[Cite as State v. Vega-Medina, 2024-Ohio-2808.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 113320

v. :

LUIS VEGA-MEDINA, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART;

 AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 25, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-22-671332-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Alexandria Serdaru, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant. 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

Defendant-appellant, Luis Vega-Medina (“Vega-Medina”), appeals his 

convictions and sentence and claims the following errors:

1. Appellant’s convictions for kidnapping and abduction are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.
2. Appellant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in violation 

of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

3. Appellant’s designation as a violent offender was improper.

4. Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law.

We affirm Vega-Medina’s convictions but vacate his sentence and 

remand the case to the trial court to comply with the requirements of 

R.C. 2903.42(C). 

I. Facts and Procedural History

In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-671332-A, Vega-Medina was charged with 

one count of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3) (Count 1); two counts of 

abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) and 2905.02(A)(2) (Counts 2 and 3); 

two counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and 2903.11(A)(2) 

(Counts 4 and 5); one count of disrupting public services in violation of 

R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) (Count 6); one count of domestic violence in violation of 

R.C.2919.25(A) (Count 7); one count of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) 

(Count 8); and one count of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A) 

(Count 9). 

The case proceeded to a jury trial that ended in a mistrial due to VegaMedina’s alleged need for an interpreter. Approximately one month later, the court 

dismissed with prejudice the felonious assault charge alleged in Count 4. The case 

later proceeded to trial on all remaining counts. 
Officer Sean Donovan (“Officer Donovan”), of the Cleveland Police 

Department, testified that he responded to a home on Denison Avenue in Cleveland 

on May 27, 2022, pursuant to a 9-1-1 call. When he arrived on the scene, he found 

M.E.1 crying hysterically in the garage. Officer Donovan observed bruising and 

marks on M.E.’s body, and M.E. reported that Vega-Medina had repeatedly hit her 

with his hands, a broom, and a belt. Officer Donovan authenticated photographs 

depicting M.E.’s injuries and video footage taken from his body camera when he 

arrived on the scene. These items were marked and admitted into evidence as 

exhibit Nos. 1 and 3 through 10.

M.E. testified that she had been dating and living with Vega-Medina for 

nearly eight years when she learned that he was having an affair with another 

woman. She also stated that their relationship was “toxic” and that she had been 

trying to end it. M.E. described the incident giving rise to this case as follows:

I was downstairs on the couch, and I heard him come inside the house. 

And he was upstairs for a little bit. And then I heard him coming down 

the steps. And I looked up and he had a broom in one hand and a belt 

in the other. 

And he approached me on the couch and asked me why I was on the 

couch. And I said, just leave me alone. I just want to be by myself. 

We’re not together anymore. 

And he started hitting me with the broom and the belt —

(Tr. 318.)

1

 In accordance with this court’s policy, initials are used herein to protect the 

privacy of the protected party.
After beating M.E. with the broom and the belt, he ordered her to go 

upstairs. M.E. testified that she “willingly” complied with his orders because she 

was afraid of “what he was going to do to [her].” (Tr. 320.) She explained, “I was 

scared. I was fearing for my life.” (Tr. 320.) 

M.E. attempted to call someone on her phone, but Vega-Medina took 

her phone away and said, “You’re not calling anybody.” (Tr. 321.) He then destroyed 

the phone and warned M.E., while holding a knife in his hand, that if she tried to call 

the police, he would stab her until she was paralyzed. (Tr. 321.) Vega-Medina 

directed her into a bedroom, threw her on the bed, and began suffocating her with a 

pillow. (Tr. 322.) Vega-Medina released M.E. from the bed, and she attempted to 

leave the bedroom, but he held the knife to her throat and told her that if she tried 

to leave, he would kill her and her mother. (Tr. 323.) Thereafter, he took the 

mattress, box springs, and nightstand and pushed them up against the door. 

(Tr. 323.) When asked if M.E. tried to get out, she replied, “I did not. I was afraid 

he would kill me.” (Tr. 324.) 

According to M.E., Vega-Medina fell asleep and they spent the rest of 

the night in the bedroom with the door barricaded. M.E. did not sleep, but VegaMedina was awakened when a family friend (“friend”), knocked on the front door. 

The friend testified that she lives near M.E. and that M.E.’s mother asked her to 

check on M.E. because she was not answering her phone. Vega-Medina opened the 

front door part way and asked her, “What do you want?” The friend asked to see 

M.E., and Vega-Medina eventually opened the door further. M.E., who had been 
watching from the first-floor bedroom, ran out the door and got into the friend’s car. 

The friend took M.E. to her house and called 9-1-1. According to the friend, they hid 

in the garage because they were afraid Vega-Medina had followed them to the 

friend’s house. 

In the ensuing days, Vega-Medina sent several messages to M.E. on 

Facebook. Some of the messages, which M.E. authenticated at trial, stated:

Just remember they can’t make u do anything that you don’t want too 

[sic] . . . you can always call them and let them know that you don’t want 

to [sic][.]

Are you going to court and help me out or what are you going to do? 

[o]r [sic] are you going to court and fuck me?

I’m sorry that I’m putting you tru all this pain and hurt. . . . I didn’t 

know it was this bad . . . .

I have nothing against you. What you did is right. I’m not supposed to 

put my hands on you. 

Please come back I won’t ever hurt you again.

I’m not a monster I love you what ever happened that night it’s not me 

. . . I don’t remember . . . I promise I can make everything better.

What ever happened that night its something that I don’t even freaking 

remember . . . When I woke up I didn’t know anything that happened 

the night before that’s why I went and answered the door . . . because I 

didn’t know what was going on[.]

I ate them freaking gummy bears crap and drank to [sic] much liquor[.]

[P]lease take a chance and text me back it can make everything better 

for both of us I’m sorry that I been taking all my anger out on you. 

(State’s exhibit Nos. 33, 34, 36, 46, 48, and 59-61.)
Vega-Medina testified in his own defense. He admitted to being 

unfaithful to M.E. and that he spent the evening at his other girlfriend’s house before 

coming home to M.E.’s house. Vega-Medina stated that he became angry with M.E. 

because he saw her on her phone, but she denied texting anyone. He explained that 

he “got mad and that’s when I went to hit her face.” (Tr. 416.) Vega-Medina 

admitted that he beat M.E. with a broom when she refused to unlock her phone and 

that he continued to beat her with a beltafter the broom broke. (Tr. 416-417.) VegaMedina further admitted that he eventually broke M.E.’s phone because she refused 

to unlock it and he suspected that she was texting another man. (Tr. 418-419, 422, 

431, and 435.) 

Vega-Medina admitted that he had consumed alcohol and “one of 

those gummies” and that he did not remember everything that happened. (Tr.432, 

437-438.) But he remembered he did not have a knife, he did not try to suffocate 

M.E. with a pillow, and he never barricaded the bedroom door with the mattress and 

box springs. Although he did not remember everything, he said he was 

remembering what happened “little by little.” (Tr. 438-439.) 

The jury found Vega-Medina guilty of the kidnapping charge alleged 

in Count 1, the abduction charges alleged in Counts 2 and 3, the domestic-violence 

charge alleged in Count 7, the assault charge alleged in Count 8, and the menacing 

charge alleged in Count 9. The jury acquitted him of the felonious-assault charge 

alleged in Count 5 and the disrupting-public-services charge alleged in Count 6.
At sentencing, Vega-Medina pleaded guilty to charges in a second 

case, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-673639-A. He pleaded guilty to one count of 

burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(3), one count of menacing by stalking in 

violation of R.C. 2903.211, and one count of domestic violence in violation of 

R.C. 2919.25. 

The State argued at sentencing that Vega-Medina’s conduct, as 

demonstrated by the two criminal cases before the court, “show[s] he has a clear 

disregard for other people’s well-being.” (Tr. 561.) After hearing a description of 

the events giving rise to CR-22-673639-A and a victim-impact statement from M.E., 

the court found that the kidnapping and abduction charges merged for sentencing 

purposes and the State elected to proceed to sentencing on the kidnapping 

conviction. The court also merged the assault, domestic violence, and menacing 

charges, and the State elected to proceed to sentencing on the domestic-violence 

conviction.

On the kidnapping conviction, the court sentenced Vega-Medina to a 

minimum of five years and a maximum of seven years and six months in prison. The 

court also imposed a minimum of two years and up to a maximum of five years of 

postrelease control. On the domestic-violence conviction, the court sentenced VegaMedina to time served. After imposing sentences, the court designated VegaMedina a violent offender under R.C. 2903.41 and advised him of his registration 

requirements. 
In CR-22-673639-A, the court sentenced Vega-Medina to 36 months 

on the burglary charge, plus one year of mandatory postrelease control and up to 

three years of postrelease control. The court also sentenced Vega-Medina to 18 

months on the menacing-by-stalking conviction and time served on the 

domestic-violence conviction in that case. Vega-Medina now appeals the trial 

court’s judgment.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Manifest Weight

In the first assignment of error, Vega-Medina argues his kidnapping 

and abduction convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

In a manifest-weight challenge, the reviewing court “‘weighs the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and 

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way 

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 

(1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). “A 

conviction should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in 

the most ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 

conviction.’” State v. Burks, 2018-Ohio-4777, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), quoting Thompkins

at 388. 

Vega-Medina was convicted of one count of kidnapping in violation of 

R.C. 2905.01(A)(3) and two counts of abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) 
and (A)(2). R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), which governs kidnapping, states that “[n]o person, 

by force, threat, or deception, . . . shall remove another from the place where the 

other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other person, . . . [in order to] [t]o 

terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another[.]”

R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) and (2), which govern abduction, state that “[n]o 

person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly . . .(1) [b]y force or threat, remove 

another from the place where the other person is found; [or] (2) [b]y force or threat, 

restrain the liberty of another person under circumstances that create a risk of 

physical harm to the victim or place the other person in fear[.]”

Vega-Medina argues the Cleveland Police Department failed to 

adequately investigate M.E.’s accusations against him because they never went to 

M.E.’s house where the alleged offenses occurred to search for evidence. He asserts 

that if the police had completed a proper investigation, they would have found no 

evidence that he barricaded the bedroom nor would they have found a steak knife in 

the bedroom as claimed by the victim, M.E. However, allegations of inadequate 

police investigations have no bearing on whether Vega-Medina’s convictions are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-838, ¶ 47 

(8th Dist.), citing State v. Johnson, 2019-Ohio-5335, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). In Williams, 

we explained that a manifest-weight challenge involves the credibility of the 

evidence presented at trial and that evidence that was not presented is not relevant 

to the analysis regardless of the reason for its absence. We, therefore, focus on the 
credibility of the evidence presented in support of Vega-Medina’s convictions and 

give no weight to the absence of evidence. 

Vega-Medina argues the evidence presented in support of his 

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because M.E. testified 

that she went upstairs with him “willingly.” Vega-Medina implies that because the 

victim went “willingly,” she was not forced, threatened, or deceived as required by 

the kidnapping and abduction statutes. 

R.C. 2901.01 defines “force” as “any violence, compulsion, or 

constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” 

However, the term “threat” is not defined. “A term not defined by statute is accorded 

its common, everyday meaning.” State v. Krupa, 2010-Ohio-6268, ¶ 32 (7th Dist.), 

citing State v. Dorso, 4 Ohio St.3d 60, 62 (1983). The word “threat” is commonly 

defined, among other things, as “an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or 

damage.” Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary /threat (accessed June 24, 2024). The Ohio Supreme Court has also held 

that the term “threat” represents “a range of statements or conduct intended to 

impart a feeling of apprehension in the victim, whether of bodily harm, property 

destruction, or lawful harm, such as exposing the victim’s own misconduct.” State 

v. Cress, 2006-Ohio-6501, ¶ 39. 

Nothing in either the kidnapping statute (R.C. 2905.01(A)(3)) or the 

abduction statute (R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) or (2)) requires the threat of force to be direct 

or explicit. Courts have held, in rape cases, that because the rape statute does not 
require explicit threats of force, threats of force may be implied by the 

circumstances. State v. Rupp, 2007-Ohio-1561, ¶ 32, (7th Dist.). We apply the same 

reasoning here and conclude that because the kidnapping and abduction statutes do 

not expressly require an explicit threat, threats of force may be implied.

M.E. testified that she went upstairs “willingly” because she was afraid 

of “what he was going to do.” (Tr. 320.) M.E. explained that she complied because 

she “was scared” and she “was fearing for her life.” (Tr. 320.) M.E. also testified 

that Vega-Medina ordered her to go upstairs after he beat her with a broom and a 

belt. There was, therefore, evidence of actual force. An ordinary reasonable person 

would infer under these circumstances that M.E. did not object to or resist VegaMedina’s order to go upstairs because she feared he would again use force to cause 

her additional harm. Therefore, M.E.’s testimony that she willingly complied with 

Vega-Medina’s order does not negate the fact that there was competent, credible 

evidence of both force and a threat of force. 

Vega-Medina further contends the inconsistencies between M.E.’s 

statements to police and her testimony at trial rendered her testimony less than 

credible. However, the inconsistencies he cites, such as whether M.E. was awake 

when Vega-Medina came home and whether there were allegations of infidelity 

between Vega-Medina and M.E., do not involve facts material to the charged acts. 

However, M.E. unequivocally stated that Vega-Medina threatened to paralyze her 

with a knife if she attempted to call for help, that he threatened to kill her and her 

mother, that he barricaded M.E. in the room, and that he attempted to suffocate her 
with a pillow. M.E. also testified that Vega-Medina destroyed her phone so she could 

not call for help. The minor inconsistencies in M.E.’s testimony do not render the 

rest of her testimony unreliable. Even if the jury did not believe those portions of 

M.E.’s testimony that were inconsistent with her statements to police, her remaining 

testimony is enough to sustain Vega-Medina’s convictions. 

Vega-Medina nevertheless asserts that his testimony and text 

messages show that M.E. was not restrained because the doors were unlocked and 

she could have left the house. There was also evidence M.E. could have escaped out 

a window while he was sleeping because the bedroom was on the ground level. 

However, M.E. testified that Vega-Medina closed the windows and barricaded the 

door to the bedroom with the mattress and box springs. Although he fell asleep, 

M.E. was afraid Vega-Medina would kill her if he caught her trying to escape. Officer 

Donovan’s body-camera video showed that M.E. was crying hysterically hours after 

the beating incident. This evidence corroborates M.E.’s testimony that the fear 

caused by Vega-Medina’s conduct prevented her from escaping. 

Finally, Vega-Medina argues there is no evidence that he terrorized 

M.E. because he denied attempting to suffocate her with a pillow. However, as 

previously stated, M.E. testified that Vega-Medina not only attempted to suffocate 

her, he also threatened to kill her and her mother and threatened to paralyze her 

with a knife. The fact that she did not describe how Vega-Medina came into 

possession of the knife does not diminish the veracity of her testimony. 
M.E.’s testimony contained some minor inconsistencies, but it was 

remarkably consistent with respect to the material facts. Vega-Medina, himself, 

admitted that he hit M.E. several times with a broom and a belt. He also admitted 

that he consumed a gummy and alcohol and that these substances impaired his 

memory. Yet, despite admitting that his memory was impaired, Vega-Medina 

asserted he knew for a fact that he did not attempt to suffocate M.E. with a pillow, 

never barricaded the bedroom door, and never threatened M.E. with a knife. When 

Vega-Medina’s testimony is considered together with all the evidence including his 

own admissions, it is clear that his testimony was self-serving and lacked credibility. 

Moreover, M.E.’s statements to police that were captured on Officer Donovan’s 

body-camera video corroborate her testimony that she feared for her life. Therefore, 

this is not the rare case where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.

The first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In the second assignment of error, Vega-Medina claims his Sixth 

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated. He argues his 

trial counsel was ineffective because (1) he failed to properly cross-examine 

witnesses in order to impeach M.E. regarding her prior inconsistent statements to 

police, and (2) he failed to properly question him on direct examination.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonable representation and that he or she was prejudiced by that deficient 
performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). Prejudice 

is established when the defendant demonstrates “a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 694.

Vega-Medina first argues that his trial counsel failed to properly 

cross-examine Detective William A. Cunningham (“Det. Cunningham”), the 

detective assigned to investigate the case. Vega-Medina asserts that “[d]uring crossexamination of Det. Cunningham, defense counsel attempted to ask whether the 

Complainant told him she was asleep when [Vega-Medina] came home.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 18-19.) He asserts that, based on the court’s statements and 

counsel’s intent to impeach M.E., “it is apparent the court would have allowed this 

impeachment if done properly during the Complainant’s testimony.” (Appellant’s 

brief p. 19.) He concludes that “there is a reasonable probability that the 

impeachment of the Complainant would have affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. 

Questioning M.E. about her inconsistent statements as to whether she 

was awake or asleep when Vega-Medina entered the home would relate to her 

credibility, but such impeachment would not have been enough to change the 

outcome of the trial. As previously stated, whether M.E. was asleep or awake is 

completely irrelevant to the charged conduct. Even if the jury chose not to believe 

the victim’s trial testimony that she was awake, they could still believe her testimony 

that Vega-Medina beat her with a broom and belt and restrained her in a bedroom 

against her will. 
Vega-Medina himself admitted that he beat her and the body-camera 

video shows that M.E. was still frightened by Vega-Medina’s actions when the police 

arrived. The body-camera video lends credence to M.E.’s testimony that VegaMedina terrorized her by attempting to suffocate her with a pillow, barricading M.E. 

in the bedroom, and destroying M.E.’s phone so she could not call for help. 

Therefore, it is not likely that the outcome of the trial would have been different even 

if counsel had been able to properly impeach M.E. 

Vega-Medina further asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective 

because he failed to elicit testimony from him regarding the layout of the house. He 

implies that had he been properly questioned, the evidence would have established 

that it was impossible for Vega-Medina to block the doorway. He, therefore, 

concludes he would have been acquitted of the kidnapping and abduction charges.

On direct examination, the State asked M.E. to sketch a layout of the 

house for the jury. Defense counsel questioned M.E. about the layout on crossexamination and used the sketch during the direct examination of Vega-Medina. 

Based on the testimony and exhibits, it was clear to the jury that M.E.’s home was a 

ranch and that it would be possible for someone to escape through a first-floor 

window. There was also evidence that M.E. might have escaped while Vega-Medina 

was sleeping. However, the evidence showed that M.E. was unable to escape 

because she was paralyzed by fear as a result of Vega-Medina’s conduct. Thus, even 

if counsel had been able to establish that M.E. could have walked out the door, it 
would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Therefore, Vega-Medina cannot 

establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

The second assignment of error is overruled.

C. Violent-Offender Designation

In the third assignment of error, Vega-Medina argues the trial court’s 

judgment designating him a violent offender was improper because the court failed 

to inform him of the violent-offender database requirements as required by

R.C. 2903.42. The state concedes this error. 

R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) governs the violent-offender database and 

provides, in relevant part:

For each person who is classified a violent offender, it is presumed that 

the violent offender shall be required to enroll in the violent offender 

database with respect to the offense that so classifies the person and 

shall have all violent offender database duties with respect to that 

offense for ten years after the offender initially enrolls in the database.

R.C. 2903.42(C) provides, in its entirety:

The judge, official, or official’s designee providing the notice under 

division (A) (3), (A) (4), or (B) of this section shall require the violent 

offender to read and sign a form stating that the violent offender has 

received and understands the notice. If the violent offender is unable 

to read, the judge, official, or official’s designee shall inform the violent 

offender of the violent offender’s duties as set forth in the notice and 

shall certify on the form that the judge, official, or official’s designee 

informed the violent offender of the violent offender’s duties and that 

the violent offender indicated an understanding of those duties.

Vega-Medina argues he did not understand the violent-offender 

duties and he never signed the violent-offender form. The State maintains that 

although Vega-Medina had an interpreter for the trial, he actually understands 
English well because he has lived in the United States for 35 years and pleaded guilty 

to numerous counts in several other cases without an interpreter. Nevertheless, 

R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) requires the court to inform the offender of the database 

duties before sentencing. Yet, the trial court informed Vega-Medina of his rights 

and duties under the violent-offender database after imposing the sentence and 

thereby violated the procedure outlined in R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). We, therefore, 

sustain the third assignment of error, vacate Vega-Medina’s sentence, and remand 

the case to the trial court to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2903.42(C). See 

State v. Wooden, 2022-Ohio-814, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.)(vacating sentence and remanding 

for resentencing where trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2903.42(C)). 

D. Sentence

In the fourth assignment of error, Vega-Medina argues his sentence is 

contrary to law. He contends his sentence violates the purposes and principles of 

sentencing outlined in R.C. 2929.11. 

We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 22-23. Under 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a 

sentence or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing if it “clearly and 

convincingly” finds that (1) the record does not support certain of the sentencing 

court’s findings or (2) the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.”

“A sentence is contrary to law if (1) the sentence falls outside the 

statutory range for the particular degree of offense, or (2) the trial court failed to 
consider the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the 

sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” State v. Evans, 2021-Ohio-3679, ¶ 12 

(8th Dist.). 

As relevant here, R.C. 2929.11 provides that the purposes and 

principles of felony sentence are

to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to 

punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the 

offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines 

accomplish those purposes without imposing unnecessary burden on 

state or local government resources.

R.C. 2929.11 does not require a trial court to make any specific factual findings on 

the record. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 20, citing State v. Wilson, 2011-Ohio2669, ¶ 31; State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, (2000). “[A] trial court’s 

statement in its sentencing entry that it considered the required statutory factors is 

sufficient to fulfill a trial court’s obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State 

v. Carter, 2016-Ohio-2725, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Furthermore, “[n]othing in 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence 

in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the 

sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at 

¶ 42.

It is undisputed that Vega-Medina’s sentences fall within the 

applicable statutory range for each conviction. Vega-Medina contends the trial 

court violated R.C. 2929.11 by sentencing him to more than a minimum prison term 

required to adequately punish him and rehabilitate him. He maintains that a term 
of community-control sanctions or a minimum prison term would have achieved the 

goals of R.C. 2929.11. He also argues the trial court failed to make any findings 

relative to R.C. 2929.11 at the sentencing hearing. 

R.C. 2929.13(D)(1) states that with respect to first- and second-degree 

felonies, “it is presumed that a prison term is necessary in order to comply with the 

purposes and principles of sentencing under section 2929.11 of the Revised Code.” 

Vega-Medina’s kidnapping conviction is a first-degree felony and is, therefore, 

presumed to carry a prison term. 

In arguing for a minimum sentence at trial, Vega-Medina’s trial 

counsel informed the court that Vega-Medina was grieving the loss of his son who 

was murdered two and one-half years before the incident giving rise to this case. He 

also explained that Vega-Medina does not use marijuana and that Vega-Medina was 

enrolled in anger-management treatment. However, the court heard evidence at 

trial that Vega-Medina beat M.E. and destroyed her phone to prevent her from 

calling for help. He attempted to smother her with a pillow and threated to kill her 

and her mother. The court also noted that it considered Vega-Medina’s criminal 

record, which involved numerous prior convictions including a case of violence 

against another woman. These findings are supported by the record, and the court 

indicated in the sentencing entry that it considered all factors required by law and 

that “prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” Thus, the trial court 

complied with R.C. 2929.11. Therefore, Vega-Medina’s sentence is not contrary to 

law.
The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part. We 

affirm Vega-Medina’s convictions but vacate his sentence and remand the case to 

the trial court to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2903.42(C). 

It is ordered that appellee and appellant share costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the 

trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR