If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re ESTATE OF MARJORIE SHEA JOHNSON.

RITA E. JOHNSON, Personal Representative of the 

ESTATE OF MARJORIE SHEA JOHNSON,

Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

October 19, 2023

v No. 362927

Wayne Probate Court

AMOS C. JOHNSON, LC No. 2021-865116-DE

Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and BORRELLO and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Amos C. Johnson (petitioner)1appeals by right the probate court’s order denying 

his request to remove appellee, Rita E. Johnson (respondent), as personal representative of 

decedent Marjorie Shea Johnson’s estate and to name petitioner as personal representative instead. 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 21, 2020, 94-year-old Marjorie Arjorie Shea Johnson, (decedent), of Canton, 

Michigan, passed away. Decedent was predeceased by her husband, Amos G. Johnson, and was 

survived by her two adult children—her biological son, petitioner, and an adopted daughter, 

respondent. Decedent’s estate was valued at approximately $600,000 and was comprised of real 

properties in Michigan, Mississippi, Louisiana, and the Bahamas, as well as a vehicle and two 

Huntington Bank accounts.

 

1 We refer to appellant as petitioner and appellee as respondent in this opinion in conformity with 

the parties’ briefs and the order appealed.
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In the years preceding the death of decedent, respondent lived in California and petitioner 

lived with decedent at her Canton home, having accrued substantial personal tax liabilities that 

were in arrears and having lost his own home to foreclosure. In the years preceding her death, 

decedent suffered from dementia to the extent she could not handle her own affairs.

After decedent’s death, respondent asked petitioner whether decedent had a will on at least 

three separate occasions. According to respondent, each time she made an inquiry, petitioner 

responded that it was none of respondent’s business. Respondent also contacted her deceasedfather’s former secretary to ask if she was aware of a will, and she referred respondent to an 

attorney who may have written a will; that attorney, however, did not have a copy of any will. 

During this time, petitioner continued to live in decedent’s Canton home rent-free, despite the fact 

that the home was titled solely in decedent’s name. When a cousin told respondent in March 2021 

that petitioner was preparing to sell a home decedent owned located in Pontiac, Michigan 

(hereinafter, the Family home), respondent decided to file an application for informal probate.

Respondent filed that application, seeking appointment as personal representative in April 

2021—11 months after decedent’s death. Respondent attested therein that “decedent died intestate 

and after exercising reasonable diligence, I am unaware of any unrevoked testamentary instrument 

relating to property located in this state as defined under MCL 700.1301.” Petitioner did not 

respond and, in May 2021, the probate court appointed respondent as personal representative and 

issued respondent letters of authority that authorized respondent to administer decedent’s estate.

After respondent filed her application for informal probate, petitioner submitted decedent’s 

will (the Will) to the probate court in September 2021. Petitioner attached the Will to a petition 

for probate and noted that the probate court was in possession of the Will. The Will named 

petitioner as the first named personal representative, after decedent’s late husband, and respondent 

as the second named personal representative, after petitioner. Decedent’s Will was a pour over 

will, leaving the residue of decedent’s estate in the Johnson Family Trust (the Trust), which was 

allegedly created on the same date as decedent’s Will. However, the Trust had been completely 

depleted of assets and all known assets of decedent’s estate were titled in her name.

Petitioner also sought removal of respondent as personal representative and appointment 

of himself to that role. Petitioner argued, and continues to do so on appeal, that respondent 

fraudulently represented that she did not know about the Will in her application for informal 

probate, and petitioner should be appointed personal representative because he had the highest 

priority to be appointed consistent with the terms of the Will. In response, respondent contested 

the suitability of petitioner as personal representative, noting that petitioner failed to tell her of the 

Will for more than a year after decedent’s death despite her inquiries, failed to account for 

purported Trust assets, failed to pay property taxes on estate properties, had substantial personal 

tax debt, and had exploited decedent’s assets for his own personal gain, including using decedent’s 

Huntington Bank account both before and after her death. Respondent also alleged that petitioner 

allowed his girlfriend to drive decedent’s car despite the fact it was uninsured.

At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner admitted he found the Will in his father’s attaché case 

about a month after decedent’s death, but did not file it with the probate court because he believed 

the court already had it and he was devastated by decedent’s death. Petitioner testified that he did 

not tell respondent about the Will because he believed she already knew there was a will and 
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denied respondent ever contacted him to ask about a will. In particular, according to petitioner, 

both he and respondent knew there was a will because petitioner, respondent, and their parents 

signed estate documents on May 3, 2000, at the office of their parents’ attorney.

Regarding the management of decedent’s assets in the nearly year after her death, petitioner 

testified that he operated under the false belief that, as trustee of the Johnson Family Trust, he had 

full control over assets of decedent’s that were in her name alone. For example, petitioner said 

that he refused to vacate the Canton home because he believed he was authorized under the Trust 

to reside there rent-free after decedent’s death and also that a document titled “Assignment of 

Furniture, Furnishings, and Personal Effects” (hereinafter, the Assignment) transferred all of 

decedent’s properties to the Trust. Petitioner also indicated that he understood decedent’s bank 

accounts to be “under his auspices” by operation of the Assignment. In this regard, petitioner 

testified that he signed documents with decedent’s name, including checks after her death, because 

he was “carrying on her business”

2

and also that he used decedent’s Huntington Bank account, 

which was in decedent’s name only, to purchase items on Amazon after her death. Petitioner also 

admitted that, at the time of decedent’s death, several of decedent’s properties had property tax 

delinquencies.

Respondent testified she was not aware of decedent’s Will when she filed her application 

for informal probate. She was not present at the lawyer’s office to sign her parents’ estate 

documents and was unaware that her parents had an estate planning attorney. In fact, respondent 

indicated that she was in China on May 3, 2000, the date that decedent signed the Will at an 

attorney’s office. According to respondent, decedent later presented her only with a signature page 

and asked respondent to sign, which respondent did without inquiring after the nature of the 

document because she trusted decedent.3 Respondent testified that decedent never told her about 

a will, even though respondent asked decedent about a will in 2012.

Respondent also testified regarding acts she took to administer and protect decedent’s 

estate after becoming personal representative. For example, respondent said she paid delinquent 

taxes on several of decedent’s properties with her own assets, thereby avoiding losing the 

properties to tax foreclosure. With respect to the Huntington Bank account, respondent, in July 

2021, presented decedent’s death certificate to the bank manager, who promptly froze the account 

for fraudulent activity. In September 2021, respondent changed the locks on the Family home to 

secure it because it had been broken into and also because, over the years, multiple people had 

acquired keys. And, in March 2022, respondent initiated eviction proceedings to remove petitioner 

 

2 A handwriting expert testified that checks signed with decedent’s name were not the signature of 

decedent, but were probably signed by petitioner. Further, respondent testified that decedent 

would never ask anyone to sign checks for her because she was very careful and private about 

money.

3 The documents with respondent’s signature are a “Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care” 

and a “Directive to Physician Pursuant to ‘Patient Advocacy Statute’ ” (hereinafter, “Durable 

Power of Attorney” and “Patient Advocacy Directive”).
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from the Canton home. Respondent also testified that she removed decedent’s car and put it in 

storage because petitioner’s girlfriend was driving it and it was not insured.

After the evidentiary hearing, the probate court issued a written opinion wherein it 

concluded that petitioner was “unsuitable to serve as personal representative according to MCL 

700.3204(3), as his appointment would not be in the best interest of the decedent’s estate[,] MCL 

700.3611(2)(a)[,]” and respondent may remain as personal representative because insufficient 

grounds had been presented for her removal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a probate court’s decision whether to remove

a personal representative. In re Kramek Estate, 268 Mich App 565, 575; 710 NW2d 753 (2005). 

When a probate court’s decision is within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, no 

abuse of discretion has occurred. In re Baldwin Trust, 274 Mich App 387, 397; 733 NW2d 419 

(2007), aff’d and mod 480 Mich 915 (2007). The probate court’s factual findings are reviewed for 

clear error. Id. at 396. “A finding is said to be clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left 

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Erickson Estate, 202 

Mich App 329, 331; 508 NW2d 181 (1993). “The reviewing court will defer to the probate court 

on matters of credibility, and will give broad deference to findings made by the probate court 

because of its unique vantage point regarding witnesses, their testimony, and other influencing 

factors not readily available to the reviewing court.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioner first argues that the probate court clearly erred by finding that “no sufficient 

grounds for [respondent’s] removal have been presented according to MCL 700.3611.” According 

to petitioner, record evidence establishes that respondent knew decedent had a will and lied that 

decedent died intestate when she filed her application for informal probate.

