J-S59002-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

COREY LEE HARVEY,

Appellant No. 2215 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 26, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003188-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2016

Appellant, Corey Lee Harvey, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of an aggregate term of 5 to 14 years’ imprisonment, imposed after he was 

convicted of one count each of burglary,1conspiracy to commit burglary,2

criminal trespass,3and theft by unlawful taking.4 Appellant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions and alleges the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence. Appellant also asserts that his 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(2). 

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 3502(a)(2). 

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(ii). 

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). 
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sentence is manifestly excessive and an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. 

We affirm. 

Appellant’s convictions stemmed from a burglary that occurred on 

March 28, 2014. Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of the 

above-stated charges and sentenced to the following: 3 to 10 years’ 

imprisonment on the charge of burglary; a consecutive sentence of 2 to 4 

years’ imprisonment on the charge of criminal conspiracy to commit 

burglary; and a concurrent sentence of 15 to 30 months’ imprisonment on 

the charge of criminal trespass. The charge of theft by unlawful taking 

merged with the burglary charge for sentencing purposes. Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/19/15, at 2. Subsequently, Appellant filed a post-sentence 

motion which challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence and 

requested that the court reconsider his sentence. Appellant’s request for 

relief was denied by the trial court on June 23, 2015. Id. 

On July 21, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by 

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b).5 Herein, Appellant presents the following issues for our review: 

I. Whether or not the evidence as presented was sufficient as 

a matter of law to support the conviction for burglary, 

criminal conspiracy, and criminal trespass when the 

____________________________________________

5 All of the matters stated within Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement were 

previously addressed by the trial court in its opinion docketed on June 24, 

2015. Consequently, the trial court incorporated said opinion into its August 

19, 2015 Rule 1925(a) opinion. Id. 
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evidence that [Appellant] was aware of the illegal activity 

was questionable and uncertain?

II. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence in 

regards to the proof of whether or not [Appellant] was 

guilty of the charges and was aware that a burglary was 

occurring? 

III. Whether the sentences as imposed were manifestly 

excessive as they were in the aggravated range of 

[Appellant’s] applicable sentencing guidelines and were not 

justified by the overall history and circumstances in 

[Appellant’s] life? 

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

To begin, we note our standard of review of a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence: 

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted). 

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

convictions of burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary.6 “A person 

____________________________________________

6 Although Appellant’s first issue references the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction of criminal trespass in addition to burglary and 

conspiracy to commit burglary, his brief lacks any argument whatsoever 

regarding the sufficiency of evidence to support his criminal trespass 

conviction. Accordingly, we deem Appellant’s sufficiency claim regarding his 

criminal trespass conviction waived and treat this issue as a sufficiency 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, 

the person enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 

occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight accommodations in 

which at the time of the offense no person is present.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

3502(a)(2). Moreover, it is well-established that “[t]o sustain a conviction 

for criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish the defendant: 

(1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with 

another person or persons; (2) with a shared criminal intent; and (3) an 

overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. 

Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2011). “This overt act need not be 

committed by the defendant; it need only be committed by a coconspirator.” Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa. 

Super. 2000) (citations omitted).

Before addressing whether the elements of the above-stated crimes 

have been met, we review the facts reflected in the record of the jury trial 

which led to Appellant’s convictions, summarized by the trial court as 

follows:

[T]he evidence established that on March 28, 2014, at 

approximately 11:50 a.m., Officer Anthony Scocca of the 

(Footnote Continued)

_______________________

challenge only to his convictions of burglary and conspiracy to commit 

burglary. See Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943, 944 (Pa. Super 2000) (holding 

“[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when briefs 

are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not 

consider the merits thereof”). 
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Allentown Police Department was dispatched to 960 West 

Emmaus Avenue, Allentown, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, for a 

burglary in progress. As he arrived on scene, he observed 

Officer Mark Dean of the Allentown Police Department on the 

front lawn of the premises with two (2) males in custody. The 

two (2) males were subsequently identified as [Appellant,] Corey 

Harvey[,] and Co-Defendant[,] Zachary Schanenberger. Officer 

Scocca ultimately placed [Mr.] Schanenberger into police 

custody. A pat down of [Mr.] Schanenberger was performed by 

Officer Scocca and he located a camera that belonged to the 

tenants of 960 West Emmaus Avenue, Apartment 126, in [his] 

left pants pocket. In addition, [Mr.] Schanenberger possessed 

two (2) cellular telephones. He indicated that one (1) cellular 

telephone belonged to him and that the other one was taken 

from the residence located at 960 West Emmaus Avenue. [Mr.] 

Schanenberger indicated to Officer Scocca that they were there 

to retrieve items for “Rachel.” 

Josefina Baez, a resident of 960 West Emmaus Avenue, 

Apartment 126, Allentown, received a telephone call from her 

neighbor while she was at work. The neighbor advised her that 

two (2) men were in her home. When Ms. Baez arrived on scene 

approximately five (5) minutes later, she observed three (3) 

officers and two (2) males on her lawn with garbage bags (taken 

from her residence) filled with her belongings. Inside the 

garbage bags were, inter alia, Ms. Baez’s jewelry box containing 

jewelry valued at approximately [$125.00], a Play Station, her 

husband’s sneakers, a laptop computer, and a Tasmanian Devil 

bank containing approximately [$125.00] in cash. She noted 

that her apartment had been ransacked and was in total 

disarray. In addition, Ms. Baez observed that a screen had been 

cut and removed from the back bedroom window, and a white 

plastic lawn chair had been placed under it. Ms. Baez testified 

that she did not know [Appellant], and she did not give him 

permission to enter her residence or remove anything therefrom. 

Ms. Baez lives with her husband, Victor Brown, and their 

two (2) daughters. Mr. Brown did not know [Appellant], and he 

did not grant him permission to enter his residence or remove 

anything therefrom. Upon questioning Ms. Baez about the 

identity of “Rachel,” the authorities learned that Rachel was Ms. 

Baez’s 21 year old daughter. Ms. Baez informed the officers that 

Rachel had stayed in the apartment located at 960 West 

Emmaus Avenue from December of 2013 through February of 
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2014. However, Rachel was never provided with a key to the 

residence. 

[Mr.] Schanenberger testified that he was familiar with Rachel. 

In particular, he stated that he, [Appellant], William Medina, and 

Rachel had discussed burglarizing Rachel’s mother’s apartment 

approximately two (2) weeks prior to March 28, 2014. [Mr.] 

Schanenberger indicated that Rachel wanted to retaliate against 

her mother because her mother, [Ms.] Baez, had kicked her out 

of the house. Rachel had told them that between the hours of 

9:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., the residence would be empty and 

that her mother had jewelry, cash, and electronics in the home. 

Consequently, on March 28, 2014, at approximately 8:00 a.m., 

[Mr.] Schanenberger, [Appellant], and [Mr.] Medina drove to 

960 West Emmaus Avenue. [Mr.] Schanenberger testified that 

the back door of the residence was supposed to be unlocked, but 

it was not. Therefore, he gained entrance through an open 

window in the rear of the apartment complex. Upon entering, 

[Mr.] Schanenberger unlocked the door and called [Appellant] 

over from the truck. [Appellant] initially grabbed the garbage 

bags. He then took a Play Station, a laptop, and a few other 

items from the living room and kitchen areas, while [Mr.] 

Schanenberger took items from the bedroom. While [Appellant]

and [Mr.] Schanenberger were exiting the residence, each with a 

garbage bag in their hands, the police were out front. They 

were immediately detained. [Mr.] Schanenberger revealed that 

the plan was to sell the items that they took from the apartment 

for money in order to get [Mr.] Medina’s truck repaired. 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 6/24/15, at 4-8. 

On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly committed a burglary or 

that he was involved in a conspiracy to commit a burglary. Appellant’s Brief 

at 14. After careful review, we discern Appellant’s contentions to be wholly 

without merit. 

At his jury trial, Appellant testified that he and Mr. Medina traveled to 

the residence at 960 W. Emmaus Avenue “at the request of [Mr.] 
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Schanenberger[,] in order to retrieve property belonging to Rachel[,] who 

was a friend of Mr. Schanenberger.” Id. at 15. Appellant further asserts 

that he had no knowledge at the time that they did not have permission to 

be there or that Mr. Schanenberger was going there with the intent to 

commit a burglary. Id. at 16. However, the Commonwealth presented 

contradictory evidence that demonstrated Appellant was a knowing and 

willing participant in the burglary. Id. More specifically, Mr. Schanenberger 

testified that he, Mr. Medina, Rachel, and Appellant had discussed 

burglarizing Rachel’s mother’s apartment approximately two weeks prior to 

the date of the incident. TCO at 7. “At the conclusion of the jury trial, the 

jury had no doubt that [Appellant] entered the residence [of Ms. Baez] when 

no one was present, with the intent to commit a crime therein, and 

conspired to do same.” TCO at 8. “It is well-settled that the jury is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence and must determine the credibility 

of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983 (Pa. Super. 

2014). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence was clearly sufficient to 

support the jury’s finding Appellant guilty of burglary and conspiracy to 

commit burglary. Therefore, we uphold Appellant’s convictions. 

Next, we address Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence 

to support his convictions. 

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial 
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court’s discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled 

that the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial 

based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where 

the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks 

one’s sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has 

been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s 

discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted 

where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-36 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Appellant acknowledges that he carried items out of Ms. Baez’s 

residence. He argues, however, that whether he committed a criminal act 

hinges on whether he thought he was “doing a favor for a friend.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 20. Appellant avers that the jury improperly gave weight 

to the testimony of Mr. Schanenberger over his own testimony. However, as 

the trial court stated: 

From the evidence [of record], it is reasonable to have concluded 

that [Appellant] was the individual who entered onto the 

premises located at 960 West Emmaus Avenue, Apartment 126, 

when no one was present, with the intent to commit a crime 

therein, and conspired to do same. Also, based on the evidence, 

it is reasonable to have concluded that [Appellant], knowing that 

he was not licensed or privileged to do so, broke into the subject 

premises and unlawfully took property of Ms. Baez and Mr. 

Brown with the intent to deprive them thereof. Accordingly, 

[Appellant’s] challenge to the weight of the evidence must fail.

TCO at 9. 

Moreover, we note that Appellant’s argument ignores the well-settled 

principles of law that the finder of fact makes credibility determinations and 
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is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super. 2009). The jury was free to believe 

the testimony of Mr. Schanenberger over that of Appellant and to weigh the 

testimony accordingly. Based on our review of the record, we ascertain no 

abuse of discretion by the trial court. 

Finally, we address Appellant’s claim that his sentence is manifestly 

excessive. Appellant avers that the trial court failed to provide any 

appropriate reasons for sentencing him in the aggravated range and failed to 

consider any mitigating factors prior to the imposition of his sentence. 

Appellant’s Brief at 12. We note that Appellant’s allegations relate to the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must 

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are 

generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing 

or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed. 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations 

and internal quotations omitted). 
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Here, the record clearly reflects that Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal, properly preserved his claim in his post-sentence motion, and 

included a separate, concise Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief in 

compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, we 

proceed to determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial question to 

meet the fourth requirement of the four-part test outlined above. 

Appellant asserts that the trial court sentenced him in the aggravated 

range without providing adequate reasons and without giving appropriate 

consideration to mitigating factors. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Based on 

Appellant’s arguments and the case law on which he relies, we conclude that 

he has presented a substantial question for our review. See 

Commonwealth v. Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(finding a substantial question existed where the appellant argued that the 

sentencing court erred by imposing an aggravated range sentence without 

consideration of mitigating circumstances). Accordingly, we will review the 

merits of his claim, keeping in mind that, 

[t]he sentencing court is given broad discretion in determining 

whether a sentence is manifestly excessive because the 

sentencing judge is in the “best position to measure factors such 

as the nature of the crime, the defendant’s character and the 

defendant’s display of remorse, defiance, or indifference.” 

Commonwealth v. Andrews, 720 A.2d 764, 768 (Pa. Super. 

1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948, 958 

(Pa. Super. 1997)). In order to find that a trial court imposed an 

“unreasonable” sentence, we must determine that the 

sentencing court imposed the sentence irrationally and that the 

court was “not guided by sound judgment.” Commonwealth v. 

Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 564, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (2007). 
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Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

We further note:

When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider the 

particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the 

defendant. In particular, the court should refer to the 

defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal 

characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation. Where the 

sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation 

report (“PSI”), we can assume the sentencing court was aware 

of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character 

and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory 

factors. Further, where a sentence is within the standard range 

of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 

Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, not only did the trial court have the benefit of a PSI, it expressly 

stated that it considered all of the appropriate relevant factors, as explained 

in the following portion of its Rule 1925(a) opinion: 

This [c]ourt considered all the required statutory factors in 

sentencing [Appellant]. Indeed, in imposing [Appellant’s] 

sentence, this [c]ourt considered the ‘protection of the public, 

the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the 

victim and the community, the defendant’s rehabilitative needs, 

and the sentencing guidelines.’ 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); 

Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super. 

2008). 

Prior to sentencing this [c]ourt carefully reviewed the PreSentencing Investigation Report prepared on May 19, 2015. The 

[c]ourt was aware of all of the information contained therein. 

Therefore, this [c]ourt did not fail to consider mitigating factors. 

Indeed, this [c]ourt was cognizant of [Appellant’s] behavior 

while in Lehigh County Prison, the recommendation of the 

Probation Officer, [Appellant’s] family situation, [Appellant’s] 

employment history and new business venture, [Appellant’s 

community involvement prior to incarceration, [Appellant’s] 

failure to comply with supervision in the past, [Appellant’s] lack 
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of remorse or acceptance of responsibility, and the 

circumstances and facts giving rise to the crimes. Additionally, 

this [c]ourt articulated on the record the reasons for the 

imposition of the sentence on the charge of Burglary within the 

aggravated range of the guidelines: (1) the guidelines do not 

accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime; and (2) the 

guidelines do not reflect that [Appellant’s] prior criminal history 

involves similar types of crimes such as thefts, robberies and

firearms offenses. 

TCO at 12-13 (internal citations omitted). 

After careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial court 

gave appropriate consideration to the relevant factors before issuing 

Appellant’s sentence, and we ascertain no abuse of discretion. Appellant’s 

claim regarding the length of his sentence is without merit. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2016