Resurgent Russia in 2030

Challenge for the USAF

by

Theodore C. Hailes, Col, USAF (Retired)

Ronald Buckley, Col, USAF

David Blanks, Lt Col, USAF

Mark Butler, Lt Col, USMC

Phillip Preen, Lt Col, USAF

Michael Tarlton, Lt Col, USAF

September 2009

The Occasional Paper series was established by the Center for 

Strategy and Technology (CSAT) as a forum for research on topics 

that reflect long-term strategic thinking about technology and its 

implications for US national security. Copies of No. 66 in this series 

are available from the CSAT, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112, or on the CSAT Web site at 

http://csat.au.af.mil. The fax number is (334) 953-6158; phone 

(334) 953-6460.

Occasional Paper No. 66

Center for Strategy and Technology

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
ii

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of Air University, the US government, or the Department 

of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property–Patents, 

Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, it is not copyrighted, but is the property 

of the US government.

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Resurgent Russia in 2030 : challenge for the USAF / Theodore C. Hailes ... [et al.].

 p. ; cm. – (Occasional paper / Center for Strategy and Technology ; no. 66)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-5866-199-2

1. Russia (Federation)—Politics and government. 2. Russia (Federation)—Economic conditions. 3. Russia (Federation)—Forecasting. 4. Russia (Federation)—

Armed Forces—Operational readiness. 5. United States. Air Force—Planning. I. 

Hailes, Theodore C. II. Series: Occasional paper (Air University (U.S.). Center for 

Strategy and Technology) ; no. 66.

320.947 –– dc22
iii

Contents

Chapter	 Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . xi

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3 POLITICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

5 MILITARY BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

6 ALTERNATE FUTURE—RUSSIA IN 2030 . . . . . . . . 57

7 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US MILITARY . . . . . . 71

Illustrations

Figure	

1 Male Russian Population Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 Female Russian Populations Trends . . . . . . . . . 9

3 With Social Reforms—Russians Aged 18–49

Fit for Military Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

4 Current Russian Population Projections 

(Military Age Defined as Ages 18–49) . . . . . . . . . 11

5 Russian Exports—2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

6 Russian Imports—2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
iv

Figure	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Page

7 Gross Domestic Product—Scenario 

Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

8 Defense Budgets—Scenario Projections . . . . . . . 63

9 Conceptual Systems Scores in 

resurgent Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

10 Enabling Technologies for a 

resurgent Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Tables

  1 Microeconomic Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
v

About the Authors

Col Theodore C. Hailes, USAF, retired, is the Office of

the Secretary of Defense chair for Force Transformation at

Air University and a founding member of the Center for Strategy and Technology. In addition to his work in technology, he

is a faculty member of the Air War College (AWC), teaching

courses on national security decision making, international

security studies, and regional studies field seminars. He

completed a 30-year career in the Air Force before retiring in

1996. He flew the F-4, O-2A, F-5, and the F-15, accumulating over 4,000 hours of which 500 were in combat. He served

in Vietnam as a forward air controller with the 2nd Brigade,

101st Airborne Division, and finished his fighter career as

squadron commander of the 22nd Tactical Fighter Squadron. He later served as director of operations of the Northeast

Air Defense Sector. He served at the Pentagon from 1979–83,

working in international programs, and was executive officer

for the Air Force chief of public affairs. Colonel Hailes was a

department chairman, then associate dean of faculty at AWC

from 1990–96. He returned to the AWC faculty in a civilian

capacity in 1997. He has a bachelor of arts degree in history

from Denison University and a master of science degree in

international relations from Troy University. His principle

areas of interest in the academic world have been in international relations and the strategic implication of accelerating

technological change. His military educational background

includes Squadron Officer School (SOS), Air Command and

Staff College (ACSC), and AWC.

Col Ronald Buckley is currently a student at AWC. He previously served at the White House as the senior military aide

to the vice president and on the Air Staff as the fighter branch

chief in the Global Power Programs Directorate. He spent his

early career as a T-38 instructor pilot and as an operational

F-15E pilot before being selected to attend Test Pilot School in

1999. Following Test Pilot School, he served as an F-16 experimental test pilot at Edwards AFB, California. Colonel Buckley

has flown over 2,600 hours in more than 25 different aircraft

and has flown 69 combat hours. He has a bachelor of science

degree in engineering mechanics from the USAF Academy. He

was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship to study at Columbia

University, earning a master of science degree in engineering

mechanics and civil engineering. His military educational

background includes SOS, ACSC, and AWC.
vi

Lt Col David P. Blanks is currently a student at AWC. He

has had a variety of assignments in the acquisition, test, and

evaluation career field. Additionally, he has served as an air

officer commanding at the USAF Academy and as a basing

and force structure staff officer with the USAF in Europe at

Ramstein AB, Germany. He deployed to Kabul, Afghanistan,

working in the Office of Defense Cooperation laying the

groundwork for an emerging Afghan air force. His most recent assignment was as commander, 421st Air Base Squadron, Royal Air Force, Menwith Hill, United Kingdom, a diverse unit of more than 300 personnel for whom he provided

base support. He has a bachelor of science degree in engineering mechanics from the USAF Academy, and his military

educational background includes SOS, ACSC, and AWC. 

Lt Col Mark Butler, US Marine Corps, is currently a student at AWC. He was commissioned in 1988 and earned his

naval aviator wings in 1990, qualifying in the AV-8B Harrier. 

He has operational flying tours in Yuma, Arizona; Okinawa,

Japan; Al Jaber, Kuwait; and Al Asad, Iraq; and has served as

an operational flight test pilot for the Harrier in China Lake,

California. Additionally, he served as the joint strike fighter

requirements officer at Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the

commanding officer, HQ Squadron, Marine Corps Air Station—Yuma. From 2006 to 2007, he was the executive officer

of the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One. 

Colonel Butler has flown over 2,500 hours (mostly in the Harrier), including 75 combat sorties during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has a bachelor of science degree in systems engineering from the US Naval Academy, and a master of science degree

in technology management and a master of business administration degree from the University of Maryland. His military

educational background includes the Marine Corps Basic

School, the Expeditionary Warfare School, ACSC, and AWC.

Lt Col Phillip Preen is currently a student at AWC. He

entered the Air Force in 1982 as a ballistic missile analyst

technician on a Titan II missile combat crew and received his

commission in 1990 through the Airman Scholarship and

Commissioning Program. He is a bioenvironmental engineer

in the Biomedical Science Corps of the Air Force Medical Service and has flight and squadron-level command experience. 

Colonel Preen successfully designed and implemented the Air

Force’s first ever medical unit type code training integration

in Silver Flag, the Air Force’s first ever chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear defense challenge adopted into an
vii

Air Force-level competition, and holds a US patent for a medical suction apparatus. He has a bachelor of science degree in

electrical engineering and a master of science degree in environmental engineering from the University of South Florida. 

His military educational background includes SOS, ACSC,

and AWC.

Lt Col Michael F. Tarlton is currently a student at AWC. 

He served on the Air Staff as deputy chief, Air Dominance

Division, Global Power Programs Directorate, and Assistant

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition where he was responsible for coordinating and communicating key Air Force

messages on F-22A and F-35 to the Office of the Secretary of

Defense and Congress. Colonel Tarlton spent operational

tours in the F-16 at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, and Kunsan AB, Korea, before attending Test Pilot School in 1998. 

Following Test Pilot School, he served as the operations officer of the 40th Flight Test Squadron at Eglin AFB, Florida,

and the squadron commander of the 416th Flight Test Squadron at Edwards AFB, California, flying F-16 developmental

test missions. As an operational fighter and test pilot, he has

accumulated over 2,400 hours in 25 different aircraft, with

over 1,775 hours in the F-16 and over 110 hours in combat. 

He has been awarded two Air Medals and five Aerial Achievement Medals. He has a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering from the University of California at Davis and

a master of science degree in electrical engineering from San

Diego State University. His military educational background

includes SOS, ACSC, a National Defense Fellowship at the

Defense Advanced Projects Agency, and AWC. 

ix

Abstract

Russia has had a turbulent history, and those experiences

have had an indelible influence on the nation as it moved

from its tsarist past, through the Soviet interregnum, to its

brief flirtation with democracy. These traditions and cultural

pressures have instilled in the Russian psyche a belief that

strives for stability and seeks strong leadership. Furthermore,

Russia tends to value stability and its proclivity for strong

leadership even when these traits conflict with those democratic ideals that have become mainstays in the West since

the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation. After each

change in governance, Russia always returns to form, which

is now easy to follow in the Putin era. There is a willing consolidation of power in an authoritarian-style government that

is leading Russia back onto the world stage. This resurgent

Russia will ultimately become a serious competitor to the

United States and over the years could well become a threat.

This monograph is concerned with the direction Russia

will take over the next 20 years, its growing influence on the

world scene, and the particular challenges it will present to

the United States by 2030. The determination that Russia

will be an adversary is certainly not a foregone conclusion;

however, neither is long-term Russo–American friendship a

predetermined outcome. What is certain is that whatever the

intentions of Russia, the United States must be prepared to

handle the challenges they may present. Further, the typical

Department of Defense (DOD) myopia of focusing primarily

on the war of the present may be blinding decision makers to

the challenges of tomorrow.

Handling these long-term threats will require forethought

and planning. Preparing the US military will require innovative planning, which needs to include the introduction of

emerging technologies, dynamic systems, and insightful strategies that can meet the full spectrum of challenges presented

by a resurgent Russia. The purpose of this monograph is to

provide the background information necessary to establish a

priority listing ofthe types of systems and organizations needed

to meet this kind of future threat. The results of this study will

be combined with other alternate futures to optimize the mix

of systems and strategies for the US Air Force of 2030.

xi

Preface and Acknowledgments

In 1996 the Air Force initiated a major study effort under

the direction of Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, the Air Force chief of

staff. That study, Air Force 2025, looked 30 years into the future and made enormous contributions toward directing Air

Force research and procurement to ready our forces for new

challenges. The study brought together some of the brightest

minds and most forward thinkers of the age, including Dr. 

Norman Augustine, president of Lockheed Martin; Alvin

Toffler; James Cameron, who later directed the movie Titanic;

Burt Rutan; Gen Bernard Schriever; Adm Bobby Inman; and

Dr. Gene McCall and Dr. Dan Hastings, two chairmen of the

Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. 

In 2007 Gen T. Michael Moseley, then Air Force chief of

staff, directed a continuous series of future thinking and

study efforts be undertaken, using Air University (AU) as the

“Air Force’s think tank.” This monograph is part of that ongoing effort. The authors collectively spent a year researching and traveling to ascertain what range of challenges Russia may present in 20 to 30 years. The team spent significant

effort on researching Russian culture, its political system, its

rapidly growing economy, and its recent military buildup. 

These efforts form much of this monograph. 

From this basic research and meetings with Russian experts both in the United States and Russia, the team began to

explore directions Russia might take in the future. This exploration is not designed to forecast a specific future, but rather

to help the reader better understand the magnitude and shape

of a rapidly rising power. This power may be our friend or foe. 

But whatever Russia does become, the nation must be ready

to engage it as a fellow member of the international system. 

From all the authors, debts of gratitude are owed to many

who offered advice. While too numerous to list here, they are

listed in the documentation and endnotes. An even greater

debt is owed to our families, who endured lengthy separations as the team traveled to research this monograph. More

is owed to them than can be stated here. 



Chapter 1

Introduction

The last 100 years have been called the American century.1 This 

monograph is about the start of what may be the Asian millennium.2 Russia is an unusual case since it is between Europe and 

Asia with aspects of both. Every indication suggests that, at some 

time in the next 20–40 years, Russia will reemerge as a world 

power. While some authors quibble about dates, there are few who 

argue about the eventual outcome. 

This monograph is part of the Blue Horizons study commissioned 

by Gen T. Michael Moseley, the former US Air Force chief of staff, 

to provide “a new look at the future.” Specifically, the chief of staff 

asked the Center for Strategy and Technology (CSAT) to “provide a 

common understanding of future strategic and technological trends 

for Air Force leaders to make better decisions.” The chief also seeks 

to “confirm Air University as [the Air Force’s] in-house think tank” 

and to improve the relevance of Air Force education to the decisionmaking processes in Washington.3

Within the context of this 2008 study, four separate planning 

scenarios were examined. The best and brightest officers from the 

Air Force and the sister services were specially selected to participate during their one-year course of instruction at Air University 

(AU). These scenarios include a resurgent Russia; a failed state in a 

vital area of US interests; a successful al-Qaeda overthrow of a Middle Eastern friendly state; and the rise of China to peer status. 

Within these works, there is no magic, no fortune-telling, and no 

attempts at clairvoyant prognostication. These are written as, and 

intended to be used as, academic works to inform decision makers 

and scholars about changes happening in our world. The discussion herein is a mix of cultural sociology, political science, economics, military science (sometimes called strategic studies), and international relations. 

The final part of the Blue Horizons project, not a part of this 

monograph series, will be an analysis of each of the four alternate 

future scenarios. While it is not possible to predict with any fidelity 

what the specific threats will be in 2030, this study’s intent is to 

look at four world views that cover a spectrum of probable futures, 

from peer to terrorist. This diverse analysis will help to better understand the nature of the potential threats the US Air Force may 

face in 2030. There will be obvious substantive differences in threat 

between a resurgent Russia, a peer China, a failed state, or a terror 

state on steroids. Finally, the Blue Horizons study will examine 

what systems and technology are best suited across the wide spectrum of possible futures.
Methodology

This monograph is grounded in reputable scholarship and in 

actual site visits to the locations in question. The researchers performed a data search across the literature covering international 

relations, political, economic, cultural, and military studies. They 

also enrolled in specialized coursework pertaining to both Russian 

domestic and international relations. 

Each researcher formulated a series of questions relative to their 

section on this monograph. They traveled to conduct interviews with 

senior members of the Department of State, the national intelligence 

agencies,4 and the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition, each 

member of the team traveled to Russia, meeting with political and 

military leaders as well as cultural experts and diplomatic staff. 

In addition to searching for answers to basic questions, the team 

engaged in a modified Delphi method5 of generating conclusions 

about both present-day Russia as well as Russia’s probable future 

direction. They identified specific trend lines that will provide guidance and understanding of Russia in 2030. These conclusions were 

then revetted against a series of experts and fellow team members 

to refine hypotheses and conclusions. Finally, the team engaged in 

additional research and interviews to narrow the perspective and 

focus of this paper. 

For the military capabilities sections, the researchers used a 

war-game methodology to add detail to the political, diplomatic, 

military, and technological materials gathered in the interviews, 

discussions, and site visits. In these sessions, a formal Delphi 

method6 was used which included a broad cross section of 22 senior DOD civilian and military strategic thinkers. This scenariobased discussion involved several iterations of discussion wherein 

the researchers interacted with three opposing teams to generate a 

more complete picture of the challenges a modernized resurgent 

Russia might present by 2030. 

Members of the Headquarters USAF Strategic Planning Directorate, US Air Force, and Air Force Research Laboratories scientists 

simultaneously collaborated on developing a list of present and 

technologically feasible future concepts that the US Air Force either will have or could have in its inventory in the 2030 timeframe. 

Many of these concepts are in the Air Force today, such as the F-22, 

and are planned to still be in the inventory 22 years from now. Others are systems wherein the enabling technologies required to field 

them are sufficiently mature to be developed and procured, if their 

value warrants, within the next two decades.

The final aspect of this analysis involved using a “value-focusedthinking” quantitative model to formally evaluate the existing and 

potential future concepts for effectiveness against a Russia with its 

current and projected systems.7 This model was implemented under 

the direction of the AU CSAT, with the assistance of Innovative 
Decisions, Inc., whose members include some of those cited in the 

seminal works on this method in the footnotes.

Notes

1. Walter LaFeber, The American Century: American Foreign Policy Since the 

1890s. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton Publishing, 1989).

2. This term was coined by Joseph A. Engelbrecht Jr., et al., in Alternate Futures 

for 2025 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 79.

3. Gen John D. W. Corley, vice-chief of staff, US Air Force, memorandum of 

agreement, 17 May 2006. 

4. There is nothing in this work, nor any source used to compile this work, that 

is or draws upon classified material. 

5. Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi 

Method to the Use of Experts,” Management Science 9, no. 3 (April 1963): 458–67. 

Dalkey and Helmer discuss the method in depth, as well as its origins in RAND’s 

Project Delphi.

6. Ibid.

7. The value-focused-thinking model closely parallels that used in the Air Force 

2025 study. For details on the Air Force 2025 model, see J. A. Jackson et al., “Air 

Force 2025 Operational Analysis,” Military Operations Research 3, no. 4 (1997): 5–21. 

For more on value-focused-thinking methodology, see R. L. Keeney and H. Raiffa, 

Decision Making with Multiple Objectives and Value Tradeoffs (New York, NY: Wiley 

Press, 1976); Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); C. W. Kirkwood, Strategic Decision 

Making: Multiobjective Decision Analysis with Spreadsheets (Belmont, CA: Duxbury 

Press, 1997); and G. Parnell, et al., “Foundations 2025: A Framework for Evaluating 

Future Air and Space Forces,” Management Science 44, no. 10 (1998): 1336–50.



Chapter 2

Overview

The purpose of this monograph is precise but easily misunderstood. The clearest way to minimize confusion is to first detail what 

this paper is not trying to accomplish. First, it is not a prediction of 

what Russia will necessarily be like in 2030. The monograph paints 

a logical picture of how the United States may be challenged by a 

near-peer competitor with the capacity to destroy the United States. 

It is written based on Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ National Security Strategy. Second, there are many potential future paths for 

Russia. This path assumes energy prices will not decline, the trends 

in Russian governance will remain stable, and the Russian republic will remain intact as a nation state. Finally, this scenario and 

the study do not assume that warfare with Russia is inevitable or 

even likely. This alternate future merely creates a situation where, 

possibly, the interests of the United States and Russia may not 

coincide, and uses this situation to explore the types of capabilities 

the Air Force would need in such a world.

Any alternate future needs to be grounded in a realistic assessment of a likely challenger’s military potential. Such a scenario 

must fall accurately within historical context and be both fiscally 

viable and politically attainable. The recent actions and directions 

taken in Russia under then Pres. Vladimir Putin made the task of 

building a realistic roadmap that leads to a resurgent Russia relatively straightforward. The Russian government is providing all of 

the fodder necessary for building the case for a resurgent Russia 

scenario. In a real sense, what started as a theoretical model for 

purely academic purposes is becoming not only a possible future 

but also a highly probable one as well. 

This monograph begins with an analysis of the political aspects 

of a resurgent Russia. It looks briefly at the Yeltsin era where power 

devolved away from Moscow, yet created a new constitution that 

laid the groundwork for a significant increase in the Russian president’s power and authority. It then details the efforts under President Putin, who took advantage of this constitution to bring new 

powers to the presidency. This section also examines the impact of 

corruption, the lack of an independent judiciary, and the politicization of key economic forces on Russia’s internal political system.

Chapter 4 presents the economic trend line underpinning Russia’s resurgence. It provides a brief look at the economic changes 

following the collapse of the Soviet Union and examines the current 

status of the Russian economy, its components, and the distribution of resources. The discussion then migrates toward Russia’s 

“strategic industries” of oil and natural gas. These industries are a 


key source in Russia’s continued economic growth, which is fueling an increase in their military spending.

Next, ongoing trends within the Russian military are examined. 

As a result of the political centralization of power and the dramatically increasing funds made available through the sale of gas and 

oil, the Russian military has seen a substantial increase in its political support and has received an infusion of cash and resources 

that has enabled it to embark on an aggressive reform program. 

These reforms span five categories: military institutions and command structures, “peopleware” designed to improve personnel 

problems, military hardware, defense industry reform and international partnerships, and emerging technology. While it will take 

years to recover from the neglect suffered in the 1990s, the Russian 

military will make substantial improvements in the next 20 years. 

Nonetheless, even with these improvements, Russia will still be only 

a major regional force in the timeframe being studied here. 

Chapter 6 posits the types of challenges Russia might pose to the 

United States. This analysis lays the foundation for what the key 

implications are for a modernized resurgent Russia in our world.

Soft Sciences behind the Hard Facts—Historical 

and Cultural Underpinnings

The political, economic, and military trend lines identified are 

the dominant ones for this research project; however, they do not 

represent all the variables that must be considered when examining and assessing Russia over the next 20 years. There are critical 

factors that affect the direction Russia will follow that cross over 

the political, economic, and military lines; hence, these forces need 

to be acknowledged up front. They provide the background and 

often the explanation for particular actions that each of the trend 

lines introduce. 

These are the forces that have evolved over 1,000 years of Russian history. It is the culture—the history of the Russian people. It 

is a combination of their long bloodied history, the demographic 

realities at work in their society, and their religious undercurrents. 

The impact of these deeply-engrained societal influences cannot be 

overstated. These forces impact everything from politics to how 

they view their economy and civil-military relations. It even helps 

explain why strong military power is so central to their collective 

Russian mindset.

