SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4983-17T2

JENNY R. CIULLA, f/k/a 

JENNY R. OTT, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RAYMOND T. OTT,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Argued May 29, 2019 – Decided July 9, 2019

Before Judges Rothstadt and Gilson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FM-14-0608-15.

James Clark Jensen argued the cause for appellant 

(Laufer Dalena, Jensen & Bradley LLC, attorneys; 

James Clark Jensen, of counsel and on the brief; Kory 

A. Crichton, on the briefs).

Daniel Pelic argued the cause for respondent 

(Townsend Tomaio Newmark LLC, attorneys; Daniel 

Pelic, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

In this post-divorce-judgment matter, defendant Raymond Ott appeals 

from a May 14, 2018 order denying his motion to reconsider a March 27, 2018 

order that compelled him to pay child support and other child care expenses, and 

denied his request to require plaintiff to attend mediation before filing a motion 

in court. The only order on appeal is the order denying reconsideration. We 

discern no abuse of discretion in that order and, therefore, we affirm.

I.

The parties were married in October 2010. They have two children: a son 

born in January 2012, and a second son born in February 2013. Less than five 

years after their marriage, the parties were divorced in May 2015.

At the time of the divorce, the parties negotiated and entered into a 

property settlement agreement (PSA), which was incorporated into their dual 

final judgment of divorce. In the PSA, the parties agreed that defendant would 

pay $93 per week in child support, he would pay thirty-five percent of agreedupon child-related expenses not covered by child support, and he would 

maintain medical, dental, and prescription insurance for the children. The PSA 

also contained a provision concerning mediation. That provision stated:

The parties agree that in the event there is a need to 

resolve certain issues, they will first attempt mediation, 
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prior to filing a court application. Any and all 

mediation costs incurred shall be split between the 

parties equally.

In January 2018, plaintiff filed a motion seeking (1) to find defendant in 

violation of litigant's rights for failing to pay child support, failing to contribute 

thirty-five percent of the children's preschool tuition and aftercare expenses, and 

failing to maintain medical, dental, and prescription insurance for the children; 

(2) compelling defendant to satisfy his child support arrears; (3) requiring 

defendant to report his income to probation to allow income withholding; (4) 

compelling defendant to purchase bunkbeds for the children so that they had a 

place to sleep when they were spending time with him; (5) sanctioning 

defendant; and (6) compelling defendant to pay plaintiff's counsel fees. 

Defendant opposed that motion and argued that plaintiff should be compelled to 

go to mediation before the motion was heard.

On March 27, 2018, the family court entered an order ruling on the motion 

and issued a written statement of reasons explaining the rulings. In the March 

27, 2018 order, the court (1) held defendant in violation of litigant's rights for 

failing to pay child support; (2) compelled him to pay his child support arrears 

and report his income to probation; (3) compelled him to make timely insurance 

premium payments and to provide proof of those payments; (4) compelled him 
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to purchase bunkbeds for the children; and (5) ordered him to pay $3336 for 

plaintiff's counsel fees. The court denied without prejudice plaintiff's request to 

compel defendant to reimburse her for his thirty-five percent share of the 

children's preschool tuition and aftercare expenses finding that plaintiff had 

submitted insufficient proof to establish whether the PSA required defendant to 

pay such expenses.

In the accompanying statement of reasons, the family court explained that 

although the parties had agreed to submit certain issues to mediation prior to 

filing an application in court, here there was no need for mediation because there 

were no disputed issues. In that regard, the court found that defendant had 

agreed to pay child support, but he was simply not paying what he had agreed 

to pay. With regard to the bunkbeds, the family court reasoned that there was 

nothing to mediate since defendant had an obligation to provide adequate 

sleeping arrangements for his children. With regard to attorney's fees, the court 

found that defendant had acted in bad faith and, therefore, plaintiff was entitled 

to an award of attorney's fees.

Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. Plaintiff sought 

reconsideration of her request for reimbursement of thirty-five percent of the 
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children's preschool and aftercare expenses. Defendant sought reconsideration 

of the court's denial of his request to compel mediation.

On May 14, 2018, the same judge denied defendant's motion for 

reconsideration and granted, in part, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and 

compelled defendant to pay his share of the children's preschool tuition and 

aftercare costs. The court also found that defendant had failed to comply with 

the March 27, 2018 order and directed defendant to comply with his obligations. 

Again, the court explained the reasons for its ruling in a written statement of 

reasons.

In addressing defendant's motion for reconsideration, the family court

reasoned that defendant had not demonstrated that the March 27, 2018 order was 

decided on a palpably incorrect basis. Instead, the court found that defendant 

was simply iterating the arguments that he had previously made. For the first 

time on reconsideration, defendant also argued that he was not able to pay child 

support. The family court rejected that argument finding that defendant had 

provided no financial information to support his contention.

On July 3, 2018, defendant filed a motion for leave to appeal as within 

time. We entered an order denying the motion as to the March 27, 2018 order, 
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but granting the motion as to the May 14, 2018 order. Accordingly, the only 

order on appeal before us is the May 14, 2018 order.

II.

On appeal, defendant makes one argument. He contends that the family 

court erred in denying reconsideration because the court should have enforced 

the parties' mediation clause. Given the issues that were ruled upon in the March 

27, 2018 order, we discern no abuse of discretion in the family court's decision 

to deny reconsideration.

On appeal from a denial of a motion to reconsider, our review is limited, 

but the denial "will be set aside if its entry is based on a mistaken exercise of 

discretion." Brunt v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 

357, 362 (App. Div. 2018). A trial court abuses its discretion "when a decision 

is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established 

policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis.'" Ibid. (quoting Pitney Bowes 

Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 

2015)).

Reconsideration should only be used in those rare cases that fit into a

narrow category where "either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based 

upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt 
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either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, 

competent evidence." Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 

2010) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).

Here, the question is whether plaintiff should have been compelled to 

mediate before bringing a court application. That question, in turn, requires an 

interpretation of the mediation provision in the parties' PSA as applied to the 

issues raised in plaintiff's motion.

New Jersey favors the use of consensual agreements to resolve marital 

controversies, treating them as binding contracts that should be enforced. 

Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265-66 (2007); Konzelman v. Konzelman, 

158 N.J. 185, 193-94 (1999). "It is not the function of the court to rewrite or 

revise an agreement when the intent of the parties is clear." Quinn v. Quinn, 

225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) (citing J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013)).

"[M]atrimonial agreements between spouses relating to . . . support, which are 

fair and just, fall within the category of contracts enforceable in equity." 

Peterson v. Peterson, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981). Nevertheless, "[t]he law grants 

particular leniency to agreements made in the domestic arena, and likewise 

allows judges greater discretion when interpreting such agreements." Guglielmo 
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v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 542 (App. Div. 1992); accord Pacifico, 190 

N.J. at 266.

Here, plaintiff sought to enforce child support obligations and agreedupon child care expenses that were not covered by child support. Significantly, 

defendant did not dispute that he owed these obligations. The mediation 

provision in the parties' PSA did not require all issues to go to mediation. 

Instead, it expressly stated that "in the event there is a need to resolve certain 

issues," the parties would first mediate such issues. There was nothing to 

resolve with regard to defendant's obligation to pay child support, the agreedupon preschool tuition and aftercare expenses, and his obligation to maintain 

health insurance. Moreover, defendant did not dispute that he was in arrears on 

his child support obligations, had failed to pay his share of the other childcare 

expenses, and was not maintaining the health insurance. Under those 

circumstances, there was nothing to mediate. Instead, as the family court 

correctly found, plaintiff was seeking to enforce agreed-upon obligations.

Defendant contends that certain of the obligations had not been agreed 

upon. In that regard, he points to the provision of the order that compelled him 

to purchase bunkbeds. Had defendant raised a factual dispute concerning that 

issue, he may well have been entitled to mediate that issue. Defendant, however, 
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did not dispute that when the children were staying with him, they did not have 

their own beds. Because this issue only comes to us on a motion for 

reconsideration, we discern no abuse of discretion that would require the matter 

to first go to mediation.

Affirmed.