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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

DECATUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Respondent-Appellee, FOR PUBLICATION March 17, 2015

9:15 a.m.

v No. 320272

MERC

VAN BUREN COUNTY EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION and DECATUR

EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, LC Nos. 00-000123; 00-000124

Charging Parties-Appellant.

Before: J ANSEN , P.J., and M ETER and B ECKERING , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Charging parties, Van Buren County Education Association and D ecatur Educational Support Personnel Association, app eal as of right the January 2 1, 2014 decision of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (“MERC”) dismissing two unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charges against respondent, Decatur Public Schools. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. PA 152

The facts in this case are largely undisputed and involve Van Buren County Education Association (“VBCEA”), which is a bargaining unit for teachers in Van Buren County, Decatur Educational Support Personnel Asso ciation (“DESPA”), a bargaini ng unit for support personnel, and the Decatur Public Schools. This case involves a public em ployer’s contributions to its employees’ health insurance costs, and whether the employer has a duty to bargain with regard to limits imposed on its contributions to employees’ health care c osts under 2011 PA 152, MCL

15.561 et seq

., 1 the “Publicly Funded Health Insurance Contribution Act.” PA 1 52 was given

1 The Legislature has since amended the act; some of the amendme nts were curative and intended to operate retroactivel y. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the statute are as it appeared in 2011 PA 152, or as it was retroactively modified by the Legislature. None of the amendments, curative or otherwise , are pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal.-2- effect on September 27, 2011 and provides limits on the maximum amount that a public employer can contribute to medical benefit plans for its employ ees or elected public officials. Among other matters, PA 152 provided what the parties term “har d caps” for contributions to medical benefit plans for its employees. Section 3 of the act provides in relevant part:

Except as otherwise provided in this act, a public employer tha t offers or contributes to a medical benefit plan for its employees or elec ted public officials shall pay no more than the annual costs or illustrative rate an d any payments for reimbursement of co-pays, deducti bles, or payments into health savings accounts, flexible spending accounts, or similar accounts used for health care costs, than a total amount equal to $5,500.00 times the number of employees and elected public officials with single-person coverage, $11,000.00 times the number of employees and elected public officials with individual-and-spou se coverage or individual-plus-1- nonspouse-dependent coverage, plus $15,000.00 times the number of employees and elected public officials with family co verage, for a medical benefit plan coverage year beginning on or after Januar y 1, 2012. [MCL 15.563(1).]

In addition to the hard caps option set forth in section 3, a public employer, excluding the state, could elect to comply, “[ b]y majority vote of its govern ing body” with secti on 4 of PA 152. The option provided in section 4 provided that a public employe r “shall pay not more than 80% of the total annual costs of all of the medical benefit plans i t offers or contributes to for its employees and elected public officials.” MCL 15.564(2). Thus, subject to certain exemptions set forth in section 8 that are not applicable in the instant m atter, PA 152 gave a public employer two options for contributing to the cost of medical benefit pla ns for its employees.

In enacting PA 152, the Legislature recognized that medical be nefit plans may have been subject to existing collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”), and grandfathered in a public employer’s contributions to medical benefit plans under existin g CBAs; nonetheless, PA 152 mandated compliance with the act upon expiration of the previou s of the CBAs. In this regard, section 5 of PA 152 provided:

(1) If a collective bargaining ag reement or other contract that is inconsistent with sections 3 and 4 is in effect for 1 or more employees of a publ ic employer on September 27, 2011, the requirements of section 3 or 4 do not apply to an employee covered by that contract until the contract expires . A public employer’s expenditures for medical benefit plans under a colle ctive bargaining agreement or other contract described in this subsection shall be excluded from calculation of the public employer’s maximum payment under sect ion 4. The requirements of sections 3 and 4 apply to any extension or renewal of the

contract

.

(2) A collective bargaining agr eement or other contract that is executed on or after September 27, 2011 shall not include terms that are inconsisten t with the requirements of sections 3 and 4. [MCL 15.565 (emphasis added) .]

