alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 655

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to exclude clinical social

worker services from coverage under the Medicare skilled nursing facility

prospective payment system.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 9, 1999

Mr. STARK (for himself, Mr. LEACH, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. HINCHEY, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. MEEHAN, Mr. WAXMAN, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. FRANK of

Massachusetts, Mr. WEYGAND, Mr. RODRIGUEZ, Mr. FROST, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. DEFAZIO, Ms. KILPATRICK, Ms. RIVERS, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. BONIOR, Mr. THOMPSON of

Mississippi, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. STRICKLAND, and Mr. GEORGE MILLER

of California) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on

Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the speaker,

in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to exclude

clinical social worker services from coverage under the

Medicare skilled nursing facility prospective payment system.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 655 IH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Medicare Social Work

3 Equity Act of 1999’’.

4 SEC. 2. EXCLUDING CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER SERVICES

5 FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE MEDICARE

6 SKILLED NURSING FACILITY PROSPECTIVE

7 PAYMENT SYSTEM AND CONSOLIDATED PAY8 MENT.

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1888(e)(2)(A)(ii) of the

10 Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395yy(e)(2)(A)(ii)) is

11 amended by inserting ‘‘clinical social worker services,’’

12 after ‘‘qualified psychologist services,’’.

13 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section

14 1861(hh)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(hh)(2)) is

15 amended by striking ‘‘and other than services furnished

16 to an inpatient of a skilled nursing facility which the facil17 ity is required to provide as a requirement for participa18 tion’’.

19 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

20 this section apply as if included in the enactment of sec21 tion 4432(a) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.

Æ
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00151-CV

IN RE Dr. Richard Bruce DE BENEDETTO, M.D.

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 10, 2015

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On May 29, 2015, relator Dr. Richard Bruce DeBenedetto filed a “corrected” petition for 

writ of mandamus. Because we conclude relator has still not established his entitlement to 

mandamus relief, we deny relator’s corrected petition.

DeBenedetto filed his original mandamus petition on March 18, 2015, complaining the 

trial court had failed to order a transfer of venue in the underlying suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship. On March 25, 2015, this court issued its opinion denying the mandamus petition.2

Although relator asserted the trial court’s failure to order transfer of venue as the basis for 

mandamus relief, the record provided did not establish the trial court’s failure to rule on a properly 

 1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 111069C, styled In the Interest of E.D., E.D., I.D., and J.D., Children, 

pending in the County Court at Law, Kerr County, Texas, the Honorable Cathy Morris, Associate Judge, presiding. 2 See In re DeBenedetto, No. 04-15-00151-CV, 2015 WL 1393375, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 25, 2015, 

orig. proceeding).
04-15-00151-CV

- 2 -

filed motion, which had awaited disposition for an unreasonable period of time. See Safety-Kleen 

Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding).

In the recently filed amended petition for writ of mandamus, relator again complains of the 

trial court’s failure to consider and rule upon his motion for change of venue. With the amended 

petition, relator has provided this court with a file-stamped copy of his motion for change of venue, 

reflecting it was filed in October 2014. Relator’s request for a hearing on his motion, however, 

was not filed until May 6, 2015. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(1) (movant has the burden to request a 

setting on a motion to transfer venue).

In order to be entitled to mandamus relief, relator must establish the trial court: (1) had a 

legal duty to perform a non-discretionary act; (2) was asked to perform the act; and (3) failed or 

refused to do so. In re Molina, 94 S.W.3d 885, 886 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. 

proceeding). When a properly filed motion is pending before a trial court, the act of giving 

consideration to and ruling upon that motion is ministerial, and mandamus may issue to compel 

the trial judge to act. See Safety-Kleen Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 269. However, mandamus will not 

issue unless the record indicates that a properly filed motion has awaited disposition for an 

unreasonable amount of time. See id. 

Based on the record provided, we conclude relator has not shown himself entitled to 

mandamus relief. Accordingly, relator’s corrected petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).

PER CURIAM
#### § 301-51.100 What method of payment must I use to procure common carrier transportation?

