In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-1259

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LONNIE WHITAKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 07 CR 123—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 3, 2008—DECIDED OCTOBER 27, 2008

Before POSNER, RIPPLE and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. When Lonnie Whitaker’s car was

searched, a police officer found a gun. Mr. Whitaker

was subsequently charged with unlawfully possessing

a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to

suppress the gun obtained from his car. The magistrate

judge, after holding an evidentiary hearing, recommended

that the district court deny the motion. The district court
2 No. 08-1259

The jurisdiction of the district court is based on 18 U.S.C. 1

§ 3231.

The jurisdiction of this court is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2

We base our rendition of the facts on the magistrate judge’s 3

report, which was adopted by the district court.

adopted the magistrate judge’s report. Mr. Whitaker

pled guilty, but reserved his right to appeal the adverse

decision on his suppression motion. The district court

sentenced Mr. Whitaker to 41 months’ imprisonment;1

Mr. Whitaker filed a timely notice of appeal. Because we 2

believe that the district court correctly determined that

the search was based on reasonable suspicion, we affirm

the judgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts3

On June 17, 2007, shortly before 8:00 p.m., an anonymous

individual called 911 to report a loud argument in a food

store parking lot. The caller stated that he was unable to

get close to the argument and, consequently, did not

know the number of individuals involved or their genders. He did state, however, that, at the scene of the

altercation, there were at least two people standing by

a car, “two males, that I can see.” R. 32. Later in the call,

he described them as “pretty good-sized black guys.” Id.

A second man called 911 soon after. He reported a man

with a gun in the same parking lot. This second caller
No. 08-1259 3

According to Officer Joswiak’s testimony, an “alert tone” is 4

a loud two-tone frequency that indicates to officers that a

call came in involving weapons. R. 23 at 14.

identified himself as “Travis” and provided the operator

with a phone number. Travis stated that he had been

shopping when he saw his female cousin and her boyfriend, Lonnie, arguing. Lonnie was standing next to his

silver car; Travis’ cousin stood next to her blue van. Travis

reported that “we pulled up to ask was she all right and

he pulled a gun on us!” Id. Travis’ cousin urged them to

leave, which they did. Travis then called 911.

After the first call to 911, the police dispatcher alerted

units in the area. Police officers Caleb Bedford, Chad

Joswiak and Becky Overland headed, each separately,

toward the parking lot. As the officers were en route to

the scene, “alert tones” went off on the radio, and the 4

dispatcher informed them that a second caller had

reported that a black man and a black woman were

arguing in a silver car in the parking lot and that the

man had displayed a handgun. The officers did not

know any of the other information provided by Travis.

The officers easily were able to locate a silver car parked

near a van in the southwest corner of the parking lot.

Officer Bedford arrived first and parked near the car,

which actually was a gray Chevrolet Impala. He

stepped out of his squad car and walked toward the

driver’s side of the Chevrolet Impala. The driver stepped

out of the vehicle to face Officer Bedford. Officer Joswiak

arrived and began walking toward the passenger side

of the car.
4 No. 08-1259

The record is unclear whether Mr. Whitaker responded. 5

Officer Bedford asked the man, soon identified as Lonnie

Whitaker, if he and the woman were having an argument.5

Officer Bedford saw nothing in Mr. Whitaker’s hands and

asked Mr. Whitaker for permission to frisk for a weapon.

After receiving permission, he frisked Mr. Whitaker

and found no weapon.

The female passenger, soon identified as Keisha Marsh,

stepped out of the car to face Officer Joswiak. He observed

that she was crying and that she had large wet circles

on both shoulders of her shirt, which he presumed were

from tears. Officer Joswiak asked Marsh if she and

Mr. Whitaker had been arguing or fighting; she

responded that they had been arguing in the car. He

asked Marsh whether “everything was alright in the

vehicle,” and she said yes. R. 20, Ex. 2 at 6. Officer Joswiak

asked Marsh if there was any problem where some type

of weapon had been involved; she responded that there

was not, and that there had just been an argument between

her and Mr. Whitaker. When asked, she stated that she

had no weapons. Officer Joswiak patted her down, but

found no weapons.