Section 9 of the act contained a penalty for failure to apply with the contributions limit:-3- If a public employer fails to comply with this act, the public employer shall permit the state treasurer to reduce by 10% each economic vital ity incentive program payment received under 2011 PA 63 and the department of education shall assess the public employer a penalty equal to 10% of each payment of any funds for which the public employer qualifies under the state s chool aid act of 1979, 1979 PA 94, MCL 388.1601 to 388.1772, during the period t hat the public employer fails to comply with this act. Any reduction setoff o r penalty amounts

recovered shall be returned to the fund from which the reductio n is assessed or upon which the penalty is determined. The department of educat ion may also refer the penalty collection to the department of treasury for collection consistent

with section 13 of 1941 PA 122, MCL 205.13. [MCL 15.569.]

B. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE BY VBCEA

Charging party VBCEA and respondent are parties to a CBA that became effective on July 1, 2011, expiring on June 30, 2012. On or about May 14, 2 012, before the first bargaining session on the new CBA, superint endent Elizabeth Godwin sent a memorandum to VBCEA members regarding their insuranc e premiums for the upcoming sch ool year. The memorandum indicated that effective July 1, 2012, the day after the curren t CBA expired, respondent intended to implement a hard cap 2 on its contributions as set forth in PA 152. Godwin also sentletters to VBCEA members regard ing the deductions tha t would be taken from their last paychecks in June 2012 that would be necessary to cover those members’ increased health care contributions.

On or about May 22, 2012, respondent and VBCEA held their firs t bargaining session for the new CBA. According to Godwin’s affidavit, which charging p arties did not refute, respondent and VBCEA began to negotiate at this session concern ing, among other matters, the hard cap option chosen by res pondent. Although the parties met and bargained, they did not reach an agreement, and respondent proceeded with implementing the hard caps on health care

costs.

On June 29, 2012, VBCEA filed a ULP charge against respondent, alleging that health

insurance benefits were a mandato ry subject of collective barga ining under the Public Employee Relations Act (“PERA”), MCL 423.215. VBCEA also alleged that r espondent had a duty to maintain the terms and conditions of the existing CBA until the parties either reached a successor agreement or impasse.

VBCEA contended that respondent i mplemented the hard cap with no meaningful bargaining, in violation of PER A. VBCEA requested that respond ent be found in violation of PERA for refusing to bargain and that insurance coverage contri butions amounts be returned to the amounts that existed under the now-expired CBA until the pa rties reached either a successor agreement or impasse.

2 “Hard cap” refers to the limits set forth in MCL 15.563.-4- C. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE BY DESPA

Respondent and charging party DESPA are parties to a collectiv e bargaining agreement that took effect on November 14, 2011, expiring on June 30, 201 2. In May 2012, respondent, just as it had done with VBCEA, sent notices to DESPA members r egarding increased insurance costs associated with its decision to implement the hard cap se t forth in PA 152. At that time, respondent and DESPA had not yet scheduled their first bargaini ng session for a new CBA, nor had DESPA requested bargaining.

In response to the memoranda indicating respondent’s choice of the hard caps and increased deductions associated therewith, DESPA filed a ULP ch arge against respondent that was virtually identical to the ULP filed against VBCEA.

D. AGENCY PROCEEDINGS

On December 20, 2012, the parties presented arguments to an ad ministrative law judge, who issued a decision and recommended order dismissing the ULP charges. Recognizing that there is a mandatory duty to bargain over health insurance bene fits under PERA, the ALJ agreed with charging parties’ contentions that there was a duty to bar gain over the employer’s choice of implementing the hard caps in MCL 15.563 or the 80% contributio n plan (“80/20 plan”) in MCL 15.564, but nevertheless found that respondent did not violate its duty to bargain in this case. First, as to DESPA, the ALJ f ound, based on unrebutted evidence , that DESPA never requested bargaining; therefore, respondent could not have violated a dut y to bargain with regard to DESPA. Second, as to VBCEA, which requested bargaining, the AL J found that the expiration of an existing CBA amounted to “statutorily imposed impasse” un der PA 152, which permitted respondent to take unilateral action in implementing the hard c aps plan. Therefore, respondent’s actions were permitted under PERA, and there was no merit to VB CEA’s charge.

Charging parties and respondent filed exceptions to the ALJ’s findings, and the matter was reviewed by MERC. On January 21, 2014, MERC issued a decis ion and order in which it dismissed the ULP charges filed by charging parties. Turning f irst to the ULP filed by DESPA, MERC found that, regardless of whether there was a duty to barg ain over the implementation of hard caps or the 80/20 plan, th e charge was without merit. In so finding, MERC noted that DESPA did not assert that it demanded bargaining, nor did the r ecord contain any such demand. Even assuming a duty to bargain, there was, reasoned MERC, no r equirement for the employer to initiate bargaining; instead, an employer’s duty to bargain under PERA is conditioned upon there being a demand for bargaining by the union.

Next, turning to the charge filed by VBCEA, MERC found that th ere was no conflict between PA 152 and PERA’s bargaining mandates, and concluded th at there was no duty to bargain on the employer’s choice between the hard caps and the 80/20 plan. It also rejected charging parties’ contention thatrespondent was not required t o implement PA 152’s mandates immediately upon the expiration of an existing CBA. It is from this decision and order that charging parties now a ppeal as of right.-5- II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The MERC is the sole state agency charged with the interpreta tion and enforcement of this highly specialized and poli tically sensitive field” of pub lic sector labor law. Kent Co Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v Kent Co Sheriff , 238 Mich App 310, 313; 605 NW2d 363 (1999), aff’d in part 463 Mich 353 (2000).

We review MERC decisions pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 28, a nd MCL 423.216(e). MERC’s findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record con sidered as a whole. MERC’s legal determinations may not be disturbed unless they violate a constitutional or statutory pr ovision or they are based on a su bstantial and

material error of law. In contra st to [ ] MERC’s factual findi ngs, its legal rulings are afforded a lesser degree of deference because review of leg al questions remains de novo, even in MERC cases.” [ Branch Co Bd of Comm’rs v Int’l Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricult ural Implement Wor kers of America,

UAW , 260 Mich App 189, 192-193; 677 NW 2d 333 (2003) (internal cita tions and quotation marks omitted).]

Resolution of the issues raised in this case involve statutoryinterpretation, which this Court ordinarily reviews de novo. Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co , 490 Mich 145, 155; 802 NW2d 281 (2011). While review is de novo, appellate courts giv e respectful consideration to MERC’s legal conclusions. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Michigan , 482 Mich 90, 97, 103; 754 NW2d 259 (2008); Detroit Pub Sch v Conn , __ Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (Docket Nos. 317007; 317050, issued November 25, 2014), slip op at 8-9. However, the agency’s interpretation is not binding on this Court, and the agency’s i nterpretation “cannot conflict with the Legislature’s intent as expr essed in the language of the st atute at issue.” In re Complaint of

Rovas , 482 Mich at 103.

III. ANALYSIS

We are first asked to consider whether PERA and PA 152 conflic t and whether there is a duty for an employer to bargain over the decision to implement hard caps or the 80/20 plan. In making this determination, we recognize that “an appellate court’s first duty is to harmonize, if possible, apparent conflicting legislative enactments in order to carry out the Legislature’s intent to the fullest extent possible.” St Clair Co Intermediate Sch Dist v St Clair Co Ed Ass’n , 245 Mich App 498, 518; 630 NW2d 909 (2001).

