IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-60122

RALPH ARNOLD SMITH, JR., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

JAMES M. HOOD, III, In his individual capacity; ALBERT LEE ABRAHAM, 

JR., Individually; CYNTHIA T. EUBANK, In her individual capacity; 

STANLEY ALEXANDER, In his individual capacity; ONETTA WHITLEY, In 

her individual capacity; RALPH E. CHAPMAN, Individually; H. SCOTT 

SPRAGINS, Individually; MEDICAL DOCTOR REB MCMICHAEL, In his 

individual capacity; LUKE SAVOIE, In his individual capacity; MEDICAL 

DOCTOR PAUL SCOTT MCGINNIS, In his individual capacity; JAMES G. 

CHASTAIN, In his individual capacity; THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT 

OF MENTAL HEALTH; JOHN DOES 1-20, Whose names and identities are 

unknown at this time; LAWRENCE JOHN TUCKER, JR., Individually, also 

known as Lucky, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

Ralph Arnold Smith brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 

Americans with Disabilities Act against various defendants for their conduct 

related to his involuntary civil commitment. The district court dismissed his 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 10, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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claims in their entirety. He appeals. We AFFIRM in part and VACATE and 

REMAND in part.

I

In April 2012, Ralph Arnold Smith allegedly hired two people—Keaira

Byrd and Derrick Lacy—to murder Lee Abraham, the attorney who had 

represented his ex-wife during their divorce proceedings. See generally Smith 

v. Chastain, No. 3:14–v–334–WHB–RHW, 2015 WL 1206918, at *2 (S.D. Miss. 

Mar. 17, 2015). Upon their arrival at Abraham’s office, the two would-be 

assassins were shot by agents from the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office. 

Byrd was killed; Lacy was apprehended and led investigators to Smith. Smith 

was arrested, and a grand jury returned two indictments against him, charging 

him, inter alia, with capital murder for Byrd’s death and conspiracy to murder 

Abraham.

Smith asserted that he was suffering from a “major mental disease” that 

rendered him incompetent to stand trial. The Leflore County Chancery Court 

ordered an initial evaluation of Smith’s competency, and he was admitted to 

the forensic unit at the Mississippi State Hospital for evaluation. After holding 

multiple hearings on Smith’s competency, the Chancery Court ordered the 

State to initiate involuntary civil commitment proceedings. The Chancery 

Court held two commitment hearings in December 2014 and January 2015 at 

which five doctors testified. Finding that Smith was suffering from a psychotic 

mental disorder, the Chancery Court ordered that he be involuntarily civilly 

committed as an inpatient to the State Hospital.1 

 

1 In November 2016, Smith was ordered discharged from the State Hospital and 

placed on involuntary outpatient civil commitment. Though no longer an inpatient, he 

remains involuntarily civilly committed and subject to conditions including wearing an 

electronic monitoring device, not accessing the internet or print media without prior 

approval, and participating in intensive psychiatric treatment. 

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Smith brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and American with Disabilities Act

(ADA) suit against the Mississippi Department of Mental Health (DMH), State 

Hospital doctors and personnel, state prosecutors, and four private attorneys 

(including Lee Abraham, the man he allegedly conspired to murder). All 

defendants except DMH were named in their individual capacities only. Smith

sought damages against these defendants under § 1983; Title II of the ADA, 42 

U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; and Mississippi state law.2 His claims were based in 

significant part on various allegations that defendants conspired to unlawfully 

civilly commit him against his will. 

Defendants filed motions to dismiss all of Smith’s claims under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting that his claims were 

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and state sovereign, 

prosecutorial, and witness immunity.3 The district court dismissed all of 

Smith’s federal claims under Heck and state sovereign immunity and declined 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. Smith timely 

appeals.4 

 

2 Though Smith’s complaint also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, he does not 

brief on appeal what these violations are or why they were wrongly dismissed; consequently, 

he has abandoned them. See Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 2014)

(forfeiture where party does not brief “in any perceptible manner” how he is entitled to relief 

on his claims). 3 Smith originally argued in his briefing on appeal that the district court erred by not 

entering default against defendant Abraham. Smith subsequently filed an unopposed motion 

to dismiss this issue, which we hereby grant. 

4 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(i), three of the private attorney 

defendants filed joinders to other defendants’ briefs instead of independently arguing all of 

their defenses. Citing out-of-circuit precedent, Smith alleges that these three defendants 

have waived the right to adopt arguments in the other defendants’ briefs because, in their 

Rule 28(i) letters, they “fail[] to explain how the co-appellees’ arguments pertain to [them].” 

However, neither Rule 28 nor our case law requires appellees to explain in their filing why 

joinder is appropriate, simply requiring that the arguments adopted are “equally applicable” 

to both parties. See United States v. Harris, 932 F.2d 1529, 1533 (5th Cir. 1991). We find 

that the arguments adopted are equally applicable, and that Smith’s argument is 

consequently without merit.

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II

This court reviews the district court’s dismissal of Smith’s claims under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) de novo. See, e.g., In re 

Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007); Hebert v. 

United States, 53 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1995). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a plausible 

claim for relief. Johnson v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 785 F.3d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 

2014).5

III

The district court dismissed Smith’s ADA claims against DMH as barred 

by the Eleventh Amendment.6 Though the district court did not explicitly 

engage with the framework established in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 

151 (2006), we agree with its conclusion. To determine whether the ADA 

validly abrogates state sovereign immunity for claims brought under Title II, 

a court asks:

(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) 

to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment; and (3) insofar as such conduct violated Title II but 

did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s 

purported abrogation of sovereign immunity in such contexts is 

nevertheless valid.

Id. at 159; see also Wells v. Thaler, 460 F. App’x 303 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying 

Georgia). Smith fails to apply or even reference this standard in his briefing, 

 

5 Smith contends that the district court erred by not accepting as true his allegation 

that his commitment was unlawful. However, this allegation is a legal conclusion entitled to 

no presumption of correctness. See Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th 

Cir. 2002) (“[L]egal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to 

prevent a motion to dismiss.”). 6 We note that the ADA cannot be assessed against an individual, see Hay v. Thaler, 

470 F. App’x 411 n.19, 417 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir.

2010)), and, in any event, Smith acknowledged that he abandoned his ADA claims against 

the individual defendants in proceedings before the district court. Therefore, we affirm the 

district court’s dismissal of Smith’s ADA claims against the individuals as well.

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relying instead on the incorrect proposition that state sovereign immunity is 

validly abrogated for all Title II claims. Because Smith references only “wideranging and ongoing ADA violations” without further specifying the alleged 

violations, he does not identify on appeal “which aspects of the State’s alleged 

conduct violated Title II,” whether that alleged misconduct “also violated the 

Fourteenth Amendment,” or whether, failing an alleged violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, “Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign 

immunity . . . is nevertheless valid.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. Accordingly,

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Smith’s ADA claims as barred by 

state sovereign immunity. 

IV

The district court dismissed Smith’s remaining § 1983 claims as barred 

by the “favorable termination rule” established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477 (1994). See, e.g., Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2006). In 

Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim for monetary damages is not 

cognizable when “judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction or sentence” unless that conviction or sentence has 

been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid 

by a state tribunal . . . or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a 

writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 487. 

However, “if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even 

if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal 

judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed in the 

absence of some other bar to the suit.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Determining

whether a particular claim is barred by Heck is “analytical and fact-intensive” 

and requires the court to consider the specifics of the individual claim. Bush 

v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008). We conduct this analysis by 

assessing whether a claim is “temporally and conceptually distinct” from the 

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related conviction and sentence. See, e.g., id. at 498. We ask whether the 

claims are “necessarily inconsistent” with the conviction, or whether they can 

“coexist” with the conviction or sentence without “calling [it] into question.” 

Ballard, 444 F.3d at 400–01. Claims that challenge conditions of confinement, 

but not the fact or length of the sentence, are not barred by Heck. See 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 83–84 (2005) (“Heck uses the word ‘sentence’

to refer not to prison procedures, but to substantive determinations as to the 

length of confinement. . . . [T]his Court has repeatedly permitted prisoners to 

bring § 1983 actions challenging the conditions of their confinement.”). 

This circuit has thus far applied the Heck doctrine only to claims that 

implicate criminal convictions or sentences. In Smith’s case, however, the 

district court concluded that there was “no reason not to” apply Heck to the

civil commitment context, citing other courts that have done so. See Huftile v. 

Vonseca, 410 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2005); Henderson v. Bryant, 606 F. App’x 301, 

304 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Allen v. Seiler, No. 4:12-CV-414-Y, 2013 WL 

357614, at *3 n.14 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2013) (collecting cases); MARTIN A.

SCHWARTZ, SEC. 1983 LITIG. CLAIMS & DEFENSES § 10.07 (4th ed. 2017). In 

Huftile, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Heck is equally applicable to people 

who are civilly committed because, as with a criminal sentence, the 

appropriate avenue to challenge the validity of civil confinement is through a 

habeas petition, not § 1983. Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1139–40. Because Heck’s 

holding was based at least in part on “prevent[ing] a person in custody from 

using § 1983 to circumvent the more stringent requirements for habeas 

corpus,” the Ninth Circuit held that Heck’s reasoning therefore applies to the 

civil commitment context as well. Id. at 1139. 

Though we note that the Ninth Circuit’s and other courts’ reasoning on 

this issue is persuasive, whether Heck extends to civil commitments is still a 

res nova question in this circuit. However, Smith’s case is an unusual one 

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because the parties, including Smith, all assume that the Heck doctrine does 

apply in a civil commitment case. Smith, in a peculiar move on appeal, 

concedes that Heck should bar any claim that would challenge the validity of 

his underlying civil commitment. He argues only that some of his claims are 

viable because they are, allegedly, conceptually distinct from the commitment 

itself. As to some of these claims, however, we reject his argument that they 

are, in fact, distinct. Additionally, he fails to demonstrate a denial of a federal 

right with regards to other claims. 

Though Smith alleges that he has brought conceptually distinct claims, 

some of his re-asserted arguments cannot, in fact, “coexist” with the existence 

vel non of his commitment. For instance, his claims that the defendants 

“pursued an involuntary inpatient civil commitment of Dr. Smith” and

participated in civil commitment hearings to “wrongly and unlawfully seek the 

continuing vilification and incarceration of Dr. Smith” clearly challenge the 

legitimacy or length of his commitment itself. Similarly, Smith’s claim that 

defendants failed to conduct periodic evaluations to determine whether 

continuing his commitment was justified is not distinct from the fact and 

duration of that commitment.

Smith also asserts that several other courses of conduct by defendants—

placing him in the forensic unit at the State Hospital, failing to conduct a risk 

assessment, and allowing unlicensed State Hospital employees to provide 

psychological treatment—give rise to temporally and conceptually distinct 

§ 1983 claims. However, it is not enough that these claims may be conceptually 

distinct; to plead a cognizable § 1983 claim, Smith must also allege a violation 

of his federal rights. Cf. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (an action that “will not 

demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment . . . should be 

allowed to proceed in the absence of some other bar to the suit.”) (emphasis 

added). With regards to these claims, Smith fails to assert any coherent legal 

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theory, either in his briefs or in his complaint below, explaining how these 

actions violated his federal rights. Accordingly, he cannot demonstrate that 

the district court erred by dismissing these allegations for failure to state a 

claim under § 1983. We affirm the district court’s dismissal as to all of these 

claims. 

Ultimately, we conclude that Smith raises only one § 1983 claim that is 

both conceptually distinct and asserts a denial of a constitutional right: his 

allegation that Defendants McMichael, Chastain, and Savoie confined him 

using leather and metal restraints in violation of his due process rights. 

“[L]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the 

liberty protected by the Due Process Clause . . . . This interest survives criminal 

conviction and incarceration. Similarly, it must also survive 

involuntary commitment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)

(citations omitted). Smith’s claim that those Defendants’ use of restraints 

amounted to a due process violation is a challenge to the conditions of his 

confinement rather than the fact of his confinement itself, and is thus 

unquestionably not barred by Heck. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 84. As to this 

claim, the district court incorrectly concluded that “any award for damages 

under the theories advanced by the plaintiff would necessarily include a 

finding by this court that he is wrongfully held [at the State Hospital].” 

Accordingly, we find that the district court erred by dismissing this claim.

***

For these reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART as to the dismissal of the

majority of Smith’s claims. We VACATE and REMAND as to Smith’s due 

process claim of unlawful bodily restraint against Defendants McMichael, 

Chastain, and Savoie. Additionally, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal 

of Smith’s pendant state law claim on this issue to permit the district court to 

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choose whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See generally 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367; City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).

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