Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Haro CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

IVAN HARO,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B328638

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SA106587)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.

Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

While out walking their dog, Harold H.

1 and his young son 

encountered defendant Ivan Haro. Haro was muttering 

incoherently, called Harold and his son “demons,” and then 

brutally attacked Harold with a heavy-duty rake and later with 

hedge clippers.

At trial, Haro claimed he acted in self-defense because 

Harold had first brandished a knife. To demonstrate Haro was 

not acting in self-defense, the prosecutor asked Haro whether,

when the police arrived and Haro was no longer in alleged 

danger, Haro refused to surrender and instead stood on top of a 

truck telling the police, “I’ll fucking obliterate you,” and “You’re 

so fucking weak, and I’m going to obliterate you, fool. If you ever 

fuck with me and my fucking people again, that is the truth, fool, 

because you are so disobedient.” Haro did not deny doing so. The

jury rejected Haro’s self-defense claim and convicted him of two 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon—one based upon his use 

of the metal rake and the other based upon his later use of the 

hedge clippers—along with other crimes.

On appeal, Haro argues the trial court erred in admitting 

evidence of Haro’s standoff with the police and his profane 

statements that he would “obliterate” them because, under 

Evidence Code section 352, such evidence was more prejudicial 

than probative. He further argues we should strike one of the 

1 Because he is a victim in a criminal proceeding, we use 

Harold’s first name and last initial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.90(b)(4).)
3

two assault convictions pursuant to Penal Code2 section 954 

because his attack constituted one continuing assault.

We conclude Haro forfeited his evidentiary argument 

because he failed to object on the basis of Evidence Code section 

352 or otherwise request the trial court balance the prejudicial 

effect of the evidence against its admitted probative value. We 

further conclude substantial evidence supported that Haro 

completed two crimes of assault and, thus, section 954 does not 

require that we strike one of the assault convictions. We 

therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Information

An information filed July 20, 2022, alleged Haro committed 

an assault with a deadly weapon, “to wit, a metal rake” (§ 245, 

subd. (a)(1); count 1), another assault with deadly weapon, “to 

wit, hedge clippers” (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), criminal threats 

(§ 422, subd. (a); count 3), and second degree robbery (§ 211;

count 4). The information further alleged Haro had a prior strike 

conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and several 

factors in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)).

B. The Prosecution’s Trial Evidence

On May 31, 2022, at about 8:00 p.m., Harold and his sixyear-old son were walking their dog in their neighborhood when 

they encountered Haro. Harold had no weapon with him. Haro 

appeared disheveled, was swinging a metal chain, and told 

Harold’s son, “Run before you die.” Harold put his son behind 

2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
4

him and attempted “to defuse the situation.” Haro “went into . . . 

[a] maniacal state,” at times muttering incoherently, called 

Harold and his son “demons,” and said, “You white 

motherfucker,” “I’m going to fucking kill you.” Harold told his 

son to run away, which his son did.

Harold retreated, but Haro followed him. Haro said he was 

going to follow Harold home and kill Harold, his family, and his 

dog. Harold called 911 as he walked backwards from Haro. Haro 

retrieved a heavy-duty rake from a gardener’s truck and began 

chasing Harold. Harold fell at least twice while trying to evade 

Haro, and Haro hit him multiple times on the back and forearms 

with the rake. Haro also knocked Harold’s phone out of his hand 

and kept it, putting it in Haro’s own pocket.

While hitting Harold with the rake, Haro partially broke its

wooden handle. Haro then fully broke the handle across his knee 

and stabbed Harold in the back with it. Haro grabbed another 

flimsier rake out of another truck and continued to give chase. 

Haro hit Harold with the flimsier rake, which did not “do much,” 

and Haro dropped the flimsier rake.

Harold ran to a neighbor standing outside, who closed his 

front door and refused to help. In the meantime, Haro took hedge 

clippers from a gardener’s truck. He opened and closed the 

clippers and told Harold, “I’m going to fucking kill you and cut 

your dick off.” Harold, feeling he had “to fight for [his] life,” 

retrieved a shovel from a gardener’s truck and used it to “duel”

Haro. The shovel broke Haro’s clippers, which fell to the ground. 

Haro picked up both blades and resumed pursuit. Haro threw 

one of the blades at Harold, which cut Harold’s hand, causing 

him to drop the shovel. Haro also stabbed Harold in his back and 
5

torso with the clippers. Haro then picked up the shovel and hit 

Harold multiple times with it.

Harold’s next-door neighbor observed Haro chuckling and 

muttering as he chased and hit Harold, and Harold screaming for 

help. Unlike the prior neighbor, this individual intervened and 

got Harold to safety inside the neighbor’s house. As a result of 

the attack, Harold had lacerations “all over” his body, and his 

hands were “severely damaged.”

C. Haro’s Trial Evidence

The defense argued Haro attacked Harold in self-defense.

Haro testified that he grew up on the same street where 

the attack occurred and that his godfather still lived there as of 

May 31, 2022. On that day, Haro was walking down the street, 

swinging a small chain. Harold, who was walking in the opposite 

direction, pulled out a knife. Haro got scared and retrieved a 

rake to defend himself. He swung the rake to get Harold to “back 

off,” but Harold “charg[ed]” at Haro. Haro hit Harold on his arm 

with the rake and was able to knock the knife out of Harold’s 

hand. Haro also testified he “said some things that were mean” 

because he was “mad that somebody had the nerve to pull a knife 

on [him].”

Haro picked up Harold’s phone because he thought it was 

his. After Harold retrieved a shovel, he and Haro continued to 

fight. Haro picked up gardening shears to scare Harold and get 

him to back off, but Harold “just kept wanting to fight.”

On cross-examination, Haro testified that he walked 

towards a park to get away from Harold. When asked whether 

he had a 40-minute standoff with police once they arrived, Haro 

responded, “I don’t know if it was 40 minutes or what.” The 

prosecutor asked, “During that standoff, you stood up on cars in 
6

the parking lot[,] correct?” Defense counsel objected on the basis 

of relevance. After the court asked for an offer of proof at sidebar, 

the prosecutor explained that Haro had “testified that he was in 

fear for his safety and he was running away from [Harold]. I 

think it’s relevant as to his behavior when help comes as to what 

he does.” The trial court stated, “ I think it’s relevant.” Defense 

counsel argued, “I think at a certain point it becomes improper 

character evidence to show there were threats in conformity with 

the threats that were previously alleged.” The court responded, 

“I don’t think that’s what [the prosecutor is] asking about now.” 

The trial court refused defense counsel’s request for a “continuing 

objection” and told counsel, “You can make an objection to each 

question if you think something is irrelevant.”

Following the sidebar, Haro testified he got onto a truck. 

He acknowledged that he had been angry, and said, “I’ll fucking 

obliterate you. I’ll obliterate you.” He did not deny that he also 

said, “You’re so fucking weak, and I’m going to obliterate you, 

fool. If you ever fuck with me and my fucking people again, that 

is the truth, fool, because you are so disobedient.” Haro testified 

he “was just saying that,” and that it was not directed to the 

police.

D. Closing Arguments

During closing argument, the prosecutor explained to the 

jury that there were two charges for assault with a deadly 

weapon because Haro used two weapons—the rake and the hedge 

clippers—and there had been a break between Haro’s use of these

weapons at the time Harold had unsuccessfully pleaded with a 

neighbor for help. The prosecutor did not mention Haro’s 

standoff or statements to the police during closing argument.
7

Defense counsel argued Haro acted in self-defense. Like 

the prosecutor, defense counsel did not mention Haro’s standoff 

or statements to the police during closing argument.

E. Verdict and Sentencing

The jury convicted Haro of both counts of assault with a

deadly weapon (counts 1 and 2) and criminal threats (count 3). 

The jury acquitted Haro of second degree robbery (count 4) but 

found him guilty of the lesser included charge of petty theft

(§ 484, subd. (a)).

In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the 

allegation that Haro had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, 

subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)). It also found true three factors in

aggravation, including that Haro engaged in violent conduct that 

indicated a serious danger to society, that Haro’s prior 

convictions as an adult and sustained petitions in juvenile 

proceedings were numerous or of increasing seriousness, and that 

Haro served a prior prison or jail term under section 1170, 

subdivision (h). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b).) The trial 

court sentenced Haro to state prison for eight years (the upper 

term of four years, doubled due to the prior strike) on count 1. 

The court stayed the sentences on counts 2 and 3 pursuant to 

section 654 and ran the sentence on count 4 concurrently. With 

respect to the second assault, the court found “there was only one 

intent, an intent to assault. However, he used different weapons. 

It was charged differently. But there was only a single intent, 

and that’s why . . . section 654 is . . . appropriate.”
8

DISCUSSION

A. The Admission of Evidence Concerning Haro’s 

Interaction with the Police Does Not Merit Reversal

Haro argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 

his standoff with police and the statements made during that 

standoff. He contends this evidence should have been excluded 

under Evidence Code section 352 because the prejudice from that 

evidence outweighed its probative value. The Attorney General 

argues Haro forfeited this argument by failing to raise this 

objection at trial.

We may not reverse a judgment based on an alleged error 

in admitting evidence unless “ ‘an objection to or a motion to

exclude or to strike the evidence . . . was timely made and so 

stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or 

motion.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 130, quoting 

Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Haro acknowledges he did not make 

a specific Evidence Code section 352 objection, but contends he 

preserved the argument because his counsel objected to the 

evidence based on relevance and as improper character evidence, 

“which encompassed the issue of balancing prejudice versus 

relevance pursuant to Evidence Code[ ] section 352.”

We do not agree. Haro’s objections based on relevancy or 

improper character evidence did not alert the court that it should 

conduct an Evidence Code section 352 balancing. (See People v. 

Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 138 [objections based on relevance 

or foundation “were insufficient to preserve for appeal the claim 

that the trial court should have excluded the evidence under 

[Evid. Code, §] 352”]; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 

1130 [relevancy objection did not preserve for review claim under 
9

Evid. Code, § 352].) Accordingly, Haro has forfeited his Evidence 

Code section 352 argument.

We likewise reject Haro’s assertion that we should excuse 

the failure to object because any such objection would have been 

futile. In admitting the testimony, the trial court found only that 

the evidence was relevant. An Evidence Code section 352 

objection, if made, would have then required the court to weigh 

that relevancy against any undue prejudice. (See People v. 

Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 138.) While the court did not 

permit defense counsel to have a continuing relevancy objection, 

it invited counsel to make an objection each time she believed it 

was proper to do so. No further objection was made.

Even if we were to excuse this forfeiture, Haro has not 

demonstrated that Evidence Code section 352 barred evidence of 

his actions once police arrived. That section permits the 

exclusion of “evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) 

Haro does not deny evidence of his interaction with the police 

immediately after he assaulted Harold had probative value but 

claims its admission created substantial danger of undue 

prejudice because the evidence was inflammatory and constituted 

improper character or propensity evidence under Evidence Code 

section 1101.

This claim is meritless. Haro’s testimony on crossexamination that he stood on a car for 40 minutes and told police 

that he would obliterate them was not marginally relevant but 

material to disproving his claim of self-defense. A victim of an 

attack ordinarily would not act in such a manner once the 

authorities arrived and the danger from the alleged aggressor 
10

had ceased. (Cf. People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 283 

[“Evidence of a defendant’s resistance to arrest, like evidence of 

flight, is admissible as evidence of the defendant’s consciousness 

of guilt”].) Nor did Evidence Code section 1101 prohibit 

admission of this evidence. Subdivision (b) of Evidence Code 

section 1101 permits the admission of evidence of wrongdoing 

when it is “relevant to prove some fact . . . other than [the 

defendant’s] disposition to commit such an act.” As just noted, 

the evidence at issue was relevant to impeach Haro’s claim of 

self-defense.

Of course, relevant evidence may still be excluded under 

Evidence Code section 352 “if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (Ibid.; see also People v. 

Hendrix (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 216, 246 [evidence relevant 

under Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b) still subject to Evid. Code,

§ 352 balancing].) But the testimony of Haro’s interaction with 

the police was not inflammatory or unduly prejudicial. Taken in 

context, it was relatively benign compared to Haro’s threats to 

maim and kill Harold and Haro’s vicious follow-through on those 

threats. Evidence about Haro’s attack on Harold consumed the 

majority of the time at trial. The questions concerning Haro’s 

stand-off with the police were few and brief and targeted at 

Haro’s claim of self-defense. Thus, if Haro had objected, Evidence 

Code section 352 did not require exclusion of this evidence.

B. The Jury Properly Convicted Haro of Two Counts of 

Assault with a Deadly Weapon

Citing section 954, Haro claims the jury could convict him 

of only one assault count. He did not make this argument to the 

trial court, and generally “only those claims properly raised and 
11

preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal.” (People v. 

Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) However, Haro frames this 

argument as one of insufficient evidence, an argument not subject 

to forfeiture. (See People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 262 

[the defendant forfeits a sufficiency-of-evidence argument only by 

failing to file a timely notice of appeal].) We therefore consider it.

Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“Section 954 . . . concerns the propriety of multiple 

convictions, not multiple punishments, which are governed by 

section 654.” (People v. Gonzalez (2014) 60 Cal.4th 533, 537.) 

Section 954 provides in part that “[a]n accusatory pleading may 

charge two or more different offenses connected together in their 

commission, or different statements of the same offense . . . under 

separate counts” and “the defendant may be convicted of any 

number of the offenses charged.” Thus, our Supreme Court has 

held that “ ‘the same act can support multiple charges and 

multiple convictions.’ ” (People v. Aguayo (2022) 13 Cal.5th 974, 

979, quoting People v. Gonzalez, supra, at p. 537; see People v. 

Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 97 [“Unless one offense is 

necessarily included in the other [citation], multiple convictions 

can be based upon a single criminal act or an indivisible course of 

criminal conduct (§ 954)”].)

The propriety of multiple convictions pursuant to the same 

statute depends on whether each conviction reflects a completed 

criminal act, as determined by the statutory elements of that 

crime. (See People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1519

[affirming multiple convictions for attempts to dissuade a witness 

pursuant to § 136.1]; People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 

1467, 1474 [affirming multiple convictions for corporal injury 

upon a cohabitant pursuant to § 273.5].) Multiple convictions 
12

may be proper “even if the crimes are part of the same impulse, 

intention or plan.” (People v. Kirvin, supra, at p. 1518; see People 

v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 62 [“Under section 954, a 

separate conviction is permissible for each completed charged 

offense, even if the defendant had the same intent and objective 

in committing multiple crimes and even if the defendant 

committed the crimes at or near the same time”], review granted 

Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)

Although prior California courts prohibited multiple 

convictions for a series of related crimes unless they were 

separated by “ ‘a pause . . . sufficient to give [the] defendant a 

reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his conduct’ ” (In re 

William S. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 313, 317), the Supreme Court 

rejected this view in People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321. 

There, the defendant claimed his three digital penetrations of the 

same victim (each lasting a few seconds) during a continuous 

sexual assault of approximately seven to 10 minutes constituted 

a single offense. The court disagreed; it explained that given the 

history and language of the applicable statute (§ 289), the 

defendant completed a new and separate offense with each new 

and separate penetration, “however slight.” (People v. Harrison, 

supra, at pp. 326, 329.) Following Harrison, courts have found 

the relevant analysis to be “dictated solely by the statutory 

language and the temporal threshold for establishing guilt, i.e., 

when the offense is complete for purposes of prosecution.” (People 

v. Washington (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 568, 578.) Courts have not 

limited Harrison’s analysis to sexual offenses. (See, e.g., People 

v. Ashbey (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 373, 383 [arson]; People v. 

Johnson, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1473-1474 [corporal 
13

injury upon a cohabitant]; People v. Washington, supra, at p. 578

[burglary].)

“The issue of whether multiple convictions are proper is . . .

reviewed de novo, as it turns on the interpretation of section 

954.” (People v. Villegas (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 646.) As 

usual, however, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting each conviction for substantial evidence. 

(People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 671.)

Analysis

Section 245, subdivision (a)(1), criminalizes “an assault 

upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument 

other than a firearm.” “An assault is an unlawful attempt, 

coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the 

person of another.” (§ 240.) “Where the assault is committed 

with a deadly weapon, or with force likely to produce great bodily 

injury, the . . . assault is complete upon the attempted use of the 

force.” (People v. Yeats (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 874, 878; see People 

v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164, 1170 [“ ‘An assault occurs 

whenever “ ‘[t]he next movement would, at least to all 

appearance, complete the battery.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Italics 

omitted.)]; People v. White (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 881, 885 [“The 

trier of fact may look to the completed battery to determine 

whether the defendant committed an assault or assault with a 

deadly weapon”].) An assault is complete even if it does not 

result in actual injury to the victim. (See People v. Chance, 

supra, at p. 1174.)

Here, substantial evidence supports two convictions for 

assault. First, there was substantial evidence that Haro

committed a completed assault with the first rake. Haro struck 

Harold with the rake several times and stabbed him with the 
14

broken rake handle, thus committing a battery. (See People v. 

White, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.) There was then a pause

as Haro abandoned a second and flimsier rake and Harold 

unsuccessfully pleaded with a neighbor for help. Although an 

interlude between the two assaults may not be necessary to 

conclude multiple convictions are proper (see People v. Harrison, 

supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 334), the fact one occurred here helps 

emphasize the separateness of the two assaults.

There was also substantial evidence that a second assault 

was completed when, after the break in the attack, Haro grabbed 

the hedge clippers and again pursued Harold. Haro opened and 

closed the clippers while threatening to kill and maim Harold. 

Haro also threw one of the blades at Harold, cutting Harold’s 

hand and again committing a battery.

Citing People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632 and Aguayo, 

Haro argues section 954 “ ‘does not permit multiple convictions 

for a different statement of the same offense when it is based on 

the same act or course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Vidana, supra, at 

p. 650.) However, Vidana and Aguayo are inapposite as they 

both concerned “ ‘ “dual convictions for the same offense based on 

alternate legal theories.” ’ ” (People v. Aguayo, supra, 13 Cal.5th

at p. 982; see People v. Vidana, supra, at p. 650.) Specifically, in 

Vidana, the Supreme Court held a defendant could not be 

convicted of both larceny (§ 484, subd. (a)) and embezzlement 

(§ 503) for the same conduct of skimming cash because those 

statutes defined the same offense. (People v. Vidana, supra, at 

pp. 649, 650.) In Aguayo, the Supreme Court concluded a 

defendant could not be convicted of both assault with a deadly 

weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and assault upon the person of 

another by any means of force likely to produce great bodily 
15

injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) based upon the same conduct. (People 

v. Aguayo, supra, at pp. 979, 981.) The court held the Legislature 

intended both of these assault provisions to be different 

statements of the same offense. (Id. at p. 988.)

In Aguayo, the Supreme Court separately held the Court of 

Appeal erred in affirming the two assault convictions on the basis 

that the defendant hit the victim with two weapons: a bike lock 

and chain as well as a ceramic pot. (People v. Aguayo, supra, 13 

Cal.5th at p. 981.) The Supreme Court observed that the jury did 

not make separate findings of fact with respect to each weapon 

because they were not “asked to do so by way of the prosecution’s 

argument, a unanimity instruction, or the like.” (Id. at p. 994.) 

The charging allegations and verdict form did not specify the act 

of force necessary to support a section 245, subdivision (a)(4)

count. (People v. Aguayo, supra, at p. 994.) Nor did the jury 

instructions identify which act supported each count. (Ibid.) 

Aguayo concluded “there is a reasonable probability that the jury 

viewed the two charged assault offenses as based on the same act 

or course of conduct. Thus, the Court of Appeal erred by 

determining for itself that defendant’s ‘convictions are based on 

multiple acts—hitting [the victim] with the bicycle chain and 

lock, and hitting him with the ceramic pot.’ ” (Id. at p. 996.) The 

Supreme Court also declined the Attorney General’s invitation to 

determine whether the record supported two separate acts 

because, “It is axiomatic that criminal defendants are 

constitutionally entitled to ‘ “a jury determination that [they are] 

guilty of every element of the crime with which [they are]

charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 995.)

Haro’s case does not suffer from the same deficiencies. The 

information, jury instructions, and verdict forms each listed two 
16

separate counts, the first of which expressly referred to the rake 

and the second of which expressly referred to the hedge clippers. 

During closing argument, the prosecutor explained there were 

two charges for assault with a deadly weapon because Haro used 

two weapons and there had been a pause between Haro’s use of 

these weapons. Further, the trial court instructed the jury, “If 

you are able to reach a unanimous decision on only one or only 

some of the charges, fill in those verdict forms only . . . .” The 

jury filled in both assault verdict forms, indicting it found the 

prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, each element 

necessary to convict Haro of assault using the rake and a 

separate assault in using the hedge clippers. Because the record 

lacks any basis upon which to conclude that the jury here 

conflated Haro’s attacks with the rake and hedge clippers in

returning guilty verdicts thereupon, Aguayo does not compel 

reversal of one of the two assault convictions.

Haro also relies on several other inapposite cases to assert 

one of his assault convictions cannot stand because he engaged in

one continuing assault despite using different weapons. Haro 

cites People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, which held that 

section 654 prohibits the imposition of three consecutive one-year 

enhancements for the use of deadly weapons (two pairs of scissors 

and a knife) to a single count for attempted murder. (People v. 

Wong, supra, at p. 978.) Wong does not aid Haro because his 

appeal does not concern the imposition of multiple punishments 

or section 654. The question instead is whether under section 

954, Haro may be convicted of more than one assault. In that 

regard, unlike Wong, a unifying “impulse, intention or plan” does 

not render multiple convictions improper. (See People v. Kirvin, 

supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518.)
17

Haro also cites People v. Oppenheimer (1909) 156 Cal. 733 

and People Mitchell (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 204 for the proposition 

that multiple blows delivered during a single episode, even if 

carried out with different instrumentalities, cannot give rise to 

multiple assault convictions. But both Oppenheimer and Mitchell

predate People v. Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d 321, which 

established that the proper analysis requires consideration of 

whether the charged crime was complete. (Id. at p. 329.) Indeed, 

following Harrison, the Court of Appeal in People v. Johnson, 

supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1467 rejected an argument similar to 

Haro’s, and held “that where multiple applications of physical 

force result in separate injuries, the perpetrator has completed 

multiple violations of section 273.5.” (Id. at p. 1477.) Thus, Haro 

has failed to demonstrate that Oppenheimer and Mitchell compel 

reversal or that pursuant to section 954, he could only be 

convicted of a single assault.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J. BENDIX, Acting P.J.