You must use a Government contractor-issued individually billed travel card, centrally billed account, or GTR to procure contract passenger transportation services. For all other common carrier transportation, you must use one of the methods specified in the following table:

| For passenger transportation services costing | You must use | Unless |
| --- | --- | --- |
| (a) $10 or less, and air excess baggage charges of $15 or less for each leg of a trip | A Government contractor-issued individually billed travel card or centrally billed account | Use of the Government contractor-issued individually billed travel card is not accepted, its use is impracticable or special circumstances justify the use of a GTR. |
| (b) More than $10, but not more than $100 | A Government contractor-issued individually billed travel card, centrally billed account, or GTR | None of the other methods are practicable, you may use cash. |
| (c) More than $100 | Only a Government contractor-issued individually billed travel card, centrally billed account, or GTR | Your agency authorizes you to use a reduced fare for group, charter, or excursion arrangements or under emergency circumstances where the use of other methods is not possible. |

[FTR Amdt. 70, 63 FR 15968, Apr. 1, 1998; 63 FR 35538, June 30, 1998, as amended by FTR Amdt. 2007-05, 72 FR 61539, Oct. 31, 2007]
#### § 109-27.5104-2 Physical protection and storage.

Precious metals shall be afforded exceptional physical protection from time of receipt until disposition. Precious metals not in use shall be stored in a noncombustible combination locked repository with access limited to the designated custodian and an alternate. When there is a change in custodian or alternate having access to the repository, the combination shall be changed immediately.
March 14, 2013

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

ANNETTE GRUBICH, Appellant

NO. 14-13-00138-CV V.

DOW CORNING CORPORATION, Appellee

________________________________

Today the Court heard appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal from the 

order signed by the court below on January 29, 2013. Having considered the 

motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by 

appellant, Annette Grubich.

We further order that mandate be issued immediately.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
I

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 694

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey an administrative site

to the county of Rio Arriba, New Mexico.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 10, 1999

Mr. UDALL of New Mexico (for himself and Mrs. WILSON) introduced the

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Resources

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey an

administrative site to the county of Rio Arriba, New Mexico.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. LAND CONVEYANCE, OLD COYOTE ADMINIS4 TRATIVE SITE.

5 (a) CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY.—Not later than one

6 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary

7 of the Interior (herein the ‘‘Secretary’’) shall convey to

8 the County of Rio Arriba, New Mexico (herein the ‘‘Coun9 ty’’), subject to the terms and conditions stated in sub10 section (b), all right, title, and interest of the United
2

•HR 694 IH

1 States in and to the land (including all improvements on

2 the land) known as the ‘‘Old Coyote Administrative Site’’

located approximately 1 3 ⁄2 mile east of the Village of Coy4 ote, New Mexico, on State Road 96, comprising one tract

5 of 130.27 acres (as described in Public Land Order 3730),

6 and one tract of 276.76 acres (as described in Executive

7 Order 4599).

8 (b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—

9 (1) Consideration for the conveyance described

10 in subsection (a) shall be—

11 (A) an amount that is consistent with the

12 special pricing program for Governmental enti13 ties under the Act of June 14, 1926 (commonly

14 known as the Recreation and Public Purposes

15 Act; 43 U.S.C. 869 et seq.); and

16 (B) an agreement between the Secretary

17 and the County indemnifying the Government

18 of the United States from all liability of the

19 Government that arises from the property.

20 (2) The lands conveyed by this section shall be

21 used for public purposes. If such lands cease to be

22 used for public purposes, at the option of the United

23 States, such lands will revert to the United States.

24 (c) LAND WITHDRAWALS.—Land withdrawals under

25 Public Land Order 3730 and Executive Order 4599, as
3

•HR 694 IH

1 extended in the Federal Register on May 25, 1989 (54

2 F.R. 22629), shall be revoked simultaneous with the con3 veyance of the property under subsection (a).

Æ
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 January 8, 2019

Order 

Clerk

January 8, 2019

158622

HANAN KHARROUBI,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

SC: 158622

v COA: 344711

Wayne CC: 17-002660-CZ

HOSAM NASSEREDDINE,

Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff,

and

KAMEL KHARROUBI,

Defendant/Cross-Defendant- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties 

agreeing to the dismissal of this application for leave to appeal is considered, and the 

application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs.
§ 80.1144 Bodega and Tomales Bay, CA. ( a ) An east-west line drawn from Sand Point to Avalis Beach.
( b ) A line drawn from the seaward extremity of Bodega Harbor North Breakwater to Bodega Harbor Entrance Light 1.
[CGD 77-118a, 42 FR 35784, July 11, 1977; 42 FR 63169, Dec. 15, 1977. Redesignated by CGD 81-017, 46 FR 28154, May 26, 1981, and CGD 87-008b, 52 FR 25218, July 6, 1987]
#### § 109-40.000 Scope of part.

