UNITED STATES ARM Y IN WORLD WAR II 

The Technical Services 

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE 

SERVICE: 

FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD 

by 

Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles 

and 

&xmond C. Cochrane 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1988 





Foreword

Rather belatedly, the United States Army in preparing for World

War II investigated on an intensive and very large scale the chemical

munitions that might be necessary or useful in fighting the Axis powers.

This effort required the collaboration of a host of civilian scientists and

research centers as well as a great expansion of the laboratories and proving grounds of the Chemical Warfare Service itself. A similar development,

recounted at the beginning of this work, came too late to influence the

outcome of World War I. In World War II, on the other hand, the

Army not only prepared against gas warfare sufficiently well to discourage

its employment by the enemy, but also developed a number of new

chemical weapons that contributed materially to victory. The authors add

perspective and interest to their story by telling very briefly about corresponding German and Japanese activity.

The manufacture of chemical munitions in quantity was possible only

through a rapid expansion of private industry to support and supplement

the work of Army arsenals. Both necessity and choice led the Chemical

Warfare Service to make widespread use of small industrial concerns

throughout the United States, and the account of production in this work

is especially pertinent to a consideration of the problems involved in military contracting with small business on a big scale. In this and other

respects, From Laboratory to Field complements other volumes in the Army

series dealing with problems of military procurement. Readers generally

as well as members of the Chemical Corps particularly should find it

instructive.

Washington, D.C.

9 June 1959

WARREN H. HOOVER

Colonel, U.S.A.

Acting Chief of Military History

vii
The Authors

Dr. Leo P. Brophy holds an A.B. degree from Franklin and Marshall College

and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Fordham University. After teaching

history and sociology at Fordham and Seton Hall Universities, he joined the

staff of the Chemical Corps Historical Office in 1945. He has specialized in administrative and logistic history. Since 1953 Dr. Brophy has served as Chief of

the Chemical Corps Historical Office. He is coauthor of The Chemical Warfare

Service: Organizing for War.

Dr. Wyndham D. Miles has an M.S. degree in organic chemistry from The

Pennsylvania State University and a Ph.D. in History of Science from Harvard.

After working in industry as a research chemist, and teaching chemistry at The

Pennsylvania State University, he joined the staff of the Chemical Corps Historical Office in 1953.

Dr. Rexmond C. Cochrane obtained a Ph.D. in English Literature from

Columbia University and was a member of the Chemical Corps Historical Office

from 1945 until 1948. After teaching at Indiana University and the University of

Virginia, he returned to the Historical Office as a consultant historian. He is at

present a Research Associate in the Department of History, University of

Maryland.

viii
Preface

This volume, the second in a series of three devoted to the Chemical

Warfare Service (CWS) in World War II, now the Chemical Corps,

covers research, development, procurement, and distribution of chemical

warfare matériel. It traces the history of these activities from the World

War I period, when the CWS was activated to supervise the offensive

and defensive aspects of gas warfare throughout the Army, until the end

of World War II. The first volume in the series, Organizing for War, discusses the development of the CWS organization and mission as well as

personnel management and military training. The third volume, entitled

Chemicals in Combat, will deal with chemical warfare activities in the theaters

of operations.

In treating research and development, the present volume concentrates

on CWS projects that proved of greatest significance to the armed forces

during World War II. It attempts to point up the problems that arose in

the course of research and development and to indicate the solutions which

the scientists hit upon. Since research and development in the zone of

the interior was closely related to research and development in the theaters

of operations, the volume covers activities in both areas.

In contrast to research and development, procurement and distribution

differed considerably as between the zone of the interior and the theaters

of operations; in the theaters these activities were closely associated with

the commanders' combat responsibilities. The volume, therefore, confines

itself to a review of procurement and distribution in the zone of the

interior, leaving narration of theater activities to the forthcoming Chemicals

in Combat.

In World War II the CWS procured a variety of munitions and

components both from government arsenals and from private industry.

For some of these items the service had prepared plans in the prewar

years, but for others it had not had the opportunity to make such plans.

ix
Procurement by the CWS of some items was on a scale never before experienced in peace or war. As in the treatment of research and development, the volume attempts to devote major attention to items that proved

significant to the war effort.

Dr. Leo P. Brophy wrote all of the chapters and sections of chapters

dealing with procurement and distribution. He was assisted in the research and writing of Chapters XIV and XVI by Mr. Sherman L. Davis of

the Historical Staff, Chemical Corps. Dr. Wyndham D. Miles wrote all of

the chapters on research and development except the section of Chapter

IV dealing with the treatment of gas casualties and Chapter V. The latter

were researched and put in draft form by Dr. Rexmond C. Cochrane. Dr.

Brooks E. Kleber and Mr. Dale Birdsell reviewed the chapters and offered

helpful comments.

The authors of this volume were greatly aided in their research by

the competent staff of the National Archives, particularly Mr. Robert W.

Krauskopf of Modern Army Branch and Mrs. Caroline Moore, Mrs. Lois

C. Aldridge, and Mrs. Hazel Ward of the World War II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service; Mr. Charles E. McCusker,

Mr. Howard V. Baute, Mrs. M. Virginia Nester, and Mrs. Mary K. Stuart

of the Federal Records Center, GSA, Alexandria, Va.; Mr. Joseph A. Logan,

Office of the Comptroller of the Army; Miss Clara J. Widger, Librarian,

Industrial College of Armed Forces; and Mr. Robert T. Baldwin of the

Chlorine Institute, New York City. Members of the U.S. Army Chemical

Corps records and technical information staff, particularly Miss Alice M.

Amoss, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Chemical Warfare Laboratories, Mrs.

Marion O. Varney, Miss Ethel M. Owens and the late Mrs. Elizabeth V.

Owens of the Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, were most helpful.

Mrs. Alice E. Moss assisted in the verification of sources and supervised

the typing of the manuscript.

The authors are indebted to the many veterans of the Chemical Warfare Service who through interviews and otherwise aided them in writing

the volume. Special thanks are due for the assistance afforded by Maj. Gen.

Charles E. Loucks, Brig. Gen. Clifford L. Sayre, Brig. Gen. Harold Walmsley, Col. Philip J. FitzGerald, Mr. Marvin J. Silberman, Mr. Robert M. Estes,

Dr. L. Wilson Greene, Lt. Col. Allan C Hamilton, Col. W. P. Fuller

Brawner, Col. Frank M. Arthur, Mr. Lester J. Conkling, Col. Ralph W.

Hufferd, and Mr. Roman L. Ortynsky.
Thanks also are due to several members of the Office of the Chief of

Military History who did much to improve this work. These include Dr.

Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, who offered valuable advice; Mr. David

Jaffé, who was Editor of the volume; Mr. Thomas H. Monahan, Copy

Editor; and Miss Margaret E. Tackley, Chief of the Photographic Branch,

who selected the photographs.

LEO P. BROPHY

WYNDHAM D. MILES

REXMOND C. COCHRANE

Washington, D.C.

15 June 1959

xi

Contents

Chapter Page

I. RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I.................. . 1

The Committee on Noxious Gases, National Research Council.............. 2

Chemical Warfare Research in the Bureau of Mines...................... 4

Medical Research.................................................. 8

Research in the AEF............................................... 9

The Centralization of Activities in the Chemical Warfare Service........... 12

Chemical Munitions................................................ 14

Gas Defense Equipment............................................. 18

Field Testing of Chemical Munitions.................................. 22

Demobilization.................................................... 24

II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR....... 28

The Peacetime Scientific Program...................................... 31

Development Procedure.............................................. 34

Laboratories and Proving Grounds.................................... 36

Assistance from Industries and Universities.............................. 41

Co-operation with the British Commonwealth............................ 45

Information from the Enemy......................................... 46

III. TOXIC AGENTS................................................. 49

Phosgene......................................................... 51

Hydrogen Cyanide.................................................. 55

Cyanogen Chloride................................................. 58

Mustard Gas..................................................... 61

Lewisite .......................................................... 67

Nitrogen Mustards................................................. 69

Chloroacetophenone................................................. 70

Adamsite......................................................... 73

IV. PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS....................... 75

The Gas Mask.................................................... 77

Collective Protectors................................................. 87

Eyeshields, Dust Respirators, and Individual Protective Covers.............. 88

Protective Clothing and Impregnites................................... 90

Protective Ointments................................................ 91

Medical Kits and Supplies........................................... 93

Protection of Food and Water Supplies Against Toxics.................... 96

Treatment of Gas Casualties......................................... 97

xiii
Chapter Page

V. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH............................. 101

CWS Interest in Biological Warfare................................... 102

The WBC Committee and War Research Service......................... 103

CWS and the U.S. Biological Warfare Committee........................ 106

The Special Projects Division......................................... 108

Keeping It Secret................................................... 111

Defense Against Biological Attack.................................... 115

The Achievement in Biological Warfare Research........................ 120

VI. CHEMICAL MORTARS AND SHELLS............................. 123

The 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar....................................... 123

Mortars of Unusual Design.......................................... 130

Mortar Shells..................................................... 133

Mortar Gunboats.................................................. 136

VII. FLAME THROWERS.............................................. 139

Portable Flame Throwers............................................ 139

The One-Shot Flame Throwers....................................... 147

Mediumweight Flame Throwers...................................... 149

Main Armament Mechanized Flame Throwers.......................... 150

Main Armament Flame Throwers Produced in Hawaii................... 153

Auxiliary Mechanized Flame Throwers................................ 159

Auxiliary Flame Throwers Made in Hawaii........................... 161

Incendiary Projector for Airplanes..................................... 163

Emplaced Flame Throwers........................................... 163

Servicing Flame Throwers........................................... 164

Toxicology of Flame Attack.......................................... 165

VIII. INCENDIARIES. ................................................ . 167

Incendiary Bombs.................................................. 168

Incendiary Grenades................................................ 190

Incendiary Shells................................................... 192

Incendiary Rockets.................................................. 194

IX. SMOKE ... . . . . . . . . ..... ................. .......................... 197

White Phosphorus. ................................................ . 197

Smoke Pots. ..................................................... . 200

Oil Smoke Generators............................................... 208

Airplane Smoke Tanks. ............................................ . 214

Colored Smoke Munitions............................................ 219

X. PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR SUPPLY........................ 226

Planning for Mobilization.......................................... 230

Procurement Planning.............................................. 231

xiv
Chapter Page

XI. BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION................. 241

Educational Order Program.......................................... 242

The Munitions Program............................................. 244

Appropriations..................................................... 250

Facilities Expansion Gets Under Way.................................. 252

Procurement in the Emergency Period.................................. 258

Mobilization of the Distribution System................................ 262

XII. MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING........................... 266

Procurement of Service Equipment..................................... 267

Procurement of Chemicals............................................ 269

Estimating Requirements in Wartime.................................. 272

Facilities Expansion in Wartime...................................... 276

Matériel Shortages and Imbalances..................................... 279

The Search for Suitable Contractors.................................... 282

Inspection of Matériel............................................... 286

The Pricing Program............................................... 289

XIII. BALANCING PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION............. 297

Developments of Early War Years.................................... 297

Advent of the Supply Control Program................................. 302

Procurement and Distribution of Spare Parts............................ 306

Improved Maintenance Practices...................................... 309

XIV. PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL..................... 314

Gas Mask Procurement............................................. 314

Production of Impregnite (CC-2)..................................... 328

Procurement of Impregnating Plants................................... 329

Protective Ointment. .............................................. . 332

Detector Kits...................................................... 334

Decontaminating Apparatus.......................................... 336

Miscellaneous Protective Items......................................... 339

XV. PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATERIEL..................... 342

Incendiaries....................................................... 342

Procurement of the 4.2-Inch Mortar................................... 352

Procurement of the 4.2-Inch Mortar Shell............................... 355

Criminal Involvement of Mortar Shell Contractors........................ 361

Flame Throwers................................................... 367

Smoke and Smoke Munitions......................................... 371

Problem of Morale................................................. 378

xv
Chapter Page

XVI. STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION. ............................... . 381

Growth of CWS Storage Activities.................................... 381

Storage and Transportation of Toxics................................. 386

Storage of Other CWS Items.......................................... 389

Packing and Packaging. ........................................... . 393

Distribution...................................................... 397

Lend-Lease....................................................... 403

Supplying the Ports of Embarkation................................... 408

XVII. INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION............................... . 412

Preparations for Demobilization...................................... 412

Disposition of Facilities. ........................................... . 415

Contract Terminations.............................................. 417

Property Disposal................................................... 424

To Be or Not To Be?. ............................................. . 431

Appendix

A. Status of CWS Facilities Program..... . . . . . . . . . . ........... . . . . . . . . ...... 436

B. Government Investment in Facilities, World War II, as of 31 December 1945. 448

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.............................................. . 455

GLOSSARY.............................................................. 460

INDEX.................................................................. 471

Tables

No.

1. Plants and Projects of Edgewood Arsenal During World War I.......... . 17

2. Gas-Defense Items Shipped Overseas From June 1917 to November 1918...... 23

3. Gas Mask Production at Edgewood Arsenal, 1927-1938. .................. . 229

4. CWS Educational Orders Program, FY 1939, 1940 & 1941 Summary of

Awards............................................................. . 245

5. Cost to Government of Gas Mask Educational Program.................. . 246

6. CWS Depot Storage Space in Operation, December 1941................ . 264

7. Summary of Estimated Dollar Value of CWS Procurement: 1940-1945. .... . 266

8. Expansion in Production of Selected CW Items, World War II............. . 268

9. CWS Gross Storage Space in Operation, 1945........................... . 383

10. CWS Property Disposal Activities, July 1943 Through July 1945......... . 428

11. CWS Property Available for Disposal, January-December 1945 ............ . 429

xvi
Charts

No. Page

1. Total Army Service Forces Estimated Dollar Value of Procurement Deliveries

by Technical Services: 1 January 1942-31 December 1945............... . 267

2. Schematic Diagram, Chemical Warfare Supply as of 6 December 1944....... . 400

Illustrations

Bureau of Mines Experiment Station........................................ 6

New Chemical Building at American University.............................. 7

Battery of Livens Projectors................................................ 10

Brig. Gen. Amos A. Fries...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15

Plant at Edgewood Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. 16

Women Workers in Gas Mask Factory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ 21

Conference on Expansion Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... 37

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah........................................... . 40

Types of Gas Masks, April 1918........................................... . 77

Army Photographer Wearing Service Gas Mask............................. . 78

Soldier Wearing Service Gas Mask......................................... . 79

Service Gas Mask........................................................ . 83

Walt Disney With Staff Members of Chemical Warfare Service. ............. . 85

Biological Warfare Test Station............................................ . 109

George W. Merck......................................................... 121

Stokes Mortar Firing Gas Shells........................................... . 124

4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar.................................................. . 129

Mortar Gunboat.......................................................... . 138

Operator Firing a Portable Flame Thrower E1R1........................... . 141

Attacking a Japanese Bunker.............................................. . 144

Firing an M2-2 Portable Flame Thrower................................... . 145

American and German Portable Flame Throwers............................ . 147

M4 Medium Flame-Thrower Tank. ........................................ . 156

Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. ............................................... 157

M3A1 Light Tank Equipped With Flame Gun.............................. . 160

Flame Gun To Fit .30-Cal. Machine Gun Mount. ........................... . 161

Burning Phosphorus From a 100-Pound Incendiary Bomb.................... . 171

B-25 Bomber Loaded With 500-Pound Clusters of M54 Bombs. .............. . 175

Lockheed P-38's Dropping Fire Bombs..................................... . 182

Smoke Pots Being Set Off in the Argonne Forest........................... . 198

xvii
Page

Smoke Screen Demonstration.............................................. . 201

Small M1 Smoke Pots Set Off in a Series.................................. . 203

Troops Landing at Elba, June 1944........................................ . 206

Mechanical Smoke Generator M1 (100-Gallon).............................. . 210

Mechanical Smoke Generator M2 (50-Gallon)............................... . 213

Lockheed A-29 Spraying Smoke From M33 Smoke Tanks.................... . 216

Lt. Col. Claude E. Brigham............................................... . 235

Members of the Chemical Advisory Committee............................. . 248

Maj. Gen. William N. Porter............................................... . 257

Meeting of Chemical Warfare Service Officers............................... . 260

Col. Norman D. Gillet................................................... . 263

Lt. Col. Robert M. Estes.................................................. . 291

Officer Personnel of the Control Division.................................. . 299

Executive Branch of the Industrial Division................................. . 302

4.2-Inch WP Chemical Mortar Shells....................................... . 359

Brig. Gen. William A. Borden............................................ . 373

Boxed Cans of Decontaminating Solution.................................. . 385

Toxic Gas Yards, Midwest Chemical Warfare Depot........................ . 388

Drums of Bleaching Powder............................................... . 397

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

xviii
THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE:

FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD

CHAPTER I

Research and Supply in World War I

Although armies have used crude chemical devices since ancient times,

chemical warfare, as an applied science, is comparatively modern.1 Chemical warfare came along as a companion of modern chemistry, which itself

dates from the late 1700's, when natural philosophers brought about a

revolution in this science. As a result of this pioneer work, chemists uncovered a multitude of facts and conceived laws to hold these facts together. By the middle of the 19th century it was a simple matter for men

with a knowledge of chemistry to visualize the application of toxic

chemicals to warfare, and to suggest specific methods of using them.

During the Crimean War the British chemist Lyon Playfair proposed

that a naval shell containing cacodyl cyanide, a toxic organic arsenic

compound, be fired into Russian ships.2 In the same war Admiral Thomas

Cochrane urged that an attempt be made to drive the Russians out of

Sevastopol by burning huge quantities of sulphur in front of the fortress

and letting the wind carry sulphur dioxide gas into enemy positions.3 In

the American Civil War, John W. Doughty of New York sent plans for

a chlorine filled shell to the War Department, and Forrest Shepherd of

New Haven recommended to President Lincoln that a cloud of hydrogen

1

 Examples of the primitive use of chemicals may be found in: (1) Charles Hederer and Mark

Istin, L'Arme Chimique et Ses Blessures (Paris: J. B. Bailliere, 1935), pp. 18-25. (2) Rudolf Hanslian, ed., Der Chemische Krieg (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1937), I, 1-4. (3) Julius Meyer,

Der Gaskampf und die Chemischen Kampfstoffe (3d ed, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1938), pp. 12-23. (4)

Tenney L. Davis and James R. Ware, "Early Chinese Military Pyrotechnics," Journal of Chemical

Education, 24 (1947), 522-37. 2

 Wemyss Reid, Memoirs and Correspondence of Lyon Playfair (New York and London: Harper

& Brothers, 1899), pp. 159-60. 3

 Wyndham D. Miles, "Admiral Cochrane's Plans for Chemical Warfare." Armed Forces Chemical Journal, XI (November-December 1957), 22-23.
2 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

chloride be used to drive the Confederates out of Petersburg.4 During the

century several other men proposed the use of toxic chemicals in munitions.5

Despite arguments that the use of chemicals in warfare was practical and

that chemicals would cause less suffering than conventional weapons,

national governments refused to test the ideas. Finally in 1915 Fritz Haber

convinced the German Army that chlorine could force the Allies out of

the trenches and he was given the responsibility of emplacing cylinders

of gas in the front lines near Ypres. The first gas cloud attack, launched

on a favorable breeze in the afternoon of 22 April, was a success.6 Allied

troops were driven from their positions and only the failure of the German

Army to exploit this advantage saved the Allies from a more serious setback.

Once the practicality of chemical warfare had been demonstrated the

belligerents organized special units to employ military chemicals, and to

conduct chemical and medical research. In the United States the War

Department gave responsibility for designing protective equipment to the

Medical Department in late 1915, but the Army did not set up combat

chemical units or begin scientific investigations until mid-1917.7

The Committee on Noxious Gases,

National Research Council

The first American chemical warfare research was not carried out by

the Army, but by the Bureau of Mines. Early in 1917, as the strained

relations between the United States and Germany approached the breaking

point, the Secretary of the Interior requested the bureaus in his Department to determine how they could assist the government if the country

were drawn into the war. On 7 February Van H. Manning, Director of

the Bureau of Mines, called together his division chiefs to discuss the

question. During the meeting George S. Rice suggested that the bureau

might turn its experience in mine gases and rescue apparatus toward the

4

 Wyndham D. Miles, "Chemical Warfare in the Civil War," ibid., XII (March-April 1958),

26-27, 33. 5

 (1) Brig. Gen. Amos A. Fries and Maj. Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1921), pp. 4-9. (2) Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, pp. 4-8 (3) Meyer, Der Gaskampf, pp. 23-28. 6

 The chlorine attack at Ypres has been discussed by many writers. See especially: Rudolf Hanslian, Der Deutsche Gasangriff bei Ypern am 22 April 1915 (Berlin: Verlag Gasschutz and Luftschutz, 1934). 7

 "The Medical Department of the United States in the World War," vol. XIV, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare (Washington, 1926), p. 27.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 3

investigation of war gases and masks.8 The following day Manning notified the Military Committee of the National Research Council that the

bureau stood ready to assist the Army and Navy on any problems that

might arise in the development of masks.9 Through the months of February and March the NRC considered the matter. The bureau, in the meantime, did not remain inactive but laid plans for research. On 3 April,

with the declaration of war imminent, the council accepted the bureau's

offer of co-operation, and appended to the Military Committee a Subcommittee on Noxious Gases composed of Army and Navy officers,

members of the NRC's Chemistry Committee, and the Director of the

Bureau of Mines (chairman), "to carry on investigations into noxious

gases, generation, and antidote for same, for war purposes; also investigations into gas masks."

 10

During the early days of its existence, the Subcommittee on Noxious

Gases was extremely important in initiating and co-ordinating chemical

warfare research. It met frequently to discuss information received from

abroad, and upon request it gave advice to the Army and Navy on questions regarding chemical warfare. Its most important act, however, was

to approve a plan of research for the Bureau of Mines. It is clear from

the records that the directing force here was Manning and a small but

extremely enthusiastic group of men whom he brought together to act

as the nucleus of a chemical warfare research organization. Manning and

his staff drew up a detailed plan for research, based on reports of the state of

chemical warfare in Europe, and then laid the plan before the subcommittee.

After some discussion the group approved the plan, thus enabling Manning to proceed.11

 It was from this action by the NRC Subcommittee on

Noxious Gases that the Bureau of Mines derived the authority, which it

exercised for more than a year, to carry on chemical warfare research and

development projects for the Army and Navy. The Subcommittee on

8

 Memo by George S. Rice, Bureau of Mines, regarding early history of mask and gas investigations for the army, 9 Jan 18. War Gas Investigations, Records of Bureau of Mines (National

Archives). Cited hereafter as War Gas Investigations, Bu of Mines. 9

 Van H. Manning, War Gas Investigations, Bu of Mines Bull 178-A (Washington, 1919). 10

 Meeting of the Military Committee of the NRC, 3 Apr 17. War Gas Investigations, Bu of

Mines. For membership of the subcommittee, which changed somewhat from time to time, see

Manning, War Gas Investigations, p. 4, and George A. Burrell, "The Research Division, Chemical

Warfare Service, U.S.A.," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry (formerly Journal of Industrial

and Engineering Chemistry), 11 (1919), 93-94. 11

 Min, Mtg, NRC Subcomm on Noxious Gases, 21 Apr 17. War Gas Investigations, Bu of

Mines.
4 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Noxious Gases became less important as the war progressed and in

August 1918 it was dissolved.12

Chemical Warfare Research in the Bureau of Mines

In expanding the activities of the Bureau of Mines into the field of

chemical warfare, Manning's first step was to assemble a group of men

to carry on the work. The leader of his staff was George A. Burrell, a

consulting chemist who had formerly been with the bureau. Upon Burrell

fell the responsibility of directing the building of the new research structure. Associated with Burrell were Arno G. Fieldner and J. W. Paul of

the Bureau of Mines; Bradley Dewey, director of the research laboratory

of American Sheet and Tin Plate Co.; Warren K. Lewis, professor of

chemical engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Yandell

Henderson, professor of physiology at Yale University.13

As a first move these men marked out various lines of research based

on reports from Europe to the Army and Navy. The most urgent task

was the design of a gas mask for the Army. Other projects included

study of the physiological effect of toxic compounds and the proper medical treatment for casualties, work on the preparation and properties of

gases already in use on the battlefield, and the discovery of new toxic

agents.

The bureau had neither the space nor the men to handle all the projects. As an emergency measure Manning obtained from the Subcommittee

on Noxious Gases authority to accept offers of assistance from the Johns

Hopkins University, the Mellon Institute, and other institutions. Manning

then sent Dewey to seek co-operation from industrial and university laboratories in the West, and Lewis to laboratories in the East.14

 In addition Manning enlisted the aid of E. Emmet Reid, professor of organic

chemistry at Johns Hopkins, who requested organic chemists throughout

the nation to synthesize compounds that might be useful as agents.15 By

12

 Manning, War Gas Investigations, p. 4. 13

 (1) Min, Mtg, NRC Subcomm on Noxious Gases, 21 Apr 17. War Gas Investigations, Bu

of Mines. (2) A group photograph showing Manning with his staff, consultants, and advisory

committee appears in Armed forces Chemical Journal, IX (September-October 1955), 20-21. 14

 Ltr, George A. Burrell to the Director, Bu of Mines, 2 May 17, sub: Gases in Warfare.

War Gas Investigations, Bu of Mines. 15

 (1) E. Emmet Reid, History of Offense Research, Johns Hopkins University Station. CWS,

H-149. (2) E. Emmet Reid, "Reminiscences of World War I," Armed Forces Chemical Journal,

IX (July-August 1955). 37-39.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 5

the end of May 1917 the bureau had obtained the aid of laboratories in

twenty-one universities, three industrial companies, and three government

agencies, with a total of 118 chemists.16 In time additional universities

and firms volunteered for research projects. These civilian laboratories were

extremely helpful, for they enabled the bureau to begin chemical warfare

research immediately instead of waiting several months for a government

laboratory to be equipped and staffed with chemists.

Up to 30 June 1917 the Bureau of Mines paid the cost of chemical warfare research from its own appropriations.17

 It engaged 16 men for physiological investigations on gases and masks, 20 to develop masks, 5 to work

on munitions, 4 to prepare toxic agents and smoke, and several as supervisors and clerks.18

 After June the Army and Navy provided funds.

As chemical warfare research expanded the volume of work became so

great that the bureau needed a large central laboratory for co-ordinating

university and industrial research, and for undertaking secret Army and

Navy projects. After examining several sites in the District of Columbia, in

Delaware, and at Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, N.J., Burrell and his assistants finally chose American University, which the trustees had offered to

President Wilson for government use on 30 April.19 The university was

then on the outskirts of Washington, and sufficiently isolated to be used

as a training center for chemical troops and to permit field testing on a

small scale. Two large buildings and several hundred acres of ground were

available.

The War and Navy Departments in June allotted the Subcommittee on

Noxious Gases $175,000 to convert American University classrooms into

laboratories and to hire more chemists.20 Several weeks later, on 21 July

the trustees granted the government free use of the university.

Throughout the summer of 1917 contractors worked at the university,

converting rooms into offices and laboratories. Temporary buildings, large

and small, were erected to serve as workshops and as houses for workers

and as shelters for animals. The War Department converted a section of

the grounds into Camp Leach, where officers and enlisted men could learn

the technique of chemical warfare.

16

 Rpt submitted at Mtg of Subcomm on Noxious Gases, 25 May 17. War Gas Investigations,

Bu of Mines. 17

 Manning, War Gas Investigations, p. 1. 18

 Rpt, G. A. Burrell to the Director, Bu of Mines, 2 Jul 17, sub: Statement of Activities on

Gas Work at the Present Writing. War Gas Investigations, Bu of Mines. 19

 Yandell Henderson, History of Research at Yale University, pt. 2, p. 3. CWS, H-150. 20

 Manning, War Gas Investigations, pp. 6-7.
6 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

BUREAU OF MINES EXPERIMENT STATION for chemical warfare, American University, Washington, D.C., 1917. McKinley building (with dome) was then known as the

Ohio building.

In September the first chemists arrived. The laboratories were not

finished, there was no heat, and there was insufficient equipment. Yet,

there were so many problems awaiting solution that chemists set up their

apparatus on improvised benches while carpenters installed hoods and

desks, plumbers laid gas and water lines, and electricians wired sockets.21

Shortly after the research center at American University opened, Manning organized it into eight sections: Chemical Research, Physiological

Research, Pyrotechnic Research, Chemical Manufacture, Mechanical Research, Submarine Gases, Dirigible and Balloon Gas, and Gas Mask

Examination.22

Liaison was maintained among the Army, Navy, and Bureau of Mines

through frequent committee meetings and by personal contact between

officers and members of the research staff. Twice a week, conferences were

held between officers and scientists. One conference considered chemical

warfare offense, the other, problems in defense. Twice each month a report was sent to the War Department, the Navy Department, the Ameri21

 Reid, "Reminiscences of World War I." 22

 Organization Chart dated 1 Sep 17. War Gas Investigations, Bu of Mines.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 7

NEW CHEMICAL BUILDING AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY under construction for

chemical warfare research. Note the class in bayonet drill, foreground.

can Expeditionary Forces in France, and to British and French chemical

warfare investigators.

By the fall of 1917 the bureau had the benefit of an increased flow of

information from Europe. In the opening months of the war it had depended

upon reports from special observers in Europe, such as Professor George

A. Hulett of Princeton University, or upon information acquired by Army

and Navy officers. Then in October, Maj. Samuel J. M. Auld, chemical

adviser of the Third British Army, and a group of officers and NCO's

came to the United States as part of the British Military Mission. Auld

and his men gave information on toxics, chemical munitions, and protective equipment, and helped to lay out a chemical proving ground.23

 Also

in October, the Army assigned an officer in London to the task of obtaining and sending home information on chemical warfare.24

 By these

means the bureau learned of research being done by the Allies, and of

new developments in enemy chemical warfare.

23

 A résumé of work done by the British may be found in the series of reports: British Gas

Mission to the U.S.A., A General Record of the American Chemical Warfare Service and the Relations therewith of the British Gas Warfare Mission. CWS, H-1 to H-10. 24

 History of Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces, Liaison Office, London.

CWS, H-24.
8 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

By the end of 1917 the chemical warfare staff of the bureau had

increased to 277 civilians, 34 commissioned officers, and 200 enlisted men.

The funds allotted by the Army had jumped to $612,000 and by the

Navy to $150,000.25 Throughout the first half of 1918 the staff continued

to grow, and on 25 June numbered 1,682 persons, civilian and military,

1,034 of whom were classified as technicians.26

Medical Research

The Bureau of Mines was not alone in conducting chemical warfare

research and development for the Army and Navy. The Medical Department, U.S. Army, also participated for a short time, taking over certain

projects from the bureau, continuing them for awhile, and then surrendering them to the new Chemical Warfare Service.

The plans for medical research were drawn up by Professor Henderson

of Yale University. Because there was no laboratory space available in

Washington, Yale allowed Henderson to remodel the Athletic Club

House into a laboratory and to use the athletic field.27 Yale also built a

laboratory beneath the bleachers, as the University of Chicago was to do

some twenty-five years later at Stagg Field for research on the atom

bomb. Faculty members of the university, medical students, and employees

of the Bureau of Mines formed the staff. The men were divided into sections working on toxicology, therapeutics, pharmacology, pathology, and

physiology. After space became available at American University, the

bureau transferred much of the work to Washington.

By December 1917 medical research had become so diversified that

Henderson and the section leaders began to hold monthly conferences in

Washington. Known as the Medical Advisory Board, the group served as

a clearinghouse for problems, ideas, and discoveries in the medical phase

of chemical warfare.

Other university groups in addition to the one at Yale were drawn

into medical research. In September 1917 professors and students at the

University of Wisconsin began research on ways to protect the employees

of poison gas factories.28 At the University of Michigan, men studied the

25

 Rpt, Research Work of the Bureau of Mines on Gases Used in Warfare for the Year 1917.

War Gas Investigations, Bu of Mines. 26

 Manning, War Gas Investigations, p. 10. 27

 Henderson, History of Research at Yale. H-150. 28

 History of the University of Wisconsin Section, Medical Division, CWS, H-151.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 9

physiology and pathology of mustard gas poisoning.29 At Western Reserve

University, the University of Chicago, and the Marine Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, Mass., scientists took up projects. In the spring of

1918 the Gas Defense Service of the Medical Department absorbed the

majority of the laboratories.

Research in the AEF

The Bureau of Mines was too far from the battle zone to carry on

research for the AEF, and General Pershing in the fall of 1917 requested

the War Department on several occasions to furnish him with a laboratory service to investigate war gases and powders. On 1 November 1917

the War Department created a Chemical Service Section to comply with

Pershing's request.30 Col. William H. Walker, chief of the new section,

took immediate steps to provide a laboratory for the AEF. Turning to Mellon

Institute, Pittsburgh, Walker enlisted the co-operation of its director, Raymond F. Bacon, and its assistant director, William A. Hamor. Hamor, who

was commissioned a major, had as his first important assignment the drawing up of plans for a laboratory for the AEF.31

To obtain chemicals and equipment for the new laboratory, Bacon and

Hamor turned to the president of the Fisher Scientific Company of Pittsburgh, Chester G. Fisher. Before World War I Germany was the world's

chief source of chemicals and laboratory equipment and the Fisher Scientific

Company depended on producers in Bavaria for its supply of these materials.

After the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 and the subsequent dislocation

of shipping on the high seas, the Bavarian suppliers became very wary of

making further shipments, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that

Fisher Scientific got material through to Pittsburgh. But by an unusual

stroke of fortune a considerable quantity of laboratory equipment arrived

shortly before the entrance of the United States into the war. Fisher had this

equipment on hand when Bacon and Hamor approached him late in 1917.32

29

 Aldred Scott Warthin and Carl Vernon Weller, The Medical Aspects of Mustard Gas Poisoning (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., 1919). 30

 (1) Report of the Chemical Warfare Service, 1918, pp. 4-5. The annual reports of the CWS

were also published as Report of the Director of the Chemical Warfare Service, Annual Report of

the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, and Annual Report of the Chemical Warfare Service,

all hereafter cited as Rpt of CWS, with appropriate year. (2) The Chemical Service Section is discussed at greater length in Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service:

Organizing for War, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959),

ch. I.

31

 Interv, Hist Off with W. A. Hamor, 30 Dec 58. 32

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Chester G. Fisher, 30 Dec 58. (2) Hamor interv.
10 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

BATTERY OF LIVENS PROJECTORS at Hanlon experimental testing field near Chaumont, France, 1918.

The government made immediate arrangements for the Fisher Scientific

Company to equip a laboratory for the AEF. All the apparatus which had

recently arrived from Bavaria was put in wooden crates and shipped, along

with chemicals, books, a glassworking shop, and another for instruments—

seven full freight cars in all—to the Hoboken Port of Embarkation for shipment to France. Fisher obtained a written statement from the Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army, that the shipment should be given a high priority. To accompany the laboratory overseas the Fisher Scientific Company furnished a glass

blower, an instrument maker, a chief clerk, and a stock clerk.33

Meanwhile in France, Col. Amos A. Fries, head of the AEF Gas Service,34

 had obtained permission from the French Government to convert

a former research laboratory for tuberculosis at Puteaux, near Paris, into

a chemical warfare laboratory. In January 1918 Colonel Bacon, accompanied by a small group of chemists, arrived from the United States to

head the laboratory. Since it would take several months for the equipment

33

 Fisher interv. 34

 General Pershing established the Gas Service to supervise chemical warfare activity in the

AEF. AEF GO 31, 3 Sep 17.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I

from the United States to reach France, Colonel Bacon managed to obtain

some laboratory supplies from French sources. Eventually other scientists

arrived from the United States, so that the staff was to average between

60 and 70 chemists, approximately 12 of whom were commissioned

officers. In this group were several men who were or later became famous

in the field of chemistry—Gilbert N. Lewis, of the University of California, one of the world's outstanding physical chemists; Joel H. Hildebrand,

a future president of the American Chemical Society; and Frederick G.

Keyes, who became director of the research laboratory of physical chemistry at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The Paris Laboratory investigated a variety of chemical and physical

problems having to do with toxic agents and protective devices, and also

acted as a consulting laboratory for other nonchemical branches of the

AEF.35 For convenience the laboratory was divided into five divisions—

Organic, Physicochemical, Mechanical, Control, and Miscellaneous. The

organic chemists developed a systematic procedure for analyzing the contents of dud enemy chemical shells and of determining the agents present

in contaminated water or earth. They synthesized possible war gases and

searched for camouflage gases to simulate or conceal the characteristic

odor of standard agents. For example, they learned that by adding butyl

sulfide to it mustard gas gave out a strong skunklike odor; since much of

the French countryside was infested by skunks the enemy was misled on

the presence of gas. The physical chemists determined such important

physical constants as density, vapor pressure, and rate of hydrolysis. The

Control Section tested old and new gas mask canisters. The need for protection against mustard was so urgent that the sections collaborated in

developing antimustard salves, a field detector for mustard, and protective

fabrics. The Miscellaneous Section worked on problems submitted by

other branches of the AEF, such as the development of a special airplane

propeller glue for the Air Service and the production of a gasproof pigeon

container for the Signal Corps.

Coupled to the Paris Laboratory was a field for experimental work and for

training officers in gas warfare. Colonel Fries had asked for such an experimental field in December 1917. Receiving permission, he chose an area cov35

 (1) Col. Raymond F. Bacon, "The Work of the Technical Division, Chemical Warfare Service, AEF," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 11 (1919), 13-15. (2) Maj. W. A. Hamor and

Col. R. F. Bacon, "A Letter from France," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 10 (1918), 495.

(3) History of the Chemical Warfare Service, AEF Technical Division, Part I, General History.

CWS, H-18. (4) History of the Chemical Warfare Service, AEF Technical Division, Part II, Paris

Laboratory. CWS, H-19.
12 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ering twenty square miles near Chaumont, headquarters of the AEF. He then

sent officers to Porton, England, to learn how the British had laid out their

experimental field and were conducting tests. The AEF started construction

in April 1918, and the first tests were made in June. In August the installation was christened Hanlon Field in honor of 2d Lt. Joseph T. Hanlon of the

First Gas Regiment, the first CWS officer killed in action.

Hanlon Field ultimately had two projector ranges, an artillery range

complete with trenches, and fifty-five buildings, including chemistry, pathology, and physiology laboratories, a shell opening plant, and a shell

filling plant.36 Among the projects carried out were the testing of American equipment under battlefield conditions, examination of captured

equipment, analysis of the chemical fillings in dud enemy shells, and

physiological research.37 From the viewpoint of organization, the Paris

Laboratory and Hanlon Field were considered as the Technical Division

of the AEF, Gas Service.38

The Centralization of Activities in the

Chemical Warfare Service

A year after American entrance into the war, the Bureau of Mines,

Medical Department, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, Corps of Engineers, and AEF were sharing the responsibility for chemical warfare. The

War Department had made an attempt in October 1917 to co-ordinate

the activity by creating a Gas Service of the Army, headed by an Engineer colonel, Charles C. Potter, and composed of Medical, Ordnance, and

Chemical Service Section officers. The Gas Service could offer advice, but

it had no authority to control research, policy, or production. The service

could therefore not bring about the high degree of teamwork that the

War Department wanted.

Finally on 11 May 1918 the War Department placed Maj. Gen.

William L. Sibert at the head of the Gas Service, and instructed him to

36

 Lt. Col. Joel H. Hildebrand, "The Organization and Work of Hanlon Field," Industrial and

Engineering Chemistry, 11 (1919), 291-92. 37

 (1) History of the Chemical Warfare Service, AEF Technical Division, Part II, Hanlon Field.

CWS, H-20. (2) Col. Raymond F. Bacon, "The Work of the Technical Division, Chemical Warfare Service, AEF." Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 11 (1919), 13-15. (3) Medical Aspects

of Gas Warfare, pp. 49-50. 38

 United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919 (Washington, 1948), vol. 15, pp. 300-302.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 13

draw up a plan for better co-ordination of chemical warfare. Sibert was

certain that this could be done only by coalescing all men and facilities

into one organization. He asked the War Department to transfer chemical warfare personnel from the Medical Department, Ordnance Department, Corps of Engineers, and Signal Corps to the Gas Service. There

was no problem here. But Sibert also wanted the research organization of

the Bureau of Mines, a request that was difficult for the War Department to fill. Sibert nevertheless persuaded Secretary of War Newton D.

Baker that the move was necessary. Baker then attempted to convince

President Wilson. Manning and his associates opposed the transfer vigorously.39

 President Wilson was reluctant, but finally agreed that the

exigencies of war necessitated the move; and on 25 June 1918, under authority of the Overman Act, he placed the research organization of the

bureau under the War Department "for operation under the Director

of Gas Service of the Army."

 40

 The War Department commissioned Burrell as a colonel, and gave other research leaders corresponding rank. The

militarization of the research organization did not affect the assignments

of the scientists. They continued their work at American University and

other laboratories.

On 28 June 1918 President Wilson approved Sibert's conception of a

unified chemical warfare organization by directing the War Department

to establish a Chemical Warfare Service in the National Army.41 The

new CWS included the Chemical Service Section of the Army, the

research organization from the Bureau of Mines, and portions of the Ordnance Department, Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, and Medical Department. Sibert organized the service into nine divisions: European, Medical,

Training, Research, Administration, Gas Offense Production, Gas Defense

Production, Development, and Proving.42 Of the nine divisions in the

new CWS, six sprang wholly or in part from the chemical warfare

research organization started by the Bureau of Mines.

39

 (1) Memo on Gas War Work, Origin and Progress of Work and Comments Relative to the

Transfer of this Work to the War Dept. 3 Jun 18; (2) Memo on Conference held in the Office of

the Secretary of War, . . . May 25, 1918, regarding Proposed Transfer of the War Gas Investigations of the Bureau of Mines to the War Department. Both in War Gas Investigations, Bu of

Mines. 40

 Wilson's Executive Order 2894, and a letter that he sent to Manning commending the Bureau of Mines, were widely reprinted. See, for example, Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 10

(1918), 654. 41

 WD GO 62, 28 Jun 18. 42

 Rpt of CWS, 1919, p. 3.
14 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Chemical Munitions 43

Before the establishment of the CWS, responsibility for procuring and

issuing chemical warfare items was divided between the Medical and Ordnance Departments of the Army. The Medical Department was assigned

responsibility for defensive items and the Ordnance Department for offensive material. The Ordnance mission included the procuring, filling, and

testing of toxic gases. The Army, of course, had never had occasion to

purchase or produce poison gas. Its first step, therefore, was to choose

the agents that would be used by the AEF. After evaluating the chemicals that had been used by armies in Europe, the Bureau of Mines

recommended chloropicrin, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, and xylyl bromide

to the Ordnance Department in July 1917.44 A few months later Colonel

Fries sent recommendations from France that chlorine, phosgene, chloropicrin, bromoacetone, and mustard gas be procured.45

It was the intention of the War Department at the start of the war

to arrange for the manufacture of toxic gases by commercial chemical

companies under Ordnance Department supervision and to confine direct

government activity to the filling of shells with toxic materials.46 In the

fall of 1917 the Ordnance Department set out to interest private industry

in the manufacture of war gases and began to plan the erection of

a shell filling plant near Edgewood, Md.47

Immediate responsibility for drawing up the plans was assigned to

Capt. Edwin M. Chance, of the Trench Warfare Section, Gun Division of

the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, then headed by Capt. E. J. W. Rags43

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on the following: (1) Benedict Crowell,

America's Munitions. 1917-1918 (Washington, 1919), pp. 395-410. (2) Lt. Col. William McPherson, An Historical Sketch of the Development of Edgewood Arsenal, 1 Feb 1919, pp. 290-

344. CWS, H-169. (3) Report on Edgewood Arsenal, January 1919. CWS, H-168. (4) Lt. Col.

Wilder D. Bancroft, History of the CWS in the United States. 31 May 1919, pp. 29-344. CWS,

H-11. Col. F. M. Dorsey, "The Development Division, Chemical Warfare Service, U.S.A.," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry. 11 (1919), 281-91. (6) Charles H. Herty, "Gas Offense in

the United States A Record Achievement." Industrial and Engineering Chemistry. 11 (1919), 5-12. 44

 (1) Ltr, Manning to Brig Gen William Crozier, 20 Jul y 1917, War Gas Investigations. Bu

of Mines. (2) Mustard gas, missing from this list, was not used until 12 July 1917, and the bureau

did not know of the gas at the time. Later advice from abroad led to elimination of hydrogen

cyanide. The recognition of the superior lachrymatory property of bromobenzylcyanide led to the

abandonment of xylyl bromide. 45

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 100-102. 46

 Lt. Col. Edwin M. Chance, History of Edgewood Plants, p. 10. Colonel Chance submitted

this report to the Assistant Secretary of War on 31 December 1918. See Ltr, Chance to Hist Off,

4 Feb 54. 47

 This property was acquired by the government under a presidential proclamation of 16 October 1917. It was at first called Gunpowder Neck Reservation and then Gunpowder Reservation.

Later it took the name Edgewood Arsenal from the nearby village of Edgewood.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 15

BRIG. GEN. AMOS A. FRIES, head of

the AEF Gas Service. (Photo taken

after July 1920.)

dale.48 Captain Chance had the advice and assistance of Lt. Raoul E.

Hankar of the French High Commission who supplied the plans of

the French filling plant at Aubervilliers together with details on the

properties of the gases to be filled.

After careful examination of the

data furnished by Lieutenant Hankar,

Captain Chance concluded that the

French methods were totally unsuited

to American conditions, that the

French production units were too

small for production of good quality,

and that their methods of handling

the gases led to an unduly high

casualty rate in French plants.

Chance then decided to study the

possibility of applying the methods

of the commercial bottling industry to a gas filling plant and he visited

a number of works where milk, beer, and carbonated liquids were bottled.

Convinced that commercial methods could be adapted to gas filling plants,

he drew up plans accordingly.49

Erection of the first shell filling plant at Edgewood, Md., was begun

in September 1917 and practically completed by the close of the year. It

consisted of four filling buildings radiating from a central powerhouse at

90-degree angles to each other. Each building was a complete unit in

itself, with individual gas handling rooms, mixing rooms, washing towers,

and ventilating equipment. If one building would have to be shut down

because of an accident or for other reasons, it would be possible to keep

the remaining units in production. The units were so constructed that the

fan discharges were separated by a distance of over 400 feet, a precaution

which prevented the accumulation of a dangerous concentration of gases

during plant operation. This shell filling plant, known as Filling Plant

No. 1, was completed by January 1918 and put into immediate operation.

In the spring of 1918 construction got underway on two similar plants,

both of which were approximately 80 percent complete by November. In

48

 The Trench Warfare Section, Ordnance Department, was organized in April 1917. 49

 Chance, History of Edgewood Plants, p. 1.
16 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

PLANT AT EDGEWOOD ARSENAL where filled shells were classified, tested for leaks,

painted, and boxed for shipment. Livens drums, foreground, were painted with two

white stripes to indicate they were filled with phosgene.

addition, two grenade filling plants and an incendiary-drop-bomb plant

were either completed or were nearing completion when the war ended.

By the close of 1917 the War Department had come to the conclusion that the government would also have to erect its own manufacturing

plants at Edgewood. The efforts of the Ordnance Department to interest

the chemical industry in the manufacture of war gases had not proved

successful because of the danger inherent in the manufacture of toxic

materials, because industry lacked experience in the production of such

materials, and because the toxic plants would serve no useful purpose

after the war. During the unseasonably cold winter of 1917-18 a chloropicrin plant and a phosgene plant were built. In April 1918 construction

was begun on a large-scale mustard plant and in the next month on a

chlorine plant. The chlorine plant, which when completed had two 50-

ton units with a total capacity of 100 tons of liquid chlorine a day, was

the largest plant of its kind in the United States at that time. These plants

collectively were on 4 May 1918 designated "Edgewood Arsenal," an installation of the Army Ordnance Department.50

50

 Ord Dept GO 7, 4 May 18.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 17

TABLE 1—PLANTS AND PROJECTS OF EDGEWOOD ARSENAL DURING WORLD WAR I

In the construction and operation of the plants at Edgewood the Ordnance Department received valuable assistance from the Bureau of Mines

and from representatives of the British and French Governments.51 While

this plant construction was going on at Edgewood, Ordnance continued to

solicit the interest of private industry in the manufacture of toxic agents.

The government decided to construct chemical plants at various points

throughout the country and to urge the chemical companies to operate

these plants. During the war a number of plants, including those operated by the government and those operated by contractors, were erected.

(Table 1)

When the Chemical Warfare Service was activated in June 1918, a Gas

Offense Production Division, with headquarters in Baltimore, Md., was

51

 Among those whose counsel was particularly valuable were Captain Hankar of the French

High Commission, mentioned previously; W. Gordon Carey and T. D. Gregory, representatives of

English firms engaged in the manufacture of toxic gases; Maj. G. M. Brightman and Lt. Col. Samuel J. M. Auld of the British Army. See acknowledgment in McPherson, An Historical Sketch of

Edgewood Arsenal.
18 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

set up. This division, headed by Col. William H. Walker, former commanding officer of Edgewood Arsenal, took over from Ordnance the function of supervising the "production of toxic gases and other substances

used offensively in gas warfare."

 52

 Edgewood Arsenal and its subsidiary

plants were included in Colonel Walker's command.

By November 1918, the United States was manufacturing almost as

much gas as England and France combined and nearly four times as much

as Germany, which at the start of the war had led all other nations in

the field of chemistry.53 The manufacture and filling of gas at Edgewood

Arsenal was carried out by the military because others lacked experience

with that type of operation. A peak employment of over 7,000 officers

and enlisted men was reached at Edgewood during the war. Government

representatives were stationed at the various plants operated by the contractors, but civilians with some experience in the chemical industry were

employed in the actual operation of those plants.

The plans for filling gas shells and shipping them across the ocean

did not work out as expected. The chief difficulty was the extreme shortage of shell boosters.54

 At no time during the war did the supply

of boosters come near meeting the demand. Consequently, the United

States resorted to ocean shipment of bulk toxics, with more than 3,500

tons going to Europe. In England and France this gas was put into Allied

shells and was eventually used against the enemy.

The implements which the U.S. Army employed to release gas on the

enemy were obtained in great part from the Allies, particularly the British. These munitions included cylinders from which gas was dispersed and

Livens projectors. Not until shortly before the armistice were these items

received in the theater from the United States.55 The delay was due in

large part to the time required to get noncommercial items of this type

into satisfactory production.

Gas Defense Equipment56

As early as the fall of 1915 the War Department delegated the task

of designing, developing, and procuring gas masks to the Medical Depart52

 Rpt of CWS, 1918, p. 4. 53

 Rpt of CWS, 1919, p. 8. 54

 The booster, an explosive-filled metallic tube, was used as a burster to crack open the gas

shell and free the gas. 55

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 78. 56

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on the following: (1) Benedict Crowell,

Americas Munitions, pp. 410-31. (2) Bancroft, History CWS in the United States, pp. 85-103.

(3) George A. Burrell, "The Research Division, Chemical Warfare Service, U.S.A.," Industrial
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 19

ment. Early in 1917 the Bureau of Mines offered its assistance in research

and development, an offer which the Medical Department gratefully

accepted. The bureau designed and tested masks in its own laboratories

and co-operated with the following universities in experiments on absorbents for gas mask canisters: The Johns Hopkins University, the University

of California, Princeton University, Wesleyan University, and the Carnegie

Institute of Technology. In conjunction with the Bureau of Chemistry of the

U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Carbon Co., the National

Lamp Works of the General Electric Co., as well as the University of

Chicago, the bureau tested charcoal obtained from different woods, nuts,

and seeds, and began to develop large-scale processes for carbonizing

raw materials and activating chemicals. In the summer of 1917 much of

this research and development work was transferred to the Medical

Department. Bradley Dewey, who was then working with the Bureau

of Mines, was commissioned in the Medical Department and put in

charge of the gas mask program. Colonel Dewey became chief of the

Gas Defense Production Division of the CWS upon its activation in

June 1918.

The Medical Department received its first procurement directive for

gas masks in May 1917. Twenty-five thousand were needed at once, the

War Department stated, to equip General Pershing's First Division, then

about to sail overseas. At the same time the Medical Department was

directed to supply the armed forces with 1,100,000 masks by 30 June 1918.

Maj. L. P. Williamson of The Surgeon General's Office turned to the

Bureau of Mines for assistance in filling the order for the first 25,000 masks.

The bureau sought out and obtained the services of various manufacturers.

The facepieces, for example, were manufactured by the B. F. Goodrich Co.

of Akron and the canisters by the American Can Co. of Brooklyn. American

Can also had the contract for assembling the masks. By June 1917 over 20,000

of the masks were at sea, bound for France, and some 5,000 followed shortly

thereafter. The masks proved unsatisfactory, primarily because they did not

protect the wearer against chloropicrin, which was beginning to be widely

used. Since the British and French had more than enough masks, they readily

and Engineering Chemistry. 11 (1919), 93-104. (4) Bradley Dewey, "Production of Gas Defense

Equipment for the Army," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 11 (1919), 185-97. (5) Dorsey,

"The Development Division, Chemical Warfare Service, U.S.A.," pp. 281-91. (6) A. C. Fieldner

and A. F. Benton, History of the Gas Mask Research Section, Research Division, Chemical Warfare Service, U.S.A. CWS, H-146. (7) Warren K. Lewis, "Protective Work in the Research Division.

Chemical Warfare Service, in the War," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 18 (April 1932) pp. 1113-19

(a publication prepared by the CWS School, formerly Chemical Warfare).
20 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

supplied the American First Division with all it needed.57 Although the 25,-

000 American masks were not used the experience resulted in improvement

in the design of the mask.

The policy of obtaining masks exclusively through contract with private

industry was continued throughout 1917. Contracts for procuring components of the mask were awarded to various manufacturers throughout the

country, while a contract for assembling the parts into complete masks went

to the Hero Manufacturing Co. of Philadelphia in the fall of 1917. From

then until the end of the war Hero was the sole private contractor assembling masks. During the last months of 1917 transportation difficulties

were aggravated by excessive snowfalls and the company experienced great

delay in getting components from such points as Boston and Akron to

Philadelphia. This was doubtless an important factor in the Hero's failure

to attain scheduled production.

As early as mid-November 1917 the War Department had concluded

that in order to meet the gas mask requirements for American troops being

sent to France, as well as to insure the rigid standards demanded in this

item of equipment, the government would have to construct its own gas

mask factory. The site for the government factory was Long Island City,

New York, where during the early months of 1918 the government took

over a group of five large buildings and converted them into a factory.58

A dollar-a-year man, Ralph R. Richardson of Chicago, was named plant

manager with a lieutenant colonel as his assistant. The various departments in the plant were headed by either military or civilian personnel.

Some 12,000 workers, of whom 8,500 were women, were at one time employed in the plant.

The government did not alter its plans of procuring masks from private industry after establishing the Long Island City plant, but on the

contrary made every effort to step up production from private sources. The

extent of private production during the war is indicated by the fact that

the Gas Defense Division of the CWS at one time supervised contracts

in approximately 600 factories extending from Boston to San Francisco.59

57

 This was but the beginning of American procurement of British and French masks in the

AEF. Colonel Fries, upon assuming command of the Gas Service, AEF, in August 1917, began

placing orders with the British and French in anticipation of the arrival of large numbers of American troops. About 200,000 masks were obtained from the French and not less than 600,000 from

the British. See Amos A. Fries, History of Chemical Warfare Service in France, 1919, pp. 4, 9. 58

 The official directive for the activation of the government gas mask plant was Memo SW for

SG, 20 Nov 17, sub: Establishment of Government Operated Plant for Gas Mask Manufacture.

CWS, H-175. 59

 Rpt of CWS, 1919, p. 50.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 21

WOMEN WORKERS IN GAS MASK FACTORY, Long Island City, New York.

Since the Army had no previous experience with gas masks, the contractors, as well as government officials supervising the contracts, had to

learn largely through trial and error. One of the most baffling procurement problems in connection with the manufacture of the gas mask was

that of obtaining sufficient charcoal for the canisters of the masks. Early

in the war the War Department undertook a concerted drive to speed the

shipment of coconut shells, from which the charcoal was made, from Ceylon, India, and other oriental countries to the Philippine Islands. There a

government charcoal plant was erected which during 1917-18 produced

1,300 tons of coconut shell charcoal; 300 tons of this had been shipped

to the United States by November 1918, but that amount was by no means

sufficient to meet the demand. In the effort to find other sources of supply, the Gas Defense Division of the CWS sent agents to Mexico and

to Central and South America to investigate ways of expediting the

importation of coconuts into the United States. At the same time possible substitutes for the coconut shell were investigated. It was found that the

corozo nut, the fruit of the Manaca palm tree, was the most suitable substitute and thousands of tons of these nuts were shipped into this country.

A colorful touch was lent to the search for carbon materials for the gas
22 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

mask in September 1918 when a nut gathering campaign was undertaken

throughout the United States. The Red Cross, the Department of Agriculture, the Food Administration, and the Boy Scouts were among the groups

sponsoring this venture. Two motion picture reels depicting the urgent need

for charcoal were made and given wide circulation. By the close of the war

on 11 November an estimated 4,000 tons of nut shells were en route to

the great carbon plant at Astoria on Long Island.

This carbon plant was established in 1917 to activate charcoal, an even

more difficult problem than the making of the charcoal itself.60 The activation had to be done in facilities permitting fine control of temperature,

and the government spent over $1,000,000 in constructing the Astoria plant.

This facility was erected adjacent to the large gas works of the Astoria

Light, Heat, and Power Co., at the junction of the East River and Long

Island Sound, the point known as Hell Gate.

The first gas masks of export standard were sent overseas in January

1918, although not until May were they shipped in large numbers.61 By

November some 4 million masks had been shipped, together with considerable quantities of other gas defense items. (Table 2) Among these were

bleaching powder, used to decontaminate gassed areas; extra antidimming,

used to prevent moisture from condensing on gas mask eyepieces; sag

paste, a protective ointment; dugout blankets, which were hung at the

doors of dugouts as a protective device; dugout-blanket oil, a special heavy

oil used to impregnate cotton blankets; warning devices, such as Klaxon

horns and watchmen's rattles; and trench fans, to draw gases out of dugouts and trenches.

Field Testing of Chemical Munitions

While drawing up plans for a shell filling plant in the fall of 1917,

the Ordnance Department began to consider the establishment of a proving ground where gas shells could be tested under simulated battle conditions. The Bureau of Mines co-operated by providing a competent scientist,

William S. Bacon of the Yale section, to take charge of the program.62

60

 Activated charcoal is a specially treated, extremely porous charcoal which is very effective in

absorbing chemical agents. 61

 Fries, History of Chemical Warfare Service in France, p. 9. 62

 (1) Bancroft, History of the CWS in the United States, pp. 345-60. (2) Lt. Col. William S.

Bacon, "The Proving Division, Chemical Warfare Service, USA," Industrial and Engineering

Chemistry, 11 (1919), 513-16. (3) History of the Proving Division, Chemical Warfare Service.

CWS, H-70.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 23

TABLE 2—GAS-DEFENSE ITEMS SHIPPED OVERSEAS FROM JUNE 1917 TO NOVEMBER 1918

Source: This table appears in Annual Report of the Director, CWS 1919, p. 51, and in Crowell, America's Munitions,

p. 431.

The British, who maintained a chemical proving ground at Porton, England, contributed the services of Maj. H. R. LeSueur, who helped lay out

the grounds and organize the tests.63

The Ordnance Department started construction of a proving ground

at Edgewood near the shell filling plant in January 1918. A month later

the department stopped work at Edgewood because it was felt that the

location was not sufficiently isolated and started anew in the pine forests

near Lakehurst, N.J.

At Lakehurst, Ordnance constructed ranges, impact areas, laboratories,

magazines, gun emplacements, observation towers, animal houses, barracks,

and other buildings necessary for successful operation of a proving ground.

To determine the quantity of gas present after explosion of a shell, Ordnance laid out two lines of trenches with dugouts and designed an automatic sampling apparatus to collect gas laden air in glass bottles located

within the area.

The proving ground was manned by Medical, Ordnance, and Quartermaster officers and men. Tests were carried out jointly by chemists, physiologists, and meteorologists. The first gas shells fired in the United States

were discharged at Lakehurst on 25 April 1918. Thereafter firing trials

were made to determine the extent of decomposition of toxic agents during the explosion of shells, to ascertain the relative effectiveness and per63

 Maj H. R. LeSueur, British Gas Warfare Mission to the USA, Section VII, Work of the Lakehurst Experimental Station. CWS, H-6.
24 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

sistency of mustard, to find the number of shells necessary to build up a

concentration of gas in a given area, to test experimental shells, and to

test representative samples from the production line.

Demobilization

With the coming of peace in November 1918, the industrial and collegiate laboratories assisting the CWS dropped war projects and returned

to their normal scientific research. At American University the volume of

research subsided as the staff of more than twelve hundred technical men,

among whom were many of the finest chemists in the United States,

dwindled away until only a handful were left. The dismemberment of the

service proceeded so rapidly that by 30 June 1919, 97 percent of its military personnel had been demobilized.64

 In a short time the CWS would

have disappeared completely had not Congress on 11 July 1919 ordered

the War Department to retain the service as an independent branch of

the Army for another year.65 Under the National Defense Act of 1920 the

CWS became a permanent branch of the Army.66

For several months after the war the CWS retained the wide authority

granted by the War Department in 1918 to carry on "all investigation

and research work in connection with gas warfare."

 67

 In reality this meant

little because the small staff could not cope with all projects relevant to

chemical warfare. The only projects carried on were the development of

boosters for gas and smoke shells, and the determination of bursting

charges.68 Shortly after Congress extended the life of the CWS in July

1919, the War Department issued the first peacetime instructions concerning research and development. The Department did not insist that the

Chief keep up the wartime level of research and development, but it did

require him to maintain a "competent body of chemical warfare specialists

with facilities for continuous research and experimentation," and to keep

"in touch with civilian agencies for chemical research and chemical industries capable of being converted for the production of wartime material."

 69

64

 Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 13. 65

 (1) 41 U.S. Statutes at Large ch. IV p. 219. (2) WD Bull No 23, 19 Jul 19. 66

 P.L. 242, 66th Cong., Sec 12a. 67

 WD GO 62, 28 Jun 18. 68

 Rpt of CWS, 1920, pp. 23-24. 69

 Instructions from the War Department to the Chief Chemical Officer, 28 Nov 19. Cited in Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 5.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 25

There was little else that the CWS could have done at this time even had

it desired. The government had returned American University to the trustees, and the Research Division of the CWS was busy preparing new laboratories at Edgewood Arsenal and transferring equipment and records.

CWS scientists, uncertain of their future, were not disposed to remain, so

that between 1 July and 1 November 1919 there was only an average of

eighteen technical men to keep the work alive.70

The central gas mask factory at Long Island City was demobilized after

the war. This was done on a gradual basis, each employee being discharged

only after he had been placed in other civilian employment.71 A second

demobilization project was the termination of over twelve hundred formal

contracts and over fifty informal contracts. By 1 July 1920 all CWS formal contracts and over 98 percent of the informal contracts had been

settled.72

More time consuming was the sale of the surplus chemical plants

and surplus items of chemical warfare equipment and matériel. By 1 July

1920 the plants had either been sold or transferred to other government

bureaus, and by that time also great quantities of surplus matériel had

been sold.73 But disposition of some World War I surplus property continued into 1925.74

Certain matériel that might prove useful in peacetime was not declared

surplus, notably the gas mask. Planners realized that a number of masks

would be needed for training purposes in peacetime as well as for war

reserve. Not only would World War I masks have to be reconditioned,

but it would also be necessary to manufacture improved masks during the

peacetime years. Thus within a year after the signing of the armistice it

was decided that a government-owned, government-operated gas mask factory would be built at Edgewood Arsenal, to be equipped with machinery used in the Long Island City plant.75

Much of this machinery had been sold as surplus after the war and

the remainder shipped for storage to the government plant at Hastingson-Hudson, N.Y. In late 1919 and early 1920 this machinery was transferred to Edgewood, where it was installed in the new gas mask factory.

70

 Ibid., p. 29. 71

 Rpt of CWS, 1919, p. 51. 72

 Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 16. 73

 Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 15. 74

 Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 17. 75

 Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 30.
26 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

A more difficult problem was that of securing operators to run the machinery, for although a number of the supervisors from the Long Island plant

came to Edgewood very few of the operators did. Consequently, it was

necessary to train new operators, a process which required a period of

about six months.76 The gas mask factory at Edgewood reconditioned

approximately one half million World War I masks and produced 120,000

new masks in the years 1920-21.77

With the armistice the staff of the proving ground was quickly demobilized. In November 1919 the CWS established an officers' training school

at Lakehurst, where shortly afterwards the First Gas Regiment was stationed.

In the spring of 1920 the service resumed testing operations.78

During the twenty months in which the United States was involved

in World War I, the Bureau of Mines and the Army built up the largest

organization of scientists ever assembled in this country, perhaps in the

world. The volume of research carried on by these scientists was tremendous and their contributions notable.79

 One group, headed by Capt. Winford Lee Lewis, of Northwestern University, discovered lewisite and another group under Maj. Roger Adams, of the University of Illinois, produced adamsite. Some scientists carried on extensive research on protective

equipment and chemical warfare weapons. In medical research, physiologists studied the reaction of chemical agents upon the body, so that methods of treatment could be devised.

When the War Department launched the program to produce gas warfare munitions, neither the military establishment nor American industry

had had any experience in manufacturing gas warfare items. Under these

conditions it is surprising that so much gas warfare equipment was manufactured and that such a large portion of it was delivered to the theater

by the close of the war.

Yet the amount of such equipment reaching France was only a fraction of what the troops needed and the U.S. Army therefore had to rely

on the French and the British to fill the bulk of its needs. This situation

was not confined to gas warfare items by any means; throughout 1917 and

1918, the AEF depended upon the French and British for almost every

76

 Rpt of CWS, 1921, p. 23. 77

 (1) Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 31. (2) Rpt of CWS, 1921, p. 24. 78

 (1) Rpt of CWS, 1920, pp. 39-40. (2) Annual Report, Edgewood Arsenal, Md. and Lakehurst Proving Ground, Lakehurst, N.J. FY 1921, pp. 26-28. CWS 314.7 Early CWS History File. 79

 A partial report on the work of the scientists is the 50-volume series of chemical warfare

monographs completed in 1919.
RESEARCH AND SUPPLY IN WORLD WAR I 27

Ordnance item except rifles and small arms ammunition.80 The implications of this experience were not lost on the War Department or on the

Congress, and in the 1920 revision of the National Defense Act provision

was made against future emergencies through the inauguration of a system of

industrial mobilization planning.

80

 Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1955), p. 24.
CHAPTER II

Research and Development in

Peace and War

Chemical warfare research and development dipped to its lowest point

at the end of 1919. At this time the service was still a temporary wartime organization, with no guarantee that Congress would pass legislation

making it a permanent branch of the Army. But word finally filtered down

to Brig. Gen. Amos A. Fries, who had succeeded General Sibert as chief

on 28 February 1920, that the legislators would probably continue the CWS,

and Fries began to rebuild its organization. He revamped the Office of

the Chief in Washington, establishing a Technical Division to act as his

staff in matters concerning research and development.1 A year later he

added a Medical Division, headed by an officer from the Medical Department, to supervise medical investigations relating to chemical warfare and

to act as liaison with the Public Health Service, the Veterans' Bureau, and

the Army and Navy Medical Departments.2

Since the CWS had been formed as a service organization to all other

branches of the Army, close liaison with them was essential in order to

meet their requirements. To fulfill this function General Fries established

the Chemical Warfare Technical Committee (CWTC) in March 1920, composed of officers of the CWS and of all combatant branches interested in

chemical munitions.3 After the CWTC was formed its duties were ex1

 (1) Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 5. (2) The responsibilities of the Technical Division are given in

Pamphlet, Organization of the Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, 7 Nov 21, pp. 5-

7. CWS 314.7 Early CWS History File. 2

 The responsibilities of the Medical Division are given in: (1) Pamphlet, Organization of OC

CWS, p. 7. (2) Rpt of CWS, 1921, pp. 13-14. 3

 OC CWS SO 74, 31 Mar 20.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 29

panded to include the preparation of the project program for chemical

warfare matériel. To handle the development of matériel intended for use

by CWS troops only, General Fries set up a similar group composed of

CWS personnel and called the Chemical Warfare Branch Committee.

To the American Chemical Society, which had provided an advisory

committee to assist the CWS during the war, General Fries went with

a request for another committee to consult with him on scientific matters.

The society appointed a group of outstanding chemists who met periodically with General Fries and with later chiefs to discuss chemical warfare

and to recommend promising lines of research, changes in organizational

structure, and possible solutions to vexing chemical warfare problems.4

Through this organization the CWS had access to the best minds in

American chemistry.

In reorganizing Edgewood Arsenal, General Fries provided for two

technical groups: the Chemical Research and Development Division (later

the Chemical Division) to investigate smokes, incendiaries, and toxic agents;

and the Mechanical and Electrical Research and Development Division

(later, the Mechanical Division) to design munitions and masks.5 In 1921,

when the War Department ordered the CWS to remove its wartime proving ground from Lakehurst, N.J., General Fries set up a Proof Department at Edgewood.6

 The following year he completed the basic technical

organization at the arsenal by adding a Medical Research Division to

determine the toxicological and physiological action of chemical compounds, to develop methods of treating chemical warfare casualties, and

to instruct officers in the medical aspects of chemical warfare.

Fries kept the Chemical and Mechanical Divisions and the Proof

Department at Edgewood in the normal command channels, but because

of the highly technical nature of their work he placed them under a Technical Director, the first of whom was Dr. James E. Mills, appointed in April

1921.7 The Medical Research Division, on the other hand, remained under

an officer of the Medical Department.

General Fries did not alter the research organization for several years,

4

 (1) The original members of the ACS advisory council are listed in Rpt of CWS, 1920, p.

18. (2) For the history of the advisory council see Carl B. Marquand, The American Chemical

Society Committee and its Relation to the Chemical Corps, 1955. CWS 314.7 ACS File. 5

 Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 26. 6

 (1) Rpt of CWS, 1921, pp. 29-31. (2) Annual Report, Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, Md.,

and Lakehurst Proving Ground, Lakehurst, N.J., 1921, pp. 7-8, 26-28. 7

 (1) Rpt of CWS, 1921, p. 17. (2) A brief account of James E. Mills may be found in "Au

Revoir, Dr. Mills," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 15 (July 1929), 606-07.
30 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

but in the meantime he established a Chemical Warfare Board, which came

to play a part in the technical program. The board, composed of seven

officers, was created in 1923 for the purpose of outlining broad policies

and shaping them in definite form for the chief chemical officer.8 In

1926 Fries reorganized the board, reduced its membership to four officers,

and stationed it at Edgewood Arsenal.9 A primary function of the board

now was to study and co-ordinate the technical developments of the CWS

with tactical doctrines and methods.10 In carrying out its mission the board

conducted or supervised service tests of equipment used by chemical

troops and studied proposed projects before they were acted upon by the

Chemical Warfare Technical Committee.11

With the addition of the board to the other technical agencies, which

included the medical and technical staffs in the Office of the Chief, the

laboratories and shops at Edgewood Arsenal, the CWTC, and the American Chemical Society advisory committee, the basic research and development organization of the CWS was complete. The organizational structure, however, still did not satisfy General Fries. Edgewood Arsenal had

grown and the projects had increased since 1920, bringing a certain amount

of unwieldiness in operations. In the autumn of 1928 he divided the three

technical divisions, Chemical, Mechanical, and Medical, into six divisions—

Research, Munitions Development, Protective Development, Engineering,

Medical, and Information. Each division, in turn, was made up of several

departments.12 The Research Division consisted of an Organic Department, which synthesized new compounds and investigated manufacturing

processes on a small scale; a Physical Department, which made fundamental studies of smokes, charcoal, and filtration; and an Analytical Department, which performed routine analyses and identified new substances.

The Medical Division had two branches: a Toxicological Department,

which determined the toxicity of substances and conducted fundamental

research on toxicity; and a Medical Department, which studied physiological action and mechanism of chemical warfare agents and developed first8

 OC CWS SO 19, 21 May 23. 9

 OC CWS SO 59, 19 Nov 26. 10

 AR 50-10, 3 Jan 27. 11

 (1) "The Chemical Warfare Board," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 12 (December 1926), p. 1.

(2) Rpt of CWS, 1928, p. 20. (3) Ltr, Maj E. Montgomery to C CWS, 5 Jan 27, sub: Procedure

in Development, Test and Adoption of Chemical Warfare Materiel, with 3 Inds. Edgewood Arsenal (EA) 400.112/2. Copy in CWS 314.7 Early CWS History File. 12

 (1) Capt Maurice E. Barker, "The Technical Divisions, Edgewood Arsenal," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 15 (July 1929), 607-10. (2) CWS News Letter, no. 1, 1 Jan 29, pp. 1-2. Technical

Library, A CmlC, Md. (3) For charts see Rpt of CWS, 1931 (secret supplement).
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 31

aid treatment. The Munitions Development Division consisted of a Munitions Department, which developed grenades, bombs, candles, and shells;

a Weapons Department, which developed mortars, Livens projectors, largearea smoke screen generators, airplane spray tanks, and gas cylinders; and

a Plants Department which developed, constructed, and operated pilot

plants and full-scale toxic and impregnite plants. The Information Division had three units—a Technical Files Department to handle files and

prepare monographs, a Technical Library Department, and an Editorial

Department to edit research and development reports. The Protective

Development Division consisted of a Protective Clothing Department,

which developed protective clothing and methods of decontamination; a

Gas Mask Department; and a Collective Protection Department. The

Engineering Division was divided into a Design Department, which prepared designs, drafts, and specifications; a Physical Testing Department,

which conducted physical tests on materials; a Shops and Loading Department, in charge of machine shops and surveillance facilities; the Field Testing Department, which conducted all tests in the field, and a Photography

Department. After the reorganization of 1928, the technical structure of

the CWS remained much the same until World War II.

The Peacetime Scientific Program

At the time of the Congressional action of 1920, service scientists had

no official project program. The CWTC several months earlier had drawn

up a list of projects which General Fries submitted to the War Department, and while the Secretary of War was studying the matter, scientists

at Edgewood and Lakehurst continued to work on problems that had been

left unfinished at American University. In December 1920 the Secretary

approved Fries' program, under which scientists were to concentrate on

perfecting unsatisfactory wartime implements and then, as salvage operations were completed, to turn to the investigation of new items. In this

way Fries planned to improve the inferior chemical warfare items that had

been produced during war, thus saving the cost of new equipment and

at the same time providing the Army with a reserve of chemical warfare

supplies for training and emergency use. By the end of fiscal year 1921

the salvage operations were largely completed and a number of new projects had been started.13

13

 Rpt of CWS, 1921.
32 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

During the period from 1920 to 1940 the CWS initiated approximately

700 projects for the Army, the Navy, and for civilian organizations. The

military subjects encompassed gas masks, protective clothing, protective

ointments, incendiary materials, mortars, airplane spray tanks, chemical cylinders, chemical artillery shells, colored smoke, chemical grenades, toxicological studies, meteorology, analytical methods, pilot plants, full-scale

plants, filling plants, and medical studies.

In the 1920's the CWS placed emphasis on long-range projects.14 During these years Capt. Louis M. McBride, Dr. G. S. Maxwell, and their

co-workers made radical improvements in the mortar, greatly increasing

its range and accuracy. Dr. James E. Mills applied the theory of probability to the study of toxic compounds, and pointed the way to better methods

of determining toxicities. Dr. Leo Finkelstein conducted fundamental research on the filtration of aerosols to improve the smoke retaining properties of gas mask canisters.

In the 1930's the CWS de-emphasized long-range research and concentrated on filling the gaps in chemical warfare equipment. This involved

the development of new items, the redesigning of chemical plants to conform to modern engineering practice, and the drawing of specifications

needed from the procurement of matériel.

While the CWS placed a large number of projects on its technical

program, the research organization itself was not large. The service received very small appropriations from Congress (from 1923 to 1926, less

than a million dollars a year; from 1927 to 1938, less than two million;

in 1939 and 1940, between two and three million), and thus it was severely limited in the funds it could spend on research and development.15

As a consequence some of the projects received only a few hundred dollars, with the average only a few thousand.

Although the primary purpose of the CWS was to produce implements

of war, the service took every opportunity to volunteer its facilities and

staff to assist civilian groups in carrying out special scientific studies.

Among these projects were: Rat Extermination (1921), War Gases as Insecticides (co-operative project with the Bureau of Entomology, 1922),

Apparatus for Toxicological Experiments (co-operative project with the

Bureau of Entomology, 1922), Extermination of Locusts (co-operative

project with the Philippine Islands Department of Agriculture, 1923), Ex14

 Duncan MacRae, "The Scientific Approach to Military Problems," Armed Forces Chemical

Journal, V (January 1952), 26-27. 15

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. 2.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 33

termination of Field Rats (co-operative project with the Hawaii Sugar

Planters' Association, 1923), co-operative project with the Biological Survey (1923), Marine Piling Investigation (1923), and Boll Weevil Investigations (1920-27). These projects were generally financed by Congress or

some agency of the government since the CWS did not have funds to

underwrite extracurricular research.16

The longest and most important of these investigations was the search

for a boll weevil insecticide. Shortly after World War I, the weevil seriously menaced cotton crops in the South. In July 1920 the CWS made

arrangements to test toxic war agents as insecticides on the farm of the

State Board of Entomology, Baxley, Ga. While the agents destroyed the

weevils, they also injured the cotton. Chemists then prepared a series of

compounds and mixtures which they tested at Tallulah, La.; the South

Carolina Experiment Station, Clemson College, Clemson, S.C.; the Florida

Experiment Station, Gainesville; Experiment, Georgia; and Auburn, Ala.

Out of thousands of poisonous mixtures, the CWS found several that could

be produced commercially and were acceptable to the farmer.17

Another investigation of considerable importance concerned the protection of submerged wooden pilings against marine borers. The Committee on Marine Piling Investigation of the Division of Engineering and

Industrial Research, National Research Council, arranged for the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and the Quartermaster

Corps to pay for the cost of the work. The CWS carried out laboratory

experiments at Edgewood Arsenal and at the Bureau of Fisheries, at Beaufort, N.C., to find poisons that would kill or repel shipworms, and other

borers. Then it soaked sections of railroad ties with these poisons, and

exposed them to borers in the harbor at Beaufort and at Pearl Harbor.

Through this procedure, the service found a number of substances for treating wood that was to be submerged under water.18

The CWS and the Public Health Service co-operated in developing an

alarm for deadly hydrogen cyanide fumigating gas. They did this by add16

 Résumés of nonmilitary research may be found in: (1) Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries, "By-Prod- ucts of Chemical Warfare," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 20 (1928), 1079-84. (2) Carl

B. Marquand, "Contributions To Better Living From Chemical Corps Research," Journal of Chemical Education, 34 (1957), 532-35. 17

 (1) H. W. Walker, "A Brief Résumé of the CWS Boll Weevil Investigation," Chemical

Warfare Bulletin 13 (December 1927), 231-37. (2) James E. Mills and H. W. Walker, Chem- ical Warfare Service Boll Weevil Investigation. EACD 485, Aug 1928. 18

 (1) William G. Atwood and A. A.Johnson, Marine Structures; Their Deterioration and

Preservation (Washington: National Research Council, 1924), pp. 165-220. (2) Maj. Gen. Amos

A. Fries, "Summary of Marine Piling Investigation," Military Engineer, 17 (1925), 237-39.
34 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ing tear gas to the odorless cyanide. The tear gas would quickly drive away

anyone who might accidentally enter an area under fumigation.19 For the

Navy the CWS worked on a special paint to prevent barnacles and other

marine growths from fouling the bottoms of ships.20 CWS protection experts also developed ammonia masks for workmen in ice plants, carbon

monoxide masks for industrial firms, and fumigation masks for the Public

Health Service. After a disastrous fire at the Cleveland Hospital Clinic on

15 May 1929, in which many of the 125 dead were suffocated by gases

from burning X-ray film, the CWS studied the factors involved in the combustion of film and then widely publicized the danger of improper storage

conditions.21

The value of this nonmilitary research could not be measured in dollars, but men within the CWS felt that its peacetime benefits to the nation

were greater than the cost of its program.

Development Procedure

All research and development carried on by the CWS, whether for civilian or military purposes, and along chemical or mechanical lines, differed from academic research in that it aimed at definite, practical goals

rather than the discovery of new scientific principles. In this sense it was

akin to industrial research and development, which also sought the development of goods for a definite purpose, the consumer market. But even

so the course of development followed by the CWS was painstaking and

rigorous because it was directed toward the production of equipment upon

which lives and battles might depend. The War Department, on the other

hand, ordered the process to be carried out as expeditiously as possible:

"The desire for perfection in any item of equipment must not delay the

designation as standard type of at least one adopted type of every required

article of equipment so that in any case of an emergency the procurement

program may be launched without delay."

 22

 In the laboratories and shops

19

 (1) H. W. Houghton, New Method for Ship Fumigation. EACD 200, 3 Aug 42. (2) C. D.

Quick, Additional Investigation on the Hydrocyanic Acid—Cyanogen Chloride Fumigation Mixture. EACD 294, 31 May 23. 20 (1) Byron L. Wehmhoff, Albert M. Jordan, and Harry C. Knight, "Hot Plastic Shipbottom

Paint," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 15 (December 1929), 675-80. (2) "Chemical Warfare Vs.

the Barnacle," ibid., 14 (July 1928) 369-71. 21

 Proceedings of a Board of the Chemical Warfare Service appointed for the purpose of investigating conditions incident to the disaster at the Cleveland Hospital Clinic, Cleveland, Ohio, on May

15, 1929 (Washington, 1929). 22

 AR 820-25, Par. 15.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 35

this was translated into the motto: "Strive for practicability rather than

perfection."

 23

In passing from the original idea to the final product, the CWS employed a procedure based upon regulations laid down by the War Department.24

 The idea itself could stem from the laboratories at Edgewood, a

CWS officer, another branch of the Army, or a patriotic civilian. It was

then studied in the Office of the Chief and perhaps by the Chemical Warfare Board. If the idea was accepted the Technical Committee drew up a

military requirement, an official statement that the proposed article was

needed by the Army, and the military characteristics, a list of specifications that stated the desired size, shape, weight, materials of construction,

and performance of the finished article. After approval of the requirements

and characteristics by the Chief, CWS, and the War Department, Edgewood Arsenal went to work.

The first step was a preliminary investigation in the library or the laboratory to see what had been done by others along the same line, and to

aid in analyzing the problem. With this information the staff drew up a

project specification outlining the problem and estimating the time and

money required. Then the technical experts took over, constructing and

testing a series of models until they produced one that fulfilled the military requirements and characteristics. The Chemical Warfare Board tested

the article under simulated service conditions and recommended any improvements that were needed. The laboratories made the improvements,

the Board tested the equipment again and gave its approval. The CWS

canvassed industry to make certain that materials and facilities were available to produce the munition in wartime quantities. Finally, when the article

was known to be satisfactory for use under field conditions and procurable

in the required quantities, it was cleared through the War Department

and designated as a standard item of equipment. The procedure varied

slightly when the request for the development of an item came from an23

 Intervs, Hist Off with Dr. Frederick W. Lane and Mr. Harry C. Knight, 22 May 57. 24

 (1) Pamphlet, Edgewood Arsenal, the Seat of Chemical Warfare, pp. 7-10. (2) Instructions

from Chairman CWTC, Principles that Should Govern in the Research and Development of Materiel and Ammunition Pertaining to the Chemical Warfare Service, 30 Mar 22. (3) Maj Earl J.

Atkisson, Policy Governing Research and Development, 19 Jul 22. All in CWS 314.7 Early CWS

History File. (4) Pamphlet, Procedure in Development, Test and Adoption of Chemical Warfare

Material, approved 31 Jul 26, corrected to 29 Aug 27, and revised edition, 6 Sep 29. (5) Pamphlet, Development Procedure, 16 Dec 31, and revised edition, 1 Feb 38. All in CWS Publications

File, Technical Library, A CmlC, Md. (6) Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 29. (7) Rpt of CWS, 1931

(secret supplement), pp. 17-20. (8) Barker, "The Technical Divisions, Edgewood Arsenal."
36 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

other branch of the Army or from the Navy. In this case the ultimate

user set forth the desired characteristics and tested the equipment.

Maj. Gen. Harry L. Gilchrist, chief of the CWS from 1929 to 1933, estimated that in time of peace ten years were required to go through the

normal development cycle of research (two years), development (three

years) adoption (one year), and supply and improvement (four years).25

Much of this time was spent in funding, delays in authorization, staffing,

procurement of materials, and administrative work, rather than in laboratory and test work. During World War II the CWS had to telescope the

procedure and take short cuts in order to supply the Army, Navy and Air

Forces with the weapons they wanted. But this speed, particularly in the

early days of the conflict, frequently resulted in items that had not been

sufficiently tested in the engineering process or in the field and consequently

were not entirely suitable.

Laboratories and Proving Grounds

In the 1920's and 1930's the CWS had to creep along, but the outbreak of war in Europe changed matters. The Congressional appropriation

jumped from approximately two million dollars in 1940 to more than sixty

million in 1941. To handle the new problems that arose, the CWS scientific organization had to expand enormously.

In 1940 the CWS carried on all research and development at Edgewood Arsenal, mainly in buildings dating from World War I. The old

laboratories had been suitable for the small-scale operations characteristic

of the 1920's and 1930's, but not for the tremendous volume of technical

work necessary to support the armed forces in World War II. The service drafted plans for a chemical research laboratory and a medical research

laboratory at Edgewood. Since these buildings could not be completed until 1942, the CWS expanded as it had in World War I, by seeking assistance from university laboratories.

In Cambridge, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology erected a new

building which the CWS leased as a development laboratory.26 The loca25

 Rpt, Maj Gen Harry L. Gilchrist, title: The Chemical Warfare Service, prepared by direction of General MacArthur, 24 Mar 31. 26

 (1) Sylvester John Hemleben, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Chemical Warfare

Service Development Laboratory, in the monograph series History of Research and Development

of the CWS in WW II. (2) Capt. Jacquard H. Rothschild, "New Development Laboratory

Opens," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 28 (January 1942), 52-54.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 37

CONFERENCE ON EXPANSION PROGRAM, Office of Chemical Warfare Chief, January 1942. From left: Brig. Gen. Paul X. English, Brig. Gen. Rollo C. Ditto, Maj.

Gen. William N. Porter, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Brig. Gen. Ray L. Avery,

Col. Augustin M. Prentiss, Maj. William M. Creasy, and Maj. Lester W. Hurd.

tion was advantageous because it was in the center of an industrial and

university area, and because the MIT faculty was at hand for consultation.

Operations began in June 1941, under the direction of Capt. Jacquard H.

Rothschild. For four years CWS scientists worked here, carrying out a wide

variety of investigations. In the course of their assignments the men studied the pilot plant production of phosgene, mustard gas, and thionyl

chloride; designed a filling plant for irritant grenades; drew up plans for

the M2 field laboratory; assisted with the development of civilian, assault,

and headwound gas masks, and collective protectors; investigated flame

throwers and flame thrower fuels; and examined German, Japanese, and

Italian protective equipment and gas detectors. The laboratory continued

to operate until the end of the war when the CWS disposed of its equipment and turned the building back to MIT.

In New York City, Columbia University permitted the CWS to occupy laboratories in the Building of Mines early in 1942.27

 At that time

27

 Capt. Bernard Baum, Columbia University Chemical Warfare Service Laboratories, in monograph series History of Research and Development of the CWS in WW II.
38 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the service was working top speed on the development and production

of incendiary bombs, and scientists, under Lt. Col. Ralph H. Talmage,

sought to improve magnesium bombs and incendiary fillings. Later in 1942

the Columbia laboratory expanded its operations. The staff investigated

the manufacture of napalm, sought substitutes for the scarce components

of incendiary gels, and designed stronger base plates for the chemical

mortar. The CWS remained at Columbia for twenty months, and then

transferred its workers to Edgewood Arsenal where space was available in

new laboratories.

As with laboratory space, the CWS found itself in need of larger testing and proving grounds. Since 1921, when the CWS had given up Lakehurst Proving Ground, all testing and proofing had been done at Edgewood Arsenal. The fields there, shared by the Chemical Warfare Board,

the Chemical Warfare School, and Ordnance Department's Aberdeen

Proving Ground, were overcrowded, close to thickly populated areas, and

too small to permit large-scale assessment of toxic agents.

In addition to the laboratory facilities in the United States the CWS

had field laboratories in operation overseas. The chemical laboratory companies and laboratory sections of chemical service companies, whose mission was the surveillance of CWS matériel and examination of enemy

agents and equipment, were initially supplied with a field laboratory designated as model M1, standardized in 1936 and in service until the latter

part of 1943. Its 21,000 pounds of equipment, comprising 88 footlockers,

20 boxes, and 15 crates of laboratory materials, as well as a truck-mounted

machine shop, had to be transported on seven 11⁄2-ton trucks. Edgewood

manufactured eleven M1 laboratories before the model was discarded in 1943.

In 1942 the CWS issued five trailer vans to the First Chemical Laboratory Company which installed its laboratory equipment in them. The

company found that the vans lacked sufficient interior space for the work,

they were unwieldly to transport on railroads, they were difficult to conceal from enemy observation in the field, and they were hard to handle

on poor roads. After several months the service dropped the idea of putting field laboratories on wheels.28

Late in 1942 the development of a more compact laboratory unit, with

new and improved materials, was turned over to the National Defense

Research Committee (NDRC), the CWS Development Laboratory at

28

 Hilbert Sloan, Field Laboratories, vol. 13 of History of Research and Development of the

CWS in WW II.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 39

MIT, and the Technical Division at Edgewood. The new unit, standardized in April 1944 as the M2 base laboratory, and, like the M1, designed

for semipermanent installation, was contained in 36 plywood shipping

cases and 19 crates, totaling 20,000 pounds, which could be transported

in five 21⁄2-ton trucks. Among many improvements in techniques and

equipment devised for this unit was a semimicroanalytical system developed by C. S. Nieman and E. H. Swift of the California Institute of

Technology.29

In December 1943 the CWS began design of still another laboratory,

this time a highly mobile unit for proposed laboratory teams accompanying task forces in the combat zone. This portable unit for gas intelligence

missions weighed 3,293 pounds and was packed in 7 plywood boxes and

9 smaller cases that could be stowed in a single 21⁄2-ton truck. It was assembled and standardized in October 1944 as the M3 mobile laboratory.30

The first new proving ground was set up in 1942 in the desert wasteland of Utah, and included part of Dugway Valley.31

 Dugway Proving

Ground became the major installation for the field testing, proof firing,

and surveillance of chemical agents and munitions under temperate zone

conditions. Here researchers carried out airplane spray tests of unthickened

and thickened mustard at various altitudes to develop the technique of

air-spraying; to determine the effect of the height and speed of the plane,

as well as meteorological conditions of the atmosphere, upon the spray;

and to evaluate agents and apparatus. Planes dropped incendiaries on facsimile German and Japanese buildings to enable investigators to learn what

happened when bombs of certain types struck enemy structures.32 They

also dropped phosgene, cyanogen chloride, and hydrogen cyanide bombs

ranging in size from 100 to 4,000 pounds from different altitudes under

different meteorological conditions to test bombs and to estimate the quantity of munitions required to lay down a lethal concentration of gas upon

a given area. Researchers determined firing tables for the 4.2-inch chemical

mortar and for chemical rockets. They studied the behavior of gas and

smoke clouds under different meteorological conditions. Smoke munitions

29

 (1) CWTC Item 1024, Standardization of Laboratory, Base, CWS, M2, 5 May 44. (2) The

work of NDRC contract groups at MIT, Cornell, Iowa, Nebraska, and elsewhere is described in

W. A. Noyes, Jr., editor Chemistry, A History of the Chemistry Components of The National Defense

Research Committee, 1940-1946 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), pp. 174-75, 221-23. 30

 CWTC Item 1198, Standardization of Laboratory, Mobile, CWS, M3, 26 Oct 44. 31

 Bernard Baum, Dugway Proving Ground, in monograph series History of Research and Development of the CWS in World War II. 32

 Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 392-94.
40 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UTAH, major installation for field testing, prooffiring,

and surveillance of chemical agents and munitions under temperate zone conditions.

were fired to permit a comparison of the effectiveness of different munitions, and to ascertain the relative merits of white phosphorus and plasticized white phosphorus. In 1945 the installation was the scene of a most

unusual test, the SPHINX project, by means of which the CWS demonstrated to General Staff officers the potentialities of gas munitions against

Japanese cave fortifications of the type that had proved invulnerable to

high explosives at Iwo Jima.

As the battle lines shifted from North Africa across the Mediterranean,

Dugway Proving Ground sent a mobile unit to conduct studies of chemical agents in the Targhee National Forest, and the National Defense Research Committee sent a group from the University of California to

Mount Shasta, where the climate and terrain were similar to those in

sections of Italy. The investigations of these two groups were chiefly concerned with clouds of nonpersistent gas released from 100-pound M47A2

bombs.

To learn the behavior of agents under Pacific island conditions, Dugway sent other units to Camp Paraiso in the Panama Canal Zone and to

Bushnell, Fla. The Bushnell installation, staffed by CWS and NDRC personnel, began operations in November 1943, and continued to function
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 41

after the war.33 The initial test project determined the offensive value of

bombs filled with nonpersistent agents when used on semitropical terrain.

Later operations ascertained the offensive value of persistent agents in such

country, this being a departure from the old tactical concept that persistent

agents were a weapon for defense. Between 1943 and the end of the war

investigators evaluated a large variety of chemical munitions (bombs, shells,

thermal generators, land mines, rocket heads, and spray tanks) for their

efficiency in dispersing toxic agents. On Florida beaches they determined

the hazard of mustard contaminated sand to assault troops. At the end of

the war Bushnell closed its agent and munition program and turned to

the testing of insecticides, fungicides, and miticides.

In addition to Dugway Proving Ground and its branches, the CWS

established an experimental station in 1944 on San Jose Island, off the

west coast of Panama.34 Here the CWS, the NDRC, Great Britain, and

Canada co-operated in assessing chemical warfare weapons under tropical

conditions. Technicians tested a variety of munitions including 1000-pound

AN-M79 bombs containing phosgene and cyanogen chloride, and 115-

pound M70 mustard filled bombs. They also studied diverse problems such

as the hazards faced by troops in mustard contaminated jungle, the purification of water contaminated by chemical agents, and the effectiveness of

bangalore torpedoes in clearing paths through mustard spotted vegetation.

These studies gave the participants valuable data on the offensive and defensive phases of chemical warfare in jungle fighting.

Assistance from Industries and Universities

The new laboratories at Edgewood, at the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, and at Columbia University, coupled with the new proving

grounds at Dugway, Bushnell, and San Jose, gave the CWS facilities for

the tremendous wartime program, but the first installations could not be

ready until 1941. To obtain assistance in getting the work started sooner

the CWS again went outside of the Army.

Early in 1940 the CWS decided to engage industrial and educational

institutions to carry out research and development along certain lines. The

33

 The section on the Bushnell installation is based on Historical Monograph on CWS Experimental Station at Bushnell, Fla. MS in Hist. Off. 34

 (1) Capt. Jay S. Stockhardt, "San Jose Project," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, II (January

1948), 32-35. (2) Col. Robert D. McLeod, Jr., "In the Wake of the Golden Galleon, or Selecting a Jungle Proving Ground," Armed Forces Chemical Journal IX (March-April 1955), 36-39.
42 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

service, finding that the War Department did not have a contract to cover

this type of endeavor, took standard supply contracts, modified them in

each case to suit the circumstances, and had them approved by the Office

of the Judge Advocate General before signing. The CWS was a pioneer

within the War Department in drawing up research and development

contracts, and it had to proceed cautiously to keep within regulations. Its

experience was subsequently of value to other branches of the Army.

The contracts specified the work that was to be done, but they did

not try to tell the contractor how to carry out his task. Each contract included a clause granting the government rights to any invention made as

a result of the work. Each contract was written for a fixed sum. In cases

where the time stated in the contract proved insufficient to carry out the

work, the CWS negotiated a supplemental agreement extending the time

and granting additional funds.

From July 1940 to September 1945 the CWS spent nearly five and onehalf million dollars for work done under approximately four hundred contracts. At the same time it was receiving a similar kind of assistance

indirectly through the efforts of a powerful civilian organization, the NDRC.

The NDRC was established by order of the Council of National Defense on 27 June 1940 to undertake those scientific problems for which

the facilities of the Army and Navy were inadequate.35 In the new organization there were five divisions. Division B (Bombs, Fuels, Gases,

Chemical Problems), with James B. Conant as chairman, was responsible

for chemical warfare projects.36 To Division B the CWS recommended

the following six projects:

CWS-1. Aerosols—Their Generation, Stabilization, and Precipitation.

CWS-2. Study of the Theory of Toxicity—To Correlate Chemical Structure, Physical Properties and Toxicological Action of Organic Compounds.

CWS-3. Synthesis of Organic Arsenicals.

CWS-4. General Method of Synthesis of Certain Non-Arsenical Organic Compounds

Including Several Specific Compounds. CWS-5. Test of Pro-Knock Materials for Use Against Gasoline Engines.

CWS-6. Chemical Detection of Persistent Chemical Agents.

In December 1940, the CWS added three additional projects:

CWS-7. Fundamental Study of Gas Mask Absorbents.

CWS-8. The Generation of Colored Smokes.

CWS-9. Manufacturing Process for Lewisite.

35

 The History of the NDRC, from the viewpoint of organization, may be found in Irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research For War, the Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948). 36

 An account of the work done for the CWS by the NDRC may be found in Noyes, Chemistry.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 43

A tenth project, "Flame Throwers—Fuel Composition and Nozzle

Design," was added in February 1941.

On 28 June 1941, the Office of Scientific Research and Development

(OSRD) was set up in the President's Office for Emergency Management

and the NDRC was transferred to the new agency. In December 1942 the

NDRC was reorganized and its alphabetical divisions were broken down

into nineteen numerical divisions. Division 9, "Chemistry"; Division 10,

"Absorbents and Aerosols"; and Division 11, "Chemical Engineering" directed the majority of chemical warfare investigations.

In undertaking these projects the NDRC drew up the program, selected a contractor (either an academic institution or an industrial firm),

and then came to terms with the contractor concerning the scope of the

work, patent rights, and the cost. When an agreement was reached, the

contractor and the NDRC drew up a detailed plan for research. Officials

of the NDRC known as technical aides followed the work of specific contracts. The contractor submitted reports periodically to the NDRC and

the CWS showing the progress and results of the project.

The CWS and NDRC maintained liaison through one or more CWS

officers from 1941 onward, reinforced by NDRC members in the Office of

the Chief and at Edgewood Arsenal from 1942 onward. By August 1942

the volume of university-industrial assistance had reached the point where

the CWS and NDRC had to form a joint Technical Committee to plan

and allocate all research and development carried out by military and nonmilitary groups. On this committee were the chief of the Technical Division, the director of the Office of Assistant Chief for Matériel, the

chairman of the NDRC, and the chairmen of Divisions 9 and 10, NDRC.

The chief of the Medical Division joined the committee in August 1943.

By the end of the war the following projects had been added to the

CWS list:

CWS-11. Incendiary Leaves.

CWS-12. Thickening of Vesicants.

CWS-13. Prevention of Corrosion of Chemical Munitions, Vesicant Filled.

CWS-14. Analysis and Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in Water. CWS-15. Filter Materials.

CWS-16. Filter Design.

CWS-17. Production and Stabilization of Fog.

CWS-18. Effect of Noise on Man and Devices for Producing Such Noises.

CWS-19. Influence Fuzes for Airplane Spray Apparatus.

CWS-20. Biological Problems.

CWS-21. Incendiary Materials.

CWS-22. Rocket Propulsion of Chemical Munitions.

CWS-23. Formation of Flexible Films.
44 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

CWS-24. Development of Protective Clothing.

CWS-26. Meteorology.

CWS-27. New Munitions for Chemical Agents.

CWS-28. Acoustical Properties of Gas Masks and Diaphragm Materials.

CWS-29. Non-Volatile Toxic Chemicals and their Uses.

CWS-30. Improvement of the Exterior Ballistics of Liquid-Filled Shell.

CWS-31. Insecticides, Rodenticides and Repellents.

CWS-32. Improvement of 4.2-Inch Mortar

These aspects of chemical warfare were not alone in receiving assistance

from civilian organizations; medical research also benefited. In October 1940

the Subcommittee on Clinical Research of the Committee on Medicine,

NRC, took up problems dealing with the treatment of mustard-induced

bronchopneumonia, the purification of contaminated water, and the treatment of skin lesions caused by vesicant agents. In August 1941, at the

request of the Chief of the Medical Research Division, CWS, the Division of Medical Sciences of the National Research Council organized the

Committee on the Treatment of Gas Casualties (CTGC).37 This was a

medical advisory body to the Chemical Warfare Service, to assist in organizational problems of medical research and to gather and co-ordinate

information on problems and research results obtained in the study of

medical aspects of gas warfare in the various OSRD agencies and in the

chemical warfare centers of other nations. To the end of the war the CTGC

proved of signal help to the Chemical Warfare Service in its acquisition

of medical personnel to staff the Edgewood laboratories and in advising

on the research conducted there and, under contract, in universities, hospitals, and industrial laboratories.38

 Among the problems investigated was

therapy for injuries to the nervous system, for mustard burns, for lung injuries, and for eye injuries caused by vesicant agents.

At the same time the NRC was having this research done for the Medical Research Division of the CWS, the NDRC was sponsoring research

on behalf of the toxicological research group. After General Porter merged

the medical and toxicological groups into a single Medical Division in

July 1943, the new division received assistance from both NRC and NDRC.

37

 Rexmond C. Cochrane, Medical Research in Chemical Warfare, in monograph series, History of Research and Development of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II, p. 117. 38

 (1) Cochrane, Medical Research in Chemical Warfare, pp. 90-93. (2) A list of the major

CMR contracts with their subjects and investigators appears in E. C. Andrus, et al., eds., "Science

in World War II," Advances in Military Medicine, Vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1946), 870-71. Hereafter cited as Advances in Military Medicine, II. (3) The range of OSRD

investigations in a single study, on the mechanism of action of war gases, is indicated in Noyes,

Chemistry, pp. 249-51.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 45

The aforementioned civilian agencies, and the universities and companies that worked for the CWS under contract, rendered invaluable service

to the CWS in World War II on all phases of the research and development program. Among their most notable contributions were the M69

incendiary bomb, the M1 mechanical smoke generator, and napalm. The

NDRC toxicity laboratory at the University of Chicago screened many

hundreds of potential chemical warfare agents, the majority of which had

been synthesized in university laboratories under NDRC contracts. Meteorological studies by scientists gave the CWS accurate data on the behavior

of gas clouds. Academic and industrial laboratories helped the CWS overcome the undesirable properties of certain standard toxic agents and to

improve the large-scale processes of preparing agents. Much of the development of the 4.2-inch recoilless chemical mortar was carried on at the

NDRC Allegany Ballistics Laboratory. Investigations on protective ointments led to the new M5 ointment. This list could be extended to a much

greater length, but as it stands it serves to show the quality, variety, and

magnitude of assistance that the CWS received from nonmilitary

organizations.

Co-operation with the British Commonwealth

Shortly before the United States entered the war, the Americans and

British began to exchange information on chemical warfare through the

U.S. Assistant Military Attache in London and representatives of the British Purchasing Commission in America. After American forces arrived in the

British Isles in 1942, CWS personnel could visit British installations and

learn at first hand what the British were doing.

To link the chemical warfare organizations of Canada and the United

States, a joint U.S.-Canadian Advisory Committee was established. Membership of the committee was subsequently broadened to include Great

Britain. This three-power committee eliminated much duplication of effort,

established uniform test procedures, and accelerated co-operative work on

such items as toxic gases, flame throwers, and smoke munitions.

In the fall of 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff set up the United

States Chemical Warfare Committee (USCWC), headed by the Chief,

CWS, to co-ordinate all chemical warfare activities.39 One of the objectives of the USCWC was to insure that all types of chemical warfare matériel used by the British and Americans would be interchangeable. The

39

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV.
46 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

necessity for this decision is illustrated by a problem involving incendiary

bombs. American munitions were attached to the plane by two lugs, British bombs by only one lug. In order to make the bombs suitable for carrying in both American and British planes, the designs had to be changed

to provide for three lugs.

Although the principle of interchangeability was of great importance

it could not be fully achieved. By the time the United States entered the

war, facilities had already been designed to produce models developed for

the American Army without thought of standardization with the British.

With protective equipment it was practically impossible to obtain a wide

range of uniform items. One case where the goal was achieved was that

of the British light respirator, whose screw thread was made to take either

the British or American canister. In the case of colored smoke there was

some uniformity in regard to colors, but no standardization of munitions.

There was practically no uniformity of flame throwers or flame thrower

fuel, but a standard method of testing was adopted.

Evaluation of United Kingdom and American equipment was accomplished more readily than interchangeability. In April 1944 the Advisory

Committee on the Effectiveness of Chemical Warfare Matériel in the

Tropics, consisting of representatives of the CWS, the Canadian Field Experimental Station, and the British Army, was established to provide operational data for planning chemical warfare in the tropical theaters of war.

This committee was served by the Project Co-ordination Staff which evaluated chemical warfare tests carried out in the United States, Great Britain,

Canada, Australia, and India. The staff considered all factors involved in

the use of chemical weapons, including weather and terrain, protective devices, and weapons and munitions.

British information, most helpful to the CWS early in the war, continued to the end of the conflict, and covered practically all areas in which

the CWS worked. The flow of information, however, was not one-way.

The CWS returned the favor by sending reports of weapons, agents, and

research across the Atlantic to give the British Commonwealth the benefit of American experience.

Information from the Enemy

Throughout the 1920's and early 1930's the CWS had kept informed

of foreign chemical warfare technical activities through reports from chemical officers traveling abroad, and through representatives in the offices of
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE AND WAR 47

the military attaches at the London and Berlin embassies. There was no

special intelligence unit in the service to handle these matters, and reports

from abroad were routed to the appropriate division in the Office of the

Chief.40 Several years before World War II the practice of stationing representatives abroad was discontinued, and the CWS was cut off from any

direct contact with European sources. In 1940 the chief established an Information Division to collect, evaluate, and distribute information on enemy chemical warfare activities.41

 This division channeled appropriate data

to the technical agencies.

Certain reports received through intelligence caused the CWS to emphasize research along certain specific lines. This was the case with nitrogen

mustards which the service had dropped many years before, but which

it again began to investigate after learning that the Germans were interested in these compounds. Generally speaking, intelligence reports were

not as fruitful as direct examination of captured enemy equipment.

The CWS put its first intelligence units into the field in February 1944

when the Director of Intelligence, ASF, authorized the Chief, CWS, to

send teams consisting of one major and four enlisted men to ETO, MTO,

Central Pacific Area, South Pacific Area, Southwest Pacific Area, and

CBI, where they would compose the CWS Section of the ASF Enemy

Equipment Intelligence Service Teams. These teams were trained to examine captured equipment and report any information of value. Before the

war was over the original 6 teams were reinforced by 5 more, 1 for the

China theater and 4 for ETO.

In addition to its organized procedures for peering over the enemy's

shoulder, the CWS at times obtained information directly from officers

and men on the fighting fronts. In February 1942, for example, American

forces on Bataan, Philippine Islands, captured two flame throwers.42 Col.

Stuart A. Hamilton, Chemical Officer, USAFFE, shipped one of these back

to Edgewood Arsenal where the technical staff examined the weapon and

adopted the cartridge type of ignition for the American flame thrower.

40

 Many of the intelligence reports on foreign research and development are in the Technical

Library, Army Chemical Center, Md. 41

 (1) OC CWS Off O 6, 6 July 40. The Information Division underwent several reorganizations and changes in name. (2) This discussion of CWS intelligence activities is drawn largely

from History of Intelligence Activities, OC CWS, 6 July 1940-31 December 1945. CWS 314.7

Intelligence File. 42

 Col. Stuart A. Hamilton, Activities Chemical Warfare Service, Philippine Islands, World

War II, 22 Nov 46. In OCMH. (2) Ltr, Hamilton to ACofS, G-2, USAFFE, 21 Feb 42, sub: Report of Physical Examination of Japanese Flame Thrower No. 1, with 1 report and 3 inds. CWS

319.7A/33.
48 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Toward the end of the war in Europe, and after V-E Day, the CWS

continued to obtain information on German chemical warfare through two

agencies.43 The first of these was a group known as the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS), organized to uncover all

German military secrets and scientific discoveries. The second was the

United States' world-wide organization, Field Intelligence Army, Technical

(FIAT).

The work of these agencies was done by teams of experts who went

into an area after it was overrun. One team of experts spent four months

in Germany studying plants that had produced hydrogen peroxide as a

propellant for torpedoes and V-2 bombs. Their 350-page report, later released to the public, was the most complete authority anywhere on the

manufacture and handling of concentrated hydrogen peroxide. Another

team inspected chlorine plants to study the operation of mercury cells,

with which the Germans had replaced the diaphragm type cells. Other

investigators found plants that had been constructed to synthesize acetylene

from hydrocarbons, and to react acetylene under high pressure, processes in

which the German chemical industry had been pioneers. The survey of

German plants occupied the time of scores of men and produced mountains of reports. This information was released to the public, and proved

a stimulant to industry, the profession, and the universities.

While the CWS obtained a large volume of information on German,

Italian, and Japanese gas masks, incendiary bombs, smoke munitions, flame

throwers, and other equipment from intelligence sources or the examination of captured weapons, the information generally resulted in only minor

changes in components of CWS items, rather than in drastic redesign.

Information from the British and the NDRC had much more influence

in bringing about significant improvements or innovations in matériel.

The new laboratories, proving grounds, testing stations, and sources of

friendly and enemy data, gave the CWS a larger technical organization

than it ever dreamed of in the 1920's and 1930's. With the additional

facilities, funds, and personnel it had the task of sending scientists and

engineers along a variety of paths and of producing an extremely diversified line of items. Some of its research was fruitful, some was fruitless.

Some of its products were welcomed by fighting men, some were not

satisfactory. Like other services that carried on research and development,

the CWS had scientific victories and defeats.

43

 Col. Harry A. Kuhn, "German Technical Information," Armed Forces Chemical Journal. I

(January 1947), 12-14.
CHAPTER III

Toxic Agents

The Chemical Warfare Service came into existence because the armed

forces needed a branch to deal with the problems arising from the use

of poison gas, and although the service acquired the responsibility for

other areas of warfare, such as incendiaries and smokes, its major concern

during World War II remained the research, production, and neutralization of toxic agents. The first chemical used in World War I was chlorine, a heavy green gas. As the war progressed liquid and solid compounds

were also used to launch chemical attacks.1

One of the first steps by the CWS just before World War II was to

expand research on the classes of substances that might be suitable for

toxic agents. In this program the National Defense Research Committee

did much work.2 Soon after the committee came into existence in 1940,

the CWS submitted to it six projects, four of which were concerned

wholly or partially with toxic agents. To screen compounds synthesized by

hundreds of chemists in universities and industry, the NDRC established

in April 1941 a toxicity laboratory at the University of Chicago.3 In its

four years of existence this laboratory screened about seventeen hundred

compounds.4 The most promising of these, including sulphur fluorides,

1

 (1) Despite the inexactness of referring to all these substances as poison "gases," the term

has continued to be commonly used. The correct military expression is "toxic agent." (2) Chlorine

was not used as a toxic agent in World War II, but was used for other purposes. See ch. XII

below. 2

 (1) Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 157-62, 166-74. (2) Chemical Warfare Agents, and Related Chemical Problems, Summary Technical Report of Division 9, National Defense Research Committee

(Washington, 1946), pp. 3-264. 3

 (1) Final Technical Report of the University of Chicago Toxicity Laboratory. OSRD 5527.

(2) George H. Mangun, "Toxicity Laboratory, University of Chicago," Armed Forces Chemical

Journal, I (January 1947), 25-26, 49-50. 4

 The results from the toxicity laboratory occupied fifty-three classified reports. A list of the

reports may be found in OSRD 5527.
50 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

nitrogen mustards, arsenicals, sulphur mustards, aromatic carbamates, fluoroacetates, and aliphatic nitrosocarbamates were studied in more detail by

the CWS at the Edgewood laboratories.

Of the vast number of compounds investigated, the CWS and NDRC

found not one new standard agent. The difficulty lay in finding substances

that met a large number of varying conditions. The compound had to be

highly toxic so that a small amount would contaminate a large area. It

had to be available in large quantities from the chemical industry, or it

had to be of such a nature that it could be synthesized on a large scale

at a reasonable price. It had to be stable during storage and not decompose into harmless materials. It was desirable that the density of the gas

or vapor be heavier than air so that the compound would linger over the

target. The vapor had to be nonflammable so that it would not be ignited

by the flash of the burster.5 It could not react unduly with air or moisture. It could not corrode the container or evolve a gas that might burst

the container. If it were a liquid, the freezing point had to be low, else

it would freeze in a cold climate or in airplanes at high altitudes. Finally,

the chemical, physical (i.e., color) and physiological (i.e., odor) properties

had to be such that the enemy would be unable to detect the gas quickly

and would have difficulty in providing protection.

These conditions were difficult to meet. Of the thousands of compounds considered by the CWS between 1917 and 1940, and by the CWS

and NDRC during World War II, not one was found that could come

up to the standbys of World War I. This was also the experience of

Great Britain and the other Allied nations; and only the Germans through

an accidental industrial discovery made while investigating insecticides,

came upon a new group of agents, the so-called nerve gases or G-agents.6

In addition to seeking new agents the CWS spent much time improving the methods of preparing the standard agents and of overcoming such undesirable properties in the agents as instability. The service

erected new plants using the improved processes at CWS arsenals and at

other locations, and renovated older plants. It advanced the design of

5

 See above, p. 18, n. 54. 6

 In 1936 Dr. Gerhard Schrader, a research chemist with I. G. Farbenindustrie in Leverkusen,

synthesized an extremely toxic compound, "Tabun," while investigating insecticides. The compound was reported to the Ministry of War. In 1938 research along the same lines led to "Sarin."

"Soman" was prepared in 1944. For the sake of secrecy the Germans called these compounds Trilon, the name of a detergent manufactured in Germany. The existence of the G-agents was unknown to Great Britain and the United States until German chemical shells were captured and

analyzed in 1945, although vague hints about them appeared occasionally in intelligence reports

from 1943 onward.
TOXIC AGENTS 51

chemical munitions, and obtained considerable information on their potential usefulness through exhaustive field tests. Arsenals and depots conducted large-scale surveillance tests to determine the storage life of agents.

During World War II the CWS devoted most of the time spent on the

research and development of toxics to the standard agents.

Phosgene

Phosgene, or carbonyl chloride (CWS symbol, CG), is a colorless

liquid, slightly denser than water. It boils at 47° F. and hence in warm

weather is in the form of vapor, unless under slight pressure as in a

cylinder or shell. The vapor dissipates into the air in a few minutes, and

for this reason CG is known as a nonpersistent agent. The vapor smells

like green corn or new mown hay, and is extremely toxic. When inhaled,

phosgene damages the capillaries in the lungs, allowing watery fluid to

seep into the air cells. If the quantity inhaled is less than the lethal dose

the injury is slight, the fluid is reabsorbed, the cell walls heal, and the

patient eventually recovers; but if a large amount is inhaled, the air cells

become flooded and the patient dies from lack of oxygen. It is difficult to

estimate the severity of poisoning since the full effect is usually not

apparent until three or four hours after exposure.

Phosgene was the second major agent to appear in World War I. The

Germans first employed it in a cloud gas attack against the British in

Flanders in December 1915 when 88 tons of the gas released from 4,000

cylinders caused more than 1,000 casualties.7 The Allies quickly adopted

it and used it in enormous quantities throughout the war. It was an extremely dangerous agent, causing more than 80 percent of all chemical

fatalities. After the war the CWS surveyed all of the nonpersistent agents,

but could not find any that were more effective than phosgene.8 In 1928

the service classified CG as a substitute standard agent and in 1936 as a

standard.9

In World War I Edgewood Arsenal and several chemical companies

7

 Lt. Col. Augustin M. Prentiss, Chemicals in War: A Treatise on Chemical Warfare (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), pp. 154-55. 8

 G. S. Armstrong and S. A. White, Selection of Quick Acting Non-persistent Agent. EATR

191, 4 Apr 35. 9

 (1) Ltr, C CWS to TAG, 21 Feb 28, sub: Adoption of Type (Chemical Agents), and Inds.

Copy in CWTC. (2) Memo, C CWS for Chairman, CWS Branch Comm, 26 Feb 36, sub: Classification of Chemical Agents. Copy in CWTC. (3) Memo, C CWS for TAG, 5 Mar 37, sub: Subcommittee Report on Military Characteristics and Classification of Gas, Non-persistent. Copy in

CWTC.
52 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

produced phosgene for the AEF.10 The compound was prepared by combining chlorine and carbon monoxide in the presence of a catalyst. There

were two methods of carrying out the reaction; in one concentrated carbon monoxide was used, in the other, dilute. The American plants adopted

the concentrated gas process, but after the war the CWS weighed the

relative merits of the two processes and concluded that the dilute gas

method was more practical because it required simpler equipment that

would be more readily available in an emergency.11 The CWS, however,

was unable to construct a dilute gas plant because of lack of funds.

From 1922 onward the phosgene plant at Edgewood lay idle as the

War Department forbade the manufacture of toxic agents. In 1937 the

CWS rehabilitated and operated the plant for a brief period to produce

phosgene and to provide the Technical Division with engineering data for

a larger plant. The design was ready in 1939, and the new plant constructed and placed in operation in July 1941.12

Between 1940 and 1945 the CWS studied the manufacture of phosgene

along four lines: improvement of the Edgewood process, pilot plant studies

of the dilute gas process, erection of a by-product plant in Tennessee, and

investigation of the diphosgene process.

Improvement of the Edgewood plant began in 1942 when the Technical Division carried out experiments that increased the efficiency of the

process at an annual savings of $65,000.13 In 1944 the division established

a pilot plant for further improvement of the process.14 The plant at Edgewood served as model for a plant of thirty tons' capacity a day that the

CWS erected at the Huntsville Arsenal and began operating in 1944.15

The concentrated gas process used at the Edgewood plant required

solid carbon dioxide, pure oxygen, refrigeration equipment, and gas compressors, all classified as critical materials. In July 1942 the CWS Develop10

 (1) Short account of the manufacture of L3 (Phosgene) as carried on at Edgewood Arsenal

during the summer and fall of 1918. BAL 572, 1 Dec 18. (2) Historical information concerning

the Bound Brook Plant of Edgewood Arsenal. CWS, H-193. (3) Clarence J. West, Phosgene,

Chemical Warfare Monographs, vol. 22, pt. 1, May 1919. 11

 L. Vickroy, Post War Developments in the Manufacture of Phosgene. EACD 110, 28 Feb 22. 12

 (1) Brooks F. Smith, Phosgene Plant Design; Operation of Edgewood Arsenal Plant, June,

July and August 1937. EATR 267, 25 May 39. (2) N. M. Bouder, Phosgene Plant Design, Final

Report on Project A 3.1-1.1. EATR 294, 23 Jun 39. (3) Edgewood Arsenal in Chemical Warfare

Production, July 1940-December 1943, pp. 51-53. 13

 Agents II (Lung Irritants), monograph MS, vol. 2 of series History of Research and Development of the CWS (1 July 1940-31 December 1945), pp. 33-35. Hereafter cited as Agents II. 14

 Capt Charles B. Griffen, Jr., and Capt P. H. Schneider, CG Process Development. TDMR

952, 30 Jan 45. 15

 History of Huntsville Arsenal, July 1941 to August 1945, vol. I, pp. 456-65.
TOXIC AGENTS 53

ment Laboratory at MIT began to investigate a dilute gas process using

ordinary producer gas, containing from 15 to 20 percent carbon monoxide,

in place of concentrated carbon monoxide. After eight months of labor

the laboratory perfected a pilot plant capable of producing ten pounds of

liquid phosgene an hour. Using the data obtained from the trials the laboratory drew up plans for a plant having a capacity of twenty-five tons a

day and requiring for the most part standard industrial equipment. The

CWS found it unnecessary to construct a dilute gas plant, but the plans

were on hand for use in an emergency.16

In 1944 the CWS added yet another process. It erected a plant near

Columbia, Tenn., to take advantage of the tremendous quantity of carbon

monoxide available as a by-product from the Monsanto Chemical Co.

phosphate works. This carbon monoxide contained impurities, particularly

phosphorus and sulphur compounds, which had to be removed before the

gas could be used. The Monsanto Co., under CWS contract, set up two

pilot plants for the development of a large-scale method of purifying carbon monoxide and manufacturing phosgene. These pilot plants and those

at Edgewood furnished the CWS with information for the design of a

large plant with capacity of thirty-six tons a day. Construction began in

May 1944, and the first phosgene was produced in February of the following year. Monsanto operated the process until the CWS closed the plant

in April.17

The fourth and most unusual method of producing phosgene was

based on the use of trichloromethyl chloroformate or diphosgene. This

compound is less volatile than phosgene and is therefore less dangerous

and troublesome to load into bombs and shells. By means of a catalyst it

is quickly converted into phosgene. Taking these facts into consideration

the CWS conceived the possibility of filling munitions with diphosgene

and enclosing a catalyst which would convert the material into phosgene.

In 1942 Morris S. Kharasch at the University of Chicago and in 1943

S. Temple at E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. investigated the reaction

under NDRC contracts. Kharasch also studied the catalysts.18 The scheme

16

 (1) Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, pp. 34-44. (2) R. P. Whitney, F. W.

Holt, Jr., C. H. King, Jr., A Pilot Plant Investigation of the Manufacture of Liquid Phosgene.

MITMR 37, 13 Aug 43. 17

 History of the Duck River CWS Plant, passim. 18

 (1) M. S. Kharasch, The Preparation of Diphosgene. OSRD 504, 15 Apr 42. (2) S. Temple,

Preparation of Diphosgene. OSRD 1437, 20 May 43. (3) M. S. Kharasch, The Catalytic Conversion of Diphosgene into Phosgene. OSRD 332, 9 Jan 42. (4) M. S. Kharasch. Catalytic Conversion of Diphosgene into Phosgene within Closed Heavy Metal Containers. OSRD 899, 28

Sep 42.
54 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

appeared practicable, but the CWS finally decided that the advantages of

the method did not compensate for the higher cost of diphosgene and

the changes that would have been necessary in the design of munitions.

During the war the CWS manufactured and purchased from industry

more than forty million pounds of phosgene for use in various munitions.19

 Two munitions for phosgene, the chemical mortar shell and the

portable cylinder, had descended from World War I. In the event of gas

warfare, the mortar would have been the chief weapon of the ground

forces for laying down concentrations of phosgene on caves, dugouts,

bunkers, and artillery and machine gun emplacements. From 1941 to 1944

the CWS filled almost half a million 4.2-inch mortar shells with CG.

Each shell held almost seven pounds of CG, about 25 percent of the total

weight of the filled munition.

The cylinder had been a standard weapon in the static trench warfare

of World War I, but it was scarcely suited for the blitz tactics of World

War II. It could have been used, however, to overcome resistance within

caves or bunkers on Japanese-held islands. It contained thirty-one pounds

of phosgene, about 56 percent of the total weight. The cylinder also held

about two pounds of carbon dioxide to expel the phosgene in the form

of a mist. In view of the possible employment of cylinders, the service

retained the final model M1A2, standardized in 1936, until World War II

was over.20

New phosgene weapons were the 7.5-inch rocket, the AN-M78 500-

pound bomb, and the AN-M79 1000-pound bomb. The rocket, which was

the World War II counterpart of the World War I Livens projectile, was

readied by 1944. The Navy took almost eight thousand of these, the Army

more than twenty-three thousand.

Development of phosgene bombs started in early 1942 when the CWS

asked the Ordnance Department for a series of chemical bombs of approximately the same shape as general purpose bombs. The new munitions

were produced in 1943 and sent to Dugway Proving Ground for testing

and evaluation.21 The 1000-pound bomb holding 415 pounds of CG

19

 Richard H. Crawford, Lindsley F. Cook, and Theodore E. Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. Copy in OCMH. Statistics is a forthcoming volume in the series UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 20

 (1) CWTC Item 1545, Obsoletion of Cylinders, Portable, Chemical, M1, M1A1, M1A2,

and Apparatus, Charging, Portable Chemical Cylinder, M1, 28 Mar 46. (2) CWTC Item 1614,

same title, 23 May 46. 21

 (1) Baum, Dugway Proving Ground, pp. 201-24. (2) CWTC Item 826, Classification of

Fillings for Chemical Munitions, 15 Oct 43. (3) CWTC Item 881, Classification of Fillings for

Chemical Munitions, 3 Dec 43.
TOXIC AGENTS 55

turned out to be an extremely effective munition. When it hit the ground

and burst open a large amount of liquid phosgene was freed. The evaporating liquid cooled the vapor and caused it to flatten out against the

ground in a pancake-shaped cloud instead of rising as had been expected.

This cloud always formed, regardless of the weather. The 500-pound bomb

containing 205 pounds of CG was not quite half as effective as the 1000-

pound bomb, but it was still a useful munition because American planes

could carry more than twice as many 500-pound bombs as 1000-pound

bombs. The CWS filled twenty-five thousand 500-pound bombs in 1944,

and sixty-three thousand 1000-pound bombs from 1943 to 1945. The Air

Forces could, in case of chemical warfare, have used these chemical bombs

against targets beyond mortar range, against fortifications on Iwo Jima

and other islands before amphibious assaults were made, and against

strategic targets, such as war plants during working hours.

After the war examination of stocks of gas weapons captured in Germany showed that the German Army had on hand thousands of 250-

and 500-kilogram phosgene bombs.22 These bombs, however, had been

largely superseded by bombs containing the nerve gas tabun, which the

Germans began producing in 1942.23 The Germans did not favor the use

of phosgene in shells. Italy had phosgene bombs, and shells ranging in

size from 149-mm. to 305-mm.24 Phosgene shells, from 75-mm. up to 150-

mm. were captured from the Japanese, who also had bombs in sizes up

to 200 kilograms.25

Had gas warfare started early in World War II, phosgene would

probably have been used widely by the Allied and the Axis armies wherever the tactical situation called for the employment of a nonpersistent,

delayed-action agent. Sometime in 1942 or thereafter, evidence indicates

that as a stockpile accumulated the Germans would have introduced

tabun, and phosgene would then have had to share the field with the

new nerve gas. Hydrogen Cyanide

At the battle of the Somme in July 1916 French artillery fired shells

filled with hydrogen cyanide (CWS symbol, AC).26 The compound had

22

 First United States Army, Report of Operations 23 Feb-8 May 1945, Annex No. 9, p. 192. 23

 Intel Div, CWS, Theater Service Forces, ETOUSA, German Chemical Warfare, World War

II, Sep 45, p. 39. Hereafter cited as German Chemical Warfare. 24

 CW Intel Bull No. 16, Italian Chemical Warfare, 1 Jul 43. 25

 (1) CW Intel Bull No. 49, pt. I, Japanese Gas Shells, 1 Feb 45. (2) CW Intel Bull No. 14,

Aerial Gas Weapons of Germany, Italy and Japan, 15 May 43. 26

 Hydrogen cyanide is also known as hydrocyanic acid and prussic acid.
56 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

been familiar to chemists for a century but this was the first time it was

used in warfare.27 It is a colorless liquid which evaporates quickly at room

temperature and boils at 78° F. The liquid and vapor interfere with normal processes in body cells, particularly in the respiratory center of the

nervous system, and if present in more than a certain small concentration

quickly causes death. But if cyanide is present in less than the lethal concentration the cells can convert it into a harmless compound and the body

is uninjured. In this respect AC is different from phosgene, mustard, and

other toxic agents which are harmful even when present in less than the

lethal dose.

The French had some difficulty in using hydrogen cyanide as an agent

because AC vapor is light and therefore has a tendency to diffuse instead

of lying close to the ground. Also, AC has a tendency to decompose—

sometimes so violently that the container exploded.28

In an attempt to cut down the rate of diffusion the French mixed AC

with stannic chloride. To prevent AC from decomposing the French added

arsenic trichloride. To keep the mixture from crystallizing and to make

soldiers more susceptible to the agent they added chloroform. The addition of these compounds diluted the AC so much that the final mixture

contained only 50 percent of the cyanide. This meant that twice as many

shells, or shells with twice the capacity, were needed to deliver the same

weight of the cyanide—a rather wasteful procedure.

In addition to employing a dilute agent the French used small shells

holding only about a pound of filling. Furthermore, their artillery fired at

a slow rate. As a result the French were not able to place a lethal concentration of gas on an enemy area. Other nations observed the apparent

failure of hydrogen cyanide and came to the conclusion that it was not

suitable as a war gas, but the French never lost faith in it and continued

to use it until the end of the war.

Despite its drawbacks, hydrogen cyanide was inexpensive, commercially

available, and had several of the other properties that have been mentioned as being necessary or desirable for a toxic agent. After the war the

opinion gained ground in the CWS that the agent had not been given

a fair trial.29 In the 1930's chemists made laboratory and field studies, in27

 Maj. Gen. C. H. Foulkes, "Gas!" The Story of the Special Brigade (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1934), p. 108, says that hydrogen cyanide was "reported" to have been employed by Austrian artillery in Italy in September 1915. 28

 After World War I the CWS experienced several explosions among AC shells and cylinders

in storage sheds at Edgewood Arsenal. 29

 Rudolph Macy, Hydrocyanic Acid: Its Military History and a Summary of its Properties.

EATR 219, 20 May 37.
TOXIC AGENTS 57

eluding firing tests with 155-mm. howitzer shells, and came to the conclusion that the compound was potentially an effective lethal, nonpersistent agent.30

 They overcame the old problem of decomposition with

the aid of Du Pont and American Cyanamid, manufacturers of hydrogen

cyanide, who gave information which finally enabled the CWS to stabilize

the cyanide in munitions.31

After the United States entered World War II the CWS extended its

work and tested AC bombs of the 100-, 115-, 1000-, and 2000-pound size.

The 1000-pound bomb, holding approximately 200 pounds of agent, proved

particularly suitable as a munition. With this large quantity of the cyanide the cooling effect brought about by evaporation of the liquid produced a cloud of gas whose density was greater than air and which hovered

close to the ground. Under favorable meteorological conditions the cloud

was fatal hundreds of yards from the point of impact.32

The bomb was unquestionably an efficient munition for use in a cyanide gas attack, but the tests uncovered a serious problem. The vapor

which billowed outward from the bomb was easily ignited by the flash

of the burster. In some tests, practically all the bombs caught fire as they

split open. There were three ways of preventing the burning of AC: one

was to devise a "cold" bursting charge that would not ignite the vapor,

the second was to use a more powerful bursting charge that would push

the vapor cloud away from the bomb faster than the flame could follow,

and the third was to add a substance that would make AC more difficult

to ignite. Since the first two methods would have required too much time

and field work, the third was followed. Anton B. Burg and his associates

conducted the research under an NDRC contract at the University of

Southern California. They discovered that hydrocarbons such as those in

gasoline were the best flame inhibitors. Dugway Proving Ground tested

AC protected with hydrocarbons and found that it did not take fire as

readily as pure AC, but bombs still burned occasionally, and the problem

was never completely solved.33

The 1000-pound bomb would have been the chief means of dumping

hydrogen cyanide on the enemy if gas had been used in the latter part

of the war. It was standardized for use with AC in 1943, and about 5,000

30

 Samuel A. White, Hydrocyanic Acid: Field Tests (Static and Artillery Fire) of HCN in 155-

mm. Shell. EATR 299, 5 May 39. 31

 G. N. Jarman, HCN: Stability in Shell, Status Report, 1940. EATR 340, 6 Mar 41. 32

 Baum, Dugway Proving Ground, pp. 214-29. 33

 Military Problems with Aerosols and Nonpersistent Gases. Summary Technical Report of

Division 10, National Defense Research Committee (Washington, 1946).
58 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

bombs were filled and stored.34 This munition accounted for almost all of

the 1,132,000 pounds of AC procured by the CWS from July 1940 to the

end of 1945.35

An unusual AC weapon was a glass bottle holding about a pint of

liquid.36 This grenade was produced from 1942 onward as a possible lastditch weapon against tanks or in overcoming bunkers. It was finally

dropped from the approved munitions in 1944 because of the danger of

breakage during shipment, either through accident or enemy action, and

because tests had proven that it would not always break on soft jungle

underbrush or if it glanced off log bunkers.37

In view of the fact that the Germans did not regard hydrogen cyanide

as highly as some other agents, they did not procure large quantities or

fill shells, bombs, or grenades. They did, however, think that AC might

be useful in the form of a spray, and the Luftwaffe carried out extensive

field trials with aerial spray tanks.

The Japanese, on the other hand, felt as the Americans did about the

value of AC, but they planned to use it in shells and grenades rather

than in bombs. Their AC munitions ranged from mortar shells—light,

medium, and heavy—to 150-mm. howitzer shells. Japanese glass grenades

containing hydrogen cyanide were captured on Guadalcanal, in Burma, and

on the upper Chindwin River.

Hydrogen cyanide was not as important as some of the other toxic

agents, but if gas warfare had broken out, both sides would certainly have

employed it in tactical situations where its rapid action and lack of persistence would have been of advantage to the attacking force.

Cyanogen Chloride

Cyanogen chloride (CWS symbol, CK) is a colorless liquid slightly

denser than water.38 It boils at a temperature of 55° F., giving off a vapor

which is approximately twice as dense as air and which irritates the eyes

34 (1) CWTC Item 826. (2) CWTC Item 881. (3) Chemical Warfare Service Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 4. Prepared by Prod Br, Proc Div, CWS. CWS 314.7

Procurement File. 35

 Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, 16 Oct 51, p. 16. This report was prepared by

Facilities Br, Ind Div, OC CmlO. CWS 314.7 Procurement File. 36

 CWTC Item 495, Standardization of HCN Filling for Grenade, Frangible M1, 10 Feb 42. 37

 (1) CWTC Item 1117, Obsoletion of Grenade, Frangible (AC), M1 and Grenade, Frangible

(FS), M1, 31 Aug 44. (2) CWTC Item 1201, same title, 26 Oct 44. 38

 In June 1943 the CWS changed the symbol CK to CC. But the letters CC resembled CG

(phosgene) when printed, and there was some confusion. In November 1944 the symbol CK was

restored. See CWTC Item 1179.
TOXIC AGENTS 59

and nasal passages. When air containing a high concentration of the

vapor is inhaled the compound quickly paralyzes the nervous system and

causes death. When a low concentration is inhaled the reaction is not so

rapid, but the compound accumulates in the body until a lethal concentration is reached.

Cyanogen chloride was first used as a toxic agent by the French in

October 1916. In 1917 and 1918 the CWS investigated the manufacture,

the chemical, physical, and physiological properties, and the effectiveness

in shells and Livens projectiles of cyanogen chloride.39 The Research Division found that the gas passed rapidly through the German but not

through the American mask. This was an important discovery and might

have led to the adoption of the compound as an American chemical warfare agent had not the density of the vapor been so low that the CWS

felt it was impossible to place a lethal concentration of cyanogen chloride

on enemy positions.40 The same decision, apparently, was also reached by

the French and other European armies, for cyanogen chloride was never

used to any extent.

Between the wars the CWS conducted few trials with CK. The compound's chief test came in 1933 when the Technical Division, searching

for an agent that would act more rapidly than phosgene, the standard nonpersistent agent, examined CK and decided it was not acceptable.41

 But

early in World War II the CWS, while examining captured Japanese and

German masks, obtained data that indicated that CK would penetrate

enemy canisters in harassing concentrations if the humidity of the air was

high—a condition common to the tropics.42 This discovery opened the

way for the adoption of CK as a standard agent. As a prelude to standardization technicians had to learn if a lethal concentration could be laid

down over enemy positions, to see if CK was available in quantities sufficient for military use, to find means of overcoming the instability of the

compound, and to modify the canister of the mask for greater protection

to American soldiers.

The CWS and NDRC assessed CK at Dugway Proving Ground in

39

 Clarence J. West, Cyanogen Derivatives, Chloride, Bromide, Iodide, Sulfide, Chemical Warfare Monographs, vol. 25, April 1919. 40

 Phosgene, mustard, lewisite, and other agents have a density 3.4 to 7 times that of air. CK

is only twice as dense as air. Only one agent, hydrogen cyanide, is less dense than CK. 41

 Armstrong and White, Selection of Quick-Acting Nonpersistent Agent. 42

 A comparison of enemy and friendly canisters may be found in: (1) CWTC Item 811,

Standardization of Nonpersistent Agent, Cyanogen Chloride, 3 Sep 43. (2) Military Problems with

Aerosols and Nonpersistent Gases, Summary Technical Report of Division 10, National Defense Research Committee (Washington, 1946).
60 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

February and March 1943.43 Testers placed a 100-pound chemical bomb

containing 67 pounds of CK and a 500-pound bomb containing 280

pounds of CK in shallow craters and split them open with tetryl bursters.

They estimated the strength of the gas cloud by means of vapor sampling

devices and goats placed downwind from the burst. The trials showed that

the 500-pound bomb released a low-hanging cloud that was lethal for a

considerable distance and that the flash from a tetryl burster would not

ignite the compound.

Even though CK was shown to be suitable as an agent, the CWS still

might not have standardized it if the protective properties of the American mask had not been improved. The mask carried by soldiers at the

start of the war gave excellent protection against chloropicrin, phosgene,

mustard, and lewisite but only fair protection against hydrogen cyanide,

and cyanogen chloride. The CWS in 1943 adopted Type ASC charcoal,

treated with chromium, which was more effective in removing CK. Thus

at the time when the investigators were uncovering evidence of the usefulness of CK on the offense, the technicians were developing better

protection for defense.

Another hurdle that remained was the chemical instability of cyanogen

chloride which had a tendency to polymerize. That is, the short molecules

of the compound would join together spontaneously to form large molecules of a new compound. Sometimes the reaction took place so rapidly

that the container exploded. Polymerization within bombs or shells also

meant a wastage of the munition, since the new compounds were relatively harmless as agents.

The task of preventing or retarding polymerization was undertaken by

Division 10 of the NDRC in 1942. A group of chemists headed by

Wendell M. Latimer of the University of California made a preliminary

search for stabilizing compounds. Later researchers of American Cyanamid

Co., working under CWS contract, took up the quest and uncovered additional information. Dugway Proving Ground contributed to these studies

by setting up a large-scale surveillance test of munitions filled with CK.

In August 1943 the NDRC started an additional experimental program

under Anton B. Burg of the University of Southern California. Burg's

group ran nearly two thousand tests on cyanogen chloride. This work

expanded the knowledge of the chemistry of CK, particularly the reactions

which took place during storage, but still did not provide the complete

43

 B. G. Macintire, Static Tests of CC in 100-lb. and 500-lb. Chemical Bombs. DPGMR 5, 12

Mar 43.
TOXIC AGENTS 61

answer. In 1944 Division 9 of the NDRC entered the field with a group

of men under Kharasch of the University of Chicago. This group observed

the retarding power of inorganic compounds on the polymerization of CK

and finally found that a small amount of sodium pyrophosphate would

preserve CK under normal storage conditions for many years. From then

on sodium pyrophosphate was used to stabilize CK.

In order to obtain sufficient CK for chemical munitions, the CWS had

to erect a plant. Before the war the only plant in the country was owned

by the American Cyanamid Co. at Warners, N.Y. This plant produced

sufficient cyanogen chloride for industry, but could not turn out the large

quantity needed for chemical warfare. In October 1943 the War Department approved the construction of a CWS plant with a capacity of fifteen tons, later increased to sixty tons, per day.44

 The Chemical Construction Co. broke ground for the "Owl" plant, as it was called, on 27 November at a site adjacent to the American Cyanamid Co.'s hydrogen cyanide

plant at Azusa, Calif. This location thus assured the "Owl" plant with

the hydrogen cyanide needed in the process. American Cyanamid, which

operated the plant under contract, started the first unit in April 1944.

The CWS chose two types of munitions for cyanogen chloride—4.2-

inch mortar shells and bombs. The mortar shell was made the official CK

munition for ground forces in 1945, but was not filled. Instead, almost

all of the twenty-five million pounds of CK procured by the CWS went

into 33,347 M78 500-pound bombs, each holding 165 pounds of agent,

and 55,851 M79 1000-pound bombs, each holding 332 pounds.45

Cyanogen chloride bombs, in event of chemical warfare, would probably have been used early against the Japanese, particularly in the tropics,

where the humidity would have assisted the vapor in passing through the

canister. The soldier then would have been forced to tear off his mask,

exposing himself to other lethal agents dropped simultaneously. In time

the Japanese and Germans could have treated the charcoal in such a way

that CK would no longer pass through their canisters. The agent would

then have lost its chief usefulness as a war gas.

Mustard Gas

In World War I the protection experts on each side tried to devise

means of neutralizing enemy agents as soon as new agents appeared. Chlo44

 History of the Owl Plant, passim. 45

 Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, p. 56. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40

through 31 Dec 45, p. 4.
62 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

rine, the first gas used, was soon parried by an adequate mask. As new

gases appeared, the masks were improved. Soon the mask furnished full

protection and men were gassed only when they were careless, panicky, or

caught by surprise. But in July 1917 the German Army brought out a

new type of agent, mustard gas, that not only attacked the respiratory system but also the skin, soaking through clothes and shoes and raising

painful blisters. It was almost impossible to shield soldiers completely

against mustard. It became the king of battle gases and caused four hundred thousand casualties before the armistice.46

Crude mustard gas (CWS symbol, H) was a mixture of approximately

70 percent -dichloroethyl sulfide and 30 percent of sulphur and other

sulphur compounds. It was an oily, brown liquid that evaporated slowly,

giving off a vapor five times heavier than air. It was almost odorless in

ordinary field concentrations but smelled like garlic or mustard in high

concentrations—hence the name. It irritated and poisoned body cells, but

generally several hours passed before symptoms appeared.

The chief problem concerning mustard had to do with its purification.

In World War I the CWS adopted the Levinstein process of the English

in which ethylene reacted with sulphur monochloride under carefully controlled conditions.47

 The reaction at first glance seems simple, but actually

it was rather complex and defied the efforts of CWS chemists to chart its

course. The impurities were of such a nature that they could not be isolated and analyzed. They resisted separation from the main ingredient,

-dichloroethyl sulfide, and caused or hastened decomposition of the

sulfide. Decomposition was a disadvantage, first, because some of the resulting products corroded the storage container, making storage unsafe;

secondly, other products settled out as a sludge that could change the ballistic properties of shells or prevent the liquid from dispersing in the most

favorable pattern; thirdly, a gas was evolved which built up pressure and

threatened to burst containers; and, later, after airplane spray tanks were

devised, the decomposition products made it impossible to thicken mustard for use in airplane spray attacks.

Chemists of the research and development division investigated methods of purifying mustard, but the processes proved to be impractical for

large-scale use.48 After the armistice the CWS disposed of the mustard

46

 Prentiss, Chemicals in War, p. 199. 47

 James K. Senior, "The Manufacture of Mustard Gas in World War I," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, XII (Sept-Oct 1958), 12-14, 16-17, 29; XII (Nov-Dec 1958), 26-29. 48

 Clarence J. West, Dichloroethyl Sulfide and Homologues, Chemical Warfare Monographs,

vol. 40, 1 Aug 18.
TOXIC AGENTS 63

plants at Cleveland, Ohio, Buffalo, N.Y., Midland, Mich., and Hastingson-Hudson, N.Y., and closed the plant at Edgewood. Research on mustard practically ceased until the early 1930's when the plant at Edgewood

was restored. In 1937 this plant was put into production for a two-week

period but not until 1940 was it opened for large-scale production.49

After Edgewood Arsenal began producing mustard again the CWS,

assisted by the NDRC, examined a number of purification methods including distillation under low pressure, distillation using steam and organic

liquids, extraction with solvents, treatment with ammonia, flash distillation, and crystal fractionation. Of these processes only vacuum distillation,

steam distillation, and solvent extraction proved to be feasible for use on

a large scale.

Purification by extraction dated back to 1918 when the CWS carried

out laboratory and pilot plant investigations to see if -dichloroethyl

sulfide could be separated from impurities by dissolving it in gasoline or

other solvents. The insoluble impurities remained in the residue and the

sulfide was recovered from the solvent by distillation.50 In 1942 this line

of research was resumed at the CWS-MIT Development Laboratory. The

chemists first obtained data on the solubility of the constituents of crude

mustard in various solvents, and on rates of solution. Then, using glass

extraction apparatus, they determined the data necessary for designing a

large-scale extractor.51 The NDRC assisted by awarding a contract to the

Texas Co. for pilot plant studies. Texas Co. engineers proved that largescale extraction was practical, but they found that the product was less

pure than steam distilled mustard and that the process required complex,

expensive equipment.

Steam distillation, in which a current of steam was passed into the

still to help carry away mustard, leaving the impurities behind as a tarry

residue, had also been tested by the CWS back in 1918. In 1943 the CWSMIT Development Laboratory re-examined this method and found that it

produced a sulfide of high purity and fair stability, and that only simple

equipment was required.52 The Texas Co. then made a pilot plant inves49

 (1) Capt William Creasy and L. Wilson Greene, Six-Ton Levinstein HS Plant, Engineering

Test. EATR 254, 14 Apr 39. (2) Edgewood Arsenal in Chemical Warfare Production, pp. 48-51. 50

 (1) Single, Successive and Continuous Extraction of Mustard Gas with Solvents. EAL 11, 24

May 18. (2) Thomas G. Thompson and Harry Odeen, "The Solubility of -Dichloroethyl Sulfide in Petroleum Hydrocarbons and Its Purification by Extraction with These Solvents," Industrial

and Engineering Chemistry, 12 (1920), 1057-62. 51

 Scott W. Walker, Capt John H. Carpenter, and Theodore Q. Eliot, Purification of Levinstein

H. MITMR 66, 23 May 44. 52

 Ibid.
64 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

tigation to obtain data for the construction and operation of a full size

plant.53 It is possible that this process would have been the one utilized,

as it seemed the most promising at the time, had not the CWS and

NDRC come across a superior method, vacuum distillation.

The CWS obtained the clue which led them to vacuum distillation in

November 1943 when Capt. J. W. Eastes visited the University of Illinois

to confer with NDRC chemists. He learned that they had distilled at low

pressure mustard which had been washed with water, and that the temperatures in the distillation column indicated that fairly pure -dichloroethyl sulfide could be prepared in this way.54

 In other words, water

removed certain impurities, and distillation removed the remainder. The

CWS had investigated vacuum distillation earlier, but had never washed

the crude mustard before distilling.55 The Technical Division investigated

the process and found that it produced a purer and more stable -dichloroethyl sulfide than the other methods and that it was quite practical

so far as apparatus was concerned. A pilot plant was first set up and then

a full-scale plant.56 In 1945 the service switched to the new process at

Edgewood and at Rocky Mountain Arsenal.57 By the end of the year 9,218,-

357 pounds of distilled mustard (symbol, HD) had been produced. With

the successful production of HD, production of the old Levinstein mustard was halted.

Mustard, in terms of the quantity that the CWS stockpiled, was the

most important American toxic agent. The plants at the Edgewood, Huntsville, Pine Bluff, and Rocky Mountain arsenals produced 174,610,000

pounds, exclusive of the nine million pounds of the new distilled mustard.58

Since mustard evaporated slowly and thus remained effective from several hours to several days, depending upon the weather and terrain, its

use was indicated on strategic targets or on enemy positions that would

not be taken immediately by American troops. Thus, it could be used to

"seal off" an enemy area into which American troops were advancing, and

53

 W. E. Kuhn, G. B. Arnold, and L. E. Rudisch, Purification of Levinstein Mustard. OSRD

3217, 5 Feb 44. 54

 Agents III (Vesicants), monograph MS, vol. 3 of series History of Research and Development of the CWS (1 July 1940-31 December 1945), pp. 80-81. 55

 Elford D. Streeter, "Continuous Vacuum Still for 'Mustard Gas,' " Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 11 (1919), 292-94. 56

 Capt William R. Wheeler, Capt Willard Marcy, Andrew E. Perry, and William R. Wilson,

Vacuum Distillation of Levinstein H, Pilot Plant Study. TDMR 985, 17 Mar 45. 57

 History of Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 1945, vol. III, pt. I, pp. 647-715. 58

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21.
TOXIC AGENTS 65

to hamper enemy lines of communication, airfields, landing beaches, artillery emplacements, and observation points. In withdrawals it could be used

to contaminate the routes of enemy advance.

For delivery of mustard by ground troops the CWS had 4.2-inch mortar shells, artillery shells, and land mines. The land mines were simply

rectangular 1-gallon tin cans, such as were commonly used to hold varnish

or syrup. They had a capacity of ten pounds of mustard. When exploded

with a slow-burning fuze or by electrical means, the mines spread mustard

over a considerable area. They were intended for use as booby traps or in

contaminating fields, roads, and buildings. The CWS procured and stored

(but did not fill) almost two million such mines.59 For possible use by

troops, 540,746 4.2-inch mortar shells were filled and stored. For the artillery, 1,360,338 75-mm. Mk 64, 1,983,945 105-mm. M60, 784,836 155-mm.

Mk 2A1, 290,810 155-mm. M110, and smaller quantities of other shells,

were readied.60

For carrying out aerial mustard attacks the CWS had chemical bombs

and spray tanks.61 The service procured 594,216 M70 and M70A1 115-

pound bombs, developed by the Ordnance Department, and 539,727

M47A1 and M47A2 100-pound bombs, developed by the CWS in the

1930's.62 The bombs were slightly over 4 feet long, about 8 inches in diameter, and contained a cylindrical burster. The bombs held from 60 to

70 pounds of mustard, and when dropped contaminated an area of from

15 to 40 yards in diameter, depending upon the altitude of the plane,

hardness of the ground, thickness of vegetation, and so on.63

In addition to bombs the service procured 92,337 M10 30-gallon airplane spray tanks. A plane flying at an altitude of 100 feet and carrying

four of these tanks could spray mustard over an area 75 to 80 yards wide

and 600 to 700 yards long. A larger tank, the M33 or M33A1, of which

the service obtained 20,598, held more than twice as much mustard. A

plane carrying two of these tanks could contaminate an area 75 to 100

yards wide and 700 yards long.64

In anticipation of the use of spray tanks the CWS expended much effort in trying to improve the spraying properties of mustard. In the 1930's

the CWS had accepted the doctrine that mustard spray attacks would be

59 Ibid., p. 24. 60

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 28-30. 61

 Spray tanks were also used to dispense liquid smoke agents. See ch. IX, "Smoke." 62

 CWS Rpt of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 3-4. 63

 FM 3-6, Employment and Characteristics of Air Chemical Munitions, Oct 46. 64

 Ibid.
66 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

carried out by planes flying at low altitudes and moderate speeds. By 1941

plans called for planes flying a mile high and at speeds up to 350 miles

an hour. At high altitudes and speeds the wind could easily carry small

droplets beyond the target or spread them over too wide an area. Small

droplets also evaporated so quickly that they either might not reach the

ground at all, or else become so minute as to be practically ineffective.

To obtain the desired large droplets chemists began to search for materials which would thicken mustard.65

After starting the project CWS learned that the British had already determined the best size for high altitude droplets and were adding various

substances to mustard to increase the particle size. In co-operation with

the NDRC the CWS tested more than seventy thickeners.66 Finally, the

search narrowed down to polystyrene and methyl methacrylate. After methyl

methacrylate sheet scrap (Plexiglas and Lucite) became available from aircraft factories, the CWS adopted it as a mustard thickener.67

As things turned out the work of the CWS and NDRC on thickeners

went for naught. High and low altitude spray tests carried out by the CWS

in co-operation with the Signal Corps and Army Air Forces at Dugway

Proving Ground from 1943 onward finally proved that unthickened mustard was a better substance for spraying purposes than thickened mustard,

and thickening agents were given up.68

Like the American Army, the German Army placed much reliance on

mustard. An examination of captured documents and gas dumps showed

that they had produced more than twice as much mustard as any other

agent for use in artillery shells of all calibers, mortar shells, 250- and 500-

kilogram bombs, rockets, and spray tanks.69 A notable feature was the

tendency to use mustard in conjunction with thickening agents or with

substances that would lower the freezing point. Arsenöl, a mixture of arsenic compounds, mainly diphenylchloroarsine, was widely used for this

purpose.

The Japanese, too, used mustard as a filling for shells and bombs. They

65

 Agents III (Vesicants), pp. 96-135. 66

 Miscellaneous Chemical Engineering Problems, Summary Technical Report of Div 11, National

Defense Research Committee (Washington, 1946). 67

 (1) CWTC Item 1007, Standardization of Thickened Persistent Agent, HV, and Persistent

Agent Thickener, W, 5 May 44. (2) CWTC Item 1074, same title, 7 Jul 44. 68

 (1) Baum, Dugway Proving Ground, pp. 153-64. (2) CWTC Item 1277, Obsoletion of

HV and W, 22 May 45. (3) CWTC Item 1346, same title, 24 May 45. 69

 (1) German Chemical Warfare, p. 32. (2) L. Wilson Greene, "Documents Relating to the

Capture of a German Gas Dump," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, III (January 1949), 26-32.
TOXIC AGENTS 67

favored a 50-50 mixture of mustard and lewisite, the lewisite acting to

lower the freezing point and also as a toxic agent in its own right.

In all probability if toxics had been called upon in World War II,

mustard would have been used extensively whenever tactics pointed to the

need of a persistent chemical agent.

Lewisite

In 1918 a group of organic chemists headed by Dr. Winford Lee Lewis

prepared a highly vesicant substance, dichloro (2-chlorovinyl) arsine,

which they named lewisite.70 The CWS leased the old Ben Hur Automobile Co. building at Willoughby, Ohio, installed equipment, and began

to produce the agent.71 A shipment was on the seas headed for Europe

when the war ended. The CWS kept the existence of lewisite and the

site of its manufacture a strict secret during the war, but later revealed

the information in scientific journals.72 After the armistice the service closed

down the Willoughby plant and did not prepare the compound again except in laboratory quantities until 1941.

In the early method of manufacture, acetylene and arsenic trichloride

were combined with the aid of a catalyst, aluminum chloride. The process

was complicated, a large quantity of unwanted by-products were formed,

and sometimes the crude product exploded as it was being distilled. In

the early 1920's the CWS renewed its research on lewisite, but was unable to continue the investigation to any great length because of the small

staff and projects of higher priority.73 In 1939 the service set out to design a pilot plant that would produce lewisite by a continuous process

using the old aluminum chloride catalyst. Shortly thereafter reports from

Great Britain told of the successful use of mercuric chloride as a catalyst.74

70

 (1) W. Lee Lewis, Summary of Work Done in Organic Unit No. 3, Offense Research Section, CWS, 26 Mar 19. CWS, H-209. (2) Clarence J. West, Organic Arsenic Derivatives, Chemical Warfare Monographs, vol. 21, pt. 4, April 1919. (3) The CWS symbol for lewisite in World

War I was G-34. Later it was change to M-1, and finally to L. 71

 The plant is described in The Story of the Development Division, Chemical Warfare Service

(1920), pp. 213-23, a souvenir book issued by General Electric Co. 72

 (1) W. Lee Lewis and G. A. Perkins, "The Beta-Chlorovinyl-Chloroarsines," Industrial and

Engineering Chemistry, 15 (1923), 290-95. (2). W. Lee Lewis and H. W. Stiegler, "The BetaChlorovinyl-Arsines and their Derivatives," Journal of the American Chemical Society, 47 (1925),

2546-56. 73

 (1) G. E. Miller, The Laboratory Development of a Method of the Manufacture of M-1.

EACD 239, 5 Jan 23. (2) A. B. Reed, Investigation of New Methods for the Preparation of M-1.

EACD 352, 20 Aug 25. (3) H. V. Wright and H. G. Shaffer, Development of Manufacturing

Process for M-1. EACD 367, 1 Mar 26. 74

 Production of Lewisite by a New Process, pt. I. Laboratory and Semi-Technical Development, 13 Dec 39, S.O./R/448.
68 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The CWS checked this work, found that the new catalyst was an improvement, and adopted it.75

 But since the mercuric chloride was a batch process, unlike the aluminum chloride process which had been continuous,

engineers had to modify the design of the pilot plant.76 Furthermore, with

the new catalyst there was considerable corrosion of equipment.77 As a

result of the problems attending the change in process the production of

lewisite was held up until the end of 1942, when plants were opened at

Huntsville and Pine Bluff Arsenals.78 In 1943 a larger plant was started

at Rocky Mountain Arsenal.79

While the CWS was erecting and starting plants, evidence was accumulating that lewisite might have only limited use. The service had no World

War I data to use in evaluating lewisite since the war ended before the

agent reached France. The information gained from field tests between 1920

and 1940 was not sufficient for World War II.80 To obtain additional data

the CWS conducted toxicological and field tests.81 Results indicated that

lewisite was of less value than had been supposed because there was difficulty in setting up a high concentration in the field, the gas mask gave

complete protection against the vapor, the vapor had a distinctive odor

that made it readily recognizable, and the agent could be readily decontaminated. In addition, British chemists had come upon a powerful therapeutic agent, DTH or BAL (British Antilewisite), that destroyed lewisite

on contact.82

Consideration of all these facts led the CWS to close the lewisite plants

in 1943, after 20,000 tons had been produced.83 Because of the possible

utility of lewisite under certain limited conditions, a supply was retained

75

 (1) Capt N. H. Hale, M-1 Process Development, Use of Mercuric Chloride as the Catalyst.

TDMR 280, 24 Apr 41. (2) Capt R. M. Cone, M-1 Process Development, Pilot Plant Production

of M-1 by a Continuous Process Using Mercuric Chloride as Catalyst. TDMR 354, 6 Mar 42. 76

 M-1 Manufacturing Plant-1941 Design. ETF 112.62-1. 77

 A. M. Reeves and Capt N. H. Hale, M-1 Process Development, Mercuric Chloride Catalytic Process, Corrosion Resistance of Miscellaneous Materials to Mercuric Chloride, Catalyst Solution and Crude M-1. TDMR 326, 21 Nov 41. 78

 (1) History of Huntsville Arsenal, pp. 436-55. (2) Pine Bluff Arsenal, Preliminary History,

Sec. VII. 79

 History of Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 1945, vol. III, pt. I, pp. 767-864. 80

 (1) J. E. Mills, H. W. Walker, R. Macy, B. G. Macintire, B. F. Smith, and H. Scheer, Lewisite Field Tests. EACD 411, 28 Feb 31. (2) E. L. Wardell, Lewisite (M-1), 1940 Summary of

Physiologic and Toxicologic Data. EATR 285, 15 Mar 41. 81

 (1) Capt Fred E. Culp, Lewisite, Dispersion as Airplane Chemical Spray. TDMR 473, 20

Nov 42. (2) Project Co-ordination Staff, Relative Value of Lewisite, 15 Jun 45. ETF 112.5. 82

 A. L. Stocken and R. H. S. Thompson, The Treatment of Arsenical Burns with Dithiol

Compounds, Oxford Univ, Research Item 21, Report 33, 26 Apr 41. 83

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 1940 through 31 Dec 45, p. 20.
TOXIC AGENTS 69

throughout the war. Afterwards the CWS sank a large quantity at sea,

and finally abandoned the agent completely.84

As has been mentioned, lewisite, because of its ability to lower the freezing point of mustard (which was only 58° F.), was used in the form of

lewisite-mustard mixtures by the Japanese. The Russians also employed

lewisite for this purpose. The Germans were familiar with L-H mixtures

for cold weather, but they preferred to use other arsenical liquids in place

of lewisite.

Nitrogen Mustards

In 1935 there appeared an article by Kyle Ward, Jr., describing the

preparation of a new compound, 2,2',2" trichlorotriethylamine, and calling attention to its marked vesicant action.85

 The CWS prepared and

studied a sample of the substance, but found that it was less vesicant than

mustard.86 Early in World War II the CWS learned through intelligence

that the Germans were working with the same compound and with related compounds—which by now had gained the name of the "Nitrogen

Mustards" because of their analogy to mustard gas.87

These reports led the CWS, NDRC, and British laboratories to synthesize and test a large number of nitrogen mustards. Three compounds

known as HN-1 (N-ethyl(2,2'dichloro)diethylamine), HN-2 (N-methyl-

(2,2'dichloro)diethylamine), and HN-3 (2,2',2" trichlorotriethylamine) were

most promising because of their vesicant action and their lack of odor,

and these the CWS studied intensively.

The British concentrated mainly on HN-2 and HN-3, but the Americans felt that HN-1 would be the most useful. Edgewood Arsenal set up

a small pilot plant in 1942. Using data obtained from this plant, the CWS

in 1943 set up a larger plant at Pine Bluff Arsenal capable of producing

one ton per day.

In the meantime field evaluation showed that the 1936 estimate had

been correct, and that the nitrogen mustards were not as potent as mustard gas. The plant at Pine Bluff turned out about 100 tons of HN-1 over

84

 CCTC Item 3114, Obsoletion of Lewisite, 2 Nov 55. 85

 Kyle Ward, Jr., "Chlorinated Ethylamines, A New Type of Vesicant," Journal of the American Chemical Society, 57 (1935), 914-16. 86

 T. P. Dawson, W. J. H. B. Wells, and C. W. MacFarlan, Preparation and Vesicant Action

of Tris(B-chloroethyl)amine and Tris(B-chloroethyl)amine Hydrochloride. EATR 281, 22 Mar 39. 87

 Nellie M. Cone, Possible Chemical Warfare Agents of the Axis Powers. TDMR 616, 26

Apr 1943.
70 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

a period of four months, mainly to mislead German intelligence, and then

closed down.88

The Germans had much more faith in nitrogen mustards than the Americans, and during the war turned out about 2,000 tons of HN-3. At the

end of the war they had on hand 105-mm. and 150-mm. artillery shells,

and 150-mm. rockets, filled with HN-3.89

Chloroacetophenone

Both sides used tear gas early in World War I to harass opposing troops.

Troops exposed to tear gas had to wear masks for long periods of time

and were very uncomfortable in the old-fashioned, heavy, bulky devices.

During the war the French, Germans, and British introduced a greater

variety of tear gases than any other class of agents. After the United States

entered the conflict, American chemists investigated chloroacetophenone

(CWS symbol, CN) and found that it had the advantage of being cheaper

and less corrosive to the inside of shells than other tear gases. The CWS

developed methods of producing the agent, but the war ended before largescale manufacture got underway.

After the armistice the service selected chloroacetophenone as the

standard American tear gas. It erected a manufacturing plant at Edgewood

Arsenal (1922), and developed a number of munitions for dispersing solid

CN or solutions of CN in the field. The solid could be scattered from

shells and grenades by means of high explosives, and volatilized from pots

and candles by means of heat. Solutions of CN in chloroform (CNC),

with chloropicrin in chloroform (CNS), and in carbon tetrachloride and

benzene (CNB) could be thrown out by grenades, shells, and high pressure cylinders.

In 1941 the CWS erected a modern plant with a rated capacity of one

ton of CN per day. This became the sole CWS plant in 1943 when the

old 1922 plant was dismantled.90 The manufacture of chloroacetophenone

involved three steps: the production of monochloroacetic acid, the chlorination of the acid to chloroacetyl chloride, and condensation of chloroacetyl chloride with benzene in the presence of a catalyst. The CWS was

aware of another method that was potentially capable of being adapted to

large-scale manufacture, the chlorination of acetophenone. If this could be

88

 Report of Activities of the Technical Division During World War II, OC CWS, p. 200. 89

 German Chemical Warfare, pp. 32, 126-27. 90

 History of Edgewood Arsenal, pp. 553-54.
TOXIC AGENTS 71

done satisfactorily the service was assured of a dependable source of lowcost CN.

In 1944 the Solvoy Process Co. contracted to develop the process and

obtain data necessary for construction and operation of a plant. As events

turned out the new plant was not needed, but the technical information

was at hand in case of an emergency.91

In addition to the development work on CN the CWS tested new

compounds for their lacrimatory effect. The Universal Oil Products Co.

and Du Pont suggested other possibilities. But none of the new tear producing chemicals proved superior to the standard agent.

During the war the CWS produced at Edgewood Arsenal and purchased from the Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Co. and the Lake Erie

Chemical Co. a total of 1,281,560 pounds of chloroacetophenone.92 A portion of this went to make up 5,282,000 pounds of CNB tear gas solution,

another portion went into 3,309,000 pounds of CNS solution.93 Almost

all of this solution was stored, but some was used to fill 4.2-inch chemical mortar shells, and 75-mm., 105-mm., and 155-mm. artillery shells.

Solid chloroacetophenone went into pots and grenades. The tear gas

pot was a modified version of the ordinary tin can and was filled with

1.2 pounds of a CN-powder mixture. When the pot was ignited by a matchhead, heat from the burning powder volatilized the CN. The pot gave

off CN smoke for several minutes. Edgewood Arsenal filled a total of

785,383 pots for possible use in the war.94

The tear gas grenade was one of the first munitions developed by the

CWS after World War I. The body was a small tin can having six holes

to let out smoke. The filling contained CN and a powder that provided

the heat to volatilize the CN. During World War II, the CWS filled

689,610 M7 grenades, each containing about six-tenths of a pound of tear

gas mixture, at the Edgewood and Huntsville Arsenals.95

Since the CWS had learned back in the 1920's that tear gas grenades

were not enough to drive determined men from their posts, they adopted

the practice of adding another agent that would cause vomiting and other

reactions. Gradually they perfected a mixture of chloroacetophenone and

adamsite (CWS symbol, DM), as a filling for grenades. Adamsite caused

91

 Development of Process For Manufacture of CN, Final, 14 Sep 44. ETF 141.6-10. 92

 Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, p. 73. 93

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. 94

 Ibid., p. 23. 95

 Ibid., p. 21.
72 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

nausea, pain in the chest, sneezing, coughing, headache, and other disorders. It had another advantage—it acted so rapidly that the victims were

unable to pick up the grenades and throw them back, as they did occasionally with ordinary tear gas grenades. Between 1941 and 1944, the

Edgewood and Huntsville Arsenals filled 582,327 M6 grenades, each holding about six-tenths of a pound of chloroacetophenone-adamsite mixture.96

In 1943 the Provost Marshal General requested the CWS to develop a

tear gas grenade with the size, shape, and weight of a baseball for military police to use in breaking up riots. The finished grenade, standardized

in February 1945, was a plastic ball holding about two-tenths of a pound

of CN, fused to burst 2-3 seconds after it left the hand and before it could

be picked up by a rioter and thrown back. The service produced more than

10,000 of these riot grenades by the end of the year.97

Tear gas rockets, for possible use as antitank missiles, were first investigated by the CWS in 1942 with assistance from the California Institute of Technology and the National Bureau of Standards. While this

work was in progress the Ordnance Department developed and standardized the antitank high explosive rocket, M6. The CWS thereupon turned

to the Ordnance rocket and developed heads to carry chemical agents. The

antitank tear gas rocket was finally dropped, but the idea took a new turn

in 1943 when the Provost Marshal General's office requested a rocket for

use, like the tear gas grenade, in controlling riots. The CWS modified

the rocket head to meet the new requirements, but the problems associated with ballistics, bursters, and size proved so difficult that in 1944 the

project was canceled.

The Germans and Japanese, like the Americans, used CN. The Germans employed it in two forms, one being solid CN, while the other was

a mixture of CN, wax, and explosive. The explosive mixture was used

in 250-kilogram and 500-kilogram air burst bombs, from which CN was

dispersed in lumps.98 The Japanese had on hand an unusual tear gas candle containing a propellant charge capable of tossing a one-quarter pound

chunk of CN a distance of 130 to 300 yards, depending on the angle of

elevation. For closer quarters a grenade containing a solution of CN in

carbon tetrachloride was available.99

In tactics, tear gases would probably not have been as useful in World

96

 Ibid. 97

 Ibid. 98

 German Chemical Warfare, pp. 130-32. 99

 CW Intel Bull No. 8, Japanese Chemical Warfare Weapons & Equipment, 15 Feb 43.
TOXIC AGENTS 73

War II as they were in 1914-18. Positions did not remain static as they had

in World War I, and the opportunities for harassment would not have

been as great. In certain cases, however, such as attacks upon Japanese

caves and bunkers, or upon isolated positions, in the Pacific Islands, the

gases might have brought about surrender or have driven the enemy into

the open.

Adamsite

The German Army introduced vomiting gases or sternutators into

chemical warfare in July 1917, as an ingenious method of penetrating the

canisters of Allied gas masks. They first used a solution of diphenylchloroarsine (CWS symbol, DA), which evaporated and left minute particles of

DA floating in the air. The canisters at that time were able to trap true

gases, the particles of which were molecular in size, but they could not

retain the larger particles of DA, which were colloidal in size. Therefore

the DA passed through the canister into the mask and was inhaled by the

soldier. It irritated his eyes, nostrils, throat, and chest, causing nausea and

vomiting. The victim had to tear off his mask, exposing himself to lethal

gases fired at the same time.

After the United States entered the war, American chemists investigated the possibility of manufacturing DA. The German process proved

to be complicated. Still, the CWS might have gone into production if

chemists had not found a related compound that could be manufactured

more easily. This was diphenylaminechloroarsine, which was named adamsite after the chemist Roger Adams.

The United States did not produce vomiting gas in time for use by

American troops. In the 1920's the CWS operated, for a brief time, a pilot

plant for the production of DA and DM at Edgewood Arsenal, but it

did not need a full size plant since DM could be purchased from the chemical industry.

The development work, instead, concentrated on means for spreading

sternutators in the field. This could be done by explosion, which shattered the agent into a dust or mist, or by heat, which produced smoke.

Engineers tested irritant smoke shells, ranging in size from 75-mm. to

105-mm., filled with solid agents and high explosives (HE), or with solutions of agents and HE, up to 1942, but the service did not produce any

for combat use. Smoke candles, which were simply cans filled with a mixture of agent and fuel, proved to be much more efficient for dispersing

DM. The early candle, dating from 1920-22, was displaced in 1941 by a
74 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

new model, M2, which differed in having a better fuel. The M2 weighed

9 pounds, held 2 pounds of DM, and burned from three to five minutes.

Edgewood Arsenal filled 92,485 candles during the war, with a portion of

the 644,589 pounds of DM purchased by the CWS.100

The Germans employed DM as a filling for base ejection and HE shells,

candles, and bombs; and DA solution as a filling for rockets.101 The

Japanese relied upon another arsenical vomiting gas, diphenylcyanoarsine

(DC), as a filling for mortar shells, artillery shells, and candles.102

Undoubtedly vomiting gases would have found much less use in World

War II than they had in 1917-18 because the canister of the gas mask had

been improved by the addition of filters which held back fine particles.

In certain limited situations, such as attacks upon isolated posts or upon

surrounded caves or bunkers, the vomiting agents might have been employed to bring about surrender or weaken resistance.

An investigation of the status of chemical warfare within Germany

made after V-E Day disclosed that it had produced a total of approximately 78,000 tons of agents—mustard, tabun, arsenöl, chloroacetophenone,

phosgene, adamsite, nitrogen mustard, and diphenylchloroarsine—during

the Hitlerian period.103 In addition, the Germans had appreciable stocks

of Italian, French, Greek, Polish, Hungarian, and Yugoslavian agents at

their disposal. The quantity of war gases produced by Japan was placed

at one-tenth of the German production. American production, on the other

hand, amounted to more than 146,000 tons of chemicals—mustard, chloroacetophenone, phosgene, adamsite, nitrogen mustard, hydrogen cyanide,

cyanogen chloride, and lewisite—from 1940 to the end of 1945.104

Although the United States did not employ toxic agents during World

War II, the money and time that went into the research, development, field

tests, and production was not wasted. The armed forces had supplies of

agents and equipment with which they could have waged warfare energetically if necessary. In this sense the work of the CWS was America's

insurance against chemical warfare.

100

 (1) Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, p. 80. (2) CWS Rpt of Production, 1 Jan

40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 5. 101

 German Chemical Warfare, pp. 127-32. 102

 (1) CW Intel Bull No. 8. (2) CW Intel Bull No. 49, pt. I, 1 Feb 45. 103

 German Chemical Warfare, pp. 31-51. 104

 Compiled from Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement"; CWS Rpt of Production; and Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report.
CHAPTER IV

Protection Against Toxic Agents

"Unfortunately, except for blister gases, there is no practical method

of detecting gases other than the sense of smell," wrote Brig. Gen. Alden H.

Waitt early in the war.1 But sensory tests were hazardous and uncertain,

particularly for chemicals with little odor or which were masked by the

enemy or by field conditions, and the CWS had long sought rapid, foolproof chemical and physical tests.

By March 1942 a number of blister gas detectors, all of which were

based on color changes in a dye base and had their origins in British and

American developments in 1918, had been standardized. They included

the M4 vapor detector kit, capable of registering even faint concentrations

of nitrogen and sulphur mustards; M5 liquid vesicant detector paint; M6

liquid vesicant detector paper; and M7 vesicant detector crayon, sensitive

to mustard and lewisite.2 Although the CWS had not discovered a better

dye base than that developed by the British, NDRC chemists at the University of Chicago, at the University of Virginia, and at Ohio State improved its composition and developed new detector materials.3

An excellent detector kit proved to be the M9, developed with NDRC

help in the CWS laboratories at Edgewood and MIT and standardized in

July 1943.4 The Army considered this compact, efficient, and widely used kit

one of the significant developments of the CWS defensive research program.

Any soldier could learn to operate it after brief training, and it proved itself

during the war in the inspection of chemical munitions at U.S. Army depots

at home and abroad.

1

 Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, Gas Warfare (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1942),

p. 205. 2

 CWTC Item 483, Military Characteristics and Standardization of Chemical Agent Detectors,

31 Mar 42. 3

 Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 157-62, 166-74. 4

 (1) CWTC Item 783, Standardization of Kit, Chemical Agent Detector, M9, 23 Jul 43. (2)

Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, pp. 73-82. The M4 Kit was made obsolete by

CWTC Item 1476, 4 Oct 45.
76 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Superior to the M4 vapor detector kit in every respect, the M9 was

an adsorption type of detector, consisting of a hand pump and nearly two

hundred small tubes of reagent dyes in silica gel, capable of detecting even

slight concentrations of such war gases as the mustards, phosgene, and

cyanogen chloride.5 The discovery by Weldon G. Brown at the University of Chicago of a sensitive and specific detector for any war gas reacting to alkali (such as the mustards) was of signal importance in the

development of the kit.6 Tests devised later for lewisite, carbon monoxide,

and hydrogen cyanide were at once incorporated in the kit.

After a requirement was established in March 1943, the laboratory at

MIT also got up an agent sample collection kit, the MIT-E12, which enabled the user to get samples of airborne agents as well as agents in contaminated soil and to keep them without loss or decomposition until they

could be delivered to a field laboratory. This was standardized in August 1945 as the M12 agent sampling kit and, along with a newly developed

M10 chemical agent analyzer kit and the M11 smoke identification kit, was

made a component of the M3 mobile laboratory unit.7

Unknown to the American Army, the Germans had discovered nerve

gases, a new class of toxic compounds. The CWS first learned of the existence of these agents after the war was over. None of the reagents in detector kits, nor any other U.S. detector devices, were sufficiently rapid or

reliable to warn in time of the presence of nerve gases. In liquid form

these agents reacted with the detector paint in the American kit, but no

substance in it could detect the agents in spray or vapor form. Had these

gases been used it is likely that only the onset of clinical symptoms would

have revealed their presence. Despite the accomplishments of the United

States in developing sensitive methods of detection, the definite evidence

in 1945 that the Germans had nerve gases reopened the whole problem

of detection.

As for enemy methods of detection, the Germans had a powder containing a dye which, when sprinkled on liquid mustard, changed color.

German vesicant detector cards worked in the same manner as American

vesicant detector paper, but were more sensitive to some reagents, and gave

a more sharply defined color. For testing the air outside fortifications, the

Germans had an apparatus with six pumps, operated electrically or manu5

 TM 3-290, 27 Mar 44, pp. 70-78. 6

 Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 217-19. 7

 CWTC Item 1407, Standardization of Chemical Warfare Agent Detection and Sampling Kits 2 Aug 45.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 77

TYPES OF GAS MASKS, APRIL 1918. From left, American, French, early British,

and German.

ally, which forced air through six tubes of reagents. A German detector

kit, comparable to CWS model M9, contained tubes of reagents and a

small hand pump to force air through the tubes.8

The Japanese also had detector kits, a number of which were captured

during the war. One of these, tested at the CWS-MIT laboratory late in

1943, was larger and heavier than the CWS model M9, had no reagent

for nitrogen mustard, gave uneven results, and allowed misleading interpretations of tests owing to the faintness of some reactions. On the other

hand, a naval-type detector examined shortly thereafter, although also without a test for nitrogen mustard, compared favorably with the M9 in design, simplicity, and effectiveness of operation, and had several good points

that were considered for possible inclusion in later American models.9

The Gas Mask

Gas masks were the earliest devices for protecting soldiers against toxic

agents. The German Army supplied crude masks to the troops who

released chlorine at Ypres, the first chemical attack of World War I. 8

 (1) Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, pp. 202-03, 210-12. (2) Intel Div,

OC CWS, ETOUSA, German Chemical Warfare Materiel, p. IV-C-1. 9

 (1) Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, pp. 201-04. (2) Off, Ch Cml O,

USASOS, Southwest Pacific Area, Japanese Chemical Warfare. Hereafter cited as Japanese Chemical Warfare.
78 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ARMY PHOTOGRAPHER WEARING

SERVICE GAS MASK with M1A2 facepiece, Camp Robinson, Arkansas, January 1942.

Between 1915 and 1918 the warring

nations developed a variety of masks,

some completely covering the head

and others covering only the face.

American troops in France first wore

French and British gas masks, then

the American C. E. (Corrected English) mask, and finally the R.F.K.

box respirator, a modification of the

British mask by Ralph R. Richardson, E. L. Flory, and Waldemar

Kops of the CWS. The R.F.K. gas

mask consisted of a canister, a fabric

facepiece with nose clip, mouthpiece, and hosetube, and a carrier

for the two units.10 It provided adequate protection against the agents

used on the Western Front, but

was uncomfortable if worn for long

periods. After the war came the

1919-model gas mask, consisting of a facepiece and hosetube of rubber,

covered on one side with elastic stockinette, a canister, and a carrier assembly. The trapezoidal facepiece was fitted with circular eyepieces of

laminated flat glass, deflectors to discharge air over the eyepieces to prevent fogging, an outlet valve, an angletube, and a head harness. The canister was of the radical flow type containing a filter unit for the removal

of solid and liquid particles from incoming air and charcoal and soda

lime absorbents for the disposal of gases. This mask was designated M1-

1-1 and adopted as standard in 1921. It was supplied in five sizes and

with improvements remained the standard U.S. Army gas mask until 1940.

After the United States entered World War II, substantial quantities of

this service mask, then designated the M1A2-9A1-4, were still available

in reserve stocks.11

In improving the mask during World War II the CWS sought to

10

 A detailed description of the R.F.K. mask may be found in Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 210-20. 11

 (1) The M1 and its improved versions, the M1A1 (1934) and M1A2 (1935), were not

declared obsolete until 1944. CWTC Item 1193, Obsoletion of Stockinette Type Facepieces and

Large Size Gas Mask Carrier, 26 Oct 44. (2) The model of a gas mask was designated by the
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 79

SOLDIER WEARING SERVICE GAS

MASK with M2A2 facepiece during

maneuvers, Camp Polk, Louisiana, June

1942.

make it more comfortable, increase

the degree of protection, and to

make it lighter. One of these steps

was to develop a fully molded faceblank. It eliminated the vulnerable

chin seam, the angletube, separate

deflectors, and multiple metal parts

in the eyepiece assembly, and it

also brought the lenses of the eyepiece closer to the wearer's eyes,

thereby enlarging his field of vision

and reducing the dead air space in

the facepiece. This molded facepiece

also resulted in lower manufacturing costs by permitting mass production methods of assembly, in

contrast to the hand work required

in the older masks. The new service mask was heavy and not waterproof, but it was an excellent device for protecting the wearer against toxic vapors.

Because there was urgent demand for the new fully molded facepieces,

the CWS provided only three sizes of molds for its manufacturers.12

These molds were based on fitting tests on a limited number of workers

at Edgewood Arsenal. Variation in the manufacturers' molds made it possible to fit 90 percent of the troops with the so-called universal size, and

large and small sizes were provided for special cases. Their wearability was

confirmed in tests on more than a thousand soldiers at Camp Edwards,

Mass. Difficulties in tooling for the production of these facepieces precluded further changes.

The chief gas mask problem, the CWS felt, was not the faceblank but

better absorbents and filters for the canister. The possibility of meeting

with new Axis toxic agents and the development of war gases by the United

three "M" numbers of the facepiece, canister, and carrier, respectively. "A" represents an alteration in the basic model design. In models under development, "E" stood for experimental and

"R" for revision. (3) A study of World War II masks and their components appears in the S. H.

Katz, "Status of the U.S. Army Service Gas Masks," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, II (October

1947), pp. 32-40. 12 They included the Industrial, Bryden, Continental, Sun, Acushnet Process, Firestone, Goodyear, General Tire, and U.S. Rubber Companies.
80 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

States made it desirable to find better canister materials. The first attack

on the problem was on the absorbents, and NDRC contracts were set up

for fundamental studies at the University of Illinois, at Johns Hopkins

University, and at Northwestern University.13

Whetlerite, a copper impregnated, activated charcoal, was the absorbent then used in the M9A1 canister.14

 Mixed with 20 percent soda lime,

this filling removed such standard gases as chloropicrin, phosgene, mustard, and lewisite. It furnished only a fair degree of protection against hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride, a degree thought particularly dangerous in the case of hydrogen cyanide because glass grenades containing this

agent had been found among captured Japanese munitions. Initial studies

at Northwestern University confirmed the British finding that the addition

of silver to the charcoal in the canister greatly improved protection against

phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, and the CWS adopted this new composite whetlerite early in 1942.15

 Studies later that year indicated that soda

lime, included in the canister since World War I to assist in the adsorption of volatile acid gases such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, was no

longer needed and it was removed.16

The NDRC meanwhile tackled the problem of increasing the cyanogen

chloride absorbing power of canisters to meet the possibility that the CWS

might adopt this substance as an agent. Research at Northwestern University led to the addition of chromium to the silver and copper already in

the charcoal, a measure which considerably improved the cyanogen chloride

protection of the canister, even under the severest semitropical weather

conditions that could be simulated in the laboratory. The service adopted

this third type of charcoal (Type ASC) in July 1943 and incorporated it

in the M9A2 canister.17 Shortly thereafter, scientists developed highly satisfactory wood and coal charcoals as substitutes for the unobtainable coconut charcoal used before the war.18

 As a result, the charcoal and its

impregnites in the 1943-44 canister gave the United States an absorbent

considered better than those in either the German or Japanese canisters.

13

 NDRC research is reported in Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 296-313. 14

 CWTC Item 40, Canister, Service, M1XA1-Standardization, 12 Sep 39. 15

 (1) Lt Col Charles E. Loucks, Visit to Porton Experimental Station. London MA Rpts

41524, 19 Aug 40, p. 1, ETF 550E284. (2) CWTC Item 535, Standardization of Light Weight

Service Gas Mask, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics, 4 Aug 42. 16

 The Value of Soda Lime in Gas Adsorbents, OSRD 437, 6 Mar 42. 17

 CWTC Item 772, Standardization of Canister, Service, M9A2, 23 Jul 43. 18

 Saul Hormats, Development of the Impregnated Charcoals for U.S. Military Gas Mask

Canisters. TDMR 1201, 13 Feb 46.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 81

The second phase of canister improvement involved filters, incorporated

to remove solid toxic particles breathed into the gas mask canister.19 The

filter paper in all canisters in 1940 consisted of a cellulose fiber mat known

as alpha web, which had recently been improved by impregnating it with

fine carbon particles. This filter assured substantial protection against toxic

smokes, such as adamsite, but it increased the resistance to air flow and

it offered only limited protection against liquid particles. The development

of new mechanical smoke generators necessitated further work on the filter,

because fine oil particles of the smoke deteriorated the impregnated paper.

Gas mask experts tested rock wool, fiber glass, and other materials as paper

substitutes, and finally found that asbestos, a material in British, German,

Japanese, and Russian filters, added to the alpha web made the canister

safe against minute droplets of oil.20

The CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, in co-operation with industrial paper companies and Arthur D. Little, Inc., produced three types of

asbestos bearing paper, each of increasing effectiveness. After 1942 they

were used successively in place of the carbon-impregnated filter paper in

the M9A2 and M10A1 canisters.21 Further research led to the substitution

for the asbestos of a paper fiber made from esparto grass, obtained from

Morocco. The new fiber had less air resistance in the canister while it

maintained a filtering capacity comparable to asbestos. The service further

improved this filter material by treating it with dimethyl silicane, which

rendered the paper highly water repellent—a useful property when troops

had to ford streams while carrying the gas mask.

The M2 type service mask previously described was, from the point of

view of the technical staff of CWS, an excellent product. Anticipating that

gas would be used in the war, the service had designed a mask that would

provide troops with the most complete protection possible against gas

attack. The mask was rugged and efficient, but it was heavy (weighing

almost five pounds with its steel box canister), bulky, inconvenient, and

therefore unsuited to the combat requirements of World War II. Troops

in training in 1940 and 1941 wore the mask unwillingly and only for gas

exercises, leaving it behind on combat maneuvers. When the War Depart19

 NDRC filter studies of W. H. Rodebush at the University of Illinois and E. P. Stevenson

and T. L. Wheeler of Arthur D. Little, Inc., are reported in Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 265-72. Those

at MIT appear in Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, pp. 120-25, 128-30. 20

 CWTC Item 759. 21

 (1) CWTC Item 772. (2) CWTC Item 827, Standardization of Canister, Service, M10A1,

15 Oct 43.
82 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ment insisted that the mask be worn in all exercises, the ground arms

reacted at once. The design had to be changed if troops were to fight effectively while wearing it.22

The requirement established in January 1942 for a lighter and less cumbersome mask for combat troops resulted in the development of the lightweight service gas mask. With a smaller, rounded canister, a shorter hose

and a simpler carrier, this mask weighed 31⁄2 pounds, yet because of better

absorbents and new filter materials, it provided almost the same, though

not as prolonged, protection as the heavyweight service mask.23 One shortcoming of the new mask was the increased breathing resistance, caused

principally by the smaller canister. Nevertheless, when Cavalry, Infantry,

and Armored Force Boards, as well as Airborne Command tests of the

new mask were completed, the Army Ground Forces recommended that

the mask be issued as quickly as possible.

The mobility of modern warfare, its jungle operations, and particularly

the increase in amphibious operations brought demands from the theater

commanders and the Army Ground Forces for an even lighter and more

compact gas mask, and especially for one that could be waterproofed. The

requirement suggested a snout type mask such as was used by German

assault troops. This type would not have an awkward hosetube, would

weigh less than two and a half pounds, be waterproof or carried in a waterproof carrier, offer the same protection as the lightweight service mask,

and not interfere with the soldier's firing in a prone position.24

The problem was turned over to the CWS-MIT Development Laboratory. In a series of tests of experimental models by the 544th Engineers

of the 4th Amphibian Brigade in combat exercises at Camp Edwards, it

appeared that a cheek-mounted canister gas mask of the type used by the

British, rather than a snout type, would provide the least interference with

combat activities. Technicians therefore modified the lightweight service

mask faceblank by boring a hole in the left cavity and fitting the canister

rigidly to the cheek of the blank. A new aluminum M11 canister, adapted

from the German design and two-thirds lighter than the previous steel

canister, had a water-repellent smoke filter and a wide, deep bed of charcoal. It was much lighter, yet it provided almost as much protection as

the lightweight service mask canister. Finally, they made a waterproof car22

 Interv, Hist Off with Col George J. B. Fisher, 8 Aug 54. 23

 CWTC Item 587, Standardization of Light Weight Service Gas Mask, 29 Sep 42. 24

 CWTC Item 722, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics for Assault Gas Mask,

11 Jun 43.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 83

SERVICE GAS MASK with M4 facepiece worn by women in training at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky.

rier for the mask from butyl rubber-coated cotton duck. Its multiple folding closure made the entire contents of the carrier watertight. It was later

reported that in mishaps during amphibious operations, the bouyancy provided by this carrier saved the lives of a number of soldiers.25

 The

assembled units, weighing three pounds, were standardized as the M5-11-

7 combat gas mask in July 1944, after production had already started.26

Over half a million of the combat masks were produced, and this was the

mask which was issued to certain assault elements for the invasion of Normandy and which was carried ashore in later amphibious operations.

Among a number of special masks developed before the war was the

optical gas mask, standardized in 1939. This mask, originally requested by

the Navy and later by AGF for Signal, Coast Artillery, and Antiaircraft

personnel using aircraft warning and fire control instruments, contained

25

 Katz, "Status of Army Service Gas Masks," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, II (October,

1947), p. 39. 26

 (1) CWTC Item 1093, Standardization of Mask, Gas, Service, Combat, M5-11-7, 7 Jul 44.

(2) Further details of the assault mask project appear in Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development

Laboratory, pp. 130-53.
84 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

small, optically ground lenses for instrument observation and a diaphragm

for speech transmission. The poor fit and bulkiness of this mask led to a

lighter model designed at the CWS-MIT Laboratory for use by the Coast

Artillery and standardized in January 1944. The Chemical Warfare Board

found the mask satisfactory, but the Armored Board in a later test did

not consider it wholly acceptable and further development was abandoned.

As the AGF reported in August 1945, "no existing gas mask is entirely

satisfactory for use by armed personnel who are required to employ optical

instruments in the performance of their assigned duties."

 27

The diaphragm gas mask was a special mask first designed for the

Armored Force and produced in January 1941.28 By means of a thin vibrating diaphragm element in the facepiece of this mask, somewhat better

speech transmission was possible than in the service mask. Yet this mask

had certain deficiencies. At a conference on 23 March 1943 the facts were

brought out that the mask was unnecessarily burdensome, that it might

make the wearer an easier object of sniper fire, that its voice transmission

qualities were only slightly better than the standard service mask, and, above

all, that it seemed impossible to turn out a diaphragm with an assurance that it would remain gas tight.29

 After a review of.this mask by

using arms and services in June 1943, when the critical components, complex manufacture, and slight acoustical properties of the mask were pointed

out, the Signal Corps, Army Air Forces, Armored Force, Cavalry, and Infantry rejected it. The CWS stopped production and apportioned existing

stocks among the Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Antiaircraft Artillery, who still wanted a diaphragm mask.30

 When in 1945 requests continued for a better speech mask, the CWS developed a new lightweight

diaphragm gas mask, having improved acoustical properties. It was intended

to replace earlier diaphragm masks carried by tank crews and by radio

and telegraph operators. The war ended before it could be put into production.

Another special mask, first requested in 1940 and again by the Chief

Surgeon, ETO, in 1944 was the headwound mask, for soldiers in field hospitals with head, face, jaw, or neck injuries.31

 It consisted of a vinylite hood

27

 2d Ind by AGF on Ltr, Armored Board to CG Armored Center, Fort Knox, 23 Aug 45,

cited in CWTC Item 1547, Revised Military Characteristics for Collective Protector for Tanks, 28

Mar 46, p. 3. 28

 CWTC Item 306, Standardization of Mask, Gas, Diaphragm, MIII-IXAI-IVA1, 21 Jan 41. 29

 Memo, OC CWS Conference, 23 Mar 43. AGO 337-1043. 30

 CWTC Item 731, Reclassification of Mask, Gas, Diaphragm, 11 Jun 43. 31

 (1) CWTC Item 286, Gas Masks for Head Wound Casualties, 19 Nov 40. (2) CWTC

Item 955, Military Characteristics for Gas Mask for Head Wound Casualties, 17 Mar 44.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 85

WALT DISNEY WITH STAFF MEMBERS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE,

January 1942, meeting to discuss a Mickey Mouse gas mask for children. From left: Col.

George J. B. Fisher, Col. Maurice E. Barker, Walt Disney, General Porter, and

General English. Note picture of mask, left background.

with a wide, transparent vinylite eyepiece, an M11 canister, and a vinylite

carrier. Although the CWS did not solve completely the problem of

obtaining a gas tight seal for patients with neck wounds, it nevertheless

standardized the mask at the request of the SGO in August 1944 and supplied them to the theaters.32

 Continuing work resulted in a much better

neck seal on this mask, but since the danger of gas warfare receded the

improved model was destined only for limited procurement.33

The CWS first planned a civilian gas mask in 1937. By 1940 the service had decided that the design of the Zapon-type mask, as it was called,

was not satisfactory, and had replaced it by another of rubberized fabric.34

At the request of the Office of Civilian Defense, the service redesigned

this gas mask with its snout-type canister in five sizes for civilian use and

obtained permission to produce it with laminated and, later, sheet rubber

32

 (1) CWTC Item 1161, Standardization of Mask, Gas, Headwound, M7-11-9, 31 Aug 44.

(2) Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, pp. 153-60. 33

 CWTC Item 1165, Classification of Mask, Gas, Headwound, E44-M11-E11, 31 Aug 44. 34

 (1) CWTC Item 11, Mask, Gas, Noncombatant (Zapon-type)—Classified as Standard, 11

Apr 39. (2) CWTC Item 151, Mask, Gas, Noncombatant, MI-I-I Standardization, 14 May 40.
86 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

facepieces, to eliminate the uncomfortable chin seam of the fabric model.35

With the growing shortage of rubber, the CWS-MIT Laboratory worked

out a process for manufacturing faceblanks from impregnated felt. The

CWS produced large numbers of this type of civilian gas mask under

experimental contract before closing the program. Other civilian masks

included the Mickey Mouse mask for children, designed by Walt Disney,

and the infant protector, a pliofilm respirator for children too young to

be fitted with a mask.

On the basis of World War I experience, the CWS had devised gas

masks for horses and mules, as well as leggings, capes, eyeshields (since the

horse gas mask did not cover the eyes), and other protective equipment.

The mask was in the process of standardization early in 1943 when the

mechanization-minded AGF canceled all requirements for horse protective

equipment. Late in 1944, as the 10th Mountain Division prepared to go

overseas with its complement of horses and mules, AGF reversed the

order.36 Subsequently, the service standardized capes and eyeshields for the

Mountain Division animal trains. It also designed masks for the dogs used

on security patrols and for messenger work overseas, and a baglike mask

to protect Signal Corps pigeons.37

Estimates of the relative value of American, Japanese, and German gas

masks varied somewhat with the specimen and the examiner, but on the

whole scientists felt that the U.S. masks, despite their weight, discomfort,

poor vision, and other disadvantages, were "probably the best worn by

any army."

 38

 The Japanese Army masks, though lighter, more compact,

and well constructed, would not stand the wear and tear of American

masks, and the canister gave somewhat less protection, particularly against

hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride.39 One model of Japanese noncombatant mask was superior in material, workmanship, and protection to

the American counterpart, but other models were inferior.40 The Japanese

had specialized masks, including a Navy diaphragm and a horse mask.

35

 CWTC Item 426, Rubber Face for Noncombatant Gas Mask, 16 Dec 41. 36

 (1) Canceled in view of policy established in Ltr, CG SOS to C CWS, 20 Oct 42, sub:

Deletion of Mask, Gas, from T/BA 2 and T/A 6, cited in CWTC Item 698, Cancellation of Requirement for Horse Protective Equipment, 23 Apr 43. (2) CWTC Item 1297, Reclassification of

Mask, Gas, Horse, M5, 22 Mar 45. 37

 (1) CWTC Item 1150, Standardization of Mask, Gas, Dog, M6-12-8, 31 Aug 44. (2)

CWTC Item 359, Protective Pigeon Bag, M2, 22 Jul 41. 38

 W. C. Pierce, The Gas Mask, NDRC Misc Pub 626, 1 Aug 44, p. 19. 39

 (1) WD Intel Bull, Oct 42, pp. 47, 48. (2) CW Intel Bull no. 10, 1 Sep 44. 40

 (1) Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, p. 215. (2) Japanese Chemical Warfare.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 87

In the opinion of Generalleutnant Herman Ochsner the American mask

"was highly effective in protection against gas and in that respect would

meet even the highest demands."

 41

 But it was too heavy for the German

Army, which favored a compact model with a drumlike canister fastened

directly to the mask. The early German canister gave lower protection

than the American, although it was improved later in the war.42 The Germans had gas masks for noncombatants, headwound casualties, horses,

dogs, and pigeons.

Collective Protectors

The collective protector was a machine designed to draw contaminated

air from outside a gasproofed shelter and purify it for circulation within.

The collective protectors available at the start of the war were the M1A1,

a 1,210-pound unit for use in large permanent installations such as

seacoast forts, headquarters, and field hospitals, and the M2A1, a 615-pound

unit, for temporary field tent installations.43 In 1942 the CWS-MIT Development Laboratory provided the M3 field collective protector, a small 10-

man unit for installation in Ordnance machine shop trucks, office trailers,

mobile surgical units, and CWS mobile laboratories. The chief difficulty

lay in obtaining an air-tight seal in these vehicles. The CWS Development

Laboratory at last devised a special canister with an Electrolux dust-precipitator air blower which supplied purified air through corrugated rubber hoses

to facepieces worn by the tank occupants.44 The Armored Medical Research

Laboratory approved the device after tests in 1944 at the Ordnance Desert

Proving Ground, Calif., but then reversed its decision on the basis of later

tests at Camp Polk, La., when it found no physiological or operational

advantages, under high humid conditions, over the individual combat mask.

Edgewood Arsenal produced more than 1,100 M1A1's and 2,500 M3's during

the war.45

At the request of the Office of Civilian Defense late in 1941, the CWSMIT Development Laboratory devised a collective protector for civilian air

raid shelters. Under power operation it would protect adequately 40 to 50

persons; when hand-operated, 20 to 25 people. The service constructed a

41

 Generalleutnant Herman Ochsner, History of German Chemical Warfare in World War II,

pt. 1, The Military Aspect, p. 33. Chemical Corps Historical Studies, No. 2. 42

 CW Intel Bull No. 46, pt. II, Recently Captured Material. 15 Dec 44. 43

 CWTC Item 132, Standardization of Large Field Collective Protector, 12 Mar 40. 44

 CWTC Item 1242, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics for a Collective Protector for Tanks, 11 Jan 45. 45

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 25.
88 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

number of experimental models of the lightweight machine before the

requirement was rescinded.46

The Germans developed a number of collective protectors for civilian

gasproof shelters, armored vehicles, and small fortifications. The pumps

used to draw outside air through the canister were generally centrifugal

air blowers operated by electricity, with a crank for turning the fan

by hand if the electricity failed. An unusual model had a double-action

bellows with a long handle that could be pumped up and down to draw

air through the protector.

Japanese collective protectors were similar to those used by European

nations and the United States. An ingenious model capable of purifying

air for forty persons derived the power for pumping the bellows from a

geared bicycle mechanism.47

Eyeshields, Dust Respirators, and Individual Protective Covers

The British, naturally more apprehensive than the United States about

gas warfare, supplied their troops from the beginning with such items as

eyeshields, protective capes (covers, in American military terminology),

helmet hoods, light oilskin jackets, overboots, oilskin trousers, oilskin

valises for antigas equipment, gasproof sacks for vehicles, oilskin stretcher

covers, and antigas-pathway paper rolls. Even though the CWS procured

many of these items for the British on lend-lease, the CWS itself later

adopted only the first two items.

When this list of British equipment was submitted to the U.S. arms

and services in an effort to establish their requirements, representatives of

the Navy, Armored Force, Quartermaster, Field Artillery, and Engineers

expressed an interest in almost every item, the Infantry and Medical Corps

indicated interest in several items only, and the Signal and Ordnance

wanted almost none.48

Believing that the enemy would attack with low-flying aircraft spraying vesicant agents, the CWS urged adoption of the eyeshield, so that

troops on the march and in the field would have special protection against

this hazard. After rejection of this item in the summer of 1942 by the

Desert Warfare Board, which felt that its dust goggles offered equal or

superior protection, AGF repeatedly turned down the eyeshield. When the

46

 CWTC Item 794, Standardization of Protector, Collective, M4, 3 Sep 43. 47

 Japanese Chemical Warfare. 48

 CWTC Item 335, New Items of Individual Protective Equipment, 27 May 41.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 89

CWS suggested that other arms would need it, the AGF insisted that either

goggles, the protective cover, or the soldier's helmet brim offered adequate

eye protection against spray attack.49 Finally, after General Eisenhower

asked for eyeshields for his North African theater forces, "regardless of

any objection to them," the CWS procured and issued them.50

The first eyeshields that went overseas consisted of simple cellulose

acetate eyepieces bent to fit tightly over the temples, rimmed with a felt

strip, and held in place by an elastic head strap. Toward the end of the

war the service designed an eyeshield which could be folded and carried

in the pocket. This item was made in both clear and green-tinted acetate,

the green for protection against snow glare and sunlight, and it could be

worn over spectacles. Two small ventilation holes in the upper corners

of the eyepiece reduced the fogging experienced with the first model.51

Because of the cheapness and excellent design of the eyeshield, the AGF

later recommended that it replace the expensive sunglasses and dust goggles being issued. It proved to be one of the most useful of troop items.

Eyeshields were intended originally to ward off drops of liquid mustard

or other vesicant agents, but they would have been of signal importance

if the German Army had suddenly uncovered its nerve gases, one drop of

which in the eye could be lethal.

German antigas eyeshields came in a pouch containing two colorless

and two yellow-green eyeshields. In designing the shields the German Army

kept in mind the fact that they could protect the soldier's eyes against

intense sunshine and snow glare as well as against chemicals. The Germans manufactured only a limited quantity of eyeshields and, as far as

known, never issued them.52

A nongas warfare item turned over to CWS for design and procurement was the M1 dust respirator, first requested in 1940 by the Armored

Force, and soon after by the Infantry, for protecting troops against coarse,

wind-driven particles. Initially, it consisted of a relatively large rubber faceblank with a felt filtering medium stitched to the blank. Later the service

reduced the bulk and weight of this respirator by using lightweight felt

on a wire and rubber frame, with rubber outlet valve and headband.53

49

 (1) CWTC Item 541, Unfavorable Consideration of Eyeshield, M1, 4 Aug 42. (2) CWTC

Item 623, Eye Shields, 24 Nov 42. 50

 CWTC Item 693, Standardization of Eyeshields, M1, 23 Apr 43. 51

 CWTC Item 742, 11 Jun 43, and Item 1405, Standardization of Eyeshield, M2, 2 Aug 45. 52

 (1) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, p. III-F-22. (2) German Chemical Warfare,

p. 165. 53

 (1) CWTC Item 329, Standardization of Respirator, Dust, M1, 1 Apr 41. (2) CWTC Item

612, Standardization of Respirator, Dust, M2, 24 Nov 42.
90 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Near the end of the war, technicians designed a simple, expendable respirator that the Cavalry Board found to be more durable and more comfortable and to give greater protection than earlier models.54

The Army first issued individual protective covers to theater troops late

in 1942. Developed at the request of the Air Forces for the protection of

air base personnel against vesicant spray from aircraft, the cover became

a Quartermaster item of general issue. It consisted of a specially treated,

large, cellophane bag folded into a small 4 by 71⁄2-inch packet. A teartape device enabled a soldier with rifle or carbine to open the cover and

don it sack-fashion in ten to twelve seconds. This cover, though it protected the soldier, enveloped and virtually immobilized him; it was an

emergency measure and no substitute for protective clothing.55

German troops had no protection similar to American and British covers

and capes, but relied on a gasplane or antigas sheet made of treated

crepe paper, parchment paper, wax paper, rubberized fabric or plastic

coated fabric, about four feet by seven feet in size. Troops could have

used these sheets to cover supplies or weapons, and could convert them

into protective capes by cutting a hole in the center.56

The Japanese Army had protective capes and sheets. The cape, four

and one half by eight feet in size, came with a triangular-shaped hood

which the soldier could slip over his head, while the rest of the cape could

be wrapped around his body. The cape was constructed from brown, lightweight paper, and, not sturdy enough to withstand decontamination, would

have to be thrown away after use. The sheet, made of rubberized fabric

eight feet square, was intended as a cover for the soldier or equipment

during an attack.57

Protective Clothing and Impregnites

The two-layer cotton permeable suit of World War I, its outer layer

impregnated with 45 percent rosin and 55 percent rosin oil, reportedly gave

almost complete protection against mustard vapor for forty minutes.58 The

demonstrable superiority of the permeable protective suit of World War

II, an impregnated herringbone-twill outfit offering effective protection

54

 CWTC Item 1360, Classification of Respirator, Dust, Lightweight, E23, 24 May 45. 55

 (1) CWTC Item 575, Protective Cape for Army Air Forces, 29 Sep 42. (2) TM 3-290, pp.

42-45. 56

 Military Intelligence Service, WD, Special Series, no. 16, Enemy Capabilities for Chemical

Warfare, 15 Jul 45, p. 42. 57

 Japanese Chemical Warfare. 58

 Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, pp. 762-64.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 91

against both mustard vapor and fine mustard spray, derived in part from

improvements in design. The CWS attacked basic design problems in cooperation with the NDRC, the Navy, and the Quartermaster Corps, which

procured, stored, and issued the clothing. The high standards of design

set by the service seemed all but unattainable. Even as the war ended,

work was still in progress to eliminate the small degree of leakage past

the closures and seals of the jacket and shorts. However slight, such leakage might produce serious blister injuries, since the areas of the body most

vulnerable to the effects of mustard were the scrotal and neck regions.59

The superiority of World War II protective clothing over world War I

type resulted mainly from an impregnite, a chloroamide designated CC-2.

The search in World War I and after for a chemical that would react

rapidly with mustard, and which was sufficiently stable on fabric to ensure

reasonably good storage qualities, led to the discovery of CC-2 in 1924

and its intermittent manufacture on a pilot plant scale at Edgewood Arsenal.60

 In 1928 the CWS accepted CC-2 as a standard impregnite. The

formula for CC-2 was one of the most closely guarded secrets of the

Chemical Warfare Service. Under Navy and NDRC auspices, between

1940 and 1945, scores of new compounds were tested in search of possibly better impregnites, but none proved superior to CC-2.

In contrast to the Americans, the Germans did not issue impregnated

clothing. They carried on experimental work, but a shortage of materials

kept them from getting very far. The few articles that they impregnated

experimentally were stiff, smelly, and caused dermatitis.61

Protective Ointments

World War I efforts to devise an ointment that would prevent mustard lesions were unsuccessful, and the attempts in the years between the

wars were equally discouraging.62 In the light of American knowledge in

1940, sag paste (salve antigas), as the ointment of 191-8 was called, was

"even worse than useless," though its issue to troops may have been "useful

59

 For adverse comment on the design imposed by the CWS on all herringbone twill clothing,

standard issue as well as protective clothing, see Erna Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), p. 97, n. 47. 60

 Capt William M. Creasy and Souren Z. Avedikian, Impregnite I. EATR 272, 31 Jul 39. 61

 German Chemical Warfare, p. 164. 62

 E. B. Vedder, The Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins,

1925), pp. 150-51.
92 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

psychologically."63 In 1940 the CWS renewed the search first in its own

and in Navy laboratories and then with the help of the Committee on

the Treatment of Gas Casualties (CTGC), the Committee on Medical Research (CMR), and the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC).

The aim was to find something that would penetrate the skin as fast or

faster than mustard and neutralize the mustard and its decomposition

products before destruction of the cells and tissues. This objective was

based on the World War I theory that mustard penetrated the cells and

released hydrochloric acid which then killed the cells and caused blisters.

Despite World War II efforts scientists still were unable to determine the

precise mechanism of mustard action, although they suggested a promising

theory that the primary action might be on essential cellular enzymes

rather than on the cell as a whole.64 What seemed necessary to combat

the action, therefore, was still believed to be a quick-penetrating neutralizer. Scientists speculated that this substance had to be a chlorine compound since chlorine alone seemed to destroy mustard effectively with the

least injury to the skin.

In 1940 researchers began a series of tests with two promising ointments, azochloramid with triacetin as its vehicle, and dichloroamine-T, also

in triacetin. The latter, produced by the Monsanto Chemical Co., appeared

to be the less irritating of the two and to possess some effectiveness, but

it was never entirely satisfactory owing to difficulties in obtaining quantities of the basic ingredient in a sufficiently pure form. The service issued

large quantities of protective ointments containing variants of the dichloramine-T formula and successively designated M1, M2, M3, and M4.65

These ointments were the best available at the time and under temperate

climatic conditions were satisfactory decontaminants. Later tests revealed

that under hot weather conditions they might be excessively irritating to

the skin.66

In the summer of 1941, meanwhile, Navy chemists in the laboratories

at Edgewood and in their own research laboratories at Bethesda, Md.,

63

 CWTC Item 166, Subcommittee Report on Standardization of Protective Ointment, 16

Jul 40. 64

 Advances in Military Medicine, II, 549-51. 65

 The confusing story of M1 protective ointment is told in CWTC Item 166; CWTC Item

280, Request for Standardization of Ointment, Protective, 19 Nov 40; CWTC Item 330, Request

for Standardization of Ointment, Protective, M2, 1 Apr 41; CWTC Item 506, Redesignation of

Ointment M1 to M4, 2 Jun 42. 66

 (1) Misc Rpt, Col Cornelius P. Rhoads, MC, Report of Medical and Toxicological Factors

Pertinent to CW in the SWPA (12 May 44), p. 12. MDR 109.1 Tech Lib A CmlC, Md. (2) Interv, Hist Off with C.W. MacFarlan, 26 Feb 57.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 93

devised a series of chlorine compounds, one of which, S-330, was highly

effective against mustard and could be better tolerated on the skin.67 The

Army adopted an ointment, M5, containing S-330 as its base in December

1943. The following year the service issued the M5 protective ointment

kit, containing four 3⁄4-ounce tubes of M5 ointment and one 3-gram tube

of BAL eye ointment, to troops in the field.68

Good as it was, M5 ointment acted primarily to destroy vesicant liquid

on the skin; it could not to any significant degree neutralize mustard that

had penetrated the skin. The soldier had to apply it within two to five

minutes. After that the blister agent penetrated the skin and its action

was irreversible. Nevertheless, it was a highly serviceable ointment.69

The Japanese Army issued individual decontamination kits to its troops

for destroying vesicant agents on the skin. The kit contained powder that

formed a paste with water, and absorbent cotton for swabbing the paste

on the mustard area. The paste could not be applied as quickly as ointment, since the soldier had to mix the ingredients before use, and this

was a vital factor in the tropics where mustard had to be destroyed within a

minute or two if burns were to be prevented. Furthermore, a paste had

little prophylactic value in contrast to an ointment.70

The German Army issued two decontaminating agents to its troops.

The first was stabilized calcium hypochlorite, in tablet form, referred to as

Losantin. These tablets had to be made into a paste with water, applied

to the skin for a few minutes, and then washed off. The second decontaminant was a thickened ointment of chloroamine-T, which was swabbed

on, allowed to stand, and finally washed off. Neither the Japanese nor the

German personal decontaminants approached the American M5 ointment

in efficiency and all-around usefulness.71

Medical Kits and Supplies

Prior to 1942 the only first-aid kit for gas casualties was one prepared

in 1933 by the CWS's Medical Division for use in chemical plants at Edge67

 (1) The Navy standardized it in August 1942; see Noyes, Chemistry, p. 210. (2) Comparative studies of the Army and Navy ointments appear in Marion B. Sulzberger, "Protection and

Treatment of the Skin Exposed to Blister Gases," Advances in Military Medicine, II, pp. 591-96. 68

 (1) CWTC Item 854, Standardization of Ointment, Protective, M5, 3 Dec 43. (2) CWTC

Item 1018, Standardization of Kit, Ointment, Protective, M5, 5 May 44. 69

 (1) Advances in Military Medicine, II, pp. 595-96. (2) Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 181-212. (3)

Lt. Col. D. J. C. Wiseman, compiler, "The Second World War: 1939-1945, Army, Special

Weapons and Types of Warfare," vol. I, Gas Warfare (London: British War Office, 1951), p. 205.

Hereafter cited as Wiseman, Gas Warfare, 70

 Enemy Capabilities for Chemical Warfare, pp. 142-44. 71

 German Chemical Warfare, pp. 165-66.
94 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

wood Arsenal. Although the service revised and tested the kit in 1938 as

a possible military item, there appeared to be no military requirement for

it and the work was stopped.72 Thus as war approached the CWS did not

have a chemical warfare medical kit, nor did the Medical Department supply catalog of 1939 contain more than one or two of the drugs and preparations that had been reported by the Edgewood laboratories up to that

time as effective remedies for gas casualties.

The service drew up a list of equipment and materials that should be

included in regimental medical-detachment supply. The list was approved

by The Surgeon General and the Medical Department Board, whose responsibility it was to standardize such equipment. They recommended that the

drugs and impervious gloves and aprons in the list be packed in a Medical Department chest for issue to each regimental medical section, while

the more bulky equipment such as the permeable protective clothing for

medical personnel handling gas casualties, the headwound masks, and the

field collective protector be held in rear area depots until required.73 In

March 1942 the service standardized the first gas casualty chest, containing drugs, gloves, and aprons. The chest was modified in December 1943

as the M2 gas casualty set, and in May 1944 it was completely revised

when its unwieldy trunk-type construction, weighing almost 300 pounds,

was scaled down to a 45-pound Alpine pack-type set. This final gas casualty set consisted of 2 canvas pack inserts containing 6 impermeable aprons,

6 pairs of impermeable gloves, and the gas casualty treatment kit.74

The CWS procured more than 10,000 gas casualty treatment kits. The

contents of the 1945 kit, representing the best efforts of wartime medical

research in the treatment of chemical agent injuries, and containing in lesser

or greater quantities the material also found in the first-aid kit and veterinary set, included BAL ointment (for removal of arsenicals from the

skin), petrolatum and amyl salicylate (for removal of mustard from the

skin), sodium sulamyd (to prevent blister gas eye infection), copper sulfate solution (to remove WP particles from the skin), copper sulfate

powder (to replenish solution), sulfadiazine tablets or penicillin (to prevent secondary infection), a floating white soap (for decontamination), BAL

eye ointment (for any liquid blister gas contamination of eyes), eye and

72

 Charles A. Rouiller, First Aid Kit for Chemical Warfare Service Plants. EATR 291,

7 Dec 38. 73

 Rpt, Medical Department Board, Medical Field Service School, Carlisle, Pa., 10 Jan 41,

sub: Chemical Protection, Medical, Project No. 171. 74

 MRL (EA) 14, Louis Venet and M. J. Oehlberg, Gas Casualty Set for Medical Units, 18

Feb 44.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 95

nose drops (to relieve pain of blister gases), chloroform (to relieve irritant smoke distress), amyl nitrite ampules (for hydrocyanic acid poisoning), ophthalmic discs, fluorescein, and atropine sulfate (for treatment of

eye injury), calamine concentrate (for relief of mustard burn itching),

forceps (to remove WP particles from the skin), a 4-ounce plastic bottle

(for preparing calamine solution), and a screening water testing kit (to

detect agents in water supplies).75

Shortly after the appearance of the gas casualty chest in 1942, a small

gas casualty first-aid kit, evolved from the earlier plant kit, was standardized and issued on the basis of one to each twenty-five individuals and as

an accessory of vehicular equipment. Its contents, based on developments

reported in TM 8-285, were dichloramine-T in triacetin, hydrogen peroxide solution, copper sulfate solution, M1 eye solution, amyl nitrite,

pontacaine ointment, and M4 protective ointment.76 Three years later, in

1945, this same first-aid kit contained BAL ointment, chloroform, amyl

nitrite, copper sulfate, eye and nose drops, calamine lotion, and the M5

protective ointment kit, the latter consisting of four tubes of M5 protective ointment and one tube of BAL eye ointment.77

 Over 250,000 of these

kits were procured for shipment overseas.

In developing special kits and chests, the CWS's Medical Division obtained standard medical items from the Army Medical Purchasing Office

in New York, but in designing the sets, in packaging, and in stocking

special items, it had to have direct contact with industrial firms. It called

upon Bauer and Black, the Davis Emergency Equipment Co., Du Pont,

Lambert Pharmacal, Dow Chemical, Rohm and Haas, the New England Collapsible Tube Co., Merck, Squibb, Lederle, and others. In the final

procurement of the gas casualty chests, kits, and other items of issue developed at Edgewood, the Army's medical department did the contracting.

The responsibility of the CWS's Medical Division was limited to ascertaining the military requirement and developing and standardizing special

equipment and supplies.

In contrast to the American Army's medical kits and sets, the German

Army depended on individual issue of emergency items. The German soldier, for example, was told to wash the skin with soap and water immediately after contamination. A special soap, known as Mersol, was issued

75

 The contents of the first-aid and treatment kits are listed in the various editions of TM 8-

285. For further details of these supplies, see Cochrane, Medical Research in Chemical Warfare,

pp. 137-52. 76

 FM 21-11, First Aid for Soldiers, 8 Apr 43, pp. 100-103. 77

 TM 8-285, Apr 1945, p. 102.
96 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

for use at decontamination centers. Ten Losantin tablets for making a decontamination paste were issued to German troops, as well as an ointment

of chloroamine-T in water, for the same purpose. Small, cloth covered

ampules containing ammonia, chloroform, alcohol, and ether were issued

to counteract the effects of the sneezing gas DM, and a suspension of chalk

in copper sulfate solution was issued for WP burns.78

Protection of Food and Water Supplies Against Toxics

In 1938 the CWS began work on purification of water and continued

it until early in 1945.79 Scientists devised an emergency method for purifying water for small units, employing carbon and special filter cartridges

in a Lyster bag, and then chlorinating the water thus treated. However,

no better method could be devised for removing agents from large bodies

of water, such as found at a water supply point, than the standard procedure used by municipal water control stations (activated carbon and alum),

and this was a Corps of Engineers responsibility.80

The service's efforts to detect the presence of toxics in water were more

successful. In February 1942, with assistance of an NDRC group under

A. M. Buswell of the University of Illinois, the CWS began work which

led to the development of a kit with which a soldier could detect contaminants. Chemists at Illinois devised specific tests for detecting the presence of sulphur and nitrogen mustards, arsenicals, selenium, and other heavy

metals in water, while J. H. Yoe at the University of Virginia found a

test for fluorine compounds in water.81 On the basis of this work, the

Army adopted a treatment-control water-testing kit in March 1944. This

kit made possible the quantitative analyses necessary to determine treatment dosages for contaminated water and to establish the effectiveness of

such treatment.82 A year later the service produced a food testing kit to

detect the presence of sulphur and nitrogen mustards, as well as other toxic

agents, on foods and food containers.

78

 German Chemical Warfare, pp. 165-66. 79

 Ltr, C MRD to TSG, 9 Oct 39, sub: Purification of Water Contaminated with Chemical

Warfare Agents. Cited in Cochrane, Medical Research, p. 478. 80

 A survey of the research on this problem appears in Joseph M. Sanchis, "Chemical Warfare

and Water Supplies," Journal of American Water Works Association, 38 (1946), 1179-96. 81

 Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 223-26. 82

 "The Medical Department in World War II," Environmental Hygiene, vol. II, Preventive

Medicine in World War II (Washington, 1955), pp. 103-05.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 97

Treatment of Gas Casualties

In 1939 the CWS was confronted with the same problems in treating

gas casualties that it had faced back in 1918. Researchers discovered no

treatment for pulmonary edema caused by phosgene poisoning, for bronchopneumonia that set in following the inhalation of mustard vapors, or

for lesions or ulcers of the eyes and skin caused by liquid or gaseous vesicant

agents. The CWS began to attack each of these problems, later receiving

assistance from the NDRC and the Committee on the Treatment of Gas

Casualties.

By the close of World War II the medical research teams which engaged in basic studies on the therapy of phosgene and other chemical irritants at Northwestern, at Yale, at Chicago, and at the University of

Pennsylvania had learned many things about the physiology of phosgene

poisoning—principally that the mode of action was the vigorous and usually fatal injury of the lung tissue, resulting in waterlogging of the lungs.

They learned little or nothing about treating it, other than that among

animals surviving the flooding of the lungs, the anoxia or oxygen starvation of the tissues that resulted would respond to pure oxygen inhalation.83

The Boothby-Lovelace oxygen therapy apparatus, developed at the Mayo

Clinic and the Aero Medical Research Laboratory at Wright Field, Ohio,

and standardized as Medical Department equipment, was a partial answer

to the problem. A subsequent development, to provide more efficient consumption of oxygen in the field, was an oxygen therapy apparatus with

distributing hose, to permit simultaneous administration of oxygen to

twenty patients.84 Oxygen was the one effective therapy for phosgene poisoning. Codeine might relieve the cough, morphine could be administered

to quiet the patient, and when the edema subsided, antibacterial therapy

(penicillin or sulfadiazine) could be administered in order to prevent pulmonary infection. Beyond this there was little that could be done.

Useful in the plants where phosgene was manufactured was the discovery that hexamethylenetetramine (HMT) was an effective prophylactic

against phosgene poisoning. The compound rapidly combined with phos83

 For detailed studies of phosgene therapy, see chapter by Ralph W. Gerard, "Recent Research on Respiratory Irritants," Advances in Military Medicine, II, pp. 565-87. 84

 (1) W. M. Boothby, E. W. Mayo, and W. R. Lovelace, "One Hundred Per Cent Oxygen,"

Journal of the American Medical Association, 113 (1939), pp. 477-81. (2) MRL (EA) 6,

M. Galdston, Distributing Hose for Field Oxygen Therapy, 6 Nov 43.
98 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

gene as it entered the lungs and blocked its action on the tissue. While

such a preventive had certain values in the factory and laboratory, it was

of little use to the soldier who could not be continually inoculated against

first one agent and then another in this manner.85

Mustard, the most important of the blister gases, is a disabling rather

than a killing agent, its action painless and undetected since it is rapidly

absorbed by the skin. The liquid, spray, and vapor produce severe eye

injury, blisters on the body, and injury to the lining of the respiratory

tract exposing it to infection. In World War I the bronchopneumonia that

followed inhalation of mustard gas was responsible for most deaths from

this agent.

Perhaps more work was done on the blister gases between 1940 and

1945 than in all the previous years put together. The CWS and its cooperative agencies studied the therapy necessary to prevent secondary infection, and methods of decontaminating liquid mustard absorbed through

the skin.86 Before the discovery of the sulpha drugs only supportive treatment, that is, careful nursing, cleanliness, and warmth, was possible for

the secondary infection, usually bronchopneumonia, following inhalation

of mustard gas. Of the new drugs, sulfathiazole seemed to have the greatest protective value against the secondary infection. As the supply of penicillin increased, pneumonia cases which showed resistance to the sulpha

compound could also be treated successfully. With these drugs available

the secondary infection was no longer to be greatly feared.

The antimustard preparation, M5 protective ointment, while not the

final answer to mustard decontamination and prevention of mustard effects on the skin, was the most satisfactory preparation devised during the

war for this purpose. Researchers found no clear-cut superiority for any

therapeutic agent in the treatment of mustard burns of the skin, but they

concluded that the use on third degree burns of sulfadiazine ointment and

petrolatum containing silver nitrate was the best treatment for the burnlike injury.87

 As for contamination of the eyes by liquid mustard gas,

nothing proved much more effective in preventing the rapid and destruc85

 MD (EA) MR 81, Therapeutic and Prophylactic Value of HMT in Phosgene Poisoning,

19 Mar 43. 86

 For the useful but essentially negative results obtained in studies of systemic mustard poisoning, see chapter by A. Oilman and M. Cattell, "Systemic Agents: Action and Treatment," Advances

in Military Medicine, II, pp. 546-51. 87

 MRL (EA) 36, J. Wexler and L. H. Rasmusen, Evaluation of Local Treatment of Mustard Burns, 1 Sep 44. (2) See Sulzberger, "Protection and Treatment of the Skin Exposed to Blister

Gases," Advances in Military Medicine, II, pp. 588-602.
PROTECTION AGAINST TOXIC AGENTS 99

tive penetration of mustard into the cornea than immediate irrigation of

the eyes with water.

Lewisite, discovered too late for use in World War I, received its share

of attention from researchers. In the winter of 1940-41, a group working

under R. A. Peters at Oxford University experimented with a compound

called DTH (dithioglycerol) or BAL (British antilewisite) which was quite

effective in preventing arsenical poisoning by lewisite.88 Under the direction of the Committee on the Treatment of Gas Casualties, extensive studies

of the new substance were undertaken in CMR and NDRC contract agencies, as well as at the Edgewood laboratories.

One of the first American results of the BAL investigation was the development by the Du Pont laboratories under CWS contract of M1 eye

solution, a 5 percent solution of 2,3-dimercaptopropanol in ethylene glycol.89

 Shortly after this a series of experiments indicated that a 5 percent

BAL ointment was much less difficult to apply to the eyes and that, despite the pain of lewisite eye contamination, untrained personnel could

probably apply effective quantities of the ointment to themselves. The service standardized BAL eye ointment in July 1943.

Hydrogen cyanide, another of the Army's toxic agents, became the subject of a long series of toxicological and medical investigations. Hydrogen

cyanide was the fastest acting nonpersistent agent known, because after a

breath or two respiration could no longer be suppressed and before the

man could mask he might be unconscious.

The recommended treatment for acute cyanide poisoning was the insertion of crushed ampules of amyl nitrite under the gas mask. The protective or therapeutic effect of amyl nitrite seemed to lie in its ability to

form methemoglobin in the blood, converting the cyanide into relatively

harmless cyanmethemoglobin. It was known that a compound called

p-aminopropiophenone was highly active in forming methemoglobin, and

experiments at Edgewood determined that a man could tolerate sufficiently

large injections of this substance, named PAPP by the Medical Research

Laboratory, to provide complete protection against the effects of the cyanides. Even more important, PAPP was almost equally effective when taken

by mouth.90 This, however, was prevention and not therapy for cyanide

88

 (1) Oilman and Cattell, "Systemic Agents," Advances in Military Medicine, II, pp. 555-61. (2) W. R. Kirner, in Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 181-84. 89

 MD (EA) MR 85, Comparative Therapeutic Values of Various BAL Products and Certain Derivatives . . ., 7 Apr 43. 90

 (1) MRL (EA) Informal Monthly Progress Reports, 15 May 44, 15 Sep 44, and 15 Apr

45. (2) Advances in Military Medicine, II, pp. 554-55.
100 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

poisoning, just as HMT was an effective prophylactic against phosgene,

and therefore suitable for protection in the laboratory but impractical in

the field.

While it is true that positive and immediate militarily useful results

from chemical warfare medical research were relatively meager in view of

the great effort made, under the threat of gas warfare the CWS had no

choice but to explore every toxic agent suspected of being of interest to

the enemy and every known or conjectured aspect of gas casualty aid and

treatment. To this end the full resources of medical science in this nation

and in the British Commonwealth were made freely available, enabling

the Chemical Warfare Service to command a degree of assistance never

achieved before. The common effort was rewarded on two levels: first,

there was an enormous accumulation of original scientific data, new instrumentation, and more precise methodology, the benefits of which may

be estimated only in the event of gas warfare in the future; and, secondly,

substantial contributions were made both to fundamental and clinical progress in medicine.91

91

 (1) See Oscar Bodansky, "Contributions of Medical Research in Chemical Warfare to Medicine," Science (23 November 1945), 102. (2) Advances in Military Medicine, II, pp. 517-21,

543-44, 551-55, 559-60, 563-64, 587, 596, 602.
CHAPTER V

Biological Warfare Research l

In the years just before America's entry into World War II, both Germany and Japan were reported to be preparing for biological warfare and, it

was believed, had devised agents capable of assailing the best defenses that

medical science had evolved. In the United States there were skeptics who

doubted the effectiveness of biological warfare against a modern army.2

They reasoned that with the development of modern sanitary precautions,

water purification, and insect and rodent control, the normal incidence of

bacterial activity could largely be thwarted. Combat troops took the field

supported by the best medical protection available and were armed with

antitoxins, vaccines, and sera as a safeguard against diseases caused by some

of the most harmful common bacteria. Furthermore, these skeptics felt,

the problem of disseminating great quantities of bacteria in order to overwhelm any possible defense would present immense technical difficulties.

But in their opinion the chief deterrent to initiating biological warfare

was the danger to the side which unleashed it. Only an isolated enemy

could be safely attacked, and there was no longer any such thing as an

isolated enemy. On the other hand, American intelligence agencies reported

that neither the Japanese, Germans, nor the embattled British shared this

skepticism.3

 Nor did the Chemical Warfare Service, which had for years

been interested in the potential problems of the bacterial weapon.

1

 The principal source in writing this chapter has been the monograph by Rexmond C.

Cochrane, Biological Warfare Research in the United States, History of the Chemical Warfare

Service in World War II (1 July 1940-15 August 1945), November 1947. (Hereafter cited as

BW Research in the U.S.) In several cases it seemed advisable to cite the documents used in

preparing the monograph. 2

 Maj. Leon A. Fox, MC, "Bacterial Warfare: The Use of Biologic Agents in Warfare," Military Surgeon, 72 (March 1933), 189-207, reprinted in 90 (May 1942), 563-79. 3

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 12-13.
102 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

CWS Interest in Biological Warfare

Ever since the League of Nations Conference of 1924 and the Geneva

Gas Protocol of 1925 linked chemical, biological, and incendiary warfare

as related problems, the Chemical Warfare Service had regarded biological

warfare as within its sphere of responsibility, and from time to time members of the service had prepared appraisals of its war potential.4

 In simplest terms, biological warfare may be defined as the intentional cultivation

or production of pathogenic bacteria, fungi, viruses, rickettsia, and their

toxic products, as well as certain chemical compounds, for the purpose of

producing disease or death in men, animals, or crops. The definition also

includes the development of defenses against these organisms and toxic

substances. Potential agents might include the organisms producing the

intestinal diseases of typhoid, cholera, and dysentery, through pollution of

water supplies; the respiratory diseases of smallpox, diphtheria, epidemic

meningitis, scarlet fever, and influenza, which are ordinarily dependent upon

ideal epidemic conditions; the insect transmitted diseases of malaria, yellow fever, dengue, typhus, and plague; infections such as tetanus, anthrax,

gangrene, and the pyrogenic diseases; agricultural diseases in the form of

the boll weevil, corn borer, and Mediterranean fruit fly, as well as fungus

diseases of crops and plants; and glanders, foot and mouth disease, Newcastle disease, fowl plague, and other diseases to which domestic animals

and fowl are subject.5

In August 1941 the growing concern of the CWS led to the activation

by oral order of the chief of the service of a unit designated the Medical

Research Division, in the Technical Service at Edgewood Arsenal, to plan

preliminary technical studies and to accumulate data "in connection with

the medical aspects of chemical warfare, including bacteriology and immunization."6

 The division, consisting of five members,7 examined potential sites, facilities, and personnel for an expanded biological program,

4

 (1) EA Mech Div Progress Rpt 442, Bacteriological Warfare, 24 Sep 24. (2) Rpt of CWS,

1926, pp. 8-9. (3) Fox, op. cit. (4) OC CWS Technical Study No. 10, Maj M. E. Barker, CWS,

Bacteriological Warfare Possibilities, 28 Aug 39. In Technical Library A CmlC, Md. 5

 An unofficial account of BW potentialities, first prepared in 1942 and published after the war,

is that by Theodor Rosebury, et al., "Bacterial Warfare: A Critical Analysis of the Available

Agents, Their Possible Military Applications, and the Means for Protection Against Them,"

Journal of Immunology, 56 (May 1947), 7-96. 6

 BW Research in the U.S., p. 13. 7

 Lt Col James H. Defandorf, Sanitary Corps (pharmacologist); Maj E. A. Richmond (entomologist); Maj A. T. Thompson, VC; Capt Frank M. Shertz (plant pathologist); and 1st Lt

Luman F. Ney (physiological chemist).
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 103

prepared a bibliography of published literature on BW,8 and drew up tentative programs for research. It also established contact with the British

scientists working on BW at Porton, in Wiltshire, England, and with

Canadian BW experts.9

The WBC Committee and War Research Service

Government agencies other than the Chemical Warfare Service also

showed concern over the threat. These included the Institute of Health

of the U.S. Public Health Service, the Council of National Defense, officers of the staffs of the Surgeons General of the Army and Navy, and

G-2 of the Army.

In July 1941, Harvey H. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of

War, called a meeting of representatives of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), The Surgeon General, the CWS, and

Army G-2, to discuss means for co-ordinating work in BW. As a result

of this meeting the OSRD recommended to the Secretary of War that

the National Academy of Sciences investigate the possibilities of BW.10

Two months before Pearl Harbor, the president of the National Academy and the chairman of the National Research Council asked Edwin B.

Fred to help form and act as chairman of a committee to study and assess current potentialities of BW. A group of twelve scientists met on

18 November 1941, designated the WBC Committee (War Bureau of Consultants). Liaison members of the committe included Lt. Col. Maurice E.

Barker, Lt. Col. James H. Defandorf, and 1st Lt. Luman F. Ney of the

Chemical Warfare Service, as well as representatives of Ordnance, the Navy

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, The Surgeon General's Office, the Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Public Health Service. The committee report to the Secretary of War in February 1942 declared the BW

was distinctly feasible, that it was a potential threat to national security,

and that steps should be taken at once to formulate defensive and offensive measures.

8

 OC CWS Technical Study 58, Biological Warfare: An Annotated Bibliography, 19 Jan 42.

In Technical Library, A CmlC, Md. 9

 (1) OC CWS Orgn Chart, 1 Oct 41, approved 20 Aug 41, p. 23. (2) Memo for file, 30 Jun

42, sub: Proposed Orgn and Functional Chart, Bacteriological Warfare Service, CWS. (3) Memo,

Col J. H. Defandorf, for file, 2 Nov 42, sub: Role of the CWS in the Development of Defenses

against BW. Cited in BW Research in the U.S., pp. 23, 33. (4) Rpt, Col Defandorf, 20 Sep 45,

sub: Research and Development in the Special Projects Division. CWS 314.7 BW File. 10

 Rpt, Henry I. Stubblefield, A Resume of the Biological Warfare Effort, 21 Mar 58. CMLHO

C-511.111.
104 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Through liaison established with the British BW group at the Porton

Experiment Station, reports of the work there were made available to the

CWS and the WBC Committee beginning in May 1942. By that time

British research in BW had progressed from the theoretical stage and experimental study to actual small-scale production. Its director, Dr. Paul

Fildes, urged that the United States undertake the large-scale studies that

his group was not equipped to do, and in November he came to Washington to discuss the organization and operations of his group.11

Informed of the WBC Committee's findings, the War Department General Staff recommended, principally as a security measure and to avoid alarming the public, that the task of formulating defensive measures and

procedures for retaliation be undertaken by a civilian agency.12 The President therefore on 15 May 1942 authorized the Secretary of War to establish such an organization in the Federal Security Agency, a special

nonresearch agency under the President. It was administered by Paul V.

McNutt, and had been set up "to promote social and economic security,

advance educational opportunities and promote public health." Thus obscured, the branch of FSA later known as War Research Service (WRS)

came into being and was formally organized four months later with

George W. Merck as director.

War Research Service was primarily an advisory body of eight members including Mr. Fred of the disbanded WBC Committee. It was charged

with making a continuous survey of the BW situation and reporting its

recommendations to appropriate government agencies, in particular the

CWS, the Medical Department, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of

the Navy, and the U.S. Public Health Service. Other agencies that came

within the orbit of WRS included the Provost Marshal General's Office,

the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

and the Department of Agriculture. The WRS was further charged with

initiating research projects in universities and in private research foundations, with the proviso that these civilian agencies were to be "strictly

limited to carrying out such projects as were assigned to the Chemical

Warfare Service by WRS."

 13

 In other words, the Chemical Warfare Serv11

 Capt Frank M. Schertz, Biological Warfare, Jan 43, pp. 118-23, 128, 130, 144-46, 227-28.

MS in Hist Off. 12

 Memo, C Spec Asgmts Br CWS to Spec Asst SW, 24 Aug 42, sub: Resume of CWS Activities in BW, 1 Oct 41 to Date. Cited in BW Research in the U.S., p. 22. 13

 Ltr, CG ASF to CofS, 8 Jan 44, sub: Bacteriological Warfare. Cited in BW Research in the

U.S., p. 20.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 105

ice actually issued the orders and directives necessary to implement WRS

recommendations. The assigned research projects were to determine areas

of investigation and special procedures necessary to maintain security, and

to provide means of retaliation should the enemy resort to BW.

To act as technical adviser to WRS, on 16 October 1942 a new group,

known as the ABC Committee, an arbitrary alphabetical designation, was

formed with the help of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council. Its chairman was W. Mansfield Clark of Johns

Hopkins University and among its members were Roger Adams and Dr.

Milton C. Winternitz, who were then also directing chemical and medical

research work through OSRD agencies for the Chemical Warfare Service.

Liaison members included Ira L. Baldwin, of the University of Wisconsin,

and Comdr. Leroy D. Fothergill, MC, USNR (later the successive directors of the Special Projects Division, CWS); Colonel Defandorf, of the

CWS Medical Research Division; Dr. Rolla E. Dyer, of the U.S. Public

Health Service; and Mr. Merck, director of WRS.

On the assumption that BW was a real and immediate threat to this

nation, War Research Service as its first action initiated through the Office of The Surgeon General antibiological warfare programs in the Hawaiian

Department, the Caribbean Defense Command (including the Panama

Canal Zone and Puerto Rico), the military districts of the United States,

and in overseas theaters of operations. The programs instructed medical

and security officers in detection and defense measures against biological

attack and requested status reports of their plans and preparations.14 Next,

the WRS established approximately twenty-five contracts with universities

and foundations for basic BW research. Most of these contracts were later

transferred to the CWS. The War Reserach Service also established a special BW intelligence service, appointing the well-known novelist, John P.

Marquand, as director of intelligence and information.

Taking the view that U.S. preparations for BW depended on enemy

plans and capabilities, WRS officials at once directed Mr. Marquand to

make arrangements to obtain all available information on enemy BW activity in possession of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, ONI, Medical Intelligence Division, OSS, and the FBI. The meager material in their files

suggested to Mr. Marquand that these agencies might not be properly

alerted to manifestations of BW activity, and G-2 sent instructions for

14

 (1) WD Radio 4622 (CM-OUT-7818), 30 Jun 42. (2) The ABW Section set up in the

Hawaiian Dept, composed of Sanitary and Medical Corps personnel, submitted its first periodic

status report in July 1942.
106 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

collecting such intelligence to all military attaches and to theater and area

commanders in the British Isles, North Africa, Middle East, China-BurmaIndia Theater, and the Pacific. When this alert also proved unproductive,

Mr. Marquand himself went overseas, early in 1943, to consult with intelligence authorities and with theater surgeons. One of the results of his

visit was that WRS, with the approval of the Office of the Surgeon General, recommended to the Secretary of War that blood samples be taken

from prisoners of war to determine whether these individuals had been

immunized against biological agents which the enemy might possibly employ.15

 By means of these samples WRS hoped to learn, for example,

whether Japanese troops were being inoculated against yellow fever, a disease not present in the Far East, and whether Japanese or German troops

were being protected against typhus, anthrax, dysentery, or botulism. It

was also considered possible that improved methods of immunization developed by enemy scientists might thus be discovered. However, the Army

finally decided that this kind of examination would not yield useful

information.

CWS and the U.S. Biological Warfare Committee

Even before civilian research had begun under WRS, the Chemical

Warfare Service had felt that civilian agencies could not achieve the degree of BW readiness for which ultimately the military had to assume responsibility. From long experience in preparing and maintaining a state of

readiness for chemical warfare the service was certain that operational re- search and development in offensive aspects of BW, which required extensive laboratory and field trials, could not be delegated. Nevertheless

until November 1942 the War Department continued to be reluctant to

permit any military agency to particpate directly in the biological research

being conducted in the universities. By then the inability of WRS agencies to carry out research beyond the laboratory stage, and the necessity

of establishing military requirements, had become apparent. "In order . . .

to obtain a clearer understanding of the dangers that confronted the nation" the WRS issued a succession of directives making the Chemical

Warfare Service directly responsible for the military phases of the program.16

To carry them out, the CWS began construction of Camp Detrick, the CWS

15

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 129-30. 16

 Initiated with Memo, Dir WRS for C CWS, 10 Dec 42, sub: Request for Supplemental Research and Development. Cited in BW Research in U.S., p. 24.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 107

biological warfare center, at Detrick Field, a National Guard airport near

Frederick, Md., in April 1943, and by November it was in operation. The

mounting threat of the German rocket program during 1943 gave added

impetus to the urgency of American preparations for BW, for defense officials thought these rockets might readily be converted into efficient vehicles for BW agents. Current reports of the OSS and the BW SubCommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the BW potential of the enemy

also served to increase apprehensions. In January 1944 the Secretary of War

directed the Chief of Staff to transfer the entire BW program from War

Research Service to the Chemical Warfare Service. The Army authorized

the CWS to begin preparations for possible retaliation in BW and, in cooperation with The Surgeon General, to provide means and methods for

protection against attack.17

With the transfer of the program to the CWS, the Army dissolved

the War Research Service, and assigned the responsibility for civilian research and development to the OSRD.18

 Mr. Merck was appointed special consultant on BW to the Secretary of War, with Mr. Fred and Mr.

Marquand as scientific adviser and intelligence aide, respectively, to Mr.

Merck. The ABC Committee was succeeded by the DEF Committee

which was headed by Dr. O. H. Perry Pepper of the University of Pennsylvania, and which guided the technical program of the Special Projects

Division, OC CWS, soon to be formed.

The U.S. Biological Warfare Committee, with Mr. Merck as chairman,

came into being in October 1944, as a supervisory body to make recommendations to the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff on policy and to

establish liaison with its British counterpart, the London Inter-Service SubCommittee on Biological Warfare (ISSCBW). Members of the new committee included the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service; the director of the

New Developments Division, WDSS; the director of the Office of Strategic Services; the chief of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance; the Surgeon

Generals of the Army and Navy; the chief of the Military Intelligence

Service; the Chief of Staff, ASF; the chief of the Requirements Section,

AGF; the assistant chief of Air Staff Plans; the British Army Staff representatives; the director of Canada's Department of Chemical Warfare and

Smoke; and the CWS representative on the ISSCBW. Research and de17

 1st Ind, CofS to CG ASF, 14 Jan 44, and 2d Ind, CG ASF to C CWS, 15 Jan 44, to Memo

SW for CofS, 13 Jan 44, sub: Biological Warfare. Cited in BW Research in the U.S., pp. 28-30. 18

 Soon after, almost all BW research was conducted by the military and by OSRD. James

Phinney Baxter, 3rd, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1946), p. 269.
108 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

velopment on BW in the United States remained under the direction of

this committee until October 1945 when the War Department dissolved

it and transferred its functions to the New Developments Division.19

The Special Projects Division

The CWS had maintained an element variously known as the "Medical Research Division," and "Special Assignments Branch" at Edgewood

ever since August 1941, principally for studying biological warfare, acquiring the staff to conduct it, and in assigning BW research projects to NDRC

agencies. It was not until 18 January 1944, however, that a separate organization, the Special Projects Division, was established in the Office of

the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, to administer the biological warfare

program.

By January 1944 the CWS had already begun operations at Camp

Detrick and at the field test station on Horn Island in Mississippi Sound,

and was constructing the Granite Peak test installation, adjacent to Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and the Vigo plant in Indiana.

The Special Projects Division was to develop measures for defense and

retaliation against BW, to produce or procure the necessary material, to

collect and evaluate intelligence on enemy activity, to maintain liaison

with other military and civilian organizations concerned with biological

warfare here and abroad, to prepare training publications and conduct instruction in biological warfare, and to supply technical advice to the armed

forces.20 The division had an immense task and had to do the work hurriedly because of the urgency of the problem as understood at that time.

Construction, research, and instruction were necessarily simultaneous operations at all installations of the Special Projects Division.

In April 1943, a little more than two weeks after the Army began

construction at Detrick Field, Camp Detrick was formally activated.21

The Horn Island installation, with its 2,000 acres of sand dunes and

scrub, began operations in October 1943. These were restricted to preliminary small-scale experiments because the island was only ten miles

away from the mainland and because it was belatedly discovered that for

two-thirds of the year the prevailing winds blew toward the mainland.

19

 Memo, Robert P. Patterson, SW, for General Marshall, 30 Oct 45. Cited in BW Research

in the U.S., pp. 30, 494-95. 20

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 51-52. 21

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 36-39, 88-92.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 109

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE TEST STATION, Granite Peak, Utah.

In view of the limitations of Horn Island, the principal BW test station

became Granite Peak, activated in June 1944, with test operations commencing shortly thereafter. The isolated terrain at Granite Peak, thirtyfive miles from the military post at Dugway Proving Ground, made it a

relatively safe area for testing living biological agents, and there all the

major field studies were carried out.22

The Vigo plant was a converted Ordnance installation south of Terre

Haute, Ind. The CWS took over the plant in May 1944. Scientists and

engineers installed equipment for large-scale production of a harmless

bacterium, Bacillus globigii, based on preliminary pilot plant studies made

at Camp Detrick. The CWS did not intend to produce pathogenic agents

until the plant had been thoroughly tested for safety and until employees

could be trained to a high degree of efficiency. These operations were still

in progress at the end of the war.23

To a greater degree, perhaps, than in any of the other CWS research

programs, the one for biological warfare was a joint service undertaking.

The Navy, for example, provided almost a quarter of the technical staff

required at Camp Detrick and other test installations, drawing them principally from the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the Bureau

22

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 40-45, 92-94. 23

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 46-50, 94-97.
110 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of Ordnance. In addition the Navy Department maintained an independent

research unit at the University of California, although its work was coordinated with that being done at Detrick and elsewhere in university

laboratories.24

The Office of The Surgeon General, a participant in all matters concerning BW, had representatives from the outset on each of the committees formed to study the problems and conduct of BW research. At the

direction of the War Research Service, the Office of The Surgeon General

and officers of the Medical Corps initiated antibiological warfare programs

in the continental United States, in Hawaii, in the Canal Zone, and in

the theaters of operation. The SGO also assigned trained sanitary engineers to protect essential industrial plants against sabotage. In co-operation

with the CWS and the Corps of Engineers it developed procedures for

protecting water supplies of municipalities and Army posts. In co-operation with the Provost Marshal General, the Veterinary Corps inspected all

meat and dairy products used by the Army. All food, beverage plants,

and water supplies in the Hawaiian Department were inspected regularly.

Studies were made of the possible dangers of sabotage of medical supplies while in production, in storage, or being distributed, and control

methods were devised for use by the drug industry to prevent sabotage.25

When the War Department assumed responsibility for the BW program, it directed The Surgeon General to co-operate with Chemical Warfare

Service in all defensive aspects of the project. It soon became apparent

that the line between offensive and defensive BW research could seldom

be distinguished. Further, The Surgeon General felt that it would not be

proper or desirable for the Medical Department to accept responsibility

for any phase of BW research.26 The CWS therefore assumed both aspects

of this research. While The Surgeon General was thus relieved of responsibility for the technical program, he designated a liaison officer to keep

him informed of its progress and he made available scientists of his Preventive Medicine Service, Veterinary Division, and Medical Consultants

Division. At the same time, The Surgeon General set up a BW commit24

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 60-65. 25

 Ltr, SG to G. W. Merck, WRS, 1 Apr 44, sub: Surgeon General Functions. Cited in BW

Research in the U.S., p. 66. 26

 (1) Ltr, SGO to C CWS, 25 Jan 44, sub: Liaison Officer at Camp Detrick, Md. SGO 020.

(2) Memo, Col K. R. Lundeberg, MC, OSG, for Maj Gen Kirk, Maj Gen Lull, Brig Gen Hillman, and Brig Gen Simmons, 30 Mar 44. (3) Memo, C CWS for C SPD, 5 Apr 44, sub: Medical

Research and Development Activities of the Special Projects Division. SPD 321. All cited in BW

Research in U.S., pp. 67-69.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH

tee in his office to advise him on BW policy and procedure and to direct

the procurement and storage of all biological supplies developed by the

Special Projects Division for protecting personnel against biological agents.

At the peak of operations the Special Projects Division was the largest

single research element in the Chemical Warfare Service and vied only

with the Manhattan Project—at times successfully—in securing certain

types of scientists. It was so large, in fact, that it was extremely difficult

at times to control the numerous research divisions at Camp Detrick. The

best known demonstration of this unwieldiness was in the independent

and original achievement of workers in two different divisions, each of

which was able to claim legitimate credit for isolating, for the first time,

the Type A botulinum toxin. In August 1945, at maximum strength, the

division had 396 Army officers, 2,466 Army enlisted men, 124 Navy

officers, 844 Navy enlisted men, and 206 civilians.27

Keeping It Secret

From the very beginning responsible officials maintained the strictest

secrecy in this country, Canada, and England concerning the fact that

work was being done in BW. They took stringent security measures not

only to prevent the enemy from obtaining information, but also to keep

the public and the armed forces from becoming unduly alarmed over the

possibility of BW.

Security and Safety

Because they were set up as classified exempt stations, Camp Detrick

and other BW installations took elaborate precautions to conceal their

purpose. The professional background of employees could not be revealed,

no person receiving "special procedures" (as the vaccination routines were

called) might donate blood to the Red Cross, and the nature of materials

and stores procured for the installation was disguised.

An important phase of security operations at Camp Detrick involved

the nearby town of Frederick. Despite all efforts, as was reported in a

security survey made in the town, anyone who really wanted to find out

27

 By comparison, after four years the British BW group under Dr. Paul Fildes at Porton

numbered 45, comprising 15 officers and civilians (including 4 officers supplied by Camp Detrick),

20 enlisted technicians, and 10 female helpers. See Report on Visit of Lt Col Oram C. Woolpert

(Chief of Tech Dept CD) to ETO, 22 May-2 Jul 44, p. 2. Cited in BW Research in the U.S.,

pp. 75, 479-81.
112 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

that BW research was being conducted at Detrick could easily have done

so through the camp construction workers who lived in Frederick and the

post employees who visited its restaurants, stores, and theaters, or by

studying the type of materials purchased for the post in Frederick or

shipped in by rail. Above all, the physical layout of the camp, with its

smoke stacks and special sewage arrangements, was informative, and clearly

visible from Braddock Heights, a nearby prominence. The security officer

nevertheless found that townspeople in general considered Detrick only a

secret chemical warfare installation and either showed little interest or

pointedly refrained from expressing curiosity about it.28

All research at Detrick had to be geared to considerations of safety

in order to minimize the danger of exposure to pathogenic organisms.

The creation of a Safety Division was one of the first steps in the organization of the center, its functions equally divided between a biological

protection group and operational safety control groups. The first element

was made responsible for close inspection of employees, first aid, and immunization; the second for inspection of operations in the pilot plants

and laboratories, and for providing methods of detecting, decontaminating,

and treating biological materials and wastes which might escape and infect

the people at Camp Detrick or in the surrounding community. Many of

the practices, testing devices, and techniques developed by the Safety Division for research and development operations at Camp Detrick, some of

them wholly new and others on a scale never attempted previously, have

since been applied to industry and medicine.29

Intelligence

The extraordinary effectiveness of American security and counterintelligence policies was revealed after the fall of Germany and Japan. The

security measures of Germany and Japan made their capabilities almost

equally inscrutable, a matter of concern to the United States since to a

degree the direction of the CWS's BW program depended on knowledge

of enemy intentions.

When the War Department assumed control of BW research, the

CWS's Special Projects Division took charge of intelligence. It sent War

Department directives to all theaters and commands alerting them to BW,

describing defensive measures against possible sabotage, and recommend28

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 127-29. 29

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 151-52, 159-67.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 113

ing appointment of staff BW officers. In the European Theater of Operations, for example, the Chief Chemical Officer prepared BW plans and

directives, supervised BW training, maintained liaison with British BW

authorities in the theater, and co-operated with the Chief Surgeon and

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The period of greatest apprehension occurred

in the early months of 1944 when planners feared that, as the allied offensive across both oceans began to move forward, the enemy in the face of

his steady deterioration might "in desperation resort to biological warfare."

 30

 Largely to meet this threat, the service established a BW school at

Camp Detrick, with the first class held in February 1944. After attending

the school, the chief of CWS intelligence went overseas to alert CWS

officers in the Middle East and North Africa theaters. Other graduates

went from Detrick to the China-Burma-India and Pacific theaters to indoctrinate G-2, ONI, and medical officers stationed there. The Army

attached trained BW officers to all major military operations in Europe

and in the Pacific. Chiefs of the Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency in

the North African, Middle East, and China-Burma-India theaters were

given BW instructions, as were military attaches in New Zealand, Canada,

Sweden, Spain, Portugal, South Africa, China, and Australia. Also CWS

members of the ASF matériel collecting teams, previously briefed on what

BW matériel to look for, arrived in the European, North Africa, South

Pacific, Southwest Pacific, Central Pacific, and China-Burma-India theaters

in the summer of 1944. All BW intelligence flowing from these far-flung

sources, as well as from service and central intelligence agencies, was

reported in the voluminous Special Projects Periodic Intelligence Reports.

On neither the intelligence nor instructional level were British efforts

as strenuous as those of the United States. They had no school similar to

that at Camp Detrick, nor did they train special BW officers. Then, too,

they had no counterpart to the United States BW intelligence network.

They gave instruction in BW only to the highest echelons of command,

whereas the CWS prepared directives for all those above troop level in

the Chemical Warfare Service and in American medical and intelligence

services.31

30

 (1) Ltr, TAG to CinC SWPA and CG's TofOpns, Eastern and Caribbean Defense Comds,

and Alaska Dept, 14 Feb 44, sub: Biological Warfare. AG 381 (9 Feb 44) OB-S-B-M. (2) Ltr,

TAG to CG's TofOpns, 28 Mar 44, sub: Defense Against Sabotage Methods of Biological Warfare

in the Theaters of Operations. AG 381 (24 Feb 44) OB-S-E-4. Both cited in BW Research in

the U.S., p. 134. 31

 Rpt, Visit of Lt Col Woolpert to ETO, 22 May-2 Jul 44. Cited in BW Research in the

U.S., p. 145.
114 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The findings of the ALSOS Mission provided the first indication that

the truth about German BW activities was considerably at variance with

earlier intelligence reports. False reports of German intentions to resort to

germ warfare had unquestionably been spread as a psychological warfare

weapon. In spite of the first reports of the mission, tension was not relaxed until early in 1945, when it was generally agreed that it was too

late for Germany to use BW as a tactical weapon against Allied forces.

The comprehensive report of September 1945 prepared by the BW

team with the ALSOS Mission

 32

 revealed that BW research in Germany

had been aimed at devising defensive measures against possible Allied use

of biological agents and specifically against the sabotage efforts of guerrilla

fighters that menaced the German Army in Poland and Russia. Among

the biological agents reportedly used by guerillas against German troops

in the Eastern theater were typhoid bacilli, botulinum toxin, typhus,

dysentery, glanders, cholera, anthrax, and paratyphoid.

Investigators examined more than seventy sites in Europe where Germans had conducted medical research. Nazi defensive measures consisted

mainly in alerting agriculture, veterinary, and public health officials to the

dangers of biological attack. They took their only large-scale defensive

measure in 1942, when, after hearing that Russian troops had been immunized against plague, they sent one million doses of plague vaccine to

the Stalingrad front. The files of German intelligence gave extensive information on Russian and Polish BW efforts and were fairly complete

on French research. But they contained no reliable information from the

United Spates or the United Kingdom after 1942, a tribute to security

precautions. For example, in German intelligence files the ALSOS mission

found a report stating that the United States had a large BW agent production plant at Huntsville Arsenal, Ala., and that the U.S. BW program

was headed by an outstanding microbiologist, Col. Harry Lebkicher. The

facts were that Huntsville Arsenal handled only chemical warfare, never

biological warfare operations, and that Colonel Lebkicher was not a biologist and never had an assignment in BW—he was commanding officer of

the Chicago Chemical Warfare Procurement District.33

Japanese activities were better organized and more comprehensive than

32

 Its members were J. M. Barnes, RAMC; C. Henze, MC, AUS; W. J. Cromartie, MC, AUS;

and J. W. Hofer, MC, USNR. 33

 (1) Int Rpt B-C-H-H-305, Mil Int Serv, ALSOS Mission, 12 Sep 45, pp. 82-88. (2) Memo,

C Int Br SPD for Consultant to SW, 20 Aug 45, sub: Final Resume of German BW Activities.

Both cited in BW Research in the U.S., p. 140.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 115

those of Germany. Japan appears to have started biological warfare studies

as early as 1936, with the principal wartime research centered in a Defense

Intelligence Institute, near Harbin in Manchuria, where 2,500 people were

employed at the peak of operations. The institute developed munitions

for glanders and anthrax. Allied intelligence seems to have been accurate

in its accounts of a Japanese bacillus bomb, its name literally translated

as "disease frozen germs," and experiments seem to have been made, as

reported, in the dissemination of typhoid, diphtheria, and cholera. The

Japanese denied, however, that the more than 9,000 paper balloons they

constructed, of which a number, more than thirty feet in diameter and

capable of lifting sixty-five pounds, sailed across the Pacific to the west

coast and Canada early in 1945, were intended for BW attack. The Japanese claimed that the balloons, which actually contained explosive and

incendiary material, had been sent in reprisal for the Doolittle raid.34

Defense Against Biological Attack

The CWS and SGO investigated special physical, chemical, and medical measures to protect the armed forces and civilian population against

biological warfare. In this effort, basic defensive measures were first developed to safeguard the thousands of workers engaged in the Special

Projects Division laboratories. Techniques had to be devised for detecting, sampling, screening, and identifying a great variety of living organisms and their toxic products. Equipment had to be designed, constructed,

and installed to handle processes never before carried out. Protective

clothing, masks, and equipment had to be developed for use in the laboratories, plant areas, and field test stations. Many of these primary steps

in defense on behalf of SPD employees were taken to provide the basis

for the development of protective measures for the soldier in combat

should biological warfare become an actuality.35

Detection and Identification of Biological Agents

In war an unusual outbreak of disease would probably be the first indication that BW agents were being employed. Troops would immediately

need a sampling device to detect organisms. The CWS therefore devised

34

 (1) Lt Col Arvo T. Thompson, VC, Report on Japanese Biological Warfare (BW) Activities,

31 May 46, pp. i-iii, 6-7. (2) Inf & Int Ltr, 6, ASF POA, 21 May 45. Tech Lib, Camp Detrick.

Both cited in BW Research in the U.S., pp. 140-41. 35

 BW Research in the U.S., passim.
116 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

a sampling kit to detect biological agents in the field. It contained cotton

impinger and liquid impinger apparatus for air sampling; cotton swabs,

syringes, and pipettes for material sampling; and means of refrigerating

the materials collected. Contaminated air and materials collected by these

devices would then be taken to the field or base laboratory for identification.36

As in standard hospital practice, identification of micro-organisms could

sometimes be made by direct or microscopic examination of sample organisms which were grown on agar plates, but the most reliable detection

test for most biological agents involved animal inoculation and response.

By inoculating animals scientists could detect most pathogenic organisms

and their toxins. Examination by smear would then be possible, using the

exudate from wounds or lesions or with sputum, feces, blood, or urine.

This evidence could then be corroborated by means of blood chemistry

analysis, blood cell counts, and urinalysis. As the infection declined or

recovery was effected, detection would also become possible through the

appearance and identification of antibodies in the blood. These could be

demonstrated by agglutination reactions, toxin neutralization, or virus

neutralization. With proper identification thus made, Countermeasures

against the particular agent or agents become possible.

Biological and Chemical Protection

During the war, Camp Detrick and university laboratories investigated

biological, chemical, and mechanical means of protecting troops against

potential biological warfare agents. While soap and water afforded elementary protection in uncomplicated circumstances, the agents and vehicles

in biological warfare would have required somewhat more complex protection. At Camp Detrick biological protection against micro-organisms

included the use of vaccines, toxoids, and immune sera, as well as

penicillin and streptomycin. Disinfectants and antiseptics, standard CWS

decontaminating agents, and the new chemotherapeutic agents like the

sulfa drugs provided chemical protection. Mechanical and physical protection was possible with special leakproof masks and protective clothing

which would exclude organisms, and the employment of heat (as in incineration or the use of the autoclave), desiccation, starvation, sunlight,

osmotic pressure, and filtration for the removal, inhibition, or destruction

of organisms. The CWS considered it feasible to protect large groups of

36

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 159-62.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 117

people by special adaptation of the gasproof shelter and collective protector, through the maintenance of strict sanitary discipline, the application

of public health principles, and by means of immunization.

While no immunological protection was possible in gas warfare, considerable protection could be conferred in biological warfare by protective

equipment and through increased body resistance. Since the best means of

increasing resistance to specific disease organisms was by immunization

through the administration of vaccines, the CWS devoted a major part

of the BW program to the development and production of new vaccines

and toxoids. Before World War II, scientists had prepared vaccines for

use against such diseases as smallpox, yellow fever, cholera, typhoid and

paratyphoid fevers, diphtheria, tetanus, plague, typhus fever, and influenza.

Of these typhoid, diphtheria, tetanus, smallpox, and yellow fever vaccines

appear to have been exceptionally effective but the others had limited

value against the diseases as they occurred naturally, and would probably

have had considerably less protective value against an attack employing

high concentrations of the disease agent.37

Among the accomplishments in biological protection made public after

the war may be mentioned new influenza vaccines and the development

of effective toxoids against Types A and B botulinum toxin. For the protection of livestock and domestic fowl—exceedingly vulnerable targets in

the event of biological warfare—researchers discovered means for mass production of highly effective vaccines for rinderpest, an animal disease, and

for Newcastle disease and fowl plague, domestic fowl diseases.38

In addition to the vaccines, a new means of biological protection for

the individual was made possible by the recently developed antibiotic

agents referred to above. While usually employed in treatment, they could

also be used prophylactically for short periods of time and, it was believed, they might have an advantage over vaccines in conferring protection immediately after administration. On the basis of wartime studies,

there was evidence that penicillin might be effective in treating human

anthrax and that streptomycin was effective in treating tularemia.

37

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 152-58. 38

 (1) H. Reames et al, "Studies on Botulinum Toxoids, Types A and B: Immunization of

Man," Journal of Immunology, 55 (1947). (2) M. W. Hale and R. V. L. Walker, "Rinderpest

XIII, The Production of Rinderpest Vaccine from an Attenuated Strain of Virus," American Journal

of Veterinary Research, 1 (1946), 199-211. (3) C. A. Brandly et al., "Immunization of Chickens

Against Newcastle Disease," American Journal of Veterinary Research, 7 (1946), 307-32.

(4) C. A. Brandly et al., "Newcastle Disease and Fowl Plague Investigations in the War Research

Program," Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, 108 (1946), 369-70.
118 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

In the realm of chemical protection, it appeared that the chemotherapeutic agent, sulfadiazine, might be one of the principal means of attacking the organisms causing glanders and melioidosis once they invaded the

body. Other substances providing varying degrees of chemical protection

were found among the common antiseptics and disinfectants. The chemical

which most nearly met the conditions of an ideal germicide for military

and civilian purposes was ordinary calcium hypochlorite, or bleach, the

same material used for neutralizing mustard gas. It was effective against

almost all micro-organisms. Its action was rapid, large quantities were

available, it was not hazardous to use, it was easily inactivated, and it

could be used in a variety of apparatus. Similarly, decontaminating agent,

noncorrosive, or DANC, another demustardizing agent, was effective in BW

for disinfecting the metal surfaces of equipment and instruments. Methyl

bromide, found in the standard Quartermaster delousing kit, proved an

effective sterilizer, and carboxide, the Navy fumigating agent, sterilized

both clothing and equipment. Formaldehyde when dispersed with steam

under pressure in enclosed spaces also made a good decontaminating agent,

and the CWS M2 smoke generator and commercial spray apparatus could

be used to vaporize a formalin-water mixture for the sterilization of air.

Finally, certain glycols in the form of aerosol mists were satisfactory for

use with the standard collective protector installed in a modified gasproof

shelter.

Protective Masks and Clothing

Where, under combat conditions, there was danger of biological warfare and no way of knowing what micro-organisms an enemy might use,

the individual soldier would, as in gas warfare, have to rely on his mask

and special protective clothing. One of the most pressing problems of

CWS research, therefore, was to devise truly effective leakproof combat

and service masks.

A minute degree of leakage could be tolerated in the standard mask

under gas attack. But biological agents are not molecular particles like war

gases. They are suspensions of solids in the air, and a few disease microorganisms entering the facepiece might produce a casualty. The mask for

biological warfare, therefore,, had to be at least an estimated 1,000,000

times more efficient than the standard service gas mask.39

39

 BW Research in the U.S., p. 177.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 119

Technicians attained near zero leakage by modifying the M5 combat

mask and adding to it a special leakproof headpiece made of butyl coated

airplane cloth. This impermeable headpiece, covering the entire head and

the facepiece of the mask except for the eyepieces and canister, reduced

peripheral leakage of the mask facepiece and provided a dead air space

around the outlet valve of the mask, thus affording a high degree of protection at that point. The slight positive pressure exerted within the headpiece by the trapped exhaled air made entry of air impossible except

through the canister. The weight of this BW mask, including facepiece,

headpiece, canister, and carrier was 3.2 pounds, making it a practicable as

well as highly effective unit of protection in the event of BW combat.

Further development resulted in a leakproof service mask weighing 2.3

pounds, with a headpiece of butyl coated nylon, improved eyelenses permitting better vision, and with the canister fitted inside the headpiece.

Although both of these combat and service masks were considered satisfactory, improvements were still being made by V-J Day.40

The special protective clothing designed for laboratory workers at

Camp Detrick was not considered practicable for combat troops. Almost

complete physical protection was achieved with the impermeable coverall

made of wind-resistant, water-repellent Oxford cotton cloth. But this very

impermeability, because it prevented the perspiration from escaping, also

put limits on the length of time it could be worn and the degree

of strenuous exercise possible. For particularly hazardous laboratory operations, a special ventilated suit was designed which provided absolute protection. This was a one-piece garment of two layers of nylon cloth bonded

together with neoprene, and with gloves and shoes of rubber cemented

to the fabric. Air introduced into the back of the suit by hose enabled

the wearer to work in the attire.

For combat troops, the standard two-piece, permeable, herringbone twill

uniform, when treated by the CWS aqueous impregnating process, was

considered the best available protective clothing which could be worn in

comfort. Tests indicated that the suit would probably exclude half the

number of organisms to which the body would be exposed without the

clothing. The addition of special ankle-length underwear under the suit

increased the degree of protection, probably raising the exclusion of organisms to almost 90 percent,41

 provided that sleeves of the uniform were

40

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 177-84. 41

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 184-86.
120 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

tied tightly at the wrists, pants legs fastened to the ankles or stuffed

inside combat shoes, and all other openings carefully secured.

The CC-2 impregnite used in protective clothing, researchers found,

had considerable sporocidal properties. The standard aqueous impregnation

process appeared to give the most powerful bactericidal and sporocidal

properties to the clothing, although relatively high atmospheric humidity

was required for the most efficient action. On the other hand, M5 antimustard ointment was found to have negligible bactericidal and sporocidal

properties when applied as skin protection. Instead, gloves of Oxford cotton cloth seemed reasonably efficient for the purpose, and, for prolonged

wearing, more comfortable than medical rubber gloves.42

The Achievement in Biological Warfare Research

A brief resume of this country's BW achievements, published on 3

January 1946 and based on a comprehensive report by Mr. Merck to the

Secretary of War, was the first War Department release informing the

general public of the fact that the Army and Navy had been engaged in

the study of biological warfare.43 Among the accomplishments of the BW

research and development reported then and later were: (1) fundamental

contributions had been made regarding nutrition and conditions of growth

of micro-organisms, as well as safe procedures for their quantity production; (2) methods had been developed for accurate detection of small

numbers of minute quantities of micro-organisms; (3) many contributions

were made to the knowledge of control of airborne diseases; (4) significant contributions had been made to the knowledge concerning the development of immunity against certain infectious diseases of humans and

animals; (5) important advances were achieved in the treatment of certain

infectious diseases of humans and animals; (6) important information had

been secured on the production and control of certain diseases in plants

and on the effectiveness of over 1,000 different chemical agents on a variety

of plant life.

Between October 1945 and June 1947 the CWS published a total of

156 scientific and technical papers based upon wartime research and

development at Camp Detrick and presented 28 other papers at scientific

meetings.

42

 BW Research in the U.S., pp. 187-91. 43

 Some of the material of this report appeared in Military Surgeon, 98 (1946), 237-42, and

in Science, 103 (31 May 46), 662-63. See also George W. Merck, "Peacetime Implications of

Biological Warfare," Chemical and Engineering News, 24 (25 May 46), 1346-49.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH 121

GEORGE W. MERCK, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, visiting

Camp Detrick, Maryland. Col. Joseph

D. Sears, left.

In evaluating the magnitude of

American BW achievement it should

be remembered that the United States

began operations with British and

Canadian experience to draw on and

with the added advantages over these

allies of almost unlimited funds and

personnel and with the finest facilities obtainable. There was also some

justice in the remark reported by the

chief of technical operations at Camp

Detrick, after a visit to his British

counterpart in 1944, that there was

"a certain amount of duplication of

effort in the several countries; that

we in the States [did] not take full

account of their fundamental studies

and . . . attacked de novo problems

which they had solved satisfactorily."44

It could not, perhaps, have been

otherwise. Despite its kinship with

public health medicine and preventive medicine, biological warfare research

and development, on the scale undertaken in World War II, was literally

something new under the sun. Both the United States and its allies had

to work by empirical methods, without precedent, and with all possible

haste. America had to prepare to defend itself, and to have an offensive

weapon for retaliation.

A series of implications drawn from American experience in BW research was reported in 1946 in a public document prepared by former

officials of the United States Biological Warfare Committee.45 There it

was asserted that the development of agents for biological warfare was

possible in many countries, large and small, without vast expenditures of

money or the construction of large-scale production facilities. It was quite

44

 Rpt, Visit of Lt Col Wool pert to ETO, 22 May-2 Jul 44, p. 3. Cited in BW Research in the U.S., pp. 479-81. 45

 G. W. Merck, E. B. Fred, I. L. Baldwin, and W. B. Sarles, "Implications of Biological Warfare," The United States and the United Nations Report Series No. 5, The International Control of

Atomic Enery, Department of State, Pub. 2661 (Washington, 1946) pp. 65-71.
122 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

probable that research directed toward enhancing the virulence of known

pathogens would result in the production of varieties much more virulent

than those already known. Finally, unlike other fields, it would be extremely difficult to control research and development work in biological

warfare.

Biological agents, like toxic agents, were not used in the war, but the

money spent by the United States on BW, like that spent on CW, was

not thrown away. Rather, the expenditures should be viewed in the light

of the harm that might have come to an unprepared America through a

sneak BW attack.
CHAPTER VI

Chemical Mortars and Shells

The 4-2-Inch Chemical Mortar

Weapons available to American ground troops for delivering toxic

agents included Livens projectors, grenades, land mines, mortars, rockets,

and artillery shells. If gas warfare had broken out, the burden would have

fallen chiefly on the 4.2-inch chemical mortars of CWS mortar battalions.

The 4.2-inch mortar descended from the old Stokes mortar of the

British Army. Britain invented the Stokes in World War I to overcome

the disadvantages of gas cloud attacks. Gas clouds could be tremendously

effective under the proper conditions, but they required considerable labor,

were wholly dependent upon the weather, could only be used with a few

gases, and, by their color and odor, sometimes warned the enemy. The

Stokes had a smoothbore barrel and therefore could not fire shells with

pin-point accuracy. On the other hand, it had certain advantages. Troops

could easily move it and fire shells at the rapid rate of twenty a minute.

Each shell held more than two quarts of toxic agent. Because of these

factors a mortar could suddenly overwhelm an enemy position with a

large amount of poison gas.1

The First Gas Regiment of the CWS obtained Stokes mortars from

the British in 1918, and employed them along the western front. In July

1918 the Army contracted with American firms for the manufacture of

these mortars. More than 400 were turned out but they did not reach

France in time for battle.

1

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 16-18. (2) For the early use of the Stokes mortar

see: Foulkes, "Gas!" The Story of the Special Brigade, pp. 109-11.
124 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

STOKES MORTAR FIRING GAS SHELLS, World War I.

The CWS found the Stokes mortar a versatile, useful weapon, and

in the early 1920's set out to lengthen its range. The objective, as laid

down by General Fries, was to double the World War I range of 1,100

yards.2 Early experiments showed that heavy powder charges could hurl

the shell only a few hundred yards beyond the normal range. This was

dangerous since the higher pressure within the mortar at the instant of

explosion could burst the barrel. The designers attached fins to the shell,

enabling it to fly through the air like a dart, and shot it 2,600 yards. But the

shock from the exploding propellant generally damaged the fins, and the

shell's flight was short and erratic. In 1924 Captain McBride and Dr. G. S.

Maxwell rifled several barrels with varying pitches and numbers of grooves.

During machining operations metal was gouged out of the bore, increasing its diameter from four to four and two-tenths inches between lands.

This marked the end of the old smoothbore Stokes mortar, and the beginning of the new 4.2-inch chemical mortar. On 7 June 1924 one of the

2

 (1) A. E. Nissen, A. A. Gandy, and A. L. Hodges, 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar. EAMD 26,

17 Mar 27. (2) Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries, "General Fries," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, 1

(October 1946), 12, 51.
CHEMICAL MORTARS AND SHELLS 125

experimental barrels sent three shells through the air on accurate, spinstabilized flights of almost 2,300 yards.

Adoption of a rifled barrel made it necessary for engineers to redesign

each component of the mortar, from baseplate to shell fuze. World War

I shells had had an allways fuze to make certain that the tumbling shell

would explode no matter whether it landed on its base, side, or nose.

Fuzes of this type could not be used in a spinning shell since centrifugal

force would activate the fuze and cause the shell to burst as it left the

muzzle of the mortar. After considerable experimentation, engineers developed a safe, dependable fuze that could be set for impact or time.

Something had to be done to prevent liquid fillings, such as mustard

or phosgene, from surging around the inside of the shell, unbalancing it

and causing it to tumble and yaw in flight. This characteristic had not

mattered with the Stokes mortar since its shells had tumbled anyway, but

it affected the accuracy and range of the rifled mortar. Technicians solved

this problem by fastening vanes inside the shell to swirl the fillings as

the shell spun through the air.

To seal the bore against loss of explosion gases, and to force the shell

to rotate as it sped up the barrel, the men had to devise a driving mechanism for the base of the projectile. This consisted of two round plates,

one of brass and one of steel, the brass disk designed so that its edge

could be forced outward by pressure. When the powder exploded, gas

pressure rammed the steel plate up against the softer brass plate, forcing

its edge out and into the grooves, sealing the gases in, and forcing the

shell to spiral out of the barrel.

For the baseplate of the Stokes mortar it had been feasible to have a

steel cup, bolted to an oak plank. But recoil from the new 4.2-inch barrel

soon pounded this type of baseplate into splinters, and a forged steel

baseplate had to be produced. Finally in 1928, after several years of experimentation, model M1 4.2-inch chemical mortar was ready for service.3

During the next decade CWS engineers put considerable thought into

improving the standard model. The practice of digging an emplacement,

which took time and reduced the mobility of the mortar, was abandoned

3

 (1) Ltr, Maj Gen Amos A. Fries to TAG, 17 Apr 28, sub: Adoption as to Type, with inds.

CWS 400.114/280. (2) 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, a monograph in series, History of Research

and Development of the CWS in World War II. (3) An excellent review of all phases of mortar

development from World War I to 1945, is: George A. Miller, "The Development of the 4.2-

Inch Chemical Mortar," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, III (October 1948), 33-42; III (January

1949) 35-42.
126 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and the base was placed directly on the ground. The two legged support

inherited from the Stokes mortar was improved and retained for a time,

but it proved to be so awkward that it gave way to a single leg. Engineers then found it necessary to place connecting rods between the baseplate and barrel support to keep the recoil from forcing base and support

apart. The barrels, hitherto obtained from old Stokes mortars, were made

specifically for the new model from seamless drawn-nickel steel tubing.

A spring shock absorber was placed on the barrel to prevent the force

of recoil from breaking the connection between the support and the barrel. At last after seven years of work the CWS completed a greatly

improved mortar, model M1A1, with a range of 2,400 yards. This mortar

was in the hands of chemical troops at the time of Pearl Harbor.4

Increasing the Range in World War II

The next step in the development of the mortar came about as a

result of an addition to the mission of CWS troops. Up to the time of

America's entrance into the war, the mortar had been considered as a

weapon for firing toxic agents, smoke, and incendiaries at the enemy. In

April 1942 General Porter asked the Services of Supply for permission to

use high explosive ammunition in the mortar. Chemical troops had fired

HE in World War I, and if allowed to do the same in World War II

it would broaden their usefulness in the theaters of operation. The SOS

gave its consent, thereby again giving the CWS impetus in lengthening

the range.

The mortar had been developed under the prewar doctrine that chemical shells would be employed only within a range of 2,400 yards. This

concept did not apply to HE, and the CWS set about increasing this distance before the mortars saw action. Engineers could have lengthened the

range by redesigning parts of the mortar, but such a step would have

taken time. The quickest way was to use more powder. When tests demonstrated that 50 percent more powder hurled the projectile an additional

800 yards, bringing the total distance up to 3,200 yards, a larger charge

was adopted. The higher explosion pressure imposed more strain on the

barrel and baseplate than they had been designed for. To prevent accidents

the service adopted a tougher barrel and baseplate. To prevent mortar

squads from using the old barrel and perhaps blowing themselves up the

4

 (1) CWTC Item TB, 21 Feb 35. (2) CWTC Item 485, Standardization of Barrel, 4.2-Inch

Chemical Mortar, M2, 31 Mar 42. (3) TM 3-320, 15 Oct 42, with changes 1 to 5.
CHEMICAL MORTARS AND SHELLS 127

CWS designated all mortars with the new barrel as model M2. The CWS

carried the M2 into all theaters and some were still in action at the end

of the war.5

The 4.2-inch mortar first saw action in the taking of Sicily in the summer of 1943. Mortar squads were among the first waves of troops to hit

the beach, and they went into action a few minutes after landing. During

the thirty-eight day campaign they shot 35,000 rounds of ammunition in

crash concentration, harassing, interdictory, and counterbattery fire, and in

tactical smoke screening missions. The mortar made an excellent impression on commanders of infantry, ranger, armored, and airborne units.

Thereafter there was no question that the CWS had taken the right course

in turning the chemical mortar into a HE delivering weapon.6

After troops tried out mortars in Europe, they began calling for a longer

range. Back in the United States the CWS had already anticipated the

demand and had succeeded in adding another thousand yards to the flight

of mortar shells. It had achieved the increase by changing the form of

the propellant so that it burned slowly, gave off gas more evenly, and

thereby became more efficient. Lt. Arthur R. T. Denues had experimented

with the propellant, trying different shapes, arrangements, and types, and

had finally found that with disks of powder of a certain thickness, the

range depended upon the number of disks. The minimum charge, which

lobbed the shell only 340 yards, could be lengthened to 4,400 yards simply by adding more disks. The maximum gas pressure did not become

excessive, and there was no disturbance in the ballistics of liquid filled

shells. The disks were cut square, with a hole in the center to allow the

disk to slip on the cartridge container. Sufficient disks, sewn together in

bundles of different thickness, were placed on each shell before shipment

to give a range of 4,397 yards. Before the shell was fired, the mortar squad

could remove one or more disks to shorten the range.7

5

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Theodore R. Paulson, 16 Nov 56. (2) CWTC Item 636, Standardization of M3A1 Propelling Charge for 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, 12 Jan 43. (3) CWTC Item

673, Standardization of Charge, Propelling, 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, M5 Al. (4) CWTC Item

727, Standardization of Baseplate, 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, M2A1, 11 Jun 43. (5) Baum,

Columbia University Chemical Warfare Service Laboratories. (6) CWTC Item 564, Redesignation

and Reclassification of 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortars and Equipment, 29 Sep 42. (7) TM 3-320,

Jun 45. 6

 The Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp.,

1948), pp. 127-28. 7

 (1) Lt A. R. T. Denues, Preliminary Investigations and Engineering Tests to Develop Increased Range for the 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar by Means Adapted to Immediate Field Use.

TDMR 549, 17 Feb 43. (2) CWTC Item 673.
128 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Notwithstanding that the range of the mortar had almost doubled by

1944, troops in the field were still not satisfied. They wanted the weapon

to hit targets 5,000 or more yards away. One means of accomplishing this

was to devise a jet accelerator that would fit on the base of a shell and

give it a boost after it left the barrel. The CWS started work on such a

device, but soon canceled the project after a survey showed that development would take too long, and that men with the know-how could not

be spared from other mortar projects.8

Two other courses lay open to the CWS, a long-term project to completely redesign the mortar from baseplate to standard, and a short project—which might or might not work—of again modifying the propellant.

Experiments with the propellant began after calculations and preliminary

experiments indicated that the velocity of the shell could be increased 100

feet per second and the range jumped to more than 5,000 yards if the

chamber volume of the mortar and the weight of powder were doubled.

Engineers set up an experimental mortar and made test firings, but to

their surprise the shells had an unexpectedly short range. They carefully

checked all possible sources of error and at last discovered that the high

pressure from the explosion had deformed the rotating disk on the base

of the shell and this had increased the air resistance. Development of a

new rotating mechanism proved to be the major task in extending the

range, but when the job was finished the mortar shell carried distances

of 5,600 yards in firings at Edgewood in June 1945. These results obtained

in the shop and on the test field occurred too late in the war to be transmitted to the battlefield.9

Regardless of demands for longer ranges, a complete redesign of the

mortar was necessary by 1944. By this time both the M1A1 and M2 had

been used extensively, particularly in mountainous regions where artillery

found it difficult or impossible to operate. The terrain in which mortars

operated in Italy and the Southwest Pacific was at times so rugged that

standard mortar carts or jeeps could not be used, and the CWS had to

devise a mule pack.10

8

 (1) CWTC Item 1060, Military Requirements and Military Characteristics for Jet Accelerator

Adapter, for 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, 7 Jul 44. (2) CWTC Item 1180, Cancellation of Military

Requirements for Jet Accelerator Adapter for 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Shell, 26 Oct 44. 9

 (1) Gilbert C. Bowen, Tests of Various Methods of Obtaining Rotation of the 4.2-Inch

Chemical Mortar Shell. OSRD 5694, Oct 45. (2) Gilbert C. Bowen, C. F. Curtiss, R. B. Kershner, and Maj A. R. T. Denues, Extension of Range of the 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, M2.

OSRD 5789, Jun 46. 10

 (1) CWTC Item 531, Standardization of 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar and Ammunition Cart,

4 Aug 42. (2) TB 3-320-5, Mule Pack M2, 13 May 44. (3) TM 3-320, Jun 45.
CHEMICAL MORTARS AND SHELLS 129

4.2-lNCH CHEMICAL MORTAR in action, Arundel Island, New Georgia, September

1943. HE ammunition for the mortar is stacked at the right.

This constant use of mortars took its toll in worn and damaged parts,

much harm being caused by attempts to get more service out of the mortar than it had been designed to deliver. The CWS Technical Division

set out to produce an entirely new mortar that would be free from the

limitations inherent in the basic design of the M2 model which had been

intended originally to fire a range of 2,400 yards. By the end of the war

an experimental model, E37, had been constructed and test fired at

Edgewood. After the war the service continued development until 1949

when the War Department, feeling that the mortar was now a legitimate

weapon of the infantry, transferred the responsibility for development to

the Ordnance Department. The Ordnance Department made a few final

modifications and standardized the mortar as model M30 in 1951.11

American troops who saw the chemical mortar in action in the Pacific and in Europe had a high opinion of the weapon. German and

Japanese troops respected its fire power and accuracy. Generalleutnant

11

 (1) Theodore R. Paulson, Development Summary of the E37R4 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar.

CWS 314.7 4.2-Inch Mortar R&D File. (2) Theodore R. Paulson, Development of E37 Chemical

Mortar. DPGMR 32, Jul 47. (3) OCM 33579, 15 Feb 51.
130 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Ochsner of the chemical warfare branch of the German Army, stated that

"from the technical point of view the American 4.2-inch chemical projector

is very good; the construction is simple, it is a very handy weapon in

battle and its firing efficiency is high."

 12

The German Army had two types of chemical mortars, the smaller

with a caliber of 8 cm. (approximately 3.2 inches) and the larger of 10

cm. (3.9 inches). The 8-cm. mortar was smoothbore, like the old Stokes,

and was similar to the 81-mm. mortar issued by the Ordnance Department

to American infantry. The complete weapon weighed 125 pounds, and

had a range of from 450 yards to 1,300 yards. German mortar shells were

pear shaped with fins fastened to the tail to stabilize their flight. The 10-

cm. mortar was more complicated than either the 8-cm. or the American

4.2-inch in that it was a breech-loading weapon with a hydropneumatic

recoil mechanism. It was mounted on a two-wheel chassis and weighed

approximately a ton, six times heavier than the 4.2-inch mortar. The heavy

weight and the wheeled mount greatly restricted the mobility of the weapon,

a distinct disadvantage in comparison to the easily transported 4.2-inch

mortar. The maximum range was 6,800 yards.13

The principal Japanese ground weapon for the employment of chemical munitions was the 90-mm. (3.5-inch) mortar. This was a smoothbore

weapon that fired a dart shaped, fin tailed shell. Its total weight was 350

pounds, slightly heavier than the 4.2-inch mortar, and its maximum range

was about 4,200 yards.14

Mortars of Unusual Design

While the 4.2-inch mortar was the workhorse of CWS troops during

World War II, members of the technical staff experimented with other

models. Following a suggestion of the Chemical Warfare Board in 1943

that fewer mortars would be needed and targets could be changed more

rapidly if the weapon could swing through a full circle, engineers began

development of a special mortar with a traverse of 360°. They designed

several models, one or more of which might ultimately have been satisfactory, but finally dropped the project when the AGF decided that a mortar

12

 Ochsner, History of German Chemical Warfare, pt. I. p. 33. 13

 (1) German Chemical Warfare, pp. 119-20. (2) German Chemical Warfare Materiel,

pp. I-A-1, I-A-2. 14

 Enemy Capabilities for Chemical Warfare, pp. 92-96.
CHEMICAL MORTARS AND SHELLS 131

with such an extreme traverse was unnecessary. Along with the 360° mortar the men experimented with a mortar of 90° traverse, but the weapon

was not particularly successful, and the project ended with the war.15

To simplify the training of mortar squads the Chemical Warfare Board

devised an ingenious subcaliber mortar consisting of a steel pipe that fitted

inside the standard mortar barrel. The shell was fashioned of steel and

wood and could be used over and over. The weapon was fired in the

regular manner, and ranged from 115 to 400 yards. A small glass bottle

of smoke solution could be fitted to the nose to give the appearance of a

miniature explosion when the shell landed. Not the least of the merits of

this subcaliber mortar was that it dropped the cost of firing a training

round of ammunition from several dollars to thirteen cents.16

In 1943, at the suggestion of Col. William A. Borden, Ordnance Department, who had conducted a survey of munitions in the Pacific Islands,

the CWS began to develop a mortar which could fire horizontally into

low Japanese bunkers of coconut logs and earth. The standard mortar

barrel could not be dropped below an angle of 45° with the horizon, and

a way had to be found of holding the barrel level with the ground and

at the same time neutralizing the tremendous recoil of a quarter of a million pounds. Engineers at the CWS Laboratories at Columbia University

devised a method of leveling the mortar by a new baseplate that could

be bolted or chained to the trunk of a tree. While this solved the recoil

problem—as long as mortar companies fought in wooded areas—it did not

end the development work. When a mortar fired on a flat trajectory, for

which it had never been designed, unusual strains were set up in the

weapon. These had to be overcome by redesigning certain components.

Even the shell was modified and its weight increased. Tests proved that

the new model would be satisfactory in the field, but the weapon was

not carried beyond the experimental stage because a recoilless mortar, which

the CWS had started to develop at almost the same time, offered a better

15

 (1) Ltr, CWB to CWTC, 10 Jan 43, sub: Modified "Armstrong" Baseplate and Mount for

4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar. CWB 472.42/69. (2) CWTC Item 726, Military Requirement and

Military Characteristics for 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar with 360° Traverse, 11 Jun 43. (3) CWTC

Item 1226, Cancellation of Military Requirements for 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar with 360° Traverse. (4) CWTC Item 997, Military Characteristics for 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, 5 May 44. 16

 (1) Chemical Warfare Board Project No. 279, Sub-Caliber Trainer for 4.2-Inch Chemical

Mortar, 27 Sep 43. (2) CWTC Item 952, Standardization of Mortar, Sub-Caliber, 3-Inch, M3;

Charge, Smoke, 3-Inch Sub-Caliber Shell, M1; and Charge, Propelling, 3-Inch Sub-Caliber Shell,

M8, 17 Mar 44. (3) TB 3-320-2, Training Accessories for the 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, 29

Feb 44.
132 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

possibility of solving the multitude of problems that accompanied the

change from angular to horizontal firing.17

A recoilless gun was open at both ends instead of one end as in the

conventional gun. When the propellant charge exploded, the shell sped

forward through the barrel while the gas blew backward through the breech.

The gun, shell, and propellant were designed to make the forward action

equal to the backward reaction, eliminating recoil.

Recoilless weapons had been investigated by the American Army in

World War I. In World War II the idea was revived by the Germans,

the British, and then by the Ordnance Department. When the CWS began development of a horizontal mortar, it realized that the principle involved in a recoilless gun might be applied, and in October 1943 General

Kabrich asked Dr. C. N. Hickman, Chief of Section H, Division 3, NDRC,

to undertake the development of a mortar having no recoil.18 That same

month the first recoilless attachment to fit on the breech of the standard

mortar barrel was designed, and in November firing trials were started.

Step by step the ignition system, firing mechanism, reaction chamber, and

shell were perfected. The shell was fired in an unusual manner. A small

rocket, called a rocket driver by the designers, was attached to the fuze.

When the mortar was fired the rocket driver hurled the shell back into

the barrel where it struck the firing pin. The firing pin then detonated

the propellant charge and started the shell forward. The rocket driver fell

off while the shell was in the air, exposing the fuze.

By August 1944 the model was ready for a full-scale demonstration at

Edgewood. Service officers were so impressed that they ordered the gun

completed under top priority. The final, standard model consisted of a

two-piece barrel mounted on a caliber .30 machine gun tripod. Targets

3,800 yards away could be hit, but accuracy was best below 1,000 yards.

The 28-pound HE shell easily demolished replica Japanese bunkers of earth

and logs.19

17

 (1) Col Borden's suggestion is cited in Ltr, Brig Gen W. C. Kabrich, C, Tech Div, OC

CWS to Dr. C. N. Hickman, C, Sec H, Div 3, NDRC, 8 Nov 43. SPCVD 472.4 GWU. Reprinted

as App. A, OSRD 5791. (2) Baum, Columbia University Chemical Warfare Laboratories. (3) Lt

Milton Stern, Lt L. L. Smith, and Charles T. Mitchell, Experiments with Horizontal Firing of 4.2-

Inch Mortar for Jungle Use. TDMR 1029, 10 May 45. 18

 (1) Ltr, Kabrich to Hickman, 8 Nov 43. (2) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 328-31. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Wendell H. Kayser, 4 Feb 57. 19

 (1) R. B. Kershner, Maj A. R. T. Denues, J. M. Woods, S. Golden, J. Levin, and Capt

F. Culp, Recoilless 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortars. OSRD 5791, Apr 46. (2) CWTC Item 1384,

Standardization of Mortar, Chemical, 4.2-Inch, Recoilless, M4, 2 Aug 45. (3) TB CW 24, 4.2-

Inch Recoilless Chemical Mortar, E34R1, 21 Dec 44.
CHEMICAL MORTARS AND SHELLS 133

The CWS contracted for the manufacture of 1,000 recoilless mortars,

100 of the weapons being completed before the end of the war. Recoilless

mortars reached the Tenth Army in the Pacific theater in time for the

Okinawa campaign, but otherwise they were produced too late for battle

use.20

Mortar Shells

The 4.2-inch mortar shell with fuze weighed 18 pounds, and held approximately 7 pounds of chemical agent. At the beginning of the war

the authorized toxic fillings were mustard, lewisite, phosgene, CNB (a solution of chloroacetophenone in benzene and carbon tetrachloride), and

CNS (a solution of chloroacetophenone and chloropicrin in chloroform).

Later cyanogen chloride was added. Some measure of the service's opinion

of the relative value of different toxic agents for gas shoots may be gauged

from the number of shells filled with various agents from 1940 to 1946:

540,746 contained mustard; 49,402, phosgene; 41,353, CNS; 12,957, CNB;

and 175, lewisite.21

The German Army came close to the American Army in its stockpile

of mustard filled shells, some 400,000 10-cm. mustard-arsenöl shells coming to light after the war. No other chemical mortar shells were found.

They either may have decided that other fillings were not satisfactory or

else they were not able to put other shells into production.22

The Japanese had a variety of toxic filled munitions for use with their

90-mm. mortar. One type of shell held a half pound of diphenylcyanoarsine, a vomiting agent, and a pound of TNT. The TNT scattered the

agent in aerosol form besides acting as a high explosive. Another shell

held two pounds of blistering agent, generally a fifty-fifty mixture of

lewisite and mustard. Shells containing hydrogen cyanide were also reported among Japanese supplies.23

American mortar shells held more agent than either Japanese or German shells. They contained from 6.25 to 7.56 pounds of chemical, depending

20

 (1) CWTC Item 1785, Obsoletion of the Mortar, Chemical, 4.2-Inch Recoilless, M4, and

the Shell, 4.2-Inch Recoilless Chemical Mortar, M6, with Cancellation of Related Military Requirements and Development Type Items, 25 Sep 47. (2) Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns,

Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), p. 38. 21

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. The phosgene shells include

2,000 containing 10 percent nitrogen dioxide, a red gas for spotting purposes. 22

 German Chemical Warfare, pp. 128-31. 23

 (1) CW Intell Bull No. 49, pt. I. (2) Enemy Capabilities for Chemical Warfare, pp. 92-96.
134 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

upon the physical characteristics of the chemicals. Thus the total weight

of filled shells varied from 24 to 26 pounds. In terms of percentage, the

agent comprised from 26 percent to 30 percent of the shell. In contrast,

German 10-cm. mustard-arsenöl shells weighing 15 pounds held 3 pounds,

or 20 percent, of agent; and Japanese 90-mm. shells weighing 12 pounds

held 2 pounds (17 percent) of vesicant agent, or 0.5 pound (4 percent)

of vomiting agent. Shell for shell, the 4.2-inch mortar could have laid

down a heavier concentration of gas on an area than the enemy mortars.24

The possibility that chemicals would be used during the war was the

reason for the mortar's presence among CWS troops; yet chemical shells,

with the exception of smoke shells, were never fired. It was the HE shell

which gained for the mortar the high regard of infantrymen. When the

CWS received permission to use HE, munitions experts modified the standard shell slightly, removed the vanes and burster tube, and then loaded

the missile with TNT. An HE shell, with fuze, weighed twenty-two pounds,

and the explosive charge weighed eight. This quantity of TNT, approximately one-third of the weight of the filled shell, represented a high loading efficiency, and the blast and fragmentation effect of the shell upon

impact was tremendous. In September 1942, the CWS standardized this

shell as model M3.25

During the course of development work the CWS Technical Command produced several experimental mortar shells, one of which, a high

explosive fragmentation shell with good flight characteristics and ballistic

properties, was superior to the M3 shell in demolishing Japanese-type pillboxes. The shell wall was twice as thick as that of the standard HE shell,

while the filling of TNT was a bit less, 6.6 pounds. In November 1943

a CWS representative returning from the Southwest Pacific Area reported

that such a shell was needed immediately. The CWS designated the new

shell as model M4 and ordered a large supply.26

In the spring of 1944 the Field Artillery Board compared the new M4

with the older M3 in a series of tests against targets in shelter trenches

and open fields. In percussion, ricochet and low-angle time fire, shell fragments from the M3 scored more hits than fragments from the M4. In

24

 (1) TM 3-320. (2) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, I-C-1. (3) CW Intell Bull No.

49, pt. I. 25

 (1) CWTC Item 530, Standardization of High Explosive 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Shell,

4 Aug 42. (2) CWTC Item 571, same title, 29 Sep 42. 26

 (1) Theodore R. Paulson, Milton Stern, and L. L. Smith, Tests of Experimental Shell for

4.2-Inch C. M. TDMR 1075, 23 Aug 45. (2) CWTC Item 869, Standardization of Shell, HE,

32-lb, 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, M4, 3 Dec 43.
CHEMICAL MORTARS AND SHELLS 135

high-angle time fire both projectiles produced about the same number of

hits. As a result of these tests the CWS halted the production of the new

shells, and thereafter used them only when there was a shortage of the

M3 shell.27 About 67,000 new M4 shells were manufactured, in comparison with the more than 6,400,000 of the M3 type.28

Smoke shells made up a large fraction of the service's output of mortar ammunition. Authorized smoke fillings included white phosphorus

(WP), a solution of sulphur trioxide in chlorosulfonic acid (FS), and titanium tetrachloride. "The American white phosphorus ammunition was

outstandingly good," wrote Generalleutnant Ochsner, after the war.29

These shells threw up a large volume of dense white smoke that was useful as a marker or as a smoke screen. Burning chunks of phosphorus flying through the air frightened enemy soldiers. Phosphorus could ignite

dry underbrush, hay, paper, and other combustibles, and thereby serve as

an incendiary. And finally the agent could cause casualties among enemy

troops by inflicting burns. Mortar squads fired quantities of WP second

in volume only to HE. Over three million WP shells came from filling

plants in the United States, more than all other mortar shells—excluding

HE—combined. In comparison, the service procured only one-third of a

million FS smoke shells, and none containing titanium tetrachloride.30

The German Army would have been happy to have had the same plentiful supply of WP as the American Army, but Germany lacked the raw

materials for producing phosphorus, and its army had to depend on inferior Berger mixture or on sulphur trioxide.31

In addition to chemical, HE, and smoke shells, the CWS developed

other types of mortar ammunition for special purposes. In 1943, the Chemical Warfare Board suggested that an incendiary shell might be useful in

driving enemy soldiers from wooded positions or combustible buildings.

After a preliminary study the question arose as to whether such a shell

would be worth the time spent on it. The CWS canvassed chemical officers in the various theaters and found only one who thought that the

shell might be useful. As a result of this survey the project was dropped.

But in the spring of 1944 the service revived the idea when the European

theater showed interest in an incendiary shell. Munitions engineers at CWS

27

 (1) CWTC Item 1011, Reclassification of Shell, HE, 32-lb, 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar, M4,

5 May 44. (2) CWTC Item 1070, same title, 7 Jul 44. 28

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. 29

 Ochsner, History of German Chemical Warfare in World War II, p. 33. 30

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. 31

 Oschner, History of German Chemical Warfare in World War II, p. 33.
136 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

designed a base ejection shell holding four hollow magnesium incendiary

cylinders filled with thermite mixture. The shell acted like a small mortar.

As it struck the target an explosive charge in the nose blew the burning

cylinders backward through the tail, and the magnesium in turn, set fires

in the target area. This shell was just being perfected as the war ended.32

In March 1944 the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area, requested an illuminating shell. The CWS had had no experience with this

type of projectile, but both the Ordnance Department and the Navy had

shells which, upon bursting, released a flare fastened to a parachute. Service engineers modified the Navy flare to fit the mortar shell, following

the standard naval practice in mixing and loading flare compositions. They

produced experimental shells that functioned perfectly, but these came too

late in the war for standardization.33

In May 1944 the Commanding General, South Pacific Area, asked for

colored smoke mortar shells. Chemists developed mixtures containing dyes

that produced red, yellow, green, and violet smokes. With a fuze set for

an air burst, shells containing these smokes erupted a colored cloud visible for some miles and lasting for several minutes in calm weather. Colored

smoke shells were recommended for standardization shortly before the end

of the war.34

Starting with one basic type of shell in 1942, the CWS evolved a variety of shells for the 4.2-inch mortar. Only three of these, HE, white

phosphorus, and FS smoke, were employed in battle, but their effectiveness led Generalleutnant Oschner to say, in speaking of the American

mortar, that "the various types of ammunition used with it are excellent."

 35

Mortar Gunboats

The CWS in 1942 experimented with mortars mounted on landing

craft, including the LCI's and the LCT's. It took the view that mortars

32

 (1) CWTC Item 1326, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics for Incendiary,

4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Shell, 24 May 45. (2) Alfred E. Gaul and Leo Finkelstein, Incendiaries,

vol. 18, 31 Jan 52, in monograph series, History of Research and Development of the CWS

(1 July 1940-31 December 1945), pp. 665-75. 33

 (1) Capt T. A. Ruble, 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Shell, Illuminating, E 71. TDMR 1030,

16 May 45. (2) CWTC Item 1059, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics for 4.2-

Inch Chemical Mortar Illuminating Shell, 7 Jul 44. 34

 (1) CWTC Item 1052, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics for 4.2-Inch

Chemical Mortar Colored Smoke Shell, 7 Jul 44. (2) Leo Finkelstein, Colored Smokes, vol. 12,

1 May 48, monograph in series, History of Research and Development of the CWS (1 July 1940-

31 December 1945), pp. 91-94. 35

 Oschner, History of German Chemical Warfare in World War II, p. 33.
CHEMICAL MORTARS AND SHELLS 137

could support an amphibious assault in the crucial period of an invasion,

after the naval and air bombardment let up so that troops might land.

Mortars could not be placed directly on the bottom of landing craft, since

there was no way to keep the recoil from kicking mortars backward when

the piece was fired. In addition, the terrific pounding might damage the

bottom of the vessel.

Technicians rigged an oblong wooden frame, filled with a mixture of

sand and sawdust, on the floor of the craft. A thick slab of wood, grooved

to take the bottom of the baseplate, sat on top of the sand-sawdust filling. This served as an artificial land emplacement for the mortar. The

Amphibious Training Command, Carrabelle, Fla., to which the CWS sent

the firing platform, saw the utility of the device and asked the service to

design a standard model.36

In July 1943 a chemical mortar battalion with weapons mounted in

landing craft took part in the seaborne assault on Sicily. The battalion

was ready to fire from its offshore positions, but the need did not arise.

Mortar gunboats first saw action in the Pacific, where amphibious warfare

was more common. On 15 September 1944, 4.2-inch mortars mounted on

landing craft, infantry (LCI), supported the 1st Marine Division in its

assault on Peleliu.37 Two days later at Angaur Island, mortar gunboats

fired on the beach area as troops of the 81st Division swarmed ashore.

Offshore LCI's afterwards lobbed mortar shells into Angaur to support infantry attacks.38

On D-day at Iwo Jima, the heavy gunfire-support ships of the invading force were augmented by 18 LCI's armed with 4.2-inch mortars. During

the night of 20-21 February LCI's with mortars delivered counterbattery

and harassing fires in supporting the V Amphibious Corps. Since LCI's

had no radar and only inadequate navigating gear, they followed the ingenious plan of steaming in an elliptical track around a reference ship

that kept station by radar, firing during the time they were on the path

of the ellipse and headed toward the island.39 On Easter Sunday, April 1945,

36

 (1) Robert W. Elton and Lt Donald W. Gerlitz, 4.2-Inch Emplacement for Landing Craft,

Vehicular. TDMR 640, 7 May 43. (2) TB 3-320-1, 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Mount LC, E2R2,

27 Jan 44. 37

 See Paul W. Pritchard, Brooks E. Kleber, and Dale Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service:

Chemicals in Combat, a volume in preparation for the series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II. 38

 Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 500, 519. 39

 Lt Col Whitman S. Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic, Marine Corps Monograph (Washington, 1954), pp. 49, 83-84.
138 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MORTAR GUNBOAT. Crew preparing to fire one of the 4.2-inch chemical mortars

mounted on the deck of an LCT.

forty-two mortar gunboats were among craft that led the way to the landing beach at Okinawa. One hundred and twenty-six mortars laid down

28,000 shells over a strip five and one-half miles long and one thousand

feet deep in less than an hour.40 All in all, LCI(M)'s (the M for mortar),

as the mortar mounted craft came to be designated, participated in a dozen

landings in the Pacific during the latter part of 1944 and the war months

of 1945.41

40

 Appleman, et al,, Okinawa, p. 70. (2) The Chemical Warfare Service in World War II, p. 150. 41

 (1) Maj. R. H. Skinner, "Famed 4.2 Rides Waves," Armed Forces Chemical Journal I

(October 46), 44-45. (2) "The 4.2 Goes to Sea," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 31 (Jan-Feb 45),

(3) Chemical Warfare Service in World War II, pp. 148-50.
CHAPTER VII

Flame Throwers

Portable Flame Throwers

On 8 December 1942 near Buna Village, Papua, Corp. Wilbur G. Tirrell crawled through the underbrush to a spot some thirty feet from a

Japanese emplacement. He stepped into the open and fired his flame

thrower. The flaming oil dribbled fifteen feet or so, setting the grass on

fire. Again and again Corporal Tirrell tried to reach the bunker, but the

flame would not carry. Finally a Japanese bullet glanced off his helmet,

knocking him unconscious. This was the first time an American flame

thrower had ever been used in combat. It failed so miserably that Col.

William A. Copthorne, Chief Chemical Officer, USAFFE, believed that

infantrymen would never want to use flame throwers again. Yet the weapon

had distinct advantages, and before the war was over the armed forces

had first-rate models.1

Flame throwers were introduced by the German Army in 1915, and

then adopted by other European armies. Americans, using European weapons as models, began to develop flame throwers in 1917, but the armistice

was reached before they were completed. The American Expeditionary

Forces was not enthusiastic about the flame thrower—General Fries called

it "one of the greatest failures among the many promising devices tried

out on a large scale in the war"—and after the conflict the Chemical Warfare Service dropped the weapon completely.2

 So it was that in July 1940

1

 (1) Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1957), p. 250. (2) Lt Col Leonard L. McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Operations in World War II, Chemical Corps Historical Studies No. 4, 1 Dec 49, p. 58. 2

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 352, 401.
140 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

when the Corps of Engineers asked the CWS for a portable flame thrower

the service had to go back to the beginning and start all over again.3

The Kincaid Co. of New York manufactured a few of the first experimental models, designated as El, in the autumn of 1940. This and all

subsequent models consisted of four main components: a storage system

for fuel, a storage system for compressed gas, a flame gun, and an igniter.

Each was an indispensable component and each required considerable development. The first fuel tank was a vertical cylinder having two compartments, the upper holding nitrogen under pressure and the lower

containing five gallons of fuel—at that time diesel oil, fuel oil, or a blend

of gasoline and oil. The filled weapon weighed seventy pounds. The fuel

oil flowed through a flexible tube into the flame gun. The gun was a metal

barrel to which was fastened an igniter consisting of a battery and a cylinder filled with compressed hydrogen. The gun had two triggers, one to

release the fuel and the other for ignition as it issued from the nozzle.

When the weapon was fired, compressed nitrogen blew the oil through

the hose and gun at the rate of one-half gallon per second. At the nozzle

an electric spark from the battery lit a small jet of hydrogen, which in

turn set aflame the oil. The stream of burning oil had a range of fourteen to twenty-one yards.4

The Engineer Board tested the weapon and decided it was not ready

for military operations. The combination fuel-compressed gas reservoir

was impractical, a bend in the gun barrel made the flame thrower difficult

to fire from a prone position, the gas pressure dropped steadily while the

weapon was being fired, decreasing the range. The entire apparatus was

cumbersome, heavy, and undependable. The CWS redesigned the flame

thrower, and contracted with the Kincaid Co. for a better model, E1R1,

which reached Edgewood in March 1941. Now the fuel and compressed

nitrogen were stored in separate reservoirs, a feature retained in all future

3

 (1) The flame throwers developed in 1917-18 are described in: (a) Arthur B. Ray, Incendiaries, Chemical Warfare Monograph, vol. 43, May 1919, pt. II, pp. 186-201; (b) Fries and

West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 347-52. (2) Ltr, C Engr to TAG, 24 Jul 40, sub: Flame Thrower

for Individual Use, with inds. This letter is reprinted in CWTC Item 221, 10 Sep 40. 4

 (1) The range of the flame thrower cannot be stated exactly because it varied with the composition of the fuel, the pressure of the gas, and with the individual weapon. The figures given

in this chapter are average, not the maximum obtained under ideal conditions. (2) The El and all

other flame throwers, as well as the basic scientific factors involved, are discussed in Leo Finkelstein, Flame Throwers, vol. 15, 1 May 49, in monograph series History of Research and Development of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II. (3) A resume of the work done by the

CWS may be found in Report of Activities of the Technical Division During World War II (1 Jan

46), pp. 136-49.
FLAME THROWERS 141

OPERATOR FIRING A PORTABLE FLAME THROWER E1R1 at a concrete fortification

during a test of the weapon.

models. The gun, the ignition system, and the valves were all improved.

The weapon weighed 28 pounds empty and 57 pounds loaded.5

The E1R1 was far from perfect—parts were easily broken, valves were

hard to reach unless the operator was a contortionist, and the weapon

made an uncomfortably heavy load on the operator's back—but the weapon

held a range of 15 to 20 yards for 15 to 20 seconds and on the whole

seemed suitable for use in special situations. Since the few that had been

produced for the purpose of testing were the only practical American flame

throwers in existence, the Army issued them to troops in training camps.

Some troops actually carried these crude weapons overseas to the Pacific

Islands and employed them in battle. Corporal Tirrell's assault on a Japanese bunker was made with one of these, an E1R1.

The CWS in the meantime had been rushing an improved version of

the E1R1 through final development. Suggestions from test boards had

led to a slightly heavier, more rugged, longer range model standardized

5

 The Report of the Engineer Board is quoted in Capt. L. W. Russem, Theodore Loew, and

C. T. Mitchell, Development of the Portable Flame Thrower M1, M1A1, and M2-2. TDMR

1069, 19 Jun 45, p. 6. (2) Service Tests of Portable Flame Thrower EB 109, Report of the Engineer Board, Report No. 621, 16 May 41. (3) Report on Service Tests of Portable Flame Thrower

E1R1, Report of the Infantry Board No. 1225, 20 Jun 41.
142 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

as M1. In March 1942 the weapons began coming off production lines,

some reaching the South Pacific Area by the end of the year.

The new flame thrower was employed for the first time on 15 January 1943 by marines and infantrymen on Guadalcanal. An infantry attack

against a stubborn enemy pocket holding up the advance of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, did not succeed. But Marine engineers burned out

three Japanese bunkers in a ravine, and thus helped rout enemy troops

holding up a Marine advance.6

At that time the flame thrower was unfamiliar to the Army. Since

most troops had never seen one before, they did not know what it could

do. After its success on Guadalcanal the word spread around, and in later

engagements in the Pacific, from New Guinea to the Ryukyus, foot soldiers always kept the flame thrower in mind when they had to overcome

a stoutly defended Japanese position. This is not to say that the M1 was

a perfect, reliable weapon. One specimen, just received from the States,

might function properly and spurt a jet of flame the customary fifteen

yards, but its twin might eject a harmless stream of nonburning oil a distance of five yards. Batteries in the ignition circuit deteriorated rapidly in

the hot, humid, climate; inadequate waterproofing allowed moisture to corrode parts and to short-circuit the electrical system; and minute rust holes

in tanks allowed compressed gas to escape and the pressure to drop.

Chemical maintenance companies had their hands full inspecting, testing,

repairing, and servicing flame throwers to keep them in proper working

order for the troops.

The weapon that replaced the M1 came about as a result of the invention of napalm, developed originally to thicken gasoline fillings in incendiary bombs.7

 The CWS tested thickened gasoline in flame throwers

and found that the range was greater than with ordinary gasoline. Furthermore, ordinary gasoline broke into a spray after it left the nozzle of

the flame gun and burned itself out in a billow of fire while thickened

fuel flew through the air in a compact stream that would ricochet into

portholes and stick to flat surfaces.

Unfortunately, the M1 flame thrower could not get the greatest range

out of the new thickened gasoline, for it was like running a 1910 model

automobile on modern premium fuel. In August 1942 Col. William C.

6

 (1) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 39-40. (2) John Miller, jr.,

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1949), pp. 279, 295. (3) Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat. 7

 See p. 169.
FLAME THROWERS 143

Kabrich, chief of the CWS Technical Division, appointed a joint CWSNDRC committee to modify the weapon. To keep from upsetting the

procurement program, Colonel Kabrich asked the committee to make the

changes in the M1 as few and as simple as possible. The committee

modified the fuel system, pressure regulator, valves, and flame gun to permit the higher operating pressure necessary to obtain the maximum range

with napalm, and at the same time improved the waterproofing.8 The

CWS-MIT Laboratory tested napalm-gasoline mixtures to find the one

giving the greatest range.9

The new flame thrower, M1A1, could expel thick fuel two or three

times as far as the old model. In aiming at the port of a pillbox fifty

yards away it could place half of the thickened fuel inside the structure.

The old model could not reach a pillbox fifty yards away, and could place

only about 10 percent of its charge in a pillbox twenty yards away. The

improved electrical system was still not entirely reliable, but on the whole

the new weapon was so superior to the M1 that the CWS decided to

produce and issue it immediately.

Initial shipments of the fourteen thousand M1A1 flame throwers manufactured during World War II arrived in the Mediterranean theater in

June 1943, the South Pacific Area in July, and the Southwest Pacific Area

in August.10 This model gave good service throughout the war, but occasionally the electrical ignition system failed. When this happened the

troops dropped the weapon or else lit it by some other means. In the

landing on Leyte, 20 October 1944, a flame thrower failed to ignite when

the operator fired it at a pillbox. Nearby Pfc. Frank B. Robinson, 19th

Infantry, threw a handful of burning paper in front of the pillbox. The

operator ignited the fuel by firing it through the flames from the paper.11

In an action at Azeville, France, 9 June 1944, Pvt. Ralph G. Riley ran up

to a German blockhouse with his flame thrower, only to find that the

ignition system would not work. He held a match near the nozzle and

ignited the stream of fuel. Ammunition exploded inside of the fortifica8

 Fire Warfare: Incendiaries and Flame Throwers (Washington, 1946), p. 96. This is Volume

3 Summary Technical Report of Division 11, NDRC. (2) A resume of the work done by the

NDRC on flame throwers may be found in Fire Warfare; Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 420-30; James

Phinney Baxter, 3d, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1946), 294-97. 9

 Hemleben, CWS-MIT Laboratory, pp. 54-68. 10

 McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 14, 182. 11

 M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), p. 69.
144 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ATTACKING A JAPANESE BUNKER with an M1A1 portable flame thrower, Bougainville, March 1944.

tion, the garrison or 169 men surrendered, and Private Riley received the

Silver Star.12

The final portable flame thrower appeared in 1944. In developing this

weapon the Chemical Warfare Service and the National Defense Research

Committee set out on different roads to find the best method of ignition,

and to design a more rugged, comfortable, dependable weapon. The

NDRC contractor, Standard Oil Development Co., produced a model

known as the E2. This featured a long-life battery, waterproof electrical

system, lightweight aluminum fuel tank, and gasoline ignition system.

The CWS turned out a weapon, E3, with a streamlined gun, improved

valves, a comfortable pack similar to the standard Quartermaster packboard used for carrying mortar shells and other ammunition, and a cartridge type of ignition. The latter was similar to a revolver. It held six

cartridges, each filled with a pyrotechnic mixture. When the operator

pressed the trigger a shower of sparks erupted from the cartridge and ig12

 Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II (Washington, 1951), p. 390.
FLAME THROWERS 145

FIRING AN M2-2 PORTABLE FLAME THROWER into a wall opening, Manila,

Luzon, February 1945.

nited the fuel. Six cartridges allowed the operator to fire up to six

bursts.13

In comparative tests the CWS and NDRC models showed approximately the same range, sixty yards with thickened fuel and one-third of

this with ordinary fuel. The former model was slightly heavier and held

less fuel than the latter. The Army preferred the rugged CWS model with

pyrotechnic ignition to the light NDRC model with electrical ignition,

and adopted it as the standard model, M2-2 in March 1944.14

American troops first employed the M2-2 in the Guam operation in

July 1944. Manufacturers turned out more of this model than all earlier

models combined—almost 25,000 as compared with 14,000—but production

difficulties slowed down the issue of flame throwers to theaters of operation. March 1945 arrived before divisions in Italy received the weapon,

13

 Development of Portable Flame Thrower, E2. OSRD No. 3574, 4 May 44. 14

 (1) In the new method of multiple designation used here, the first "2" referred to the gas

and fuel reservoirs, the second "2" to the flame gun. (2) CWTC Item 935, Standardization of

Flame Thrower, Portable, M2-2, Kit, Service, for Portable Flame Thrower, M2-2, and Cylinder,

Ignition, Portable Flame Thrower, 17 Mar 44.
146 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and some troops in the Pacific fought their last engagements of the war

using the old M1A1.15

Although the M2-2 was better than its predecessor, it was not entirely

satisfactory. It was too heavy, it did not hold enough fuel, and the fuel

tanks were uncomfortable on the backs of the operators when the weapon

had to be carried a considerable distance. It was, however, the most reliable flame thrower designed by any army up to that time. The CWS

technicians continued to develop a light, large capacity weapon, but they

did not reach their goal during the war.

The German Army, as the American, had portable-type flame throwers.

The model in general use was Flammenwerfer 41. The fuel pack consisted

of two steel cylinders, one containing approximately two gallons of fuel

oil, and the other holding compressed nitrogen. A metal braided hose ran

from the fuel pack to the flame gun. The original ignition system was

similar in operation to the early CWS models; that is, an electrical spark

from a small battery ignited a tiny jet of hydrogen. The Germans, too,

had difficulty with this system and switched to a pyrotechnic cartridge.

The filled flame thrower weighed approximately forty pounds, and expelled

a jet of fuel from twenty-five to thirty-five yards.16

Japanese troops on occasion used flame throwers. Americans first faced

them on Bataan in early February 1942, and shortly thereafter American

soldiers captured two. The CWS laboratory staff at Fort Mills tested one

flame thrower, and sent the ignition system to Edgewood where it was

examined for usable features.17

Fuel packs on Japanese flame throwers were similar to the American

type. Two cylindrical tanks held a mixture of oil and gasoline, while a

small tank contained compressed nitrogen. A rubber hose connected the

fuel pack and the flame gun. The ignition mechanism was a revolving

cylinder holding ten pyrotechnic cartridges. Japanese weapons were lighter

and held slightly less fuel than the American models. The range was

somewhat more than the E1R1, M1, and M1A1 models, but less than

Model M2-2.

The Japanese flame throwers were well made. Colonel Hamilton, chem15

 (1) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 190, 227. (2) Crawford, Cook,

and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 24. 16

 (1) German Chemical Warfare, World War II, p. 141. (2) WD Intel Bull, Apr 44,

pp. 22-28. 17

 Hamilton, Activities Chemical Warfare Service, Philippine Islands, World War II, 22 Nov

46, sec. B, pp. 21-30.
FLAME THROWERS 147

AMERICAN AND GERMAN PORTABLE FLAME THROWERS. U.S. flame thrower

M2-2, left; German 1942 model, right.

ical officer in the Philippines, stated his opinion in early 1942 that the

"United States principle and basis of flame thrower research and development is somewhat inferior and less practical than the Japanese principle."

 18

The Japanese weapon was of course not foolproof. The ignition cartridges

were susceptible to moisture, and at times would not throw off a shower

of sparks. In many instances in the Pacific Islands American tanks and

troops who were fired on escaped with only a harmless shower of oil.

The One-Shot Flame Throwers

One disadvantage of the portable flame thrower was its weight, about

70 pounds including fuel. In December 1942 the chemical officer, Fifth

Army, recommended the development of a single-shot flame thrower light

enough for a man to carry long distances, and inexpensive enough to be

discarded after firing. In addition to its light weight and low cost

18

 Ltr, Col Stuart A. Hamilton, USFIP, to C CWS, sub: Status of Improvised Flame Thrower,

Philippine Islands, 16 Apr 42. Copy in Activities Chemical Warfare Service, Philippine Islands,

World War II, sec. A, p. 64.
148 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the weapon could be shipped from the United States ready for use, thus

saving the time of maintenance crews.19

The first crude model was cylindrical in shape, thirty-four inches long,

and five inches in diameter. Inside at the butt end was a pressure bottle

taken from a carbon dioxide fire extinguisher to provide gas for expelling

the fuel. Seated against the pressure bottle was a piston. Between the piston and the nozzle were two gallons of fuel. The weapon was simple to

operate. The soldier held it tightly against his body as he might the

nozzle of a fire hose, and then pulled the firing pin. This released a steel

spike which pierced the gas bottle. Escaping carbon dioxide pushed the

piston forward, squirting the fuel out through the nozzle. A railroad fusee

ignited the charge. The effective range of the flame thrower was about

thirty yards.20

The Army was at first not particularly interested in the one-shot flame

thrower and CWS engineers worked on the device only when they could

spare time from other jobs. After the portable model proved valuable in

jungle fighting, the service hastened development of the one-shot. The

NDRC assisted by letting a contract with the Firestone Tire and Rubber

Co. Firestone in the summer of 1944 designed a model containing compressed gas stored in a long, steel tube coiled around the outside. The

maximum effective range was forty yards, the weapon emptying in four

seconds.21

A new method of propelling fuel had meanwhile been suggested—gas

from a combustible powder. Powder would eliminate carbon dioxide coils,

it would simplify charging the weapon, and it would ease the problem of

supply. The NDRC produced a model in which powder gave off gas at a

pressure of 1,000 pounds per square inch. This pressure was great enough

to shoot unthickened gasoline twenty-five yards. When the war ended the

one-shot had reached the stage where the CWS was ready to produce some

for battle testing.22

The American Army was not alone in seeking a light flame thrower.

Toward the end of the war the German Army produced Einstossflammenwerfer 46, a single-shot close combat weapon for assault troops and paratroopers. The barrel was two feet long and three inches in diameter. It

was lighter than the CWS weapon—it weighed only six pounds filled—

19

 McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Operations, p. 190. 20

 T. Loew, Development of One-Shot Flame Thrower, E15. TCIR 215, 15 Nov 44. 21

 Flame Thrower, Portable, One-Shot, E15. TB CW 28, 28 Mar 45. 22

 (1) Fire Warfare, pp. 101-02. (2) The Status of ABL Projects as of VJ-day. OSRD 5932,

3 Sep 45.
FLAME THROWERS 149

but in reducing the weight the designers reduced the fuel capacity to one

and one-half quarts. The pressure to expel the fuel was provided by gas

from an exploding cartridge. The range averaged thirty yards. Germany

seems to have been alone among the enemy countries in producing a oneshot flame thrower; neither Italy nor Japan had this type of weapon.23

Mediumweight Flame Throwers

A disadvantage of the portable flame thrower was the limited capacity

of its fuel tanks. During battle they often ran dry, leaving operators with

the choice of going to the rear for more fuel or abandoning the weapons.

To get around this objection the CWS attempted to increase the capacity.

For the use of Engineer troops in assault operations, the CWS developed a two-man flame thrower. With the exception of the fuel tanks,

pressure tank, and minor parts, the design was the same as for the M1

portable. The fuel tanks held twenty-two gallons of fuel, and were fastened on a two-wheeled frame. One operator grasped the handles of the

frame and pushed it along like a wheelbarrow, while the other operator

carried the flame gun. The fuel charge lasted about thirty seconds, and the

range with a mixture of gasoline and oil was around twenty-five yards.

The CWS did not produce this flame thrower because the Engineer Board

considered it too bulky and heavy for troops.24

Another large weapon for assault and mopping-up operations was the

cart-mounted flame thrower. The CWS took a fuel pressure unit designed for flame throwing tanks, mounted it on a chemical mortar cart

and connected it to a portable flame thrower gun by means of two hundred feet of high pressure hose. The weapon, filled with twenty-five gallons of fuel, weighed more than six hundred pounds. Two men were

needed to pull the cart—more if the terrain was rugged. One man

remained at the cart while another dragged the flame gun to the firing

point. In tests conducted by the Infantry Board the weapon proved efficient and reliable, but too heavy for foot troops in rough country.25

The CWS designed a manifold portable flame thrower especially for

use in the jungle. By means of a manifold assembly the pressure tanks

23

 (1) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, p. I-P-8. (2) German Chemical Warfare, pp. 141-42. 24

 Rpt, Engineer Board, Demolitions No. 38, Engineering Report on Test of Two-Man Flame

Thrower, 1 Jul 43. 25

 Rpt, Infantry Board, Ft Benning, Ga., Cart Mounted Flame Thrower, 28 Sep 45.
150 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and fuel tanks of two or more portable flame throwers could be coupled

together. Two hundred feet of hose connected the manifold to a special

flame gun. The operator would crawl through the underbrush dragging the

gun and hose along with him. With this device one operator could fire

as much fuel as six men with portable flame throwers. The CWS developed

the manifold flame thrower rather late in the war and it was not produced.

The German Army, like the American, found the small fuel capacity

of portable flame throwers a disadvantage, and it devised a larger weapon

for its troops. Two men pulled the flame thrower, which weighed more

than two hundred pounds and was mounted on a dolly fitted with two

pneumatic tires. The fuel tank held approximately eight gallons, sufficient

for twenty-five seconds of continuous firing. The range was about thirty

yards. The Germans limited the distribution of this weapon, and it was

not used to any great extent.26

Main Armament Mechanized flame Throwers

Just as World War II proved the value of portable flame throwers, it

likewise demonstrated the usefulness of mechanized flame throwers. The

CWS had designed its first mechanized flame thrower in World War I

but did not have time to carry the weapon beyond the experimental stage.

Intended for installation in a tank, the gun could expel a stream of oil

fifty yards. After the war the service put mechanized flame throwers aside

and did not work on them again for twenty years.27

The revival of the mechanized flame thrower began in the United States

in the late 1930's after newspapers, magazines, and newsreels reported that

the Italian Army had outfitted some of its armored units with this type of

weapon. The Chemical Warfare Technical Committee laid down tentative

military characteristics and in the summer of 1940 engineers constructed

the weapon. Tests with this flame thrower uncovered flaws which were

corrected in a second model, installed in an M2 medium tank. In the tank

the flame gun replaced the cannon (the main armament), and for this

reason the flame thrower became known as the main armament type. Two

sixty-gallon reservoirs on the floor of the tank held fuel, and three commercial steel cylinders held compressed nitrogen for expelling it. Ignition

was provided by propane gas lit by sparks from a spark plug. The opera26

 German Chemical Warfare, p. 141. 27

 Ray, Incendiaries, pt. III, 190-91.
FLAME THROWERS 151

tor elevated and traversed the gun with his left hand and fired with his

right.28

With this tank, observers on the Armored Force Board were able to

see a mechanized flame thrower in action for the first time. They were

not impressed and would not recommend flame throwers for the armored

forces.29

 Their opinion, widely shared during the early part of the war,

kept the development of mechanized flame throwers moving along at a

slow pace. The CWS had to give priority to items that the troops did

want, and engineers had difficulty getting tanks for further experiments.

The opinion of the Armored Board was based on guesses that seemed

reasonable at the time, not on experience. Later, as battle showed the

value of flame warfare, opinions changed, but by then the CWS had lost

irreplaceable development time.

By the summer of 1942 engineers had the third model, mounted in an

M3 medium tank, ready for tests. This flame thrower was provided with

a larger fuel supply than previous designs, and used pressure from a rotary

pump to expel the fuel. The pump eliminated the need for supplying gas

cylinders and removed a potential safety hazard. But the pump took too

much power from the tank engine, and the whirling blades of the pump

smashed the cellular structure of thickened fuel, thinning it out so that

it gave the same range as unthickened fuel. Changing back to compressed

air, engineers obtained a range almost twice that of earlier flame throwers.30

At the same time the CWS was developing the flame throwing unit

for tanks, NDRC engineers had taken up the study of some of the fundamental factors involved in flame throwers such as the design of nozzles

and the composition of fuels.31 In March 1942 the NDRC contracted with

several firms for a large flame thrower similar to the Ronson type of the

Canadian Army. Several models were made, but none passed beyond the

experimental stage. During this period, however, the firms gained experience that later made possible the rapid development of model "Q" (for

Quickie). Work on "Q" began in November in the plant of the Standard Oil Development Co. Tanks were so scarce that the designers had to

28

 (1) Charles T. Mitchell, Development of Mechanically Transported Flame Throwers.

TDMR 737, 15 Nov 43. (2) CWTC Item 167, Flame Thrower, Development of Mechanically

Transported, 16 Jul 40. 29

 Rpt, Armored Board, Project No. 58, Report on Mechanized Flame Thrower, E2, 13 Sep 41. 30

 Mitchell, TDMR 737. 31

 The work of the NDRC on mechanized flame throwers is summarized in (1) Fire Warfare.

(2) Baxter, Scientists Against Time, 294-97. (3) Noyes, Chemistry, 420-30.
152 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

mount the weapon on an old truck. With napalm thickened fuel, "Q"

had a range of more than 100 yards.32

By the beginning of 1943 there were thus two fairly satisfactory flame

throwers, the CWS model and NDRC's "Q." Although theaters of operation had not asked for main armament flame throwers the Army Ground

Forces had watched the development of the weapon with approval. In

March 1943 CWS arranged a demonstration to allow the AGF to decide

which of the two models it preferred. This turned out to be "Q." The

Army decided to place the flame thrower in light tanks, these being the

only tanks available.33

Engineers mounted the flame gun, fuel reservoir, and compressed gas

cylinders in a turret basket that was interchangeable with the regular turret

basket of an M5A1 tank. The reservoir held 105 gallons of fuel that could

be discharged at a rate of approximately two gallons a second. The range

with ordinary fuel was 30 to 40 yards, with thick fuel 105 to 130 yards.34

Difficulty in getting tanks delayed the installation of flame throwers,

and January 1944 arrived before the Armored Board received a weapon

for test. By this time the M5A1 tank was no longer in use, forcing the

CWS and NDRC to start over and design a flame thrower for the M4

medium tank. The work went forward slowly because the Army did not

want to hold tanks in the United States, the CWS lacked engineers for

the project, and considerable time was needed to perfect the complex

mechanism. Finally representatives of CWS, AGF, ASF, and NDRC agreed

that the fastest way to get a main armament flame thrower into action

was to modify the earlier "Q." This was done rapidly, but the M5-4, as

the flame thrower was designated, could not be installed until the spring

of 1945 because tanks were still scarce. The war ended before the flame

throwing tank could be shipped overseas.35

32

 The CWS designation for this flame thrower was E7. The "Q" model is discussed in NDRC

Div 11, OSRD Report 6012, Development and Field Use of E7-7 Mechanized Flame Thrower,

12 Sep 45. 33

 (1) Ltr, Hq SOS to CG ASF, 24 Jan 43, sub: Military Characteristics for Mechanically

Transported Flame Thrower, with two inds. SPRMD 470.71. (2) Memo, Munitions Development

Div for CG CWS Tech Cmd, 30 Mar 43, sub: Report of Conference on Mechanized Flame

Thrower. Proj 8.1 (FY 43) in Corres Files, CW Labs A CmlC, Md. 34

 (1) Development and Field Use of E7-7 Mechanized Flame Thrower, NDRC Div 11,

Report No. OSRD 6012, 12 Sep 45. (2) Flame Thrower, Mechanized, E7-7, in Light Tank,

M5A1. NDRC Div 11, Report No. OSRD 5125, 29 May 45. 35

 (1) Report of Activities of the Technical Division, p. 143. (2) Memo, Lt Col R. A. Meridith,

ADG Asst Ground AG for CofS US Army, attn: G-4 Division, WDGS, sub: Mechanized Flame

Thrower, 10 Oct 44. In AGF file 470.71.
FLAME THROWERS 153

The CWS in the meantime had on its hands four obsolete light tanks

that it had rigged up with flame throwers for Armored Board tests. The

service did not wish to abandon these tanks since they were serviceable

as flame weapons. It had the turrets strengthened and shipped the tanks

to Manila early in 1945. The Sixth Army attached them to the 27th Division for assault operations on Myoko Mountain, and to the 38th Infantry

Division in the Ipo Dam area. They were the only main armament flame

throwers produced in continental United States to see combat.36

Main Armament Flame Throwers Produced in Hawaii

Troops in the Pacific early discovered the value of flame throwers in

overcoming fortified positions. By 1944 experience with flame warfare convinced them of the need for main armament flame throwing tanks. The

weapons were not available for the reasons noted above and servicemen in

the Central Pacific Area produced their own.

The main armament flame thrower turned out in Hawaii was based

on the Ronson flame thrower. The Ronson had been developed in Great

Britain in 1941, rejected by the British Army because of its short range

and low hitting power, and then accepted by the Canadian Army and

produced in Canada. The Canadians sent twenty to the Pacific at the

request of the V Marine Amphibious Corps. In January 1944 a team of

men from the 43d Chemical Laboratory Company, the Royal Canadian

Army, and the V Amphibious Corps installed a Ronson in an LVT, and

on 3 February demonstrated it at Koko Head before high-ranking Army,

Navy, and Marine Corps officers. The weapon satisfied the officers, who

decided that it should be developed further. Shortly thereafter the Marine

Corps stepped aside, leaving Col. George H. Unmacht, CWS, responsible

for future work.37

The medium tank, rather than the LVT, was the most suitable mount

for the Ronson, but as in other instances, medium tanks were needed for

their high explosive firepower and were scarce. Only the obsolescent M3A1

light tank could be obtained from Ordnance. The 43d Chemical Labora36

 (1) McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 142-50. (2) Sixth United

States Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, III, p. 89. 37

 For the part played by the CWS in developing flame throwing tanks in the Pacific see: (1)

History of Chemical Section, U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific, 7 Dec 41-2 Sep 45, vols. II and

III, in OCMH; (2) Col George H. Unmacht, "Flame Throwing Seabees," Armed Forces Chemical

Journal, III (July 1948), 48-50, reprinted from United States Naval Institute Proceedings (April

1948).
154 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

tory Company removed the 37-mm. cannon from a tank and replaced it

with a flame gun, protected by a howitzerlike shroud. To lessen the possibility of mechanical failure and to permit easier operation, the company

redesigned the entire electrical system. The Honolulu Iron Works fabricated the fuel reservoirs. Satan, as the finished tank was called, used

compressed carbon dioxide as the propellent gas, had a fuel capacity of

170 gallons, and a range of 40 to 60 yards with oily fuel or of 60 to 80

yards with thickened fuel. It was demonstrated on 15 April before Army,

Navy, and Marine officers, and the following day Lt. Gen. Holland M.

Smith asked for twenty-four Satans.

In June on Saipan, marines employed the Hawaiian flame throwers for

mopping up and, after the operators gained experience, in assaults. The

tanks attacked dugouts, cane fields, buildings, and caves. Marines then

shipped the tanks to Tinian and used them in the assault waves and in

overcoming Japanese strongholds.38

These two islands served as proving grounds for the tank mounted

flame thrower, and brought out faults in the design. The scarcity of napalm

restricted the weapons to oily fuel, which gave a shorter range than

marines wanted. Before the weapons were employed again, Colonel

Unmacht's group overcame some of the flaws, and the supply channels

opened to the flow of napalm.

In September the Tenth Army, planning an attack—later canceled—

on Formosa, requested that large capacity flame throwers be installed in

fifty-four M4 medium tanks. In the first model the company installed a

Ronson gun like that used on Satan. The Tenth Army pointed out that

the silhouette was different from the 75-mm. gun of the regular M4 tank,

and this would permit the enemy to spot flame tanks. The problem then

arose of obtaining 75-mm. gun tubes to enclose the flame gun. Ordnance

did not wish to sacrifice new tubes for the manufacture of flame throwers,

and only a few salvaged tubes were available. Seabees machined these items

to hold the flame gun, and in the meantime the ASF shipped fourteen

salvaged tubes under high priority. Later, Colonel Unmacht obtained

authority to use forty-two serviceable tubes for the purpose.

The new flame thrower tank, designated POA-CWS "75" H-1 (POA

for Pacific Ocean Areas, H for Hawaii), was demonstrated to the Tenth

38

 (1) McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 75-78. (2) Maj Carl W. Hoffman, "Marine Corps Monographs," The Seizure of Tinian (Washington, 1951), pp. 53, 131.

(3) Maj Carl W. Hoffman, "Marine Corps Monographs," Saipan: The Beginning of the End

(Washington, 1950), pp. 146, 252, 254.
FLAME THROWERS 155

Army about 1 November. The weapon used compressed carbon dioxide

gas to propel the fuel, had a fuel capacity of 290 gallons, a range of 40

yards with oily fuel and 60 to 80 yards with thickened fuel. Eight tanks

were sent to the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for the Iwo Jima operation

and 54 were supplied to the 713th Provisional Flame Thrower Tank

Battalion for the Ryukyus operation.

On Iwo Jima, marines found the flame tanks particularly helpful in

the later stages of the operation when they had to take a network of

caves. By the time the marines had reached the northern end of the island,

flame tanks had proven so useful that demands for them exceeded the

supply. On Okinawa the operations took place on the hilly southern

portion of the island where Japanese troops had defenses in cliffs, hills,

and escarpments. The tank battalion carried out more than six hundred

attacks, and fired almost 200,000 gallons of napalm thickened fuel.39

Troops on Okinawa employed an ingenious hose extension against

caves that were out of range of tanks. The Navy donated fifty-foot lengths

of fire hose which the men coupled together to form a hose four hundred feet long. They fastened one end of the hose to the fuel reservoir of

the tank, and attached an M2-2 portable flame gun to the other end. In

action the tank parked as close as possible to the target, the operators

dragged the hose to a position within range, the tank pumped fuel through

the hose, and the nozzleman ignited the fuel and directed the flame at

the target. The extension was used with good results on a number of

occasions.40

Troops objected to main armament flame throwers chiefly because they

replaced the tank's cannon. To meet this criticism, Colonel Unmacht's

staff drew up plans for mounting flame throwers alongside the cannon

instead of replacing it. Work began in late 1944 when Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific, anticipating an invasion of Japan, asked for at least seventy-two

main armament flame throwers. Most of the tanks provided by the marines

carried 75-mm. guns. The remainder carried 105-mm. howitzers. By

judicious planning, designers arranged the interior of the vehicles to allow

39

 (1) McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 93-104, 108-39. (2) Maj

Charles S. Nichols, Jr., and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., "Marine Corps Monographs," Okinawa: Victory in

the Pacific (Washington, 1955), pp. 132, 272. (3) Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle, pp. 229, 256-57, 277, 305, 340, 456. (4) Alvin P. Stauffer, The War

Against Japan, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1952), p. 405. 40

 (1) McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 119-21, 124-25, 139-42. (2)

Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa, p. 247. (3) Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Okinawa, pp.

441-42, 444.
156 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

M4 MEDIUM FLAME-THROWER TANK in action on Okinawa, May 1945

the storage of forty rounds of 75-mm. or twenty rounds of 105-mm. shells

without decreasing the quantity of flame-thrower fuel. Handicapped by a

scarcity of parts and a dearth of machinists and other craftsmen, the work

proceeded slowly. During the battle on Okinawa the Tenth Army asked

for eighteen of these tanks. They were on their way to that island by the

time the battle ended, and were rerouted, instead, to the Marianas to

equip the Marine division rehabilitating there. Seventy tanks were ready

for the invasion of Japan when the operation was called off and the war

came to an end.

The Marine Corps was not alone in using mechanized flame throwers.

The Navy, after seeing a demonstration of model "Q" in December 1943,

recognized the effectiveness of flame throwers in amphibious assaults. In

January 1944 the Bureau of Ordnance ordered a model mounted on an

LCVP or LCM. The complete unit, designated the Navy Mark I flame

thrower, had a fuel capacity of 300 gallons and a maximum range of approximately 110 yards with napalm thickened gasoline. The unit proved

too heavy for an LCVP and the Chemical section at Pearl Harbor tried

mounting it in an M3A5 tank. But the excessive weight (which reduced

the mobility of the tank), the limited flame gun traverse of 60°, and other
FLAME THROWERS 157

LT. GEN. WILHELM D. STYER standing in front of a flame thrower mounted on a

medium tank chassis at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. To the right of General Styer is

Col. Jay C. Whitehair, Howard C. Peterson, and Col. George F. Unmacht.

difficulties ended the experiment. Finally an LVT-4 lightly armored

amphibious tractor was found to be a fairly satisfactory mount. Six of

these were used in the mopping-up phase of the Peleliu operation, particularly around the caves of Umurbrogol mountain. The LVT-4 was not

the ideal carrier and the crews were kept busy making repairs but the

flame thrower itself proved rugged and dependable.41

Under Colonel Unmacht the composite group of Army, Navy, and

Marine personnel produced more main armament flame throwing tanks

than did engineers in the United States, but the problems which they faced

were much simpler. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in the Pacific

were anxious to get the weapons and gave the Chemical section all necessary

assistance and supplies, whereas Edgewood could not get the Army to set

up a requirement for a main armament flame thrower and had great diffi41

 (1) The Navy Mark I is described in: Summary Technical Report of Division 11, NDRC,

vol. 3, Fire Warfare, pp. 112-16. (2) Maj Frank O. Hough, "Marine Corps Monographs," The

Assault on Peleliu (Washington, 1950), pp. 32, 180-81. (3) Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, p. 564.
158 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

culty obtaining tanks for conversion into flame throwers. American forces

on one side of the world wanted the weapon, gave technicians full support, and got it. Forces on the other side of the world were indifferent

toward the weapon, gave technicians little support, and did not receive it.

Enemy armies had mechanized flame throwers, but used them infrequently. Indeed, there is no record of Italians or Japanese using flame tanks

against United States troops. The Italians had had tank mounted weapons

since the Ethiopian War, 1935-1936. The tank was quite light and mounted

the flame gun coaxially with a machine gun. Fuel was carried in a trailer

with a capacity of one hundred gallons. The range was rather low, from

thirty to forty-five yards. The reasons why the Italians did not employ

their tanks are not known. Among them may have been the lack of

opportunity, unfamiliarity with flame thrower tactics, and conservatism of

tank commanders.42

American troops did not see Japanese flame throwing vehicles until

they captured eight on Luzon in 1945. The weapons were placed on

amphibious tractors, similar to American DUKW's. The Japanese did not

have fuel thickeners comparable to American napalm, and had to use mixtures of crude oil, gasoline, and kerosene. Since Japanese troops employed

portable flame throwers against Americans from early 1942 onward, it is

difficult to explain why they did not use mechanized flame throwers.

American troops learned by trial and error of the value of flame tanks,

and perhaps the Japanese never threw off their conservatism sufficiently

to give the tanks full-scale battle tests.43

The German Army was equipped with a Pz. Kw. III tank carrying a

flame gun disguised as a cannon. The fuel capacity was more than 200

gallons, the range about 40 yards. In addition the Germans had armored

half-track vehicles carrying 2 large flame throwers on the sides and a small

flame thrower at the rear. Each large flame thrower had a fuel reservoir

of 95 gallons, and a range of 40 yards. The Germans also developed a

trailer-mounted flame thrower that could be hauled behind a truck or tank.

The 2-wheeled trailer carried a 40-gallon fuel reservoir, and was protected

by armor plate. Only a few of these were ever manufactured. German flame

fuels did not have particularly good thickening agents. The best was aluminum alcoholate, but this was not as good as napalm. Generally German

42

 (1) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Operations, p. 34. (2) WD Intel Bull, Oct 42, pp.

67-68. 43

 (1) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 32-33. (2) WD Intel Bull, Sep 45,

pp. 114-17.
FLAME THROWERS 159

thickened fuels had little more, if any, range than American unthickened

fuels.44

Auxiliary Mechanized Flame Throwers

The auxiliary mechanized flame thrower was smaller than the main

armament type, and at the most replaced only a machine gun in the tank.

Since the tank retained its cannon, tank commanders did not raise as

strenuous objections to the auxiliary flame thrower as they did to the main

armament type. Warfare on the Pacific islands provided the impetus for

the development of the auxiliary flame thrower. After the Battle of Guadalcanal infantrymen and marines tried to devise ways of putting portable

flame throwers in tanks so as to protect the operator from Japanese rifle

fire. One group of soldiers drilled a hole in the armor of the tank near

the bow machine gun and shoved through a flame gun. They fired the

flame thrower, and then ignited the fuel by means of tracers. The 3d

Marine Division modified a flame gun to fit the bow machine gun balland-socket joint. For the invasion of Kwajalein the 7th Infantry Division

mounted flame throwers on LVT's and on light tanks. None of the improvised mountings were successful until February 1944 at Bougainville

when tanks carrying portable flame throwers supported an infantry assault

against Japanese positions along the Torokina River.45

The idea of installing portable flame throwers in tanks was sound. The

difficulty lay in the short range, small fuel capacity, and delicacy of the

weapon which had not been designed to withstand the jarring vibration

of tanks. Because troops constantly tried to improvise auxiliary flame throwers, the Army Service Forces in October 1943 requested the CWS to

develop a standard model. Service engineers took the portable flame

thrower and modified it to fit the bow machine gun ball-mount. Fuel reservoirs were designed for M3, M4, and M5 tanks. It took troops in the

field several hours to install fuel reservoirs, but thereafter the operator

could remove the machine gun and insert the flame gun in a minute or

two. The flame thrower could fire a gallon of fuel per second to an effective range of 25 to 30 yards with oily fuel, 50 to 60 yards with thickened

44

 (1) German Chemical Warfare, pp. 142-43, 153-55. (2) McKinney, Mechanized Flame

Thrower Operations, pp. 194-95, 200. (3) WD Intel Bull, Jul 44, pp. 11-14. (4) Tactical and

Technical Trends, no. 45, 1 Apr 44, pp. 7-14, a publication of Intel Div, WD. (5) Chemical

Warfare Bulletin 30, p. 11, Aug-Oct 44. 45

 (1) Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), p. 233. (2) McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 2-8.
160 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

M3A1 LIGHT TANK EQUIPPED WITH FLAME GUN firing during a demonstration,

New Zealand, October 1943.

fuel. The CWS procured 1,784 model M3-4-3 bow flame throwers with

fuel capacity of 50 gallons for M4 tanks, and 300 model E5R2-M3 with

a capacity of 10 gallons for M3 or M5 tanks. Many bow-type flame throwers

saw action in the European Theater, in the Marianas operation, on Peleliu, Luzon, and other islands.46

Tank commanders were not all in favor of the bow flame thrower

because it deprived them of an important machine gun. An alternative

was to mount the flame gun in the turret alongside the periscope. The

CWS and its contractors produced several periscope models, one of which

(M3-4-E6R3) went into production in 1945 too late for war use.47

The Italian and Japanese Armies did not equip tanks with auxiliary

flame throwers, but the German Army had two flame throwers that might

be placed in this classification. For the Pz. Kw. II tank it developed a

46

 (1) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 24. (2) TM 3-362, Jun 45.

(3) Finkelstein, Flame Throwers, pp. 261-89. (4) McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 10-74. (5) The E4-5, E4R2-5R1, and E4R3-5R1 models occasionally mentioned in

reports were prestandardization models of the M3-4-3, without one of the fuel reservoirs. 47

 (1) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 24. (2) Finkelstein, Flame

Throwers, pp. 384-431. (3) TM 3-364, 6 Jun 45.
FLAME THROWERS 161

FLAME GUN TO FIT .30-CAL. MACHINE GUN MOUNT of tanks is demonstrated

to Seventh Army soldiers, France, February 1945.

small flame thrower mounted in an individual turret. Tanks carried two

of these turrets on the bow. Behind each turret was a small cylinder of

acetylene for ignition and a large reservoir for thirty-five gallons of fuel.

Electrical controls for traversing the turrets and firing the flame throwers

were in the tank. The weapons could fire eighty bursts, each lasting two

to three seconds, a distance of thirty-five yards. For the Pz. Jg. 38 tank

the Germans provided a projector flame gun similar to the portable Flammenwerfer 41. The fuel was held in three reservoirs with a capacity of 154

gallons, and was pumped to the gun by a gasoline engine. The weapon

could fire twenty-four bursts, which was the number of cartridges carried

in the ignition magazine. The German Army seems to have made little

use of auxiliary flame throwers.48

Auxiliary Flame Throwers Made in Hawaii

Marines and infantrymen in the Pacific had hastened the development

of auxiliary flame throwers and they were anxious to obtain the weapons.

48

 (1) Tactical and Technical Trends, no. 39, 2 Dec 43, pp. 9-11. (2) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, pp. I-P-15, I-P-16. (3) German Chemical Warfare, p. 142.
162 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Finally in 1944 the Tenth Army could wait no longer for weapons to

come from the States. It asked the Chemical Section, USAFPOA, then

engaged in producing main armament flame throwers, to provide at least

eighty-eight periscope flame weapons. Colonel Unmacht's composite group

constructed a model based on an experimental periscope flame thrower

gun manufactured by the Armored Board at Fort Knox, which in turn had

been based on the M1A1 portable flame thrower gun. The gun was constructed from a piece of metal tubing, and passed through a 11⁄2-inch hole

in the periscope ring. The fuel reservoir developed by technicians at Edgewood for the bow auxiliary flame thrower was used when it was available, but when it was not similar containers were manufactured at Pearl

Harbor. Compressed air or nitrogen was used as the propellant. With

unthickened fuel the range was twenty yards; with thickened fuel, twice

that distance. The weapon could be mounted in any of the M4 medium

tanks.49

One hundred and seventy-six of these were completed for the Tenth

Army. They were on hand for the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns,

but they were not used extensively because Hawaiian-produced main armament flame throwers, preferred for their large fuel capacity and greater

range, were also available for these battles.50

The demand for auxiliary flame throwers waxed and waned during the

war. When the Army first used them in 1944, troops in the Pacific liked

them because they had a longer range and carried more fuel than the portable flame thrower, and because armor allowed the flame thrower operator

to approach Japanese positions without fear of rifle fire. But when Hawaiian main armament flame throwers became available and troops had an

opportunity to compare the auxiliary and the main armament in battle,

their choice swung toward the latter type with its larger fuel capacity,

greater range, and all-around mobility. By the end of the war the CWS

and NDRC were concentrating their efforts on the development and production of large main armament weapons rather than small auxiliary

models.

49

 (1) A full account of the development of the auxiliary flame thrower in Hawaii may be

found in: History of Chemical Section, U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific, 7 Dec 41-2 Sep 45, vols.

II and III. (2) Tentative Instruction Book for Flame Thrower, Mechanized POA-CWS Periscope

H (E4R2) A-H1A and H1B, prepared by CWS Central Pacific Base Command, 24 Feb 45, ETF

550-344. (3) CW Supply Catalog, List of Service Parts and Spare Parts for Flame Thrower, Mechanized, POA-CWS Periscope H (E4R2) A-H1B, prepared by Hq Central Pacific Base Command,

1 Jul 45, ETF 550-484A. 50

 McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations, pp. 15-21.
FLAME THROWERS 163

Incendiary Projector for Airplanes

In 1941 CWS engineers made some experiments to see if a flame

thrower could be mounted on an airplane. They constructed a model and

tested it on the ground. The turbulent blast of air from the propeller extinguished the flame and the CWS dropped the project. Late in 1943 the

Army Air Forces requested the service to resume work. It was reasoned

that a rain of burning thickened fuel dropping from the sky might be

used to set fire to enemy-held jungle, grassy areas, and supply dumps.

At this time the British were working on an airplane flame thrower and

the CWS profited from their experience. CWS and NDRC engineers designed a fuel container of the size and shape of the 4,000-pound bomb,

fitting it with a discharge pipe and nozzle similar to that used on toxic

spray tanks. Rocket motors provided gas that expelled the 210-gallon load

of thickened gasoline in one spectacular burst. Technicians tested the projector, aeroflame, as the weapon was called, on a wooden tower and in

actual flight on B-25H airplanes. Although the aeroflame developed into

a workable weapon, the CWS decided that droppable gasoline tanks were

more effective in starting fires, and in 1944 it stopped the project for good.51

Emplaced Flame Throwers

After Dunkirk, Britain's eastern coast lay vulnerable to invasion. As

part of the defenses against German landings the Petroleum Warfare Department installed flame throwers along the Channel beaches. From underground storage tanks holding forty-five tons of fuel—a mixture of gasoline, kerosene, and diesel oil—pipes led outward beneath the sea. Valves

on the ends of the pipes could be opened by remote control, releasing oil

which floated to the surface. Ignited by naval flares, the pools of oil would

burn fiercely for hours. The British also emplaced flame throwers along

roads to burn enemy vehicles and troops that might get ashore.52

Taking their cue from the British, the CWS developed a remote controlled flame thrower to be used to guard U.S. airfields and beaches. The

steel fuel tank holding 120 gallons of oil could be placed in a pit along

with two cylinders of compressed nitrogen. Pipes led above ground to 2

flame thrower nozzles. The nozzles pointed in opposite directions, and

threw streams of burning oil 40 yards. A wall of flame 80 yards long,

51

 T. Loew and C. T. Mitchell, Development of Incendiary Projector for Airplanes. TDMR

909, 23 Oct 44. 52

 WD Intel Bull, Apr 46, pp. 39-44.
164 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

lasting about a minute and a half, could be set up. The CWS standardized the device in 1941, but the Army found no use for it and discarded

it at the end of the war.53

The first recorded use of emplaced flame throwers was by the Russians

in the defense of Moscow. A line of flame throwers was set up in the

outer defense zone that the Soviets had built in front of their capital to

block the German Army. The body of the flame thrower was a cylindrical

tank twenty-one inches high, twelve inches in diameter, and holding eight

gallons of oil. Pressure was furnished by gas given off from burning powder. These flame throwers were dug in at intervals of about thirty yards

and covered with stones, earth, or other natural materials as camouflage.

Detonated electrically the weapon threw out a stream of flame lasting a

second or two. When the Germans went on the defensive they employed

emplaced flame throwers similar to the Russian type. The Japanese in

Burma set up some field expedients, but these were of little value.54

The British flame weapons emplaced along the channel might have

been useful barriers to an invasion, but the Russian and German weapons

of this type probably had only a temporary psychological effect since they

suffered from a limited range and fuel capacity. Furthermore, there was

considerable labor in digging them in, the aim could not be changed once

they were emplaced, they could only be fired once, the enemy might bypass them, and their control wires could be easily damaged by shell fire.

On the whole, World War II experience showed that the emplaced flame

thrower had only slight value in warfare.

Servicing Flame Throwers

The job of the CWS did not end with the production of flame throwers. Weapons had to be serviced, fuels had to be mixed with thickeners,

and compressed gas or air had to be supplied. The CWS rigged up an

air compressor and mixing vat carried on a truck or trailer. With this

equipment troops could mix the hundreds of gallons of thickened fuel

used by flame tanks, and compress the large volume of air needed as a

propellant.55

53

 (1) CWTC Item 356, Emplaced Flame Thrower, 22 Jul 41. (2) CWTC Item 1513, Obsoletion of Flame Thrower, Emplaced, M1, 30 Dec 45. (3) CWTC Item 1564, same title, 28 Mar 46. 54

 (1) Tactical and Technical Trends, no. 26, 3 Jun 43, pp. 24-26. (2) WD Intel Bull, Nov

44, pp. 80-85. (3) Ibid., Apr 46, pp. 39-44. 55

 (1) Mobile Flame Throwing Servicing Unit, 43d CWS Chem Lab TR 40, 18 Jul 44. (2)

TM 3-361, 26 Jun 45. (3) CWTC Item 1487, Standardization of the Flame Thrower, Mechanized,

M5-4, and the Service Unit, Mechanized Flame Thrower, M4, 4 Oct 45.
FLAME THROWERS 165

Portable flame throwers did not require as much fuel and propellant

as mechanized types, but nevertheless problems existed. While napalm and

gasoline could be carried in cans and mixed when needed, a machine

weighing 800 pounds was required to furnish compressed air. Such a compressor could be carried only on a jeep or truck. The CWS decided to

develop a small, light, gas producer. With co-operation of the NDRC, it

turned out a generator weighing sixty pounds and containing lithium hydride. When water was allowed to drip on the compound, hydrogen under

a pressure of 2,000 pounds per square inch was evolved. This hydrogen

could be piped into flame thrower gas tanks. The service started producing these generators in the spring of 1945, and a few reached the theaters

before the end of the war.56

Toxicology of Flame Attack

A year after the initial operations in the Pacific the CWS began studies

to discover the predominating characteristics and cause of death by flame

and to learn what defensive measures might be devised against the use

of flame by the enemy. The agencies engaged in various aspects of flame

attack research with the CWS included NDRC units at the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, the Standard Oil Development Co., New York

University, Harvard and Johns Hopkins Medical Schools; units of the

Bureaus of Ordnance and Medicine of the Navy Department, the Armored

Medical Research Laboratory; and the Experiment Station at Suffield,

Canada.57

In studying the toxicology of flame attack in poorly ventilated enclosed

spaces like those found in Japanese bunkers and similar fortifications, researchers determined that three important changes occurred within them

at the moment of flame attack, quite aside from the penetration of the

flaming fuel itself: there was a sudden jump in temperature, lethal concentrations of carbon monoxide were built up in the bunker, and there

was a dangerous lowering of oxygen content. They learned that 70 percent carbon monoxide in the blood resulted in unconsciousness and frequently in death and that this accumulation was obtainable in flame

attack within two minutes. Furthermore, only one-tenth of one percent

56

 (1) TM 3-374, 7 Jul 45. (2) CWTC Item 1398, Standardization of Generator, Hydrogen,

High-Pressure, Portable, M1 and Cartridge, Hydride, Hydrogen Generator, M1, 2 Aug 45. 57

 Misc Rpt, Informal Notes of Meeting on Flame Throwers held at the Medical Research

Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal, 17 and 18 July 1944. MDF 109.1 Tech Lib, A CmlC, Md. (2)

Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 258-59. (3) "CWS Studies Flame Deaths," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 30

(Apr-May 44), 31-32.
166 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

carbon monoxide in the air was sufficient to maintain this lethal blood

level, and it was present in bunkers for seven to ten minutes after flame

attack. They also learned that for intervals up to fifteen seconds there was

almost complete absence of oxygen in a bunker under attack, and that

unconsciousness would likely be almost instantaneous in such an event.

Any one of these factors or any combination of them, therefore, meant

certain death, quite aside from the effects of direct contact with the flame.58

Work on flame defense led to the construction of a hood-type mask

built to withstand 1,000° F. for one minute, to the development of a steel

sliding door for pillbox apertures, to experimental fireproof clothing and

water fog, and to spray extinguishers, all of which proved unsatisfactory.

The CWS finally concluded that no positive defense could be devised

against flame attack.59

Flame throwers were not major weapons in the same sense as cannon,

rifles, and bombs. Rather they were weapons that proved valuable in certain tactical situations. The men in the Pacific, the locale of most of these

situations, did much to bring about the improvement of flame throwers.

Americans started work on them later than Europeans and Japanese, but

while enemy armies did not push the development of the weapon, Americans, particularly in the Pacific, called for it more and more frequently as

the war progressed. Despite the fact that the American achievement in

flame thrower development and production does not look impressive, it

surpassed that of the enemy during the same period.

58

 "Toxicology of Flame Attack in Enclosed Spaces" and "Toxicology of Carbon Monoxide and

Anoxia," in Symposium on the Toxicological Aspects of the Flame Thrower, Dumbarton Oaks,

29 Jan 45. ETF 235-45. 59

 (1) MIT MR 136, Protection Against Flame Throwers, 12 May 45. (2) CWS R & D Program Monthly Report, FY 1945, Jun 45, p. 63.
CHAPTER VIII

Incendiaries

In 1917-18 the Chemical Warfare Service branched out from its research

on toxic agents into other fields, one of which was incendiary mixtures.

Chemists experimented with incendiary fillings for shells, grenades, and

bombs, but did not have time to perfect any of the munitions.1 In this

field CWS overlapped the Ordnance Department's work on incendiaries. In

1920 the War Department set up a line of demarcation between the two

services, with the Ordnance Department henceforth to design the munitions and the CWS to provide the filling.2

During the 1920's and early 1930's the CWS practically ignored incendiaries. In the first place, they had not been very effective in World War

I, and there was no indication that they would be in the future. Secondly,

there was a widespread feeling that high explosives were better. An Ordnance Department study, written in 1934, stated that "everything that can

be accomplished by an incendiary bomb can in most cases, at least, be

accomplished as well or better by either a smoke bomb loaded with WP

[white phosphorus] or demolition bomb loaded with a high explosive."3

Along the same line, Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries had said in the Report of

the CWS, 1922, "Purely incendiary materials are generally of much less

importance [than smoke]." Thirdly, lack of funds forced the CWS to leave

out of its research programs all but the most vital projects—and, as noted,

incendiaries did not seem important at the time. Finally, the division of

1

 (1) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 336-44. (2) Ray, Incendiaries. 2

 WD GO 54, Sec IIIc, 28 Aug 20. 3

 From a study on the relative effectiveness of incendiary and demolition bombs by Maj H. H.

Zornig, OD, 17 Jan 34, quoted in A. L. Kibler, Brief Review of Work Done to Date on Incendiaries. ETF 180-2, 10 Apr 34.
168 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

responsibility between the CWS and Ordnance was unfortunate in one

respect—neither service felt as enthusiastic about the development of incendiaries as it would have if given sole authority.4

The unrest abroad in the mid-thirties revived interest in incendiary

bombs. In 1935 a reporter on the New York Herald Tribune covering the

Italian invasion of Ethiopia found a partially burned bomb that had been

dropped by an Italian plane. He shipped it back to his newspaper, which

gave it to Professor Joachim E. Zanetti of Columbia University, a CWS

reserve officer. Zanetti passed it on to the CWS, which then analyzed it.5 In

the summer of 1936 Maj. Gen. Claude E. Brigham sent an officer to Europe

to gather information on incendiary bombs. In December of that year, the

CWS added an incendiary project to its program, and chemists began experiments. These experiments provided them with the experience and data

that were to prove extremely useful when the service began to produce

incendiaries a few years later.

Incendiary Bombs

One-Hundred-Pound Bombs

The earliest American incendiary bomb of World War II was the 100-

pound missile, M47. It began in a roundabout way in 1937 when the GHQ

Air Force asked the Ordnance Department for a chemical bomb.6 Ordnance completed the munition in 1940. At this time the armed forces had

no incendiary bomb, and as an emergency measure the Ordnance Department recommended that the new chemical bomb be pressed into use as

an incendiary, by loading it with gasoline and cotton waste.7 While the

idea seemed good, tests conducted by the CWS showed that ordinary gasoline was almost useless as a filling. When bombs exploded the gasoline

atomized and burned out so quickly that it scarcely had time to transfer

heat and fire to the target. A material was needed to thicken the gasoline

so as to make it burn slowly.

4

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 259, 452. 5

 L. Wilson Greene, "Prewar Incendiary Bomb Development," Armed Forces Chemical Journal,

II (October 1947), 25-30. 6

 Ltr, CG GHQ Air Force to TAG, 2 Jul 37, sub: 100-lb Chemical Bomb. Cited in Ordnance

Technical Committee Minutes (hereafter cited as OCM) 16808.. 7

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 455-56. (2) Bomb,

Chemical, 100-lb, M47, Classified as Standard, 3 Oct 40. OCM 16142. (3) Bomb, Chemical,

100-lb, M47, Incendiary Filler, Approval of, 20 Nov 40. OCM 16274.
INCENDIARIES 169

Overseas the British were adding rubber to the gasoline in bombs, making a filling resembling sticky rubber cement. Following the lead of the

British the CWS adopted smoked rubber, crepe rubber, and latex as thickeners, designating the respective fillings as incendiary oil SR, incendiary

oil CR, and incendiary oil LA.8

With the advance of Japanese armies in Southeast Asia cutting the flow

of natural rubber to the United States, the CWS and NDRC made a

wide search for substitute thickeners. Two lines of research led to success.

Chemists at Du Pont found that isobutyl methacrylate polymer, (IM),

converted gasoline into a tough, rubbery jelly. Unfortunately a large

amount of IM—from 15 to 20 percent—was necessary to thicken gasoline

to the required point, and IM was in short supply. Plastic firms were

using it to make transparent bomber noses and other war items. The

CWS had to find materials that could replace part of the IM without

impairing the desirable properties of the filling.9

While experiments were going on with IM, NDRC chemists at Arthur

D. Little, Inc., and Harvard University had taken a different tack and were

investigating soaps as thickeners. Such an investigation had been carried

out by CWS chemists in World War I but without much success. Their

gasoline-soap mixtures had been hard and friable, lacking the adhesiveness

and cohesiveness demanded in a gasoline incendiary filling.10 The new generation of chemists was more fortunate, coming up with an aluminum soap

of naphthenic and palmitic acids that converted gasoline into a thick jelly

suitable as an incendiary. The men named it napalm from naphthenic and

palmitic. Gobs of napalm thickened gasoline, scattered by the explosion of

a bomb, clung to many surfaces and burned fiercely for several minutes.

The mixture was as effective as rubber thickened gasoline. Furthermore

napalm could be used to thicken gasoline for flame throwers, greatly increasing the range.11

8

 (1) CWTC Item 425, Incendiary Fillings for M47 100-lb Chemical Bomb, 16 Dec 41. (2)

CWTC Item 457, same title, 10 Feb 42. 9

 (1) Gaul and Finkelstein, Incendiaries, pp. 145-62. (2) Report of Activities of the Technical Division, pp. 39-43. 10

 (1) Arthur B. Ray, "Incendiaries in Modern Warfare," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 13 (1921), 645-46. (2) Ray, Incendiaries, pp. 33-57. 11

 (1) Louis F. Fieser, George C. Harris, E. B. Hershberg, Morley Morgana, Frederick C.

Novello, and Stearns T. Putnam, "Napalm," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 38 (1946)

768-73. (2) Louis F. Fieser, U.S. Patent 2,606,107, Incendiary Gels. (3) E. W. Hollingsworth,

"The Use of Thickened Gasoline in Warfare," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, IV (January 1951),

26-32. (4) R. W. Hufferd "Spectacular Developments Made in Incendiaries," Chemical Engineering,

53 (1946), 110-13. (5) Summary Tech Rpt Division 11, NDRC, pp. 192-226. (6) Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 410-19.
170 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Now the CWS possessed two thickeners, IM and napalm. It had to

decide how much of each material to purchase. Firms which had begun

to manufacture napalm were having difficulty producing satisfactory, uniform batches. The thickener IM, on the other hand, was hard to obtain

in competition with aircraft manufacturers and other war industries. The

Army settled the question by allotting most of the IM elsewhere, leaving

the CWS and its contractors to overcome the problems holding up the

manufacture of napalm. By January 1943 only one manufacturer was in

full-scale production, but at the end of the year nine other companies had

joined in. From 500,000 pounds in 1943, production jumped to 8,000,000

in 1944 and 12,000,000 in 1945.12

Finding a thickening agent for the gasoline filling was not the only

difficulty in developing the M47 100-pound bomb. The casing had to be

modified in several ways before the war was over. Originally the specifications called for walls one thirty-second of an inch thick. After a number of bombs had been made the CWS and the Ordnance Department

discovered that the metal was too thin to withstand rough handling. New

specifications doubled the wall thickness, the missile being redesignated as

M47A1.13 When bombs were filled with mustard, moreover, the agent for

which they had originally been designed, pressure from gaseous decomposition products sometimes split the welds. Since the CWS had to keep a

supply of mustard filled bombs on hand for retaliation in case of enemy

chemical attack, the seams had to be strengthened. About the same time

a problem arose with incendiary fillings. Bomb interiors were coated with

acid-proof paint to protect them from corrosion by mustard. Evidence

accumulated that this paint was affecting thickened gasoline. Bombs with

thicker welds and without the acid-proof paint, designated as M47A2, were

then turned out and saw action until the end of the war.14

During the conflict the CWS procured three and a half million M47-

type bombs. Although referred to as 100-pounders, their total weight, including forty pounds of incendiary filling, was only seventy pounds. Japan

and Germany each felt the flaming burst of more than one-half million

missiles. In one attack on the Focke-Wulf aircraft plant at Marienburg,

12

 (1) See below, pp. 350-52. (2) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement" p. 21. 13

 OCM 18706, 27 Aug 42, cited in CWTC Item 1275, Standardization of Bomb, Incendiary,

100-lb, AN-M47A3, 22 Mar 45. 14

 Bomb, Chemical, 100-lb, M47A1, Modification of, to Bomb, Chemical, 100-lb, M47A2,

23 Oct 42. OCM 19111. (2) CWTC Item 803, Classification of 100-lb Incendiary Bombs, 3

Sep 43.
INCENDIARIES 171

BURNING PHOSPHORUS FROM A 100-POUND INCENDIARY BOMB on an enemy

airfield, Rabaul, New Britain. Aircraft are Japanese Betty-type bombers.

East Prussia, in October 1943, Flying Fortresses dropped more than thirteen thousand 100-pound incendiaries mixed with high explosives, almost

completely destroying the works. That same month the ball-bearing plants

at Schweinfurt suffered critical damage from M47 incendiaries and HE.

Later in the war and on the other side of the world the XXI Bomber

Command frequently employed mixtures of M47's and 6-pound M69 incendiaries in fire raids on Japan. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey estimated that an M47 100-pounder was twelve times as effective as a 500-pound

general purpose bomb against targets classified as readily inflammable, and

one and one half times as effective against targets classified as fire resistant.

The M47 napalm filled bomb, uneven as its development had been, proved

to be one of the most valuable American bombs of the war.15

Germany and Japan had no incendiaries comparable to the American

15

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement." p. 21. (2) The Chemical Warfare

Service in World War II, pp. 71, 74. (3) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds, "The

Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. II, Europe: Torch to Pointblank (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 194p), pp. 697, 703-704. (4) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds,

"The Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 614-44. (5) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, p. 472.
172 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

M47. The closest in weight were 50-kilogram bombs, but these carried

explosives in addition to the incendiary filling. In the German bomb the

incendiary effect came from thirty pounds of benzene thickened with rubber, with bits of phosphorus scattered through the mixture for ignition.

The nose held twenty pounds of TNT, enough to cause a respectable

explosion. The German Air Force did not employ this bomb to any great

extent, generally relying on other types and sizes.16 The Japanese missile

contained thirty-five pounds of a solution of phosphorus and carbon disulfide, in which were suspended phosphorus-impregnated rubber cylinders an

inch long and an inch in diameter. A charge of picric acid in the nose

of the bomb caused casualties and could also be set for air bursts which

scattered rubber incendiary pellets up to 150 feet. The 50-kg. bomb was

generally employed by the Japanese.17

Four-Pound Magnesium Bombs

Surprising as it may seem, the first great incendiary raids of World

War II were not carried out with large bombs, but with small missiles

weighing only a few pounds. In September 1940 the Germans showered

London with 1-kg. magnesium alloy bombs, starting innumerable fires,

damaging considerable property, and injuring many people. Any doubt

concerning the effectiveness of small incendiaries was gone forever. A few

months later the Joint Aircraft Committee, established to allocate American materiel between the United States and Great Britain, recommended

that the Ordnance Department produce a 4-pound magnesium bomb

suitable for the Army, the Navy, and the British. Ordnance thereupon

modified the British Mark II/A 4-pound incendiary and standardized it as

the American AN-M50 (A standing for Army, N for Navy).18

During the preliminary work it became apparent that the old demarcation between the CWS and Ordnance Department which gave the former

responsibility for the filling and the latter jurisidiction over the casing

would not be an efficient way of manufacturing magnesium bombs. One

16

 German Chemical Warfare Materiel, p. II-D-5. 17

 (1) Japanese Chemical Warfare. (2) Col. George J. B. Fisher, Incendiary Warfare (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), p. 49. 18

 (1) Memo for the Secretary, Ordnance Technical Committee, 1 Apr 41, sub: Bombs,

Standardization by Army, Navy, British Purchasing Committee. Cited as ref a, CWTC Item 1220,

Obsoletion of 40-lb Steel Case Type Incendiary Bombs and Clusters for Same, 11 Jan 45. (2)

Bomb, Incendiary, 4-lb, and Bomb, Incendiary, 40-lb, Classified as Standard and Designated

Bomb, Incendiary, 4-lb, AN-M50, and Bomb, Incendiary, 40-lb, AN-M51, 19 May 41. OCM

16816. (3) Bombs, Incendiary, 4-lb, AN-M50-X, 4-lb, AN-M50, and 40-lb, AN-M51, Clearance for Procurement and Classification as Standard, 22 Jul 41. OCM 17028.
INCENDIARIES 173

organization should have charge of the entire operation, planners agreed.

Ordnance, busy with other munitions and not enthusiastic about incendiaries, dropped out, leaving the CWS in full charge of the AN-M50 and

related bombs.19

Initial investigations at Edgewood improved the fuze, found substitutes

for critical materials (such as a metal plug for a cork plug in the vent),

and modified the filling. The completed bomb, AN-M50A1 (Al signifying

the first alteration in the standard munition), was approximately twentytwo inches long, hexagonal in cross section, and about three inches thick.

The cast magnesium body held a thermite-type mixture known as therm-8,

or thermate. The filling would burn for 1 to 2 minutes, the case for 6 to

7 minutes longer.20

Factories began to turn out magnesium bombs in the spring of 1942,

slowly at first but soon in tremendous quantities. Most of the bombs went

to Great Britain on lend-lease and were dropped in air raids over Europe.

The early 4-pound bomb had flaws, as might be expected in a new munition. Fuzes sometimes broke when the bombs struck, first fire mixtures

failed to heat fillings to the ignition point, and metal plugs stuck in vents,

causing heated air to build up pressure and blow the bombs apart. Furthermore, the British dropped the bombs from higher altitude than the

CWS had designed them for, and many of the bombs broke on impact.21

Engineers at CWS strengthened the fuze to withstand harder impacts,

replaced metal vent plugs with cork, and developed a better first fire mixture. The improved bomb, AN-M50A2, slightly lighter and thinner than

its predecessor, functioned well. As fast as the new munitions came from

plants they were shipped to Europe and used. The earlier model remained

in reserve until 1944 when it was discarded.22

19

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 259, 452. (2) Ltr, C

Ord to C CWS, 10 Jul 41, sub: Procurement of Incendiary Bombs, with inds. CWS 471.6/241-

280. (3) Notes of conference in office of General Moore at 11 p.m. on 15 July, 1941, by Lt

Col J. T. Lewis, Asst SGS, sub: Incendiary Bombs. CWS 471.6/241-280. (4) Brophy and Fisher,

Organizing for War, ch. II. (5) WD GO 10, Sep 41. (6) WD GO 13, 24 Nov 41. 20

 (1) Therm-8 was a mixture of 80 percent thermite and 20 percent of the Ordnance Department's M8 flare mixture. (2) L. Wilson Greene, "Prewar Incendiary Bomb Development," pp.

25-30. (3) TM 9-1980, 3 Jun 42. (4) TM 3-330, 23 Mar 42. 21

 (1) Ltr, CG SOS ETO to Chm CWTC, 13 Apr 43, sub: 4-lb Incendiary Bomb, ANM50A1. CWS 471.6/68. (2) Report of Activities of the Technical Division, p. 89. 22

 (1) Capt J. E. Gilbert, Development of 4-lb Incendiary Bomb, AN-M50A2. TDMR 1224,

4 Mar 46. (2) Baum, History of Research and Development of the CWS in WW II, pp. 37-46.

(3) S. J. Magram, A Survey of Starters for Burning-Type Munitions. TDMR 655, 24 May 43.

(4) Lt J. E. Gilbert, Fillings for Magnesium Incendiary Bombs, AN-M52. TDMR 437, Sep 42.

(5) CWTC Item 807, Standardization of Bomb, Incendiary, 4-lb, M50A2, 3 Sep 43. (6) CWTC

Item 1017, Obsoletion of Bomb, Incendiary, 4-lb, AN-M50A1, 5 May 44.
174 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Aircraft dropped more 4-pound magnesium bombs than all other incendiary bombs put together. Almost thirty million fell on Europe, and

almost ten million on Japan, causing damage that ran into astronomical

figures.

Four-Pound Steel-Cased Bombs

The chief obstacle blocking American production of magnesium bombs

in 1941 was the scarcity of magnesium. Since the metal had little commercial use before World War II, America did not have a large magnesium industry. During the emergency period firms sent most of the metal

to aircraft plants, leaving little available for other purposes. Despite the

fact that industry expanded its facilities as rapidly as possible, for a time

there was simply not enough of the metal for the armed forces.

The Ordnance Department was aware of these facts when it began

development of 4-pound magnesium bombs. It planned a substitute bomb

having the same dimensions and incendiary filling as the M50, but with

a steel case in place of magnesium. It sent the plans and models of the

substitute bomb, called the M54, to the CWS when that service took

over responsibility for incendiaries, and the bomb was completed by the

technical staff at Edgewood.23

The CWS let out contracts, through its procurement districts, for

enough metal parts and thermate filling to fabricate twenty million M54

bombs. Contracts were signed in November 1941, and so effectively did

industry co-operate that the first missiles were ready for testing at Aberdeen Proving Ground in December, several months before the magnesium

bombs came from production lines. Each month millions of bombs were

fabricated, filled, and stored in CWS depots to await the call of the Air

Forces.

Not all of the bombs, however, remained in storage. On 24 February

1942, the Eastern Chemical Warfare Depot at Edgewood Arsenal received

orders to ship forty-eight 500-pound clusters of AN-M54 bombs to

Benicia Arsenal, California, for reissue to Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle.

The men who filled the order and handled the clusters had no idea of

their ultimate destination. Shortly after noon on April 18 a B-25 bomber

commanded by Doolittle roared over Tokyo and unloaded some of these

23

 (1) Bomb, Incendiary, 4-lb, T1 Classified as Substitute Standard for Bomb, Incendiary,

4-lb, AN-M50, Designated Bomb, Incendiary, 4-lb, AN-M54, 28 Jul 41. OCM 17052. (2)

CWTC Item 412, Approval of Development Project for Small (1 to 2 lb) Incendiary Bomb,

and Military Characteristics, 14 Oct 41.
INCENDIARIES 175

B-25 BOMBER LOADED WITH 500-POUND CLUSTERS OF M54 BOMBS leaving

the flight deck of USS Hornet for the first American airstrike against the Japanese

homeland, April 1942.

clusters on the city. Plane after plane followed, bombing factory areas and

military installations, while other aircraft struck at Kobe, Yokohama, and

Nagoya.24

Doolittle's raid, the first American airstrike against the Japanese homeland, was one of the few times during the war when M54 bombs were

used. After increasing supplies of magnesium enabled the CWS to procure

large quantities of M50 bombs, the service finally halted production of

the substitute bomb altogether. Thirteen million M54 bombs lay in warehouses while millions of M50's passed by on their way to air bases. In

1945 when there was no possible chance of M54 bombs being pressed

into service again, the CWS declared the model obsolete.25

The fact that the Air Forces almost never employed M54's during the

war made the production of steel-cased bombs, in one sense, a loss. On

24

 (1) George W. Scaggs, History of the Eastern Chemical Warfare Depot (formerly Edgewood Depot), p. 99. (2) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds, "The Army Air Forces

in World War II," vol. I, Plans and Early Operations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1948), pp. 438-44. 25

 (1) CWTC Item 1220, Obsoletion of 4-lb Steel Case Type Incendiary Bombs and Clusters

for Same, 11 Jan 45. (2) CWTC Item 1288, same title, 22 Mar 45.
176 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the other hand, these bombs were a reserve for a possible emergency.

The contractors had the tools, men, and experience, moreover, to switch

to the production of magnesium bombs when magnesium became available. Under the circumstances the loss was more apparent than real.

Clusters for Four-Pound Bombs

Four-pound magnesium bombs and other small incendiaries were not

dropped individually, but in clusters which were held together by devices

called adapters.

The Ordnance Department began development of the first American

adapter. The CWS inherited the item when it accepted responsibility for

incendiary bombs.26 The device was made up of two end plates, two

longitudinal bars, and four steel straps, and it held together thirty-four

bombs. The adapter was designated as Model M5, the entire cluster of

bombs as the AN-M6.27 A larger adapter, holding 128 bombs, was developed shortly afterward. This adapter was standardized as the M6, the

cluster as the AN-M7.28

These clusters, known as the quick-opening type, endangered aircraft.

Occasionally they opened so quickly that parts glanced off the tail of the

bomber. Parts of the adapter also "drifted" through the air and sometimes

struck planes coming along below. To keep the cluster intact until it

fell a safe distance the CWS devised delay mechanisms. One device blew

open the straps twelve seconds (equivalent to a 2,000 foot drop) after

the cluster left the plane. Another device was a metal flap, hinged to the

end of the adapter. The air jerked up the flap, pulling wires which opened

the cluster twenty-five to fifty feet below the plane. The delay mechanisms worked well, but the CWS did not standardize them because aimable clusters were superseding the quick-opening type.29

Aimable clusters were developed to improve the accuracy of high altitude bombing. Quick-opening clusters had been suitable for low or medium

26

 (1) Ltr, C CWS to CG EA, 22 Sep 41, sub: Design of Cluster Adapters for 4-lb Incendiary

Bombs. CWS 680.429/390. (2) The Ordnance model, T2, is described in TM 3-330, 23 Mar 42. 27

 (1) CWTC Item 898, Standardization of Incendiary Bombs, 21 Jan 44. (2) TM 9-1980,

3 Jun 42. (3) Seth Q. Kline, Robert E. Patchel, and Charles T. Mitchell, Development of QuickOpening Cluster Adapters, M4, M5, M6, M7, and M8 for Incendiary Bombs. TDMR 1015, 16

Apr 45. 28

 (1) CWTC Item 898, cited above. (2) TM 9-1980, Nov 44. 29

 (1) Capt Theodore R. Paulson and Charles T. Mitchell, Development of Delay Buckle

Release on Cluster Adapters for Small Bombs. TDMR 795, 20 Jan 44. (2) Aaron S. Berlin,

Development of 100-lb Cluster Adapter E20 for Low Altitude Bombing. TDMR 889, 13 Sep 44.
INCENDIARIES 177

altitude bombing raids because the bombs landed within a small area.

As the war progressed and planes flew at higher altitudes, bombs from

quick-opening clusters scattered widely as they fell, many landing completely outside the target area. Aimable clusters prevented this fault by

holding bombs together until they were some distance down, then opening

by means of a time fuze and allowing the bombs to fall free.

Aimable cluster M17 consisted of an adapter, M10, and 110 4-pound

bombs. The total weight was 490 pounds. The adapter was similar to

the quick-opening type, but was streamlined by being enclosed in a cylindrical case, and by attachment of a tail fin and round nose. A time fuze

adjustable from six to ninety-three seconds regulated the distance that the

cluster fell before opening. The fuze detonated a strand of primacord,

enclosed in a long tube running the length of the cluster, and the exploding primacord burst the steel straps binding the cluster. Later, on

recommendation of the Joint Aircraft Committee, the CWS modified the

adapter so that the cluster could be used on British and Navy aircraft.

The modified cluster, designated as Model AN-M17A1, was used throughout the remainder of the war.30

Explosive Four-Pound Bombs

In any raid a number of bombs would turn out to be duds, others

would land on open ground, and still others would burn out in buildings

without setting them afire. Therefore only a fraction of the bombs would

start a fire and if firemen were alert they had an excellent chance of extinguishing the bombs or limiting the blaze. While airmen could not

avoid wasting bombs they could give those that hit the target an opportunity to start conflagrations if they could keep firemen away.

The British solved this problem by producing magnesium bombs containing a small amount of black powder, and mixing these explosive

incendiary bombs with the regular type. When bombs landed, fire fighters

were unable to distinguish between explosive and nonexplosive bombs

and kept their distance. Explosive bombs themselves had a disadvantage

since the blast scattered the incendiary mixture and lessened the chance of

30

 (1) CWTC Item 924, Standardization of Adapter, Aimable Cluster, M10 (500-lb size),

21 Jan 44. (2) Seth Q. Kline, Development of Aimable Cluster E4, 500-lb, for Incendiary Bombs

AN-M50. TDMR 724 1 Sep 43. (3) CWTC Item 1019, Standardization of Cluster, Aimable,

Incendiary Bomb, AN-M17A1, 5 May 44. (4) TB CW 11, Aimable Cluster, AN-M17A1, 27 Jun

44.
178 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

a fire; therefore only a small proportion of explosive bombs were mixed

with the regular missiles.

When the Ordnance Department began the development of magnesium

incendiaries for the American Army early in the war it adopted the British explosive bomb, changed its designation to AN-M50X (the X for

"explosive"), and then passed it on to the CWS along with other bombs.

Service engineers changed the design slightly, redesignating it as the ANM50X-A1. The powder charge was held in a plastic cup in the nose of

the bomb, and detonated when heat from the filling reached it.31

In 1942 the Germans went a step further and substituted lethal TNT

for the relatively harmless but terrifying black powder. Raiders flying

over Birmingham, England, in July released explosive incendiary bombs

that caused more than five hundred casualties. In retaliation the AAF

asked that American 4-pounders be loaded with HE.32 The CWS designed

a bomb identical in size, shape, and weight with the standard magnesium

bomb, except that it had a hollow steel nose filled with tetryl, detonated

by a delay fuze. This fuze gave the incendiary an opportunity to start

a fire before exploding. Then tetryl shattered the steel nose and the lower

section of the magnesium case into hundreds of fragments, capable of

injuring or killing people within a radius of fifty feet. Two types of explosive bombs were produced, one exploding between 1 and 10 minutes

after it struck (type A), the other exploding after a delay of 60 to 70

seconds (type B). The bombs were used in the ratio of 4 of type A to

one of type B, since this brought about the most uniform distribution of

explosions.33

The explosive bomb was based on the current 4-pound magnesium

bomb, M50A1, and therefore had flaws that appeared in the standard

bomb. When the CWS redesigned the latter in 1943 it incorporated similar changes in the explosive bomb, redesignating it as M50X-A3 and employing it throughout the remainder of the war.34

31

 (1) Bomb, Incendiary, 4-lb, and Bomb, Incendiary, 40-lb Classified as Standard and Designated Bomb Incendiary, 4-lb, AN-M50, and Bomb, Incendiary, 40-lb, AN-M51, 19 May 41.

OCM 16816. (2) Bombs, Incendiary, 4-lb, AN-M50-X, 4-lb, AN-M50, and 40-lb, AN-M51,

Clearance for Procurement and Classification as Standard, 22 Jul 41. OCM 17028. (3) CWTC

Item 411, Incendiary Bombs, 14 Oct 41. 32

 Ltr, C CWS to CG CWS EA, 17 Aug 42, sub: Incendiary Bomb with Explosive Charge.

AGO 471.6/510. 33

 (1) CWTC Item 670, Standardization of Bomb, Incendiary, 4-lb, M50X-A2. (2) CWTC

Item 714, same title, 23 Apr 43. (3) L. M. Prince, Jr., Variable Delay Explosive Incendiary

Bomb, AN-M50X-A2. TDMR 585, 27 Mar 43. 34

 Louis G. Willke, Development of Bombs, AN-M50X-A3, Type A, Type B, and Type B

Alternate. TDMR 1041, 16 May 45. (2) CWTC Item 838, Standardization of Bomb, Incendiary,

4-lb M50X-A3, 15 Oct 43.
INCENDIARIES 179

In incendiary clusters for the Air Forces, the CWS packed approximately

20 percent explosive incendiary bombs. Model AN-M6 quick-opening

cluster contained 34 bombs, of which 6 were explosive. Quick-opening

cluster AN-M7 held 128 4-pounders, including 26 of the explosive type.

Aimable cluster M17A1 carried 88 incendiary and 22 explosive.35

It is not known how many casualties explosive bombs caused, in all

probability a relatively small number. But certainly the presence of explosives kept fire wardens from approaching burning missiles and putting

them out, with consequent great property damage.

Large Incendiary Bombs

In the spring of 1942 the CWS received reports that German aircraft

were dropping large incendiary bombs filled with crankcase oil. The British, too, were employing large missiles filled with rubber thickened gasoline in their raids over Germany. As a result the CWS decided to develop

incendiary bombs much larger than any of the standard American models.36

A large bomb could not be obtained by simply filling a casing with

thickened gasoline. The missile had to be ballistically stable for accurate

bombing, it had to burst at the proper moment, and it had to have a

device for setting the filling on fire. Beginning with a design similar to

the Ordnance Department's 250-pound general purpose bomb, the CWS

constructed a missile holding 95 pounds of thickened fuel and weighing

160 pounds filled. Although the bomb was too large and the black powdermagnesium burster igniter failed to set off the filling, the design served

as a steppingstone to a better bomb. This munition, smaller and lighter

(135 pounds), with less filling (70 pounds), and a HE-white phosphorus

burster igniter, seemed likely to be satisfactory. The project came to an

end in April 1943, however, when the Army Air Forces asked instead for

a 500-pound munition suitable for precision bombing against large industrial targets.37

While the 500-pound bomb was being developed the CWS had been

experimenting with a new incendiary filling called pyrotechnic or PT-1

35

 Nellie Anson, Clusters and Adapters for Chemical and Incendiary Bombs. ETF 420-21, 1

Dec 47. 36

 (1) Ltr, C Tech Svc OC CWS to CG Edgewood Arsenal, 4 Jun 42, sub: Chemical Bombs.

(2) Ltr, C Tech Svc OC CWS to CG Edgewood Arsenal, 6 July 42, sub: Chemical Bombs. Both

in CWS 471/51. 37

 (1) Capt Roman L. Ortynsky, The E-1 and the E-2 250-lb Incendiary Bombs. TDMR

1032, 26 Apr 45. (2) Ltr, CG AAF to C CWS, 3 Apr 43, sub: Large Incendiary Bombs. AAF

471.6. (3) CWTC Item 694, Military Characteristics for 500-lb Scatter Type Incendiary Bomb, 23

Apr 43.
180 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

fuel. This was a complex material, having as its main ingredient "goop,"

a mixture of magnesium particles and asphalt used as an intermediate in

the Hansgirg magnesium process. To goop was added gasoline thickened

with IM, oxidizing agents, and magnesium scraps from magnesium bomb

plants. The PT-1 fuel provided a use for magnesium that otherwise would

have been wasted. It also gave the service a filling which, because of its

hot, metallic ash, was a better fire starter than ordinary thickened gasoline,

particularly against targets that did not ignite easily.38

As in the case of gasoline thickening agents, HC smoke mixtures, and

other materials, the CWS had to look forward to the possibility that a

shortage might develop in PT-1. The supply of goop and IM were both

critical. Chemists found that IM might be replaced by synthetic rubber,

and goop by a magnesium-aluminum alloy. These substitute mixtures,

PT-2 and PT-3, were not employed since sufficient ingredients kept coming

to produce ample amounts of ordinary PT-1 fuel.39

Four types of 500-pound bombs looked suitable on paper, and to determine which was best the technical staff, with co-operation from the Ordnance Department, set to work on all of them. One had a thick steel

casing filled with napalm and carrying a HE-white phosphorus burster

igniter. Two others were identical with the above except for the casing,

one being of thin steel, the other of magnesium. The fourth bomb was

filled with a number of small incendiary units that scattered when the

bomb exploded.

 40

The thin steel-cased bomb was eliminated midway in development

because of production difficulties, but the other three went through the

testing process. The final choice, based on ease of production and bombing results against industrial-type test buildings, was the thick steel-cased

missile, designated as AN-M76.

 41

The AN-M76, essentially a modified 500-pound general purpose bomb,

38

 Capt W. A. Franta, Capt Harvie Barnard, and James S. Carson, Development of PT1

Incendiary Gel (pyrogel). TDMR 1283, 2 Mar 48. 39

 (1) Capt E. J. Schantz, Lt Bradley Dewey, Jr., and James S. Carson, PT-2 Incendiary Gels

Thickened with Synthetic Rubber. TDMR 962, 22 Jan 45. (2) Capt Bradley Dewey, Jr., and

James S. Carson, PT-3 Incendiary Gels Thickened with Synthetic Rubber. TDMR 1180, 21

Feb 46. 40

 (1) Capt Roman L. Ortynsky, The 500-lb Incendiary Bomb, El. TDMR 1043, 1 May 45.

(2) Capt William H. Daiger, Test of the 500-lb. Magnesium Incendiary Bomb, E12. TDMR

1049, 12 May 45. (3) Capt Julius Kovitz, Development of 500-lb Tail Ejection Incendiary Bomb,

E16. TDMR 1016, 30 Mar 45. 41

 (1) Capt Roman L. Ortynsky, The AN-M76 (T2-E1) 500-lb Incendiary Bomb. TDMR

1028, 25 Apr 45. (2) CWTC Item 928, Standardization of Bomb, Incendiary, 500-lb, M76, 21

Jan 44.
INCENDIARIES 181

held either 115 pounds of IM filling or 180 pounds of PT-1 filling, for

a total weight of 425 or 490 pounds. In comparison with the 100-pound

M47, the 500-pounder had greater penetrating power, was more accurate

and, containing three to four times more filling, created a more intense

fire. It was therefore the choice against strongly constructed industrial and

military structures that might withstand the impact of a 100-pound bomb,

or against targets that had to be bombed accurately from high altitudes.

On the other hand, it was wasteful to drop 500-pounders on light structures since a plane could carry more 100-pound bombs and start a larger

number of fires.42

The Army Air Forces did not drop nearly as many 500-pound bombs

as it did smaller missiles, since the large munitions were intended for use

only against heavily roofed structures that could stand up under the impact of light bombs. Still, the number dropped by aircraft was by no

means insignificant, more than 39,000 falling on Germany and almost

38,000 on Japan.43

The five-hundred pound bomb was the heaviest incendiary standardized

by the CWS, but several larger missiles went part way through the development stage. The idea of a 1000-pound incendiary had its origin in the

fire bomb, prepared in the field by filling droppable airplane gas tanks

with thickened gasoline. Since the Navy already had a 1000-pound practice bomb, Mk 66, the CWS decided that modification of the Navy missile

would be the quickest means of producing an incendiary bomb of this

size. Engineers loaded the Mk 66, using a range of napalm fillings and a

variety of burster igniters, but V-J Day arrived before the work was completed.

 44

 The Navy's 2000-pound bomb, Mk 67, served in the same manner as a model for a 2000-pound incendiary, and the end of the war also

brought an end to this project.

 45

The large bombs of the German Air Force weighed approximately 250

and 550 pounds. They were thin shelled missiles filled with crude oil and

were not particularly efficient. Thickened fillings, which probably would

have increased the effectiveness of the bombs, were just coming into use

when Germany surrendered. Japan's largest incendiary bomb, weighing

about 550 pounds, was radically different in design from American or

German bombs. It contained more than 700 open-end iron cylinders filled

42

 TB CW 4, Bomb, Incendiary 500-pound M76 (T2-E1), 4 Apr 44. 43

 Chemical Warfare Service in World War II, p. 74. 44

 Gaul and Finkelstein, Incendiaries, pp. 585-91. 45

 Ibid., pp. 591-92.
182 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

LOCKHEED P-38's DROPPING FIRE BOMBS near Ipo Dam, Luzon.

with thermite. Fuzed to burst 150 to 200 feet above the ground, the bomb

scattered the cylinders, which continued to burn for about one minute,

over a radius of 500 feet.46

Fire Bombs

Somewhere early in the war a pilot dropped his spare gasoline tank

on an enemy position, circled back and ignited the gasoline with tracer

bullets. Who the first pilot was to employ his fuel tank as a bomb and

where the action took place are not matters of record, but the event marked

the birth of the fire bomb, as this type of incendiary was called. Jettisonable wing and belly tanks were convenient because they were on hand at

almost all airfields and could be employed as bombs without affecting

their primary purpose as gasoline containers. The Army Air Forces tried

to find a device that would fire the gasoline when the tank smashed into

the target, and thus save the pilot from making a dangerous, low altitude

pass over the area to ignite the gasoline with tracers. They tried attaching incendiary grenades and small incendiary bombs to tanks, but tests

46

 (1) Japanese Chemical Warfare. (2) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, p. 160. (3) Fisher,

Incendiary Warfare, p. 49.
INCENDIARIES 183

showed that these makeshift igniters were not reliable. The AAF then

asked the CWS to design an igniter that would function at least 90 percent of the time, and would be so small that it would not change the

streamlined shape of the tank.

 47

After considerable work, including the standardization of an igniter

that later proved unsatisfactory, engineers devised two fairly reliable devices. One was inserted into the tank through the gasoline cap, the other

was fastened to the tail. To make doubly certain that the fire bomb would

burn, both types could be attached. Spontaneouly ignitable white phosphorus was the filling for use on land, sodium for targets on water.

 48

Fire bombs were employed on a variety of missions in the theaters

from mid-1943 onward. At Tinian, low-flying P-47's dropped wing and

belly tanks, generally filled with an oil-gasoline mixture since napalm was

still scarce, on beaches as a preliminary to marine landings, and on overgrown areas to burn away foliage concealing enemy installations.

 49

 On

Luzon, fire bombs proved to be "one of the most effective implements

of aerial-delivered destruction," in burning off wide areas of vegetation,

and in setting fire to enemy held villages.50 A 165-gallon fire bomb holding approximately 960 pounds of thickened gasoline could burn off vegetation in an oval-shaped area 300 feet long and 100 feet wide. In Europe

the XIX Tactical Air Command used fire bombs effectively in attacks on

deep shelters because of their effect on ventilating systems, and in strikes

against gun positions where intense heat impaired or destroyed enemy

artillery.51

Fire bombs were made in many sizes, from small tanks holding 30

gallons up to tanks of 300-gallon capacity. In Europe the most popular

sizes were 100, 108, and 110 gallons; in the Pacific 150 and 165 gallons.

All together, the AAF dropped more than 12,000 fire bombs over Europe,

while Army, Navy, and Marine planes in the Pacific employed twice that

number against the Japanese.52

47

 Gaul and Finkelstein, Incendiaries, pp. 550-83. 48

 (1) Tests of the AN-M52A1 and AN-M52XA1 Bombs, Modified as Igniters (El and

E1R1) for Droppable Fuel Tanks. TDMR 1172, 9 Nov 45. (2) Development of Fuze Adapters

and Bursters for the Igniter, Incendiary Gasoline Tank. TDMR 1089, 13 Aug 45. (3) CWTC

Item 1174, Standardization of Igniters, M15 & M16, 11 Jan 45. 49

 Hoffman, The Seizure of Tinian, pp. 34-35, 37. 50

 Maj Charles W. Boggs, Jr., "Marine Corps Monographs," Marine Aviation in the Philippines (Washington, 1951), p. 92. 51

 After Action Rpt, Third U.S. Army, 1 Aug 44-9 May 45. vol. 1, an. 3, p. 2. 52

 Chemical Warfare Service in World War II, p. 75.
184 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Six-Pound Oil Bombs

The incendiary bomb most widely used against Japan was a 6-pounder.

The NDRC conceived the idea for the bomb in 1941 after European air

raids had proven the effectiveness of small incendiaries. Since magnesium

was scarce, the NDRC contracted with the Standard Oil Development

Company for a steel-cased bomb filled with thickened gasoline.53

The new bomb differed in principle from standard and experimental

CWS munitions. Instead of burning where it landed, like the 4-pound

magnesium bomb, or bursting and scattering its contents over a wide

area, like the 100-pound bomb, the missile acted like a small mortar,

ejecting a single blob of filling a distance of several yards. To achieve

this, engineers devised a radical design. Inside the bomb at the forward

end they put the fuze, followed by a small powder charge to eject and

ignite the filling, then the filling of jellied gasoline contained in a cheesecloth sack, and finally, at the base, tail streamers. When the missile came

to rest in the attic of a building, for example, the powder blew the

filling out of the bomb. The filling hit the underside of the roof, stuck

there, and burned.

An innovation in this bomb was the design of the stabilizers. Instead

of metal fins the tail consisted of cloth ribbons. These saved weight and

space (the ribbons were folded in the base of the bomb and were unfolded by the airstream). Also, because of air resistance, they kept the

bomb from dropping too fast and penetrating too deeply. The ideal velocity would be just enough for the bomb to break its way through a roof

and come to rest on the rafters.

Designers started off by modeling bombs of different sizes, but after

tests, including "raids" against abandoned buildings at Jefferson Proving

Ground, demonstrated the superiority of the 6-pound bomb, they concentrated on it. The completed bomb was approximately a foot and a half

long, hexagonal in cross section, and about three inches thick. The service

standardized it as the M69 in 1942, less than a year after the project

began, and started production in November.54

Several flaws showed up in proofing carried out with samples from

the production line. Cloth tail ribbons could not stand the sudden pull

as they snapped outward in mid-air, and they tore loose from bombs.

53

 (1) Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 389-96. (2) Fire Warfare, pp. 7-31. 54

 (1) CWTC Item 529, Standardization of 6-lb Oil Incendiary Bomb and 500-Pound Cluster

Adapter, 4 Aug 42. (2) CWTC Item 570, same title, 29 Sep 42. (3) CWTC Item 621, Redesignation of Bomb, Incendiary, Oil, 6-lb, M56, 24 Nov 42. (4) TM 9-1980, Nov 44.
INCENDIARIES 185

Fuzes did not always function, and fillings did not always ignite. After

these weak points were corrected, more than 90 percent of the bombs

caught fire when they landed.55

Originally, M69's were dropped in quick-opening clusters, similar to

the clusters used for small magnesium bombs. All went well until aimable

clusters appeared in 1943. These, since they were streamlined and released

from high altitudes, attained considerable velocity by the time they opened.

Tail ribbons on the bombs unfolded with a terrific jerk, tearing the cloth

or snapping ribbons completely off the missiles. Apparently all that

had to be done was to find sturdier cloth and a stronger method of attachment. Actually engineers had considerable difficulty finding cloth strong

enough to stand the strain, yet light enough not to unbalance falling

bombs. Then, after finding suitable cloth, the CWS was not able to procure all it needed. The problem continued throughout the war, forcing

the CWS to make several modifications in the ribbon retaining mechanism and in the ribbons themselves.

Supplies of M69 bombs became available in 1943, at a time when the

AAF was giving thought to the strategic bombing of Japan. Many believed that incendiaries would be highly effective against the wooden

structures in Japanese cities. The Air Forces already knew something of

what British and American incendiaries could do in Europe. Could that

experience be measured and tested for use against Japan? New incendiary

munitions had been under development. What was the best incendiary

for the new mission?

These questions were answered in bombing "raids" against industrialtype buildings at Edgewood, against a simulated Japanese village constructed

by the AAF at Eglin Field, and in the successive razing and rebuilding

of a composite German-Japanese village at Dugway. Among the points

that had to be determined was the degree of penetration of bombs, and

the time-temperature factor for igniting the typical Japanese target.

These large-scale, costly field tests demonstrated the merits and defects

of different bombs, and indicated that the M69 would be effective. The

missile wobbled and therefore was not always accurate, but its inaccuracy

turned out to be of little moment in the low altitude, large area bombing

later carried out over Japan.

The great air campaign against the Japanese islands began in November

55

 (1) Report of Activities of the Technical Division, p. 98. (2) Gaul and Finkelstein, Incendiaries, pp. 402-06. (3) Capt Roman L. Ortynsky, Tests of M69 Bombs at Huntsville Arsenal,

February 4-9, 1943. TDMR 576, 17 Feb 43.
186 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

1944, taking the form of high altitude precision bombing with HE bombs.

At first incendiaries were dropped only in inconsequential numbers. Then

on 25 Februrary 1945 the XXI Bomber Command changed its bombs and

hit Tokyo with more than 400 tons of M69's. Photos from reconnaissance

flights showed that approximately a square mile of the urban area had

been destroyed or damaged. This marked the turning point in bombing

tactics. Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay adopted the policy of low level area bombing with incendiaries. On the evening of March 9, more than 300 superforts

swarmed over Tokyo, dropping about two thousand tons of incendiaries,

mostly clusters of M69's. Photographs indicated that almost 16 square

miles of the city had been burned out. Tokyo police records, examined

after the war, showed that more than one-quarter of a million buildings

were destroyed—about one-fourth of the total in Tokyo. It was the most

devastating fire raid of the war up to that time. Before representatives of

Japan appeared on board the USS Missouri, AAF bombers had dropped

more than one hundred thousand tons of incendiaries on Japan, most of

them M69's. The tremendous destruction wrought in the Orient showed

how accurate had been the foresight of those who planned this bomb four

years earlier.56

Incendiary Oddities

The incendiary bombs just discussed include those important in operations; yet they represent only a minor proportion of the aerial incendiaries

that the CWS worked on during the war. By itself or in co-operation

with the NDRC, under its own initiative or upon request from other

branches of the armed forces, the CWS undertook the development of

many other incendiary bombs. Some went part way through the development cycle, others proceeded all the way to standardization.

An example of a munition that was standardized but never employed

is the incendiary leaf, developed in 1941-42 by the CWS and the Celanese

Corporation of America. It was intended for dry grain fields, forests,

thatched roofs, and other targets that would burn easily. As with the

4-pound magnesium bomb, the idea came from the British. Leaves were

made in the form of disks, eight inches in diameter, one-fourth of an inch

thick, and composed of pyroxylin. One type had pellets of white phosphorus attached to it, embedded in a putty-like material. When containers

56

 (1) Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, chs. 18, 20, 21, 23. (2) Chemical Warfare Service in World War II, p. 74.
INCENDIARIES 187

of leaves were dropped, they opened in mid-air and the leaves spun to

the ground. The sun dried and cracked the covering material, permitting

air to ignite the phosphorus and this, in turn, the leaf. Another type was

coated with a friction sensitive chemical. These were stored and dropped

in containers filled with a desensitizing fluid. The containers opened, the

leaves whirled away, and the liquid evaporated. On striking an object of

any kind, the leaf burst into flame. The CWS standardized these incendiaries, but when intelligence reports indicated that leaves dropped by the

British on Germany had caused little, if any, damage, the service abandoned

the munition.57

One example of an incendiary that seemed useful in the planning

stage, but proved unnecessary after it was developed and tested, was a

device to ignite oil slicks on water. In September 1942 the Navy Bureau

of Ordnance asked the CWS to devise such a munition. The service modified

existing incendiary bombs for the job, and also tried containers filled with

calcium carbide (carbide reacts with water, producing acetylene which

catches fire from the heat of reaction).

The NDRC took a different approach and designed the city slicker.

This was a container filled with small cardboard cartons, each carton

holding an incendiary mixture, chiefly magnesium dust and a bag of

calcium carbide. Dropped from a bomber, the container opened and spilled

the cartons into the air. When they landed water entered through holes,

was heated by reaction of the carbide, and then acted on the incendiary

mixture.

Tests finally showed that the standard, 100-pound incendiary bomb

filled with thickened gasoline and fitted with a sodium burster ignited

oil slicks with fair regularity. An additional advantage of using this bomb

was that industry would not have to produce oil slick igniters and the

armed forces would have one less munition to clutter up supply channels.

Engineers therefore stopped work on oil slick igniters and turned to other

projects.58

While the incendiary leaf and city slicker were unusual, they were

no match in this respect for the bat incendiary. This bomb was conceived on the day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Lytle S. Adams, a

dental surgeon from Pennsylvania, was returning from a visit to Carlsbad

57

 (1) James S. Carson, WP Incendiary Bomb M2 (Leaf). TDMR 482, 17 Dec 42. (2) Red

Phosphorus Incendiary Bomb M1 (Leaf). TDMR 484, 23 Dec 42. (3) CWTC Item 354, Bomb,

Incendiary, Leaf, 22 Jul 41. (4) CWTC Item 598, Withdrawal of Military Requirement for

Incendiary Leaves, 24 Nov 42. 58

 Capt Roman L. Ortynsky, Ignition of Oil Slicks on Water. TDMR 814, 4 Mar 44.
188 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Caverns when news of the attack came over his car radio. The thought

flashed through his mind that the millions of bats in American caves might

be fitted with incendiary bombs and dropped on Japan. He drove back to

Carlsbad, captured some bats for tests, ransacked libraries for data on the

subject, and in January sent his proposal to the White House. President

Roosevelt OK'd it, and the project was on.

Adams and his search teams drove hundreds of thousands of miles,

traveling day and night, to explore bat caves. In their yearlong survey

they found America's largest colony, estimated at between 20 and 30 million bats, in Ney Cave, Texas. In 1943 the CWS and NDRC began to

design an incendiary weighing less than an ounce for attachment to bats.

The finished product was an oblong, nitrocellulose case filled with thickened kerosene and carrying a delayed-action igniter. Two sizes were made,

the larger capable of burning for six minutes, the smaller for four. A

bomb was attached to the loose skin on the bat's chest by a surgical clip

and a piece of string. When released from a container that opened automatically in mid-air, bats were supposed to fly into hiding in dwelling

and other structures, gnaw through the string, and leave the bombs behind.

All sorts of complications arose to slow the project. Bats were cooled

to force them to hibernate. They could then be handled and transported

and not have to be fed (a bat can eat many times its own weight of

insects each day). But artificial cooling was tricky business, and in early

attempts the bats did not wake.up. After this problem was solved and

bats were taken aloft for test flights, many failed to co-operate and either

flew away or else dropped to earth like stones. Some bats got loose from

a careless handler and set fire to a hangar and to a general's automobile.

The Army gave up the project to the Navy, which passed it along to

the Marine Corps. All this experimentation took time, and in 1944 when

the Chief of Naval Operations found that bats would not be ready for

combat until mid-1945 he canceled the project. So ended the most extraordinary incendiary bomb of the war, leaving those who were acquainted

with it to wonder what would have happened if bomber bats had been

released over Japan.59

Less weird than the bat incendiary was the butane bomb. It was well

known that mixtures of hydrocarbon vapors and air would explode under

59

 (1) Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Washington:

Combat Forces Press, 1952), p. 129. (2) Charles E. Mohr, "Texas Bat Caves Served in Three

Wars," National Speleological Society Bulletin no. 10 (April 1948), pp. 89-93. (3) Capt Wiley

W. Carr, Live Carriers for Small Incendiaries. ETF 180-27, 8 Jun 43.
INCENDIARIES 189

certain conditions if touched by a flame. A number of serious industrial

accidents had been traced to the presence of such explosive mixtures. At

New London, Tex., 18 March 1937, almost 300 children were killed in a

school when natural gas leaked into the air and exploded.

After war broke out the CWS considered the possibility of using butane

and similar hydrocarbons as incendiary agents or explosives. Theoretically,

bombs filled with butane would burst and the gas would escape into the

air, forming an explosive mixture. Finally a board of officers studied the

technical difficulties in the way of using butane in bombs. After it concluded that butane offered "no advantage over current standard explosive

and incendiary agents," the matter seemed to be settled. Nevertheless in

July 1944 Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell ordered the CWS to investigate

the usefulness of explosive hydrocarbon mixtures as fillings for bombs

and other munitions. A few months later the AAF added its voice to

Somervell's. Although the CWS was aware that butane munitions were

impractical, it had no choice but to assign men to the project. Engineers

detonated butane "bombs" statically at Edgewood, and then dropped actual

bombs on Japanese-type fortifications at Dugway. These tests convinced

the Army and AAF that while mixtures of butane and air would explode

quite handily under laboratory conditions, it was impossible to get a vigorous explosion in the field because of such uncontrollable factors as wind

velocity, air temperature, ignition time, point of impact of the bomb, and

type of target. The CWS dropped the project without any further objecttion from the Army or AAF. 6 0

An incendiary of an entirely different kind from those that have been

mentioned was the Weary Willie. By the end of 1944 the AAF had a

number of worn-out aircraft that could no longer be used safely in combat. Someone came up with the idea that these planes might be loaded

with explosives or incendiaries and flown by remote control over important

targets in enemy territory. The Army handed the CWS the problem of

determining the most effective incendiary cargo for these Weary Willies

or remote controlled bombs.

At Edgewood, engineers tried to figure out the best payload by stacking different kinds and sizes of incendiary bombs as they would be piled

inside the planes, and igniting them. This method of testing did not

work out very well because engineers could not duplicate the conditions

under which bombs would be used. The service laid plans for simulated

60

 Capt R. E. Bolgiano, Development of an Inflammable Gas Bomb. TDMR 1136, 24 Sep 45.
190 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

bombing raids, but before they could be carried out the AAF dropped

the idea of employing Weary Willies.61

In addition to the aerial incendiaries discussed above, the CWS worked

on 3-pound, 6-pound, 25-pound, 30-pound, and 40-pound bombs; a 2-pound

bomb with a plastic case; the 2-pound magnesium bomb, AN-M52,

abandoned because of poor ballistic properties; and the 10-pound M74,

produced too late in the war for wide use. The reason that so many

models were designed and then discarded somewhere along the development line is that incendiary bombs, as a means of mass destruction, were

new in World War II and the necessary characteristics were not well

defined. The CWS, Ordnance Department, and AAF learned what physical and incendiary properties were required in a satisfactory bomb only as

large-scale, expensive tests were completed at proving grounds, and as

surveys of American bombing raids became available. Even when items

were unsatisfactory the effort that went into them was not entirely wasted.

From failures engineers and chemists got information that could be applied to the development of successful munitions.

Incendiary Grenades

Second only to incendiary bombs in terms of wartime production were

incendiary grenades. The CWS between 1942 and 1944 procured more

than eight million which were employed wherever American troops saw

action.62

The standard grenade, AN-M14, consisted of a round tin can, of the

same type used for smoke grenades, loaded with a thermite mixture. It

was born in late 1940 when the Infantry and Engineers asked for a munition that could destroy enemy matériel or American equipment on the

verge of capture. Ordnance engineers designed the grenade body while

CWS chemists developed the filling.63

What the users wanted was a munition that could burn through crankcases, cylinder heads, and transmission cases; fuse breech mechanisms beyond repair; ruin the rifling of large cannon; weaken bridge girders and

steel rails; and burn through armor plate on tanks. But it was not pos61

 (1) CWTC Item 1270, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics for Incendiary

for Remote Controlled Bombs, 22 Mar 45. (2) CWTC Item 1439, Cancellation of Projects in

CWS Project Program for 1945, 2 Aug 45. 62

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. 63

 Capt J. W. Gilbert, Development of Grenade, Incendiary, AN-M14. TDMR 1114, 22

Aug 45.
INCENDIARIES 191

sible to design a grenade-size incendiary capable of doing all of these

things because the small quantity of filling could not provide sufficient

heat. What the Army got was a grenade containing about one and onehalf pounds of a thermite-type mixture, able to fuse the breech of a 37-mm.

gun, ruin the bore of 75-mm. guns and larger, and burn through quarterinch steel plate.

Production began in 1942. By 1943 there were so many AN-M14's

on hand, and troops were using them so slowly, that the CWS stopped

production and made no more for the remainder of the war.

In the field, rangers carried these grenades on raids into enemy territory. Infantrymen used them on trip wires to catch prowling Japanese at

night, to destroy disabled American tanks, to ignite gasoline poured into

enemy caves and fortified positions, and to signal after dark. While the

AN-M14 was one of the grenades least employed, it served a useful purpose in special situations.

 64

The CWS investigated two other kinds of incendiary grenades, a bursting type and a frangible type. The bursting type, containing a small explosive charge to scatter the burning incendiary mixture, did not go beyond

the experimental stage. The frangible type, however, got more attention.

These grenades, made from glass bottles filled with gasoline and carrying

cloth wicks in the necks, came out of the Spanish Civil War. In action

the soldier poured a bit of gasoline on the wick, touched it with a match,

and threw the bottle. Upon impact the bottle burst and the gasoline

went up in flames.

Despite their crudeness, Molotov Cocktails, as they were called, could

put tanks and mechanized vehicles out of action. In addition they could

be produced quickly and easily. These factors led the CWS to investigate

frangible grenades in 1941.

Technicians first tried to improve the old Molotov Cocktail by making

it self-igniting. To do this they added alcohol to the gasoline, and attached a tube of chromic anhydride to the bottle. When the bottle broke

the gasoline was ignited by the reaction between the alcohol and anhydride. While this munition, standardized as frangible grenade (GA) M1,

worked satisfactorily, it was dangerous to produce, store, and ship. A

bottle broken accidentally could start a fire that might destroy a plant,

64

 (1) "American Forces in Action Series," Small Unit Actions (Washington, 1946), pp.

31-34. (2) H. M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II (Washington, 1950), p. 386. (3) Maj John N. Rentz, "Marine Corps Monographs," Marines

in the Central Solomons (Washington, 1952), p. 87. (4) "Klieg Lights in the Jungle," Chemical

Warfare Bulletin 30 (Jun-Jul 44), p. 32.
192 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

warehouse, or ship. No grenades of this type were ever stored or issued

to troops and in 1943 the service discarded them.65

Next, engineers tried using ordinary railroad fusees as igniters, taping

them to the grenades. In operation the soldier pulled a wire leading from

the fusee to start it burning and then tossed the bottle. Although this

type of igniter seemed safe, it would not flare up when wet and therefore

had to be discarded. Finally engineers came up with a small igniter that

fired a .38 caliber blank cartridge into the gasoline at the instant the

bottle broke. This device remained standard on all frangible grenades.66

For grenade fillings the CWS had a range of flammable materials. An

early mixture, copied from the British, contained carbon disulfide, white

phosphorus, and rubber. This filling was spontaneously flammable and

therefore hazardous in filling plants and storage depots. Within a few

months the service discarded it and adopted gasoline thickened with napalm

(NP) and isobutyl methacrylate (IM).67

The CWS turned out more than a half million frangible grenades

mostly with IM fillings. They were hardly worth the trouble involved.

When it came to dealing with enemy armored forces, American troops

preferred antitank guns, bazookas, cannon, and other weapons.

The Japanese had a "potato masher" or stick-type grenade consisting

of a cylindrical body attached to a wooden handle. The filling was composed of white phosphorus, carbon disulfide, and pellets of rubber. Germany had two incendiary grenades. The frangible glass type contained

gasoline. Two matches fastened to the bottle served as igniters. The metallic

grenade, used to destroy equipment that might be captured, was a 1-kilogram incendiary bomb with the tail removed, and the bomb fuze replaced

by a pull-igniter. The Germans and Japanese both found incendiary grenades

useful items of special equipment.68

Incendiary Shells

The CWS did its initial work on incendiary shells for the Navy, which

wanted munitions that submarines, surface raiders, and regular naval ves65

 (1) CWTC Item 562, Standardization of Incendiary Filled Frangible Grenades, 29 Sep 42.

(2) CWTC Item 609, same title, 24 Nov 42. (3) CWTC Item 746, Obsoletion of Grenade,

Frangible, M1, 11 Jun 43. 66

 (1) CWTC Item 692, Obsoletion of Grenade, Frangible, M1, 23 Apr 43. (2) CWTC

Item 746. (3) CWTC Item 737, Standardization of Igniter, Frangible Grenade, M3, 11 Jun 43. 67

 (1) CWTC Item 692. (2) CWTC Item 746. (3) CWTC Item 902, Reclassification of

Incendiary Fillings for Grenade, Frangible, M1, 21 Jan 44. 68

 (1) Japanese Chemical Warfare. (2) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, pp. I-J-7, I-J-9.
INCENDIARIES 193

sels could use to burn junks, sampans, warehouses, barracks, and supply

dumps. In early experiments CWS engineers tested base ejection shells

filled with thickened gasoline and white phosphorus, but these missiles

generally atomized the filling instead of ejecting it whole, and the men

discarded the idea.

They then turned to exploding-type shells filled with small incendiary

canisters. Steel and magnesium canisters of different sizes containing a

number of incendiary mixtures were tried. The experiments had to take

into account the shell velocity, type of fuze, and construction. The large

number of variables that had to be investigated slowed the work and it

was many months before the service narrowed its choice to a 5-inch shell

containing four cylindrical canisters, each filled with a special thermite mixture. The end of hostilities terminated this project.69

The AAF presented the service with a similar problem in 1944 when

it asked for incendiary shells that 75-mm. aircraft cannon could fire at

cargo vessels and fuel dumps. The CWS munitions experts started with

base ejection shells containing small magnesium canisters. It was no easy

matter to find an incendiary filling suitable for the canisters. Nor was it

easy to design canisters that could be blown from a 75-mm. shell, ignite,

and set fire to the target. To complicate matters still more the capacity

of 75-mm. shells was so small that the shells were not effective unless

they landed in a highly flammable area and then functioned perfectly.

All these obstacles blocked progress during 1944. Finally in 1945 it became

evident that the project was impractical, and it was canceled.70

Like the Navy and AAF, the CWS itself had thought of using incendiary shells. White phosphorus mortar shells, normally employed for

laying down smoke or causing casualties, could start fires under favorable

conditions. For example, dry hay or leaves might be ignited. But WP

would not ordinarily set fire to wooden structures.

In 1943 the service set out to develop base-ejection incendiary shells,

then canceled the project in 1944 when a survey of the theaters of operation showed that only the CBI had use for such a munition. Later that

year the ETO changed its mind, and in January 1945 the service resumed

the project. By V-J Day development had reached the point where the

69

 (1) Gaul and Finkelstein, Incendiaries, pp. 647-65. (2) Capt J. H. Hayes and Capt E. R.

Marshall, 5-Inch Navy Shell. TDMR 1112, 26 Sep 45. 70

 (1) Capt Julius Kovitz, Development of 75-mm. Base Ejection Incendiary Shell, T-34.

TDMR 1190, 13 Dec 45. (2) CWTC Item 1439, Cancellation of Projects in CWS Project Program for 1945, 2 Aug 45.
194 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Army authorized limited procurement of 4.2-inch mortar incendiary shells

for field tests.71

American forces did not press for incendiary shells because they were

useful only in special situations. This occasional usefulness had to be

weighed against the inconvenience of another item in supply channels.

Furthermore, white phosphorus ammunition served the purpose of incendiary ammunition where the target was easy to ignite.

If we can judge by the variety of incendiary shells in the German

and Japanese armies, both these nations placed a higher value on them.

The Japanese army had incendiary 75-mm. artillery and 90-mm. mortar

shells filled with white phosphorus, carbon disulfide, and rubber pellets.

This mixture was the same as the one used in Japanese incendiary bombs.

The Navy employed a 12-cm. antiaircraft shell loaded with steel pellets

filled with white phosphorus. When this shell exploded the pellets streaked

through the air and caught fire.72

Among German incendiary munitions were 50-mm., 100-mm., and

105-mm. shells containing high explosive and thermite. They were felt to

be particularly effective against tanks. An 88-mm. antiaircraft shell was

reminiscent of the Japanese AA shell in containing a number of small

incendiary slugs. It was more spectacular as a fireworks display than as

a munition for shooting down planes.73

Incendiary Rockets

In addition to incendiary bombs, grenades, and shells, the CWS worked

with incendiary rockets. Rocket research, to determine if the munitions

would be suitable for toxic fillings, was first undertaken for the service

by the NDRC in 1941. Incendiary fillings became the subject of CWS

experimentation two years later, with the Ordnance Department and Navy

co-operating in the design of rocket bodies and mortars.

In 1943 the CWS began to develop a 2.36-inch incendiary rocket for

the bazooka. Chemists filled shells with various thermite and PT mixtures and tested them. The missiles were not stable ballistically, and the

fuel would not always ignite upon impact. While these problems might

eventually have been solved, there was another obstacle that proved insurmountable. The rocket cavity held so little filling that it was practically

71

 (1) Gaul and Finkelstein, Incendiaries, pp. 665-75. (2) Lt Oren E. Ross, 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Shell, Incendiary, E66R3. TDMR 1218, 5 Mar 46. 72

 (1) Tactical and Technical Trends, no. 22, 8 Apr 43, p. 17. (2) Japanese Chemical

Warfare. 73

 German Chemical Warfare Materiel, p. I-H.
INCENDIARIES 195

useless in starting fires. The CWS gave up, and thereafter worked with

larger missiles.74

A much more suitable rocket, from the viewpoint of quantity of filling, was an 8-inch missile that the service devised by adding a rocket

motor to the tail of the Ordnance AN-M30 30-pound bomb. Loaded

with PT fuel, this rocket could range up to 600 yards. When it landed

a burster igniter broke open the casing and scattered burning fuel over a

radius of sixty yards. 7 5

In similar fashion the CWS and Ordnance Department Rocket Research Division evolved an incendiary rocket from the AN-M57 250-pound

general purpose bomb. With three rocket motors attached to the base,

the bomb would fly almost half a mile. Containing eighty pounds of PT

fuel, this was the largest experimental rocket worked on by the service.76

The development of incendiary rockets for the Army proceeded slowly

until the autumn of 1944, because none of the theaters or branches of

the armed services set up a military requirement for the munition. Then

a joint Army-Navy testing and experimental board asked for one hundred

7.2-inch incendiary rockets for trial. This became a joint project of the

Ordnance Department and CWS, with the latter filling the rocket with

incendiary fuel and fitting it for bursting and ignition. The rocket head

held about twenty pounds of PT fuel, a quantity shown by test to be adequate for starting fires. This rocket was never standardized, but the CWS

would have considered it satisfactory for use as a standard munition if the

need for such a rocket had arisen.77

The Navy was more interested than the Army in incendiary rockets.

In 1943 it considered the possibility of firing 3.5-inch incendiary rockets

from LCT's during amphibious operations. Engineers at CWS carried out

experiments that indicated rockets of this size, like the 2.36-inch bazooka

rocket, could not hold sufficient incendiary filling. The Navy turned to

the 4.5-inch rocket, with the thought that it might be used to burn light

structures, such as nipa shacks, in the Pacific. Rockets of this size filled

with PT fuel and fitted with an HE burster and WP igniter satisfied the

requirements set up by the Navy. The end of the war cut off the development of 4.5-inch rockets at the service test stage.78

74

 J. J. Jungbauer, Development of the 2.36-inch Chemical Rockets. TDMR 850, 24 Jun 44. 75

 R. E. Bolgiano, Development of 8-in. Incendiary Rocket E2. TDMR 893, 25 Sep 44. 76

 R. L. Ortynsky, Development of 11-in. Incendiary Rocket, E33. TDMR 1101, 21 Aug 45. 77

 R. E. Bolgiano, Development of 7.2-in. Incendiary Rocket Head E27. TDMR 1146, 16

Oct 45. 78

 (1) R. E. Bolgiano, Tests of the 3.5-inch Incendiary Rocket Mk 11. TDMR 1184, 28 Nov.

45. (2) R. E. Bolgiano, Test of the 4.5-inch Incendiary Rocket Mk 9. TDMR 1161, 2 Nov 45.
196 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The development of incendiary rockets proceeded slowly because the

Army did not ask for them and the Navy was only mildly interested.

Without a definite military requirement, the CWS was not justified in

diverting men and funds from crucial projects. The work done was exploratory in nature, and served to give engineers experience that would have

been useful if theaters of operations had suddenly requested incendiary

rockets to place beside HE rockets.

In World War II the Chemical Warfare Service's greatest stride was

in the field of incendiaries. During the period from 1941 to 1945, all its

standard bombs and grenades, experimental shells and rockets, sprang

forth. The service procured more incendiary bombs than any other single

item, and it spent more money and employed more manpower on incendiaries than on an any other item of supply.
CHAPTER IX

Smoke

At Algiers, Bizerte, Naples, and other Mediterranean cities during

World War II German bombers flew over harbors intent on blowing

Allied shipping out of the water. In all but a relatively few instances

they found nothing but an impenetrable haze covering the targets. On

New Guinea and Luzon American paratroopers dropped safely to earth

protected from bullets of Japanese riflemen by screens of white smoke.

At beachheads, highways, and river crossings in Italy, France, and Germany, troops and trucks went about their work under a shield of artificial fog. Never before had armies been able to protect their troops and

hide their movements as successfully as Allied forces did in World War II.

Military history records the tactical use of smoke in early times, but

reliable smoke munitions are of fairly recent origin. Not until World

War I did armies develop standard munitions and give them a wide trial.

The British Army produced grenades and shells containing white phosphorus that emitted white smoke, and carbonaceous mixtures that gave

off black smoke. The German Army, lacking phosphorus, depended on

oleum, chlorosulfonic acid, and sulphur trioxide, all of which reacted with

moisture in the air to form white fog. The French contributed Berger

mixture, which threw off a gray smoke when heated. The American Army

designed grenades, shells, candles, pots, and other munitions based on

European originals, but did not get them to the battle zone in time for

use. From the smoke munitions of World War I evolved most of the

efficient screening devices used by friend and foe in World War II.

White Phosphorus

White phosphorus (CWS symbol, WP) is a soft waxy substance that

reacts spontaneously with oxygen. When phosphorus is scattered from a

bursting munition the heat of the explosion causes the phosphorus to
198 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

SMOKE POTS BEING SET OFF IN THE ARGONNE FOREST, near Beaucamp,

Meuse, France, October 1918.

ignite as soon as exposed to air and throw off a dense white smoke of

phosphorus pentoxide. The material WP was unsurpassed as a smoke

producer and it also paid dividends in other ways. Burning phosphorus

wounded enemy soldiers just as readily as rifle bullets and shell fragments. Fragments of burning phosphorus streaking through the air were

also hard on enemy morale. For these reasons the CWS purchased two

hundred million pounds of WP from 1942 to 1945, far more than any

other smoke agent obtained during the war. 1

The CWS used white phosphorus as a filling for shells, rockets, bombs,

and grenades, all of which the armed forces employed extensively in World

War II. Artillery and chemical mortar companies hurled shells to set fire

to enemy held buildings and cane fields, to drive enemy soldiers from

fortified positions, to unnerve enemy troops, to support infantry attacks,

and to shield flame thrower operators. Naval vessels threw WP at shore

installations on Saipan, Eniwetok, and other places to support amphibious

assaults. The Army fired a sizable portion of the two and one-half million 2.36-inch rockets filled during the war to screen operations, to start

fires, and to wound and unnerve the enemy. Airplanes dropped WP bombs

on enemy installations to start fires or aid infantry. For infantrymen and

1

 Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, p. 109.
SMOKE 199

marines, the CWS filled more than five million hand grenades and two

million rifle grenades with WP, and, as indicated earlier, the American

phosphorus was considered by the Germans, who were in a good position

to know, of superior quality.2

Despite its excellence as a smoke agent, WP had a fault that brought

objections from the field early in World War II. The smoke had a tendency in still air to rise into a pillar instead of lingering close to the

ground where infantrymen wanted it. Pillaring depended primarily on the

size of phosphorus fragments. If the bursting charge of a munition shattered

the solid phosphorus filling into extremely fine particles, a large reactive

surface area was exposed to the air. The large surface allowed the phosphorus to burn rapidly and in so doing give off a considerable quantity

of heat which billowed the smoke upward. If, on the other hand, the

explosion broke the phosphorus into a few large fragments, the exposed

area was not nearly so great. The phosphorus then burned more slowly,

emitted less heat, and the smoke hovered close to the ground.

The CWS tried various expedients to keep the explosion from completely shattering the phosphorus. In one experiment engineers stuffed

wads of steel wool into a phosphorous shell to see if the network of

steel threads would hold the phosphorus in chunks. In other tests they

poured melted phosphorus into metal and paper tubes, and packed these

tubes inside shells. None of the experimental shells was entirely successful

and the problem remained unsolved until 1944 when the NDRC Munitions Development Laboratory at the University of Illinois devised a new

filling consisting of small granules of phosphorus, about the size of grains

of sand, suspended in a matrix of rubber. Explosion broke this filling,

called plasticized white phosphorus, PWP, into chunks several millimeters

in diameter that burned slowly for several minutes. Munitions loaded

with PWP raised a better smoke screen than ordinary phosphorus munitions. Furthermore, the phosphorus, being in large pieces, was more effective against enemy troops. Although PWP was not completely satisfactory,

since the phosphorus slowly separated from rubber in storage during hot

weather, it was the best solution devised during the war.3

2

 (1) See Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat, a volume in preparation for

the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1

Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 14, 15, 26. (3) Ochsner, History of German Chemical Warfare

in World War II, p. 33. 3

 (1) Benjamin C. Macintire, Navy 5-inch Smoke Projectile, WP-Filled, Engineering Tests.

EATR 338, 8 Apr 41. (2) H. F. Johnston, Plasticized White Phosphorus, in Military Problems

with Aerosols and Nonpersistent Gases. Summary Tech Rpt of Div 10, NDRC (Washington,

1946). (3) Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 277-78. (4) CWTC Item 1514, Standardization of Screening

Smoke, PWP, 20 Dec 45.
200 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The CWS produced a few hundred experimental 75-mm., 105-mm., and

155-mm. PWP shells in late 1944. The following year plants got into

production and turned out 891,941 pounds of PWP. The service loaded

this into mortar shells, recoilless mortar shells, bombs, and 3.5-inch and

4.5-inch rockets, but these appeared when the curtain was falling on the

last act of the war and they were practically unknown to the fighting man.

 4

In contrast to the Americans and the British, the Germans did not have

phosphorus ammunition. Germany lacked the raw materials for producing

phosphorus, and its Army had to depend on less effective Berger mixture, described below, and on oleum. Grenades and smoke pots generally

took a Berger-type filling, while mortar smoke ammunition, artillery

smoke ammunition, and smoke rockets contained pumice saturated with

oleum. The Japanese had a wide range of WP bombs, mortar shells,

artillery shells, and grenades, but they used WP much less than the Americans did.5

Smoke Pots

Along with the first wide-scale use of white phosphorus as a smoke

producer, World War I saw the invention of a new type of smoke agent,

Berger mixture, by Capt. Ernest E. F. Berger of the French Army. The

mixture, containing carbon tetrachloride, powdered zinc, and zinc oxide,

was inert at normal temperatures, but when it was heated the ingredients

reacted and gave off a dense gray smoke of carbon and zinc chloride

particles.6

In the United States CWS chemists experimented with Berger mixture

during the 1920's and 1930's and replaced carbon tetrachloride, a liquid,

with hexachloroethane, a solid, to decrease evaporation during storage.

(From the name hexachloroethane came the symbol HC employed by

the American Army in designating this type of smoke agent.) By 1940

the service was using Type A HC containing hexachloroethane, zinc, ammonium chloride, and ammonium or potassium perchlorate, as a filling

for smoke pots and other munitions. The fall of France cut off America's

supply of imported perchlorate, and chemists began to search for substitutes. They chose calcium silicide, which Captain Berger had suggested

4

 (1) Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, p. 109. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1

Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 5, 14, 15, 26, 28, 29, 30. 5

 (1) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, passim. (2) Japanese Chemical Warfare, passim. 6

 (1) Lt Col J. E. Zanetti, Notice sur les Appareils Fumigeres Utillisant les Compositions du

Capitaine Berger, Z-206, 19 Jun 18. (2) George A. Richter, "Combustion Smokes," Industrial

and Engineering Chemistry, 13 (1921), 343-45.
SMOKE 201

SMOKE SCREEN DEMONSTRATION over the harbor, Palermo, Sicily. The screen was

produced by mechanical smoke generators and smoke pots in thirteen minutes.

back in World War I and which the British Army had adopted. The new

mixture, designated as Type B HC, functioned satisfactorily but industrial

firms had trouble producing it. They found that calcium silicide could

be a dangerous material. When it was ground to a powder it reacted

rapidly with oxygen in the air sometimes causing an explosion. Plants

redesigned their equipment and took great precautions, but the danger

led chemists to develop a safer mixture, Type C, containing grained aluminum, hexachloroethane, and zinc oxide. Then came the threat of a shortage of hexachloroethane. Chemists had to develop a substitute mix, Type

E, with carbon tetrachloride replacing hexachloroethane. Actually the

shortage of hexachloroethane never matured and the CWS was able to

procure all the Type C mix it wanted. Engineers discovered that the new

Type E mix could be loaded into bombs more easily than the other types,

however, and the CWS used it extensively as a filling for M77 ten-pound

bombs.7

7

 (1) Leo Finkelstein, "The Chemistry of HC Smoke Munitions," Armed Forces Chemical

Journal, IV (October 1950), 16-18. (2) E. T. Lawrence, Development of HC Smoke Mixture.

EACD 227, 3 Mar 25. (3) G. H. McIntyre, "Ferro's War Story," Armed Forces Chemical Journal,

II (October 1947), 12-15. (4) Capt J. H. Hayes and Lt L. C. Andrews, Smoke Munitions for

Airborne Operations. TDMR 823, 11 Apr 44.
202 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

With types A, B, C, and E HC mixtures, the CWS had a range of

smoke agents suitable for hand grenades, rifle grenades, artillery shells,

rockets, bombs, and smoke pots. Shells, grenades, and bombs found employment during the war but by far the most widely used HC munition

was the smoke pot.

At the time of Pearl Harbor the CWS's standard smoke pot, M1, was

a cylindrical can 8 inches high and 5 inches in diameter, holding about

10 pounds of HC. Fired by hand or electric current, it released a cloud

of grayish white smoke for a period of 5 to 8 minutes. The service had

devised this pot in the early 1930's as a munition for training exercises,

but when war came it was the only munition of its type available and

the American Army took it along to North Africa.8

Because they released smoke immediately, pots were useful in setting

up a preliminary screen during the five or so minutes that it took large

mechanical generators to warm up and start functioning. They helped

shield harbors and installations on the coast of North Africa as well as

at the harbors at Palermo, Licata, and Porto Empodocle on Sicily.

 9

Before the landings on Italy, troops employed smoke almost exclusively

for harbor defense and only to a minor degree in amphibious operations.

But at Salerno, where the enemy kept beaches under observation for two

weeks, the Army used smoke along the shore to protect incoming landing craft from enemy bombers, machine guns, and artillery fire. The small

size and light weight of pots enabled troops to carry them ashore and

employ them until heavy, bulky, mechanical generators could be landed.

After Salerno, smoking of invasion areas by army units and by naval support boats became a standard practice on the coast of Europe and on

Pacific islands.10

In Italy pots also graduated from harbor defense and invasion defense

to forward area defense. Troops employed them to screen supply routes,

bridge construction, river assault crossings, tanks, ammunition dumps,

troop concentrations, ground operations, and even to hide mortar flash. As

a result of the wide usage of pots under many conditions, the CWS

learned of minor flaws in the design of the munition. Those that were

opened in anticipation of combat could not be resealed tightly. Moisture

from the air crept under the lid, disintegrated the matchhead and rendered

8

 (1) TM 3-300, 13 Apr 42. (2) CWTC Item 943, Standardization of Pot, Smoke, HC M1A1, 17 Mar 44. 9

 Paul W. Pritchard, Smoke Generator Operations in the Mediterranean and European Theaters,

Chemical Corps Historical Studies No. 1, pp. 37-46. 10

 Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat.
SMOKE 203

SMALL M1 SMOKE POTS SET OFF IN A SERIES to maintain a screen for troops in

the Gothic Line, Italy.

the pots useless. Furthermore, handles protruding above the lids made it

impossible to stack the pots. To overcome these defects engineers substituted a flat screw-type lid without handles that could be resealed, and

allow pots to be placed one on the other. The revised model bore the

designation M1A1.11

In addition to these flaws, smoke pots at times proved to be smaller

than troops desired. More men were required for maintaining a smoke

screen with small pots than with large ones. In 1944 the CWS began to

turn out pots holding three times as much HC, and burning twice as

long. Almost a million large pots, designated as model M5, came from

filling lines before the war ended. They did not reach Europe in appreciable quantities before V-E Day, and the original M1, of which more

than five million were produced, remained the workhorse of ground

troops.12

11

 (1) CWTC Item 943. (2) A photograph showing troops using type M1 pots to screen

infantry crossing the Rapido River, Italy, may be found in The War Against Germany and Italy:

Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), p. 227. 12

 (1) CWTC Item 926, Standardization of Pot, Smoke, 30-lb, HC, M5, 21 Jan 44. (2)

Capt J. H. McLain and Lt E. R. Padavic, Pot, Smoke, HC, M5. TDMR 817, 24 Mar 44. (3)

TB 3-300-1, HC Smoke Pot, M5, 27 May 44. (4) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics,

"Procurement," p. 23.
204 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Although HC was regarded as nontoxic as the other CWS screening

agents (titanium tetrachloride, chlorosulfonic acid-sulphur trioxide, and

white phosphorus), its use in troop training exercises showed that when

breathed in a confined area it might produce fatalities through extreme

lung irritation. The airborne particles of zinc chloride that were dispersed

during the burning of HC were believed to be the only toxic element,

until further tests revealed that hexachlorothane mixtures contaminated

with ammonium chloride were even more lethal. Wearing the gas mask

in HC smoke clouds provided adequate protection, and the Army changed

manuals and other training literature accordingly.13

The German Army did not have as large a variety of HC-type smoke

munitions as did American forces. Smoke bombs, grenades, and candles

(analogous to U.S. pots) made up the list, and of these the infantrymen

depended generally on the candle. Type 39 candle, a metal cylinder slightly

over 5 inches in height and 3 inches in diameter, held sufficient HC-type

mixture to burn for 4 to 7 minutes. Armored vehicles carried modified

type 39 candles containing a mixture that burned more rapidly. Type 42

candle, produced late in the war, was a much larger munition, burning

for 20 to 25 minutes.

 14

The Germans had a variety of launchers capable of tossing smoke pots

25 to 300 yards. These were first designed for armored vehicles. The original model was a bracket fastened to the side of the vehicle with 3 cups

to hold candles. The device had to be loaded from the outside and was

fired electrically, the candle being ignited and hurled about 25 yards by a

charge of black powder. A later model resembled a miniature cannon. It

was attached to a vehicle by a ring mount, and was loaded through the

breech. Toward the end of the war, launchers for ground troops made

their appearance. These were little more than crude mortars. The operator

placed a powder charge in the bottom of the launcher barrel and then

dropped an ignited smoke candle down the barrel, setting off a blast

which threw the candle up to 300 yards.15

The German Army's use of smoke pots was not unlike that of the

American Army. Troops used smoke to cover withdrawals, as at Metz, to

screen troops and supply movements against observation and air attack,

to permit tanks to disengage from the enemy, and to divert the enemy's

attention and fire. As early as 1943 the production of smoke pots had

13

 Toxicological Research Laboratories. Informal Monthly Progress Report 2, 15 Jun 44. 14

 German Chemical Warfare, pp. 135-37. 15

 (1) Ibid. (2) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, pp. 1-K-6 - I-K-9.
SMOKE 205

fallen behind the demand, and through the remainder of the war the German Army was unable to expend smoke with the same liberality as the

American Army.

The Japanese Army had among its munitions grenades, candles, bombs,

and shells filled with Berger-type or HC smoke mixtures. For producing

screens it favored candles, of which there were 3 major types: the selfpropelled candle, the rifle-launched candle, and the stationary candle. The

self-propelled candle held 11⁄2 pounds of smoke mix in one end and a

propelling charge at the other capable of hurling the munition a distance

of 130 to 300 yards, according to the angle at which it was fired. The

rifle-launched candle was a cylinder 2 inches in diameter, 6 inches long,

filled with smoke mix, and carrying from 45 to 200 yards, depending

upon the adjustment of a heavy grenade launcher. Stationary candles came

in 2 sizes, one holding 2 pounds of smoke agent, the other 7 times this

quantity.16

While the Japanese gained considerable experience with smoke in their

early campaigns against the Chinese, they made little use of it against

American forces in the Pacific. Army and Navy raiding parties sometimes

carried smoke grenades, ground troops on several occasions used smoke

to confuse American air crews as to targets previously marked with smoke

by American forces, and on Okinawa they screened local counterattacks

and attempts at infiltration. The failure of the Japanese to make greater

use of smoke screens in their tactics is surprising in view of the ample

supplies of smoke munitions captured in Japanese ammunition dumps on

Leyte, Luzon, and other islands.

The Army and Navy needed floating smoke pots to screen amphibious

forces from enemy observation posts and artillery fire. Harbor defense

units needed floating pots to assist in maintaining smoke rings against

enemy planes. For these reasons the CWS undertook the development of

this type of munition in 1942.

Engineers constructed the first experimental munitions from metal

drums ballasted with concrete and loaded with HC. When tests proved

these pots too heavy and difficult to handle, engineers simplified the design by discarding the concrete and only partially loading the drums so

they were bottom-heavy and floated upright. The final model, M4, was a

5-gallon steel pail containing 26 pounds of smoke mix. To generate smoke

the operator jerked a fuze wire extending through a hole in the lid and

16

 WD Intel Bull, Sep 45, pp. 78-84.
206 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

TROOPS LANDING AT ELBA, JUNE 1944. Note HC floating smoke pot at left of the

LCI's.

tossed the can into the water. The pail bobbed to the surface and poured

out white smoke through vents in the lid for ten to fifteen minutes.17

When floating pots came off the production line and entered supply

channels, the Army and Navy found fault with the design. If the munition was handled roughly its HC filling crumbled, and the pot would

not generate smoke. On several occasions firing mechanisms went off

accidentally, igniting the pots and starting fires in warehouses, docks, and

ships. To improve the munition, engineers placed a perforated, circular

steel plate on top of the filling to hold it in place and devised a safer

firing mechanism. The modified munition passed rough-handling tests

satisfactorily and was standardized as the M4A1 in July 1943.18

17

 (1) CWTC Item 561, Standardization of Pot, Smoke, Floating, HC, M4, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics, 29 Sep 42. (2) W. H. Flegenheimer, Development of a Floating

Smoke Pot. TDMR 510, 6 Mar 43. 18

 (1) Capt J. H. McLain and Lt E. R. Padavic, Development of an Improved Floating Smoke

Pot. TDMR 822, 5 Apr 44. (2) Ltr, Port Ord Office, Brooklyn, N.Y., to OC Ord, 22 Mar 43,

sub: Malfunction of HC Floating Smoke Pot, M4. Cited in ref d, CWTC Item 725. (3) Ltr, CG

Hawaiian Dept to Pres CW Board, 12 Apr 43, sub: Malfunctioning of Pots, Smoke, Floating, HC,

M4. CWS 470.71. (4) CWTC Item 725, Standardization of Pot, Smoke, Floating, HC, M4A1,

1 Jun 43. (5) CWTC Item 781, same title, 23 Jul 43. (6) TM 3-300, 1 Mar 44.
SMOKE 207

The service found another source of trouble in the composition of the

smoke mixture. Type B HC, the first filling used in floating pots, contained calcium silicide which could react with moisture in the atmosphere

and generate hydrogen. Hydrogen and the air beneath the lid produced

an explosive mixture. When the operator pulled the fuze wire the flame

ignited the mixture, causing an explosion that sometimes blew the lid

off the pot. As a precaution the CWS told operators to take off the lids

and allow the hydrogen to escape before employing the smoke pots. This

was inconvenient, particularly when a large number of pots had to be

vented. The trouble was finally eliminated when chemists developed Type

C HC to replace Type B.19

One other flaw in the floating pot was rather minor, yet it caused

considerable annoyance to those who handled the munitions. The fuze

stuck out from the center of the lid, preventing pots from being stacked

in piles, and sometimes causing it to get knocked out of place. Engineers

remedied this by lowering the fuze into a shallow well. This final model

of the floating pot, designated as M4A2, was ready in March 1944.20

American forces used floating pots soon after they arrived in the Mediterranean area. After the invasion of Sicily naval patrol boats helped

maintain smoke screens surrounding the harbors at Licata and Porto

Empedocle by means of floating pots. At Salerno support boats dropped

floating pots to form a screen that would protect landing craft from machine gun and artillery fire. The Third Army in its drive across France

into Germany employed thousands of floating pots in assault river crossings, bridge construction, ferry operations, and other missions. The Ninth

Army employed several thousand pots in crossing the Roer and Rhine

rivers. Other armies set up floating screens whenever the occasion demanded. Since floating pots functioned on land as well as on water, troops

often employed them in place of standard land pots when supplies of the

latter ran low. While the M4 floating pot did not have the all-around

usefulness of M1 and M5 land pots, it was a valuable munition in certain situations and it repaid the time and labor that went into its development and production.21

The German Army did not have floating munitions of the American

19

 (1) Lt H. Barnard, Pot, Smoke, Floating, HC, M4—Aluminum (Secondary), Zinc Oxide,

Hexachloroethane Filling. TDMR 489, 19 Dec 42. (2) TM 3-300, 1 Mar 44. 20

 (1) McLain and Padavic. TDMR 822. (2) CWTC Item 934, Standardization of Pot, Smoke,

Floating, HC, M4A2, 17 Mar 44. (3) TB 3-300-2. HC Floating Smoke Pot M4A2, 1 Jul 44. 21

 (1) Pritchard, Smoke Generator Operations, pp. 44, 53, 170-71, 184. (2) After Action

Rpt, Third U.S. Army, 1 Aug 44-9 May 45, vol. II, pt. 11, p. 10.
208 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

type which gave off smoke from a burning mixture, but they had a smoke

float that generated white smoke by the action of water on fuming sulphuric acid or oleum. The float was a drum about 30 inches high, a

foot in diameter, weighing 40 pounds empty and 80 pounds loaded. An

inner container held the oleum which reacted with water, and emitted

smoke for 8 to 9 minutes. The disadvantage of this type of munition

lay in the corrosive action of the acid.22

Japanese troops were supplied both with floating pots that produced

smoke from a burning mixture, and with floating generators that produced smoke by action of water. The Japanese floating pot, designed for

use at sea or in rivers and harbors, was a long metal tube filled with

eleven pounds of smoke mixture similar to the HC mixture used by the

CWS. The novelty of the pot lay in the method of floatation. The pot

fitted into a doughnut shaped, inflatable, rubber ring that held it upright

and kept it from sinking to the bottom.23 The generator was a steel

drum about a foot in height and in diameter, weighing ninety pounds

when filled with fuming sulphuric acid. An inflated rubber ring could

be attached to the float to increase its buoyancy. A small device inside

the lid contained a material that burned slowly, giving off considerable

gas. This gas built up pressure in the drum and forced the acid up a

pipe that protruded above the float. Upon contact with air the acid formed a

dense white cloud.24

Japanese and German forces did not employ floating smoke pots as

extensively as American troops did. Early in the war enemy troops advanced and made amphibious landings without serious resistance, so that

such aids as floating pots seemed unnecessary to them. Later as they

retreated stubbornly and the American forces advanced, it was the Americans who used smoke pots to the best advantage.

Oil Smoke Generators

Smoke produced by the combustion of chemical mixtures was not the

perfect answer to screening because mixtures were expensive, the smoke

nauseated the troops, pots burned out in a short time, and many men

were needed to maintain a large screen. On the other hand, it was easy

and cheap to produce smoke by burning oil, and in 1941 the CWS stand22

 Tactical and Technical Trends, no. 23, 22 Apr 43, p. 7. 23

 WD Intel Bull, Jun 43, pp. 47-49. 24

 Japanese Chemical Warfare.
SMOKE 209

ardized an oil burner for this purpose. The Stationary Oil Smoke Generator, as the device was called, consisted of a sheet-iron pot about 2 feet

in diameter and topped by a smokestack 3 feet high. The pot held about

15 gallons of crude oil. When the oil was ignited a mixture of black

carbon smoke and oil droplets raced up the chimney and billowed out

into the air. The volume of smoke was about equal to that given off by

the M1 pot. The generator functioned like the smudge pots used in

the South, to help protect citrus groves against frost. The British had

produced a considerable number of similar smoke generators for defense

of their island, and this was one of the factors that led the CWS to

adopt this device.25

A few months after Pearl Harbor the CWS organized smoke generator

companies, equipped each company with 3,600 oil smoke generators, and

stationed them at the Panama Canal, the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, and

around aircraft factories on the west coast. The generators did not go

outside the continental United States or the Canal Zone. In maneuvers

troops found that the large, heavy generators could not be moved quickly

when the wind changed direction. Furthermore, the black smoke that they

emitted did not have the obscuring power of white smoke. These disadvantages led the service to adopt a mechanical smoke generator in 1942

and abandon the stationary generator in 1944.26

Mechanical smoke generators came into existence through the co-operative efforts of industry, the National Defense Research Committee, and

the CWS. The principle behind the device was simple. It vaporized a

mixture of water and oil (the CWS used a special oil commonly referred

to as fog oil), and then discharged the mixed vapors into the air. When

the hot vapor hit the cool air it condensed back into tiny liquid droplets.

Mechanical generators had many advantages over oil burning generators. They produced smoke more rapidly and in larger quantity so that

fewer men could screen a larger area. Their smoke was very persistent.

By way of comparison, smoke from HC pots was seldom effective for

more than 500 to 800 yards downwind, while smoke from mechanical

generators extended for several miles.

Development of the first mechanical generators took more than a year.

In 1941 the CWS received reports from the British of the Haslar genera25

 (1) CWTC Item 357, Standardization of Generator, Oil, Smoke, M1, 22 Jul 41. (2) CWTC

Item 403, same title, 14 Oct 41. (3) Brooks F. Smith, Engineering Test of Kincaid Oil Smoke

Generators. TDMR 265, Jan 41. 26

 (1) CWTC Item 1010, Obsoletion of Generator, Oil, Smoke, M1, 5 May 44. (2) CWTC

Item 1073, same title, 7 July 44.
MECHANICAL SMOKE GENERATOR M1 (100-GALLON) pouring out smoke screen

to conceal Fifth Army operations from the Germans, Anzio area, Italy, March 1944.
SMOKE 211

tor, a 14-ton, cumbersome monster that produced dirty brown smoke from

fuel oil and water. The CWS undertook the development of a generator

based on the Haslar. In the meantime the NDRC, which had established

a project on smokes and filters in 1940, was making progress on a different kind of generator. Associated with the NDRC were Irving Langmuir

of General Electric Co. and Victor La Mer of Columbia University. These

men and their associates studied the size and color of particles in artificial

fogs to find the properties of droplets essential for maximum screening

ability. Their final determinations ended the search for the ideal properties

of particle size and color. They began their analysis with the knowledge

that the effect of a smoke screen on the eye was partly physiological,

partly optical, and partly psychological. Light from the sun struck the

smoke, some of it passing through untouched, the remainder scattering

in all directions. A person trying to concentrate on a target saw not only

light reflected from the target but also the scattered light. The intensity

of the scattered light determined the effectiveness of the screen in confusing and disorting the image. In their experiments, Langmuir and La

Mer found that white particles .3 micron in radius produced the proper

scattering effect. 2 7

Langmuir and his co-worker Vincent J. Schaefer then devised a small

generator capable of producing fog particles of the desired size. The model

turned out a smoke screen much thicker and more permanent than the

screen from the current oil burning generator. Upon request from NDRC

the Standard Oil Development Co. rushed a full-size generator to completion in six weeks. In tests the generator performed so well that the

CWS asked Esso to begin production at once. To obtain generators quickly,

the CWS by-passed procedures generally followed in development, and

engineers made last minute changes in design at the plant. In December

1942 the service standardized the apparatus for military use.28

Mechanical Smoke Generator M1 stood six feet high, weighing 3,000

pounds empty and 5,400 pounds filled. It had to be transported by a trailer,

truck, or barge. At full capacity it consumed 100 gallons of fog oil, 7 gallons of fuel, and 150 gallons of water per hour. After starting, three to

27

 (1) Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 283-86. (2) Military Problems with Aerosols and Nonpersistent Gases. (3) Noyes, Chemistry, 278-81. 28

 (1) Invention Report of Aerosols: I. The Langmuir-Schaefer Smoke Generator, NDRC

Division 10, Miscellaneous Pub. No. 270, 30 Apr 43. (2) W. H. Rodebush, V. K. La Mer, Irving

Langmuir, and T. K. Sherwood, Screening Smokes. OSRD 940, 5 Oct 42. (3) CWTC Item 574,

Standardization of Mechanical Smoke Generator, 24 Nov 42. (4) CWTC Item 646, same title,

12 Jan 43.
212 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

six minutes elapsed before it warmed up and threw out an effective smoke

screen.29

Generators first saw action in North Africa where CWS units used

them in the smoke defense rings around Oran, Algiers, Bone, Bizerte, and

other harbors. Later, the service used them for the invasion of Sicily. At

Paestum in Salerno Bay, generator units operated for the first time under

artillery fire, effectively concealing the anchorage and unloading areas from

the Germans. The operation worked out so well that the Army decided

to include a smoke unit in the forces assembled for the Anzio landing.

In March 1944 mechanical generators threw up a protective haze between

the town of Anzio and enemy lines. Thereafter the Army employed generators in front-area operations and to shield troop and convoy movments.30

The wide use of M1 generators in all kinds of weather and on all kinds

of terrain in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy revealed shortcomings in the

device. Mechanical flaws that normally would have shown up in development tests and have been corrected before the item was issued to troops

now popped up in battle. More important, the heavy weight of the generators and the length of time they needed to warm up sometimes delayed

the rapid deployment of troops, and on occasion prevented them from

moving generators about on the battlefield. As a result the CWS and

NDRC intensified their efforts to produce a lighter, compact generator

that could be moved easily and make smoke quickly.31

In May 1943, the DeVilbiss and York-Hessian Companies built, under

NDRC contract, small generators for trial. In September the Besler Corp.

delivered to the CWS an experimental generator that the corporation had

originally developed for the U.S. Navy. In comparative tests the Besler

generator came out on top, and in January 1944 the CWS standardized it

as model M2. The new generator was less than 3 feet long, 2 feet wide

and 2 feet high. It consumed 50 gallons of fog oil, 5 gallons of gasoline,

and 5 gallons of water per hour. Weighing only 180 pounds empty, 266

pounds full, it could be carried short distances by two men, whereas the

M1 needed a vehicle. It could be employed in mountainous country or

on soft ground, whereas the M1 could only be used on fairly flat, firm

29

 TM 3-380, 12 May 43. 30

 (1) Pritchard, Smoke Generator Operations, pp. 37-83. (2) Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell,

Chemicals in Combat, ch. VI. (3) The War Against Germany and Italy, pp. 262-63. (4) "American Forces in Action Series," Anzio Beachhead (22 January-25 May 1944), p. 110. (5) Charles

B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews, Three Battles, Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, UNITED

STATES IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1952), pp. 65-70. 31

 Capt T. L. Hurst and 1st Lt W. F. Kozak, Inspection of Mechanical Smoke Generator M1

(Esso) After Extensive Service. TDMR 644, 7 Jun 43.
SMOKE 213

MECHANICAL SMOKE GENERATOR M2 (50-GALLON), one of many used to screen

a heavy ponton bridge over the Rhine River, Germany.

ground. It produced smoke in less than 1 minute in contrast to the M1

which needed 3 to 6 minutes. On top of all these advantages it was

simpler to operate and maintain in working order.32

The Fifth Army in Italy issued M2's to smoke units in August 1944.

The First Army received them in time for the landings in Normandy. As

units received M2's they gradually substituted them for M1's. But all was

not well. In action the new generators did not perform as efficiently as

had been expected. They produced smoke for a few days, and then stopped.

Frequently the coils in which the oil-water mixture was heated kept burning out. Poorly trained, careless operators caused some of the breakdowns

while defects in the design of the generator caused others. As reports

came in from the field, engineers at Edgewood corrected minor faults in

the generator, though by the end of the war they were still not able to

prevent coils from burning out.33

32

 (1) Capt T. L. Hurst, Capt Winton Brown, and H. E. Norton, Development of a Lightweight Portable Oil Smoke Generator of Fifty Gallon Per Hour Capacity. TDMR 810, 1 Mar 44.

(2) TM 3-381, 14 Jun 44. (3) CWTC Item 864, Standardization of Generator, Smoke, Mechanical, M2 (50 Gallon), 3 Dec 43. 33

 (1) Col William H. Green, "Make Smoke," Chemical Warfare Bulletin 31 (Jan-Feb 45),

21-24. (2) The War Against Germany and Italy, p. 381.
214 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Germans had large smoke generators for shielding oil refineries,

blast furnaces, factories, canals, docks, and other important bomber targets.

The principle behind their generators was entirely different from the one

used by Americans. Instead of using oil they employed an acidic solution

which fumed in moist air. The acid was stored in large barrels fitted with

spray nozzles and connected to cylinders of compressed air which forced

the acid out through the nozzles. Smoke from these sprayers has been

described as resembling tobacco smoke. With a twenty-gallon drum of

acid, a screen could be maintained for more than an hour. They did not

generate smoke as rapidly as mechanical generators, the average length of

time needed to set up an effective screen being fifteen minutes.34

German defenders ringed Berlin, Gdynia, Warnemunde, and other vital

cities with acid spray generators generally spaced seventy-five to one hundred yards apart. At harbors such as Brest, sprayers on docks, breakwaters,

and small fishing boats helped maintain the defensive circle. The smoke

screens were not as thick as those thrown up by American mechanical

generators, but the records show that they were helpful in cutting down

the effectiveness of American bombing raids.35

The mechanical smoke generator was one of the innovations of World

War II. It added a new dimension to smoke operations, making it possible for the Army to mass produce smoke for tactical and strategic operations. Judging from the increased use of generators as the war progressed,

it seemed highly probable that mechanical smoke generators would be a

standard piece of equipment in any future war.

Airplane Smoke Tanks

While smoke screens on land and sea were not new at the time of

World War II, air screens were an innovation. Such screens, or curtains

as they were frequently called, were set up by low-flying airplanes spraying liquid smoke-producing chemicals into the air. As the droplets floated

to earth they reacted with moisture in the atmosphere and formed white

smoke that hung suspended in the sky like a high, wide curtain.

The CWS began work on air smoke back in World War I when the

Army considered smoke signals as a possible means of communication

between planes or between planes and the ground. The service experimented with the idea, dropped it after the armistice, and then took it

34

 (1) Military Intelligence Div, WD, Special Series No. 24, Enemy Tactics in Chemical Warfare, 1 Sep 44, pp. 53-54. (2) Tactical and Technical Trends, no. 24, 6 May 43, pp. 8-11. (3)

German Chemical Warfare Materiel, pp. I-L-1-I-L-5. 35

 The War Against Germany and Italy, p. 393.
SMOKE 215

up again in 1923 when the Navy asked for a smoke signaling device that

could be mounted on a seaplane. During trial flights, engineers found

that signal smoke formed so readily and had such good quality that it

was worth investigating as screening smoke. The CWS continued to

develop apparatus for airplane smoke screens long after the idea of smoke

signals had been forgotten.36

Early devices injected liquid smoke agents into the exhaust of the

plane. These soon gave way to simple spray tanks that emptied their

contents directly into the air. The development of smoke tanks then received impetus from the fact that they could also be used to spray liquid

toxic agents, such as mustard, on enemy troops. In other words, the Army

could employ them on defensive missions to drop air curtains, or on

offensive missions to drop toxic chemicals. In World War II the Army

and Navy employed tanks only for the former purpose, but they were

on hand in case gas warfare broke out.

The CWS had two smoke agents for spraying. Titanium tetrachloride

(symbol FM) had been known to chemists for almost a century before

European armies placed it in World War I artillery shells to throw up

a white smoke and thus assist observers in directing fire. It reacts immediately with water vapor, forming several white compounds that remain suspended in air as a dense white cloud. The service employed FM as its

first agent in the 1920's, but the disadvantages—excessive cost and the

tendency of solid reaction products to clog spraying apparatus—sent

chemists in search of a replacement. In 1930 the service decided on FS, a

solution of sulphur trioxide in chlorosulfonic acid. When atomized in

moist air the ingredients reacted with water vapor forming minute droplets

of sulphuric acid that, like FM, also appeared as a dense white cloud.

During World War II the CWS procured supplies of both agents, two

thousand tons of FM, and twenty-four thousand of FS (some of which

went into smoke bombs and grenades).37

The standard airplane spray tank was, at the time of Pearl Harbor,

model M10, holding about thirty gallons of liquid and streamlined in

accordance with formulas recommended by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. The CWS had begun development of this tank in

1937 at the request of the Air Corps and later, lacking time and person36

 (1) F. R. Weaver, The Development of a Screening Smoke Generator for Type F-5 Sea

Planes. EACD 268, 27 Mar 23. (2) Harry O. Huss, "Airplane Spray Apparatus: The Evolution

of the Ram Gravity-Type Smoke Tank," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, III (April 1950), 10-15,

32-33. 37

 (1) TM 3-215, Aug 52. (2) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21.
216 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

LOCKHEED A-29 SPRAYING SMOKE FROM M33 SMOKE TANKS visible under

wings of craft. Smoke tank protruding from bomb bay is the M33 A-1.

nel, had contracted with the Douglas Aircraft Co. to complete it. The

A-20 Douglas Havoc or any other plane equipped with suitable carrying

racks and controls could take the spray tank aloft. An inlet in the front

admitted air, and an outlet in the tail pipe released the spray. Glass disks

blocked both holes until the pilot pressed an electrical switch, sending

a current through detonators attached to the glass. Air rushed through

the inlet into the tank forcing the filling out through the tail pipe. The

rate of discharge varied with the velocity of the plane, dropping from 51⁄2

seconds at 175 miles per hour to 4 seconds at 325 miles per hour. With

FS smoke agent, the maximum height at which the plane could fly to

produce an effective curtain was about 300 feet. Some of the smoke billowed upward so that the completed screen towered about 400 feet in

the air and stretched about 2,000 feet along the ground. Model M10 was

the most popular of the CWS's smoke tanks, more than 90,000 coming

from plants during the war.38

While the CWS was readying a smoke tank for the Army, the Navy, 38

 (1) CWTC Item 13, Tanks, Airplane Chemical Spray, Approval of Military Characteristics,

3 Aug 37. (2) TB 3-255A-1, Airplane Smoke Tank M10, 8 Nov 44. (3) Capt H. E. Lott and

Harry O. Huss, FS Smoke Curtains from Airplane Spray Tanks M10 and M33. TDMR 805, 7

Mar 44. (4) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 24.
SMOKE 217

which had never lost its early interest in air curtains, designed two tanks

somewhat larger and based on a different principle than the CWS's M10.

One of these held fifty gallons, the other thirty gallons. The plane carried a

cylinder of compressed carbon dioxide gas, the pressure of which ejected the

smoke agent. With this system the pilot could turn the spray tank on

or off at will, releasing the agents in puffs or in one long burst.

The CWS adopted the Navy tanks for the Army, modifying them for

bomb bay installation (the Navy used belly mounting) and designating

them as models M20 and M21. In 1942-43 the service procured more

than six thousand of each model. Experience showed that the tanks were

cumbersome, the cylinders of carbon dioxide were an annoyance in supply

channels, and the smoke screens were not sufficiently thick. The CWS

stopped production of the tanks and declared them obsolete in 1944.39

The tanks that have been mentioned were designed originally for external mounting on planes. Some years before the war the CWS had

considered mounting tanks in bomb bays for smoke spraying or toxic

spraying, but it discarded the idea because of the danger to crew and

plane in case the tank was pierced by enemy fire. In 1939 a conference

of Air Corps and CWS officers decided to go ahead with the idea. The

work proceeded slowly owing to a combination of circumstances: the

runway at Edgewood Arsenal had to be enlarged to accommodate multiengine planes, the CWS had to obtain an isolated proving ground for

high altitude spray tests, and the Army needed bombers abroad so badly

that it would not assign one for the test project. Not until 1942 was the

experimental model ready, and not until 1944 did production begin. This

new tank held seventy gallons of agent, and could set up a smoke screen

400 feet high and 4,000 feet long in one minute. The bombardier could

drop the tank if necessary before or after the mission. Later the CWS

modified the tank so that it could be suspended from wings of aircraft,

and thus decrease contamination of the plane from spattering and lessen

the danger to aircrews. Industry produced more than ten thousand of the

bomb bay type (M33) and wing type (M33A1).40

39

 (1) CW TB 13-1-3, Airplane Smoke Tanks, M20 and M21, 18 Jul 42. (2) CWTC Item 503, Standardization of Airplane Smoke Tank, M20A1 and M21A1, 2 Jun 42. (3) Crawford,

Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 24. (4) CWTC Item 1129, Obsoletion of

Tanks, Airplane, Smoke, M20, M20A1, M21, M21A1, and Related Handling Equipment, 31

Aug 44. 40

 (1) Ltr, Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons to Chief Air Corps, 25 Jan 41, sub: High Altitude

Chemical Spray, with 5 inds. AF 470.7 (1-25-41). (2) CWTC Item 633, Standardization of M33

Airplane Smoke Tanks, 12 Jan 43. (3) TB 3-255B-1, Airplane Smoke Tanks AN-M33A1 and

M33, May 45. (4) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 24.
218 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The M10, M20, M21, and M33 smoke tanks gave the Army a range

of from thirty to seventy gallons, but wartime bombers were capable of

carrying tanks of considerably greater size. Accordingly the CWS designed

and tested, but did not produce in quantity, a tank (M40) holding more

than 200 gallons (4,000 pounds) of FS for B-17 and B-24 airplanes.

With its large capacity, this tank could set up a screen much longer and

thicker than could smaller tanks.41

The armed forces used aerial smoke curtains on many operations in

Europe and in the Pacific. In the Marshalls carrier planes laid screens to

shield landings at Roi-Namur. As a prelude to amphibious landings on

Guam, Okinawa, and Borneo, planes laid down smoke to conceal underwater demolition teams. In Italy the Air Forces placed a screen behind

Cisterna to shield the 7th and 15th Infantry. At Nadzab, near Lae, New

Guinea, at Kamiri airstrip, Noemfoor, and at the Camalaniugan airfield

near Aparri, Luzon, aircraft sprayed smoke to protect paratroop landings.

 42

American forces far outdid German and Japanese armies in the use of

aerial smoke screens in World War II, although the enemy was also

equipped for such operations. The Germans had several spray tanks of

different sizes which, like American tanks, could have been used for toxic

agents or smoke agents. Their liquid agent was a solution of sulphur

trioxide in acid, similar to the CWS's FS smoke agent. The Japanese had

at least one aircraft spray device, as well as agents like FS and FM. The

reason the Germans did not use aerial smoke seems to have been the

fact that their armies had been successful in invasions and paratroop drops,

as at Crete, without smoke curtains, and by the time they had learned

the value of such curtains from American successes, they were on the

defensive. The Japanese could have employed aerial smoke on many of

their island invasions, but again their success in invasion by conventional

means may have made them oblivious of the potential value of air curtains.

 43

41

 (1) CWTC Item 792, Standardization of Tank, Airplane Smoke, M40, 3 Sep 43. (2) Huss,

"Airplane Spray Apparatus." 42

 (1) Wesley Frank Graven and James Lea Cate, eds, "Army Air Forces in World War II,"

vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 185, 659. (2) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds, The

Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 456. (3) The War Against Japan, pp. 166-67, 378. (4)

United States Sixth Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, vol. 3, p. 90. (5) Lt Col Robert D.

Heinl, Jr., and Lt Col John A. Crown, "Marine Corps Monographs," The Marshalls: Increasing

The Tempo (Washington, 1954). (6) Anzio Beachhead, p. 33. (7) Appleman, Burns, Gugeler,

and Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 65. (8) Maj O. R. Lodge, "Marine Corps Monographs," The Recapture of Guam (Washington, 1954), p. 34. 43

 (1) Enemy Capabilities for Chemical Warfare, p. 124. (2) New Notes on German Chemical Warfare (London, British War Office [M110], May 1943) sec. 7 (c) (VIII).
SMOKE 219

Airplane spray tanks were not as widely or as frequently employed as

smoke pots, grenades, mechanical generators, and other ground smoke

munitions. In amphibious landings, paratroop drops, and situations where

a wall of protective smoke had to be erected quickly between American

and enemy forces, smoke tanks nonetheless proved to be valuable, efficient

devices.

Colored Smoke Munitions

The Chemical Warfare Service's experience with colored smokes began

in 1917 when it developed red, yellow, blue, green, and black smoke

signals for the AEF. 4 4 In carrying out this work the CWS stepped into

a field of munition research already occupied by the Ordnance Department. Therefore in 1920, when Congress made the CWS a permanent

branch of the Army, the War Department found it necessary to set up

a boundary between the two organizations. The Secretary of War assigned

to the Ordnance Department all smoke devices used in signaling and

spotting, to the CWS all smoke devices used in screening.45 As a result

of this ruling and of a lack of interest on the part of the using arms the

CWS did little with colored smokes during the 1920's and 1930's. But

shortly before World War II the service received requests from the Army

Air Forces and from the Armored Force for colored smoke munitions.

With the co-operation of Ordnance, CWS again undertook work on colored

smokes.46

During World War II, colored smoke grenades were the signal munitions most commonly used by American troops. The CWS began development in September 1942 when the Army Ground Forces requested smoke

grenades that could be used to show troop positions, to identify American

tanks, or to signal the location of forced-down planes. The major problem

facing the service was to find a mixture of chemicals that would produce

smoke of the desired color, volume, visibility, and duration. This necessitated a search for heat-stable, commercially available, inexpensive dyes,

and for a fuel which would burn with sufficient intensity to volatilize but

44

 (1) Arthur B. Ray, "Production of Colored Smoke Signals," Industrial and Engineering

Chemistry 18 (1926), 10-17. (2) Arthur B. Ray, "Signal Smokes," Chemical Warfare Monograph, vol. 41, pts. 1 and 2, May 1919. (3) Leo Finkelstein, Colored Smokes. 45

 WD GO 54, 28 Aug 20. 46

 (1) CWTC Item 568, Standardization of Grenade, Smoke, Red, AN-M3, 29 Sep 43. (2)

Col Robert D. McLeod, Jr., "Colored Smoke," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, VIII (Jan-Feb 54),

10-12.
220 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

not to decompose the dye. Dyes were not synthesized in the Edgewood

laboratories, but were obtained from industry. Industrial co-operation was

extremely important since the CWS needed a large quantity of dye. For

example, since each colored smoke grenade required seven-tenths of a

pound of dye the CWS had to purchase approximately three and onehalf million pounds of dye to fill the five million grenades produced

during the war. Other signal muntions greatly increased the total poundage of dyestuffs so that industry had a problem in producing all the

special dyes that the CWS needed.47

Engineers fashioned the first smoke grenades from the standard chemical warfare M7 grenade. This was a steel cylindrical can 4 5/8 inches high and

2 3/8 inches in diameter. They punched a number of holes in the sides to

give the volatilized dye a short path through the hot ash, and thus keep

the dye from burning. The fuel consisted of sulphur and potassium chlorate, with sodium bicarbonate to absorb some of the heat and keep the

temperature down. The ignited grenade emitted a cloud of smoke for

approximately 2 minutes. The CWS standardized the munition as the

M16 in April 1943, and produced it in 6 colors, red, orange, yellow, green,

violet, and black.48

After the production of the M16 grenade had gotten underway, the

Army Ground Forces studied the performance of the munition in service

tests and decided that it would be more useful if the rate of smoke production was increased. It was impossible to raise the volume of smoke

by speeding the combustion because a higher temperature would have

caused excessive decomposition of the dye. However, the rate of smoke

production could be increased by changing the design of the grenade body,

the proportion of the ingredients in the mixture, and the pressure under

which the mixture was compressed. In the new design, engineers eliminated the side holes and cut one large hole, one-half inch in diameter,

down through the middle of the filling. The finished grenade, designated

as Model M18, gave off a dense volume of smoke for approximately one

minute. The CWS planned to produce eight colors, but later at a conference of Air Forces, Navy, British, and CWS representatives it was

47

 (1) Brig Gen Alden H. Waitt, "Colored Smokes for Protection," Chemical Warfare Bulletin

29 (July 1943), 9-10. (2) Ltr, CG AGF to C of Ord, 4 Aug 42, sub: Colored Smoke Grenade.

CWS 471.6/211. 48

 (1) S. J. Magram and Leo Finkelstein, Colored Smoke Grenades, M16. TDMR 497, 26 Dec

42. (2) CWTC Item 696, Standardization of Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M16, 23 Apr 43. (3) CWTC

Item 749, Approval of Standardization of Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M16, 3 Sep 43.
SMOKE 221

decided to reduce the number to four contrasting colors, red, yellow,

green, and violet.

 49

Colored smoke grenades were employed in every kind of signaling by

troops in the field, but the most common use lay in communicating with

planes that provided close air support. Planes had to recognize American

front lines, artillery positions, and tanks or else they might bomb them

accidentally. American forces generally showed yellow smoke to protect

themselves from their own planes. Troops found other uses for smoke in

marking targets for artillery fire, in communicating with tanks, and in

signaling other troops. An indication of the value of colored smoke grenades

is the large number, more than five million, produced by the CWS from

1942 to 1945.50

Infantrymen found it difficult to throw colored smoke grenades very

far. In 1943 upon request of the Army Ground Forces the CWS undertook the development of rifle grenades that could carry several hundred

yards. Model M22, the first produced in quantity, was similar in appearance to the M9A1 antitank rifle grenade. It could be sent off by means

of the M7 or M8 grenade launcher, from either the M1 rifle or M1

carbine, and upon impact let off colored smoke—red, orange, yellow,

green, or violet—for more than one minute. A later model, M23, intended

for use in jungle or thick forest where high trees and thick underbrush

would hide smoke from hand grenades, released a stream of colored

smoke as it arched across the sky. It remained in flight about eleven

seconds, reaching an altitude of five hundred feet. Four colors were produced: red, yellow, green, and violet. Filling plants loaded more than

one-half million of the impact and the streamer grenades in 1944 and 1945.51

The difficulties the CWS faced in finding suitable smoke mixtures for

grenades were duplicated in the work on colored artillery shells, mortar

shells, rockets, and bombs. Chemists had to formulate mixtures that would

release smoke of the desired density for the required time, and engineers

had to cope with mechanical obstacles that appeared in casings. Artillery

shells posed no unusual problem. Technicians took a base-ejection shell

49

 (1) CWTC Item 797, Standardization of Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M18, 3 Sep 43. (2)

CWTC Item 1000, Classification of Fillings for Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M18, 5 May 44. (3)

CWTC Item 1637, Cancellation of Blue, Black, White, and Orange Fillings for Grenade, Smoke,

Colored, M18, 6 Aug 46. 50

 (1) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. (2) First United States

Army Report of Operations, pp. 90-91. 51

 (1) CWS Rpt of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 15-16. (2) Finkelstein,

Colored Smokes, pp. 53-61.
222 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

developed years before and substituted colored smoke canisters (steel tubes

filled with smoke mixture) for white smoke canisters. The shell, in flight,

ejected and ignited the canisters which then gave off colored smoke. The

shell released its canisters several hundred yards from the target, but the

canisters continued to fly through the air and fell close to the point where

the projectile landed. The service developed several experimental and

standard canisters for base-ejection shells of different calibers, but actually

produced only those for 105-mm. and 155-mm. shells. These came in red,

yellow, green, and violet. More than two million 105-mm. canisters and almost seven hundred thousand 155-mm. canisters passed along the filling

lines. Artillery employed these shells widely in Europe and in the Pacific for

indicating targets within enemy territory where black or white bursts

could have been confused with the usual smoke of battle.52

Artillery shells were only one type of marking and signaling ammunition developed by the CWS. For units in the Pacific, engineers devised

2.36-inch colored smoke rockets to mark positions of units or locations

of front lines in dense jungle where smoke from hand grenades could

be seen not at all or with great difficulty. Rockets of one type smoked

upon impact, those of the other type left a trail of smoke as they flew

through the air. For the Army Ground Forces the CWS designed colored

smoke shells to fit 60-mm. and 81-mm. infantry mortars, and 4.2-inch

chemical mortars. The demand for rockets and shells did not materialize,

and the CWS closed the projects without getting into production.53

Although infantry and artillery made most use of colored smokes,

aviators saw the possibility of using signals for communicating with the

ground or with other planes. The Navy asked for a 100-pound colored

smoke bomb that could be dropped on beaches to identify areas where

troops could be landed quickly. The CWS produced experimental models,

but then dropped the project when the Navy changed its mind about

the need for such bombs. The Army Air Forces requested a smoke missile

that could be used in pattern bombing over Europe. In this method of

52

 (1) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. (2) Wendell P. Munro,

Colored Smokes—Development of Smoke Canister, 105-mm., Base Ejection Shell, M84. TDMR

561, 28 May 43. (3) Wendell P. Munro and J. C. Driskell, Colored Smokes—Development of

Smoke Canister, 155-mm. Base Ejection Shell, M115 and M116. TDMR 787, Jan 44. 53

 (1) J. J. Jungbauer, The Early Development of 2.36-inch Chemical Rockets. TDMR 850,

22 Jun 44. (2) J. C. Driskell and M. A. Zizmor, Colored Smoke-2.36-inch Rocket, T32 Streamer.

TDMR 977, 14 Feb 45. (3) J. C. Driskell and W. K. Ginman, Colored Smokes-Colored Smoke

Shell for the 60-mm. Mortar. TDMR 857, 3 Jul 44. (4) J. C. Driskell, 81-mm. Colored Smoke

Shell. TCIR 126, 10 May 44. (5) J. C. Driskell and W. K. Ginman, Colored Smokes: Bursting

Type, 4.2-inch Chemical Mortar Shell E72. TDMR 923, 9 Nov 44.
SMOKE 223

bombing, all planes in the formation released their bombs simultaneously

upon signal from the lead plane. A colored smoke bomb dropped by the

leader appeared to be a feasible means of giving the signal. In 1944 the

CWS started work on this bomb. Engineers took the Ordnance M38A2

100-pound practice bomb, and replaced the sand ballast with pellets

of colored smoke mixture. When dropped, the bomb left a trail of colored

smoke. Since smoke from this first model was too tenuous to be seen

clearly by all planes in a flight, engineers placed a tube in the long axis

of the bomb and filled the tube with a string of red and yellow smoke

grenades. The first grenade ignited when the bomb left the bay, and the

other grenades ignited in succession, leaving an easily visible trail in the

sky. Before the war was over the CWS produced fillings for several thousand M87 colored smoke streamer bombs.54

The German Army, as the American, had a variety of air and ground

colored smoke signals. The most common munitions were small candles

about two inches in diameter and holding a few ounces of smoke mixture. The candles, for the colors red, green, blue, and violet, produced

smoke for about twenty seconds. German forces employed single colors or

combinations to send a variety of signals. An orange smoke candle, issued

in three sizes, was used only to send distress signals. For artillery signaling, marking, and ranging, the Germans had 7.5-cm. and 10.5-cm. shells

with red and blue smoke fillings, fused for either air burst or impact.

In the fighting in Europe, German artillery attempted to cross up signals

between American planes and troops and cause planes to bomb Americanheld territory by firing colored smoke shells into the American lines. All

in all, the Germans found colored smoke quite as useful as did the

Americans.55

The Japanese seemed to have favored colored flares fired from grenade

dischargers in their signaling; consequently they did not have as large a

variety of colored smoke munitions as the Americans or the Germans. The

standard candle was a cylindrical can six inches high, two inches in diameter, and containing a few ounces of red, blue, or yellow smoke mixture.

Smoke from these candles was not as thick or persistent as American

smoke. The Japanese made up for the lack of variety in their signal gre54

 (1) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. (2) J. C. Driskell,

W. K. Ginman, and M. A. Zizmor, Colored Smokes—Colored Smoke Trail Bombs E13, E13R1,

and E13R2. TDMR 861, 3 Aug 44. (3) CWTC Item 1132, Standardization of Bomb, Smoke,

Colored Streamer, M8 7, 31 Aug 44. 55

 (1) German Chemical Warfare, p. 139. (2) German Chemical Warfare Materiel, pp. I-E,

I-F-3, I-O-1 - I-O-8. (3) First United States Army Report of Operations, pp. 90-91.
224 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

nades, shells, and bombs by the large variety, at least fifteen, of 50-mm.

signal flares that could be seen for several miles, day or night.56

Colored smoke munitions were of small importance when compared

to the CWS's 4.2-inch chemical mortars, mechanical smoke generators,

incendiary bombs, toxic agents, gas masks, and other items, but they

proved their usefulness in special situations and contributed to the success

of American troops throughout the war.

The armed forces made significant advances in the evolution of smoke

tactics during the war. Progress resulted largely from the introduction of

two new smoke producing devices, the mechanical smoke generator and

the airplane spray tank, and the improvement of conventional smoke

munitions and agents. The old and new devices gave the army munitions

for almost every conceivable type of operation so that smoke as a military

tactic became far more valuable than at the start of the conflict.

The subjects of the previous chapters—chemical agents, incendiaries,

smokes, chemical mortars, flame throwers, biological agents—were the

chief concern of the CWS during the war. They do not, however, represent the entire scientific program. At times the service carried out other

investigations. One of these was begun in December 1944 when the Air

Forces asked the CWS to develop propellants for the JB-2 flying bomb,

the American counterpart of the German "buzz bomb." A group of scientists,

headed by Maj. Frederick Bellinger, investigated three systems of liquid

propellants: hydrogen peroxide-permanganate, fuming nitric acid-aniline,

and mononitromethane-catalyst. The FRED project (after Frederick

Bellinger) ended with the successful launching of the JB-2 bomb at Eglin

Field.57 Another unusual project had to do with the production of iron

carbonyl, needed by the Signal Corps. The only commercial source then

available was the General Aniline and Film Co. plant at Linden, N.J.,

managed and operated by German aliens. To assure a steady supply of

the compound the Defense Plant Corporation tried to develop the process,

but proceeded so slowly that Secretary of War Patterson transferred the

project to the CWS. The service co-operated with a chemical engineering

56

 Japanese Chemical Warfare. 57

 (1) Ltr, Frederick Bellinger to Hist Off, 18 Dec 57. (2) F. Bellinger, H. B. Friedman,

W. H. Bauer, J. W. Eastes, J. H. Ladd, and J. E. Ross, "Chemical Propellants: The System

Hydrogen Peroxide-Permanganate," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 38 (1946), 160-69.

(3) F. Bellinger, H. B. Friedman, W. H. Bauer, J. W. Eastes, and W. C. Bull, "Chemical Propellants: Corrosion and Stability Studies," ibid., 310-20. (4) F. Bellinger, H. B. Friedman, W. H.

Bauer, J. W. Eastes, and S. M. Edmonds, "Chemical Propellants: Analytical Studies and Characteristics of the System Hydrogen Peroxide-Permanganate," ibid, 627-30.
SMOKE 225

firm in producing the product.58 Another group of projects had to do

with researches on insecticides, miticides, and rodenticides. The CWS was

represented on the Army Committee on Insect and Rodent Control, established in November 1944, and also co-operated with the OSRD's Committee on Insect and Rodent Control.59

In the approximately four years of World War II the CWS carried

on tar more technical work than during the previous twenty years of

peace. But it could have accomplished even more had there been a larger

research and development organization at the start of the war. The service tried to overcome its early handicap by spending large amounts of

money, but funds could not buy time.

The Chemical Warfare Service came out of the war with the largest

technical organization it had ever had. Its leaders, many of whom had

grown up with the service, were impressed with the need for maintaining

such an organization lest the mistakes of the past be repeated. They did

not want to suffer a repetition of the post World War I experience.

58

 Ltr, Brig Gen Clifford L. Sayre, USAR, to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, 3 Sep 57. CWS 314.7

R & D File. 59

 Leo Finkelstein and C. G. Schmitt, Insecticides, Miticides, and Rodenticides, vol. 19, 7 Dec

49, monograph in series History of Research and Development of the CWS (1 July 1940-31

December 1945).
CHAPTER X

Peacetime Preparation for Supply

After the CWS developed such items as gas masks, incendiaries, flame

throwers, and smokes for the armed forces, it turned to the difficult job

of trying to procure them. During World War II the relationship between development and procurement was very obvious, for then the manufacturer was constantly presented with changes in drawings and

specifications by those responsible for developing and engineering the

item. But even before the war the relationship, though not so clearly

apparent, was nevertheless maintained.

The unfortunate experience of World War I when the nation was

called on to produce a number of munitions for which there were no

detailed specifications led Congress, in the National Defense Act of 1920,

to provide against another such contingency. A provision of the act was

that the Assistant Secretary of War would be responsible not only for

current procurement for the Army but also for peacetime industrial mobilization planning.l

 In the fall of 1921 the Assistant Secretary set up in

his office a Procurement Division, made up of a current procurement

branch and a planning branch. This division supervised the purchase, storage, distribution, and procurement planning activities of the eight supply

arms and services, of which the Chemical Warfare Service was one.2 In

an effort to further strengthen the industrial mobilization program an

1

 Later the duties were shifted to the Office of the Under Secretary. For a discussion of this

office and its activities see Troyer S. Anderson, History of the Office of the Under Secretary of War

(1919-1941). MS reproduced in OCMH, January 1951. 2

 The other arms and services were the Air Corps, Coast Artillery Corps, Corps of Engineers,

Medical Department, Ordnance Department, Quartermaster Corps, and Signal Corps.
PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR SUPPLY 227

Army and Navy Munitions Board was established in 1922 and an Army

Industrial College in 1924.3

Among the duties of the Assistant Secretary of War was the approval

of "shopping lists" for the various supply arms and services. On 9 December

1921 the Assistant Secretary approved such a list for the CWS. Included

were toxic agents, smoke materials, cloud gas materials, and chemical

engineering equipment.4 Several reviews of the "List of Supplies to be

Procured by the Chemical Warfare Service" were made in the various

categories in the 1920's and 1930's, but no substantial changes were effected.5

The Army supply list served a double purpose—it was a partial list of

materials required by CWS for manufacture of its requirements and it was

also the authorized procurement list of CWS for procurement planning

purposes.

 6

The surplus items of World War I served as the basis of a reserve

for an emergency in the postwar years. In the fall of 1921 the chiefs of

the technical services were directed to draw up plans for retaining supplies

and equipment to meet (1) war needs, (2) the requirements of the defense projects of the insular possessions and the Panama Canal Zone, and

(3) the peacetime requirements of the Regular Army, the National Guard,

and the Organized Reserves.7 The CWS already had items of equipment

like masks, Livens projectors, and Stokes mortars at the Edgewood Depot

and at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii. By 1924 the term, "War Reserves,"

came to be applied to the stock of supplies maintained to meet war requirements and in that year the Congress authorized such stocks for an

army of 1,000,000 men. The concept behind War Reserves was to stockpile enough supplies to equip an armed force from the time war started

until that industry could start producing war matériel.8

A chief objective of the CWS procurement and supply program was

to maintain at optimum level those items of the Army supply list for

3

 For a discussion of the background of interwar industrial mobilization planning see R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II (Washington, 1959), chs. II and IV. 4

 Rpt of CWS, 1921, p. 5. 5

 Specifically these reviews were made in 1923, 1924, and 1931. The revised lists of 1923 and

1924 are in CWS 400.123 file, National Archives and of 1931 in CWS 381 file, National Archives.

AR 50-5 (20 Jul 25) made mention of the procurement list. 6

 Memo, Dir of Proc OASW for C CWS, 5 Nov 24, sub: Procurement Lists. CWS 400.12/78. 7

 Ltr, TAG for C CWS, et al.. 13 Oct 21, sub: Computation of War Requirements and the

Determination of Surplus. AG 381.4 (3.30.22), Plng Div ASF. 8

 (1) Ltr, TAG to ASW, et al., 23 Jan 33, sub: War Reserves. AG 381.4 (10-31-32)

(Misc) M-D, Plng Div ASF, War Reserves, 1934. (2) Memo for Record on War Reserves, Col

James H. Burns, 7 Oct 38. Plng Div ASF, War Reserves, 1935-38.
228 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

which the CWS had procurement responsibility. The service never attained

this objective because of the low appropriations for CWS procurement. In

1926 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, reported deficits in all items stored

and issued by the CWS in the War Reserves.9 These items included the

following: gas masks, canisters, charcoal, phosphorus, Stokes mortars,

Livens projectors, portable cylinders, smoke candles, lachrymatory candles,

Livens projector smoke shells, Livens projector incendiary shells, 4-inch

Stokes mortar chemical shells, and 4-inch Stokes mortar smoke shells.

Planners then estimated that it would require $3,737,741 to bring the War

Reserves up to the million-man requirement.10 They figured that for critical chemical warfare items it would take twenty-two and one-half million

dollars to build up War Reserves for a million men. Critical chemical warfare items were those indispensable munitions which could not be procured in time to meet the initial requirement of mobilization. They were

listed in 1937 according to three priorities. Included under the first priority were the various chemical agents, 4.2-inch mortars and ammunition,

impregnite, masks, collective protectors, and airplane spray tanks. The second priority consisted of gas alarms, irritant candles, Livens projector shells

(less chemical filling), portable chemical cylinders, field laboratories, Livens

projector accessory sets, and wrenches for portable chemical cylinders.

Under the third priority came CN (tear gas) capsules, 8-inch combination

pliers, colored drawing sets for chemical warfare material, gas identification sets, and CWS insignia stencils.11

 The experience of the CWS was

similar in this respect to that of the War Department as a whole. Col.

James H. Burns, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, estimated

in 1938 that there was a shortage in the War Reserves of $507,000,000

just in critical items using standard equipment.12

Another objective of the procurement and supply program in the CWS

was to fill the peacetime requirements of the Regular Army, the National

Guard, the Organized Reserves, and, upon request, the Navy. The gas

mask was the principal item of issue, although some munitions such as

grenades and nontoxic drop bombs were manufactured and issued chiefly

for training purposes.13

9

 Memo, C Supply Br G-4 for ACofS G-4, 25 Jan 26, sub: War Reserves Stored and Issued

by CWS. G-4/13765. 10 Ibid. 11

 Critical Items, sec. II, 1 Dec 37, Incl 8 to Ltr, TAG to ASW, et al., 17 Dec 37, sub: War

Reserves. AG 381.4 (11-8-37) (Misc)-D, CWS 314.7 Supply File. 12

 Memo for Record on War Reserves, Col James H. Burns, 7 Oct 38. Plng Div ASF, War

Reserves, 1935-38. 13

 Rpt of CWS, 1928, p. 12.
PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR SUPPLY 229

TABLE 3—GAS MASK PRODUCTION AT EDGEWOOD ARSENAL, 1927-1938

Source: Ltr, Arsenal Operations, Edgewood Arsenal, Cml Warfare Center, Md., to Hist Br OC CWS, 4 Sep 45, sub:

Edgewood Production. CWS 314.7 Edgewood Arsenal File.

The Supply Division (later the Manufacturing and Supply Division)

in the chiefs office had general supervision over all CWS procurement

and supply. Actual manufacture and procurement as well as storage and

issue was carried out almost exclusively at Edgewood Arsenal. There the

gas mask factory turned out masks for the Army and the Navy and there

some of the filling plans occasionally came out of hibernation to grind

out the few munitions required for training. The depot at Edgewood

stocked War Reserves and items of current issue and filled requisitions

coming in from the continental United States and the overseas departments.

At the Edgewood Depot were also stored the surplus toxics from World

War I, over which constant surveillance was mandatory.

The chief item of manufacture, as just mentioned, was the gas mask.

The production program of 1920-21 14 was followed by a drastic reduction

in the years 1922 to 1926, when only 900 masks were manufactured for

the Army.15 During the same period, however, a good many masks were

made for the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the United States Public Health

Service. Production in modest volume for all users continued from 1927

to 1938. (Table 3)

The continued manufacture of masks at the Edgewood factory enabled

the CWS to keep alive a highly technical art until such time as private

industry could get into production. Not only did factory managers and

supervisors gain valuable experience, but the skilled and semiskilled workers of the Edgewood gas mask plant were able to train workers in private

plants in the period of emergency preceding World War II. This situation was in marked contrast to the lack of experienced supervisors and

14

 See ch. I. 15

 These 900 were made in 1925 for special field tests of the diaphragm facepiece by the using

service. Memo, C CWS for ACofS G-3, 29 Nov 26, sub: Functions of the Chemical Warfare

Service. In OC CWS "black book" on policy.
230 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

workers in such operations as the manufacture of toxics, smokes, and

incendiaries. The emergency forced the service to call to active duty a number of reserve officers with experience in private industry to supervise the

technical operations of its arsenals and plants which produced these

munitions.

Planning for Mobilization

The CWS, like the other technical services of the Army, was consulted

in the formulation of the general Industrial Mobilization Plan and was

also assigned planning responsibility for specific items designated by the

Assistant Secretary of War. These were the items included on the "List

of Supplies to be Procured by the CWS," as already indicated. To carry

out the procurement planning activities, an Industrial Relations Division

was set up in OC CWS in 1920. This division was renamed the Industrial War Plans Division in 1925 and in 1926 the Procurement Planning

Division, a designation retained until 1940.16 In January 1924 five procurement district offices were opened in the following cities to carry out

procurement planning activities: New York, Boston, Pittsburgh, Chicago,

and San Francisco.17 Edgewood Arsenal, in addition to its actual peacetime procurement and manufacture, also engaged in industrial mobilization

planning.

From 1937 onward all industrial mobilization planning was based on

the manpower requirements of the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP).

The PMP called for an army of 400,000, within 30 days after mobilization, known as the Initial Protective Force and made up of the Regular

Army and the National Guard. Within 4 months, the number would be

raised to 1,000,000 men and within 14 months to a peak wartime figure

of 4,000,000. The CWS planned for both units and facilities under the

PMP and estimated the time it would require to furnish the mobilized

forces with critical and essential items, such as gas masks, toxic agents,

smoke, munitions, impregnite, airplane spray tanks, and shells for 4.2-inch

chemical mortars.18

16

 (1) OC CWS Orgn Chart, 7 Nov 20. (2) Rpt of CWS 1925, p. 26. (3) Rpt of CWS,

1926, p. 25. 17

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. II. 18

 (1) Ltr, ACofS G-4 to C CWS, 1 Oct 36, sub: Manufacture and Supply of Essential Chemical Agents. G-4/29895. (2) Memo, ACofS G-4 for C CWS, 20 Jun 38, sub: CWS Program for

National Defense. G-4/29895-1. (3) Ltr, C CWS to TAG, 13 Jul 37, sub: The Protective Mobilization, Plan, and 1st Ind, C CWS 28 Dec 37, on Ltr, CmlO 3d Corps Area, 22 Dec 37, sub:

Critical Items, CWS. Both in CWS 381/259, pt. 1, Jan 37 thru Dec 38. (4) Ltr, C CWS to

TAG, 13 Jul 39, sub: Supply Facilities under the P.M.P. 1939. CWS 381/259, pt. 2, Jan 39

thru Dec 39.
PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR SUPPLY 231

Procurement Planning

Planning for the procurement of matériel was but one phase of the

industrial mobilization process.19 Because it was relatively inexpensive the

CWS concentrated on this activity more than on other aspects of industrial mobilization.

Procurement planning involved the following steps by CWS:

1. The computation of the quantities and time of delivery as required under the War Department Mobilization Plans.

2. The preparation of specifications for each item to be bought or

manufactured.

3. The decision as to what matériel should be manufactured by government plants and what should be obtained from industry.

4. The preparation for the procurement of such matériel. Although

the CWS was responsible for the spade work involved, all proposals had

to meet with the approval of the General Staff and of the Assistant Secretary of War.20

Computation of Requirements

The computation of requirements through most of the period was a

relatively simple process because the basis of calculation was the number

of individuals or units that were to be supplied with defensive items of

equipment. Offensive munitions were not taken into consideration until

the late thirties; the color plans

 21

 made no provision whatever for the

use of toxics, although the YELLOW plan called for dispatching four companies of CWS troops and a large quantity of tear gas with the expeditionary forces.22

 The Procurement Planning Division of the chiefs office

19

 The CWS Annex to the 1925 Industrial Mobilization Plan listed the following activities that

would have to be carried out in peacetime as a basis for wartime expansion:

1. Maintenance of present manufacturing facilities.

2. Maintenance of a war reserve.

3. Research, development, and proving.

4. Small-scale manufacture.

5. Procurement planning.

War Plan for Industrial Mobilization, Annex 7, CWS, 5 Feb 25, submitted by C CWS to

ASW, 5 Feb. 25. CWS 400.123/141. 20

 For a discussion of procurement planning in the War Department see Smith, The Army and

Economic Mobilization, ch. III. 21

 For color plans see (1) Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition

Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington, 1953), p. 6 and (2) Mark Skinner Watson, The Chief of Staff:

Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, 1950), pp. 87-89, both in UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 22

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS, 28 Mar 27, sub: CWS Functions, G-3/5749.
232 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

prepared tables of equipment and tables of basic allowances as well as distribution and maintenance factors. These it defended before the Planning

Branch of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. The Procurement

Planning Division also computed the quantities of chemical warfare items

and components which would be required by the Army and Navy during

the 14-month period of mobilization.

Until the mid-thirties there was little correlation between the manpower

requirements of the War Department general mobilization plans and the

industrial mobilization plans. The general mobilization plans of the early

twenties had called for six and one-half million men, a figure which was

reduced to less than four million men in the 1933 plan.23 For a number

of years planners gave little concern to equipping this huge force, because

of the existence of surplus items remaining from World War I. By the

early thirties this World War I equipment had become obsolete and the

War Department had to give more serious consideration both to procuring sufficient War Reserve matériel and to drawing up more realistic plans

for procurement in an emergency.

The 1930's saw a marked revision in mobilization planning. The Assistant

Secretary of War, who later became the Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring, and the Chiefs of Staff, Generals Douglas MacArthur and Malin

Craig, worked together to make the plans more realistic. The result was

the Protective Mobilization Plan of the late 1930's which called for the

gradual mobilization of an army of four million men over a 14-month

period and the gearing of procurement planning to the new concept.24

Preparation of Specifications

A second step in procurement planning was the preparation of specifications for the item to be procured. The specification described the item

in detail, listed the materials and other information required for its manufacture, and outlined the methods to be employed in its inspection and

23

 (1) Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 21 Sep 21, sub: Determination of a Basis for the Further

Declaration of Surplus Supplies. AG 318.14, (3.30.22), Plng Div ASF. (2) Watson, The Chief of

Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 23-31. (3) Marvin A. Kriedberg and Merton G. Henry,

History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945, DA Pamphlet No. 20-

212, June 1955, chs. XII and XIII. 24

 (1) Annual Rpt SW, 1938, p. 1. (2) Otto L. Nelson, National Security and the General

Staff (Washington: The Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 303-04. (3) Watson, The Chief of

Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 26-31. (4) Kriedberg and Henry, History of Military

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945, chs. XIV and XV.
PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR SUPPLY 233

testing. The CWS, unlike the older technical services, had to start almost

from scratch in developing a complete set of specifications, because its

experience was limited to World War I. The items for which the CWS

drew up specifications were generally those included on the supply list.25

The actual writing of the specifications was done by the Technical

Division at Edgewood Arsenal. All specifications were reviewed by a board

made up of representatives of the Technical, Production, and Inspection

Divisions of the arsenal. After the board had made a preliminary review

of the specifications, the chiefs office sent them through the procurement

district office to industrial firms experienced in the manufacture of the

item. Final approval had to come from the Standards Division, Office of

the Assistant Secretary of War.26

In spite of the fact that the CWS wrote specifications for a great

many items, a considerable part of its labor, unfortunately, went for naught,

because many specifications were found not suitable once the items were

put into production during the emergency or early war period. One feature of the specification of the gas mask, for example, was a requirement

for brass. While there were definite advantages in the use of this metal,

brass was simply not to be obtained when war came and substitutes had

to be found. A more serious defect was that the specifications for some

items were written on the basis of experience with models fabricated by

hand at the lone machine shop at Edgewood Arsenal, a method which

gave little indication of the mass producibility of the items. Surprisingly,

the industrial concerns which reviewed the specifications did not point out

this fact. It must be borne in mind, however, that the manufacturers were

requested to do this work gratis and as a result their reviews were often

not as thorough as they might have been. Only when the period of the

emergency brought the prospect of actual contracts did the review of

specifications by industry prove truly valuable. The ideal procedure, in the

opinion of several CWS officers who had experience with the handling

of specifications, would have been to award contracts to engineering firms

specializing in such work. But since no funds were allowed for thus purpose such a procedure was not possible.27

25

 Copies of all CWS specifications are filed at Chemical Corps Engineering Command, ACmlC,

Md.

26

 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 50-51. 27

 Intervs, Hist Off with Col Harry A. Kuhn, USA Ret, 19 Oct 53; Lt Col Rura O. Ball, 1 Oct

53; and H. C. Fischer, Supt, Machine Shop, ACmlC, 8 Oct 53. Colonel Kuhn had experience in

procurement planning in NYCWPD and Colonel Ball at the War Plans Division EA and in the

OC CWS.
234 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Government Plants or Private Industry?

The procurement experience of the CWS in World War I had a

definite influence on procurement planning in the postwar years. During

that war chemical warfare items were obtained through manufacture in

both government plants and private industry. The chemical industry never

waxed enthusiastic about manufacturing toxic agents. After the war it

became an accepted Army policy that the production of these agents was

"attended with so many hazards" that their manufacture should be restricted

to government arsenals and plants.28 These same government installations

would also manufacture smokes, incendiaries, and nontoxic gases, and

would fill the required shells, bombs, and grenades. The raw materials

and chemicals as well as the chemical engineering equipment needed for

this manufacture would be purchased through the procurement districts.

Gas masks would be procured both from private industry and from

government factories.29

In the 1920's the CWS believed that the facilities at Edgewood Arsenal

could fill the requirements for smoke, incendiaries, and toxic and nontoxic agents during the first eight months of an emergency, by which

time a second arsenal in the vicinity of Memphis, Tenn., could be erected

to help carry the production load.30 These plans were made in the years

when the manufacturing and filling plants at Edgewood were not yet

beyond hope of rehabilitation. The Edgewood facilities were not restored,

as already noted, and by the close of the 1920's most of them were ready

for the scrap heap.

With the appointment in 1933 of Mr. Woodring as Assistant Secretary

of War and Maj. Gen. Claude E. Brigham as Chief, CWS, more stress

was placed on planning for the procurement of items of chemical ammunition, their components, intermediate and raw chemicals, and on

arsenal planning.31 The first tangible result of the emphasis on arsenal

planning was the creation of a War Plans Division at Edgewood Arsenal

in the fall of 1934. This division was staffed by an officer or two and a

few civilian engineers and draftsmen. Its function was to draw up plans

28

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 25 Mar 25, sub: Necessary Peacetime Preparation to Insure

Successful Opposition to an Enemy Using Chemical Methods of Warfare. AG 321.94 (3-25-

25) (1). 29

 CWS Gen Mob Plan based on WD Gen Mob Plan, 1928, pp. 8-9. 30

 (1) War Plan for Ind Mob, an. 7, CWS, 5 Feb 25, p. 5. CWS 400.123/141. (2) CWS

Gen Mob Plan based on WD Gen Mob Plan, 1928, p. 8. 31

 Rpt of CWS, 1934, p. 3.
PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR SUPPLY 235

LT. COL. CLAUDE E. BRIGHAM (photograph taken before 1932 when Brigham became a general officer).

for rehabilitating old arsenal plants

or building new ones, "capable of

meeting average monthly requirements of Section 11-A, P.M.P."32

For a time the division was under

the general supervision of the technical director at Edgewood, but in

July 1936 it was placed directly

under the jurisdiction of the commanding officer at Edgewood Arsenal.33

 While the War Plans Division

assumed chief responsibility for

arsenal planning, it was not the

only agency in the CWS carrying

out such activity. The Engineering

Division at Edgewood drew up certain plans for which its members

had special qualifications, such as

those for a phosgene filling plant

and an impregnite (CC-2) plant.

These plans were to prove valuable when construction of new facilities

was undertaken in the emergency period.34

While the planners were studiously drawing up their blueprints, the

Chief, CWS, was losing no opportunity of calling the attention of the

Chief of Staff to shortages that would exist on M-day, unless some actual

rehabilitation or new construction were undertaken. In the summer of 1934

General Brigham notified the Chief of Staff that it would take from four

to nine months to put the manufacturing and filling plants into operation

and he urged that they be partially rehabilitated as soon as possible.35

General Brigham's estimate of the situation was generally confirmed by a

study made in the fall of 1936 by the Planning Branch of the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of War on procurement possibilities under the 1933

Mobilization Plan. That study included two chemical warfare items, the

32

 Report of Activities of Edgewood Arsenal for the month of Jan 1938, pt. X, WPD. CWS

319.1/2183-2249. 1936-41. 33

 EA GO 4, 1 Jul 36. 34

 Rpt on Arsenal Planning Proj, CO EA to C CWS, 4 Mar 36. CWS 322.095/727. 35

 Memo, C CWS for CofS, 31 Aug 34, sub: Major Deficiencies in CWS. CWS 679/5.
236 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

gas mask and mustard gas. It concluded that for neither of these would

the supply requirement be met until ten months after M-day.36

In order to improve the preparedness status of the service the Chief,

CWS, in the spring of 1936 suggested to the Chief of Staff that a 5-year

program be undertaken in the CWS.37 This program would cover all

phases of the CWS mission, including research and development, training,

procurement, and supply. The procurement phase of the program included

the erection of new facilities for the manufacture of important reserve material, which the Chief, CWS, listed in the following order of urgency:

impregnite, gas masks, persistent gas, nonpersistent gas, ammunition for

chemical weapons, and collective protectors. General Brigham estimated

the cost of the projected CWS program for the years 1938-42 as follows:

1938—$4,331,879

1939— 4,294,307

1940— 5,791,819

1941— 5,737,669

1942— 5,122,669

General Brigham's recommendations were no doubt prompted in part by

the action of the Joint Board in the summer of 1935 in confirming CWS

responsibility for research and procurement of chemical warfare matériel

for the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.38

The Chief of Staff referred General Brigham's suggestion to G-4 for

study and comment. The Chemical Warfare program was, of course, only

one of a number which the General Staff was called on to evaluate, and

the amount of funds which the Bureau of the Budget would approve for

military purposes at that time was strictly limited.39 The War Department

General Staff, therefore, had to closely scrutinize all programs entailing an

expenditure of funds. To complicate matters still more, both G-4 and the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of War had definite misgivings about

spending too much money on chemical plants which they felt might become obsolete in a few years. Their attitude was reflected in the words of

the director of the Planning Branch of the Office of the Assistant Secre36

 OASW, Procurement Possibilities Under the 1933 Mobilization Plan, October 1936. 37

 Memo, C CWS for CofS, 21 Mar 36, sub: National Defense Against Chemicals. CWS

381/125-154. 38

 (1) Ltr, Sr Member, Jt Bd to SW, 21 Aug 35, sub: Chemical Warfare. Jt Bd No 330, Ser

550. (2) For a discussion of CWS relations with the Navy, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing

for War, ch. III. 39

 (1) Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, p. 307. (2) Watson, The Chief of

Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 48.
PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR SUPPLY 237

tary of War, commenting approvingly on a G-4 study of 1936: "I believe,"

he said, "Edgewood Arsenal should be rehabilitated only to the extent

previously recommended by this office, i.e., the smallest most up-to-date

commercially reproducible unit, but that each type of equipment should

be properly housed and made shipshape."

 40

 Assistant Secretary Woodring

expressed himself in the same vein when after a vist to Edgewood Arsenal

in May 1936 he sent the following note to the Chief of Staff, General

Malin Craig:

As a result of our recent visit to Edgewood Arsenal, I am not favorably impressed

with the idea of rehabilitating the Chemical Warfare manufacturing plant. It would

seem advisable to have more manufacturing work done by commercial plants and utilize funds to become available for the Edgewood Arsenal for experimental and developmental projects. The question of secrecy in manufacturing processes may have some

effect on outside manufacture but should not prevent it.41

It is understandable, then, why G-4 did not give favorable consideration

to General Brigham's suggestions.42 Instead of the annual expenditure of

about 5 million dollars which the Chief, CWS, had proposed, G-4 recommended a total expenditure of a little over 6 million dollars for the entire

five-year period.43 This G-4 estimate was to be drastically revised after

the German invasion of Poland in September 1939. With the funds actually allotted in the late 1930's the CWS built and operated small production units for toxic agents, impregnite, and white phosphorous at Edgewood Arsenal.

Planning for the Gas Mask

On no other item was there more planning than on the gas mask.

Although masks were manufactured in peacetime at Edgewood Arsenal,

plans called for procuring masks at various points throughout the country

in the event of an emergency. The plans of the twenties and early thirties

specified that the Edgewood plant would run at full capacity during the

first few months of a war until government assembly plants in various

cities throughout the country, such as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis,

Memphis, and Los Angeles, would be in operation. The gas mask factory

at Edgewood would then be discontinued. While the government plants

40

 Memo, Dir PI Br OASW for The Ex OASW, 27 Aug 36. G-4/29895. 41

 Memo, ASW for Gen Craig, 25 May 36, sub: Rehabilitation of Edgewood Arsenal. Plng

Div ASF, Arsenal Reserve Plants-CWS. 42

 The General Staff and the OASW co-operated closely on decisions regarding procurement

planning. See Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, ch. III, and Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, p. 304. 43

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 20 Jun 38, sub: CWS Program. G-4/29895-1.
238 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

would do the actual assembling of the masks, private contractors would

supply the components.

The plans for the purchase of these components were worked out in

considerable detail in the various procurement district offices before being

submitted to the Procurement Planning Division, OC CWS. The district

office plans were not confined to the components of the mask, but they

were of primary concern while chemicals were secondary. Each procurement district was headed by a civilian chief, who was chairman of an advisory board of five to ten members drawn from among the leaders of the

community in the fields of science, commerce, and industry. Each district

also had a military executive officer, usually of company grade, with a

civilian assistant. The planning activities of the district office were facilitated by the assignment of selected CWS Reserve officers to appropriate

mobilization duties. From the ranks of these Reserve officers were to come

competent officer material for World War II.44

In accomplishing their procurement planning mission, the district offices

conducted surveys to determine appropriate facilities for manufacturing the

items, such as the gas mask and others, apportioned to them by the

Assistant Secretary of War. The results of these surveys were reported to

the Office of the Assistant Secretary, who thereupon allocated specific

facilities to the districts. Representatives from the district offices then

approached the management of these allocated facilities with the request

that they sign a schedule of production, which was a mutual statement

of intention of the contractor to produce the item or items specified in

certain quantities and of the government to purchase such material if needed.

These schedules of production were in no sense binding contractual obligations. The understanding was, however, that the allocated facilities

would devote all, or a specified portion, of their wartime production

capacity to the particular supply branch to which they were allocated.

From the mid-thirties on, there was a changed conception in procurement planning for the mask. Both the Assistant Secretary and G-4 believed

that more emphasis should be placed on contracting with private industry

in the event of an emergency and this attitude was reflected in the plans

of the CWS. A CWS arsenal procurement plan of March 1935, for example, called for the Edgewood gas mask plant to work at full capacity until

six months after mobilization, whereupon some nine private contractors

would assume entire production of the mask. No mention whatever was

44

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. VII.
PEACETIME PREPARATION FOR SUPPLY 239

made of the government assembly plants in various cities, referred to in

previous plans.45

The increased attention by the Assistant Secretary's Office to meeting

the requirements of the 1933 Mobilization Plan led to a greater emphasis

on possible shortages in the supply of gas masks. In June 1935 the Chief,

CWS, notified G-4 that the existing plant at Edgewood Arsenal, operating twenty-four hours a day, could not meet the requirements of the 1933

plan, and recommended corrective action. "The choke point in meeting

requirements, by the use of additional manufacturing plants," the Chief

said, "is the lack of special gauges, dies and jigs, and other apparatus not

commercially available. The National Defense Act authorizes the procurement of these items in times of peace, but no funds have been appropriated for this purpose."

 46

 General Brigham urged that provision be made

in the budget estimates for the fiscal year 1937 for buying the necessary

gauges, dies, and jigs. The request was honored and $25,000 was appropriated for this purpose in the fiscal year 1937 and a similar sum for the

following fiscal year.47 These sums were not large, but they did enable

the CWS to be in a fair position, so far as tooling went, when the time

came for actually producing more masks.

General Brigham, as early as January 1936, believed that the time had

come for manufacturing masks in greater numbers. He suggested to the

Chief of Staff that a 5-year program aimed at procuring 100,000 masks

each year be initiated.48 This suggestion, though approved in principle by

the General Staff, was never implemented because of inadequate appropriations. Procurement of masks on a considerable scale was to wait until

the enactment of educational order legislation by Congress on 16 June

1938.49 Immediately upon the enactment of this legislation the Secretary

of War appointed a board of officers from the technical services, the War

Department General Staff, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War

45

 Arsenal Procurement Policy CWS, 15 Mar 35, an incl to Ltr, C CWS to Dir Pi Br OASW,

9 May 35, same sub. Plng Div ASF, Arsenal Reserve Plants-CWS. 46

 Memo, Actg ACofS G-4 for CofS, 14 Jun 35, sub: Budget Estimates CWS for FY 1937.

G-4/30376. 47

 (1) Ltr, C CWS to CofS, 19 May 37, sub: Final Report on the Status of Chemical Readiness by the Retiring Chief, CWS, and Memo (Draft) C CWS for ACofS G-4, 30 Apr 38, sub:

Data Collected for Use in Connection With the Preparation of a Program for the CWS. Both

in G-4/29895-1. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Rura O. Ball, 16 Mar 51. Colonel Ball was

with War Plans Div, EA, from November 1938 till after outbreak of the war. 48

 Memo for ACofS G-4, 30 Apr 38. 49

 (1) P.L. 639, 75th Cong. (2) In Annual Rpt of SW, 1931, p. 157, an educational order

is defined as "a contract placed, without advertising, for a limited quantity of a desired technical

article, with any selected facility."
240 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

to select items for the first orders under the program. The CWS was represented on this board by Maj. George F. Unmacht. The board selected

six items, one of which was the gas mask.50

Viewed in retrospect and with all the advantages of hindsight it is possible to point out several miscalculations in the prewar mobilization planning

of the CWS. The first was the assumption that there would be an orderly

transition from peace to war. A second was the failure to realize the global

extent of the coming war. These two concepts generally characterized the

thinking of the planners throughout the War Department. In addition

there were two other basic miscalculations in chemical warfare planning.

One was the conviction that gas warfare was all but inevitable and the

other was the failure to draw up procurement plans for what turned out

to be the most important chemical warfare items to be used in World War

II—incendiary bombs, high explosive mortar shells, flame throwers, and

smoke generators. The oversight, so far as incendiary bombs and high

explosives were concerned, resulted from uncertainty over the CWS mission.51

 With regard to flame throwers and smoke generators, the CWS

planners failed to draw up procurement plans because development of those

munitions was not emphasized in the period of peace.

The procurement and supply activities of the two decades following World

War I reflected the diplomatic and economic developments of the period. The

efforts of the United States Government to disarm, and to eliminate war as an

instrument of national policy, together with the advent of the greatest depression

in the nation's history, militated against a strong military preparedness posture,

particularly in the field of chemical warfare. Until the late 1930's little money was

expended for CWS procurement or construction, although a great deal of time

and effort went into the planning of these activities.

Hopes for world peace, so buoyant in the 1920's, were dashed against the

realities of international lawlessness in the 1930's when Japan invaded Manchuria

and China and when the armies of Mussolini invaded Ethiopia. These act were

followed in September 1939 by the march of Hitler's forces into Poland. With

these developments came a gradual change in the attitude of the government on

military preparedness. The closing years of the decade were to see not only a

greater emphasis on planning, but the initiation of programs to implement the

plans.

50

 Rpt of CWS, 1939, p. 17. 51

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. III.
CHAPTER XI

Beginnings of Industrial Mobilization

The years 1939-41 were a period of initial industrial mobilization, during which programs for the construction of badly needed facilities got under

way and a start was made in procuring critical and essential items. This

period was to reap the reward of the labors of the previous years, when

so many blueprints for arsenals and plants had been drawn up and so many

procurement plans had been made in the Chemical Warfare Service.

Although the President did not put the Industrial Mobilization Plan

of 1939 into operation, the plan was nevertheless followed rather closely

in War Department procurement activities for the Army at large.1 So far

as the CWS was concerned, it had a much more restricted application. In

the general scramble for contracts by all elements of the armed forces and

by foreign governments after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, many

allocated plants were lost to the CWS. In only one chemical warfare procurement district, New York, were contracts awarded on a considerable

scale to previously allocated manufacturers.2 This situation was probably

due to the fact that the majority of the contracts in the New York district were for certain raw chemicals for which there was no keen competition. In other districts, it was the exception rather than the rule for a

previously allocated plant to be awarded a contract.3

1

 (1) Industrial College Armed Forces (ICAF), R63, Use of Industrial Mobilization Plan in

World War II, April 1945, pp. 1-5. ICAF Library. (2) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 83-86. 2

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Harry A. Kuhn, 19 Oct 53. Kuhn was chief of the New York

district in the early part of the war. 3

 (1) Intervs, Hist Off with following procurement district officers of WW II: Col Raymond

L. Abel, 23 Apr 55; Col Victor C. Searle, 18 Apr 55; and Walter E. Spicer, Jr., 28 Apr 55. (2)

ICAF R63, Use of Industrial Mobilization Plan in World War II. See especially Table 1.
242 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Procurement planning in the emergency period took on a new sense

of urgency because of the immediate need to supply a progressively growing army with the implements of war. The initiation of the building and

procurement programs affected the nature of procurement planning, for

considerable attention had to be paid to such matters as priorities and the

availability of machine tools. While such matters were of primary concern

to those then engaged in construction and procurement operations, they

were also of vital interest to the procurement planners.

Educational Order Program

After the enactment of educational order legislation on 18 June 1938

and the selection of the gas mask as one of the six Army items to be

procured, the Assistant Secretary of War called upon the Chief, CWS, for

a suggested 5-year educational order program for his service to include items

and facilities to be procured, the order of priority, and the amount of funds

to cover each item.4 In reply the Chief, CWS, listed the following gas

mask items and facilities in the order of priority. For fiscal year 1939, Number 1 priority was the procurement and installation of all equipment required for assembling the complete standardized service gas masks at a

rate of 100,000 per month; Number 2, the procurement of equipment for

manufacturing impregnated charcoal at the rate of 4,000 pounds per day;

Number 3, the procurement of required metal components for the canister; Number 4, the procurement of manufacturing aids such as molds, dies,

jigs, and gauges; and Number 5, the procurement of additional components. Under the first three priorities, specific manufacturers were recommended for contracts. For the fiscal year 1940 the Chief, CWS, recommended substantially the same priorities as those for fiscal 1939. For the

fiscal years 1941-1943 inclusive the CWS planned only comparatively minor

activities, such as retesting of equipment by contractors. Because of the

outbreak of the war, the educational order program lasted not five years,

but only about half that period. During that time it was to follow rather

closely the lines proposed by the Chief, CWS, to the Secretary of War

in the summer of 1938.

The fact was that the planners in the CWS had been discussing the

educational order programs for a number of years and had well formulated

ideas by the time the legislation was finally enacted.5 Those manufactur4

 Ltr, ASW to C CWS, 20 Jun 38, sub: Program Under Educational Order Legislation.

CWS 011-21. 5

 Ltr, ExO OC CWS to CO EA, 22 Sep 38, sub: Educational Orders. CWS 011-21.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 243

ers whom the Chief, CWS, recommended for contracts were well known

to CWS procurement planners as well as to the research and development

personnel, for there had been constant contact with industry with regard

to the improvement of the mask. An example of benefit deriving from

such contact was the case of the fully molded facepiece. In the 1930's

the government scientists at Edgewood were doing a great deal of work

on improving the facepiece of the mask and eventually a new and better

faceblank was devised consisting of a single piece of molded rubber.6

While this faceblank was still in the development stage, the CWS considered the feasibility of mass producing the item. It approached a number

of rubber manufacturers who for a time showed an interest in the problem. But after a couple of years the general reaction was one of discouragement among both the industrialists and CWS planners.7

 Only two

manufacturers, the Acushnet Process Co. of New Bedford, Mass., and the

General Tire and Rubber Co. of Akron, Ohio, remained hopeful. One

CWS officer in close touch with the problem, Maj. Charles E. Loucks,

technical director at Edgewood, shared their optimism and gave them all

possible encouragement. The reward came when P. E. Young, president

of the Acushnet Process Co., through his own personal research and experimentation, demonstrated that fully molded face blanks could be produced

in mass, a conclusion which the General Tire and Rubber Co. arrived at

independently.8 Through such contacts as these the CWS increased its

knowledge of the capabilities of the various prospective gas mask contractors.

Under educational order legislation, bids were received only from those

firms that had been selected by the Secretary of War and any contract

entered into as a result of the invitation to bid had to be approved by

the President of the United States. Usually, although not always, the Secretary of War solicited bids from the firms recommended by the CWS.

The first educational order of the CWS went to the Goodyear Tire

and Rubber Co. for the operation of a service gas mask assembly plant

at Akron, Ohio. This contract, the only CWS educational order contract

written in fiscal year 1939, resembled all later contracts in requiring the

6

 The patent on this fully molded facepiece, U.S. Pat. 2,164,330, 4 Jul 39, was awarded to

Sidney H. Katz and D. O. Burger. 7

 Ltr, Dewey and Almy Chemical Co to Lt Col A. M. Prentiss, 20 Aug 37, and 1st Ind. In

Corres files, CW Labs, A CmlC, Md. 8

 (1) Ltr, P. E. Young to Hist Off, 15 Apr 52. (2) Ltr, P. E. Young, Acushnet Process Co,

to C CWS, 27 Oct 37. In Corres files, CW Labs, A CmlC, Md.
244 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

actual manufacture of a specified number of items in connection with the

contract, in this instance 3,000 masks. In fiscal 1940 the CWS awarded

two other contracts for service gas mask assembly plants, one to the Firestone Rubber and Latex Products Co. of Fall River, Mass., and the other

to Johnson and Johnson at its Chicago plant. The same year also saw the

following additional awards:

1. Construction of a gas mask carrier line at the Goodyear Tire and

Rubber Co. plant in Akron, Ohio.

2. Construction of charcoal and whetlerite plants by Barnebey-Cheney

Brothers Engineering Co. at Columbus, Ohio, and Carlisle Lumber Co. at

Onalaska, Wash.

3. Erection of a complete canister component manufacturing plant at

the Milwaukee Stamping Co. in Milwaukee, Wis.

4. Construction of plants at Akron, Ohio, and New Bedford, Mass.,

for the manufacture of faceblanks.

5. Construction of five noncombatant gas mask assembly plants at

various points throughout the country.

*6. Erection of an impregnite (CC-2) plant at Niagara Falls, N.Y.

Although educational order contracts were awarded mostly for gas

masks and components, one contract was written in fiscal 1940 for a CC-2

plant. In the following fiscal year the CWS awarded educational order

contracts for the construction of a shoe impregnite plant and for the manufacture of filter paper. (Tables 4 and 5)

9

The educational order program in the CWS proved invaluable in supplying much needed facilities and in enabling the representatives of the government and industry to co-operate in solving manufacturing and other

problems. At the time the program was initiated the Chief, CWS, delegated responsibility for its administration to the chief of the Manufacturing and Supply Division of his office. At the same time he directed that

an additional officer of company grade be assigned to the War Plans

Division at Edgewood Arsenal to assist in the administration of the program. This procedure was followed throughout the life of the contracts.

The Munitions Program

If the educational order program permitted the CWS to take the first

faltering step in an accelerated procurement program in the emergency

9

 AG Memo for Record on CWS Educational Order Program, 8 May 41. CWS 314.7 Educational Order Program File.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 245

TABLE 4—CWS EDUCATIONAL ORDERS PROGRAM, FY 1939, 1940 & 1941 SUMMARY OF AWARDS

Source: All the data in this chart, with the exception of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. assembly contract, were taken

from a study prepared by the Purchase Policies Branch, OC CWS, in 1945, entitled Analysis of Chemical Warfare Service

Pricing Record World War II, p. 34. CWS 314.7 Educational Order Program File. This study makes no reference to

the Goodyear assembly contract, which was the first contract under the Educational Order Program. The data on this

contract were obtained in 1949 in a file of the Procurement Agency, Army Chemical Center.
246 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

TABLE 5—COST TO GOVERNMENT OF GAS MASK EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM

a

 This figure does not include the 3,000 masks procured under the Goodyear Tire & Rubber contract listed in Table 4,

since full cost data were not available.

Source: Data in this chart were obtained from Analysis of Chemical Warfare Service Pricing Record in World War II,

p. 35, prepared in 1945 by the Purchase Policies Branch, OC CWS.

period, the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940 and the subsequent appropriation acts which the Congress passed to finance that program

enabled the service to advance to the toddling stage. The Munitions Program was a requirements and fiscal plan worked out by the War Department, the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, and

the President.10 It became the new overall guide for all procurement

planners.

In August 1939, when the war clouds were hanging heavy over Europe,

the War Department undertook a quick review of its plans for emergency

action. In this connection the Assistant Secretary of War called the chiefs

of the technical services to his office on 19 August and outlined three

more or less distinct phases through which the nation might pass in the

change from peace to war. These phases were:

1. A period of neutrality when peacetime legislation was in effect and

only current appropriations available.

2. A national emergency declared by the President and provisions of

Section 120 of the National Defense Act invoked.

3. A declaration of war by the Congress.

The Assistant Secretary then listed a number of actions which his office

or the Army and Navy Munitions Board would initiate in each of the

10

 (1) For details on the Munitions Program see Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and

Preparations, pp. 166-82, 318-21. (2) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 126-33.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 247

three periods and requested the chiefs of the supply services to send him

a list of the steps they individually planned.11

Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker, in his reply to this request on 21 August

1939, stated that during the present period of neutrality—Phase I—he was

taking measures to: (1) accelerate all current procurement and educational

orders then being planned; (2) round out Edgewood Arsenal; (3) request

the removal of the field artillery garrison at Fort Hoyle, Md., and the

incorporation of that reservation into Edgewood Arsenal; (4) present plans

for the establishment of an additional manufacturing arsenal with necessary storage and range facilities; (5) freeze all completed specifications and

drawings and expedite the completion of all others; (6) review and perfect

plans for accomplishing and controlling procurement in war; (7) request

funds to accumulate stockpiles of strategic materials; and (8) request the

detail of selected Reserve officers for training in key positions connected

with procurement.

Passing on to the second phase, that of the state of a national emergency, the Chief, CWS, said that he would: (1) request additional funds

for carrying out requirements of the initial stages of a war; (2) start the

construction of a new arsenal; (3) utilize to the greatest extent possible

the productive capacity of industry; (4) prepare a war budget for the possible prosecution of a war through the second year; and (5) request a

detail of additional selected Reserve officers for training in key positions

connected with procurement.

Coming to the final phase, when the nation would be at war, General

Baker listed only two steps: (1) the acceleration of all procurement programs in both government arsenals and commercial plants, and (2) the

revision of existing procurement plans for a possible second year of war.12

During Phase I, the period of neutrality, the Assistant Secretary of

War, Louis Johnson, personally took steps to insure that increased requirements for chemicals would be met in the event of war. Acting upon

a suggestion of Edward M. Allen, president of the Manufacturing Chemists

Association, he recommended early in 1939 that a national defense committee be set up to assist the War and Navy Departments in perfecting plans for utilizing the chemical industry should war break out.13

11

 Memo, Dir Plng Br OASW for C's Supply Arms and Services, 19 Aug 39, sub: Acceleration

of Plans for Procurement. CWS 381/247-260 re War Plans. 12

 Ltr, C CWS to ASW, 21 Aug 39, sub: Procurement Planning CWS in Certain Contingencies. CWS 381/247-260. 13

 This information is contained in Ltr, Louis Johnson, Asst SW to E. M. Allen, 30 Mar 39.

CWS 314.7 Chemical Advisory Committee to ANMB File.
248 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MEMBERS OF THE CHEMICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE receiving Army Certificates

of Appreciation from Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, November 1945. From left (front):

Charles S. Munson, Warren N. Watson, James W. McLaughlin, Harry L. Derby,

General Waitt, Col. Harry A. Kuhn. From left (back): George W. Merck, Lammot

du Pont.

Mr. Allen, who was also the civilian chief of the New York Chemical Procurement District, had suggested that the district advisory committee be

designated the Chemical Advisory Committee to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. This suggestion was adopted and from early 1939 until after

the close of World War II the committee, whose members were leading

representatives of the chemical industry, met monthly in Washington or

New York.14 Liaison officers from the Army and Navy Munitions Board,

the Ordnance Department, and the CWS attended the meetings. A representative from the Advisory Commission to the Council of National

Defense and, later, one from the War Production Board, were often in

attendance.15

14

 Members of the committee were: H. L. Derby, chairman, E. M. Allen, H. F. Atherton,

Charles Belknap, Willard H. Dow, Lammot du Pont, J. W. McLaughlin, George W.

Merck, Charles S. Munson, and Warren H. Watson. 15

 Minutes of the meetings of the Chemical Advisory Committee are in files of the Manufacturing Chemists Association. Reproduction of these minutes and other data are in CWS 314.7

Chemical Advisory Committee File.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 249

Upon its activation the committee called the attention of the War

Department to the fact that its members might be suspected of conspiring

to violate the federal antitrust acts. The War Department sought the

opinion of the Attorney General of the United States on this matter. The

Attorney General ruled that reports made by the Chemical Advisory Committee to the Army and Navy Munitions Board were considered confidential

in nature and were therefore not subject to subpoena or investigation by

other government agencies.16 In other words, the recommendations of the

committee were placed in the same category as war plans.

In 1939 and 1940 the committee set up fifteen commodity subcommittees which were responsible for making reports and recommendations to

the parent committee. The reports covered such matters as consumption

of specific chemicals by industries, means for transporting specific chemicals, and suggested locations for new plants. On the basis of production

statistics and estimated industrial capacity furnished by the subcommittee

as well as through statistics on military requirements furnished by the

military services, the committee made recommendations on allocation of

chemicals to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Largely because of assistance which the Chemical Advisory Committee rendered during the emergency and war periods, chemical facilities were erected at the proper locations and the turnaround time on railroad cars carrying chemicals was cut

down.17

Another development that facilitated preparations for chemical warfare under the Munitions Program was the receipt of pertinent information from the British. The assistant military attache in London in the

emergency period, a CWS officer, obtained access to data on development

and production methods for chemical warfare items, on British smoke

operations for screening critical installations, on the effects of incendiary

bombing, and on the types of German incendiaries dropped on London.

16

 The ruling of the Attorney General is discussed in Ltr, Col Charles Hines, Secy ANMB to

E. M. Allen, 17 Jul 40. In files of Chlorine Institute, New York City. 17

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Charles S. Munson, who served on the Chemical Advisory Committee, 21 Jan 58. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col Harry A. Kuhn, USA Ret, 20 Nov 57. Col.

Kuhn was liaison officer to the Committee for CWS. (3) Ltr, E. R. Weidlein to Hist Off, 31

Jan 58. Mr. Weidlein was Chief of the Chemical Div of the Advisory Commission to the Council

of Nat'1 Defense and later Chief of the Chemical Div, WPB. (4) Ltr, E. W. Reid to Hist Off,

26 Feb 58. Mr. Reid succeeded Mr. Weidlein as Chief of Chemical Div, WPB. (5) Interv, Hist

Off with Wilbur F. Sterling, 29 Apr 58. Mr. Sterling served as contact officer of ANMB to the

Chemical Advisory Committee. (6) Minutes of the Meetings of the Chemical Advisory Committee. On 8 Dec 42, Robert P. Patterson, USW, and James Forrestal, USN, attended a meeting

of the committee. Both expressed appreciation for the achievements of the committee to date

and requested that the committee be continued during and after the war.
250 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

This information he sent to the Office of the Chief or to Edgewood

Arsenal.

Appropriations

The Munitions Program would of course be merely an academic exercise

without the money to implement it. As early as the fall of 1939 the Chief,

CWS, again made an urgent appeal to the General Staff to take immediate steps to secure authorization and funds for rounding out the plant

facilities at Edgewood Arsenal. Both the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-3

and G-4, concurred in the recommendation of the Chief, CWS, and suggested that a deficiency appropriation of approximately $5,500,000 be requested for this purpose.18

 This proposed request was conceived of just

half a year ahead of the time when the Bureau of the Budget was in a

mood to approve it. The temper of the bureau with regard to such requests was demonstrated by its action early in January 1940 when it

excluded from the President's budget for fiscal year 1941 all supplemental

estimates covering the "Critical Item Program," the "Essential Item Program," and the "Arsenal and Depot Facilities Program."

 19

 This was the

winter of the "phony war" in Europe, and neither the Bureau of the

Budget nor Congress was convinced of the need for greater expenditures

for the Army. Hitler's invasion of Denmark and Norway in April and of

the Low Countries and France in May changed their minds.20

Notwithstanding the action of the Bureau of the Budget in January

1940 the General Staff did not relax its efforts to gather all information

possible on munition shortages preparatory to future requests for funds.

On the very day after the Bureau of the Budget's action, for example,

General Marshall requested G-4 to furnish him with a half page statement on Edgewood Arsenal, to include the approximate amount that had

been invested in the installation along with additional "pieces" that the

CWS might wish to add. The Chief of Staff wanted this information to

enable him to withstand "pressure to reduce appropriations for Edgewood

Arsenal in order to promote a large brand new arsenal somewhere else."

In compliance with General Marshall's request he was furnished with the

following information: Edgewood Arsenal was the only chemical warfare

research, manufacturing, and chemical storage installation in the United

18

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for ACofS G-4, 10 Oct 39, sub: Status of Chemical Warfare Facilities. OCG, ASF-Edgewood Arsenal, Md. 19

 Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 163, quoting Memo, SGS for

AC'sofS, 10 Jan 40, sub: War Department Estimates, FY 1941. 20

 Ibid., pp. 164-66.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 251

States. The arsenal plants, with the exception of the gas mask assembly

plant, were of the experimental type and not suitable for meeting the

needs of the Initial Protective Force. The cost of constructing and maintaining the arsenal since 1917 was estimated at $43,600,000, with deterioration due to budgetary limitations at $29,100,000, making the value of

the facilities as of January 1940, $14,500,000. The value of the existing

stocks at the arsenal was put at $31,300,000. It was estimated that it

would cost $5,000,000 to remove the stocks to a new arsenal. Therefore,

it was planned to spend $5,400,000 to round out the plants at Edgewood

Arsenal to enable it to meet the needs of the peacetime and the Initial

Protective Force. The cost of a new arsenal of equivalent capacity was

placed at $21,000,000 plus 8 to 10 million more for land. These data, according to the Acting Executive, Supply Division, G-4, were to be placed

in the Chief of Staff's small information book where it would be considered confidential.21

The events in Europe in the spring of 1940 had their effect and by

May the President and the Congress were in a very liberal mood indeed

with regard to military appropriations.22

 On 16 May the President delivered in person a special message to the Congress on the need for supplemental outlays for national defense. On 13 June he signed the Military

Appropriation Act of 1941 which provided for vast increases in military

expenditures, and less than two weeks later, on 26 June, the first of five

supplemental to the National Defense Appropriation Act of 1941.23 The

President had meanwhile received advice from General Marshall and

William S. Knudsen, the newly appointed production authority on the

Council of National Defense, on how this appropriated money was to be

spent. Their decisions were embodied in the Munitions Program of 30

June 1940.

The appropriations to the CWS for fiscal year 1941 totaled $60,092,-

532.24 This figure was in contrast to the $2,091,237 appropriated for the

previous fiscal year. The increased appropriations gave the CWS the green

light to carry out its planned procurement and construction, and these

programs got into actual operation in the summer of 1940.

21

 Memo, Actg Exec Supply Div G-4, 11 Jan 40, sub: Information for CofS. OCG, ASFEdgewood Arsenal, Md. 22

 (1) Watson, The Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 166. (2) For international background, see William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation

1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), chs. XV and XVI. 23

 P.L. 611, 76th Cong, 3d Sess. 24

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Table 1.
252 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The amounts appropriated to the CWS were arrived at only after the

most painstaking calculations. As previously, the CWS passed its estimates

on to the General Staff, but in June 1940 Mr. Knudsen also become interested in the estimates. On 11 June Mr. Knudsen informed the Assistant

Secretary of War that he wanted the answers to two questions: "How

much munitions productive capacity does this country need and how rapidly

must it become available?"

 25

 That Mr. Knudsen did not confine his attention solely to the broad aspects of these questions is shown by the

fact that on the very day he made his inquiry he personally received a

reply from the Chief, CWS, listing quantities and unit prices of critical

items as approved by the War Department for procurement and manufacture by CWS, as well as supplemental lists of critical and essential

items.26 Six days later the Chief, CWS, in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War, gave detailed data on the new arsenal and plant

facilities that would be needed to meet the requirements of the PMP

(1,000,000 men), and its augmentation to 4,000,000 men, and requested

that the data be passed on to Commissioner Knudsen, who was evidently

anxious to get the facts.27 The Chief, CWS, listed the rehabilitation of

Edgewood Arsenal which he estimated would require 15 months to complete, a new $21,000,000 arsenal to require 18 months, and $5,000,000 worth

of government owned plants in industry to require 15 months to complete.

Facilities Expansion Gets Under Way

In July 1940 G-4 listed the immediate objectives of the CWS, under the

Munitions Program in the following order of importance: first, rounding

out Edgewood Arsenal; second, placing approved educational orders in industry (already considered above); and third, preparing plans for obtaining

manufacturing plants in industry other than those covered by educational

orders.28

The Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1941 carried an item of $918,988

for The Quartermaster General "for work authorized by the Act of June 4,

25

 Memo, Ex Asst to ASW for ASW, 13 Jun 40, sub: National Policy on Munitions Productive

Capacity. CWS 381/247-260 (War Plans). Also quoted in Watson, The Chief of Staff: Prewar

Plans and Preparations, p. 174. 26

 Memo, C CWS for W. S. Knudsen, 11 Jun 40, sub: Expenditure Program, CWS. CWS

381/247-260 (War Plans). A handwritten note on the margin of the carbon copy states that

the memo was handed to Mr. Knudsen personally by Col A. M. Heritage, CWS, at 3:10 P.M. 27

 Memo, ExO OCWS for ASW, Attn Col Harry K. Rutherford, 17 Jun 40, sub: Munition

Production Capacity, CWS. CWS 381/247-260 (War Plans). 28

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 16 Jul 40, sub: Chemical Warfare Manufacturing Facilities at

U.S. Nitrate Plant No. 1. G-4/30645.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 253

1936 (49 Stat 1462) at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland."

 29

 This was for construction of badly needed storage facilities. The First Supplemental to the

Appropriation Act, signed on 26 June 1940, made the sum of $3,060,300

available to the Chief, CWS, for rounding out and rehabilitating Edgewood Arsenal.30

 These two appropriations of June 1940 enabled the CWS

to initiate a program of construction which its chiefs had been advocating

for years.31

In August 1940, General Baker, the Chief, CWS, directed Maj. Walter J.

Ungethuem, chief of his War Plans Division, to supervise all construction

activities at Edgewood. In September actual construction of new manufacturing plants was initiated under contracts drawn up by The Quartermaster General with the architect-engineering firm of Whitman, Requardt,

and Smith of Baltimore and two construction companies, Riggs-Distler Co.

of Philadelphia and Cummings Construction Co. of Baltimore. In November the General Staff ordered the erection of new troop barracks and gave

approval to a CWS recommendation to enlarge the Chemical Warfare

School. In the same month the long planned rehabilitation program of the

deteriorating structures at Edgewood Arsenal was begun. All this building

activity in the winter of 1940-41 resembled in scope that of 1917-18, when

the arsenal was originally constructed. Although the forces of nature were

considerably kinder in 1940-41 than they had been in 1917-18, winter days

at Edgewood are often not too pleasant for outside work.32 Since the Secretary of War insisted on the speedy consummation of construction projects, the commanding officer directed that work be carried on every day

regardless of the weather.33 It was not without significance that the funds

in the Assistant Secretary's Office from which the CWS was allotted the

money for arsenal construction were earmarked "Expediting Production

Funds." The Chief, CWS, was constantly reminded of the importance of

speed on this program.

By December 1941 the initial phase of the construction program at

Edgewood was virtually completed. Old plants had been rehabilitated and

29

 WD Bull 11, 15 Jul 40, summarizes grants under the regular Appropriation Act for FY

1941 (P.L. 611, 76th Cong). 30

 (1) P.L. 667, 76th Cong. (2) Ltr, C CWS to USW, 9 Jan 41, sub: Defense of Procurement Activities Under Various 1941 Appropriations. CWS 400.12/6. 31

 See Rpts of CWS from 1931-38. 32

 This statement is based on detailed climatological data for the periods 1917-18 and 1940-41,

furnished by G. N. Brancato, Meteorologist in Charge, U.S. Department of Commerce, Weather

Bureau, Baltimore, Md. 33

 Ltr, Col W. J. Ungethuem, USA Ret, to Hist Off, 18 Jun 51.
254 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

a number of new facilities had been erected. These included manufacturing and filling plants, a new steam plant and distribution system, an

entirely new sewage system with pumping stations and disposal plant, a

research and development center, an airplane runway, a dock on Bush

River, paved roads, new railroads, a new wing on the Chemical Warfare

School, additions to the post headquarters building, several troop barracks,

and two new training fields.34 In addition, new depot facilities had been

erected.35 The actual cost of rehabilitation and construction came to over

$34,000,000.36 Within a period of sixteen months a considerable face lifting had taken place at Edgewood.

Government-Owned Contractor-Operated Plants

The preparation of plans for securing manufacturing plants in industry, which G-4 listed as one of the chief objectives of the CWS under

the Munitions Program, was accomplished in 1940 and 1941. Under the

Second Supplemental to the 1941 Appropriations Act, approved on 9 September 1940, funds were allotted to the CWS to erect plants for private

industry in order to expedite production.37 The procedure was for the government to build the plants which would be operated under contract with

private industry. Both the Ordnance Department and the Chemical Warfare Service followed the practice extensively.38

 The CWS built charcoal

and whetlerite plants and plants for the manufacture of impregnite (CC-2)

under this program.39

Construction was begun on the first of these plants, a charcoal-whetlerite plant at Zanesville, Ohio, in December 1940 on the property of the

Barnebey-Cheney Engineering Co.40 The whetlerite portion of this plant

34

 (1) Annual Rpt, CW Center, EA, Md., FY 1942. Technical Library A CmlC, Md. (2)

Appendix A. 35

 For details see below, p. 381. 36

 See app. A. 37

 P.L. 781, 76th Cong, 3d Sess. 38

 (1) ICAF R 83, Construction of New Facilities, January 1957, p. 47. ICAF Library. (2)

Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 437-55. 39

 (1) Charcoal and whetlerite plants were in addition to similar plants built under educational

order contracts. (2) Construction responsibility was divided between the Quartermaster and the

Corps of Engineers until December 1941 when all construction activities were put under the latter. In the case of Ordnance and CWS plants, the using service was given the prerogative of selecting a prime contractor as management agent during the construction and during the operation of

the completed facility. Jesse A. Remington and Lenore Fine, Construction in the United States, a

Corps of Engineers volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II, ch. II, p. 50. 40

 A charcoal-whetlerite plant had already been constructed on the Barnebey-Cheney property

at Columbus, Ohio, under an educational order. This plant processed the charcoal of all the producers until other plants were put in operation.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 255

was completed by 5 January 1942 and turned over for operation to the

Pittsburgh Coke and Chemical Co. In April 1941 construction of a second

charcoal-whetlerite plant was started at Fostoria, Ohio. This was completed

by the beginning of 1942 and turned over to the National Carbon Co.41

In February 1941, meanwhile, work had begun on the erection of impregnite plants at Niagara Falls, N.Y., East St. Louis, Ill., and Midland, Mich.

These three plants were designed by Du Pont. The Du Pont Co. had been

awarded an educational order contract in 1940 for an impregnite plant at

Niagara Falls, N.Y.42 At that time the Du Pont engineers had consulted

CWS engineers and had surveyed the model impregnite plant at Edgewood Arsenal whose basic design had been drawn up by the Du Pont

Co.43 The plant which Du Pont constructed under the educational order

contract thus represented the combined thinking of the CWS and Du Pont.

On the basis of its experience in constructing the educational order plant

the Du Pont Co. was awarded the contract to design the other impregnite plants. Du Pont itself was given the additional impregnite plant at

Niagara Falls to operate, Monsanto Chemical Co. the East St. Louis plant,

and Dow Chemical Corp. the Midland plant. The Site Location Board of

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense had to approve the sites for all

these plants.44

Government-Owned and -Operated Plants and Arsenals

By the summer of 1941. the immediate objectives of the Munitions Program in the CWS were well on the way to realization and the service

began to concentrate on some of the less urgent objectives. Among the

latter were the construction of government plants for the impregnation of

clothing, new government arsenals for the manufacture and filling of chemical warfare munitions, and additional storage space for the mass of new

items being procured. In May 1941 the government awarded a contract to

41

 Interv, Hist Off with Sebastian W. Kessler, 11 Dec 57. Mr. Kessler was CWS engineer

on construction of charcoal-whetlerite plants and he supervised their initial operation. 42

 See above, Table 4. 43

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Col Robert D. McLeod, 12 Apr 54. Colonel McLeod, then a

captain, was in charge of the CC-2 pilot plant at Edgewood in 1940. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen T. H. Marshall to Hist Off, 24 Jan 57. During World War II Marshall was on the Staff of the Technical Division, OC CWS. 44

 Memo, Col James H. Burns, OASW, for C CWS, 11 Jul 40, sub: Procedure on Munition

Plant Construction Program, Awarding of Contracts and Supervision of Performance Thereunder.

CWS 381/247-260.
256 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the American Laundry Machinery Co. to design, construct, and install four

plants to impregnate clothing at Columbus, Ohio; Ogden, Utah; Kansas

City, Mo.; and New Cumberland, Pa. These government-owned and -operated plants, with the exception of the one at Ogden, were completed by

15 December 1941. The Ogden plant was dismantled before it was completed and shipped to England where it was erected at the Blythe Colour

Works, Cresswell, near Stoke-on-Trent.45

The War Department, meanwhile, began to erect additional CW arsenals. In the years of peace, as mentioned above, the CWS had planned

for one additional wartime arsenal in the central or western section of the

United States.46 On 30 April 1941 General Baker, in his final report to

the Chief of Staff, again brought up the matter saying that he could not

"stress too strongly the absolute necessity for the immediate authorization

and construction of additional facilities other than those at Edgewood

Arsenal at a location west of the Allegheny Mountains."

 47

 General Baker

added that he knew consideration was being given to the construction of

a new arsenal, but that to date no positive action had been taken.

Positive action was not taken until May 1941 when General Baker's

successor, General Porter, became the sixth chief of the CWS. At that

time several sites in the interior of the United States were being surveyed

for a suitable location for a CWS arsenal.48 On 18 June, Porter recommended selection of one of those sites, a stretch of flat lowland in the

fertile valley of the Tennessee River near Huntsville, Ala.49 The War

Department approved General Porter's recommendation, and on 21 July

construction of the new arsenal was begun. That same month the arsenal

was designated an Army installation under command of Col. Rollo C. Ditto.

Lt. Col. Walter J. Ungethuem was transferred from Edgewood Arsenal

where the building program was nearing completion, to supervise the construction at Huntsville. Accompanying Ungethuem were several engineers of

the War Plans Division (later Industrial Engineering Division) of Edgewood Arsenal, who had worked on plans for a new CWS arsenal in the

late thirties. These included two of the most experienced arsenal engineers

in the CWS, E. C. Thompson and L. W. Greene. The CWS engineers

45

 (1) History of Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 242-45. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Brig Gen Clifford

L. Sayre, 22 Oct 56. Sayre was Chief of the Facilities & Engineering Branch, OC CWS, in World

War II. (3) Ltr, Brig Gen T. H. Marshall to Hist Off, 24 Jan 57. 46

 See ch. X above. 47

 Ltr, C CWS to CofS, 30 Apr 41, sub: Final Report. CWS 319.1/2183-2449. 48

 History of Huntsville Arsenal from July 1941 to August 1945, p. 3. 49

 Ltr, C CWS to President WD Facilities Board OUSW, 18 Jun 41, sub: Additional Facilities,

CWS. CWS 679/17.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 257

GENERAL PORTER, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service (holding pointer), discussing

construction problems with General Ditto (left), Colonel Prentiss (right), and General

Avery (second from right), in General Porter's office, Washington, January 1942.

worked closely with the engineers of the firm of Whitman, Requardt, and

Smith of Baltimore, which on 16 July was awarded a contract for architectural and engineering services for a new arsenal. On 21 July the Corps

of Engineers awarded construction contracts to the following firms: C. G.

Kershaw Contracting Co. of Birmingham, Engineers Limited of San Francisco, and Walter Butler Co. of St. Paul.

The Chief, CWS, in his recommendation for the construction of the

new arsenal, listed the following facilities: four chemical loading plants,

a chemical warfare depot, plant storage, laboratories, shops, offices, hospitals, fire and police protection installations, paved roads, and railroads.

Construction under this program was getting well under way when the

war began. The war period was to see the erection of many more facilities than originally planned.50

The decision of the Chief of Staff in the summer of 1941, to place

entire responsibility for the incendiary bomb program with the CWS led

to the need for still more facilities. The CWS surveyed industry and drew

up a number of contracts for the production of these bombs.51 Since this

50

 See app. A and B. 51

 See ch. XV below.
258 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

country had little experience in the manufacture of incendiaries and since

there was a growing demand for them by both United States and the British

forces, the War Department decided that the CWS should also manufacture and assemble incendiary bombs in government plants.52

 A pilot plant

was erected at Edgewood, and in the fall of 1941 the Chief, CWS,

obtained approval to construct an arsenal for this purpose at Pine Bluff,

Ark., thirty miles southwest of Little Rock.53 Col. Augustin M. Prentiss

was named commanding officer of the new installation on 30 September

1941, and two weeks later the government awarded a contract for facilities

for manufacturing and assembling incendiary munitions to Sanderson and

Porter of New York.54 The CWS arsenal engineers at Huntsville co-operated with the contractor in drawing the plans for Pine Bluff Arsenal,

actual construction of which began on 1 December 1941. As at Huntsville, many more facilities than originally planned were to be constructed

at Pine Bluff during World War II. Total cost of construction at Huntsville came to over $58,431,200 and at Pine Bluff to over $51,156,748.55

Procurement in the Emergency Period

Even while the new facilities were under construction at Edgewood Arsenal in 1940 and 1941 the manufacturing load rose sharply over that of previous years. Greater quantities of mustard gas, tear grenades, decontaminating apparatus, ton containers, 500-pound smoke clusters, smoke pots,

and airplane smoke tanks were produced.56 In the summer of 1940 the procurement districts began to engage in actual procurement, letting contracts

for such items as 4.2-inch mortar shells,57 components of the gas mask, and

for assembling of the mask, charcoal, and smoke mixtures. Contracts were

52

 Ltr, Lt Col Charles E. Loucks, ExO OC CWS to Brig Gen H. K. Rutherford, OUSW, 26

Sep 41, sub: Outline of General Plan Incidental to the Procurement of Incendiary Bombs. CWS

679/17. 53

 This plant at Edgewood turned out the AN-M54 incendiary bombs which were used in Lt.

Col. James H. Doolittle's raid on Japan, 18 Apr 42. See (1) Ltr, Brig Gen T. H. Marshall to

Hist Off, 24 Jan 54. Marshall at that time was a captain working on the incendiary bomb program at Edgewood. (2) Seth Q. Kline, Robert E. Patchel, and Charles T. Mitchell, Development of Quick-Opening Cluster Adapters M4, M5, M6, M7, and M8 for Incendiary Bombs. TDMR

1015, 16 Apr 45. 54

 Pine Bluff Arsenal History, vol. I, p. 3. 55

 See app. B. 56

 CWS Rpt of Production 1 June 1940 through 30 July 1945. 57

 (1) Contracts for a limited number of shells were approved for training purposes and to

build up the overseas reserve. Ltr, C CWS to USW, 9 Jan 41, sub: Defense of Procurement

Activities Under the Various 1941 Appropriations. CWS 400.12/6. (2) Contracts for mortar

shells were awarded in January 1941 to one prime and eight subcontractors in the Pittsburgh district. Hist of Pittsburgh CWPD, 1 July 1940 through 30 June 1945, pp. 192-93.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 259

let to the lowest bidder and the OC CWS had to approve all contracts

over $10,000.58

These increased activities led to organizational changes both in the

chiefs office and in the installations.59 In July 1940 separate Procurement

and Supply Divisions were established in the Office of the Chief and a

year later, in a major reorganization by the newly appointed chief, General

Porter, an Industrial Service was activated. Lt. Col. Paul X. English was

named chief of the Industrial Service and Maj. Norman D. Gillet, chief of

the Supply Division of the Industrial Service. After the initiation of contractual operations in the procurement districts in mid-1940 more Reserve officers were called to active duty and the district civilian personnel rolls were

greatly expanded. District organizations resembling those planned in the

peace years were put into operation. At Edgewood Arsenal an Arsenal

Operations Department was activated in December 1940 to supervise manufacture, inspection, and service activities.60

Like all elements of the military establishment the CWS in the emergency period was faced with procurement problems caused by dislocations

in the national economy. Perhaps the most significant of these problems

was the low priority rating given chemical warfare items by the Army and

Navy Munitions Board (ANMB), to which Donald Nelson of the Office

of Production Management had delegated responsibility for War Department priorities.61

 In the summer of 1941 the board formulated a system

of priority ratings ranging from A-1-a to A-1-j. Under this system chemical warfare items came under the low rating of A-1-i, undoubtedly because the board did not consider the need for such items as pressing as

that of other items, which led at times to considerable delay in CWS facilities and production programs.62

 The construction of the charcoal-whetlerite plants at Zanesville and Fostoria in 1940 was delayed because the CWS

was given a low priority for structural steel and steel plate, and in 1941

erection of the new impregnite plants was held up for the same reason.

In 1941 also a considerable part of the gas mask factory at Edgewood had

to be shut down temporarily because of low priorities.63

58

 Ltr, C CWS to CO's PD's and Arsenals, 13 Dec 41, sub: Authority to Contract. CWS

400.12/105. 59

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. II. 60

 Ibid., See chs. V and VI for a detailed discussion. 61 ASF Annual Rpt for FY 1943, p. 66. 62

 For discussion of ANMB decisions on CWS priorities, see Conference, Manufacturing and

Procurement Program of the CWS, 27 May 42, p. 6. CWS 314.7 Conferences File. 63

 (1) Advance Weekly Rpt CWS No. 12 to Statistics Br OUSW, 30 Jul 41. (2) Advance

Weekly Rpt No. 14 to Statistics Br OUSW, 13 Aug 41. Both in CWS 319.1/70. (3) Kessler

interv, 11 Dec 57.
260 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MEETING OF CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE OFFICERS to discuss procurement problems, Temporary Building F, Washington, D.C., October 1941. From left: Colonel

Kuhn, Capt. Walter E. Spicer, Lt. Col. Henry Enterline, Col. Patrick F. Powers, Col.

Hugh W. Rowan, General English, Capt. James H. Batte, Col. Sterling E. Whitesides,

Jr., Col. Harry R. Lebkicher, Col. Raymond L. Abel, Lt. Col. John L. Miles.

Another problem was the shortage of machine tools needed for the completion of contracts for components of the gas mask. Like most of the

prewar procurement and supply problems in the CWS, this problem was

national in scope. It originated in the large orders which foreign nations

placed with the American tool builders before Congress had finally gotten

around to appropriating considerable sums of money for national defense.

As early as 30 July 1940 the Chief, CWS, expressed concern over the effect

of the shortage of machine tools on the gas mask contracts.64 The problem was not solved until well into the war period.

A third problem was the shortage of raw materials needed in the construction of new facilities and in the manufacture of munitions. With the

War Department placing emphasis on rehabilitating Edgewood Arsenal

and on building new plants and arsenals, meeting the raw material needs

of the construction program was the most important immediate task. But

shortages of needed materials for munitions also arose and these became

more acute as time went on. By June 1941 material shortages were con64

 Ltr, C CWS to H. H. Pinney, President of E. W. Bliss Co., Brooklyn, N.Y., 30 Jul 40.

CWS 011/21.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 261

sidered so serious that the Under Secretary of War inaugurated a program

in the technical services for the conservation of certain basic materials.65

He drew up a list of the strategic and critical materials on the ANMB

list and a few additional materials which had been placed under allocation

or priority control by the Office of Production Management. Of particular

interest to the CWS were aluminum, nickel, manganese, chlorine, rubber,

copper, steel, cotton duck, and webbing. The Under Secretary directed the

Chief, CWS, to conduct a continuous study of all specifications with a

view to eliminating or reducing requirements for strategic materials which

were under allocation or priority control. Even before receipt of the directive the Chief, CWS, had been investigating the possibility of replacing

strategic materials in gas mask parts with plastic and steel.66 To supervise

all matters bearing on priorities, as well as to co-ordinate the growing

problem of labor relations, a Priorities and Labor Relations Section was

activated in the Industrial Service of OC CWS in August 1941.67

Still another problem of expanding procurement activities was plant

protection. The Federal Bureau of Investigation inspected all War Department and contractors' facilities until the spring of 1941, when the function

was transferred to the War Department itself. On 12 May the Under Secretary of War notified the Chief, CWS, of the change and outlined the

activities to be carried out. He stressed the safety features of plant protection as well as the need for guarding against sabotage and directed that

plant protection units be set up in the Office of the Chief and in the procurement districts. In conformity with this directive, the Chief, CWS, activated a plant protection unit in his office in May 1941 and instructed the

chiefs of the districts to do likewise.68

One of the greatest difficulties of the period was meeting the need for

trained inspectors. In the peacetime years all CWS inspection was carried

on at Edgewood Arsenal under the supervision of the Inspection, Safety,

and Proof Division. Inspection was on a 100 percent basis; that is, every

major component was inspected on the manufacturing line and later each

finished end item was inspected. In addition to the inspection of items being

65

 Memo, USW for C CWS, 11 Jun 41, sub: Conservation of Certain Basic and Semi-Finished

Materials. CWS 381.388. 66

 Memo, ExO OC CWS for USW in reply to request of 11 Jun 41, sub: Conservation of Certain Basic and Semi-Finished Materials. CWS 381.388. 67

 OC CWS Organ Chart, 20 Aug 41. Capt. Alexander Leggin, a CWS Reserve officer,

headed this section. 68

 Ltr, C CWS to ExO's all PD's, 13 May 41, sub: Plant Protection Inspection Service.

CWS-1D 679.2C/11.
262 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

manufactured, there was a program of surveillance inspection under which

chemical warfare matériel was periodically checked to determine the extent

of its stability. This was done by making spot checks on matériel from a

pilot or production plant or by conducting periodic tests on stocks in storage. Both the technicians and inspectors at Edgewood were vitally interested

in these data.

The increase in CWS manufacturing activities led to the hiring in 1940

of a greater number of inspectors at Edgewood and in the districts. The older

inspectors at Edgewood acted as a training unit for the new ones, the districts sending their apprentice inspectors to Edgewood for training before

sending them out on the job. The concept of 100 percent inspection, as

carried out at Edgewood Arsenal, was transferred to the districts and the

new gas mask assembly plants such as that of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber

Co. at Akron were planned and operated on that basis. During 1941 the

number of inspectors at Edgewood and in the districts multiplied several

times. To insure better methods of inspection, an analytical laboratory, a

physical testing laboratory, and a gauge manufacturing and testing facility

were set up at Edgewood Arsenal in 1941.

The increase in inspection activities in 1940 and 1941 led to several

organizational developments in the chiefs office. The most important of

these were the activation of a Statistical, Inspection, and Specifications

Section in 1940 and establishment of a separate Inspection Division in

July 1941.

Mobilization of the Distribution System

Procurement of CWS items initiated under the educational order and

munitions programs expanded still more as a result of the passage of the

Lend-Lease Act in March 1941.69 A few weeks after the act was passed,

the War Department began revising its requirements upward. At the end

of August President Roosevelt requested the War and Navy Departments

to submit by 10 September their recommendations on how munitions produced in the United States should be distributed as between the United

States, Great Britain, Russia, and other friendly powers during the period

30 August 1941 and 30 June 1942. The joint Army-Navy document compiled to fill the President's request became known as the Victory Program.70

69

 For details on effects of Lend-Lease Act on CWS activities, see ch. XVI below. 70

 (1) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 133-39. (2) Watson, The Chief of Staff:

Prewar Plans and Preparations, ch. XI. (3) M. M. Postan, "History of the Second World War,"

British War Production (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1952), pp. 238-41.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 263

COL. NORMAN D. GILLET

As CWS procurement grew in

1940 and 1941 the demand naturally

arose for more storage space. Late in

1940 the CWS leased a large warehouse in Chicago and early in 1941

another warehouse in Indianapolis

for the storage of gas masks acquired

under the educational order program. Under the provisions of the

Military Appropriation Act for the

fiscal year 1941 over $12,000,000 was

allotted to the Chemical Warfare

Service for the construction of additional storage facilities. In July a

construction program was initiated

throughout the continental United

States and in the overseas departments. Included within the depot program were the immediate construction

of new facilities and the formulation of plans for the construction of additional storage space in the future. Two Reserve lieutenants were called to

active duty to assist Major Gillet, chief of the Supply Division, OC CWS,

in supervising the program. These officers collected data and drew up plans

for modern storage depots where space would be utilized to the best possible

advantage and where the latest handling equipment, such as fork lift trucks,

would be used on an extensive scale.

After the enactment of the appropriation legislation the CWS began

building new storage facilities at Edgewood in September 1940. Within a

year the following new additions had been made: 6 warehouses, 13 magazines, 6 igloos, 2 sheds, 1 toxic gas yard, and 1 office. These facilities

comprised over 360,000 square feet of storage space.71 Between July 1940

and May 1941 the CWS acquired additional space in the War Department general depots at Ogden, San Antonio, Memphis, New Orleans,

Atlanta, and in Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines.72 In the latter half

of 1941 it was necessary to plan and arrange for modern storage depots

at the new arsenals at Huntsville and Pine Bluff.73 Actual construction of

71

 Scaggs, History of Eastern Chemical Warfare Depot, pp. 21 and 173. 72

 See app. A. 73

 (1) Ltr, C CWS to AG, 6 Oct 41, sub: Storage of 4-lb Incendiary Bomb and 1st Ind, AG,

112.05 (10-6-41) MC-D, 14 Nov 41. CWS 471.6/29 Conf. (2) Memo, C Fld Svc OC CWS

to C Ind Svc OC CWS, 13 Nov 41, sub: Incendiary Storage at Pine Bluff and Huntsville. CWS

314.7 Incendiaries File.
264 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

TABLE 6—CWS DEPOT STORAGE SPACE IN OPERATION, DECEMBER 1941

Source: The figures in this table were compiled from data furnished by Supply Division, OC CWS, in 1946.

those facilities was not undertaken, however, until early 1942.74 (Table 6)

While the Supply Division, OC CWS, was planning new depots and

acquiring additional storage space, the immediate need arose of furnishing

gas masks to troops being inducted into the rapidly expanding Army. In

order to prevent delay in delivery, the Supply Division made arrangements

to transport the masks and some other equipment directly from the point

74

 (1) See app. A. (2) Table 6 shows the amount of CWS storage space as of December 1941.
BEGINNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 265

of manufacture to post, camps, and stations. This direct delivery, which

characterized the period from the fall of 1940 to early 1942, enabled the

CWS to carry on its program of depot planning and construction without

having to expand its current storage activities. During 1941 gas masks and

gasproofing equipment in considerable quantities were also shipped to

Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, the Philippines, and Hawaii.75 This equipment was put to good use in the Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor before

the final surrender of the American troops.76

Procurement and supply developments in the two years preceding U.S.

entrance into war placed the CWS in a better position to meet the demands of a full-scale conflict. Thanks to the educational order program

and the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, the CWS was able to build

new facilities and undertake procurement in the districts and arsenals.

Had such construction not been undertaken, the state of CWS preparedness at the time of the outbreak of war would have indeed been tragic.

Moreover, by obtaining experience in the production and inspection of

munitions, drawing up contracts, and storing and issuing equipment, CWS

personnel—military and civilian—were in a much better position to cope

with the problems which would confront them after the war got under

way. The problems that arose, such as shortages of raw materials and low

priorities, were to continue and become even more acute once the nation

entered the war.

75

 (1) Ltr, ExO OC CWS to CO Columbus Gen Dep, 19 Feb 41, sub: Shipment of Gas

Masks. (2) Cablegram, Baker to CmlO Philippine Dept, 8 Apr 41. (3) Memo, CmlO

Hawaiian Dept for C CWS, 11 Sep 41. (4) Cablegram, Porter to CmlO Philippine Dept, 12

Sep 41. All in CWS 470.72/181. 76

 Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat.
CHAPTER XII

More and More of Everything

CWS procurement and supply activities increased tremendously in World

War II, reaching proportions never contemplated in the prewar years. Figures on dollar value (Table 7) and the production of selected items (Table

8) give some indication of the volume of CWS procurement. Although

the CWS program was small when compared to those of other technical

services (Chart 1), the fact that it amounted to over a billion and a half

dollars definitely placed it in the class of big business. The CWS procured

matériel not only for the Army but also for the Navy, as well as for counTABLE 7—SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED DOLLAR VALUE OF CWS PROCUREMENT:

1940-1945 a

a

 Value computed by Hqs, Army Service Forces, from physical quantities of materiel delivered in each year multiplied

by unit costs in 1945. The data, therefore, reflect physical volume rather than actual cost to or total expenditure of funds

by the government.

Source: Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement." MS in OCMH.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 267

CHART 1—TOTAL ARMY SERVICE FORCES ESTIMATED DOLLAR VALUE OF PROCUREMENT DELIVERIES BY TECHNICAL SERVICES: 1 JANUARY 1942—31 DECEMBER

1945

Source: Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," passim.

tries included in the Lend-Lease Act. The total value of CWS items procured

for the Navy amounted to about $150,000,000 and for lend-lease countries

to almost $303,000,000.1

Procurement of Service Equipment

In addition to toxic, incendiary, and smoke ammunition and bombs, as

well as chemical warfare offensive weapons and equipment, the CWS was

responsible for the procurement of a variety of service equipment. The

latter included a truck mounted with a swinging boom crane, a chemical

service truck, a chemical service trailer, a unit for mixing toxic and incendiary agents in the field, and a set for maintaining and repairing chemical

warfare equipment in the field. Several of these items presented unusual

problems of development and procurement.2 (Table 8)

The truck, crane, swinging boom, was designed to handle ton containers of toxics and was prescribed equipment for airfields where chemical

1

 The figure on Navy procurement was supplied by the Supply and Distribution Div, OC CWS,

in 1946. The figure on lend-lease was obtained from WD Lend-Lease Transfer, CWS, May 46. 2

 Unless otherwise indicated, discussion of items of service equipment is based on History of

Chicago CWPD, 1 Jan 45-15 Aug 45; CWS Report of Production 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45,

pp. 27, 31; and Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Robert C. Hinckley, 9 Jan 58. Col. Hinckley was

Chief, Procurement Division, Chicago CWPD in World War II. The CWS procured most of its service equipment through that district.
268 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

TABLE 8—EXPANSION IN PRODUCTION OF SELECTED CW ITEMS, WORLD WAR II

Source: a Weekly Report for Chief of Staff, CWS Munitions on Hand as of December 12, 1941. b

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," pp. 21-24, and CWS Report of Production 1 Jan 40 through

31 Dec 45. Because of the inclusion in this column of certain minor items not considered in Crawford, Cook, and Whiting,

some of the totals shown above differ slightly from those in that study.

air service companies were stationed. The service companies were responsible for delivering toxic, smoke, and incendiary bombs to the apron for

aircraft loading by Army Air Forces crews. As soon as other services observed how the unit performed, they began using it on jobs for which it

had not been intended. For example, it was frequently used to remove

wrecked aircraft from fields. Projects such as this were simply too heavy

for the mechanism and the truck frequently broke down. The CWS procured the truck, crane, swinging boom, from Gar Wood Associates, Inc.,

Washington, D.C., which developed the telescopic boom and power takeoff. These were mounted on a 4-ton tractor chassis furnished under subcontract by the Diamond T Co. About 400 of the units were assembled

at the Diamond T rebuild plant near Detroit.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 269

The chemical service truck was used to facilitate the loading and handling of chemical containers, such as smoke tanks, ton containers, and

55-gallon drums. The Ordnance Department supplied the 6 by 6 chassis

for the truck while the CWS contracted with several firms for mounting

the superstructure, which consisted of a monorail frame with a chain hoist,

chocks, and equipment lockers. Though development and manufacture of

this item proceeded with no more than an average number of obstacles,

the task of obtaining priorities for the necessary materials did present a

knotty problem. The CWS procured more than 3,000 of these trucks during the war.

Procurement officials experienced some difficulty in getting chemical

handling and chemical service trailers because of the failure of the chief

prime contractor, the Saginaw Products Corp. of Saginaw, Mich., to obtain critical components on time. These trailers resembled the M5 bomb

trailers which the Saginaw company manufactured for the Ordnance Department in that both types featured a special design on which Saginaw

Products Corp. held a patent. The special design consisted of two front

bogie wheels with electrical brakes and a device that enabled the trailer

to cut loose from its tow truck and come to a stop at a specified point.

This feature did not always work well. The service trailer, like the service

truck, was equipped with beam and hoist, while the handling trailer was

designed to carry toxic containers and smoke tanks. The CWS procured

over 2,300 of the handling trailers and over 250 of the service trailers.

The service assembled 114 maintenance repair sets for chemical equipment at Edgewood Arsenal between August 1942 and July 1945. These

sets consisted essentially of special tools needed for hand-tool repair of

flame throwers, collective protectors, air compressors, and portable decontaminating apparatus, as well as gas mask repair tools and test equipment.

No single item of field equipment supplied by the CWS proved more useful

to the chemical officer in the field than did this set.

Procurement of Chemicals

The CWS was also responsible for procurement in appreciable quantities of 374 chemicals in World War II.3

 A few of these, such as toxic

agents, decontaminating agents, and napalm, were end items. The others

3

 See Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, 16 Oct 51. The number 374 does not include

chemicals used for experimental purposes at CWS laboratories, where many more chemicals, sometimes in insignificant amounts, were used. CWS 314.7 Procurement File.
270 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

were components and process chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical warfare items. Although the CWS manufactured certain basic chemicals such as arsenic trichloride, sodium hypochlorite, and chlorine at its

own arsenals, it purchased the vast bulk of the basic chemicals from some

600 firms throughout the United States. Since the home offices of most of

these companies were in New York City, the OC CWS in November

1941 decided to centralize preliminary negotiations for procurement of

chemicals for the incendiary bomb program in that district.4 A year later

the entire Chemical Section, Industrial Division, of the chiefs office, was

transferred from Washington to New York.5 In the summer of 1944, the

Chief, CWS, directed that this section be raised to the status of a division to be known as the Chemical Commodity Division, OC CWS. From

that time until the close of the war this division, whose chief was Col.

Samuel N. Cummings, supervised the procurement of chemicals at all CWS

arsenals and procurement districts.6

While procurement of most chemicals was usually a simple commercial transaction, in the case of some half-dozen real complications arose.

This half-dozen included hexachloroethane for smoke mixture, thermite,

barium nitrate, barium chromate, magnesium for incendiary bombs, and

chlorine.7

Among the basic chemicals, none was considered more important than

chlorine, if the extent of CWS planning and the quantity of the item procured are taken as criteria. Although chlorine was used on the battlefield

in World War I, the CWS in the postwar years decided against using it

as a toxic agent. It was nevertheless an essential component not only of

other toxic agents, but also of smoke, protective ointment, bleach, and

other decontaminating substances. In the mid-1930's the CWS began to

give serious consideration to planning for emergency production of chlorine. The planners in the Office of the Chief made a study of wartime

requirements and concluded that it would be necessary to construct an electrolytic caustic plant at Edgewood Arsenal capable of producing 150 net

tons of chlorine a day. The CWS believed that its additional war demands

4

 Memo, C Ind Svc, OC CWS, for CO Pittsburgh CWPD, et al., 5 Nov 41, sub: Procurement

of Chemicals for Incendiary Bomb Program. CWS 400.171/551. 5

 OC CWS Adm O 6, 6 Nov 42. 6

 (1) Memo, C Ind Div, OC CWS, for all Procurement Districts, 27 Jul 44, sub: Establishment of a Chemical Commodity Division. CWS 400.12 OC CWS Procurement, Chicago CWPD.

(2) Interv, Hist Off with Col Samuel N. Cummings, 26 Aug 54. (3) History of Chemical Commodity Procurement, 1 Aug 44-13 Nov 45. 7

 For discussion of procurement of chemicals used in smoke and incendiaries see ch. XV below.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 271

of 550 net tons a day could be met by the chlorine industry through expansion of existing capacity by 40 percent. In the event of an emergency,

according to CWS plans, the government would provide funds for expansion of chlorine plants, but the industry was expected to draw up plans

for expansion at its own expense. In the fall of 1935 the Chief, CWS, disclosed this idea, in confidence, to the leaders of the chlorine industry. This

he did by communicating with the president of the Chlorine Institute in

New York City. The Chlorine Institute found its members receptive to

the suggestion.8

Among the subcommittees of the Advisory Committee to the Army

and Navy Munitions Board was one on alkali-chlorine.9 Set up in the fall of

1939, this subcommittee, whose members were leaders of the industry,

continued throughout the war to assist the government in meeting demands for alkali and chlorine products. The subcommittee met periodically in New York City. In attendance was a CWS officer, Col. Harry A.

Kuhn. Kuhn was responsible for gathering statistics on production from

the manufacturers and passing these on, together with estimates of government requirements, to the Chemical Advisory Committee. From 16 December 1941 to the end of the war a U.S. Naval officer also attended meetings of the Alkali-Chlorine Subcommittee.10

The emergency period witnessed a steadily increasing demand for chlorine. With the inauguration of its procurement program in the summer of

1940, the CWS circulated bids for the delivery of some 3,780 net tons to

Edgewood Arsenal to be used in the manufacture of toxic agents. In 1941

the demand continued to rise, especially after passage of the Lend-Lease

Act. On 19 March the Office of Production Management put chlorine on

the priority critical list, and there it remained throughout the war. By July

about 30 percent of the country's chlorine was being channeled into war uses.11

In the prewar period the CWS had to depend entirely on industry for

chlorine. This arrangement was not satisfactory for there were delays in

8

 (1) Ltr, C CWS to S. W. Jacobs, [President, Chlorine Institute], 10 Sep 35. This letter gives

a brief summary of CWS plans. (2) Ltr, S. W. Jacobs to C CWS, 6 Feb 36. Both in files of Chlorine Institute, New York City. 9

 See ch. XI above. 10

 Minutes of Meetings of the Alkali-Chlorine Committee are in the files of the Chlorine Institute, New York City. Copies of the most pertinent minutes are in CWS 314.7, Chlorine Institute

File.

11

 (1) "Report on Chlorine Industry," Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering, vol. 51 (1944),

pp. 115-22. (2) Robert T. Baldwin, "Chlorine in World War II," Armed Forces Chemical Journal,

III (October 1948), 29-32. (3) Minutes of Meeting of Alkali-Chlorine Subcommittee, 2 Jul 40.

In files of Chlorine Institute, New York City.
272 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

transporting the chemical. In January 1942, therefore, the War Production

Board advised the Chemical Warfare Service to obtain chlorine from its

own facilities.12 The CWS, as indicated, had made plans in the peacetime

period for construction of a chlorine plant at Edgewood Arsenal capable

of producing 150 tons a day. When construction of Huntsville Arsenal

was undertaken in the summer of 1941, these plans were modified to provide for a 100 ton a day plant at Huntsville and a 50 ton a day plant at

Edgewood. Later a 50 ton plant was built at Pine Bluff and a 100 ton

plant at Rocky Mountain Arsenal. These plants were thus capable of turning out 300 tons of chlorine a day, but because gas warfare did not materialize they were not all run to full capacity. Total production at the

CWS arsenals ran to something less than 370,000,000 pounds.13 In addition to this chlorine, which was used principally in the manufacture of

toxic agents, the CWS bought over 64,000,000 pounds through the procurement districts, for use chiefly in the manufacture of decontaminating

agents and for CC-2 manufactured at the Niagara Falls plant.14 Some other

CC-2 plants produced their own chlorine.15 Wartime consumption of chlorine, military and civilian, exceeded the estimates of both the peacetime

planners and of the chlorine industry. From a total of 696,472 tons in 1940,

production in private industry jumped to a yearly wartime peak of 1,343,956

tons in 1944.16

By the fall of 1943 the CWS had accumulated a surplus of chlorine

while the civilian demands for the chemical and for its by-product, caustic

soda, were not being filled. Under an arrangement agreed upon by the War

Production Board, the Army Service Forces, and the Chemical Warfare Service, CWS arsenals sold excess chlorine and caustic soda to private industry.17

Estimating Requirements in Wartime

A significant feature of the CWS procurement program in World War II

was the inclusion of several important end items not planned for in the pre12

 Notes for Gen Porter ANMB Advisory Committee [Meeting], Cosmos Club [Washington],

7 Dec 42. CWS 314.7 Advisory Committee File. 3

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 21. 4

 Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, 16 Oct 51, p. 74. 5

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Harry A. Kuhn, 27 Jan 58. 6

 Baldwin, "Chlorine in World War II." 7

 (1) Memo, Prod Div ASF for C CWS, 20 Aug 43, sub: Solid Caustic Soda. (2) Ltr, Lt Col

L. W. Munchmeyer, Ind Div, OC CWS to CG Prod Div, ASF, sub: Solid Caustic Soda. (3) Ltr,

Dir of Prod Div, ASF for Dir Chemical Div, WPB, 21 Sep 43, sub: Solid Caustic Soda. All in

files of Planning Div, ASF. (4) Interv, Hist Off with J. C. Leppart, 5 Mar 58. Leppart was with

the Chemical Div, WPB, in World War II and was instrumental in bringing about the arrangement on sale of CWS excess supply of chlorine and caustic soda.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 273

war years. As late as the fall of 1941, CWS requirements under the Victory

Program made no mention of 4.2-inch mortars, 4.2-inch mortar shells, or

flame throwers. It listed other gas warfare items, both offensive and defensive, and certain types of incendiaries, and estimated, sometimes with

astounding accuracy, the quantities of such material that would be needed

during the war.18 The Victory Program, in a word, did an excellent job

of estimating CWS requirements in terms of the CWS mission as it was

then envisioned, but it did not (and could not) take into account ramifications of the CWS mission as it developed in 1942.19

The Office of the Chief, CWS, estimated requirements for chemical

warfare items, other than ammunition and toxics, on the basis of the

planned size and composition of the Army. The size of the Army was

projected by totals of types of organizations and units and by totals of

individuals. Each arm and service evolved tables of organization and equipment for the units under its jurisdiction. Each technical service, including

the CWS, then worked out tables of basic allowances for each type of organization and unit, specifying the material the service would furnish the

organization or unit as a whole and the individuals within the unit. The

total material to be provided under tables of basic allowances therefore

comprised the initial issue requirement for items provided by the service.

Early in the war factors for resupply, maintenance, and distribution were

assigned rather haphazardly. The total of the items required under these

factors plus the initial issue requirement equaled the first procurement objective of the service. Ammunition requirements were computed on the

basis of the unit of fire per weapon. Units of fire were determined by the

War Department General Staff, in co-operation with the Army Ground

Forces and the Army Service Forces, on the basis of the firing potential

of each weapon as adjusted by contemplated usage of weapon in operation. The unit of fire method of determining requirements was only as

good as the estimate of operational usage, which proved a poor basis for

computation prior to the availability of experience data. Toxic requirements

during World War II were determined by the United States Chemical

Warfare Committee.20

All chemical warfare requirements were subject to review by the War

Department General Staff (G-4), and later by Headquarters, ASF, before

18

 Joint Board Estimate of United States Overall Production Requirements 11 Sep 41. [Victory

Program] Jt Bd No. 355 Ser. 707. 19

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. III. 20

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV, for discussion of USCWC.
274 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

being passed on to the Munitions Assignments Board and other agencies

of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the summer of 1941 when

the computation of requirements was beginning to assume the proportions

of a major activity, the Chief, CWS, established a separate Planning Division in his office to perform this function.

In November 1941 Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War Department General Staff. This appointment was to have a marked effect on the development of requirements

procedures as well as on all procurement and supply activities in the Army.

The new G-4 soon came to learn that civilian agencies responsible for

determining the production capabilities of the nation for war, such as the

Office of Production Management (OPM), were critical of the Army's estimates of requirements. Somervell came to the conclusion that what the

Army needed was a single comprehensive report reflecting military needs

and the ability to fill such needs. Such a report was devised in early 1942

in the form of the Army Supply Program, which listed estimated requirements for two and sometimes three years ahead. This directive, issued periodically and in several parts, was the overall Army directive for

procurement and supply during the first two years and more of the war.

When General Somervell was appointed commanding general of the

Army Service Forces in March 1942 he took most of his G-4 organization with him. From that time until the end of the war the CWS, as a

technical service of the Army, usually reported directly to ASF headquarters

on procurement and supply activities.21

The day war was declared on Japan the Planning Division, OC CWS,

was combined with the Fiscal Division.22 Computing requirements was

apparently considered so closely related to fiscal matters that both activities were put under the jurisdiction of a single agency, the new Fiscal and

Planning Division. Whatever the seeming justification, there were serious

drawbacks to the arrangement. This the War Department came to realize,

and in August 1942 it directed that fiscal officers confine their activities

strictly to fiscal and budgetary matters.23

Actually the estimating of supply requirements was more closely related to the drawing up of operational plans than to fiscal matters. The

21

 (1) John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), pp. 1-8. (2) Smith, The Army and

Economic Mobilization, ch. VII. (3) SOS, Administrative Order (Adm O) 38, 16 Sep 42. 22

 OC CWS Off O 40, 8 Dec 41. 23

 WD Cir 280, 21 Aug 42.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 275

decision of the chief's office to set up a Field Requirements Branch in the

Operations Division in the fall of 1942 was therefore sound. As part of

the reorganization of General Porter's Office in May 1943 the Field Requirements Branch was raised to the status of a division under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations, General Waitt.24

It had final responsibility for chemical warfare requirements until the end

of the war. While the Field Requirements Division had ultimate responsibility for chemical warfare requirements for the ground forces, two other

elements of the chief's office, the Supply Division and the Control Division, worked on the computation of those requirements. The Supply Di -

vision needed requirements data in order to carry out its mission of storing

and issuing matériel, while the Control Division had the responsibility of

correlating all statistical data transmitted from the OC CWS to higher

echelons. With the inauguration of the supply control system throughout

the ASF in March 1944, the CWS set up a Materiel Planning Branch

and a Requirements Planning Committee to work on requirements.25

Three factors had to be considered in calculating supply requirements

during the first two years of the war—initial equipment, maintenance, and

building up a reserve of material. Special difficulty arose in calculating

maintenance and reserve factors because there was no field experience on

which to base estimates, which were at times nothing more than educated

guesses. The problem was not confined to the CWS but was general

throughout the Army, and occupied the attention of ASF headquarters

throughout most of 1943.

The CWS confined itself to estimating requirements for the ground

forces, leaving the task of estimating Air Forces chemical warfare requirements to the Air Corps and later to Headquarters, AAF. The AAF requirements for chemical warfare items, particularly incendiary bombs, were high.

Among the duties of the Air Chemical Officer was that of assisting the

AAF in estimating their chemical warfare requirements. Shortly after the

outbreak of war, Lt. Col. Thomas A. Doxey, Jr., CWS, was appointed to

this post. Late in 1943 Colonel Doxey was succeeded by Col. Edward

Montgomery.

The factors that were considered in estimating the chemical warfare requirements of the AAF were the number of planes to be operated, the

sortie rate, the bomb load per sortie, and the types of bombs to be used.

24

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. V. 25

 See ch. XIII below for details.
276 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

As experience data became available, statistics on actual expenditure, on

theater levels of supply, and on transit time were utilized.26

In arriving at chemical warfare requirements the Office of the Air Chemical Officer worked closely with the Requirements Division of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations Commitments and Requirements,

which correlated all AAF requirements. Once the requirements were computed they were included in the Army Supply Program. Administratively

the Office of the Air Chemical Officer was under the jurisdiction of the

Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Matériel, Maintenance and Distribution, after

that office was established in March 1943.27 It devolved upon the Air

Chemical Officer not only to estimate chemical warfare requirements, but

to check closely with the CWS to see that the requirements were translated into actuality, for the CWS procured all AAF chemical warfare items.

In accomplishing its mission the Office of the Air Chemical Officer, as a

representative of and speaking for the Commanding General, AAF, dealt

directly with OC CWS. On matters of policy or command the Air Chemical Officer conducted correspondence through the Commanding General,

ASF.

Facilities Expansion in Wartime

The chief impediments to full production in 1942 and the early part

of 1943 were shortages of facilities, shortages of manpower, difficulty in

obtaining suitable contractors to handle the ever expanding volume of procurement, technical problems inherent in the initial manufacture of noncommercial items, shortages of raw material, and imbalances in the supply

of materials and components. There was also a need for certain refinements

in organization and administrative procedures in the CWS and among

higher echelons of the government. In some instances, as indicated above,

the problems had already risen in the prewar period, and merely became

more complicated after entrance of the United States into the war.

Of more immediate concern than estimating requirements was providing facilities for the manufacture of matériel. The construction program

26

 (1) Note in Diary of Air CmlO, 27 September 1943, quoting a memo for Munitions Assignment Board on sub: Review of Combined Resources and Requirements on Incendiary Bombs. CWS

314.7 Air CmlO File. (2) Interv, Hist Off with J. S. Entriken, 19 Jun 56. Entriken was on active

duty as requirements officer in office of Air Chemical Officer from December 1943 until the end

of World War II. (3) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces in

World War II," vol. VI, Men and Planes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 378. 27

 Craven and Cate, Men and Planes, p. 44.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 277

which got under way in the emergency period was greatly accelerated after

the outbreak of war. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, none of the

manufacturing plants at the new arsenals was completed and Edgewood

was still the sole source of all types of chemical agents.

The years 1942-43 saw the number of CWS facilities increased several

times over. In addition to the erection of most of the plants at Huntsville and Pine Bluff, a third new CWS arsenal, Rocky Mountain, was built

outside Denver. Here the government acquired some 20,000 acres of land,

the southern boundary of which was adjacent to the city limits of Denver. The choice of this site was a happy one. Considered relatively immune from attack by air, it was near the main lines of the Chicago,

Burlington, and Quincy and the Union Pacific Railroads, and to main

highways. The climate was favorable and there was an adequate supply

of electric power furnished by the Public Service Company of Colorado.

Irrigation water from the Platte River was available for industrial purposes, but potable water had to be brought in by laying about ten miles

of piping to connect with the Denver water system.28

In the construction of this last CWS arsenal, of which Lt. Col.

Marshall Stubbs was named first commanding officer on 2 June 1942, the

CWS benefited from its experience in planning and building the earlier

arsenals. In mid-June Colonel Ungethuem, who had supervised the new

construction at Edgewood and later at Huntsville, was transferred to Rocky

Mountain to lend assistance. The War Department awarded prime contracts to Kershaw, Swinerton, and Walberg of San Francisco and Birmingham, and H. K. Furgeson Co. of Cleveland to build the arsenal. Contracts

as design consultants were awarded to H. K. Furgeson and Du Pont, and

architect-engineer contracts to Whitman, Requardt, and Smith of Baltimore, and Kershaw, Heyer, Swinerton, and Walberg of San Francisco and

Denver.29

In 1942 construction was also begun on two government-owned and

privately operated plants and in 1943 on another five such plants. Besides

the construction work done on arsenals and plants, the following major

CWS facilities were erected in whole or part in 1942-43: Camp Sibert,

Deseret Depot, Dugway Proving Ground, and Camp Detrick. In 1944,

when War Department construction had been virtually completed, addi28

 History of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 1945, vol. I, pt. 1, pp. 3, 171-79. 29

 (1) Ibid., p. 9. (2) RMA Post Diary (2 May 42-30 Sep 43).
278 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

tions were made to the arsenals and two more manufacturing plants were

built.30

From 1 July 1940 to 31 December 1945 a total of $315,658,264 was

spent on construction of CWS facilities.31

"The most critical problem of the whole war program was that of facilities expansion," said an Industrial College research study of 1947.32

 To

win the war the munitions capacity of the country had to be increased

tremendously and many of the same materials needed for munitions were

also needed for facilities. The Executive Order establishing the War Production Board (WPB) placed the solution of the construction problem

in the hands of that agency.33 On 9 April 1942 WPB Order L-41 limited

construction to facilities contributing to the war effort.34 With the initiation of the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) in November 1942 the following critical items were strictly rationed by the WPB: carbon and alloy

steels, high octane gasoline, copper, aluminum, and nickel.35 That this rationing had an adverse effect on the CWS construction and production

program is evidenced by a complaint registered by the Chief, CWS, with

the Commanding General, ASF, on 31 December 1942.36

While the complaint of the Chief, CWS, is understandable, for the

War Department was obviously not giving priority to chemical warfare

items, there was sound reasoning behind the War Department's action.

Seven months after the date of the CWS complaint, the Director of Production Division, ASF, Brig. Gen. H. C. Minton, observed that it was

War Department policy to operate many CWS projects at low rates and

to maintain a large number of CWS facilities in standby. This policy,

Minton said, was based on the character of chemical warfare to date. "Operations now and in the past," he stated, "have been only for the purpose of

30

 In 1942 construction was undertaken on the Kanawha Plant, South Charleston, W. Va.,

and the Maury Plant, Columbia, Tenn. In 1943 work was begun on the following plants: Seattle,

at Seattle, Wash.; Marshall at New Martinsville, W. Va.; Owl at Azusa, Calif.; Firelands at Marion, Ohio; and Birmingham at Birmingham, Ala. The plants which were started in 1944 were

the Duck River Plant, Columbia, Tenn.; and the San Bernardino Plant, San Bernardino, Calif. See

Appendix A for details on all CWS facilities built in World War II. 31

 See app. B. 32

 ICAF R83, Construction of New Facilities, p. 63. 33

 E O 9024, 16 Jan 42. 34

 For discussion of effects of this order on construction in the Army, see Jesse A. Remington

and Lenore Fine, Construction in the United States, a Corps of Engineers volume in preparation

for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, ch. XIII. 35

 For discussion of CMP in CWS see below, pp. 281-82. 36

 Ltr, C CWS to CG ASF, 31 Dec 42, sub: Delayed Shipments of Equipment for CWS Program. CWS 400.226.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 279

building up our base supply of materials for chemical warfare and the plant

capacity must be maintained in token operation with trained crews ready

to start full production at a moment's notice, should the enemy elect the

use of chemicals. These plants are insurance against changes in warfare

tactics."

 37

To administer expanding construction functions, the Chief, CWS, in

May 1942 directed that a Construction Division be activated in the Industrial Service of his headquarters. This division, whose chief was Col. Lester

W. Hurd, was charged with collecting data on construction and maintaining liaison with the Office of the Under Secretary of War, the General

Staff, Headquarters, ASF, and the Corps of Engineers. As of 1 May 1942

the organization chart of the division listed its strength as ten officers and

fifty-two civilians. In August 1942 the division was renamed a branch of

the Industrial Division and because the Corps of Engineers maintained

that construction of facilities was its function the name was changed to

Facilities and Engineering Branch and later to Facilities and Requirements

Branch.38

Matériel Shortages and Imbalances

The shortage of raw materials which arose in the emergency period

became even more acute once war was declared. Until the end of 1942

the chief need for such materials was for construction facilities. From then

until the close of hostilities the principal demand for raw materials was

for production of munitions, which started to mount sharply once war

was declared. Typical shortages in the CWS were steel for decontaminating apparatus, nickel-chrome steel for elevating screws for 4.2-inch mortars, Monel metal and stainless steel for valves for one-ton containers, and

raw chemicals for protective ointment and smoke mixtures.39

The problem of shortages was complicated by the lack of an efficient

system of overall administration for the country. The government first established the priorities system to control the flow of materials during the

emergency period. Under this system ratings were assigned to end items.

37

 Memo, Dir Prod Div for the Dir of Materiel, 2 Aug 43, sub: Report on the War Department's Investment in Industrial Facilities. ASF 004 Facilities. 38

 (1) OC CWS Off O 40, 29 Jul 42. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Brig Gen Clifford L. Sayre,

18 Oct 56. Sayre, then a lieutenant colonel, was assigned to the Construction Division during World

War II. (3) OC CWS Organization Charts, 6 Nov 42 and 10 Aug 43. 39

 See Reports of Accomplishments and Pending Difficulties in Connection with Procurement

and Production Activities of CWS, prepared by Chief, Industrial Service, OC CWS for USW, 25

Feb, 5 Mar, and 9 Apr 42. CWS 400.12/106-139.
280 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

By the fall of 1941 this arrangement was supplemented by one of allocations which aimed at control of materials in the component stage.40

 Under the priorities system, the Office of Production Management examined

the applications of prospective claimants, and notified producers to ship

allotted quantities of critical items to those contractors whose applications

were approved.

To supervise its priority and allocation activities, the CWS set up a

separate section in the Procurement Planning Division, OC CWS, early

in 1941.41 This section had responsibility for estimating the amounts of

critical materials needed and recommending priorities to be assigned to

end items. The Chief, CWS, submitted these recommendations to the

Army and Navy Munitions Board for assignment of certification of priorities.

They were then passed on to the Office of Production Management for

final approval.

With the great increase in the volume of contracts after the outbreak

of war came a corresponding rise in priority and allocation activities. In

the OC CWS the priorities unit was raised to the status of a branch—the

Priorities and Allocation Branch—which remained one of the largest administrative units in the OC CWS during 1942 and early 1943.42

 For each

contract entered into by the CWS, this branch drew up a schedule of every

pound of critical material needed.

Notwithstanding that much time and effort were put into the compilation of these schedules the information did not always reflect the true

situation. The reason was that the manufacturers made the same item in

different ways (even though they used identical specifications). Consequently, some manufacturers consumed a much greater quantity of critical

material than others. In view of the serious problem of scarcities, it was

essential that the situation be corrected.

The solution adopted by the chief's office was to have bills of material drawn up which listed component parts of every item as well as the

40

 For details on material controls in World War II see: (1) Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of

Democracy (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946); (2) Civilian Production Administration, Industrial

Mobilization for War; History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940—1945

(Washington, 1947), vol. I, pp. 457-74; (3) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pt. VI,

chs. XXII-XXVI; and (4) Millett, Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, ch. XIV. 41

 This section was headed by a CWS Reserve officer called to active duty in January 1940,

Capt. Alexander Leggin. Unless otherwise indicated this discussion of priorities and allocations is

based on Interv, Hist Off with Leggin, 23 June 55. 42

 OC CWS Organization Chart, 6 Nov 42, lists 27 officers and 68 civilians in this branch.

According to Leggin in his interview of 23 June 55, the numbers listed were very close to those

actually employed.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 281

exact time and quantity of critical material going into each item. General

Porter decided to use recent graduates of the CWS Officer Candidate School

on this project and other officers were borrowed from the procurement districts. In the summer of 1942 about 300 of these young officers were housed

in a hotel owned by the Bata Shoe Co. near Edgewood, Md., where for

six weeks, seven days a week, they worked hour after hour drawing up

bills of material. As of 1 November a temporary freeze was imposed on

drawings and specifications because the bills were subject to continual

changes from waivers and changes in specifications. The freeze was lifted

upon completion of an initial bill of material.43

The compilation of up-to-date bills of material was one of the most

significant procurement developments of the war, for these bills enabled

the service to determine the precise quantity of raw materials needed and

where and how it was being used. The CWS could refer to them to iron

out discrepancies between its figures and those submitted by contractors.

The bills also aided in forecasting production more accurately since gross

critical materials requirements could be exactly computed for scheduled

delivery; they furnished data later required by the War Production Board

and the Army Service Forces under the Controlled Materials Plan.

Defects inherent in the overall system of government priorities led to

the inauguration of the CMP in late 1942.44

 The CMP provided for an

allocation of critical materials to each service according to the national

supply and according to the relative needs of that service. Under the

CMP, priorities were no longer assigned to end items but to the critical

materials. Since steel, copper, and aluminum were the most critical, these

materials were the first to be included in the CMP. Later, other items

such as rubber were added.

The Controlled Materials Plan was a far more orderly and equitable

system than any that had preceded it. In the CWS the system worked

extremely well, partly because the list of chemical warfare items was

smaller than that of the other technical services, and partly because the

CWS had already compiled accurate bills of materials. The CMP enabled

43

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Col Lester W. Hurd, 18 Mar 57. (2) Conference, Commanding

Officers, Chemical Warfare Districts, Industrial Division, OC CWS, 3-4 Mar 43, pp. 19-23. CWS

314.7 Procurement File. 44

 For details see (1) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, ch. XXV and (2) Civilian

Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War, vol. I, pt. IV, ch. VI. H. Duncan

Hall, in "History of the Second World War," North American Supply, p. 386, note 1 (Longmans

Green & Co., 1955), states that the U.S. Controlled Materials Plan was patterned after the British

system.
282 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the service to delegate priority and allocation responsibilities to its installations, with staff responsibility being retained in the chief's office. Unfortunately the system was inaugurated after the construction program had

passed its peak and after the procurement of certain items was well advanced. But this was perhaps inevitable. The CMP was a system that

grew out of the trials and errors of several years of procurement experiences and it is difficult to see how it could have been drawn up beforehand. The Search for Suitable Contractors

The procurement of items through private contract, initiated in the

CWS with the awarding of the first educational order contract in 1939,

continued in 1940 and 1941 financed by appropriations in support of the

Munitions Program of 1940. All educational order contracts and many of

the other contracts were written in the Office of the Chief, CWS. Relatively few contracts of any kind were written in the district offices before

December 1941 because the chief's office, as already indicated, had to approve all contracts exceeding $10,000. Actual entrance into war led to the

immediate need for eliminating such a highly centralized procedure. Nine

days after war was declared Under Secretary Patterson urged the chiefs of

the technical services to expedite and decentralize war procurement. He

directed them to award contracts without advertising and specified that

only contracts in excess of five million dollars need be submitted to his

office for approval.45 On the very next day, 18 December, the First War

Powers Act, vesting broad procurement powers in the Secretary of War,

became law. One feature of this act was the decentralization of procurement activities to field offices;

 46

 another was the authorization of contracts through negotiation.

In pursuance of the First War Powers Act and of Executive Order

9001, 27 December 1941, which President Roosevelt issued to implement

45

 (1) Awarding of contracts without advertising, that is, by negotiation, was provided for in

P.L. 703, 76th Congress and in Section 9 of the Military Appropriations Act of 1942. However,

until 17 December 1941 the Under Secretary of War urged caution in the use of negotiated contracts. See Troyer S. Anderson, History of the Office of the USW (1914-1941), unpublished

monograph, OCMH, ch. VI, p. 13. In the CWS there was a limited number of negotiated con- tracts prior to the declaration of war. Not till after the enactment of the First War Powers Act

did negotiation become common. (2) Memo, USW for C CWS, et al., 17 Dec 41, sub: Decentralization of Procurement. (3) Telg, USW to C CWS, et al., 17 Dec 41. Both in USW 400.13

Procurement. 46

 The Secretary of War asked the Attorney General for an opinion on the constitutionality

of his power to delegate authority to contract to field offices. The Attorney General ruled that he

had such power. See Ltr, Att Gen to SW, 29 Aug 42. CWS 381.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 283

the act, and in conformity with directives from the Under Secretary of

War, the Chief, CWS, decentralized procurement activities to the field

installations under his command in January and March 1942.47 From then

until the close of the hostilities CWS procured the bulk of its matériel

through private contracts. The CWS arsenals and plants generally confined

their activities to manufacturing chemical agents and to chemical warfare munitions which were difficult to obtain through private contract.

The hardships which the Chemical Warfare Service began to experience in obtaining suitable contractors in the emergency period became

much more pronounced after the declaration of war. Since the Industrial

Mobilization Plan of 1939 had not been put into operation, the CWS, as

indicated, in some instances had lost allocated contractors to other elements of the armed forces, particularly the Ordnance Department and the

Navy. This state of affairs continued into the war period. Only for the

gas mask and raw chemicals did the CWS experience little difficulty in

obtaining contractors with the necessary experience and equipment. Thanks

to the educational order contracts on the mask, excellent contractors with

well-equipped plants were already in production and were willing and able to

proceed with other gas mask contracts. In the case of raw chemicals, a sizable

number of well-established houses were available for government work. On

all other items, CWS usually placed contracts with establishments that had

not been allocated to it under the Industrial Mobilization Plan. In almost

all instances these establishments were small operators who had to convert their plants in order to manufacture the items.

While the CWS was not in the most favorable position with regard

to prospective contractors, the difficulties can be exaggerated. It is true

that many of the contractors were small businessmen, but most CWS

contracts were for components which small contractors were well able to

handle. It is also true that the contractors had to convert their plants, but

this would have been the case even with larger contractors since 95 percent of all CWS items were noncommercial.48

 Actually there was seldom

any dearth of bidders for CWS contracts and generally when the contractors had gained experience they did an excellent job. A more serious

problem than securing contractors and converting plants was the lack of

47

 (1) Ltr, C Ind Div OC CWS to COs PDs and Arsenals, 3 Jan 42, sub: Authority to Contract. CWS 400.12/105. (2) Ltr, C CWS to COs PDs and Arsenals, 23 Mar 42, sub: Approval

of Awards and Formal Contracts. CWS 160/3011. 48

 CWS Presentation, SOS Staff Conference, Procurement and Production Problems, January

14, 1943, p. 2. CWS 337, 1943.
284 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

proper specifications for the contractors. As already indicated, the CWS

drew up specifications during the peacetime period, but in some instances

these were of little value when the items had to be produced under assembly line procedures. Moreover, time did not permit the development

of complete specifications on the important items for which the CWS was

given definite procurement responsibility in the emergency period—the

4.2-inch mortar and shell, the incendiary bomb, and the flame thrower.

These and other items the CWS, and in some cases the contractors, continued to develop after the service had awarded production contracts on

the items. Since much of the matériel produced under the early contracts

soon became obsolete, much time and money were lost. It would have

been to the advantage of the government, from the standpoint of both

economy and preparedness, if in the 1930's the CWS had been allowed

to expend on the development and engineering of munitions a fraction

of the funds that were allocated after Pearl Harbor.

The Chemical Warfare Service had already been placing contracts with

small business firms over a period of months when the Small Business

Act was passed in June 1942.49 To administer that act the ASF set up a

Small War Plants Branch in its purchases division, and shortly thereafter the technical services appointed liaison officers in their headquarters

and field installations. These officers were in constant touch with the representatives of the Smaller War Plants Corp. (SWPC) which was set up

under the act.50

The CWS soon acquired something of a reputation in the War Department for awarding contracts to smaller war plants and for assisting the

small fellow generally.51 When General Somervell's office conducted sur -

veys in New York and Cincinnati in 1942, for instance, it found that the

CWS through its New York district office would call in manufacturers to

help delinquent contractors straighten out their difficulties.52 In the fall of

1942 a witness before the Small Business Committee of the United States

49

 P.L. 603, 77th Cong, 11 Jun 42. 50

 Appraisals of the SWPC are contained in the following lectures given at the Army Industrial College: W. D. Denit, War Production in Small Plants, 13 Dec 46, ICAF L47-54; B. T. Bonnot, Problems of Small War Plants in Industrial Mobilization, 28 Mar 46, ICAF L46-61; and

R. C. Enos, Utilization of Smaller Plants, 23 Mar 49, ICAF L49-108. All in ICAF Library. 51

 (1) See Chart 7, ASF Annual Report 1943, p. 31. (2) Remarks of Brig Gen P. X. English,

Conference of Commanding Officers, CW Procurement Districts, 3-4 Mar 43, p. 114. CWS 314.7

Procurement File. (3) Ltr, CO NYCWPD to C CWS, 16 Oct 42, sub: Local Newspaper Reports

on Small War Plants. CWS 000.7. 52

 See Harry B. Yoshpe, Organization for Production Control in World War II, 1939-45,

passim. An unpublished monograph in OCMH.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 285

Senate stated that the only government agency in New York in which

there was any "real co-operation" and "any degree of efficiency" so far as

procurement work was concerned was the CWS. "The manufacturer," the

witness stated, "may go to the Office of Chemical Warfare, bring his

brochure, his financial statement, a line of his material and equipment,

and within a short time an engineer will go out from Chemical Warfare

to inspect the plant, to determine whether or not it is available for present war work or can be converted into war work." 53

The award of numerous contracts to smaller businesses was not without its drawbacks. Most small contractors lacked facilities for volume production of standard or specialized parts and had to let subcontracts to

smaller firms for such parts. Again, while the small prime contractors

were often purchasers of standard commercial raw materials, the volume

of their business did not warrant maintaining skilled purchasing departments capable of contracting for made-to-order components on the scale

called for under war contracts. Moreover, government inspection methods

were almost completely foreign to the commercial experience of the

smaller companies. All these factors complicated the job of the CWS

procurement officer, who had to provide administrative, technical, and

engineering assistance to a number of contractors who could not afford to

hire men trained in these various fields. The CWS procurement officers,

both in the chief's office and the installations, were generally Reserve

officers with engineering education and some experience in industry. Without the assistance of these men the service could not have carried out its

procurement mission.

Particularly burdensome, from the point of view of administration, was

the practice of awarding numerous contracts for components to small war

plants. This practice entailed a tremendous amount of administrative work

both in the chief's office and in the procurement districts. Although the

system worked fairly well during the first year of the war, by the spring

of 1943 a definite change was indicated, for by then General Somervell's

office was emphasizing controls of all sorts, including control of manpower and control of production. The matter came up for serious discussion in the conference of CWS procurement officers in March 1943.54

 By

53

 Hearings before the Special Committee to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business

Enterprises, U.S. Senate, 77th Cong, 2d Sess, Pursuant to S.R. 298 (76th Cong); Part 10, Small

Concerns in War Production: I-Oct 13, 14, and 15, 1942. 54

 Conference of Commanding Officers, CW Procurement Districts, 3-4 Mar 43, passim, CWS

314.7 Procurement File.
286 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the fall of 1943 the CWS had worked out a new system of procurement

which emphasized end-item buying rather than component buying. Contracting officers were urged to make end-item contractors responsible for

the procurement of their own components. The end-item contracting system was not immediately successful in all cases since some contractors

were reluctant to undertake responsibility for subcontracts or were unable

to find subcontractors.55 But despite its defects, end-item buying was one

of the most important administrative developments in the CWS during

World War II.

Inspection of Matériel

After the outbreak of hostilities the number of inspectors rapidly increased. They were needed not only in the existing installations but also

in those newly activated—Pine Bluff, Huntsville, and Rocky Mountain

Arsenals, and Atlanta and Dallas Procurement Districts. By the close of

1942 the CWS reached its peak wartime figure of 6,398 inspectors. From

then until the end of the war the number dropped sharply—less than 3,000

in December 1943 and less than 2,500 in May 1945.56

The training and experience requirements of CWS inspectors varied

with the type of positions they had to fill. Those in key posts had to

have technical training and were expected to have a college degree or its

equivalent, particularly if they were engaged in inspecting chemicals. Line

inspectors were required to have a high school education, be intelligent,

and be willing to learn. As the war went on, women were hired in great

numbers as line inspectors. In general their performance was equal to that

of the men and many women were advanced to supervisory positions, even

to that of chief inspector. However, it was difficult to find women with

the necessary formal education and practical experience required for key

positions, and these were generally filled by men.

The chief reason for the great number of inspectors in 1942 was the

prevailing practice of inspecting end items and components on a 100 percent basis. Despite this practice inferior chemical warfare munitions were

being sent to installations in the zone of interior and to the theaters.57

55

 Intervs, Hist Off with Cols Almon N. Bowes and A. J. L. Wilson, 27 Nov 56. Colonels

Bowes and Wilson were officers in the New York Procurement District in World War II. 56

 (1) Analysis of Operations of the Inspection Division, 1942-1945, compiled by Col John

H. Sharp, C Insp Div, OC CWS. (2) Ltr, C Insp Div OC CWS to Chiefs, Inspection Offices, all

districts and arsenals, 3 May 45, sub: Policy of Inspection Division on Manpower Utilization and

Other Studies. Both in CWS 314.7 Inspection File. 57

 (1) Ltr, CG CWS Repl Tng Center, Camp Sibert to C CWS, 7 May 43, sub: Report of

Inspection Trip. CWS 319.1. (2) Ltr, Maj D. Althauser to C Tech Div, OC CWS, 13 May 43,

sub: Report on Tour of Temporary Duty in ETOUSA and NATOUSA. CWS 381.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 287

The Chief, CWS, felt that before any real improvement in inspection procedures could be effected, some changes would have to be made in the

organization of his office and the installations. Until May 1943 the Inspection Branch of the chief's office was an element of the Industrial Division.

The inspection units at the installations reported to the division's commanding officers, whose chief objective in accordance with War Department policy in 1942 and early 1943 was to procure more and more of

everything with the greatest possible speed. To solve the problem of inferior inspection the Chief, CWS, in the reorganization of his office on

27 May 1943, made the inspection unit independent of the procurement

unit by putting the Inspection Division on the same echelon as the Industrial Division.58

 At the same time he directed that the inspection units

at the installations be put under the direct jurisdiction of the Inspection

Division, OC CWS. While commanding officers of some installations later

questioned the wisdom of this action, none ever expressed doubt that

from May 1943 until the end of the war a great improvement took place

in the quality of CWS items.59

The CWS's first step to improve inspection procedures after the 27

May 1943 reorganization was the elimination of inspection of components.

On 4 August 1943 the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel, announced

that henceforth all contracts would contain a clause to the effect that the

contractor would be responsible for such inspection.60 After this policy

was announced a number of former CWS inspectors were hired by the

contractors to carry out the same work they had done for the government.

A second step toward improved administration of inspection was the

inauguration of the practice of accepting chemical components on the

basis of notarized certificates of analysis submitted by the contractor.

Under this procedure the duties of the CWS inspector were confined to

making spot checks of the material.61

A third move in the direction of improved inspection was the introduction of a system of statistical quality control. As early as the fall of

1942 the CWS became interested in this type of inspection as carried out

by such industrial concerns as the General Electric Co. and the American

58

 (1) OC CWS Off O 39, 27 May 43. (2) Chiefs of Inspection Division in World War II

were Maj. John L. Miles, Maj. Elwood H. Snider, Lt. Col. Ludlow King, Col. William M. Creasy,

and Col. John Sharp. 59

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. VI. 60

 Ltr, AC CWS for Matl to Chief Inspection Officers, all Districts and Arsenals, 4 Aug 43,

sub: Personnel Reductions. CWS 314.7 Inspection File. 61

 This procedure is discussed in ASF Manual CWS-M608, 1 Sep 44, par. 712.
288 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Telephone and Telegraph Co. The system was mathematical in nature,

embodying the sample inspection of a fixed number of items from each

lot produced. The number of items selected from a lot was based on

records of past performance. Little headway was made in the CWS with

statistical quality control until Headquarters, ASF, directed the service to

draw up and adopt tables based on the "laws of probability reconciled

with results of actual experience."

 62

 From the fall of 1943 until the close

of the war the CWS inaugurated the system on a gradual basis. Although

the project involved considerable planning and retraining of personnel, the

results obtained more than justified the time and effort expended. By

properly applying the principles of quality control, Inspection Division,

OC CWS, was able to greatly improve inspection and at the same time reduce the number of inspectors. To take but a single example, after the

Quality Control System was established the number of inspectors on the

M50 bomb program was reduced from 66 to 35.63

Another significant administrative innovation was the centralization of

the control of waivers. A waiver, as the term implied, dispensed with a

particular requirement of a drawing or specification. It permitted a variation in the standard of quality, but not to the extent of causing a deterioration in the product. Waivers were intended to apply only to a

minimum quantity over a particular period of time. Their issuance was a

perfectly legitimate procedure so long as the practice was not abused. But

unfortunately the practice was abused, and it became necessary for the

Inspection Division, OC CWS, to revise procedures on issuance of waivers.

In June 1943 the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel, issued a directive

that districts and arsenals could grant waivers only with the concurrence

of the Chief, Inspection Division, OC CWS. The Inspection Division was

to use its discretion in obtaining the concurrence of the Technical Division. In all instances the Chief, Inspection Division, was to notify the

Industrial Liaison Branch, which would in turn notify the installation.64

Other important measures taken to improve inspection were the use

of standardized gauges throughout the CWS, standardization of procedures

for operating CWS inspection laboratories, an adequate system of surveillance, and the compilation of an inventory of items in CWS depots.

62

 See ASF Manual CWS-M608, 1 Sep 44, par. 1022. 63

 History of New York CWPD 1940 through June 1944, pp. 268-69. 64

 (1) Ltr, AC CWS to C Ind Div, et al., 29 Jun 43, sub: Directives Governing Definitions

and Procedures on Waivers, Alternates and Changes. CWS 400.1141 1943. (2) ASF Manual CWSM608, 1 Sep 44, par. 1040. The Industrial Liaison Branch was responsible for clearance of drawings

and specifications as well as waivers. See OC CWS Adm O 14, 7 Aug 43.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 289

In 1943 the Specification and Inspection Branch, ASF, contracted with

the Trundle Engineering Co. of Cleveland to survey inspection practices in

the technical services. The report of this survey, which was turned over to

the Director of Production, ASF, on 2 July 1943, indicated that the CWS

was outstanding among the technical services with regard to inspection

organization and procedures.65 One of the most significant results of the

Trundle survey was the formulation by the War Department of general

inspection policies, which were eventually published in ASF Inspection

Manual M608, in March 1944. This manual was to be implemented by

inspection manuals in the technical services, with CWS Inspection Manual

M608 not published until 1 September 1944.

Inspection manuals were extremely useful in keeping the inspectors

informed on government policies and procedures, but they were not intended to serve as guides for individual inspectors working on specific

items. For that purpose the Inspection Division, OC CWS, prepared individual standard inspection procedures. A standard inspection procedure

described the item, specified the parts to be inspected and the tools or

instruments needed to accomplish the inspection, and finally, indicated

where pertinent how the item would be proof tested, inspected for surveillance, and packaged.

Inspection in the CWS improved so markedly after the independent

Inspection Division was set up in the chiefs office in May 1943, that the

action stands out as one of the wisest organizational moves of the wartime period in the CWS. Not only did the quality of inspection improve;

the attitude of the inspectors took a marked turn for the better. For, once

they were removed from the control of those who at OC CWS level were

responsible for meeting production schedules, the inspectors carried out

their duties in a more effective manner.

The Pricing Program

The Second War Powers Act, supplemented by Presidential order,

authorized certain government agencies, including the War Department, to

inspect and audit the books of war contractors and subcontractors.66 The

War Department established administrative units for securing voluntary

adjustments or refunds whenever prices, costs, or profits were considered

65

 Report of Inspection Survey for Inspection Section, Facilities and Inspection Branch, Production Division, Headquarters, ASF, by the Trundle Engineering Co. CWS 314.7 Inspection File. 66

 (1) 56 Stat 176, 27 Mar 42. (2) EO9127, 10 April 1942.
290 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

excessive. In the CWS, for example, a Price Adjustment Section was activated in the Legal Branch on 8 August 1942.67

 Later a Cost Analysis

Branch was set up in the Fiscal Division to collect data on costs and

profits on War Department contracts.68 Close liaison was maintained between the fiscal and legal officers on all matters pertaining to costs.69

The enactment of renegotiation legislation in 1942 and 1943 led to

greater emphasis on pricing analysis in the War Department.70 In one of

the Procurement Regulations which the War Department began to issue

in the spring of 1943 provision was made for a revision of pricing organization and procedures.71

 In conformity with this regulation, Headquarters,

ASF, established a Purchases Division and the technical services activated

similar units at their headquarters.72 In the CWS the unit was known as

the Purchase Policies Branch.73 Throughout the war it was headed by

Lt. Col. Robert M. Estes. In September 1943 the branch was transferred

from the Washington headquarters to the Baltimore suboffice of the Chief,

CWS, where it remained for the duration of the war.

The chief of the new Purchase Policies Branch faced the problem of

attempting to carry out the provisions of an act that was not popular

either with the contractors or with CWS contracting officers. Each group

felt that price analysis tended to interfere with production, their principal

mission. If the law was to be carried out in letter and in spirit, this

prejudice against pricing activities had to be overcome.

67

 OC CWS Off O 44, 8 Aug 42. 68

 OC CWS Organ Chart, 22 Feb 43. 69

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Joseph F. Escude, 25 Jun 46. Colonel Escude served with the Fiscal

Division throughout World War II. 70 Renegotiation was provided for in Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Act

as amended in October 1942 and again in Title VIII Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1943. The

1943 act modified the 1942 act in the following particulars: (1) The 1942 act vested administrative

authority in the Secretaries of the Departments, whereas the 1943 act set up an interdepartmental

War Contracts Price Adjustment Board. (2) The 1942 act did not provide for court action; the 1943

act made provision for determination by the Tax Court of the United States. (3) The 1942 act

covered renegotiation and repricing in the same statutory provision, while the 1943 act treated the

two separately and vested the repricing power in the Secretaries of Departments. (4) The 1942 act

provided for exemptions measured by sales volume under war contracts up to $100,000; the 1943

act set the figure at $500,000. (5) The 1942 act set the date of discontinuance of renegotiation as

three years after the war; the 1943 act set the date as 31 December 1945. (6) The 1943 act was more

specific as to exemptions from renegotiation procedures and methods of determining excess profits. 71

 WD Procurement Regulation 2, 26 Mar 43, sec V. 72

 See Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 273-79, for a discussion of wartime pricing policy. The chief objective behind the WD pricing program was to compel contractors to produce

efficiently if they wished to make a profit. To produce efficiently they would have to make effective

use of manpower, materials, and equipment. 73

 OC CWS Off O 31, 1 May 43.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 291

LT. COL. ROBERT M. ESTES

The first step which the Purchase

Policies Branch took was to secure

the co-operation and obtain the support of the procurement district staff.

A survey of the districts conducted

by the branch in the fall of 1943

revealed an almost total lack of interest and initiative with regard to

pricing functions.74 To rectify this

situation General Ditto, Assistant

Chief, CWS, for Materiel, wrote a

letter in December 1943 to the commanding officers of the districts in

which he emphasized that price

analysis was primarily a district

function.75 From then until the

close of the war the procurement

districts were more active in conducting pricing operations. The Purchase

Policies Branch, OC CWS, continued to act in a staff capacity on all

pricing matters.

The co-operation of the district officials was secured not alone by directive from the chiefs office, but also through demonstration of the

practical utility of pricing studies. One of the principal means of convincing contracting officers of the value of such studies was the dissemination of comparative price and cost data throughout all CWS procurement installations. From January 1944 on, the Purchase Policies Branch distributed copies of the price reports covering the most important (from the

standpoint of cost) chemical warfare items of procurement on a weekly

basis. Each installation was thus advised of every change in the unit price

or cost of important CW items. Price analysts in the districts compiled

the data on index cards for ready reference. Another method whereby increased interest in pricing was fostered was through conferences of all

CWS purchase policy personnel.

Opposition on the part of contractors was considerably mollified by

the threat of prolonged renegotiation of their contracts. For while a great

74

 Analysis of CWS Pricing Record in World War II, p. 18. This 100-page mimeographed report

was compiled by Purchase Policies Branch OC CWS in 1945. MS in Hist Off. 75

 Ltr, AC CWS for Mad to CO CCWPD, et al., 3 Dec 43, sub: Relationship of Price Analysis to

Procurement. CWS 400.12.
292 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

many contractors disliked the inconvenience caused by price and cost

analysis, they thoroughly detested renegotiation, which they conceived of

as both un-American and unconstitutional.76 During 1943 a number of

businessmen testified in Congressional hearings before four separate committees that in their opinion government contracting officers should have

sufficient information to draw up contracts which guaranteed that no excess profits would be made and thus do away with the need for renegotiation. After this testimony, the President ruled that by June 1944 the need

for renegotiation of contracts should have been eliminated. The War Department thereupon put considerable pressure on the technical services to

improve their knowledge and handling of all aspects of purchase policies.

The June 1944 deadline was not met and renegotiation activities were still

being carried on when the war ended. This deadline, however, plus the

continued uncertainty over whether Congress would continue renegotiation

legislation, acted as incentives to sound pricing policies in the CWS.77

In the spring of 1944 the Purchase Policies Branch brought about a

significant improvement in price analysis techniques by adding to its staff

a qualified industrial engineer and an accountant experienced in production

cost procedures. The branch required the services of the engineer to evaluate different drawings and specifications and to act in an advisory capacity

to the accountant and other pricing personnel.78 In July 1945 the Chief,

Industrial Division, OC CWS, recommended that the services of industrial engineers be utilized also in pricing operations in the districts, but

the war came to an end before this suggestion was acted on.79

The fact that very few chemical warfare items were manufactured in

peacetime made it generally impossible to establish equitable prices at the

start of the war. In the emergency and early wartime period, the CWS

wrote contracts for most items without too much regard to price. Assistant

Secretary Patterson himself urged the chiefs of the technical services not

to be too concerned about prices, but rather to see that the supplies for

the troops were delivered on time. Excess profits, he said, could be recaptured through legislation.80

76

 (1) Analysis of CWS Pricing Record, p. 11. (2) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization,

p. 354. 77

 Remarks of Lt Col R. M. Estes, Report of CWS Procurement Conference held at Pittsburgh,

Pa., 8 Jan 45. CWS 314.7 Procurement File. 78

 Analysis of CWS Pricing Record, p. 21. 79

 Ltr, C Ind Div OC CWS to CO NYCWPD, 5 Jul 45, sub: Industrial Engineer to Assist in

Price Analysis. CWS 213 NYCWPD (1945). 80

 Interv, Hist Off with Maj Gen W. N. Porter (Ret), 14 Sep 51.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 293

The only major item on which the CWS had cost and price data was

the gas mask because that was the one item which continued to be

manufactured in considerable quantity after World War I. Experience

gained under the educational order contracts was especially productive of

valuable data on the cost of the mask. The Purchase Policies Branch had

little trouble, therefore, compiling charts depicting the discrepancies in

prices charged by the various contracts. By simply calling the attention of

the contractors to these charts it was sometimes possible to secure a reduction in prices. The price level of the gas mask declined over 9 percent

between January 1942 and June 1945.81

Contractors on other CW items, lacking as they were in experience,

often quoted prices which were later considered exorbitant. It was almost

inevitable that the initial cost of production would be high, because the

manufacturer first had to learn how to produce the item. After he mastered that, he learned how to make it more economically. In most instances the manufacturers gave the government the benefit of their ability

to produce at lower cost by voluntarily reducing their prices. Those who

co-operated with the government received preferential treatment under the

Renegotiation Act.82 Those who did not were thoroughly checked not

only by the War Department but by the General Accounting Office. As

of February 1945 the CWS was investigating some twenty companies

whose profits exceeded 15 percent or whose profits in renegotiation had

been cut by 25 percent.83

Pricing operations, as noted, were always simplified when a number of

contractors worked on the same item. As in the case of the mask, it was

possible to make comparisons between the prices charged by the various

manufacturers and on that basis to attempt price adjustments. Practically

all items manufactured by the CWS followed the competitive pattern.

Although originally a single manufacturer might have been awarded a

contract, eventually several competing firms were also given contracts and

the prices of all were subject to study. In the case of the portable flame

81

 Analysis of CWS Pricing Record, p. 39. 82

 Testimony of George H. Knutson, member of the War Department Price Adjustment Board, in Hearings before Special Committee Investigating National Defense Program, Part 34, pp. 17988-

18008 (Washington, 1946). The War Department Price Adjustment Board became a staff division

of ASF in the fall of 1943. 83

 Remarks of Lt Col R. M. Estes, Report of CWS Procurement Conference held at Dallas, Texas,

14-15 Feb 45. CWS 337 Dallas PD 1945. The CWS was carrying on its investigation under an ASF

program known as "Company Pricing," initiated under ASF Cir 207, 1944. See Smith, The Army

and Economic Mobilization, 339-50, for details on this program.
294 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

thrower, for example, the Kincaid Manufacturing Co. of New York City

early in 1941 was assigned the job of developing a flame thrower. By the

time this contract was completed the E. C. Brown Co. of Rochester, N.Y.,

was called on to manufacture the item. Later two other companies, the

Beattie Manufacturing Co. of Little Falls, N.J., and R. F. Sedgley, Inc.,

of Philadelphia were also awarded similar contracts. A comparison of the

prices charged by these contractors enabled the CWS to effect reductions.

These price reductions amounted to over 27 percent for the period of the

war.84

While most CW items were manufactured by a number of contractors, there were occasional exceptions. For example, the barrel of the M1A1

and the later M2 chemical mortar was made exclusively by the Bell

Machine Co. of Oshkosh, Wis., which also assembled the mortar. It was

not possible, therefore, for the CWS Purchase Policies staff to make comparative studies of prices and costs of this item. On its own initiative the

Bell Machine Co. reduced prices and made large refunds to the government in the period 1942-45. Acknowledging that the attitude of the contractor was commendable, the chief of the Purchase Policies Branch felt

that completely accurate cost data could not be obtained unless the company installed an adequate cost accounting system. The company readily

accepted this suggestion and it further agreed to co-operate with CWS

engineers and accountants who went to its plant in the spring of 1945 to

conduct an extensive study of costs. As a result of the CWS study, the

Bell Machine Co. voluntarily reduced its prices once more, from $724.30

to $575.00 per unit on one contract and from $649.30 to $575.00 per unit

on another.85

CWS experience with pricing chemicals dated from the emergency

period, when, as has been indicated, unprecedented demands arose for certain components of the incendiary bomb, including thermite. Thermite

was manufactured in relatively small quantities in peacetime, and it sold

on the open market for twenty-eight cents a pound. In the fall of 1941

the commanding officer of the New York Procurement District conducted

an investigation into the price at which the chemical could be manufactured profitably on a large scale. With the assistance of a chemical broker

and two officers with accounting background, he learned that something

84

 Analysis of CWS Pricing Record, pp. 89-92. See ch. XV below for details on the procurement

of flame throwers and other weapons. 85

 Ltr, Pres Bell Machine Co to C CWS, 26 May 45. Reproduced in Analysis of CWS Pricing

Activities, pp. 55-58.
MORE AND MORE OF EVERYTHING 295

in the neighborhood of eight cents a pound would be a reasonable price.

He then made arrangements with certain ceramic manufacturers, whose

plants were idle because of WPB restrictions, to produce the thermite at

eight cents a pound or less.86 This was the start of a campaign carried on

throughout the war period to secure chemicals at a reasonable price to the

government, a campaign that between January 1942 and May 1945 led to

a reduction of 20 percent in the price of chemicals.87 This figure compared favorably to the overall price reduction of 22 percent for all CW

items and components from 1 January 1942 through 15 August 1945.88

The activity of the Chemical Commodity Division in effecting a reduction in prices is well illustrated in the case of napalm.89

 By the spring of

1944 seven contractors throughout the United States were producing this

material at prices which varied as much as ten cents a pound. Upon investigation the Chemical Commodity Division discovered that the low cost

producers were invariably those who had installed up-to-date labor saving

equipment. The division representatives thereupon made arrangements to

have such equipment adopted by other manufacturers. This action resulted

in a general leveling off in the prices of the various manufacturers.90

Some of the problems the service and its contractors faced were common to all military procurement. These included the shortage of raw

materials and machine tools, frequent changes in production schedules,

and difficulty in obtaining and training competent workers for arsenal and

depot operations. But the CWS generally found these problems more complicated because of the low priority which the War Department placed on

chemical warfare items and because the CWS lacked experience in the

manufacture of every item except the gas mask.

In carrying out its vast and varied procurement program in the early

war years, the CWS made notable advances, particularly in compiling upto-date bills of material and in inaugurating an improved system of inspection and a sound pricing program. Impressive as this record was there

was still considerable room for improvement. But before improvement

could be made, a drastic change had to be brought about in Army think86

 Interv, Hist Off with Col S. N. Cummings, 14 Sep 51. 87

 WD Monthly Progress Report, Section 1D, 3 May 45. 88

 Analysis of CWS Pricing Record, Introduction. 89

 For details on procurement of napalm see ch. XVI below. 90

 (1) History of Chemical Commodity Procurement, 1 Aug 44-13 Nov 45, p. 67. (2) Interv,

Hist Off 10 Jun 58 with following former members of the Chemical Commodity Div: Walter C.

Gibbons, Jerome F. McGinty, Robert J. Milano, and Benjamin M. Redmerski.
296 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ing with regard to supply. A basic defect was the tendency to treat the

main facets of supply—procurement and distribution—as separate entities.

During the second half of World War II the Army initiated a program

aimed at correcting the situation, a program whose main objective was the

balancing of procurement and distribution.
CHAPTER XIII

Balancing Procurement and

Distribution

Developments of the Early War Years

During the early part of the war when the Army was placing great

emphasis on mobilizing men and matériel, CWS officers engaged in operations had little opportunity to concentrate on administrative improvements. Many of them both in the Washington headquarters and in the

installations were working fourteen or more hours a day, with certain

headquarters divisions running two shifts of civilian clerks. Some officers

set up cots in their offices and seldom went home. Since most supervisory

energies were absorbed in mobilization operations, the development of upto-date administrative procedures lagged far behind. To more rapidly bring

about greater efficiency, General Somervell, the commanding general of the

ASF, directed the various elements of his command to set up units, known

as control divisions or branches, whose chief function was to conduct surveys and studies aimed at administrative betterment.

The principal managerial deficiency throughout the supply system was

a lack of co-ordination between the demonstrated needs of the troops in

the field and the capacities of the procurement and distribution systems.

To provide the necessary co-ordination, officials would have to root out

inefficiency and waste, those inevitable products of mobilization haste.

They could achieve this objective only by acquiring and analyzing comprehensive and accurate information on field requirements and on the actual

operation of the supply system. At the beginning of the war planners did

not have the experience to determine even what kind of information they

needed. As they gained that experience, the principal problem was to

evolve reporting and co-ordinating procedures which would make it useful.
298 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Control Division of the chief's office and similar units within the

installations attacked this problem and did much to establish more business-like procedures throughout the CWS. Co-operating closely with the

Control Division, OC CWS, was the competent staff of the Industrial

Service (in July 1942 it was renamed the Industrial Division).

One of the Office of the Chief's earliest administrative studies was

aimed at eliminating excessive paper work throughout the CWS. In the

summer of 1942 the Administration and Management Branch, Control

Division, in conjunction with the Executive Office, Industrial Division,

made a survey of the forms and records maintained in the Washington

headquarters and at the installations. They found that the installations had

independently developed their own forms, 90 percent of which could have

been eliminated without loss of efficiency, and that there was a staggering duplication of records between the chiefs office and the installations.1

Yet, despite all the record keeping, or probably because of it, no one in

the CWS could tell just what was in the supply system. What was needed

was an improved method of statistical control.

This need became all the more urgent after the ASF began to compile monthly progress reports on procurement and supply. In gathering

information for these reports, Headquarters, ASF, requested accurate data

from the various technical services on the quantity of items: (1) to be

produced; (2) actually produced; (3) on hand at points of procurement;

(4) en route to depots; (5) received at depots; (6) in storage at depots;

and (7) issued by depots. In the fall of 1942 the Chief, CWS, charged

the Control Division with developing an accurate system of statistical reporting. He assigned responsibility for carrying out the work to a financial

statistician commissioned from civilian life, Maj. Philip J. FitzGerald of

the Statistics and Progress Branch of Control Division.

FitzGerald first undertook to draw up an accurate definition of a procured item. The CWS installations and contractors were employing a

variety of criteria for determining when an item was actually procured.

For example, certain munitions were said to have been procured before

they had been proof tested—and it sometimes took weeks for them to be

tested—while others were not considered procured until after they had

been proof tested. In most instances end items were considered procured

only after all components had been assembled. But some items were defined as procured even though all components had not been assembled

into the end product. FitzGerald, upon investigation, determined that the

1

 OC CWS, Activities of Control Division for Period 15 Nov 42 to 31 Dec 43, p. 12a.
BALANCING PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 299

OFFICER PERSONNEL OF THE CONTROL DIVISION. From left: 1st Lt. Selig J.

Levitan, Maj. Philip J. FitzGerald, Lt. Col. Llewellyn G. Ludwig, Colonel Kuhn, Lt.

Col. Jacob K. Javits, Maj. Edward Mery, Capt. Lyman C. Duncan, and 1st Lt. James

J. Troy.

only sound criterion for describing an article as procured was the delivery

of the "tally-in" by the Inspection Division to the Finance Office. This

unique document not only described the article as combat worthy, but

also established the CWS's financial responsibility for the item. The Statistics and Progress Branch pointed out to the Industrial and Inspection

Divisions, OC CWS, the desirability of reporting all procurement from

CWS installations on the sole basis of tally-ins and by early 1943 this

was accepted practice. From then on the CWS could accurately compare

production forecast with production accomplished.2

By the summer of 1943 the Supply Division, OC CWS, was receiving

copies of War Department Shipping Documents which accompanied all

shipments of materials. On the basis of these documents the CWS for the

first time compiled accurate statistics on matériel shipped to the ports of

embarkation and other points in the zone of interior. With these figures,

together with those on procurement, the CWS could calculate the amount

of matériel in transit, the amount received in depots, and the amount

shipped directly to the various units. 2

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Philip J. FitzGerald, 10 Oct 56 and Ltr, FitzGerald to Hist Off, 8

Feb 57.
300 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

In mid-1943 General Porter set up a "Situation Room" in his headquarters where a representative of the Control Division, usually Major

FitzGerald, briefed the chief and his staff on the data to appear in the

monthly progress report. This procedure led the chief's office to a greater

awareness of the procurement and supply problems of the CWS and to

closer co-operation by those responsible for supervising procurement and

those responsible for supervising the storage and issue of matériel.3

The surveys which the Control Division, OC CWS, conducted throughout 1942 and 1943 indicated an excessive degree of centralization in the

Washington headquarters. This centralization was due in part to lack of

standardized procedures and organizations throughout the CWS installations. By the summer of 1943 the latter condition had been largely corrected,4

 and it then became possible to decentralize many activities to the

installations. The Central Planning Section, Industrial Division, OC CWS,

headed by Lt. Col. Stanton D. Sanson, took the lead in the project. In

the summer and fall of 1943 this section, in co-operation with the Control Division, OC CWS, and the commanding officers of the installations,

drew up a decentralization plan which they labeled the 1944 Procurement

Plan.

Under the new plan the Industrial Division, OC CWS, assumed the

role of a staff rather than an operating agency. It prepared procurement

schedules of end items for the installations, based on the Army Supply

Program. In preparing these schedules the division consulted frequently

with installation officials. Three weeks after the schedules were drawn up,

a meeting of representatives of the chief's office, the arsenals, and the districts was held in Washington for the purpose of arranging the manufacture and delivery of components which the installations could not procure

within their own confines.

Under the 1944 Procurement Plan the chiefs office was no longer responsible for furnishing each installation with needed components; instead

the districts and the arsenals dealt directly with one another, and the installation with whom the order had been placed was held responsible for

delivery. Each installation was to procure its own components whenever

possible. Each installation, moreover, was urged to write contracts for end

items only, leaving the procurement of components to the prime contractor.5

3

 Activities of the Control Division 15 Nov 42-31 Dec 42, p. 21. 4

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. VI. 5

 Chemical Warfare Service Procurement Plan for 1944 Procurement, 12 Aug 43. CWS 314.7

Procurement File.
BALANCING PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 301

The new plan was received enthusiastically by key officers in most installations. Typical of reactions to it were the remarks of the officer in charge of

arsenal operations at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Col. H. M. Black:

The added responsibilities given to the Arsenals and Procurement Districts, in that

they alone are responsible for controlling and maintaining adequate stock positions of

all direct materials required for the production of CWS end-items, had tended to bring

the Arsenals and Procurement Districts closer together for better co-operation. Services

and requests for services are exchanged much more freely. At no time previously has

the general stock position at this Arsenal on all raw materials been in such favorable

condition, and this Arsenal feels that with the privileges allowed in the plan, this condition can be perpetuated.6

While the Industrial Division was devising improved procurement procedures, the Supply Division, OC CWS, was developing a better system

of distribution. In the early war period the Supply Division had issued

matériel on the basis of notices of availability from production sources,

routing the matériel to the storage facility nearest the manufacturer. While

this practice made for a certain degree of convenience, the matériel later

often had to be reshipped. Supply Division would frequently discover that

depot A, to which the item had been sent, had a surplus of the item while

depot B, more distant from the original point of procurement, had a deficit; the resulting reshipment, or "back hauling," from depot A to depot B

was considerably more costly of scarce transportation and handling services than original shipment to the more distant depot would have been.

After the Industrial Division, in mid-1943, came up with more accurate

production forecasts, the Supply Division began planning distribution of

newly procured items on the basis of those forecasts rather than on notices

of availability. The result was a great decrease in the number of back hauls.

A second innovation that led to a decline in the number of back hauls

was the practice of correlating the stock levels of the depots with the troop

basis of the particular theater that the depot served.7

Another malpractice that plagued the CWS distribution system in the

early war period was cross hauling. A cross haul took place when a load

of a specific item passed another load going in the opposite direction. A

flagrant instance of cross hauling in the spring of 1944 led the Supply

Division to take vigorous steps to eliminate the practice. Huntsville Arsenal had requested some 4.2-inch shells filled with HE for demonstration

6

 Ltr, CO PBA to C CWS Attn: C Ind Div, 10 Mar 44, sub: Comments on Effectiveness of 1944

Procurement Plan. CWS 400.12. 7

 Interv, Hist Off with William Harris, II, 29 Aug 57. Harris was a key officer in Supply Division, OC CWS, from May 43 until after close of World War II.
302 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE INDUSTRIAL DIVISION. Prom left: Lt. Joel O. Henry,

Maj. Henry G. Baker, Jr., Lt. Col. Robert T. Norman, Col. Clarence W. Crowell, General

English, Col. Lester W. Hurd, Lt. Col. Louis W. Munchmeyer, Maj. Stanton D.

Sanson, Lt. Edgar St. Clair.

purposes. Upon receiving the request the Supply Division, OC CWS, telephoned Deseret Depot headquarters in Utah to ship the shells by fast

freight. That installation thereupon arranged for attaching a freight car

containing the shells to a passenger train heading toward Huntsville. About

the time this train was leaving Deseret a freight train loaded with the

same type shell was leaving Parsons, Kans., where the Ordnance Department rilled chemical shells with HE, for Deseret. At an intermediate point,

the west bound train was sidetracked to allow the east bound train to

pass. From then until the end of the war the Supply Division waged an

intensive campaign not only to eliminate cross hauls but also to encourage more frequent shipments of cargo direct from manufacturer to user.8

Advent of the Supply Control Program

Efforts to improve procurement and distribution procedures were not

confined to the CWS, but were characteristic of other elements of the Army

8

 (1) Ibid. (2) Rpt of CWS, 1945, pp. 77-78.
BALANCING PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 303

as well. In the ASF these efforts were closely related to a program to conserve manpower and matériel that got under way in late 1942 and continued throughout the war period. By the end of 1943 procurement of

initial equipment for the Army had been carried out and many categories

of munitions were in good supply. The year 1944 was to see a conceited

attempt by the ASF to balance procurement and distribution.9

In the early summer of 1943 the newly created government "super

agency," the Office of War Mobilization, requested each of the agencies

engaged in government procurement to set up a board of review to study

and make recommendations on improving methods of establishing requirements and of procurement practices generally. In response to this request,

the War Department appointed a board, headed by Maj. Gen. Frank S.

McCoy, USA, Ret. On 31 August 1943 the McCoy board submitted its

report, including recommendations for more adequate screening of requirements and increased attention to inventory control. Several days later the

War Department appointed another board, headed by Brig. Gen. George J.

Richards, to resurvey the following five specific areas of requirements determination: (1) the strategic reserve; (2) theater reserves; (3) stockpiles

in the United States; (4) day of supply; and (5) maintenance, distribution, and shipping loss factors. The Richards board came up with fiftyseven specific recommendations which were incorporated into a general

implementing directive issued by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen.

Joseph T. McNarney, on 1 January 1944.10

After issuance of this document generally referred to as the McNarney

directive, the ASF set up a system aimed at closer co-ordination of the

various phases of procurement and distribution. Known as the Supply Control System, it was formally announced in ASF Circular 67, 7 March 1944.

Its aims were summarized as follows by the Requirements and Stock Control Division, ASF, at the time the system was being put into operation:

The Supply Control System adjusts production to demands by requiring realistic

estimates of equipment and weapons needed for:

Supplying troops newly activated.

Replacing losses due to wear and combat.

Providing special equipment for unusual operations.

Maintaining a proper level of supply in each overseas theater so that abnormal

usage for short periods and interruptions in shipping will not endanger operations.

These levels will average about 100 days of expected usage depending on theater location.

9

 (1) Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), p 632. (2) Millett, The Organization

and Role of the Army Service Forces, pp. 373-84. 10

 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, ch. VII.
304 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Maintaining a proper level of supply in U.S. depots so that fluctuating demands

and production difficulties will not result in short supply. The maximum level of 90

days is decreased if production and issue experience justify less.

Building up a Strategic Reserve for emergency use. Estimates are checked against

all pertinent factors including issue experience. From these needs stocks available in

depots and returns of matériel from deactivated units, inactive theaters, and other

sources are deducted. Production is then scheduled to meet but not exceed the balance

of needs by months and quarters for a two year period.

The system further permits immediate quantitative identification of any stocks available for redistribution or disposal as surplus.11

The Supply Control System provided for two general categories of

items, principal items and secondary items. For principal items a form was

devised which summarized on a single page all important supply and demand information on a monthly basis for the three months preceding and

the three months following the date of estimate, and for two quarterly

periods and two semiannual periods thereafter. For secondary items a short

form was devised. General instructions on the Supply Control System were

published in an ASF Manual which went through several revisions.12 In

Headquarters, ASF, the Requirements Division was merged with the Stock

Control Division, with the new organization to supervise the administration of the control system throughout the technical services.

In conformity with the provisions of ASF Circular 67, the Chief, CWS,

established a Materiel Planning Branch in April 1944 to compute requirements under the Supply Control System. There was a difference of opinion

between the two Assistant Chiefs, CWS, over who should control the

work of this branch. General Waitt, Assistant Chief for Field Operations,

believed he should have the responsibility because he felt that the determination of requirements should be entirely divorced from procurement

and supply activities.13 General Ditto, Assistant Chief for Materiel, maintained on the other hand, that the requirements function could not be

separated from procurement and supply activities and that he should therefore have jurisdiction over the new branch.14

 General Porter intervened

with a compromise solution by directing that the Chief of the Materiel

11

 Memo, Reqmts and Stock Control Div, ASF, sub: The Supply Control System. Reqmts and

Stock Control Div ASF File. 12

 ASF Manual M-413, editions of 20 Jul 44, 22 Dec 44, and 10 Apr 45. 13

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen A. H. Waitt for Maj Gen Porter, 24 Feb 44, sub: Record Keeping

and Use of Figures in Control of Operations—Responsibilities of Field Operations Command. (2)

Memo, Brig Gen A. H. Waitt for Maj Gen Porter, sub: Army Supply Program. This memo was

written to supplement the 24 Feb 44 memo. Both in CWS 314.7 Requirements File. 14

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Lyman C. Duncan, 23 Jun 55. Duncan was chief of the Materiel

Planning Branch (later Division) during World War II.
305

Planning Branch, Lt. Col. Lyman C. Duncan, report to the Assistant Chief

for Materiel, but that the Assistant Chief for Field Operations should supervise those activities of the branch for which he had final responsibility.15

General Porter apparently saw the need in this instance for a further application of the type of co-operative effort that had begun to develop in

the Situation Room meetings. This is indicated by his action in appointing a Requirements Planning Committee, made up of representatives from

the offices of the two assistant chiefs, to consider the supply and demand

status of all CWS items.16

Shortly after the Supply Control System was inaugurated, the War Department revised its troop basis to include about 13,000 organizations. The

Materiel Planning Branch computed requirements for these units on a

Table of Allowances basis.17 It used a key punch multiplier to obtain the

gross requirement of chemical warfare items by multiplying the number

of units, organizations, and individuals on the current troop basis by the

stated number of items listed for the unit, organization, or individual on

the Tables of Allowances.

The gross requirement was the keystone on which estimates were based

under the Supply Control System. It was modified for each item in accordance with one or more of the following factors: stock on hand, estimated special requirements, current issue experience, amount in the pipeline needed to maintain an even flow of supplies, production lead time,

impending standardization of a substitute item, abnormal replacement rates

of principal components, and required special handling or storage.

At no time during the war did the determination of requirements develop into an exact science. There was the ever present risk of sudden

and unforeseen demands upon the supply system and only the rash and

unorthodox supply officer would postulate that there would be no military reversals, no sudden changes in tactics or strategy, no initiation of

gas warfare. Gentlemen of what might be called the "old school" of supply planners tended to favor the maximum production and issue of every

item needed. War, they felt, was by its very nature wasteful and the fortunes of war should not be jeopardized by possible shortages of any kind.

The "Supply Control" school of planners, on the other hand, stressed the

15

 OC CWS Off O 7, 5 Apr 44. 16

 Ibid.

17

 Tables of Allowances were standardized extracts and condensations of individual tables of

organization and equipment. Each table of equipment was a compilation of all the standard items

of issue listed per unit or organization, or in some cases per person, within a particular arm or area.
306 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

need for considering the limits of the nation's natural resources and manpower, the relative importance of required munitions, and the intelligent

use of all available logistics information. Until the very end of the war

these two schools were represented in the CWS Requirements Planning

Committee, although the views of the "Supply Control" group, backed as

they were by the ASF, became ever more dominant.

The emphasis which the ASF placed on balancing procurement and

distribution under the Supply Control System led the CWS to keep a more

careful check on inventories. From April to June 1944 inspection teams

composed of representatives of the Inspection, Technical, and Field Requirements Divisions, OC CWS, visited the various CWS depots and CW

sections of Army depots to determine by actual count what material was

available in the zone of interior for shipment overseas. With the assistance of depot personnel,18

 these teams inspected all items in the depots,

and classified them as active, inactive, obsolete, surplus, or unserviceable.

They found that 40 percent of the items were in categories other than active. On the basis of the teams' findings the chiefs office compiled a 10-

volume report listing the items throughout all the depots.19 With this

report as a guide, the CWS undertook a general house cleaning in its depots

and sections to discard or declare surplus all useless items. Perhaps no

single development during the war did so much to improve the quality

of items stored and issued by the CWS.

Procurement and Distribution of Spare Parts

During the first year of war the CWS concentrated on the procurement of end items and paid little attention to the procurement of spare

parts. The procedure for procuring parts was simply to divert a portion

of components to the Indianapolis Depot or in certain instances to the

Edgewood Depot or to one of the chemical sections of the War Department depots.20

 The quantity of matériel being set aside as spare parts proved

entirely inadequate so that by the spring of 1943 the Office of the Chief,

18

 Memo, C Insp Div, OC CWS, for C Sup Div, OC CWS, 18 May 44, sub: Reinspection of

Materiel in CWS and ASF Depots. CWS 314.7 Inspection File. 19

 Reinspection of all CW Materiel in Depots Within Continental United States Compiled by

Inspection Division, OC CWS, 31 May 44. CWS 314.7 Inspection File. 20

 In February 1942 the Chief, Supply Division, OC CWS, decided to have CW spare parts

stored at the Indianapolis Depot. Interv, Hist Off with Col Oscar Gullans, 6 Dec 54. Gullans commanded this depot in World War II. ASF did not officially designate the place as a spare parts

depot until 14 May 43, under ASF Memo S-50-3-43.
BALANCING PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 307

CWS, was issuing parts to ports of embarkation "on a hand-to-mouth

basis."

 21

 Reports on spare part shortages from the theaters of operation

were becoming alarming. In November 1943 CWS organizations in Italy

actually set up manufacturing lines to produce spare parts and a year later

CWS organizations in France did the same thing.22

By early 1943 the ASF had become seriously concerned over the spare

parts situation throughout all the technical services and was conducting

a number of studies aimed at a solution.23 It found that among the shortcomings in the CWS spare parts program, besides the delay in procurement, were lack of a complete system of stock numbering and identification,

confused nomenclature, and absence of a definite procedure for checking

estimates of actual usage in the field. The Chief, Control Division, OC

CWS, in commenting on the findings of the ASF, admitted that unfortunately many of the criticisms were true, but added that efforts were being

made to improve the situation.24

The first important step to improve the spare parts situation in the

CWS was the activation of a Spare Parts and Catalog Branch in the Field

Requirements Division in July 1943.25 This branch, headed by Maj. John L.

Eddy and located at Edgewood, prepared standard nomenclature and price

lists, compiled requirements of spare parts, and prepared the spare parts

catalogs for issuance to the field.26 The catalogs contained photographs

and sketches to permit easy identification in field use.

A further step toward the solution of the spare parts problem was taken

as the result of an ASF policy announced on 6 July 1943. This policy provided that spare parts were to be issued to provide maintenance for not

less than 12 months or more than 18 months and that such parts were

to be delivered "simultaneously with equipment deliveries."

 27

 To carry

out this directive the CWS made provisions in its Procurement Plan for

1944 to step up the production and distribution of spare parts. Under the

21

 Spare Parts for CWS Equipment (Report). ASF, G-4 Chemical Warfare Rpt 102, Apr 43. CG, ASF File. 22

 See Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat. 23

 Hist of Contl Div ASF 1942-1945, Appendix, Project 62. In OCMH. 24

 Ltr, C Contl Div, OC CWS, to Dir Opns Hq ASF, 11 Jun 43, sub: Spare Parts for Chem- ical Warfare Equipment. CWS 400, Army Supply Program, Apr-Jun 43. 25

 OC CWS Adm O 13, 3 Jul 43. 26

 Spare Parts for CWS Equipment. ASF, G-4 Spare Parts for CWS Equipment Rpt 144, Nov

43. CG, ASF File. This survey was conducted by Office of the Director of Stock Control, Mainteance Division, and Control Division, ASF. 27

 (1) ASF, Memo W 700-32-43, 6 Jul 43, referred to and quoted in ibid. (2) See also Hist

of Contl Div ASF 1942-1945, Appendix, Project 62.
308 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

plan, the Industrial Division, OC CWS, was to furnish the installations

promptly with lists of the spare parts to be procured by the contractors.

In some instances the parts were to accompany the end item to the point

of destination, in others they were to be shipped to the Indianapolis Depot.28

Another move to improve the spare parts situation came with the inauguration of the Supply Control System. In order to analyze the stock control

position of each of the 10,000 CW parts, it was necessary to scrutinize carefully their procurement and supply status.29

 To obtain the necessary data

on spare parts as well as on end items, the Materiel Planning Branch was

assigned the mission of collating the Stock Status reports and the monthly

procurement reports.30

In spite of the various measures taken to improve the situation the

procurement and distribution of spare parts was still unsatisfactory in the

fall of 1944. For one thing the provisions of the CWS Procurement Plan

for 1944 were not working out as successfully as had been anticipated.

The list of spare parts which the Industrial Division, OC CWS, was furnishing the procurement districts contained items which had lead times

varying from twenty days to six months and which had to be procured

from various contractors. The task facing the districts of procuring, storing, and shipping the parts was complicated by the Industrial Division

requirement for simultaneous shipping of all parts on any procurement

list. The Industrial Division eventually eliminated this particular problem

by drawing up shorter lists, each containing parts having approximately

the same lead time.31

In the fall of 1944 the Office of the Chief, CWS, reached the conclusion that the spare parts problem would not be fully solved until all the

various functions—requisition, initiation of procurement, and distribution—

were centralized at the Indianapolis Depot.32 In late 1944 and early 1945

28

 Chemical Warfare Service Procurement Plan for 1944 Procurement, 12 Aug 43. CWS 314.7

Procurement File. 29

 The dollar value of spare parts procurement in CWS between July 1940 and October 1945

amounted to over $78,000,000. See Memo, AC Supply and Dist Div to C Contl Div, OC CWS,

1 Feb 46, sub: Dollar Value of Spare Parts. CWS 314.7 Spare Parts File. 30

 Resume of Activities, OC CWS, for Week Ending 7 Oct 44. CWS 314.7 Supply Control File. (2) Memo, Dir Plans and Opns ASF for C CWS, 31 Oct 44, sub: Report of Status of

Spare Parts Supply Control and 1st Ind thereto. CWS 400 Oct thru Dec 1944. (3) OC CWS Off

O 5, 24 Feb 45. 31

 (1) Ltr, ExO Ind Div, OC CWS, to CO NYCWPD, 28 Aug 44, sub: Spare Parts Study.

CWS 400. (2) Ltr, Actg C Ind Div, OC CWS to NYCWPD, 10 Nov 44, Sub: Spare Parts Procurement, and 1st Ind. CWS 400. 32

 Memo, C Contl Div, OC CWS, for AC CWS for Field Operations, 19 Oct 44, sub: Spare

Parts. CWS 314.7 Spare Parts File. This memo was written by S. J. Levitan of the Control Division.
BALANCING PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 309

this centralization was carried out. All requisitions for spare parts were

sent directly to the Indianapolis Depot instead of, as formerly, to the various

CWS depots and sections. This innovation resulted in a saving in delivery

time of from 10 to 30 days on parts produced by the CWS and of from

15 to 40 days on parts bought under contract. Indianapolis Depot established direct contact with the procurement district offices on packaging

and shipping problems and in many instances dealt directly with the manufacturers of the parts in the districts.33

Improved Maintenance Practices

Greater emphasis on maintenance of matériel was a feature of the campaign to bring procurement and distribution into balance.34

 In the period

between the wars the quantity of chemical warfare supplies was extremely

limited and consequently maintenance was not much of a problem. Most

CW supplies were stored at the Edgewood Depot, which had access to

the shops at the arsenal to do required maintenance. In the field the CW

sections in division and company headquarters were responsible for first

and second echelon maintenance while repair shops near the posts or at

Ordnance Department depots carried on the higher echelon repairs.35 The

CW sections normally consisted of one officer and several enlisted men.

In the first two years of the war more than 75 percent of all maintenance activities were third, fourth, and fifth echelon.36

 Third and fourth

echelon work was accomplished at the principal shop located at Edgewood

Arsenal or at the other shops at Camp Sibert and Huntsville, Pine Bluff,

and Rocky Mountain Arsenals. Fifth echelon maintenance or complete rebuild was generally done by contracting with the manufacturer of the item.

In the case of the gas mask, the CWS awarded contracts to four industrial concerns who were not the original manufacturers.37

 Because facilities

were limited at the Chemical Warfare shops, it was also occasionally necessary to send equipment to commercial machine shops to expedite third

33

 Rpt of CWS, 1945, pp. 61-64. 34

 Maintenance was defined as "care taken and work done to keep any item of equipment in

good working condition" in TM 20-205, Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms, 18 Jan 44. 35

 First echelon maintenance was performed by the individual, while second echelon maintenance was carried out by an organization using tools provided in the T/O&E. 36

 Third echelon maintenance was performed by depot companies, and fourth echelon maintenance was accomplished in rear areas. Ltr, C Fld Serv, OC CWS, to CG AGF, et al., 15 Aug 42,

sub: Maintenance of CWS Materiel. CWS 470.72. As a result of an ASF directive of May 1943

two echelons were made out of the third, and the fourth echelon then became the fifth echelon. 37

 These contractors were: Hub Hosiery Mills of Boston; Cluett Peabody, Inc., of Troy, N.Y.;

Dryden Rubber Co. of Keokuk, Iowa; and Joyce, Inc., of Los Angeles.
310 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and fourth echelon rehabilitation.38 From 1942 until the close of the war

twenty chemical maintenance companies were trained for the ground and

service forces and fourteen companies were activated for the assistance of

the Air Forces. These companies helped with the maintenance task in the

United States, but by the late spring of 1944 all but one of the mainte- * 

nance companies then in existence were serving at overseas stations.39

Thus, with an increasing maintenance workload caused by increasing

stocks, the CWS was now beginning to meet serious maintenance problems. The existing shops were proving inadequate and the practice of

contracting fifth echelon maintenance to the original manufacturer was proving to have drawbacks. One drawback was that certain items of equipment,

such as the power driven decontaminating apparatus, came in several

models and each manufacturer usually could repair his own model only.

Another drawback to contracting was that a number of manufacturers estimated the cost of repair on the basis of a complete rebuild job which

made CWS maintenance costs unduly high. Securing officers with the necessary technical knowledge to supervise maintenance operations was another

difficulty.

These problems had arisen earlier in other technical services, and the

Maintenance Division, ASF, had initiated two far-reaching programs in

the search for solutions. One of these was the reclamation program which

was defined as "the process of restoring to usefulness condemned, discarded,

abandoned, or damaged property or components thereof by repair, refabrication, or renovation."

 40

 By the summer of 1943 this program was being

emphasized in the CWS, with good results. For example, a number of

WP shells had failed in proof firing and it had been found that there was

an excessive quantity of water in each shell. To overcome this condition

the workers tapped the shells at the nose by drilling a small hole and

draining off the excess water. They then drove a tapered pin into the shell

to form a closure. After these reworked shells were reproofed, they functioned in a satisfactory manner. Again, some arsenals had a practice of

burying their worn out reactor coils. But Huntsville Arsenal developed a

method of reclaiming these coils by dipping them (after they had been

given some decontamination treatment) in refuse oil and then burning

them in a hot fire for several hours. The arsenal sold the burnt iron as

38

 Ltr, C CWS to CG ASF, Attn: Dir Maint Div, 29 Apr 43, sub: Improvements of Maintenance Practices and Procedures. CWS 400.4. 39

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. F. 40

 ASF Cir 140, 6 Dec 43.
BALANCING PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 311

scrap. The CWS extended this practice to its other arsenals.41 Another

ASF program aimed at improving maintenance practices was the establishment of centralized maintenance shops. These shops, first activated in the

fall of 1943, were under service command jurisdiction and repaired equipment of all the technical services.42

 The centralized shops were organized

along functional lines and included the following individual shops: automotive, armament and instrument, clothing and equipment, electrical

equipment, machine, and paint.43

The CWS, like other technical services, was entitled to the use of the

ASF combined shops, but at first hesitated to use them because the personnel was not familiar with chemical warfare equipment.44

 Officials felt

that trained CWS field representatives should be dispatched to the service

commands to offer assistance on CW items. Beginning in the spring of

1944 a number of officers, selected on the basis of initiative and sound

judgment, were sent out on this mission. Before departing, they were instructed to contact the directors of maintenance in the service commands

to assist them in selecting the shops best equipped to handle chemical

warfare items. They were directed to "inspect all large equipment such

as the power driven decontaminating apparatus; smoke generators; compressors; equipment (water heater) for the power driven decontaminating

apparatus; trailers; Chemical service trucks; cranes with swinging boom . . . ."

They were to render assistance to commanding officers of CW depots on

technical matters relating to the repair, maintenance, and storage of CW

items.45

The problem of fifth echelon maintenance was solved by setting up a

fifth echelon maintenance shop at Rocky Mountain Arsenal. This shop

was established in November 1944, but it was several months before it

got into operation. In the spring of 1945, as redeployment planning for

Pacific operations got under way, it appeared that the capacity of the

Rocky Mountain shop would be inadequate for repairing matériel needed

41

 Memo, C Contl Div, OC CWS, for CG ASF, Attn: Dir Maint Div, 21 Jul 43, sub: Distribution of Reclamation Information. CWS 400, July 1943. 42

 WD Memo 210-25-43, 7 Sep 43. 43

 Memo, Dir of Opns ASF for QMG, 31 Jul 43, sub: Combined Shops at Posts, Camps, and

Stations. CWS 314.7 Maintenance File. 44

 WD Cir 7, 5 Jan 44, outlined the general procedure for using the shops. This circular was

later amended by WD Cir 90, 29 Feb 44. 45

 Instructions to Maintenance Branch Inspectors, 9 Jun 44. These typed instructions are reproduced as Appendix N in Bernard Baum, Leo P. Brophy, Sylvester J. Hemleben, Chemical Warfare Supply Program, pt. 4, Storage and Maintenance, vol. IV, in the series History of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (1 July 1940-15 August 1945).
312 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

in the Pacific and another fifth echelon shop was opened at Huntsville

Arsenal.46

The return of overseas matériel necessitated the formulation of a plan

for receiving, classifying, and repairing various CW items. In conformity

with a directive from the Distribution Division, ASF, the Chief, Supply

Division, OC CWS, drew up such a plan in the spring of 1945. This plan

divided CW matériel into six categories and established receiving ports

and classification facilities for each category. To illustrate, flame throwers,

classified as Class B items under the plan, were to be received at the east

and west coast ports and at New Orleans, and were to be sent to Rocky

Mountain Arsenal for repair.47

The problem of securing officers to supervise maintenance work was

met by initiating a two-week training course at Camp Sibert. This course

was first given from 28 May to 10 June 1944 and was repeated on two

occasions in the summer and fall of 1944. An officer with extensive experience in training maintenance companies was selected as instructor. The

course covered both theory and practice in maintenance of specific chemical warfare items, such as pumps for decontaminating apparatus made by

different manufacturers, M1 A1 and M2-2 flame throwers, and the truck,

crane, swinging boom, Ml.48

In addition to the problems of spare parts and maintenance which the

CWS faced in its efforts to balance procurement and distribution, there

were problems of property disposal and contract termination.49

 No sooner

had the CWS procured its initial equipment than problems of property

disposal began to arise. By early 1944 delay in disposing of inventory and

industrial property was leading to delay in contract terminations throughout all the technical services.50

46

 Memo, C Ind Div, OC CWS, for CO HA, 15 Jun 45, sub: Fifth Echelon Maintenance Shop.

CWS 319.1. 47

 Ltr, C Sup Div, OC CWS, to CG ASF, Attn: Distribution Div, 15 May 45, sub: Return of

CWS Materiel from Overseas. CWS 400 May-Jun 1945. 48

 Baum, Brophy, and Hemleben, Chemical Warfare Service Supply Program, Storage and

Maintenance, p. 778 and app. L. 49

 Property disposal and contract termination were also closely related to demobilization planning and will be discussed in that connection. See ch. XVII below. 50

 (1) Minutes of Meeting Staff Conference ASF, 22 Feb 44, p. 3.. ASF Hist Files, National

Archives. (2) Under Secretary of War Patterson later remarked: "Prompt and equitable settlement

of terminated contracts aids production by removing impediments to the maximum utilization of

production facilities, thereby enabling contractors to meet new demands for war production promptly

and otherwise expedite the carrying on of war work." See Memo, USW for CG AAF and CG ASF,

12 Jan 45, sub: Relation of Production to Readjustment Activities. CWS 400.12.
BALANCING PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 313

By the end of 1943, when the Army had completed its initial distribution of matériel, the CWS had finished the bulk of its new construction

and had gained valuable experience in procurement, inspection, and distribution operations. The second half of the war witnessed greater stress

on improvement of the supply system through adoption of more refined

administrative procedures and through programs aimed at better maintenance practices and better control of spare parts. Problems of maintenance,

spare parts, contract termination, and property disposal constituted potential bottlenecks to production.
CHAPTER XIV

Procurement of Defensive Matériel

In addition to large quantities of service equipment, toxic agents, and

raw chemicals the CWS in World War II procured a variety of defensive

and offensive munitions. Included among the defensive items were the gas

masks, impregnite, impregnating plants, protective ointment, detector kits,

decontaminating apparatus and such miscellaneous items as shoe impregnite and dust respirators.

Gas Mask Procurement

During the years between the wars the Army manufactured gas masks

for troops in its own production facility at Edgewood Arsenal. It was on

this production line that the Chemical Warfare Service developed the basic

tools and techniques for mass production of the service mask. But CWS

planners were aware that in time of war a fully mobilized citizen army

could not possibly be equipped with gas masks from a single small production line. From the early 1930's onward they assumed it would be

necessary to bring private industrial firms into the gas mask program on a

large scale as soon as mobilization became likely. Between 1934 and 1941

the War Plans Division at Edgewood Arsenal completed arrangements for

private production facilities capable of turning out 900,000 masks a month.

As already noted, the first assembly plant established in an industrial facility was set up by means of an educational order.1

 Completed just as

the armed forces were beginning to expand to war strength, the educational orders for gas masks were promptly replaced by full-scale produc1

 See ch. XII above.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 315

tion contracts which were to yield more than thirty million industryproduced gas masks before the end of World War II. By the end of 1940,

mass production of gas masks was well under way.

Mass production of the gas mask gave rise to a number of problems.2

The mask and its major components were specialized military items unfamiliar to private industry; moreover, as equipment which might mean

the difference between life and death to the individual soldier, the Army

required a high standard of precision in its manufacture. The first need

of the contractors was for skilled and experienced workmen. There was

but one place, Edgewood Arsenal, from which to draw them; accordingly

men and women from Edgewood's gas mask plant joined the assembly

lines at the factories as instructors and inspectors. In some cases they remained to form the nucleus of permanent inspection teams.

Without the assistance of the experienced employees from the gas mask

plant at Edgewood Arsenal, the contractors would not have been able to

operate, for as just indicated, nowhere in industry were there workers with

the necessary skills. After picked employees of the contractor had learned

to perform their tasks, they in turn became instructors to other selected

employees.

The training of skilled and semiskilled workers was only one of the

perplexing matters that the gas mask contractors faced. Like many other

wartime procurement difficulties, this problem was not confined to a particular item or a particular contractor. Another problem was the impact

on manufacturing operations resulting from changes in production schedules. The fact that such changes were inherent in the system of wartime

supply did not lessen the impact. A change in a gas mask schedule made

it necessary for the contractor to cut back the number of workers on the

assembly line. These workers were often employed elsewhere in the plant,

and under company policies they were usually not obliged to return to

their former jobs. If a demand arose for increased production of gas masks,

the contractors had to train new workers. The situation became particularly complicated when a contractor had several contracts on the mask running simultaneously.

Both the CWS and the contractors assembling gas masks had trouble

procuring components. Under the educational order program the CWS had

2

 Discussion of these problems is based on: (1) Histories of the CWS procurement districts in

World War II; (2) History of the Johnson and Johnson Gas Mask Factory; (3) Interv, Hist Off

on 12 Nov 57 with the following World War II gas mask supervisory employees of the Goodyear

Tire and Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio: H. E. Morse, C. S. Davis, Wayne White, and E. Wendt.
316 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

procured components from relatively few contractors, but once full-scale

production got under way the service had to add many additional sources

for such noncommercial items as faceblanks, valve parts, canister parts,

treated charcoal (whetlerite), and eyerings. In many instances the components furnished did not prove satisfactory and the CWS had to station

inspectors at the plants of all major manufacturers of components.

Another difficulty in the manufacture of the gas mask resulted from

slight variations in the faceblank molds of the different mold manufacturers. Because each mold maker used a slightly different pattern the faceblanks also had slightly different patterns and could therefore not be successfully assembled with the same tools. Many faulty assemblies took place

with resultant delays in production.3

The mask which industry began to produce in 1940 was the standard

Army service mask, M1A2-9A1-4, together with its economically priced

counterpart, the training mask, M2A1-1-1. In some respects these items

proved difficult to adapt to assembly line techniques. The M1A2 facepiece

not only needed careful handwork at such points as its eyering assembly,

but it also had a potentially vulnerable chin seam, which had to undergo

an elaborate process of repeated cementing, taping, and baking to meet

specifications. One contractor, Firestone Rubber and Latex Products Co. of

Fall River, developed an automatic chin seam vulcanizer to speed the

work.4 The ultimate solution to the problem however, was to replace the

M1A2 faceblank altogether by getting the simpler, seamless, all-rubber

molded faceblank into production. It took some time and care to produce

the molds in the needed quantities and within the close tolerances required.

The first attempts to produce molded faceblanks in quantity for the service masks were undertaken late in 1940. A number of changes in the rubber

composition and molding techniques had to be worked out before the

process could be depended upon to turn out the intricately shaped forms

without having a large percentage unacceptable because of cracks or other

3

 In 1948 the Chemical Corps awarded a contract to Firestone Industrial Products Co., Akron,

Ohio, to make a study aimed at improving the industrial mobilization plan for the gas mask. In

compiling data, the Firestone Co. interviewed representatives of the various World War II gas

mask contractors. Among other things the Firestone report recommended that in the future all

mold manufacurers should use identical patterns. See Industrial Mobilization Planning Study, Mask,

Service, Combat, M-5-11-7, Chemical Corps Contract W 18-035-CM-834 Phase I, 5 March 1948,

p. 65. ETF 611.69-2/2. Hereafter referred to as Planning Study, Mask. 4

 (1) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, Revised 31 July 1945, p. 145. Referred to hereafter as

History of Pittsburgh CWPD. (2) History of the Boston CWPD in World War II, vol. 9, p. 80.

Referred to hereafter as History of the Boston CWPD.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 317

flaws.5 By June 1941 the fully molded faceblank was ready to replace the

M1A2 on the assembly lines.

The transition to mass production by industry brought new ideas as

well as new problems to the gas mask assembly line. These ideas were

introduced after some of the methods and devices which through the years

had met the needs of the small pilot plant at Edgewood Arsenal were

found inadequate for the demands now made upon them. For example,

the firms that were turning out training masks (an item which differed

from the standard service masks principally in its use of a simple cylindrical canister) soon became dissatisfied with the machine Edgewood Arsenal

had designed to fill the canisters. They felt that it did not meet the standards of current commercial technology, and lost little time in arbitrarily

replacing it with a more up-to-date filler borrowed from the food canning

industry.6

By December 1941 the mass production of service and training masks

by industry had been under way for a year. Despite the many problems

of inexperience and adjustment, well over two million masks had been

delivered to the Army, and production capacity had already exceeded ten

thousand masks per day.7 The nation's entry into active warfare only accelerated the existing program. There was, however, one major change of

emphasis. The training mask, whose principal virtue lay in the fact that

it was cheaper than its regular service counterpart, had never been intended

for use in combat. Training mask production lines were therefore gradually

shifted to service mask assembly, and by mid-1942 the training mask had

been virtually dropped as a production item.8

But if one gas mask program was marked for conclusion after war came,

another was suddenly and vigorously resuscitated. The period of educational orders had witnessed a small-scale trial production program for

noncombatant gas masks. In 1940 the Chemical Warfare Service selected

five firms, none of them experienced in such items, and contracted to set

up complete noncombatant mask production lines in each for turning out

a single educational order of gas masks. On the basis of this experience

5

 History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 144-45. 6

 (1) Ibid., pp. 159-60. (2) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, p. 39. (3) Interv, Hist Off

with Col Victor C. Searle, Cml C, 4 Oct 56. 7

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 21. 8

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, p. 38. (2) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, p.

149. (3) Memo, C Ind Svc CWS for USW, 13 May 42, sub: Rpt of Accomplishments of CWS.

CWS 400.12/106-139.
318 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the CWS after Pearl Harbor began mass production of civilian masks. For

once, the service had no difficulty attracting potential producers. Several

hundred applicants, hearing of a defense item which would be made by a

comparatively small plant, solicited contracts. The CWS planners reckoned

that for optimum production efficiency an individual plant should be capable of turning out 125,000 masks per month. This led to the conclusion

that about twenty good sized producers would be preferable to a large

number of small fabricators, and production contracts were ultimately

assigned on this basis. Three of the original five educational order contractors were considered capable of undertaking full-scale production and

over a dozen additional contractors were obtained to fill out the program.

The selection was such that each of the six CWS procurement districts

had two or more suppliers within its jurisdiction.9

By midsummer of 1942 the full-scale production program for noncombatant masks was under way. From the outset there were difficulties. The

CWS, as a result of experience gained in educational order production,

was convinced that the fabric facepieces needed a coating of natural rubber in preference to synthetic plastics if they were to have a firm, leakproof

fit.10 This requirement at once ran up against the sudden crisis in the nation's rubber supply, and though a limited amount of rubber was at last

made available for the program, the CWS and its customer, the Office of

Civilian Defense, had to accept a production ceiling of 8,500,000 masks.

On the production line itself, shortages of materials and components hampered scheduling. The outlet valve case proved a particularly troublesome

bottleneck until the molds needed to make it could be hurried to completion.11

 Despite difficulties the program reached its assigned goal approximately on schedule. In 1943 production of noncombatant gas masks came

to a halt, and thereafter about half the production lines were maintained

on a standby basis.

During 1942 the program for service gas masks was vigorously carried

forward to meet the demands of the rapidly increasing Army. Since the

service mask formed part of every soldier's equipment, the rate at which

9

 (1) Summary of Conference, OC CWS, 13 Mar 42, re Noncombatant Gas Mask Assembly

Plants. (2) Maj R. D. Ball, Gas Masks, p. 39. Both in CWS 314.7 Gas Masks File. 10

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, p. 23. (2) Interv, Hist Off with G. H. Titcomb,

7 Nov 56. Titcomb served as both civilian and officer in several protective equipment assignments,

including Chief, Protective Equipment Section, Industrial Division, OC CWS. 11

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, p. 28. (2) History of the Dallas CWPD, February

1942- June 1944, pp. 73, 75-77. (3) Memo, C Ind Service CWS for USW, 6 May 42, sub: Rpt 

Accomplishments of CWS. CWS 400.12/106-139.
319

the mobilization of military manpower was proceeding required full use of

all available production facilities. To those already at work on the service

mask the CWS added a new end item assembler by converting Sprague

Specialities Co. of North Adams, Mass., from a training mask line to the

more urgently needed service mask. In 1943 the west coast was brought

into the program when the San Francisco district set up service mask production at the plant of the Simmons Co. That same year the Dallas district

began contracting with B. F. Goodrich Co. for production of the service

mask in Clarksville, Tenn. By November 1943 service mask production

had reached its peak rate, nearly a million a month, as compared with a

prewar monthly rate averaging about two hundred thousand.12

The service mask that was being turned out at the end of 1943 was

the new lightweight model, the M3-10-6, which had been developed in

1942. The first essay at putting the new mask into production was entrusted to the Pittsburgh district's end-item contractor, the Goodyear Tire

and Rubber Co. of Akron, Ohio, which set up a pilot line for it in January 1943, without interrupting its regular production. The contract called

for an initial production of 150,000 lightweight masks, but barely a tenth

of that number had been assembled when the program was temporarily

halted. So many practical difficulties had arisen in meeting the original

specifications that these had to be altered somewhat before production could

continue. Among the trouble spots singled out for special notice were the

canister assembly and filling operations, the crimping of eyerings in the

M3 facepiece assembly, and the sewing of the M6 carrier. The carrier turned

out to be the main bottleneck, and the district ultimately had to call a

conference of the CWS officers stationed at the plants of the carrier contractors before a standard design meeting both CWS requirements and

production needs could be worked out. But by the end of May 1943 product

engineering had advanced to a point where the CWS was able to negotiate full-scale production contracts with Goodyear and its other prime contractors. By August the new mask, with its nosecup, 18-inch hosepiece,

cylindrical canister, and carrier, had replaced the old on all existing production lines and was being turned out by the new facilities at San

Francisco and Clarksville as well.13

12

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, p. 65. (2) History of the San Francisco CWPD

in World War II, pp. 71-72. (3) History of the Dallas CWPD, February 1942-June 1944, p. 74.

(4) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45. 13

 (1) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 161-68. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40

through 31 Dec 45.
320 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Though Goodyear's pilot plant experience had served to correct some

major difficulties, problems still remained at the assembly line level. The

principal distinctive feature of the new facepiece was its nosecup, almost

a mask within a mask, which had to be carefully vulcanized into place,

simpler methods of attachment having proved impractical.14 This process

was speeded up after Firestone Rubber and Latex Products Co., one of

the end-item contractors in the Boston district, developed and put into

use a machine that vulcanized the nosecups to the facepieces automatically. A large surplus stock of old style 27-inch hosepieces ceased to be a

problem when the contractors successfully demonstrated that a satisfactory

18-inch hosepiece could be fashioned from two 9-inch remnants, thereby

making every two old style hosepieces a potential source of three lightweight pieces.15

 The problem of handling the recently developed whetlerite on the canister line called for some new techniques and a good deal

of care to prevent overexposure of the impregnated charcoal to the atmosphere.16

The Pittsburgh district bore most of the burden of keeping the gas

mask program supplied with charcoal. Early production contracts were for

nutshell and wood charcoals. The major source at this stage was the

Barnebey-Cheney Engineering Co. of Columbus, Ohio, a pioneer in the

field, which operated not only charcoal activating kilns but also a Zanesville, Ohio, plant where charcoal was converted to whetlerite. A CWS

contractor-operated plant in Fostoria, Ohio, used a zinc chloride process

to produce a wood charcoal which met standards at first, but which later

proved comparatively expensive and unsuited to the manufacture of the

ASC form of whetlerite in use by 1943. In that year the Pittsburgh Coke

and Chemical Co. opened up a new domestic source, bituminous coal, for

the mass production of whetlerite. After the company had demonstrated

the practicability of making charcoal from bituminous coal, the government built two charcoal plants for the Pittsburgh company.17

 A little later,

the CWS acquired the plant at Zanesville for the Pittsburgh Coke and

Chemical Co. to operate. The elaborate test procedures required for the

effective inspection of ASC whetlerite led the Pittsburgh district's chief

14

 History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, p. 168. 15

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, pp. 66, 78. (2) History of the Chicago CWPD,

1 July 1940 through 31 December 1944, vol. 1, p. 57. 16

 History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, p. 165. 17

 Interv, Hist Off with R. C. Moore, 14 Nov 57. Mr. Moore was in charge of Pittsburgh Coke

& Chemical Co.'s charcoal program in World War II.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 321

inspection officer to urge that the CWS set up a central testing laboratory

in the Pittsburgh area. The service adopted the suggestion, and by midFebruary of 1944 a central laboratory was in operation at Carnegie, Pa.,

near the contractor's plant, and beginning the process of taking over the

major responsibility for whetlerite inspection.18

The Rubber Crisis

The most difficult problem confronting the gas mask program was the

critical wartime shortage of its principal ingredient, crude rubber, as noted

earlier. In peace or war the United States had to have an annual rubber

supply running to upward of half a million long tons just to keep its

rubber tired vehicles operating. The source of nearly all the crude rubber

used in America was the plantations of Southeast Asia. The onset of a

Pacific war, followed within weeks by the loss of most of the rubber regions

to the enemy, left the United States facing a major emergency in rubber

supply by the spring of 1942. The government quickly imposed rigid limitations on the use of the country's existing rubber stockpiles, while a tremendous new production program for synthetic rubbers was rushed into

being.

Despite the fact that the Chemical Warfare Service for the time being

had a large enough share of the overall military allotment of rubber to

continue its service mask programs as planned, the post-Pearl Harbor procurement of noncombatant gas masks was in trouble from the outset. The

item, being specifically nonmilitary, had no proper claim on military allocations of strategic materials. Moreover, civilian authority as represented

by the newly organized War Production Board (WPB) tended to discourage the issuance of rubber allotments for the mask. Concern over the

immediate and dangerous rubber emergency outweighed concern over a

hypothetical gas attack on continental United States. The expressed intention of CWS officers to aim for a total program of fifty million noncombatant masks, involving the probable expenditure of some ten thousand

tons of rubber, met with opposition firm enough to force a compromise.

The WPB agreed to supply 1,360 tons of reclaimed rubber, sufficient for

five million noncombatant masks for domestic use plus an additional three

and a half million destined for Australia. Officials of WPB hoped that the

CWS would soon be able to standardize a noncombatant facepiece using

18

 History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 178-92.
322 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

some substitute plastic as a fabric coating. Though work on such a product was being carried on it had not yet produced a facepiece meeting the

requirements.19 When later in 1942 it developed that the original allocation would not be large enough to complete the masks on order, WPB

reluctantly granted an additional allocation of 750 tons of reclaimed rubber, over the objections of its own Office of Civilian Supply.20

Notwithstanding that by 1943 the rapidly increasing output of synthetic rubbers was beginning to have its effect on the rubber emergency, the

stock of natural rubber continued to dwindle. By the spring of that year

it was becoming plain that mass production of the natural rubber service

mask could not go on indefinitely. The CWS had already improvised measures to stretch its rubber allocation for the time being, first by reducing

the percentage of latex in the prescribed compound and then by authorizing increased use of reclaimed rubber. But a change to an all-synthetic

mask was fast becoming a necessity.

The Office of the Rubber Director, WPB, brought matters to a head

early in June 1943 by setting up a committee, representing gas mask producers, the CWS, the Navy, and the WPB, to plan the change-over. The

committee, under the chairmanship of J. J. Allen of the Firestone Rubber

and Latex Products Co., met monthly beginning in June. Though the CWS

was doing most of the necessary development work through its laboratory

at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a great deal of technical information on mixing and handling compounds based on synthetics was

exchanged through the committee by the industry representatives. It was

the general conviction that butyl rubber was the synthetic that would be

best for the purpose, and throughout the summer the planning and experimentation was based on this conclusion. Planners expected a butyl service

mask to be in production by early fall. Then in September they realized

that the expected output of butyl rubber could not be counted upon, and

they quickly decided to proceed with the conversion plans using neoprene

instead. In October the CWS placed educational orders for pilot lots of

19

 (1) Memo, W. Allen for C Rubber Branch, WPB, 6 Feb 42, sub: Gas Masks for Civilian

Defense. (2) Memo, W. Helburn for C Rubber Branch WPB, 25 Mar 42. (3) Ltr, Brig Gen Paul

X. English to C Rubber Branch WPB, 26 Mar 42, sub: Rubber for Non-Combatant Gas Masks.

(4) Memo, C Rubber Branch WPB for Brig Gen English, 27 Mar 42, sub: Reclaimed Rubber for

Non-Combatant Gas Masks. All in WPB 572.4. (5) Titcomb interv, 7 Nov 56. 20

 (1) Memo, E. J. Casey, 4 Nov 42, sub: Face Pieces for O.C.D. Gas Masks. WPB 577.0413.

(2) Memo, Asst Deputy Rubber Director, WPB for C CWS, 3 Nov 42, sub: Reclaimed Rubber

for Noncombatant Gas Masks. (3) Memo, C Rubber Sec Off of Civilian Supply for C Appeals Bd,

17 Nov 42, sub: Additional Allocation ... for ... Gas Masks. Both in WPB 571.14.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 323

synthetic components (faceblanks, hose tubes, and nosecups) with its principal contractors, and on 1 November the Rubber Director's order limiting

gas masks to 50 percent crude rubber in November and none subsequently

became effective.21

For more than a year thereafter the Army's standard service masks—

both the M3 lightweight mask standardized earlier and its shortlived successor, the M5 combat mask—were made of neoprene. As in the case of

any major change in specifications, there was an occasional hitch on the

production lines. Some of these hitches were caused by the fact that batches

of neoprene compound were not always uniform.22 A more critical problem arose when one contractor attempted to produce faceblanks for the

complicated optical gas mask from neoprene. The neoprene stock refused

to take molding acceptably, and nearly all the first batch of one thousand

faceblanks failed to pass inspection. The contract had to be terminated.23

But with these exceptions, production of neoprene masks proceeded

smoothly enough.

Not until the neoprene masks had reached the troops in the European

Theater of Operations and experienced cold weather—that is, not until

the winter of 1944-45—were the shortcomings of neoprene fully appreciated. The "black rubber" masks, as they were called, were likely to stiffen

into deformed shapes at low temperatures, making it impossible to obtain

a gastight fit. The theater let it be known that it wanted no more of them.

This tendency of neoprene to develop "cold set" was not unknown in 1943.

According to a WPB historian the output of neoprene had been reduced

in the spring of 1943 because its unreliability at low temperatures limited

its usefulness.24 The Gas Mask Industry Technical Committee, which had

co-ordinated the work leading to the adoption of neoprene, had been aware

of the difficulty. The committee, when considering formulas the contractors were preparing to use, had apparently left approval of the neoprene

21

 (1) Minutes of Third Meeting of Gas Mask Industry Technical Committee, 17 Aug 43. (2)

Memo, S. P. Thacher, Rubber Branch ASF for C CWS, 25 Aug 43, sub: Development of Synthetic

Rubber Gas Masks. (3) Ltr, J. J. Allen to Capt F. G. Reinke, Rubber Branch ASF, 18 Oct 43.

All in ASF 470.72. (4) Memo, S. P. Thacher for Rubber Director WPB, 2 Oct 43, sub: Proposed

Directive Eliminating Crude Rubber ... in Gas Masks. (5) Memo, S. P. Thacher for Chiefs

of Technical Services, 13 Oct 43, sub: Proposed Directive . . . Both in ASF 423. 22

 History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, p. 171. 23

 History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, pp. 176-77. 24

 Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War

Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-45, vol. II ch. V, p. 94. Unfinished typescript

draft in WPB Policy Files.
324 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

compounds to the CWS Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.25

The Latter War Years

At the time the shift to synthetics was made, the production rate for

gas masks was just passing its wartime peak. With the completion of the

Army expansion program, there was a leveling-off in gas mask requirements. By February 1944 the cutbacks in scheduled production were extensive enough to justify a substantial reduction in assembly facilities. Accordingly, Goodyear was dropped from the program that month, and Sprague

Specialities of North Adams, Mass., ceased production when their current

contract was completed in April.26

The cutback coincided with the start of production on a new service

mask, the M5-11-7 combat (or assault) mask. The CWS meant to ultimately replace this new item, a hoseless mask with a cheek mounted axialflow canister and a new waterproof carrier, but at the outset scheduled

only limited production with a single assembler, Firestone of Fall River.

The principal production difficulties were in the assembly of components.

New seaming and filling machines had to be installed for the M11 canister,

an item radically different from the radial-flow canisters that had preceded

it. The filters took the form of elaborately pleated shells of specially treated

absorbent paper. Although a comparatively simple shell pattern was available, the CWS had also developed a pattern involving concentric pleats

and wanted comparative field reports on the two types. Consequently, both

types were produced. The concentric filter was considerably more troublesome to assemble. The M7 carrier, a complex item made of butyl coated

duck, was a source of trouble from the start. The specifications, especially

those for the waterproof closure, were such as to make for an inherently

awkward assembly job.27

The Dallas district brought its principal gas mask contractor, the B. F.

Goodrich plant at Clarksville, Tenn., into the combat mask program in

September 1944, but the program itself was nearing a sudden end. Though

the problem raised by the assemblers of canisters and carriers were not unusual, the difficulties which the combat facepiece itself presented were 25

 Ltr, J. J. Allen to Capt F. G. Reinke, Rubber Branch ASF, 18 Oct 43. ASF 470.72. 26

 (1) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 163-64. (2) History of the Boston CWPD, vol.

9, p. 68. 27

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, pp. 121-36. (2) Interv, Hist Off with G. H. Titcomb and E. S. Graves, 7 Nov 56.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 325

another matter. The attempts to convert faceblank molds to M5 production had not been successful, and the faceblanks themselves had so high

a rejection rate that by the end of August the CWS was ready to admit

that continued production of the M5 was not worth the trouble. The

contracts were terminated accordingly, with the M3-10A1-6 resuming its

status as the standard service mask.28

The M3 was not the only service mask in production at the end of 1944.

A salvage and reconditioning program of steadily increasing proportions

had brought into being the lightweight service mask M4-10A1-6, which

was manufactured by adding the nosecup, hose tube, canister, and carrier

of a lightweight mask to a reconditioned M2A2 rubber facepiece. The M4

had been developed and approved late in 1942 as a stopgap item to be

turned out while the production difficulties of the new M3 were being

remedied.29 It was not produced in any substantial quantity, despite the

original plan, until the beginning of 1944. From then on it ranked as an

important factor in the nation's gas mask output, and several major contractors were kept busy dismantling used heavy service and training masks

so that the M4 assembly lines could be kept supplied.

The reconditioning program assumed a new importance in January 1945,

after the using arms had declared the neoprene facepiece unsatisfactory

From then onward the CWS mask program depended on the output of

natural rubber facepieces from the reconditioners. By the summer of 1945

an elaborate process was under way of recalling neoprene masks from overseas, exchanging them for rubber masks in use in the zone of interior,

and shipping the latter in turn to the reconditioning plants for ultimate

use overseas. The reconditioning program also played a part in supplying

a substitute for the hoseless M5 combat mask withdrawn from production

in 1944. In the summer of 1945 the gas mask industry began turning out

the M3-11-10 snout-type mask, in which the assault-type- M11 canister

was attached directly to the front of a reconditioned rubber facepiece. Over

300,000 of these masks were produced before V-J Day halted the assembly lines.30

 The M8 snout-type mask was the last of the series of masks

produced during the war for general issue to troops.

28

 (1) History of the Dallas CWPD, 1 Jul 44-14 Aug 45, p. 31. (2) Minutes of Weekly

Meeting, Office of Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel, 31 Aug 44. CWS 314.7 Gas Masks File. 29CWTC Item 1339, 24 May 45, Standardization of Facepieces, Service, M4 and M4A1. 30

 (1) Ltr, TAG to CG's of Service Commands, MDW, and C CWS, 11 Apr 45, sub: Survey of

Gas Masks in Service Command Posts, Camps, and Stations in the Continental United States. (2)

Memo, Dir Requirements and Stock Control Div ASF for ASF Directors, 17 Jul 45, sub: Supply

Control of Gas Masks. Both in ASF 470.72. (3) Weekly Report of Activities, OC, CWS, week

ending 20 Jul 45. (4) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, pp. 152-59.
326 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Special Purpose Masks

The production history of the gas mask program would not be complete without reference to the special purpose masks manufactured by the

CWS or its contractors between 1940 and 1945. In terms of magnitude,

the most important of these special programs was the one for the diaphragm

mask. Although this item was never entirely satisfactory, the CWS hoped

that eventually a greatly improved diaphragm mask would come off the

assembly line. Plans in May 1942 called for supplying the Army with five

million or more of these masks.31 A program of this size obviously required the participation of industry. Edgewood Arsenal alone produced two

million diaphragm masks in the two years between February 1941 and

March 1943. By the latter date plans for industrial production were complete, and the first diaphragm masks to be turned out by private contractors were accepted in April 1943.32

 But by June this type of mask was

rejected by the using arms and production was stopped.33

The program for the optical mask was less ambitious. Edgewood Arsenal turned out about 116,000 in mid-1941, and no further production

was undertaken for three years. Then in 1944, in response to an ASF demand, the CWS undertook to produce another ninety thousand though it

had not yet completed development of the item. The development laboratory provided a master form for the facepiece, and the rubber blanks were

manufactured by the Sun Rubber Co. of Barberton, Ohio, after an attempt

by the Acushnet Process Co. of New Bedford had demonstrated that neoprene would not meet requirements. The masks were assembled by a Chicago district contractor, Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co. of Detroit.34

 An

optical mask developed and requisitioned by the Navy was produced on

short notice in 1943-44 by the New York district, despite the fact that

the district had not shared in the CWS gas mask program except for its

part in the nationwide procurement of noncombatant masks.35

Procurement of such other special purpose masks as were not turned

out solely by the CWS pilot plant at Edgewood Arsenal was generally

accomplished through the Boston Procurement District. The headwound

mask was produced in the district for a short time in 1944-45, with the

Firestone Co. of Fall River making the final assembly. Facepieces for col31

 WD SOS Army Supply Program, Monthly Status Report CWS Equipment Section, No. 4,

May 1942. 32

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45. 33

 History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, p. 118. 34

 History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 175-77. 35

 History of the New York CWPD from 1940 through June 1944, vol. 1, pp. 225-50.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 327

lective protectors were also procured in 1944-45, the prime contractor being

the Electrolux Co. of Old Greenwich, Conn. This company, which had

taken part in the development of the item, continued to assemble facepieces until the war ended.36

Inspection of Gas Masks

At the start of the war the CWS had compiled very little literature to

assist its inspectors in carrying out their day-to-day operations. To fill this

need the Inspection Division, OC CWS, inaugurated the practice of writing a Standard Inspection Procedure (SIP) for each CW end item. The

SIP described the item and its use, how it was made, and how it functioned. It went on to specify the parts of the item to be inspected, the

tools or instruments to be used in carrying out the inspection, and it finally outlined such matters as proof testing, surveillance procedures, and

packaging. The bulk of the SIP's on the CW items were prepared and

circulated by the summer of 1944.37

The SIP on the gas mask which the Inspection Division wrote in 1943

called for end-item inspection by the government of each lot of masks

coming off the assembly line. If the CWS inspector rejected a lot the contractor's inspectors had to recheck each mask in that lot. All defective masks

then had to be reworked. Later the CWS modified this procedure by having its inspectors check the masks as they were moving along on the conveyor line, and if the CWS inspector rejected a certain number, the

contractor's inspectors reinspected all the masks remaining on the line.

Meanwhile the contractor held up all production until the particular defect was eliminated. The latter system proved more satisfactory than the

former because it prevented the incorporation of undesirable features into

the mask.

After World War II the contractors who had assembled gas masks during the war almost invariably complained of the CWS system of inspection. Their complaints came under two headings: first, that the inspectors

by and large were inadequately trained, and secondly, that the 1943 SIP

was impractical for purposes of quantity, and simultaneously quality, production of gas masks.38

 While many gas mask inspectors were doubtless

deficient in background and insufficiently trained, this complaint was perhaps too sweeping. The condition was partially the result of the tight labor

36

 History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 9, pp. 160-65, 179-86. 37

 Annual Report of Inspection Division, OC CWS, for Fiscal Year 1944. 38

 Planning Study, Mask, Phase I, pp. 87-90, and vol. VTl, p. 124. ETF 611.69-2/2.
328 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

market existing at that time. The second complaint would also seem to

have a basis in fact. When the government took the position that there

should be a 100 percent of inspection of certain munitions—and such insistence was unquestionably legitimate— it could not at the same time

consistently place primary emphasis on mass production of the item. It

was mass production, plus haste in designing masks and components, that

was at the root of the difficulty. The fact that there were many minor

discrepancies in specifications and acceptance standards for components from

different suppliers tended to produce rejections of finished masks for causes

beyond the control of the end-item assembler.

Production of Impregnite (CC-2)

The plant for producing the impregnite CC-2 which the CWS built

at Edgewood Arsenal in the 1930's began to operate on a production basis

in October 1940. Among the plants it erected at Edgewood in the emergency period, the CWS included a new impregnite plant utilizing a new

process of manufacture. This plant got into production early in 1942. The

two Edgewood plants continued to operate until the start of 1943. Meanwhile, the plant at Niagara Falls got into operation in the fall of 1941

and in early 1942 the plants at St. Louis and Midland.39

A number of manufacturing difficulties soon presented themselves. At

the Niagara Falls plant, corrosion of equipment by the highly reactive materials used in the process became a major problem, so much so that Du

Pont made it the subject of an extended research project during 1942.

Early production yields were disappointingly small when measured against

the yields known to be available. Furthermore, the quality of the product

left much to be desired. Batch after batch failed to meet specifications and

had to be washed free of impurities if not reprocessed altogether. By

March 1942, when the Du Pont plant had been over five months in operation without a substantial advance in yield or quality, the CWS was

voicing concern.40 Production ills were meanwhile besetting the Midland

and St. Louis plants, operated by Dow Chemical Co. and Monsanto Chemical Co., respectively. But in the months that followed, the results of accumulating experience and production research began to tell. By the late

39

 (1) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 18. (2) History of Edgewood Arsenal in World War II, vol. II, pp. 556-57. (3) History of Niagara Falls CWS Plant,

p. 1. (4) Pamphlet, "Performance Record of the Dow Chemical Company in the War Effort,"

9 Jan 45 (Historical Account), p. 30. 40

 (1) Niagara Falls CWS Plant Reports, Sep 4l-Mar 42, Incls to Historical Material. (2)

Notes of conference held by General Porter, 13 Mar 42. CWS 337.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 329

autumn of 1942 the plants were approximating their rated capacity of five

tons per day apiece, and the worst difficulties were past. In 1943 the rated

capacity was substantially exceeded by actual production of specificationgrade material.41

In the impregnating process CC-2 was dissolved in acetylene tetrachloride, a highly toxic solvent. Since the use of such a solvent was both difficult and dangerous, officials placed a requirement for a water soluble

impregnite. Technicians met this need by reducing the individual particle

size in CC-2 to micron proportions. Production of micronized CC-2, redesignated XX-CC3, began in the spring of 1943 after the installation of

micronizing equipment in the plants. During the next eighteen months

the greater part of the CC-2 turned out was converted at the plant to

XX-CC3. At the beginning of 1944 the impregnite plants were delivering 700 tons of impregnite a month to the CWS.42

 With the peak period of military build-up already past, the CWS had to plan early cutbacks

in output. In March 1944 the ASF authorized the CWS to place the Midland plant on standby status and to reduce production in the remaining

two plants. By May impregnite production was accordingly down to a level

approximating 250 tons per month. Micronizing operations were halted

entirely by the CWS after October 1944, but CC-2 production was increased somewhat in the early months of 1945. Production continued until

hostilities ended. From first to last, over 18,000 tons of impregnite were

produced for the CWS between 1940 and 1945.43

Procurement of Impregnating Plants

As important as the development of the protective clothing was the

problem of maintaining a global supply of the item against the threat of

gas warfare. Large stores of protective clothing had to be kept in readiness in all theaters of war and maintained in effective condition. Since the

protective capacity of CC-2 in clothing gradually diminished with long

storage and deteriorated even more rapidly when the clothing was in use,

a kit had to be developed to assess the CC-2 content of protective clothing.44

 Rapid resupply of storage stocks which might be called for issue

41

 (1) Niagara Falls CWS Plant Reports, Nov 42-Nov 43, Incls to Historical Material. (2)

"Performance Record of the Dow Chemical Company," p. 31. (3) History of the St. Louis CWS

Plant, p. 2. 42

 (1) Niagara Falls CWS Plant Reports, Apr-Nov 43, Incls to Historical Material. (2) CWS

Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45. 43

 (1) Memo, Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay to USW, 25 Mar 44, sub: Request for Approval of

Cutback in Production of Impregnite "I." Files of Dir Materiel ASF. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45. 44CWTC Item 690, Standardization of Kit, Testing Impregnite in Clothing, Ml, 23 Apr 43.
330 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

on very short notice demanded the installation of impregnating facilities

at storage points both at home and abroad. With the outbreak of gas

warfare, vast quantities of contaminated clothing would have to be decontaminated and laundered, with consequent diminution of its CC-2 content. This potential need made it imperative that large-scale semifixed

plants be developed and installed near resupply points.

Three types of impregnating plants, based on American Laundry Machine Co. models, were developed and standardized by 1943: (1) The M1

plant (zone of interior), a fixed type with a capacity of 9,000 units of clothing each 24 hours; (2) the M1 plant (theater of operations); and (3) the

M2 plant (theater of operations), which was a semifixed type with a capacity of almost 4,000 pounds per 24-hour day or 13,300 sets of clothing

weekly. Both of the M1 plants were designed for the standard solvent

process of impregnation in which CC-2 and chlorinated paraffin as a binder

were dissolved in acetylene tetrachloride, applied to the clothing by uniform saturation, and the solvent then evaporated.45

The size and weight of M1 impregnating equipment presented difficulties in zone of interior installations, and in theater of operations plants

gave rise to major problems. Theater plant equipment included two 400-

gallon solution tanks; three modified laundry washing machines, two with

solvent recovery units; a modified laundry washing machine, called the

impregnator; a steam generating unit; an electric generating unit; and various auxiliary items such as fuel tanks, pumps, and tools. Depending upon

the model the packed plant weighed from 80,000 to 105,000 pounds and

was approximately 6,000 cubic feet in volume. Thirteen vehicles were required for its transportation. Skid mountings and special packings were

developed to facilitate handling.46

Each zone of interior M1 plant cost $358,000 and each theater of operations M1 plant approximately $79,000.47

 A total of thirty-four M1 theater of operations plants was procured in 1942 and 1943 from the American

Laundry Machinery Co. and Proctor and Schwartz, Inc., under the super45

 (1) CWTC Item 344, Standardization of Impregnating Plant (T of O), 27 May 41. (2)

CWTC Item 761, Standardization of Plant, Impregnating (Z of I), Ml, 23 Jul 43. (3) Ltr, Clarence E. Trotter, Manager, Special Projects, American Laundry Co. to Hist Off, 25 Apr 58. With

this letter is an inclosure signed by Russell A. Hetzer, Chief Engineer, who worked on the impregnating plant program in World War II. CWS 314.7 Impregnating Plants File. 46

 TM 3-270, 4 Feb 44. 47

 Draft table, Dollar Volume of CWS Procurement, Protective Material, in folder, Unit and

Dollar Summaries, Protective Storage and Issue, 1 Jul 40-31 Dec 45. CWS 314.7 Procurement

Statistics File.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 331

vision of Edgewood Arsenal and the New York procurement district. Two

M1 zone of interior plants were procured.48

The M2 plant used a water suspension method, developed in 1942 by

a group under Dr. P. L. Salzberg at the Du Pont chemistry laboratories,

involving micronized CC-2, chlorinated paraffin, and suspension and dispersing agents. This process, through the elimination of the toxic solvent,

was simpler, safer, and more economical than the solvent process and was

standardized for both the Army and Navy in mid-1943.49

Although clothing treated by the new aqueous method proved highly

satisfactory when worn in temperate climates, in the tropics the clothing

caused excessive skin irritation to troops wearing it for long periods of

time. The hazard was traced to the zinc oxide stabilizer that had been incorporated in both the solvent and suspension processes by the Du Pont

group to prevent deterioration of impregnated cotton clothing in storage

in the tropics. The CWS withheld issue of the M2 plant from Pacific theaters until researchers found that replacing the stabilizing agent zinc oxide

with calcium carbonate eliminated the hazard without affecting the storage life of the clothing.50

The M2 plant was less complicated than the M1 and was considerably

less expensive to procure, the cost being about $47,000 per plant.51 The

packed plant weighed from 10,000 to 30,000 pounds less than the Ml,

but the volume was 500 cubic feet greater principally because of the addition of a large but lightweight solution mixing unit. The M2, like the

Ml, required a firm foundation of timbers or concrete and a weatherproofed

shelter.52 In 1942 Edgewood Arsenal produced one M2 plant and in the

following year the CWS procured ninety-four additional M2's from the

American Laundry Machinery Co.53

The major portion of these M2 plants replaced M1's or provided initial

equipment for the thirty-nine processing companies activated between 1941

and 1945. All but one of these companies saw service overseas.54 In the

absence of gas warfare, the companies were given secondary missions, in

48

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 25. 49

 (1) CWTC Item 756, Standardization of Plant, Impregnating, M2, 23 Jul 43. (2) Chemical

Warfare Board Project No. 289, Field Test of Plant, Impregnating, Ml, 20 May 43. (3) Noyes,

Chemistry, pp. 206-07. 50

 CWTC Item 1246, Issue of Plant, Impregnating, M2, 26 Oct 44. 51

 Draft table, Dollar Volume of CWS Procurement. 52

 TM 3-281, 10 Feb 54. 53

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 25. 54

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H-ll.
332 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

addition to their primary function of maintaining theater stocks of impregnated clothing, of providing dry cleaning (the M1 plant) and laundry services to troops in the field. Once a suitable water supply was located the equipment was easily adapted to these tasks. In the tropics and

semitropics the equipment was put to good use in impregnating clothing

with insecticides as a preventative for scrub typhus and malaria.55

To provide advance company units in the field with means for impregnating clothing in an emergency, Dr. Salzberg's group developed a

small field set weighing 52 pounds, capable of processing 24 suits of clothing.56

 Finally, a helmet impregnating set, to be carried in the pack or gas

mask carrier and weighing less than half a pound, was experimented with

to permit the individual soldier to impregnate his uniform, shorts, and

socks, using his helmet and water from his canteen. A later requirement

for a highly mobile unit capable of handling 1,400 pounds of clothing

(approximately 200 suits) each 24 hours was relinquished when it was

found that the Quartermaster mobile laundry units in the field could be

adapted, by means of a special kit, as temporary water-suspension impregnating plants.57

Next to the gas mask, protective clothing was the soldier's most important defense against gas warfare and every individual moving overseas

received a complete issue. In the theater of operations this individual issue was maintained either in the hands of the soldier or in readily available supply locations. In addition, theater reserves were stocked in the

early part of the war on a 100 percent reissue basis and later in the war

on a descending scale according to the vulnerability of each area to the

initiation of gas warfare. Protective clothing was actually worn in operations in which the enemy's initiation of gas warfare appeared possible,

such as the Normandy invasion.58

Protective Ointment59

The CWS awarded a development contract on protective ointment, the

antigas decontaminant for use on the soldier's body and personal weapons,

55

 See Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat.

56 CWTC Item 766, Standardization of Set, Impregnating, Field, Ml, 23 Jul 43. 57

 (1) Chemical Warfare Board Project No. 298, Test of Mobile Water Suspension Impregnating Plant, 31 Aug 43. (2) CWTC Item 863, Military Requirements and Military Characteristics

for a Mobile Impregnating Unit, 3 Dec 43. (3) CWTC Item 993, Military Requirement and Military Characteristics for a Kit for Conversion of Mobile Laundry Units for Impregnation, 5 May 44.

See also Item 1090, 7 Jul 44, same title. 58

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV, and Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell,

Chemicals in Combat. 59

 Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on the following: (1) Wallace and Tiernan
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 333

to Wallace and Tiernan Products, Inc., in February 1941.60 Under that

contract the company produced M1 and M2 ointment on a pilot plant

basis until September when it suspended production in order to put the

knowledge and experience gained into practice. Wallace and Tiernan set

up a manufacturing plant for M1 ointment in one of its buildings in Belleville, N.J., and this plant was operating in December 1941. In the fall of

1941, meanwhile, the CWS awarded a research contract to Evans Chemetics, Inc., of New York City. This was followed by a production contract

in January 1942. To manufacture the ointment Evans Chemetics built a

plant in Hoboken, N.J.

The M1 was unlike any ointment that had ever been produced commercially. One of its chief ingredients was chlorine, which reacts adversely

on ordinary production equipment. The nature of the ingredients made it

difficult to obtain a uniform mix and it was impossible to pump this mix

from the kettle to the tube filling machine. To overcome these difficulties, Wallace and Tiernan, the first contractor in production, developed

glass lined kettles and power driven agitators to mix the ingredients, used

inert metals such as platinum or tungsten for valve seats, valve stems, and

metallic parts of tubing machines, installed an air pressure transfer system,

and devised glass and ceramic piping to carry the mix from the kettle to

the tube filling machine.

Another serious complication encountered in early manufacture was that

the lead tubes into which the ointment was filled contaminated the product. Tubes made from aluminum or even from tin would have been preferable, but those metals were in short supply. The Dewey and Almy

Chemical Co., Cambridge, Mass., developed a satisfactory lining for the

tube, consisting of a combination of wax and synthetic rubber. This tube

was put into production by several manufacturers, including the Peerless

Products, Inc., CWS Production in World War II, an account written in Oct 44 by a representative of the company at the request of CWS. CWS 314.7 Industrial History and Procurement File.

(2) Interv, Hist Off with C. W. MacFarlan, 26 Feb 57. Mr. MacFarlan worked on development of

protective ointment for the CWS before and during World War II. (3) Interv, Hist Off with

Paul A. Longo, 29 Apr 58. Mr. Longo worked on production of the ointment in the New York

procurement district. (4) Interv, Hist Off with Dr. Henry C. Marks, Wallace and Tiernan Co.,

27 Nov 57. Dr. Marks worked on the protective ointment program before and during World War

II. (5) Ltr, Dr. Henry C. Marks to Hist Off, 10 Dec 57, implementing points discussed in interview of 27 Nov 57. (6) Interv, Hist Off with Dr. Ralph L. Evans of Evans Research and Development Corp., formerly Evans Chemetics, Inc., 4 Mar 58. Evans Chemetics was an early protective

ointment contractor. (7) Interv, Hist Off with Joel Y. Lund, 29 Apr 58. Mr. Lund supervised the

ointment program at Lambert Pharmacal Co. 60

 Progress Report Covering Experimental Work Under Contract No. 266-CWS 120, February 1, 1941, to December 31, 1941, submitted by Research Department of Wallace and Tiernan,

Inc. ETF 615 W-lla.
334 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Tube Co., Bloomfield, N.J., and the Sun Tube Co., a subsidiary of the

Bristol Myers Co., Hillside, NJ.61 In August 1942 the CWS contracted

with a third firm to produce the ointment, the Lambert Pharmacal Co.,

St. Louis, Mo. This company, which continued in production until November of the following year, produced more ointment than either of the

other contractors.62

In the fall of 1943 the NDRC began sponsoring conferences between

manufacturers of the ointment and representatives of the CWS and the

Navy. One of the chief objectives of the conferences was improvement in

the packaging of the ointment. As a result of these conferences the contractors generally became much freer in exchanging ideas on all phases of

the program. This they generally did through telephone calls or visits to

one another's plants.

An outstanding accomplishment connected with the procurement of

the ointment was the development of an excellent brand of triacetin, an

ingredient of glycerol triacetate, by the Tennessee Eastman Co. of Kingsport, Tenn. This company produced a high grade product and sold it to

the manufacturers of the ointment at a reasonable price. The same company also furnished the cellulose acetate butyrate used in the ointment.

From February 1941 until December 1943 the CWS procured over

58,000,000 2.54-ounce tubes of M4 ointment and from May 1944 until

June 1945 over 26,000,000 packages, each containing 4 3/4- ounce tubes o

M5 ointment.63

Detector Kits64

The CWS procured over 40,000 M4 vapor detector kits for detection

of toxic agents in 1942 through contracts in the New York and Chicago

procurement districts. No unusual problems arose in the procurement of

this relatively simple item. In mid-1943, as indicated elsewhere, the M4

61

 Bristol Myers Company made BAL for the Medical Corps in World War II. See Civilian

Production Administration, Industrial Statistics Division, Alphabetic Listing of Major Supply Contracts, Cumulative, June 1940 through September 194), vol. 1, p. 495. 62

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 24. 63

 Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 23 and CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 19, 24. 64

 This section is based on: (1) History of the Chicago CWPD, 1 Jan 45-15 Aug 45, pp. 68-

69. (2) Evans interv, 4 Mar 58. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Raymond Reed, Chief of Research for

Raymond Laboratories, St. Paul, Minn., in World War II, 14 Mar 58. (4) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 18-19. (5) David Tenenbaum, Chemical Agent Detector Kit, M9, History of Development Work at Raymond Laboratories. CWS 314.7 Procurement

File.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 335

was replaced by the M9, a kit containing nearly 200 small tubes of reagents for detection of various war gases.65

The M9 proved much more difficult to produce than did the M4. As

one of the chief wartime contractors later put it, "this item was typical

of the new development, characterized by immature specification."

 66

 Commercial laboratories continually face situations such as this in day-to-day

operations, but they do not attempt to put items into full-scale production until the items have reached an advanced state of development. With

government wartime contracts it was different. The M9 kit was but one

of a number of items on which the CWS awarded production contracts

before mature development had taken place.

The CWS awarded contracts in the summer of 1943 to two firms for

production of the M9 kit, Evans Chemetics, Inc., of New York City, and

Raymond Laboratories, Inc., of St. Paul, Minn. Because of the stream of

specification changes which the CWS laboratory at MIT issued on the

various items in the kit, neither contractor was able to produce a single

finished kit for at least six months. Meanwhile, both contractors had devised methods for mass production, set up assembly lines, and made valuable suggestions relative to certain features of the kit. Raymond Laboratories

was particularly prolific with suggestions. In peacetime this company had

manufactured appliances for beauty parlors and it applied some of its experience with this type of item to the production of the M9 kit. For example, original specifications called for the use of lighted matches as a

source of heat for producing chemical reactions. On the basis of its experience in making heating pads for waving hair, Raymond Laboratories

suggested the use of a foil wrapped pad which would produce flameless

heat upon the addition of a liquid chemical. This suggestion the CWS

gladly accepted. Again, original specifications called for packing the small

glass tubes of reagents in cellophane straws and then sealing the ends of

the straws by a heating process. Raymond convinced the CWS to substitute aluminum foil for cellophane. Finally, at the suggestion of Raymond

Laboratories, the CWS made several changes in the design of the air sampling pump of the detector kit.

The CWS procured over eighty-two thousand M9 kits between April

1944 and July 1945.

65

 See ch. IV above. 66

 Reed interv, 14 Mar 58.
336 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Decontaminating Apparatus 67

In carrying out its gas readiness program the Army was able to find

no quicker or more effective destroyer of liquid mustard or contaminated

areas or structures than the bleaching powder or chloride of lime used in

World War I, and large quantities of it were stored in depots here and

abroad as part of the Army's gas warfare readiness program. The CWS

procured over thirty-eight million pounds of bleaching material through

private contract and obtained over thirty-one million more from the British on reverse lend-lease.68

 The American bleach (known as Grade 3)

which the CWS first procured had a high moisture content which caused

chemical reaction leading to rupture of the containers. The British product, known as super tropical bleach, developed by the Imperial Chemical

Industries, was a much more satisfactory product. The U.S. Government

arranged to have the British Imperial Chemical Industries assist the Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Co., which supplied bleach to the CWS, to

construct a plant for the manufacture of tropical bleach at Wyandotte,

Mich. This plant had been built and in production only a short time when

a fire destroyed it in August 1944. Since the U.S. wartime requirements

had been met by that time the CWS let no further contracts for bleach.69

For decontaminating vehicles, planes, weapons, fire control apparatus,

and similar finished metal surfaces, DANC, the standard decontaminating

agent, non-corrosive, was used.70 Because this decontaminant caused some

damage to paint, plastics, and bare metal surfaces and because there were

objections to the toxic solvent in its composition, the NDRC at the request of the Naval Research Laboratory initiated a contract study under

J. E. Kirby of the Du Pont Laboratories to find a better agent. No clearly

superior decontaminant was developed.71

67

 Unless otherwise indicated the section on power-driven decontamination units is based on:

(1) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 228-34; (2) History of Chicago CWPD, 1 Jan 45-

15 Aug 54, p. 70; (3) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 2; (4) Hinckley interv, 9 Jan 58; (5) Interv, Hist Off with Col Carl Casto, 17 Apr 58; Casto was chief of the

Edgewood Arsenal Inspection Off in WW II, which inspected the power-driven decon apparatus

and made numerous suggestions for its improvement; and (6) Interv, Hist Off with Ferdinand J.

d'Eustachio, 24 Apr 58. Mr. d'Eustachio worked on the inspection and engineering problems of

the decon apparatus in World War II. 68

 Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, 16 Oct 51, p. 67. 69

 Memo, 1st Lt E. F. Lennon to Chief, Chemical Section, Industrial Division, OC CWS, 14

Aug 43, sub: Report of Visit to Chicago CWPD and Penn Salt Mfg Co. CWS 314.7 Procurement

File. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Eugene F. Lennon, Jr., 27 May 58. Lennon was in the Chemical

Commodity Division in World War II. 70

 DANC was a solution of a chemical compound known as RH 195 in acetylene tetrachloride. 71

 Noyes, Chemistry, pp. 184-87.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 337

The CWS modified fire extinguishers and garden sprayers for the application of DANC, and adapted commercial orchard sprayers for the discharge of volumes of bleach water mixtures (slurry) over large contaminated

areas. Every vehicle going overseas was equipped with a l1⁄2- quart decontaminating apparatus and every company in the Army was furnished a

5-gallon unit. The Army issued power driven apparatus to CWS decontaminating companies and to the Armored Force and Air Force squadrons.

In the spring of 1941 the CWS contracted with the F. E. Myers and

Brothers Co., Ashland, Ohio, a manufacturer of pumps and orchard sprayers, for six power driven models. On the basis of these models, which

the company delivered in June 1941, the CWS wrote specifications for the

power driven decontaminating apparatus. After the outbreak of war the

Myers Co. continued to manufacture the item. In March 1942 two additional companies, Friend Manufacturing Co., Gasport, N.Y., and John

Bean Manufacturing Co., Lansing, Mich., got into production. Later A. B.

Farquhar of York, Pa., was awarded a contract. These companies found

the item so difficult to manufacture that the CWS Inspection Division

deemed it advisable first to approve numerous changes in the specifications

and eventually to authorize a performance-type specification for the item.

The apparatus (M3 and M3A1) which these companies manufactured

for the CWS in 1942 and 1943 consisted of a 400-gallon wooden tank

mounted on a 21⁄2-ton truck with a pump and slurry agitator powered by

a take-off from the engine of the truck. It was capable of spraying 400

gallons of the mixture in twenty minutes.72 For more efficient spraying a

separate portable water heater was furnished in 1943.73 Each manufacturer

applied a pump of his own design to the apparatus which in effect put

four models instead of one into the supply system. The item went into

production before the CW Board had carried out extensive tests on the

possible corrosive effects of the slurry. Upon investigation the board found

that the slurry corroded not only the wooden tanks but also the pumps.

The tanks could be cleaned—a difficult task to be sure—but there was

nothing left to do with regard to the pumps but to require that they be

made of noncorrosive materials. Friend Manufacturing Co. already had a

pump with ceramic cylinder lining which was satisfactory. But Myers,

Bean, and Farquhar had to change their pumps, an undertaking that proved

onerous because of low CWS priorities. After the introduction of the hot

bleach system it was found that the rate of corrosion became much more 72

 TM 3-221, 15 Apr 43, p. 3. 73

 TM 3-228, 15 Aug 44, p. 1.
338 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

rapid. The practice of heating the slurry was nevertheless desirable since,

as already indicated, it made for a much more effective spray. In fact in

cold weather heating the liquid was a necessity.

The Quartermaster Corps and later the Ordnance Department furnished

the trucks on which the apparatus was mounted. Ordnance experienced

so much difficulty procuring these trucks that in the spring of 1943 the

CWS standardized a skid mounted apparatus (M4).74

 As its name indicates, this model was constructed on skids, and in such a manner that it

could be hauled on a 21⁄2-ton truck. The apparatus, with pump and agitator powered by a 22-horsepower gasoline engine, could spray the contents of its tank for about twenty minutes.75

 As with the previous model,

each manufacturer of the skid mounted apparatus, proceeded to make his

own type of pump. In procuring this new apparatus the CWS was faced

with the problem of obtaining an engine to run the apparatus pump, because with the elimination of the truck engine, the system of power takeoff was also eliminated. Three of the companies had no trouble obtaining

motors of the Continental and Novo variety, but the fourth, A. B.

Farquhar, did experience difficulty. For a time the Ordnance Department

supplied Ford motors that Farquhar could use, but that source of supply

soon dried up. Following a suggestion of the Farquhar Co., the CWS approached Sears, Roebuck and Co. with a request to supply Ford motors.

But Sears furnished only Ford blocks into which parts had to be assembled. To accomplish the latter task, the CWS awarded a contract to a St.

Louis firm which scoured every conceivable source of supply—junk yards,

secondhand stores, auto supply stores—for parts and assembled them into

the blocks. These rebuilt motors were shipped to Farquhar and incorporated into the decontaminating unit.

Discouraging though this procurement program was, the CWS might

have continued with it but for general dissatisfaction with the skid mounted

apparatus. No one liked its lack of mobility. By 1943, moreover, complaints

were coming in from the theater on the lack of interchangeability of the

parts of the various apparatus. The CWS therefore decided to standardize

the most satisfactory truck mounted model, the unit produced by John

Bean Manufacturing Co. From that time until the close of hostilities Bean

was the sole manufacturer of power driven decontaminating apparatus.76

Few pieces of CWS equipment saw so much application overseas as

74

 CWTC Item 701, 23 Apr 43. 75

 TM 3-222, 5 Feb 44, p. 1. 76

 This model was the M3A2. See TM 3-223, 26 Jul 44.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 339

did these large decontaminating units. In the absence of gas warfare they

were used as emergency fire fighting apparatus, water "haulers, field showers, high pressure equipment cleaners, and later as large-volume spray

apparatus in insect control operations. Both the hand operated decontaminating apparatus and the M10 airplane spray tank were also used to spray

insecticides.

The 11⁄2- quart hand decontaminator, M2, was essentially a modifi

commercial fire extinguisher. Several concerns, notably the Fyr-Fyter Co.

of Dayton, Ohio, General Detroit Corp. of Detroit, and the Badger Fire

Extinguisher Co. of Somerville, Mass., produced the item for the CWS

during the first years of the war. There were difficulties in connection with

the heavy consumptions of brass sheets and strips required for the M2.

Copper and copper alloys were critical items, and the ASF would have

welcomed a decontaminator constructed of other materials. But though

such an item had reached the design stage by 1943, it did not get into

production before the program ended. A major problem, both in the production model and the testing of substitutes, was the corrosive character

of the decontaminating material with which the M2 was charged. Pyrex

valves replaced steel because of this factor, and new spray nozzles and valve

seats had to be designed. Total production of the M2 hand decontaminators reached a rate of over one hundred and thirty thousand per month

in the spring of 1943, and more than a million had been turned out when

the program was terminated in October of that year. Limited production

was resumed early in 1945 and continued until the end of the war.77

The 3 — gallon decontaminating apparatus, Ml, like the powe

types, was adapted to CWS purposes from an agricultural sprayer. Again,

the corrosive nature of the charge made certain design and material changes

necessary. More than two hundred and seventy-five thousand M1 decontaminators were procured from industry by the New York and Chicago

procurement districts between 1941 and 1943.78

Miscellaneous Protective Items

In 1938-39 the CWS, in co-operation with the Vortexol Co., Sangus,

Mass., developed an impregnite to protect shoes against toxic agents. In 77

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 7, pp. 61-65. (2) History of the Chicago CWPD,

1 Jan 45-15 Aug 45, pp. 79-81. (3) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 245-47. (4) Memo,

Col J. E. Butterworth to Requirements Br ASF, 2 Apr 43, sub: Brass Sheet and Strip for Apparatus, Decontaminating, 1 1/2 quart. CG, ASF, 475.9 Equipment, CWS. (5) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 2. 78

 (1) History of the Chicago CWPD, 1 Jan 45-15 Aug 45, p. 81. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 2.
340 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the summer of 1940 the chiefs office awarded an educational order contract on shoe impregnite to Baldwin Laboratories, Seagerstown, Pa., a subsidiary of Robinson Industries, Inc. This educational order provided for

the contractor (1) to prepare a factory plan and design for CWS approval,

(2) upon approval of this plan to procure and install necessary equipment

for the manufacture of the item, and (3) to produce 125 tons of the

product during a 25-day period in order to prove the design and capacity

of the plant. This contract proved very successful and Robinson Industries

became one of the chief wartime producers of shoe impregnite. Not only

did this concern produce a high grade product, but it also paid close attention to plant safety and co-operated in an exemplary manner with later

contractors. Among the most successful of these were the Ernest Bischoff

Co., Inc., which manufactured the product at its Memphis, Tenn., plant,

and the National Oil Products Co., which produced the material at its

Cedartown, Ga., plant. Over seventy million 8-ounce cans of shoe impregnite were procured.79

The CWS procured over six and a half million dust respirators in

World War II.

 80

 This item, which was designed to protect drivers of heavy

vehicles from dust, consisted of a faceblank with a layer of filtering material, webbing, and inlet and outlet valves. The most critical component

was the facepiece, which was manufactured by some half dozen rubber

companies and which, because of its peculiar design, gave rise to several

molding problems. Another difficulty that arose was the tendency of the

respirator to build up high air resistance. This condition was caused by

the type of cloth filter material used, and to overcome it the CWS modified the filter material.81

To satisfy the Army demand for eyeshields the CWS procured almost

72,000,000 of them through private contracts.82 The eyeshield consisted of

a cellulose acetate sheet (which was either clear or tinted), impermeable

cloth, webbing, and metal hardware. The cellulose acetate sheeting and

impermeable cloth were die cut and the webbing and hardware assembled

to these components. The assembly process was relatively simple. The eyeshields were packaged in packets of 4—2 clear and 2 tinted.83

79

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 7, pp. 58-60. (2) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD,

pp. 208-15. (3) Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, "Procurement," p. 22. 80

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 26. 81

 (1) History of the Boston CWPD, vol. 7, pp. 1-9. (2) Ltr, Paul A. Longo to Hist Off, 15 Apr

58. Mr. Longo assisted in the administration of the dust respirator and eyeshield programs in the

New York Procurement District in World War II. 82

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 12. 83

 Ibid.
PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 341

Other miscellaneous protective items which the CWS procured under

contract were gas resistant aprons, made of impermeable cloth and intended

for use by certain Medical Corps and CWS troops; gas resistant sacks for

shipment of contaminated clothing to decontaminating stations; and various items for detecting such gases as vesicant detector crayons and liquid

vesicant detector paper and paint.

Most of the defensive items which the CWS procured were intended

for protection against gas warfare, although certain of them such as the

decontaminating apparatus and the eyeshield proved useful in nongas warfare situations. Most offensive items, on the other hand, were intended

for nongas warfare uses. These included such weapons as the incendiary

bomb, the smoke generator, and the flame thrower, all of which the service procured in great numbers. The CWS also procured a considerable

number of 4.2-inch chemical mortars and shells. The mortar, though originally designed to fire toxic shells, was used during the war to fire high

explosives.

Problems of manufacture of CWS defensive items sprang chiefly from

the attempt to put items that had not been fully developed into mass production. Of all these items the gas mask had been developed to the greatest

degree, yet the pressure to produce new models during the war gave rise

to many manufacturing difficulties. Such items as protective ointments, detector kits, and decontaminating apparatus were at primitive states of development when the CWS awarded production contracts for them.

Development of these items proceeded simultaneously with their production.
CHAPTER XV

Procurement of Offensive Matériel

Among the offensive munitions which the CWS procured in World

War II were incendiaries of various types, 4.2 inch mortars and shells, flame

throwers, smoke, and smoke munitions.

Incendiaries

The M54 Thermate Bomb

Even before the Secretary of War officially notified the Chief, CWS,

of his responsibility for the entire incendiary bomb program,1 General

Porter was authorized on 28 August 1941 to procure over twenty-five million 4-pound incendiary bombs with magnesium bodies at a cost of something under $50,000,000. On 20 September, after a decision by the General Staff, procurement of fifteen million more bombs was approved,

bringing the aggregate to forty million incendiary bombs.2 General Porter

took immediate steps to obtain these bombs, assigning direct responsibility

to Col. Joachim E. Zanetti whom he appointed chief of a newly activated

Incendiaries Branch, Technical Service, OC CWS.3 After surveying a number of industrial facilities the CWS began awarding contracts for the assembly and filling of the bombs as well as for the procurement of metal

components.

On the very day that Pearl Harbor was attacked The Adjutant General telephoned General Porter's office and advised that over sixty-nine

1

 See ch. VIII above. 2

 Memo, ExO Contl Div, OC CWS, for C CWS, 30 Nov 42, sub: Chronology of Events on

Requirements of 4-lb Incendiary Bomb. CWS 314.7 Incendiary File. 3

 Organization Chart, OC CWS, 18 Sep 41.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 343

million dollars still available to the Chief of Ordnance from funds originally estimated for the incendiary bomb program would be suballotted to

the Chief, CWS. Before another two weeks elapsed contracts for assembling and filling twenty million incendiary bombs had been awarded to

thirteen contractors throughout all the various procurement districts.4 Construction of new manufacturing and loading facilities for incendiaries was

meanwhile progressing at Pine Bluff and Huntsville Arsenals. Actual requirements for the 4-pound incendiary, as covered by the first supplemental

appropriation act, Fiscal Year 1942, totaled over seventy-four million bombs,

but since there was no possibility of obtaining magnesium, the steel body

thermate bomb (M54) had to be substituted. For this reason the Office

of the Under Secretary of War had held the requirements for the time

being to twenty million bombs.5

In letting contracts for the M54 bomb the chief's office directed each

procurement district to start negotiations with a minimum of five competent firms for the metal components and subassemblies. Prime contractors were required to subcontract at least 40 percent of the dollar value

of their contracts. This provision was aimed at spreading the contracts

through certified distressed areas and industries, which still existed in the

period of initial war production. The procurement districts awarded these

contracts to firms with experience in manufacturing such items as vacuum

cleaners, oil filters, and household appliances. While this commercial background was valuable, it was inevitable that problems should arise in the

manufacture of new items. The most serious difficulty was fitting the nose

and tail to the hexagonal bomb body. The contractors found it hard to

obtain the services of qualified tool makers, engineers, and plant inspectors.6

4

 (1) Memo, C Ind Svc, OC CWS, for A. H. Browning, SOS, 26 Mar 42, sub: The 4-lb Incendiary Bomb. (2) Memo, ExO Contl Div, OC CWS, for C CWS, 30 Nov 42, sub: Chronology

of Events on Requirements of 4-lb Incendiary Bomb. Both CWS 314.7 Incendiary File. (3) Advance Weekly Rpt CWS, No. 33, to Statistics Br, OUSW, 24 Dec 41. CWS 319.1/70. 5

 (1) Memo, Lt Col Charles E. Loucks, ExO to C CWS, for Brig Gen H. K. Rutherford, OUSW,

26 Sep 41, sub: Outline of General Plan Incidental to the Procurement of Incendiary Bombs. (2)

Memo, ExO Contl Div, OC CWS, for C CWS, 30 Nov 42, sub: Chronology of Events in Requirements of 4-lb Incendiary Bomb. Both in CWS 314.7 Incendiary File. 6

 (1) History of the Chicago CWPD, 1 July 1940 through 31 December 1944, p. 70. (2)

Memo for District Executives, Boston, et al., 11 Oct 41, sub: General Plan for Procurement of

Incendiary Bombs. Chicago CWPD 471.6 Bombs 1941. (3) Memo, C Ind Svc, OC CWS, for

USW, 24 Dec 41, sub: Report of Accomplishments, Pending Difficulties in Connection with

Procurement and Production Activities of CWS. CWS 400.12/106-139. (4) Interv, Hist Off with

Col W. P. F. Brawner, 18 Mar 57. Colonel Brawner was Chief, Production Division, San Francisco

CWPD, and later Executive Officer, Industrial Division, OC CWS. (5) Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. VII.
344 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

These production and manpower experiences foreshadowed the more pronounced snarls of the later war period both in private industry and in

government installations.

The CWS awarded separate contracts for the final assembly and loading

of the bomb. The service aimed at confining this type of contract to

peacetime manufacturers of fireworks, powder, and explosives. This objective was not always possible, and CWS loading contractors included a wallpaper manufacturer in Chicago and a stove manufacturer on the west coast.

The loading contracts required the government to furnish all items including various fire ingredients such as barium nitrate, grained and flaked

aluminum, black powder, and thermite.7 The need for these and other

chemicals in manufacturing incendiary bombs led to unprecedented demands

on the chemical industry. For example, before the war only about four

hundred tons of barium nitrate per year were manufactured in the United

States; the incendiary bomb program required over twice that amount each

month. Again, the one producer of thermite in the country turned out

about fifty tons a month; the CWS needs rose to over two thousand tons

per month. To supply the additional chemicals a number of new plants

had to be constructed for the manufacture of barium nitrate and grained

aluminum. The facilities of the ceramic industry, which were found to be

lying idle because of WPB restrictions, were adapted to the manufacture

of thermite.8

Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Under Secretary of War

directed the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service to "take all measures

necessary to expedite so far as possible the delivery of incendiary bombs."

 9

In January 1942 the OC CWS, after hearing from the War Production

Board that magnesium would be available by May or June, notified each

of five procurement district offices to arrange for the purchase of components of the M50 bomb.10

 The district offices began immediately to negotiate contracts for components and for casting magnesium bomb bodies.

7

 (1) Memo, C Ind Svc, OC CWS, for Executives, Boston, New York, Pittsburgh, Chicago,

and San Francisco Districts, 11 Oct 41, sub: General Plan for Procurement of Incendiary Bombs.

Chicago CWPD 471.6. (2) Ltr, C Ind Svc, OC CWS, to USW, 15 Oct 41, sub: General Plan .for

Procurement of Incendiary Bombs. CWS 471.6/48. 8

 (1) History of the New York CWPD, vol. 1, p. 169. (2) G. H. McIntyre, "Ferro's War

Story," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, II (October 1947), 12-15. 9

 The quotation appears in Memo, C Ind Svc, OC CWS, for ExO Chicago CWPD, 11 Dec 41.

Chicago CWPD 471.6 Bombs 1941. 10

 Ltr, C CWS to CG SOS, 4 Mar 42, sub: Status of Procurement Program for 4-lb Incendiary

Bomb. CWS 471.6/29.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 345

The Magnesium Bomb

Magnesium was one of the most critical of wartime metals, in the emergency period the sole producer of the metal in this country was the Dow

Chemical Co., which in 1939 turned out a peak peacetime quantity of

6,700,000 pounds.11 Concern over the need for far greater amounts of magnesium for war needs led to a government loan to the Permanente Metals

Corp., organized by Henry J. Kaiser, to build a new plant at Permanente,

Calif. in 1941. About the same time the Defense Plant Corp. (DPC) initia.ted construction of other magnesium plants. By 1943 the DPC had built

13 new plants, which were operated under private contract for the government.12

 For three consecutive years in World War II the CWS took

more than one third of all the magnesium produced in the United States

for the magnesium bomb program.13 Total CWS procurement of the metal

from 1942 to 1945 amounted to over 288,000,000 pounds.14 The service

wrote contracts with the individual producers for magnesium alloy used

in the manufacture of the incendiary munition.15

The magnesium bomb (M50) had a magnesium body and a cast iron

nose, the body being molded around the nose. Casting of the bomb body

in permanent type molds was a new art which made it possible to produce the bombs in large quantities in a relatively short time, at a reasonable cost, and without undue use of critical raw materials. Neither the

Germans nor the Japanese developed the art of casting this type of bomb

in molds and throughout the war both nations continued to machine the

bomb bodies. American manufacturers at first developed their own individual manufacturing techniques, but eventually, with the co-operation of

the CWS, they set up a steering committee to exchange information.16

Among the very successful CWS contractors on this vital work were

the International Silver Co. of Meriden, Conn; L. E. Mason Co. of Hyde

Park, Mass.; Dow Chemical Co. of Midland, Mich.; the Permanente

11

 Statement of Hans A. Klagsbrunn, Executive Vice President, Defense Plant Corporation,

and Deputy Director, Surplus Property, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 27 Feb 45, Hearings

Before Senate Small Business Committee on Aluminum and Magnesium, p. 1. 12

 See Hans A. Klagsbrunn, "Wartime Aluminum and Magnesium Production," Industrial and

Engineering Chemistry, vol. 37 (July 1945), 608-17. 13

 H. B. Comstock, Magnesium, Reprint from Bulletin 556, Bureau of Mines, 1955, p. 6. 14

 Consolidated Chemical Commodity Report, 16 Oct 51, p. 97. 15

 The alloy consisted of approximately 95 percent magnesium and 5 percent of alum, zinc, and

manganese. 16

 Ltr, Lt Col A. C. Hamilton to Hist Off, 11 Sep 57. Colonel Hamilton supervised the incendiary bomb program in the Boston CWPD in World War II.
346 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Metals Corp. of Permanente, Calif.; the American Radiator and Standard

Sanitary Corp. of Richmond, Calif.; and the Austin Bridge Co. of Dallas,

Tex. In May 1942 the first M50's came off the production line in the New

York procurement district.17 A problem that arose in the manufacture of

the bomb body was its tendency to oxidize or "bloom." The oxidation

was caused by flux left on the body after the casting operation. The flux

was a magnesium chloride compound used on the surface of the molten

metal to prevent fires. When a worker dipped his ladle into the melting

pot he often picked up some of the flux with the magnesium alloy. Although workers were instructed to push away as much of the flux as possible, they could not entirely eliminate it. In order to remove the substance

and thus prevent the oxidation of the bomb, the bodies were pickled after

casting. The pickling was generally performed by contractors in the pickling

business.18 In the fall of 1942 the Dow Chemical Co. conducted a study

of "bloomed" bombs and concluded that "blooming" was harmful only

when it was so pronounced as to prevent the bombs from being tied in

bundles, that a wire brush could be used to good effect to eradicate the

"bloom," and that as a preventative bomb bodies should be filled as soon

as possible after casting and packed in airtight shipping cases.19

Another complication in the manufacture of the bomb was the formation of black deposits on the body during casting. It was found that bodies with such deposits would cause fires if rubbed against a metallic substance. By mid-1944 a million and a half of such bombs were segregated

and shipped to Pine Bluff Arsenal for storage. A study conducted by representatives of the CWS and the bomb manufacturers disclosed that the

deposits were caused by lack of sufficient sulphur dioxide to keep air out

of the mold. After considerable experimentation researchers found that the

deposit could be prevented to a large degree by regulating the casting temperature, using more sulphur dioxide, cleaning the mold frequently, and

taking care to eliminate flux.20

A series of explosions in bomb loading plants plagued the CWS in

the spring of 1942. Over a 6-week period in March and April four explo17

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 9. 18 The bombs were dropped into a stainless steel tank containing a pickling solution. This tank

was suspended in another tank in which cold water circulated. 19

 (1) Ltr, Maj J. C. Thompson, Plant Representative, to C CWS, 30 Nov 42, sub: "Blooming" of Magnesium Bomb Bodies. Chicago CWPD 471.6 Bombs 1942. (2) J. E. Gilbert, Development of 4-lb Incendiary Bomb AN-M50A2. TDMR 1224, 4 Mar 46. 20

 (1) History of Chicago CWPD, 1 Jul 40 through 31 Dec 44, p. 74. (2) History of Boston

CWPD, vol. 11, pp. 22-25. (3) C. E. Miller, Desensitization of "Black Deposits" on M50 Bomb

Bodies. TCIR 143, 17 Jun 44.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 347

sions occurred which resulted in eight fatalities. The CWS was so concerned that it shut down the loading plants for several weeks pending an

investigation and study by representatives of the Ordnance Department,

the CWS, and the loading contractors.21

The general causes of the explosion were plain enough. The CWS had

taken over a partially developed bomb from the Ordnance Department

and under pressure from the War Department had put it into production

without adequate lead time. In doing this the CWS did not insist that

loading contractors construct explosive proof buildings and use the best

safety procedures in filling the bombs. Actually no one knew exactly what

the best procedures were, as is indicated by the fact that the War Department had previously classified incendiaries as pyrotechnics instead of explosives. In fact, one of the explosions had occurred at the loading plant

at Huntsville Arsenal.22

Although the specific causes of the explosions were not fully resolved,

investigators learned enough to realize the need for certain changes. One

of these related to the handling of the mix that was loaded into the bombs;

the decision was made that it should be handled in small batches—100 to

200 pounds. The second change indicated was the need for better housekeeping to prevent the accumulation of dust, to insure proper ventilation

of the building, and to provide for the installation of conductive flooring

as a means of preventing static electricity.23

Oil Bombs

After the M69 6-pound oil bomb was successfully tested at Jefferson

Proving Ground in July 1942,24 the CWS awarded an experimental con21

 (1) Memo, C Ind Svc, OC CWS, for USW, 23 Apr 42, sub: Report of Accomplishments,

Pending Difficulties in Connection with Procurement and Production Activities of CWS. CWS

400.12/106-139. (2) Joint Conference Commanding Officers of all Districts, Chiefs Incendiary

Plants of all Arsenals, and Chief Inspectors and/or safety officers, and all executives and plant

superintendents at 9:30 a.m. May 2, 1942, Room 5127, New War Department Bldg., on Loading

Hazards in Incendiary Bomb Loading Plants. Chicago CWPD 471.6 Bombs 1942. Hereafter referred to as Joint Conference on Loading Hazards. 22

 Joint Conference on Loading Hazards. It is nevertheless true that efficient loading contractors who had previous experience in the loading of explosives, such as Federal Laboratories, Saltzburg, Pa., experienced no difficulty. This company's plants were constructed in strict accordance

with the "Tables of Distances for Explosive Plants" prescribed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Interv, Hist Off with C. R. Weinert, Technical Director, Federal Laboratories, 14 Nov 57.

Mr. Weinert supervised the World War II loading operations at this plant. 23

 (1) Joint Conference on Loading Hazards. (2) CWS Safety Bulletin No. 1, 6 Mar 42, sub:

Safety Requirements for the Loading and Handling of AN-M54 and AN-M54X Incendiary

Bombs. CWS 314.7 Incendiary File. 24

 (1) See ch. VIII above. (2) History of New York CWPD, 1 Jul 44 to 14 Aug 45, p. 264.
348 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

tract for 52,000 of the bombs to the American Machine Defense Corp.,

New York City. In the fall, after the AAF had indicated heavy requirements for the bomb, the chiefs office directed the procurement districts

to award contracts for components and filling of the M69. As in the case

of the thermate and magnesium bombs, the contracts were of two general

types: (1) those for the bomb casing and its components, and (2) those

for loading, assembling, clustering, packing, and marking the bomb. In

the manufacture of the bomb casing the most difficult problem encountered was brazing the nose of the bomb body. Specifications called for

copper brazing, but since copper brazing equipment was in short supply

other metals which melted at lower temperatures were used. For example,

a New York district contractor employed brass as a weld while several

New England contractors used silver solder.25 The CWS awarded loading,

clustering, packing, and marking contracts to firms in the East, the Midwest, and the Far West. The bombs were also loaded under private contract at the CWS Firelands Plant, Marion, Ohio, and Huntsville Arsenal

produced over 4,000,000 M69 bombs, which it assembled into more than

111,000 clusters.26

In the summer of 1943 the CWS interrupted the M69 procurement

program, terminating all existing contracts. The main reason for this action was dissatisfaction with the quick opening cluster, which had not yet

been replaced by the aimable cluster. The design of the bomb itself also

needed improvement. Early in 1944 technicians developed and put into

production an aimable cluster and in the spring the procurement districts

began awarding contracts on an improved M69 bomb. This later phase of

the M69 program turned out to be much more satisfactory than the earlier

phase. With CWS encouragement the contractors set up an integrating

committee, which met at frequent intervals with representatives of the CWS

in an effort to solve specific manufacturing problems. These meetings were

alternately held at various manufacturing plants, thus enabling the contractors to inspect each other's facilities.27

In the summer of 1943, meanwhile, the procurement districts began to

let contracts for the production of casings for the M74 10-pound oil bomb.

25

 (1) Ibid., p. 266. (2) History of Boston CWPD, 1940-1944, vol. 12, p. 6. 26

 (1) History of Pittsburgh CWPD, p. 222. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through

31 Dec 45, p. 10. (3) Memo, Dr. L. Wilson Greene for Hist Off, 17 Sep 57. Dr. Greene was a

CWS officer at Huntsville Arsenal in World War II. 27

 (1) History of the New York CWPD, 1 Jul 44 to 14 Aug 45, pp. 220-38. (2) History of

the Boston CWPD, vol. 12, p. 7. (3) History of Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 221-23.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 349

But not until the following summer did this program get actively under

way. In the manufacture of this bomb, no less than in the M69, difficulties arose. For example, the copper brazing of the bomb presented a problem. It was essential that all components fit correctly before the brazing

operation, which was carried out in special electrical furnaces built by the

General Electric Co. The CWS had to furnish the contractors with these

furnaces and most of the other equipment used in making the bomb. The

most serious problem encountered in the bomb body was the fabrication

of the nosecup. This cup, which measured 31/2 inches in length by 2 3/4

inches in diameter, with a wall thickness of 1/8 inch, required 17 different

operations. Since ordinary steel dies could not stand the strain, carboloy

dies were developed.

As with other small incendiary bombs, the M74 was loaded and clustered not only under private contract, but at certain CWS arsenals as well.

Rocky Mountain and Huntsville Arsenals loaded, clustered, and packed

this bomb.28 No serious complication arose in filling the M74, but the

M142 fuze caused a considerable amount of trouble. The design of this

fuze, which was manufactured under private contract at the Ordnance Firelands Plant, Marion, Ohio, was such that visual observation did not reveal

whether the fuze was armed. After several accidents caused by explosion

of the fuze, the CWS changed contractors. The new contractor, the Ferro

Enamel Corp., initiated a number of changes to improve safety and handling procedures, which resulted in satisfactory working conditions and a

satisfactory fuze.29

Since the M74 bomb was designed to penetrate light structures and to

eject its incendiary charge in the most vulnerable interior locations, it was

regarded as a prime weapon against Japanese structures. The ASF and the

CWS therefore rated the procurement of the M74 bomb among the most

urgent wartime programs.30 By the spring of 1945 AAF requirements for

the M74 bomb, in anticipation of the invasion of Japan, reached a scale

that called for the CWS to multiply its M74 component facilities by five

and its loading lines by better than three. At the same time the AAF stepped

28

 (1) History of RMA, vol. IX, pp. 2773-78. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through

31 Dec 45, p. 9. 29

 Ltr, CO HA to C CWS, 22 Dec 44, sub: Fuze, Bomb, M142, and inds. CWS 471, HA-44. 30

 (1) Ltr, Asst C Ind Div, OC CWS to CG ASF, 27 Oct 44, sub: Request for Authorization

to Assign AA-1 Preference Rating in the Amount of $500,000 for Critical Equipment Required for

M74 Incendiary Bomb. (2) Memo, Dir Prod Div ASF for C CWS, 27 Oct 44, sub: Request for AA-1

Rating for Critical Equipment Required for M74 Incendiary Bomb Program. Both in Chicago

CWPD 471.6 Bombs M74, 1944.
350 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

up requirements for the M50 to a point where CWS facilities would have

to be more than doubled.31 The war ended before this expansion could

be carried out.

Large Incendiary Bombs

The Ordnance Department furnished the bomb bodies for the M47

(100-pound) and M76 (500-pound) bombs which the CWS filled in its

own facilities.32 Edgewood, Rocky Mountain, and Pine Bluff arsenals filled

M47's, while Edgewood, Huntsville, and the CWS Firelands Plant filled

M76's.33

Large facilities and equipment were needed for filling heavy incendiary

bombs. For example, at Pine Bluff a tank farm was set up consisting of

eight 20,000-gallon tanks. Four centrifugal pumps were used to pump gasoline from car tanks to these storage tanks to the reactor room. The reactor room, one of the largest buildings at the arsenal, was equipped with

four 1,000-gallon reactors to prepare the gel for filling the bombs.34 Plants

of this type were set up to perform operations that had no counterpart

in industry. It was inevitable that changes in operations would have to

be made on the basis of experience.

Napalm 35

The manufacture of napalm, the metallic soap used to thicken gasoline to form a fill for incendiary bombs and a fuel for flame throwers,

31

 Report, CWS Procurement Conference held at Boston CWPD, 24-25 Apr 45, p. 24. CWS

314.7 Procurement File. 32

 (1) Ltr, C CWS to C Ord, 11 Apr 42, sub: Procurement of Bombs, Incendiary, Liquid M47

(100-lb) and 1st and 2d Inds. CWS 471.6/251-290. (2) Ltr, C Insp Div OC CWS to C Insp Off

RMA, 24 Jun 44, sub: M47 Bombs. CWS 471.6 Edgewood Arsenal (Jan through Jun 44). 33

 (1) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 4. (2) Ltr, Mr. Sebastian

Kessler to Hist Off, 11 Dec 57. Mr. Kessler was CWS engineer at the Firelands Plant in World

War II. (3) Some M47 bombs were also filled in the theaters. See Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell,

Chemicals in Combat. 34

 Preliminary History of Pine Bluff Arsenal (World War II), sec. VII. 35

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on (1) History of the San Francisco CWPD in

World War II, pp. 82-83; (2) History of Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 227-28; (3) History of Chemical Commodity Procurement, 1 Aug 44-13 Nov 45, pp. 67-69; (4) Interv, Hist Off with Benjamin M. Redmerski, 10 Jun 58. Redmerski was an officer in charge of production of napalm in the

NYCWPD throughout World War II; (5) Ltr, Redmerski to Hist Off, 10 Jul 58; (6) Interv,

Hist Off with Maj Eugene F. Lennon, Jr, 16 May 58. (7) Baum, Columbia University Chemical

Warfare Service Laboratories, pp. 52-59. (8) G. H. McIntyre, "Ferro's War Story," Armed Forces

Chemical Journal, II, (October 1947), 14-15. (9) K. E. Long, "The Harshaw War Story," Ibid.,

II, (January 1948), 48-49.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 351

presented unforeseen problems. Prospective contractors did a great deal of

development work at their own expense before any procurement contracts

were awarded. The CWS required proof of performance by actually testing samples of the material at Edgewood and at the CWS laboratory in

New York City and awarded contracts only to those firms that appeared

capable of producing. These contractors included Nuodex Products Co.,

Elizabeth, N.J.; Imperial Paper and Color Corp., Glens Falls, N.J.; Ferro

Enamel Corp. and McGean Chemical Corp., both of Cleveland, Ohio, and

California Ink Co. and Oronite Chemical Co., both of San Francisco, Calif.

These contractors almost invariably believed that the production of napalm

would be a relatively simple matter, much like the manufacture of a commercial soap. In this they were mistaken, as experience soon demonstrated.

While the same general processes were employed as in the manufacture

of other soaps, napalm had to have standard components and low moisture content in all stages of its manufacture.

One of the item's chief components, naphthenic acid, was a by-product

of the petroleum refining process. Since oil from Venezuela and Aruba

was rich in that particular acid, it was essential that the producers obtain

the oil from those sources. Frequently they could do this by direct contact with commercial handlers, but often the CWS had to assist in securing

a supply. Because naphthenic acid was also used as a paint drier and because many paints, particularly those of the quick drying variety, were war

requirements, the War Production Board found it necessary to allocate

naphthenic acid.

A second important component of napalm, coconut fatty acid, was obtained by boiling and pressing the kernel of dried coconut known as copra.

This product, which was also used in the manufacture of shortenings and

commercial soaps, was imported. Since many of the coconut producing regions were in war zones, it became very difficult to obtain copra during

the war.

Next to the difficulty of securing consistently pure components, the

chief problem that arose in producing napalm was its required low moisture content. If the moisture content of napalm was too high, it would

result in an ineffective and short-lived mix. Various measures were employed to overcome this difficulty, such as reducing the exposure time of

the soap to the surrounding humid atmosphere to a minimum, adding a

dehydrating agent to the gasoline along with the soap, and air-conditioning

the rooms in which the soap was exposed. The manufacturers used various methods to dry granular napalm. The United Wall Paper Co., for ex-
352 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ample, spread it thinly on wallpaper conveyers and passed it through a

heated room. Most contractors placed the powdered napalm on shallow

trays which were fitted into mobile racks and then pushed into drying ovens.

In May 1943 the chiefs office appointed an officer from the Industrial

Division to follow the napalm program closely and report progress to the

Production Division, ASF.36 The CWS laboratories at Edgewood and Columbia University, as well as the NDRC laboratory at Stanford University

did considerable research aimed at improving the manufacture of napalm.

In addition, government contracts along this line were awarded to such

firms as Eastman Kodak Co., Ferro Drier and Chemical Co., Harshaw

Chemical Co., Shell Development Co., and Standard Oil Development Co.

Despite all these efforts the quality of the napalm continued to vary considerably and mixing problems beset the CWS and the using units

throughout the war.37

Procurement of the 4.2-Inch Mortar38

In directing that two battalions of troops be supplied with 4.2-inch

mortars, the Chief of Staff in September 1941 revoked an earlier directive

of 19 July 1938 which had suspended the manufacture of the mortar.39

The decision to supply two battalions presented the Chief, CWS, with an

immediate problem of procurement. General Porter's office turned to the

Chicago procurement district office, because the 4.2-inch mortar had been

allocated to the Crane Co. of Chicago under the prewar procurement plan.

But by the fall of 1941 that company was working on other war contracts

with higher priority and could not undertake the manufacture of the mortar. The Chicago district office therefore secured bids from five other

manufacturers, two of whom were awarded contracts—the Bell Machine

Co. of Oshkosh, Wis., and the Oakes Products Division of HoudailleHershey Co., Decatur, 111. The Bell Machine Co. concentrated on the manu36

 Memo, C Facilities & Inspec Br for Dir, Prod Div, ASF. 22 May 43, sub: Fillers for M47, or

M47A1, and M69 Incendiary Bombs. ASF 471.6 Grenade Bombs. 37

 See Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat. 38

 Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on the History of the Chicago CWPD, 1 July

1940 through 31 December 1944, pp. 59-62, 1 January 1945-15 August 1945, pp. 51-52, and

interviews with M. A. Bell, manufacturer of the 4.2-inch mortar (4 April 1957) and with the following key officers who were intimately acquainted with the manufacture of the mortar: Col Gilbert C. White (4 April 1957), Lt Col Walter E. Spicer, Jr., (28 April 1955), Lt Col J. S. Entriken

(21 June 1956), and Lt Col Robert C. Hinckley (15 October 1956). 39

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for TAG, 5 Sep 41, sub: Chemical Troops, G-3/46556. The 19 July

1938 directive, among others, is referred to in Memo, ACofS, G-4 for AC of SWPD, 28 Mar 40,

sub: Lack of Chemical Warfare Weapons and Supplies. G-4/29895-1.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 353

facture of the barrel, while the Oakes Products Division made the carts

for the mortar.40 Other contracts were let for such parts as base plates,

recoil springs, and elevating screws.

The Bell Machine Co., a manufacturer of custom-made woodworking

machinery in peacetime, undoubtedly did not foresee the tough job it would

encounter in rifling the barrel of the mortar. The 4.2-inch barrel was unique

in U.S. Army munitions in that it employed ratchet type rifling rather

than the simple spiral rifling employed in small arms and in most field

pieces. This feature seriously complicated the broaching of the barrel, as

the Bell Co. and the CWS inspectors from the Chicago district shortly

came to learn.

Early in 1942 a broaching machine arrived at Oshkosh from Edgewood.

Some 56 barrels had been rifled on this machine when it was discovered

that 4 inches of the rifling toward the muzzle were defective. Little progress could be made in manufacturing the barrel until a suitable broaching

machine was obtained. To overcome the difficulty the OC CWS, awarded

a contract to the American Broach Co., Ann Arbor, for the design of a

new 35-ton hydraulic broach. This broach when put into operation was to

prove very satisfactory, but it was not ready for installation at the Bell

Machine Co. until June 1943. Meanwhile the manufacture of the barrels

had been delayed for more than a year. Only 823 barrels were manufactured in 1942, compared to 2,002 in 1943 and 2,600 in 1944.41

 By October 1944 the Bell plant had a capacity of 800 to 1,000 mortars a month,

but the production schedule called for only 200.42

While the rifling of the barrel was the most perplexing task encountered in producing the mortar, several other hitches arose. In each instance

these difficulties were the outgrowth of efforts to increase the range of

the mortar. Base plates and recoil springs broke and elevating screws bent.

The CWS laboratories at Edgewood and M.I.T. worked on these problems and, in addition, the service awarded contracts to private manufacturers who were specialists in particular items. For example, it awarded a

contract to A. O. Smith Corp. of Milwaukee to improve the welding technique employed in the manufacture of the base plate. This company did

an excellent job in working out the necessary preheating, positioning,

40

 Contracts W799-CWS-189 and 190. 41 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 24. 42

 Ltr, Lt Col C. B. Watkins, IGD, to Actg IG (through CO CCWPD, C CWS, and CG ASF),

26 Oct 44, sub: Special Inspection of CCWPD and Inspection Service, Chicago, Illinois. CWS.

333.1.
354 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

welding sequence, and heat treatment for a base plate suitable for CWS

purposes. The Pullman Standard Car Co. of Hammond, Ind., also worked

on the improvement of the base plate. L. A. Young Steel and Wire Co.

of Detroit provided the CWS with a greatly improved spring, while Foote

Brothers Gear and Machine Co. and the Lindberg Engineering Co., both

of Chicago, did much to perfect the elevating screw. By mid-1944 most

of the technical problems arising in the manufacture of the mortar had

been solved.43

In 1943, as indicated above, the CWS began to develop a recoilless

4.2-inch mortar. In September 1944 the service placed an experimental contract with the Budd Wheel Co. of Detroit for the manufacture of 25 of

the new recoilless mortars.44 After receiving these 25 prototype samples

the Office of the Chief directed the Chicago procurement district to investigate the possibility of procuring the item on a mass basis. Late in

1944 the Office of the Chief sent the drawings and specifications on the

new recoilless mortar to the Chicago procurement district with the view

of obtaining a contractor to produce the item on a mass production basis.

On examining the drawings and specifications, the Chicago district decided

that the most practicable procedure would be to superimpose the contract

on the Bell Machine Co. and on 24 January 1945 a letter of intent for

1,000 barrels was issued to that company. The Bell plant had to be retooled

for the new mortar, a process which proved very time consuming, and by

the war's end Bell had turned out only 100 of the models.45 Two days

after V-J Day 12 of these reached the Pacific theater.46

The CWS first conducted proofing of the mortar exclusively at Edgewood Arsenal, but beginning in late 1942 some mortars were also proofed

at Huntsville Arsenal. From mid-1943 until the spring of 1944 all mortars

were fired for acceptance inspection at Huntsville. The mortars were

shipped from the points of manufacture, assembled, and fired. Proofing

procedures consisted of firing sand filled shells, using a heavy propellant

43

 (1) T. R. Paulson, Development of the 4.2-inch Chemical Mortar E35R1, 18 Mar 46, TDMR

1202, p. 23. (2) Memo, C Proof Sec, Chemical Mortar Proof-testing Br Camp McCoy to C Insp

Office Chicago CWPD, 3 Oct 44, sub: Special Test on Elevating Screws. Chicago CWPD 472.4,

Chemical Mortars. (3) Report on 4.2-inch Mortar Base Plate by A. O. Smith Corp. ETF 2182-6. 44

 (1) Ltr, C Insp Off EA to C Insp Div, 6 Sep 44, sub: Mortar, Chemical, 4.2-Inch Recoilless, E34. (2) Memo, C Offense Matl Br for AC Mfg and Proc CWC EA, 6 Oct 44, sub: Status of

the 4.2-Inch Recoilless Chemical Mortar. Both in CWS 472.4. 45

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 24.

46 CWTC Item 1785, Obsoletion of the Mortar, Chemical, 4.2-Inch Recoilless, M4, and the

Shell, 4.2-Inch Recoilless Chemical Mortar, M6, with Cancellation of Related Military Requirements and Development Type Items, 25 Sep 47.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 355

charge. If found satisfactory, the mortars, together with mortar carts, were

shipped to the theaters of operation or points in the zone of interior.47

Since shipping the mortar parts to Edgewood and Huntsville caused

considerable delay, the CWS in the spring of 1944 investigated the possibility of acquiring a proofing site nearer the point of manufacture. After

arrangements were made in July 1944 all mortars were proofed at Camp

McCoy, Sparta, Wis., until the war was over.48

Procurement of the 4.2-Inch Mortar Shell49

In the prewar years the CWS procured 4.2-inch shells from Frankford

Ordnance Arsenal. While the Ordnance Department could supply the

peacetime needs of the CWS, it was in no position in mid-1940 to fill an

order for 47,626 E38R2 shells. The Office of the Chief was therefore obliged to obtain these shells through private contract. It directed the commanding officer of the Pittsburgh procurement district to send invitations

to bid to four likely contractors for machining, assembling, and packing

the shells. The lowest bidder was the H. K. Porter Co. of Pittsburgh, a

reputable manufacturer of industrial locomotives, diesel engines, and chemical processing equipment. Under the contract the government agreed to

furnish some $77,000 worth of equipment—government-furnished equipment being a common feature of wartime contracts. About the same time

that the Porter contract was awarded, other contracts were let to some

47

 (1) TT, CO Chicago CWPD to CO HA, 23 Dec 42. Chicago CWPD 472.4 Chemical Mortars 1942-1943. (2) Ltr, C Insp Div OC CWS to C Insp Off EA, 6 Jul 43, sub: Proofing and Reconditioning of Mortars. CWS 472.4 EA 43. (3) Ltr, C Insp Div OC CWS to C Insp Off HA,

14 Feb 44, sub: Responsibility of Inspection Office—Proofing of 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortars. CWS

472.4 HA 44. (4) History of Chemical Warfare Center, p. 248. (5) History of Huntsville Arsenal,

vol. 2, p. 785. 48

 (1) Hinckley interv, 15 Oct 56. (2) History of the Chicago CWPD, 1 Jan 45-15 Aug 45,

p. 52. 49

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on: (1) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD,

pp. 192-207. (2) History of the Chicago CWPD, 1 July 1940 through 31 December 1944, p. 63.

(3) History of the Dallas CWPD, February 1942-June 1944, pp. 93-97. (4) History of the Dallas CWPD, 1 July 1944-14 August 1945, p. 35. (5) History of the Boston CWPD, 1940-1944,

vol. 8, pp. 1-4. (6) History of San Francisco CWPD in World War II, pp. 76-78. (7) Analysis

of Chemical Warfare Service Pricing Record World War II, pp. 59-62. (8) Lt G. E. McCullough,

Engineering Test of 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Shell Experimental—Manufactured by the Scaife

Company. TDMR 348, 11 Feb 42. (9) Ltr, Ch Tech Div OC CWS to A. V. Murray, Scaife Co.,

3 Nov 44, with enclosure History of the Development of the Fabricated 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Shell, 31 Oct 44. SPCVF-141 Scaife Co., CWS 314.7 Procurement File. (10) Interv, Hist Off

with Paul A. Varley, 6 Nov 56. Varley was the CWS officer in charge of the mortar shell program

in the Pittsburgh CWPD in World War II. (11) Interv, Hist Off with C. E. Johnson, Vice President for Engineering, Scaife Co., 13 Nov 57. Johnson worked on mortar shell engineering in World

War II.
356 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

half dozen prime contractors for such components of the shell as the burster

tube well, the vane, the cartridge container, and the striker nut. A contract for forging shell bodies was awarded to the Pennsylvania Forge Co.50

In October 1941 the War Department authorized procurement of 160,879

more E38R2 shells; later this authorization was changed to 143,230 M2

shells and 33,584 M3 shells. The OC, CWS, directed the Pittsburgh district to procure these additional shells, whereupon the contracting officer

of that district sent invitations to bid to six prospective contractors. The

successful bidders were the Lempco Products Co. of Cleveland, a producer

of industrial machine tools, grinders, and equipment used in the automotive industry; the Hydril Corp., Rochester, Pa., a manufacturer of oil field

supplies and equipment; and the H. K. Porter Co. which was already working on the shell.

With the vast increase in requirements for 4.2-inch mortar ammunition, the CWS began to investigate the possibility of manufacturing the

shell more quickly and economically than by the forging process. In the

1930's the Ordnance Department in an effort to make a less expensive

shell had experimented with one fabricated from seamless steel tubing,

but this experiment had not proved successful.51 In the summer of 1941

the matter was brought up in a discussion between Maj. J. L. Rose of the

Office of the Chief and R. F. Cecil, vice president of the Scaife Co., Oakmont, Pa. The Scaife Co., a producer of boilers, pressure vessels, and commercial and domestic hot water tanks, specialized in the field of steel tubing.

Cecil suggested to Rose the possibility of fabricating the shell from commercial hot rolled tubing and of brazing both base and nose adapter to

the casing of the shell.52 The practice at the time was to weld the base

and adapter to the casing and this had not proved satisfactory. After the

CWS had shown keen interest in Cecil's suggestions, the Scaife Co., at

its own expense, worked on these developments both in its own laboratories and at the Mellon Institute of Industrial Research, Pittsburgh, Pa.,

where it sponsored a research fellowship. On 22 December 1941 the company was able to deliver ten fabricated shells with bases and adapters brazed

to the casings to Edgewood Arsenal, where the shells were tested and proved

50

 (1) History of the Pittsburgh CWPD, pp. 192-93. (2) Varley interv, 6 Nov 56. 51

 Charles T. Mitchell, Outline of 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Development, p. 66. ETF 218-

26, 22 Feb 45. 52

 An adapter is "a metal lining put into the nose or base of a shell to make it fit the fuze."

TM 20-205, 18 Jan 44.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 357

satisfactory.53 The CWS then awarded the Scaife Co. the first of several

wartime production contracts. The company's findings were made available to other mortar shell manufacturers, so that the bulk of 4.2-inch shells

produced in World War II were of the fabricated variety. In the fabricated shell the requirement for steel was 20 pounds to the shell as compared to 50 pounds in the forged shell.

By the spring of 1942 requirements for the shell had reached a point

where the CWS felt obliged to seek additional contractors, and the service awarded 4 additional prime contracts at that time. Two of the new

contractors, Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., and the David Bradley Manufacturing Division of Sears Roebuck and Co., were located in the Chicago

Chemical Procurement District. The other 2, the Guiberson Co. and

Hardwicke Etter Co., were in the Dallas procurement district. In 1943 another prime contractor was added, the Day and Night Manufacturing Co.

in the San Francisco district. Early in 1945 prime contracts were awarded

5 more manufacturers, 3 in the Boston procurement district and 2 in the

Dallas procurement district. But the war came to an end before any of

these 5 got into production.

In order to exchange information on the 4.2-inch shell program, a Shell

Manufacturers Co-ordinating Committee was established in 1942. This committee, whose chairman was Mr. Cecil of the Scaife Co., held monthly meetings, at which one representative of each manufacturer in the United States

was present. In attendance also, but not as active committee members,

were experienced officers and civilians from the CWS.54

The CWS estimated requirements for the shell on the basis of a continually growing theater demand and, of course, passed on the requirements

to Headquarters, ASF, to be incorporated into the Army Supply Program.

On 1 October 1944 the ASF reduced the Army Supply Program figure

for 4.2-inch shells from 5,645,306 to 4,007,000 without stating the reasons.

After the CWS protested this action, Headquarters, ASF, reversed its decision and on 13 November approved the original figure of 5,645,306. The

CWS had meanwhile been retarded over a six-week period in efforts to

secure steel for its 1945 production, a procedure that required considerable

53

 (1) Lt G. E. McCullough, Engineering Test of 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar Shell Experimental-Manufactured by the Scaife Company. TDMR 348, 11 Feb 42. (2) Charles T. Mitchell, Outline of 4.2-inch Chemical Mortar Development, p. 66. ETF 218-26, 22 Feb 45. 54

 Ltr, Asst C Ind Div, OC CWS, to CG's of all arsenals and CO's of all CWPD's, 28 Dec 42,

sub: 4.2 Chemical Mortar Shell Manufacturing Committee Meetings. Chicago CWPD 471.3.
358 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

lead time. Early in 1945 reports from the theaters of operations indicated

that the 4.2-inch shell was in such short supply that commanders had resorted to rationing. This development was probably an outcome of the

ASF action of 1 October in cutting back shell requirements; at least the

CWS felt that it was.55

The Shell Fuze

When the procurement of the shell was allocated to the Pittsburgh

district in 1940 a contract was awarded to the Westinghouse Airbrake Co.

for assembling the metal components of the fuze and to the Acme Die

and Machine Co. for loading the fuze. Later, contractors for the assembly

of the metal components were Casco Products Co., Bridgeport, Conn.;

Atlas Ansonia, North Haven, Conn.; Heckethorne Manufacturing Co., Littleton, Colo.; Milwaukee Stamping Co., Milwaukee, Wis.; Louis S. Dow,

Minneapolis, Minn.; and Simset Manufacturing Co., Oakland, Calif. In

addition to the Acme Die and Machine Co., the following contractors and

arsenals loaded fuzes during the war: Atlas Ansonia; William M. Fencil

Manufacturing Co., Huntley, Ill.; National Fireworks, Inc., West Hanover,

Mass.; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas Ordnance Plant, Little Rock, Ark.;

and Picatinny Ordnance Arsenal, Dover, N.J. Loaded fuzes and empty shells

were shipped to CWS arsenals (Edgewood, Pine Bluff, and Huntsville)

for loading with chemicals and to Ordnance plants or contractors for loading with high explosives. Ordnance plants loading HE shells were Kansas

Ordnance Plant, Parsons, Kans.; Louisiana Ordnance Plant, Minden, La.;

and Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, N.J. Ordnance contractors loading the shell

were National Fireworks Inc., and National Munitions, Eldred, Pa.56

During the war there were a number of instances when rounds of ammunition exploded prematurely either in the barrel of the 4.2-inch mortar

or immediately after leaving the muzzle. This matter was given considerable publicity after the war when the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program was holding hearings on Erie Basin

55

 Memo, C Field Requirements Div OC CWS for Col Elliott (Deputy Chief CWS), 3 Mar

45, SPCWD. (2) Min, Mtg, Requirements Planning Committee, OC CWS, 28 Feb 45. (3) Min,

Mtg, Requirements Planning Committee, OC CWS, 6 Nov 44. All in CWS 314.7 Requirements

File.

56

 Report on Malfunctions of the 4.2 Chemical Mortar Ammunition, Their Cause, Effect, and

the Measures Taken to Correct the Deficiencies, 12 Aug 46. A report prepared by the C CWS, for

USW, Appendix 559. Hereafter cited as Report on Malfunctions.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 359

4.2-lNCH WP CHEMICAL MORTAR SHELLS on an assembly line, Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas.

Metal Products, Inc.57 The committee then requested the Chief, CWS, to

furnish accurate figures on how many were killed and wounded by these

premature explosions or bursts.58

The CWS reported that during the war there were sixty-three premature explosions in the zone of interior and the theaters of operation. These

explosions brought death to thirty-eight American soldiers and injury to

127. After each explosion the lot of ammunition was impounded and a

thorough investigation made. Some commanding officers in the field felt

it tactically urgent to utilize the ammunition even after it had been declared unsafe.59

 In every instance, it was found that faulty fuzes were a

factor in premature bursts.60 Various malpractices in fuze manufacture, in

some cases the result of lack of experience, were discovered. Among these

were failure to put steel safety balls in the fuzes, the use of inaccurate

and uncontrolled methods of loading the fuze, the stacking of detonators

57

 See below, pp. 361-67. 58

 Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings before a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong. 2d sess., pursuant to S.R. 55, 79th

Cong., extending S.R. 71, 77th Cong. (Washington, 1947), p. 19071. Hereafter cited as Hearings. 59

 See Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat. 60

 Other factors that had a possible bearing on premature bursts were poor packaging and storage of chemical shells. See Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat.
360 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

into position rather than cementing the detonator cap.61 One manufacturer, National Fireworks, Inc., was singled out has having had a disproportionate number of detonator rejects and faulty plant practices. The

CWS conceded that had inspectors been on the alert these conditions

would not have existed.62

The CWS required its inspectors to examine all fuzes before they were

released to the loading plants by the assemblers. After receiving complaints

from the field on the malfunctioning of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition, the

service reviewed all inspection practices. The Inspection Division, OC CWS,

called several conferences, the most noteworthy being held in Milwaukee

on 5 January 1945. The purpose behind this conference was restudy of

all phases of fuze manufacture and review of all authorized waivers and

changes to insure that they did not compromise proper functioning of the

fuze. In attendance at the conference were representatives of the CWS and

all contractors assembling and loading the fuze. The day after the conference the group visited the Fencil plant at Huntley, 111., to review at

first hand problems associated with the assembling and loading of the fuze.63

This plant had an excellent record in producing safe fuzes.

The Fencil plant's success was the result of the extreme precautions its

owner took both in constructing the plant and in carrying out loading

operations. William M. Fencil, who headed the company, had been trained

as a chemical engineer and in peacetime had been a manufacturer of gaskets. He wanted to engage in war work and after approaching the office

of the CWS Chicago procurement district in mid-1942 he learned of the

search for suitable contractors to assemble and load the fuze. Fencil's educational background and business experience impressed the CWS procurement office, where he was given favorable consideration. Before undertaking

a contract Fencil made a thorough study of Ordnance manuals on ammunition and made a tour of a well run ammunition loading plant. When

he built his own plant at Huntley, Fencil took pains to see that all safety

features were incorporated into the design. He was equally cautious in

carrying out loading operations. Convinced that the primary need was for

61

 The term "stacking the detonators" referred to the practice of holding the detonator in place

by means of metal prongs raised from the surface of the slider. These prongs sometimes abraded

the delicate mechanism and caused a rough surface subject to corrosion. Cemented detonators, on

the other hand, left the slider smooth and the cement coating itself was a protection against corrosion. 62

 Report of Malfunctions, Abstract preceding Table of Contents. 63

 Minutes of meeting between representatives of U.S. Army and representatives of industry on

the 4.2-inch mortar fuze, held at the Milwaukee Stamping Co., West Allis, Wis., on the 5th day of

January 1945, at 0900. 314.7 Procurement File.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 361

safety rather than mass production, he hired a great many inspectors to

insure that every fuze was properly loaded. He set up a procedure whereby

after 100 fuzes had been loaded operations were interrupted to ascertain

if one or more components were left over. If such was the case the entire

100 were disassembled and reworked. While this procedure tended to slow

up production, it insured the loading of safe fuzes.64

In contrast to the practice at CWS arsenals and privately operated

plants, there was no CWS inspection of fuzes loaded at Ordnance plants.

Since the Ordnance Department was the biggest and presumably the most

competent munitions loader in the United States, the CWS felt that it

did not need to have inspectors at those plants. This arrangement was

discussed and agreed upon by the CWS and the Ordnance Department.65

Criminal Involvement of Mortar Shell Contractors

During World War II CWS contractors became involved on two separate occasions in criminal activities that led to court trials and convictions.66

 While both these trials attracted considerable publicity, the second

elicited far more attention than the first for it involved a prominent United

States Representative from Kentucky, Andrew Jackson May, who was

Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs. May, together with

Murray Garsson and his brother Henry M. Garsson, were tried and convicted in a federal court in the District of Columbia for conspiring to defraud the government. In July 1947 they were each sentenced to serve from

eight months to three years in a federal penitentiary.67

Just a year before sentence was passed the affairs of Congressman May

and the Garssons were publicly aired at hearings before the Special

Committee of the U.S. Senate Investigating the National Defense Program.68

 In July 1946 this committee took testimony relative to government

64

 (1) History of Chicago CWPD, 1 Jan 45-15 Aug 45, p. 54. (2) Interv, Hist Off with William M. Fencil, 14 Mar 58. (3) Hinckley interv, 15 Oct 56. 65

 Report on Malfunctions, p. 74. 66

 The first of these trials involved underloading of incendiary bombs and grenades by the Antonelli Fireworks Co. of Spencerport, N.Y. On 10 June 1944 a Federal jury in Rochester, N.Y. found

the president, two superintendents, and a foreman of this company guilty of conspiracy to defraud

the government. The indictment had also charged the defendants with sabotage, but the jury after

deliberating for thirteen hours failed to find them guilty on that count. See Report of Antonelli

Fireworks Co., Indictment and Trial for Criminal Activities in Connection with CWS Contracts,

compiled by the CWS legal adviser. CWS 314.7 Antonelli Case File. 67

 Sentence was pronounced by Judge Henry A. Schweinhaut. See World Almanac and Book of

Facts for 1948, p. 760. 68

 Hearings, pts. 34 and 35.
362 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

contracts with two corporations in which the Garsson brothers served as

officers, Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., and Batavia Metal Products, Inc.

The government agency party to the contracts was the Ordnance Department in some instances and the Chemical Warfare Service in others. A

great deal of the testimony centered around the contacts between several

key officers of the Chemical Warfare Service and the Garsson brothers.

It was disclosed that in the summer of 1941 Henry Garsson went to the

office of Col. Paul X. English, then executive officer to the Chief, CWS,

to inquire about the possibility of obtaining a war contract. Garsson said

he was representing the Segal Lock and Hardware Co., Brooklyn, N.Y.,

which was setting up a subsidiary, the Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc.,

for the purpose of doing war work. This company, Garsson stated, was

particularly interested in a contract to manufacture 4.2-inch mortar shells.69

On 7 October 1941 Henry Garsson wrote a letter to the Chemical Warfare Service in which he made a bid on the mortar shell. He stated that

Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., "organized under the laws of state of New

York," was an affiliate of the Norwalk Lock Co. and a subsidiary of the

Segal Lock and Hardware Co. One week later, Colonel English thereupon

addressed a letter to Henry Garsson, Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., 395

Broadway, New York, N.Y., pointing out that there would not be the

immediate demand for the 4.2-inch shell that had been anticipated and

that the CWS therefore would not be able to award a contract.70 It was

brought out at the hearings that at that time the Erie Basin Metal Products company had not come into existence, that it was not incorporated

in the state of New York until 29 January 1942, and that it was not at

any time an affiliate of the Norwalk Lock Co. or a subsidiary of the Segal

Lock and Hardware Co.71

Actually Henry Garsson was employed as a consultant engineer by the

Segal Co. and according to Louis Segal, president of that company, he

performed very satisfactorily. Garsson had suggested to Segal that the Erie

Basin company be set up as a subsidiary of the Segal Lock and Hardware

but the suggestion was never implemented.72 Apparently while awaiting

word from Mr. Segal, Henry Garsson on 25 January 1942 met Allen B.

69

 Hearings, pt. 34, p. 17678. 70

 Hearings, pt. 35, Exhibit 1939. 71

 (1) Hearings, pt. 34, Certificate 2476B, State of New York, County of New York, 29 Jan

42, being Exhibit 1756. (2) Hearings, pt. 34, p. 17760, testimony of Louis Segal, President of

Segal Lock and Hardware Co.

72

 Ibid., pp. 17781-87.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 363

Gellman in the Washington office of Congressman Sabath of Illinois.

Gellman's family and the family of Joseph T. Weiss owned several

Illinois corporations, including the Illinois Watch Case Co., which made

watch cases and metallic novelties, and the United States Wind Engine

and Pump Co., which made farm implements and railroad supplies. When

Gellman heard of Garsson's interest in the 4.2-inch mortar shell, his

curiosity was aroused because he recognized that this was a mass production item which his plants could make.73

 Gellman agreed to assist Henry

Garsson and his brother financially and this agreement flowered into an

amazingly complicated financial structure, in the manipulations of which

Congressman May became entangled. These manipulations were the chief

target of Senate investigators, who contended that their purpose was the

realization of excessive war profits.

Five days after Gellman met Garsson and one day after Erie Basin

Metal Products, Inc., was certified as a New York corporation, Colonel

English, now Chief, Industrial Service, OC CWS, as CWS contracting

officer, issued a letter of intent to the new company at 75 West Street,

New York, N.Y.74 This letter was an order for 15,000 4.2-inch chemical

mortar shell bodies and 15,000 chemical mortar shell fuzes, "the shell

bodies f.o.b. common carrier, Brooklyn, N.Y., or Elgin, I11., the fuzes,

f.o.b. common carrier, point of loading and assembly."

 75

 A provision to

manufacture an item at either of two locations was seldom if ever included in government contracts. The provision for the manufacture of

fuzes was deleted as of 27 April 1942.76

At the time Colonel English issued the letter of intent to Erie Basin

Metal Products, Inc., he forwarded a directive to the New York procurement district, and apparently to the Chicago district also, to begin preparation of a formal contract. On 23 February 1942 the commanding officer

of the New York district sent a confidential memorandum to the Chief,

CWS, stating that Henry Garsson's statements regarding the status of

Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., were contradicted by Louis Segal. A copy

of this memorandum was sent to the commanding officer of the Chicago

Chemical Warfare Procurement District.77

73

 Hearings, pt. 35, p. 18809. 74

 A letter of intent served as a contract until a more formal contract was written. 75

 Hearings, pt. 34, Exhibit 1757. 76

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Robert M. Estes, former Chief, Purchase Policies Division,

OC CWS, 18 May 52. (2) Personal Statement of Lt Col Robert M. Estes on Erie Basin Metal

Products, Inc., p. 1. This 33-page statement, which was compiled during and after World War

II was turned over to the Chemical Corps Historical Office in 1952. CWS 314.7 Procurement File. 77

 Hearings, pt. 34, Exhibit A-17, p. 18267.
364 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Why did neither the chief's office nor the Chicago Procurement District office act on this memorandum casting doubt on Henry Garsson's

trustworthiness? To this question the Senate investigators were most

anxious to obtain an answer. Brig. Gen. Paul X. English testified that he

did not see the memorandum until it was brought to his attention in the

latter part of 1943 in connection with the renegotiation of the contract.

He stated that if he had seen it in February 1942 he would not have

gone through with the contract, at least not before thoroughly investigating Mr. Segal's statement.78

 The commanding officer of the Chicago district recalled having received the memorandum but could not recall

whether it was before or after he signed the contract.79 But regardless of

the memorandum, he declared, he would have signed the contract because

the letter of intent and General English's signature on the contract itself,

dated 1 March 1942, gave him no alternative.80 To this statement General

English took vigorous exception, saying that under no conditions was a

commanding officer supposed to "go blindly into" a contract.81 The 1

March contract was the first of a number which the CWS awarded to

two companies in which the Garssons obtained an interest—Erie Basin

Metal Products, Inc., and the Batavia Metal Products company.

Why wasn't the memorandum from the commanding officer of the

New York Procurement District brought to General English's attention

in February 1942? No definite answer to that question was forthcoming

at the hearings. But the committee left little doubt as to whom it thought

was responsible for the failure. It strongly intimated that a civilian lawyer

in the Office of the Chief, CWS, who was closely associated with Congressman May and the Garssons, was the culprit. Toward the end of the

hearings several members of the committee accused this lawyer, whose

legal career before coming into the Chemical Warfare Service had been

under a cloud, of perjury and of purloining documents and records. The

chairman of the committee said he hoped the Department of Justice

would look into the man's record.82 If the Department of Justice followed up the suggestion, it apparently did not feel there was sufficient

evidence for conviction because the individual was not prosecuted.

He was the only person in the CWS whose motives the committee

questioned. Several committee members did imply, and with seemingly

78

 (1) Ibid., p. 17686. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Brig Gen P. X. English, 26 Oct 56. 79

 Hearings, pt. 34, p. 17648.

80

 Ibid., pp. 17651, 17684. 81 Ibid., p. 17683. 82

 Hearings, pt. 35, pp. 18934-36.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 365

good reason, that the judgment of several CWS officers left something to

be desired. On the other hand, the committee hearings brought to light

that other CWS officers used extremely good judgment and were most

solicitous for the welfare of the government in their dealings with companies controlled by the Garsson interests. Particularly noteworthy was

the role played by the chief of the Purchase Policies Branch, Colonel

Estes.83 Estes' attention was drawn to the Erie Basin and Batavia Metal

companies by the unusual high prices in the contracts. He had made

some headway in reducing these prices, but in December 1944 they were

still so high that Estes advised the Renegotiation Division, ASF, to

request a Bureau of Internal Revenue audit on the Garsson brothers.84 On

2 January 1945 the Renegotiation Division replied, stating that Estes' proposal for an audit was considered impractical. Then on 8 May, Estes personally conferred with the Chicago Bureau of Internal Revenue District

Field Office, where he learned that an audit on the Garssons was already

under way. Early in the summer of 1945 the ASF reversed its previous

decision and concurred in requesting an audit from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.85

In January 1945, meanwhile, Estes called the attention of a CWS procurement conference to the terms of the Erie Basin contract, terms which

enabled the contractor "to pay higher salaries, buy $500,000 worth of

equipment from an affiliate, and within half a year write off half of his

shell production facilities, in addition to paying $250,000 rent to another

affiliate."86 These remarks attracted the attention of Brig. Gen. Charles E.

Loucks, Chief, Industrial Division, OC CWS, who had been making some

observations on his own on the "fantastic" prices in the Garsson contracts.87

 General Loucks deputized Colonel Sanson of his staff to review

those contracts for the purpose of revising them downward, and early in

1945 this was done.88

On V-J Day, 14 August 1945, Colonel Estes advised the Legal Branch,

OC CWS, through the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel, General

83

 Hearings, pt. 34, pp. 18075, 18100-102, 18107-109. 84 Ltr, C Purchase Policies Br OC CWS to C Renegotiation Div, ASF, attn: Lt Col W. W.

Watts, 8 Dec 44, sub: 1943 Renegotiation of Erie Metal Products Inc. and Illinois Watch Case

Co., Inc., Elgin, I11. Copy in CWS 314.7 Garsson Case File. 85

 Ltrs, R. M. Estes to Hist Off, 30 Jan 52 and 4 Mar 52, and Ltr, Brig Gen Charles E. Loucks,

Acting Chief Chemical Officer to Hist Off, 21 Mar 52, commenting on Estes 4 Mar 52 ltr. 86

 Report of CWS Procurement Conference held at Pittsburgh, Pa., 8 Jan 45. CWS 314.7

Procurement File. 87

 Ltr, Brig Gen Charles E. Loucks to Hist Off, 21 Mar 52. 88

 Hearings, pt. 34, pp. 17743-54.
366 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Ditto, that no termination payments should be made to the Erie Basin

Metal Products companies until the full extent of the liabilities of those

companies to the government had been determined.89 A week later Estes

addressed a second memorandum directly to the Renegotiation Division,

ASF, in which he again urged the withholding of invoice and termination claims to the Erie Basin company in order to protect the interests

of government in recovering excessive profits.90 Colonel Estes' letter was

followed by positive action on the part of the Renegotiation Division,

ASF, which suggested to the Office of the Under Secretary of War that a

withholding order be issued against Erie Basin. The Under Secretary's

office issued such an order on 6 September 1945.91

The Under Secretary's order to withhold funds brought vigorous reaction from the Garssons and their associates. Before it was issued the

civilian lawyer in the OC CWS referred to above, drafted a letter for the

Commanding General, ASF, which the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel

signed, criticizing the position the Purchase Policies Branch had taken.92

Congressman May bombarded Under Secretary Patterson's office with phone

calls. Patterson turned the problem over to Kenneth C. Royall, a special

assistant. On the basis of a survey the Under Secretary issued a directive

on 15 September modifying the freeze order of 6 September.93

No mention whatever was made in the withholding orders of any

company other than the Erie Basin Metal company. Mr. Royall, after he

had become Under Secretary of War, said he had never even heard of the

Batavia Metals company until May 1946 when he was informed of the

following developments.94 On 13 September 1945 the Settlement Advisory

Board of the Chemical Warfare Procurement District, acting on what

they considered reliable data, made a partial payment to the Batavia Metal

Products company of $3,846,700 of which amount $3,231,649.60 went to

liquidate the outstanding balance of the government's advance payment

account and the remainder was paid to the contractor. Subsequently, an

audit of this company's account disclosed some rather unusual accounting

89

 Ltr, C Purchase Policies Br OC CWS to C Legal Br, thru: AC CWS for Mat'1, 14 Aug 45,

sub: Renegotiation and Termination Settlements with Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc. Copy in

CWS 314.7 Garsson Case File. 90

 Memo, C Purchase Policies Br OC CWS for Dir Renegotiation Div, ASF, 23 Aug 45, sub:

Withholding Payments of Invoices and Termination Claims to Protect Government Interest in Recovery of Excessive Profits. Hearings, Exhibit 1860. 91

 Hearings, pt. 34, Exhibit 1861, p. 18099. 92

 Ibid., Exhibit 1890. 93

 Ibid., Exhibit 1863. 94

 Ibid., p. 18176.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 367

practices and it was concluded that the Batavia company's invoices to the

government should have been $1,067,000 less than previously reported,

or, in other words, that the Batavia Metal Products owed the government

over a million dollars. A later audit reduced the figure somewhat.95 In

May the Batavia company agreed to repay the government $140,000 at

once and $50,000 a month thereafter to liquidate the debt.96 Mr. Royall

referred the matter to the Department of Justice for advice and on 18 June

1946 Theron L. Caudle, Assistant Attorney General, wrote to Mr. Royall:

If a criminal case should result from the Department's investigation of the Batavia

Metal Products Co. and related companies, it is felt that acceptance of the contractor's

offer would make successful prosecution more difficult. However, the investigation to

date is not sufficiently complete for the Department to express any opinion as to whether

a criminal case will develop, and therefore, no determination can be made at the present

time as to the advisability of accepting the contractor's offer.97

Acting upon the advice of the Department of Justice, Mr. Royall made

no move to accept payments under the terms suggested by the Batavia

company.98 Instead, the War Department, through the CWS, served a

demand on Batavia Metal Products, Inc., to repay the excessive portion

of the partial payment which had been made.99 This demand against the

Batavia company, which went into the hands of receivers in the fall of

1946, was never honored. In the spring of 1952 the case against the

Batavia company, so far as its civil aspects were concerned, was nolprossed by the government. But action against the Erie Basin company

was to continue for a number of years.100

Flame Throwers

Portable Flame Throwers 101

In April 1942 the CWS awarded a contract to the Beattie Manufacturing Co., Little Falls, N.J., a nationally known manufacturer of rugs and

95

 Hearings, pt. 35, Exhibit 1924, p. 19355. 96 Ibid. 97

 Hearings, pt. 34, Exhibit 1899, p. 18181. 98

 Ibid., p. 18181. 99

 Notes in history of Garsson contracts compiled by special agents of FBI in September and

October 1946. CWS 314.7 Garsson Case File. 100

 Thirteen years after the close of the war the Department of Justice had two civil and one

criminal cases pending against the Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc. and Erie Basin had two civil

suits pending against the government. 101

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on: (1) History of New York CWPD, from

1940 through June 1944, pp. 198-224; (2) Interv, Hist Off with William Hewitt, inspector on

the flame thrower in New York CWPD, and Alfred Benson, engineer in New York CWPD during World War II, 16 Mar 50; (3) Interv, Hist Off with Lawrence J. Beck, production engineer

on portable flame thrower for Beattie Manufacturing Co. in World War II, 26 Nov 57; (4)

Alphabetic Listing of Major War Supply Contracts.
368 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

carpets, for production of the M1A1 flame thrower, the development of

which was well under way.102 In mid-1941 this company had acquired the

services of Lawrence J. Beck, an engineer who had worked closely with

the CWS on the development and production of early model flame throwers.

Beck's background and experience plus the company's standing in the

business world virtually guaranteed creditable performances. In July 1943

the CWS engaged another prime contractor, the E. C. Brown Co.,

Rochester, N.Y., a manufacturer of agricultural sprayers, especially of the

portable type. These two companies produced over 14,000 M1Al's in such

an excellent manner that they were awarded contracts on the later model,

the M2-2. In May 1944 a third contractor, R. F. Sedgley, Inc., of Philadelphia, was awarded a prime contract on the M2 model. Sedgley was a

well known manufacturer of high grade sporting rifles. Over 24,500 M2-2

flame throwers were produced in 1944 and 1945.103

Of the three prime contractors, E. C. Brown was the most self-contained facility. This company manufactured production tools and made

certain components not only for itself but also for the other two primes.

Numerous subcontractors supplied components to all the primes—such

items as pressure regulators, high pressure valves, safety heads, die castings, rubber components, and fuel filling lines. All contracts were under

high priority, particularly after the ASF, in June 1944, issued an urgency

circular describing the M2-2 as a "new and superior weapon."

 104

In the manufacture of the M2-2 the contractors used the latest techniques to insure uniformity and quality. All silver brazing on the gun

assembly was done by induction heating and die cast aluminum parts were

used for lightness and interchangeability. Corrosion resistant materials were

used to withstand the effects of extreme climatic conditions. Complications arose in the manufacture of the fuel valve, the safety mechanism,

and the outlet valve needle. The technique for the construction of the

fuel valve, which consisted of a rubber diaphragm molded to a metal pin,

was never fully developed, and on several occasions the service had to

suspend production because of the number of rejects of this valve.105 The

safety mechanism had two objectionable features: it frequently pinched

the operator's hand and it had a tendency to shift to the "off safety"

102

 See ch. VII above. 103 CWS Report of Production, 1 January 1940 through 31 December 1945, p. 13. 104

 ASF Urgency Circular, 24 Jun 44, sub: Flame Thrower M2-2. Chicago CWPD 470.71 OC

CWS Flame Throwers. 105

 The valve was very difficult to operate. Only a man with a large hand could open it.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 369

position should the operator accidentally touch it. The outlet valve was

difficult to adjust with the result that frequent leaks occurred. These

defects were never entirely eliminated.

All the prime contractors built test ranges to proof test the flame

throwers. These ranges were completely equipped to handle and service

the weapon and its parts. Although the CWS and the contractors took

safety measures to protect workers against the hazards involved in testing, three cases of severe burns occurred during the war period.

Auxiliary Flame Throwers

In December 1943, after a successful demonstration for representatives

of the ASF, the CWS, the AGF, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Navy, production of the tank mounted auxiliary flame thrower (E4-5) was begun.106

The CWS awarded a contract to the Kemp Manufacturing Co. of Baltimore to develop a pilot model. By early 1944 this company had devised

a flame thrower consisting of a ten-gallon fuel tank, a gun utilizing a

gasoline-electrical ignition system, and compressed air for propelling the

flame.107 Later an improved ten-gallon unit was developed jointly by the

Westinghouse Electrical Corp., Atlantic Division, Philadelphia (also known

as the Atlantic Elevator Co.), and J. B. Blair Co., Mineola, N.Y. These

companies had produced fifty experimental models by the time the war

came to an end.

Meanwhile the M3-4-3 auxiliary type flame thrower had been developed,108

 and the CWS awarded a production contract to the Atlantic

Elevator Co. for production of these units. Over 1,700 were manufactured

in 1944 and 1945.109 The principal engineering difficulties in this type of

flame thrower were the malfunctioning of the gasoline ignition valve, the

faulty design of the diaphragm on the fuel discharge valve, and the

clogging of the atomizer of the ignition system. Many units had to be

rejected until these defects were rectified.

In November 1944 the CWS awarded a contract to Pressurelube Inc.

for 500 periscope-type flame throwers.110 The manufacture of the periscope

type proved very troublesome. The ignition system failed to function unless

106

 Memo, CG AGF for CofS, U.S.A., attn: G-4, 10 Oct 44, sub: Mechanized Flame Throwers.

AGF Cml Sec 470.71.

107 Ibid. 108

 See ch. VII above.

109 cwS Report of Production, 1 January 1940 through 31 December 1945, p. 13. 110

 See ch. VII above.
370 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the air pressure in the gasoline tank was at a critical point between 12 and

30 pounds per square inch, and the exact point for each unit could be

determined only by experience. Another obstacle was leakage in the fuel

valve; in some instances this was caused by defective valve seals, in others

by porosity in the valve housing. Technicians took steps to improve the

valve by impregnating the castings with a polyspastic and cashew nut oil,

by using different bronze alloys, and by improving manufacturing processes

in the foundry. Pressurelube produced only 192 of the 500 units ordered.111

Main Armament Flame Throwers

Early in 1945 the CWS awarded prime contracts to M. W. Kellogg Co.

of Jersey City and the Pullman Standard Car Co. of Hammond, Ind., for

the main armament flame thrower (E12-7R1). They made little progress

on the contracts largely because priorities for material were too low. The

WPB upon request granted higher priorities for specific items but this

procedure was time consuming. To rectify the situation, the Director of

the New Developments Division, War Department Special Staff, Brig. Gen.

William A. Borden, on 26 June 1945 suggested to the Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-4, that, in view of reports from the Pacific areas indicating the

great effectiveness of the armored flame thrower, the E12-7R1 project

should be assigned a priority "equally as high as the Manhattan Project."

 112

Upon reviewing General Borden's memorandum the Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-4, passed it on to OPD for comment. Someone apparently

brought the matter to the immediate attention of the Under Secretary of

War, for the very next day the Under Secretary informed the Commanding General, ASF, that production of the E12-7R1 should have sufficient

priority to insure delivery on schedule.113 The following day—28 JuneGeneral MacArthur cabled the War Department urging that units be

equipped with the E12-7R1 flame thrower.114

111

 (1) Historical Record of M3-4-E6R3 Mechanized Flame Thrower Contract, 20 Sep 45.

Copy in CWS 314.7 Procurement File. (2) Hewitt interv, 16 Mar 50. (3) CWS Report of Production, 1 January 1940 through 31 December 1945, p. 13.

112

 DF, Brig Gen W. A. Borden, Dir New Developments Div to G-4, 26 Jun 45, sub: Production Status of Tank Flame Thrower, E12-7R1. OPD 470.71. By this time a number of mechanized units had been manufactured and assembled in the Middle Pacific Area and had been successfully employed in Pacific operations, especially on Okinawa. See Pritchard, Kleber, and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat. 113 See Memo for Record, 3 Jul 45, included with comment No. 3, C, Projected Logistics, with

Ltr, OPD to G-4, 3 Jul 45, sub: Production Status of Tank Flame Thrower E12-7R1.

OPD 470.71. 114

 CM-IN-27779 referred to in ibid.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 371

The personal interest in the armored flame thrower displayed by

echelons of the War Department and by General MacArthur led to accelerated production of the E12-7R1. On 4 July 1945 General Somervell

wrote a personal letter to 83 subcontractors appealing to them to meet

their schedules. In this letter he indicated that the War Production Board

would be most co-operative in the matter of priorities and urged the contractors to take any problem or anticipated problem directly to a CWS

officer whom he named as his personal representative. On 21 July the

Industrial Division, OC CWS, reported to the Commanding General, ASF,

that one or more telephone calls had been received from 21 of these contractors and letters from 23 others pledging co-operation. Late in July the

acting director of Plans and Operations, ASF, was able to report to OPD

that after the issuance of a triple A priority, 25 flame throwers were being

produced in July, and 85 scheduled for August. Contemplated production

for September ran to 115 and for each of the following three months to

175.115 But the war ended before this scheduled production could be

carried out.

Smoke and Smoke Munitions

Hexachloroethane (HC)

Hexachloroethane was the principal ingredient in making HC smoke

mixture used in smoke pots, smoke grenades, smoke bombs, and certain

types of shells and rockets. The prewar requirement for hexachloroethane

was relatively small and the chief source of supply was the Pittsburg,

Calif., plant of the Dow Chemical Co. The estimated capacity of that

plant was about 3,000 tons a year, while the CWS requirements under

the Army Supply Program (as of 14 January 1943) were 16,191 tons for

1943, and 33,222 tons for 1944. In order to fill immediate requirements

the CWS contracted with a Canadian firm to deliver 2,500 tons late in

1942. At the same time, the service began writing contracts for future

delivery with the Dow Chemical Co., the Hooker Electrochemical Co. of

Niagara Falls, N.Y., and the Westvaco Chlorine Products Co. of South

Charleston, W.Va.116 In August 1942 the government started construction

115

 (1) Ltr, CG ASF to Eastman Manufacturing Co., Manitowoc, Wis., 4 Jul 45. Chicago

CWPD 470.71 Flame Thrower 1944-45. (2) Memo, Actg C, Prod Br Ind Div OC CWS for CG

ASF attn: Col G. D. Woods, 21 Jul 45, sub: Results of General Somervell's letter of 4 July to

Subcontractors of the Mechanized Flame Thrower. ASF 470.71 Flamethrower. (3) Memo, Actg Dir

Plans and Opns ASF for Asst CofS OPD WDGS, 27 Jul 45, sub: Main Armament Flame Throwers E12-7R1. OPD 470.71. 116

 Dow Chemical Co. was to produce the product at Freeport, Tex.
372 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of the CWS Kanawha Plant adjacent to the property of the Westvaco

Chlorine Products Co. The following summer the CWS Marshall Plant

at New Martinsville, W.Va., was erected for the production of hexachloroethane and other chemicals and a contract awarded to Du Pont to operate the plant. From these various sources the CWS procured over 9,000,000

pounds of hexachloroethane in 1943 and almost 8,000,000 pounds in

1944.117

In 1943 a priority problem arose on perchlorethylene, the chief ingredient of hexachloroethane. Perchlorethylene is produced from acetylene

tetrachloride, which is also the source of chemicals used in degreasing

metal parts and in dry cleaning. The CWS had to work closely with the

War Production Board to set up a schedule that would guarantee perchlorethylene in sufficient quantities.

Among the munitions filled with HC smoke mixture were 2-pound

bombs, M8 grenades, rifle smoke grenades, M88 and M89 shells, canisters for 105-mm. and 155-mm. shells, 100-pound and 500-pound clusters,

2.35-inch rockets, and smoke pots. Virtually all the 2-pound bombs were

loaded under private contract in the Pittsburgh and Chicago procurement

districts. Rifle grenades, smoke shells, and canisters were loaded at CWS

arsenals, particularly Huntsville and Pine Bluff. Edgewood Arsenal filled

all 100- and 500-pound clusters.118

The M1 smoke pots were manufactured and filled at Huntsville and

Pine Bluff Arsenals and under contract in the New York and Dallas procurement districts. The latter districts also procured all the M5 smoke pots.

Maintaining safety in the loading plants took constant attention. The creation of static sparks was an ever present possibility and to eliminate it a

high degree of humidity had to be maintained in the plants. The tragic

experience of one of the contractors with a poorly designed air conditioning system pointed up the need for extreme care. Because of the scarcity

of raw materials this company set up a system wherein all the air conditioning ducts throughout the entire plant were connected. One day a fire

broke out in one of the explosive-proof cubicles. The fire itself proved

117

 (1) History of the New York CWPD, June 1940 through June 1944, vol. 1, pp. 181-85.

(2) Chemical Warfare Presentation SOS Staff Conference, 14 Jan 43, sub: Procurement and Production Problems, CWS 337, 1943. (3) Memo, Dir of Req Div SOS for C CWS, sub: Production of Hexachloroethane. CWS 334.8, Chemical Warfare Production. (4) History of Kanawha

Plant, CWS, p. 22. (5) History of the Marshall Plant, CWS p. 1. CWS Report of Production,

1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 17. 118

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 5, 7, 11, 16, 26.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 373

BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM A. BORDEN

relatively harmless, but the air cooling system spread the smoke created

by the burning HC mix throughout

every room and department of the

plant. So thick was the smoke that

workers could not find doors and

windows only a few feet away. Two

employees suffocated. This experience led the Plant Protection and

Safety Branch, OC CWS, to rule

that air conditioning systems should

have elaborate automatic safety cutoffs and that in all future installations each section of a plant should

have a separate air conditioning

system.119 During the war the

CWS procured over 5,000,000 M1

and over 880,000 M5 smoke pots.120

The service also procured a great quantity of floating smoke pots for use in

amphibious operations. Almost all of these—over 2,000,000—were filled at

Huntsville Arsenal.121 The loading process consisted of pressing the 26

pounds of HC mix into the 5-gallon buckets with 8 tons of dead weight.

A delay train ignition device, which consisted of a pyrotechnic mixture

pressed into a metal tube, was attached to the lid. The lid was then strapped

on the bucket, after which the pot was ready for packing. At first wooden

boxes were used for packing but later these were replaced by steel drums.

As in the case of other type smoke pots, the loading of the floating pot

presented hazards. In pressing the mix into the buckets a certain portion

was forced out as dust. To overcome this health and safety hazard Huntsville Arsenal constructed shields to force the dust back to the base of the

presses.122

White Phosphorus (WP)

In August 1941 the CWS awarded a contract for delivery of white

phosphorus, the smoke and incendiary agent, to the Victor Chemical

119

 G. B. Spencer-Strong, "Pemco War Story," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, III (October

1948), 53-55. 120

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 25. 121 Ibid. 122

 History of Huntsville Arsenal from July 1941 to August 1945, vol. II, pp. 534-38.
374 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Works. The Victor company's Mount Pleasant, Tenn., plant supplied Edgewood Arsenal with the material until December 1941. After the outbreak

of war the CWS procured the bulk of its WP from Tennessee Valley

Authority (Wilson Dam, Ala.) although between April 1943 and April

1946 it also obtained some from the Columbia, Tenn., plant of the Monsanto Chemical Co.123

 Two conditions necessary for producing WP are

proximity to phosphate rock deposits and a cheap source of electricity.124

The CWS arranged to have most of TVA's product shipped to Huntsville

Arsenal, since transportation was relatively direct and inexpensive between

these two points. The Monsanto plant supplied the other three CWS arsenals as well as the Ferro Enamel Co., Cleveland, Ohio, which also filled

some WP munitions.125

Shipping WP to the loading plants presented a problem. Because the

chemical burned upon contact with air, it had to be shipped under a covering of water. Trained operators filled the white phosphorus in liquid

form into tank cars or trucks, which were insulated with 4 inches of rock

wool and equipped with steam coils. The CWS bought 25 of these tank

cars and 10 trailer trucks, the latter for the exclusive use of Huntsville

Arsenal. Before the phosphorus was poured in, the tanks were partially

filled with water, all but a small portion of which was to be replaced by

the WP. The workmen had to exercise great care to make certain that

all the water was not replaced by the chemical, else a fire would occur.

On a short journey the chemical remained in liquid form and was unloaded at its destination by a reverse process, that is, by forcing a sufficient quantity of water into the tank to replace the WP. On a long

journey the material solidified and the tanks had to be treated with steam

to liquefy the WP and make it ready for unloading. It was essential that

the tanks be unloaded without undue delay because the combination of

the phosphorus and water produced a weak solution of sulphuric acid

which attacked steel. The material had to be stored in concrete structures.

White phosphorus was loaded into artillery shells, 4.2-inch chemical

mortar shells, 30-pound M46 bombs, and 100-pound M47 bombs, M15

hand grenades, explosive type igniters, and 3.5-inch and 4.5-inch rockets.

It was also loaded into catalin, bakelite, or glass containers, which in turn

123

 Alphabetic Listing of Major War Supply Contracts, vol. 3, p. 2137; vol. 4, p. 3075, and

p. 3262. 124

 For an excellent account of the growth of the phosphorous industry see Christian H. Aall,

"The American Phosphorus Industry," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 7 (July 52),

1520-25. 125

 Interv, Hist Off with Maj Eugene F. Lennon, Jr, 16 May 58.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 375

served as ignition charges in the M74, M69, and M69X incendiary bombs.

In the loading process the munitions were filled with hot liquid phosphorus under water and then cooled to solidify the WP in such a way

as to maintain proper ballistic properties.126

The CWS conducted training courses for phosphorus fillers and press

operators at Edgewood Arsenal, to which key individuals from other arsenals were sent for periods of from thirty to ninety days. Upon their return to their home stations these workers trained others in the various

procedures.127

Smoke Generators

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor a demand arose for stationary smoke generators in the Panama Canal Zone and in the Western

Defense Command. The OC CWS allocated procurement of this item to

the Chicago procurement district office. Early in February 1942 the Chicago office drew up a contract with Gendar, Paeschke and Frey Co. of Milwaukee to produce about 10,000 stationary generators in 30 days. At the

same time contracts for parts were drawn up with the Grand Sheet Metal

Co. of Chicago and dozens of small sheet metal shops in the Chicago

vicinity. A big problem was obtaining the 5,000 tons of 18-gauge sheet

steel to fabricate the generators. A search revealed that the Ford Motor

Co. in Detroit could spare this quantity of steel and the procurement district office arranged for transporting it to Milwaukee. Late in February an

express trainload of stationary generators and auxiliary equipment was rolling to the New Orleans port of embarkation, destination MERCURY.128

The CWS was responsible not only for the procurement of the generator

itself but also for a list of some 35 auxiliary items. These items included

10,000-gallon bolted steel tanks for storing the fuel oil, 750-gallon refueling units mounted on Army 21⁄2-ton trucks, 55-gallon drums, funnels, and

torch igniters.129

By the fall of 1942, 123,800 smoke generators had been procured. Of

this number 55,800 were in the hands of smoke generator companies in

126

 (1) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 5, 14, 17, 26, 28, 29,

30. (2) Hist of Huntsville Arsenal from July 1941 to August 1945, vol. 1, 483-505. (3) Preliminary History of Pine Bluff Arsenal, World War II, sec. VII. (4) History of Rocky Mountain

Arsenal, vol. IX, 2918-58, 3165-83. (5) Lennon Interv, 16 May 58. 127

 History of Huntsville Arsenal from July 1941 to August 1945, vol 1, p. 497. 128

 (1) The code name for Panama. (2) History of Chicago CWPD, 1 Jan 45-15 Aug 45,

p. 76. 129

 Ibid.
376 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the Canal Zone, at the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, and at aircraft factories on

the west coast. Companies found that it was difficult to move the large

bulky generators quickly when the wind changed, and this disadvantage,

coupled with the development of better generators, led the service to abandon the device in 1944.13°

In mid-1942 the CWS let a contract through the Chicago procurement

district to the Heil Co. of Milwaukee for the manufacture of the M1 mechanical generator.131

 This company worked closely with CWS technicians

and representatives of the Standard Oil Development Co. on production

difficulties. Among the serious production problems encountered was a

tendency of the oil burners to overheat; this was solved by installing temperature regulators on the burners. Another difficulty was obtaining efficient pumps for the water and oil. The CWS procured over a thousand

of these models.132

The Besler Corp., Emeryville, Calif., which was mainly responsible for

developing the M-2 mechanical smoke generator, was the sole prime contractor for this item.133

 Besler, whose peacetime business was the engineering, developing, and building of high pressure generating units and

engines, had already manufactured somewhat similar units for the Navy.

Consequently, no outstanding production manufacturing troubles arose. The

Clayton Manufacturing Co., Alhambra, Calif, the chief subcontractor, cooperated in an excellent manner in furnishing parts. Over 2,700 M2s were

procured and shipped overseas.134

Airplane Smoke Tanks 135

The CWS procured all airplane smoke tanks through its Chicago district. By far the greatest number—over ninety-two thousand—was of the

130

 (1) Memo for Record, Maj Delancey R. King, Opns Br OC CWS, 15 Sep 42, sub: Generators, Smoke, Stationary, M1. CWS 320.2/207. (2) CWTC Item 1010, Obsoletion of Generator, Oil, Smoke, M1, 5 May 44. (3) CWTC Item 1073, same title, 7 Jul 44. 131 The M1 mechanical generator was standardized in Jan 43. See ch. IX, above. 132

 (1) History of Chicago CWPD, 1 January 1945-15 August 1945, p. 62. (2) Ltr, C Insp

Div OC CWS to Insp Off Chicago CWPD, 6 Jun 44, sub: Inspection, Generator, Smoke, Mechanical, M1 (100 gallons). CWS 319.1, ETOUSA 1944. CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through

31 Dec 45, p. 14. 133

 See ch IX above. 134

 (1) History of San Francisco CWPD, 1940-1945, pp. 78-80. (2) CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, p. 14. (3) Interv, Hist Off with John A. Panella, 13 Mar 57.

Mr. Panella, then a CWS officer, was in charge of the M2 smoke generator program in San Francisco CWPD in World War II.

135

 This section is based on History of Chicago CWPD, 1 Jan 45-15 Aug 45, pp. 71-72, and

CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 45-31 Dec 45, p. 31.
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 377

M10 type, which was wing mounted and expendable. Over ten thousand

each of the M33 and M33A1 models were procured. These models, which

were mounted in the bomb bays of the planes, were not expendable. As

indicated above, some M20's and M21's were procured before decision was

made to abandon these models.136

The principal contractor for smoke tanks was the Empire Stove Co.,

Belleville, Ill. Other contractors were the James Manufacturing Co., Fort

Atkinson, Wis., and the National Roadjoint Manufacturing Co. of Chicago. The contracts called not only for the delivery of the tanks but also

of such parts as wrenches, elbows, air inlet plates, and plate closures. A

hitch was encountered in the procurement of the parts by the shortage of

copper bearing steel. In the installation of the M33 and M33A1 models a

difficulty arose in developing satisfactory mounting lugs and braces. Both

the Navy and the Air Forces co-operated closely with the CWS in resolving this matter.

Colored Smoke Munitions137

The loading of colored smoke munitions was confined to two CWS

arsenals, Edgewood and Huntsville. By far, most of the loading was done

at Huntsville. There the colored smoke was loaded into M16 and M18

grenades, and M22 and M23 rifle grenades, furnished by the Ordnance

Department, and canisters for 105-mm. and 155-mm. Ordnance shells.

The job of loading these munitions raised a number of problems which

were solved on a pragmatic basis. For example, when the production of

M16 grenades was initiated in the fall of 1942 a hazard was created in

filling the grenade with the dry mix, the dust of which caused fires and

explosions. To overcome this hazard the dry mix was placed in a dough

mixer and granulated with water. In the spring of 1943, when the schedule for M16 grenades was increased, a quicker method of filling had to

be found. Huntsville Arsenal experimented with a Stokes-Smith filling machine using dry mix instead of granulated mix. This method proved successful for red and violet grenades, but not for yellow and green grenades,

because the latter were more sensitive; consequently, they continued to be

loaded by the granulated method. The finished batch of mix was tested

by filling two grenades and firing them. If the grenades functioned accord136

 See ch. IX above. 137

 This section is based on History of Huntsville Arsenal, July 1941 to August 1945, vol. II,

664-75 and CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45, pp. 6, 7, 15.
378 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ing to specifications the mix was used in the filling line; if not, it was

reworked. In filling the M16 three increments were used, each increment

being subjected to pressure of about two tons. As a preventative against

dust, fuel oil was poured into the mix in the filling machine.

In loading the M16 grenades, and all other colored smoke munitions,

safety was the biggest problem. The danger of fire from dust and other

causes was always present. Workers had to wear fireproofed clothing and

safety shoes at all times. The plants had to have sprinkler systems, and

the workers had to be taught how to use them. Dust was not only a fire

hazard, but it also caused some workers to become ill for several hours

at a stretch.

Problem of Morale

Complications arose in storing and issuing chemical warfare matériel

no less than in its procurement. These complications began to appear in

the emergency period and continued to challenge the CWS throughout

the period of the war.

Notwithstanding the hazards inherent in the operation of chemical warfare plants, the CWS and its contractors did obtain the services of a body

of loyal and efficient workers. When one considers these hazards together

with the difficulties besetting the mass production of certain chemical warfare items, it is not surprising that the CWS was sensitive to the need

for maintaining a high level of morale. The chief's office initiated the practice of sending military officers who were on production assignments to

Dugway Proving Ground to witness demonstrations of airplanes dropping

incendiaries on specially built targets. These visits gave the officers an opportunity to see in action the munitions they had labored to produce. If

there were any duds the officers were impressed with the need for producing only high grade matériel. Civilian workers at the arsenals and plants,

many of whom were wives of servicemen, were spurred on by motion pictures depicting the effectiveness of chemical warfare munitions as well as

through lectures given by soldiers who had been overseas.

The contractors, no less than military and civilian workers, needed incentives to bring out their maximum potentialities. Problems associated with

CWS procurement had particular implications for the contractors. In the

matter of priorities, for example, a manufacturer who was faced with a

low priority would naturally tend to assume that his product was not so

important as others. He would, moreover, be put in the embarrassing
PROCUREMENT OF OFFENSIVE MATÉRIEL 379

position of having his work interrupted for lack of materials and labor

without any provision being made for equitable compensation. Again, frequent changes in drawings and specifications resulting from the backward

state of development of a number of chemical warfare items caused frustration among contractors. Sometimes the contractors would but recently

have succeeded in mastering the manufacturing techniques on a certain

model when a change would come along. Another source of irritation was

the frequent revisions in production schedules resulting usually from a

change in Army requirements. These changes might lead to cancellation

of contracts or to the need for setting up new assembly lines with consequent dislocation of workers. Another possible source of annoyance was

the inspection standards on certain items such as the gas mask. Regardless of the merits or lack of merit of certain CWS inspection procedures,

the fact was that many contractors resented the procedures.

The principal medium for improving morale of contractors was the

Army-Navy E (for Excellent) award. The quality and quantity of the contractor's production in the light of the facilities available to him were prime

considerations in selecting recipients for this award. Other criteria included

the contractor's record in (1) overcoming production obstacles; (2) avoiding work stoppages; (3) maintaining fair labor standards; (4) training additional labor forces; (5) managing his business effectively; (6) maintaining

a safe and sanitary plant; and (7) utilizing subcontracting facilities. Final

selection of Army recipients for E awards rested with the Army Board for

Production Awards appointed by the Under Secretary of War.138

The CWS presented over 150 E awards during the war. In the granting of two of these awards, those to Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., and

to Batavia Metal Products, Inc., the CWS is open to criticism. The lack

of co-operation on the part of these contractors in connection with the

pricing program in the CWS would in itself seem to have been sufficient

reason for precluding them from the awards. But their records on labor

turnover and on use of facilities were also bad. These facts came to public notice in the open hearings before the Special Committee of the U.S.

Senate Investigating the National Defense Program in July 1946. There it

was revealed that the former wartime chiefs of the Chicago Ordnance District offices, Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Hammond and Col. John Slezak, steadfastly refused to recommend these contractors for E awards. To quote Gen138

 Army-Navy Production Award Manual, pp. 4-4a. CWS 314.7 "E" Awards File.
380 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

eral Hammond, "If you gave the E award to them, the E award wasn't

worth very much in the Fox River Valley after that."

 139

But there is good reason for believing that the E awards granted to

the Erie Basin and Batavia Metals companies were the exception to the

rule among CWS contractors. The standards for this award were very

high—perhaps somewhat too high—and most of those who received it

deserve the highest praise. There is little doubt that the other CWS contractors who got the E award richly deserved the honor.

139

 Hearings, pt. 34, p. 17894.
CHAPTER XVI

Storage and Distribution

Growth of CWS Storage Activities

During the months before Pearl Harbor, new logistics responsibilities

assigned to the Chemical Warfare Service led to major changes in storage

facilities. The principal problems at the beginning of 1941 had been the

storage of mobilization quantities of gas masks (and, to a lesser extent, the

storage of toxic gases). The Army's September 1941 call for CWS procurement of incendiary bombs and 4.2-inch mortar shells introduced a whole

new set of storage needs, and greatly enlarged the scale of facilities planning. There could be no storage of bombs and shells in urban warehouses,

nor was there space at Edgewood for the many new magazines which would

be required.1 As early as the winter of 1940-41 the CWS had to lease large

warehouses in Chicago and Indianapolis for storing items delivered by

contractors, and the Indianapolis installation was subsequently (April 1942)

to become a full-fledged depot. But far more than this was needed. New

depots had to be quickly planned. The first was an addition to the recently

authorized CWS Huntsville Arsenal which the Army was building in

northern Alabama. Action for this facility, the future Gulf Chemical Warfare Depot, began in September 1941 with an authorization for the transfer of 282,000 square feet of proposed toxic gas storage yard construction

from Edgewood to Huntsville.2 In November the Army informed the OC

CWS that funds would be available to provide storage for 40,000,000 fourpound incendiary bombs. The planned Huntsville depot gained half the

1

 See ch. XI above for description of storage facilities at Edgewood. 2

 (1) Ltr, Col P. X. English, C Ind Div OC CWS, to QMG, 23 Aug 41. CWS 681/29.

(2) Memo, Col H. S. Aurand, C Req & Dist Br G-4, for Construction Br, 10 Sep 41, sub: Depot

Storage Program (Deferred Storage). G-4/32315 Sec I.
382 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

number of magazines needed to fill this requirement, while the remainder

was scheduled for construction at Pine Bluff, Ark., like Huntsville the site

of a new CWS arsenal.3 During 1942 the storage area at Pine Bluff became the nucleus of another new depot, Midwest.

As soon as the country was actually at war, the Chemical Warfare

Service took steps to provide itself with a major depot in the far west.

The preferred location was the Salt Lake City area, and a desert valley

some fifty-seven miles southwest of the city, in Tooele County, Utah, was

selected in February 1942. The new facility, designated Deseret Chemical

Warfare Depot, was under construction by the summer of 1942. Its principal function was to serve as another storage center for bombs, mortar

shells, and toxics.4

Within a year of the attack on Pearl Harbor, therefore, the wartime

storage requirements of the Chemical Warfare Service were well on the

way toward being matched by Chemical Warfare facilities. In addition to

the prewar storage areas at Edgewood and Indianapolis, new depots were

virtually complete at the sites of the Pine Bluff and Huntsville Arsenals,

while the Deseret Depot was being hurried into existence. Deseret began

its active storage operations in October 1942, despite the fact that construction was still underway; the depots at Pine Bluff and Huntsville had

been operating since summer. From some 2,500,000 square feet of storage

space in June 1942, the total available to the CWS jumped to 19,500,000

square feet by the end of 1942 and to 23,000,000 square feet by the following June.5

With the activation of the new depots the CWS depot system consisted of five branch depots—Eastern (Edgewood), Gulf (Huntsville),

Midwest (Pine Bluff), Indianapolis, and Deseret—and five chemical sections of Army Service Forces depots—Atlanta, Memphis, New Cumberland, San Antonio, and Utah.6

 The missions of these installations varied

considerably. The Indianapolis Depot became in effect (and eventually in

name) a national control point for CWS spare parts.7 The other branch

depots had in common a responsibility for reserve storage of CWS gen3

 Memo, C Fld Svc OC CWS for C Ind Svc, OC CWS, 13 Nov 41. CWS 471.6 Bombs. 4

 (1) History of the Deseret Chemical Warfare Depot to June 30, 1945, pp. 1-13. (2) Ltr,

TAG to C CWS, 14 Jul 42, sub: Designation of Deseret Chemical Warfare Depot. AG 681

(7-9-42) MR-M. 5

 Cf Baum, Brophy, and Hemleben, Chemical Warfare Service Supply Program, pt. 4, Storage

and Maintenance, p. 637, and Table 9. 6

 A sixth branch depot, Northeast, was activated in mid-1944 near Niagara Falls, N.Y., to serve

as an ammunition subdepot of Edgewood. 7

 See ch. XIII above.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 383

TABLE 9—CWS GROSS STORAGE SPACE IN OPERATION, 1945

a

 CE, Quarterly Inventory, Sponsored, and Leased Facilities, 31 Dec 44. b

 Hemleben, CWS Activities at Ports of Embarkation, pp. 142, 206, 213. Approximately 15,000 sq. ft. of CWS warehouse storage space was in use by the Port Chemical Officers at the smaller Ports of Embarkation.

Source: ASF MPR-2-H, 31 Mar 45, p. 39, except as noted.

eral supplies, but their main mission was the handling of chemical ammunition and toxics for zone of interior distribution, shipment to Ports of

Embarkation, and reserve storage. Distribution of general supplies, both

for zone of interior installations and the Ports of Embarkation, was handled in the main by the Chemical Sections of the ASF Depots, which also

distributed training ammunition to their local Service Commands.8

One of the early concerns of the new Headquarters, Services of Supply, in the spring of 1942 was supervising and standardizing Technical

Service depot activities. Immediately upon its activation the SOS called

upon a group of commercial warehousemen to help solve Army warehousing problems. This group, working at the San Antonio General Depot,

introduced a number of innovations into Army storage practices. Among

these were the reduction of aisle space to a minimum by eliminating inventory aisles, and the mechanization of materials handling through the

8

 Supply Mission statements of the branch depots and chemical sections may be found in

S. J. Hemleben and E. M. Loughery, Hist of CWS in World War II, vol. IV, Chemical Warfare

Service Supply Program, pt. V, Distribution, app. A. (MS Monograph).
384 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

use of fork-lift trucks and palletized loads.9 The CWS belatedly profited

from the lack of peacetime expansion of storage facilities in that it could

build the new depots along lines of contemporary storage practices and

wartime Army requirements. At the prewar Eastern Depot at Edgewood

storage space was distributed among a number of small buildings, all with

floors at ground, rather than boxcar, level. The new CWS depots, on the

other hand, were designed for more efficient concentration of storage,

within limits of safety, and all had floors at boxcar level. The savings in

aisle space and labor made possible by the new Army guidelines promised to be considerable.10

The mechanization of materials handling at CWS depots began on a

small scale during the summer and fall of 1942, in accordance with SOS

policy and directives. The process of change was slow at first. Indianapolis

Depot was using half a dozen fork-lift trucks for stacking matériel as early

as July 1942.11 Gulf Depot, which had begun operations on "whiskey

and manpower" in the spring of 1942, received its first fork-lift trucks in

October, along with some warehouse tractors.12 Midwest and Deseret were

operating fork-lift trucks by the spring of 1943, but Eastern Depot, with

its complicated physical layout, did not begin this phase of mechanized

storage until February 1944.13 Northeast Depot, activated in the spring of

1944, well after the early days of mechanization, used fork-lift trucks from

the outset.14

The fork-lift truck made possible a number of labor- and space-saving

advances in storage techniques. Chief of these was the palletized load, a

unit of storage consisting of a pallet or wooden platform of a size to hold a

given quantity of material, and built to leave clearance underneath for the

forks of the fork-lift truck. Palletized loads, capable of being moved quickly

into place with the fork-lift trucks, could be stored to considerable heights

without danger of damage, thus making possible more economical use of

space as well as of time and labor.15 Fork-lift trucks were also used in

9

 (1) ICAF R 39, Handling of Materiel, Nov 45, p. 9. ICAF Library. (2) Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, p. 300. 10

 Memo, Maj W. C. Crosby, WD General Depot Service, to Col A. B. Drake, 2 Jul 42, sub:

Inspection of Edgewood CWS Depot. ASF A46-139, Eastern CW Depot. 11

 History of the Indianapolis CWD, May 1942-July 1945, p. 63. 12

 History of the Gulf CWD, 6 March 1942 to 15 August 1945, pp. 5, 10. 13

 (1) History of Midwest CWD, 2 August 1945, vol. I, pp. 60-62. (2) History of Deseret

CWD to June 30, 1945, pp. 25, 28. (3) History of Eastern CWD to June 1945, pp. 107-08. 14

 History of Northeast CWD, June 1944-August 1945, pp. 8-10. 15

 For a more complete description of palletizing, see Risch, Organization, Supply, and Services,

pp. 347-49.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 385

BOXED CANS OF DECONTAMINATING SOLUTION stacked on pallets,

wooden platforms built to leave clearance

underneath for the forks of the fork-lift

truck.

conjunction with many jigs, booms,

and claw devices, most of them onthe-spot expedients, to improve the

handling of bulky items. Deseret had

a jig and boom attachment to the

fork-lift truck in operation for unloading freight cars by October 1943.

Jigs for simultaneous handling of up

to nine 55-gallon drums of toxics

were in use there during 1944, and

similar methods came into use for

loading the awkward incendiary

bomb clusters.16

By 1944 the use of mechanized

handling equipment had become

general in CWS depots, and the savings in man-hours began to loom

large. Eastern Depot found that the

40 man-hours previously needed to

unload a boxcar could be cut to 20

or less, with 5 men doing the work of 10.17 Deseret cut crew time for

the unloading of 100-lb incendiary clusters from 5 hours to 1 hour per

car by using fork-lift trucks with homemade jigs.18 But fork-lift trucks

brought problems as well as savings. Eastern Depot, which had never

been built for mechanized handling equipment, frequently found itself in

difficulties on this score. Its sixty-odd ground-level storage structures,

scattered over two main areas a mile and half apart, made it hard even

to get trucks from building to building, for they were not designed for

cross-country operation. The trucks ultimately had to be mounted on low

trailers constructed for the purpose, and towed from place to place by

tractor. The depot also found that it needed an unusually large number

of pallets if enough were to be on hand in any given area when required.

By 1945 there were no fewer than 35,000 pallets of various sizes on the

depot grounds.19

16

 History of Deseret CWD, pp. 37-45. 17

 History of Eastern CWD, pp. 107-08. 18

 History of Deseret CWD, p. 42. 19

 History of Eastern CWD, pp. 108-11.
386 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Storage and Transportation of Toxics

The problems of handling war-swollen stocks of general supplies by

up-to-date methods came upon the CWS suddenly, but the task of storing items such as toxic agents was hardly new. The methods for storing

and handling agents in bulk had been worked out during and after World

War I by Edgewood Arsenal. The principal packaging device for toxics

was the ton container, a steel cylinder with a capacity of 170 gallons (about

1900 pounds in the case of mustard). These were kept in open storage,

resting horizontally on tracks designed to keep them off the ground and

assure free circulation of air.

Edgewood had developed a deep respect for the problems inherent in

handling and storing toxic agents and had worked out special techniques

for testing, cleaning, and handling toxic containers. Men classified as toxic

gas handlers had demonstrated an aptitude for the work and completed

a special training course. This experience with a training program proved

its value in another way after Pearl Harbor, when the depot at Edgewood

found itself obligated to train cadres of toxic gas handlers for the new

depots under construction.20 Midwest Depot, for example, sent seven enlisted men to the course at Edgewood in the summer of 1942 as the first

step in getting its projected toxic yard into operation.

With the exception of Indianapolis, the new depots were meant to assume most of the responsibility for the storage of toxics. While Eastern

was reaching its wartime maximum of some quarter of a million square

feet of toxic yard space, its younger counterparts were hurrying to completion toxic yards which multiplied Eastern's size many times over. Deseret alone had a toxic yard potential of over eighteen million square feet,

and Midwest and Gulf had 2,300,000 square feet between them. But in

the early days of wartime production it sometimes seemed as i£. storage

space would never catch up with the demand. At Midwest Depot in 1942

the first shipment of toxics—525 ton containers of mustard—arrived just

in time to fill the storage tracks available, and for the next eleven weeks

construction of additional trackage was matched week after week by fresh

shipments.21 Shipments of toxics into Deseret became necessary in October of 1942, though the depot had been only four months under construction. Over two thousand tons of mustard were received and stored there

by mid-November, though most of the necessary mechanical handling equip20

 Ibid., pp. 122-27. 21

 History of Midwest CWD, p. 86.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 387

ment was still lacking and the crews were still without permanent living

quarters.22

The maintenance of toxics in storage involved a number of special

problems arising from the nature of the materials. Mustard, which constituted by weight well over half of all the toxics produced by the CWS,

required particular attention. In the form produced during most of the

wartime period (the so-called Levinstein H) it contained about 30 percent of more or less unstable impurities which introduced some complicating factors when it was left in storage for any length of time. It evolved

gases at a rate which sometimes built up dangerous amounts of pressure

within the containers. It deposited tarry sludges which could not be drained

out. Handlers had to learn techniques for testing pressures in containers,

venting them when necessary, and cleaning them after they were drained.

The possibility of leakage was always present, and with it the likelihood

that other containers near the leaking one would become contaminated.

Midwest Depot found it necessary at one time to segregate a large number of suspect toxic-filled containers in a "sick bay" to keep them from

contaminating the rest of the toxic yard when, as sometimes happened, a

combination of corrosion and high pressure produced a sudden spray of

mustard through a leak.23

When toxics were stored in 55-gallon drums instead of ton containers,

as necessity or convenience sometimes required, problems of corrosion and

leakage multiplied. If the drums were shipped and stored standing on end

they were likely to trap rain water on top and rust. If they were placed

on their sides some of the bungs at the ends were likely to leak. Eventually CWS decided that in depots, at least, it was better to leave the

drums on their sides and keep inspecting them for leaks, than to risk accelerated corrosion through rusting.24

In view of the undependability of containers and the highly dangerous

character of toxic agents, it was very important that shipments of toxics

be accompanied by guard details trained to handle such materials and to

recognize and deal with potential sources of trouble. When large-scale

shipments of toxics in and out of depots began in 1942, trained servicemen were picked up wherever they were available to act as guards and

22

 History of Deseret CWD, pp. 23-26. 23

 History of Midwest CWD, pp. 92-93. 24

 Ltr, CO Pine Bluff Depot [Midwest] to C CWS, attn: Supply Br, 15 Apr 43, sub: Storage

of 55-Gallon Drums for HS and 1st Ind, Col N. D. Gillet to CO, Pine Bluff Depot, 21 Apr 43.

CWS 457-PBA-1943.
388 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Toxic GAS YARDS, MIDWEST CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT, Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas.

handlers. The first trainload of mustard from Huntsville Arsenal to the

toxic yard at Midwest Depot, for example, was convoyed by the first 7

men the depot had sent to Edgewood for training as toxic gas handlers;

they were simply detailed to stop off at Huntsville on their way back

from Edgewood in order to accompany the train.25 In other cases the installation originating shipment provided a guard detail from its own military personnel to act as convoy.26

 It seemed advisable as time went on to

provide a centrally available and uniformly trained detachment to handle

all convoy duties incident to the shipment of toxics and chemical munitions. Accordingly, in January 1943, on the recommendation of OC CWS,

the Services of Supply directed the Chemical Warfare Service training

center at Camp Sibert, Ala., to set up and train a detachment of 20 officers and 100 enlisted men for service as a guard and security unit for the

shipment of toxics.27

The unit was duly brought into being at Camp Sibert as a section of

the RTC Specialist Schools. Its enlisted men came from the 1st and 2nd

25

 History of Midwest CWD, pp. 85-86. 26

 History of Guard and Security and Tech Escort Detachment, December 1954, p. 7. Hereafter

cited as Guard and Security. 27

 Ltr, OC CWS to CG SOS, 20 Jan 43, sub: Military Personnel to Accompany Shipments of

Classified Chemical Warfare Material. CWS SPCWP 210.482/3.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 389

Regiments of the RTC, and the officers were attached from the CW Officers' Replacement Pool. On 1 February 1944 the unit was transferred to

Headquarters Detachment I, Chemical Warfare Center at Edgewood, where

it remained for the rest of the war. Its strength rose to a wartime peak

of about three hundred and fifty officers and enlisted men.28 The unit carried on a three-week training program for all men assigned to it.

Within the zone of the interior the principal job performed by the

guard and security unit was to escort rail shipments of toxics and toxic

filled munitions to and from depots, arsenals, and ports of embarkation.

A guard detail, headed by a junior officer, took custody of each shipment

at its point of departure, accompanied it via railroad caboose throughout

its journey, maintained a continual alert for emergencies, checked the cars

for evidence of contamination at each stop, and made detailed inspection

of the condition of the shipment during major stopovers. All leaks found

in containers or casings were repaired. Cars found to be contaminated

through extensive leakages of toxics were promptly sidelined and guarded

until they could be decontaminated or the contents reloaded.29

If the shipment was bound overseas, the guard detail went overseas with

it. It supervised loading on shipboard and also guarded the matériel.

While at sea it kept a daily check of the ship's ventilating system to make

sure that no toxic vapors were contaminating the air. The crew was

equipped with gas masks and given instruction by the detail in gas mask

drill, first aid, and decontamination. After the destination was reached,

the cargo was inspected again before being unloaded.30

Storage of Other CWS Items

Incendiary Bombs

The transfer to the Chemical Warfare Service of responsibility for the

incendiary bomb program in the late summer of 1941 brought with it the

need for magazine operations on a scale hitherto reserved for Ordnance.

Storage requirements for items capable of explosive or incendiary behavior—

both of which could be expected from incendiary bombs in case of accidents—followed a fairly strict pattern based largely on Ordnance experi28

 Guard and Security, pp. 7-11, 18. 29

 (1) 1st Ind Hq Guard and Security Division, CWS, 20 Dec 44, to Ltr, Maj H. J. Isbell,

Training Div OC CWS, 18 Dec 44. CWS 314.7 Storage File. (2) Guard and Security, pp. 20-23. 30

 Guard and Security, pp. 24, 25.
390 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ence with ammunition storage. From 1928 onward the typical Ordnance

high-caliber ammunition magazine had been built in the form of what

was called an igloo. Igloos, in Army terminology, were low concrete

buildings of semicylindrical shape, covered with sod. The arching walls

were designed to direct the force of an explosion upward.31 Several small

igloos were already in existence at Edgewood Arsenal, including some

half-dozen built as part of the emergency period expansion program in

1940-41.

When the incendiary bomb program materialzed, the CWS at once

began work on plans for igloo construction at the proposed new depots

on a scale large enough to provide permanent storage for 40,000,000 fourpound bombs.32

 A type of igloo used by Ordnance for the storage of

smokeless powder became the prototype for the CWS building program.

This igloo had exterior dimensions approximating 29 feet by 82 feet—

twice the length of the igloos recently erected at Edgewood. According to

estimates, it would store about 58,500 four-pound incendiary bombs in its

2,200 square feet of interior space. A 300-foot interval between igloos was

considered standard.33

The new depots provided sites for hundreds of igloos. Two hundred

and twenty went up at Midwest Depot, and some three hundred and fifty

at Gulf Depot. Deseret accommodated 140 igloos. The activation of Northeast Depot in 1944 brought an additional fifty-eight igloos into the CWS

storage program, so that altogether nearly eight hundred of these specialized magazines were brought into use by the CWS after completion

of its original expansion plan at Edgewood.34

By the summer of 1942 the first shipments of incendiary bomb clusters

were beginning to fill the new facilities. As the carloads arrived, the 100-

pound clusters were manhandled into the igloos from the railroad docks

via trucks and roller conveyors arid stacked inside by hand, as many as

twelve to a stack. This procedure, time consuming and laborious as it

was, remained without much change for more than a year until the use

of fork-lift trucks and pallets became general. A number of devices had

by then been improvised for handling 100-pound and 500-pound clusters.

11

 Mrs. Lida Mayo and Dr. Harry C. Thomson. The Ordnance Department: Production and Distribution, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 12

 See above, p. 342. 33

 Memo, C Supply Div OC CWS for C CWS, 30 Sep 41, sub: Fire Protection of Magnesium

Incendiary Bombs in Storage. CWS 314.7 Storage File. 34

 (1) History of Midwest CWD, p. 6. (2) History of Huntsville Arsenal, 1941-45, p. 22.

(3) History of Deseret CWD, p. 103. (4) History of Northeast CWD, p. 7.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 391

Crane operated booms and jigs lifted a truckload of clusters at a single

operation, the standard load being seven 500-pound M17 clusters.35

The igloo capacity of the CWS, despite its great expansion, was not

enough to guarantee interior storage of bombs at all times. Frequently

depots and arsenals found themselves obliged to resort to open storage.

Furthermore, when supplies were moving quickly in and out of the depot,

open storage was often the more economical of time and labor. Storage

out of doors was not harmful if the necessary precautions were taken.

The packaged clusters had to be placed on platforms allowing at least a

few inches of air to circulate between them and the ground. Reasonable

limits had to be observed in the size of the stacks, their nearness to each

other, and the total number of clusters kept in one area.36 Of particular

importance was the necessity for providing the stacked clusters with some

protection from the elements. At first, it was customary to cover the stacks

with tarpaulins. It was not sufficient, however, simply to drape the

weatherproofmg on the stacks. While the packaged clusters were not very

susceptible to damage from occasional incidental sprinkling, they were, on

the other hand, vulnerable to corrosion and rotting if the tarpaulins

covered them so closely as to prevent the free passage of air.37 Some

storage areas arranged stacks with a narrow row of boxes on top to provide a sort of ridgepole for the tarpaulin covering. Others used supporting frames of light timber. Midwest Depot, which found tarpaulins difficult to procure in quantity, hard to handle, and quick to deteriorate, devised

a new system. The light timber "A" frames which had been constructed

to support the tarpaulins were discarded. In their place 20 foot by 20 foot

frames were built, covered with tarpaper, and placed on top of the stacks

like so much shed roofing.38 This proved to be adequate protection and

not too burdensome to handle, provided cranes were available.

Bleach

The packaging and storage of bleaching powder was hardly as big a

responsibility as the handling of incendiaries, but it proved to be one of

35

 (1) History of Midwest CWD, pp. 57-59, 66. (2) U.S. Army Photographs, Midwest CWD,

17 Aug 44 and 3 Nov 44. CWS 314.7 Storage File. 36

 Ltr, CO NYCWPD to C CWS, attn: C Supply Br Operations Div, 19 May 43, sub: Storage

of M69 Incendiary Bombs at Loading Plants. CWS 400.24-NYCWPD-1943. 37

 Ltr, C Insp Div OC CWS to C Insp O NYCWPD, 5 May 44, sub: Storage of Finished M17

Aimable Clusters. CWS 400.24-NYCWPD-1944. 38

 History of Midwest CWD, pp. 77-78.
392 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the most troublesome episodes in the wartime storage experience of the

CWS. Bleaching powder (calcium hypochlorite), in addition to its powerful

oxidizing action, liberates free chlorine. Since it was a cheap and abundant

commercial item it was an obvious choice for chemical decontamination

of the persistent toxic agents, which decomposed into relatively harmless

compounds when chlorinated. On the basis of World War I experience,

the CWS considered bleaching powder its standard general-purpose

decontaminating agent, and once the nation was at war again it prepared

to lay in large supplies.

No sooner had the depots begun to fill their warehouses with drums

of bleaching powder than difficulties began to appear. The bleach was

not high-test hypochlorite, a product of relative purity and stability, but

a lower commercial grade of variable composition and inconvenient characteristics. It came packed in large steel drums, covered, but not tightly

sealed. The powder took up moisture from the air and began evolving

chlorine, sometimes at a rate sufficient to blow the tops off the drums.

At the same time it was slowly but steadily corroding its containers, not

only from the inside, but, thanks to careless packing and the resultant

dusting of bleach on the drum exteriors, from the outside as well. This

double process of decomposition and corrosion was accompanied by a

parallel decline in the potency of the bleach itself. By the time the

country entered its second year of war much of the bleaching powder held

in storage by the CWS had become worthless.39

The situation had not failed to arouse concern. The CWS sought the

advice of its suppliers at a conference at Niagara Falls in November, 1942.

But the manufacturers could not offer much comfort. They themselves had

never found an economical container for bleach more effective than the

galvanized steel drum. Furthermore, it had never been customary in industry to keep bleaching powder in storage for more than a few months.

After this meeting Lt. Col. Ludlow King, Chief of Inspection Branch, Industrial Division, OC CWS, was detailed to study possible substitute containers and came to the conclusion that no available metal drum could

be regarded as offering guaranteed satisfaction for the long-term storage

of ordinary American bleach. The CWS then adopted the practice of

packaging bleach for storage in steel drums which had been provided

with heavy coats of baked lacquer, inside and out. Containers of this sort

39

 (1) Ltr, C R&D Dept OC CWS to CO, CW Depot, Edgewood, 10 Sep 42, sub: Reclamation of Bleaching Powder. CWS 470.6/2751. (2) Baum, Brophy, and Hemleben, Storage and

Maintenance, p. 730.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 393

appeared to be the best available for the purpose, though they, too, were

not immune from corrosion.40

In addition to improving the containers, CWS technicians could attack

the problem of storing bleach successfully through improving the bleach.

In early 1943 there seemed no immediate likelihood of procuring high-test

hypochlorite from American sources for CWS use.41 Fortunately another

source of relatively stable bleaching powder was at hand. The British had

been producing a surplus of bleach of a quality well above that of the

American commercial grade, and from the fall of 1942 substantial quantities

of this product were made available to the CWS through reverse lendlease. Between September 1942 and March 1943 a total of nearly 16,000

tons of British bleach entered the CWS supply system, twice the amount

obtained from American manufacturers in the same period.42 But this

windfall was not without its disadvantages. The British bleach arrived

packed in drums which did not meet demonstrated storage requirements.

The CWS promptly repackaged it in 100-pound lacquered steel drums.

The job of repackaging was one of the most laborious experienced by

the depots. The bleaching powder, as just noted, was corrosive and the

chlorine gas it evolved was both suffocating and poisonous. The crews

engaged in shoveling the bleach from container to container were obliged

to wear full protective equipment, including gas masks and special clothing. They were greatly relieved when the task was done.43

Packing and Packaging

The problems encountered in keeping bleach in storage constituted

only one instance of a general deficiency. Items had entered the distribution system before techniques had been developed to keep them in storage

safely or see them on their way with reasonable assurance of safe arrival.

One of the obvious responsibilities of a distribution system is to get

matériel to its destination intact. To a large degree the successful fulfill

ment of this responsibility depends on the protection provided by the

packing methods utilized. This fact is especially true when the system

40

 (1) Memo, Lt Col Ludlow King for C Field Requirements Br, Opns Div, OC CWS, 25 Feb

43, sub: Deterioration of Chloride of Lime Drums. CWS 314.7 Storage File. (2) Interv, Hist Off

with Maj Eugene Lennon, Cml C, 27 May 58. (3) Interv, Hist Off with W. C. Gibfeons, J. F.

McGinty, R. J. Milano, and B. W. Redmerski, 10 Jun 58. These men all served in CWS Chemical

Commodity Div in World War II. 41

 King memo, 25 Feb 43. 42

 CWS Report of Production, 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45. 43

 (1) History of Midwest CWD, p. 70. (2) History of Eastern CWD, p. 95.
394 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

must supply expeditionary forces through all the hazards of wartime communications and in virtually all the climates of the world. The demands

of the war on the CWS packaging techniques revealed shortcomings that

had escaped notice during the peacetime years and the prewar build-up.

It took many months for CWS packing doctrine and practice to catch up

to the requirements of global war.44

For the most part, CWS packing and packaging had met ordinary

peacetime standards. Packaging specifications were often simply references

to ICC requirements for shippers using common carriers. Many items were

never considered liable to overseas shipment and were packed in a manner

suitable to the needs of domestic railroad requirements only, while even

material bound overseas was given only the care and safeguards of normal peacetime ports and shipping. In some cases packing specifications

which in themselves might have been basically sound were waived for

shipments designated "emergency." The shortcomings of the existing packaging practices became generally apparent after the first major overseas

landing operation by American forces in French North Africa late in 1942.

Under the pressure of rough and hasty handling, improvised storage,

over-the-beach landing, salt water corrosion, emergency unpacking, and

the like, all factors inevitably associated with supply in an active theater

of operations, many CWS packing and packaging methods failed to meet

the demands made of them. This was true of Army packing in general,

and theater complaints became the subject of top level Army concern.45

CWS officials, studying the reports of packaging failures and corrosion

overseas, found six major factors responsible for the trouble: (1) inadequate packing and packaging design particularly in the selection of packing materials; (2) poor workmanship by inexperienced labor; (3) insufficient emphasis by inspectors on adherence to packaging standards; (4)

poorly designed blocking and bracing, in view of the rough handling to

be expected; (5) unanticipated outdoor storage; (6) unanticipated climatic

conditions.46 It was evident that immediate action was needed to redesign

inadequate packages and packing to meet the actual stresses encountered.

44

 (1) Maj F. B. Shaw, Jr., "Crating, Packing and Marking" (a lecture before the Inspection

School, Edgewood Arsenal), 15 Sep 43. CWS 314.7 Storage File. Major Shaw, a CWS reserve

officer, directed CWS packaging research. (2) Pritchard, Birdsell, and Kleber, Chemicals in

Combat. 45

 Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training and Supply, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1956), p. 392. 46

 Abstract of Chemical Corps Packaging Activity During World War II, a study prepared

by CmlC Tech Command (F. B. Shaw), Oct 46. See Ltr, CO Tech Command to C R&D Div,

Liaison Group, same sub, 24 Oct 46. CWS 314.7 Storage File.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 395

A packaging unit was created within the Technical Division early in 1943

and assigned specialized personnel and laboratory space at Edgewood

Arsenal. This unit, subsequently raised to branch status, began at once to

develop new designs and specifications where the need existed.47 The basic

problems dealt generally with increasing the strength of packages, cutting

size and weight down as far as practicable, denying access to water or

water vapor, inhibiting corrosion, and preventing mildew. Such things as

materials shortages had to be kept in mind as well as the matter of ease

and speed of packaging. The variety of overseas destinations multiplied

the difficulties. The Pacific theaters, though the first impact of their requirements seems to have been less than that of the North African landings, presented some of the most complex problems. Supplies there were

often landed on small beaches, without mechanical equipment or trained

labor, and, in the early days especially, under the fire of enemy snipers

or aircraft. Sometimes matériel was simply floated ashore. Once landed,

it had to be hauled through jungles, stored during tropical rainstorms, and

protected somehow from the corrosive humidity.48

The point of departure for packaging development in the CWS, as

in the other branches of the Army, was War Department Specification

100-14A, which prescribed general requirements and indicated standard

methods of crating and boxing. Within these limits, whenever possible,

and outside them when necessary, the CWS packaging laboratory developed

specific packaging requirements for all the items in the CWS supply system.

Crates were used for packing a few comparatively bulky CWS items,

such as smoke tanks and smoke generators. These had to be specially

designed in each case, with particular care to make sure that hard surfaced points on the item or the bracing were not so placed as to abrade

the waterproof paper liner. Corrosion prevention for hardware was accomplished by cleaning all ferrous surfaces and coating them with grease

or oil.

For the greater number of CWS items, boxes of one sort or another

were devised and specified. In some cases the specifications were changed

over and over again in the attempt to attain the best possible protection

in the face of a variety of hazards. The 500-pound aimable cluster, M19,

an adapter holding thirty-eight M69 incendiary bombs, was one such ex47

 (1) M. A. Raun and T. A. Treglia, "Packaging Development in the Chemical Corps." (2)

Shaw Study CmlC Packaging Activity. Both in CWS 314.7 Storage File. 48

 S. J. Hemleben, History of CWS Activities at Ports of Embarkation (MS Monograph), pp.

134-35.
396 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ample. The bombs had to be kept moistureproof, particularly since their

fuzes contained black powder and would become inactivated if subjected

to high humidity. There was no point in using vaporproof film covering

with silica-gel dehydrator, as prescribed for moistureproof packing in some

other services, because there was almost no silica-gel available to the CWS,

nor could handlers conveniently or economically wrap the awkwardly

shaped cluster in film without puncturing it. The first solution arrived at

was a metal-sheathed, hermetically sealed plywood box. This proved satisfactory on an experimental basis, but attempts to secure rapid quantity

production failed. Then a similar box made entirely of steel was substituted; it was unduly heavy but otherwise almost as satisfactory as the

first. Again, production fell, in this case as a result of failure to observe

the close tolerances needed to assure a vaporproof seal. By this time, however, a double steel drum pack (two steel drums fitted end to end over

the cluster and sealed with a clamp and a sponge rubber gasket) had

been worked out and proved to meet the basic requirements. This pack

was ultimately adopted as standard. Subsequent difficulties ensued when

stocks of fully dried wood for interior bracing ran out. To avoid raising

the humidity inside the pack, a new bracing system was worked out incorporating moisture laden wood. This problem was solved only as the

war ended.49

While troubles of this sort kept the packaging laboratory busy

throughout the war, the worst of the lag in packaging development was

overcome in the course of 1943. Before the year was out the packaging

development chief was able to venture the opinion that most of the big

changes had already been made.50 But many routine packaging and packing designs remained to be worked out and revised during the remaining

two years of war. Generally speaking, the problem of safely containing

bulk quantities of highly reactive chemicals under wartime conditions was

never solved. There was no certainty that existing containers for toxics

would not burst or corrode, and the ever-present possibility of "leakers"

in lots of toxic-filled drums or munitions imposed a perpetual state of

alert on depot and transportation personnel. Even so familiar a commercial item as bleaching powder developed problems of corrosion in

storage, mentioned earlier in this chapter, which were ameliorated but

49

 F. B. Shaw, Jr., "Packing Incendiary Bomb Clusters," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, III

(April 1950), 20-21, 40. 50

 Shaw, "Crating, Packing and Marking."
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 397

DRUMS OF BLEACHING POWDER stacked at a depot in England, August 1943.

never completely solved before hostilities ceased, remaining to challenge

the ingenuity of CWS technicians in the years that followed.

Distribution

The CWS distribution system functioned in general along lines laid

down by the ASF. Its depots were allocated responsibilities by OC CWS

in such a way as to conform with Army requirements for regional decentralization. For the most part its filler depots were located well back of

the seaboard—in Utah, Arkansas, and northern Alabama, for example—a

circumstance which tended to reduce congestion at and near the ports, as

far as CWS matériel was concerned. The one major exception was Eastern

Depot at Edgewood, Md., the original center of the distribution system;

but the policy of moving storage functions back from the crowded coast

was applied at Eastern also, when first the major part of its general supplies responsibility and then a substantial share of its ammunition storage

functions were shifted inland to New Cumberland and Northeast Depots

respectively. The CWS, which for years before the war had a minimal

distribution load centering on a single depot consisting mostly of gas

masks, succeeded in getting a nationwide depot system into operation,
398 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

meeting modern standards of depot management and materials handling,

shipping large quantities of ammuntion and toxics without serious

incident, and keeping supplies moving to overseas theaters, Lend-Lease

nations, and the training centers at home.

Supplying the Corps Areas

During the emergency period before the entry of the United States

into the war, the CWS, like the other supply services, supplied equipment

to zone of interior installations and units through the several Corps Area

commanders.51 As in the period before the emergency each Corps Area

Headquarters received requisitions from posts under its jurisdiction, edited

them, and forwarded them to the appropriate supply service. CWS matériel

was supplied by OC CWS through the depot at Edgewood. The first expansion of the peacetime distribution system centered in Edgewood Arsenal

came early in 1941 when the Boston Chemical Warfare Procurement District was designated as the source of supply for training masks for posts

in the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Corps Areas, and the Chicago District became the source for the remaining areas.52

 (At this period training

masks for the suddenly expanded Army were the chief distribution responsibility of the CWS.) The new CWS depots and the chemical sections of

the ASF depots did not begin to figure in the active distribution system

until the end of the emergency period.

A few weeks after Pearl Harbor the War Department moved to

expedite the distribution process by ending the role of the Corps Area

Headquarters as a middleman between posts and depots. Henceforth,

depots were to receive consolidated requisitions directly from post supply

officers and make shipment accordingly.53 By this time the chemical sections of the general depots were ready to bear their share of the distribution load. Accordingly, a new regional supply system was set up by OC

CWS, giving Edgewood Depot responsibility for serving Corps Areas I-III,

the chemical section of Atlanta General Depot responsibility for Corps

Area IV, the chemical section of Memphis General Depot responsibility

for Corps Areas V-VII, the chemical section of San Antonio General

Depot responsibility for Corps Area VIII, and the chemical section of

51

 Ltr, TAG to CofS, et al., 30 Dec 40, sub: Current Supply Policies and Procedure. AG 475

(12-27-40) M-D-M. 52

 (1) Ltr, OC CWS to Exec O Chicago CW Warehouse, 16 Jan 41. (2) Ltr, OC CWS to

Exec O Boston CWPD, same date. Both in CWS 400.22/65. 53

 Ltr, TAG to Chiefs Supply Arms and Services, 20 Jan 42. AG 475 (1-16-42) MO-D-M.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 399

Utah General Depot responsibility for Corps Area IX. These chemicals

supply points were required to maintain computations of unit allowances

and records of current status of CWS matériel authorized for organizations

in the Corps Area served.54 This regional distribution system for general

supplies was the first and basic step in CWS participation in the War

Department's continuing campaign to decentralize supply functions and

maintain balance in movement of matériel. World War I experience in

the clogging of supply lines at the Ports of Embarkation provided a

warning of the vital necessity of balancing supply movements with supply

facilities, an example reinforced by the threat of congestion at east coast

ports in 1942. The CWS regional distribution plan described above was

limited to general supplies, such as protective equipment, and still left

Edgewood with a disproportionately large share of responsibility. The

system approached completion before the year was out, though, as one

by one the new CWS branch depots were activated. Each of these became

responsible not only for general supplies but also for the distribution of

ammunition and toxics on a regional basis. Thus Gulf Depot dealt with

the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Corps Areas (or Service Commands, as they

were subsequently designated), Midwest with the Seventh and Eighth, and

Deseret with the Ninth. The remaining Service Commands, the First,

Second, and Third, continued to draw on Eastern Depot at Edgewood for

the chemical ammunition. Eastern's supply load was further reduced on

30 April 1943 when its responsibility for the distribution of general supplies was cut back to that area of the Third Service Command south of

Pennsylvania. The First and Second Service Commands, plus Pennsylvania,

were served thereafter by an additional chemical section, that of the New

Cumberland ASF Depot. Again in 1944 Eastern's storage and shipping

load was divided when the activation of Northeast Depot (on a site

originally developed by the Ordnance Department) provided an additional

East Coast depot for chemical ammunition, a facility particularly helpful

in providing extra back-up storage for the New York Port of Embarkation. (See Chart 2 for CWS distribution network.)

The regional allocation of responsibilities among the facilities in the

CWS depot system served to meet ASF requirements for decentralized

supply. The designation of depots by function—filler, reserve, distribution,

or key—was also accomplished in accordance with ASF standards, though

54

 (1) Ltr, OC CWS to CmlO's Corps Areas et al., 7 Feb 42, sub: Direct System of Supply for

Posts, Camps and Stations. CWS 475/234. (2) S. J. Hemleben and E. M. Loughery, Distribution,

vol. 4, pt. 5, in monograph series History of the CWS in World War II, pp. 821-23.
CHART 2—SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM, CHEMICAL WARFARE SUPPLY, As OF 6 DECEMBER 1944

Source: Baltimore-Liaison Office, Storage Branch, Supply Division, OC CWS, Dec. 1944.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 401

in an organization as small as the CWS, this required the assignment of

multiple missions to most of the installations. Distribution depots were

those which supplied matériel to posts, camps, and stations within a designated region. The chemical sections of ASF depots and the CWS branch

depots fulfilled this function for general supplies and ammunition respectively. Reserve depots stored additional stocks for the replenishment of

the distribution depots; this function was also included in the missions

of all CWS storage installations, with a range of matériel, broad or limited

as the case might be, specified in each instance. Filler depots provided a

storage service for the Ports of Embarkation by filling Port requisitions

out of their stocks, thus reducing the likelihood of an unmanageable accumulation of goods on the seaboards. Each CWS installation had a mission

assignment as a filler depot for one or more ports. Key depots were those

which stocked special items whose distribution could be more usefully

accomplished from centralized control points than through the standard

regional setup. The only CWS depot with this type of mission was

Indianapolis, which controlled the distribution of all CWS spare parts.

An additional measure of specialization was carried out by the major

CWS branch depots. Eastern, Gulf, and Midwest Depots shared locations

with three of the four CWS arsenals. They took advantage of this circumstance to act whenever practicable as primary destinations for the

products of their respective arsenals regardless of the ultimate destination envisaged. This tended to reduce crosshauling and backhauling by

keeping the matériel out of any actual transit until it was needed. In

order to perform the same service for Rocky Mountain Arsenal, which

had no CWS depot at hand, Deseret established a storage area under its

own jurisdiction adjacent to the arsenal.

Stock Control

A major purpose of the decentralizing of depot functions was, as has

been stated, the avoidance as far as possible of the inevitable tendency to

choke the lines of distribution with an oversupply of goods, a condition

particularly acute at the ports, where the lines of distribution converged

on a few overcrowded centers. A rigorous system of stock control, based

on limitation of station stock levels and the provision of careful controls

on the rate at which matériel moved to the ports was the obvious corollary of the new depot system. In 1942 the Control Division, ASF, made a

survey of stock control practices in the CWS. The survey disclosed that

a records system for approximately 1,000 items, including components,
402 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

was maintained. Of this number only thirty-eight were fast moving items,

and on these a daily report was received from each depot and port of

embarkation. This report which listed on-hand figures, was used as a basis

for filling requisitions and setting up credits. On another sixty items

weekly reports were made to the Office of the Chief, and on still another

sixty-five, monthly reports were made. The remaining chemical warfare

items were reported periodically. A record of all chemical warfare items

in CW depots was maintained on hand-posted sheets in the OC CWS,

as well as on a prescribed hand-posted form in the depots. The survey

found that the system was workable only because there were few items

and because the bulk moved slowly.55

Early in 1943 the Assistant Chief of Staff, ASF, for Operations, Maj.

Gen. LeRoy Lutes, requested the chiefs of the various technical services to

submit recommendations for implementing a stock control system.56 During the next two months the ASF worked up a tentative stock control

manual which was issued on 3 May 1943.57 This manual was to be later

revised several times on the basis of actual experience.58 When issuing the

tentative stock control manual, Headquarters, ASF, at the same time

directed the technical services to set up stock control, storage, and maintenance units in their headquarters.59

The tentative stock control manual stipulated that the new system

was to go into effect by 1 June 1943. It provided that each post, camp,

and station as of that date would have an established supply level based

on the actual needs of troop units. This level in most cases was first

established as a 90-day level, a figure which fluctuated from time to time.

All stocks above the established level were to be declared excess and returned to the depots. Stock levels were also established for the depots.

Much co-operation was necessary among the commanding officers of the

headquarters of the technical services, the headquarters of the service

commands, the depots, and the post supply officers in order to fix accurate stock levels, but this objective was gradually accomplished.60

55

 The ASF survey is discussed in ICAF, R 116, History of Stock Control Army Service Forces,

United States Army, Jan 48, p. 59. ICAF Library. 56

 Memo, ACofS for Opns SOS for C CWS, et al., 11 Jan 43. Copy in ICAF R 116, Jan 48,

p. 253. 57

 TM 38-220, 3 May 43. 58

 Revisions of TM 38-220, 9 May 44 and 10 May 45. 59

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. VI. 60

 (1) Memo, Dir of Opns ASF for Chiefs of Tech Services, 13 Jul 43, sub: Depot Stock Levels.

Copy in ICAF R 116, Jan 48. (2) Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the Army Service

Forces, p. 80.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 403

An important feature of the new stock control system was the scheduled requisitioning of supplies. Troop units sent their requisitions to the

post supply officer who in turn presented his requisitions to the depot on

a standard form and according to a fixed schedule. This innovation helped

to prevent alternate periods of peak and slack activity in the depots. Station supply officers kept the chiefs of the technical services informed on

the stock status of their particular stations and in that way the volume

of stock to be maintained at the depots was gauged.61

Though the stock control system led to marked improvement in

the issue of items, a serious deficiency in the distribution system still

remained. That deficiency was failure to control the flow of materials

from production lines to the depots. "That," said General Lutes after

the close of World War II, "is an excellent illustration of one of

the most important lessons about Army supply; that is, that the supply

process is an individual entity and cannot be broken down into un-coordinated phases such as production, stock control, and distribution."

 62

With the advent of the supply control system in the Army in the spring

of 1944 came a concerted effort to co-ordinate the various phases of the

supply process.63

Lend-Lease

While the Chemical Warfare Service's program for supplying U.S.

forces was moving into high gear, a parallel supply effort was already

under way. The inclusion of the defense needs of friendly nations among

the supply responsibilities of the Army antedated Pearl Harbor by more

than a year and was given statutory authority by the Lend-Lease Act of

March 1941. That portion of the War Department's lend-lease commitments represented by chemicals and chemical warfare supplies fell to the

CWS to fulfill. The task of receiving and satisfying the demands of U.S.

allies for such matériel was supervised by the Navy and International Aid

Branch of OC CWS, but the main burden fell upon the regular staff and

operating organizations in CWS.64 The official beginning of CWS participation in lend-lease dated from shortly after the Lend-Lease Act was passed,

61

 ASF Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1943, p. 105. 62

 ICAF lecture, Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes, The Army Supply Program, 5 Feb 46, ICAF L 46-23,

p. 7. In ICAF Library. 63

 See ch. XIII above for fuller discussion of the Supply Control System. 64

 The Chemical Warfare Service and International Aid (a monograph prepared by Hist Br

OC CWS in Jun 44), pp. 3-4. MS in Hist Off The first appearance of a lend-lease staff agency

in OC CWS came with the creation of a Lend-Lease Division on 26 Aug 41 (OC CWS Off O 16,

26 Aug 41), renamed Defense Aid Division as of 24 Nov 41 (OC CWS Off O 39, 24 Nov 41).
404 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

but CWS concern with the war requirements of the British Empire went

back somewhat farther than that. Though it was not called upon for

foreign aid matériel in 1940, as was the Ordnance Department,65 the

CWS at this time did have very close liaison with the British Purchasing

Commission, particularly on the procurement of chemicals. The official in

charge of the procurement of chemicals on the British Purchasing Commission (BPC) was an American CWS reserve officer in the New York

Chemical Warfare Procurement District, Lt. Col. W. Hepburn Chamberlain. Colonel Chamberlain's acquaintance with British requirements for

chemicals enabled him to gauge the extent of the demands which would

be made on American chemical resources under similar conditions, and

the more he studied the matter the more he became convinced that the

United States estimates were much too low. In 1940 Chamberlain left the

BPC to join the Office of Production Management, where he was instrumental in impressing upon the leaders of the American chemical industry, with whom he was well acquainted, the need for expansion to meet

wartime needs. In processing orders for the British (and that included the

entire British Empire and its allies) he negotiated with the leaders of the

American chemical industry on the expansion of existing plants or the

building of new ones. These plants were a distinct asset to the nation

once it got into the war.66 Colonel Chamberlain was called to active duty

as an Army colonel shortly after Pearl Harbor and became the officer in

charge of lend-lease operations in the CWS throughout the greater part

of the war.

The first direct impact of the Lend-Lease Act on the CWS came in

April 1941, when the Secretary of War directed the transfer of 200,000

service masks, complete with spare canisters and repair kits, to Great

Britain, for ultimate transshipment to Yugoslavia. The Chicago Procurement District's storage warehouse filled the order.67

 During the same

month the first British requisitions for phosgene arrived.68 In the course

of the next few months the British requisitioned a number of defensive

65

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 73. (2) Levin H. Campbell, Jr., The Industry-Ordnance Team (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946) p. 314. 66

 Interv, Hist Off with Col W. Hepburn Chamberlain, 3 Aug 54. 67

 (1) Memo, SW for C CWS, 9 Apr 41, sub: Transfer of Defense Articles to the United Kingdom (Lend-Lease Act). (2) Ltr, C CWS to CO Edgewood CW Depot, 7 Apr 41, sub: Preparation

for Shipment of 200,000 Canisters ... . (3) TT, Supply Div OC CWS to C CWPD, 7 Apr 41,

sub: Shipment of Gas Masks. All in CWS 400.22/25. 68

 Form I, Requisition of Defense Articles under the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, dated

14 Apr 41 from U.K. (C. W. Reid, Chief, Requirements Office, BPC) to OPM. CWS 400.12/17.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 405

chemical warfare items and chemicals.69 More significant in terms of the

future were the preparations under way late in 1941 for the first transfers

to the British of incendiary bombs, destined to be the largest single item

of lend-lease matériel handled by the CWS.70 As early as October 1941,

the Lend-Lease Administrator allocated $10,000,000 to the Army for construction of an incendiary bomb plant at Pine Bluff.71

 Planners thus fully

realized that during the following year the major effort in the early production of incendiary bombs by the CWS would be for British requisitions, despite the fact that the United States entered the war in December. Though the CWS, in the absence of any directive to the contrary

from higher authority, filled American requisitions for magnesium incendiaries before authorizing manufacture for British requirements, roughly

two-thirds of the production of magnesium incendiaries (M50) went to

fill British requirements. This two to one ratio was observed faithfully

enough to give the WPB the impression that it had been based on a

formal Anglo-American agreement.72 The first lend-lease shipment of

incendiary bombs was sent to Great Britain early in 1942. Before the war

was over, a total of over 66,000,000 of the 4-pound magnesium bombs,

M50, valued at more than $172,000,000 had been shipped to England, as

well as 15,000 1000-pound aimable clusters, and a few M69 oil (napalm)

incendiaries.73

Of the chemical agents that the CWS procured for the British, by far

the most important was white phosphorus. Shortly after the United States

entered the war the British were looking forward to an ultimate supply

of a thousand tons of white phosphorus per month from the CWS. The

total they actually received during the course of the war exceeded 16,000

tons.74 The chief obstacle was not so much the production of the agent

itself as the difficulty of getting it shipped. A critical shortage of con69

 Memo, C Supply Div OC CWS for ACofS G-4, 7 Dec 41. CWS 400.12/47. 70

 Memo, C Tech Svc OC CWS for C Defense Aid Div, 27 Nov 41, sub: Lend-Lease Report.

CWS 400.12/169. 71

 Ltr, E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Admin, to SW, 21 Oct 41. Production Div, ASF 471.6-

Bombs, 1941-42. 72

 (1) Ltr, F. Eberstadt WPB to ACofS for Materiel SOS, 10 Dec 42. Production Div, ASF,

471.6-Bombs ... . (2) Memo, Dir International Div for ACofS for Materiel SOS 14 Dec 42, sub:

4-Pound Incendiary Bombs. Production Div, ASF, 471.6-Bombs ... . 73

 Lend-Lease Transfers, Chemical Warfare Service, May 46, Prepared by Sup and Dist Div, OC

CWS. CWS 314.7 Lend-Lease File. 74

 (1) Memo, C Industrial Service OC CWS for Dir Defense Aid, 1 Apr 42, sub: Cml Items

on the Fifth Supplemental with inclosure. Production Div, ASF, 470.6-U.K. (2) Lend-Lease Shipments, World War II, 31 Dec 46, p. 1. Prepared by Off C of Finance, WD.
406 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

tainers early in 1943 produced a proposal for a 70 percent cut in British

allocations of white phosphorus. This evoked an immediate protest from

the British supply mission. It called attention to the fact that the Combined Raw Materials Board had suggested that vital shipping space would

be saved if the United Kingdom stopped importing American phosphate

rock to make its own phosphorus and depended instead on getting the

finished product from America. One of the two British phosphorus plants

had already been closed down in consequence, and closure of the other

was imminent. The shortage of shipping space being more serious than

the shortage of steel for containers, the British view prevailed, and most

of the cut in the white phosphorus allocation was restored.75

Of the other standard chemical agents, substantial quantities of phosgene and FM (titanium tetrachloride, used as a filling for smoke shells)

went to Great Britain under lend-lease action. But the shipments of industrial chemicals which the CWS procured for British needs were often

of greater importance than these. For example, a total of 34,000 tons of

ethylene glycol, an engine coolant and antifreeze, was shipped to the

United Kingdom during the war. Two special purpose rubber substitutes,

neoprene and polyvinyl chloride, accounted for shipments of 7,500 tons

and 8,500 tons respectively. It would take the enumeration of over fifty

other chemicals to complete the list. Also of importance in the British

lend-lease program were CWS-supplied smoke grenades, HC smoke mixture, and a number of items of protective equipment.76

The principal customer for CWS lend-lease shipment, after Great

Britain, was the U.S.S.R. But unlike the British program, which was

dominated by the mass production and shipment of incendiary bombs, the

Russian requisitions were mainly for industrial chemicals. Chief among

these, in terms of tonnage shipped, were methanol (28,000 tons), caustic

soda (22,500 tons), phenol (18,000 tons), and ethylene glycol (13,000

tons). The only munitions which the CWS shipped to the U.S.S.R. in

quantity were smoke pots. The Russians received about 1,300,000 Ml

smoke pots (HC), and 130,000 floating smoke pots.77 The heavy tonnage

of caustic soda reflects in part the U.S.S.R.'s strong demand for this

chemical, for use in refining petroleum. The requisition came after the

Germans had retreated from the Caucasus at the start of 1943 and the

75

 (1) Ltr, Col G. W. Smythe International Div WD to British Ministry of Supply Mission,

attn: Mr. C W. Reid, 16 Feb 43. (2) Ltr, C. W. Reid Dir Requirements Br Min of Supply to

Col G. W. Smythe, 20 Feb 43, with 1st and 2nd Inds. Both in Production Div, ASF, 470.6-U.K. 76

 Lend-Lease Shipments, World War II, pp. 1-16. 77

 Ibid.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 407

Russian refineries had begun to receive once again the products of the

Caucasian oil fields. After an all-out effort by CWS officials to locate

every available source and organize immediate delivery, fifty-six carloads of

caustic soda were assembled in Chicago and sent on their way. Somewhat

later in the war, procurement of caustic soda was transferred from the

War Department to the Treasury Department. Other chemicals sent to

the U.S.S.R. by the CWS went into the manufacture of such military

necessities as smokeless powder, plastics, explosives, and high octane

gasoline.78

Certain shipping problems present to some extent in lend-lease distribution generally tended to become more acute in the case of the Russian supply program. Chief of these was the problem of co-ordinating

shipments with vessels. Before 1942 was out, large stocks of some chemicals were being held in warehouses and War Department holding and

reconsignment points because ships were not available to take them overseas.79

 It became evident eventually that the Russians were putting off

acceptance of requisitioned chemicals for shipment whenever they had cargoes of greater concern to them ready to fill the available ships. In some

instances these delayed chemicals were finally diverted to American war

production, as in the case of 900 tons of unused sodium bromide.80 For

the most part, the CWS had to meet the storage problem as best it

could. Special care had to be given to keeping containers in good condition during periods of unscheduled storage. On one occasion an inspection

team from the Chemical Commodity Division, OC CWS, finding it necessary to perform an emergency repaint job on large lots of chemical containers held at Cheyenne, Wyo., had to call on Quartermaster troops for

help in order to prevent further large-scale deterioration.81

Canada, Australia, French North Africa, China, and Brazil also received

substantial amounts of CWS-procured matériel, though Canadian shipments were purchases, rather than lend-lease. The CWS sent to Canada

some 3,500 tons of mustard gas and smaller amounts of lewisite, phosgene, and smoke mixture (FS), together with 400 tons of whetlerite and

78

 The CWS and International Aid, pp. 16-18. 79

 Ltr, Lt Col W. H. Chamberlain, C International Br OC CWS, to CG SOS attn: Col G.

Olmstead, International Div, 28 Nov 42, sub: Deliveries of Lend-Lease Chemicals Held up by

the Shipping Situation. Production Div ASF 470.6-Chemicals. 80

 Ltr, W. H. Healey WPB to Hq ASF, attn: Capt Baugh, International Aid Div, 17 Jul 43,

sub: PD-1A Application ... . Sodium Bromide ... . Production Div, ASF 470.6-U.K. 81

 (1) Memo, Dir International Aid Div ASF for C CWS, attn: Col Chamberlain, 20 Aug 43,

sub: Inspection of Lend-Lease Chemicals in Storage. Production Div, ASF 470.6-Chemicals. (2)

Gibbons-McGinty-Milano-Redmerski interv, 10 Jun 58.
408 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

several hundred smoke generators.82 Australia, preparing for the possibility

of invasion after Pearl Harbor, felt it advisable to stockpile 4,000,000

civilian gas masks. As only a quarter of these could be produced locally,

over 3,000,000 were requisitioned and obtained from the United States.83

The CWS participated in the task of rearming the French by shipping to

North Africa all the chemical warfare items for initial equipment and

maintenance for the eleven French divisions being outfitted there in 1943.

Service gas masks and dust respirators were the major items in this program.84

 The CWS also contributed its share to the limited flow of

American supplies to China, via the China-Burma-India Theater. For the

most part the CWS matériel sent to China consisted of weapons and ammunition, some of it for use in conjunction with General Stilwell's campaigns in Burma. Among the major items were 327 4.2-inch mortars,

1,470 portable flame throwers (for which the demand was increasing in

the CBI Theater), over 500,000 mortar shells, and over a quarter of a

million smoke grenades. Half a million outlet valve assemblies went overseas to keep the Chinese gas mask factories going.85

 Brazil received as

lend-lease matériel the chemical warfare equipment needed to outfit the

troops it sent to Europe early in 1944. Over and above these items, the

CWS sent about 500 tons of bleaching powder to Brazil.86 Small amounts

of CWS matériel went as lend-lease to more than a dozen other countries.

The final CWS report listed a total of 312 separate items procured for

lend-lease.87

Supplying the Ports of Embarkation

A basic responsibility of zone of interior distribution was supplying

the ports of embarkation, the Army commands which, under the general

authority of the Chief of Transportation, supervised the transfer of men

and matériel overseas. Within each of these commands a chemical officer

served as adviser to the commanding general on technical matters in his

82

 Lend-Lease Transfers, CWS, May 46. 83

 Ltr, Australian Military Mission to Brig Gen H. S. Aurand, WD, 15 Jul 42, sub: AustraliaCivilian Gas Respirators. Production Div, ASF 470.72-Australia. 84

 The CWS and International Aid, pp. 19-20. 85

 (1) Ltr, Lt Col E. O. Straw, Rear Echelon Hq USA Forces CBI to Dir International Aid

Div, 17 Mar 44, sub: Flame Thrower Requirements. Production Div ASF 470.71-China. (2)

Memo, Maj E. S. Hays for International Div ASF, attn: Maj H. Biggs, 18 Apr 44, sub: Items

Requisitioned for Chinese Arsenal No. 23. Production Div ASF 470.72-China. (3) Lend-Lease

Shipments, World War II, pp. 1-16. 86

 (1) The CWS and International Aid, p. 23. (2) Lend-Lease Shipments, World War II, pp. 1-16. 87

 Lend-Lease Transfers, CWS, May 46.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 409

field while at the same time heading an organization performing a variety

of CWS functions. The port chemical officer had a training mission, giving refresher training in protection against toxic gas to station personnel

and troops bound overseas as well as decontamination training to help

avoid accidents in handling toxic cargoes. He had an inspection mission,

involving the checking of CWS cargoes for serviceability, safety, and

proper loading and stowing. Finally he had a supply mission which required him to act as CWS supply officer at his post, forwarding requisitions from the theaters, filling shortages for units in transit, receiving,

storing, and preparing for export CWS matériel received, and maintaining stock control records accordingly.88

 This supply function enabled the

post chemical officers to serve as the link between the CWS distribution

system and the ports, as represented by the commanding generals of the

ports of embarkation and their staff sections. For the chemical officers

were responsible in the first instance to the port commanders, rather than

to the Chief of the CWS, and their activities in the field of overseas supply were carried on under the immediate direction of the ports' overseas

supply officers.89 Indeed, as far as the overseas theaters were concerned,

CWS supply liaison was maintained through the overseas supply divisions

of the ports, the agencies which first edited their requisitions, and hence

only indirectly with the port chemical officers.90

Chemical sections were first activated in the ports of embarkation in

the latter part of the emergency period. A chemical section existed in

the San Francisco General Depot (which acted as supply agency for the

San Francisco Port before Pearl Harbor) as early as October 1940, but the

first Port Chemical Warfare Sections, properly so called, were those activated at the New York and New Orleans Ports of Embarkation in August

1941. Within three months after Pearl Harbor, CWS sections were in

operation at the Seattle, Charleston, and Boston Ports of Embarkation, as

well as at San Francisco, where the supply functions were shifted to the

Port of Embarkation in December 1941. The Chemical Warfare Section of

the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation came into being in August

1942. and that month also saw the beginning of CWS supply functions at

the Los Angeles subport, an installation which attained independent POE

status in the fall of 1943. The volume of CWS lend-lease cargo passing

88

 Hemleben, CWS Activities at Ports of Embarkation, pp. 1-10. 89

 Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 105-06. 90

 For a discussion of problems which arose in this area see Pritchard, Birdsell, and Kleber,

Chemicals in Combat, ch. II.
410 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

through the Portland, Ore., subport necessitated the appointment of a

port chemical officer there in September 1942. A final addition to the

number of port chemical officers was made in December 1943 when a

CWS officer was assigned to the Baltimore Cargo Port of Embarkation.91

As in the case of the service commands, the ports of embarkation

operated under a regional allocation of CWS supply facilities. According

to the pattern that ultimately emerged, the west coast ports dealt with

Deseret and Utah Depots for CWS ammunition and general supplies respectively. Midwest and Memphis Depots served New Orleans Port of

Embarkation similarly, with additional supplies shipped from Gulf Depot.

The east coast ports were served by Eastern, Gulf, and Northeast CWS

Depots and the ASF Depots at New Cumberland and Atlanta. The depots

dealt with port requisitions directly and on a priority basis, advising OC

CWS of shipments made. The CWS made periodic efforts to speed up

the processing of requisitions which could not be filled at once from

stocks on hand. In 1944, the chiefs office received permission from Headquarters, ASF, to short-cut prescribed procedures by acting itself to teletype

an order to a second depot to fill shortages in a requisition which the

original depot could not complete. This system served to make OC CWS

a clearinghouse for the speedier dispatch of unfilled extracts of requisition to known sources of supply and ended the necessity of having depots

send them haphazardly from one to another until supply could be made.

It also eliminated the additional delay involved in the earlier practice of

routing the final shipping order back to the original depot before shipment was made to the ultimate supplier.92

By and large, the supply function of the chemical sections of the ports

was an extension of the work of the depots. The tasks of storing, maintaining, shipping, and receiving were similar, as were many of the problems encountered. The sections had to devote time to checking the adequacy of packing and marking, replacing corroded containers, and maintaining surveillance over toxics. As the system of regional filler depots

was elaborated by the ASF and the supply services, the ports of embarkation were enabled to close out a substantial share of their storage operations, but some necessarily remained to be performed on the spot.

The scale of operations varied considerably from port to port. The San

Francisco Port of Embarkation, bearing primary responsibility for supply

of the Pacific theaters, processed a rising flood of CWS equipment and

91

 Hemleben, CWS Activities at Ports of Embarkation, pp. 13-110. 92

 Ibid, pp. 123-24.
STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION 411

matériel, the monthly total reaching a peak of 63,287 measurement tons

in July 1945, just as the war was being won. Incendiary bombs, grenades,

napalm, mortar shells, toxics, and gas masks dominated the shipments.93

The New York Port of Embarkation, which received the requisitions of

the European and Mediterranean theaters, shipped its peak load of CWS

matériel in April 1944, just before the Normandy landings, when 48,109

measurement tons were processed.94 The other ports never dealt with

burdens of this magnitude, but many of them had special needs to satisfy.

The New Orleans Port of Embarkation, for example, shipped the variegated and often highly dangerous supplies needed for support of the San

Jose research project in the Canal Zone. The Seattle Port of Embarkation

experienced an emergency period during the Japanese invasion of the

Aleutians in mid-1942, when men and supplies had to be gotten to bases

in Alaska as rapidly as possible. The danger of submarine attacks in the

early days of the war was such that some ports had to handle shipments

diverted from more hazardous routes; the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation more than once had to ship organizational equipment to the ChinaBurma-India Theater for units whose personnel were shipping out by way

of Charleston. This responsibility involved cross-country liaison through a

representative of the unit concerned.

Generally speaking, the pace of the American war effort in the zone

of interior tended to slacken in the summer of 1945, when only the conquest of Japan remained to be achieved. But the CWS experienced an

opposite trend. The possibility of an all-out struggle in the Japanese home

islands gave increasing significance to the chemicals, incendiaries, and

smoke in the CWS arsenal and kept the rate of CWS distribution high.

It was at this point, as noted above, that the CWS workload at the west

coast ports rose to its peak. Then in August came the sudden surrender

and the end of hostilities. The CWS effort, like that of the rest of the

armed forces, made a full about turn. The storage and distribution network that had grown in four years from a single small depot to a system

embracing ten major storage installations and as many port of embarkation sections, prepared to face the new responsibilities of demobilization.

93

 Ibid, pp. 166-74. 94

 Ibid, p. 224.
CHAPTER XVII

Industrial Demobilization

Preparations for Demobilization

As early as the spring of 1943 the Commanding General, ASF, at the

direction of the Chief of Staff began to plan for demobilization. At that

time, General Somervell set up a Special Planning Division in his headquarters to supervise demobilization planning. Because this type of planning was of vital concern to all major commands, the War Department

in July 1943 transferred the Special Planning Division, whose chief was

Brig. Gen. W. F. Tompkins, to the War Department General Staff.1

There it remained throughout the war.

After the transfer of the Special Planning Division, the Commanding

General, ASF, set up a Special Committee on Materiel Demobilization

Planning, headed by Brig. Gen. Theron D. Weaver, who later became

Director of Demobilization, ASF. It was at the suggestion of General

Weaver's committee that the Chief, CWS, late in 1943, set up a Demobi-.

lization Planning Branch in the Control Division of his office. This

branch was headed throughout the war by Col. Paul Sherrick. The Chief,

CWS, appointed liaison officers on demobilization planning in the Industrial, Supply, Technical, and Field Requirements Divisions of his office and

at the CWS installations. Because facilities loomed large in all CWS

demobilization plans, he set up a separate demobilization unit in the

Facilities and Requirements Branch, Industrial Division, OC CWS, in

1944.2

1

 (1) Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the Army Service Forces, pp. 214-15. (2)

Memo, Dir Special Planning Div WDGS for CWS, 30 Jul 43, sub: Demobilization Planning.

CWS 314.7 Demobilization Planning File. 2

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Theron D. Weaver, Chairman, Special Committee on Materiel Demobil-
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 413

Demobilization planning fell into two general categories, the computation of special demobilization Army Supply Programs and the drawing up

of specific plans for such activities as disposition of facilities, contract terminations, and property disposal. Both types of planning were carried on

under a formula which provided for two separate periods of demobilization—Period I running from V-E Day to V-J Day and Period II for six

months after the defeat of Japan. The Demobilization Planning Branch,

OC CWS, was responsible for co-ordinating the compilation of the special

Army Supply Programs, while the demobilization unit in the Industrial

Division of the chief's office and demobilization officers in the installation

drew up plans for disposition of facilities, contract termination, and disposal of surplus property.

Demobilization planning got under way in the procurement districts

following an indoctrination course in the chief's office in January 1944.

Selected senior officers from the districts attended this course, which covered the main aspects of demobilization. After returning to their home

stations these officers were put in charge of demobilization planning activities for their respective districts. In April 1944 Readjustment Divisions

were activated in all procurement districts to administer demobilization

planning, contract termination, and property disposal. These divisions not

only planned future contract termination and property disposal actions but

also supervised current activities along those lines in the districts. Demobilization planning officers were also appointed in the arsenals, but their

duties were confined chiefly to planning the disposition of CWS facilities.

On 27 October 1943 the ASF directed the technical services to submit

by 20 December 1943, at least in skeleton form, plans for partial demobilization in Period I.3

 Headquarters, ASF, furnished a guide in the form of

a control chart listing operations considered necessary to accomplish

demobilization objectives. These operations included the disposition of

industrial facilities, the curtailment of industrial construction, and the disposition of supplies. After submitting the skeleton the CWS added flesh

ization Planning, ASF, for C CWS, attn: Mr H. C. Walsh et al., 27 Oct 43, sub: Project Control

Charts for Materiel Demobilization Planning. File SPUPE in folder, Chronology I, 2 Jul-28 Dec

43. Minutes Interdepartmental Group on Materiel Demobilization Planning, Dir of Industrial Demobilization ASF. (2) Brig Gen W. F. Tompkins' address before Army Industrial College, 5 Jan

44, entitled, War Department Demobilization Planning. CWS 314.7 Demobilization Planning File.

(3) R. Stanley McCordock, Demobilization, 1 Apr 47, pp. 12-13, 20-21, in monograph series

History of the CWS in World War II. (4) Activities of Control Division, OC CWS, 1 Jan 44 to

31 Dec 44. 3

 Memo, Brig Gen Theron D. Weaver for C CWS et al., 27 Oct 43, sub: Project Control Charts

for Materiel Demobilization Planning.
414 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and the product became the Chemical Warfare Service Materiel Demobilization Plan, Period I—Echelon of the Office of the Chief. This document

went through several editions, the final one appearing under the date of

20 May 1944.

The Materiel Demobilization Plan for Period I included a statement of

the demobilization objectives of the CWS, a list of governing policies,

and an assignment of responsibilities of each element of the chief's office

in the period of demobilization. Objectives were listed as: (1) immediate

termination of the maximum quantity of war production consistent with

continuing requirements for the war with Japan and sound economic

practice; (2) expeditious settlement of terminated contracts and prompt

removal of government owned matériel and industrial equipment from

plants of private contractors; (3) efficient disposition of excess Chemical

Warfare Service property; and (4) retention in pilot production, standby

or reserve, of such government owned facilities and equipment for the

production of noncommercial items as might be necessary for continuing

development of techniques and for the availability of adequate production

capacity to insure future military security.4

The Materiel Demobilization Plan for Period I devoted ten pages to

governing policies. These were listed under such headings as provision for

gas warfare, research and development projects, restriction of contracts and

purchase orders, and retention of arsenals and industrial facilities. As to

gas warfare, the policy was promulgated that facilities would be disposed

of only after due consideration of the possible initiation of that type of

warfare. Planners decided that with the defeat of Germany all research

and development projects would be reviewed to determine if they would

be useful against Japan, if they could be completed within eighteen

months, or if they were important as long-range developments. New

contracts and purchase orders were not to be placed unless they were

specifically found to be necessary for the defeat of Japan.

From the spring of 1944 until the spring of 1945 the chief's office

worked on still another demobilization plan, the one for Redeployment,

Readjustment and Demobilization, Period I. This plan, published on 1

March 1945, listed the same objectives as those contained in the previous

20 May 1944 plan on matériel demobilization, only in much more detail.

It listed not only the actions that the chief's office would take in the

demobilization period, but also those which the installations would take.

4

 CWS Materiel Demobilization Plan Period I for Echelon of Office of the Chief, 20 May 44, p. 1. CWS 314.7 Demobilization File.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 415

Five weeks before the surrender of Germany, all responsible officers in

OC CWS and at the installations received a copy of this plan.5

After the defeat of Germany the Demobilization Planning Branch began

to give serious consideration to plans for Period II. The surrender of Japan

and the end of hostilities, coming early as they did, found the plan still

in its infancy. The CWS, therefore, continued to operate under the plan

for Period I, most of the features of which applied with equal force to

Period II.

Disposition of Facilities

On 6 October 1943 the Chief, Control Division, OC CWS, suggested

to General Porter that decisions be made on the following questions: (1)

which of the CWS arsenals would be retained as peacetime installations;

(2) which existing facilities were to be expanded—by the addition of a

gas mask factory, for example, or of a 4.2-inch chemical mortar and shell

line; and (3) what other government owned facilities should be retained

as war reserve.6 The Chief, CWS, referred these questions to the commanding officers of the arsenals for study and reply.7

Among the policies laid down in the Materiel Demobilization Plan for

Period I was that planners concerned with the matter should give due

weight to the suitability of arsenals and plants for peacetime retention.

Under the plan for Period I all four CWS arsenals were to be retained.

Edgewood was to be the chief center for gas mask production and was

also to be used for experimental and pilot-scale production of chemical

agents, weapons, and defensive items. Huntsville's primary mission would

be to produce smoke matériel and its secondary mission to turn out chemical

agents. Pine Bluff would be engaged exclusively in producing incendiary

munitions, while Rocky Mountain's primary mission would be the manufacture of chemical agents and weapons.

But facilities planning was not confined to a mere statement of policy.

In line with the emphasis General Somervell was placing on the limitation of construction in 1944,8

 the technical services were directed to draw

up detailed plans for demobilizing facilities. These plans sought to co5

 McCordock, Demobilization, p. 70. 6

 Ltr, C Control Div OC CWS, 6 Oct 43, sub: Demobilization Planning. Cited in McCordock,

Demobilization, pp. 15-16. 7

 See Memo, CG RMA for C CWS, 13 Dec 43, sub: Demobilization Planning. CWS 370.01,

RMA. McCordock, Demobilization, pp. 16-17. 8

 Jesse A. Remington and Lenore Fine, The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United

States, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II,

ch. XIV.
416 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ordinate the requirements set forth in the Army Supply Program with

the need for facilities. In September 1944 the CWS submitted its first

facilities plan for Period I to the ASF, and in December a revised version.9

In 1945 the CWS began to pay an increasing amount of attention to

plans for disposing of its facilities. In May the chief's office directed that

all CWS arsenals be surveyed to determine measures needed to implement

the policies on the arsenals laid down in the 20 May 1944 Materiel Demobilization Plan. The survey board, headed by Col. Harry W. Spraker,

scrutinized each arsenal and made recommendations as to what plants

should be retained or placed on a standby basis. It also estimated the

expenditure required to make permanent improvements at the various plants.

This estimate totaled just under $47,000,000.10

At a 12 July 1945 conference of key ASF and CWS officers a formula

was drawn up for disposing of all CWS facilities at the close of hostilities. Under this formula facilities fell into three categories: Class A, those

that would be retained; Class B, those that could not be classified at the

time; and Class C, those that could be put up for advance sale. In addition to the four CWS arsenals, the following plants were listed as Class

A: Marshall, St. Louis, Owl 4X, Seattle, Columbus, Kansas City, and New

Cumberland. There was no listing under Class B plants. The list of Class

C plants included ten government owned plants and five CWS sponsored

plants.11 In September the following plants were removed from the Class

C category and placed in Class B: Midland, Lake Ontario Ordnance,

Firelands, San Bernadino, and Turlock.

The Chief, CWS, advised the Commanding General, ASF, on 10

August, that the clothing renovating plants, which were operated by The

Quartermaster General with CWS technical assistance, would continue to

operate on a full time basis at the close of hostilities. The chlorine and

mustard plants at Rocky Mountain and Pine Bluff Arsenals would continue on a reduced basis, as would the mustard plant at Edgewood. Fifty

percent of the workers at the Edgewood Arsenal Machine Shop would be

retained because they were doing work for the laboratories at the Chemical

Warfare Center. Also scheduled for continued operation were the Vigo

9

 Activities of Control Division, OC CWS, 1 Jan 44-31 Dec 44, pp. 27-28. 10

 Report of Board on Permanent Construction at Installations Chosen for Post War Retention,

23 June 1945, passim. CWS 314.7 Demobilization File. 11

 The government owned plants were Firelands, San Bernadino, Turlock, Zanesville, Birmingham Smoke Mix, Birmingham Smoke Pot, Midland, Lake Ontario Ordnance, Niagara Falls, and

Duck River. The CWS sponsored plants were operated by Lempco Products Co., Bell Aircraft Ordnance Division, Bell Machine, Ferro Enamel Corp., and Rheem Manufacturing Co.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 417

Plant and the contract on the 4.2-inch chemical mortar shell at the

Milwaukee Stamping Co. At certain other key industrial installations, according to plans, a cadre of 20 percent of the workers were to be kept to

put equipment in standby condition. The following day, 11 August, the

Chief, Industrial Division, directed the arsenals to cut back production of

chemical agents and the procurement districts to end production of specified

munitions.

At 1900 on 14 August the President officially announced the end of war.

Within an hour General Porter's headquarters was sending out detailed

instructions to the arsenals and districts on cutting back production schedules. The period of full-scale demobilization had begun, a period characterized by drastic reduction of military and civilian rolls and by concentration on such activities as property disposal, processing and packaging of

chemical items for reserve storage, putting plants in standby condition,

and contract terminations. The arsenals reduced the number of workers

much more drastically than did the procurement districts; by the end of

1945 about 90 percent of arsenal civilians were released as compared with

about 50 percent of district workers.12 The procurement districts retained

a larger percentage of their workers in order to carry out contract termination

and property disposal activities.

Contract Terminations

As the war approached its end the CWS placed greater stress on

terminating contracts. On 10 August the Chief, Industrial Division, OC

CWS, directed the commanding officers of the procurement districts to

prepare lists of all contracts to be terminated as well as books of telegrams on termination to be released to the Western Union the moment

the war was over. This activity harkened back to a similar experience in

World War I, when, as indicated, CWS contracts were terminated

expeditiously.13 But this action was an exception to the general situation

in the War Department. When hostilities were suddenly concluded in

November 1918 the government found that its authority to settle many

contracts was dubious, that there was definite need for a sound organization to carry out settlements, and that in many instances no criteria

whatsoever had been established for effecting settlements. More than 3,000

12

 These percentages are based on figures appearing in the histories of CWS installations in the

period 15 Aug to 30 Dec 45. 13

 See ch. I above. The number of CWS contracts was comparatively small.
418 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of the 30,000 contracts terminated were later appealed to the U.S. Court

of Claims and this litigation dragged out over an average period of three

and a half years per contract. In a word, World War I experience

demonstrated the need for such procedures as a uniform termination article, a uniform termination policy, statutory authority to effect negotiated

settlements, and confirmation of the government's right to carry out

interim financing.14

During the emergency period preceding World War II, the War

Department took its first significant step to improve contract settlement

procedure when in October 1941 it made mandatory the inclusion of a

termination article in all standard fixed-price contracts. It took a further

step a year later when it introduced the principle of negotiated settlement

into the termination process. A negotiated settlement represented a compromise between the claims and counterclaims of the government and the

contractor with the aim of compensating the contractor equitably for the

unfinished portion of his contract.15

The War Period

Termination of contracts was a factor in CWS procurement almost

from its inception, but the first wave of terminations did not come until

the M54 bomb program was cut back in the spring of 1942.16

 Since the

War Department had not yet compiled guidelines on termination procedures, CWS contracting officers suddenly found themselves facing such

problems as how to reimburse the contractor for his inventories of raw

materials, for his commitments to his suppliers, and for his work in

process. Some contractors were already losing money; should these men

be allowed profit on a partially completed job when they would have

suffered loss on a completed job? In an effort to formulate answers to

such questions the procurement district offices worked out procedures on

contract termination based on accepted principles of law and accounting,

and at least one district, New York, put these procedures in writing.

When difficulties of interpretation arose the district offices communicated

with the legal branch of the chief's office for guidance. But not until

14

 (1) Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, ch. XXVII. (2) Jerry Maxfield, Industrial

Mobilization Course: Termination of Contracts, 7 Jun 46, ICAF, L 46-96. ICAF Library. 15

 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, pp. 620-21. 16

 The program was cut from 20,000,000 to 13,500,000 bombs. See Memo, C Ind Svc OC

CWS for Chairman ANMB, 2 May 42, sub: Magnesium, and 1st Ind. CWS 400.17/12.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 419

mid-1944 did the latter branch exert close supervision over termination

activities throughout the CWS.17

From the summer of 1943 on, meanwhile, the War Department began

concentrating on contract termination activities. In June a Contract

Termination Branch was set up in the Purchases Division, ASF; in August

a new termination section (PR 15) was added to War Department Procurement Regulations; and in November the Readjustment Division, ASF,

was activated to deal with all matters relating to demobilization, including contract termination. Spurred on by both the Office of the Under Secretary of War and by Headquarters, ASF, the Chief, CWS, began to put

greater emphasis on contract termination. Early in 1944, as indicated, he

arranged for a course on contract termination and property disposal in his

headquarters, and in April he directed that Readjustment Divisions be set

up in the procurement districts. At the same time the Assistant Chief,

CWS, for Materiel urged the commanding officers of the districts to keep

in personal touch with contract termination matters and to provide for

the training of future termination officers.18

The War Department was but one of six major procurement agencies

in the government; consequently there was need for developing uniform

termination procedures for all these agencies.19 At the request of the

President, Bernard Baruch and John Hancock made a study of contract

settlement and property disposal matters, which they embodied in their

Report on War and Post-War Adjustment Policies (15 February 1944).

Congress was meanwhile studying the need for new legislation and passed

the Contract Settlement Act of 1944.20 This act, which pointed out the

need for speed, equity, and finality in the settlement of terminated contracts, created an Office of Contract Settlement with a director empowered

to prescribe policies, procedures, and standards on contract settlements.

17

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with John J. Geraghty, 10 Sep 58. Geraghty was the legal officer in

charge of termination activities in the Atlanta CWPD and later (from Nov 44 to Apr 46) in the

chiefs office. (2) Interv, Hist Off with James M. Poyner, 10 Sep 58. Poyner was Chief of the

Readjustment Div in the Dallas CWPD during World War II. (3) Ltr, Robert M. Estes to Hist

Off, 18 Feb 58. Mr. Estes as a member of the Legal Branch of the New York CWPD worked on

the terminations of M54 bomb contracts in 1942. A copy of the procedures compiled by the Legal

Branch of the NYCWPD in the spring of 1943 is in CWS 314.7 Contract Termination File. 18

 (1) Ltr, Asst C CWS for Materiel to all CWS Proc Dists, 10 Apr 44, sub: Readjustment

Activities. (2) Ltr, Asst C CWS for Materiel to CO's of Arsenals and Proc Dists, 1 Jul 44, sub:

Training for Contract Termination. Both in CWS 161. 19

 Others were the Navy, the Treasury Dept, the Maritime Commission, RFC subsidiaries, and

the Foreign Economic Administration. 20

 58 Stat 651, approved 1 Jul 44.
420 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The summer of 1944 saw more emphasis in the War Department on

contract termination than ever before.21 After the passage of the Contract

Settlement Act, Headquarters, ASF, urged the technical services to pay as

much attention as possible to advance planning of termination settlements

and to assist contractors in becoming familiar with the termination articles

in their contracts. The services were to advise contractors to form termination sections in their organizations and to train personnel in operations

involving the prompt settlement of claims and disposal of inventories. In

the CWS the chiefs of the readjustment divisions in the procurement

districts arranged one-day courses for contractors in the principal cities of

the districts. The ASF also directed the technical services to obtain written

termination plans for certain contractors.22 In August 1944, for example,

the CWS was directed to obtain such plans from three contractors.23

With the issuance of the Joint Termination Regulations on 1 November

termination officers were furnished an authentic guide for carrying out

their duties.24 As of late December 1944 the termination planning program in the CWS was rated as among the most advanced in the ASF.25

The procedures which the CWS followed on contract terminations

generally resembled those followed throughout the Army.26 At the procurement district level the chiefs of the readjustment divisions appointed

"settlement teams" to carry out termination actions. Each team was headed

by a negotiator, who was assisted by members qualified in property disposal, accounting, and engineering. The membership of a team remained

unchanged only through the termination of a particular contract. Under

the guidance of the negotiator the team took the necessary steps to effect

settlement of the claim, complete plant clearance, and process the claim

to final payment. In carrying out plant clearance the teams received invaluable assistance from the inspection offices of the procurement districts.

Washington headquarters reviewed all termination actions in excess of

$5,000. The Legal Branch reviewed all terminations for compliance with the

21

 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, p. 613.

22

 (1) Memo, Dir Readj Div, ASF, for C CWS, 10 Aug 44, sub: Termination Planning. CWS

161. (2) ASF Circular 366, 6 Nov 44, pt. II. 23

 The contractors were Lempco Products, Inc., Monsanto Chemical Co., and Continental Can

Co., Inc. See Ltr, Asst C CWS to CO's of all CWPD's, 12 Aug 44, sub: Termination Planning.

CWS 161. 24

 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, p. 629. 25

 Memo, Maj Thomas F. Parks for Col Curtis G. Pratt, 27 Dec 44, sub: Appraisal of Pretermination Program. ASF Readjustment Div 161, Pretermination Planning, 1 Nov 44-28 Feb 45. 26

 For a good account of general termination practices in the Army and Navy see Maxfield,

Termination of Contracts, pp. 11-12.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 421

Joint Termination Regulations and other directives while the Fiscal Division

checked the accounting methods followed in the termination action.

Representatives of the chief's office, moreover, reviewed all terminations

of less than $5,000 on periodic visits to field installations.27

Postwar Activities

With V-J Day came an all-out effort to quickly terminate all war

contracts. Both in the Washington headquarters and in the procurement

district offices this objective became the first order of business. By August

1946 the CWS could report that there were only six contracts that had

not yet been terminated.28 Three of these were with Erie Basin Metal

Products, Inc., and Batavia Metal Products, Inc. The other three were

with Pressurelube, Inc.

While the settlement of CWS contracts in the postwar period was carried out with speed, there is, unfortunately, good reason to suspect that

administration of various aspects of the settlements left something to be

desired. In November 1946 the Chief, Chemical Corps, appointed a Contract Settlement Review Team to assist all contracting officers to properly

document all termination actions. The basic purpose behind the appointment of the team was protection of the contracting officers and the corps

as a whole.29 Some of the disclosures brought about by the Senate committee investigating the Erie Basin and Batavia contracts had convinced

the Chief, Chemical Corps, as well as his superiors in the War Department of the need for such a team. A civilian with considerable experience

in Ordnance Department termination, Christian Van Heest, was selected

to head the team. Van Heest was assisted by a group which varied in

number from six to ten, several of whom had had previous termination

experience in the Ordnance Department.30

Although the purpose behind its appointment did not include investigation of termination actions taken by contracting officers, the team could

not help but draw certain conclusions relative to such actions.31 Among

27

 (1) History of Dallas CWPD Aug 45-Apr 46, pp. 33-34. (2) Inspection Div, OC CWS,

Policy Letter 21, on Contract Terminations, 25 Oct 44. CWS 161. (3) Memo, Dir Readj Div,

ASF, for C CWS, 27 Jul 45, sub: Review of the Administration of Termination Settlements and

1st Ind, 31 Jul 45. CWS 161. 28

 Memo, Legal Br OC CWS for Supply and Procurement Div OC CWS, 28 Aug 46. CWS 161. 29

 Ltr, Deputy Chief, CmlC to CO's of CWPD's, 2 Dec 47, sub: Contract Termination Review

Program. CWS 314.7 Contract Termination, Van Heest File. 30

 Interv, Hist Off with Christian Van Heest, 10 Jul 58. 31

 Ltr, Christian Van Heest to CCmlC, 27 Apr 49, sub: Report on the Administration of Contract Terminations by the Chemical Corps, with inclosed report. CWS 314.7 Contract Termination

Van Heest File.
422 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

other observations, it expressed the conviction that the government regulations on contract terminations were well thought out. Errors of omission

and commission were not the result of faulty regulations but rather of

poor administration of the regulations. Under the stress of war the War

Department had not placed sufficient emphasis on training future contract termination officers. Relatively few CWS officers, for example, had

been given the opportunity to attend the excellent course in contract

terminations given at the Army Industrial College in 1944. At the close

of the war, in consequence, hundreds of inexperienced officers were placed

in termination positions. "Surprisingly enough, however," the report says,

"the majority of settlements made by the Chemical Corps appear to have

been made with justice to the contractor and the government. It is with

the minority that we are primarily concerned. While the number of

termination settlements indicating excessive payments, or the use of questionable judgment, is comparatively small, the amounts involved are large

and therefore a matter of concern in any future emergency."

Among specific criticisms of the report was the comment that although

the accountants, both military and civilian, were very well trained and

efficient they should have co-operated more closely with engineers and

the other technical experts with regard to the value of inventories. The

report did not hold the accountants responsible for the situation but

blamed it on those administering the program.

The report is critical of the manner in which inventories were disposed of by the CWS. In many instances contractors' plants were cleared

in thirty days instead of the allotted ninety days, a feat that would have

been commendable had the action been properly carried out. Unfortunately, however, disposal officers often short-cut the regulations, with the

result that the government acquired many items it later had to dispose of

as scrap. The lack of documentation on disposition of inventories was very

frustrating. In "hundreds of cases" the team was unable to find any

evidence on the disposition of items.

Under provision of the Joint Termination Regulations, contract review

boards were set up at the various CWS installations. In most instances

these boards were entirely military and the officers who sat on them were

of lower rank than the negotiating officer submitting the proposed settlement for review. "Ordinarily," the report states, "such a review board

would not be likely to question the acts of a superior officer." The report

recommended that in any future emergency the selection of members of
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 423

review boards be given closer attention; that at least two qualified civilians

with business experience sit on each board and that no military member

be below the rank of major.

In its final recommendation the report urged that contract terminations

be studied in connection with the peacetime Industrial Mobilization Program, so that in any future emergency proper instruction might be given

to prospective negotiators and property disposal officers.

The report of the Contract Settlement Review Team might have made

several additional observations in its analysis of the situation in the CWS.

One of the reasons for poor property records was that many CWS small

contractors did not have facilities to set up necessary records when they

undertook a contract. Later CWS termination offices had to attempt to

reconstruct the property record back to the time the contract was awarded.

The efficiency with which property records were administered, as well as

with regard to other aspects of contract terminations, differed among CWS

installations. Some had excellent staffs and closely supervised all aspects

of termination activities; others did not have enough qualified people and

operated in a rather haphazard manner.

At the root of the difficulty was the tendency to relegate contract termination activities to a secondary role while the war was in progress.

Both at the chiefs office and at the installations the first objective was

considered to be the procurement and supply of chemical munitions to the

armed forces; in the light of the expanding overall chemical warfare procurement program this tendency was natural. An indication of the relatively minor importance assigned to contract terminations is the delay in

activating a Readjustment Division in the Washington headquarters; not

until October 1945 was that division established. Had such a division been

set up under a competent chief (preferably a man with about fifteen years

experience in contracting) at the time the Readjustment Divisions were

activated in the procurement districts in 1944, the supervision of all CWS

contract termination activities would have been greatly improved.32 As

actually carried out, the supervision of various termination activities was

divided among several elements of the chief's office. In addition to the

overall supervision of termination actions by the Legal Branch, the Fiscal

Division supervised property accountability and the Property Disposal

Branch all matters relating to the disposal of surplus property.

32

 Geraghty and Poyner interviews.
424 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Property Disposal

Half a dozen years after the close of World War I, the CWS was

still disposing of surplus property.33 With the passage of time additional

materials, particularly chemicals, became surplus and these the CWS disposed of by transfer to other branches of the War Department or to

civilian agencies.34 In 1937 several of the deteriorated buildings at Edgewood Arsenal were sold as surplus.35

One effective means of speeding up production in the emergency

period was through eliminating large reserves of outmoded property

through prompt disposal.36 The First War Powers Act of 18 December

1941 provided for the sale of serviceable property to war contractors without going through the formality of declaring it surplus. Supported by this

provision of the act and by rulings of the War Production Board, the

War Department in October 1942 issued Procurement Regulation Number

7 on disposing of surplus and obsolete property. Under this regulation

the CWS as an element of the Army carried on its disposal activities during the first half of the war. If the service found it impossible to sell

excess property to war contractors, it drew up a list of the material which

it circulated among other supply services of the Army and among elements of the Navy. If another service wanted all or part of the material

it was transferred; if not it was declared surplus and reported to the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department. If the Treasury Department did not indicate an interest the CWS sent out invitations to private

industry to bid on the surplus property.37

The war period naturally witnessed the accumulation of a considerable

amount of excess property by the CWS. Among the causes of this development was the elimination of certain munitions such as the M54 bomb

and lewisite. When these programs were discontinued the items were declared surplus, and in the case of lewisite the plants also.38

 When a

manufacturing program was eliminated the machinery in the plant gen33

 See ch. I above. 34

 Rpt of CWS, 1931, p. 23, and 1936, p. 4. 35

 Ibid., 1937, p. 4. 36

 Memo, TAG for Chiefs of Supply Services, 23 Dec 42, sub: Surplus and Obsolete Property.

ASF (SPX 400.7 (12-18-42) OB-P-SPDDS-MPR). 37

 3d Ind, Asst C Ind Div OC CWS to CO Edgewood Arsenal, 3 Apr 43 on Ltr, CO Edgewood Arsenal to C CWS, 4 Feb 43, sub: Excess Property. CWS 400.7 EA 1943. 38

 In 1944 the CWS shipped considerable lewisite equipment from Rocky Mountain Arsenal to

the Corps of Engineers Manhattan Projects. See Resume of Activities, OC CWS, for Week Ending

16 Sep 44.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 425

erally became surplus. Another cause for the accumulation of excess property was the practice of discarding old model items or old type matériel

when a newer model or a newer type had been developed. Still another

cause was the refusal of Russia to accept certain chemicals, particularly

ammonium chloride, which the CWS had purchased and packed for lendlease shipment.39

 Basic, of course, was the fact that gas warfare did not

eventuate, with the result that the armed forces did not expend its gas

warfare ammunition. Since most CWS matériel, moreover, was not suitable for civilian use, the service faced a more difficult problem of disposal

than did other elements of the Army.

By the spring of 1943 the property disposal situation was becoming

serious enough to warrant the appointment of special officers to administer

the program. In April the Chief, CWS, in accordance with a directive

from the ASF made the Chief of the Priorities and Allocation Branch,

Industrial Division, in his headquarters, salvage and excess property officer

in addition to his other duties. At the same time he directed the commanding officers of the installations to appoint property disposal officers.

In May 1943 the ASF set up a Redistribution and Salvage Branch in its

headquarters to supervise these activities in the technical services. The

extent of CWS disposal activities by the end of 1943 is indicated by the

value of sales and transfers of salvage and excess property for the last six

months of 1943, which totaled $7,825,507.40

General English, Chief, Industrial Division, in General Porter's office

did not believe that the service was putting forth its best efforts in disposing of surplus property and in December 1943 he urged the installations to become more active in this matter.41

 What was true of the CWS

was evidently true of the ASF generally, for in the spring of 1944 General Somervell was quoted as saying that he "did not know of any situation in the Army Service Forces that was any worse than the disposal

of surplus property."

 42

 One cause was the long period of time being

consumed in disposing of inventory and industrial property, which was in

turn leading to delays in contract settlements.43

There was a variety of reasons for the leisurely pace of industrial prop39

 Resume of Activities, OC CWS, for Weeks Ending 8 Apr and 22 Apr 44. 40

 (1) OC CWS Adm O 7, 28 Apr 43. (2) OC CWS Organ Chart, 6 Mar 44 and 10 Aug 44.

(3) Resume of Activities, OC CWS, for Week Ending 15 Jun 44, Report of Industrial Division. 41

 Ltr, Brig Gen P. X. English, C Ind Div OC CWS, to CG EA, et al., 6 Dec 43, sub: Redistribution and Salvage Program. CWS 314.7 Demobilization File.

42

 Min, Mtg ASF Staff Conference, 14 Mar 44, p. 13. Control Div, ASF Files. 43 Min, Mtg ASF Staff Conference, 22 Feb 44, p. 3. Control Div, ASF Files.
426 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

erty disposal, but in the judgment of an officer who had a number of

years experience in production one seemed predominant. Col. Louis W.

Munchmeyer, who directed the program in the Office of the Chief, CWS,

in an address to members of the Industrial Division in the fall of 1944,

blamed it on the human frailty of the typical production man who wanted

"to hide a piece of equipment" for possible use if a similar piece should

break down.44

 That there was a great deal in what Colonel Munchmeyer

said seems to be indicated by the fact that from early 1944 the ASF and

other pertinent government agencies placed much emphasis on ferreting

out industrial equipment that had been hidden away.

The Latter War Period

The Baruch-Hancock Report of February 1944 led to drastic reforms

in the field of property disposal no less than in contract termination. The

first result was establishment of a Surplus Property Administration in the

Office of War Mobilization.45 The Surplus Property Administration arranged for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to act as a disposal

agency in addition to the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation handled general purpose

equipment, machine tools, and chemicals, while the Procurement Division,

Treasury Department, was restricted to consumer-type property.

Another important outcome of the Baruch-Hancock Report was the

enactment of the Surplus Property Act of 3 October 1944.46 This act

created a Surplus Property Board of three members. Appointments to the

new board were completed in January 1945 and the board's regulations

were made available to the ASF in April. In September the board was

abolished and a single administrator appointed.47

While the CWS conducted its surplus property functions under the

general supervision of Headquarters, ASF, it also had direct contacts with

the Surplus Property Board and later the Surplus Property Administration.48

 The Property Disposal Branch in the chiefs office formulated pro44

 Remarks of Col L. W. Munchmeyer, Rpt of Ind Div Conf at OC CWS, 15-16 Sep 44, p. 63.

CWS 314.7 Property Disposal File. 45

 E O 9425, 19 Feb 44. 46

 P.L. 457, 78th Cong. 47

 (1) Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the Army Service Forces, p. 224. (2) Herman M. Somers, Presidential Agency (Cambridge, 1950), p. 181. (3) Industrial Mobilization for

War, vol. I, 724-26. 48

 On 1 October 1945 the Surplus Property Administration took over the functions of the Surplus Property Board. On 31 January 1946 the President under Executive Order 9689 transferred

the functions of the Surplus Property Administrator to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of

the War Assets Corporation. This same Executive Order provided that as of 25 March 1946 a War

Assets Corporation be set up to handle all surplus property functions.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 427

cedures for CWS disposal activities based on the regulations and directives of the War Department and the top level government disposal

agencies.49 These procedures were printed in a CWS Property Disposal

Manual. The branch also carried on a training program for CWS property

disposal workers through conferences and meetings, through correspondence, and through personal contacts.

It was the opinion of those who directed the wartime disposal program in the CWS that ASF administration of property disposal was of an

excellent character. General Somervell's headquarters laid down clear-cut

instructions aimed at redistributing property on an equitable basis, and

although these instructions were not always palatable to individual commanders, they were beneficial to the CWS and to the Army as a whole.

The handling of surplus property by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was not looked upon with very much favor because of alleged delays

of that agency in carrying out disposition.50

Among the most important of property disposal procedures was the

compiling of complete descriptions of each individual item to be disposed

of. It was not possible, for example, to sell a gas mask production line as

such. Instead, a complete description of every item going into that line,

such as motors and sewing machines, had to be made. After the description was drawn up it was circulated to likely military branches, such as

the Ordnance Department or the Corps of Engineers. If these had no use

for the item and it was less than $100 in value it could be sold to a war

contractor. In September 1944 an innovation was introduced in that items

for sale were disposed of through the service command, which had more

facilities for effective sales. The items that were not sold were declared

surplus to the Surplus Property Board and later the Surplus Property

Administration.51

Major salvage projects in the CWS included the gas mask carrier and

gas mask disassembly program and the protective ointment program. These

projects got under way after General Porter received a letter from General

Somervell late in 1944 stressing the critical manpower shortage and the

49

 WD publications of particular importance were TM 38-505, 24 Apr 44, and ASF Manual

M419, 1 Aug 45. 50

 (1) Ltr, Col L. W. Munchmeyer to Hist Off, 26 Mar 52. (2) Ltr, Frederick H. Schovoir to

Hist Off, 6 Mar 52. Mr. Schovoir was Property Officer at Edgewood Arsenal during World War II.

(3) For evidence that criticism of RFC delays were not confined to CWS, see Lyle B. Brundage,

Storage Operations December 1941-45, an unpublished history of Storage Division, ASF, p. 253. 51

 Remarks of Col L. W. Muchmeyer in Rpt of Ind Div Conf, OC CWS, 15-16 December

1944, pp. 61-68. CWS 314.7 Property Disposal File.
428 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

desirability of utilizing the labor of prisoners of war.52 The gas mask

program, which was carried on at some half dozen points throughout the

country, resulted in the salvaging of webbing, hardware, and minor components badly needed by both the CWS and the Quartermaster Corps.53

The protective ointment program consisted of the salvaging of approximately 27 million tubes of ointment which had been declared surplus to

the War Department in early 1945.54 The ointment was removed from

the tubes and stored in drums and the tubes and various packaging material was transferred to other services of the Army and to the Navy.

In the period July 1943 through July 1945 the CWS made available

for disposal property valued at $143,051,000. (Table 10) Of this amount

property valued at $126,910,000 was actually disposed of during the

period.55

TABLE 10—CWS PROPERTY DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES, JULY 1943 THROUGH JULY

1945 a

a

 All figures in the tabulation are based on initial cost.

Source: Property Disposal Branch, OC CWS, compilation, CWS 314.7 Property Disposal File.

52

 Ltr, CG ASF to C CWS, 21 Dec 44. CWS 314.7 Demobilization File. 53

 Gas mask salvage projects were carried on at Camp Grant, Ill. (later transferred to Camp

Ellis, Ill.); the CW warehouse in Chicago, Ill.; Camp McCoy, Wis.; Pine Camp, N.Y.; Camp

White, Oreg.; and Ft. Devens, Mass. 54

 Ltr, AC Ind Div OC CWS to CG EA, 7 Feb 45, sub: Ointment, Protective, M4. CWS 400.24. 55

 ASF commended the C CWS for the "most outstanding manner" in which the CWS carried

out its excess property mission. See Memo, Dir Readj Div ASF for C CWS, 6 Feb 45, sub: Redistribution of Excess Property. CWS 314.7 Property Disposal File.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 429

The end of fighting in the Pacific saw an immediate increase in CWS

property disposal activities, as the following figures indicate. The total

volume of all types of property (contractor-inventory, nonmilitary, and inventory) for the period January-July 1945 amounted to $8,623,000; for the

month of August 1945 alone the figure was $23,274,000. Table 11 lists the

original dollar value of all CWS property disposed of during the calendar

year 1945.

TABLE 11—CWS PROPERTY AVAILABLE FOR DISPOSAL, JANUARY-DECEMBER

1945

Source: Rpt of Property Disposal Br, OC CWS, August-December 1945. CWS 314.7 Property Disposal File.

The Postwar Period

The War Department in the months immediately after the close of

hostilities urged the technical services to "jar loose supplies of civiliantype items."

 56

 The CWS encountered little or no problem in disposing

of matériel that had a civilian use. In addition to sales to private industry, the service disposed of a number of items by grants to schools and

colleges through the U.S. Office of Education. These items included chemicals in small quantities, laboratory equipment, gas alarms, decontaminating apparatus, chemical mortar carts, 55-gallon drums, eyeshields, mechanical smoke generators, chemical agent detector kits, floating smoke pots,

dust respirators, 1⁄4-ton trailers, 1⁄4-ton tractors, and impregnating plants.57

But with the bulk of chemical warfare matériel it was different. After

56

 Remarks of Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes, CofS ASF, in Resume of ASF Staff Conference, 28 Dec 45,

p. 1. ASF Hist Files, National Archives. 57

 Ltr, C Property Disposal Section OC CmlC to CO's of all Chemical Corps Installations, 12

Nov 46, sub: Donation of Surplus Property under PR7-316. CWS 400.7, Jul-Dec 46.
430 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

setting aside certain quantities of munitions as war reserve, there were still

vast quantities on hand.58

It was the matériel for which there was no civilian demand that created

particular disposal problems. Such items as toxic agents, "goop," and certain raw chemicals had very little or no commercial value.59

 Shortly after

the close of the war some toxic agents were dumped at sea, but the problem of disposing of surplus toxics was to persist for a number of years.60

Some "goop" was eventually disposed of by turning it over to state government agencies in the far west and to certain lumber companies who

used it to destroy undesirable brush.61 Among the raw chemicals the CWS

had difficulty in selling were ammonium chloride and arsenic trichloride.

The former was used as a catalyst in the manufacture of lewisite and its

chief commercial use was in preserving the greens on golf courses. But

there were just not enough golf courses in the United States to absorb

the quantity of ammonium chloride the CWS had on hand. Arsenic trichloride was also used in the production of lewisite, and after the CWS

discontinued the manufacture of that agent in mid-1944 it declared

1,700,000 pounds of arsenic trichloride surplus to the Reconstruction

Finance Corporation. By March 1946 less than 250,000 pounds had been

sold and the remainder was in storage at Pine Bluff.62 This situation

pointed up a grave postwar problem facing the CWS: its depots and

other storage facilities were bulging with items long since declared surplus.

Until early 1946 the CWS experienced little difficulty in administering its surplus property program. The procedure was for the service to

notify the War Department periodically of the amount of surplus property

on hand, but no great pressure was exerted to reduce these surpluses. In

February 1946 War Department policy underwent a complete change.63

The new policy called for the disposition of all items for which there was

58

 For data on the disposal levels of individual items see file CWS 400.7, Jan-Mar 46. 59

 "Goop" was an incendiary material produced by one of the CWS contractors. See ch. VIII

above. 60

 The War Department would not approve sufficient funds for proper storage of toxic agents,

but neither would it approve funds for disposing of toxics in appreciable quantities. Consequently

the CWS "couldn't afford to keep [mustard and lewisite] or dispose of it." Comment of Maj Gen

Alden H. Waitt, former Chief Chemical Officer, on margin of draft copy of this chapter, Sep 58. 61

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Harold F. Zimmerman, 23 Jan 58. Col Zimmerman was in Property Disposal Br, OC CWS, during and following World War II. 62

 Ltr, C CWS to CG ASF, attn Maj William M. Teffingwell, Readj Div Distribution Br, 25

Mar 46, sub: Disposal of Surplus Chemicals and Kindred Items that Remain Unsold for a Twelve

Month Period. CWS 400.7. 63

 WD Circulars 34, 5 Feb 46, and 38, 7 Feb 46.
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 431

not a definite military need.64 Although this approach put a tremendous

burden on the Property Disposal Branch of the chief's office as well as

on the installations, it did bring about greater disposition of surplus

material.65

The task of the CWS property disposal officials was not made any

lighter by the unfavorable publicity which the service was receiving in

1946. In July a Senate committee began its open hearings into the Garsson contracts.66

 That same month some 33 leaking German mustard gas

bombs were dumped into the Gulf of Mexico about 60 miles off the coast

of Alabama in 100 fathoms of water. Despite all evidence to the contrary and despite the fact that similar phenomena had occurred periodically

in various regions throughout the world, the death of some fish off the

coast of Florida was blamed on this action.67 In the fall of 1946 the service received more unfavorable publicity when some workmen suffered

burns while unloading leaking shells from a munition ship at Mobile, Ala.68

As a result of all this notoriety the CWS was anything but the darling of

the War Department at the time. But this predicament was not without

its compensations. Under the circumstances the Chief, CWS, insisted that

his subordinates co-operate fully with higher headquarters and be most

scrupulous in carrying out property disposal transactions. It stands to the

credit of the CWS that, unlike some other elements of the Army, no

serious question was ever raised by higher authority as to the propriety of

the service's disposal actions.

To Be or Not To Be?

During the war the ASF not only assumed responsibility for supervising such technical service activities as disposition of facilities, contract

termination, and property disposal; it also set up organizational and administrative standards for all elements under its jurisdiction, and General

Somervell's headquarters did not confine its concern for Army organization

to the war period, but made plans for the postwar period as well. As

64

 See OC CWS, Disposition of CWS Items, 10 Apr 46 and 15 Jul 46. CWS 400.7. 65

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Robert A. Owendoff, 14 Jul 58. Colonel Owendoff headed the

Property Disposal Br, OC CWS, in the postwar period. 66

 See ch. XV above. 67

 See MC OUT 44842, Kenneth C. Royall, SW, to Hon J. Hardin Peterson, Member of Congress, 15 Aug 47. CWS 314.7 Property Disposal File. 68

 See account of the decontamination of the Francis L. Lee in Guard and Security, pp. 45-47.
432 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

early as the summer of 1944 the Control Division, ASF, began working

on such a plan. As finally evolved, this plan envisioned a setup consisting of a commanding general, ASF, assisted by a dozen staff officers, six

of whom would also serve as chiefs of technical services. Each technical

service would have functional rather than commodity responsibilities.69

For example, the Quartermaster Corps would return to its traditional

Army function of distributing all Army supplies, the Medical Department

to medicine, the Engineers to engineering, and the Ordnance Department

to procuring everything for the Army. As the wartime Chief of Control

Division, ASF, later expressed it, "In such a shift, the Chemical Warfare

Service simply gets lost."

 70

 Under the ASF plan the functions of the CWS

were to be transferred to the Ordnance Department.

Somervell's recommendations were among those studied by a board of

officers appointed by General George C. Marshall on 30 August 1945 to

prepare a plan for the peacetime organization of the War Department.71

In the course of its study this board, whose chairman was Lt. Gen.

Alexander M. Patch, interviewed Under Secretary Patterson and Assistant

Secretary Robert A. Lovett, and a number of high ranking officers, including Generals Eisenhower, McNarney, and Walter Bedell Smith. On 18

October the Patch board submitted its recommendation to the Chief of

Staff. A new board, headed by Lt. Gen. William M. Simpson, was then

appointed to consider suggested adjustments to the Patch board recommendations. On 28 December the Simpson board submitted its report,

which differed in only minor details from the Patch board report.72

General Porter was one of the officers interviewed by the Patch board.

When Porter appeared before the board on 13 September he carried in

his hand a note he had received from Under Secretary Patterson two days

before. This note was a reply to a 7 September letter from Porter to Patterson, written at the latter's request. This letter had listed arguments in

favor of an independent chemical service. Patterson's note, which Porter

read at the start of his testimony, included the following statements:

69

 Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, p. 422. 70

 Ltr, Clinton F. Robinson to Hist Off, 28 Apr 58. See also Ltr, John D. Millett to Hist Off,

19 Apr 58. 71

 Memo, Brig Gen H. I. Hodes, Asst DCofS, for Lt Gen Alexander M. Patch, Maj Gen H. A.

