[Cite as State v. Kendrick , 2012-Ohio-504.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 24626 : v. : Trial C ourt Case No. 03-CR-4234 : SHAUN D. KENDRICK, SR. : : (Criminal Appeal from Defendant-Appellant : ( Common Pleas Court) :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 10 th day of February, 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . . MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by CARLEY J. INGRAM, Atty. Reg. #0020084, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appe llate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee SHAUN D. KENDRICK, SR., #A489-082, Pickaway Correctional Institution, Post Office Box 209, Orient, Ohio 43146 Defendant-Appellant, pro se

. . . . . . . . . . . . . KLINE, J. (sitting by assignment) {¶ 1} Shaun D. Kendrick, Sr., appeals the denial of his Motion to Dismiss and Vacate Conviction Pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 & Crim.R. 32( A)(C). Kendrick argues that the trial court’s termination entry was not a final appealable order, and, therefore, he is entitled to an 2

 evidentiary hearing on why his case should not be dismissed. Because the proper remedy of the error in this case is not a new hearing or dismissal, we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. {¶ 2} On January 26, 2005, Kendrick accepted a pl ea deal and pled guilty to seven counts of rape. “Six of those convictions were for rapes that had occurred prior to the July 1, 1996 effective date of th e Senate Bill 2 sentencing laws, a nd the other one took place after that date. The trial court sentenced Kendrick to five consecutive, i ndeterminate sentences of 10 to 25 years and one concurrent sent ence of 10 to 25 years for the pre-S.B. 2 rapes. The court also ordered a consecutive 10-year term for th e post-S.B. 2 rape. We affirmed Kendrick’s convictions and sentence. State v. Kendrick, Montgomery App. 20965, 2006-Ohio-311 [hereinafter ‘ Kendrick I ’].” State v. Kendrick , Montgomery App. No. 21790, 2007-Ohio-6136, at ¶2 (hereinafter “ Kendrick II ”). {¶ 3} The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed Ke ndrick's post-S.B. 2 sentence following our decision in Kendrick I . See In re Ohio Sentencing Cases , 109 Ohio St.3d 411, 2006-Ohio-2394, at ¶19. The case was rema nded for re-sentencing in line with State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856. See Kendrick II at ¶3. {¶ 4} The trial court re-sentenced Kendrick on remand to ten years on the post-S.B. 2 count, and, in August 2006, the trial court issued a new termination entry (hereinafter the “Resentencing Entry”). The c ourt ordered Kendrick to serve that sentence consecutive to his other six sentences. Kendrick a ppealed following the resentencing hearing, and we affirmed 3

 the trial court’s decision. See Kendrick II at ¶19. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to review our decision in Kendrick II . See State v. Kendrick , 117 Ohio St.3d 1441 (Table), 2008-Ohio-1279. {¶ 5} On January 20, 2011, Kendrick filed a “Motion to Dismiss and Vacate Conviction Pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 & Crim.R. 32(A)(C).” In his motion, Kendrick argued that the trial court’s Resentencing Entry was not a final appealable orde r. Kendrick asserted that, because there was no final appealable order properly sentencing him, the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing and disc harge Kendrick. The trial court denied Kendrick’s motion. {¶ 6} Kendrick appeals and asse rts the following assignment of error: {¶ 7} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ISSUING A FINAL APPEALLABLE [sic] ORDER VIOLATING THE SIXTH & FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, §16 TO THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

II. {¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, Kendrick argues that the trial court’s Resentencing Entry does not meet the requirements of a final app ealable order, and, therefore, he is entitled to a hearing on why his case should not be dismissed. {¶ 9} Crim.R. 32(C) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict, or findi ngs, upon which each conviction is based, and the sentence. * * * The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the journal. 4

 A judgment is effective only when en tered on the journal by the clerk.” {¶ 10} Thus, “[a] judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the guilty plea, the ju ry verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based; (2 ) the sentence; (3) th e signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court.” State v. Baker , 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, syllabus. {¶ 11} Kendrick asserts that the Resentencing Entry is not a final appealable order because it fails to set forth th e manner of Kendrick’s conviction. That is, the entry does not indicate that Kendrick pled guilty to the cr imes for which he was convicted. The State concedes the error in the Resentencing Entry. Kendrick notes that it has been six years since his original sentence and five years since the Resentencing Entry. According to Kendrick, the trial court has fa iled to impose his sentence without unn ecessary delay, and, therefore, he claims he is entitled to an evidentiary hear ing on why his case should not be dismissed. Kendrick’s argument is misplaced because dismissal is not the proper remedy for the trial
court’s error. {¶ 12} A nunc pro tunc entry is the proper method for correcting clerical errors such as the error in this case. “Clerical mistakes in j udgments, orders, or othe r parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time.” Crim.R. 36. “A nunc pro tunc entry is often used to correct a sentencing entry that, because of a mere oversight or omi ssion, does not comply w ith Crim.R. 32(C).” State ex rel. DeWine v. Burge , 128 Ohio St.3d 236, 2011-Ohio-235, at ¶17 (citations omitted). “Consistent with the treatment of Crim.R. 32(C) errors as clerical mistakes that can be 5

 remedied by a nunc pro tunc entry, [the Supreme Court of Ohio has] expr essly held that ‘the remedy for a failure to comply with Crim.R. 32(C) is a revised sentencing entry rather than a new hearing.’” Id. at ¶18, quoting State ex rel. Alicea v. Krichbaum , 126 Ohio St.3d 194, 2010-Ohio-3234, at ¶2. And “the technical failu re to comply with Crim.R. 32(C) by not including the manner of conviction * * * is not a violation of a statutorily mandated term, so it does not render the judgment a nullity.” Burge at ¶19 (emphasis sic) (citations omitted). Also see State v. Lester , 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204. {¶ 13} Thus, the trial court properly denied Kendrick’s motion because Kendrick sought relief that was unavailable to him. That is, Kendrick sought an evidentiary hearing on why his case should not be dismissed. The prope r remedy, however, for a trial court’s failure to set forth the manner of a defe ndant’s conviction in a judgment entry is to issue a nunc pro tunc entry that corrects the error. 1 {¶ 14} Accordingly, we overrule Kendrick’s sole assignment of error, and we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. . . . . . . . . . . . GRADY, P.J., and FAIN, J., concur. (Hon. Roger L. Kline, Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).

Copies mailed to: Mathias H. Heck

1 We note that the trial court issued a nu nc pro tunc entry reflecting Kendrick’s plea of guilty on September 20, 2011. 6

 Carley J. Ingram Shaun D. Kendrick, Sr. Hon. Michael Tucker