In Michigan, the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., 

governs the administration of estates. Under MCL 700.3611(1), “[a]n interested person may 

petition for removal of a personal representative for cause at any time.” MCL 700.3611(2)

enumerates multiple grounds on which a personal representative may be removed, including that 

the personal representative “intentionally misrepresented material facts in a proceeding leading to 

the appointment.” MCL 700.3611(2)(b). Here, petitioner asserts that removal of respondent was 

proper under MCL 700.3611(2)(b) because respondent intentionally misrepresented that decedent 

died intestate when she sought to be appointed personal representative. As the moving party, 

petitioner had the burden of proof of establishing that respondent’s removal was warranted by a 

preponderance of the evidence. See In re Guardianship of Redd, 321 Mich App 398, 409-411; 

909 NW2d 289 (2017).

With respect to petitioner’s request that respondent be removed, the probate court 

recognized that “the parties disagree as to the Respondent’s knowledge of the Decedent’s Will” 

and noted their conflicting testimonies. However, the court ultimately stated:

[N]o sufficient grounds for [respondent’s] removal as personal represented have 

been presented according to MCL 700.3611. In fact, the [respondent] asserts 
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without her work the remaining real estate assets in this estate would have been lost 

to foreclosure.

As petitioner recognizes, implicit in the probate court’s conclusion is a finding that respondent did 

not “intentionally misrepresent material facts in a proceeding leading to her appointment.” MCL 

700.3611(2)(b).

Petitioner focuses on respondent’s statement under oath in her application for informal 

probate that “decedent died intestate and after exercising reasonable diligence, I am unaware of 

any unrevoked testamentary instrument relating to property located in this state as defined under 

MCL 700.1301.” According to petitioner, this statement was false and respondent committed 

perjury. Petitioner asserts that the record shows that respondent was present at the Will’s signing 

on May 3, 2000, as evidenced by her signature on two other estate planning documents signed that 

day. Petitioner further asserts that respondent’s self-serving testimony that she was in China that 

day is unbelievable because it was not corroborated by her passport and, further, that respondent 

contradicted her own testimony that there was not a will because she admitted she asked decedent 

about a will in 2012, and she also lied when she included the Family home address as her address 

on one of the estate planning documents she signed.

Petitioner’s testimony supports his claim. Petitioner testified that respondent was present 

at the attorney’s office on May 3, 2000, when decedent and her husband signed estate planning 

documents. The probate court, however, chose to believe respondent’s testimony that she was out 

of the country on that date, that respondent only signed a Durable Power of Attorney and Patient 

Advocacy Directive when decedent presented the signature page to her at a later date, and that 

respondent was unaware of a will despite asking decedent about a will in 2012. And despite 

petitioner’s argument, when respondent’s testimony is read in context, no inconsistencies exist. 

Respondent repeatedly testified that she was unaware of a will, which is corroborated by 

respondent’s later actions of asking petitioner about a will three times after decedent’s death and 

inquiring with her father’s secretary whether a will existed. Respondent’s testimony that she asked 

decedent about a will in 2012 and decedent answered, “Don’t worry about [it], everything is at the 

house,” does not demonstrate that respondent knew a will existed. In fact, respondent testified 

with respect to this exchange, “I don’t know what that means.” Respondent also provided a 

reasonable explanation why she used the Family home address on the Durable Power of Attorney, 

despite that she lived at a different address—decedent asked respondent to use that address because 

respondent was then living out-of-wedlock with her fiancé.

Petitioner argues that respondent’s claim that she was in China was “simply preposterous” 

and the probate court was required to “at least offer some evidentiary explanation” for the fact that 

respondent’s signature was also on documents signed the same day as the will, pointing out that 

respondent’s passport was never produced.4 However, the burden of establishing that respondent 

should be removed as personal representative was on petitioner, not the probate court. See In re 

Guardianship of Redd, 321 Mich App at 409-411. And, as respondent points out, petitioner had 

 

4 Of note, petitioner generally argues that the probate court was required to cite to the portions of 

the record that underpinned its decision. We reject this claim because the authority petitioner cites 

does not support this contention.
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the opportunity for discovery, but chose to conduct none. Petitioner also cites no law requiring 

respondent to corroborate her own testimony or any case which would prevent the probate court 

from weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations, despite a lack of any 

corroborating evidence, rendering petitioner’s argument on this issue devoid of merit.

Petitioner next argues that nothing in the record supports the probate court’s finding that 

he is unsuitable to serve as personal representative. 

MCL 700.3203 governs the priority of persons seeking appointment as personal 

representative. In particular, MCL 700.3203(1) provides that “persons who are not disqualified

have priority for appointment as a general personal representative in the following order[,]” listing 

first the “person with priority as determined by a probated will . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, a 

person designated as personal representative in a will has priority to be appointed personal 

representative unless he or she has been disqualified. In turn, MCL 700.3204(3) states: “A person 

is not qualified to serve as a personal representative if the person is either under the age of 18 or 

is a person whom the court finds unsuitable in formal proceedings.”

Respondent challenged petitioner’s appointment as personal representative, alleging he is 

unsuitable to administer decedent’s estate. See MCL 700.3203(2) (providing that “[a]n objection 

to the appointment of a personal representative may be made only in a formal proceeding”).

While EPIC allows an interested party to object to the initial appointment of a personal 

representative, MCL 700.3203(2), it does not define the grounds that would support such an 

objection, nor does EPIC define the term “unsuitable.” However, this Court has recognized that 

the grounds for removing a personal representative in MCL 700.3611(2) are “sufficient to support 

an interested person’s objection to the initial appointment of a personal representative under MCL 

700.3203(2).” In re Estate of Stan, 301 Mich App 435, 447; 839 NW2d 498 (2013). Those 

grounds include, that “[r]emoval is in the best interest of the estate,” MCL 700.3611(2)(a), or the 

proposed personal representative has “[d]isregarded a court order[,]” “[b]ecame incapable of 

discharging the duties of office[,]” “[m]ismanaged the estate[,]” or “[f]ailed to perform a duty 

pertaining to the office[,]” MCL 700.3611(2)(c)(i)-(iv). Further, the party challenging suitability 

has the burden of establishing unsuitability by a preponderance of the evidence. In re 

Guardianship of Redd, 321 Mich App at 409-411.

Here, the probate court found that respondent sufficiently carried her burden of establishing 

that appointment of petitioner as personal representative would not be in the best interests of the 

estate. In support, the court found that petitioner failed to timely submit decedent’s Will because 

not probating the estate allowed him to control decedent’s assets. The court additionally found 

that petitioner wrongfully converted decedent’s Huntington Bank account, misunderstood the 

distinction between probate and trust administration to justify his continued living in decedent’s 

Canton home rent-fee, had a long history of personal tax problems and financial mismanagement 

that reflected on his ability to act as a fiduciary, and failed to pay outstanding property taxes on 

either the Canton home or the Family home after decedent’s death.

At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner admitted that he has a long history of personal 

financial mismanagement (including losing his home to tax foreclosure and having outstanding 

personal tax liabilities), admitted he did not pay the outstanding tax liabilities on decedent’s real 
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properties after her death, and admitted that he used decedent’s Huntington Bank account to make 

purchases after her death under the guise that he was trustee. Petitioner also admitted he 

misunderstood the Trust as allowing him to stay rent-free at the Canton property and that he only 

submitted the Will to probate after respondent filed her application for informal probate. In short, 

petitioner’s own testimony supported the factual findings that underpinned the probate court’s 

decision and petitioner is simply wrong that nothing in the record supports the court’s findings.

See, In re Estate of Stan, 301 Mich App at 447.

On appeal, petitioner argues that a multitude of the probate court’s factual findings are 

clearly erroneous. For example, petitioner asserts that the court’s finding that he failed to pay 

property taxes on decedent’s real property is erroneous because the liability existed before 

decedent’s death. First, this argument is irrational because the tax liabilities continued while 

petitioner lived in the house with decedent, and continued to accrue after his mother’s death while 

petitioner had sole control over decedent’s finances. Respondent testified she paid the arrearages 

out of her own funds when she became personal representative 11 months later. 

Further, while petitioner is correct that some of the probate court’s factual findings were in 

error—specifically that petitioner submitted the Will to probate after commencement of eviction 

proceedings, failed to maintain utilities or lawn maintenance on estate properties, and failed to 

insure the Family home—none of these misstatements of fact require reversal. This is because a 

preponderance of other evidence supported the probate court’s decision and, thus, any error was 

harmless. MCR 2.613(A) (explaining a harmless error does not require reversal). Likewise, to 

the extent petitioner argues that his misunderstanding of probate and trust administration, as well 

as his personal financial problems, were irrelevant under MCL 700.3611(2), the probate court’s 

consideration of those factors was also harmless for the same reason.

Accordingly, having reviewed the record evidence and testimony of the witnesses, we 

conclude that a preponderance of the evidence supported the probate court’s conclusion that 

petitioner is unsuitable, and thus disqualified, from serving as personal representative. It follows

that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by determining that petitioner was unsuitable to

serve as personal representative because his service would not be in the best interests of the estate.5

 

5 Petitioner also argues that the probate court erred by refusing to impose sanctions under MCR 

1.109 for respondent’s allegedly false statement in her application for informal probate that 

decedent died intestate. Petitioner, however, did not raise this request for sanctions in a motion as 

required by MCR 1.109(E)(6). Accordingly, because petitioner failed to properly raise this issue 

before the probate court, we deem this claim waived and we do not consider it. See Tolas Oil & 

Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW2d___ (2023) 

(Docket No. 359090); slip op at 2-5.
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Affirmed. Respondent, being the prevailing party, is entitled to costs. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney