COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

PAUL F. LEE, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2588-98-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 FEBRUARY 15, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPOMATTOX COUNTY 

Richard S. Blanton, Judge 

 Michael J. Brickhill (Michael J. Brickhill, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Paul F. Lee, Jr., (appellant) appeals from his jury trial 

convictions for two counts of taking indecent liberties with a 

minor pursuant to Code § 18.2-370.1. On appeal, he contends the 

trial court erred in admitting "evidence regarding [his] 

possession of pornographic videotapes" because it was unduly 

prejudicial. We hold that appellant waived his right to object to 

admission of a videotape box and testimony about the box and a 

videotape from the victims, A.L. and M.L., whom appellant allowed 

to view the videotape immediately prior to committing the charged 

offenses. We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
discretion in admitting into evidence a companion videotape--which 

the girls found in appellant's trailer but did not actually watch 

and which appellant subsequently turned over to an 

investigator--and brief testimony from the investigator about the 

tape's contents. Therefore, we affirm appellant's convictions. 

A. 

WAIVER 

 We hold that appellant failed properly to preserve for appeal 

any objection to the admission of the videotape box, 

Commonwealth's exhibit two. 

 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the videotape box, and 

the trial court admitted it without objection from defense 

counsel. Because appellant did not object to the admission of 

Commonwealth's exhibit two, the videotape box, Rule 5A:18 bars our 

consideration of this question on appeal. Similarly, appellant 

raised no objection to the testimony of A.L. and M.L. that the 

videotape box was the one they found in appellant's trailer. He 

also posed no objection to their testimony about finding two 

videotapes hidden in appellant's pantry and their graphic 

descriptions of the X-rated videotape they watched, which involved 

different sexual acts between a woman and two men. Moreover, the 

record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or 

ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. 

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B. 

ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEOTAPE AND TESTIMONY ABOUT ITS CONTENTS 

 "Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however 

slight, to establish a fact at issue in the case." Ragland v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 918, 434 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1993). 

[I]ts relevancy "must be weighed against the 

tendency of the offered evidence to produce 

passion and prejudice out of proportion to 

its probative value." The responsibility for 

balancing these competing considerations is 

largely within the sound discretion of the 

trial judge. And a trial court's 

discretionary ruling will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. 

Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986) 

(citations omitted). 

 Evidence of other bad acts or crimes is not admissible merely 

to show a defendant's predisposition to commit such acts or 

crimes. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 

176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970). However, "'if such evidence tends to 

prove any other relevant fact of the offense charged, and is 

otherwise admissible, it will not be excluded merely because it 

also shows him to have been guilty of another crime.'" Williams 

v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 837, 841, 127 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1962). 

Where a course of criminal conduct is 

continuous and interwoven, consisting of a 

series of related crimes, the perpetrator has 

no right to have the evidence "sanitized" 

. . . . The fact-finder is entitled to all 

of the relevant and connected facts, 

including those which followed the commission 

of the crime on trial, as well as those which 

preceded it; even though they may show the 

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defendant guilty of other offenses. Evidence 

of such connected criminal conduct is often 

relevant to show motive, method, and intent. 

Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526-27, 323 S.E.2d 572, 577 

(1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

 Appellant argued at trial that the videotape and its contents 

were both (a) irrelevant, because the tape was not "the [one] in 

question," and (b) more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. 

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, established that the tape was relevant because it 

was one of two X-rated videotapes A.L. and M.L. found in 

appellant's trailer, with appellant's help, preceding the charged 

acts. A.L. and appellant testified that the girls found two 

movies in appellant's trailer, and although the girls watched only 

one, appellant said both tapes were pornographic. When 

Investigator Ricky Baldwin asked appellant if he still had any 

movies at his trailer, appellant responded that he had "no idea" 

what happened to the movie the girls actually watched but that 

"the other one" was "ou[t] in my van." Appellant then retrieved 

the tape from his van and turned it over to Investigator Baldwin. 

