UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5141

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER O’NEAL PATTERSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00054-TDS-1)

Submitted: August 17, 2011 Decided: August 19, 2011

Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

James E. Quander, Jr., QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Christopher O’Neal Patterson appeals his 744-month 

sentence and convictions, following his guilty plea, of (1) one 

count of interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a) (2006); (2) one count of carry and use 

of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C)(i) 

(2006); (3) one count of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a) (2006); and (4) one count of carry and use 

of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence 

causing death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 

924(c)(1)(a)(iii), (c)(1)(C)(i), 924(j)(1). On appeal, 

Patterson’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the 

district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Patterson was 

informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but 

has not done so. The Government has filed a motion to dismiss 

the appeal on the basis of the appellate waiver provision in 

Patterson’s plea agreement.

A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the 

right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v. 

Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). We review the 

validity of an appellate waiver de novo, and we will uphold a 
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waiver of appellate rights if the waiver is valid and the issue 

being appealed is covered by the waiver. United States v. 

Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). An appellate waiver 

is valid if the defendant’s agreement to the waiver was knowing 

and intelligent. Id. at 169. To determine whether a waiver is 

knowing and intelligent, we examine “the totality of the 

circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the 

accused, as well as the accused’s educational background and 

familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” United 

States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, if a district 

court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of 

appellate rights during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, and 

the record indicates that the defendant understood the full 

significance of the waiver and was not denied effective 

assistance of counsel, the waiver is valid. United States v. 

Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005).

A review of the Rule 11 hearing transcript confirms 

that Patterson knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 

appeal. In his plea agreement, Patterson explicitly waived the 

right to challenge his sentence on appeal, reserving only the 

right to appeal based upon grounds of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, a sentence in excess of the 

statutory maximum, and a sentence based on an unconstitutional 
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factor. Patterson confirmed at his Rule 11 hearing that he read 

and understood the plea agreement. The district court conducted 

the colloquy required under Rule 11, ensuring that Patterson 

understood the charges and potential penalties, and that 

Patterson was competent to enter the plea. We therefore 

conclude that Patterson knowingly and intelligently waived the 

right to appeal his sentence. Because Patterson explicitly 

challenges only his sentence on appeal, and we further conclude 

that Patterson’s appeal falls squarely within the scope of the 

waiver provision of Patterson’s plea agreement, we grant the 

motion to dismiss as to Patterson’s sentence.

The waiver provision, however, did not waive 

Patterson’s right to appeal his convictions. Defense counsel 

does not assert any errors related to Patterson’s guilty plea or 

convictions, but the waiver provision does not preclude our 

review of his convictions pursuant to Anders. In accordance 

with Anders, we have thoroughly examined the entire record for 

any potentially meritorious issues not covered by the waiver and 

have found none. Accordingly, we deny the Government’s motion 

to dismiss as to Patterson’s convictions, and we affirm those 

convictions.

In sum, the Government’s motion to dismiss is granted 

in part and denied in part, Patterson’s appeal of his sentence 

is dismissed, and his convictions are affirmed. This court 
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requires that counsel inform Patterson, in writing, of his right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Patterson requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Patterson. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART