Failed State 2030

Nigeria—A Case Study

by

Christopher J. Kinnan, Colonel, USAF

Daniel B. Gordon, Colonel, USAF

Mark D. DeLong, Colonel, USAF

Douglas W. Jaquish, Colonel, USAF

Robert S. McAllum, Colonel, USAF

February 2011

The Occasional Papers series was established by the Center for 

Strategy and Technology (CSAT) as a forum for research on topics 

that reflect long-term strategic thinking about technology and its 

implications for US national security. Copies of no. 67 in this series 

are available from the Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War 

College, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or on the 

CSAT Web site at http://csat.au.af.mil/. The fax number is (334) 

953-6158; phone (334) 953-6150.

Occasional Paper No. 67

Center for Strategy and Technology

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
ii

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of Air University, the US government, or the Department 

of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—Patents, 

Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, it is not copyrighted but is the property 

of the US government.

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Failed state 2030 : Nigeria - a case study / Christopher J. Kinnan . . . [et al.].

 p. ; cm.–(Occasional paper / Center for Strategy and Technology ; no. 67)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-203-6

1. National security—Nigeria—Forecasting. 2. Nigeria—History. 3. United States. 

Air Force—Planning. 4. Strategic planning—United States. 5. United States—

Foreign relations—Nigeria. 6. Nigeria—Foreign relations—United States.

I. Kinnan, Christopher J. II. Series: Occasional paper (Air University [U.S.]. Center 

for Strategy and Technology) ; no. 67.

320.9669—dc22
iii

Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . ix

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 NIGERIA IN CONTEXT: 

DEFINING FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3 THE SOCIAL SCHISMS OF NIGERIA . . . . . . . 21

Col Douglas W. Jaquish

4 NIGERIAN POLITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Col Mark D. DeLong

5 NIGERIA’S ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Col Daniel B. Gordon

6 MILITARY VECTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Col Robert S. McAllum

7 NIGERIA IN 2030: PATHS TO FAILURE . . . . . 65

Col Christopher J. Kinnan

8 TECHNOLOGY AND FAILED STATE 2030—

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

RESPONDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Col Christopher J. Kinnan

9 SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Appendix

A Yar’adua’s Seven-Point Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . 113

B Definitions of Failed or Weakened States . . . . 115

C Nigerian Military Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
iv

Figures

Figure Page

1 Colonial Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2 Twelve federal states of Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3 States of Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4 36 states of modern Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

5 Demographic transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

6 Population by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

7 Government effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

8 Nigeria bribery in selected sectors . . . . . . . . . 44

9 Cascading failure of the 

Nigerian state (2008–2030) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Tables

Table Page

1 Poverty level percentages by 

region (1980–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

2 Self-assessment of poverty status 

versus actual incidence 

(percentage of populace) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3 Infrastructure status in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

4 RAND technology applications for 2020 . . . . . 58
v

About the Authors

Col Christopher J. Kinnan is the deputy director of the Center 

for Strategy and Technology (CSAT), Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), 

Alabama. Colonel Kinnan, a space and missile officer, was previously assigned to the Air Staff as the deputy chief of Air Force Nuclear Operations and commanded the 45th Operations Support 

Squadron at Patrick AFB, Florida. In 1998 Colonel Kinnan served 

as the space weapons officer for Joint Task Force Southwest Asia 

and Operation Southern Watch. From January to June 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, he served as a lead planner for Joint 

Task Force IV collocated with the combined forces land component 

commander at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and as the deputy chief of 

plans for both the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 

Baghdad, Iraq. He wrote and executed the plan establishing the 

Baghdad ORHA regional headquarters, leading the CPA interagency team that planned and executed a highly complex $450 

million effort that paid salaries and provided emergency payments 

to three million Iraqis. The plan jump-started Iraq’s economy and 

helped stabilize its financial and banking systems. Colonel Kinnan 

has a bachelor of arts degree in Russian/East European area studies from Auburn University, a master of management of information systems from Lesley College, a master of airpower arts and 

sciences degree from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 

and a master of strategic studies from Air University (AU).

Col Daniel B. Gordon is the chief of the Space and Nuclear Network Group at Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. He has served as an 

engineer in the Aero Propulsion and Power Laboratory at WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio, where he managed projects to advance turbine 

engine technologies. He also led the development of a variety of programs in airspace management, precision landing systems, and the 

maintenance system on the F-22. He has served in numerous staff 

positions at the major command, Air Staff, and combatant command levels. Colonel Gordon was also the chief of the Multinational 

Logistics Branch at Headquarters United States European Command in Stuttgart, Germany. Colonel Gordon has a bachelor of science degree in aerospace engineering from Pennsylvania State University, a master’s in engineering management degree from Western 

New England College, and a master’s in military operational art and 

science and a master of strategic studies from AU.

Col Mark D. DeLong is the executive officer to the commander 

of Pacific Air Forces. Colonel DeLong was assigned to the Joint Air 

Land Sea Application Center at Langley AFB, Virginia, where he 

was responsible for the development of tactics, techniques, and 

procedures for the use of Army, Navy, and Air Force suppression of 

enemy air defenses. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, he served as 
vi

the deputy chief of interdiction in the Combined Air Operations 

Center, Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He commanded the 36th Fighter Squadron, Osan Air Base, Republic of 

South Korea. Colonel DeLong is a command pilot with more than 

3,300 total hours and 3,000 hours in the F-16. He has a bachelor 

of science degree in computer science from the United States Air 

Force Academy (USAFA), a master of national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College, a master of aeronautical 

science degree from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, and a 

master of strategic studies from AU.

Col Douglas W. Jaquish is the director of the National Assessment Group at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Colonel Jaquish began 

his career as an EF-111A electronic warfare officer, where he flew 

combat missions in Operations Southern Watch, Deny Flight, and 

Provide Comfort. He is a graduate of the Air Force Test Pilot School 

and has flown test and evaluation on the F-15, F-16, and T-38 aircraft. As commander, 452nd Flight Test Squadron, he oversaw the 

test and evaluation of several unmanned vehicles including the 

Predator and the X-45 as well as the Airborne Laser. He is a master 

navigator with over 2,600 total flying hours. Colonel Jaquish holds 

a bachelor of science in engineering sciences from the USAFA, a 

master of engineering in engineering mechanics from Old Dominion 

University, and a master of strategic studies from AU. He is also the 

author of “Uninhabited Air Vehicles for Psychological Operations—

Leveraging Technology for PSYOP Beyond 2010,” published in the 

April 2004 Chronicles Online Journal by Air University Press.

Col Robert S. McAllum serves as the principal assistant to the 

director, Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E), Office of the 

Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

at the Pentagon. In this job, Colonel McAllum provides oversight of 

operations within the directorate, including assessments of the 

DT&E efforts of each major defense acquisition program, assessments of the DT&E capabilities of the military departments, and 

the annual DT&E report to Congress. Colonel McAllum is a distinguished graduate of Officer Training School, USAF Pilot Training, 

F-16 training, and the USAF Test Pilot School. As an F-16 pilot and 

instructor, he has supported three deployments for Operation 

Southern Watch. As a test pilot, he participated in developmental 

test and evaluation of the F-16 and F-117 aircraft. Colonel McAllum 

has also served as lead USAF pilot for F-16 departure testing, including high angle of attack and departure recovery training for Air 

Force Materiel Command and Air Combat Command. His previous 

assignments include flight test branch chief for the F-16 System 

Program Office at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio; commander of the 

410th Flight Test Squadron in Palmdale, California; and deputy 

commander of the 49th Operations Group located at Holloman 

AFB, New Mexico. He has a graduate degree in mechanical engineering and a master of strategic studies from AU.
vii

Abstract

This monograph describes how a failed state in 2030 may impact the United States and the global economy. It also identifies 

critical capabilities and technologies the US Air Force should have 

to respond to a failed state, especially one of vital interest to the 

United States and one on the cusp of a civil war.

Nation-states can fail for a myriad of reasons: cultural or religious 

conflict, a broken social contract between the government and the 

governed, a catastrophic natural disaster, financial collapse, war, 

and so forth. Nigeria with its vast oil wealth, large population, and 

strategic position in Africa and the global economy can, if it fails, 

disproportionately affect the United States and the global economy. 

Nigeria, like many nations in Africa, gained independence from 

the United Kingdom in 1960. It is the most populous country in 

Africa and will have nearly 250 million people by 2030. In its relatively short modern history, Nigeria has survived five military coups 

as well as separatist and religious wars, is mired in an active armed 

insurgency, is suffering from disastrous ecological conditions in its 

Niger Delta region, and is fighting one of the modern world’s worst 

legacies of political and economic corruption. 

A nation with more than 350 ethnic groups, 250 languages, and 

three distinct religious affiliations—Christian, Islamic, and animist, 

Nigeria’s 135 million people today are anything but homogenous. 

Of Nigeria’s 36 states, 12 are Islamic and under the strong and 

growing influence of the Sokoto caliphate. While religious and ethnic violence are commonplace, the federal government has managed to strike a tenuous balance among the disparate religious and 

ethnic factions. With such demographics, Nigeria’s failure would 

be akin to a piece of fine china dropped on a tile floor—it would 

simply shatter into potentially hundreds of pieces.

Poor investment in the nation’s critical infrastructure and underinvestment in health care, education, science, and technology are 

all leading to a “brain drain” in which Nigeria’s most talented and 

educated citizens are leaving the country. This will leave a future 

Nigeria even poorer. 

Nascent attempts to address electoral and governmental corruption are meeting with some success and hold promise for the future. Recent meetings between the president and insurgent groups 

may, over time, help resolve some of Nigeria’s most intractable and 

dangerous internal conflicts. The population’s disappointment in 

its government has not appreciably shaken its faith in democracy. 

Elections are and will likely remain an important part of Nigerian 

life as they, despite the odds, provide the people hope that they can 

make a difference as Nigeria struggles to succeed.

Nigeria becoming a failed state is not a foregone conclusion. 

However, should the oil-rich state of Nigeria, a nation likely to pro-
viii

vide up to 25 percent of US light, sweet crude oil imports by 2030, 

fail, then the effect on the United States and the world economy 

would be too great to ignore. The threat that failure poses to a 

quarter billion Nigerians in terms of livelihood, security, and general way of life could quickly spread and cause a humanitarian 

disaster of previously unimagined proportions. Regardless of the 

extent of the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the wake of failure, 

the hard work to repair the damage could take two generations to 

make Nigeria viable again.

This failed-state scenario is one of four that comprised the Blue 

Horizons study in 2008. It explores the implications of what it 

would mean for the US Air Force to respond to a failed state in 

2030, one with a large population that has resources vital to the 

Western world. The capabilities necessary to detect threats, characterize the environment, rapidly deploy and protect responders, and 

sustain operations long enough to create conditions for the indigenous people to resurrect their fallen nation are all issues that need 

to be explored. From these, this monograph helps the study team 

understand what types of technologies the US Air Force should 

pursue to enable it to lead and prevail against the challenges and 

surprises posed by future failed states.
ix

Preface and Acknowledgments

In 1996 the Air Force initiated a major study effort under the 

direction of Gen Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force chief of staff. That 

study, Air Force 2025, looked 30 years into the future and made 

enormous contributions toward directing Air Force research and 

procurement to ready our forces for new challenges. The study 

brought together some of the brightest minds and most forward 

thinkers of the age, including Dr. Norman Augustine, president of 

Lockheed Martin; Alvin Toffler; James Cameron, who later directed 

the movie Titanic; Burt Rutan; Gen Bernard Schriever; Adm Bobby 

Inman; and Dr. Gene McCall and Dr. Dan Hastings, two chairmen 

of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.

In 2007 Gen T. Michael Moseley, then Air Force chief of staff, 

directed that a continuous series of future thinking and study efforts be undertaken, using AU as the “Air Force’s think tank.” This 

monograph is part of that ongoing effort. The authors collectively 

spent a year researching and traveling to ascertain what range of 

challenges a failed state may present in 20 to 30 years. The authors further examined what capabilities and technologies the US 

Air Force would require to effectively deal with failed states, especially one possessing and controlling a vital US interest.

The authors selected Nigeria, a representative nation, as a case 

study. Nigeria is a complex nation of many cultures, with a singlecommodity petroleum-based economy and a history of rampant 

corruption, ethnic violence, and poor governance. Against a backdrop of other candidates for failure such as Pakistan, Nigeria is 

likely one of the most stressing and critical to the United States, 

given the importance its light, sweet crude exports have on the 

United States and the global economy.

The researchers created a scenario which plays out in the target 

year of 2030. They found it essential to explore many crosscutting 

issues, many examined by the United Nations, the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation, the Failed State Index, Transparency International, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 

This extensive exploration helped the researchers appreciate the 

character, nature, and complexities making modern Nigeria function. The researchers concluded that a plausible series of cascading failures in several of these crosscutting areas could cause the 

modern state of Nigeria to fail. To show how these events could 

combine to produce a devastating failure, the authors explored Nigeria’s culture, political system, economy, and military. These efforts form much of this monograph.

The reader should know that the scenario presented in this 

monograph is not a forecast of a specific future but rather is structured to help the reader understand the magnitude and shape of 

Africa’s largest economy and the impact it has on the world. As we 
x

see in the 2009 global recession and credit crisis in today’s globalized world, a failure in Nigeria, like the failure of almost any other 

nation, could have serious repercussions across the planet. 

Whether Nigeria is able to grow into a thriving, stable, and vibrant 

democracy or whether it becomes a failed state, the people of the 

United States must be ready to support Nigeria as a fellow member 

of the international system.

From the authors, debts of gratitude are owed to many who offered advice. We are especially grateful for the outstanding support we received from the Air War College (Col John Carter and 

Dr. Roy Houchin), the Air Command and Staff College faculties, 

and the team at the Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center. Special thanks goes to Mr. J. A. Felton, an adjunct faculty 

member at the University of Missouri Honors College, teaching 

Issues for the 21st Century, and an attorney with Lathrop and 

Gage L.C., for his thorough review of our work. While there are 

too many others to whom we owe our thanks to list here, the 

reader will be able to find them in the documentation and footnotes. An even greater debt is owed to our families, who endured 

lengthy separations as the team traveled to research this monograph. More is owed to them than can be stated here.
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

The last 100 years have been called the American Century.1 It 

was a century notable for its global strife, which in the wake of two 

world wars saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of 

many new nations. While some were viable, many began with few 

resources and poor capital reserves. They were and are still at risk 

of failure. This monograph is about how the world, particularly the 

United States and its Air Force, will deal with the potential global 

consequences of a failed state whose principle export commodity is 

also of vital interest to the United States.

This monograph is part of a larger ongoing study called Blue 

Horizons. This study was commissioned by the former US Air Force 

chief of staff to provide “a new look at the future.” Specifically, the 

chief of staff tasked the team to “provide a common understanding 

of future strategic and technological trends for Air Force leaders to 

make better decisions.” The chief also sought to “confirm Air University as our [the Air Force’s] in-house think tank” and to improve 

the relevance of Air Force education to the decision-making processes in Washington.2

Within the context of this 2008 study, four separate scenarios 

were examined. The best and brightest officers from the Air Force 

and the sister services were specially selected to participate during 

their one-year course of instruction at Air University (AU). These 

scenarios include a resurgent Russia, a peer China, a successful 

jihadist insurgency against a friendly state in the Middle East, and 

a failed state in a vital area of US interest.

Within these works, there is no magic, no fortune-telling, and no 

attempts at clairvoyant prognostication. These are written and intended to be used as academic works to inform decision makers 

and scholars about changes happening in the world. The discussion herein is a mix of cultural sociology, political science, economics, military science (sometimes called strategic studies), and international relations.

Why a “failed state” case study about Nigeria rather than a seemingly more dangerous state such as Pakistan? Pakistan clearly has 

many visible and obvious unstable, dangerous elements that are 

conspiring to threaten its viability as a nation-state. It has a long 

history of coups d’état; it is armed with nuclear weapons whose 

safety, security, and surety measures are not well known; it is 

fighting an active insurgency against various Taliban factions (an 

organization its own intelligence service created and, in some quarters, still supports); it is riddled with violent and ungoverned regions; it is locked in seemingly perpetual conflict with nucleararmed India with which it has fought three major wars in the last 
2

60 years; and some of the most dangerous and violent Islamic fundamentalist groups and individuals in the world reside within its 

borders. Its failure presents a clear and present danger to the region and the United States. Given the attention Pakistan has received both by the US government and the media, it is certainly 

worthy of study.

Less well known in the United States, but no less important, is 

Nigeria. Although not possessing nuclear weapons, Nigeria has the 

potential to dramatically affect the United States and the global 

economy if it fails. Africans are fond of saying: “As Nigeria goes, so 

goes Africa.” Nigeria’s geographic and political position in Africa, its 

single-commodity and soon-to-be-top-20 oil-rich economy, extraordinarily complex demographics, culture of corruption, poor and 

failing national and human infrastructure, long history of dangerously destabilizing religious and ethnic violence, repeated and potential for future military coups d’état, endemic disease, and its 

growing importance to the global and US economy present researchers with a myriad of vexing and intractable problems and 

challenges. Further complicating Nigeria’s current history is the untimely death of reformist Pres. Umaru Yar’Adua and the political and 

religious violence his illness and death have sparked. Unlike Southwest Asia, Africa is often overlooked by political and military planners 

until a problem presents itself such as those found in Libya, Egypt, 

Somalia, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. 

While each African nation is important, none likely has the potential 

to dramatically alter the strategic environment both in Africa and the 

world. Thus, Nigeria is a tantalizing research challenge.

Methodology

This monograph is grounded in reputable scholarship and empirical research through actual site visits to the locations in question. The authors began with a search across the international relations, political economy, and cultural and military studies 

literature. Each enrolled in specialized coursework in international 

studies as well as instruction on conflict.

Each researcher formulated a series of questions relative to a 

section of this monograph. All traveled to conduct interviews with 

senior members of the Department of State, the national intelligence agencies, and the Department of Defense (DOD).3 In addition, the team interviewed senior military and governmental leaders in Nigeria and other West African nations.

In addition to searching for answers to basic questions, the team 

engaged in a modified Delphi method of generating conclusions about 

the present and Nigeria’s current direction.4 These conclusions were 

then revetted against a series of experts and other study team members to adjust hypotheses and then reengaged in additional research 

and interviews to narrow the paper’s perspective and focus.
3

For the sections on military capabilities, the researchers used a 

war-game methodology to add detail to the political, diplomatic, 

military, and technological materials gathered in the interviews, 

discussions, and site visits mentioned above. In these sessions, a 

formal Delphi method was used which included a broad crosssection of 22 senior DOD civilian and military strategic thinkers.5

This scenario-based discussion involved several iterations of discussion wherein the researchers interacted with three opposing 

teams to generate a more complete picture of the challenges a failed 

Nigerian state might present by 2030.

Simultaneously with these events, members of the Air Force 

Strategic Planning Directorate as well as scientists from the Air 

Force Research Laboratories were collaborating on developing a 

list of present and technologically feasible future concepts or systems that the US Air Force either would have or could have in its 

inventory for the target year (2030) in question. Many of these 

concepts are systems resident in the Air Force today, such as the 

F-22 and C-17, which will likely still be in the inventory 22 years 

from now. Others are systems wherein the technologies required 

to field them are sufficiently developed and could be fielded within 

the next two decades.

The final aspect of this analysis involved using a value-focusedthinking quantitative model to formally evaluate the existing and 

potential future concepts for utility in a failed Nigeria with its current and projected systems.6 This model was implemented under the 

direction of the AU Center for Strategy and Technology along with 

Innovative Decisions, Inc., whose members include some of those 

cited in the seminal works on this method in the footnotes below.

Overview

What happens when a modern nation-state fails? Does a single 

catastrophic event herald a nation’s collapse, or is it the result of a 

series of failures in critical areas? Does each failure in a series produce a torrent that becomes a cascade resulting in rapid failure, or 

is it something that happens so slowly that few notice the failure 

until it is too late? What impact does the failure of an individual 

state have on other nations in the region or the world? More importantly, what will be required of other nations to respond to the 

failure of a nation-state now and in the future? If nations choose to 

respond, what characteristics of a failed state would compel the 

United States to respond?

Nigeria with its vast oil wealth, already large and growing population, religious and cultural diversity, history of weak governance, 

endemic corruption, poor health care and education systems, failing human service and industrial infrastructure, rising criminality, 

importance in West Africa and African security, and potential to 

disproportionately impact the global economy is a clear example of 
4

a nation at risk of failure with an ensuing major impact on the rest 

of the world. It is a challenging case study candidate.

In a foreshadowing of what could happen to Nigeria within the 

next two decades, Nigeria is currently experiencing tremendous 

political instability and religious violence. Between November 2009 

and April 2010, reformist Muslim president Umaru Yar’Adua traveled 

to Saudia Arabia to seek treatment for a severe heart condition and 

kidney problems. While he was gone for almost four months, the 

corruption-ridden government was hobbled by nagging and unsubstantiated reports of the president’s death. Although President Yar’Adua returned to Nigeria to continue his recovery in a 

Nigerian hospital, rumors of his death and parliament’s vote on 

9 February 2010 to transfer presidential powers to Christian vice 

president Goodluck Jonathan sparked a new round of religious violence between already fractious Muslims and Christians, resulting 

in the death of hundreds and the internal displacement of thousands more.7 It also prompted Nigeria’s most active and dangerous 

insurgent groups, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 

Delta (MEND), to abandon the cease-fire brokered by President 

Yar’Adua and launch deadly attacks on critical oil infrastructure 

and to kidnap oil workers.

President Yar’Adua succumbed to his illness on 5 May 2010 at 

the age of 58. His successor, President Jonathan, continues to deal 

with the political and religious violence sparked by this forced transition. These significant events mask the grinding poverty and institutional corruption that is destroying the social contract between 

Nigeria’s government and its 135 million people. With critical reforms on hold or in jeopardy, Nigeria’s future is uncertain at best.

This monograph posits the conditions leading to the collapse of 

Nigerian governance and the rapid failure of the state in the year 

2030. Its intent is descriptive rather than prescriptive. The authors 

begin by defining a failed state and then briefly examine Nigeria’s 

history, culture, politics, governance, and military. The monograph 

then explores the various interconnected paths and conditions 

that cause Nigeria, when stressed and declining, to fail and shatter 

in 2030 as it begins its inexorable slide into civil war.

The central question which this monograph, like the others in 

the 2008 Blue Horizons II study, seeks to answer is, “Are there 

technologies and capabilities the US Air Force should invest in now 

to prepare itself to respond in 2030 to the challenges and surprises 

a failed state poses to the United States and the world?” To address 

this question, this book is broken into several parts.

Chapter 2 defines nation-state “failure” and briefly outlines a 

short history of Nigeria from before it became a modern state in 

1960 through the study year 2008. This history provides a context 

for the evolution of the Nigerian state and identifies key vectors 

that could cause the state to fail in 2030.
5

In chapter 3, Col Douglas Jaquish addresses the schisms caused 

by Nigeria’s social-cultural complexity. He argues Nigeria’s rich social and cultural makeup offers hope for a successful future for 

Nigeria. However, deep fissures within its extraordinarily complex 

demographic and cultural makeup could become the fault lines 

that shatter the nation.

Chapter 4, authored by Col Mark DeLong, addresses Nigeria’s 

political situation. The political discussion begins on a cautious 

note of hope for Nigeria’s future, but this hope is bounded by the 

reality that institutional government corruption and a combination 

of religious and cultural factionalism is endemic and pervasive—

the quality of Nigerian governance is already very poor. Left unchecked, these can ultimately corrode the social contract between 

the government and the people and bring about the failure of the 

Nigerian state.

In chapter 5, Col Daniel Gordon takes on the complexities of 

Nigeria’s economy. He examines oil-rich Nigeria’s “one commodity” 

petroleum economy. While the price of oil will likely continue to 

rise and fall and Nigeria’s government normally budgets using a 

lower oil price as a basis for planning, the fact remains that Nigeria’s oligarchs reap 80 percent of the oil profits. Colonel Gordon 

explores three economic scenarios—The Nightmare Continues, The 

Dream Is Realized, and The Dream Is Derailed—noting that a failure by the government to reign in corruption could derail Nigeria’s 

economy and bring about failure of the state.

In chapter 6, Col Robert McAllum addresses Nigeria’s military 

capabilities and technology while examining the role of Nigeria’s 

military in politics and in preserving this ethnically complex nation. While Nigeria’s military has had a relatively consistent constitutional role because it has overthrown five elected governments, 

the support it receives from the government and the people is inconsistent. A lack of support for the military or a highly fragmented 

Nigerian military in 2030 during a time of national crisis could also 

bring down Nigeria.

Chapter 7, authored by Col Christopher Kinnan, builds on the 

work of the other authors. From the team’s research, he develops 

a sequence of events connecting the Nigeria of today to one potential future outcome. In this chapter, he defines what “day-to-day” 

Nigeria may look like in 2030 and presents a plausible scenario 

for a systemic collapse of governance and Nigeria’s failure. Rather 

than a single cause, Colonel Kinnan describes multiple paths of 

cross-cutting social and cultural issues, infrastructure, the economy, the government, and the influence of outside elements that 

could combine and cause Nigeria to fracture and devolve into a 

potential multipartite civil war. If Nigeria shatters, what remains 

in its wake and its effect on the United States and the global 

economy are incalculable.
6

Chapter 8, also authored by Colonel Kinnan, identifies some desired key capabilities and technologies the US Air Force could use 

to respond to this scenario. These are also a set of capabilities that 

would apply to any failed state on the brink of civil war. These capabilities are important to future peace operations—peacekeeping, 

peace enforcement, peacemaking, and peace building—and have 

applicability that range far beyond the scenario painted here. Peace 

enforcement operations in a failed-state scenario in 2030 will require capabilities to anticipate impending threats, understand the 

operating environment and capabilities of the belligerents, engage

with the appropriate force, survive in a highly stressed environment with a small operational and support footprint, rapidly deploy response forces and supplies to the operating area, and quickly 

replenish materiel and people in order to sustain forces.

Based on their analysis of the projected international strategic 

environment in 2030, the authors led the Delphi and quantitative study of US capabilities necessary to engage with Nigeria or 

almost any failed state in the future. This analysis forms the 

backbone of chapter 9. Here, a prioritized list of capabilities the 

US Air Force requires to adequately protect American interests in 

light of Nigeria’s or almost any other failed state’s capabilities is 

addressed. Similarly, the enabling technological advances required to provide the United States with these capabilities are 

also addressed.

In the end, the authors conclude that despite its best efforts, 

Nigeria has a long-term struggle ahead to remain a viable state, 

much less a top-20 economy. While its vast sweet-crude-oil wealth 

potentially provides Nigeria with great power and influence, the 

government’s history of rampant corruption and inability and unwillingness to invest in its human service and industrial infrastructure and the people’s welfare could doom it to failure. Given 

that Nigeria will likely account for more than 25 percent of US oil 

imports by 2030 and that other large economies depend on an uninterrupted flow of oil from Nigeria, a failure of this top-20 global 

economy in Africa will be a failure the United States cannot ignore.

As the American experiences in Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan have shown, intervention in any nation’s internal affairs 

is fraught with extreme danger and, in the case of Nigeria, could 

subject the United States to charges that it is only doing so to protect “its oil.” Thus, the decision to intervene in a failed state must 

be made by those with an understanding of the state and its diverse mix of political factions, ethnicities, religions, cultures, capabilities, and problems. Such understanding requires context, which 

is where this study begins.
7

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the 

bibliography.)

1. LaFeber, American Century.

2. Corley, memorandum of agreement. 

3. There is nothing in this work, or any source used to compile this work, that 

is or draws upon classified material. 

4. Dalkey and Helmer, “Experimental Application of the Delphi Method,” 458–67. 

Dalkey and Helmer discuss the method in depth, as well as its origins in RAND’s 

Project DELPHI.

5. Ibid.

6. The value-focused-thinking model closely parallels that used in the Air Force 

2025 study and is explained fully in Geis, “Toward Blue Horizons.” For details on 

the Air Force 2025 model itself, see Jackson et al., “Air Force 2025 Operational 

Analysis.” For more on value-focused-thinking methodology, see Keeney and Raiffa, 

Decision Making with Multiple Objectives; Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking; Kirkwood, 

Strategic Decision Making; and Parnell et al., “Foundations 2025,” 1336–50.

7. Tran, “President Umaru Yar’Adua returns to Nigeria.”

9

Chapter 2

Nigeria in Context: Defining Failure

A state fails when it suffers “the loss of physical control of its 

territory; [its] monopoly on the legitimate use of force; the erosion 

of [its] legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability 

to provide reasonable public services; and the inability to interact 

with other states as a full member of the international community.”1 The 2007 Failed State Index, compiled by the Fund for Peace 

and Foreign Policy magazine, identified these indicators of a failed 

state and then ranked the nations of the world from those most to 

least likely to fail based on institutional corruption, criminality, the 

ability of a government to regulate the economy and collect taxes, 

internal displacement of citizens, sharp economic decline, group 

grievances, institutional discrimination, the emigration of the intelligentsia, and the state of the ecology.2

Nigeria, an oil-rich country with the largest population in Africa and a top-20 economy, was ranked 17th most likely to fail on 

the list of 148 countries studied for the 2007 Failed State Index.3

The areas of greatest concern for Nigeria included uneven economic and social development, a failure to address group grievances as manifested through an active insurgency, and a perceived lack of government legitimacy.4 While its oil wealth holds 

promise for the future of its people, Nigeria’s potential failure 

holds danger for the global economy and could threaten the vital 

interests of many nations.

The Failed State Index researchers conclude that state failure, 

such as that considered possible in Nigeria, can be catastrophic 

based on a single incident or may be the result of a long period of 

decline in which the government can no longer govern or provide 

for its people. Even worse, states that do fail take a long time to 

recover. The World Bank surveyed states identified as failed in 

1980 and found that they are still failed 28 years later. In fact, statistical analyses suggest that most of these states will likely require 

another 28 years, for a total of 56 years to fully recover.5

According to the United States Commission on National Security, 

state failure results in “an increase in the rise of suppressed nationalisms, ethnic or religious violence, humanitarian disasters, 

major catalytic regional crises, and the spread of dangerous weapons.”6 In short, failed states are a danger not only to their own 

people but also to their regional neighbors, and in a highly globalized world, they are a probable danger to the world economy and 

the vital interests of other nations.
10

Nigeria’s History—Foundations for Failure

Two main facets of Nigeria’s history bear directly on its tenuous 

status as a functioning nation capable of effective governance—the 

British colonization of Nigeria and the spread of Islam.7 Like other 

countries in Africa, Nigeria was once a British colony. Its current 

system of government and the present racial, ethnic, and religious 

conflicts are, to an extent, the result of its colonial past.

Nigeria has the sixth largest Muslim population in the world.8

Moreover, it is the largest country in Africa, with an almost equal 

balance of Muslims and Christians—a balance that will soon reach 

a tipping point because of the larger population growth in the Islamic north.9

Pre-Nigerian Nation

Prior to the arrival of the earliest European settlers, the area 

now called Nigeria was the home to a number of separate and 

distinct societies. The largest of these included the Kingdom of 

Borno in the northeast; the city-states of Katsina, Kano, Zaria, 

and Gobir in the north-central part of modern Nigeria; the Yoruba 

Kingdoms of Ife, Oya, and Ijebu in the southwestern regions; and 

the Igbo region in the southeast. Between these various regions, 

an extensive trading network developed, which stretched across 

the Sahara.10

The people of the region have long-standing roots that predate 

the drawing of Nigeria’s modern borders. Despite widespread trading between these regions, the area now known as Nigeria has a 

history of conflict and instability. This background has been made 

potentially more unstable by developments in the postcolonial era.

In the late 1790s through the early 1800s, the northern kingdoms 

began resisting the establishment of a religion-dictated set of laws. 

