UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

CASE NO. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM 

GRACE, INC.; ENGAGE MIAMI, INC.; 

SOUTH DADE BRANCH OF THE NAACP; 

MIAMI-DADE BRACH OF THE NAACP; 

CLARICE COOPER; YANELIS VALDES; 

JARED JOHNSON; and ALEXANDER 

CONTRERAS, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF MIAMI, 

 Defendant. 

 / 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT 

 Pursuant to S.D. Local Rule 7.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendant, City of Miami 

(the “City”), respectfully renews its motion to Dismiss the Supplemental Complaint of Plaintiffs, 

Grace, Inc. (“Grace”), Engage Miami, Inc. (“Engage Miami”), South Dade Branch Of The 

NAACP (“South Dade NAACP”), Miami-Dade Branch Of The NAACP (“Miami-Dade 

NAACP”), Clarice Cooper, Yanelis Valdes, Jared Johnson, Alexandra Contreras and Steven 

Miro (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”). As grounds, the Defendant states: 

I. Facts From Plaintiffs’ Pleadings and Filings 

The City has had single member districts for its five commissioners (rather than at large 

elections) since 1997. DE 23 Am. Compl., ¶ 33-39, 59-64. These districts have had 

substantially the same shape and same racial demographic make-up since the individual districts 

were first constituted and throughout the last several redistricting cycles. DE 26 p.4; DE 24-76 

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p.12 (2013 demographics prior to 2013 redistricting); DE 24-78 p.6 (2013 demographics of 2013 

redistricting),; DE 24-80 p.1 (1997 map), p.2 (2003 map), p.3 (2013 map).1

 

Following the 2020 Census, it was revealed that the City’s Commission Districts were 

demographically unbalanced and that the ideal Commission district size was 88,448. Id., ¶¶ 72-

74. In particular, the waterfront District 2 needed to “shed” population to the other four districts. 

Id., ¶ 75. The City thus had to redistrict and had to shift people from District 2 to the other 

districts. Plaintiffs brought a single count complaint challenging the redistricting plan enacted by 

the City of Miami in Resolution 22-131 as unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. DE 23. 

 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs accused the City of “packing certain districts with 

as many Hispanic and Black residents as possible” predominantly in order to maintain “racial 

purity.” DE 23 ¶ 2. They accused the City of “racial sorting” with the goal of “isolating Black 

from Hispanic from Anglo residents as much as possible into separate districts.” DE 23 ¶ 9, 12, 

18. They claimed the City was “packing” Black residents into District 5 and Hispanic residents 

into Districts 1, 3 and 4. DE 23 ¶¶ 2, 15, 202, 277, 290, 308, 327, 331, 341, & § IV(C) at p.39. 

“[A] “packed” district is one in which a party’s supporters are highly concentrated, so they win 

that district by a large margin, “wasting” many votes that would improve their chances in 

others.” Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2492 (U.S. 2019) (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 

138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (U.S. 2018)). Approximately 25% of the Amended Complaint focused 

heavily on a small sliver of the West Grove that was moved from District 2 to District 4. This 

 

1

 “In determining whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may also consider the 

allegations in the complaint, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the 

case, and exhibits attached to the complaint.” Hodges v. Buzzeo, 193 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1281 (S.D. 

Fla. 2002). 

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area is not moved in the current plan and remains in District 2. The Amended Complaint also 

focused heavily on the public comments of commissioners during public hearings on the plans 

under consideration as indicia of improper intent. 

Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Critically, at that time they did not 

propose any alternative map. This Court entered a preliminary injunction finding that Plaintiffs 

had a likelihood of prevailing that the City’s redistricting map set forth in City of Miami 

Resolution 22-131 (the “Enjoined Plan”) unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered the City to 

preserve “three Hispanic districts, one Black district, and one Anglo district.” DE 60 p.16; DE 

94 pp.20-21. After the injunction issued, Plaintiffs for the first time proposed alternative plans to

the City. As discussed below, these plans had essentially the same ethnic demographic 

breakdown as the plan to which they objected. Rather than just adopt a temporary, interim 

remedial plan, on June 14, 2023, the City adopted Resolution 23-271, adopting a new 

redistricting plan (the “New Plan”) to replace the Enjoined Plan. DE 77. Plaintiffs objected to 

that plan, and, eventually, proposed four alternative plans to this Court. DE 82-34 to DE 82-37. 

There are critical features that are substantially similar as pertaining to the all the plans at 

issues in this litigation. First, Miami is a majority-minority city. Second, there is no White 

majority district, and no plan proposes one. All plans have a coastal District 2 with the largest 

concentration of White voters. Compare DE 82-24 to 34-37. Plaintiffs’ Maps 2, 3 and 4 have a 

greater White Voting Aged Population (WVAP) in District 2 than the New Plan. Compare DE 

82-12 p.15 to 16. All plans have a VRA-protected Black District 5. Plaintiffs previously 

accused the City of “packing” Black voters into District 5 by looking at Black Citizen Voting 

Age Population (BCVAP), but Plaintiff Plan 3’s BCVAP is 56.5% and Plan 4’s BCVAP is 

55.8% compared to the New Plan’s 57.4%. Compare DE 82-12 p.15 to 16. All plans have three 

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supermajority Hispanic districts, but Plaintiffs’ Hispanic Voting Age Population (“HVAP”) in 

District 4 in all plans is maximally packed at higher than 94%. Id. 

This Court rejected the City’s New Plan finding that it failed to correct the prior racial 

predominance of the Enjoined Plan. DE 94 pp.27,35-39. This Court articulated that its purpose 

was to ensure that the new districting plan “completely corrects—rather than perpetuates—the 

defects that rendered the original districts unconstitutional or unlawful.” DE 94 p.16. This Court 

found the New Plan had “continued racial predominance. DE 94 p.27, 35-40. In other words, it 

preserved the alleged defect by preserving three Hispanic districts, one Black district, and one 

so-called Anglo district. This Court mandated that the City adopt a plan proposed by Plaintiffs: 

Plan 4. This Court acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ Plan 4 was “fundamentally similar” to the New 

Plan but found that to be expected to a certain extent. Id. at 49. That ruling was appealed, and 

there is currently a stay of the ruling pending appeal. 

There is a reason that the New Plan and Plaintiffs’ plan are fundamentally similar. As 

Plaintiffs’ plans demonstrate, there is no way to draw the map without preserving the same racial 

demographics. Plaintiffs acknowledge that District 5 is a Black Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) 

required district. DE 26 p.33; DE 109 ¶35. Given the fact that the City of Miami is 70% 

Hispanic, after drawing District 5, it is mathematically impossible to draw the rest of the map 

without at least three majority Hispanic Districts. Moreover, because the largest White 

population lives near the coast, the coastal district will always have the largest concentration of 

White (or “Anglo”) voters, as it does in all of Plaintiffs’ plans. 

Because the New Plan replaced the Enjoined Plan, Plaintiffs filed a twenty-three page 

Supplemental Complaint to address the New Plan. DE 109. Now that they have published four 

of their own allegedly constitutional plans, the Supplemental Complaint no longer accuses the 

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City of packing any race. Instead, it now accuses the City of “Avoiding ‘Packing’ Hispanics.” 

DE 109 p.14, ¶¶ 115-120. It claims the City is now “balancing” the Hispanic population. Id. 

Plaintiffs changed the accusation from “packing” to “balancing” while at the same time alleging 

that the Enjoined Plan and the New Plan are “nearly identical” with 97.8% of the Miamians 

remaining in the same district. Id. ¶¶ 64-69. In a majority-minority city, there is literally no 

move where the City would not either be slightly increasing (alleged packing) or not slightly 

increasing (balancing) the population of some racial demographic. 

Plaintiffs continue to challenge District 5 even though they themselves conceded, and in 

the course of the litigation have submitted reports establishing that racially polarized voting 

exists. DE 24-32 (“Moy Report”); 82-9 (“Supplemental Moy Report”). Plaintiffs have 

submitted plans they contended were narrowly tailored with nearly equivalent demographics to 

the New Plan. For example, Plan 3 has a 48.8 % BVAP and 56.5% BCVAP and Plan 4 has a 

48.4% BVAP and 55.8% BCVAP in comparison to the New Plan’s 50.3% BVAP and 57.4% 

BCVAP. 2

 In the Supplemental Complaint, Plaintiffs no longer accuse the City of “packing” 

Black voters into District 5. Instead, Plaintiffs posit a purely subjective test and allege that the 

City failed to consider an appropriate functional analysis before creating the district. DE 109 ¶ 

161 (“Commission was obligated to assess the level” of voters necessary); ¶ 162 (“no indication 

the Commission conducted an analysis of racially polarized voting”); ¶ 172 (“Without 

conducting a functional analysis of RPV, the Commission’s race-based map drawing was not 

narrowly tailored to achieve VRA compliance.”) Plaintiffs ignore that have filed in the record 

 

2

 “BVAP” refers to Black Voting Aged Population; “BCVAP” refers to Black Citizen Voting 

Aged Population. 

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the transcript3 of their own presentation to the Commission at the June 14 meeting where they 

presented their Plan 3, with its remarkably similar demographics, and represented that their plans 

“fully comply with the VRA.” DE 82-2 p.6, l.16-17; see also DE 77 p.53 (Plaintiffs’ handout). 

II. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss 

A complaint must allege sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must contain sufficient factual 

allegations that are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When a complaint pleads facts that are merely 

consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possible and plausible 

relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the allegations in the complaint, 

matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached 

to the complaint.” Hodges v. Buzzeo, 193 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2002), citing Watson 

v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 844 F. Supp. 1533, 1535 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1993), aff’d, 84 F.3d 438 (11th 

Cir. 1996). 

III. Argument 

There are two threshold legal questions that go to the core of Plaintiffs’ case. First, is 

narrow tailoring a purely subjective test in the redistricting context, or is it an objective test with 

a subjective safe harbor? In other words, can a plaintiff challenge a VRA district that was 

objectively drawn narrowly on the grounds that the legislative body did not have a good enough 

reason to believe it. If it’s not a purely subjective test, then Plaintiffs do not plead a cause of 

action regarding to District 5 for any of the alleged gerrymandering that occurred along its 

 

3

 Plaintiffs liberally quote from the transcript throughout the Supplemental Complaint. 

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borders. The second issue is whether Plaintiffs have pled an actual racial gerrymander, rather 

than simply an alleged intent to racially gerrymander. If the Districts are simply a reflection of 

the demographics of the City, and significant numbers of people were not racially 

gerrymandered, then Plaintiffs do not state a claim. 

A. District 5 

Plaintiffs’ attack on District 5 in the Supplemental Complaint arises out of the Supreme 

Court’s ruling in Bethune-Hill.

When a State justifies the predominant use of race in redistricting 

on the basis of the need to comply with the Voting Rights Act, “the 

narrow tailoring requirement insists only that the legislature have a 

strong basis in evidence in support of the (race-based) choice that 

it has made.” ... [T]he requisite strong basis in evidence exists 

when the legislature has “good reasons to believe” it must use race 

in order to satisfy the Voting Rights Act, “even if a court does not 

find that the actions were necessary for statutory compliance.” 

Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections (Bethune-Hill I), 580 U.S. 178, 187 (2017) (quoting 

Alabama Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama (ALBC I), 575 U.S. 254 (2015)). Plaintiffs assert that 

the City did not perform enough analysis to justify District 5. 

There are several levels to the Bethune-Hill inquiry. The first is whether a VRA district 

is required at all. This is the classic Gingles analysis.4

 From an objective standpoint, this is not 

an issue in the case. Plaintiffs have conceded racially polarized voting exists and that a VRA 

District is required, and they have urged on this Court their own versions of the VRA District. 

They also presented to the Commission their own versions of such a District to be considered at 

the June 14 meeting, and those versions look remarkably like the City’s. As a result, Plaintiffs 

only contend that the District is not “narrowly tailored.” DE 109 ¶¶ 160-172. 

The purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that 

"the means chosen `fit' th[e] compelling goal so closely that there 

 

4 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986), 

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is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was 

illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." Richmond v. J. A. 

Croson Co., 488 U. S., at 493 (plurality opinion). 

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). In other words, it is an objective test. 

If a court finds a firm basis in evidence to support a compelling 

government interest in taking race-based action, it will look to see 

if the action is narrowly tailored to address that interest. On the 

whole, the court will consider whether the racial distinctions are 

necessary and whether they are over-inclusive or under-inclusive 

Id. In the Voting Rights Act context, it is used to prevent packing of the protected class in one 

district so as to deprive them of influence elsewhere. That is not contended here. There is not 

and has never been a claim of vote dilution. 

From an objective standpoint, Plaintiffs cannot assert that District 5 is not narrowly 

tailored. As an initial matter, the BVAP was set at just over 50%. It is mathematically the 

definition of a majority. It is also the threshold required to bring a claim under Section 2 of the 

VRA. It is a paradox to conclude that a plaintiff must assert that a minority population is 

sufficiently large and geographically compact to draw a majority minority district to state a valid 

claim, but it is constitutionally impermissible to draw that same district in the first instance. 

Additionally, Plaintiffs have in the record of this case, and at the Commission meeting where the 

New Plan was adopted, presented their own allegedly compliant plans of essentially the same 

demographics. The difference in the BVAP and BCVAP between Plaintiffs’ plans and the New 

Plan is as small as 1.5% and .9% respectively. There is no requirement that the required majority 

be pared down to the minimum with mathematical precision. 

“The law cannot insist that a state legislature, when redistricting, 

determine precisely what percent minority population § 5 

demands.” The question is whether the State had “good reasons” to 

believe a 55% BVAP floor was necessary to avoid liability under § 

5. The State did have good reasons under these circumstances. 

Holding otherwise would afford state legislatures too little 

breathing room, leaving them “trapped between the competing 

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hazards of liability” under the Voting Rights Act and the Equal 

Protection Clause. 

Id. at 195-96 (citations omitted). 

Holding otherwise would afford state legislatures too little 

breathing room, leaving them “trapped between the competing 

hazards of liability” under the Voting Rights Act and the Equal 

Protection Clause. 

Id. at 196. 

Bethune-Hill then creates a good-faith safe harbor. As long as there is a basis for a good 

faith reason to believe that the district is narrowly tailored, courts should not second guess the 

decision. Plaintiffs, however, assert an untested theory: that even if there is valid basis for a 

VRA district, and even if that district is objectively narrowly tailored so as not to be overly 

inclusive, the district can still be challenged on the grounds that the legislative body did not 

subjectively have a good enough reason to believe it was narrowly tailored. 

Plaintiffs’ theory makes little sense for a number of reasons. First, it is based on an 

interpretation of the law that upends the purpose of “narrow tailoring,” which is to prevent over 

inclusiveness. It is to ensure that the solution is narrow tailored to fit the goal. In the VRA 

context, that means that the district is not packed with the protected class. The Gingles test is the 

test of the legislature’s decision to create such a district. The purpose of narrow tailoring is to 

insure that even if such a district is created, it does not go too far and become a vehicle for 

packing. Second, if that were the purpose of judicial review, just to make sure that the 

Legislature considered enough data before adopting an objectively narrow district, the remedy in 

such a case would not be to redraw the district and call a special election. The remedy would be 

to have another meeting of the legislative body to review the analysis and bless the District as it 

currently exists. 

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Because District 5 is a VRA district, racial gerrymandering is permissible. As a result, 

Plaintiffs do not state a cause of action with respect to its borders. The complaints about 

Morningside, Overtown, and its other borders do not state a claim. DE 109 ¶¶ 84-114, 135-137, 

142-151, 156-158. 

B. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Lack of Compactness 

Before discussing that Plaintiffs bring a racial gerrymandering case without any actual, 

significant racial gerrymandering, it must be noted that Plaintiff is challenging compact districts. 

Plaintiffs allege only that District 2 is non-compact, (DE 109 ¶¶ 135, 141), and that Districts 3 

and 5 are “less compact” in the New Plan than the Enjoined Plan.5

 DE 109 ¶¶ 151, 159. Thus 

they do not allege that Districts 1 and 3-5 are not compact. How could they? As this Court 

observed Plaintiffs’ Plan 4 is “fundamentally similar” to the New Plan,6 (DE 94 p.49). Facially, 

the New Plan’s districts are relatively compact and do not have the sort of gerrymandered shapes 

present in gerrymandering cases. Some lack of compactness is driven by the irregular shape of 

the city. District 5 is a VRA district and can be drawn with race as a factor. That forces a certain

level of non-compactness on Districts 1 and 2. Accounting for this, the City is relatively 

compact as demonstrated by Plaintiffs’ own plans and data. Plaintiffs’ Reock compactness 

scores reinforce this. While District 1 receives a relatively low Reock score (21) so does 

Plaintiffs’ Plan 1 (18). DE 82-11 p.6. Plaintiffs other plans are all in the low 30s. Id. Similarly, 

District 2, the only District Plaintiffs claim is non-compact, is essentially no less compact than 

Plaintiffs’ plans. They and the New Plan are all in the 30’s. Id. The City’s District 1 is only 

10% less compact than Plaintiffs’ Plans 3 and 4 (30 versus 34). The City’s District 3 (43) is 

more compact than three of Plaintiffs’ plans. The City’s District 4 and the Plaintiffs’ Plans 2 and 

 

5

 Stating that they became slightly less compact does not mean that they are not compact. 

6

 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, and in its stay order stated that one “looks a lot like” the other. 

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3 are all in the 20’s (24 versus P3 and P4’s 29). Only in District 5 does the City have an 

appreciably better Reock score, the one district that Plaintiffs concede is a VRA district and may 

be racially gerrymandered. There has never been a requirement to make the districts maximally 

compact or to disregard the legislature’s plan if plaintiffs offer a slightly more compact plan. 

C. Districts 1 through 4. 

Plaintiffs’ next threshold issue concerns whether there was actually a racial gerrymander 

at all. Miami is a majority-minority city. It is approximately 15% Black and 70% Hispanic. 

See, e.g., DE 26 p.32; DE 24-31 p.23. When Plaintiffs first pled this case, they pled that the City 

racially segregated the City to pack certain districts with as many Hispanic residents as possible. 

They now allege the City was trying to “avoid packing” to “balance.” Any district map with a 

VRA protected Black District will unavoidably have three Hispanic districts because the 

remainder of the City is 75% Hispanic. DE 82-2 p.9:1-8. Now that Plaintiffs have presented 

their own maps, every map proposed by Plaintiffs also had a VRA District 5 for Black voters, 

three Hispanic districts, and a coastal district with more White voters than the other districts. 

In a racial gerrymandering case, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that “race 

was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of 

voters within or without a particular district.” Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 291 (2017) 

(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)). The test for racial gerrymandering is not 

merely whether race was discussed, but whether it actually resulted in a racial gerrymander of a 

significant number of voters. Id. If the Districts simply reflect the demographic reality, then 

they are not racial gerrymanders, regardless of what the legislators may say. The priests of an 

ancient religion may say that they have to perform a yearly ritual to make the sun rise, but just 

because they are claiming credit for it, does not mean that they are making the sun rise. 

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The core of Plaintiffs’ case was that the City was originally racially gerrymandered to 

preserve three Hispanic, one Black, and one Anglo district.7

 DE 23 ¶¶ 87, 197-202. Plaintiffs 

also originally alleged that the Enjoined Plan was meant to further pack those districts, but the 

numbers belied that allegation; the redistricting reduced racial concentrations. Compare id., ¶ 

76-77 with ¶ 269, 289, 326, 340. There is nothing the City can do to avoid having at least three 

Hispanic Districts. Every map it draws will have roughly the same demographic breakdown, as 

do all of Plaintiffs’ maps. Moreover, as a majority-minority city, every move will either move or 

not move a minority, and thus will be either packing or balancing. In Plaintiffs’ view, the City 

can never draw a lawful map. 

Plaintiffs allege that the New Plan is 94.1% the same as the Enjoined Plan, and that three 

Hispanic Districts have a 97.8% overlap with the Enjoined Plan. DE 109 ¶¶ 64, 154; see also

p.15 n.1 (“The fewer than 1,000 people moved between Districts 1, 3, and 4 along the District 1 

border swapped high-Hispanic areas between the predominantly Hispanic districts, thus did not 

alter the racial “balance” the plan achieved”). If anything, the New Plan had the effect of 

lowering racial concentrations compared to the Enjoined Plan. The New Plan lowered the 

WVAP in District 2 from 40.5% to 38.6%, had the same BVAP, less than a 1% difference in the 

HVAP in Districts 1 and 4, and lowered the HVAP in District 3 from 88.3% to 84.5%. DE 82-

12 p.14-15. 

If the New Plan did not move a significant number of people, then it did not, in its own 

right, place a significant number of voters for racial reasons. It cannot be both. The New Plan 

cannot have failed to appreciable change from the Enjoined Plan, and still be a racial 

 

7

 There is no Anglo District. The majority of the White voters live near the water. The coastal 

district thus has a higher WVAP than other districts, but the White voters are still a minority. 

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gerrymander in its own right. At most, Plaintiff is making a case that the New Plan, like the 

Enjoined Plan, preserved the original racial “separation” from the original 1997 establishment of 

the districts. There is nothing inherently wrong with having a district with lopsided racial 

demographics if that is the natural result of residential segregation. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 

900, 911 (1995). Additionally, preserving the core of those Districts is a legitimate, permissible 

redistricting criterion. Id. at 906. 

Plaintiffs can plead what they like, but their allegations that everything was “motivated” 

by race is belied by the actual numbers. Plaintiffs ask this Court to invalidate the map adopted 

by the Commission based on alleged racial separations that have existed from inception and are 

based on demographic realities—every map Plaintiffs proposed preserved that same alleged 

racial separation. The City’s New Plan simply preserves the cores of those original districts. 

The largest differences between the New Plan and plans proposed by Plaintiffs concern 

those three Hispanic Districts: 1, 3 and 4. Plaintiffs seek to realign them. This case is unique 

insofar as Plaintiffs are complaining of either being placed in a Hispanic district because of their 

race, and are suing to be placed in a different Hispanic district. If Miami were a majority White 

city, would White plaintiffs be able to sue to claim that they were placed in a majority White 

District because they are White, and seek to be placed in a different majority White district? 

Why is this a claim in a majority Hispanic city? If Plaintiffs have a cause of action to seek such 

relief, majority-minority cities would essentially be deprived of the ability to govern 

themselves—federal courts would have to draw their districts. 

Legislatures may be aware of these racial demographic realities. That alone does not 

state a case for racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 

Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state 

decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when 

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it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, 

religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other 

demographic factors. That sort of race consciousness does not lead 

inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. 

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993). There must actually be a gerrymander. 

This is not a case where Plaintiffs have alleged any diminution or dilution of any group’s 

ability to vote in any other district. These are the harms that Courts are meant to guard against: 

the dilution of minority voting power by spreading minority voters throughout different districts 

or by packing minority voters into a single district. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993). The 

so-called racial divisions here simply reflect the actual racial make-up of the City as reflected in 

Plaintiffs’ own maps. This case is thus unprecedented. It confronts the question of whether a 

racial gerrymander case may proceed based upon alleged motives and statements of legislators, 

when there is no actual gerrymandering placing significant numbers of minority voters in any 

district in any way inconsistent with the City’s actual demographics. The Courts should not be 

in the business of simply swapping minority populations between Districts in order to disrupt the 

Core as Plaintiffs seek. 

D. Plaintiffs Lack Standing 

In response to the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, the City moved to dismiss 

for lack of standing. DE 34. This Court denied it as Moot because of the Supplemental 

Complaint. DE 110. Plaintiffs did not reallege the allegations of the Amended Complaint in 

their Supplemental Pleading. To the extent that the Supplemental Complaint is deemed to 

incorporate the Amended Complaint, the City incorporates its Motion to Dismiss the same and 

will not restate the allegations here. 

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E. Without the Supplemental Pleading, this Case Is Moot. 

As set forth above, the Supplemental Complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiffs’ own 

proposed maps are part of the record and should be considered. If the Supplemental Complaint 

is Dismissed, then the case must be dismissed. Plaintiffs cannot proceed solely on a challenge of 

the Enjoined Plan when it has been superseded by the New Plan. A challenge is generally 

mooted by the repeal of the challenged statute. Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc. v. City of 

Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004). When a city resolution is repealed by the 

enactment of a superseding resolution, the superseding statute resolution “moots a case only to 

the extent that it removes challenged features of the prior law.” “Rarely will challenges to a 

law’s validity survive a mootness analysis when that law is no longer effective.” Health 

Freedom Defense Fund v. President of United States, 2023 WL 4115990 (11th Cir. June 22, 

2023). While this Court earlier exercised its remedial authority to order a remedial process (DE 

91), that process has been terminated. DE 112 p.2 n.1. Plaintiffs cannot proceed once their 

challenge to the New Plan has been dismissed. 

IV. Conclusion 

The City of Miami is a majority-minority city. It is not, and is not even accused of, 

gerrymandering to diminish any group’s ability to have influence in any district. District 5 is a 

valid VRA District, as demonstrated by Plaintiffs’ own maps. Otherwise, the City is solely 

accused of racial sorting when there is no actual sorting other than that reflected in the 

demographics of the City as demonstrated by the demographics of Plaintiffs’ own maps. Every 

plan will perpetuate that same balance. The Supplemental Complaint should be dismissed. 

 WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

Supplemental Complaint. 

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 Respectfully submitted, 

GRAYROBINSON, P.A.

333 S.E. 2nd Avenue, Suite 3200 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone: (305) 416-6880 

Facsimile: (305) 416-6887 

 By: s/ Christopher N. Johnson 

Christopher N. Johnson 

 Florida Bar No. 69329 

Email: Christopher.Johnson@gray-robinson.com 

Marlene Quintana, B.C.S. 

Florida Bar No. 88358 

Email: Marlene.Quintana@gray-robinson.com 

GRAYROBINSON, P.A. 

Jason L. Unger, Esquire 

Florida Bar No. 991562 

George T. Levesque 

Florida Bar No. 55551 

Andy Bardos 

Florida Bar No. 822671 

301 S. Bronough Street 

Suite 600 

Tallahassee, Florida 32301 

Telephone: (850) 577-9090 

Facsimile: (850) 577-3311 

CITY OF MIAMI 

VICTORIA MÉNDEZ, City Attorney 

Florida Bar No. 194931 

JOHN A. GRECO, Chief Deputy City Attorney 

Florida Bar No. 991236 

KEVIN R. JONES, Deputy City Attorney 

Florida Bar No. 119067 

KERRI L. MCNULTY, 

Litigation & Appeals Division Chief 

Florida Bar No. 16171 

Office of the City Attorney 

444 S.W. 2nd Avenue 

Miami, FL 33130 

Telephone: (305) 416-1800 

Facsimile: (305) 416-1801 

 Attorneys for Defendant 

Case 1:22-cv-24066-KMM Document 117 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/21/2023 Page 16 of 17
17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I hereby certify that on September 21, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 

Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served 

this day on all counsel of record or pro se parties either via transmission of Notice of Electronic 

Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who 

are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing. 

 By: s/ Christopher N. Johnson 

Christopher N. Johnson 

Case 1:22-cv-24066-KMM Document 117 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/21/2023 Page 17 of 17