning, after 30 days of fighting in 

Central Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would have 3,500 

aircraft and the Warsaw Pact only 1,500. With 3,000 aircraft, Allied Command Europe 

could mount 1,950 sorties daily over the next 60 days. Even after deducting 750 daily 

sorties for interdiction, 28.5 still could be flown in support of each division. That was 

3.5 above the JSOP number, more than twice the World War II rate, and four times the 

World War II payload figure. In East Asia, even if half the 2,000 US aircraft were committed to the battle for air supremacy, the remaining 1,000 could fly 250 interdiction 

sorties daily and still provide 37.5 close air support sorties to each of 14 US divisions 

as well as 159 to all those of our allies.41

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found no merit in these figures. Tactical air power, they 

advised the Secretary, was “a highly complex but versatile force . . . ; its role varies in 

relation to the enemy, the areas of opposition, the strategy, the friendly forces, and the 

military and political situation.” To compare inventories was to compare resources, not 

capabilities. The real issue, instead, was “how much tactical air can be applied during 

specific time periods, for how long, and against what kind of opposition.” The Joint 

Chiefs believed that qualitative comparisons must also take into account the roles and 

missions to be performed. American multi-purpose planes, while more expensive than 

specialized Soviet aircraft, were not necessarily more effective in a given role. Costs 

rose on account of such things as the need to deploy over greater distances, safety, 

reliability, and ease of maintenance, none of which necessarily resulted in better performance. General Johnson wanted to sum up by saying that OSD’s “emphasis on cost 

relationships to the exclusion of comprehensive and professional effectiveness analysis 

raises serious questions in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the objectivity 

of the analysis process.” Instead, the conclusion was softened to say that “it would be 

appropriate to review the analysis process as it is now being conducted [in order] to 

assess its adequacy and validity.”42

The “analysis process” was not reviewed, probably because Systems Analysis 

and Joint Staff officers recently had signed an agreed estimate of NATO and Warsaw 

Pact air power, covering both quantitative and qualitative aspects.43 But Secretary 

McNamara’s final recommendation did provide modest increases: 24 USAF wings and 

a total of 3,290 aircraft in FY 1968; 23 wings and 3,139 in FY 1971. He kept the number 

of attack carriers steady at 15.44

Even so, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not satisfied. They warned Secretary McNamara that, if Admiral Sharp’s latest requests were filled, CONUS-based tactical fighter 
52

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

units would be committed completely to training by late 1967. Yet Strike Command 

(STRICOM) needed at least 37 squadrons to meet NATO and other contingencies. Even 

counting replacement training units, STRICOM still would stand 22 squadrons short of 

requirements. Moreover, Admiral Sharp wanted the Seventh Fleet, which was deeply 

involved in Rolling Thunder, reinforced with a sixth attack carrier group. Unless one 

ASW carrier was adapted to an attack role and an ASW carrier reactivated, the Chiefs 

anticipated that one attack carrier would have to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The Service Chiefs tried again to revisit the subject of mobilizing the reserves. 

They observed that mobilizing reserve aviators and aircraft would do much to correct 

deficiencies.45 Secretary McNamara took no action.

For strategic mobility, the JSOP recommended an FY 1975 force of 105 ships and 

592 aircraft, including 240 C–130s, 208 C–141s, and either 144 (Air Force) or 96 (Army, 

Navy, Marine Corps) C–5As. Secretary McNamara tentatively planned 92 ships and 656 

aircraft. During FY 1968, he wanted to initiate the procurement of 18 C-5As and 10 FDL 

ships. When 96 C–5As, 224 C–141s, 18 FDLs, and 316,000 tons of pre-positioned equipment became available, Secretary McNamara anticipated an ability to reinforce Allied 

Command Europe and, concurrently, carry out one other contingency operation.46

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, observing that Secretary McNamara had described 

requirements for two rather than 21⁄2 wars, asked for: additional C–130 procurement 

to offset Vietnam diversions and attrition; pre-positioning equipment in Europe for 

another armored division; constructing tankers and cargo ships; and delaying the 

retirements of troopships. The Secretary’s sole concession involved the indefinite 

retention of 16 troopships.47

Projecting force levels for ASW carriers and attack submarines sharpened differences between OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

FY 1968 FY 1975

JSOP 68-75 August DPM JSOP 68-75 August DPM

ASW Carriers 9 7 11 6

Nuclear Subs 44 44 83 68

Diesel Subs 61 61 22 32

This time, Mr. McNamara labeled ASW carriers “costly and unproductive” because 

their aircraft apparently had only one chance in thirty of turning a detection into a kill. 

If new sensors and processors for surface ships proved ineffective, retired carriers 

could easily be reactivated. And, since several attack carriers were slated for conversion to ASW roles, the capability of ASW carriers could increase rapidly if necessary. 

While the Secretary and the Chiefs agreed that the attack submarine force should total 

105, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted all to be nuclear-powered while Mr. McNamara 

stopped at 68. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sought an augmentation of 23 destroyer escorts 

for Southeast Asia, he allowed only eleven.48
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

53

The Secretary based his decision upon a Navy study claiming that, during a twelvemonth sea war in 1970, the allies would lose 1,000 to 1,200 of their ships out of 15,000 

while 90 percent of the Soviet submarine fleet would be sunk. In their commentary, 

dated 6 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized that study as a “useful 

first step” but “fundamentally inconclusive for purposes of force planning.”49 They 

seized upon several inconsistencies with other Draft Presidential Memorandums. For 

instance, while the Anti-Submarine Warfare DPM anticipated that NATO allies would 

protect 1,800 ship arrivals per month, the NATO DPM advocated major reductions 

among certain of the allies’ ASW forces. Also, while the ASW DPM spoke about possibly 

curtailing convoys during the early phases of conflict so as to lessen sinking, the DPM 

on strategic mobility stated that a swift, heavy commitment of forces could reduce 

losses. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected the Soviets to act more cleverly 

than the DPM suggested. Why would they try to fight a long sea war, when they knew 

what enormous losses they must suffer? A better strategy would involve blockading 

Japan or the Persian Gulf, where the economic payoff was great, and delaying an all-out 

attack until the requirements for supporting a land campaign left the western powers 

most vulnerable at sea.

Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that 12 rather than 10 destroyers be 

started and 9 ASW carriers retained, on grounds that hunter-killer task forces generated “a synergistic effect in which the capability of the group is greater than the sum 

of its parts.” As to major surface escorts, Secretary McNamara proposed 77, allowing 

four for every attack carrier, two for each of the four ASW carriers that might operate 

within range of enemy aircraft, and eleven for other missions. The Chiefs found these 

numbers too low, since attack carriers probably would be widely separated and hence 

have little opportunity to provide mutual support.50

On 6 December, Admiral McDonald presented his case to President Johnson. Admiral McDonald began by noting that no major fleet escorts51 had been started since 1962. 

In 1965 DOD had not supported any nuclear-powered guided missile escort (DLGNs), 

but Congress authorized one anyway. Believing that each nuclear carrier should have 

two nuclear escorts, Admiral McDonald sought a second DLGN in FY 1968. Failure 

to ask for it, he predicted, would lead to another wrangle with Congress. Secretaries 

McNamara and Vance disagreed on the grounds that one nuclear escort per nuclear 

carrier was sufficient. Turning to nuclear attack submarines, Admiral McDonald 

argued for continuing the practice of starting five each year, rather than three as the 

Secretary proposed. Secretary McNamara replied that, since the Navy hoped to settle 

upon a new class of submarines in 1968, he favored delaying two until next year, when 

the Navy would be able to exploit new technology. On both escorts and submarines, 

the President backed Mr. McNamara.52

Choosing objectives for amphibious assault forces raised no controversy. The first 

in a class of 40,000-ton LHAs (amphibious assault ship (general-purpose)), uniquely 

able to carry troops, helicopters, cargo and landing craft, would be funded in FY 1968. 

Mr. McNamara proposed and the Chiefs endorsed accelerating from FY 1972 to FY 
54

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

1969 a plan for having enough lift to carry 1 1/2 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) 

at 20 knots, relying on older 13-knot ships to lift as much of the remaining 1/2 MEF as 

possible.53

Force Planning in 1967: Fraying Faster

Early in March 1967, through JSOP 69-76, the Joint Chiefs of Staff once more recommended maintaining 21 Army and 4 Marine divisions while the war lasted, 

18 and 3 thereafter. Without mobilization, essential elements of the 21⁄2-war strategy 

could be fulfilled by 26 division-equivalents: 10 for Europe; 14 for Asia; and 2 as a strategic reserve.54 Again, though, the field commander’s call for more troops left these 

calculations outdated. On 18 March, General Westmoreland asked for a “minimum” 

of 80,000 more personnel (including 2 1/3 divisions and 4 tactical fighter squadrons) 

and suggested an “optimum” of 199,000 (including 4 2/3 divisions and 10 squadrons).55

Responding on 19 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deploying another 

98,000 personnel to Vietnam during FY 1968, adding that this would be impossible 

without a 24-month reserve call-up and a 12-month involuntary extension of terms 

of service. Concurrently, the Chiefs broadened their study to address worldwide contingencies. Their findings, forwarded to Secretary McNamara on 20 May, were that 

meeting General Westmoreland’s “minimum” request would maintain momentum but 

offered little likelihood of bringing the war to a satisfactory end. Expanded operations, 

however, could spark Soviet and Chinese countermoves. Yet by mid-1968, as matters 

now stood, the strategic reserve would be reduced to 2 2/3 Army divisions, two Marine 

divisions, and nine tactical fighter squadrons, all with “marginal sustaining capability” 

and unable either to satisfy post-1968 Vietnam requirements or respond to Sino-Soviet 

pressures. Therefore, they urged prompt action to provide through mobilization a 

capability for maintaining: (1) FY 1968 Vietnam requests; (2) units already in Europe, 

pre-positioned stocks in Germany, and initial reinforcements from CONUS; (3) a contingency force of three divisions and 10 squadrons intended primarily for Southeast Asia; 

and (4) a ready reserve of one division and three squadrons for minor contingencies.56

On 29 May, through a tentative DPM, Secretary McNamara proposed adding one 

division to the Army, for a wartime total of 18. His calculation of requirements for 21⁄2 

wars allocated only 8 divisions to Europe compared to 11 in the DPMs of 1965–66. His 

justification was that the allies probably would exhaust their munitions before reactivated US reserve divisions reached the battlefield.57 As for Southeast Asia, Secretary 

McNamara cited findings by the Chairman’s Special Studies Group that the Chinese 

would enjoy only a 1.2-1.6 to 1 advantage over 7 US divisions, with interdiction making 

the two sides approximately equal. Admittedly, in South Vietnam, about 1,000,000 allied 

troops were fighting 280,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. But during a “conventional” war, the Secretary argued, superior US equipment and support would more than 

offset China’s numerical edge. South Korea could defend itself without American help, 
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

55

he continued, rejecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff claim that 6 to 15 US divisions would 

be required. In 1951, he noted, 535,000 United Nations (UN) troops had halted 835,000 

Chinese and North Koreans. In 1967, by M+90, 680,000 South Koreans would face 825,000 

Chinese and North Koreans. That, plus the fact that US units cost 15 times as much as 

South Korean counterparts, convinced him that the two American divisions in South 

Korea should be withdrawn when “political factors” permitted. Throughout East Asia, 

then, the post-Vietnam requirements would be seven divisions for Southeast Asia and 

perhaps two for Korea. Lastly, Mr. McNamara provided 1 1/3 divisions for Western 

Hemisphere contingencies.58

On 24 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Mr. McNamara that his force levels 

incurred “an excessive degree of risk.” For Europe, 10 divisions rather than 8 more 

accurately reflected available intelligence and military objectives. As to Southeast Asia, 

Vietnam had left them chastened enough to conclude that between 13 1/3 and 19 2/3 

division-equivalents would be needed if the Chinese chose to concentrate their entire 

effort in that area. In South Korea, they still saw a need for “substantial” US forces to 

defend against as many as 58 Chinese and North Korean divisions. In sum, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the JSOP position, augmented by their recommendations 

of 20 May.59

The Joint Chiefs of Staff critique had no impact because Secretary McNamara 

concluded that, without mobilizing reserves, extending tours, or diverting units 

earmarked for Europe, the services could supply General Westmoreland with 3 2/3 

division-equivalents by 31 December 1968—more than his “minimum” request. In 

Saigon, during 7–9 July, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, and General Westmoreland settled upon an increase of less than 50,000 personnel, creating a new ceiling of 

525,000. The Service Chiefs concurred and President Johnson approved. Major units to 

be deployed included the 101st Airborne Division (-) and two tactical fighter squadrons, 

plus a Marine brigade and three USAF squadrons placed in readiness.60

General Johnson worried that, after much of the 101st went to Vietnam, only the 

82nd Airborne Division would be promptly available for other contingencies—and the 

recent Middle East war had shown how quickly crises could erupt. He asked the other 

Chiefs to join in supporting activation of another division. J–5 prepared a justification for adding one Army division and 1/3 Marine Expeditionary Force, but General 

McConnell opposed forwarding it to the Secretary on grounds that doing so would 

amount to a retreat from their recommendations of 20 May. General McConnell suggested, and his colleagues agreed, that discussion with Mr. McNamara was the best 

approach. In response, the Secretary did agree that the Army needed another division. 

On 7 September he authorized activation of the 6th Infantry Division, thereby raising 

the total to 19. Regionally, Secretary McNamara’s allocations now ran as follows: eight 

for NATO; 10 for Southeast Asia; two for Korea; one for the Western Hemisphere; and 

two for a strategic reserve.61

In JSOP 69-76, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a united front about USAF tactical fighter wings: 23 in FY 1969, 25 in FY 1970, 29 in FY 1972. Generals Wheeler and 
56

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

McConnell wanted 16 attack carriers; the other Chiefs favored 17. Active Air Force, 

Navy and Marine Corps aircraft should number 3,416 in FY 1969 and 3,687 in FY 1976. 

Forces needed to fight in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Korea (singly or in various combinations) totaled 3,700, organized in 32 or 33 tactical fighter and 18 or 19 carrier wings. 

Since combat losses were not wholly replaceable, those levels would not be reached 

until FY 1972. The resulting risks stopped short of being “entirely unacceptable” only 

thanks to the alternative provided by tactical and strategic nuclear forces.62

The wartime Air Force now contained 25 wings, but Secretary McNamara had 

lower postwar goals: 23 by FY 1969, building to 24 in FY 1970 and reducing to 23 thereafter; 16 carriers in FY 1969, 15 thereafter. Active aircraft would total 3,198 in FY 1969, 

2,877 in FY 1976. He put forward, as a planning guide, being able to fight indefinitely 

in the Far East while holding enough forces to fight in Europe for ninety days. The 

Secretary continued to believe that NATO led the Warsaw Pact in both quantity (11,367 

versus 10,697 in 1967; 8,821 versus 7,461 in 1972) and quality (payloads and pilot training). Consequently, “we can deploy 1,511 aircraft to Asia while still holding eight wings 

and two attack carriers for Europe”—and those 1,511 could deliver thirteen times the 

payloads of their opponents. With the Air Force and Navy developing a new avionics 

system for the A-7 designed to double or triple bombing accuracy, “we can reduce from 

24 to 23 wings while still increasing our capability.”63

The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized Secretary McNamara’s DPM for emphasizing 

“cost considerations over security requirements.” They called the concepts underlying 

its analyses “militarily unsound” and concluded that “neither the forces recommended 

nor the employment portrayed . . .will support, simultaneously, two major contingencies and one minor contingency.” In Europe, NATO’s numerical advantage could fail 

to materialize because so much depended upon timely arrival of reinforcements from 

CONUS. Very likely with the shortcomings of Rolling Thunder in mind, they observed 

that a “piecemeal application” of tactical air power could imperil the attainment of air 

superiority. Qualitatively, they denied that total payload capability stood out as the 

key factor. Effectiveness also was “a function of missions, range, employment profiles, 

types of ordnance, and operational constraints.” All of them, singly or in combination, 

could offset apparent payload advantages. They also rejected the DPM’s Asian scenario 

because it assumed a static situation in which the enemy never made full use of his 

capabilities, China remained a sanctuary, and similar bombing restraints would be 

imposed.64 Secretary McNamara’s final program contained no concessions, keeping 

USAF wings steady at 23 and carriers at 15.65

Turning to strategic mobility, JSOP 69-76 analyzed FY 1972 capabilities to support combat in either Vietnam or Korea while reinforcing Europe and conducting a 

Dominican-scale intervention. The conclusion was that troop requirements would be 

met but serious shortfalls in cargo deliveries would develop. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

recommended modernizing sealift, making the merchant marine more responsive to 

military needs, and preserving options to increase C-5A output from 96 to 148 and FDL 

ships from 30 to 48. These were perennial issues between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

57

the Secretary. The Chiefs normally asked for more and Mr. McNamara, citing costs 

and improving technology like the C–5A, decided on less.66

Matched against JSOP 69-76, Secretary McNamara projected slightly lower totals 

for airlift (816 versus 768 in FY 1972), notably lower ones for sealift (110 versus 73 in 

FY 1972). But his assessment of lift capabilities was far more optimistic. By D+30, the 

programmed force could put nine divisions in Europe, five in Southeast Asia, and one 

in Latin America. C–130Es alone could fulfill the airlift requirements for two contingencies; augmented by C–141s, they could carry out a minor operation as well. Hence, 

he intended to accelerate C–130A retirements and do away with 19 Forward Floating 

Depots because FDL ships soon would become available.67

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that C–130A retirements be delayed since so many 

were committed in Vietnam, that cancellation of Forward Floating Depots await Congressional funding of the FDL program, that 16 rather than 8 troopships stay in active 

service, and that replacement or modernization of the cargo fleet begin. In response 

to the Chiefs reclama, the Secretary agreed to slow C–130A retirements, keeping 434 

C–130s in service during FY 1969. He also saved three Forward Floating Depots for at 

least another year and retained 16 troop ships in service.68

This year’s (1967) dispute over ASW force levels also followed a familiar pattern. 

JSOP 69-76 recommended 49 diesel and 56 nuclear submarines for FY 1969, changing 

to 21 and 84 by FY 1976. Generals Wheeler and McConnell continued favoring nine 

ASW carriers, just as in JSOP 68-75, while the other Chiefs proposed eight for the next 

few years but ultimately eleven. Mr. McNamara again wanted to start three nuclear 

submarines while the Chiefs favored five. The Secretary cited several studies supporting his contention that his programmed forces would destroy 90 to 100 percent 

of Soviet submarines over six months. He cited recent intelligence estimates that the 

total number of Soviet submarines probably would not increase, although the fleet 

should become one-third nuclear by 1975. While the readiness of Soviet submarines had 

improved, their relatively high “noise” levels remained about the same. Thus, “unless 

we are much mistaken about kill probabilities across the board, there is little to be 

gained from additional increments to our forces.” His cost-effective justification was 

that it would cost “$11 million or more to save cargoes worth $3 to $9 million.” As for 

surface escorts, he intended to press on with contract definition for a new “DX” but 

defer starting any construction. Finally, for ASW carriers, he limited ASW carriers to 

seven in FY 1969 and six thereafter. Secretary McNamara judged them uncompetitive 

with new land-based P-3 patrol planes, of which he planned to procure 243.69

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejoinder, on 26 August, questioned the use of selective 

excerpts to reach overly optimistic conclusions. While ASW capabilities certainly had 

improved, kill probabilities even as high as .79 could not be substantiated. That alone, 

they argued, was enough to “impugn” Secretary McNamara’s claim that little could 

be gained by creating larger ASW forces. Studies by the Weapon Systems Evaluation 

Group showed various scenarios resulting in “excessive” US losses. As for Mr. McNamara’s cost/benefit analysis, they cautioned that a cargo’s wartime value might bear 
58

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

little relation to its peacetime cost. Turning to the DX program, they observed that 

postponing construction until FY 1970 would delay availability until the mid-1970s. 

By then, modernized World War II destroyers would have reached retirement age and 

many new escorts must be built, competing with DXs for funds and facilities. Finally, 

the Chiefs argued that ASW carriers could meet high-sortie requirements on short 

notice, which land-based aircraft could not do. In January 1968, Secretary McNamara 

did approve FY 1969 construction of five DXs but cut nuclear submarine starts to two. 

After FY 1969, he intended to operate only 5 ASW carriers.70

A Navy study, based upon requirements for simultaneous wars in Europe and the 

Far East, indicated that each attack carrier needed six rather than four escorts, and 

that planes from attack carriers could not always protect the ASW carriers, which 

therefore required their own anti-air protection. Secretary McNamara responded by 

increasing from 79 to 96 the number of anti-air escorts programmed for FY 1976. As 

soon as contract definition for the DX was completed, he intended to begin contract 

definition for a conventional “DXG” class of escorts combining ASW with anti-air 

capability. The Secretary also proposed starting construction of two nuclear-powered 

guided-missile destroyers, followed by three more later. Added to the four already 

funded, there would be a total of nine. Nuclear propulsion, he agreed, was definitely 

superior in speed, reliability, and efficiency. But he projected enough nuclear escorts 

for only two of the four planned nuclear carriers, thereby saving $546 million.71

The Joint Chiefs wanted to lift one Marine Expeditionary Force at 20 knots in the 

Pacific and another in the Atlantic. For the near term, that translated into 155 amphibious assault and 10 gunfire support ships in FY 1969, 155 and 10 in FY 1970. Secretary 

McNamara planned enough new construction, by FY 1970, to carry 1 MEF in the Pacific 

and 1/2 in the Atlantic at 20 knots. The other 1/2 MEF in the Atlantic would be carried 

by 37 older, 13-knot ships. Before replacing older ships, however, he wanted to know 

whether the numbers of new ships could be cut by shifting some equipment from the 

assault back to the follow-on echelon.72

The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that, over twenty years, the cost of keeping older 

ships in service was considerably higher than the cost of building and maintaining new 

ones. Older ships could lift the force, but their ability to put it ashore and then maintain 

it would be inadequate. The difference in transit time between 13- and 20-knot ships 

was only six days, which did not impress the Secretary. The Chiefs contended, however, 

that such a delay “can influence every aspect of assault operations.”73

Secretary McNamara’s final recommendation, dated 10 January 1968, stretched out 

the shipbuilding program even further, delaying until FY 1971 the attainment 20-knot 

lift for 1 1/2 MEFs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended activating two battleships 

for service off the coast of Vietnam. Secretary McNamara agreed to bring the USS New 

Jersey out of mothballs, so his FY 1969 program amounted to 162 amphibious assault 

and 9 gunfire support ships.74
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

59

Force Planning in 1968: The Snap

The first three months of 1968 saw crisis heaped upon crisis, starting with the North Koreans seizure of the USS Pueblo, on 23 January 1968. Almost 200 US aircraft 

rushed to South Korea; 28 Air Force and Navy reserve units were mobilized. One week 

later, in South Vietnam, communists launched a country-wide offensive. As February 

opened, forces available for Southeast Asia amounted to the 82nd Airborne Division, 

1 1/3 Marine division/wing teams, five carriers, and 12 tactical fighter squadrons, 

including eight equipped with older type aircraft activated in response to the Pueblo 

emergency.75 Sensing that the Vietnam War had reached a critical phase, General 

Wheeler also concluded that the mobilization issue must be confronted and resolved. 

At his strong prompting, General Westmoreland on 12 February cabled that he “desperately” needed a Marine regiment and a brigade from the 82nd Division. President 

Johnson approved immediately, but bringing the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd up to strength 

stripped the other two brigades almost to cadre level. The next day, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff recommended immediately activating 46,000 reservists, mainly to man two Army 

infantry brigades and one Marine regiment, and placing 137,000 more in readiness.76

Late in February, General Wheeler made a three-day trip to Vietnam. He and 

General Westmoreland put together a request for 205,000 more men, split into three 

increments. The first increment of 108,000 should arrive by 1 May. The other two would 

deploy only if the military situation worsened; otherwise, they would reconstitute the 

strategic reserve. Meeting the full request would require calling up 250,000 reservists, 

extending tours of duty as long as six months, and increasing the May draft.77

On 4 March a committee headed by the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, 

recommended deploying only 22,000 personnel to Vietnam immediately while calling 

up 262,000 reservists, extending tours, and increasing draft quotas. General Wheeler 

advised General Westmoreland to expect 30,000 reinforcements, but the prospect of a 

large mobilization quickly evaporated. On 10 March, The New York Times published 

details of the 205,000 request, giving a public already shaken by Tet yet another jolt. The 

strength of anti-war feeling showed in the New Hampshire Democratic primary, where 

on 12 March Senator Eugene McCarthy ran almost even against President Johnson. The 

international monetary system weakened suddenly, in part from the strain of growing 

war costs and budget deficits. General Wheeler warned General Westmoreland that 

this combination of troubles had placed the administration in “as difficult a situation 

as I have seen in the past five years.” The culmination came on 31 March when President Johnson announced the curtailment of Rolling Thunder, limited Vietnam-bound 

reinforcements to 13,500 support troops over the next five months, and revealed his 

decision not to seek another term.78

On 2 April, the Services recommended calling up 56,887 reservists, including five 

Army brigades and six USAF tactical fighter squadrons. Warning that Strategic Army 

Forces had dwindled to four divisions, none immediately deployable and only one 

suitable for non-NATO contingencies, General Johnson proposed and the Joint Chiefs 
60

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

of Staff endorsed adding a fifth division to STRAF. Instead, Secretary Clifford decided 

upon a modest call-up of 22,767 personnel, involving two brigades and two tactical 

fighter squadrons. Secretary Clifford’s plan to create a five-division STRAF involved 

some legerdemain. First, he postponed “Reforger,” a periodic rotation of CONUS units 

back to West Germany,79 thereby releasing to STRAF two brigades from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Second, he listed the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as 

available for use anywhere instead of being solely NATO-committed. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff vainly protested that, since Europe still was a first-priority theater, shifting 

“Reforger” units into STRAF would be contrary to strategy and commitments.80

Back in February, as aerial reinforcements were being rushed to South Korea, 

General Wheeler directed the Joint Staff to collaborate with the Services in preparing a worldwide assessment. When a very detailed draft was completed in March, the 

Joint Chiefs shortened it considerably. Even so, on 10 April, they provided Secretary 

Clifford with plenty of specifics about “the limited capability of our military forces 

to respond rapidly to crisis situations.” No CONUS-based ground forces could be 

deployed without changing tour/rotation policies and extending terms of service. The 

Army’s three NATO-committed divisions (two armored and one mechanized) would 

need about 90 days to reach combat readiness. Although the 82nd and 101st Airborne 

Divisions were listed as substitutes, the entire 101st and one brigade from the 82nd had 

been sent to Vietnam. Two Marine division/wing teams were supposed to arrive in 

Europe between M+30 and M+60, but only 1 1/3 could do so. Of the 37 tactical fighter 

squadrons supposed to augment European Command by M+30, a mere six were available immediately and four of them were slated for service in Southeast Asia. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff also took account of “domestic considerations”—namely, urban riots 

triggered by the murder of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Active and Ready Reserve 

forces could cope with these threats, as some already were doing, but of course they 

would be unavailable for duty elsewhere.81

In JSOP 70-77, dated 15 March 1968, the Joint Chiefs asked again for 21 Army 

and 4 Marine divisions as long as the war lasted, 18 and 3 thereafter, with both totals 

supported by 10 reserve divisions. Their 21⁄2-war scenario differed from JSOP 69-76 in 

assigning more strength to Europe and less to the Far East: 14 to 16 divisions for an 

initial defense of NATO; between 10 and 13 2/3 to conduct another major operation; 

three to maintain Korean and Pacific deployments; 1 1/3 for a minor contingency; and 

two for the strategic reserve. They deemed 25 wartime and 21 peacetime divisions 

“sufficient to meet only the minimum requirements for the initial defense of NATO and 

one non-NATO major contingency.”82 On 10 April, in the assessment described above, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that these levels be swiftly attained, and that “the need 

to move ahead quickly on re-equipping and modernizing our forces” be assigned “the 

utmost importance.”

Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze, who was now overseeing all force planning issues, 

disagreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His DPM, circulated late in May, prescribed 22 

wartime divisions and 19 peacetime ones. Currently, he acknowledged, active Army 
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

61

divisions in CONUS would need between 10 and 17 weeks to become combat-ready, 

reserves 18 to 40 weeks. The partially organized 6th Infantry Division would be dissolved, freeing its men and materiel to rebuild other STRAF units. By September, Mr. 

Nitze predicted, STRAF divisions would be able to reach combat readiness in one 

to three weeks. The overall combat capability of land forces, he claimed, “has been 

improving markedly.”83

The Joint Chiefs replied by again reiterating their JSOP recommendations and protesting the 6th Division’s inactivation. Moreover, they saw little likelihood that STRAF 

units could achieve one to three weeks’ readiness, due to “reduced manning levels 

(90 percent) for the NATO-oriented division and the high turnover caused by the oneyear tour in Vietnam, the 25 months between [Vietnam tours], and the limited rotation 

base.” Mr. Nitze’s final decisions, in a DPM dated 9 January 1969, however contained no 

changes. But Army readiness, in his judgment, did show a “significant improvement” 

over the post-Tet low point. Two STRAF divisions were completely combat-ready, and 

the other two would become so within six months. During 1969–70, however, reserve 

divisions would need at least 14 weeks to become deployable.84

Exchanges between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD about tactical air power went 

over a good deal of familiar ground. The Pueblo mobilization temporarily raised USAF 

wings to a peak of 29. In JSOP 70-77, all the Service Chiefs recommended moving from 

23 USAF wings in FY 1970 to 29 in FY 1977, except General McConnell who wanted 31 

by then. Generals Wheeler and McConnell asked for 16 attack carriers; the other Chiefs 

proposed 17. Put differently, Service parochialism remained strong as the Navy sought 

more ships and the Air Force more air wings. According to the now standard rationale, 

3,956 active aircraft could conduct one major non-NATO operation, meet Allied Command Europe’s initial requirement for reinforcements, and fulfill other needs. Dealing 

successfully with a Warsaw Pact attack while conducting a holding action against major 

Chinese aggression required 5,126 aircraft; 4,811 could cope with Chinese aggression 

in one or more areas yet remain able to execute an initial defense of Western Europe. 

Nonetheless, a force of 3,861 aircraft (a combined USAF, Marine Corps, and Navy total 

for FY 1977) would be “within acceptable limits of risk”; that figure translated into 17 to 

19 attack carriers, 3 1/3 to 4 1/3 Marine wings, and 32 to 34 USAF wings.85

Tentatively, Deputy Secretary Nitze planned to operate a constant 23 wings and 15 

carriers. His computations were based upon what would be needed to “fight indefinitely 

in Asia while holding enough forces to fight in Europe and a third area for 90 days.” Mr. 

Nitze replaced the old Unit Equipment (“UE”) figures with Authorized Active Inventory 

(“AAI”) ones, which were larger because they included spares, replacements, and trainers. 

Translating JSOP levels into AAI showed a growing divergence with OSD’s projections:

FY 1970 FY 1977

OSD 5,012 4,369

JCS 5,167 5,725
62

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Mr. Nitze desired a “baseline” of 5,455 AAI aircraft (compared to the JCS figure of 

6,857) that would support 1,000 daily sorties in Europe, 640 in the Far East, and 250 

in a third area. Free World and Sino-Soviet Bloc inventories, he now estimated, would 

remain approximately equal (13,600 versus 13,357 in 1969; 12,439 versus 12,707 in 1973). 

But he foresaw no erosion of the US advantage in quality, since new Soviet aircraft 

designs still seemed to stress homeland defense and nuclear missions.86

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discerned a “basic misunderstanding” about the objectives 

and concepts of tactical air operations. Mr. Nitze assumed that opposing air forces 

would concentrate upon the battlefield area, avoiding attacks upon air bases and lines 

of communication. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff methods of aggregating the aircraft 

inventories of all communist countries into one gross number was also unrealistic. 

Even more important, they feared that the US qualitative lead was eroding. While cuts 

in expenditures compelled Deputy Secretary Nitze to propose slowdowns in production, the Soviets were introducing one fighter prototype every year. The MiG-21 had 

proved equal to the F–4 in aerial combat over North Vietnam—and by 1973 communist countries should be deploying 4,270 MiG–21s, compared to 1,840 F–4s in the US 

inventory. This struck them as especially ominous because the Free World’s advantage 

rested almost entirely upon high-payload aircraft (A–6s, A–7s, and F–111s) that required 

fighter protection when carrying out their attack missions. Not persuaded, Mr. Nitze 

kept 23 wings and 15 carriers as the core of his final proposals.87

Turning to strategic mobility, JSOP 70-77 rated programmed forces insufficient 

for a 21⁄2-war strategy and re-argued last year’s case for increases. Again, Mr. Nitze 

disagreed. He recognized that, as measures to reduce the balance-of-payments drain 

brought more units back to CONUS, strategic mobility would acquire increasing 

importance. But, seeing no reason why programmed forces should prove inadequate, 

he delayed moving a tactical transport into the contract definition phase until studies 

revealed whether its introduction would permit equivalent reductions in helicopters, 

trucks, and theater stocks. He also planned to phase out five troop ships and quickly 

modernize the tanker fleet by chartering private ships, cancelling new construction.88

Responding early in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for more C–130s, claiming 

that Vietnam requirements alone exceeded Mr. Nitze’s projected figures. They reprised 

the old argument against delaying a tactical transport and recommended retaining 

16 troop ships, denying that FDL ships could serve as substitutes. In January 1969, 

Deputy Secretary Nitze authorized an additional C–130 squadron during FYs 1970–71 

but refused to proceed with the new tactical transport. Spiraling costs also led him 

to caution that C–5A objectives might have to be cut back, as indeed they would be. 

The sealift program, meantime, suffered a major blow when Congress deleted funding 

for FDL ships. Their existence, critics charged, would only make Vietnam-style interventions easier. Senator Richard Russell, a conservative Democrat who chaired the 

Armed Services Committee, remarked that was like saying “when the sheriff makes 

too many arrests, don’t buy any more squad cars.” Mr. Nitze responded by retaining 

11 troop ships in FY 1970 and 10 thereafter. He still projected 15 FDL ships but sug-
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

63

gested, as an alternative, a private build-and-charter program of 30 ships. Mr. Nitze’s 

final proposals for FY 1970 included 275 C–141s, 37 C–5As, 26 tankers, 84 cargo and 3 

Forward Floating Depot ships.89

In sizing ASW forces, OSD analysts consistently reached much more optimistic 

conclusions about US capabilities than the Joint Chiefs thought warranted.90 JSOP 

70-77 listed 8 ASW carriers, 58 diesel submarines and 47 nuclear ones in FY 1970, 

changing to 9 or 10 carriers, 30 diesels, and 75 nuclears by FY 1977. Mr. Nitze proposed 

maintaining only five carriers and 90 submarines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to 

start five nuclear submarines each year; Mr. Nitze thought two annually were enough. 

He also projected 208 escorts in FY 1970 and 135 in FY 1977, compared to JSOP levels 

of 240 and 174. As justification, Mr. Nitze predicted “dramatic” improvements flowing 

from the introduction of new technology such as the Mark 46 and Mark 48 torpedoes, 

a directional sonobuoy system, and two types of sonars. He cited studies that, in FY 

1969, the Soviets should lose 93 submarines while passing through barriers in the 

Barents Sea and the North Pacific. After two sorties, the Soviets would complete 145 

attacks but lose 142 of their presumed 160 submarines. By FY 1977, only 44 Soviet 

submarines would survive to execute 26 attacks, a mere 12 would re-pass the barriers 

and return to port.91

In their reclama, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that new Soviet submarines (as 

yet not operational) would be faster, quieter, and carry better sonar; yet, Mr. Nitze’s 

DPM did not consider how these improvements would affect US capabilities. They 

also faulted the DPM’s indices of effectiveness. According to those indices, 24 nuclear 

submarine barrier stations (12 in the Barents Sea, 12 in the North Pacific) were enough. 

But JSOP analyses, based upon war-gaming, using different parameters, held that 39 

would be needed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff observed, too, that mine and submarine barriers might not be in position when war began, that the effectiveness of ASW systems 

varied with water conditions, and that attrition of US forces should be included in calculations. Thus JSOP 70-77 recommendations represented “minimum” requirements.92

Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover, known as the father of the nuclear navy, wanted all 

large surface combatants as well as submarines to be nuclear-powered and found 

powerful allies on Capitol Hill. Influential members of Congress, collaborating with 

Admiral Rickover, brought OSD’s proposals under sharp criticism and Deputy Secretary Nitze reconsidered them. His DPM of January 1969 retained six ASW carriers, and 

slightly raised escort levels, and increased nuclear submarine starts to three in FY 1970 

and four annually during FYs 1971–74. Most importantly, he projected a total of 105 

submarines, not 90, exactly following JSOP 70-77’s goal of 30 diesels and 75 nuclears 

by FY 1977. For FY 1970, he would start three of the new nuclear attack submarines, 

high-speed SSN-688s, followed by four each year during FYs 1971–74.93

For fleet escorts, JSOP 70-77 listed 106 in FY 1977; the DPM provided 96. Mr. Nitze 

based his total upon a requirement to escort 12 attack and 4 ASW carriers, 6 amphibious 

assault echelons, and 10 underway replenishment groups. The Joint Chiefs of Staff countered that: escorts were employed for convoying, gunfire support, and other independent 
64

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

operations; all carriers, not only those at sea, needed assigned escorts; and seven cruisers 

slated for retirement should be retained because they provided superior firepower and 

communications facilities. Mr. Nitze raised from four to five the number of ASW carriers 

requiring escorts but reduced the FY 1977 total to 94. He planned to begin one nuclear 

guided-missile DXGN as well as five conventional ASW DXs, but defer starting the first 

six DXGs (combining anti-air with ASW) from FY 1970 to FY 1971.94

JSOP 70-77’s objectives for amphibious assault forces ran fairly close to the currently approved program: 160 amphibious assault and 16 gunfire support ships in FY 

1970, 113 and 10 in FY 1977. But Secretary Nitze, in June, decided that only 1 2/3 Marine 

Expeditionary Forces (one in the Pacific, 2/3 in the Atlantic/Mediterranean) need be 

transported at 20 knots. By abandoning the long-held objective of carrying two MEFs 

at 20 knots, he expected to save $1 to $2 billion over the next ten years. Consequently, 

in FY 1977, Mr. Nitze planned only 93 amphibious and four gunfire support ships. These 

were not enough to conduct simultaneous assaults in two separate theaters, but the 

likelihood of having to do so he believed was “very low.” Moreover, in a major European 

war, probably even two MEFs would be insufficient to secure a beachhead on Allied 

Command Europe’s northern or southern flanks.95

The Joint Chiefs of Staff still wanted two MEFs carried at 20 knots. On the northern 

and southern flanks, they claimed, “a single MEF assault could be decisive in shifting 

the local military balance.” Norway, for example, offered 37 potential landing areas; the 

enemy could hardly defend all of them. Mr. Nitze finally approved nine gunfire support 

ships in FY 1970 and eight for several years thereafter. He remained firm, though, about 

lowering the lift objective, requiring 138 amphibious assault ships in FY 1970, 88 in FY 

1977. For FY 1970, he proposed proceeding with construction of two 40,000-ton LHAs 

and providing advance procurement funds for two more.96

In September 1968, when the Vietnam commitment was at its height and Warsaw 

Pact divisions had just swept into Czechoslovakia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Clifford a tabulation of world-wide deployments that included:

CONUS/Atlantic: 4 1/3 Army divisions, 3 attack and 2 ASW carriers, 8/9 Marine division, 

10 USAF tactical fighter squadrons.

Europe/Mediterranean: 4 1/3 Army divisions, 1 ASW and 2 attack carriers, 17 USAF 

tactical fighter squadrons.

Southeast Asia: 7 2/3 Army divisions, 2 2/3 Marine divisions, 4 attack and 2 ASW 

carriers, 34 USAF tactical fighter squadrons.

What if a new emergency erupted? The Army had one brigade available in three 

weeks, another three in four weeks. Within seven days, the Navy could deploy one attack 

and one ASW carrier from the Atlantic as well as two ASW carriers from the Pacific. The 

Marine Corps had one battalion in the Caribbean and one in the Mediterranean immediately available. The Air Force could deploy three squadrons from CONUS in three to 

seven days, followed by three more in four to six weeks. Yet even these modest figures 
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

65

were, in some measure, a façade. Materiel and personnel shortages existed everywhere 

except Southeast Asia. Reserves could neither reinforce Europe rapidly nor make more 

than a “marginal response” to emergencies elsewhere. Any additional commitments 

could not be sustained long because CONUS-based units were providing the training 

and rotation base for overseas deployments.97

In fact under Secretary Clifford Army readiness was slowly improving. The Secretary hoped, also, to assemble a larger USAF reserve by returning some units from 

overseas and modifying Southeast Asia rotation policies. He warned the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, though, that budgetary constraints would be even greater in FY 1970 than they 

had been in FY 1969.98 In sum, no early or easy solution to the problem of over-stretched 

conventional capabilities seemed in sight.

Afterthoughts

The area of US superiority was air power, land- and sea-based. Witness the rapid response to the Pueblo’s seizure, when nearly 200 aircraft moved to South Korea 

and two attack carriers steamed into the Sea of Japan. Yet how many Army divisions 

were combat-ready—“boots on the ground”—remained the clearest measure of US 

capability and determination. That was why drawdowns of Seventh Army in Germany 

created such concern among European allies. As the strategic reserve was drained for 

Vietnam and specialist personnel were transferred from Europe, mobilization offered 

the best way to maintain a good measure of credibility. Timing was crucial, however. 

In 1965, a large call-up might have been accomplished. By 1968, when action became 

unavoidable, support for the war had shrunk so much that only a very modest mobilization in response to TET and the Pueblo crisis was politically feasible. In fairness to the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, they premised their force structure requirements on worst-case 

scenarios because they were responsible for the security of the nation. Yet, in doing so, 

they often deferred to their respective Service requirements rather than considering a 

comprehensive Joint program.

President Johnson never explained his long delay in making a decision on mobilization. Walt Rostow recalled that, in July 1965, President Johnson was extremely anxious 

to avoid any dramatic step that might trigger either a Hanoi-Moscow or a Hanoi-Peking 

military pact. During 1967–68, in Mr. Rostow’s opinion, two other factors influenced 

Johnson’s thinking. First, he was determined not to use large US ground forces outside 

South Vietnam’s borders. Second, he feared that a substantial force increase might 

widen the federal deficit, fuel inflation, and thus aggravate the balance-of-payments 

problem.99 In the end, President Johnson’s action proved to be too little and too late.
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Appendix

Forces in Being

30 Jun 65 30 Jun 66 30 Jun 67 30 Jun 68

Army

Airborne Divs 2 2 2 1

Airmobile Divs - 1 1 2

Armored Divs 4 4 4 4

Mechanized Divs 4 4 4 4

Infantry Divs 6 6 6 8

Marine Corps

Division/Wing Teams 3/3 4/3 4/3 4/3

Navy

Attack Carriers 16 15 15 15

ASW Carriers 9 8 8 8

Diesel Subs 83 82 77 72

Nuclear Subs 21 22 28 33

Guided Missile 

Destroyers 23 23 24 28

Destroyers 178 176 175 175

Escorts/Frigates 49 52 61 64

Amphibious Ships 129 148 150 145

Air Force

F-105 Aircraft 579 484 322 247

F-4 Aircraft 338 516 929 1,124

Tactical Fighter Wings 22 24 25 29

C-130 Aircraft 416 439 454 437

C-141 Aircraft 26 110 206 242

Source: OASD (Compt.), “The Five-Year Defense Program,” 12 May 82. Information about Army divisions 

came from John Wilson, US Army Center of Military History. Until 1968, the 1st Armored Division was 

organized and equipped as a mechanized division. In February 1968, McNamara approved converting the 

101st Airborne Division into an airmobile division. Information about USAF tactical fighter wings came 

from Dr. Walton Moody, Office of Air Force History.
67

5

Arms Control Inches Forward

President Johnson had expansive hopes for arms control. Publicly, on 30 December 

1964, he appealed to Soviet leaders that “we can and should move to limit the spread 

of nuclear weapons; to achieve a verified worldwide comprehensive test ban; to make 

a cutoff of fissionable material production for weapons coupled with measures to 

safeguard the peaceful uses of nuclear power; and to agree on a verified freeze in 

existing offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery systems.” Already he had 

appointed a task force led by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, to 

study means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Reporting in January 1965, 

it concluded that “the world is fast approaching the point of no return.” Therefore, “as 

a matter of great urgency,” the scope and intensity of US efforts must substantially 

increase. Specifically, the administration should strive for a non-proliferation agreement, a comprehensive test ban, and nuclear-free zones—all to be accomplished 

through multilateral treaties.1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had long displayed a skeptical, often disapproving attitude 

toward arms control proposals. The interagency body for assessing such proposals was 

the Committee of Principals. Chaired by the Secretary of State, its members included 

the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Directors of the 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the President’s Special Assistants 

for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology. Upon reviewing the 

Gilpatric report, General Wheeler judged it riddled with “major deficiencies and gaps 

in the analysis” and recommended referring it to the Committee of Principals. Secretary Rusk, in fact, had warned the Committee that the report was “as explosive as a 

nuclear weapon” and that its premature disclosure “could start the ball rolling in an 

undesirable manner.” So the report remained under tight wraps. On 28 June, President 

Johnson directed ACDA to take the initiative in proposing a new arms control program, 

accompanied by preliminary comments from interested agencies.2

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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Killing the Comprehensive and Threshold Test Bans

Many people saw the 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater as only a beginning. Believing that a comprehensive test 

ban treaty (CTBT) would do far more to slow the arms race and stop nuclear proliferation, they viewed the failure to conclude such a ban as little less than tragic. It is important, therefore, to explain why the quest for a CTBT went nowhere during 1965–68. 

President Johnson, on 30 December 1964, appealed for “a verified worldwide 

comprehensive test ban.” General Wheeler promptly tasked the Joint Staff with 

assessing the implications of a CTBT. Answering in February 1965, the Special Assistant for Arms Control, Major General George T. Powers, USA, acknowledged that 

such a ban would: inhibit nuclear proliferation; slow Soviet weapons development; 

continue the US advantage in tactical nuclear weapons; promote mutual confidence 

between the two superpowers; and, if on-site inspections occurred, not only create a 

desirable precedent but also lead to the acquisition of valuable information. Yet Major 

General Powers assessment also identified many disadvantages such as: permitting 

the Soviets to preserve their lead in yield-to-weight ratios for 10- to 100-megaton 

weapons, in the weapons-effects knowledge derived from these devices, and in the 

knowledge of nuclear effects drawn from having tested ABM systems; enabling the 

Soviets to make advances through clandestine testing, and to alter the military balance by capitalizing upon their current advantages; retarding US weapons technology and rendering it difficult to maintain efficient laboratories; and resulting, after 

1970, in an ever-increasing challenge from China. Major General Powers stated that 

US policymakers now knew, as they had not known in 1963, that significant advantages would be gained from testing underground below the detection threshold. On 

balance, therefore, he judged that a CTBT’s drawbacks outweighed its benefits. The 

Joint Chiefs agreed to use his study as a basis for any future CTBT considerations, 

and they sent a copy to Secretary McNamara.3

On 22 April, the Committee of Principals discussed the pros and cons of a CTBT. 

William C. Foster, the Director of ACDA, observed that the danger of nuclear proliferation gave added importance to achieving a ban. Secretary Rusk, however, saw no point 

in publishing proposals until the Soviets accepted the principle of verification through 

international mechanisms. But Secretary McNamara, noting that ACDA simply wanted 

to indicate willingness to explore an agreement involving less extensive verification 

procedures, opposed any delay. The Committee accepted his argument and, on 26 April 

at the UN, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson delivered an appropriate statement.4

In mid-July, answering the President’s call for new approaches, Director Foster 

circulated three proposals. The first involved a CTBT, providing for inspection when 

a signatory charged violation and threatened to withdraw. The second, a “threshold” 

ban without on-site inspection, would prohibit underground explosions producing 

seismic signals that measured more than 4.5 on the Richter scale. The third described 

a CTBT with a small quota of on-site inspections.5 The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed 

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Arms Control Inches Forward

69

all three. “Substantial military information,” they advised Secretary McNamara, “can 

be obtained from tests at yields below the US seismic detection threshold. These tests 

would be undetected and unknown, and there would be no reason or basis for requesting on-site inspections.” A threshold ban, they continued, would preserve the Soviet 

lead in high-yield weapons and erode the US lead in low-yield ones. The 4.5 limitation 

was “not meaningful” because it could represent explosions of five to ten kilotons in 

hard rock or fifty kilotons in dry alluvium, tuff, and dolomite. Conversely, since yields 

could not be precisely predicted in advance, US testers would be under great pressure 

to keep the yield well below the limit. The Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled seismology an 

imprecise science, “inherently incapable” of proving a violation. That being the case, 

Washington would come under considerable pressure not to withdraw from a treaty 

even as indications of Soviet cheating accumulated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff worried 

particularly that secret testing of high-yield hot X-ray devices, having significantly 

larger kill radii, could award the Soviets a major advantage in ballistic missile defense.6

Secretary McNamara forwarded these views to ACDA but did not endorse them. 

A 4.5 threshold ban could be monitored with confidence, he informed the Agency. In 

the field of nuclear technology, he judged that neither superpower could acquire any 

significant advantage; the same would hold true under a CTBT. Mr. McNamara believed 

that a major improvement in verification techniques had occurred, but, until he knew 

more about US detection capabilities and whether the Soviets as well as potential 

nuclear powers would support a CTBT, he deemed it unwise to define “a specific new 

position on verification.”7

In August, OSD circulated its own proposal. It stated that a comprehensive test 

ban, observed by all signatories, probably would work to the net advantage of the United States, “though not in any decisive way.” Admittedly, Soviet cheating could threaten 

the effectiveness of US forces, in the “unlikely” event that it continued undetected for 

some years. Even if the Chinese refused to participate, they probably could not produce 

new developments that would require additional US tests. As for a 4.5 threshold ban, 

OSD foresaw no marked advantage accruing to either side.8

The Joint Chiefs believed OSD’s proposal was “unduly optimistic” about prospective US detection and verification capabilities, assessing adequately neither US and 

Soviet nuclear positions nor the consequences of eroding US superiority, and unjustifiably assuming a serious Soviet intent to abide by treaty terms. Consequently, they again 

labeled comprehensive and threshold test bans as disadvantageous. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff emphasized the importance of ABM testing, particularly to learn whether US 

missile warheads could be destroyed by hot X-rays. Here underground tests, more 

powerful than those permitted by a 4.5 threshold ban, probably would be required.9

Meeting on 25 August, the Committee of Principals agreed “to hold to the status 

quo in nuclear negotiations for the time being.” It did authorize Secretary Rusk and 

Director Foster to explore terms under which Soviet interest in a CTBT could be 

probed. Nonetheless, General Wheeler worried that some Committee members were 

willing to soften their position on a CTBT. Remembering how the Soviets “have in 

69
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

the past changed policy direction sharply and quickly,” he tasked the Joint Staff with 

identifying criteria for an acceptable CTBT. In December, the J–5 supplied a rather 

formidable list. There must be no known areas on the threshold of development that 

could alter the nuclear balance significantly. The United States must be able to detect, 

with a high degree of confidence, tests at the lowest yield from which significant 

gains could be made and to verify suspicious events. Treaty provisions must permit 

necessary verification and inspection, rapid withdrawal, and explosions for peaceful 

purposes. A system of US safeguards should include effective monitoring, the “highest 

state” of nuclear weapons technology, and constant readiness to resume testing. Since 

these conditions could not be met, a CTBT seemed “disadvantageous now and for the 

foreseeable future.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these findings and, in March 

1966, distributed them widely among concerned agencies.10

Meanwhile, on 3 September 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created a small civilian 

group to serve as an ad hoc panel to examine technical aspects of the ACDA’s Nuclear 

Test Ban Proposals. Dr. William G. McMillan, Jr., a UCLA chemist, chaired the panel; its 

members came mostly from the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. The report, submitted on 14 January 1966, focused on how comprehensive and threshold bans would 

affect the deterrent. The panel began by warning that the deterrent’s security, a main 

factor behind US willingness to approve the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, “has been 

brought into question as a result of the recent discovery of significant vulnerabilities in 

our strategic missile forces.”11 Uncertainties surrounding the deterrent’s survivability, 

the nuclear requirements of an ABM system, and the rapidly developing technology of 

hot X-ray devices all amounted to a strong technical argument against further testing 

restrictions. Under a CTBT, confident eradication of the deterrent’s weaknesses would 

be “virtually impossible,” as would the continuation of high competence in weapons 

development beyond more than a few years. The Soviets had already tested ICBMs 

large enough to carry about a dozen one-megaton warheads of proven reliability. Thus, 

from the United States’ standpoint, this was a “particularly disadvantageous” time for a 

CTBT. What about banning underground tests measuring more than 4.75 on the Richter 

scale? Development of an optimum ABM warhead and other high-yield devices would 

be precluded, the panel agreed, but the impact on other areas would be far less serious. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, finding their views reinforced “in many important respects,” 

again declared themselves “firmly opposed” to comprehensive and threshold bans. 

Again, too, they gave the panel’s report interagency distribution.12

ACDA now proposed pressing for a total ban or, if the Soviets proved unwilling to 

accept on-site inspection, an uninspected 4.75 threshold ban.13 Disapproving, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff found indications that the Soviets were scoring “important gains” in 

offensive and defensive weaponry; US countermeasures would require underground 

US testing. Secretary McNamara advised ACDA that he would accept an adequately 

inspected CTBT—a crucial qualification. As for a threshold ban, he wanted deeper 

study into problems of verification, the effect upon the military balance, and the impact 

upon nuclear proliferation.14

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Arms Control Inches Forward

71

ACDA next suggested a different approach. The McMillan panel worried that a 

threshold ban would preclude development of an “optimum” high-yield, high-temperature, clean ABM warhead. Why not, then, try to assess how important an optimum 

ABM warhead actually was, compared to one that could be developed through existing 

technology? Subsequent studies showed, at least to ACDA’s satisfaction, (1) that markedly improved ability to identify earthquakes and explosions would allow verification 

of an uninspected 4.75 ban and (2) that whatever effectiveness ABM warheads lost 

through a threshold ban could be regained by redesign, albeit at higher cost. Therefore, 

on 26 May 1966, Director Foster advised the Committee of Principals that a threshold 

treaty actually would be advantageous to the United States.15

A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) lent strong support to the Joint Chiefs’ 

views. Issued on 25 May 1966, it stated that a threshold ban would place no greater 

restrictions on most Soviet programs than those already imposed by the Limited 

Test Ban of 1963. However, because the relationship between underground yields 

and seismic readings remained “uncertain at best” and could be altered greatly by 

decoupling, the Soviets might continue testing over a wide range of yields, “depending on how far they were willing to risk violating the treaty and to support the cost 

and effort of decoupling.”16

On 8 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that they saw 

a continuing need for on-site inspections. All Soviet detonations, they reminded him, 

had occurred in well-known test areas where evasion was unnecessary. Consequently, 

US ability to identify deliberately masked detonations had not been demonstrated or 

even intensively studied. Then, too, the risk of evasion was bearable when the penalty 

would be nothing more than an unproved accusation. Thus the Soviets might reap 

“incalculable benefits” through a very modest program of covert violations. The Joint 

Chiefs cited the NIE’s judgment that there seemed about an even chance that the Soviets already possessed ABM warheads. Consequently, they could not accept ACDA’s 

claim that a threshold ban would impede the Soviets more than the United States. Also, 

according to the Chiefs, ACDA erred in arguing that a threshold ban would not “significantly affect” the vulnerabilities in offensive US systems. Finally, they saw no reason 

to suppose—as ACDA did—that a threshold ban would inhibit nuclear proliferation. 

France and China probably would reject a ban and, in any case, a 4.75 ceiling would 

not seriously hamper the development of low-yield fission weapons.17

Although ACDA made some minor modifications, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to oppose a threshold ban, calling much of ACDA’s argument “inaccurate, 

overstated, and misleading.” The Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy 

Commission generally aligned themselves with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in opposition. 

So, when the Committee of Principals met on 17 June, no one except ACDA’s spokesman favored pursuing a threshold ban.18

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also had concerns with verification and inspection. A 

possibility existed that the US detection capabilities might improve to the point where 

verification could be made without an on-site inspection. On 1 November 1966, the Air 

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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Force Technical Applications Center reported a “significant improvement” in its ability 

to identify seismic events in the Kurile Islands and the Kamchatka peninsula, down 

to 4.5 on the Richter scale. Several days later, the administration endorsed a British 

proposal for a seismic conference of US, UK, and Soviet specialists. However, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff deemed this a “most disadvantageous time” to extend testing limitations, 

outlining in urgent terms the “absolute need” for continued testing to assure stockpile 

reliability,19 acquire information about weapons effects, and develop ABM warheads 

and advanced re-entry vehicles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that deployment of 

missile defenses around Moscow and the Soviets’ test of a one-megaton warhead were 

an indication that they now possessed a medium hot X-ray warhead. Consequently, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Committee of Principals develop “a 

coordinated position . . .which would serve to curtail further effort to achieve a comprehensive treaty, a threshold treaty, or any extension of the present limitations.”20

Secretary McNamara felt much less concern, because the Soviets had shown no 

interest in talking about test limitations and no discussions were scheduled in any 

international forums. That, plus the heavy work schedules of senior officials led him 

to recommend against a Committee review. Secretary Rusk agreed.21

At this point, uncertainty about penetrating Soviet missile defenses rather than 

uncertainty about adequate verification was the real barrier to expanding the limited 

test ban. The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) were 

developing a new generation of strategic offensive weapons. Since they comprised the 

major response to Soviet ABM deployment, assessing their vulnerability to nuclear 

attack took on vital importance. That required exposing components and assemblies 

to large fluxes of neutrons, gamma and X-rays, which was feasible only by nuclear 

detonations.22

Nothing more happened until July 1968, when the Eighteen Nation Disarmament 

Conference (ENDC) prepared to reconvene in Geneva. The State Department suggested 

that President Johnson urge the ENDC to discuss “a comprehensive test ban, based 

on an agreement providing for adequate on-site inspection.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

opposed doing so. OSD agreed that a comprehensive ban was undesirable but argued 

that, because of other nations’ sensitivities, “tactically we are better off making a mild 

statement of support.” On 16 July, President Johnson sent the ENDC a bland expression 

of hope that it “will soon be able to make significant progress on measures which have 

been the subject of past discussions.”23

At the Tuesday Lunch on 24 July 1968, the CTBT was formally buried. Citing the 

need to perfect ABM, Minuteman III and Poseidon warheads, Secretary Rusk said that 

while the administration could not officially disavow its earlier support for a CTBT, 

he wanted “merely to discuss the subject rather than cling to it as policy.” President 

Johnson approved that approach.24

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the most determined, consistent opponents of 

comprehensive and threshold bans, they alone did not prevent positive action. Secretary McNamara recognized that his argument for only a “thin” anti-missile shield rested 

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Arms Control Inches Forward

73

upon the assurance that US warheads could penetrate Soviet defenses, which made 

testing above the threshold level essential. The Atomic Energy Commission Chairman 

Glenn T. Seaborg also saw no alternative to continued testing.

Fissionable Material Production: No Cutoff

During 1963, OSD’s forecast of nuclear stockpiling objectives led the Atomic Energy 

Commission to decide that six of the fourteen production reactors could be shut 

down. In April 1964, the United States and the USSR agreed to make cuts in their production of fissionable materials. Without publicity, US officials also let it be known that 

the United States would transfer 60,000 kilograms of uranium to peaceful purposes 

if the Soviets would transfer 40,000. Moscow did not respond. On 15 February 1965, 

the Atomic Energy Commission publicly announced that, between 1966 and 1969, US 

production of enriched uranium would be reduced again, by one-third. Privately, the 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency urged resubmitting the offer of transferring 

uranium to peaceful purposes, adding as well a transfer of plutonium. Such transfers, 

to be accomplished by destroying nuclear weapons and then extracting their fissionable materials, would be linked to a cessation of production for military purposes.25

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, calculated that a production cutoff coupled with 

a plutonium transfer would prevent the attainment of an adequate US weapons stockpile. Only 90 percent of the plutonium needed would be available in FY 1966, merely 50 

percent by FY 1973. Given the great uncertainties about Soviet production and utilization, they could not say which superpower would be most affected by ACDA’s proposal. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed a large uranium transfer and any plutonium transfer 

at all. They also asked that Soviet needs for fissionable material receive further study. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also requested that a scheme for destroying the material and 

verifying destruction be prescribed in detail and thoroughly tested.26

Secretary McNamara saw the matter differently. Forwarding Joint Chiefs of Staff 

views to Director Foster, he maintained that a production cutoff in the near future 

“would clearly be advantageous to the United States.” Despite the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

denials, he felt sure that a wide range of plutonium transfers still would leave the United 

States with a net advantage. He supported Director Foster’s proposal in principle but 

opposed any attempt to decide how much plutonium should be involved, given the 

absence of any Soviet interest and the changes in US and Soviet stockpiles. Still, he 

endorsed the Joint Chiefs’ caveat about the need to test verification schemes.27

ACDA rewrote its proposal to be less specific. The Joint Chiefs still objected, but 

ISA concurred as long as no specific ratios and amounts of plutonium were mentioned. 

In September 1965, at the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg proposed that 

the United States and the USSR (1) transfer, respectively, 60,000 and 40,000 kilograms 

of U-235 to peaceful uses; (2) destroy nuclear weapons “of our own choice” in order 

to make their fissionable material available for non-military purposes; and (3) add to 
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

this transfer “associated plutonium obtained from the destroyed weapons in an agreed 

quantity or ratio.”28

This failed to evoke a positive Soviet reply. So, on 19 January 1966, Director Foster 

suggested either halting military production, under verification, or reducing production on a plant-by-plant basis “with the same type of inspection applicable to all.” The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended one revision, to specify that on-site inspection 

must accompany the plant-by-plant cutback. On 27 January, in a message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, President Johnson stated that, if a complete 

production halt proved unattainable, there should be plant-by-plant reductions under 

“effective” inspection. The Soviets replied by proposing destruction of all stockpiles 

“under appropriate international controls”—a very elastic phrase.29

Early in July 1968, Director Foster suggested a different approach. For declared 

production facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency would apply safeguards 

to verify compliance with a cutoff. For undeclared ones, parties would rely upon their 

unilateral capabilities. ACDA further suggested a presidential appeal for agreement to 

halt all military production of fissionable materials. General Wheeler argued, however, 

that it was “premature to review the current verification arrangements until further 

analysis proves our capability to be good enough to warrant a change.” An interagency 

working group, led by ACDA, concluded that US ability to accomplish assured destruction would continue despite a cutoff. In fact, the date of a cutoff should have little effect 

upon the wartime level of fatalities inflicted.30

Upon review, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it “impossible to determine 

by the systems analysis approach when and if a cutoff would be to the net interest of 

the United States.” Uncertainties included: a possible error of 30 to 40 percent in the 

estimates of cumulative Soviet production; the effectiveness and accuracy of Soviet 

weapons, and the amounts of fissionable material used in them; and attack scenarios. 

In 1965, the Joint Chiefs had told Secretary McNamara that a cutoff would continue 

the US advantage “within a reasonable margin of risk.” Yet now, and for the next five to 

ten years, they concluded that a cutoff “would, at best, be imprudent and could involve 

major risks to US security.” They would accept a changed position on verification, 

though, if the United States was willing to abrogate an agreement immediately upon 

detection of cheating.31 There the matter rested.

Signing an Outer Space Treaty

I

n October 1963, by unanimous vote, the UN General Assembly asked all nations “to 

refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any object carrying nuclear weapons 

or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” In April 1965, the United States and the 

USSR published draft treaties prohibiting the orbiting of mass destruction weapons. 

Late that year, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) 

asked the Joint Chiefs for their views about some proposed treaty principles: no claims 
Arms Control Inches Forward

75

of sovereignty over celestial bodies; no weapons of mass destruction stationed on or 

near them; no military bases, maneuvers, or weapons tests upon them, but no prohibition on using military personnel and equipment for peaceful purposes. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff replied that a “serious disadvantage” could arise if the treaty inspired a feeling 

that the Soviet threat from this quarter had lessened, thereby leading to a diminution 

in US military exploitation of space. Therefore, they wanted American negotiators to 

insist upon: complete symmetry in obligations and responsibilities; freedom to take 

adequate steps toward verifying compliance; and a right of withdrawal.32

When treaty negotiations began in mid-1966, the US draft article permitting use 

of “military personnel and equipment” for peaceful purposes aroused controversy. 

Arguing for deletion of “and equipment,” the Soviets won considerable support in a UN 

subcommittee. Ambassador Goldberg suggested omitting that sentence (after all other 

important issues had been settled) and stating “for the record” the US belief that the 

treaty did not prevent peaceful uses of military personnel and equipment. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff agreed, but only to be offered as a final concession.33

As things turned out, the Soviets accepted wording that largely met American 

wishes. On 8 December, the UN Outer Space Committee agreed upon a draft treaty; 

President Johnson praised this as “the most important arms control development since 

the limited test ban treaty of 1963.” Article IV stipulated that the moon and other celestial bodies would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; it obligated parties not 

to orbit “nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install 

such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other 

manner.” Using military personnel for scientific research and other peaceful purposes 

would not be prohibited; neither would “any equipment or other facilities necessary for 

peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies.” Article XII authorized 

inspection of “all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles” following 

“reasonable advance notice of a projected visit.” Article XV permitted withdrawal after 

one year of notification.34

President Johnson signed the Outer Space Treaty on 27 January 1967. What it proscribed was not military activities but military action—placing nuclear weapons in 

full orbit—which neither superpower was planning in any case.35 Testifying before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General Wheeler backed the treaty but stressed 

the need to develop verification capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he continued, 

assigned “crucial significance to . . . the proposition that the United States will not 

permit the authority of this treaty to become meaningless by diminishing US military 

efforts in space technology.” Senatorial consent followed on 27 April.36

Negotiating a Non-Proliferation Treaty

Early in January 1965, General Wheeler tasked the Joint Staff with studying the security implications of efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. Answering in April, 
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the Staff stated that a basic policy of opposing the spread of nuclear weapons served 

the long-term interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The best way of 

doing this appeared to lie in agreements preventing non-nuclear states from acquiring 

these weapons, rather than in agreements preventing nuclear states from disseminating 

them. Yet overseas deployments of nuclear weapons and effective inter-allied nuclear 

arrangements were essential elements of US strategy. Thus a “soft sell” approach to 

non-proliferation seemed best, because a “hard sell” could diminish the nuclear deterrent’s credibility and restrict US flexibility. Moreover, “a US nuclear guarantee is a price 

that may have to be paid to convince a country to forego an independent nuclear capability.” A meaningful guarantee, of course, must involve more than a mere declaration; 

it would mean a visible US presence on the territory of the country thus guaranteed as 

well as substantive inter-allied military arrangements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with 

the exception of General McConnell, endorsed these findings. Secretary McNamara 

forwarded both the study and their endorsement to Secretary Rusk.37

Already, Director Foster had called for discussions with the British and French 

about seeking an informal understanding with the Soviets to refrain from supplying 

other states with strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). A multilateral force for 

NATO would be exempt, Director Foster claimed, because the United States would 

transfer neither ownership nor control to another state. The Joint Staff raised no objection to Director Foster’s idea, but General Wheeler did. At his initiative, the Joint Chiefs 

advised Secretary McNamara that no advantage would flow from such an understanding since they saw “almost no likelihood that the Soviets would disseminate SNDVs in 

appreciable numbers.” In fact, a non-dissemination agreement might weaken collective 

security “by demonstrating our readiness to place our own fears above the possible 

security interests of our allies.” Since the Soviets would repudiate an understanding 

whenever convenient, the only likely effect of non-dissemination would be to withhold 

“possibly necessary armament” from Free World nations. But Secretary McNamara, 

believing that an informal understanding would serve US interests, supported Director Foster’s idea.38

On 22 April 1965, the Committee of Principals debated the wisdom of pressing 

for a non-proliferation agreement. McGeorge Bundy said that “we should stay as far 

away from this subject as possible in order to avoid getting ourselves into a box” over 

the NATO multilateral force. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara agreed that achieving 

a treaty now was “completely out of the question.” The Committee decided to seek an 

agreement that would “specifically prohibit transfer of control of nuclear weapons 

to states not presently nuclear powers, but which would neither explicitly forbid nor 

permit transfer of control of nuclear weapons to groups of states.”39 This formulation 

was intended to answer strong Soviet protests that creating a multilateral force would 

put a German finger on the nuclear trigger.

In mid-July, Director Foster circulated the draft of a non-proliferation treaty (NPT). 

Previously, attention had focused upon the meaning of a prohibition against transferring “control” over nuclear weapons. Now, Mr. Foster offered an approach centering 
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upon obligations neither to “acquire nuclear weapons by manufacturing them or by 

any other means” nor to assist any other state in doing so. All parties, further, would 

cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or 

similar safeguards. As for security assurances to give non-nuclear signatories, Director 

Foster suggested that nuclear signatories promise to “provide or support immediate 

assistance” for victims of nuclear aggression. Further, nuclear signatories would pledge 

not to use their weapons against non-nuclear signatories, “except in defense against an 

act of aggression in which a State owning nuclear weapons is engaged.”40

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that they still opposed 

“aggressive pursuit” of an NPT. If political considerations dictated otherwise, provisions must be made for: preserving nuclear flexibility, including multilateral sharing; maintaining nuclear dispersal and delivery arrangements; and clearly defining 

adequate safeguards for peaceful applications of atomic energy. They preferred on-site 

inspection but could accept carefully defined international safeguards. As to security 

guarantees, the Joint Chiefs urged that these be general in nature and granted “only 

on a case-by-case basis after complete analysis of the full implications, including 

specific military commitments.” They particularly objected to any limitations upon 

using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, fearing a loss of strategic flexibility, 

advancement of ban-the-bomb efforts, and misinterpretation by Hanoi and Peking of 

US efforts in Southeast Asia.41

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) asked for a clarification of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff views. First, when exactly would a resort to nuclear weapons be necessary or desirable? Second, why would a limitation upon their use fuel the ban-the-bomb 

campaign? Third, in what way would US actions in Southeast Asia be misinterpreted? 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reply was not very illuminating, perhaps because the questions were really unanswerable. To the first, they replied simply that options should 

remain open. Otherwise, a “major and understandable” shift among non-nuclear US 

allies could occur; the Soviets might use “this powerful wedge” to pressure them into 

changing positions. To the second, they noted that outlawing “first use” was a favorite 

tool of Soviet propaganda and easily could expand to embrace ban-the-bomb. As to the 

third, they argued that a limitation would strike the communists as evidence of a lack 

of US determination to oppose aggression by whatever means became necessary.42

At Geneva, on 17 August 1965, Director Foster laid before the Eighteen Nation 

Disarmament Conference a draft NPT in which parties would undertake “not to 

transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-member state, either 

directly or indirectly through a military alliance.” Signatories also would pledge not 

to increase “the total number of States and other organizations having independent 

power to use nuclear weapons.” The draft made no mention of security assurances, 

but Mr. Foster did make clear that the multilateral force was unaffected because the 

number of nuclear entities would not increase. Unimpressed, the Soviets countered 

with a draft explicitly forbidding the transfer of “nuclear weapons, or control over them 

or their use” to military units of non-nuclear allies, even if these were placed under 
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joint command.43 In December 1965, President Johnson and West German Chancellor 

Ludwig Erhard abandoned efforts to create a NATO multilateral force. Since they did 

not say so explicitly, the Soviets continued acting as if the possibility was still real.44

On the issue of great-power guarantees for non-nuclear signatories, Washington 

and Moscow remained far apart. Early in 1966, Premier Kosygin proposed a provision 

“prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, signatories to the 

treaty, which have no nuclear weapons on their territory.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

opposed such a pledge “in any form,” warning Secretary McNamara that it was “a 

shrewd propaganda move” designed to discriminate against and intimidate US allies 

and to erode collective security arrangements. If assurances seemed necessary, they 

should be generally worded and take the form of a UN resolution. If a draft NPT did 

contain specific assurances, the overall advantages of a treaty should be carefully 

reassessed; the sacrifices necessary to entice non-nuclear states into signing might 

prove too great.45

The Soviets saw West Germany’s physical access to nuclear weapons as the crux 

of the NPT problem. In June 1966, Secretary Rusk circulated treaty articles worded to 

answer that concern. Article I stipulated that nuclear signatories would neither grant 

nor help non-nuclear states to achieve physical access to nuclear weapons. Article II 

stated that non-nuclear parties would neither manufacture nor achieve physical access 

to nuclear weapons. In Article III, signatories pledged not to violate the prohibitions in 

I and II either directly or indirectly, through third parties or groups of states. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff lodged two objections. First, the draft failed to apply clearly defined, 

adequate safeguards over presumably peaceful nuclear facilities. Second, it defined 

proliferation in terms of “physical access” rather than “control.” Secretary McNamara, 

however, endorsed the new draft in toto. A surprising dissent came from ACDA, whose 

Acting Director doubted whether Article I could be squared with bilateral arrangements among NATO members. Since European allies not only transported US nuclear 

weapons but also attached them to their own aircraft and missiles, it would be difficult to argue that they lacked “physical access.” ACDA suggested, instead, language 

based on the 1954 Atomic Energy Act prohibiting physical access that contributed to 

a capability to design, develop, or fabricate nuclear weapons.46

Late in September, talks between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Andrei 

Gromyko led US civilian leaders to believe that Moscow might accept a formula 

permitting (1) NATO’s two-key arrangement,47 (2) intensive nuclear consultations 

among NATO members, and (3) the right of a united Western Europe to succeed 

France and the United Kingdom as a nuclear power. The State Department drafted 

and President Johnson approved a no-transfer article effectively foreclosing any 

multilateral force.48

There followed weeks of negotiations with the Soviets and extensive consultations with NATO allies. West Germany, particularly, worried that Article III might 

be so strictly worded as to preclude peaceful applications of atomic energy. In 

April 1967, the North Atlantic Council accepted an Article III wherein non-nuclear 
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powers would place international safeguards (those of the International Atomic 

Energy Agency or similar) “on all sources of special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes.” After reviewing the full draft, the Director, Joint Staff, advised the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows: “There do not appear to be any overriding reasons 

against US efforts to pursue an NPT. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff not address the revised NPT text and that they not provide unsolicited views to the Secretary of Defense at this time.” On 24 August 1967, the United 

States and the USSR gave the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference separate 

but identical NPT texts, with Article III left blank.49

Security guarantees raised the last hurdle to agreement. In February 1967, ACDA 

proposed a UN resolution welcoming the “intention” (1) of nuclear states to refrain 

from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, as well as signatories not engaged in aggressive acts supported by nuclear states, and (2) of states 

to “provide or support immediate assistance” to any non-nuclear state that became 

the victim of non-nuclear aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still opposed any public 

pledge to limit the use of nuclear weapons, on grounds that doing so “could detract from 

the psychological deterrent effect of US nuclear superiority as well as set a precedent 

leading to further restrictions on US operations.” They doubted, in any case, whether 

negative assurances would woo away many supporters of a Soviet alternative. Instead 

of pursuing a watered-down version, why not strongly oppose a pledge in any form? 

They were willing to endorse only a positive assurance of “strong support against some 

threat of nuclear blackmail,” such as President Johnson publicly promised after China’s 

first nuclear explosion in October 1964.50

In November 1967, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara agreed on language expressing 

an intent to refrain from the threat or use of force against any non-nuclear signatory 

“that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear weapon state.” (Previous proposals had specified “acts of aggression.”) But then the Soviets expressed 

willingness, in their own supporting declaration, to delete all references to a non-use 

obligation. Writing to Secretary McNamara in mid-February 1968, General Wheeler 

cited heightened international tension, the changed Soviet position, and previous Joint 

Chiefs of Staff recommendations as reasons for rejecting “any form of nuclear non-use 

commitments other than those required by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.”51

On 14 March 1968, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference presented a draft 

NPT to the UN General Assembly. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the 

Soviet Union co-sponsored a Security Council resolution providing positive assurances 

of support for threatened non-nuclear signatories. The Joint Chiefs endorsed this NPT 

but considered it “almost certain” that the General Assembly would debate negative, 

non-use assurances which they opposed. A non-use assurance, they observed, might 

well confine US reaction over North Korea’s seizure of the Pueblo to conventional 

weapons. They, therefore, repeated General Wheeler’s recommendation to avoid all 

assurances save those required by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.52
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Shortly afterward, nonetheless, ACDA proposed that US negotiators adhere to 

the Rusk-McNamara formula of November 1967. Promptly and strongly, the Joint 

Chiefs protested against a non-use commitment “in any form,” asking that their 

views be brought before President Johnson if necessary. Interdepartmental review 

resulted in an agreement that non-use would receive further consideration “only if 

and when” it surfaced in the General Assembly. Subsequently, in New York, the US 

and Soviet delegations agreed that both would attempt to avoid a UN debate over 

non-use assurances.53

On 12 June 1968, by vote of 95 to 4 (with 21 abstentions), the General Assembly 

adopted an NPT text summarized below:

Article I: Nuclear states pledged not to transfer nuclear devices directly or indirectly 

 “to any recipient whatsoever” and neither assist nor encourage non-nuclear states 

in acquiring either nuclear weapons or control over them.

Article II: Non-nuclear states undertook similarly stringent obligations against either 

receiving or acquiring nuclear weapons.

Article III: Parties without nuclear weapons would accept International Atomic Energy 

Agency or similar safeguards over their peaceful nuclear activities.

Article X: Parties could, by reason of “extraordinary events,” withdraw upon three 

months’ notice.

One week later, the Security Council approved an innocuous resolution of assurance that “[w]elcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide 

or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear 

weapon State Party . . . that is a victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”54 Since nothing was said about non-use commitments, the Joint Chiefs’ 

objections were fully satisfied.

President Johnson signed the NPT on 1 July 1968. Testifying before the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, General Wheeler said the Joint Chiefs of Staff were “in 

agreement with the expressed objectives of this treaty and support ratification . . . as 

not inimical to US security interests.”55 Ratification followed in March 1969. Over the 

next eight years, 99 countries became signatories. Among the abstainers were India, 

Pakistan, Israel, China, and Brazil, some of the very countries from whom, in American 

eyes, nonproliferation commitments were most needed.56

SALT: Hopes Raised and Blighted

During 1963, the US Government started giving serious thought to a separate agreement limiting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At this point, the US missile 

program was running ahead of the Soviet one. On 21 January 1964, President Johnson 

urged the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference to explore a verified freeze of 
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SNDVs. Within the US government, verification was the sticking point. While ACDA 

proposed relying largely upon US intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted upon 

“resident and random on-site inspection.” At Geneva, when US spokesmen presented 

a freeze proposal involving on-site inspection, Soviets dismissed it as “inspection 

without disarmament.”57

Meeting on 22 April 1965, the Committee of Principals discussed whether a freeze 

proposal should include reductions as well. If it did, Secretary Rusk cautioned, US 

verification capabilities would have to be reviewed very carefully. After all, if Houston 

could build an astrodome, the Soviets “no doubt could do the same thing, except that 

they would not be playing baseball.” A CIA representative said that past camouflage 

efforts by the Soviets had been failures. Major General Powers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Special Assistant for Arms Control, countered that US intelligence could not know 

about Soviet efforts that did succeed.58

In mid-July 1965, ACDA circulated a plan to (1) freeze the numbers and characteristics of SNDVs, (2) reduce US and Soviet SNDV inventories by about 700 each, and (3) 

explore the foregoing possibilities during an 18-month cessation of launcher construction. Since verification of (3) could be accomplished without on-site inspection, ACDA’s 

plan could answer the Soviet accusation of inspection without disarmament. Director 

Foster observed that, since US strategic programs were leveling off while Soviet ones 

gained momentum, a freeze certainly would serve US interests.59

The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed offering any specific numbers. Instead, discussions “should be confined to determining, in private, whether the Soviets are interested 

in the principle of coupling some reductions with the freeze and, if so, the magnitude 

of any reductions they would consider.” The danger in reducing was that the Soviets, 

by scrapping some early-model ICBMs, a portion of their medium bombers (which they 

were phasing down anyway), and part of their massive IR/MRBM force, could trade 

about 700 short-range, obsolescent SNDVs for hard-silo Minuteman ICBMs. Thereafter, 

given the much higher payload of Soviet missiles, they could deploy several times as 

many warheads as the United States.

The Joint Chiefs did not believe that US intelligence alone could verify a cessation 

of ICBM launcher construction. As a result, Washington “would find it politically and 

psychologically difficult to make any meaningful response to a suspected but unproven 

violation.” Additionally, a moratorium would severely curtail the development of US 

ballistic missile defenses. All in all, the Joint Chiefs characterized ACDA’s proposal as 

indicating a weakening of US resolve and thus “incompatible with the deepening US 

commitment to defend South Vietnam.”60

Addressing the UN General Assembly on 23 September, Ambassador Goldberg 

stated that if there was progress toward freezing offensive and defensive systems, 

“the United States will also be willing to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these carriers of mass destruction.” His words evoked no Soviet 

response. Accordingly, early in January 1966, Director Foster wrote directly to the 

President, proposing that his State of the Union message offer an 18-month halt in 
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constructing all fixed, land-based offensive and defensive missile launchers, beginning 

at mid-year. Such a freeze would preserve the US offensive lead, but Mr. Foster saw 

“just a chance” that the Soviets might agree in order to save money. Also, he argued, 

the latest National Intelligence Estimate showed that the Soviets had been unable to 

conceal large-scale deployments.61

The Joint Chiefs opposed any such offer and asked that President Johnson be 

so advised. The NIE, they pointed out, acknowledged that detection of large-scale 

violations could not be guaranteed. They believed, in fact, that the Soviets could 

start and sustain 25 to 40 single-silo sites annually with a low risk of detection.62 But 

Assistant Secretary (ISA) John McNaughton favored a moratorium mainly because, 

during the next 18 months, no Minuteman silos would be started anyway. Further, 

he suggested that a moratorium cover mobile as well as fixed missiles, and that the 

starting date remain open to allow implementation as soon as possible.63 Yet, in his 

State of the Union address on 12 January, President Johnson made no mention of 

any moratorium.

Findings by the Chairman’s Special Studies Group reinforced the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff objections to a freeze. In March 1965, General Wheeler had tasked the Group 

with analyzing proposals for freezing offensive and defensive systems. On 1 December, it submitted conclusions based upon the results of 237 war games. Assuming that 

an offensive freeze took effect in mid-1969 and the Soviets deployed sophisticated 

defenses, US retaliatory forces would not achieve minimum levels of assured destruction. But the Soviets could inflict well above minimum damage upon the United States, 

regardless of the level of American defenses. Even if both sides’ offensive and defensive 

forces were frozen and then reduced symmetrically, losses would not become equal 

until Soviet forces had been cut by 70 percent. Eliminating bombers would lessen 

American far more than Soviet capabilities; excluding ICBMs would do the reverse, 

while removing SLBMs apparently made no difference. Finally, the Group insisted upon 

the essentiality of on-site inspection.64

Upon reviewing the Group’s conclusions, Admiral McDonald objected to a statement that eliminating submarine-launched ballistic missiles “would appear to be an 

attractive segment to explore for arms control agreements.” This was rewritten to 

stress that the large damage potential of bomber-delivered weapons overshadowed the 

small yield of Polaris. General Johnson at first recommended rejecting the whole report 

on grounds that, among other things, it made bombers the main casualty causers, failed 

to examine alternative targeting philosophies, and provided an over-simplified analysis 

of defensive systems. (He believed, presumably, that ballistic missile defenses could 

be much more effective than the report indicated.) After General Johnson relented 

somewhat, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that the Group’s findings appeared valid in light of the terms of reference, assumptions, and methodology 

used—but not in any other context. This was “particularly true in the area of defensive 

systems.” And, they stressed, the report should not be construed as a Joint Chiefs of 

Staff endorsement of any specific proposal.65
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Assistant Secretary McNaughton now reached several tentative conclusions, and 

asked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinions of them:

1. Any proposal for significant missile reductions should include the reduction 

of associated launchers and a freeze on producing strategic nuclear delivery 

vehicles and constructing related launchers.

2. As part of a general agreement on significant strategic reductions, the United 

States should be prepared to eliminate certain ICBMs if the Soviets removed 

some of their medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles (MR/IRBMs) 

targeting Western Europe.

3. Washington should be prepared to present a list of US and Soviet arms to be 

destroyed, provided Moscow would do likewise.

4. Significant SNDV reductions would tend to enhance the importance of conventional and tactical nuclear forces.

5. The worldwide political consequences of SNDV reductions deserved study.

The Joint Chiefs’ critique reflected their wariness towards the whole subject of 

arms control:

1. McNaughton made no mention of verification, yet progress toward a verifiable freeze was a pre-requisite to considering SNDV reductions.

2. MR/IRBM reductions would be helpful, but ICBM cutbacks could prove harmful 

because the Soviets were hardening their missile sites and increasing their payloads. Consequently, detailed analysis must precede firm conclusions.

3. A simple exchange of lists would support the Soviets’ propaganda campaign for 

an uninspected ban on all nuclear weapons.

4. Nuclear and non-nuclear forces alike were essential. Major SNDV reductions 

might tempt a would-be aggressor into covertly strengthening his strategic forces. 

Thus the impact of an SNDV cutback could be precisely delineated only in terms 

of a specific proposal.

5. Again, it would be more productive to examine a specific proposal.

More generally, the Joint Chiefs observed that spreading Soviet ABM deployments 

cast doubt upon the desirability of any freeze “at this time.” They doubted, also, whether 

practical solutions could be found for the complex problems inherent in freezes and 

reductions. After all, substantial differences still remained within the administration. 

So, in the absence of specific proposals, they could not support Mr. McNaughton’s 

tentative conclusions “as applying across the board to SNDV freeze and reduction 

negotiations.”66

Meantime, in mid-March 1966, ACDA proposed (1) ascertaining privately whether 

the Soviets were interested in coupling significant reductions with a freeze while (2) 

conducting a technical experts’ discussion of guidelines common to a freeze and a 

reduction. The State Department, the NSC Staff, and the AEC concurred. The Joint 

Chiefs, however, saw no merit in even considering SNDV reductions without some 

progress toward a freeze. Without limitations upon replacements and alternative 

systems, an accelerated Soviet buildup might well change the strategic balance. They 
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approved a private probe of Soviet intentions but, in view of the sizeable program of 

hard-silo construction, saw no reason to believe that Moscow would show any interest 

in an SNDV freeze. Agreeing with the Joint Chiefs, Secretary McNamara asked Director 

Foster to be “extremely careful to insure that no one gains the impression that we are 

willing to discuss the possibility of reductions without a freeze.”67

In May, ACDA drafted a letter for Premier Kosygin from President Johnson proposing an 18-month moratorium on constructing fixed, land-based offensive and 

defensive missile launchers, to be verified by “our respective national capabilities.” Mr. 

McNaughton concurred, and Mr. McNamara agreed to discuss it with the President. 

But the Joint Chiefs insisted that such a proposal include mobile missiles and provide 

for on-site inspections. Also, unless broader arrangements were concluded during 

the moratorium, which seemed unlikely, they anticipated strong pressures to extend 

the 18-month period. In that case, verification would become even more significant, 

because the Soviets stood to widen their lead in ballistic missile defense and gain an 

advantage in developing MIRV warheads. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that President 

Johnson be apprised of their views. No letter went to Premier Kosygin. At Geneva, on 

8 July, the Soviets indicated that they were uninterested in an SNDV freeze.68

On 31 July, General Wheeler’s Special Studies Group submitted its follow-on analysis of a freeze accompanied by symmetrical and asymmetrical SNDV reductions. The 

Group concluded that a 1969 freeze would allow both sides to accomplish assured 

destruction, either in pre-emption or retaliation. Yet reductions as small as 15 percent 

could prevent the United States from accomplishing assured destruction. At the same 

time, the Soviets would retain their assured destruction capability even through reductions exceeding 50 percent. A freeze alone would be more advantageous to the United 

States in 1967 than in 1969, because of the accelerating Soviet buildup, but a freezeand-reduce combination in 1967 would benefit the USSR.69 The Joint Chiefs judged 

these conclusions “valid within the study’s parameters,” telling Secretary McNamara 

that they revealed “even more clearly the complex and potentially destabilizing nature 

of arms control proposals having SNDV freeze and reductions as their basis.” Primary 

consideration, they stressed, must be given not to the quantitative reductions but rather 

to the residual capabilities.70

On 13 January 1967, ACDA circulated a less ambitious plan simply to “level off” 

strategic offensive and defensive missile forces at approximately current levels (i.e., 

launchers that were either operational or already under construction). Leveling off 

impressed ACDA as having the best prospect of success, since lessening the likelihood 

of ambiguity—the confusion between permitted and prohibited changes—would ease 

verification problems. As fallback positions, ACDA proposed either freezing ABMs and 

fixed land-based launchers or freezing ABMs only.71

The Joint Chiefs endorsed exploratory discussions about leveling off but accompanied that with their oft-repeated recommendation to deploy heavy ballistic missile 

defenses. They also voiced “serious reservations” about several points in ACDA’s 

proposal: excluding the ambiguous Tallinn Line in the northwestern USSR, which 
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appeared to be anti-aircraft but could become anti-missile defenses; relying upon 

unilateral US intelligence; assuming that full-scale testing by the Soviets, which would 

be banned, was necessary before MIRVs and penetration aids could be deployed; and 

apparently believing that ballistic missile defenses would not usefully contribute to 

“the total US strategic posture” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. They suggested 

informing the Soviets, early in discussions, that a freeze must be accompanied by 

appropriate verification procedures. The Joint Chiefs also opposed any discussion 

of MIRVs, because continuing their development offered the best guarantee against 

a Soviet surprise. Finally, they deemed it essential that any limitation agreement be 

formalized as a treaty.72

A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), issued in mid-February 1967, 

reframed the debate over verification by downplaying a need for on-site inspections: 

“In the continued absence of a large-scale Soviet program of deception and concealment we believe that we would almost certainly detect any extensive new deployment 

in strategic forces, although the Soviets probably could effect small-scale increases 

without our knowledge. . . .We would almost certainly detect any large-scale test program, but we could not always expect to assess accurately the test objectives or even 

the precise nature of the system being tested.”73

Early in March, after making some minor surgery, ACDA re-circulated its levelingoff plan. By this time, exploratory Soviet-American discussions at a high level had 

begun. On 14 March, the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara, the Committee 

of Principals, and President Johnson that ACDA’s latest version still was “not in the 

national security interest of the United States.” They acknowledged, however, that the 

new SNIE described US capabilities as “adequate now for timely detection of increases 

in fixed ABM-capable launch sites and radars and increases in fixed ICBM and MR/

IRBM launch sites of known characteristics.” Consequently, although still advocating 

on-site inspection, they did not object to a unilaterally verified agreement “confined 

to a limit on defensive systems (ABMs) and a quantitative freeze on fixed, land-based 

offensive systems.” The Chiefs attached several “essential” conditions: listing the stillambiguous Tallinn Line as an ABM system; including a withdrawal clause; refusing 

to trade any US reductions for a freeze of specific Soviet systems; preserving freedom 

to deploy ABMs if the Soviets did not dismantle theirs; and putting results in treaty 

form. Nonetheless, the Chiefs’ acceptance of unilateral verification was a critical step 

toward SALT.74

On 14 March, the Committee of Principals discussed ACDA’s leveling-off plan. 

General Wheeler outlined the Joint Chiefs of Staff position, arguing that an agreement 

“should maintain our strategic superiority.” Secretary McNamara challenged him, 

claiming that the current US superiority (such as it was) could not be turned to political advantage. He reasoned that the US lead had come about inadvertently, through an 

over-estimate of Soviet aims. Now, probably, the Soviets were responding to their own 

overly pessimistic assessment of American intentions. Therefore, Washington and Moscow should strive for a clearer understanding of each other’s intentions; narrowing that 
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area of uncertainty could dampen down the arms race. A good test, National Security 

Adviser Walt Rostow observed, would be “whether we can establish what the Tallinn 

system is”—anti-aircraft or anti-missile. General Wheeler thought it “inconceivable that 

the Soviets did not know where they were going on ABMs,” but Secretary McNamara 

believed the odds were “ten to one” that they had not yet decided.75

The Committee decided to open a dialogue rather than offer a specific proposal. 

Finally, though, ACDA had found a winning formula. On 18 March, Secretary Rusk 

instructed Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow to tell Soviet leaders that the 

United States was “prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance 

on unilateral means of verification. . . . [W]e suggest that measures of agreed limitation 

on deployment should apply to all strategic offensive missile systems (launchers) and 

to all strategic defensive missile systems (launcher and radars) having a significant 

anti-ballistic missile capability.”76

The Johnson-Kosygin meeting, over 23–25 June 1967 at Glassboro, New Jersey, produced nothing of substance. Late in August, while the President was deciding whether 

to proceed with a light ABM deployment, ACDA proposed that private discussions with 

the Soviets precede a public announcement. The Joint Chiefs objected. A dialogue about 

ABM limitations they predicted, would go nowhere and serve no purpose except that 

of delaying US deployments. They labeled “particularly imprudent,” in the absence of 

similar Soviet assurances, ACDA’s suggestion that the administration declare its intent 

to keep further ABM deployments limited. The fielding of Nike-X, in fact, might provide 

the United States with “powerful leverage” in arms control discussions.77

Early in October 1967, Secretary McNamara solicited the Joint Chiefs of Staff views 

about NSC and State proposals to (1) limit ICBM, MR/IRBM, and SLBM launchers to 

those that were operational or under construction, (2) deploy no more than an agreed 

number of ABM launchers, and (3) accomplish verification by unilateral means. After 

extensive debate among themselves, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that none of these 

would serve US interests. Since no more American launchers were planned, an agreement would place the United States at a “significant disadvantage” within two years. 

During time-consuming negotiations, the Soviets probably would continue initiating 

new construction. They found these proposals objectionable because they covered 

unverifiable sea-based and mobile land-based systems, excluded the Tallinn line, failed 

to protect assured destruction and damage-limiting capabilities, and did not provide 

for continued US strategic superiority.78

In February 1968, amid crises, a persistent President Johnson asked Secretary Rusk 

to consider steps that would “prod the Soviets into accepting talks.” The State Department and ISA prepared an offer that General Wheeler did not see until after Secretary 

Rusk and the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, had agreed to it. Basically, construction of offensive land-based launchers would be frozen (although sites already under 

way could be completed) and each side allowed an agreed number of ABM launchers 

and radars. After reading it, the Chairman informed Secretary Clifford that handing 

such a proposal to the Soviets would “expose far too much of the extreme risks which 
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87

the US might be willing to accept finally in order to entice the Soviets into commencing 

negotiations. It seeks no comparable concessions.” On 2 May, the President sent Premier 

Kosygin a letter stripped of such specifics. Mr. Kosygin endorsed an exchange of views, 

and on 1 July President Johnson announced that discussions about limiting offensive 

and defensive strategic weapons would begin “in the nearest future.”79

Opening strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) now topped the arms control 

agenda. In July, General Wheeler created a small office to serve as the focal point in 

preparations for these talks and to supply a nucleus of military representation during 

them. To be Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations (ACSAN), he 

“temporarily” designated Major General Royal B. Allison, USAF, who had served as 

deputy chairman of the Special Studies Group during 1964–1967.80

Late in July, an interagency working group completed and ACDA circulated a 

“basic proposal” that included: limiting fixed land-based ICBM launchers to 1,200 per 

side, forbidding mobile launchers and new construction after 1 September but allowing qualitative improvements to existing launchers and missiles; prohibiting, as of 1 

September, the construction of new missile submarines and the placement of additional 

launchers on existing submarines, although missile improvements and retrofitting 

would be allowed; and confining ABM deployments to a set and equal number of fixed 

land-based launchers and associated radars. OSD then prepared a draft presidential 

memorandum incorporating these provisions, with minimal changes (e.g., assurances 

that the Tallinn Line would not become an ABM system and that ICBMs would not 

clandestinely replace MR/IRBMs). Deputy Secretary Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff for an assessment.81

The Joint Chiefs agreed that, “on balance” and with “essential modifications,” 

these ACDA and OSD papers defined an acceptable framework. On 9 August, they 

advised Secretary Clifford that US intelligence could verify ABM launchers of known 

characteristics and, with a reasonable degree of confidence, the number of fixed sites 

and silos for ICBMs and MR/IRBMs. On-site inspection would be needed, however, to 

spot the upgrading of anti-air defenses into ABMs and to detect the retrofitting of MR/

IRBM launchers into ICBM status. Construction of missile submarines, they continued, 

could not be discovered until a few (say, 4 to 10) were at sea; a ban on mobile launchers would remain undiscovered prior to substantial deployment.82 Therefore, the Joint 

Chiefs proposed three revisions. First, forbid further hardening of MR/IRBM launchers. Second, prohibit the production as well as the deployment of mobile land-based 

missiles. Third, ban reload missiles for ABMs, since Soviet systems possessed reload 

capability while US ones would not. Furthermore, no restriction should be placed on 

ABM radars to avoid a chance of erroneous categorization. And here unanimity among 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff ended.

Admiral Moorer and General Chapman wanted to let each side, within the overall 

ceiling, vary its mix of land- and sea-based offensive and defensive launchers. Their 

justification was that proposed ceilings allowed the Soviets to take advantage of 

their larger land area, deploying ICBMs to threaten more of the CONUS perimeter 
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and positioning ABMs to reduce battle space interference and collateral damage. 

Freedom to mix, conversely, would capitalize upon superior American ASW and 

SLBM capabilities, and upon easier US access to the sea.

General Wheeler, however, found compelling arguments against freedom to mix. 

As he saw it, the Moorer-Chapman approach would simply encourage a Soviet shift 

to sea-based launchers, thereby gaining for them the advantages now enjoyed by 

US forces. Also, there would be an “open invitation” to cheating since, if the Soviets 

announced SLBM construction to offset ICBM retirements, US intelligence could not 

ascertain whether hard-silo ICBM activations and deactivations actually had occurred. 

(Yet he also observed, a bit contradictorily, that land-to-sea shifting required such 

advance planning that the issue probably would not arise during a treaty’s ten-year 

life.) General Wheeler dismissed US geographical advantages as being theoretical at 

best, since Soviet access to the sea already was “literally unrestricted.” Lastly, and 

perhaps most importantly, General Wheeler appealed to Admiral Moorer that a split 

among the Chiefs was “not only regrettable but indeed dangerous. The fact that there 

is a divergency will permit certain people to exploit this in support of their own views.” 

But Admiral Moorer held firm, arguing that it was “very much too early to lock ourselves into a fixed combination.” Secretary Clifford sided with General Wheeler.83 Yet 

in the early 1970s, when Admiral Moorer was Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff came 

to place great value upon freedom to mix.

On 13 August, Secretary Clifford informed President Johnson that “an agreement 

based upon [ACDA’s proposal] would allow the actions necessary to preserve US 

security.” To an impressive extent, the statements in Mr. Clifford’s memorandum were 

identical with those in JCSM-498-68. He spoke, though, of maintaining an adequate 

rather than a superior US deterrent.84 Next day, the Committee of Principals debated 

whether to eliminate a ban on ABM radars from the US position. General Wheeler 

wanted to do so, of course, but Secretary Rusk favored retaining it at the outset in 

order to probe Soviet intentions. Conferees agreed to (1) give the radar issue further 

study and (2) seek presidential approval of ACDA’s proposal, modified to meet the Joint 

Chiefs’ three objections.85

By 21 August, the working group completed a basic position paper and an opening 

statement. But, on that same day, Soviet and satellite forces swept into Czechoslovakia 

and deposed the reform-minded leadership. The Service Chiefs promptly recorded 

their objection against proceeding with SALT for the time being. When the Committee of Principals reconvened on 22 August, Secretary Rusk agreed that Soviet action 

obviously made SALT’s future uncertain. Still, he continued, their task was “to give the 

President the necessary material to go ahead with the talks if and when he desires.” 

The Committee made one amendment: Seek assurance that the Tallinn Line would not 

be upgraded to an ABM system. If that proved impossible, Tallinn launchers must be 

limited and included in the level of Soviet ABMs.86

President Johnson “tentatively” approved the amended position and, on 6 September, Rusk suggested approaching NATO allies about proceeding with SALT. General 
Arms Control Inches Forward

89

Wheeler objected that doing so “in the near future . . . could be interpreted as approval 

of Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia and would be divisive of NATO at a critical 

time.” Secretary Clifford agreed. However, President Johnson still hoped for a heads-ofstate meeting at which to launch the talks. Early in December, he wrote to his national 

security adviser, “I’m ready—are they?” The Director, Joint Staff, had recommended 

disbanding General Allison’s office; on 10 December, General Wheeler disapproved. 

Secretary Clifford now wanted to push ahead, but Johnson’s last hope ended when 

president-elect Nixon refused to join any negotiations prior to his inauguration.87 On 

20 January 1969, a new SALT cycle began.

A Qualified Conclusion

Clearly, arms control was one area in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff still wielded major influence. Since a treaty stood no chance of Senate ratification if they 

opposed it, the Joint Chiefs appeared to possess an untrammeled veto. That appearance, however, was not entirely accurate. For example, when the intelligence community concluded that the number of offensive launchers could be verified without on-site 

inspection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff really had no choice but to reverse their position. 

The evolution of a treaty prohibiting the seabed emplacement of nuclear weapons, 

described below, showed how changing circumstances could turn a strong “no” from 

the Joint Chiefs into a grudging “yes.”

In December 1967, the UN General Assembly tasked an ad hoc committee to study 

(1) demilitarizing the seabed, which was defined as anything beyond the 12-mile limit, 

(2) reserving the seabed for peaceful purposes, and (3) prohibiting the stationing there 

of weapons of mass destruction. That kindled interest among many nations. Director Foster favored negotiating a treaty to prohibit nuclear or other weapons of mass 

destruction. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected, foreseeing “a distinct possibility” of 

emplacing such weapons there. If “pindown”88 and submarine vulnerability became 

realities, crippling Minuteman and Polaris/Poseidon, the United States had convenient 

access to a wide range of seabeds while the USSR did not. Also, the superpowers as 

well as other nations possessed the technology to emplace weapons of mass destruction on the ocean bottom with “virtually no risk of detection.”89

When the Committee of Principals convened on 14 May 1968, Director Foster asked 

General Wheeler what kinds of systems DOD was considering. The Chairman listed a 

submarine mobile platform carrying ICBMs, a bottom crawler or sitter, a three-section 

submersible, and tunnels for encapsulated missiles. Characterizing ACDA’s paper as 

“more polemical than analytical,” Deputy Secretary Nitze suggested working out an 

analysis that would form the basis of a US position. This was done. Two weeks later, 

the Committee Deputies—General Wheeler’s representative dissenting—submitted an 

amended proposal. When the Committee of Principals reviewed it on 3 June, Secretary 

Rusk and Director Foster aligned against Mr. Nitze and General Wheeler. Director 
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Foster said it was US policy to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world: first Antarctica, then atmospheric testing, next deployment in outer space, and now logically the 

seabed. Mr. Nitze replied that in 1963 DOD had supported a limited test ban to avoid 

further contamination of the atmosphere. General Wheeler added that we were paying a penalty for that treaty, because underground tests had to be performed at much 

greater expense and delay. No one wanted to fight over the Antarctic, he noted, and 

verification was easier in outer space than in the seabed. Basically, General Wheeler 

contended, “we are giving up possible future strategic capabilities in return for a small 

political gain. Further, this might be only the first step toward a strategic straitjacket, 

particularly in view of US verification capabilities.” But the State Department, noting 

that the Soviets were pushing a ban on seabed military activities as well as nuclear 

weapons, described the basic issue as “how we avoid a bloody nose in handling the 

Soviet initiative.”90

In August, after reviewing Secretary Rusk’s draft for the UN ad hoc committee, Secretary Clifford and the Joint Chiefs were willing to endorse only a carefully 

hedged statement of support (e.g., “examine the question” rather than “undertake 

negotiations”). Over the next weeks, though, the ad hoc committee made what the 

State Department considered “appreciable progress . . . in major areas of US concern.” 

Using the Rusk-Clifford formula, all members affirmed that the deep seabed should be 

reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.91

In March 1969, the United States introduced a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. The USSR tabled a draft providing 

for complete demilitarization. But soon, surprisingly, the Soviets essentially accepted 

the US draft and added on-site inspection. The General Assembly approved, and a treaty entered into force on 19 May 1972. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsement, provided 

to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was notably restrained: “The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff interpose no objection to the ratification of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. 

They reiterate their concern, however, that any additional constraints on military use 

of the seabeds beyond the prohibitions contained in the treaty would bear a potential 

for grave harm to United States national security interests.”92
91

6

NATO: Surviving Challenges 

from Within

Among US foreign policy priorities, none had ranked higher over the course of the Cold 

War than preserving the Atlantic alliance as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. Created in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joined Western Europe 

with North America in a collective security arrangement.1 Allied Command Europe 

came into being, with an American serving as its Supreme Allied Commander and a 

large US contingent that included five divisions. During the mid-1960s, however, the 

most serious challenges confronting NATO proved to be internal and basically political 

in nature. Chafing at American pre-eminence, President Charles de Gaulle withdrew 

French units from the integrated command and evicted US forces from France, challenging the very idea of trans-Atlantic partnership. The Johnson administration also 

faced fiscal and congressional pressures to reduce American forces in Europe, which 

could disrupt security ties with West Germany where the bulk of US personnel were 

stationed. Greece and Turkey seemed to distrust each other more than their presumed 

adversary, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.

Coping with France’s Secession

Upon becoming president in 1958, Charles de Gaulle pursued his conviction that “France is not really herself unless she is in the front rank.”2 Promptly, he 

approached the US and UK governments about forming a triumvirate to deal with 

global problems. After they declined, he withdrew some naval units from NATO assignments. More importantly, he awarded high priority to creating an independent “force 

de frappe” composed of Mirage bombers carrying nuclear weapons. In 1960, France 

exploded its first nuclear device.

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Was there some way to foster nuclear cooperation? In April 1964, President Johnson decided not to assist any national nuclear forces save those that were earmarked 

for assignment to NATO and targeted in accordance with NATO plans. Britain met that 

condition; France’s force de frappe did not. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had misgivings 

about denying help to France. Just before President Johnson rendered his decision, 

they warned of possible French retaliation. For example, restrictions could be placed 

upon US use of ports, airfields, depots, and headquarters in France. American efforts, 

they argued, should be directed more towards influencing French nuclear efforts in a 

way that would benefit the Atlantic Alliance.3

In September 1964, General Curtis LeMay returned to the issue of Franco-American cooperation. If France developed a thermonuclear weapon and an intermediate 

range ballistic missile, General LeMay warned his fellow Joint Chiefs of Staff, President 

de Gaulle could offer European allies more advanced weapons than the United States, 

restricted by the Atomic Energy Act, could make available. Britain, in exchange for 

being admitted to the Common Market, might join France in establishing a European 

nuclear force. Alternatively, President de Gaulle might energize the Franco-German 

relationship or build a “third force” among Common Market countries. At all events, 

General LeMay argued, the time had come to formulate proposals aimed at preventing 

France from taking control of NATO’s strategy and future. Agreeing, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff asked Secretary McNamara to press for an interdepartmental study of how 

French nuclear forces could be integrated into the NATO framework. Such a study 

should recognize that US concessions might be necessary and that the French might 

try to exploit their nuclear potential “to the detriment of US interests.” Assistant Secretary (ISA) John McNaughton put their proposal before a State-Defense Ad Hoc Group.4

On 4 December 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again appealed to Secretary McNamara over what they saw as the urgent need for a policy review “at the highest level.” 

The administration was weighing whether to keep trying to create a multilateral force 

(MLF) of nuclear-armed ships, which France strongly opposed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

predicted that, unless President de Gaulle could be persuaded to integrate his force 

de frappe into NATO, he probably would block the US campaign to change NATO’s 

strategic concept from meeting major aggression with prompt nuclear retaliation into 

one of flexible response. In that case, the alternatives would be continuing without 

French participation or promoting the coordination of national nuclear forces. Two 

weeks later, President Johnson decided not to press for a binding MLF agreement and 

to avoid public or private quarrels with France, taking the line that “we will not sign 

any agreement which does not contain open doors for France.”5

In April 1965, General McConnell proposed three steps: minimize Franco-American policy conflicts; declare France eligible for assistance in developing nuclear 

weapons; and give allies more control over and responsibility for nuclear weapons. For 

example, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), might assume responsibility for targeting 30 US B–58 bombers, even though the aircraft themselves would 

stay under the control of Strategic Air Command. That arrangement, perhaps, could 

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set a precedent for France to follow with its force de frappe. Apparently, these proposals were too bold for the other Chiefs to endorse outright. They simply forwarded his 

paper to Lieutenant General Andrew Goodpaster, Assistant to the Chairman, who was 

serving on the State-Defense Ad Hoc Group.6

What nuclear assets might the allies share? The SACEUR, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, wanted to control by 1970 Polaris missile submarines and either mobile, 

land-based medium range ballistic missiles or extended-range Pershing missiles. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with him. Late in September 1965, they warned Secretary 

McNamara that NATO’s viability might well hinge on solving the nuclear sharing problem. Placing an MRBM force at SACEUR’s disposal would: add an option for countering 

the threat from Soviet intermediate and medium-range missiles; satisfy allied aspirations for a greater role in controlling and using nuclear strike forces; and allay fears that 

Europeans might face a situation for which there was no suitable nuclear response.7

Meantime, a much more troubling question was coming to the forefront: would 

France leave NATO? Early in 1964, de Gaulle called for a new system of coordinated 

planning wherein each ally would be responsible for defending its own national territory. Secretary McNamara reacted by asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume (1) 

that France either withdrew from NATO or took actions tantamount to withdrawal 

and (2) that French forces would support the alliance and ports, airfields, and other 

facilities would be available in wartime. How, he asked, could the damage to NATO be 

contained and an effective defense maintained? They replied that, without the lines of 

communication running across central France, a forward defense seemed infeasible. 

Unless extensive peacetime stockpiling took place, French facilities would possess 

merely “marginal” value if they became available only in wartime. Nothing except 

“strong and effective” bilateral arrangements could minimize the damage to NATO 

and maintain an effective posture.8

By May 1965, as President de Gaulle grew ever more outspoken in his criticisms of 

US policies worldwide, Secretary McNamara began to anticipate a French secession. 

He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for (1) an emergency plan to remove US forces from 

France and (2) an examination of how US forces would operate if they were forced 

completely out of France. In a hasty preliminary answer, they described three logistical 

arrangements: a base section in Britain, advanced section in Belgium, the Netherlands, 

and Luxemburg (Benelux); a base section in Portugal, advanced sections in Benelux 

and Britain; and a base section in the United States, advanced sections in Benelux and 

Britain. The cost would be around $1 billion, with a relocation time of 18 to 36 months. 

Since a complete evacuation would have “extensive repercussions affecting NATO and 

all of Europe,” the administration should not react to French pressure by unilaterally 

initiating any large-scale withdrawals. If the French formally requested withdrawal, 

the US reply should place wholly upon them the onus for fragmenting NATO. Then 

France would face counter-pressure from all the allies and not the United States alone.9

General Wheeler’s Special Studies Group looked at places where US forces and 

facilities might move. On 13 August, after reviewing its findings, the Joint Chiefs of 

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Staff advised Secretary McNamara that “there is no feasible alternative to supporting 

US commitments to NATO except through the Low Countries.” Protecting a Benelux 

base would require strengthening defenses in the North German plain. Because the 

financial and political problems involved in shifting US forces northward appeared sizable, Europeans—preferably Germans—should fill the need. Obviously, US interests 

would be best served by avoiding or delaying a withdrawal from France. Emphasis 

should be placed upon “how to stay” rather than “how to leave.”10

Soon afterward, President de Gaulle intensified his campaign. During a press 

conference on 9 September, he declared that “[a]t the expiration of our present commitments—that is to say, in 1969 at the latest—we shall end the subordination which is 

described as integration and which puts our destiny into the hands of foreigners.” Five 

weeks later, the French government proposed that the alliance structure be replaced by 

two separate systems. The first, covering the North Atlantic area, would be “a simple 

treaty of alliance” in which each member would enjoy “genuine freedom of action.” 

The second, limited to Europe, would contain a “considerable degree” of integration 

in the non-nuclear field.11

The US government found President de Gaulle’s proposal unacceptable. On 8 

October, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, and Under Secretary of State George Ball reviewed the outlook for NATO. Mr. Ball proposed that, 

if France ceased participating constructively, Article V of the treaty should no longer 

be considered applicable. Mr. Bundy called that an empty threat, but Secretary McNamara agreed with Mr. Ball. General Wheeler mentioned that his French counterpart, 

General Charles Ailleret, said France wanted to maintain an integrated command in 

Germany but abolish the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) 

sited near Paris, and veto its establishment elsewhere. Secretary McNamara observed, 

and General Wheeler concurred, that the prospect of fighting a war without France 

would lead people to accept the likelihood of a “trip-wire situation,” leading quickly to 

nuclear escalation. The problem, McNamara believed, was that NATO’s conventional 

strength “would be so substantially weakened in the next two years that it would no 

longer be reasonable for the US divisions to stay in Europe.” Mr. Bundy disagreed.12

President de Gaulle’s proposals, or challenges, stifled any prospect of nuclear 

cooperation. Early in October, the State-Defense Ad Hoc Group recommended against 

asking the French to coordinate targets assigned to their Mirage bombers with targets assigned to NATO-committed nuclear forces. For the next few years, the Group 

reasoned, military advantages from such cooperation would go almost exclusively to 

France. Also, a bilateral arrangement would appear to reward President de Gaulle’s 

drive for nuclear independence. If the French did make an overture, the Group suggested replying that coordination could be accomplished most effectively within the 

SACEUR framework.13

Near the year’s end, Defense Minister Pierre Messmer told Secretary McNamara 

that the French would be willing “very soon now” to talk about target coordination. 

Following the Ad Hoc Group’s advice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a cautious, 

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constrained approach. Close consultation with other allies, particularly London and 

Bonn, should precede any substantive response. The best solution would be to commit 

the force de frappe to NATO, with SACEUR accomplishing coordination. Since President de Gaulle’s agreement looked extremely unlikely, a fallback was to accomplish 

coordination through SACEUR’s Liaison Office at Omaha, headquarters of the Strategic 

Air Command. Quickly, however, events rendered this entire issue obsolete.14

On 21 February 1966, de Gaulle delivered his decisive strokes. He announced, first, 

that the last French forces committed to NATO—two divisions and supporting aircraft 

in West Germany—would withdraw from the integrated command and, second, that 

“every foreign element stationed in France must be under the sole control of French 

authorities.” Through a subsequent aide-memoire, he made clear that “every foreign 

element” meant NATO headquarters as well as US bases. A second note set 1 July 1966 

as the date for ending French participation in integrated commands, and 1 April 1967 

as the deadline for evacuating all “foreign” elements from France.15

Perhaps relieved that France was leaving “the organization but not the alliance,” 

President Johnson directed Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to articulate a “constructive” US position. “I see no benefit to ourselves or to our allies,” the President told them, 

“in debating the position of the French government. Our task is to rebuild NATO outside 

of France as promptly, economically, and effectively as possible.”16

Meanwhile, on 18 March, General Wheeler cautioned General Lemnitzer that whatever reorganizing was done “must be austere in the extreme” because Congress would 

fund nothing more. In fact, he worried “whether the US will continue to support NATO 

with US funds and forces in whatever form [the alliance] takes.” He thought the job of 

rebuilding NATO should proceed along the following lines: “factor” the French out of 

NATO organs and agencies; reorganize military structures, possibly elevating SACEUR 

to the status of Supreme Allied Commander, NATO (SACNATO); and reconstitute the 

US lines of communication in Europe.17

Simultaneously, Deputy Secretary Vance tasked the Joint Chiefs with evaluating 

alternatives for relocation and adjustments to NATO’s military structure.18 On 13 April, 

after an extensive interservice debate, they outlined two possibilities. First, establish 

a SACNATO supported by an International Military Staff. SACNATO’s principal subordinates would be the Commanders in Chief, Allied Forces in Northern Europe, Central 

Europe, Southern Europe, and the Atlantic. That way, the North Atlantic Council would 

draw advice from a single primary source. The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred this solution but only if the SACNATO would be an American. Second, continue SACEUR and 

the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), held by a US officer 

but disestablish the Channel Command headed by a British admiral. An International 

Military Staff would report to NATO’s Military Committee. This would minimize disruption but could prove cumbersome and result in the North Atlantic Council receiving 

conflicting advice.

As to relocation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered selecting a new site for 

SHAPE to be the key element. They preferred the vicinity of Brussels; Headquarters, 

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US European Command (HQ, USEUCOM), should be placed nearby. American forces in France numbered 28,000 personnel with 730,000 tons of removable stores.19

President de Gaulle’s deadlines did not allow enough time to do everything the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted, in the way they wanted. They proposed a two-phased 

plan. Phase I would create a new line of communication (LOC) through the Benelux 

countries, costing about $200 million and emphasizing through-put capacity rather 

than maintaining reserve stocks. Phase II, building a permanent infrastructure 

over the next five years, would require perhaps $600 million.

There were six USAF tactical reconnaissance squadrons based in France. Also, 

in time of crisis, nine French bases were supposed to receive aircraft arriving from 

CONUS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended shifting the squadrons to Britain and 

Germany and acquiring replacement airfields in Belgium, Britain, and Germany. Dualbasing, meaning that units would redeploy to the United States but maintain bases in 

Europe to which they would return periodically, was an option. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff opposed it, “particularly at this time,” on grounds that Europeans would see it 

simply as a withdrawal and so give credence to President de Gaulle’s allegations about 

American unreliability. Assuming there would be enough warning time to fly back from 

US bases amounted to gambling on a correct assessment of the enemy’s intentions 

instead of his capabilities.20

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to relocate a force structure intact, Secretary McNamara saw an opportunity for reduction. His systems analysts spotted what 

they deemed unnecessary duplications, and the spiraling costs of Vietnam demanded 

economies elsewhere. In a DPM dated 21 April, he identified solutions that were “far 

less costly than their JCS counterparts.” First, move SHAPE to London or Brussels and 

relocate HQ, USEUCOM, from Camp des Loges just outside Paris to Germany and house 

it in existing facilities. The American element at SHAPE should be large enough, in his 

judgment, to retain US influence as well as maintain liaison with USEUCOM. Second, 

transfer war reserve stocks to Germany but build no new depots there. That limitation meant stockpiling only 60 days worth of ammunition. Since allies’ stocks did not 

exceed 15 to 30 days, he argued, why keep more? Third, dual-base the reconnaissance 

squadrons, bringing them back to Europe twice a year for two-week periods. Fourth, 

study whether replacing the nine air bases in France with an equal number was really 

necessary. Would not a smaller number of well-protected facilities be preferable to a 

larger number of poorly protected ones?21

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that his solutions would 

incur “military risks disproportionate to the savings described,” impress the allies as 

a “fundamental change” in US policy, and “endanger the survival of US forces on the 

Continent and significantly lower the capability of SACEUR/USCINCEUR to conduct 

a successful, sustained forward defense.” They provided a point-by-point critique. 

First, SHAPE should go to Brussels: “The stigma of the special Anglo-American relationship and the retreat from the Continent would appear to eliminate London from 

further consideration.” Moreover, HQ, USEUCOM, ought to be in Brussels because, as 

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USCINCEUR, General Lemnitzer bore responsibilities that required immediate and 

continuous access to US intelligence data and operational advice. He also had to be 

able to act unilaterally if necessary. Second, the Joint Chiefs wanted to stockpile a 

90-day supply of ammunition in Europe. In most cases, they claimed, allied stocks of 

combat-essential items did approach 90-day levels. And, in any case, the requirement 

for war reserves must be based on being able to fight until convoys from US ports 

reached Europe. Supplies should start arriving in 71 days, but a safety cushion had to 

be added. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with Secretary McNamara’s veto of more 

depots in Germany, largely on grounds that overcrowding would impede resupply. 

Again, they argued, “the risk is extremely high for the contemplated savings.” Third, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed dual-basing. Squadrons should be in place, familiar 

with the terrain, and ready to undertake operations immediately. Economically, they 

said, redeployment to CONUS would yield no overall savings. Politically, dual-basing 

combined with deployments to Vietnam could fan allies’ fears that US withdrawals 

from Europe were imminent. Fourth, and finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred 

expanding existing air bases over constructing new ones.22

Secretary McNamara offered only minor concessions. While agreeing that SACEUR 

would need a much larger US liaison staff, he remained convinced that moving HQ, 

USEUCOM, to Germany was efficient and would save $40 million. As to war reserves, 

he provided a detailed rationale for storing only 67 combat days of ammunition and 50 

to 70 days of other materiel—$200 million cheaper than the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan. 

Despite his support of the flexible response strategy, the Secretary surprisingly argued 

that NATO strategy did not envision a large-scale conventional conflict lasting more 

than 30 to 45 days, which was the longest time that most allied forces could sustain 

themselves in combat. Even if a conventional battle did go beyond 30 to 45 days, resupply from CONUS should be fully under way within 75 days. Secretary McNamara did 

not believe that he was seeking “fundamental” policy changes. He simply wanted to be 

sure that resources were not used in a manner that was “wastefully inconsistent” with 

NATO strategy and allied capabilities. As to dual-basing aircraft, Secretary McNamara 

felt sure that doing so would save $50 million without an increase in risk. He believed 

that the danger of losses in a surprise attack were greater than the hazard of having 

aircraft unavailable for several days. Politically, he was confident, periodic returns to 

Europe would calm allied fears. Looking at replacement air bases, Secretary McNamara still found JCS requirements excessive.23

On 20 May, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed their differences. Afterward, the Secretary agreed that their objections had merit and discarded 

his DPM. On 25 May, he sent President Johnson a short memorandum stating that “we 

are prepared . . . to move out of France as promptly as possible.” The cost would be 

relatively modest—“somewhere in the tens of millions of dollars.” General Wheeler took 

charge of studies about relocating personnel, materiel, and HQ, USEUCOM. General 

McConnell and Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown began preparing recommendations about repositioning reconnaissance squadrons and air base requirements.24
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Secretary McNamara authorized moving to Germany whatever stocks were needed 

to support, for 60 days of combat, the US force planned to be in Europe by D+30. General Wheeler wanted two new depots built; Secretary McNamara disapproved. Since 

President de Gaulle insisted that “not a man, not a kilo” could remain, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff provided Secretary McNamara with a plan to transfer 417,000 tons to Germany. 

But, they elaborated, German depots would be filled to overflowing and practically 

all combat support stocks would come within range of air and missile attacks. Consequently, at least two new and safer storage sites were needed. They also opposed 

reducing stock levels from 90 down to 60 combat days. The duration of a conventional 

war was unpredictable. If nuclear exchanges occurred, residual forces must be able to 

continue fighting, and stocks must last until resupply from CONUS began. Therefore, 

unless there was sufficient strategic warning, unless timely decisions were made to 

deploy forces to Europe and commence automatic resupply, and unless combat losses 

proved insignificant, “anything less than 90 combat days of war reserve stockage 

constitutes significant risk.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that (1) planning 

exclude wartime use of French facilities, (2) efforts begin to develop a British base for 

30 days of combat stockage, and (3) an attempt be made to obtain sites for new storage 

facilities in the Saar region west of the Rhine.25

A skeptical Secretary asked the Joint Chiefs for “a better appraisal” of how adding depots in Germany would reduce vulnerability and increase efficiency. He also 

questioned the wisdom of creating a logistical base in Britain so that theater stocks 

could total 90 days. Instead, could not the 75 days calculated to begin bringing supplies 

from CONUS be cut by assembling convoys while supplies were being brought to US 

ports? Secretary McNamara also cited studies suggesting that the Benelux complex 

might be lost within a week or two, in which case supplies from Britain could not 

reach Germany. A 30-day reserve in Britain would be needed, he believed, only during 

a large-scale conflict that began with little warning—but under such conditions Allied 

Command Europe would have great difficulty conducting a prolonged conventional 

defense.26 Thus Secretary McNamara’s position had come almost full circle from the 

early 1960s, when he insisted that a protracted conventional defense was within reach 

and constantly pressed the allies to increase their efforts.

On 7 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara a study of places 

where the 156,000 tons of supplies remaining in France might be relocated. Britain 

still impressed them as the best solution on grounds of economy, safety, availability, 

and flexibility. They noted that, even if defenses in Central Europe did collapse, US 

war plans still envisioned holding strong points on the continent, in Norway, and in 

the British Isles. In those circumstances, stocks in Britain would prove most useful.27

Secretary McNamara still hoped to reduce the 75-day figure. But a study by OSD, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the services apparently persuaded the Secretary that he was 

wrong. On 12 December 1966, he approved stocking 156,000 tons in Britain. So, with 

30 days’ worth there and 60 days in Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff objective of 90 

days would be fulfilled.28
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Back in August, Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville told Ambassador 

Charles Bohlen that France would permit re-entry only during a war in which she 

herself was participating. Secretary McNamara promptly called for plans to withdraw 

all USAF property and personnel. Relocating USAF forces and facilities went forward 

with comparatively little friction. Of the six reconnaissance squadrons in France, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended bringing two back to CONUS and keeping four in 

Europe. McNamara decided to return three and shift three to Britain.29 How should the 

nine air bases be replaced? The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed one in Germany, one in 

Belgium, and seven in Britain. Secretary McNamara approved reopening, in Britain, 

Sculthorpe and Chelveston as well as expanding Mildenhall. Other augmentation 

aircraft arriving from CONUS would be accommodated at seven existing bases, one 

German and six British. Placing so many aircraft in Britain would reduce their payloads 

and loiter time over the battlefield while increasing their response time. Consequently, 

Secretary McNamara authorized approaching allies about establishing co-located 

bases in northern Germany and the Netherlands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied a 

co-location survey in September 1967 and supported an Air Force proposal to reopen 

Greenham Common. Secretary McNamara disapproved, but after he left office the 

decision was reversed.30

What about the pipeline carrying petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) through 

France into Germany? The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that alternatives be developed; 

Secretary McNamara authorized some actions but preferred peacetime leasing. In 

December 1966, at General Lemnitzer’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged negotiations to permit wartime use of POL facilities, airfields, hospitals, and depots. Secretary 

McNamara solicited the State Department’s view—and received a polite rebuff. Nine 

months earlier, Secretary Rusk reminded him, the French had made such an offer. The 

US response had been to insist on peacetime access plus “an ironclad guarantee” of 

wartime availability. No new approach should be contemplated, therefore, until relocations had been completed.31 The French agreed to peacetime leasing of the pipeline 

but withheld formal approval for its wartime use.

Finally, there was the challenge of revamping NATO’s command structure. The 

most radical solution, creating a SACNATO, went nowhere. Secretary McNamara, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and SACEUR himself all supported this 

concept as the simplest, most economical, and most effective means of providing 

military direction.32 But the allies balked, feeling that resentment would arise against 

absolute US control. The British argued that the power already enjoyed by SACEUR 

was one reason for de Gaulle’s defection. By mid-1966, the administration had to admit 

that the SACNATO idea was “dead.”33

On 3 May 1966, General Lemnitzer recommended relocating SHAPE to the vicinity of 

Brussels. The Belgians offered Chievres-Casteau, about 30 miles southwest of Brussels. 

General Lemnitzer judged that site unacceptable, on grounds of remoteness and inaccessibility. Separating SHAPE from the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, he believed, 

would seriously harm working relationships. But the State Department, fearing Belgians 
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might withdraw their offer, opposed any “confrontation.” Casteau became SHAPE’s new 

home.34 Concurrently, the US-UK-French Standing Group was abolished and its International Planning Staff expanded into an International Military Staff reporting to the 

NATO Military Committee, which moved from Washington to Brussels.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while convinced that military considerations mandated 

co-locating SHAPE with HQ, USEUCOM, recognized that political factors took precedence. HQ, USEUCOM, had to be operating outside of France by 1 April 1967. Relocating 

it to the Brussels area would impose delays, and Belgium might be reluctant to accept 

a US as well as a NATO headquarters. Accordingly, on 30 June 1966, the Joint Chiefs 

agreed to put HQ, USEUCOM, at Stuttgart, 250 miles from SHAPE.35

On 14 March 1967, the Stars and Stripes were lowered at USEUCOM’s old headquarters near St.-Germain-en-Laye. On 31 March, SHAPE opened its new facilities at 

Casteau. As fighter-bombers flew overhead and a British Army band played a regimental march, flags of fourteen allies crackled as they ran up their poles. But NATO’s blue 

and silver flag remained earth-bound; at the critical moment, the pulley had come off 

the flagstaff.36 Happily, that symbolism did not reflect the substance of the occasion. 

Allied Command Europe, although weaker, remained alive and functioning.

Re-Cementing the German Connection

I

n March 1966, after President de Gaulle announced France’s secession, General 

Wheeler counseled SACEUR that keeping West Germany tightly tied to the Atlantic alliance was “probably our highest security interest vis-à-vis NATO.”37 Two large 

obstacles loomed. First, as rising Vietnam commitments drained the CONUS reserve, 

Secretary McNamara started drawing upon US Army, Europe. In April 1966, without 

informing German officials beforehand, he announced plans to withdraw 15,000 

personnel, promising to replace them by the year’s end. Actually, 55,000 were sent to 

Vietnam and replaced by 40,000 newly-trained men.38 The decline in combat readiness 

would continue through 1968. Second, the US balance-of-payments deficit kept rising. 

A 1964 agreement obligated West Germany to “offset” fully the deficit incurred by 

stationing US troops there. But the German government, facing budget troubles and 

a sluggish economy, fell short.39 In May 1966, Secretary McNamara warned Defense 

Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel that Washington reserved the right to reduce “proportionally” if German purchases of US arms failed to fully offset troop costs. Some Germans 

suspected he was using this issue as a pretext to justify transferring divisions to Vietnam. London also threatened to withdraw units from the British Army of the Rhine 

unless Bonn shouldered the costs of keeping them there.40

On Capitol Hill, misgivings about the Vietnam War spilled over into resentment 

against continuing such a large presence in Europe. In August 1966, the Senate Democratic Policy Committee called for a substantial reduction of the 330,000 personnel 

deployed there. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D, MT) introduced an implementing 
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resolution that attracted 31 co-sponsors.41 Although the measure never came close to 

passing, it was a harbinger of growing discontent.

Even before the Vietnam buildup, Secretary McNamara had thought seriously 

about reducing the American presence in Europe. If allies refused to muster enough 

conventional strength for prolonged resistance, should not the United States follow 

suit? On 23 August 1966, Secretary McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study 

the implications of (1) withdrawing two divisions and 184 tactical fighters, (2) removing four divisions and 368 aircraft, and (3) thinning out US units plus redeploying 108 

aircraft. Not surprisingly, the Joint Chiefs opposed any cutbacks. First, they advised, 

withdrawing two divisions would “jeopardize the integrity of the entire defense,” 

probably require earlier use of nuclear weapons, force a rapid retreat to the Rhine, 

and endanger reinforcement capability by quickly losing German bases. Second, taking away four divisions would “negate the concept of a forward defense and probably 

necessitate the immediate use of nuclear weapons.” Third, thinning out Army units to 

70 or 80 percent strength would seriously degrade their combat capability and endurance. Reducing tactical fighter strength would severely degrade NATO’s ability to fight 

the initial air battle. If ground units were withdrawn, in-place reconnaissance and air 

defense units became much more important. For a trans-Atlantic return, 50 tankers 

would be needed to refuel 108 aircraft, 90 to refuel 184, and 110 to refuel 316.42

General Wheeler held little hope that Joint Chiefs of Staff arguments would carry 

weight. On 7 September, he warned General Lemnitzer that “there is already a definite 

acceptance (and perhaps even a tentative but closely held decision) in OSD and the 

White House that substantial reductions should be made; I think it is most significant 

that the Mansfield amendment was not refuted by the administration except from the 

standpoint of its timeliness, the need for consultations, and the need to distinguish 

between combat and support troops.” General Wheeler thought it likely that the first 

steps would preserve “the façade of the magic five divisions . . . until the political 

ground has been thoroughly plowed for further reductions.”43

On 26 September, President Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard held a frosty 

meeting. When Mr. Erhard said that Germany could not fulfill all its offset obligations, 

President Johnson replied that “he did not want to be arbitrary with the Chancellor, but 

if he could not keep his word it would seriously aggravate his own position, financially 

and otherwise.” Next day, the two leaders announced a “searching reappraisal” of NATO 

strategy and force levels, addressing the question of equitable burden-sharing. One week 

later, Secretary McNamara asked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff advice about the best way 

to cut US Army, Europe’s, strength by 50,000. He told them to apply several assumptions: 

withdrawals would be completed by the close of 1967; redeployed units would remain 

committed to NATO; dehumidified storage and pre-stockage would be authorized; and 

the United States would continue to support a strategy of forward defense.44

Anticipating such a request, General Wheeler already had tasked the Joint Staff 

with finding the “least bad” answer. On 27 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the 

Secretary a lengthy reply, which opened by denying any military justification for 
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reductions. The least bad solution would be to bring back the 24th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized) plus one brigade and assorted support units. The 24th was USAREUR’s 

reserve division, located in southern Bavaria outside Seventh Army’s defense sector. 

Since an entire complex of installations could be closed, substantial savings would 

result. Alternatively, they noted, keeping all five division flags in Europe might garner 

political advantage. In that case, the 24th Division’s command and control elements 

could stay in Germany, but a brigade from another division would have to leave.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff doubted whether dehumidified storage would be available, as Secretary McNamara assumed. Demands of the Vietnam War meant that 

pre-positioning of stocks might have to wait until FY 1971, in which case equipment 

would have to be brought back to CONUS along with the personnel. The continuing 

credibility of the US commitment, they claimed, would revolve in large part around 

the feasibility of a rapid return. Re-entry times would vary between 43 and 69 days, 

depending on how much equipment had been pre-positioned. Even under the least bad 

scheme, US capability for a forward defense would be called into question, since the 

means for supporting it would be “visibly weakened.” With any other alternative, they 

claimed, forward defense would become “virtually impossible.”

Secretary McNamara also had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider “dualbasing” between 12 and 15 of the 28 strike, reconnaissance, and air defense squadrons 

based in Europe. Dual basing would involve bringing squadrons back to bases in 

CONUS but returning them to Europe periodically for exercises. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff identified the least bad solution as bringing back four squadrons and periodically 

returning one, redeploying 4,245 personnel and saving $16.4 million in the balance of 

payments. The next most palatable solution would be to bring back ten squadrons and 

periodically return three, yielding almost twice the savings.45

General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara considered applying a “rotational 

brigade” approach to the 8th and 24th Divisions. When a division left Europe, one of 

its brigades plus the command and control elements and all heavy equipment would 

remain in place. Then each of the division’s three brigades would rotate periodically 

to CONUS and back. But all the Service Chiefs opposed brigade rotation, deeming it “a 

difficult and expensive way to do business.” Admittedly, it would better demonstrate 

US will and ability to reinforce Europe as well as make reintroduction less sensitive 

politically. On the other hand, experience indicated that training would be disrupted 

and morale impaired. Brigade rotation would require manning units at 102 percent 

strength, pre-positioning equipment for 1 1/3 divisions, making more transport aircraft 

available, and providing 3,000 more support personnel as well as an extra $46 million. 

The Service Chiefs urged that brigade rotation, if ordered, be postponed until all these 

assets became available.46

In Bonn, meantime, Americans, British, and Germans started trilateral talks about 

security issues. On 11 October 1966, President Johnson appointed John J. McCloy, who 

had been High Commissioner for Germany during 1949–52, to serve as US Representative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Mr. McCloy with a support element headed by 
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Lieutenant General Berton Spivy, USA, who was Director of Plans and Policy (J–5) on 

the Joint Staff. General Wheeler told Mr. McCloy that, if withdrawals proved inevitable, 

an “honest” justification must rest on political and financial grounds, not military ones. 

Late in November, Mr. McCloy advised the President that any “material” reductions 

probably would trigger allied cutbacks, lower the nuclear threshold, and encourage 

Soviet pressure tactics. Even with improved air and sealift, he reported, CONUS reinforcements could not reach Europe for at least three weeks. Politically, material US 

withdrawals would “seriously increase the risks of NATO disintegration and reduction 

of US influence in Europe.” Consequently, Mr. McCloy opposed withdrawing “significant” forces from Central Europe. In the financial realm, he recommended exploring 

with Bonn new arrangements to “neutralize” the balance-of-payments problem. After 

reviewing Mr. McCloy’s report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that it generally reflected 

their views.47

Through a DPM dated 19 January 1967, Secretary McNamara outlined ways to cut 

foreign exchange costs by $200 million without “significantly reducing our military 

effectiveness.” To make that possible, he counted upon (1) several weeks of political 

warning prior to an attack and (2) faster means of trans-Atlantic movement. Secretary 

McNamara believed NATO and the Warsaw Pact had reached a state of rough equilibrium in Central Europe. The Soviets seemed to be adopting an increasingly defensive 

posture in reaction to the split with China and the loosening of their control over Eastern Europe. The Allies no longer feared a Soviet attack, as proved by the slackening of 

their own efforts. Consequently, they would not be alarmed by a “moderate” US reduction, provided the United States reaffirmed its “solemn commitment” and maintained 

a credible posture. These factors led Secretary McNamara to propose dual-basing 

the 8th and 24th Infantry Divisions, always keeping one brigade from each in Germany. 

Doing so would bring 59,000 personnel back to CONUS and reduce costs. Most equipment would be pre-positioned in Germany, with war reserves providing enough stocks 

for training in CONUS. He believed the two divisions could return substantially in 15 

days, completely in 30. Secretary McNamara further proposed dual-basing 432 tactical 

aircraft, always keeping at least 108 at German or British bases. Thus totals in Europe 

would fall by half, from 662 to 338, withdrawing 11,000 to 14,500 USAF personnel and 

reducing costs. Secretary McNamara cautioned that, even though a serious foreign 

exchange drain would persist, any further cuts in combat power would be “traumatic, 

and dangerous, at this time.”48

Responding on 2 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly disagreed with the 

Secretary’s solution. First, they expected that emergencies would develop too rapidly 

to allow the return of forces from CONUS. In their judgment, strategic warning of a 

major assault would be only 11 to 15 days; for a smaller attack, simply a matter of hours. 

Second, they disagreed that dual-based divisions could return in 15 to 30 days, mainly 

because they would be competing for transportation with units already scheduled 

to reach Europe by D+30. Additionally, if dual-based aircraft did not fly back before 

hostilities began, Allied Command Europe probably could not sustain air superiority 
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long enough to permit their safe arrival later. Third, they disputed Mr. McNamara’s 

assertion that a NATO-Warsaw Pact equilibrium existed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

cited intelligence estimates that, within 21 to 28 days, the Warsaw Pact could deploy 

80 divisions in Central Europe, not 50 to 70 as the Secretary supposed. Fourth, they 

challenged Mr. McNamara’s conclusion that the withdrawals he recommended would 

neither weaken NATO nor destabilize Europe. Since there would be no compensating 

Soviet cutbacks and NATO allies might well reduce their own forces, Moscow could be 

tempted toward a more adventurous course. If there had to be withdrawals, said the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, limit them to one division and 216 aircraft during FY 1968, adding 

enough funds to allow brigade rotation and USAF dual-basing.49

President Johnson chose to treat this mainly as a political problem: What was the 

smallest withdrawal that would disarm Congressional critics without alarming allies? 

After White House meetings on 24–25 February 1967, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk 

informed the President that their “preferred outcome” involved rotating not more than 

one division and three wings, with one brigade and 54 of the 216 aircraft always in 

Europe. When President Johnson talked with Congressional leaders on 27 February, 

Senate Democrats favored reductions while Senate Republicans did not; House members of both parties opposed withdrawals.50 President Johnson evidently deduced that 

Congressional pressure for withdrawal was not as powerful as he had feared.

On 17 March 1967, Secretary McNamara circulated a solution. Return to CONUS 

two brigades plus support units from the 24th Division, totaling about 30,000 personnel. The entire division would exercise annually in Germany, using pre-positioned 

equipment. The United States would dual-base 216 tactical aircraft, of which 54 always 

would be at German bases. The other aircraft and 6,500 personnel would redeploy to 

CONUS but remain ready to return within seven days. Again, all dual-based aircraft 

would assemble annually in Germany. Secretary McNamara wanted withdrawals to 

start on 1 October 1967.51

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested several modifications. Keep basing the 24th

Division in Germany, rotating its three brigades on six-month cycles.52 Limit Army 

withdrawals to 28,000, so more support personnel could be retained. Keep redeployed 

units able to return in 28 days, assuming that pre-positioned equipment and air transportation were available. Return 144 of the dual-based aircraft to CONUS, retaining 

72 in Germany. Keep one squadron from each of the three wings affected at bases in 

Germany, rotating the squadrons every two or three years.53 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

noted that, because of Vietnam’s demands, only 75 percent of each squadron could 

return to Europe within seven days. Also, to meet the deadlines of 30 days for Army 

units and seven for Air Force ones, the services would need a good deal more money 

and manpower.54

Secretary Rusk pronounced Mr. McNamara’s scheme of 17 March “good” and 

approved its use in the tripartite talks. These culminated on 28 April when Mr. McCloy, 

George Thomson for Great Britain, and Georg Duckwitz for West Germany completed 

a series of agreements. Two of the 24th Division’s brigades with support troops, about 
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28,000 in all, would leave Germany but remain ready to return in thirty days. Dualbasing of aircraft would involve 216 planes, with 120 staying in Germany and 96 

returning to CONUS but ready to return in ten days (five, if possible). As many as 6,500 

USAF personnel would redeploy. All 216 aircraft would perform annual exercises in 

Germany. For both ground and air units, the first movements would not take place 

before 1 January 1968, “but in no event before the US is ready to meet the criteria 

described above.” Financially, Germany agreed to purchase significant amounts of US 

military equipment, buy $500 million worth of US Treasury securities during FY 1968, 

stop converting dollars into gold, and take other measures to deal with the remaining 

dollar deficit. Bonn also pledged major purchases from the British, who in turn limited 

their withdrawals to one brigade and two squadrons.55

Mr. McCloy assured President Johnson that “we have come a considerable distance 

from the unpromising situation we faced last autumn.” The Germans, he related, had 

been “particularly pleased” by US willingness to change position and remove only 96 

instead of 154 aircraft. General Wheeler thought the Germans had been so apprehensive about rotating nuclear-capable aircraft because they suspected that Washington 

really wanted to de-nuclearize Europe, and this would be the first step.56 Overall, Mr. 

McCloy discerned “a distinct improvement in the political atmosphere at the conclusion of the talks.”57

To implement the tripartite agreements, the Army’s REFORGER (“Return of 

Forces to Germany”) outlined a 28,000-man withdrawal; the Air Force’s HEAVY 

DRAW prescribed a 3,500-man redeployment. When Secretary McNamara ordered 

larger packages prepared, the Services complied but the Joint Chiefs of Staff filed an 

objection. Ultimately, in August, the Secretary ruled that 28,000 Army and 5,300 Air 

Force personnel would redeploy between January and June 1968. He later delayed 

their return until April-September 1968, so that costs could be deferred until FY 1969 

and—as the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished—more pre-positioned equipment would 

become available.58

Surviving France’s secession and securing the Washington-Bonn connection 

assured NATO’s continuing vitality, which in turn would prove essential to the Cold 

War’s outcome. Taken together, therefore, this was a major achievement in foreign 

policy for the Johnson administration.

Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus

Greece and Turkey presented special problems for NATO. Geographically, they were separated from the other European allies, rendering them more vulnerable 

to Soviet or satellite attack. Militarily, both suffered from numerous weaknesses and 

neither could afford thorough-going modernization. Politically, Athens and Ankara 

deeply distrusted one another. The island of Cyprus, an independent nation, lay less 

than 50 miles off the Turkish coast. Four-fifths of its inhabitants were Greek and 
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many of them favored “enosis” or union with Greece, which was anathema to Turkish 

Cypriots. In August 1964, Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish towns; Turkey responded 

with bombing sorties. American mediation helped restore a tense, temporary calm.

In December 1964, the Greek Defense Minister told Secretary McNamara that his 

country had little hope of fulfilling the force goals set by NATO. He voiced particular 

concern about the possibility of a Bulgarian attack against narrow, exposed Thrace in 

northeastern Greece. Secretary McNamara was not much worried about a strike from 

Bulgaria. The two men did agree, however, to make a “completely fresh” evaluation of 

Greece’s defense problems—meaning, primarily, the prioritizing of missions assigned 

to Greek forces.59

The Joint Chiefs of Staff created a Hellenic Defense Study Team, with Lieutenant 

General Charles H. Bonesteel, USA, as its Director.60 Secretary McNamara told the 

Team to assume that US military assistance would average $65 million annually, plus 

$5 million from allies. After visiting Greece in March 1965, the Bonesteel Team concluded that, while a Bulgarian attack appeared unlikely, Greece stood “less than a fifty 

percent chance” of conducting a successful forward defense unless NATO’s alerting 

procedures and regional defense plans were improved. Prompt Turkish cooperation 

would be required, as would rapid support from the US Sixth Fleet. The team proposed 

that Greece give first priority to repelling limited attacks, second priority to dealing 

with either major aggression or nuclear war. Without such priorities, as matters now 

stood, the Greek air force’s weakness was accentuated by its need to withhold many 

modern aircraft for nuclear strike and air defense missions. In sum, Greek forces 

needed “moderate” improvements to defend Thrace. That, in turn, required the continuation of moderate US aid, augmented by aid from other allies.61

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a strategy of modified forward defense, but they 

opposed establishing priorities between limited and general war, mainly because giving 

first priority to limited war would spark serious opposition from European allies who 

emphasized prompt nuclear retaliation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found no tradeoffs 

between Greek and other NATO forces that would enhance overall effectiveness “significantly.” While external reinforcements could offset Greek shortcomings, no adjustments in mission priorities could greatly improve the “austere” combat capability of 

Greek forces. Still, the number of strike squadrons available for conventional missions 

could be increased by pre-planning their temporary release from SACEUR’s Scheduled 

Program for General War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also wanted to plan a unilateral US 

response as a hedge against slow NATO reaction. Finally, while acknowledging that 

there might be genuine worry about a Bulgarian land grab, the Joint Chiefs noted that 

the Greeks themselves were not taking reasonable corrective actions. Perhaps, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff speculated, Greeks really were preparing themselves for trouble 

with Turkey over Cyprus. Finally, the Joint Chiefs judged the Team’s aid recommendations too small. Secretary McNamara had assumed that military assistance would 

average $65 million annually; the Bonesteel Team proposed $80 million; the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff recommended $131.1 million.62
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Anticipating hurt feelings in Ankara, General Wheeler recommended a similar 

study of Turkish forces and Secretary McNamara agreed.63 So, during April 1965, 

General Bonesteel led another team to Turkey. It reported, late in May, that Turkey’s 

importance actually had increased because of Soviet successes in penetrating the 

Arab Middle East and extending influence across the North African littoral. But 

the Team believed that events in Cyprus, where Turks saw US behavior as favoring 

the Greeks, were creating an emotional wave of anti-Americanism. Efforts by US 

officials to revise NATO strategy toward a flexible response, combined with talk 

about sizable reductions in the Military Assistance Program (MAP), were reinforcing Turkish doubts about US dependability. The Team believed that, unless these 

trends were halted or reversed, Washington might lose a staunch ally within the 

next few years.

The Team concluded that “locally applicable” Warsaw Pact forces could not only 

seize and open the Turkish Straits but also achieve major successes in eastern Turkey. 

As it had for Greece, the Team recommended a strategy of modified forward defense, 

placing more reliance upon bringing external reinforcements to meet lesser aggressions. Turkish forces already were so austere that no mission tradeoffs with allies 

appeared possible. Rather, rapid reinforcement capabilities should be improved, along 

with more NATO planning and exercises.64 Turks must reorganize their forces, spend 

more, and improve production facilities. The Team recommended that MAP average 

between $118 and $130 million annually. In July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they generally concurred with the Team’s assessment but believed 

MAP should average $219.6 million yearly.65

Late in October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the Secretary that current MAP 

levels would leave major Greek and Turkish weaknesses uncorrected.66 Yet, as they 

saw it, the greatest risks were political and psychological. If the Turks became disenchanted with NATO, “we risk the loss of the Turkish Straits and the loss of a substantial 

complex of communications, intelligence, and transportation capabilities of direct 

concern to US national security.”67

Meanwhile, in September, OSD suggested maximum annual outlays of $60–70 million for Greece and about $120 million for Turkey. The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated 

their recommendation: $131.1 million for Greece ($182.7 million in FY 1967, $119.3 

million by FY 1971) and $219.6 million for Turkey ($243.6 million in FY 1967, $185.2 

million by FY 1971). In view of the recognized weaknesses on NATO’s flanks and the 

“continually deteriorating US strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean,” the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed this “a particularly inopportune time” either to reduce 

assistance for the two countries or to readjust the proportionate share between them. 

Conversely, increased aid on the scale they suggested would do much to reverse declining US influence in both countries.68 Members of Congress, however, were in no mood 

to vote larger appropriations. In FY 1966, Greece received $77.4 million and Turkey 

$124.4 million. The figures for FY 1967 were $65 million and $134 million respectively, 

about what OSD had suggested.
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A political upheaval pushed purely military issues aside. In Athens, on 21 April 

1967, Army officers ousted the constitutional government, claiming they had acted 

to prevent a communist takeover. The United States promptly suspended major MAP 

deliveries. Late in June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended resuming, as soon as 

possible, normal military relations and MAP deliveries. They noted that the junta had 

agreed to accommodate Americans evacuated during the recent Middle East war, a 

gesture that might ease Congressional concern about the new regime’s nature and 

intent. Small steps toward liberalization had taken place. Continuing the suspension, 

the Joint Chiefs argued, would seriously delay military modernization and could alienate the regime: “The United States can ill afford these consequences in view of the 

delicacy of the US presence in other parts of the eastern and central Mediterranean.”69

Forwarding Joint Chiefs of Staff views to State, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

(ISA) Townsend Hoopes observed that “our policy was meant to be flexible,” alleviating suspensions if liberalization occurred and tightening them if authoritarianism 

increased. The junta had ended martial law and released most political prisoners, yet 

Washington had made no reciprocal gestures, thereby deepening misunderstanding 

and distrust. Mr. Hoopes also worried that King Constantine’s apparent intention to 

stage a showdown with the junta probably would lead either to his expulsion or to civil 

war. Why not then, try to create a climate in which a showdown might be averted? He 

suggested, among other steps, selling ten helicopters to Greece and transferring one 

minesweeper.70

In mid-July, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) endorsed Mr. Hoopes’ 

proposal to release equipment. Writing to Secretary McNamara on 7 August, General 

Wheeler added his strong support. In fact, if any delay developed, General Wheeler 

urged transferring the minesweeper alone as soon as possible. But, after discussions 

with State, Mr. McNamara decided to defer all action until Congress completed passage 

of the MAP. Since the junta was unpopular on Capitol Hill, equipment transfers could 

jeopardize the worldwide program.71

Unfortunately, the passage of time only created more problems. On Cyprus, in 

mid-November 1967, ethnic clashes erupted. When Greek Cypriots attacked several 

Turkish villages, Turkey responded by preparing to invade the island. At an NSC meeting General Wheeler said that Turkey, enjoying an advantage in the air and on land, 

could put several divisions into Cyprus and gain control of the island. A mediation 

mission by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance secured another temporary settlement. Next, in December, King Constantine tried to oust the junta, failed, 

and fled into exile.72

In mid-April 1968, the SIG again debated whether to ease the MAP embargo against 

Greece. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach said that, by all evidence, the 

junta would stay in power for some time to come. Linking MAP to political liberalization seemed sound in theory, he continued, but Washington then became accountable 

for achieving meaningful liberalization, regardless of whether the junta was willing to 

move in that direction. SIG members agreed that preserving the US position in Greece 
NATO

109

was “essential” to preserving the US position in the Middle East and Mediterranean. 

Consequently, the SIG recommended releasing $5 million at once and obligating 

another $20 million before 1 July. Since the United States could not exert more than 

marginal influence on political developments, MAP gradually should be dissociated 

from Greek politics and justified solely from the standpoint of US and NATO interests. 

Again, though, the administration chose to continue its MAP ban from fear that easing 

it might irritate Congress and thereby endanger the worldwide program. So in October, 

after the bill had been passed, Mr. Katzenbach recommended releasing about 40 percent of the equipment (e.g., some tank ammunition and heavy guns but neither tanks 

nor F–5 interceptors). President Johnson approved.73

With Turkey, there were problems of a different sort. First, Congress cut Turkey’s 

FY 1969 MAP down to $100 million. Second, the administration began to doubt whether 

Turkey would make its bases available for non-NATO purposes. In December 1967, 

Secretary McNamara decided that US visibility within Turkey must be reduced, both to 

preserve the long-term health of bilateral relations and to reduce US dependence upon 

Turkish facilities. Accordingly, he ordered plans for reducing US personnel (military, 

civilian, and dependent) from 25,000 to 10,000 over five years. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

complied, although arguing for only a modest cut in FY 1969.74

In May 1968, OSD proposed withdrawing 3,139 people in FY 1969. Calling even 

that too much, too soon, the Joint Chiefs voiced particular concern about reducing 

US personnel in two NATO headquarters—Commander, Land Forces, Southeast, and 

the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force. The Turks, they warned Secretary Clifford, might 

perceive a significant weakening of US assurances, particularly in the context of 

REFORGER, reductions in MAP, and Congressional demands for more US withdrawals 

from Europe. Instead of acting unilaterally, they wanted to wait for East-West discussions about mutual force reductions. The State Department, however, endorsed OSD’s 

plan. On 29 June, Deputy Secretary Nitze approved withdrawing 3,098 personnel in 

FY 1969, to be followed by 3,034 more in FY 1970. Mr. Nitze also endorsed, in principle, 

reductions over FYs 1971–73 that would lower the total to 10,000. But the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff did win one point. Withdrawals from the two NATO headquarters, scheduled 

for FY 1969, were made smaller.75

A major lesson lies in MAP’s ineffectiveness as an instrument for influencing political behavior. By October 1968, Walt Rostow informed President Johnson, the SIG recognized that the time had come “to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval 

of domestic Greek politics. The colonels have had their constitutional referendum, but 

they won’t hold elections under it until they’re ready. We can keep prodding them, but 

we can’t make them. Meantime, it doesn’t make sense to let our security relationships 

with Greece—NATO role, [communications] facilities, Sixth Fleet support—deteriorate further.”76 Yet, although the Bonesteel Team concentrated on Soviet and satellite 

threats to Thrace and the Straits to justify MAP, Cyprus remained the focal point of 

Greek-Turkish tension. In 1974 Turkey would use MAP-furnished equipment to invade 

the island, protecting Turkish Cypriots and dispossessing a good many Greeks.

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7

NATO’S Flexible Response: 

Reality or Mirage?

According to MC 14/2, a strategic concept which dated from 1957, NATO would meet an 

attack by employing nuclear weapons—regardless of whether the Soviets did so—in 

all situations, except incursion, infiltration, or local hostile action.1 During the early 

1960s, Secretary McNamara led a strenuous effort to revise the strategic concept and 

expand Allied Command Europe’s capabilities to the point where a major attack could 

be contained, at least initially, by conventional means alone. He met with very limited 

success, because most Europeans saw a threat of swift nuclear retaliation as constituting the essence of deterrence. During the mid-1960s, a fresh array of complications 

made change even more difficult. The outcome was so ambiguous that all sides could 

claim some degree of success.

Cross Currents

I

n December 1961, the North Atlantic Council approved a 1966 objective of 107 2/3 

active and reserve divisions, including 29 2/3 active divisions in Central Europe. By 

1963, though, it was apparent that these goals would not be fulfilled. Accordingly, ministers and secretaries who comprised the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) initiated 

a new exercise. The three Major NATO Commanders (MNCs)—SACEUR, SACLANT, 

and the Commander in Chief, Channel Command—began preparing 1970 force goals. 

Since the French insisted upon assessing requirements only in the context of a general 

nuclear war, the MNCs worked within the confines of MC 14/2. In August 1964, they 

submitted two sets of goals: ALPHA, which they recommended, called for 66 2/3 active 

and 23 1/2 reserve divisions; BRAVO stipulated 63 active and 17 1/2 reserve divisions.2

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When the Military Committee met in December 1964, it did not choose between 

ALPHA and BRAVO. Instead, it directed MNCs to recommend priorities for improvement. This was christened the “Mountbatten Exercise,” after Admiral Lord Louis 

Mountbatten, Chief of the UK Defense Staff. Some responses were not encouraging. 

SACEUR, for example, postulated that after 72 hours’ warning 40 NATO divisions and 

1,248 aircraft would be attacked by 83 to 88 Warsaw Pact divisions with about 3,800 

tactical aircraft. The SACEUR thought he could “handle” air attacks for one or two days 

and hold the main forward defense zones for one to three days.3 Disagreeing, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that the SACEUR had overrated Warsaw 

Pact and underrated NATO capabilities. He ignored, for example, the qualitative superiority of NATO aircraft and the availability of reinforcements from the United States. 

All in all, these appraisals “should not be used as a basis for revising NATO strategic 

concepts or for restructuring the major NATO commanders’ forces.” But the MNCs’ 

recommendations for quantitative and qualitative improvements did impress them as 

being valid and worthy of United States support.4

When the Defense Ministers met in Paris, over 31 May–1 June 1965, Secretary 

McNamara warned that neither the ALPHA nor BRAVO goals appeared attainable. So 

he advocated a “rolling” five–year force structure and financial plan, updated annually, 

that would “enable us to move up and down the scale of military power according to 

changes in the threat we face.”5 Secretary McNamara wanted to replicate the planningprogramming-budgeting system that he had imposed upon the Defense Department.

In September 1965, Secretary McNamara circulated a draft presidential memorandum dealing with NATO strategy and force structure. He cited US intelligence 

estimates that Allied Command Europe would have 11 to 15 days of warning before 

being struck by a 55-division attack. Secretary McNamara claimed that those 55 divisions, plus 15 more in reserve, had the fighting power of 35 US divisions. That being the 

case, he believed that only 11 US and 24 allied divisions were needed to match them. 

Five US divisions were stationed in Europe. With 11 to 15 days of warning, another 

four or five could be moved from the United States. By 1971, faster means of transAtlantic reinforcement could change the mix to 16 US and 19 allied divisions. NATO air 

forces, in Secretary McNamara’s judgment, probably could achieve a “commanding” 

superiority over the battlefield, furnishing considerable close air support and interdiction. However, if the allies believed the conclusions of the Mountbatten Exercise, they 

would grow even more certain that a conventional defense was totally infeasible. “For 

this reason,” he wrote, “the US should make known in appropriate NATO forums its 

rejection of the Exercise.”

Turning to nuclear weaponry, Secretary McNamara opposed developing a mediumrange ballistic missile for NATO, on grounds that strategic targets could be covered 

by “external” US and British forces. As for the tactical nuclear stockpile, he proposed 

(1) improving SACEUR’s capability for selective, controlled use and (2) substituting 

Pershing missiles for quick-reaction alert aircraft, thereby freeing those planes for 

conventional missions. Seeing no way to make tactical nuclear forces survive more 

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NATO’S Flexible Response

113

than a few days of fighting, he believed a firebreak against escalation had to be built 

at the conventional level.6

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took issue with Secretary McNamara on many points. 

They were unsure whether United States and British strategic forces would remain 

strong enough to render MRBMs redundant. As they had for several years running, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with Secretary McNamara that “an equal ground 

combat capability with the Warsaw Pact will achieve the desired non-nuclear option.” 

In their judgment, his force-matching gave insufficient attention to air and naval 

requirements and could not adequately assess factors that eluded quantification. 

To make force-matching fully reliable, NATO would need “an absolute knowledge of 

enemy objectives, intentions, tactics, and force capabilities.” Much would depend upon 

US ability to move divisions to Europe, and Secretary McNamara appeared to ignore 

requirements beyond M+30. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it unwise to reject the 

Mountbatten Exercise. Back in June, they recalled, allied leaders had seemed willing 

to accept the results. Perhaps US interests would be better served simply by “playing 

down” attention to the Exercise. Late in October, Secretary McNamara issued a revised 

draft presidential memorandum that showed no substantive changes but did cite the 

Joint Chiefs’ objections to force-matching.7

European reactions to the Mountbatten Exercise gave no grounds for expecting a 

conventional buildup. The French insisted upon strict adherence to MC 14/2, in which 

context BRAVO forces “might be acceptable.” The Germans believed that BRAVO levels, 

reinforced, could cope with middle and upper levels of aggression. But, as in past years, 

they strongly urged increasing SACEUR’s nuclear capabilities. The British, facing a 

sizable balance-of-payments deficit, said they must reduce their military budget. They 

wanted forces programmed to deal with either local incidents or general war—nothing 

in between. General Wheeler had no patience with London’s argument that defense 

spending would hurt Britain’s economic growth. As he wrote to a US official at NATO 

headquarters, it “reminds me of the fox who lost his tail . . . [and] thereupon tried to 

persuade all other foxes that lack of a tail was not only chic but actually gave an operational advantage to foxes who lacked that appendage. . . .There are comparisons that 

could be drawn between foxes and humans, but they would be odious!” Repeatedly, 

Wheeler had told allied leaders that he “considered the core of the matter to be that 

the European nations were not scared enough. In other words, what is lacking is not 

money but political will.”8

Early in September 1965, OSD asked the Joint Chiefs to propose force goals for 

1970. A Joint Chiefs of Staff majority recommended accepting BRAVO, except for the 

northern and southern flanks where increases were needed. General Johnson dissented, calling it illogical to work within the context of MC 14/2, which all members except 

France had agreed to revise. Why not just extend existing goals for one year, by which 

time President de Gaulle’s intentions would be clearer? Separately, General Wheeler 

advised Secretary McNamara that attaining BRAVO goals would constitute a significant gain. Members, he believed, would look upon BRAVO not as a reaffirmation of MC 

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14/2 but as encouraging evidence of US willingness “to work constructively within the 

alliance rather than to isolate itself in inflexible positions.” With allies already fearing a 

French secession, “the imperative . . . today is to get underway with measures to restore 

life and vitality to the Alliance; to do otherwise may well destroy it.”9

Secretary McNamara did endorse BRAVO goals but with several provisos. There 

was no requirement for land-based MRBMs,10 and approving BRAVO should not be 

construed as a commitment to supply the allies with additional nuclear support. Also, 

US acceptance of BRAVO should be conditioned upon (1) presentation in May 1966 

of detailed plans for achieving them and (2) NATO’s agreeing to an annual review of 

five-year force goals. Finally, forces on the flanks need not be “significantly” above 

BRAVO levels. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in December, approved these goals 

and conditions.11

Early in 1966, NATO countries submitted their force plans. Altogether, in 1966, 

there would be 64 2/3 active divisions and 2,831 strike, reconnaissance, and air defense 

aircraft; by 1970, 68 2/3 and about 2,570.12 Meanwhile, at Secretary McNamara’s request, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated 1971 goals that would be attainable and consistent 

with country plans. In May 1966, they presented two alternatives. The first, which they 

characterized as militarily desirable but probably unattainable, called for a force of 85 

active and reserve divisions and 6,338 strike, reconnaissance, and air defense aircraft. At 

that level, they foresaw “a good probability” of holding east of the Weser-Lech River, along 

a line running from Bremen and Hannover through Augsburg. Italy could be defended 

but Greece, Turkey, and northern Norway could not. The second, termed “NAMILPO-71” 

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Posture) with 76 divisions and 5,691 aircraft, stayed within expected manpower and budget levels but fell somewhat short of 

BRAVO objectives. In the Center Region, with 15 days’ warning, NAMILPO-71 forces 

stood “a reasonable chance of stabilizing the situation” behind the Weser-Lech. Italy 

could be defended for a considerable period, but Greece and Turkey would require “rapid 

external reinforcement.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered improvements—more divisions and tactical aircraft with improved readiness and manning levels, augmented air 

defenses, strengthened tactical nuclear capabilities—to be necessary and feasible. But 

they intended to use NAMILPO-71 as a basis for commenting on the adequacy of country 

programs, and urged Secretary McNamara to do likewise.13

Concurrently, NATO was reviewing the validity of estimates measuring its air 

strength against that of the Warsaw Pact. Secretary McNamara agreed to give the 

Germans a comparison that enjoyed JCS and DIA support. In June 1966, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff sent him their comparison of inventories. According to it, NATO would 

be slightly behind at M+6 days (4,983 versus 5,727) then draw slightly ahead by M+30 

(6,317 versus 5,905). Secretary McNamara’s analysts contended, however, that NATO’s 

resources greatly exceeded those of the Pact, in both quantity and quality. Admittedly, 

for a few days at the outset, Allied Command Europe might be outnumbered by as much 

as 1,000 aircraft. Yet, Systems Analysts argued, that was not as bad as it seemed. Most 

Pact aircraft were designed as interceptors and so could not attack ground targets. 

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115

Moreover, because of their generally superior quality, US reinforcing aircraft were 

worth “about double” their Soviet counterparts. They had greater range and carried 

greater payloads; a larger proportion were either supersonic or high subsonic.14

The Joint Chiefs of Staff spotted errors in the Systems Analysts’ brief. First, many 

Pact aircraft could perform ground support as well as air defense missions. Second, 

adding Soviet medium bombers would reduce NATO’s payload-carrying advantage. 

Third, the assumption that NATO’s higher operating costs resulted in greater capabilities seemed questionable. NATO aircraft, for instance, needed extra range and payload 

capability to reach their targets; the Soviets relied on theater missiles and medium 

bombers for these tasks. Hence equally capable Pact planes, requiring less range and 

payload capacity, could be produced more cheaply. Fourth, the qualitative advantages 

stressed by Systems Analysis were difficult to measure. NATO’s standard of 23 flying 

hours per month did exceed that of the Pact—yet many allied pilots were averaging 

only 13 hours.15

Systems Analysis and Joint Staff officers devoted three weeks to working out their 

differences. In mid-July, Assistant Secretary Alain Enthoven and the Director, J–5, 

signed an agreed estimate of air strengths in 1968. According to it, NATO would enjoy 

a worldwide lead over the Pact: 10,359 compared to 7,762. However, if there was no time 

to mobilize and deploy, Allied Command Europe would be outnumbered by perhaps 20 

percent, and many multi-purpose aircraft would have to be committed to a counter-air 

battle. Qualitatively, the higher cost of NATO aircraft “appears to result” in equivalent 

advantages in effectiveness. Similarly, greater training for NATO pilots would produce 

superiority equal to or larger than its cost. Secretary McNamara forwarded these 

findings to his German counterpart. When doing so, however, he noted that “NATO’s 

potential advantage is in danger of being wasted because of deficiencies in logistics, 

air base defense, and training. . . .These can be remedied for a relatively small cost.”16

In July 1966, Secretary McNamara bluntly told NATO defense ministers that, 

given the levels of country programs, BRAVO goals appeared “quite unrealistic” and 

unattainable. He claimed that separating military from political planning had led to 

BRAVO goals being based upon exaggerated estimates of enemy strength, focusing on 

the extreme rather than the most likely danger. Country programs needed substantial changes to eliminate weaknesses and correct inequities in contributions. On the 

ground, either US units were too ready or allied forces were not ready enough. German 

and Italian defense ministers agreed that increased efforts were in order, but the British minister argued that current plans were adequate for deterrence, as distinct from 

“battles and campaigns.” The ministers did adopt country programs proposed for 1970, 

subject to annual reviews under the rolling five-year procedures.17

By this time, the administration was no longer practicing what it preached. In 

May 1965, the US reply to NATO’s annual Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) 

had listed two armored divisions, one infantry division, and one brigade as an M-Day 

strategic reserve, all based in CONUS and earmarked for assignment to Allied Command Europe. In March 1966, the Joint Chiefs made an important revision to the DPQ 

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response. Since the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions had been drained of manpower 

to support the Vietnam buildup, the M-Day reserve changed to a weaker mix of one 

mechanized, one infantry, and one airborne division.18 Seventh Army in Germany also 

was debilitated by transfers of experienced personnel. From this point on, therefore, 

an artificial air surrounded the listings in DPMs and elsewhere of supposedly combatready US divisions.

Secretary McNamara’s DPM of 1 August 1966 stated that NATO had more than 

enough men under arms to cope with any non-nuclear situation except a full-scale 

surprise attack, which impressed him as being the least likely. Yet most of the allies’ 

active ground units lacked adequate equipment and support; their reserves were poorly 

trained and equipped. Since they could not sustain large-scale combat for even 45 days, 

Secretary McNamara contemplated reorganizing US ground forces along more austere 

lines. He proposed withdrawing some support units, lowering combat stocks in Europe 

from 90- to 60-day levels, and limiting CONUS reinforcements to three instead of six 

divisions (which were all that would be available in any case). Committing even these 

would “make sense” only if the allies substantially improved their own capabilities. 

Secretary McNamara also suggested dual-basing 10 to 15 of the USAF tactical squadrons in Europe, saying there already were enough to maintain air superiority and carry 

out a good deal of interdiction.19

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found little merit in the DPM. Of “paramount importance” 

was its failure to provide for concluding a conflict successfully. In their judgment, it 

understated the threat by concentrating on Soviet intentions rather than capabilities, 

assuming that adequate warning time would precede an attack, slighting the weaknesses on NATO’s flanks, and treating inadequately the implications of US withdrawals. 

Since US strength was the foundation of Allied Command Europe’s viability, continued 

reductions could transform it into a mere façade.20

Secretary McNamara modified the final DPM, speaking of possible withdrawals only in general terms and acknowledging that effective warning time would be 

reduced if NATO failed to act promptly. His assessment of Allied Command Europe’s 

conventional capability became a bit less sanguine. If NATO had 60 days or more to 

mobilize and all members used that time effectively, “the resulting force would . . . at 

least deny any overwhelming Pact superiority and might reasonably be expected to 

mount a successful forward non-nuclear defense.” In case of a surprise attack by 20 

to 36 divisions in the Central Region, “under reasonable (but by no means provable) 

assumptions present forces might permit stabilization of the battle line at some point 

East of the Rhine without NATO’s initiating the use of nuclear weapons.”21

The Secretary’s DPM on theater nuclear forces stated that the Soviets were 

“approaching essential parity with the US” and neither side could acquire an advantage great enough to upset this equilibrium. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with 

the linkage of “parity” with equality. A controlled, selective response required more 

than merely an exchange of equivalent megatonnage; there had to be a balanced 

stockpile with a wide variety of delivery systems. They wanted 5,000 tactical bombs; 

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117

the Secretary believed 4,100 was sufficient. The Secretary justified his lower figure by 

citing the advent of Pershing missiles, the strength of external strategic forces, and 

the vulnerability of forward-base aircraft carrying the bombs. His final DPM made no 

changes and simply footnoted Joint Chiefs of Staff criticisms.22

Secretary McNamara’s DPM of May 1967 reached the same conclusion about rival 

conventional capabilities as the previous year’s DPM. And the Joint Chiefs’ critique 

again demurred. Fundamentally, they disagreed that a state of mutual deterrence 

existed at the conventional level. In their judgment, recent Soviet restraint flowed 

from a realization that “an apparent atmosphere of détente” was “contributing much 

toward the dissolution of NATO.” Once again, they believed NATO’s capabilities were 

overstated and those of the Pact minimized. Superimposing US criteria on Pact forces, 

they cautioned, “will produce differences but not necessarily deficiencies.” The draft 

presidential memorandum presented a combination of concepts but did not unite them 

in a coherent strategy. If deterrence failed, the Joint Chiefs asked, how was a war to 

be fought and won? Secretary McNamara, however, found no more merit in their arguments than they had in his. The final DPM, dated 17 November 1967, contained only 

minor changes and the Joint Chiefs of Staff dissents were footnoted.23

Arguments over the utility of theater nuclear weapons persisted. Secretary McNamara’s DPM of June 1967 described the existing stockpile as “more than adequate”: “We 

should not try to provide forces for a long tactical nuclear war nor should we set aside 

special theater nuclear forces for a general war.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. 

Being able to conduct a sustained operation was critical, they claimed, because quick 

termination of a conflict might hinge upon the ability to threaten further losses. The 

“damping down” phase could well be characterized by either protracted exchanges 

at a lower rate of delivery or sporadic bursts of intense delivery. Therefore, “the programmed tactical nuclear capability must provide selective options of discriminate and 

selective response ... and not be limited by a philosophy that theater nuclear wars will 

be short.” As before, the Secretary did not agree.24 Seven years of debating this issue 

had done little to narrow the differences between the JCS and OSD.

Of course, Allied Command Europe could fight only as long as its supplies lasted. 

Late in 1965, the SACEUR proposed replacing the 90-day objective with one requiring 

enough supplies to continue combat (1) until resupply was established and (2) for at 

least 30 days in any case. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred; the Secretary did not. 

The allies, Mr. McNamara concluded, would consider stockage until resupply began 

an impossible objective and look upon “30 days in any case” as an upper rather than 

a lower limit. He favored a goal of 45 days, to be achieved over five years. The Joint 

Chiefs agreed to 45 days as an “intermediate” objective, reasonable for the near term. 

But, after it was achieved, they believed each nation should acquire enough additional 

stocks to keep fighting until resupply began. The final US position, presented to the 

Military Committee in January 1967, was that 45 days should become an intermediate 

objective of the first priority, to be followed by a long-term goal of achieving “higher 
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stock levels as they are clearly desirable.”25 Essentially, each country would be allowed 

enough leeway to proceed pretty much as it chose.

The Evolution of MC 14/3

During 1963–65, the NATO Military Committee remained deadlocked over MC 100/1, a draft strategic concept for the defense of Europe which rejected the tripwire 

concept and called for direct defense at the conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic 

nuclear levels. Basically, France would accept no strategy except prompt and massive 

nuclear retaliation. Thus French withdrawal from the Military Committee removed 

the one insuperable obstacle to revising MC 14/2, the operative strategic concept for 

the defense of Europe since 1957. The Germans, though, still had serious doubts about 

shifting to flexible response. General Wheeler set out to remove them by corresponding with his West German counterpart, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Heinz 

Trettner. In February 1966, General Wheeler opened the exchange by defining the 

“fundamental” divergence as a question of whether defending Central Europe without 

early recourse to nuclear weapons was feasible and desirable. There might be a temporary loss of territory, General Wheeler admitted, but that would be preferable to the 

devastation caused by firing battlefield nuclear weapons. Americans and Germans, he 

urged, “must set the military standards for the other NATO nations.” The capabilities 

of US forces furnished commanders with a wide range of options; those of German 

units, in his judgment, did not.26

General Trettner replied by describing nuclear weapons as the most significant 

political instrument available for defending Western Europe. The less either side 

dreaded escalation, the more likely such escalation would become. Since he saw 

no convincing proof that conventional capabilities would deter an attack, nuclear 

weapons—particularly those with lower yields—must be part of operational plans. 

Extended and extensive use of battlefield nuclear weapons on West German territory 

was untenable because of the resulting devastation. Consequently, threatening early 

use of nuclear weapons impressed him as constituting the very nature of a strategy 

of deterrence.27

Replying on 31 May, General Wheeler told General Trettner that “we now have 

arrived at the point of essential agreement”—a claim that was hardly self-evident. 

General Wheeler wanted NATO forces to be able to: identify, at an early stage, the scale 

and intent of aggression; defeat limited aggression by conventional means; conduct a 

forward defense against major aggression, using nuclear weapons as necessary; and 

employ strategic forces when needed. The most credible deterrent, General Wheeler 

maintained, was one that spanned the full spectrum of warfare. While nuclear weapons 

should be employed when necessary, the unity of the strategic deterrent must not be 

fragmented by premature, indecisive, demonstrative use. In fact, General Wheeler felt 

that demonstrative use of a few nuclear weapons would suggest to the enemy a lack of 
NATO’S Flexible Response

119

determination to use them in strength, forcing the enemy to choose between complete 

withdrawal and massive nuclear retaliation.28

General Trettner replied that his concept and General Wheeler’s coincided to 90 

percent—leaving what constituted the other 10 percent unstated. He still worried, 

though, that Allied Command Europe’s conventional forces would be very inferior at 

the outbreak of war. It was an open question, he thought, whether Americans or Soviets would win the reinforcement race. Thus, if the Soviets thought that NATO would 

not employ nuclear weapons, they could in all cases count on success. Would it not be 

wise to show them, by an early demonstrative use of nuclear weapons, that their basic 

assumption was wrong?29

The International Military Staff (IMS), acting as executive agent for the Military 

Committee, took the next step. In February 1967, it circulated drafts of a new strategic 

concept and an appreciation of the military situation. The Joint Chiefs judged both to 

be generally acceptable, although they thought that (1) adequate warning of an attack 

was less likely than the IMS believed and (2) the risks incurred by reduced allied efforts 

should be clearly set forth. Conversely, Deputy Secretary Vance criticized both IMS 

drafts for being unduly pessimistic. In his opinion, the appreciation wrongly forecast 

a narrowing gap in the superpowers’ strategic capabilities, overestimated the enemy’s 

combat readiness, and did not allow for NATO’s mobilization and reinforcement capabilities. He also rejected the Joint Chiefs’ reservation about warning time, stating that 

any attack was “likely to be preceded by political warning measured in weeks.” Moreover, the IMS appreciation contradicted US positions by indicating that conventional 

resistance for more than two to six days was impossible and by assuming that NATO 

would improve its position by initiating tactical nuclear warfare. In a mid-April rebuttal, General Wheeler informed Mr. Vance that he expected the strategic nuclear gap to 

narrow and endorsed the IMS estimate that three-fourths of all Soviet line divisions 

could undertake offensive operations immediately or after short preparation. He also 

rejected Mr. Vance’s position that rising political tension was a meaningful indicator 

of warning, on which military measures could be based.30

Soon afterward, the Defense Planning Committee convened at Brussels.31 Here, 

on 7 May 1967, the Defense Ministers approved guidance for the military authorities. 

Responding to their guidance, the IMS circulated MC 14/3, a draft defining NATO’s 

“defense concept” as follows:

1. Maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent with a secure retaliatory capability.

2. Sustain a capability for forward defense, so that a potential aggressor would feel 

that he must contend with an effective and immediate response.

3. Identify the scale of any aggression as quickly as possible.

4. Prevent an aggressor from seizing and holding NATO territory and counter limited aggression without necessarily resorting to nuclear warfare. If an aggressor 

persisted, confront him with such resistance that he must either withdraw or 

risk further escalation.

5. Meet major aggression with whatever conventional and nuclear power proved 

necessary.
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Therefore, “the main deterrence to aggression short of full nuclear attack is the 

threat of escalation which would lead the Warsaw Pact to conclude that the risks 

involved are not commensurate with their objectives.” To cover “a full spectrum,” NATO 

must maintain a credible capability: first, “for direct defense to deter the lesser aggressions such as covert actions, incursions, infiltrations, local hostile actions, and limited 

aggressions”; second, “for deliberate escalation to deter more ambitious aggression”; 

and third, “to conduct a general war response as the ultimate deterrent.”32

In June 1967, the US representative on the Military Committee, Admiral A. G. Ward, 

gave his superiors the glad news that a general consensus had been achieved over MC 

14/3. Any attempts at radical revision, he cautioned, would preclude approval of the new 

strategic concept during 1967. The Joint Chiefs in turn advised Secretary McNamara 

that MC 14/3 generally reflected US positions taken at the May meeting of the DPC. 

In their judgment, it accommodated allies’ views and yet preserved “the primary US 

position of flexible response to meet any aggression, while keeping the level of conflict 

as low as possible.” They also agreed with Admiral Ward about the inadvisability of 

seeking major changes. As General Wheeler stressed in a separate memorandum, “a 

raft of national comments” could prevent MC 14/3’s adoption and thereby “slow the 

momentum NATO has been gathering since the low point of the French defection.”33

On 18 August, Secretary McNamara authorized Admiral Ward to help finalize MC 

14/3. Mr. McNamara stipulated, however, “that the IMS draft substantially changes 

the tone and intent of the Ministerial guidance and I want to make it clear that, to the 

extent this influences the force recommendations of the NATO Military Authorities, I 

shall take exception to them.” When NATO chiefs of staff met on 16 September, they not 

only approved MC 14/3 but also adopted Secretary McNamara’s proviso that the wording of the Ministerial guidance should be controlling.34 On 12 December, the Defense 

Planning Committee accepted MC 14/3 under the same conditions.

MC 14/3’s impact proved to be nowhere as great as Secretary McNamara and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped. Its wording was sufficiently ambiguous to allow a range 

of interpretations; otherwise, most of the other allies would not have accepted it. The 

Wheeler-Trettner exchanges papered over critical differences without resolving them; 

the Germans refused to countenance more than a very few weeks of conventional 

combat in their homeland. Indeed, Europeans were wont to describe MC 14/3 as “the 

nuclear strategy.”

Conventional Capabilities Start to Dwindle

I

n May 1967, while approving guidance for what became MC 14/3, the Defense Planning Committee asked Major NATO Commanders to propose force levels covering 

1968–1972. Their responses fell below BRAVO’s 1970 goals: from 63 active divisions 

and 3,232 aircraft for 1970 down to 60 and 2,676 for 1972. SACEUR stated that his own 

proposals, although inadequate, would effect as much improvement as possible within 
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limits set by the May Ministerial guidance.35 The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary 

McNamara that, if 1968–1972 proposals were implemented and the Pact launched a 

surprise attack using only its 35 to 45 active divisions, Allied Command Europe “could 

not provide high confidence of a successful forward defense without improvements in 

quality. . . or the early use of tactical nuclear weapons.” Should the Pact mobilize beforehand, its 80 divisions could penetrate defending forces before enough reinforcements 

arrived, “unless NATO initiated the use of nuclear weapons.” In December, the Defense 

Ministers “reluctantly” adopted MNCs’ proposals for 1968–1972, on the understanding 

that they would be revised to conform with May guidance and force proposals covering 1969–1973. Addressing his fellow ministers for the last time, Secretary McNamara 

reiterated that a good non-nuclear option “clearly” was within reach. He advocated 

returning to “the tested European tradition” of maintaining (1) active forces adequate 

to deal with a surprise attack and (2) a mobilization base capable of keeping pace with 

the enemy’s buildup.36

For 1969–1973, the MNCs recommended 61 1/3 active divisions and 2,641 aircraft. 

SACEUR intended to shift eleven squadrons to non-nuclear missions and provide all 

tactical aircraft with dual capability. Nonetheless, in January 1968, the Joint Chiefs 

advised that MNC proposals would fail to provide “the full range of options” outlined 

in the May 1967 guidance and MC 14/3. They suggested instructing Admiral Ward 

that, since “stringent” fiscal constraints would continue, recommendations should be 

drafted to achieve improvements (e.g., dual capability for tactical aircraft) through 

trade-offs. Instead, Deputy Secretary Nitze decided Admiral Ward should say that 

MNCs had exaggerated the Pact’s capabilities by neglecting the qualitative superiority 

of NATO aircraft, the larger size of NATO divisions, and growing US strategic mobility. 

Also, the endorsement of dual-capable aircraft should not be blunted by mentions of 

high cost and possible tradeoffs.37

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe the allies could be prodded into greater 

efforts by being told that the enemy’s conventional capabilities were less than previously estimated. So, at General Wheeler’s urging, Admiral Ward advised the Military 

Committee “that there is a high degree of skepticism both in the civilian elements of 

DOD and the JCS that the détente is anything more than a façade.” Consequently, “even 

though the Soviet military strengths may not be as strong as once thought,” NATO still 

needed powerful forces.38

No longer, though, would powerful forces be coming from CONUS. In August 1967, 

when a response to NATO’s Defense Planning Questionnaire was being prepared, Secretary McNamara instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to list one mechanized and two 

armored divisions in the NATO-committed strategic reserve. If those divisions could 

not be made available by M+30 days—and the Joint Chiefs concluded that they could 

not—then 1 1/3 airborne division must be substituted for them. Six months later, with 

the USS Pueblo’s seizure and the Tet offensive, the strategic reserve virtually disappeared. Moreover, as of 31 March 1968, General Lemnitzer rated all five US divisions in 

Germany as being in the lowest readiness category. By July, the Joint Chiefs reported 
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that CONUS-based ground units committed to NATO amounted only of two airborne 

brigades available by M+30 and one airborne, one mechanized, and two infantry brigades by M+60.39

Perhaps even more troubling was a seismic shift in US public opinion, as opposition to the Vietnam War broadened into what seemed like a revulsion against all overseas commitments. Late in 1967, NATO began studying the possibility of mutual and 

balanced force reductions (MBFR).40 Secretary Rusk decided that the United States 

should proceed with “high caution,” leaving initiatives to others. But by the spring of 

1968 “high caution” no longer appeared possible. Senator Stuart Symington (D, MO) 

prepared an amendment to fund no more than 50,000 US military personnel in Western 

Europe. Reacting swiftly, Secretaries Clifford and Rusk drafted a NATO Ministerial 

resolution endorsing MBFR and inviting early talks with the Soviets.

On 27 May 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned Secretary Clifford that MBFR 

was acquiring a life of its own, one that could propel the United States prematurely into 

a major withdrawal. The JCS were willing to accept “carefully calculated, truly mutual, 

and fully verifiable” reductions. Admittedly, quick diplomatic progress might ease the 

pressure for unilateral United States withdrawals. But, General Wheeler cautioned 

in a separate memorandum, “I really believe we are getting ahead of ourselves in our 

efforts to placate Congress.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed approaching Moscow 

until NATO had fully examined all of MBFR’s ramifications. They feared that current 

trends toward détente, disarmament, and disengagement could “dismantle the Alliance before its members have reasoned out another way to defend themselves with 

reduced forces.”41 On 25 June, the North Atlantic Council agreed to “make all necessary preparations” for talks but affirmed that “the overall military capability of NATO 

should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced 

in scope and timing.”42

Congressional critics were not satisfied. Senator Symington, whom the White 

House had persuaded to withdraw his amendment, reintroduced it on 25 June. Speaking on the Senate floor, he dismissed hopes for MBFR as unfounded and argued that 

US troops “are not there to meet an immediate military threat, at least in European 

eyes, but rather for psychological assurance purposes, and the financial benefit of the 

countries in question.” Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D, MT) voiced a hope 

that, if the administration failed to act, “Congress itself will face up this responsibility, 

and do it before too long.” Senator Richard Russell (D, GA), influential chairman of the 

Armed Services Committee, reportedly favored Senator Symington’s amendment.43

Even before Senator Symington’s speech of 25 June, OSD had begun drafting a 

“save the teeth” program to cut spending by $200 million without sacrificing major 

combat units. Steps included: merging and reducing higher headquarters; returning 

to CONUS one reconnaissance squadron from Germany and three quick-reaction 

alert (QRA) squadrons from Spain, Italy, and Turkey; and consolidating air and naval 

bases, particularly those around the Mediterranean littoral. Deputy Secretary Nitze 

suggested more steps that might induce Senator Russell to oppose Senator Symington’s 
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amendment: in FY 1969, completely withdraw the 24th Division and its air support; in 

FY 1970, if no satisfactory offset agreement with Bonn had been reached, withdraw 

another division along with its air support.44

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff met on 26 June, they began talking about what 

hitherto had been unthinkable—a total withdrawal from Western Europe. General 

Wheeler said that, if Seventh Army was cut to three divisions, “we had better get out 

of Europe.” Without a large force, General Johnson agreed, Europe would become a 

big Bataan. Admiral Moorer, General Chapman, and General McConnell expressed 

similar opinions.45

After venting their frustrations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 July sent Secretary 

Clifford advice that was a good deal less drastic. They warned that the consequences of 

OSD’s “save the teeth” program (apart from deputy Secretary Nitze’s additions) would 

include: “severe atrophy” of the Mediterranean base posture and impairment of normal operations in that area; additional degradation of air defenses in Central Europe; 

and a “significant degradation and/or elimination” of command and control facilities. 

They recommended keeping the QRA squadrons in Spain, Italy, and Turkey as well as 

preserving one air and naval base in each of these countries. Means could be found 

to cut costs yet keep the 24th Division’s 3rd Brigade in Germany. As a last resort, which 

they strongly opposed, tactical reconnaissance aircraft in Britain could be brought 

home. The State Department supported most of their recommendations.46

On 23 July, General Wheeler began looking at the task of maintaining a long-term, 

substantial US contribution at bearable cost. He directed the Joint Staff to examine 

ways of providing “a well-balanced three-division force,” buttressed by “reception 

facilities to provide for a rapid build-up in times of tension.”47 Thus he was willing to 

study a solution that, one month earlier, had struck him as obliging the United States 

to “get out of Europe.”

Until Czechoslovakia Compels a Turnabout

At this point, Europe’s political climate changed radically. In Czechoslovakia, during the spring, Stalinists had lost power to reformers led by Alexander Dubcek. 

Soviet leaders decided that the Czech push for liberalization was becoming dangerous. 

So, on 20–21 August, seventeen Soviet and four Polish divisions (along with Bulgarian, Hungarian, and East German contingents) occupied Czechoslovakia.48 They met 

virtually no resistance. Mr. Dubcek was promptly deposed; Gustav Husak, reputedly 

a hard-liner, replaced him.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia left West Europeans deeply shocked; members of Congress stopped calling for major US withdrawals. On 27 August, General 

Wheeler tasked the Joint Staff with assessing the effect on NATO. He believed détente 

to be “at least for the moment, dead” and MBFR negotiations impossible “for some 

time to come.” General Wheeler detected a “real fear” among the allies about future 
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Soviet actions; several of them suggested steps to improve NATO’s capabilities. For 

the moment, Washington was taking care to do nothing that would lend credence to 

Moscow’s charges that western machinations had compelled Soviet intervention. Perhaps, General Wheeler believed, the time had come to pursue a more active policy.49

The Joint Staff completed its work quickly. On 7 September, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff informed Secretary Clifford that “the basic US objective of a secure, peaceful, 

self-reliant and cooperative Europe is now more remote than at any time during the 

past several years.” NATO’s posture had been shaped by a number of beliefs: that 

Europe was achieving stability; that the USSR posed a diminishing threat to peace; 

that the Soviets “think and act like us,” and would seek to avoid a direct resort to force; 

that a surprise attack was unlikely; that ample warning time and increased mobility 

permitted troop withdrawals; and that arms control and MBFR agreements would 

permit further economies without undue risk. The Soviets’ speed and ruthlessness in 

Czechoslovakia called each of those beliefs into question. By all accounts, Europeans 

were looking to the United States for leadership. The Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined 

measures designed to lower risks and improve NATO’s cohesion and stability “in a 

situation which should be neither ignored nor intensified.” These included:

Holding an early Ministerial meeting to demonstrate unity and reassess policy.

Suspending redeployments and reductions, and urging the allies to do likewise.

Raising all NATO-committed US forces to high levels of readiness, and pressing

 allies to take equivalent steps.

Returning dual-based units to Germany early in 1969 for annual exercises.

The Secretary assured them that most of these steps were either being implemented 

or under study.50

On 14 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Clifford a list of “immediate and visible military actions” to bolster NATO. First, cancel most “save the teeth” 

measures and strongly support the Military Committee’s proposal that members 

promise to make no force reductions. Second, press for immediate improvements to 

the US posture in Europe. Promptly deploying to Germany an armored battalion from 

the 24th Division, for instance, would symbolize American resolve to return dual-based 

units regularly. At the very least, Washington would gain leverage in dealing with the 

allies. “In particular, the United States should insist that all of its NATO allies improve 

their mobilization capabilities and build up adequate war reserve stocks.” Additionally, the administration should initiate expensive, long-term measures to remedy the 

debilitating effects of Vietnam draw-downs.51

Concurrently, the Soviets made threats against independent-minded Romania and 

alleged that Austria had not acted neutrally. At the State Department’s urging, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff reviewed possible counter-moves against further Soviet aggression. They 

concluded that, apart from unconventional warfare units, available US forces were 

“inadequate to support major contingency operations” in Yugoslavia, Austria, or Romania. Therefore, the United States should act with “extreme caution” in these areas.52
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125

Late in September, General Wheeler toured Western Europe and came away 

convinced that more economizing would not merely trim fat but cut away muscle. All 

the allied chiefs of staff, he found, appreciated the need to effect force improvements. 

SACEUR said, and General Wheeler agreed, that Czechoslovakia represented a turningpoint for NATO. Positive action could revitalize the alliance, while hesitation would 

simply continue the downward spiral.53

Meanwhile, on 18 September, Secretary Clifford circulated a new “save the teeth” 

solution. “Largely due to your efforts,” he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “this plan 

is substantially superior to our first one.” He proposed actions that would reduce US 

personnel by 55,000 and save $425 million annually. No withdrawals would occur, however, until occupation forces began leaving Czechoslovakia.54 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

protested that even these measures “would place USCINCEUR in an unsound military 

posture from which it would be impossible to respond immediately and effectively in 

a crisis situation.” The final plan that was approved in December eliminated 33,897 

military and 2,205 civilian spaces. Total budgetary savings would be $428.8 million, 

including $158.4 million in balance-of-payments savings.55

State, Defense, and Treasury officials considered sending a high-level team to 

European capitals where they would “take soundings” on what extra steps the allies 

might carry out. As a corollary, on 2 October, Deputy Secretary Nitze asked the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to say what would constitute appropriate contributions. For an inducement, he added, the United States might increase its own effort by $50 million in 

budgetary along with $50 million in balance-of-payments expenditures.56 The very 

modesty of these figures illustrated how tight the overall fiscal situation had become.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff called a $50 million budget hike inadequate, allowing only 

superficial, short-term improvements. The sudden injection of a small sum could not 

eliminate major weaknesses that had accumulated over the past several years; indeed, 

“our deteriorating readiness will not even be slowed.” What, then, ought to be done? 

The “indispensable first step,” they argued, was a moratorium upon force reductions. 

Measures within the $50 million proposal ought to include returning dual-based Army 

and Air Force units to Europe during January or February 1969 and keeping them 

there until mid-year. As for allied actions, they suggested that West Germany activate 

two additional brigades. Most importantly, implementing a $50 million package should 

mark only the beginning of a long-term effort.57

Tentatively, Secretary Clifford decided to raise the budget allocation by $49 million 

and raise balance-of-payments spending by $18 million. These amounts would make 

possible the return of dual-based units and the construction of aircraft shelters in Germany and the Netherlands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, instead, assuming the 

amount for aircraft shelters was NATO-reimbursable and applying money thus saved 

to: retaining dual-based USAF units in Europe for 90 days (Army units could not stay 

so long because their billets had been released to the Germans); returning an EB–66 

squadron to Europe earlier than planned; improving aerial port facilities; and keeping a maritime patrol squadron in the Mediterranean. But they argued again that “this 
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effort does not go far enough, especially if [it] is to signify US leadership in improving 

NATO’s posture in the post-Czech situation.”58

Secretary Clifford decided to defer near-term US responses until allied intentions 

became clearer. He noted, also, that Joint Chiefs of Staff plans for long-term improvements would cost $5.1 billion during FYs 1969–1971. Secretary Clifford asked them to 

reconsider carefully and then submit detailed justifications for those steps that they 

still thought necessary. In mid-December, the J–5 completed a response. General William Westmoreland, the new Army Chief of Staff, told his colleagues that the paper was 

“untimely” and would not make them “look good” in Mr. Clifford’s eyes. Specifics, he 

believed, were to be avoided when they conferred with civilian superiors. So the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff agreed simply to “note” J–5’s submission.59

Early in November, the NATO chiefs of staff concluded that, despite some withdrawals from Czechoslovakia, the Soviets’ capability to launch a surprise attack had 

been enhanced and their options increased. They, therefore, assessed risks as “markedly higher” than those used in 1969–1973 force planning, and urged members to act 

with “utmost vigor” in meeting goals and raising active forces to the required standard 

of readiness.60

The Defense Planning Committee advanced its semi-annual meeting from December 

to November. There Secretary Clifford outlined US actions, all of them either proposed 

or endorsed by the Joint Chiefs, which were conditional upon similar allied efforts:

Raise US Army Europe to its full peacetime strength, and make NATO-

 committed divisions in CONUS available by M+30 days. The 5th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) should reach that status by 31 December 1968, the 2nd

Armored by 31 March 1969, and the 1st Armored several months thereafter.

Earmark for SACEUR the USAF Rapid Reaction Force in CONUS. It consisted of 

14 squadrons totaling about 300 aircraft.

Eliminate rotation of the 24th Division’s brigades, keeping one permanently 

in Germany.

Advance the return of dual-based units to January-February, and temporarily 

retain four fighter squadrons in Europe.

Pre-finance, with US funds, the construction of aircraft shelters in Germany and 

the Netherlands.

Accelerate the return of an EB-66 squadron, and greatly increase the number of 

jamming pods for fighters.

Augment aerial port facilities.

Suspend the inactivation of a maritime patrol squadron operating in the Mediterranean.61

This signaled a beginning; how to continue rebuilding was left to the Nixon administration.

The 1968 DPM debate took on a curious air, with OSD repeating its positions of 

earlier years while virtually ignoring the Seventh Army’s low readiness and the near 

disappearance of a CONUS reserve. On 1 May, Deputy Secretary Nitze circulated a draft 

claiming that active conventional forces in Central Europe were roughly balanced: 45 

divisions and 577,000 personnel for the Pact versus 28 2/3 and 610,000 for NATO. The 

Pact led in tanks, was about equal in artillery, and fell behind in vehicles and logistic 
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support. However, the Pact’s impressive armored capability could be countered by the 

greater accuracy and reliability of NATO tanks, the defenders’ advantages of choosing terrain and firing first, and an array of anti-tank weapons. Without great expense, 

NATO could shelter aircraft, increase ammunition stocks, correct maldeployments, 

and improve reserves’ readiness.62

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded with familiar objections and a few new ones. As 

before, they rejected OSD’s assumption that there would be a period of political warning, speculating that NATO’s slow decisionmaking process would allow the Pact an 

initial advantage in mobilization and deployment. As before, they argued that the DPM 

did not deal with the most dangerous kind of attack, in which limited, concealed reinforcement could achieve an optimum balance between surprise and weight of assault. 

According to the latest National Intelligence Estimate, 35 divisions were available for 

a surprise attack rather than “some part” of 20 as the DPM claimed. Such a force, said 

the Joint Chiefs, could seize considerable portions of NATO territory.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had some additional criticisms. In comparing armor 

capabilities, the DPM matched NATO’s newest models not against comparable T–62s 

but older T–54s and T–55s. Additionally, it ignored important advantages enjoyed by 

an attacker: surprise; choice of whether to engage; and ability to mass and maneuver. 

The DPM assumed that NATO’s tactical air strength was superior, most Pact aircraft 

being interceptors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. In their opinion recent analyses showed that, MiG–19s and MiG–21s were multipurpose and thus able to support 

ground troops.63

Mr. Nitze’s final DPM, circulated on 7 January 1969, offered no substantive concessions but did add rebuttals. The appearance of US tanks carrying Shillelagh missiles 

should “more than offset” the introduction of T–62s. (Actually, Shillelaghs never lived 

up to expectations.) As for political warning, Deputy Secretary Nitze cited statements 

by SHAPE and the NATO Military Committee stated that the Czech invasion had 

been preceded by a three-week period of political warning.64 The DPM’s section on 

rival reinforcement capabilities was recast, but its conclusions remained the same. 

According to US intelligence, the Soviets could assemble 84 divisions (1,260,000 men) 

in seven days. Yet, unlike their NATO counterparts, Soviet reservists would move to 

the front immediately, without undergoing unit refresher training. Thus, by M+30, the 

Pact would have more men with less training. Mr. Nitze’s deduction: “If we thought 

the Pact would gain a major advantage with its temporarily larger forces, we could 

change our pre-deployment training times.”65 In sum, OSD believed flexible response 

to be almost a reality while the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it was mostly a mirage.

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8

Phasing Out the Military 

Assistance Program

By 1965, the Military Assistance Program was at a crossroads. In the early 1950s, MAP 

concentrated on nations of Western Europe. As those countries revived, MAP’s focus 

shifted to the most vulnerable and least self-sufficient countries around the Sino-Soviet 

periphery: Greece; Turkey; Taiwan; South Korea; Thailand; Laos; and South Vietnam. 

But MAP became a favorite target of congressional budget-cutters. The 1961 Foreign 

Assistance Act, which provided the statutory basis for MAP, sought to shift as much 

grant aid as possible to sales and credits. In FY 1964, sales agreements with Near East 

and South Asian countries amounted only to $5.3 million. By FY 1968, that figure had 

climbed to $452 million.1

Organizationally, the State Department supplied supervision and general direction of all assistance programs. The Defense Department bore responsibility for 

MAP’s logistics and supervised recipients’ use of equipment. Within the Office of 

International Security Affairs, a flag officer serving as Director of Military Assistance administered the program. Early every year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted 

Annex J of their Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, listing those Free World forces that 

they considered “strategically desirable” although perhaps not “reasonably attainable.” Next, the Director of Military Assistance prepared dollar guidelines for each 

country. Then unified commanders submitted recommendations based on Annex J 

and the dollar guidelines. Beginning with FY 1967, the Secretary of Defense circulated a draft presidential memorandum detailing and justifying his proposals. After 

a review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State’s Agency for International Development 

forwarded their recommendations through the Budget Bureau to the White House. 

The annual appropriation, plus any legislative changes, would be voted by Congress 

as an amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act.

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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

The FY 1966 Program

Between FY 1962 and FY 1965, MAP appropriations shrank from $1.6 to $1.055 billion. Recognizing fiscal reality, but hoping to keep further reductions small and gradual, 

Secretary McNamara in December 1964 proposed $1.17 billion for FY 1966 and $1.15 billion in FY 1967, declining to $800 million by FY 1971. He intended to allocate the bulk 

of FY 1966 funds as follows: Greece, $75 million; Turkey, $119.3 million; Taiwan, $104.3 

million; South Korea, $150 million; and South Vietnam, $230 million. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff commented that, while those amounts would permit minor force improvements, 

a decreasing availability of dollars together with increasing requirements was harming 

friendly nations’ ability to meet Annex J objectives and so play their part in US strategy. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged three significant changes. First, Congress’ $55 million 

ceiling on material aid to Latin America should be either removed or raised to $75 million. Second, the amount for neutral India should be reduced and the savings assigned 

to Greece and Thailand, both US allies. Third, embattled South Vietnam might need $100 

million more. If so, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed either making comparable cuts in 

other country programs or shifting MAP costs to the services’ budgets. In the latter case, 

United States and allied requirements would be competing against each other. They proposed, instead, asking for special congressional authority to support countries engaged 

in “open warfare”: South Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo.2

In January 1965, President Johnson asked Congress for a $1.17 billion appropriation 

plus “a special standby authorization for use if necessary in Vietnam only.” Passage 

through Congress proved remarkable: not a single dollar was deleted, although Congress retained the ceiling on aid to Latin America. On 20 October, President Johnson 

signed a $1.17 appropriation bill. Early in November, Secretary McNamara recommended that funding for allied forces in Vietnam shift from MAP to the regular DOD 

budget. This would follow a Korean War precedent, in which service budgets funded 

the Army’s consolidated supply system for US, Korean, and United Nations forces. A 

$375 million supplemental for Southeast Asia, in March 1966, marked the end of funding through MAP. Thereafter, South Vietnam came under Military Assistance, Service 

Funded (MASF), in the regular DOD budget. Final FY 1966 MAP allocations for key 

countries were: Greece, $77.4 million; Turkey, $124.4 million; Taiwan, $94 million; 

South Korea, $157 million; and South Vietnam, $540 million.3 Never again would final 

allocations come so close to, let alone slightly exceed, the original recommendations.

The FY 1967 Program

Annex J of JSOP-70, provided to Secretary McNamara on 22 April 1965, proposed a total of $1.299 billion for FY 1967, compared to OSD’s preliminary guidance of $1.15 

billion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would provide more money to Latin America than OSD 

proposed ($98 versus $74.9 million) and a good deal more to the Near East/South Asia 

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Phasing Out the Military Assistance Program

131

region ($539.6 versus $325.5 million), but less to the Far East. The Director of Military 

Assistance drew up country plans that stayed within a $1.15 billion ceiling. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff protested that these plans would lead to “quantitative and qualitative 

deficiencies in the activation and equipping of major combat units in key allied countries.” 

The allies’ role in mid-range strategy would have to be modified, their force objectives 

revised, and selected programs either drastically reduced or eliminated. Therefore, they 

reaffirmed their recommendation for $1.299 billion, minus Vietnam and Laos. Their 

recommendations for the most critical “forward defense” countries were: Greece, $182.7 

million; Turkey, $243.6 million; Taiwan, $156.4 million; and South Korea, $231.4 million.4

On 26 October, Secretary McNamara circulated a draft presidential memorandum 

proposing $897 million in new obligational authority, Vietnam and Laos excepted. 

Here he articulated a new strategic framework for MAP. While overt Soviet aggression 

seemed increasingly unlikely, the Chinese threat was growing. Therefore, “the center 

of gravity of the US defense problem has . . . shifted perceptibly eastward,” meaning 

that countries located “eastward from Kashmir” had assumed greater relative importance.5 However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against forwarding this DPM to the 

President “in its present form.” A limit of $897 million would incur “substantial risks to 

US security,” certainly cause adverse allied reactions, “significantly lower” deterrent 

capabilities in certain critical areas, and cast doubt upon the credibility of US intentions and assurances. Even $1.15 billion barely sufficed to maintain the status quo; 

qualitative improvements in the Sino-Soviet camp would render deferrals of allied force 

improvements all the more hazardous. And, as American units streamed into Vietnam, 

US ability to help other friends became “highly questionable.”6

Secretary McNamara went ahead anyway, keeping country programs well below 

what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended. He proposed $68.7 million for Greece, 

$143 million for Turkey, $96 million for Taiwan, and $160 million for South Korea. On 1 

February 1966, President Johnson asked Congress for $917 million in new obligational 

authority, including $70 million for Laos. This year, however, MAP met with a rough 

passage as liberals, opposed to escalation in Vietnam, joined conservatives who were 

always dubious about foreign aid. Ultimately, Congress voted $792 million. But, since 

Congress disapproved $57 million for India and Pakistan after those two countries 

started fighting over Kashmir, the cuts for all other recipients amounted only to $68 

million. After President Johnson visited Bangkok in October 1966, he raised Thailand’s 

share of MAP from $35 to $60 million in recognition of her role in supporting the Vietnam War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued against offsetting the $68 million reduction 

by cutting other country programs. Instead, they wanted to recoup money allocated 

to India and Pakistan, recover spare parts credits given to the services and shift $4.6 

million away from Latin American programs to stay within an $85 million limit imposed 

by the Fulbright Amendment. The Mundt Amendment, limiting to forty the total number of nations receiving grant aid, worried the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it limited 

flexibility and might prevent responses to emergencies. The former amendment was 

named for Senator J. William Fulbright (D, AR), Chairman of the Foreign Relations 

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Committee, the latter for Senator Karl Mundt (R, SD). Senator Fulbright had become 

a prominent critic of the Vietnam War while Senator Mundt was a staunch conservative, showing that MAP was under attack from both sides of the political spectrum.7

In November 1966, Secretary McNamara approved a figure of $951.6 in total obligational authority for the FY 1967 MAP. He expanded Laotian aid from $70 to $106.6 

million in order to replace combat losses, and raised from $23 to $32.3 million the US 

share of relocating NATO headquarters to Belgium. As offsets, he withdrew $43 million 

from the India-Pakistan pipeline, $54 million worth of Service credits, and $5.5 million 

from the Portuguese program. Even so, Secretary McNamara had to pare Greece from 

$68.7 to $65 million and Turkey from $143 to $134 million—a stark contrast to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff recommendations of $182.7 and $243.6 million.8

The FY 1968 Program

This cycle, too, started with a gap between the force levels recommended in Annex J of JSOP 68-75 and the dollar guidelines issued by OSD. The unified commanders’ 

country plans, which kept within OSD’s ceiling, reached the Pentagon during the summer 

of 1966. After reviewing them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that 

they contained “serious deficiencies in major combat units of key allied countries.” For 

Greece and Turkey, particularly, the consequences could be serious. The United States 

wanted both countries to concentrate upon improving their ground forces, relying in an 

emergency upon US air and naval reinforcements. Now, however, heavy commitments 

in Southeast Asia rendered an adequate US response questionable. Therefore, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff asked that annually, for the next five years, MAP average $131.3 million for 

Greece and $219.6 million for Turkey. They also opposed reducing allocations for Africa 

and Latin America, recommended reinstituting MAP for India and Pakistan, and urged 

efforts to repeal both the Mundt and Fulbright amendments.9

MAP was battered by fiscal and political fallout from the Vietnam War. Aware of 

growing hostility on Capitol Hill, Secretary McNamara contemplated drastic revisions 

that would end grant aid to all countries except those facing a serious threat from 

external aggression, transferring all other assistance into the regular DOD budget. In 

mid-September 1966, General McConnell suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff try to 

redefine MAP priorities, but his colleagues decided the review had progressed so far that 

no study could be completed in time to influence OSD’s deliberations. Here perhaps they 

forfeited an opportunity, since MAP unavoidably faced major changes. On 5 November, 

Secretary McNamara circulated a DPM recommending $606 million in new obligational 

authority for FY 1968. He would put Laotian and Thai programs, intimately associated 

with the Vietnam War, into the DOD budget. India and Pakistan would get moderate sales 

credits instead of grants. Africa would receive $31.2 million, Latin America $45.5 million. 

Over the next four years, Secretary McNamara planned upon phasing out grant aid for 

Latin America, except for training. In most Latin countries, he said, the US intelligence 

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133

community could see neither a current threat of widespread insurgency nor a likelihood 

of insurrections within the next five years. As in past years, major recipients would be 

Greece ($65 million), Turkey ($134 million), Taiwan ($90 million), and South Korea ($160 

million). Korean MAP had become, in good part, compensation for the two divisions that 

Seoul had deployed to South Vietnam.10

Recognizing Congressional realities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adding 

only $14 million to MAP. They opposed ending grant aid to Latin America and asked 

that the DPM include a footnote that Greece and Turkey required annual averages, over 

the next five years, of $131.3 million and $219.6 million respectively. President Johnson 

requested an appropriation of $596 million for FY 1968. What followed was a reduction 

of unprecedented severity, at least proportionately, as the House and Senate appropriated only $400 million. This time, legerdemain could not cover such a large cutback and 

all programs except one suffered substantial reductions. Regionally, Africa received 

$20.6 million and Latin America $27.4 million. Greece received $41.7 million, Turkey $87 

million, and Taiwan $44 million. South Korea kept its full $160 million, a result of North 

Korea’s stepped up infiltration and an increase in fighting along the Demilitarized Zone.11

The FY 1969 Program

I

n March 1967, through Annex J of JSOP 69-76, the Joint Chiefs listed their top five 

MAP priorities: Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea. Three 

were directly involved in the Vietnam War. A fourth, the Philippines, received only $20 

to $30 million annually in grant aid, but the availability of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay 

was deemed vital to operations in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff recommended a total of $794 million in grant aid for FY 1969, warning 

Secretary McNamara that his preliminary estimate of $630 million would leave allied 

forces $1.216 billion short of MAP goals for the five-year period. Field commanders 

submitted proposals that, as Secretary McNamara directed, stayed within OSD’s ceiling 

of $630 million. In September, after reviewing them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted 

that “deficiencies in major combat units and increasing obsolescence of equipment 

in key allied countries will continue and even accelerate.” They outlined five areas 

of “major strategic concern.” First, by FY 1973, cumulative shortfalls for Greece and 

Turkey would reach $165.3 million and $77.9 million respectively. Yet the importance of 

those two countries had been accentuated by the reduction of ready forces in Central 

Europe, the denial to Allied Command Europe of French territory and air space, and 

growing Soviet involvement in Mediterranean affairs. Second, reductions in Taiwanese and South Korean forces, by 145,000 and 87,000 personnel respectively, could not 

be justified. Third, the $85 million ceiling for grants and credit sales to Latin America 

was too low. Grant aid should continue beyond FY 1970, when Secretary McNamara 

wanted to end it. Fourth, MAP shipments to selected Arab countries, which had been 

suspended in June during the Six Day War, should resume. Fifth, MAP-funded war 

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reserves were insufficient. In South Korea, for example, ammunition stocks amounted 

to less than thirty days of consumption at US combat rates.12

Through a DPM dated 18 December 1967, Secretary McNamara proposed $420 million in grant aid plus a $120 million credit authorization to support a $280 million sales 

program. The key grant programs would be $40 million for Greece, $110.5 million for 

Turkey, and $30.4 million for Taiwan, and $160 million again for South Korea. Secretary 

McNamara planned to minimize the fallout from Congressional budget-cutting by (1) 

incorporating within the regular DOD budget all training, “forward defense,” and “base 

rights” country programs, (2) shifting internal security and civic action projects to 

the Agency for International Development, and (3) dealing with foreign military sales 

through separate legislation and special appropriations. He planned to offset most 

grant reductions through increased cash and credit sales. Where such sales proved 

infeasible, Secretary McNamara admitted, greater risks must be incurred—but Congressional acceptance of his restructuring proposals should prevent these risks from 

becoming excessive. He acknowledged, though, that the “crux of our difficulties” lay in 

the sizeable reductions imposed upon Greek, Turkish, and Taiwanese programs, where 

some delays in modernization and decreases in capabilities should be anticipated.13

Commenting early in January 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that a $420 

million ceiling would impose “serious risks” that were “disproportionate to the funds 

involved.” They recommended $109.9 million for Greece, $181.8 million for Turkey, 

$120.3 million for Taiwan, and $233 million for South Korea. They feared that the size 

of past reductions, plus the probability that FY 1969 would establish an upper limit for 

future years, would not “substantially delay”—as Secretary McNamara claimed—but 

actually prevent US objectives in many countries from being achieved. Inadequate 

investment funds for Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and South Korea meant that obsolete 

equipment could not be replaced. If allies could not conduct a successful initial defense, 

the consequences would include less time for decisionmaking, a probable need for 

earlier and larger US troop commitments, and possibly a quicker resort to nuclear 

weapons. As for restructuring MAP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed Secretary McNamara’s plan. They recommended, instead, “transferring all grant military assistance 

from the Foreign Assistance Act to the DOD budget as a separate program . . . package.” 

General Wheeler initially had supported Secretary McNamara’s plan, but the Service 

Chiefs apparently changed his mind. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that 

substituting sales for grants did not always produce comparable progress toward US 

objectives. Recipients might not proceed with the programs desired and, even if they 

did, might press for purchases that did not conform to US strategic priorities.14

Ultimately, Secretary McNamara recommended and President Johnson agreed to seek 

$420 million in grant aid plus $120 million worth of credits to support a $280 million sales 

program. Confronted by objections from the State Department, the Budget Bureau, and 

influential members of Congress as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary McNamara 

narrowed his reorganization plan to a proposal that sales be authorized by separate legislation. On Capitol Hill, by March 1968, attitudes toward foreign assistance had grown even 

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135

more hostile. MAP became an element in complex negotiations that traded Congressional 

approval of a tax increase for the administration’s acceptance of budget cuts. The Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1968, signed by President Johnson on 9 October, appropriated $375 

million in grant aid. Major programs were recast as follows: $35 million for Greece, $100 

million for Turkey, $36 million for Taiwan, and $127.9 million for South Korea. A Foreign 

Military Sales Act authorized $296 million worth of credits, the jump from $120 million 

caused mainly by Congress’ objections to financing sales through the Export-Import Bank. 

To illustrate the shift of emphasis, Latin America would get $22.7 million in grants and $45 

million in sales credits.15

Congress further complicated matters by passing both the Conte-Long and Symington amendments. The Conte-Long Amendment required that economic aid be 

withheld from any under-developed country that used military assistance to acquire 

sophisticated weapons. A number of nations were exempted (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, South Korea) and the President could exempt any country on grounds of national 

security. The Symington Amendment required termination of development loans and 

surplus food shipments to any country whose military expenditures “materially interferes with its development.” The administration threatened to invoke the Symington 

amendment to stop Peru from purchasing French Mirage jets instead of cheaper US 

F-5s, but it did nothing when Peru’s president refused to back down.16

Preparing the FY 1970 Program

Annex J to JSOP 70-77 was completed early in 1968. Since Laos and Thailand had been transferred to the regular DOD budget, it listed the top five MAP priorities 

as South Korea, the Philippines, Turkey, Greece, and Taiwan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

advised that OSD’s preliminary ceiling of $422.8 million in FY 1970 would leave allied 

forces with $1.727 billion worth of accumulated shortages.17 Late in October, Deputy 

Secretary Nitze proposed $400 million in grants and $325 million in sales credits. 

Reacting to the Vietnam War’s growing unpopularity, he stressed how aid to “forward 

defense” countries would lessen the need to use US forces. Deputy Secretary Nitze also 

recommended transferring, from MAP to Service budgets, grant aid to countries that 

provided the United States with base rights.18

Once again, the Joint Chiefs urged a considerably larger effort:

(Millions) Nitze JCS

Greece (grants and sales) $76.0 $129

Turkey (grants and sales) $144.5 $202

Taiwan (grants and sales) $80.0 $121

South Korea (grant aid only) $166.6 $234
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They stressed, also, that effective Greek, Turkish, and South Korean forces provided deterrents of a type for which US forces were not fully equivalent. Stationing 

more American forces in those countries would tie down US strength, restrict decisionmakers’ flexibility, and create all the economic and political problems associated 

with foreign troops in sovereign nations. On the matter of transferring programs for 

countries that provided base rights from MAP to Service funding, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff suggested that careful study precede any action, since aid to those nations usually included other justifications. In his final recommendations, dated 28 December, 

Mr. Nitze added the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments about the value of indigenous over 

US forces. But he pared the FY 1970 program even further, down to $375 million in 

grants and $275 million in sales credits. He would allow Greece $66.5 million, Turkey 

$120 million, Taiwan $44 million, each of them in both grants and sales. South Korea 

would receive $164 million in grant aid only.19 Together these four totaled $394.5 million, compared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff request for $668 million.

Conclusion

When Johnson’s presidency ended, MAP had ceased to be a significant instrument of US policy. Some of that was inevitable, even without the anti-Vietnam backlash. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not prove themselves adept defenders of 

grant aid. Secretary McNamara tried to provide aid through administrative reorganizations, but the Joint Chiefs joined with his bureaucratic and Congressional opponents 

in blocking most of them. The Greek and Turkish programs, for example, might have 

been presented more persuasively in a DOD or NATO context rather than as line items 

in MAP. As it was, the Joint Chiefs’ appraisals and reclamas had a rote quality, their 

memoranda for any one year being much the same as those before and after it, regardless of how much the political circumstances had changed.
137

9

Latin America: The Instruments 

of Influence

In Central America, stopping the spread of Fidel Castro’s influence remained an overriding US concern. This chapter examines US interventions in the Caribbean basin: a 

new one in the Dominican Republic, conducted during 1965–66; and an old one dating 

from 1903, in Panama. Why was the new one launched? And why were the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff so wary about undoing the results of the old one? The answer lay in Fidel 

Castro’s Cuba, which Washington saw as a springboard for communist subversion 

throughout the Western Hemisphere. Weak governments could be toppled; insurgencies could be channeled into pro-communist courses.

In South America, a different problem existed after Castro’s lieutenant, Ernesto 

“Che” Guevara, was defeated and killed trying to spark a revolution in Bolivia. The new 

challenge came from Latin governments eager to buy weapons, jet aircraft especially, 

and European governments eager to sell them. The Johnson administration tried to 

select arms sales that would preserve US ties to South American military establishments without diverting resources away from economic development.

The Dominican Imbroglio

A Special National Intelligence Estimate in 1964 described the Dominican Republic, occupying the eastern half of Hispaniola Island and with a population of 3.3 

million, as “one of the Latin American countries least prepared for representative 

government. Its past has been characterized by a succession of foreign occupations, 

coups, and despotic administrations.”1

 Between 1916 and 1924, anarchy and insolvency 

reached a point where the country came under US military government. From 1930 

until his assassination in May 1961, General Rafael Trujillo ran a home-grown regime 

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that was staunchly anti-communist and brutally authoritarian. After his death, Joaquin 

Balaguer briefly served as president. In February 1963, Juan Bosch took office with a 

popular mandate but soon alienated influential elements. After a military junta ousted 

Bosch in September, Donald Reid Cabral headed a civilian triumvirate that proved 

equally transitory.2

On 25 April 1965, a revolt by key army units forced Reid’s resignation. An interim 

junta rapidly fell apart as the Dominican military broke into two groups. One, an Army 

group headed by Brigadier General Elias Wessin y Wessin plus the Air Force, called 

itself “Loyalists” in that they professed loyalty to the interim junta arrangement. The 

other, a large part of the Army joined by the Navy, declared a “Constitutionalist” government; that term referred to the constitution in force during Bosch’s tenure. Rafael 

Molina Urena, their nominal leader, in 1963 had been next in the line of succession to 

the presidency. Fighting spread through the capital of Santo Domingo.

Worried about the appearance of “extreme leftist elements” in Constitutionalist 

demonstrations, the State Department instructed the US Embassy3 to urge that all 

Dominican military leaders unite in forming a provisional government that would 

restore order and prevent a communist takeover. Secretary Rusk also asked DOD to 

position ships for a possible evacuation of US citizens. At 0930 on 25 April, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff ordered the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), to take appropriate action. CINCLANT deployed six ships of Task Group 44.9, carrying the 6th Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and able to take on 3,600 evacuees. His contingency plan, 

OPLAN 373-64, covered situations ranging from a show of force through intervention 

by three battalions.4

During 26 April, full-scale civil war engulfed Santo Domingo. Loyalists tried to 

advance into the capital and Constitutionalists distributed weapons to thousands of 

civilians. To assist the evacuation of Americans, the Constitutionalists agreed that 

US helicopters could land at the Embajador Hotel and US ships could dock at nearby 

Haina. Americans began assembling at the Embajador. That evening, as a preparatory step, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCLANT to alert two battalions of the 

82nd Airborne Division, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, along with airlift and 

tactical air support.5

On the morning of 27 April, Secretary Rusk cabled instructions to the US Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett that his primary objectives were “restoration of law and order, 

prevention of possible Communist takeover, and protection of American lives.” A Constitutionalist mob burst into the Embajador Hotel, firing their automatic weapons in the 

air but not harming Americans. President Johnson immediately ordered that Haina be 

used for an evacuation, which was carried out the next day. A “nervous and dejected” 

Molina Urena, fearing that leftists in his own party would kill him, appeared at the US 

Embassy. Although sympathetic to Molina’s plight, Ambassador Bennett’s only recommendation was for both sides to negotiate a settlement. The Ambassador was clearly 

disturbed by the Castroism spouted on local TV by Molina’s party and bluntly told him 

that “he could not deny serious Communist infiltration and influence in recent events.”6

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By morning on 28 April, Constitutionalists controlled downtown Santo Domingo; 

the Loyalists appealed for 50 radio sets to coordinate their scattered forces. Ambassador Bennett strongly endorsed their request, but State Department officials approved 

only moving the sets to the USS Boxer offshore. He repeated the request early that 

afternoon, warning that “delivery could well mean [the] difference” in a situation 

where the fighting was between “Castro-type elements” and those who opposed them. 

Loyalists now pleaded for immediate and unlimited assistance; Ambassador Bennett 

sent a cable urging that Marines land forthwith. That evening, transmitting President 

Johnson’s decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered CINCLANT to land all Marines 

aboard USS Boxer and have two flights of tactical aircraft overfly the capital when 

the ambassador requested them. Also, the two airborne battalions would prepare for 

immediate departure. President Johnson also approved providing radios to the Loyalists, and Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann passed the word to General Wheeler. 

Fifty sets arrived late that night.7

At 1930 on 28 April, President Johnson with senior officials (but not General Wheeler) briefed Congressional leaders. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral 

William Raborn, reported “positive identification of three ring-leaders of the Rebels,” 

which US officials now labeled the Constitutionalists, as being “Castro-trained agents.” 

Secretary McNamara said that 2,000 Marines were ready to land and two airborne divisions at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were on alert. President Johnson told congressmen 

and senators that—on the unanimous advice of Ambassador Bennett and his country 

team, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Marines were 

landing to protect and escort US citizens to safety. Members extended their full support. Speaker of the House John McCormack thought it “obvious” that the situation 

was developing contrary to US interests and asked, “Can we afford another Castro 

situation . . . ?” At 2040, President Johnson went on television to say that US troops 

were entering the Dominican Republic “to protect American lives.” By midnight, 536 

Marines secured the area around the Embajador Hotel. Also, at JCS instruction, the 

readiness of four airborne battalions was advanced to Defense Condition 3. General 

Wheeler asked Secretary Rusk to ascertain whether Ambassador Bennett wanted more 

Marines. Secretary Rusk suggested that, next day, mechanized units might land “to 

link up with Marines ashore, protect evacuees, and rescue endangered Americans.”8

“All indications,” Ambassador Bennett cabled late on 28 April, “point to the fact 

that if present efforts of forces loyal to the government fail, power will be assumed by 

groups clearly identified with the Communist Party.” In that eventuality, “we should 

intervene to prevent another Cuba.” During 29 April, rebels seized the initiative and 

captured several police stations. General Wessin had grown inert, and the Loyalists 

appeared to be near collapse. That afternoon, at President Johnson’s order, CINCLANT 

put more Marines ashore. They landed at Haina, then linked up with the Marine perimeter around the Embajador. Vice Admiral K. S. Masterson took control of operations 

as commander of Joint Task Force 122, reporting directly to CINCLANT.

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At the United States’ request, the Organization of American States (OAS) convened 

in special session but Latin members required time to consult their governments. The 

State Department, at 1326 on 29 April, asked Ambassador Bennett whether direct US 

intervention in the civil war appeared necessary: “We cannot afford [to] permit the 

situation [to] deteriorate to point where Communist takeover occurs.” Around the same 

time, General Wheeler notified CINCLANT that the “basic objective . . . is not only to 

protect American lives but also to insure that there is no Communist takeover.” While 

the sole mission at this point was protecting American lives, he should “recommend 

immediately the expansion of your mission should the situation demand.”9 From the 

standpoint of command relations, this was an awkward moment. The CINCLANT, 

Admiral H. P. Smith, was due to retire on 30 April, when Admiral Thomas Moorer, 

previously the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, would succeed him. Thus during 

the changeover Vice Admiral Masterson assumed a key operational role.

The pace of events accelerated. In mid-afternoon on 29 April, carrying out presidential decisions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered (1) that the rest of the 6th MEU land 

immediately and (2) that two airborne battalions be flown from Fort Bragg to Ramey 

Air Force Base in Puerto Rico, where they would prepare to drop the next morning on 

San Isidro airfield, several miles east of the capital. But early that night, when troopcarrying C–130s were already in the air, it was decided that they would head directly 

to San Isidro and land there during the night.10 President Johnson made the decision, 

General Wheeler said later, from fear that “the whole thing was going to fold up unless 

we got some troops in. If we were to wait until dawn, we might not have anything to 

support.” This change of plan proved fortunate, because later inspection revealed the 

projected drop zone to be rock-studded and quite hazardous. The two battalions began 

landing at 0230.11

Meanwhile, early in the evening of 29 April, senior State and Defense Department 

officials—General Wheeler among them—conducted a teleconference with Ambassador Bennett. Secretary Rusk proposed sealing off the downtown section where most 

of the Constitutionalist operated, thereby enforcing a cease-fire; the OAS then would be 

asked to negotiate a political settlement. Ambassador Bennett agreed, warning that “we 

are dealing with mad dogs now, as regards leftist forces.”12 At 1956, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff directed Admiral Masterson to prepare a plan for isolating the Constitutionalists 

in the southeastern corner of Santo Domingo. At 0108 on 30 April, Admiral Masterson 

sent CINCLANT an operational concept in which paratroopers would secure San Isidro 

airfield, then advance to secure bridges over the Ozama River, and create a cordon 

along the river’s east bank. Marines would establish a north-south line running about 

a block east of the US Embassy. Loyalists would patrol the gap between paratroopers 

and Marines.13

During the morning of 30 April, the OAS foreign ministers voted to create an International Security Zone in Santo Domingo’s diplomatic quarter which US Marines had 

secured. The diplomats were outpaced by actions in Washington. At a meeting attended 

by Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and General Wheeler, among others, President 

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Johnson spoke bluntly: “I am not willing to let this island go to Castro. OAS is a phantom—they are taking a siesta while this is on fire.” He ordered Secretary McNamara to 

“find out what we need to take that island” and Secretary Rusk to “determine what it 

takes to make this take on the right color.”14 Insisting upon swift action, President Johnson approved committing the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and the entire 

82nd Airborne Division, with the 101st Airborne Division ready in reserve.

After the meeting adjourned, General Wheeler briefed the Service Chiefs, reviewed 

Admiral Masterson’s plan, and concluded that the assigned forces, especially the 

ground elements, were too weak for the task. He alerted the MEB and the airborne 

divisions and, with Secretary McNamara’s approval, directed that some amphibious 

shipping move from Virginia to North Carolina, near the Marine base at Camp Lejeune. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA, should 

proceed to Santo Domingo and take command, under CINCLANT, of all US ground 

forces in the Dominican Republic. General Palmer was then the Army’s Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Operations, under orders to become Commanding General, XVIII Airborne 

Corps in June. At 1130, General Wheeler gave him an oral briefing. General Palmer 

then flew to Fort Bragg, where he assembled a staff, and reached San Isidro airfield 

around midnight. The next morning, General Wheeler cabled instructions to Palmer: 

“Your announced mission is to save US lives. Your unannounced mission is to prevent 

the Dominican Republic from going Communist. . . .You will be given sufficient forces 

to do the job.”15

On 1 May, General Palmer requested four more airborne battalions and a third 

battalion of Marines: “We should not send a boy to do a man’s job.” With their superiors’ 

approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized landing one Marine battalion aboard USS 

Okinawa, committing the remainder of the 4th MEB, and deploying two more battalions 

from the 82nd Airborne Division.16 In Santo Domingo, paratroopers secured the Duarte 

Bridge over the Ozama River, while Marines established a line east of the US Embassy. 

However, Loyalists did not fill the gap between paratroopers and Marines, as Admiral 

Masterson had hoped. Their failure to do so was dangerous, because rebels might 

escape through that gap and spread over the countryside. At 1840 on 1 May, General 

Wheeler asked CINCLANT, Admiral Masterson, and General Palmer to assess three 

perimeters “designed to confine rebel activity to the southern and eastern portions of 

the city.” Plan A specified a close-in perimeter, sealing off southern Santo Domingo. 

Plan B would create a direct corridor from the Duarte Bridge to the Marines’ easternmost position. Plan C envisioned a longer perimeter located farther north. Replying at 

0214 on 2 May, Admiral Masterson advised that Plan A would take 18 battalions and 

seven days to establish at “prohibitive” cost and risk; Plan B, 15 battalions and 24 hours 

with unknown casualties; and Plan C, 12 battalions over three to five days with the 

fewest casualties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose Plan B and, at 1303 on 2 May, issued 

orders to create a corridor at dawn on 3 May.

Those orders already were outdated. Because an earlier reconnaissance met no 

resistance, General Palmer decided that a cordon could be imposed quite easily. This 

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was entirely his own conclusion; because of a misdirected transmission, he had seen 

neither General Wheeler’s query nor Admiral Masterson’s reply. When General Palmer 

telephoned General Wheeler and outlined his link-up proposal, the Chairman expressed 

serious doubts based on Admiral Masterson’s appraisal. However, General Wheeler 

finally agreed to General Palmer’s plan. After speaking directly to General Palmer by 

telephone, President Johnson gave his approval. General Palmer proved right. Shortly 

after midnight on 2–3 May, three airborne battalions closed the cordon without loss 

in little more than an hour. Thus 80 percent of the rebel forces were confined within 

Santo Domingo’s southeastern corner.17

The US buildup continued. General Palmer wanted enough strength to deal with 

an all-out attack on Santo Domingo combined with uprisings across the countryside. 

Accordingly, during 2 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved deploying another Marine 

battalion and all five uncommitted battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division. When 

these units arrived in Santo Domingo, during 3–4 May, US strength ashore stood at 12 

maneuver battalions and about 21,000 personnel.18

One further step was taken to meet any direct challenge by Castro. Cuban MiG17s, -19s, and -21s had enough range to cover US air transport routes and even reach 

Santo Domingo. Accordingly, on 6 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to augment 

the F–100s at Ramey Air Force Base with faster F–104s.19

A Political Quagmire?

The administration faced large difficulties in justifying intervention to the American public and throughout Latin America. In a televised speech on 2 May, President 

Johnson said that what began as a popular democratic revolution had been taken over 

by “a band of Communist conspirators . . . trained outside of the Dominican Republic 

in guerrilla warfare and (who) came there to . . . have a Communist seizure of that 

country.” Several days later, the Central Intelligence Agency claimed that “the time of 

US intervention clearly was one in which a movement increasingly under the influence 

of Castroites and other Communists was threatening to gain the ascendancy.” When 

the CIA released a list of 58 supposed communists, however, journalists quickly found 

a run of errors.20 President Johnson remained convinced the danger of a communist 

takeover had become real, as did General Palmer, Ambassador Bennett, and most US 

officials on the scene, but critics in Congress and the media were not persuaded.

Finding acceptable leaders in the Dominican Republic proved a daunting job. On 

the right, General Antonio Imbert-Barrera, one of Trujillo’s assassins, looked like “the 

best of a sorry lot.”21 On the left, former president Juan Bosch—living in exile in Puerto 

Rico—struck US officials as an unheroic, impractical intellectual whom communists 

easily could manipulate. In Santo Domingo, Bosch’s mantle was worn by Colonel 

Francisco Caamano-Deno. He possessed some charismatic qualities, but US officers 

concluded that his boyhood nickname of “Caamano loco” was still apt.22

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Hoping to enlist Latin support, the administration turned to the OAS. On 1 May, 

OAS foreign ministers empowered a five-member commission to investigate “all 

aspects of the situation.” Two days later, the United States asked OAS members to send 

military contingents that would assist in re-establishing peace. On 6 May, the foreign 

ministers voted to organize an Inter-American Force.23

When Argentina and Brazil asked what types of forces they should send, Assistant 

Secretary McNaughton asked for JCS recommendations. Endorsing the Inter-American 

Force as a demonstration of hemispheric solidarity, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested 

small, lightly-equipped companies trained in riot control and counter-guerrilla tactics. 

They did not want tactical air contributions; any naval contributions should consist of 

coastal patrol ships and be limited to one or two ships per country. If Argentina and 

Brazil decided to send battalions, they should be infantry units. Wherever possible, 

the Latins should rely on their own transportation. Logistically, units should be as 

self-sufficient as possible, capable of receiving and distributing bulk supplies from US 

sources. If donors could not bear all the materiel and training costs, funds might be 

furnished by the OAS, the Agency for International Development, or the President’s 

Special Contingency Fund. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed designating General 

Palmer as Force commander, with a Latin officer as his deputy. They were willing to 

accept a Latin commander, though, provided he had a US deputy. Subsequently, they 

recommended (among other things) that the Force’s political guidance come from the 

OAS foreign ministers, that its combined staff be organized along US lines, and that 

its combined component commanders be US officers. The administration agreed to 

adopt JCS views “so far as politically possible.”24

On 6 May, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy raised the possibility of 

pulling out some US troops. Secretary McNamara replied that one battalion could 

withdraw immediately; a second could follow as soon as some Latin units arrived. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted more cautiously. First, they agreed, the recommendations of General Palmer, Ambassador Bennett, and Ambassador to the OAS Ellsworth 

Bunker should be taken into account. (Palmer, in fact, advised that possibly three or 

four battalions might leave after an effective stable government began functioning.) 

Second, a sudden large withdrawal would be militarily and psychologically harmful. 

Third, no redeployments should occur until adequate OAS forces were in place. President Johnson ruled against even a token reduction for the time being.25

The situation in Santo Domingo remained unstable. On 30 April, President Johnson 

had dispatched John Bartlow Martin, ambassador during 1962–63, to assess the situation. On 5 May, the Constitutionalists announced creation of a government headed by 

Colonel Caamano. Next day, under US pressure, the Loyalist junta resigned in favor of 

a Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) headed by General Imbert. However, 

Martin reported that the Constitutionalists, who controlled Radio Santo Domingo, 

were winning the “propaganda political war” by successfully linking “constitutionality” 

with jobs and food. On 13 May, with Ambassador Bennett’s support, General Palmer 

suggested widening the corridor or cordon in order to seize the radio facility. The Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff disapproved but did authorize him to prepare a plan to destroy the radio 

station using US Special Forces. Since there were many transmitting sites outside the 

rebel zone, seizing one would have little effect. While this was being debated, a GNR 

strafing and rocketing attack took Radio Santo Domingo temporarily off the air.26

Washington deemed it “essential” that Santo Domingo’s northern industrial sector, 

paralyzed by civil strife, resume normal activities as soon as possible. On 12 May, State 

and Defense instructed the US Embassy to prepare a plan for clearing armed rebels 

from the area. The next day witnessed widespread cease-fire violations. On 14 May, 

General Palmer advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “the rebels are stalling for time 

and have no serious intention to negotiate. How long we will put up with this before 

calling their hand is beyond my purview. I do warn you, however, that this country 

could slip away from us while we dance on the head of the needle.” Also on 14 May, 

the Constitutionalists attacked GNR troops in northwestern Santo Domingo—unsuccessfully. General Imbert thereupon gave the OAS Commission his plan for clearing 

Constitutionalists from the industrial areas. According to General Imbert, the Commission did not object. As a further complication, the UN Security Council voted to 

send a fact-finding mission. Ambassador Bennett cabled Secretary Rusk that Colonel 

Caamano and his associates, “feeling oats” because of this action, had treated the OAS 

Commission “with arrogance and disrespect.”27

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended strong, swift action, advising Secretary 

McNamara on 15 May that the Constitutionalists almost certainly would oppose creation of a new security zone. Ambassador Bennett had submitted the plan to clean 

out the rebel areas as requested by State and Defense back on 12 May. Consequently, 

“immediately following Caamano’s refusal to agree,” Bennett and Palmer should be 

authorized to execute that plan. The OAS Commission should be informed and its 

support solicited, but also told that the United States intended to act unilaterally if 

necessary.28

The administration did not act upon that proposal because, without having 

informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was launching a new mediation effort. On 15 May, 

McGeorge Bundy and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance flew to Puerto Rico 

and conferred with Bosch and Sylvestre Antonio Guzman, whom Bosch endorsed 

for the post of president. Bosch and Guzman proposed that a new cabinet include an 

armed forces minister acceptable to both factions; they further agreed to intern or 

deport communists and Trujillistas. Next day, in Santo Domingo, Bundy and Vance 

conferred with General Imbert. Simultaneously, President Johnson ordered General 

Palmer to neutralize the Loyalist navy and air force and to prevent Loyalists from 

attacking the rebel zone.29

On 17 May—the day US strength peaked at 23,889 personnel—the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff again urged immediate, unilateral action to reduce the rebel stronghold. Then the 

Inter-American Force (IAF) could take charge at a time when the rebels were either 

eradicated or forced to negotiate from weakness. Otherwise, “we may be placed in a 

position whereby future US unilateral action would seriously impair the functioning of 
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the IAF.” Next day, instead, Bundy, Vance, Bennett, and Martin proposed that (assuming acceptance by the OAS, General Imbert, and Colonel Caamano) US forces place 

themselves between the advancing Loyalists and the retreating Constitutionalists, 

thus demonstrating impartiality, enforcing a cease-fire, and reducing pressure for UN 

involvement. Admiral Moorer and General Palmer expressed grave reservations. General 

Wheeler also was dubious, although he advised Admiral Moorer and General Palmer that 

“the governing factors in this chaotic situation are largely political rather than military.” 

Very quickly, however, military and civilian proposals alike became superfluous. General 

Imbert evidently sensed the rebels’ weakness. On 19 May, Loyalist troops breached the 

intended line of interposition, drove into the rebels’ northern sector, and captured Radio 

Santo Domingo. An informal cease-fire then took hold.30

Nonetheless, US efforts to build a broadly based, anti-communist coalition failed. 

Neither General Imbert nor Colonel Caamano would make meaningful concessions; 

Guzman dismayed US mediators by reversing himself and insisting that the 1963 

constitution forbade deporting communists. Ambassador Bennett characterized the 

Caamano group as “a bunch of hoodlums infiltrated and fortified by Communists.” As 

for General Imbert, “the gangster side of his nature has surged rapidly to [the] fore.” 

When May ended, so did the Bundy-Vance mission.31

Internationalizing the Occupation

Washington turned negotiating initiatives over to the OAS, whose foreign ministers entrusted mediation efforts to a committee consisting of Ambassador Ellsworth 

Bunker, Ilmar Pennha Marinho of Brazil, and Ramon de Clairmont Duenas of El 

Salvador. Ambassador Bunker soon concluded that a political formula acceptable to 

Washington and the warring factions was beyond reach. The only solution lay in forming a provisional administration of technicians that would serve until the Dominican 

people, in an OAS-supervised election, chose a permanent government.32

Meantime, a multinational peace-keeping force was taking shape. A Honduran 

contingent, 250 strong, arrived on 14 May; 166 Nicaraguans and 21 Costa Ricans came 

the next day; 1,129 Brazilians arrived by 29 May; and 184 Paraguayans landed on 26 

June. The act creating an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was signed on 23 May by 

OAS Secretary General José Mora as well as the US and Latin contingent commanders.33 A Brazilian, General Hugo Panasco Alvim, became the IAPF’s commander.34

Argentina refused to put its troops under a Brazilian, and so made no contribution. 

Brazilians excepted, the Latin contingents reached Santo Domingo in poor condition; 

their governments evidently expected the United States to clothe and equip them.35

The United States placed all its forces in the Dominican Republic under OAS 

control, and designated General Palmer to be deputy commander. Admiral Moorer 

and General Palmer vigorously protested against putting the entire US contingent into 

the IAPF. General Wheeler replied that the administration could hardly do otherwise, 
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since “we devised the IAPF concept for the purpose of giving an international cover 

to American involvement in the Dominican Republic and to legitimize our activities 

in world opinion by identifying them with the OAS.”36

General Alvim’s political guidance, approved by the OAS foreign ministers, tasked 

him with “co-operating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican 

Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human 

rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation that will 

permit the functioning of democratic institutions.” To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that was 

a political announcement rather than a military mission. US officials, they suggested 

to Secretary McNamara, should influence General Alvim to translate the ministers’ 

resolution into military terms. An example would be: “employ assigned forces to 

establish and maintain a condition of law and order in the Dominican Republic.” They 

urged, also, that General Palmer in his capacity as deputy be empowered to act unilaterally when necessary. Their rationale was that a nation such as Venezuela, which 

had sharply criticized US intervention, might contribute forces in order to influence 

what the IAPF did. Also, they asked that no US forces withdraw until General Alvim 

could accomplish his mission without them.37

Peter Solbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA), replied that General Alvim probably could not restate his mission without raising questions about whether he was 

modifying the ministers’ resolution. Possibly, however, greater precision could be 

achieved through mission statements issued to the IAPF’s subordinate elements. As for 

unilateral action, he reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that such a step would require 

a presidential decision. But he pointed out that, since US forces comprised most of the 

IAPF, Washington’s views could not easily be ignored. Lastly, Solbert drew attention to 

US public statements that withdrawals would occur only as Latin replacements arrived 

and General Alvim judged residual forces adequate.38

As the dangers of chaos and communism subsided, and Santo Domingo stayed 

quiet, the pressure for US withdrawals mounted. On 22 May, General Palmer and 

Deputy Secretary Vance informed General Wheeler that, once Brazilian troops began 

arriving, a Marine battalion could be shifted to ships offshore. Other units could be 

thinned out and a Marine battalion afloat freed for employment elsewhere. Two days 

later, General Wheeler informed field commanders that “highest authorities” hoped for 

“a substantial withdrawal . . . in order to place problems associated with governmental 

control squarely in hands of OAS.” That could mean withdrawing as many as 10,000 

men over the next ten to fourteen days. General Wheeler asked for a timetable and for 

criteria permitting withdrawals at minimum risk.39

General Palmer replied that, contingent upon continued progress toward “normalcy,” US strength could fall from twelve to seven battalions over fourteen days. Residual 

forces should be capable of: physically separating Loyalists and Constitutionalists; 

reducing rebel resistance in southeastern Santo Domingo; protecting US and other 

foreigners; and providing a balanced contribution to, and logistical support for, the 

IAPF. General Palmer submitted a three-phase plan. Phase I, immediate departure, 
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would remove two Marine battalions (one ashore and one afloat) plus 1,700 Army and 

Air Force personnel. Phase II would withdraw all remaining Marines over a period of 

seven days. Phase III would remove two airborne battalions and 2,000 support troops 

within fourteen days.40

The administration acted immediately. On 26 May, at Mr. McNamara’s instruction 

(relayed through Deputy Secretary Vance, who was still in Santo Domingo), a Marine 

battalion ashore began embarking. The battalion afloat also received release orders. 

On 27 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed General Palmer’s three-phase plan. Next 

day, they authorized the withdrawal of 1,700 Army and Air Force personnel. Thus, by 

30 May, Phase I was finished.41

Phase II involving 4,100 Marines was completed on 6 June, leaving 12,832 US troops 

in the Dominican Republic.42 On 8 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended (1) 

authorizing General Palmer to discuss additional withdrawals with General Alvim—

which was promptly authorized—and (2) starting a somewhat smaller Phase III on or 

about 13 June. On 10 June, General Palmer talked with General Alvim about removing 

two airborne battalions, which General Alvim proved “somewhat reluctant” to accept. 

Instead, Alvim suggested temporarily redeploying the airborne battalions to Puerto 

Rico rather than CONUS and discussing US-Latin force ratios within the OAS forum.43

General Palmer planned to discuss Phase III again with General Alvim on 15 

June. But, on that day, rebels began shooting at IAPF troops all around the perimeter 

in southeastern Santo Domingo. Major General Robert York, commanding the 82nd 

Airborne Division, had authority to respond with fire and maneuver. Accordingly, US 

paratroopers counterattacked and won control of a thirty-block area. On 18 June, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Secretary McNamara that the Palmer-Alvim 

talks resume “at an appropriate time” but advised against redeploying two battalions 

to Puerto Rico and discussing US-Latin force ratios before the OAS.44

Soon after the flare-up on 15 June, at Alvim’s insistence, General Palmer asked that 

a US tank platoon be deployed to Santo Domingo. CINCLANT agreed. At the Pentagon, 

the J–3 drafted a memorandum endorsing the commitment of a reinforced platoon 

(seven tanks). However, State and ISA opposed the deployment as not only politically 

and psychologically disadvantageous but also possibly at cross-purposes with the 

stated goals of peace-keeping. US Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson also 

opposed this step as unnecessary and likely to hamper negotiations, exposing the 

United States to international condemnation, and perhaps provoking retaliation. On 

23 and 25 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the problem and deferred a decision. 

There, for more than a month, the matter rested.45

Meantime, on 22 June, Colonel Caamano tried to inspire a general strike. He failed 

almost completely, and his star waned. Two days later, General Palmer received permission to renew discussions with General Alvim. Next day, these two officers agreed 

to announce a two-battalion withdrawal on 3 July. The first battalion returned to Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, on 11 July; the second did so eight days later.46 That brought 

the US contingent down to about 10,250; the Latin contribution totaled around 1,750.
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Resolution and Extrication

Thanks in good part to the talents of Ambassador Bunker, all parties signed or accepted an “Act of Reconciliation.”47 Entering into force on 31 August, it provided 

for: installing a provisional government; liquidating the Constitutionalist zone; reintegrating rebel officers into the armed forces; holding presidential elections within 

nine months; and negotiating with the OAS over the manner and timing of the IAPF’s 

withdrawal. Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy, a businessman who had served as foreign minister during Bosch’s tenure, accepted the post of provisional president. Garcia Godoy 

emphasized to Bennett and Bunker that he would be “aligned with [the] United States 

in opposing communism in all facets.”48

In July, Admiral Moorer and General Palmer recommended a residual IAPF totaling 8,650 with the US contingent, 6,744 strong, including three airborne battalions, one 

tank company, and one artillery battalion. Were the tanks now politically palatable? By 

late August, with a settlement imminent, Bennett and Bunker were willing to accept 

them. General Alvim agreed to the early release of an airborne battalion, contingent 

upon subsequent arrival of the tank company. Through memoranda dated 2 and 4 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested—and later that month received—approval 

to (1) continue stationing 7,137 US personnel and (2) send in the tank company and 

take out an airborne battalion. Also, at General Johnson’s instigation, they cautioned 

that withdrawing the IAPF prematurely could have “serious effects” upon Dominican 

stability. The four-month stalemate had allowed communists to regroup and prepare 

for future efforts. Once the entire IAPF departed, any attempt to reintroduce it would 

encounter “severe complications.”49

A problem arose when, on 29 September, State and OSD reversed themselves and 

disapproved including an artillery battalion within the residual force structure. At the 

Joint Chiefs’ request, Admiral Moorer and General Palmer furnished a rationale for 

retaining the battalion. First, it would ensure force balance and obviate the need for a 

hasty introduction of additional units that might prove politically unpopular. Second, 

in a show of force, artillery would be highly effective without evoking the emotional 

protests aroused by air attacks. Third, General Alvim wanted the battalion available to 

support Latin training and operational missions. Fourth, reversing the decision could 

result in US loss of face and erode the shaky status of Garcia Godoy. General Wheeler 

advised Secretary McNamara that he agreed with their assessment. Subsequently, 

State and OSD withdrew their objection.50

The ensuing months witnessed slow but steady progress toward “normalcy.” Provisional President Garcia Godoy returned the country to relative calm by placating left 

and right through a series of exiles (both Wessin and Caamano51 were posted abroad), 

appointments, recalls, and promotions. At crucial moments, he was prodded into action 

by the IAPF and then relied upon that Force to cow Loyalists or Constitutionalists, as 

circumstances warranted.52
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A rift developed between Ambassador Bunker and the intensely conservative 

General Alvim. On 6 January 1966, General Alvim refused to act upon a request by 

Garcia Godoy and an OAS committee that the IAPF evict right-wing soldiers who had 

just occupied Radio Santo Domingo. When Bunker threatened to use US troops without 

his sanction, Alvim allowed American paratroopers to seize the station. To smooth 

over matters, the Brazilian government agreed to bring General Alvim back home if 

General Palmer left also. Accordingly, on 17 January, Brigadier General Alvaro Braga 

of Brazil took command of the IAPF; Brigadier General Robert Linvill, USA, who had 

been Palmer’s chief of staff, became his deputy.53

Late in 1965, Secretary McNamara decided to replace airborne units with the 

196th Infantry Brigade, a new unit scheduled for activation by mid-1966. In April 1966, 

however, Ambassador Bunker and Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Gordon asked 

McNamara to keep the paratroopers there until sometime in July. The presidential election was scheduled for mid-June, and they evidently worried that troop movements 

might affect the outcome. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff readily 

agreed.54 Instead, the 196th Infantry Brigade went to Vietnam.

In May, Garcia Godoy pushed for an OAS decision to withdraw the IAPF before an 

elected government took office. Secretary Rusk recommended, instead, seeking passage of a resolution that the IAPF withdraw during June—unless, before 15 June, the 

newly-elected government asked it to stay longer. The Operations Directorate (J–3), 

Joint Staff, favored more flexible wording, seeking an OAS resolution “at the earliest 

possible date” and calling for withdrawal to begin “at the earliest practicable date after 

the election.” General Johnson suggested, instead, that the resolution call for initiating 

negotiations among the OAS, the provisional government, and the president-elect. Otherwise, he feared, Washington would seem to be washing its hands of the Dominican 

Republic. On 9 May, after amending J–3’s paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended 

seeking an OAS resolution “at the earliest possible date” to commence withdrawal of 

the IAPF “at the earliest practicable date following the election of 1 June.” A withdrawal 

schedule should be set through consultations involving the OAS, Garcia Godoy, and 

the president–elect. Deputy Secretary Vance endorsed their idea and forwarded it to 

State. On 28 May, the United States and other IAPF contributors asked OAS foreign 

ministers to authorize negotiations between Garcia Godoy, the president-elect, and 

the three OAS mediators.55

On 1 June, much to Washington’s relief, conservative Joaquin Balaguer defeated 

leftist Juan Bosch by 57 to 39 percent in what appeared to be a reasonably free election.56 Three weeks later, OAS foreign ministers resolved that the IAPF’s withdrawal 

should begin on 1 July. The last unit—115 US airmen—departed on 21 September.57

They left behind a fairly stable anti-communist government with some claim to democratic legitimacy. The unpromising political landscape in which Americans worked 

made this outcome all the more remarkable. Garcia Godoy proved a fortunate find, 

although the IAPF acted as ultimate arbiter.
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The administration had achieved its major objectives quickly and at modest cost, 

a rare accomplishment. Special circumstances applied in the Dominican Republic, but 

General Palmer drew conclusions that had wider applicability. What happened in Santo 

Domingo convinced him that intervention must be (1) timely and in strength, (2) supported by US domestic as well as international opinion, and (3) executed with speed, 

determination, and finesse, seeking to complete the mission and withdraw as rapidly 

as possible. General Palmer was particularly impressed by the fact that intervention 

required four times the force (twelve battalions instead of three) that contingency planners had projected. Yet “the country is relatively small and readily containable because 

of its island location. Moreover, he who controls the capital city, Santo Domingo, 

controls the country.” Therefore, “if the situation has been allowed to deteriorate, we 

had better think twice before we commit our forces to a larger country—it may be a 

bottomless pit. . . .The secret of successful counter-insurgency is to nip it in the bud; 

once it has taken root, it may, as often as not, be too late.”58

Panama: Toward a New Canal Treaty

The events of 1903 still dominated US-Panamanian relations. After the SpanishAmerican War vividly demonstrated the importance of being able to shift warships 

rapidly between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Washington determined to build and 

control an isthmian canal, running across what then was Colombian territory. When 

Colombia rejected a canal treaty, US action helped ensure the success of a rebellion, 

and Panama became an independent country. Through the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 

of 1903, Panama permitted the United States to build, operate, and defend an interoceanic canal as well as to control a Canal Zone in perpetuity, enjoying “all the rights, 

power, and authority . . .which the United States would possess and exercise as if it 

were the Sovereign . . . to the entire exclusion of Panama.” A lock canal, 40.27 statute 

miles long, opened in 1914. A Canal Zone approximately ten miles wide along most of 

its length, garrisoned by US troops and inhabited by US civilians who operated the 

Canal, divided the country. The Hull-Alfaro Treaty of 1936 gave the United States a 

right to defend the Canal by unilateral intervention, in case of an international threat 

or conflict. President Eisenhower acknowledged Panama’s “titular” sovereignty over 

the Zone and allowed the simultaneous raising of US and Panamanian flags in certain 

areas but made no fundamental changes.

In 1961, after President Roberto Chiari pressed for renegotiation of the 1903 treaty, 

the Kennedy administration began studying whether a sea-level canal should be built. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored doing so, because mobility of forces and economical 

movement of materiel remained essential. The lock canal, they forecast, would be 

“approaching inadequacy within ten years.” A sea-level canal, by contrast, would prove 

far less vulnerable to sabotage and much more adaptable to modification.”59
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In April 1962, President Kennedy decided against renegotiating the 1903 treaty 

but recognized that the issue might have to be faced before a sea-level canal could be 

completed. He also directed DOD to review the requirements for military facilities in 

the isthmian region. The Department of the Army, which administered the Canal Zone, 

produced a list of lands that might be returned to Panama; but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

in August 1963, opposed releasing any of them. They recalled how, only one year after 

British troops evacuated the Suez Canal Zone, Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal 

Company. Taking account of “extremely nationalistic elements in Panama, the Castrocommunist influence in Latin America, and the traditional instability of Panamanian 

politics, continued exercise by the United States of its legal rights” remained necessary. 

Concessions would only encourage more demands. Washington ought to make a liberal 

interpretation of existing treaties, and nothing more. However, the administration 

should be willing (without letting Panama know) to consider reversions on a caseby-case basis, adding whatever provisions seemed necessary to assure continued US 

defense of the canal. Secretary McNamara agreed.60

The events of 9–12 January 1964 forced some fundamental rethinking in Washington. Trouble started when Panamanian students entered the Zone, raised their flag 

at a high school, and then tried to lower the US flag at an administration building. As 

police were escorting them out of the Zone, rock-throwing began. Around nightfall, 

several thousand Panamanians stormed into the Zone, starting a rampage. When the 

disorders ended, on 13 January, four US soldiers and perhaps twenty Panamanians lay 

dead. Panama severed diplomatic relations, charging “unjustifiable aggression” and 

insisting upon a basic revision of the 1903 treaty.

Panama was in turmoil, with its presidential election approaching. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann warned President Chiari that communists had penetrated 

high positions in his government and that Castro soon would try to bring weapons into 

Panama. On 17 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that (1) eight F–102s, then 

in the Zone for an air defense exercise, should stay there until further notice and (2) 

one Marine battalion landing team (BLT) should remain within twelve hours’ sailing 

time from Panama.

Deputy Secretary Vance ordered the development of plans to intervene in case the 

Panamanian government asked for help in preventing its overthrow by Communist/

Castro-oriented groups or Washington decided to remove a Communist regime from 

power. On 23 January, the Director of Operations (J–3), Joint Staff, flew to Panama for 

a discussion with General Andrew O’Meara, USA, who was the Commander in Chief, 

Southern Command. Two days later, General O’Meara advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

that fast reaction was most important. If he could act within one hour, instead of waiting 14 hours for reinforcements to arrive by air from CONUS, intervention probably 

would encounter considerably less opposition. There were, in the Canal Zone, three 

US Army battalions: one airborne; one mechanized; and one infantry. General O’Meara 

asked for another infantry battalion and one mechanized infantry company that would 

bring the mechanized battalion up to full strength. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved 
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his quick-reaction plan. They also recommended, and Deputy Secretary Vance authorized, raising the mechanized battalion to full strength and keeping a Marine BLT in 

the Zone.61

On 2 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that access 

to a canal remained “vital” to US economic, military, and political interests. They 

wanted the administration to make an early, public decision in favor of constructing a 

sea-level canal. Also, perhaps in exchange for returning non-essential land, Washington 

should insist upon Panamanian recognition (1) that the US military presence in Panama 

was important to and in furtherance of hemispheric security and (2) that concluding 

an agreement covering base rights and status of forces outside the Zone would be “an 

appropriate and important contribution” by Panama to the inter-American system.62

On 3 April, the two governments re-established diplomatic relations and appointed 

special ambassadors “with sufficient powers to seek the prompt elimination of the 

causes of conflict between the two countries.” Robert B. Anderson, who had been 

Deputy Secretary of Defense and then Secretary of the Treasury under President Eisenhower, accepted the post of Special US Representative. Three weeks later, President 

Johnson created a Panama Review Group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State 

for Inter-American Affairs; it served as the principal point of focus for the formulation 

and execution of policy. The Secretary of the Army, who was the Group’s only Defense 

member, served as executive agent for DOD in canal negotiations. In May, after Marco 

Robles won the presidential election, US forces began easing the alert that had been 

in effect since January.63

Meanwhile, early in April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended trying to acquire 

training areas outside the Zone, reasoning that they could serve as a quid pro quo in 

negotiations to revise the basic treaties. Deputy Secretary Vance asked which areas, 

inside and outside the Zone, to retain and which to relinquish. The governor of the 

Zone and General O’Meara advised that there should be a buffer area 3,000 yards wide 

on each side of the lock canal. Nearly all requirements outside the Zone were justified 

solely on grounds of hemispheric security rather than canal defense. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, on 8 June, reminded Secretary McNamara that Panama had not yet accepted 

hemispheric security as a legitimate reason for the US military presence. Why not, 

then, use land as a bargaining chip? The United States might release extensive areas 

within the Zone if Panama (1) recognized that a US military presence was important 

to hemispheric security and (2) accepted base rights and status of forces agreements 

covering areas outside the Zone as well as areas released within it.64

General O’Meara, it turned out, wanted to retain all properties inside the Zone and 

almost all those proposed for acquisition inside and outside it. In mid-October 1964, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they concurred. Explaining 

their change, they cited a Special National Intelligence Estimate indicating an on-going 

need not only to deter communist penetration but also to ensure local stability. SNIE 

84-64 stated that “from a negligible factor in Panamanian life, the Communists and 

the Castroists have become a significant one. Their short-run prospects have been 
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sharply improved, and the longer the treaty issue remains agitated, the more lasting their gains are likely to be.”65 Since Panama’s National Guard probably could not 

control large-scale urban violence combined with insurgency, “the only real security 

the Panamanians enjoy is that provided by the US military presence.” They argued, in 

fact, that “Panamanians do not resent the US military presence per se.” This being so, 

returning lands would win the United States “little or no advantage.”66

By December 1964, with the anniversary of the riots approaching, some kind of US 

initiative seemed imperative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed a draft statement by 

President Johnson expressing willingness to move forward with planning a new sealevel canal and negotiating a new treaty for the lock canal. They urged two changes. 

First, clearly enunciate a US responsibility for defense of the lock canal and for hemispheric security. Second, state no preference as to whether control over the operations 

of a sea-level canal should be multinational or bilateral. (They, in fact, disagreed among 

themselves about this.67) Additionally, and more important, they stressed the need for 

a classified statement of US policy and objectives.68

President Johnson’s public announcement, on 18 December, fully incorporated 

their wishes. On 8 January 1965, Johnson issued an equally agreeable classified statement. According to NSAM No. 323, sovereignty over a sea-level canal would reside with 

the country (Panama, Colombia, Nicaragua, or Costa Rica) through which it passed; 

the issue of bilateral versus international control would be decided later. The United 

States and the host nation would be responsible for defense; Washington should seek 

terms leaving the United States free to ensure the canal’s security, regardless of other 

countries’ actions. A new lock canal treaty would recognize Panama’s sovereignty 

and, when a sea-level canal opened, terminate rights retained by the United States. 

However, a new treaty should: ensure the continuation of US bases and activities for the 

lock canal’s lifetime; draw no distinction between using those bases for canal defense 

and for hemispheric security; and acknowledge Panama’s contribution to hemispheric 

security under these arrangements.69 Thus NSAM No. 323 precisely reflected the views 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The objectives in NSAM No. 323 had to be translated into a negotiable draft. State 

and Defense prepared a draft sea-level canal treaty that, in February 1965, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff reviewed and judged generally acceptable. They cautioned, though, that 

Panama should not be allowed to gain concessions through piecemeal negotiations 

and that no lock canal treaty be signed without assurances that a favorable sea-level 

canal treaty was attainable. The latter objective could best be attained by a single 

treaty covering both canals, with annexes for base rights and status of forces agreements. A sea-level canal treaty, in any case, had to distinguish between canal defense 

and hemispheric security. Moreover, such a treaty must “ensure without qualification 

that the United States has specified authority to determine defense missions and full 

use of the canal in performing the defense mission, including priority for use.” Since 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff split again over bilateral versus multinational control, Deputy 

Secretary Vance decided to support the multinational concept.70
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In May 1965, Panamanian and US diplomats began negotiating lock and sea-level 

canal treaties, along with base rights and status of forces agreements. Soon afterward, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff softened their opposition to relinquishing military facilities. 

Instead of a buffer area, some locations adjacent to the Canal should become “access 

and surveillance” areas under Panamanian sovereignty, with security forces retaining 

a right of access for defense purposes.71

On 24 September 1965, Presidents Johnson and Robles announced that a new lock 

canal treaty would “effectively recognize” Panama’s sovereignty over the Zone and 

establish joint administration over the canal. The treaty would terminate either on a 

specified date or when a sea-level canal opened, “whichever occurs first.” The original 

draft lacked “whichever occurs first”; the words were added because the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff objected that a lock canal treaty might expire before a sea-level canal treaty 

had been ratified. Both treaties would contain provisions for canal defense, US forces 

being maintained under base rights and status of forces agreements.72

Early in December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed draft treaties and concluded 

that they failed to protect “essential” defense and security interests. First, the United 

States should have a right to act unilaterally, not only in actual defense of the canals 

but also “in situations threatening the continuity of operation of either canal.” Second, 

joint defense of a sea-level canal would be acceptable only if it was understood to 

include “defense of Panama against communist domination.” Third, US negotiators 

should seek positive control, through a majority voice, over the multinational authority 

operating a sea-level canal.73

Paragraphs were added to each draft stipulating a US right to intervene unilaterally 

in order to safeguard the canals’ security and continuity of operation. As to the multinational authority, weighted voting would virtually assure a US majority until amortization 

occurred sixty years hence. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to win their argument against restricting a right of intervention to protect US security interests. Instead, 

Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor recommended relying on the 1903 treaty’s statement 

that the canal “shall be neutral,” which repeated language in the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote 

Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. Taking account of World War 

II experience, the broad defense rights already embodied in the drafts, and the dimensions of US regional power, Resor concluded that security requirements could be met 

without sacrificing the political advantages of a neutrality provision.74

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted explicit permission for the United States and 

Panama to employ “all means at their disposal to maintain the neutrality of the Canal.” 

Secretary Resor countered, though, that the Hay-Pauncefote language never had 

impaired US ability to act. Indeed, since the 1901 treaty referred to old-fashioned 

methods of warfare, it might allow the United States greater freedom than would a 

commitment phased in more general terms. Unlike the JCS proposal, a simple declaration that the canal’s neutrality “shall be maintained” would leave the choice of means 

entirely at Washington’s discretion. They agreed, and on 30 December 1965 the State 

Department was so advised.75
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One final barrier remained: would the treaties allow US bases to be used for 

hemispheric security? In mid-1966, Panamanian negotiators said that their National 

Assembly would not accept any such provisions. They added, though, that separate 

agreements covering missions apart from canal defense might be attainable. Secretary 

Resor asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe how this might be done and to state 

whether there were acceptable alternatives to the bases in Panama. Answering on 

6 October, they recommended against removing any forces or missions. Relocating 

the headquarters of Southern Command would harm prestige and “hearten” anti-US 

forces, because it would be seen as a weakening of US power. Again, they claimed that 

curtailing US activities in the Canal Zone was “not one of the expressed aspirations 

of the Panamanian people.” Foreign Minister Fernando Eleta and negotiator Diogenes 

de la Rosa stood almost alone, they argued, in opposing provisions for hemispheric 

security—probably because the two men had a vested interest in driving the hardest possible bargain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, as an alternative, offering 

a long-term mutual defense and assistance pact. But they opposed seeking separate 

agreements for each individual mission, believing that doing so would subject Washington to demands for more concessions “as well as to the continuing emotionalism 

and opportunism inherent in Panamanian politics.”76

A consummation seemed at hand in June 1967, when US and Panamanian negotiators presented their governments with three finished treaties covering the lock canal, 

a sea-level canal, and the lock canal’s defense and neutrality. The 1903 treaty would 

be abrogated and Panama’s sovereignty over the Zone recognized. A new lock canal 

treaty would terminate in 1999—or one year after a sea-level canal opened, up to a 

date as late as 2009. Within the Zone, re-designated the “Area,” land and water sites 

no longer necessary for the canal’s operation would be returned to Panama. A Joint 

Administration would assume control over the Canal and the Area; provisions in each 

of the canal treaties assured US majorities on the governing bodies. Through a defense 

treaty, the United States would acquire clear right to provide for defense, security, 

neutrality, and continuity of operation. If the lock canal treaty terminated without 

a sea-level canal having been built, the defense treaty would continue for five years 

thereafter, during which time the two countries would conclude appropriate arrangements. In the Isthmus, the existing US base structure would remain essentially intact. 

Negotiators understood the defense treaty, together with its associated exchange of 

notes, as permitting the continuation of all current activities not strictly associated 

with canal defense.77

After reviewing these drafts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary of the Army 

Resor to support several changes. First, relocating facilities that were on lands being 

transferred to Panama would cost $10 million, yet no funds had been programmed for 

this purpose. Second, US payments for a sea-level canal should be settled prior to the 

formal signing of a treaty. Otherwise, US negotiators would have nothing tangible to 

trade for relinquishing perpetual sovereignty over the Zone and a monopoly on interoceanic canal construction. Third, and most important, the authority for conducting 
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hemispheric security activities should not lie simply in a reference to “related security 

purposes.” When General Wheeler raised these points, however, a senior US negotiator78

told him there was not the slightest chance that Panamanians would agree. Accordingly, on 20 July 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Resor that, while they 

still preferred a specific written understanding, the treaties “should not be rejected” if 

one proved unattainable. State and Defense both recommended that President Johnson 

approve these drafts.79

At this point, treaty texts were leaked to the press, apparently by a Panamanian. 

On Capitol Hill, protests were raised against the apparent ending of US control. In the 

eyes of many Panamanians, however, US privileges remained too great. With feelings 

inflamed by an approaching Panamanian election, President Robles decided against 

moving toward ratification.

What the Joint Chiefs of Staff had called “the continuing emotionalism and 

opportunism inherent in Panamanian politics” intervened. In 1968, the National 

Assembly deposed President Robles, but the Panamanian Supreme Court ruled that 

action unconstitutional and the National Guard put Robles back in office. Dr. Arnulfo 

Arias won a tumultuous presidential election, and promptly launched a purge of the 

National Guard. Instead, the Guard purged him—the third time that Arias had been 

ejected from the Presidential Palace.80 A coup then put Lieutenant Colonel Omar 

Torrijos in control.

Thus in 1968 treaty negotiations reached a dead end, and for Panamanians that 

proved an unexpected benefit. The passage of time—almost ten years would pass 

before a new treaty was completed—worked to their advantage. By the final terms, 

the United States conceded more than the 1967 draft would have allowed.

Aircraft Sales: Pro and Con

I

n South America, where Castro posed no serious threat after Che Guevara’s death 

in October 1967, US policymakers traditionally faced other problems. They wanted 

to preserve US influence over Latin military establishments but, at the same time, 

persuade South American governments to spend less on arms and more on economic 

development. Sometimes, however, these objectives proved mutually exclusive.

In 1947, the Secretaries of State and War debated the wisdom and propriety of selling US arms to Latin nations. The former argued that spending on weapons, instead of 

improving living standards, “would perpetuate and aggravate conditions of economic 

and political instability. . . .These conditions are the soil in which the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured.” The latter replied that most of those countries “will insist 

upon maintaining such military establishments as they, not we, feel they require and 

which they, not we, feel they can support financially.” Thus the question was not, “Shall 

they have arms?” but rather, “Shall they have United States or foreign arms?”81 Almost 

twenty years later, that question still resonated.
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NSAM No. 297, issued by President Johnson in April 1964, required that military 

spending by Latin countries receiving US aid be “consistent with and proportionate 

to expenditures for social and economic development.” Grants and sales programs 

should avoid providing “sophisticated and expensive prestige equipment . . . except 

where specifically justified.” Moreover, Washington ought actively to discourage Latin 

purchases from other nations of non-essential prestige items.82

Very quickly, this policy was put to the test. In July 1964, Argentina sought permission to buy the A–4 Skyhawk, a subsonic attack aircraft used by the Navy and Marine 

Corps since 1956. France, reportedly, was offering to sell Argentina supersonic Mirage 

fighters. ISA asked the Joint Staff to look as far ahead as 1970 and assess whether more 

modern aircraft appeared necessary.83

In September 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves answered and addressed 

the problem from a far wider perspective. They found no strictly military need for 

supersonic aircraft; most countries could satisfy their needs with armed T–28 and 

T–33 trainers. What those countries needed most were versatile, multipurpose 

aircraft for counterinsurgency missions. Regardless, some countries might persist in trying to acquire modern, high-performance fighters. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff foresaw a potential requirement to provide 150 such aircraft. They deemed 

it “fundamental” that US military influence remain predominant throughout Latin 

America; indeed, a selective and vigorous sales program struck them as “imperative.” 

Washington must be prepared to offer aircraft “on an ascending scale from the T–28 

through the F–5A,” a supersonic interceptor designed specifically for sale to allies 

and friendly nations.84

In January 1965, Argentines did approach the US government about buying 36 

F–5s, asking that deliveries start in 1968. Their inventory, at this point, included aging 

F–86s and British Meteors. Secretary McNamara wanted to delay Argentina’s acquisition of advanced aircraft but keep open the possibility of “pre-emptive” US action. 

Consequently, he considered offering an immediate sale of one more F–86 squadron, 

priced low enough to avoid interfering with Argentina’s long-range plans. As to F–5s, 

Argentine representatives should be invited to Washington and asked, pending that 

visit, to postpone a decision about buying French Mirage IIIs.85

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to do a good deal more. Argentina’s F–5 bid 

impressed them as “a sincere effort to assure a reasonable degree of modernization.” 

They did not rate the F–5 as highly sophisticated by current standards; in fact, it was 

designed expressly for sale to countries with limited technical and financial means. 

Argentines were bound to learn that F–5s had been offered to Ethiopia and Morocco, 

whose resources were no greater than theirs. Besides, F–5s would be less likely to trigger a serious arms race than would the more sophisticated Mirage IIIs. The decision 

facing the US government, they stressed, was “essentially a political one.” The need to 

keep US influence predominant in the region remained fundamental. Therefore, they 

strongly favored “a prompt and clear statement” of willingness to provide Argentina 

the F–5s by 1969, or even sooner.86
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On 31 March, Secretary McNamara informed the Argentine defense minister 

that F-86s could be delivered quickly and A–4s made available at an early date. He 

suggested consultations during April and May about an F–5 sale. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff had called an A–4 offer inadvisable, since the Argentines preferred to keep their 

F–86s flying if F–5 deliveries could be assured “within a reasonable period.” For the 

US ambassador’s eyes alone, Secretary McNamara cabled that sales of A–4Es and F–5s 

could be considered about five years hence. Washington would make no commitment 

now, though, because the F–5 might be superseded by a better airplane.87

In May 1965, after learning that the Argentines were considering Mirage bids, Secretary McNamara decided to offer 50 A–4A and A–4B Skyhawks, for delivery during 

1966–67. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered this, too, an inadequate response. They 

noted that efforts to lure Brazil and Venezuela away from F–5s by offering A–4s and 

other interim aircraft had failed. Even if the Argentines were persuaded to purchase 

A–4s, other major Latin American countries would insist upon equal treatment. In that 

case, the sales requirements for A-4Bs would exceed 100, just at a time when Skyhawks 

were being sent to Southeast Asia. So, yet again, they recommended selling F–5s to 

Argentina, and to Brazil and Venezuela as well.88

Argentina agreed to buy 50 A–4Bs during 1966–67 and indicated willingness to 

procure between 18 and 24 F–5s starting in 1970. The State and Defense Departments 

decided to negotiate with Brazil and Venezuela about selling F–5s that would be delivered during 1969. Chile and Peru also would be offered F–5s with deliveries beginning 

in 1970–72, if doing so was necessary to forestall purchases elsewhere. The State 

Department believed, and Secretary McNamara agreed, that Venezuela was the only 

country that might try to buy aircraft elsewhere—and US interests would not be seriously harmed if only one country did so. Postponing F–5 purchases beyond 1966–67, 

McNamara argued, actually would help Latin American governments by: allowing them 

to improve their foreign exchange positions; possibly permitting better counterinsurgency aircraft to become available; and providing them time to consider purchasing 

transport aircraft and other equipment “that all of us consider of much higher military 

priority.” As to the possible shortage of A–4s, Secretary McNamara calculated that 

Latin American needs during 1966–67 would not exceed 70 to 80 aircraft. If difficulties 

did develop, he foresaw a number of solutions.89

A related matter, small in itself but symptomatic of larger difficulties, deserves 

mention. ISA proposed deleting two C–130s—one for Peru and one for Chile—from 

grant aid and reassigning funds to higher-priority programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

countered that the C–130’s great flexibility and special cargo capabilities “uniquely 

qualify it for internal security and civic action missions in Latin American countries, 

where the terrain and weather often present insurmountable obstacles to other types 

of transport aircraft.” This problem was particularly acute in Peru, where supplies for 

civic action programs had to be flown across the Andes.90

Disagreeing, Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Alvin Friedman advised cancellation of the C–130 grants. When the Director, Joint Staff, learned of this, he urged 
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159

General Wheeler to plead the case personally: “More is at stake . . . than the question 

of the . . . aircraft. The real issue is whether Mr. Friedman is to be permitted to fragment the Latin American MAP piecemeal . . . by red-lining individual items which he 

considers to be too expensive. His action disregards the considerable judgment and 

experience that goes into the refinement and preparation of the military assistance 

program.” Nonetheless, Secretary McNamara sided with Friedman. Peru, the Secretary ruled, must purchase her C–130 through the Military Sales Program; otherwise, 

he foresaw pressure from other Latin countries for similar grant aid. The MAP funds 

thus released would meet more pressing needs outside Latin America.91

Whether to sell F–5s remained a sensitive topic. Chile asked for them, was put off, 

and proceeded to buy British Hawker-Hunters. Peru, unsatisfied by a US offer to sell 

F–86s, began negotiating for French Mirages. Argentina, denied M–41 light tanks,92

also looked to Paris. Brazil wavered between contracting for F–5s or Mirages.93 In July 

1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that administration policies were undermining 

the structure of US military influence, “which has been decades in the making.” Were 

not aid and advice “basic, essential, and integral” parts of what Washington sought to 

achieve through the Alliance for Progress? If the United States did not support selective modernization, an arms race and the displacement of US influence might result. 

Then peace, political stability, economic and social development all would stand in 

serious jeopardy. Therefore, they urged that “legitimate demands” for modernization 

be met—specifically, M–41 tanks for Argentina and F–5 aircraft for Argentina, Brazil, 

Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. In June 1967, the Peruvian government was reported ready 

to purchase Mirages. Washington threatened to deny much-needed financial assistance 

and declined to promise F–5 deliveries: “We could not agree to be party to transaction 

which diverted substantial Peruvian resources from economic to military purposes 

when the latter purposes are of low priority.” This threat failing, Washington offered 

to loan and subsequently sell cheaper F–5s. The switch came too late. In October 1967, 

President Terry Belaunde declared the Mirage deal “a closed issue.”94

Another debate involved how much help to give Latin anti-submarine warfare 

forces. This was the one form of external defense that the Kennedy administration had 

supported. In February 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that US firms be encouraged to bid upon building four submarines for the Brazilian navy. Deputy Secretary 

Nitze reacted by posing broader questions. Reportedly, Argentina, Chile, and Peru 

planned to acquire two submarines each. Brazil also planned to add ten destroyer 

escorts; Argentina and Peru had inquired about buying two destroyers each. The JSOP 

recommended that these four nations possess a total of 47 destroyers and escorts. 

They had only 32, some of which were old; full replacement would cost between $225 

and $375 million. What ASW forces, Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did Latins 

actually need? How could sizable requirements be reconciled with the US objective of 

reducing their military spending?95

They replied that Latin navies, which during general war would bear the whole 

ASW burden in contiguous waters, could not protect shipping routes. The Soviets 
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probably would deploy between six and ten diesel submarines in the South Atlantic. 

Supercargo ships, too wide to pass through locks in the Panama Canal, would be sailing 

around Cape Horn. That being the situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still wanted their 

JSOP goals fulfilled; the cost of doing so would total $380.8 million through FY 1977.96

Deputy Secretary Nitze dismissed those arguments. Even under optimum conditions, larger ASW forces could not prevent “substantial” shipping losses. But the danger 

of losing enough shipping to impair US war production struck him as remote, “when 

one considers the substantial levels of essential materials that are stockpiled against 

possible wartime needs.” Consequently, he saw no reason to encourage spending for 

ASW forces. US policy would continue emphasizing internal security, just as it had 

been doing since 1961.97

Meanwhile, in September 1967, an Inter-departmental Regional Group (IRG) 

circulated a draft prescribing policy toward Latin American security forces. Among 

other things, it proposed (1) limiting grant aid to internal security programs as a 

general rule and (2) carrying out sales commitments with larger countries to replace 

their obsolescent jets with F–5s. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged this draft generally 

acceptable and naturally endorsed a continuation of selective grant aid. Still, they 

objected to several things: an apparent overstressing of internal security; an emphasis 

upon restrictive policies rather than constructive, cooperative ventures; insufficient 

recognition of national aspirations; and failure to note that Latin American defense 

expenditures were low and falling. The IRG produced a revision that incorporated 

some of their minor reservations but not their larger ones. Nonetheless, in mid-1968, 

the Senior Interdepartmental Group approved it as policy guidance.98

In May 1968, Secretary Rusk suggested arranging an informal meeting with Latin 

defense ministers to strengthen hemispheric understanding of security matters. State 

also recommended that grant aid continue after the cutoff scheduled for FY 1970. General Johnson urged his JCS colleagues to back both proposals. He warned of “steady 

erosion” in US-Latin military relations, as South American governments sought arms 

elsewhere. Argentina, for example, had reacted to political pressures and sales restrictions by refusing MAP credits and buying minesweepers from Britain and tanks from 

France. General McConnell, however, considered the idea of a ministerial meeting too 

nebulous to warrant their unsolicited consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed 

a study but then, in August, decided against approving a report that stated concern 

over deteriorating US-Latin military relations and recommended preparations for a 

ministerial meeting. No such gathering occurred.99

It is impossible to generalize about whether or how far aircraft sales helped 

preserve US influence. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate issued 

in January 1968, most Latins would consider refusal to sell F–5s an affront to their 

national pride and unwarranted US interference in their internal affairs.100 As things 

turned out, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela contracted for Mirage IIIs. Brazil and 

Venezuela—but not Argentina—also acquired F–5s. Brazil continued along the conservative, pro-US path begun in 1964 by a military takeover. The Peruvian military 
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ousted President Belaunde in October 1968. The new regime promptly displayed its 

independence by reversing Belaunde’s settlement and nationalizing the International 

Petroleum Co., a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. Argentina went its own 

way, veering politically between left and right. During its 1982 war with Great Britain 

over the Falkland Islands, A–4B Skyhawks proved to be the most effective weapons 

in Argentina’s arsenal.

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10

Upheaval in the Middle East

The Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were also 

manifested in the Middle East. Arabs and Israelis had been at war—always formally, 

sometimes literally—since 1948, when the state of Israel came into being. Israel 

proved unbeatable on the battlefield, but Arab governments would neither recognize 

nor make peace with her. The United States and some nations of Western Europe supplied Israel with modest amounts of weaponry; they also preserved influence with 

the conservative, pro-western monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia by providing 

them with some military equipment. The Soviet Union gave large-scale economic and 

military assistance to the radical regimes of Egypt and Syria. Egypt’s fiery President 

Gamal Abdul Nasser, a heroic figure for many Arabs, became something of a Soviet 

protégé. US economic aid to Egypt, in the form of sizable “Food for Peace” disbursements, yielded puny political dividends.1 Nasser appeared to follow Moscow’s lead in 

opposing US policies, going as far afield as the Congo to do so.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that, from the standpoint of US security interests, Arab countries possessed more strategic assets than Israel. Back in 1947, they 

had opposed the partitioning of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. Alienated 

Arabs would turn to the USSR, they predicted, and access to vital oil supplies would 

be endangered.2 But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not overtly hostile to Israel, by any 

means. In 1962, they supported the sale to Israel of a Hawk surface-to-air missile battalion. In 1964, they recommended selling 300 M–48 tanks. Repeatedly, however, they 

warned about the dangers of close military collaboration with Israel.

Israel and Jordan: An Unattainable “Balance”

As 1965 opened, US policymakers faced challenges from several quarters. First, regional tensions rose as Syria and Jordan (reacting to Israel’s diversion of water 

163
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

from Lake Tiberias) started projects that would siphon water from the Jordan River’s 

tributaries. Second, Israelis were angered by West Germany’s sudden abrogation of 

an agreement to sell 150 M–48 tanks.3 Their unhappiness increased when a Tel Aviv 

newspaper revealed that the United States was about to sell Jordan almost $50 million worth of equipment, including some M–48s. The United Arab Command, a unified military command composed of 13 states of the Arab League, had been pressing 

Jordan to pursue an arms buildup, as part of a larger Arab effort to achieve military 

parity with Israel.4

The Joint Chiefs, OSD, and Central Intelligence recommended completing the tank 

sale to Jordan, fearing that otherwise King Hussein would seek Soviet weaponry. But 

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sent President Johnson a letter recording his strong objections. On 9 February, the President decided that National Security Council (NSC) staff 

member Robert Komer and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman would go to 

Israel. Their task was to forestall Israeli lobbying on Capitol Hill against US assistance 

to friendly Arab governments. Komer and Harriman could offer an assurance that, 

“when Israel has a demonstrable need which cannot be satisfactorily filled elsewhere,” 

the United States would “consider direct sales on credit terms.” Israel, in return, would 

be asked actively to support US aid for Jordan and to refrain from premature preemptive action against Arab water-diversion projects. “Never,” McGeorge Bundy wryly 

cabled Komer, “has so much been done by so many for so few.”5

Prime Minister Eshkol proved unwilling to endorse US aid for Jordan unless Israel 

received similar help. Any other solution, Mr. Komer reported, would precipitate “a 

major crisis in our relations.” Under Secretary Harriman proposed saying that the 

United States was “willing to consider favorably” aircraft and tank sales. President 

Johnson instructed him to say, instead, that the administration was “prepared to consider sympathetically” Israel’s needs. This, too, proved inadequate. Finally, on 3 March, 

President Johnson authorized a promise that the United States would—without setting 

a precedent—sell Israel equipment comparable in quantity and kind to that given Jordan. Israel, in return, must neither oppose the offer to Jordan nor reveal any aspects 

of the agreement until Washington was ready to do so. That, of course, represented a 

considerable retreat from the original US position.6

On 10 March 1965, the two governments concluded a Memorandum of Understanding in which the United States undertook to (1) sell Israel “at least the same number 

and quality of tanks that it sells to Jordan,” (2) provide, if West Germany backed away, 

the rest of 150 tanks under the German-Israel deal of 1964, and (3) “ensure for Israel 

an opportunity to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft, if not from Western 

sources, then from the United States.” Although not specified in the Agreement, the 

maximum number was understood to be 24. Eight days later, United States and Jordanian officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for cash sales along 

the lines of an “illustrative list” that included 100 M–48s. King Hussein promised to 

keep those tanks on the East Bank of the Jordan River.7

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165

Meantime, ISA had asked the Joint Staff to assess how sales to Jordan would affect 

the Arab-Israeli balance, to appraise the impact of Jordan’s purchasing supersonic 

Mirage IIIs from France, and to identify Israeli deficiencies that, during the next five 

years, must be remedied by outside sources. Answering on 12 March, the Director, Joint 

Staff, found no reason to believe that Israel’s superiority would erode. Combat-ready 

tank inventories (1,600 Arab versus 756 Israeli) would not change significantly, and 

Israel’s qualitative advantage should remain intact. Aircraft inventories stood at 543 

Arab against 231 Israeli. Mere numbers of planes were deceiving, however, because 

combat readiness ran about 80 percent for Israel versus 60 percent for Arabs. Israel’s 

qualitative lead actually would increase, despite the Mirage sale to Jordan, because 

Israel would be buying 49 French Ouragons and Mysteres. Consequently, the Director 

could detect no deficiencies requiring correction through foreign procurement.8

In April, Israel sought permission to purchase 210 M-48A2C tanks with 90-mm 

guns, 75 combat aircraft, and 60 self-propelled 155-mm howitzers. ISA asked the Joint 

Staff to assess the effect of providing 310 M-48A2Cs (100 to equalize the sale to Jordan, 

110 to make good the aborted German delivery, and perhaps an additional 100 to offset 

a later sale to Jordan), 25 to 75 aircraft (probably light bombers), and 60 howitzers. 

The Joint Chiefs themselves answered on 6 May and addressed their reply to Secretary 

McNamara—a measure of the importance they attached to this issue. Fundamentally, 

they began, “every effort should be made to avoid a polarization . . .whereby the United 

States becomes increasingly identified with Israel and the USSR with the Arab world.” 

Such a situation probably would promote anti-American Arab unity under Nasser’s 

leadership. As to armor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that selling M-48A2Cs would 

“significantly increase Israeli qualitative superiority” but reduce the US Army’s inventory. The British intended to sell Israel 250 Centurions outfitted with 105-mm guns. 

Therefore, to reduce adverse Arab reaction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended selling only 100 earlier model M–48A1s, balancing the Jordanian sale. As for aircraft, they 

urged that every effort be made to persuade Israel to keep buying from Western Europe 

sources. If a US sale became necessary, the F–5 interceptor offered “the best available 

compromise on the basis of performance, cost, political considerations, and impact 

on US military posture.” The arrival of Hawk missiles would offset Arab superiority 

in offensive aircraft, and adding 75 bombers to Israel’s inventory would “drastically” 

change the military balance. As to howitzers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would approve 

only if the tank sale was correspondingly reduced. The Chiefs summarized: “If the 

Israelis were to acquire . . . 310 M–48 type tanks, 60 self-propelled 155-mm weapons, 

and 250 Centurion tanks, the Arab-Israeli arms balance would be tipped in favor of 

Israel to a significant degree by the end of 1967.”9

By an agreement reached on 29 July, Israel received (1) 110 M-48A2Cs to replace 

the German sale, with 105-mm conversion kits for those and for the 40 that Bonn had 

delivered, and (2) 100 M–48 A1s to match those being sold to Jordan. No self-propelled 

artillery was included, except as substitutes for tanks, and Israel must exhaust European sources before seeking US aircraft. Originally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had jus165
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tified furnishing M–48s as necessary to modernize Israel’s inventory. But, as M–48s 

arrived, the Israelis did not retire their World War II Shermans. Instead, they improved 

them and upgraded their guns.10

In October 1965, Brigadier General Ezer Weizman came to Washington with a 

request to purchase 210 aircraft (45 supersonic multipurpose F–4s or subsonic A–6 

attack aircraft, 165 subsonic A–4 attack aircraft). He said the Israeli Air Force operated according to a concept of absorbing the first blow, surviving, and then striking 

back. For the initial retaliatory attack against Egypt, a wave of 360 aircraft would be 

required. Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Townsend Hoopes read the US reply: “We 

cannot stress too strongly our view that the French are the natural suppliers of the 

Israeli Air Force.” Subsequently, the Joint Staff advised Mr. Hoopes that General Weizman’s aircraft requirements were invalid, and that the Israelis probably would consider 

launching a pre-emptive strike.11

After the Israelis alleged that no suitable European planes were available, President Johnson allowed them to purchase US aircraft. In February 1966, McNamara and 

Foreign Minister Abba Eban discussed the conditions for a sale. McNamara said the 

United States would not act as a major arms provider for either Israel or the Arabs, sell 

sophisticated aircraft like the A–612 to any Middle Eastern country, or supply supersonic planes to Jordan without Israel’s approval. Washington was, however, prepared to 

supply Israel with 24 A–4 Skyhawks and extend an option to buy 24 more. Sales terms 

would involve low-interest payments over ten years. Israelis, for their part, should 

continue looking to Europe for the bulk of their aircraft purchases, reiterate their 

undertaking not to be the first Middle East power to manufacture nuclear weapons, 

accept periodic inspection of the Dimona reactor, agree not to use US-supplied aircraft 

as nuclear weapons carriers, and keep all agreements secret until Washington decided 

otherwise. Secretary McNamara stressed that he wanted no repetition of the 1965 furor 

over the tank sale to Jordan. Eban assured him that Israel would maintain its French 

connection and did not intend to build nuclear weapons. If publicity or non-publicity 

about Israel and Jordan was “symmetrical,” he anticipated no serious problems.13

Under a sales agreement signed in March 1966, the United States contracted to 

deliver 48 A–4Fs between September 1967 and December 1968. Israel agreed to the conditions specified above, although stating the nuclear provisos simply as affirmations 

of existing policy. Simultaneously, the United States sold Jordan 12 F–104 interceptors, 

for delivery between September 1967 and April 1968, along with an option to buy 24 

more. Washington publicized the Jordanian arrangement in April 1966, the Israeli deal 

about a month later.

An unpleasant epilogue occurred in May, when France agreed to sell Israel 50 

supersonic Mirage IIIs. US officials were upset, particularly because General Weizman had told them in great detail why the Mirage III was unsuited to Israel’s needs. 

Nonetheless, the administration did not reconsider its A–4 sale.14

Late in 1966, US efforts to nurture ties with Jordan nearly came to grief. The tempo 

of Palestinian raids into Israel steadily increased; the attackers came from Jordan but 

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Upheaval in the Middle East

167

probably were spurred by Syria. On 13 November, Israel resorted to massive reprisal. 

An Israeli brigade devastated the border village of Es Samu, reputedly a terrorist haven, 

and routed Jordan Arab Legion soldiers who tried to stop them. King Hussein’s standing 

was severely shaken. Since the King had barred United Arab Command and Palestine 

Liberation Organization troops from Jordan, his inability to resist Israel’s incursion 

was humiliating. Palestinians rioted in Jerusalem, and Hussein’s Bedouin soldiers were 

incensed. The King told the US ambassador that “a point may come when he would 

rather go down fighting his enemies rather than his own people.”15

On 17 November, after discussions between OSD and Joint Staff officers, Acting 

Assistant Secretary Hoopes recommended to Secretary McNamara that arms deliveries 

to Israel be temporarily suspended. The State Department decided against doing so, fearing congressional counter-pressure for an area-wide ban. Moreover, the State Department 

could find no evidence that US equipment had been used in the Es Samu attack. On 20 

November, the State Department rejected a Jordanian request for massive military aid.

The next day, at President Johnson’s direction, Secretary Rusk warned the Israeli 

ambassador that “further punitive forays . . . could bring about a reassessment of the 

premises” on which supply decisions were based.16 Three days later, the administration 

decided to airlift six howitzers and 15 recoilless rifles to Jordan, and also to accelerate F–104 deliveries. On 25 November, with US approval, the UN Security Council 

censured Israel. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg explained that Arab losses at Es Samu 

“far surpass the cumulative total of the various acts of terrorism conducted against 

the frontiers of Israel.”17

These actions left King Hussein unsatisfied, and he sent the President a letter saying 

so very bluntly. On 28 November, the State Department, ISA, and Joint Staff officers discussed “the real price we have to pay to preserve a moderate, pro-Western Jordan.” The 

best answer, they agreed, lay in providing some items that were “defensive, inexpensive, 

manpower conserving, and readily available.” Simultaneously, King Hussein’s chief of 

staff, Brigadier General Amer Khammash, arrived in Washington uninvited. Presenting 

US officials with a huge shopping list, Khammash said that failure to fulfill it would 

compel King Hussein to abdicate, seek Soviet aid, or attack Israel and die fighting.18

Mr. Hoopes asked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations about ways to assist 

Jordan. The J–5 proposed an immediate suspension of arms shipments to Israel. General 

Johnson suggested suspension as a “minimum” and diversion of those same shipments 

to Jordan as a “maximum.” General McConnell argued, however, that too much time 

had elapsed since Es Samu for suspension to be politically effective. Accordingly, on 5 

December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that if another incident 

similar to Es Samu occurred, “the United States should suspend the sale and deliveries of 

military equipment to Israel.” They further proposed providing Jordan with $12.8 million 

worth of equipment, including 105-mm guns to upgrade 50 M–48s, 90 armored personnel 

carriers (APC), 36 howitzers, and 27 106-mm recoilless rifles.19

At that point, FY 1967 aid for Jordan amounted to $3.7 million. On 6 December, 

interdepartmental representatives discussed options. Worried about Israel’s reaction 

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and wondering whether King Hussein could survive even with massive help, the State 

Department suggested providing only $2 to $3 million over the next two or three years. 

ISA’s spokesman presented $5, $8, and $12 million alternatives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

representative reaffirmed support of a $12.8 million supplemental. Ambassador William Macomber, Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development 

(AID), recommended an additional $1 to $2 million over the next two years.20

Mr. Hoopes asked the Joint Staff to review a proposed $4.75 million supplemental 

and a letter from President Johnson to King Hussein. On 9 December, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff themselves sent a reply to Secretary McNamara. In it, they “strongly” reaffirmed 

that $12.8 million was the minimum necessary to achieve significant impact. An offer 

of $4.75 million, being merely a token, probably would lead King Hussein to seek arms 

elsewhere. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended changes in the President’s letter, removing admonitions against over-arming and an implication that additional aid 

might be forthcoming. Nonetheless, Secretary McNamara supported $4.75 million.21

An interagency meeting on 12 December added tanks to the supplemental package 

and accelerated delivery schedules. However, President Johnson did not send the letter 

to King Hussein because he wanted to be able to tell members of Congress, who might 

oppose Jordanian aid, that “nothing is jelled.” The next day, Secretary McNamara presented the $4.75 million package to General Khammash, who was “very obviously, very 

completely disappointed.” Bitterly, King Hussein revealed to US officials that he had 

been secretly in contact with Israeli leaders during the past three years and so regarded 

Es Samu as a complete betrayal of his efforts in the interest of peace and stability.22

President Johnson sent Ambassador Macomber to Amman, with instructions to 

“hold [the king] down but don’t lose him.” On 21 December, King Hussein and Ambassador Macomber agreed that the United States would furnish $9 million in aid. Six 

F–104s accompanied by American instructors came to Jordan in January 1967. By late 

February, air and sea lift had delivered to Jordan ground equipment which included 60 

armored personnel carriers, 42 recoilless rifles, and 18 155-mm howitzers. Nonetheless, 

the damage was done. Recognizing that King Hussein provided “a significant, albeit 

weak, barrier between Israel and more radical Arab regimes,” the administration had 

tried to nurture moderation. However, Es Samu “shattered the delicate confidence that 

existed between Israel and Jordan.”23

Countdown

I

n January 1967, as incidents along the Israel-Syria border increased, Israel asked the 

United States for 200 M–113 armored personnel carriers and $2 million worth of spare 

parts for tanks, all as grant aid rather than sales. On 2 February, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff labeled grant aid unjustified, whether for economic, military, or political reasons. 

Israel already could defend itself against “any individual or collective Arab attack.” In 

the Joint Chiefs’ judgment, additional sales of major items would: negate the effect of 

168
Upheaval in the Middle East

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warnings issued after Es Samu; aggravate instability in Jordan; further establish the 

United States as Israel’s principal arms supplier; provoke adverse Arab reactions; and 

further fuel the Arab-Israeli arms race, with Washington supplying both sides. They 

even wanted to discourage Israel from acquiring M–113s from European sources. 

Secretary McNamara agreed, and the administration deferred action.24

Regional tensions mounted steadily. Palestinian guerrillas operating from Syria 

and Jordan struck at Israel. On 7 April, Syrians fired at Israeli tractors in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the border. Fighting intensified, first on the ground and then 

in the air, where Israeli Mirages shot down two MiG–21s over Quneitra and four more 

over Damascus.25

Matters took a fateful turn on 13 May, when Moscow warned Cairo—incorrectly—

that an Israeli invasion of Syria was imminent. Nasser reacted by moving troops into 

the Sinai, presumably to deter an Israeli attack. Since 1957, when Israel withdrew from 

Egyptian territory under US pressure, a 3,400-man United Nations Emergency Force 

(UNEF) had patrolled the Egyptian side of the armistice line in the Sinai. A UNEF 

detachment stationed at Sharm al-Shaykh assured that Israeli ships could pass the 

Strait of Tiran, through the Red Sea up to the Gulf of Aqaba and the port of Eilat at 

its head. On 16 May, Egypt demanded the UNEF’s immediate withdrawal. UN Secretary General U Thant chose to comply immediately and totally. Six days later, Nasser 

ordered the occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh and closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli 

shipping as well as vessels carrying “strategic materials” to Israel.26 He placed Egypt 

on a war footing and started massing forces in the Sinai Desert. By then, Israel had 

begun a general mobilization.

In 1957, the US government had declared that “no nation has the right to prevent 

free and innocent passage” in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran.27 On 23 May 

1967, President Johnson publicly described a blockade of Israeli shipping as “illegal” 

and the right of free, innocent passage through an international waterway as “a vital 

interest of the international community.” Simultaneously, the administration approved 

(1) cash sales of 100 APCs, preferably M–113s produced under license in Italy but 

directly from the United States if necessary; (2) cash sale of $2 million in tank spare 

parts; and (3) credit sales of $4 million in Hawk spares and another $10 million in tank 

spares. The US intelligence community judged Israeli ground forces to be capable of 

defending against Arab assaults on all fronts, launching limited counterattacks on all 

fronts, or holding on three fronts while mounting a major successful offensive on the 

fourth. In the air, Israelis probably could defeat Egyptians if their own air facilities 

were not damaged beyond repair.28

A new Middle East Control Group, headed by Under Secretary of State Eugene 

Rostow and including Deputy Secretary Vance, examined options. A contingency 

planning group, subordinate to it, had among its members Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Hoopes and Brigadier General Thomas Sibley, USA, from the J–5.

The National Security Council reviewed matters on 24 May. General Wheeler 

cautioned that opening the Gulf of Aqaba might prove harder than first believed. Two 
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Egyptian submarines were in the Red Sea; the nearest anti-submarine warfare unit 

would need two weeks to steam from Singapore, since sending one through the Suez 

Canal looked too risky. General Wheeler suggested backing Israelis “down the line,” 

relying upon Arabs’ inefficiency and lack of homogeneity to weaken their cause. In a 

long war, he continued, we would have to decide whether to commit US forces and 

confront Nasser directly. Could the Soviets, President Johnson asked, avoid directly 

committing themselves? General Wheeler thought the USSR “might just cut its losses 

and back out.” More pessimistically, Secretary McNamara foresaw a fierce air battle 

in which Arabs and Israelis depleted their inventories and turned to the superpowers 

for help.29

Later that day a British mission led by George Thomson, Minister of State for 

Foreign Affairs, arrived in Washington. Meeting with the Rostow group, Mr. Thomson 

conveyed the Cabinet’s belief that strong measures to reopen the Strait were necessary 

because Israel could be restrained only for a matter of days. London’s plan involved: a 

declaration by maritime powers affirming their determination to uphold the right of 

free passage; prompt creation of a US-UK task force in the Red Sea, backed by larger 

forces in the Mediterranean; and armed escort of each ship bound for Eilat. Rear Admiral Józef Bartosik of the Royal Navy outlined a three-tiered scheme involving: a “probe 

force” of one US cruiser, one or two US destroyers, and one or two UK frigates to test 

Egyptian intentions and shepherd merchantmen through the straits; a “covering force” 

including one British carrier in the Red Sea; and a powerful “deterrent force” including 

the Sixth Fleet and two UK carriers in the eastern Mediterranean. If the Egyptians 

chose to resist, their airfields would be hit at once.30

General Sibley responded with a preliminary proposal in which three escorts 

would be backed up by one ASW carrier, six destroyers, minesweepers, and aircraft 

from either Israel or the US and UK Mediterranean fleets. Assembly time would be 

longer but the risk lower. Indeed, when General Wheeler and the Director, Joint Staff, 

reviewed Bartosik’s plan that evening, both men were alarmed by the absence of 

adequate aerial, ASW, and minesweeping protection. Were the British, perhaps, trying 

to trigger an incident and take revenge for their humiliation over the aborted invasion 

of 1956? If an incident was wanted, General Wheeler observed, one could be arranged 

without sacrificing an American destroyer.31

Anglo-American talks resulted in tentative agreement, “on a staffing basis,” to 

press for UN action to guarantee free passage, seek support from maritime powers for 

a declaration asserting the right of free passage through the Strait of Tiran, and explore 

necessary military actions. The British wanted probe, covering, and deterrent forces 

all put under US command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred that any such force “be 

designed as a protective presence—not for escort duty—and be capable of defending 

itself.”32 Meanwhile, Eugene Rostow instructed the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv to tell 

the Israelis about Minister Thomson’s plan.

With the crisis showing signs of worsening, Israel’s Foreign Minister Abba Eban 

flew to Washington for consultations. On the morning of 26 May, Eban told Secretary 
Upheaval in the Middle East

171

McNamara and General Wheeler that “the balloon would go up” unless he could take 

home definite assurances of US action of keep the Strait open. Eban also reported 

“knowledge” that an attack by Egypt and Syria was imminent. Early that afternoon, 

President Johnson polled his senior advisers. Wheeler described Egyptian deployments 

in the Sinai as basically defensive. Israel, the Chairman said, should be able to resist or 

undertake aggression and prevail “in the long term.” He believed Nasser would back 

down “if the maritime powers were able to muster an impressive enough force.” General 

Wheeler proposed first sending a non-Israeli flag cargo ship into the Strait, followed by a 

cargo ship with military escort. If they were attacked, “the least we could do” would be 

to strike the air and naval bases from which the attackers came. If you were in Eban’s 

place, President Johnson asked General Wheeler, would you be satisfied with relying on 

the UN and a group of maritime powers? General Wheeler replied that he would “drive a 

harder bargain” involving a US guarantee to back Israel if these efforts failed. Secretary 

McNamara suggested telling Mr. Eban that if Israel struck first, it would stand alone. But 

if a UN effort failed, and subject to Congressional approval, the President would work 

with other nations to ensure that the Gulf stayed open. That evening, President Johnson 

assured Mr. Eban that “our best efforts and our best influence” would be used—but support from Congress and the American people were essential. The President stressed that 

“all our intelligence people are unanimous” in believing no attack was imminent, and 

that if it did occur “you will whip hell out of them.”33

The US Embassy in Cairo cabled a grim assessment: “We believe [Egyptians] will 

militarily contest any attempt by anyone to break Aqaba blockade unless faced by 

overwhelming military force and that they have little or nothing to lose by such confrontation.”34 On 27 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary McNamara with 

an appraisal of blockade-breaking measures:

Course I: Unilateral execution by the 2 US destroyers and 1 tactical command 

ship already east of Suez, ready within four days.

Course II: Combined US and UK action by forces already east of Suez, which would 

 add the British carrier Hermes with 2 destroyers and be ready to execute in 

about eight days.

Course III: Unilateral US execution with reinforcements from the Mediterranean 

 (1 cruiser, 3 or 4 destroyers, and the carrier USS Intrepid with 53 A–1 and 

A–4 attack aircraft aboard), ready in three days. 

Course IV: Combined US and UK action with Mediterranean augmentations, ready 

eight days hence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed Course I too risky. They rejected Courses III and 

IV because of: the provocation involved in sending a carrier, cruisers, and destroyers 

through the Suez Canal, and the threat of their being blocked and trapped during transit; the danger incurred by operating a carrier in the Red Sea’s restricted waters; and 

the probability that a US-Egyptian incident would spark an Israeli reaction followed by 

escalation. Consequently, Course II offered “the best chance of success” and ran fewer 

risks.35 Even so, they foresaw “a high probability” that the Egyptians would attack and 
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damage the probing destroyers. Retaliatory strikes from carrier aircraft would spread 

the fighting and defeat the probe’s purpose, which was to confine the issue to assuring free passage through the Strait of Tiran. Therefore, since all courses easily could 

escalate into either a full-scale Arab-Israeli war or a US-Egyptian confrontation, “US 

action should not be undertaken unless the US Government is prepared to respond 

appropriately.” Acting Assistant Secretary Hoopes told Secretary McNamara that he 

considered the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper “unduly pessimistic with respect to the 

chances of success and the attendant risks.”36

Premier Kosygin sent the President an urgent message that Israel “evidently 

intends to carry out armed aggression,” in which case the Soviets would “give aid to 

the countries attacked.” President Johnson quickly cabled Prime Minister Eshkol that 

“Israel just must not take any pre-emptive military action.” The Israeli Cabinet, almost 

evenly divided, resolved to wait as long as three weeks for Washington to act upon its 

promise of an international effort to reopen the Strait.37

On 29 May, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk drafted “marching orders” that involved 

positioning a larger force in the Red Sea, seeking a declaration by maritime nations, 

and approaching several countries about contributing to what was dubbed a “Red Sea 

Regatta.” Anglo-American military planning should not resume, however, until diplomatic 

efforts had been exhausted. So when the Chairman, British Joint Services Mission, raised 

that question with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the American replied that political 

initiatives should precede more naval conversations. Secretaries McNamara and Rusk 

also recommended that the carrier USS Intrepid, en route to Southeast Asia and held in 

the eastern Mediterranean since 20 May, sail through the Suez Canal. President Johnson 

approved, and Intrepid made the transit on 31 May without incident.38

On 30 May, Nasser and Hussein concluded a mutual defense treaty. In Israel, pressure for action kept growing. “It is crucial,” Eshkol informed President Johnson the 

same day, “that the international naval escort should move through the straits within 

a week or two.” That evening, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk submitted to the President their proposed “marching orders.” An international task force, keeping the Strait 

open for all flags, should consist of two parts: a “protective” force in the northern Red 

Sea and a “reinforcing” one in the eastern Mediterranean. They proposed to begin 

testing the blockade’s limits quite soon, perhaps encouraging passage to Eilat by an 

Israeli-owned but non-Israeli flag ship carrying non-strategic cargo. But the probe 

itself should not proceed for 25 to 30 days, allowing time to assemble a strong force 

augmented primarily by naval units from CONUS. Politically, a congressional resolution must precede the use of US forces. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara wanted to 

delay seeking one until diplomacy’s failure was plain and prompt support on Capitol 

Hill seemed certain. Although many Vietnam “doves” might convert to Middle East 

“hawks,” they warned that “the problem of ‘Tonkin Gulfitis’ remains serious.”39

At mid-day on 2 June, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk conferred with British 

officials who included Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend and Admiral Nigel Henderson. 

Secretary McNamara said the Israelis believed they could win in three or four days, 
Upheaval in the Middle East

173

first destroying the Egyptian air force; his own estimate was seven to ten days. The 

Israelis claimed their capabilities were perishable, but Secretary McNamara believed 

Israel could delay two to four weeks and still accomplish its objective.40 According to 

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, intensive consultations with congressional leaders 

had revealed “a passionate aversion” to any unilateral US action. British and Americans 

agreed to put off joint military planning, the danger of leaks being too great.41

On 2 June, also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara another appraisal of blockade-breaking schemes. Caution was their watchword, probably because just 

then they were enmeshed in a debate about expanding the war in Southeast Asia.42 In 

31 days, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported, a balanced naval force could be assembled 

in the Red Sea. That course impressed the Joint Chiefs as operationally unsound, however, since it meant splitting forces between the Red and Mediterranean Seas, operating 

in a confined area, depending upon extended lines of communication, and requiring 

rotation that would degrade readiness elsewhere. A probe launched in less than 31 

days would have to employ whatever forces already were east of Suez, and their ability to defeat Egyptian attacks appeared doubtful. If the President decided to wait and 

employ larger forces, the task of assembling them should start soon. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff outlined a concept of operations. First, concentrate a naval force in the Red Sea 

off the Strait of Tiran; position US and UK naval units in the eastern Mediterranean, 

putting carrier- and land-based air within striking distance of Egyptian targets. Then, 

send merchant ships through the Strait in the following order: non-Israeli-owned and/

or non-Israeli flag; Israeli owned but non-Israeli flag; Israeli owned and Israeli flag. If 

the Egyptians resorted to force, countermeasures would be directed at “the immediate 

perpetrators.” Should these fail, more wide-ranging attacks would follow.43

At this point, Washington and Tel Aviv were moving along entirely different time 

lines. Garnering support for a maritime declaration and a Red Sea Regatta, followed 

by passage of a congressional resolution, would take a few weeks. Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Hoopes informed Secretary McNamara that the basic difficulty about organizing probes was “the general unavailability of appropriate shipping.” Mr. Hoopes and 

Deputy Secretary Vance wanted to seek “a political settlement based on compromise.” 

In Israel, however, Prime Minister Eshkol’s plea for more patience had worn very thin. 

Facing intense pressure, Mr. Eshkol appointed Moshe Dayan to be Defense Minister. 

General Dayan was an acclaimed war hero known to favor action.44

On 2 June, National Security Adviser Walt Rostow asked the Israeli Chargé how 

much time remained to solve the crisis. Israel, the Chargé replied, had made “a commitment to hold steady for about two weeks,” but there was “nothing ironclad” about 

that figure. The next day, President Johnson informed Prime Minister Eshkol that the 

administration was “moving ahead” with diplomatic efforts” and exploring “on an 

urgent basis” the creation of an international naval presence near the Strait of Tiran. 

His words failed to reassure Israeli leaders. “There’s no reason to wait,” Prime Minister 

Eshkol told his military secretary. “They can’t help us.” On 4 June, the Israeli Cabinet 

approved a pre-emptive strike against Egypt.45
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

The Six Day War

Early on 5 June, the Israeli air force delivered devastating blows. Taking off en masse and staying low to avoid radar detection, most planes flew out over the 

Mediterranean then banked toward targets deep in Egypt’s interior. The first wave 

achieved complete surprise, cratering runways and trapping aircraft. By mid-morning, 

a second wave had completed the destruction of Egypt’s air power at minimal cost. 

Jordan and Syria immediately joined the war, and their air forces met similar fates. 

Supreme in the air, Israeli ground forces occupied all Jerusalem on 6 June and reached 

the West Bank of the Jordan next day. By 8 June, they had seized the port city of Sharm 

al-Shaykh, on the approach to the Strait of Tiran, routed Egyptian forces in the Sinai, 

and advanced to the east bank of the Suez Canal.46

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found their proposals and recommendations outmoded 

by onrushing events.47 On 6 June, they recommended seeking “a means of reversing 

Nasser’s rising stature and control of the Arab world”—but, in so doing, avoid seriously 

damaging American interests and denying the Soviets an opening through which to 

increase their influence over the Arabs. Specifically, participate in no military actions 

that would tend to identify the United States with either Israel or the Arabs, continue 

to work for the termination of hostilities, and suspend logistic support for all belligerents “at this time.” But that same day Nasser charged that US and UK carrier planes 

had joined the Israeli attackers and were replacing Israel’s losses. Vigorous denials by 

Washington and London left the Arab world unconvinced. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, 

Mauretania, the Sudan, and Yemen severed diplomatic relations with the United States; 

Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also suspended oil shipments. Anti-American 

riots erupted in Libya. When mobs ringed Wheelus Air Base there, 50 F–4s and 9 of 47 

F–100s withdrew.48

On 8 June, Secretary McNamara stopped all military sales and grant aid shipments 

to Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia. He also 

suspended “all supply actions of either a grant or sales character” pertaining to Algeria, 

Egypt, Iraq, Mauretania, Syria, the Sudan, and Yemen. The following day, the White 

House extended that embargo to Jordan and Lebanon.49

In its final spasm, the Six Day War almost created a superpower confrontation. On 

the evening of 8 June, the belligerents accepted a UN-sponsored cease-fire. However, 

on the next day, Israel accused Syria of violating the cease-fire and as a result attacked 

the Golan Heights, from which Syrian guns often had shelled Israeli settlements. Early 

on 10 June, the Israeli Army successfully cleared the Heights and seemed poised to 

drive on to Damascus.

Exchanges between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin over the “hot line” 

had begun on 5 June. At 0905 Washington time on 10 June, Premier Kosygin warned 

that “a very crucial moment” had arrived. Unless Israel unconditionally halted operations within the next few hours, the Soviets would take “necessary actions, including 

military.” Secretary McNamara asked whether the Sixth Fleet should turn around and 
Upheaval in the Middle East

175

sail toward the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet submarines monitoring its operations 

would report immediately to Moscow. “Yes,” said the President, “go ahead and do it.” 

At 0939, President Johnson informed Premier Kosygin that the Israelis said “the firing 

has stopped as of this moment.”50

At General Wheeler’s direction, the J–3 drafted an order for the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to begin generating an airborne alert. He also told the J–3 to recommend 

a series of responses against possible Soviet actions. Two hours later four colonels 

submitted a list that included: offering Syria a UN force to assist in ending hostilities; 

asking Turkey and Iran to refuse Soviet overflight requests; sending equipment to Israel, 

if Soviet military units moved into Syria; and as a last resort, intervening militarily on 

Israel’s behalf. At 1128, General Wheeler arranged a conference call with the Service 

Chiefs. He described the “rather low-key preparatory moves” already undertaken; adding that he thought proceeding with an airborne alert would be unwise. All agreed with 

General Wheeler that the best policy was to “sit tight.” At 1230 (1830 Middle East time), a 

new cease-fire began. This time, the armistice held and the Six Day War was truly over.51

Attack on the USS Liberty

On 23 May, just as the crisis began, a Joint Chiefs of Staff message drafted by the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) directed the electronic intelligence ship USS 

Liberty to sail from the Ivory Coast to the eastern Mediterranean. Further orders 

on 1 June specified that, beginning 9 June, Liberty would operate no closer than 6.5 

nautical miles from Israel’s and 12.5 nautical miles from Egypt’s coast. On 7 June, as 

Liberty neared the battle area, Admiral McDonald worried about her safety. By then, 

Egypt’s air force had been destroyed and Egypt’s army routed; Nasser had charged that 

US forces were aiding Israel. Consequently, the JRC sent the US Commander in Chief, 

Europe (USCINCEUR), a message changing Liberty’s closest approach to 15 nautical 

miles from Israel and 20 from Egypt. This message went out at 1830 Washington time 

on 7 June. Erroneously, the Army Communications Center sent it to a naval communications station in the Pacific.

Admiral McDonald wanted to keep Liberty 100 nautical miles from any coast; 

General Wheeler wanted to buttress denials about any US complicity with Israel. 

Accordingly, a decision was made to have Liberty stay 100 nautical miles offshore. 

A JRC officer promptly informed the Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR) staff, but the 

Deputy Chief of Staff, NAVEUR, decided to follow procedure and wait for a confirming 

message. This message, JCS 7347, reached USCINCEUR at 0411 local time on 8 June, 

then NAVEUR and Sixth Fleet at 0655.

In the early hours of 8 June, Liberty reached a point about 15 miles from El Arish on 

the Sinai coast; steaming there at “best possible speed” had brought her there one day 

early. At 0850 local time, three jets circled her and departed. Meanwhile, Sixth Fleet staff 

drafted a message to Liberty conveying the substance of JCS 7347. The Commander, 
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Sixth Fleet, who was preparing himself for a press conference ordered by Secretary 

McNamara to refute charges that carrier planes had joined the Israeli attack, did not 

release this message until 1113. After a delay for higher priority traffic, it finally went 

forward. Something like a tragicomedy of errors followed. The message was misrouted to 

a relay station in Morocco, then to one in Ethiopia, then to Greece, then back to Ethiopia.52

Liberty’s crew, who knew nothing about their changed orders, now paid a terrible 

price for other men’s errors. Israeli Naval Headquarters had been informed of the 

ship’s presence, including its name, ship type, and hull number. But at 1100 on 8 June, 

Liberty’s identification was inadvertently erased from the Headquarters plot table, 

apparently because her exact location after 0900 was unknown. Subsequently, when 

Israeli Naval Headquarters received reports of El Arish being shelled from the sea, 

three torpedo boats were dispatched; aircraft soon followed.

Israeli aircraft began strafing runs around 1400; motor torpedo boats opened 

fire and launched torpedoes about thirty minutes later. Liberty called Sixth Fleet for 

help, and at 1450 the Commander, Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT), ordered aircraft from 

the USS Saratoga and the USS America to her rescue. Since the carriers were south 

of Crete, about 500 miles from the action, their aircraft could not arrive over Liberty 

until 1715. But at 1614, the US Defense Attaché in Tel Aviv flashed word to the White 

House that Israel had admitted and “abjectly” apologized for the attack. COMSIXTHFLT 

recalled his aircraft. By then, 34 Americans lay dead and 171 wounded. The battered 

Liberty made its way to Malta for repairs.

Had Israelis deliberately attacked what they knew to be an American ship? No, if 

the audiotape recordings of radio transmissions made by Israeli air force pilots are 

a reliable guide.53 Possibly the Israeli navy, eager to prove its prowess, believed that 

Liberty was really an Egyptian ship. The State Department, on 10 June, formally condemned the attack as “an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for 

human life.” Under US pressure, the Israelis convened a court of inquiry; the presiding judge found no justification for any courts-martial. However, the Deputy Director, 

National Security Agency, privately labeled that inquiry “a nice whitewash.”54

Liberty had suffered such extensive damage that the Navy decommissioned her. In 

May 1968 Israel paid $3,323,500, the amount claimed by the US government on behalf of 

families of those who had been killed. In April 1969, after litigation, Israel paid another 

$3,452,275 as compensation for injuries and property losses. In December 1980, the US 

government accepted $6,000,000 as the final settlement for damage to the Liberty. But 

there has been no finality to a debate, often intensely and understandably emotional, 

over whether the attack was mistaken or intentional.55

The War’s Aftermath: US Alignment with Israel

Humiliating defeat left the Arabs amenable to Soviet wooing, which threatened an East-West polarization of the region. On 16 June, Secretary McNamara asked for 
Upheaval in the Middle East

177

a Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment of how such an outcome would affect US military 

interests in the Middle East. He speculated, also, that polarization might lead Iran and 

Turkey to restrict US access rights and re-examine their roles in the Central Treaty 

Organization (CENTO) and NATO. What, Secretary McNamara asked, would be the 

effect upon our ability to execute regional contingency plans, worldwide military communications, logistic capabilities in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and the US 

military posture in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean?56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered that “the most significant impact” of East-West 

polarization would be creation of conditions in which renewed Arab-Israeli fighting 

became “almost certain.” When that happened, the United States would have to choose 

between abandoning Israel and directly supporting her.57 Inevitably, the danger of a 

superpower confrontation would increase. If Soviet influence among the Arab states 

rose, moderate Arabs would lose their freedom of action and ability to restrain their 

radical brethren. The United States then would have to supply Israel with military aid, 

in order to counter the greater threat from a more united Arab world.

If polarization did occur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw ominous outcomes: an 

increase of Soviet and a decrease of US influence; loss of US bases, communications 

facilities, and intelligence collection sources; lengthening of the sea line of communication to Southeast Asia; probable denial of Arab oil; loss of supporting facilities for the 

small naval Middle East Force; and forfeiture of Libyan and Moroccan co-operation. 

Reassessments by Iran and Turkey might lead to denial of base and overflight rights, 

requests for additional aid, Turkish reappraisal of its NATO role, divisive pressures 

within CENTO, and the possible loss of intelligence and electronics-communications 

facilities. The impact upon neighboring areas might include losing the Kagnew communications relay station in Ethiopia, a greater need for bases in the Indian Ocean and 

facilities in South Africa, and opportunities for the Soviets to expand their influence 

in Africa. Admittedly, if polarization did take place, Israel probably would grant the 

United States base and overflight rights.58 Nonetheless, “[i]n view of the serious military 

implications which would probably result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the 

United States should make every effort to avoid such a polarization.”59

Meantime, a Special State-Defense Study Group completed a reassessment of 

regional policy. The Group, which worked from March until July 1967, was directed by 

retired Ambassador Julius Holmes; Brigadier General Stephen W. Henry, USAF, acted 

as his deputy. It proposed principles for US strategy that included:

Strengthening the northern tier of Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

Lessening the US public role in Arab-Israeli relations, thereby reducing the abrasion 

in US relations with the Arabs and the opportunities for Soviet aggrandizement.

Rebuilding relations with Arabs, concentrating on the moderate states.

Centering US interest in the Horn of Africa upon Ethiopia, where the retention of 

 Kagnew communications station was an overriding concern—but planning 

for its eventual relocation.

Improving US military ability to operate in the area, establishing an on-call force 

and seeking Indian Ocean bases.
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Supplying conventional arms pragmatically and flexibly, and dissuading Arabs and 

Israelis from acquiring nuclear weapons.60

The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the Holmes study generally sound and authorized 

General Wheeler to say, in interdepartmental discussions, that it constituted a good 

starting point. They applauded its realism in recognizing that, “from a strictly objective 

point of view, the costs of close US association with Israel outweigh any conceivable 

advantages.” However, they took issue with several of the Group’s recommendations 

including that Kagnew station should stay open as long as possible.61

In mid-September, when the Senior Interdepartmental Group reviewed the Holmes 

study, some members wondered whether the strength of indigenous resistance against 

Soviet encroachment was being slighted. The State Department responded with a 

paper defining local and regional nationalisms as the greatest long-term deterrent to 

Soviet incursions, and economic ties with the West as next most important. But no 

indigenous factors, by themselves, were effective guarantees. On 30 November, the 

SIG accepted this assessment.62

What should be done about arms supply? On 30 June, President Johnson authorized 

several exceptions to the embargo: for Saudi Arabia, a $15 million sale of four C–130 

transports and a $9 million weapons maintenance and repair program; for Morocco, a 

$14 million arms credit. Israel wanted US weapons, particularly A–4 Skyhawks, tanks, 

and helicopters. Secretary Rusk was sympathetic because, as he wrote Secretary 

McNamara on 22 July, “I do not believe we can completely rule out the possibility of an 

early military strike against Israel by one or a combination of radical Arab states.” He 

warned that the Algerians and Syrians also might launch guerrilla attacks. Secretary 

Rusk recommended receiving a high-level Israeli military mission, and asked for a Joint 

Chiefs of Staff estimate of the Arab-Israeli military balance.63

On 25 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they 

could find no justification for Israeli anxiety. Admittedly, a massive Soviet resupply 

effort had made good many Arab losses, and might replace all of the lost equipment 

within a year. A numerical comparison of current inventories appeared to give the 

Arabs a clear advantage (621 versus 209 in jet fighters, 2,505 versus 1,123 in tanks). 

Israel, however, possessed battle-tested personnel, a qualitatively superior air force, 

an excellent intelligence organization, and more defensible borders. Arab states, on 

the other hand, would need a minimum of eighteen months to re-create combat-worthy 

forces. Consequently, in the Joint Chiefs’ judgment, Israel “can defend itself in the 

near future against both conventional and guerrilla threats” and needed no additional 

equipment.64

In September, an Israeli military mission came to Washington. At the Pentagon, 

General Weizman argued that by January 1969 Israel would need between 225 and 250 

modern aircraft, adding to its inventory 27 A–4s (beyond the 48 already scheduled for 

delivery) and either 50 supersonic F–4 Phantoms or 50 subsonic A–6 Intruders. Without 

them, he claimed, 168 Israeli planes would face about 700 Arab aircraft in 1970. Perhaps 

the French would sell or license Mirage IIIs; if not, General Weizman stressed that “he 
Upheaval in the Middle East

179

would be back again.” Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes delivered the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff assessment that Israel could defeat any Arab attack for the next eighteen months, 

but he promised a speedy examination of General Weizman’s request.65

Secretaries McNamara and Rusk had recommended to the President some more 

easings of the regional arms embargo (e.g., release to Israel less than $1 million worth 

of items, resume MAP shipments to Jordan, move toward completing the cash sale of 

ten F–5 interceptors to Libya). President Johnson postponed these decisions, however, 

because Congressional debate over the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act stood at 

a delicate stage.66 General McConnell worried that a selective resumption of arms shipments, such as $3 million in spare parts just released to Israel, might harm efforts to 

renew US rights at Wheelus Air Base. If A–4s arrived in Israel before F–5s reached Libya, 

those negotiations could be jeopardized. He urged, therefore, that a public announcement of the F–5 sale either precede or exactly coincide with publicity about A–4 deliveries. On 22 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff so advised Secretary McNamara.67

Early in October, as Congress was completing action on foreign aid legislation, 

the State Department recommended delivering the 48 A–4s already sold to Israel 

and approving $30 million in other sales, while deferring a decision about selling the 

100 APCs authorized in May. The State Department believed this would ease Israeli 

pressure on the administration and could encourage the French to proceed with the 

Mirage III deliveries. For Jordan, though, the State Department recommended deferring 

action on all shipments, since King Hussein’s participation in the Six Day War and his 

recent visit to Moscow posed major policy and public relations problems.68 President 

Johnson approved these recommendations on 24 October. Ambassador David Newsom 

was authorized to assure the Libyan government that Washington would go forward 

with the F–5 sale.69

Concurrently, the Senior Interdepartmental Group tasked an interdepartmental 

regional group with drafting guidance for regional arms supply “against the backdrop 

of our broadest objectives for the area.” Replying on 9 November, the group suggested 

an “interim” approach. First, “entice Moscow into at least a tacit agreement” on limiting 

arms shipments. Second, give “a minimum of equipment to our Arab friends.” Third, 

supply Israel with 27 A–4s (beyond the 48 already sold) “as an extra margin of safety.” 

All these things should be accomplished “with an eye particularly to maintaining the 

momentum toward an Arab-Israeli political accommodation.” The group acknowledged, however, that “we should not overestimate the leverage we gain through decisions on arms supply to Israel.”70

The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged selling more A–4s to Israel unnecessary and 

wanted the Jordanian embargo ended before King Hussein turned to either the Soviets 

or radical Arab states for arms. ISA, on the other hand, argued that providing A-4s 

would make Israel’s request for F–4s less pressing, minimize Arab anger, and make the 

smallest impact upon Soviet supply decisions. As to Jordan, ISA saw little likelihood 

that King Hussein would seek Soviet aid while he still enjoyed US economic and political support. Congress would not permit significant sales to Jordan, and even a modest 
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amount of grant aid might affect worldwide MAP. Consequently, ISA recommended 

that arms aid should await consummation of an Israel-Jordan political agreement.71

What political objectives were arms sales supposed to be promoting? On 19 June, 

President Johnson publicly described “a peace that is based on five principles”: the 

recognized right of national life; justice for the refugees; innocent maritime passage; 

limits on the arms race; and political independence and territorial integrity for all.72

Simultaneously, Secretary McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe, 

without regard to political factors, the minimum territory that Israel might justifiably 

retain as added protection against conventional and terrorist attacks. In reply, they 

listed: the Golan Heights; a strip of the West Bank running 10 to 15 miles west of the 

Jordan River; the Gaza Strip; El Auja on the Israel-Egypt border; a buffer strip around 

the port of Eilat; and Sharm al-Shaykh by the Strait of Tiran.73

During July, Ambassador Goldberg and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin 

worked out two versions of a Security Council resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal 

in return for peace treaties and other guarantees. But in mid-September Foreign Minister Eban advised Ambassador Goldberg of more ambitious Israeli “thinking”: with 

Syria, some territorial adjustments; in Jerusalem, possible Muslim control over their 

Holy Quarter; on the West Bank, demilitarization with UN inspection and some form of 

economic, customs, or travel arrangements. Late in October, Mr. Eban told Secretary 

Rusk that Israel needed “security frontiers.” Secretary Rusk reminded him that Prime 

Minister Eshkol, early in June, had said that Israel held no territorial ambitions. “That,” 

Eban replied, “was before Syria and Jordan entered the war.”74

The US Government would not support a United Nations resolution requiring 

complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. The British circulated a 

compromise calling more ambiguously for “withdrawal.” This was grudgingly accepted 

by all parties and, on 22 November, the Security Council adopted Resolution 242. After 

emphasizing “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” it asserted that 

a “just and lasting peace” should be built upon the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 

recent conflict;

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 

acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and 

recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

It further affirmed the necessity of guaranteeing freedom of navigation through 

international waterways, achieving a just solution to the refugee problem, and every 

State’s territorial inviolability and political independence “through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.” Resolution 242 authorized the Secretary 

General to appoint a Special Representative who would try to promote a settlement; U 

Thant selected Gunnar Jarring of Sweden.75
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181

On 30 November the Senior Interdepartmental Group concluded that, while Israel 

did not need any F–4s, the administration should retain an option to provide 27 more 

A–4s. Subsequently, after receiving an Israeli analysis, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara 

advised President Johnson that there was “a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968.” Israel might, therefore, be informed of US willingness “to divert F–4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli 

need.” Doing so, they hoped, would dampen Israeli opposition to Jordanian sales.76

According to the Israelis, the Arabs’ inventory of 660 aircraft would grow to 924 

by 1970. The Defense Intelligence Agency produced a different forecast, assuming that 

Israel received no additional aircraft:

 1967 1970

High Performance Aircraft

Israel 55 50

Arabs 292 536

Total Aircraft

Israel 160 188–215

Arabs 720 788

But, just as before the war, numbers alone were misleading. DIA did not expect that 

Arab efforts to improve pilot training, maintenance, command and control, and airground cooperation would prove “markedly successful.” Furthermore, the Agency did 

not believe that Soviet aid was aimed at supporting another round of hostilities. Most 

post-war deliveries were of older MiG–17 interceptors; the number of Su–7 fighterbombers remained below pre-war levels.77

On 15 December, during a meeting with General Wheeler, the Israeli Chief of Staff 

made a case for supplying more aircraft. Wheeler was not convinced. Four days later, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary McNamara that Israel certainly could prevail, 

even if France decided against delivering Mirages, for “at least the next 18 months.” 

Nothing, they stressed, should be done to endanger Ambassador Jarring’s mission 

chances for success. Increasing Israel’s inventory at this point, particularly with sophisticated F–4s, would cause the Arabs to harden their position, probably open a new 

round in the arms race, and possibly make the Israelis more confident and thus more 

intransigent. Still, the Chiefs were willing to reconsider Israeli requests in mid-1968, 

or even earlier if circumstances warranted, “with a view toward assuring an adequate 

quantitative and qualitative balance in the area.” Secretary McNamara supported selling 27 more A–4s, but he recommended against making any commitment about F–4s. 

These views went to the State Department and the White House.78

On 7 January 1968, President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol along with 

their senior advisers reviewed matters at the LBJ Ranch. Eshkol asked for 50 F–4s 

“as rapidly as possible.” President Johnson replied that “Phantoms won’t determine 
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security. . . .The big problem is how 21⁄2 million Jews can live in a sea of Arabs.” He 

reminded Prime Minister Eshkol that, after the 1966 sale of 48 A–4s, Israel had agreed 

to look elsewhere for additional equipment. Israelis would be delighted to do so, 

Eshkol responded, if Americans would “give them an address.” Secretary Rusk suggested that the Israelis allow a UN force at Sharm al-Shaykh, with clear understanding that the Strait was an international waterway. Doing so would cost nothing and 

show that Israel did not intend to hold the occupied territories. Perhaps, Mr. Eshkol 

answered, but he could not return to the pre-war borders. Israelis wanted a peace 

treaty; they “cannot live with bazooka shots into villages and houses demolished. This 

is a last stand for the spirit of a nation—the Jewish spirit. This we believe in. It is our 

history.” Mr. Eshkol asserted that Israel felt “weaker than before the war.” General 

Wheeler commented that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prediction about the June war’s 

outcome had been accurate to within half a day, which lent “a certain support” to 

their view that Israel’s air force would remain superior for the next eighteen months. 

What the Israelis really had destroyed was Arab morale, motivation, and confidence, 

which could not be quickly recovered. Secretary McNamara added that selling F–4s 

would greatly reduce the chance of concluding a Mirage deal and might increase the 

flow of Soviet aircraft. Secretary Rusk suggested that a comfortable position at the 

UN might give Israel greater security than 50 F–4s.

At the final session, on 8 January, President Johnson stated emphatically that he 

was not yet prepared to make a decision about F–4s. However, he was willing to sell 

either 27 or 30 A–4s—and perhaps another ten if needed. Additionally, he agreed to the 

crash training of Israeli pilots on F–4s, so that there need be no gap between delivery 

and ability to operate. Three times, Prime Minister Eshkol asked that a few F–4s be 

delivered during 1968. President Johnson refused, saying “the Soviets and Arabs must 

prove the Israelis are right” before he would make a decision. But he did want to know 

when a decision must be made, so that planes and pilots could be available on 1 January 1970. A month later, Secretary McNamara informed the President that he could 

delay the F–4 decision until 31 December 1968 and still start deliveries early in 1970.79

The Israelis wanted delivery of the 30 A–4s advanced from June to January 1969. 

When OSD asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff how that would affect Navy capabilities 

in Southeast Asia, they opposed any diversions from already allocated production. 

Instead, deliveries of the 48 A–4s sold in 1966 should be stretched from December 1968 

to May 1969, and deliveries of the 30 new planes added between June and December 

1969. Otherwise, the Navy would have to send two inferior squadrons of A–4Cs to 

Southeast Asia and keep them there until 1970, when the diverted A–4Fs could be 

replaced. Secretary McNamara approved the stretch-out schedule; the Israelis evidently 

traded acceptance of it for an increase of the sale to 40 A–4s.80

What to do about Jordan? Of the Arab armies, King Hussein’s alone had not been 

rearmed. Early in November 1967, General Wheeler advised Secretary McNamara that 

the administration “must” promise King Hussein, during the King’s forthcoming visit, 

“at least a token resumption of military assistance.” The Senior Interdepartmental Group 
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183

recommended meeting Jordan’s minimum requirements, but nothing more was done. 

On 30 December, King Hussein promised President Johnson that he would not acquire 

Soviet arms if he received prompt assurance that US weapons would be forthcoming. At 

the King’s strong urging, General Khammash was invited to Washington. On 17 January, 

Khammash told General Wheeler that the invitation “came at the eleventh hour” because 

King Hussein had agreed to receive a Soviet delegation. Jordanians wanted $200 million 

worth of equipment, including 200 M–48A3 tanks with 105-mm guns (like Israel’s) and 

36 multi-purpose jets. General Khammash related how, when he and King Hussein had 

visited Moscow a few months earlier, a Soviet marshal handed him a pad, asked him to 

list all his wishes, and promised a prompt and full response. In his presentation, General 

Khammash cautioned repeatedly that time was running out; General Wheeler, who generally agreed with Jordanian estimates of their needs, got the “strong impression” that 

Khammash “is a very worried soldier.” The Director, CIA, also concluded that Hussein 

and Khammash, “in a mood of desperation, have for the first time engaged in a serious 

consideration of Soviet arms as an alternative to their destruction.”81

On 6 February 1968, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk asked the President to 

approve an $82 million package extending over 21⁄2 fiscal years. It would involve: shipping $10.8 million of undelivered or suspended equipment; replacing $38.3 million worth 

of ground force losses, including 88 M–48A1 tanks with 90-mm guns but excluding (on 

grounds of political sensitivity) 155-mm heavy artillery; and providing 18 F–104 interceptors followed perhaps by ten more later. The two secretaries voiced “little doubt” 

that, otherwise, King Hussein would accept Soviet arms. President Johnson agreed 

and, on 28 March, the two governments concluded a Memorandum of Understanding 

embodying these arrangements.82 So Jordan stayed on the US side.

Meanwhile, Gunnar Jarring’s peace mission made hardly any progress. Arab 

commandos still entered Israel from Syria and Jordan. On 21 March, Israel launched 

a retaliatory raid into Jordan so heavy that the Security Council, with US support, 

passed a condemnatory resolution.83 Ambassador Jarring believed that Israeli policy 

included territorial expansion. Soon afterward, Israel incorporated the occupied sector of Jerusalem. The Security Council, with a US abstention, censured this action.84

The Senior Interdepartmental Group commissioned a new study of regional policy. 

In July, the Interdepartmental Regional Group circulated a draft stating that the threat 

of expanded Soviet influence should be countered primarily by the indigenous forces 

of independence and modernization. In dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, “the 

United States should avoid identification with the aims and policies of one side alone 

and should be prepared to bring pressure to bear on either or both parties as means of 

moving the dispute toward settlement.” Military aid policy should conform to general 

political strategy. Oil was important, but not even a pro-Soviet government would 

willingly forego its main source of income in order to serve Moscow’s strategy. Supply 

interruptions had rarely been permanent; coordinated actions by the Arab states and 

Iran appeared most unlikely.85
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

The Joint Chiefs approved a position for General Wheeler to use at SIG meetings. 

Broadly, they wanted the United States to try and gain influence among Arabs (1) by 

bringing greater pressure upon Israel to be forthcoming in seeking a political settlement and (2) by re-establishing diplomatic relations as soon as conditions allowed. 

They had several specific suggestions. If the thrust or pace of Soviet efforts changed 

significantly, US strategy should be re-examined. Since the United States was “already 

over-identified with Israel,” action should be taken to improve standing with the Arabs. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also predicted that American interest in access to oil could 

produce a situation requiring either potential or actual use of military power.86

When an effort was made to have this study formally approved as policy guidance, 

General Wheeler and Deputy Secretary Nitze recommended merely distributing it for 

information. First, they argued, it did not fully analyze issues and alternatives. Second, 

it omitted important problems: how to deal with the USSR; the continuing arms race; 

growing instability in Jordan and Lebanon; and the role of military forces, particularly 

the Sixth Fleet. Ultimately, the study was simply circulated to posts abroad and passed 

along to the Nixon administration.87

Early in May, at the White House’s request, General Wheeler had assessed the 

Arab-Israeli balance and concluded once again that Israel could defend itself for the 

next 18 months. A decision about furnishing high-performance aircraft, he advised 

President Johnson, could be deferred until late in the year. But, only a few weeks later, 

intelligence appraisals evidently changed the Chairman’s mind.88 Consequently, in midJune, General Wheeler warned Secretary Clifford that Arab capabilities could become 

threatening by mid-1970. Israel still could gain and retain the initiative, but not as easily 

as in 1967 because Arabs’ training and air defenses had improved. Thus the next ArabIsraeli air war might become a battle of attrition. General Wheeler even foresaw “an 

outside possibility” of the Arabs launching a successful pre-emptive attack. In either 

case, Israel might appeal for US assistance. “I can see a possible danger period, early in 

1970, during which Israel could be under direct air threat. Therefore, a logical case can 

be made that there is a legitimate military need for more high-performance aircraft.”89

The Foreign Assistance Act, signed by President Johnson on 8 October, contained a 

section stating “the sense of the Congress that the President . . . as soon as practicable . . .

negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale . . . of such 

number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate 

deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression.” The President promptly 

ordered Secretary Rusk to begin negotiations. He then told Foreign Minister Eban that 

back in January he had rendered a decision “in principle” to sell F–4s and planned to move 

ahead if Israel was helpful in seeking peace and accepted the NPT. President Johnson 

said that, while he was not making NPT ratification a formal condition, Mr. Eban should 

know “the very strong feelings in the American government on this matter.”90

Nonetheless, when Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul C. Warnke presented 

these conditions in a series of meetings with Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin,91 the Israelis 

gave no ground. “We have not come here,” Ambassador Rabin said, “to mortgage the 
Upheaval in the Middle East

185

sovereignty of the State of Israel, not even for 50 Phantoms.” When Mr. Warnke put them 

forward again, Ambassador Rabin “flatly and rather brutally” refused to give further 

assurances, claiming that the President had promised F–4s without any conditions. 

Finally, on 27 November, the administration settled for an assurance that Israel “reaffirms its longstanding policy...that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to 

introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United 

States as a nuclear weapons carrier.”92

As F–4 negotiations neared their end, Israelis started pressing for accelerated 

deliveries—in response, they said, to a faster buildup of Syrian and Egyptian air power. 

From the Arabs’ standpoint, Ambassador Rabin told General Wheeler, the summer of 

1969 would be the best time for “another adventure” against Israel, since no F–4s and 

only a few A–4s would have arrived. Israel wanted to receive two F–4s per month, 

beginning in April 1969 rather than January 1970, together with a small number of US 

technicians. Ambassador Rabin asked for another assessment of the Arab-Israeli balance, and General Wheeler agreed to do one.93

The request for faster deliveries found no favor in DOD. As an OSD official 

explained to the Israelis, “we are already robbing the Air Force by promising delivery 

starting in January 1970; we have spent money for long lead-time items, we have given 

tough orders, and we cannot cut the lead-time again.” General Mordechai Hod, Weizman’s successor, replied that “the aircraft would be there not to fight but simply to fly 

around, be seen, and thus serve as ‘deterrents.’”94

On 11 December, General Wheeler supplied Secretary Clifford with his evaluation 

of Israel’s F–4 requirements. He could find no evidence to support Israel’s allegations 

of accelerated Soviet aircraft shipments. He noted, also, the US Air Force’s finding that 

advancing the first deliveries to April 1969 would cause an “unacceptable drawdown” 

of US F–4 reserves. A September start, by contrast, would have no adverse effects. Still, 

General Wheeler did discern an Israeli disadvantage in high-performance aircraft. In 

terms of combat readiness, Arab-Israeli ratios would reach 4.4 to 1 by June 1969, 5.3 to 

1 by December 1969, and 4.8 to 1 in June 1970 (assuming F–4 arrivals began in January). 

All these exceeded what General Wheeler considered the “maximum safety level” of 4 

to 1. He was willing, therefore, to begin deliveries in September 1969.

The issues involved, of course, were as much or more political than military. As 

General Wheeler observed, delivery even of “a few noncombat-ready, US-maintained 

F–4 aircraft in the spring of 1969” would be a powerful deterrent mainly because it 

would demonstrate the depth of US interest in Israel. But, since some Israeli leaders 

were calling for a US commitment to defend Israel, “we must be prudent in undertaking 

any action which could be construed as movement in this direction.” He anticipated, 

also, that sending US training teams to Israel would increase East-West polarization, 

inflame Arab moderates, and possibly harm chances for a political settlement. And, if 

Americans became involved in incidents or terrorist attacks, “the United States could 

become embroiled in Middle East affairs to a degree unexpected and unwanted.” At 

least, General Wheeler urged, send contract civilians rather than US servicemen.95
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The F–4 sale marked a watershed, moving the United States toward becoming 

Israel’s main and ultimately sole source of foreign weapons. The United States was 

acting openly as Israel’s patron and protector. Militarily, US sales commitments totaled 

50 F–4s and 100 A–4s. Politically, President Johnson supported the Israeli position on 

peace negotiations. He said in a September speech that, while “boundaries cannot and 

should not reflect the weight of conquest,” it was “clear . . . that a return to the situation 

of June 4, 1967, will not bring peace.”96 Administration policies ran contrary to what 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeatedly had proposed, but the consequences were precisely 

what they had predicted. American arms were flowing to Israel, Soviet arms to Egypt 

and Syria; and the Middle East stood “polarized” as never before.

Iran: Satisfying the Shah

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi stood out as America’s firmest friend in the entire area, Israel apart. But the Shah could be a prickly ally, whose regional ambition 

and appetite for arms grew ever greater. In 1962, Washington and Tehran agreed upon 

a five-year program of grant aid that included 52 F–5 interceptors. In July 1964, recognizing Iran’s improved financial condition, a Memorandum of Understanding arranged 

for Iran to procure $250 million worth of equipment ($50 million in cash, $200 million 

through sales credits) during FYs 1965–1969, including 26 more F–5s, M–60 tanks, and 

one battalion of Hawk surface-to-air missiles. In 1965, the Shah conveyed his desire 

for up-to-date hardware, such as F–111 aircraft and Sheridan armored reconnaissance 

vehicles, both still under development. He also let Ambassador Armin Meyer know 

he was “increasingly unhappy with his virtually complete dependence on [the] US for 

military supplies. He considers there have been intolerable delays, too much back-seat 

driving . . . , undesirable gaps such as in air defense, and discrimination in the sense 

that Iran . . . is forced to pay for its supplies on virtually commercial basis while other 

less friendly nations receive . . . more generous terms.”97

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended selling (1) 26 multi-purpose F–4s in lieu 

of the F–5s, with deliveries perhaps delayed until FY 1973, and (2) a second Hawk battalion that would become operational in 1970.98 In January 1966, the Shah asked that 

US experts carry out a study of air defense requirements. State and Defense favored 

sending a tri-Service team and ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to activate one; its 

terms of reference centered upon “maintaining the primacy of the US presence in Iran 

at a moderate cost to Iranian resources.” After touring Iran from 16 February until 3 

March, a team headed by Brigadier General Chesley Peterson, USAF, recommended 

providing equipment costing $192 million. The major items are shown below:

Army: 209 M–60s to complete the approved program; 130 Sheridans to 

 replace aging M–47s; two Vulcan battalions for short-range air defense; 

and a 90-day level of war reserve materiel.
Upheaval in the Middle East

187

Navy: 8 patrol boats and one destroyer.

Air Force: 16 F–4s, two mobile radars, and one Hawk battalion for medium-range 

air defense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with this report. On 23 May, President Johnson 

approved a $200 million package of sales and credits, extending the 1964 agreement 

through 1970. “Most of us,” Walt Rostow warned President Johnson, “believe the Shah 

is foolish to spend his money this way. . . . But since he is determined to buy arms somewhere, the best we can do is put on the brakes.” The President directed that annual $50 

million slices not be approved without a “searching review of Iran’s economic position.”99

Soon, however, the Shah voiced dissatisfaction with some of the numbers, costs, 

and delivery dates. He wanted, for example, 32 instead of 16 F–4s. In fact, allegedly 

because of high costs, he approached the Soviets about arms purchases and professed 

interest in acquiring their surface-to-air missiles. That was worrisome, because Soviet 

SAMs would be sited at bases from which F–4s and F–5s would be operating. Communications tie-ins, involving all the elements of an air defense system, could allow 

the Soviets to gain extensive knowledge about US weapon systems.100

How far should the Shah be accommodated? The State Department saw no need 

to accede completely. Yet, since the Shah publicly had committed himself to an independent procurement policy, he could not retract without some face-saving gesture. “In 

light of all this,” the State Department informed DOD, “we have concluded that present 

political hazards are great enough to call for a little ‘give’ in our military proposal. On 

8 July, the United States offered to “consider” selling 32 F–4s; the Shah replied that he 

could not reverse his Moscow initiative without being labeled a “US puppet.”101

The F–4 issue caused a split within the administration. The State Department 

and some officials in ISA wanted to offer 32 F–4Cs for $70 million, instead of the latest F–4Ds costing $100 million. Secretary McNamara opposed offering 32 rather than 

16, apparently because the Air Force then would have to ask Congress for additional 

appropriations. The State Department asked Ambassador Meyer for his opinion about 

selling 32 F–4s, with deliveries from new production beginning in 1969. Meyer replied 

that, unless an “extraordinary” offer was forthcoming, the way would be opened for 

increased Soviet influence. The Ambassador also appealed directly to the President, 

asking for a generous offer to forestall a “triumph for Soviet policy in Mideast and 

serious setback for our interests in this area.” It would be wrong, he added, “to think 

Persians will not cut off their noses to spite face.”102

On 1 August 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that “it is 

essential to maintain the primacy of US military interests in Iran and that every effort 

should be made to prevent the Soviets from gaining a foothold through the introduction of military equipment and technicians into Iran.” They recommended waiving all 

research and development (R&D) costs and offering 32 F–4Cs at reduced prices, with 

deliveries beginning in 1968. Next day, at the Tuesday Luncheon, President Johnson 

decided to (1) offer 32 F–4Ds at full cost and (2) waive R&D costs for two Hawk battalions, perhaps doing the same for other weapon systems. If necessary, some items 
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would be taken out of inventories. Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes conveyed these 

decisions to the Shah, with the caveat that F–4s and other “sensitive” equipment might 

be withheld if Iran acquired “sophisticated” Soviet equipment. The Shah consented 

but wrote President Johnson that a $200 million credit, “I must say, still falls short of 

meeting Iran’s needs.”103

In January 1967, the Shah concluded an agreement with the USSR whereby Iran 

exchanged quantities of natural gas for $110 million worth of armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, jeeps, and trucks.104 American pressure, apparently, dissuaded 

him from acquiring Soviet SAMs. Concurrently, the State Department issued a National 

Policy Paper (NPP) stating that the Shah was “openly seeking to build an ‘independent’ 

foreign policy posture while maintaining the fundamentals of his security relationship 

with us.” The NPP recommended shifting from grants to credit sales “on fairly hard 

terms.” The Shah’s rationale for expanding military strength was “based in part on the 

threat of radical Arab nationalism and worry over the shift in relative power positions 

after the withdrawal of Britain from the Persian Gulf.” Barring an economic downturn 

or unexpectedly effective internal dissidence, “the Shah’s confidence in his own ability 

to rule and manage his nation is not likely to be shaken by advice and admonition from 

even the friendliest of critics.”105

In mid-April 1968, President Johnson prepared to receive a visit from His Imperial 

Majesty. Anticipating that the Shah would ask for $500 million in credits during FYs 

1969–73, Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommended offering only $75 to $100 million 

for FY 1968. In lieu of a long-term commitment, President Johnson should promise to 

seek from Congress the annual credit authorizations and appropriations permitting 

orderly achievement of a five-year program. The President agreed and so advised the 

Shah, proposing $100 million in FY 1968.106

Concerned about how the Persian Gulf could be protected after the British departed, the Shah suggested that US surface-to-surface missiles under Iranian control be 

stationed on islands in the Strait of Hormuz. The Director, Joint Staff, judged either 

F-4s or missile boats more suitable, advising ISA that Iranian control of the Strait would 

neither keep peace in the Persian Gulf nor assure its pro-western orientation. After 

all, if the Soviets decided to move into the Gulf, the mere presence of Iranian missiles 

would not deter them from doing so.107

President Johnson promised the Shah a comprehensive study of this problem. 

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed Strike Command to organize a survey 

team. It was headed by Major General Luther Richmond, USAF, who was the Director of 

Plans at STRICOM.108 In September 1968, the team reported that Iranian forces did need 

additional equipment, including two fast missile-equipped patrol ships, four shipboard 

ASW sonars, three shore-based radars, and aircraft identification systems aboard 

four ships. Aerial surveillance could be accomplished effectively and economically by 

C-130s which Iran already possessed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed these findings 

which, in revised form, were forwarded to the Iranian government in January 1969.109
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189

Early in December 1968, Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda asked US officials 

to lift the ceiling on credit sales from $100 to $191.2 million; the increase would cover, 

among other things, 32 additional F–4s (raising the total to 64) and 100 more Sheridans. 

DOD opposed doing so, believing that Iran had overstated foreign threats and lacked 

the technical personnel to service extra F–4s and Sheridans. But the President did 

let Iran acquire 11 F–5 fighters.110 Circumstances—notably the huge demands of the 

Vietnam War and Britain’s imminent withdrawal east of Suez—compelled Washington 

to treat the Shah as policeman of the Persian Gulf.

A Senescent CENTO

The Central Treaty Organization, intended as a buffer against Soviet expansion into the Middle East and Southwest Asia, remained hamstrung by dissension. Iran, 

Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom were treaty signatories; the United States, 

which was not, sent representatives to CENTO’s organizations and observers to its 

meetings. Washington, London, and Ankara saw the Organization as an anti-Soviet 

alliance. Pakistan, however, hoped to align CENTO against her arch-enemy India; Iran 

worried about Arab subversion at least as much as Soviet aggression.

More and more, Pakistan acted as the spoke in CENTO’s wheel. In July 1964, 

President Mohammed Ayub Khan secured his Cabinet’s approval for withdrawing 

from CENTO; the State Department expected him to use that threat as a tactic to 

restrict US arms aid for India. Consequently, ISA asked the Joint Staff to assess the 

military implications of a Pakistani withdrawal. The Director, Joint Staff, replied 

that it “undoubtedly” would bring about CENTO’s dissolution. As matters stood, the 

Organization’s military effectiveness was “marginal,” but it still possessed political 

and psychological value. If Pakistan left CENTO, the fate of US facilities would hinge 

upon what kind of bilateral agreement could be negotiated. Probably, Pakistan would 

not press for the evacuation of intelligence facilities “as long as we are willing to pay 

the price through continued economic and military assistance.” While the immediate 

military implications of CENTO’s collapse would not be “catastrophic,” a break-up 

could have “far-reaching implications” because “the military base which offers the best 

long-term possibility for collective, multilateral co-operation would be destroyed.”111

The centrifugal tendencies within CENTO increased. In February 1965, the Shah 

told Ambassador Julius Holmes that he and President Ayub had decided to press for a 

decision about whether CENTO would be a true alliance with a command structure or 

merely a paper facade. Subsequently, the Shah went so far as to say that he and Ayub 

might discard CENTO and organize a regional defense grouping composed of Iran, 

Pakistan, and Afghanistan.112

The annual meeting of CENTO’s Military Committee was scheduled for 30–31 

March in London; the Council of Foreign Ministers would convene in Tehran one week 

later. In anticipation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they 
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saw “nothing new on the horizon this year to engage the zeal of the CENTO Military 

Committee in a positive way. An atmosphere of futility may, therefore, prevail . . . unless 

the United Kingdom and the United States can get the regional members to appreciate 

and acknowledge the positive values of CENTO, limited instrument though it is.” The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it “improbable” that Iran and Pakistan seriously contemplated secession. Steps should be taken, however, to prevent further deterioration of 

CENTO and to advance US interests. These included: agreeing in principle to support 

the need for a command structure, including a Supreme Commander; planning and 

conducting exercises in the area “with a more distinct CENTO flavor”; and continuing 

the US-sponsored Professional Military Development Program. Secretaries McNamara 

and Rusk supported these suggestions.113

Admiral McDonald acted as US representative at the Military Committee meeting. All members except Turkey joined in urging the Council of Ministers to agree that 

a command structure with a Supreme Commander was “a military necessity.” But a 

decision about the terms of reference (TOR) for a five-year program to develop Iranian 

and Pakistani ground and naval forces proved more difficult. Admiral McDonald was 

willing to endorse the TOR but added that his endorsement should not be interpreted 

as agreement to support actual implementation. His words displeased Pakistan’s representative, General Mohammed Musa, who replied that such a reservation nullified the 

TOR’s purpose. General Musa asserted, also, that US military assistance was a bilateral 

program that had no connection with CENTO. Admiral McDonald answered “rather 

forcefully” that CENTO’s purpose and plans were carefully considered in the shaping 

of US decisions about bilateral support. Thereafter, according to Admiral McDonald, 

General Musa refrained from “harassing” remarks and became more moderate in his 

views. Finally, the Military Committee referred this problem to the Permanent Military 

Deputies Group. Afterwards, Admiral McDonald advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that 

“any significant progress in CENTO is contingent upon resolution of political differences which exist within the alliance and between certain members of the alliance 

and the United States.”114

Political differences soon intensified. September 1965 witnessed a full-scale, albeit 

short-lived, war between India and Pakistan; Britain and the United States suspended 

aid to both belligerents. When the CENTO Military Committee reconvened in April 

1966, General Wheeler represented the United States. Lieutenant General Altaf Qadir 

of Pakistan repeatedly tried to make other members agree that the threat Pakistan 

faced from India properly fell under CENTO’s purview. He pointedly remarked upon 

“the undue haste” with which, after the 1962 Sino-Indian border clashes, “India had 

been rearmed by our Western Allies against the so-called Chinese threat.” The British representative, Field Marshal Sir Richard Hull, took him to task, insisting that the 

Chinese threat was real and dangerous. Iran’s spokesman, concerned about an Iraqi 

threat to his country, gave the Pakistani “lukewarm” backing. But General Tural of Turkey unwaveringly supported the US-UK position that the Sino-Soviet threat remained 

predominant. Still, Pakistan’s insistence that CENTO’s “Estimate of the Enemy Threat” 
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embrace India precluded a compromise and compelled the Military Committee to refer 

this problem to the Council of Ministers. The Committee also asked the Ministers to 

review their “political guidance,” unchanged since 1959, and then provide planners 

with basic assumptions for global war and lesser contingencies. But the Council of 

Ministers, unable to resolve either of these issues, referred both to their Deputies, who 

in turn became deadlocked.115

The Military Committee’s next meeting in April 1967 proved to be “one of the 

smoothest and least contentious to date”—and, perhaps for that very reason, not one of 

the more productive. Pakistan’s General Qadir argued that, since détente had reduced 

the danger of general war, CENTO should reorient its planning toward regional threats 

(i.e., India). General Wheeler answered that CENTO supplied “the protective umbrella 

under which the regional CENTO nations have been able to work individually toward 

achieving their national aspirations.” The Soviets’ capabilities were increasing, he 

warned, and their intention could change overnight; hence an apparent détente “can 

prove to be very evanescent and lead to an extremely dangerous relaxation of vigilance.” Just like last year, the Committee referred “Political Guidance” and “Estimate 

of the Enemy Threat” to the Council of Ministers. As to the “Co-ordination of Military 

Forces–Iran/Pakistan,” Iranian and Pakistani spokesmen remained “elusive” about 

when and whether they would report the results of their bilateral arrangements.” 

Finally, during drafting of the press communiqué, General Qadir wanted to highlight 

Pakistan’s non-participation in CENTO exercises. General Wheeler and Field Marshal 

Hull, seeing this as “a sop for the Chinese and for home consumption,” lodged strong 

objections and General Qadir retreated.116

At the 1968 meeting, where Lieutenant General Stanley Donovan, USAF, as Chief, 

US Element, CENTO, represented the United States, nothing noteworthy occurred.117

CENTO meetings had come to serve mainly as forums at which to air grievances and 

delineate the differences among presumed allies.

Summation

The Six Day War transformed the Middle East, creating issues and problems that would long outlast those of the Vietnam War. Washington found itself unable to 

create effective mechanisms for promoting collective security in the region. CENTO 

did little more than exist, and the Shah had his own agenda. Strengthening security ties 

between the United States and Israel further polarized the region, as the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff foresaw, drawing Egypt and Syria closer to the Soviets.

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11

Africa: Avoiding Direct 

Intervention

Africa ranked last on the list of regional strategic priorities during the Johnson administration. The most important US military facility was Kagnew station in Ethiopia, used 

for communications and intelligence collection, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted 

to retain as long as possible. In sub-Sahara Africa, though, they could see no justification for direct military involvement. Matching the promotion of human rights against 

the preservation of strategic assets (e.g., space tracking stations in South Africa), the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff saw it as their duty to emphasize the latter. Pressuring the white 

government of South Africa to change its repugnant racial policies, they argued, should 

stop well short of enforcing sanctions through a blockade. Talk of invading Rhodesia 

to topple white supremacy prompted them to recommend strongly against committing US forces. Even in the Congo, where a communist-supported insurgency briefly 

flourished, they stressed the Europeans’ role and looked upon overt US intervention 

as a last resort.

Southern Africa: White Supremacy under Siege

The years 1964–65, which witnessed notable civil rights victories for African Americans in the United States, saw a sharpening of racial barriers in southern 

Africa. Colonial rule was ending rapidly, save for Portugal’s empire in Angola, GuineaBissau and Mozambique, but white minorities in South Africa and Rhodesia refused 

to relinquish their privileged status. In South Africa, whites not only repressed that 

country’s black majority through the rigid segregation of apartheid but also prepared 

to create separate “homelands” for blacks in South West Africa, which they held as a 

United Nations mandate.1 A suit to revoke that mandate had been brought before the 

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International Court of Justice. If the Court so ruled and South Africa refused to comply, 

the UN Security Council might impose sanctions.

What should the US government be prepared to do? A draft National Policy Paper, 

prepared by the State Department and circulated in July 1964, listed objectives in the 

following order of importance: avert a clash between the UN and South Africa, preferably by securing Pretoria’s compliance even with a strongly unfavorable Court ruling; 

seek alternatives to apartheid; prevent communist infiltration; continue to operate 

facilities that tracked missiles, satellites, and deep space probes, even while preparing alternative sites; and maintain, as long as possible, the availability of air and naval 

facilities.2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who favored friendly persuasion rather than outright 

pressure, told Secretary McNamara that they harbored “serious reservations” about 

emphasizing South West Africa in the NPP. They listed US objectives in a very different 

order: continue South Africa’s pro-western alignment; preserve the deep space and missile tracking facilities; and sell weapons designed for defense against external aggression. The NPP, they said, should be revised to avoid implications either that the United 

States would support UN sanctions or that US forces might be employed to enforce 

Security Council resolutions. If the administration opted for graduated pressure, rather 

than a “dialogue of persuasion” as they preferred, the consequences could include loss 

of important facilities, severe degradation of South Africa’s value as a potential ally, 

and internal violence with opportunities for communist penetration. The draft NPP, 

by contrast, denied that South Africa could be of “real help” and pointedly observed 

that its current leaders had opposed going to war against Hitler.3

Deferring to State’s judgment, ISA concurred in giving first priority to South West 

Africa. Also, ISA rejected the Joint Chiefs’ argument against sanctions and intervention by concluding that the draft “does not imply any decision now.” But in November 

1964, “to avoid misunderstanding and to clarify their position,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

approved a statement that they considered the draft NPP inconsistent with their views. 

Beyond the objections outlined above, they took issue with its statements that South 

Africa had become “a major burden to the West,” that political considerations might 

eventually “require us to discourage, possibly even prohibit, further American investment” there, and that the United States should furnish long-term financial support to 

political refugees, perhaps even those with previous communist contacts. Nonetheless, 

in January 1965, Secretary Rusk approved an NPP that differed from the draft version 

only in minor details.4

The NPP tasked the Defense Department with determining the feasibility of using 

US forces to enforce either a decision by the International Court of Justice ending the 

South West Africa mandate or a UN imposition of economic sanctions against South 

Africa. Accordingly, in April 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that liberating South West Africa would require a UN force of four divisions, three 

air wings, and three carrier task forces. To enforce sanctions by blockading South 

Africa, there might have to be 4 carriers, 24 destroyers, and 8 submarines—treble that 

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force to allow for rotation, if the operation continued indefinitely.5 In the Joint Chiefs’ 

judgment, those operations would prove “extremely costly,” strain relations with allies, 

offer opportunities for communist influence to intrude, forfeit important installations 

and base rights (including the Azores, since Portugal would support South Africa), and 

produce “potential chaos throughout southern Africa.” The need to divert so much 

military power away from more important tasks made US participation infeasible and 

inconsistent with US security interests. A proper position, they contended, would be 

one that stood “clearly” against employing force and sanctions and “clearly” in favor of 

non-violent solutions. They concluded by asking Secretary McNamara to discuss the 

problem with Secretary Rusk and President Johnson. He, in turn, advised the State 

Department and the White House (1) that “formidable” difficulties would surround the 

mounting of any military operation and (2) that “it is at least questionable” whether 

any NATO allies would participate.6

Actually, the possibility of intervening against white rule became most acute not 

over South West Africa but in Rhodesia. This British colony contained 225,000 whites 

(many of whom had arrived in the 1940s) and 4,100,000 blacks. When the British pressed 

their presumed countrymen to accept majority rule, Prime Minister Ian Smith led the 

fight to save white supremacy. On 11 November 1965, he declared Rhodesia independent but with continuing loyalty to the British Crown. Nine days later, the UN Security 

Council called upon members to sever economic relations with Rhodesia.7 Black African states, deeply angered by Smith’s action, demanded British military intervention.

In Washington, on 3 December, an interdepartmental group reviewed the Rhodesian situation; Brigadier General Thomas Sibley, J–5, acted as JCS representative. G. 

Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said that relying 

on sanctions alone would likely lead to an economic morass in Central Africa, with 

indeterminable but certainly high costs for the United States. Instead, he argued timely 

use of even limited force stood a much better chance of rapid results at a much lower 

cost. Mr. Williams conceded that, in view of Vietnam commitments, the US contribution would be limited to providing transport aircraft. Even so, General Sibley detected 

within the group “a growing movement . . . to argue for US military involvement.” 

Assistant Secretary Williams apparently believed that US military support for British 

military intervention would pay tremendous political dividends, far out of proportion 

to the costs and risks. General Sibley disagreed.8

ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess Rhodesian defense capabilities, calculate 

what forces were needed to overcome white resistance, and describe the military problems that might arise. Answering on 16 December 1965, they examined a British invasion 

from neighboring Zambia. Occupying Kariba Dam on the border and Wankie coal fields 

near the border would require one airborne/infantry division and three tactical fighter 

squadrons. Ending resistance and restoring “lawful government” would require two divisions, five squadrons, and necessary airlift. While urban whites eventually should accept 

British authority, rural whites probably would resort to resistance and harassment. The 

British would have difficulty assembling adequate forces; if they asked for US airlift, 

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three troop carrier squadrons could be detached from other duties. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff warned, however, that major commitments elsewhere did not permit another 

intervention “wherein the depth of involvement is impossible to predict with any degree 

of accuracy.” Accordingly, they “strongly” opposed any such commitment. That possibility disappeared because London, believing that sanctions soon would succeed, refused 

to countenance armed intervention. The Senior Interdepartmental Group decided (1) 

against military involvement “in any way” and (2) that economic sanctions had reached 

a level beyond which further escalation would be unprofitable.9

In January 1966, Secretary Rusk warned Secretary McNamara that looming difficulties over South West Africa “may be both accelerated and aggravated” if Portugal 

and South Africa tried to thwart efforts at ending Ian Smith’s rebellion. Since retaining 

rights in the Azores and tracking stations in South Africa were major considerations 

in US relations with Lisbon and Pretoria, Secretary Rusk asked for an assessment of 

how important the Azores still were and how soon alternatives to the tracking stations 

could be found.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that, despite the advent of long-range transports 

in the 1970s and the possibility of alternative arrangements, the Azores would “continue to be of major strategic importance for the foreseeable future.” Uses included 

“sea and air routing, staging and support, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, 

communications, and intelligence.” As for South Africa, the growing emphasis on 

contingency planning for countries bordering the Indian Ocean enhanced her importance, because South Africa contained airfields, logistical and ship repair facilities, 

and a level of technical competence that could not be duplicated elsewhere in Africa. 

Closure of the Suez Canal would make ready access to South Africa a valuable asset. 

In summary, “the United States currently enjoys a certain rapport with the South African armed forces and has a continuing need to deny the communists access to this 

strategic location.” Again, therefore, they advocated a “firm, patient, and diplomatic 

dialogue” with Pretoria.10

When Secretary McNamara forwarded these views to Secretary Rusk, he added 

his own opinion that the Azores were neither indispensable nor merely convenient. 

During 1966–1970 their loss would decrease US strategic mobility by about 10 percent—although that could be offset by spending $75 million for additional aircraft 

and pre-positioned equipment. By 1971-80, when C–5As and Fast Deployment Logistic 

ships became available, offsetting costs would be only $10 million. But the Azores’ 

mid-Atlantic location did ensure its importance for anti-submarine warfare even after 

1970. As to South African tracking facilities, Secretary McNamara claimed that all their 

functions could be replaced, except for intelligence collection during the atmospheric 

re-entry of Soviet space vehicles.11

The issue of South West Africa continued to smolder but did not ignite. Surprisingly, in July 1966, the International Court of Justice defused that powder keg by ruling 

that plaintiff countries had not established a legal interest entitling them to bring the 

case. In October, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to terminate South 

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Africa’s mandate. A fourteen-member committee then tried, unsuccessfully, to decide 

how the UN should proceed to assume direct responsibility. In December 1966 the UN 

Security Council imposed mandatory selective sanctions upon Rhodesia, but the CIA 

did not expect them to drive Ian Smith into an accommodation.12 As things turned out, 

Smith’s regime had thirteen more years of life.

Ship stops at South African ports might foster collaboration, but civil rights groups 

protested that black sailors going ashore would face racial restrictions. In 1965, the 

South African government would not allow racially mixed aircrews from the USS 

Independence to land at their bases, so a port visit was cancelled. In mid-1966 the 

Navy wanted the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, en route to the South China Sea, to put 

in at Cape Town for refueling and shore leave; President Johnson ruled that the carrier would stop at Rio de Janeiro instead. When the Roosevelt was returning from war 

duties, early in 1967, the Navy directed that sailors “go ashore at Cape Town only in 

connection with integrated activities of any type.” Even so, anti-apartheid protests in 

the United States led DOD to cancel further Port Calls in South Africa.13

Meanwhile, early in 1967, Deputy Secretary Vance asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

as well as the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, to assess the minimum requirements for military facilities in South Africa and analyze alternatives. Secretary of the 

Navy Paul Nitze replied that, while the ports were “extremely useful but not indispensable,” South Africa’s strategic location and potential wartime value had “even greater 

importance . . . than its obvious short-term utility.” Should the Suez Canal be denied (as 

it would be during and after the Six Day War), South African facilities would become 

“essential to control of vital sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and Far East.” Secretary 

of the Air Force Harold Brown stated that, although tracking and testing activities 

would be “substantially degraded” by losing South African facilities, additional ships 

and aircraft could compensate for their absence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, 

noting the essentiality of South African facilities in wartime. Deputy Secretary Vance 

forwarded all their views to the State Department.14

The NSC discussed South African issues on 13 September 1967. UN Ambassador 

Arthur Goldberg endorsed a policy of “disengagement”—or so, at least, the JCS representative believed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted by advising Secretary McNamara, two weeks later, why they viewed disengagement with “serious concern.” South 

Africa’s domestic policies, however repugnant, were not exportable and did not directly 

threaten the United States. Disengagement that included self-denial of air space, ports, 

and repair facilities, curtailment of trade and investments, and the elimination of range 

and tracking sites used by NASA and DOD “would be militarily disadvantageous to the 

United States and would probably result in counter actions without altering basic South 

African policies.” They also recommended relaxing the prohibition against operational 

and maintenance port visits. The Roosevelt episode seemed to have set “a precedent for 

US disengagement from South Africa.” By contrast, since the Six Day War closed the 

Suez Canal, the British Navy’s use of Simonstown had risen from an average of one to 

ten ships monthly. Furthermore, the travel restrictions placed on US personnel were 

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impeding intelligence collection; a disengagement policy would aggravate that problem. 

They asked OSD to raise all these points with the State Department.15

On 19 October, Paul Nitze as Deputy Secretary did transmit JCS views to State. He 

suggested that, since a regional reassessment was moving slowly, they might review 

immediately the interim policy on ship stops. In reply, Under Secretary Katzenbach 

expressed doubt that this single issue could usefully be separated from “the full spectrum of our policy.” If a specific issue required decision, the Senior Interdepartmental 

Group could deal with it. Such an issue was brought before the SIG in June 1968, 

when General Johnson presented General Wheeler’s recommendation that the carrier 

Intrepid, en route from the Atlantic to the Pacific, stop for refueling at a South African 

port without allowing crew liberty. Otherwise, an oiler would have to make a 42-day 

round trip costing $338,000.16 Katzenbach refused, mainly on grounds that there would 

be “serious repercussions for us at home.”17

At last, in November 1968, State circulated the draft of a new National Policy Paper 

on Southern Africa.18 Generally, it recommended pursuing a measured approach, bringing flexible pressure to bear upon white regimes, setting clear limits on US activities 

with them, and encouraging long-term constructive forces for change. The governing 

principles of US policy should include progress toward self-determination, majority 

rule, and equal rights for all. Specifically, for South Africa, that meant: totally embargoing sales of military equipment; avoiding “conspicuous military association,” such 

as visits by high-ranking officers; exchanging intelligence as long as the work could 

be done “discreetly and without creating the impression of US collaboration”; making 

a resumption of routine naval calls contingent upon the ability to do so inconspicuously and with assurance that US personnel would undergo neither segregation nor 

discrimination; and maintaining range and tracking stations with the same assurances 

for US personnel, while developing alternative facilities. As for black-ruled states, “the 

US should be prepared to entertain requests for defensive arms if such requests cannot 

be met through traditional UK channels.”19

In their critique, dated 12 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called some of these 

proposals unrealistic. Several, in their judgment, were not fully developed, would 

unnecessarily limit military activities, and could either contradict US objectives or 

prove counter-productive. Why, for example, would visits by high-ranking officers 

automatically create undesirable publicity? Such contacts served to develop intelligence collection channels, maintain a military rapport, and “exert a moderating 

influence whenever possible.” Therefore, they “should not be restricted as a matter of 

principle but considered in relation to the conditions which prevail at the time proposals are made.” As for naval visits, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it highly unlikely 

that South Africa would make official exceptions to apartheid. Consequently, a more 

flexible provision for shore leave should be made. Where alternatives were not available, aircraft carriers should be allowed to refuel at South African ports. Otherwise, a 

fleet oiler would have to be diverted for 45 to 50 days. Soviet naval activity in the South 

Atlantic and Indian Oceans, they continued, underscored the need for a more flexible 

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approach. Finally, as to the advisability of arming black-ruled nations, they warned 

that “defensive” weapons could fall into insurgents’ hands, placing the United States in 

a position of seeming to support insurgencies and operations across national borders. 

The result could be retaliation and escalation. They urged, therefore, that such requests 

be considered “not as policy but on a case-by-case basis.”20

Forwarding their views to State, on 24 December, ISA added criticism of its own 

that cut even deeper. The draft, for example, emphasized a policy of pressing for majority rule but it also recognized how slight the chances of success were. Thus State had 

proposed “essentially a declaratory policy”; ISA wanted to know the disadvantages 

as well as the advantages of it. Was the United States weakening its ability to achieve 

limited progress by insisting upon absolute majority rule, which was anathema to most 

whites? Also, since black Africans would want more than a declaratory policy, the draft 

should say plainly what the United States was not prepared to do, such as employing 

either military force or mandatory sanctions against South Africa. Moreover, while 

averting a racial war was identified as a major objective, no courses of action had been 

laid out to achieve that goal: “We should consider whether there is anything meaningful 

that the United States can do in this regard, or whether we should focus our efforts on 

avoiding US involvement in the event racial strife occurs.”21 When President Johnson 

left office, the draft NPP remained unapproved.

Another Congo Crisis

The Congo gained independence from Belgium in June 1960 and promptly descended into chaos. Washington worked to keep the new nation unified and non-communist, giving strong support to peacekeeping by a United Nations Expeditionary Force. 

The Kennedy administration backed a UN military campaign against the secessionist 

regime of Moise Tshombe, which controlled copper-rich Katanga province. In January 

1963, Tshombe capitulated to UN unifiers.

Sadly, Robert Southey’s verse about the battle of Blenheim—“But what good came 

of it at last?”. . .”Why that I cannot tell,” said he, “But ‘twas a famous victory”—fit the 

Congo equally well. Victory over Tshombe brought neither peace nor unity. American 

officials wondered “whether the wholesale buying of political leaders is a sound basis 

for establishing a stable government. In the Congo there appears to have been no feasible alternative.”22 Early in 1964, a rebellion against the central government erupted 

in northern Kivu province. There was some evidence of rebels receiving Chinese communist weapons. By 30 June, when the last UN peacekeepers left the Congo, insurgents 

of the “Popular Army” controlled about one-fifth of the country as the Armée Nationale 

Congolaise (ANC) melted away. Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula resigned in disgrace. As 

his successor, President Joseph Kasavubu named the once-despised Moise Tshombe. 

Outside the Congo, practically all black African leaders viewed Tshombe as a tool of 

the former colonial powers.
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Washington now had to do an about-face and bolster Tshombe. Quietly, the United 

States encouraged Israel to train a para-commando battalion, Italy to provide aircraft 

and train pilots, and Belgium to train and advise all echelons of the ANC. American 

civilians, soon replaced by anti-Castro Cubans recruited by and under contract to 

the CIA, flew six T–28s.23 These were not enough. On 5 August, just after insurgents 

occupied Stanleyville, Ambassador McMurtrie Godley cabled that they might very 

soon control enough territory to organize a “People’s Government” which communist 

and radical African regimes would recognize. Next day, Secretary Rusk appealed to 

Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak that “you and we and all European friends 

must move immediately and vigorously to prevent total collapse. . . . [C]hronic instability provides fertile ground for communist infiltration, prevention of which has been 

cornerstone [of] our Congo policy [for the] last four years.”24

In Brussels, on 7 August, Spaak and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman 

agreed upon steps short of open intervention. Belgium dispatched advisors and small 

arms. The United States sent four C–130 transports and three CH–34 cargo helicopters 

to the capital of Leopoldville and lent three B–26 light bombers.25

The State Department solicited suggestions from DOD. On 1 September, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that while the Congo had little strategic 

value, its political worth was great since this “communist-inspired” rebellion could 

spread communist influence throughout central Africa. They recommended: providing 

materiel and financial assistance to supplement Belgian and other Western support; 

urging the Belgians to increase their efforts “and to assume responsibility for the 

effective performance of Congolese security forces, including mercenaries”; backing 

the Belgians with limited numbers of US advisers; encouraging “the concept of intervention by a Western and African coalition,” if Belgium failed to assume responsibility 

for effective performance by the Congolese; and accelerating psychological operations 

and exerting diplomatic pressure.

Should these steps fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, Washington must choose 

between pursuing US objectives and avoiding increased involvement. Direct US military intervention could preserve a pro-Western government but would provoke severe 

international reactions and might lead to long-term American involvement. Putting tactical advisers in the field might succeed at less cost but risk what they called “another 

Vietnam.” (At that moment, there were nearly 20,000 US advisers in South Vietnam) 

So, at this point, they opposed committing any US combat forces. But, if intervention 

did become necessary, “it should be executed without hesitation and with adequate 

forces to ensure rapid success.” A permanent solution for the Congo, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff added, required effective diplomatic action to deny the rebels safe havens in 

neighboring countries.26

Already, though, the military tide had started turning in Tshombe’s favor. Colonel 

Frederic Van de Waele, a Belgian officer acting as Tshombe’s military adviser, planned 

to attack Stanleyville with four separate columns. On 30 August, Tshombe’s mercenaries recaptured Albertville to the south.27
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As the mercenaries advanced, rebels in Stanleyville announced that the Europeans 

and Americans there would be held hostage until Tshombe stopped using mercenaries. 

On 4 September, at State’s request, Deputy Secretary Vance asked the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to prepare a plan for rescuing about two dozen Americans in Stanleyville. They 

in turn contacted General Paul D. Adams, USA, who as Commander in Chief, Strike 

Command, bore the responsibility for planning operations in the Middle East, subSahara Africa, and South Asia. The JCS recommendation of 12 September, based upon 

General Adams’ reply, outlined an overt course of action and a covert one. In the overt 

operation, two rifle companies supported by eight fighters would seize Stanleyville 

airfield in a parachute/air-landing assault, rescue the hostages, and withdraw. In the 

covert operation, 100 soldiers carried in two C–46s and four helicopters would make 

secret night landings, infiltrate to the hostage sites, overpower the guards, and bring 

liberated hostages to a pre-selected aerial evacuation point. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

believed that either plan offered “a reasonable chance of successfully rescuing the personnel unharmed” provided that: the hostages’ precise location was known beforehand; 

complete surprise was obtained; and the commander was authorized to use whatever 

force proved necessary. A covert operation appeared to offer the best chance, but it 

should be backed up by pre-positioning the overt force.28

Early in October, rebel broadcasts threatened death to American hostages. The Joint 

Staff instructed General Adams to alert a rescue force—two battalions were now proposed—and plan upon using either British-owned Ascension Island in the South Atlantic 

or Wheelus Air Base in Libya as the forward staging area. Monrovia, Liberia, could be 

either the alternative site or used in conjunction with them. However, on 13 November, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Adams that inadequate facilities at Ascension 

and Monrovia made them last resorts. Yet, since basing and overflight rights in Africa 

might prove unobtainable, he should prepare a plan using Ascension alone.29

Meantime, the United States loaned Tshombe seven B–26 light bombers. Rebels 

reacted by threatening to execute one hostage for every Congolese killed by air attacks. 

Accordingly, on 15 October, Washington ordered a suspension of US-supported air 

operations. Eight days later, the State Department authorized resumption but banned 

(1) flights within 25 miles of Stanleyville and (2) air strikes closer than five miles from 

the outskirts of any large or sensitive urban area or within two miles of any other 

urban area.30

On 27 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that State’s restrictions were 

“militarily unwise,” establishing a political precedent in which they saw “inherent 

dangers” for giving adequate support to US policies and objectives world-wide.31 Succumbing to threats of reprisals might endanger the safety of Americans around the 

world. In their judgment, these restrictions would preclude effective air operations. 

To exempt an area from attack merely because it was urban—a position that went 

beyond the requirements in the Law of Land Warfare—“would impose a crippling 

degradation upon one of the vital components of national military strength.” In the 

Congo, cities and towns were “the keys to population and resource control”; effective 
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use of US-supported air power was “vital” for operations aimed at ending the rebellion. Restricting urban attacks, in their judgment, “will result in a prolonged period of 

warfare with an uncertain outcome and will aggravate a broad spectrum of related 

factors inimical to US national interests.” Moreover, since Tshombe had a T–6 squadron flown by mercenaries, full enforcement of any restrictions seemed doubtful. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that their views be provided to President Johnson. However, 

on that very same day, the Congo Country Team advised that these restrictions were 

“acceptable operationally.” Consequently, they remained in force.32

Early in November, as mercenaries approached Stanleyville, the rebels announced 

that hostages’ lives could no longer be guaranteed. On 8 November, Foreign Minister 

Spaak came to Washington with a proposal to rescue the hostages by using Belgian 

paratroopers flown in US transports. The administration agreed. Since, from this point 

forward, the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned mostly as a communications channel,33

the rest of the story can be quickly told.

Officers from Headquarters, US European Command, collaborated with Belgians 

in planning a rescue mission. A Joint Staff officer flew to Brussels and monitored their 

work. Operation DRAGON ROUGE was promulgated by General Lyman Lemnitzer, 

USCINCEUR, on 14 November. Three days later, US C–130s began moving a Belgian 

paratroop battalion to Ascension Island. On 24 November, at 0600 local time, twelve 

C–130s brought the Belgians over Stanleyville airfield. After seizing it, paratroopers 

moved toward the Victoria Hotel where some 300 people (including 17 Americans) were 

held. Rebels began shooting the hostages, killing 33—two of them Americans—before 

being driven away. About 1,500 foreign nationals were evacuated from Stanleyville; 

mercenaries entered the city on 26 November. A similar mission to Paulis over 26–27 

November, DRAGON NOIR, evacuated 375 people—although 22 hostages were killed 

before the paratroopers arrived.34

At the United Nations, spokesmen for black African states denounced the rescue 

missions as propping up Tshombe and colonialism.35 In mid-December, they began 

pressing a resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of mercenaries. The State 

Department, fearing that Tshombe’s situation would worsen, favored an immediate 

cease-fire. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 24 December, objected that withdrawing 

mercenaries would work to the rebels’ advantage—an advantage that would be compounded if radical African states continued supplying the rebels with arms and advisers. Eventually, under such conditions, the United States would either have to accept 

a communist victory or resort to “extensive US military involvement.” They worried, 

too, that a cease-fire agreement might give the rebels recognition and legitimacy. They 

recalled, also, how radicals and communists had taken advantage of cease-fires in 

Laos, Vietnam, and Yemen. Negotiations, therefore, should be undertaken “against a 

backdrop of military advantage.” That meant strengthening the Tshombe government‘s 

military base, making enough force available to end “any serious rebel activity,” stopping arms traffic to the rebels, closing cross-border sanctuaries, establishing effective inspection machinery in the Congo and surrounding countries, and coordinating 
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political strategy with Brussels and Leopoldville. ISA agreed and so advised the State 

Department. Yet, on 30 December, the UN Security Council adopted by vote of 10-0 a 

resolution requesting a cease-fire, withdrawal of mercenaries, and an end to foreign 

intervention.36

Concurrently, General Adams sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff what he called “clearcut proof” that communists were trying to overthrow the Congolese government, 

“which is the key to the economic and political situation in Central Africa.” He rated 

Central Africa as “a Cold War battleground second in intensity only to Vietnam.” 

Unless changed, the trend of events “will inexorably lead to a Communist-dominated 

Central Africa within the next few years.” General Adams offered a series of vigorous 

countermeasures.37

On 31 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded General Adams’ appraisal 

to Secretary McNamara. They cautioned, though, that the actions he proposed would 

conflict with the administration’s aims of limiting US involvement in the Congo, keeping the Cold War out of Africa, and placing principal reliance upon the former colonial 

powers. However, they continued, General Adams’ proposals called for answers to 

important questions. First, should the United States concentrate its resources to support pro-Western governments? Second, in dealing with key countries such as Egypt, 

Algeria, Ghana, and South Africa, what policies and actions should be changed to 

protect US interests in Africa generally and the Congo particularly?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an urgent, intensive high-level review of 

strategy and policy toward all of Africa. As a “point of departure,” they put forward 

several propositions. First, since Southeast Asia and Latin America deserved higher 

Cold War priorities, other Western governments must be enlisted to assist African 

nations. Second, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa should be offered political and 

economic inducements to moderate their racial policies. Third, Western assistance 

should gradually be concentrated in friendly countries. Fourth, Western powers 

should be prepared to support insurgencies within radical states that interfered in 

other countries’ affairs. Fifth, the feasibility and desirability of blocking the Congo’s 

borders should be studied. In one area, though, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unwilling 

to wait for a review. Immediate action should be taken to arrest the deterioration of 

Tshombe’s air capabilities.38

On 14 January 1965, Ambassador Godley asked that Tshombe’s US-supported 

aircraft be allowed to attack clearly identified targets of military importance, except 

where hostages might be held. The Defense Department strongly supported him. The 

State Department lifted restrictions on 19 February but ordered that “great care” be 

taken to avoid strafing villages within ten miles of the Ugandan border, so that British 

efforts to persuade Uganda to seal her border would not be jeopardized. Two days 

later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded Secretary McNamara that restrictions had been 

imposed to protect hostages who were now free; continuing them could jeopardize 

Tshombe’s success and spread the conflict into other countries.39
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In mid-February, the Congolese Army started using napalm. Then Tshombe, 

under strong US pressure, promised to prohibit its use. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

on 16 March, criticized restrictions upon “conventional air support weapons” as 

militarily unwise and claimed that napalm could give Tshombe’s government “an 

element of superiority” over the rebels. But the State Department kept the napalm 

restriction in force. According to Under Secretary Harriman, reactions among black 

African governments would favor the rebel cause and lead radical states to harden 

their support for the insurgents.40

General Adams proposed creating a Central Government force that included 20 

Congolese battalions, a mercenary special brigade, two tactical and air transport 

squadrons, and 75 river patrol boats. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended using General Adams’ plan as a framework. Meantime, they said, Belgium and other European 

powers ought to “shoulder the burden” because of their vested interest in Africa and the 

growing US commitment in Vietnam. The United States should refuse responsibility for 

additional tasks in the Congo but consider providing “minimum materiel requirements 

which exceed Belgian capabilities.”41

At Brussels, on 26 March 1965, Foreign Minister Spaak and Under Secretary Harriman agreed upon an allotment of responsibilities. The United States would make available aircraft, vehicles, and communications equipment. Additionally, in Leopoldville, 

a US-Belgian-Congolese logistics group would oversee the purchase and utilization of 

military supplies. First priority for training and equipment support would go to units 

operating in the rebellious northeastern Congo.42

After the Stanleyville operation, Moscow decided to give the rebels more direct 

military aid. Fidel Castro sent a small group of volunteers led by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, a dedicated revolutionary. But by mid-1965, in the northeast, mercenaries had 

cut off the rebels from their sanctuaries and supply sources in Sudan and Uganda. 

Guevara and his Cubans reached the last area held by the rebels, Fizi-Baraka along 

the western shore of Lake Tanganyika, which also was the Congo-Tanzania border. In 

October 1965, mercenaries began a final push against Fizi-Baraka. Guevara and his 

Cubans withdrew to Tanzania in November, effectively marking the insurgency’s end.43

In November, also, General Joseph Mobutu took control of the Central Government 

by a bloodless coup. The next crisis began during July 1967. Tshombe, now an exile 

under sentence of death, was kidnapped and held in Algeria; the remaining 230 white 

mercenaries rebelled and 1,000 disgruntled Congolese soldiers joined them. Mobutu 

appealed for US military support. “We must keep Mobutu in power,” Under Secretary 

Katzenbach told the NSC, “because there is no acceptable alternative to him.” The 

United States dispatched three C–130s which flew 180 missions ferrying troops and 

supplies. The last C–130 left in December, after the mercenaries had retreated into 

Rwanda and Mobutu regained full control.44 There followed in the Congo a long run of 

notoriously bad government.

In appraising the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what stands out is the near-irrelevance of conventional military advice. Their recommendation about how to rescue 
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hostages, for example, was adopted without having a well of experience upon which 

to draw. The Congo became a theater of para-military operations, where mercenary 

activities provided the margin of victory.

What Price Kagnew?

Ethiopia mattered to the United States mainly because Kagnew station, near Asmara 

in Eritrea, served as an important communications and intelligence collection 

facility. It enjoyed unique climatic and topographical advantages. Washington had to 

decide how much “rent,” in the form of grant aid, Kagnew was worth. Matters were 

complicated by border clashes between Somalia and Ethiopia, and by Somalia’s turning to the USSR for arms. In the Horn of Africa, Soviet-American competition became 

a real possibility.

In 1953, the United States acquired a 25-year lease to operate Kagnew station; in 

exchange Ethiopia began receiving $5 million annually in grant aid. Late in 1963, as 

border clashes between Ethiopia and Somalia intensified, the Johnson administration 

raised the MAP ceiling to $10 million.45 In July 1964, after consulting General Adams 

and Ambassador Edward Korry, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara 

that a “prompt and substantial” aid increase was justified by (1) Ethiopia’s importance 

to US politico-military interests, (2) a recent deterioration in US-Ethiopian relations, 

and (3) Sino-Soviet progress in influencing East African countries. They recommended 

approving in principle a six-year aid plan averaging $15 million annually, aiming for a 

40,000-man army plus a “minimum but effective” air force.46

Evidently, Somalia would be receiving MiG-15/17 fighters from the Soviets. To 

offset this advantage, Washington had promised to provide Ethiopia with twelve F–5 

interceptors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while labeling the MiG threat “more psychopolitical than military,” urged an acceleration of deliveries so that eight would be 

delivered during 1966 and the remaining four in 1967. On 18 December 1964, Secretary 

McNamara approved a $15 million MAP for FY 1966 so that seven F–5s would arrive 

in CY 1966. Because of demands elsewhere, though, he decided against approving a 

six-year aid plan.47

A National Policy Paper on Ethiopia, circulated by the State Department early in 

March 1965, incorporated JCS views. Previously, the primary aim had been retaining 

Kagnew at the lowest possible cost. Now, the NPP said, wider interests should be taken 

into account: Ethiopia’s moderating role in Africa, and her willingness to participate 

in collective security (e.g., the Korean War and Congo peacekeeping); the importance 

of retaining the Ethiopian military’s confidence, by helping build effective forces; and 

the threat to Ethiopia’s stability, stemming from military shortcomings shown during recent clashes with Somalia. So, instead of waiting until Addis Ababa pressured 

Washington into action, the administration would be willing to meet its military commitments at a rate determined by Ethiopia’s ability to use and maintain equipment.48
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The Soviets provided Somalia with five MiG–15s, 60 T–34 tanks, between 130 

and 150 armored personnel carriers, 126 pieces of antiaircraft artillery. Ethiopian 

Emperor Haile Selassie, who had only 40 light tanks, between 26 and 39 APCs, and 

nine antiaircraft guns, told Ambassador Korry that he “wonders what US-Ethiopian 

relationships are when, after 13 years of US aid, he observes what the Somalis receive 

from the Soviets in a few months.” Ambassador Korry, in turn, warned Washington of 

a “gloomy outlook” for US-Ethiopian ties. The administration decided that, for “overriding political reasons,” Ethiopia’s claim to 14 rebuilt M–41 light tanks would come 

ahead of all other MAP recipients except Vietnam.49

On 24 May 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara of developments that gave rise to “considerable concern.” Communist China, reportedly, had 

offered Ethiopia $25 million worth of grants and credits in return for diplomatic recognition. As anti-western influence increased, US interests would come under “increasing 

jeopardy.” Kagnew’s availability, already “tenuous,” might well be endangered unless 

Ethiopia’s confidence could be restored “through expeditious and forthright demonstrations of US sincerity.” They proposed, among other things, increasing MAP levels 

and accelerating efforts to determine and initiate remedial actions. ISA communicated 

this concern to the State Department. A few days earlier, in fact, Ambassador at Large 

Averell Harriman had an audience with Haile Selassie that focused on postponing 

recognition of China.50

Concurrently, General Adams suggested that a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding, similar to one concluded with Iran in July 1964, would stabilize MAP and 

eliminate much Ethiopian dissatisfaction. The J–5 disagreed, noting that the Understanding with Iran had not eliminated MAP’s “open-ended” aspects, because the Shah 

later sought “massive” changes. Nonetheless, writing to Secretary McNamara on 30 

June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that General Adams’ proposal receive consideration. While recognizing its disadvantages, they noted the importance of MAP in USEthiopian relations. The State Department, though, saw a serious danger of increased 

Ethiopian demands. It recommended, as the NPP specified, making deliveries contingent upon Ethiopians’ ability to use and maintain the equipment involved.51

Early in 1966, the US Embassy in Addis Ababa proposed keeping annual MAP at 

$15 million, limiting the Ethiopian army to 36,000 men (reorganized into eight brigades 

of improved efficiency), and providing transport aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

generally agreed, adding that selection of a transport (either C–130s or C–119s with jet 

pods) should await further tests. In February 1967, with Haile Selassie about to arrive 

in Washington, Assistant Secretary (ISA) John McNaughton described the US objective 

as saying “no” to the Emperor’s demands while preserving good relations with him. 

Haile Selassie highlighted the “massive” Somalia buildup and asked for $16.7 million in 

military aid. For FY 1967, MAP did rise to $16.5 million, providing four helicopters52 and 

17 light tanks along with expedited deliveries of trucks, APCs, and F–5s. Then moderates came to power in Somalia and the tensions with Ethiopia eased. Consequently, 

during FYs 1968–1969, annual MAP declined to $12 million.53
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During 1965–66, the Kagnew staff grew from 2,500 to 3,000 personnel; Defense 

asked State to approve acquiring another 100 acres. However, Under Secretary Katzenbach worried that Ethiopians interpreted growth as an index of Kagnew’s importance 

to the United States. That being so he asked, can “the price of our tenure involve us 

more deeply in the Horn of Africa than our vital interests warrant.” He questioned if 

visible expansion could be avoided, and perhaps some of our personnel be withdrawn? 

After consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary McNamara replied that he saw no 

way to make substantial reductions without sacrificing “some significant capabilities 

and products.” For a number of the most important missions, relocations were technically possible. Such moves, however, would incur operational and other costs without 

making Kagnew much less conspicuous. He added, though, that 100 acres would be 

DOD’s last request, and that manning levels should not increase more than 300 during 

the next five years.54

Under Secretary Katzenbach reopened the issue in May 1967 because, he advised 

Secretary McNamara, estimates about stability in the Horn of Africa over the next 

few years had become “considerably more pessimistic.”55 Ambassador Korry doubted 

whether the Ethiopian government could maintain “some semblance of order” in newly 

rebellious Eritrea for more than five years. Haile Selassie’s death, which could not be far 

distant, would provoke “severe disturbances throughout the Empire.” Accordingly, Mr. 

Katzenbach favored freezing the US presence at Kagnew and planning for an orderly, 

phased withdrawal as soon as possible. Deputy Secretary Vance asked for opinions 

from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Agency.56

Answering on 13 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a withdrawal plan 

should be prepared but warned that reducing, relocating, or eliminating missions at 

Kagnew “would seriously prejudice US security interests and would seriously reduce 

US military capability in the Middle East, South Asia, and Indian Ocean areas.” The 

Director, National Security Agency, also recommended retaining Kagnew “as long as 

possible.”57 Still, work upon a relocation plan did begin.

In August 1967, the Eritrean situation grew so uncertain that all construction 

at Kagnew stopped. A Special National Intelligence Estimate, issued in April 1968, 

predicted that the insurgency would persist but the government probably could keep 

it “from getting out of hand” during Haile Selassie’s lifetime. The Emperor’s death, 

however, would “usher in a period of great uncertainty in Addis Abba, which could be 

prolonged and violent.” A relocation plan circulated for review. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

on 23 July 1968, advised Secretary McNamara that the political situation appeared 

“favorable to continued US use of Kagnew Station.” They also observed that recent 

developments—the pending loss of facilities in Pakistan, restraints against additions 

in Iran, probable major cutbacks in Turkey, proposals to consolidate signal intelligence 

sites, and general reductions in overseas expenditures—restricted the alternatives 

to Kagnew and so required revisions to the relocation proposals. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff would agree to abandon Kagnew only under strong pressure from Ethiopia “or 
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if other severe contingencies arise.” A unilateral withdrawal, in their judgment, would 

be imprudent and present “significant political, financial, and technical problems.”58

Deputy Secretary Nitze informed General Wheeler and Under Secretary Katzenbach that duplicating Kagnew’s facilities would cost $116 million and take four years. 

The difficulties of relocation would have to be weighed against the uncertain political 

situation in Ethiopia. When the Defense Communications Satellite System became 

operational in 1971—an overly optimistic forecast, as it turned out—a substantial 

reduction of Kagnew’s staff and acreage should become possible. In the meantime, 

DOD intended to eliminate non-essential construction projects and personnel.59

In retrospect, $15 or $16.5 million for annual “rent” made Kagnew a bargain that 

could not last. Haile Selassie’s ouster in a coup by left-wing officers, in 1974, hastened 

the American exit from Kagnew station and allowed the Soviets entrée. The Horn of 

Africa had become another area of Cold War competition.
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12

South Asia: US Influence 

Shrinks

Statesmen face few tasks more difficult than that of maintaining close ties with two 

nations that look upon each other as deadly enemies and press claims over the same 

territory. Yet, in the Indian subcontinent, this was precisely what US policymakers 

were trying to do. The 1947 partition of British India into a Hindu India and a Moslem 

Pakistan produced scenes of expulsion and massacre that left enduring enmity on 

both sides. The subsequent partition of predominantly Moslem Kashmir in 1949 gave 

India most of the territory and created an apparently insuperable barrier against reconciliation. Predictably, US military assistance to Pakistan, begun in 1954, annoyed 

the Indians. Then US military aid to India, begun after the Sino-Indian border battles 

of 1962, infuriated the Pakistanis. Why, they asked, was Washington treating neutral 

India the same way as ally Pakistan? After all, Pakistan belonged to the Southeast 

Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO); it 

acted as a link in the chain of containment around the Soviet Union and China; and it 

permitted an important intelligence collection facility to operate at Peshawar. US officials sought, with scant success, to persuade Indians and Pakistanis that communist 

expansion constituted the real threat to their security.

War over Kashmir

I

n May 1964, the State Department circulated National Policy Papers for India and 

Pakistan that listed the “most compelling” requirements for US policy as follows: 

expand influence with India, aiming to bolster Indian resistance to Chinese pressure 

while increasing US ability to affect Indian behavior; maintain a “sufficiently amicable” 

relationship with Pakistan, in order to preserve strategically important military ties; 

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prevent Indo-Pakistani hostilities; and finally, contain communist efforts—by Moscow 

towards India and by Peking towards Pakistan—to establish greater influence in the 

subcontinent. An “even-handed” approach offered the best chance of achieving these 

aims. Broadly, military assistance for both countries must continue, balancing India’s 

increasing military and economic strength by additional assurances to Pakistan. 

Specifically, India and Pakistan each should be offered grant aid programs involving 

about $50 million annually. Also, the United States should participate with Pakistan in 

planning against all contingencies, including the threat from India—and offer to join 

with India in anti-Pakistani planning.1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff lodged three major objections. First, they wanted to 

include an objective of “promoting India’s acceptance of interdependence among Free 

World nations,” as opposed to her current policy of non-alignment. Second, references 

to US participation with Pakistan in anti-Indian planning and vice versa should be 

deleted. Third, Pakistan should be offered long-term sales credits, thus balancing a 

recent offer to India. The final National Policy Papers, approved in November 1964, 

rejected their first suggestion but accepted their second and to some extent their 

third. The Pakistan NPP recommended providing about $40 million in annual grants 

and considering additional credit sales. The India NPP stated that the administration 

should be ready to provide $50 million in grants and $50 million in credits annually 

during FYs 1965–69, provided that India’s arms purchases from other countries did 

not exceed about $285 million yearly.2

In September 1964, India decided to purchase MiG-21s from the USSR and to 

develop her own MiG production lines. In January 1965, India’s Defense Minister Y. B. 

Chavan asked for US assistance in acquiring between three and six squadrons of F–5 

interceptors. Sensing an opportunity to limit MiG acquisitions and restructure India’s 

air force, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views. Answering in April, they 

noted that India hoped to deploy 45 squadrons while JSOP-70 proposed only 33. They 

outlined a plan, staying within JSOP-70’s guidelines, by which India would acquire 304 

aircraft between FY 1965 and FY 1970. It included 64 F–5s and 64 MiG–21s. Before any 

F–5s were made available, however, India would have to accept this plan in principle.

Concurrently, from New Delhi, US Ambassador Chester Bowles urged efforts to 

bring about “a more intimate but highly confidential relationship” between the United 

States and India, which would include a study of ways to contain a Chinese attack. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no merit in his suggestion. As they advised Secretary 

McNamara, a decision to initiate either US staff studies or discussions with the Indians “would have to be based on over-riding political considerations since there is no 

pressing military need for them at present.” Until an opportunity appeared for altering the existing situation “markedly in favor of the United States,” they recommended 

avoiding any broadening of defense commitments to India and adhering to the current 

guidelines on military assistance.3

By this time, Indo-Pakistani tensions were nearing the flash point. Kashmir provided the combustibles for an explosion. Late in 1964, Indian Prime Minister Lal B. Shastri 

210
South Asia

211

precipitated a confrontation when he declared Kashmir’s annexation to be “complete, 

final, and irrevocable,” a position totally unacceptable to Pakistan. Beginning in February 1965, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed in the Rann of Kutch, bordering the 

Arabian Sea. On 30 June, they stopped fighting and agreed to binding UN arbitration.4 

In mid-July, without publicity, Secretary McNamara deferred all remaining portions 

of FY 1966 MAP for India and Pakistan. Believing that Pakistan had done much to 

provoke fighting in the Rann, President Johnson began an “orchestrated” campaign 

to convince Pakistan of US dissatisfaction with its behavior. Further, on 10 August, 

he directed that alternatives to the intelligence facilities in Pakistan be developed “as 

a matter of urgency.”5

Starting on 5 August, large numbers of Pakistani guerrillas entered Kashmir, trying 

to incite a Moslem revolt. India retaliated with cross-border raids. Early in September, 

a Pakistani armored brigade equipped with MAP-supplied M–47 tanks entered Kashmir. India bombed targets in Pakistan and struck back in the Punjab; a full-scale war 

began. Consequently, on 7 September, the United States suspended military assistance 

shipments to both countries.6

Assistant Secretary McNaughton asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess the 

relative strategic importance of India and Pakistan and to appraise the implications 

of possible Chinese intervention against India.7 Answering on 18 September, they said 

that the whole subcontinent, not India or Pakistan alone, possessed major strategic 

importance because: it offered possible sites for bases that would be useful in a war 

against China and, to a lesser degree, against the Soviet Union; its loss would jeopardize 

control over air and sea lanes through the Indian Ocean; and the potential strength of 

India and Pakistan “could offer a meaningful deterrent against communist aggression” 

in the subcontinent. Throwing support to either nation would harm US objectives “in 

all of the forward defense countries.”

As for possible Chinese efforts to help Pakistan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suspected 

that these would be limited to “aggressive patrols or small-unit border incursions.” They 

stipulated that, as a condition for aiding India against China, the United States should 

insist upon India (1) accepting a cease-fire with Pakistan as preliminary to a return 

to the situation existing before the war and (2) agreeing to resolve the long-standing 

Kashmir dispute through self-determination. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

advocated an even-handed approach. To side with Pakistan would drive India firmly 

into the Soviet camp; to support India would prompt Pakistan to seek closer ties with 

China and probably to withdraw from CENTO and SEATO. Continuation of the war 

would erode both countries’ power and prejudice the US objective of a strong, healthy 

subcontinent. Consequently, the administration should develop “a carefully calculated 

balance of military and economic sanctions and/or inducements in order to persuade 

both India and Pakistan to accept a cease-fire.”8

The war, meanwhile, was not going well for the Pakistanis, who lost a fair part of 

their tank force. So, on 16 September, China took a hand. Charging India with repeated 

“military aggression and provocation,” including the heinous crime of yak-stealing, 

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China demanded that Indians withdraw within three days from certain disputed border 

areas of Sikkim. The next day, President Johnson decided to give strong backing for 

UN cease-fire efforts and to develop contingency plans but avoid preparatory military 

moves. Ambassador Bowles passed along an Indian request for covert military consultations; he was advised that the administration was not prepared to do so. On 18 

September, though, ISA asked the Joint Staff to examine possible responses. Five days 

later, when General Wheeler provided a preliminary reply, the crisis atmosphere had 

dissipated.9

 China first extended its deadline, then announced that India had complied 

with its demands—something the Indians denied having done. More important, on 22 

September, India and Pakistan accepted a UN cease-fire resolution. Assistant Secretary McNaughton advised the State Department that, while he favored an even-handed 

approach, a cease-fire that did not lead to an India-Pakistan détente might force the 

United States to choose between the two countries. General Wheeler, in his preliminary 

reply, also restated the Joint Chiefs’ concern about giving aid without getting compensating actions by India that would promote unity and harmony on the subcontinent.10

ISA actually was moving away from an even-handed approach, proposing that 

annual MAP for Pakistan be cut to about $25 million while India would continue 

receiving $50 million in grant aid and up to $50 million more for sales credits.11 The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposing any such change, “strongly” reaffirmed their view that 

the two countries’ relative importance could not be considered apart from US security 

interests in the subcontinent and adjacent areas. On 12 October, for Secretary McNamara’s edification, they laid out some “important factors” that merited consideration:

1. “Possible reactions throughout the Moslem world, particularly in Iran and 

 Turkey, should Pakistan be forced into the communist camp by US support 

of India.”

2. “The extreme importance to US national security of US facilities extending from 

Pakistan through Iran, Turkey, and Cyprus.”

3. “The improbability that India will agree to the same degree of cooperation with 

the United States which Pakistan until recently has provided.”

4. The probable adverse adjustments in “Eurasian political/military orientation” 

should Pakistan be “lost to the West.”12

Pakistan Slips Away

The Soviets hosted a summit meeting between Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan and India’s Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. At Tashkent, on 10 January 1966, the 

two leaders agreed to withdraw to pre-hostilities positions and abjure the use of force 

over Kashmir. Hours after signing the Tashkent agreement, Shastri suffered a fatal 

heart attack.13 Indira Gandhi, who was the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s 

daughter, became prime minister.

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In February, President Johnson authorized cash and credit sales of non-lethal equipment to both countries, on a case-by-case basis. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow 

asked State and Defense to analyze alternative approaches. In June, ISA circulated a 

paper suggesting that, under certain conditions, the United States should be prepared 

to pursue “discriminatory” aid programs. Upon review, J–5 was disturbed to find “the 

thread of a new US pro-India policy woven throughout” ISA’s paper. Accordingly, on 

15 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that they rejected the 

thrust of ISA’s argument. Policymakers, they said, must recognize that “what the United 

States may consider as illogical or irrational attitudes and policies on the part of India 

and Pakistan are, in fact, the controlling elements upon which US actions will have to 

be predicated.” These attitudes and policies included: Pakistan’s fear that India’s fundamental goal was the conquest of Pakistan; India’s intransigence over Kashmir, fearing 

to lose face before the world; Indian and Pakistani maintenance of armed forces that 

exceeded their legitimate defensive needs and which neither country could afford; and 

refusal by both nations to recognize the great advantages of cooperation.

Again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that US actions in the subcontinent would 

affect US efforts elsewhere. Aid for India that drew Pakistan closer to China would be 

“self-defeating,” they said, because there would be a concomitant weakening of SEATO 

and CENTO and loss of US special facilities in Pakistan. Such setbacks would outweigh 

any gains for Washington and New Delhi, particularly if India became encircled by 

an alliance between Pakistan and China dominated by Peiping. Accordingly, they 

proposed: allowing cash and credit sales, to both countries, of spare parts for lethal 

as well as non-lethal items; offering grant aid training programs to both nations; and 

resuming grant aid selectively, for projects that served US security interests. Also, India 

and Pakistan should be urged to minimize their force structures and military spending. 

Once agreement was achieved, the United States should be prepared to discuss force 

modernization with both governments.14

The arms race, however, continued with India moving to acquire Soviet and British 

weapons while Pakistan turned to China. In February 1967, the Senior Interdepartmental Group recommended a policy aimed at limiting arms purchases by both nations, 

restraining military confrontation, and encouraging the highest priority for agricultural 

and economic development. The main steps suggested by SIG were: withdrawing the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group-Pakistan and the US Military Supply Mission India, 

arranging limited alternatives; preventing sales by third countries of US-produced 

equipment, except when so doing would contribute to arms limitation; and considering, case-by-case, selling spare parts for previously supplied lethal equipment where 

there was a “clearly established critical need” and where such sales would contribute 

to arms limitation and maintenance of a “reasonable military balance between the 

two nations.” On 30 March, President Johnson approved these recommendations.15

Unfortunately, that approach to limiting arms acquisitions did not work. In June 

1967, Washington endorsed Britain’s sale to India of 24 Hawker-Hunter aircraft, after New 

Delhi gave explicit assurances that India would not buy any aircraft from the Soviets. 

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Instead, India did contract for 200 Soviet Su-7s; Pakistanis then went to Moscow and 

tried to arrange a sale.16

The Pakistanis were also badly in need of tanks to replace their 1965 losses. In 

April 1967, they approached West Germany about buying 100 M–47s. Since those tanks 

were MAP-supplied, Washington’s permission was needed. Six months later, Pakistanis raised their requirement to 200. A small complication lay in US suspicion that 

Pakistanis also were ordering tanks from China. A large complication lay in Pakistan’s 

implicit effort to link the approval of tank purchases with renewal of the lease on the 

US facility at Peshawar. The administration decided not to recognize any linkage, fearing “intolerable pressures . . . for more and more hardware.” With US blessing, Pakistan 

approached Italy, Belgium, and Iran about acquiring M-47s.17

On 22 December 1967, during a brief meeting with President Ayub at Karachi airport, President Johnson promised to look into the possibility of replacing Pakistan’s 

M–4s of World War II vintage with M–47s. On 28 February 1968, Johnson agreed to 

notify Italy of US approval for selling 200 M–47s. Ayub was informed, but to no avail. 

On 6 April, the Government of Pakistan communicated its decision to terminate the 

Peshawar agreement, requiring that the facility close by 17 July 1969. Significantly, 

Foreign Minister Yusuf told the US ambassador that Pakistan was “now normalizing 

friendly relations with all major powers,” and that Peshawar “has been and continues 

to be a serious liability” in relations with China and the Soviet Union.18

On 27 June 1968, the SIG again reviewed arms supply policy. General Wheeler 

joined the Ambassador to Pakistan, Benjamin Oehlert, in arguing that US credibility 

with Pakistan hinged on consummating a tank sale. Conversely, Ambassador Bowles 

pressed the case for suspending both direct and third-country sales of lethal weapons. 

Finally, the SIG agreed to continue the policy of selling spares only but encourage 

Belgium to sell tanks to Pakistan. The Belgian deal fell through, however, and Turkey 

refused to sell 100 M-47s unless the United States would replace them with refurbished 

M–48s. Thus the whole problem was left to the next administration.19

To sum up: The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected repeatedly to a policy that they 

deemed too pro-Indian. Denying that the relative importance of India and Pakistan 

could be assessed apart from US security interests in the subcontinent as a whole, 

they argued for an even-handed approach. Their view did not prevail, and might have 

proved infeasible in any case. Washington’s refusal to assist Pakistan during the 1965 

war left a great residue of bitterness. When India’s courting of the USSR intensified, 

Pakistan predictably turned to China as a counterweight. Termination of the Peshawar 

lease marked the end of a special relationship dating from 1954.

Will India Join the Nuclear Club?

Nothing could alter the military balance in South Asia more drastically than the advent of nuclear weapons. According to the draft National Policy Papers circulated 

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in May 1964, “no single Indian act” could disturb her neighbors and disrupt US nonproliferation efforts world-wide more than the building of an atomic bomb. Yet China was 

very close to becoming a nuclear power, and Indian memories of the 1962 Sino-Indian 

border war were quite fresh. India thus had an obvious motive for building her own bomb. 

Perhaps, the NPP continued, the United States could discourage India from becoming 

a nuclear power by: emphasizing the great cost of creating an effective anti-Chinese 

deterrent and the probability of regional proliferation; offering an “explicit assurance” 

that the United States would react in appropriate ways to an unprovoked nuclear threat 

or attack; and allowing Indians to see and appreciate the strength of US installations in 

the Far East. Commenting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called such a detailed description of 

anti-proliferation measures “undesirable and inappropriate.” In the final NPP, approved 

on 3 November, the passage about how to discourage India’s nuclear development became 

briefer and vaguer; the reference to “explicit assurances” disappeared.20

On 16 October 1964, China exploded its first nuclear device. Two days later, President Johnson announced that countries not seeking nuclear weapons “can be sure that 

if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they 

will have it.” In December, Assistant Secretary McNaughton solicited opinions from the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff about ways to meet the threat of nuclear blackmail around Asia’s 

periphery. Replying on 16 January 1965, they perceived no military need to modify US 

commitments “at this time.” Difficult problems would arise later, however, as China’s 

nuclear arsenal grew. They foresaw pressures from threatened states for more definitive security guarantees, and they did not exclude the possibility of nuclear sharing 

(e.g., providing selected nations with delivery vehicles while retaining weapons under 

US custody). Therefore, they recommended an interdepartmental study of ways to (1) 

improve the alliance system and (2) increase nuclear support for Asian allies, nuclear 

sharing included. An interdepartmental Committee on Non-Proliferation, chaired by 

Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson, took up this task. Central Intelligence 

believed that, “unless the Indian Government considers that it has international guarantees which adequately protect its security, the chances are better than even that 

within the next several years India will decide to develop nuclear weapons.”21

The Thompson Committee suggested the Indian government say publicly that it 

did not intend to build nuclear weapons, and President Johnson replying that his assurance of 18 October “will apply to all non-nuclear countries in free Asia who want our 

backing in resisting the threat from Peiping.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 11 March 

1965, recommended some rewording to expunge any implication that the United States 

would furnish nuclear support for all who wanted it. Such judgments, instead, should 

be made on a case-by-case basis after a careful analysis of all implications. Assistant 

Secretary McNaughton told Ambassador Thompson that he agreed with their views, 

but “[i]f you believe that the inclusion of the specific references in a Presidential statement may have important political significance . . . , let me know and I shall press the 

issue to decision here.”22
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Ambassador Thompson, meantime, had assured ISA that the proposed assurance would not commit the United States to any particular course of military action. 

Nonetheless, on 24 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicated to Secretary McNamara their concern that the assurance already given by President Johnson could be 

construed more broadly than the State Department intended. Any more statements 

might prompt requests for “additional and substantial military commitments.” Again, 

therefore, they asked that further assurances to India be considered on a case-by-case 

basis.23

Late in April, Ambassador Thompson circulated two “preliminary” suggestions 

aimed at obviating any need for an Indian nuclear weapons program. First, the British 

could provide India with between 12 and 24 Canberra jet bombers. Second, the United 

States could supply A–4 Skyhawks, which Indians could fly from US or UK carriers.24

On 14 May—the same day China exploded its second nuclear device25—the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that both suggestions struck them as 

“unduly restrictive.” Once committed to such arrangements, the United States might 

have to furnish hardware, advisers, logistic support, and perhaps combat forces. 

They saw no need to make specific arrangements. If the United States did accept a 

nuclear-support obligation, a formal US-Indian alliance would be necessary, as would 

the positioning of US and/or UK forces on Indian soil. So, before proceeding further, 

there would have to be preliminary discussions about these issues with the British, 

Indians, and Pakistanis. Agreeing, Secretary McNamara wrote Ambassador Thompson 

that options needed to be more deeply explored.26

In January 1966, with Prime Minister Gandhi about to visit Washington, the State 

Department circulated a study of ways to “head off an Indian decision to produce 

nuclear weapons.”27 It discerned no need for President Johnson to propose specific 

arrangements at this point. Instead, he should simply invite consultations about 

arrangements to ensure India’s security against a Chinese nuclear threat, should that 

threat become sufficiently serious for Indians to find them necessary as an alternative 

to developing and acquiring their own nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged 

this study “overly optimistic” about the chances of avoiding or delaying an Indian 

decision to develop nuclear weapons. They believed, also, that it underestimated (1) 

the adverse impact upon allied and other governments of US-Indian nuclear sharing 

arrangements and (2) the disadvantages that would be incurred by pursuing several 

possible courses. They evaluated three courses, each unfavorably:

1. The study stated that a complete cutoff of economic, political, and 

military aid probably would turn India toward the Soviet Union. Instead, US 

representatives should drive harder bargains with the Indians, showing them 

that the cost of going nuclear would well exceed direct outlay for weapons 

development and production. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the 

Soviet Union would assume the US role in India, mainly because the USSR 

could not furnish all the emergency wheat shipments that India was getting 

from North America.

2. The study claimed that a unilateral US guarantee might offer “at least an 
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interim solution.” They opposed giving a guarantee, largely for the reasons mentioned above. It would have to be specific, they pointed out, thus binding the United 

States but not allowing Washington to control New Delhi’s actions.

3. Some sort of sharing would do no more than delay a pro-nuclear decision. 

India could acquire valuable training and delivery systems, continue her own secret 

development, and then abrogate a nuclear-sharing arrangement. The United States 

would be left facing an alienated Pakistan, increased West German pressure for 

nuclear weapons, and severe criticism from world opinion.28

On 18 February, Secretary McNamara informed Secretary Rusk that he agreed 

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except in two areas. First, a specific estimate should 

be made about how much time was available to influence an Indian decision. Second, 

“we should indicate that we are ready to try to work out with the other nuclear powers 

appropriate arrangements to guarantee non-nuclear states against nuclear attack.” 

However, he opposed any nuclear-sharing plan “at this time.” A small deterrent would 

be inadequate against China, probably enrage the Pakistanis, and almost certainly 

would bring the United States into any war involving nuclear weapons.29

Secretary Rusk forwarded State’s study to President Johnson, calling it merely 

“illustrative” and requiring no decision. Rusk opposed offering any bilateral nuclear 

assurances. The President should suggest to Prime Minister Gandhi, instead, examining together how to meet a Chinese threat “without nuclear proliferation and without 

Indian assumption of the heavy economic and other burdens of a nuclear weapons 

program.”30 However, in President Johnson’s conversation with Prime Minister Gandhi 

on 28 March, the subject never surfaced. The next day, she told Secretary Rusk that 

“we are sure we don’t want to go into the manufacture of nuclear devices or bombs.”31

In May 1966, China exploded a thermonuclear device. On 10 June, after an NSC 

discussion, President Johnson ordered another examination into ways of discouraging 

India from developing nuclear weapons. An interagency group responded; ISA asked 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comments and then withdrew its request. After being 

slightly amended by the SIG, major recommendations were approved by the President 

on 1 August. These can be summarized as follows: Avoid direct threats to eliminate US 

economic aid, but continue such indirect efforts as describing the cost and difficulties 

of a nuclear program. Show Indian leaders information about the difficulties still confronting China’s nuclear efforts. After ascertaining the Soviet Union’s attitude toward 

a UN resolution offering security assurances for non-nuclear countries, address the 

question of offering India a private US assurance. As Secretary Rusk acknowledged 

to President Johnson, “we have been unable to devise anything dramatic which would 

not cost us more than any anticipated gain.”32

In December 1966, the State Department concluded that existing US assurances 

against nuclear blackmail probably would not dissuade India from developing nuclear 

weapons. Consequently, State outlined and evaluated several approaches “which 

might be used in private bilateral discussions with India’s leaders if and as the situation requires”:
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Course A: Privately reiterate previous assurances of support, a solution 

that seemed inadequate.

Course B: Seek specific understandings with Indian leaders on ways of implementing US policy against nuclear blackmail. That would involve advance consultations about various contingencies and arrangements to ensure further prompt 

consultations when the necessity arose. This was the course that State preferred.

Course C: Privately offer a unilateral security guarantee. Since the US Government could not commit itself to a single response “under any and all circumstances,” 

there would have to be joint contingency planning, which would pose major problems for both countries. Probably, then, the odds on India’s accepting such an offer 

were “considerably less than even.”

Course D: Explore ways in which India might play a nuclear role without seeking a national nuclear capability.33

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that Course A, which State considered inadequate, “most nearly” reflected their own views. American willingness to help contain 

communist aggression in Vietnam, they argued, should provide considerable reassurance about the identity of US and Indian interests in meeting the Chinese threat. They 

opposed Course B on grounds that US-Indian consultations could not long remain 

private; their disclosure would impair US relations with Pakistan and lead other nations 

to increase their demands for assurances of American protection. As for Courses C and 

D, they recommended rejection. The National Intelligence Community, they reminded 

Secretary McNamara, had concluded that India “will probably detonate a nuclear 

device within the next few years despite any guarantees which might be proferred 

by the nuclear powers.” Admittedly, nuclear proliferation would be detrimental to the 

Free World’s security interests. But they deemed it imprudent for the United States, 

“in its attempts to forestall such a decision, to incur risks which would compound the 

overall US security problem.”34

The issue of guarantees resurfaced when, in April 1967, India’s Cabinet Secretary 

L. K. Jha came to Washington. According to Jha, the Soviets had agreed to offer—provided the United States did likewise—an assurance that nuclear attack or blackmail 

against a non-nuclear state would not go unpunished. General Wheeler reminded 

Secretary McNamara that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed such guarantees; he also 

expressed doubt that Jha had accurately reported the Soviet offer. Nonetheless, Secretary McNamara signed a memorandum for the President saying that Jha should be 

told the US government “accepts in principle the desirability” of such declarations. 

Secretary Rusk softened this to read that the administration “is much interested in 

the possibility. . . .” Meeting Mr. Jha on 19 April, President Johnson said merely that the 

Soviet proposal about security assurances “looked very interesting.” Next day, Johnson, 

Rusk, and McNamara agreed to take a cautious approach until they learned the exact 

wording of the Soviet offer.35

Ultimately, Washington and Moscow worked out vaguely worded assurances which 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed. In June 1968, shortly after the United Nations General 

Assembly approved the text of a Non-Proliferation Treaty, the UN Security Council 
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219

passed a resolution welcoming “the intention expressed by certain States that they 

will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the [UN] Charter, 

to any non-nuclear weapon State party . . . that is a victim of an act of aggression in 

which nuclear weapons are used.”36

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the intelligence community predicted, the Indian 

portion of Washington’s campaign against nuclear proliferation came to naught. India 

did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, another India-Pakistan war spurred 

the Indian government to press forward with nuclear weapons development. In May 

1974, India exploded a 10- to 15-kiloton device.

Seeking an Indian Ocean Base

The early 1960s, which witnessed a steady reduction in British strength east of Suez, saw a budding of US interest in Indian Ocean bases. Worrying about a power 

vacuum in that area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 suggested negotiating agreements 

with London for using strategically located islands. They recommended giving first 

priority to Diego Garcia, in the Chagos Archipelago, where they wanted to build communications facilities.37

In London, during 25–27 February 1964, US and UK officials agreed upon preliminary 

steps.38 The British would (1) favorably consider developing, at US expense, facilities that 

would become jointly available, (2) move as rapidly as possible to shift Diego Garcia and 

the Agalega Islands away from Mauritius over to British control, and (3) facilitate a joint 

survey of those islands that the United States might require. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

endorsed this approach but reminded Secretary McNamara that their only construction 

plan for the area involved a communications station at Diego Garcia.39

In August 1964, as a UN investigation into the administration of colonial territories 

drew near, the State Department wanted to press London into taking direct control 

over desirable islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended informing London 

immediately about the US desire to obtain continuous access rights at Diego Garcia. In 

October, after the joint survey had been completed, they listed seven places to which 

they wished access, putting Diego Garcia and the remainder of the Chagos Archipelago 

first on the list.40 Potential uses included air, logistic, and staging bases, radar installations covering all extended-range ballistic missile launch sites within the USSR and 

thereby filling a gap in the space tracking system, and installations that would support 

space programs, atomic energy detection systems, and communications.41

The State Department, however, expressed “serious doubts” about whether those 

possibilities provided a “sufficiently persuasive basis” for London to risk the Third 

World’s wrath by detaching islands and making them direct dependencies of the United 

Kingdom. As the US Embassy advised, the British government would be very reluctant 

to act unless the United States was prepared to follow through with construction or 

actual use. At this point, though, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed only building 
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communications facilities on Diego Garcia. Perhaps, State suggested, the best approach 

would be to seek detachment of Aldabra and the Chagos archipelago from the Mauritius and Seychelles governments, while reassessing long-range US objectives and 

requirements in the area. On 10 December 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed 

their October recommendations, also advising Secretary McNamara of “an increasing need for politically secure and lasting access to Africa south of the Sahara.” For 

that purpose, they favored construction of a jet-capable airstrip on Aldabra Island. 

Probably, the recent rescue of hostages in the Congo had focused their attention on 

sub-Sahara Africa.42

In May 1965, the British began detaching the Chagos archipelago, Aldabra, Farquahr, and Ile des Roches from the Mauritius and Seychelles governments. Should the 

United States, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, share the costs of detachment and 

of airfield construction on Aldabra? They promptly answered yes, adding that continuing British involvement in using these islands could help reverse London’s efforts to 

make the United States shoulder more burdens east of Suez. “In this sense alone,” they 

argued, “these islands may prove to be of strategic value far in excess of the estimated 

detachment costs.” Secretary McNamara endorsed the idea of cost-sharing.43 Later 

that year, London did create a British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) that included the 

Chagos Archipelago, Aldabra, Farquahr, and Isle des Roches.

Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff changed their minds on one point. They told 

the Secretary, in December 1965, that they saw no requirement warranting the expenditure needed to build a communications station on Diego Garcia. Other programs 

could fulfill the functions originally intended for that island. They assured Secretary 

McNamara, though, that their October 1964 list of “potential uses” remained valid.44

On 30 December 1966, the US and UK governments concluded an agreement outlining the conditions for joint base development in the BIOT. The United States agreed to 

the costs of creating the BIOT, on the understanding that its territory would be used to 

meet both nations’ defense needs. Secretly, the British undertook to establish a base 

on Diego Garcia; the Americans arranged to share costs by cutting $14 million from 

the sale price of Polaris missiles.45

In February 1967, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze urged that a start be made upon 

an “austere” $26 million support facility at Diego Garcia, even if the British decided 

against substantial cost-sharing. As explained previously, US Navy ships no longer 

stopped at South African ports, but a refueling base at Diego Garcia would allow aircraft carriers to sail from the China Sea to the US East Coast. Diego Garcia, in fact, 

“is ideal for our ships transiting the Indian Ocean to and from Vietnam and its political 

visibility is very low.”46

After reviewing this problem at ISA’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that construction of such a facility “is fully warranted. US strategic 

interests in the area are important and will increase in importance in the future.” Their 

catalogue of US interests included: continued access to Middle East oil; protection of 

US nationals; free access to and transit of the Indian Ocean, now used by aircraft car-
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riers moving between the Atlantic and the Vietnam war zone; CENTO and SEATO commitments; and support for such countries as Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia. They predicted 

that political instability would continue and Sino-Soviet pressures increase. By using 

Diego Garcia, the United States could support a “graduated and flexible response” yet 

avoid becoming embroiled in local problems. So they recommended creating a support 

facility and paying half its operating and maintenance costs; British personnel should 

constitute half of Diego Garcia’s permanent garrison.47

Nonetheless, late in October, Secretary McNamara informed the Navy that he saw 

no clear requirement for such a base, because it failed his test of cost-effectiveness. The 

value of carrier days lost by diverting to Diego Garcia, he calculated, was much greater 

than the value of oiler days saved by using it. Moreover, Diego Garcia would start paying 

for itself only after a carrier task group stayed in the Indian Ocean more than fifteen 

days—a highly unlikely eventuality, the Secretary believed. He, therefore, disapproved 

any investment “at this time” but would reconsider after the British had decided whether 

to share the cost of building an airfield on Aldabra Island. The US Air Force wanted an 

austere facility there, to support contingency operations in East Africa.48

Late in 1967, the British decided that they could not afford to help develop a staging 

airfield at Aldabra, ending that project. Moreover, in January 1968, London announced 

that practically all UK forces would leave the Far East and the Persian Gulf by the end 

of 1971. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expected that Moscow and Peiping would move to 

fill this vacuum. Accordingly, in April 1968, they recommended the immediate establishment of a base on Diego Garcia. The cost would total $43 million, mainly for POL 

storage, a 12,500-foot runway, and harbor improvement. On 15 June, Paul Nitze—who 

was now Deputy Secretary of Defense—approved in principle a more modest facility 

costing about $26 million.49

In December 1968, the British approved US base development on Diego Garcia. 

Budgetary stringencies led the Nixon administration, in 1969, to decide against seeking 

any funds from Congress.50 Yet, by the mid-1970s, the Persian Gulf’s growing importance would make a base at Diego Garcia look like a sound investment indeed.

223

13

The Far East: The Climax of 

Containment

China, Vietnam, and “Close-In” Containment

When communists won control of mainland China in 1949, US policymakers began devising strategies to stop the spread of communist power in the Far East. In 

January 1950, the Truman administration publicly committed itself to defending an 

offshore island chain running from the Aleutians through Japan and the Ryukyus down 

to the Philippines. Then North Korea’s invasion added South Korea and Taiwan to the 

US defense perimeter. In 1954, after French defeats in Indochina led to the partitioning of Vietnam, the United States helped create a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Although South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were not SEATO signatories, the 

“treaty area” was defined as including Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split, occurring 

between 1958 and 1960, brought no immediate comfort to Washington because the 

People’s Republic of China behaved more militantly than the USSR.

South Vietnam, where an anti-communist government faced a growing insurgency aided by the communist regime in North Vietnam, proved the weakest link in 

the containment chain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the entire Pacific basin as a 

single strategic entity, where defeat in one area would have repercussions everywhere. 

They were among many policymakers who subscribed to a belief that the fall of one 

“domino” would topple others as well. When South Vietnam approached collapse, the 

Johnson administration decided upon direct intervention. Sustained bombing of North 

Vietnam started on 2 March 1965; US Marines landed in South Vietnam six days later.

At that point, US decisionmakers had to consider the possibility of Chinese intervention. China might do in Vietnam what it had done so effectively in Korea, fifteen 

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years before. Accordingly, during the spring of 1965, a Special State-Defense Study 

Group headed by Lieutenant General Berton Spivy, USA, Director, J–5, analyzed possible Sino-American confrontations and speculated what courses each side might 

adopt. The Group worked under the general supervision of Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Vance, General Wheeler, and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson.

Early in May, the Group circulated a “short-range” report assessing four possible 

confrontations:

Under Situation A, the bombing of North Vietnam would continue for 

six to eight weeks, broadening to include peripheral industrial targets such 

as power plants. The Chinese might be sufficiently patient to avoid any overt 

action. A massive land invasion of Southeast Asia was possible, but it would 

mark a drastic shift from tactics that had served Peiping well in the past.

In Situation B, the bombing of North Vietnam would intensify considerably, 

and three US divisions would deploy to South Vietnam by October. Objectives for 

the Far East would have to be reassessed, since a large US presence in Southeast 

Asia would shape Sino-American relations for years to come and mould the character of US commitments to Asian allies. China probably would react by moving 

equipment and technical personnel into North Vietnam. (That was an accurate 

forecast of what occurred.) A greater danger lay in the likelihood of US pilots 

confronting “volunteer” Soviet antiaircraft crews.

Situation C was more explosive. Chinese aircraft, operating from home bases, 

would defend North Vietnam and Chinese “volunteers” would enter North Vietnam. 

The US response—bombing Hanoi, striking air and naval bases in South China—

should be prompt, limited, and effective. Since Peking might respond with a massive invasion of Southeast Asia, US actions against South China should stop if the 

Chinese ceased attacking US ships and aircraft. The Soviets probably would feel 

compelled to supply North Vietnam with surface-to-air missiles and MiG aircraft, 

thereby gaining a voice in deciding the communists’ next move.

Situation D envisioned a full-scale Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia. 

American counter-efforts should concentrate upon military and logistical targets throughout Southeast Asia and South China. It was “quite likely that the US 

would be faced with the decision to use nuclear weapons . . . perhaps the second 

or third day of the invasion.” However, using nuclear weapons would produce 

“overwhelmingly adverse reactions from US allies as well as the Communist world 

and the uncommitted powers,” and “lasting resentment against the US might be 

generated.”1 Thus “[t]he progressively increasing costs of achieving larger objectives would tend to place a ceiling on US objectives well below the upper limit.” 

Washington should assure Moscow that US objectives would be confined to the 

minimum considered necessary.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made some criticisms (e.g., the Group might be underestimating the extent of Sino-Soviet cooperation during a major Sino-American confrontation) 

but advised Secretary McNamara that they saw no need to revise current planning 

because of the report.2

On 27 August, senior officials including Generals Wheeler and Spivy discussed the 

report. Secretary Rusk said that recent events, such as France’s diplomatic recognition 

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225

of China, Indonesia’s friendly attitude towards Peking, and fighting between India and 

Pakistan, might encourage Chinese leaders to believe they were pursuing wise courses. 

In that case, the United States faced serious risks pursuing its policies. Agreeing about 

the risks, Secretary McNamara cautioned against taking a firm stand unless the necessary power was available. Secretary Rusk observed that NATO had spent $1 trillion to 

convince Soviet rulers about the wisdom of peaceful coexistence. Nonetheless, Moscow 

had provoked the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban missile crises. Secretary McNamara 

observed that the United States could not contain China alone; others, particularly Japan 

and India, must be persuaded to help.3

Militancy remained the watchword for Mao Tse-tung in domestic and foreign policy. China was convulsed by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as he launched 

young Red Guards against a wide range of class or ideological enemies. In 1964, Mao 

began preparing his country for US attacks, even attempting to create an alternate 

industrial base in remote provinces. Starting in June 1965, Chinese surface-to-air 

missile, antiaircraft artillery, railroad, engineer, and minesweeping units deployed 

into North Vietnam. Between June 1965 and March 1968, more than 320,000 Chinese 

troops served there, the peak number being 170,000 in 1967. During this period, Peking 

strongly opposed peace talks between Hanoi and Washington, rejecting a number of 

international initiatives. Mao believed that the war in Vietnam, if successful, would 

vindicate his militant approach; the drain on American resources would make it difficult for the United States to suppress liberation movements elsewhere.4

The Study Group’s “long-range” report, completed in June 1966, stated that Peking’s 

objectives of “regional hegemony and world revolution clash with our own fundamental 

interests.” The preferred US strategy should consist of “close-in” containment, involving a significant US military presence on the Asian mainland. Abandoning close-in 

containment was impossible while the Vietnam War lasted. The United States could 

withdraw to offshore containment only if: the likelihood of overt communist aggression diminished because there was “a clear downgrading of expansionist aims” in 

Peking, Hanoi, and Pyongyang; the ability of threatened non-communist areas to cope 

with insurgency and the first shock of overt aggression increased substantially; and 

US strategic mobility markedly improved. In the Group’s judgment, “conditions in all 

mainland areas concerned are not likely to satisfy the above requirements for many 

years, and possibly not within the decade [1966–76] under study.” In mid-October 

1966, the Far East Interdepartmental Regional Group approved these basic concepts 

as policy guidelines.5 Then the Study was circulated to agencies “for information and 

general guidance, but not as a directive for specific action.”6

The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully embraced close-in containment. In February 1966, 

General Johnson told Secretary McNamara that there appeared to be no clear governmental position on how to deal with aggression along China’s extensive southern 

border. Acknowledging the omission, Secretary McNamara requested JCS recommendations. Their reply, delayed until December 1966, repeated the concepts outlined in 

the long-range Study. Containing China would require some form of a forward strategy, 

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even after the Vietnam War ended. To prevent China from dominating Asia, the United 

States and its allies must be prepared to “deter or defeat all forms of Chinese aggression.” South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand comprised “key elements of the overall US posture in the Far East.” Assistance 

against large-scale aggression would remain necessary until indigenous capabilities 

improved. Of course, the United States should try to reduce dependence upon US 

forces by encouraging greater Asian participation in regional security arrangements. 

But, above all, “[t]he Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to stress that the present situation in 

Southeast Asia is the initial testing ground for the containment policy. The viability of 

this policy will be essentially dependent on a successful resolution there—a resolution 

satisfactory not only in the US view but also in the eyes of the countries presently or 

potentially threatened by China.” Therefore, the United States should “use whatever 

resources may be needed to contain China, consistent with security requirements in 

Western Europe.”7

Concurrently, at General Wheeler’s urging the Special Studies Group examined 

ways to deal with a Chinese invasion, looking at three strategies, each aimed at achieving a cessation of hostilities and a Chinese withdrawal. In “Alpha,” ground troops would 

conduct holding operations in Southeast Asia while aircraft conducted intensive strikes 

against South China and selective strikes north of the Yangtze River. “Bravo,” requiring 14 US divisions, involved an air-sea-land campaign against South China. “Charlie,” 

for which eight US and allied divisions would be needed, contemplated an invasion of 

North Vietnam and an air-sea effort against South China. All these strategies seemed 

feasible, said the Group, provided that they were preceded by a mobilization of men 

and resources.8

The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the Group’s conclusions “reasonable” but added 

several reservations. First, possible Soviet reactions deserved further study. Second, 

mobilization requirements might be greater than what the Group indicated. Third, 

shortages caused by the Vietnam War would restrict the availability of materiel; decisions to begin producing some items “should have been made from six months to a 

year ago.”9

By the spring of 1968, more than 500,000 US troops had been committed to Vietnam 

and there was no end in sight. So in May, when OSD circulated a draft presidential 

memorandum addressing a strategy and force structure for Asia, the chastening effect 

of Vietnam was clearly visible. If the United States wished to continue close-in containment and commit large conventional forces, “we must reconsider the premises of 

our military strategy in Asia and redefine the functions that US forces should perform 

there.” Communists could project into Southeast Asia much larger forces than previously believed, and China could achieve over time a capability to fight concurrently on 

several fronts. Thus, in waging and winning a war with China, the United States would 

face “indeterminate and open-ended requirements.” That being the case, maximum 

reliance should be placed upon Asian allies’ ability to defend themselves, and US policy 

should stress the Military Assistance Program.

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Initially, according to the draft presidential memorandum, Southeast Asia might be 

defended against a Chinese attack by allies plus the seven US divisions already there, 

which would be reinforced by more US divisions as the conflict developed. South Korea 

could cope with a combined Chinese-North Korean attack initially, although not for any 

sustained period. However, if South Korea could mobilize and equip seven rear-area 

divisions by M+90 days, the need for US reinforcements would be reduced. In Taiwan, 

the Nationalist forces were more than adequate to defeat an amphibious attack.10

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who still strongly supported close-in containment, protested that adopting such policies would lead to a “substantial erosion” of US strength 

and influence. There would be greater likelihood of miscalculation by the communists, 

and US motives probably would be misinterpreted. Self-help, the DPM suggested, was 

receiving insufficient emphasis. Yet US allies might not oppose communist expansion 

unless they were convinced that the United States was “prepared to provide a great deal 

more than meager support.” The Military Assistance Program effectively complemented 

US forces but could not substitute for them. Moreover, the option for first use of nuclear 

weapons constituted a necessary element of deterrence, and so should be retained.

Area requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, had been underestimated. 

Seven US divisions hardly seemed enough for a holding action in Southeast Asia, since 

10 2/3 division-equivalents already were needed in Vietnam even without Chinese 

intervention. In South Korea, between 5 1/3 and 7 US divisions would be required even 

for the initial defense against a combined Chinese-North Korean attack. As to Taiwan, 

any reduction of Nationalist force levels might tempt China to invade the offshore 

islands of Quemoy and Matsu. These and other criticisms led the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to pronounce the DPM unsatisfactory and recommend that it be withdrawn.11

Late in the year, OSD circulated a revised DPM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed 

it, found their comments reflected “only superficially,” and again urged rejection. They 

added one stinging criticism. According to the DPM, efforts to formulate an Asian strategy were complicated by the fact that the United States was “geared to fight relatively 

short, intense wars.” That, it would seem, caused their frustration about the conduct 

of the Vietnam War to boil over. Decisive results could be achieved, they countered, 

when forces were used as the military wished. Conversely, long and costly wars of attrition were “virtually assured” if the United States lacked adequate strength for swift 

commitment, unnecessarily restricted the way its forces fought, and allowed enemy 

sanctuaries to exist. However, the final DPM dated 2 January 1969 contained only one 

concession.12 Thus the Johnson administration left office with close-in containment 

facing serious criticisms but still formally intact.

Taiwan: On Hold

Taiwan was still considered a “vital” link in the containment chain.13 Since June 1950, the United States had protected Chiang Kai-shek’s refugee regime and continued to 

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recognize it as the Government of the Republic of China (GRC). In contrast to the violent 

confrontations that characterized the 1950s, the 1960s proved to be nearly crisis-free. 

Indeed, during 1965–68, modernization of GRC military forces was the main issue requiring attention from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In January 1965, the GRC asked Washington to approve in principle a sale of eleven 

high-speed transports from the US reserve fleet, to replace obsolete ships patrolling the 

Taiwan Strait. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported a sale, although urging that only two 

ships be sold at this point. ISA agreed, but the administration approved a six-ship sale.14

“Back to the Mainland” had been the mantra of Nationalist leaders since June 1950. 

President Chiang’s son, Defense Minister Chiang Ching-Kuo, came to Washington in 

September 1965. He presented an invasion “concept” that would require massive US 

naval, air and logistical support plus large-scale popular uprisings and defections. Upon 

review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled Chiang’s concept of limiting US air and naval 

forces to a covering role, without striking mainland targets, as “militarily unsound.” 

Since available intelligence furnished no evidence that the population would rise to support invaders, a successful invasion looked to be impossible. In fact, Chiang’s concept 

struck them as being not an operational proposal but rather “a vehicle for increasing 

the scope and volume of US-GRC discussions.” They recommended that the existing 

“Blue Lion” committee, comprised of the US Ambassador and Minister Chiang, examine 

concepts and strategies for dealing with the threat in Southeast Asia, endeavor to reach 

agreed intelligence assessments of the mainland situation, and critique GRC plans—

all without committing the United States to involvement in planning, encouraging, or 

supporting a GRC invasion.15

When General Wheeler visited Taipei in December 1965, President Chiang pleaded 

for the United States to land its men on the mainland so they could re-conquer five 

southwestern provinces. Meeting Minister Chiang and his senior officers, however, 

General Wheeler “gained the distinct impression that the [invasion] presentation was 

pro forma.” Upon returning to Washington, the Chairman recommended “frankly” telling President Chiang that an invasion was out of the question, “although it would have 

to be done tactfully and perhaps sweetened by some addition of military assistance 

to assuage his pride.”16

Back in September, Minister Chiang gave Secretary McNamara a fairly sizable 

shopping list: nine squadrons of F-5 interceptors to replace aging F–86s; two submarines and twelve PT boats; ground force equipment; and possible deployment, for 

psychological effect, of one Mace missile squadron. Late in November, Congressional 

budget cutting led Secretary McNamara to reduce FY 1966 grant aid for Taiwan from 

$104 to $94.5 million. General McConnell made a special plea to restore those funds, 

noting that the cut would not only preclude an acceleration of F–5 deliveries (the first 

nine had arrived on 26 November) but also compel the GRC to retire its F–104 squadron. 

Secretary McNamara refused to restore any funds, reminding General McConnell that 

there had been “many extraordinary demands” for MAP appropriations. One week 

earlier, in fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised Secretary McNamara that some 

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of Minister Chiang’s September requests exceeded their own JSOP recommendations. 

Thus, unless MAP dollar guidelines were raised, meeting Chiang’s requests would 

disrupt the flow of higher-priority items already programmed for delivery.17

Early in 1966, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy talked with President 

Chiang, who this time emphasized defensive requirements. Claiming that Chinese 

Communists were capable of attacking Taiwan, he stressed a need for radars and F-5s. 

(According to CINCPAC, “President Chiang obviously feels the need to compete with 

South Vietnam for US attention.”) Reviewing the situation in mid-April, at ISA’s request, 

the Joint Staff found no indication of an impending invasion. Moreover, Taiwan’s air 

defenses most needed improvement not in weaponry but in management, training, 

discipline, and delegation of authority. In mid-April, Chiang wrote directly to President 

Johnson about what he described as an immediate threat of air attack against Taiwan. 

The administration found no supporting evidence but did temporarily deploy F–100s 

and F–4s there.18

Concurrently, the GRC asked permission to purchase five more transports. General Wheeler was willing, provided that enough ships remained in the reserve fleet. A 

sale, he observed, “might well take some of the sting” out of Chiang’s having to retire 

his F–104s. Admiral McDonald reported, however, that various MAP recipients had 

requested 21 transports and only 16 were available. Consequently, he would support 

nothing more than a one-ship sale. The Joint Staff agreed, and on 20 May Assistant Secretary McNaughton passed this one-ship recommendation to the State Department. But 

counter-pressures soon developed. On 20 June, Assistant Secretary Bundy telephoned 

McNaughton to say he was “fully convinced that cogent political reasons” required 

a two-ship sale. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a review. After discovering that 

other MAP recipients had reduced their requests by five, they endorsed a two-ship sale. 

McNaughton agreed and so advised the State Department; a two-ship sale followed.19

President Chiang’s practice of keeping large numbers of men under arms had long 

concerned Washington. The 1967 and 1968 Military Assistance Manuals called for 

gradually reducing the GRC’s Army and Marine Corps from 452,000 to 307,000. In February 1968, OSD Systems Analysis reported that ground and tactical air forces could 

be cut substantially with only a minimum increase in risk. Thus, for FY 1973, Systems 

Analysis proposed cutting Army divisions from 22 to 13 and F-86s from 125 to 25, 

while increasing the F-5 inventory from 54 to 72. During FYs 1969–1973, annual grant 

aid need average only $34.8 million. In fact, if the GRC carried out the suggested cuts, 

it would have enough money to buy all the items now being provided through MAP.20

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that this report contained many flaws. Systems 

Analysis, they advised Secretary McNamara, had overstated GRC and under-rated 

communist capabilities. The study limited unduly the courses of action open to the 

communists, relied upon unsound air and naval tactics, treated air and sea combat in 

isolation, and analyzed GRC requirements without regard to regional needs. Further, 

Systems Analysis ignored the political and psychological effects of GRC cutbacks, 

which would worry not only the Taiwanese but also those Southeast Asian countries 
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threatened with insurgencies. In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw a need for greater 

MAP funding and higher 1973 objectives (e.g., 16 instead of 13 Army divisions and 198 

rather than 151 attack aircraft). Therefore, they recommended rejecting the study.21

In August 1968, Defense Minister Chiang indicated that Army cutbacks might be 

desirable if modernization could keep GRC combat capability at its current level. As 

one aspect of modernization, the GRC was keenly interested in co-producing UH–1H 

utility helicopters. ISA solicited the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thereby triggered a debate within the JCS organization. The Joint Staff endorsed a requirement 

for 236 helicopters. General Wheeler disagreed. Success or failure of a communist 

invasion would depend upon aerial supremacy, and if the defenders failed to attain 

control of the air quickly, GRC reliance on helicopters for troop reinforcement “could 

be disastrous.” In other words, GRC concepts seemed to be diverging from approaches 

that were “strategically sound, militarily necessary, and economically feasible.” At a 

time when the United States faced “contracting budgets and increasing worldwide 

commitments,” Chiang’s insistence upon helicopters as the top priority indicated that 

an overall review of GRC planning might be in order.22

The Director, Joint Staff, suggested saying that, while there was no “high priority 

military requirement” for UH-1Hs, helicopters could be used effectively if political or economic reasons ruled in favor of co-production. At a JCS meeting late in October, General 

Wheeler voiced concern over the expense involved. General Westmoreland, on the other 

hand, considered co-production “most desirable.” Finally, on 7 November, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff advised Secretary Clifford that “a valid military requirement” for helicopters did 

exist, since GRC troops depended almost completely upon ground lines of communication. Also, in the post-Vietnam era, there could be “potential value” in having a helicopter 

rebuilding and distribution point offshore. Since President Chiang was reported to be 

considering relegating two divisions to reserve status, a co-production program might 

serve to bring about force reductions that the administration desired, without displacing 

higher priority air defense and naval improvements. In April 1969, the Nixon administration did authorize co-production.23 Yet Chiang, at that time, made no force reductions.

Taiwan constituted a strategic asset only in its being denied to the communists. 

In 1966, at General Greene’s urging, the Joint Chiefs of Staff looked into sending a GRC 

Marine brigade to Vietnam. CINCPAC called such a move militarily desirable but warned 

about political ramifications. The Embassy in Saigon voiced serious reservations, noting particularly the strong anti-Chinese sentiment among Vietnamese. The Joint Staff 

then recommended against seeking a GRC contribution. In 1967, the State Department 

opposed even increasing the few dozen Taiwanese personnel in South Vietnam.24

Indonesia Changes Course

A bloody revolution in Indonesia, a nation with almost 100,000,000 people, profoundly affected the future of Southeast Asia. When 1965 opened, President Sukarno was 
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pursuing a pro-communist, stridently anti-American course. His “Crush Malaysia” campaign raised a real possibility of armed confrontation with Washington and London. 

Britain dispatched troops and warships to bolster Malaysia. In March 1965, President 

Johnson told the British Foreign Secretary that “he would be ready for major war 

against Indonesia if she raises the stakes too high.”25

Under Secretary of State George Ball warned President Johnson that “[o]ur relations with Indonesia are on the verge of falling apart.” Mobs threatened US consulates and USIA libraries; the administration suspended what by then was a very small 

program of grant military aid. In July 1965, the administration approved a commercial 

sale of $3 million worth of communications equipment, after Indonesian Army personnel said privately that they needed some secure means of internal communication. 

However, according to a Special National Intelligence Estimate issued on 1 September, 

“Sukarno’s Indonesia already acts in important respects like a Communist state and 

is more openly hostile to the US than most Communist nations.”26

Upheaval began on 1 October, when a group led by an officer in Sukarno’s bodyguard kidnapped and murdered six Army generals. The Defense Minister, General 

Abdul Haris Nasution, narrowly escaped although his daughter was killed. General 

Suharto, who headed the Army’s Strategic Reserve, directed a counterattack that 

broadened into a country-wide purge with wholesale killings. The once-powerful 

Indonesian Communist Party was exterminated.27

An immediate issue facing US policymakers involved the possibility of a communist insurgency. Indonesian Army officers asked for the rapid, covert provision of 

secure communications equipment. A “303 Committee” that included General Wheeler 

was charged with reviewing proposals for covert action. In mid-November, it recommended approval; the CIA located and purchased equipment that solved the problem 

of attribution.28

Judging by advice they tendered to Secretary McNamara on 30 December 1965, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff approached aid for Indonesia very cautiously. They speculated 

that, if the Army took power from Sukarno, there might follow substantial requests for 

economic aid and modest ones for military materiel (e.g., ammunition, man-portable 

radios, light automatic weapons, vehicles, and perhaps C–47 and C–30 spares). The 

Army, although the strongest anti-communist force in the country, eventually would 

call for civilian leadership “which, in turn, probably will represent a nationalist-religious-communist coalition” that would follow a neutralist course.29 The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff listed several factors that “impinged” upon the advisability of providing military 

aid immediately and overtly: Sukarno and his supporters could charge the Army with 

being a tool of US imperialism; the United States could find itself subsidizing Indonesian aggression, until Indonesia discontinued its “Crush Malaysia” campaign; problems 

flowing from the expropriation of US property and recognition of a legal right of free 

passage through the Sunda Strait required resolution; and the logistics implications of 

aid to Indonesia must be evaluated in light of US commitments in Southeast Asia. Also, 

“In view of Indonesia’s past tendency to export aggression, the impact on neighboring 
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countries . . . should be considered.” Since the Army’s campaign against the Indonesian 

Communist Party “appears to be progressing according to plan,” the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff saw no current need for overt US military aid. They did recommend supplying “a 

limited quantity of foodstuffs/medicines.”30

Suddenly, in February 1966, President Sukarno ousted General Nasution and 

appointed seven leftists to be cabinet ministers. The Army then staged a coup that 

reduced Sukarno to a figurehead; General Suharto assumed executive power and the 

Communist Party was officially outlawed.31 In June, Suharto sought US help in conducting an aerial survey of Indonesia’s outer islands and in furnishing training and equipment for civic action programs. Late in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended: 

approving civic action and other non-combatant training at CONUS schools; sending a 

team to survey civic action programs and providing some spare parts to support them; 

and, pending survey results, using US military personnel to support a modest civic 

action program. Progress, they noted, was being made toward solving the Malaysian, 

Sunda Strait, and expropriation issues. Secretary McNamara, however, supported only 

non-combatant training of Army officers in US Service schools. An aerial survey struck 

him as unwise, unless the United States was prepared to follow up with substantial 

support. Civic action programs, he believed, should be funded by AID rather than MAP. 

On 1 September, President Johnson authorized spare parts and replacements, as well 

as civic action training for the Indonesian military on a modest scale.32

The State Department proposed allocating $6 million from the FY 1968 MAP to help 

rehabilitate Indonesia’s communications and transportation systems. State reasoned 

that, since the Army now dominated Indonesia’s life, “there is probably no other place 

in Asia where such a small investment can produce more significant long-range results.” 

Wholly agreeing, General Wheeler on 1 November urged that funding be advanced to 

FY 1967. Secretary McNamara, nonetheless, decided that FY 1968 was the earliest date 

at which funds could be made available.33

Suharto, who became Acting President in March 1967, followed a pro-western 

course. He ended the “confrontation” with Malaysia, which contributed to London’s 

announcement in January 1968 that all UK forces east of Suez would depart by the end 

of 1971. Subsequently, a draft National Policy Paper covering Indonesia, Malaysia, and 

Singapore stated that the “preferred” US strategy would be to “decline to assume any 

direct military responsibilities in the sub-region, but demonstrate an active interest 

in its security and a willingness to increase . . . economic or military aid should serious instability threaten.” This approach assumed that British Commonwealth states, 

particularly Australia and New Zealand, would devise a satisfactory substitute for the 

UK presence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended some minor changes (e.g., noting 

the loss of British nuclear capability). Burned by Vietnam, ISA urged a cautionary note 

about avoiding direct involvement in any Indonesian insurgency (through combat advisers and the like) and providing no additional equipment “unless there was an agreed 

estimate that its delivery would have an extensive influence on the government’s ability 
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to control the insurgency.” The final NPP, approved in September 1968, did incorporate 

JCS and ISA comments.34

Strategically, the consequences of Indonesia’s revolution can hardly be exaggerated. The influence of Moscow and Peking in much of Southeast Asia shrank drastically. 

No dominoes would fall beyond Indochina, which meant that a crucial justification for 

the massive US intervention in Vietnam had become obsolete.35

South Korea Becomes a Second Front

Since the North Korean invasion in June 1950, the United States had acted as South Korea’s protector in order to: retain a forward position on the Asian mainland; 

preserve a buffer between Japan and China; prove the advantages of a non-communist 

approach to nationbuilding; and demonstrate the dependability of US alliance and 

support.36 The Eighth Army’s two infantry divisions constituted the main US military 

presence in South Korea. The American general who was Commander, US Forces, 

Korea, also acted as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). 

As CINCUNC, he exercised operational control over Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.

Increasingly, during 1965–68, developments in South Korea and South Vietnam 

became intertwined. In March 1965, as the first US ground combat units arrived in 

Vietnam, the administration started considering whether it should press Seoul to 

send one ROK division there. If a division did go, would the military balance change? 

There were 21 divisions (2 US, 19 ROK) in South Korea; air strength included one US 

tactical, two ROK interceptor, and five ROK tactical squadrons. In an attack, North 

Korea and China could commit as many as 59 divisions (25 North Korean, 34 Chinese) 

and about 1,200 aircraft. According to J-3, the allies could successfully resist a North 

Korean attack by conventional means alone, and sending one ROK division to Vietnam 

would not change that situation. On 23 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that 

conclusion. On 13 August, the Korean National Assembly authorized sending combat 

troops to Vietnam; the ROK Army’s Tiger Division and one ROK Marine brigade arrived 

there between September and November.37 In exchange, President Johnson assured 

the South Koreans that the US would maintain two US divisions in Korea and would 

provide economic aid and assistance.

Meanwhile, US strength in South Korea underwent a small reduction. The Johnson 

administration, facing a growing balance of payments deficit, looked for ways to reduce 

military spending overseas. Eighth Army had grown from 48,700 in December 1963 to 

58,000 by the beginning of 1965. So, in February 1965, Secretary McNamara directed a 

cutback to 48,700 by mid-year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 19 May, protested that doing 

so would increase risks and reduce combat potential. Therefore, they recommended 

either rescinding the cut or holding it in abeyance until US commitments in the Far 

East decreased. Nonetheless, Secretary McNamara asked the Army to prepare a plan 

for paring Eighth Army to 48,700 personnel.38
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Early in August 1965, the Army proposed and Deputy Secretary Vance approved 

a smaller reduction to 53,000; withdrawals would involve individual soldiers rather 

than complete combat units. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff reopened this issue in October, advising Secretary McNamara that “recent developments in the Far East militate 

against any force reductions along China’s periphery.” Since “severe tensions and Chinese Communist challenges continue to increase,” reductions could be seen as a sign 

of US weakness. The threat to South Korea actually could grow, as the communists 

contemplated countermoves against allied actions in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, US 

ability to reinforce Eighth Army was declining. The 173rd Airborne Brigade, listed as 

the earliest reinforcement, had moved from Okinawa to South Vietnam. “As a result, 

the need for a high state of combat readiness in Korea is as critical today as at any 

time since the Korean War.” Political and psychological reasons, they continued, also 

argued against reductions. Reassurance about the US commitment seemed essential 

to South Korea’s stability and development. President Johnson had promised the ROK 

government that no US withdrawals would occur without prior consultation; another 

assurance had been given during discussions about sending the Tiger Division to 

Vietnam. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended postponing reductions 

“until the situation in the Far East improves.” Nonetheless, on 31 January 1966, Secretary McNamara ruled that a reduction to 53,000 must be achieved by 30 June. In fact, 

when June came, Eighth Army’s authorized figure was 50,782 and its strength on the 

ground only 43,351. As with the Seventh Army in Germany, shortages of well-trained 

personnel further reduced combat effectiveness.39

The administration also hoped to reduce South Korea’s military establishment. 

According to the US-ROK Agreed Minute of December 1960, Washington would support 

an ROK establishment as large as 600,000 men. When 21,000 ROK troops left for Vietnam, the total number in South Korea would fall to 580,000. But Secretary McNamara 

saw no reason to replace the 21,000. As he told his Korean counterpart in May 1965, 

“we do not need two fists when one fist will do.”40

According to a National Policy Paper approved in November 1965, ready ROK 

forces plus US augmentations would be able to hold a line north of Seoul. South Korea 

might be forced, because of its economic problems and inadequate MAP support, to 

reduce its establishment as low as 500,000. (The original draft implied that a reduction actually was preferable to maintaining current levels. In response to JCS and 

OSD protests, that passage was rewritten and the implication removed.) But no cuts 

should be carried out, the NPP stipulated, while ROK troops were serving in Vietnam. 

Also, US force levels should remain unchanged about a year after any ROK reductions 

began. The 25th Infantry Division, which had been the theater reserve, was deploying 

from Hawaii to Vietnam. To replace it, a division in Korea might be designated as the 

strategic reserve for the Far East.41

The administration wanted even more ROK troops in Vietnam, as proof that the 

war enjoyed Asian support. In February 1966, the ROK government agreed to send its 

White Horse division along with another brigade and support troops—about 24,000 
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235

men, all told.42 The US government agreed to “equip, train, and finance complete 

replacement” of those 24,000, but not of the 21,000 deployed to Vietnam earlier. The 

US Embassy proposed temporarily raising the Agreed Minute’s ceiling of 600,000. In 

mid-April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended replacing the Vietnam-bound 24,000 

and providing for a “reconstitution and support” force of 14,500 in South Korea. Since 

the ROK military establishment actually numbered 585,000, the new ceiling would 

be 623,000. Subsequently, the South Koreans proposed using 11,000 civilians to serve 

logistic depots and fill non-combatant billets, eliminating a need for the 14,500-man 

reconstitution and support force. Accordingly, on 27 May 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

asked Secretary McNamara to support a 608,000-man establishment (564,000 in South 

Korea and 44,000 in Vietnam). The administration adopted this position with Secretary 

McNamara’s agreement to postpone any drawdowns of the ROK Army so long as the 

war in Vietnam required their presence.43

The Military Assistance Manual for FYs 1968–1972, published in 1967, stated that 

MAP planning should be based upon reducing the ROK Army from 18 divisions to 15 

modernized ones. According to the Manual, Vietnam made this too sensitive a matter 

to bring up in the near future. But, beginning in FY 1969, plans should be limited to 

investment items for modernizing 15 divisions. General Charles Bonesteel, USA, as the 

Commander of both US Forces, Korea, and the United Nations Command, and Ambassador Winthrop Brown warned that such planning soon would become known to the 

South Koreans, thereby triggering military and political repercussions. On 6 July 1967, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned Secretary McNamara that, if the Korean public ever 

learned about such a plan, the ROK government “would find it difficult for domestic 

reasons to maintain its forces in Vietnam.” They therefore pressed for deletion of the 

statement that 15-division planning should begin in FY 1969. OSD altered the Manual 

accordingly, but the administration still intended to bring about an eventual reduction 

in active ROK ground forces.44

Meanwhile, tensions in the Korean peninsula were rising rapidly. On 2 November 

1966, North Korean soldiers infiltrated through the Demilitarized Zone, ambushed a 

US patrol, and killed six Americans. South Koreans had been making and continued 

to make raids northward; in one of these, each side lost about twenty killed. During 

1967, North Korea launched a sizable effort at subversive war. The number of serious 

incidents rose from 50 in 1966 to 566 in 1967, bringing the death total to 228 North 

Koreans and to 131 Americans and South Koreans. Along the DMZ, fire fights occurred 

almost nightly. Over the summer, 25 teams of seven or eight each entered South Korea 

to test the feasibility of guerrilla operations. In the course of killing or capturing these 

men, 63 South Koreans died. According to captured agents, Pyongyang believed the 

United States had become so over-extended by Vietnam that it could not adequately 

reinforce South Korea in case of war.45

North Korea probably hoped that chaos and disruption in the South would force 

President Park Chung Hee to recall some troops from Vietnam or at least prevent him 

from sending more. Politically, South Korea remained tense but stable. In May 1967, 
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President Park won re-election in orderly voting. His party subsequently gained a large 

legislative majority, although there were well-founded charges of fraud and abuse.46

In September, General Johnson proposed that the Joint Staff appraise US military 

adequacy in Korea “as a matter of urgency.” He posed several questions. Should US forces be awarded higher priority for resourcing and modernization? Should US manning 

levels be increased? Should there be more military assistance, with greater emphasis 

on providing essential equipment to the South Koreans? Should counter-infiltration 

efforts intensify, particularly in and around the DMZ? And, if none of those things could 

be accomplished? On 27 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized such a study.47

Some modest measures improved US and ROK capabilities. Early in November, at the urging of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Secretary Nitze directed that 

ten UH-1D helicopters slated for Vietnam be diverted to Korea.48 On 27 November, 

CINCPAC endorsed and forwarded a Counter-Infiltration Plan prepared by General 

Bonesteel. In mid-December, the ROK government stated willingness to send a light 

division to Vietnam if, among other things, Washington became firmly committed to 

the Counter-Infiltration Plan. The administration accepted in principle a $32 million 

counter-infiltration package, which the Services would fund as Vietnam-related costs. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, and in March 1968 Deputy Secretary Nitze approved, 

an additional $11 million worth of materiel for US forces (e.g., Starlight scopes, barrier 

fencing, floodlights, and flares).49

The Pueblo Humiliation

On 23 December 1967, CINCPAC asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve a mission by the USS Pueblo, a refitted light auxiliary cargo ship similar to the USS 

Liberty. The mission would include determining the nature and extent of North Korean 

naval activity, conducting surveillance of Soviet naval units on the Tsushima Strait, 

determining Soviet and North Korean reaction to an overt intelligence collector, and 

reporting the deployments of North Korean and Soviet units. The procedure for reviewing mission recommendations ran as follows: First, the Joint Reconnaissance Center 

coordinated and evaluated proposals. Then, each Service as well as the DIA made a 

formal recommendation. Next, the JRC consolidated mission proposals into a monthly 

reconnaissance schedule. When the Pueblo proposal reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

on 23 December, Generals Wheeler and Greene were on leave and General Johnson was 

in Southeast Asia.50 On 27 December, the Operations Deputies reviewed the January 

schedule. Normally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have met two days later for final 

action. This time, each Service Chief or Vice Chief gave permission to his Operations 

Deputy to release the schedule when the Deputies met on 29 December. This was done.

Pueblo’s operational plan had been prepared by the staff of Rear Admiral Frank 

Johnson, Commander Naval Forces, Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN). Admiral Johnson 

evaluated the risk of sailing along the east coast of North Korea to be “minimal.” On 
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17 December, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), concurred; six 

days later, so did the CINCPAC, Admiral Sharp. On 29 December, the National Security 

Agency sent the JRC a message stating that, while the North Korean navy reacted when 

any South Korean ship came near its coastline, signal intelligence had given no evidence of provocative or harassing activities beyond the twelve-mile limit. However, the 

message did warn of a possible attack and suggested that “ship protective measures” 

receive serious consideration. Admiral Moorer was supposed to get an information 

copy but did not because forwarding instructions were misinterpreted. The message 

went to CINCPAC headquarters where staff officers did not bring it to Admiral Sharp’s 

attention because they saw nothing that would change CINCPACFLT’s risk evaluation. 

Meanwhile, on 29 December, an interdepartmental Special Committee approved all 

January missions. So, on 2 January 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCPAC 

to proceed with Pueblo’s mission.51

The USS Pueblo left Japan on 8 January. Required to maintain radio silence 

until taken under surveillance, the ship’s first transmission to the US Navy Security 

Group at Kamiseya, Japan, did not occur until a North Korean subchaser appeared 

on 22 January. The previous day had been a grim one in South Korea. A 31-man team 

of North Korean commandos, under orders “to chop off President Park Chung Hee’s 

head and to shoot to death his key subordinates,” tunneled under the DMZ but then 

ran into woodcutters who alerted security forces. Nearly all the would-be assassins 

were killed or captured, although not before some penetrated within 800 meters of the 

Presidential Blue House in Seoul.

As 23 January dawned, Pueblo was steaming near the North Korean port of Wonsan. Around noon, a subchaser approached and signaled, “Heave to or I will fire!” 

Pueblo’s captain, Commander Lloyd Bucher, ascertained that his ship stood 15.8 miles 

offshore, 3.8 miles beyond what North Korea claimed as its territorial waters. He 

therefore replied, “I am in international waters.” At 1252 local time, Pueblo reported 

this challenge to COMNAVFORJAPAN at Kamiseya. Because a sister ship, USS Banner, had undergone similar experiences at Chinese and Soviet hands, this seemed like 

routine harassment.

The situation changed drastically when two MiGs and four torpedo boats appeared. 

One boat neared Pueblo and tried to put a landing party aboard; Commander Bucher 

ignored a heave-to signal and headed for the open sea. At 1329 Pueblo radioed, “They 

plan to open fire on us now.” Moments later, Pueblo’s bridge was strafed by cannon and 

machine gun fire. Several men sustained minor wounds and Pueblo came to a stop. 

“Follow me,” the subchaser signaled. “Have pilot aboard.”

At Kamiseya, meanwhile, Pueblo’s 1329 message galvanized the staff of COMNAVFORJAPAN into action. (Rear Admiral Johnson was in Tokyo attending a weather 

conference.) By 1350, the staff of Fifth Air Force knew about Pueblo’s predicament. 

The Commander, Lieutenant General Seth McKee, was informed at 1415. He in turn 

contacted General John Ryan, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces. There 

were six F–4s at Osan and Kunsan in South Korea, 25 F–105s on Okinawa, and 77 
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combat aircraft in Japan.52 At 1448, General McKee directed that F–105s on Okinawa 

to fly to South Korea. The attack carrier USS Enterprise was in the East China Sea, 

470 nautical miles from Wonsan. At 1506, the Commander, Seventh Fleet, ordered the 

Enterprise and her escorts to reverse course and sail toward the Korean Strait. The 

carrier’s 35 operationally ready strike aircraft would need approximately three hours 

to reach Wonsan.

Off Wonsan, however, the tempo of events ran much more rapidly. Trying to gain 

time in which to destroy sensitive documents and devices, Commander Bucher sailed 

slowly toward shore and then brought Pueblo to a full stop. That provoked more volleys upon the helpless ship; several men were wounded, one fatally. A boarding party 

took control before destruction could be completed. Pueblo reported being boarded 

at 1425, and sent her final message at 1432.

The captured crew waited for rescue, but none came. Six F–105s left Okinawa at 

1611. Flight time to Wonsan was 93 minutes, and darkness would occur at 1736, only 

85 minutes hence. That ruled out a rescue from Enterprise as well. Moreover, the 

Okinawa-based F–105s would have to land in South Korea for arming and servicing. 

General McKee spoke with General Ryan’s Operations Deputy, who granted authority 

to arm the F–4s at Osan and Kunsan with 3,000-pound bombs. Then it became clear 

that they, too, could not reach Wonsan before dark. Consequently, Generals Ryan and 

McKee decided against any rescue attempt. They knew, too, that about 80 MiGs were 

based at Wonsan.

Although the ROK air force had 84 F–86s and 44 F–5s that were combat-ready, 

General Bonesteel decided against using them. He considered the “minimal” chance of 

a successful rescue to be “far outweighed” by the danger of escalation. If ROK planes 

were lost trying to rescue Americans while the Blue House raid went unpunished, USROK relations would suffer and the likelihood of South Korean retaliation against the 

North would be “gravely enhanced.”

In Washington, on the other side of the International Date Line, it was late evening 

on 22 January when the Pueblo crisis began. The National Military Command Center 

received the Pueblo’s warning, “They plan to open fire on us now,” only ten minutes after 

its dispatch, at 2346 Washington time. General Wheeler was notified fifteen minutes 

later. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow called General Wheeler at 0051 to ask what 

could be done. General Wheeler, in turn, asked J–3 whether any units were available. 

Rear Admiral William McClendon, Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, talked to 

General Bonesteel by secure telephone around 0240. Intercepted messages, said Bonesteel, indicated that the crew had been transferred to small boats while the Pueblo was 

being towed to Wonsan.53 (The ship probably was inside the twelve-mile limit claimed by 

North Korea and close to the three-mile limit recognized by the United States.) General 

Bonesteel had, therefore, decided against sending any US aircraft to the area because 

their attacks might kill Americans. The J–3 then sent a summary of the situation to General Wheeler, who found it “very disturbing.” Walt Rostow, meanwhile, called CINCPAC 
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headquarters to ask about Enterprise’s distance from Wonsan and her efforts to assist 

Pueblo. He was told that aircraft could not arrive in time.54

Why was no rescue available? Rear Admiral Johnson informed the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that he had not asked Fifth Air Force to put any planes on the runway or strip 

alert because (1) there had been no reaction to Pueblo’s ten-day sweep along the North 

Korean coast and (2) policy concerning Sea of Japan missions, unlike those in the East 

China Sea where the USS Banner had been harassed, did not call for specific strip 

alerts. President Johnson appointed a committee headed by former Under Secretary 

of State George Ball to assess “the Pueblo incident.” Secretary McNamara told the 

committee that providing either naval escort or air cover would have (1) been inconsistent with the Pueblo’s mission, (2) constituted a complete departure from previous 

practice by the United States and other nations, and (3) increased the possibility of 

misunderstanding, resentment, and international incidents. For the past twelve years, 

Soviet trawlers had operated just beyond the US three-mile limit. If Soviet warships 

had accompanied them, the American reaction would have been “strong and negative.” 

A week after the incident, General Wheeler sent the President his judgment that on 23 

January “aircraft would have been of little use in aiding the Pueblo. Their use could 

have been more harmful than helpful.”55

What next? On the afternoon of 23 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the 

J–3 to draft an analysis of the situation and prescribed in unusual detail what it should 

contain:

1. Compare the balance of forces within Korea, and state what the Soviets and the Chinese could and might do.

2. After reviewing the “meager” US force posture, “particularly in the air,” 

propose actions to improve those capabilities and establish when they should be 

carried out.

3. Ascertain what air and naval forces were available for a contingency operation, and determine what additional forces might be furnished.

4. Consider such steps as destroying or seizing North Korean shipping even 

in territorial waters, making hit-and-run strikes, retaking the Pueblo, mining or 

blockading one or more North Korean ports, and raiding across the DMZ.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also directed US air and naval units to stay at least 80 nautical 

miles from North Korea’s coast, and instructed Enterprise and her escorts to remain 

south of the 38th parallel.56

The next day, 24 January, the J–3 replied that the balance of forces within Korea 

was such that, in a conventional confrontation, neither side would enjoy a clear advantage. No overt Sino-Soviet reaction to such a confrontation seemed likely. By the J–3’s 

reckoning, the arrival times of possible reinforcements ran as follows:

Ground: 82nd Airborne Division within seven days, 6/9th of a Marine division/wing team in 40 days, and another 7/9th in 55 days.

Naval: Two attack carriers in the Sea of Japan within five days, followed by 

two more within 30 days.
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Air: Seven tactical air squadrons in two days, followed within three days by 

one more to South Korea and three to Okinawa.

The J–3 cautioned, however, that these figures were somewhat misleading because 

the logistical establishment could not provide adequate support during the early period 

of hostilities. The J–3 then set out a sequence of actions:

1. Demand return of the ship and crew through talks at Panmunjom, where 

the Military Armistice Commission met.

2. Send an unarmed tug to Wonsan, where it could accept the Pueblo.

3. Conduct an air and naval show of force at Wonsan.

4. Carry out selective air strikes against military and industrial targets.

It was “paramount,” though, that Action No. 4 be agreed upon before embarking upon 

Action Nos. 2 and 3. The J–3 characterized other possibilities (e.g., seizing ships at sea) 

as offering “small chance of success, half measures, and less worthiness than should 

be expected of a great power.” That afternoon, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed 

the J–3’s report, their attention centered upon what air and naval reinforcements could 

be provided without affecting operations in Vietnam.57

Meantime, late that morning, a group that included Secretary McNamara, Secretary-designate Clifford, and General Wheeler had taken the first look at North Korea’s 

motives and US options. CIA Director Richard Helms speculated that Pyongyang wanted 

“to create the appearance of a second front;” Under Secretary Katzenbach described 

taking the Pueblo as “a calculated attack on a target of opportunity.” General Wheeler 

said that, while he was not ready to recommend specific actions, “we could do any or all 

of the following”: seizing or sinking North Korean ships at sea; mining selected harbors; 

punitive activities against coastal ocean-going traffic; carrying out air and naval strikes 

against selected targets (Wonsan, he noted, was well defended); raiding an isolated 

DMZ outpost, which Wheeler did not favor; and conducting photo reconnaissance prior 

to any other action. Secretary McNamara suggested two general types of responses: 

first, military movements into Korea; second, a buildup which could include mobilizing 

reserves and seeking authority from Congress to extend terms of service.58

An imbalance in air strengths, heavily favoring the North over the South, had to 

be redressed. DOD prepared a plan to deploy about 300 aircraft and activate an equal 

number to replace them in CONUS. At a luncheon meeting with the President on 25 

January, Secretary McNamara recommended immediately seeking authority to call up 

reservists but delaying deployments to avoid damaging diplomatic efforts at the UN. 

Conversely, General Wheeler wanted to reinforce South Korea promptly with 170 landbased aircraft and to station the USS Kitty Hawk off North Korea: “This would give 

us ample aircraft to protect ourselves against any eventuality. . . . It would be four or 

five days before all the units are operationally ready” in the area. Disputing Secretary 

McNamara, he maintained that military moves would demonstrate US determination 

“to do everything it can on both the diplomatic and the military front if necessary.” 
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Ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg agreed that “military actions will create a 

sense of urgency for the UN to act.” Secretary-designate Clifford supported McNamara, 

arguing that deployments would only heighten tension: “I am deeply sorry about the 

ship and the 83 men but I do not think it is worth a resumption of the Korean War.”59

Next morning, though, a consensus formed; McNamara and Clifford agreed about 

alerting units “today” for movement to Korea. President Johnson approved the activation of 28 Air Force and Navy units, involving 14,787 personnel and 372 planes. Between 

28 January and 2 February, 182 aircraft (72 F–4s, 14 RF–4s, 34 F–104s, 38 F–102s, 18 

F–100s, and 6 EB–66s) arrived in South Korea; the carriers Yorktown and Ranger 

entered the Sea of Japan. During 3–6 February, 26 B–52s flew to Guam and Okinawa; 

soon afterward, 18 F–106s deployed to South Korea.60

Noting that there were still only 427 tactical aircraft in South Korea compared to 

530 in the North, General McConnell on 29 January urged that another 150 planes be 

shifted to the western Pacific. Admiral Sharp demurred, perceiving some danger of air 

bases becoming overcrowded and a real need for only one F–106 air defense squadron. 

He proposed, instead, either conducting an air mobility exercise with a brigade from 

the 82nd Airborne Division or dispatching a sizeable reconnaissance party to South 

Korea. The J–3 recommended a battalion-scale exercise but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

on 31 January, disapproved.61 In South Vietnam, the Tet offensive had begun and the 

82nd Airborne was the Army’s only combat-ready division in CONUS.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to improve other facets of the US military posture 

in Korea. On 25 January, they proposed and Secretary McNamara promptly agreed 

that 10,000 tons of aerial munitions en route to Southeast Asia be diverted to Korea 

and replaced later. They also recommended increasing Eighth Army by 8,500 personnel, from 79 to 90 percent of strength in the tables of organization. But the Secretary 

saw no justification for an across-the-board increase. Rather, as Systems Analysis 

maintained, any increase would have to be justified by auditing each unit’s task and 

status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded that the US sector of the DMZ needed to be 

more fully and actively manned, and that Army installations required better protection. Nonetheless, the Secretary deferred a decision and no increase came about. In 

mid-February, though, Secretary McNamara did approve a JCS proposal that enough 

ammunition be pre-positioned to support 18 ROK divisions in combat for 30 days. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also advised the Secretary that two Hawk surface-to-air 

missile battalions in CONUS were available for transfer to Korea. General Bonesteel 

and Admiral Sharp believed that Hawks were needed there. On 30 January, General 

Wheeler recommended airlifting those units over the next two weeks, but Secretary 

McNamara took no action.62

Why had Pyongyang resorted to such a brazen provocation? On 24 January, General McConnell advised all major Air Force commands that, since North Korea was 

perhaps the world’s most security-conscious nation, Pyongyang probably viewed as 

an aggressive act the presence of any intelligence collector near its border. Hence “we 

believe the seizing of the Pueblo was an opportunistic act to silence a US intelligence 
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collector, embarrass the US, and improve North Korea’s image.” Nothing indicated that 

the incident was “part on overall plan to initiate hostilities.” However, when the Tet 

offensive erupted only a week later, most policymakers concluded that “[t]hey were 

trying to divert US military resources from Vietnam and to pressure the South Koreans 

into recalling their two divisions.”63

In any case, even before Tet, the administration opted for a diplomatic solution; 

the aerial buildup was a precautionary move rather than a preparation for war. General 

Wheeler advised Admiral Sharp on 25 January, the President wanted to avoid confronting Moscow and Pyongyang with either “an ultimatum or with military actions that 

could be construed as a prelude to an ultimatum.” And, he added, the President also 

had to take account of domestic divisions spawned by the Vietnam War.64 Three days 

later, Secretary Rusk sent the US Ambassador in Seoul an appraisal that had been 

approved by Secretary McNamara and President Johnson.

It is apparent that North Koreans now realize full possible consequences of their 

actions and that [the] Soviets have almost certainly told them to defuse situation. . . . It is imperative . . . that we make it as easy as possible for them to get off 

hook. . . .

The North Koreans will probably talk tough and try to humiliate the US and ROK. 

If they do we should let them rant and ignore it. The velvet glove approach is the 

best, for there is a steel fist in it, and the North Koreans know it. . . .

We expect the first round of talks will produce the release of the crew.65

At a White House meeting on 31 January, Secretary Rusk estimated that chances of 

liberating the crew in a “reasonable time” by diplomatic means were “about fifty-fifty.” 

He observed, and General Wheeler agreed, that no military plan put forward thus far 

offered any promise of returning the crew alive.66

The conviction that the Soviets would act to defuse the situation proved wrong. 

Although Pyongyang had not coordinated with Moscow and Hanoi beforehand, the Soviets saw no reason why they should pull American chestnuts out of the fire.67 Hence, in 

talks at Panmunjom, hopes for a rapid resolution faded. The North Koreans, obviously not 

awed by the “steel fist,” adamantly insisted upon admission of and apology for Pueblo’s 

acts of espionage and intrusion into territorial waters. The United States refused.

There also was a crisis of confidence between Washington and Seoul. President 

Park resented that the United States, after virtually ignoring the Blue House raid, reacted 

forcefully over the Pueblo. On 28 January he received assurances that, when the crew 

was freed if release was long delayed, the administration would: announce its intention 

to keep augmented forces in the area; consider additional MAP funding; supply the ROK 

with two destroyers; and airlift counter-infiltration equipment on the same priority as 

Vietnam. But what President Park really wanted was joint retaliatory action if provocations continued. His suspicion sharpened when, on 2 February, US and North Korean 

members of the Military Armistice Commission began bilateral discussions about the 
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Pueblo. Several days later, General Bonesteel warned his superiors that President Park 

had become “almost irrationally obsessed with need to strike now at North Koreans.” 

The Chief of Staff, ROK Air Force, even feared that he might receive orders to launch 

unilateral air strikes against the North.68

President Johnson sent former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to Seoul 

as his Special Envoy. Arriving on 11 February, Vance found Park in a “highly emotional 

state,” doubting US commitment and resolve. In the ensuing discussions, Mr. Vance 

rejected any automatic US response to further incidents; President Park agreed to 

consult Washington before taking action but would not guarantee to heed US advice. 

Nonetheless, Vance reported that US objectives had been “essentially achieved.” After 

returning to Washington, he recommended that annual MAP appropriations rise from 

$160 to $200–210 million, and that an interagency group assess current policy and 

identify objectives for the next several years.69

On 5 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a $100 million MAP increase for FY 

1968. Major items included 18 F–4Ds, 300,000 M–1 rifles for Homeland Reserve Forces, 

and a $13 million counter-infiltration package.70 In July, Congress completed passage 

of the $100 million addition.

Concurrently, an interagency group reviewed near-term alternatives. The chairman, Winthrop Brown, had been ambassador to South Korea during 1964–67 and 

currently was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

Major General George Pickett, USA, Vice Director of J–3, served as JCS representative. 

On 13 March, the group advised Under Secretary of State Katzenbach that “diplomatic 

alternatives appear to have the best chance of freeing the crew.” An improved military 

capability, particularly for the ROK, would enhance these efforts. If the situation grew 

markedly worse, “sharp military action might be required.” North Korea’s air force was 

vulnerable to speedy destruction, and its loss might decisively weaken enemy capabilities. North Korea knew the air power to do this was available, but Pyongyang also 

knew that the lack of US ground reserves might deter Washington from taking action 

that risked full-scale war. The group therefore concluded that:

1. For the immediate future, it would be wisest to continue diplomatic pressure, complemented by a rapid buildup of US/ROK capabilities and the continued stationing in South Korea of US air augmentations.

2. The United States should avoid small-scale actions and pressure tactics, because 

these might either weaken the US/ROK legal position as victims of aggression or 

spark retaliation and escalation.

3. The US would be in a better position to deal with its problems in Korea if it were 

to improve its overall strategic posture. General Pickett had sought a stronger 

statement about the need for worldwide improvements, particularly in ground 

forces; ISA’s spokesman had opposed any mention of this subject whatever.71

Meanwhile, from Seoul, Ambassador William Porter in mid-February suggested 

ways of increasing pressure that included blacklisting ships that used North Korean ports 

and conducting an aerial demonstration well inside South Korea. General Johnson, who 
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

was Acting Chairman,72 asked the Joint Staff to analyze Ambassador Porter’s proposals 

and develop a preferred course of action. He believed that, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

might be confronted with proposals for action, they should develop some sense of what 

they preferred. General Johnson wanted the Joint Staff to work under an assumption 

that diplomacy alone would be pursued for “a reasonable time.”73

Replying on 28 February, the J–3 recommended (1) improving world-wide readiness, as well as the US politico-military posture in South Korea, and (2) continuing the 

necessary global surveillance and intelligence operations. Then, if diplomacy failed, 

launch “an all-out attack to neutralize the North Korean Air Force and its bases.” 

Since such an attack probably would trigger North Korean counter-action, the J–3 

would consider only a strike that was damaging enough to alter the military balance 

significantly.74

On 1 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the J–3’s report. General Wheeler 

wanted the J-3 to develop its study further, under an assumption that diplomacy alone 

would not succeed. He and the Service Chiefs agreed upon the following scenario: 

Strengthen the US/ROK military posture to a point that would permit the delivery of 

an ultimatum. Wait about three weeks before beginning reprisals, so that the North 

Koreans would be worn down by continuous alerts. Then submarines would start sinking ships and continue, if necessary, until the North Korean navy had been eliminated.75

On 21 March, the J–3 replied with a report that was far from encouraging. In its 

judgment, the destruction of North Korea’s entire navy and merchant marine required 

attacks on ports and harbors that would incur a “high risk of reopening full-scale 

hostilities.” If only a limited number of ships were sunk, there would be less hazard 

of full-scale fighting. In both cases, however, the risks outweighed the gains. Covert 

sinking of a North Korean submarine by a US submarine, while not so dangerous, 

courted retaliation in kind. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a review, decided that the 

J–3 had overstated the risks. They ordered yet another paper, based upon the scenario 

outlined on 1 March. Instead of merely noting the result, as the J–3 had recommended, 

they anticipated sending it to Secretary Clifford.76

Early in April, the J–3 submitted its response. Forces would be strengthened over 

a six-month period and aerial reconnaissance increased; then the United States would 

deliver an ultimatum. If the Pueblo’s crew was not returned in three weeks, a US submarine would destroy a North Korean submarine. Thereafter, US forces would either 

sink more ships or launch other military measures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted this 

paper, but neither approved it nor sent it to Secretary Clifford.77

By this time, public protests against the war in Vietnam had grown so great that 

starting a second war in Asia was simply unthinkable. When Presidents Johnson and 

Park met in Honolulu, on 17 April, Vietnam and not the Pueblo was their prime topic of 

conversation. About two weeks earlier, President Johnson had restricted the bombing 

of North Vietnam and announced only a small increase to US strength in the South. 

President Johnson still wanted an ROK light division sent to South Vietnam, and in 

December Park tentatively had agreed to send it. Now, though, President Park saw no 
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reason to increase South Korea’s commitment just after the United States had decided 

against increasing its own. So, at the morning meeting with Johnson, Park said that 

the threat from the North precluded sending a light division. President Park claimed, 

in fact, that South Korea was militarily inferior to the North in every category. General 

Wheeler attended the meeting. In the afternoon, after getting Wheeler’s opinion, President Johnson answered Park by citing the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the 

ROK Army was superior. The arrival of air reinforcements, President Johnson continued, had created aerial superiority as well. North Korea, he argued, had “provoked the 

Pueblo incident to prevent South Korea from sending more troops to Vietnam.”78 But 

President Park remained immovable, and no more troops were sent.

Even though Pueblo’s crew remained in captivity, the sense of crisis began to abate. 

Around mid-year, a Special National Intelligence Estimate concluded that North Korea 

would neither invade the South nor—at least for the next year or so—take actions that 

carried a high risk of provoking war.79 No further reinforcements went to Korea. Early 

in July, 72 F–4s returned to CONUS, replaced by 50 of the older, recently activated 

F–100s. Deputy Secretary Nitze deferred action on General Wheeler’s request for more 

Hawk battalions, believing that (1) enough Hawk and Nike-Hercules batteries already 

were in place and (2) an aircraft shelter program would reduce vulnerability “very 

significantly.” Under pressure from Congress, the administration initiated a worldwide 

cost-cutting program. Late in July, General Wheeler told the Director, Joint Staff, that 

some of the reinforcements might have to return from Korea. In September, the Director suggested that withdrawals be so arranged as to retain the F–100s and F–106s as 

long as possible.80 Since the Pueblo impasse continued, however, no more aircraft left 

Korea during 1968.

Actually, the Pueblo buildup was a temporary aberration. That became evident 

through the results of a long-range reassessment completed in mid-June. Originally 

proposed by Mr. Vance, it was prepared under the direction of Joseph Yager, vice chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council. According to it, continuing the 

status quo was “simply not sustainable beyond the next few years” and “probably was 

not desirable for even that brief period.” The two US divisions should be withdrawn 

for strategic and financial reasons; the case for keeping them would become much 

weaker after ROK divisions returned from Vietnam. Furthermore, the state of American public opinion indicated the fragility of a “protectorate” relationship when the 

need for US protection clearly was declining. Rapid disengagement, however, “could 

pull the props from under much of what our blood and treasure have helped to build.” 

The United States “must long retain a real though diminishing role in support of the 

ROK.” The paper outlined a “preferred strategy” that would “in a few years’ time all 

but eliminate the risk that US combat forces would have to be committed to help the 

ROK repel a new North Korean attack.” The major steps might run as follows: during 

FYs 1970–71, return the ROK divisions from Vietnam; during FYs 1972–73, withdraw 

the US 2nd and 7th Divisions; and by FY 1975, substantially complete the modernization 

of the ROK military structure.81
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The East Asia and Pacific Interdepartmental Regional Group endorsed this study. 

While agreeing upon the wisdom of withdrawing US ground forces at least, it inclined 

to plan in terms of a “sequence of events” rather than specific dates. On 21 August, 

however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Clifford that they found the 

preferred strategy “unrealistic in the time frame proposed.” It assumed a favorable 

outcome in the 1971 ROK presidential election, after which US actions apparently would 

proceed in “a generally rigid sequence.” Yet they judged ROK political stability to be still 

fragile, a prey to factionalism, corruption, and extremism. Therefore, they preferred 

delaying implementation of the preferred strategy until many of the current variables 

and assumptions could be clarified. Also, any proposals to change had to be related 

to a coherent regional strategy. Until they saw substantial evidence of moderation by 

North Korea, the outcome of the Vietnam War could be foreseen more clearly, and the 

likelihood of achieving desired ROK force goals became more nearly a reality, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff would not endorse the preferred strategy. They did agree to limited 

participation by JCS representatives in interagency discussions “at [the] present slow 

pace.” On 26 September, the SIG directed that interagency deliberations continue, with 

full-time participation by a representative from each Service and from the Joint Staff. 

But the pace was slow enough for the Johnson administration to leave office without 

reaching any decisions about Korean policy.82

Returning to immediate problems, firefights along the DMZ cost the United States 

12 killed and 41 wounded during 1968. In July, General Bonesteel and Admiral McCain 

reported that another 29,592 personnel were needed to “round out and modernize” 

Eighth Army and to permit sustained operations. On 17 October, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff repeated to Secretary Clifford their recommendation for an 8,500-man increase 

“as soon as possible.” They acknowledged, though, that Eighth Army’s need had to be 

considered within the context of meeting Vietnam requirements, increasing Allied 

Command Europe’s readiness, improving the strategic reserve, and adjusting to 

budgetary and balance-of-payments restrictions. Once again, Deputy Secretary Nitze 

deferred action.83

At last, after long and acrimonious negotiations, the Pueblo’s crew won release. 

This was done through an arrangement in which the United States simultaneously 

tendered and repudiated an apology. At Panmunjom, on 23 December 1968, Major 

General Gilbert Woodward, USA, read the following statement:

The position of the United States Government . . . has been that the ship was 

not engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the 

ship intruded at any time into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, 

and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took 

place. . . . I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.

Then he signed a statement that the Pueblo had “illegally intruded” into North Korea’s 

territorial waters and conducted “grave acts of espionage” for which the US Government 
The Far East

247

“solemnly apologizes.” That done, Commander Bucher and his crew were released from 

a brutal captivity and returned to American hands.84

Japan: Burden-Sharing and the Reversion Issue

During the 1960s, Japan emerged as an economic powerhouse but remained a military mini-power. In January 1965, Secretary McNamara told Prime Minister Eisaku Sato that he believed Japan’s military and foreign aid budgets should be 

increased “four or five times in the next five, ten, fifteen years.” Japan, he continued, 

should consider sending substantial amounts of military and economic aid to the 

Philippines, Malaysia, and South Korea. Sato replied that, while he was personally 

amenable, public support still had to be developed.85

At that point, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) contained 13 divisions, each 

equivalent at most to a US brigade, enough warships to escort coastal and intra-island 

convoys, and 16 squadrons of F–86 and F–104 fighter interceptors. ISA asked the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to recommend priorities among Japanese defense missions and functions. Replying early in July, they said that neither the USSR nor China seemed likely to 

assault Japan except during general war, in which case the main dangers would be air 

and naval attacks.86 Hence Japan’s military priorities ought to be, in descending order: 

air defense, emphasizing all-weather capability; anti-submarine warfare; minesweeping; ground defense and supporting tactical fighters, reconnaissance, and airlift.87

In August 1965, the State Department circulated a draft proposing how the US 

government should proceed. Since the limit upon Japan’s defense effort would be 

determined by what the Japanese themselves thought they needed, “our ability to affect 

the issue will remain minimal.” The administration should, therefore, acquiesce in 

Tokyo’s apparent decision to defer expanding its ground forces from 140,000 to 171,000 

men, until Japanese public opinion seemed ready to support that step. Washington 

should even accept a reduction to 120,000 men, provided the savings were applied to 

force modernization. In fact, by adopting a laissez-faire attitude on defense policy, the 

United States might even gain greater leverage in encouraging the Japanese to increase 

economic aid to other nations. The Director, Joint Staff, commented that, while US 

pressure for greater defense efforts might prove counter-productive, “a policy of ‘acquiescence and no objection’ could be inimical to US and Japanese defense interests.”88

From Tokyo, at Secretary McNamara’s suggestion, Ambassador Edwin Reischauer 

submitted an assessment of US-Japanese relations. The “violent popular reaction” to 

US intervention in Vietnam, he reported, meant the United States could not simply 

assume that the Security Treaty would be renewed routinely in 1970. Reischauer suggested taking account of Japanese reactions when making decisions about Vietnam, 

redefining the US-Japanese defense relationship, and encouraging Japan to undertake 

regional economic and political leadership. At Secretary Rusk’s suggestion, which the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed, the Interdepartmental Regional Group for the Far East 
248

JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

started studying the overall US-Japan strategic relationship as well as the JSDF’s size 

and missions. Its assessment of the overall relationship proved surprisingly optimistic. 

As for the JSDF, the Group recommended expanding its surveillance capability, improving anti-submarine warfare, harbor defense, minesweeping, and air defense forces, as 

well as modernizing (at a lower priority) ground and tactical air power. In May 1966, 

the Senior Interdepartmental Group approved these studies.89

Secretary McNamara wanted to reduce the US military presence in Japan. The 

last US F–102s left during 1965, making air defense a wholly Japanese responsibility.90

“We should now plan the next series of moves,” he told General Wheeler in June 1966. 

In preparation, Secretary McNamara asked for a list of all US units in Japan and an 

indication of which ones acted primarily as area defense forces.91 Unfortunately, the 

Secretary’s expectations proved to be exaggerated. No major units, General Wheeler 

replied, could be considered as directly and primarily concerned with the defense of 

Japan. Most were service support units, important in the context of contingency and 

general war plans. Their value, he claimed, had been reaffirmed in the Vietnam conflict.92 That assessment ended the Secretary’s hopes.

During 1967, the military balance-of-payments deficit with Japan totaled $473 million, a figure which special financial transactions reduced to $230 million. For 1968, 

the Japanese proposed cooperative actions amounting to $350 million. In July 1968, 

as part of an urgent effort to reduce that deficit, the State and Defense Departments 

launched a review of US base requirements in Japan. At State’s suggestion, Admiral 

McCain and Alexis Johnson, who had succeeded Edwin Reischauer as ambassador in 

Tokyo, oversaw this review. Late in September, they recommended releasing or relocating 54 installations, for a $2.6 million saving. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred.93

Meantime, however, General Wheeler discovered that Systems Analysis was considering cuts in bases and forces that would go far beyond the McCain-Johnson proposals. On 25 October 1968, he protested to Secretary Clifford that a study by Systems 

Analysis alone simply complicated interdepartmental work in progress and clouded the 

value of judgments being made about basic issues. Once again, as he saw it, Systems 

Analysis was proposing wide-ranging actions based on logic that was inconsistent 

with national strategy. Early in December, nonetheless, the Secretary circulated “tentative” proposals involving major cutbacks that included: closing Tachikawa, Atsugi, 

and Yamato air bases; reducing operations at Itazuki air base; returning Sasebo naval 

base to Japanese control; withdrawing three of eight Hawk missile battalions; and 

moving Marine support units from Okinawa back to CONUS. Annual savings should 

come to $181 million in budgetary and $72 million in balance-of-payments expenditures. 

But no major decisions resulted because, on 7 December, President Johnson communicated his concern that “in this last month we do not diminish our contribution by 

rash, eleventh-hour actions which have not been carefully considered at all levels of 

the government.”94

There remained one truly sore spot in US-Japanese relations: what to do about 

the Ryukyu and Bonin-Volcano Islands—basically, Okinawa and Iwo Jima? The 1951 
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249

Peace Treaty had awarded administering authority to the United States, with Japan 

retaining residual sovereignty. In July 1965, Ambassador Reischauer warned that the 

Okinawa issue “cannot be held on present terms for more than two years.” Secretary 

Rusk suggested, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported, a study of requirements in 

the Ryukyus. The Interdepartmental Regional Group for the Far East began work.95

In December 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Secretary McNamara their judgment that exclusive US control over the Ryukyus would remain essential for the foreseeable future. Reversion to Japan would “seriously impair the US military posture in 

the Far East.” Recent problems with Tokyo about using bases in Okinawa to support 

operations in Vietnam indicated what difficulties would arise if Japan regained administrative control. Taking account of China’s growing militancy, her growing nuclear 

capability, and the volatile situation in Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed 

it “premature and unrealistic” to draft a timetable for reversion of the Ryukyus. They 

said, in fact, that Japanese officials recently had “gone out of their way” to give public 

assurances that they acquiesced in the continuation of full US control.96

In mid-1966, the Senior Interdepartmental Group tasked a working group with 

examining the problems of US base rights in the Ryukyus. It reported that, while Japanese pressure for reversion was rising, so was Japanese recognition of the longer-term 

value of US bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a set of recommendations which, 

on 13 September, the SIG approved as policy guidance.97

Early in 1967, the US High Commissioner in the Ryukyus recommended looking at 

other Ryukyu islands besides Okinawa. CINCPAC proposed, instead, giving attention 

to Guam and other islands in the Marianas which would remain under US control. At 

General Johnson’s urging, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered a study of where (besides 

the Ryukyus) unrestricted base rights could be found. On 20 July, they advised Secretary McNamara that unrestricted access to Ryukyus bases remained “essential if US 

security interests in the Far East are to be protected through the foreseeable future.” 

They assessed the alternatives bleakly:

1. An orderly transfer of civil administration, in return for an agreement

 allowing the free deployment and employment of US forces, would be the 

least disruptive arrangement.

2. A transfer of administrative authority within the context of the 1960 Security 

 Treaty would impose “highly restrictive” conditions and “seriously reduce” 

US military capabilities.

3. A base structure consisting of enclaves would be impractical, except as a last 

resort.

4. Relocation to other sites in the western Pacific would “seriously undermine” 

 US capabilities. More significantly, $1 billion worth of assets on Okinawa 

would be lost, and $600 million would have to be spent on new construction.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the administration to press for continued exclusive 

control over the Ryukyus, as the price of US defense commitments to Japan. Back in 

September 1966, the SIG had ordered an assessment of fallback and alternative positions 
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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

on the Ryukyus, such as partially or totally transferring administrative authority. The 

working group, in July 1967, reported that “special arrangements” between the two governments (i.e., exceptions to restrictions imposed by the Security Treaty) seemed “by far 

the preferred course.”98

Some kind of change looked unavoidable. During the spring of 1967, Japanese 

officials made clear that they wanted to begin discussions leading to (1) reversion of 

the Ryukyus perhaps by 1970 and (2) early return of the Bonin and Volcano Islands. 

Washington agreed to a joint study of the Bonin-Volcanoes’ military utility. Secretary 

McNamara asked for JCS views. Answering in June 1967, they said the Bonin-Volcanoes 

represented “an important strategic asset which should be retained by the United 

States.” Their value, while not readily apparent, became more evident as the political 

restrictions upon US forward bases increased. If satisfactory base rights in Japan and 

the Ryukyus failed to endure, retaining rights in the Bonin-Volcanoes would “salvage 

a measure of flexibility in the western Pacific.” Consequently, changes in status should 

be deferred until the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, embracing most of Micronesia, came under full US sovereignty.99 Meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored 

preserving US control, either by continuing the current arrangements or by resorting 

to outright purchase or long-term lease.100

With Prime Minister Sato due in Washington for a state visit, reversion of the 

Ryukyus and Bonin-Volcanoes became a prime topic. A State-Defense position paper, 

drafted in mid-August, outlined three options. One of them prescribed negotiations 

leading to early reversion of the Bonin-Volcanoes and, subsequently, of the Ryukyus. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that another option, conducting exploratory discussions about reversion of the Ryukyus and adopting interim measures, most closely 

approximated their views.101

Late in October, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara asked President Johnson to 

approve early negotiations for returning the Bonin-Volcanoes but permitting US retention of Iwo Jima as a military base.102 The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred to maintain 

administrative rights for contingency purposes. As a fallback, however, they would 

agree to return all the Bonin-Volcanoes except Iwo and Chichi Jima, where the Service 

Chiefs wanted to preserve an option for storing nuclear weapons. Yielding those rights 

in the Bonin-Volcanoes, they feared, would make the Japanese more likely to refuse 

nuclear storage in Okinawa. After a White House meeting on 4 November, at which 

General Wheeler presented the Service Chiefs’ views, President Johnson approved 

negotiating an early return of the Bonin-Volcanoes, without an explicit exception for 

basing nuclear weapons.103

After discussions on 14–15 November 1967, President Johnson and Prime Minister 

Sato announced that their governments would “enter immediately into consultations 

... for accomplishing the early restoration of [the Bonin and Volcano] islands to Japan,” 

with the United States retaining those bases deemed mutually necessary. The reversion ceremony took place on 26 June 1968, with the United States retaining a Loran 

station on Iwo Jima.104
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251

In their communiqué, the President and the Prime Minister agreed to keep the 

Ryukyus’ status “under continuing review, guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over these islands to Japan.” Washington and Tokyo, Sato emphasized, 

should agree “within a few years” upon the date for complete reversion. But that date, 

as far as the administration was concerned, would depend upon developments in Vietnam. At Blair House, on 18 November, Secretary McNamara told Sato that reversion 

was “certain, but what was uncertain was the role of bases. We could not leave US 

forces exposed and unable to operate effectively.” With Tokyo’s support, the Ryukyuan 

legislature passed resolutions opposing the stationing of B–52s at Kadena Air Base. 

Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended keeping them there, so that a rate of 1,800 

sorties per month in Southeast Asia could be sustained. When Ambassador Johnson 

warned that US-Japanese relations might be souring, the President responded that “if 

our relationship was to survive in the long run, the Japanese would have to overcome 

their one-sided view of that relationship.” For Japanese, though, prompt reversion of 

Okinawa had become the overriding issue.105

Catalysts of Change

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rightly saw Vietnam as the testing ground for close-in containment. As they wished, the war also froze deployments in Korea, the status of 

Taiwan, and the disposition of Okinawa. Essentially, the test of close-in containment 

failed when its cost proved much higher than the American public was willing to pay. 

President Nixon soon announced a lower military profile in Asia, started withdrawing troops from Vietnam and Korea, agreed to the reversion of Okinawa, and stressed 

self-reliance by US allies. Concurrently, armed clashes along the Sino-Soviet border 

led Mao Tse-tung to fear an encirclement of China. He acted to thaw Sino-American 

relations and President Nixon readily reciprocated. Practicing “triangular diplomacy” 

with Moscow and Peking, President Nixon created a new strategic environment in the 

Far East.

253

14

Conclusion

The years 1965–1968 marked a low point in the influence exercised by the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. In Dereliction of Duty, H. R. McMaster characterized General Wheeler, General Johnson, Admiral McDonald, General McConnell, and General Greene as “five 

silent men.”1 Though not literally silent, their words carried little weight. General 

Johnson later described JCS influence as “minimal” and likened his own role to that 

of a frustrated spectator.2 While the air war against North Vietnam provided the most 

conspicuous example of minimal influence, there were a good many others. How did 

that situation come about, and what were the consequences?

Early in his tenure, President Johnson invited the Joint Chiefs of Staff to luncheon 

discussions. Vietnam changed their relationship, as the President decided that Secretary McNamara’s strategy of applying graduated pressure offered the best hope of 

achieving limited objectives without risking major escalation. But the Service Chiefs 

began seeing the President less and less, leaving General Wheeler as the conduit for 

conveying their advice and receiving decisions.3

According to one well-placed officer, President Eisenhower hoped the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 would strengthen the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and clarify 

that of the Secretary of Defense; instead, Secretary McNamara strengthened his role 

and clarified theirs. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for undiluted military requirements which inevitably exceeded the bounds of fiscal feasibility. The Secretary liked 

to say that he dealt with requirements rather than arbitrary budget ceilings—but, he 

added, he himself would have to validate those requirements. So, military men concluded, he did operate under a budget ceiling. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, not knowing 

what it was, had to probe for the underlying assumptions that would reveal it. For 

them, this constituted a crippling handicap. Without knowing the Secretary’s limit, 

the services submitted inflated budget requests, which McNamara in turn cut in the 

name of cost-effectiveness.4

The McNamara methodology, centering upon cost-effectiveness calculations, 

brought important benefits. In its early years, systems analysis obliged the Joint Chiefs 

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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

of Staff and the services to become more rigorous about examining their own assumptions and conclusions. For military officers, however, Vietnam did much to discredit the 

entire approach. Civilians believed they could “program” the enemy because, logically, 

the leadership in Hanoi should have responded in certain ways to particular military 

pressures. But, military men countered, OSD excluded from its calculations the impact 

upon human lives; to them, that made all such analyses woefully incomplete.5 The 

failure of ROLLING THUNDER appeared to prove their point.

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services, many DPMs seemed designed more 

to justify force levels pre-selected by OSD than to provide objective analyses. Admiral McDonald learned “not to raise the issue of experience before certain individuals 

because . . . that just made you parochial.”6 Senior Air Force officers became particularly alienated. As one general put it, “Our program is cost-effective no matter what the 

cost.”7 While the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services adopted Secretary McNamara’s 

methodology, they often did so by creating categories into which they could fit whatever 

data would support their pre-determined goals.

Could the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recovered through Congress some of the clout 

they no longer wielded within the administration? In January 1965, President Johnson 

assured Congress that American military strength was “greater now than that of any 

combination of adversaries . . . assuring an indisputable margin of superiority for our 

defenses.”8 That December, with the Vietnam buildup well under way, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff informed Secretary McNamara that the program proposed for FY 1967 appeared 

“inadequate” to support operations in Southeast Asia as well as worldwide commitments and strategic concepts. Several days later, after learning that there would be a 

sizable FY 1966 supplemental request, they advised that “the programs supported by 

these budgets will improve our overall combat effectiveness and the readiness of our 

forces to safeguard the vital security interests of the United States.” However, actual 

and forecast drawdowns for Vietnam would “reduce our abilities to meet additional 

contingencies and commitments . . . to a serious but as yet undetermined extent in 

terms of time, size, and quality of response.” They reminded Secretary McNamara 

that failure to mobilize reserves and/or extend terms of service, which they always 

had assumed would occur in the event of protracted hostilities, was draining the strategic reserve, creating “substantial inadequacies” in the training and rotation base, 

and leaving some forces in Vietnam and elsewhere with less than the required rates 

of supply support.9

Very likely, members of Congress did not deduce the extent of JCS unease. In February 1966, during hearings before the Armed Services Committee, Senator Richard 

Russell asked whether the proposed FY 1967 budget would provide adequately for the 

security of the United States “in the face of the threats as we now see them.” General 

Wheeler answered that it would. How could his answer be reconciled with the assessments above? Presumably, the statements were delivered on different planes. Volume I 

of JSOP 69-76, approved in July 1966, stated that the overall strategic balance “favors” 

the Free World. The J–5’s draft had said only “appears to favor.” The Joint Chiefs of 

254
Conclusion

255

Staff changed this to “favors” because, as Admiral McDonald emphasized, “It is the 

consensus of the intelligence community that the Soviet Union is in an inferior position 

to the United States and the Free World in the matter of strategic military power.”10

In November 1966, as the FY 1968 budget cycle neared completion, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff decided to send Secretary McNamara a “wrap-up” memorandum, stating that 

his force-level decisions reflected “a greater degree of risk than is considered warranted.” Secretary McNamara made only a few minor concessions. In March 1967, during 

hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, Representative George Mahon 

asked whether the administration’s requests were adequate to assure the nation’s 

security. “My answer,” General Wheeler responded, “is generally ‘yes.’”11

In February 1968, confronting the Tet offensive and the USS Pueblo provocation 

when there was hardly any strategic reserve, Mahon questioned General Wheeler about 

the FY 1969 budget’s adequacy. The Chairman called it “reasonably adequate,” amplifying that “although it does not contain all the forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, or the individual members thereof, we are in agreement that this program will 

improve the readiness and overall combat effectiveness of our forces.” He added that 

they wanted “somewhat larger” ground and tactical air forces.12

In open sessions before congressional committees, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made 

clear that they disagreed with their civilian superiors about the bombing campaign 

against North Vietnam, the deployment of ballistic missile defenses, and the role of 

civilian systems analysts. What General Wheeler did not make clear publicly was how 

far the budget and force levels chosen by Secretary McNamara and approved by President Johnson fell short of what they desired. Taken at face value, his congressional 

testimony on those issues was not alarmist. When the Chairman testified, however, 

he chose to discuss what could be done within the limits imposed by the civilian 

leadership. President Johnson had decided to wage the Vietnam War without moving 

the country toward a wartime footing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed, repeatedly 

but vainly, for substantial reserve mobilization and for greater expansion of the active 

forces. In fact, military versus civilian differences were large and persisting.

Resignation—more precisely, requesting retirement in mid-tour—offered the final 

recourse. In July 1965, the President’s refusal to mobilize reserves so upset General 

Johnson that he considered resigning. Several times, Admiral McDonald said to his 

executive assistant, “I think I’ll just turn in my suit. I just don’t think I can do this 

any longer.” Ultimately, both men reasoned that their resignations would not compel 

changes in policy, and that they could do more good by staying in their jobs than by 

leaving them. Years later, though, General Johnson deemed himself guilty of a “lapse 

in moral courage.”13

To sum up, even after excluding Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff lost more bureaucratic battles than they won. Strategic nuclear forces no longer could be considered 

“superior” to those of the Soviet Union, being sized instead to meet Secretary McNamara’s criterion of “assured destruction.” Conventional forces clearly were incapable 

of waging two wars. Arms control, though, stands as an area where the Joint Chiefs of 

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JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

Staff continued to exercise significant influence. Without their endorsement, no treaty 

was likely to win Senate approval. Thus they along with AEC played an important 

part in blocking threshold and comprehensive test bans; the non-proliferation treaty 

accommodated their objections.

On NATO matters, the administration stood united in opposing major withdrawals of US forces from Western Europe. A debate over dual-basing air and ground units 

ended with decisions that were closer to JCS than to OSD recommendations, although 

the differences in any case were not great. The Joint Chiefs of Staff persuaded Secretary McNamara to approve 90-day stockpiling objectives, yet that goal remained 

out of reach and far exceeded what the allies were willing to support. Whether Allied 

Command Europe could conduct a successful initial conventional defense remained 

debatable. The JCS appraisal was rather pessimistic, the OSD appraisal much more 

optimistic.

In the Middle East, after the Six Day War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff grew increasingly 

concerned about US over-identification with Israel. The costs of a close association 

with Israel, they felt, would outweigh any conceivable advantages. But the President, 

perhaps with domestic political considerations in mind, proved willing to accept these 

costs. In East Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wholeheartedly supported “close-in” containment of China. Thus they opposed reversion of the Ryukyu Islands, largely because 

they viewed bases on Okinawa as a keystone of the effort in Southeast Asia. Their role 

in Korean events is more complex. While they wanted a stronger military posture than 

the administration would allow, the Pueblo was not lost for lack of aircraft to attempt 

a rescue. Rather, the Pueblo was captured because the danger had been misjudged and 

no aircraft were on strip alert. Having approved Pueblo’s mission, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff could not avoid some responsibility for the result.

Vietnam ultimately shattered the Cold War consensus, blighting many reputations. 

As the anti-war groundswell grew, so did resentment against all those deemed responsible for launching such a horrible misadventure. A fair part of the American public took 

the Tet offensive to be final proof of military incompetence. Pentagon debates became 

irrelevant, in a sense, because a disillusioned Congress started imposing increasingly 

strict limits upon defense spending. The era that had opened with President Kennedy’s 

promise that Americans would “pay any price, bear any burden . . . to assure the survival and the success of liberty” closed with President Johnson’s poignant appeal for 

an end to the Vietnam-spawned “division in the American house.”14 But disarray and 

distrust, within the government as well as without, were among the main legacies of 

that troubled time. From that perspective, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ranked among the 

many losers.

256
257

Acronyms

AAI Authorized Active Inventory

ABM anti-ballistic missile

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACSAN Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

AID Agency for International Development

AMSA Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft

ANC Armée Nationale Congolaise

APC armored personnel carrier

ASW anti-submarine warfare

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

Benelux Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg

BIOT British Indian Ocean Territory

BLT battalion landing team

CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CINCLANT Commander in Chief, Atlantic

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

CINCSAC Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

CINCSTRIKE Commander in Chief, Strike Command

CINCUNC Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

COMNAVFORJAPAN Commander, Naval Forces, Japan

COMSIXTHFLT Commander, Sixth Fleet

CONUS Continental United States

CTBT comprehensive test ban treaty

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DLGN nuclear-powered guided-missile destroyer

DMZ demilitarized zone

DPC Defense Planning Committee

DPM Draft Presidential Memorandum

DPQ Defense Planning Questionnaire

ENDC Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference
258

JCS and National Policy

FDL fast deployment logistics

GNR Government of National Reconstruction

GRC Government of the Republic of China

HQ, USEUCOM Headquarters, US European Command

IAF Inter-American Force

IAPF Inter-American Peace Force

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IMI Improved Manned Interceptor

IMS International Military Staff

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

IRG Inter-departmental Regional Group

ISA International Security Affairs

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JLRSS Joint Long-Range Strategic Study

JRC Joint Reconnaissance Center

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces

JSOP Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

JSTPS Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff

LHA amphibious assault ship (general-purpose)

LOC line of communication

LST landing ship, tank

MAM Military Assistance Manual

MAP Military Assistance Program

MASF Military Assistance, Service Funded

MBFR mutual and balanced force reductions

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle

MLF multilateral force

MNCs Major NATO Commanders

MRBM medium-range ballistic missiles

NAMILPO North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Posture

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Abbreviations and Acronyms

259

NAVEUR Naval Forces, Europe

NFZ nuclear-free zone

NIE National Intelligence Estimates

NMCC National Military Command Center

NPP National Policy Paper

NPT non-proliferation treaty

NSC National Security Council

OAS Organization of American States

OJCS Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OTH over-the-horizon

POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants

PPBS planning-programming-budgeting system

PSAC President’s Science Advisory Committee

QRA quick-reaction alert

R&D research and development

REFORGER Return of Forces to Germany

ROAD Reorganization Objective, Army Division

ROK Republic of Korea

RV Re-entry vehicle

SAC Strategic Air Command

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

SACNATO Supreme Allied Commander, North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAM surface-to-air missile

SAM-D Surface-to-Air Missile, Development

SCAD subsonic cruise armed decoy

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe

SIG Senior Interdepartmental Group

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan

SLBM submarine launched ballistic missile

SNDV strategic nuclear delivery vehicle

SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate

SRAM short-range air-to-surface missile
260

JCS and National Policy

STRAF Strategic Army Forces

STRICOM Strike Command

TOR terms of reference

UE Unit Equipment

UN United Nations

UNEF United Nations Emergency Force

USCINCEUR US Commander in Chief, Europe

USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic

VSTOL very short takeoffs and landing
261

Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief

Lyndon B. Johnson 22 Nov 63–20 Jan 69

Assistant to the President for

(National Security Affairs)

McGeorge Bundy 20 Jan 61–27 Feb 66

Walt W. Rostow 01 Apr 66–20 Jan 69

Secretary of State

Dean Rusk 20 Jan 61–20 Jan 69

Secretary of Defense

Robert S. McNamara 20 Jan 61–29 Feb 68

Clark M. Clifford 01 Mar 68–20 Jan 69

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Cyrus R. Vance 28 Jan 64–30 Jun 67

Paul Nitze 01 Jul 67–20 Jan 69

Assistant Secretary of Defense for

(International Security Affairs)

Paul H. Nitze 20 Jan 61–29 Nov 63

William P. Bundy 29 Nov 63–14 Mar 64

John T. McNaughton 01 Jul 64–19 Jul 67

Paul C. Warnke 01 Aug 67–15 Feb 69

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA 01 Oct 62–01 Jul 64

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA 03 Jul 64–02 Jul 70

Chief of Staff, US Army

General Earle G. Wheeler 01 Oct 62–02 Jul 64

General Harold K. Johnson 03 Jul 64–02 Jul 68

General William C. Westmoreland 03 Jul 68–30 Jun 72
262

JCS and National Policy

Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral George W. Anderson 0 Aug 61–01 Aug 63

Admiral David L. McDonald 01 Aug 63–01 Aug 67

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer 01 Aug 67–01 Jul 70

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

General Curtis E. LeMay 30 Jun 61–31 Jun 65

General John P. McConnell 01 Feb 65–01 Aug 69

Commandant, US Marine Corps

General David M. Shoup 01 Jan 60–31 Dec 63

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. 01 Jan 64–31 Dec 67

General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. 01 Jan 68–31 Dec 71
263

Notes to Pages 1–6

Notes

Chapter 1. Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

1. NSAM No. 288, 17 Mar 64, printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, 

vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1992), pp. 153-154, 170-173.

2. Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age: 1956–1960 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), pp. 277-278.

3. Alice Cole et al. (eds.), The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and 

Organization, 1944–1978 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 1978), pp. 244–245.

4. The National Military Command Center in the Pentagon operated outside the Joint Staff but 

under supervision of the Director, J-3. Following creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 

J-2 was abolished in 1963. Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1942–1989, 

pp. 47, 48, 76.

5. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of 

State, 2002), pp. 943–950. Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 (Washington, DC: 1968), pp. 1077–1078.

6. Rain and sleet forced the cancellation of a fly-over; Johnson and McNamara were briefly 

stuck in a Pentagon elevator; and the public address system failed to amplify dignitaries’ tributes. 

But as McNamara walked through a crown of applauding well-wishers, tears filled his eyes. NY 

Times, 1 Mar 68, p. 1.

7. Clifford focused on Vietnam, leaving most other issues to Deputy Secretary Paul H. Nitze, 

who had been Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) during 1961–64 and Secretary 

of the Navy during 1964–67.

8. Time, 22 Feb 65, p. 22.

9. Oral History Interview of General Wheeler by Dorothy P. McSweeny, 7 May 70, pp. 21–22; 

Memo, SecDef to Pres, “DOD Assignments Which Should be Decided by 2/1/68,” 19 Jan 68, EX 

FG 115, White House Central Files; Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

10. When Wheeler advanced from Chief of Staff to Chairman, Gen. Barksdale Hamlett who 

was Vice Chief of Staff would have been a logical choice to replace Wheeler. However, Hamlett 

suffered a heart attack and retired.

11. Lewis Sorley, Honorable Warrior (Lawrence, Kansas: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1998), pp. 

224–225, 254, 267–271.

12. “The Reminiscences of Admiral David Lamar McDonald, US Navy Retired,” Nov 76, pp. 

323, 360, 388–389, 396, quotation on p. 407; Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.

13. Edward J. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965–1968 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011), chap. 1.

14. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 1.

15. Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–1969 (Washington, DC: 

1970), vol. 1, p. 430.

16. Dept. of State, “National Policy Papers: Procedures and Annotated Standard Outline,” 17 

Jun 65, JCS 2101/522-3, Joint Master File 9105 (23 Mar 65), Record Group 218, NARA II.

17. Back at the Pentagon, Wheeler quipped that they were served tough liver.

18. David C. Humphrey, “Tuesday Lunch at the Johnson White House: A Preliminary Assessment,” Diplomatic History, Winter 1984, pp. 81–101. Dr. Humphrey counted between 155 and 
264

Notes to Pages 7–12

160 meetings, not always on Tuesday. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 

chap. 1. Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 359–360. 

Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 457. The notetaker 

was Deputy Press Secretary Tom Johnson.

19. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 33 (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Historian, Dept. of State, 2004), pp. 111–120, 123, 126–130, 277–279, 289–299.

20. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 1. “Reminiscences of 

Adm. McDonald,” p. 409.

21. Records of Tuesday Lunch and other White House meetings in 1968 are printed in FRUS: 

1964–1968, vol. 5.

22. JSCP-69, circulated via SM-863-67 to CSA et al., 23 Dec 67, JCS 1844/488, and Encl C, JMF 

510 (4 Dec 67).

23. JCSM-514-66 to SecDef, 16 Aug 66, JCS 1920/18, JMF 3110 (27 Jul 66).

24. The sixteen included: Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces; General Purpose Forces; 

Land Forces; Tactical Air Forces; Antisubmarine Warfare Forces; Escort Ship Forces; Amphibious Forces; Mobility Forces; NATO Strategy and Force Structure; and Asia Strategy and Force 

Structure.

25. New obligational authority refers to the amount appropriated by Congress, including cash 

and new contract authorizations, minus appropriations to meet commitments such as previously 

unfinanced contract authorizations falling due during the current fiscal year. Expenditure or 

outlay means payment of bills or cash withdrawals from the Treasury.

26. CNOM-293-65 to JCS, 10 Dec 65, JCS 2143/268; CSAFM-T-57-65 to JCS, 22 Dec 65; JMF 

3130 (10 Dec 65) sec. 1.

27. Note to Control Div., “JCS 2143/268,” 22 Dec 65; JCSM-15-66 to SecDef, 10 Jan 66, JCS 

2143/268-1; JMF 3130 (10 Dec 65) sec. 1. In 1967, for JSOP 69-76, Parts I-V were presented as 

“Volume I”; Part VI became “Volume II.”

28. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 459–468.

29. The Joint Chiefs’ differences with McNamara are described in Foreign Relations: 1964–

1968, vol. 10, pp. 625–640. Johnson’s words appear in ibid., p. 646.

30. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 9.

31. Gen. Johnson made this remark during a 1979 interview with W. S. Poole.

32. The second and third sentences in para (2) were added at Gen. Wheeler’s instigation. JCS 

2143/233, 15 Jul 64; Chairman’s Flimsy 13-64 to JCS, 22 Jul 64; JMF 3130 (15 Jul 64) sec. 1. CF-17-64 

to JCS, 30 Jul 64; Note to Control Div., Jt. Secretariat, “JCS 2143/233 (JSOP-70 Parts I-V),” 5 Aug 

64; Decision On JCS 2143/233, Parts I-V of JSOP-70, 5 Aug 64; same file, sec. 2.

33. Cited in JCSM-221-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2101/540-2, JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) sec. 2.

34. JCSM-866-65 to SecDef, 8 Dec 65, JCS 2458/42-8, JMF 7000 (24 Nov 65) sec. 2.

35. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Historian, Dept. of State, 1996), p. 567. JCSM-866-65 to SecDef, 8 Dec 65, JCS 2458/42-8, JMF 

7000 (24 Nov 65) sec. 2. Memo, CNO to CJCS, Op-00 Memo 0044-66, 3 Feb 66, Chairman’s File 

381 Plans.

36. Memo, Capt. Weinel to CJCS, “Suggested Re-evaluation of Existing Contingency Plans,” 

14 Feb 66, CJCS 381 Plans.

37. CM-1184-66 to DJS (Director, Joint Staff), 15 Feb 66; Talking Paper for CJCS, “World-Wide 

Contingency Capabilities,” n.d.; CJCS 381 Plans.
265

Notes to Pages 12–19

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Feb 66, JCS 2343/760-1, JMF 9155.3 (24 Jan 66) sec. 1. 

JCSM-130-66 to SecDef, 1 Mar 66, JCS 2343/760-5, same file, sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 

11 Apr 66, JCS 2343/760-13, same file, sec. 8.

39. Chapter 9 describes the US intervention in the Dominican Republic.

40. JSCP-68, circulated via SM-998-66 to CSA et al., 22 Dec 66, JMF 3120 (17 Dec 66).

41. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, book 3, transmitted via JCSM-167-67 to SecDef, 1 Apr 67, JMF 511 (7 

Mar 67) sec. 1C.

42. JSOP 70-77, vol. 1, part 5, circulated via SM-553-67 to CSA et al., 18 Aug 67, JCS 2143/312; 

Memo, CSA to JCS, “Volume I, Strategy, JSOP 70-77,” Aug 67; JMF 511 (27 Jul 67) sec. 1. The concept is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 602. The November discussion is 

described in JCSM-369-68 to SecDef, 14 Jun 68, JCS 2458/401-1, JMF 560 (16 May 68) sec. 1 and 

in Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 9.

43. J-5T 9-68, “Forces Available for Emergency Deployment to Southeast Asia,” 5 Feb 68, JMF 

911/374 (5 Feb 68).

44. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 645.

45. Hrgs, House Cmte. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, pt. 1, pp. 343–344.

46. JCSM-221-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2101/450-2, JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) sec. 2. Printed in 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 679–684; the quoted passage comes from pp. 683–684.

47. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 May 68, JCS 2458/401; JCSM-369-68 to SecDef, 14 Jun 68, 

JCS 2458/401-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 68, JCS 2458/401-4; JMF 560 (16 May 68) sec. 1. 

JCSM-649-68 to SecDef to CJCS, 1 Nov 68, JCS 2458/401-5, same file, sec. 2.

48. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 773.

Chapter 2. Strategic Nuclear Forces: The End of US Superiority

1. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1961–1963, vol. 8 (Washington, DC: State Dept. 

Historical Office, 1996), p. 549.

2. J. C. Hopkins and Sheldon A. Goldberg, The Development of Strategic Air Command: 1946-

1986 (Office of the Historian, HQ, SAC), pp. 124–125. When 1965 began, SAC also had 99 Atlas 

and 54 Titan I ICBMs in service; these first-generation missiles, unprotected and liquid-fuelled, 

were retired later that year, as were most of the B-47s. The Polaris figure comes from Foreign 

Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 10 (Washington, DC: State Dept. Historical 

Office, 2002), p. 288. NIE 11-8-65 is printed in ibid., pp. 263–265.

3. These figures are cited in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, pp. 177, 192, 199, and 288.

4. Bernard C. Nalty, “USAF Ballistic Missile Programs, 1964–1966” (Office of Air Force History), p. 4, National Security Archive online.

5. Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study in Defense Decision-Making (Cambridge, 

Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 4–7.

6. Nalty, “USAF Ballistic Missile Programs, 1964–1966,” pp. 34-35.

7. The 1,200 figure is cited in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 192. All 41 boats were 

scheduled to be in commission by 1967. Ibid, p. 354.

8. SM-175-65 to CINCAL et al., 24 Feb 65, JMF 3130 (1 Feb 65) sec. 1A. JCSM-131-65 to SecDef, 

1 Mar 65, JCS 2143/248; CM-461-65 to SecDef, 3 Mar 65, same file, sec. 1.

9. US figures are cited in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 288.
266

Notes to Pages 19–22

10. The methodology underlying these calculations is explained in Alain C. Enthoven and K. 

Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Enthoven was Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) from September 1965 until January 1969. His office 

prepared the DPMs dealing with strategic offensive and defensive forces.

11. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 14 Jul 65, JCS 1800/961, JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 1. General 

Dynamics, prime contractor for the F–111, had begun exploring a strategic bomber variant 

in 1963. OSD analysts concluded that FB–111s carrying short-range attack missiles offered a 

cheaper alternative than either modifying older B–52s or restarting B–58 production. The Air 

Force, wanting at least an interim bomber, approved FB–111 development in June 1965.

12. JCSM-626-665 to SecDef, 13 Aug 65, JCS 1800/961-1, JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 1. DOD 

Directive 3200.9, issued in July 1965, broke the acquisition process into three phases: first, “concept formulation” beginning with validation of the requirement, moving next from exploratory 

development into advanced development covering all components and subsystem hardware 

that were undergoing experimental tests, then culminating with preparation of a technical 

development plan; second, “contract definition,” in which approval of the plan would be followed by engineering development; and third, “development,” meaning that following approval 

for production and deployment, the operational development of systems, support programs, 

vehicles, and weapons would begin.

13. Greenwood, Making the MIRV, p. 7. The DPM of 1 November is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 284-321.

14. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 Oct 65, JCS 1800/961-4; Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 

Nov 65, JCS 1800/961-7; JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 2. Intelligence estimates are printed in Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 288.

15. These figures are cited in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 317.

16. JCSM-778-65 to SecDef, 23 Oct 65, JCS 1800/961-5; CSAFM-H-36-65 to JCS, 24 Nov 65, JCS 

1800/961-9; JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 2. Memo, ASD(Compt.) to SecAF, 15 Dec 65, 2nd N/H of JCS 

1800/961, 27 Dec 65; same file, sec. 1. McNamara also rejected a JCS reclama against ending 

the B–52 airborne alert, which he believed Minuteman and Polaris deployments had rendered 

unnecessary. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 334.

17. JCSM-167-66 and CM-1279-66 to SecDef, 22 Mar 66, JCS 2143/277, JMF 3130 (10 Feb 66) 

sec. 1. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, same file, sec. 1B.

18. Figures are given in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 317.

19. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Jan 66, JCS 2056/437, JMF 3340 (22 Jan 66) sec. 1. Printed in 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 339–341.

20. CJCS Special Studies Group, “Alternative Strategic Force Applications,” 15 Jun 66, JMF 

3340 (22 Jan 66) sec. 1A. CM-1547-66 to SecDef, 20 Jun 66, JCS 2056/437-2; JCSM-461-66 to SecDef, 

13 Jul 66, JCS 2056/437-7; same file, sec. 1. OSD concurrence was given in Memo, DepSecDef to 

CJCS, 24 Sep 66, JCS 2056/437-8, same file, sec. 1.

21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 27 Jul 66, JCS 2458/115, JMF 7130 (27 Jul 66) sec. 1. The 

number of SLBMs actually online would not reach 656 because submarines would have to be 

put in drydock for lengthy conversions.

22. In a recent war game, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha and the Joint War 

Games Agency in Washington had calculated fatalities under conditions of US pre-emption to 

be 85 to 87 million Americans and 103 to 105 million Soviets. If the Soviets struck first, fatalities 

would be 98 to 103 million for the US and 83 to 99 million for the USSR. “Briefing of the Report 

of the SIOP-4 War Game,” 2 Jul 66, JMF 386 (27 Feb 67) sec. 1A.
267

Notes to Pages 22–28

23. JCSM-555-66 to SecDef, 31 Aug 66, JCS 2458/115-2, JMF 7130 (27 Jul 66) sec. 1. Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 Nov 66, JCS 2458/115-7; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 10 Feb 67, JCS 

2458/115-17; same file, sec. 3.

24. Chapter 3 fully covers the ABM debate.

25. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 459-461, 465-466.

26. CM-1749-66 to JCS, 15 Sep 66, JCS 2101/534, JMF 4610 (15 Sep 66) sec. 1. Rpt by CJCS 

Special Studies Group, “Implications of Strategic Nuclear Force Relationship,” 15 Nov 66, same 

file, sec. 1A. JCSM-791-66 to SecDef, 29 Dec 66, JCS 2101/534-6, same file, sec. 1.

27. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Jan 67, JCS 2101/534-7, JMF 4610 (15 Sep 66) sec. 1.

28. Ltr, DSTP to DJS, 5 Apr 66, JMF 3105 (23 Mar 66).

29. Dec On JCS 2056/442-2, 18 May 66; SM-43-66 to DSTP, 19 May 66, JCS 2056/442-2; JMF 

3105 (12 Apr 66) sec. 1.

30. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Aug 66, JCS 2056/451; JCS 2056/451-1, 10 Sep 66; CSAFM-B-54-66 

to JCS, 16 Sep 66; CSAM-424-66 to JCS, 20 Sep 66; CNOM-180-66 to JCS, n.d.; JMF 3340 (4 Aug 66).

31. JCSM-599-66 to SecDef, 22 Sep 66, JCS 2056/451-1, JMF 3340 (4 Aug 66). Available records 

indicate that McNamara did not pursue the matter any further.

32. Encl C to JCS 2056/446-2, 7 Sep 66; SM-754-66 to DSTP, 15 Sep 66, JCS 2056/442-2; JMF 

3105 (21 Jun 66) sec. 1.

33. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bk. 2, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec. 1, pt. 1. Transmitted via JCSM-179-67 to 

SecDef, 19 Apr 67, JCS 2143/302, same file, sec. 1.

34. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 24 Sep 66, JCS 2056/437-8, JMF 3340 (22 Jan 66) sec. 1. CJCS 

Special Studies Group, “Alternative Strategic Force Applications—Phase II,” 15 May 67, same 

file, sec. 1B. CM-235-67 to SecDef, 23 May 67, JCS 2056/437-11; JCSM-354-67 to SecDef, 21 Jun 

67, JCS 2056/437-16; same file, sec. 1.

35. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Aug 67, JCS 2458/272, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 1 (IR 1952).

36. JCSM-481-67 to SecDef, 28 Aug 67, JCS 2458/272-2, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 1.

37. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 2 Oct 67, JCS 2458/272-8, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 2. 

Memo, SecDef to SecAF, 4 Oct 67, JCS 2458/147-14, JMF 484 (20 Sep 67). CM-2724-67 to SecDef, 

4 Nov 67, JCS 2458/272-9; CM-2764-67 to SecDef, 15 Nov 67, JCS 2458/309-2, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) 

sec. 2.

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Nov 67, JCS 2458/309, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 2. CM-2789-67 to 

SecDef, 27 Nov 67, JCS 2458/312-2, JMF 570 (6 Nov 67).

39. Minuteman and Polaris-to-Poseidon conversions would take some ICBMs and SLBMs 

offline.

40. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 623–627, 642–643.

41. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 1, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1. Transmitted via JCSM-196-68 to 

SecDef, 2 Apr 68, same file, sec. 1A.

42. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Jul 68, JCS 2458/428, JMF 560 (29 Jul 68). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 709–732. The US figure of 1,054 appears in ibid., p. 659.

43. OSD analysts had reduced the criteria for assured destruction from 30 percent down to 

20-25 percent of the Soviet population. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 283.

44. “Pindown” could be accomplished by detonating warheads well above the silos, creating 

a radiation barrier through which US missiles could not safely pass. Bernard Nalty, “USAF Ballistic Missile Programs, 1967–1968” (Office of Air Force History), pp. 34–35, National Security 

Archive online.
268

Notes to Pages 28–34

45. JCSM-520-68 to SecDef, 26 Aug 68, JCS 2458/428-1, JMF 560 (29 Jul 68). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 734–737. Concurrently, in vol. 1 of JSOP 71-78, the Joint 

Chiefs stated that the Soviets were “attempting to achieve a superior posture.” The J–5 draft had 

said simply that the Soviets were “attempting to improve their strategic posture.” The change 

in language came about at Gen. McConnell’s urging. Interestingly, during the drafting of JSOP 

70-77, McConnell had tried and failed to add a statement that “the Soviets could be seeking, over 

the long term, . . . a credible first strike capability against the United States.” JSOP 71-78, vol. 1, 

circulated via SM-456-68 to CSA et al., 26 Jul 68; CSAFM-28-68 to JCS, 26 Jun 68; JMF 511 (13 

Jun 68) sec. 1. CSAFM-B-26-67 to JCS, 8 Aug 67, JMF 511 (27 Jul 67) sec. 1.

46. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Jan 69, JCS 2458/428-7, JMF 560 (28 Jul 68) sec. 4.

47. Development of Strategic Air Command: 1946–1986, p. 151. In 1969, the first FB–111A 

entered service but the program was pared back to 60. The last B–58 was retired in 1970 and 

SCAD was terminated in 1973.

48. Dept. of State Bulletin, 9 Oct 67, p. 446.

49. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 712. Dept. of State Bulletin, 3 Jul 72, pp. 9–10.

50. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 613-614. The Joint Chiefs repeated parts of this 

memo in JCSM-520-68, 26 August 1968, described above. Brown served as Director of Defense 

Research and Engineering during 1961–65, Secretary of the Air Force during 1965–69, and 

Secretary of Defense during 1977–81.

51. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 740–741.

Chapter 3. Losing the ABM Debate

1. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 490–494. Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983 (University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 17–39, provides 

an overview of ABM issues.

2. JCSM-131-65 to SecDef, 1 Mar 65, JCS 2143/248; CM-461-65 to SecDef, 3 Mar 65; JMF 3130 

(1 Feb 65).

3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jul 65, JCS 1800/961; JCSM-626-65 to SecDef, 13 Aug 65, JCS 

1800/961-1; JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 1.

4. DEPEX is described in Encl E to JCS 2012/257-2, JMF 4714 (1 Oct 65).

5. In fact, the Chinese deployed their missiles in mountainous areas where they were hard 

to detect and destroy.

6. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 273–282.

7. The report stated that it “attempted to focus on the technical aspects of the problem” but 

“recognizes . . . that some of the broader issues . . . must weigh heavily in any final decision on 

deployment.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 275.

8. JCSM-807-65 to SecDef, 6 Nov 65, JCS 2012/259-2, JMF 4714 (1 Oct 65). Printed in Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 322-324.

9. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Nov 65, JCS 1800/967-1, JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 2. Printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 284–321.

10. “Nike-X,” 8 Dec 65, Att to Memo, Capt. L. L. Meier to BG Forbes, 9 Dec 65, JMF 4714 (1 

Oct 65).

11. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, “Nike-X,” 17 Jan 66, JMF 4714 (1 Oct 65).

12. JCSM-167-66 to SecDef, 22 Mar 66, JCS 2143/277, JMF 3130 (10 Feb 66) sec. 1. JSOP 68-75, 

pt. 6, 22 Mar 66, same file, sec. 1B.
269

Notes to Pages 34–39

13. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Jul 66, JCS 2458/115, JMF 7130 (27 Jul 66) sec. 1.

14. JCSM-555-66 to SecDef, 31 Aug 66, JCS 2458/115-2, JMF 7130 (27 Jul 66) sec. 1.

15. The National Intelligence Estimate issued on 17 November is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 446–450. The Tallinn Line might have been designed to intercept 

Polaris A-1 missiles launched in the Barents Sea and passing over Estonia en route to targets 

in the USSR. Baucom, Origins of SDI, p. 30.

16. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, “Production and Deployment of the Nike-X,” 28 Nov 66, Att 

to CM-1961-66 to JCS and DJS, 29 Nov 66, JCS 2012/283, JMF 3212 (28 Nov 66).

17. JCSM-742-66 to SecDef, 2 Dec 66, JCS 2012/283-1, JMF 3212 (28 Nov 66). Printed in Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 458.

18. Several days later, the Director of Central Intelligence backed McNamara’s argument. 

Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 11 (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Historian, Dept. of State, 1997), pp. 411–412.

19. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 459–464.

20. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 22 Dec 66; JCSM-804-67 to SecDef, 29 Dec 66, JCS 2012/283-

2, JMF 3212 (28 Nov 66). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 483–486, 508-511, 519–520, 

526–533. Through a memorandum to the President dated 17 January, McNamara formally stated 

this position. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 421–423.

21. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1967, p. 48. Hearings, DOD Appropriations 

for 1968, H. Com on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 199–201.

22. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bk. 2, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec. 1, pt. 1. Foreign Relations of the United 

States: 1964–1968, vol. 14 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2001), p. 529.

23. Negotiation of the NPT is described in chap. 5.

24. JCSM-425-67 to SecDef, 27 Jul 67, JCS 2012/308-1, JMF 485 (23 Jun 67). Printed in Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 562–564.

25. ABM Research and Development at Bell Laboratories: Project History, October 1975, 

pt. 1, pp. 44–45.

26. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 2 Aug 67, JCS 2458/272, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 1.

27. The pin-down phenomenon made missiles liable to destruction if they were launched 

into an atmosphere filled with debris created by high-altitude nuclear explosions. The Joint 

Strategic Target Planning Staff developed a “control time launch” concept designed to minimize 

this vulnerability. It was hoped that, by 1972, most ICBMs could be hardened against pin-down 

effects. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Nov 67, JCS 2056/470; JCSM-652-67 to SecDef, 22 Nov 67, JCS 

2056/470-1; JMF 480 (1 Nov 67) sec.1.

28. JCSM-481-67 to SecDef, 28 Aug 67, JCS 2458/272-2, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 1.

29. Dept. of State Bulletin, 9 Oct 67, p. 450.

30. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 645. “Record of Decision” DPM, 15 Jan 68, JCS 

2458/272-10, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 3. Printed in ibid., pp. 655-674.

31. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Jul 68, JCS 2458/428, JMF 560 (29 Jul 68) sec. 1. Printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 709–732. According to a National Intelligence 

Estimate issued in October, ABM defenses around Moscow had “probably achieved some 

operational capability.” It appeared unlikely that the Tallinn Line in the northwestern USSR, now 

identified as a long-range SAM system, would be modified for an ABM role. Ibid., pp. 753–755.

32. JCSM-520-68 to SecDef, 26 Aug 68, JCS 2458/428-1, JMF 560 (29 Jul 68) sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 9 Jan 69, JCS 2458/428-7, same file, sec. 1, pt. 4. On 1 December 1968, continental 

defense forces included 304 manned interceptors in seventeen squadrons (six of F–101s, one of 
270

Notes to Pages 40–44

F–102, one of F–104s, and nine of F–106s), plus substantial numbers of Hawks and Nike-Hercules 

SAMs. CONAD Command History: 1968, pp. xv, xvi.

33. Baucom, Origins of SDI, pp. 39–50.

Chapter 4. The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

1. Figures are from JCSM-221-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2101/540-2, JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) 

sec. 2. Usually, three USAF tactical fighter squadrons comprised a wing.

2. Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1950–1952, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 1998), p. 63.

3. During July and August 1950, the Army called up 93,586 officers and enlisted men from 

reserve components, including four National Guard divisions, for 21 months. The Air Force 

activated 49,672 reservists. By the end of 1950, 167,000 veterans enrolled in the Army’s inactive 

reserve had been mobilized. Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951 (University Press 

of Kansas, 2010), pp. 204, 155.

4. JSOP-70, pt. 6, vol. 2, sec. B, JMF 3130 (1 Feb 65) sec. 1A. Transmitted via JCSM-131-65 to 

SecDef, 1 Mar 65, JCS 2143/248; CM-461-65 to SecDef, 3 Mar 65; same file, sec. 1.

5. Concurrently, the Army Staff concluded that a five-division force would be required in 

South Vietnam—one to help hold the Central Highlands and coastal enclaves, four to interdict 

infiltration routes from the North. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 246.

6. ROAD (Reorganization Objective, Army Division) with three brigades and six to fifteen 

battalions had replaced the smaller and less powerful “pentomic” division built tailored for 

tactical nuclear combat and built around five battle groups of 1,350 men each.

7. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 8 Jul 65, JCS 1800/954; JCSM-596-65 to SecDef, 31 Jul 65, JCS 

1800/954-1; JMF 7000 (8 Jul 65).

8. John M. Carland, Stemming the Tide (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2000), pp. 22, 33, 37, 46. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, pp. 290, 297. If South Korea did not 

supply nine battalions, which in fact it did, the US number would have been 43.

9. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 304. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, 

vol. 3 (Washington, DC; Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1996), pp. 171-179. General Wheeler 

interviewed by Dorothy P. McSweeny, 21 Aug 69, pp. 18–19, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

10. Emphasis on Marine Corps issues derives from the fact that General Greene kept a 

detailed daily record while General Johnson did not.

11. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 3, pp. 193, 211, 204. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 

pp. 316–317, 321–322. Actually, the 1st Cavalry Division required a sizeable infusion of personnel, mainly from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 55–57.

12. General Johnson interviewed by W. S. Poole on 3 May 79, JHO.

13. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, pp. 317–318.

14. A Marine division/wing team usually came under the operational control of a Marine 

Expeditionary Force. In Vietnam, MEF was changed to Marine Amphibious Force to avoid any 

association with the French Expeditionary Force of the earlier war. Thus the 3rd Marine Division was under operational control of III MAF. Definitions provided by Dr. Graham Cosmas.

15. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 3, pp. 411-412. JCSM-721-65 to SecDef, 24 Sep 65, JCS 

2343/640-1, JMF 9155.3 (23 Jul 65) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 13 Oct 65, JCS 1800/954-2; 

JCSM-770-65 to SecDef, 20 Oct 65, JCS 1800/954-3; JMF 7000 (8 Jul 65) sec. 3.
271

Notes to Pages 40–49

16. Chapter 9 describes the Dominican intervention.

17. Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 68–69. JCSM-814-65 to SecDef, 10 Nov 65, JCS 2343/640-

2, JMF 9155.3 (23 Jul 65) sec. 2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Nov 65, JCS 2458/42, JMF 7000 (24 

Nov 65).

18. JSOP-70, pt. 6, vol. 2, sec. B, JMF 3130 (1 Feb 65) sec. 1A. Transmitted via JCSM-131-65 to 

SecDef, 1 Mar 65, JCS 2143/248; CM-461-65 to SecDef, 3 Mar 65; JMF 3130 (1 Feb 65).

19. These figures, taken from the November DPM, are a bit higher than those in the June 

paper. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, n.d., JCS 1800/953-5, 2 Nov 65, JMF 7000 (6 Jul 65) sec. 2.

20. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 26 Jun 65, JCS 1800/949, JMF 7000 (26 Jun 65) sec. 1. Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS, 6 Jul 65, JCS 1800/953, JMF 7000 (6 Jul 65) sec. 1. JCSM-595-65 to SecDef, 31 

Jul 65, JCS 1800/953-1, JMF 7000 (26 Jun 65) sec. 1. JCSM-570-65 to SecDef, 23 Jul 65, JMF 7000 

(26 Jun 65) sec. 1. The Navy advocated, and the JCS supported, having nuclear-powered rather 

than oil-fired carriers. OSD balked at first, citing higher initial costs. McNamara began relenting when it appeared possible to run a carrier with two nuclear reactors rather than four with 

shorter-lived nuclear fuel cores. He finally accepted nuclear-powered carriers only after tough 

bargaining with the JCS that involved other issues. Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear 

Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 133–146. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Sep 

65, JCS 1800/949-3, JMF 7000 (26 Jun 65) sec. 2. Information from Dr. Edward Drea.

21. The A–4 was a subsonic attack aircraft.

22. JCSM-814-65 to SecDef, 10 Nov 65, JCS 2343/640-2, JMF 9155.3 (23 Jul 65) sec. 2.

23. Memo, SecDef to Pres, n.d., JCS 2458/42-7, 7 Dec 65, JMF 7000 (24 Nov 65) sec. 2.

24. JSOP-70, pt. 6, sec. B, 1 Mar 65, JMF 3130 (1 Mar 65) sec. 1A.

25. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 65, JCS 2458/4, JMF 7000 (4 Oct 65).

26. JSOP-70, pt. 6, vol. 2, sec. B, JMF 3130 (1 Feb 65) sec. 1A.

27. In the final DPM, these figures became 80 percent and 16 percent for the Barents barriers, 

55 percent and 25 percent for the Pacific ones.

28. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Jun 65, JCS 1800/950, JMF 7000 (28 Jun 65) sec. 1.

29. JCSM-576-65 to SecDef, 24 Jul 65, JCS 1800/950-1, JMF 7000 (28 Jun 65) sec. 1. Draft 

Memo, SecDef to Pres, n.d., JCS 1800/950-7, same file, sec. 2. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, n.d., 

JCS 1800/949-6, JMF 7000 (26 Jun 65) sec. 3.

30. Memo, D. F. Hornig to Pres, 14 Dec 65, JCS 1800/950-9, JMF 7000 (28 Jun 65) sec. 2. Hearings, DOD Appropriations for FY 1967, Senate Cmtes. on Appropriations and Armed Services, 

89th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 11.

31. JSOP-70, pt. 6, vol. 2, sec. B, JMF 3130 (1 Mar 65) sec. 1A. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Jun 

65, JCS 1800/937; JCSM-531-65 to SecDef, 6 Jul 65, JCS 1800/937-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 

Sep 65, JCS 1800/937-1; Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, n.d., JCS 1800/937-3; JMF 7000 (3 Nov 65). 

JCSM-814-65 to SecDef, 10 Nov 65, JCS 2343/640-2, JMF 9155.3 (23 Jul 65) sec. 3.

32. JCSM-866-65 to SecDef, 8 Dec 65, JCS 2458/42-8, JMF 7000 (24 Nov 65) sec. 2. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 3, pp. 591-593, 615-619.

33. Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 152–157.

34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Feb 66, JCS 2343/760-1, JMF 9155.3 (24 Jan 66) sec.1. 

JCSM-130-66 to SecDef, 1 Mar 66, JCS 2343/760-5, same file, sec. 3.

35. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 11 Apr 66, JCS 2343/760-13, JMF 9155.3 (24 Jan 66) sec. 8.

36. Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 165-166. George L. MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive 

(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 13–14.

37. JCSM-590-66 to SecDef, 15 Sep 66, JCS 2458/127, JMF 7130 (19 Aug 66) sec. 1.
272

Notes to Pages 50–54

38. JCSM-646-66 to SecDef, 7 Oct 66, JCS 2343/887-2, JMF 9155 (24 Aug 66) sec. 2. In October, 

on its own initiative, Congress passed legislation authorizing the President to call up reserves 

without declaring a state of national emergency.

39. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 28 Nov 66, JCS 2458/127-6, JMF 7130 (19 Aug 

66) sec. 3. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 465-467, 482. Hrgs, Senate Cmte on Armed 

Services, DOD Appropriation for FY 1968, 90th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 15–16.

40. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, vol. 2, App F, JMF 3130 (10 Feb 66) sec. 1C. JCSM-167-66 to SecDef, 22 

Mar 66, JCS 2143/277; CM-1279-66 to SecDef, 22 Mar 66; same file, sec. 2.

41. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Jul 66, JCS 2458/112, JMF 7130 (22 Jul 66) sec. 1.

42. CSAM-375-66 to JCS, 18 Aug 66; JCSM-534-66 to SecDef, 24 Aug 66, JCS 2458/112-1; JMF 

7130 (22 Jul 66) sec. 1.

43. This is described in chap. 7.

44. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 3 Oct 66, JCS 2458/112-4, JMF 7130 (22 Jul 66) sec. 3. 

45. JCSM-646-66 to SecDef, 7 Oct 66, JCS 2343/887-2, JMF 9155 (24 Aug 66) sec. 2.

46. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, vol. 2, sec. B, App F, JMF 3130 (10 Feb 66) sec. 1C. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 

5 Aug 66, JCS 2458/120, JMF 7130 (5 Aug 66) sec. 1. In FY 1968, according to OSD calculations, 

two divisions and 596,000 tons of supplies could be moved to Europe within thirty days; in FY 

1972, 5 1/3 divisions and 964,000 tons.

47. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, vol. 2, transmitted via JCSM-167-66 to SecDef, 22 Mar 66, JMF 3130 (10 

Feb 66) sec. 2. JCSM-565-66 to SecDef, 8 Sep 66, JCS 2458/120-1, JMF 7130 (5 Aug 66) sec. 1. 

Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 1 Oct 66, JCS 2458/120-5, same file, sec. 5.

48. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, vol. 2, transmitted via JCSM-167-66 to SecDef, 22 Mar 66, JMF 3130 (10 

Feb 66) sec. 2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Aug 66, JCS 2458/121, JMF 7130 (6 Aug 66) sec. 1. During 

FY 1968, one ASW carrier would serve in an attack role off North Vietnam.

49. In April, the ASW Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee had contradicted 

Navy and OSD assessments by concluding that “our overall ASW capability is very poor in 

relation to what we should expect from a program which costs the nation approximately $3 

billion per year. The principal reason seems to us to be an inability to take full advantage of 

the technical opportunities available to us, which is directly traceable to management policy 

which in effect gives excessive emphasis to quantity, to the relative neglect of quality ... in force 

development.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 378, 385.

50. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Jul 66, JCS 2458/112; JCSM-534-66 to SecDef, 24 Aug 66, JCS 

2458/112-1; JMF 7130 (22 Jul 66) sec. 1.

51. These ships would have ASW plus anti-air capability along with enough speed to accompany fast carriers, as distinct from smaller ASW destroyers designed mainly to protect slower 

convoys.

52. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 467–468, 482. Hrgs., H. Cmte. On Approps, 90th

Cong, 1st sess., DOD Appropriations for 1968, pt. 2, pp. 307, 310.

53. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Jun 66, JCS 2458/102; JCSM-485-66 to SecDef, 29 Jul 66, JCS 

2458/102-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 22 Aug 66, JCS 2458/102-3; JMF 7130 (28 Jun 66). In FY 

1968, there would be 165 amphibious assault and six gunfire support ships; in FY 1969, dropping 

the Southeast Asia augmentation, 138 and six.

54. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bk. 3, 7 Mar 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec 1C. The Army had enough independent brigades to allow 26 division-equivalents.

55. Graham A. Cosmas, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 

3 (Washington, DC; Joint History Office, 2009), p. 44.
273

Notes to Pages 54–60 

56. Cosmas, JCS and the War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 3, pp. 47-53. JCSM-288-67 to SecDef, 

20 May 67, JCS 2101/538-3, JMF 372 (18 Mar 67) sec. 3.

57. Yet the NATO DPM circulated almost simultaneously claimed that prompt mobilization 

could keep Allied Command Europe abreast of the Warsaw Pact, and it listed three US reserve 

divisions among the available reinforcements. The discrepancy went undetected, probably 

because the DPMs were drafted by different offices in OSD and reviewed by different offices 

in the Joint Staff.

58. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 May 67, JCS 2458/243, JMF 560 (29 May 67) sec. 1.

59. JCSM-368-67 to SecDef, 24 Jun 67, JCS 2458/243-7, JMF 560 (29 May 67) sec. 2.

60. Cosmas, JCS and the War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 3, pp. 64–65. A wing usually consisted of three squadrons.

61. CSAM-261-67 to SecDef, 31 Jul 67, JCS 2101/539; JCS 2101/539-2, 14 Aug 67; CSAFM-B-41-67 

to JCS, 15 Aug 67; Notes to Control Div., “JCS 2101/539-2, Strategic Reserve Reconstitution,” 15, 

16, and 18 Aug 67; JMF 373 (31 Jul 67). The date of decision to activate the 6th Division was provided by John Wilson, Center of Military History. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 

9 Jan 68, JCS 2458/243-23, JMF 560 (29 May 67) sec. 6.

62. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bks. 4 and 5, 7 Mar 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) secs. 1D and 1E.

63. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Jun 67, JCS 2458/256, JMF 560 (23 Jun 67) sec. 1.

64. JCSM-417-67 to SecDef, 22 Jul 67, JCS 2458/265-5, JMF 560 (23 Jun 67) sec. 2.

65. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Jan 68, JCS 2458/252-5, JMF 560 (16 Jun 67).

66. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bk. 5, 7 Mar 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec. 1F.

67. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jul 67, JCS 2458/263, JMF 560 (14 Jul 67) sec. 1.

68. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 3 Jan 68, JCS 2458/263-8, JMF 560 (14 Jul 

67) sec. 3.

69. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bk. 5, 7 Mar 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec. 1E. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 

Aug 67, JCS 2458/273, JMF 567 (2 Aug 67) sec. 1. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 12 

Jan 68, JCS 2458/273-6, same file, sec. 2.

70. JCSM-479-67 to SecDef, 26 Aug 67, JCS 2458/273, JMF 567 (2 Aug 67) sec. 1.

71. Memo, SecDef to SecNav, 26 Aug 67, JCS 2458/279; “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef 

to Pres, 5 Jan 68, JCS 2458/279-7; JMF 465 (24 Aug 67).

72. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bk. 5, 7 Mar 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec. 1E. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 

Jun 67, JCS 2458/252, JMF 560 (16 Jun 67).

73. JCSM-396-67 to SecDef, 13 Jul 67, JCS 2458/252-1, JMF 560 (16 Jun 67).

74. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Jan 68, JCS 2458/252-2, JMF 560 (16 Jun 67).

75. J-5T 9-68, “Forces Available for Emergency Deployment to Southeast Asia,” 5 Feb 68, 

JMF 911/374 (5 Feb 68).

76. Cosmas, JCS and the War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 3, pp. 150–156. JCSM-96-68 to 

SecDef, 13 Feb 68, JCS 2472/231, JMF 911/374 (5 Feb 68).

77. Cosmas, JCS and the War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 3, pp. 157-160. Foreign Relations 

of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: State Dept. Historical Office, 2002), 

pp. 263–266, 274.

78. Cosmas, JCS and the War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 3, pp. 161-–172. Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 6, pp. 399–400. These additions raised US personnel in Vietnam to a peak of 

549,500.

79. The origin and execution of “Reforger” are described in chap. 6.
274

Notes to Pages 60–64

80. DJSM-380-68 to JCS, 2 Apr 68. CSAM-173-68 to JCS, 3 Apr 68, JCS 2101/542; Note to Control, “Strategic Army Forces,” 3 Apr 68, JCS 2101/542; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 4 Apr 68, JCS 

2101/542-2; JCSM-215-68 to SecDef, 6 Apr 68, JCS 2101/542-1; JMF 379 (3 Apr 68).

81. MFR by SJCS, “Possible Actions to Increase Worldwide US and Allied Military Strength,” 

5 Feb 68, JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) sec. 1. JCS 2101/540-1, 12 Mar 68; Note to Control, “JCS 2101/540-1,” 

14 Mar 68; JCSM-221-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2101/540-2; JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) sec. 2. Subsequently, Clifford inquired what further forces could be sent to Vietnam if the enemy launched 

another major offensive. The JCS listed four Army brigades, none sustainable on a permanent 

basis. The Marine Corps could make 1 1/9 division/wing teams available by revising rotation 

policies and extending tours of duty. For a 30-day surge, the Navy could furnish two attack 

carriers, two cruisers, and six destroyers. The Air Force’s capability was limited to two F–100 

squadrons. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 May 68, JCS 2472/291; JCSM-315-68 to SecDef, 21 May 68, 

JCS 2472/291-1; JMF 911/372 (13 May 68). The enemy did launch offensives in May and August, 

each weaker than the last. By the end of August, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were 

pulling back while US and allied forces prepared to take the initiative. Cosmas, JCS and the 

War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 3, p. 203.

82. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 3, 15 Mar 68, JCS 2143/324, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1C.

83. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 May 68, JCS 245/406, JMF 560 (28 May 68) sec. 1. In How 

Much Is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 94, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith 

highlight a budget-trimming imperative in the decision to inactivate the 6th Division.

84. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 11 Jan 69, JCS 2458/406-

10, JMF 560 (28 May 68) sec. 3.

85. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bks. 4 and 5, 15 Mar 68, JCS 2143.324, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) secs. 1D 

and 1E.

86. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 23 Jul 68, JCS 2458/426, JMF 560 (23 Jul 68) sec. 1.

87. JCSM-510-68 to SecDef, 21 Aug 68, JCS 2458/426-3, JMF 560 (23 Jul 68) sec. 2. “Tentative 

Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 13 Jan 69, JCS 2458/426-7, same file, sec. 3.

88. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 6, 15 Mar 68, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1F. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 

7 Jun 68, JCS 2450/411, JMF (7 Jun 68) sec. 1. JSOP and DPM airlift figures cannot be compared 

because the former used UE and the latter AAI.

89. JCSM-430-68 to SecDef, 8 Jul 68, JCS 2458/411-2, JMF 560 (12 Jun 68) sec. 1. NY Times, 

14 May 68, p. 1. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 14 Jan 69, JCS 2458/411-6, 

same file, sec. 3.

90. The OSD methodology is described in Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?, pp. 

225–234.

91. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 5, 15 Mar 68, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1E. Memo, DepSecDef to 

CJCS, 30 Jul 68, JCS 2458/429, JMF 560 (30 Jul 68) sec. 1. JSOP levels included a Southeast Asia 

augmentation of 15 escorts for FYs 1970-73. Because Nitze’s DPM listed only FY 1970 additions, 

the JSOP levels cited above have been similarly restricted. The same formula applies to amphibious assault forces below.

92. JCSM-578-68 to SecDef, 24 Aug 68, JCS 2458/429-1, JMF 560 (30 Jul 68) sec. 1.

93. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 15 Jan 69, JCS 2458/429-5, JMF 

560 (30 Jul 68) sec. 3.

94. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 5, 15 Mar 68, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1E. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 

6 May 68, JCS 2458/396; JCSM-337-68 to SecDef, 29 May 68, JCS 2458/396-1; “Tentative Record 

of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 6 Jan 69, JCS 2458/396-4; JMF 560 (6 May 68).
275

Notes to Pages 64–70 

95. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 5, 15 Mar 68, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1E. Memo, DepSecDef to 

CJCS, 12 Jun 68, JCS 2458/413, JMF 560 (12 Jun 68) sec. 1.

96. JCSM-434-68 to SecDef, 10 Jul 68, JCS 2458/413-2, JMF 560 (12 Jun 68) sec. 1. “Tentative 

Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Jan 69, JCS 2458/413-6, same file, sec. 2. LHA 

funding, originally programmed for FY 1968, had been postponed by Congress.

97. JCSM-548-68 to SecDef, 14 Sep 68, JCS 2147/475-1, JMF 372 (5 Sep 68).

98. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 8 Oct 68, JCS 2147/475-2, JMF 372 (5 Oct 68).

99. Ltr, Walt W. Rostow to Willard J. Webb, 13 Sep 84, JHO. Comparing Rostow’s speculation 

with General Johnson’s above shows the difficulty of identifying the President’s motives.

Chapter 5. Arms Control Inches Forward

1. Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson: 1963–1964, pp. 1673–1674. Foreign 

Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 11 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 

Dept. of State, 1997), pp. 126, 173–182. 

2. CM-450-65 to McGeorge Bundy, 24 Feb 65, copy from Lyndon B. Johnson Library in OSD 

Historical Office. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 216-217. Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 

1987), pp. 143–145. The arms control agenda stayed crowded enough that, in February 1966, 

Gen. Wheeler proposed to McNamara (1) raising the minimum time for JCS review from seven 

to fourteen days, except in unusual circumstances, and (2) placing all position papers before 

Committee members or their deputies for discussion and approval. OSD asked ACDA to put any 

new proposals formally before the Committee, thereby ensuring adequate time for review. Note 

to Control, “JCS Consideration of ACDA Proposals,” 14 Jan 66; CM-1183-66 to SecDef, 15 Feb 66, 

JCS 1731/916-1; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to Acting Dir, ACDA, 10 Feb 66, JCS 1731/916; Memo, ASD(ISA) 

to CJCS, 22 Feb 66, JCS 1731/916-1; JMF 3050 (10 Feb 66). 

3. CM-350-64 to DJS, 31 Dec 64, JCS 1731/851; JCS 1731/851-1, 15 Feb 65, and Decision On, 24 

Feb 65, JCS 1731/851-1; JMF 3050 (31 Dec 64). JCSM-348-65 to SecDef, 11 May 65, JCS 1731/851-1, 

JMF 3050 (24 Feb 65) sec. (A).

4. Memo for Record, “Mtg of the Cmte of Principals on 22 Apr 65,” JCS 1731/867-1; “Summary 

of Action, Mtg of the Cmte of Principals, Thurs, 22 Apr 65,” JCS 1731/867-2; JMF 3050 (22 Apr 

65). ACDA, Documents on Disarmament: 1965, pp. 74–75.

5. Memos, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 16 & 19 Jul 65, JCS 1731/879 and 1731/879-1; JMF 

3050 (19 Jul 65) sec. 1.

6. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Jul 65, JCS 1731/879-2; JCSM-601-65 to SecDef, 5 Aug 65, 

JCS 1731/879-3; JMF 3050 (19 Jul 65) sec. 1.

7. Ltr, SecDef to Acting Dir, ACDA, 7 Aug 65, JCS 1731/879-4, JMF 3050 (19 Jul 65) sec. 1.

8. Memo, ATSD(AE) to CJCS, 11 Aug 65, JCS 1731/886, JMF 3050 (11 Aug 65).

9. JCSM-645-65 to SecDef, 21 Aug 65, JCS 1731/886-1, JMF 3050 (11 Aug 65). Gen. Johnson 

wanted to protest “the gross violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty by the Soviets on 15 January 1965.” US monitors had detected “a certain amount of venting” caused by an underground 

test, but there were enough complicating factors for the administration to accept this as a 

miscalculation or, at least, lacking major significance. CSAM-393-65 to JCS, 20 Aug 65, same 

file. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, pp. 220–225.

10. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 1, pp. 237–243. CM-812-65 to DJS, 27 Aug 65, JCS 

1731/888; JCS 1731/888-1, 6 Dec 65, and Dec On, 5 Jan 66; JMF 3050 (27 Aug 65) sec. 1. JCSM163-66 to SecDef, 16 Mar 66, JCS 1731/888-2; JCSM-164-66 to SecState, Dir ACDA, Chm AEC, 
276

Notes to Pages 70–73

and Spec Assts to Pres for Natl. Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, 16 Mar 66; 

same file, sec. 2.

11. These were: in-silo vulnerability to blast, shock, and possibly electro-magnetic pulses; 

launch phase vulnerability to gamma and X-rays; and vulnerability of re-entry vehicles. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, p. 313.

12. Rpt of the Ad Hoc Panel to the JCS through the CSAF, “Technical Aspects of Nuclear 

Test Ban Proposals,” 14 Jan 66, CSAFM-4-34-66 to JCS, 14 Jan 66, JCS 1731/890-6, JMF 3050 

(13 Sep 65) sec. 2. Subsequently, two panel members decried a tendency in the report to take a 

“most pessimistic” view of US and a “most optimistic” view of Soviet capabilities. JCSM-77-66 

to SecDef, 3 Feb 6, JCS 1731/890-7; JCSM-78-66 to Dir, ACDA, et al., 3 Feb 66, JCS 1731-8907; 

JMF 3050 (13 Sep 65) sec. 1.

13. According to ACDA, a 4.75 reading equated to yields of 5 to 20 kilotons in hard rock and 

tuff and to more than 20 kilotons in dry alluvium.

14. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, n.d., JCS 1731/905; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 

23 Dec 65, JCS 1731/905-1; JCSM-28-66 to SecDef, 13 Jan 6, JCS 1731/905-3; JMF 3050 (17 Dec 

65) sec. 1. “Position Paper: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” n.d., JCS 1731/879-5; JCSM-37-66 

to SecDef, 15 Jan 66, JCS 1731/879-5; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 22 Jan 66, JCS 1731/905-5; same 

file, sec. 2. JCSMs 28-66 and 37-66 are printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 

282–284, 286–288.

15. Ltr, Actg Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 17 Feb 66, JCS 1731/905-6; Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of 

Principals, 26 May 66, JCS 1731/932; JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec. 2.

16. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 321-323.

17. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 May 66, JCS 1731/932-1; JCSM-379-66 to SecDef, 8 Jun 66, 

JCS 1731/932-3; JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec. 3.

18. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 9 Jun 66, JCS 1731/932-4; CM-1538-66 to SecDef, 

11 Jun 66, Att to JCS 1731/932-4, 14 Jun 66; JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec. 3. Memo, Acting Dir, ACDA, 

to Cmte of Principals, 14 Jun 66, JCS 1731/935; JCSM-407-66 to SecDef, 15 Jun 66, JCS 1731/935-

1; Ltr, Dir ACDA to SecState, 17 Jun 66; Ltr, Chmn, AEC, to Acting Dir, ACDA, 16 Jun 66, JCS 

1731/932-6; same file, sec. 4. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 334–339.

19. They were referring to a recently discovered effect in the Polaris warhead’s nuclear safing system.

20. Memo, DDR&E to SecDef, “AEDS Identification Capability Within the Kurile-Kamchatka 

Area,” 1 Nov 66; Msg, SecState 79889 to London, 5 Nov 66; JCSM-109-67 to SecDef, 27 Feb 67, 

JCS 1731/960; JMF 730 (18 Feb 67) sec. 1.

21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Mar 67, JCS 1731/960-1; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 27 Mar 67, JCS 

1731/960-2; JMF 730 (18 Feb 67) sec. 1.

22. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 492–494.

23. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Jul 68, JCS 2482/4, JMF 755 (2 Jul 68) sec. 2. Memo, Dir, 

ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 2 Jul 68, JCS 1731/999, same file, sec. 1. DJSM-867-68 to SecDef, 15 

Jul 68, JCS 2482/4; DJSM-874-68 to JCS, 16 Jul 68, JCS 2482/4-1; same file, sec. 2. Public Papers 

of the Presidents: Johnson, 1968, pp. 815–817.

24. CM-3501-68 to DJC and SAAC, 24 Jul 68, JMF 755 (2 Jul 68) sec. 1.

25. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, pp. 33–34. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, p. 53. 

Figures are given in Dept. of State Bulletin, 8 Mar 65, p. 339 and 1 Oct 65, pp. 583-584. Memo, 

Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 31 Dec 64, JCS 1731/852; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Jan 

65, JCS 1731/852-1; JMF (31 Dec 64) (1).

26. JCSM-66-65 to SecDef, 29 Jan 65, JCS 1731/852-2, JMF 3050 (31 Dec 64) (1).
277

Notes to Pages 73–78

27. Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 23 Feb 65, N/H of JCS 1731/852-2, 25 Feb 65, JMF 3050 (31 Dec 

64) (1).

28. Memo, Acting Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 5 Apr 65, JCS 1731/852-3; DJSM-441-65 

to DASD(AE), 9 Apr 65, N/H of JCS 1731/852-4, 20 Apr 65; Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 24 Apr 65, JCS 1731/852-5; JMF 3050 (31 Dec 64) 91). Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Oct 65, 

pp. 583–584.

29. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 19 Jan 66; JCSM-49-66 to SecDef, 21 Jan 66, JCS 

1731/913; JMF 3050 (19 Jan 66). Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1966, pp. 92–94. 

ACDA, Documents on Disarmament: 1966, p. 12.

30. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 626–628, ftnt. 3 on p. 696. Ltr, DepSecDef to 

Dir, ACDA, 27 Jul 68, N/H of JCS 1731/999-1, JMF 755 (2 Jul 68) sec. 1. “Interim Impact Study 

Report,” 5 Aug 68, JCS 1731/999-2, same file, sec. 1A.

31. JCSM-519-68 to SecDef, 24 Aug 68, JCS 1731/999-3, JMF 755 (2 Jul 68) sec. 1. Printed in 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 696-699. JCS views were forwarded to ACDA via Ltr, 

DASD(ISA) to Dep Dir, ACDA, 6 Sep 68, N/H of JCS 1731/999-3, same file.

32. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Nov 65, JCS 1731/900; JCSM-839-65 to SecDef, 24 Nov 65, 

JCS 1731/900-1; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 11 Jan 66, JCS 1731/900-2; JMF 9000 (16 Nov 65) sec. 1.

33. JCS 1731/900-3, 25 Jul 66; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Jul 66, JCS 1731/940; JCSM-494-

66 to SecDef, 1 Aug 66, JCS 1731/940; JMF 9000 (17 Nov 65).

34. Dept. of State Bulletin, 26 Dec 66, pp. 952–955. 

35. The treaty would not have prohibited a fractional orbital bombardment system, which 

the Soviets were pursuing but later abandoned.

36. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1967, pp. 91–92. Seaborg, Stemming the 

Tide, p. 406. Hearings, Treaty on Outer Space, Senate Cmte on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 

1st sess., pp. 82–85.

37. CM-357-65 to DJS, 4 Jan 65, JCS 1731/853, JMF 3050 (4 Jan 65) sec. 1. Joint Staff, “Study 

on Security Implications of a Nonproliferation Treaty,” 21 Apr 65, same file, sec. 1C. CM-621-65 

to SecDef, 17 May 65, JCS 1731/853-3; JCSM-375-65 to SecDef, 17 May 65, JCS 1731/853-3; same 

file, sec. 1. Gen. McConnell believed the study should have addressed, among other things, an 

appropriate US response to proliferation, the extent to which pursuit of nonproliferation would 

damage other US policies, and the acceptability of self-denial among potential nuclear states. 

Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 29 May 65, JCS 1731/853-4, same file, sec. 1.

38. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 19 Jan 65, JCS 1731/855; Memo, DASD(ISA) to 

CJCS, 27 Jan 65, JCS 1731/855-1; JCS 1731/855-2, 6 Feb 65; CF-84-65 (Rev.), 11 Feb 65; JCSM-105-

65 to SecDef, 13 Feb 65, JCS 1731/855-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Apr 65, JCS 1731/855-3; JMF 

3050 (19 Jan 65).

39. Memo for Record, “Mtg of the Cmte of Principals on 22 Apr 65,” JCS 1731/867-1; “Summary 

of Action, Mtg of the Cmte of Principals, Thurs, 22 Apr 65,” JCS 1731/867-2; JMF 3050 (22 Apr 65).

40. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 16 Jul 65, JCS 1731/878, JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65) 

sec. 1.

41. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Jul 65, JCS 1731/878-1; JCSM-602-65 to SecDef, 5 Aug 65, 

JCS 1731/878-2; JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65) sec. 1.

42. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Aug 65, JCS 1731/878-4; JCSM-677-65 to SecDef, 10 Sep 65, 

JCS 1731/878-5; JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65) sec. 1.

43. Dept. of State Bulletin, 20 Sep 65, pp. 474–475. On 8 November, the UN General Assembly 

passed without dissent a resolution urging that the NPT (1) “be void of any loopholes which 

might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear 
278

Notes to Pages 78–82

weapons in any form” and (2) “embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and 

obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.” Ibid., 20 Nov 65, p. 884.

44. Kosygin’s claim that plans for providing West Germany with access to nuclear weapons 

constituted “the main difference” between US and Soviet positions on non-proliferation, and 

Johnson’s rebuttal, are printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 277–281, 297–300.

45. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament: 1966, pp. 5-8. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 18 Feb 66, JCS 1731/918; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 19 Feb 66, JCS 1731/918-1; JCSM-138-66 

to SecDef, 4 Mar 66, JCS 1731/918-2; JMF 3050 (18 Feb 66).

46. Memo, SecState to Cmte of Principals, 24 Jun 66, JCS 1731/938; JCSM-437-66 to SecDef, 29 

Jun 66, JCS 1731/938-1; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 5 Jul 66, JCS 1731/938-2; Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, 

to SecState, 8 Jul 66, JCS 1731/938-3; JMF 3050 (24 Jun 66). 

47. Tactical aircraft and missiles were owned by the nation that bought them (e.g., West 

German F-104s); nuclear weapons, however, lay under the dual control of that country and the 

United States. Thus the US president held a veto power.

48. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 395–397.

49. DJSM-612-67 to CJCS, 16 May 67, JMF 3050 (24 Jun 66). Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Sep 

67, pp. 315–319.

50. Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to State and ISA, 6 Feb 67, JCS 1731/959; JCSM-96-67 to SecDef, 

21 Feb 67, JCS 1731/959-1; JMF 750 (2 Feb 67). Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 

1963–1964, p. 1379.

51. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 25 Nov 67, JCS 1731/989; CM-3023-68 to SecDef, 19 Feb 68, JCS 

1731/989-1; JMF 750 (2 Feb 67). Curiously, a draft CM by the Director, Joint Staff, spoke of a 

Soviet-American “impasse” over negative assurances. DJSM-173-68 to CJCS, 14 Feb 68, same file.

52. JCSM-230-68 to SecDef, 11 Apr 68, JCS 1731/994, JMF 731 (2 Apr 68).

53. Memo, PDASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Apr 68, JCS 1731/994-1; JCSM-249-68 to SecDef, 17 Apr 68, 

JCS 1731/994-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Jun 68, JCS 1731/994-2; JMF 731 (2 Apr 68).

54. Dept. of State Bulletin, 1 Jul 68, pp. 8–11, and 8 Jul 68, pp. 58–59.

55. Hearings, Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Cmte. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd

session, p. 57. The treaty text is given on pp. 258–262.

56. France did not sign the treaty but promised to honor it.

57. Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 6 Feb 64, JCS 1731/790-1; JCSM-148-64 to 

SecDef, 22 Feb 64, JCS 1731/790-4; JMF 3050 (23 Jan 64)(A). Dept. of State Bulletin, 21 Sep 64, 

pp. 413–417.

58. Memo for Record, “Mtg of the Cmte of Principals on 22 Apr 65,” JCS 1731/867-1; “Summary 

of Action, Mtg of the Cmte of Principals, Thurs, 22 Apr 65,” JCS 1731/867-2; JMF 3050 (22 Apr 65).

59. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 16 Jul 65, JCS 1731/880, JMF 3050 (20 Jul 65) 

sec. 1.

60. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Aug 65, JCS 1731/880-1; JCSM-633-65 to SecDef, 14 Aug 65, 

JCS 1731/880-2; JMF 3050 (20 Jul 65) sec. 1.

61. Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Oct 65, p. 583. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Pres, 4 Jan 66, Att to Memo, 

ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Jan 66, JCS 1731/907, JMF 3050 (5 Jan 66).

62. NIE 11-6-65 stated, “Even in the face of determined Soviet concealment efforts, there is 

a good chance that violations involving large-scale testing or deployment would be detected, 

but this cannot be guaranteed. In view of our limited capabilities to detect the early phases of 

weapons programs, we cannot assure detection sufficiently timely to preclude attainment by 
279

Notes to Pages 82–86

the Soviets of a significant lead in acquiring an increased strategic capability.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 253–254.

63. JCSM-14-66 to SecDef, 7 Jan 66, JCS 1731/907-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) to Joseph Califano, 7 

Jan 66, JCS 1731/907-2; JMF 3050 (5 Jan 66) sec. 2.

64. CM-442-65 to JCS, 2 Mar 65; SM-214-65 to Chmn, Special Studies Group, 10 Mar 65; JMF 

3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 1. Rpt by CJCS Special Studies Group, “The Security Implications of a 

Freeze on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems,” 1 Dec 65, same file, sec. 1A.

65. CNOM-14-66 to JCS, n.d.; CSAM-35-66 to JCS, 22 Jan 66; “Dec On JCS 1731/862-5,” 2 Feb 66; 

JCSM-79-66 to SecDef, 4 Feb 66, JCS 1731/862-5; JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 1. OSD was provided 

with a sanitized version of the report via JCSM-128-66 to SecDef, 28 Feb 66, JCS 1731/862-9, 

same file, sec. 2A.

66. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Mar 66, JCS 1731/862-6; JCSM-202-66 to SecDef, 1 Apr 66, 

JCS 1731/862-8; JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 2.

67. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 10 Mar 66, JCS 1731/880-8; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Mar 

66, JCS 1731/880-9; CM-1270-66 to SecDef, 17 Mar 66, 1st N/H of JCS 1731/880-9, 18 Mar 66; Ltr, 

SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 31 Mar 66, JCS 1731/880-11; JMF 3050 (20 Jul 65) sec. 2.

68. Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 2 May 66, Att to Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 May 66, 

JCS 1731/928; JCSM-311-66 to SecDef, 9 May 66, JCS 1731/928-1; Memo, M. W. Roche to CJCS, 

26 Aug 66, JCS 1731/928-2; JMF 3050 (2 May 66). Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens 

of Vietnam, chap. 12.

69. SM-290-66 to Chmn, SSG, 1 Apr 66, JMF 3050 (22 Mar 66). Rpt by CJCS SSG, “Freeze 

and Reduction of Offensive and Defensive Systems,” 31 Jul 66, JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 2B. 

Forwarded to SecDef via CM-1663-66 to SecDef, 5 Aug 66, JCS 1731/862-10, same file, sec. 2.

70. JCSM-574-66 to SecDef, 10 Sep 66, JCS 1731/862-13, JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 2. 

71. Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 13 Jan 67, JCS 1731/957, JMF 755 (13 Jan 

67) sec. 1.

72. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Jan 67, JCS 1731/957-2; JCSM-30-67 to SecDef, 19 Jan 67, JCS 

1731/957-1; JMF 755 (13 Jan 67) sec. 1. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 

426-429. Gen. McConnell wanted to provide detailed comments while the US position was still 

in a formative stage, but the Chiefs decided against doing so. CSAFM-F-15-67 to JCS, 18 Jan 67; 

Dec On JCS 1731/957-1, 18 Jan 67, same file.

73. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 536–539.

74. Memo, ActgDir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 3 Mar 67, JCS 1731/966, JMF 755 (13 Jan 

67), sec. 1. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Mar 67, JCS 1731/966-1; JCSM-143-67 to SecDef, 14 Mar 

67, JCS 1731/966-2; same file, sec. 2. Distribution of JCSM-143-67 to the White House and the 

Committee of Principals is recorded in Memo, M. W. Roche to CJCS, 24 Mar 67, N/H of JCS 

1731/966-2, 28 Mar 67, same file.

75. Gen. Wheeler summarized JCS views in Ltr, CJCS to Walt Rostow, 14 Mar 67, CJCS 388.3 

Disarmament. ACDA Memo, “Mtg of the Cmte of Principals, 14 Mar 67,” 20 Mar 67, JCS 1731/966-4, 

JMF 755 (13 Jan 67) sec. 2. Seaborg’s account of the meeting, providing some different perspectives, is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 466-467. As explained in chap. 3, 

the subsequent Soviet buildup went well beyond US levels, contrary to McNamara’s analysis 

of the arms race.

76. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 468–470.

77. Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to SecDef et al., 28 Aug 67, JCS 1731/980; JCSM-492-67 to SecDef, 8 

Sep 67, JCS 1731/980-1; JMF 481 (28 Aug 67). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 495–499, 

507–508.
280

Notes to Pages 86–92

78. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 67, JCS 1731/983; Notes to Control, “JCS 1731/983,” 25 and 

30 Oct 67; JCSM-598-67 to SecDef, 2 Nov 67, JCS 1731/983-1; JMF 755 (13 Jan 67) sec. 2.

79. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 12. Draft Msg, State to 

Moscow, n.d.; CM-3227-68 to SecDef, 22 Apr 68; CJCS 388.3 US/Sov Msl Talks. Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 589–591, 623–625.

80. CM-3464-68 to DJS, 11 Jul 68, JCS 2482/2, JMF 021 (11 Jul 68). Instead, Allison would 

continue as ACSAN until early 1973.

81. Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 31 Jul 68, JCS 2482/9, JMF 750 (29 Jun 68) 

sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2 Aug 68, JCS 2482/9-1, same file, sec. 2. The former is printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 659–661.

82. Essentially, they were repeating the conclusions of SNIE 11-13-68, 18 July 1968, printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 646–648.

83. JCSM-498-68 and CM-3572-68 to SecDef, 9 Aug 68, JCS 2482/9-4, JMF 750 (29 Jul 68) sec. 

2. Msg, CJCS to COMNAVPHIL for CNO, 10 Aug 68; Msg, CNO to CJCS, 121230Z Aug 68; Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS, 24 Aug 68, CJCS 388.3 US/Sov Msl Talks.

84. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 13 Aug 68, JCS 2482/9-10, JMF 750 (29 Jun 68) sec. 3. Printed in 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 669–672.

85. “Mtg of the Exec Cmte of the Cmte of Principals, Wed, 14 Aug 68,” JCS 2482/9-13, JMF 750 

(29 Jun 68) sec. 4. Memo, SecState and Dir, ACDA, to Pres, 15 Aug 68, JCS 2482/9-12, same file, 

sec. 3. The latter is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 677–680.

86. CM-3604-68 to JCS, 21 Aug 68, JCS 2482/9-14; Memos, CSA, CNO, VCSAF, and Actg CMC 

to CJCS, 22 Aug 68, JCS 2482/9-15; JMF 750 (29 Jun 68) sec. 4. “Mtg of the Exec Cmte of the Cmte 

of Principals, 22 Aug 68,” JCS 2482/9-18, same file, sec. 5.

87. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 699–700. Msg, Draft Msg, SecState to US Mission NATO, 6 Sep 68; CM-3642-68 to SecDef, 10 Sep 68; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Sep 68, JCS 

2482/920; JMF 750 (29 Jun 68) sec. 5. DJSM-1405-68 to CJCS, 18 Nov 68; CM-3822-68 to DJS, 10 

Dec 68; JMF 021 (11 Jul 68). Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 12.

88. The term is described in chap. 4.

89. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 579–583.

90. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 593–597, 608–614, 621–622.

91. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 680–683, 714–715.

92. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, p. 411. Hrgs., S. Com on Foreign Relations, Seabed Arms 

Control Treaty, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., p. 11.

Chapter 6. NATO: Surviving Challenges from Within

1. Signatories were Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (i.e., West 

Germany), Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the 

United Kingdom, and the United States. The heart of the treaty, Article V, stated that “an attack 

against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all.”

2. Charles de Gaulle, The Call to Honor (London: Collins, 1955), p. 9.

3. NSAM No. 294 to SecDef et al., 20 Apr 64, JCS 2278/76, JMF 9164 (11 May 64). Printed in 

Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 12 (Washington, DC: Dept. of State 

Historical Office, 2001), pp. 50–51. JCSM-280-64 to SecDef, 2 Apr 64, JCS 2278/74, JMF 9164/9105 

(27 Mar 64).
281

Notes to Pages 92–97

4. CSAFM-789-64 to JCS, 21 Sep 64, JCS 2278/78; JCSM-853-64 to SecDef, 8 Oct 64, JCS 2278/-

1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Nov 64, JCS 2278/78-2; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 21 Nov 

64, JCS 2278/78-3; JMF 9164 (21 Sep 64) sec. 1.

5. JCSM-853-64 to SecDef, 4 Dec 64, JCS 2278/78-4; JMF 9164 (21 Sep 64) sec. 1. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 12, p. 79. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 

13 (Washington, DC: Dept. of State Historical Office, 1995), pp. 165–167.

6. CSAFM-R-32-65 to JCS, 7 Apr 65, JCS 2278/78-5; Bfg Sheets for CJCS, “2278/78-5,” 16 and 

20 Apr 65; SM-379-65 to LTG Goodpaster, 23 Apr 65, JCS 2278/78-5; JMF 9164 (21 Sep 64) sec. 2.

7. Ltr, SACEUR to JCS, 18 Aug 65, JCS 2450/68; JCS 2450/68-1, 17 Sep 65; JCSM-722-65 to 

SecDef, 27 Sep 65, JCS 2450/68-1; JMF 9050 (18 Aug 65). In November, the Army submitted a 

technical plan for developing an MRBM, but final abandonment of the MLF in December killed 

further action. Memo, LTG Mock to DJS, 30 Nov 65, JCS 2450/68-2, same file.

8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 May 64, JCS 2421/792; JCSM-523-64 to SecDef, 27 Jun 64, JCS 

2421/792-1; JMF 9050 (2 May 64).

9. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 May 65, JCS 2278/83, JMF 9164 (13 May 65). Note to Control, 

“Effect of Withdrawal of US Military Forces from France,” 17 May 65, JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec. 

1. JCSM-402-65 to SecDef, 22 May 65, JCS 2278/83-1, JMF 9164 (13 May 65).

10. JCSM-627-65 to SecDef, 13 Aug 65, JCS 2278/84-5, JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec. 2. OSD 

acknowledgement is in Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 25 Aug 65, JCS 2278/84-6, same file.

11. NY Times, 10 Sep 65, p. 1 and 17 Oct 65, p. 1.

12. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 13, pp. 253–259.

13. Memo, LTG Goodpaster to CJCS, 7 Oct 65, JCS 2450/101, JMF 9050 (7 Oct 65).

14. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 8 Jan 66, JCS 2278/91-1; JCSM-68-66 to SecDef, 1 Feb 66, JCS 

2278/91-3; JMF 9164 (30 Dec 65). In December 1966, the North Atlantic Council created a Nuclear 

Defense Affairs Committee to propose general policy and a smaller Nuclear Planning Group to 

“handle the detailed work.” Dept. of State Bulletin, 9 Jan 67, pp. 50–51. Creation of the NDAC 

and NPG is described in Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 14.

15. NY Times, 22 Feb 66, p. 1; 10 Mar 66, p. 1. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 13, pp. 

333–335, 360–363.

16. Memo, Pres to SecState and SecDef, 4 May 66, JCS 2450/217, JMF 9050.3 (4 May 66). Printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 13, pp. 376–377.

17. Msg, CJCS to SACEUR, 18 Mar 66, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

18. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 18 Mar 66, JCS 2278/84, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 1.

19. These figures come from JCSM-886-65 to SecDef, 15 Dec 65, JCS 2278/84-12, JMF 9164 

(21 May 65) sec. 1.

20. JCSM-234-66 to SecDef, 13 Apr 66, JCS 2278/94-3, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 1B.

21. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 14. Draft Memo, SecDef to 

Pres, “Disposition of US Forces and Facilities in France,” 21 Apr 66, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 2.

22. JCSM-291-66 to SecDef, 3 May 66, JCS 2278/94-9, JMF 905.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 2. The 71-day 

figure comes from JCSM-255-66 to SecDef, 23 Apr 66, JCS 2278/94-7, same file, sec. 1B.

23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 May 66, JCS 2278/98-11, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 3.

24. JCS 2278/94-12, 19 May 66, and Dec On, 20 May 66; Note to Control, “JCS 2278/94-12,” 20 

May 66; JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 3. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 20 May 66, JCS 2278/104, 

JMF 9050 (20 May 66) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 25 May 66, JCS 2278/104-9, same file, sec. 2.
282

Notes to Pages 98–100

25. JCSM-497-66 to SecDef, 1 Aug 66, JCS 2278/104-25; JCSM-522-66 to SecDef, 19 Aug 66, JCS 

2278/104/28; JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 5. A detailed justification of 90-day levels was provided 

in Msg, CINCUSAREUR to CJCS, HBG 1583, 071442Z Jul 66, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

26. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Sep 66, JCS 2278/104-33, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 6.

27. JCSM-643-66 to SecDef, 7 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-44, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 8.

28. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-57; JCSM-703-66 to SecDef, 3 Nov 66, 

derived from CM-1882-66; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Nov 66, JCS 2278/104-60; JMF 9050.3 (20 

May 66) sec. 10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Dec 66, JCS 2278/104-85; same file, sec. 14.

29. JCSM-432-66 to SecDef, 28 Jun 66, JCS 2278/104-15; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Jul 66, JCS 

2278/104-20; JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 3. Most of the redeployed aircraft moved on to Vietnam.

30. Memo, SecDef to SecAF, 5 Aug 66, JCS 2278/109; JCS 2278/109-1, 22 Aug 66, and Dec On, 

30 Aug 66; Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 7 Sep 66, JCS 278/109-2; JCSM-666-66 to SecDef, 

14 Oct 66, JCS 2278/109-5; JMF 9050.3 (15 Jul 66) sec. 1. The Air Force prepared, and the JCS 

supported, plans to relocate equipment at Chelveston, Sculthorpe, and Greenham Common in 

Britain. In December 1966, McNamara agreed to reopen Greenham Common for temporary storage only, and to negotiate base rights at the other two sites. Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 

16 Feb 67, JCS 2278/114-6; Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 18 Jul 67, JCS 2278/114-10; JCSM-508-67 to 

SecDef, JCS 2278/114-11; Memo, SecDef to SecAF, “European Air Bases,” 7 Dec 67; JMF 9050.3 (15 

Nov 66) sec. 2. There is a handwritten note on the last document: “See SecAF memo to SecDef, 

13 Feb 68 for reconsideration . . . and DepSecDef approval 16 Mar 68.”

31. JCSM-657-66 to SecDef, 12 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-47, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 9. Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS, 2 Nov 66, JCS 2278/104-58, same file, sec. 10. Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 220950Z 

Nov 66; JCSM-800-66 to SecDef, 29 Dec 66, JCS 2278/118; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Feb 67, JCS 

2278/118-1; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 5 Mar 67, JCS 2278/118-2; JMF 9164 (27 Sep 66).

32. Msg, CJCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 2365-66, 30 Apr 66; Msg, General Lemnitzer to CJCS, PRS 

1075, 241756Z Apr 66; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation). Ltr, Dean Acheson to SecDef, 25 Mar 66, 

JCS 2450/189, JMF 9050 (25 Mar 66).

33. USN-85-66 to DJS, 13 Apr 66; Msg, CJCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 2727-66, 17 May 66; CJCS 

092.2 NATO (Relocation).

34. Msg, Lemnitzer to Wheeler, PRS 1927, 051040Z Aug 66; Msg, CJCS to SACEUR, 4812-66, 13 

Aug 66; Msg, Lemnitzer to Wheeler, PRS 1975, 151730Z Aug 66; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation) 

(Jun 66–Oct 66).

35. JCSM-440-66 to SecDef, 30 Jun 66, JCS 2278/104-16, JMF 9050.3 (20 Mar 66) sec. 3. Memo, 

DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 18 Aug 66, JCS 2278/104-30, same file, sec. 5.

36. NY Times, 15 Mar 67, p. 1 and 1 Apr 67, p. 1.

37. Msg, CJCS to SACEUR, 18 Mar 66, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

38. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 15.

39. Military expenditures in Germany, which had averaged $650 to $700 million in 1960-66, 

were expected to reach $850 to $900 million. Bonn was falling about $600 million short of 

its commitment to order $1.35 billion worth of US military equipment during 1965-66. Since 

Germans were meeting their FY 1966–67 offset commitment by making advance payments for 

future orders, none of the $850–900 million US expenses anticipated between 30 June 1967 and 

31 December 1968 would be offset by new German payments. This information comes from 

Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Jan 67, JCS 2450/294-8, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec. 4. For a thorough 

account of these problems and their resolution, see Hubert Zimmermann, Money and Security 

(Cambridge Univ. Press: German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, 2002), pp. 171–233.
283

Notes to Pages 100–105 

40. NY Times, 6 Jun 66, p. 1; 22 Jul 66, p. 2; 26 Jul 66, p. 1. British views are described in 

JCS 2265/33, 29 Aug 66, JMF 9163 (1966), and Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of 

Vietnam, chap. 15.

41. NY Times, 16 Sep 66, p. 1.

42. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Aug 66, JCS 1731/936-3; JCSM-605-66 to SecDef, 27 Sep 66, JCS 

1731/936-5; JMF 3050 (13 Jun 66) sec. 1.

43. Msg, JCS 5279-66 to USCINCEUR, 071423Z Sep 66, CJCS 323.3 SACEUR.

44. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 13, pp. 474–476. Public Papers of the Presidents: 

Johnson, 1966, pp. 1078–1079. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 66, JCS 2450/294, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 

66) sec. 1.

45. JCSM-693-66 to SecDef, 27 Oct 66, JCS 2450/294-1, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec. 2. In both 

dual-basing solutions, most of the squadrons brought back home would be reconnaissance units.

46. CM-1897-66 to DJS, 5 Nov 66, JCS 2450/294-5; JCSM-789-66 to SecDef, 28 Dec 66, JCS 

2450/294-6; JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec. 3.

47. Public Papers: Johnson, 1966, p. 1139. Memo, CJCS to McCloy, 8 Oct 66, JMF 9050 (11 Oct 

66) sec. 1. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 15. Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 13, pp. 495-498. Dec On JCS 2450/326, 22 Nov 66, same file.

48. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Jan 67, JCS 2450/294-8, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec. 4.

49. JCSM-50-67 to SecDef, 2 Feb 67, JCS 2450/294-10, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec. 5.

50. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 

pp. 309–310. “Results of Meeting with the President on February 25, 1967,” Doc. 51c; “Record of 

the President’s February 27 Meeting with the Congressional Leadership,” Doc. 52g; “Trilateral 

Negotiations and NATO: 1966–1967,” Book 2, NSC History, National Security Files, Lyndon B. 

Johnson Library.

51. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Mar 67, JCS 2450/381; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Mar 67, JCS 

2450/381-1; JMF 806/374 (17 Mar 67) sec. 1.

52. The J–5 suggested stationing one brigade permanently in Germany to save money and 

ease the strain on personnel. But the Joint Chiefs decided that frequent rotation would demonstrate US ability and intent to reinforce the Seventh Army in time of crisis.

53. The J–5 recommended wing rotation as being cheaper and more efficient. The Joint 

Chiefs opted for squadron rotation and then claimed the same advantages for that approach.

54. JCSM-180-67 to SecDef, 30 Mar 67, JCS 2450/381-3, JMF 806/374 (17 Mar 67) sec. 1. By JCS 

estimates, the Army would require $121–148 million and 3,900 to 7,500 personnel to handle prepositioned equipment and storage. The Air Force would need $107 million and 1,700 personnel 

for basing facilities, air crews, and equipment.

55. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 13, pp. 562–570. The rotation plan appears on pp. 

566–567.

56. CM-2276-67 to SecDef, 27 Apr 67, JCS 2450/402, JMF 808/701 (27 Apr 67).

57. Ltr, McCloy to Pres Johnson, 17 May 67, JCS 2450/413, JMF 806/541 (CY 67).

58. CSAFM-61-67 to JCS, 18 Apr 67, JCS 2450/381-4; “HEAVY DRAW,” 15 May 67, JCS 2450/381-8; 

JMF 806/374 (17 Mar 67) sec. 2. Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 19 May 67, JCS 2450/381-11; Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS et al., 31 May 67, JCS 2450/381-14; Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 6 Jun 67, JCS 

2450/381-15; same file, sec. 3. Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 15 Jun 67, JCS 2450/381-20; JCSM-358-67 

to SecDef, 22 Jun 67, JCS 2450/381-21; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Aug 67, JCS 2450/381-22; same 

file, sec. 4. Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 11 Oct 67, JCS 2450/381-24; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 

13 Oct 67, JCS 2450/381-25; same file, sec. 5.
284

Notes to Pages 106–111

59. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Dec 64, JCS 2445, JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64).

60. Bonesteel was Director of Special Studies in the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army.

61. Note to Control, “Greek-Turkish Exercise,” 19 Jan 65; CM-398-65 to CSA et al., 27 Jan 65; 

CM-402-65 to Lieutenant General Bonesteel et al., 27 Jan 65, JCS 2445/1; JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) 

sec. 1. Rpt by JCS Hellenic Defense Study Team, “Reappraisal of the Defense Posture of Greece 

for the Period FY 1966-1971,” secs. 1 and 14, 25 Mar 65, same file, sec. 2A.

62. JCSM-317-65 to SecDef, 30 Apr 65, JCS 2445/5, JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) sec. 2. A resumé of 

the Bonesteel Report was forwarded to the Greeks via Ltr, SecDef to Greek Min of Defense, 7 

Dec 65, JCS 2445-8, same file.

63. CM-401-65 to SecDef, 27 Jan 65, 1st N/H of JCS 2445, 28 Jan 65; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 

Feb 65, JCS 2445/2; JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) sec. 1.

64. Current general war plans called for making three USAF squadrons available by D+30; 

one Marine division/wing team could arrive by D+30, with perhaps another following by D+60.

65. “Reappraisal of the Defense Posture of Turkey for the Period FY 1966-1971,” sec. IIA, 28 

May 65, JCS 1704/142-7; JCSM-511-65 to SecDef, 1 Jul 65, JCS 1704/142-8; JMF 9187 (10 Feb 65).

66. The deficiencies that MAP, at current levels, could and could not set right are detailed in 

Encl B to JCS 2315/346-2, JMF 4060 (5 Dec 64).

67. JCSM-755-65 to SecDef, 14 Oct 65, JCS 2315/358-4, JMF 4060 (16 Jun 65).

68. Rpt by OASD(ISA), “Military Assistance Reappraisal, FY 1967–1971: Draft Report on 

Greece and Turkey,” pp. II–32, II–35, Sep 65, JMF 4060 (26 Sep 65) sec. 1A. Memo, ASD(ISA) to 

CJCS, 28 Sep 65, JCS 2315/372; JCSM-742-65 to SecDef, 9 Oct 65, JCS 2315/372-1; same file, sec. 1.

69. JCS 2445/10, 19 Jun 67; JCSM-359-67 to SecDef, 22 Jun 67, JCS 2445/10; JMF 954/495 (12 

Jun 67).

70. Memo, PDASD(ISA) Hoopes to AsstSecState Lucius Battle, 28 Jun 67, JCS 2445/10-1, JMF 

954/495 (12 Jun 67).

71. CM-2557-67 to SecDef, 7 Aug 67, JCS 2445/12; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Aug 67, JCS 

2445/12-1; JMF 954/495 (7 Aug 67).

72. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 16 (Washington, DC: Dept. of 

State Historical Office, 2000), pp. 642–643, 680–682, 690–704.

73. “Record of Discussions and Decisions at the 34th SIG Meeting on April 16, 1968,” 23 Apr 68, 

JCS 2464/87, JMF 537 (CY 68). Draft Administrative History of the Dept. of Defense: 1963–1969, 

vol. 1, p. 92. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 16, p. 767.

74. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 11 Dec 67, JCS 1704/173; JCSM-164-68 to SecDef, 16 Mar 68, 

JCS 1704/173-3; JMF 970/101 (11 Dec 67).

75. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 16 May 68, JCS 1704/173-5; JCSM-356-68 to SecDef, 

5 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-6; Ltr, DepUSecState to DepSecDef, 3 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-7; Memo, 

PDASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, 27 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-9; JMF 970/101 (11 Dec 67).

76. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 16, p. 767.

Chapter 7. NATO’s Flexible Response: Reality or Mirage?

1. MC 14/2 is “A Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area,” 21 February 1957.

2. “1966 NATO Defense Planning Survey and Country Defense Summaries,” Jan 67, p. 9, JMF 

806 (2 May 67) sec. 1A. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, p. 28, JCS 2450/77, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 

65) sec. 1.
285

Notes to Pages 111–116

3. SACEUR’s assumptions about warning times and opposing forces are in Memo, SecDef to 

CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1.

4. JCSM-454-65 to SecDef, 11 Jun 65, JCS 2450/32-1, JMF (2 Jun 65).

5. Dept. of State Bulletin, 21 Jun 65, p. 993. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Jun 65, JCS 2421/982-1, 

JMF 9050 (22 Mar 65) sec. 1.

6. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1.

7. JCSM-713-65 to SecDef, 24 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77-1, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1. Memo SecDef 

to CJCS, 29 Oct 65, JCS 2450/77-6, same file, sec. 2.

8. USM-246-65 to CJCS, 17 Sep 65, JCS 2450/80, JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65). Ltr, CJCS to DEFREPNAMA, 7 Jun 65, CJCS 902.2 NATO.

9. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Sep 65, JCS 2450/80; JCSM-752-65 to SecDef, 15 Oct 65, JCS 

2450/80-1; CM-911-65 to SecDef, 15 Oct 65; JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65).

10. MRBM development was cancelled in November.

11. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Oct 65, JCS 2450/80-3; SM-1002-65 to US Rep to MC/SGN, 21 

Oct 65, JCS 2450/80-3; JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65). JCS 2450/143-8, 4 May 66, JMF 9050 (7 Jun 66) sec. 2.

12. “1966 NATO Defense Planning Survey and Country Defense Summaries,” Jan 67, JMF 

806 (2 May 67) sec. 1A.

13. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1. JCSM-297-66 

to SecDef, 5 May 66, JCS 2450/204-1, JMF 9050/3001 (19 Apr 66) sec. 1. Figures are taken from 

“NATO Military Posture Study: Part I, Basic Report,” Apr 66, same file, sec. 1A, and Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS, 11 Oct 65, JCS 2450/77-3, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 2.

14. CM-1432-66 to DJS, 14 May 66, JCS 2450/220; JCSM-376-66 to SecDef, 4 Jun 66, JCS 

2450/220-1; “Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Power,” Att to Memo, Col. 

Moody to CJCS, 11 Jun 66, JCS 2450/220-2; JMF 2200 (14 May 66) sec. 1.

15. JCSM-414-66 to SecDef, 21 Jun 66, JCS 2450/220-3, JMF 2200 (14 May 66) sec. 1.

16. Memo of Understanding, “Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Power,” 14 

Jul 66, JCS 2450/220-4; Ltr, SecDef to DefMin Von Hassel, 19 Jul 66, JCS 2450/220-5; JMF 2200 (14 

May 66) sec. 2. In How Much Is Enough?, pp. 142–147, Enthoven and Smith claimed a complete 

victory for Systems Analysis. Joint Staff officers probably saw matters differently.

17. “Remarks by Secretary McNamara, Defense Ministerial Meeting, Paris, France, 25 July 

1966,” JCS 2450/274, JMF 9050 (12 Jul 66). Subsequently, the Joint Staff reviewed allied efforts 

and rated improvements as ranging from marginal (Greece and Turkey) to very substantial 

(Germany, Italy, and Norway). DJSM-340-67 to CJCS, 17 Mar 67, CJCS 092.2 NATO (misfiled in 

the Mar–Jul 68 folder).

18. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Apr 65, JCS 2450/3; JCSM-420-65 to SecDef, 29 May 65, 

JCS 2450/3-1; JMF 9150 (15 Apr 65) sec. 1. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Feb 66, JCS 2450/170; 

JCSM-159-66 to SecDef, 12 Mar 66, JCS 2450/170-4; JMF 9050 (23 Feb 66) sec. 1.

19. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Aug 66, JCS 2458/118, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec. 1. Dual basing 

was part of the effort, described in chap. 6, to reduce the balance of payments drain.

20. JCSM-560-66 to SecDef, 1 Sep 66, JCS 2458/118-2, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec. 1.

21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Sep 66, JCS 2458/118-5, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec. 3.

22. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Jul 66, JCS 2458/104; JCSM-505-66 to SecDef, 4 Aug 66, JCS 

2458/104-1; JMF 7130 (2 Jul 66) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Aug 66, JCS 2458/104-5; Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS, 23 Jan 67, JCS 2458/104-6; same file, sec. 3.
286

Notes to Pages 117–122

23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 May 67, JCS 2458/237; JCSM-313-67 to SecDef, 2 Jun 67, JCS 

2458/237-1; JMF 560 (10 May 67) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Nov 67, JCS 2458/237-8, same 

file, sec. 3.

24. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Jun 67, JCS 2458/257; JCSM-421-67 to SecDef, pp. 2-3 of Appendix, JCS 2458/257-2; JMF 560 (29 Jun 67) sec. 1. The JCS still wanted the tactical bomb inventory 

increased to 5,000; McNamara now planned a reduction to 3,700 by FY 1971. “Record of Decision” 

Memo, SecDef to Pres, 11 Jan 68, JCS 2458/257-7, same file, sec. 2.

25. JCSM-860-65 to SecDef, 7 Dec 65, JCS 2450/95-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS 20 Jul 66, JCS 

2450/95-3; JCSM-521-66 to SecDef, 18 Aug 66, JCS 2450/95-4; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Sep 66, 

JCS 2450/95-5; JCSM-712-66 to SecDef, 14 Nov 66, JCS 2450/95-6; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Dec 

66, JCS 2450/95-7; SM-63-67 to US Rep to MC, 23 Jan 67, JCS 2450/95-8; JMF 9050 (1 Oct 65).

26. Ltr, CJCS to General Trettner, 2 Feb 66, CJCS 091 Germany.

27. Ltr, General Trettner to CJCS, 13 May 66, JCS 2124/370, JMF 9165 (13 May 66).

28. Ltr, CJCS to General Trettner, 31 May 66, CJCS 091 Germany.

29. Ltr, General Trettner to CJCS, 29 Jul 66, CJCS 091 Germany.

30. USM-52-67 to CJCS, 17 Feb 67, JCS 2450/367; USM-50-67 to CJCS, 17 Feb 67, JCS 2450/68; 

JCSM-128-67 to SecDef, 10 Mar 67, JCS 2450/368-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Mar 67, JCS 

2450/368-2; CM-208-67 to DepSecDef, 12 Apr 67, JCS 2450/368-3; JMF 806 (17 Feb 67).

31. The DPC, to which the Military Committee was subordinate, stood in permanent session 

and normally comprised representatives of the Chiefs of Staff. Several times a year—and this 

was one such time—the DPC met at either the Chiefs of Staff or the ministerial level.

32. MC 14/3, 16 Jan 68, printed in Gregory Pedlow (ed.), NATO Strategy Documents: 1949–

1969.

33. JCSM-377-67 and CM-2486-67 to SecDef, 1 Jul 67, JCS 2450/420-1, JMF 806 (17 Feb 67).

34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Aug 67; SM-571-67 to US Rep to MC, 19 Aug 67, JCS 2450/420-1; 

JMF 806 (17 Feb 67). Msg, USDEL MC to JCS, 170757Z Sep 67, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

35. USM-175-67 to CJCS, 8 Jun 67, JCS 2450/419, JMF 806/372 (8 Jun 67).

36. JCSM-349-67 to SecDef, 19 Jun 67, JCS 2450/419-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 30 Jun 67, JCS 

2450/419-2; SM-468-67 to US Rep to MC, 1 Jul 67, JCS 2450/419-5; JMF 806/372 (8 Jun 67). Encl 3 

to Bfg Book, “NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 10 May 1968,” JMF 806 (15 May 68) sec. 1A. 

“Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to Defense Planning Committee of 

NATO, Brussels, December 12, 1967,” JCS 2450/507, JMF 806/372 (19 Dec 67) sec. 1.

37. USM-355-67 to DJS, 16 Nov 67, JCS 2450/490; JCSM-18-68 to SecDef, 13 Jan 68, JCS 

2450/490-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 9 Feb 68, 1st N/H of JCS 2450/490-1, 14 Feb 68; SM-98-68 

to US Rep to MC, 14 Feb 68, JCS 2450/490-1; JMF 806 (16 Nov 67) IR 2839.

38. USM-93-68 to CJCS, 27 Feb 68, JCS 2450/540, JMF 806 (16 Nov 67) IR 2839. Memo, CJCS 

to ASD(SA), 12 Mar 68, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

39. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Aug 67, JCS 2450/459; JCSM-522-67 to SecDef, 23 Sep 67, JCS 

2450/459-1; JMF 806 (31 Aug 67) sec. 1. EUCOM Annual Historical Report: 1968, pp. 2–4. JCSM443-68 to SecDef, 12 Jul 68, JCS 2450/483-1; JMF 806 (5 Jun 68) sec. 1. JSCP-68, approved in 

December 1966 and applicable from 1 July 1967 until 30 June 1968, retained the concept of a forward defense despite a reduced reinforcement capability and forthcoming redeployments from 

Germany. However, “these realities, combined with the ambiguous position of France within 

NATO, increase the possibility that early employment of nuclear weapons would be necessary 

to maintain a successful forward defense.” JSCP-69 took the same position. JSCP-68, circulated 

via SM-998-66 to CINCAL et al., 22 Dec 66, JCS 1844/469, JMF 3120 (17 Dec 66). JSCP-69, 23 

Dec 67, circulated via SM-868-67 to CINCAL et al., 23 Dec 67, JCS 1844/488, JMF 510 (4 Dec 67).
287

Notes to Pages 122–127

40. In mid-December, the North Atlantic Council approved the Harmel Report, a key document defining future tasks of the alliance as defense and détente.

41. DJSM-415-68 to CJCS, 11 Apr 68; DJSM-610-68 to CJCS, 18 May 68; Msg, State 167504 to 

all NATO capitals, 21 May 68; JCSM-341-68 to SecDef and Memo, CJCS to SecDef, 27 May 68, 

JCS 2450/580; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 20 Jun 68, JCS 2450/580-1; JMF 806/372 (22 May 68).

42. Dept. of State Bulletin, 15 Jul 68, p. 77.

43. NY Times, 26 Jun 68, p. 17.

44. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Jun 68, JCS 2458/410; CM-3440-68 to JCS, 26 Jun 68; JMF 

585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 1.

45. Note to Control, “CM-3440-68,” 26 Jun 68, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 1.

46. JCSM-449-68 to SecDef, 12 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-4, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 1. Ltr, USecState 

to DepSecDef, 22 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-7, same file, sec. 5.

47. CM-3485-68 to DJS, 23 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-8, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 5.

48. Figures are cited in Msg, DIA to US Mission, Brussels, 13 Sep 68, CJCS 092.2 NATO. Politburo debates, and Brezhnev’s initial hesitation, are described in Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed 

Empire (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 207-209.

49. CM-3608-68 to DJS, 27 Aug 68, JCS 2450/609, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 1.

50. JCSM-538-68 to SecDef, 7 Sep 68, JCS 2450/609-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Sep 68, JCS 

2450/609-4; JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 1.

51. JCSM-547-68 to SecDef, 14 Sep 68, JCS 2450/609-3, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 1.

52. Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 21 Sep 68, Att to Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 30 Sep 68, 

JCS 2066/74, JMF 948/532 (21 Sep 68) sec. 1. JCSM-667-68 to SecDef, 7 Nov 68, JCS 2066/74-1, 

same file, sec. 3.

53. CM-3702-68 to SecDef, 4 Oct 68, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

54. The number of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe had risen from 22 to 36. Msg, DIA to 

US Mission, Brussels, 13 Sep 68, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

55. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 18 Sep 68, JCS 2458/410-10, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 5. Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS et al., 20 Sep 68, JCS 2458/410-11; JCSM-580-68 to SecDef, 2 Oct 68, JCS 2458/410-

13; same file, sec. 6. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Dec 68, JCS 2458/410-28, same file, sec. 8.

56. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620, JMF 806/543 (2 Oct 68).

57. JCSM-594-68 to SecDef, 8 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620-1, JMF 806/543 (2 Oct 68).

58. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620-2; JCSM-651-68 to SecDef, 31 Oct 

68, JCS 2450/620-3; JMF 806/543 (2 Oct 68).

59. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Nov 68, JCS 2450/609-5, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 1. JCS 

2450/609-6, 13 Dec 68; Note to Control, “JCS 2450/609-6,” 20 Dec 68; same file, sec. 2.

60. Msg, USDEL MC to JCS, 051142Z Nov 68, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 2. US approval is 

in JCSM-672-68 to SecDef, 8 Nov 68, JCS 2450/636; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Nov 68, 1st N/H of 

JCS 2450/636, 12 Nov 68; Msg, JCS to USDEL MC, 10 Nov 68; same file.

61. “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Clifford in NATO Defense Planning Committee,” 14 

Nov 68, Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 7 Dec 68, JCS 2450/653, JMF 806 (16 Oct 66).

62. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 May 68, JCS 2458/394, JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec. 1.

63. JCSM-334-68 to SecDef, 29 May 68, JCS 2458/394-1, JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec. 1. A separate DPM again downplayed the role of tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., enhance the conventional option by moving atomic demolition munitions in Germany back from the border to 

rear defensive positions) and proposed cutbacks in the stockpile. Escalating their rhetoric, 

the Joint Chiefs criticized the DPM as being “obfuscated and inconsistent to the point that it 
288

Notes to Pages 

is not possible, in most instances, to determine . . . the basis upon which force level recommendations . . . have been derived.” It “implies that theater nuclear forces can somehow deter 

without, at the same time, being needed to wage war successfully should deterrence fail.” The 

final DPM postponed cutbacks and a repositioning of atomic demolition munitions. Memo, 

DepSecDef to CJCS, 10 Aug 68, JCS 2458/436; JCSM-534-68 to SecDef, 7 Sep 68, JCS 2458/436-1; 

JMF 560 (10 Aug 68) sec. 1. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 

15 Jan 69, JCS 2458/436-8, same file, sec. 3.

64. Actually, US officials believed that a meeting of the Soviet and Czech Presidiums at 

Cierna, Czechoslovakia, during 25 July–1 August had eased tensions and probably averted 

intervention. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 17 (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1996), pp. 229, 232–234. 

65. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 7 Jan 69, JCS 2458/394-5, JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec. 2.

Chapter 8. Phasing Out the Military Assistance Program

1. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Fiscal Year Series as of September 1981, pp. 2–3, 

122, 270.

2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Dec 64, JCS 2315/346; JCSM-1082-64 to SecDef, 29 Dec 64, JCS 

2315/346-1; JMF 4060 (5 Dec 64).

3. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1965, p. 44. Digest of Appropriations: 1965, p. 

84; 1966–67, p. 8. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, p. 460. Final FY 1966 

figures are taken from Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Dec 65, JCS 2315/375-2, JMF 4060 (26 Oct 65).

4. Memo, Gen. R. J. Wood to DJS, 16 Jun 65, JCS 2315/358; JCSM-632-65 to SecDef, 14 Aug 

65, JCS 2315/358-2; JMF 4060 (16 Jun 65). Individual countries’ deficiencies were specified in 

JCSM-755-65 to SecDef, 14 Oct 65, JCS 2315/358-4; same file.

5. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 26 Oct 65, JCS 2315/375; JMF 4060 (26 Oct 65). Back in April, Annex 

J of JSOP-70 had awarded comparatively more importance to the Near East and South Asia, 

less to the Far East. Escalating US involvement in Vietnam evidently accounted for the DPM’s 

different emphasis.

6. JCSM-802-65 to SecDef, 3 Nov 65, JCS 2315/375-1; JMF 4060 (26 Oct 65).

7. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1966, p. 124. Digest of Appropriations: 

1966–67, p. 82. JCS 2315/388-2, 21 Oct 66; JCSM-690-66 to SecDef, 27 Oct 66, JCS 2315/388-2; 

JMF 4060 (25 Jul 66). JCS 2315/393, 16 Sep 66; JCSM-596-66 to SecDef, 22 Sep 66, JCS 2315/393; 

JMF 4060 (16 Sep 66).

8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 8 Nov 66, JCS 2315/388-3; JMF 4060 (25 Jul 66).

9. Annex J of JSOP 68-75 was transmitted via JCSM-91-66 to SecDef, 15 Feb 66, JCS 2143/273; 

JMF 3130 (28 Jan 66). Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 25 Jul 66, JCS 2315/388; JCSM-541-66 to SecDef, 

26 Aug 66, JCS 2315/388-1; JMF 4060 (25 Jul 66).

10. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, p. 466. CSAFM-B-42-66 to JCS, 

12 Sep 66, JCS 2315/390; JCS 2315/390-1, 30 Sep 66, and Dec On, 4 Oct 66; JMF 4060 (12 Sep 66). 

Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Nov 66, JCS 2458/157; JMF 7130 (5 Nov 66) sec. 1.

11. JCSM-728-66 to SecDef, 25 Nov 66, JCS 2458/157-1; JMF 7130 (5 Nov 66) sec. 1. Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS, 7 Jan 67, JCS 2458/157-4; same file, sec. 2. Public Papers of the Presidents: 

Johnson, 1967, p. 171. Digest of Appropriations: 1967–68, p. 82. Readjusted FY 1968 figures 

come from Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Dec 67, JCS 2315/432; JMF 495 (18 Dec 67) sec. 1. Drea, 

McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, p. 468.

Notes to Pages 127–133
Notes to Pages 

289

12. Ann J to JSOP 69-76, Part I; JMF 511 (14 Feb 67) sec. 1A. Memo, Actg Dir. of Mil Assistance 

to DJS, 4 Aug 67, JCS 2315/419; Encl C to JCS 2315/419, 7 Sep 67; JCSM-503-67 to SecDef, 13 Sep 

67, JCS 2315/419-1; JMF 495 (4 Aug 67). Major MAP deliveries to Greece were suspended after 

the military takeover in April 1967. As explained in chap. 6, the JCS recommended a prompt 

resumption.

13. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Dec 67, JCS 2315/432; JMF 495 (18 Dec 67) sec. 1.

14. JCSM-8-68 to SecDef, 4 Jan 68, JCS 2315/432-1; JMF 495 (18 Dec 67) sec. 1. CM-2447-67 

to JCS, 20 Nov 67; Memo, Gen. Brown to CJCS, “Military Assistance Program,” 21 Nov 67; CJCS 

091.3 MAP.

15. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, pp. 478–80. Memo, SecDef to 

CJCS, 5 Feb 68, JCS 2315/432-3; JMF 495 (18 Dec 67) sec. 2. Public Papers of the Presidents: 

Johnson, 1968–69, p. 207. Digest of Appropriations: 1968–69, pp. 92, 265. Readjusted FY 1969 

country figures are taken from Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Oct 68, JCS 2458/463; JMF 560 (29 

Oct 68). For reasons described in chap. 13, Congress appropriated an additional $100 million 

in grant aid for South Korea,

16. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 31 (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Historian, Dept. of State, 2004), ftnt. 2 on p. 159 and ftnt. 4 on p. 1030. The Peruvian issue is 

documented in ibid., pp. 1032–1039, 1046–1047.

17. JSOP 70-77, vol. 3, bk. 1; JMF 511 (13 Feb 68) sec. A. JCSM-163-68 to SecDef, 15 Mar 68, 

JCS 2143/320; JMF 511 (13 Feb 68).

18. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Oct 68, JCS 2458/463; JMF 560 (29 Oct 68).

19. JCSM-674-68 to SecDef, 9 Nov 68, JCS 2458/463-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Dec 68, 

JCS 2458/463-2; JMF 560 (29 Oct 68). President Nixon, in May 1969, asked Congress for $375 

million in grants and $275 million worth of sales credits.

Chapter 9. Latin America: The Instruments of Influence

1. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 32 (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Historian, Dept. of State, 2005), p. 1.

2. An account of the intervention emphasizing OSD’s role is in Drea, McNamara, Clifford, 

and the Burdens of Vietnam, pp. 289–315.

3. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, who had been called to Washington for consultations, 

returned to Santo Domingo at 1240 on 27 April. Until then, Deputy Chief of Mission William B. 

Connett was in charge of the Embassy.

4. Msg, State 633 to Santo Domingo, 25 Apr 65, JCS IN 30100; Msg, State to DepDir, J–3, 

251305Z Apr 65, JHO. Msg, JCS 9731 to CINCLANT, 25 Apr 65, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic 

(Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). USCOMDOMREP, Stability Operations: Dominican Republic, Aug 65, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, p. 2; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65) sec. 1A. 

5. Msg, JCS 9802 to CINCLANT, 26 Apr 65, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic.

6. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 32 (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Historian, Dept. of State, 2005), pp. 67–70. Molina then sought asylum at the Colombian embassy.

7. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, p. 71 and ftnt. 3 on p. 73. Msgs, Santo Domingo 1136, 

1146, 1149 and 1151 to State, 28 Apr 65; Msgs, State 657 and 660 to Santo Domingo, 28 Apr 65; 

JHO. Msg, Santo Domingo to DIRNSA, 282015Z and 282040Z Apr 65, summarized in “Chronology 

of the Crisis in the Dominican Republic,” JHO. Hereafter, all messages not otherwise sourced 

are drawn from this “Chronology.”

Notes to Pages 134–139
290

Notes to Pages 139–142

8. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 81–84. Public Papers: Johnson, 1965, p. 461. 

Msgs, JCS 9987 and 9988 to CINCLANT, 28 Apr 65, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). Msg, NMCC to CINCLANT, 290136Z Apr 65.

9. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 84–85. Msgs, JCS 1023 and 1037 to CINCLANT, 

29 Apr 65, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). Msg, 

CJCS to CINCLANT, 291707Z Apr 65; JHO.

10. About 150 C–130s were employed, 60 being in the air at any one time. General Bruce 

Palmer, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean (Lexington, Ky.: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1989), p. 33.

11. WSEG Critical Incident Study, “The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965,” p. 90. Msgs, JCS 

1089 and 1095 to CINCLANT, 30 Apr 65, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles 

and Missions of DOD). A US officer had photographed the drop zone from the road, so his pictures showed apparently flat ground. Stability Operations: Dominican Republic, vol. 1, pt. 1, 

chap. 2, p. 6, JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65) sec. 1A.

12. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 95–99. The Embassy estimated that Constitutionalists numbered between 3,500 and 6,500, of whom 1,500 were believed to be under the 

direct leadership of communist-trained fighters. Loyalist strength amounted to 2,400 men of 

wavering allegiance. Msg, Santo Domingo 1173 to State, 29 Apr 65, JCS IN 35777; Msg, CIA to 

JCS et al., 291757Z Apr 65, JCS IN 36200; JHO.

13. Msg, JCS to CJTF 122, 300056Z Apr 65; Msg, CJTF to CINCLANT, 300608Z Apr 65.

14. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, p. 100.

15. Msg, JCS 1113 to CINCLANT, 30 Apr 65, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning 

Roles and Actions of DOD). Stability Operations, Dominican Republic, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, p. 

1; JMF 9128.4 (4 May 65) sec. 1A. General Palmer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 4 Sep 84, JHO. 

On 7 May, Palmer formally assumed command of all Army, Marine, and Air Force units ashore. 

When he became Commander, US Forces in the Dominican Republic (USCOMDOMREP), JTF 

122 was dissolved.

16. Msgs, JCS 1218, 1219, and 1220 to CINCLANT, 1 May 65, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic.

17. WSEG Study, “The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965,” pp. 179–186. Msg, JCS 1237 and 

1251 to CINCLANT et al., 2 May 65; Msg, JCS 1261 to CINCLANT and CJTF 120, 2 May 65; CJCS 

091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). Msg, CJTF 122 to JCS, 

020714Z May 65; CJCS 091 Dominican Republic. Msg, LTG Palmer to CJCS, 022145Z May 65. 

Stability Operations, Dominican Republic, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, pp. 9–10; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 

65) sec. 1A. General Palmer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 4 Sep 84. Palmer talked with Wheeler 

and Johnson on open telephone lines which ran through an exchange manned by some rebels, 

who evidently did not pass on whatever information they overheard.

18. Msg, CJTF 120 to CINCLANT, 021328Z May 65. Msgs, JCS 1250 to CINCLANT, 021758Z May 

65; JCS 1252 to CINCLANT, 021826Z May 65; JCS 1255 to CSA et al., 021958Z May 65; JCS 1258 to 

CINCLANT, 022259Z May 65; and JCS 1262 to CINCLANT, 030153Z May 65; CJCS 091 Dominican 

Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). At first, Palmer sent back-channel messages directly to Wheeler, with CINCLANT as information addressee. When Moorer strongly 

objected, Wheeler reversed that procedure, although Palmer still considered CINCLANT as 

being “in effect a relay station.” Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, pp. 43–44. Throughout 

his tour in Santo Domingo, General Palmer displayed considerable initiative and was allowed 

a good deal of latitude.

19. JCS 2338/15, 5 May 65; Msg, JCS 1595 to CINCLANT and CINCONAD, 6 May 65; JMF 

9128.4 (5 May 65).

20. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1965, pp. 469–471. Foreign Relations: 1964–

1968, vol. 32, p. 139. Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition 
291

Notes to Pages 142–147

Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention (Washington, DC: US Army Center 

of Military History, 1987), p. 25.

21. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, p. 119.

22. Palmer Interview. Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, ftnt. 15 on p. 201.

23. Dept. of State Bulletin, 17 May 65, p. 741; 31 May 65, pp. 862–863.

24. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 May 65, JCS 2338/12; JCSM-344-65 to SecDef, 8 May 65, JCS 

2338/12-1; JCSM-397-65 to SecDef, 20 May 65, JCS 2338/18; JMF 9128.4 (3 May 65). JCSM-363-65 

to SecDef, 14 May 65, JCS 2338/12-3; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Jun 65, N/H of JCS 2338/12-

3, 21 Jun 65; same file.

25. Tab E to J-5 TP 43-65, 17 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (18 May 65). Note to Control, “Reduction of 

US Forces DOMREP,” 9 May 65; JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 082322Z May 

65; JHO.

26. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 142–143. Msg, JCS 2080 to CINCLANT, 13 May 

65, CJCS 091 (Dominican Republic). Msg, JCS 2110 to CINCLANT, 14 May 65. Palmer Interview.

27. Msg, State 979 to Santo Domingo, 12 May 65; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65). Msg, CINCLANT 

to JCS, 131622Z May 65; Msg, USCOMDOMREP to JCS, 140606Z May 65; CJCS 091 Dominican 

Republic. App B to JCS 2338/17, 17 May 65; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65). Palmer judged the UN observers to be biased in favor of the “rebels.” Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, p. 63.

28. Msg, Santo Domingo 1682 to SecState, 14 May 65, JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65). JCSM-372-65 

to SecDef, 15 May 65, JCS 2338/16, JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65).

29. Msg, Santo Domingo 1752 to State, 17 May 65, JCS IN 64194; JHO. Stability Operations, 

Dominican Republic, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, p. 14; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65) sec. 1A.

30. JCSM-377-65 to SecDef, 17 May 65, JCS 2338/17; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65). Santo Domingo 

1776 to State, 18 May 65, JCS IN 66072; JHO. Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 192338Z May 65; Msg, 

JCS 2484 to CINCLANT and USCOMDOMREP, 20 May 65; CJCS 091 Dominican Republic. Msg, 

USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 200800Z May 65, JCS IN 68615; JHO. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 

21 May 65, JCS 2338/16-1; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, p. 206.

31. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 207–210, 227–229, 251–253. Msgs, Santo 

Domingo 2077 and 2097 to SecState, 29 May 65.

32. Dept. of State Bulletin, 21 Jun 65, p. 1018. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 

258–259. Msgs, Santo Domingo 2475 and 2500 to State, 18 Jun 65, JHO.

33. On 4 June, the OAS re-designated the IAF as the IAPF.

34. In April 1964, the Brazilian military had ousted leftist President Goulart. On 15 May 1965, 

the State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Sao Paulo to propose that a Brazilian 

be the commander. JCS 2338/19, 18 May 65; JMF 9128.4 (18 May 65).

35. General Palmer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 4 Sep 84.

36. Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 271832Z May 65; Msg, JCS 2997 to CINCLANT and USCOMDOMREP, 27 May 65; CJCS 091 Dominican Republic. Palmer, of course, remained USCOMDOMREP.

37. JCSM-393-65 to SecDef, 20 May 65, JCS 2338/19; JMF 9128.4 (18 May 65).

38. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Jun 65, JCS 2338/19-1; JMF 9128.4 (18 May 65).

39. App B to JCS 2338/12-4, 26 May 65; Msg, JCS 2703 to CINCLANT, 24 May 65; JMF 9128.4 

(25 May 65).

40. Msgs, USCOMDOMREP to JCS, 250530Z and 252040Z May 65; CJCS 091 Dominican 

Republic.
292

Notes to Pages 147–149

41. JCSM-414-65 to SecDef, 27 May 65, JCS 2338/14; JMF 9128.3 (25 May 65). Msg, JCS 2893 

to CINCLANT, 26 May 65; Msg, JCS 3045 to CINCLANT et al., 28 May 65; CJCS 091 Dominican 

Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD).

42. JCSM-423-65 to SecDef, 1 Jun 65, JCS 2338/22; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Jun 65; Msg, JCS 

3183 to CINCLANT, 1 Jun 65; JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 

1965, p. 609.

43. JCSM-443-65 to SecDef, 8 Jun 65; JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). Msg, JCS 3646 to USCOMDOMREP et al., 9 Jun 65; Msg, USCOMDOMREP to JCS, 102205Z Jun 65; CJCS 091 Dominican 

Republic.

44. Msgs, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 150530Z Jun 65, 160725Z Jun 65, and 170650Z Jun 

65. JCM-476-65 to SecDef, 18 Jun 65, JCS 2338/24; JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65).

45. General Palmer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 4 Sep 84. Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 171627Z Jun 65; Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 181548Z Jun 65; JCS 2338/25, 22 Jun 65; TP for 

CJCS, “JCS 2338/25,” 22 Jun 65; CSAM-306-65 to JCS, 23 Jun 65; Notes to Control, “JCS 2338/25,” 

23 and 25 Jun 65; JMF 9128.4 (18 Jun 65).

46. Msg, JCS 4502 to USCOMDOMREP, 24 Jun 65; Msg, USCOMDOMREP to JCS, 252330Z 

Jun 65; CJCS 091 Dominican Republic. Stability Operations, Dominican Republic, vol. 1, pt. 

2, chap. 1, p. 5; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65) sec. 1E.

47. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 258-259, 263-266.

48. Dept. of State Bulletin, 20 Sep 65, pp. 748-749. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, 

pp. 305, 310–311, 313–316.

49. Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS, 26 Jul 65, JCS 2338/32; Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 

301850Z Aug 65; Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 311600Z Aug 65; JCSM-671-65 to SecDef, 2 Sep 65, JCS 

2338/33; Msg, JCS 2215 to CINCLANT, 22 Sep 65; JMF 9128.4 (18 Jun 65). JCSM-674-65 to SecDef, 

4 Sep 65, JCS 2338/32-3; Memo, DASD(Compt.) to CJCS, 25 Sep 65, N/H of JCS 2338/32-3, 29 Sep 

65; JMF 9128.4 (26 Jul 65) sec. 1. General Alvim proposed that IAPF headquarters contain 79 US 

and 73 Latin personnel. At JCS urging, the US contribution was cut to 72, so that Latins would 

be in the majority. JCSM-697-65 to SecDef, 17 Sep 65, JCS 2338/32-4; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepAsst 

SecState, 23 Sep 65; same file. Msg, JCS 3975 to CINCLANT et al., 13 Oct 65; same file, sec. 2.

50. J3M-1537-65 to DJS, 6 Oct 65; Msg, JCS 2937 to CINCLANT, 29 Sep 65; Msgs, CINCLANT 

to JCS, 042036Z and 042040Z Oct 65; CM-892-65 to SecDef, 7 Oct 65, JCS 2338/32-6; Memo, 

ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Oct 65, JCS 2338/32-8; JMF 9128.4 (28 Jul 65) sec. 2.

51. Several years later, Caamano went to Cuba. In 1973, he returned to his native land with 

a tiny guerrilla band and died fighting Dominican soldiers. Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican 

Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 414–415.

52. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 351–354, 382–384. Palmer, Intervention in 

the Caribbean, pp. 102–118. 

53. Greenberg, US Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations, pp. 82–83. Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, pp. 130–131.

54. CSAM-529-65 to JCS, 6 Dec 65, JCS 2338/32-10; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Apr 66, JCS 

2338/32-11; CM-1299-66 to SecDef, 9 Apr 66, JCS 2338/32-13; JMF 9128.4 (28 Jul 65) sec. 2.

55. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, pp. 406–410. JCS 2338/42, 5 May 66; JCS 2338/42-1, 

6 May 66; CSAM-216-66 to JCS, 6 May 66; Dec On JCS 2338/42-1, 6 May 66; JCSM-312-66 to SecDef, 

9 May 66, JCS 2338/42-1; Memo, M. W. Roche to SJCS, 9 Jun 66, JCS 2338/42-1; JMF 9128.4 (5 May 

66). NY Times, 31 May 66, p. 1.
293

Notes to Pages 149–153 

56. The US government provided indirect but substantial financial support to Balaguer, who 

gained ground rapidly in the last weeks before the election. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 

32, pp. 357–358, 403–404, 413–417.

57. Msg, State Dept. Circular 2543, 24 Jun 66; JMF 9128.4 (24 Jun 66). The withdrawal schedule 

is in DJSM-868-66 to DepSecDef, 5 Jul 66, JCS 2338/45-1; same file. For the entire intervention, 

US combat losses were 24 killed (14 Army, 9 Marine, 1 Navy). Figures supplied by Dr. Walter 

Hermes, US Army Center of Military History.

58. Stability Operations, Dominican Republic, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, pp. 2, 3, 19; JMF 9128.4 

(14 May 65) sec. 1A. Palmer of course had in mind South Vietnam, where he and Ambassador 

Bunker soon were assigned.

59. NSAM No. 95 to SecState, 15 Sep 61, JCS 1778/96; JMF 9125/9105 (15 Sep 61) sec. 1. Memo, 

Actg ASD(ISA) to DJS, 17 Nov 61, JCS 1778/98; JCSM-825-61 to SecDef, 29 Nov 61, JCS 1778/99; 

JMF 9125/9220 (17 Nov 61) sec. 1. JCSM-825 was forwarded to State; N/H of JCS 1778/99, 14 Dec 

61; same file.

60. NSAM No. 152 to SecDef et al., 30 Apr 62, JCS 1778/108; JMF 9125/9105 (15 Sep 61) sec. 1. 

Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Jul 63, JCS 1778/134-2; JCSM-627-63 to SecDef, 29 Aug 63, JCS 

1778/134-3; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, 21 Sep 63, JCS 1778/1343; same file, sec. 3.

61. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 31 (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Historian, Dept. of State, 2004), pp. 792-800, 808-809. Memo, Actg DepSecDef to CJCS, 22 Jan 

64, JCS 1778/143; Msg, JCS 4506 to USCINCSO, 22 Jan 64; Msg, USCINCSO to JCS, 250641Z Jan 

64; JCSM-66-64 to SecDef, 29 Jan 64, JCS 1778/143-5; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, “Contingency 

Plans for Panama,” 29 Jan 64; JMF 9125/3100 (10 Jan 64) sec. 1. A draft JCSM in sec. 2 indicates 

that sending another infantry battalion was rejected because doing so might harm negotiations 

to resume diplomatic relations. General O’Meara’s quick-reaction plan called for occupying 

centers of power within Panama City, securing the installations and borders of the Canal Zone, 

and then sealing the “Communist stronghold” of Colon. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, 

ftnt. 4 on p. 809.

62. JCSM-157-64 to SecDef, 2 Mar 64, JCS 1778/145; JMF 9125/9105 (2 Dec 63) sec. 2. Printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 836-838.

63. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1963–64, p. 436. Foreign Relations: 1964–

1968, vol. 31, pp. 863, 869-870. The Army was the administering authority for the Canal Zone. 

JCSM-289-64 to SecDef, 7 Apr 64, JCS 1778/148-3; JMF 9125/3100 (10 Jan 64) (A). J-3 TP 96-64 for 

CJCS, 13 May 64; Note to Control Div., “J-3 TP 96-64,” 13 May 64; same file, sec. 2.

64. JCSM-293-64 to SecDef, 7 Apr 64, JCS 1778/145-2; Memo, DepSecDef, to CJCS et al., 20 

Apr 64, JCS 1778/145-3; JMF 9125/905 (2 Dec 63) sec. 2. JCSM-487-64 to SecDef, 8 Jun 64, JCS 

1778/145-4, same file, sec. 3.

65. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 844–848 (quotation on p. 845).

66. JCSM-657-64 to SecDef, 31 Jul 64, JCS 1778/145-9; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS 21 Sep 64, 

JCS 1778/145-10; JCSM-881-64 to SecDef, 17 Oct 64, JCS 1778/145-11; JMF 9125/9105 (2 Dec 63) 

sec. 4. SNIE 84-64 appeared to contradict JCS claims about Panamanians’ attitude toward the 

US military presence.

67. General LeMay, Admiral McDonald, and General Shoup favored bilateral control, believing 

that US influence in an international commission would be “too flexible, speculative, and varying to provide the measure of certainty needed.” Generals Wheeler and Johnson disagreed. The 

Chairman worried that bilateral control “could expose the US to being blocked, frustrated, or 

even blackmailed in an unending series of debates.” But control over an international commission could be assured, Wheeler thought, if US nationals represented all the creditors holding the 
294

Notes to Pages 153–158

funded debt that would be incurred in building a sea-level canal. JCSM-1012-64 and CM-285-64 

to SecDef, 2 Dec 64, JCS 1778/157-2; JMF 9125 (24 Nov 64) sec. 1.

68. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 14 Dec 64, JCS 1778/159; JCS 1778/159-1, 15 Dec 64; JCSM-1052-

64 to SecDef, 17 Dec 64, JCS 1778/159-1; JMF 9125 (14 Dec 64).

69. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1963–64, pp. 1663–1665. CM-360-65 to DJS, 5 

Jan 65; DJSM-11-65 to CJCS, 11 Jan 65; NSAM No. 323 to SecDef et al., 8 Jan 65, JCS 1778/160-1; 

JMF 9125 (18 Dec 65). NSAM No. 323 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 

896–899.

70. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 17 Feb 65, JCS 1778/157-5; JCSM-133-65 to SecDef, 26 Feb 65, 

JCS 1778/157-6; Memo, SecArmy to USecState, 8 Mar 65, N/H of JCS 1778/157-6, 10 Mar 65; JMF 

9125 (24 Nov 64) sec. 2.

71. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS and ASD(ISA), 21 May 65, JCS 1778/145-13; JCSM-470-65 to 

SecDef, 16 Jun 65, JCS 1778/145-14; JMF 9125/9105 (2 Dec 63) sec. 4.

72. JCS 1778/167, 15 Sep 65; JCSM-703-65 to SecDef, 18 Sep 65, JCS 1778/167-1; JMF 9125 (15 

Sep 65). Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1965, pp. 1020–1021.

73. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 13 Nov 65, JCS 1778/169; JCSM-848-65 to SecDef, 3 Dec 65, JCS 

1778/169-1; JMF 9125 (13 Nov 65) sec. 1.

74. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 13 Dec 65, JCS 1778/169-2; JMF 9125 (13 Nov 65).

75. JCSM-892-65 to SecDef, 17 Dec 65, JCS 1778/169-3; Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 28 Dec 65, 

JCS 1778/169-4; JMF 9125 (13 Nov 65) sec. 1. JCSM-915-65 to SecDef, 30 Dec 65, JCS 1778/169-5; 

Memo, SecArmy to Ambassador Irwin, 30 Dec 65, N/H of JCS 1778/169-5, 30 Dec 65; same file, 

sec. 2.

76. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 24 Aug 66, JCS 1778/179; JCSM-644-66 to SecArmy, 7 Oct 66, 

JCS 1778/179-1; JMF 9125 (24 Aug 66).

77. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 27 Jun 67, JCS 1778/185-2; JMF 933/533 (26 May 67) sec. 2. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 934–936.

78. John N. Irwin II, who since 1965 had been serving as Special Representative for InterOceanic Canal Negotiations.

79. JCSM-395-67 to SecArmy, 13 Jul 67, JCS 1778/185-3; MemCon by CJCS, “Panama Canal 

Treaties,” 19 Jul 67; JCSM-410-67 to SecArmy, 20 Jul 67, JCS 1778/185-4; Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 28 Jul 67, JCS 1778/187-5; JMF 933/533 (26 May 67) sec. 3. 

80. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 941–944, 951–952.

81. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1947, vol. 8 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1972), pp. 105–108.

82. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 30–31.

83. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 20 Aug 64, JCS 1976/540; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 1.

84. JCSM-825-64 to SecDef, 24 Sep 64, JCS 1976/540-1; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 1.

85. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Feb 65, JCS 1976/540-4; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2. 

86. JCSM-138-65 to SecDef, 27 Feb 65, JCS 1976/540-5; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2.

87. Msg, Def 8122 to Buenos Aires, 31 Mar 65; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2.

88. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, p. 295. Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecNav, 18 May 

65, JCS 1976/540-9; Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecNav, 24 May 65, JCS 1976/540-10; JCSM-438-65 

to SecDef, 5 Jun 65, JCS 1976/540-11; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2.

89. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Jun 65, JCS 1976/540-12; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2.

90. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Mar 65, JCS 2315/355; JCSM-244-65 to SecDef, 1 Apr 65, JCS 

2315/355-1; JMF 4060 (4 Mar 65).
295

Notes to Pages 159–164

91. DJSM-434-65 to CJCS, 9 Apr 65; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 May 65, JCS 2315/355-2; JMF 

4060 (4 Mar 65).

92. A military takeover had led the administration to refuse any tank sales. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, p. 329.

93. CSAM-186-67 to JCS, 29 May 67, JCS 2395/13; CSAFM-G-15-67 to JCS, 2 Jun 67, JCS 2395/13-

1; JMF 976/496 (29 May 67). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 513–515, 157.

94. JCSM-392-67 to SecDef, 10 Jul 67, JCS 2395/13-2; JMF 976/496 (29 May 67). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 1013, 1027–1032.

95. JCSM-110-68 to SecDef, 23 Feb 68, JCS 2399/12; JMF 987/467 (18 Jan 68). Memo, DepSecDef 

to CJCS, 19 Mar 68, JCS 1976/570; JMF 976/330 (19 Mar 68) sec. 1.

96. JCSM-318-68 to SecDef, 21 May 68, JCS 1976/570-1; JMF 976/330 (19 Mar 68) sec. 1.

97. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 23 Jul 68, JCS 1976/570-2; JCSM-564-68 to SecDef, 21 Sep 

68, JCS 1976/570-3; JMF 976/330 (19 Mar 68) sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 Dec 68, JCS 

1976/540-4; same file, sec. 2.

98. Memo by Staff Dir, SIG, 27 Sep 67, JCS 2464/45; JCSM-561-67 to SecDef, 20 Oct 67, JCS 

2464/45-2; JCSM-679-67 to SecDef, 6 Dec 67, JCS 2464/45-4; Memo, VADM Blouin to DJS, 16 Oct 

68; JMF 537 (30 Jan 67) sec. 2.

99. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 13 May 68, JCS 1976/572, JMF 976/541 (13 May 68). CSAM-248-68 

to JCS, 27 May 68, JCS 1976/573; CSAFM-F-8-68 to JCS, 12 Jun 68; Note to Control Div., “JCS 

1976/573,” 12 Jun 68; JCS 1976/573-3, 26 Jul 68, and Dec On, 2 Aug 68; JMF 976/496 (27 May 68).

100. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 159–161. Recent legislation added potential 

complications. The Conte-Long amendment required the President to withhold economic 

assistance to any “under-developed country” using military assistance funds to acquire “sophisticated weapon systems.” The Symington amendment stipulated that the President terminate 

economic development loans and PL–480 assistance to any country engaging in military expenditures “to a degree which materially interferes with its development.”

Chapter 10. Upheaval in the Middle East

1. “Egypt” is used here for convenience, although after dissolution of its union with Syria the 

country formally remained the “United Arab Republic.”

2. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Problem of Palestine,” 10 Oct 47, JCS 1684/3; CJCS 092 Palestine 

(5-3-46) sec. 3.

3. In 1964, Washington persuaded Bonn to make a secret tank sale, on condition that West 

Germany could stop shipments if the arrangement became public knowledge. Nasser learned of 

the deal, publicly denounced it, and embarrassed Bonn by entering into economic arrangements 

with East Germany. Msg, Bonn 3050 to SecState, 15 Feb 65; CJCS 091 Jordan (Arms for Jordan).

4. Msg, Tel Aviv 945 to SecState, 8 Feb 65, CJCS 091 Jordan (Arms for Jordan). Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 18 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. 

of State, 2000), pp. 211–212, 283. Created in 1964, the United Arab Command was charged with 

protecting the water diversion project and preparing for an offensive campaign. Michael B. 

Oren, Six Days of War (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), p. 20.

5. Msgs, SecState 446 to Amman, 9 Feb 65; SecState 727 to Tel Aviv, 10 Feb 65; and SecState 

736 to Tel Aviv, 11 Feb 65; CJCS 091 Jordan (Arms for Jordan). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 18, pp. 288–289, 305–306, 308, 313, 321.
296

Notes to Pages 164–168

6. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 330–331, 358–363, 378–379. These messages are 

also in CJCS 091 Jordan (Arms for Jordan). Johnson also had sought “complete assurances with 

respect to the non-acquisition and non-manufacture of nuclear weapons” as well as “favorable 

consideration” to accepting safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Eshkol simply gave assurance that Israel had no plans for developing nuclear weapons. Ibid., pp. 360, 362.

7. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 398–399, 404–405. Israel also reaffirmed that it 

“will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons” into the area. The United States made clear 

to Hussein that there would be no sales if he purchased arms from the Soviets.

8. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 26 Feb 65; DJSM-306-65 to DASD(ISA), 12 Mar 65, JCS 2369/12; 

JMF 9183 (26 Apr 65) sec. 1.

9. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 26 Apr 65, with Israeli Aide Memoire of 19 Apr attached as Tab 

B, JCS 2369/12; JCSM-337-65 to SecDef, 6 May 65, JCS 2369/12-2; JMF 9183 (26 Apr 65) sec. 1. The 

quoted summary was added to J–5’s draft at General Johnson’s initiative. CSAM-250-65 to JCS, 

4 May 65; same file. JCSM-337 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 448–450.

10. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, 12 Jun 65, JCS 2369/12-4; Memo for Record by Col. J. 

E. Murphy, “Tank Sales to Israel”; JMF 9183 (26 Apr 65) sec. 1. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 18, pp. 469–470, 483. Providing M-48A2Cs meant that some US Army units had to continue 

using older M-48A1s. Encl B to JCS 2369/16-1; JMF 889/498 (20 Jan 67).

11. “Proceedings of the October 12–13, 1965, Talks Between the United States and Israel 

Regarding Aircraft”; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Nov 65; JMF 9183 (26 Apr 65) sec. 1A. DJSM1435-65 to DASD(ISA), 3 Dec 65, same file, sec. 1.

12. The new A-6 Intruder, much more expensive and complicated than the A–4, could be 

made capable of delivering nuclear as well as conventional weapons. Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, p. 551.

13. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 552–554.

14. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 571–573. Memo for Record by Col. J. E. Murphy, 

“US Aircraft Sales to Israel and Jordan,” 31 Mar 66; Memo for Record by Col. Murphy, “Israel Aircraft Procurement,” 19 May 66; DJSM-866-66 to CJCS, 9 Jul 66; JMF 9183/5410 (14 Feb 66). Israel 

also requested, and the administration refused, permission to purchase napalm, Sidewinder 

air-to-air missiles, and Bullpup air-to-ground missiles. In September, a study by CIA, DIA, and 

State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that “Israel retains qualitative superiority 

over any of the various combinations of Arab states with which it could be expected to come 

into direct conflict.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 633–634.

15. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, p. 683.

16. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 671–672.

17. Dept. of State Bulletin, 26 Dec 66, pp. 974–978.

18.DJSM-1520-66 to CJCS, 18 Nov 66; CNOM-238-66 to JCS, 25 Nov 66, JCS 1887/702; JCS 

1887/702-1, 30 Nov 66; JMF 9180 (25 Nov 66). Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 30 Nov 66, JCS 

1887/702-3; DJSM-1574-66 to CJCS, 1 Dec 66, JCS 1887/704; JMF 9184 (28 Nov 66) sec. 1. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 690–693.

19. JCS 1887/703-1, 1 Dec 66; CSAM-493-66 to JCS, 2 Dec 66; CSAFM-1-5-66 to JCS, 5 Dec 66; 

JCSM-751-66 to SecDef, 5 Dec 66, JCS 1887/703-1; JMF 9184 (28 Nov 66) sec. 1. Printed in Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 700–702.

20. Memo for Record by Col. C. V. Alba, 7 Dec 66, JCS 1887/703-5, JMF 9184 (28 Nov 66) sec. 1.

21. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 8 Dec 66, JCS 1887-703-6; JCSM-765-66 to SecDef, 9 Dec 66, JCS 

1887/703-7; Memo, DASD(ISA) to SecDef, 9 Dec 66, JCS 1887/703-9; JMF 9184 (28 Nov 66) sec. 2.
297

Notes to Pages 168–172

22. DJSM-1628-66 to CJCS, 12 Dec 66, JCS 1887/703-10; Memo for Record by Col. Alba, “Military and Supporting Assistance to Jordan,” 13 Dec 66, JCS 1887/703-11; JMF 9184 (28 Nov 66) 

sec. 2. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 711–713, 719.

23. DJSM-1657-66 to CJCS, 17 Dec 66; JMF 9184 (28 Nov 66) sec. 2. Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 724–725, 728–730. US Strike Command History, 1967, pp. 76–77. The 

F–104 instructors withdrew in May when Arab-Israeli hostilities seemed imminent. Clea L. 

Bunch, “Strike at Samu: Jordan, Israel, the United States, and the Origins of the Six-Day War,” 

Diplomatic History, January 2008, pp. 68–69.

24. Memo, DASD(ISA) to JCS, 20 Jan 67, JCS 2369/16; JCSM-55-67 to SecDef, 2 Feb 67, JCS 

2369/16-1; JMF 889/460 (20 Jan 67). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 756–757.

25. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 46–47.

26. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 54–55, 67–72, 83–84.

27. Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Mar 57, p. 393. But Secretary of State Dulles also said, during 

a press conference, “I do not think that the United States, in the absence at least of a treaty or 

congressional action, has authority to defend ships of another registry.” Ibid., p. 402.

28. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1967, p. 562. Foreign Relations of the United 

States: 1964–1968, vol. 19 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2004), pp. 

72–74.

29. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 87–91.

30. WSEG Study, “Critical Incident No. 14: Some Aspects of US Involvement in the Middle 

East Crisis, May-June 1967,” p. 28.

31. WSEG Study, “Middle East Crisis,” pp. 29–30.

32. Msg, State 203642 to London, 26 May 67, “Middle East Crisis, vol. 2, Cables (cont.), 5/67,” 

Doc. 15, Box 105, National Security Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 116–117.

33. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 118-122, 127-136, 140-146. The CIA concluded 

that Israel “almost certainly” could win air superiority over the Sinai in 24 hours if it struck 

first, and in two or three days even if Egypt hit first, and that Israel could breach Egypt’s double 

defense line in the Sinai within several days, while containing attacks from Syria or Jordan. 

Ibid., pp. 138-139.

34. Msg, Cairo 8007 to SecState, 26 May 67, “Middle East Crisis, vol. 1, Cables, 5/67,” Box 104, 

Doc. 15-b, National Security Files, Johnson Library.

35. In its draft JCSM, J-5 had favored Course IV. At Admiral McDonald’s urging, the Joint 

Chiefs chose Course II instead. JCS 1887/712, 25 May 67; CNOM-141-67 to JCS, 26 May 67; JMF 

898/329 (25 May 67).

36. JCSM-301-67 to SecDef, 27 May 67, JCS 1887/712; JMF 898/329 (25 May 67). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 171–172.

37. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 159–160, 162–164. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 

122–124.

38. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 177, 173. Memo for Record by VCNO, “Discussion with Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson,” 29 May 67, CJCS 091 Israel/UAR Conflict, May/June 1967.

39. Foreign Relations: 1964–68, vol. 19, pp. 187–194. In August 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin 

resolution authorized the President to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed 

force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 

requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.” Johnson used this as authority to bomb North 

Vietnam and send ever larger ground forces into South Vietnam.
298

Notes to Pages 173–177

40. The Director, Joint Staff, had just reported that Israel could continue its current state of 

readiness indefinitely without foreign help. Full and prolonged mobilization, however, would 

prove increasingly harmful to the civilian economy. The Director further advised that Israeli 

stockpiles were sufficient to support sustained combat for 30 days. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to 

DJS et al., “Israeli Military Requirements During Protracted Mobilization or Hostilities,” 26 May 

67; DJSM-688-67 to ASD(I&L), 1 Jun 67; JMF 898/434 (26 May 67).

41. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 237–244.

42. Cosmas, The JCS and the War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 3, pp. 55-60.

43. JCSM-310-67 to SecDef, 2 Jun 67, JCS 1887/713; JMF 889/329 (25 May 67).

44. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 259-262. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 132–138. 

Tom Segev, 1967 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), pp. 311–320.

45. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 244–246, 262–264. Segev, 1967, pp. 329–337; the 

Eshkol quote is on p. 329. On 4 June, Rostow provided the President with a detailed scenario for 

pursuing a diplomatic settlement while organizing a forcing of the blockade. Ibid., pp. 272–277.

46. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 170-277. In June 1967, Israel’s combat aircraft were of French 

manufacture; Egypt’s were Soviet-supplied.

47. Back on 1 June, Israel asked permission to purchase one Hawk battery and for loans of 140 

M-60 tanks with 105-mm guns and 48 A-4s. On 5 June, the Director, Joint Staff, recommended 

rejection. Since Israel was militarily superior to Egypt and Syria, he surmised that Israel saw 

a “desperate need for immediate visible indication of US military support.” At the moment, 

however, an “evenhanded” approach seemed wise. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, “Israeli military 

Requests, 1 June 1967,” 2 Jun 67; DJSM-709-67 to ASD(I&L), 5 Jun 67; JMF 898/434 (26 May 67).

48. JCSM-315-67 to SecDef, 6 Jun 67, JCS 1887/714; JMF 898/396 (3 Jun 67). Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 320-321, 330-331. USAFE Actions in the Middle East Crisis: June 1967. 

On 2 September, Saudi Arabia resumed oil shipments to all countries, effectively ending the 

embargo. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 34 (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1999), pp. 431–433, 467–471.

49. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 8 Jun 67; Memo, McGeorge Bundy to Special Cmte, 9 Jun 

67, JCS 1887/718; JMF 898/499 (CY 67).

50. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 409, 410, 414.

51. WSEG Critical Incident Study, “Middle East Crisis,” pp. 126–128.

52. A post-mortem attributed this mishandling to (1) human error, (2) the high volume of 

traffic, and (3) failure to appreciate the urgency surrounding Liberty’s situation. JCSM-379-67 

to SecDef, 1 Jul 67; JMF 898/392 (8 Jun 67) sec. 1. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 19, pp. 596–597.

53. These are fully transcribed in A. Jay Cristol, The Liberty Incident (Washington, DC: 

Brassey’s, 2002), pp. 209–223.

54. The above paragraphs draw upon: William D. Gerhard and Henry W. Millington, “Attack 

on a Sigint Collector, the USS Liberty,” 1981, National Security Agency/Central Security Service. 

“Report of the JCS Fact-Finding Team, USS Liberty Incident,” 9-20 Jun 67; JMF 898/392 (8 Jun 

67) sec. 1A. Memo, Col. A. A. Jordan to DJS, 11 Aug 67; same file, sec. 2. CM-2567-67 to SecDef, 

10 Aug 67; same file, sec. 4.

55. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, ftnt. 5 on p. 799. Jay Cristol concluded that the 

attack resulted from a mistake in identification, involving neither a conspiracy nor US complicity in a cover-up. The Liberty Incident, pp. 199–200.

56. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Jun 67, JCS 1887/719; JMF 898 (16 Jun 67).
299

Notes to Pages 177–180

57. J–5’s draft had said simply that polarization would create an environment in which 

the “possibility” of further Arab-Israeli conflict “would be increased.” The JCS adopted more 

forceful wording at General Johnson’s urging. JCS 1887/720-1, 26 Jun 67; CSAM-232-67 to JCS, 

26 Jun 67; JMF 898 (16 Jun 67). In October 1973, the Chiefs’ forecast about a new war in which 

the United States would have to choose sides was fulfilled to the letter.

58. General Johnson wanted to say, instead, that Israel “has very little to offer,” and that 

base and overflight rights would be “extremely tenuous.” CSAM-232-67 to JCS, 26 Jun 67; JMF 

898 (16 Jun 67).

59. JCSM-374-67 to SecDef, 29 Jun 67, JCS 1887/720-1; JMF 898 (16 Jun 67). OSD acknowledgement is in Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Jul 67, N/H of JCS 1887/721, 26 Jul 67; JMF 898 (19 

Jun 67).

60. Special State-Defense Study Group, “Near East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa: A 

Recommended American Strategy,” Jul 67; JMF 821/520 (17 Jul 67) sec. 1A.

61. SM-565-67 to CJCS, 19 Aug 67, JCS 1887/731-1; JMF 821/520 (17 Jul 67) sec. 1.

62. DJSM-1191-67 to Dir DIA, 29 Sep 67; IRG/NEA 45-67 to SIG, 14 Nov 67; J5SM-2105-67 to 

Secy, JCS, 21 Dec 67; JMF 821/520 (17 Jul 67).

63. Memo, McGeorge Bundy to Special Cmte., “Exceptions to Interim Military Aid Policy in 

the Middle East,” 11 Jul 67, JCS 1887/730; JMF 898 (CY 67). Memo of Conv by Col. A. A. Jordan, 

“Israeli Arms Requests,” 19 Jul 67, JCS 2369/22-1; JMF 889 (29 Jul 67). Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 

22 Jul 67, CJCS 091 Israel. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 711–712.

64. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Jul 67, JCS 2369/22; JCSM-474-67 to SecDef, 25 Aug 67, JCS 

2369/22-1; JMF 898 (19 Jul 67).

65. Memo for Record by Col. J. E. Murphy, “DOD Discussions with General Weizman,” 13 Aug 

[actually Sep] 67; JMF 889/460 (6 Nov 67) sec. 1. Verbatim transcripts are in secs. 1A, 1B, and 1C. 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 822–823.

66. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 783–785.

67. CSAFM-I-10-67 to JCS, 15 Sep 67; JCSM-523-67 to SecDef, 22 Sep 67, JCS 1887/737; JMF 

898/495 (15 Sep 67).

68. Many in Congress held that Jordan had attacked Israel in the face of (1) legal conditions 

providing US equipment for defensive purposes only and (2) Israel’s appeal to Hussein for mutual 

restraint. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 940–941.

69. Memo, Exec Secy, State Dept. to SecDef, n.d., JCS 1887/738; JMF 898/430 (CY 67) Misc. JCS 

1887/741-3, 13 Nov 67; JMF 898 (27 Oct 67). Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Nov 67, JCS 1887/737-1; 

JMF 898/495 (15 Sep 67). Dept. of State Bulletin, p. 652. Subsequently, the Israelis said they no 

longer wanted APCs. TP for DepSecDef and CJCS (SIG Mtg of 22 Nov 67), “US Arms Policy for 

the Near East and North Africa,” n.d.; JMF 898 (27 Oct 67).

70. “SIG Record of Discussion and Agreement of 21st Meeting of 14 September 1967,” 18 Sep 

67, JCS 2464/44; JMF 537 (30 Jan 67). Memo, Staff Dir to IRG/NEA, 9 Nov 67, JCS 1887/741-2; 

JMF 898 (27 Oct 67).

71. SM-771-67 to CJCS, 16 Nov 67, JCS 1887/741-3; TP for DepSecDef and CJCS (SIG Mtg of 22 

Nov 67), “US Arms Policy for the Near East and North Africa”; JMF 898 (27 Oct 67).

72. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1967, p. 634.

73. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Jun 67, JCS 1887/721; JCSM-373-67 to SecDef, 29 Jun 67, JCS 

1887/721-1; JMF 898 (19 Jun 67). OSD acknowledgement is Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Jul 

67, N/H of JCS 1887/721-1, 26 Jul 67, same file. Israel secretly informed the US government that it 

would withdraw from the Golan Heights and the Sinai in return for direct negotiations about a 
300

Notes to Pages 180–184

peace treaty. Nothing came of this initiative, which did not mention the West Bank, Jerusalem, 

or Gaza. Segev, 1967, pp. 500–501.

74. Nina J. Noring and Walter B. Smith II, “The Withdrawal Clause in UN Security Council 

Resolution 242 of 1967,” Feb 78, pp. 4-10, State Dept. Historical Office. Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 623-628, 674-677, 688-694, 695-697, 720-723, 834-838. Walt Rostow mentioned an intention, never carried out, “to tell Eban frankly that we’ve been disturbed by Israeli 

actions that make Israel look as if it is being so hard-nosed that it doesn’t care whether it kills 

chances for a peace settlement or not.” Ibid., p. 941.

75. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 914–916, 991–994, 1018–1020, 1036, 1061–1063.

76. “Record of Discussion and Decisions at the 26th SIG Meeting on November 30, 1967,” 13 Dec 

67, JCS 2464/30; JMF 537 (30 Jan 67). Memo, ActgSecState to Pres, 11 Dec 67, JCS 1887/742; JMF 

889/460 (11 Dec 67). Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 20 (Washington, 

DC Dept. of State Historical Office, 2001), pp. 23–25, 29–30.

77. Apps A and B to JCSM-700-67 to SecDef, 19 Dec 67, JCS 2369/24-1; JMF 889/460 (6 Nov 

67) sec. 1.

78. CM-2837-67 for Record, 16 Dec 67, JCS 1887/744; JMF 889/075 (16 Dec 75), Memo, Col. A. 

C. Greenleaf to CJCS, 13 Dec 67, JCS 2369/24; JCSM-700-67 to SecDef, 19 Dec 67, JCS 2369/24-1; 

Memos, DepSecDef to USecState and Walt Rostow, 29 Dec 67, JCS 2369/24-2; JMF 889/460 (6 

Nov 67) sec. 1. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 20, pp. 42-43.

79. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 20, pp. 79-99. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 6 Feb 68, JCS 

2369/26; JMF 889/460 (6 Nov 67) sec. 1. Printed in ibid., p. 141.

80. Memo, ASD(I&L) to CJCS, 24 Jan 68, JCS 2369/25; JCSM-57-68 to SecDef, 26 Jan 68, JCS 

2369/25-1; Memo, ASD(I&L) to SecDef, 27 Jan 68, JCS 2369/25-2; JMF 889/460 (6 Nov 67) sec. 1. 

Subsequently, the administration agreed to sell 12 more A-4s as replacements for normal attrition, raising the total to 100 Skyhawks. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, n.d. [c. 19 Sep 68], CJCS 

091 Israel.

81. CM-2734-67 to SecDef, 3 Nov 67, CJCS 091 Jordan. “Record of Discussion and Decisions 

at the 26th SIG Meeting on 30 November 1967,” 13 Dec 67, JCS 2464/60; JMF 537 (30 Jan 67). 

CM-2929-68 for Record, 21 Jan 68, JCS 2461/3; Memo, Dir, DCI, to Pres, 25 Jan 68, JCS 2461/4; 

JMF 891 (21 Jan 68). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 20, p. 54.

82. Memo, SecState and SecDef to Pres, 6 Feb 68, JCS 2461/5; JMF 891 (21 Jan 68). Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 20, pp. 143-146, 248. Subsequently, Jordanians again sought 155-mm 

guns—and were again rebuffed. J5M-1258-68 to DJS, 30 Jul 68; DJSM-961-68 to CJCS, 1 Aug 68; 

same file.

83. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 20, pp. 241–245. Dept. of State Bulletin, 15 Apr 68, 

pp. 508–511.

84. Memo, ActgDir, DIA, to CJCS, 1 Apr 68, CJCS 091 Israel. Dept. of State Bulletin, 24 Jun 

68, pp. 849–851.

85. IRG/NEA, “US Policy in the Middle East,” 19 Jul 68, Att to Memo, L. D. Battle to USecState, 

19 Jul 68, JCS 1887/753; JMF 898/530 (19 Jul 68) sec. 1.

86. SM-604-68 to CJCS, 6 Sep 68, JCS 1887/753-2; JMF 898/530 (19 Jul 68) sec. 1.

87. Memo, DepSecDef to USecState, 26 Nov 68, JCS 2464/143; Memo, USecState to DepSecDef, 

5 Dec 68, JCS 2464/143-1; Memo, Staff Dir, SIG, to all SIG Members, 17 Jan 69, JCS 2464/153; JMF 

898/530 (19 Jul 68) sec. 2.

88. During April and May, five studies of the Arab-Israeli military balance and its relation 

to an F-4 decision led to the conclusion that, if France decided not to deliver Mirages (and de 

Gaulle did so decide), “Israel beginning sometime in the last half of 1969 will at least face an 
301

Notes to Pages 184–188

unacceptable ratio of high-performance Arab aircraft.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 

20, pp. 351–355.

89. CM-3275-68 to Pres, 3 May 68, JCS 1887/749; CM-3411-68 to SecDef, 18 Jun 68; JMF 898/292 

(3 May 68). The Director of the Joint Staff’s draft of CM-3411 stated less equivocally that “there 

is a legitimate military need for the early delivery of F–4 aircraft.” DJSM-740-68 to CJCS, 17 Jun 

68; same file. It is noteworthy, also, that the corporate JCS did not provide an opinion.

90. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 20, p. 548, 555–556, 563.

91. Until December 1967, Rabin had been Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces.

92. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 20, pp. 580–582, 585–586, 604–607, 611–616, 618, 

627–630, 656–658, 659–661. The quote by Clifford is on p. 586; those by and about Rabin are on 

p. 614 and 618; the assurance is quoted on p. 661.

93. Memo, SecAF to ASD(ISA), 21 Nov 68; Memo of Conv. by CAPT R. P. Hilton, “Meeting of 

Ambassador Rabin with General Wheeler on 22 November 1968,” 23 Nov 68; CJCS 091 Israel.

94. Memo of Conversation, “Israeli F-4 Aircraft and US Intelligence Requirements,” 25 Nov 

68, CJCS 091 Israel.

95. CM-3824-68 to SecDef, 11 Dec 68, JCS 1887/756; JMF 898/530 (19 Jul 68) and CJCS 091 

Israel.

96. Public Papers, Johnson, 1968, p. 948.

97. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 22 (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Historian, Dept. of State, 1999), pp. 94–97, 181.

98. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Aug 65, JCS 2315/367-1; JCSM-712-65 to SecDef, 23 Sep 65, 

JCS 2315/367-2; JMF 4060 (12 Aug 65) sec. 1.

99. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 22, pp. 209–210, 251–252, 257. Msg, Def 1848 to Tehran, 17 Jan 66; Memo, DASD(ISA) to 18 Jan 66, JCS 1714/179; JCSM-67-66 to SecDef, 1 Feb 66, 

JCS 1714/179-2; JMF 9181 (17 Jan 66) sec. 1. “Report of the United States Military Survey Team 

to Iran, 16 Feb-3 Mar 66,” JCS 1714/179-3, same file, sec. 1A. JCSM-240-66 to SecDef, 15 Apr 66, 

JCS 1714/179-3; same file, sec. 1. The Shah permitted US technical intelligence operations. In 

November 1965, after the Indo-Pakistani War strained US-Pakistani relations, President Johnson approved establishing in Iran alternatives for intelligence facilities in Pakistan. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 22, pp. 52-53, 260-261.

100. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to B. H. Read, 10 Jun 66, JCS 1714/179-5; JMF 9181 (17 Jan 66) sec. 

1. JCS 1714/182, 29 Jul 66; Msg, USCINCSTRIKE to JCS, 251911Z Jul 66, JCS IN 15275; JMF 9181 

(17 Jan 66) sec. 1. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 22, pp. 262–265.

101. Ltr, DepUSecState Alexis Johnson to DepSecDef Vance, 6 Jul 66, JCS 1714/179-6; JMF 

9181 (17 Jan 66) sec. 1. JCS 1714/182, 29 Jul 66; same file, sec. 2. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 22, pp. 269–270, 276–280.

102. Memo, SecAF to DepSecDef, 12 Jul 66, JCS 1714/181; JMF 9181 (12 Jul 66). Msg, Tehran 

451 to Pres, 29 Jul 66, CJCS 091 Iran.

103. JCSM-498-66 to SecDef, 1 Aug 66, JCS 171/182; JMF 9181 (17 Jan 66) sec. 2. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 22, pp. 303–305, 309–314. The 1964 Memorandum of Understanding would be extended through FY 1970, adding $20 million for cash purchases and up to $50 

million in credits. Ibid., p. 310.

104. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 22, pp. 338–339.

105. “Dept. of State National Policy Paper: Iran,” 2 Feb 67, JCS 1714/183-3; JMF 9181 (23 Aug 

66) sec. 1. Other sections are printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 22, pp. 341–351. 

During drafting of the NPP, the Joint Chiefs suggested changes that would put somewhat 

greater emphasis on the Shah’s independence from and disillusionment with the United 
302

Notes to Pages Notes to Pages 188–195

States. JCSM-588-66 to SecDef, 15 Sep 66, JCS 1714/183-1; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to J. A. Yager (State 

Dept.), 23 Nov 66; same file.

106. Memo, ActgSecState to Pres, 19 Apr 68, JCS 1714/188; JMF 887/499 (CY 68). Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 22, pp. 505–507, 525–528.

107. DJSM-790-68 to ASD(ISA), 25 Jun 68; JMF 887/081 (CY 68).

108. STRICOM bore geographic responsibilities for the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

109. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Aug 68, JCS 1887/754; JCSM-513-68 to SecDef, 21 Aug 68, JCS 

1887/754-1; SM-581-68 to USCINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, 21 Aug 68, JCS 1887/754-1; JMF 887/520 

(9 Aug 68) sec. 1. “Report of the US Military Survey Team to Iran, Sep 68,” same file, sec. 1A. 

Ltr, USCINCSTRIKE to JCS, 30 Sep 68, JCS 1887/754-2; JCSM-615-68 to SecDef, 18 Oct 68, JCS 

1887/754-3; Memo, Capt R. D. Pace to Joint Staff et al., 16 Jan 69; same file, sec. 1.

110. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 22, pp. 574-576. Tab to J–5 TP for CJCS, 18 Dec 68; 

JMF 887/081 (CY 68). Memo, Pres to SecState, 27 Dec 68, JCS 2315/455; JMF 455 (25 Nov 68).

111. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, “Pakistan,” 1 Jul 64; DJSM-1145-64 to ASD(ISA), 8 Jul 64; JMF 

9070 (13 Feb 65).

112. Msg, Tehran 852 to SecState, 13 Feb 65, JCS IN 27011; Msg, Ankara 1219 to SecState, 17 

Feb 65; JMF 9070 (13 Feb 65).

113. JCSM-209-65 to SecDef, 24 Mar 65, JCS 2273/413; JMF 9070/5410 (20 Mar 65). JCSM-201-

65 to SecDef, 20 Mar 65, JCS 2273/412; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 31 Mar 65, JCS 2273/412-1; JMF 

9070 (13 Feb 65).

114. Memo, CNO to CJCS, 5 Apr 65, JCS 2273/415; JMF 9070/5410 (5 Apr 65).

115. CM-1333-66 to JCS, 13 Apr 66, JCS 2273/428-3; JMF 9070 (3 Feb 66). JCSM-153-68 to 

SecDef, 15 Mar 68, JCS 2273/463; JMF 804/075 (9 Mar 68).

116. CM-2251-67 to JCS, 19 Apr 67, JCS 2273/439-4; JMF 9070 (19 Dec 66) sec. 2. Since the 1965 

war, Pakistan had been drawing closer to China. Subsequently, Pakistan compelled an indefinite 

postponement of the Council of ministers meeting.

117. JCSM-153-68 to SecDef, 15 Mar 68, JCS 2273/4463; JMF 804/075 (9 Mar 68).

Chapter 11. Africa: Avoiding Direct Intervention

1 .South Africa’s population consisted of 3 million whites, 12 million blacks, 1.5 million 

mulattoes, and 500,000 Asians.

2. Dept. of State, “National Policy Paper: South Africa,” 31 Jul 64; JMF 9110.4 (5 Aug 64) sec. 1.

3. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Aug 64, JCS 2121/183; JCSM-716-64 to SecDef, 18 Aug 64, JCS 

2121/183-1; JMF 9110.1 (5 Aug 64) sec. 1.

4. Memo, ASD(ISA) to Chmn, State Dept. Policy Planning Council, 29 Sep 64, JCS 2121/183-2; 

“Views of the JCS on NPP on South Africa,” JCS 2121/183-4; JMF 9110.1 (5 Aug 64) sec. 1. Dept. of 

State, “National Policy Paper: South Africa,” 18 Jan 65; same file, sec 1A (IR 1854). DJSM-215-65 

to CJCS, 23 Feb 65; same file, sec. 1. Portions are printed in Foreign Relations of the United 

States: 1964–1968, vol. 24 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1999), pp. 

1007–1019.

5. Figures are taken from Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS 24 Mar 65, JCS 2121/189-1; JMF 9110 (24 

Feb 65).

6. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Feb 65, JCS 2121/189; JCSM-268-65 to SecDef, 13 Apr 65, 

JCS 2121/189-2; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 3 May 65, JCS 2121/189-3; JMF 910 (24 Feb 65). The last 

of these is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 1025–1026. During the drafting 
Notes to Pages 

303

Notes to Pages 195–200

of JCSM-268-65, General Johnson observed that “the South African problem is being exploited 

by liberal and left-wing groups and threatens to assume within the next year the proportions 

of a major US domestic political issue.” CSAM-186-65 to JCS, 8 Apr 65; same file.

7. Dept. of State Bulletin, 6 Dec 65, pp. 916–917.

8. Memo for Record by BG Sibley, “Meeting, Southern Rhodesia-Zambia Problems and Plans 

Group, 3 Dec 65,” 7 Dec 65; JMF 9112.5 (6 Dec 65). Also, Memo for Record by BG Sibley, same 

subj., 8 Dec 65; same file.

9. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 6 Dec 65, JCS 2121/196; JCSM-882-65 to SecDef, 16 Dec 65, JCS 

2121/196-1; JMF 9112.5 (6 Dec 65). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 868–870, 885, 901.

10. JCSM-44-66 to SecDef, 19 Jan 66, JCS 2125/28-2; JMF 9166.2 (7 Jan 66).

11. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 7 Jun 66, JCS 2125/28-3; JMF 9166.2 (7 Jan 66). Alternative tracking 

facilities in Madagascar, Spain, and Ascension Island would be available by June 1966. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 1030, 1035.

12. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 1065–1066.

13. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 1026–1028, 1051–1052, 1067–1069.

14. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Feb 67, JCS 2121/205; Memo, SecNav to DepSecDef, 4 

Mar 67, JCS 2121/205-1; Memo, SecAF to DepSecDef, 16 Mar 67, JCS 2121/205-2; JCSM-191-67 to 

SecDef, 5 Apr 67, JCS 2121/205-3; JMF 855/470 (21 Feb 67). All but the SecAF memo are printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 1070–1072. Ltr, DepSecDef to USecState, 6 Jun 

67, JCS 2121/205-4; same file.

15. JCSM-525-67 to SecDef, 26 Sep 67, JCS 2121/206; JMF 855/532 (21 Sep 67).

16. In August 1967, when USS Forrestal and four destroyers sailed around the Cape of Good 

Hope, they had been refueled by British oilers. This time, British oilers were unavailable.

17. Ltr, DepSecDef to USecState 19 Oct 67, JCS 2121/206-1; Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 15 

Nov 67, JCS 2121/206-3; JMF 855/532 (21 Sep 67). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 

1109–1110.

18. It covered white-ruled South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique along with black-ruled Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

19. State Dept. Policy Planning Council, “National Policy Paper: Southern Africa,” Nov 68, 

JCS 2121/211; JMF 821/532 (5 Nov 68).

20. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Nov 68, JCS 2121/211-1; JMF 821/532 (5 Nov 68) sec. 1. JCS 

2121/211-2, 26 Nov 68; JCSM-739-68 to SecDef, 12 Dec 68, JCS 2121/211-3; same file, sec. 2. The 

draft that the JCS reviewed had been slightly amended by the IRG and SIG. While JCS-739-68 

was being written, J–5 observed that US military interests would be better served by a policy 

that ignored apartheid, but acknowledged that such an approach would not receive “serious 

consideration.” Encl B to JCS 2121/211-3, 6 Dec 68; same file.

21. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to Chmn, State Dept. Policy Planning Council, 24 Dec 68, JCS 

2121/211-4; JMF 821/532 (5 Nov 68) sec.2.

22. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, p. 292.

23. Fred E. Wagoner, Dragon Rouge (Washington, DC; National Defense University, 1980), 

pp. 15, 29. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 11 Jan 64, JCS 2262/141; JCSM-63-64 to SecDef, 30 Jan 64, 

JCS 2262/141-1; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Feb 64, JCS 2262/141-3; JMF 9111/4060 (11 Jan 64).

24. Quoted in App to JCSM-756-64 to SecDef, 1 Sep 64, JCS 2262/150; JMF 9111 (25 Aug 64).

25. App to JCSM-756-64 to SecDef, 1 Sep 64, JCS 2262/150; JMF 9111 (25 Aug 64). Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
304

Notes to Pages 200–205

Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 69-71. This account, while thoroughly researched, is 

relentlessly critical in its interpretation of US policies and motives.

26. JCSM-756-64 to SecDef, 1 Sep 64, JCS 2262/150; JMF 9111 (25 Aug 64).

27. J-5 T 108-64, “The Congo Situation,” 27 Aug 64; JMF 9111 (25 Aug 64). Wagoner, Dragon 

Rouge, pp. 43–44.

28. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Sep 64, JCS 2262/151; JCSM-788-64 to SecDef, 12 Sep 64, 

JCS 2262/151-1; JMF 9111 (4 Sep 64). Wagoner, Dragon Rouge, pp. 54–56.

29. Msg, JCS 9807 to CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, 14 Oct 64; JCS 2363/38-1, 4 Nov 64; Msg, JCS 

1825 to CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, 13 Nov 64, JCS 2363/38-1; JMF 3149 (14 Oct 64) sec. 1.

30. Msg, SecState CAS 58850 to Leopoldville, 23 Oct 64; JMF 9111 (25 Oct 64). Wagoner, 

Dragon Rouge, pp. 76–77, 81.

31. This mirrored a crucial debate over whether the air campaign being planned against 

North Vietnam should consist of a hard knock advocated by the JCS or graduated pressure 

favored by OSD and State.

32. JCSM-903-64 to SecDef, 27 Oct 64, JCS 262/155; Memo, DASD(ISA) to M. W. Roche, 15 Jan 

65, Att to N/H of JCS 2262/155, 26 Jan 65; JMF 9111 (25 Oct 64).

33. General Wheeler kept abreast of developments through conversations with Under Secretary Harriman. Wagoner, Dragon Rouge, pp. 139, 202.

34. Wagoner, Dragon Rouge, pp. 130–193. USEUCOM Annual Historical Report: 1964, pp. 

43–53.

35. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, rescue missions planned for Bunia and Watsa 

were cancelled.

36. Msg, USUN New York 2313 to SecState, 22 Dec 64; Msg, SecState 1372 to Brussels, 22 

Dec 64; JCSM-1071-64 to SecDef, 24 Dec 64, JCS 2262/160; Memo, DASD(ISA) to USecState, 30 

Dec 64, N/H of JCS 2262/160; JMF 9111 (22 Dec 64). Dept. of State Bulletin, 25 Jan 65, p. 120.

37. Ltr, General Adams to JCS, 18 Dec 64, JCS 22622/154; JMF 9111 (18 Dec 64).

38. JCSM-1090-64 to SecDef, 31 Dec 64, JCS 2262/159-1; JMF 9111 (18 Dec 64).

39. Memo, DASD(ISA) to M. W. Roche, 15 Jan 65, N/H of JCS 2262/155; Msg, SecState 1831 to 

Leopoldville, 19 Jan 65; JCSM-48-65 to SecDef, 21 Jan 65, JCS 2262/155-1; JMF 9111 (25 Oct 64).

40. JCS 2262/163, 5 Mar 65; JCSM-185-65 to SecDef, 16 Mar 65, JCS 2262/163; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 20 Mar 65, JCS 2262/163-1; JMF 9111 (18 Feb 65).

41. Ltr, General Adams to JCS, 14 Feb 65, JCS 2262/162; JCSM-198-65 to SecDef, 19 Mar 65, 

JCS 2262/162-1; JMF 9111 (14 Feb 65).

42. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 12 Apr 65, JCS 2262/162-2; Airgram, Brussels A-805 to SecState, 

14 Apr 65, JCS 2262/162-3; JMF 9111 (14 Feb 65) sec. 1. Since Tshombe’s fortunes improved, no 

high-level review took place. J–5 M 2250-65 to SJCS, 7 Dec 65; JMF 9111 (18 Dec 64).

43. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 75, 88, 92, 98, 109–110, 134–135, 137, 147.

44. Anti-Castro Cubans flew Mobutu’s T–28s. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 157–158. 

US Strike Command: Command History, 1967, pp. 26–32. Tshombe died in captivity.

45. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CHMAAG, Addis Ababa, 31 Dec 63, JCS 2262/140-2; JMF 9114/4060 

(29 Oct 63).

46. JCSM-591-64 to SecDef, 11 Jul 64, JCS 2121/180-1; JMF 9114 (14 May 64) sec. 1. Printed in 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 513–514.

47. JCSM-1009-64 to SecDef, 3 Dec 64, JCS 2315/343; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Dec 64, JCS 

2315/343-1; JMF 9114 (22 Oct 64).
305

Notes to Pages 205–210

48. “Dept. of State National Policy Paper: Ethiopia, Part One,” 5 Mar 65, JCS 2262/136-4; JMF 

9114 (5 Mar 65).

49. Memo of Conv, “Ambassador Korry’s Discussion with SecDef McNamara on Military 

Assistance to Ethiopia,” 27 Mar 65, JCS 2449; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 May 65, JCS 2449/2; 

JMF 9114 (17 May 65). CSAM-259-65 to JCS, 11 May 65, JCS 2449/1; JMF 9114 (11 May 65).

50. JCSM-400-65 to SecDef, 24 May 65, JCS 2449/1-1; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Jun 65, JCS 

2449/1-2; JMF 9114 (11 May 65). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 527–529.

51. Ltr, General Adams to JCS, 22 May 65, JCS 2262/136-5; Encl to JCS 2449/3, 22 Jun 65; 

JCSM-509-65 to SecDef, 30 Jun 65, JCS 2449/3; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 9 Jul 65, JCS 2449/3-1; 

JMF 9114 (22 May 65).

52. General Johnson had opposed providing the four UH-1Ds, recommending that all current 

and future production be held as a reserve for Southeast Asia requirements. OSD overruled him. 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, p. 559.

53. Ltr, General Adams to JCS 21 Sep 65, JCS 2449/5-2; JCSM-134-66 to SecDef, 2 Mar 66, JCS 

2449/5-4; Msg, SecState 877 to Addis Ababa, 1 Apr 66; Msg, SecState 878 to Addis Ababa, 2 Apr 

66; JMF 9110 (23 Jul 64) sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Feb 68, JCS 2315/532-3; JMF 495 (18 Dec 

67) sec. 2. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Oct 68, JCS 2458/463; JMF 560 (29 Oct 68). Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 558, 564–571, 586–588.

54. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 2 Nov 66, JCS 2449/11; Memo, SecDef to DDR&E and CJCS, 

14 Nov 66, JCS 2449/11-1; Memo, Dep DDR&E to CJCS, 25 Nov 66, JCS 2449/11-2; Ltr, SecDef to 

USecState, 13 Jan 67, JCS 2449/11-5; JMF 9114 (2 Nov 66). The first and last documents are printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 576–577. According to the Briefing Sheet cited 

below, a draft JCSM emphasized Kagnew’s unique location and lack of acceptable alternatives. 

The final paper, JCSM-770-66, is not in the regular files. Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 2449/11-4,” 7 

Dec 66; JMF 9114 (2 Nov 66).

55. The conclusions of NIE 75-76/67, which formed the basis of Katzenbach’s memo, are in 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 572–573.

56. Ltr, USecState to SecDef, 8 May 67, JCS 2449/11-6; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS and Dir, 

NSA, 15 Jun 67, JCS 2449/11-8; JMF 9114 (2 Nov 66). The first document is printed in Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 576–577.

57. JCSM-397-67 to SecDef, 13 Jul 67, JCS 2449/11-9; JMF 9114 (2 Nov 66). Printed in Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 578-579. Memo, ASD(ISA) to ASD(I&L) and DDR&E, 20 Sep 

67, JCS 2449/11-10; same file. At this point, intelligence collection accounted for about two-thirds 

of the US presence at Kagnew. Memo, RADM Showers to DJS, 16 Jun 67; same file.

58. Memo, DASD(I&L) to ASD(ISA), 28 Mar 68, JCS 2449/11-11; Encl B to JCS 2449/11-13, 18 

Jul 68; JCSM-464-68 to SecDef, 23 Jul 68, JCS 2449/11-13; JMF 832/630 (28 Mar 68) sec. 1.

59. Memo, DepSecDef to USecState and CJCS, 6 Sep 68, JCS 2449/11-14; JMF 832/630 (28 Mar 

68). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 606–607.

Chapter 12. South Asia: US Influence Shrinks

1. State Dept., “National Policy Paper: India,” pt. 1, 6 May 64; State Dept., “National Policy 

Paper: Pakistan,” pt. 1, 6 May 64; JMF 9150/9105 (25 May 64) sec. 1. State Dept., “National Policy 

Series: US Policy Towards India and Pakistan,” 5 May 64; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 25 May 

64, JCS 2271/88; JMF 9105/9105 (25 May 64) (Indian and Pakistan) sec. 1.

2. JCSM-555-64 to SecDef, 26 Jun 64, JCS 2271/88-1; JMF 9150/9105 (25 May 64) (India and 

Pakistan) sec. 2. State Dept. NPP, “Pakistan,” 3 Nov 64, JCS 2271/88-3; JMF 9150/9105 (25 May 
306

Notes to Pages 210–214

64) (Pakistan) sec. 1. State Dept. NPP, “India,” 3 Nov 64, JCS 2271/88-2; JMF 9105/9105 (25 May 

64) (India).

3. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 25 (Washington, DC: Dept. of 

State Historical Office, 2000), pp. 184–186. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Feb 65, JCS 2271/94; 

JCSM-280-65 to SecDef, 17 Apr 65, JCS 2271/94-1; JMF 9154 (2 Feb 65). The only concrete “commitment,” dating from May 1963, pledged the US government to consult with India regarding 

the use of US air power if China launched another attack.

4. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 227–229, 286–287. In 1968, Pakistan was 

awarded 10 percent of the disputed territory in the Rann, including much of the high ground 

where the heaviest fighting took place.

5. Memo, SecDef to ASD(ISA), 13 Jul 65, JCS 2347/45; JMF 9150 (13 Jul 65). Memo, McGeorge 

Bundy to SecDef et al., 6 Jul 65, JCS 2347/35; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 12 Aug 65, JCS 2347/36; 

JMF 9157 (6 Jul 65). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 228–229, 294, 307, 333–334.

6. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 328, ftnt. 2 on p. 343, and ftnt. 2 on p. 367.

7. Central Intelligence believed there was “some secret understanding” between China and 

Pakistan which, however loosely worded, gave the Pakistanis something they considered an 

“ace in the hole.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 359–360.

8. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Sep 65, JCS 2347/37; JCSM-704-65 to SecDef, 18 Sep 65, JCS 

2347/37-1; JMF 9150 (10 Sep 65) sec. 1. Secretary Rusk’s advice to the President was similar: “If 

at the end of the day we are forced to choose between them, India with its much larger population, industrial base, rudimentary democracy, and other potentials would probably be a better 

bet. However, we could never fully support policy goals of either India or Pakistan. The best 

protection of American interests rests in maintaining adequate, though probably not intimate, 

links with both.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, p. 377.

9. Air defense plans, General Wheeler reported, involved deploying four Hawk missile battalions and four tactical fighter squadrons to Amballa and Calcutta. Aircraft could arrive in one 

week, Hawks in four to six weeks. The Chief, US Military Supply Mission, in India reported that 

responding to minor Chinese incursions would require airlifting between 350 and 900 tons daily. 

CM-859-65 to DJS, 18 Sep 65, JCS 2271/100; JMF 9154 (2 Feb 65). CM-870-65 to SecDef, 23 Sep 

65, JCS 2271/100-1; JMF 9154 (18 Sep 65). The full, final JCS report is JCSM-803-65 to SecDef, 5 

Nov 65, JCS 2271/100-2; same file.

10. Memo, ASD(ISA) to Chmn, State Dept. Policy Plng Council, 22 Sep 65, N/H of JCS 2347/37-

1, 24 Sep 65; JMF 9150 (10 Sep 65). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 402, 403, 406, 

424–426.

11. OASD(ISA), “Draft Report on India and Pakistan,” Sep 65; JMF 9150 (10 Sep 65) sec. 1A.

12. JCSM-745-65 to SecDef, 12 Oct 65, JCS 2347/37-2; JMF 9150 (10 Sep 65) sec. 2. Forwarded 

to State via Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState (NESA), 20 Oct 65, N/H of JCS 2347/37-2, 25 

Oct 65; same file.

13. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, p. 530.

14. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 566–568. Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 2347/46-1,” 

13 Jun 66; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 8 Jun 66, JCS 2347/46; JCSM-403-66 to SecDef, 15 Jun 66, 

JCS 2347/46-1; JMF 9150 (24 May 66). JCSM-403 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 25, pp. 685–687.

15. Record of Agreement and Decisions, “SIG Mtg of 14 Feb 67,” 3 Apr 67, JCS 2464/33; JMF 

537 (30 Jan 67) sec. 1. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 833–834.

16. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 891, 910–914. Memo of Conv, “Pakistan,” 25 

Jun 68, JCS 2347/53; JMF 902/430 (CY 68).
307

Notes to Pages 214–217

17. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 837, 903, 914–915, 929.

18. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 934, 949–950, 961.

19. “Chmn’s Summary of Discussion and Decisions at the 40th SIG Mtg on June 27, 1968,” 

JCS 2464/106; JMF 537 (CY 68) sec. 5. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 988, ftnt. 3, 

and 1030. The tank tale became almost impossibly tangled. West Germany had insisted upon 

selling tanks to Pakistan through a third country, which the United States would not approve. 

Likewise, Washington vetoed an M–47 sale by Iran. An arrangement to sell German tanks to 

Italy and thence to Pakistan looked possible, but the Italians had no M-47s of their own, would 

not proceed until they had customers for all 750 they contemplated buying, and demanded 

outrageous prices. Germans insisted upon a clause in the German-Italian contract prohibiting 

resale to Pakistan. Belgium was willing to proceed with a sale to Pakistan, on condition that 

Brussels could inform New Delhi that Belgium was prepared to sell tanks to India on similar 

terms. Ibid., pp. 1000–1001.

20. State Dept. Drafts, “National Policy Papers: India, Pakistan,” pt. 1, 6 May 64; JMF 9150/9105 

(25 May 64) sec. 1. State Dept. Draft, “National Policy Series: US Policy toward India and Pakistan,” 5 May 64; JMF 9150/9105 (25 May 64) sec. 1 (India and Pakistan). Memo, DASD(ISA) to 

CJCS, 25 May 64, JCS 2271/88; JCSM-555-64 to SecDef, 26 Jun 64, JCS 2271/88-1; JMF 9150/9105 

(25 May 64) sec. 2. Dept. of State NPP, “India,” 3 Nov 64, JCS 2271/88-2; JMF 9150/9105 (25 May 

64) (India).

21. Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1964, p. 1379. Memo, 

ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 11 Dec 64, JCS 2320/4; JCSM-41-65 to SecDef, 16 Jan 65, JCS 2320/4-1; JMF 

9082/4610 (11 Dec 64). JCS views were forwarded to State via Memo, DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState 

William Bundy, 18 Feb 65, JCS 2320/4-2; same file. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 

191–193, quotation from p. 193.

22. Memo, ActgDepUSecState to Non-Proliferation Cmte, 25 Feb 65, JCS 1731/858; Memo, 

DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Mar 65, JCS 1731/858-1; JCSM-173-65 to SecDef, 11 Mar 65, JCS 1731/858-

2; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to ActgDepUSecState, 24 Mar 65, N/H of JCS 1731/858-2, 29 Mar 65; JMF 3030 

(25 Feb 65).

23. Ltr, ActgDepUSecState to ASD(ISA), 5 Mar 65, and Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Mar 

65, JCS 1731/858-3; JCSM-213-65 to SecDef, 24 Mar 65, JCS 1731/858-4; JMF 3030 (25 Feb 65).

24. Ltr, Ambassador Thompson to SecDef, 29 Apr 65, JCS 2271/97; JMF 9154 (29 Apr 65).

25. US intelligence estimated that China could stockpile about ten bombs during 1965–67 

and possibly have a few medium range ballistic missiles ready for deployment during 1967–68. 

J–5 T 41-65, 14 May 65; JMF 3050 (1 Mar 65).

26. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 May 65, JCS 2271/97-1; JCSM-358-65 to SecDef, 14 May 65, JCS 

2271/97-2; Ltr, SecDef to Ambassador Thompson, 21 Jun 65, JCS 2271/97-5; JMF 9154 (29 Apr 65). 

27. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate issued in October 1965, “within the 

next few years India probably will detonate a nuclear device and proceed to develop nuclear 

weapons.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, p. 451.

28. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 26 Jan 66, JCS 2271/104; JCSM-80-66 to SecDef, 4 Feb 66, JCS 

2271/104-1; JMF 9154 (26 Jan 66).

29. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 18 Feb 66, JCS 2271/104-2; JMF 9154 (26 Jan 66).

30. While McNamara entirely concurred with Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want 

to go beyond Johnson’s statement of 18 October 1964. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, 

pp. 582–583.

31. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 596–600.
308

Notes to Pages 217–221

32. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 671–673, 709–710, 702. Memo, DASD(ISA) 

to CJCS 28 Jun 66, JCS 2271/107-4; N/H of JCS 2271/107-4, 1 Jul 66; JMF 9154 (4 Jun 66) sec. 1. 

“Record of Agreements and Decisions, Meeting of July 12, 1966,” 13 Jul 66, JCS 2464/13-1; JMF 

9082 (12 Apr 66). NSAM No. 351 to SecState, 10 Jun 66, JCS 2271/107-3; NSAM No. 355 to SecState, 

1 Aug 66, JCS 2271/107-5; JMF 9154 (4 Jun 66) sec. 1.

33. State Dept. Draft Rpt, “The Indian Nuclear Weapon Problem: Security Aspects, A Report 

Under NSAM No. 355,” Dec 66, Encl to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Dec 66, JCS 2271/107-8; JMF 

9154 (4 Jun 66).

34. JCSM-1-67 to SecDef, 4 Jan 67, JCS 2271/107-9; JMF 9154 (4 Jun 66) sec. 2. JCSM-1 was 

forwarded to State; see Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Jan 67, JCS 2271/107-10; same file.

35. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Apr 67, JCS 2271/113; JCSM-203-67 to SecDef, 12 Apr 67, 

JCS 2271/113-1; J-5 T 47-67, 27 Apr 67; JMF 9154 (4 Jun 66) sec. 2. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 25, pp. 850–851.

36. Dept. of State Bulletin, 1 Jul 68, pp. 8–11, and 8 Jul 68, pp. 58–59. Evolution of the NonProliferation Treaty and the long debate over security assurances are described in chap. 5.

37. JCSM-26-62 to SecDef, 11 Jan 62, JCS 570/548; JCSM-592-62 to SecDef, 3 Aug 62, JCS 

570/560; JMF 4920 (19 Dec 61).

38. The US delegation included Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Frank Sloan and Capt. 

Walter Stencil, USN, from the Joint Staff.

39. Memo, DepAsstSecState J. C. Kitchen to SecDef et al., 2 Mar 64, JCS 2294/27-5; Memo, 

DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Mar 64, JCS 2294/28-2; JCSM-312-64 to SecDef, 11 Apr 64, JCS 2294/28-3; 

JMF 91050.1/9105 (11 Nov 63) sec. 2.

40. The other sites, in descending order of importance, were Coetivy, Aldabra, Agalega, 

Farquahr, Ile des Roches, and the Cosmoledos Islands.

41. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 14 Aug 64, JCS 2294/30; JCSM-705-64 to SecDef, 15 Aug 64, JCS 

2294/30-1; “Report of Indian Ocean Islands Survey,” 15 Sep 64; JCSM-871-64 to SecDef, 14 Oct 

64, JCS 2294/30-4; JMF 9150.1 (14 Aug 64). JCSM-871 was forwarded to State via Ltr, DASD(ISA) 

to DepAsstSecState J. C. Kitchen, 19 Oct 64, JCS 2294/30-5; same file.

42. Encl B to JCS 2294/30-7, para 14, 1 Dec 64; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Nov 64, JCS 

2294/30-6; JCSM-1028-64 to SecDef, 10 Dec 64, JCS 2294/30-7; JMF 910 (14 Aug 640. JCSM-1028 

was sent to the State Dept. and from there to the London Embassy. 1st N/H of JCS 2294/30-7, 26 

Jan 65, same file. The Congo rescue is described in chap. 11.

43. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 May 65, JCS 2294/30-8; JCSM-392-65 to SecDef, 20 May 65, 

JCS 2294/30-9; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jun 65, JCS 2294/30-10; JMF 9150.1 (14 Aug 64). Memo, 

DASD(ISA) to DJS, 17 Aug 66, JCS 2294/47; JMF 9163 (1966) IR 6925.

44. JCSM-885-65 to SecDef, 15 Dec 65, JCS 1800/977-2; JMF 7000.1 (8 Sep 65) sec. 2.

45. The text of the 30 Dec 66 agreement is in JCS 2294/52, 17 Feb 67; JMF 971/537 (14 Feb 67) 

and also in 18 United States Treaties and Other International Obligations 28. The agreement 

would last fifty years, and twenty more if neither party objected. The secret arrangement, 

revealed in 1975, appeared in NY Times, 17 Oct 75, p. 3.

46. Memo, SecNav to SecDef, 24 Feb 67, JCS 2294/53; JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 1.

47. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Jun 67, JCS 2294/55; JCSM-420-67 to SecDef, 25 Jul 67, JCS 

2294/55-1; JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 1.

48. Memo, SecDef to SecNav, 27 Oct 67, JCS 2294/60; JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 1.

49. JCSM-226-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2294/61-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 15 Jun 

68, JCS 2294/61-2; JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 2.

50. CINCPAC Command History: 1968, vol. 1, p. 92; 1969, vol. 1, pp. 78–79.
309

Notes to Pages 223–229

Chapter 13. The Far East: The Climax of Containment

1. These two quotations are printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, 

vol. 30 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 1998), p. 187.

2. “Communist China (Short-Range Report), Att to Memo, CJCS, DepSecDef, and ActgDepUSecState to DJS et al., 4 May 65, JCS 2118/230; JMF 9141 (30 Apr 65) sec. 1. The four situations 

are fully summarized in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 30, pp. 188–190. Copies were sent 

to the White House and the CIA. JCSM-437-65 to SecDef, 7 Jun 65, JCS 2118/230-2; same file.

3. This paragraph draws upon two sources: Memo for Record, “State-Defense Meeting on 

Communist China Study, 27 Aug 65,” 21 Sep 65, CJCS 091 China (Comm), and Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 30, pp. 197–201.

4. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars: 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina 

Press, 2000), pp. 140–144, 135, 157, 166.

5. Senior officials had decided not to submit this Study to the Senior Interdepartmental 

Group.

6. Rpt by Special State-Defense Study Group, “Communist China, Long-Range Study,” vol. 1, 

Jun 66, CJCS 091 China (Comm) Apr 65-, Bulky Package. J-5 T 136-66, 9 Sep 66; JMF 9141 (30 Apr 

65) sec. 1. This exercise of the Study Group was directed by Joseph Yager from the State Dept. 

and BG Stephen Henry, USAF, from J-5. Memo, Staff Dir, Far East IRG to AsstSecState William 

Bundy et al., 26 Oct 66, JCS 2463/3-11; JMF 9082 (15 Apr 66). The Study’s abstract is printed in 

Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 30, pp. 332–343.

7. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Feb 66, JCS 2118/235; JCSM-774-66 to SecDef, 19 Dec 66, JCS 

2118/235-5; JMF 9141 (12 Feb 66) sec. 1.

8. CM-1103-66 to JCS, 11 Jan 66, JCS 2118/234; JMF 9141 (11 Jan 66) sec. 1. Rpt by CJCS Special 

Studies Group, “Alternative US Strategies for Communist China,” vol. 1, 14 Oct 66; same file, sec. 

1B. Lt. Gen. Spivy chaired the study.

9. JCSM-744-66 to SecDef, 7 Dec 66, JCS 2118/234-7; JMF 9141 (11 Jan 66) sec. 1.

10. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 May 68, JCS 2458/401; JMF 560 (16 May 68) sec. 1. Systems 

Analysis, rather than ISA, drafted this DPM.

11. JCSM-369-68 to SecDef, 14 Jun 68, JCS 2458/401-1; JMF 560 (16 May 68).

12. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 68, JCS 2458/401-4; JMF 560 (16 May 68) sec. 1. JCSM649-68 to SecDef, 1 Nov 68, JCS 2458/401-5; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 2 Jan 69, JCS 

2458/401-9; same file, sec. 2.

13. Ann B to Dept. of State National Policy Paper, “The Republic of China,” 11 Sep 64, JCS 

1966/141-5; JMF 9142/9105 (18 Mar 64).

14. JCSM-99-65 to SecDef, 11 Feb 65, JCS 1966/145; Memo, DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState W. P. 

Bundy, 2 Mar 65, N/H of JCS 1966/145, 25 Mar 45; JMF 9142 (16 Jan 65). The six-ship sale can be 

inferred from later documents on this subject.

15. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 30, pp. 222–226.

16. “Memo of Conv between Pres of Nationalist China and CJCS on 29 Dec 65,” JCS 2118/233; 

JMF 9141/5410 (29 Dec 65). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 30, pp. 234–237.

17. MemCon, “Call on the Secretary of Defense by the Chinese Minister of Defense,” 23 Sep 65, 

JCS 2118/231; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Oct 65, JCS 2118/231-3; JMF 9141 (23 Sep 65). Memos, 

CSAF to SecDef, 23 Nov 65, and SecDef to CSAF, 8 Dec 65, JCS 1966/153; JMF 9142 (23 Nov 65). 

JCSM-851-65 to SecDef, 1 Dec 65, JCS 2118/231-5; JMF 9141 (23 Sep 65). By December 1967, 53 

F-5s had been delivered to Taiwan. CINCPAC Command History: 1967, vol. 1, pp. 374-375.
310

Notes to Pages 229–232

18. Ltr, AsstSecState Bundy to ASD(ISA), 24 Mar 66; Memo, RADM Blouin, OASD(ISA) to 

CJCS, “GRC Military Assistance Requests,” 29 Mar 66; DJSM-487-66 to RADM Blouin, 16 Apr 66; 

JMF 9141 (23 Sep 65). Msg, CINCPAC to CJCS, 262210Z Mar 66, JCS IN 82715; CJCS 091 China 

(Rep). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 30, p. 324.

19. Memo, RADM Blouin to DJS, “GRC Request to Purchase Five Additional APDs,” 12 May 

66; JMF 9142 (16 Jan 65). CM-1440-66 to CNO, 17 May 66; Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 191919Z May 66; 

CJCS 091 China (Rep). DJSM-673-66 to ASD(ISA), 20 May 66; Memo, ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState 

Bundy, 28 May 66, JCS 1966/158; Memo, RADM Blouin to DJS, 20 Jun 66, JCS 1966/158, 27 Jun 

66; JCSM-439-66 to SecDef, 29 Jun 66, JCS 1966/158; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState Samuel 

Berger, 1 Jul 66, JCS 1966/158-1; JMF 9142 (16 Jan 65). CINCPAC Command History, 1966, vol. 

1, p. 239. Congress also authorized five-year loans of one destroyer and one destroyer escort, 

which the JCS certified as being in the national interest. JCSM-276-66 to SecDef, 29 Apr 66, JCS 

2118/238; JMF 9142 (28 Apr 66).

20. Draft Administrative History of the Department of Defense, vol. 1, p. 205. Memo, 

ASD(IDSA) to CJCS, 9 Feb 68, JCS 1966/166; JMF 882/495 (9 Feb 68). In September 1967, the 

administration had agreed to supply the GRC, on a grant basis, with 253 M-41 light tanks. Ltr, 

SecDef to DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo, 15 Sep 67, JCS 1966/164; JMF 9142 (28 Apr 66).

21. JCSM-190-68 to SecDef, 29 Mar 68, JCS 1966/166-1; JMF 882/495 (9 Feb 68).

22. Msg, Def 4575 to JCS, 112308Z Jul 68; JCS 1966/167-1, 4 Oct 68; CM-3716-68 to DJS, 19 Oct 

68; JMF 82/461 (11 Jul 68). Although the Assistant to the Chairman drafted and signed CM-3716, 

the memo expressed Wheeler’s views.

23. DF-200-68 to JCS, “JCS 1966/167-1,” 29 Oct 68; Note to Control, “JCS 1966/167-1,” 30 Oct 68; 

JCSM-670-68 to SecDef, 7 Nov 68, JCS 1966/167-3; JMF 882/461 (11 Jul 68). CINCPAC Command 

History, 1969, vol. 2, p. 87.

24. The JCS and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968, pt. 2. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 30, p. 555.

25. Formed in September 1963, Malaysia consisted of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore 

(until August 1965), and two British dependencies in northern Borneo. Johnson is quoted in 

Wm. Roger Louis, “The Dissolution of the British Empire in the Era of Vietnam,” American 

Historical Review, Feb 2002, p. 15.

26. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 26 (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Historian, Dept. of State, 2001), pp. 228, 251, 272, 274–275, 289–290.

27. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 26, pp. 310–312. The question of whether there was 

US complicity in mass murder remains controversial. An indictment based on inferences and 

circumstantial evidence is in Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns (Stanford, CA: Stanford 

Univ. Press, 2008), pp. 184-194. An exculpatory summary is in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 26, pp. 338–340, 386–387.

28. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 26, pp. 368–371.

29. Here they were following a CIA estimate: “Whatever the outcome of the current scramble 

for power, it is unlikely there will be a major change in Indonesian foreign policy. Should the 

army emerge on top, Indonesian policies would probably be more genuinely neutral in balancing 

East and West, and the tendency to follow Peking’s lead in international affairs certainly would 

be reduced. However, no break with Moscow is in the cards. . . .” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 26, p. 378. Hindsight shows this estimate to have been wrong.

30. JCSM-909-65 to SecDef, 30 Dec 65, JCS 2357/31; JMF 9156 (27 Dec 65). Printed in Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 26, pp. 390–392. ISA forwarded JCSM-909 to State. Memo, ASD(ISA) 

to CJCS, 15 Jan 66, JCS 2357/31-1; same file.

31. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 26, pp. 410, 417, 448.
311

Notes to Pages 232–236

32. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Jun 66, JCS 2357/32; JCSM-473-66 to SecDef, 25 Jul 66, JCS 

2357/32-1; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Aug 66, JCS 2357/32-3; JMF 9156 (27 Dec 65). Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 26, pp. 468-469.

33. Memo, ActgDepUSecState to SecDef, 19 Oct 66, JCS 2315/397; CM-1880-66 to SecDef, 1 

Nov 66, JCS 2315/397-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Nov 65, JCS 2315/397-2; JMF 4060 (19 Oct 66). 

CM-1880 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 26, pp. 478–479.

34. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 15 May 68, JCS 2339/276; JCSM-360-68 to SecDef, 11 Jun 68, JCS 

2339/276-1; Memo, DASD(ISA); Memo, DASD(ISA) to Chmn, State Dept. Policy Plng Council, 24 

Jun 68, 1st N/H of JCS 2339/276-1, 19 Jul 68; JMF 907/532 (15 May 68). State Dept., “National Policy 

Paper: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Singapore Subregion,” Sep 68; same file, sec. 2.

35. Some claimed that the Indonesian army’s willingness to fight the communists was a 

result of the firm US stand in Vietnam, but no clear evidence for this has been found. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 26, p. 430.

36. State Dept. “National Policy Paper: The Republic of Korea,” 9 Nov 65, JCS 1776/704-4; 

JMF 9144 (6 Feb 65) sec. 2.

37. JCS 1776/701, 20 Mar 65, and Dec On, 23 Mar 65; JMF 9144 (20 Mar 65). Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 39 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. 

of State, 2000), p. 125.

38. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, 17 Feb 65, JCS 1800/932; JCSM-832-65 to SecDef, 19 May 65, 

JCS 1800/932-6; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, 29 May 65, JCS 1800/932-7; JMF 1100 (17 Feb 65).

39. Encl C to JCS 1776/711, 30 Sep 65; JCSM-737-65 to SecDef, 12 Oct 65, JCS 1776/711; Memo, 

SecDef to CJCS, 31 Jan 66, JCS 1776/711-1; JMF 9144 (4 Sep 65). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 39, pp. 226–227.

40. Memo of Conv, “Visit of Korean Def Min Kim, 18 May 65,” 21 May 65, JCS 1776/706; JMF 

9144/5410 (22 Mar 65).

41. JCSM-411-65 to SecDef, 27 May 65, JCS 1776/704-3; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to W. W. Rostow, 6 Jul 

65; State Dept., “National Policy Paper: The Republic of Korea,” 9 Nov 65, JCS 1776/704-4; JMF 

9144 (6 Feb 65) sec. 2.

42. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 39, pp. 171–172.

43. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Apr 66, JCS 1776/720; JCSM-245-66 to SecDef, 16 Apr 66, JCS 

1776/720-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 27 May 66, JCS 1776/720-2; Msg, Joint State/AID/Defense 

to Seoul, 4 Jun 66; JMF 9144 (1 Apr 66). In return for the additional ROK deployment, the United 

States provided about $70 million worth of extra equipment and payments. Foreign Relations: 

1964–1968, vol. 39, ftnt. 5 on p. 148.

44. JCSM-386-67 to SecDef, 6 Jul 67, JCS 1776/737-1; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 19 Jul 67, 

N/H of JCS 1776/737-1; JMF 892/495 (19 May 67). Presumably, the MAM’s mention of FY 1969 was 

based on an assumption that the Vietnam War would be ending by then.

45. Msg, Gen. Bonesteel to CJCS and CINCPAC, KRA 1804, 120848Z Nov 66; Msg, Gen. 

Bonesteel to CINCPAC, KRA 1579, 211207Z Jul 67; Rpt, Amb. Brown to USecState, “Near-Term 

Strategy in Korea,” 13 Mar 68; CJCS 091 Korea. Encl C to JCS 1776/779-1, 13 Aug 68; JMF 893/309 

(8 May 68). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 209, 299.

46. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 254–255, 257–259.

47. CSAM-325-67 to JCS, 18 Sep 67, JCS 1776/743, and Dec On, 27 Sep 67; CNOM-235-67 to JCS, 

n.d.; SM-644-67 to JCS, JCS 1776/743; JMF 892/372 (18 Sep 67).

48. JCSM-570-67 to SecDef, 21 Oct 67, JCS 1776/744; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Nov 67, JCS 

1776/744-1; JMF 892/461 (29 Aug 67).
312

Notes to Pages 236–241

49. Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 1776/748,” 28 Dec 67; JCSM-14-68 to SecDef, 6 Jan 68, JCS 

1776/748-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Mar 68, JCS 1776/748-3; JMF 892/372 (22 Dec 67). On 

29 December, the JCS cancelled the study they had requested back on 27 September. Instead, 

they asked for a paper dealing only with dollar and manpower requirements for US forces; this 

became JCSM-14-68. Note to Control, “JCS 1776/748,” 29 Dec 67; same file.

50. The Joint Chiefs’ responsibilities for reviewing and overseeing missions were delineated 

in SM-676-66 to CSA et al., 19 Aug 66, JCS 2150/214-2; JMF 2400 (13 Aug 65), and SM-24-68 to CSA 

et al., 11 Jan 68, JCS 2150/251-3; JMF 322 (22 Nov 67).

51. The above paragraphs are based upon: Henry Millington’s Pueblo monograph prepared for 

the National Security Agency; Statement by SecDef, “The Pueblo Incident,” n.d., Tab 3 to “Ball 

Committee Briefing Book” in JHO; Memo for Record by BG Steakley, “Pueblo Approval Cycle,” 

29 Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Re: Pueblo Incident, Jan 68) BP; Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 29, p. 555; and Matthew Aid, The Secret Sentry (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), p. 141.

52. Aircraft dispositions and distances from Wonsan were as follows: Osan, 3 F–4s at 214 

nautical miles; Kunsan, 3 F–4s at 272 nm; Okinawa, 25 F–105s at 804 nm; Iwakuni, Japan, 17 

F–4s and 20 A–4s at 378 nm; Yokota, Japan, 20 F–4s and 8 F–105s at 592 nm; and Misawa, Japan, 

12 F–4s at 632 nm. CM-2948-68 to Pres, 30 Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Re: Pueblo Incident, Jan 68) 

BP. In subsequent Congressional testimony, though, Gen. Wheeler stated that only eight USMC 

and 16 USAF aircraft in Japan plus 18 USAF aircraft on Okinawa could have responded. H. 

Com. On Armed Services, Hearings on the USS Pueblo and EC–121 Plane Incidents, 91st Cong., 

1st sess., p. 886.

53. This was wrong; the crew remained aboard the USS Pueblo until the ship docked.

54. The above paragraphs are based upon: Henry Millington’s Pueblo monograph prepared 

for the National Security Agency; Statement by SecDef, “The Pueblo Incident,” n.d., Tab 3 to “Ball 

Committee Briefing Book”; Msg, Pueblo to AIG 7623, 230352Z Jan 68, JCS IN 52575; Msg, Pueblo 

to AIG 7623, 230415Z Jan 68, JCS IN 52545; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 240435Z Jan 68, JCS IN 55456; 

JHO; CM-2948-68 to Pres, 30 Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Re: Pueblo Incident, Jan 68) BP; Memo 

for Record by BG Shedd, “Chronological listing of times the CJCS was called on the PUEBLO 

incident . . . ,” 30 Jan 68; Memo, BG Shedd to CJCS, “FONECON, RADM McClendon and General 

Bonesteel, 230240 EST,” 0345, 23 Jan 68; Msg, CINCUNC to CJCS, KRA 214, 242314Z Jan 68; CJCS 

091 Korea (Pueblo Incident); Lloyd M. Bucher, Bucher: My Story (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 

pp. 174–217; and H. Com. On Armed Services, Report of the Special Subcommittee on the USS 

Pueblo, 91st Cong., 1st sess., passim.

55. Msg, COMNAVFORJAPAN to JCS et al., 231610Z Jan 68; Statement of SecDef, “The Pueblo 

Incident,” Tab 3 to “Ball Committee Briefing Book”; JHO. CM-2948-68 to Pres, 30 Jan 68; CJCS 091 

Korea (Re: Pueblo Incident, Jan 68) BP. The Ball Committee’s terms of reference and summary 

conclusions are in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 590–591, 613–615.

56. Note to Control, 23 Jan 68; Msg, JCS 7989 to CINCPAC et al., 23 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 

Jan 68) sec. 1.

57. J–3 TP 2-68, 24 Jan 68; Note to Control, “J-3 TP 2-68,” 24 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68).

58. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 468–475.

59. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 500, 505–513.

60. CM-2937-68 to SecDef, 25 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1. CM-2941-68 to SecDef, 

26 Jan 68, JCS 1776/753; JMF 893/376 (26 Jan 68). Msg, JCS 8361 to CINCPAC et al., 26 Jan 68; 

Msg, JCS 8344 to CINCPAC and CINCSAC, 26 Jan 68; Msg, JCS 8344 to CINCPAC and CINCSAC, 

26 Jan 68; Msg, JCS 8343 to AIG 936, 27 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1. NY Times, 26 Jan 

68, p. 1. Of the 182 aircraft sent to South Korea, the F–4s and F–100s came from CONUS, most 
313

Notes to Pages 241–244

of the others from Okinawa. JCSM-82-68 to SecDef, 3 Feb 68, JCS 2147/455; Memo, DepSecDef 

to CJCS, 7 Feb 68, JCS 2147/455-1; JMF 376 (1 Feb 68).

61. CSAFM-A-29-68 to JCS, 29 Jan 68, JCS 1776/755; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 050612Z Feb 68; 

JMF 892/460 (29 Jan 68). Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 270156Z Jan 68, JCS IN 61821; JCS 1776/758, 30 

Jan 68, and Dec On, 31 Jan 68; JMF 893/375 (25 Jan 68). The JCS did approve Gen. McConnell’s 

proposal that CINCPAC and CINCSAC develop a plan for delivering a coordinated attack against 

the entire North Korean air order of battle. Msg, JCS 8654 to CINCPAC and CINCSAC, 31 Jan 

68, JCS 1776/754-1; same file.

62. Memo for Record by DepSJCS, “Korean Situation (Pueblo Incident),” 25 Jan 68; JCSM-53-

68 to SecDef, 25 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Feb 68, JCS 

1776/752-2; JCSM-112-68 to SecDef, 21 Feb 68, JCS 1776/752-4; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 2. 

CM-2992-68 to SecDef, 10 Feb 68; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 Feb 68; CJCS 091 Korea. Foreign 

Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 318–320, 501. JCSM-53-68 to SecDef, 25 Jan 68; CM-2947-68 

to SecDef, 30 Jan 68, JCS 1776/752-1; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1.

63. Msg, CSAF to SAC et al., 240230Z Jan 68, JCS IN 55468; JHO. Lyndon B. Johnson, The 

Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 535.

64. Msg, CJCS 8177 to CINCPAC, 25 Jan 68; JMF 893/375 (25 Jan 68).

65. Msg, State 106085 to Seoul, 28 Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Pueblo Incident, vol. 1). Printed 

in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 547–549.

66. Msg, CJCS 1116 to CINCPAC, 31 Jan 68, CJCS 091 Korea (Pueblo Incident, vol. 1). Adm. 

Sharp supported a diplomatic approach accompanied by a buildup. If diplomacy failed, he suggested positioning the USS Banner with escorts off Wonsan. Harbor mining, he added, could 

be accomplished without great difficulty and should have a “salutary effect.” Msg, CINCPAC to 

CJCS, 310706Z Jan 68, same file.

67. Much of the available evidence is in Christian Ostermann and James Person (eds.), Crisis 

and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, 1968–1969: A Critical History (Washington, 

DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011). On 27 January, a Soviet military 

transport landed at Wonsan, apparently bringing Soviet experts to examine Pueblo’s signal 

intelligence spaces and documents. Soon much of the captured material was sent to Moscow. 

The full extent of the security compromise did not become clear until 1985, with the discovery 

that since 1967 a spy ring within the US Navy had been supplying keys to coded communications, allowing the Soviets to decrypt documents and transmissions. Aid, The Secret Sentry, p. 

141. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, p. 743.

68. Msg, CINCUNC to CINCPAC, 231405Z Jan 68, JCS IN 5343; JHO. Msg, State 106085 to Seoul, 

28 Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Pueblo Incident, vol. I). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, 

vol. 29, p. 547–549. Msg, Gen. Bonesteel to CINCPAC, KRA 513, 091337Z Feb 68; CJCS 091 Korea 

(Pueblo Incident, vol. 2).

69. “Final Report, Vance Mission to Korea: February 9-15, 1968,” Att to Memo, Vance to CJCS, 

n.d., JCS 1776/767; JMF 892 (9 Feb 68) sec. 1. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, 

pp. 384-391. A US-ROK communiqué issued on 15 February stated that if aggression continued, 

“the two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under the Mutual 

Defense Treaty. . . .They reaffirmed the commitment . . . to undertake immediate consultations 

whenever the security of the Republic of Korea is threatened.” Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Mar 

68, pp. 344–345.

70. JCSM-136-68 to SecDef, 5 Mar 68, JCS 1776/766-1; “FY 1968 Korea MAP Supplemental,” 

n.d.; JMF 892/495 (20 Feb 68).

71. Rpt, Amb. Brown to USecState, “Near-Term Strategy in Korea,” 13 Mar 68; CJCS 091 Korea.

72. Gen. Wheeler was in Vietnam making a post-Tet assessment.
314

Notes to Pages 243–248

73. Msg, Seoul 4321 to SecState, 18 Feb 68; CM-3050-68 to DJS, 23 Feb 68; CJCS 091 Korea. 

Seoul 4321 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 629–631.

74. JCS 1776/768, 28 Feb 68; JMF 892/396 (28 Feb 68).

75. Memo for Record by Lt. Gen. Rottet, “JCS Meeting, Friday, 1 March 1968,” 4 Mar 68; JMF 

892/396 (28 Feb 68).

76. JCS 1776/768-1, 21 Mar 68; Note to Control Div., “JCS 1776/768-1,” 22 Mar 68; JMF 892/396 

(28 Feb 68).

77. JCS 1776/768-2, 8 Apr 68, and Dec On, 10 Apr 68; JMF 892/396(28 Feb 68).

78. Memo of Conv, Johnson-Park Meeting in Honolulu, 17 Apr 68, Country File, Korea, Box 

256, vol. 6, National Security Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

79. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, p. 427.

80. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 5 Apr 68, JCS 2339/273; JCSM-255-68 to SecDef, 22 Apr 68, JCS 

2339/273-2; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 22 May 68, JCS 2339/273-3; JMF 907/374 (4 Apr 68). Memo, 

DepSecDef to CJCS, 10 Jul 68, JCS 2472/372; JMF 911/374 (6 May 68). US Strike Command History, 1968, p. 29. CM-3518-68 to DJS, 27 Jul 68; DJSM-1129-68 to CJCS, 12 Sep 68; CJCS 091 Korea.

81. She and her community, having so little, embrace life with a mind-set of abundance, 

thankful for the simple things they do have. In contrast, we Americans and the elite of El Salvador seem to operate with a mind-set of scarcity, seeking what we don't have and building 

walls to protect what we might lose. Dept. of State Policy Planning Council, “US Policy Toward 

Korea,” 15 Jun 68, Att to Memo, Staff Director to SIG, 26 Jun 68, JCS 2464/104; JMF 892 (26 Jun 

68) sec. 1. While preparing this report, State officials consulted OSD, Joint Staff, CIA, AID, and 

Budget Bureau specialists. The abstract is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, 

pp. 433–436.

82. Memo, DepAsstSecState Winthrop Brown to Chmn, SIG, “EA/IRG Comments on ‘US 

Policy Toward Korea,’” 6 Aug 68; JCSM-508-68 to SecDef, 21 Aug 68, JCS 2464/104-1; Note to 

Control, “J-5M 1353 of 13 Aug 68,” 16 Aug 68; Memo, DJS to OpsDeps, “Interagency PPBS for 

Korea,” 10 Oct 68; JMF 892 (26 Jun 68) sec. 2.

83. JCSM-612-68 to SecDef, 17 Oct 68, JCS 1776/759-9; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 30 Nov 

68, JCS 1776/759-10; JMF 893/374 (30 Jan 68) sec. 4A. The most serious post-Pueblo incident 

occurred in November, when about 120 seaborne commandos landed on the central east 

coast of South Korea, inflicting considerable civilian and military casualties before being 

killed or captured.

84. CINCPAC Command History, 1968, vol. 4, pp. 232–235. Gen. Woodward was Senior 

Member of the Military Armistice Commission, United Nations Command. The Pueblo itself 

remained in North Korean custody.

85. Memo of Conv, “Conversation, Prime Min Sato—SecDef McNamara,” 21 Jan 65, JCS 

2180/198; JMF 9143 (13 Jan 65). Japan’s postwar constitution renounced the right to wage war 

and to maintain standing armed forces.

86. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 1 Jun 65, JCS 2180/201; JMF 9143 (12 Jun 65).

87. JCSM-537-65 to SecDef, 8 Jul 65, JCS 2180/201-1; JMF 9143 (12 Jun 65). A sanitized version 

is printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2006), pp. 100-101.

88. Memo, Rear Adm. Blouin, OASD(ISA), to DJS, “Japanese Defense Policy,” 30 Aug 65; 

DJSM-1042-65 to Rear Adm. Blouin, 9 Sep 65; JMF 9143 (12 Jun 65). “Japanese Defense Policy” 

is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pt. 2, pp. 114–121.

89. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pt. 2, pp. 104–110, 127–129. Studies by IRG for 

Far East, “The US-Japan Over-all Relationship,” and “Japanese Defense Forces,” 27 May 66 JCS 
315

Notes to Pages 248–251 

2180/207-4; JMF 9143 (16 Mar 66). Memo, ActgStaffDir, IRG for Far East to AsstSecState Bundy 

et al., 11 Jun 66, JCS 2463/3-5; JMF 9082 (15 Apr 66).

90. The decision to withdraw air defense units had been taken in 1963 as part of an effort to 

stanch the balance of payments drain.

91. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Jun 66; CJCS 091 Japan.

92. CM-1572-66 to SecDef, 25 Jun 66; CJCS 091 Japan.

93. Memo, SecTreasury to Pres, 5 Feb 68, JCS 2180/227; JMF 890/585 (5 Feb 68). Ltr, CINCPAC 

to JCS, “US Bases in Japan,” 26 Sep 68, JCS 2180/231; JCSM-658-68 to SecDef, 2 Nov 68, JCS 

2180/231-1; JMF 890/470 (26 Sep 68).

94. Fact Sheet, “Summary of ASD/SA Draft Proposal on US Bases and Forces in Japan and 

Okinawa,” 23 Oct 68; CM-3733-68 to SecDef, 25 Oct 68; CJCS 091 Japan. Memo, SecDef to CJCS 

et al., 6 Dec 68, JCS 2458/481; JMF 890/470 (6 Dec 68) sec. 1. JCS 2458/481-5, 21 Jan 69; JCSM-63-

69 to SecDef, 6 Feb 69, JCS 2458/481-5; same file, sec. 2.

95. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pt. 2, pp. 104–110, 127–129. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 

11 Oct 65, JCS 2180/202-2; JCSM-760-65 to SecDef, 16 Oct 65, JCS 2180/202-3; JMF 9143 (14 Jul 65).

96. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 24 Nov 65, JCS 2180/204; JCSM-900-65 to SecDef, 23 Dec 65, 

JCS 2180/204-1; JMF 9143 (24 Nov 65). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pt. 2, 

pp. 132–134.

97. Memo, W. P. Bundy to Staff Dir, SIG, 4 Jun 66, JCS 2463/3-4; JMF 9082 (13 Apr 66). Rpt of the 

Ryukyus Working Group of the IRG, “Our Ryukyus Bases,” 24 Aug 66, JCS 2463/6; JCS 2463/6-1, 

6 Sep 66; JMF 9147 (18 Aug 66). “Record of Agreements and Decisions, Meeting of September 

13, 1966,” 14 Sep 66, JCS 2464/27; JMF 9082 (12 Apr 66).

98. Memo, CINCPAC to SecArmy, 11 Apr 67, JCS 2326/27; JMF 904/472 (24 Feb 67). CSAM-187-

67 to JCS, 8 Jun 67, JCS 2326/28; JCSM-406-67 to SecDef, 20 Jul 67, JCS 2326/29-1; JMF 904/471 

(8 Jun 67) sec. 1. OSD acknowledgement is Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 8 Aug 67, N/H of JCS 

2326/291-1, 11 Aug 67; same file. JCSM-406-67 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 

29, pt. 2, pp. 184–186. “Ryukyus Base Study,” Att to Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Jul 67, JCS 2326/30; 

JMF 904/471 (15 Jul 67) sec. 1.

99. Very recently, Japanese fishermen had been allowed limited access to specified ports in 

the Trust Territory. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 12 May 67, JCS 2180/217-2; JMF 890 (14 Mar 67).

100. Encl B to JCS 2180/220-1, 24 Jun 67; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Jun 67, JCS 2180/220; 

JCSM-376-67 to SecDef, 29 Jun 67, JCS 2180/220-1; JMF 904/420 (3 Jun 67). These views were 

sent to the State Dept. and to Amb. Alexis Johnson in Tokyo. DJSM-1008-67 to DCSOPS, US 

Army, 18 Aug 67; same file. JCSM-376-67 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, 

pt. 2, pp. 172–175.

101. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Aug 67, JCS 2326/33; JCSM-491-67 to SecDef, 6 Sep 67, JCS 

2326/33-2; JMF 904 (29 Aug 67) sec. 1.

102. On Iwo, which was part of the Volcanoes, the US maintained a Loran navigation aid station and an emergency air strip. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pt. 2, p. 246.

103. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pt. 2, pp. 214–221.

104. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1967, pp. 1033–1037, and 1968, pp. 750–751.

105. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pt. 2, pp. 263 (ftnt. 2), 286–287, 278, 284, 310–313. 

Memo of Conv, “Balance of Payments . . . Ryukyus Reversion,” 18 Nov 67, Country File, Japan, 

Visit of P. M. Eisaku Sato, 11/14-15/67, National Security Files, Johnson Library.
316

Notes to Pages 253–256

Chapter 14. Conclusion

1. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 300.

2. General Harold K. Johnson interviewed by W. S. Poole on 3 May 79, JHO.

3. Admiral McDonald Interview, pp. 409–410.

4. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, interviewed by W. S. Poole on 17 May 79, JHO. General 

Goodpaster served as Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower during 1954–61, Assistant to the 

Chairman, JCS, during 1962–66, and Director, Joint Staff, during 1966–67.

5. Ibid.

6. Admiral McDonald Interview, p. 360.

7. E-mail, J. Ronald Fox to Walter S. Poole, 17 March 2004. Fox served as Deputy Assistant 

Secretary (Comptroller) in the Department of the Air Force. In 1967, after Israel’s spectacular 

victory in the Six Day War, Air Force officers could not resist applying the systems analysis 

methodology and caustically concluding that “the Israeli Air Force, because of its extremely 

limited damage-causing capability, could not influence the outcome of the land battle with the 

Arab States.” Their point, of course, was that “surprise, well-defined objectives, air-ground 

cooperation, strategy and tactics, precise plans, and imaginative leadership greatly affect the 

effectiveness of tactical air.” Memo, VCSAF to SAF-0S, 12 Jun 67; CJCS 091 Israel.

8. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1965, p. 63.

9. JCSM-856-65 to SecDef, 3 Dec 65, JCS 2458/42-1; JMF 7000 (24 Nov 65) sec. 1. JCSM-867-65 

to SecDef, 8 Dec 65, JCS 2458/42-8; same file, sec. 2. McNamara had asked the JCS to say that the 

force structure proposed for FY 1967 would further increase overall combat effectiveness and 

“provide the forces which we require, in a high state of readiness, to defend the vital interests 

of the United States.” Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Nov 65, JCS 2458/42; same file, sec. 1.

10. Hearings, DOD Appropriations for FY 1967, S. Com on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2nd 

sess., pt. 1, pp. 3, 70. CNOM-130-66 to JCS, n.d. [c. 15 Jul 66]; JSOP 69-76, vol. I, circulated via 

SM-602-66 to CSA et al., 25 Jul 66, JCS 2143/285; JMF 3130 (8 Jul 66) sec. 1.

11. TP for CJCS, “JCS 2458/131-2,” 1 Nov 66; JCSM-734-66 to SecDef, 26 Nov 66, JCS 2458/131-

4; JMF 7120 (24 Aug 66) sec. 1. Hearings, Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1967, H. 

Com on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2–3.

12. Hearings, DOD Appropriations for 1969, H. Com on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 

pp. 342–343, 423.

13. Sorley, Honorable Warrior, pp. 268–270, quotation on p. 304. Admiral McDonald Interview, pp. 388, 390.

14. Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1968–1969, p. 475.
317

Adams, General Paul D., USA: 201, 203, 204, 205, 206

Adoula, Cyrille: 199

Afghanistan: 189

Africa: 132, 133, 193–208

Agalega Islands: 219

Agency for International Development: 129, 134, 143

Ailleret, General Charles: 94

Air Force, US

and bomber defense: 38

force levels: 41, 43, 44–45, 50–51, 56, 61, 64, 66

forces for Korea: 241

forces for Vietnam: 43, 44–45, 50, 59–60

HEAVY DRAW: 105

Rapid Reaction Force: 126

tactical air strength: 44–45, 50–51

tactical fighter units: 55–56, 59–60, 61

tactical reconnaissance units: 96, 99

Technical Applications Center: 71–72

Air Force Scientific Advisory Board: 70

Air National Guard: 38

Aircraft: 17, 28–29, 32

Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft 

(AMSA): 18, 19, 20–21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 38

Air Force: 44–45, 46, 50–51, 52, 56

Airborne Warning and Control System 

(AWACS): 34

airlift: 46, 52

Army: 46, 50–51, 52

cargo: 56–57, 62

Marine Corps: 44, 45, 46, 50–51, 52, 56

Mirage bombers (French): 91, 94–95, 157, 158, 

159, 160, 165, 166, 178–79, 181, 182

Navy: 44, 45, 46, 50, 52, 56

sales to India and Pakistan: 210, 216

sales to Latin America: 156–61

sales to Middle Eastern countries: 165–66, 

178–79, 181–82, 183, 184–86, 187–89

sent to South Korea: 241, 245

Soviet: 62, 115

for the Vietnam War: 44–45

Aldabra Island: 220, 221

Algeria: 174, 178

Allied Command Europe: 51, 52, 61, 91, 98, 100, 

103–04, 111, 112, 114–16, 117, 119, 121, 256

Allison, Major General Royal B., USAF: 87, 89

Alvim, General Hugo Panasco: 145, 146, 147, 148, 149

Anderson, Robert B.: 152

Anti-ballistic missile systems

and arms control: 69, 70–71, 81–89

Army “DEPLEX” plan: 32–34, 37, 38

mobile missiles: 84, 86, 87

Nike-X: 31, 32, 33–34, 35, 36–38, 86

Nike-Zeus: 31

radars for: 38, 86–87, 88

Sentinel: 38, 39

and short-range SLBMs: 33

Soviet: 18, 22, 23, 25, 32, 33, 35–36, 81, 83, 84–86, 87, 88

Spartan: 31

Sprint: 31

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs): 32, 34

Tallinn Line: 35, 84–85, 86, 87, 88

US: 22–23, 31–40, 81

Anti-submarine warfare carriers: 45, 159–60

Apartheid: 193–94, 197, 198

Arab League: 164

Argentina: 143, 145, 157–58, 159, 160, 161

Arias, Arnulfo: 156

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: 67, 68, 

69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83–84, 85–86, 87, 

88, 89–90

Army, US

and ballistic missile defense: 32–34, 37, 38

combat readiness of CONUS-based units: 44

force levels: 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 54, 64, 66

forces for Vietnam: 43–44, 49, 59–60

forces in South Korea: 233, 234

proposals to mobilize reserves: 43, 44, 48, 

49–50, 52, 54, 59–60, 65

REFORGER: 105

Strategic Army Forces: 44, 49, 59–60, 61

Army, US, units

Seventh Army: 102, 116, 123, 126, 234

Eighth Army: 233, 234, 241, 246

173rd Airborne Brigade: 42–43, 234

82nd Airborne Division: 55, 59, 60, 138, 141, 

142, 147, 239, 241

101st Airborne Division: 42–43, 55, 60, 141

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile): 43

1st Infantry Division: 42-43

4th Infantry Division: 49

6th Infantry Division: 55, 61

8th Infantry Division: 102, 103

9th Infantry Division: 49

24th Infantry Division: 102, 103, 104–05, 122–23, 

124, 126

25th Infantry Division: 49, 234

Army, US Department of the: 151

Army Materiel Command: 37

Index
318

Index

Atomic Energy Act of 1954: 78, 92

Atomic Energy Commission: 67, 71, 72, 73, 83

Austria: 124

Ayub Khan, Mohammed: 189, 212, 214

Azores Islands: 196

Balaguer, Joaquin: 138, 149

Balance-of-payment deficits: 62

and Japan: 248

and NATO: 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 125

and strength in South Korea: 233

Balaunde, Terry: 159, 160–61

Ball, George: 94, 231, 239

Bartosik, Rear Admiral Józef: 170

Belgium: 93–94, 96–97, 98, 99–100, 199, 200, 202, 

204, 214

Bennett, W. Tapley: 138–39, 140, 142, 143–45, 148

“Blue Lion” committee: 228

Bohlen, Charles: 99

Bonesteel, Lieutenant General Charles H., USA: 

106, 107, 109, 235, 236, 238, 241, 243, 246

Bonin Islands: 248–49, 250

Bosch, Juan: 138, 142, 144, 148, 149

Bowles, Chester: 210, 212, 214

Boxer, USS: 139

Braga, Brigadier General Alvaro: 149

Brazil: 80, 143, 145, 146, 149, 158, 159, 160

British Indian Ocean Territory: 220

Brown, Harold: 30, 97, 197

Brown, Winthrop: 235, 243

Brussels, Belgium: 95–97, 99–100

Bucher, Commander Lloyd: 237, 238, 247

Budgets, military

and balance-of-payments considerations: 62, 

100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 125, 233, 248

and cost-effectiveness evaluations: 1, 7–10, 19, 

37–38, 39, 45, 47, 56, 57-58, 221, 253–54

FY 1966 supplement: 9

FY 1967: 9

FY 1967 supplement: 9-10

FY 1968: 10

FY 1969: 10

and nuclear weapons: 19

Bulgaria: 106

Bundy, McGeorge: 6, 47–48, 76, 94, 143, 144–45, 164

Bundy, William: 229

Bunker, Ellsworth: 143, 145, 148, 149

Caamano-Deno, Colonel Francisco: 142, 143, 

144–45, 147, 148

Cambodia: 223

Castro, Fidel: 137, 142, 151, 156, 204

Central Intelligence Agency: 67, 71, 81, 142, 164, 

183, 200, 215, 231

Central Treaty Organization: 177, 189–91, 211, 213

Chagos Archipelago: 219-20

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: 2, 4, 6, 7, 67. See also

Wheeler, General Earle G., USA.

Assistant for Strategic Arms Negotiations: 87

and the Committee of Principals: 67

Special Studies Group: 18-19, 21, 22–23, 25, 46, 

54, 82, 84, 93-94

Chapman, General Leonard F., Jr., USMC: 5, 7, 87, 

88, 123

Chavan, Y. B.: 210

Chiang Ching-kuo: 228–29, 230

Chiang Kai-shek: 227–28, 229

Chiari, Roberto: 150, 151

Chief of Naval Operations: 4–5. See also 

McDonald, Admiral David L.; Moorer, 

Admiral Thomas H.

Chief of Staff, US Air Force: 3–4, 5. See also

McConnell, General John P.

Chief of Staff, US Army: 4. See also Johnson, 

General Harold K.

Chile: 158, 159

China, Peoples Republic of

conventional forces: 54

and Ethiopia: 206

and India: 209–10, 211–12, 215, 217, 218

and Korea: 329

and nuclear weapons: 24, 32–33, 35, 36, 37–38, 

68, 69, 71, 80, 85, 215, 216, 217

and Pakistan: 209–10, 211, 213, 214

and the spread of communist power in the 

Far East: 223–27, 229, 233, 234, 251

and the Vietnam War: 223–24

Clark Air Base, Philippine Islands: 133

Clifford, Clark M.: 3, 6, 7, 14, 28, 184, 185, 188, 230, 248

and arms control: 86–87, 88–89, 90

and force levels: 60, 64, 65

and NATO: 109, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126

and the USS Pueblo incident: 240–41, 244, 246

and troops for Vietnam: 59, 60

Colombia: 150

Commandant, US Marine Corps: 5. See also

Greene, General Wallace M.

Commander, US Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam: 4. See also Westmoreland, General 

William C.

Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT): 138, 

139, 140, 141, 147

Commander in Chief, Channel Command: 111–12, 

120–21

Commander in Chief, Europe: 125, 175

Commander in Chief, Pacific: 12, 48, 229, 230, 

236–37, 238–39, 249. See also Sharp, 

Admiral U. S. Grant.

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet: 237

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command: 23

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command 

(CINCUNC): 233, 235

Commander Naval Forces, Japan: 236–38

Committee of Principals: 67, 68, 69–70, 71, 72, 76, 81, 

85–86, 88, 89–90

Committee on Non-Proliferation: 215

Communism

and Africa: 193, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206

and the Dominican Republic: 137–41, 142, 145,

146, 148
Index

319

and the Far East: 223–27

and India and Pakistan: 209–10, 211, 212

and Indonesia: 230–31

and Panama: 151, 152–53, 154

US containment policy: 223–30, 251

Congo: 130, 199–205

Costa Rica: 145

Cuba: 137, 142, 204

Cyprus: 105–06, 108, 109, 212

Czechoslovakia: 88–89, 123–27

Dayan, Moshe: 173

De Gaulle, Charles: 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 113

De la Rosa, Diogenes: 155

De Murville, Maurice Couve: 99

De Waele, Colonel Frederic Van: 200

Defense, Secretary of: 67. See also Clifford, Clark 

M.; McNamara, Robert S.

Defense, US Department of

and aircraft sales to Israel: 185

and aircraft sales to Latin America: 158

and the Congo: 200, 203

and the Dominican Republic: 138, 140, 144, 148

and Ethiopia: 207

and India and Pakistan: 213

and the Middle East: 185, 186, 187, 189

and the Panama Canal Zone: 151, 152, 153, 156

and Southern Africa: 194–95, 197–98

Defense Intelligence Agency: 45, 181, 236

Defense Reorganization Act of 1958: 2, 253

Dereliction of Duty, by H. R. McMaster: 253

Diego Garcia: 219–21

Director of Central Intelligence: 6, 184–85

Dobrynin, Anatoly: 180

Dominican Republic: 137–50

Donovan, Lieutenant General Stanley, USAF: 191

Draft Presidential Memorandums: 8, 10, 254

on anti-submarine warfare: 53

and the containment policy: 226–27

on MAP funding: 129, 131, 132, 133, 134

on NATO: 53, 96, 97, 103, 112, 113, 116–17, 126–27

on nuclear weapons: 21

on strategic mobility: 53

Dubcek, Alexander: 123

Duckwitz, Georg: 104–05

Duenas, Ramon de Clairmont: 145

East Asia and Pacific Interdepartmental Regional 

Group: 246

Eban, Abba: 166, 170–71, 180, 184

Egypt: 163, 166, 169–70, 171–73, 174–75, 185, 186, 191

Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference: 72, 74, 

77–78, 79, 80–81

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 31, 150, 253

Eleta, Fernando: 155

Enterprise, USS: 238–39

Enthoven, Alain: 115

Erhard, Ludwig: 78, 101

Eshkol, Levi: 164, 172, 173, 180, 181–82

Ethiopia: 177, 178, 193, 205–08

Extensions of terms of military service, proposed: 

43, 54, 59, 60

Far East Interdepartmental Regional Group: 225, 

247–48, 249

Five-Year Defense Program: 7

Force levels

Air Force: 41, 43, 44–45, 50–51, 56, 61, 64, 66

Army: 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 54, 64, 66

deployments around the world: 64

Marine Corps: 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, 54, 64, 66

NATO: 42, 51, 54, 55, 111–12, 113–14, 120–23, 256

Navy: 43, 52-53, 61, 64, 66

in the Panama Canal Zone: 151–52

in South Korea: 240, 241

Soviet: 42

strategic reserve: 11, 12, 13, 14, 41, 54, 55, 59, 

65, 254–55

in Vietnam: 42–43

Force planning

and ballistic missile defense: 32–40

conventional capabilities: 41–66

disagreements among the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff regarding: 42

and nuclear weapons: 17–23, 25–30

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: 129, 134

Foreign Assistance Act of 1968: 135, 179, 184

Foreign Military Sales Act: 135

Foster, William C.: 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76–77, 81–82, 

84, 89–90

France: 76, 157, 224–25

force de frappe: 91, 92–93, 95

and the Middle East: 165, 166, 178–79, 181, 182

and NATO: 91, 92–93, 94–95, 98-99, 111, 

113–14, 118

and nuclear weapons: 71, 78, 91, 92–93

Friedman, Alvin: 158–59

Fulbright, J. William: 131–32

Gandhi, Indira: 212, 216, 217

Garcia Godoy, Hector: 148, 149

Germany, Federal Republic of (West Germany)

and Israel: 164, 165

and NATO: 94–95, 96–97, 98, 99, 100–105, 113, 

114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126

and nuclear weapons: 78–79, 217

and Pakistan: 214

Gilpatric, Roswell: 67

Godley, McMurtrie: 200, 203

Goldberg, Arthur: 73–74, 75, 81, 167, 180, 197, 241

Goodpaster, Lieutenant General Andrew: 93

Gordon, Lincoln: 149

Greece: 105–06, 107, 108–09, 114, 129, 130, 131, 132, 

133, 134, 135–36, 177

Greene, General Wallace M., USMC: 5, 32, 34, 42, 

50, 230, 253

Gromyko, Andrei: 78

Guam: 241, 249
320

Index

Guevara, Ernesto “Che”: 204

Gulf of Aqaba: 169–70, 171

Guzman, Sylvestre Antonio: 144, 145

Harriman, Averell: 164, 200, 204, 206

Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903: 150, 151, 154

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901: 154

Headquarters, US European Command: 95–96, 97, 

100, 202

Helms, Richard: 240

Henderson, Admiral Nigel: 172–73

Henry, Brigadier General Stephen W., USAF: 177

Hod, General Mordechai: 185

Holmes, Julius: 177–78, 189

Honduras: 145

Hoopes, Townsend: 108, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 173, 

179, 188

Hornig, Donald: 36, 47–48

Hoveyda, Amir Abbas: 189

Hull, Field Marshal Richard: 190, 191

Hull-Alfaro Treaty of 1936: 150

Husak, Gustav: 123

Hussein, King of Jordan: 164, 167-68, 172, 179–80, 

182–83

Imbert-Barrera, General Antonio: 142, 143, 144–45

India: 80, 130, 131, 132, 189, 190–91, 209–12, 214–19, 225

Indian Ocean bases: 219–21

Indonesia: 224–25, 230–33

Indonesian Communist Party: 231–32

Inter-American Force: 143, 144–45

Inter-American Peace Force: 145–47, 148, 149

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

and arms control: 81, 82, 83–84, 86, 87, 88

Chinese: 32–33, 35, 36

hardened silos for: 17–18, 81, 82, 83–84, 87

Minuteman: 17–21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 36, 38, 39, 72, 81, 82

Soviet: 18, 19, 20–21, 24, 26, 28, 29–30, 32, 35, 

37–38, 70, 81, 83–84, 87–88

Titans: 17–18, 22, 26, 29

US: 17, 18, 19, 20–21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 83

Inter-departmental Regional Group: 160, 183

International Atomic Energy Agency: 74, 77, 78–79

International Court of Justice: 193–95, 196–97

Intrepid, USS: 171, 172, 198

Iran: 176–77, 186-89, 190, 191, 212

Iraq: 174

Israel: 80, 183, 200

Arab-Israel relations: 163–75

US military sales to: 164, 165-66, 167, 169, 178–80,

 181–82, 184–86

US military support for: 176–77

Italy: 114, 115, 122, 123, 200, 214

Iwo Jima: 248–49, 250

James Madison, USS: 29

Japan: 225, 226, 247–51

Jarring, Gunnar: 180, 181, 183

Jha, L. K.: 218

Johnson, Alexis: 248, 251

Johnson, Rear Admiral Frank: 236–37, 239

Johnson, General Harold K., USA: 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 46, 51, 

82, 160, 167, 198, 225, 236, 243–44, 249, 253, 255

and ballistic missile defense: 32, 36

and the Dominican Republic: 147, 148, 149

and force levels: 42, 45, 50

and mobilization of the reserves: 50

and NATO: 113, 123

and nuclear weapons: 24, 27

and troops for Vietnam: 43–44, 55, 59–60

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 2–3, 4, 5, 6–7, 254

and aircraft for Vietnam: 45

and arms control: 67, 68, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80–82, 

84, 85, 86–87, 88–89

and ballistic missile defense: 33–34, 35–37, 38, 40

budget requests: 9–10, 13, 255

and the Dominican Republic: 138, 139, 140–41, 

142, 143, 144

and Ethiopia: 205

and force levels: 50, 53

and France: 92, 95

and India and Pakistan: 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 

217, 218

and Indonesia: 231, 232

and Israel: 164, 166, 167, 181–82, 186

and Japan: 248, 250–51

and Latin America: 157

and MAP funding: 109, 130, 131, 133, 134–35, 

184, 232

and the Middle East: 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 

172, 173, 174–75, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 186, 

187–88, 189, 256

and mobilization of reserves: 48, 49, 65

and NATO: 95, 97, 101, 102–03, 104, 105

and naval vessels: 48

and nuclear weapons: 22, 79, 92, 215, 217, 218

and the Panama Canal: 152, 153, 154, 156

and the USS Pueblo incident: 239, 240, 241, 242

and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 253

and South Korea: 233, 234, 243, 244-45

and southern Africa: 195, 197, 199

and Taiwan: 229

and troops for Vietnam: 9, 13, 14, 43–44, 45, 

48, 55, 59, 65

Tuesday Lunches: 6, 72, 187

and the Vietnam War: 1, 3, 223, 253, 255, 256

Joint Chiefs of Staff

and Africa: 193, 203, 220

and arms control: 67, 68–69, 70–73, 74–75, 81, 

82, 83–84, 85–88, 89–90

and ballistic missile defense: 31, 33–36, 37, 38, 

39–40, 69, 70–71, 81, 83-84

and budget requests: 7–10, 13–14, 253–54

composition of: 2, 3–5

concerns about cost-effectiveness analyses: 

51, 56, 57–58

and the Congo: 200–202, 203, 204–05

and the containment policy: 223–24, 225–26, 

227, 234, 251, 256
Index

321

and costs for the Vietnam War: 9

and demilitarization of the seabed: 89–90

disputes with civilian leaders: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 

21–24, 26–27

and the Dominican Republic: 138, 139, 140, 141, 

142, 143, 144–45, 146, 147, 148, 149

and the “domino” theory: 223

and dual-basing of units for NATO: 96, 97, 102, 

103–05, 116, 124, 125

and efforts to curb nuclear proliferation: 76, 77,

78, 79, 80

and estimates of Soviet military strength: 42

and Ethiopia: 205, 206, 207–08

and extensions of terms of service: 60

and the Far East: 223

and force planning: 42–66, 255

and forces for NATO: 96, 99, 101–05, 109

and France’s role in NATO: 92–95

and Greece: 106, 107, 108

Hellenic Defense Study Team: 106, 109

and India and Pakistan: 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 

215, 216–17, 218, 219

and Indian Ocean bases: 219–21

and Indonesia: 231-33

and Israel: 163, 165–66, 168-69, 177, 178–79, 181, 

182, 184, 185, 186, 256

J–3: 147, 149, 151, 175, 233, 239–40, 241, 244

J–5: 55, 70, 115, 126, 167, 206, 213, 216

and Japan: 247–48, 249–50, 251

JCSM-498-68: 88

Joint Reconnaissance Center: 175, 236, 237

Joint Strategic Planning System: 7, 10

lack of influence during the Johnson 

administration: 253–56

length of terms of Service Chiefs and 

Chairman: 2

and MAP funding: 106, 107, 108, 109, 129, 

130–31, 132, 133, 134, 135–36, 228–30, 243

and the Middle East: 163, 164, 167, 168–69, 

171–72, 173, 174, 175–77, 178–79, 181, 182–84, 

185, 186, 188–90, 256

and military sales to Latin America: 157–60

and military sales to Middle Eastern countries: 

164, 165–66, 167–69, 178–80, 181, 182–83, 184–85, 

186–89

and military transportation needs: 46, 52, 56–57

and NATO: 92–98, 99, 100, 101–09, 111–27, 256

and NATO’s strategic concept: 112, 113, 116, 

117–18, 119, 121, 127

and a new canal in Central America: 150, 152, 153

and nuclear weapons: 17–30, 73–74, 92, 93, 

94–95, 116–17, 215, 216–17, 218, 219, 255–56

and the Panama Canal Zone: 150, 151–53, 154, 

155–56

and proposals to mobilize the reserves: 48, 

49–50, 52, 54, 59–60

and the USS Pueblo incident: 236–37, 239–40, 

241, 243–44, 256 

and SNDVs: 81, 83–84

and South Korea: 233, 234–35, 236, 239–40, 

241, 245–46, 256

and Southern Africa: 193, 194–96, 197–99

and the strategic reserve: 11, 54, 121–22, 254, 255

and submarines: 47

and tactical air power: 44–45, 50, 51

and Taiwan: 228–30

and troops for Vietnam: 12, 43, 44, 48–50, 

51–52, 54, 55, 59–60

and a two-war strategy: 11, 12, 15, 41–42

and a 21⁄2-war strategy: 12–13, 54, 60, 62

and US forces for NATO: 113, 114, 115–16, 

121–22, 123, 124, 125

and use of US bases in Panama for hemispheric 

defense: 152, 153, 155–56

and the Vietnam War: 1–2, 3, 224, 226, 227, 253–56

Joint Long-Range Strategic Studies: 7–8

JLRSS-76: 8

JLRSS 77-86: 8

JLRSS 79-88: 8

Joint Staff: 2

and aircraft sales to Latin America: 157, 158–59

analysis of military transportation needs: 46

and arms control: 68, 70

and efforts to curb nuclear proliferation: 75–76, 79

and force levels: 49, 50, 60

and India and Pakistan: 212

and the Middle East: 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 180, 

188, 189

and NATO: 101–02, 115, 123, 124

and the USS Pueblo incident: 243–44

and tactical air strength: 44

and Taiwan: 229, 230

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP): 7, 8, 10

JSCP-66: 8

JSCP-68: 12

JSCP-69: 8

Joint Strategic Objectives Plans (JSOP): 7–8, 9, 10, 

159–60

Annex J: 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 228–29

JSOP 68-75: 9, 20–21, 34, 49, 50–51, 52, 57, 132

JSOP 69-76: 12, 25, 37, 54, 55–57, 60, 133, 254–55

JSOP-70: 8–9, 11, 18, 19, 32, 41–42, 44, 45–46, 47, 

48, 130–31, 210

JSOP 70-77: 13, 27–28, 39, 60, 61, 62, 63–64, 135

JSOP-71: 9

Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: 21–22, 23, 24

Jordan: 163–69, 174, 179–80, 181, 182–83, 184

Kagnew station, Ethiopia: 177, 178, 193, 205–08

Kamchatka peninsula: 71

Kasavubu, Joseph: 199

Kashmir: 131, 209, 210–12, 213

Katzenbach, Nicholas: 108–09, 198, 204, 207, 208, 

240, 243

Kennedy, John F.: 6, 150, 151, 159, 199, 256

Khammash, Brigadier General Amer: 167, 168, 183

Kitty Hawk, USS: 240

Komer, Robert: 164

Korea, North: 233, 235-36, 239, 240–47

Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
322

Index

defense of: 54-55, 59, 226, 227, 239–40, 241–43, 

245–46, 247

MAP funding for: 129, 130, 131, 133–34, 135–36,

233, 234, 235, 242, 243

and the USS Pueblo incident: 233–36, 239–47

troops for Vietnam: 233, 234–36, 242, 244–45

Korean War: 41

Korry, Edward: 205, 206, 207

Kosygin, Alexei: 37, 78, 84, 86-87, 172, 174–75

Krulak, Lieutenant General Victor H., USMC: 5

Kuwait: 174

Laos: 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 223

Latin America: 137–61

and economic development: 135, 137, 156–57

MAP funding for countries in: 130, 131, 

132–33, 135, 159

military sales to: 156–61

use of US bases in Panama for hemispheric 

security: 152, 153, 155–56

Lebanon: 174, 184

LeMay, General Curtis, USAF: 3–4, 92

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., USA: 93, 95, 96–97, 

99–100, 101, 121–22, 202

Liberty, USS: 175–76

Libya: 174, 177, 179

Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963: 70, 71

Linvill, Brigadier General Robert, USA: 149

Luxembourg: 93–94, 96, 98

Macomber, William: 168

Mahon, George: 14, 255

Malaysia: 230–31, 232, 247

Mann, Thomas: 139, 151

Mansfield, Mike: 100–101, 122

Mao Tse-tung: 225, 251

Marine Corps, US

forces for Vietnam: 42, 43, 44, 49, 60

strength: 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, 54, 64, 66

units deployed to the Dominican Republic: 

139–42, 146–47

Marine Corps, US, units

1st Marine Division: 49

3rd Marine Division: 42–43

4th Marine Division: 43

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade: 141

Marine Expeditionary Forces: 53–54, 58, 64

6th Marine Expeditionary Unit: 138, 140

Marinho, Ilmar Pennha: 145

Martin, John Bartlow: 143, 144–45

Masterson, Vice Admiral K. S.: 139, 140, 141–42

Mauretania: 174

Mauritius: 219–20

McCain, Admiral John: 246, 248

McCarthy, Eugene: 59

McClendon, Rear Admiral William: 238

McCloy, John J.: 102–03, 104–05

McConnell, General John P., USAF: 3–4, 5, 9, 132, 

160, 167, 179, 228, 241–42, 253

and arms control: 76

and ballistic missile defense: 32, 36

and force levels: 42, 44–45, 47, 48, 50–51, 

55–56, 57–58, 61

and NATO: 92–93, 97, 123

and nuclear weapons: 19, 20, 22, 24, 27

McCormack, John: 139

McDonald, Admiral David L., USN: 4–5, 7, 9, 11, 24, 

82, 175, 190, 229, 253, 254–55

and ballistic missile defense: 32, 34, 36

and force levels: 42, 44, 50, 53

McKee, Lieutenant General Seth: 237–38

McMaster, H. R.: 253

McMillan, William G., Jr.: 70, 71

McNamara, Robert S.: 3, 4–5

and aircraft for Vietnam: 45

and aircraft sales to Latin America: 157–58, 159

and arms control: 69, 70, 71, 72-73, 74, 82, 84, 

85–86

assessments of the situation in Vietnam: 48

and assured destruction: 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 29–30, 

31, 35, 255–56

and ballistic missile defense: 31, 32, 33, 34–36, 

37–38, 39–40

budget requests: 8–9, 10, 112, 253, 254–55

and the Congo: 200, 203

and the containment policy: 224–26

and cost effectiveness evaluations: 1, 7–10, 19, 

37–38, 39, 45, 47, 56, 57–58, 221, 253–54

and the Dominican Republic: 139, 140–41, 

143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149

and efforts to curb nuclear proliferation: 76, 77, 

78, 79, 80

and Ethiopia: 205, 206, 207

and force levels: 42, 44, 45, 46, 47–48, 49, 50, 51, 

52, 53–55, 56–57, 255

and India and Pakistan: 210, 211, 212, 213, 216, 

217, 218

and Indian Ocean bases: 219, 220–21

and Indonesia: 231, 232

and Japan: 247, 248, 249, 250, 251

and MAP funding: 106, 107, 108, 109, 130, 131, 

132–33, 134, 136, 211, 232

and the Middle East: 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 

170–71, 172–73, 174–77, 178, 179, 180, 181, 

182–83, 187, 189–90

and military strategy: 13

and NATO: 92, 93–95, 96–98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 

103–04, 105, 107, 256

and NATO’s strategic concept: 111, 112–13, 

114–15, 116, 117, 120–21

and nuclear weapons: 17, 18–19, 21–24, 25–27, 

29–30, 73, 112–13, 114, 218

and nuclear weapons for allies: 93

and the Panama Canal Zone: 151, 152

and the PPBS: 7, 8–10, 112

and proposals to mobilize the reserves: 48, 52

and the USS Pueblo incident: 239, 240–41, 242

and South Korea: 233, 234, 235

and southern Africa: 194–95, 196, 197

and Taiwan: 228–30
Index

323

and troops for Vietnam: 9, 12, 43, 44, 48, 55, 100

and US forces for NATO: 113, 114, 115, 116, 

121–22

and the Vietnam War: 3, 224–25, 253

McNaughton, John: 82–83, 84, 92, 142, 206, 211, 212, 

215, 229

Messmer, Pierre: 94–95

Meyer, Armin: 186, 187

Middle East: 163–91

and the Arab-Israeli military balance: 165, 

168–69, 178, 184, 185

US military sales to countries in the: 164, 

165–66, 167–68, 174, 178–80, 181

Middle East Control Group: 169

Military Assistance Advisory Group–Pakistan: 213

Military Assistance Program: 129–36

and aircraft for Latin America: 159

appropriations for: 129, 130, 131, 133, 135

and the containment policy: 226–27

for Ethiopia: 205, 206

for Greece: 106, 107, 108–09

for India: 210, 211, 212, 213

for Indonesia: 231–33

for Israel: 168–69

for Middle Eastern countries: 133, 168–69, 

179–80, 182–83, 186, 187–88, 189, 190

for Pakistan: 210, 211, 212, 213, 214

for South Korea: 233, 234, 235, 242, 243

for Taiwan: 228–30

for Turkey: 107, 109

Missiles. See also Anti-ballistic missile systems; 

Intercontinental ballistic missiles; 

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

medium range ballistic missiles: 93, 112–13, 114

multiple independently targetable re-entry 

vehicles (MIRVs): 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 

35, 84–85

Pershing: 112, 117

Shillelagh: 127

short-range air-to-surface missiles (SRAMS): 

21, 25, 26, 27, 28–29

Mobilization of reserve forces, proposed: 43, 44, 

48, 49–50, 52, 54, 59–60, 65

Mobutu, General Joseph: 204

Molina Urena, Rafael: 138

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN: 5, 87, 88, 123, 

140, 145–46, 148, 237

Mora, General José: 145

Morocco: 174, 177, 178

Mountbatten, Admiral Louis: 112

Mundt, Karl: 131–32

Musa, General Mohammed: 190

Nasser, Gamal Abdul: 163, 165, 169, 170, 171, 172, 

174, 175

Nasution, General Abdul Haris: 231, 232

National Intelligence Estimates

and arms control: 71, 82

and NATO: 127

on Soviet nuclear weapons: 18, 20, 28

National Military Command Center: 238

National Policy Papers: 6

on Ethiopia: 205–06

on the Far East: 232

on India and Pakistan: 209–10, 214–15

on Iran: 188

on South Korea: 234

on southern Africa: 194–95, 198–99

National Security Action Memorandums

No. 297: 157

No. 323: 153

National Security Agency: 207, 237

National Security Council: 6

and Africa: 197–98, 204

and the Middle East: 169–70

Navy, US

force levels: 43, 52–53, 61, 64, 66

forces for Korea: 241

forces for Vietnam: 43, 44

and Indian Ocean bases: 220–21

number of carriers: 44, 45, 47–48, 50, 51, 52, 57

Seventh Fleet: 52

Sixth Fleet: 175–77,184

Netherlands: 93-94, 96, 98, 99, 125, 126

New Jersey, USS: 58

New York Times: 59

Newsom, David: 179

Nicaragua: 145

Nitze, Paul H.: 11, 39, 135, 136, 184, 197, 198, 208, 

220, 221, 236, 245, 246

and aircraft sales to Latin America: 159, 160

and arms control: 87, 89–90

and force levels: 60–64

and NATO: 109, 121, 122–23, 126–27

and nuclear weapons: 28–29

Nixon, Richard M.: 40, 89, 126, 221, 230, 251

Non-proliferation treaty: 75–80, 218–19

North Atlantic Council: 78–79, 95, 99–100, 111, 

114, 122

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

airbases for: 96, 99, 126

allied forces for: 95, 106, 114, 115, 124, 125

and arms control negotiations: 88-89

capabilities: 112, 113, 114–15, 116, 117, 118, 119–20, 

121, 122, 123–24, 125-27

command structure: 95, 99

Defense Planning Committee: 111–12, 119–21, 126

dual-basing of US forces for: 96, 97, 102, 

103–05, 116, 124, 125, 126, 256

and flexible response strategy: 92, 97, 107, 111–27

force levels: 42, 51, 54, 55, 111–12, 113–14, 

120–23, 256

France’s secession from: 91–100

International Military Staff: 119, 120

MAP funding for: 132

MC 14/2: 111, 113–14

MC 14/3: 118–20, 121

MC 100/1: 118

and the Middle East: 177

Military Committee: 100, 112, 117–18, 119, 120, 

124, 127
324

Index

Mountbatten Exercise: 112, 113

nuclear weapons for: 76, 77–79, 92–93, 94–95, 

112–13, 114, 116–17, 118–19

and planning for nuclear warfare: 111

stockpiles of war materiel: 96–98, 102, 103, 104, 

116, 117–18, 124, 127

strategic concept: 92, 97, 98, 101, 103–04, 106, 107, 

111–27

strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for: 76

tactical air strength: 44–45, 56, 60, 101, 103, 104, 

105, 112, 114–15, 116, 120–21, 126, 127

US forces for: 55, 56, 60–61, 65, 96, 97, 99, 100–105, 

112, 113, 115–16, 121–23, 124–27

Norway: 114

Nuclear proliferation

and China: 215

efforts to curb: 75–80, 215

and guarantees for non-nuclear nations: 77, 78, 

79, 215, 217–19

and India: 214–19

and Israel: 166, 178, 184

and the Middle East: 178

and a test ban treaty: 68–73

Nuclear weapons

and arms control: 67

and assured destruction strategy: 17, 18, 19, 

21, 23, 26–27, 28, 29, 30, 84, 86

Chinese capabilities: 24, 68, 215, 216

as a deterrent: 111, 118–19, 120, 227

and force planning: 17–23, 25–30

and France: 91, 94–95

and India: 214–19

and Israel: 166, 184–85

and NATO: 76, 77–79, 92–93, 94–95, 112–13, 

114, 116–17, 118–19

in outer space: 74–75

production of fissionable material: 73–74

seabed emplacement of: 89–90

Soviet capabilities: 17, 18, 19, 20, 68, 116–17, 119

stockpiles: 73, 116–17

tactical: 116–17, 118, 119

targeting systems for: 23–25, 92–93, 94–95

test ban movement: 67

for US allies: 76, 78, 91–93, 94–95

US superiority in: 17, 19, 20–23, 25–30, 35, 68, 84

Oehlert, Benjamin: 214

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(International Security Affairs): 8

and aircraft sales to Latin America: 157, 158–59

and arms control: 73, 74–75, 77, 82, 86

and the Congo: 203

Director of Military Assistance: 129, 131

and the Dominican Republic: 146, 147

and Ethiopia: 206

and India and Pakistan: 210, 212, 213, 216, 217

and Indian Ocean bases: 220–21

and Indonesia: 232–33

and Japan: 247

and Korea: 243

and the Middle East: 165, 167, 168, 179–80, 186, 

187, 188, 189

and southern Africa: 194, 195, 199

and Taiwan: 228, 229, 230

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Systems Analysis): 8, 114–15, 229–30, 241, 248, 

253–54

Office of the Secretary of Defense

and arms control: 69, 72

and the containment policy: 226–27

and force structure for Asia: 226

and MAP funding: 107, 109, 226

and the Middle East: 164, 167, 182, 185

and NATO: 113, 122–23, 126–27

and the PPBS: 7–10

and the SIOP: 23–25

and South Korea: 234

Okinawa: 226, 241, 248–49, 250, 251, 256

Okinawa, USS: 141

O’Meara, General Andrew, USA: 151–52

Organization of American States (OAS): 140–41, 

143, 144–46, 147, 148, 149

Outer Space Treaty: 74–75

Pahlevi, Mohammed Reza: 186, 188,189, 191

Pakistan: 80, 131, 132, 189, 190–91, 209–14, 216, 217, 218

Palestine: 166–67, 169

Palestine Liberation Organization: 167

Palmer, Lieutenant General Bruce, Jr., USA: 141–42, 

143–44, 145–47, 148, 149, 150

Panama: 137, 150–56

Panama Canal Zone: 150–56

Panama Review Group: 152

Paraguay: 145

Park Chung Hee: 235–36, 237, 242–43, 244–45

Peru: 135, 158, 159, 160–61

Peterson, Brigadier General Chesley, USAF: 186–87

Philippine Islands: 133, 135, 226, 247

Pickett, Major General George, USA: 243

Planning-programming-budgeting system 

(PPBS): 7–10

Porter, William: 243–44

Portugal: 93, 132, 193, 195, 196, 203

Powers, Major General George T., USA: 68, 81

President’s Science Advisory Committee, Strategic 

Military Panel: 32–33

President’s Special Assistant for National Security 

Affairs: 67

President’s Special Assistant for Science and 

Technology: 67

President’s Special Contingency Fund: 143

Public opinion

and Korea: 244, 245

and the Middle East: 171, 172

and troops for Vietnam: 43–44, 59, 65

and US forces for NATO: 122

and US intervention in the Dominican Republic: 142

and the Vietnam War: 3, 14, 244, 247–48, 256

Pueblo, USS: 13, 41, 59, 61, 65, 236–47
Index

325

Qadir, Lieutenant General Altaf: 190, 191

Rabin, Yitzhak: 184–85

Raborn, Admiral William: 139

Reid Cabral, Donald: 138

Reischauer, Edwin: 247–48, 249

Resor, Stanley: 154, 155–56

Rhodesia: 193, 195–96, 203

Richmond, Major General Luther, USAF: 188

Rickover, Vice Admiral H. G.: 63

Rivers, Mendel: 2

Robles, Marco: 152, 154, 156

Rolling Thunder: 3, 42, 45, 50, 52, 59, 254

Romania: 124

Rostow, Eugene: 169, 170

Rostow, Walt W.: 6, 65, 86, 109, 173, 187, 213, 238–39

Rusk, Dean: 6, 160, 217, 218, 242

and arms control: 67, 68, 69, 72, 81, 86, 88–90

and the Congo: 200

and the Dominican Republic: 138, 139, 140–41, 

144, 149

and efforts to curb nuclear proliferation: 76, 

78, 79, 80

and France: 95

and Japan: 247–48, 249, 250

and the Middle East: 167, 172–73, 178, 179, 180, 

181, 182, 183, 184, 188, 190

and NATO: 95, 99, 104–05, 122

and southern Africa: 194, 195, 196

and the Vietnam War: 224–25

Russell, Richard: 62, 122–23, 254

Ryan, General John D., USAF: 24, 25, 237–38

Ryukyu Islands: 248–51, 256

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: 138–39, 

140–41, 142, 143–44, 145, 146, 150

Sato, Eisaku: 247, 250–51

Saudi Arabia: 163, 174, 178

Schultze, Charles: 47–48

Seabed, demilitarization of: 89–90

Seabed Arms Control Treaty: 90

Seaborg, Glenn T.: 73

Selassie, Haile: 206, 207, 208

Senate Democratic Policy Committee: 100–101

Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG): 6–7

and Greece: 108–09

and India and Pakistan: 213, 214, 217

and Japan: 248, 249–50

and Korea: 246

and the Middle East: 178, 179, 181, 182–84

and military sales to Latin American countries: 

160

and southern Africa: 196, 198

Sharp, Admiral U. S. Grant: 48, 49, 51–52, 236–37, 

241, 242

Shastri, Lal Bahadur: 210–11, 212

Ships

amphibious assault: 48, 53–54, 58, 64

anti-submarine warfare carriers: 45, 47–48, 

50, 51, 52, 53, 57–58, 63–64

attack carriers: 55–56, 57–58, 59, 61

destroyer escorts: 47, 52, 53, 57–58, 63–64

fast deployment logistics (FDL) ships: 46, 52, 

56–57, 62–63

nuclear-armed: 92

nuclear attack submarines: 47

to support Vietnam War: 47

troop ships: 57, 62–63

Sibley, Brigadier General Thomas, USA: 169, 170, 195

Sinai Peninsula: 169, 171, 174

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP): 20, 23–25

SIOP-63: 24

SIOP-64: 24–25

Six Day War: 174–75, 179, 191

Smith, Admiral H. P.: 140

Smith, Ian: 195, 196, 197

Solbert, Peter: 146

Somalia: 205, 206

South Africa: 193–99, 203

South West Africa: 193–95, 196–97

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO): 209, 

211, 213, 223

Southey, Robert: 199

Spaak, Paul-Henri: 200, 202, 204

Spain: 122, 123

Special Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs: 6

Special National Intelligence Estimates 84–64: 152–53

and aircraft sales to Latin American countries: 

160

on the Dominican Republic: 137

on Ethiopia: 207–08

on Indonesia: 231

on Korea: 245

on nuclear weapons: 85

and the Panama Canal Zone: 152–53

Special State-Defense Study Groups: 177–78, 

224–25, 226

Spivy, Lieutenant General Berton, USA: 102–03, 

224–25

State, Secretary of: 67. See also Rusk, Dean.

State, US Department of

and arms control: 72, 78, 83, 86

and the Congo: 200, 201–03, 204

and demilitarization of the seabed: 89–90

and the Dominican Republic: 138, 139, 140, 144, 

147, 148, 149

and Ethiopia: 205, 206, 207

and Greece: 108

and India and Pakistan: 209–10, 212, 213, 216, 

217–18

and Indian Ocean bases: 219–20

and Indonesia: 232

and Japan: 247

and MAP funding: 108, 129, 134, 232

and the Middle East: 167–68, 176, 178, 179, 181, 

186, 187, 188, 189

and military sales to Latin America: 158, 160

and NATO: 99–100, 123, 124, 125
326

Index

and nuclear weapons: 217–18

and the Panama Canal Zone: 153, 154, 156

and southern Africa: 194, 195, 197–98, 199

and Taiwan: 229, 230

and Turkey: 109

Stevenson, Adlai: 68

Strait of Tiran: 169, 170–72, 173, 174, 180, 182

Strategic Air Command: 17–18, 29, 92–93, 95, 175

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT): 37, 40, 

80–89

Strategic mobility needs: 46, 52, 56–57, 62–63, 64

Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs): 76, 

80–81, 83–84

Strategic reserve: 11, 12, 13, 14, 41, 54, 55, 59, 65, 

121–22, 254–55

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs): 

18, 26

and arms control negotiations: 82, 86, 87–88

Poseidon: 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 72

Soviet: 18, 19, 28, 29, 88

US: 17–18, 19, 21, 28, 29, 88

Submarines

attack (US): 46–47, 52–53

ballistic missiles for: 18

for Latin American countries: 159–60

nuclear: 57–58, 63

Polaris: 17–18, 21, 29, 93

Soviet: 46–47, 53, 57, 63, 159–60

US: 52–53, 57–58, 63

Sudan: 174

Suharto, General: 231, 232

Sukarno: 230–31, 232

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic 

(SACLANT): 95, 111–12, 120–21

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR): 

91, 92–93, 95, 96–97, 99, 100, 111–12, 113, 117, 

120–21, 125, 126. See also Lemnitzer, 

General Lyman L.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe: 

94, 95–97, 99–100, 127

Symington, Stuart: 122–23

Syria: 163–64, 166–67, 168–69, 171, 174, 175, 178, 180, 

183, 185, 186, 191

Taiwan: 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 226, 227–30

Taylor, General Maxwell, USA: 6–7

Test ban treaty: 67, 68–73

Thailand: 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 226

Thant, U: 169, 180

Thompson, Llewellyn: 37, 86, 215–16, 224

Thomson, George: 104–05, 170

Time magazine: 4

Torrijos, Lieutenant Colonel Omar: 156

Treaty of Tlatelolco: 79

Trend, Burke: 172–73

Trettner, Heinz: 118–19, 120

Trujillo, General Rafael: 137–38, 142

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: 250

Tshombe, Moise: 199, 200, 201, 202, 203–04

Tunesia: 174

Turkey: 105–07, 108, 109, 114, 122, 123, 129, 130, 131, 

132, 133, 134, 135–36, 177, 189, 190, 212, 214

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

and Africa: 204, 205, 206

and arms control: 68, 69–70, 71, 72, 73–74, 77–78, 

81, 83, 86–87

and Czechoslovakia: 88–89, 123–27

and demilitarization of the seabed: 89–90

and effort to curb nuclear proliferation: 76, 

77–79, 80

and India: 209–10, 211, 213–14, 216, 218

and Korea: 239, 242

and the Middle East: 163, 164, 165, 167, 169, 

170, 172, 174–77, 178, 179–80, 181, 182–83, 

184, 185, 186, 187–88, 189, 191

missile defenses: 18, 21, 25, 33, 35–37, 69, 

81–84, 86–87

and NATO planning: 116-20

and nuclear weapons: 17, 18, 19, 20–23, 24–25, 

28–30, 32, 33–34, 35, 37–38, 68, 69, 72–73, 

74–75, 116–17

and Pakistan: 212, 214

and SNDVs: 81, 83

and the Vietnam War: 224

United Arab Command: 164, 167

United Kingdom

and arms control: 72, 76, 78, 79

and India: 209, 213–14, 216

and Indian Ocean bases: 219–21

and Malaysia: 231, 232

and the Middle East: 165, 170, 171, 180, 188, 

189–90

and NATO: 91, 92, 93, 94–95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 

102–03, 104–05, 112–13, 115, 123

and nuclear weapons: 92, 112–13

and Rhodesia: 195–96

and South Africa: 197–98

United Nations

and arms control: 68, 73–74, 79–80, 81, 89

and the Congo: 199, 202, 203

and demilitarization of the seabed: 89–90

and India and Pakistan: 211, 212

and the Middle East: 167, 169, 171, 174

and the Non-Proliferation Treaty: 218–19

Outer Space Committee: 75

and the USS Pueblo incident: 240, 241

Security Council. See United Nations 

Security Council.

and South West Africa: 193–95, 196–97

United Nations Emergency Force: 169

United Nations Security Council

and the Congo: 203

and the Dominican Republic: 144

and Israel: 167, 180, 183

Resolution 242: 180

resolutions: 79, 80, 180, 183, 218–19

and Rhodesia: 195, 197

US Army, Europe: 49, 100, 102, 126

US Congress
Index

327

and ballistic missile defense: 36–37, 40

and the Dominican Republic: 139, 142

and funding for ships: 62–63

and Israel: 164, 167, 168

and MAP funding: 107, 108–09, 129, 130, 131, 

132, 133, 134–35, 136, 179–80, 184, 188, 228, 243

and the Middle East: 171, 172–73, 179–80, 184, 

187, 188

and military budgets: 9–10, 245, 254–55, 256

and mobilization of reserves for Vietnam: 43

and NATO: 95, 100–101, 104, 122–23

and naval vessels: 48

and nuclear carriers: 53

and role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 2

US House of Representatives, Committee on 

Appropriations: 37, 255

US Military Supply Mission India: 213

US Senate, Foreign Relations Committee: 75, 80, 90

US Strike Command: 52, 188, 201

Vance, Cyrus: 2, 25, 108, 169, 173, 197, 201, 207, 243, 245

and ballistic missile defense: 36

and the Dominican Republic: 144–45, 146, 147, 149

and force levels: 49, 50, 53, 234

and NATO: 95, 119

and the Panama Canal Zone: 151, 152, 153

and the Vietnam War: 224

Venezuela: 146, 158, 159, 160

Vietnam, North: 225

Vietnam, South: 1, 12, 42, 129, 130, 131, 223, 226

Vietnam War: 256

aircraft for: 44–46

allied troops for: 230, 233–36

effects on aircraft sales: 182, 189

effects on MAP funding: 130, 131–32, 135

funding for: 130, 131, 133, 254, 255

and Japan: 247, 249, 251

possible Chinese intervention in: 223–25

and the USS Pueblo incident: 241–42

strategy for: 253–54

Tet offensive: 59

transportation needs: 45–46

troops for: 1, 12, 42, 43, 44–45, 48–49, 226

and US forces for NATO: 115–16 

Volcano Islands: 248–49, 250

Von Hassel, Kai-Uwe: 100

Ward, Admiral A. G.: 120, 121

Warnke, Paul C.: 184–85

Warsaw Pact: 103–04, 107, 121

capabilities: 112, 113, 114–15, 116, 117, 119, 121, 

126–27

force levels: 42, 51, 104

tactical air strength: 44–45, 56, 112, 114–15, 127

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group: 57–58

Weinel, Captain J. P., USN: 11

Weizman, Brigadier General Ezer: 166, 178–79, 185

Wessin y Wessin, Brigadier General Elias: 138, 139, 

148

Westmoreland, General William C., USA: 4, 5, 43, 

44, 45, 48, 49, 54, 55, 59, 126, 230

Wheeler, General Earle G., USA: 2, 4, 6, 7, 156, 159, 

198, 208, 212, 214, 218, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 

253–55

and arms control: 67, 68, 69–70, 74, 75, 82, 84, 

85–90

assessments of the war in Vietnam: 43

and ballistic missile defense: 32, 34, 35, 36, 37

and China: 224–25, 226

and the Dominican Republic: 139, 140–42, 

145–46, 148

and efforts to curb nuclear proliferation: 

75–76, 79, 80

and force levels: 42, 45, 50, 55–56, 57, 60, 61

and Japan: 248, 250

and MAP funding: 108, 134

and the Middle East: 169–71, 175, 178, 181, 

182–83, 184, 185, 190, 191

and military capabilities: 11–12, 13–14, 254–55

and mobilization of reserves: 59

and NATO: 93–94, 95, 97–98, 100, 101–03, 105, 

107, 113–14, 118–19, 120, 121, 122, 123–24, 125

and nuclear weapons: 18, 21, 22, 30, 118–19

and the USS Pueblo incident: 236, 238–39, 240, 

241, 242, 244

and South Korea: 240, 241, 245

and troops for Vietnam: 43, 44, 48, 55, 59

and the Vietnam War: 59, 224–25, 226

Wheelus Air Base, Libya: 174, 179

Williams, G. Mennen: 195

Woodward, Major General Gilbert, USA: 246

Yager, Joseph: 245

Yemen: 174

York, Major General Robert: 147

Yugoslavia: 124