A. PERA

“The PERA governs the relationship between public employees an d governmental agencies.” Macomb Co v AFSCME Council 25 , 494 Mich 65, 77-78; 833 NW2d 225 (2013). “PERA drastically altered public employee labor relations in Mi chigan. It represents the Legislature’s intent to assure [ ] public employees of protectio n against unfair labor practices, and of remedial access to a state-level administrative agency with special expertise in statutory unfair labor practice matters.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). In the past, this Co urt and our Supreme Court have held that t he provisions of PERA take pr ecedence over other conflicting-6- laws “to ensure uniformity, consistency, and predictability in the critically important and complex field of public sector labor law.” Kent Co Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n , 238 Mich App at

313. See also Rockwell v Crestwood Sch Dist Bd of Ed , 393 Mich 616, 630; 227 NW2d 736 (1975) (explaining that “[t]he S upremacy of the provisions of t he PERA is predicated on the constitution . . . and the appare nt legislative intent that the PERA be the governing law for public employee labor relations.”).

Pertinent to the case at bar, PERA imposes upon public employe rs a duty to bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees “in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . .” MCL 423. 215(1). See also AFSCME Local 25 v Wayne Co , 297 Mich App 489, 494; 824 NW2d 271 (2012) (explaining that P ERA imposes a duty to bargain colle ctively upon the expiration of aCBA). Wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, includi ng health insurance benefits, are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Ranta , 271 Mich App at 270. While a public employer has a duty to b argain, that duty is not implicated absent a request by the employer to ente r into negotiations. St Clair Prosecutor v AFSCME, Local 1518 , 425 Mich 204, 242; 388 NW2d 231 (1986). Thus, an employer’s duty to bargain is “expressly condition[ed]” “on the re being a request for bargaining from the employees.” Local 586 Serv Employees Int’l Union v Village of Union City , 135 Mich App 553, 557; 355 NW2d 275 (1984).

B. CLAIM OF DESPA

As an initial matter, because the duty to bargain is “expressl y conditioned” on a request for bargaining from the employ ees, we find that, even assuming a duty to bargain over the choice between the hard caps and the 80/ 20 plan, DESPA’s claim is meri tless as it is undisputed that DESPA never requested bargaining in this case. See Local 586 Serv Employees Int’l Union , 135 Mich App at 557. Charging parties do not even challenge this p ortion of MERC’s decision.

C. PA 152

Next, in order to evaluate th e issue briefed by charging parti es as it relates to VBCEA, we turn to PA 152. PA 152 exclusively concerns health insurance b enefits and provides, for purposes of this case, two different means for capping an emplo yer’s contributions to its employees’ health insurance benefits. The first, set forth in MCL 15.563, establishes the hard caps option. In MCL 15.564, the Le gislature provided a second option for a public employer’s contributions to its employees’ health care benefits. As was i n effect at the time of charging parties’ ULP charge, that option provided:

(1) By a majority vote of its governing body, a public employer , excluding this state, may elect to comply with this section for a medical bene fit plan coverage year instead of the requirements in section 3. The designated state official may elect to comply with this section instead of section 3 as to me dical benefit plans for state employees and state officers.

(2) For medical benefit plan cov erage years begi nning on or aft er January 1, 2012, a public employer shall pay not more than 80% of the total annu al costs of all of the medical benefit plans it offers or contributes to for its e mployees and elected-7- public officials. For purposes of this subsection, total annua l costs includes the premium or illustrative rate of t he medical benefit plan and al l employer payments for reimbursement of co-pays, deductibles, and payments into he alth savings accounts, flexible spending accounts, or similar accounts used for health care but does not include beneficiary-paid copayments, coinsurance, dedu ctibles, other out-of-pocket expenses, other serv ice-related fees that are ass essed to the coverage beneficiary, or beneficiary payments into health savin gs accounts, flexible spending accounts, or similar accounts used for health care. Each elected public official who participates in a medical benefit plan offe red by a public employer shall be required to pay 20% or more of the total annu al costs of that plan. The public employer may allocate the employees' share of total annual costs of the medical benefit plans among the employees of the public employer as it sees fit. [MCL 15.564.]

With a nod toward existing CBAs that were not in compliance wi th the limitations imposed in sections 3 and 4, MCL 15.656(5) clarified that the r equirements contained in the statute only applied to new CBAs, not existing CBAs:

(1) If a collective bargaining ag reement or other contract that is inconsistent with sections 3 and 4 is in effect for 1 or more employees of a publ ic employer on September 27, 2011, the require ments of section 3 or 4 do no t apply to an employee covered by that contractuntil the contract expires. A public employer’s expenditures for medical benefit plans under a collective barga ining agreement or

other contract described in this subsection shall be excluded f rom calculation of the public employer's maximum payment under section 4. The req uirements of sections 3 and 4 apply to any exten sion or renewal of the contr act.

(2) A collective bargaining agr eement or other contract that is executed on or after September 27, 2011 shall not include terms that are inconsisten t with the requirements of sections 3 and 4.

D. DOES PA 152 CONFLICT WITH PERA , AND IS THERE A DUTY TO BARG AIN?

“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory language. The first step in that determination is to review the language of the statute itself.” Krohn , 490 Mich at 156 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, both PA 152 and PERA concern, at least to some degree, the subject of health insurance benefits for public employees. Thi s Court should attempt to construe

the statutes so as to avoid a conflict. See St Clair Co Intermediate Sch Dist , 245 Mich App at 518. As noted, in the past, our S upreme Court has held that wh en PERA conflicts with another statute, PERA, as the predominant law in the field of public em ployee relations, prevails. See,

e.g., Rockwell , 393 Mich at 629-630.

We find that PA 152 and PERA do not conflict, and that there i s no duty to bargain over the employer’s choice between the hard caps and the 80/20 plan. Initially, the plain language of PA 152 does not give rise to an obligation to bargain with rega rd to this choice. Notably, MCL 15.563(1) states that a public employer “ shall pay no more of the annual costs ” than “a total-8- amount equal to” the hard caps set forth in the statute. The w ord “shall” is a mandatory directive, indicating that the h ard caps option is the default position. See Smitter v Thornapple Twp , 494 Mich 121, 136; 833 NW2d 875 (2013) (“The Legislature’s us e of the word ‘shall’ generally indicates a mandatory directive, not a discretionary act.”). As an alternative to the hard caps, the public employer may, “[b]y majority vote of its gover ning body” elect to comply with the 80/20 plan. MCL 15.564(1). Nothing in this language gives rise to the idea that there is a duty to bargain with regard to the choice between hard caps and the 80/20 plan. Rather, the choice is left to the “governing body” of the public employer t o decide, by majority vote, if it will deviate from the default position of the hard caps. As no ted by MERC, this interpretation is buttressed by examination of PA 152’s repeated references to “t otal amounts” of health care contributions and the fact that the limits imposed by the act a pply to the “total amounts” of contributions for all of the employer’s employees and all barga ining groups. The act does not speak of “total amounts” for each type of plan chosen for each individual bargaining group; rather, the act speaks only of the “total amounts” of contribut ions for the public employer’s “employees.” See MCL 15.563-15.564. This supports the interpr etation that an employer is to choose one type of plan for all of its employees, not that the employer is to bargain over the choice of plans with each of its labor groups. In other words, the choice of contribution limits for all groups of employees is le ft solely to the public employ er.

Moreover, this result is not in conflict with the collective b argaining mandates of PERA,

nor does it remove health insurance benefits from the realm of mandatory bargaining. PERA requires bargaining on certain subjects, including health insur ance benefits. PA 152 does not foreclose bargaining on health insurance benefits. Rather, as MERC recognized, PA 152 sets

limits on the amount of health insurance benefits a public employer c an pay. Nothing in the statute prevents bargaining up to the statutorily-imposed limit s. Indeed, PA 152 expressly recognizes the right of collective bargaining, as it mandates t hat the limits not take effect until after the expiration of a CBA in the event that the existing CBA con tained terms that were inconsistent with the limits prescribed in the statute. See MC L 15.565(1). Employees may still bargain for health insurance benefits up to the amount of the l imits imposed by the employer,

whether that limit be in the form of the hard caps or the 80/20 plan. For instance, if the employer chooses the hard caps option, diffe rent employee bargaining gro ups can then bargain for the amount that the employer will pay, up to the hard caps. As lon g as, after negotiations, the employer does not exceed the amounts imposed by the hard caps, the employer remains in compliance with the statute. Examination of the 80/20 plan yie lds the same result. The 80/20 plan provides that an employer “shall pay not more than 80% of the total annual costs of all of the medical benefits plans it offers or contributes to for its employees and elected public officials.” MCL 15.564(2). Agai n, this gives various employee groups the ability to bargain with regard to the total amount, up to a maximum of 80% of cost s, that the employer will contribute to that group’s health insurance costs. In sum, the fact that the governing body of the public employer has the discretion to choose the plan that will affect the parameters of bargaining does not conflict withthe public employer’s obligat ion to bargain under PERA. See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n , 391 Mich 44, 67-68; 214 NW2d 803 (1974) (finding no conflict between PERA and the Home Rule Cities Act by reading the Home R ule Cities Act as empowering a city to set certain procedures for its pension pla n and to leave the substantive terms of the plan to collective negotiation).-9- Furthermore, finding a conflict between the statutes on the is sue of a public employer’s choice between the hard caps and the 80/20 plan would effective ly read into PA 152 language that the Legislature did not see fit to include. MCL 15.564 on ly states that t he “governing body” of a public employer “may elect to comply with this section . . . .” It does not state that a bargaining unit may force the hand of the board to choose the 8 0/20 plan, or even that a bargaining unit may force the governing body to vote on the cho ice between the hard caps and the 80/20 plan. Rather, the statu te simply states that the gov erning body “may elect to comply with this section instead of section 3 . . . .” MCL 15.564(1). This Court should not read into MCL 15.564 words not that were not within the intent of the Leg islature as derived from the plain language of the statute. See Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State , 489 Mich 194, 218; 801 NW2d 35 (2011).

Our conclusion that there is no conflict betw een PA 152 and PE RA is strengthened by comparing the interaction of PA 152 and PERA in the instant cas e with cases where courts have found conflicts between PA 152 and other statutes. Notably, in Rockwell , 393 Mich 616, one of the seminal cases on the supremacy of PERA, there existed a con flict between PERA and the Teachers’ Tenure Act (“TTA”) that was much more direct and appa rent than any alleged conflict

in the case at bar. In Rockwell , a school board and teachers’ union became embattled in a labo r dispute that involved strikes. Id. at 626. After two strikes, the school board ordered teachers t o return to work or submit a letter of resignation; otherwise, th eir employment would be

terminated. Id. at 626-627. Scores of teachers neither returned to work nor s ubmitted a letter of resignation, and the school board terminated their positions. Id. at 627. Pertinent to that case, PERA enabled public employers to discipline employees for strik ing, and if the employer disciplined the employee, the e mployee was entitled, under PERA , to request a determination whether he violated the provisions of PERA; thus, the determina tion came after the discipline.

Id. at 624. In contrast, the TTA required a hearing before discharge, and directed that discharge could only occur for reasonable and just cause, and only after notice and a hearing. Id. at 625. The dispute in that case concerned whether the procedures in PE RA—determination after discipline—or the procedures in the TTA—determination before discipline—controlled. Id. at 624-625, 628-629. In resolving this issue, our Supreme Court f ound that the TTA, which was enacted before PERA, could not have been intended to consider l abor disputes between school boards and their employees, and that PERA was intended to be th e predominant law governing public employee labor relations. Id. at 630. Therefore, the Court found that the disciplinary procedures set forth in PERA with regard to teachers who partic ipated in a strike should apply over those set forth in the TTA, as those disciplinary procedur es primarily concerned the actions

of individual teachers in non-labor related settings. Id. at 631-632.

Similarly, in Detroit Bd of Ed v Parks , 417 Mich 268, 281; 335 NW2d 641 (1983), our Supreme Court found a conflict between the TTA and PERA and ref used to read into CBAs entered into under PERA requirements from the TTA concerning a reasonable and just cause standard for discharge. As a result, the teacher in Parks was precluded from invoking procedures under the TTA because PERA, the requirements of whic h conflicted with the TTA,

controlled in t hat situation. Id.

The instant case is distinguishable from Rockwell and Parks . PA 152 and PERA do not contain conflicting provisions as to collective bargaining righ ts. Rather, the statutes and their respective mandates can be read to coincide with one another. As noted, PA 152 simply sets-10- limits an employer may not exceed when paying for health care c ontributions. The statute gives the employer a choice as to which set of limits—the hard caps o r the 80/20 plan—that the employer can implement. After the employer makes that choice, nothing prohibits or prevents collective bargaining on the issue of health insurance contribu tions. Therefore, PA 152 and PERA can be read so as not to conflict, and can be reconciled w ith one another. See Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections

, 451 Mich 569, 576-577; 548 NW2d900 (1996) (explaining that, where possible, statutes should be construed to avoid con flict and to avoid a finding of repeal by implication). 3

D. IMPOSITION OF HARD CAPS IMME DIATELY UPON EXPIRATION OF CBA

Lastly, we address charging part ies’ contention that responden t was not required to implement its choice of the hard caps option immediately upon t he expiration of the parties’ existing CBA. Charging parties argue that respondent could hav e waited, after bargaining, to make its choice, and that it had enough time to ensure that the benefits paid were within either the hard cap or the 80/20 plan. The importance of this issue i s largely dependent on whether respondent had a duty to bargain with regard to the choice betw een the hard caps and the 80/20 plan. With no duty to bargain over the implementation of hard caps or the 80/20 plan, nothing prevented respondent from unilate rally implementing the plan atthe date of the expiration of the existing CBA. See Grand Rapids Community College Faculty Ass’n v Grand Rapids Community College , 239 Mich App 650, 656-657; 609 NW2d 835 (2000). Moreover, PA 152 is clear that, upon expiration of the existing CBA, a public employer is to co mply with the statute. Indeed, the limits imposed by either the hard caps or the 80/20 plan ca me into play at the expiration of the previous CBA. See MCL 15.565( 1) (explaining that, in the e vent the public employer and its employees were parties to a CBA, the limits imposed on employer health care contributions “do not apply . . . until the contract expires). The word “until” 4 means “up to the time that or when[.]” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2005). Thus, a public employer’s ability to delay implementation of the limits imposed by PA 152 lasted “up to the time that or when” the CBA expired, but no longer. See MCL 15.565(5). Ther e is no language in the statute explaining that an employer is a llowed to delay implementation of the hard caps or the 80/20 plan. And PERA, in MCL 423.215b(1), 5 is clear that the employee is required to bear the

3 Because we find that an employer does not have a duty to barga in over the choice between implementing the hard caps and the 80/20 plan, we find moot cha rging parties’ all egation that the ALJ erred in finding that PA 152 created a “statutorily imposed impasse” upon the expiration of an existing CBA. Indeed, if bargaining is not required, nothin g prohibited respondent from taking unilateral action, and whether PA 152 created a statutor ily imposed impasse has no bearing on this case. Thus, w e do not decide this issue.

4 A reviewing court may consult di ctionaries in order to give wo rds their plain and ordinary meaning. Krohn , 490 Mich at 156.

5 MCL 423.215b, which was enacted as an amendment to PERA in 201 1, provides, in pertinent
part:-11- increased costs of maintaining h ealth insurance benefits after the expiration of a CBA. There is no merit to charging parties’ contentions.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Jane M. Beckering

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, after the exp iration date of a collective bargaining agreement and until a successor collectiv e bargaining agreement is in place, a public e mployer shall pay and provide wages and benefits

at levels and amounts that are n o greater than t hose in effect on the expiration date of the collective bargaining agre ement. The prohibition in thi s subsection includes increases that would result from wage step increases. Employees who receive health, dental, vision, prescripti on, or other insurance benefits under a collective bargaining agreement shall bear any increased costs of maintaining those benefits that occur after the expiration date. The public employer may make payroll deductions necessary to pay the increased costs of maintaining those benefits. [Emphasis added.]