The Honor able Milton I . Shadur, United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District * of I llinois , sitti ngby

desig nation. Be cause the claim ag ainst Carl Br own in his official c apac ity is nothing more tha

n a 1 c la im a g a ins t E c or se its e lf (s e e , e .g ., Ke ntu c ky

v. Gr aham, 4 73 U. S. 1 95 , 1 65 -6 6 ( 19 85 )) , h is be ingname d a s a

c od e fe nd ant i s p ur e surp lus a g e and may be ig no re d ( id. ). He nc e we re fe r o nly to Ecorse in the balanc e of this opinion.

NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0302n.06 F iled: April 23, 2009 No. 08-1041 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT DAVI D C. BROWN,

Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. CI TY OF ECORSE and CARLBROWN,

De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : GI BB ONS and McKEAGUE, Circ uit J udg es, and SHAD UR, Senior District J udg e. * SHADUR , Senior District J udg e. David C. Brown ( “B rown” ) appe als from a district
c ourt or de r gra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt f

or bo th h is t arg e te d d e fe nd ants -- City of Ec or se (“Ec orse” ) and Car l Brown, an Ec orse of ficial sued in his off

icial ca pacity -- in an a ction

1 broug ht under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Sec tion 1983") a nd the Four

teenth Amendme nt. That
summa ry jud g me nt o rd e r r e

je c te d B ro wn ’s c on te nti on that E c or se vio late d h is “ c on sti tut ion a llyAs noted by the district court, “ [a] lthough Plaintiff’s Complaint alleg es liability based 2 upon a liberty

interest, he did not pursue that basis in his response to Def endants’ motion [for summary judgme nt] .” Nor

does B rown pursue that basis on appea l. Accor dingly we c onfine our ana ly sis to t

he ke y iss ue be fo re us : w he the r B ro wn ha s a pr ote c te d p ro pe rt

y int e re st n e e de d to su pp or t hi s Co mpl a int

. B e c a us e , a s st ate d in

the ne xt se c tio n o f t

his op ini on , w e (l ike the dis tr ic t c ourt ) m us t 3 cre dit Brown’ s version of e vents, what ha s just been desc ribed in the text is accepte d as true on thi s a pp e a l. 2 protec ted prope rty

and liberty

interest to pursue his oc cupation as a develope r by

hara ssment and in delay in not gr anting ” him permits to construct thre e modular home s in Ecorse. 2 For the re asons stated he rea fter w e af firm the district cour

t’s order . In sum, beca

use the City of Ec or se Z on ingOr din anc e (“ Or din anc e ” ) g ave its B uil din gDe pa rtme nt ( and

a lso its Z oning B oard of

Appea ls (“Z oning B oard” )) the disc retion to reje ct B rown’s a pplication for building per

mits, he did not have a c onstitut ionally -protec ted prope rty interest in the per

mits he soug ht. And lackingthat proper ty interest, he c ould not sustain an action base d on deprivation of his procedur al and substantive due proce ss rig hts. BACK GR OUND Acc ordingto Brown’s Complaint, on or about Dec ember 15, 2005 he applied f

or building permits to build modul ar home s on eac h of three vaca nt lots he owned in Ecor se. As re quired, Br own submitted site plans to the Building D epar tment with the application. His application was not approve d. Br own states via a ffidavit that the B uilding De partment ne ver pr ovided a wr itten explanation for the denia l of his application and that he was instead r efe rre d to Ecorse ’s mayor, who told him, “Idon' t want them homes over here in Ecorse at all. Your home is ugly , and we don' t appre ciate that home beinghere in Ecorse . I ' m not goingto have a ny more of those houses built. I ' m goingto have that house torn down.” 3Br own counter s that the lots were sufficie ntly larg e. Ag ain we must cr edit that 4 response . Br own does not re visit t he equa l protection ar g uments that he had r aised in the district 5 c ourt . 3 Ec or se c onte nd s th at it s b uil din gc od e of fi c ia l Ca rl B ro wn de te rm ine d th at B ro wn ’s lot s failed to mee t the minimum square footag e re quirements for residential homes unde r Ordina nce §1 5. 00 5. Ec or se state s th at Ca rl B ro wn a lso c on sid e re d O rd ina

nc e §4 .0 04 e nti tle d “ On e F amil y 4 Dw e lli ngRe g ulatio ns ,” wh ic h s ay s th at su c h d we lli ng s sh a ll b e “ a e sth e tic a lly c omp atib le in desig n and appe ara

nce to homes in the ne ighbor hood in which it is located.” Although his a

pplication was not appr oved, B rown did not appe al the B uilding Depa rtment’s dec ision to t he Z oning B oard a s permitted under Ordinanc e § 4.004(h) . Instead Br own filed his district court Complaint in May 2006. Over

18 months later, on Dec ember 7, 2007, that court g rante d summary judgme nt for Ec orse a

nd dismiss ed the Complaint and the action. B ro wn

no w s e e ks to p re se nt t

wo iss ue s: ( 1) wh e the r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d whe n it conclude d that he had no pr otected pr operty interest in the issuance of the building permits for which he a

pplied and (2) whether

denial of those pe rmits constitut ed violations of his substantive and proc edura l due proc ess rig hts. As to the first issue, B rown a rgues that he ha d a prote cted 5 proper ty interest bec ause the building inspec tor had so little discretion re g ardinghis application that approva l should have bee n virtually assure d. As to the second, B rown c ontends that there
was no rational basis relate d to leg itimate state conc erns f or deny ing his a pplication. Be cause we hold that Brown falls at the f irst hurdle, we do not addre ss the second.We find this case to be r ipe for a djudication. Whil e the Or dinance provides that B rown 6 c ou ld h ave a

pp e a le d th e B uil din gDe pa rtme nt’ s d e nia l of

his a pp lic atio n to the Z on ingB oa rd , h is failure to do so does not rende r his claim constitutionally unripe (se e Willi amson County Reg ’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Ba nk of Johns on City , 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985)). We find the case to be prude ntially

ripe a s well. We see no r eason to for ce B rown to g o befor e the Z oning Boa rd to deve lop the rec ord, and nothingis to be g ained by postponing the substantive r esolution of B ro wn ’s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im, g ive n o ur a bil ity to d e c ide on

the me ri ts n ow(s e e Ky . Pr e ss Ass’n v. Ke ntucky , 454 F.3d 505, 509 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). 4 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291. Our re view of or ders grantingsummary 6 judgme nt is conducted de novo (B assett v. Nat’ l Coll eg iate Athletic Ass’ n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)). To that e nd “we must assume the truth of the non-movingparty ’s evidenc e and
c o n s tr u e a l l i n f e r e n c e s f r o mth ate v i d e n c e i nth e l i g h tm o s tf av o r a b l e t o th e n o n - m o v i n gp arty” (Ciminil lo v. Streicher, 434 F .3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006)). Motions for summary judgme nt must be denied in ca ses when a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t exi sts -- “whe n there is sufficient evidenc e for

a trier of fa ct to find for the non-moving party” (id.). AP P LICATION OF THE ST ANDAR D To preva il under Section 1983 B rown “ must establish that a person a ctingunder c olor of state law d e pr ive d [hi m] of a ri g ht s e c ur e d b y

the Con sti tut ion

or the laws of

the Un ite d St ate s” (Waters v. City

of Morristown, 242 F .3d 353, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2001)). T o that end B rown ha s char g ed that Ec orse de prived him of his proce dural a nd substantive due proc ess rig hts under the Four teenth Amendme nt, which provides in re levant par t that a State shall not “depr ive any person of life, liber

ty , or prope rty , without due proce ss of law” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1). With the exis tence or nonexistence of “ proper ty ” beingat issue her e, B rown c annot re ach the question of a deprivation of proce dural or substantive due proce ss rig hts unless he is first able to show that he5

had a c onstitut ionally -protec ted prope rty interest (K

y . Dep’ t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) ( proce dural due proce ss); Sil ver v. F ranklin Twp. B d. of Z oning A ppeals, 966 F .2d 1031, 1036 (6th Cir. 1992) (substantive due proce ss)). I f a zoning authority

reta ins discretion to issue or deny a building pe rmit, an individual whose pe rmit application has bee n reje cted ha s no protecte d proper ty interest (Silver, 966 F .2d at 1036). In Silver we he ld that a plaintiff in a zoning c ase c ould not show that his subst antive due proce ss rig hts were violated unless he c ould first establish that he had a constitutionally -protec ted pr op e rt y int e re st ( id. ). At

iss ue the re wa s th e towns hip ’s re sc iss ion of a c on dit ion a l us e pe rm it that th e pla int if

f h a d b e e n g ra

nte d to c on str

uc t r e sid e nti a l dw e lli ng s ( id. at 10 31 -3 3) . T o e sta bli sh

a pr op e rt y int e re st the pla int if

f h a d to sh owthat th e zon inga pp e a ls b oa

rd la c ke d d isc re tio n to deny his desired use of

the land if he complied with cer tain mandatory

minimum require ments (id. at 1036). That is, if the board re tained the discr etion to deny the plaintiff’s zoning c ertificate eve n afte r he ha d complied with those requir ements, he ha d no protec ted prope rty interest (id.). Such a proper ty interest would exist, however, if the board’ s discretion we re so c ircumscr ibed that

a pp ro va l of

the pla int if

f’ s p ro po se d u se of

the pr op e rt

y be c ame mand ator

y on c e he c omp lie d w ith the min ima l r e qu ir e me nts imp os e d o n h im ( id. ). Di sc re tio n b y zon inga uth or iti e s to lim it the us e of pr op e rt y lawf ull y is the re fo re the ke y

to e sta bli sh ingwh e the r a

pla int if f h a s a pr op e rt y int e re st in zoni ngcase s such as this one. Despite B rown’s a

rguments to the contrar

y , the district court wa s corr ect in findingthe absenc e of a

protec ted prope rty

interest in the building pe rmits for which he applied, bec ause the BuildingDepa

rtment reta ined discre tion as to whether those permits would issue. Under Or din anc e §4 .0 04 (h ) i t is the B uil din gDe pa rtme nt’ s r e sp on sib ili ty

to d e te rm ine in t

he fi rs tAs stated ea rlier, that obviate s any

need to turn to B rown’s se cond conte ntion. But we 7 note as we ll that Brown c ould not bootst rap himself into F ourtee nth Amendment protec tion by c la imi nga

pr op e rt y int e re st i n c e rt a in p ro c e dure s th at he c ha rg e s w e re no t f

oll ow e d b y

Ec or se (see , e.g ., Ex perimenta l Holdings, Inc. v. F arr is, 503 F.3d 514, 519 (6 Cir. 2007) and c ases c ited th there ). In an impermissible depa rture f rom the re cord, B rown’s a ppellate br ief quotes the 8 mayor as pur

portedly havingsaid that he “ did not want modular houses built in the City ,” a statement notably

absent fr om the actua l evidence -- B rown’s de position and affidavit. That ref lects an e ffor

t to liken this case to Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 302 N.W .2d 146, 149 (Mich. 1981), which he ld that “[t] he per se exclusion of mobile homes from all ar eas not de signated as mobile home parks ha s no rea sonable ba sis under the police power , and is there fore unconstitutional.” But no litiga nt is of course e ntitled to reshape the fac ts in the recor d to fit the law. 6 instance whether

dwelling s are “ae sthetically compatible in desig n and appe ara nce to homes in the neig hborhood in which it is located.” That provision confe rs discre tion on the Building De pa rtme nt t o a

pp ro ve or de ny bu ild ingpe rm its . Wh ile B ro wn may have ho pe d th at hi s application would be grante d, hopes alone -- thoug h they may springeter

nal -- do not c reate a
c on sti tut ion a lly -p ro te c te d p ro pe rt y int e re st. Th at a lon e dis patc he s B ro wn ’s laws uit

. 7 Ap pa re ntl y un da un te d b y his la c k o f a

pr ote c te d p ro pe rt

y int e re st, B ro wn

atte mpt s to
re surr e c t hi s c la im o n a

pp e a l by a sse rt ingthat th e tr

ue mot ivatio n b e hin d th e de nia l of his pe rm it application wa s an illeg al desire expressed by the Ecor se mayor to ban a ll mobil e homes fr om Ec or se . T hat ho we ve r d ist or ts the re c or d, wh ic h r e fl e c ts n ot a n o utr ig ht b an o n mo bil e ho me s in 8 Ecorse but rather

a stateme nt totally

in sy nch with the B uilding De partment’s e valuation of B ro wn ’s a

pp lic atio n a

nd its re je c tio n o f t

hat a pp lic atio n o n th e ba se s o f a e sth e tic s a nd c on fo rm ity with the neig hborhood, both of those be ing le g itimate state conc erns ( see, e .g ., Robinson Twp., 302 N.W.2d at 149).7 CO NC LU SION F or the re a so ns we have e xpla ine d, B ro wn ’s la c k o f a pr op e rt y int e re st d ise nti tle s h im from invokingthe Four

teenth Amendme nt and henc e compe ls rejec tion of his Section 1983 claim. We t he re fo re a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r gra nti ngEc or se ’s mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt.