UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-24156-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

RENÉ GARCIA, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

KERRIE J. STILLMAN, et al., 

Defendants. 

___________________________/ 

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Movant Henry Tien’s Application to Proceed in 

District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, ECF No. [72] (“Application”), filed on April 21, 

2023. The Court has denied Movant leave to intervene in this case, see Order on Motion for Leave 

to Intervene, ECF No. [55], and Movant has filed a Notice of Appeal, ECF No. [67]. As such, the 

Court construes Movant’s Application as his Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis. The 

Court has carefully reviewed the Application, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is 

otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Application is denied. 

“Applications to appeal in forma pauperis are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Federal 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.” Woodson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., No. 02-21921-Civ, 2020 WL 

5819808, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2020). “An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the 

trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). “A party 

demonstrates good faith by seeking appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous when 

examined under an objective standard.” Ghee v. Retailers Nat’l Bank, 271 F. App’x 858, 859 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). An issue is frivolous when it appears that “the legal theories are 

Case 1:22-cv-24156-BB Document 73 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/25/2023 Page 1 of 4
Case No. 22-cv-24156-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

2

indisputably meritless.” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir.1993) (citations omitted).

“In other words, an IFP action is frivolous, and thus not brought in good faith, if it is ‘without 

arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Ghee, 271 F. App’x at 859-60 (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 

F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

On February 24, 2023, Movant filed his Motion for Leave to Intervene, ECF No. [53], and 

his “Intervention Complaint.” ECF No. [51]. Neither of Movant’s filings revealed whether he was 

seeking intervention as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), or permissive intervention under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Court therefore analyzed whether intervention under either was appropriate. 

ECF NO. [55]. As for intervention as of right, the Court concluded that Movant failed to assert a 

“direct, substantial, legally protectible interest in the proceeding” because his only asserted interest 

in this case is that he wants to become mayor of the City of South Miami, a position that might 

become available if Defendant Javier Fernández is forced to resign as a result of the Lobbying 

Restrictions. ECF No. [55] at 2 (quoting Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 

1989). Moreover, Movant failed to show that his interests were not adequately represented by the 

Attorney General of the State of Florida and the other Defendants in this case. Id. As for permissive 

intervention, the Court concluded that Movant’s intervention would not add any meaningful 

contribution to this case, and his intervention would result in undue delay in the adjudication of 

the original parties. Id. at 3.

Procedurally, Movant’s Application is deficient for failing to “state[ ] the issues that the 

party intends to present on appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. R. 24(a)(1)(C). Due to that failure, the Court 

does not know whether Movant seeks to appeal the issue of intervention as of right, or permissive 

intervention. Regardless, the Court concludes that both issues are frivolous. For the reasons 

explained in the Court’s Order, ECF No. [55], Movant’s Motion for Leave to Intervene failed to 

Case 1:22-cv-24156-BB Document 73 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/25/2023 Page 2 of 4
Case No. 22-cv-24156-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

3

satisfy multiple Rule 24(a) factors, most notably the requirement that Movant have a “direct, 

substantial, legally protectible interest in the proceeding.” Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213-14. As for 

permissive intervention, the Eleventh Circuit would evaluate the Court’s determination under the 

highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Worlds v. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 

929 F.2d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court sees no possibility of the Eleventh Circuit 

concluding that the Court abused its discretion in these circumstances, wherein (a) Movant has no 

claim in this case, (b) his filings are procedurally deficient, (c) his intervention will not “help 

resolve the issue” of the Lobbying Restrictions’ constitutionality, Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Sandy 

Lake Props., 425 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2005), and (d) his intervention would “unduly delay 

. . . the adjudication of the original parties’ rights. Rule 24(b)(3).

In sum, the Court concludes that Movant has failed to seek appellate review “of any issue 

that is not frivolous when examined under an objective standard.” Ghee, 271 F. App’x at 859. The 

Court therefore finds Movant’s appeal to be frivolous and “certifies in writing that it is not taken 

in good faith.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Application, ECF No. [72], is 

DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on April 24, 2023.

_________________________________

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Case 1:22-cv-24156-BB Document 73 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/25/2023 Page 3 of 4
Case No. 22-cv-24156-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

4

Henry Tien

5660 S.W. 58 Place

Miami, FL 33143

aucadmiss@copper.ne

Case 1:22-cv-24156-BB Document 73 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/25/2023 Page 4 of 4