Russia is reasserting itself as a world power in terms of geography, politics, nationalism, and religion.1 Russia’s ideology is deeply 

rooted in its unique history, which helps explain its focus on national security and its high level of suspicion in the international 

arena. One cannot look at Russian culture from a Western perspective or as a simple recitation of historical facts. It is a nation 

that encompasses a large land mass with few natural barriers, a 


geographic reality that has motivated many invasions at the hands 

of its neighbors. Throughout its history, Russia has been required 

to maintain a large standing army to protect itself from rival countries and internal threats. Their history easily explains why Russia 

often displays a paranoid-nation mentality. Subsequently, this attitude also illustrates why Russia has the need to flex its military 

muscle, as it has done with more frequency with the reemergence 

of its military power.

Putin, now prime minister, is acutely aware of Russian paranoia 

and is taking steps to restore a sense of nationalism and strength 

in the Russian people. The latest examples of Putin’s efforts to restore Russian pride and prestige include claims to the North Pole 

as sovereign territory and reviving the Russian space program in 

an attempt to be the first country to send a manned mission to 

Mars. All of this “flexing” of Russian international muscle is an effort to show Russian citizens that they are part of a strong and 

resurgent Russia. It is presumed that Russians will never be comfortable until they believe they are invincible. This constant pursuit 

of security will drive them to continue spending an increasingly 

larger share of their gross domestic product (GDP) on their military. Additionally, security concerns will continue to allow for the 

centralization of authority in the hands of a strong, autocratic 

leader. Consequently, these security concerns and associated 

spending priorities will come at the expense of social programs 

which will continue to be underfunded. 

Demographics

The most serious, long-term problem facing the Russian government––a problem that permeates every aspect of Russian politics, 

economics, and military readiness––is the conundrum of demographics. Topping the list of these concerns is its significantly declining overall population and simultaneous problematic rise in the 

Muslim proportion of their general public. Though distinctly separate issues, they combine to create even greater dilemmas for the 

Russian government. Though the Kremlin fully understands the perils associated with their demographic challenges, there is little they 

can do to reverse the projected trends in their population. Although 

a decline in population puts less strain on a country’s infrastructure, 

a smaller population will significantly limit future economic potential 

and dramatically impact future defense-related issues.

Although there are many social factors contributing to the population slide, the nation’s dismal health care system is arguably the 

most direct cause of the Russian population decline. Russia’s poor 

medical infrastructure alone contributes to a staggering 40 percent 

preventable mortality rate. This rate is a direct result of poor preventive medicine programs, substandard medical facilities, and limited health care accessibility.2 This statistic also reflects an infant 


mortality rate that alone accounts for 1.4 million female and 1.8

million male deaths annually.3

Further compounding the Russian demographic problems caused 

by a poor health industry is the extremely high prevalence of suicide. Given the World Health Organization’s (WHO) reported suicide 

rate of 70.2 per 100,000 for males and 11.9 per 100,000 for females 

in 2003 implies that approximately 46,000 males and 9,000 females 

annually take their own lives.4 Furthermore, the mortality rate 

among young and middle-age men is increasing. For example, the 

death rate of the working age population is 350 percent higher than 

that of the European Union. 

Additionally, Russia faces even greater demographic challenges 

because their birth rates are lower than the mortality rates.5 Despite extensive governmental efforts to stem the tide of population 

decline, the Russian population is projected to continue to decrease 

through 2050. The causes are wide-ranging, yet all are linked to 

the effects of widespread alcoholism and drug use, the poor health 

care system, and the decline in birth rates.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the decline in both the male and female military-age sectors of Russian society, as projected out to 

2030. There is no denying that Russia will be faced with many 

challenges over the next two decades, and a shortage of available 

personnel to serve in the Russian armed forces is arguably at the 

top of Russia’s list of security challenges. Additionally, Russian 

leadership must also be concerned about fielding a viable civilian 

workforce in addition to fielding a credible military force. Russia 

will be required to make significant cultural changes to reverse its 

declining demographic trend and insure its survival. 

Figure 1. Male Russian population trends. (Data derived from Central Intelligence 

Agency [CIA] Fact book, http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/rs-russia/mil

-military&all=1).
Putin fully understands that he must increase the standard of 

living, create jobs, and enhance social programs to reverse the 

downward demographic trend. However, Russia will not noticeably 

be able to slow the downward demographic trend any earlier than 

2015. This is due to the long lead times associated with improving 

infrastructure, repairing a broken health care system, and altering 

the “small or no family” mindset prevalent among the child-bearing 

age groups of society. However, the government is beginning to put 

programs in place to improve these areas. For example, there is a 

plan to double (to 6 percent) the amount of GDP spent on health 

care by 2010. Additionally, public health education and training 

will most likely move higher on the list of Russian priorities. One 

area where relatively major results could be realized is in the area 

of suicide prevention. Even a 50 percent decrease in the number of 

suicides would equate to an additional population of 750,000 between the ages of 15–24 by 2030. The net impact on population 

decline, from a relatively minor spending increase in these programs, could result in nearly one million lives saved per year. 

In addition to stemming unnecessary population decline, Russia 

is trying to stimulate larger family sizes with its “Conception Day” 

program. This highly publicized program awards money to Russian 

families who conceive.6 However, current low income levels and the 

associated low standard of living of young Russian families creates 

a further disincentive for procreation than can be made up for by 

this program. Unfortunately for the government, 70 percent of all 

families with children live near or below the poverty line. Hence, the 

Conception Day’s one-time $10,000 government “prize” for having 

children will not attract as many families as the Kremlin may desire. 

Figure 2. Female Russian population trends. (Data derived from CIA Fact book, 

http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/rs-russia/mil-military&all=1).
10

Low amounts of discretionary spending only aggravate this problem. 

For example, approximately 87 percent of the population spends at 

least half of their income on food. Interestingly, the current Russian expenditure of $2.30 per resident per day is equivalent to the 

cost of feeding a British cat in 2004.7 The bottom line is that, for a 

large segment of the population, it is still too expensive to maintain 

a large family, and those who do face the additional challenges of a 

neglected education system. However, a steady increase in personal 

incomes and a new focus on educational funding will, over time, 

ameliorate some of the standard-of-living difficulties that exasperate 

the current demographic curve issues.

Despite these barriers, figure 3 shows the potential impact of the 

Conception Day program; a moderate increase of nearly 100,000, or 

roughly 60 percent of those between the ages of 18–49, fit for military service. The first sign of significant growth will be in the 2030 

census when the estimated five-year bumper crop of Conception 

Day babies reaches 18. This can be seen in a leveling of the curves 

of military-age males and females in the 2025–30 time frame. 

Despite these programs, the Russian population currently stands 

at an estimated 143.1 million and is declining at a rate of 0.484 

percent annually,8 a rate that is shocking compared to the rest of 

the modern world. As evidenced by the Russian government’s 

health crisis plan, Russia has one of the world’s lowest life expectancy averages: 59 for males and 73 for females.9 If this negative 

trend continues, the shrinking population problem will only be 

compounded. Moreover, the WHO projections show an additional 

four-year drop in overall life expectancy by 2015.

10

Figure 3. With social reforms—Russians aged 18–49 fit for military service. 

(Data derived from CIA Fact book, http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/rs

-russia/mil-military&all=1 (2 October 2007). 
11

Although short-term impacts are inconsequential, even small 

improvements in population decline can have tremendous impacts 

over the long run. For example, over the next 23 years, a 50 percent decrease in the annual percentage of population decline, from 

0.484 to 0.242, could be realized and would result in a 2030 population of 135.3 million compared to the current prediction of 127.9 

million. Statistical trend analysis also indicates a 56 percent reduction in the number of 18-year-olds by 2018. Figure 4 shows the 

current extrapolation of data reflecting the number of Russians, 

between the ages of 18–49, who are fit for military service. Note 

that in contrast to figure 3, absent any social programs, the number of military age men and women in Russia continues to fall 

through 2030 and potentially beyond. 

It is interesting to note that the number of qualified candidates 

is only 60 percent of the total theoretically available due to a large 

percentage of physical and mental disqualifiers. Again, based on a 

plethora of societal limitations that must be overcome, the best 

the Russian government can hope for is that, by 2030, they will be 

able to cut the current percentage of population decline by 50 percent. Clearly these numerical challenges will have a profound effect on Russian defense planners. Therefore, in order to reach a 

truly resurgent Russian military scenario, Russia will be forced to 

turn to technology to compensate for this limited manpower pool. 

Such a step is eminently logical and reflects similar decisions 

made by the United States after World War II, when the United 

States pursued a high-tech nuclear solution to fend off the threat 

of a far larger Soviet force. This allowed a dramatic reduction in 

the Pentagon’s force structure, which freed up critical manpower 

Figure 4. Current Russian population projections (military age defined as 

ages 18–49). (Data derived from CIA Fact book, http://www.nationmaster.com/

red/country/rs-russia/mil-military&all=1 (2 October 2007).
12

and resources for the extensive rebuilding process following the 

war. Today, with their newfound petroleum wealth, the Russians 

have the financial resources necessary to fund the development 

and fielding of such technological solutions, an approach that is 

both logical and probable.

Religion

A critical subset of the overall demographic change in Russia is 

the noteworthy shift in the religious diversity of the current population. This religious migration is far-reaching and will play a significant role in Russian society by the year 2030. Russia has a highly 

diverse ethnic makeup creating a significant potential for internal 

conflict between the shrinking ethnic Russian population and the 

quickly growing Muslim portion of Russian society. The extent of 

this shift is evidenced by a World Bank study that predicts the majority religion in Russia will shift from Orthodox to Muslim by 2050. 

Will the Russian leadership or the ethnic Russian population allow 

such a shift in religious affiliation? Is it even possible for such a 

dramatic shift to occur peacefully? 

Amendment 93 of Article 14 of the Russian Constitution, Law of 

Religion, highlights “the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of 

Russia and in the establishment and development of its spirituality 

and culture.”11 The Orthodox Church maintains close ties with the 

prime minister and continues to influence governmental actions, 

particularly those that affect other religious practices in Russia. 

Needless to say, the Orthodox Church has a vested interest in keeping the other religions and their potential influence at bay. Subsequently, the government also has a vested interest in this symbiotic 

relationship since it can use the Orthodox Church and its influence 

as yet another tool to manipulate the population.

While the Orthodox Church is afforded a privileged status by the 

Russian government, minor religious movements, such as Lutherans and Jehovah’s Witnesses, face repressive social intimidation, including outright harassment.12 Additionally, religious groups, such 

as Buddhists and the Christian Evangelical movement, face additional bureaucratic restrictions not imposed on the Orthodox Church 

including the requirement to register with the state.13 It is interesting 

to note that well-established Russian Orthodox, Islamic, and Jewish 

groups do not garner the same level of bureaucratic scrutiny these 

“new” religious movements receive. Presumably, this is because of 

their long-standing presence, subsequent acceptance of the public 

at-large, and strong ties with the Russian leadership and the powerwielding Oligarchs.14 As a result of these legal discriminatory activities and outright intimidation, Russia has experienced few problems 

with the minor religious groups within its borders.

However, there is one glaring exception and that is with the radical Islamic movement in the Russian region of Chechnya. Although 
13

the Islamic fighters in Chechnya make up just 0.001 percent of the 

overall Russian Muslim population, their impact on Russian defense 

posture has, at times, been near catastrophic.15 Currently, Muslims 

comprise a substantial segment of the Russian population; however, 

they tend to be moderate in their practices and diverse in terms of 

sect, practicing believers, and geography. Hence, the influence of 

radical ideologies has been geographically limited to Chechnya. 

When compared to members of the European Union, Russia has 

the largest per capita of citizens professing to be Islamic at 15 million. Nearly all Russian Muslims follow the Sunni branch of Islam; 

however, a few areas like Chechnya follow Sufism.16 The number of 

mosques in Russia now exceeds 8,000, representing an exponential 

increase from just 300 in 1989. Interestingly, there are currently no 

mosques located on Russian military bases despite the fact that 20 

percent of Russia’s military conscripts is Muslim.17 Trends indicate 

that the Muslim population will grow by 40 to 50 percent by 2015

due to high birth rates and active religious recruitment.

Russian Muslim families have, on average, three children, while 

non-Muslim Russians have substantially fewer children.18 Additionally, compared to the Orthodox Church, the Muslim community is 

proactively seeking souls and is successfully drawing in new converts. Arab-supported nongovernmental organizations (NGO) are 

assisting in this area and are gaining momentum as a by-product of 

the war in Chechnya.19 Also, a relatively poor social climate is spurring people to look to other faiths as a source of refuge, especially 

among the younger population. The higher Muslim birthrate, increased support from transnational Islamic organizations, and an 

expanding Islamic affinity within the youth grouping all contribute 

to the fact that Muslims, without Russian intervention, will become 

the majority as early as 2050. Presently, the predominant religion in 

Russia is Orthodox Christianity, at roughly 50 percent, while practicing Muslims make up 10 percent of the population.20 It is another 

Russian paradox that it has the largest population of nonpracticing 

and nonbelievers per capita in the world, yet approximately 80 percent of ethnic Russians claim to be Orthodox followers.21

The countervailing forces at work in the area of religious diversity 

make any prediction difficult. However, the way such dynamics play 

out will certainly be one of the important variables on the road to a 

resurgent Russia. The trend line followed for this monograph makes 

the following assumptions: (1) The Orthodox Church will maintain 

its dominance. The considerable influence it has within the government and, conversely, the substantial control the government has 

within the church will guarantee continued close collaboration; (2) 

The current jihadist forces at work in the Balkans and in southern 

Russia will abate over time, returning the Russian population to 

their historical norm of disinterest in religion; (3) The Muslim’s increased percentage within the Russian population will still be a 
14

disruptive factor but controlled sufficiently through government 

oversight, intimidation, and disinterest from the general public. 

Notes

1. John Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies: The Politics of 

Religion (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 118.

2. Zvi Gitelman, Stephen White, and Richard Sakwa, Developments in Russian 

Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 216.

3. “Russian Federation,” NationMaster.com, 2 October 2007, http://www

.nationmaster.com/red/country/rs-russia/hea-health&all=1 (accessed 11 

February 2009). 

4. “Suicide Rates,” World Health Organization, 26 June 2008, http://www.who

.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suiciderates/en (accessed 11 February 2009).

5. William Fisher, “Russia’s New NGO Law: A Contrary View,” OpEdNews.com, 

24 January 2006, http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_william__060124

_russia_92s_new_ngo_law.htm (accessed 11 February 2009).

6. “Russian Province Gets Set for ‘Conception Day,’ ” Breitbart.com, 20 September 

2007, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=070910121950.syw0vp1n&show

_article=1 (accessed 11 February 2009).

7. Gitelman, White, and Sakwa, Developments in Russian Politics, 206.

8. Russia (Russian Federation), Culturegrams 2008. The World Edition reflects 

the Russian population is declining at a rate of 0.484 percent annually; the World 

Bank Russian Federation Country Brief 2006 reflects a rate of -0.5. 

9. Radio Free Europe, “Russian Cabinet Approves Health-Crisis Plan,” 23 

February 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/2/e1a0ba5b-b574

-4172-a85c-e00b9d8d42ec.html (accessed 11 February 2009).

10. Gitelman, White, and Sakwa, Developments in Russian Politics, 215.

11. Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies: The Politics of Religion, 124. 

12. Ibid., 158.

13. Russia (Russian Federation), Culturegrams. 

14. Ibid.

15. Institute for Defense Analysis, “Terrorist Perspective Brief,” 25 September 2007.

16. “Russia: Islam,” RussiansAbroad.com, http://www.russiansabroad.com/

russian_history_136.html (accessed 11 February 2009).

17. Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Slavic Converts to Radical Islam Pose New Threat,” 

Radio Free Europe, 25 August 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/

08/1051a2c7-c5f1-44ce-bb7a-a4d3488155b6.html (accessed 11 February 2009).

18. Press Box, “Russia Becoming a Muslim State!” Pressbox.co.uk, 29 September 

2007, http://www.pressbox.co.uk/detailed/Media/Russia_becoming_a_Muslim

_state__68754.html (accessed 11 February 2009).

19. Ibid.

20. Russia (Russian Federation), Culturegrams. 

21. Kathryn M. Coughlin, ed., Muslim Cultures Today: A Reference Guide (Westport, 

CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 187.
15

Chapter 3

Political Background

With the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia emerged 

as one of 15 newly independent states. Boris Yeltsin became the 

first elected president and promptly implemented numerous economic and political reforms that created a completely new theory of 

government. Under his leadership, Russia dissolved the Congress 

of People’s Deputies, which enjoyed supreme lawmaking powers 

under the 1977 Soviet constitution, and established direct presidential rule.1

Back to the Future—The Theory of 

Russian Politics

In 1993 Russia ratified a new constitution, which established a 

new parliament and a separate judicial branch. The new constitution combined elements of several Western democracies, including 

the United States and England, but with stronger executive powers. 

However, even with $14 billion in economic aid from the United 

States to encourage democracy and economic reform, the Kremlin 

could not prevent the ensuing seven-year economic crisis nor could 

it quickly overcome the 1,000 years of political tradition that proved 

so antithetical to the budding democratic process.2 By 2000 the 

Russian economy had all but collapsed, and President Yeltsin’s 

policies had left him extremely unpopular in Russia. Nevertheless, 

he did win his final political battle, securing the presidency for his 

chosen successor, Vladimir Putin.3

This new governmental construct was designed to be Western in 

process and democratic in execution. According to Yeltsin’s constitution, the Russian government is composed of the president, a 

bicameral legislature, and a prime minister. Much like the United 

States, the president of Russia serves for four years, can serve a 

maximum of two consecutive terms, and is charged with protecting 

the rights and civil liberties of the Russian people. He administers 

domestic and foreign policy while serving as commander in chief of 

the Russian military. The president also determines issues of migration and has the sole authority to provide pardons and nominate 

justices to Russia’s high courts.4

The president appoints the prime minister, and the legislature 

approves the appointment. In theory, the prime minister and the 

president share executive power within the Russian Federation. 

The prime minister is the head of government, while the president 

is the head of state. In reality, under the Putin regime, the prime 

minister was more of a presidential puppet than the “head of government.” However, this relationship is changing with the recent 
16

presidential elections, and the power of the prime minister appears 

to have increased.

This new governmental system had many of the trappings of 

typical democratic nations. The bicameral legislature is called the 

Federal Assembly and is composed of the Duma, or lower chamber, 

and the Federation Council, or upper chamber. Under the Russian 

Constitution, the Duma, the more powerful chamber in the Federal 

Assembly, has the power to pass laws; approve the presidential 

nominee to prime minister; and consider and approve federal taxes. 

It also has the power to override a presidential veto or Federation 

Council law. Under Putin’s presidency, the Duma has undergone 

changes that strengthen presidential powers. At its inception, the 

Duma was composed of 225 seats from single-member districts and 

225 seats from national party lists with proportional representation. To limit the number of parties, it also maintained a 5 percent 

threshold for party representation. In September 2004, President 

Putin proposed that all 450 Duma seats be filled from party lists 

with proportional representation and with a new 7 percent threshold for party representation.5 By doing so, he effectively eliminated 

several national opposition parties and virtually all Duma members 

from individual districts who opposed his government. Thus, proPutin factions currently dominate the Duma and pose minimal 

opposition to the president and “his” government.6

The Federation Council, the weaker of the two houses and the 

first to feel the changes under Putin, started with 178 members 

composed of two seats from each of the Russian Federation’s 89 

regions. Thus, in theory, the populations of small ethic regions are 

well represented. Constitutionally, the Federation Council has 

powers to approve presidential nominees to the high courts, to 

approve any actions resulting in territorial boundary alterations, 

and to consider any legislation that deals with financial policy, 

taxes, budgets, customs, or the declaration of war.7 President Putin 

altered the makeup of this body to better control members and insure control over the process.

Russia passed a law in 2000 that altered the original purpose of 

the upper chamber by moving much of the selection process for 

members into the hands of the executive branch. The heads of regional and executive bodies would no longer gain automatic representation; instead, their regional legislatures or chief executives appoint the members of the Federation Council. Thus, it is now much 

easier for federal authorities to control the composition of the council,8 essentially serving as a “rubber stamp” for the Kremlin. In fact, 

according to Freedom House, the Federation Council is more of a 

network of informal alliances used to help allies gain power rather 

than a legitimate governmental agency.9 Thus, although the Federation Council has many important powers granted under the Russian Constitution, it wields very little, if any, real power and certainly poses no threat to the president or his government.
17

Political parties in Russia are another anomaly. Prior to the collapse 

of the Soviet Union, the only political party in Russia was the Communist Party. The 1977 Russian Constitution, adopted by Leonid 

Brezhnev, defined the party as the “leading and guiding force of 

Soviet society, the core of its political system and of state and public 

organizations.”10 According to the constitution, the Communist Party 

gave planned scientific guidance to the Soviet people for communism’s victory over the West. With the collapse of the Soviet Union 

in December 1991 and the emergence of a new Russian Constitution under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Russian Federation appeared to 

be headed for a more Western political system, complete with ideological diversity and a multiparty political system.11 However, even 

though Article 13 of the Russian Constitution guaranteed respect 

for all social, racial, national, and religious political party associations, what has emerged today is a political party system that looks 

nothing like its Western counterparts. Instead of political parties 

drawn along liberal-conservative, sociocultural ideals or values, the 

Russian political party system is, more often than not, driven by 

individual politicians or factions seeking to increase their power 

base within the Russian Federation.12

Of the 23 political parties registered for the 2003 Duma elections, only two had distinct ideologies with a loyal following: the 

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the proWestern Yabloko Party.13 Almost all of the remaining 21 parties 

were either creations to provide the Kremlin with a power base in 

the Duma or servants as a political platform for a power-hungry 

individual.14 Despite the relatively high number of registered political parties, only four won enough votes to clear the 5 percent 

threshold required to secure general party representation in the 

Duma. Of the remaining 19 parties, only four were able to achieve 

the 2 percent threshold required for reimbursement of governmentprovided election funds. However, 11 parties did win seats in contests for single-member constituencies.15

Following President Putin’s September 2004 initiative proposing 

that all 450 Duma seats be filled from party lists with proportional 

representation and a 7 percent threshold for party representation, 

only 11 political parties were able to register for the 2007 Duma 

elections. Only four won enough votes to clear the 7 percent threshold required to secure party representation. Of the remaining seven 

parties, only one received over 2 percent of the vote. Thus, with the 

single-member constituency eliminated and the 7 percent threshold requirement in place, the number of political parties represented in the Duma dropped from 15, following the 2003 elections, 

to four as of December 2007.

