J-S16018-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CLARENCE TYRONE TAYLOR

Appellant No. 1090 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 29, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000785-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and OTT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 12, 2017

In this matter, which returns to us by way of remand from the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Appellant, Clarence Tyrone Taylor, appeals his 

judgment of sentence entered on May 29, 2014 in the Criminal Division of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County. For the reasons that 

follow, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand this matter 

with instructions.

We adopt the statement of undisputed background facts set forth in 

our prior unpublished memorandum. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2015 

WL 7012589, *1 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). On 

January 27, 2014, at the conclusion of a three-day trial, a jury found 
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Appellant guilty of one count each of unlawful contact with a minor,1criminal 

use of a communication facility,2and solicitation to commit sexual abuse of 

children.3 On May 29, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of three to six years’ incarceration, followed by four years’ 

probation. In addition, over the objection of counsel,4the trial court ordered 

Appellant to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his life on 

grounds that he had two qualifying convictions for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9799.14 and 9799.15 of the Sex Offenders Registration and Notification 

Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.40.

Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion but, on June 27, 2014, 

he filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. On July 28, 2014, Appellant 

timely complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Thereafter, 

the trial court issued its opinion on August 25, 2014. 

On appeal, Appellant argued that he should have been sentenced to a 

25-year registration period under §§ 9799.14 and 9799.15 of SORNA, rather 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902(a) and 6312.

4

In his objection, trial counsel argued that Appellant should be subject to a 

25-year registration period because his two convictions involved only one 

criminal episode and one victim.
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than lifetime registration, because his offenses involved a single course of 

conduct and one intended victim. On June 2, 2015, this Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence, including the lifetime registration 

requirement. Specifically, we held that Appellant’s convictions for unlawful 

contact with a minor and criminal solicitation to commit sexual abuse of 

children constituted “two or more convictions of offenses listed as tier I or 

tier II sexual offenses” under § 9799.14 of SORNA such that Appellant was 

subject to lifetime registration pursuant to § 9799.15.5 See 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2015 WL 7012589, at *2 (Pa. Super. June 2, 

2015) (unpublished memorandum).

Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme 

Court. By order of October 20, 2016, the Supreme Court granted 

Appellant’s petition, vacated our order of June 2, 2015, and remanded this 

matter for further proceedings consistent with Commonwealth v. 

Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2016). In Lutz-Morrison, the Supreme 

Court held that § 9799.14 of SORNA encompassed a recidivist philosophy 

such that “the statute requires an act, a conviction, and a subsequent act to 

trigger lifetime registration for multiple offenses otherwise subject to a 

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5 Section 9799.14 of SORNA provides that tier III crimes include “[t]wo or 

more convictions of offenses listed as [t]ier I or [t]ier II sexual offenses.” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(16). Furthermore, § 9799.15 states that “[a]n 

individual convicted of a [t]ier III sexual offense shall register for the life of 

the individual.” Id. at § 9799.15(a)(3).
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fifteen- or twenty-five-year period of registration.” Lutz-Morrison, 143 

A.3d at 895. Applying Lutz-Morrison in the present case, it is clear that 

Appellant, who stands convicted of two tier II sexual offenses without an 

intervening judgment of sentence,6is now entitled to the relief he seeks, i.e.

registration as a sexual offender for a period of 25 years. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9799.15(a)(2)(individual convicted of tier II sexual offense shall register 

for a period of 25 years). Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to 

amend the judgment to conform to the dictates of Lutz-Morrison.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded with instructions. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/12/2017

____________________________________________

6 SORNA classifies Appellant’s convictions for unlawful contact with a minor 

and criminal solicitation to commit sexual abuse of children as tier II 

offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(c)(4) (sexual abuse of children), 

(c)(5) (unlawful contact with a minor), and (c)(18) (making solicitation of a 

listed offense a tier II crime).