UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM

GRACE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF MIAMI,

Defendant.

 /

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant City of Miami’s (“Defendant”) 

Emergency Motion to Stay Order Rejecting Redistricting Map. (“Motion” or “Mot.”) (ECF No. 

97). Therein, Defendant requests that the Court stay its Order Sustaining Objections to 

Defendant’s Notice of Passing Remedial Plan, (“Order”) (ECF No. 94), pending appeal. See 

generally Mot. Plaintiffs did not file a response.1 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the Parties’ familiarity with the background in this matter. Previously, 

the Court entered an order enjoining Defendant from conducting the November election pursuant 

to the election districts set forth in City of Miami Resolution 22-131 (“Enjoined Plan” or “2022 

Enacted Plan”). See (ECF No. 60). Thereafter, Defendant filed a notice informing the Court that 

it passed Resolution 23-271 (“Remedial Plan”). See (ECF No. 77). The Court subsequently found 

that the Remedial Plan did not completely correct—but rather perpetuated—the unconstitutional 

1Plaintiffs in this Action are Clarice Cooper, Yanelis Valdes, Jared Johnson, Alexandra Contreras, 

Steven Miro, GRACE, Inc., Engage Miami, Inc., South Dade Branch of the NAACP and MiamiDade Branch of the NAACP (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).

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racial gerrymandering that was substantially likely to exist in the Enjoined Plan. See generally

Order. In the instant Motion, Defendant requests that the Court stay the Order pending a resolution 

of its appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. See generally Mot. The Court denied the Motion in a 

paperless order, see (ECF No. 98), but provides this supplemental order to explain its rationale.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The issuance of a stay pending appeal is an “extraordinary remedy.” See Garcia-Mir v. 

Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986). “A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable 

injury might otherwise result.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (citing Virginian Ry. 

Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)). “It is instead ‘an exercise of judicial discretion,’ 

and ‘[t]he propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.’” Id. 

(quoting Virginian Ry. Co., 272 U.S. at 672–73). “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of 

showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 433–44. Specifically, 

the movant must show: “(1) that the movant is likely to prevail on the merits on appeal; (2) that 

absent a stay the movant will suffer irreparable damage; (3) that the adverse party will suffer no 

substantial harm from the issuance of the stay; and (4) that the public interest will be served by 

issuing the stay.” Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at 1453. “The first two factors are the most critical.” 

Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Nken at 434–

35). “To satisfy its burden as to those factors, the party seeking the stay must show more than the 

mere possibility of success on the merits or of irreparable injury.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of Defendant’s Motion, the Court notes that the Eleventh 

Circuit addressed and denied a motion to stay under nearly identical circumstances. See 

Jacksonville Branch of NAACP v. City of Jacksonville, No.22-14260, 2023 WL 119425 (11th Cir. 

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Jan. 6, 2023). In that case, the district court enjoined the City of Jacksonville from using a 

districting plan because it found that the districts were substantially likely to be unconstitutionally

gerrymandered. Id. at *1. The City of Jacksonville then passed a remedial map, which the district 

court found did not remedy the unconstitutional aspects of the prior plan. Id. The City of 

Jacksonville then filed a motion to stay the district court’s order which found the remedial plan

unconstitutional and implemented one of the plaintiffs’ alternative maps.2 Id.

Addressing the City of Jacksonville’s Motion, the Eleventh Circuit explained that by ruling 

on the defendant’s motion to stay, it “would have to hold on the merits that the City Council’s 

proposed interim remedial plan is constitutional. Such a determination would be a ruling on the 

merits of the City’s appeal, and an order on a motion for stay pending appeal is not a resolution of 

the appeal itself.” Id. at *3. The Eleventh Circuit denied the motion, explaining that the City was 

not asking to stay the order and restore the status quo. Id. Instead, what the City was really seeking

was “a ruling on the merits of its appeal.” Id.

In this case, Defendant makes the same request. Defendant asks the Court to stay its Order 

adopting Plaintiffs’ P4 as the Court’s remedial plan, and instead, to proceed forward with the 

Remedial Plan for the upcoming elections. See generally Mot. Like in Jacksonville, there is no 

status quo to which Defendant may return; the Court has already found that the Enjoined Plan is 

substantially likely to be racially gerrymandered, and the Remedial Plan is not a constitutional 

remedy. See generally Order. Asking the Court to stay its Order, when neither the Enjoined Plan 

nor the Remedial Plan is constitutional, would necessarily require the Court to reverse course on 

2

 Unlike Defendant in the instant Action, the defendant in Jacksonville only filed the motion to 

stay in the Eleventh Circuit.

