(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

BOROUGH OF DURYEA, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. v. 

GUARNIERI 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 09–1476. Argued March 22, 2011—Decided June 20, 2011 

After petitioner borough fired respondent Guarnieri as its police chief, 

he filed a union grievance that led to his reinstatement. When the 

borough council later issued directives instructing Guarnieri how to

perform his duties, he filed a second grievance, and an arbitrator ordered that some of the directives be modified or withdrawn. Guarnieri then filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that the directives were issued in retaliation for the filing of his first grievance, 

thereby violating his First Amendment “right . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”; he later amended his complaint

to allege that the council also violated the Petition Clause by denying

his request for overtime pay in retaliation for his having filed the 

§1983 suit. The District Court instructed the jury, inter alia, that the 

suit and the grievances were constitutionally protected activity, and

the jury found for Guarnieri. Affirming the compensatory damages 

award, the Third Circuit held that a public employee who has petitioned the government through a formal mechanism such as the filing of a lawsuit or grievance is protected under the Petition Clause

from retaliation for that activity, even if the petition concerns a matter of solely private concern. In so ruling, the court rejected the view

of every other Circuit to have considered the issue that, to be protected, the petition must address a matter of public concern. 

Held: A government employer’s allegedly retaliatory actions against an

employee do not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless

the employee’s petition relates to a matter of public concern. The 

Third Circuit’s conclusion that the public concern test does not limit 

public employees’ Petition Clause claims is incorrect. Pp. 4–19.

(a) A public employee suing his employer under the First Amend-
2 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Syllabus 

ment’s Speech Clause must show that he spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 147. Even 

where the employee makes that showing, however, courts balance his 

employee’s right to engage in speech against the government’s interest in promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the public services 

it performs through its employees. Pickering v. Board of Ed. of 

Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568. Although cases might arise in which special Petition Clause concerns 

would require a distinct analysis, public employees’ retaliation claims 

do not call for this divergence. The close connection between the 

rights of speech and petition has led Courts of Appeals other than the 

Third Circuit to apply the public concern test to public employees’ Petition Clause claims. This approach is justified by the substantial

common ground in the definition and delineation of these rights. Pp.

4–8. 

(b) The substantial government interests that justify a cautious

and restrained approach to protecting public employees’ speech are 

just as relevant in Petition Clause cases. A petition, no less than

speech, can interfere with government’s efficient and effective operation by, e.g., seeking results that “contravene governmental policies

or impair the proper performance of governmental functions,” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 419. A petition taking the form of a

lawsuit against the government employer may be particularly disruptive, consuming public officials’ time and attention, burdening their

exercise of legitimate authority, and blurring the lines of accountability between them and the public. Here, for example, Guarnieri’s attorney invited the jury to review myriad details of government decisionmaking. It is precisely to avoid this sort of intrusion into internal

governmental affairs that this Court has held that, “while the First

Amendment invests public employees with certain rights, it does not

empower them to ‘constitutionalize the employee grievance.’ ” Id., at 

420. Interpreting the Petition Clause to apply even where matters of

public concern are not involved would be unnecessary, or even disruptive, when there is already protection for the public employees’ 

rights to file grievances and litigate. Adopting a different rule for Petition Clause claims would provide a ready means for public employees to circumvent the public concern test’s protections and aggravate 

potential harm to the government’s interests by compounding the 

costs of complying with the Constitution. Pp. 8–13.

(c) Guarnieri’s claim that applying the public concern test to the

Petition Clause would be inappropriate in light of the private nature 

of many petitions for redress lacks merit. Although the Clause undoubtedly has force and application in the context of a personal

grievance addressed to the government, petitions to the government 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

Syllabus 

assume an added dimension when they seek to advance political, social, or other ideas of interest to the community as a whole. The 

Clause’s history reveals the frequent use of petitions to address a

wide range of political, social, and other matters of great public import and interest. Pp. 13–17. 

(d) The framework used to govern public employees’ Speech Clause

claims, when applied to the Petition Clause, will protect both the

government’s interests and the employee’s First Amendment right. If 

a public employee petitions as an employee on a matter of purely private concern, his First Amendment interest must give way, as it does

in speech cases. San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 82–83. If he petitions as a citizen on a matter of public concern, his First Amendment 

interest must be balanced against the government’s countervailing 

interest in the effective and efficient management of its internal affairs. Pickering, supra, at 568. If that balance favors the public employee, the First Amendment claim will be sustained. If the balance 

favors the employer, the employee’s First Amendment claim will fail

even though the petition is on a matter of public concern. As under 

the Speech Clause, whether a petition relates to a matter of public 

concern will depend on its “content, form, and context . . . , as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, supra, at 147–148, n. 7. The 

forum in which a petition is lodged will also be relevant. See Snyder 

v. Phelps, 562 U. S. ___, ___. A petition filed with a government employer using an internal grievance procedure in many cases will not

seek to communicate to the public or to advance a political or social

point of view beyond the employment context. Pp. 17–18. 

(e) Absent full briefs by the parties, the Court need not consider 

how the foregoing framework would apply to this case. P. 19. 

364 Fed. Appx. 749, vacated and remanded. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., 

joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. 

SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 09–1476 

BOROUGH OF DURYEA, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. CHARLES J. GUARNIERI 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2011] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the court. 

Among other rights essential to freedom, the First 

Amendment protects “the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U. S. 

Const., Amdt. 1. This case concerns the extent of the 

protection, if any, that the Petition Clause grants public

employees in routine disputes with government employers. Petitions are a form of expression, and employees 

who invoke the Petition Clause in most cases could invoke 

as well the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. To 

show that an employer interfered with rights under the

Speech Clause, the employee, as a general rule, must show

that his speech was on a matter of public concern, as that 

term is defined in the precedents of this and other courts. 

Here the issue is whether that test applies when the

employee invokes the Petition Clause. 

Alone among the Courts of Appeals to have addressed 

the issue, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has 

held that the public concern test does not limit Petition

Clause claims by public employees. For the reasons stated 

below, this conclusion is incorrect. 
2 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

I 

Charles Guarnieri filed a union grievance challenging 

his termination as chief of police for the borough of

Duryea, a town of about 4,600 persons in northeastern

Pennsylvania. His grievance proceeded to arbitration 

pursuant to the police union collective-bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found that the borough council,

Duryea’s legislative body and the entity responsible for

Guarnieri’s termination, committed procedural errors in 

connection with the termination; and the arbitrator also 

found that Guarnieri engaged in misconduct, including 

“attempting to intimidate Council members.” App. 37, 38.

The arbitrator ordered Guarnieri reinstated after a disciplinary suspension. Id., at 38. 

Upon Guarnieri’s return to the job, the council issued 11 

directives instructing Guarnieri in the performance of his

duties. The council’s attorney explained that the council 

“wanted to be sure that the chief understood what was 

going to be expected of him upon his return.” Tr. 19:12–14

(Apr. 16, 2008). One directive prohibited Guarnieri from

working overtime without the council’s “express permission.” App. 59, ¶1. Another indicated that “[t]he police

car is to be used for official business only.” Id., at 60, ¶9.

A third stated that the “Duryea municipal building is a

smoke free building” and that the “police department is 

not exempt.” Id., at 61, ¶10. Guarnieri testified that, 

because of these and other directives, his “coming back 

wasn’t a warm welcome feeling.” Tr. 65:7–8 (Apr. 15, 

2008). Guarnieri filed a second union grievance challenging the directives. The arbitrator instructed the council to 

modify or withdraw some of the directives on the grounds

that they were vague, interfered with the authority of 

the mayor, or were contrary to the collective-bargaining 

agreement.

Guarnieri filed this lawsuit against the borough, the

borough council, and individual members of the council 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

under 42 U. S. C. §1983. Guarnieri claimed that his first 

union grievance was a petition protected by the Petition

Clause of the First Amendment, and he alleged that the 

directives issued upon his reinstatement were retaliation 

for that protected activity. 

