Filed 10/3/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ABIR COHEN TREYZON 

SALO, LLP, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

ARTA LAHIJI, 

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B291636

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC687731)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. David S. Cunningham, III, Judge. Affirmed.

Parker Mills, and David B. Parker for Plaintiffs and 

Appellants.

Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, Boris Treyzon, and Cynthia 

Goodman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Schlichter & Shonack, Jamie L. Keeton, and Jeremy P. 

Cowan for Defendant and Respondent. 

* * * * * *
2

After a client fired her attorney and his firm, the firm 

placed a lien on the client’s further recovery and then sued the 

client’s daughter for defaming them in several online reviews. 

The daughter moved to dismiss the defamation claim under our 

anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16),1 and the trial court 

granted the motion. The trial court’s ruling was correct, so we 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. Legal representation

Nahid Lahiji (Nahid)2 retained attorney Alexander Cohen 

(Cohen) and his law firm Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP (the 

firm) in June 2017 to represent her in a dispute with the insurer 

of her home. Nahid obtained some preliminary recovery, and 

authorized the firm to retain $120,000 of that recovery. She 

nevertheless became dissatisfied with the firm’s representation, 

and terminated the firm in November 2017. The firm thereafter 

placed a lien on any further recovery from the insurer under a 

theory of quantum meruit. 

B. Online posts

On November 19, 2017 (nine days after the firm asserted 

its lien), a person using a Yelp account with the name “AI L.” and 

with a photograph of Nahid’s daughter, Arta Lahiji (Arta), posted 

1 “SLAPP” is short for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 

Participation.

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

2 To avoid confusion, we use the first names for family 

members who share the same last name. We mean no disrespect.
3

a review of the firm and Cohen (the Yelp review). The reviewer

recounted that she had hired Cohen to handle her “home 

insurance claim” and that Cohen had (1) used a law student “case 

manager” to negotiate with the insurer, (2) ignored the reviewer’s 

request to inform her of expenses “over a certain threshold,” (3) 

withheld disbursements to her longer than necessary, (4) 

improperly deducted expenses, and (5) repeatedly yelled when 

asked when checks would be cleared. The review more broadly 

stated that the firm was “underhanded and shady,” was 

“unprofessional and unethical,” used “scare tactics,” and had an 

“awful moral compass.” The reviewer warned readers to “stay 

away from this firm.”

On November 21, 2017, an “anonymous” user posted an 

identical review on Avvo, an online lawyer directory. 

On December 13, 2017, “Angela Helder” posted a review on 

the firm’s Facebook page that read: “Unprofessional and 

unethical group of attorneys . . . will botch your home owners 

insurance claim.” 

On December 14, 2017, reviews identical to the Yelp review 

were posted on the website Ripoff Report by “Nancy” in “Redondo 

Beach” and on Google by “Nahid Lahiji.” 

II. Procedural Background

A. Complaint and initial discovery

On December 19, 2017, Cohen and the firm sued Arta for 

defamation.3 Although the above recounted postings purported 

by name or content to be from Nahid, Cohen and the firm alleged 

3 Cohen and the firm also sued Thuy Tran, who had posted a 

review on the firm’s Facebook page, but Tran is not at issue in 

this appeal.
4

a “good faith belief” that Arta was the poster. Cohen and the firm 

sought compensatory damages, punitive damages and a postjudgment order enjoining Arta from publishing further 

defamatory statements and requiring her to remove the existing 

posts. 

In January 2015, Nahid sent an email to Cohen explaining 

that she, and not her daughter, had posted the various reviews. 

Rather than add Nahid as a defendant, Cohen and the firm 

proceeded to promulgate discovery against Arta. Specifically, 

they served her with one set of general interrogatories and with 

119 special interrogatories. 

B. Anti-SLAPP litigation

On March 18, 2018, Arta filed an anti-SLAPP motion 

seeking dismissal of the defamation claim on the grounds that (1) 

the postings constituted “protected activity” within the meaning 

of the anti-SLAPP law, and (2) Cohen and the firm could not 

establish that the defamation claim had minimal merit. In 

support of the motion, Nahid submitted a sworn declaration 

attesting that she had “left [the] reviews” underlying the 

defamation claim and Arta submitted a sworn declaration 

attesting that she had not “post[ed]” any of the reviews at issue 

but was “aware” of Nahid’s posts on Yelp, Avvo, Ripoff Report,

and Google. 

Arta’s motion triggered the anti-SLAPP law’s automatic 

stay of discovery. (§ 425.16, subd. (g).) On March 26, 2018, 

Cohen and the firm filed an ex parte motion to lift that stay in 

order to depose Nahid and Arta and to serve Yelp with a business 

records subpoena. Without waiting for the court to act on their 

motion (and thus in violation of the automatic stay), Cohen and 

the firm issued a subpoena on Yelp two days after they filed their 
5

motion to lift the stay seeking 28 categories of documents, 

including the internet protocol (IP) addresses from which the 

Yelp review at issue was posted. Following further briefing, the 

trial court denied the motion to lift the discovery stay. 

After Cohen and the firm filed their opposition to Arta’s 

anti-SLAPP motion, after Arta filed a reply, and after a hearing, 

the trial court granted Arta’s motion in a 15-page order. The 

court ruled that posting the online reviews constituted “protected 

activity” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP law. The court 

then ruled that Cohen and the law firm had not carried their 

burden of showing that their defamation claim had minimal 

merit. Cohen’s and the firm’s “assertions that . . . Arta 

. . . posted the social media statements at the heart of [their] 

[c]omplaint,” the court reasoned, “are speculative and not 

supported by the evidence in the record.” The court went on to 

award Arta, as the party prevailing on the anti-SLAPP motion, a 

total of $36,855 in attorney fees ($12,590 at the time of the 

dismissal and $24,265 in a post-judgment order). 

C. Appeal

Cohen and the firm timely appealed the dismissal. 

DISCUSSION

The anti-SLAPP law “provides a procedure for weeding out, 

at an early stage, meritless claims arising from” activity that is 

protected by the law. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) 

Accordingly, a trial court tasked with ruling on an anti-SLAPP 

motion must ask two questions: (1) has the moving party “made a 

threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from 

protected activity” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 

1056), and, if so, (2) has the nonmoving party “established . . . a 

probability that [he or it] will prevail” on the challenged cause of 
6

action by showing that the claim has “minimal merit” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (b)(1); Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93-94)? We 

independently review a trial court’s resolution of each question. 

(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 

269, fn. 3.)

I. Protected Activity

Among other things, the anti-SLAPP law defines “protected 

activity” to include “any written . . . statement . . . made in a 

place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an 

issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) As neither party 

disputes on appeal, reviews posted to an Internet website meet 

this definition of protected activity. (E.g., Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 

209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145-1147; Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. 

(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294, 310.)

Cohen and the firm offer one argument as to why the 

reviews posted in this case are not protected activity. 

Specifically, they argue that the anti-SLAPP law defines 

protected activity as pertaining to a “cause of action against a 

person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the 

person’s right of petition or free speech.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1), 

italics added.) Because Arta denies making the posts, plaintiffs

reason, their cause of action is not “aris[ing] from an[y] act [of 

Arta].” We squarely rejected this precise argument in Bel Air 

Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 929 (Bel Air). 

Bel Air expressly held that a defendant who denies engaging in 

the alleged conduct “may rely on the plaintiff’s allegations alone” 

in assessing whether the conduct at issue is protected activity. 

(Ibid.) That is because it is “[the] plaintiff’s complaint [that] 

ultimately defines the contours of the claims.” (Id. at p. 936.) 

Not allowing the defendant to rely on the allegations alone, Bel 
7

Air reasoned, “would have the perverse effect of making antiSLAPP relief unavailable when a plaintiff alleges a baseless 

claim, which is precisely the kind of claim that [the anti-SLAPP 

law] was intended to address.” (Id. at p. 929.) We are troubled 

by Cohen and the firm’s failure to cite this directly applicable 

contrary authority anywhere in their briefs.

II. Minimal Merit

Once a claim is shown to fall within the ambit of the antiSLAPP law, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to establish a 

“probability” of prevailing on that claim at trial. (§ 425.16, subd. 

(b)(1); Chodos v. Cole (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 692, 701.) In 

making this assessment, “the [trial] court shall consider the 

pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the 

facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (b)(2).) The pleadings “frame the issue to be decided” 

(Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 

655, abrogated on other grounds, Equilon Enterprises v. 

Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53), and the court then 

evaluates whether the evidence submitted by the parties and 

admissible at trial amounts to a “‘sufficient prima facie showing 

of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted 

by the plaintiff is credited’” or instead whether the defendant is 

entitled to prevail “‘as a matter of law.’” (Tuchscher Development 

Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 

Cal.App.4th 1219, 1235 (Tuchscher), quoting Wilson v. Parker, 

Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821, superseded by 

statute on another point as stated in Hart v. Darwish (2017) 12 

Cal.App.5th 218, 226, fn. 3; Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 

Cal.App.4th 892, 906 (Kashian); Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 

Cal.App.4th 13, 26 (Gilbert) [nonmoving party must meet its 
8

burden with “competent and admissible evidence”].) Because 

plaintiffs’ evidence must be credited, a court is not to make 

credibility determinations or otherwise weigh the evidence 

submitted. (Kashian, at p. 906.)

To prove defamation, a plaintiff must establish “‘(a) a 

publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, 

and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes 

special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720; Civ. 

Code, §§ 44, 45, 45a.) As always, the plaintiff must establish that 

the person sued is the one legally responsible for the tort. (See 

Westside Estate Agency, Inc. v. Randall (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 317, 

329 [lawsuit will be dismissed if plaintiff “su[es] the wrong 

party”].)

We independently agree with the trial court’s conclusion 

that Cohen and the firm did not make a “prima facie showing” 

that Arta was legally responsible for the postings that underly 

their defamation claim. The posts themselves do not establish 

that Arta was the author or poster, as none of the posts are in 

Arta’s name and their content suggests that the author was the 

one represented by Cohen and the firm—that is, Nahid.

Cohen and the firm point to four pieces of evidence that, in 

their view, constitute a “prima facie” showing that Arta was the 

author. 

First, they point to the fact that the Yelp account from 

which the Yelp review was posted had Arta’s photograph and the 

username “AI L.” However, both Arta and Nahid explained that 

they shared that Yelp account and that Nahid—not Arta—had 

been the one who posted the review of Cohen and the firm. 

Cohen and the firm assert that Yelp’s terms of service prohibit 

shared accounts, but those terms of service are not properly 
9

before us because the trial court ruled them inadmissible, and 

that evidentiary ruling is not challenged on appeal.

Second, Cohen and the firm point to two emails sent to 

them on October 6, 2017. The first email was sent from Nahid’s 

email account to the firm’s “case worker” on the matter. The only 

portion of that email’s content that is not redacted is the request: 

“Please blind copy my mom and I on the email.” (Italics added.) 

Four minutes later, Arta fired off a responsive email from her 

own account to Nahid, Cohen and the case worker that reads: 

“Correction: please blind copy my daughter Arta and I.” From 

this email exchange, Cohen in his declaration asserted that Arta 

“routinely masquerades as her mother in email and other online 

communications,” and thus must have authored all of the reviews 

underlying the defamation claim. 

These emails do not establish a prima facie showing that 

Arta authored the reviews. To begin, Cohen’s and the firm’s 

theory as to why the emails show Arta’s authorship of Nahid’s 

email is unsupported by the emails themselves. Their theory is 

that Arta sent the first email while attempting to pose as Nahid 

(which is why the first email refers to blind copying “my mom and 

I”), that she realized her mistake, and that she then sent the 

second email to correct it (which is why the second email asks 

that “my daughter Arta and I” be “blind cop[ied]”). It is 

impossible to confirm this theory from the emails themselves, 

particularly because the first email is so heavily redacted and 

does not even reflect who received it. This theory also make no 

sense: It is far more likely that Nahid made a typographic error

when sending the first email that went to Cohen, Arta and the 

case worker and that Arta, seeing the error, sent an email 

replying to all from her own account correcting it, than it is that 
10

Arta made a “slip of the tongue” while pretending to be Nahid, 

realized the error, and then for some reason logged in to her own

email account and sent a corrective email. Further, and more to 

the point, even if we assume that Arta posed as her mother in the 

first email, the jump from authoring that email to posting all of 

the reviews at issue in this case is a leap—and a speculative one 

at that—because it requires us to assume that (1) Arta’s 

impersonation of Nahid in one email means she impersonates 

Nahid in all Internet communications, and (2) Arta’s 

impersonation of Nahid once means she always impersonates her. 

As our Supreme Court recently noted, “speculative inferences not 

supported by the evidence” fall short of establishing a prima facie 

showing. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 

795.) Cohen’s assertion in his declaration does not cure this 

deficiency because the trial court struck that assertion and that 

evidentiary ruling also is not challenged on appeal. 

Third, Cohen and the firm point to the inconsistent use of 

the first-person single (“I”) and plural (“we”) in the Yelp review as 

proof that Arta wrote that review. While the posting does 

sometimes use “I” and sometimes “we,” it is undisputed that 

Nahid included Arta in much of her correspondence with Cohen 

and the firm. More to the point, the reviewer says that “I hired 

. . . Cohen” and “I signed the retainer”—acts that the parties 

agree were undertaken by Nahid, not Arta. 

Lastly, Cohen and the firm point to Nahid’s request for an 

interpreter in the pending fee arbitration matter. However, the 

trial court struck that evidence and that ruling has not been 

challenged. As noted above, only admissible evidence can 

support a finding of a prima facie showing.
11

Cohen and the firm make three further arguments on 

appeal.

First, they assert that the trial court wrongly denied them 

the ability to make a prima facie showing by denying their 

motion to lift the statutory stay of discovery. A trial court may 

lift the statutory stay for “good cause” (§ 425.16, subd. (g); Britts 

v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1125 (Britts)), 

which requires a showing that the specific discovery sought is 

both “needed . . . to establish a prima facie case” and “tailored to 

that end.” (Britts, at p. 1125; 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg

(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568, 593 (1-800 Contacts).) We review a 

trial court’s denial of a motion to lift the stay for an abuse of 

discretion. (1-800 Contacts, at p. 593.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

motion to lift the discovery stay. Cohen and the firm told the 

trial court that deposing Nahid and Arta and subpoenaing 

documents from Yelp would help them establish that: (1) Nahid 

had “never used the ‘AI L.’ Yelp account,” (2) the “AI L.” Yelp 

account was not a “‘shared’ account,” as Arta and Nahid stated, 

(3) Nahid lacked the “computer savvy necessary to navigate” the 

various websites where the reviews were posted, (4) Nahid lacked 

the “command of the English language necessary to draft” the 

reviews, (5) “Arta used her phone, to which Nahid does not have 

access, to make the Postings,” and (6) “[s]ome, or all, of the 

Postings were made from New York, New York, while Nahid was 

not residing in New York, but Arta was residing there.” The first 

five reasons are aimed at testing Nahid’s and Arta’s declarations, 

but it is well established that “[d]iscovery may not be obtained 

merely to ‘test’ the opponent’s declarations.” (1-800 Contacts, 

supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 593; Sipple v. Foundation for Nat.
12

Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 247.) The final reason might 

be established by the IP addresses sought from Yelp, except that 

Cohen acknowledged that Arta and Nahid “share[d] the same

[street] address” in Redondo Beach at the time the reviews were 

posted, so the IP addresses corresponding to the posts would not 

reveal which one of them made the post, rendering any “internet 

service protocol . . . discovery . . . inconclusive.” 

Second, Cohen and the firm contend that Arta’s admission 

to being “aware” of Nahid’s posts means that she took “a 

responsible part in [the] publication of defamatory matter.” 

(Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1245 (Shively).) 

They are wrong. While Shively provides that “each person who 

takes a responsible part in a publication of defamatory matter 

may be held liable for the publication” (ibid.), Cohen and the firm 

cite no authority for the proposition that one person’s awareness 

of another person’s tortious conduct, without more, renders them 

“responsible” for that conduct. 

Lastly, Cohen and the firm proclaim that Arta’s evidence 

was “very weak.” What matters, however, is not the weakness of 

Arta’s evidence, but the strength of all the evidence. (See Gilbert,

supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) Because, as we have explained, 

Cohen and the firm have not advanced anything beyond 

speculation that Arta was the author of the posts at issue, their 

defamation suit against her lacks minimal merit regardless of the 

persuasiveness of the evidence offered by Arta.

In light of our analysis, we have no occasion to discuss 

Cohen’s and the law firm’s defense of other elements of their 

defamation claim or the alternative bases for affirmance offered 

by Arta.
13

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Arta is entitled to her costs on 

appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P.J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