IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM

GRACE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF MIAMI, 

Defendant. 

PLAINTIFFS’ EXPEDITED MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Nicholas Warren

ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc.

336 East College Avenue, Ste. 203

Tallahassee, FL 32301

(786) 363-1769

nwarren@aclufl.org

Daniel B. Tilley 

Caroline A. McNamara

ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc.

4343 West Flagler Street, Ste. 400

Miami, FL 33134

(786) 363-2714

dtilley@aclufl.org

cmcnamara@aclufl.org

Neil A. Steiner*

Dechert LLP

Vree Bryant Park

1095 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10036

(212) 698-3822

neil.steiner@dechert.com

Christopher J. Merken*

Jocelyn Kirsch*

Dechert LLP

Cira Centre

2929 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104

(215) 994-2380

christopher.merken@dechert.com

jocelyn.kirsch@dechert.com

* Admitted pro hac vice

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Plaintiffs move under FRCP 65(a) for a preliminary injunction enjoining the City of Miami 

from conducting future elections, beginning with the 2023 regular elections,

1 using the districts 

enacted in Resolution 22-131 (“Enacted Plan”). As demonstrated below, the Enacted Plan is an 

unlawful racial gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 

As explained in the Local Rule 7.1(d)(2) statement on page 36, Plaintiffs respectfully suggest a 

ruling on this motion is needed no later than May 23, 2023.

MEMORANDUM

Re City of Miami’s Enacted Plan for the five City Commission districts sorts its residents 

by race. Miami’s gerrymander is the product of a calculated scheme in which communities and 

neighborhoods were split along racial lines for the predominant purpose of maintaining and 

enhancing racially segregated districts. As Commissioner Alex Díaz de la Portilla put it: “Our goal 

here is to have an African American district, . . . a white district, . . . and three Hispanic districts.”

Race-based considerations were not simply a factor in redrawing district lines; they were 

the predominant factor. Race was the predominant factor in maintaining arbitrary racial quotas; in 

packing certain districts with as many Hispanic and Black residents as possible; in maintaining 

racial “purity” with the “same type of last name and faces”; in the decision to perpetuate existing 

districts’ cores, which were themselves race-based; and in the Commission’s overt command that 

Black, Hispanic, and Anglo residents must be separated as much as possible into different districts 

because, in the Commission’s view, each race needs to be represented by a co-ethnic, irrespective 

of Miami’s communities or their interests and values. Rere is no valid reason for this practice, 

which is “by [its] very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the 

1 District 2 became vacant on December 29, 2022 and a special election will be held on

February 27, 2023. ECF 24-24 to 24-27. Plaintiffs do not seek an injunction for the special election.

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doctrine of liberty.” Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).

“Re Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State, without sufficient justification, from 

‘separat[ing] its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.’” Bethune-Hill v. Va. 

State Bd. of Elections (Bethune-Hill I), 580 U.S. 178, 187 (2017) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 

U.S. 900, 911 (1995)). Because race was the predominant factor motivating district lines, the City 

must satisfy strict scrutiny by proving that its use of race “serves a ‘compelling interest’ and is 

‘narrowly tailored’ to that end.” Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 292 (2017) (quoting BethuneHill I, 580 U.S. at 193). Re City cannot meet that burden. Although courts assume governments 

have a compelling interest in complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), id., the 

City’s use of race was not narrowly tailored to achieve that laudable goal. Re City cannot show 

that it narrowly tailored its use of race with a “functional analysis” assessing racial bloc voting to 

determine the proportion of minority voters needed in a district to allow those voters to usually 

elect their preferred candidates. Bethune-Hill I, 580 U.S. at 194.

Instead, the City set “mechanical racial targets,” imposing a 50% Black voting-age 

population (BVAP) quota for District 5, and aiming to get the Hispanic and Anglo populations as 

high as possible in Districts 1, 3, and 4; and District 2, respectively. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. 

Alabama (ALBC I), 575 U.S. 254, 267 (2015). Narrow tailoring requires far more than just picking 

a number or shooting for the maximum. Further, the City misused key metrics of VRA compliance

and ignored the absence of fundamental preconditions for VRA liability in Districts 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Re Supreme Court has condemned this type of unjustified use of race as resembling 

“political apartheid.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647. Plaintiffs seek preliminary relief enjoining use of 

the Enacted Plan to ensure these harms are not irreparably perpetuated in future elections.

I. Overview of the City Commission and Its Elections

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Miami is governed by a five-member City Commission and a Mayor. Miami City Charter 

(“Charter”) § 4(a). Except where the Charter provides otherwise, municipal elections are governed 

by the state’s general election laws. Id. § 7. Since 1997, the City Commission has been elected 

from five single-member districts. Id. § 4(b); ECF 24-64. Candidates file to run during the 

qualifying period, which, for the November 2023 election, runs from September 8–23. See id.

Commissioners are limited to two consecutive terms. Id. § 4. The current commissioners are:

District Commissioner First

Elected

Term 

Up

Eligible for 

Reelection

Race/Ethnicity/

National Origin Background

1 Alex Díaz de la Portilla 2019 2023 Yes Hispanic/Cuban American

2 Vacant — — — —

3 Joe Carollo 2017 2025 No Hispanic/Cuban American

4 Manolo Reyes 2017* 2023 Yes Hispanic/Cuban American

5 Christine King 2021 2025 Yes Black/Not Hispanic

* Special Election

During the 2021–22 redistricting process, the District 2 commissioner was Ken Russell, 

who is Japanese American. ECF 24-21. Russell ran for Congress in the 2022 elections and 

therefore resigned from the Commission under Florida’s resign-to-run law. ECF 24-24 to 24-27.

II. Redistricting Background

Before 1997, the Commission was elected at-large, citywide. ECF 24-64. Re original map

(the “1997 Plan”) was drawn by the Commission after a blue-ribbon panel appointed by thenMayor Joe Carollo made its recommendations. Id.; ECF 24-58. Re blue-ribbon panel included 

current Commissioner Reyes and Miguel De Grandy. ECF 24-47; Tr. 4B 19:15–18. Re 

Commission map was redrawn in 2003 and again in 2013, with De Grandy and Stephen Cody 

serving as the City’s consultants in both cycles. ECF 24-78. Race was a central, driving factor 

behind each of these maps. See generally ECF 24-42 to 24-79.

2

2 Rese maps and the others discussed in this motion can be viewed on Google Maps at the 

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III. Le 2021–22 Redistricting Process

Following the 2020 Census, the Commission began its redistricting process. Re process 

proceeded through six Commission meetings, the records of which reveal that the mapmaking was 

driven by racial considerations at every turn.

3 Re Commission again hired De Grandy and Cody 

as its redistricting consultants, and they first met with the Commission on November 18, 2021, 

when De Grandy presented an initial report on redistricting considerations and the 2020 Census 

demographics of the districts under the 2013 Plan. ECF 24-20; see generally Tr. 1; Abott Rep. 23.4

De Grandy shared that redistricting was needed to bring the districts within the allowable 

population range, to have no greater than 10% difference between the smallest and largest district. 

Tr. 1 4:1–11; see Abott Rep. 23.

5 Analyzing the 2013 Plan, Districts 1, 3, 4, and 5 were each under 

the ideal population and needed to gain population. Tr. 1 3:10–15. District 2 was overpopulated 

and needed to shed population. Tr. 1 3:12–13; Abott Rep. 23. Under the 2013 Plan, Districts 1, 3, 

and 4 were majority Hispanic, with Hispanic voting-age populations (HVAPs) of 91.0, 88.5, and 

91.6%, and Hispanic citizen voting-age populations (HCVAPs) of 86.6, 86.8, and 90.1%.6 Id.

links listed in the Maps section of the Notice of Filing Exhibits (ECF 24 at 6).

3 Rese meeting transcripts are at ECF 24-11 to 24-18 and cited here as “Tr. 1,” “Tr. 2,” etc.

4 Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted a records request for the initial report in December 2022 and 

subsequently discussed it with defense counsel, but do not have a copy as of the time of filing.

5 Full statistics for the various plans and districts discussed herein are in the appendix to the 

Expert Report of Dr. Carolyn Abott (ECF 24-31 at 23–29).

6 Total population (POP) and voting-age population (VAP) figures cited herein are from the 

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District 5 was majority Black, with a Black voting-age population (BVAP) of 52.9% and a Black 

citizen voting-age population (BCVAP) of 59.4%. Id. District 2 under the 2013 Plan had the 

highest non-Hispanic white (“white” or “Anglo”) population of the five districts, at 34.5% white 

voting-age population (WVAP) and 38.1% white citizen voting-age population (WCVAP). Id.

Also at the November 18 meeting, De Grandy explained the VRA’s applicability to Miami 

and that “we can consider race as one of several factors that we will be conscious of in crafting a 

plan.” Tr. 1 6:23. De Grandy warned, however, that under the Supreme Court’s racial 

gerrymandering jurisprudence, race “cannot be the overriding factor.” Tr. 1 7:6. Re Commission 

consistently ignored De Grandy’s warning as the process unfolded.

