1 East Galesburg’s population is around 900. It’s not to be

confused with its more robust neighbor to the west, just plain

old Galesburg, which has over 33,000 inhabitants.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-3625

CODY MIYLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF EAST GALESBURG,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 04 C 1228—Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

____________

ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2007—DECIDED JANUARY 9, 2008

____________

Before BAUER, EVANS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

EVANS, Circuit Judge. With his mother ensconced as

the president of the Village, and an ordinance that provided he could only be removed from office if the

president agreed, Cody Miyler must have been shocked

when he was discharged from his position as the Chief

of Police of tiny East Galesburg,1

 Illinois, without his

mother’s consent. After this came to pass, Miyler sued the

Village under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of his
2 No. 06-3625

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution. The district court granted

the Village’s motion for summary judgment and Miyler

appeals.

In January 2001, Miyler was appointed to the position

of Chief of Police of the Village of East Galesburg. His

pay was set at the surprisingly low rate of about $9 per

hour. Two and a half years later, the Village Board of

Trustees, by a two-thirds vote, voted to remove Miyler

from office. The board claimed it was troubled by

various allegations of misconduct by Miyler, such as his

providing beer to some underage boys, using a local

brickyard for a firing range, and being ticketed for

riding a motorcycle without a valid license, a “violation”

to which he entered a guilty plea. Miyler’s employment

was actually terminated without a hearing two weeks

later.

As we said, at the time of the termination of his employment, Miyler’s mother was president of the Village. It

was Miyler’s understanding that his employment could

not be terminated unless his mother fired him. Given

the Village ordinances, we can understand the basis

for Miyler’s belief about what would have to happen

before he could be fired. But in this civil rights case, it

doesn’t matter. Nothing in the Village ordinances or the

state statutes gives him a protectible property interest

in his position, nor does he have an employment contract with the Village. In short, he was an at-will employee.

For Miyler to have a constitutionally protected property

right in continued employment as the police chief of the

Village, he had to have a legitimate claim of entitlement

to continue in the job. Property interests are created

and defined by an independent source, such as state law

or a contract. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408
No. 06-3625 3

U.S. 564 (1972). Under Illinois law, public employees

do not have property rights in employment which trigger

due-process protections. Levin v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of

Cook County, 52 Ill. 2d 516, 288 N.E.2d 97 (1972).

Nevertheless, Miyler argues that state law, 65 ILCS

5/3.1-35-10, gives him a property interest. That section

states that the mayor or president of a municipality may

remove any officer appointed by a mayor or president. The

statute then sets out procedures for removal. Miyler

argues that a similar statute was found to be sufficient

to overcome the presumption of at-will employment in

Summers v. Village of Durand, 267 Ill. App. 3d 767, 643

N.E.2d 272 (2nd Dist. 1994).

We find Summers a bit puzzling. But one thing is

clear: it is not relevant to Miyler’s case. Summers is a

breach of contract action, not a civil rights case, and

involves the firing of the chief of police of the Village

of Durand. Summers’ employment contract, partly in

writing, partly oral, did not specify a definite term of

employment. His employment was terminated without

the filing of a formal charge, as the statute requires. In

his breach of contract action, Summers contended that

the Illinois Municipal Code provided him with procedural

protections, which he did not receive. The court said

that the “presumption that an employment contract is

terminable at will can be overcome by an applicable

statutory provision that demonstrates a contrary intent”

and that the Code demonstrated such an intent. The

court continued by saying that the Code became part of

Summers’ employment contract and so he could only be

fired pursuant to a formal charge presented to the board.

Because no charge was filed, Summers’ complaint stated

a claim for breach of contract. As we read the case, it

stands for the proposition that, in a claim based on

contract, a plaintiff can claim that the failure to provide procedural protections is a breach.
4 No. 06-3625

That is a far cry from saying that the statute establishes a property interest in employment for purposes of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Procedural guarantees do

not establish a property interest protected under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In order

to create a property interest, a statute or ordinance must

provide “some substantive criteria limiting the state’s

discretion,” as for instance in a requirement that employees can only be fired “for cause.” A statute which

merely provides procedures to be followed does not include a substantive right. Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424,

1426 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.

341 (1976).

The Village ordinances are no more help to Miylar

than are the statutes. Ordinance 1-5-12(J) provides for

the termination of “[a]ny officer appointed by the President and Board of Trustees,” and Section 6-1-2(B) provides for removal of the chief of police by the “President,

with the advice and consent of the Board of Trustees.” The

police chief can be removed when “the corporate authorities determine that the best interests of the Village require such removal.” It seems clear that the latter section, applying specifically to the chief of police, is the

relevant ordinance. And it provides for removal by the

president of the Village, not the board. Contrary to the

ordinances, Miyler was removed by the board, not his

mother, the president.

But despite the fact that his removal may have been

contrary to the ordinance, it does not follow that there

has been a violation of the Due Process Clause. Miyler

simply cannot establish a property interest in continuing to hold on to his position as the Village police chief.

That he may have a claim for some sort of relief in state

court is not a concern with which we can deal.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. 
No. 06-3625 5

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—1-9-08