Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC16-289

____________

ROBERT EARL PETERSON,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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No. SC16-1279

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ROBERT EARL PETERSON,

Petitioner,

vs.

JULIE L. JONES, etc.,

Respondent.

[July 6, 2017]

PER CURIAM.

Robert Earl Peterson appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 

to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
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habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the 

reasons explained below, we affirm the postconviction court’s order denying postconviction relief as to the guilt phase and also deny Peterson’s separate habeas 

petition. However, because Peterson’s jury recommended death by a vote of seven 

to five and his sentence became final in 2012, see Peterson v. State, 94 So. 3d 514, 

523 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 793 (2012), Peterson is entitled to a new penalty 

phase under Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-

998 (U.S. May 22, 2017). See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016). 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Peterson was convicted of first-degree murder and evidence tampering, and 

was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of his 64-year-old stepfather, 

Roy Andrews, after Peterson’s jury recommended death by a vote of seven to five. 

Peterson, 94 So. 3d at 519, 523. The facts of Peterson’s crime are set forth in this 

Court’s opinion affirming his conviction and sentences on direct appeal: 

Peterson, who was 41 at the time of the crime, had been living 

at home with his mother and his stepfather. Andrews had been 

Peterson’s stepfather since Peterson was fifteen. Shortly before the 

murder, Peterson’s mother, at the urging of Andrews, told Peterson he 

had to move out. Also at Andrews’ insistence, Peterson’s mother 

stopped providing Peterson with money. Andrews was beaten and 

shot twice in Jacksonville, Florida, with his body left in the 

Greenlawn Cemetery very close to where Peterson’s ex-girlfriend was 

buried. 
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Guilt Phase Evidence

The State first presented evidence to establish that about a 

month before the murder, Peterson told several people that he was 

going to kill Andrews. In early July 2005, Peterson talked to Becky 

Price, his second cousin, and told her that Andrews had “kicked him 

out” and told his mother not to give him more money. Peterson 

informed Price that he was going to kill Andrews. About two weeks 

later, after his mother refused to give him money again based on 

Andrews’ direction, Peterson told Price a second time that he was 

going to kill Andrews. While the statements scared her, Price did not 

take him seriously and did not warn anyone. At the beginning of July, 

Peterson told his aunt that Andrews called his mother fat and that this 

made him “want to jump across the table and beat him to death.” 

On August 7, 2005, Peterson was staying at a hotel, the Masters 

Inn, with his girlfriend, Clara Keene. At 6:01 a.m. on August 8, the 

security cameras at his hotel showed Peterson leaving his room 

wearing jeans, shoes, a jacket, and a dark hat with a design on it. 

At the time of the murder, Andrews was a counselor at a local 

drug clinic, Jacksonville Metro Treatment Center, and generally 

worked from 5:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. On August 8, 2005, Andrews 

arrived at 4:45 a.m. but left early at 9:30 a.m. Between 9 and 10 that 

morning, two people who worked close to Greenlawn Cemetery heard 

two loud pops that sounded like gun fire and then saw an older green 

pick-up truck with faded paint and big tires [N.1] leaving the cemetery 

very quickly. 

[N.1] Peterson’s girlfriend, Keene, had a truck that 

matched this description. On the night before the 

murder, she had given Peterson the keys to the truck and 

left it at the work place of Peterson’s brother, since she 

and Peterson went to the hotel together in his vehicle. 

She never saw her truck after that evening.

Andrews’ body was found shortly after his murder. He was 

lying on the ground in a pool of blood, relatively close to the grave of 

Peterson’s ex-girlfriend who had died about a year earlier. Near the 

body, law enforcement found a dark “Bike Week” baseball cap, which 

matched the hat that Peterson wore when he left the hotel room that 

morning. Andrews’ truck was nearby, with the keys in the truck, the 
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passenger door opened, and the hood of the truck released but not 

fully opened. Andrews’ wallet was still in his pocket, and he had a 

considerable amount of money in his pocket. Andrews had been 

beaten around the head and shot in the head twice. 

Around 10:30 a.m. that same day, Peterson called Keene at the 

hotel and asked her to let him into their room because he forgot his 

key. The video surveillance cameras showed Keene opening the door 

for Peterson. In the video, Peterson was dressed in different clothes 

from those he had worn when he left the hotel a few hours earlier: he 

was wearing a different shirt and not wearing an undershirt, shoes, or 

his hat. According to Keene, Peterson was upset and told her they 

needed to go to his mother’s house. 

A few days after the murder, the police arrested one of 

Peterson’s acquaintances, Jimmie Jackson, for driving on a suspended 

license. While Jackson was in custody, he agreed to call Peterson to 

ask about the murder. During their initial conversations, Peterson 

made a number of incriminating statements, implying that he had 

killed Andrews as he had planned. Jackson set up a meeting with 

Peterson, agreeing to meet him in a parking lot. Peterson drove up in 

his vehicle at the designated time and then entered Jackson’s truck, 

which the police had wired. 

During their conversation, Peterson admitted to killing 

Andrews and provided numerous details about the crime, including 

that he killed Andrews in broad daylight at 9:45 in the morning. 

Peterson explained that he killed Andrews because Andrews crossed 

the line by slapping his mother and calling her names. He then told 

Jackson that his mother knew about it because he and his mother were 

close and his mother was “contracting it.” Peterson informed Jackson 

that even though the police took his red truck, he was not in that 

vehicle during the crime. He bragged that the vehicle he did use was 

“crushed and gone” on the same day as the crime. He then described 

the murder in detail, explaining that he was walking down Emerson 

Road, as though his truck had broken down, and Andrews picked him 

up and took him to the cemetery. Peterson described the crime as 

follows: 

PETERSON: No, I busted his ass with brass 

knuckles. I tried to beat him to death so’s I could take him 

somewhere else.

[JACKSON]: Oh, oh, oh, oh.
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PETERSON: The bitch wouldn’t fucking—I done 

broke his jaw, knocked all his teeth out, his eye ball 

hanging out his fucking head, the bitch wouldn’t go out, so 

I had to go pop pop and haul ass. By that time, I’m 

covered from head to toe—

[JACKSON]: Blood.

PETERSON: So I hauled ass out way out to the 

west—

[JACKSON]: Yeah.

PETERSON: Hauled ass out to the fucking—got 

brain matter, the whole fucking nine yards. I went out to 

fucking Baldwin, stripped down, took a shower, scrubbed 

myself with a brush, got dressed, come back, still hit the 

cameras . . . .

. . . .

PETERSON: Set all my clothes, all my clothes, the 

vehicle I was driving, and the gun, you’ll never find it. I 

don’t give a fuck who you are. You can be Inspector 

[Clouseau], you ain’t finding this shit. Drove back, and 

the man that I was working for says I was there from 9:00 

to 11:00 and from 11:00 to 12:00. I eat lunch and from 

12:00 to 1:00. I was sitting at my mama’s house when 

they came and informed us he got killed.

Peterson next discussed his former girlfriend, who was buried in 

Greenlawn Cemetery, telling Jackson that Andrews “landed on her 

grave.” Peterson also admitted that he made mistakes regarding some 

aspects of the plan because during the crime, there was a struggle and 

Peterson lost his hat and left some fingerprints in the truck. [N.2] He 

planned to explain this evidence by saying that he left his fingerprints 

when he was with Andrews the night before and Andrews had a nose 

bleed. 

[N.2] The police were unable to obtain any usable 

fingerprints from the truck.

Dr. Jesse Giles, the medical examiner, testified that Andrews 

had a significant number of blunt force injuries spread over his head 

and neck that were consistent with brass knuckles and that occurred 

shortly before the time of death. Andrews’ cause of death was two 
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contact gunshot wounds, where the gun was pressed against the 

victim’s head. One gunshot wound was at Andrews’ left temple. The 

other wound entered over Andrews’ right ear, and the bone fragments 

from this wound severed the brain stem, which was fatal. 

After the State rested, Peterson testified in his defense, denying 

that he killed Andrews. Peterson testified that he had visited Bike 

Week one time, and while there, he bought about four Bike Week 

hats. According to Peterson, on the day before the murder, he went to 

his mother’s house to buy lottery tickets for her and saw Andrews 

sitting in his truck. Andrews had a trickle of blood coming from his 

nose, so Peterson helped wipe it away. He then left and bought the 

tickets as he planned to do. When he brought the tickets back to his 

mother’s house, he noticed the interior light of the truck was on, so he 

reached into Andrews’ truck and turned off the light, knocking off his 

hat. He did not reach down to retrieve his hat because he was in a 

hurry to return to his hotel room with his girlfriend. 

Peterson further testified that on the day that Andrews was 

killed, he got up at 5:30 that morning and wore a jacket because it was 

very cold in the hotel room. He spent the morning on various errands 

and went to his mother’s house. Around 9 a.m., Peterson began to 

work on a siding project near his mother’s house. Shortly after he 

began, he realized that his phone was missing, so he left to find it. 

Peterson explained that the reason he was dressed differently when he 

arrived at his hotel room late that morning was because he had taken 

off his hat and left it at his mother’s house, along with his warmer 

clothes. He also was not wearing shoes because his shoes got dirty 

when he walked through a yard during the siding project. 

In explaining the incriminating statements that he made to 

Jackson, Peterson testified that near the time of the murder, he had a 

drug deal going on with Jackson, where he had “invested” $10,000 so 

that Jackson could sell the drugs and he could make a $4,000 profit. 

In an attempt to get his money back, he made up a story that he beat 

his stepfather so badly that he knocked out his eyeball and all of his 

teeth—something that was not even accurate as to Andrews’ actual 

injuries. 

In his defense, Peterson also called Joel Sockwell, who testified 

that he lived near Peterson’s mother’s house. On the day of the 

murder, Sockwell went to work, but left around 9 a.m. and saw 

Peterson in the neighborhood while he was out on the patio. 

However, Sockwell was not certain about the times. 
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The jury found Peterson guilty of first-degree murder and 

tampering with evidence. 

Id. at 519-22.

During the penalty phase, the State presented four victim impact statements 

and relied upon the evidence already presented to establish the aggravating factors. 

Id. at 522. This Court summarized the evidence presented by Peterson during the 

penalty phase as follows: 

The defense presented numerous witnesses, most of whom lost 

contact with Peterson in recent years but testified that years ago, 

Peterson was a good worker and friend. Many of the witnesses who 

testified on Peterson’s behalf knew of Peterson’s involvement at the 

raceway where Peterson raced cars. For example, David Bradshaw

testified that he had known Peterson since 1986, when they raced 

together. According to Bradshaw, during that time, Andrews and 

Peterson got along well and worked on cars together. However, 

Bradshaw did not have regular contact with Peterson during the last

five years. During this period of time, Peterson was married, but he 

and his wife eventually divorced. A few witnesses testified that they 

speculated that Peterson might have become addicted to drugs after 

the divorce, but never actually witnessed Peterson use any illegal 

substances.

In addition, Peterson presented testimony to establish that he 

had not received any disciplinary reports since he was in jail. 

Peterson also called his aunt, Laverne Rundall, who testified that she 

likewise had once contemplated whether Peterson was under the 

influence of drugs when she saw Peterson outside of Andrews’ office 

at the Jacksonville Metro Treatment Center and did not recognize him 

because he was so scruffy and skinny. She asserted that Andrews and 

Peterson had a good relationship until recently, when they argued 

about money. On cross-examination, she asserted that Peterson

obtained his truck and most of his money through his mother and 

Andrews.

Peterson’s mother, Patricia Andrews, also testified on his 

behalf, asserting that Peterson and Andrews were very close and 
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previously were involved in racing together. At the time of the 

murder, Andrews had been Peterson’s stepfather for about eighteen 

years. According to Patricia, Peterson supported her significantly 

since she has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and also provided 

a tremendous amount of support to Andrews when he was undergoing 

cancer treatment. They paid him for his help, including paying his 

child support and his truck insurance in exchange for his assistance. 

Andrews invited Peterson to live with them and told Peterson that if 

he was not working, they would find things for him to do around the 

house. On cross-examination, she admitted that Andrews recently had 

changed the arrangement, so that Peterson could not obtain money 

from one person without telling the other person. They tried to talk to 

Peterson about obtaining a better job. 

Id. at 522-23. 

The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five for the 

murder of Andrews. Id. at 523. Following the jury’s recommendation, the trial 

court found three aggravating factors: (1) the murder was cold, calculated, and 

premediated (CCP); (2) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (3) 

the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. Id. Peterson did not offer any 

statutory mitigation, and none was found. The court found two nonstatutory 

mitigating circumstances: (1) Peterson had a history of drug abuse, and (2) 

Peterson had numerous positive qualities. Id. The trial court “sentenced Peterson 

to death, concluding that ‘[t]he three weighty aggravators, when weighed against 

the two non-statutory mitigators, which were assigned only at best slight weight, 

support a death sentence.’ ” Id.
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On direct appeal, Peterson raised eight claims: (1) the trial court erred in 

admitting a statement that could imply Peterson committed a prior murder; (2) the

trial court erred in permitting the State to present certain victim impact evidence; 

(3) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the statements that 

Peterson made to Jackson; (4) the trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravating

factor; (5) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed for 

pecuniary gain; (6) the trial court erred in giving little weight to the evidence 

pertaining to Peterson’s cocaine addiction; (7) the death sentence is 

disproportionate; and (8) this Court should reconsider whether Florida’s death 

penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 

Peterson, 94 So. 3d at 523. We unanimously affirmed Peterson’s convictions, id.

at 538, and Peterson’s sentence became final in 2012.1 Id. at 514.

On November 13, 2013, Peterson filed an initial motion for postconviction 

relief, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Peterson’s motion 

for postconviction relief raised the following ten claims: (1) Peterson’s due process 

rights were violated when counsel lost or destroyed records; (2) ineffective 

assistance of counsel; (3) Peterson was denied his constitutional rights and the 

 

1. Justice Pariente, joined by Chief Justice Labarga and Justice Perry,

dissented as to the sentence because none of the aggravators were unanimously 

found by the jury, relying on Ring, 536 U.S. 584. Peterson, 94 So. 3d at 538 

(Pariente, J., concurring as to conviction and dissenting as to sentence). 
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effective assistance of counsel under the rules prohibiting Peterson’s lawyers from 

interviewing jurors; (4) the State improperly withheld material evidence in 

violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (5) Peterson was denied his 

right to effective mental health assistance of a mental health expert as required by 

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); (6) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 

unconstitutional because it allows trial court judges unfettered discretion to assign 

weights to mitigating and aggravating factors without providing a baseline for their 

discretion; (7) Duval County prosecutor’s discretionary use of the death penalty is 

arbitrary and thus violates the Eighth Amendment as announced in Furman v. 

Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); (8) Florida’s use of the death penalty violates the 

Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency because juries are not 

required to issue a unanimous death sentence and Florida still adheres to a widely 

criticized practice of allowing a judge to override a jury’s life verdict; (9) the 

cumulative prejudice resultant from numerous instances of counsel’s deficient 

performance resulted in an unfair trial; and (10) Peterson is innocent of first-degree 

murder. 

After a four-part evidentiary hearing on claims 1, 2, and 4, the 

postconviction court denied Peterson’s motion. Peterson appeals the denial of his 

motion, contending the postconviction court erred by: (1) denying Peterson’s 

motion to recuse or disqualify the postconviction judge; (2) denying Peterson’s 
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motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s expert, Dr. Alan J. Waldman; (3) 

denying Peterson’s claim that his due process rights were violated when trial 

counsel lost or destroyed Peterson’s trial records; (4) determining that trial counsel 

was not ineffective in the guilt and penalty phases in failing to establish an 

attorney-client relationship and in failing to investigate and present experts and lay 

witnesses to demonstrate substantial mitigation; and (5) denying Peterson’s motion 

to appoint Dr. Morton, violating Peterson’s due process rights. Peterson also 

argues that Hurst v. Florida (Hurst v. Florida), 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), applies to his 

case. Additionally, Peterson raises a claim, without briefing, that the 

postconviction court’s order was erroneous for thirteen other reasons, which we 

summarily deny.2 Peterson has also filed a separate petition for habeas corpus.

We affirm the denial of relief as to Peterson’s ineffective assistance of guilt 

phase counsel claim, but because we conclude that Peterson is entitled to a new 

penalty phase proceeding under Hurst, we decline to address his other penalty 

 

2. We once again repeat that this Court deems waived arguments made 

without briefing. See Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 101 (Fla. 2011). As this 

Court has explained, “to merely refer to arguments presented during the 

postconviction proceedings without further elucidation is not sufficient . . . and 

these claims are deemed to have been waived.” Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 

482 (Fla. 2008) (citation omitted). This Court has further explained that “[t]he 

purpose of a legal brief is to offer argument in support of the issues raised on 

appeal.” Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 685 (Fla. 2010).
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phase claims.3 Additionally, as we discuss first, we affirm the denial of Peterson’s

motion to recuse or disqualify the postconviction judge. 

ANALYSIS

Motion to Recuse or Disqualify Trial Judge in Postconviction Proceedings

At the outset, Peterson contends that the postconviction court erred in 

denying his motion to disqualify the trial judge during the postconviction 

proceedings.4 “A motion to disqualify is governed substantively by section 38.10, 

Florida Statutes [(2014)], and procedurally by Florida Rule of Judicial 

Administration 2.330.” Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Fla. 2007). The 

statute requires that the moving party file an affidavit in good faith “stating fear 

that he or she will not receive a fair trial . . . on account of the prejudice of the 

judge” as well as “the facts and the reasons for the belief that any such bias or 

prejudice exists.” § 38.10, Fla. Stat. (2014). “The judge against whom an initial 

 

3. Specifically, because we conclude Peterson is entitled to a new penalty 

phase, we do not address his claims that the postconviction court erred in not 

excluding the testimony of the State’s expert, neuropsychiatrist Dr. Alan J. 

Waldman, or erred in denying Peterson’s motion to appoint Dr. William A. 

Morton, a psychopharmacolgist, as both experts either testified or would have 

testified as to the ineffectiveness of penalty phase counsel. 

4. On April 23, 2014, Peterson filed a petition for writ of prohibition 

seeking to disqualify the trial judge on the same basis he raises on appeal. On May 

22, 2014, this Court unanimously denied the petition without prejudice to raise the 

issue on appeal. Peterson v. State, 145 So. 3d 827 (Fla. 2014) (table).
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motion to disqualify . . . is directed shall determine only the legal sufficiency of the 

motion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 

2.330(f). A trial judge’s ruling on a motion to disqualify “may be assigned as error 

and may be reviewed as are other rulings of the trial court.” § 38.10, Fla. Stat.

(2014).

Peterson’s motion alleged that the trial judge improperly made comments 

regarding the efficacy of mitigation coordinators in other cases, including a case 

where the mitigation coordinator—Sarah Flynn—was the same mitigation 

coordinator appointed to Peterson’s case during postconviction proceedings. 

These comments, Peterson contends, displayed a bias against mitigation 

coordinators that created a belief that he would not receive a fair postconviction 

hearing because the postconviction court would “not neutrally consider mitigation 

that is offered through a mitigation coordinator.” Peterson’s motion does not 

allege that the trial judge made any statements in this case regarding mitigation 

coordinators, and in fact, the trial judge appointed a mitigation coordinator in 

Peterson’s postconviction proceedings below. 

We conclude that not only was the motion to disqualify or recuse legally 

insufficient, but the order denying the motion did not impermissibly exceed the 

scope of the inquiry by passing on the truth of the facts alleged. As this Court 

explained in Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978), “[w]hen a judge has 
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looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a suggestion of prejudice and 

attempted to refute the charges of partiality, he has then exceeded the proper scope 

of his inquiry and on that basis alone established grounds for his disqualification.” 

Id. at 442. 

This Court has previously considered whether the denial of a motion to 

recuse or disqualify a trial judge has exceeded the proper scope of the inquiry by 

considering whether the order “passed on the truth of the facts alleged and 

adjudicated the question of his disqualification.” Cave v. State, 660 So. 2d 705, 

708 (Fla. 1995) (emphasis added). We conclude that the postconviction judge’s 

denial of Peterson’s motion to recuse or disqualify in this case did not “pass[] on 

the truth of the facts alleged and adjudicate[] the question of his disqualification.” 

Id. Rather, the order denied Peterson’s motion as legally insufficient because the 

facts alleged—that the postconviction court had made prior written statements in 

other cases regarding the use of mitigation specialists—would not “place a 

reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” 

Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983). In short, the order only

stated the basis for the legal insufficiency of the motion and went no further. 

Accordingly, we deny this claim. 
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Lost or Destroyed Trial Records

Peterson alleges that his due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated when trial 

counsel Fletcher “lost or destroyed” Peterson’s trial records. This error, Peterson 

asserts, prohibited counsel from adequately investigating and pleading claims of 

ineffectiveness. Intertwined with this claim is Peterson’s contention that a conflict 

of interest existed between him and trial counsel Fletcher due to Fletcher’s 

burdensome caseload and what Peterson describes as a “severely strained attorneyclient relationship between Peterson and Fletcher.” 

We “review for the circuit court’s denial of this claim [for] abuse of 

discretion.” Jones v. State, 928 So. 2d 1178, 1192 (Fla. 2006) (citing Parker v. 

State, 904 So. 2d 370, 379 (Fla. 2005)). However, “[t]he law is scarce on [the] 

issue” of whether the loss or destruction of trial counsel’s trial records hindered 

appellate counsel’s investigation and, therefore, violated the postconviction 

defendant’s due process rights. Id. We explained in Jones that “the Eleventh 

Circuit has stated that ‘[w]hen a defendant asserts prejudice because of the loss of 

evidence, he must show that the loss impaired his ability to provide a meaningful 

defense.’ ” Id. at 1192-93 (quoting United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863, 872 