By far the largest and strongest political party in 2008 is the 

United Russia Party. Its main attraction is its pro-Putin platform 

and the personal support of the Right Honourable Putin. In fact, 

although it lacks internal discipline and coherence, the absence of 
18

a distinct political platform allows Putin supporters from all walks 

of life to rally behind this loosely-defined, broad-based cause.16 In 

fact, in the Duma elections in 2007, then president Putin effectively turned the vote into a referendum on his time in power, casting the spotlight on his leadership instead of the political party. A 

vote for the United Russia was really a show of support for Putin 

and was clearly designed to provide him with moral authority and 

personal power after he stepped down as president. As of the 2007 

elections, the United Russia Party maintains almost complete control of the Duma, receiving 64 percent of the total vote, and now 

holds 315 of 450 total Duma seats. This represents a two-thirds 

majority, providing Putin the power to make permanent changes to 

the Constitution of Russia.

Although a far cry from its heyday power base, the CPRF remains 

one of the few political parties with any significant political influence, 

with 134,000 members across Russia in 2006.17 As late as 2000, the 

CPRF could count on about 30 percent of the electorate; however, in 

the 2003 Duma elections, the CPRF received only 13 percent of the 

vote and lost half of its parliamentary mandates.18 This drove party 

leaders to make a determined effort to attract younger Russian 

voters.19 However, this effort has failed. The CPRF only received a bit 

over 11 percent of the vote in the December 2007 elections and now 

holds a mere 57 seats on the Duma.

In late 2006, a new purported leftist party called Justice Russia 

emerged with the consolidation of three smaller parties. The merger 

of Motherland, the Pensioner’s Party, and the Party of Life was designed to compete with the CPRF for seats in the 2007 Duma elections. Although its leaders have denied any association with the 

Kremlin and claim to offer an alternative to the United Russia 

Party, it is also pro-Putin and is designed to displace what remains 

of the CPRF as a more “loyal” opposition party.20 In the December 

2007 elections, the Justice Russia Party received 7.7 percent of the 

party list vote and now holds 38 seats on the Duma.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) remains the main 

nationalist group and is far from espousing liberal or democratic 

values. In fact, much like the Justice Russia Party, the LDPR remains loyal to the Kremlin. Although LDPR membership has fallen 

by more than half since the mid-1990s, they still mustered 8 percent of the party list vote in the December 2007 Duma elections 

and hold the remaining 40 seats. Many experts believe the LDPR 

was able to attract voters and pass the required electoral threshold 

of 7 percent because of a resurgence in nationalism, increased 

anti-Western sentiment, and racial hatred of the Muslim population in the Caucasus and Central Asia.21

In 2003 the Union of Right Forces and the Yabloko Party represented the sole liberal forces in Russian politics. Neither was able 

to pass the threshold of 5 percent required for gaining party representation. There was talk of forming an alliance prior to the 2007 
19

Duma elections in order to meet the new threshold requirement, 

but this alliance never materialized. Thus, as of December 2007, 

with individual district representation eliminated, liberal political 

parties no longer have any official voice in Russian politics.

Back to the Future—The Reality 

of Russian Politics

It does appear that the definitions and processes under the Russian Constitution are flexible. With the election of Dmitry Medvedev, the role of senior leadership is undergoing yet further change. 

This has changed with Putin assuming the position of prime minister. The exact nature of the shifting power base is unclear, but 

many expect Putin will continue to exert his influence, simply from 

a different seat. 

The turmoil created by the Yeltsin government, with the rapid 

diffusion of power away from Moscow, created a sense of chaos and 

loss of control. With Putin’s ascent to power, the Kremlin has 

sought to correct those problems and consolidate power back into 

the hands of the executive branch. Early in his first term, Putin 

won major victories over regional leaders, reclaiming much of the 

central government authority Yeltsin had allowed to slip away.22

When Putin first took office, he created seven super-regional 

districts overseen by his personal appointees, giving himself direct 

oversight of the regional governors. Then he sponsored legislation 

that changed the composition of the Federation Council giving control of the council to his new super-regional district appointees.23

Next, President Putin passed a bill giving him the power to remove 

popularly elected regional leaders who “violate” federal law.24 Finally, to consolidate his power at the regional level, Putin convinced 

the Kremlin-controlled parliament to abolish direct gubernatorial 

elections. Governors are now nominated by the Kremlin and “approved” by regional assemblies.25 All told, since he took office in 

2000, power has been continually and increasingly consolidated 

into the hands of the presidency. 

Further, although elections had been relatively free in the past, 

the most recent Duma elections were suspect. International observers were prevented from monitoring the elections, and governmental control of the press and questionable balloting procedures 

raised significant issues. The international community judged that 

the most recent parliamentary and presidential elections were not 

fair.26 In fact, some candidates have claimed open intimidation and 

smear campaigns in the media.27

In addition to exercising direct control over the political process, 

Putin has also steadily worked to gain control of the media. For example, in June 2000, the head of Russia’s only independent television network was arrested on “corruption” charges after airing commentary critical of the Putin regime.28 He was later released and 
20

allowed to leave the country. However, less than a year later, his 

independent television network was acquired by the Kremlin, and 

Putin loyalists were appointed to run it.29 Similarly, Putin has gained 

control over all other significant independent news media including 

newspaper and radio. Russia’s leadership has a tight control on 

media outlets and blocks news related to environmental issues, military bases, events in Chechnya, and activities of the president. 

Additionally, President Putin does not like bad press.30 There 

appears to be a developing trend in Russia for journalists, such as 

Russian Forbes editor Paul Khlebnikov, to have “untimely accidents” if they report on contentious governmental issues.31 According to Freedom House, Russia is one of the three most dangerous 

places in the world to be a journalist. Since Putin assumed office 

in 2000, 13 journalists have been killed in contract-style murders. 

Yet, despite their best efforts, Russian political leaders cannot filter 

all news reaching their people. The Internet is one source of information that the government is finding difficult to control.

Although there is no official censorship of the Internet, Russian 

security services require each Internet provider to install monitoring equipment at their own expense to monitor all Internet and 

e-mail activity.32 Yet, Russians still obtain real-time unfiltered news 

and information from the Internet.33 For example, Chechen supporters posted videos on YouTube showing improvised explosive 

device operations a mere two hours after detonation.34 News can 

reach the eight million Internet users in Russia, with an increasing 

usage rate of 30 to 40 percent annually since 1999.35 In truth, 

much of the Russian population willingly trade freedom of the press 

in favor of stability and strong, autocratic control from the top.

The Russian judiciary has fared no better under the Putin regime. In fact, there is a large gap in the Russian judiciary between 

how laws appear on paper and how justice is exercised within the 

court system. According to Freedom House, laws are often applied 

inconsistently, with more emphasis on exigent circumstances or 

political purposes than justice. Although the judiciary is independent 

of the executive and legislative branches, judges are often pressured 

by federal authorities, members of government, wealthy individuals, 

or powerful businesses. Further, although suspects are allowed a 

trial by jury, if facing the possibility of more than 10 years in prison, 

juries currently adjudicate only 8 percent of all criminal cases.36

Moreover, because of the 81 percent conviction rate of jury trials, 

the Russian Supreme Court has expressed concern about the gap 

between the jury and nonjury trials that have a conviction rate of 

99 percent.37 Finally, unlike the United States, prosecutors are often 

allowed to do appeal acquittals. In fact, the Supreme Court overturns a much higher percentage of acquittals than convictions and, 

in a few cases, the prosecution obtains guilty verdicts only after a 

third jury trial.38 This high rate of double jeopardy convictions and 

reversal of jury acquittals reduces the usefulness of jury trials.39
21

In fact, it sets up an atmosphere of oppression in Russia that 

affects everything else in the country. This naturally undermines 

the confidence of the people in the legal system and fosters an attitude favorable to graft and corruption.

Corruption in Russian Politics

Since 2000, when Putin took office, the nomenklatura, or ruling 

elite, has taken corruption to heights undreamed of under the Communists or Yeltsin administrations.40 Corruption almost defines 

Russia; it permeates all aspects of Russian society encompassing 

both the political and economic systems starting with the president. 

According to a senior Russian analyst at the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, corruption in Russia begins with Putin and flows downhill. 

Such corruption ranges from the small and petty to the national 

level. As an example, in 1996 a cooperative society called the Ozero 

was formed under the auspices of a business partnership surrounding vacation homes. Since that time, its shareholders wealth has 

grown to over $2 billion, and most have assumed top positions in 

the Russian government and business.41 As of 2007, some of the 

Ozero’s more prominent members include Putin; Vladimir Yakunin, 

the head of Russian Railways; Andrei Fursenko, the minister of 

education and science; Yuriy Kovalchuk, the head of the board of 

directors of the Russia bank; and prominent Russian businessmen 

Nikolay Shamalov and Vladimir Smirnov. Together, the Ozero has 

far-reaching political and economic impact. In a sense, Putin’s 

Ozero has become a “good old boys club” where a very small group 

of powerful friends control many things including giant businesses, 

banks, football clubs, and pipeline deals, not to mention the government of the Russian Federation.

Ironically, when Putin took office in 2000, many Russians saw an 

opportunity to decrease corruption based on his image as an incorruptible former Committee for State Security (KGB) colonel. However, according to the corruption-monitoring group Transparency 

International, corruption has increased sevenfold since 2000. Russia is now perceived as the third-most corrupt nation in the world.42

There is no escaping the graft. Whether a local citizen attempting to 

accomplish mundane tasks such as seeking medical treatment or a 

large multinational company seeking a license, a well-placed bribe 

is essential everywhere. Private citizen bribery accounts for an estimated $2.8 billion; however, this explains only 10 percent of the 

overall corruption.43 One recent report suggested the value of big 

business bribes paid to government officials is now $240 billion a 

year or almost equal to Russia’s entire annual revenues.44 On average, according to the independent Russian think tank, INDEM, 

Russian businesses now spend $146,000 or 7 percent of their budgets on business-related bribes.45
22

However, Putin’s ties to corruption do not stop with Ozero nor is 

corruption in Russia limited to business practices. In order to gain 

true insight into the breadth and depth of the political corruption 

in Russia, one must examine Putin’s ties to the siloviki. This network of former and current state security officers controls many 

positions in Russian politics and have many personal ties to the 

Soviet-era KGB.46 In fact, over the course of Putin’s seven years in 

office, an estimated core of over 6,000 siloviki has moved into key 

government and business-controlling positions.47 Some of the more 

prominent siloviki members of Putin’s political staff include Igor 

Sechin and Viktor Ivanov, chief of staff deputies; Sergei Ivanov, 

first deputy prime minister; Federal Security Service head Nikolai 

Patrushev; and Boris Boyarskov who heads the Culture and Mass 

Communications Ministry.48 Further, many believe Putin’s installation of Viktor Zubkov as prime minister last October served as an 

excellent example of just how powerful the siloviki are within Russian politics. Although Zubkov does not have a KGB background, 

he was assimilated during his years at the Russian Financial Monitoring Service and is widely believed to know where the country’s 

legal and illegal assets can be found.49

Within the siloviki are the chekisty, the descendants of the founders of the ruthless Russian secret police organization originally set 

up under Lenin. Unlike ordinary siloviki, the chekisty see themselves as the messianic saviors of Russia from a raft of internal and 

external enemies.50 True to their heritage, the chekisty operate 

with impunity from governmental prosecution, and their actions 

are limited only by their own imaginations and consciences.51 Since 

Putin’s rise to power, the chekisty have been linked to multiple 

high-profile criminal cases. 

An independent commission set up in 2002 to investigate possible Federal Security Service (FSB) involvement in a series of 1999 

apartment bombings is believed to have been decimated by the 

chekisty. Duma deputy Sergei Yushenko was shot to death in Moscow in April 2003; Duma deputy Yury Shchekochikhin died of suspected thallium poisoning in July 2003; and former KGB investigator Mikhail Trepashkin, who served as the commission’s investigator, 

was arrested in October 2003 and sentenced to four years in prison 

in a closed trial. The commission’s key witness, former FSB officer 

Aleksandr Litvinenko, died of radiation poisoning in London in November 2006.52 Further, a Qatari court accused the chekisty of involvement in the assassination of former acting Chechen president 

Zelmikhan Yandarbiyev,53 while Ramzan Kadyrov, the current 

Moscow-backed Chechen prime minister, has been widely accused 

of murdering prominent Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, an 

outspoken critic of Chechen civil rights violations.54 The ability to 

discern illegal behavior is becoming complex and difficult because 

such activity is going on inside the government structure as well as 
23

within the criminal class. Which criminal group is dominant and 

how far they coordinate their activities is an open question.

All told, since Putin’s rise to power, corruption in Russia has increased dramatically, and Russia is now ranked 121st out of 163 

countries based on perceptions of corruption internationally.55 Still, 

foreign investment in Russia reached a record $60.3 billion in the 

first six months of 2007.56 With oil surpassing $100 per barrel along 

with Russia’s vast natural gas reserves, there is more than enough 

money to go around. Further, in a country where the general populace values stability, economic security, and a high standard of living 

as much more important than corruption, the status quo will most 

likely be maintained for quite some time. As long as the economy 

remains strong, the Russian people are likely to turn a blind eye to 

the rampant corruption in their political and economic system. 

Presently, Putin’s popularity remains above 70 percent. In fact, 

the siloviki understand the fine line between a fascist regime’s outright oppression and ensuring the general population has just 

enough resources to keep them satisfied. They are pragmatic, goal 

oriented, and occupy positions of power across the entire political 

and commercial Russian landscape. If they correctly calculate just 

how far they can exploit the Russian population, then a resurgent 

Russia is almost certain to emerge on the other side.

These trends can help discern the direction the Russian government is moving. Though a highly accurate prediction of the state of 

the Russian government in 2030 is not possible, the broad outlines 

are visible, and the centralization of the authority will continue. This 

is driven by several immutable forces alluded to earlier; however, 

highest among them is the Russian respect and expectation of a 

powerful government in the hands of a strong leader. This focusing 

of vast wealth and power in the hands of a small, elite group, created 

from the spoils of economic policies that exclusively favor that group, 

and the corruptive effect such wealth and power has on the group is 

a recurring theme throughout Russian history. Ironically, this historical experience has created, over generations, an inherent belief 

in Russian society that such power is somehow acceptable and the 

only protector for a nation without defensible borders. 

Clearly a principal factor allowing this reawakening of Russia is 

its plentiful resources: oil, natural gas, timber, and scarce metals. 

The wealth these are generating is dramatically changing the 

landscape and must be studied thoroughly to better grasp the 

forces creating this resurgent Russia. The long-term future for 

Russia is not necessarily a bright one. The very weaknesses that 

were an inherent part of George Kennan’s “X” article, describing 

the underlying factors that ultimately led to the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, are coming back into play. However, for this study’s 

timeframe, these forces will probably remain in the background. 

By 2030 the world will be facing a determined nation that has 

centralized its political power, developed the wealth to rebuild, 
24

and fostered a sense of paranoia sufficient to motivate the return 

of its powerful military machine.

Notes

1. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile 2007: Russia (London: 

EIU, 2007).

2. Stuart D. Goldman, Russia Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. 

Interests (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), 2007), 2.

3. EIU, Country Profile 2007. 

4. All duties of the Russian president are spelled out in chapter four of the 

Russian Constitution, “The Constitution of the Russian Federation,” 1993. 

5. Goldman, ed., Russia, CRS, Library of Congress, 22 March 2006, 5. 

6. EIU, Country Profile 2007.

7. Zvi Gitelman, Stephen White, and Richard Sakwa, Developments in Russian 

Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 53. 

8. EIU, Country Profile 2007.

9. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Countries at the Crossroads 2007, Country Report–

Russia (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2007), 6.

10. Gitelman, White, and Sakwa, Developments in Russian Politics, 80. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Byron Moraski, Elections by Design (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University 

Press, 2006).

13. EIU, Country Profile 2007.

14. Ibid.

15. Gitelman, White, and Sakwa, Developments in Russian Politics, 74. 

16. EIU, Country Profile 2007.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Goldman, Russia, 6.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. EIU, Country Profile 2007.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Goldman, Russia, 6.

29. Ibid.

30. Aleksaner Grigorqev, “Russia: The Media and Unfreedom of the Press,” 

International Communications: A Media Literacy Approach (Armonk, NY: M. E. 

Sharpe Publishers, 2004), 20.

31. Ibid., 208.

32. Ibid., 210.

33. Mark Conversino, “Russia” (lecture, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 18 

September 2007). 

34. Ibid.

35. Tai Adelaja, “Arrival of 3G Technology Hampered by Bureaucracy,” St. 

Petersburg Times, 4 September 2007, http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.

php?action_id=2&story_id=22884 (accessed 11 February 2009).

36. Stoner-Weiss, Countries at the Crossroads 2007, 13. 

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Anna Politkovskaya, Putin’s Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy (New York, 

NY: Metropolitian Books, 2004), 82.
25

41. Conversino, “Russia.”

42. Michael Mainville, “Bribery Thrives as Big Business in Putin’s Russia,” San 

Francisco Chronicle, 2 January 2007.

43. Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That 

Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

2006), Preface. 

44. Mainville, “Bribery Thrives as Big Business.” 

45. Ibid.

46. Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Silviki Takes the Reins in Post-Oligarchy Era,” 

Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty, 17 September 2007. 

47. Yasmann, “Russia: From Silovik Power to a Corporate State,” Radio Free 

Europe, 25 September 2007.

48. Yasmann, “Russia: Silviki Takes the Reins.” 

49. Ibid.

50. Robert Coalson, “Russia: Why the Chekist Mind-Set Matters,” Radio Free 

Europe, 15 October 2007. 

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Claire Bigg, “Russia: Politkovskaya Investigating Chechen Torture at Time of 

Death,” Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty, 9 October 2006. 

55. Mainville, “Bribery Thrives as Big Business.” 

56. “Foreign Investment at Record Levels in Russia,” Agence France-Presse, 15 

October 2007.

27

Chapter 4

Economic Background

As with the political realm, an understanding of the past is necessary to understand the future trajectory of the Russian economy. 

History provides significant insight into both the current structure 

of the Russian economy as well as the Russian government’s outlook towards future economic policy.

Historical Background

For the last 1,000 years, Russian history has been one of autocratic rule with the Mongols, tsars, and Soviets all exercising tight 

control of the Russian economy. Under the Mongols, Russian commerce predominantly served a single purpose—to pay tribute to the 

khan. Likewise, under the tsars, serfdom ensured that economic 

activity was solely for the benefit of the “divine ruler.” Most recently, 

the Soviets centrally planned and controlled the economy. This historical bias towards centralized control with the objective of supporting the government versus supporting the people continues to 

affect the Russian economy and will play a significant role well into 

the future. In particular, there are vestiges of the Soviet economy 

that are still present today. 

The Economy of the USSR

For over six decades, the Russian economy was centrally planned 

and controlled by the State Planning Committee of the Communist 

Party (Gosplan). Under this system, Gosplan directed all aspects of 

the economy including its structure, organization, and output, as 

well as the distribution of that output. The system gave rise to a 

huge bureaucracy that was responsible for implementing the annual and five-year plans that were passed down from the Gosplan. 

These directions dictated that industrial development, investment, 

and production quotas were assigned on a regional basis. In addition, as a consequence of World War II where Russia moved and 

distributed its industrial capacity, the Russian economy was heavily regionalized with specific sectors of industry centralized in specific geographic regions. This regionalization was implemented by 

the Soviets initially for strategic purposes during the war. After the 

war, the further regionalization was accomplished for political 

rather than economic reasons. This enabled the government to 

centralize control of the economy and force dependencies of one 

region upon another and, ultimately, strengthen the control of the 

Kremlin. In short, by dispersing key components of the industrial 

base, they guaranteed that no region had all the tools on hand to 
28

complete their required tasks. This creation of critical dependencies 

insured centralized control could be maintained. Since the collapse 

of the Soviet Union, such distribution is no longer required. However, the nature of Russia’s new wealth, in commodities such as oil, 

gas, and timber, also fosters a very strong drive for centralized control since these commodities can be used as international leverage 

to further the Kremlin’s goals.