This part describes DOE regulations governing transportation and traffic management activities. It also covers arrangements for transportation and related services by bill of lading. These regulations are designed to ensure that all transportation and traffic management activities will be carried out in the manner most advantageous to the Government in terms of economy, efficiency, service, environment, safety and security.
§ 102-37.530 What are FAA's responsibilities in the donation of surplus property to public airports? In the donation of surplus property to public airports, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting under delegation from the DOT, is responsible for: ( a ) Determining the property requirements of any State, political subdivision of a State, or tax-supported organization for public airport use;
( b ) Setting eligibility requirements for public airports and making determinations of eligibility;
( c ) Certifying that property listed on a transfer request is desirable or necessary for public airport use;
( d ) Advising GSA of FAA officials authorized to certify transfer requests and notifying GSA of any changes in signatory authority;
( e ) Determining and enforcing compliance with the terms and conditions under which surplus personal property is transferred for public airport use; and
( f ) Authorizing public airports to visit holding agencies for the purpose of screening and selecting property for transfer. This responsibility includes: ( 1 ) Issuing a screening pass or letter of authorization to only those persons who are qualified to screen.
( 2 ) Maintaining a current record (to include names, addresses, and telephone numbers, and additional identifying information such as driver's license or social security numbers) of screeners operating under FAA authority and making such records available to GSA upon request.
( 3 ) Recovering any expired or invalid screener authorizations.
AMERICAN CONSUMERS, INC
                           NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE

                                   EXHIBIT 11

                                                       THIRTEEN WEEKS ENDED
                                                    September 2,      August 28,
                                                            2000           1999
                                                  --------------   ------------

Net income (loss) for computing income (loss)
  per common share                                $        3,200   $    (22,339)
                                                  ==============   ============



Weighted average number of common shares
  outstanding during each period                         835,618        844,042
                                                  ==============   ============



Net income(loss) per common share                 $        0.004   $     (0.026)
                                                  ==============   ============
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

N O . 09

- 22

- 00397

- CV

__________________

RICARDO GONZALEZ AND R&K FABRICATING INC.

, Appellant s

V.

DAYTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT , Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 75th District Court

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause No. TX 20105550

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ricardo Gonzalez and R&K Fabricating Inc.

, Appellant s , filed an unopposed

motion to dismiss this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). Appellant s filed the

motion bef ore the appellate court issued a decision in the appeal. We grant the

motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).2 APPEAL DISM I SSED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on April 19, 2023

Opinion Delivered April 20, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
§ 105-71.143 Enforcement. ( a ) *Remedies for noncompliance.* If a grantee or subgrantee materially fails to comply with any term of an award, whether stated in a Federal statute or regulation, an assurance, in a State plan or application, a notice of award, or elsewhere, the awarding agency may take one or more of the following actions, as appropriate in the circumstances: ( 1 ) Temporary withhold cash payments pending correction of the deficiency by the grantee or subgrantee or more severe enforcement action by the awarding agency,
( 2 ) Disallow (that is, deny both use of funds and matching credit for) all or part of the cost of the activity or action not in compliance,
( 3 ) Wholly or partly suspend or terminate the current award for the grantee's or subgrantee's program,
( 4 ) Without further awards for the program, or
( 5 ) Take other remedies that may be legally available,
( b ) *Hearings, appeals.* In taking an enforcement action, the awarding agency will provide the grantee or subgrantee an opportunity for such hearing, appeal, or other administrative proceeding to which the grantee or subgrantee is entitled under any statute or regulation applicable to the action involved.
( c ) *Effects of suspension and termination.* Costs of grantee or subgrantee resulting from obligations incurred by the grantee or subgrantee during a suspension or after termination of an award are not allowable unless the awarding agency expressly authorizes them in the notice of suspension or termination or subsequently. Other grantee or subgrantee costs during suspension or after termination which are necessary and not reasonably avoidable are allowable if: ( 1 ) The costs result from obligations which were properly incurred by the grantee or subgrantee before the effective date of suspension or termination, are not in anticipation of it, and, in case of a termination, are noncancellable, and,
( 2 ) The cost would be allowable if the award were not suspended or expired normally at the end of the funding period in which the termination takes effect.
( d ) *Relationship to debarment and suspension.* The enforcement remedies identified in this section, including suspension and termination, do not preclude grantee or subgrantee from being subject to “Debarment and Suspension” under E.O. 12549 (see § 105-71.135).
§ 105-68.940 Disqualified. *Disqualified* means that a person is prohibited from participating in specified Federal procurement or nonprocurement transactions as required under a statute, Executive order (other than Executive Orders 12549 and 12689) or other authority. Examples of disqualifications include persons prohibited under— ( a ) The Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. 276(a));
( b ) The equal employment opportunity acts and Executive orders; or
( c ) The Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7606), Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1368) and Executive Order 11738 (3 CFR, 1973 Comp., p. 799).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

