FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 05-30270 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-04-00106-EJL

MARK CASCH,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 1, 2006*

Portland, Oregon

Filed May 24, 2006

Before: John T. Noonan, A. Wallace Tashima, and

William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Noonan

*This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

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COUNSEL

Greg Silvey, Boise, Idaho, for the defendant-appellant. 

Nancy Cook, Assistant United States Attorney, Coeur

d’Alene, Idaho, for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

NOONAN, Circuit Judge: 

Mark Casch appeals his conviction of conspiracy to possess

with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He contends that the

court erred by failing to instruct on venue and consequently

allowing him to be convicted on conduct uncharged in the

indictment. Ruling on an issue of first impression in this circuit, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

PROCEEDINGS

On February 23, 2005, Casch was charged in a single paragraph superseding indictment with conspiracy, from July

1999 to May 18, 2004, to possess with intent to distribute 500

grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more

of cocaine “in the District of Idaho and elsewhere.” 

Three witnesses testified for the government to sales or

deliveries of the drugs by Casch in Idaho. Three more witnesses testified to purchases of drugs by Casch in the state of

Washington. Three additional witnesses testified to drug

transactions by Casch that occurred in both Idaho and Washington. 

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In Instruction No. 23, the district court instructed the jury

that the government must prove the defendant entered an

agreement to commit at least one of the crimes charged in the

indictment. The defense objected as follows: 

Instruction No. 23 does not have any kind of jurisdictional element to it. I guess it may indirectly

because it says “did commit one crime as charged in

the superseding indictment.” And then if you look in

the superseding indictment, it does refer to the District of Idaho. So I guess like if all this stuff happened in Wisconsin, obviously this Court may not

have jurisdiction over this matter and the jury would

not have any jurisdiction to convict him if it

occurred like in Wisconsin or someplace. It just

seems like there needs to be something that this happened in the District of Idaho. 

The court responded that the issue was “really a question

of law for the Court . . . . The Court would rule that as a matter of law, that venue jurisdiction does lie with this Court.” 

The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Casch was sentenced

to 16 years in prison. He now appeals his conviction. 

ANALYSIS

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of

Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall

be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have

been committed; but when not committed within any

State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the

Congress may by Law have directed. U.S. Const.,

Art. III, § 3. 

[1] Embedded in the Constitution as a significant section of

the article creating the federal judicial system, this provision

determining the venue for federal criminal trials is part of the

5762 UNITED STATES v. CASCH
bedrock of our federal system. Persons charged with crimes

are to be tried where the crimes are said to have been done.

Division of venue by states trumps the national interest in

having a single place where all offenses against the nation

might be tried. 

Casch contends that the indictment charging him with

offenses committed “in the District of Idaho or elsewhere”

permitted the jury, uninstructed as to venue, to convict him on

crimes committed in Washington. Casch characterizes this

result as a constructive amendment of the indictment. But

there was no “complex of facts” presented at trial “distinctly

different from those in the indictment.” United States v.

Adamson, 291 F.3d 606, 615 (9th Cir. 2006). Nor was there

a fatal variance. Id. 

Casch also argues that the jury was free to be not unanimous, some members finding him guilty on account of his

conduct in Idaho, others on account of his conduct in Washington. He insists that it was for the jury to determine where

venue lay. Uninstructed, the jury did not do so. His point merits examination. 

[2] Venue is a question of fact: is there a match between the

place of commission of the crimes and the state where the

trial is taking place? United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747,

749 (10th Cir. 1997). Venue is not an element of the charged

crime, but establishment of venue is part of the prosecution’s

burden. Id. at 749-50. In a jury trial, it is not for the court to

determine that venue exists, and it is error for the court to

decline to give the instruction. Id. at 750. 

[3] The error, which deprives the command in Article III of

effect, is of constitutional magnitude, but it is not structural —

that is, it does not deprive the trial of fundamental fairness.

See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). The

error is consequently susceptible of harmless error analysis. 

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[4] Casch was properly convicted in this case if he was

convicted of a conspiracy entered into by him to possess

methamphetamine and cocaine with intent to distribute them

in Idaho. The evidence at trial was overwhelming that he had

formed such a conspiracy. It is a speculation without substance that any juror thought him innocent of conspiracy in

Idaho but guilty in Washington or that a less than unanimous

jury convicted him of the crimes in Idaho. See United States

v. Garcia-Rivera, 353 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 2003). Casch

was convicted of a crime in the venue in which he had committed it. See United States v. Martinez, 901 F.2d 374, 377

(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 462

(8th Cir. 1985). Relying on these cases, we adopt their harmless error test in contrast to the apparently more vigorous standard set by the Tenth Circuit in Miller. See 111 F.3d at 753-

54. Because the evidence that Casch committed conspiracy in

Idaho was “substantial” and “uncontroverted,” the district

court’s error was harmless. See Martinez, 901 F.3d at 377;

Moeckly, 769 F.3d at 462. Here, as in Martinez, “proof of

venue may be so clear that failure to instruct on the issue is

not reversible error.” 901 F.2d at 376. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. 

5764 UNITED STATES v. CASCH