EXHIBIT 3

Case 1:22-cv-24023-RNS Document 153-4 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2024 Page 1 of 5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

MIAMI DIVISION 

Case No. 1:22-cv-24023-SCOLA/GOODMAN 

KENNETH C. GRIFFIN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al., 

 Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

DECLARATION OF SCOTT H. MOFFIT, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, 

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION 

I, Scott H. Moffit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, do hereby declare as follows: 

1. I am the Special Agent in Charge of the Cybercrime Investigations Division for 

the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). I have held this position since 

2023. Before that, I was an Assistant Special Agent in Charge in the Cybercrime Investigations 

Division, a position I held from 2018 to 2023. In 2022, I intermittently served as Acting Special 

Agent in Charge of the Cybercrime Investigations Division. 

2. TIGTA is a Department of the Treasury office of inspector general that oversees 

the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). TIGTA is separate and apart from the IRS and operates 

wholly independent of the IRS. In accordance with § 3(a) of the Inspector General Act (IG Act), 

5 U.S.C. § 403(a), TIGTA reports to, and is under the general supervision of, the Secretary of the 

Treasury. 

3. TIGTA evaluates allegations to determine if unauthorized disclosure or inspection 

of return information has occurred. This authority is granted to TIGTA under Sections 

Case 1:22-cv-24023-RNS Document 153-4 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2024 Page 2 of 5
2

8D(k)(1)(A) and 9 of the IG Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 412(k)(1)(A) and 422(a)(1)(L)(ii). Under the IG 

Act, TIGTA has the duty and responsibility to conduct investigations relating to the programs 

and operations of the IRS. The IG Act also gives TIGTA the authority to enforce the criminal 

provisions of the internal revenue laws and other criminal provisions of law relating to internal 

revenue for the enforcement of which the Secretary is responsible, and to seize property subject 

to forfeiture under the internal revenue laws. These provisions of the IG Act are restated and 

verified by the Secretary of the Treasury in Treasury Order 115-01. Pursuant to these governing 

authorities, TIGTA has the responsibility to investigate allegations of unlawful disclosure or 

inspection of return information and seize property used in or intended for use in such activities. 

See TIGTA Operations Manual, 400-290.2. 

4. As part of my duties as an Assistant Special Agent in Charge, I was assigned to 

supervise the investigation of the alleged unauthorized disclosure of return information to 

ProPublica, a potential violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7213 and 7213A. TIGTA’s investigation of the 

alleged disclosure to ProPublica ultimately determined that Charles Littlejohn was the source of 

such disclosure. 

5. TIGTA coordinated with the Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public 

Integrity Section (PIN) during the entire investigation, i.e., from its initiation to Littlejohn’s 

prosecution, but TIGTA independently determined the course of the investigation. Coordination 

with PIN generally consisted of TIGTA updating PIN on the status of the investigation and new 

developments during the investigation and requesting assistance from PIN in obtaining court 

orders and search warrants to acquire evidence. Due to the highly technical nature of the 

investigation, TIGTA had the unique skills and knowledge to determine the information that 

needed to be collected to conduct the investigation. 

Case 1:22-cv-24023-RNS Document 153-4 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2024 Page 3 of 5
3

6. During its Title 26 investigation, TIGTA collected information and evidence and 

shared this information and evidence with PIN. This primarily included verbal updates on relevant 

information identified, drafts of legal process with summaries of facts acquired from TIGTA’s 

investigation – e.g., search warrants, court orders pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), and applications 

for such warrants and orders – and a limited set of memoranda or other documents regarding 

interviews and other investigative activity. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 60.1, TIGTA generally must 

obtain concurrence from a U.S. Attorney’s Office prior to applying for a search warrant.1

 

7. TIGTA was present with PIN at two proffer meetings with Littlejohn on September 

13 and December 11, 2023. Littlejohn, his counsel, PIN attorneys, and TIGTA agents were present 

for such meetings. TIGTA agents took notes during the proffer meetings, reduced the notes to 

memoranda of interview and provided the memoranda to PIN on October 26 and December 13, 

2023, respectively. 

8. Prior to the September 13, 2023 proffer meeting, Littlejohn’s counsel advised 

TIGTA and PIN that Littlejohn maintained information related to his unauthorized disclosure to 

ProPublica and the New York Times on multiple flash drives. Littlejohn subsequently provided 

TIGTA with consent to search the drives and abandoned them to the United States. TIGTA began 

pursuing forfeiture of these flash drives pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7302. 

9. One of these flash drives was described in the forfeiture orders in United States v. 

Charles Edward Littlejohn, 1:23-cr-00343-ACR ECF 17, 18, and 35 (D.D.C.), as the “[s]ilver USB 

flash drive located inside the lining of a wooden leather box containing an ornamental camel.” 

TIGTA agents collected the drive and transported it to a TIGTA office. TIGTA personnel 

1

 28 C.F.R. § 60.3 identifies TIGTA by its predecessor agency’s name, the Internal Security Division of the Internal 

Revenue Service’s Inspection Service. The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (PL 

105-206) created TIGTA and transferred the functions discussed here to TIGTA. See 5 U.S.C. § 422(a)(1)(L)(ii). 

Case 1:22-cv-24023-RNS Document 153-4 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2024 Page 4 of 5
4

examined the drive and its contents. After analysis and extraction, TIGTA provided the extracts of 

portions of data on the flash drive to PIN that included: 

a. Mr. Littlejohn’s electronic journal concerning the inspection and disclosure of 

confidential return information, 

b. metadata that Mr. Littlejohn provided to ProPublica identifying the categories 

of confidential return information disclosed; 

c. records of information and communications Mr. Littlejohn prepared, sent, or 

received about and including the confidential return information he inspected 

and disclosed; 

d. communications between Mr. Littlejohn and ProPublica. 

10. TIGTA shared its investigative findings with PIN, which was the basis of the 

information, subsequent plea agreement, and forfeiture under 26 U.S.C. § 7302. 

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 

Executed on May 29, 2024. 

 

 SCOTT H. MOFFIT 

 Special Agent in Charge 

 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 

Scott H. Moffit Digitally signed by Scott H. 

Moffit 

Date: 2024.05.29 09:39:30 -04'00'

Case 1:22-cv-24023-RNS Document 153-4 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2024 Page 5 of 5