# FILED June 25, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AT KNOXVILLE

HELEN EBLEN and KYLE E. BEVERLY,) ROANE CHANCERY and wife, JUDITH T. BEVERLY; ) C. A. NO. 03A01-9709-CH-00423 ) Plaintiffs-Appellees ) ) ) ) ) ) vs. ) HON. FRANK V. WILLIAMS, III ) CHANCELLOR ) ) ) ) ) LUCILLE JOHNSON and CHERYL ) AFFIRMED AND REMANDED ROUSE, ) ) Defendants )

Cheryl Rouse, ) Appellant )

KATHLEEN E. McGEECHAN, Kingston, for Appellant. HAROLD D. BALCOM, JR., Kingston, for appellees, Helen Eblen, Kyle E. Beverly and wife, Judith T. Beverly. JOHN AGEE, Cooley, Cooley & Agee, Kingston, for appellee, Lucille Johnson.2 O P I N I O N

McMurray, J.
Generallystated, this is a boundary line dispute. The plaintiffs and the defendant, Lucille Johnson, settled all issues between them. The defendant, Rouse, was the immediate vendee from t h e v endor, Johnson. Rouse filed a cross-claim against Johnson seeking rescission and reimbursement for improvements allegedly made on the property purchased fromJohnson. Johnson also filed a cross-claim against Rouse, alleging that Rouse was trespassing on her property by virtue of having built a fence on Johnson's property. She sought damages and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the trial court established the common boundaries between the litigants and dismissed the cross-claims. From the judgment of the trial court, the defendant, Rouse has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rouse, prese nts the following issues for our consideration:

1 . Plaintiffs Beverly, mere pending vendees under a contingent purchase contract, without possession of property, did not have standing to bring this cause and are not proper parties pl a intiff; and having sought relief jointly, this deficiency is fatal to the claim, and should therefore be dismissed in its entirety. 2 . Alternatively, the boundary between Eblen and Johnson's parcels, as between those grantees, is d icta ted by the deeds of record from their common3 grantor, with respect to both the parcels whet her conveyed byquitclaim or by warrantydeed, and upon which the court should have based its decision; the m atte r should be remanded for determination by an impartial survey to establish said line from common grantor's deeds. 3 . Defendant Rouse's cross-claim against Johnson, being based upon the covenants and warranties of title contained in the deed, and clearly evidenced in the record, should not have been dismissed, nor shoul d costs have been assessed as were done , plaintiff [sic] having done nothing to occasion or exacerbate this situation, but relying with clean hands in good faith on the warranties and covenants fromher grantor, whic h should have been specifically performed.
As to the first issue of standing by the Beverleys, we note, that "[o]ne holding a valid contract for the purchase of realty... has an eq uitable interest therein." Land Developers, Inc. v. Maxwell , 537 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1976). There seems to be no rational basis why a contingent contract should be treated any differentlythan a non-contingent contract. In an y event, this issue is controlled by Rule 20.01 and Rule 21 of the Ten ness e e Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 20.01, T.R.C.P., provides as follows:

Rule 20. PermissiveJoinder . — All persons may join i n one (1) action as plaintiffs if they assert any right t o relief jointly, severally, or in the alternativ e i n respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and i f any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one (1) action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, seve r a lly, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of4

transactions or occurrences and if anyquestion of lawor fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Aplaintiff or defendant n eed not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their resp e c tive rights to relief, and aga ins t one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
Rule 21, T.R.C.P. provides as follows:
Rule 21. Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties. Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of a n action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative a t any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proce ede d with separately.
We find no merit in the appellant's first issue.

Even though a court reporter was present at the trial, no transcript of the evidence or statement of the evidence has been filed in accordance with Rule 24, T.R.C.P. Therefore, we are unable to reach the merits of the remaining issues which were before the trial court. The issues are not pure matters of law, but add ress themselves also to the facts as found by the trial court.

Where the issues raised go to the evidence, there must be a transcript. In the absen ce of a transcript of the evidence, there is a co nclu sive presumption that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its judgment, and this Court must therefo re a ffirm the judgment.5

Coakleyv. Daniels , 840 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tenn. App. 1992). See also Word v. Word , 937 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tenn. App . 1996); Sherrod v. Wix , 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (T enn . App. 1992); Irvin v. City of Clarksville , 767 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tenn. App. 1988).

Since we are unable to reach the merits of the appellant's remaining issues, we must resolve them against the appellant.

W e affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. Costs are assessed to the appellant and this case is rema nded to the trial court.

________________________________ Don T. McMurray, J.

CONCUR:

___________________________________ Houston M. Goddard, Presiding Judge

___________________________________ Charles D. Susano, Jr., JudgeIN THE COURT OF APPEALS AT KNOXVILLE

HELEN EBLEN and KYLE E. BEVERLY,) ROANE CHANCERY and wife, JUDITH T. BEVERLY; ) C. A. NO. 03A01-9709-CH-00423 ) Plaintiffs-Appellees ) ) ) ) ) vs. ) HON. FRANK V. WILLIAMS, III ) CHANCELLOR ) ) ) ) LUCILLE JOHNSON and CHERYL ) AFFIRMED AND REMANDED ROUSE, ) ) Defendants )

Cheryl Rouse, ) Appellant )
JUDGMENT This appeal ca me on to be heard upon the record from the ChanceryCourt of Ro ane County, briefs and argument of counsel. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of opinion that there was no reversible error in the trial court. W e affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. Costs are assessed to th e app ellant and this case is remanded to the trial court.

PER CURIAM