       
<CAPTION>

<ARTICLE>  7
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT OF ANCHOR NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE  TO  SUCH  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>


<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                     DEC-31-1998
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>           4,248,840,000
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                      0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                        0
<EQUITIES>                         1,419,000
<MORTGAGE>                       388,780,000
<REAL-ESTATE>                     24,000,000
<TOTAL-INVEST>                 8,306,943,000
<CASH>                         3,303,454,000
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                         0
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>           866,053,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                23,146,333,000
<POLICY-LOSSES>                8,155,774,000
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                        0
<POLICY-OTHER>                             0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                      0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                  209,367,000
<COMMON>                           3,511,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      0
<PREFERRED>                                0
<OTHER-SE>                       743,515,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  23,146,333,000
<PREMIUMS>                                 0
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>               53,773,000
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                   271,000
<OTHER-INCOME>                    83,330,000
<BENEFITS>                        26,808,000
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>       27,070,000
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>               6,624,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   54,497,000
<INCOME-TAX>                      20,106,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               34,391,000
<DISCONTINUED>                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            0
<CHANGES>                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                      34,391,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                              0
<EPS-DILUTED>                              0
<RESERVE-OPEN>                             0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                        0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                          0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                         0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                           0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                            0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                    0
        




</TABLE>
#### § 301-10.122 What must I do with compensation an airline gives me if it denies me a seat on a plane?

If you are performing official travel and a carrier denies you a confirmed reserved seat on a plane, you must give your agency any payment you receive for liquidated damages. You must ensure the carrier shows the “Treasurer of the United States” as payee on the compensation check and then forward the payment to the appropriate agency official.

[FTR Case 2020-300-1, 87 FR 55704, Sept. 12, 2022]
[Civ. No. 12201.

Second Appellate District, Division Two.

November 3, 1939.]

#### HERMAN C. WERK, Jr., Appellant, v. WILLIAM REHKOPF et al., Respondents.

August J. O’Connor and George J. Hider for Appellant.

Joseph A. Spray and Charles P. Gould for Respondents.

MoCOMB, J. —

From a judgment in favor of defendants after trial by jury in an action to recover damages resulting from an automobile accident plaintiff appeals.

The essential facts are:

June 26, 1937, plaintiff was operating his automobile at a speed of fifty miles per hour in a southerly direction on Fremont Avenue and approaching its intersection with Commonwealth Avenue in the city of Alhambra, California. At the same time the defendant Rehkopf was proceeding in his auto*357mobile in a northerly direction on Fremont Avenue and approaching the same intersection. Defendant Rehkopf entered. the intersection and turned to the west on Commonwealth Avenue. As he did so, the right rear of his ear was struck by plaintiff’s automobile. In turning to the left defendant Rehkopf failed to comply with the provisions of section 544 of the Vehicle Code (i. e., by giving an appropriate signal during the last 50 feet his automobile traveled before turning, indicating that he intended to turn to the left), and of section 540 of the same code (i. e., by passing immediately to the right of the center of the intersection before turning). Likewise in approaching the intersection plaintiff was exceeding the *primei facie*speed limit fixed by section 511 of the Vehicle Code.

This is the question presented for determination:

*Was there substantial evidence to sustain the implied findings of the trial jury that (a) defendant Rehkopf’s failure to comply with sections 544 and 540 of the Vehicle Code were not the proximate cause of the accident, and (b) plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence m operating Ms automobile at a speed in excess of the prima facie speed limit fixed by section 511 of the Vehicle*Code?

This question must be answered in the affirmative. There is substantial evidence to sustain the facts set forth above and it is unnecessary to cite authority for the proposition that, where from the evidence a reasonable inference may be drawn supporting a finding of fact either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant, the trial jury’s determination of the facts is conclusive upon an appellate court.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants (respondents), there is substantial evidence to sustain a finding that defendant Rehkopf’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident and plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in operating his automobile at a speed of fifty miles per hour. The verdict of the jury on these points in favor of defendants is conclusive here.

The judgment is affirmed.

Wood, Acting P. J., concurred.