(11th Cir. 1982)). In denying Peterson’s claim, the postconviction court found as 

follows:
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Fletcher denied destroying any of Defendant’s case files. Fletcher 

instead testified that, in response to the Defendant’s complaints 

regarding Fletcher at sentencing and Defendant’s request that 

someone else hold onto the files, Fletcher packed Defendant’s records 

in ten or eleven boxes and delivered them to Nolan at the [Regional 

Collateral Counsel] office. Fletcher specifically recalled loading the 

boxes “into the back of [his] green [SUV]” and taking them over to 

Nolan’s office. Fletcher also vehemently denied commenting on 

Defendant’s guilt or intentionally providing ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The Court finds Fletcher’s testimony worthy of belief. See

Foster v. State, 929 So. 2d 524, 537 (Fla. 2006) (“[T]he trial court has 

‘the superior vantage point to see and hear the witnesses and judge 

their credibility.’ ”). Further, the Court must note that before 

Defendant’s case was “closed out,” [Regional Collateral Counsel] 

moved the location of its office and had to transport all of their files to 

the new location. 

(Record citations omitted.)

We agree with the postconviction court that Peterson cannot demonstrate 

that the absence of these eleven trial box records, which Fletcher testified 

contained “supplemental” files that were mostly duplicative of records that could 

be reproduced, such as general police records, violated his due process rights. This 

Court previously considered whether the loss of “trial counsel’s personal notes of 

any interviews he had with [his client], [the client’s] relatives, or other witnesses, 

as well as phone messages and impressions and theories of the case” hindered 

“collateral counsel’s investigation.” Jones, 928 So. 2d at 1193. As this Court 

explained, “these personal notes and impressions most likely would support the 

State’s position by identifying specific reasons for trial counsel’s choice not to call 

certain witnesses or pursue various courses of action.” Id. Unlike in Jones, the 
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files in this case contained “the State’s discovery exhibits, copies of police reports, 

copies of depositions, DVD discs with interview, phone calls . . . probably four 

boxes full of case law,” and “reproduction of the same things over and over and 

over.”

Additionally, “[Peterson’s] counsel does not identify what records were not 

available, or what particular argument he is prevented from making due to a lack of 

records.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 29 (Fla. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 

16-9033 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2017) (rejecting similar claim relating to lost trial records);

see Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 21 (Fla. 2003) (holding that defendant who “has 

not pointed to any errors that occurred during the portions of the proceedings that 

were not transcribed” is not entitled to habeas relief). 

Peterson also does not point to any prejudice arising from the lost or 

destroyed trial records, presumably because he alleges, relying on United States v. 

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), that an actual conflict of interest existed between him 

and trial counsel Fletcher. In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court held that 

the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have “counsel acting in the role of 

an advocate” by requiring defense counsel to put the prosecution’s case to 

meaningful adversarial testing. Id. at 656-59. Cronic, thus, “created an exception 

to the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] standard for ineffective 

assistance of counsel and acknowledged that certain circumstances are so 
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egregiously prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be presumed.” 

Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1152 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

We have explained that the Cronic standard is reserved for when “the 

assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or withheld during a critical stage of 

the proceeding such that the ‘likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that 

a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary.’ ” Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199, 212 (Fla. 

2009) (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002)). Peterson has 

provided little evidence as to how his relationship with Fletcher or Fletcher’s 

burdensome caseload demonstrated the high standard of “per se ineffective 

assistance” of counsel. Id. at 212-13. Therefore, we reject Peterson’s attempt to 

rely on the per se rule from Cronic to avoid establishing prejudice for his claim. 

Accordingly, we deny this claim.

Ineffective Assistance of Guilt Phase Counsel

Because Peterson is entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst, we do not 

address whether Peterson’s counsel was ineffective in the penalty phase of his trial. 

To determine whether Peterson is entitled to a new guilt phase, however, we 

address his claim that guilt phase counsel was deficient in failing to establish an 

attorney-client relationship and was operating under an actual conflict of interest. 
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Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland, this 

Court has explained that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be 

successful, two requirements must be satisfied: 

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 

lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 

competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 

Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 

demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 

proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 

Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. 

Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted)). 

To establish the deficiency prong under Strickland, the defendant must prove 

that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under “prevailing professional 

norms.” Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 688). “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 

be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

As to the prejudice prong of Strickland, this Court has explained:

With respect to those claims alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel specifically during the penalty phase, penalty-phase prejudice 

under the Strickland standard is measured by “whether the error of 

trial counsel undermines this Court’s confidence in the sentence of 

death when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and 

the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.” Hurst [v. 

State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1013 (Fla. 2009)]. Under this standard, a 
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defendant is not required “to show ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct 

more likely than not altered the outcome’ of his penalty proceeding, 

but rather that he establish ‘a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in [that] outcome.’ ” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 

(2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). 

Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 865, 873 (Fla. 2013). 

“[T]his Court’s standard of review is two-pronged: (1) this Court must defer 

to the [trial] court’s findings on factual issues so long as competent, substantial 

evidence supports them; but (2) must review de novo ultimate conclusions on the 

deficiency and prejudice prongs.” Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 472 (Fla. 2010) 

(quoting Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 421-22 (Fla. 2004)). “Thus, under 

Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law 

and fact, with deference to be given only to the lower court’s factual findings.” 

Eaglin v. State, 176 So. 3d 900, 906 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Stephens v. State, 748 So. 

2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999)). 

Peterson contends that his trial counsel was per se ineffective because of an 

actual conflict of interest and because of counsel’s failure to establish an attorneyclient relationship. Peterson, however, presents little argument for his claim that 

counsel was deficient in establishing an attorney-client relationship and operated 

under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his representation of 

Peterson. Peterson’s entire argument on appeal as to this claim is that because 

counsel Fletcher represented six other capital defendants during the time he 
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represented Peterson, and in one of these cases, the assistant state attorney emailed Fletcher more than a year after Peterson was convicted to suggest that 

Fletcher withdraw in the case because of his busy schedule, Peterson was deprived 

of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Peterson also does not allege with any 

specificity how Fletcher failed to establish an attorney-client relationship with 

Peterson except to briefly reference that Fletcher only visited Peterson in jail 

intermittently. In short, Peterson has not raised before this Court a specific claim 

of deficiency, and instead relies on “speculative allegations of ineffectiveness.” 

Miller v. State, 161 So. 3d 354, 368 (Fla. 2015). Moreover, we agree with the 

postconviction court’s analysis of Peterson’s subclaim that Peterson has failed to 

meet his burden in proving that Fletcher’s workload constituted an actual conflict 

of interest that deprived Peterson of his constitutional right to counsel. In fact, as 

already discussed, it appears that Peterson is attempting to “rely on the per se rule 

from Cronic to avoid establishing prejudice” for his claim. Chavez, 12 So. 3d at 

213. 

Accordingly, we deny this claim.

Hurst Relief

Peterson contends that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the United States 

Supreme Court’s opinion in Hurst v. Florida, which held that Florida’s capital 

sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a 
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jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A 

jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.” 136 S. Ct. at 619. On remand, this 

Court held that a unanimous jury recommendation for death is required before the 

trial court may impose a sentence of death. Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 54. Moreover, 

this Court held that “in addition to unanimously finding the existence of any 

aggravating factor, the jury must also unanimously find that the aggravating factors 

are sufficient for the imposition of death and unanimously find that the aggravating 

factors outweigh the mitigation before a sentence of death may be considered by 

the judge.” Id. We also determined that Hurst error is capable of harmless error 

review. Id. at 67. 

Hurst applies retroactively to defendants whose sentences became final after 

the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring. Mosley, 209 So. 3d 

at 1283. Thus, Hurst applies retroactively to this case, which became final in 2012. 

Accordingly, we must determine whether the Hurst error during Peterson’s 

penalty phase proceeding was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “[I]n the 

context of a Hurst v. Florida error, the burden is on the State, as the beneficiary of 

the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s failure to unanimously 

find all the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to 

[the] death sentence.” Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 68. As applied to the right to a jury 

trial with regard to the facts necessary to impose the death penalty, it must be clear 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found that 

each aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 

aggravating factors were sufficient to impose death, and that the aggravating 

factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.

We conclude that the State cannot establish that the error in Peterson’s case 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Peterson’s case, the jury did not make 

the requisite factual findings and did not unanimously recommend a sentence of 

death. Instead, the jury recommended the sentence of death by a vote of seven to 

five. Therefore, this Court has no way of knowing if the jury unanimously found 

any of the three aggravating factors—CCP, HAC, pecuniary gain—that the 

aggravating factors were sufficient to impose a death sentence, or whether the 

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Further, this Court 

cannot speculate why the five jurors who voted to recommend a sentence of life 

imprisonment determined that a sentence of death was not the appropriate 

punishment. Thus, we conclude that the Hurst error in Peterson’s case was not 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, we note that the jury in 

Peterson’s case recommended a sentence of death by the same narrow vote that 

Timothy Lee Hurst’s jury recommended where the aggravating factors presented 
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required a factual determination. See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 47. Accordingly, we

vacate Peterson’s sentence of death and remand for a new penalty phase.5 

HABEAS PETITION

In addition to appealing the denial of his postconviction motion, Peterson 

has filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition raises six issues,

6

the 

majority of which allege ineffectiveness of trial counsel and are therefore not 

properly addressed in a habeas petition. See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 

668 n.13 (Fla. 2000). Additionally, Peterson’s claim that the trial court violated his 

due process rights by appointing trial counsel with a high caseload which 

precluded counsel from providing effective representation merely uses “different 

grounds to reargue” his postconviction claim that trial counsel operated under an 

 

5. We reject Peterson’s argument that section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes 

(2015), entitles him to be resentenced to life imprisonment. See Hurst, 202 So. 3d 

at 44, 63-66. 

6. Peterson’s six habeas claims are as follows: (1) whether Peterson’s direct 

appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim; (2) 

whether Peterson’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to test and investigate 

DNA evidence; (3) whether Peterson’s direct appeal counsel was ineffective in 

failing to ensure that the entire record was transcribed; (4) whether trial counsel 

was ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of Peterson’s confession; 

(5) whether the trial court violated Peterson’s due process rights by appointing trial 

counsel with an unrealistically high caseload which prevented trial counsel from 

providing effective assistance; and (6) whether trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to challenge the fact that the State’s confidential informant acted outside of 

the scope of what is allowed.
- 25 -

actual conflict of interest, and is therefore “improper.” Breedlove v. Singletary, 

595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992). Accordingly, we address only his first and third 

habeas claims that pertain to the ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel. 

Peterson claims that his appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise a 

Fourth Amendment violation claim stating that the search of Peterson’s cell phone 

violated his Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. 

However, Peterson devotes his argument to alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel

for not arguing that the search was illegal and moving to suppress the evidence. 

Therefore, it would appear that because trial counsel did not move to suppress the 

evidence gathered from Peterson’s cell phone, the issue of whether the police 

search of Peterson’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment was not preserved. 

Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present arguments 

that are unpreserved and procedurally barred. See Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d 20,

35 (Fla. 2010). “The only exception to this is when the claim involves 

fundamental error,” which Peterson has not alleged. Id. Accordingly, we deny 

Peterson’s claim. 

Peterson also contends that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 

ensure that the entire trial record was transcribed and became a part of the record 

on appeal. In Ferguson v. Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53, 58 (Fla. 1993), this Court

rejected a similar claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to have 
- 26 -

transcribed portions of the record, including parts of voir dire, the charge 

conference, and a discussion of whether the defendant would testify. The Court

reasoned that “[h]ad appellate counsel asserted error which went uncorrected 

because of the missing record, or had [the defendant] pointed to errors in this 

petition, this claim may have had merit.” Id. However, because the defendant 

“point[ed] to no specific error which occurred” during the portions of the record 

that remained untranscribed, the Court concluded that appellate counsel was not 

ineffective. Id.; see also Turner v. Dugger, 614 So. 2d 1075, 1079-80 (Fla. 1992)

(finding defendant had not been prejudiced by failure of counsel to have charge 

conference transcribed). More recently, in Thompson, 759 So. 2d 650, this Court 

considered a similar claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when 

counsel did not provide this Court with an adequate record during the direct appeal 

“because some pretrial hearings and bench conferences were not transcribed and 

included in the appellate record.” Id. at 660. In rejecting this claim, this Court 

explained, that “[a]s with the defendant in Ferguson, Thompson has not pointed to 

any errors that occurred during the untranscribed portions of the proceedings. 

Therefore, these habeas claims are without merit.” Id. 

Peterson has not “pointed to any errors that occurred during the 

untranscribed portions of the proceedings.” Id. Accordingly, we deny this habeas 

claim. 
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief and 

deny Peterson’s petition for habeas corpus relief. However, we vacate Peterson’s 

sentence of death and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding under Hurst. 

It is so ordered. 

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion.

CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 

POLSTON, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LAWSON, J., concurring specially.

See Okafor v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S639, S641, 2017 WL 2481266, at 

*6 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially).

CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority’s decisions to affirm the denial of Peterson’s 

motion to recuse or disqualify the trial judge, to affirm the denial of relief 

regarding the conviction, and to deny habeas relief. However, I dissent from the 

decision to vacate the death sentence because, as I have previously explained, 

Hurst should not be given retroactive effect. See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 

1285-91 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
- 28 -

other penalty phase issues raised by Peterson are without merit. Accordingly, I 

would affirm Peterson’s death sentence.

POLSTON, J., concurs.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 

Lawrence Page Haddock, Judge - Case No. 162005CF011551AXXXMA

And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 

Frank Tassone and Casey Woolsey of Tassone & Dreicer, LLC, Jacksonville, 

Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer L. Keegan, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent