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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re S. N. ADAMS, Minor. March 7, 2017 

No. 333797 

Ingham Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 15-000840-NA 

 

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and O’CONNELL and METER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights 

to her minor child, SNA, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to rectify conditions that lead to 

adjudication), MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) (other conditions exist that cause the child to come 

within the court’s jurisdiction), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) (parental rights to one or more siblings of the child were terminated due to 

serious and chronic neglect), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be 

harmed if returned to parent’s home). However, the court concluded that it had not been shown 

that termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(m) (parent’s rights to another child 

were voluntarily terminated). We affirm.1

 

I. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION 

 Respondent challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the statutory grounds for 

termination were established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the 

minor child’s best interests. 

 “We review for clear error both the court’s decision that a ground for termination has 

been proven by clear and convincing evidence and, where appropriate, the court’s decision 

regarding the child’s best interest.” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 

(2000). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special 

opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 

(2004). Clear and convincing evidence “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief 

 

1

 The parental rights of the minor child’s father were also terminated. He has not appealed. 
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or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear . . . as to 

enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy.” In re Martin, 450 Mich 

204, 227; 538 NW2d 399 (1995). 

 The court based the termination on the following provisions: 

 (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this 

chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial 

dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either 

of the following: 

 (i) The conditions that lead to the adjudication continue to exist and there 

is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age. 

 (ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s 

jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, 

the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received 

notice and a hearing and has been given reasonable opportunity to rectify the 

conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be 

rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. 

* * * 

 (g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or 

custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be 

able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the 

child’s age. 

* * * 

 (i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated 

due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and prior attempts 

to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful. 

 (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of 

the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the 

home of the parent. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (i), and (j).] 

 In general, a respondent’s “[f]ailure to substantially comply with a court-ordered case 

service plan is evidence that return of the child to the parent may cause a substantial risk of harm 

to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well being.” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich at 346 n 

3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Specifically, where one of the goals of the service plan 

is to rectify a substance-abuse problem, the failure to do so supports termination. See In re 

Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 44; 549 NW2d 353 (1996) (considering §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g)). 

 Respondent characterizes her cooperation with her case-service plan as substantial 

compliance, but the record shows that her participation was intermittent. Respondent 
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emphasizes in her testimony that she does not have a substance abuse problem, citing evidence 

that shows she only failed one of 14 drugs tests conducted. However, the evidence also shows 

she repeatedly failed to attend her drug tests, only completing 14 out of 42 scheduled tests, 

including one completed test that came back positive for marijuana. This inconsistent record of 

compliance does not support her portrayal of her substance abuse issues being a thing of the past, 

leaving the trial court free to discredit her testimony if it so chose to do so. See In re Miller, 433 

Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989) (explaining that a reviewing court must defer to the 

special ability of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses). 

 Additionally, respondent emphasizes that she had obtained a Section 8 housing voucher2

and was searching for a home that would accept it. However, respondent does not deny that she 

has had the voucher for several months, and no one was able to state with any certainty how long 

it might be before respondent is able to locate an appropriate home. Respondent also claims that 

she has ended her erratic relationship with the minor child’s father, whose parental rights had 

been terminated, as well. However, she has a prior history of lying to caseworkers about the 

status of her troubling relationships. Respondent did find employment, but as of the date of the 

termination hearing, she had only been employed for a little over a month. This is not a 

sufficient amount of time to prove a pattern of stable employment. 

 Respondent also failed to attend her individual therapy sessions intended to address her 

mental health issues. While it is commendable that respondent completed an anger management 

class that she was not required to complete as part of her case plan, she was aware that this 

particular class was not required, but that individual therapy addressing her mental health issues 

was in fact required. Respondent intentionally ignored her service plan by neglecting to attend 

the required therapy sessions regarding her mental health. 

 Furthermore, while respondent had been consistent in attending parenting time during the 

pendency of this case, she failed to attend parenting time the week before the termination 

hearing. Respondent contends that she had to work ̧ but also admitted she did not inform any of 

her caseworkers that she would not be attending the session. 

 The record is clear that respondent has made progress that should not be discounted. 

However, on the whole, respondent has failed to substantially comply with her case-service plan, 

which supports the termination of her parental rights pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii), (g), and 

(j). However, we conclude that the court erred in concluding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) had been 

established. 

 “Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to 

terminate a respondent’s parental rights,” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 

(2011), so while the error with respect to § 19b(3)(i) does not undermine the court’s ultimate 

decision, this Court finds it important to articulate the flawed analysis with respect to this factor. 

Petitioner had her parental rights terminated to another child in 2014. The caseworker in that 

proceeding, Faith Wilkins, testified that petitioner’s rights were terminated due to unstable 

 

2

 42 USC 1437f. 
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housing, mental health issues that had not been addressed, inappropriate parenting skills, and 

domestic violence in the relationship she was involved in at the time. Wilkins’ testimony, taken 

with other evidence presented to the court, was insufficient to establish that there had been 

serious or chronic neglect of the minor child. Therefore, the burden to terminate petitioner’s 

parental rights under §§19b(3)(i) is not met in this case. 

II. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 

 MCL 712A.19b(5) provides, “[i]f the court finds that there are grounds for termination of 

parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court 

shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the 

child with the parent not be made.” 

 The minor child—not the parent—is the focus of the best-interest stage. In re Moss, 301 

Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). In determining the best interests of the child, the trial 

court must consider the record as a whole. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 211; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). 

The trial “court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the 

child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the 

parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 34, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) [citations 

omitted]. It may also consider the length of time the child was in foster care, the likelihood that 

the child could be returned to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, compliance with the 

case-service plan, In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012), evidence that

the child is not safe with the parent and is thriving in foster care, In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 

120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011), “a parent’s history of domestic violence, . . . and the possibility 

of adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). 

 In support of her argument that termination of her parental rights was not in the minor 

child’s best interests, respondent noted that she had obtained a housing voucher and 

employment, had left the minor child’s father, and had developed adequate parenting skills. 

While these are significant improvements, they are not persuasive, in light of other factors, to 

indicate that termination is not in the minor child’s best interests. For example, despite having a 

Section 8 voucher, respondent did not have proof that she had secured suitable housing for 

herself and the minor child. Further, she had only recently obtained employment, meaning that 

she had not yet established that her employment was stable. Additionally, the record shows that 

respondent persistently failed to engage in or benefit from provided services, including her 

consistent failure to attend drug screenings and individual mental health therapy. 

 There was ample evidence that supports the trial court’s determination that it was in the 

minor child’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter