[J-59A-2022 and J-59B-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

THE BERT COMPANY D/B/A

NORTHWEST INSURANCE SERVICES 

v.

MATTHEW TURK, WILLIAMS COLLINS, 

JAMIE HEYNES, DAVID MCDONNELL, 

FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE AGENCY, 

LLC, FIRST NATIONAL BANK, AND FNB 

CORPORATION 

APPEAL OF: MATTHEW TURK, FIRST 

NATIONAL INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK, AND FNB 

CORPORATION 

THE BERT COMPANY D/B/A 

NORTHWEST INSURANCE SERVICES 

v.

MATTHEW TURK, WILLIAM COLLINS, 

JAIME HEYNES, DAVID MCDONNEL, 

FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE AGENCY, 

LLC, FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND FNB 

CORPORATION 

MATTHEW TURK 

v.

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No. 13 WAP 2022

Appeal from the Order of the 

Superior Court entered May 5, 2021 

at No. 817 WDA 2019, affirming the 

Judgment of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Warren/Forest County 

entered June 3, 2019 at No. AD 260 

of 2017

ARGUED: October 25, 2022

No. 14 WAP 2022

Appeal from the Order of the 

Superior Court entered May 5, 2021 

at No. 975 WDA 2019, dismissing as 

moot the cross-appeal from the 

Judgment of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Warren/Forest County 

entered June 3, 2019 at No. AD 260 

of 2017

ARGUED: October 25, 2022
[J-59A-B-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2

THE BERT COMPANY, NORTHWEST 

BANK, AND NORTHWEST 

BANCSHARES, INC. 

APPEAL OF: MATTHEW TURK, FIRST 

NATIONAL INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK, AND FNB 

CORPORATION 

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CONCURRING OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: JULY 19, 2023

I join the majority’s well-reasoned opinion in full. I write separately only to 

emphasize that courts may ordinarily consider a defendant’s wealth when evaluating

whether a punitive damages award is excessive. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§908(2) (1979) (“In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider 

the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that 

the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.”)

(emphasis added); and Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984) (adopting 

§908(2)). See also Majority Opinion at 25. A defendant’s wealth is “relevant, since the 

purposes of exemplary damages are to punish for a past event and to prevent future 

offenses, and the degree of punishment or deterrence resulting from a judgment is to 

some extent in proportion to the means of the guilty person.” Restatement (Second) of 

Torts §908(2) cmt. e. 

In my view, it is simple common sense that “if a wealthy person commits a rather 

heinous act, nominal punitive damages will not deter either that person or any other 

similarly situated person from committing a similar act. . . . If the resulting punishment is 

relatively small when compared to the potential reward of his actions, it might then be 

feasible for a tortfeasor to attempt the same outrageous conduct a second time.”

Kirkbride v. Libson Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 802-03 (Pa. 1989). Stated differently, 
[J-59A-B-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3

if a wealthy defendant can absorb a punitive damages award without suffering financial 

discomfort, the deterrent purpose of the award is undermined. After all, how can punitive 

damages possibly deter future wrongdoing if a massive award represents a mere fraction 

of the defendant’s actual worth? A company which generates millions of dollars every 

year can comfortably pay hundreds of thousands of dollars assessed against it – even if 

the same figure would be unreasonably high when levied against the average person. 

Because such damages are intended to inflict financial “pain” as punishment, and thus 

deter similar future conduct, the wealthier the defendant, the larger the monetary loss

required to have that deterrent effect.

It is true the “wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional 

punitive damages award.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 

427 (2003). Although evidence of great wealth may “provide[] an open-ended basis for 

inflating awards . . . [t]hat does not make its use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply means 

that this factor cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as ‘reprehensibility,’ 

to constrain significantly an award that purports to punish a defendant’s conduct.” BMW 

of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). The 

jury’s award in the present case reflected the reprehensibility of the defendants’ conduct 

in engaging in a brazen conspiracy “to steal a corporation,” and consideration of their 

wealth in assessing the award’s excessiveness is proper.