Further, A.L.'s and M.L.'s testimony regarding the contents of the 

X-rated tape they actually viewed was in line with the testimony 

of Investigator Baldwin about the content of the companion X-rated 

tape he received from appellant. Therefore, the companion tape, 

the way Baldwin came into possession of the tape, and Baldwin's 

testimony about the tape's contents were relevant to corroborate 

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the victims' testimony about the events leading up to charged 

offenses. 

 Appellant argues that our decision in Blaylock v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 579, 496 S.E.2d 97 (1998), required the 

exclusion of the videotape and related testimony as more 

prejudicial than probative. Again, we disagree. 

 We held in Blaylock that, although evidence of other crimes 

or bad acts may be admissible to prove intent or absence of 

mistake or accident, such evidence is not admissible "where a 

defendant's intent is genuinely uncontested." Id. at 588-89, 592, 

496 S.E.2d at 101-02, 103. Under such circumstances, we said, 

"any nominal probative value will be easily outweighed by the 

danger of prejudice." Id. at 592, 496 S.E.2d at 103. Blaylock

involved a charge for aggravated sexual battery of an 

eleven-year-old girl which was based on an incident occurring many 

years earlier in 1985. See id. at 584, 496 S.E.2d at 99. 

Reversing on other grounds, we noted that the trial court's 

admission of evidence of pornographic pictures and a pornographic 

story, both involving children, found on the defendant's computer 

several years after the alleged abuse was error because the only 

real issue in Blaylock was "'"the commission of the act itself,"' 

rather than [the defendant's] intent in committing the act." Id.

at 592-93, 496 S.E.2d at 103-04 (citations omitted). We 

specifically noted, however, that Blaylock "[did] not involve the 

use of other bad acts evidence where the other acts [were] 

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continuous and interwoven or part of a series of related crimes." 

Id. at 592 n.4, 496 S.E.2d at 103 n.4. 

 In appellant's case, the challenged videotape was interwoven 

with the offense for which appellant was being tried. It was one 

of two X-rated videotapes the victims found in appellant's 

trailer, and it was the same videotape appellant turned over to 

police when questioned about the incident. Further, it was 

relevant to establishing appellant's intent and the absence of 

mistake or accident in appellant's exposing himself to A.L. and 

M.L. 

 Appellant was charged with violating Code § 18.2-370.1. The 

Commonwealth was required to prove, therefore, that appellant 

acted with "the intent to sexually molest, arouse, or gratify any 

person," Code § 18.2-67.10(6), or with "lascivious intent," Code 

§ 18.2-370.1, which is "a state of mind that is eager for sexual 

indulgence, desirous of inciting to lust or of inciting sexual 

desire and appetite," McKeon v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 24, 27, 175 

S.E.2d 282, 284 (1970). 

 Although appellant claims he denied the incident ever took 

place--thereby rendering evidence of other bad acts inadmissible, 

under Blaylock, to prove intent--this is not entirely accurate. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, appellant admitted in his statement to police that 

the girls walked in on him while he was masturbating and that he 

may unintentionally have exposed himself to them. He also said 

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the girls found two X-rated videotapes and viewed one of them. 

The girls testified, on the other hand, that appellant encouraged 

them to look for the videotapes, intentionally disrobed and 

encouraged them to do the same, and encouraged them to masturbate 

him when M.L. referred to the videotape they viewed and asked a 

question about ejaculation. The Commonwealth's evidence, 

therefore, placed appellant's intent in issue and justified 

admission into evidence of the videotape itself and Baldwin's 

brief testimony describing it. Because Baldwin's description of 

the videotape's contents was brief and the record provides no 

indication that the jury viewed the videotape itself, we cannot 

say the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the 

probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudice 

resulting from its admission. 

 For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in 

admitting the challenged evidence, and we affirm appellant's 

convictions. 

Affirmed.

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