J-S31018-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

OLGA SEGREAVES

Appellee

v.

ROSS SEGREAVES 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 888 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered April 9, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Civil Division at No(s): C-48-PF-2016-00811

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED DECEMBER 17, 2021

Appellant, Ross Segreaves, appeals from the order entered in the 

Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, which found Appellant in 

indirect criminal contempt of court for violating an order under the Protection 

From Abuse (“PFA”) Act,1in favor of Appellee, Olga Segreaves. We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

Appellant and Appellee were married, and they are the parents of two minor 

children. In September 2016, while divorce proceedings were underway, the 

parties had a heated confrontation. 

On or about September 21, 2016, [Appellee] obtained a 

temporary [PFA] Order in the instant case.... Per the request 

of [Appellee], that temporary Order was dismissed without 

prejudice on October 3, 2016. On that same date of October 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122. 
J-S31018-21

- 2 -

3, 2016, [Appellee], by and through her counsel, ... and 

[Appellant], who was pro se, reached an agreement that 

was made part of the record wherein [Appellee] agreed to 

withdraw her PFA in exchange for exclusive possession of 

the marital home and other modifications to the parties’ 

Custody Order. 

On November 18, 2016, the [trial court] conducted a 

hearing on a Petition for Contempt filed by [Appellee] 

wherein [Appellee] alleged violations of the parties’ 

agreement of October 3, 2016. [Appellee] alleged that 

[Appellant] showed up at her home on multiple occasions 

and repeatedly harassed her. Following this hearing, [the 

trial court] reinstated the temporary PFA Order. [Appellee] 

later obtained a final PFA Order against [Appellant], which 

was set to expire November 18, 2019. [The trial court] 

directed that [Appellant] could only contact [Appellee] on 

matters pertaining to the custody of their children.[2] 

[Appellee] filed a request for an extension of the final PFA 

Order on October 31, 2019. A hearing was scheduled for 

November 8, 2019. The [trial court] entered the first 

extension of the PFA Order on November 5, 2019, extending 

the PFA Order until November 22, 2019. On November 22, 

2019, by agreement of the parties, the final PFA Order was 

extended for an additional three years and is now in effect 

until November 22, 2022. On September 3, 2020, at the 

request of [Appellee], the [trial court] entered an Order 

modifying the PFA Order to prevent [Appellant] from 

contacting the following individuals, all of whom were 

friends or acquaintances of [Appellee]: 1) Sue Gunderman; 

2) Martin Gunderman; and 3) Jorge Parra. [Appellant] had 

sent them numerous letters from prison concerning 

[Appellee]. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed May 13, 2021, at 4-6) (internal citations omitted). 

Between November 18, 2016 and December 14, 2020, the trial court 

____________________________________________

2 The final PFA order specifically prohibited Appellant “from having ANY 

CONTACT” with Appellee, “either directly or indirectly through a third 

party....” (Order, 1/24/17, at ¶3) (emphasis in original). 
J-S31018-21

- 3 -

found Appellant guilty of ten (10) charges of indirect criminal contempt for 

violating the PFA order.3 At the December 14, 2020 contempt hearing, the 

court explained Appellant’s most recent violations of the PFA order as follows: 

THE COURT: Sir, the contempt petition that is datestamped September 3, 2020, alleges that while you were 

incarcerated [you] wrote letters to [Appellee’s] close 

friends, mailed them to their family business address, and 

told her friends to ask [Appellee] to come before me and 

ask for your release. 

The friend has appeared numerous times here on previously 

scheduled hearings and gave me a stack of letters from you, 

sir. Do you admit you did these things? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes, I have already stated that. Yes. 

THE COURT: Sir, the contempt petition that was datestamped November 5, 2020, alleges that on October 17, 

2020, [Appellee] received a ... health guide on bipolar 

disorder, and then a couple of days later, a letter came 

addressed to her [from the] International OCD Foundation. 

And that on November 4, 2020, [Appellee’s] friend received 

a letter ... at her work at St. Luke’s Hospital campus, and 

that it was addressed from a correctional facility. Do you 

admit that you sent these items? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes. 

(N.T. Contempt Hearing, 12/14/20, at 11-12). The court also warned 

Appellant that he would face additional prison time if “in any way, shape, or 

form” he contacted Appellee, “or anyone associated with [Appellee] for any 

____________________________________________

3

In addition to the criminal contempt charges, Appellant entered a guilty plea 

to first-degree misdemeanor stalking of Appellee on June 1, 2018. The court 

sentenced Appellant to three (3) to six (6) months’ imprisonment, followed by 

twenty-four (24) months of probation for the stalking conviction. 
J-S31018-21

- 4 -

reason[.]” (Id. at 15). 

On December 16, 2020, Appellee filed another indirect criminal 

contempt private complaint. In it, Appellee alleged that Appellant had sent 

an additional letter to her friend’s place of employment at St. Luke’s Hospital, 

and the letter was “disturbing” to her friend. (Criminal Contempt Private 

Complaint, filed 12/16/20, at ¶2). Appellee’s complaint included the letter, 

which speculated about various medical conditions that Appellant believed 

were affecting him. At the conclusion of the letter, Appellant asked Appellee’s 

friend to contact both Appellee and Appellee’s attorney to inform them about 

Appellant’s purported medical conditions. 

The court conducted a contempt hearing on March 12, 2021. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the court found Appellant guilty of indirect criminal 

contempt and sentenced him to six (6) months’ incarceration. Appellant 

timely filed a notice of appeal on April 9, 2021. On April 12, 2021, the court 

ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement 

on April 28, 2021. 

Appellant now raises one issue for our review: 

Did the trial court err in finding that Appellant violated the 

PFA order with wrongful intent? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

On appeal, Appellant contends that he sent a letter to Appellee’s friend 

“for the purpose of passing on urgent concerns about the health of 
J-S31018-21

- 5 -

[Appellant’s] family, which included the parties’ minor children.” (Id. at 8). 

Appellant asserts that “it would take a hyper-literal reading of the PFA order 

to find wrongful intent simply based on a momentary solicitation of Appellee’s

health alongside that of their children.” (Id.) Appellant argues that, “if 

anything,” the letter amounted to a “de minimis infraction [of the PFA order 

that was] insufficient to demonstrate wrongful intent.” (Id. at 8-9). Appellant 

concludes that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for indirect 

criminal contempt. We disagree. 

“[W]hen reviewing a contempt conviction, much reliance is given to the 

discretion of the trial judge. Accordingly, we are confined to a determination 

of whether the facts support the trial court decision.” Commonwealth v. 

Kolansky, 800 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa.Super. 2002) (quoting Williams v. 

Williams, 681 A.2d 181, 183 (Pa.Super. 1996), aff’d, 554 Pa. 465, 721 A.2d 

1072 (1998)). “We will reverse a trial court’s determination only when there 

has been a plain abuse of discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of 

the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of 

record.” Commonwealth v. Griffiths, 15 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa.Super. 2003), 

appeal denied, 581 Pa. 671, 863 A.2d 1143 (2004)). 

“The purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence 
J-S31018-21

- 6 -

from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance 

prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519 

(Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1262 

(Pa.Super. 2008)). 

Where a PFA order is involved, an [indirect criminal 

contempt] charge is designed to seek punishment for 

violation of the protective order. A charge of indirect 

criminal contempt consists of a claim that a violation of an 

order or decree of court occurred outside the presence of 

the court. To establish indirect criminal contempt, the 

Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently 

definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no 

doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had 

notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must 

have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted 

with wrongful intent. 

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 147 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“Wrongful intent will be found where the contemnor knows or 

reasonably should be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Stewart v. 

Foxworth, 65 A.3d 468, 472 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Himes v. Himes, 

833 A.2d 1124, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2003)). “It is imperative that trial judges 

use common sense and consider the context and surrounding factors in 

making their determinations of whether a violation of a court order is truly 

intentional before imposing sanctions of criminal contempt.” 

Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal 

denied, 585 Pa. 686, 887 A.2d 1240 (2005) (emphasis in original). 

Instantly, the trial court conducted a contempt hearing on March 12, 
J-S31018-21

- 7 -

2021. At the hearing, Appellee’s friend, Marina Mikhalik, testified that: 1) she 

received a letter that Appellant sent to her place of employment in December 

2020; 2) the letter made her feel uncomfortable; and 3) she informed Appellee 

about the letter and forwarded it to Appellee. (See N.T. Hearing, 3/12/21, at 

10-11). In the letter, Appellant claimed to “have potentially been poisoned 

by toxic exposure to benzene[.]” (Id. at 13). 

Appellant also testified at the hearing, and he admitted sending the 

letter to Ms. Mikhalik. (Id. at 17). Appellant emphasized that his “intent was 

not clearly to communicate with [Appellee]; it was to have my children and 

my wife, their health taken care of.” (Id. at 23). Appellant further explained 

that there was a “chimney collapse” at the parties’ residence over eleven years 

ago, and he believed that the collapse exposed his family to “neurotoxins,” 

which could cause brain damage or cancer. (Id. at 25). 

The trial court evaluated the hearing testimony and the letter at issue, 

concluding that Appellant acted with the requisite wrongful intent: 

The letter that was admitted into evidence as Exhibit “P1” 

at the March 12, 2021 hearing cannot be viewed in isolation. 

The PFA Order against [Appellant] has been in effect since 

2016 and extended on several occasions. [Appellant] has 

not been compliant with the PFA Order since its 

inception. Consistently since 2016, [Appellant] has 

violated the PFA Order through communications with 

[Appellee] that have been incessant and unrelenting in 

nature, including and continuing while he is incarcerated in 

state prison for violating the PFA Order. [Appellant] has 

repeatedly threatened to kill [Appellee]. [Appellant]

violated his bail provisions by contacting [Appellee], 

violated his probation by contacting [Appellee], alarmed his 

probation officer with his behavior ..., impersonated his
J-S31018-21

- 8 -

therapist, has made death threats by and through his 

mother, and has been arrested by the police at [Appellee’s]

house in violation of the PFA Order. [Appellant], who has 

been criminally convicted of stalking and harassing 

[Appellee], has continued unrelentingly to stalk and harass 

her, even with the PFA Order in place. [Appellant] has been 

repeatedly warned and counseled by [the trial c]ourt 

concerning the prohibitions of the PFA Order, and he has 

been ordered to receive mental health treatment. 

[Appellant] has repeatedly claimed to have various mental 

health diagnoses and ailments for which there is absolutely 

no evidence of record. He has communicated with 

numerous third parties at their homes and places of 

employment in an effort to enlist them to help him 

communicate with [Appellee] in violation of the PFA Order, 

which resulted in at least one amendment to the Order. 

(Trial Court Opinion at 35-36) (emphasis in original). 

Our review of the record confirms the court’s conclusions. Although 

Appellant insists that he sent the letter to Ms. Mikhalik for the good faith 

purpose of giving his children relevant medical information, the court correctly 

noted that Appellant did not actually provide any evidence to support the 

purported diagnoses. Instead, Appellant asked Ms. Mikhalik to tell Appellee 

that she should “expect a letter” from doctors, who would provide additional 

information about Appellant’s medical condition. (See Letter marked as 

Exhibit P1). The letter’s closing sentences reveal that Appellant’s true purpose 

in writing to Ms. Mikhalik was to garner sympathy and further his goal of 

reunification with Appellee and his children: “I love my wife and kids very 

much, every day I cry because I miss them. Can you imagine my pain?” (Id.) 

Based upon the court’s prior warnings, Appellant knew or should have 

known that his conduct was wrongful. See Stewart, supra. Here, the trial 
J-S31018-21

- 9 -

court used common sense and considered the context and surrounding factors 

in making its determination that Appellant had committed another contempt. 

See Haigh, supra. Because the facts support the court’s decision, we cannot 

say that it abused its discretion in concluding that Appellant acted with a 

wrongful intent. See Kolansky, supra. Accordingly, no relief is due. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/17/2021