Craig, Maj Gen H. C. Ingles, and Maj Gen P. E. Brown, 30 Aug 45, sub: Reorganization of the

War Department, CofS file, Reorganization of War Department (Patch-Simpson Boards) 19 Aug 45. 72

 The Patch and Simpson Board reports, together with the testimony of the various persons

interviewed, are in the CofS files marked Reorganization of War Department (Patch-Simpson

Boards).
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 433

You make a strong case for the continuance of the Chemical Warfare Service. It is

a convincing case so far as I am concerned. The record made by the Chemical Warfare Service has been a notable one. I know of no move to merge your service with

any other service, having heard nothing more than casual talk on the subject.73

In Porter's 7 September letter to Patterson—wherein he made "the

strong case for the continuance of the Chemical Warfare Service"—he indicated in the opening paragraph that about ten days before the two men

had discussed the future of the CWS when they met on an airplane.74

Porter at that time was cognizant of the plans of the ASF to combine

the CWS with the Ordnance Department.75 In the course of the conversation Patterson had asked the Chief, CWS, to send him something in

writing justifying the continuance of a separate chemical service.

"First and foremost" among the reasons which Porter propounded was

the need of an agency for co-ordinating chemical research, as well as

biological and physical research. The CWS was the only War Department

agency in existence prepared to carry out this mission. It would be very

unwise, Porter felt, to subordinate such a vital activity to an element of

the War Department already saddled with a huge supply and service mission. It would be particularly unfortunate in the light of the ever increasing importance of research and development to warfare.

The second reason which the Chief, CWS, presented was that since

the application of research and development to warfare was relatively new,

these activities should not be confined by the "shackles of existing

weapons and channels of thought" nor should they be relegated to a secondary position in some technical service.

A distinction between the kind of research and development performed by the Ordnance Department and that carried out by the CWS

constituted Porter's third point. Whereas Ordnance research, development,

and procurement followed fairly well defined patterns, based essentially on

commercial and industrial commodities, those of the CWS were largely

noncommercial. Ordnance, moreover, had no concern whatever with medical or biological research.

Porter's "fourth vital point" was predicated on the proposition that

selling new ideas was always a difficult task:

73

 Testimony of Maj Gen William N. Porter before Patch Board 13 Sep 45, in CofS files Reorganization of War Department (Patch-Simpson Boards). Copy of this note is also in CWS 300.4-

1945.

74

 Ltr, C CWS to Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, 7 Sep 45, sub: Justification for

an Independent Chemical Warfare Service. CWS 321 file marked Secretary of War 1945. 75

 Interv, Hist Off with Maj Gen William N. Porter, 30 Apr 57.
434 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Absent a protagonistic approach [he stated], new ideas are often suppressed, or, at

best, impeded and delayed. That the history of suppression is not theoretical is borne

out by the history of the 4.2 mortar; this war would not have had the mortar—with

its brilliant record—but for the advocacy of the Chemical Warfare Service. ... I need

not multiply incidents—you know the conflict within our own armed forces and those

of our allies on high explosives versus incendiaries, and how effective a weapon incendiaries have proven to be, and how the development of smoke and flame has

progressed only because of the singleness of interest of the Chemical Warfare Service.

These were Porter's four principal reasons for the continuation of the

CWS. As he himself indicated, they centered around the research and

development mission. To these four Porter added five additional reasons

for a separate organization. These were that the CWS had a combat and

field staff mission related to its research mission, that the size of the

CWS was just about right for carrying the chemical and biological activities of the armed forces, that the storage and shipment of chemical munitions required special handling, that the CWS was unique in military

circles in having experience in the production of defense as well as offensive munitions, and that if the CWS were eliminated it would not be

feasible to simply transfer its activities to the Ordnance Department because certain of these activities were more akin to the missions of other

elements of the Army, such as the Quartermaster Corps, the Medical

Department, and the Corps of Engineers. Although General Porter did

not point out the fact, distribution of responsibilities would have meant

a reversion to the situation that had existed in World War I before the

establishment of the CWS.

In his testimony before the Patch board, Porter, in answer to specific

questions, went into more details on certain items, especially the biological

warfare activities of the CWS. But essentially his arguments were those

embodied in his letter to the Under Secretary of War.

The duties of the Chief, CWS, as defined in the National Defense

Act included not only the development, procurement, and issue of smoke

and incendiary materials and toxic agents, but also the organization,

equipment, training, and operations of special gas troops, and such other

duties as the President might from time to time prescribe. This list of

duties indicates that the CWS was not only a service branch of the Army

but also a fighting branch or arm in that it was responsible for the training of special troops and for their employment in battle.

The Chiefs of the Chemical Warfare Service never interpreted their

role as being confined solely to development and procurement of matériel.

They believed that the special weapons which the service developed and
INDUSTRIAL DEMOBILIZATION 435

procured should be tried out by special troops for whose training the

CWS was responsible. Only on the basis of such experience, they felt,

could sound training doctrine be formulated. General Porter, no less than

his predecessors, was imbued with this concept; he saw the CWS as an

organization with balanced and interacting responsibilities for research and

development, supply, training, and combat employment of chemical munitions. For that reason it would have been inconceivable for General Porter

to have subscribed to any such shifting of CWS responsibilities as the

Army Service Forces suggested in 1945. That the General Staff was convinced of the validity of Porter's thesis seems obvious from its decision

to maintain the organizational integrity of the Chemical Warfare Service.
43

6 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX A—STATUS OF CWS FACILITIES PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1945

43

8 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX A—STATUS OF CWS FACILITIES PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1945—Continued

44

0 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX A—STATUS OF CWS FACILITIES PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1945—Continued

44

2 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX A—STATUS OF CWS FACILITIES PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1945—Continued

44

4 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX A—STATUS OF CWS FACILITIES PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1945—Continued

44

6 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX A—STATUS OF CWS FACILITIES PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1945—Continued

44

8 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX B—GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES, WORLD WAR II AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1945

45

0 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX B—GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES, WORLD WAR II AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1945—Continued
APPENDIX B 451
45

2 TH

E CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

APPENDIX B—GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN FACILITIES, WORLD WAR II AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1945—Continued
APPENDI

X B 45

3

a Defense Plant Corporation and War Department funds. The Maury CWS plant,

Columbia, Tenn., built in 1942, was in standby status in 1943 and by 31 December

1945 had been declared surplus and was in the hands of the Corps of Engineers. Total

cost to government was 91,330,248.

b 253,440 acres under permit from Interior Dept. Declared inactive 1 Oct. 1945.

c All under lease.

d Land and construction cost data included in Lake Ontario Project, Engineer Redistribution-Storage Facility.

e 1,969 acres public domain. Declared surplus 1 Oct. 1945.

Source: Corps of Engineers, Quarterly Inventory of War Department Owned,

Sponsored and Leased Facilities, 31 December 1945, RCS AMD-1.

Bibliographical Note

Research and Development

In the chapters on research and development the author relied on

records of the CWS and other branches of the armed forces, on articles,

books, and interviews. For the World War I period he used records of

the Bureau of Mines which trace the beginnings of chemical warfare in

the United States. These documents are in the National Archives. He supplemented this with two series of monographs. The first of these was the

fifty-volume Chemical Warfare Monographs prepared by chemists of the

Research Division, American University Experiment Station, CWS, in

1919. These volumes are an excellent, detailed account of the work of

American scientists in 1917-1918. The second series, about two hundred

reports (designated by the letter H) written by commanding officers

shortly after the war, give the histories of the various elements of the

CWS. Both series of monographs are in the Technical Library, Army

Chemical Center, Md. Some of the reports in the latter series of monographs were modified and published in chemical journals from 1919

onward.

For the period between the wars the author relied largely on reports

written by chemists, physiologists, engineers, and other scientists, covering

projects carried out at Edgewood Arsenal between 1920 and 1940. These

reports are filed in the Technical Library where they are designated by

the call letters EATR (Edgewood Arsenal Technical Report), EACD

(Edgewood Arsenal Chemical Division), MD(EA)MR (Edgewood Arsenal

Medical Division Memorandum Report), MRL(EA) (Edgewood Arsenal

Medical Research Laboratory), MRD (Medical Research and Development

Section), EAL (Edgewood Arsenal Laboratory), EAMD (Edgewood Arsenal

Mechanical Division), and ETF (Edgewood Technical File). In addition

the author employed articles in the Chemical Warfare Bulletin, a publication which, for three decades, carried articles on all phases of chemical

warfare.
456 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The author depended upon a variety of sources for the World War II

period. The Technical Library has many reports under the letters DPGMR

(Dugway Proving Ground Memorandum Report), TDMR (Technical

Division Memorandum Report), MITMR (Massachusetts Institute of

Technology Memorandum Report), and other designations that cover research, development, and testing of CWS equipment. Minutes of the

Chemical Warfare Technical Committee are a mine of data on any standard item, giving reasons for the development of the item, its good and

bad features, and its use. The minutes are on file in the office of the

Executive Secretary of the CWTC (now the Chemical Corps Technical

Committee), and in the Technical Library. Chemical Warfare Board reports, also filed in the Technical Library, supplied an evaluation of chemical items. The Report of Activities of the Technical Division during World

War II, a paper-bound volume written by several CWS officers and issued

in 1946, proved useful as a ready reference source. The score of monographs in the series, History of Research and Development of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (1 July 1940-31 December 1945),

were useful in dealing with the major fields of smoke, mortars, and incendiaries, and with new scientific installations, such as Dugway Proving

Ground, the CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, and the CWS-Columbia

University Development Laboratory. These R&D monographs, available

in the Historical Office, are extremely detailed in their treatment of topics.

Histories of CWS installations, activities, and plants, copies of which are

in the Historical Office, provided data on pilot plants and production. In

the Armed Forces Chemical Journal from 1946 onward there appeared a number of useful articles written by members of the CWS or by contractors.

In tracing the work done by the OSRD (Office of Scientific Research

and Development), the NDRC (National Defense Research Committee),

and other agencies, the author used published works and unpublished

technical reports. The Technical Library contains many OSRD reports on

chemical warfare topics. It also has the excellent series of Summary Technical Reports of various NDRC divisions. These reports are in book form,

but are not available to the general reader since they are classified. Members of the OSRD published a number of books after the war, including

James P. Baxter's Scientists Against Time and Irvin Stewart's Organizing

Scientific Research for War.

The following documents were helpful in tracing German and Japanese

chemical warfare equipment: German Chemical Warfare, World War II, a

mimeographed pamphlet issued by the Intelligence Division, CWS, Head-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 457

quarters Theater Service Forces, European Theater, in 1945; German Chemical Warfare Materiel, a booklet drawn up by the Intelligence Division,

Office of the Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, Headquarters European

Theater of Operations; Japanese Chemical Warfare, a book prepared by

the Chief Chemical Officer, USASOS, Southwest Pacific Area; Chemical

Warfare Intelligence Bulletins; and the Military Intelligence Service's

Tactical and Technical Trends.

In addition to records in the National Archives and other government

repositories, to published and unpublished reports, articles and books, the

author interviewed members of the Chemical Corps, as well as retired

officers and civilians who were in the corps back in the hectic days of

World War II. At the time of writing, these interviews were on file in

the Chemical Corps Historical Office. Copies will be retired with permanent records of the CWS under file reference 314.7, Interviews and Correspondence File. In the same file are included letters addressed to the

Chemical Corps Historical Office.

Procurement and Supply

The procurement and distribution chapters of the volume are based

chiefly on official records and reports of the Chemical Warfare Service

and higher echelons of the Army and on documents in such private depositories as the Chlorine Institute, New York City, and the Manufacturing Chemists Association, Washington, D.C. Much of this recorded material was supplemented by interviews and correspondence with key participants. There are two published volumes that make reference to CWS

procurement and supply activities. These are Benedict Crowell's, America's

Munitions, 1917-1918 (Washington, 1919), which discusses the World War

I period, and a volume entitled The Chemical Warfare Service in World War

II: A report of Accomplishments, published in 1948, which devotes a chapter

to CWS procurement and supply activities in World War II. The latter

volume was prepared by the Historical Office for the Chief of the Chemical Corps and was published by the Reinhold Publishing Corporation,

New York City, for the Chemical Corps Association.

In addition to Crowell's account of CWS manufacturing activities in

World War I, the author made use of two unpublished histories written

shortly after the close of activities by former officers. These were Lt. Col.

Edwin M. Chance's, History of Edgewood Plants and Lt. Col. William

McPherson's, An Historical Sketch of the Development of Edgewood
458 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Arsenal. A copy of Chance's manuscript is in Historical Office files and

a copy of McPherson's in the Technical Library at the Army Chemical

Center, Md. The annual reports of the CWS for the years 1918 to 1921

contained valuable references to certain aspects of the procurement and

distribution missions of the service. The reports continued to be compiled

up to the fiscal year 1937, when apparently for reasons of economy they

were discontinued. During World War II the Chief, CWS, resumed the

practice of compiling an annual report.

For information on industrial mobilization planning and on the scanty

procurement and supply activities of the peacetime period, the author used

pertinent retired files of the Chemical Warfare Service; the War Department Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division (WPD), G-3, and

G-4; and The Adjutant General's Office. Footnote citations throughout

the volume which give file numbers preceded by the abbreviation "CWS"

indicate documents from the retired files of the Chemical Warfare Service.

Records of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff G-3 and G-4 are indicated by

the prefixes "G-3" and "G-4," respectively, those of The Adjutant General's Office by the prefix "AG." At the time this volume was written

the majority of these records were in the custody of the Department of

the Army. Since then, however, these records have been transferred to and

are in the custody of the National Archives.

These same files, supplemented by other source material, were consulted for the emergency and war periods. The author found valuable

information on the Chemical Advisory Committee to the Army-Navy

Munitions Board in the files of the Chlorine Institute and the Manufacturing Chemists Association. He also searched the retired files of the

Army-Navy Munitions Board, some of which were in the National

Archives and others in the Pentagon. He obtained data on various aspects

of CWS procurement and distribution from retired files of the Assistant

Secretary of War (ASW), the Under Secretary of War (USW), the Army

Service Forces (ASF), the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff, the War Production Board (WPD), and the War

Department Manpower Board (WDMB), all in the National Archives.

The author made use of appropriate monographs prepared by the

Chemical Corps Historical Office and of the installation histories prepared

under the supervision of that office. Copies of these monographs and histories are on file in the Chemical Corps Historical Office and in the

Office of the Chief of Military History. In addition, he consulted the installation files of The Adjutant General's Kansas City Record Center. He
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 459

reviewed studies and lectures on various phases of logistics in the files of

the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, those volumes in the series

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II that touch on logistics,

unpublished monographs in the Office of the Chief of Military History,

and historical accounts compiled by a few CWS World War II contractors. (It is a pity more contractors did not write a historical account.)

To supplement the record of contractor activities, the author corresponded

with and interviewed a number of key plant officials who had experience

with the World War II program. These letters and interviews are now

on file in the Chemical Corps Historical Office and copies will be retired

with permanent records of the CWS under file reference 314.7, Interviews

and Correspondence File.
Glossary

AAF

ABC Committee

ABL

ABW

AC

A Cml C

ACS

ACofS

Actg

Adm O

AEF

AG

AGD

AGF

AGO

ALSOS Mis- sion

ANMB

App

AR

ASC

ASF

ASFD

ASW

AUS

BAL

Bd

BPC

Br

Bu

Bull

BW

C

CBI

CC

CC-2

Army Air Forces

A code designation for a Biological Warfare Committee, formed with

the help of the National Academy of Sciences and the National

Research Council

Allegheny Ballistics Laboratory

Antibiological Warfare Section, Hawaiian Department

Hydrogen cyanide, a toxic agent; Assistant Chief

Army Chemical Center

American Chemical Society

Assistant Chief of Staff

Acting

Administrative Order

American Expeditionary Forces

Adjutant General

Adjutant General's Department

Army Ground Forces

Adjutant General's Office

Code name for an intelligence mission to Europe

Army and Navy Munitions Board

Appendix

Army Regulation

Army Specialist Corps; a type of charcoal used for gas masks

Army Service Forces

Army Service Forces Depot

Assistant Secretary of War

Army of the United States

British antilewisite, a protective ointment for vesicant gas

Board

British Purchasing Commission

Branch

Bureau

Bulletin

Biological Warfare

Chief

China-Burma-India Theater of Operations

CWS symbol for cyanogen chloride from June to November 1943. CK

was the symbol used before and afterward.

CWS symbol for chloroamide cloth impregnite discovered in 1924

and standard in World War II
GLOSSARY 461

CCmlC

CCWPD

CD

CE

CG

Ch

CinC

CIOS

Cir

CK

CM-IN

Cml

CmlC

CmlO

CMP

CMR

CN

CNB

CNC

CNS

CO

Co

Cong

CofS

Contl

CR, incendiary

oil

C SPD

C Spec Asgmts

Br

CTGC

CWB

CWC

CWD

CWPD

CWS

CWTC

DA

DANC

DC

Chief of the Chemical Corps, now Chief Chemical Officer (CCmlO)

Chicago Chemical Warfare Procurement District

Civil Defense; Camp Detrick

Corps of Engineers

Commanding General; a CWS symbol for carbonyl chloride (phosgene), a toxic agent

Chapter

Commander in Chief

Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee, under the Combined

Chiefs of Staff

Circular

CWS symbol for cyanogen chloride, a toxic agent. This symbol was

changed to CC in June 1943 and changed back to CK in November

1943. Classified Message, incoming

Chemical

Chemical Corps

Chemical Officer

Controlled Materials Plan

Committee on Medical Research

CWS symbol for chloroacetophenone, a tear gas

CWS symbol for a solution of CN in carbon tetrachloride and

benzene, a tear gas

CWS symbol for a solution of chloroacetophenone (CN) in chloroform, a tear gas

CWS symbol for a solution of CN and chloropicrin in chloroform,

a tear gas

Commanding Officer

Company

Congress

Chief of Staff

Control

CWS designation for gasoline thickened with crepe rubber, used as

a filling for incendiary bombs

Chief of the Special Projects Division, Office of the Chief of the

Chemical Warfare Service

Chief of the Special Assignments Branch, Office of the Chief of the

Chemical Warfare Service

Committee on the Treatment of Gas Casualties

Chemical Warfare Board

Chemical Warfare Center, now Army Chemical Center

Chemical Warfare Depot

Chemical Warfare Procurement District

Chemical Warfare Service

Chemical Warfare Technical Committee

Department of the Army; CWS symbol for diphenylchloroarsine

Decontaminating agent, noncorrosive, a solution of the compound

RH 195 in acetylene tetrachloride

CWS symbol for diphenylcyanoarsine, a vomiting gas
462 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

DCofS

Decon

DEF Committee

Dep

Dept

DF

Dir

Div

DM

DPC

DPGMR

DTH

DUKW

EA

EACD

EAL

EAMD

EATR

ETF

Eq

ETO

ETOUSA

Exec

ExO

FIAT

Fld Svc

FM

FS

FSA

Ft

FY

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

G agents

GHQ

GO

"Goop"

GPO

Deputy Chief of Staff

Decontamination

A code name for a biological warfare committee formed with the

help of the National Academy of Sciences and the National

Research Council

Depot

Department

Disposition Form

Director

Division

CWS symbol for diphenylaminechloroarsine, a toxic agent, also

known as adamsite

Defense Plant Corporation

Dugway Proving Ground Memorandum Report

Symbol for British antilewisite (dithioglyceral)

A 21⁄2-ton amphibious truck

Edgewood Arsenal

Edgewood Arsenal Chemical Division

Edgewood Arsenal Laboratory

Edgewood Arsenal Mechanical Division

Edgewood Arsenal Technical Report

Edgewood Technical File

Equipment

European Theater of Operations

European Theater of Operations, United States Army

Executive

Executive Officer

Field Intelligence Army, Technical

Field Service

Field Manual; CWS symbol for titanium tetrachloride, a smoke

mixture used as a filling for smoke shells

CWS symbol for a solution of sulphur trioxide in chlorosulfonic

acid, a smoke mixture

Field Security Agency

Fort

Fiscal year

Personnel section, division or higher unit

Intelligence section, division or higher unit

Operations and training section, division or higher unit

Supply section, division or higher unit

Nerve gases

General Headquarters

General Orders

A mixture of magnesium particles and asphalt used in incendiary

bombs

Government Printing Office
GLOSSARY 463

H

HA

HC

HCN

HD

HE

Hist Off

HMT

HN-1, HN-2,

HN-3

Hq

HS

HV

ICAF

ICC

IG

IGD

Igloo

IM

Incl

Ind

Ind Svc

Inf

Insp

Int

Interv

ISSCBW

Jt

L

LA, incendiary

oil

LCI

LCM

LCVP

L-H

Lib

Ltr

LVT

MC

Mech Div

Mil Int Serv

CWS symbol for crude mustard gas

Huntsville Arsenal

CWS symbol for hexachloroethane, a smoke mixture

Hydrogen cyanide, a toxic agent

Distilled mustard gas

High explosive

United States Army Chemical Corps Historical Office

Hexamethylenetetramine, a compound effective against phosgene poisoning

Nitrogen mustard gases

Headquarters

A former CWS symbol for mustard gas

Thickening agent composed of a 5 percent solution of methylmethacrylate in benzene

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Interstate Commerce Commission

Inspector General

Inspector General's Department

Concrete building of semicylindrical shape, covered with sod, used to

store ammunition

Isobutyl methacrylate, polymer AE, a substance used to thicken gasoline for incendiary purposes

Inclosure

Indorsement

Industrial Service, Office of the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service

Information

Inspection

Intelligence

Interview

Interservice Subcommittee on Biological Warfare, a British co-ordinating body

Joint

CWS symbol for lewisite, a toxic agent

CWS symbol for gasoline thickened with latex, used as a filler for

incendiary bombs

Landing craft, infantry

Landing craft, mechanized

Landing craft, vehicle and personnel

Lewisite-mustard mixtures

Library

Letter

Landing vehicle, tracked

Medical Corps

Mechanical Division

Military Intelligence Service
464 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Min

Misc

MIT

MITMR

MRD

MRL

MTO

NA

Napalm

NATO

NCO

NDRC

NP

NRC

NYCWPD

OASW

OC CWS

OCD

OCM

OCMH

OD

Off

Off O

ONI

OPM

Ord

OSG

OSRD

OSS

OUSW

PAPP

PBA

PD

P.L. PMP

POA

POE

PR

Proc

Prod

Pt

PT-1, PT-2,

PT-3

PWP

Minutes

Miscellaneous

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Memorandum Report

Medical Research and Development Section

Medical Research Laboratory

Mediterranean Theater of Operations

National Army; National Archives of the United States

A mixture of aluminum naphthenate and palmitate used to thicken gasoline for incendiary purposes

North African Theater of Operations

Noncommissioned officer

National Defense Research Committee

Napalm

National Research Council

New York Chemical Warfare Procurement District

Office of the Assistant Secretary of War

Office of the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service

Office of Civilian Defense

Ordnance Technical Committee Minutes

Office of the Chief of Military History

Ordnance Department

Office

Office Order

Office of Naval Intelligence

Office of Production Management

Ordnance

Office of The Surgeon General

Office of Scientific Research and Development

Office of Strategic Services

Office of the Under Secretary of War

P-aminopropiophenone, a compound highly active in forming methemoglobin, hence a protection against cyanide

Pine Bluff Arsenal

Procurement District

Public Law

Protective Mobilization Plan

Pacific Ocean Areas

Port of Embarkation

Procurement Regulation

Procurement

Production

Part

An incendiary fuel, based mainly on "goop" and IM gasoline, and

substitutes

Plasticized white phosphorus, granules of white phosphorus suspended

in a matrix of rubber
GLOSSARY 465

"Q"

QMG

R&D

Readj Div

Ref

Req Div

Ret

RFC

RMA

RP

Rpt

Sag paste

Sarin

Sec

Ser

Sess

SG

SGO

SGS

SIP

SO

SOS

SPD

Spec Asst SW

SPHINX

S.R. SR, incendiary

oil

Stat

Sub

Sup Div

Supt

SW

SWPA

SWPC

T/A

Tabun

TAG

TB

T/BA

TBCW

TCIR

TDMR

Tech

Quickie, a model of the flame thrower developed by the National

Defense Research Committee

Quartermaster General

Research and Development

Readjustment Division, Army Service Forces

Reference

Requirements Division, Army Service Forces

Retired

Reconstruction Finance Corporation

Rocky Mountain Arsenal

Research Project

Report

Antigas salve, a World War I protective ointment

A nerve gas

Section

Series

Session

Surgeon General

Surgeon General's Office

Secretary, General Staff

Special Inspection Procedure

Special Order

Services of Supply

Special Projects Division, Office of the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service

Special Assistant to the Secretary of War

An overall army project concerned with testing equipment and tactics for detecting and reducing Japanese field fortifications

Senate Resolution

CWS designation for gasoline thickened with smoked rubber, used

for incendiary purposes

Statute(s)

Subject

Supply Division

Superintendent

Secretary of War

Southwest Pacific Area

Smaller War Plants Corporation

Table of Allowances

A nerve gas

The Adjutant General

Technical Bulletin

Table of Basic Allowances

Technical Bulletin, Chemical Warfare

Technical Committee Interim Report

Technical Division Memorandum Report

Technical
466 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Telg

TM

Tng

T/O&E

TofO

TSG

TT

TVA

USA

USAFFE

USAFPOA

USASOS

USBWC

USCWC

USFIP

USW

VC

W

WBC

WD

WDGS

WDSS

WP

WPB

WPD

WRS

XX-CC3

Telegram

Technical Manual

Training

Tables of Organization and Equipment

Theater of Operations

The Surgeon General

Teletype

Tennessee Valley Authority

United States Army

United States Army Forces in the Far East

United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas

United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area

United States Biological Warfare Committee

United States Chemical Warfare Committee

United States Forces in the Philippines

Under Secretary of War

Veterinary Corps

Mustard thickened with a 5 percent solution of methylmethacrylate

in benzene (HV)

War Bureau of Consultants, a committee on biological warfare

War Department

War Department General Staff

War Department Special Staff

White phosphorus

War Production Board

War Plans Division, War Department General Staff

War Research Service, established by the President in May 1942 to

consider biological warfare

Micronized CC-2, an impregnite

Zanetti reports
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Services Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outputs

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive
468 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Services in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 469

Special Studies—Continued

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan

Index

ABC Committee, 105, 107

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., 38, 174

AC (hydrogen cyanide). See Hydrogen cyanide.

Acetylene, German processes for, 48

Acme Die and Machine Co., 358

Acushnet Process Co., 243, 326

Adams, Lytle S., 187

Adams, Roger, 26, 73, 105

Adamsite, 73-74

discovery, 26, 73

gas mask protection, 81

in tear gas grenades, 71-72

Adjutant General, The, 342

Administration Division, CWS, 13

Administration and Management Branch, Control

Division, OC CWS, 298

Advisory Commission, Council of National Defense,

246, 248, 255

Advisory Committee, U.S.-Canadian, 45

Advisory Committee on Effectiveness of Chemical

Warfare Matériel in Tropics, 46

Aero Medical Research Laboratory, Wright Field,

Ohio, 97

Aerosols research, 42

Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 19, 103, 104

Air Chemical Officer, 275, 276

Air chemical service companies, 268

Air Corps, 215, 217, 275

Air Service, 11

Airborne Command, 82

Airplane flame thrower, 163

Airplane smoke tanks

in amphibious landings, 218

German, 218

Japanese, 218

M10, 216, 217, 218, 377

M20, 217, 218, 377

M21, 217, 218, 377

M33, 217, 218, 377

M33A1, 217, 377

M40, 218

Navy, 217

procurement, 216, 217, 376-77

research and development, 214-19, 224

Airplane spray tanks, 163

German, 218

Japanese, 218

M10, 65, 215, 339

M33, 65

M33A1, 65

Airplane spray tanks—Continued

procurement, 65, 228

research and development, 32, 62, 65-66, 215

testing, 39, 66

Alaska, supply shipments to, 411

Algiers, 197, 212

Aliphatic nitrosocarbamates research, 50

Alkali-Chlorine Subcommittee, 271

Allegany Ballistics Laboratory, NDRC, 45

Allen, Edward M., 247, 248, 248n

Allen, J. J., 322

ALSOS Mission, 114

American Broach Co, 353

American Can Co., 19

American Chemical Society, 11, 29, 30

American Cyanamid Co., 57, 60, 61

American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), 6-7, 14, 52,

219

chemical laboratory, 9-12

flame thrower, 139

supplies furnished by British and French, 19, 26

American Laundry Machinery Co., 256, 330, 331

American Machine Defense Corp., 348

American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,

346

American Sheet and Tin Plate Co., 4

American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 287-88

American University Experiment Station, 5-8, 13,

24, 25, 31

Ammonia mask, 34

Ammonium chloride disposal, 425, 430

Amphibian Brigade, 4th, 82

Amphibious Corps, V, 137, 153

Amphibious operations

flame thrower, 156-57

gas mask for, 82-83

incendiary rockets, 195

mortar gunboat, 136-38

smoke, 198

Amphibious Training Command, Carrabelle, Fla.,

137

Analytical Department, Research Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30

Angaur Island, 137

Antiaircraft Artillery, gas mask requirements, 83,

84

Antidimming, 22

Antitank rifle grenade, M9A1, 221

Antitank tear gas rocket, 72
472 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Antonelli Fireworks Co., 361n

Apparatus for Toxicological Experiments project,

32

Appropriations

FY 1941, 250-54, 263

FY 1942, 343

peacetime, 32, 33, 36

Arkansas Ordnance Plant, Little Rock, Ark., 358

Armored Force, 84, 88, 89, 219, 337

Armored Force Board, 82, 84, 151, 152, 153, 162

Armored Medical Research Laboratory, 87, 165

Army Air Forces (AAF), 36, 268, 337, 377

airplane flame thrower, 163

airplane spray tests, 66

butane bomb project, 189

and chemical bombs, 55

colored smoke munitions requirement, 219, 220,

222

estimation of requirements, 275-76

gas mask requirement, 84

incendiary bombs, 174, 175, 178, 179, 181, 182,

183, 185, 348, 349

and incendiary shell development, 193

JB-2 flying bomb project, 224

Weary Willie project, 189-90

Army Board for Production Awards, 379

Army Ground Forces (AGF), 273

colored smoke munitions requirement, 219

eyeshield requirement, 89

gas mask requirement, 82, 83, 86

mortar requirement, 130

and tank mounted flame thrower, 152, 369

Army Industrial College, 227, 422

Army Medical Purchasing Office, N.Y., 95

Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB), 227,

246

advisory committee, 248, 249, 271

priority ratings, 259, 261, 280

Army Service Forces (ASF), 47, 107, 113, 272, 278,

279, 339, 349, 352

computation of requirements, 273, 274, 275, 276,

281

cutbacks, 329

demobilization planning, 412, 413, 415, 416,

419, 420, 425, 426, 427

depots, 382, 383, 397, 398, 399, 410

and 4.2-inch mortar shell procurement, 357, 358,

365, 366

inspection procedures, 288, 289

and optical mask, 326

postwar organization plan, 431, 432, 433, 435

procurement, 284, 290

and spare parts, 307

statistical control procedures, 297, 298, 303, 306,

stock control, 401-03

Army Service Forces—Continued

and tank mounted flame thrower, 152, 154, 159,

368, 369, 370, 371

Army Service Forces Circular 67, 7 March 1944,

303, 304

Army Service Forces Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team, 47, 113

Army Supply Program, 274, 276, 300, 357, 371,

413, 416

Aromatic carbamates research, 50

Arsenal and Depot Facilities Program, 250

Arsenal Operations Department, Edgewood Arsenal,

259

Arsenals. See also arsenals by name.

construction, 250-54, 256-58, 276-79

demobilization, 414, 415, 416, 417

planning, 234-37, 238, 241, 247, 252, 256

Arsenic trichloride, 270, 430

Arsenicals research, 50

Arsenöl, 66, 74

Arthur D. Little, Inc., 81, 169

Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations, 275,

304, 305

Assistant Chief, CWS, for Matériel, 287, 288, 291,

304, 305, 365, 366, 419

Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Matériel, Maintenance and Distribution, 276

Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations, Commitments and Requirements, 276

Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Plans), 107

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, ETO, 113

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, 103, 104,

105

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, WDGS, 250

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, WDGS, 228, 370

and plant construction, 236, 237, 238, 239, 250,

251, 252, 254

reviews requirements, 273, 274

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SOS, 402,

403

Assistant Secretary of War

industrial mobilization planning, 226, 227, 230,

231, 232, 238, 242, 246, 247, 252

pricing policies, 292

Astoria Light, Heat, and Power Co., 22

Atherton, H. F., 248n

Athletic Club House, Yale University, 8

Atlanta ASF Depot, 382, 410

Atlanta General Depot, 263, 398

Atlanta Chemical Warfare Procurement District,

286

Atlantic Division, Westinghouse Electrical Corp.,

369

Atlantic Elevator Co., 369

Atlas Ansonia, 358
INDEX 473

Attorney General of U.S., 249

Aubervilliers, France, filling plant, 15

Auld, Lt. Col. Samuel J. M., 7, 17n

Austin Bridge Co., 346

Australia

biological warfare intelligence, 113

chemical warfare tests, 46

gas masks for, 321, 408

Azeville, France, 143

Azochloramid protective ointment, 92

Bacillus bomb, Japanese, 115

Bacillus globigii, 109

Bacon, Col. Raymond F., 9, 10, 11

Bacon, William S., 22

Badger Fire Extinguisher Co., 339

Baker, Newton D., 13

Baker, Maj. Gen. Walter C., 247, 253, 256, 260

BAL (British antilewisite), 68, 93, 94, 95, 99

Baldwin, Ira L., 105

Baldwin Laboratories, 340

Balloons, Japanese, 115

Baltimore, Md., 253, 257, 277, 369

headquarters of Gas Offense Production Division,

World War I, 17

suboffice of Chief, CWS, 290

Baltimore Cargo Port of Embarkation, 410

Bangalore torpedoes, 41

Barium chromate, 270

Barium nitrate, 270, 344

Barker, Lt. Col. Maurice E., 103

Barnebey-Cheney Engineering Co., 244, 254, 254n,

320

Barnes, J. M., 114n

Baruch, Bernard, 419, 426

Baruch-Hancock Report, 419, 426

Bat incendiary project, 187-88

Bata Shoe Co., 281

Bataan, Philippine Islands, Japanese flame thrower

captured, 47, 146

Batavia Metal Products, Inc., 362, 364, 365, 366,

367, 379, 380, 421

Bauer and Black, 95

Bazooka rocket, 2.36-inch, 194, 195

Bean, John, Manufacturing Co., 337, 338

Beattie Manufacturing Co., 294, 367

Beck, Lawrence J., 368

Belknap, Charles, 248n

Bell Aircraft Ordnance Division, 416n

Bell Machine Co., 294, 352, 353, 354, 416n

Bellinger, Maj. Frederick, 224

Ben Hur Automobile Co., 67

Benicia Arsenal, Calif., 174

Berger, Capt. Ernest E. F., 200

Berger mixture, smoke agent, 197, 200, 205

Besler Corp., 212, 376

Bills of material, 281, 295

Biological Survey, CWS cooperative project with,

33

Biological warfare

CWS mission, 433, 434

defense, 115-20

definition, 102

detection of biological agents, 116

intelligence information, 101, 108, 112-15

intelligence service, 105, 106

liaison with British and Canadians, 101, 103,

104, 107, 111, 113, 121

research, 43, 101-22

Biological Warfare Center, CWS, 107

Biological Warfare School, Camp Detrick, 113

Biological Warfare Subcommittee, JCS, 107

Birmingham, England, incendiary air raid on, 178

Birmingham Plants, Birmingham, Ala., 278n, 416n

Bischoff, Ernest, Co., Inc., 340

Bizerte, 197, 212

Black, Col. H. M., 301

Blair, J. B., Co., 369

Bleaching powder

for Brazil, 408

procurement, World War II, 336, 393

storage, 391-93, 396

supply, World War I, 22, 336, 392

Blythe Colour Works, Cresswell, England, 256

Boll weevil research, 33, 102

Bomb, chemical

filled in World War II, 55, 57-58, 61, 65

German, 55, 58, 61, 66, 72

Japanese, 55, 58, 61, 66

M47, 100-pound mustard, 168, 170

M47A1, 100-pound mustard, 65, 170

M47A2, 100-pound mustard, 40, 65

M70, 115-pound mustard, 41, 65

M70A1, 115-pound mustard, 65

M78, 500-pound cyanogen chloride, 61

M78, 500-pound phosgene, 54-55

M79, 1,000-pound cyanogen chloride, 41, 61

M79, 1,000-pound hydrogen cyanide, 57-58

M79, 1,000-pound phosgene, 41, 54-55

procurement, 65

testing, 41, 57, 60

Bomb, incendiary. See Incendiary bomb.

Bomb, Japanese bacillus, 115

Bomb, JB-2 flying, 224

Bomb, Ordnance

AN-M30, 30-pound, 195

AN-M57, 250-pound, 195

M38A2, 100-pound, 223

Bomb, smoke. See Smoke munitions, bomb.

Bomber Command, XXI, 171, 186

Boosters, shell. See Shell boosters.

Boothby-Lovelace oxygen therapy apparatus, 97
474 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Borden, Brig. Gen. William A., 131, 370

Borneo, 218

Boston Chemical Warfare Procurement District,

230, 320, 326, 357, 398

Boston Port of Embarkation, 409

Botulinum toxin, 111, 117

Bougainville, 159

Brazil, lend-lease, 407, 408

Brigham, Maj. Gen. Claude E., 168, 234, 235, 236,

237, 239

Brightman, Maj. G. M., 17n

Brine wells, World War I, 17

Bristol Myers Co., 334

British Army, 46, 123, 153, 201

British Army, Third, 7

British Army Staff, 107

British Commonwealth, exchange of chemical warfare information with, 45-46

British Gas Warfare Mission, 7n

British ISCCW, 107

British Military Mission, World War I, 7

British Petroleum Warfare Department, 163

British Purchasing Commission (BPC), 45, 404

Bromine supplies, World War I, 17

Bromoacetone, 14

Bromobenzylcyanide, 14n, 17

Brown, E. C., Co., 294, 368

Brown, Weldon G., 76

Budd Wheel Co., 354

Building of Mines, Columbia University, 37

Buna Village, Papua, 139

Bundy, Harvey H., 103

Bureau of the Budget, U.S., 236, 250

Bureau of Chemistry, Agriculture Dept., 19

Bureau of Entomology, 32

Bureau of Fisheries, 33

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Dept., 103,

104, 109, 165

Bureau of Mines, Interior Dept., 22

chemical warfare organization transferred to War

Dept., 13

chemical warfare research, 1917-18, 2-8, 12, 14,

17, 26

gas mask research, 19

Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Dept., 107, 109-10.

156, 165, 187

Bureau of Yards and Docks, Navy Dept., 33

Burg, Anton B., 57, 60

Burma

Japanese equipment captured, 58, 164

U.S. equipment, 408

Burns, Col. James H., 228

Burrell, George A., 4, 5, 13

Burster

cylindrical, 65

HE-white phosphorus, 179, 180, 195

tetryl, 60

Bursting charges research, 24

Bushnell, Fla., experiment station, 40, 41

Buswell, A. M., 96

Butane bomb, incendiary project, 188-89

Butler, Walter, Co., 257

Cacodyl cyanide, toxic agent in Crimean War, 1

Calcium hypochlorite, 118

California, University of, 11, 19, 40, 60, 110

California Ink Co., 351

California Institute of Technology, 39, 72

Camp Detrick

activation, 108

and biological and chemical protection, 116, 119

biological warfare research, 108, 109, 110, 111,

112, 113, 120, 121

biological warfare school, 113

construction, 106-07, 277

security measures, 111-12

Camp Edwards, 79, 82

Camp Leach, 5

Camp McCoy, 355

Camp Paraiso, 40

Camp Polk, 87

Camp Sibert, 277, 309, 312, 388

Canada, 115

biological warfare liaison with U.S., 103, 107,

111, 113, 121

chemical warfare liaison with U.S., 45, 46

flame thrower, 151, 153, 165

purchase of U.S. chemical munitions, 407

testing of chemical munitions, 41

Canadian Department of Chemical Warfare and

Smoke, 107

Canadian Field Experimental Station, 46

Candles, smoke, 73, 74, 228

Canister, gas mask. See Gas mask canister.

Captured enemy equipment, 37

CWS study of, 46-48, 50n, 55, 58, 66, 76-77,

80, 146, 158

intelligence teams, 47, 113

Carbine, M1, 221

Carbon materials, for gas masks, 21-22

Carbon monoxide, 34, 76

Carbonyl chloride. See Phosgene.

Carey, W. Gordon, 17n

Caribbean Defense Command, 105

Carlisle Lumber Co., 244

Carlsbad Caverns, N. Mex., 187-88

Carnegie Institute of Technology, 19

Casco Products Co., 358

Casualties, British air raid, 178

Casualties, gas

headwound gas mask, 84-85

medical supplies, 93-96

medical treatment, 4, 29, 44, 97-100

World War I, 51, 62
INDEX 475

Caudle, Theron L., 367

Caustic soda, 272, 406-07

Cavalry, gas mask requirements, 84

Cavalry Board, 82, 90

CC-2 impregnite, 91, 120, 235

equipment, 329-32

manufacturing plants, 244, 254, 255, 272

production, 328-29

research, 91, 120, 329, 331, 332

Cecil, R. F., 356, 357

Celanese Corporation of America, 186

Central Pacific Area

enemy equipment intelligence teams, 47, 113

illuminating shell, 136

main armament flame thrower production, 153-

59, 161-63

Central Planning Section, Industrial Division, OC

CWS, 300

CG (carbonyl chloride). See Phosgene.

Chamberlain, Lt. Col. W. Hepburn, 404

Chance, Capt. Edwin M., 14, 15

Charcoal, 316. See also Whetlerite.

ASC, 60, 80, 320

coconut, 21, 80

in gas masks, 61, 80

plant construction, 244, 254-55, 259

procurement, 242, 245

research, World War I, 19, 21, 22

supplies, 228, 320

Charleston, S.C., Port of Embarkation, 409

Charleston Chemical Co., 17

Chaumont, France, gas warfare experimental field,

12

Chemical Advisory Committee, ANMB, 248, 249,

271

Chemical artillery shells. See Shells, chemical.

Chemical bomb. See Bomb, chemical.

Chemical Commodity Division, OC CWS, 270,

295, 407

Chemical Construction Co., 61

Chemical cylinder. See Cylinder, chemical.

Chemical Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 29, 30

Chemical grenade. See Grenade, chemical.

Chemical Laboratory Companies. See Laboratory

Companies.

Chemical maintenance companies, 142, 310

Chemical Manufacture Section (American University), 6

Chemical mortar. See Mortar, chemical, 4.2-inch.

Chemical mortar battalions. See Mortar battalions,

chemical.

Chemical plants, construction planning, 234-37,

247

Chemical processing companies, 331

Chemical Research and Development Division,

Edgewood Arsenal, 29, 30

Chemical Research Section (American University),

6

Chemical rocket. See Rocket, chemical.

Chemical Section, ASF Depot, 382, 383

Chemical Section, Central Pacific Area, 156, 157

Chemical Section, Industrial Division, OC CWS.

270

Chemical section, port of embarkation, 409, 410

Chemical Section, USAFPOA, 162

Chemical Service Section, 9, 12, 13

Chemical service trailer, 269

Chemical service truck, 269

Chemical shells. See Shells, chemical.

Chemical smoke generator companies, 209

Chemical Warfare Board, 35, 38, 84, 337

established, 30

incendiary shell, 135

mortar design, 130, 131

Chemical Warfare Branch Committee, 29

Chemical Warfare Center (CWC), 389, 416

Chemical Warfare School, 38, 253, 254

Chemical Warfare Section, ASF Enemy Equipment

Intelligence Service Team, 47, 113

Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), 8

appropriations, 32, 33, 36, 250-55, 343

biological warfare responsibility, 102, 104, 106-

08, 433, 434

contract authority, 259, 282

demobilization, World War I, 24-27

established, 12-13

HE mission, 126, 240

incendiaries, development responsibility, 167,

168, 172-73, 389

organization, 28-31, 287

peacetime supply program, 227-40

permanent branch of Army, 24

postwar role and mission, 431-35

Chemical Warfare Service-MIT Development Laboratory. See Development Laboratory, CWSMIT.

Chemical Warfare Technical Committee (CWTC),

35

established, 28-29, 30

main armament mechanized flame thrower, 150

scientific program, 1920, 31

Chemicals

lend-lease requirements, 404-08

procurement, 54, 61, 71, 198, 215, 220, 269-72,

283, 294-95, 404-08

Chemistry Committee, NRC, 3

Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad, 277

Chicago, Ill., 375, 376

gas mask assembly plant, 244

mortar manufacture, 352, 354

warehouse leasing, 381
476 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Chicago, University of

chemical warfare research, 8, 9, 19, 61, 75, 76,

97

NDRC toxicity laboratory, 45, 49, 53

Chicago District Field Office, Bureau of Internal

Revenue, 365

Chicago Ordnance District, 379

Chicago Procurement District, 114, 230, 326, 334,

339, 372

airplane smoke tanks, 376

and 4.2-inch mortar program, 352, 353, 354,

357, 360, 363, 364

gas mask distribution, 398, 404

smoke generators, 375, 376

Chief, Chemical Corps, 421

Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, 30, 35, 168. See

also Porter, Maj. Gen. William N.

and machine tool shortage, 260

and plant construction, 250, 252, 253, 256, 257,

258, 278, 279

procurement planning, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239,

242, 243, 244, 247, 270, 271, 280, 283

Chief, Intelligence, CWS, 113

Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War Dept.,

107

Chief Chemical Officer, ETO, 113

Chief Chemical Officer, USAFFE, 47, 139, 146-47

Chief of Naval Operations, 188

Chief of Ordnance, 343

Chief of Staff, ASF, 107

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 10, 107

demobilization planning, 412

and incendiary bomb program, 257

industrial mobilization planning, 232, 235, 236,

237, 239, 250, 251, 256

and mortar battalions, 352

postwar organization, 432

Chief Surgeon, ETO, 84, 113

Chief of Transportation, 408

China, lend-lease, 408

China-Burma-India Theater, 411

biological warfare intelligence, 106, 113

enemy equipment intelligence teams, 47

incendiary shell requirements, 193

lend-lease supplies, 408

Chindwin River, Japanese equipment captured, 58

Chlorine, 92

German gas attack at Ypres, 2, 77

German plants, 48

manufacture, World War I, 14, 16, 17, 49, 270

procurement, 270-72

protective equipment, 61-62

S-330 compound, ointment, 93

toxic agent in Civil War, 1

Chlorine Institute, 271

Chloroacetophenone, 34, 70-73, 74, 228

Chloropicrin, 14, 16, 17, 19, 60, 80

CIOS. See Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee.

City slicker incendiary, 187

Civil War, U.S., chemical shell, 1

CK (cyanogen chloride). See Cyanogen chloride.

Clark, W. Mansfield, 105

Clayton Manufacturing Co., 376

Clemson College, 33

Cleveland Hospital Clinic, 34

CN (chloroacetophenone). See Chloroacetophenone.

CNB toxic filling, 133

CNS toxic filling, 133

Coast Artillery Corps, gas mask requirements, 83,

84

Cochrane, Admiral Thomas, 1

Collective Protection Department, Protective Development Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Collective protectors, 37, 87-88, 117, 118

M1A1, 87

M2A1, 87

M3, 87

procurement, 228, 327

Colored smoke. See Smoke, colored.

Columbia University, 168, 211

CWS laboratory, 37, 38, 41, 131, 351, 352

and napalm manufacture, 351, 352

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 45, 274

Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee

(CIOS), 48

Combined Raw Materials Board, 406

Combined shops, ASF, 311

Commanding General, ASF. See Somervell, Lt.

Gen. Brehon B.

Commanding Officer, Edgewood Arsenal, 235

Commerce, Department of, marine piling investigation, 33

Committee on Insect and Rodent Control, OSRD,

225

Committee on Insect and Rodent Control, U.S.

Army, 225

Committee on Marine Piling Investigation, NRC,

33

Committee on Medical Research (CMR), 92, 99

Committee on Medicine, NRC, 44

Committee on Treatment of Gas Casualties

(CTGC), 44, 92, 99

Committees, Congressional. See U.S. Congress.

Conant, James B., 42

Construction Division, OC CWS, 279

Containers, chemical, 267, 269

Contract Settlement Act, 1944, 419, 420

Contract Settlement Review Team, CWS, 421, 423

Contract termination, 25, 312, 413, 417-23, 425

Contract Termination Branch, Purchases Division,

ASF, 419
INDEX 477

Contractors, criminal involvement of, 361-67

Contracts, 277, 309

biological warfare research, 105

educational orders, 239, 242-44, 245, 246, 252,

255, 282, 283, 293, 314, 315, 317, 322, 340

negotiation, 282

procurement, 174, 241, 242, 243, 244, 257, 258,

259, 280, 282-86, 289-96, 300, 315, 333, 334,

335, 343-44, 348-49, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355,

356, 357, 358, 363, 369, 371, 372, 373, 375,

376, 414

renegotiation, 289-96, 365-67

research and development, 42-45, 53, 57, 60, 61,

63, 80, 99, 148, 151, 332, 333, 336

termination, 25, 312, 413, 417-23, 425

Control Division, ASF, 401, 432

Control Division, OC CWS, 275, 298, 300, 307,

412, 415

Control Section, Paris Laboratory, AEF, 11

Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), 278, 281, 282

Copthorne, Col. William A., 139

Corps Area supply, 398-401

Corps of Engineers. See Engineers, Corps of.

Corrosion problem, 43, 50, 62, 170, 387, 391, 392,

393, 394

Cost Analysis Branch, Fiscal Division, OC CWS,

290

Council of National Defense, 42, 103, 246, 248,

251, 255

Craig, General Malin, 232, 237

Crane Co., 352

Crete, German parachute drop, 218

Crimean War, 1

Critical Item Program, 250

Critical materials. See Raw materials shortage.

Cromartie, William J., 114n

Cummings, Col. Samuel N., 270

Cummings Construction Co., 253

Current Procurement Branch, Procurement Division, OASW, 226

Cyanogen chloride, 58-61

bomb testing, 39, 41, 60

CWS munitions, 61, 133

detectors, 76

gas mask protection, 60, 80

German munitions, 61

Japanese munitions, 61

procurement, 61

research, 58-61

Cylinder, chemical

portable, 54, 228

procurement, World War I, 18

research and development, 32

DA (diphenylchloroarsine). See Diphenylchloroarsine.

Dallas Chemical Warfare Procurement District,

286, 319, 324, 357, 372

DANC (decontaminating agent, noncorrosive), 118,

336, 337

David Bradley Manufacturing Division, Sears Roebuck and Co., 357

Davis Emergency Equipment Co., 95

Day and Night Manufacturing Co., 357

Decontaminating agents, 22, 118, 269, 272, 336,

337, 391-93, 408

Decontaminating apparatus

maintenance, 310, 312

procurement, 336-39

DEF Committee, 107

Defandorf, Lt. Col. James H., 102n, 103, 105

Defense Plant Corporation (DPC), 224, 345

Demobilization, industrial. See Industrial demobilization.

Demobilization, World War I, 24-27

Demobilization Planning Branch, Control Division,

OC CWS, 412, 413, 415

Denues, Lt. Arthur R. T., 127

Denver, Colo., arsenal, 277

Depot distribution system. See Distribution system,

CWS.

Depot storage, 263-65, 297-306, 381-93

bleaching powder, 391-93

fork-lift trucks, 384, 390

incendiary bombs, 381, 382, 389-91

packing and packaging, 393-97

palletization, 384, 385, 390

toxics, 386-89

Derby, H. L., 248n

Deseret Chemical Warfare Depot, Utah, 277, 302,

382, 384, 385, 386

regional supply, 399, 401, 410

storage of toxics, 386

Desert Warfare Board, 88

Design Department, Engineering Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Detection, biological warfare, 101, 115-18

Detection, chemical warfare

equipment, German, 37, 76-77

equipment, Japanese, 37, 77

equipment, U.S., 75-76, 334, 335, 341

research projects, 42, 43, 75-76

Detectors, gas. See Gas detector equipment.

Detrick Field, 107, 108

Development Division, CWS, 13

Development Laboratory, CWS-MIT, 63, 81, 82,

86, 87

construction, 36-37

flame thrower research, 143, 165

gas detector kits, 75, 76, 77, 335

synthetic rubber research, 322, 324

toxic agent research, 52-53, 63
478 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

DeVilbiss Co., 212

Dewey, Bradley, 4, 19

Dewey and Almy Chemical Co., 333

Diamond T Co., 268

Dichloramine-T, protective ointment, 92, 95

Diphenylaminechloroarsine. See Adamsite.

Diphenylchloroarsine, 17, 73, 74

Diphosgene, 52, 53, 54

Director of Demobilization, ASF, 412

Director of Intelligence, ASF, 47

Director of Production, ASF, 278, 289

Dirigible and Balloon Gas Section (American University), 6

Distribution Division, ASF, 312

Distribution system, CWS, 262-65, 297-306, 397-

411

Corps Area supply, 398-401

lend-lease, 403-08

maintenance and reclamation, 309-13

ports of embarkation, 399, 401, 402, 408-11

spare parts, 306-09

stock control, 401-03

Ditto, Brig. Gen. Rollo C., 256, 291, 304, 366

Division 3, NDRC, 132

Division 9, NDRC, 43, 61

Division 10, NDRC, 43, 60

Division 11, NDRC, 43

Division B, NDRC, 42

Division of Engineering and Industrial Research,

NRC, 33

Division of Medical Sciences, NRC, 44

Divisions. See Infantry divisions.

DM (adamsite). See Adamsite.

Doolittle, Lt. Col. James H., 174, 258n

Doolittle bombing raid on Japan, 115, 174-75

Doughty, John W., 1

Douglas Aircraft Co., 216

Dow, Louis S., Co., 358

Dow, Willard H., 248n

Dow Chemical Co., 17, 95

HC smoke mixture production, 371

impregnite plant, 255, 328

magnesium production, 345, 346

Doxey, Lt. Col. Thomas A., Jr., 275

Drop bombs, 228

DTH (dithioglycerol), 68, 99

Duck River Plant, Columbia, Tenn., 278n, 416n

Dugout blankets, 22

Dugout-blanket oil, 22

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, 108, 109

established, 39, 277

testing, 39-41, 54, 57, 59-60, 61, 66, 185, 189,

378

DUKW, 158

Duncan, Lt. Col. Lyman C., 305

Du Pont, Lammot, 248n

Du Pont de Nemours, E. I., & Co., 53, 57, 71, 95,

99, 277, 336

gasoline thickener research, 169

hexachloroethane production, 372

impregnite plants, 255, 328, 331

Dust respirators, 89-90, 340

Dyer, Dr. Rolla E., 105

E awards, 379-80

East St. Louis, Ill., impregnite plant, 255, 328

Eastern Chemical Warfare Depot (Edgewood), 174,

306, 309

regional supply, 397, 398, 399, 401, 410

stocks of war reserves, 227, 229

storage space, 381, 382, 384, 385

toxic storage, 386, 388

Eastes, Capt. J. W., 64

Eastman Kodak Co., 352

Eddy, Maj. John L., 307

Edgewood, Md., filling plant, World War I, 14, 23

Edgewood Arsenal, Md., 35, 79, 92, 93, 94, 95,

256, 269, 277, 307, 309, 353, 375

biological warfare research, 102-03, 108

collective protector manufacture, 87

demobilization, 415, 416, 424

established, 14n, 16

flame thrower tests, 140, 157, 162

gas manufacture, 52, 53, 63, 64, 69, 70, 71, 73,

270, 271, 272, 416

gas mask factory, 25-26, 229, 237-40, 251, 259,

314, 315, 317, 326, 415

guard and security unit, 388-89

impregnite manufacture, 91, 255, 328

incendiary bomb development, 174, 185, 189,

258

inspection, 261, 262

laboratory construction, 36-38, 41

liaison with NDRC, 43

manufacturing plants, 234-40, 247, 250-54, 255,

258, 259, 260, 328

marine piling investigation, 33

mortar tests, 129, 132, 353, 354, 355, 356

munitions filling, 71, 72, 74, 350, 351, 358, 372,

377

procurement, 229, 230, 233, 331, 374

reorganization, 29-31

research, 31-34, 50, 75, 99, 243, 352

smoke munitions development, 213, 217, 220

storage facilities, 263, 381, 382, 384, 385, 386,

398, 399

study of captured enemy equipment, 47, 146

in World War I, 14-18, 25, 51, 52, 253

Edgewood Arsenal Machine Shop, 416

Edgewood Depot. See Eastern Chemical Warfare

Depot.
INDEX 479

Editorial Department, Information Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Educational Order Program, 263, 265

Educational orders, 239, 242-44, 245, 246, 247,

252, 255, 262, 263, 265, 282, 283, 293, 314,

315, 317, 318, 340

Eglin Field, Fla., 185, 224

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 89, 432

Electrolux Co., 327

Empire Stove Co., 377

End-item contracting system, 286, 300

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team, ASF,

47, 113

Engineer Board, 140, 149

Engineering Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30, 31,

235

Engineers, Corps of, 88, 190, 257, 279, 427

chemical warfare function transferred to CWS,

12-13

flame thrower requirement, 140

postwar mission, 432

water purification responsibility, 96, 110

Engineers, 544th, 82

Engineers Limited, 257

English, Brig. Gen. Paul X., 259, 362, 363, 364,

425

Eniwetok, 198

Entomology, Bureau of, 32

Equipment, CWS development procedure, 34-36

Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., 357, 358-59, 362,

363, 364, 365, 366, 379, 380, 421

Essential Item Program, 250

Esso, 211

Estes, Lt. Col. Robert M., 290, 365, 366

Ethiopia, Italian invasion of, 168, 240

Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co., 326

European Division, CWS, 13

European Theater of Operations (ETO), 411

biological warfare intelligence, 113

enemy equipment intelligence teams, 47, 113

flame thrower use, 143, 160

headwound mask requirement, 84-85

incendiary air raids, 170-71, 183

incendiary shell, 135, 193

neoprene gas mask, 323

smoke use, 197

Evans Chemetics, Inc., 333, 335

Executive Order 9001, 282

Experiment Station, SurHeld. Canada, 165

Explosive bomb. See Incendiary bomb.

Eye solution, M1, 95, 99

Eyeshields, protective, 88, 89, 340

Facilities disposition, 25, 26, 62-63, 413, 415-17,

424

Facilities and Engineering Branch, Industrial Division, OC CWS, 279

Facilities and Requirements Branch, Industrial Division, OC CWS, 279, 412

Farquhar, A. B., Co., 337, 338

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 104, 105,

261

Federal Security Agency, 104

Fencil, William M., 360

Fencil, William M., Manufacturing Co., 358, 360

Ferro Drier and Chemical Co., 352

Ferro Enamel Corp., 349, 351, 374, 416n

Field Artillery, 84, 88

Field Artillery Board, 134

Field Intelligence Army, Technical (FIAT), 48

Field laboratories, 116, 228

M1, 38, 39

M2 base, 37, 39

M3 mobile, 39, 76

Field Requirements Branch, Operations Division,

OC CWS, 275

Field Requirements Division, OC CWS, 275, 306,

307, 412

Field Testing Department, Engineering Division,

Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Fieldner, Arno G., 4

Fifth Army, U.S., 147, 213

Fildes, Dr. Paul, 104, 111n

Filling Plant No. 1, Edgewood, Md., 15

Filling plants, construction planning, 235

Filter paper, gas mask, 81, 244, 245

Finance Office, OC CWS, 299

Finkelstein, Dr. Leo, 32

Firelands Plants, Marion, Ohio, 278n, 348, 349,

350, 416, 416n

Firestone Rubber and Latex Products Co., 244,

316, 320, 322, 324, 326

Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 148, 245

First Army, U.S., 213

First Chemical Laboratory Company, 38

First Gas Regiment, 12, 26, 123

First-aid kit, gas casualty, 95

Fiscal Division, OC CWS, 274, 290, 421, 423

Fiscal and Planning Division, OC CWS, 274

Fisher, Chester G., 9

Fisher Scientific Co., 9, 10

FitzGerald, Maj. Philip J., 298, 300

Flame attack, toxicology, 165-66

Flame Thrower Tank Battalion, 713th Provisional,

155

Flame throwers

auxiliary mechanized, 159-62, 165, 369-70

Canadian Ronson, 151, 153, 154

cart-mounted, 149

emplaced, 163-64

El portable, 140
480 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Flame throwers—Continued

E1R1 portable, 140, 141, 146

E2 portable, 144

E3 portable, 144

E4-5 auxiliary, 369

E5R2-M3 bow, 160

E7 main armament, 152n

E12-7R1 main armament, 370, 371

German, 146, 148, 149, 150, 158, 160, 161, 162,

164

incendiary projector for airplanes, 163

Japanese, 47, 48, 146, 147

main armament mechanized, 150-59, 162, 165,

370-71

manifold portable, 149-50

medium weight, 149-50

M1 portable, 142, 143, 146

M1A1 portable, 143, 146, 162, 312, 368

M2-2 portable, 145, 146, 155, 312, 368

M3-4-3 bow, 160, 369

M3-4-E6R3 periscope, 160, 369

M5-4 main armament, 152

one-shot, 147-49

portable, 139-47, 149, 150, 162, 165, 293, 367-

69, 408

procurement, 160, 240, 284, 293-94, 367-71

production in Hawaii, 153-59, 161-62

Q model, 151, 152, 156

research and development, 43, 139-66

servicing, 164-65

standardization with British, 46

two-man, 149

Flanders, German gas attack, 1915, 51

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 155

Florida Experiment Station, Gainesville, Fla., 33

Flory, E. L., 78

Fluoroacetates research, 50

FM smoke agent, 135, 215, 218, 406

Food testing kit, 96

Foote Brothers Gear and Machine Co., 354

Ford Motor Co., 375

Fork-lift trucks, 384, 390

Formosa, 154

Forrestal, James, 249n

Fort Atkinson, Wis., 377

Fort Hoyle, Md., 247

Fort Knox, Ky., 162

Fort Mills, Philippine Islands, 146

Fostoria Plant, Fostoria, Ohio, 255, 259, 320

Fothergill, Comdr. Leroy D., 105

France, 307. See also French Army.

Allied invasion, 83, 143

biological warfare research, 114

chemical warfare liaison with U.S., 7, 17, 18,

200

U.S. laboratory in Paris, 10-12

Frank Hemingway, Inc., 17

Frankford Ordnance Arsenal, 355

Fred, Edwin B., 103, 104, 107

FRED Project, 224

Frederick, Md., Camp Detrick near, 107, 111-12

French Army. See also France.

Berger smoke agent, 197, 200

gas masks for U.S. troops, 19, 26, 78

use of toxic agents, 55-56, 59, 70

French High Commission, 15, 17n

Friend Manufacturing Co., 337

Fries, Maj. Gen. Amos A., 10, 11-12, 14

and flame thrower, 139

heads CWS, 28, 29, 31

and incendiary materials, 167

research program, 31, 124

FS smoke agent, 215, 216, 218, 407

FS smoke shell, 135, 136

Fumigation mask, 34

Furgeson Co., H. K., 277

Fuzes

influence, 43

mortar shell, 358-61

Fyr-Fyter Co., 33P

G-2. See Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS.

G-3. See Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, WDGS. G-4. See Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, WDGS.

G-agents. See Nerve gases.

Gar Wood Associates, Inc., 268

Garsson, Henry M., 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366,

431

Garsson, Murray, 361, 364, 365, 366

Gas alarms, 228

Gas casualties. See Casualties, gas.

Gas casualty first-aid kit, 95

Gas casualty treatment kits, 93-95

Gas defense equipment

procurement, 18-22, 23, 314-41

research and development, 75-100

Gas Defense Production Division, CWS, 13, 19, 20,

21

Gas Defense Service, Medical Department, 9

Gas detector equipment

captured enemy, 37, 76, 77

M4 vapor detector kit, 75, 76, 334, 335

M5 liquid vesicant detector paint, 75, 341

M6 liquid vesicant detector paper, 75, 341

M7 vesicant detector crayon, 75, 341

M9 chemical agent detector kit, 75, 76, 77, 335

M10 chemical agent analyzer kit, 76

M11 smoke identification kit, 76

M12 agent sampling kit, 76

MIT-E12 agent sample collection kit, 76

procurement, 18-22, 23, 314-41
INDEX 481

Gas mask, 32, 224, 309

American C.E., 78

animal, 86-87

biological warfare, 118-19

civilian, 85-86, 317-18, 321

design standardization with British, 46

development, World War I, 3, 4, 78

diaphragm, 84, 229n, 326

distribution, 264, 265, 398

educational orders, 242, 243, 244, 283, 293, 314,

315, 317, 318, 322

fully molded facepiece, 79, 243, 316, 317

German, 48, 59, 86, 87

headwound, 84-85, 326

impermeable headpiece, 119

infant protector, 86

inspection, 262, 327-28

Italian, 48

Japanese, 48, 59, 86

manufacture, 25-26, 37, 78, 227, 228, 229, 251,

259, 293, 314-28, 415

Mickey Mouse, 86

MI-I-I, 78

M1A2-9A1-4, 78, 316, 317

M2A1-1-1 training, 81, 316

M2A2, 325

M3-10A1-6, 319, 323, 325

M4-10A1-6, 325

M5-11-7 combat, 83, 119, 323, 324, 325

M8-11-10 snout-type, 325

neoprene, 323, 325

optical, 83, 323, 326

procurement, World War I, 18-22

procurement, World War II, 314-28

procurement planning, 233, 234, 236, 237-40,

242

reconditioning program, 325

research, 42, 44, 77-87, 118-19, 243, 321-22

R.F.K. box respirator, 78

salvage program, 427, 428

service. See Gas mask, service, type of.

storage, 263

tests, 79, 82

and toxic agents, 59, 60, 61, 62, 68, 73, 74, 80,

204

training in M2A1-1-1, 81, 316

transfer to British, 404

Zapon-type, 85

Gas mask, service, types of.

M1-1-1, 78

M1A2-9A1-4, 78, 316, 317

M2A2, 325

M3-10A1-6, 319, 323, 325

M4-10A1-6, 325

M5-11-7 combat, 83, 119, 323, 324, 325

M8-11-10 snout-type, 325

Gas mask canister, 32, 73, 74, 119

design standardization with British, 46

enemy, 59

M9A1, 80

M9A2, 80, 81

M10A1, 81

M11 aluminum, 82, 84, 324, 325

procurement, 19, 21, 228, 242, 244, 317, 319,

320

research, 79-81

Gas Mask Department, Protective Development Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Gas Mask Examination Section (American University), 6

Gas Mask Industry Technical Committee, 322, 323

Gas Offense Production Division, CWS, 13, 17-18

Gas Regiment, First, 12, 26, 123

Gas Service, AEF, 10, 10n

Gas Service, U.S. Army, 12-13

Gasoline thickener, for incendiaries, 168-70, 179,

180, 183, 184, 192, 193, 350-52

Gasproof shelter, 87, 117

Gellman, Allen B., 363

Gendar, Paeschke and Frey Co., 375

General Accounting Office, U.S., 293

General Aniline and Film Co., 224

General Detroit Corp., 339

General Electric Co., 19, 211, 287, 349

General Headquarters, Air Force, 168

General Staff, War Department. See War Department General Staff.

General Tire and Rubber Co., 243

Geneva Gas Protocol, 1925, 102

German Air Force

AC spray tests, 58

incendiary bomb, 172, 178, 179, 181

German Army, 91. See also Germany.

biological warfare defense, 114

captured equipment of, 37, 47, 55, 59, 66, 69,

70, 72, 73, 74, 80, 133

chemical mortars, 129--30, 132

chemical shells, 133, 134, 135

collective protectors, 88

decontaminants, 93, 95, 96

eyeshields, 89

flame throwers, 146, 148, 149, 150, 158, 160,

161, 162, 164

gas attacks, World War I, 2, 51, 77

gas detector, 76-77

gas masks, 48, 59, 77, 82, 86, 87

gasplane, 90

incendiary munitions, 171, 172, 192, 194

phosgene bomb stocks, 55

rocket program, 107

smoke munitions, 197, 200, 204-05, 214, 223

toxic agents, 62, 66, 73
482 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Germany, 18, 187, 414. See also German Army.

biological warfare preparation, 101, 106, 112,

114, 115

chemical production, World War II, 74

discovers nerve gases, 50, 50n, 55, 76

incendiary raids on, 170-71

U.S. study of chemical information in overrun

areas, 48, 58, 74

Gilchrist, Maj. Gen. Harry L., 36

Gillet, Maj. Norman D., 259, 263

Goodrich Co., B. F., 19, 319, 324

Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 243, 244, 262,

319, 320, 324

Goop, 180, 430

Government-owned, contractor-operated plants

disposition, 414, 416, 416n

World War I, 17, 25

World War II, 61, 254-55, 277, 320, 345, 372

Government-owned, government-operated plants

construction, 255-58, 276-79

disposition, 414, 415, 416, 416n, 417

peacetime, 25

and procurement planning, 234-37

Grand Sheet Metal Co., 375

Granite Peak, Utah, testing station, 108, 109

Great Britain, 132, 153, 186

biological warfare preparation, 101, 103, 104,

107, 113, 121

chemical warfare liaison with U.S., 7, 17, 23, 45,

46, 66, 100, 200, 220, 249, 262

chemical warfare research, 18, 41, 50, 66, 67, 68,

69, 75, 80, 169, 192

eyeshields and protective covers, 88, 90

flame throwers, 163-64

gas masks, 19, 26, 46, 78, 80, 82

lend-lease requirements, 172, 173, 177, 185, 404-

06

smoke generators, 209-10

Stokes mortar, 123

Greene, L. W., 256

Gregory, T. D., 17n

Grenade, chemical, 32, 123, 228

AC filled, 58

CN filled, 70, 71, 72

M6, 72

M7, 71, 220

Grenade, incendiary, See Incendiary grenade.

Grenade, smoke. See Smoke munitions, grenade.

Grenade filling plant, 16, 37

Grenade launchers, 221

Guadalcanal, 58, 142, 159

Guam, 145, 218

Guiberson Co., 357

Gulf Chemical Warfare Depot (Huntsville), 381,

382, 384, 386

regional supply, 399, 401, 410

storage of toxics, 386, 388

Gulf of Mexico, mustard gas bomb dumping, 431

Gun Division, OCO, 14

Gunpowder Neck Reservation, 14n

H (mustard gas). See Mustard gas.

Haber, Fritz, 2

Hamilton, Col. Stuart A., 47, 146

Hammond, Brig. Gen. Thomas S., 379-80

Hamor, William A., 9

Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, 409

Hancock, John, 419, 426

Hankar, Lt. Raoul E., 15. 17n

Hanlon, 2d Lt. Joseph T., 12

Hanlon Field, France, 12

Harbin, Manchuria, 115

Hardwicke Etter Co., 357

Harshaw Chemical Co., 352

Harvard University, 169

Harvard University Medical School, 165

Haslar smoke generator, 209, 210

Hawaii Sugar Planters' Association, 33

Hawaiian Department, antibiological warfare program, 105, 110

Hawaiian Islands

depot storage, 263, 265

flame thrower production, 153-59, 161-63

stocks of war reserves, 227

HC (hexachloroethane) smoke agent, 180, 203, 205,

206, 207, 208

procurement, 270, 371-73, 406

research, 200-202

toxicity, 204

HD (distilled mustard gas). See Mustard gas.

HE. See High explosive.

Headquarters Detachment I, Chemical Warfare

Center, Edgewod Arsenal, 389

Heckethorne Manufacturing Co., 358

Heil Co., 376

Henderson, Yandell, 4, 8

Henze, C., 114n

Hero Manufacturing Co., 20

Hexachloroethane smoke agent. See HC smoke

agent.

Hexamethylenetetramine (HMT), 97, 100

Hickman, Dr. C. N., 132

High explosive (HE)

bomb, 167, 171, 178, 179, 186

mortar shell. See Shells, high explosive.

rocket, 196

Hildebrand, Joel H., 11

HMT (hexamethylenetetramine), 97, 100

HN (nitrogen mustard). See Nitrogen mustard.

Hoboken Port of Embarkation, 10

Kofer, J. W., 114n

Honolulu Iron Works, 154

Hooker Electrochemical Co., 371
INDEX 483

Horn Island testing station, 108, 109

Horse masks, 23, 86

Houdaille-Hershey Co., 352

House Committee on Military Affairs. See U.S.

Congress.

Howitzer shells, hydrogen cyanide, 57

Hulett, Professor George A., 7

Huntsville Arsenal, Ala., 114, 286, 301, 302, 309,

310, 374

construction, 256, 258, 277, 343

demobilization, 415

depot storage, 263, 381, 382, 384, 386

fifth echelon maintenance shop, 312

incendiary bomb production, 347, 348, 349, 350

mortar tests, 354, 355

munitions filled, 71, 72, 358, 372, 373, 377

toxic agent production, 52, 64, 68, 272, 388

Hurd, Col. Lester W., 279

Hydril Corp., 356

Hydrocyanic acid. See Hydrogen cyanide.

Hydrogen chloride, toxic agent in Civil War, 1-2

Hydrogen cyanide, 55-58

bomb testing, 39, 57-58

CWS munitions, 57-58

detectors, 76

fumigating gas, 33-34

gas mask protection, 60, 80

German munitions, 58

Japanese munitions, 58

procurement, 58

research, 55-58

World War I use, 14, 14n, 55-56

Hydrogen peroxide, German use as propellant, 48

Illinois, University of

chemical warfare research, 26, 64, 80, 96

NDRC laboratory, 199

Illinois Watch Case Co., 363

IM. See Isobutyl methacrylate.

Imperial Chemical Industries, 336

Imperial Paper and Color Corp., 351

Impregnating plants, procurement, 329-32

Impregnites

CC-2. See CC-2 impregnite.

plant facilities, 235, 244, 254-55, 256, 259, 329-

32

procurement, 228, 244, 328-29

research, 91, 120, 329, 331, 332

shoe, 244, 245, 339-40

XX-CC3, 329, 331

Incendiaries Branch, Technical Service, OC CWS, 342

Incendiary bomb, 142, 24

adapter, 176, 177

aimable clusters, 176-77, 179, 185, 390, 391,

395, 405

Incendiary bomb—Continued

AN-M50, 4-pound magnesium, 172, 173, 174,

175, 288, 344, 345-47, 350, 405

AN-M50A1, 4-pound, 173, 178

AN-M50A2, 4-pound, 173

AN-M50X, 4-pound, 178

AN-M50X-A1, 4-pound, 178

AN-M50X-A3, 4-pound, 178

AN-M52, 2-pound, 190

AN-M54, 4-pound steel-cased, 174, 175, 258n,

342-44, 418, 424

AN-M76, 500-pound, 180, 350

bat project, 187-88

British requirements, 405

butane project, 188-89

city slicker, 187

design standardization with British, 46, 172, 173,

177

development, 38, 168-90, 257, 389

explosive, 4-pound, 177-79, 186

fire bomb, 181, 182-83

five-hunderd pound, 179-81

German, 48, 181

Japanese, 181

leaf, 186-87

magnesium, 4-pound, 172-74, 184, 186

M47, 100-pound, 168, 170, 171, 350

M47A1, 100-pound, 170

M47A2, 100-pound, 170

M69, 6-pound oil, 45, 171, 184-86, 347-50, 375,

395, 405

M69X, 6-pound, 375

M74, 10-pound oil, 190, 348, 349, 375

Navy, 181

oil, 6-pound, 45, 171, 184-86

one-hundred pound, 168-72, 184

one-thousand pound, 181

procurement, 170, 174, 175, 240, 257, 270, 284,

294, 342-52, 418

steel-cased, 4-pound, 174-76

storage, 381-82, 389-91, 395-96

testing, 39, 174, 184, 189, 347

two-thousand pound, 181

Weary Willie, 189-90

Incendiary gels, 38, 350

Incendiary grenade

bursting type, 191

development, 190-92

fillings, 192

frangible type, 191

German, 192

Japanese, 192

Molotov Cocktail 191

procurement, 190

Incendiary materials research, 32, 43

Incendiary oils, 169
484 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Incendiary rocket

research and development, 194-96

2.36-inch bazooka, 194, 195

3.5-inch, 195

4.5-inch, 195

7.2-inch, 195

Incendiary-drop-bomb plant, construction, 16

India, 21, 46

Incendiary shells. See Shells, incendiary.

Indianapolis Chemical Warfare Depot, 306, 308,

309, 381, 382, 384, 386, 401

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 278

Industrial demobilization

contract termination, 417-23

facilities disposition, 415-17

planning, 412-15

surplus property, 424-31

World War I, 24-27

Industrial Division, OC CWS, 279, 287, 292, 298,

299, 308, 352, 365, 371, 392

Chemical Section transferred to N.Y., 270

demobilization plannings, 412, 413, 417, 425, 426

procurement role, 300, 301

Industrial Engineering Division, Edgewood Arsenal,

256

Industrial Liaison Branch, OC CWS, 288

Industrial mobilization

educational orders, 242-44, 245, 246, 247, 252,

255, 262, 263, 265, 282, 283

planning, 27, 226-40

prewar, 241-65

Industrial Mobilization Plan, 230, 231n, 241, 283

Industrial Mobilization Program, 423

Industrial Relations Division, OC CWS, 230

Industrial Service, OC CWS, 259, 261, 279, 298,

363

Industrial War Plans Division, OC CWS, 230

Infantry, 190

and British protective equipment, 88

dust respirators, 89

gas mask requirements, 84

Infantry Board, 82, 149

Infantry divisions

1st, 19, 20

7th, 159

10th Mountain, 86

27th, 153

38th, 153

81st, 137

Infantry regiments

7th, 218

15th, 218

19th, 143

35th, 142

Information Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30, 31

Information Division, OC CWS, 47

Initial Protective Force, 230, 251

Insecticides, 50

clothing impregnating, 332

research, 41, 44, 225

spray apparatus, 339

Inspection, 261, 262, 286-89, 295, 327-28, 360, 379

Inspection, Safety, and Proof Division, Edgewood

Arsenal, 261

Inspection Branch, Industrial Division, OC CWS,

287, 392

Inspection Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 233, 262

Inspection Division. OC CWS, 287, 288, 289, 299,

306, 327, 337, 360

Inspection Manual M608, ASF, 289

Inspection Manual M608, CWS, 289

Institute of Health, U.S. Public Health Service, 103

Intelligence, biological warfare, 101, 105, 106, 108,

112-15

Intelligence, chemical warfare

collecting teams, 47, 113

collection and use, 46-48, 50, 55, 58, 59, 61, 66,

69, 70, 72, 74, 76-77, 80, 146, 158

of incendiary raids on Europe, 187

Interchangeability with British, chemical items, 45-

46

Interior, Secretary of, 2

Internal Revenue, Bureau of, 365

International Aid Branch, OC CWS, 403

International Silver Co., 345

Inter-Service Committee on Chemical Warfare

(ISCCW), 107

Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 394

Iron carbonyl supply, 224-25

Isobutyl methacrylate (IM), gasoline thickener for

incendiaries, 169, 180, 181, 192

Italian Army, captured equipment of, 37, 48, 55

Italy, 40, 168, 197, 240, 307

flame thrower use in, 145, 149, 150, 158

4.2-inch mortar use in, 128

smoke use in operations in, 202, 207 212, 213,

218

Iwo Jima, 40, 55

flame throwers, 155, 162

mortar gunboats in assault, 137

James Manufacturing Co., 377

Japan, 240, 415. See also Japanese Army.

biological warfare preparation, 101, 106, 112,

114-15

chemical production, World War II, 74

incendiary air raids on, 115, 171, 174-75, 183,

185-86

U.S. invasion preparations, 155, 156, 349, 411, 414

Japanese Army, 61, 90

captured equipment of, 37, 48, 55, 58, 59, 61,

66, 67, 69, 72, 74, 77, 80, 86, 158
INDEX 485

Japanese Army—Continued

chemical shells, 133, 134

collective protectors, 88

decontamination kits, 93

flame throwers, 47, 146, 147, 158, 160, 164

gas detector equipment, 77

gas masks, 48, 59, 86

incendiaries, 171, 172, 181-82, 192, 194

mortars, 130, 133

protective capes, 90

smoke munitions, 200, 205, 223

and U.S. 4.2-inch mortar, 129, 130

Japanese Defense Intelligence Institute, Harbin,

Manchuria, 115

JB-2 flying bomb, 224

Jefferson Proving Ground, 184, 347

John Bean Manufacturing Co., 337, 338

Johns Hopkins University, 4, 19, 80, 105

Johns Hopkins University Medical School, 165

Johnson, Louis, 247

Johnson and Johnson Co., 244, 245

Joint Aircraft Committee, 172, 177

Joint Board, 236

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 107, 274

Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency, 113

Joint Termination Regulations, 420, 421, 422

Judge Advocate General, Office of, 42

Jungle warfare, 58, 61, 82

flame thrower for, 148, 149-50

testing of chemical munitions, 41, 46

Justice, Department of, 364, 367

Kabrich, Brig. Gen. William C., 132, 142-43

Kaiser, Henry J., 345

Kanawha Plant, South Charleston, W.Va., 278n,

372

Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Mo., 256, 416

Kansas Ordnance Plant, Parsons, Kans., 302, 358

Kellogg, M. W., Co., 370

Kemp Manufacturing Co., 369

Kershaw Contracting Co., C. G., 257

Kershaw, Heyer, Swinerton, and Walberg, 277

Kershaw, Swineston, and Walberg, 277

Keyes, Frederick G., 11

Kharasch, Morris S., 53, 61

Kincaid Manufacturing Co., 140, 294

King, Lt. Col. Ludlow, 392

Kirby. J. E., 336

Knudsen, William S., 251, 252

Kobe, Japan, incendiary air raids on, 175

Kops, Waldemar, 78

Kuhn, Col. Harry A., 271

Kwajalein, 159

La Mer, Victor, 211

Laboratories, field. See Field laboratories.

Laboratories, government

facilities, 36-41

research, World War I, 2-8, 9-12, 22-24, 51

research, World War II, 63, 64, 67, 69, 70, 73,

75, 79, 87, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 108, 109,

111-12, 116

Laboratories, industrial

research, World War I, 4, 9, 10, 19

research contracts, World War II, 41-45, 53, 60,

63, 81, 92, 95, 97, 99

Laboratories, university, 131, 351, 352

biological warfare research, 105, 106, 110, 116

CWS use of, 36-38

research, World War I, 4, 5, 8-9, 19, 26

research contracts, World War II, 41-45, 49-50,

53, 57, 60, 61, 63, 64, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82,

84, 86, 87, 96, 97, 105, 106, 143, 322, 324

Laboratory Companies

1st, 38

43d, 153, 154

Lake Erie Chemical Co., 7 1

Lake Ontario Ordnance Plant, 416, 416n

Lakehurst Proving Ground, 23, 26, 29, 38

Lambert Pharmacal Co., 95, 334

Land mines, chemical, 65, 123

Landing craft, mortar, 137-38

Langmuir, Irving, 211

Latimer, Wendell M., 60

LCI (landing craft, infantry), 135-38

LCI(M) (landing craft, infantry, mortar), 138

LCM, 156

LCT (landing craft, tank), 136, 195

LCVP, 156

Leaf, incendiary, 186-87

League of Nations Conference, 1924, 102

Lebkicher, Col. Harry, 114

Lederle Laboratories, Inc., 95

Legal Branch, OC CWS, 290, 365, 423

LeMay, Maj. Gen. Curtis, 186

Lempco Products Co., 356, 416n

Lend-lease, 398, 409

British, 173, 404-06

procurement for, 267, 403-08

reverse, 88, 336, 393

Russian, 406-07

Lend-Lease Act, 262, 267, 271, 403, 404

Lend-Lease Administrator, 405

LeSueur, Maj. H. R., 23

Levinstein process mustard gas, 62, 64, 387

Lewis, Gilbert N., 11

Lewis, Warren K., 4

Lewis, Dr. Winford Lee, 26, 67

Lewisite

Canadian purchase, 407

detectors, 75, 76

discovery, 26, 67
486 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Lewisite—Continued

gas mask protection, 60, 68, 80

manufacture, World War I, 17

manufacture, World War II, 67-68, 424, 430

mortar shells filled, 133

plant disposal, 424

research, 26, 67-69

Leyte Campaign, 143, 205

Lincoln, President Abraham, 1

Lindberg Engineering Co., 354

List of Supplies To Be Procured by CWS, 227, 230

Livens projectors, 18, 54, 59, 123, 227, 228

Locust extermination project, 32

London Inter-Service Sub-Committee on Biological

Warfare (ISSCBW), 107

Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, 409, 411

Losantin, 93, 96

Loucks, Brig. Gen. Charles E., 243, 365

Louis S. Dow Co., 358

Louisiana Ordnance Plant, Minden, La., 358

Lovett, Robert A., 432

Lucite, 66

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 402, 403

Luzon operation, 197

aerial smoke screen, 218

fire bombs, 183

flame throwers, 160

Japanese equipment captured, 158

Japanese use of smoke, 205

LVT, 153, 159

LVT-4, 157

MacArthur, General Douglas, 232, 370, 371

McBride, Capt. Louis M., 32, 124

McCoy, Maj. Gen. Frank S., 303

McCoy board, 303

McGean Chemical Corp., 351

Machine tools shortage, 242, 260, 295

McLaughlin, J. W., 248n

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 303, 432

McNarney directive, 303

McNutt, Paul V., 104

Magnesium

bomb program, 38, 172-74, 345-47. See also

Incendiary bomb.

procurement, 345

shortage, 174, 270, 343, 344, 345

Maintenance, 309-13

ASF policy, 307, 310, 311

combined shops, 311

fifth echelon, 309, 311-12

reclamation program, 310

Maintenance companies, chemical, 142, 310

Maintenance Division, ASF, 310

Maintenance repair sets, 269

Manila, Philippine Islands, 153

Manhattan Project, 111, 370

Manning, Van H., 2, 3, 4, 6, 13

Manufacturing Chemists Association, 247

Manufacturing and Supply Division, OC CWS, 229,

244

Mariana Islands

fire bomb use in, 183

flame thrower use, 145, 154, 156, 160

smoke, 198

Marienburg, East Prussia, incendiary attack on,

170-71

Marine Biological Laboratory, 9

Marine Corps, U.S., 188

CWS procurement for, 236

flame thrower use in Pacific, 142, 153, 154, 155,

156, 157, 369

gas mask requirements, 229

incendiary air raids, 183

Marine Division, 1st, 137

Marine Division, 3d, 159

Marine Piling Investigation project (1923), 33

Marion, Ohio, Firelands Plant, 278n, 348, 349, 350

Marquand, John P., 105, 106, 107

Marshall, General George C., 250, 251, 432. See

also Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Marshall Islands, 218

Marshall Plant, New Martinsville, W. Va., 278n,

372, 416

Mask, ammonia, 34

Mask, fumigating, 34

Mask, gas. See Gas mask.

Mason, L. E., Co., 345

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 4, 11

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, CWS laboratory, 36-37, 52-53, 63, 75, 76, 77, 81, 82,

86, 87, 143, 165, 322, 324, 335, 353

Materials handling equipment, 383-85

Matériel Demobilization Plan, Period I, CWS, 414,

415, 416

Matériel Planning Branch, OC CWS, 275, 304,

305, 308

Maury Plant, Columbia, Tenn., 278n

Maxwell, Dr. G. S., 32, 124

May, Rep. Andrew J., 361, 363, 364, 366

Mayo Clinic, 97

Mechanical Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 29, 30

Mechanical and Electrical Research and Development Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 29, 30

Mechanical Research Section (American University),

6

Mechanical Section, Paris Laboratory, AEF, 11

Medical Advisory Board, 8

Medical Consultants Division, SGO, 110

Medical Corps, U.S. Army, 88, 110, 341

Medical Department, Medical Division, Edgewood

Arsenal, 30

Medical Department, U.S. Army, 29, 97

biological warfare research, 104, 110
INDEX 487

Medical Department—Continued

chemical warfare research transferred to CWS, 13

gas casualty treatment kits, 94, 95

gas mask procurement, 19

medical research, World War I, 8-9, 12

postwar mission, 432, 434

procurement responsibility, World War I, 2, 14,

18-22

Medical Department, U.S. Navy, 28

Medical Department Board, 94

Medical Division, CWS, 13

Medical Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30

Medical Division, OC CWS

established, 28, 44

gas casualty treatment kits, 93, 95

represented on Technical Committee (CWSNDRC), 43

Medical Intelligence Division, OSS, 105

Medical research, chemical warfare, 8-9, 29

CWS mission, 433, 434

laboratory constructed, 36

in World War II, 44, 92, 97-100, 116-18

Medical Research Division, CWS, 44, 105, 108

Medical Research Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 29,

30, 102

Medical Research Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal, 99

Medical treatment

biological warfare protection, 116-18

gas casualties, 4, 29, 44, 97-100

Mediterranean Theater of Operations. 197, 411

enemy equipment intelligence teams, 47

flame thrower use, 143, 145

smoke use, 202, 207

Mellon Institute of Industrial Research, 4, 9, 356

Memphis, Tenn., 237, 340

arsenal planned for, 234

depot storage, 263

Memphis ASF Depot, 382, 410

Memphis General Depot, 382, 398, 410

Merck, George W., 104, 105, 107, 120, 248n

Merck Co., 95

MERCURY, 375

Mercury cells, German use in chlorine plants, 48

Mersol, 95

Meteorological research, 32, 44, 45

Methacrylate sheet scrap, 66

Mexico, 21

Michigan, University of, 8-9

Middle East theater, 106, 113

Midland, Mich., 345

impregnite plant, 255, 328, 329, 416, 416n

mustard gas plant, 17, 63

Midwest Chemical Warfare Depot (Pine Bluff), 382,

384

incendiary bomb storage, 390, 391

regional supply, 399, 401, 410

toxic storage, 386, 387, 388

Military attaches, 45, 46, 47, 106, 113, 249

Military Committee, NRC, 3

Military Appropriation Act of 1941, 251, 252, 263

Military Intelligence Service, 107

Mills, James E., 29, 32

Milwaukee Stamping Co., 244, 358, 417

Minden, La., ordnance plant, 358

Mines. See Land mines.

Minton, Brig. Gen. H. C., 278

Miscellaneous Section, Paris Laboratory, AEF, 11

Miticides research, 41, 225

Mobile, Ala., munitions ship unloading incident, 431

Mobilization, peacetime planning for, 226-40. See

also Industrial mobilization.

Mobilization Plans, War Dept., 231, 232, 235, 239

Molotov Cocktail, 191

Monsanto Chemical Co., 53, 92, 255, 328, 374

Montgomery, Col. Edward, 275

Mortar, chemical, 4.2-inch, 32, 38, 137, 224, 273

E37, 129

firing tables, 39

lend-lease, 408

M1, 125

M1A1, 126, 128, 294

M2, 128, 129, 294

M30, 129

procurement, 123, 228, 284, 294, 352-55, 415

research and development, 44, 45, 123-30

Mortar, chemical, recoilless, 131

Mortar, chemical, stokes

redesign, 124, 125, 126

stocks, 227, 228

in World War I, 123

Mortar, chemical, unusual design, 130-33

Mortar battalions, chemical, 123, 137, 352

Mortar gunboats, 136-38

Mortar shells, 4.2-inch. See Shells, 4.2-inch, mortar.

Mount Shasta, 40

Mountain Division, 10th, 86

Munchmeyer, Col. Louis W., 426

Munitions Assignments Board, 274

Munitions Department, Munitions Development

Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Munitions Development Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30, 31

Munitions Development Laboratory, NDRC, University of Illinois, 199

Munitions Program, 30 June 1940, 244-50, 251,

252, 254, 255, 262, 265, 282

Munson, Charles S., 248n

Mustard gas, 61-67. See also Nitrogen mustard;

Sulphur mustard.

Canadian purchase, 407

casualties, World War I, 62

CWS munitions, 41, 65, 133

detectors, 75, 76

gas mask protection, 60, 80
488 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Mustard gas—Continued

German munitions, 66

Japanese munitions, 66-67

Levinstein process, 62, 64, 387

manufacture, World War I, 14, 14n, 16, 17, 62,

63

manufacture, World War II, 37, 62, 63, 64, 74

mortar shells filled, 133

procurement planning, 236

research, 9, 37, 39, 61-67, 336

storage, 386, 387, 388

test of air-spraying, 39, 62, 65-66

thickener, 66

vacuum distillation process, 64

Myers, F. E., and Brothers Co., 337

Nadzab, New Guinea, 218

Nagoya, Japan, incendiary air raids on, 175

Napalm, 38, 45, 269

discovery, 169

in flame throwers, 142, 143, 152, 154, 155, 156,

158, 165

incendiary filling, 171, 181, 183, 192, 350-52

Naphthenic acid storage, 351

National Academy of Sciences, 103, 105

National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, 215

National Aniline & Chemical Co., 17

National Bureau of Standards, 72

National Carbon Co., 19, 255

National Defense Act of 1920, 24, 27, 226, 239,

246, 434

National Defense Appropriation Act of 1941, 251,

253, 254

National Defense Research Committee (NDRC),

38. See also NDRC laboratories, University of

Chicago, Harvard University, University of

Illinois, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

Ohio State University, University of Southern

California, Stanford University, University of

Virginia.

biological warfare research, 108

organization, 42, 43

protective items research, 42, 43, 44, 45, 75, 80,

91, 92, 96, 97, 99, 334, 336

testing of chemical munitions, 40, 41, 48, 59, 60

toxic agents research, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 53,

57, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 69

weapons research, 42, 43, 45, 132, 143, 144, 145,

148, 151, 152, 162, 163, 165, 169, 184, 186,

187, 188, 194, 199, 209, 211, 212, 352

National Fireworks, Inc., 358, 360

National Guard, 227, 228, 230

National Lamp Works, 19

National Munitions Co., 358

National Oil Products Co., 340

National Research Council (NRC)

biological warfare research, 103, 105

National Research Council—Continued

chemical warfare research, World War I, 2-4

marine piling investigation, 33

medical research, 44

National Roadjoint Manufacturing Co., 377

Naval Research Laboratory, 336

Navy Department, U.S., 28, 36, 42, 88, 136, 153,

154, 212, 247, 262, 283, 376, 377, 424, 428

bat incendiary project, 188

biological warfare research, 103, 104, 109, 110,

120

chemical warfare research, World War I, 3, 4,

5, 6, 8

CWS procurement for, 228, 229, 232, 236, 266,

267

CWS research for, 32, 33, 34

flame thrower use, 156-57, 165, 369

gas mask requirements, 83, 229, 322, 326

impregnite research, 91, 331

incendiaries, 172, 177, 181, 183, 192, 193

laboratory, Bethesda, Md., 92

lend-lease activities, 403

protective ointment research, 92, 334

rocket research, 54, 194, 195, 196

smoke munitions, 205, 206, 215, 216, 217, 220

222

NDAC. See Advisory Commission, Council of National Defense.

Nelson, Donald, 259

Neoprene, 322, 323, 325, 406

Nerve gases, 50, 50n, 55, 74, 76, 89

New Cumberland ASF Depot, 382, 397, 399, 410

New Developments Division, WDSS, 107, 108, 370

New England Collapsible Tube Co., 95

New Guinea, 142, 197

New London, Tex., explosion, 189

New Orleans, La., depot storage, 263

New Orleans Port of Embarkation, 312, 375, 409,

410, 411

New York Chemical Warfare Procurement District,

230, 241, 248, 331, 334, 339, 363, 372, 418

fixing fair price for chemicals, 294

incendiary bomb program, 270, 346

Lend-lease, 404

Navy optical mask, 326

small business contract awards, 284, 285

New York Herald Tribune, 168

New York Port of Embarkation, 399, 409, 411

New York University, 165

New Zealand, 113

Ney, 1st Lt. Luman F., 102n, 103

Ney Cave, Tex., 188

Niagara Falls, N.Y., 17, 371

conference on bleaching powder, 392

impregnite plant, 244, 255, 272, 328, 416n

Nieman, C. S., 39

Ninth Army. U.S., 207
INDEX 489

Nitrogen mustard, 69-70

detectors, 75, 77

German interest, 47, 69, 70, 74

U.S. research, 50, 69

Noemfoor, 218

Normandy, Allied invasion, 83, 213, 332, 411

North African Theater of Operations (NATO), 106,

113, 197, 394, 395

eyeshield requirement, 89

French rearmament, 408

smoke munitions, 202, 212

Northeast Chemical Warfare Depot, Niagara Falls,

382n, 384, 390, 397, 399, 410

Northwestern University, 26, 80, 97

Norwalk Lock Co., 362

Nuodex Products Co., 351

Oakes Products Division, Houdaille-Hershey Co.,

352, 353

Ochsner, Generalleutnant Herman, 87, 130, 135,

136, 199

Office of the Air Chemical Officer, 276

Office of Assistant Chief for Matériel, CWS, 43

Office of Assistant Secretary of War (OASW), industrial mobilization planning, 228, 232, 233,

235, 236, 238, 239, 255

Office of Chief, CWS (OC CWS), 35, 270, 280.

344, 375, 410

contract authority, 259, 282

demobilization planning, 412-15, 426

and depot system, 381, 397, 398

estimation of requirements, 273, 276

and 4.2-inch mortar production, 353, 354, 355,

356, 364

guard and security unit, 388

intelligence function, 47

liaison with NDRC, 43

organization, 28, 30, 108, 287

plant protection unit, 261

and spare parts, 306-08

and statistical control, 298

Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), 85, 87, 318

Office of Civilian Supply, 322

Office of Contract Settlement, 419

Office for Emergency Management (OEM), 43

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 104, 105, 113

Office of Production Management (OPM), 259,

261, 271, 274, 280, 404

Office of Scientific Research and Development

(OSRD), 43, 103, 105, 107

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 104, 105. 107

Office of Under Secretary of War (OUSW), 279,

343, 366, 419. See also Under Secretary of

War.

Office of War Mobilization (OWM), 303, 426

Officer Candidate School, CWS, 281

Ohio State University, 75

Oil smoke generators, 208-14

Oils, incendiary, 169

Ointment, protective. See Protective ointment.

Okinawa Campaign, 133

flame throwers, 155, 156, 162

mortar gunboats in assault, 138

smoke use, 205, 218

Oldbury Electro-Chemical Co., 17

Operations Division, OC CWS, 275

Operations Division (OPD), WDGS, 370, 371

Ordnance Department, 38, 88, 136, 248, 254, 269,

283, 302, 309, 338, 355, 362, 399, 404, 421,

427

ammunition storage, 389, 390

biological warfare research, 103

chemical munitions, 54, 65

chemical proving ground, World War I, 22-24

chemical warfare function transferred to CWS,

12-13

4.2-inch mortars, 129, 131, 132, 355, 356, 361

HE rocket, 72

incendiary bomb development, 167, 168, 170,

172, 174, 176, 178, 179, 180, 190, 347, 350,

389

incendiary grenade, 190

incendiary rocket development, 194, 195

postwar mission, 432, 433, 434

procurement of chemical warfare items, World

War I, 14-18

smoke munitions, 219

Ordnance Desert Proving Ground, Calif., 87

Organic Department, Research Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30

Organic Section, Paris Laboratory, AEF, 11

Organized Reserves, 227, 228, 230

Oronite Chemical Co., 351

Overman Act, 13

Overseas supply division, port of embarkation, 409

Owl Plant, Azusa, Calif., 61, 278n, 416

Oxford University, 99

Pacific Ocean Areas, 154, 162

Pacific theater

biological warfare intelligence, 106, 113

chemical shells, 134, 136

flame thrower production, 153-59, 161-62

flame thrower use, 139, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146,

147, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 165,

370, 371

4.2-inch mortars, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133

mortar gunboats, 137, 138

packaging for, 395

smoke use, 197, 198, 205, 218

supply, 410, 411

Packing and packaging, 393-97

Palletization, 384, 385, 390
490 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Panama Canal Zone, 40, 41, 227

antibiological warfare program, 105, 110

depot storage, 263, 265

San José research project, 411

smoke generators, 209, 375, 376

PAPP, 99

Papua Campaign, 139

Paris Laboratory, AEF, 9-12

Parsons, Kans., Ordnance plant, 302, 358

Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M, 432

Patch board, 432, 434

Pathology research, 8

Patterson, Robert P., 224, 249n, 282, 292, 366, 432,

433, 434. See also Under Secretary of War.

Paul, J. W., 4

Peerless Tube Co., 333-34

Peleliu, 137, 157, 160

Penicillin treatment, 97, 116, 117

Pennsylvania, University of, 97, 107

Pennsylvania Forge Co., 356

Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Co., 71, 336

Pepper, O. H. Perry, 107

Perchlorethylene shortage, 372

Permanente Metals Corp., 345, 346

Pershing, General of the Armies John J., 9, 19

Peters, R. A., 99

Pharmacology research, 8

Philippine Islands, 197

charcoal plant constructed, 21

depot storage, 263, 265

fire bombs in attack on, 183

flame thrower in operations in, 143, 153

Japanese flame thrower captured, 47, 146, 147,

158

locust extermination study with CWS, 32

smoke in operations in, 205, 218

Phosgene, 51-55, 74

bomb testing, 39, 41, 54-55

British requirements, 404, 405

Canadian purchase, 407

CWS munitions, 39, 54, 133

detectors, 76

filling plant, 235

gas mask protection, 60, 80

German gas attack. World War I, 51

German munitions, 55

Italian munitions, 55

Japanese munitions, 55

manufacture, World War I, 14, 16, 17, 51-52

manufacture, World War II, 51-54

mortar shells filled, 54, 133

pilot plant, 37, 52

Photography Department, Engineering Division,

Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Physical Department, Research Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30

Physical Testing Department, Engineering Division,

Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Physicochemical Section, Paris Laboratory, AEF, 11

Physiological Research Section (American University), 6

Physiology research, 8

Picatinny Arsenal, N.J., 5, 358

Pine Bluff Arsenal, Ark., 286, 301, 309, 350

chlorine production, 272, 416

construction, 258, 277, 343, 405

demobilization, 415, 416

depot storage, 263, 346, 382

4.2-inch mortar shell production, 358

lewisite production, 68, 430

munitions filling, 372

mustard gas production, 64, 416

nitrogen mustard production, 69

Pittsburgh Chemical Warfare Procurement District,

230, 372

4.2-inch mortar shells, 355, 356, 358

gas masks, 319, 320

Pittsburgh Coke and Chemical Co., 255, 320

Planning Branch, Procurement Division, OASW,

226, 232, 235, 236

Planning Division, OC CWS, 274

Plans and Operations Division, ASF, 371

Plant construction

prewar planning, 234-37, 241, 244, 252, 253,

404

World War I, 14-18

World War II, 52, 53, 61, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73,

250-55, 259, 276-79, 328, 343, 344

Plant disposal

World War I, 25, 26, 62-63

World War II, 413, 415-17, 424

Plant protection, 261

Plant Protection and Safety Branch, OC CWS, 373

Plant safety, 373

Plants Department, Munitions Development Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Plasticized white phosphorus. See White phosphorus, plasticized.

Playfair, Lyon, 1

Plexiglas, 66

Poland

biological warfare preparation, 114

German invasion of, 237, 240

Polyvinyl chloride, 406

Port chemical officers, 409, 410

Port chemical warfare sections, 409, 410

Porter, H. K., Co., 355, 356

Porter, Maj. Gen. William N., 409

biological warfare committee member, 107

chemical mortar program, 352, 359, 363

and CWS postwar role and mission, 432, 433,

434, 435
INDEX 491

Porter, Maj. Gen. William N.—Continued

demobilization planning, 412, 415, 416, 417, 419,

421, 425, 427, 431

and HE mission, 126

heads USCWC, 45

incendiary bomb program, 342, 343, 344

organizational changes, 44, 259, 270, 274, 275,

283, 287, 298, 300, 304

and plant construction, 256, 257, 258, 278, 279

procurement planning, 270, 280, 283

recommends Huntsville Arsenal construction, 256

Portland Subport of Embarkation, 410

Porton Experiment Station, England

biological warfare research, 103, 104, 111n

chemical proving ground, 12, 23

Ports of embarkation, supply, 375, 399, 401, 402,

408-11

Portugal, 113

Potter, Col. Charles C., 12

Prentiss, Col. Augustin M., 258

Pressurelube Inc., 369, 370, 421

Preventive Medicine Service, SGO, 110

Price Adjustment Section, Legal Branch, OC CWS, 290

Pricing program, 289-96

Princeton University, 7, 19

Priorities and Allocation Branch, Industrial Division, OC CWS, 280, 425

Priorities and Labor Relations Section, Industrial

Service, OC CWS, 261

Priority ratings, 242, 259, 261, 279, 280, 281, 370,

371, 378

Prisoner of war labor, 428

Proctor and Schwartz, Inc., 330

Procurement

bills of material, 281

chemicals, 54, 61,71, 198, 215, 220, 269-72, 283,

294-95, 404-08

cutbacks, 324-25, 329, 418

CWS for AAF, 275-76

CWS for Navy and Marine Corps, 228, 229,

232, 236, 266, 267

defensive matériel, 18-22, 266, 314-41

dollar value, 266

educational orders. See Educational orders.

emergency period, 258-62, 403-08

end-item contracting system, 286, 300

lend-lease, 403-08

materials shortages, 279-82

offensive matériel, 65, 123, 135, 160, 170, 174,

175, 190, 228, 240, 257, 266, 270, 284, 294,

342-80, 418

prewar planning, 226-40, 241-65

pricing program, 289-96

service equipment, 267-69

spare parts, 306-09

Procurement—Continued

survey, Cincinnati, Ohio, 284

World War I, 14-22, 226

Procurement district offices, 114, 230, 233, 234,

238, 241, 270, 281, 318

contract operations, 258, 259, 272, 282, 284, 285,

291, 319, 320, 326, 334, 339, 343, 344, 346,

348, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 360,

363, 364, 372, 375, 376

contract termination, 413, 417, 418, 420, 421,

423

inspection, 262, 286, 420

plant protection, 261

spare parts, 308, 309

Procurement Division, OC CWS, 259

Procurement Division, Treasury Dept., 424, 426

Procurement Plan, 1944, 300, 307, 308

Procurement Planning Division, OC CWS, 230,

231, 232, 238, 280

Procurement Regulation 7, 424

Procurement Regulation 15, 419

Procurement Regulations, War Dept., 290, 419,

424

Production, 268. See also individual items.

cutbacks, 324-25, 417

E awards, 379-80

inspection, 286-89, 327-28

morale problem, 378-80

statistical control, 297-306

Production Division, ASF, 278, 289, 352

Production Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 233

Project Co-ordination Staff, 46

Projector, aeroflame, 163

Pro-knock materials research, 42

Proof Department, Edgewood Arsenal, 29

Proofing, 38, 184, 310, 351, 354, 355. See also

Testing.

Propellant, hydrogen peroxide as, 48

Property Disposal Branch, OC CWS, 423, 426,

431

Property Disposal Manual, CWS, 427

Property disposal officers, 425

Protective clothing, 32, 256

impregnating equipment, 329-32

research, 44, 90-91, 118, 119, 120

Protective Clothing Department, Protective Development Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Protective covers, 88, 90

Protective Development Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30, 31

Protective equipment, 32

design responsibility, 1915, 2

manufacture after World War I, 25-26

procurement, World War I, 18-22

procurement, World War II, 314-41

research and development, 75-96, 118-20
492 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Protective equipment—Continued

standardization with British, 46

Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP), 230, 232, 235

Protective ointment, 22, 23, 32

BAL, 93, 94, 95, 99

M5 (S-330 chlorine), 45, 93, 95, 97, 120, 334

procurement, 332-34

research, 45, 91-93, 333

salvage program, 427, 428

Proving Division, CWS, 13

Proving grounds, chemical. See also proving grounds

by name.

World War I, 22-24, 26, 29

World War II, 38, 39-41

Provisional Flame Thrower Tank Battalion, 713th,

155

Provost Marshal General, 72, 110

Provost Marshal General's Office, 104

Prussic acid. See Hydrogen cyanide.

PT filling, for incendiaries, 179, 180, 181, 194, 195

Public Health Service, U.S. See U.S. Public Health

Service.

Public Service Company of Colorado, 277

Puerto Rico, 105, 265

Pullman Standard Car Co., 354, 370

Purchase Policies Branch, OC CWS, 290, 291, 292,

293, 294, 365, 366

Purchases Division, ASF, 290, 419

Puteaux, France, AEF laboratory site, 10

PWP (plasticized white phosphorus). See White

phosphorus, plasticized.

Pyrotechnic filling, for incendiaries, 179-80, 181,

194, 195

Pyrotechnic Research Section (American University), 6

Pyroxylin, in incendiaries, 186

Quality Control System, 288

Quartermaster Corps, 33, 88, 90, 338, 428

postwar role, 432, 434

protective clothing, 91

Quartermaster General, The, 252, 253, 416

Ragsdale, Capt. E. J. W., 14-15

Rat extermination research projects, 32, 33, 44,

225

Raw materials shortage, 260, 261, 279-82, 295,

318, 321-24, 343, 344, 345, 351, 377

Raymond Laboratories, Inc., 335

Readjustment Division, ASF, 419

Readjustment Division, OC CWS, 423

Readjustment divisions, procurement districts, 413,

419, 423

Reclamation program, CWS, 310-11

Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), 426,

427, 430

Red Cross, American, 22, 111

Redeployment, Readjustment and Demobilization,

Period I, 414

Redistribution and Salvage Branch, ASF, 425

Regiments, infantry. See Infantry regiments.

Regular Army, 227, 228, 230

Reid, E. Emmet, 4

Renegotiation, contract, 289-96, 365-67

Renegotiation Division, ASF, 365, 366

Renegotiation legislation, 290, 293

Repair sets, maintenance, 269

Repellents research, 44

Replacement Training Center, CWS, 388

Report on War and Post-War Adjustment Policies,

419, 426

Requirements computation, CWS, 231-32, 244-50,

262, 272-76, 297-306

Requirements Division, AAF, 276

Requirements Division, ASF, 304

Requirements Planning Committee, OC CWS, 275,

305, 306

Requirements Section, AGF, 107

Requirements and Stock Control Division, ASF,

303

Research and development, biological warfare, 101-

22

Research and development, chemical warfare, 49-

74, 284

chemical mortars and shells, 123-38

CWS postwar mission, 433, 434, 435

development procedure, 34-36

flame throwers, 139-66

impregnites, 91, 120, 329, 331, 332

incendiaries, 167-96

program, 1920-40, 31-34

program, World War II, 36-48, 49-74

protection against toxic agents, 75-100, 336

smoke, 197-225

World War I, 2-12, 24

Research Division, CWS, 13, 25, 59

Research Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30

Reserve officers, CWS, 238, 247, 285

Rheem Manufacturing Co., 416n

Rhine River, smoke pots use at, 207

Rice, George S., 2

Richards, Brig. Gen. George J., 303

Richards board, 303

Richardson, Ralph R., 20, 78

Richmond, Maj. E. A., 102n

Rifle, M1, 221

Rifle grenades, colored smoke, 221

Riggs-Distler Co., 253

Riley, Pvt. Ralph G., 143, 144

Robinson, Pfc. Frank R., 143

Robinson Industries. Inc., 340

Rocket, antitank HE, M6, 72, 196
INDEX 493

Rocket, chemical

antitank tear gas, 72

firing tables, 39

research, 194

7.5-inch, 54

Rocket, German program, 107

Rocket, incendiary. See Incendiary rocket.

Rocket, smoke. See Smoke rockets.

Rocket Research Division, Ordnance Dept., 195

Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colo., 286, 309

chlorine production, 272, 416

construction, 277

demobilization, 415, 416

fifth echelon maintenance shop, 311

incendiary bomb production, 349, 350

lewisite production, 68

mustard gas production, 64, 416

regional supply, 401

Rodenticides, research projects, 32, 33, 44, 225

Roer River, smoke pots use at, 207

Rohm and Haas, 95

Roi-Namur, 218

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 104, 188, 241,

243, 246, 250, 251, 282

and contract renegotiation, 292, 419

and Victory Program, 262

Rose, Maj. J. L., 356

Rothschild, Capt. Jacquard H., 37

Royall, Kenneth C., 366, 367

Rubber

as gasoline thickener, 169, 179

shortage of, 281, 318, 321-24, 406

Rubber Director, WPB, 322, 323

Ryukyu Islands, 142, 155. See also Okinawa

Campaign.

Sabath, Rep. A. J., 363

Safety Division, Camp Detrick, 112

Sag paste, 22, 23, 91

Saginaw, Mich., 269

Saginaw Products Corp., 269

St. Louis Plant, East St. Louis, Ill., 255, 328, 416

Saipan, 154, 198

Salerno, 207, 212

Salvage programs, 31, 310, 427-28

Salzberg, Dr. P. L., 331, 332

San Antonio ASF Depot, 382, 383

San Antonio General Depot, 263, 383, 398

San Bernardino Plant, San Bernardino, Calif., 278n,

416, 416n

San Francisco Chemical Warfare Procurement District, 230, 319, 357

San Francisco General Depot, 409

San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 409, 410

San José Island, 41

San José Project, 411

Sanderson and Porter Co., 258

Sanson, Lt. Col. Stanton D., 300, 365

Sarin, 50n

Satan, flame throwing tank, 154

Sault Ste. Marie Canal, smoke generators, 209, 376

Scaife Co., 356, 357

Schaefer, Vincent J., 211

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, 227

Schrader, Dr. Gerhard, 50n

Schweinfurt, Germany, incendiary attack on, 171

Sears Roebuck and Co., 338, 357

Seattle Plant, Seattle, Wash., 278n, 416

Seattle Port of Embarkation, 409, 411

Secretary of the Interior, 2

Secretary of War, 13, 31, 232, 239

and biological warfare research, 103, 104, 106,

107, 120

and gas mask transfer to British, 404

and incendiary bomb program, 342

and plant construction, 253

and procurement planning, 242, 243, 282

and smoke munitions, 219

Section H, Division 3, NDRC, 132

Sedgley, R. F., Inc., 294, 368

Segal, Louis, 362, 363, 364

Segal Lock and Hardware Co., 362

Service command supply, 399, 410, 427

Service equipment, procurement, 267-69

Services of Supply (SOS), 126, 383, 384, 388. See

also Army Service Forces (ASF).

Settlement Advisory Board, 366

Sevastopol, 1

Shell boosters, 18, 18n, 24

Shell Development Co., 352

Shell filling

Edgewood Arsenal, World War I, 14-18

World War II, 54, 58, 65, 71, 72, 73, 74, 133

Shell Manufacturers Co-ordinating Committee, 357

Shells, chemical, 32, 65, 123, 374, 377

chlorine, Civil War, 1

chloroacetophenone, 70, 71, 133

cyanogen chloride, 61, 133

enemy, 55, 133, 134

filled in World War II, 54, 57, 58, 65, 71, 133

first fired in U.S., 23

hydrogen cyanide, 57, 58

lewisite, 133

mustard, 65, 133

phosgene, 54, 133

research, 44

Shells, 4.2-inch mortar, 133-36, 273, 417

chloroacetophenone, 71, 133

colored smoke, 136

criminal involvement of contractors, 361-67

cyanogen chloride, 61, 133

employed in battle, 136
494 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Shells, 4.2-inch mortar—Continued

enemy, 130, 133, 134

E38R2, 255, 356

filled in World War II, 54, 133, 135

fuze, 358-61

HE, 126-28, 134, 136

incendiary, 135-36, 193-94

lewisite, 133

M2, 356

M3, 134, 135, 356

M4, 134

mustard, 65, 133

phosgene, 54, 133

procurement, 135, 284, 355-61

range increase, 126-28

smoke, 134, 135, 136, 193, 194, 374

Shells, high explosive, 126-27, 132, 134, 135, 136,

240, 301, 358

Shells, incendiary

4.2-inch mortar, 135-36, 193-94

German, 194

Japanese, 194

Shells, smoke munitions, 73, 134, 135, 136, 193,

200, 228, 372, 374

Shepherd, Forrest, 1

Sherrick, Col. Paul, 412

Shertz, Capt. Frank M., 102n

Shipment of toxics, 18, 386-89

Shipping Documents, War Dept., 299

Shoe impregnite, 244, 245, 339-40

Shops and Loading Department, Engineering Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Sibert, Maj. Gen. William L., 12, 13, 28

Sicily

mortars in assault, 127, 137

smoke use, 202, 207, 212

Signal Corps, 11, 224

British protective equipment, 88

chemical spray tests, 66

chemical warfare functions transferred to CWS,

12-13

gas mask requirements, 83, 84, 86

Simmons Co., 319

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William M., 432

Simpson board, 432

Simset Manufacturing Co., 358

Site Location Board, OASW, 255

Situation Room, OC CWS, 300, 305

Sixth Army, U.S., 153

Slezak, Col. John, 379

Small Business Act, 284

Small Business Committee, U.S. Senate, 284

Small War Plants Branch, Purchasing Division,

ASF, 284

Smaller War Plants Corp. (SWPC), 284

Smith, A. O., Corp., 353

Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., 154

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 432

Smoke, 5, 193

FM (titanium tetrachloride) agent, 135, 215, 218,

406

FS agent, 135, 215, 216, 218, 407

HC agent, 180, 200-202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207,

208, 270, 371-73, 406

identification kit, M11, 76

plasticized white phosphorus, 40, 199-200

research and development, 197-225

white phosphorus, 40, 135, 136, 167, 197-200,

373-75

Smoke, colored, 32

artillery shells, 221-22, 377

bomb, M87 streamer, 223

German munitions, 223

grenades, 219-21, 377-78

Japanese munitions, 223

mortar shells, 136, 221, 222

production, 220, 221, 377-78

research, 42, 219-24

rockets, 198, 222, 372

standardization with British munitions, 46, 220

Smoke generator companies, 209

Smoke generators, 81, 224

Canadian purchase, 408

development, 208-14

German, 214

mechanical, M1, 45, 211-12, 213, 376

mechanical, M2, 118, 212-13, 376

procurement, 240, 375-77

stationary, 375

Smoke munitions

bomb, 167, 201, 215, 374

candle, 73, 74, 228

generator. See Smoke generators.

German, 48, 74, 200, 204, 207-08, 214, 218

grenade, 190, 199, 215, 372, 374, 406, 408

Japanese, 48, 74, 200, 205, 208, 218

pots. See Smoke pots.

research and development, 197-225

rocket. See Smoke rockets.

shells. See Shells, smoke munitions.

tanks, airplane. See Airplane smoke tanks.

testing, 39, 40, 199, 200, 310

Smoke pots, 200-208, 406

German, 204, 207-08

Japanese, 205, 208

M1, 202, 203, 207, 209, 372, 373

M1A1, 203

M4 floating, 205-06, 207, 373

M4A1 floating, 206

M4A2 floating, 207

M5, 203, 207, 372, 373

Smoke rockets

2.35-inch, 372

2.36-inch, 198, 372
INDEX 495

Smoke rockets—Continued

3.5-inch, 200, 374

4.5-inch, 200, 374

Smoke screens, aerial, 218

Smoke tanks. See Airplane smoke tanks.

Soda lime, 80

Sodium hypochlorite, 270

Sodium pyrophosphate, 61

Solvoy Process Co., 71

Soman, 50n

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 189, 274, 284, 285,

297, 370, 371

Somme, France, French firing of hydrogen cyanide

shells, 55

demobilization planning, 412, 415, 416, 425, 427

postwar Army organization plan, 431, 432, 435

South Africa, 113

South America, 21

South Carolina Experiment Station, Clemson, S.C.,

33

South Pacific Area

Colored smoke mortar shells, 136

enemy equipment intelligence teams, 47, 113

flame throwers, 142, 143

Southern California, University of, 57, 60

Southwest Pacific Area

enemy equipment intelligence teams, 47, 113

flame throwers, 143

4.2-inch mortar, 128

HE shell, M4, 134

Spanish Civil War, 191

Spare parts, procurement and distribution, 306-09,

382, 401

Spare Parts and Catalog Branch, Field Requirements Division, OC CWS, 307

Special Assignments Branch, CWS, 108

Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, U.S. Senate, 358, 361, 379,

421, 431

Special Committee on Matériel Demobilization

Planning, ASF, 412

Special Planning Division, WDSS, 412

Special procedures, 111

Special Projects Division, OC CWS, 105, 107, 108-

11, 115

intelligence function, 112, 113

strength, 111

Special Projects Periodic Intelligence Reports, 113

Specification and Inspection Branch, ASF, 289

Specification 100-14A, War Dept., 395

Specifications, preparation of, 232-33, 284

SPHINX project, 40

Sprague Specialties Co., 319, 324

Spraker, Col. Harry W., 416

Spray tanks. See Airplane spray tanks.

Squibb Co., 95

Stagg Field, University of Chicago, 8

Standard Inspection Procedure (SIP), 327

Standard Oil Development Co., 144, 151, 165, 184,

211, 352, 376

Standardization of chemical munitions, U.S.-British,

45-46

Standards Division, OASW, 233

Stanford University, 352

State Board of Entomology, Baxley, Ga., 33

Statistical, Inspection, and Specifications Section,

262

Statistics and Progress Branch, Control Division,

OC CWS, 298, 299

Sternutators. See Adamsite.

Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W., 408

Stock control, 401-03

Stock Control Division, ASF, 304

Stokes mortar. See Mortar, Stokes.

Storage space. See Depot storage.

Streptomycin treatment, 116, 117

Stubbs, Lt. Col. Marshall, 277

Subcommittee on Clinical Research, Committee on

Medicine, NRC, 44

Subcommittee on Noxious Gases, NRC, 2-4, 5

Submarine Gases Section (American University),

6

Suffield, Canada, experiment station, 165

Sulfa drug treatment, 97, 116, 118

Sulfadiazine treatment, 118

Sulfathiazole treatment, 97

Sulphur dioxide, toxic agent in Crimean War, 1

Sulphur fluorides research, 49-50

Sulphur monochloride, 17

Sulphur mustard, 50, 75

Sun Rubber Co., 326

Sun Tube Co., 334

Supply

computation of requirements, 231-32, 244-50,

262, 272-76

distribution system, 397-411

levels, 401-03

maintenance, 309-13

packing and packaging, 393-97

peacetime preparation for, 226-40

ports of embarkation, 408-11

procurement list, CWS, 227, 230, 233. See also

Procurement.

specifications, 232-33

statistical control, 297-306

stock control, 401-03

storage space, 263-65, 297-306, 381-93

World War I, 14-22, 25-26, 123, 226

Supply Control System, 302-06, 308

Supply Division, OC CWS, 229, 263, 264, 299

computation of requirements, 275

demobilization planning, 412

distribution system, 301, 302, 312

established, 259
496 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 94, 103, 107

Surgeon General, U.S. Navy, 103, 107

Surgeon General's Office (SGO), U.S. Army

biological warfare research, 103, 105, 106, 110

gas masks, 19, 85

Surplus Property Act, 1944, 426

Surplus Property Administration, OWM, 426, 427

Surplus Property Board, 426, 427

Surplus property disposal, 312

value, 425, 428, 429

World War I, 25

World War II, 312, 413, 415-17, 424-31

Sweden, 113

Swift, E. H., 39

Tabun, 50n, 55, 74

Tactical Air Command, XIX, 183

Talmage, Lt. Col. Ralph H., 38

Tanks, airplane smoke. See Airplane smoke tanks.

Tanks, flame throwing, 150-62

Targhee National Forest, 40

Tear gas, 34, 70-73, 228

Technical Command, CWS, 134

Technical Committee (CWS-NDRC), 43

Technical Director, Edgewood Arsenal, 29, 235,

243

Technical Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 39, 52, 59,

233, 395

Technical Division, Gas Service, AEF, 12

Technical Division, OC CWS

demobilization planning, 412

established, 28

and flame thrower, 143

and 4.2-inch mortar, 129

and inspections, 288, 306

represented on Technical Committee (CWSNDRC), 43

Technical Files Department, Information Division,

Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Technical Library Department, Information Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31

Technical Service, Edgewood Arsenal, 102

Technical Service, OC CWS, 342

Temple, S., 53

Tennessee Eastman Co., 334

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 374

Tenth Army, U.S., 133, 154, 156, 162

Terre Haute, Ind., Vigo Plant, 109

Testing, chemical warfare items, 31

chemical munitions, 54-55, 57-58, 59, 60, 66, 68,

347, 356, 377, 378

field test stations, 41, 108, 109

incendiaries, 168, 174, 184, 185, 189, 351

proving grounds, 23, 26, 29, 38-41, 217

weapons, 132, 134, 140, 145, 149, 154, 199, 217,

354, 355

Testing—Continued

World War I, 11, 12, 19, 22-24

Tetryl burster. See Burster, tetryl.

Texas Co., 63

Therapeutic research, 8

Thermate filling, for incendiaries, 173

Thermite, procurement, 270, 294-95, 344

Thionyl chloride, pilot plant production, 37

Third Army, U.S., 207

Third British Army, 7

Thompson, Maj. A. T., 102n

Thompson, E. C., 256

Tinian, 154, 183

Tirrell, Corp. Wilbur G., 139, 141

Titanium tetrachloride (FM), 135, 215, 218, 406

TM 8-285, 95

TNT, 133, 178

Tokyo, Japan, incendiary air raid on, 186

Tompkins, Brig. Gen. W. F., 412

Toxic agents, 224. See also agents by name.

detection of, 75-77

disposal, 430, 431

manufacture and shipment, World War I, 14-18,

49, 386

procurement, 269-72

research, 42, 44, 45, 49-74

stocks, 228

storage and transportation, 386-89, 396

testing, 23-24, 38

Toxicological Department, Medical Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 30

Toxicological research, 8, 32, 44, 49-74, 165-66

Training Division, CWS, 13

Treasury Department, U.S., 407, 424, 426

Trench Warfare Section, Gun Division, OCO, 14

Trichloromethyl chloroformate. See Diphosgene.

Trilon, 50n

Tropical warfare. See Jungle warfare.

Truck, crane, swinging boom, 267, 312

Trundle Engineering Co., 289

Turlock Plant, Turlock Calif., 416, 416n

Under Secretary of War, 249n, 261, 279, 282, 283,

343, 344, 366, 367, 370, 379

and iron carbonyl production, 224

and postwar organization, 432, 433, 434

Ungethuem, Lt. Col. Walter J., 253, 256, 277

Union Pacific Railroad, 277

U.S.S.R., 114, 262

emplaced flame throwers in defense of Moscow,

164

lend-lease requirements, 406-07, 425

lewisite use, 69

U.S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), 47, 139

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA),

162
INDEX 497

U.S. Biological Warfare Committee, 107, 121

U.S.-Canadian Advisory Committee, 45

U.S. Chemical Warfare Committee (USCWC), 45,

273

U.S. Committee on Military Affairs, 361

U.S. Congress, 246, 260

Committee on Military Affairs, 361

and contract renegotation, 292

and contract settlements, 419

and CWS appropriations, 32, 33, 36, 250-55,

343

and CWS organization, 24, 219

and mobilization planning, 227, 239

National Defense Act of 1920, 226

Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 358, 361, 379, 421,

431

Senate Special Committee to Study and Survey

Problems of Small Business Enterprises, 284

U.S. Court of Claims, 418

U.S. Department of Agriculture, 19, 103, 104

U.S. Department of Commerce, 33

U.S. Department of Justice, 364, 367

U.S. Federal Security Agency, 104

U.S. House Committee on Military Affairs. See

U.S. Congress.

U.S. Navy Department. See Navy Department,

U.S.

U.S. Office of Education, 429

U.S. Public Health Service, 28

biological warfare research, 103, 104, 105

fumigating gas investigation, 33, 34

gas mask production for, 229

U.S. Senate Special Committee Investigating the

National Defense Program. See U.S. Congress.

U.S. Senate Special Committee to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business Enterprises.

See U. S. Congress.

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 171

U.S. Veterans' Bureau, 28

United States Wind Engine and Pump Co., 363

United Wall Paper Co., 351

Universal Oil Products Co., 71

University of California. See California, University

of.

University of Chicago. See Chicago, University of.

University of Illinois. See Illinois, University of.

University of Michigan, 8-9. See Michigan, University of.

University of Pennsylvania, 97, 107. See Pennsylvania, University of.

University of Southern California, 57, 60. See

Southern California, University of.

University of Virgina, 75, 96. See Virginia, University of.

University of Wisconsin, 8, 105. See Wisconsin,

University of.

Unmacht, Col. George H., 153, 154, 155, 157, 162,

240

Utah ASF Depot, 382, 410

Utah General Depot, 399

V-2 bombs, German propellant for, 48

Vaccines, research and development, 117

Van Heest, Christian, 421

Vapor detector kit. See Gas detector equipment.

Veterinary Corps, 110

Veterinary Division, SGO, 110

Victor Chemical Works, 373, 374

Victory Program, 262, 273

Vigo Plant, Terre Haute, Ind., 108, 109, 416, 417

Virginia, University of, 75, 96

Vomiting gas. See Adamsite.

Vortexol Co., 339

Waitt, Brig. Gen. Alden H., 75, 275, 304

Walker, Col. William H., 9, 18

Wallace and Tiernan Products, Inc., 333

Walter Butler Co., 257

War Bureau of Consultants (WBC) Committee,

103-04

War Department

assumes control of biological warfare research,

106, 110, 112

Bureau of Mines chemical warfare organization

transferred to, 13

contract termination, 419, 420, 421

demobilization planning, 412

Gas Service, U.S. Army, created, 12

industrial mobilization planning, 266-40

postwar organization, 432

procurement regulations, 290, 419, 424

War Department General Staff, 104, 231, 236, 239,

250, 252, 253, 273, 274, 279, 342, 412, 435

War Food Administration, 22

War Gases as Insecticides project (1922), 32

War Plans Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 234, 235,

244, 253, 256, 314

War Powers Act, First, 282, 424

War Powers Act, Second, 289

War Production Board, 248, 272, 278, 281, 295,

321, 322, 323, 344, 351, 370, 371, 372, 405,

424

War Research Service (WRS) 104-06, 107, 110

War Reserve matériel, 227, 228, 229, 232, 430

Ward, Kyle, Jr., 69

Warehousing, 263, 264, 381, 383. See also Depot

storage.

Water-testing kit, 96

Watson, Warren H., 248n

WBC (War Bureau of Consultants) Committee,

103-04

Weapons Department, Munitions Development Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 31
498 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Weary Willie, remote-controlled bomb, 189-90

Weaver, Brig. Gen. Theron D., 412

Weiss, Joseph T., 363

Wesleyan University, 19

Western Defense Command, 375

Western Reserve University, 9

Westinghouse Airbrake Co., 358

Westinghouse Electrical Corp., 369

Westvaco Chlorine Products Co., 371, 372

Whetlerite, 80, 245, 316. See also Charcoal.

ASC, 60, 80, 320

Canadian purchase, 407

plant construction, 244, 254-55, 259

supply, 320-21

White phosphorus (WP), 94, 95, 167, 195, 228

British requirements, 405-06

incendiaries, 179, 186, 192, 193, 194, 375

procurement, 198, 373-75, 405, 406

research, 197-200

smoke munitions, 135, 136, 310, 374

testing, 40

White phosphorus, plasticized (PWP), 40, 199-200

Whitman, Requardt, and Smith, 253, 257, 277

William M. Pencil Manufacturing Co., 358, 360

Williamson, Maj. L. P., 19

Wilson, President Woodrow, 5, 13

Winternitz, Dr. Milton C., 105

Wisconsin, University of, 8, 105

Woodring, Harry H., 232, 234, 237

World War I, 98, 126, 132, 233, 240, 270, 293,

386, 434

contract terminations, 25, 417-18

World War I—Continued

demobilization, 24-27

flame throwers, 139, 150

French use of gas, 55-56, 59, 70

German gas attacks, 2, 51, 62, 70, 73, 77

incendiary fillings research, 167, 169

research and supply, 1-27, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 62,

67, 68, 78, 90, 91, 336, 399

smoke 197, 200, 201, 214, 215, 219

Stokes mortar, 123, 124

surplus items, 227, 229, 232

WP (White phosphorus). See White phosphorus.

Wright Field, Ohio, 97

WRS. See War Research Service.

Wyandotte, Mich., 336

Xylyl bromide, 14, 14n

Yale University, 4, 8, 22, 97

YELLOW war plan, 231

Yoe, J. H., 96

Yokohama, Japan, incendiary air raids on, 175

York-Hessian Co., 212

Young, L. A., Steel and Wire Co., 354

Young, P. E., 243

Ypres, France, German gas attack, 2, 77

Yugoslavia, gas masks for, 404

Zanesville Plant, Zanesville, Ohio, 254, 259, 320,

416n

Zanetti, Col. J. Enrique, 168, 342

PIN : 038981-000

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1988-1 9 3 -5 1 8 /0