Officer Joswiak announced to Marsh that he was going to

do a weapons sweep of the passenger compartment of

the car. Marsh said nothing but maintained her position

blocking the passenger-side door. Officer Joswiak physically guided Marsh out of the way and searched the

car; he found a black semiautomatic handgun in the

center console. Officer Bedford then arrested Mr. Whitaker.
No. 08-1259 5

Later, after Mr. Whitaker had been conveyed to a detention facility, Officer Joswiak contacted the first 911 caller

at the number listed in the records. Speaking with the

first caller, Officer Joswiak was able to corroborate

Mr. Whitaker’s build and what he was wearing. The first

caller also stated that, in addition to two men

arguing, there was a third person seated in the front

passenger seat of the car. Officer Joswiak was unable to

reach the second caller who had identified himself as

Travis, although the officer reached a voice mail box for

“Smokey.” Detectives later were able to locate and interview this second caller despite the fact that he had given

a false name and phone number.

II

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s legal analysis on a motion

to suppress de novo. United States v. Riley, 493 F.3d 803,

808 (7th Cir. 2007). Pure findings of fact, however, are

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Faison, 195 F.3d

890, 893 (7th Cir. 1999).

A.

Mr. Whitaker submits that the police did not have

reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime had been

committed. He contends that the police lacked reasonable

suspicion to conduct a search of the car for weapons

because the 911 caller identified as “Travis” was anonymous. He notes that Travis intended to conceal his
6 No. 08-1259

identity and was successful in doing so, undermining

the reliability of the 911 call. Mr. Whitaker further

submits that the first anonymous phone call was too

vague to corroborate Travis’ later call.

Mr. Whitaker further contends that the police did not

observe any behavior that justified a Terry pat-down. See

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In his view, the anonymous tip could not be a valid basis for the search

because the information was not verified independently

by the police. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000);

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). Mr. Whitaker

distinguishes this case from United States v. Drake, 456

F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2006), in which the caller to 911

identified herself by her first and last name, stayed on

the scene until the police arrived and provided detailed

information to the operator. Id. at 772-74. He notes that,

in this case, Travis provided a false name and phone

number. He points out that Travis failed to provide a

contemporaneous description of an emergency or a

detailed account of the suspect car, and did not remain

at the scene.

Mr. Whitaker further submits that, even if the second

caller cannot be characterized as anonymous, the officers

still lacked collective knowledge of the details of Travis’

call at the time of the search. He acknowledges that, under

the collective knowledge doctrine, law enforcement

officers are considered to possess information known to

other officers but not known to them. United States v.

Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that

when police officers are in communication regarding a

suspect, “the knowledge of one officer can be imputed to
No. 08-1259 7

the other officers under the collective knowledge doctrine”). Nevertheless, he submits that the doctrine does

not apply to knowledge that civilian 911 operators do not

share with the officers. See United States v. Colon, 250

F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a 911 operator

was not capable of determining whether reasonable

suspicion existed for a stop and frisk). In Mr. Whitaker’s

view, at the time of the search, the officers were aware

only that a man and a woman were in a silver car and

that a weapon was involved. He concludes that this

information was not predictive and that it therefore

could not be used to establish reasonable suspicion under

J.L., 529 U.S. at 271-72.

The Government takes a different view. It contends that

the district court was correct in determining that J.L. is

not relevant because that case dealt with whether the

initial stop was justified. It emphasizes that there can be

two stages to a Terry stop: the actual stop itself and a

protective pat-down search. United States v. Brown, 232

F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2000). Because the holding in J.L. is

limited to an actual stop, submits the Government, the

reasoning in J.L. is not applicable to this case; this case

concerns only the legality of a search or protective sweep

after a consensual encounter of the police with the defendant. J.L., 529 U.S. at 274. The Government submits that

the only issue is whether, under an objective test, the

police officers had a reasonable suspicion that Mr.

Whitaker had a gun in his possession. Brown, 232 F.3d at

594. In the Government’s view, the district court

identified “specific, articulable suspicions” that Mr.

Whitaker possessed a gun. Appellee Br. at 14. When Travis

called 911, he identified himself as Marsh’s cousin, and
8 No. 08-1259

described an encounter in which Mr. Whitaker had

waved him away with a handgun. This call alone,

contends the Government, was enough to establish

articulable suspicion. It further agrees with the district

court’s conclusion that the first caller provided some

minimal corroboration. See White, 496 U.S. at 331.

