Filed 3/28/14; pub. order 4/22/14 (see end of opn.) 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

In re ASHLY F. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B250742 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

T.A. , 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK98890) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Carlos 

E. Vazquez, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. 

 Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, 

Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

________________________________________ 
2

 After a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing the juvenile court 

found jurisdiction over Ashly F. and her sister Cristina F. under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j)1

 and ordered the children removed from 

their home. T.A. (Mother) appeals only the dispositional order. We conclude the 

evidence does not support the court’s findings that the Department of Children and 

Family Services made “reasonable efforts” to prevent the children’s removal and that 

there were no “reasonable means” to protect the children other than removing them from 

their home. Accordingly, we reverse the dispositional order and remand the cause to the 

juvenile court for further proceedings in accordance with law. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

 The family came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family 

Services (DCFS) when a DCFS worker and a police officer came to the family home in 

response to a report of suspected child abuse. 

 P.F., the half-sister of Ashly and Cristina, told the worker that Mother had beaten 

her for stealing a wallet at church. According to P.F., Mother used an extension cord to 

strike her on her head, face and arms. The worker observed dark bruises under P.F.’s 

eyes and lateral marks on her upper left arm. P.F. said that Mother often beat her with 

extension cords, belts and clothes hangers. In this particular incident Mother hit her 

many times with an extension cord and she fell backward onto her bed. When Mother 

kept hitting her, and she raised her arms to protect herself, Mother whipped her on the 

arm. Afterward, P.F. said her head hurt and she was bleeding from the top of her head. 

Her left eye also hurt and was swollen. Mother did not attempt to administer first aid and 

when P.F.’s father came home, Mother told him she did not regret “anything I did to her. 

She deserved it.” 

 

1

 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
3

 While at the home the DCFS worker interviewed five-year-old Cristina. Cristina 

showed the worker a cut on one of her palms and said Mother had cut her with a belt. 

She told the worker that Mother often used a belt or a hanger to discipline her. 

 The worker then went to the children’s elementary school to talk to Cristina’s 

sister, Ashly. Ashly admitted that sometimes Mother hit her with a plastic hanger and 

had hit her with cords and belts “a long time ago.” In a subsequent interview Ashly told 

the worker that Mother had hit her with a thin hanger and it did not hurt although it left 

red welts on her arms, legs and hands. 

 Mother admitted hitting P.F. with an extension cord for stealing the wallet. She 

said she was aiming at P.F.’s buttocks but the girl moved and the cord hit her in the face. 

Mother claimed she only hit P.F. two or three times. When asked how she usually 

disciplined the children Mother said she uses her hand or sometimes a “soft” belt. 

She used hangers “only to tap them.” 

 The worker interviewed the children’s father, I.F. (Father), who stated that he 

was asleep when the incident arose between P.F. and Mother. When he saw P.F.’s 

injuries he told Mother never to discipline any of the children like that again or their 

relationship would end. He treated P.F.’s injuries with witch hazel, peroxide, alcohol and 

over-the-counter pain medication. He did not believe she needed to see a doctor. Father 

told the worker that he was unaware of the beatings Mother gave the children in the past 

because they had never told him about them. 

 DCFS removed Ashly and Cristina from their home and placed them in protective 

custody with their maternal aunt and uncle. In a petition filed under section 300, 

subdivisions (a), (b) and (j), DCFS alleged that the two children were at risk of physical 

harm due to Mother’s “excessive physical abuse” and Father’s failure to protect them.2

 

In its report for the detention hearing DCFS stated that there were “no reasonable 

means by which the [children’s] physical or emotional health may be protected without 

 

2

 The court also sustained a petition as to P.F. and her sister, J.F. Their case is not 

included in this appeal. 
4

removing the [children] from the parents’ or guardians’ physical custody.” The report 

did not mention any reasonable alternatives to removal from the home that had been tried 

and failed or that had been considered and rejected. The report did state that the family 

was “referred to ARS services however it is unknown if family complied and followed 

through with services.” (The record does not show that anyone at DCFS checked.)3

 The court found that a prima facie case was established for detaining the children 

under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j); that there were no reasonable means to 

protect the children from physical or emotional harm other than to remove them from 

their home; and that “[r]easonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate need 

for [the children’s] removal from home.” The court did not identify or describe those 

“reasonable means” and “reasonable efforts” nor does the record show that the court 

inquired into the availability of services “that would prevent or eliminate the need to 

detain the child or that would permit the child to return home” as required by California 

Rules of Court, rule 5.678(c)(2). 

Mother was allowed monitored visitation with the children; Father was permitted 

unmonitored visits. DCFS was ordered to provide family reunification services to the 

parents and the children and to prepare a prerelease investigative report on Father. 

 Between the detention hearing and the combined jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing Mother was arrested and convicted of misdemeanor child abuse. She was placed 

on probation and ordered to do community service and attend a 52 week parenting class. 

Mother moved out of the family home and Father told DCFS that he did not know where 

she was residing. 

 For the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, DCFS reported that Mother 

was attending parenting classes and regularly visiting Ashly and Cristina. Mother 

 

3

 ARS stands for Alternative Response Services. Under ARS the child welfare 

agency responds to cases where the risk of harm to the child is minimal with services that 

are “less invasive” than those needed in more intensive, high risk cases. (Zielewski, et al. 

Families’ Connections to Services in an Alternative Response System (2006) The Urban 

Institute.) 
5

admitted losing her temper and using physical discipline on P.F. She stated she would 

enroll in an anger management class as soon as her work schedule was set. Mother 

denied “striking” the children with objects. She stated she would only “tap” them with a 

hanger “or throw something at them, not hard,” to get their attention. The DCFS worker 

observed that Mother “is committed to her children doing well in school and helps them 

with their school work.” 

 The report recommended that the children continue in an out-of-home placement. 

It stated that “there are no reasonable means by which the child(ren)’s physical health 

can be protected without removing the child(ren) from the physical custody of the 

child(ren)’s parents . . .” and that “[r]easonable efforts were made to prevent or to 

eliminate the need for removal of the [children] from [their] home.” Again the report did 

not state what “reasonable means” for protecting the children DCFS had considered nor 

what “reasonable efforts” it had made to eliminate the need to remove the children from 

their home. The report stated that “the family has been provided with Family 

Reunification Services including but not limited to referrals for services, Family 

Reunification Services, case management, and visitation.” The report did not state that 

DCFS had conducted the prerelease investigation report on Father as it was directed to do 

at the detention hearing. The report did state that a DCFS worker had an appointment 

with Father to assess his home but the record does not show whether this appointment 

was kept nor the result of the assessment. 

 Mother testified at the hearing. She told the court she was remorseful for her 

conduct toward P.F. She denied striking the children with shoes and clothes hangers. 

She stated she only used such objects to “tap” the children to get their attention. Mother 

confirmed that she was attending parenting classes. Finally, Mother testified she had just 

moved back in with Father since the children were not in the home. No one else testified. 

 The court sustained the petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j). 

 As to disposition, the court stated that it had read and considered the DCFS reports 

and admitted them into evidence. The court found “by clear and convincing evidence” 
6

that “[t]here are no reasonable means by which the children’s physical and emotional 

health could be protected without removing them from the parents’ physical custody.” 

The court further found that “[r]easonable efforts were made to prevent and eliminate 

the need for the children’s removal.” Again, the court made no inquiry of DCFS 

regarding available services that would eliminate the need to further detain the children. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.678(c)(2).) Ashly and Cristina remained placed in the home 

of their aunt and uncle. 

 Mother filed a timely appeal arguing substantial evidence does not support the 

court’s disposition. We agree.4

DISCUSSION 

 On appeal from a dispositional order removing a child from a parent we apply the 

substantial evidence standard of review, keeping in mind that the trial court was required 

to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. (In re 

Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 367.) 

Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) children may not be removed from their 

home “unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence” of a substantial 

danger to the children’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional 

well-being “and there are no reasonable means” for protecting the children other than 

removal from their home. The statute “is clear and specific: Even though children may 

be dependents of the juvenile court they shall not be removed from the home in which 

they are residing at the time of the petition unless there is clear and convincing evidence 

of a substantial danger to the child’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being and there are no ‘reasonable means’ by which the child can be 

protected without removal.” (In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 288; italics in 

original.)

 

4

 Father is not a party to this appeal. 
7

 To aid the court in determining whether “reasonable means” exist for protecting 

the children, short of removing them from their home, the Rules of Court require DCFS 

to submit a social study which “must include” among other things: “A discussion of the 

reasonable efforts made to prevent or eliminate removal[.]” (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).) No discussion of reasonable efforts appears in the record in this 

case. As noted above, the DCFS report merely stated in perfunctory language that 

“[r]easonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the 

[children] from [their] home.” No supporting evidence was offered. Likewise, the DCFS 

report stated in conclusory fashion that “there are no reasonable means by which the 

child(ren)’s physical health can be protected without removing the child(ren) from the 

physical custody of the child(ren)’s parents[.]” Again, DCFS did not describe the 

“reasonable means” it had considered and rejected.5

 The court also failed to carry out its duties in making the decision to remove Ashly 

and Cristina from their home. 

Section 361, subdivision (d) provides that “[t]he court shall make a determination 

as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for 

removal of the minor from his or her home[.] . . . The court shall state the facts on which 

the decision to remove the minor is based.” Here, the court concluded that “[r]easonable 

efforts were made to prevent and eliminate the need for the children’s removal.” The 

court did not “state the facts” supporting its conclusion. 

 In addition, the court was required to “consider, as a reasonable means to 

protect the minor, the option of removing an offending parent . . . from the home.” 

(§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Nothing in the record shows that the court considered this option 

even though the evidence showed that it was available. The record shows that Mother 

removed herself from the family home following the detention hearing and had moved 

 

5

 We leave for another day the question how DCFS could have made “reasonable 

efforts” to prevent removal of the children if, as it claims, there were no “reasonable 

means” of preventing their removal. 
8

back just prior to the jurisdiction hearing because the children were not present and to 

save the family the cost of renting two residences. 

 “[O]ur dependency system is premised on the notion that keeping children with 

their parents while proceedings are pending, whenever safely possible, serves not only to 

protect parents’ rights but also children’s and society’s best interests.” (In re Henry V.

(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530.) The requirement for a discussion by the child welfare 

agency of its reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate removal (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i)) and a statement by the court of the facts supporting removal 

(§ 361, subd. (d)), play important roles in this scheme. Without those safeguards there is 

a danger the agency’s declarations that there were “no reasonable means” other than 

removal “by which the [children’s] physical or emotional health may be protected” and 

that “reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal” can 

become merely a hollow formula designed to achieve the result the agency seeks. 

 DCFS and the court committed prejudicial errors in failing to follow the 

procedures mandated by Legislature and Judicial Council for determining whether the 

children needed to be removed from their home. Ample evidence existed of “reasonable 

means” to protect Ashly and Cristina in their home. Mother had expressed remorse for 

the injuries she inflicted on P.F. and was enrolled in a parenting class “to learn other 

ways to discipline [her] children.” By the time of the hearing Father had already 

completed a parenting class. Furthermore, “reasonable means” of protecting the children 

that should at least have been considered include unannounced visits by DCFS, public 

health nursing services, in-home counseling services and removing Mother from the 

home. (See In re Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) 

 Nothing in this opinion should be construed as condoning Mother’s physical abuse 

of Ashly and Cristina as found by the court. The court’s finding of physical abuse, 

however, is not the issue before us. The issue in this appeal is whether substantial 

evidence supports the order removing Ashly and Cristina from their home. A finding 

of parental abuse is not sufficient by itself to justify removing the child from the home. 
9

(See In re Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 531; In re Jasmine G., supra, 

82 Cal.App.4th at p. 293.) 

 On the record in this case there is a reasonable probability that had the juvenile 

court inquired into the basis for the claims by DCFS that despite its efforts there were no 

reasonable means of protecting the children except to remove them from their home the 

court would have found that claim was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. 

Accordingly, the court’s dispositional order must be reversed and the cause remanded 

for a new hearing in conformity with the statutes and Rules of Court discussed above. 

We base our disposition on the facts existing at the time of the dispositional hearing 

which we determined from the record on appeal. On remand, the juvenile court must 

make its decision based on the facts existing at the time of the further proceedings. 

DISPOSITION

 The dispositional order is reversed and the cause is remanded for further 

proceeding in accordance with law. 

 ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 JOHNSON, J. 

MILLER, J.

 



 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
Filed 4/22/14 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

In re Ashly F. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law, 

___________________________________ 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

T.A., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B250742 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK98890) 

 CERTIFICATION AND 

 ORDER FOR PUBLICATION 

 The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed March 28, 2014, was not certified 

for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion 

should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered. 

 ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. JOHNSON, J. MILLER, J.

 



 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.