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the merits of its Order and uphold the Remedial Plan’s constitutionality. Just as in Jacksonville, 

the Court will not grant a motion to stay under these circumstances. 

Though the Court finds a stay inappropriate for the reasons previously discussed, for the 

sake of providing a thorough explanation, it turns now to the merits of Defendant’s Motion. 

Defendant proffers two arguments: (1) the Court should not apply the traditional standard to 

analyze a stay because the instant Action runs afoul of Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006); and 

(2) even under the traditional standard, Defendant satisfies each element necessary for the Court 

to grant a stay. See generally Mot. Upon review, the Court reiterates, once again, that the 

circumstances of this case do not implicate Purcell, and thus, the Court will not consider 

Defendant’s Motion under an alternative standard. Reviewing the Motion under the traditional 

legal standard, the Court finds that granting a stay is not warranted given that Defendant has failed 

to satisfy the necessary elements. 

A. The Purcell Principle

In the Motion, Defendant again raises the argument that Purcell applies to the instant 

Action. See Mot. at 3–4. In fact, Defendant copies its argument regarding how Purcell should 

alter the standard by which the Court considers the instant Motion verbatim from its prior motion 

to stay. See (ECF No. 64 at 1–2). The Court has already addressed whether Purcell applies, not 

just once, but twice.3 See (ECF No. 60 at 27–29) (comparing the instant Action to other cases in 

the Eleventh Circuit and concluding that Purcell is inapplicable); (ECF No. 70 at 3–4) (refusing 

to apply Purcell to Defendant’s prior motion to stay because doing so “would extend the eve of an 

3 The proper time to raise a Purcell argument was prior to the Court’s order enjoining the use of 

the 2022 Enacted Plan on May 23, 2023. See Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022) 

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining that “federal district courts ordinarily should not enjoin 

state election laws in the period close to an election”) (internal quotations omitted). The injunction 

has already occurred, and Purcell is inapplicable at this stage in the case.

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election farther than the Eleventh Circuit has before”) (internal quotations omitted). It will not 

evaluate the argument a third time.4 Therefore, finding Purcell inapplicable to the instant Action, 

the Court reviews the Motion under the traditional framework.

B. Stay Analysis

A party requesting a stay must demonstrate (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits on 

appeal; (2) absent a stay, the moving party will suffer irreparable harm; (3) the adverse party will 

not suffer substantial harm from the issuance of a stay; and (4) the issuance of a stay will serve the 

public interest. Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at 1453. The Court addresses each factor in turn.

i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

By filing the Emergency Motion, Defendant essentially asks the Court to reconsider vast 

swaths of its Order, and in doing so, Defendant seeks to relitigate much of its case. See Mot. at 4–

11. Defendant advances the following arguments: (1) the May 11 Meeting was not direct evidence 

of racial gerrymandering; (2) the Court improperly considered core-retention rates in the Remedial 

Plan; (3) the Court improperly disregarded legitimate, non-racial criteria when rejecting the 

Remedial Plan, including partisan considerations; (4) the Court applied the incorrect standard 

when finding District 5 was not narrowly tailored to Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) compliance; and 

(5) the Court cannot find the Remedial Plan unconstitutional while adopting Plaintiffs’ alternative 

map (“P4”), which is fundamentally similar. See id. 

4 Separately from arguing that Purcell should alter the framework by which the Court analyzes a 

motion to stay, Defendant also argues that, because it believes Purcell applies, the Court should 

stay the injunction. Mot. at 14. The Court does not address this argument because (1) it has already 

explained Purcell does not apply, and (2) the time to request a stay of the original injunction has 

passed. It is unclear why Defendant advances this argument asking the Court to stay the injunction

when the subject of this Motion is the Court’s Order Sustaining Objections to the Remedial Plan.

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To the extent Defendant seeks to use this Motion as a second opportunity to argue in favor 

of the Remedial Plan, it is too late. Defendant had an opportunity to pass a constitutional plan that 

would remedy the unconstitutional violations the Court found was substantially likely to exist in 

the Enjoined Plan. It did not do so. Accordingly, while the Court will explain why Defendant is 

not likely to succeed on the merits on appeal, it will not use this order to simply explain its rationale 

for rejecting the Remedial Plan once more.

Addressing Defendant’s first argument about the May 11 Meeting, Defendant asserts that 

“there was no expressed intent to racially sort [from the Commissioners]; the Court is inferring it.” 

Mot. at 5. To Defendant, the Court’s finding contradicts the legal requirement that “the 

Commission is due a presumption of good faith.” Id.

The Court’s findings were not inferred. Rather, while the Court explained the 

Commissioners were entitled to a presumption of good faith, the Court evaluated multiple 

statements and described how each demonstrated the Commission’s legislative intent that a 

remedial plan should perpetuate the unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan. See Order at

20–24. One such statement was a unanimous directive from the Commissioners to the redistricting 

consultant, De Grandy, to “start redrawing a map[,] that will guarantee that ten years from now 

we’re going to have the diversity. . . in the city government and we are going to elect an Afro 

American to a seat, that they’re going to be properly represented, as well as other groups.” Id. at 

23 (quotations omitted) (alterations in original). Based on the Commissioners’ explicit, 

unequivocal statements from the May 11 Meeting, the Court found direct evidence “that the 

Commissioners intended the Remedial Plan to carry forward the very same race-based 

characteristics of the Enjoined Plan.” Id. To describe the Court’s analysis of the expressed intent 

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of multiple commissioners about their desire for a future map to maintain the gerrymandered 

voting districts as an “inference” is at best inaccurate, and at worst disingenuous.5

Turning to the next argument, Defendant argues the Court “placed undue emphasis on the 

notion of core retention” and in doing so, improperly relied upon Jacksonville Branch of NAACP 

v. City of Jacksonville (“Jacksonville II”), No. 3:22-cv-493-MMH-LLL, 2022 WL 17751416 

(M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2022).6 Mot. at 6–7. But, by Defendant’s own words, “[c]ore retention can 

only be suspect insofar as it perpetuates the harms of a racial gerrymander.” Id. at 6. That is 

precisely how the Court analyzed it. See Order at 26 (“The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the 

core retention rates between the Remedial Plan and the Enjoined Plan are ‘staggeringly high’ and 

. . . indicate that the Remedial Plan does not completely correct the unconstitutional aspects of the 

Enjoined Plan.”). The Court’s analysis of core retention was therefore appropriately limited to an

evaluation of whether the Remedial Plan perpetuated the harms of racial gerrymandering, which 

the Court found it did. 

Defendant also argues that the Court improperly disregarded the Commission’s 

“legitimate, non-racial criteria, such as political considerations, where [the Commissioners] had 

5 Defendant also asserts that “[d]etermining legislative intent from statements by a minority of the 

Commission is always problematic.” Mot. at 5 (quoting Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State 

for State of Alabama, 992 F.3d 1299, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021)). While a true statement of law, 

Defendant’s assertion is entirely divorced from the Court’s finding. The Court identified specific 

statements from Commissioners Díaz de la Portilla and Reyes, and then considered the unanimous

directive to De Grandy mentioned above to determine legislative intent. See Order at 22–23.

6Defendant argues that the Court should not rely upon Jacksonville II because this is not a claim 

of vote dilution, and there, “the new plan still diluted the votes of minority voters [so] the Court 

replaced it with a plan that did not dilute these votes.” Mot. at 7. Jacksonville II directly addressed 

the question of whether the City of Jacksonville’s remedial plan remedied the unconstitutional 

gerrymander from the enjoined plan, and in doing so, the Jacksonville II Court evaluated core 

retention rates as one factor to demonstrate that it did not. See id. at *14. To the extent the Court 

analogized to Jacksonville II, it did so to demonstrate that, as in that case, the Remedial Plan in 

the instant Action “perpetuates the impact of the Enjoined Plan’s unconstitutional racial 

gerrymandering of the election districts.” Order at 40.

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invested substantial district resources, and where candidates reside” because the Court found those 

reasons “‘had the impact of perpetuating, rather than completely correcting the constitutional 

infirmities [of the Enjoined Plan].’” Mot. at 7 (quoting Order at 12). As a matter of law, 

Defendant’s argument is unavailing. In the remedial posture, courts must ensure that a proposed 

remedial districting plan “completely corrects—rather than perpetuates—the defects that rendered 

the original districts unconstitutional or unlawful.” Covington v. North Carolina (“Covington I”), 

283 F. Supp. 3d 410, 431 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (citing Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 86 (1997),

aff’d in relevant part, 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018)). Thus, while the Court properly considered the 

Commission’s legitimate goals, it nevertheless found that those considerations did not completely 

correct the unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan. See Order at 25, 29–33. The Court’s 

analysis was not just appropriate; it was also legally necessary.

Relatedly, Defendant asserts that political considerations influenced the creation of the 

Remedial Plan, in contrast to the Court’s findings that they did not. See Mot. at 7 n.4. According 

to Defendant, the court “lack[s] jurisdiction to undo what is essentially a political question.” See 

id. (quoting Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507–08 (2019)). In support of its 

argument, Defendant cites to a portion of the June 14 Meeting and its accompanying presentation 

materials. Id. During that portion of the June 14 Meeting, De Grandy only discusses the political 

outcomes of two unadopted alternative maps, P1 and P2. (ECF No. 82-2 at 9:9–11:2). For 

example, De Grandy explained that in “[P]laintiffs[’] Alternative 1, the percentage of Republican 

registered voters in D[istrict] 1 drops by close to 9% compared to our proposal.” Id. 10:9–10. 

Further, De Grandy explained that in Plaintiffs’ “Alternative 2, the percentage of Republican 

registered voters in D[istrict] 1 drops by 6%. . . compared to our proposal.” Id. 10:16–17. 

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At no point during that meeting, however, did De Grandy opine that he factored in political 

considerations when drafting V12 or the Remedial Plan. See generally id. Nor did any 

Commissioner. See id. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the Court concluded that partisanship 

did not play a role in the Remedial Plan’s creation based on an absence of any record material 

demonstrating otherwise. See Order at 40 (finding “nothing in the record demonstrates that 

partisanship played any role”). Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that it correctly determined 

partisanship did not influence the creation of the Remedial Plan.

Defendant also takes issue with how the Court analyzed whether District 5 was narrowly 

tailored under the Remedial Plan. See Mot. at 8–10. Specifically, Defendant argues that the Court 

used an incorrect legal standard when evaluating the Remedial Plan and did not actually consider 

whether District 5 in P4 is narrowly tailored. See id. at 8. 

As to the Remedial Plan, Defendant asserts that the Court imposed the duty upon Defendant 

to “determine[] with precision” the Black Voting Age Population (“BVAP”) required in District 

5, and to “memorialize the analysis or compile a comprehensive record” of how Defendant 

calculated the BVAP figure. Id. at 8. Defendant misconstrues the Court’s analysis. The Court 

explained that “the narrow tailoring requirement insists only that the legislature have a strong basis 

in evidence in support of the (race-based) choice that it has made.” Order at 38 (emphasis omitted). 

To demonstrate a strong basis in evidence, the Court explained that Defendant was required to 

conduct a functional analysis of the electoral behavior within District 5 to determine how District 

5 would comply with the VRA’s requirements. See id. (citations omitted). The Court further 

elaborated that by having this strong basis in evidence, Defendant “could demonstrate it had ‘good 

reason to believe’ it must use race to satisfy § 2 of the VRA.” Id. (citation omitted)

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Nowhere in this explanation did the Court require Defendant to memorialize or compile a 

comprehensive record of that analysis, nor did it require Defendant to demonstrate with precision 

the necessary BVAP. Rather, the Court explained that the record did not contain any evidence 

suggesting a functional analysis ever occurred, meaning there was no record evidence 

demonstrating what “good reason” Defendant had for drawing District 5 as it did in the Remedial 

Plan. See id. at 38–40. Accordingly, the Court properly evaluated District 5 to determine if it was 

narrowly tailored in the Remedial Plan.

Secondly, the Court did evaluate whether P4 was narrowly tailored. See id. at 47–48. In 

doing so, the Court considered Dr. Moy’s functional analysis to conclude that P4’s District 5 would 

enable Black voters to regularly elect a candidate of their choosing, as is required under § 2 of the 

VRA. See id. Because Plaintiffs used Dr. Moy’s analysis to craft P4, the Court found that P4 was

narrowly tailored to ensure VRA compliance. See id. at 48. Defendant’s assertion that the Court 

did not undergo this analysis is patently false.

Defendant’s final argument regarding its likelihood of success on the merits is that the 

Court cannot possibly find the Remedial Plan unconstitutional, but simultaneously find P4 

constitutional, when the maps are fundamentally similar. See Mot. at 7–8, 11. To Defendant, the 

Court’s conclusion is “inconceivable,” and if the Remedial Plan perpetuates the constitutional 

infirmities from the Enjoined Plan, then P4 must do the same. See id. at 7. But, as the Court 

explicitly noted in its Order, “‘[w]hen faced with the necessity of drawing district lines by judicial 

order, a court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative policies underlying the existing 

plan, to the extent those policies do not lead to violations of the Constitution or Voting Rights 

Act.’” Order (citing Abrams, 521 U.S. at 79). Thus, when evaluating P4, the Court had to ensure 

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that P4 reconciled two goals: (1) adherence to the Commission’s lawful objectives, and (2): that 

the map remedied the unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan. 

The Court evaluated the process by which P4 was created accordingly. In doing so, it 

considered how P4 incorporated the Commission’s goals of substantial equality of population, 

respect for traditional neighborhoods and communities of interest, and the use of significant and 

natural boundaries, while also considering traditional districting criteria, which the Enjoined Plan

did not. After undergoing this analysis, the Court found that P4 properly reconciled those two 

objectives. See Order at 40–49. Cf. Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 17751416, at *18–19 (evaluating a 

remedial plan to ensure it “adheres to the legitimate redistricting criteria advocated by the City 

Council” while also ensuring it did not result in the perpetuation of the unconstitutional effects 

from the enjoined plan). Accordingly, even if P4 is facially similar to the Remedial Plan, as 

Defendant suggests, P4 is a constitutional remedy if it reconciles the two objectives mentioned 

above. Because the Court found that it does, the Court is satisfied that P4 is a sufficient remedial 

plan based on the underlying considerations that factored into its creation. See Order 40–49.

In sum, none of Defendant’s arguments indicate a “strong showing that [it] is likely to 

succeed on the merits.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. 

ii. Irreparable Harm

Defendant does not suffer irreparable harm because it “has no legitimate interest in 

enforcing an unconstitutional ordinance.” KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 

1272 (11th Cir. 2006). “[T]here can be no irreparable harm to a municipality when it is prevented 

from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.” Id. (quoting Joelner v. Vill. of Washington Park, 378 

F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2004)). Defendant’s claims that it will be harmed absent a stay of the 

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Court’s Order finding the Remedial Plan unconstitutional are thus unavailing. The Court could 

properly end its analysis there.

Nevertheless, Defendant argues that absent a stay, it will suffer irreparable harm because

the Court’s Order created “districting changes [which] are ‘prescriptions for chaos.’” See id. at 12 

(citing Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring)). According to 

Defendant, the Court’s Order “will ‘affect candidates, campaign organizations, independent 

groups, political parties, and voters, among others.’” Id. (citing Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 880). 

Defendant gives one example of the consequence of the Court’s Order, explaining that like in 

Milligan, “candidates and elected officials no longer even know what [sic] district they live [sic]

in, where they may run, and where they must campaign.”7 Id. Defendant believes that the ensuing 

“chaos” from the Court Order constitutes irreparable harm. See id.

But the instant Action is not like Milligan. In Milligan, an Alabama district court 

concluded that “Alabama’s congressional districts [must] be completely redrawn” seven weeks 

prior to the next election. Id. at 779. Importantly, because no map existed and the election was 

fast-approaching, the Supreme Court opined that the district court’s injunction was “a prescription 

for chaos.” Id. at 880. Accordingly, the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order, explaining

that individuals and entities “now do not know who will be running against whom,” “candidates 

cannot be sure what district they need to file for,” and “potential candidates do not even know 

which district they live in.” Id.

7 Lastly, Defendant argues that based on Miami residence requirements, “Commissioners who are 

up for reelection may be drawn out of their districts with no opportunity to qualify in a new 

district.” See Mot. at 12 (citing City of Miami, Code of Ordinances § 16-6(b)(3)). Defendant cites 

to no authority to suggest that a Commissioner who may be drawn out of his district constitutes 

harm on behalf of Defendant, the City of Miami. Moreover, the Court finds that any potential 

harm that a Commissioner may suffer by virtue of no longer residing in a particular district must 

give way to the Court’s duty to remedy the Defendant’s unconstitutional districting decisions.

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There is no such chaos here. Unlike in Milligan, the Court already adopted its own 

remedial map. The Court has done so before August 1, 2023, the date by which the Miami-Dade 

Board of Elections stated it would need a map to conduct the November Election. The map clearly 

delineates the borders of each district. Consequently, it strains credulity to claim, as Defendant 

does, that candidates do not know the district in which they live or where they may run. Mot. at 

12. The Court’s remedial map specificizes it clearly. Otherwise, Defendant fails to explain what 

other “chaos” will result from the Court’s Order, much less explain how it will be harmed. See id. 

As noted above, the “first two factors are the most critical” when analyzing a motion for a 

stay pending appeal: likelihood to prevail on the merits and irreparable harm absent a stay. See 

Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla., 915 F.3d at 1317. Here, both factors weigh against the stay 

Defendant now proposes. Accordingly, the Court need not examine the other two factors, and 

denies Defendant’s Motion. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the Court finds that a stay is not warranted. For 

the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Emergency 

Motion to Stay Order Rejecting Redistricting Map (ECF No. 97) IS DENIED. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this ______ day of August, 2023. 

K. MICHAEL MOORE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

c: All counsel of record 

3rd

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