J-A25018-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS 

TRUSTEE FOR GSR MORTGAGE LOAN 

TRUST 2005-AR4

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

G. LINTON SHEPPARD, JUDITH A. 

SHEPPARD AND WENDY LYNNE 

SHEPPARD

Appellant No. 2997 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 11, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2012-05497

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2015

Appellants, G. Linton Sheppard, Judith A. Sheppard, and Wendy Lynne 

Sheppard, appeal pro se from the September 11, 2014 in rem judgment 

entered in favor of Appellee, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for 

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR4 (U.S. Bank), pursuant to the order 

granting U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment in its action for 

mortgage foreclosure. After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant procedural history of this case, as gleaned from the 

certified record, is as follows. On February 29, 2012, U.S. Bank filed a 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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complaint in mortgage foreclosure on a property located at 2256 Washington 

Lane, Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania 19006, for a sum of $989,021.88, 

against Appellants, G. Linton and Judith Sheppard.1 U.S. Bank amended 

said complaint on January 8, 2013, naming Appellant, Wendy Lynne 

Sheppard, as an additional defendant. U.S. Bank’s Amended Complaint, 

1/8/13, at ¶ 2. U.S. Bank’s amended complaint asserted the following.

4. On or about April 25, 2005, G[.] LINTON 

SHEPPARD and JUDITH A. SHEPPARD made, 

executed and delivered to WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 

a Mortgage in the original principal amount of 

$787,500.00 on the premises described in the legal 

description marked Exhibit “B”, attached hereto and 

made a part hereof. Said Mortgage being recorded 

in the Office of the Recorder of MONTGOMERY 

County in Book 11457, Page 0123. The mortgage is 

a matter of public record and is incorporated herein 

by reference in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1019(g), 

which rule relieves the Plaintiff from its obligation to 

attach documents to pleadings if those documents 

are of public record. ...

5. Plaintiff is the current Mortgagee. By Assignment 

of Mortgage recorded July 7, 2010, the mortgage 

was assigned to US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

AS TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF GSR MORTGAGE LOAN 

TRUST 2005-AR4 which Assignment is recorded in 

the Office of the Recorder of MONTGOMERY County 

in Book 12866, Page 00018. The Assignment is a 

____________________________________________

1 We note Appellants filed several objections to U.S. Bank’s service of the 

complaint. On November 16, 2012 a hearing was held, and U.S. Bank’s 

original service was stricken, and U.S. Bank was directed to personally serve 

Appellants. Thereafter, on November 20, 2012, U.S. Bank filed a “Praecipe 

to Reinstate Civil Action/Mortgage Foreclosure.” U.S. Bank personally 

served Appellants, G. Linton Sheppard and Judith A. Sheppard, on November 

23, 2012.
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matter of public record and is incorporated herein by 

reference in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1019(g), 

which rule relieves the Plaintiff from its obligation to 

attach document to pleadings if those documents are 

of public record. ...

6. Defendant Wendy Lynne Sheppard has been 

made a party to the instant action pursuant to a 

Deed recorded on March 15, 2012, at the Office of 

the Recorder of Montgomery County in Book 5830, 

Page 0040. The Deed is a matter of public record 

and is incorporated by reference in accordance with 

Pa.R.C.P. 1019(g), which rule relieves the Plaintiff 

from its obligation to attach documents to pleading if 

those documents are of public record.

Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.2 

On February 11, 2013, Appellants filed preliminary objections to U.S. 

Bank’s complaint, and on March 4, 2013, U.S. Bank filed its response.3 On 

April 23, 2013, the trial court overruled Appellants’ preliminary objections 

and ordered Appellants to file an answer to the complaint within 20 days. 

Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, 

which was denied by the trial court on May 21, 2013. On June 10, 2013, 

____________________________________________

2 Despite noting they were not obligated to attach the subject mortgage, 

U.S. Bank attached a copy of the mortgage attached to its complaint as an 

exhibit. The copy of the mortgage did not include an indorsement.

3 U.S. Bank attached a copy of the indorsed mortgage to its response. U.S. 

Bank’s Response to Preliminary Objections, 3/4/13, at Exhibit A.
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Appellants filed an answer and new matter. On June 26, 2013, as amended 

on July 9, 2013, U.S. Bank filed a reply to Appellants’ new matter.4 

Subsequently, on July 8, 2014, U.S. Bank filed a motion for summary 

judgment. On August 18, 2014, Appellants filed a Verified 

Opposition/Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 11, 

2014, the trial court granted U.S. Bank summary judgment and an in rem

judgment in the amount of $1,153,370.32 plus interest from June 12, 2014, 

against Appellants. On September 19, 2014, Appellants filed an objection, 

and on September 25, 2014, a motion for reconsideration, which were 

denied by the trial court on October 2, 2014.

On October 7, 2014, Appellants filed a timely appeal. On October 8, 

2014, the trial court ordered Appellants to file, within 21 days, a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal in accordance with 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Said statement noted 

“[a]ny issues not properly included in the concise statement timely filed and 

served pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) shall be deemed waived.” Trial Court 

Order, 10/8/14. On October 29, 2014, Appellants filed a 12 page statement 

of errors listing 9 issues, the last of which contained 35 sub-issues. 

Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/29/14.

____________________________________________

4 U.S. Bank attached a mortgage assignment dated September 18, 2012, 

assigning the subject mortgage from Wells Fargo to U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank’s 

Amended Reply to Appellants’ New Matter, 7/9/13, at Exhibit D.
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On appeal, Appellants raise the following multi-part issue for our 

review.

I. Did the lower court commit an error of law and

abuse its discretion when it did not consider the 

cumulative effect of all of the following errors, 

thereby depriving [Appellants] of their due process 

rights and their right to a hearing?

A. [U.S. Bank] was not the owner of the 

obligation upon filing the complaint and 

therefore did not have standing to sue[.]

B. [U.S. Bank] did not have standing to sue 

due to two identical Assignments of Mortgage, 

executed two years apart[.]

C. [U.S. Bank] was not the Real Party in 

Interest[.]

D. [U.S. Bank] did not have standing as the 

chain of title of the mortgage and the note has 

not been specifically traced[.]

E. [U.S. Bank] did not have standing when the 

mortgage was purportedly assigned into the 

Trust five (5) or seven (7) years after the 

Appellee Trust closed[.]

F. The blank indorsement argument was 

improperly used to grant summary judgment 

when the Trust documents require that the 

note be specially indorsed[.]

G. The [trial] court improperly granted 

summary judgment when none of the 

“evidence” provided by [U.S. Bank] was 

authenticated and therefore summary 

judgment should have been denied[.]

H. The [trial] court granted summary judgment 

when discovery and a subpoena duces tecum

were still outstanding[.]
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I. Oral arguments were not granted when 

specifically requested[.]

J. Appellants were not given an opportunity to 

respond to [U.S. Bank]’s supplemental brief in 

support of summary judgment[.]

K. The [trial court] mischaracterizes Appellants 

statement of errors as a “concise” statement[.]

L. The [trial court] improperly moved this 

[C]ourt to affirm [its] decision[.]

M. U.S. Bank has come to the court with 

unclean hands[.]

Appellants’ Brief at 3-4.

Before addressing the merits of Appellants’ claims we first address 

Appellants’ issue K arguing the trial court mischaracterizes Appellants’ 

statement of errors as concise. Id. at 53. Appellants argue that its 

“Statement of Errors (or Concise Statement as the Judge insisted on calling 

it) conformed to Pa.R.A.P. § 1925(b)(4)(vi).” Id.

Contrary to Appellants’ claim, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b) requires Rule 1925(b) statements to “concisely identify 

each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient 

detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) 

(emphasis added). Further, “[t]he Statement should not be redundant or 

provide lengthy explanations as to any error.” Id. at 1925(b)(4)(iv). Any 

issue not raised in accordance with Rule 1925(b)(4) is waived. Id. at 
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1925(b)(4)(vii). Our Supreme Court has clarified that Rule 1925(b) is a 

bright-line rule. Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011).

We caution Appellant that this Court has found 

claims waived on appeal for failure to specify the 

error alleged. See Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 

A.2d 398, 409–10 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. 

Super. 2011), appeal denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa. 

