COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

IN THE INTEREST OF

R.A.A., T.J.A., and S.M.A.,

Children.

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No. 08-19-00213-CV

Appeal from the

65th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2018DCM5057)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss this parental termination appeal, stating that the 

notice of appeal was prematurely filed as the trial court has not yet rendered a final judgment in 

this case.1

 

1 On July 26, 2018, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed an Original Petition for Protection 

of a Child, For Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship. The parties 

listed to be served were L.M. (Mother) and R.A. (Father). On July 16, 2019, the trial court issued an order titled 

“Interlocutory Order of Termination on [Mother]” in which Mother’s parental rights were terminated. The order did 

not discuss Father. The clerk’s record filed in this case shows that after the notice of appeal was filed in this case, the 

trial court issued a “Permanency Hearing Order Before Final Order” in which the trial court stated that Mother “had 

her parental rights terminated by interlocutory order signed July 15, 2019” but that Father’s parental rights remained 

intact. This order noted that the date of dismissal for the cause was set for January 24, 2020, and that trial was set for 

December 13, 2019.

We note that prior to 2007, former TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 263.401(d) made it possible in a termination case brought 

by the Department for there to be a final order that did not dispose of all parties and claims. See In re J.D., 304 S.W.3d 

522, 526 (Tex.App.—Waco 2009, no pet.). However, the Legislature amended the statute in 2007 to remove 

Subsection (d). See id. (recounting legislative history)(Act of May 28, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 600, § 17, 1999 

TEX.GEN.LAWS 2108, 2113, replealed by Act of June 15, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 866, § 5, 2007 TEX.GEN.LAWS
2

Rule 42.1(a) governs voluntary dismissals in civil cases.2 That rule states:

In accordance with a motion of appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal . . . 

unless such disposition would prevent a party from seeking relief to which it would 

otherwise be entitled. 

TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(a). 

Granting dismissal in this case would not prejudice the rights of the Appellee in this appeal.

Therefore, the Appellant’s motion for voluntary dismissal is GRANTED. 

September 25, 2019

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before Rodriguez, J., Palafox, J., and Barajas, Senior Judge

Barajas, Senior Judge (Sitting by Assignment)

 

1837, 1838). Since the Legislature removed Subsection (d), courts now use the ordinary final judgment standard in 

determining whether a termination order is actually final for purposes of appeal, i.e., whether it disposes of all parties 

and all claims. See id.; see also In Interest of C.M., No. 01-15-00830-CV, 2016 WL 1054589, at *5 (Tex.App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 17, 2016, no pet.)(mem. op.).

We express no opinion on whether any of the orders identified above are final or interlocutory because such a 

determination is unnecessary to the resolution of this motion; Mother (the Appellant) has elected to voluntarily dismiss 

her appeal, which is her right under TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(a).

2 As a basis for the motion to dismiss, Appellant cites TEX.R.APP.P. 27.1, which deals with prematurely filed notices 

of appeal. That rule states:

(a) Civil Cases. In a civil case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day 

of, but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting the appeal.

Rule 27.1 deals with how the Court calculates appellate deadlines when a notice of appeal is filed before a final order 

is signed. However, Rule 42.1(a) sets the standard for when an appellant can voluntarily dismiss his or her own appeal 

in a civil case.