DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JOEL HUNT,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-1577 

[November 20, 2019]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Edward H. Merrigan Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-5155 

CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Picard, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

LEVINE, C.J.

Appellant was convicted of aggravated battery with a hate crime. At 

trial, the victim and his friend both testified to appellant stabbing the 

victim. Appellant’s wife and son testified that the victim hit appellant 

before the stabbing. Appellant’s defense was that his actions were selfdefense. The state introduced the testimony of a detective who interviewed 

the victim at length. During the detective’s testimony, the state directly 

asked whether, based on his training and experience, “there [was] selfdefense used in this case by the defendant.” The detective responded,

“[N]o.” The trial court erred in admitting this opinion testimony. 

The detective testified that, based on his training and experience, there 

was no self-defense legitimately available for appellant. If there was no 

self-defense, then appellant was effectively left with no defense. The 

credibility of appellant’s claim of self-defense was exclusively within the 

province of the jury. The deputy’s testimony invaded this exclusive 
2

province. Thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial.1 

The victim, an African American, was visiting his friend when appellant, 

a neighbor of the friend, came to sit on a bench next to the victim. The 

victim asked appellant why he was sitting so close, and appellant stated 

that it was his bench. Appellant was drinking alcohol and appeared 

intoxicated. Both the victim and friend declined appellant’s offer of 

alcohol. At that point, appellant talked about killing his wife because she 

was having an affair with an African American, using a racial epithet. The 

friend then asked appellant if he was a racist. Appellant said his parents 

were racists, and then proceeded to use the same racial epithet over and 

over. The victim repeatedly asked appellant what appellant had just said. 

Appellant told the victim that he would not “f---ing win.” The friend heard 

the victim state, “Say that s--t again.” The victim also heard appellant say 

to appellant’s son, “Boy. Boy. Get him, boy. Attack.” 

The victim then felt something “pop,” at which time he told his friend 

that he had been stabbed and to call the police. According to the victim, 

appellant tried to stab him again and ran after him saying, “I’m going to f-

--ing kill you, n----r.” The victim ran away, with appellant saying, “Come 

here, n----r. Let me finish the job.” Appellant’s son and wife denied that 

appellant chased the victim following the stabbing. 

The police then arrived at the scene and ordered appellant, who had 

returned to his house, to exit the house and put his weapon down. 

Appellant later gave a statement to Detective Huertas. Appellant claimed 

that the victim hit him and broke his glasses. At trial, appellant’s wife and 

son testified that the victim was hitting appellant in the head before 

appellant stabbed the victim. The victim’s friend stated that he saw the 

victim standing over appellant, but that the victim did not put his hands

on appellant. 

During the trial, the detective testified about his investigation. The 

detective had spoken at length with the victim and appellant. The state 

introduced the following statement appellant gave to the detective: 

I had a bench, a nice little bench and I sit there. One of the 

gentleman was the neighbor. The other black has been sitting 

out doing drug deals all god damn day, we see them all the 

time. We haven’t seen him since the other black guy moved 

two weeks ago. He came up and started trying to make me 

1 We affirm all other issues. The clerical correction in the conviction has become 

moot based on the disposition of this case, and all other issues are without merit.
3

buy drugs. So I’m sitting there drinking and all that and we’re 

standing—the conversation gets a little sh--ty. The neighbor 

guy gets up and walks away. The guy from next door, he 

doesn’t live there anymore. It was his mother-in-law that 

owned the place but she sold the place now so we have a new 

landlord, all right. And this guy starts, I mean, I don’t know 

how to explain—I’m sitting there and he’s right here. 

There’s—he’s pushing at me and he started to slap me in the 

head. Everything I can f---ing do.

. . . .

[T]his guy started slapping me in the head, and I drove him in 

the f---ing chest. F--k off me, man.

During the testimony of Detective Huertas, the state asked him the 

following:

Q Detective Huertas, during your investigation did you find 

that the defendant used the word n----r towards the victim[] . 

. . on March 5, 2016? 

A Yes. 

Q During your investigation, was there any evidence that the 

victim . . . was hitting the defendant?

A No. 

Q Based on your training and experience, was there selfdefense used in this case by the defendant?

A No. 

Q Based on your training and experience, did the defendant 

stand his ground in any way? 

A No. 

Q Based on your training and experience, was the defendant 

defending anyone else?

A No. 
4

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I am going to object as to invading the 

province of the jury.2

The trial court overruled appellant’s objection. Subsequently, appellant 

was convicted of aggravated battery with a hate crime. Appellant appeals 

the conviction.

We review this conviction, and the trial court’s decision to admit the 

detective’s testimony as evidence, under the abuse of discretion standard. 

Jackson v. State, 107 So. 3d 328, 339 (Fla. 2012). The trial court’s use of 

discretion still must comport with the rules of evidence. Id. 

Appellant argues that Detective Huertas’s testimony about the validity 

of his claim of self-defense invaded the exclusive province of the jury. The 

state responds that this issue was not preserved. The state claims that 

only the last question in the string of questioning by the state was 

preserved with a contemporaneous objection, since only after the fifth 

question did appellant object. The key question in dispute was the third 

question. 

An objection is required to be made at the time of error “to give the trial 

court the opportunity to correct” the error. Mansueto v. State, 148 So. 3d 

813, 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Still, “[a]n objection need not always be 

made at the moment an examination enters impermissible areas of 

inquiry.” Jackson v. State, 451 So. 2d 458, 461 (Fla. 1984). An issue can 

be properly preserved if the objection is made “shortly after the comment 

and before the witness was relieved.” Bradley v. State, 214 So. 3d 648, 

654-55 (Fla. 2017); see also Fratcher v. State, 37 So. 3d 365, 367 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2010) (holding that the issue was preserved since the objection was 

made “shortly thereafter” the statement in question, and “soon enough 

that the judge could have issued a curative instruction to the jury had he 

sustained the objection”). 

This court has determined that a contemporaneous objection preserved 

a motion for mistrial where the motion was made three questions after the 

objectionable comment. Roban v. State, 384 So. 2d 683, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1980); see also Fittipaldi USA, Inc. v. Castroneves, 905 So. 2d 182, 185 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (finding an objection made “[f]our to five questions” 

after the testimony in question was timely and preserved the issue for 

review because of “the closeness in time between [the] testimony and 

2 This transcript reflects the last version of the trial transcript. It is appropriate 

to abide by the corrected transcript when it is available. See Myers v. State, 557 

So. 2d 682, 682-83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
5

counsel’s objection”). Based on the foregoing authority, we find the 

objection in this case was timely and preserved the issue for our review.

When the detective was asked whether “[b]ased on your training and 

experience, was there self-defense used in this case by the defendant” and 

he said, “No,” the detective entered an “impermissible area[] of inquiry.” 

Jackson, 451 So. 2d at 461. The law is clear. “A police officer’s testimony 

or comments suggesting a defendant’s guilt invades the province of the 

jury to decide guilt or innocence.” Lopiano v. State, 164 So. 3d 82, 84 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2015). 

Thus, “[i]t is clear that error is occasioned where a witness, including a 

lay witness, is permitted to offer her opinion about the guilt of the 

defendant.” Zecchino v. State, 691 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). 

It is especially harmful when a police officer offers an opinion on the guilt, 

or in this case, the sole defense of appellant. “Police officers, by virtue of 

their positions, rightfully bring with their testimony an air of authority and 

legitimacy. A jury is inclined to give great weight to their opinions . . . .” 

Salomon v. State, 267 So. 3d 25, 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citation omitted).

A police officer’s testimony is especially prejudicial when it invades the 

province of the jury as to the defendant’s sole defense. In Bartlett v. State, 

993 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the investigator ruled out the 

possibility that the defendant acted in self-defense, where the defendant 

was relying on a “battered spouse syndrome” defense after being charged 

in the murder of her boyfriend. The First District held that 

by allowing the State’s questions and [the investigator’s]

detailed answers on a matter within the realm of an ordinary 

juror’s knowledge and understanding, the trial court 

improperly invaded the province of the jury as the fact-finder 

and allowed the detective to serve as a fact-finder during the 

guilt phase by determining that self-defense was not a viable 

defense for Appellant.

Id. at 161. In this case, the detective acted effectively as a fact-finder by 

neutralizing appellant’s defense in front of the jury. This was error.

In many cases, courts have found that the erroneous admission of 

testimony that invaded the exclusive role of the jury was not harmless 

error. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 1074, 1080-81 (Fla. 2000) 

(finding that the detective’s improper opinion as to the defendant’s guilt 

was not harmless error in light of the evidence in the record); Edwards v. 

State, 248 So. 3d 166, 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding that a police 
6

officer’s testimony on credibility invaded the province of the jury and was 

not harmless error when the officer explained that, “based on his training 

and experience in conducting interviews, certain body language and 

mannerisms indicate deception,” and the defendant was displaying such 

mannerisms); Bartlett, 993 So. 2d at 166-67 (holding that the state was 

unable to meet its burden to show harmless error when an officer gave 

opinion testimony as to the existence of self-defense). That is true in this 

case as well. The admission of the detective’s testimony about appellant’s 

self-defense, or rather lack of self-defense, was harmful error.

In summary, we find that the admission of the detective’s testimony 

about appellant’s theory of self-defense invaded the exclusive province of 

the jury and was harmful error. We, therefore, reverse appellant’s 

conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded. 

CONNER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.