2011) (“[A] [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague 

to allow the court to identify the issues raised on

appeal is the functional equivalent of no [c]oncise 

[s]tatement at all. The court’s review and legal 

analysis can be fatally impaired when the court has 

to guess at the issues raised.”) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). [] [H]owever, Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(v) provides that “[e]ach error identified 

in the Statement will be deemed to include every 

subsidiary issue contained therein which was raised 

in the trial court[.]”

Commonwealth v. Garvin, 50 A.3d 694, 697 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2012).5

Instantly, Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) statement is 12 pages long, and 

oftentimes redundant. The trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

acknowledged the excessive length of the statement, but noted that it would 

address the issues raised to the extent possible. Trial Court Opinion, 

12/23/14 at 3. As the trial court has addressed the majority of Appellants’ 

issues, we decline to fine waiver.

____________________________________________

5 We note “[s]ince the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to criminal and 

civil cases alike, the principles enunciated in criminal cases construing those 

rules are equally applicable in civil cases.” Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 

141, 148 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2006), citing Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 

400 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005).
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Additionally, upon review of Appellants’ brief, issues J and L are not 

developed. Appellate briefs must conform to the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Rule 2119 requires that the “argument shall be 

divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued” and include 

“such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Id. at 

2119(a). “[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a 

claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any 

other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” 

Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 

47 A.3d 848 (Pa. 2012), quoting In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 (Pa. Super. 

2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

Further, “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments 

on behalf of an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 

(Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2011). 

Further, while this Court will construe pro se materials liberally, “pro se

status confers no special benefit on an appellant.” Id. at 1211-1212. As 

Appellants have failed to develop issues J and L, these issues are waived.

We turn now to the remaining issues Appellants raise. Appellants’ first 

six issues, issues A through F, argue various bases on which they assert that 

U.S. Bank did not have standing in this matter. Appellants’ Brief at 4.

We begin by noting our standard and scope of review.

We review an order granting summary 

judgment for an abuse of discretion. Indalex, Inc. 
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v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 83 

A.3d 418, 420 (Pa. Super. 2013). Our scope of 

review is plenary, and we view the record in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A party 

bearing the burden of proof at trial is entitled to 

summary judgment “whenever there is no genuine 

issue of any material fact as to a necessary element 

of the cause of action or defense which could be 

established by additional discovery or expert 

report[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1). In response to a 

summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party 

cannot rest upon the pleadings, but rather must set 

forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of 

material fact. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3.

The holder of a mortgage has the right, upon 

default, to bring a foreclosure action. Cunningham 

v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1056–57 (Pa. 

Super. 1998). The holder of a mortgage is entitled 

to summary judgment if the mortgagor admits that 

the mortgage is in default, the mortgagor has failed 

to pay on the obligation, and the recorded mortgage 

is in the specified amount. Id.

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 464-465 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

appeal denied, 112 A.3d 648 (Pa. 2015).

In this appeal, Appellants argue that U.S. Bank does not have standing 

because (1) there are two identical assignments of the mortgage, (2) U.S. 

Bank was not a real party in interest, (3) there are defects in the chain of 

title, (4) the mortgage was purportedly assigned to a trust that closed, (5) 

the indorsement was blank when the trust documents require the note be 

specially indorsed, and (6) the evidence used to establish summary 

judgment was not properly authenticated. Appellants’ Brief at 4. Assuming 

arguendo there is a defect in the chain of assignment, we conclude that any 
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purported defects in the chain of assignment do not prevent U.S. Bank from 

enforcing the note because it is undisputed that U.S. Bank is the current 

holder of the original note that has been specially indorsed. In JP Morgan 

Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013), this 

Court concluded that under the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code 

(PUCC), 13 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1101-9809, the note securing a mortgage is a 

negotiable instrument. Id. at 1265, citing 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104. The PUCC 

states that a person entitled to enforce an instrument includes the following.

§ 3301. Person entitled to enforce instrument

“Person entitled to enforce” an instrument means:

(1) the holder of the instrument;

(2) a nonholder in possession of the 

instrument who has the rights of a holder; or

(3) a person not in possession of the 

instrument who is entitled to enforce the 

instrument pursuant to section 3309 (relating 

to enforcement of lost, destroyed or stolen 

instrument) or 3418(d) (relating to payment or 

acceptance by mistake).

13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301. Significantly, Section 3301 also provides that “[a] 

person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the 

person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the 

instrument.” Id. Thus, applying the PUCC, this Court has held that if a 

mortgagee can “establish that it holds the original Note, and that it is 

indorsed in blank [or specially indorsed], under the [PUCC] it will be entitled 
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to enforce the Note [as a negotiable instrument] ... even if there remain 

questions as to the chain of possession of the [n]ote from the time of its 

making to its arrival in [a]ppellee’s figurative hands.” Murray, supra at 

1268, citing 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3109(a). Accordingly, if U.S. Bank can establish 

both that it was (1) the holder in due course of the original note, and (2) the 

note is indorsed in blank or specially indorsed, it is entitled to enforce the 

note regardless of the alleged deficiencies in the assignments. See id.

A “holder in due course” of a negotiable instrument is defined by the 

PUCC as the holder of an instrument if “the instrument when issued or 

negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or 

alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into 

question its authenticity[,]” and “the holder took the instrument ... for value 

... [and] in good faith.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302(a)(1)-(2). Regarding 

indorsement, the PUCC provides as follows.

§ 3205. Special indorsement; blank 

indorsement; anomalous indorsement

(a) Special indorsement.--If an indorsement is 

made by the holder of an instrument, whether 

payable to an identified person or payable to bearer, 

and the indorsement identifies a person to whom it 

makes the instrument payable, it is a “special 

indorsement.” When specially indorsed, an 

instrument becomes payable to the identified person 

and may be negotiated only by the indorsement of 

that person. The principles stated in section 3110 

(relating to identification of person to whom 

instrument is payable) apply to special 

indorsements.
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(b) Blank indorsement.--If an indorsement is 

made by the holder of an instrument and it is not a 

special indorsement, it is a “blank indorsement.” 

When indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes 

payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer 

of possession alone until specially indorsed.

...

Id. § 3205.

Here, there is no genuine issue of material fact that U.S. Bank is the 

current holder of the original note and the note is specially indorsed to Wells 

Fargo. U.S. Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/8/14, at Ex. A1 

(“Adjustable Rate Note”). The note contains the following indorsement.

WITHOUT RECOURSE

PAY TO THE ORDER OF 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

By [signature of Joan M. Mills]

Joan M. Mills, Vice President

Id. Additionally, the assignment of the mortgage from Wells Fargo to U.S. 

Bank states Wells Fargo “does hereby grant, sell, assign, transfer, and 

convey, unto [U.S. Bank] ... a certain Mortgage dated 04/25/05 and 

recorded 05/05/2005, ... in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ... together with 

the note(s) and obligations therein described[.]” Id. at Ex. A2 (“Assignment 

of Mortgage”). U.S. Bank, as the successor in interest to Wells Fargo Bank 

N.A., is the current holder of the specially indorsed note. Therefore, U.S. 

Bank is entitled to enforce the note despite any alleged deficiencies in the 

chain of assignments of the mortgage, and Appellants’ assertion that the 
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assignment was defective does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. 

See 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301; Murray, supra. 

Further, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that “all 

actions shall be prosecuted by and in the name of the real party in 

interest[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 2002. This Court has repeatedly held that the 

mortgagee is the real party in interest in a foreclosure action. Wells Fargo 

Bank N.A. v. Lupori, 8 A.3d 919, 922 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2010) (noting “[w]e 

observe that the mortgagee is the real party in interest in a foreclosure 

action[]”); see also PHH Mortgage Corp. v. Powell, 100 A.3d 611, 219 

(Pa. 2014) (holding “[t]his Court has held that the mortgagee is the real 

party in interest in a foreclosure action[]”). In support of its motion for 

summary judgment, U.S. Bank in its prima facie case asserted it is the 

mortgagee of record through assignment by Wells Fargo of the original 

mortgage. U.S. Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/8/14, at ¶ 4. 

Therefore, Appellants’ first six issues challenging U.S. Bank’s standing are 

without merit.6

____________________________________________

6

In issue E, Appellants argue that the “mortgage was purportedly assigned 

to the Trust five (5) or seven (7) years after the Trust closed[.]” Appellants’ 

Brief at 31. However, Appellants concede the Trust can acquire assets after 

closing if “tax counsel has reviewed and approved the acceptance and that 

such acceptance will not affect the [Real Estate Mortgage Investment 

Conduit] (REMIC)’s status[.]” Id. at 33. Appellant has failed in its 

Opposition/Objection to U.S. Bank’ Motion for Summary to Judgment to 

provide any evidence that said mortgage was not accepted by the Trust. 

Accordingly, the trial court was not precluded from granting summary 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Next, in issue G, Appellants argue summary judgment was improper 

because “all of U.S. Bank’s paper work has been ‘verified’ by a non-party to 

this litigation with no authority provided by U.S. Bank to make 

verifications[.]” Appellants’ Brief at 39. Verification is guided by the 

following statute.

Rule 1024. Verification

(a) Every pleading containing an averment of fact 

not appearing of record in the action or containing a 

denial of fact shall state that the averment or denial 

is true upon the signer’s personal knowledge or 

information and belief and shall be verified. The 

signer need not aver the source of the information or 

expectation of ability to prove the averment or denial 

at the trial. A pleading may be verified upon personal 

knowledge as to a part and upon information and 

belief as to the remainder.

...

(b) If a pleading contains averments which are 

inconsistent in fact, the verification shall state that 

the signer has been unable after reasonable 

investigation to ascertain which of the inconsistent 

averments, specifying them, are true but that the 

signer has knowledge or information sufficient to 

form a belief that one of them is true.

(c) The verification shall be made by one or more of 

the parties filing the pleading unless all the parties 

(1) lack sufficient knowledge or information, or (2) 

are outside the jurisdiction of the court and the 

verification of none of them can be obtained within 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

judgment as there was no genuine issue of material fact. See Gibson, 

supra.
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the time allowed for filing the pleading. In such 

cases, the verification may be made by any person 

having sufficient knowledge or information and belief 

and shall set forth the source of the person's 

information as to matters not stated upon his or her 

own knowledge and the reason why the verification 

is not made by a party.

Pa.R.C.P. 1024.

In its motion for summary judgment, U.S. Bank provided the affidavit 

of Matthew McKeown, Vice President of Loan Documentation. U.S. Bank 

Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/8/14, at Exhibit B. The affidavit provides 

that Mr. McKeown is the “mortgage serving agent for [U.S. Bank] in the 

within matter.” Id. at ¶ 1. The affidavit states that the note has been duly 

indorsed, Appellants have failed to make payments on their mortgage since 

July 1, 2009 resulting in default, and Appellants have failed to cure the 

default. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5, 7. Appellants fail to assert on what basis Mr. 

McKeown is disqualified from making verifications on behalf of U.S. Bank. 

Rather, Appellants revert back to the same argument made in the preceding 

six issues arguing “since we know that U.S. Bank is not involved in this 

litigation and they are not the owner of the note at the inception of the case 

sub judice, there is no evidence in the record giving U.S. Bank authority to 

act on anyone else’s behalf.” Appellants’ Brief at 39-40. For all the reasons 

set forth above, Appellants’ argument fails.

In its next issue, Issue H, Appellants argue that they requested to 

inspect the note, and that U.S. Bank “never notified [Appellants] that the 
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collateral file had been obtained for [Appellants’] inspection.” Id. at 45. 

Nevertheless, Appellants acknowledge U.S. Bank notified them that “counsel 

has requested that the Original Note be sent to its office so it can be 

inspected by [Appellants] upon appointment.” Appellants’ Brief at 44. 

However, by Appellants’ own admission, “[Appellants] concede that counsel 

did not state they would contact [Appellants] when the note was received, 

but what were [Appellants] to do? Contact counsel every single day from 

the date they received the communication to see if the purported original 

note had been received?” Id. Appellants’ inaction does not equate to 

discovery being open. Thus, this issue fails.

Next, in Issue I, Appellants assert that oral arguments were not 

granted when specifically requested. Appellants’ Brief at 48. In support of 

this averment Appellants cite Montgomery County Local Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1035.2(a)(3) which states “[i]f oral argument was requested by 

either party on either of their respective cover sheets or the argument 

Praecipe, the matter shall be scheduled for argument.” Id. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion in response to Appellants’ issue as framed 

in its Rule 1925(b) statement, the trial court noted the following.

[Appellants] claim the Motion was granted 

without oral argument despite [Appellants] request 

for same and thus constituted a violation of due 

process. Further, such denial allegedly violated the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, and, 

Montgomery County Local Rules of Civil Procedure 

(“the Local Rules”) at Local Rule 1035.2(a)(3). The 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, at Pa.R.C.P. 
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1035.2, do[] not include a provision for oral 

argument and therefore there is no basis for 

[Appellants] claim under the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

The Local Rules allow for oral argument if 

requested by either party on their respective cover 

sheets and attached to the motion or response, or by 

separately filed argument praecipe. Local Rule 

1035.2(a)(3). [U.S. Bank’s] form cover sheet 

attached to the Motion checked the box indicating no 

argument requested. [Appellants] Response to the 

Motion did not include a cover sheet. [Appellants’] 

claimed error is without merit.

Further, as the Superior Court explained in a 

decision involving a mortgage foreclosure appeal, 

appellants are “not entitled to any particular 

advantage because [they] lack legal training. As our 

Supreme Court has explained, any lay person 

choosing to represent [themselves] in a legal 

proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, 

assume the risk that [their] lack of expertise and 

legal training will prove [their] undoing.” Branch 

Banking and Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 

942 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/14, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).

In their appellate brief, Appellants now claim they “clearly requested 

oral arguments on the cover page of their Opposition/Objection, contrary to” 

the trial court’s claim in its opinion.7 Appellants’ Brief at 49. Nevertheless, 

by their own admission Appellants acknowledge they did not include a cover 

page, but “[t]hat front page, the ‘cover’ page, was stamped with a lower 

____________________________________________

7 The caption to Appellants’ Verified Opposition/Objection to Motion for 

Summary Judgment does include the words “Oral Argument Requested” in 

the upper right hand corner.
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court clerk’s sticker indicating it was the first page of the pleading[.]” Id. 

Montgomery County Local Rule 1035.2(a)(2) requires “an answer from the 

adverse parties motion for summary judgment is required ... along with[] a 

cover sheet in the form set forth in Rule 205.2(b)[.]” Montgomery 

Cty.R.C.P. 1035.2(a)(2). Local Rule 205.2(b) states, “[t]he Cover Sheets 

required by Rule 208.3(b), 1028(c), 1034(a) and 1035.2(a) shall be as 

follows[,]” and then provides a .pdf link to the required cover sheet. Id. at 

205.2(b). Appellants completely failed to file a cover sheet in accordance 

with Rule 205.2(b), and therefore, their claim that oral argument was not 

granted is meritless for failure to comply with procedures necessary to 

request argument. Moreover, we note that Appellants were aware of, and 

had correctly complied with Rule 205.2(b) by using the mandated cover 

sheet on prior filings in this matter. See Appellants’ Preliminary Objections 

to Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure, 2/11/13, at Cover Sheet; Appellants’ 

Motion to Strike U.S. Bank’s Affidavit in Support of Its Motion for Summary 

Judgment Pursuant to 225 Pa.R.E. 104 and 12 P.S. 514, 8/11/14, at Cover 

Sheet. Because Appellants failed to include a cover sheet on the Verified 

Opposition/Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellants’ Issue I 

fails. 

Finally, in Issue M, Appellants baldly assert that “U.S. Bank has come 

to the court with unclean hands and, as a result, is not entitled to equitable 

relief.” Appellants’ Brief at 54. Appellants base their reasoning on the 
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notion that U.S. Bank “did not have possession or ownership of the note at 

the inception of the lawsuit and therefore, the Assignments of the Mortgage 

are void ab initio ... U.S. Bank is not a real party in interest ... [and] the 

chain of title of the mortgage and note is broken[.]” Id. at 55. For all the 

reasons discussed supra, Appellants issue is meritless.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellants’ issues are waived or 

devoid of merit and the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a 

matter of law in awarding summary judgment to U.S. Bank. See Gibson, 

supra. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s September 11, 2014 

judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2015