Re Commission gave De Grandy four ranked directives for map-drafting: (1) achieve 

substantial equality of population between districts, rather than precise mathematical equality; (2)

“maintain the core constituencies of the districts;” (3) apart from what the VRA required, “the 

minority voters must be politically cohesive;” and (4) avoid splitting traditional communities and 

neighborhoods when feasible. Tr. 1 4:5–11, 17:19–20, 18:15–22, 19:22–23, 33:4–11, 35:21, 36:1–

11. The first directive “is part of the redistricting background.” ALBC I, 575 U.S. at 272. As to the 

second directive, the Commission made it clear throughout the process that it sought to maintain 

existing districts to carry the 2013 Plan’s existing racial divisions forward, and to exacerbate them 

through further changes. With respect to the third directive, the phrase “political cohesion” was 

subsequently used throughout the process as a shorthand for keeping racially homogenous areas 

2020 Census and come from the Abott Report or the Commission record. Citizen voting-age 

population (CVAP) figures are from the Census Bureau’s 2019 American Community 

Survey (ACS), as cited in the Abott Report. Voter registration figures come from the County

Elections Department (ECF 24-92; 24-93) or the Expert Report of Dr. Bryant Moy (ECF 24-32).

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together. See, e.g., Tr. 1 28:20–21 (Carollo: “minority voters will be politically cohesive within 

these districts”); Tr. 3 9:7–8 (De Grandy: “this area has a high percentage of Hispanics and greater 

voter cohesion with D1 residents”), 10:7–8 (“we tried to find adjacent areas with similar 

demographics in order to maintain voter cohesion”); Tr. 4A 8:3–4 (same), 7:6–7 (“we felt this 

movement was needed because Hispanics in this area constitute roughly 70% of the population. 

Thus, they have greater voter cohesion”); Tr. 6 67:1 (Carollo discussing District 3 going into West 

Brickell as “not cohesive anymore” because the racial demographics change). The Commission 

abandoned the fourth-ranked directive whenever it got in the way of its race-based goals, splitting 

communities across the city as a result.

Also at the November 18 meeting, Carollo recounted why districts were instituted when he 

was mayor: “the original idea” was “that minority voters will be politically cohesive within these 

districts,” Tr. 1 28:19–21, “to assure that there would be an African American sitting in this 

Commission and there would be an Anglo,” and “to make sure that there were three Hispanic 

districts,” Tr. 1 28:7–10. And he explained that during the 2022 redistricting, each district would 

have to change to carry forward that “original idea.” Tr. 1 28:15–29:3.

Re Commission next met on December 9, 2021, with De Grandy recapping his instructions 

and commissioners discussing what areas might be moved between districts. See generally Tr. 2. 

Some of the key elements of the Enacted Plan’s racial gerrymander originated at this meeting, 

including the idea to remove parts of Coconut Grove7 from District 2 to maintain the plan’s racial 

7 “Coconut Grove” refers to the area encompassing Neighborhood Conservation Districts 

(NCDs) 2 and 3, bounded by US 1, the Rickenbacker Causeway, Biscayne Bay, and the City limits.

CITY OF MIAMI, bit.ly/40EMhT1; see also Tr. 5A 45:11–12. Re “West Grove” largely overlaps 

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balance and avoid “jeopardiz[ing] the ethnic integrity of [the] districts,” and to redraw District 5 

to minimize reductions to its Black population. Tr. 2 9:4–10:10, 13:15–22. De Grandy also 

reiterated the Commission’s four directives at this meeting and confirmed that drawing compact 

districts should not be a consideration since that would jeopardize the Commission’s racial goals.

Tr. 2 28:23–29:20. Further, the Commission could not reach a consensus on using major manmade 

and natural boundaries as a factor. Tr. 2 18:23–19:21. De Grandy agreed to take the Commission’s 

directives, meet individually with each commissioner, and develop a draft plan. Tr. 2 33:18–35:14.

On February 7, 2022, De Grandy returned with his draft plan (the “Feb. 7 Draft”). Tr. 3 

5:16–12:11; ECF 24-4 at 40; ECF 24-84. Walking through each draft district’s racial 

demographics, De Grandy noted the many race-based decisions he made in developing them. Tr. 

3 7:5–13, 8:4–12:11. Commissioners debated the draft, focusing especially on the decision to move 

part of the historically Black West Grove neighborhood from District 2 into District 4, extending 

District 4 across US Route 1. Ris proposal prompted intense public criticism from Miamians who 

objected to dividing a cohesive neighborhood and excising it from District 2. See, e.g., Tr. 3 25:9–

26:7, 30:12–31:14. De Grandy defended the choice in racialized terms, Tr. 3 41:23–42:11, 42:21–

43:6, and the Commission voted 4-1 to direct De Grandy to consider going south of US 1 into 

District 2 to “obtain voter consistency” and balance population. Tr. 3. 95:15–16, 99:9–20.

De Grandy shared a new draft on February 22, 2022 (the “Feb. 22 Draft” or “Base Plan”)

and presented it at the February 25 meeting. ECF 24-7 at 32; ECF 24-8 at 15; ECF 24-85. Ris

map incorporated certain feedback shared in earlier Commission meetings, and during private 

meetings De Grandy had with individual commissioners. Tr. 4A 4:5–10:2. Except for three 

with NCD-2 and refers to the area of Coconut Grove bounded by US 1, McDonald Street, and 

Franklin Avenue, west to the City limits. See Tr. 5A 45:14–16.

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unpopulated census blocks later moved from District 1 to District 5, the Feb. 22 Draft became the 

Enacted Plan. Tr. 6 7:12–14, 86:17–18. Public comment again centered on objections to splitting 

Coconut Grove, including the continued division of the West Grove. See, e.g., Tr. 3 24:17–25:7, 

25:9–26:7, 30:12–31:14. Russell sketched out his suggestion for the District 2 border at this 

meeting, which kept all of Coconut Grove in District 2. Tr. 4B 12:7–14:21; ECF 24-86. Re 

Commission voted 4-1 to make the Feb. 22 Draft the “Base Plan” for future changes. Tr. 4B 37:6–

11, 39:2, 42:9–23.

On March 11, 2022, the Commission discussed two suggested changes to the Base Plan: 

an unrealized suggestion of King’s—whose racial impacts De Grandy noted—and the “Initial 

Russell Plan,” which sought to unify Coconut Grove. See generally Tr. 5A; Tr. 5B; ECF 24-8 at 

3–4; ECF 24-9. De Grandy also addressed “allegations of racism” in the Base Plan and defended 

the map with race-based logic. Tr. 5A 37:18–40:16, 47:20–23; ECF 24-8 at 6–13. Russell and 

members of the public disagreed with De Grandy by explaining all the race-neutral reasons why 

Coconut Grove should be unified in one district. See, e.g., Tr. 5A 45:18–46:1, 47:1–8, 64:13–65:9. 

Re meeting closed with the commissioners directing De Grandy to meet with them individually

and craft different options accommodating each commissioner’s wishes. Tr. 5B 40:5–22.

Re Commission reconvened for its final meeting on March 24, 2022, with De Grandy 

presenting the options each commissioner directed him to develop. Tr. 6 5:14–8:19. King proposed 

a small, unpopulated change between Districts 1 and 5; Díaz de la Portilla suggested moving one 

condo tower from District 1 into District 5; Russell proposed the “Revised Russell Plan,” which 

made changes to Districts 2, 3, and 4 to keep Coconut Grove whole; and Reyes had his own plan

(the “Reyes Plan”) which altered those same three districts to remove a portion of Coconut Grove 

from District 4. Id.; ECF 24-10 at 5–11. Re Commission debated and eventually adopted the Base 

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Plan with King’s small change on a 3-2 vote. Tr. 6 86:15–18, 89:20–22.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Preliminary Injunction

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed 

on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 

[3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Re third and fourth factors “merge when 

the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Plaintiffs bear

the burden of persuasion on each factor, and each is required for preliminary relief. Id.

At the preliminary-injunction stage, courts “may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials 

which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is ‘appropriate 

given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.’” 828 Mgmt., LLC v. Broward 

Cnty., 508 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1193 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l

Trading, 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995)).

II. Racial Gerrymandering

Racial gerrymandering claims involve “a two-step analysis.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291. 

First, plaintiffs must prove that “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s 

decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district,” and “that 

the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial 

considerations,” Bethune-Hill I, 580 U.S. at 187 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916). But they need 

not show actual conflict between district design and those principles: “Race may predominate even 

when a reapportionment plan respects traditional principles.” Id. at 189. To meet their burden, 

plaintiffs may rely on “‘direct evidence’ of legislative intent, ‘circumstantial evidence of a district’s 

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shape and demographics,’ or a mix of both.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 

916). Alternative district configurations that satisfy non-racial criteria can also be probative of 

racial predominance. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 249 (2001). Re use of race “remains 

suspect even if race is meant to function as a proxy for other (including political) characteristics.” 

