[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-11853

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-60741-RNS

DUTY FREE AMERICAS, INC., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

THE ESTEE LAUDER COMPANIES, INC., 

 Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(August 7, 2015)

Before MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and THAPAR,∗ District Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge: 

Duty Free Americas, Inc. (“DFA”), which operates duty free stores in many 

international airports nationwide, appeals the district court’s dismissal of its 

 ∗ Honorable Amul R. Thapar, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, 

sitting by designation.
2

multicount suit against The Estée Lauder Companies, Inc. (“Estée Lauder”), the 

largest manufacturer of beauty products sold in duty free retail outlets in the United 

States. DFA claims that Estée Lauder’s refusal to do business with DFA, and its 

communication of that fact to airport authorities evaluating whether to offer rental 

space to DFA, violates several federal and state laws. DFA also says that Estée 

Lauder places anticompetitive restrictions on duty free operators’ display space 

and ability to select their own inventory; it seeks injunctive relief from these 

requirements. Finally, DFA claims that its competitors disparaged its business 

methods and financial projections to airport authorities and seeks to hold Estée 

Lauder accountable for all of those statements. DFA filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Florida, asserting three claims in its 

amended complaint: (1) attempted monopolization, in violation of § 2 of the 

Sherman Act; (2) contributory false advertising, in violation of § 43(a) of the 

Lanham Act; and (3) tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, 

in violation of Florida law. The district court dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety

for failure to state a claim. 

After thorough review, we affirm. On each claim, DFA failed to allege 

basic facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Thus, in 

pleading its antitrust claim, DFA did not adequately allege that Estée Lauder

engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct. Nor has DFA come close to 
3

establishing standing to seek injunctive relief from the requirements that Estée 

Lauder places on its competitors, inasmuch as DFA no longer does any business 

with Estée Lauder. As for its false advertising claim, DFA failed to plead 

sufficient facts from which a court could find that Estée Lauder made false 

statements, or, for that matter, was responsible for any such statements made by 

DFA’s competitors. Finally, the complaint failed to allege any improper conduct 

sufficient to constitute tortious interference with a business relationship in 

violation of Florida law.

I.

A.

The essential facts contained in DFA’s complaint and its attached exhibits 

are these. DFA operates many duty free stores in American airports with 

international terminals. DFA is one of approximately ten major operators of duty

free stores in the United States. DFA currently holds leases in thirteen 

international airports located in eleven cities: New York (JFK and LaGuardia), 

Washington, D.C. (Dulles and Reagan National), Detroit, Miami, Atlanta, 

Baltimore, San Antonio, Phoenix, San Diego, Salt Lake City, and Charlotte. It 

competes with other duty free operators for the limited rental space available in 

U.S. airports servicing international flights. 
4

Airports generally rent their dedicated duty free space for lease terms of 

between five and ten years. An airport seeking to rent to a duty free operator 

proceeds by initiating competitive bidding. Typically, the airport issues a request 

for proposal (“RFP”), and interested duty free operators respond with proposals 

explaining what products they would carry at the airport and the amount of rent 

they are willing to pay. Proposed rent in the duty free market is comprised of both 

a minimum annual guarantee and a percentage of sales revenue. Normally, all of 

the space that an airport allocates for duty free retail space is leased by the same 

operator. 

At duty free stores, customers -- who must be outbound international 

travelers -- can purchase luxury products at discounted prices. Beauty products --

which include makeup, skin care products, and fragrances -- are a substantial 

component of duty free stores’ product offerings. And Estée Lauder is the “largest 

manufacturer of beauty products sold in duty-free stores in U.S. airports.” DFA 

notes that in 2010 Estée Lauder’s market share of cosmetics, a subgroup consisting 

of makeup and skin care, sold in duty free stores was approximately 45.71%, while 

its market share for skin care products exceeded 50%. DFA further estimates that 

Estée Lauder’s market share has increased in the intervening years. Newcomers to 

the duty free beauty products market are apparently rare, due to the “extremely 

limited shelf space available in airport duty free shops,” and DFA alleges that 
5

“[t]here has been no change in the composition of the top five beauty product 

manufacturers in the past five years, other than [Estée Lauder’s] continuous 

increase in market share each year.” 

DFA purchased Estée Lauder beauty products to sell in its duty free stores 

until June 2008. During that time, Estée Lauder set two different prices for each 

product -- a suggested domestic retail price and a lower suggested travel retail 

price. Retailers that sold Estée Lauder products in traditional outlets, such as 

department stores, could purchase goods at wholesale prices, which were set by 

discounting the suggested domestic retail prices of items. By contrast, duty free 

operators like DFA could purchase at lower travel wholesale rates that were set by 

discounting the suggested travel retail prices for particular products. For most of 

DFA’s relationship with Estée Lauder, the suggested travel retail price for beauty 

products offered customers a 10% discount off of the suggested domestic retail 

price. 

Duty free operators that contracted with Estée Lauder had to comply with 

several inventory and display requirements. In particular, Estée Lauder required 

operators to carry the full line of products within a particular brand (“full line 

forcing”) and carry the company’s less-popular fragrances if they wanted to sell 

cosmetics (“tying”). Estée Lauder also mandated that operators reserve display 

space of a certain size and quality for its products and that they keep excess 
6

inventory in stock, and routinely threatened to cut off all product supply when duty 

free operators resisted these conditions. According to the complaint and its 

attached exhibits, DFA was last subject to Estée Lauder’s various contractual 

requirements several years ago: (1) “display space and inventory demands” in 

March 2008; (2) “full line forcing” in March 2008; and (3) “tying” fragrances to 

other products in April 2006.

In January 2007, Estée Lauder announced plans to eliminate the differences 

between its suggested domestic retail prices and suggested travel retail prices. In 

other words, it would promulgate only one suggested retail price for each product 

that would be used in both traditional retail outlets and duty free stores. This 

planned change, which would both increase the prices DFA paid for Estée Lauder 

products and eliminate the discount that DFA’s customers gained by shopping at 

duty free stores, was supposed to take effect on April 1, 2008. As a result of the 

changing price structure, DFA terminated its business dealings with Estée Lauder 

by June 2008. 

DFA adapted to the loss of Estée Lauder’s product lines by devoting the 

display space that it formerly reserved for Estée Lauder products to other beauty 

brands. But at some undisclosed point, DFA sought to renew its prior relationship 

with Estée Lauder. The manufacturer refused to have any further dealings with 
7

DFA. The decision not to resume relations with DFA costs Estée Lauder an 

estimated $14.5 million each year. 

Since 2008, DFA has participated in competitive bidding for duty free retail 

space at four international airports: Newark Liberty International Airport, Boston 

Logan International Airport, Orlando International Airport, and Hartsfield-Jackson 

Atlanta International Airport. Because DFA’s allegations of unlawful conduct 

stem from Estée Lauder’s involvement, directly and indirectly, in these bidding 

processes, we relay the events that occurred in some detail. 

In December 2008, Newark Liberty International Airport issued a request for 

proposal, seeking a tenant to lease its duty free retail space for a seven-year term. 

DFA submitted a proposal in response to the RFP, as did three competitors: 

International Shoppes, Dufry, and EJE Travel Retail. Each of the other operators 

sold Estée Lauder products. During the RFP process, Estée Lauder’s President of 

Travel Retailing Worldwide, Olivier Bottrie, sent a letter to the leasing agent 

responsible for administering Newark’s bidding. The letter included a list of duty 

free operators that sold Estée Lauder products. Bottrie wrote: “We are confident 

that each of these authorized retailers brings the expected quality of in-store 

execution and required operational excellence necessary to represent our brands 

and service your valued passengers.” 
8

Newark ultimately rejected DFA’s proposal and opted to lease its space to 

Dufry. Newark also ranked the proposals, indicating that it chose the Dufry 

proposal because “Dufry had . . . [the] strongest financial position.” The airport 

ranked DFA’s proposal second to last among those submitted, stating only “Duty 

Free Americas does not have the rights to sell Est[é]e Lauder brands.” 

In May 2011, Boston Logan International Airport issued an RFP, seeking a 

tenant to lease its duty free retail space for a seven-year term. At the time the RFP 

was issued, DFA had been the incumbent duty free operator at the Boston airport 

for the last 16 years. DFA submitted a bid for the lease, as did two competitors, 

International Shoppes and Dufry. Both of the other operators had ongoing 

relationships with Estée Lauder. During the bidding process, Estée Lauder 

informed the contractor administering the RFP that the company did not sell its 

products to DFA. Boston elected to lease its duty free space to International 

Shoppes. The contractor explained its reasoning, emphasizing two factors:

International Shoppes was authorized to sell Estée Lauder products, and the 

minimum annual guarantee component of International Shoppes’ proposed rent 

was higher than DFA’s. 

In August 2011, Orlando International Airport issued an RFP, seeking an 

operator to develop duty free space. DFA submitted a proposal in partnership with 

Stellar Partners Inc. -- a local Florida entity that operated the duty free stores at 
9

Tampa International Airport. Under the terms of DFA and Stellar’s joint proposal, 

each company would run separately branded stores within the Orlando airport. 

DFA alleges that its bid “proposed to pay millions of dollars more in rent than any 

other bidder over the life of the contract.” Four bids were also submitted by 

DFA’s competitors: Dufry, Heinemann (in conjunction with a local partner, Travel 

Retail), World Duty Free, and a partnership of Nuance and DFASS. During the 

bidding process, Bottrie wrote to the Executive Director of the Greater Orlando 

Aviation Authority to inform him that Estée Lauder would not do business with 

DFA or with Stellar. The other four bids were submitted by entities or partnerships 

that sold Estée Lauder products. The Airport Authority awarded its duty free 

concessions to the Nuance/DFASS partnership, ranking DFA’s proposal second 

among the submitted bids. DFA appealed the decision, and the Airport Authority

conducted a hearing on November 15, 2011.

At the appeal hearing, DFA was asked to explain why its proposal implied

that it would sell Estée Lauder products in the Orlando Airport if it were awarded 

the lease.1

 DFA and Stellar attempted to account for the discrepancy by arguing 

 1 Specifically, DFA’s proposal had listed a “significant number of Estée Lauder brand items”

that would be sold in its Orlando stores. Next, the promotional brochure that DFA included with 

its proposal made multiple references to Estée Lauder. First, the brochure included a section 

entitled “DFA Name Brands.” Both Estée Lauder and Clinique -- one of Estée Lauder’s brands -

- were included in this list. Second, the brochure included pictures of DFA retail space in which 

Estée Lauder and Clinique signage and products were visible. Finally, during the interview that 

the Airport Authority conducted after the proposals were submitted, when DFA representatives 
10

that its proposal had not been misleading, because the two operators assumed that 

the Stellar locations within the airport would carry Estée Lauder products. Stellar 

explained that, in the past, it sold Estée Lauder products in its Tampa duty free 

space. However, it had been forced to downsize its physical space and could no 

longer comply with Estée Lauder’s display requirements. Stellar’s representative 

claimed that Estée Lauder had assured Stellar that if the company acquired

sufficient physical space to meet Estée Lauder’s display requirements, the two 

companies could resume their relationship. 2

 

During the appeal hearing, several competitors for the Orlando International

Airport contract criticized DFA’s proposal. Travel Retail expressed its view that 

DFA’s financial projections were “unreasonable in light of past performance,” and 

that awarding a contract to DFA would be a “risk.” Travel Retail further said, “we 

strongly believe that Estée Lauder is a product which you have to sell.” Travel 

Retail reiterated this view in a letter after the hearing, in which it cited information 

“received directly from Estée Lauder” that placed “Estée Lauder’s market share 

 

were asked to confirm that the company had “a direct merchandise purchasing relationship with 

all that brands [it was] offering,” both representatives responded “yes” to the question. 

2 DFA also alleges that Estée Lauder engaged in similar conduct toward another of its partners, 

Concourse Concessions. Concourse Concessions partners with DFA to run duty free stores in 

three airports -- Miami, Dulles, and San Diego -- but partners with another operator in the Los 

Angeles airport. Estée Lauder has refused to sell products to Concourse Concessions for resale 

in Miami, Dulles, and San Diego, but supplies the operator with products for its Los Angeles 

location. 
11

[at] first in all categories” of beauty products sold in U.S. airport duty free stores. 

Travel Retail emphasized, “failure to offer the Estée Lauder product line will 

negatively impact duty free and duty paid sales revenue for both international and 

domestic travelers.” Similarly, Nuance, the winner of the Orlando contract, 

criticized DFA’s proposal, claiming that the ability to sell Estée Lauder products 

was a “key component” of operating a successful duty free store and “echo[ing]” 

Travel Retail’s concerns. Specifically, Nuance argued that “DFA[’s] sale 

projections are deemed to be unreasonable and not sustainable in light of the

history.” 

In January 2012, the Orlando Airport Authority affirmed its decision to 

award the Orlando lease to Nuance/DFASS, stating that it found DFA’s “sales

projections . . . overstated and not reasonably attainable.” Specifically, the Airport 

Authority concluded that DFA’s inability to offer Estée Lauder products would 

adversely impact sales. Moreover, the data that DFA provided from its other 

airport locations cast doubt on its predictions for sales in Orlando, and DFA’s 

estimates for future performance far exceeded what the independent consultant that 

the Airport Authority hired to evaluate the proposals believed was probable. 

Finally, in July 2011, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport issued 

an RFP for a seven-year lease to operate its duty free retail space. DFA submitted 

a proposal here too, as did three of its competitors: World Duty Free, Dufry, and 
12

Nuance. In November 2011, Atlanta’s Chief Procurement Officer, Adam Smith, 

informed the bidders that the contract would be awarded to DFA. In December, an 

attorney representing one of the other bidders wrote a letter to Atlanta officials 

regarding DFA. The letter suggested that DFA had made improper representations 

about its relationship with Estée Lauder, and it included Bottrie’s contact 

information, a list of Estée Lauder-owned brands, and information about the 

Orlando Airport Authority appeal hearing. The attorney urged Smith to examine 

DFA’s proposal for indications that the company was planning to sell Estée Lauder 

products if awarded the Atlanta contract, and suggested that Smith contact Bottrie 

to verify any representations DFA may have made. 

Smith contacted DFA. He recounted that DFA had listed 19 stock keeping 

units of Estée Lauder’s products, and asked DFA to confirm that it could in fact 

carry those items. DFA explained that it could supply everything listed in the 

proposal out of outstanding inventory. Subsequently, in early January 2012, the 

contract was officially awarded to DFA. 

On January 13, 2012, an attorney representing World Duty Free wrote to 

Bottrie, asking him whether DFA was authorized to sell Estée Lauder’s products. 

Bottrie responded, “Estée Lauder . . . do[es] not have a commercial relationship 

with DFA or its affiliates and ha[s] no plans to enter into such a relationship. In 
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accordance, DFA does not have authority to offer our product lines in their 

operations.”3

 

On January 17, Nuance sent a letter to Smith formally protesting the 

decision to award the Atlanta contract to DFA and accusing DFA of making 

misrepresentations in its proposal. Nuance stated in its letter “DFA may have 

made misrepresentations about its ability to carry Estée Lauder brands.” The letter 

also claimed that “a lack of access to Estée Lauder brands would cast doubt on the 

validity of DFA’s projected revenue streams.” Nuance based this statement on the 

fact that “Estée Lauder brands account for 20% of cosmetic and fragrance sales . . . 

and cosmetic and fragrance sales constitute one of the largest sources of revenue 

for duty free stores.” The letter also contained excerpts from the Orlando appeal 

decision. The protest letter apparently had no impact on the Atlanta officials’ 

decision.

B.

On April 26, 2012, DFA commenced this action in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Florida, asserting four claims against Estée 

Lauder: (1) conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 

15 U.S. § 1; (2) conspiracy to monopolize, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 

 3 An attorney representing Nuance later contacted Bottrie, seeking confirmation that Estée 

Lauder had not resumed relations with DFA. Bottrie responded with a similar letter to the one he 

sent to World Duty Free, stating that DFA had no relationship with Estée Lauder.
14

15 U.S. § 2; (3) attempt to monopolize, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act; and 

(4) tortious interference with prospective business relationships, in violation of 

Florida law. Estée Lauder moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6); the district court granted the motion, and dismissed the claims without 

prejudice. Soon thereafter, DFA amended its complaint. This time, DFA raised 

three claims: (1) attempt to monopolize, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act; (2) 

contributory false advertising, in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1125(a); and (3) tortious interference with prospective business relationships, in 

violation of Florida law.

Estée Lauder again moved to dismiss the claims, and once again, the district 

court granted Estée Lauder’s motion. This time, though the court dismissed the 

Lanham Act claim without prejudice, it dismissed the Sherman Act and tortious 

interference claims with prejudice, because “DFA [had] already had an opportunity 

to amend these claims” after accessing “tens of thousands” of Estée Lauder 

documents in discovery. The court first addressed DFA’s attempted 

monopolization claim, examining the three different forms of conduct that DFA 

alleged were anticompetitive. It concluded that the first two -- refusing to deal 

with DFA and disparaging DFA to airport authorities -- did not constitute 

anticompetitive conduct within the meaning of the antitrust laws. As for the last 

allegation -- that Estée Lauder imposed restrictions on duty free operators’ display 
15

space allocation and inventory stocking -- the court concluded that the claim was

time barred to the extent DFA sought damages. To the extent that DFA sought 

injunctive relief, the district court held that the claim was barred by laches or, in 

the alternative, that DFA lacked antitrust standing to pursue it. Next, the court 

concluded that the Lanham Act claim failed because DFA did not adequately 

allege that Estée Lauder or any of the duty free operators had made any false or 

misleading statements about DFA. In the trial court’s view, each of the offending 

statements expressed merely an opinion or prediction for the future and not a 

verifiable fact. Thus, it concluded that the statements were not actionable under 

§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Finally, the court dismissed the tortious interference 

claim because the complaint contained no allegations of improper conduct that 

would amount to an unjustified interference with DFA’s business relationships.

DFA timely appealed.

II. 

We review de novo the district court’s order dismissing DFA’s complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Henderson v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 

(11th Cir. 2006). We accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Murphy v. F.D.I.C., 208 F.3d 959, 

962 (11th Cir. 2000). “However, we afford no presumption of truth to legal 

conclusions and recitations of the basic elements of a cause of action.” Franklin v. 
16

Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1248 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). We are “free to 

affirm the district court’s decision on any ground that is supported by the record.” 

United States v. Elmes, 532 F.3d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted); 

see also Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1059 (11th Cir. 

2007) (“[W]e may . . . affirm a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion 

for any reason, regardless of whether it was raised below.”).

Rule 8(a) provides that a plaintiff’s pleading “must contain . . . a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The 

Supreme Court has further instructed that the plaintiff must submit “more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). This “plausibility standard is met only where the facts alleged 

enable ‘the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.’” Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 744 F.3d 702, 708 

(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Where a complaint pleads facts 

that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Although “[a] plaintiff need not plead 
17

‘detailed factual allegations[,] . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action will not do,’” and the plaintiff must offer in support of its claim

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.’” Simpson, 744 F.3d at 708 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555).

We measure each claim against this standard.

III. 

DFA first says that Estée Lauder violated the Sherman Act by attempting to 

monopolize the market for duty free beauty products sold in United States airports. 

Section 2 of the Act establishes that “[e]very person who shall . . . attempt to 

monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 

with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Section 

15 of the same statute prescribes that “any person who shall be injured in his 

business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 

therefor.” 15 U.S.C. § 15. A plaintiff alleging a claim for attempted 

monopolization under § 2 must plausibly assert three things: “(1) that the 

defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific 

intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 

power.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
18

“[T]he conduct requirement is arguably the single most important aspect of 

attempted monopolization.” Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc. v. Clear Channel 

Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1075 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). To 

survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must adequately allege “actual or 

potential harm to competition.” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 

1339 (11th Cir. 2010). This means the plaintiff must allege a “factual connection 

between the alleged harmful conduct and its impact [or likely impact] on 

competition in the market.” Id. Damage to individual competitors is rarely

sufficient to establish this element. See Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc., 376 F.3d 

at 1072-73 (“Although damage to a critical competitor may also damage 

competition in general, [the plaintiff] bears the burden of drawing that implication 

with specific factual allegations.” (emphasis omitted)). 

“Actual anticompetitive effects include, but are not limited to, reduction of 

output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality.” Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1339. 

“[A] showing of market power is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish 

potential harm to competition.” Id. at 1340; see Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc., 

376 F.3d at 1073 (“A plaintiff seeking to use market power as a proxy for adverse 

effect must show market power, plus some other ground for believing that the 

challenged behavior could harm competition in the market . . . .” (quoting Tops 

Mkts, Inc. v. Quality Mkts, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1998))). To show that
19

the defendant’s conduct caused harm to competition, “the plaintiff must define the 

relevant market and establish that the defendants possessed power in that market.” 

Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 302 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2002)

(quotation omitted). 

The relevant market has two components, and the plaintiff must define both 

the geographic market and the product market in which the defendant allegedly 

possesses increasing power. McWane, Inc. v. F.T.C., 783 F.3d 814, 828 (11th Cir. 

2015). The relevant geographic market is “the area of effective competition in 

which a product or its reasonably interchangeable substitutes are traded.” L.A. 

Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 423 (11th Cir. 1984)

(quotation omitted). The Court considers whether outside sellers are precluded 

from entering the market, id., and whether consumers cannot realistically turn 

outside the geographic area, T. Harris Young & Associates, Inc. v. Marquette 

Electronics, Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 1991). “[E]conomic and physical 

barriers to expansion [such] as transportation costs, delivery limitations and 

customer convenience and preference” are relevant to this determination. L.A. 

Draper & Son, 735 F.2d at 423 (quotation omitted).

“Defining a relevant product market is primarily a process of describing 

those groups of producers which, because of the similarity of their products, have 

the ability -- actual or potential -- to take significant amounts of business away 
20

from each other.” Polypore Int’l, Inc. v. F.T.C., 686 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 

2012) (quoting U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 995). For this reason, we “pay particular 

attention to evidence of the cross-elasticity of demand” -- the extent to which 

consumers demand less of the particular product as the price for its alleged 

substitute declines. Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1337 & n.16. “A high cross-elasticity of 

demand (that is, consumers demanding proportionately greater quantities of 

Product X in response to a relatively minor price increase in Product Y) indicates 

that the two products are close substitutes for each other,” and are part of the same 

product market. Id. at 1337 n.16. In other words, “[a] product market consists of 

‘products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they 

are produced.’” McWane, Inc., 783 F.3d at 828 (quoting United States v. E. I. du 

Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956)).

Defining the relevant product market is a fact-intensive endeavor. U.S. 

Anchor, 7 F.3d at 994. We consider a variety of factors in the calculus, including 

“industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the 

product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct 

customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.” 

Polypore Int’l, Inc., 686 F.3d at 1217 (quoting U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 995).

Second, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted with specific intent 

to monopolize. Anticompetitive intent is the design “to gain greater market share, 
21

to drive up prices, or to obtain some other illegal goal.” Mr. Furniture Warehouse, 

Inc. v. Barclays Am./Commercial Inc., 919 F.2d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1990). We 

have also explained that intent “may sometimes be inferred from predatory conduct 

itself.” U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 1001.

Lastly, to adequately plead dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 

power, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant is “close to achieving monopoly 

power” in the relevant product market. U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 994. “Monopoly 

power is ‘the power to raise prices to supra-competitive levels or . . . the power to 

exclude competition in the relevant market either by restricting entry of new 

competitors or by driving existing competitors out of the market.’” Id. (alteration 

in original) (quoting Am. Key Corp. v. Cole Nat’l Corp., 762 F.2d 1569, 1581 

(11th Cir. 1985)); see McWane, Inc., 783 F.3d at 830 (“Monopoly power is the 

ability to control prices or exclude competition.” (quotation omitted)). “[A] 

dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power may be established by a 50% 

share” of the relevant market. U.S. Anchor, 7 F.3d at 1000.

We accept for the purposes of our analysis that DFA has adequately defined 

a relevant product and geographic market. We read the complaint to essentially 

say that the relevant product market is the retail market for duty free “beauty 

products,” and the relevant geographic market is comprised of airport duty free 

stores throughout the United States. While Estée Lauder challenges both the 
22

definition of the product market and the definition of the geographic market, we 

have no occasion to address this fact-intensive question at this stage because the 

complaint wholly fails to allege any truly anticompetitive conduct on Estée 

Lauder’s part -- no matter how broadly or narrowly the market is defined.

4

 

Because our analysis begins and ends with the first, and most important, element of 

an attempted monopolization claim, we also decline to reach Estée Lauder’s 

arguments about anticompetitive intent and probability of achieving monopoly 

power. We find that each of DFA’s allegations of anticompetitive conduct is

insufficient to state a claim, and accordingly affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

the antitrust claims. Moreover, we conclude that DFA lacks both constitutional 

and antitrust standing to complain about the requirements that Estée Lauder places 

on DFA’s competitors, because DFA has not alleged that those restrictions have 

caused it any injury.

A.

DFA first argues that Estée Lauder’s refusal to reinstate its sales relationship 

with DFA constitutes anticompetitive conduct. It is by now well settled that “[a]

unilateral refusal to deal is [generally] not unlawful.” Mr. Furniture Warehouse, 

 4 DFA is not completely clear in its complaint whether it is defining the relevant market as the 

market to sell or to manufacture beauty products to be sold in airport duty free stores. On the 

one hand, the complaint alleges that DFA licenses brand names and manufactures their products, 

and, on the other hand, the complaint posits that Estée Lauder has entered the sales side of the 

market by hiring its own staff to work in duty free stores and by placing vending machines in 

DFA-dedicated airports. Estée Lauder challenges both formulations, arguing that it is not a seller 

-- or at least not an airport duty free retailer -- and DFA is not a manufacturer.
23

Inc., 919 F.2d at 1522 (second alteration in original). The Supreme Court has for 

many years emphasized that “the Sherman Act ‘does not restrict the long 

recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private 

business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom 

he will deal.’” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP

(Trinko), 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 

Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). Moreover, the Court has “been very 

cautious in recognizing . . . exceptions” to that rule “because of the uncertain virtue 

of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive 

conduct by a single firm.” Id.

At the same time, “[t]he high value that [courts] have placed on the right to 

refuse to deal with other firms does not mean that the right is unqualified.” Aspen 

Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Aspen Skiing), 472 U.S. 585, 601 

(1985). Thus, a refusal to deal under some circumstances “can constitute 

anticompetitive conduct and violate § 2.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. We come, 

then, to the first basic question: whether DFA’s refusal to deal allegations “fit 

within existing exceptions or provide a basis, under traditional antitrust principles, 

for recognizing a new one.” Id. We conclude that they do not.

DFA claims that its complaint sets forth sufficient facts yielding an inference 

of an anticompetitive refusal to deal within the meaning of two Supreme Court 
24

cases: Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, and Otter 

Tail Power Co. v. United States (Otter Tail), 410 U.S. 366 (1973). But as we see 

it, these two cases are persuasively distinguishable, and this case provides no 

compelling reason to depart from a business entity’s general “right to deal, or

refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently.” 

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).

First, in Aspen Skiing, a system was developed in Aspen, Colorado at a time 

when each of its three major ski resorts were independently owned, under which 

skiers could purchase an “all-Aspen” pass that would allow them to use speciallypurchased tickets interchangeably at all the resorts. 472 U.S. at 587-89. One 

company, Ski Co., subsequently gained control of three of the four major resorts, 

but the fourth, Highlands, remained independent. Id. at 589-90. Ski Co. then 

unilaterally discontinued the “all-Aspen” pass, and subsequently refused to enter 

into any cooperative arrangement allowing Highlands customers access to any of 

its resorts. Id. at 592-94. It also refused to sell lift tickets to Highland, even when 

Highland offered to pay the market retail price of the tickets. Id. at 593.

The Court held that Ski Co. had engaged in anticompetitive conduct by 

terminating the all-Aspen program, emphasizing that Ski Co. had not “merely 

reject[ed] a novel offer to participate in a cooperative venture that had been 

proposed by a competitor. Rather, [Ski Co.] elected to make an important change 
25

in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had 

persisted for several years.” Id. at 603. The Supreme Court acknowledged that 

this conduct was “not necessarily anticompetitive.” Id. at 604. But it raised 

enough of a question that the Court was required to consider the effect of Ski Co.’s 

actions on Highlands, the “impact on consumers[,] and whether [the company]

ha[d] impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way,” id. at 605. The

Court noted that customers strongly preferred the all-Aspen pass, id. at 606-07, and 

that Highlands’s market share dropped from approximately 20% to 11% over the 

four year period after the pass was discontinued, id. at 594-95, 607-08. Under 

these circumstances, the Court explained,“[t]he jury may well have concluded that 

Ski Co. elected to forgo . . . short-run benefits because it was more interested in 

reducing competition in the Aspen market over the long run by harming its smaller 

competitor.” Id. at 608.

The Supreme Court’s later opinion in Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law 

Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, provides further guidance. Trinko

clarified that Aspen Skiing embodies only a “limited exception” to the general rule 

that firms may choose the other companies with which they deal. Id. at 409. In 

Trinko, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant Verizon was statutorily obliged to 

make its operations support system available to its competitors, but that Verizon

essentially refused to deal with those competitors by ignoring or delaying its 
26

response to their requests for access. Id. at 402-05; see Covad Commc’ns Co. v. 

BellSouth Corp. (Covad II), 374 F.3d 1044, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2004). The 

Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had not stated a refusal to deal claim under 

Aspen Skiing, characterizing that case as “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 

liability.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. The Court held that the Trinko plaintiffs could 

not state a refusal to deal claim under Aspen Skiing for two primary reasons. As 

an initial matter, the plaintiff in Aspen Skiing had demonstrated “[t]he unilateral 

termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing,” 

which “suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an 

anticompetitive end.” Id. (emphasis in original). By contrast, the Trinko plaintiffs

did “not allege that Verizon voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing with its 

rivals.” Id. Interpreting this portion of the opinion, we have explained, “Trinko

now effectively makes the unilateral termination of a voluntary course of dealing a 

requirement for a valid refusal-to-deal claim under Aspen.” Covad II, 374 F.3d at 

1049.

The Supreme Court also emphasized “pricing behavior,” noting that the 

plaintiff in Aspen Skiing was willing to compensate the defendant at the price its 

rival charged its ordinary customers. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. By contrast, the 

Trinko plaintiffs complained about Verizon’s reluctance to deal at a statutorily set 

“cost-based rate of compensation.” Id. (“Verizon’s reluctance to interconnect at 
27

the cost-based rate of compensation . . . tells us nothing about dreams of 

monopoly.”).

In our view, DFA has similarly failed to state a refusal to deal claim under 

Aspen Skiing. For starters, DFA has not alleged that Estée Lauder unilaterally

terminated the business relationship between the two companies. Rather, the 

district court found, and we agree, that DFA ceased dealing with Estée Lauder of 

its own accord. DFA argues that this Court must credit the complaint’s allegation 

that Estée Lauder is responsible for ending the relationship between the two 

parties. However, the complaint did not allege that Estée Lauder originally 

terminated the relationship in 2008. Rather, the complaint used broad language to 

generally allege that Estée Lauder refused to do business with DFA. It says, for 

example, “[Estée Lauder] refused to sell its products to DFA,” and that Estée 

Lauder attempted “to isolate and exclude DFA,” without specifically mentioning 

how the parties’ business relationship was terminated. Indeed, the complaint 

focuses not on the relationship’s end but on the fact that, while “DFA has 

approached [Estée Lauder] in an effort to resume their . . . relationship several 

times[,] [Estée Lauder] has refused to even discuss this possibility.” 

Moreover, when Estée Lauder filed its motion to dismiss, the district court 

conducted a hearing. At that proceeding, DFA’s counsel admitted that DFA 

terminated the relationship. The district court asked counsel: “Isn’t it undisputed 
28

that [DFA] initially terminated its relationship and then they went back and said, 

‘Now we want to restate [sic] our relationship, and [Estée Lauder] refused to 

restart it[?]” Counsel responded:

[A]fter DFA did not want to purchase from [Estée Lauder] because of 

the price increase, you’re right. They went back to them. But I would 

say there’s additional facts that would suggest that the initiative to 

refuse to deal had moved to [Estée Lauder] certainly by 2010 . . . .

Because DFA’s own characterization of its complaint at the hearing was that DFA, 

not Estée Lauder, terminated the relationship, its attempt to now argue the opposite 

is unpersuasive.

But even if we were not persuaded by DFA’s own description of the 

termination at the hearing before the district court, DFA referred to the transcript 

of the Orlando RFP appeal hearing repeatedly in its complaint and attached an 

excerpt of the transcript as an exhibit. At the Orlando hearing, a representative for 

DFA noted that all of the duty free operators had disagreed with Estée Lauder’s 

proposed price increases. He went on to explain: “DFA was the only company that 

followed through on its conviction that the Estée Lauder pricing change was not in 

keeping with the spirit of customer duty-free savings expectations. And as a 

consequence, DFA quit offering Estée Lauder products in its stores.” As a 

document which was referenced in the complaint, and is central to the issue of 

whether DFA adequately alleged anticompetitive conduct, the district court was 

entitled to consider the transcript and the facts therein. Bickley v. Caremark RX, 
29

Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1329 n.7 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here the plaintiff refers to 

certain documents in the complaint and those documents are central to the 

plaintiff’s claim, then the Court may consider the documents part of the pleading 

for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” (quotation omitted)); Maxcess, Inc. v. 

Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) 

(stating that a court may consider documents “central to the plaintiff’s claims 

and . . . undisputed in terms of authenticity”).

Aspen Skiing is also distinguishable from this case in other significant ways. 

Thus, while the Aspen Skiing plaintiffs demonstrated their willingness to pay the 

market price for the defendant’s goods, DFA repeatedly asserts in its complaint 

that it strongly resisted Estée Lauder’s across the board price increases. In this 

regard, DFA far more closely resembles the Trinko plaintiffs, with their insistence 

that Verizon had to deal with its rivals at cost.

We are likewise unpersuaded by DFA’s suggestion that the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Otter Tail applies. Notably, Otter Tail involved “a vertically integrated 

monopolist that refuse[d] to deal with a customer to foreclose competition in a 

second market.” See Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 

1289 (11th Cir. 2002), vacated, 540 U.S. 1147 (2005), overruled on other grounds 

by Covad II, 374 F.3d 1044; see also IIIB Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 

Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 772b3, at 205 (3d ed. 2008) (“The defendant [in 
30

Otter Tail] possessed a natural monopoly. This monopoly was partially regulated 

in ways that may have allowed it to operate to the detriment of consumers through 

vertical integration. Third, the case ought to be read in light of strong historical 

formulations from the common law imposing broad duties to deal on public 

utilities.”). Here, by contrast, DFA has not alleged that Estée Lauder is a 

monopolist attempting to leverage its power to foreclose competition in a related or 

secondary market. Rather, taken in the light most favorable to DFA, the complaint 

establishes only that Estée Lauder has captured half of the market for supplying 

beauty products to duty free operators in U.S. airports. Thus, even if Estée Lauder

is seeking to move into the sales market, it is not a monopolist, much less a 

vertically integrated monopolist, rendering Otter Tail inapplicable.

B.

DFA also cites as predatory conduct that Estée Lauder made false statements 

about DFA during airport bidding processes. Disparagement is rarely a basis for 

finding attempted monopolization under § 2, because even false statements about a 

single competitor often do not meet the requisite standard of generating harm to 

competition. See Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc., 376 F.3d at 1076-77. As we 

have explained, when a defendant makes false statements -- even clearly false 

statements -- about a competitor, “these . . . practices might be characterized as 

unsavory, or even illegal under other laws,” but “they do not give rise to a federal 
31

antitrust claim without factual allegations specifically addressing how these 

practices have harmed competition.” Id. Indeed, many of our sister circuits have 

adopted a presumption that misrepresentations or false statements about a 

competitor have a de minimis effect on competition. See, e.g., Lenox MacLaren 

Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 762 F.3d 1114, 1127 (10th Cir. 2014); Am. 

Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric 

Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2003); Am. Prof’l Testing Serv., Inc. v. 

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc. (Harcourt), 108 F.3d 

1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997); Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., Div. 

of/& Am. Home Prods. Corp., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Mercatus 

Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 852 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[C]laims 

based on one competitor’s disparagement of another should presumptively be 

ignored. . . . [A]bsent an accompanying coercive enforcement mechanism of some 

kind, even demonstrably false commercial speech is not actionable under the 

antitrust laws.” (quotations omitted and alteration adopted)).

These courts generally require a plaintiff alleging disparagement to rebut the 

presumption by showing the defendant’s statements were “(1) clearly false, (2) 

clearly material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4) made to buyers 

without knowledge of the subject matter, (5) continued for prolonged periods, and 

(6) not readily susceptible to neutralization or other offset by rivals.” Lenox 
32

MacLaren Surgical Corp., 762 F.3d at 1127; accord Harcourt, 108 F.3d at 1152; 

Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., 850 F.2d at 916.

We agree that these factors are at least relevant to determining whether a 

defendant engaged in anticompetitive disparagement of a competitor. As the Ninth 

Circuit has explained, “distinguishing false statements on which buyers do, or 

ought reasonably to, rely from customary puffing is not easy,” particularly because 

most buyers “recognize disparagement as non-objective and highly biased.” 

Harcourt, 108 F.3d at 1152 (quoting III Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, 

Antitrust Law ¶ 737b, at 278 (1978)). Moreover, where a plaintiff complains of 

isolated rather than systemic disparagement, the effects on the plaintiff are 

necessarily speculative and the effects on competition even more so. See id. 

To resolve this case, however, we need not decide whether the plaintiff must 

present facts to support each of these factors, because, at the most basic level, DFA 

has failed to allege that Estée Lauder made any clearly false statements. As we see 

it, a plaintiff alleging anticompetitive disparagement must allege, at a minimum, 

statements that were demonstrably false in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 

Indeed, DFA seems to agree with this baseline requirement, inasmuch as it urges 

us to hold that a claim may go forward on allegations of deliberate “submission of 

false information to a decision-making governmental agency.”
33

DFA’s complaint identifies three instances of disparagement: (1) Estée 

Lauder sent a letter to the Newark Airport Authority including a list of its dealers 

and its belief that they were quality operators; (2) Estée Lauder told Boston and 

Orlando airport officials that it did not deal with DFA; and (3) Estée Lauder

communicated its market share and the fact that it did not deal with DFA to other 

duty free operators. Even taking these allegations in the light most favorable to 

DFA, none of the statements are false. First, Estée Lauder’s statement vouching 

for the quality of its duty free partners neither refers to DFA nor expresses an 

opinion about the quality of its work. Moreover, Estée Lauder does not have a 

relationship with DFA, and there is no allegation that the market share it 

communicated to its duty free operator customers was inflated or otherwise 

incorrect. For these reasons, we are unable to find any allegations of 

disparagement that could offend the antitrust laws in DFA’s complaint.

Moreover, DFA has failed to allege that any of these communications 

harmed competition. Rather, the complaint contains numerous examples of robust 

competition between the duty free operators to obtain airport leases. In fact, each 

of the relevant RFPs resulted in an award to a different operator. DFA itself was 

awarded the Atlanta duty free concessions contract after successfully rebutting 

claims that it would be unable to sell any Estée Lauder products. Similarly, during 
34

the Orlando RFP, DFA was offered a full and fair opportunity to contest the 

statements that other duty free operators made against it.

The complaint also does not allege that DFA is being pushed out of the duty 

free beauty products market. Rather, it concedes that DFA was able to develop 

demand for new beauty brands, and continues to sell beauty items despite losing 

access to Estée Lauder products. Finally, and perhaps most compellingly, DFA’s 

strategy of offering a wider array of products than its competitors appears to be 

working. The complaint alleges that DFA currently operates the duty free 

commercial spaces in more than half of the airports that possess that space -- it is 

the leaseholder in 13 of the 25 airports. 

As we have explained, “[a]lthough damage to a critical competitor may also 

damage competition in general, [the plaintiff] bears the burden of drawing that 

implication with specific factual allegations.” Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc., 

376 F.3d at 1072-73 (second emphasis added). And “market power alone cannot 

be sufficient to show the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition”; the 

plaintiff is “required [to make] specific allegations linking market power to harm 

to competition in that market.” Id. at 1073; see also Tops Mkts, Inc., 142 F.3d at 

97 (“A plaintiff seeking to use market power as a proxy for adverse effect must 

show market power, plus some other ground for believing that the challenged 

behavior could harm competition in the market, such as the inherent 
35

anticompetitive nature of the defendant’s behavior or the structure of the interbrand 

market.”). Here, it is not enough for DFA to allege that Estée Lauder is the top 

supplier of duty free beauty products. DFA was required to link that fact to a 

competitive harm.

Finally, DFA argues that the district court “refused to treat as true the 

allegations in the Complaint attributing statements by [Estée Lauder]-favored 

operators to [Estée Lauder].” However, DFA did not allege a conspiracy between 

Estée Lauder and the operators, nor did it claim any agency relationship between 

the companies. Rather, the complaint, taken in the light most favorable to DFA, 

simply asserts that “[Estée Lauder] is aware of and has not stopped its favored duty 

free operators from representing to airport authorities that DFA . . . cannot meet its 

financial bids to airports.” These conclusory statements provide no legal basis for 

attributing the statements to Estée Lauder.

C.

DFA’s final claim is that Estée Lauder’s restrictions on its customers’ 

display space and its inventory requirements are anticompetitive. Although DFA’s 

complaint seeks damages -- and the company argued in its briefing before this 

Court that damages might be appropriate -- DFA’s counsel stated at oral argument 

that it was abandoning any claim for damages resulting from Estée Lauder’s 

display space and inventory requirements. In any event, to the extent DFA seeks 
36

damages on this count, its claim is time barred. An action by a private party 

seeking damages based on a defendant’s antitrust violations must be “commenced 

within four years after the cause of action accrued.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(b); see id. § 

15. The complaint establishes that DFA was last subject to Estée Lauder’s 

requirements several years ago: (1) “display space and inventory demands” in 

March 2008; (2) “full line forcing” in March 2008; and (3) “tying” fragrances to 

other products in April 2006. Because DFA did not bring suit until April 26, 2012, 

any claim for damages is barred by the statute of limitations.

DFA says that even if it cannot state a claim for damages, it may still seek 

injunctive relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (“Any person, firm, corporation, or 

association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against 

threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . .”). Because 

DFA is not a customer of Estée Lauder, and thus is not subject to any of these 

requirements, we are hard pressed to see how it has constitutional standing to 

challenge them. As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, DFA had the burden of 

demonstrating that it has standing to sue. Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 618 

F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 

1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[S]tanding requirements ‘are not mere pleading 

requirements but rather are an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case.’ 

Therefore, each element of standing must be supported ‘with the manner and 
37

degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.’” (quoting 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992))). “[B]ecause the 

constitutional standing doctrine stems directly from Article III’s ‘case or 

controversy’ requirement, this issue implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, and 

accordingly must be addressed as a threshold matter regardless of whether it is 

raised by the parties.” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 

1242 (11th Cir. 2003). When analyzing a defendant’s “motion to dismiss we must 

evaluate standing based on the facts alleged in the complaint, and we may not 

‘speculate concerning the existence of standing or piece together support for the 

plaintiff.’” Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation 

omitted)).

The test for Article III standing is by now well settled. “First, the plaintiff 

must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ -- an invasion of a legally protected interest 

which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quotation omitted). Second, 

the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between its injury and the 

defendant’s conduct. Id. Third, the plaintiff must show that it is likely -- and not 

merely speculative -- that a favorable decision by the court will redress the injury. 

Id. at 561. Moreover, we have explained that there is an additional element to the 

injury in fact requirement when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. Houston v. 
38

Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013). “Because 

injunctions regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek injunctive relief 

only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and immediate -- as opposed 

to a merely conjectural or hypothetical -- threat of future injury.” Wooden v. Bd. 

of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Church, 30 F.3d at 1337); see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 

(1983) (“[P]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 

controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, 

present adverse effects.” (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).

The fact that DFA may have been injured by the display and inventory 

requirements in the past -- as late as March 2008 -- cannot be sufficient to establish 

an injury in fact that would support injunctive relief. The complaint contains no 

allegation that those restrictions caused any lasting impact or likely future injury, 

and thus DFA has not met the requirement that it show harm that is “actual or 

imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Absent facts suggesting that former exposure 

to Estée Lauder’s requirements caused “continuing, present adverse effects” on 

DFA, Estée Lauder’s past conduct cannot be the basis of a request for injunctive 

relief. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102; see Church, 30 F.3d at 1337 (“Logically, a 

prospective remedy will provide no relief for an injury that is, and likely will 

remain, entirely in the past.” (quotation omitted)).
39

DFA claimed at oral argument that it would suffer injury if it resumes

purchasing from Estée Lauder and becomes subject to Estée Lauder’s 

requirements. This cannot be characterized as a “concrete” or “actual” injury in 

fact because, by its very terms, it has not yet occurred, and indeed may never 

occur.

DFA also suggests that it is injured by the display space and inventory 

requirements because its competitors are still subject to them. But DFA fails to 

provide any plausible connection between an injury it has sustained and the 

restrictions which DFA claims harm its competitors. Indeed, DFA alleges in its 

complaint that it protested the restrictions when it was subject to them several 

years ago. Moreover, DFA draws attention to the ways in which the restrictions --

which limit its competitors’ ability to offer a wide array of products -- benefit

DFA. Specifically, DFA claims to “obtain[] licenses from a number of high-end 

beauty product brand owners” that its competitors often do not carry because they 

do not have enough space. DFA also alleges that it is “able to offer more and more 

prominent display space to non-[Estée Lauder] brands than [other] duty free 

operators do.” In short, nothing in the complaint suggests that DFA is harmed by 

Estée Lauder’s restrictions on other duty free operators. We therefore hold that 

DFA does not have constitutional standing to challenge the display space and 

inventory requirements. 
40

Because DFA cannot demonstrate that it has Article III standing to challenge 

Estée Lauder’s contractual requirements, it plainly follows that it cannot establish 

what our cases have referred to as “antitrust standing.” See Palmyra Park Hosp. 

Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To 

have antitrust standing, a party must do more than meet the basic ‘case or 

controversy’ requirement that would satisfy constitutional standing; instead, the 

party must show that it satisfies a number of prudential considerations aimed at 

preserving the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.” (quotation omitted)).

We analyze antitrust standing using a two pronged test that “involves 

consideration of the nexus between the antitrust violation and the plaintiff’s harm 

and whether the harm alleged is of the type for which Congress provides a 

remedy.” Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 

1264, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013). First, we consider whether the plaintiff has suffered 

an antitrust injury. Id. “Antitrust injury is ‘injury of the type the antitrust laws 

were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes [the] defendant[’s] 

acts unlawful.’” Palmyra Park Hosp. Inc., 604 F.3d at 1299 (quoting Brunswick 

Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). When a plaintiff is 

seeking injunctive relief, this means it “must allege threatened injury that would 

constitute antitrust injury if inflicted upon the plaintiff and the defendant’s causal 

responsibility for such threatened injury.” Id. at 1452. Second, the plaintiff must
41

“be an ‘efficient enforcer’ of the antitrust laws.” Sunbeam Television Corp., 711 

F.3d at 1271. When only injunctive relief is sought, “the dangers of mismanaging 

the antitrust laws are less pervasive,” Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 

1438, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991), and accordingly “we are less concerned about 

whether the party would be the most efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws,”

Palmyra Park Hosp. Inc., 604 F.3d at 1299-300. Nevertheless, certain factors that 

the Court typically considers when determining whether a plaintiff is an efficient 

enforcer remain relevant to this Court’s inquiry into whether injunctive relief 

would be appropriate. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 

104, 111 n.6 (1986); Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 437 (2d 

Cir. 2005).

5

 Thus, for example, a plaintiff who has suffered only indirect injury, or 

who alleges speculative damages, may lack antitrust standing to seek an injunction.

Again, DFA has not alleged that it suffers any injury as a result of Estée 

Lauder’s restrictions on its competitors, much less that it suffers an antitrust injury. 

And even if DFA had plausibly alleged that it sustained an antitrust injury, we 

 5 This Court usually considers six factors in determining whether a plaintiff would be an efficient 

enforcer of the antitrust laws: (1) whether the plaintiff has suffered a direct injury; (2) whether its 

injury is remote; (3) whether other plaintiffs are better suited to bring the suit; (4) whether the 

plaintiff’s injuries are speculative; (5) whether the calculation of damages would be complex and 

run the risk of duplicative recoveries; and (6) whether the plaintiff could enforce the court’s 

judgment. Sunbeam Television Corp., 711 F.3d at 1271 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of 

Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538-45 (1983)). When the plaintiff 

seeks only equitable relief, however, some of these factors -- such as the danger of duplicative 

recoveries, complexity of assessing damages, and the existence of more suitable plaintiffs -- are 

not implicated. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 (1986).
42

would still be obliged to find that it is not an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws 

because it is not currently subject to Estée Lauder’s display space and inventory 

restrictions and has not been for several years. This means that DFA could not 

enforce any judgment that we would reach about the requirements, and that any 

injury to DFA would necessarily be speculative -- something that may or may not 

occur in the future. Plainly, another duty free operator that currently maintains a 

relationship with Estée Lauder would be in a far better position than DFA to clarify 

the contours of Estée Lauder’s restrictions and to point out what harm, if any, those 

requirements may cause.6

 

IV. 

DFA’s second claim is that its competitors made statements to airport 

authorities that amount to actionable false advertising under § 43(a) of the Lanham 

Act. DFA argues that Estée Lauder can be held liable for these statements based 

 6 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 

134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014), casts doubt on the future of prudential standing doctrines such as 

antitrust standing. In Lexmark, the Supreme Court declined to adopt the antitrust standing test in 

the Lanham Act context. Id. at 1385-87, 1391. In the course of this discussion, the Court 

questioned referring to the test as one of prudential “standing” -- noting that, in actuality, it is 

neither prudential nor an inquiry into standing, but an analysis of whether the plaintiff’s “injuries 

were proximately caused by a defendant’s antitrust violations.” Id. at 1386-87 n.4. This, the 

Court explained, is a statutory interpretation question about “the scope of the private remedy 

created by Congress” when it drafted the antitrust laws. Id. at 1386-87 (quotation omitted). 

However, Lexmark is a Lanham Act case, and this discussion is dicta. We do not “lightly cast 

aside” Supreme Court dicta, Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006), but 

“[u]nder the prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a prior binding precedent unless and 

until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. VegaCastillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). In any event, any impact that

Lexmark may have on the notion of antitrust standing is utterly immaterial in this case, because 

DFA has not established that it has Article III standing.
43

on a theory of contributory liability. Estée Lauder responds that the claim must 

necessarily fail both because the Lanham Act’s prohibition on false advertising 

does not include a derivative claim based on contributory liability and because, 

even if it did, DFA has not alleged facts sufficient to support such a claim. While 

we agree with DFA that the prohibition on false advertising in § 43(a) of the 

Lanham Act may allow a claim based on contributory liability, the complaint does 

not come close to alleging the necessary facts. Thus, we affirm the dismissal of the 

Lanham Act claim for failure to state a claim. 

Whether § 43(a) of the Lanham Act includes within its ambit a claim for

false advertising based on contributory liability is a question of first impression.

DFA has cited only one case in which a circuit court recognized the possibility that 

a defendant could be contributorily liable for a third party’s false advertising. See

Societe Des Hotels Meridien v. LaSalle Hotel Operating P’ship, L.P., 380 F.3d 

126, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2004). Moreover, our research suggests that while district 

courts routinely assume that contributory liability claims are available, neither the 

Supreme Court nor any Court of Appeals has explicitly considered and resolved 

this question. See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Sapatis, 994 F. Supp. 2d 192, 201 (D.N.H. 

2014); Merck Eprova AG v. Brookstone Pharm., LLC, 920 F. Supp. 2d 404, 425 

(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 901 F. Supp. 2d 436, 456 

(S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014); Coach, Inc. v. Farmers Mkt. 
44

& Auction, 881 F. Supp. 2d 695, 704 (D. Md. 2012); ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Sec. 

One Int’l, Inc., No. 11-CV-05149 YGR, 2012 WL 4068632, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

14, 2012); Campagnolo S.R.L. v. Full Speed Ahead, Inc., No. C08-1372 RSM, 

2010 WL 2079694, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2010), aff’d, 447 F. App’x 814 

(9th Cir. 2011).

Although we begin any statutory construction by looking to the plain 

language of the provision at issue, Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013), 

contributory liability under the Lanham Act is a judicially developed doctrine, see

Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1245 

(11th Cir. 2007) (noting that contributory liability actions “stem from the general 

prohibitory language” of the Act’s trademark infringement provisions). Indeed, in 

the trademark infringement arena, the Supreme Court has long recognized that 

liability “can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods.” Inwood Labs., 

Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982). This means that when a claim 

involves trademark infringement, a manufacturer or distributor can be liable if it

“intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark” or “continues to supply its 

product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 

infringement.” Id. at 854 (citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 

U.S. 526 (1924)). 
45

Interpreting this language, this Court has found no reason to confine the 

doctrine to manufacturers, and has expanded it to cover a wide variety of 

trademark infringement contexts. Mini Maid Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., 

Inc., 967 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1992) (“With respect to a franchisor’s liability 

for the independent infringing acts of its franchisees, we hold that the franchisor 

may be held accountable only if it intentionally induced its franchisees to infringe 

another’s trademark or if it knowingly participated in a scheme of trademark 

infringement carried out by its franchisees.”); Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 

1165, 1171 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A person who knowingly participates in furthering 

the trade dress infringement is liable as a contributing party.”). Our sister circuits 

have taken a similar approach. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 

259 (9th Cir. 1996); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 

42 F.3d 1421, 1432 (3d Cir. 1994); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession 

Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. 

eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106-09 (2d Cir. 2010) (assuming, without deciding, that 

Inwood applied to a claim outside the manufacturing context). 

The rationale for allowing contributory trademark infringement actions

supports recognizing a similar theory of liability in the false advertising context. 

For starters, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act contains two different classes of 

prohibitions: one banning trademark infringement and one prohibiting false 
46

advertising. Each cause of action is a subpart of a single statutory provision, which 

reads this way:

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, 

or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 

symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 

designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false 

or misleading representation of fact, which--

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 

to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 

another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 

her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 

characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 

person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 

she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

These prohibitions are found in the same statutory provision, and they share 

the same introductory clause. We analyze this structure in light of the core 

principle that “[s]tatutory construction is a holistic endeavor,” Koons Buick 

Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004) (quotation omitted), and that 

individual provisions are “often clarified by the remainder of the statutory 

scheme,” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 

484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). The placement of the two prohibitions in the same 

statutory section -- and correspondingly, the fact that the introductory language 
47

banning both practices is identical -- suggests the two causes of action should be 

interpreted to have the same scope.

Reading these two clauses in the same way is reinforced by the fact that both

causes of action were motivated by a unitary purpose. “Section 43(a) of the 

Lanham Act creates a ‘federal cause of action for unfair competition.’” Optimum 

Techs, Inc., 496 F.3d at 1247-48 (quoting Univ. of Fla. v. KPB, Inc., 89 F.3d 773, 

775 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)); see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (noting that one of the 

purposes of the Act is “to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair 

competition”); S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

1274, 1275 (“There is no essential difference between trade-mark infringement and 

what is loosely called unfair competition. Unfair competition is the genus of 

which trade-mark infringement is one of the species . . . .”). Both its trademark 

protections and its prohibition on false advertising are “part of the broader law of 

unfair competition that has its sources in English common law.” Moseley v. V 

Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (citation omitted); see Natural 

Answers, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 529 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 

2008) (“The intent of [the false advertising] provision is to protect ‘commercial 

interests [that] have been harmed by a competitor’s false advertising, and [to 

secure] to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by 

preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who have 
48

not.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Phoenix of Broward, Inc. 

v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2007))). 

The Supreme Court has clarified that the principles underlying the Lanham 

Act contemplate liability that extends beyond direct violators of the trademark 

provision of § 43(a). Inwood Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. at 853; see William R. Warner 

& Co., 265 U.S. at 530 (“The [defendant manufacturer’s] wrong was in designedly 

enabling the dealers to palm off the [drug] as that of the [plaintiff].”). Because 

these same principles motivated the false advertising provision, the same reasoning 

supports the conclusion that a plaintiff can state a claim for contributory false 

advertising. As the Third Circuit has explained in addressing whether claims based 

on agency and apparent agency are cognizable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act:

The contributory infringement cases . . . demonstrate that in certain 

instances, secondary, indirect liability is a legitimate basis for liability 

under the federal unfair competition statute. There is a good reason 

for this: the Lanham Act is derived generally and purposefully from 

the common law tort of unfair competition, and its language parallels 

the protections afforded by state common law and statutory torts. . . . 

In construing the Act, then, courts routinely have recognized the 

propriety of examining basic tort liability concepts to determine the 

scope of liability.

Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 F.3d at 1433.

Moreover, while the two causes of action are derived from the same 

principles and contained in the same statute, the Supreme Court has recognized 

that the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act entails broader protections. 
49

See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2014) (“The 

Lanham Act’s trademark provisions are the primary means of achieving [the 

statute’s] ends. But the Act also creates a federal remedy [for false advertising] 

‘that goes beyond trademark protection.’ The broader remedy is at issue here.” 

(quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 

(2003)). It would be odd indeed for us to narrow the scope of the false advertising 

provision -- a cause of action plainly intended to encompass a broader spectrum of 

protection -- and hold that it could be enforced only against a smaller class of 

defendants. Absent congressional direction, we are reluctant to limit the statute’s 

scope in this way. Thus, we hold that a plaintiff may bring a claim for contributory 

false advertising under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 

What, then, must a plaintiff establish in order to state a contributory false 

advertising claim? First, the plaintiff must show that a third party in fact directly 

engaged in false advertising that injured the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must 

allege that the defendant contributed to that conduct either by knowingly inducing 

or causing the conduct, or by materially participating in it.

In order to establish that a third party engaged in false advertising, the 

plaintiff “must plead (and ultimately prove) an injury to a commercial interest in 

sales or business reputation proximately caused by the . . . misrepresentations.” 
50

Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1395. To prove that the third party’s statements 

caused the requisite injury, we have held that the plaintiff must show:

(1) the . . . statements were false or misleading; (2) the statements deceived, 

or had the capacity to deceive, consumers; (3) the deception had a material 

effect on the consumers’ purchasing decision; (4) the misrepresented service 

affects interstate commerce; and (5) [the plaintiff] has been, or likely will be, 

injured as a result of the false or misleading statement.

Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order v. Fla. Priory of Knights Hospitallers, 702 

F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012).

The Lanham Act’s false advertising provision allows a plaintiff to base its 

claim not only on statements that are literally false, but also on statements that are

misleading when considered in their full context. Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 

612 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010). Although “[s]tatements of opinion are 

generally not actionable” under the Lanham Act, id. at 1311, we have suggested 

that we will treat a statement framed as an opinion as one of fact if it “fairly 

implies a [factual] basis.” See id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Unfair 

Competition § 3 cmt. d. (1995) (“Some representations of opinion may imply the 

existence of facts that justify the opinion . . . .”)).

Once the plaintiff establishes the elements of a direct false advertising claim 

against a third party, it must allege that the defendant contributed to that conduct. 

This means that the plaintiff must allege that the defendant had the necessary state 

of mind -- in other words that it “intended to participate in” or “actually knew 
51

about” the false advertising. See Mini Maid Servs. Co., 967 F.2d at 1522. The 

plaintiff must also allege that the defendant actively and materially furthered the 

unlawful conduct -- either by inducing it, causing it, or in some other way working 

to bring it about. Cf. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1249 

(10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Inwood establishes liability for a defendant who 

“enables a third party” to violate the Lanham Act). 

Analogies from trademark infringement, in which contributory liability is 

more developed, can be instructive. Thus, for example, a plaintiff may be able to

make out the participation prong of a contributory false advertising claim by 

alleging that the defendant directly controlled or monitored the third party’s false 

advertising. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th 

Cir. 2007). It is also conceivable that there could be circumstances under which 

the provision of a necessary product or service, without which the false advertising 

would not be possible, could support a theory of contributory liability. See Inwood 

Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. at 854-55. In determining whether a plaintiff has adequately 

alleged facts to support such a claim, we look to whether the complaint suggests a 

plausible inference of knowing or intentional participation, examining “the nature 

and extent of the communication” between the third party and the defendant 

regarding the false advertising; “whether or not the [defendant] explicitly or 

implicitly encouraged” the false advertising; whether the false advertising “is 
52

serious and widespread,” making it more likely that the defendant “kn[ew] about 

and condone[d] the acts”; and whether the defendant engaged in “bad faith refusal 

to exercise a clear contractual power to halt” the false advertising. See Mini Maid 

Servs. Co., 967 F.2d at 1522.

The district court identified four allegedly false claims in the complaint, 

each of which was made by a duty free operator to representatives of an airport and 

each of which DFA says we should attribute to Estée Lauder. First, Nuance stated 

in a letter to Atlanta officials: “Given that Estée Lauder brands account for 20% of 

cosmetic and fragrance sales, at least in Orlando, and cosmetic and fragrance sales 

constitute one of the largest sources of revenue for duty free stores, a lack of access 

to Estée Lauder brands would cast doubt on the validity of DFA’s projected 

revenue streams.” Second, Travel Retail told Orlando officials: “[W]e strongly 

believe that Estée Lauder is a product which you have to sell, also, to domestic 

passengers.” Third, Nuance said during the Orlando appeal hearing: “With respect 

to DFA, I’d like to echo Travel Retail’s concerns on DFA’s rents. . . . DFA sales 

project[ions] are deemed to be unreasonable and not sustainable in light of the 

history.” Finally, Travel Retail informed the Orlando Airport Authority: “[F]ailure 

to offer the Estée Lauder product line will negatively impact duty free and duty 
53

paid sales revenue for both international and domestic travelers.”7 DFA argues 

that it also alleged that Nuance, in its letter protesting the Atlanta award, stated 

“DFA may have made misrepresentations about its ability to carry Estée Lauder 

brands,”8 and we agree that this is an allegedly false claim the district court failed 

to consider.

As for the first element, Estée Lauder claims that the duty free operators did 

not engage in any false advertising. Estée Lauder urges us to hold that DFA’s 

complaint is devoid of any false or misleading statements cognizable under the 

Lanham Act, but we need not answer this fact-intensive question. We agree that 

DFA did not adequately allege Estée Lauder contributed to any of the statements, 

and thus affirm the district court’s dismissal on this ground.

We are unable to find in DFA’s complaint any facts that would enable the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that Estée Lauder induced or knowingly or 

intentionally participated in any of the allegedly false statements made by the other 

duty free operators. In its complaint, DFA based its claim for contributory liability 

 7 DFA argues that the district court ought not to have considered these quotes, but should have 

credited the complaint’s formulations, specifically (1) “carrying [Estée Lauder] products is 

required for the success of a duty free store” and (2) “DFA’s lack of access to [Estée Lauder] 

products will prevent it from being successful, including being able to meet its projected revenue 

targets.” DFA’s summarized false statements are indistinguishable from the quotations in 

substance. And its claim fares no better if they are substituted for the actual statements that the 

operators made to airport authorities. 

8 DFA again argues that we must consider its preferred formulation: “DFA did not have the 

ability to sell the [Estée Lauder] products it had listed in its [Atlanta] bid.” The substitution of 

this phrasing would be similarly immaterial.
54

on the fact that “[Estée Lauder] knew or should have known of the False Claims, 

but [it] continued to supply [Estée Lauder] product[s] to its favored duty free 

operators . . . . In doing so, [Estée Lauder] provided its favored duty free operators 

with the means to continue making the False Claims . . . . ” We cannot see how the 

mere sale of Estée Lauder products can serve as a basis for holding the 

manufacturer liable for any disparaging statements its customers make in the 

course of their own separate business relations. In our view, selling Estée Lauder 

products is too unrelated to the making of the allegedly false or misleading 

statements to form a basis for liability -- under either an inducement or 

participation theory. 

Moreover, contrary to DFA’s argument, there are simply no facts in the 

complaint that suggest the existence of coordinated action or encouragement, much 

less inducement, between Estée Lauder and the operators on the decision to make 

the disputed claims to airport authorities. There has been no allegation that by 

selling its products to the duty free operators, Estée Lauder monitored, controlled, 

or participated in operators’ statements to airport authorities during a competitive 

bidding process for which Estée Lauder was not even present. More generally, 

there are no facts to suggest that Estée Lauder commonly exercises any level of 

control over or involvement in the duty free operators’ conduct during airport RFP 

bidding. 
55

In short, although we agree with DFA that a plaintiff may state a claim 

against a defendant for contributory false advertising, we are unwilling to extend 

the doctrine as far as DFA urges. The mere sale of products in the course of an 

ordinary business relationship, without more, cannot justify a finding that a 

defendant induced, encouraged, caused, procured, or brought about false 

advertising. Contributory false advertising claims are cognizable under the 

Lanham Act, but a plaintiff must allege more than an ordinary business 

relationship between the defendant and the direct false advertiser in order to 

plausibly plead its claim. DFA has failed to do so here.

V.

DFA’s final claim is that Estée Lauder’s direct and indirect involvement in 

airport RFP processes violated Florida’s prohibition against tortious interference 

with a prospective business relationship. Under Florida law, “[t]he elements of 

tortious interference with a business relationship are ‘(1) the existence of a 

business relationship[;] (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the 

defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by 

the defendant; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the 

relationship.’” Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 814 

(Fla. 1994) (alteration adopted) (quoting Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton, 463 

So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam)). Though the second and fourth 
56

elements of this test are self-explanatory, the first and third require some additional 

explication.

As for the first element -- the existence of a business relationship -- the 

Supreme Court of Florida has explained that the plaintiff need not allege the 

existence of an enforceable contract and that the plaintiff can prevail “if the jury 

finds that an understanding between the parties would have been completed had 

the defendant not interfered.” Id. (quoting Landry v. Hornstein, 462 So. 2d 844, 

846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)). “A mere offer to sell, however, does not, by itself, 

give rise to sufficient legal rights to support a claim of intentional interference with 

a business relationship.” Id. (quoting Landry, 462 So. 2d at 846).

The third element, intentional and unjustified interference with a business 

relationship, requires the plaintiff to allege that “the defendant acted without 

justification.” Sec. Title Guarantee Corp. of Balt. v. McDill Columbus Corp., 543 

So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). This is a fact-intensive inquiry that 

requires “an examination of the defendant’s conduct, its motive, and the interests it 

sought to advance.” Id. (quotation omitted). Importantly, however, Florida 

recognizes a “privilege of interference.” Wackenhut Corp. v. Maimone, 389 So. 

2d 656, 657-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). This means that where “there is no 

contract right to have the relation continued, but only an expectancy[,] . . . a 

competitor has the privilege of interference in order to acquire the business for 
57

himself.” Id.; accord Greenberg v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Greater Miami, Inc., 

629 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 

“If a defendant interferes with a contract in order to safeguard a preexisting 

economic interest of his own, the defendant’s right to protect his own established 

economic interest outweighs the plaintiff’s right to be free of interference, and his 

actions are usually recognized as privileged and nonactionable.” See Heavener, 

Ogier Servs., Inc. v. R.W. Fla. Region, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1074, 1076-77 (Fla. Dist. 

Ct. App. 1982); Sec. Title Guarantee Corp. of Balt., 543 So. 2d at 855 (noting that, 

as “long as improper means are not employed, activities taken to safeguard or 

promote [a company’s] own financial interests are entirely non-actionable.”

(quotation and alteration omitted)).

9

 Indeed, Florida courts have explained that, 

even if the plaintiff has an existing, terminable-at-will contract, the defendant’s 

interference to protect its economic interests is privileged unless the plaintiff 

 9 Florida’s Standard Jury Instructions, though merely persuasive, also confirm our understanding 

of Florida law. They read, in relevant part:

A person who interferes with the business relations of another with the motive 

and purpose, at least in part, to advance [or protect] his own business [or 

financial] interests, does not interfere with an improper motive. But one who 

interferes only out of spite, or to do injury to others, or for other bad motive, has 

no justification, and his interference is improper. So also, a person who interferes 

with another’s business relations using ordinary business methods [of 

competition] does not interfere by an improper method. But one who uses 

[physical violence], [misrepresentations], [illegal conduct], [threats of illegal 

conduct], [or] [(identify other improper conduct)] has no privilege to use those 

methods, and his interference using such methods is improper.

Standard Jury Instructions-Civil Cases (99-1), 778 So. 2d 264, 269 (Fla. 2000) (footnotes 

omitted).
58

alleges “a purely malicious motive” divorced from any “legitimate competitive 

economic interest.” See Heavener, Ogier Servs., Inc., 418 So. 2d at 1077. It 

follows that where the plaintiff alleges only a prospective business relationship --

and thus the plaintiff has a “mere expectancy” of a new relationship -- the privilege 

of interference similarly bars only interference consisting of malicious conduct. 

Cf. id. at 1077.

Interpreting Florida law, we have said that “when there is room for different 

views” about the propriety of a defendant’s interference with a plaintiff’s business 

relationships, “the determination of whether the interference was improper or not is 

ordinarily left to the jury.” Mfg. Research Corp. v. Greenlee Tool Co., 693 F.2d 

1037, 1040 (11th Cir. 1982) (quotation omitted). However, when plaintiffs have 

failed to adequately allege improper methods, we have followed the Florida courts 

and dismissed these claims. See, e.g., Int’l Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Austral Insulated 

Prods., Inc., 262 F.3d 1152, 1159 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001); Royal Typewriter Co., a 

Div. of Litton Bus. Sys. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1104-05 

(11th Cir. 1983); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Times Pub. Co., 780 So. 2d 

310, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming district court’s grant of defendant’s 

motion to dismiss tortious interference claim).

DFA urges us to find that it adequately alleged improper methods in its 

complaint, citing to three allegations about Estée Lauder’s conduct: (1) Estée 
59

Lauder represented to airport authorities that DFA could not meet its financial 

projections; (2) Estée Lauder represented to the Atlanta Airport Authority that 

DFA was unable to sell any Estée Lauder products, implying that DFA did not 

have outstanding inventory; and (3) Estée Lauder suggested to airport authorities 

that DFA was not a quality operator.

As we see it, the problem with each of these allegations is the same: the 

complaint does not allege that Estée Lauder actually made any of these statements. 

To be sure, false statements made “for the purpose of harming [a competitor’s] 

economic interests” can in some instances form the basis of a claim for tortious 

interference. Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 609 So. 2d 14, 18-19 (Fla. 1992). 

But DFA does not allege that Estée Lauder ever expressed an opinion on DFA’s 

financial projections or its inventory, much less that it conveyed that opinion to 

any airport officials. As for the third statement -- that DFA was not a quality 

operator -- DFA asks us to infer this opinion from a letter in which Estée Lauder

vouched for the quality of other duty free operators. In our view, this is not a 

reasonable inference from Estée Lauder’s statement. That Estée Lauder is satisfied 

with the quality of its named business partners cannot be read to implicitly 

disparage the quality of all other unmentioned entities in the same industry. DFA 

was not referenced at all in the disputed letter to Newark airport officials, and we 
60

are unwilling to read this silence to make any comment on the quality of DFA’s 

work.

DFA also cites language from its complaint that Estée Lauder “encourag[ed] 

or induc[ed]” other duty free operators to make misrepresentations to airport 

authorities. We agree that if the complaint adequately alleged inducement, this 

might be sufficient to state a claim under Florida law. But DFA was required to 

provide more than “‘a formulaic recitation of the elements’” of its tortious 

interference claim. Simpson, 744 F.3d at 708 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

It was obliged to support its allegation with facts from which a reasonable trier of 

fact could infer inducement or encouragement by Estée Lauder. We are unable to 

find any facts of this kind in DFA’s complaint. No facts in the complaint plausibly 

suggest that Estée Lauder asked or encouraged any duty free operator to discuss 

DFA with airport authorities. All that the complaint establishes is that Estée 

Lauder sold its products to the operators, provided them with truthful information 

about its market share, and vouched for the quality of their work. These facts are 

entirely unrelated to inducement, and for that reason are insufficient to raise DFA’s 

claim from possible to plausible.

Moreover, even if we were to agree with DFA that its bare and wholly 

conclusory statements that Estée Lauder induced or encouraged the duty free 

operators were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, we would still conclude 
61

that the complaint is devoid of any allegations of impropriety. Florida law is clear 

that the privilege of interference encompasses actions taken to protect a company’s 

economic interests as long as the methods employed were not improper. Sec. Title 

Guarantee Corp. of Balt., 543 So. 2d at 855; Heavener, Ogier Servs., Inc., 418 So. 

2d at 1076-77. DFA does not allege that any of its competitors took action for the 

sole purpose of interfering with DFA’s prospective relationships with airport 

authorities. To the contrary, as DFA acknowledges, each duty free operator was 

attempting to procure the same airport contract for itself. Taking the complaint in 

the light most favorable to DFA, two of its competitors disparaged its sales 

projections and business practices during the competitive bidding processes for 

both the Orlando International Airport and the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 

International Airport. DFA does not allege that its competitors entered the 

competition pretextually, solely for the purpose of harming DFA’s prospective 

interests. Moreover, there are simply no facts from which we can infer that the 

statements were made out of any motivation other than the hope of winning the 

airport contract. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the tortious interference 

claim.

VI.

In sum, DFA failed to allege a critical element of each of its three claims 

against Estée Lauder. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.