Perestroika, the Collapse, and the Recovery of the Economy

By the mid-1980s, it was clear the Soviet economy had to be reformed, and in 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev convinced the Soviet government to restructure (perestroika) the economy. Perestroika put 

the Soviet economy in limbo. This extraordinary economic policy 

change provides an excellent example of the law of unintended consequences. In the Soviet case, the ultimate result had a far more 

profound impact than the original objectives of perestroika. The 

economy was no longer centrally planned, nor was it market driven. 

There were no mechanisms, central government, or free market to 

guide production, assess value, determine costs, or provide incentives in place to spur innovative change. Industrial output collapsed, 

even for basic goods, and as a result, inflation skyrocketed. 

By 1991 the Soviet economy was in a dangerous recession. That 

year, it had contracted over 17 percent; consumer inflation was 140 

percent; and both of these trends were accelerating.1 Beginning in 

1992, the government began selling off small- and medium-sized 

enterprises. By the end of 1993, more than 85 percent of these 

businesses were in private hands.2 This was followed by a voucher 

program used to privatize large state-run enterprises. The next year 

the privatization program had divested the state of the majority of 

its business enterprises, including 70 percent of the large enterprises and over 95 percent of the small- and medium-sized businesses.3 Such a vast redistribution of wealth could not pass unnoticed by opportunists that knew how to work the system.

While the privatization plan successfully transferred control of 

the Russian industry into private hands, the process allowed the 

distribution to become highly concentrated and monopolized by a 

few powerful individuals (usually government insiders) known as 

the “oligarchs.” While there was a façade of capitalism, the aggregation of economic power into the hands of a privileged few was the 

underlying reality. Furthermore, the oligarchs had strong incentives 

to extract as much wealth from their new acquisitions as possible, 

giving little thought to the health of the underlying industries. As a 

result, Russian industry failed to undertake the required internal 

restructuring actions necessary to compete in the global market. 

In 1998 when oil prices declined sharply, the Russian economy 

collapsed and, the government defaulted on its debt, causing the 

value of the ruble to plummet. The development of a resurgent 
29

Russia assumes that Russia will extract considerable revenue from 

its vast oil, natural gas, and/or mineral resources, thereby feeding, 

protecting, and growing the Russian economic machine. However, 

the events of 1998 demonstrate the relatively fragile nature of the 

Russian economy. It should also provide innumerable lessons for 

the ruling elite and certainly demonstrates that a strong, petrocentric Russian economy is not necessarily a given. 

In the aftermath of the 1998 collapse, the Russian government 

was able to stabilize the economy and then, with the benefit of a 

devalued ruble and rising oil prices, begin to grow Russian exports. 

By 2000 the economy was growing over 7 percent annually. Since 

then, Putin has been able to sustain the rapid growth in the economy, benefiting from both high oil prices and a series of economic 

reforms. These reforms have included a revised private and corporate tax code (flat rate), fiscal restraint by the federal government, 

and the establishment of a stabilization fund to reduce the economy’s sensitivity to oil price fluctuations. 

A key aspect of Putin’s economic policy during this period has 

been his commitment to remove the oligarchs from power. He 

claimed to be doing it in an effort to address corporate corruption, 

but, more likely, his incentives were in restoring state control of 

key industries (energy and media) and capitalizing on the “political 

calculus—the populist dislike of the rich, plus a desire by rising 

businessmen and officials to grab the assets of oligarchs who are 

on their way down . . . also a desire to maintain his iron grip on the 

country’s politics.”4 While the crusade enabled him to gain control 

of almost the entire media industry and a significant portion of the 

oil and gas industry, the policy has frightened foreign investors. 

There are numerous arguments that point out the dangers of this 

approach and the inherent weaknesses of such centralization of 

control. For this study, the expectation is that the economy will 

continue to grow, and, though collapse may be inevitable, it will 

not occur in the period leading into 2030.

Historical Implications for Russia’s Economy

There are significant numbers of “artifacts” that remain in the 

Russian economy today, legacies of the Soviet era and its aftermath. They have shaped the current economic situation in Russia 

and, in some cases, will continue to influence the Russian economy 

into the future. 

First among these is the Russian propensity for direct state involvement and control of the economy. This tendency reflects the Russian 

historic experience of the last 1,000 years and, more recently, is a reaction to the perceived inequities and exploitation that occurred during the rise of the oligarchs. The case can be made that the current 

Russian government is exploiting its population’s unfamiliarity with 

free-market commerce to consolidate power within the state. 
30

Second, the Russian government has not completely addressed 

the issue of property rights. While parts of the Soviet industry have 

been privatized, the Russian government has been noticeably ambiguous in its efforts to address land ownership rights and implement 

legislation that protects basic property rights.5 Furthermore, there is 

significant tension in government policy making between the desire to 

maintain state control of important parts of the economy and the need 

to maintain at least the façade of private property rights. This problem 

has hampered investment, particularly by foreign entities, and 

remains a drag on economic growth. 

Finally, the regionalization of industrial infrastructure implemented under the communists remains today. This has suppressed 

market forces and forced the Russian government to subsidize inefficient, unprofitable businesses. The problem is exacerbated by 

restrictive residency rules for urban areas which inhibit workforce 

migration. This problem is likely to be a burden on Russian industry 

for at least another decade. 

The Current Economy

Today, the Russian economy enjoys robust growth as a result of 

high oil prices and the stable macroeconomic policies of Putin’s 

administration. The country’s domestic consumption is rapidly 

growing, and the economy is beginning to attract foreign investment. The economy is also becoming increasingly connected with 

regional and global economic markets. Both of these latter trends 

are being accelerated by the government’s efforts to attain membership in the World Trade Organization. This section will consider 

the Russian economy as it exists today and examine its structure, 

strengths, and weaknesses. 

At the macroeconomic level (see table 1), Russia’s economy exhibits 

some notable features. First, the economy is enjoying rapid growth 

(over 6 percent annually). The Russian economy grew an additional 

3.9 percent during the first six months of 2007, with forecasts to finish 

the year with over 7 percent growth.6 Second, Russia’s economy, in 

absolute terms, remains quite small. It is less than one-tenth the size 

of the US economy and only one-thirdthe size of the Chinese economy. 

On a per capita basis, Russia’s GDP is 22 percent smaller than Poland’s. Third, while Russia is enjoying some foreign direct investment 

(FDI), it is still small compared with other nations, particularly those 

who are members of the World Trade Organization. Finally, while Russia has a large population, it is one of the few countries in the developed or developing world who has a decreasing population. In sum, 

while Russia’s economy has been growing, it is a mixed bag of future 

macroeconomic indicators. To clarify the true nature of the Russian 

economy, it is necessary to understand the underlying structure and 

composition of the economy.
31

Economic Growth

While it is commonly believed that Russia’s economic boom has 

come from the exportation of oil, in fact, it is domestic consumption that accounts for over 70 percent of the Russian economy and 

most of its economic growth. By comparison, Chinese domestic 

consumption accounts for only 50 percent of its total GDP and only 

37 percent of its GDP growth. However, these numbers mask the 

extent to which Russia’s domestic economic activity is the result of 

the country’s natural resources. An accounting practice called 

“transfer pricing”7 artificially inflates the GDP contribution of the 

consumer services sector, since the trading company’s profit is 

categorized as a “service.” This in itself would be innocuous, except 

that the government’s economic statistics are the basis on which 

access to credit is built. As a result, the World Bank has substantial interest in this issue. 

This practice decreases tax revenues and contributes to an environment of corruption within the economy. When Russia’s industrial output is adjusted for the effects of transfer pricing, the oil 

and gas sector was found to account for almost 30 percent of the 

Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators

Annual Data: 2006 Russia Poland India China EU US

Population (million) 143 38 1,095 1,315 491 299

GDP

(US$ billion [bn]; 

exchange rate) 985 342 923 2,774 14,551 13,195

GDP 

(US$ bn; purchasing 

power parity [PPP]) 1,741 543 4,312 9,985 N/A 13,195

GDP per head 

(US$; exchange rate) 6,905 8,958 843 2,110 29,666 44,071

GDP per head

(US$; PPP) 12,213 14,242 3,936 7,596 N/A 44,071

Historical averages 

(%): 2002–06 Russia Poland India China EU US

Population growth -0.5 1.2 1.5 0.6 0.1 1.0

Real GDP growth 6.4 2.7 7.8 10.1 2.2 2.7

Real domestic 

demand growth 8.2 2.1 7.8 9.5 N/A 3.0

Inflation 12.5 6.4 4.5 1.5 2.2 2.6

Current account 

balance (% of GDP) 9.4 0.8 0.2 5.0 -0.7 -5.4

FDI inflows

(% of GDP) 2.1 2.3 1.1 3.1 N/A 0.9

Current macroeconomic indicators for Russia. Comparative data for Poland, India, China, the European Union (EU), and the United States are also depicted.
32

domestic demand as compared to the 9 percent reported by the 

Russian government.8

The industrial output of the Russian economy has two important 

attributes: (1) it is dominated by activity related to the extraction 

and processing of natural resources, and (2) it is dominated by large 

enterprises and lacks small- and medium-sized businesses (many of 

them in high-tech) that normally constitute 50 percent or more of 

the typical economy in a developed nation. The Russian government 

claims that fuels, energy, and metallurgy account for 36 percent of 

Russia’s industrial output, followed by heavy machinery at 22 percent, and agriculture/food stuffs at 16 percent.9 Light industry, 

within which high-tech activity is included, accounts for less than 

1.5 percent. This is in comparison to the United States, where light 

industry accounts for over 70 percent of the industrial output and a 

high-tech sector that alone accounts for more than 5 percent.10

The industrial output of Russia is also highly concentrated 

within large enterprises. Small- and medium-sized businesses constitute only 10 to 15 percent of the economic output in Russia, as 

compared to 50 percent in most of developed economies.11 These 

businesses, often the drivers for technological innovation, are severely 

hampered by governmental regulations and taxation. The dominance of large, state-controlled enterprises likely means that technological innovation is driven by the government and focused on 

technologies related to resource extraction and defense. While this 

has positive effects now and in the immediate future, it has longterm negative consequences. Though the immediate trend is certainly favorable, the restrictions on innovation and the loss of flexibility inherent in small, agile firms will take an inevitable toll on 

Russia’s future ability to compete in the open market.

Trade

In addition to Russia’s domestic demand for its natural resources, external demand on these same resources continues to 

drive its foreign trade and foreign policy. There is also a growing 

domestic demand for foreign goods that is shrinking the country’s 

trade balance. Figure 5 highlights the central role that natural resources, oil and gas in particular, play in Russia’s export market. 

While the full economic implications of Russia’s natural resources will be addressed later in this paper, at this point, it is sufficient to point out that they are a critical component of Russia’s 

economy. Figure 6 highlights Russian reliance on foreign producers for machinery and equipment, especially high-tech equipment, 

and is indicative of the challenges that remain in revitalizing certain parts of Russia’s industry. 
33

Infrastructure—Economic and Social

The state of Russian infrastructure, by the Kremlin’s own admission, is dismal. Hard infrastructure––transportation, power, 

and communication networks––is strained and decrepit, or both. 

Even in the natural resource sector, the infrastructure (pipeline, 

ports, etc.) is not sufficient to meet demand. Additionally, Russia’s 

social infrastructure, especially the health of its citizens, is also 

under extreme pressure. 

Given Russia’s geographic size, the most problematic part of the 

Russian economy is the state of its transportation system. The country has 557,000 miles of roads, yet only three-quarters of them are 

paved. Over the last 20 years, Russia has added less than 5 percent 

Figure 5. Russian exports—2006. (Reprinted from the EIU, Country Profile 2007: 

Russia [London: EIU, 2007], 31.)

Figure 6. Russian imports—2006. (Reprinted from the EIU, Country Profile 2007: 

Russia [London: EIU, 2007], 31.)
34

of new roadway. Similarly, Russia’s railways are also in disrepair. 

They are only capable of handling 80 percent of the capacity transported during the Soviet era.12 Worst of all, Russian pipelines and 

ports are no longer able to handle the high demand for Russian oil. 

Transneft, the state-controlled pipeline monopoly, has numerous 

projects to upgrade Russia’s capacity to transport and export oil. 

However, the government’s refusal to allow private enterprises to be 

involved in pipeline and port operations will continue to constrain 

output. These restrictions will insure that the government is able to 

maintain economic and political control over the country’s energy 

resources but will inhibit growth and development. 

Russian power and communications networks exhibit many of 

the same problems as the transportation systems. The country’s 

electrical infrastructure is undergoing reform and production capacity is being privatized. However, the age and capacity of existing 

fossil-fuel and nuclear power stations have made it impossible to 

keep pace with the demand. The government intends to sell off the 

state-controlled power plants to fund upgrades to the distribution 

networks, but it is deemed unlikely these revenues will be sufficient 

to adequately fund the nearly $10 billion needed annually––an 

amount that will be required for at least the next decade.13 As with 

the oil and gas infrastructure, the state will retain control of the 

distribution networks, ensuring it retains political and economic 

leverage over this segment of the economy.

Government Involvement and Corruption

Corruption is as equally a serious problem in the economic sphere 

as it was in the political arena. At present, Russia exhibits many of 

the symptoms of the “resource curse,” wherein natural resource 

wealth fosters rent seeking by the state.14 When this occurs, the state 

bureaucracy usually focuses on controlling resource-generated 

wealth rather than on the rule of law and free market competition. 

The current trends in this area are not promising. The Russian 

government is focused on state control of its natural resources. The 

wealth generated by these resources appears to be flowing to a few, 

powerful individuals, who are either inside the government or 

closely aligned with it. 

The impact of widespread corruption is well illustrated in the 

economic realm. First, there is significant evidence that the government bureaucracy is growing ever larger and more inefficient. Since 

2001 all levels of Russian government (federal, regional, and municipal) have grown considerably. This trend accelerated in 2006 when 

the federal government grew by over 10 percent in just one year.15

In fact, a Russian brokerage house has shown that there is a close 

correlation between the number of government employees and the 

price of oil.16 As oil prices climb, so does government employment, 
35

creating an unhealthy dependency on the federal government, versus private enterprise, for developing jobs.

Second, the government is increasingly reasserting itself by playing 

a direct role in the economy. Although much of the Soviet-controlled 

economy was privatized during the 1990s, the recent trend has been 

in the opposite direction. Gazprom (the state-controlled gas company) and Unified Energy Systems (the state-controlled power company) are the best examples of the Russian government’s direct involvement in these markets. Other examples include Rosoboronexport

(the state-controlled armament manufacturer), which recently took 

over Avtov (the country’s largest auto manufacturer) and VSMPOAvisma (the world’s largest titanium producer), and the establishment of United Aircraft Building Company, which consolidates the 

entire aircraft manufacturing industry under state control.17

Third is the government’s push to establish oversight of “strategic” industries. During 2007 Putin’s administration proposed regulations that would establish a special government council to oversee 39 industries deemed to be of strategic importance to Russia.18

Businesses with a majority foreign ownership involved in these key 

industries would require the approval of this special council. Notably, the council would be headed by the prime minister, a position 

soon to be held by then president Putin. The immediate result has 

been extensive pressure on foreign owners. These owners have 

found their ability to continue to exercise effective control challenged and, in increasing numbers, are forced to sell their controlling shares. The impact on Western oil conglomerates operating on 

Sakhalin Island is but one case study. Faced with litigation from 

several governmental sources, they have been driven to cede their 

controlling interests in the oil extraction process.

An additional concern is the role government plays in ensuring 

the dominance of large, often state controlled, enterprises. Smalland medium-sized businesses are suppressed by overregulation, 

particularly in terms of government taxation. Additionally, because 

the Russian government has not reformed private property rights, 

these enterprises are frequently subject to capricious action by the 

government and/or creditors.

Finally, there is significant evidence that governmental corruption continues to hinder the business environment. The British embassy in Moscow has reported that “formal studies and anecdotal 

evidence alike suggest that corruption is becoming a more severe 

problem. Since corruption usually involves the use of public office 

for private gain, this trend is linked to the discretionary use of regulatory, oversight and other powers.” The report points out that 

“[t]here is little evidence that the state plans to reform itself.”19

It is easy to portray the weaknesses in the Russian economy. 

From a Western perspective, many of the economic forces that 

proved so untenable in the Soviet era are being resurrected, and 

the likelihood of a similar outcome in the future is increasing. 
36

Whether correct or not, this assessment has little direct bearing on 

the evaluation of a resurgent Russia in 2030. The trend lines in the 

economic life of Russia are becoming very clear. The Russian leadership will foster a centralization of power; they will use this dominance in critical commodities, such as oil and gas, to achieve political objectives; and the numbers of hands controlling that power 

will remain small, allowing for rapid changes and agenda-driven 

objectives. This will provide strong political leverage in the short 

term but will have serious negative consequences on growth and 

expansion for the future. 

These features are not new to the world economic scene. Its 

name, the “Dutch disease,” is the concentration of wealth and 

power placed in a small number of individuals or groups. Alternatively, a robust and diverse economy would spread jobs, wealth, 

and power over a large section of the population. This approach 

would insure diverse interests are met and that power is spread 

among the people, building a middle class that fosters a more stable economy. However, the current Russian approach that concentrates the tremendous wealth of natural resources in a relatively 

small portion of the society is, in the long run, inherently unstable. 

As long as oil prices stay high, Russia will most likely continue to 

prosper economically and be able to solidify its role internationally 

and present substantial challenges to Western powers.

The chief area to benefit from this largess will be the Ministry of 

Defense. Russia has always believed that only through strong military power can it protect its boundaries and preserve itself as a 

nation. Currently it has only two mechanisms that it can routinely 

employ to demonstrate international power: nuclear weapons and 

its control of energy resources to the rest of the world. These are 

valuable but limited tools. They are the influence cards that Russia 

can most easily play in the international arena, but their limitations are real. Russia is now embarking on a rigorous program to 

increase its military capability, taking advantage of its newfound 

petroleum wealth and the Kremlin’s increased centralized power 

that allows for grander plans.

Notes

1. Library of Congress, A Country Study: Russia, Country Studies, 11 November 

2007, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/rutoc.html (accessed 11 February 2009).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Anders Aslund, “The Hunt for Russia’s Riches,” Foreign Policy Magazine, 

January/February 2006, 44.

5. William E. Pomeranz, Whither Russian Property Rights (Washington, DC: 

Center for International Private Enterprise, 11 March 2004), www.cipe.org/pdf/

publications/fs/pomeranz.pdf (accessed 16 March 2009). 

6. World Bank, Russian Economic Report, November 2007, 3.

7. The practice involves oil companies selling their output well below market 

prices to wholly owned subsidiaries registered in a low tax region. The subsidiary, 
37

which is registered as a trading company, then sells the oil at market prices thereby 

making large profits. 

8. World Bank, Russian Economic Report, February 2004, 23.

9. EIU, Country Profile 2007: Russia (London: EIU, 2007), 31.

10. Federal Reserve, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, 16 November 

2007, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/table5.htm (accessed 

11 February 2009).

11. EIU, Country Profile 2007, 31.

12. Ibid., 25.

13. Ibid., 30.

14. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” 

European Economic Review 45 (May 2001): 827–38.

15. British Embassy Moscow, Russian Economy: Going Global, July 2006, 5.

16. Ibid.

17. EIU, Country Profile 2007, 39.

18. PBN Company, Policy Report: Foreign Investment in Russian Strategic 

Industries, September 2007, 2, http://www.pbnco.com/eng/files/Policy_Matters

_Sept_07.pdf (accessed 11 February 2009).

19. Russian Economy: Going Global, 6.

39

Chapter 5

Military Background

Built with the backdrop of dynamic internal political reforms 

and fueled by the economic reality of a cash-laden petroleum state, 

Russia is currently engaged in an effort to reform its military with 

the ultimate goal of returning the Red Army to its once revered 

status as a legitimate world superpower. This desire to return to a 

Cold War–style military force, one that is once again respected and 

relevant in the arena of international realpolitik, is evidenced both 

by increased rhetoric coming from the Russian leadership and also 

numerous antagonistic military actions directed by the Kremlin. 

Evidence of this new, aggressive strategy can be seen in the resurrection of long-range Bear bomber flights that intentionally violate 

the sovereign airspace of America and its allies. 

Additionally, the Red Army’s detonation of the world’s largest 

nonnuclear bomb on the 9/11 anniversary, and the largest cyberattack since the beginning of the global information age (directed at 

Estonia over the removal of a Soviet-era statue), points to the 

Kremlin’s new desire to draw attention to its reform efforts. The 

purpose of these provocative actions also appears to highlight new 

Russian capabilities and shows the face of a military that is once 

again capable of projecting power well beyond its borders. 

However, the Russian military is far from being the Soviet juggernaut it was during the last half of the twentieth century. Yet, the 

Kremlin’s recent push for true reform appears to be well funded, 

broad based, and evolutionary in its design. Before simply dismissing Russian reform efforts and prematurely labeling them a “paper 

tiger,” it is important to look at their attempts to reform, to analyze 

what appears to be five interrelated components of their military 

reform strategy, and, most importantly, to examine where those 

reforms will be taking them over the next few decades.

Russian Attempts to Reform Their Military

While the debate over the military reform needs appeared to have 

been won several years ago, the timing, structure, and funding of 

those reforms have continued to create confusion and contentious 

deliberation throughout the Russian government. The initial attempts at military reform occurred even before Putin took office in 

2000 and were characterized by false starts, misplaced priorities, 

and sputtering results. Following the Kursk submarine disaster, 

the head of the Defense Ministry’s main directorate for international cooperation lamented, “We have been doing nothing but talking about the reform of the armed forces and making some incomprehensible attempts in this direction.”1 The confusion over reform 
40

efforts was further heightened by Putin in 2003 when he stated, “The 

period of radical reform [of the military] is finished.”2 His minister of 

defense contradicted that statement just three months later when he 

conceded that the military was entering a period of “regimentation,” 

which he described as “more radical reforming of the army.”3

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted that Putin took 

concrete steps in an effort to create favorable conditions and facilitated the desired reform in the armed forces. He appointed his 

long-time acquaintance (and fellow former KGB officer), Sergei Ivanov, to the position of defense minister, which was followed by a 

2004 decision to remove the military’s General Staff from the direct 

chain of command.4 Both moves were aimed at strengthening the 

civilian control of the military with the ultimate objective of generating enough institutional horsepower to bring about the elusive military reforms. Additionally, the CRS highlighted Russia’s decision to 

greatly reduce their nuclear force (from 6,000 to 1,500 deployed 

warheads), shifting their resources from strategic to conventional 

forces, and their desire to move to a volunteer force suggested “serious intent” to generate a significant transformation of the military.5

Military Reform Component 1—Military

 Institutions and Command Structures

The first reform efforts have been aimed at eliminating inefficiencies in the organizational and command structures. The most 

fundamental change in the Russian military command structure 

occurred at the very top, when Article 15 (which listed the main 

functions of the General Staff) was declared null and void by the 

Duma. In essence, this move meant the General Staff now worked 

for (not against . . . as the practice tended to be) the defense minister, a move seen essential by many because much of the inertia 

behind slow military progress was caused by friction of the top 

military brass.6 The most noticeable structural change within the 

military ranks themselves was the transition from six military districts and four fleets into three regional commands—western Europe, central Asia, and the Far East.7

The command and control relationships were also adjusted under this new regional command framework. The commanding officer would now be in charge of all services and military defense formations in his region, with the exception of the strategic nuclear 

forces, and would be responsible for territorial defense. Additionally, the air force was to merge with the strategic missile forces and 

space forces; airborne troops were subordinated to the main ground 

forces headquarters; and a joint logistics/procurement system was 

established for all defense and security services.8 For the army, the 

goal of these reforms was to have 209 units on “permanent combat 

readiness” status, that is, fully equipped and capable of performing 

missions in both peacetime and wartime without additional mobili-
41

zation.9 In 2003, only 72 of these units existed; however, “since 

then, it is clear that increasing their number (by 29 units in 2005, 

20 units in 2006, and 11 in 2007) remains a priority for the MoD 

[ministry of defense].”10 According to one Russian military expert, 

“[t]hese units, amounting to around 144,000 troops, will be the primary units called to deal with hot spots like Chechnya.”11 Besides 

the significant changes in command relationships, redefined geographical districts, and a push for improved readiness, the government has also attempted to improve its force from the bottom up.

Military Reform Component 2—Peopleware

The second focus area of the military reform efforts is aimed at 

improving a wide range of personnel problems. The approach adopted by the Russian leadership appears to be an attempt to emulate many of the positive aspects that are prevalent in Western militaries, especially in the US forces. Hence, special emphasis has been 

placed on upgrading the individual soldier’s working and living conditions, both sources of long-term frustration and dissatisfaction 

within the post–Cold War Russian army. Again, the dramatic disparity between the performance of individual soldiers in the post9/11 Middle East conflicts and the woeful performance of the Russian forces in their regional conflicts provided additional motivation 

for an “Americanization” of their personnel programs. Russian general Vladimir Dvorkin, former head of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Defense Ministry, assessed, “It is difficult to imagine 

today’s Russian conscripts being able to use modern weapons systems such as those used by the American soldiers in Iraq.”12

The initial part of this transition of the personnel system was a 

concerted effort to move away from a conscription service to a “professional” military. The reasons for this move to a more voluntary 

force are numerous but are mainly driven by widespread hazing 

and corruption in the ranks. “The conditions for ordinary draftees 

(conscripts) are appalling,” said Russian expert Zoltan Barany.13

Several hazing incidents captured national attention and led one 

Russian human rights observer to identify the hazing as the country’s “most painful and dismal human rights problem” that drives 

thousands to desertion, suicide, and violent crime.14 Additionally, 

there have been frequent reports of commanders selling their conscripts “into virtual slavery to local farmers or businessmen or 

forcing them into prostitution.”15

In addition to reducing these “forced labor” practices, the government has also attacked the practice of paying for military deferments and tried to improve the low quality of draftees, a characteristic that has become embedded in Russian society. Defense 

Minister Ivanov described his current corps of conscripts as “not 

even an Army of Workers and Peasants. It’s just peasants.”16 Subsequently, the Duma eliminated nine of the 25 types of deferments 
42

and increased the quantity of the draft pool by 100,000.17 During 

the debate concerning the abolishment of these deferrals, the deputy defense minister said the point of the bill was that “decent 

people should join the army and not the scum of the earth we 

sometimes get.”18 Henceforth, no longer will “delays” be given to 

young fathers, certain medical professionals, graduates of academies of art, or for certain other subjective reasons.19

Needless to say, the hazing problems and perceived injustices in 

the draft system and their accentuation in the Russian media have 

had a dramatic impact on public opinion. A 2003 survey showed 

that 86 percent of those surveyed thought that Russia needed a 

“professional” army for exactly these reasons.20 Efforts in pursuit 

of that professional army appear to be taking shape. In March 

2007, the Duma voted to reduce the length of compulsory military 

service from two years to one, abolishing a practice that had been 

in effect for nearly 40 years,21 and Putin pledged that by 2008, twothirds of the military members would be professional soldiers with 

service contracts.22 This goal has not been met, but the intent of 

the leadership is clear.

Besides reducing the overall percentage of conscripts in the 

army, the government is also looking to increase the effectiveness 

of its noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. “Unlike in Western 

armies, in which NCOs constitute a cadre of highly trained, effective, and competent middle managers, they remain the most underutilized human resource in the Russian military,” Barany pointed 

out. 23 Currently, most “sergeants” are conscripts who have been 

sent to school for six weeks to become NCOs and have very little 

authority or respect because they are conscripts and not professional soldiers.24 To that end, Putin and Ivanov saw that establishing a strong NCO corps could help repair many of the problem areas in their army, a move that, in the past, has been strongly 

opposed by senior officers who were reluctant to delegate authority 

to senior enlisted personnel.25 However, as the Conflict Studies Research Center points out, Putin’s “shake up” in the army is starting 

to win converts, as “more and more [of] those within the military 

believe that unless there is a serious attempt at a reshaping, the 

army could now well be on the brink of an irrevocable crisis.”26

Restoring benefits and prestige to those who serve in the military 

is also a significant part of the reform plan. As previously mentioned, military pay is an area that has been sadly derelict in the 

past. Military pay has been a major problem since Mikhail Gorbachev left office, and every pay raise has been wiped out by inflation. For example, the army’s ill-trained conscript forces have been 

required to serve two-year “terms” for just 100 rubles ($3) per 

month, approximately 10 cents per day.27 However, Putin has targeted this lack of funding and has ordered pay raises that began in 

2006 with the goal of raising salaries by 67 percent over a threeyear period.28 Additional funding has been targeted at the contract 
43

professional soldiers in an effort to double their salaries and make 

about 15 percent above the average wage, with additional supplements available for various bonuses like combat duty.29

Lack of quality housing has also been an impediment to retaining 

quality people in the military. A 2006 Defense Ministry survey revealed that less than 19 percent of the contract soldiers reenlisted 

mostly because of “poor housing conditions and lack of opportunities for rest and leisure.”30 Putin acknowledged this discrepancy in 

November 2005 when he sarcastically blasted the current housing 

system stating that “[t]he average price for housing is 29,000 rubles 

per one square meter of floor space, while we assume it is 11,000 

rubles. And we wish [the soldiers] good luck. Why are we pulling the 

people’s leg?” He then ordered the government to set aside an additional 1.5 billion rubles for military housing.31

In addition to the pay and housing reforms, several of the Red 

Army’s new personnel programs have elements that are strangely 

similar to programs in the United States. First is the revamped 

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program in Russia. The 

MoD has changed the rules so that every student enrolled in ROTC 

will be paid by the military and will be required to sign a contract 

that obligates them to serve as an officer for three years in the Russian military, very similar to American ROTC programs. Those who 

leave before completing the commitment will be required to repay 

the government for their education.32 Political parties in Russia 

have also pushed for a program similar to the American GI Bill that 

“promote[s] retraining programs and cover[s] the cost of higher education for veterans.”33 Additionally, the Russian government has 

instituted personal savings accounts for their newest servicemen, 

similar to the American government’s Thrift Savings Plan that 

opened to US service members in the late 1990s.34 One final area 

that mirrors changes in Western military personnel systems is the 

increased presence of women in uniform. As noted by Jennifer 

Mathers, a British expert on the Russian military, “While fewer and 

fewer young men have been willing to comply with conscription 

orders, a considerable number of young women have demonstrated 

their willingness to join the military.” Hence, females have made up 

a significant portion of the new volunteers and currently make up 

about 10 percent of the military.35

Professional military education (PME) and efforts to restore the 

prestige of the Russian army have also become priorities in the 

defense reform efforts. Putin has specifically addressed the need 

for PME improvements and has called for the introduction of new 

officer training concepts at all military hierarchy levels. Putin’s resolve became even stronger after the Dubrovka Theater hostage 

incident in 2002 where many of the hostages were killed by the actions of the military as they stormed the theater.36 Following this 

terrorist incident, his defense minister characterized the attention 

paid to modern warfare as “unacceptable” and urged the General 
44

Staff to abandon “old stereotypes.” He further directed that “much 

remains to be done to understand and . . . predict the nature of 

future warfare.”37 At the same time Putin and Ivanov were chastising the military leadership for insufficient PME, they were also attempting to reestablish the prestige of the military culture within 

Russian society, something that had dramatically fallen from a time 

when the uniforms of Soviet superpower warriors garnered tremendous respect in the public. To that end, the president has taken an 

active role by frequently paying “homage to the armed forces, their 

history, and their role in the country’s successes, and [has] actually 

attempted to deepen the age-old societal reverence toward them.”38

Military Reform Component 3—Military Hardware

The aftermath of the Cold War and the impact of the neglectful 

Russian military policies were not limited to the dismal conditions 

of the individual soldiers but had tremendous negative consequences on the equipment and weapons systems those soldiers 

would need in combat. In 1998, the defense minister highlighted 

the dreadful shape of the Russian military: “About one-third of the 

armed forces’ military hardware is not combat-ready and . . . some 

60 percent of the country’s strategic missile systems have been in 

service for twice their service life. Some 70 percent of the ships in 

Russia’s navy require repair . . . while in the air force about twothirds of all aircraft are incapable of flying. This year . . . the armed 

forces had not received a single nuclear submarine, tank, combat 

plane, helicopter, or piece of artillery.”39

However, in 1998 the decline in the Russian military’s hardware 

was still not a political or budgetary priority for the Russian leadership. Just 10 days before the 2000 disastrous sinking of the Kursk, 

the Russian security council decided on “sweeping cuts” to the entire armed forces in an effort to bring military spending in line with 

the country’s financial means.40 However, the Kursk tragedy, which 

killed 118 Russian sailors, was a significant emotional event, not 

only for the Russian society but also for the Russian government’s 

leadership. As noted by Yevgeny Primakov, leader of the Fatherland–

All Russia Party in the Duma, the submarine sinking “illuminated 

the situation in the country, the state of our armed forces, and the 

situation in the navy.”41 The leadership in the executive branch also 

recognized the need for change. Dale Hespring pointed out, “Putin 

believed it was time for a presidential about-face in dealing with the 

armed forces. He intended to breathe new life into the army.”42 The 

foundation for that new life came in the form of funding. There were 

dramatic increases in defense spending and ambitious plans to reenergize the ailing military hardware fleet across the board.

Looking at the current status of the Russian military hardware, 

the private intelligence agency Strategic Forecasting, Inc. recently 

noted that while the 17 years since the end of the Cold War had 
45

seen a precipitous decline in the Russian military; during Putin’s 

two terms, “Russia has arrested—and haltingly reversed” this decline. “New or well-maintained military equipment is certainly not 

the norm—a floor has definitely been inserted under the country, 

halting the fall,” they added.43 Conveniently for the Russian leadership and their desire to rebuild their capabilities, the recent rise in 

petroleum prices and Russia’s enormous natural gas reserves have 

provided a “cash cow” for the desired upgrade in military hardware. As noted by Christian Science Monitor, “Russian defense budgets have been soaring since Putin came to power, buoyed by a 

rising tide of petroleum income, and are set to jump . . . to a postSoviet high of $32.4B [billion].”44 This, according to figures from 

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, represented 

an increase of more than 200 percent since 2001, a funding trend 

they characterized as “a steep upward trajectory.”45

Harkening back to the perceived threats from the West, Putin 

said that a new arms buildup was warranted in a recent state-ofthe-nation address.46 Details of his rearmament programs are 

highly classified; however, some details have come to light. Putin’s 

initial “state rearmament plan” was signed just after he took office 

in 2000 but was significantly altered between August and November of that year, following the Kursk incident. The 34-volume “top 

secret” (now unclassified) document that detailed the plan was divided into three chapters: the first regarding weapon systems to be 

fielded or modernized between 2001–10, the second concerning 

weapons under development or other research programs, and the 

third chapter pertaining to foreign military sales. The initial financial support for this program was limited, amounting to $70 billion 

over 10 years with only half of the funding coming from the budget 

and the other half coming from the profits of arms exports.47

Since the initial push for modernization, world events including 

the US conventional dominance in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO 

expansions, and “color” revolutions in Russia’s neighboring countries have fueled even more investment in Russian military equipment and weapon systems. Earlier this year, Ivanov unveiled a 

$189 billion rearmament program to replace about half of Russia’s 

current military equipment by 2015. The Christian Science Monitor

reported that “among the armed forces’ acquisitions will be a completely revamped early-warning radar networks, new intercontinental missiles, a fleet of supersonic TU-160 strategic bombers, 

and 31 new warships, including aircraft carriers.”48 In particular to 

the Russian air force, Air Force magazine reports that “the Russian 

plans call for acquiring 250 new air force aircraft and upgrading 

800 more ‘legacy’ airframes by 2015,” which would constitute an 

air force procurement budget of between $8–10 billion per year.49

Evidence that these reforms are actually beginning to take hold 

is beginning to materialize. Aviation Week reported “earlier this 

year that the Russian Air Force had received a few dozen upgraded 
46

combat aircraft and helicopters. While modest, the figure is impressive considering that the previous decade had seen no renewal 

of the combat aircraft inventory.”50 Of particular note with these 

deliveries was the step up to modern capabilities: satellite communication, laser-guided weapons, and “glass” cockpits.51

In addition to this buildup in conventional military forces, Putin 

has also called for an “asymmetric” strategy to balance the lopsided might of the United States by emphasizing a modernized nuclear force. In particular, he drew attention to Russian efforts to 

preserve their nuclear deterrence capability, noting that Russia 

will field two new ballistic-missile submarines (the first since the 

fall of the USSR) and the new land-based Topol-M intercontinental 

ballistic missile. Furthermore, he claimed that work was underway 

to create “unique high-precision weapons and maneuverable combat units that will have an unpredictable flight trajectory,” a clear 

response to US efforts in the area of ballistic missile defense.52

The interests in “asymmetric” technologies that might restore 

more of a balance-of-power relationship with the West have not 

been limited to nuclear weapons. A desire to achieve innovative 

military breakthroughs, particularly in emerging technology fields, 

has spurred the Russian government to make radical changes in 

its defense industry and international partnerships. The greatest 

threat to the United States may well reside in this area.

Military Reform Component 4—Defense Industry 

Reform and International Partnerships

The radical reforms being instituted within the Russian defense 

industry are meant to serve many purposes. However, these new 

policies are mainly viewed as a convenient way to accomplish Putin’s twin priorities—which “remain [revival of] the economy and 

strengthen[ing] the state.”53 The economic aspects of these reforms 

are viewed as an investment with potentially huge profits from foreign military sales, something that has not gone unnoticed by the 

Russian leadership since “the arms sales portfolio is one of the 

most lucrative sources of presidential slush funds.”54 Furthermore, 

as pointed out by Sergey Chemezov, head of the state arms-export 

monopoly Rosoboronekport, “The fact that our country is playing a 

leading role in the world in the sphere of export of military production is a sign that the Russian defense industry has not only survived but has a powerful potential for further development.”55

Russia’s deputy prime minister reiterated these ideas and went 

on to say the government was looking for an effective system “for 

copying the best aspects of [the] foreign experience.”56 He further 

predicted that these defense industry reforms had the potential to 

become “the main driving force of the Russian economy” over the 

next few years.57 Another impetus behind these reforms is a link 

between profits and politics. As pointed out by foreign affairs ana-
47

lyst Jed Babbin, “One of the most powerful cliques in Soviet society was the military industrialist. When the Soviet empire fell 

apart, they suffered huge losses of wealth and status. Putin is 

aiming to restore their financial wealth and status in return for 

their political support.”58

Political support will be a key ingredient to overcome the tremendous inertia of a well-entrenched defense industry. Vitaly Shlykov, 

a member of the Defense Ministry’s public advisory council, described the magnitude of the overhaul required by saying, “[W]e 

need a completely new military industry, not just remnants of the 

old [Soviet] one. And these new defense industries will need a lot of 

attention, and an influx of resources on the level that today is only 

going into the oil and gas industry.”59 Evidence that the defense 

industry is receiving this increased attention is beginning to mount. 

In March 2006, the Russian government created a military-industrial 

commission (MIC) to “centralize and strengthen the operational 

management of the military-industrial complex and act as a new 

state institution for unified supply and equipment procurement for 

all ‘power industries,’ with the MoD having the leading role.”60 In 

other words, the Russian government is taking control of the defense industry in much the same manner that it took a “hands-on” 

approach with their now very profitable petroleum industry.

Recent actions by Rosoboroneksport highlight the government’s 

new approach with regard to the military-industrial complex. The 

company, run by MIC member Chemezov, is transforming into an 

industrial conglomerate and “recently took over Russia’s largest 

auto and titanium companies and is reportedly bidding on a major 

steel company.”61 The move to control a large percentage of the 

world’s titanium market is particularly noteworthy since titanium 

is such a key component in defense production, particularly in 

submarines and modern aircraft.62 This increased control will not 

only benefit the development and fielding of domestic weapon systems but also will foster more international influence on Russia’s 

behalf. For example, Rosoboronekport will control 80 percent of the 

titanium going to Europe’s Airbus Corporation; a fact that one observer noted was a “secret” advantage and may provide Russia with 

increased leverage in matters of defense in Europe.63

Besides the government’s “takeover” of key defense raw material 

industries, they have also gone after companies that provide niche 

military capabilities. This is evidenced by the establishment of two 

government-run defense holding companies in the radio electronics 

and space rocket sectors. The first deputy prime minister stated that 

“both companies would have huge R&D [resource and development] 

and production potential, as well as large workforce, and would be 

financed regularly by investors and state defense orders.”64

Overhaul of the defense industry has also led to new strategic 

military partnerships that are based on the sale of military equipment; these efforts have also had the fringe benefit of increasing 
48

the Russian’s sphere of international influence. Although the 

United States often criticizes Russian arm sales to problematic 

countries such as Iran, Venezuela, and Syria, the Russian government is increasingly bold in their efforts to court and use these new 

military-export relationships many in the West see as antagonistic. 

Even under the threat of sanctions or other restrictions from the 

United States over these military exports, the Russians have 

pressed forward.65

In October 2007 at a meeting of the Commission for Military and 

Technical Cooperation in Moscow, Putin said that Russia will not 

permit anyone to restrict its arms export business,66 something 

that plays directly into his desires since “arms sales are one of several tools that. . . demonstrate Russia’s claim to world-power status.”67 Moreover, this influential power appears to be growing significantly. Today, Russia does arms business with over 70 

countries,68 and, between 2001 and 2006, these military exports 

grew by over 50 percent.69 Last year the value of these items accounted for $6.5 billion in military material and another $1.5 billion in spare parts and military services.70

The increased arms export activity has gone beyond the simple 

exchange of merchandise and has brought about new military ties 

and Russian influence. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO) is a perfect example of this move to more militarized partnerships. Although the original purpose of the SCO was an economic 

association, it has expanded its scope of issues to include military 

support and cooperation. Although Putin has said that Russia is 

not seeking a Cold War–style “military bloc,” he has also said the 

SCO should take on “a greater military role.”71

That increased military role was displayed in August 2007 when 

the SCO member nations took part in the largest combined military exercise to date. The exercises took place in the Urals and involved 6,000 soldiers, more than 1,000 military equipment units, 

and more than 70 aircraft.72 Of note was the fact that “all participants [in the exercise] except China used Russian ammunition, 

equipment, and armaments, so Russia also has an interest in supplying its neighbors with weapons from its huge military industrial 

complex rather than allowing other suppliers to enter the market.”73 This SCO Asia-centric attitude has already negatively impacted the US military’s influence in central Asia by playing a significant role in recent demands that American forces leave the 

region. The “growing SCO efforts threatened to make highly difficult the US efforts to clean up growing Taliban/al-Qaeda opposition in Afghanistan, and, indeed, threatened Washington’s hopes 

that Central Asia . . . would move closer to US interests,” said Walter 

LaFeber. 74 Furthermore, Russia’s new SCO power apparatus should 

be even more disconcerting for the United States since Iran was 

just granted “observer” status by that organization, while the SCO 

denied the United States’ application for observer status.75 These 
49

links between military equipment, military cooperation, and political partnerships could have even greater future impact, depending 

on the nature of the advancements in Russia’s final focus area for 

military reform—emerging technology. 

Military Reform Component 5—Emerging Technology

There is a desire by many Russians to be at the forefront of technological innovation, particularly with defense-related systems, 

even if it means sacrifices in other areas. There is an old Soviet joke 

that highlights this sentiment: An inventor goes to the ministry 

and says “I have invented a new button-holing machine for our 

clothing industry.” “Comrade,” says the minister, “we have no use 

for your machine: don’t you realize this is the age of the Sputnik?”76

While Russian-developed technology has taken the world by surprise in the past (Sputnik being the most notable example), a decline in Russian technological innovation has shadowed the atrophy of their military. Adding “salt to the wound” for some Russians 

is the fact that, in the past, some Russian-derived technological 

“discoveries” have been exploited by the West and turned into significant military advantages, the most notable being the development of stealth technology by Lockheed’s Skunkworks division. Its 

work in developing such aircraft as the F-117 was based on the 

mathematical breakthroughs of the Soviet’s chief scientist at the 

Moscow Institute of Radio Engineering, Pyotr Ufimstev.77 This 

sense of frustration has fostered a newfound push for technological innovation as part of the efforts to modernize the military. Additionally, Putin has pointed to technology as a unique source of 

asymmetric power that Russia can use to counterbalance the 

American hegemonic might.78

Fortunately for Putin’s ambitious technology strategy, Russia is 

awash in intellectual raw materials. Even during the Soviet communist era when most personal freedoms were suppressed by the 

government, the scientific world was allowed to flourish and created a tradition that, even today, produces some of the world’s finest scientists and technical scholars. These remnants of the old 

Soviet system are the kind of resources that, if used effectively, 

could produce an array of revolutionary breakthroughs for Russia’s 

future war fighters. However, the one major weakness of the postcommunism scientific community has been a lack of capacity to 

transition theoretical ideas into practical applications. 

Yet, Russia does have a strong foundation to build that capability. A Russian consultant to the World Bank’s science and technology program recently pointed out that Russia “has one of the 

world’s largest ‘armies’ of scientist and engineers at its disposal, 

comparable only to the ‘armies’ of the world’s two leading scientific 

and technical powers—the United States and Japan.”79 This Soviet 

scientific legacy encompasses 3,500 scientific institutes which 
50

employ 600,000 scientists and engineers.80 Furthermore, Russian 

universities are graduating another 200,000 scientists and engineers each year.81 This scientific prowess has even captured the 

attention of the world’s leading technology firms. Ashish Patel, a 

managing director for Intel, identified Russia as “one of the emerging countries with an excellent education system, and a culture of 

developing high technology.”82

The Russian government appears to be taking an Americanization path with their new technology strategies similar to their military personnel reforms; the benefits of which will have tremendous 

implications both economically and militarily. Ivanov pointed out 

this dual purpose when he stated that the goal of the new technology strategy was to “overcome the current technology lag and create a powerful economy.”83

One major aspect of this new approach is increased government 

investment and oversight. The Duma’s commitment to create a 

Russian “Silicon Valley” by 2012 illustrates the government’s new 

mindset.84 Part of that effort calls for establishing up to 12 “technoparks,” which are initially being aimed at software developers.85

Each of these technoparks is slated to receive between $80–100 

million in state funding along with tax breaks to encourage private 

investment.86 Indications that this approach is showing early signs 

of success are plentiful. For example, foreign investors such as 

Boeing appear very interested in these technoparks87 and multinational corporations such as IBM and Motorola have already established in-house programming centers in Russia.88

Russian software exports, which surged by 54 percent last year 

to $1.5 billion, provide further evidence of progress in technological reform.89 A former Intel executive who now heads venture funds 

at a Russian investment bank said that “[a]ll the pieces of this innovative ecosystem are now coming together.”90 The military implications of this new technology “ecosystem” are worrisome to the 

West. Heritage Foundation analyst Ariel Cohen points out that 

“[t]he US still has a solid lead in top end weaponry. But at the next 

level Russia is advancing fast.”91 Furthermore, 1,550 Russian firms 

are now involved in arms production and experts say “they have 

proven adept at modernizing Soviet designs.”92

While the technology upgrade and advancement of traditional 

military systems should cause concern in the West, it’s the Kremlin’s new commitment to emerging technology development and exploitation that is even more eye-opening. During his annual address to the Russian Senate in April 2007, Putin announced a 

massive $7 billion program aimed at the development of nanotechnology,93 an amount and a commitment that is unprecedented for 

the Russian government. The formation of this new state corporation called Rosnanotech, which will oversee and coordinate nanotechnology research, mirrors the previously discussed establishment of the monopolistic arms-export corporation Rosoboroneksport. 
51

Notably however, this nanotech firm will receive “three times more 

state funding than the rest of the Russian scientists put together.”94

While this investment may seem benign, nanotechnology has “captured the imagination” of Russia’s politicians,95 and they fully understand the revolutionary potential that this area holds. Ivanov 

commented that “nanotechnology could not only change our whole 

economy and the quality of life of Russian people but could also 

drastically change all perceptions about modern warfare”96 [emphasis added]. Again, it is obvious that simply pushing large sums of 

money at a problem will not, by itself, spur innovation (not to mention the conflicting objectives of a corruption-ridden environment). 

However, capital investment is a prerequisite for any large scale 

transformation and progress will most certainly be made. The 

chance for significant impacts will represent a true challenge to the 

United States in the not too distant future.

In addition to this new push for nanotechnology, Putin has 

pledged increased funding for science across the board and is also 

calling on the science community to create “stimuli” to involve the 

business community and private investment.97 He promised to 

boost government spending on science to more than $16.5 billion 

by 2010, doubling the amount spent on it in 2007.98 Additionally 

the Associated Press reported that “he stressed the need to develop 

new scientific fields such as nanotechnology, nuclear physics, bioengineering, and others for the country’s defense needs.”99

Obstacles and Motivators for 

a Resurgent Russian Military

Opinions over whether Russia’s military is capable of returning 

to a superpower status cover the spectrum. Yet all the current indicators certainly point to a nation that knows where it must go, 

has the political structure in place to direct change, and the economic resources to make good on their plans. However, if the military is going to achieve such a feat, there are many difficult barriers that must be overcome. Barany points out that the “greatest 

barrier to meaningful defense reform has been political.”100

The attempts at reform have been complicated and delayed by 

the military’s top brass who have “acquired an autonomous political voice that is entirely incompatible with even the most generous 

definitions of democratic civil-military relations.”101 In addition, 

there are conflicting agendas within the new administration that 

make further reform difficult. However, there is evidence that Putin’s attempts at consolidating presidential power, combined with 

his widespread popularity within the rank-and-file members of the 

armed forces, and his handpicking the new president of Russia 

bode well for a significant resurgence in the military arm of the 

Russian government. 
52

Economically, Russia is accumulating large stockpiles of petroleumderived revenue, much of which is being directed toward the military 

and its efforts to reform. However, as pointed out by a Russian military 

expert, “now military leaders have enough money to create a kind of 

caricature of the Soviet armed forces, and they want to do a lot of the 

same old things. But their plans are a confused mixture of realistic 

goals and unworkable Soviet-style symbolism.”102 Furthermore, crime, 

corruption, human-rights abuses, and a looming demographic “catastrophe” all detract from the effectiveness of reform efforts.103 In particular to the pursuit of emerging technologies, the lack of business 

skills on the part of Russian scientists and problems with governmental control of intellectual property rights have discouraged many of the 

privatization efforts that have been tied to improving technology in 

defense-related areas.104

The one aspect of military reform that may be underestimated is 

the Russian desire to resurrect a Soviet-style “military bear” and the 

associated international influence that accompanies such military 

power. This warrior ethos and desire for world power status is something deeply embedded in Russian society and dates back to the 

nation’s earliest days. Evidence of Putin’s relentless efforts to restore this desired “great power” status and a growing confidence in 

the military are beginning to be displayed in the form of provocative 

actions aimed at the West and America, in particular. During the 

same month that the first round of post–Cold War Bear bomber intercepts occurred, a Russian-led submarine team planted a titanium flag on the North Pole and claimed it as sovereign territory.105

Also in August 2007, the Russians announced their desire to expand their naval presence into the Mediterranean. Their naval chief 

said they may reclaim a naval base in Syria, from which Soviet warships used to keep track of US ships in the Mediterranean.106

Finally, in response to US plans to station missile defense assets in 

eastern Europe, Putin suspended his country’s participation in the 

Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, opening the door for Russia 

to move its armed forces into more offensive locations west of the 

Ural mountains.107 While the obstacles to successfully reforming the 

military may be daunting, their ability to achieve a resurgent Russian military will definitely not fail due to a lack of self-confidence. 

On the contrary, this desire and belief in a warrior destiny may be 

the one point that propels the Russian society over the obstacles 

that stand in front of returning to a “super bear” status.

Notes

1. Zoltan Barany, “The Politics of Russia’s Elusive Defense Reform,” Political 

Science Quarterly 121, (Winter 2006): 609.

2. Ibid., 597.

3. Ibid.

4. Stuart D. Goldman, Russia Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. 

Interests (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2007), 15.
53

5. Ibid., 14–15.

6. Dale R. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 

Problems of Post-Communism 54 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Publishers, January/

February 2007), 21. 

7. Irina Isakova, “Russian Defense Reform,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly

5 (2007): 10.

8. Ibid.

9. Barany, “The Politics of Russia’s Elusive Defense Reform,” 605. 

10. Ibid.

11. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 23. 

12. Isabelle Facon, “Modernisation of the Russian Military,” Conflict Studies 

Research Centre, August 2005, 7. 

13. Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 16 July 2007), 64.

14. Ibid., 64–65.

15. Ibid., 65.

16. Keir Giles, “Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?,” Conflict Studies Research 

Centre, October 2006, 5. 

17. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 22. 

18. Giles, “Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?,” 5. 

19. Isakova, “Russian Defense Reform,” 26. 

20. Barany, Democratic Breakdown, 64. 

21. Goldman, Russia Political, Economic, and Security Issues, 1. 

22. J. A. Tirpak, “Washington Watch: Now, a Russian Buildup?,” Air Force 

Magazine 89, no. 7 (July 2006): 12–29.

23. Barany, “The Politics of Russia’s Elusive Defense Reform,” 610.

24. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 23.

25. Ibid., 22.

26. Facon, “Modernisation of the Russian Military,” 7. 

27. Fred Weir, “Iraqi Defeat Jolts Russian Military,” Christian Science Monitor, 16 

April 2003, 6.

28. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 24.

29. Barany, “The Politics of Russia’s Elusive Defense Reform,” 614. 

30. Ibid., 606.

31. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 24.

32. Ibid., 22.

33. Barany, “The Politics of Russia’s Elusive Defense Reform,” 614. 

34. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 23.

35. Stephen Weber and Jennifer Mathers, Military and Society in post-Soviet 

Russia (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 12 January 2006), 207. 

36. Facon, “Modernisation of the Russian Military,” 6. 

37. Ibid.

38. Barany, “The Politics of Russia’s Elusive Defense Reform,” 620.

39. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 20.

40. Barany, Democratic Breakdown, 26. 

41. Ibid.

42. Herspring, “Putin and the Re-Emergence of the Russian Military,” 20.

43. “Geopolitical Diary: Russian ‘Smiles,’ ”STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 10 

August 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary_russian_smiles. 

44. Fred Weir, “Russia Intensifies Efforts to Rebuild Its Military Machine,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 12 February 2007, 4.

45. Guy Anderson, “Russia Reaffirms Major Rise in Defence Budget,” Jane’s 

Defence Weekly, 9 February 2009, 14.

46. Tirpak, “Washington Watch,” 12–29.

47. Michal Fiszer and Jerzy Gruszczynski, “Results of Russia’s Military Reforms,” 

Journal of Electronic Defense, 1 July 2003, 34–35. 

48. Weir, “Russia Intensifies Efforts,” 4.

49. “Russia’s Bold Talk,” Air Force Magazine 90, no. 10 (October 2007): 13. 
54

50. Alexey Komarov, “Russian Renewal: Modest Russian Air Force Ambition Bears 

Fruit; Modest Air Force Ambition Provides Route to Key Inventory Improvements,” 

Aviation Week and Space Technology 166, no. 5 (29 January 2007): 53.

51. Ibid.

52. Tirpak, “Washington Watch,” 12–29. 

53. Goldman, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues, Summary Page.

54. Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Project 2008: Reforming the Military and Preparing 

a Coup,” World Affairs 169, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 72.

55. Weir, “Russia Intensifies Efforts,” 4. 

56. Keri Smith, “Russia Keeps Watch on New Holdings’ R & D Spend,” Jane’s 

Defence Weekly 44, no. 22 (30 May 2007): 22. 

57. Ibid.

58. Jed L. Babbin, In the Words of Our Enemies (Washington, DC: Regnery 

Publishing, Inc., 2007), 203. 

59. Weir, “Russia Intensifies Efforts,” 4. 

60. Isakova, “Russian Defense Reform,” 12.

61. “Rosoboroneksport: Arms Firm Run by Putin Friend Advances State 

Oversight Over Key Industries,” 31 December 2006, 1, http://zhezhe.wordpress

.com /2006/12/31/rosoboroneksport.

62. Ibid., 1–2.

63. Ibid.

64. Smith, “Russia Keeps Watch,” 22. 

65. Heather Maher, “U.S./Russia: Arms Sanctions Threaten Business Ties,” 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 August 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/

Article/1070516.html.

66. “Putin Says Nobody Will Limit Russian Arms Exports,” Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty, 1 November 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143985

.html.

67. Ibid.

68. Weir, “Russia Intensifies Efforts,” 4.

69. Keri Smith, “Defence Sector Leads Russia’s Push for High Technology,” Jane’s 

Defence Weekly 44, no. 17 (25 April 2007): 16.

70. Ibid.

71. Weir, “Russia’s Resurgent Military,” Christian Science Monitor, 17 August 

2007, 1–10. 

72. “Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),” GlobalSecurity.org, http://

www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/sco.htm; and Morten L. Nonboe, 

“Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” APEM–World Student Press 

Agency, 20 November 2007, http://www.studentpa.info/spip.php?auteur120. 

73. Ibid.

74. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2006 (New York, 

NY: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2006), 446. 

75. Nonboe, “Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” 

76. David Edgerton, Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900

(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 189. 

77. Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at 

Lockheed (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1994), 19. 

78. Tirpak, “Washington Watch,” 12–29.

79. T. Subbotina, “Russia at the Crossroads: Two Roads to International 

Competitiveness,” Russian Social Science Review 48, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 31.

80. Jason Bush, “Russia Bids to Become a Tech Tiger,” Business Weekly Online, 27 

June 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2007/gb20070626

_218538.htm.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Smith, “Russia Keeps Watch,” 22. 

84. “Russian ‘Silicon Valley’ to be Built by 2012 Near Moscow,” RUS®SOFT, 13 

March 2007, http://www.russoft.org/docs/?doc=1334.
55

85. Ibid.

86. “From Russia with Technology,” RUS®SOFT, 27 January 2006, http://www

.russoft.org.docs/?doc=1079. 

87. “Russian ‘Silicon Valley’ to be Built.” 

88. Bush, “Russia Bids to Become a Tech Tiger.” 

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Weir, “Russia Intensifies Efforts,” 4. 

92. Ibid.

93. Bush, “Russia Bids to Become a Tech Tiger.” 

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Smith, “Defence Sector Leads Russia’s Push,” 16.

97. “Putin Pledges to Double Russia’s Spending on Science in the Next 2 Years,” 

Associated Press (International Herald Tribune), 30 November 2007. 

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Barany, “The Politics of Russia’s Elusive Defense Reform,” 598. 

101. Ibid., 626.

102. Anderson, “Russia Reaffirms Major Rise in Defence Budget,” 10.

103. “Putin’s People—Russia’s Government,” Economist, 25 August 2007, 11. 

104. Bush, “Russia Bids to Become a Tech Tiger.”

105. James Kitfield, “A Czar in the Making: Cold War is Dead, but Vladimir 

Putin is Very Much With Us,” Air Force Magazine 90, no. 12 (December 2007): 53.

106. Weir, “Russia’s Resurgent Military,” 10. 

107. Kitfield, “A Czar in the Making,” 53.

57

Chapter 6

Alternate Future—Russia in 2030

Under Putin, Russia has moved away from democracy and toward 

a more “managed” (read autocratic) regime. The question is, can 

Putin’s current political system of sovereign democracy survive, or is 

it just a momentary stop on a trend line leading toward a failed 

state, a fully democratic, or an authoritarian regime? Further, after 

examining major trend lines that will drive the answer, is a resurgent Russia plausible given the projected political system in 2030?

Political Future

The least likely scenario is a failed state. Russia has vast economic resources of gas, oil, timber, and precious metals that will 

serve as a buffer to bad political decisions. Thus, even faced with 

rampant corruption and large demographic issues, it is highly unlikely the Russian economy will completely collapse. In addition, 

given Putin’s ability to handpick his successor and capture the support of the population through stability and improving standard of 

living, there is very little chance this power base will allow Russia to 

spiral into a failed state. There is too much money at stake, and the 

available domestic resources are prevalent enough to prevent such 

a catastrophic event. However, it is interesting to note that Putin 

himself used the threat of a Russian Federation collapse in order to 

justify the current political power consolidation.1

The likelihood of a fully democratic state is only slightly more 

probable than the failed-state scenario. In order for Russia to 

transition into a democracy, much within the Russian Federation 

must change. Democracies require effective governance through 

free and fair election of representatives within a legal framework 

that guarantees representation without corruption. Democracies 

must allow freedom of speech and freedom of the press, as well as 

governance by the rule of law with the attendant civil society. 

Further, a democracy must have a judicial system that guarantees the protection of private property, promotes free and fair 

global business practices, and, most importantly, protects and 

promotes the rights of individual citizens. For Russia to become a 

democracy, it must forego 1,500 years of history, undergo radical 

reforms in the public sector and business community, and create 

a robust civil society from scratch. 

At present, such reforms do not appear viable. There is no historical basis for such reform, no current political or economic interest in making such changes, and no compelling forces that 

would drive Russia in such directions. Since Putin took power, all 

leading indicators of democratization have been trending in the 
58

wrong direction. Elections are far from fair; political power has been 

consolidated among the siloviki; the state has taken control of most 

of the media; legislation has passed reducing the number of opposition political parties; and a tainted judiciary are all prominent forces 

that are now driving Russia towards an autocratic regime. 

With the election of Pres. Dmitry Medvedev, the Right Honorable 

Putin has taken much of his old authority with him, stripping the 

power of the president and hastening the consolidation of power 

into the hands of the few. Thus, although some argue it can take a 

fledgling democracy an entire generation to mature,2 it is highly 

unlikely Russia will head in this direction. A democratic Russia 

would require a basic cultural shift among the Russian population 

and a revolutionary change to the political structure. 

A recent poll conducted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty concluded only 41 percent of Russians value fair, multiparty elections.3

Further, only 34 percent believe free speech is important, and only 

40 percent disapprove of media censorship.4 On the flip side, 68 

percent trusts Putin and over 50 percent have a positive view of the 

Russian economy.5 Thus, in what appears to be an ironic twist, the 

more Putin consolidates power, the more authoritarian the regime 

becomes, the stronger his approval rates grow. With this attitude 

among the Russian population, the chances of a fledgling democracy taking hold are very small indeed.

It is apparent that some form of authoritarian rule is the most 

probable course. Yet, a slide toward the totalitarianism of the Soviet era is equally unlikely. The new Russian strength comes from 

oil, not nuclear weapons. The sale of oil forces Russia to participate 

in the global market and come to at least partial accommodation 

with the pressures of world market and world opinions. The China 

model seems the most likely outcome where strong central governmental control is maintained, while the economic sphere and limited personal freedoms at the individual level are allowed. A slide 

into a fully authoritarian regime similar to the Soviet era poses far 

too great a risk for Putin and his siloviki power base within the 

Kremlin. As politically astute as the Roman Republic corrupt power 

brokers who knew that bread and circuses ruled the masses, the 

siloviki well understand the fine line between outright oppression 

of an authoritarian regime. Therefore, the siloviki ensures the general population has enough resources to keep them pacified. They 

are pragmatic, goals oriented, and believe they understand how 

much exploitation the Russian population will tolerate. 

The Possibilities—Sovereign Democracy

Prediction of future Russian actions is difficult in the specific 

details, but, in the macro sense, it is far easier to define. The imponderables include price structure of commodities into the future, 

the byplay of political control with Medvedev as president and Putin 
59

as prime minister, and the chaotic international security environment. How each of these forces will interact and alter the direction 

in detail is well beyond the scope of this study. Yet, in the broader 

sense, all roads do appear to lead to new Russian definition called 

sovereign democracy. Since 2000, Putin has continually worked 

toward a more centralized and authoritarian political system while 

being perceived as the most trusted figure in Russian politics. Although evidence shows a dramatic consolidation of power in the 

Kremlin combined with rampant corruption, Putin has been able 

to win the hearts and minds of his own people as well as the respect of the international community. Further, according to a recent survey, most of Russia’s well-educated youth believe contemporary Russian society requires a charismatic leader who wields an 

iron hand.6 Thus, Putin’s style of sovereign democracy ironically 

appears to satisfy nearly everyone from the corrupt to the powerful 

siloviki to the general population at large. As long as the economy 

prospers, so will Putin’s sovereign democracy. 

The scenario is set, and the political trend lines are relatively 

easy to follow. The consolidation of power within the Kremlin is 

ongoing and will finish its most important work within the next few 

years. Medvedev has been talking about a more liberal western 

view; yet his actions demonstrate little change from the Putin line 

established over the previous eight years; and his reduced authority dramatically limits any autonomous action on his part. This is 

not to imply the future will be easy or that challenges will not continually crop up testing political structures. There is already evidence of internal competition within the power structure, but it 

will, in the best Russian tradition, remain opaque to outside observers. There is a great deal of friction within this type of system 

created by internal fighting among the powerful few, endemic corruption in the system, dependence upon commodities that fluctuate from forces outside Russian control, and restlessness of a population that is held back. These forces closely resemble the same 

issues listed by George Kennan in his famous “X” article that recommended the strategy for the Cold War. However, as powerful as 

the negative forces will be, this team’s research indicates that any 

failure of the sovereign democratic process will occur well past the 

2030 time frame of this study.

So the die is cast; sovereign democracy will dominate and, at least 

for the short term, successfully direct the interests of Russia. Those 

interests include the return of Russia in prestige and power to the 

ranks of the elite nations, the economic clout to influence the actions 

of other nations, and sufficient military power to protect the integrity 

of the Russian nation and compel actions within its near abroad. 

Nonetheless, corruption, internal dissent, and lack of innovation 

in a rapidly changing world will take its toll. Such events, however, 

will take decades to fully unfold. Of interest to this study is that by 

2030 Russia will be either reaching its peak or, at worst, just meeting 
60

its culminating point. It will be resurgent, and the United States 

will be facing serious challenges in 2030 that must be addressed.

Economic Future

The economic forces at work, principally the revenue and power 

generated by its oil and gas sales, act as the enabler for Russia’s 

development of a hybrid system called sovereign democracy. The 

concept of a resurgent Russia is directly dependent upon the wealth 

generated through its commodity sales, and strong evidence indicates that such wealth will continue for several years to come. For 

this scenario, it is envisioned that government policies will continue 

along current trend lines seeking to control strategic sectors of the 

economy, while allowing some free market reforms to occur in other 

areas. The Russian leaders will leverage their control of the economy for domestic and international political power and, in some 

cases, for personal gain. The changes will be sufficient for Russia to 

successfully complete its application to the World Trade Organization, further integrating Russia into the global economy. Finally, 

the government will implement regulations that provide some economic transparency but only to the degree necessary to appease 

foreign investor concerns over state control of businesses.

Infrastructure rehabilitation will take longer to achieve. In the 

next three to five years, only limited progress will be made in modernizing the infrastructure, and that modernization will be focused 

on the energy sector. Within a decade, other parts of the infrastructure will begin to improve as the government budget surpluses flow 

into other sectors of the economy. The changes will be noticeable 

and worthwhile; however, they will be small in comparison to other 

countries that adopted a more open economic model, such as India 

and China. The infusion of money will improve the transportation 

and communications networks, especially in western Russia; will 

start important yet hesitant steps towards rebuilding the health 

care system; and foster programs to stop the demographic downward slide of the Russian population. These measures, while expensive, will improve the state of the national workforce and will 

enable the government to “mask” its exploitation of the economy 

from the general population. 

As with infrastructure, industrial diversity will also be slow to 

develop and will be the weakest part of the Russian economy. The 

impact of corruption will tend to stifle innovation and risk taking 

necessary to foster new enterprises, and an open environment will 

receive little support since it is antithetical to a centralized system. 

So in the short-term, some diversification will occur in sectors related to domestic consumers, especially the financial markets, but 

will be limited in those areas important to the nation’s political 

survival. Energy resources will still account for over 50 percent of 

the country’s industrial output and 35–40 percent of Russia’s gross 
61

domestic product (GDP), ensuring that Russia will not be able to 

avoid the negative impact of the “Dutch disease.” 

Within a decade, the Russian government will begin to see a limited return on its investment in technology zones and its nanotechnology investment fund. By 2015 the combination of infrastructure 

development, continued investor confidence, and sustained domestic demand will have enabled the light manufacturing sector, 

including the high-tech industry, to grow to nearly a quarter of 

Russia’s total industrial output. Consumer services sector will have 

grown to 10–15 percent, reducing commodity sales to less than 

half of the country’s GDP. 

The plan is for this diversification to posture the Russian economy 

for the latter part of the century when the country’s natural resources will be depleted. However, there are few historical examples 

of a resource-based economy that has successfully diversified the 

economy to move beyond commodity dependency. Intellectually, this 

challenge is well understood by the Russians, and they have set up 

funds specifically designed to allow this transition. There has been, 

however, a stark divide between the theory of diversification and the 

actions necessary for such economic diversity. But as with the political case, these factors will not be fully in play by 2030.

More importantly, state control of strategic industries will enable the government to focus its resources on defense modernization. When Putin came to power, he recognized that rehabilitation 

of Russia’s economic power had to come first. His policies over the 

last eight years have come to fruition, enabling Russia to now begin 

rehabilitating its military forces. 

While the industrial side will see only modest gains, the high 

technology sector will have far more success. Russia will be able to 

capitalize in this important arena with a large influx of money and 

a broad scientific base from which to draw. There are other forces 

at work that will influence and escalate the status of science and 

technology. The first is the declining population base, which will 

have a positive impact on the technical side of the economy. Russia 

will not have the manpower for developing an overly powerful military and fully developing the large industrial side of the economy. 

Advances in science and technology have had a profound ability to 

substitute for manpower in developed nations, and this lesson will 

not be lost on the Russians. The second falls under the lessons of 

history. The perception of many in Russia is that the collapse of the 

Soviet Union was partially caused by its inability to compete with 

the United States technologically. As the United States developed 

the “Star Wars” concepts, the Soviets were not able to compete. 

Making advances in areas of technological competition is one way 

the Russians can restore their pride.
62

Resurgent Russia

By 2030 the resurgent Russia envisioned here will have largely 

continued the path set during the Putin presidency. It will have 

become the world’s eighth or ninth largest economy (up from 11th 

in 2007) and will have surpassed Canada and Spain in terms of 

GDP. The economy will remain heavily dependent on Russia’s natural resources but will also have had some limited success in diversifying its industrial capacity. The government, much like today, will be strongly nationalistic and will have direct control over 

critical elements of the Russian economy.

To better understand what power Russia will bring to bear in 

2030, an examination of the growth of the GDP is helpful. These 

are only broad estimates but illustrate that Russia will be an increasingly important actor on the global stage.

The progression of the Russian economy over the next 25 years 

under this scenario is shown in figure 7. It envisions that Russia 

will experience steady economic growth (five percent annually) over 

the next decade. In 2015 it is envisioned that economic growth will 

rise slightly to 5.5 percent on the strength of Russia’s economic 

diversification and infrastructure development. For comparison, 

figure 7 also depicts the US economy with growth of 2 percent annually. Under this scenario, Russia would grow its economic output from one-tenth of the United States to over one-quarter of the 

US GDP by 2030. This highlights that while Russia will enjoy strong 

economic growth, it will not challenge the United States, the European Union, or China in terms of overall economic power. 

Figure 7. Gross domestic product–scenario projection. (From our analysis.)
63

Government Revenues and Defense Spending

Revenue growth for the Russian government will be episodic, a 

characteristic of a commodity-based economy, but it will, nonetheless, enjoy growing revenues over the entire course of the next 20 

years. This growth will enable the government to modernize infrastructure, address social issues, and reinvigorate its military establishment. Figure 8 depicts the expected growth of the Russian 

government’s defense budget out to 2030. Presently, the Russian 

government spends 3.1 percent of GDP on defense. However, Putin 

has increased the defense budget by over 20 percent in each of the 

last three years, and Medvedev has committed to continued increases in defense spending. It seems likely that Russian defense 

spending will reach at least 5 percent of GDP during the next decade and could exceed that as the Russian government seeks to 

strengthen its military power. 

While higher defense spending will significantly increase Russia’s military power, it will have limited expeditionary capability for 

its conventional forces, restricting it to a regional power. Russia 

will be unable to achieve military parity with the United States for 

two reasons. First, in spite of strong economic growth, the Russian 

government would have to grow its defense budget by over 13 percent annually until 2030 to reach an equivalent level of annual 

spending with the United States. Second, the Russian military is 

Figure 8. Defense budgets–scenario projections. (From our analysis.) 
64

starting from a low state of capability, having been drastically underfunded during the last two decades. 

During the last decade, much of Russia’s geopolitical strength 

has stemmed from its nuclear forces and its permanent seat on the 

United Nations’ Security Council. By 2030 the resurgent Russia 

will have also established itself as a global economic power. Furthermore, state control over much of the economy will have enabled it to revitalize its conventional military forces and its ability 

to project conventional military power in eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and central Asia. In sum, Russia will have become a nation 

that possesses all the traditional elements of national power. Resurgent Russia will play a much more significant role in regional 

politics and, to a lesser degree, global politics.

Military Future

Even with substantial progress in all five of the military reform 

components, it is hard to envision a Soviet-like conventional superpower arising from the programs that are currently in place, 

even by 2030. At best, the Russian military will probably be considered no more than a regional conventional military power. But 

that takes nothing away from its ability to defend itself. In this regard, they will certainly field a modern and robust system for 

homeland defense. Just their demographic limitations alone will 

prevent them from deploying large fielded forces as they have in the 

past, and they have no plans for large expeditionary efforts. 

However, the Russians still possess unique asymmetric capabilities in the form of nuclear weapons, space access, and orbital 

systems that still give them superpower niches; ones they will 

surely not give up, but enhance. Putin himself has discussed “new 

spirals” in an arms race that could include nuclear weapons based 

in space,7 something the United States must recognize and defend 

against. Strategic Forecasting, Inc., summed up recent moves by 

the Kremlin, “Russia is back, and it no longer accepts its decline 

into obscurity.”8 Part of this “nonacceptance” attitude is a push for 

asymmetric technologies that may produce surprises that significantly shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. Although these 

surprises are, by definition, hard to predict, it is worthwhile to 

watch areas the Kremlin is centralizing its control over and expanding its funding for, since these emphasis areas may be places 

from where these surprises emerge. 

For example, it is not hard to imagine a scenario where the current Russian investments in nanotechnology lead to miniaturized 

control and power systems that allow massive numbers of inexpensive titanium-built unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that are capable of delivering biotech-engineered weapons. The recent Russian 

cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia demonstrate that the 

Kremlin is very much interested in and capable of pursuing non-
65

traditional approaches to warfare.9 These threats may not look like 

those of “Cold War–Fulda Gap” timeframe, but they may be just as 

lethal. For some it may be hard to imagine that Russia could produce such a technological leap, but Sputnik is a reminder that 

Russia has done it before. Furthermore, as noted by the Central 

Intelligence Agency’s Russian analyst, most experts “consistently 

underestimated the Russian economic capabilities in the early 

2000s,”10 a miscalculation the United States can ill afford to make 

when it comes to future asymmetric military capabilities.

In sum, resurgent Russia of this alternate future is a major supplier of global energy resources that is not closely aligned with either the West or the East. As a result, resurgent Russia will be 

particularly concerned with defending its natural resources and 

the infrastructure that brings these resources to markets in Europe and the Far East. The country will be a regional power in 

terms of conventional military capability with only limited global 

expeditionary capabilities. 

The military will be smaller but more capable, with professional 

soldiers and technologically advanced military systems. The Russian military will have the ability to project its full combat power 

into the Russian “near abroad” including eastern Europe, the Caucuses, and central Asia but will be limited in its ability to deploy 

conventional forces globally. In part to make up for the limitations 

in its conventional forces, resurgent Russia will have developed 

significant strategic reach through its nuclear forces and its development of advanced strategic technologies for space and cyberspace. In this alternate future, the Russian military will possess 

significant, advanced capabilities across all warfighting domains, 

including air, space, and cyberspace.

By 2030 a resurgent Russia’s air power will be dominated by 

UAVs. Conventional aircraft is still present on the battlefield, but 

Russia will not likely have invested in fifth-generation (F-22 or Joint 

Strike Fighter) technology to any degree. Thus, they have no F-22 

equivalent aircraft, but they have a small inventory of fourthgeneration MiG-29s, MiG-31s, SU-27s, and SU-34s. UAVs have 

taken over the battlefield and represent 70 percent of Russia’s air 

power. This is a natural extension of earlier military philosophy. It 

alleviates the manpower issue while maintaining strong ground 

control of air assets, just as with their manned systems. Technology 

has advanced sufficiently to allow near autonomous operations. 

While most UAVs in 2030 will still be large, “micro” and “nano” 

UAVs will provide niche capabilities in the area of psychological 

operations, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and perhaps combat swarming. 

Further, from a purely quantitative targeting standpoint, trying 

to take out a swarm of UAVs, or even the infrastructure associated 

with a swarm, is problematic at best. The traditional large infrastructure associated with aircraft, such as fuel tanks, shelters, 
66

runways, and control towers, does not apply to UAV squadrons. 

Finally, attempting to destroy a UAV that weighs 50 pounds and is 

only three feet long will be very difficult with today’s weapons arsenal and targeting capability. Tracking objects this small is a difficult technological problem; thus the traditional means of defeating 

enemy aircraft and their associated infrastructure will have to be 

completely reevaluated.

From advancement in air platform weapons, UAVs and fourthgeneration manned aircraft equipped with solid-state laser and 

high-power microwave weapons are likely. Solid-state laser technology has evolved to a point where the offensive potential can be 

lethal against both air and ground targets. High-power microwave 

(HPM) weapons will advance along with solid-state lasers. HPM capability provides for self-protection and introduces a disruptive 

and destructive ability that will present a very serious challenge. 

Advance production capacity and proliferation will make them 

ubiquitous on air platforms. 

In 2030 resurgent Russia’s ability to operate in space will be on 

par with the United States and superior to China. Militarily, the 

Russians will have pursued an aggressive space power program to 

take full advantage of their existing space lift infrastructure and to 

fully exploit the asymmetric benefit that is possible through space 

operations. The Russians will deploy their own networks of communication and navigation satellites. Networks are highly redundant and capable of transmitting enough bandwidth to support all 

Russian military operations. Additionally, excess bandwidth that is 

not used for military functions will be sold to commercial companies in order to generate additional revenue for Russian military 

efforts. These communication satellites will be of a traditional size 

and will use mostly laser-based transmitters and receivers in order 

to support their enormous bandwidth capacity.

Besides these traditional satellites, the Russians will take advantage of their investments and their discoveries in the fields of nanotechnology and robotics and pursue much smaller satellites. Advances in these two areas will allow the Russians to field whole new 

classes of micro-sized satellites. These microsatellites will be launched 

in very large quantities and on short notice by a variety of air breathing and ground-based systems. They will be deployed with the full 

spectrum of state-of-the-art sensors, providing the Russians with 

the ability to quickly monitor any part of the earth through multispectral surveillance. Additionally, these microsatellites will provide 

the Russians with a similar ability to detect and monitor on-orbit assets. This situational awareness of space-based hardware will play 

an important role in the strategy of Russian space operations.

In order to take advantage of this space situational awareness, 

the Russians will continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) technologies. These ASAT systems will be both ground- and space-based 

and prolific in their ability to destroy or disrupt an adversary’s 
67

satellite in low Earth orbit. Ground-based systems will harness 

both kinetic and nonkinetic weapons. Additionally, the Russian 

on-orbit ASAT capability will present a significant threat to any 

satellite, regardless of its orbit. Although more limited in number 

than their ground-based counterparts, these ASAT microsatellites 

will provide the Russians with a potentially nonattributable capability to destroy, disrupt, or simply monitor most critical spacebased assets. The Russians will also pursue and field a very small 

number of space-based directed energy weapons that will have the 

capability to quickly target other on-orbit satellites.

One major aspect of Russia’s future space power force will be its 

rapid regeneration capability. Historically, the Russians have always been faster at getting missions into space, and they will maintain this advantage into the future. They will possess large numbers of traditional ground-based launch facilities, both fixed sites 

and mobile launchers. While these systems will be limited in payload size, they will provide a very responsive ability to launch microsatellites on order. Plus, the Russians will continue to develop a 

limited amount of air-launched platforms that are capable of deploying microsatellites or kinetic kill vehicles for low Earth orbit 

targets. These air-launched rockets will be mated to the new classes 

of UAVs that the Russians will develop. For satellites of a more traditional size, the Russians will make more limited progress in their 

ability to deploy these systems. 

While small advances will occur as a result of scientific research 

and the Russians pursuit of lunar and Mars missions, the Russians will still rely on a “brute force” method for deployment of 

large satellites. While these systems will be more numerous than 

their present systems, they still will not provide a very responsive 

capability for deploying large satellites. Overall, similar to their decision to pursue a UAV-centric airpower force, the Russians will 

pursue a space force that is highly reliant on microsatellites, a 

force that can rapidly employ small, niche asymmetric effects on 

their intended space targets.

The Russians have also moved rapidly into the cyber world. 

Though at an initial disadvantage to the West, their well-educated 

computer force quickly garnered the asymmetric advantages associated with the art of using cyberspace. It is a cheap and effective 

way to have strategic effects with minimal investment, low manpower requirements, and difficulty in attributions. By 2030 a resurgent Russia will have fielded advanced cyber-warfare capabilities as 

a means of developing an “asymmetric” counter to the United States’ 

superiority in conventional forces. They will possess cyber power 

that is both offensive and defensive in nature, which enables engaging within the cyber domain using both “hard” and “soft” systems. 

Software systems will represent an area of expertise that could 

well exceed the United States. In the early years of computing, the 

Russians did not have many of the advantages of state-of-the-art 
68

hardware created in the United States and had to develop elegant 

software to compensate. That software, when combined with the 

robust commercially available hardware, will enable the Russians 

to employ global networks to find, fix, track, and target information 

technology systems operating in the cyber domain. These software 

systems will be capable of operating in the face of active deception 

by adversaries and will provide Russia the means to locate targets 

within the network, positively identify those targets, and then determine available means for engaging the targeted system. 

Russia’s offensive cyber-warfare systems will be capable of direct, immediate attacks on adversary systems and of causing effects that manifest, both in physical destruction of the targeted 

system, as well as in the destruction/corruption of data that is 

stored on the targeted system. Russia’s offensive cyber systems will 

also be capable of infiltrating an adversary’s networks and assuming control of some (or all) of the systems operating on the network. 

Finally, they will have the ability to employ its offensive cyber power, 

through Trojan horse attacks, where the attack mechanism is infiltrated into an adversary’s network but remains dormant until activated. In short, Russia will be a formidable foe, though not as pervasive as China but more lethal in focused areas with a greater 

willingness to use direct attack as a preferred approach.

Russia, always cognizant of a defense in depth, will have developed defensive cyber systems to protect its own networks from attack by an adversary. These systems will provide a layered hardware and software defense designed to detect, isolate, and block 

attempts by an adversary to infiltrate Russia’s computer networks. 

It is important to note that unlike the United States, where there is 

a clear delineation between government and the private sector, this 

defensive system will protect not only government networks but 

also private networks as well. In particular, those networks associated with the utility (oil, natural gas, and electricity) and financial 

sectors will be heavily defended by Russia–cyber systems. 

In summary, the Russians will represent a formidable threat to 

US safety and interests. The economic power generated by oil 

wealth will imbue the Russians with power that was formally garnered through military strength. This wealth will allow an essentially regional power to have inordinately strong international effects considering its small population and relatively minor industrial 

capacity. Their strengths will be enhanced by their wealth through 

the creation of strategic capability in economic persuasion, cyber 

systems, and space capabilities that can directly threaten the 

United States, and a respectable defensive military force sufficient 

to influence those in the “near abroad.”
69

Notes 

1. Jim Nichol, “Democracy in Russia: Trends and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 

CRS, 29 August 2006, 22.

2. Ibid., 26.

3. Brian Whitmore, “Russian Skeptical about Elections, Hopeful for Future,” 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 November 2007.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Irina Milyukova, “The Political Future of Russia through the Eyes of Young 

Students,” Young 10, no. 3–4 (2002): 22.

7. J. A. Tirpak, “Washington Watch: Now, a Russian Buildup?” Air Force Magazine

89, no. 7 (July 2006): 12–29.

8. “Geopolitical Diary: Putin’s Most Recent Surprise Move,” STRATFOR Global 

Intelligence, 13 September 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary

_putins_most_recent_surprise_move.

9. “A Cyber-Riot: Estonia Has Faced Down Russian Rioters’ But Its Websites Are 

Still Under Attack,” Economist, 10 May 2007, http://www.economist.com.hk/

displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=E1_JTGPVJR&CFID=66912014&CFTOKEN=56565252.

10. Interview with Russian CIA analyst, Langley AFB, Virginia, 18 September 2007.

71

Chapter 7

Implications for the US Military

How should the US military prepare for a resurgent Russia? In 

order to answer this question, it is important to look at it from two 

different perspectives. First, what is the current American approach 

to warfare deficiencies that are being built into our future combat 

systems, bureaucracies, and force structure of which a resurgent 

Russian military might take advantage? To do this, one can look at 

today’s combat systems, along with those currently being designed 

and built for future combat, and project vulnerabilities that may 

arise as those systems and organizations come online. Due to the 

longevity of modern weapon systems, the footprint of today’s global 

war on terrorism force will most assuredly be visible in the American military of 2030. Furthermore, the underlying assumptions 

driving the current development of many American “transformational” systems have associated risks that might be exploited by a 

Russian military that is focused on returning to a Cold War-type 

rivalry status. The second perspective, useful when looking at the 

potential future threat presented by a resurgent Russia, is that of 

the Russians themselves. In particular, what systems are the Russians likely to design in order to overcome their own shortcomings 

and physical limitations? Economic, demographic, and geographic 

realities are likely to influence many of the Russian decisions when 

it comes to funding future defense projects. These existential weaknesses of the Russian state and its society will most certainly drive 

a serious effort toward asymmetric capabilities, most specifically in 

the technological areas to make up for these shortcomings.

The modern American way of war is heavily dependent on technology in its attempt to lift the fog of war through ever quicker, 

smarter, and stronger weapons systems. However, this approach 

and quest for efficiency on the battlefield have exponentially driven 

up the cost of individual weapon systems. While the pursuit of 

these “force multipliers” has produced lopsided victories on the 

present-day battlefield, it has also left the American military highly 

dependent on a finite and ever-decreasing number of weapon systems which have become prohibitively expensive to build in large 

quantities. Additionally, because most of these advances involve 

“system-of-system” technologies, many of todays and tomorrows 

combat capabilities will be even more interdependent and thereby 

more susceptible to single-point failures. This significant decline in 

the overall number of weapons platforms and the increased potential for a strategic “Achilles’ heel(s)” has opened up opportunities 

that a resurgent Russian military can take advantage of by focusing on certain emerging technologies.
72

Like a risky stock portfolio that is overly invested in too few 

stocks, the future American military force structure may not be 

diversified enough to handle a Russian military that invests in a 

strategy of procuring large numbers of small systems. The current 

Russian government’s unprecedented investment in nanotechnology provides some evidence that they are interested in technologies 

that might facilitate building military capabilities on a much smaller 

and less expensive scale. Thus, while an American F-22 Raptor may 

be capable of defeating modern enemy aircraft, even when greatly 

outnumbered, this may not be the threat that matters. Nanotechnology may provide Russia with the capability of fielding small, 

less-capable UAVs, but at a cost vastly below that of an F-22. This 

creates a dilemma for the United States. While technology will be a 

mainstay for both US and Russian future systems, Russia will 

probably seek to specialize in areas of asymmetric advantage, such 

as flooding the skies with less capable but greater numbers of 

weapons systems. Russian futurists and technology innovators 

may well return to the Soviet concept that “quantity has a quality 

all its own,” an approach that if adopted and successfully developed 

could potentially change the military calculus by introducing a new 

category of “force dividers.”

Besides the pure numerical vulnerabilities of the future US combat platforms, their inherent “information bandwidth” architectures 

expose key nodes to potential attack. Global positioning system 

(GPS), for example, has become a mainstay and vital lifeline for every US high-tech combat platform (not to mention the potentially 

catastrophic dependency of a large portion of the global economy). 

The value and vulnerability of these few dozen hard-to-defend satellites are truly astronomical. A Russian space force capable of conducting a relatively small number of offensive attacks against GPS 

satellites could not only prevent the precision engagement and 

data-linking capabilities that our military forces have become dependent upon, but it could also shock the global economy by taking 

automated teller machines and world financial markets off line. 

The United States will not be static in defending its assets and 

will certainly have developed capabilities to secure GPS and dramatically improve onboard navigation. But every new system comes 

with new vulnerabilities, and the point is that Russia will have the 

incentive, the wherewithal, and the capability to find those weaknesses. Furthermore, recent Russian investment and interest in 

information technologies provide them yet another asymmetric avenue for inexpensively developing techniques and tools that could 

potentially disrupt the information pipelines.

Russian Challenges to the USAF

Given the evolving Russian resurgence, what then are the principal challenges of a resurgent Russia to the USAF? Principally, 
73

there are four key areas that Russia will focus on that will pose a 

challenge: (1) Russia will continue to use space to its advantage; (2) 

due to demographic problems, Russia will focus on asymmetric 

technologies such as nanotechnology and cyber technology that 

will provide advantages that cannot be achieved through quantity; 

(3) with increasing economic prosperity and a focus on reforming 

conventional military capabilities, Russia in 2030 will have a strong 

regional, conventional capability to add to its already strong nuclear arsenal; and (4) Russia’s interest and investment in directed 

energy technologies will provide further advances in compensating 

for reduced population.

Russia has an active space program and has made further commitment to increase its presence in space. In particular, while Russia benefits from US GPS technology, the Russian paranoia for selfreliance is driving development and deployment of inherent 

precision, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites. While Russia attempted to launch and operate the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) PNT satellites, in the 1980s, economic collapse 

prevented a fully deployed system. With renewed funding, GLONASS 

now has 14 satellites on orbit heading toward a constellation of 24. 

At present, there are few GLONASS receivers commercially available, and there are few plans to develop them. However, the Russian military will exploit this inborn technology to its advantage. 

Russia’s commercial space launch program is best known by the 

Soyuz program. Russia remains committed to growing this program 

as well. With obvious military implications, Soyuz provides the infrastructure necessary for a variety of platforms to be launched into 

space. Continued research of miniaturizing payloads coupled with 

technology on disabling, disrupting, and/or destroying technologies 

presents a credible challenge to US space systems. 

Discussed earlier is Russia’s economic commitment to asymmetric technologies principally in the forms of cyber and nanotechnology. With regards to nanotechnology, Russia may seek to overcome improved detection technologies by using the inherent stealth 

properties of nanomachines. Nanobots may have the ability to deny 

and disrupt our systems on multiple fronts from launch to command and control to end-use capability. Similarly, nanotechnology 

promises to revolutionize materials technology providing for stronger, smaller, cheaper, and more capable systems. 

Capitalizing on a well-educated populace with a strong centralized government, Russia has demonstrated a willingness to use 

cyber technology to deny and disrupt. As evidenced in the infamous Estonian cyber attack of 2007, the globalized world presents 

a wide target set for those willing to “push the button.” The complete reliance on cyber for all phases of USAF operations presents 

an inherent vulnerability that is subject to exploitation. 

Russia will modernize its air defenses between now and 2030. It 

will use the technologies mentioned to form a fully integrated air 
74

defense system to enhance command and control (C2) capabilities. 

Russia’s desire for border security will enable fully controlled entry 

into its territory. 

Lastly, Russia’s directed energy (DE) developments will challenge the USAF in 2030. Covering the gamut from communications 

disruption to personnel denial to tracking and targeting, DE in 

2030 promises to be a true “game changer.” Deployed on the 

ground, in the air via UAVs, and possibly in space, DE gives rise to 

multiple ordeals. 

USAF Response

How the USAF should respond to a resurgent Russia is the central concern of this paper. While this monograph does not recommend any specific weapon systems for development (those answers 

are provided in the final Blue Horizons report), both alternate future research and operational analysis point towards important 

areas for future investment and essential enabling technologies.

With identified vulnerabilities of manned flight systems, UAVs 

are becoming and need to become even more important and ubiquitous. Future UAV development will need to improve overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) awareness as well 

as kinetic capabilities. From long endurance to survivable communication protection, UAVs enhancements will provide cost efficiencies while further reducing manned exposure.

The USAF’s reliance on space will continue to grow over the next 

two decades. GPS dependence and vulnerability are well documented. But, all of the key space platforms and space launch capabilities will be required in times of conflict. As such, increased protection of space assets coupled with a rapid reconstitution capability 

becomes more important. This is particularly true in the areas of 

PNT, ISR, and communications and warning—the areas necessary 

for the United States to operate in the high ground of space.

In the domain of cyberspace, it is not possible to fully envision 

every avenue by which the United States can be attacked. To that 

end, the USAF must work on increased protection capability combined with the ability to rapidly reconstitute operations in this domain. The USAF’s need for certain C2 is central to executing any 

campaign. Securing and being able to rapidly restore cyber capability are imperative.

Just as DE has become a focus for Russia, it should also be a 

focus area for the United States. The USAF needs to develop DE 

protection capabilities for its ground and airborne systems as well 

as the ability to use DE, both lasers and microwaves, in an offensive capacity. These systems are not domain specific; thus investments in systems for operations on the surface, in the air, and in 

space are all areas ripe for investment.
75

Conceptual Systems and 

Their Enabling Technologies

Part of the Blue Horizons study relied on a “value-focusedthinking” quantitative analysis of current and future systems 

against each of the four alternate futures. With specific regards to 

a resurgent Russia, the team evaluated the likelihood of success 

of weapon systems fulfilling the USAF mission of Global Reach, 

Global Vigilance, and Global Power. 

The top 10 concepts across the three USAF defined mission sets 

when confronting a resurgent Russia in 2030 are shown in figure 

9. The number one and two concepts are based on DE and point 

toward the usefulness of developing technologies in a conventional 

capability package. The third highest ranking concept is called 

“pathfinder” and refers to a UAV that serves multiple roles from 

sensor awareness to networking to kinetic capability while accompanying other aerial platforms. Fourth on the list is “cyberspace 

UAV” which refers to the growing importance of understanding and 

exploiting this domain. Of note in the other concepts is an emphasis on other unmanned systems in a conventional context. Five of 

the top 10 systems, in terms of their utility against a resurgent 

Russia, are unmanned. 

All 58 systems in the study were then used to discern which 

underlying technologies were most important for investment in 

each scenario. A list of 172 comprehensively exhaustive and mutually exclusive technologies was mapped against all 58 of the scored 

Figure 9. Conceptual systems scores in resurgent Russia. (From our own 

analysis.)
76

concepts and systems. This enabled determining which underlying 

technologies had the greatest importance for each alternative future. The model accorded points to each technology based on the 

value of the concept(s) that technology enabled. The top 10 technologies for a resurgent Russia are listed in figure 10. 

The highest valued enabling technology is “object identification 

and report fusion.” Specifically, our ability to accurately identify 

targets and seamlessly integrate into reporting systems enables 

superior C2. The next two technologies support the C2 requirement for access and connectivity even in a denied access environment. Protection of aircraft, manned and unmanned, from electromagnetic/radio frequency was a key enabler of many systems in 

the 2030 timeframe. GPS antijam highlights the importance of PNT 

across all aspects of the battlespace from employment to defense. 

Beam control and adaptive optics facilitate numerous concepts in 

2030 from space awareness to DE applications. Integrated aircraft 

self-defense alludes to the necessity of survival in demanding environments. The remaining technologies highlight our dependence 

on the global information grid and the importance of accessing and 

sharing data for the purposes of maintaining awareness. 

Figure 10. Enabling technologies for a resurgent Russia. (From our own 

analysis.)
77

Final Thoughts

The thesis of this study is how the underlying impact of rapidly 

changing technology will alter the future in unexpected ways. The 

study team evaluated four separate alternative futures that would 

stress the Air Force in fundamentally different ways.1 One of these 

scenarios is a resurgent Russia. The stresses created by this resurgent Russia present specific threats that can be identified and for 

which planning can be accomplished. In this scheme, Russia represents the nation that creates the most classic threat, a major 

force-on-force conflict. It is also a scenario with many of the new 

technologies that will allow regional powers to project powerful 

strategic effects. As such, it represents, potentially, a major challenge for the United States. This resurgent Russia was created to 

specifically challenge the USAF and to highlight areas that must be 

pursued in order for the Air Force to be prepared to fight and win in 

2030. The Russia created for this study was manipulated to ensure 

the resurgent characteristics, but, in the view of the researchers, it 

also represents a very logical and even probable future for Russia.

Notes

1. The study was designed to look for commonalities across the four future 

scenarios, and it was these common aspects of all four that became the heart of the 

final report. The Blue Horizons Summary Report is available from CSAT. 

79

Center for Strategy and Technology

The Center for Strategy and Technology was established at the 

Air War College in 1996. Its purpose is to engage in long-term strategic thinking about technology and its implications for US national security. 

The center focuses on education, research, and publications that 

support the integration of technology into national strategy and 

policy. Its charter is to support faculty and student research; publish research through books, articles, and occasional papers; fund 

a regular program of guest speakers; and engage with collaborative 

research with US and international academic institutions. As an 

outside-funded activity, the center enjoys the support of institutions in the strategic, scientific, and technological communities.

An essential part of this program is to establish relationships with 

organizations in the Air Force, as well as other Department of 

Defense agencies, and identify potential topics for research projects. 

Research conducted under the auspices of the center is published 

as occasional papers and disseminated to senior military and 

political officials, think tanks, educational institutions, and other 

interested parties. Through these publications, the center hopes to 

promote the integration of technology and strategy in support of US 

national security objectives.

For further information on the Center for Strategy and Technology, 

please contact:

John P. Geis II, Col, PhD, Director

Christopher J. Kinnan, Col, Deputy Director

Theodore C. Hailes, Col, USAF (Retired),

Air University Transformation Chair

Air War College

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

(334) 953-6996/6460/2985
80

Titles in the Occasional Paper Series

1

Reachback Operations for Air Campaign Planning and Execution

Scott M. Britten, September 1997

2

Lasers in Space: Technological Options for Enhancing U.S. Military 

Capabilities

Mark E. Rogers, November 1997

3

Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy

Joseph Siniscalchi, March 1998

4

Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and the 

American Use of Force Since 1945

Jeffrey Record, March 1998

5

Lasers and Missile Defense: New Concepts for Space-Based and 

Ground-Based Laser Weapons

William H. Possel, July 1998

6

Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological 

Inevitables

Thomas D. Bell, January 1999

7

Legal Constraints or Information Warfare

Mark Russell Shulmann, March 1999

8

Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to 

Use Force

Jeffrey Record, May 1999

9

Airborne and Space-Based Lasers: An Analysis of Technological and 

Operational Compatibility

Kenneth W. Barker, June 1999

10

Directed Energy and Fleet Defense: Implications for Naval Warfare

William J. McCarthy, February 2000

11

High Power Microwaves: Strategic and Operational Implications for

Warfare

Eileen M. Walling, March 2000
81

12

Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations

John E. Ward, Jr., March 2000

13

Cruise Missiles and Modern War: Strategic and Technological 

Implications

David J. Nicholls, March 2000

14

Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations

Eric M. Sepp, March 2000

15 

Technology and Command: Implications for Military Operations in 

the Twenty-First Century

William B. McClure, July 2000

16

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations

David Glade, July 2000

17

Computer Networks and Information Warfare: Implications for 

Military Operations

David J. Gruber, July 2000

18

Failed States and Casualty Phobia: Implications for Force Structure 

and Technology Choices

Jeffrey Record, December 2000

19 

War as We Knew It: The Real Revolution in Military Affairs/

Understanding Paralysis in Military Operations

Jan S. Breemer, December 2000

20

Using Lasers in Space: Laser Orbital Debris Removal and Asteroid 

Deflection

Johnathon W. Campbell, December 2000

21

Weapons for Strategic Effect: How Important is Technology?

Colin S. Gray, January 2001

22

U.S. Army Apache Helicopters and U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Forces: 

Implications for Future Military Operations

Brad Mason, June 2001
82

23

The End of Secrecy? Military Competitiveness in the Age of 

Transparency

Beth M. Kasper, August 2001

24

Prompt Global Strike through Space: What Military Value?

Larry G. Sills, August 2001

25

Precision Engagement at the Strategic Level of War: Guiding Promise 

or Wishful Thinking?

Timothy J. Sakulich, December 2001

26

Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military 

Affairs?

George B. Hept, January 2002

27

Unmanned Undersea Vehicles and Guided Missile Submarines: 

Technological and Operational Synergies

Edward A. Johnson, Jr., February 2002

28

Attack Operations for Missile Defense 

Merrick E. Krause, May 2002

29

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Micro-Air Vehicles in the Service of Air

Force Missions

Arthur F. Huber II, June 2002

30

Sustained Space Superiority: A National Strategy for the United 

States

Larry J. Schaefer, August 2002

31 

Hyperspectral Imaging: Warfighting through a Different Set of Eyes

Paul J. Pabich, October 2002

32

Directed Energy Weapons on the Battlefield: A New Vision for 2025

John P. Geis II, April 2003

33

Homeland Security and the Coast Guard: Postured for Technology 

Improvements

Arthur C. Walsh, June 2003
83

34

Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting our Phasers on Stun? Potential Strategic 

Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield

Erik L. Nutley, August 2003

35

Aircrew Performance Cutting Edge Tech

Kris M. Belland, September 2003

36

Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution: Never Divide the 

Fleet

Daniel F. Baltrusaitus, May 2004

37

The Decision Maker’s Guide to Robust, Reliable, and Inexpensive 

Access to Space

Gary N. Henry, July 2004

38

Global Mobility: Anywhere, Anytime, Any Threat? Countering the 

MANPADS Challenge

Jacqueline D. van Ovost, July 2005

39

Strategies For Defeating Commercial Imagery Systems

Stephen Latchford, July 2005

40-51

Netted Bugs and Bombs: Implications for 2010

Edited by Marsha J. Kwolek, December 2005

Part I: Network Centric Operations: Promises and Pitfalls

Network Warfare Operations: Unleashing the Potential

Richard A. Lipsey

Network-centric Operations: Challenges and Pitfalls

Eric E. Silbaugh

Network-enabled Precision Guided Munitions

Benjamin F. Koudelka, Jr.

Lowering the High Ground: Using Near-Space Vehicles for Persistent 

C31SR

Andrew J. Knoedler

Part II: UAVs in 2010: Lean and Lethal

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles: SEAD and EW for the Future

James C. Horton

Small Power: The Role of Micro and Small UAVs in the Future

James M. Abatti
84

Pesky Critters

Kirk M. Kloepple

Pandora’s Box Opened Wide: UAVs Carrying Genetic Weapons

Daryl J. Hauck

Part III: Silver Bullets in Search of a Six Shooter

Perfecting War: Searching for the Silver Bullet

Eric J. Schnitzer

Who Pushes the Pickle Button?

John E. Marselus

Leveraging Simulation Against the F-16 Flying Training Gap

Shaun R. McGrath

Electronic Pulse Threats in 2010

Colin R. Miller

52

Ground Truth: The Implications of Joint Interdependence for Air 

and Ground Operations

L. Ross Roberts, March 2006

53

“Heads, Not Tails:” How To Best Engage Theater Ballistic Missiles?

Ronald C. Wiegand, February 2006

54

Transcendental Terrorism and Dirty Bombs: Radiological Weapons 

Threat Revisited

Chad Brown, February 2006

55

International Armament Cooperative Programs: Benefits, Liabilities, 

and Self-inflicted Wounds—The JSF as a Case Study

Stephen G. DiDomenico, February 2006

56

War without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation

Michael J. Hornitschek, May 2006

57–59

Streamlining DOD Acquisition: Balancing Schedule with Complexity

Edited by Lt Col James Rothenflue and Marsha J. Kwolek, 

September 2006

“A System as the Enemy: A Doctrinal Approach to Defense Force 

Modernization”

Benjamin A. Drew

“Impact of Weapons Systems Complexity on Systems Acquisition”

Robert A. Dietrick
85

“Faster is Better . . . Can the USAF Acquisition Process be SAIV’D?”

James L. Chittenden

60

The Seductive Effects of an Expeditionary Mindset

Michael Arnold, March 2007

61

The Air Force in SILICO—Computational Biology in 2025

Christopher Coates, December 2007

62

Biofuels: An Alternative to U.S. Air Force Petroleum Dependency

Mark S. Danigole, December 2007

63

Air Force and the Cyberspace Mission: Defending the Air Force’s 

Computer Network in the Future

Shane P. Courville, December 2007

64

Next Generation Nanotechnology Assembly Fabrication Methods: A 

Trend Forecast 

Vincent T. Jovene, Jr., January 2008

65

Blue Horizons II: Future Capabilities and Technologies for 2030 

John P. Geis II, Christopher J. Kinnan, Ted Hailes, Harry A. 

Foster, and David Blanks, June 2009

Resurgent Russia in 2030

Challenge for the USAF

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Belinda L. Bazinet

Copy Editor

Sandi Davis

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations

L. Susan Fair

Composition and

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Vivian D. O’Neal

Quality Review

Carolyn Burns

Print Preparation and Distribution

Diane Clark