The idea of religious rule began to spread to the region as Islam continued its westward expansion from the Middle East. The resistance 

of these kingdoms set the stage for an Islamic holy war, in which the 

Sokoto caliphate, in an effort to create stability, end violence, and 

establish Islamic justice, brought the northern sections of presentday Nigeria under a single Islamic government in 1808.11 The caliphate reached its peak when it eventually governed 30 emirates from 

modern Burkina Faso to Cameroon in the mid-1800s.12

The North was not the only part of Nigeria experiencing unrest 

in the early 1800s. In 1817 the Yoruba (southwestern) provinces 

were caught up in civil wars over issues surrounding trade roots, 

the slave trade, and the right to populate inland areas.13

Shortly thereafter, in part as a result of pressure from missionaries and others, Britain began to work to eradicate the slave trade 

along the African coast. These efforts began in Lagos and then 

moved eastward along the African coast. The decision to eradicate 
11

the slave trade led to a concomitant decision to occupy and maintain control over the African coastal regions. Catholic and Protestant missionaries followed on the heels of British forces. The religious orders cooperated to divide up the territory in order to convert 

as many of the indigenous people to Christianity as they could with 

their limited resources. This process of gradually expanding both 

British influence and the influence of the Christian faith would 

forever change the southern part of Nigeria.

The British occupation of these lands initially resulted in the 

granting of trading rights to a large territory encompassing much 

of Nigeria to the Royal Niger Company. The company exercised 

control over the territory in exchange for a monopoly on trading 

rights for goods sold from Nigeria to the rest of the British Empire.

While the boundaries of this region were expanded several times, 

usually by force, they did not quite encompass all of present-day 

Nigeria. To achieve that objective, the jurisdiction of the Royal Niger Company was deemed insufficient. In 1900, after compensating 

the Royal Niger Company for the loss of its property, the British 

established a formal British governmental protectorate with Sir 

Frederick Lugard as the high commissioner of northern Nigeria.14

This change allowed Britain to bring its full power to bear on uniting the lands of Nigeria as a single colony (see figure 1).

Northern Region

Eastern

Region

Western

Region

Kaduna

River Benue

River Niger

Ibadan

Lagos Enugu

Figure 1. Colonial Nigeria. A historical map of Nigeria showing three federal regions created by British colonial rule. (Reprinted from Association of Nigerian 

Scholars for Dialogue, Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism 1997, ed. 

Peter P. Ekeh, www.waado.org/nigerian_scholars/archive/pubs/wilber8.html.)
12

Among Lugard’s first challenges was to bring the Sokoto caliphate under British control. This was initially achieved by force, but 

Lugard’s governance after the conflicts was considered highly successful, largely because he generally applied indirect rule, allowing 

the former rulers (the emirs) to enjoy some autonomy. To insure 

against major uprisings, Lugard reduced the number of small fiefdoms in the emirates, thus reducing the wealth and patronage provided to the emirs, which curbed their influence and power substantially. Further, the emirs were made formally subservient to 

the British crown. Nonetheless, Lugard permitted the continuation 

of Shar’ia law in this region, although Shar’ia law was not applied 

to Christians living in the Sokoto emirates.15 While this use of indirect rule kept relative peace in the north, it had the effect of perpetuating existing divisions and set the stage for a later religious 

bifurcation of the country. By 1914, during his tenure as governor 

general, Lugard succeeded in unifying Nigeria.

In 1919 Lugard’s successor, Hugh Clifford, took charge. His 

leadership style was nearly the opposite of his predecessor. Whereas 

Lugard preferred to allow the various ethnic groups to retain some 

autonomy, Clifford sought to modernize Nigeria and bring it into 

the Western world. Clifford’s efforts had the dual effect of alienating some while producing yet a new culture in the south—one more 

Western and increasingly industrial.16

In the efforts to civilize the Nigerian delta, Clifford introduced cultural influences that would eventually serve to further split the Nigerian populace. Clifford scaled back the influence of the Sokoto caliphate, and Christianity, which had first taken root in the country 

during the slave trade, began to rapidly expand in the south.17 Complicating this split were the indigenous people who lived in southeastern Nigeria—the remnants of the kingdom of Igbo. Upon first 

encountering the British several years after the colony was formally 

established, the Igbo were forced to pay taxes to support the British 

crown. The Igbo reacted with animosity, which placed them at odds 

with their neighbors to the north and west. This simmering animosity against the British lingered in this region of Nigeria.

Thus, the initial result of British colonialism was the exacerbation 

of the already considerable ethnic and cultural differences spanning 

a collection of people with divergent histories and traditions. The 

newly created “Nigeria” was composed of diverse people with no 

common sense of nationality. Moreover, due to the types of leadership exercised by Lugard and Clifford, the dividing lines between the 

Islamic emirates and Christian provinces were reinforced. The north 

was generally left to practice its Islamic agrarian traditions18 while 

the south was modernized and opened to commercial trade with 

ports, roads, and railroads.19 Yet even the south was split between 

its eastern and western parts (see figure 2).20

From the period of 1940 to 1960, Britain continually tried to 

unify these diverse regions (see figure 3). The result of its efforts 
13

still stands in some measure today with the Hausa-Fulani (northern), Yoruba (western), and Igbo (eastern) regions in fierce political 

and economic competition.21 Indeed, today most Nigerians continue to identify themselves by their religion before identifying 

themselves as being Nigerian or African.22

Today, Nigeria is composed of 36 states (see figure 4), many of 

which trace their history as described above. As a result of the prior 

existence of city-states and the uneven effects of colonization, there 

are further splits embedded within states as well.23 In fact, within 

modern Nigeria there are over 350 distinct ethnic groups.24 The fault 

lines among these individual states, religions, and ethnicities, as 

well as between the north and south, are the basis of sectarian violence, which is becoming increasingly common across the country.25

This violence was a prime factor in the original Nigerian governments’ inability to fully govern the region.

The Nascent State (1960–99)

Britain granted Nigeria independence in 1960 after a set of parliamentary elections in late 1959. In this vote, the parties representing the Muslim north earned 142 seats in the 312-seat assemFigure 2. Twelve federal states of Nigeria. A historical map of Nigeria showing 12 

federal states created by federal military government on the eve of civil war. (Reprinted from Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue, Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism 1997, ed. Peter P. Ekeh, www.waado.org/nigerian

_scholars/archive/pubs/wilber8.html.)

River Benue

River Niger

Midwest

State

North

Eastern

State

Kano

State

Kano

Maiduguri

Zaria

Jos

Horin

Ibadan

Lagos

Benin Enugu

Caiabar

Port Harcourt

Sokoto

Kwara

State

 South

Eastern

State

East

Central

State

North

Central

State

North

Western

State

Western State

River State

Benue-Plateau

Lagos State

State
14

Figure 4. 36 states of modern Nigeria. Courtesy of the United Nations Development Program.

Figure 3. States of Nigeria. A historical map of Nigeria showing 36 federal states 

created by a series of federal military governments through military decrees. (Reprinted 

from Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue, Wilberforce Conference on 

Nigerian Federalism 1997, ed. Peter P. Ekeh, www.waado.org/nigerian_scholars/

archive/pubs/wilber8.html.)

Sokoto

Kebbi

Katsina

Kano

Kaduna

Niger

Kwara

Oyo

Ogun

Lagos

Lagos

Ikeja

Abeokuta

Ondo

Edo

Delta

Rivers

Akwa

Ibom

Enugu

Anambra Abia

Cross

River Enugu

Ondo

Asaba Awka

Owerri

Imo Oyo Calabar

Umuahia

Osun Kogi

Benue

Bauchi

Plateau

Taraba

Adamawa

Bauchi

Jos

Jalingo

Makurdi

Federal Capital

Territory

Port

Harcourt

Benin

City

Yola

Kaduna

Minna

Ilorin

Ibadan

Osogbo

Abujn

Lokoja

Jigawa Yobe Borno

Dutse Maiduguri

Damaturu

Lake

Chad

Kano

Sokoto Katsina

Bimini

Bernin
15

bly, but no political party achieved a voting majority. As the British 

departed, this newly elected parliament was in place, as was its 

newly elected leader Nnamdi Azikiwe. Azikiwe became president, 

replacing the colonial governor.

As none of the parties had a majority, the federal legislature was 

run by a coalition government of Muslims and Christians. Almost 

immediately, however, periodic crises and charges of corruption 

were levied at politicians of various factions.26 This mistrust grew 

and led to a series of challenges, the most serious being challenges 

to the 1963 national census. The census would have been used to 

craft election laws and, more importantly, determine how revenues 

would be distributed throughout the country.

The first postindependence elections in 1964 led to continued 

charges of political unfairness and boycotts of the electoral process 

by provinces in the east. Even after a second set of elections was 

held in those regions which initially boycotted the electoral process, 

the major governing parties were barely speaking to each other.

The army launched a coup d’état in early 1966, assassinating 

key party leaders in all sectors of the nation. In the ensuing violence, at least 2,000 Nigerians died.27 This was followed by a 

countercoup in July 1966 when the northern territories attempted 

to overthrow the exiting military leader. These events created the 

two factions that led to the civil war of 1967—a war in which up to 

100,000 died in combat and up to one million more died of starvation.28 In the end, Maj Gen Yakubu Gowon, the military leader, assumed control of Nigeria in late 1969.

For a time, General Gowon was able to run the country, but as 

political restrictions were lifted, demonstrations increased, and political activists began to incite unrest. His attempt to update the 

1963 census in 1973 was unsuccessful, as most ethnic groups 

were fearful of the results and battled census workers to ensure it 

was not completed fairly.29 Corruption became endemic, which 

generated inefficiencies in the economy. At one point, the Port of 

Lagos was clogged with ships filled with goods to unload; the backlog to unload some of these ships stretched to 15 months. As the 

country descended once more toward chaos, General Gowon was 

deposed in a bloodless coup d’état in 1975.30

General Gowon was replaced by Brig Gen Murtala Muhammad, 

whose first actions were to dismiss 10,000 governmental civil servants for inefficiency and corruption and demobilize 100,000 from 

the military ranks. General Muhammad scrapped the 1973 census, 

deeming it an abject failure, leaving the 1963 population count as 

the official survey used for determining national assembly and senate apportionment. He reset the transition to civilian government 

with a target date of early 1976, which earned him respect among 

the people. However, his reign was short-lived. He was assassinated 

in February of that year, after only seven months in office.
16

Military leader Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo assumed the national 

leadership in the intervening years leading up to the 1979 elections. General Obasanjo presided over a period of relative economic 

prosperity, partly due to increased oil revenues, and led the nation 

back toward democracy.31 Nigeria adopted a constitution based 

closely on that of the United States. Nigeria elected a new president, a house of representatives, and a senate, all of which took 

office on 1 October 1979.

These elections, like those of the 1960s, led to a coalition government, as no party garnered a majority of the vote. Disagreements 

between the parties were substantial. In order to placate party opponents, massive spending on federal projects ensued, which increased the Nigerian national debt and drove down the value of the 

Nigerian currency. As a result of its devalued currency, Nigeria’s 

economy began to decline. A drop in oil prices added to the misery.32

By the time the next round of elections occurred in 1983, corruption and a blatant disregard for democratic processes were corrosively endemic in the federal government, and political unrest 

was growing.33 Despite presiding over a precipitous decline in the 

Nigerian economy and being highly unpopular, the ruling party 

claimed nearly three-quarters of the seats in the house and senate, 

all but confirming a rigged vote count.

The military seized power again in 1983 as there was no domestic confidence in the civilian leadership. The new leader was Maj 

Gen Muhammadu Buhari, who worked to purge the government of 

corruption, bring federal spending back under control, and stabilize the value of the Nigerian currency, which was plummeting on 

international markets. General Buhari’s austerity programs to curtail Nigerian debt were unpopular, and many believed he was out 

of touch.34 In the end, Maj Gen Ibraham Babangida overthrew General Buhari in a coup d’état in 1985.

The Babangida regime was faced with the same economic crisis 

that made the Buhari leadership unpopular. Austerity measures 

were necessary to entice the International Monetary Fund to offer 

a bailout plan worth $4.3 billion. In addition to beginning to restructure the economy, General Babangida appointed a commission in 1986 to direct the transition back to civilian rule. Although 

he did not agree with many of the commission’s recommendations, 

he implemented them, including a commission recommendation of 

the further division of Nigeria, creating two more states in 1987.

However, General Babangida wanted to retain his power. While 

the initial timetable called for new elections before 1990, General 

Babangida postponed them until 1992. When the presidential election was held, confusion on the date of voting led to an unusually 

low participation rate of around 30 percent. The results were nullified by General Babangida, who sought to remain in power as 

interim president until a new president could be named via yet 

another set of elections. The combination of these events led to 
17

public dissatisfaction. As a result, he was overthrown by yet another 

coup d’état, which brought Chief Ernest Shonekan to power. After 

two months, the chief stepped aside, giving power to Vice President 

Sani Abacha.35

Abacha immediately dissolved all organizations of state governance and installed his own regime. He ruled as a corrupt tyrant, 

often killing political opponents and pocketing national oil revenues. By the time he died in office, some estimates indicate he may 

have stolen over $3 billion.36 In fact, Abacha has been listed as the 

fourth most corrupt leader in world history.37 Abacha remained 

president until his 1998 death due to a possible heart attack. As an 

autopsy was never performed, it is unknown whether the death 

was by natural causes or assassination by his military advisors in 

order to effect another coup d’état.

In the wake of Abacha’s death, army general Abdulsalami Abubakar assumed the role of head of state. He immediately freed one 

past leader, General Obasanjo, from prison and scheduled new national elections. General Obasanjo won the election in 1999 and 

remained president until April 2007.38 While president, Obasanjo 

campaigned for a constitutional amendment to run for a third 

term; the amendment was never passed, so he stepped down after 

eight years as president. He was succeeded by his vice president, 

Shehu Mus Yar’Adua.

This early history of Nigeria tells much about the nation’s stability, its culture, and its corruption. These are crucial to understanding how Nigeria may evolve over the next two to three decades. This timeline shows that there is almost no history or 

tradition of continuity of leadership in Nigeria. Further, nearly every regime in the country’s history has been, by Western standards, 

corrupt. Money is siphoned from major industries by those in 

power, sometimes at the rate of hundreds of millions of dollars per 

year. The inability of the Nigerian government to agree on a census 

for over 40 years undermines the legitimacy of the electoral process 

and thus the legitimacy of Nigerian governance.

In short, Nigeria is a country that has been governmentally unstable. Ruled by corrupt elites who have shown an enormous reluctance to relinquish power, sometimes unto death, it has no history of majority governance or even national agreement on any 

major issue. Analogous to a plate of china, Nigeria remains crisscrossed by a myriad of stress cracks and fissures that are the result of the ethnic and religious cleavages spanning the country. If 

sufficiently stressed, this china plate will split or even shatter. 

What is frightening is that, stressed in the wrong manner, Nigeria 

is a nation-state which could conceivably splinter into dozens or 

even hundreds of independent pieces.
18

The Nigerian State Today

Despite a questionable election in 2007, President Yar’Adua rapidly implemented his reform initiatives. These include developing 

sufficient and adequate power and energy supplies, improving food 

security and agricultural production, and diversifying the economy. 

The industrial-based economy emphasizes creating wealth, improving the transportation sector by building modern road and rail 

networks, promoting land reforms that will make unused land productive for commercial farming, protecting national security, and 

emphasizing security in the Niger Delta region. Another initiative 

is investing in twofold reforms in the educational sector to raise 

Nigeria to the minimum acceptable international standards of education for all by developing a plan for teaching science and technology skills.39

In 2008 Nigerians began to see some results in land reform, but 

they appear to reserve judgment on how well the reforms will work. 

In October 2009, President Yar’Adua met with the leader of the 

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and 

representatives of insurgent groups within Nigeria in an effort to 

make good on his promise to improve security in the Niger Delta 

region.40 President Yar’Adua’s benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of his seven reforms, most of which will bear fruit slowly, 

is 2015.

Notes

1. “Failed States Index 2007,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Wyler, Weak and Failing States, 8.

6. Commission on National Security, New World Coming, 6.

7. Library of Congress, Country Profile: Nigeria, 1.

8. Paden, “Nigeria.”

9. Ibid.

10. Institute for Security Studies, Nigeria: History and Politics.

11. The boundaries of this caliphate extended both east and west well beyond 

the boundaries of present-day Nigeria but were limited to the northern sections of 

what is now Nigeria. Library of Congress, Country Profile: Nigeria, 1, 21.

12. Ibid., 3.

13. Ibid., 22.

14. Ibid., 28.

15. Paden, “Nigeria.”

16. Library of Congress, Country Profile: Nigeria, 4.

17. Ibid., 4, 47.

18. Paden, “Nigeria.”

19. Library of Congress, Country Study: Nigeria.

20. Library of Congress, Country Study: Nigeria, Frederick Lugard.

21. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, 20.

22. Ruby and Shah, “Nigeria’s Presidential Election.”

23. Ibid., 2.

24. Dagne, Nigeria in Political Transition, 1.
19

25. Danan and Hunt, Mixed Blessings, 30.

26. This mistrust boiled over into actual fights within some of the regional (state) 

legislatures at times. See Library of Congress, Country Profile: Nigeria.

27. Sarkees, “The Correlates of War Data on War,” 123–44.

28. Ibid.

29. Anene, “Military Elites and Democratization,” 230–45.

30. Library of Congress, Country Profile: Nigeria, 40–41.

31. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, 64.

32. Ibid.

33. Falola and Heaton, History of Nigeria, 208–9.

34. Ibid., 212–16.

35. BBC, “Nigeria: A History of Coups.”

36. Falola and Heaton, History of Nigeria, 234.

37. Hodess, “Introduction to Political Corruption,” 13.

38. Lewis, Performance and Legitimacy in Nigeria’s New Democracy. There is 

ample evidence that the elections of Obasanjo in 2003 and Yar’Adua in 2007 were 

fraudulent. However, given the history of Nigerian coups, the majority of the people 

in Nigeria prefer a civilian leadership to another military takeover, even if the means 

by which the civilians are in power is not wholly legitimate.

39. Appendix A, “Yar’Adua’s Seven-Point Agenda.”

40. “Yar’Adua Meets with MEND’s Aaron Team,” Times of Nigeria. This meeting 

included President Yar’Adua; Nobel Laureate Professor Wole Soyinka; Henry Okah, 

presumed leader of MEND; and others comprising “the Aaron Team.” The Aaron 

Team is a group of negotiators established by MEND and led by the former chief of 

general staff, Vice Adm Okhai Mike Akhigbe. Its purpose is to establish a dialogue 

with the government and work to bring the Niger Delta crisis to a mutually 

acceptable end. Based on a statement released by MEND confirming the meeting, 

the group heralded the meeting as “the beginning of serious, meaningful dialogue 

between MEND and the Nigerian government to deal with and resolve root issues 

that have long been swept under the carpet” (ibid.).

21

Chapter 3

The Social Schisms of Nigeria

Col Douglas W. Jaquish

Nigeria is a mosaic of dramatic demographic forces fused together by the early twentieth century machinations of the British 

Empire. Brought under colonial rule in the late nineteenth century, Nigeria relished the independence it received in 1960. Invigorated by the discovery of oil in 1956, the fledgling nation hoped for 

a bright future. Instead, the young state fractured through corruption and took the next half century to achieve some semblance of 

stable self-governance.

Demographic Fissures

Nigeria is comprised of approximately 350 ethnic groups, more 

than any other nation on the vast African continent.1 Four main 

groups make up the majority of this population: Hausa and Fulani 

(29 percent), Yoruba (21 percent), and Igbo (18 percent).2 These 

and the next eight significant population groups of Kanuri, Ibibio, 

Tiv, Ijaw, Nupe, Anang, Efik, and Kalbari bring with them distinct 

languages. While English stands as Nigeria’s official language, 

three other market languages—Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa—also tie 

the people together politically and economically.3

Thrown into this linguistic milieu is a mix of ethnic, geographical, and historical diversity that has often boiled over into open, 

genocidal conflict. This was particularly evident in the Igbo uprising of the late 1960s, a civil war that cost roughly 1.1 million Nigerian lives.4 As recently as the year 2000, more than 1,900 Nigerians died in clashes between Muslims and Christians in the seam 

states.5 This highlights a deep religious divide that continues to 

trouble Nigeria.

Religion is often the primary defining factor in Nigeria for economic, social justice, and political reasons. Nigeria has the greatest 

number of people in any single African nation, as well as the continent’s largest and the world’s sixth largest Muslim population.6

Most of Nigeria’s Muslims, who currently account for roughly 50 

percent (and rapidly growing) of the population,7 live in the 14 

northern states; nearly 40 percent of Nigerians profess the Christian faith and dwell in the 22 southern states; and the last 10 percent of the population professes syncretism or other indigenous 

(animist) beliefs and are scattered across Nigeria.8

Consider the vastness of the country—nearly one out of every 

four sub-Saharan Africans is Nigerian.9 According to a recent report from the Washington, DC–based Center for New American Se-
22

curity, violent civil conflict remains a significant possibility in Nigeria. Religion is a key factor worthy of attention by the international 

community and the US government in particular.10

Culture is also a strong force in Nigerian life. “For most Nigerians, social life unfolds within an ethnic context, and this tie to 

one’s group is manifest in a proliferation of ethnic states, political 

parties, demands for teaching in local languages and various other 

ethnic-cultural organizations.”11 Nigeria experiences ongoing communal violence between Christians and Muslims and among its 

various ethnic groups. At least 800,000 people have been driven 

from their homes since 2003 because of these clashes.12

Some of the most violent disputes have been between Muslim 

ethnic Fulani herders and Christian ethnic Mambila farmers over 

grazing lands in the eastern part of the country.13 A similar conflict 

brewed at a lower level in the north between farmers and herders 

of different religions, several were killed, prompting the dispatch of 

hundreds of police officers to the area.14

In the Niger Delta region, insurgent conflict persists over resource allocation and oil profits—such conflict is defined as criminality by the Nigerian government. Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger 

Delta People’s Volunteer Force, was arrested in September 2004 

after he called for the disintegration of the Nigerian state. His detainment brought a temporary moratorium to all insurgency activities in the Delta but indicated strong civil sentiment with respect to control of oil resources and self-determination.15 Intercommunal violence provoked a military crackdown that destroyed the 

Rivers State town of Odiama in the Niger Delta.16

Ethnic, regional, and community ties also define politics in Nigeria.17 Patronage is a strong dynamic in the culture, where candidates who “buy off” the most constituents generally win elections.18

This perversion of governance flows from Nigeria’s corrupt society, 

culture, and precolonial history. It also inflames growing ethnic 

nationalism across the country. American anthropologist and author Daniel Jordan Smith postulates, “The prominence of corruption as both a justification for nationalist movements and a critique to undermine them illustrates both the extent of discontent 

about corruption and Nigerians’ cynicism that anyone can rise 

above it.”19

Nigerians are a proud people whose nationalism runs as deep as 

the corruption woven in the fabric of their living and trade. Driving 

this rampant corruption is a petroleum-based economy, a combination which affords wealth to the few in power, namely the oligarchs. Even as annual petroleum revenues exceed $90 billion, the 

vast majority of Nigerians live on less than two dollars a day, with 

many surviving on less than one dollar a day.20 Tribal and especially political-based patronage networks providing power to chosen “haves” exacerbate economic disparity.21 Alongside religious 

beliefs, patronage networks driven by a culture of corruption define 
23

the way of life for the vast majority of Nigerians and are a pretext 

for internal conflict.

The Rise of Information

Enter the twenty-first century with the sprawl of information 

and the spread of information technologies. Africa, with its lack of 

infrastructure, is ripe for growth in an industry that constantly 

seeks new markets. One-hundred-dollar laptops, wireless cell 

phones, and the Internet will grant access to seemingly bottomless 

wells of digital information to anyone on the network.22 Thomas 

Freidman describes this phenomenon simply by the title of his 

2005 book, The World Is Flat. Information technology was, is, and 

will likely remain a key flattening force but only in the context of 

conveniently aligned events in the developed world.

Among these were the fall of the Berlin Wall, huge intellectual 

capital investments within the population of India, and the global 

fiber optic networks laid during the “dot-com” period of the late 

1990s.23 But the present-day surge in information technology alone 

does not create vast social and cultural change in all countries. It 

operates primarily in societies that are poised for that change. 

Lacking a robust communications hardware infrastructure, Nigeria is ripe for the revolution that this wireless generation of information technology promises.

This rise of information is also taking on the traditional power of 

the media once governed by states. Internet blogs such as Global 

Voices Online offer dialogue and expression and were an open forum for many Nigerians in last year’s elections. “New information 

and communication tools such as wikis, blogs, ‘tweets,’ podcasts, 

and social networking sites have the potential to transform election 

reporting, campaigning, monitoring, and political discussions all 

over the world.”24 Nigeria provides a unique cyberspace outlet in 

this global market of information and ideas in Africa.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) administrator 

Kemal Dervis stated, “Globalization has fundamentally altered the 

world economy, creating winners and losers. Reducing inequalities 

both within and between countries, and building a more inclusive 

globalization is the most important development challenge of our 

time.”25 Information technology is both a powerful flattener and an 

effective means to unravel the inequalities that create social disparity in Nigeria. But it also is a double-edged sword. Knowledge 

gained through information technology brings power to the people, 

the power of transparency, and has the potential to generate unrest among unequals that compete for an interest in Nigeria’s 

poorly distributed oil wealth.
24

Pandemics and the Youth Bulge

A major health crisis faces Nigeria in preventable diseases, 

namely human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immune 

deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and malaria. World Health Organization (WHO) statistics from 2007 show that malaria kills four out 

of 10 children—over 270,000 per year—with most dying under 

the age of five.26 According to Nigeria’s National Ministry of Health, 

infected children will suffer two to four malaria illnesses each 

year, and 70 percent of pregnant women are infected and suffer 

from the disease.27

Nigeria’s central government has made only low levels of investment and achievement in health and education services over the 

past three decades. The HIV epidemic, a retrovirus that causes 

AIDS, is a national crisis pervading every segment of society. HIV 

infection rates have surpassed 5 percent prevalence in the population—the rate of infection is currently projected only to worsen and 

surpass 5 percent prevalence.

Over five million Nigerians are HIV positive. Most do not have access to drugs to treat the infection and, therefore, will or have developed AIDS. Since the infection is spread largely through sexual contact in the Nigerian heterosexual population, it directly threatens 

what is considered the “prime age” workforce. Also it will, without 

aggressive treatment of infected individuals, harm economic productivity and lead to millions of orphans in the next decade. Today, 

one out of 10 families in Nigeria houses a disease orphan, with up to 

three or four orphans per household in higher prevalence states.28

Africa is experiencing what the United Nation’s (UN) Global Environment Outlook report calls “demographic transition” (see figure 5).29 Pandemics are having a key impact on this transition for 

Africa as a whole and, specifically, Nigerians. Nigeria’s youth are 

rapidly becoming the predominant age bracket, and this has tremendous national and strategic implications. The US Agency for 

International Development (USAID) posts several disturbing statistics for Nigeria:

•  Half of the country is comprised of youths under the age of 15.

•  A large population and high fertility have led to over five million births a year.

• Underweight and under-age-five mortality rates are worse than

the average in both developing countries and sub-Saharan Africa.

•  Infant and maternal mortality rates are 90 percent higher than

in developing countries.30

The preponderance of these infant and maternal deaths occurs 

in Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim northern states.31 This persistent rift between north and south is a potential driver for future 

conflict between Nigeria’s “haves” and “have-nots.” Demographic 
25

pressures in Nigeria are driven by its expanding population. As 

shown in figure 6, Africa, like Asia, is growing in population whereas 

the rest of the world is not.32

This disproportionate population growth combined with social 

and economic disparity is a potential danger to stability in Nigeria 

and the surrounding region.

Nigeria combines a high birthrate of 5.6 children with the secondorder effect of the HIV pandemic, namely increased adult mortality, 

which in turn creates a youth population that is increasing as a 

percentage of the overall population.33 This looming “youth bulge” 

brings with it many unique challenges. German anthropologist 

Gunnar Heinsohn describes them this way:

A result of rapid population growth, a youth bulge happens when 30 to 40 

percent of a nation’s males are between the ages of 15 and 29. Even if these 

young men are well nourished and have good housing and education, their 

numbers grow much faster than the economy can provide them with career 

opportunities. Many don’t have jobs, and don’t have places in society. When 

Figure 5. Demographic transition. (Reprinted from United Nations Environment 

Programme, Report of Global Environment Outlook [GEO] 4: Environment for Development, [Progress Press Limited: Valetta, Malta, December 2007].)
26

so many young men compete for the few places available, they become frustrated, angry, and violent. They [enlist] quite easily into radical groups and 

terror organizations.34

Unemployed and underemployed young adults can rapidly destabilize a society with their restive energy. They are quick to join 

nationalistic movements or are quite often easy targets for radical 

religious movements. In Heinsohn’s view, this human dynamic 

equals “demographic armament,” an arsenal of people standing 

against weak governments and even other nations who are facing 

the “demographic capitulation” of negative population growth 

rates.35 The youth bulge emerging in Nigeria may swap roles from 

productive laborers to disaffected rebels in the next two decades, 

which then may place enormous stresses on the fissures and 

cracks dividing Nigerian society.

Exacerbating the prospects for the employment of these young 

people is the problem of the “brain drain” that persists in Nigeria. 

Intellectuals and many health care professionals continue to emigrate to the United States and Europe.36 In early 2006, WHO identified Nigeria as one of 30 countries across the globe with critical 

shortages of health service providers.37

The loss of intellectuals reduces educational opportunities for 

the young and, in the long term, their chance of learning a trade 

and becoming self-sufficient. It also harms governance on a number of levels by depriving the nation of educated people who can 

lead it and further develop and integrate Nigeria into the global 

economy. This loss of health care workers and intellectuals will 

cause the current demographic trends to continue and limit the 

prospects for economic growth that would help Nigeria remain stable, especially as young men reach their peak employment years.

Figure 6. Population by region. (Reprinted from the United Nations Environment 

Programme, Report of GEO 4: Environment for Development [Progress Press Limited: Valetta, Malta, December 2007].)
27

Corruption and Criminality

Corruption holds a prominent place in Nigerian trade and daily 

living. With respect to Nigeria’s culture of corruption, Smith states, 

“Discontent about corruption, frustration over perceived marginalization, and aspirations for a more equal and just society are expressed in religious language. This is among the most significant 

and potentially explosive trends in contemporary Nigerian society,”38

and leaves the general population “interpreting corruption and inequality in a language that highlights ethnic discrimination.”39

More than anything, corruption drives a criminal element prominent in Nigeria’s lucrative oil industry. A militant sector classified 

as “criminality” by the government emerged in the Niger Delta region with an agenda to highlight environmental abuses in the 

Delta.40 MEND, a growing and powerful opposition force to Nigeria’s military since 2005, is the most prominent among these 

groups. MEND is credited for reducing Nigeria’s oil production by 

as much as 25 percent in recent years and by 50 percent capacity 

for brief periods in 2009.41

The combined effort of criminality in the Delta and piracy in the 

Gulf of Guinea has led to the loss of 10 percent of Nigeria’s $92 billion oil industry as of 2007; oil business revenues in mid-2009 were 

running at around $40 billion per year.42 These revenues undoubtedly strengthen forces both inside and outside Nigeria that keep the 

state and region unstable. In addition, unregulated oil production in 

the Delta has led to a local ecological crisis of acid rain, air pollution, 

and fouled waters that has limited the Niger Delta population’s access to clean drinking water and stable fishing stocks.43

Corruption in Nigeria is not just a domestic issue. Transnational 

crime has germinated in Nigeria over the past four decades. Louise 

Shelley argues that “the growth of transnational crime is inevitable 

because of the rise in regional conflicts, decline in border controls, 

greater international mobility of goods and people, and the growing 

economic disparities between developed and developing countries.”44 These forces of instability—declining oil production, endemic corruption, and rising criminality—plague Nigeria and could 

define a path to state failure.

The corruption in Nigeria reaches to the highest levels of government and has the potential to be a major catalyst in state failure. 

The Nigerian government initiated efforts to create a perception 

that it is addressing this corruption. It established the Nigerian 

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The EFCC has 

the reputation of being the president’s storefront in that it serves to 

protect his financial exploits and target people of interest.45 This 

reputation undermines government legitimacy. An Internet poll 

conducted by The Fund for Peace asked what single factor causes 

state failure. The overwhelming response was “corruption,” appearing three times more often than that of the next category, “lack 
28

of basic education.”46 Corruption challenges any notion of sound 

governance, effectively undermining public trust and confidence.

Nigeria’s persistent poverty points to a fundamental failure in 

national and local governance and exposes the corruption that defines Nigerian life. The World Bank lists Nigeria as a less than a 

25th percentile nation for government effectiveness, as shown in 

figure 7.47 Criminality is undoubtedly a critical driver in Nigeria’s 

poor performance in governance.48

Figure 7. Government effectiveness. (UN, World Book [New York: UN, 2006].)

Petro-Culture Collapse

Oil drives the Nigerian power brokers and energizes nationalist 

sentiments and even transnational forces to bring conflict to the 

country. The global economy in 2009 heavily depends on Nigeria’s 

oil resources, but the rise of new energy technologies in the twentyfirst century threatens the importance of Nigeria’s dominant industry in the next 20 years. Traditional energy suppliers face shifting 

markets driven by the national security interests of competing 

global powers. Nations built and dependent on oil commodities 

face dramatic change, including loss of revenue and possible chaos 

as governments find themselves unable to pay for vital social services for their populations.

A possible future decline in the world’s oil demand driven by 

new types of energy bodes ill for Nigeria. A weakened petrol-based 

economy, combined with a large socially oppressed and possibly 

radicalized youth population and a corrupt and illegitimate government, has the potential to shatter Nigerian society. Civil clashes 

are certain to worsen following such a collapse. The failure of cen-
29

tral and local governments to create the institutions and infrastructure that normally foster prosperity, support education, and 

promote equity will foreclose options for dealing with this impending social and economic crisis.

Clash of Haves and Have-Nots

The youth bulge exacerbates Nigeria’s imbalance in resource 

distribution. The country’s transportation infrastructure, left undeveloped, makes efficient transport of goods virtually impossible 

and subject to exploitation by the MEND’s roving gangs. Nigeria’s 

growing population is expected to climb to 225 million by 2030. 

Marked by near 6 percent unemployment in 2007,49 the youth bulge 

will result in dismal employment prospects for restless workers who 

will find little hope for work in the nation’s weak industrial sector.

Despite Nigeria’s strong progress in food security, the UN Food 

and Agriculture Organization posits that Nigeria may suffer future 

water shortages in the agrarian north. This region borders the Sahel 

and the Sahara, an area known as a training ground for international terrorist groups. Complicating economic development in 

the north is the suffocating cloak of Shar’ia law, which prevents 

women from gaining an education or achieving equality in the 

workplace, effectively eliminating half the potential of Nigeria’s 

northern states. This latter dynamic is taking place in the region 

where birthrates are the highest in the country.50 Over time, this 

will further widen the economic disparity that defines the rift between north and south.

The effects of climate change may adversely affect the whole of 

the country. The story of global climate change has gained traction, as evidenced by the US decision at the late 2007 global summit in Bali to implement and enforce initiatives to bring its domestic industry into tighter compliance with rules regulating 

harmful emissions.51 The UN Framework Convention on Climate 

Change in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009 produced 

some additional momentum. Regardless of severity, climate 

change potentially threatens to impact global demographics, especially in states that have enormous investment and dependency 

on industries operating near the coasts and those with large 

population concentrations located near ocean or desert areas.52

While the Sahara Desert may expand more rapidly into the northern agrarian regions, a rise in the sea level may affect the coastal 

south. In short, global changes in climate could displace people 

and disrupt economic activities in coastal centers such as Lagos 

or the Niger Delta.53 Internal displacement or forced migration of 

populations from these threatened regions only exacerbates current ethnic tensions.

As a result of the influences of culture, climate change, and governmental corruption, an economic schism is developing across 
30

Nigeria, and this divide is likely to worsen. As noted earlier, Nigeria’s south is receiving a disproportionately large fraction of the 

infrastructure development for the purpose of bringing goods and 

services to the major seaports. These advances are not likely in the 

north where its leaders and social structure tend to stifle education, restrict global and national engagement, and restrain economic opportunity. As the Muslim population in the north grows, 

the combination of traditional values will keep the restive youth in 

the conservative north primed for conflict against the more liberal 

south. These northern “have-nots,” possibly radicalized and angry, 

will likely foment the rise of civil conflict in years ahead.

Notes

1. Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, 156.

2. “Failed States Index 2007,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy.

3. Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, 157.

4. Sarkees, “The Correlates of War,” 123–44.

5. Ploch, Africa Command, 12. Seam states are those bordering Nigeria’s 12 

northern Islamic states.

6. Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, 157.

7. CIA, “Nigeria Country Page,” World Factbook. The factbook shows Nigeria to 

have approximately 146,255,000 people, of which half, or 73 million, are Muslim. 

This places Nigeria between fourth and sixth place in terms of states with a Muslim 

population—nearly tied with Egypt and Turkey.

8. Ibid.

9. “Failed States Index 2007,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy.

10. Danan and Hunt, Mixed Blessings, 32.

11. Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, 159.

12. “Failed States Index 2007,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. BBC, “Nigerian Military Warns Oil Rebels.”

16. “Failed States Index 2007,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy.

17. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, 118.

18. Ibid., 119.

19. Ibid., 193.

20. Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

21. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, 136.

22. Thompson, “Give Me Rice, but Give Me a Laptop Too,” BBC News.

23. Friedman, The World Is Flat, 3–50.

24. Global Voices, “Sub-Saharan Africa.”

25. Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

26. Ibid.

27. Federal Ministry of Health, National Malaria Control Programme, 3.

28. Ibid.

29. United Nations (UN) Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook

(GEO–4).

30. Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

31. UN Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook.

32. Ibid.

33. Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

34. US Department of State, “Background Note: Nigeria.”

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.
31

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Dagne, Nigeria in Political Transition, 8.

41. “Nigeria Oil Production Drops to 50 Percent of Capacity as Fighting Continues,” 

Ghana Business News, 22 May 2009, http://ghanabusinessnews.com/2009/05/22/

nigeria-oil-production-drops-to-50-of-capacity-as-fighting-continues (accessed 20 June 

2009).

42. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 15. At the production rate of 1.6 million 

barrels per day, and with oil priced at $60.15 per barrel, the Nigerian oil industry in 

mid-May 2009 had fallen to an annual revenue production rate of $36 billion per 

year. This has recovered slightly over the summer due to higher oil prices.

43. Ibid.

44. Shelley, “Unraveling the New Criminal Nexus,” 1.

45. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 7.

46. Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, Web Survey.

47. Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

48. UN Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook.

49. CIA, “Nigeria Country Page,” World Factbook.

50. Ibid.

51. BBC, “US Sets Terms for Climate Talks.”

52. CNA, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.

53. Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, 158. Levinson points out that rises in 

ocean levels in areas near sea level, like the Niger Delta, could force the migration 

of millions of people.

33

Chapter 4

Nigerian Politics

Col Mark D. DeLong

According to the CIA’s World Factbook, “Nigeria is a federalized 

constitutional democracy which boasts a gross domestic product 

of over $165 billion (2009 est. official exchange rate).”1 Yet despite 

this outward appearance of a representative democracy with a robust growing economy, between 52 and 72 percent of Nigerians live 

on less than one dollar per day.2 The most prominent reason for 

this seeming paradox is the corruption pervading Nigerian society. As stated previously, past leaders have been more concerned 

with lining their own pockets than with providing Nigeria’s populace with good governance and basic human services.

Nigeria is also a very diverse and complex society. Governing this 

country of nearly 135 million people, at least 350 different ethnicities, and numerous languages is no easy task. A failure to properly 

govern this diverse country may lead to its collapse. Should that 

occur, the seams that currently define Nigeria’s individual cultures 

could shatter, threatening not only the survival of the nation’s large 

population but, because of its contribution to Western oil supplies, 

the economies of Europe and North America as well.

Governmental Framework

The president of Nigeria is the head of state; his service is limited 

to two four-year terms. Like the United States, Nigeria is a threebranched federal republic with executive power held at the presidential level. Unlike the United States, the Nigerian constitution 

also requires the cabinet to be representative of the various regions 

of the country, with at least one cabinet member required from 

each of Nigeria’s 36 states.

The legislative branch is the National Assembly. The National 

Assembly consists of a 109-member senate and a 360-member 

house of representatives. Each state is equally represented with 

three senators in the senate, plus one senator from the capital city 

of Abuja. In the house of representatives, the members are allocated based on population.

The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court, the Court of 

Appeal, and the Federal High Court. Supreme Court members are 

appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate.3

“Power sharing” in Nigeria is not constitutionally mandated. 

However, in the most recent elections, the main political parties 

have presented a Muslim and a Christian combination on the ballot to gain diverse support in an equally split country. For example, 
34

Nigeria’s current vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, former governor of Bayelsa State and a Christian, is from the Niger Delta.4 He is 

the elected balance to President Yar’Adua, a Muslim from the 

northern Katsina State.

Beneath the federal level of government lie the 36 states. Each 

state has an elected governor who is also limited to two four-year 

terms. Each state also has an assembly based on population and a 

judicial high court. Nigeria is further divided into 774 local governmental areas. The local-level government councils are responsible 

for providing basic governmental needs and services and are dependent on the federal government for funding.5

The federal government’s job is to provide national services and 

funding to the lower echelons of government. In turn, the local governments are responsible for basic services such as police, health 

care, and education.

Political Parties

There are several political parties in Nigeria. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) is the current majority party. As of 2009, it holds 

the presidency, the Senate, and the House. The closest opposition 

party is the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP). Muhammadu Buhari 

was the 2007 presidential candidate for the ANPP. Buhari set a 

new precedent in Nigeria for a leader of a party not in power, becoming the “voice of the constructive opposition.” In an amazing 

precedent, despite the very questionable legitimacy of the 2007 

election, Buhari commanded his followers not to take to the 

streets.6 The other main political party is the Action Congress, led 

by former vice president Atiku Abubakar.

Officially, there are 51 registered political parties in Nigeria. To 

qualify as an official political party, its leadership must show that 

it has officers in at least two-thirds of the 36 states.7 Even though 

there are 51 officially registered political parties in Nigeria, the top 

three parties represent 97 percent of the Nigerian electorate.8

Legitimacy

One of the main issues affecting the current political control of 

the Third Republic is legitimacy. Specifically, the elections of 1999, 

2003, and 2007 were steeped in violence and fraud. International 

observers of the 2007 election, such as former US president Jimmy 

Carter, were invited with the intent of gaining international legitimacy. Yet, even with these observers present, voting boxes were 

stolen; many districts reported more votes than they had registered 

voters; and there was rampant vote buying, ballot box stuffing, and 

voter intimidation.

Nonetheless, the 2007 elections produced a nationally respected 

leader who has no apparent public ties to corruption. Many feared 
35

that Yar’Adua was simply a front man for Obasanjo, the leader under whom he served as vice president. Yet Yar’Adua enhanced his 

legitimacy by upholding the rulings of the state high courts that 

addressed the election irregularities, removing several of his party 

from power; he subsequently distanced himself from Obasanjo by 

reversing several of his policies and by appointing a well-regarded, 

high-level commission to again overhaul the electoral system.9

Governance

With limited industrial development and oil production consigned mainly to the southern states, 90 percent of funding to the 

states and localities is provided by the Nigerian federal government, largely from oil export revenues. Much of this funding is 

provided through a complex federal oil wealth-sharing program in 

which each of the 36 states has calculated shares. These shares 

are based on a formula which includes population, level of development, and sources of oil revenues.10 However, the state governors 

are given the budgeting and distributing powers for this money, 

and as a result, much of the oil wealth has flowed to the members 

of the predominant political party, the PDP. Thus, defections from 

one political party to the one currently in power are not uncommon.11 By the time the money flows through the political system, 

there is normally little left for the local governments to provide required basic human services.

Nigeria is progressing in making the entire revenue system more 

transparent. Three years into his administration, President Obasanjo 

initiated the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 

(NEITI) and began publishing revenue transfers between the federal, state, and local governments. NEITI is mandated by law to 

promote transparency and accountability in the management of 

Nigeria’s oil, gas, and mining revenues.12 President Yar’Adua 

pledges to uphold this transparency and serves as minister of energy to oversee this vital area.13

This new level of transparency revealed that the national government failed to provide the country with basic human services, 

transportation, and industrial infrastructure. As a result, Nigeria 

is fraught with substandard roads and rails. The national power 

grid is just as bad, leaving most Nigerians with little or inconsistent electrical power.14 Telecommunications have improved but 

still provide only 16 million fixed and mobile phones for a population of 135 million. Additionally, airline service is limited to the 

major cities.15

President Yar’Adua’s seven-point plan concentrates on exactly 

what previous national Nigerian governments failed to provide for 

the Nigerian people: power/energy, food security, wealth creation, 

a transport sector, land reforms, security, and education (see appendix A). The president’s overall governing intent is “to deepen 
36

democracy and the rule of law; build an economy driven primarily 

by the private sector, not the government; display zero tolerance for 

corruption in all its forms; and finally, restructure and staff government to ensure efficiency and good governance.”16

The Politics of Diversifying the Economy

Between 90 and 95 percent of Nigeria’s current export earnings 

are from oil and other petroleum products. In turn, the oil exports 

are 80 percent of the government’s revenues.17 Oil has become almost the singular export product due to the collapse of the northern textile and manufacturing industries. These industries failed 

as financiers shifted their investment capital to the oil sector and 

to other regions in Africa and Southeast Asia. The northern 

economy remains based on agriculture and suffers from a lack of 

infrastructure, as does the south.18 While the oil industry provides 

the lion’s share of wealth to Nigeria, it only employs an estimated 

35,000 people, or less than 6 percent of the population.19

The current government agenda calls for industrial diversification, and the government has made positive improvements in this 

area. Non-oil growth accounted for 8.9 percent in 2006 and was 

estimated to reach 10.4 percent by 2009.20 This diversification may 

expand if the government not only modernizes the oil industry but 

also leverages advances in commercial farming and excavation of 

solid minerals. Nigeria boasts large deposits of bitumen, columbite, 

tin, and kaolin. Further, Nigeria possesses large natural resources 

of developable coal, gold, diamonds, bauxite, gypsum, barite, zinc, 

aluminum, copper, and salt.21

The oil revenue-sharing program provides little incentive for the 

states to produce anything else. Prior to independence, states were 

able to keep all of the revenues that were gained within their state.22

With the oil boom and strict adherence to federalism, Nigeria 

started the revenue-sharing program. While revenue sharing provided much needed government funding to the nonlucrative agrarian 

north, it also intensified ethnic tension with the oil producing 

south, which appears to resent the transfer of wealth. This resentment gave birth to an active insurgency in the Niger Delta region 

which now threatens oil production throughout the south.

Political Summary

Nigeria is stepping into the twenty-first century with hope, a 

growing economy, and a strong leader heading its national government. Nigerians appear to be working to turn this hope into action. 

Their governmental leaders have shown strength and appear to have 

the moral courage to counter corruption with new tools such as the 

EFCC, NEITI, and the Independent National Electoral Commission 

(INEC). These tools have been forged from the dismal failures of the 
37

previous regimes and are strengthened with the promise of transparency and accountability at the highest levels. Yet Nigeria must 

leverage its lucrative oil economy to diversify a very narrow economy rather than merely reap monetary benefits from a finite, nonrenewable resource.

Consequently, the main variable in Nigeria’s future that will determine if the country succeeds as a democracy or fails as a state 

is the government’s ability to provide good governance. If Nigeria 

uses its national treasures and oil wealth properly, its people and 

institutions may yet prosper. Yet reduced oil prices and the global 

recession of 2007–10 will likely delay universal prosperity in the 

difficult years ahead. Nigeria’s future will be shaped by the ability 

and willingness of elected officials and their supporters to provide 

professional governance and security to Nigeria’s people while 

building solid infrastructure and diversifying the economy. Nigeria’s 

political success could be a model for all future democracies desiring to leave their corrupt civil-military dictatorships behind. Political 

success creates conditions for economic progress. In Nigeria’s case, 

its failure could affect the entire world.

Notes

1. CIA, “Nigeria Country Page.”

2. World Bank, “Nigeria.” Again, there is no accurate census available.

3. Library of Congress, Country Profile: Nigeria, 17.

4. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 4.

5. Library of Congress, Country Profile: Nigeria, 18.

6. Angelica Carson (Central Intelligence Agency), interview by the author, 26 

October 2007. The fact that a charismatic political leader can effectively control the 

passions of his followers in modern Nigeria suggests that politically powerful 

religious leaders may hold even greater sway over their populations. This 

demonstrated power and influence by a charismatic leader form the basis for the 

scenario presented in chapter 7 in which politically motivated and charismatic 

Islamic religious leaders exert great influence over their followers and use their 

larger Islamic population with its effective majority of the voting age electorate to 

win control of Nigeria’s government in a special election called in 2030.

7. Dagne, Nigeria in Political Transition, 3.

8. Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria.

9. Carson, interview.

10. Paden, “Nigeria.”

11. Ibid.

12. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “Nigeria.”

13. Political Risks Services Group, Nigeria: Country Report, 19. While the 

purpose is transparency, placing the politician who occupies the position that 

historically has gained the most revenue, namely the president, in charge of the 

accounting process may not necessarily be the perfect cure for Nigeria’s corrupt 

past. It takes little imagination to liken this to having the fox guard the henhouse. 

While there is no intent to impugn President Yar’Adua here, establishing this as a 

systemic solution to the problem of corruption may not yield a permanent solution.

14. Ibitoyea and Adenikinju, “Future Demand for Electricity in Nigeria,” 492.

15. Political Risks Services Group, Nigeria: Country Report, 10.

16. Yar’Adua, inaugural address.

17. Dagne, Nigeria in Political Transition, 6.
38

18. Paden, “Nigeria.”

19. Tripathi, “In Nigeria, Oil Wealth Delivers Grief.”

20. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects. This growth is mostly in the services 

industries at present. Manufacturing has actually declined in 2007 and 2008, while 

services industries are growing at roughly 12 percent per year.

21. CIA, “Nigeria Country Page.”

22. Library of Congress, “Unification of Nigeria.”
39

Chapter 5

Nigeria’s Economy

Col Daniel B. Gordon

Nigeria has been called the best example of the “paradox of 

plenty.” Its natural resources, especially its light “sweet” crude oil, 

create great wealth that begets “extravagant corruption, deep poverty, polarized income distributions, and poor economic performance.”1 Largely because of this paradox, Nigeria has not achieved 

its economic potential.

Instead of capitalizing the revenue from its oil sales to grow into 

a strong, stable, and democratic country, Nigeria has instead become infamous for its numerous military coups, lawlessness, rampant corruption, extreme poverty, and ubiquitous 419 fraud 

schemes.2 The US State Department views Nigeria’s lack of economic development as a result of “decades of unaccountable rule.”3

Consequently, frustration runs high, thus contributing to Nigeria’s many internal conflicts. While some have been ethno-religious 

and community conflicts, the primary underlying source of tension 

in the country is the uneven distribution of wealth from oil revenue.4 The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes the flow of money 

is going to a small fraction of the populace, and, as a result, the 

majority of Nigerians have only two options: “fatalistic resignation 

or greater identification with alternative hierarchies based on ethnicity, religion, or other factional identities.”5

Nigeria’s Economic Landscape Today

At the macro level, Nigeria’s economy is problematic. Poverty levels 

are high, and individual and national prosperity has been hindered by 

rampant corruption, underdeveloped and insufficient human services 

and industrial infrastructure, overreliance on a single commodity 

(oil), a poor education system, and an ever-growing youth bulge. On a 

positive note, the government has instituted an improved economic 

policy framework, and the economy has seen robust growth, low inflation, and better investor confidence. In addition, record-high oil prices 

have, in the past, generated greater-than-expected revenues.

Significant Economic Problems

Poverty in Nigeria is a major problem and the cause of internal 

tension. Average Nigerian per capita income is $1,149 per year,6 an 

astonishing figure considering the approximately $45 billion the 

country receives in annual oil revenues.7 Again, Nigeria is not a 

homogeneous nation, so its poverty is not affecting the entire pop-
40

ulation equally. Thus, it is important to consider poverty statistics 

at the regional and subregional level. The Central Bank of Nigeria 

reports that northern Nigeria has higher poverty levels than the 

rest of the country (see table1).8

Table 1. Poverty level percentages by region (1980–2004)

Nigerian Region 1980 1985 1992 1996 2004

South-Central 13.2 45.7 40.8 58.2 35.1

South-East 12.9 30.4 41.0 53.5 26.7

South-West 13.4 38.6 43.1 60.9 43.0

North-Central 32.2 50.8 46.0 64.7 67.0

North-East 35.6 54.9 54.0 70.1 72.2

North-West 37.7 52.1 36.5 77.2 71.1

While the poverty gap between north and south had almost 

closed in the early 1990s, the gap has widened again this century. 

Nigeria’s Central Bank has determined that elevated poverty rates 

are highly correlated with literacy rates, the average size of the 

household, and “orientation to private-sector led wealth creation 

as opposed to dependence on government assistance.”9 In other 

words, higher poverty rates were found in regions where dependence on government was greatest.

A 2007 University of Oxford study concluded that economic inequalities in Nigeria are also due to discriminatory allocation of 

government projects, different access to key sectors of the economy, 

as well as unintended consequences of macroeconomic policies.10

As researchers conducting field studies with the local population 

found, perceptions among the Nigerian people, regardless of ethnicity, are really more important than actual statistics. It is interesting to note that although southern Nigerians are much less 

poverty-stricken than their northern brethren, they view themselves 

as less well-off (see table 2).11

Table 2. Self-assessment of poverty status versus actual incidence 

(percentage of populace)

ZONE Self-Assessment Actual Incidence

North-West 71.9 71.17

North-East 81.8 72.16

North-Central 80.0 66.97

South-West 71.5 43.01

South-East 77.6 26.74

South-South 74.8 35.06
41

These perceived and actual poverty rates have directly led to rising tension and conflict, particularly in the oil-producing regions in 

the south.12 The recurring insurgency, now led by MEND in the 

Niger Delta region in southern Nigeria, has received the most recent attention.

First organized in 2005, MEND appears to be an umbrella group 

for a number of indigenous rebel groups in the Niger Delta region. 

Labeled as a criminal organization by the Nigerian government, 

MEND is composed mostly of disaffected unemployed youth in the 

Delta region. Young people from other areas of the country are 

drawn to the group, as tales of their exploits are made known 

through the press and by word of mouth.13 The group appears to 

use attacks on critical oil infrastructure, kidnapping or murder of 

oil personnel in the region, and attacks on offshore oil platforms in 

the Gulf of Guinea to disrupt oil production. Their actions are designed to create price spikes in the international oil market14 and 

perhaps even induce an artificial Hubbert peak.15

MEND seeks redress for the environmental degradation caused 

by oil production in the Niger Delta region. It also intends to force 

the Nigerian government to return a greater share of the nation’s 

oil profits to the region. The cumulative effects of numerous oil 

spills (reports indicate up to 2.5 million barrels spilled between 

1986 and 1996) have limited clean water access for the people of 

the Delta region and have depleted most of their fishing stocks.16

Further, while the oil producing states receive one-third of the oil 

derivation funds, the amount of money making its way down to the 

local populace is minimal due to corruption and mismanagement.17

In fact, one recent estimate indicates the Nigerian government is 

losing $14 billion a year in oil revenues as a result of corruption 

and crime.18

In an attempt to force the government to address these twin 

problems, the insurgency has targeted Nigerian military forces, oil 

company personnel, and oil facilities and related critical infrastructure. At times insurgents have successfully reduced oil production capacity by up to one-third.19 The insurgency funds its 

arms and sustainment mostly through the sale of “bunkered” oil it 

steals from Nigeria’s largely unguarded pipelines.20

Nigeria’s economic success has been limited by rampant corruption and a culture of impunity where anything goes.21 Nigeria’s 

grossly underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly its electricity 

capacity, is a major limiting factor for growth due to both a lack of 

production capability and transmission capacity. For comparison, 

Nigeria’s per capita power output is estimated at 82 kilowatts (kW) 

annually compared with an average of 456kW in other sub-Saharan 

African countries and 3,793kW in South Africa (see table 3).22 This 

is a considerable factor in the lack of economic development and 

high levels of poverty, which trigger conflicts throughout Africa’s 

most populous country.23
42

Table 3. Infrastructure status in Africa24

Nigeria

South 

Africa

SubSaharan 

Africa

LowIncome 

Countries

HighIncome 

Countries

Electric power consumption kW per capita (2001) 82 3,793 456 317 8,421

Road-to-population ratio 1000km per million 

people (1995–2001)

1.1 8.5 2.6 — —

Paved primary roads – percent of roads (1995–2001) 30.9 20.3 13.5 16 92.9

Telephone – mainlines per 1,000 people (2002) 6 107 15 28 585

Access to sanitation – percent of population (2000) 54 87 54 43 —

Access to safe water – percent of population (2000) 62 86 58 76 —

President Yar’Adua acknowledged this problem, stating that “our 

abysmal infrastructural challenge remains the greatest impediment to economic growth” and has caused “higher costs of doing 

business, declining rates of capacity utilization, and lower quality 

of life for a majority of our population.”25 The president’s assessment is borne out by the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), 

which ranks Nigeria 159th of 177 surveyed countries.26

Most troubling for Nigeria’s future is the education system, which 

is in a state of collapse.27 The annual federal government spending 

on health and education is only 1 and 3 percent of expenditures, 

respectively.28 The responsibility for both programs now lies with 

local officials who have demonstrated an inability to improve the 

situation. The net result is high disease mortality rates and a “top 

20” economy with a societal literacy rate of only 57 percent.29 With 

disproportionate population growth in the Islamic north,30 the 

youth bulge, high unemployment, and economic disparity are likely 

to worsen in the future.

A final and perhaps paramount weakness in Nigeria’s current 

economy is its overreliance on a single commodity—petroleum. As 

the world’s eighth largest oil exporter, with oil accounting for over 

80 percent of federal government income, 52 percent of the gross 

domestic product (GDP), and up to 95 percent of export earnings,31

high oil prices generate ample revenue for Nigeria, but its economy 

depends so heavily on its oil sector that any disruption to this revenue stream will almost always have significant ramifications. ICG 

notes that a failure to diversify the economy, widely fluctuating oil 

prices with prices spiking to over $147 a barrel in July 2008 followed by a rapid decline to under $50 per barrel in 2009, and corruption all have firmly placed Nigeria into “a development trap.”32

Positive Economic Trends

Even with these weaknesses and ongoing issues, Nigeria’s economy 

has enjoyed some positive developments and trends over the last five 

years. Implementation of an improved policy framework and new 
43

policies is leading to steady growth, low inflation, and better investor 

confidence. From 2002 to 2008, GDP growth ranged between 3.8 

and 6.5 percent, inflation dropped from 18 to 11 percent (2009), and 

the population increased (a key ingredient for economic growth) 

from 130 to nearly 140 million.33 In 2009 Nigeria’s economy slowed 

considerably as the global recession substantially reduced the price 

of oil—GDP growth was a relatively anemic 1.9 percent.34

Overall though, this performance has emboldened the Nigerian 

leadership to trumpet “Nigerian Vision 20: 2020,” in which Nigeria is 

to become a top 20 global economy by the year 2020.35 This vision links 

up well with the Bank of Nigeria’s position that “sound economics is 

excellent politics,” with prosperity required to establish an enduring 

democracy and a per capita income of $1,000 as the threshold.36

To continue this positive momentum, President Yar’Adua has 

announced his reform priorities, several of which, if successful, 

will improve the economy. The most critical of these is improving 

electric power generation and distribution and winning the fight 

against corruption. President Yar’Adua stated that Nigeria would 

require an estimated annual infrastructure investment of $6–9 billion per year.37 While Nigeria’s fight against corruption to date has 

resulted in 130 convictions for fraud and the arrest of over 2,000 

others responsible for illegal scams, it is clear the problem needs 

continued attention if it is to be decidedly reduced.38

The 2008 high oil prices were a major boon for Nigeria’s economy. 

With prices rising to more than $147 per barrel in July 2008, the 

influx of oil profits quickly improved government revenues. Nigeria 

created the Petroleum Equalization Fund to properly invest its oil 

windfall, most notably to finance the budget deficit and increase 

savings.39 Nigeria also implemented an oil-price-based fiscal rule, 

basing government expenditures on a conservative oil price benchmark to diminish the impact of significant oil-price fluctuations on 

the domestic economy.40 In fact, despite rising oil prices, Nigeria’s 

2007 budget was based on $40 per barrel.41

Although oil prices briefly retreated below $50 per barrel in early 

2009, the long-term outlook for continued high oil profits is positive, as demand will generally continue to climb while Organization 

of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC marginal 

producer sources of supply decrease.42 Properly invested, excess 

funds can be used to improve infrastructure, provide better services for the Nigerian people, strengthen education and health 

care, and even diversify the economy.

President Yar’Adua’s priority of fighting corruption is a continuation of an effort initiated by his predecessor, Obasanjo. Government 

activities to stem corruption appear to have yielded some positive 

results (see figure 8), as there has been a measurable decrease in 

the percentage of firms reporting high bribery activities in the important taxation, procurement, and judiciary sectors.43 Although cor-
44

ruption is rampant throughout Nigerian society, there is still much 

to do before the government can claim victory.

Nigeria’s Economic Landscape

As addressed above, Nigeria’s social and development problems 

have stunted its economic growth. The good news for Nigeria is 

that, over the next 20–25 years, the confluence of increasing demand for oil and other natural resources and greater globalization 

will create a strategic environment favorable for Nigeria to realize 

its potential and become a global economic power.

At the macro or global level, the World Bank projects that economic integration through globalization will continue through the 

year 2030 with global GDP increasing 2.9 percent annually and 

developing countries, such as Nigeria, experiencing the greatest 

economic growth.44 In spite of the global recession which hit hard 

in 2008 and 2009, the World Bank notes that the region’s projected 

growth over the next few decades and implications for global poverty reduction are “nothing short of astounding,” with the total 

number of people living in poverty being cut in half, despite continuing population growth.45

Figure 8. Nigeria bribery in selected sectors. (Reprinted from briefing, Danny 

Kaufmann, “Nigeria in Numbers—the Governance Dimension: A Preliminary and 

Brief Review of Recent Trends on Governance and Corruption,” Abuja, Nigeria, 12 

October 2005.)
45

Will Nigeria Become a Top 20 Economy?

This positive attitude extends to Nigeria’s economic growth. 

Goldman-Sachs, the global investment bank which projected the 

economic rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), has identified 11 additional countries with great potential to emerge as economic forces—Nigeria is one of these 11 countries.46 In its December 2005 update to the original BRIC assessment, Goldman-Sachs 

provided an in-depth analysis of Nigeria’s potential for rapid economic growth and the difficulties Nigeria may experience in achieving and sustaining the prerequisite conditions permitting the 

growth to happen.47 To make its assessment, Goldman-Sachs modeled projections of GDP, real GDP growth, income per capita, incremental demand, and exchange rate paths. The results of the model 

predict that Nigeria has the potential to become the 20th largest 

economy in the world by 2025 and the 12th largest by 2050.48

In terms of real GDP, Goldman-Sachs projects growth to accelerate between 2005 and 2030 from an average of 5 percent per year, 

over the next five years, to 6.6 percent per year between 2025 and 

2030.49 This would increase Nigeria’s GDP from $94 billion today to 

$556 billion in 2030.50 Even with its rapid population growth, GDP 

per capita has the potential to more than triple between 2005 and 

2030, from $733 to $2,405.51 These positive numbers provide a 

basis for the Nigerian government’s economic optimism.

However, Goldman-Sachs also assessed the conditions of each 

of the Next Eleven (N-11) countries necessary to achieve and sustain solid economic growth. Goldman-Sachs developed a growth 

environment score (GES) to summarize the overall economic environment, based on the notion that “strong growth is best achieved 

with a stable and open economy, healthy investment, high rates of 

technology adoption, a healthy and well-educated workforce, and a 

secure and rule-based political environment.”52 Goldman-Sachs 

considers five basic areas: macroeconomic stability, macroeconomic 

conditions, technical capabilities, human capital, and political 

conditions.53 Of the 15 emerging countries (BRICs plus the N-11), 

Nigeria was dead last with a GES index of 2.6 out of seven. The 

mean score was 3.8.54

A closer look at the GES scores reveals Nigeria scored close to 

the mean for macroeconomic stability and conditions but scored 

at the bottom or next to last in technological capabilities (integration of personal computers, telephones, and Internet), human 

capital (education and life expectancy), and political conditions 

(political stability, rule of law, and corruption).55 Successful implementation of President Yar’Adua’s priorities for battling corruption and upgrading the nation’s electrical power production 

and transmission grid will likely improve the political conditions 

and technological capabilities of Nigeria. However, because of the 

lack of diversity in the Nigerian economy, these and other gains 
46

rely completely on Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues. One important 

lesson from the Goldman-Sachs study is how critical it is for Nigeria to address each of these issues now in order to secure for a 

positive future.

A Positive Energy Outlook

Focusing on demand first, both Exxon Mobil (the world’s largest 

oil company) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) agree that 

world energy consumption is projected to grow by approximately 

43 percent between 2006 and 2030.56 The global energy mix is not 

expected to change significantly over the next few decades, with oil, 

gas, and coal continuing as the predominant sources of energy.57

This increase in demand will occur even with high oil and natural 

gas prices—prices that are likely to increase beyond their 2008 

peak in the mid and long term.58

Like other members of the OPEC cartel, Nigeria is one of the 

world’s largest producers of light sweet crude oil. Because of its 

lower sulfur and hydrogen content, sweet crude oil is much easier 

and cheaper to refine into gasoline and other high-demand petroleum products than heavier “sour” crude oil. Thus, Nigerian oil is 

very much in demand by most of the world’s advanced economies, 

including the United States.

With the stage set for global energy demand to increase over the 

long run, Nigeria is poised to reap the economic benefits. Some of 

the world’s other major oil producers have started to see their 

“wells run dry.” According to the DOE, Europe’s primary oil producing countries (Norway and the United Kingdom) have already 

experienced production peaks, with their combined outputs dropping to less than a third of their peak outputs by 2030.59

In fact, utilizing the reserve-to-production ratios in the DOE’s 

2007 International Energy Outlook, the following countries may 

no longer be producing oil in large quantities by the year 2030: 

Russia, United States, China, Mexico, Algeria, Brazil, Canada, 

Angola, Indonesia, Oman, Malaysia, Argentina, Kazakhstan, and 

India.60 This means the world’s major oil producers in 20 years 

may be limited to Nigeria, Venezuela, Libya, and the Middle East 

countries of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar.61

A report by the National Petroleum Council (NPC), an oil and 

natural gas advisory committee to the US Secretary of Energy, 

states, “In addition to projected Saudi Arabian production, significant conventional oil production increases from Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and Nigeria will be needed to meet projected global demand in 

2030.”62 As a producer of light sweet crude oil, Nigeria recognizes 

this opportunity and is targeting an increase in its current proven 

reserves and production capacity from 35.9 billion barrels and 2.6 
47

million barrels per day (MBPD) to 40 billion barrels and four MBPD, 

respectively, by 2010.63

In a longer-term outlook, growth in Nigerian oil production has 

been estimated to increase to as much as five MBPD by 2020.64

From the US perspective, oil imports from Nigeria and its West 

African neighbors could rise from 15 percent of all oil imports to 

25 percent by 2015.65 This is due in part to three facts: oil from 

the Nigeria region is high-quality sweet crude, so it is easier to 

“crack” and distill than heavier sour crude; it takes one third 

the time to reach the American market compared to oil from the 

Middle East;66 and Nigeria’s oil offers better potential for stability 

vis-à-vis the Middle East.

While oil is the main focus of the energy market now, natural gas 

is quickly gaining in importance. The advances made in the ability 

to produce and transport liquefied natural gas (LNG) have made it 

a more viable energy source. Demand is expected to increase to 50 

percent of total gas trade by 2030.67 Nigeria is already the world’s 

seventh largest LNG exporter,68 and it is expected to increase its 

natural gas output by approximately 50 percent by 2011.69

With a projected 60 percent increase in energy demand by 2030, 

the next major question for Nigeria is what the price of oil and 

natural gas will be over that time frame. While speculation, energy 

usage, stockpiles and reserves, the strength of the US dollar, and 

economic growth drive great volatility in the fossil fuel markets, 

most analysts expect rising prices over the long term. As previously 

mentioned, the decline of oil production in a number of countries 

will increase the share coming from the OPEC nations of the Middle 

East.70 In this case, OPEC could wield unprecedented power, which 

will likely not only cause prices to escalate but also increase price 

instability in the future.71

In addition, the dwindling oil sources mean transoceanic oil 

flows will more than double by 2030 (reaching 65 MBPD), thereby 

increasing transport costs and concomitantly the risk of disruption 

at major maritime chokepoints and even piracy on the high seas.72

CountryWatch forecasts oil prices to be as high as $130 a barrel in 

2030.73 The DOE notes that rising oil prices will, in turn, increase 

the demand for and eventually the price of natural gas, as it replaces liquid fuels in the industrial and electrical power sectors.74

The projected rise of fossil fuel demand and the corresponding 

increase in prices, combined with Nigeria’s production output 

growth, will increase available revenues for Nigeria to use in achieving President Yar’Adua’s reform priorities. President Yar’Adua 

stated that Nigerians “are totally committed to transforming Nigeria into one of the world’s 20 largest economies by 2020!”75 While 

this may not be achievable (President Yar’Adua acknowledges this 

requires a minimum average growth rate of 15 percent while the 

best economic rate Nigeria has achieved in recent history is 10 percent), growth rates anywhere near 15 percent will allow him to ac-
48

celerate his reform priority of infrastructure improvement.76 This 

will then lay the foundation for economic diversification, since 

Nigeria’s lack of infrastructure is acknowledged by global economists to be one of the main impediments to economic growth outside the oil and gas industries.

A Widening North-South Gap

As Nigeria’s economy grows, there will be several factors that 

widen the previously discussed poverty gap. The first is education. 

The USAID reports the northern states are providing little in the 

way of formal schooling for their children. The agency’s statistics 

show the percentage of the population in the three northern regions having no education at all ranges from 40 to 70 percent, with 

only 10 to 15 percent having completed primary school. Conversely, 

the southern states are educating about 80 percent of the population, with over 20 percent completing primary school and half of 

those going on to complete secondary education.77

While the south’s education is poor compared to Western standards, it far exceeds the north. Combined with disproportionate 

population growth in northern states78 and a worsening national 

youth bulge,79 a growing segment of the north’s population will be 

young unskilled workers. As the World Bank points out, “Even 

though wages of unskilled workers in virtually all countries have 

risen as productivity has increased with globalization, the unskilled have received wage increases that are lower than those for 

skilled workers—and they have experienced greater difficulty in 

sustaining their employment.”80 Thus, the economic disparities between Nigeria’s north and south, particularly in employment opportunities, are likely to worsen in the future.

A History of Violence

As Nigerian history has proven, differences (actual or perceived) in economic and social development between the north 

and south can be the catalyst for conflict. These differences have 

directly led to fighting resulting in over 12,000 casualties and 3 

million displaced people since 1999.81 The ICG asserts this 

bloody history has left Nigerians concerned that future factional 

violence will cause the state to fail.82 Similarly, any future 

lengthy and significant reduction in the price of oil is of great 

concern for Nigeria as it becomes increasingly dependent on oil 

revenue and the pressure to spend revenue to improve overall 

economic growth and employment rises.83

Falling oil prices proved to be the fatal catalyst for the 1982 collapse of Nigeria’s government. The drop in revenue caused government services to deteriorate, and the overall economy worsened to 

the point that a military-led coup was carried out.84 Nigerians have 

already experienced several government failures based on econom-
49

ics. Economic fault lines remain and grow deeper as corruption 

and widely fluctuating oil prices siphon off resources needed to 

improve human service and industrial infrastructure, fund human 

services and education, and diversify the economy.

Plummeting Fossil Fuel Prices

The collapse of oil prices, and to a lesser degree gas prices, is a 

key factor in Nigeria’s boom-to-recession scenarios. While global 

demand and regional instability, some driven by MEND actions, 

may force prices up, there are factors such as the growing concern 

over climate change and new renewable energy technologies that 

may work to constrain the rise in oil prices over the long term. Additionally, global recessions, like the one experienced between 

2008 and 2010, may further suppress oil prices. How these forces 

interact will determine the market value for fossil fuels and will, in 

a single commodity economy, largely dictate Nigeria’s economic 

and political future.85

Many of the renewable energy sources in use or under development throughout the world today were born out of the energy crises in the early and late 1970s. While the last three decades have 

yielded only modest investments and fielding of these technologies, 

the record-setting prices over the last four years have again put 

these technologies back under the spotlight.86

Political will notwithstanding, one of the biggest obstacles to renewable energy has simply been development and implementation 

costs—as long as oil remained relatively inexpensive, there was 

little incentive for industry and consumers to pay higher prices for 

non-fossil-fuel energy and its associated technologies. In May 

2009, the DOE projected oil prices could begin rising again soon, 

reaching prices potentially as high as $200 per barrel (constantyear dollars) in 2030.87

Even with today’s relatively high cost of fuel and widely fluctuating prices with moderate relief in sight, the DOE predicts renewable energy sources will only capture an additional 1 percent of the 

overall market (increasing its share from 7 to 8 percent) by 2030.88

Studies by ExxonMobil and the NPC also show only a small market 

share for renewable energy sources.89

However, these analyses appear to have three notable flaws. 

First, most studies only evaluate the renewable penetration into 

markets as a function of a void filler where renewables are used to 

supplement fossil fuels when oil and gas cannot meet energy demands. The second flaw is that estimates are using linear methods 

for predicting the introduction and use of new technology and are 

thus underestimating the likely exponential rate of technology development. Finally, both ExxonMobil and the NPC are heavily invested in the oil economy and stand to profit from any rise in oil 
50

prices; thus, any analyses they sponsor about alternative energy is 

arguably suspect.

The truth is that global growth in renewable energy investment 

and fielding indicates alternative energy technologies are becoming 

viable alternatives to fossil fuels, not just supplemental energy 

sources. Excluding large hydropower projects, renewable energy 

facilities generated 15 percent more electricity than in 2007; wind 

energy is currently growing at 25–30 percent annually with an 11-

fold capacity increase over the last decade; and solar-photovoltaicgenerated electricity (grid tied) grows 50–60 percent each year.90

Ray Kurzweil, a renowned futurist, notes that solar power alone 

“has the potential to provide the bulk of our future energy needs 

in a completely renewable, emission free, and distributed manner” 

by the year 2030.91 In 2005 Kurzweil stated that the energy sector 

will “become governed by the law of accelerating returns,” where 

the pace of technology changes exponentially, not linearly.92

Echoing Kurzweil, the investment bank Jefferies Group expects 

short-term solar panel production to double in 2008 and double 

again in 2009.93

The final major problem of fossil fuels is the growing concern it 

is having on climate change. The DOE projects a 59 percent increase in carbon dioxide emissions between 2004 and 2030.94 Lobbying by environmental groups has successfully attributed climate 

change to melting polar ice caps, severe droughts, desertification, 

and destructive deadly storms. The emission of greenhouse gasses 

as fossil fuels are burned is increasingly a political concern, driving 

world leaders to seek solutions to this problem, with an emphasis 

on renewable or clean energy sources.

Some see renewable energy as the primary economic path for 

the future. In December 2007, over 200 nations attended the UN 

Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia, and developed the 

“Bali Roadmap” as a path to address climate change, calling it 

“the defining human development challenge of the twenty-first

century.”95 Two years later, almost 200 nations attended the UN 

Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, in an effort to establish carbon emission limits and an international fund 

to help developing nations curb their carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions.

A new US presidential administration and Congress have increased political rhetoric and could successfully enact new policies 

and laws to encourage the use of alternative sources of energy, 

especially renewable sources.96 Deutsche Bank predicts government efforts to reduce climate change will become a catalyst for 

creating a “megatrend” investment opportunity. In fact, renewable 

energy investment likely exceeded $100 billion globally in 2007, 

and global financiers began “the shift away from a carbon-based 

economy”; renewable energy is a “megatrend that will shape the 

asset management industry for many years.”97
51

Economic Summary

Over the next 20 years, Nigeria’s economy could well grow to be 

among the world’s 20 largest. This success will be built on the export of oil and gas and the development of sufficient infrastructure 

to allow a slow, but steady growth in economic diversification. The 

non-fossil economy will be almost entirely based in the more prosperous southern states, while the northern states will continue to 

depend on government assistance.

By the year 2030, global use of renewable energy sources may 

cut demand for oil and natural gas, forcing a large price drop in 

Nigeria’s main export and, in turn, reducing government revenues. This will widen the existing north-south economic gap, exacerbate tensions in the Niger Delta region, and serve as a catalyst for violence that may once again make a civil war imminent 

unless the Nigerian military maintains a state of readiness to 

forestall such an outcome.

Notes

1. Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz, Convergent Interests, 2.

2. 419 Fraud or 419, as the Nigerians refer to it, is a subclassification of Nigeria’s 

advance fee fraud law. It is an organized attempt to solicit advance fees from 

unsuspecting people via fax, letter, or e-mail by promising them a remittance for 

their assistance in moving large sums of money, normally from a Nigerian bank.

3. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 12.

4. International Crisis Group (ICG), Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State? 9.

5. Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, 1.

6. US Department of State, “Background Note: Nigeria.”

7. Nigeria Country Report, 5.

8. Soludo, “Nigerian Economy.”

9. Ibid., 8.

10. Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, 9.

11. Soludo, “Nigerian Economy.”

12. Dagne, Nigeria: Background and U.S. Relations, 8.

13. Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, ICG, 6.

14. Wikipedia, s.v. “Hubbert peak theory.”

15. The Hubbert peak oil theory was posited by American geophysicist M. King 

Hubbert. His models are used to predict when known or proven regional or global 

oil reserves—based on discovery rates, production rates, and cumulative production—

will reach their maximum production rate or peak and then begin to decline. The 

model is expressed as a bell curve.

16. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 17.

17. Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, 21.

18. Gentile, “Nigeria Losing $14 Billion,” UPI.com.

19. Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz, Convergent Interests, 1.

20. Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, ICG, 8.

21. Soludo, “Nigerian Economy,” 4.

22. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, Nigeria’s Economic Reforms, 6.

23. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 1.

24. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, Nigeria’s Economic Reforms, 6.

25. Yar’Adua, “Maintain Macroeconomic Stability.”

26. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 11.

27. Soludo, “Nigerian Economy,” 4.
52

28. Goings, “Socio-Economic Factors,” 2.

29. CIA, “Nigeria Country Page.”

30. Goings, “Socio-Economic Factors,” 5.

31. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 12.

32. Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, 1.

33. “Nigeria Country Report,” Economist, 5.

34. Export Development Canada, Nigeria—EDC Economics.

35. Soludo, “Nigerian Economy,” 2.

36. Ibid., 3. This was the estimated threshold necessary for sustained growth in 

2006 and was crossed in 2007. In light of the marked reduction in oil revenues, as 

oil fell from $147 to roughly $50 a barrel at the time this is going to press, there is 

no guarantee that this threshold is still a plausible number.

37. Yar’Adua, “Maintain Macroeconomic Stability.”

38. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 9.

39. NPC, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 11.

40. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, Nigeria’s Economic Reforms, 10.

41. Nigerian government, memorandum of understanding, 3.

42. Braml, “Can US Shed Oil Addiction?” 123. Nonetheless, the authors are 

aware that there may be shorter-term fluctuations as a result of the ongoing 

economic recession.

43. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, Nigeria’s Economic Reforms, 20.

44. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, 3.

45. Ibid., xiii. This sentiment was restated in the World Bank’s Prospects for 

Global Economy 2009.

46. O’Neil et al., How Solid Are the BRICS? 7.

47. Ibid., 10.

48. Ibid., 8.

49. This growth rate is based on Goldman-Sachs December 2005 analysis. This 

does not account for the brief exponential rise in oil prices in the first half of 2008, 

nor does it account for the global recession, which dramatically reduced oil prices 

from their $147 per barrel peak in July 2008 to less than $50 per barrel in 2009. 

This also reduced global financial transactions and restricted credit from the second 

half of 2008 throughout 2009. Nor does it account for the 2009 low 1.9 percent GDP 

growth. However, in spite of these fluctuations, Nigeria’s economy is expected to 

grow 4 percent in 2010, moving it closer to the forecasts laid out by Goldman-Sachs 

in 2005. See “Nigeria 2009 GDP Growth Seen at 7.5 Percent,” Reuters News Agency 

UK, http://www.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL22700032081202 (accessed 27 

May 2009).

50. Ibid.

51. O’Neil et al., How Solid Are the BRICS? 20.

52. Ibid., 10.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 13.

55. Ibid., 16–17.

56. US DOE, International Energy Outlook 2009, 7.

57. Ibid., 9.

58. Ibid., 2.

59. US DOE, International Energy Outlook 2007, 32.

60. Ibid., 38; and US DOE, Strategic Significance of America’s Oil Shale Resource, 2. 

The combination of technology improvements and high oil prices makes it likely 

that additional oil reserves will be discovered and drilled, extending the oil 

production of some countries; however, the trend of dwindling resources will not be 

significantly altered.

61. Ibid., 38.

62. NPC, Hard Truths, 120.

63. Heinrigs, “Oil and Gas,” 10–12. Recent data suggests, however, that these 

estimates may be optimistic. Reuters News Agency reports that Nigeria’s oil output 
53

for the first three months of 2008 averaged only 1.6 million barrels of oil per day, 

roughly 70 percent of the government’s late 2007 estimates.

64. Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz, Convergent Interests, 4. The latest DOE 

estimates are slightly more pessimistic, with Nigeria having proven reserves of 36.2 

billion barrels and a projected 2030 output of 3.4 MBPD. This latest decrease is due 

to instability in the regions adjacent to the oil fields, which this paper will address 

in the sections to come. See DOE, International Energy Outlook 2009, 39–41.

65. Ibid.

66. Heinrigs, “Oil and Gas,” 5.

67. Ibid., 6.

68. Ibid.

69. US DOE, “Nigeria: Natural Gas.”

70. US DOE, International Energy Outlook 2007, 38.

71. Braml, “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?” 23.

72. Heinrigs, “Oil and Gas,” 5.

73. CountryWatch, World Economic Summary.

74. US DOE, International Energy Outlook 2007, 3. The 2009 outlook reiterates 

this conclusion but also admits to some uncertainty in future oil prices, with the 

potential for oil to reach $200 per barrel in constant 2000 year dollars.

75. Yar’Adua, “Maintain Macroeconomic Stability.”

76. Ibid.

77. USAID, “Socio-Economic Factors,” 7.

78. Ibid., 5.

79. US Census Bureau, “Midyear Population.”

80. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, xix.

81. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 2.

82. Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, 7.

83. NPC, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 14.

84. Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, 19.

85. NPC, Non-Bio Renewables, 1. The NPC study clearly showed increasing 

concern over renewable energy that caused energy independence to be seen as an 

element of national security.

86. Ibid., 5.

87. The US DOE has three forecasts for 2030—a low end, midrange, and upper-end 

forecast. The middle- and upper-end forecasts suggest oil prices will rise to between 

$130 and $200 per barrel by 2030. DOE, International Energy Outlook 2009, 24.

88. Ibid., 74; and US DOE, International Energy Outlook 2007, 4. The 2009 

outlook, however, is more optimistic on renewable energy sources, suggesting they 

could comprise as much as 21 percent of the liquid fuels used in 2030. Even with 

this more optimistic estimate, Nigeria’s oil will still be a critical piece of the world’s 

energy supply, however.

89. NPC, Non-Bio Renewables, 1.

90. Technology News Daily, “Double-Digit Growth, Global Renewable Energy.”

91. Kurzweil, Singularity Is Near, 248.

92. Ibid., 243.

93. Wynn, “Solar Power Edges.”

94. Ibid.

95. Witoelar, address, UN Climate Change Conference.

96. As of publication, the Obama administration has asked Congress to vote on 

and pass a comprehensive energy policy, which may include “cap and trade” 

legislation, in 2010. The Environmental Protection Agency is taking action to 

increase corporate average fuel economy standards on vehicles produced in the 

United States and is preparing to implement caps on carbon dioxide and other 

greenhouse gasses.

97. Reuters, “Major Bank Says Climate Change Is Investment,” What effect the global 

recession of 2008 through 2010 will have can only be surmised as of publication.

55

Chapter 6

Military Vectors

Col Robert S. McAllum

President Obasanjo published Nigeria’s first defense policy in 

1979. At that time he tasked the Nigerian military with four primary functions: preserving Nigeria’s territorial integrity, contributing to national emergencies and security, promoting collective security in Africa while furthering Nigerian foreign policy, and 

contributing to global security.1 Thirty years later, the responsibilities of the current Nigerian military remain the same as iterated in 

President Obasanjo’s 1979 national defense policy.2

Consistent with its prescribed responsibilities, Nigerian military 

forces have operated outside the country only in support of peacekeeping efforts. These efforts began nearly simultaneously with independence, with Nigerian peacekeepers assisting in the Congo in 

19603 and Tanzania in 1963.4 The Economic Community of West 

African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) formed under 

Nigerian leadership in 1990. Since then, ECOMOG’s efforts have 

helped end the Liberian civil war, with Nigeria providing about 

6,000 peacekeepers. Through ECOMOG, Nigeria also committed 

nearly 3,000 peacekeepers to stabilize Sierra Leone in the wake of 

its 1997 civil war. Nigeria’s resolve to lead and participate in peacekeeping efforts in Africa continues today, with nearly 2,000 troops 

committed to international efforts in Liberia, another 2,000 troops 

operating since 2004 in Sudan, and another 850 pledged to support African Union efforts in Somalia.5

While Nigerian forces have performed acceptably during these 

peacekeeping operations, years of military rule have paradoxically 

not equipped the country with a capable military.6 By the time of 

President Obasanjo’s election in 1999, the Nigerian military was 

widely blamed for the country’s economic and social problems. Military facilities had decayed considerably with corresponding declines in morale and discipline.7

President Obasanjo began efforts to reform leadership in the 

military soon after taking office in 1999. He retired 150 military 

officers with strong political ties, published plans to downsize the 

armed forces by 40 percent, and promised to restructure military 

spending to about 3 percent of GDP,8 which would bring Nigeria 

closer to the world average of about 2.5 percent.9 However, nationwide unrest and the operations tempo of Nigerian peacekeeping 

efforts led President Obasanjo to put military reform plans on hold 

in 2001.10

Suspension of these reform efforts left little room for military 

improvement. At the time of President Obasanjo’s reelection in 
56

2003, estimates indicated that 78 percent of Nigerian army equipment was not operational and training had virtually ceased.11 More 

recent studies also conclude that Nigerian military units are 

plagued by an inadequate technical ability, poor discipline, and a 

lack of training.12 However, new acquisition efforts are promising a 

reformed capability.

The president of Nigeria is also the commander in chief of Nigeria’s military forces. He decides when and how to employ the 

armed forces. Day-to-day military operations are managed by the 

Ministry of Defence. The chief of the Defence Staff, the three service chiefs, and the national security advisor are all appointed by 

the president. Each service leader’s responsibilities are proscribed 

in Section 18(3) of the Armed Forces Act CAP A20 Laws of the 

Federation of Nigeria 2004.13 These responsibilities include “command, direction, and general superintendence” as well as the organizing and training of the forces.14 The Nigerian army, with almost 60,000 troops, commands the largest share of the military 

budget and resources.

The Nigerian navy and air force represent about 7,000 and 9,000 

personnel, respectively, of the overall military strength of about 

76,000.15 Much of the military budget during the past several years 

was used to upgrade air force and navy equipment.16 For the navy, 

this means refurbished frigates and coastal patrol boats, which it 

primarily uses to enforce security in Nigeria’s offshore oil regions, 

a difficult challenge in light of increasing MEND attacks on offshore oil infrastructure and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.17

The air force used funds to support navy maritime patrol efforts 

by purchasing aircraft equipped with surveillance radar and electrooptical tracking systems. Funds have also contributed to some improvement in aircraft serviceability.18 Other air force acquisitions 

focus on training aircraft, helicopters, and air defense fighter aircraft, although these systems are not yet in the Nigerian inventory.19

The Nigerian army constitutes the bulk of service personnel with 

nearly 60,000 troops spread across five divisions. Much of the army’s share of the defense budget has been spent on renovation of 

military facilities and in support of its internal security and foreign 

peacekeeping deployments.20 However, the army has also taken 

steps to modernize equipment by coordinating with Pakistan for 

upgraded main battle tanks. Nigerian army equipment is summarized in appendix C.

Military Reforms

To better support the military’s constitutional tasks, the Nigerian army chief of staff under President Yar’Adua, Maj Gen Owoye 

Azazi, has established a 10-year modernization and reform plan. 

His plan is designed to improve the military’s professionalism and 

reputation while developing “a lighter, yet lethal, sustainable and 
57

more rapidly deployable and responsible force, better able to meet 

the diverse challenges now and of the future.”21

The chief of staff also intends to reduce the Nigerian army from 

five to four divisions “with a level of decentralization enabling divisions and brigades to plan operations and carry them out independently of Army Headquarters.”22 Nigerian efforts to modernize and 

adapt their military coincide with increasing international efforts 

to support stability in the West Africa region and represent a desire 

by Nigeria’s political leaders to prevent future Nigerian military intervention in politics.

US Energy Security and 

Counterterrorism Efforts

With global demand for energy potentially increasing over 60 

percent by 2030,23 the United States as well as the international 

community has recognized the strategic importance of sweet crude 

oil production in the Gulf of Guinea off the west coast of central 

Africa. This focuses considerable attention on Nigeria since it controls approximately 60 percent of the proven reserves in the region.24 Insurgent and terrorist groups like MEND and transnational 

criminal enterprises recognize western dependence on Nigerian oil 

and appear to have stepped up their attacks on oil infrastructure. 

They have also increased their theft of oil in order to bring western 

pressure on the Nigerian government to resolve grievances and to 

profit from sales of stolen bunkered oil.

The Nigerian military and internal security forces have struggled 

to deter attacks and root out both violent groups and criminal 

enterprises. Attacks by groups affiliated with MEND have succeeded in reducing oil production in Nigeria by almost 25 percent 

since 2006.25 Several oil companies have approached the US military for assistance, stating that they fear the Nigerian government 

can no longer provide adequate security.26

Beginning in 2005, the US Navy increased its patrols in the waters off Nigeria in an effort to bolster security in the region, and 

plans are currently underway to implement a 10-year security and 

training initiative known as the Gulf of Guinea Guard.27 The purpose 

of this force is to protect offshore oil production and transload infrastructure from attack by modern pirates and MEND forces.

This guard force will eventually include several West African nation navies, including Nigeria’s, working in concert with the US 

Navy and Britain’s Royal Navy. Several multinational maritime security and training deployments occurred in 2005, with maritime 

security conferences occurring in 2006.28 In late 2007, the US Navy 

deployed assets to the region for six months of security patrols, 

training, and infrastructure evaluation and improvement. 29

The United States and Britain are also conducting joint training efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. These efforts also include equip-
58

ment and training improvements for three Nigerian amphibious 

brigades in the Niger Delta.30 Ultimately, US forces are attempting 

to establish a permanent local presence, possibly with a base facility and airfield on the island nation of São Tomé e Príncipe in 

the Gulf of Guinea.31

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, the United States is 

combating terrorism in West Africa. This effort began with the PanSahel initiative in 2002, in which special operations forces deployed 

to the region to train local militaries in counterterrorism operations. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea 

region, this effort has expanded to include Algeria and Nigeria under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). The 

TSCTI effort is programmed to receive $100 million each year 

through 2011.32 For Nigeria specifically, American military forces 

are deployed to train and assist national forces in monitoring and 

securing Nigeria’s northern border.33

Nonmilitary Technologies

According to a recent study by the RAND Corporation, there are 

16 “technology applications” that, based on global demand and 

technical feasibility, will most likely be available for implementation in 2020 (see table 4).34

Although the RAND study does not address Nigeria specifically, 

it indicates that countries in western Africa would most likely be 

able to acquire only the first five technology applications: cheap 

solar energy, rural wireless communications, ubiquitous informaTable 4. RAND technology applications for 202035

RELEVANT CONDITIONS

Technology Applications

Rural

Economic 

Development

Economic 

Growth

Improve

Health

Improve 

Environmental 

Conditions

Influence 

Governance

and Social 

Structure

Cheap Solar Energy X X X X X

Rural Wireless Communications X X X X X

Ubiquitous Information Access X X X

Genetically Modified Crops X X X

Rapid Bioassays X X X

Water Purification & Decontamination X X X

Targeted Drug Delivery X X

Cheap Autonomous Housing X X X

Green Manufacturing X X

RFID of Commercial Products X X

Hybrid Vehicles X

Pervasive Sensors X X

Tissue Engineering X X X

Improved Diagnostic/Surgical Methods X

Wearable Computers X X X

Quantum Cryptography X
59

tion access, genetically modified crops, and rapid bioassays. The 

RAND study differentiates between a country’s ability to acquire a 

potential technology and its ability to implement it. In the case of 

countries in western Africa, RAND rates their overall ability to implement these relevant technologies as low.36

The interests of the United States and the Nigerian government represent concerted efforts to improve both governance 

and human services while reducing crime and securing Nigerian 

national resources. These efforts increase the likelihood that 

technologies which impact these areas may be acquired and 

used, including technologies that are not in the RAND top five 

list, as part of international assistance efforts in Nigeria and 

other nations in West Africa. For example, pervasive sensors 

would greatly enhance energy security and counterterrorism efforts while immunotherapy, number 34 on the RAND list due to 

uncertain technological progress, would facilitate HIV/AIDS and 

other pandemic treatment efforts.37

Military Coup

Nigeria endured several military coups from the 1960s through 

the 1990s. There are at least three indicators that typically precede 

a military coup. These include civilian dependence on the military 

due to either immediate or long-term crisis, dependence upon the 

military for political survival, and public dissatisfaction with the 

federal government.38 Afrobarometer data from 2005 suggest Nigeria may have already started down the path towards another military coup since the population’s satisfaction rating with the current and previous civilian government was dropping below the level 

recorded with the previous military regime.39 The Afrobarometer 

data from 2008 was no better, with nearly 89 percent of the Nigerian people perceiving government officials are corrupt and fewer 

than 30 percent believing their electoral process was fair.40

Likewise, with areas in the Niger Delta largely ungovernable, no 

end to ethnic unrest in sight, and a shaky amnesty and mediation 

effort to forestall MEND attacks against oil infrastructure and 

workers ready to fail, the Nigerian government remains dependent 

on the military for internal security and stability. The third indicator, political survival, is not currently a significant threat for Nigeria since the country has taken care, through its participation in 

intra-African organizations like the African Union and Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to help stabilize the 

West African region.

Conditions in Nigeria have not resulted in a coup in several 

years. Much like anticipating successful democracy in Nigeria, 

Afrobarometer data may well be the leading indicator of conditions 

forming for a potential coup. Declines in corruption and human 

development indices will likely alleviate some public dissatisfac-
60

tion, thereby reducing the possibility of a coup. However, avoiding 

yet another coup is not a sufficient or reliable measure of Nigeria’s 

political situation, internal stability and security, or the strength of 

the nation. It is not a guarantee that Nigeria will be a successful 

democracy or remain a viable state.

Civil War

Prior to 1960, the British recognized that the different ethnic 

regions of Nigeria might not be governable as a single unified nation. Although somewhat tolerant of the limited autonomy granted 

during the long years of British rule, the fiercely independent Biafra 

tribe rebelled against the central government; ethnic tensions 

eventually erupted in the 1967 Biafra civil war. Even in 2009, little 

has changed for Nigeria in this regard.

According to Karl Maier, author of This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria, “Nigerians from all walks of life are openly questioning whether their country should remain as one entity or discard the colonial borders and break apart into several different 

states. Ethnic and religious prejudices have found fertile ground in 

Nigeria, where there is neither a national consensus nor a binding 

ideology.”41 While reform efforts might improve conditions in Nigeria, it is unlikely any effort currently envisioned will make the population any less polarized in one generation, especially those from 

the proud Igbo, Hausa, or Yoruban tribes, who have a fierce loyalty 

to their respective tribes and traditions.

Militant groups often form to protect specific geographic areas or 

communities or to press grievances for indigenous people when 

governments fail to provide expected services and security.42 The 

conditions for these scenarios are already present in Nigeria, with 

poverty levels in the northern areas nearly double those in the 

southern regions.43 Any downturn in the Nigerian economy, particularly if regionally focused, has the potential to escalate into civil 

war.44 Given that development generally progresses more rapidly 

where infrastructure already exists,45 overall economic improvement in Nigeria may be seen as favoring the southern region.

Military Summary

Whether Nigerian governance will continue to deteriorate and 

lead the country inexorably toward a military coup and, perhaps, 

civil war is unknown. Where Nigeria falls within the “spectrum of 

failure” will determine if the reforms implemented by the current 

minister of defense, General Azazi, take hold or if the military remains marginally capable as it has for the last few decades.

With reductions in corruption and criminality and with strategic 

investments to diversify the economy and meet basic human needs, 

Nigeria could slowly improve, thereby reducing the possibility of 
61

failure. Should the people gain confidence in Nigerian governance, 

then the Nigerian military might receive the resources and support 

it needs to reform and function as a force promoting internal security and regional stability without threatening the political process. 

If the people lose faith in their current democratically elected civilian government, it is then possible that a weakened military might 

feel emboldened to attempt a coup and, if successful, would likely 

fare no better than it has on the previous five occasions where it 

seized and controlled the government.

Long-term international interest in the region will provide the 

Nigerian military opportunities for increased professionalism and 

new capabilities. While this does not guarantee success, recent 

cooperation with the British and United States has made noticeable improvements.46 In almost any scenario, the Nigerian military will, with government and international support, continue to 

acquire new capabilities as they have in the past. This means, as 

illustrated in appendix C, Nigeria’s army, air force, and navy will 

continue to be characterized by relatively common, ubiquitous, 

although dated, military equipment. Access to advanced technology and better military equipment is desired by Nigeria’s military and could, with proper training and care, enhance the Nigerian military’s status in its traditional internal security and 

peacekeeping roles.

In particular, surveillance and situational awareness technologies will strengthen the Nigerian military’s ability to provide security for its populace. It is unlikely, however, that even continuous 

national growth in a failed-state scenario will produce significant 

gains in Nigerian power projection capability. Other than prestige, 

there are currently no threats or significant or vital interests outside Nigeria’s borders that would drive Nigerian forces to involve 

themselves beyond their current peacekeeping efforts.

Alternately, civil war in Nigeria would almost certainly erupt 

along the ethnic and religious divides between the northern and 

southern regions of the country—it would, in effect, shatter the 

country. Military forces involved in this type of civil conflict would 

normally be expected to fight for their country with perceived moral 

justification, employing any and all means to achieve their goals.47

Given 350 different ethnicities and a large population whose loyalties to tribe and religion are often stronger than national loyalties, 

the Nigerian military may find these same loyalties overwhelming 

any moral justification and rapidly thinning its ranks. Expecting 

technologically advanced international involvement, opposing 

forces might also adopt violent, “neo-absolutist” techniques, where 

the government exercises complete and absolute power to defeat 

the will of its enemy using any means.48 Such techniques can only 

be employed if the forces are sufficiently strong to use them.

Initial capability of forces involved in civil wars would depend on 

how far Nigeria had progressed, or failed to progress, in reforming 
62

its military prior to the nation shattering and devolving into civil 

war. Even from a state of relative governmental and military disarray, however, forces would normally be expected to recruit new 

forces and rapidly develop better capabilities.

During the 1967 Biafran conflict, Nigerian federal forces grew 

from about 15,000 at the start of the war to a total of nearly 

250,000.49 Both sides of the conflict were able to obtain various 

levels of international support,50 while indigenously producing 

some limited weaponry.51 However, in this case, only one region 

was in rebellion against the larger state. In a situation where multiple ethnicities and religious groups are fighting each other, it is 

possible the military may not be able to recruit people, build its 

forces, secure the country, and restore the state.

A civilian government in charge of a functioning state who harbors doubts about the loyalties of its military may limit military 

reforms to equipping its forces with modern weapons and providing it with a training system that promotes professionalism, inspires a degree of loyalty to the state, and enhances readiness. 

Given Nigeria’s relatively recent history of military coups, it is likely 

most civilian governments will be reticent to make the military too 

powerful. However, these same civilian governments recognize Nigeria must have a competent, credible force in order to protect the 

nation’s oil infrastructure and ensure the survival of its single 

commodity economy.

Insurgent attacks and anything else threatening oil production 

reduce revenues that can be used to “buy” political loyalty and reform the military. A professional military is necessary to help preserve order within Nigeria’s 36 disparate states. Whether the current military reforms take hold and Nigeria’s armed forces prove 

equal to the daunting and difficult challenges the nation faces remain to be seen.

Notes

1. Peters, The Nigerian Military, 176.

2. “Lt Gen M. L. Agwai (Nigerian chief of army),” 14.

3. Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria.”

4. Peters, The Nigerian Military, 38.

5. Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria.”

6. Ibid., 5.

7. Maier, This House Has Fallen, 291–93.

8. Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria.”

9. Shah, “World Military Spending.”

10. Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria.”

11. Ibid., 5.

12. Ibid., 2.

13. Nigerian army Web site, http://www.nigerian-army.org/index.php?option=

com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=30 (accessed 22 July 2008).

14. Ibid. The navy, air force, and police Web sites are all accessible from the 

Nigerian army Web site.

15. US Department of State, “Background Note: Nigeria,” 6.
63

16. Jane’s Information Group, “Procurement, Nigeria,” 1.

17. US Department of State, “Background Note: Nigeria,” 6.

18. Jane’s Information Group, “Procurement, Nigeria,” 1.

19. Ibid., 3.

20. Ibid., 1.

21. “Gen O. A. Azazi (Nigerian chief of defense staff),” 14.

22. Ibid.

23. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007, 41.

24. Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz, Convergent Interests.

25. Nigeria/Africa Masterweb News Report, Chronology of Nigeria Militants’ 

Attacks, 25 June 2008, http://www.africamasterweb.com/AdSense/Nigerian 

Militants07Chronology.html (accessed 28 June 2008). The situation was no 

different in early 2009, with more than 600,000 barrels of oil per day out of 

production, which was about 25 percent of the Nigerian total. “FACTBOX—Nigeria’s 

Oil Production Outages,” Reuters News Agency, http://www.reuters.com/article/

rbssIntegratedOilGas/idUSLH94524020090317 (accessed 27 May 2009).

26. Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschulz, Convergent Interests, 19.

27. Ibid., 16.

28. Volman, U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6.

29. Crawley, “U.S. Navy Plans Six-Month West African Training Mission,” 1.

30. Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschulz, Convergent Interests, 19.

31. Ibid., 17.

32. Volman, U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3.

33. Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschulz, Convergent Interests, 17.

34. Silberglitt et al., The Global Technology Revolution 2020, xvii.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 94.

37. Ibid., 219.

38. Peters, The Nigerian Military, 12.

39. Logan, Fujiwara, and Parish, Citizens and the State.

40. Institute for Democracy in Africa, “Public Opinion and Local Government.”

41. Maier, This House Has Fallen, xx.

42. Hammes, “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves,” 16.

43. Angelica Carson, CIA, interview by the author, 26 October 2007.

44. Bannon, Ross, and Collier, The World Bank, 20.

45. Silberglitt et al., The Global Technology Revolution 2020, 39.

46. Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria,” 5.

47. Hammes, “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves,” 17.

48. Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age, 75. Neo-absolutist 

techniques are violent, brutal tactics designed to defeat the will of a more competent, 

technologically advanced enemy. The techniques used against American forces in 

Somalia serve as an example of neo-absolutist methods.

49. Peters, The Nigerian Military, 118.

50. Ibid., 119 for federal forces and 126 for Biafra.

51. Ibid., 181 for federal forces and 125 for Biafra.

65

Chapter 7

Nigeria in 2030: Paths to Failure

Col Christopher J. Kinnan

This chapter posits potential future events that could lead to 

Nigeria’s catastrophic failure in or near the year 2030. Once dubbed 

the Giant of Africa, Nigeria’s lack of unifying national identity, history of corrupt governance, religious and cultural schisms, and 

shifting demographics may cause the state, over time, to break 

apart.1 The factors discussed below describe current and potential 

deteriorating trends in cross-cutting human social issues. Figure 9 

graphically depicts how these various trends could coalesce into a 

situation where Nigeria as a state could catastrophically fail.2

This chapter is not a specific prediction of the future or a depiction of a state of affairs that will and must occur. It is a discussion 

of how the trends occurring in Nigeria since its birth as a nation in 

1960 could, under the right conditions, lead to its failure. The details underlying the various trends can be used to develop strategies or war games to avoid or test potential responses to the very 

calamity painted below.

These details also allow for a specific discussion of what types of 

resources are required to stabilize a failed state, in this case, Nigeria. In the sequence of events discussed below, Nigeria’s history, 

diverse culture, ethnicity, religion, and corruption combine to drain 

the national treasury. The empty treasury prevents the government 

from providing for people’s basic needs, as it blatantly diverts much 

of the nation’s oil treasure to buy support from criminal family 

enterprises and business oligarchs.

By 2030 the social contract between the weakened federal government and the Nigerian people is effectively broken. An attempt 

to restore confidence through a national election sweeps the electorally dominant Islamic political structure into power. Buoyed by 

its electoral success, the new government threatens to ruin family 

criminal enterprises and confiscate the wealth of the business oligarchs. Its ultimate end state is to rebrand Nigeria as an Islamic 

republic. The culmination of these negative trends and political actions sparks a violent reaction from the non-Islamic population, 

the criminal family enterprises, and the oligarchs. In this case, the 

state fails.

The disparities and traditions of Nigeria’s tribal and colonial past 

have created significant social tensions that have made establishing an integrated, coherent, and legitimate government difficult 

under the best of circumstances.3 By 2030 Nigeria’s endemic corruption and the predatory economic practices of the oligarchs and 

their associated enterprises may well deplete the financial re-
Figure 9. Cascading failure of the Nigerian state (2008–2030)
67

sources for economic diversification and critical human and industrial infrastructure projects. This depletion could result in a loss of 

confidence and a lack of capital investment from the World Bank 

and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

Under such circumstances, a devaluation of Nigeria’s credit rating by Goldman-Sachs and other credit-rating organizations is certain. Were Nigeria to default on its large and growing international 

debt, the resulting financial crisis would erode what little credibility 

the government has internally and threaten to destroy the federal 

system. These events would promote destabilizing rumors of a military coup d’état, as such crises have so often in Nigeria’s past.

If this corruption cannot be noticeably reversed, the Nigerian 

government would likely lose legitimacy with its diverse people 

and, with the exception of the 12 Islamic-dominated states in the 

north, no longer function at the federal and state level. Between 

2008 and 2030, tribal ties throughout the country will largely be 

supplanted by loyalty to Islam in the north and emerging predatory 

family enterprises in the south.4 Religious ideology and Shar’ia law 

in the north, combined with its as yet unflexed electoral power of 

its disproportionately large Islamic population and growing youth 

bulge, will prove stronger than any loyalty purchased for a price in 

the south.

By 2030 Nigeria’s robust population will have an average age of 

less than 20 years and a life expectancy of less than 60 years. As 

such, Nigeria will likely have many disaffected and underemployed 

young people.5 It already has the sixth largest Muslim population 

in the world, with a nearly equal balance of Muslims and Christians.6 This balance is currently at a tipping point because of the 

faster population growth in the Islamic north, which is ruled under 

Shar’ia law.7 By 2030 Nigeria’s Islamic population will comprise a 

majority of the federal electorate; this will precipitate a fundamental change in Nigeria’s domestic political situation.8

In 2030, with a population of more than 225 million people, 350 

ethnicities, and multiple languages, Nigeria’s negative social trends 

may become ever more destructive.9 What impact human and social factors have on the strength of any nation is largely determined 

by its own people. If the social contract between government and 

its people remains relatively strong—where the government rules 

justly, invests in its people, and provides economic and political 

freedom—national survival is reasonably assured. Such favorable 

conditions become paths for success.10 However, if the government 

fails to invest in its people and rules through fear and intimidation 

and corruption becomes corrosively endemic, the bonds of trust 

between the government and its people could become irreparably 

weak. These negative trends in crosscutting conditions then become the path to failure.
68

Crosscutters

The crosscutting issues are presented here in the context of 

what might happen in 2030 if current trends hold or Nigeria reverts to past practices. The examination and discussion herein are 

not prescriptive, but rather present a possible, plausible future history of Nigeria.

Culture and Ethnicity

Tribal culture and ethnicity are strong forces in Nigerian social 

life. Respect for elders, political affiliation, ethnicity, demands for 

educational systems that promote tribal language and history, and 

social welfare systems that operate within tribal familial or ethnic 

communal structures have long dominated modern Nigeria’s social 

construct.11 Although 2003 proved to be a watershed year in the 

level of violence throughout Nigeria, explosive episodes of factional 

fighting will likely continue at a strong pace for at least another 

decade until reform measures instituted in 2008 begin to have a 

visible effect.12 Even then, strong tribal allegiances combined with 

exploitable ignorance and perceived wrongs will spawn episodic 

violence between ethnic groups well beyond 2030.

By 2015 the leaders of the moderate Sokoto caliphate will likely 

bring a firm sense of social order throughout the 12 Islamic-dominated 

states of the north. Over time, tribal culture in the north will be 

subsumed by the population’s growing devotion to the tenets of 

Islam and Shar’ia law. The thriving culture of the Sokoto caliphate 

could enjoy a renaissance by 2020, when it will likely become a 

major Islamic center on the African continent—one with great appeal to sub-Saharan Muslims.

If successful, government reforms could result in a reverse diaspora with the return of a large number of educated Nigerians who 

long to return to their homeland. These people left the country of 

their own volition and most often took up residence in Europe and 

the United States. They will form the core of a new intelligentsia

that will use advanced communications to champion democracy, 

social welfare, education, and the acceptance and integration of 

new technology, especially among the youth. Their strong influence 

will manifest itself, over time, in increased political factionalism 

and activism as the population seeks government redress for past 

perceived and real grievances. This influence will create tension 

with the Islamic north. By the time of the national election in 2027, 

these factions may become powerful enough to spark nationalistic 

tendencies in the north and the south that could rapidly debilitate 

the federal system.

If government reforms are not successful, violent attacks against 

critical petroleum and natural gas infrastructure by MEND and 

their supporters will likely continue. This, combined with the failure of the central government to meet the basic needs of its indig-
69

enous people, would intensify calls for new elections and the ouster 

of the national government. By 2030 these clarion calls will be carried throughout the country on advanced communication networks 

and amplified through social-networking systems, all of which 

would further erode tribal social cohesion and undermine the legitimacy of the elected government.

Either way, technology will transform the politics of business. 

By 2015 Next Generation Internet (NGI), cloud computing, and 

broadband cellular personal data systems will be extensively used 

by a class of technologically savvy oligarchs in the south. They will, 

through their various (criminal) enterprises, control the service 

sector and telecommunications industry not only in Nigeria but 

also throughout West Africa. Through payoffs and lucrative employment opportunities, they will garner the support of urban 

youths which, in turn, will further erode respect for ethnicity and 

tribal culture. By 2030 tribal identity and culture may denigrate to 

the status of gang affiliation.

Religion

Throughout modern Nigeria’s history, religious fundamentalism 

has created fear and violent conflict. Although Islamic fundamentalism has threatened to supplant traditional Islam throughout the 

world, Nigeria’s Sokoto caliphate will likely remain firmly opposed 

to any form of jihadist extremism that tries to establish itself in the 

region or challenge the caliphate’s growing influence.

The caliphate’s arguably moderate interpretation and application of Shar’ia law in the 12 northern Nigerian states will likely 

prove a stabilizing force, bringing order and structure along the 

vast Sahel region of the southern Sahara Desert.13 By contrast, 

Nigeria’s Christian south has both benefited from biblical morality 

and suffered from gang-like criminality as evidenced by the rise of 

vigilante groups such as the Bakassi boys, who sought exact justice for real and perceived injustices.14

By 2020 the continued consolidation of wealth in the hands of a 

few southern oligarchs may succeed in “professionalizing” this 

criminality. With religious passions contained and these criminal 

elements functioning as private commercial family enterprises, the 

likelihood for religious conflict between the Islamic north and the 

Christian/animist south will be reduced.

As the Muslim population is now the dominant population in 

Nigeria,15 the Sokoto caliphate will take pains to contain the passions of its youth by inculcating them with their interpretation of 

the basic tenets of Islam while commanding respect for Shar’ia law 

and Nigerian federal law. The result of the careful cultivation of 

their large and growing youth population is stability and religious 

homogeneity in the north. Based on the caliphate’s political calculus, this stability is necessary for the Islamic leaders to implement 
70

a new grand political-theocratic strategy, which will bring them full 

political power and the opportunity to establish an Islamic Republic in the scheduled 2031 elections.

Despite successful economic reform efforts begun in 2008, some 

religious and ethnic violence will continue to flare. Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics will track this violence and periodically 

report its findings to the UN. Although Nigerians will continue to 

question whether Nigeria should stay together as one country or be 

divided into separate nations along ethnic and religious lines,16 the 

government, with the support of the Sokoto caliphate and the 

southern oligarchs, will likely discourage calls for any referendum 

that divides Nigeria.

Public disaffection should abate as the Sokoto caliphate’s power 

and influence expand throughout Africa, especially if a more radical 

Middle East caliphate is established on the Arabian Peninsula.17

Should such an event occur, it may bring about an Islamic schism 

similar to the Protestant Reformation in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Sokoto caliphate will seek to expand its 

power and influence throughout Africa by promoting its moderate 

religious theology and African virtues. Its rising influence should 

result in declining religious violence. This will give rise to a perception of internal security and harmony and, in turn, mitigate secessionist fervor throughout Nigeria.

The leaders of the Sokoto caliphate will maintain firm control of 

social welfare, education programs, and the legal system in northern Nigeria. Their power and influence will hold the passions of 

their rapidly growing and youthful Islamic population in check, 

easing religious and ethnic tensions. In the south, Christian faiths 

will still be practiced in various forms by approximately 30 percent 

of the population.

Animism in the south may attract support from violent eco-terror 

groups such as the Earth Liberation Front, who may actively support MEND with money and training. While it is likely other ethnic, 

religious, and environmental insurgent groups in Nigeria will attempt to form between 2008 and 2030, these groups will, in most 

cases, fail after inception; some could be annihilated or subsumed 

by MEND, while the remainder may be defeated by the Nigerian 

army. In the event amnesty programs fail and the government fails 

to live up to promises made to address grievances, MEND will resort to violence to press its claims for economic fairness and remediation of the ecologically damaged areas in the Niger Delta.

The Influence of Technology

With the addition of almost 600 million people18 since 2005, Africa will prove itself a lucrative market for industries that offer inexpensive computer systems, quantum computing, virtuality,19

wireless broadband cell and satellite phones, cloud computing, 
71

and NGI systems.20 By 2030 social networking will be a part of 

daily life in Nigeria, particularly among the large youth population. 

Its popularity will be regularly exploited by the major business 

owners, mainly the southern oligarchs who, through their family 

and criminal enterprises, will come to dominate all advanced communication and computing technologies in West Africa and perhaps on the African continent.

These commercial communications enterprises will invest heavily 

in technologies that protect their ability to control cyberspace, 

while denying its use to others. These enterprises will have an incentive to quietly recruit and support an organized community of 

hackers and their own version of cyberwarriors (ögajun-ërô).21

Such forces could launch cyberattacks against any national or 

international organization that may threaten their criminal and 

business interests. In addition, by 2015 such cyber capabilities 

could be used to probe international oil consortia in a bid to gain 

insider information so as to better manipulate the price of oil and 

maximize profits.

These likely investments in advanced telecommunications will 

create a regional hub for modern services that the southern oligarchs will control. They will have the ability to develop a pool of 

labor resources, which will give them advantages in protecting their 

regional market and helping their enterprises grow. By 2030 Nigeria 

could become a center of the telecommunications revolution in Africa and one of the leading information societies in the world.

Easy information access and social networking will undercut the 

power of traditional news media, including those outlets controlled 

by the central government. The popularity of social networking 

sites and Internet blogs such as Global Voices Online will help the 

oligarchs in the south and the caliphate in the north preserve their 

respective holds on power and expand their influence.

Eventually, these will likely lead to a clash of power bases between the Christian southern oligarchs and the northern Islamic 

caliphate. Here, the clash will be one based on a quest for political 

and financial power; moral and religious issues will be used to 

stimulate the passions of their respective followers. Nigeria’s southern state politicians and politically powerful families have historically retained a disproportionate share of the oil wealth. This entrenched graft and corruption mean that the leaders in the south 

have a strong disincentive to relinquish power to those who would 

reward them less well.

Medical technology, power generation equipment, water treatment materials and techniques, and even weaponry will also prove 

to be lucrative ways of making money. Since 2009 the United States 

and the United Kingdom have transferred older vessels from their 

respective fleets, while providing training and equipment from their 

own navies, to Nigeria.22 Nigeria’s newly refurbished frigates and 

coastal patrol boats will be easily integrated into the US Navy’s 
72

Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, which stresses forward deployment of US naval forces to support national objectives in areas 

where the American forces are denied basing or access.23

This operating concept stresses the importance of establishing 

habitual working relationships with the navies of nations in the 

deployed region to control unstable areas that are home to critical 

national resources; this has often been described by the US Navy 

as the 1,000-ship navy. Although they routinely patrol the Gulf of 

Guinea with the navies of the United States and the United Kingdom, after years of support, the Nigerian navy should be postured 

and provisioned to lead security enforcement operations in Nigeria’s offshore oil regions by 2015.24

The Nigerian air force will use its funds to support navy maritime patrol efforts, purchasing aircraft equipped with surveillance 

radar and electro-optical tracking systems. Although expensive, 

these systems will perform well as long as funds are available to 

purchase new equipment, improve aircraft serviceability, and train 

crews.25 Without these funds, mission-capable rates for the Nigerian air forces’ current fleet of advanced aircraft systems will likely 

decline after 2020, which will then require greater effort on the 

part of Nigerian surface forces.26

International Terrorism

As noted by the ICG in 2007, the sub-Saharan region of Africa is 

not guaranteed to become an area of widespread terrorist activity.27

In fact, institution of the Sokoto caliphate’s moderate interpretation of Shar’ia law in the northern Nigerian states which border the 

Sahel could make this region safer than the areas in and around 

the Niger Delta.28

By 2020 the Niger Delta region may become the cause célèbre for 

international environmental groups, given the extraordinary level 

of ecological damage. Radical environmental groups operating 

through social networking may funnel money and weapons to 

MEND forces to help them recruit new followers to take direct action against petroleum facilities and infrastructure.

The power of social networking by 2030 will likely enhance the 

visibility of MEND issues and actions. The more spectacular the 

attacks, the greater the international focus on MEND and, in turn, 

the easier it is for outside groups to raise funds and garner support 

for MEND’s causes and actions. Having successfully reduced oil 

production by 25 percent since 2008, MEND has proven that it is 

a force to be reckoned with.29 It is likely that the government will 

attempt to undertake some reforms to address some of the grievances of the affected tribes in the Niger Delta region, which may, 

over time, serve to undermine MEND’s appeal. However, the reduced resources available for these reforms, combined with Nigeria’s culture of institutional corruption, could limit progress on 
73

these issues. This is especially true should the southern oligarchs 

be successful in consolidating their power behind a slate of national leaders they control. To maintain their hold on power, the 

oligarchs may use oil profits to “buy off” MEND with tribute payments rather than investing in technology and infrastructure to 

remediate the ecology and address grievances. Although tribute 

payments from the central government may temporarily reduce 

MEND actions, such payments will, in the long term, provoke 

greater demands for more money and increased calls for greater 

government action to address grievances. These will become the 

price of MEND’s forbearance. In response, the southern oligarchs 

who provide tribute payments will demand additional resources 

from the elected government. By 2025 the government will be 

forced to source these funds from other areas of the government 

and the economy, including funds dedicated to infrastructure and 

human services. Failure to pay will be punctuated by a series of 

small yet potent attacks on critical oil infrastructure in an attempt 

to produce a significant oil shock and bring international pressure 

on Nigeria’s government.

Any attempted inroads into West Africa by al-Qaeda or similar 

jihadist Salafist groups will likely be successfully thwarted by a 

resurgent Sokoto caliphate which may issue fatwas rejecting the 

violent jihadist ideology of these outsiders. The caliphate may go so 

far as to brand any attempt by al-Qaeda to either sanction attacks 

or destroy Nigeria’s oil production capacity as an attack on the Islamic people of northern Nigeria, since the north will continue to 

depend on oil revenues for basic goods and services beyond 2030.

Because of its interest in maintaining a stable Nigeria and its 

need for Nigerian oil, the United States will continue aggressive 

measures to combat terrorism in West Africa and in the Pan-Sahel 

region. The TSCTI will continue to receive more than $100 million 

each year well beyond 2015. Any attempt by a corrupt government 

to siphon these funds off for tribute or loyalty payments will likely 

result in funding being curtailed or stopped.30

Criminality

Criminality has long been institutionalized in Nigeria, even before 

its founding. Criminality experienced tremendous growth between 

1993 and 2009, especially in the Niger Delta region and in Lagos, 

Nigeria’s largest city. Attempts to steal oil and refined gasoline directly from pipelines and storage tanks still result in extensive damage to oil infrastructure and large loss of life among the poor and add 

to the ecological disaster in the Niger Delta region. Escalations in local 

and international criminal activity make the entire region, including 

off-shore facilities, ungovernable for brief periods of time. Even in 

2030, several major oil companies will fear losing their ability to operate in the area.31 Despite tribute payments, MEND conducts armed 
74

attacks and kidnappings to achieve their goal of cutting Nigerian oil 

production and creating periodic oil shocks for greater gain.

Generous donations of money, training, social networking support, weapons, and support equipment provided by groups like the 

Earth Liberation Front will likely keep MEND viable. By 2030 

MEND should be able to maintain a well-trained force of up to 

10,000 fighters who will conduct raids against national oil infrastructure, both on and offshore. They will likely prove more than 

equal to Nigerian forces stationed in the region.

Nigeria continues to brand MEND a criminal element; thus, the 

Nigerian army, with the help of the Nigerian air force, stations up 

to 15,000 troops to combat MEND forces in the Niger Delta region. 

Any interruption in funding for training Nigerian troops or a decision by the central government to keep Nigerian forces in a weakened state to prevent them from seizing power from a corrupt government will harm the army’s ability to recruit, train, and retain 

forces in the region.

Any move by MEND or other militia forces in the country to 

launch an all-out attack against an untrained, underpaid, and 

weakened Nigerian military, particularly in 2030, will likely result 

in Nigerian troops abandoning their positions and rejoining their 

tribes and families. In many cases, these disaffected troops will 

join family, tribal, or religious militias and could turn against the 

central government.

In the face of a growing criminal militia movement and with oil 

profits threatened by growing demands for tribute, increased corruption, and declining oil revenues, the Nigerian government may 

seek assistance from ECOWAS and the Organization of African 

Unity. While these organizations may offer moral support, the difficult logistics posed by the region and the uncertainty generated 

by the 350 ethnicities and multiple religious beliefs may drive the 

central government to seek support and assistance through the UN 

and other international organizations. These organizations may offer monetary assistance and could seek a negotiated settlement.

Such a move on the part of the central government will likely be 

viewed as a weakness and could embolden various militias and 

MEND to go on the offensive. Ill-equipped to deal with the well financed and trained MEND forces, the government could call for an 

early election in the hope it would present a new opportunity to 

negotiate a compromise, maintain territorial integrity, and restore 

a strong central government to power.

Corruption 

Like criminality, corruption at all levels has frustrated the reform efforts of Nigerian leaders since 1960. Bribes, kickbacks, favoritism, nepotism, and other similar corruptive influences and 

practices will continue to permeate all personal, business, and gov-
75

ernment transactions. These act as a hidden tax that robs the Nigerian people of resources to improve their health, education, and 

quality of life.32 The national security apparatus is similarly corrupt. 

Federal and state police forces continue to extract patronage or 

bribes from the Nigerian citizenry and even tourists.33 Poor pay, lack 

of education, and limited training for security forces to accomplish 

their job will remain the proximate cause and exacerbate corruption. These problems are expected to continue well beyond 2030.

The INEC, NEITI, and EFCC combined with strong use of 419

provisions and a more transparent distribution of resources 

throughout Nigeria provided teeth and structure for leaders to implement anticorruption measures in 2008.34 But given Nigeria’s intractable historic penchant for corruption, it is likely the efforts of 

these organizations will meet with very limited success. By 2030, 

even with consistent determination by potentially five successive 

Nigerian governments producing a measurable decline in institutional and client-patronage corruption at the local level will still 

erode a significant measureable percentage of national GDP each 

year.35

Rapid population growth will likely be matched by growth in 

international criminal activities as internal anticorruption measures drive the oligarchs to look elsewhere. By 2030 even the socalled constructive political opposition will openly court influence 

among international conglomerates and Nigeria’s industrial tycoons—the oligarchs. Political parties, with the active yet quiet 

support of the oligarchs and even the caliphate, will buy off constituents who will turn out in huge numbers to support their slate 

of candidates. In the face of increasing corruption in federal and 

state institutions, it is possible the caliphate will restrict efforts by 

Islamic political leaders to gain power for a time, in order to highlight the corruption of the southern leadership. Its intent will likely 

be to allow these non-Islamic leaders to continue to abuse their 

power so that they discredit themselves in the eyes of Nigerians 

and in front of international financial and good-governance institutions like Transparency International.

By 2030, with criminality and corruption permeating all facets 

of government at levels unimaginable by today’s standards, the 

people will lose faith in their government. This could stoke ethnic 

nationalism across the country, particularly in the Islamic north. 

With discontent among the then-Islamic majority reaching a fever 

pitch, the stage will be set for wholesale political change.

The State of the Society

The UN Development Program’s HDI, which considers relative 

levels of health, education, and standards of living, will be among 

the first to note the reversal of anticorruption measures.36 Declines 

in federal government spending on health care and education will 
76

likely be the result of diversion of funds through client patronage 

from federal programs.

The impact of this loss of funds in social programs will be most 

directly felt by the poor and the large youth population, especially 

in urban areas in the south and to a lesser extent in the north. 

Poor health-care funding with a breakdown in electrical, sewage, 

and water-treatment services will lead to increased disease incidence, particularly in the cities. Squalor in high-density population 

areas like Lagos will increase, as will social disorder.

Health Care and Medicine

The WHO monitors disease morbidity, mortality, and the state 

of national health-care programs available to serve the population. 

Nigeria achieved a low point in 2006 when it was found to be one 

of 30 countries across the globe with critical shortages of healthservice providers.37 Reforms imposed in 2008 brought some new 

emphasis on improving health care in Nigeria. This increased emphasis could bring limited improvements in infant mortality rates, 

although they will remain high in the southeastern part of the 

country, in large measure, because of very poor health services and 

the disastrous state of the ecology in the Niger Delta region. Multiple disease vectors including poor water quality, uncontrolled insect populations, petrochemical contamination, and pollution of all 

sorts will continue to plague this ecologically devastated region. 

These issues, in combination with the rise in criminality in the 

south and a large disenfranchised urban youth population, will 

likely result in an increased incidence of drug and other addictions.

To stem these problems, the Nigerian central government will 

continue to make limited investments in health and education services. With WHO and other assistance, it is possible the HIV infection rates may be held to a maximum 5 percent prevalence, with 

AIDS cases peaking before 2020 and then slowly declining.38 HIV 

infection rates and prevalence could be arrested by the introduction of new retroviral drugs.

Tuberculosis rates of infection should remain in line with other 

states in West Africa since these nations do benefit from UN and US 

support for antimalarial programs. As in 2009, drug-resistant strains 

of the disease will still be found in densely populated urban areas.

Malaria treatment in the form of new drugs and other intervention methods including mosquito netting and insecticide spraying 

could bring down infection rates. Given that malaria is endemic to 

the region, any precipitous decline in health-care funding will immediately reverse any improvements. Any decline in health-care 

funding could also restart a “brain drain” of doctors and nurses, 

including those with pediatric and epidemiological specialties.

More troubling is that international donations of vaccines 

against diseases like cholera, typhoid, tuberculosis, and HIV as 
77

well as medicine and equipment normally provided by intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO)39

may face major distribution delays caused by poor roads and a 

lack of basic human services including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. In addition, distribution of health care will be affected by corruption, especially in the south, where graft will siphon resources away from these programs. Further, MEND’s 

growing influence may preclude distribution in some areas due to 

conflict or the confiscation of medical resources. In the Islamic 

north, health-care delivery is likely to be stronger since the Sokoto 

caliphate exerts a strong central influence over social welfare programs in the 12 Islamic states.

Education

In 2009 wholesale educational reforms instituted by President 

Yar’Adua (see appendix A) initially helped Nigerians meet the minimum acceptable international standards of education regardless of 

ethnicity, sex, or religion. Special emphasis is given to educational 

depth through tutoring and strong investments of resources in 

teaching science and technology. Most Nigerian states are adopting 

the reforms, although the leaders of the Sokoto caliphate will likely 

continue to reject reforms perceived to violate Islamic norms. Given 

the inconsistency of support for and application of education standards, by 2030 it is likely Nigeria will be unable to honor its commitment to the African Union to invest 1 percent of its GDP in science and technology instruction and development.

By 2030 the education of young girls should be routine throughout the country, with most receiving a primary school education. 

Secondary education of girls will be more common throughout the 

south. The Islamic north will likely provide men their education 

through religious schools controlled by the caliphate. Access to 

secondary and higher education will remain much more accessible 

for men than women. Leaders will likely allow a select, though 

small, number of women to pursue secondary and higher education in Islamic studies. NGOs will attempt to fill gaps and will try to 

help the central government establish and enforce national education standards and deliver standardized curricula.

Literacy rates throughout the country should rise by 2030, although it will likely be measurably lower in the Islamic north where 

women will continue to lag behind men. Religious instruction will 

form the core of the curricula in the Islamic states. The caliphate 

will impose restrictions on what can be read—the Koran and the 

Syrah—and taught in Islamic schools.

As it did in 2002, the Central Bank will continue to warn that 

any reduction in education funding and standards will elevate poverty rates.40 The failure to fund schools could cause them to close. 
78

A lack of education in the large youth population in 2030 could 

drive them to other outlets—criminality, drugs, and violence.

Population and the Youth Bulge

By 2030 Nigeria’s population will reach 225 million people, with 

much of the growth in the Islamic north.41 Nigeria will likely be the sixth 

most populous country in the world.42 The population of the entire 

African continent will grow to approximately 1.5 billion people.43

By 2030 the Islamic north could account for almost 65 percent of 

Nigeria’s population.44 The voting-age population in the North is expected to comprise more than 50 percent of the national electorate.45

Nigeria’s population will be increasingly urban. In the largely 

Christian south, urbanization will continue to rise, particularly in 

Abuja and Lagos. By 2030 roughly two-thirds of the population will 

live in urban centers, a number that may rise to 83 percent by 

2050.46 By 2030, Lagos could be the 11th largest city in the world 

and, according to the UN, could become the seventh largest city by 

2050. Other cities throughout the country have seen their populations grow exponentially as tribal ties for the young give way to the 

popular appeal of modern technology and the need for work. Uncontrolled growth in urban areas will likely outpace the government’s ability to provide basic electrical, water, and sewage services. 

This will exacerbate development problems as well as health issues.

The youth bulge will dominate population demographics particularly in urban areas of Nigeria.47 By 2030 the average age in Nigeria will be less than 20 years, and life expectancy could increase by 

an average of 10 years. These two factors will increase the workingage population, which will stress Nigeria’s ability to provide basic 

human services, health care, and employment for large segments 

of its youth. As a result, this large, young, mostly urbanized, and 

unemployed population will create a pool of disaffected youth who 

will be easily recruited by antisocial groups with a propensity for 

criminality and violence.

International criminal enterprises owned mostly by the southern 

business oligarchs will recruit many of these young people. By 2030 

these enterprises will establish an international transshipment 

point in Lagos for illicit drugs, precious gems, endangered species, 

weapons, and human traffic. The client-patronage networks required to sustain these operations will further weaken the central 

government’s hold on power and infect most local governments.

Infrastructure

In 2008 President Yar’Adua’s seven-point plan (see appendix A) 

concentrated on resources to solve infrastructure problems that 

have limited Nigeria’s development as a modern nation. Recognizing the need to provide basic human service infrastructure such as 

electricity, sewage and water treatment, and transportation for 
79

farming and commerce, the Nigerian government will try to establish a stronger relationship with the World Bank and venture capitalists to secure funding for improving Nigerian human and industrial service sectors.

By 2030 most of the current infrastructure and the construction 

companies necessary to build new infrastructure will be controlled 

by criminal enterprises or various oligarchs. Through client patronage, they will rig bids for the contracts while siphoning off government investment. While family enterprises will build partnerships with the government to create jobs and some services, they 

will also fill their own coffers with oil profits. The result will be a 

slower infrastructure improvement process.

Power and Energy. Electrical power remains an essential element of any modern state. With electricity, a nation has the ability to operate oil refineries, provide clean water, treat sewage, 

build a modern service-based society, diversify the industrial 

base, make significant advancements in science and technology, 

and provide modern telecommunication services. As discovered 

during Phase IV operations in postwar Iraq in 2003, a nationwide 

failure of electrical power makes it extraordinarily difficult to provide basic human services.48 Nigeria’s reform movement could result in new national development funds for electricity, sewage, 

water, and other basic human services. However, endemic corruption will slow the development of a robust national power grid, 

while also allowing the oligarchs controlling the installation of the 

new infrastructure to gain greater influence with local and regional governmental leaders.49

By 2020 Nigeria will likely have some new power plants fueled by 

oil and natural gas and a power grid augmented by experimental 

solar and wind farms and tidal generators. However, it is also probable by 2030 that corrupt officials and enterprises will divert the 

funds needed to maintain a stable national electrical grid for their 

own purposes. Under these conditions, rolling brownouts will be 

the norm, especially in large urban areas, with occurrences peaking during the hot Nigerian summers. Without stable power, other 

essential human services will suffer, creating vectors for increased 

incidences of water-borne disease with all its attendant consequences. This, in turn, will spark social unrest and increase doubt 

about the government’s ability to provide basic services.

Water and Other Basic Services. In the north, rainfall is seasonal and is becoming increasingly uncertain in areas bordering the 

expanding Sahara Desert. Lake Chad, a shallow lake that was once 

the source of much of the water for irrigated fields in the north, is all 

but dry because of overuse.50 Continued draining of wells which tap 

the aquifers under much of sub-Saharan West Africa will likely increase the incidence of transnational migration of nomadic tribes in 

the Sahel. It could also lead to an increase in the number of inter-
80

nally displaced people in the north who may abandon villages as 

lack of water may eventually make farming impossible.

By 2030 internal displacement in the Niger Delta region and 

southeast Nigeria will rise because of MEND violence, the contamination of most surface water supplies with carcinogens and petrochemicals, and the lack of fresh-water wells. Without consistent 

funding and dedicated government action, remediation efforts in 

the Niger Delta region will fail. Saltwater and contaminates from 

the oil industry will likely intrude into coastal aquifers.

Without reliable clean water in 2030, waterborne disease morbidity will rise throughout the country with increased death among 

the very young and old alike. Popular discontent will rise as the 

lack of services and the perception of government favoritism of one 

ethnic group over another increase. Episodic violence and unremitting protests against local and national governments will likely 

follow, further eroding confidence in the Nigerian government.

Transportation. Nigeria’s road networks are extensive but relatively poor—approximately 165,000 kilometers (km) of Nigeria’s 

194,000 km (85 percent) of roadways were either unpaved or were 

merely unimproved trails in 2009.51 Without new investment, there 

will be little change in the ratio of unpaved to paved roads by 2030. 

Investments by the World Bank, China, and the United States have 

resulted in the roads in oil-producing areas receiving the most attention. This disparity has been noticed. If the government committed itself to provide either improved gravel or a paved road 

within a mile of every Nigerian farm, such an investment could 

enhance not only food security for the people but also the financial 

prospects of those living in the largely agrarian north and help diversify the economy. If, however, the road-paving industry becomes 

co-opted by the same graft and corruption as have other areas of 

government, then the north and the poor will remain mostly separated and isolated from more prosperous areas.

Other investments could improve the very small rail service (approximately 3,500 km) and air service (70 airfields) throughout the 

large country. Roads connecting major urban centers will likely be 

paved only with the assistance of international NGOs and oil and 

mining conglomerates. Investors in Nigeria’s strategic mineral 

mines will likely pave and widen existing roads to facilitate the 

transport of goods and services for mining of raw materials and 

expanding Nigeria’s oil infrastructure. Investment capital for improved 

transport may be generated by the sale of government bonds and 

with loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary 

Fund, if Nigeria’s bond rating can remain investment grade.

Otherwise, government expansion of transport services in the 

Niger Delta will be limited to developing roads to facilitate transportation of oil-related materials and using the Nigerian army to 

help control this volatile region. The government will restrict development in areas of known or suspected MEND activity in order to 
81

contain and limit the movement of insurgent forces. Paradoxically, 

this could reinforce perceptions that the government is unwilling 

or incapable of addressing local grievances.

As in the human service areas, corruption could disrupt or halt 

all investments in road, rail, and airport development, especially if 

it is bad enough to cause Nigeria to default on repayment of loans 

and bonds. Monsoons and other environmental factors unique to 

sub-Saharan Africa along with MEND attacks in the south could 

rapidly degrade any improvements made. The quality of the road 

network will affect agricultural production in the north as farmers 

may be unable to move their crops to market. Mining interests will 

also falter as they lose reliable transportation modes to key production and port facilities.

Declining food production combined with poor transportation 

infrastructure will take its toll on the poorest members of the population. Without food security, riots and thefts of food from storage 

facilities and granaries will become more commonplace and produce the same effect as bunkering oil. Without reliable transportation, industrial diversification efforts will cease.

Telecommunications. With a disproportionately large youth 

population accounting for more than 50 percent of the population, 

Nigeria will continue to buy into anything related to telecommunications. Ironically, telecommunications will prove a double-edged 

sword for the government, the oligarchs, and criminality in Nigeria.

By 2030 the oligarchs may form a strong telecommunications 

alliance or cartel that will likely lock out competition from non-African 

companies. Given Nigeria’s proximity to the equator, it will continue to serve as a critical link for satellite communications. The 

oligarchs will control analog and digital radio stations; analog, high 

definition, and cable television; direct satellite broadcasts; broadband cellular; and NGI. Through broadband cellular, the family 

enterprises will circumvent government restrictions on public protests and can easily communicate with criminal elements throughout Africa and the world. They will also likely pioneer new security 

measures for industry that also serve to protect their interests, 

especially their criminal activities.

Through their dominance of the public airways, these family enterprises could control advertisement about goods and services, 

becoming the greatest beneficiaries of the public’s insatiable appetite for new technology, goods, and services. The government will 

earn fees through auctions of the electromagnetic spectrum, telecommunication fees, and taxes. Through patronage, the oligarchs 

will likely win each auction and pay virtually no taxes. The oligarchs will then use their dominance of television and radio to help 

elect and reelect their candidates to public office.

MEND and the Sokoto caliphate will avail themselves of the 

same technology to recruit followers and spread their message 

throughout the world. Communication towers, normally tempting 
82

targets for any insurgency, will remain relatively unaffected since 

both MEND and criminal enterprises will depend on them. While 

helping them exert influence and control among their own followers, they will, with the assistance of international civil society 

groups, undermine the government’s legitimacy.

Food Security. Although a largely agrarian nation, Nigerian 

farming contributes little to the GDP. With appropriate government 

investments in water and road projects, agriculture may increase 

its contribution to the GDP by 2030. Distribution could be enhanced by new efficiencies in transportation using barges, rail, and 

trucking. With easy access to the modern Internet and the cloud, 

farmers will be able to create and use up-to-date weather, imagery, 

entomology, transportation, hydrology, and other farm-related 

data and information to improve crop yields and profits.

Any increased wealth in the north will provide the Sokoto caliphate additional funds that it would then likely use to meet the health 

care, education, political, and spiritual needs of its people. The 

caliphate will also invest in infrastructure projects, particularly 

wells and irrigation systems, to ensure its people have reliable access to water for crop irrigation even during periods of drought. It 

will also provide its people safe drinking water as surface contamination from fertilizers and industrial pollutants spills into rivers 

and lakes. Such assistance to the local populace will solidify political support for caliphate-selected leaders.

Although Lake Chad remains a relatively safe source of water for 

Nigeria, the encroaching Sahara Desert and overuse will further 

reduce its surface area by more than 50 percent and reduce available water supplies for Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon.52 This, 

in turn, will likely increase tension between the countries and 

could spark periodic clashes.

 With poor quality surface water sources in the south for farming 

and drinking, the industrial south will depend more and more on 

the agrarian north for its food supply. Due to the corruption mentioned above, while the Sokoto caliphate may invest in agriculture, 

underinvestment in agricultural infrastructure by the central Nigerian government will decrease crop yields, thus increasing food 

prices throughout the country. This, in turn, will hurt the poorest 

people in the urban centers the most. Overpriced food and shortages of food staples will spark social unrest and further harm the 

relationship between the government and the people. It may also 

be used by a corrupt government to spark nationalism if it chooses 

to blame foreign governments, the World Bank, the International 

Monetary Fund, and other international organizations for its own 

planning and development failures.

Environment. The ecological devastation in the Niger Delta cannot be overstated. Millions of barrels of spilled oil, the clear-cutting 

of jungles, and the ravages of violent conflict will only compound 

the problem, destroying virtually all surface water supplies in the 
83

Niger Delta. Saltwater inundation and the carcinogens from the oil 

industry will contaminate the vital southern aquifer and fishing 

areas. Fish stocks in rivers, lakes, and immediately offshore in the 

Gulf of Guinea will likely fall through 2030 unless immediate steps 

are taken to remediate the Niger Delta region and establish farming guidelines in the north.53

The lack of government action to remediate the Niger Delta will 

create conditions for active insurgencies. MEND and other groups 

will attract funds from groups like Earth Liberation Front and, 

with a large youth population, will find it relatively easy to recruit 

new members. Tribute payments to MEND and other similar 

groups will only encourage violence over the long term. By 2030 

they will have more capabilities to attack the oil infrastructure and 

oligarch-controlled businesses in the south.

Economics

The Nigerian Economy

The Nigerian economy has long been considered one of the strongest in Africa, largely because of oil revenues and conservative 

budgeting by the central government. With virtually no debt in 

2008 and with global demand for oil, its dominant commodity, increasing, Sachs projected growth from 2005 to 2030 (the 2008–

2010 global recession notwithstanding) in five-year intervals to be 

5.0, 5.5, 5.7, 6.1, and 6.6 percent. If realized, Nigeria’s $94 billion 

(US dollars) economy in 2005 could grow to $556 billion by 2030.54

If sustained, government reforms through 2030 could help Nigeria develop what it arguably needs most—a large middle class—in 

order to sustain economic growth, improve per capita income, and 

preserve internal harmony. A healthy middle class would form an 

important tax base to help Nigeria diversify its economy, provide 

some stability to the budgeting process, and attract outside investment for new economic areas outside its oil industry.

Given volatility in the oil markets and Nigeria’s current oil-based 

budgeting process, the Nigerian government may seek long-term, 

fix-priced oil contracts with the United States, China, and the European Union to bring predictability to their annual budget process. With declining institutional corruption, these long-term contracts could allow the Nigerian government to prioritize investments 

in infrastructure, especially power and oil production, enhanced 

recovery systems, and some other limited industrial diversification.

However, by 2030 a failure to address corruption will hinder investments to grow a middle class, harm Nigeria’s credit rating, 

force early termination of oil contracts, and result in slower economic growth, thereby eliminating Nigeria as a top-20 world economy. 

Nigeria could also see peak oil production before 2030, as oil com-
84

panies cease exploration and oil drilling in Nigeria in favor of exploration and production in less volatile and potentially more lucrative regions of the world. In combination with each other, these 

factors would lead to an increased probability of instability and 

perhaps government failure.

The Single Commodity

Nigeria’s current economy is largely built around a single commodity—light sweet crude oil.55 Although currently demonized for 

pollution, climate change, and other environmental and health related problems, light sweet crude oil will remain in great demand 

beyond 2030 because it is relatively easy to distill and produces 

many useful types of petroleum products such as gasoline, plastics, and polymers. Declining oil production and violence in other 

petroleum-producing regions will help Nigeria improve its relative 

position as an oil producer. With proper investment in infrastructure and without production interruptions caused by violence, Nigeria’s oil profits could rise to over 85 percent of federal government income, 91 percent of export earnings, and more than 60 

percent of overall GDP by 2030.56

While high oil prices currently provide the potential for assured 

growth for Nigeria’s economy, they could prove unsustainable 

over the long term as importing nations seek alternative and more 

reliable sources of energy. Energy and industrial diversification 

could raise agricultural and mining contributions to the overall 

GDP. However, as in other industries, institutional corruption 

could reverse these gains and spark greater levels of malfeasance 

in the form of taxes and fees as the government seeks to make up 

these losses.

The oligarchs will still hold a disproportionately large stake in 

the energy sector, but government reforms could initially reduce 

their share of oil profits from their current 80 percent level. However, the oligarchs will invest in new enterprises to assure their 

profits in many areas of the economy. The ICG’s 2005 warnings 

about “a development trap” could prove prescient by 2030 should 

Nigeria fail to diversify its economy as wild fluctuations in oil prices 

and institutional corruption increase.57

Nigeria’s complex national oil-revenue sharing plan will also be 

threatened.58 Loss of these revenues will be felt most acutely in the 

north which, in turn, will harden the Sokoto caliphate’s resolve to 

“depose through democracy” the corrupt government. Attempts to 

conduct a national census will continue to be opposed by the people 

of the Niger Delta region as a systematic attempt to steal oil wealth 

by the increasingly populous north.

As a result of these trends, the most likely outcome appears to 

be that the Niger Delta will continue as the heart of Nigeria’s oil 

production, yet its share of global oil revenues will continue to de-
85

cline from its peak of 13 percent of the value it produces. This decline will continue as funds are siphoned off for MEND tribute payments and institutional corruption. These all result in disincentives 

for oil companies to invest further in the area. By 2030 oil production will fall below current rates as these dynamics take their toll.

Industrial Diversification

In order to create a more diversified economy, government reform efforts must be sustained for more than 10 years to create the 

needed confidence to attract investment by venture capital fund 

organizations. Such investment would have the effect of attracting 

multinational conglomerates like Bechtel Corporation to establish 

mining and production facilities in Nigeria. Nigeria has resources 

beyond oil, and with the proper investment, production of strategic 

materials required for aerospace and telecommunications, such as 

bauxite, aluminum, and gold, could see significant growth. Copper, 

tin, and other ores will likely not be as well developed but could 

help with economic diversification.

Early reform efforts to diversify the economy would include improvements to major port facilities like Lagos, which, in turn, will 

help the country develop new air, road, and rail services. Capital 

investments into the energy, services, and telecommunication sectors would also be key to sparking job growth in these new economic areas.

In addition, the emphasis on education reforms would also need 

to be continued. The efforts begun in 2007, if they take hold, could 

measurably increase literacy rates before 2020. This growing, educated workforce would attract new investment in Nigeria.

The challenge with this, however, is that the southern oligarchs 

will use their influence to attempt to control as much of this industry as possible. Further, the graft and corruption endemic to 

the central government mean that the needed reforms in the 

north will have to come from indigenous nonoil sources rather 

than revenue sharing. Lastly, the historic diversion of education 

funding for political purposes will continue, as it has in the past, 

to harm wealth creation by constraining growth of a middle class, 

increasing youth unemployment, ensconcing power in the hands 

of the oligarchs, and potentially threatening Nigeria’s free enterprise system. In such an event, social disruptions and internal 

instability will increase.

The Government

Internal Security

Although religious and criminal violence is dropping throughout 

Nigeria, a further reduction depends on multiple factors: (1) the 
86

success of reforms in government, education, and the economy; (2) 

strong leadership provided by the Sokoto caliphate in the north; (3) 

the success of the southern oligarchs in “professionalizing” criminal 

elements; (4) the failure of MEND to mount a sustained successful 

insurgency; and (5) successful revenue sharing and payoffs to extremist groups in the Niger Delta region. A failure in any of these 

areas could increase violence between religious and ethnic groups 

and further threaten the social contract between the government 

and the people.

The collapse of Nigeria’s economy could create challenges in 

maintaining order throughout the country. In the south, the oligarchs will help maintain order by developing their own security 

forces, likely professionalized criminal groups, to help “supplement” Nigeria’s already corrupt law enforcement. The protection of 

critical oil infrastructure and the need to hold MEND forces at bay 

will require a major Nigerian military presence. In the north, the 

Sokoto caliphate will grow its own militia and paid religious police. 

If the economy fails to grow, these three forces—military, southern 

security forces, and an Islamic militia—will likely work to maintain 

internal security in their respective areas of interest. However, the 

disparate philosophical views of these groups suggest that conflict 

between them is possible. Should the people lose confidence in the 

government, rumors of a coup d’état by the Nigerian military could 

spark increased internal conflict.

Governance and Legitimacy

Nigerian “power sharing” at the federal level is still not constitutionally mandated. While Christians will represent the majority of 

the electorate through the mid-2020s, the Islamic electorate, by 

sheer population growth, will likely compose the majority before 

2030. Christian-led governments will continue to follow the Nigerian constitution and appoint people from each of Nigeria’s 36 

states to serve as ministers and to key positions in each ministry. 

However, client patronage and other forms of corruption will likely 

continue unabated throughout the federal, state, and local governmental systems.

The Sokoto caliphate will win a majority election late in this time 

frame. When its majority is sufficiently robust, it will seek to enshrine elements of the Islamic judicial code into law. As justification for its actions, it will point to a long and tarnished history of 

corrupt Christian-led rule.

There is no question that the caliphate will maintain a strong 

political base and hold on to the 12 northern Islamic-dominated 

states. To the extent it can under the existing system of graft and 

corruption, it will use limited monetary resources to expand its 

agricultural infrastructure and distribute revenues to provide for 

development, social welfare, education, and health-care needs.
87

In the south, the oligarchs and their enterprises become conduits for federal monies that they will use to attempt to “buy” loyalty. While this may work for a time, this corrupt practice to maintain power will eventually become clearly visible as communications 

expand. While government deals may go to the highest bidder for a 

time, eventually the corruption will spark a general disdain for the 

federal government. The corruption in the south will be a marked 

contrast from the governance in the north, which, regardless of 

religious overtones, will appear more responsive to the people than 

a national government beholden to client patronage.

The likely result is that the Islamic leaders will, in time, be confident of their numerical majority and moral superiority. When this 

occurs, an election result that ostensibly rejects the corruption of 

the past will bring into power a government supportive of Islamic 

reforms that will purify the corrupt state. This could lead to a nationwide establishment of Islamic schools and a gradual transformation of Nigeria and the Sokoto caliphate into the center of subSaharan Islam.

Such a government would likely attempt rapid reform by eradicating previous administrations’ graft and corruption. Such actions could include seizing assets of those deemed most corrupt, 

particularly the southern oligarchs, and the government officials 

they supported.

The oligarchs professionalized security forces would react 

quickly to any threat to their livelihood, including striking hard 

against government forces and the Islamic militia. Similarly, MEND 

forces would likely view such actions unfavorably. As it has since 

2005, MEND may strike hard at oil centers in the south and attempt attacks on oil platforms, transshipment loading terminals, 

and pipelines in the Gulf of Guinea. Its goal would likely be to force 

the new government to address its grievances before allowing the 

new government to consolidate its gains. As such, internal conflict 

throughout the southern part of Nigeria is likely, as the oligarchs, 

MEND, and the former leaders will all have strong financial incentives to retain their financial or government powers.

The resultant nationwide violence could very plausibly lead to the 

collapse of law and order in urban areas. The Nigerian armed forces, 

weakened by decades of graft and siphoning off of funds, even with 

the help of Islamic militias, would likely be unable to contain the 

violence. The government would be in grave danger of collapse.

If this violence continued even for a short time, oil production 

would rapidly drop, causing a significant loss of government revenue. This, in turn, could cause a collapse of the currency on international markets and a concomitant collapse of the government’s 

ability to maintain economic order at home. The nation would be 

on the verge of shattering.
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Military

The Nigerian military has been active in preserving Nigeria as an 

independent entity since 1960. It still functions to preserve Nigeria’s territorial integrity, contribute to national emergencies and 

security, promote collective security in Africa while furthering Nigerian foreign policy, and contribute to global security.59 It has 

ruled the state on five occasions, the last time being in 1993. Since 

then, presidents have worked to maintain it as a credible force but 

one too weak to seize power without assistance from nonmilitary 

elements. Unfortunately, this also has meant that it is too weak to 

fully stop the destruction of the oil infrastructure by MEND and 

other insurgents.

As an institution, the Nigerian military will likely remain a marginally capable force between 2009 and 2030. It should be able to 

continue supporting the Organization of African Unity and UN 

peacekeeping efforts throughout Africa. However, without adequate 

funding for training, professionalism will continue to be an issue 

whenever the force deploys as well as for domestic operations. Attempts by the government to reform the military and its leadership 

will remain sporadic and underfunded. Existing plans will downsize the armed forces by 40 percent and limit military spending to 

3 percent of the GDP.60

Modernization efforts will also be limited. The Nigerian military 

will occasionally purchase new aircraft and army equipment. 

Training programs instituted through TSCTI will help professionalize the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps but will 

not eliminate institutional corruption. Indeed, a continuation of 

corrupt presidential administrations will both distrust the military 

and infect the institution with its own supporters. A continued diversion of funds from operations, maintenance, equipment, and, 

most importantly, training accounts will atrophy the military to a 

point that it is unable to threaten the central government. By 2030 

the military will likely be unable to quell violence. In fact, the announced 2008 reorganization leaves the military with only three 

divisions. Further, as the Sokoto caliphate seeks to establish its 

own internal professional police force and militia, it is likely that 

many Islamic officers and NCOs will resign their commissions in 

Nigeria’s armed forces and return north to serve in the Islamic militia.

In recent years, the United States has assisted the Nigerian military in maintaining its own sovereignty over its territory. Since 

2005, the US Navy has increased its patrols in Nigerian waters. In 

2008 the Gulf of Guinea Guard was formed with the help of the 

United States and Britain with assistance from Angola, Chad, 

Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé e Principe. Even 

then, MEND’s counteroil operations have not been slowed.

When the electoral shift between Christian and Muslim leadership occurs, the Nigerian military will likely be unable to provide 
89

internal security and ironically will still be viewed with suspicion. 

The army will lack the resources to secure the country, resulting in 

a demoralized force with large-scale desertions by soldiers who 

leave the service to protect their own families. Yet, in spite of this, 

the army’s past history will almost certainly spark rumors of coups 

d’état as the central government faces a legitimacy crisis.

The hollow nature of the army will be known. Its inability to defend the oil-producing infrastructure from MEND, combined with 

desertions, will only empower and encourage other groups to attempt to seize some measure of control. Localized professional militias, Islamic militant forces, and MEND will have little reason to 

fear direct action from the Nigerian military, resulting in what may 

become a multipartite civil crisis. The state may, quite literally, be 

incapable of protecting itself, and the resultant breakup may be as 

violent as the shattering of a piece of plate glass when dropped 

upon a tile floor.

Outside Influences

The Players

In 2030 the United States probably will still be Nigeria’s largest 

trading partner, with China holding the number two position. China’s 

successful experiment with capitalism has opened many diplomatic doors across Africa, Nigeria included. As China seeks assured access to the resources it needs to sustain economic growth 

to maintain “internal harmony,” it is likely to support stabilization 

efforts to protect critical resources and infrastructure.

Since 2008, China has invested heavily in Nigeria’s oil sector to 

secure it as a reliable energy source for its rapidly growing economy. 

With the United States providing security in the Gulf of Guinea region, China will remain focused on infrastructure development 

rather than physical security through its paramilitary private military 

organizations. Both China and the United States will seek long-term 

energy contracts with Nigeria to help ensure predictable energy 

prices. These energy contracts could lock the United States into receiving up to 25 percent of its oil imports from Nigeria by 2025.

While the United States and China are generally viewed favorably within Nigeria, potential tensions may arise between the 

United States and the Sokoto caliphate over US military action in 

other Islamic countries. These tensions will be exacerbated by US 

demands for the accountability of money invested by the World 

Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the MCC in developing nations.

If Nigeria’s anticorruption measures fail, or elections are disputed, it is likely that the US Congress may sequester assistance 

funds and cancel loans to the Nigerian government. This could 
90

briefly spark nationalistic fervor within Nigeria as the federal government attempts to enhance its legitimacy by blaming “outsiders” 

for Nigeria’s failing economy and lack of basic human services.

This could create a conundrum for the international community 

as any attempt by outsiders to intervene to stabilize the country, 

no matter how benevolent their intent, could spark a backlash. 

This is a situation not unlike Iraq, where various ethnic groups 

initially viewed the intervention by the United States quite differently. Outside influence is unlikely to unite the Nigerian people 

into a single nation, and any show or even perception of favoritism 

towards any ethnicity or group will be poorly received.

Donor Fatigue

Donor nations joke about how their money is spent in Nigeria 

today. Despite the best efforts of donors to account for the money 

they spend, institutional corruption, in the form of NGO entrepreneurs, only serves to undermine government legitimacy. As a result, donor nations and even large international NGOs like the Red 

Cross will gradually demand greater transparency and accountability. Failing this, they will withdraw their support for large projects and focus on election monitoring and the most basic human 

needs such as disease mitigation and feeding hungry people.

The long decline of human services in Nigeria is generally viewed 

as one caused by the government and sustained by an unremitting 

culture of corruption. After 70 years of trying, donor fatigue has set 

in. If law and order break down in Nigeria, the donor fatigue already resident may cause many NGOs to withdraw.

The Failed State of Nigeria

In 2030, in the transition between the leadership of the extant 

corrupt regime and some form of Islamic replacement, the country 

will probably experience an episode of significant violence. Any attempt by an Islamic-led government to establish laws based on 

Islamic jurisprudence or to declare Nigeria as an Islamic republic 

will be rejected by the large Christian minority. Attempts to remove 

corrupt influences from governance will be fought by those who 

have historically benefited from these arrangements, namely the 

criminal family enterprises and the business oligarchs.

Business leaders, who have historically held great power, will not 

willingly allow their influence to be diluted. Conflict between security forces for criminal enterprises, various militias, insurgents, and 

the Nigerian military will erupt. Each of these entities will strive to 

protect their respective interests. The result will be a combination of 

religious and ethnic violence, which will almost certainly overstretch 

the mechanisms of the government to maintain control. When this 

occurs, it is likely the country will shatter along religious and ethnic 

lines, and civil war, probably multipartite, will ensue.61
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The Nigeria of the distant future will likely succumb to a variety 

of ills—corruption, weak government institutions, failure to meet 

the social welfare needs of its people, unchecked criminality, crumbling infrastructure, growing insurgency in the Niger Delta region, 

and loss of confidence by international investors, among many others. In the early 2030 elections, the people of the Islamic-dominated 

north will successfully exercise their democratic vote and succeed 

in electorally deposing the previous government and, in the process, will likely trigger the collapse of their own country.

The aftermath of this election may cause vital interests of many 

of the world’s powers to be threatened. A Nigeria in turmoil cannot 

produce oil, and up to 25 percent of US oil imports will be at risk. 

Global oil prices will skyrocket, threatening the world with serious 

economic turmoil. This will be a crisis few can ignore.

Yet it also promises to be a crisis few can fathom. With conflict 

nationwide, the flow of goods and services, including food, will be 

jeopardized. As galvanizing as the starvation in Darfur was in the 

late 2000s, a humanitarian crisis in a country with 225 million 

people threatens to be more than 100 times worse—both in terms 

of the number of mouths to be fed and the potential spread of 

death and disease. Further, Darfur was a conflict between two major factions; a fragmented Nigeria could break into as many as 

eight or more. Peacemaking is a must, as is restoring the oil flow; 

yet the problem at hand will be much more complex than the operations in Iraq or Afghanistan and will involve more than 10 times 

the number of people. It will demand a force structure more than 

an order of magnitude larger than any operation the United States 

has conducted in recent history, and it will likely come at a time 

when that force structure will not be resident among either the active duty or reserves. This will be a crisis that will take the concerted and integrated cooperation of much of the global community, or the global economy may fail.

Notes

1. Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 158.

2. The author developed this figure to provide the reader with a quick-look 

synopsis of the multiple factors at work within Nigeria from 2008 to 2030. While not 

all inclusive, it is a pictorial representation of all facets discussed in this chapter.

3. Library of Congress, Country Profile: Nigeria, 1.

4. However, many of these family enterprises will likely be formed along tribal/

historically familial lines. As such, it may not appear that a formal shift in loyalty 

has taken place from the tribe to the corporation.

5. Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.” According to the CIA, World 

Factbook 2008, the youth population (under age 16) accounts for 41.7 percent of 

the total population. Given the average fertility rate of 5.6 children and the relatively 

low life expectancy of Nigerian men and women (less than 54 years of age), the 

percentage of young people will likely continue to increase.

6. The CIA’s World Factbook 2008 shows Nigeria to have approximately 

146,255,000 people, of which half, or 73 million, are Muslim. This places Nigeria 
92

between fourth and sixth place in terms of states with a Muslim population—nearly 

tied with Egypt and Turkey.

7. Paden, “Nigeria.”

8. This percentage is synthesized from research reports from the United Nations 

(UN) Development Program, the UN Population Program, and the World Bank; 

Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007;” and statistical information found 

in The World Fact Book 2008. These sources generally agree that Nigeria’s population 

is currently more than 50 percent Muslim, although some Islamic publications 

claim higher figures. The last official recorded census taken in Nigeria was in 1991. 

In 2006 Nigeria’s National Population Commission attempted a new census, but the 

results of this effort are widely dismissed because of flawed collection and calculation 

methodologies and a failure to collect information about controversial demographics 

like religion. Charges of political corruption in the census process levied at President 

Obasanjo and his political party further tainted the results. As a result, the 2006 

census was rejected by the 36 governors who are required to approve the results. 

Under Nigeria’s constitution, state population statistics directly affect the 

proportional representation in the National Assembly and the federal allocation of 

funds to each state. Previous census attempts have led to conflict between the 12 

Islamic states and the 24 non-Islamic states. The unofficial 2006 population 

statistics showed a 63 percent increase in the number of people over the 1991 

census. The UN, World Bank, and the CIA population projections generally agree 

that the overall population growth rate is approximately 2.025 percent annually. 

The World Fact Book 2008 states, as of 2008, the voting age population accounts for 

55.3 percent of the Nigerian population. Population growth rates are higher in the 

12 northern Muslim provinces, potentially because, under the Shar’ia law practiced 

there, men are allowed to marry up to four women, while the Christian provinces 

ban polygamy. Based on this data, it is expected that by 2030, the voting age 

population of the 12 northern states will make up the majority of voters within the 

country.

9. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World 

Population Prospects”; and UN, “World Urbanization Prospects.” The UN 

Population Database projects Nigeria’s population to reach 226,855,000 by 2030. 

The UN calculates Nigeria’s population will double in 32 years based on the following 

formula: log(2) / log(1 + r), where r = population growth rate.

10. Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Annual Scorecard of Policy Categories.”

11. Smith, Culture of Corruption, 177.

12. “Failed States Index 2007,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy.

13. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 12.

14. Smith, Culture of Corruption, 177.

15. The CIA’s World Factbook 2008 shows Nigeria to have approximately 

146,255,000 people, of which half, or 73 million, are Muslim. This places Nigeria 

between fourth and sixth place in terms of states with a Muslim population—nearly 

tied with Egypt and Turkey.

16. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 6.

17. Schlisser, “Global War on Terrorism.” Although likely written after 2003, the 

presentation is based on the analysis of captured al-Qaeda documents in 2005 

showing a well constructed, seven-phase, 20-year strategy which began with the 

events of 9/11. The phases are The Awakening (2001); Eye-opening (United States 

invasion of Iraq in 2003); Arising and Standing Up (2007—formation of new groups 

throughout Arab countries); Demise of Arab Governments (2010); Islamic caliphate 

(2013); Total Confrontation (2016—attack against the West to drive all western 

nations from all Islamic states); and Definitive Victory (2020). The long-term goal is 

a world united under Islam by 2100.

18. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 

“World Population Prospects.” The UN Population Database projects Africa’s 

population to reach 1.524 billion by 2030, an increase of 603 million since 2005 

(middle case).
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19. The term virtuality is a combination of the words virtual reality. This term is 

now used extensively by “gamers,” scientists, and engineers who develop virtual 

reality technology.

20. Thompson, “Give Me Rice, but Give Me a Laptop Too.”

21. This term for “warrior” is derived from the Yoruba language in southern 

Nigeria. English is the official language of Nigeria.

22. Crawley, “U.S. Navy Plans Six-Month West African Training Mission.”

23. Department of Defense, Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept 1.0.

24. US Department of State, “Background Note: Nigeria,” 6.

25. Jane’s Information Group, “Procurement, Nigeria,” 1.

26. Volman, U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3.

27. Ibid., 14.

28. Ibid., 18.

29. BBC, “Nigerian Military Warns Oil Rebels.”

30. Volman, U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3.

31. Ibid., 1.

32. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, 56.

33. Ibid., 11–12.

34. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 9.

35. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, 229.

36. UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008, 232.

37. US Department of State, “Background Note: Nigeria.”

38. Goings, “Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

39. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, 88–89.

40. Goings, “Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

41. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 

“World Population Prospects”; and UN, “World Urbanization Prospects.” UN 

Population Database projects Nigeria’s population to reach 226,855,000 by 2030. 

The UN calculates Nigeria’s population will double in 32 years based on the following 

formula: log(2) / log(1 + r), where r = population growth rate.

42. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 

“World Population Prospects.”

43. UN, “World Urbanization Prospects.”

44. Pande et al., “Population Density in West Africa.” The red areas indicate 

population densities of 75 people per square kilometer.

45. See note 8.

46. Globalis.gvu.unu.edu. Globalis is an interactive world atlas and Globalis.

gvu.unu.edu is a collaboration between the Norwegian UN Association, UN 

Environment Programme/GRID-Arendal, UN University/Global Virtual University, 

the University College of Hedmark, and the INTIS schools. The project is supported 

by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for 

Development Cooperation.

47. Ibid.

48. Firsthand account of the author who served as the deputy chief of plans for 

Task Force IV, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, and the 

Coalition Provisional Authority during Operation Iraqi Freedom, January–June 

2003.

49. This was practiced extensively in Iraq by Saddam Hussein and immediately 

after his overthrow in 2003 (author’s firsthand account, January–June 2003) 

against the Shi’a. It is used in other nations where the central government and its 

coterie of supporters often threaten to cut off essential services to those communities 

who do or are perceived to oppose them.

50. Jacob Silberberg, “Lake Chad Waters Recede,” Wall Street Journal, http://

online.wsj.com/article/SB124033310033639597.html (accessed 22 April 2009). 

According to the slide show, Lake Chad’s surface area is only 15 percent of what it 

was in the 1960s. Scientists blame the encroaching Sahara Desert as the principle 

cause, one exacerbated by irrigation programs in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and 

Cameroon.
94

51. CIA, World Factbook 2008.

52. Gupta, “Climate Change and Diminishing Desert Resources,” CNN.

53. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 17.

54. Ibid., 21. Nigeria’s growth rate estimates for 2009 appear to range from a low 

of 2.7 percent to a high of 5.9 percent. While the latest estimates seem clustered 

just below 3 percent, Nigeria’s economy continues to grow in spite of the ongoing 

recession. The worst estimate of Nigeria’s current economic status is found in 

“Nigeria’s Growth Slows to 2.7%,” Businessday.

55. Until 2022, Iran’s economy, like Nigeria, was also built around crude oil 

production. Throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first century, Iran was a net 

exporter of sweet crude oil and a net importer of refined oil products like gasoline. 

From 2007 to 2011, Iran’s government was roundly criticized by the people in a 

series of protests for failing to provide enough gasoline and natural gas. The decline 

of Iran’s oil stocks since 2014 has made it a net importer of oil for its growing 

population.

56. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 12.

57. Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, 1.

58. Library of Congress, Country Study: Nigeria.

59. Peters, Nigerian Military and the State, 176.

60. Jane’s Information Group, “Procurement, Nigeria,” 3.

61. “Failed States Index 2009,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy. As this 

monograph was being written, Nigeria continued its inexorable rise on the list of 

states most likely to fail. With the exception of refugee flows, the growth rate of the 

economy, and current intervention by outside powers, Nigeria scores abysmally in 

all categories rated. As of late June 2009, it is considered one of the 15 most likely 

states to fail.
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Chapter 8

Technology and Failed State 2030—The 

United States Air Force Responds

Col Christopher J. Kinnan

With Nigeria on the brink of civil war, the global community, 

particularly the United States and the nations of West Africa, is 

faced with the difficult choices of if, who, how, and when to intervene. If the president chooses to intervene, then the United States 

will need to consider if the UN has sanctioned an action. If so, what 

limits have been imposed? What capabilities will allies or coalition 

partners bring to the fight and what do they need to be helpful 

partners? If the United States must stand alone, what technological 

capabilities will it require to be successful? Also, if the US Air Force 

is the force of choice to respond to a crisis caused by a failed state, 

what technological capabilities will it require to be successful?

For the purposes of this analysis, the researchers assumed the 

following: (1) Oil, particularly light sweet crude, remains a vital 

United States and global interest; (2) although declining, Nigerian 

oil imports may account for up to 25 percent of all US oil imports; 

and (3) Nigeria is fragmenting and sliding into a multipartite civil 

war. Civil war in Nigeria could destabilize all of West Africa, leading to instability across sub-Saharan Africa; create sanctuaries 

for violent extremist and terrorist groups; create a humanitarian 

crisis of unprecedented size; and create the conditions for global 

economic collapse.

The researchers also assumed that (1) the UN has sanctioned 

action to restore order and create conditions for a political solution 

to the crisis—one that will ultimately restore the Federal Republic 

of Nigeria; (2) African nations are not in a position to lead a response force; and (3) the United States will respond using the resources necessary to conduct a peace enforcement operation in 

order to secure critical oil infrastructure, separate belligerents, 

and create conditions for a political solution.

In addition to peace enforcement, the United States must prepare 

to provide humanitarian relief, restore basic human services as 

required to directly support the mission, assist NGOs as they conduct relief operations, separate the warring parties, and protect 

and secure the critical resource and supporting infrastructure.

A final assumption is that no other African nation will attack 

Nigeria since the nations in West Africa lack the forces necessary 

to take and hold territory. None of the forces within Nigeria—the 

Nigerian military, Islamic and tribal militias, the corporate security forces, and insurgent groups—are able to establish control 

over Nigeria.
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Options to Restore the Peace

Peace enforcement falls under the larger construct of peace operations which is defined by the DOD as “multi-agency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to 

contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to 

support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to 

legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, 

peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts” (emphasis added).1

Peace enforcement allows for the application of military force or 

the threat of its use. According to the DOD, peace enforcement is 

“normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore 

peace and order.”2 In this case, the UN will only authorize the use 

of force to restore order, provide sufficient stability for humanitarian 

relief operations, and create conditions for a political solution.

To Engage or Not to Engage

So why engage at all? Responding to humanitarian disasters is 

a mission long undertaken by the United States regardless of a 

country’s strategic position or interest to the United States. War, 

especially civil war, is arguably an unmitigated humanitarian disaster in the making, one that will require and consume tremendous resources. A humanitarian response operation is a powerful 

soft power option that can, over time, improve long-term relations 

between countries and their respective people while promoting internal security and stability.

In this case, the researchers assume engagement is required 

because Nigeria occupies a strategic position in sub-Saharan Africa and West Africa and provides a critical commodity the United 

States needs and the global economy requires in 2030. Nigeria is 

one of the world’s largest producers of light sweet crude oil—highly 

prized because of ease of refinement and the proportionally high 

number of useful products (aviation fuel and gasoline among others) that can be distilled from it. Its loss is arguably disproportionately disruptive to the United States and the global economy and 

similarly destabilizing across much of sub-Saharan Africa.

In this case, failing to engage at all entails the risk of potential serious disruption of oil supplies, which would directly and seriously 

harm the United States and the global economy. Additionally, instability in Africa has traditionally sparked new wars, famines, and genocide across the continent—all of these are extraordinarily difficult 

challenges. As it is, this scenario will create many of these challenges. 

Allowing it to fester could create an intractable problem, expanding 

the need for humanitarian relief across a large swath of Africa.
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There is also a significant moral element that should be considered based on recent failed-state experiences. Failed states of the 

past—for example, Lebanon and Somalia—disintegrated into destructive, even genocidal, civil wars. Lebanon’s civil war lasted from 

1975 through 1990; a political solution was finally agreed to but 

only after hundreds of thousands of people were killed or displaced.

In the case of Somalia, which completely failed in 1991, attempts 

at a political solution, humanitarian relief, and peacekeeping operations have all largely failed. Hundreds of thousands have died in 

genocidal fighting; human trafficking, piracy, transnational terrorism, religious hatred, and famine have increased suffering and 

promoted instability in other areas of Africa and the Middle East. 

There is still no central government—political violence, clan warfare, and religious hatred will likely keep Somalia a failed state for 

at least two generations. Instability in Somalia has threatened to 

ignite wars in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

The world is also bearing witness to the slow failure of Yemen, 

which suffers from weak governance and an internal Shi’a insurgency and hosts numerous terror training camps. Somalia, Eritrea, 

and Yemen sit astride the Gulf of Aden, a critical waterway and 

strategic choke point for maritime commerce leading to the Suez 

Canal. It is only a matter of time before intervention of some kind, 

likely military, will be required to keep this critical waterway open.

In the near term, a decision to not intervene may save lives and 

money for the nations normally expected to respond. The longterm costs of waiting until a failing nation erupts in civil war—with 

its evil sisters, genocide, hunger, privation, and disease—are incalculable. Delay brings the great risk of explosive costs to the international community as it potentially spends generations, irreplaceable lives, and national treasure to rehabilitate and recover from 

the consequences of a failed state.

US Response to Nigeria’s 2030 Failure

For purposes of this analysis, the researchers assume the UN 

has sanctioned a peace enforcement operation in Nigeria led by the 

United States. The United States will, in this case, as it has in other 

US-led interventions, pursue a course of action designed to create 

conditions for a political solution.

Under these circumstances, United States priorities are to prevent full-scale civil war in Nigeria, limit the spread of conflict beyond Nigeria’s borders, secure critical oil resource areas in order to 

limit damage to United States and global economy, relieve human 

suffering in all parts of the country, identify and separate belligerents, create conditions for a political solution between warring parties and foster national reconciliation, and transition from a US-led 

peace enforcement operation to a UN-led national recovery and 

peace building operation.
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Normally in any peace enforcement operation, the United States 

relies, at least in part, on airpower to address its priorities. In this 

case, researchers assume the US Air Force will serve as the lead 

agent of a joint and international peace enforcement operation. In 

light of the current situation, the Air Force must be prepared to

•  Detect—achieve full spectrum dominance (land, sea, air, 

space, and cyberspace) that allows US forces to rapidly identify belligerents, survey operating areas, quickly respond to 

threats, identify environmental and disease vectors that could 

threaten the mission, and synthesize all forms of intelligence 

to form an accurate composite picture of the battlespace. Allsource intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) will 

help build this picture.

•  Understand—use a combination of technology and human 

sources to characterize the nature of threats posed by the belligerents, discriminate between friend and foe, find critical 

players and their supporters, discern potential vulnerabilities 

and opportunities, map human and communication networks, 

and identify opportunities to exploit the rapidly evolving situation to defuse tensions while creating conditions for a peaceful 

political settlement.

•  Deploy—rapidly move forces, materiel, and supporting infrastructure into the region.

•  Survive—integrate the use of technology and human networking to secure US operating areas in the failed state and enhance force protection efforts.

•  Engage—target and attack belligerents through multiple means.

•  Sustain—rapidly replenish forces and quickly restore operations in the wake of losses by attack or system failure.

Technologies Required to Address a 

Failed-State Scenario in 2030

Technologies in 2030 available to support a military response in 

a failed state, especially in the most stressing case where civil war 

is imminent or ongoing, will likely be highly accurate, precise, direct, and discrete capabilities that allow the application of minimum force to compel warring factions to cease their hostile actions 

and quickly seek a political solution. The researchers expect by 

2030 that weapons and supporting systems (those designed to detect, understand, deploy, survive, engage, sustain, and assess) will 

be tied through the ubiquitous Global Information Grid (GIG) into 

an adaptable, flexible, and highly responsive “system of systems.”
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The GIG in 2030 will possibly be integrated within its own network cloud composed of sensors, databases, analysts, analyzing 

technologies, automatic recognition and characterization, decision 

support, decision-making models, and users. In the researchers’ 

opinion, today’s kill chain—find, fix, track, target, analyze, engage, 

and assess—remains a valid operative model for this peace enforcement operation.

Every land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace weapon platform and 

system during this time will function as a sensor by collecting and 

feeding data to and through the GIG and, in many cases, conducting rudimentary analysis. Platforms and systems will probably 

have routine seamless access to the GIG throughout their mission 

but will also have stand-alone features allowing mission completion should access to the GIG be severed or compromised.

The technology available in 2030 will provide accurate automatic 

target recognition (ATR) at much greater distances through the use 

of onboard and off-board detection and assessment systems. 

Weapon platforms and systems in 2030 will likely be programmed 

with the most current up-to-the-minute information prior to each 

mission; this data will be updated continuously during the entire 

mission with additional information provided via the GIG.

Some basic assumptions about technology in this timeframe include: (1) many advanced technologies will be accessible and used 

by nonstate actors (e.g., groups and individuals); (2) all sensors 

(electro-optical, infrared, radar [C-band, X-band, etc.], multispectral, hyperspectral, ultraspectral, electronic detection, acoustic, 

listening, olfactory, cyber, etc.) will be much smaller, allowing platforms to carry multiple sensors in an integrated, multisensor suite 

on almost any platform; (3) advanced sensing and detection technologies (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace) will provide better 

discrimination of targets (e.g., location of an industrial plant, identification of effluents, resolution of specific chemical trace, etc.), 

which will allow discrete targeting of a particular section of a target; 

(4) advanced sensing technology will allow increased probability of 

detecting moving targets and “targets of opportunity,” as well as an 

increased probability of detecting previously unknown targets; (5) 

systems will likely carry the maximum number of sensors they can 

based on mission design, platform capabilities, system power, and 

computational capabilities; and (6) weapons and platforms (land, 

sea, air, space, and cyberspace) will have the capability and capacity 

to be loaded with information required to support their basic mission profile prior to mission start, receive “low probability of intercept” communications from other platforms on the same mission 

or operating in the same area, acquire mission information from 

databases and sensors outside the operating area, and assess new 

data and synthesize it with onboard resident information to refine 

mission parameters.
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It is assumed that, when programmed or allowed, systems will 

self-select targets, make engagement decisions, provide assessments to other platforms or systems, and conduct operations as 

determined by the designated controlling commander. The system 

memory storage capacity within the network cloud will be virtually 

unlimited; bandwidth capacity in this timeframe will range from 

hundreds of megabits per second to hundreds of petabits per second—higher capacity to send and receive information, while desirable, should not be a disqualifier (e.g., microsystems, which are 

limited by the physical size of the communications apertures/

pipes). Weapons and platforms will be capable of autonomous operations to a level determined by the designated controlling commander (or in the case of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 

mass destruction, the president). Weapons and platforms will, in 

some cases, have the ability to complete their mission if they are 

disconnected from the GIG and their command and control elements, and they will be subject to physical attack from all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber—using systems that can 

disrupt, degrade, deny, delay, and destroy.

Thus, technology in this timeframe will potentially provide many 

useful platforms and systems that will enable the Air Force in 2030 

to act as the lead force in responding to and resolving failed-state 

situations. For purposes of this examination and the failed-state 

scenario, emphasis is given to the following areas.

Detect

Prior to engagement in any scenario, the response team requires 

access to air, space, cyberspace, human intelligence, and other resources to build a comprehensive picture of the battle space or operating environment. Response elements will likely require ISR capabilities that they can immediately task and, in many cases, control.

The response team will require a system of systems that integrates the tasking, controlling, and manipulation of intelligence 

products from electro-optical, electronic, radar (various wavelengths designed to image the surface and penetrate camouflage, 

buildings, soil, and water), communications, auditory, acoustical, 

spectral (multi, hyper, and ultra), biological, chemical, nuclear, 

network mapping (human, cyber, communications, etc.), and other 

varieties of active and passive sensing and taggant systems. These 

can operate in the air, space, near space, cyber, surface, and subsurface environments and provide planners and operators with vital 

information of a dynamic environment.

Nanoscale sensors employed as smart dust or a cloud of micro 

electromechanical systems (MEMS), also known as motes, are deployed by blast, spraying, or other similar dispersion methods. 

When dispersed in target areas, these sensors, when clustered together, can create a sensing network that is virtually undetectable 
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by an adversary but can provide valuable information about an 

adversary’s movement and activities. These sensors and taggants 

can track individual movements, identify disease vectors, and detect dangerous gases or effluents. Fused with other sensor information, these sensors detect and build a comprehensive picture of 

the battlespace.

Control systems should be easily portable by individuals and 

easily networked with and through the GIG. The software systems 

should automatically control all operations once the operator provides basic mission profile information. The control system’s logic 

matrix should prioritize all mission taskings in the region, assign 

and adjust priorities, control the handoff from one mission system 

to another as required, and recommend alternative courses of action to optimize persistence and ensure mission completion.

Passive systems are designed to provide early warning of possible 

threats. Advanced warning should allow for a greater variety of active defense and attack operations options. Advanced detection capabilities and systems, combined with robust signature databases, 

will help the response force identify biological, chemical, and nuclear hazards.

Understand

Context is “job all.” In peace enforcement, a failure to understand the strategic, operational, and tactical situation in a fluid 

operating environment can lead to rapid escalation with its attendant tragic consequences, including collateral damage and mission 

failure. The ability to understand an evolving conflict situation is 

useful so that appropriate courses of action can be developed and 

contingencies anticipated. The better the information, the more refined the solution set will be and, potentially, the better the decision.

Using integrated, persistent ISR, advanced detection systems, 

indigenous human intelligence capabilities (recruited and friendly), 

and decision support systems, the response team can begin to 

bound the problem. Among the more vexing challenges for the 

team is understanding who the belligerents are and how they are 

linked to other factions in the conflict (shifting alliances that can 

either be exploited or that may threaten the response force); how 

these disparate factions operate and the depth of their passion for 

this or any conflict; what underlying problems are sparking the 

conflict; what the aggravating factors are—cultural, ethnic, religious, language, historic animosities, special grievances, economic, 

social, tribal, and so forth; and what capabilities the various factions have to continue the conflict and what they can provide their 

own people.

The team must also look at what various belligerents value (axiological targeting); what the current status of critical infrastructure is—economic, basic services, government, military, and so 
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forth; what the people need to sustain them until the conflict is 

resolved; what gaps exist in its understanding so that detection 

capabilities can be tasked or its capabilities refined to compensate; and what infrastructure is available to receive, host, and 

sustain the forces flowing into the country.

With this basic understanding, the team can refine its response and make it more targeted and efficient. While there are 

many unknowns in a failed-state civil war, a well-informed response force that understands the situation on the ground can 

spend more of its energy and resources addressing real problems in discrete areas rather than husbanding resources to respond to all unknowns.

In the face of belligerents taking advantage of the collapse of a 

central government and a nation’s disintegration, understanding 

who they are and, more importantly, what they value becomes 

critical in this fluid environment. Systems that map human and 

communication networks and identify key players among various 

factions make axiological or value targeting possible. Once the 

players are identified, it is then possible to identify what they value. 

With this information, the response force can take action compelling belligerents to cease or curtail their hostile or divisive activities 

and, perhaps, encourage them into a process that ends violence 

and creates conditions for a political solution and the possible restoration of the state.

Thus, persistent ISR, decision support systems, human and 

communications network mapping systems, reliable communications (radio, telecom, and computer), language and cultural competency, and knowledge of the conditions precipitating and aggravating the crisis are essential to understanding the situation in a 

failed state. It is especially important to be forearmed prior to deploying forces or taking actions to resolve seemingly intractable 

civil wars and even lower-level conflict. Current, actionable information presented in its proper context is a very powerful weapon.

Deploy

Once a decision is made to conduct a peace enforcement operation in 2030, the ability to rapidly deploy forces, support, and humanitarian relief materiel will be critical. In a situation where a 

civil war is threatening, the shock effect generated by the quick 

deployment of a large number of forces arriving simultaneously 

and ready to engage can potentially slow down belligerent actions 

and give hope to innocent victims, while reassuring regional nations and global markets. The deployed force must arrive quickly, 

be large enough to be immediately visible to the populace, and robust enough to have an immediate impact on events. In a nation 

with 10 times the people and more than twice the land area of Iraq, 

the number of forces and resources necessary will be quite large.
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Airborne delivery of personnel and equipment in such a situation must be rapid and highly efficient. Within hours of a direction 

to deploy to the affected area, air forces must load and deliver hundreds of thousands of pounds of personnel and materiel for an Air 

Force wing to conduct and sustain operations. The scope of the 

humanitarian crisis may be hundreds of times larger than the Berlin 

Airlift. The absence of surface infrastructure means much of this 

materiel will be delivered by air, as the road network will not be 

adequate to move goods from seaports to inland areas. The Air Force’s 

current lift capabilities are grossly inadequate for this scenario.

For this task, Air Force lift capabilities must have unrefueled 

global range and be able to use unimproved, even open, farm fields 

to deploy and receive military forces and equipment. Given the 

shifting alliances and the multipartite aspect of Nigeria’s civil conflict, any local contracting will be seen as taking sides—all operations will be done “in-house” or in conjunction with allies. In order 

to carry the quantity of materials to stem a humanitarian crisis 

involving a quarter of a billion people, size will be important. Some 

airlift aircraft will need the cargo capacity of modern sealift vessels 

and will need to be self supporting. They must carry any required 

air and space ground and material handling equipment for loading, 

unloading, and relaunching the aircraft.

Once unloaded, these enormous airlifters should be rapidly configurable to move refugees or internally displaced persons, carry 

the wounded, move indigenous cargo for the local population or 

NGOs, conduct airdrops of food and critical equipment, and even 

act as an airborne command center as the situation warrants. 

Some large airlifters may need to be configured as “hospital ships” 

like the US Navy ships Mercy and Comfort.

Medium airlifters—C-5, C-17, and C-130 aircraft and contracted 

cargo airlift—will be used in the failed-state scenario in 2030; however, their utility may be somewhat limited by access to airfields. 

As proven assets, they are useful for moving cargo from logistics 

hubs to forward operating locations and for conducting airdrop 

operations. Short haul airlift can be provided by CV-22 and the 

Joint Cargo Aircraft. The inability of helicopters to self-deploy 

across the Atlantic means that vast quantities of lift, which may be 

needed for immediate humanitarian relief and stabilization, will be 

required to move these assets to theater.

Survive to Operate

Threats to deploying aircraft will normally be considered low for 

the 2030 timeframe. However, in 2030 this means that, in addition 

to automatic weapons, handheld surface-to-air missiles such as 

the SA-7, SA-9, SA-16, SA-18, and SA-24 will likely be available on 

world arms markets and may be in the inventory of the oligarchs’ 

security forces and individuals.3 As a result, aircraft operating in 
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theater must be able to detect these threats at tactically significant 

ranges and successfully defend themselves, as even relief operations for opposing segments of the population may be seen as provocative, especially in the early phases.

Securing operating areas in a failed state with little more than 

what is deployed with the response force requires technologies that 

are simple to set up, integrate, operate, and employ in various scenarios. Generating power, treating water and sewage, controlling 

disease vectors, and securing installations and facilities will be essential to mission success since these help promote a general sense 

of security among threatened populations.

Electrical power is essential to all modern military and civilian 

operations. Portable power stations, not the current diesel or gas 

generators, will be required in a failed-state scenario. These power 

stations should make use of locally procured sources of fuel; waste 

materials (e.g., garbage, sewage, etc.) will likely be the easiest to 

obtain. Easily deployable and assembled alternative energy stations (e.g., solar, wind, etc.) can help augment power generation 

and mitigate shortages.

With assured power generation, the response force can make 

clean water, treat its sewage, provide lifesaving medical care, operate advanced communications, sustain command and control and 

military operations, power solid-state directed energy weapons and 

detection sensors for installation defense, and conduct other mission sustainment operations.

An uninterruptable power source is also necessary to pump and 

distill oil, operate tank farms and hydrant fuel systems, fuel aircraft and vehicles, and operate other types of fuel and power systems. Because of the logistical difficulties in providing sufficient 

aviation and motor vehicle gasoline in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn 

of Africa, and other locations to sustain operations, Air Force systems should be configured as flex-fuel systems (microbial, synthetic gasoline, bio, etc.) or use alternative sources of energy that 

can be accessed and developed cheaply and easily on site.

Monitoring the spread of disease in the tropical developing world 

is also crucial. Here, swarms of unmanned systems, enabled by micro and nanotechnology, could be used to identify disease vectors 

throughout Nigeria, allowing the response force to bring appropriate 

medicines and material to treat disease and eradicate its source. Additionally, small MEMS vehicles could be used to inoculate populations in remote areas against endemic or epidemic disease. This 

would not only improve the health of the indigenous population but 

also protect the response force by slowing the spread of illnesses 

against which the response force may have limited immunity.

Force protection and installation security in a failed-state environment should be easily deployable, non–labor intensive, and effective (force protection “in a box”). Such protection systems could 

include defense systems that can sense incoming threats and use 
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small nonlethal weapons such as a miniaturized active denial system against humans or a directed-energy-based defense system 

against incoming mortars or missiles. They should also include active detection and sensing systems designed to detect and defeat 

improvised explosive devices, both static and those rigged to people 

and animals.

As this mission in Nigeria involves securing and repairing critical 

oil and gas production facilities and associated infrastructure, the 

ability to defend the restoration operations is essential. A combination of persistent ISR, advanced ATR, and passive and active defense measures on the various facilities are needed. 

Keeping the pipelines and pumping stations in operation, despite attacks, is also a required capability. As such, material advancements such as “spray on” ballistic jackets for pipelines, 

pumping stations, and transloading facilities could mitigate attacks and assure global markets that the flow of oil and gas would 

continue. Once those facilities were protected, skilled oil technicians 

would be recruited and contracted to operate and maintain the 

existing infrastructure. They must be safely housed, fed, inoculated, 

and cared for.

Engage

The US Air Force has proven it is well versed in active engagement of targets. The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have 

demonstrated a need for identifying human networks, air vehicles 

capable of long loiter and persistence, developing weapons that are 

able to deliver greater precision in their destructive power (i.e., 

weapons that kill the target but leave the surrounding area unharmed), positive target identification, and better means for assessing the implications and the level of destruction. Collateral 

damage has inadvertently increased hostility against the United 

States and will continue to do so. If our ability to mitigate this damage remains unchanged, collateral damage has the potential to 

exacerbate insurgencies and push a future Nigeria over the brink 

into open civil war.

Feeding the GIG with advanced detection capabilities, the Air 

Force should be able to identify and track viable targets. Modern 

remotely piloted aircraft can track and target hostile elements, and 

nano air vehicle swarms and taggants can mark belligerents, thus 

making it easy to distinguish them from the nonviolent population.

Directed energy weapons carried on aircraft and on ground vehicles can be utilized to effectively target and eliminate belligerents 

with precision. Such weapons virtually eliminate the potential for 

collateral damage. Nonlethal weapons, including microwave, foam, 

and other effective crowd control weapons, can be employed with 

impunity from aircraft. Again, they minimize the possibility of collateral damage, which, in turn, discourages an active insurgency.
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By 2030 many nations in the world will have the most modern 

advanced communications and will have citizens who actively use 

the NGI, cloud computing, and broadband communications. Computer savvy people operating alone or within a criminal enterprise 

may use cyberattacks to disrupt the actions and systems of a technologically advanced response force. Thus, the response force must 

be able to monitor its networks and aggressively seek out and neutralize any potential threats. In the event of a successful cyberattack, the response force must be able to instantly identify the 

attacker, take actions to neutralize the attack system, assess damage, and reconstitute its networks. Rapid reconstitution makes a 

powerful impression on belligerents and civil society alike.

While helping provide security and promoting stability, advanced 

technology weapons (lethal and nonlethal) may also attract support 

from various indigenous groups who might be impressed by the response force’s capabilities. This, in turn, helps separate belligerents 

from their base of support; response forces may then find it easier to 

create conditions for a political solution. However, such technologies 

must provide a visible “massing” of force and must be sustained.

Sustain

In a failed-state scenario, the risk of loss of air and space assets 

is likely relatively low compared to a near-peer scenario. Most nations that are likely to fail do not normally possess robust integrated air defense or antisatellite capabilities (the former Soviet 

Union being a notable exception). This in no way precludes them 

from acquiring such capabilities or engaging in various forms of 

hybrid warfare to strike critical terrestrial nodes.

Attacks through cyberspace and direct attacks against landbased support infrastructure pose the greatest danger, especially 

for Air Force information and space systems. Airlift must be robust 

enough to provide an unbreakable supply chain to bring critical 

mission components and materiel into the country when and where 

it is needed.

Without forward basing or “lily pads” in the affected area, airlift 

capabilities must be able to reach any point on the earth quickly 

and effectively from continental US locations. Aircraft in flight and 

logistics nodes must be able to receive information from the frontline forces, even down to the individual, so that appropriate supplies can be quickly brought in to the country and forwarded to the 

location needed. Requests for supplies and assistance through the 

GIG are as important as the in-transit visibility it affords. Further, 

in a scenario as demanding as a failed Nigeria, forces will not have 

the luxury of delivering too many supplies to one location, as it will 

mean too few in another; this will permit lives to hang in the balance everywhere. Information assurance in a failed-state scenario 

such as this is essential, requiring the GIG and the network cloud 
107

to be adaptable and self-healing in the event of a cyberattack or the 

loss of a physical node.

Technology Summary

Failed states on the verge of civil war present innumerable and 

extraordinarily difficult challenges. In the case of Nigeria, a country with a vital resource for the United States and the rest of the 

modern world, its failure must be immediately addressed. While 

the US military likely possesses the means to get its forces to the 

region, how it will deal with various individuals (“Bubba Einstein”), 

groups, and factions possessing some of the technological capabilities of modern states requires investments now in critical enabling technologies. Early investment in technologies that should 

be available for use in 2030 will ensure they are ready and relatively easy to adapt into systems necessary to detect, understand, 

deploy, survive, engage, and sustain forces that can counter and 

respond to the surprises a future failed state will pose.

Notes

1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms.

2. Ibid.

3. “U.S. Concerned with Venezuela’s SA-24 Purchase,” Thoughts of a Technocrat 

(blog), 10 June 2009, http://djtechnocrat.blogspot.com/.../us-concerned-with

-venezuelas-sa-24. As of this writing, the SA-24 Grinch missile system had already 

been sold to Venezuela by Russia. With a superior seeker head and high 

maneuverability, it has an estimated maximum effective altitude above 19,000 feet. 

As with previous Russian missiles, proliferation onto the international arms 

markets is highly probable.

109

Chapter 9

Summary

This body of work, while focused on Nigeria, explores dynamics 

that exist in many other failed and failing states. This scenario 

could have just as easily been about a nuclear-armed Pakistan, 

which presents vexing and extraordinarily dangerous challenges.1

Whether these dynamics lead to the failure of any particular state 

has much to do with the quality of governance, the wisdom of national leaders, the assistance and support of other nations and 

international institutions, and a commitment by the people to secure for themselves and their posterity a life and nation they can 

be proud to call their own.

The history of any nation provides a context for examining the 

current state of affairs and then projecting possible and even probable outcomes or alternate futures. With history as a starting point, 

analysts can anticipate the possible choices that must be made in 

response to a failed state as it slips into civil war. More importantly, 

these analysts should identify the kinds of investments in technology 

that must be made now to help ensure success. In the case of Nigeria in 2030, its history of tribal and religious conflict, endemic 

corruption at all levels of government, poor national planning, uneven development, social disorder, rampant criminality, violent insurgency, and terminal weak governance provides an environment 

that could portend imminent collapse and failure.

In the absence of a pandemic, oil spill, or earthquake, national 

collapse and state failure are often the result of a culmination or a 

cascade of failures in critical areas required to build and maintain a 

healthy nation. These paths are often intertwined; the loss of one or 

many can rob a nation of its identity and speed the process of failure. Through the lens of history, this study’s authors envisioned the 

conditions that might cause Nigeria to fail in 2030. These same conditions could and do exist, to varying degrees, in other nation-states.

In this 2030 case study, fragmentation of the Nigerian body politic could create conditions for a multipartite civil war, mirroring in 

some ways the events in Lebanon in 1975 and Somalia in 1991. 

However, Nigeria’s 250 million people, 350 different ethnicities, 

and religious differences can, under the right circumstances, cause 

the nation to shatter in an instant.

While Nigeria has experienced civil war in the past, the ramifications of one in the 2030 timeframe, given the importance of Nigerian oil to the world economy and easy access to advanced technology, 

would be much greater. One can only imagine the impact on the 

world economy of the sixth most populated country on Earth—the 

most populous nation in Africa and a top 20 economy—suddenly 

collapsing and erupting into nationwide violence.
110

In a highly globalized world, the failure of one nation can send 

out a potentially destructive shockwave rapidly destabilizing other 

nations, some in close proximity and others around the world. 

There is a saying today that “as Nigeria goes, so goes the rest of 

Africa,” which illustrates the strategic influence Nigeria has on the 

African continent. By 2030 this influence will probably be much 

greater. This fact alone creates an imperative for deliberate and immediate action to halt conflict, relieve suffering, restore conditions 

for a political solution, reverse failure, and ultimately restore Nigeria as a functioning state.

With its growing population and the importance of petroleum 

and natural gas to the world economy, Nigeria’s influence will only 

increase over the next few decades. Thus, a civil war, whether it 

occurs or not, could be devastating for Nigeria, West Africa in which 

Nigeria is the leading power, and Africa as a whole.

The ECOWAS has conducted a number of peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone. 

However, it is dominated by Nigeria and would likely be incapable 

of dealing with Nigeria’s failure and a subsequent civil war. With 

war, millions of refugees would flee across Nigeria’s borders into 

Cameroon, Niger, and Benin, putting tremendous strain on their 

human services, local infrastructure, and national economies. The 

more destructive the civil war, the greater the chance of genocide 

and other horrors that leave an indelible stain on human history.

On a larger scale, a failure of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or a 

state of similar influence would wreak havoc on the global economy. 

With continued globalization and Nigeria’s position as a major 

player in global economics now and in 2030, its collapse will have 

enormous wide-ranging impact. Even though demand for oil and 

gas may be declining in 2030, they will still be vital for most economies to function.

When presented with any failed-state scenario, the United States 

and other world nations must decide whether intervention is required, and if so, when, where, why, and how to intervene. Intervention in any failed state in 2030 will potentially bring great economic and political costs. Thus, it is likely the United States will 

initially strive to build coalitions and assist NGOs operating in the 

region, rather than take on the challenge alone in the absence of 

assistance from other nations.

If the United States chooses to intervene, it must act quickly to 

address a myriad of practical infrastructure, governmental, and 

humanitarian problems. In most cases when employing military or 

“hard power,” the United States seeks to minimize its presence 

while using technology to maximize effect. By 2030 the US military’s ability to move resources and create instant effects will probably still be unrivaled. The US Air Force in 2030 will still master 

and require systems and technologies to immediately detect and 
111

understand, rapidly deploy and engage, and sustain and quickly 

resupply itself for almost any military or peace operation.

Detection technologies which provide high-fidelity information 

that enable both skilled analysts and front-line troops to accurately assess, properly characterize, and understand the nature of 

the operating environment and the capabilities and threats posed 

by adversaries will be prized. These technologies must provide 

users with the forensic tools required to properly attribute attacks, 

discriminate between belligerents and noncombatants, and empower leaders to anticipate enemy actions while formulating appropriate responses to real threats and conditions, sometimes at 

machine speed. Systems allowing a force to survive in place by 

providing robust force protection and engaging adversaries before 

they pose a direct threat will reduce the “tail” while adding more 

warfighting “tooth.”

Advanced airlift systems, both manned and unmanned, in 2030 

must be larger than today’s airlifters, have an unrefueled global 

reach, be fast, be able to self-defend, and be more than capable of 

operating in austere environments with little support. The team 

able to arrive first and meet the needs of the people in a highly 

charged and confused civil war environment will likely stand the 

best chance of winning hearts and minds. This will help create 

conditions for disparate factions to work together to rebuild.

Under conditions of failure and multipartite civil war, sorting 

through the ethnic and cultural stew will be virtually impossible 

since most people will identify more with their tribe, religion, or 

culture than with their country. In the case of Nigeria or any nation, shifting allegiances will make the task of restoring a failed 

state extraordinarily difficult.

In a globalized world with advanced communications technology 

available even to the most destitute, governance vacuums become 

more obvious to disenfranchised people. No doubt the same will be 

true of the Nigerian people in 2030. Today’s ubiquitous availability 

and popularity of technology such as cell phones, computers, television, personal data assistants, social networking, and the Internet create greater awareness and increase socialization. The African people are openly embracing these technologies. Without a 

basic understanding of the context of national history or a nation’s 

present circumstances, this new awareness and virtual socialization 

afforded by these technologies proliferate group grievances, which 

lead to greater mistrust of all institutions related to governance.

In a world of virtual social networks, facts can give way to rumor 

and innuendo, especially in a failing state; these rumors then begin 

to fill the leadership and information vacuum, as do “outsiders” 

with agendas of their own. In the absence of good governance, the 

people supplant the existing social contract with one of their own 

making. The weight of this mass of disparate agendas and emerging social orders can fill the vacuum until it reaches a critical mass 
112

and then, in an instant explosion, rapidly collapses the existing 

order. What remains is anything but orderly.

Whether the US Air Force will be prepared with the right technologies and capabilities to respond to a failed state depends, in 

large measure, on prioritized technology investments today. A 

single gold-plated system likely has limited utility in a future failedstate scenario since surprises and unanticipated challenges will 

abound. Thus, a variety of capabilities enhancing the US Air Force’s 

ability to detect, understand, deploy, survive, engage, and sustain 

forces while protecting those who can restore or rehabilitate a 

failed state and its critical industries are essential. The wisdom applied to these critical technology investment decisions, especially 

the game changing cyber, nano, and biotechnologies, will likely 

carry the US Air Force through many fights, including the allimportant and arguably most stressing 2030 scenario—a failed 

state sliding into a protracted and bloody civil war.

Notes

1. In fact, a lengthy debate occurred at the beginning of this study as to whether 

the failed-state scenario should be written about Pakistan. The challenges would be 

similar. The population is roughly the same, seaport to road infrastructure is poor, 

and the number of ethnic groups is roughly equivalent. The principal differences 

are that Pakistan would have added about 4,000 miles to the airlift problem and the 

securing of around 100 nuclear weapons to the military challenges. In the end, it 

was thought such a scenario might be viewed as “too extreme.” It is not. Based on 

the “Failed State Index,” Pakistan is the 10th most likely nation to fail; it ranks as 

a more probable failure than Nigeria.
113

Appendix A

Yar’Adua’s Seven-Point Agenda*

Power and Energy—The development of sufficient and adequate power supply in this critical sector will ensure Nigeria’s 

ability to develop as a modern economy and an industrial nation 

by the year 2015.

Food Security—This reform is primarily agrarian based. The 

emphasis on the development of modern technology, research, financial injection into research, and production and development of 

agricultural inputs will revolutionalize [sic] the agricultural sector, 

leading to a five to 10-fold increase in yield and production. This 

will result in massive domestic and commercial outputs and technological knowledge transfer to farmers.

Wealth Creation—By virtue of its reliance on revenue from nonrenewal oil, Nigeria has yet to develop industrially. This reform is 

focused on wealth creation through diversified production, especially in the agricultural and solid mineral sector. This requires 

Nigerians to choose to work, as hard work by all is required to 

achieve this reform.

Transport  Sector—The transportation sector in Nigeria, with 

its poor road networks, is an inefficient means of mass transit of 

people and goods. With a goal of a modernized, industrialized Nigeria, it is mandatory that Nigeria develops its transport sector. The 

People’s Democratic Party government has already started this 

process by the ongoing rehabilitation and modernization of the 

railway. While the reforms might take some time to take effect, it is 

a need that must be addressed.

Land Reforms—While hundreds of billions of dollars have been 

lost through unused government-owned land assets, changes in 

the land laws and the emergence of land reforms will optimize Nigeria’s growth through the release of lands for commercialized 

farming and other large-scale business by the private sector. The 

final result will ensure improvements and boosts to the production 

and wealth creation initiatives.

Security—An unfriendly security climate precludes both external and internal investment into the nation. Thus, security will be 

seen as not only a constitutional requirement but also a necessary 

infrastructure for the development of a modern Nigerian economy. 

With its particular needs, the Niger Delta security issue will be the 

primary focus, marshaled not with physical policing or military security but through honest and accurate dialogue between the 

people and the federal government.

*Oota and Adah, “Nigeria: Yar’Adua’s Budget and the Seven Point Agenda.”
114

Education—The two-fold reforms in the educational sector will 

ensure the minimum acceptable international standards of education for all. With that achieved, a strategic educational development plan will ensure excellence in the tutoring and learning of 

skills in science and technology by students who will be seen as the 

future innovators and industrialists of Nigeria. This reform will be 

achieved through massive injection into the education sector.
115

Appendix B

Definitions of Failed or Weakened States*

US Agency for International Development (USAID). In the 

2005 Fragile States Strategy, USAID uses the term “fragile states” 

to include those that fall along a spectrum of “failing, failed, and 

recovering from crisis.” The most severe form of fragile states is 

“crisis states,” where conflict is ongoing or “at great risk” of occurring, and the central government does not exert “effective control” 

over its territory, is “unable or unwilling to assure the provision of 

vital services to significant parts of its territory,” and holds “weak 

or nonexistent legitimacy among its citizens.”

National Intelligence Council (NIC). In Mapping the Global Future, the NIC describes “failed or failing states” as having “expanses 

of territory and populations devoid of effective government control” 

which are caused by internal conflicts. In this report, the NIC considers the terms “post-conflict” and “failed state” to be synonymous.

National Security Council (NSC). The NSC defines “weak 

states” as lacking the “capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities” in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

(NSCT). The strategy document also describes some weak states as 

lacking “law enforcement, intelligence, or military capabilities to 

assert effective control over their entire territory.” The NSC describes failing states in the 2006 NSCT as similar to “states emerging from conflict.”

US Government Accountability Office (GAO). GAO, in its 

2007 report Forces That Will Shape America’s Future, defines failed 

or failing states as “nations where governments effectively do not 

control their territory, citizens largely do not perceive the governments as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic public services 

or domestic security.”

US Interagency Working Group on International Crime. In 

the 2000 International Crime Threat Assessment report, an interagency working group created under the Clinton administration 

defines a failed state as “unwilling or unable” to meet “many of 

the accepted standards and responsibilities of sovereign control 

over its territory,” which may lead to “significant economic deterioration and political unrest that threatens both internal and 

regional stability.”

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 

(OECD). The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, of which 

the United States is a member, defines fragile states as lacking “either the will or the capacity to engage productively with their citi-

*Liana Sun Wyler, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. 

Policy, appendix A.
116

zens to ensure security, safeguard human rights, and provide the 

basic function for development.” They are further characterized as 

possessing “weak governance, limited administrative capacity, 

chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social tensions, violence, 

or the legacy of civil war.”

Political Instability Task Force (PITF). Originally commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency’s directorate of intelligence in 1994 and called the “State Failure Task Force,” PITF defines state failure as a “range of severe political conflicts and regime 

crises” which is characterized by a “total or near-collapse of central 

political authority.” The task force’s statistical methodology identifies instances of politicide, genocide, adverse regime changes, and 

ethnic and revolutionary wars as situations when total or partial 

state failure occur.

US Commission on Weak States. This bipartisan commission, 

sponsored by the Washington Think Tank Center for Global Development, in its final 2003 report entitled On the Brink: Weak States 

and U.S. National Security, defines weak states as those with “governments unable to do the things that their own citizens and the 

international community expect from them: protecting people from 

internal and external threats, delivering basic health services and 

education, and providing institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and needs of the population.”

World Bank. The World Bank’s Fragile States Initiative, previously called Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Initiative, 

describes fragile states as often characterized by poor governance, 

internal conflicts or tenuous postconflict transitions, weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdowns in the 

rule of law, and insufficient mechanisms for generating legitimate 

power and authority. All are low income, which is defined as countries with a 2006 gross national income per capita of $905 or less, 

calculated using the World Bank’s Atlas Method.
117

Appendix C

Nigerian Military Forces

Nigerian Air Force Order of Battle1

Unit Base Primary Aircraft

Tactical Air Command HQ Makurdi

65 Air Defense Group Makurdi

Combat Squadron Makurdi MiG-21 

Combat Squadron Maiduguri MiG-21

75 Strike Group Yola

81 Air Maritime Group Benin

Maritime Squadron Benin Dornier 128/228

Maritime Squadron Benin Dornier 228

88 Military Airlift Group Lagos

221 Wing Lagos C-130

227 Wing Llorin G222

97 Special Forces Group Port Harcourt

Combat Squadron Port Harcourt Mi-35P

99 Air Weapons School Kainji

Training Squadron Kainji Alpha Jet

Training Command HQ Kaduna

301 Flying Training School Kaduna Air Beetle, Dornier 128/228

303 Flying Training School Kano

305 Flying Training School Enugu Mi-34
118

Nigerian Air Force Major Equipment

Type Role

Initial Total/

In Service

First 

Delivery

MiG-21MF Air Defense 30/0 1975

Jaguar SN Air Defense 13/0 1984

Alpha Jet Trainer/Light Attack 24/12 1981

G222 Transport 6/6 1985

C-130 Transport 9/1-2 1975

125 Srs 800B Communications 1/1 2007

Business Jet, Boeing Communications 1/1 2006

Falcon 900 Communications 2/2 1994

550 Citation II Communications 1/1 2005

G-1159 II Communications 1/1 1976

G-1159 IV Communications 1/1 1990

G-1159 IV Communications 1/1 2001

128-6 Dornier Utility/Transport 16/10 1984

228-100 Dornier Utility/Transport 1/1 1984

228-201 Dornier Utility/Transport 2/2 1984

228-212 Dornier Utility/Transport 6/4 1996

L-39ZA Trainer/Light Attack 24/12 1986

MB-339A Trainer/Light Attack 12/12 1983

MiG-21UM Trainer 6/0 1975

Jaguar BN Trainer 5/0 1984

Air Beetle Trainer 60/55 1994

AS 332M1 Super Puma Utility 6/4 -

Mi-35P Attack 6/5 2000

Mi-34S Trainer 6/4 2001

AW139 VIP Transport 2/2 2006

Nigerian Army Order of Battle2

Base Unit

Abuja Presidential Guard

Enugu 82nd Division

Ibadan 2nd Division

Llorin

Jos 3rd Armored Division

Kaduna 1st Mechanized Division

Lagos 81st Division
119

Nigerian Army Major Equipment

Type Role

Initial Total/

In Service

Armor

T-55 Main Battle Tank 129/100

Vickers Mk 3 Main Battle Tank 150/36

Scorpion 76 mm Reconnaissance 100/70

Scimitar Reconnaissance -/5

VBL Reconnaissance 72/72

EE-9 Cascavel Reconnaissance 75/70

AML 60-7 Reconnaissance 90/60

Fox Reconnaissance 55/50

AML 90 Reconnaissance 120/40

Saladin Mk 2 Reconnaissance -/20

Sagaie 1 Reconnaissance 46/-

Steyr 4K 7FA Personnel Carrier 300/250

MOWAG Piranha Personnel Carrier 70/70

Saracen Personnel Carrier 10/10

Saxon Personnel Carrier 75/4

Casspir III Personnel Carrier -/5

MT-LB Multi-Purpose 67/-

Artillery

155mm Palmaria Self-Propelled Howitzer 25/25

155mm FH-77B Howitzer 48/25

130mm M-46 Field Gun 7/5

122mm D-74/D-30 Field Gun 200/84

105mm Light Gun -/48

105mm M-56 Howitzer 200/180

105mm M-56P Howitzer -/24

122mm APR 40 Rocket Launcher 11/11

122mm BM-21 Rocket Launcher 8/-

Anti-Tank Weapons

89mm LRAC Anti-Tank Gun -/24

3.5” RL M20 Anti-Tank Gun 240/24

RPG-7 Anti-Tank Gun -/3000

84mm Carl Gustav Anti-Tank Gun 154/100

Swingfire ATGW -/-

Air Defense Weapons

SA-7 Manportable SAM 100/50

Blowpipe Manportable SAM -/40

Roland 2 SAM / AMX-30 Chassis 16/16

ZSU 23-4 Anti-Aircraft Gun 30/30

ZU 23 Anti-Aircraft Gun -/350

40mm Bofors L/60 Anti-Aircraft System 50/12

Notes

1. Jane’s Information Group, “World Air Forces, Nigeria,” 2–7.

2. Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria,” 2–9.

121

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135

Center for Strategy and Technology

The Center for Strategy and Technology (CSAT) was established 

at the Air War College in 1996. Its purpose is to engage in longterm strategic thinking about technology and its implications for 

US national security. 

The center focuses on education, research, and publications 

that support the integration of technology into national strategy 

and policy. Its charter is to support faculty and student research; 

publish research through books, articles, and occasional papers; 

fund a regular program of guest speakers; and engage with collaborative research with United States and international academic institutions. As an outside funded activity, the center enjoys the support of institutions in the strategic, scientific, and technological 

communities.

An essential part of this program is to establish relationships with 

organizations in the Air Force, as well as other Department of 

Defense agencies and identify potential topics for research projects. 

Research conducted under the auspices of the center is published 

as Occasional Papers and disseminated to senior military and 

political officials, think tanks, educational institutions, and other 

interested parties. Through these publications, the center hopes to 

promote the integration of technology and strategy in support of US 

national security objectives.

For further information on the CSAT, please contact:

John P. Geis II, Col, PhD, Director

Christopher J. Kinnan, Col, Deputy Director

Harry S. Foster, Col, Deputy Director

Theodore C. Hailes, Col, Retired,

Air University Transformation Chair

Air War College

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

(334) 953-6996/6460/2985
136

Titles in the Occasional Paper Series

1

Reachback Operations for Air Campaign Planning and Execution

Scott M. Britten, September 1997

2

Lasers in Space: Technological Options for Enhancing US Military 

Capabilities

Mark E. Rogers, November 1997

3

Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy

Joseph Siniscalchi, March 1998

4

Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and 

the American Use of Force since 1945

Jeffrey Record, March 1998

5

Lasers and Missile Defense: New Concepts for Space-Based and 

Ground-Based Laser Weapons

William H. Possel, July 1998

6

Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and 

Technological Inevitables

Thomas D. Bell, January 1999

7

Legal Constraints on Information Warfare

Mark Russell Shulman, March 1999

8

Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to 

Use Force

Jeffrey Record, May 1999

9

Airborne and Space-Based Lasers: An Analysis of Technological 

and Operational Compatibility

Kenneth W. Barker, June 1999
137

10

Directed Energy and Fleet Defense: Implications for Naval Warfare

William J. McCarthy, February 2000

11

High Power Microwaves: Strategic and Operational Implications for 

Warfare

Eileen M. Walling, March 2000

12

Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations

John E. Ward, Jr., May 2000

13

Cruise Missiles and Modern War: Strategic and Technological 

Implications

David J. Nicholls, May 2000

14

Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations

Eric M. Sepp, May 2000

15

Technology and Command: Implications for Military Operations in 

the Twenty-First Century

William B. McClure, July 2000

16

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations

David Glade, July 2000

17

Computer Networks and Information Warfare: Implications for 

Military Operations

David J. Gruber, July 2000

18

Failed States and Casualty Phobia: Implications for Force Structure 

and Technology Choices

Jeffrey Record, September 2000
138

19

War as We Knew It: The Real Revolution in Military Affairs/

Understanding Paralysis in Military Operations

Jan S. Breemer, December 2000

20

Using Lasers in Space: Laser Orbital Debris Removal and Asteroid 

Deflection

Johnathon W. Campbell, December 2000

21

Weapons for Strategic Effect: How Important Is Technology?

Colin S. Gray, January 2001

22

U.S. Army Apache Helicopters and U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Forces: 

Implications for Future Military Operations

Brad Mason, June 2001

23

The End of Secrecy? Military Competitiveness in the Age of 

Transparency

Beth M. Kasper, August 2001

24

Prompt Global Strike through Space: What Military Value?

Larry G. Sills, August 2001

25

Precision Engagement at the Strategic Level of War: Guiding 

Promise or Wishful Thinking?

Timothy J. Sakulich, December 2001

26

Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military 

Affairs?

George B. Hept, January 2002

27

Unmanned Undersea Vehicles and Guided Missile Submarines: 

Technological and Operational Synergies

Edward A. Johnson, Jr., February 2002
139

28

Attack Operations for Missile Defense

Merrick E. Krause, May 2002

29

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Micro-Air Vehicles in the Service of Air 

Force Missions

Arthur F. Huber II, June 2002

30

Sustained Space Superiority: A National Strategy for the United 

States

Larry J. Schaefer, August 2002

31

Hyperspectral Imagery: Warfighting through a Different Set of Eyes

Paul J. Pabich, October 2002

32

Directed Energy Weapons on the Battlefield: A New Vision for 2025

John P. Geis II, April 2003

33

Homeland Security and the Coast Guard: Postured for Technology 

Improvements

Arthur C. Walsh, June 2003

34

Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting our Phasers on Stun? Potential 

Strategic Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons on the 

Battlefield

Erik L. Nutley, August 2003

35

Aircrew Performance: Cutting-Edge Tech

Kris M. Belland, September 2003

36

Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution: Never Divide the 

Fleet?

Daniel F. Baltrusaitus, June 2004
140

37

The Decision Maker’s Guide to Robust, Reliable, and Inexpensive 

Access to Space

Gary N. Henry, July 2004

38

Global Mobility: Anywhere, Anytime, Any Threat? Countering the 

MANPADS Challenge

Jacqueline D. van Ovost, December 2005

39

Strategies for Defeating Commercial Imaging Systems

Stephen Latchford, December 2005

40–51

Netted Bugs and Bombs: Implications for 2010

Edited by Marsha J. Kwolek, December 2005

Part I: Network Centric Operations: Promises and Pitfalls

Network Warfare Operations: Unleashing the Potential

Richard A. Lipsey

Network-centric Operations: Challenges and Pitfalls

Eric E. Silbaugh

Network-enabled Precision Guided Munitions

Benjamin F. Koudelka, Jr.

Lowering the High Ground: Using Near-Space Vehicles for 

Persistent C31SR

Andrew J. Knoedler

Part II: UAVs in 2010: Lean and Lethal

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles: SEAD and EW for the Future

James C. Horton

Small Power: The Role of Micro and Small UAVs in the Future

James M. Abatti

Pesky Critters

Kirk M. Kloepple

Pandora’s Box Opened Wide: UAVs Carrying Genetic Weapons

Daryl J. Hauck

Part III: Silver Bullets in Search of a Six Shooter

Perfecting War: Searching for the Silver Bullet

Eric J. Schnitzer
141

Who Pushes the Pickle Button?

John E. Marselus

Leveraging Simulation against the F-16 Flying Training Gap

Shaun R. McGrath

Electronic Pulse Threats in 2010

Colin R. Miller

52

Ground Truth: The Implications of Joint Interdependence for Air 

and Ground Operations

L. Ross Roberts, March 2006

53

“Heads, Not Tails”: How To Best Engage Theater Ballistic Missiles?

Ronald C. Wiegand, February 2006

54

Transcendental Terrorism and Dirty Bombs: Radiological Weapons 

Threat Revisited

Chad Brown, February 2006

55

International Armament Cooperative Programs: Benefits, Liabilities, 

and Self-inflicted Wounds—The JSF as a Case Study

Stephen G. DiDomenico, February 2006

56

War without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation

Michael J. Hornitschek, May 2006

57

The Seductive Effects of an Expeditionary Mindset

Michael Arnold, March 2007

58–60

Streamlining DOD Acquisition: Balancing Schedule with Complexity

Edited by Lt Col James Rothenflue and Marsha J. Kwolek, 

September 2006

A System as the Enemy: A Doctrinal Approach to Defense Force 

Modernization

Benjamin A. Drew
142

Impact of Weapons Systems Complexity on Systems Acquisition

Robert A. Dietrick

Faster Is Better . . . Can the USAF Acquisition Process Be SAIV’D?

James L. Chittenden

61

The Air Force in SILICO—Computational Biology in 2025

Christopher Coates, December 2007

62

Biofuels: An Alternative to U.S. Air Force Petroleum Dependency

Mark S. Danigole, December 2007

63

Air Force and the Cyberspace Mission: Defending the Air Force’s 

Computer Network in the Future

Shane P. Courville, December 2007

64

Next Generation Nanotechnology Assembly Fabrication Methods: A 

Trend Forecast 

Vincent T. Jovene, Jr., January 2008

65

Blue Horizons II: Future Capabilities and Technologies for 2030 

John P. Geis II, Christopher J. Kinnan, Ted Hailes, Harry A. 

Foster, and David Blanks, June 2009

66

Resurgent Russia in 2030: Challenge for the USAF

Theodore C. Hailes, Ronald Buckley, David Blanks, Mark Butler, 

Phillip Preen, and Michael Tarlton, September 2009
Failed State 2030

Nigeria—A Case Study

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Belinda L. Bazinet

Copy Editor

Sandi Davis

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations

L. Susan Fair

Composition and 

Prepress Production

Ann Bailey

Quality Review

Dr. Richard Bailey

Demorah Hayes

Print Preparation and Distribution

Diane Clark