Cooper, 581 U.S. at 308 n.7.

“Second, if racial considerations predominated over others, the design of the district must 

withstand strict scrutiny. Re burden shifts to the State to prove that its race-based sorting of voters 

serves a ‘compelling interest’ and is ‘narrowly tailored’ to that end.” Id. at 292. While courts 

assume VRA compliance is a compelling interest, “to meet the ‘narrow tailoring’ requirement,” 

the State must prove it “had ‘a strong basis in evidence’ for concluding that the [VRA] required 

its action.” Id. (quoting ALBC I, 575 U.S. at 278). Ris requires a “functional analysis of the 

electoral behavior within the particular . . . district.” Bethune-Hill I, 580 U.S. at 194.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs Are Substantially Likely to Prevail on the Merits

At the outset, there can be no doubt that Plaintiffs have standing to bring these claims. 

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995), “set forth a bright-line standing rule for . . . cases 

alleging illegal racial gerrymandering with respect to voting districts: if the plaintiff lives in the 

racially gerrymandered district, she has standing.” Dillard v. Baldwin Cnty. Comm’rs, 225 F.3d 

1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000). Individual Plaintiffs have standing because they live in Districts 2, 3, 

4, and 5. ECF 24-37 to 24-41. Organizational Plaintiffs have associational standing because they 

have members who live in all five districts and voting rights are germane to the organizations’

purposes. ECF 24-33 to 24-36; Jacksonville Branch of NAACP v. City of Jacksonville (Jacksonville

I), No. 3:22-cv-493, 2022 WL 7089087, at *29 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2022) (finding individuals and 

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organizations have standing on preliminary injunction), stay denied, No. 22-13544, 2022 WL 

16754389 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2022) (per curiam); Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1537 & 

n.11 (N.D. Fla. 1995). Plaintiffs have certainly shown a substantial likelihood as to their standing.

A. Race Predominated in the Drawing of the Enacted Districts

Plaintiffs are likely to prevail because there is overwhelming “‘direct evidence’ of 

legislative intent,” and ample “circumstantial evidence of [the] district[s’] shape[s] and 

demographics” reveals racial predominance. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291. 

1. Direct Evidence of Legislative Intent

Re legislative record is replete with direct evidence of the Commission’s predominant 

racial intent. Re Commission’s explicit, overriding goal was to separate Anglo from Black from 

Hispanic voters into separate districts as much as possible, with the aim to have commissioners of 

particular races and ethnic backgrounds elected. Carollo set the stage from the start: “[T]he original 

idea” of districts was “that minority voters would be politically cohesive within these districts,” so 

that “there would be an African American sitting in this Commission and there would be an 

Anglo,” and “that there were three Hispanic districts.” Tr. 1 28:19–21, 28:7–10. In the 2022 

process, Carollo went on, each district would have to change to carry forward that “original idea.” 

Tr. 1 28:15–19, 28:21–29:1. Ris objective drove the Commission’s entire redistricting process 

and formed the core of every mapmaking decision: separating Miamians, as much as possible, by 

race. See, e.g., Tr. 1 13:13–14 (Carollo urging mapmaking “in a way that the balance is not really 

shifted” after De Grandy and Díaz de la Portilla discussed racial demographics); Tr. 3 51:10–14 

(Carollo: districts were established “to assure” a particular racial composition), 100:13–17 

(Carollo’s “goals:” “to have guaranteed Anglo representation, and to have three districts that were 

Hispanic”); Tr. 5B 8:14–16 (Díaz de la Portilla); Tr. 4B 22:14–15 (Reyes: “Yes, we are 

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gerrymandering to preserve those seats”); Tr. 6 68:14–17 (Carollo: “I do not want to change the 

District 3 voting patterns, the types of people that are there with different people. I don’t want to 

do that to District 4, nor to District 1. Just like I want to be able to leave District 2 where it could 

still elect a guy like you [Russell] . . . . District 5 [] will be a majority-African American district.”).

Re Commission carried out this policy in three specific ways. First, the Commission 

created an “Anglo-access district” in District 2. Second, the Commission “purposefully established 

a racial target” of 50% Black voting-age population (BVAP) for District 5. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 

299. ,ird, the Commission packed Hispanic residents into Districts 1, 3, and 4 as much as 

possible. In so doing, the Commission explicitly “subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 

principles . . . to racial considerations”—splitting neighborhoods, ignoring compactness, and 

straying from major manmade and natural boundaries to draw districts almost solely based on race. 

Bethune-Hill I, 580 U.S. at 187 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916). “Race was the criterion that, in 

the [Commission’s] view, could not be compromised,” with every proposal viewed through the 

lens of racial targets. Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996).

a. Creating an “Anglo-Access District” in District 2

Rroughout the process, the Commission acknowledged that District 2 was historically 

drawn to elect an Anglo commissioner and sought to maintain it as such. Originally, Carollo

explained, District 2 “was gerrymandered but it was a legal gerrymander so that you would have 

an Anglo elected commissioner.” Tr. 3 51:18–19. Rat remained his goal—a goal others shared.

Tr. 6 at 56:16–18 (Carollo: “We’re gonna have to keep one district that you can get an Anglo, 

whether they’re an Anglo that’s Japanese or an Anglo that’s Russian, Ukrainian, Italian, Polish, 

English, French, they can get elected.”), 68:15–16 (Carollo: “I want to be able to leave District 2 

where it could still elect a guy like you [Russell], if they want to.”), 39:9–11 (Reyes: “What we 

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want to achieve now is” that “the probabilities of electing an Anglo . . . are great”); Tr. 3 68:7–9 

(Reyes asking De Grandy if the Feb. 7 Draft is “the best you can do to protect . . . the Anglo seat”); 

Tr. 4B 19:21–20:4 (Reyes confirming with De Grandy that “the so-called Anglo district will . . . 

stand the test of time” and “the probability of electing . . . an Anglo” is “very probable”); Tr. 5B 

8:14–16 (Díaz de la Portilla: “Our goal here is to have . . . a white district”). Re Commission 

succeeded in its race-based goal: De Grandy confirmed that District 2 had a high probability of 

electing an Anglo commissioner. Tr. 4B 20:11–12. It has the highest Anglo population of the five 

districts, at 37.4% WVAP, 41.5% WCVAP, and 43.4% white voter registration—higher even than 

under the 2013 Plan. Abott Rep. 23; Supervisor of Elections, District Demographic Analysis at 34,

https://bit.ly/3HU5iIi (Feb. 1, 2023); Supervisor of Elections, District Demographic Analysis at 

32, https://bit.ly/3HQgiGD (Feb. 1, 2022).

b. Maintaining an Arbitrary BVAP Quota for District 5

At the beginning of this 2020 redistricting cycle, District 5 under the 2013 Plan was 52.9% 

BVAP, 59.4% BCVAP, and 56.9% Black by voter registration, but needed to add population. 

Abott Rep. 23; ECF 24-92 at 35. Re Commission’s overriding goal was to keep the Black 

population as high as possible by “purposefully establish[ing] a racial target: African-Americans 

should make up no less than a majority of the voting-age population.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 299.

From the outset, De Grandy and the Commission were sensitive to maintaining District 5’s Black 

share, with a particular reluctance to change significantly the District 2/5 boundary lest that 

decrease District 5’s Black population. See, e.g., Tr. 1 23:6–10.

In De Grandy’s initial Feb. 7 Draft, District 5 was 51.7% Black by total population (BPOP), 

49.8% BVAP, and 58.7% BCVAP. Tr. 3 8:17; Abott Rep. 23. De Grandy explained he deliberately 

underpopulated District 5, “because bringing in additional population from most any side of the 

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district might reduce the African American population percentage.” Tr. 3 8:13–15. He set the 

boundary “wall” between Districts 2 and 5, explaining “we could not move further east without 

affecting the African American population’s ability to elect a candidate of its choice in D5.” Tr. 3 

9:19–20.

8 In exchange for moving the “wall” east into less-Black areas of Downtown and 

Edgewater, De Grandy “rebalance[d] the ethnic and racial population” by removing 

“overwhelmingly Hispanic” areas along the Miami River from District 5 and moving them into

District 1. Tr. 3 43:1–3; 11:17–20; ECF 24-84 at 3.

Re Commission reacted to De Grandy’s Feb. 7 Draft—and its District 5 with a BVAP 

under 50%—with skepticism. Tr. 3 68:7–8 (Reyes: “is this the best you can do to protect the 

African American seat?”), 71:22–23 (King likewise “concerned . . . that District 5 is 51% African 

American.” De Grandy interpreted this and other feedback as a “directive” to “increase[] D5’s 

Black voting age population above 50%,” which he did in his Feb. 22 Draft, “by reconfiguring

areas around the boundaries” of the district. Tr. 4A 7:1–2, 9:15, 9:17, 5:13–15; ECF 24-85 at 7; cf. 

Cooper, 581 U.S. at 299–300 (elected officials “were not coy in expressing that goal,” an 

“objective [that] was communicated in no uncertain terms to [their] consultant”). De Grandy again

deliberately underpopulated District 5 to increase its Black share. Tr. 4A 6:15–16. Maintaining the

minimum-50% BVAP quota remained a priority through all the redistricting meeting. See, e.g., 

Tr. 5A 37:5–9 (De Grandy explaining King proposal would “lower the Black VAP to 49%, but 

this could be remedied by making additional changes to . . . increase D5’s Black voting age 

population”); ECF 24-8 at 4 (describing same proposal as a “deficiency”); Tr. 6 8:7–9 (De Grandy

8 As De Grandy explained, this caused him to turn to District 2’s southern end to equalize 

its population, resulting in moving areas of District 2 into Districts 3 and 4 in Coconut Grove. Tr. 

3 9:20–21. Adherence to a Black population target also impacted District 1. Tr. 6 70:21.

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“recommend[ing] additional tweaks to the plan to bring the Black voting age population back 

above 50%”), 56:12–16 (Carollo: “Re only reason [King] doesn’t take the rest [of Downtown] is 

. . . we have to keep one district that is going to have a majority of African Americans.”), 64:23–

65:2 (De Grandy: “I cannot put one more resident into Commissioner King’s district. . . . [G]oing 

further east would dilute the Black majority.”), 68:16–17 (Carollo: “In District 5, that will be a 

majority-African American district.”), 70:21 (Díaz de la Portilla: “I can’t go north, because if I go 

north I jeopardize the African American seat.”). Re Commission hit its target: District 5 in the 

Enacted Plan has a BVAP of 50.3%. Abott Rep. 23.

c. Packing Hispanic Residents into Districts 1, 3, and 4

Race likewise predominated in the drawing of Districts 1, 3, and 4. Re Commission’s 

overriding goal for these districts was to make their Hispanic populations as high as possible, 

thereby artificially stripping Hispanic residents from Districts 2 and 5 and diminishing their 

influence in those two districts. Carollo set the tone before any maps were drafted: “My main 

interest in my district and [Districts 1 and 4] is that I’m sure that we’re going to keep the balance 

of the Hispanic population where we’re going to be getting Hispanics elected there.” Tr. 2 23:4–

7. Rat goal pervaded the Commission’s attitude toward these three districts. See, e.g., Tr. 2 14:8–

9 (Carollo discussing relative “purity” of Hispanic percentages in the three districts); Tr. 3 103:18–

21 (Carollo expressing desire to “keep the same type of last names, faces” in the districts), 107:13–

14 (Reyes agreeing to “working out in a way that we can make it as Hispanic as you can”); Tr. 6 

56:19–20 (Carollo: “we have to keep three districts that are going to be majority-Hispanic”), 

70:22–71:2 (Díaz de la Portilla expressing same views).

1. District 1/5 Border

As outlined below, the District 1/5 border was drawn along racial lines, to put Hispanic 

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residents in District 1 and strip them from District 5. Simultaneously, the border packed Black 

residents into District 5 and stripped them from District 1. District 1, which under the 2013 Plan 

was underpopulated by about 7,000 residents, Abott Rep. 23, gained all its new population from 

District 5. Rather than, for example, pairing communities of interest with shared values and needs, 

from the outset, discussions of where District 1 could gain population focused almost exclusively

on race, with Carollo highlighting both Wynwood and the north side of the Miami River as 

“logical” and “attractive” because they are “mainly Hispanic.” Tr. 2 3:12–17. Díaz de la Portilla 

reflected how he “really can’t go north” to gain population in Allapattah or Liberty City, because 

“[i]t’s an African American area.” Tr. 2 4:19–20. Carollo noted there might be an area by 36th 

Street (District 1’s northern border under the 2013 Plan) that District 1 might add, depending on 

how Hispanic the area was. Tr. 2 5:6–8. Díaz de la Portilla agreed the line might extend north to 

40th Street, but not past State Road 112, because “north of 112 we are entering into African 

American neighborhoods—and we can’t touch that area.” Tr. 2 5:14–19.

De Grandy’s Feb. 7 Draft added to District 1 the riverside areas Carollo suggested. ECF

24-84 at 4. De Grandy explained he did so “because this area has a high percentage of Hispanics 

and greater voter cohesion with D1 residents.” Tr. 3 9:7–8. Re Base Plan moved a small portion 

of that riverside area around the Miami Riverside Center back into District 5. In exchange, the plan 

moved another eight city blocks into District 1. ECF 24-85 at 4. De Grandy explained, “[a]gain, 

we felt this movement was needed because Hispanics in this area constitute roughly 70% of the 

population. Rus, they have greater voter cohesion” with the rest of District 1. Tr. 4A 7:6–8.

Besides the changes Downtown, the Enacted Plan also moved territory between Districts 

1 and 5 in Allapattah. ECF 24-85 at 5. Rese areas were moved to increase District 1’s Hispanic

share, decrease its Black share, and do the opposite for District 5. See, e.g., Tr. 4A 6:23–7:2.

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2. District 2/3 Border

Re Commission also drew the District 2/3 border along racial lines, to pack Hispanic 

residents into District 3 and strip them from District 2. Díaz de la Portilla first suggested moving 

areas “where Hispanic voters live” from District 2 and into Districts 3 and 4 at the second 

redistricting meeting, mentioning Coconut Grove and Bay Heights specifically. Tr. 2 7:16–17. De 

Grandy incorporated this suggestion into his Feb. 7 Draft (ECF 24-84 at 5), moving portions of 

District 2 into District 3, stretching from SW 15th Road in the north to SW 17th Avenue in the 

south, over to South Miami Avenue. Tr. 3 9:21–23. After Russell questioned why De Grandy 

moved this area from District 2 rather than parts of Brickell/Downtown further north, De Grandy 

said he did so “because the demographics were dissimilar” further north. Tr. 3 90:10.

Walking through the Base Plan (ECF 24-85 at 6), De Grandy reiterated he “did not feel it 

was appropriate to move east” into Brickell “because of dissimilar demographics.” Tr. 4A 7:22–

23; Tr. 5B 36:17–37:2 (De Grandy explaining he didn’t move parts of Brickell into District 3 

because its Hispanic population was “in the 40’s, whereas District 3 is in the 80’s”); Tr. 6 75:11–

13 (reiterating same point). Commissioners supported this reasoning, which compelled District 3 

to pick up part of Coconut Grove instead. Tr. 4A 7:6–8 (Carollo); Tr. 4B 41:13–19 (Carollo: 

“throw[ing] District 3 into Brickell” is “truly going to change the whole component of one district” 

with “a domino effect” for other districts’ demographic compositions), 9:15–17 (Díaz de la Portilla

agreeing that the Grove is “the only place to go” to remove population from District 2).

Re Commission’s rejection of alternatives for the 2/3 border further demonstrate its racebased decision-making. See Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama (ALBC II), 231 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 

1391 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (rejected alternative plans constitute evidence of racial predominance). Re 

Initial Russell Plan (ECF 24-87) proposed extending District 3’s eastern boundary one block east 

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to South Miami Avenue, to allow all of Coconut Grove to be united in District 2. ECF 24-9 at 3.

Even though De Grandy advised the proposal complied with the VRA, Tr. 5A 52:12–13, that was 

not enough for the rest of the commissioners, who objected to moving a less-Hispanic area into 

District 3. Tr. 5B 32:11–13 (Reyes: “I don’t agree with it because [] there is a lot of Anglos in that 

area”), 32:10 (Díaz de la Portilla).

Re Revised Russell Plan (ECF 24-88) again united Coconut Grove in District 2 while 

moving even less of the Brickell area into District 3. Re area moved—44.6% HVAP, 39% 

WVAP—would have decreased District 3’s HVAP. Abott Rep. 24, 29. De Grandy again advised 

that the proposal complied with the VRA, Tr. 6 at 8:6–7, and it met the criteria the Commission 

originally adopted, Tr. 6 at 61:10–62:8, but the Commission rejected it because it decreased 

District 3’s Hispanic population. Tr. 6 at 64:10–13, 74:2–10 (Reyes explaining why he rejected 

Russell plans), 70:15–18, 71:7–16, 72:1–3 (Díaz de la Portilla).

Re Reyes Plan (ECF 24-89) made even smaller changes to the 2/3 border, restoring the 

West Grove sliver to District 2 while moving a bare-HVAP-majority area from District 2 into 3 

(51% HVAP). Tr. 6 at 77:6–7; Abott Rep. 29. Even though De Grandy advised the Reyes Plan 

complied with the VRA, Tr. 6 at 8:6–7, the Commission rejected it for the same reasons as 

Russell’s proposals. Tr. 6 at 66:14–18, 67:1–5, 68:13–15, 70:13. De Grandy summed up the 

perceived benefit of his District 3 versus Russell’s or Reyes’ proposals: “Is it [a] stronger Hispanic 

district under the base plan, absolutely.” Tr. 6 75:21; see also Tr. 6 at 78:3–18.

Under the Revised Russell Plan, District 3 was 86.6% HVAP and 84.8% HCVAP. Abott

Rep. 24. Under the Reyes Plan, it was 87.3% HVAP and 86.0% HCVAP. Id. In the Base Plan and 

Enacted Plan, it is 88.3% HVAP and 86.9% HCVAP. Id. at 23.

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3. District 2/4 Border

Re Commission also drew the line between Districts 2 and 4 to pack Hispanic residents 

into the majority-Hispanic district and strip them from the “Anglo-access” district. Ris border was 

shaped by two major decisions: (1) moving a supermajority-Hispanic area of Golden Pines north 

of US 1 around Douglas Park into District 4, and (2) moving areas south of US 1 in Coconut Grove

(ECF 24-85 at 6). Both originated in the very first redistricting meetings. Díaz de la Portilla and 

Carollo discussed the “very Hispanic area” around Douglas Park in District 2 as one that “probably 

doesn’t belong there” because it has “more commonalities” in terms of “political cohesion” with 

District 4 than the rest of District 2. Tr. 1 24:1–4, 24:14–16; Tr. 2 19:22–20:2. Ris area, which is

81.8% HVAP, was moved into District 4 in all drafts the Commission considered. Abott Rep. 25.

Re second area moved into District 4, a piece of Coconut Grove, followed Díaz de la 

Portilla’s early suggestion to move areas “where the Hispanic voters live” given the “ethnic 

diversity in Coconut Grove.” Tr. 2 7:16–17. Re area moved is a 59.2%-HVAP triangle bounded 

by US 1, Day Avenue, and SW 27th Avenue. Abott Rep. 26. Rat triangle was not as Hispanic as 

the rest of District 4, but because the Commission considered District 4 to be the “purest” Hispanic 

district already, it was acceptable for it to add “only” “a slice, sliver” of less-Hispanic “bone.” Tr. 

2 14:5–6; Tr. 3 103:18, 104:4–7. Eventually, Reyes begrudgingly accepted adding part of Coconut 

Grove because he thought it was needed to maintain District 5’s racial balance. Tr. 5A 50:13–14.

Rejected proposals for District 4 clarify the Commission’s intent to “balance” its Hispanic 

population. On February 7, De Grandy proposed giving District 4 a chunk of the North Grove 

between 22nd and 27th Avenues. Tr. 3 101:11–14, 102:2–3. To convince Reyes to take this 55%

WVAP area, Carollo reminded him he has “the most Hispanic” and “Cuban district,” and that the 

Feb. 7 Draft already gave him “a huge Hispanic area on the other side of US 1”—the Douglas Park

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area. Tr. 3 102:10–12, 103:11–12, 105:2–3; Abott Rep. 28; see also Tr. 3 103:16 (Reyes

welcoming the Douglas Park area: “I’ll take it.”). Comparing that 82% HVAP Douglas Park 

addition to his 55% WVAP North Grove proposal, Carollo explained Reyes cannot be “getting all 

the sirloin but none of the bone.” Tr. 3 103:18. In the end, the Hispanic-rich “sirloin” was moved 

into the packed Hispanic-majority District 4, while most of the majority-white “bone” remained 

in District 2. District 4 in the Enacted Plan is 89.5% HVAP and 88.2% HCVAP. Abott Rep. 23.

4. Internal Borders of Districts 1, 3, and 4

Re borders that Districts 1, 3, and 4 share were also drawn to facilitate the Enacted Plan’s 

packing of Hispanic voters into these districts and, more generally, to accomplish the tripartite 

racial separation throughout the map. ECF 24-85 at 7. Re Commission treated Hispanic voters on 

the borders of these districts as fungible because these areas are all predominantly Hispanic. See, 

e.g., Tr. 1 33:14–16 (Díaz de la Portilla explaining it did not matter whether Flagami was in District 

1 or 4 because those residents “will elect the same kind of representative”). As commissioners

recounted multiple times, Hispanic neighborhoods like Flagami and Little Havana were split 

between Districts 1, 3, and 4 to effectuate the policy of maximum racial separation. See, e.g., Tr. 

3 52:5–53:2 (Carollo); Tr. 6 39:2–12 (Reyes), 79:19–20 (Díaz de la Portilla); infra pp. 24–25.

De Grandy followed the Commission’s direction in his Feb. 7 Draft, shifting parts of Little 

Havana between Districts 3 and 4 because they were “adjacent areas with similar demographics.” 

Tr. 3 10:7–8. Workshopping that map and following his comments about District 4 not keeping all 

the “sirloin,” Carollo suggested moving into District 3 a different portion of Little Havana, between 

SW 27th and 32nd Avenues. Tr. 3 104:21–23; 2/7/22 video, https://youtu.be/foXmqENNpRY, at

4:30:25–:50. When Reyes objected, Carollo explained why it was necessary to add that territory 

to District 3: “you’re getting more than two squares here,” referring to the Douglas Park area, “in 

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prime Hispanic area, and you’re diluting the Hispanic vote.” Tr. 3 105:1–3; 2/7/22 video,

https://youtu.be/foXmqENNpRY, at 4:30:50–:58. “Rere has to be a balance,” Carollo continued, 

and in exchange for getting “a huge chunk of rich Hispanic voters” around Douglas Park, District 

4 needed to balance its Hispanic population out with District 3. Tr. 3 106:3–23. Reyes agreed to 

“working out in a way that we can make it as Hispanic as you can.” Tr. 3 107:13–14. Re area 

Carollo wanted to move into District 3 was indeed moved in the Enacted Plan. De Grandy 

explained the change: “we tried to find adjacent areas with similar demographics in order to 

maintain voter cohesion.” Tr. 4A 8:3–4. Re area is 96.2% HVAP. Abott Rep. 27.

d. ,e Commission Explicitly and Consistently Subordinated Traditional 

Redistricting Criteria to Race

Rroughout the map, the Commission “subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 

principles . . . to racial considerations.” Bethune-Hill I, 580 U.S. at 187 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. 

at 916). Because “[i]n general, legislatures that engage in impermissible race-based redistricting 

will find it necessary to depart from traditional principles in order to do so,” it is unsurprising that 

evidence of this subordination is manifold. Id. at 190.

1. Neighborhoods

Respecting traditional communities like neighborhoods is not just a judicially

acknowledged traditional principle, ALBC I, 575 U.S. at 272, but also a criterion the Commission 

itself adopted. Tr. 1 36:6–11. But from the start, the Commission wanted to split certain 

neighborhoods to pack and crack voters based on their race. Cf. Covington v. North Carolina, 316 

F.R.D. 117, 145, 160 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (splitting of neighborhoods “strongly suggests” racial 

predominance), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections (BethuneHill II), 326 F.Supp.3d 128, 148 (E.D. Va. 2018) (split subdivisions indicate racial predominance). 

Díaz de la Portilla noted that some neighborhoods like Flagami could be divided between districts 

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if they “will elect the same kind of representative.” Tr. 1 33:14–16. But putting part of

(predominantly Black) Overtown or Liberty City in his district was unacceptable.9 Tr. 1 33:16–17.

At the second redistricting meeting on December 9, 2021, Díaz de la Portilla suggested 

splitting another neighborhood: Coconut Grove. He proposed adding portions to both District 3 

and 4 “based on where the Hispanic voters live” to maintain the districts’ “ethnic integrity,” noting 

“there’s ethnic diversity in Coconut Grove.” Tr. 2 7:15–16, 13:15–17. Re decision to split the 

Grove stemmed also from the desire to avoid “touching the racial integrity of District 5.” Tr. 2 

13:17–18. Re District 2/5 “wall” that prevented District 5 from dropping below 50% BVAP 

compelled the Commission to remove population from overpopulated District 2’s southern end 

instead. See, e.g., Tr. 2 9:4–7; Tr. 3 42:21–43:6.

De Grandy’s Feb. 7 Draft followed the Commission’s direction, going into the Grove to 

move population from District 2 into 4. Responding to public comment opposing splitting parts of 

the historically Black West Grove, De Grandy justified his choice in racial terms. Tr. 3 41:23–

42:11 (“put[ting] into conte[x]t what we’re moving into, a majority-Hispanic district” and noting 

statistics of the area moved, indicating it is nearly majority-Hispanic). After continued public 

objection to the Base Plan splitting the West Grove, De Grandy stressed “the only allegation of 

racism results from the proposed movement of 114 Black residents who are currently represented 

by a commissioner who is not Black to a district that is represented by a commissioner who is not 

Black. . . . [Y]ou do not have to be a redistricting expert to conclude that the allegation of this plan 

is somehow racist is simply false and inflammatory.” Tr. 5A 39:17–20, 40:6–7.

Commissioners’ defenses for splitting the West Grove similarly highlighted their race9 Part of Overtown did end up in District 1—a 74.4% HVAP part. Abott Rep. 28. In contrast, 

the portion placed in District 5 is 61.0% BVAP. Id.; MIAMI CRA, https://bit.ly/3jseTOv.

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based motivations. Carollo was explicit: splitting Coconut Grove was required to keep racial 

“balance and having a balance in the Hispanic districts.” Tr. 3 54:5–9. Further, he objected to 

claims that by moving a portion of “the Black part of Coconut Grove to a district that’s Hispanic, 

this disenfranchises them”—but “leav[ing] it in an Anglo area” would be fine. Tr. 3 18:2–6. He 

pointed out that no African Americans had ever been elected to District 2, implying that, since 

District 2 was the “Anglo seat” and District 4 was a “Hispanic seat,” Black Groveites had no 

grounds to complain about being moved from one to the other. Tr. 3 18:7–11.

Remarkably, the only reasons De Grandy and the Commission majority ever gave for 

splitting Coconut Grove and moving portions into Districts 3 and 4 were race-based. In contrast, 

members of the public, including Plaintiffs, repeatedly implored the Commission to consider the 

numerous race-neutral reasons for keeping the neighborhood together in District 2, and the ways 

in which Coconut Grove constituted a “communit[y] defined by actual shared interests” rather than 

by race. ALBC I, 575 U.S. at 272 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916); see, e.g., Tr. 3 24:17–26:7, 

30:12–31:14; Tr. 4A 13:23–14:13, 16:10–20, 27:19–28:18; Tr. 5A 63:17–64:3, 64:13–65:9, 71:6–

18, 77:23–78:14, 80:9–81:4; Tr. 6 22:13–23. Russell made similar appeals. Tr. 4B 18:20–19:2

(citing area’s distinctive interests); Tr. 5A 45:18–46:1 (“they’re looking for not a Black 

commissioner, but they’re looking for someone to solve those issues”), 47:1–8, 48:4–6, 49:13–18 

(responding to De Grandy’s point that more Black residents were moved out of District 2 in Golden 

Pines than in the West Grove, by noting the neighborhoods’ Black residents face different issues).

Re Commission split many other neighborhoods to achieve their preferred racial divisions, 

harming these communities as a result. Little Havana straddles all three majority-Hispanic 

districts; Silver Bluff and Shenandoah (“distinct” and “historical” communities) are divided

between Districts 3 and 4; and Flagami is split between 1 and 4. Tr. 3 52:5–7, 52:8–14, 52:16–17.

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Allapattah and Overtown (“traditional communities”) cross Districts 1 and 5, with more-Hispanic 

portions going to District 1 and less-Hispanic parts going to District 5. Tr. 1 17:20–22; Tr. 3 60:16; 

Abott Rep. 28. Re Commission “cut up communities” like these to facilitate racial separation: “to 

make sure that there’s gonna be an African American . . . to make sure there’s an Anglo American” 

and “that in the rest of the districts that are majority Hispanic, that they stayed that way.” Tr. 3 

52:18–23; see also Tr. 6 38:9–16 (Carollo explaining why they split Little Havana, Shenandoah, 

Silver Bluff, Flagami), 38:23–39:20 (Reyes agreeing that splitting “real established communities” 

“has to be done in order to keep diversity”), 79:19–20 (Díaz de la Portilla: Carollo “broke up 

Hispanic neighborhood after Hispanic neighborhood cause he had to for the greater good.”).

2. Compactness

Re Commission rejected directing De Grandy to draw geographically compact districts 

early in the process, subordinating this traditional criterion to race. Tr. 2 29:10–16. Díaz de la 

Portilla noted that “if you want to have an African American district and you want to have an 

Anglo district, it’s almost impossible to emphasize compactness,” so it’s “a foregone conclusion” 

that districts would not be compact. Tr. 2 28:23–29:3. De Grandy concurred. Tr. 2 29:2–6. Re 

districts are indeed visibly non-compact, featuring “irregular contours,” “bizarre designs,” and 

“unnecessary appendage[s].” Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 939; In re Senate Joint Resol. 1176, 83 So. 3d 

597, 634 (Fla. 2012); see ECF 24-1 at 6–10. District 3 gains an irregular appendage south of US 1 

into Coconut Grove, to pick up a more ethnically diverse, Hispanic area. Tr. 2 7:16–17. District 2 

features a bizarre spur in Downtown, scooping out six less-Black city blocks from District 5. Abott 

Rep. 28. District 1 snakes along the north side of the Miami River to Flagler Street, an appendage 

designed to move more-Hispanic areas into District 1 from District 5. Id. at 27; Tr. 3 9:5–8; Tr. 

4A 7:3–8. Districts 1 and 4 feature long tails stretching west to divide Flagami for racial purposes. 

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Tr. 6 38:9–15, 39:3–12. “[N]o matter how many ways one might try to describe the shape of [these 

districts], the word compact would not apply, elongated, or sprawling, perhaps—but certainly not 

‘compact.’” Jacksonville I, 2022 WL 7089087, at *37; accord Tr. 2 18:9–11 (Reyes stating only 

one district is compact), 18:4–5 (Russell: District 2 “the least compact as a district”), 2:10–11 (De 

Grandy: “Compactness, quite frankly, in this plan would be extremely difficult to achieve.”), 17:20 

(“Compactness, again, I don’t think compactness is a feasible alternative.”), 18:7–8 (“I mean look 

at the districts the way they are drawn, they are not compact.”), 29:2–6 (“[Y]our plan is not really 

a plan of compact districts.”); contra ECF 24-23 (“Re districts in the adopted plan are relatively 

compact.”). Such “highly irregular and geographically non-compact” shapes are “evidence of 

racial predominance.” Bethune-Hill II, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 141 (quoting Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 905–

06); see also ALBC II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 1252–53 (non-compactness probative of racial intent).

3. Respecting Major Manmade and Natural Boundaries

Drawing districts to respect major manmade and natural boundaries is another traditional 

redistricting principle the Commission subordinated to race. See In re SJR 1176, 83 So. 3d at 618, 

636–38 (explaining this criterion as embodied in the Florida Constitution). De Grandy suggested 

the Commission consider using such boundaries as a factor, but there was no consensus to ratify 

it as a priority. Tr. 2 18:23–19:21. Ris debate largely focused on whether US 1 was a boundary 

that should be respected as the border of District 2, or whether Districts 3 and/or 4 should cross 

US 1 into Coconut Grove. Tr. 2 19:5–21. Ultimately, the Commission opted to cross US 1 “where 

the Hispanic voters live” to maintain Districts 3 and 4’s “ethnic integrity.” Tr. 2 7:17, 7:3.

Re Enacted Plan deviates from major geographic boundaries for racial reasons elsewhere, 

too. Re District 1/4 border in Flagami winds along two-lane residential streets. See Tr. 2 4:15–17 

(De Grandy explaining major boundaries include section-line roads as opposed to local streets).

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Re piece of Allapattah moved into District 5 is bounded by two-lane streets, rather than I-95 and 

a federal highway as in the 2013 Plan. Further south, the District 1/5 border again deviates from I95 to ensure a 61% BVAP tract stays in District 5. Abott Rep. 28. Downtown, the District 2/5

border departs from NE 2nd Avenue to scoop out an irregular, 14.2% BVAP six-block area. Id.

Re border strays from 2nd Avenue again just before the river to ensure a 5.5% BVAP tract stays 

on the District 2 side of the 2/5 “wall.” Id.; see ALBC II, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 1253, 1300 (finding 

bizarre district protrusions racially motivated); Bethune-Hill II, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 161 (same).

2. Circumstantial Evidence of Racial Predominance

In addition to the staggering direct evidence, robust “circumstantial evidence of [the] 

district[s’] shape[s] and demographics” points to racial predominance. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291.

a. Demographics of the Districts and Areas Moved

In her report, Dr. Abott examines the districts’ shapes and demographics, studies the areas 

moved between the 2013 Plan and Enacted Plan, and concludes that race explains both the overall 

shapes of the Enacted Plan’s districts, as well as the changes made from the 2013 Plan. Abott Rep.

1–2. In particular, Dr. Abott scrutinizes how the map splits precincts along racial lines to achieve 

even the most granular of racial sorting. Id. at 6–12. At every turn, district lines were carved with 

surgical precision to sort residents based on race. Dr. Abott also describes how alternative 

explanations—such as partisan gerrymandering, maintaining the existing districts’ partisan 

makeups, and keeping incumbents in their districts—cannot explain the enacted districts’ shapes 

or the areas moved from the 2013 Plan. Id. at 12–16. Further, the only discussion of incumbent 

protection during the process arose with respect to Carollo and District 3. Members of the public 

accused Carollo of wanting a property he owned in Coconut Grove moved into his District 3, so 

he could move there. ECF 24-22. But Carollo denied any such motivation—going so far as to state 

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he would support the area being moved into District 4 instead. Tr. 5A 7:9–8:4, 21:18–22:6; Tr. 6 

57:14–16; see also Tr. 6 4:21–23.

b. Rejected Alternative Configurations

Separate from the direct evidence of the Commission’s race-based reasons for rejecting 

alternative configurations, circumstantial evidence about alternative rejected configurations and 

the evolution of draft plans further illuminates the race-based decisions behind the Enacted Plan. 

Rese include several key changes between the Feb. 7 Draft and the Feb. 22 Draft/Base Plan that 

served to better separate Anglo from Black from Hispanic residents into their designated districts:

• Re Base Plan moved less of Coconut Grove into District 4. Re portion moved now had a 

higher Hispanic population—59.2% HVAP versus 49.1%. Abott Rep. 25–26.

• A 76.6% HVAP area in Allapattah was moved into District 1 from 5, and a 66.7% HVAP 

area was moved out of District 1 into 5 in exchange. ECF 24-85 at 5. Ris swap increased

District 1’s Hispanic share while increasing District 5’s Black share. Abott Rep. 23, 26.

• District 5 gained a small, 40.4% BVAP area of Downtown from District 1. In exchange, 

District 1 gained a 72.1% HVAP area west of I-95. ECF 24-85 at 4. Ris change increased 

District 1’s Hispanic share and increased District 5’s Black share. Abott Rep. 23, 26.

• Areas were swapped along the District 2/5 “wall”: Two 13% BVAP blocks moved into 

District 2; and a 32.1% BVAP area moved into District 5. Id. at 26; ECF 24-85 at 4.

Each of these changes increased the dominant racial group’s population share in each district, 

exacerbating the racial packing and stripping already present in the Feb. 7 Draft. Indeed, the Base 

Plan managed to increase the dominant-group VAP in Districts 1, 4, and 5. Abott Rep. 23. Of the 

three majority-Hispanic districts, the HVAP of the least-Hispanic district increased. Id. Re 

average HVAP of those three districts also increased. See id.

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Rree other abandoned changes are probative as well. First, King requested restoring to 

District 5 part of the riverfront area that the Base Plan moved to District 1. Tr. 5A 37:5–6. De 

Grandy noted the request would lower District 5’s BVAP to 49% and suggested “remedying” this 

to increase the BVAP. Tr. 5A 37:6–9. After consulting with King, this change was abandoned in 

favor of moving just the unpopulated Wharf into District 5, which did not impact the district’s 

BVAP. Tr. 5B 4:21–5:7; Tr. 6 7:12–14; ECF 24-10 at 11.

Second, at the final meeting, Díaz de la Portilla suggested moving into District 5 a single 

73% HVAP city block with a total population of 510 residents—the Flagler on the River condo 

tower. Tr. 6 6:12–15. De Grandy reported this change would lower District 5’s BVAP to 49.97%—

just below the 50% target. Tr. 6 6:16–17. De Grandy acknowledged that BVAP would comply 

with the VRA, but still recommended changing the proposal to bring the BVAP above 50%. Tr. 6 

8:6–9. Re Commission rejected the proposal, making further changes unnecessary.

,ird, Carollo and De Grandy floated an alternative to moving the West Grove sliver into 

District 4: moving an area roughly between 22nd and 27th Avenues in the North Grove. Tr. 3 

101:11–14, 102:2–3; Tr. 5B 3:8–9; 3/11/22 afternoon video, https://youtu.be/SyxiRlMTqu0, at 

7:07. Ris area was even less Hispanic than the West Grove sliver—36.7% HVAP compared to 

59.2%—and De Grandy never presented this option as a fully realized map. Abott Rep. 26, 28.

Altogether, the evidence demonstrates adherence to “announced racial target[s] that 

subordinated other districting criteria and produced boundaries amplifying divisions between 

blacks[,] whites” and Hispanics. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 300–01. Facing similar evidence, the 

Supreme Court noted a factfinder “could hardly have concluded anything but” racial 

predominance. Id. at 391.

B. Le Use of Race Does Not Satisfy Strict Scrutiny

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Plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail because the City cannot prove that its unabashed 

race-based sorting of voters is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, namely to comply with 

the VRA. To survive strict scrutiny, the City must prove it “had ‘a strong basis in evidence’ for 

concluding that the [VRA] required its action.” Id. at 292 (quoting ALBC I, 575 U.S. at 278).

Re City falls far short of the requisite showing. Re Commission failed to conduct a

“functional analysis of the electoral behavior within the particular . . . election district[s]” to ensure 

Black or Hispanic candidates of choice could usually prevail. Bethune-Hill I, 580 U.S. at 194 

(citation omitted). Nor is there anything else in the record resembling “a strong showing of a preenactment analysis with justifiable conclusions.” Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2335 (2018). 

Instead, the Commission set arbitrary racial thresholds, misused key metrics of VRA compliance, 

and ignored the absence of fundamentals of VRA liability with respect to four districts. Altogether, 

the Commission lacked the “strong basis in evidence” necessary to show its use of race was 

narrowly tailored to comply with the VRA.

1. Lere Was No Strong Basis in Evidence for an “Anglo Access District”

Re Commission’s overriding goal for District 2, drawing an “Anglo access district” with 

as many Anglo voters as possible “to have guaranteed Anglo representation,” Tr. 3 100:16, lacked 

the “strong basis in evidence” required for narrow tailoring. Indeed, De Grandy advised at the very 

first meeting that “white, non-Hispanic, is not a protected class under the Voting Rights Act.” Tr. 

1 12:13–14. Re Commission ignored this advice.10

To make out a vote-dilution claim under Section 2, a racial or language minority group 

10 De Grandy was not quite correct on this point. Non-Hispanic white voters can make out 

VRA claims if they satisfy the elements for Section 2 liability. United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 

420, 433–35 (5th Cir. 2009). As explained below, Anglo voters in Miami clearly cannot do so.

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must satisfy three preconditions: (1) the minority group “is sufficiently large and geographically 

compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” (2) the minority group “is politically 

cohesive,” and (3) the “majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the 

minority’s preferred candidate.” [ornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (cleaned up). If 

the minority group satisfies the Gingles preconditions, the group must then prove that, “based on 

the totality of the circumstances,” they “have less opportunity than other members of the 

electorate.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,

425–26 (2006). Section 2 then requires the creation of a district in which minority voters have an 

equal “opportunity . . . to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). Critically, 

the protected group need not necessarily form a majority of the population in a Section 2 remedial 

district, as long as protected-group “voters otherwise have an opportunity to elect a representative 

of their choice” in the remedial district. Caster v. Merrill, No. 2:21-CV-1536-AMM, 2022 WL 

264819, at *83 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022), cert. granted before judgment sub nom. Merrill v. 

Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022); see Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 979 F.3d 1282, 1299 

(11th Cir. 2020) (affirming district court’s conclusion that “[t]he remedial plan should give[ ] 

African American voters a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of their choice”).

In areas like Miami where there are significant differences between racial groups’ 

citizenship rates, the first Gingles precondition requires a showing that it is possible to draw a 

district in which the minority group comprises a majority of the “voting age population as refined 

by citizenship.” Negron v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 1997). But it is 

impossible to draw a majority-Anglo district. Abott Rep. 21. “If a State has good reason to think 

that all the ‘Gingles preconditions’ are met, then so too it has good reason to believe that § 2 

requires drawing a majority-minority district. But if not, then not.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 302

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(citations omitted). With a majority-WCVAP district impossible, the Commission lacked good 

reasons to believe an “Anglo-access district” was necessary to comply with the VRA. Its racebased decision to draw a predominantly Anglo district, therefore, was not narrowly tailored to 

achieve a compelling interest.11 Id. at 306 (“[N]either will we approve a racial gerrymander whose 

necessity is supported by no evidence and whose raison d’être is a legal mistake.”).

2. Lere Was No Strong Basis in Evidence for Drawing Max-Hispanic Districts

Likewise, the Commission did not have a strong basis in evidence to maximize the 

Hispanic populations in Districts 1, 3, and 4. De Grandy repeatedly told the Commission that 

districts with lower Hispanic majorities than the ones eventually adopted would afford Hispanic 

voters the opportunity to elect preferred candidates. Tr. 3 at 7:6–8, 8:7–11 (Districts 1, 3, and 4 at

88.7, 88.4, and 88.0% HVAP “clearly compl[y] with the Voting Rights Act”); Tr. 5A at 52:12–13 

(Initial Russell Plan’s District 3 “would comply with the federal Voting Rights Act” at 85.2% 

HVAP); Tr. 6 at 8:6–7 (Revised Russell Plan and Reyes Plan “comply with the Constitution and 

the Voting Rights Act” with District 3 at 86.6 and 87.3% HVAP). Re Commission rejected these 

lower-HVAP proposals in favor of even larger Hispanic majorities of 89.5, 88.3, and 89.5% HVAP 

for Districts 1, 3, and 4, respectively. Abott Rep. 23.

Even more significantly, Miami is 71.1% HVAP, 66.4% HCVAP, and 58.0% Hispanic by 

voter registration. Id.; ECF 24-93 at 76. Given the City’s robust Hispanic majority, there was no 

“good reason” to believe that Hispanic voters were an effective “minority” in the City, or that the 

“majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat [Hispanic voters’] preferred 

11 Even if a majority-WCVAP district were possible, there is no factual basis, much less a 

strong showing, that in the “totality of the circumstances,” the political process is less open to 

Anglos than the Hispanic majority. See Wright, 979 F.3d at 1288–89 (factors relevant to totality).

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candidate.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46–51. To the contrary, the evidence shows that, when voting is 

racially polarized, Hispanic-preferred candidates usually prevail citywide. Moy Rep. 2, 58. “Strict 

scrutiny requires much more” than “uncritical majority-minority district maximization.” Wis. 

Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1249 (2022).

Because “proof of the Gingles threshold factors is a necessary precondition to Section 2 

relief,” Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1513 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Commission lacked 

good reasons to believe that drawing deliberately Hispanic-majority districts was necessary to 

comply with the VRA. See also Cooper, 581 U.S. at 304 (“[T]he State must carefully evaluate 

whether a plaintiff could establish the Gingles preconditions . . . .”). Its race-based decision to draw 

three districts with as large Hispanic majorities as possible, therefore, fails strict scrutiny.

3. Le Arbitrary 50% BVAP Quota for District 5

Re Commission also fell far short of strict scrutiny’s demands when it adopted an 

uninformed 50% BVAP target for District 5. Re Parties agree the VRA requires a district in which 

Black voters have an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. See, e.g., PULSE v. City of 

Miami, No. 1:96-cv-3327-JLK (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18 and Nov. 3, 1997) (granting partial summary 

judgment for Black voters in VRA case); Moy Rep. 2 (finding racially polarized voting and that 

Black voters’ choice is usually defeated). But Plaintiffs disagree that the 50% BVAP quota was 

necessary or appropriate to provide that opportunity. In fact, such an arbitrarily high target limited 

Black voters’ influence by stripping them from adjacent districts. “Determining what minority 

population percentage will” allow “members of a minority group to elect their preferred 

candidates” “is a difficult task requiring . . . a functional analysis of the electoral behavior within 

the particular election district.” Bethune-Hill I, 580 U.S. at 801 (cleaned up). “[A] strong showing 

of a pre-enactment analysis with justifiable conclusions” can satisfy strict scrutiny. Abbott, 138 S. 

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Ct. at 2335. Re Commission can make no such showing. Rather, its 50% BVAP floor was an 

“uncritical” assumption free of “other evidence or analysis.” Wis. Legislature, 142 S. Ct. at 1249.

As a threshold matter, BVAP was deficient as a metric to gauge whether Black voters in 

District 5 had an opportunity to elect preferred candidates. As discussed above, it is not a majorityBVAP district—but rather, a majority-BCVAP district—that triggers Section 2 protection. 

Negron, 113 F.3d at 1569. Because of the differing citizenship and registration rates between Black 

and other racial groups, the BVAP proportion of a given area in Miami is generally lower than 

BCVAP, Black voter registration, or Black turnout in recent elections. Abott Rep. 23; Moy Rep. 

42. Looking at BVAP therefore underestimates Black voting strength in a given district.

Dr. Moy conducted the “functional analysis of the electoral behavior within the particular 

. . . election district” to show the concentration of Black voters necessary to ensure an opportunity 

to elect their candidate of choice. Bethune-Hill I, 580 U.S. at 194 (citation omitted). Consistent 

with best practices, Dr. Moy conducted a racially polarized voting (RPV) analysis to determine 

VRA compliance. Moy Rep. 3–5. He finds RPV between Black and other voters in Miami and that 

Black voters are cohesive, confirming the second and third Gingles prongs. Id. at 2–42. Re first 

prong is satisfied by the existence of a majority-BCVAP district in the Enacted Plan. Abott Rep. 

23. But as discussed above, a Section 2 remedy district need only afford Black voters an 

opportunity to elect candidates of choice, and need not necessarily be 50% BCVAP or BVAP. Dr. 

Moy’s examination of recent elections finds that Black voters will be able to elect candidates of 

choice when the BCVAP is at least 48.8%. Moy Rep. 42, 55. So, District 5’s Black share—58.2% 

BCVAP—far exceeded what was necessary for Black voters to have the opportunity to elect their 

preferred candidates. Abott Rep. 23.

Moreover, the public implored the Commission to avoid packing Black voters into District 

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5 and even warned the Commission it risked violating the Constitution if it did not meaningfully 

assess the Black share necessary to achieve VRA compliance. See, e.g., Tr. 4A at 34:7–14; ECF 

24-28; 24-29. Even De Grandy advised sub-50% BVAPs would comply with the VRA. Tr. 3 at 

8:17–19. In other words, not only did the Commission lack “good reasons” or a “strong basis in 

evidence” to conclude the VRA required its packing of Black voters, Cooper, 581 U.S. at 292–93,

it had “good reasons” to know the opposite—that District 5’s Black share far exceeded what was 

necessary to comply with the VRA.

II. Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent an Injunction

“Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers,” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 

657, and Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if elections are held under the Enacted Plan. 

Plaintiffs will be classified, sorted, and represented in districts resembling “political apartheid.” Id. 

at 647. Meanwhile, commissioners elected under these lines will be “more likely to believe that 

their primary obligation is to represent” only one racial group “rather than their constituency as a 

whole.” Id. at 648. Rese are serious, irreparable, “immense” harms. Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 

16754389, at *5 (denying stay of preliminary injunction in racial gerrymandering case).

Plaintiffs seek no less than their fundamental right “to cast their votes effectively.” Williams 

v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). When impaired, this injury “cannot be undone through 

monetary remedies,” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010). “Given the 

fundamental nature of the right to vote, monetary remedies would obviously be inadequate in this 

case; it is simply not possible to pay someone for having been denied a right of this importance.” 

Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2015).

III. Le Balance of the Equities Weighs in Favor of Plaintiffs

and Injunctive Relief is in the Public Interest

Re irreparable harm Plaintiffs face outweighs any burden an injunction might create for 

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the City, and an injunction is in the public interest. Re Miami-Dade County Elections Department

can administer the November 2023 elections if it has district lines by August 1, 2023. ECF 24-30.

“[C]autious protection of the Plaintiffs’ franchise-related rights is without question in the public 

interest,” Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005), and 

allowing elections to proceed under unconstitutional lines “would be harmful to the public’s 

perception of the election’s legitimacy,” Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 

1327 (11th Cir. 2019). Re public “has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law.” Scott, 612 

F.3d at 1297; Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324 (irreparable harm “[u]nless that statute is 

unconstitutional”). Re balance here is not a close call.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enjoin the City, its 

officers, and agents from calling, conducting, supervising, or certifying any elections under the 

Enacted Plan, beginning with the regular 2023 elections, until entry of a final judgment.

LOCAL RULE 7.1(d)(2) STATEMENT

To conduct the November 2023 elections, the Miami-Dade County Elections Department 

needs a map transmitted to it by the City Clerk by August 1, 2023. ECF 24-30. Rerefore, if the 

Court grants this motion, a final ruling on an interim remedial map is needed before that date. To 

provide the City with “a reasonable opportunity . . . [to] adopt[ ] a substitute measure,” Wise v. 

Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978), and to give the Court time to review the parties’ submissions 

on remedy, Plaintiffs suggest that a ruling on this motion is needed by May 23, 2023. A ruling by 

that date would provide 70 days for the City to enact a proposed interim remedy, for the Parties to 

submit briefs on remedy, for the Court to issue a ruling approving an interim remedy, and for the 

City to transmit it to the Elections Department. See Jacksonville I, 2022 WL 7089087, at *54.

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REQUEST FOR HEARING

In accordance with Local Rule 7.1(b)(2), Plaintiffs request oral argument should the Court 

find it useful to ask questions of counsel. Plaintiffs do not request an evidentiary hearing, but are 

prepared for one should Defendant request it.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of February, 2023,

/s/ Nicholas L.V. Warren

Nicholas L.V. Warren (FBN 1019018)

ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc.

336 East College Avenue, Suite 203

Tallahassee, FL 32301

(786) 363-1769

nwarren@aclufl.org

Daniel B. Tilley (FBN 102882)

Caroline A. McNamara (FBN 1038312)

ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc.

4343 West Flagler Street, Suite 400

Miami, FL 33134

(786) 363-2714

dtilley@aclufl.org

cmcnamara@aclufl.org

Neil A. Steiner*

Dechert LLP

Rree Bryant Park

1095 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10036

(212) 698-3822

neil.steiner@dechert.com

Christopher J. Merken*

Jocelyn Kirsch*

Dechert LLP

Cira Centre

2929 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104

(215) 994-2380

christopher.merken@dechert.com

jocelyn.kirsch@dechert.com

* Admitted pro hac vice

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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