The Government further submits that, contrary to Mr.

Whitaker’s argument, this case does not involve truly

anonymous callers because the police were able to talk

to both 911 callers after the fact and because Travis identified himself as Marsh’s cousin. See Drake, 456 F.3d at

774. It also agrees with the district court that the 911

dispatcher should be considered an integral part of

the investigative process for purposes of the collective

knowledge doctrine.

Moreover, submits the Government, corroboration of

Travis’ statements occurred when the officers arrived at

the parking lot, and observed the make and color of the

car, its location in the parking lot, its proximity to the

blue van and that two people were in the car. Marsh

also confirmed that she and Mr. Whitaker had been

arguing. The Government contends that her reluctance

to move away from the car door gave Officer Joswiak a

reason to be suspicious.

B.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States prevents the Government from conducting

unreasonable searches and seizures. United States v.
No. 08-1259 9

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). The jurisprudence of

the Supreme Court makes clear that the primary bulwark

against such conduct is the procurement of a warrant from

a neutral and detached magistrate. Groh v. Ramirez,

540 U.S. 551, 575 (2004) (“The point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law enforcement the

support of the usual inferences which reasonable men

draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring

that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached

magistrate instead of being judged by the officer

engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting

out crime.”) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,

13-14 (1948) (alteration in original)). That same jurisprudence makes clear, however, that there are certain situations, defined in case law, when a warrantless search or

seizure is reasonable. See United States v. Allman, 336

F.3d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing exceptions to the

warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme Court).

This case involves one of those exceptions.

1.

We begin our analysis of the factual circumstances by

examining the officers’ initial encounter with Mr.

Whitaker. The Government contends, and, after a hearing

the magistrate judge and the district court agreed, that this

initial encounter was consensual in nature and therefore did not constitute a seizure within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Scheets, 188

F.3d 829, 836-37 (7th Cir. 1999). Whether a police-citizen

encounter is consensual is a question of fact, and we
10 No. 08-1259

See United States v. Nobles, 69 F.3d 172, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1995) 6

(holding that whether an encounter between the police and

the defendants was consensual is a question of fact); United

States v. Maldonado, 38 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The

question of whether a particular encounter is voluntary is a

factual one, dependant on the circumstances of each case.”)

(quoting United States v. Berke, 930 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th

Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted)).

From reviewing the record, it appears that Officer Overland 7

remained in her squad car during the encounter. The record

is unclear regarding where Officer Overland parked her squad

car.

therefore review it for clear error.6

Upon examination of the record, we must conclude

that the district court did not clearly err in reaching its

decision. At the time of the encounter, Mr. Whitaker’s

car was parked in a food store parking lot. Officer

Bedford was the first to arrive at the scene. In his report,

he states that he pulled up behind the gray Chevrolet

Impala; he does not mention whether he had his emergency lights on or whether his weapon was drawn. R. 20,

Ex. 1. Officer Bedford stepped out of the vehicle and

began to approach the driver’s side of the car. At this

point, Mr. Whitaker stepped out of the car and faced

Officer Bedford.

Officer Joswiak and Officer Overland arrived soon

afterwards. Officer Bedford already was parked behind 7

Mr. Whitaker’s car on the driver’s side; Officer Joswiak

parked his squad car behind Mr. Whitaker’s car on the
No. 08-1259 11

The record contains no evidence that the officers had their 8

emergency lights on or had their guns drawn. 

passenger side. The two squad cars were side-by-side

behind the Chevrolet Impala.

A van with Marsh’s children was parked next to the

Chevrolet Impala. The record does not indicate whether

any vehicle was parked in front of Mr. Whitaker’s car,

preventing him from driving away. As the officers approached the car, they did not assert their authority in a

manner that fairly could be characterized as restricting

the movements of Mr. Whitaker and his companion.8

The officers did not convey, by word or action, that the

occupants were to exit the vehicle. Indeed, as Officer

Bedford approached, Mr. Whitaker got out of his car of

his own accord to meet him.

Although neither the Supreme Court nor this court has

decided a case identical in all respects to our own, some

of our cases are instructive. We have held that, if a driver

stops a car on his own and no other coercive activity

occurs, a police encounter is consensual. United States v.

Hendricks, 319 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 2003). In

Hendricks, a police car without its emergency lights followed a car into a gas station. The officer parked his

car about fifteen feet from the car, and the occupant of

the car got out and began to approach the officer. The

officer radioed for backup, then got out of the car and

spoke with the driver. We held that the initial encounter

was consensual and that no stop had occurred until a
12 No. 08-1259

We also held that the defendant had waived his Fourth 9

Amendment argument. United States v. Clements, 522 F.3d 790,

794 (7th Cir. 2008). The discussion of whether the stop was

consensual was an alternative holding.

second officer arrived with his emergency lights activated.

Id. at 999.

Similarly, in United States v. Clements, 522 F.3d 790, 792

(7th Cir. 2008), the police received an anonymous tip that

a car had been parked and running for four hours in

front of the caller’s house. Two police officers investigated. They stopped their squad car fifteen to twenty feet

behind the parked car, shined a spotlight on the car and

activated their emergency lights. When they approached

the car, the occupant of the car raised a knife at the officers.

The officers ordered him to drop the weapon and step out

of the car, and when he did, a magazine containing ten

cartridges of long rifle ammunition fell out of the car. We

held that the district court did not plainly err in admitting

the evidence. Id. at 794. We furthermore held that the car 9

was not seized because the driver had stopped the car

voluntarily, not because of the flashing lights. Id. at 794-95.

We emphasized that, other than flashing lights for identification and safety purposes, the officers did not do

anything to make the driver feel that his freedom was

restrained, such as drawing their weapons, surrounding

the car with squad cars, touching the driver or using

forceful language prior to the knife being displayed. Id.

By contrast, in United States v. Pavelski, 789 F.2d 485, 488-

89 (7th Cir. 1986), we determined that surrounding a car

on three sides constitutes a stop. In that case, a deputy
No. 08-1259 13

was following a car when it turned into a parking lot. Id. at

486-87. The deputy stopped his patrol car behind the

parked car, and a second officer later parked beside it. At

this point, the officers had no suspicion that the driver

or the other occupants had violated any laws. A third

officer arrived, and parked twenty to thirty feet in front

of the car.

The driver exited the car, and the deputy began questioning him. The deputy then tapped the window of the

left rear passenger door, and, after the occupant lowered

the window, began questioning him. Id. Not having

reasonable suspicion but rather a “gut feeling,” the

officer searched the car and found weapons and various

items associated with a recent bank robbery. We noted

that, prior to the third squad car arriving, the car had not

been subject to a Terry stop. Id. at 488. When the third

patrol car parked in front of the defendant’s car, however,

a stop had occurred. Id. at 488-89. See also United States

v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that

where officers blocked a car’s exit, the stop was not

consensual); United States v. Packer, 15 F.3d 654, 657 (7th

Cir. 1994) (holding that a stop occurred where the officers’ cars were parked in front of and behind the defendant’s car with the “take down” light shining through

defendant’s car’s windows).

The question of whether this encounter was consensual

in this case is a close one. However, assessing the record in

its totality, we must conclude that, on this fact-bound

question, the district court’s decision was not clearly

erroneous.
14 No. 08-1259

2.

Even if the officers’ initial encounter with Mr. Whitaker

cannot be characterized as consensual, we believe that the

officers had the authority to stop Mr. Whitaker long

enough to ascertain whether illegal activity was afoot.

Any discussion of this area must begin with the

Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court held:

where a police officer observes unusual conduct

which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his

experience that criminal activity may be afoot and

that the persons with whom he is dealing may be

armed and presently dangerous, where in the course

of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as

a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and

where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter

serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or

others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of

himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully

limited search of the outer clothing of such persons

in an attempt to discover weapons which might be

used to assault him.

Id. at 30. The Court has made clear that this exception to

the warrant requirement does not give an investigating

officer carte blanche to detain an individual, even temporarily, simply because the officer believes that such

action will aid his investigation. Most notably, in J.L.,

529 U.S. at 271-72, the Court held that the stop of an

individual solely on the anonymous tip of an individual
No. 08-1259 15

In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), the police had received 10

an anonymous call reporting that a black man wearing a

plaid shirt and standing at a particular bus stop was carrying a

gun. With no other information, officers went to the location,

frisked the individual and found a firearm.

The record shows that the officers later discovered that the 11

caller had given the 911 operator a false name and telephone

number. However, we measure the strength of an officer’s

information at the time he acted. Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661,

668 (7th Cir. 2004). Moreover, Travis correctly identified

himself as Marsh’s cousin. 

usually falls beyond the bounds of reasonableness.

10

Such a tip, noted the court, simply tends to identify a

particular person, but, unless it contains some prediction

of future behavior that can be identified by independent

investigation, there is nothing to corroborate its

assertion of illegality. Id. Otherwise, “any person

seeking to harass another [could] set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person

simply by placing an anonymous call,” id. at 272,

accusing the targeted individual of an illegality.

The situation before us today is very different from

the one presented in J.L. Here, the 911 center received

two calls in close succession that alerted the police to an

ongoing altercation in a food store parking lot. The

first call was anonymous; the second call was from an

individual who gave a name and telephone number,11

claimed to be related to one of the people involved in

the altercation and said that his own intervention

attempt had ended with Mr. Whitaker threatening him

with a gun. At the scene, the officers found the two vehi-
16 No. 08-1259

See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 496 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir.

12

2007) (“[W]e conclude it was reasonable for the police to

further credit the information provided in an emergency 911

call because the caller was apparently seeking protection and

aid for a friend.”); United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 319 (4th

(continued...)

cles described in the calls and two individuals in one

of those vehicles. The weapon described by one of the

callers was not immediately visible.

In United States v. Drake, 456 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2006),

while acknowledging the strictures of J.L., we noted that

the reporting of an ongoing emergency presents special

problems and obligations on the police. Id. at 774-75.

Accordingly, we held that, when the police respond to

an emergency as a result of a 911 call, the exigencies of

the situation do not require further pre-response verification of the caller’s identity before action is taken.

Indeed, we recently have encountered this situation

in another case. In United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555

(7th Cir. 2008), we held that the officer had reasonable

suspicion to stop the defendant based on a tip which

reported an ongoing emergency to 911. Id. at 558-59.

We held that J.L. does not govern because the caller

“gave the 911 operator enough information to identify

him and his location, and because he reported an ongoing emergency.” Id. We further noted that every circuit

to confront the issue had distinguished J.L. when the

tip was “not one of general criminality, but of an

ongoing emergency, or very recent criminal activity.” Id. 12
No. 08-1259 17

(...continued) 12

Cir. 2007) (holding that a “911 report, even if anonymous, bore

strong indicia of reliability and alerted the police officers to a

serious and imminent danger” and that “[g]iven such circumstances, the district court did not err in concluding that

the officers possessed information sufficient to justify a Terry

stop” of the defendant); United States v. Drake, 456 F.3d 771, 775

(7th Cir. 2006) (holding that we “presume the reliability of an

eyewitness 911 call reporting an emergency situation for

purposes of establishing reasonable suspicion, particularly

when the caller identifies herself”); United States v.

Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Police delay

while attempting to verify an identity or seek corroboration

of a reported emergency may prove costly to public safety and

undermine the 911 system’s usefulness. . . . The Fourth Amendment does not require the police to conduct further pre-response

verification of a 911 caller’s identity where the caller reports

an emergency. Accordingly, an emergency 911 call is entitled

to greater reliability than an anonymous tip concerning

general criminality.”); United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331,

1337-38 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that in an emergency, “officers

are compelled to search by a desire to locate victims and the

need to ensure their own safety and that of the public,” and

holding that “in an emergency, the probable cause element

may be satisfied where officers reasonably believe a person is

in danger”).

One case in the Second Circuit expresses reservations concerning whether the collective knowledge doctrine should be

extended to the 911 employee who takes the call and passes on

the emergency nature of the situation to police officers

operating in the field. See United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130 (2d

(continued...)
18 No. 08-1259

(...continued) 12

Cir. 2001). The panel’s misgivings in that case were based on

the training given to employees who are not police officers. Id.

at 135-37. Our case law, and indeed the case law of the other

circuits, has not dwelled on the same reservations. In Drake, we

held that 911 reports by identified callers can provide the

police with reasonable suspicion and that 911 employees are

part of the police collective. Drake, 456 F.3d at 775. Indeed, it

appears that the Second Circuit has modified its position and

would follow the path that we have chosen here in a case such

as this where the callers were describing events of an

emergency nature occurring as the individual reported them.

See Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2003)

(“In the instant case, the call came from the same location to

which the police responded, and more importantly, the caller

described an immediate and deadly threat of harm to which

she herself was being exposed at that location. The concern

we expressed in Kerman regarding the reliability of anonymous

and uncorroborated calls—that is, calls reporting an emergency

at a different location and involving someone other than the

caller—is not implicated here, where the caller expressed an

immediate risk of harm to herself, and where the address

from which the call was placed was verified.”).

(citations omitted). We further stated:

A rule requiring a lower level of corroboration

before conducting a stop on the basis of an emergency

report is not simply an emergency exception to the

rule of J.L. It is better understood as rooted in the

special reliability inherent in reports of ongoing

emergencies. Based on that special reliability, the

Supreme Court has held that reports of ongoing
No. 08-1259 19

emergencies made in 911 calls are subject to less

testing in court than other out-of-court statements.

Similarly, when an officer relies on an emergency

report in making a stop, a lower level of corroboration

is required.

Id. at 559-60 (internal citations omitted).

The First Circuit also has mentioned the importance

of the police being able to take quick action during an

ongoing emergency. In United States v. Ruidiaz, 529 F.3d

25, 27 (1st Cir. 2008), a 911 caller reported a shooting at

or near a particular address. He noted that the

individuals involved were wearing red shirts and that

the shooter or shooters were in a green Mercedes-Benz

parked at the address he provided. The caller confirmed

the number from which he was calling, but did not

provide his name and warned that he would not be on the

street when the police arrived. The officers who arrived

found the green car as described and noticed that it was

parked in violation of two municipal ordinances. They

found the defendant slumped over in the passenger seat.

When they touched the man’s shoulder, he screamed a

profanity. The officers searched the man and found a

handgun. One of the officers called the phone number

provided to 911 and spoke with someone, but the

person would not identify himself; nor is it clear that it

was the same person. The First Circuit held that, based

on a totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable

suspicion for the search. Id. at 33. It noted that the

caller confirmed his phone number and that the police

knew the caller could be tracked down if he provided
20 No. 08-1259

false information. Id. at 31. In holding that the facts taken

together were more than sufficient for the police to give

some credence to the 911 call, the court emphasized that

the call referenced an ongoing emergency. Id. at 31 n.2.

“[R]eports about ongoing emergencies, by virtue of their

very nature, necessitate quick action.” Id.

Accordingly, the police had the right to detain the

occupants of the car long enough to ascertain whether the

situation described by the callers was still an

ongoing threat to either of the individuals involved in

the altercation or to the public.

C.

The information obtained by the police after their

arrival at the scene, when combined with the information already known to them prior to their arrival,

certainly gave the officers the requisite authority to

search the cabin of Mr. Whitaker’s car to ascertain

whether it contained a weapon. The officers’ conversation

with Mr. Whitaker and his companion, together with

their independent observations, made it clear that the

two occupants of the car were engaged in an altercation.

Marsh admitted that she had been arguing with

Mr. Whitaker; the officer observed that her shirt was

stained with her tears and she was crying. Although

Marsh denied that Mr. Whitaker had a weapon, she

would not voluntarily move away from the car door

when Officer Joswiak announced that he was going to

search the car. All of these factors, when assessed in

their totality, certainly constituted a sufficient basis to
No. 08-1259 21

In Officer Joswiak’s testimony, he describes what drew his 13

attention as he was entering the parking lot. He states: “As

I recall, the one vehicle parked next to the silver vehicle with

a van had the door open with some kids in and I mean there’s

the van with the kids, the silver car.” R. 23 at 39. It is

unclear when Officer Bedford noticed the children.

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justify the officers’ inspection of the cabin for a weapon. See

United States v. Arnold, 388 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 2004). To

leave the scene at that point without having performed

such an inspection could have jeopardized their own

safety, as well as that of those in the surrounding area,

including Marsh’s children in the van parked immediately

next to Mr. Whitaker’s car. The Fourth Amendment does

13

not require such an unrealistic response to the situation

before us.

Conclusion

The officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to

justify their search of the passenger compartment of Mr.

Whitaker’s car. Therefore, the firearm found there was

admissible, and the district court correctly denied the

motion to suppress. Accordingly, the judgment of the

district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED