# FILED May 20, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIM INAL APPEALS OF

TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) CCA No: 02C01-9707-CR-00254 Appellee, ) ) Shelby County v. ) ) Hon. Joseph Dailey, Judge ) THOMAS LEWIS, ) (Especially Aggravated Kidnaping – ) 2 Counts; Aggravated Robbery – Appellant. ) 2 Counts) )

FOR THE APPELLA

NT: FOR THE APPELLEE: Loys A. “Trey” Jorda

n, III John Knox Walkup 80 Monroe Avenue, Suite 550 Attorney General and Reporter Memphis, TN 38103 Elizabeth Ryan Bradley J. Cordts Assistant Attorney General 6263 Poplar Avenue, Suite 1132 425 Fifth Avenue North Memphis, TN 38119 2 nd Floor, Cordell Hu ll Building Nashville, TN 37243-0493 William L. Gibbons District Attorney General Terrell L. Harris James Morton Lammey, Jr. Assistant District Attorneys General 201 Poplar Avenue, Third Floor Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:

CONVICTIONS AFF

IRMED; SENTENCES MOD IFIED ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, Special Judge1 Because the appellant challenges t

he trial court’s denial of his mot ion to suppress,

the facts establish

ed at the suppression hearing and at trial are set forth herein. 2

O P I N I O N On May 16, 1996, the appellant was charged with two counts each of especially aggravated kidnaping and aggravated robbery. At the March 1997 jury

trial, the appella

nt was convicted o

n all

c harges. The trial court imposed twenty-year sentences for the especially aggr avated kidnapin g convictions and ten-year sentences for the aggravated robbery convic tions. The trial court further ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an ef fective sentence of sixty years. In this appea

l, the appellant ma

kes the following

claims of error: 1. The trial court e

rred in deny

ing defendant’ s motion to suppress; 2. The evidence wa

s insufficient to su

pport the verdict

; 3. The trial court erred whe n it required the d

efendant to

make in-court

statements; and 4. The trial court improperly sentenced him. Following our review, we affirm the convictions and modify the sente nces as set out below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1 Suppression Hearing On November 6, 1995, while investigating the robbery of Exline Pizza, Officer Tim Cook of the Memphis Police Department developed the ap

pellant and Carlos

Malone as suspec

ts. Officer Cook locatedboth men and asked them to come to the police station to answer questions about the robbery. At approximately 12:50 p.m. on November 8, 1995, Malone and the appellant went to the station where they were placed in separate

interview rooms. Officer Cook and Officer C.D. Gordon entere d the appellan t’s interview roo m at 1:30 p.m. and ask

ed the appellant t

o read aloud his Miranda rights as contained on the advice of rights form. Upon reading his rights, the appellant signed the form and indicated to the officers that he understood his rig

hts and wished to inv

oke his right to remain silent. Officer Cook advised the appellant that he was under arrest. Officer Cook also told the appell

ant that afte

r Malone’s statement was taken, the appellant would be taken downstairs for booking. Honoring the appellant’s wish not to speak with the police, no one with the3

department spoke with the appellant. Malone was interviewed and taken home. At approximately 3:30

p.m., Officer

Cook re-entered the appellant’s interview room to get statistical information for the arrest ticket. Lt. Steve Cole, also of the Memphis Police Dep

artment, testified that he also took some of the statistical information for the arrest ticket. When the appellant askedCook why he was under arrest, Cook responded that a witness had identified the telephone in the appellant’s possession as being taken during the Exline Pizza robbery. The appellant told Officer Cook that he wanted

to talk about the telephon

e; however, Cook t

old the appellant t

o think about it and left the room. When Officer Cook returned a few minut es later, the appellant expresse d his continued desire to talk. Both Officers Cook and Gordon witnessed the appellant’s execution of a second advice of rights form at 3:50 p.m. The appellant did not requ est an at tor ney. During the ensuing conversation, the appellant admitte

d to his involvement in

a number of robbe

ries. At 11:05 a.m. the nex t morning, Officers Cook and Gordon too k several stateme

nts from the appellant, including a statement about his involvement in the robbery of Christa Richards and Sean Greene. The appellant admitted to the aggravated

robbery of these victims. Before giving e ach statement, the appellant executed a waiver of rights form; however, he did not ask for an attorney on any of these occasions. The appellant testifi

ed that he was at h

is mother’s home when he was surrounded by police and taken to the station in the bac k of the patrol ca r. He added that h

e did not feel he w

as free to leave. At the station, he sa id he was placed i

n a small in

terroga tion room and leg-shackled to the chair. The appellant maintained that he had asked for an attorney during the investigation and made a statement to Officer Cook based on the promise of leniency.

Trial On May 22, 1995 at approximately 8:30 p.m., Sean Gr eene escorted

his fiancé, Christ

a Richards, to her car

following a visit. The two spent severa l minutes talking by

the car when Ms. Richards noticed a man, later identified as the appellant, walking past the other side of the car. The appellant turned around and walked back towards her. The ap pellant then o pened his jacket and pu lled out wha t Richards described as a little black revolver. Mr. Greene was not facing the appellant but turned around when he saw the frightened look on Ms. Richards’ face. The appellant stated “I’m pre pared to go to ja

il. I just need s

ome money.”

When Ms.4

Richards told

the appellant tha

t she only had

six dollars, the appe

llant became ang

ry at which

time Mr. Greene offered the appellant his cellular phone. Next, the appellant asked who owned the car and demanded the keys. Ms. Richards told the appellant that the key s we re in the apartment; however, they dropped from her h ands. Th e appellant remarked “Oh, so you want to lie to me. We’re all going for a little ride now.” The ap pellan t instructed Mr. Gr eene to drive whi

le he sat in the bac

kseat holding a g

un to Mr. Greene’s h

ead. Ms. Richards

sat in the front pa

ssenger seat.

The appellant or

dered Ms. Richards to remove her wa t ch and engagement ring. After they drove some distance, Mr. Greene urged the appellant to let them go by saying that they would de

ny seeing him. Mr. Greene went on to offer the car to the appellant in exchange for their release. After somethought, the appellant released Mr. Greene and Ms. Richards and fled in the car. The victims walked back to the apartment and called the police. They described the appellant as a fit, young, black male, approximately 5' 7" tall with med ium-c olored skin wearing a hat and black leather jacket. The appellant was ev

entu ally arr

ested and charg

ed with two counts e

ach of especia

lly ag gr avated

kidnaping and aggravated robbery. At trial, Ms. Richards testified concerning her contact with the appellant. As to her certainty to the identity of the perpetrator, she stated that she could recognize the v

oice of the perpe

trato r as he had said to her “Turn around, bitch.” Over defense objection, the trial court ordered the appellant to utter that statement; however, the appellant declined. Ms. Richards then stat ed that the phrase

“I don’t wan

t to hurt anyb

ody. All I need is some

mo ney” was spoken by the perpetrator. Again, the trial court aske d the appellant to r epeat th e phrase. The appellant complied.

ISSUES I. Motion to Suppress The appellant’s first complaint is that the trial court erred in deny

ing his motion to supp

ress. In his motion, the appe

llant argued tha

t his statements were

taken in violation o

f his Miranda

rights. Spe cif ica lly, he maintained tha t the officers fa

iled to “scrupulou

sly honor” h

is invocation of

his right to counsel. Within this is sue, the appellan t insists that his resulting confession was not knowing and voluntary.5

An appellate court should uphold a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, unless the evidence in the record preponderates against the finding. State v. Odom , 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence , and resolution of conflicts in the eviden c e are matters en trusted to the tria

l judge as the tri

er of fact. The

party prevailing in the trial court i s entitled to

the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as wel l as all reasonab

le and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Id . So long as the g reater weigh

t of the evidence

supports the trial c

ourt’s findings,

those findings shall be upheld. Id . However, theapplication of the law to the facts found by the trial court, is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Yeargan , 9 58 S.W. 2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997). In the instant case, the trial court made its findings on the record following the suppression hearing. The trial judge concluded that the officers had acted conscientiously by having the appellant execute th e advice of ri ghts form. T he judge further found that the appellant read the rights aloud and understood what he was reading. According to the Court, the re-entry into the interview room for the purpose of obtaining statisticalinformation for the arrest ticket did not constitute a violation of the appellant’ s Miranda rights. The trial court stated that it “did not find [the appellan

t’s] testimony to be credible today.” The appellant’s testimon y that th e officers used trickery or coercion was unsuppor ted by the evidence. The judge said that by the appellant’s own admission, the appellant was fully advised of his rights and signed the advice of rights forms. Finally, the trial court found no inconsistency in the testimonies of Officer Cook and Lt. Cole. In fact, the cou rt co ncluded that their testimony was consistent with the evidence that morethan one person c ontributed to the c

ompletion of the ar

rest ticket. The appellant compla ins that the office

rs violated his Miranda

rights by seeking statistical information from him. We disagree. Upon the appellant’s arrival at the police station, the officers sought to qu estion him ab out his involvement in various robberies. The appellant was given an advice of rights form which he read aloud and executed. The officers honored the appellant’s decision to invoke his rights. After theofficers spoke with Carlos Malone, they placed the appellant under arrest. Officer Cook entered the interview room

to obtain information for the arrest ticket. As c ited b y the state, in State v. Williams , 623 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)6

the Court held that M irandadid not prohibit an officer from asking statistical information and concluded

that the disclosure of a name, age and address “is essentially a neutral act.” Id . (citations omitted). Absent some compuls ion or coercion, “defendant’s statement of his place of residence cannot conflict with any constitutional guarantees of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.” Id . Fi nal ly, the Williams court concluded that an arrest ticket is not a “statement” under Rule 1 6 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id

. As to the presenc e of any compulsion, the appellant argues that his confession was not kn owing and voluntary and that the officers failed to scrupulously honor his request not to spe a k withthem. Without question, the officers had the legal obligation to honor the appellant’s right to remain silent. However, the record is devoid of evidence that his resulting

statements were

not freely given or that the officers in any way coerced th e appellant into confes sing. At the suppression he

aring, the appe

llant testified tha

t he had been held

in the interview room for several hours and eventually chained to a chair. He a dds that he was not perm itted to use the restroom facilities. The record indicates that the appellant was held initially for

approximately two hours once he had assert ed his Miranda rights. However, once the interview with Malone was

co mplete, the appellant was placed under arrest. Some time later, he made the statements that implicated him in various robberies, including the robbery and kidnaping at issue. As the trial court fo und, the evidence simply does not support a claim that the resulting statements

were not freely and voluntarily given. The appellant wa

s given two oppor

tunities to read his advice of rights form. Upon the first reading, he invoked his rights and the officers honored the invocation. The appella nt then ini tiated the subsequen t conversat ion which l ead to the re ading o f the second advice of rights form. Only after reading these rights did the appellant volunteer the information which made up his statements. The appellant’s claim of compulsion is unsupported by the evidence. Fin all y, the appellant argues that the conflict in

the testimonies of O

fficer Cook and L

t. Cole supports his position that his Miranda rights were

not honored and tha

t the statements we

re not freely given. At the hearing, Officer Cook testified that he obtained certain information for the arrest ticket and Lt. Cole testifi

ed that some of the st

atistical informa

tion on the arrest

ticket was in his handwriti ng. We are not convinced that this discrepancy in the testimony suppor ts the appellant’s claims. The trial j udge found no inconsiste ncy in the tw

o witnesses and co

ncluded that both

played7

some role in comple

ting the arrest

ticket. As the sole

judge of the cr

edibility of the witnesses, the trial judge was in a much better position to resolve any conflicts in the testimony. Having resolved such conflicts against the appellant, we will not usurp the trial court’s function. Findin g no coer cion or compulsion, we conclude that the officer’s request for statistical information did not constitute a st ate men t, a nd t here for e, d id n ot v iol ate the app ell ant ’s p revi ous lyinvoked Miranda

rights. Accord

ingly, this i

ssue is without merit

.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Next, the appellant contends that the evidence was insuffi cient to support his convictions. In Tennessee, great weight is given to the result reached by the jury in a

criminal trial. A jury verdict approved by the trial judge accredits the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Williams , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evide nce and all reasonable inferences which may be draw n therefrom. State v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 8 35 (Tenn. 197 8). Moreover, a guilty verdict

removes the presumption of innocence which the appellant enjoyed at trial and raises a presumption of guilt on appeal. State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The appellant has the burden of overcoming this presumption of guilt. Id

. Where sufficiency of the

evidence is challenged, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found the es sential elements o f the crime

or crimes beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson

v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Duncan , 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Te nn. 1985); T.R.A.P. 13(e). The weight and c

redibility of

the witnesses’ testimony are matters entruste

d exclusively

to the jury as the triers of fact. State v. Sheffield , 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984). The indictments charg

ing the appellan

t with two counts

of especially aggravated kidnaping read as follows: “Thomas Lewis on May 22, 1995, in Shelby

County, Tenn

essee . . . did unla

wfully and knowingly remove

Christa Richards [and Sean Greene] so as to interfere substantially with the liberty of the said Christa Richards [and Sean Greene], by use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a handgun, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-305 . . .” The evidence presented at trial revealed t hat Mr. Greene and Ms. Richards were standing beside Ms. Richards’ vehicle when the appellant held them at gunpoint. The appellant eventu ally8

ordered them into the vehicle and placed the gun towardsMr. Greene’s head while he drove. Only upon the victims’ pleas did the appellant free the victims a

nd take the vehic

le. The victims

were then forced t o walk some distance back to the apartment to telephone the police. The presence of the deadly weapon, the unquestionable interferen ce with the ir liberty a nd the removal of t

he victims provide the elemen ts necessary to support the appellant’s convictions for especially aggravated kidnaping. As to the aggrava

ted robbery

charges, the r

espective indict

ments stated that “Thoma s Lewis

on May 22, 1995, in Shelby County , Tennessee, and before

th e finding of this i

ndictment, did unl awfu lly, intentionally, knowingly and viole ntly, by use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a handgun, obtain from the person of Christa Richards [and Sean Greene], a sum of money, a motor vehicle and

a cellular telephone, proper goodsand chattels of Ch rista Richards [and Sean Greene], in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-402 . . .” The trial testimony indicated that the appellant approached the victims wh

ile standi ng next to Ms. Richa rds’ vehi cle. At gunpoint, he ordered them to produce their money. When he determinedtha t th e vi cti ms h ad n o mo ney, he asked for the keys to the vehicle. After Ms. Richards to ld him the keys were ins ide the apar tme nt b ut t hen dro ppe d th em, the app ell ant beca me a ngry, utteredvarious phrases and ordere d them into the vehicle. Once inside the vehicle, the appellant ordered Ms. Richards to gi

ve him her enga

gement ring and watch. He also took the cellular telephone offered to him by Mr. Greene. Fin

ally, afte r releasing the

victims, he drove away

in their vehicle. Without question, the necessary elements of aggrava ted robbery have been met. Withinthis issue, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in part on the fact that the victims had difficulty in identifying him as the perpetra tor of t he robber y and kidnapin g. However, this challenge is misplaced. While it is true that the victims’ testimony as to whether the appellant was the perpetrator revealed some uncertainty, the remainin g evidence supports the

conv ictions. Further, the court gave a jury instruction on how to evaluate the eyewitnes s identification. Additionally, the appellant ad mitted in his statements to police that he had robbed the victims. This statement was corroborated by the evidence. On appeal, the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions at trial. Here, the appellant has failed to meet his burden on any charge. This issue is without m

erit.9 III. In-Court Voice Identification The appellant’s third claim of error is that the trial court committed reversible

error when it ordered him to utter various statements in court. At trial, during the testimony of Ms. Richards, the witness, responding to a

question posed by the state, said that she remembered certain statements the perpetrator

made to her at the time of the incident. At the request of the state, the trial court asked the appellant to repe

at various phrase

s. When defense

counsel objected, the court held a “jury out” hearing. During this heari ng, the court stated various facts of the case that supported the necessity of

a voice exemplar. The court also conclu ded that the word “

bitch” was not bei

ng offered to in

flame the jury but to re flect the actual statement made by the perpetrator. Recognizing the ne ed for the voice-identification, the trial court ordered the appellant

to utter the phrase, “Turn around, bitch.” Upon a return to court and in the presence of the jury,

the appellant re

fused to utter the

phrase “Turn around, bitch.” When the trial court asked the witness for other statements of the perpetra tor, the witness off ered the phr ase “ I don ’t w ant to h urt anyb ody, I just want some money.” The appellant uttered the phrase. The defendant now complains that the for c ed utterance of these phrases and the jury’s viewing of him refusing to utter one o f the statements viol ated his right to r

emain silent. I

t is undisputed that an appellant in a criminal case has the constitutional right to remain silent and cannot be compelled to testify. However, “[a] def endant may b

e compelled to

give evidence which does nothave t estimoni al significance because such evidence is not protected by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” State v. Meeks , 867 S.W.2d 361, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (citations omitted). Citing United States v. Wade , 388 U.S. 218, 222-223 (1967), the Meeks court reiterated the well-settled principle that “the privilege against self-incrimination was not violated by compelling a defendant to speak and to utter words purportedly uttered by the assailant in order

for witnesses to consider the utterances for identification purposes.” Id

. The appellant conten d s that the statements made by him had testimonial significance; however, this Courtfinds that the utterances made by the appellant during the trial constituted voice exemplars. As such, the statements made by the appellant did not rise to the level of testimony and didnot violate his right to remain silent. The Court would note, however, as suggested by the appellant,that when such voice exemplars became a useful or necessary part of a case, the pref erred10

timing of obtaining these exemplars would be prior to the trial of the matter. In this case, we do not find that the utterances required of appellant during the trial, the nature of the utterances o

r the appellant’ s refusal to make one such utteran

ce so prejudiced

his trial as to require a reversal. Error, if any, was ha rmless. This issue is without merit.

IV. Sentencing Fi nal ly, the appellant maintains that the judge erred in sentencing him to an effect ive sentenc e of sixty (60) years. Specifically , the appellant contends that the trial court impr operly co nsidered certain enhancement factors and errantly r an the sentences consecutively. When a challenge is

made to the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence , it is the duty of this court to conduct a de novo review with a presumption that the determinations made by th e court from which the appeal is taken are correct.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). Th e Sentencing Commission Comments provide that the bu rden is on the defendant to show the impropriety

of the sen

tence. Th

ere are, however, exc eptions to t he presumption of c orrectness. First, the record must demonstrate that the trial court consider ed the senten cing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). Second, the presumption does not apply to the legal conclusions reached by the trial court

in sentencing. Third, the presumption does not apply when the determinations made by the trial court are predicated upon uncontroverted

facts.

A. Length of Sentences Aggravated

robbery, a

Class B felony, carries a range of 8 to 12 y ears for a Standard R ange I offender. Without consideration of enhancing and mitigating factors, the presumptive sentence for

a Class B felony is the minimum sentence in the statutory rang e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). In each of the espe

cially aggravated kidnaping convictions, the trial jud ge im pos ed t wen tyyear sentences. Especially

aggravated

kidnaping, a Clas s A felony, carries a range of 15 to 25 y ears for a StandardRange I off

ender. Althoug

h the statute chan

ged in 1995, at the time this offense, the presumptive sentence in a Class A felony was the minimum within the statutory ra nge. Where the trial court finds one or more enhancing but no mitigating factors, the court may sentence above the presumptive sentence within the range. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(d). Where11

bothenhancing and mitigating factors apply, the trial court must start at the presumptive sentence and then enhance within the statutory range based on any appropriate enhancing factors and r educe the sentenc e within the statutory range based on any appropriate mitigating factors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(e). So long as the trial court complies with the purposes and principles of the Tennesse e Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and its findings are s upporte d by the record, the weight afforded to any enhancing and/or mitigating factors is left to

the discretion of

the trial court.

State v. Moore , 942 S.W.2d 570 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Following a sentencin g hearing, the trial court considered as enhancement factors that: the appellant has no hesitation about

committing the offense when the risk to human life was high and that the offense was committed under circumstances under which the po tential for bodily

injury to

a victim was gr eat. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-114(10) & (16). In addition, the trial court gave

someweight, as required

by statute, to the fact

that the appellant released the victims. However, the court indica ted that t

he release was

not necessarily

voluntary a

nd resulted only

after the victims begged to be released. The trial judge refused to consider the age of the appellant as a mitigating circumstance as the appellant was in his twenties when the incident occurred. Init ial ly, the C ou rt would note, and t he state conced

es, that the trial c

ourt improperly considered enhancement factors (10)and (16) in the ag gravated robb

ery convic

tions. As resolved in State v. Claybrooks , 910 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 994), this Court held that because these factors are inh

erent in the offense of aggravated robbery , they may

not be used to enhance the resulting sentence. Acc ording ly, these sentences are reduced to the minimum eight y ears in each aggravated robbery conviction. This Court has further held that enhancement factors (10) and (16) are inapplicable i n especially aggravated kidnaping convictions where a deadly weapon is used. See State v. Kern , 909 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Acc ordingly, these sentences are similarly modified to the minimum fifteen years in each especially aggravated kidnaping conviction.

. B. Consecutive Sentences The appellant also al

leges that the tr

ial c ourt errantly imposed consecutive sentences. As stated above, th

e trial judg e found that the appellant was a dangerous offender and imposed an12

effectivesentence of 60 years. With the modifications made by this Court, the effecti ve sentence is reduced to 46 y

ears. Tennessee CodeAnnotated Section 40-35-115 provides that “[i]f a defendant is convicted of more than one (1) criminal offense, the court shall order sentences to run consec uti vel y o r concurrently

as provided by the criteria in this section.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(a). “The Courtmay order s

entences to

run con secu tiv ely i f th e cou rt f ind s by a preponderance of the evidence that: . . . (4) The defe

ndant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4). The trial court concluded that theappellant should be classified as a “dangerous offender.” Citing the statute

, the court reaso

ned that: These two victimswere minding the ir own businesses in

the evening, standing outside the apart ment building in

which one of them lived, talking, not ha rming a soul, minding their own business, when Mr. Lewis elected to appro

ach them, stick a g

un inthei r face, rob them , force them into the car, kept the gun at the head of, I believe it was, the male victim that

was dr iving as they went down, if I’m not mistaken. . . . When people are forc

ed into a car at g

unpoi nt and are made to start drivi ng and they’re he ading toward de

solate areas, it s

pells trouble. And I

think these two victims in this case were lucky to be alive today to tell the tale. And for an individual to have committed the crimes that Mr. Lewis committed in the manner in which they w

ere committed, in m

y judgment there can be no question

that he is a dangerous offender as contemplated in the statute. In State v. Wilkerson , 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), the Tennessee Supreme Court delineated the following requirements fo r imposing consec

utive sentences w

hen the defenda

nt is classified as

a “dangerous offender”:

(1) Proof that

an offender’s behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesita

tion about committing

a crime when the

risk to human life was high. (2) The proof must establish that the terms imposed are reaso nably related to the severity of the offenses committed. (3) An e xte nde d se nte nce i s ne cess ary to prote ct the public aga inst further crimina

l conduct by

the defendant. Id . at 938-39. The testimony at trial indicates tha t the appellant approached the victims with a weapon, robbedth em at gunpoint and forced them into one of the victim’s car. Holding the gun to Mr.13

Greene’s head, the app ell ant for ced G reen e to dri ve aw ay. While in the car, the appellant demanded Ms. Ri chards’ engagement ring and her watch. Only after pleading with the appellant were the victims released. Without question, the appellant’s behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation a

bout committing a c

rimewhen the risk to human life was high. We agree that the appellant is a dangerous offender. The appellant’s decision to rob the victims was tak en a step further

when he also dec

ided to kidnap them. The robbery itself placed the victims in harms way ; ho wever, when th e appellant unnecessarily

kidnaped them, the danger to them was increased exponentially. As such, the consecutive sentences reasonably relate to the offe nses committed. Fin all y, based on the proof in the r ecord, t his Court finds that a n extended sentenc

e is necessary to pro te ct society from the appellant. As stated above, the appellant shows little regar d for the sanc tity of h uman life. His dang erousness warr

ant the extended se

ntence imposed in t

his case. This issue is

similarly wit

hout merit.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the appellant’s convictions. The sentences are modified as set forth herein.

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, Special J udge

CONCUR:

JOE G. RILEY, J udge

CURWOOD W ITT, Judge