After this suit was filed, the council denied a request 

by Guarnieri for $338 in overtime. The United States 

Department of Labor investigated and concluded that 

Guarnieri was entitled to be paid. The council offered 

Guarnieri a check for the amount, but Guarnieri refused 

to accept it. Instead, Guarnieri amended his complaint to 

encompass the denial of overtime. Guarnieri alleged that

his §1983 lawsuit was a petition and that the denial of 

overtime constituted retaliation for his having filed the

lawsuit. 

Under the law of the Circuit, the defendants could not 

obtain judgment as a matter of law on the basis that

the lawsuit and grievances were not on a matter of public 

concern. The case proceeded to a jury. Guarnieri’s attorney argued that the council was “sending a message to” 

Guarnieri through the directives and the denial of overtime: “You might have won your arbitration, but we control you.” Tr. 53:24–25 (Apr. 17, 2008). The District Court 

instructed the jury that the lawsuit and union grievances

were “protected activity . . . under the constitution,” and 

that the jury could find defendants liable if it found an 

adequate connection between the protected activity and 

the alleged retaliation. Id., at 61:17–20; 62. The jury

found in favor of Guarnieri. The jury awarded $45,000 in

compensatory damages and $24,000 in punitive damages 

for the directives, as well as $358 in compensatory damages and $28,000 in punitive damages for the denial of 

overtime. The District Court awarded $45,000 in attorney’s fees and denied defendants’ renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law. 

Defendants appealed on the ground that Guarnieri’s 
4 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

grievances and lawsuit did not address matters of public 

concern. Courts outside the Third Circuit have held that 

allegedly retaliatory actions by government employers

against government employees may not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless the employee’s petition related to a matter of public concern. See, e.g., Kirby 

v. Elizabeth City, 388 F. 3d 440, 448–449 (CA4 2004); 

Tang v. Rhode Island, Dept. of Elderly Affairs, 163 F. 3d 7, 

11–12 (CA1 1998); White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F. 2d 1049, 1059 (CA2 1993). These courts rely

on a substantial overlap between the rights of speech and

petition to justify the application of Speech Clause precedents to Petition Clause claims. They reason that,

whether the grievance is considered under the Speech 

Clause or the Petition Clause, the government employer is

entitled to take adverse action against the employee 

unless the dispute involves a matter of public concern. 

Rejecting that view, the Court of Appeals here affirmed

the award of compensatory damages, although it found 

insufficient evidence to sustain the award of punitive 

damages. The Court of Appeals concluded that “‘a public 

employee who has petitioned the government through a 

formal mechanism such as the filing of a lawsuit or grievance is protected under the Petition Clause from retaliation for that activity, even if the petition concerns a matter

of solely private concern.’” 364 Fed. Appx. 749, 753 (CA3 

2010) (quoting Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F. 3d 231, 236 

(CA3 2007)). The decision of the Court of Appeals was

consistent with the rule adopted and explained by that 

court in San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F. 3d 424, 442 

(1994). This Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts of Appeals. 562 U. S. ___ (2010). 

II 

When a public employee sues a government employer 

under the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, the em­
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

ployee must show that he or she spoke as a citizen on a 

matter of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 

147 (1983). If an employee does not speak as a citizen, or 

does not address a matter of public concern, “a federal

court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the 

wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency 

allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.” Ibid. 

Even if an employee does speak as a citizen on a matter of 

public concern, the employee’s speech is not automatically

privileged. Courts balance the First Amendment interest 

of the employee against “the interest of the State, as an 

employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services

it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Board of 

Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 

U. S. 563, 568 (1968).

This framework “reconcile[s] the employee’s right to

engage in speech and the government employer’s right to

protect its own legitimate interests in performing its

mission.” San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 82 (2004) (per 

curiam). There are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a

contract for public employment. “Our responsibility is to

ensure that citizens are not deprived of [these] fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.” Connick, supra, at 147; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents 

of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 605–606 (1967). 

Nevertheless, a citizen who accepts public employment 

“must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” 

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 418 (2006). The government has a substantial interest in ensuring that all of 

its operations are efficient and effective. That interest 

may require broad authority to supervise the conduct of

public employees. “When someone who is paid a salary so 

that she will contribute to an agency’s effective operation 

begins to do or say things that detract from the agency’s

effective operation, the government employer must have 
6 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

some power to restrain her.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 

U. S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion). Restraints are 

justified by the consensual nature of the employment 

relationship and by the unique nature of the government’s 

interest. 

