### COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

I N THE INTEREST OF

R.A.A., T.J.A., and S.M.A.,

Children. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 9

- 00 21 3

- CV

Appeal from the

65th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2018DCM5057 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss this parental termination appeal, stating that the

notice of appeal was prematurely filed as the trial court has not yet rendered a final judgment in

this case. 1

1 On July 26, 2018, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed an Original Petition for Protection

of a Child, For Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent

- Child Relationship. The parties

listed to be served were L .M. (Mother) and R.A. (Father). On July 16, 2019, the trial court issued an order titled

“Interlocutory Order of Termination on [Mother]” in which Mother’s parental rights were terminated. The order did

not discuss Father. The clerk’s record filed in th is case shows that after the notice of appeal was filed in this case, the

trial court issued a “Permanency Hearing Order Before Final Order” in which the trial court stated that Mother “had

her parental rights terminated by interlocutory order signed July 15, 2019” but that Father’s parental rights remained

intact. This order noted that the date of dismissal for the cause was set for January 24, 2020, and that trial was set for

December 13, 2019.

We note that prior to 2007, former T EX .F AM .C ODE A NN

. § 263. 401(d) made it possible in a termination case brought

by the Department for there to be a final order that did not dispose of all parties and claims. See In re J.D. , 304 S.W.3d

522, 526 (Tex.App.

—

Waco 2009, no pet.). However, the Legislature amended the statute in 2007 to remove

Subsection (d). See id . (recounting legislative history) (Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 600, § 17, 1999

T EX .G EN .L AWS 2108, 2113, replealed by Act of June 15, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 866, § 5, 2007 T EX .G EN .L AWS

### 2

Rule 42.1(a) governs voluntary dismissals in civil c ases. 2 

### That rule states:

In accordance with a motion of appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal . . .

unless such disposition would prevent a party from seeking relief to which it would

otherwise be entitled.

T EX 

### .R.A PP 

### .P. 42.1(a).

Granting dismiss al in this case would not prejudice the rights of the A ppellee in this appeal.

Therefore, the Appellant’s motion for voluntary dismissal is GRANTED.

September 25, 2019

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before Rodriguez, J., Palafox, J., and Barajas, Senior Judge

Barajas, Senior Judge (Sitting by Assignment)

1837, 1838). Since the Legislature removed Subsection (d)

, courts now use the ordinary final judgment standard in

determining whether a termination order is actually final for purp oses of appeal, i.e., whether it disposes of all parties

and all claims. See id

. ; see also In Interest of C.M. , No. 01

- 15

- 00830

- CV, 2016 WL 1054589, at *5 (Tex.App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 17, 2016, no pet.)(mem. op.).

We express no opinion on whether any of the orders identified above are final or interlocutory because such a

determination is unnecessary to the resolution of this motion; Mother (the Appellant) has elected to voluntarily dismiss

her appeal, which is her right under T EX .R.A PP .P. 42.1(a).

2 As a basis for the motion to dismiss, Appellant cites T EX .R.A PP .P. 27.1, which deals with prematurely filed notices

of appeal. That rule states:

(a) Civil Cases

. In a civil case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day

of, but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting the appeal.

Rule 27.1 deals with how the Court calculates appellate deadlines when a notice of appeal is filed before a final order

is signed. However, Rule 42.1(a) sets the standard for when an appellant can voluntarily dismiss his or her own appeal

in a civil case.