This case arises under the Petition Clause, not the 

Speech Clause. The parties litigated the case on the premise that Guarnieri’s grievances and lawsuit are petitions

protected by the Petition Clause. This Court’s precedents

confirm that the Petition Clause protects the right of individuals to appeal to courts and other forums established by the government for resolution of legal disputes.

“[T]he right of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an 

aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883, 896– 

897 (1984); see also BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U. S. 

516, 525 (2002); Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 

461 U. S. 731, 741 (1983); California Motor Transport Co. 

v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 513 (1972). Although retaliation by a government employer for a public 

employee’s exercise of the right of access to the courts may

implicate the protections of the Petition Clause, this case

provides no necessity to consider the correct application of

the Petition Clause beyond that context.

Although this case proceeds under the Petition Clause,

Guarnieri just as easily could have alleged that his employer retaliated against him for the speech contained 

within his grievances and lawsuit. That claim would have 

been subject to the public concern test already described. 

Because Guarnieri chose to proceed under the Petition 

Clause, however, the Court of Appeals applied a more 

generous rule. Following the decision of the Court of 

Appeals in San Filippo, supra, at 443, Guarnieri was 

deemed entitled to protection from retaliation so long as 

his petition was not a “sham.” Under that rule, defendants and other public employers might be liable under 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

the Petition Clause even if the same conduct would not 

give rise to liability under the Speech Clause. The question presented by this case is whether the history and 

purpose of the Petition Clause justify the imposition of

broader liability when an employee invokes its protection 

instead of the protection afforded by the Speech Clause.

It is not necessary to say that the two Clauses are identical in their mandate or their purpose and effect to acknowledge that the rights of speech and petition share

substantial common ground. This Court has said that the 

right to speak and the right to petition are “cognate 

rights.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945); see 

also Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 610, n. 11 

(1985). “It was not by accident or coincidence that the 

rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a 

single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to 

assemble and to petition for redress of grievances.” Thomas, 323 U. S., at 530. Both speech and petition are

integral to the democratic process, although not necessarily in the same way. The right to petition allows citizens

to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the 

right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is

integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole 

realm of ideas and human affairs. Beyond the political

sphere, both speech and petition advance personal expression, although the right to petition is generally concerned

with expression directed to the government seeking redress of a grievance.

Courts should not presume there is always an essential

equivalence in the two Clauses or that Speech Clause 

precedents necessarily and in every case resolve Petition 

Clause claims. See ibid. (rights of speech and petition are

“not identical”). Interpretation of the Petition Clause 

must be guided by the objectives and aspirations that 

underlie the right. A petition conveys the special concerns 
8 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests action by the government to address those concerns. See Sure-Tan Inc., supra, at 896–897. 

This Court’s opinion in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U. S. 

479 (1985), has sometimes been interpreted to mean that 

the right to petition can extend no further than the right 

to speak; but McDonald held only that speech contained

within a petition is subject to the same standards for 

defamation and libel as speech outside a petition. In those 

circumstances the Court found “no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made

in a petition . . . than other First Amendment expressions.” Id., at 485. There may arise cases where the 

special concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a 

sound basis for a distinct analysis; and if that is so, the 

rules and principles that define the two rights might differ

in emphasis and formulation. 

As other Courts of Appeals have recognized, however,

claims of retaliation by public employees do not call for 

this divergence. See supra, at 4. The close connection 

between these rights has led Courts of Appeals other than

the Third Circuit to apply the public concern test developed in Speech Clause cases to Petition Clause claims by

public employees. As will be explained further, this approach is justified by the extensive common ground in the

definition and delineation of these rights. The considerations that shape the application of the Speech Clause to 

public employees apply with equal force to claims by those

employees under the Petition Clause. 

The substantial government interests that justify a

cautious and restrained approach to the protection of 

speech by public employees are just as relevant when

public employees proceed under the Petition Clause.

Petitions, no less than speech, can interfere with the 

efficient and effective operation of government. A petition

may seek to achieve results that “contravene governmen­
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

tal policies or impair the proper performance of governmental functions.” Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 419. Government must have authority, in appropriate circumstances, 

to restrain employees who use petitions to frustrate progress towards the ends they have been hired to achieve. A 

petition, like other forms of speech, can bring the “mission 

of the employer and the professionalism of its officers into 

serious disrepute.” Roe, 543 U. S., at 81. A public employee might, for instance, use the courts to pursue personal vendettas or to harass members of the general 

public. That behavior could cause a serious breakdown in 

public confidence in the government and its employees.

And if speech or petition were directed at or concerned

other public employees, it could have a serious and detrimental effect on morale. 

When a petition takes the form of a lawsuit against the

government employer, it may be particularly disruptive. 

Unlike speech of other sorts, a lawsuit demands a response. Mounting a defense to even frivolous claims may 

consume the time and resources of the government employer. Outside the context of public employment, this 

Court has recognized that the Petition Clause does not 

protect “objectively baseless” litigation that seeks to “‘interfere directly with the business relationships of a

competitor.’” Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 49, 60–61 

(1993) (quoting Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. 

Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127, 144 (1961)). In 

recognition of the substantial costs imposed by litigation, 

Congress has also required civil rights plaintiffs whose 

suits are “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” 

to pay attorney’s fees incurred by defendants. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 421 (1978); see 

also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11 (providing sanctions for claims

that are “presented for [an] improper purpose,” frivolous, 

or lacking evidentiary support). The government likewise 
10 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

has a significant interest in disciplining public employees

who abuse the judicial process.

Unrestrained application of the Petition Clause in the context of government employment would subject a wide 

range of government operations to invasive judicial superintendence. Employees may file grievances on a variety of 

employment matters, including working conditions, pay, 

discipline, promotions, leave, vacations, and terminations. 

See Brief for National School Boards Association as 

Amicus Curiae 5. Every government action in response 

could present a potential federal constitutional issue. 

Judges and juries, asked to determine whether the government’s actions were in fact retaliatory, would be required to give scrutiny to both the government’s response 

to the grievance and the government’s justification for its 

actions. This would occasion review of a host of collateral 

matters typically left to the discretion of public officials. 

Budget priorities, personnel decisions, and substantive 

policies might all be laid before the jury. This would raise 

serious federalism and separation-of-powers concerns. It 

would also consume the time and attention of public officials, burden the exercise of legitimate authority, and blur 

the lines of accountability between officials and the public. 

This case illustrates these risks and costs. Guarnieri’s 

attorney invited the jury to review myriad details of government decisionmaking. She questioned the council’s 

decision to issue directives in writing, rather than orally, 

Tr. 66 (Apr. 14, 2008); the council’s failure to consult the 

mayor before issuing the directives, id., at 105 (Apr. 15, 

2008); the amount of money spent to employ “Philadelphia

lawyers” to defend Guarnieri’s legal challenges, id., at 

191–193:7–10 (Apr. 14, 2008); 152–153 (Apr. 16, 2008); 

and the wisdom of the council’s decision to spend money to

install Global Positioning System devices on police cars, 

id., at 161–162 (same). Finally, the attorney invited the

jury to evaluate the council’s decisions in light of an emo­
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

tional appeal on behalf of Guarnieri’s “little dog Hercules,

little white fluffy dog and half Shitsu.” Id., at 49:13–14 

(Apr. 14, 2008). It is precisely to avoid this intrusion into

internal governmental affairs that this Court has held

that, “while the First Amendment invests public employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to ‘constitutionalize the employee grievance.’” Garcetti, supra, at 

420 (quoting Connick, 461 U. S., at 154). 

If the Petition Clause were to apply even where matters

of public concern are not involved, that would be unnecessary, or even disruptive, when there is already protection

for the rights of public employees to file grievances and to

litigate. The government can and often does adopt statutory and regulatory mechanisms to protect the rights of 

employees against improper retaliation or discipline, while 

preserving important government interests. Cf. Garcetti, 

supra, at 425 (noting a “powerful network of legislative 

enactments”). Employees who sue under federal and state

employment laws often benefit from generous and quite 

detailed antiretaliation provisions. See, e.g., Pa. Stat. 

Ann., Tit. 43, §1101.1201(a)(4) (Purdon 2009); §1101.1302.

These statutory protections are subject to legislative revision and can be designed for the unique needs of State, 

local, or Federal Governments, as well as the special 

circumstances of particular governmental offices and 

agencies. The Petition Clause is not an instrument for 

public employees to circumvent these legislative enactments when pursuing claims based on ordinary workplace

grievances.

In light of the government’s interests in the public

employment context, it would be surprising if Petition

Clause claims by public employees were not limited as

necessary to protect the employer’s functions and responsibilities. Even beyond the Speech Clause, this Court has 

explained that “government has significantly greater 

leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does 
12 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at 

large.” Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U. S. 

591, 599 (2008); see also NASA v. Nelson, 562 U. S. ___, 

___ (2011) (slip op., at 12). The government’s interest in

managing its internal affairs requires proper restraints on

the invocation of rights by employees when the workplace 

or the government employer’s responsibilities may be affected. There is no reason to think the Petition Clause 

should be an exception. 

The public concern test was developed to protect these

substantial government interests. Adoption of a different

rule for Petition Clause claims would provide a ready

means for public employees to circumvent the test’s protections. Consider Sheila Myers, who was the original 

plaintiff in Connick. She circulated “a questionnaire

soliciting the views of her fellow staff members” on various

office matters. 461 U. S., at 141. The Court held that 

Myers’ claim for retaliation failed the public concern test

because the questionnaire was “most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office 

policy.” Id., at 154. It would undermine that principle if a 

different result would have obtained had Myers raised

those same claims using a formal grievance procedure.

Myers’ employer “reasonably believed [Myers’ complaints] 

would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and 

destroy close working relationships.” Ibid. These concerns would be no less significant in the context of a formal grievance. Employees should not be able to evade the

rule articulated in the Connick case by wrapping their 

speech in the mantle of the Petition Clause. 

Articulation of a separate test for the Petition Clause 

would aggravate potential harm to the government’s

interests by compounding the costs of compliance with the

Constitution. A different rule for each First Amendment 

claim would require employers to separate petitions from

other speech in order to afford them different treatment; 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

and that, in turn, would add to the complexity and expense of compliance with the Constitution. Identifying petitions might be easy when employees employ formal grievance procedures, but the right to petition is not limited 

to petitions lodged under formal procedures. See, e.g., 

Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966). Indeed, the 

employee in Connick could have made a colorable argument that her questionnaire ought to be viewed as a petition for redress of grievances.

Guarnieri claims application of the public concern test 

to the Petition Clause would be inappropriate in light of 

the private nature of many petitions for redress of grievances. The Petition Clause undoubtedly does have force

and application in the context of a personal grievance

addressed to the government. See, e.g., Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1 (1964); Thomas, 323 U. S., at 530–531. At the founding, citizens

petitioned on a wide range of subjects, including matters

of both private and public concern. Petitions to the colonial legislatures concerned topics as diverse as debt actions, estate distributions, divorce proceedings, and requests for modification of a criminal sentence. Higginson,

A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for 

the Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L. J. 142, 146 (1986).

Although some claims will be of interest only to the individual making the appeal, for that individual the need for

a legal remedy may be a vital imperative. See, e.g., 

M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102 (1996); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). Outside the public employment context, constitutional protection for petitions 

does not necessarily turn on whether those petitions relate

to a matter of public concern.

There is, however, no merit to the suggestion that the

public concern test cannot apply under the Petition Clause 

because the majority of petitions to colonial legislatures

addressed matters of purely private concern. In analogous 
14 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

cases under the Speech Clause, this Court has noted the 

“Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of 

citizens to participate in political affairs,” Connick, supra, 

at 145, even though it is likely that, in this and any other 

age, most speech concerns purely private matters. The 

proper scope and application of the Petition Clause likewise cannot be determined merely by tallying up petitions 

to the colonial legislatures. Some effort must be made to 

identify the historic and fundamental principles that led 

to the enumeration of the right to petition in the First 

Amendment, among other rights fundamental to liberty. 

Petitions to the government assume an added dimension 

when they seek to advance political, social, or other ideas 

of interest to the community as a whole. Petition, as a 

word, a concept, and an essential safeguard of freedom, is

of ancient significance in the English law and the AngloAmerican legal tradition. See, e.g., 1 W. Blackstone, 

Commentaries *143. The right to petition applied to petitions from nobles to the King, from Parliament to the 

King, and from the people to the Parliament, and it concerned both discrete, personal injuries and great matters

of state. 

The right to petition traces its origins to Magna Carta,

which confirmed the right of barons to petition the King. 

W. McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great 

Charter of King John 467 (rev. 2d ed. 1958). The Magna 

Carta itself was King John’s answer to a petition from the

barons. Id., at 30–38. Later, the Petition of Right of 1628

drew upon centuries of tradition and Magna Carta as a

model for the Parliament to issue a plea, or even a demand, that the Crown refrain from certain actions. 3 Car. 

1, ch. 1 (1627). The Petition of Right stated four principal 

grievances: taxation without consent of Parliament; arbitrary imprisonment; quartering or billeting of soldiers;

and the imposition of martial law. After its passage by

both Houses of Parliament, the Petition received the 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

King’s assent and became part of the law of England. See 

S. Gardiner, The First Two Stuarts and the Puritan Revolution, 1603–1660, pp. 60–61 (1886). The Petition of Right 

occupies a place in English constitutional history superseded in importance, perhaps, only by Magna Carta itself 

and the Declaration of Right of 1689. 

The following years saw use of mass petitions to address

matters of public concern. See 8 D. Hume, History of

England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, p. 122 (1763) (“Tumultuous petitioning . . . 

was an admirable expedient . . . for spreading discontent,

and for uniting the nation in any popular clamour”). In 

1680, for instance, more than 15,000 persons signed a

petition regarding the summoning and dissolution of Parliament, “one of the major political issues agitating the 

nation.” Knights, London’s ‘Monster’ Petition, 36 Historical Journal 39, 40–43 (1993). Nine years later, the Declaration of Right listed the illegal acts of the sovereign and 

set forth certain rights of the King’s subjects, one of which 

was the right to petition the sovereign. It stated that “it 

is the Right of the Subjects to petition the King, and all 

Commitments and Prosecutions for such Petitioning are 

Illegal.” 1 W. & M., ch. 2; see also L. Schwoerer, The 

Declaration of Rights, 1689, pp. 69–71 (1981).

The Declaration of Independence of 1776 arose in the

same tradition. After listing other specific grievances and 

wrongs, it complained, “In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble 

terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by

repeated injury.” The Declaration of Independence ¶30. 

After independence, petitions on matters of public concern continued to be an essential part of contemporary

debates in this country’s early history. Two years before

the adoption of the Constitution, James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, an

important document in the history of the Establishment 
16 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

Clause, was presented to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia as a petition. See 1 D. Laycock, Religious Liberty: Overviews and History 90 (2010); 

Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. 

Winn, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12–13). It 

attracted over 1,000 signatures. Laycock, supra, at 90, 

n. 153. During the ratification debates, Antifederalists

circulated petitions urging delegates not to adopt the 

Constitution absent modification by a bill of rights. Boyd,

Antifederalists and the Acceptance of the Constitution: 

Pennsylvania, 1787–1792, 9 Publius, No. 2, pp. 123, 128–

133 (Spring 1979).

Petitions to the National Legislature also played a

central part in the legislative debate on the subject of

slavery in the years before the Civil War. See W. Miller, 

Arguing About Slavery (1995). Petitions allowed participation in democratic governance even by groups excluded 

from the franchise. See Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: 

The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 

Ford. L. Rev. 2153, 2182 (1998). For instance, petitions by 

women seeking the vote had a role in the early woman’s 

suffrage movement. See Cogan & Ginzberg, 1846 Petition 

for Woman’s Suffrage, New York State Constitutional 

Convention, 22 Signs 427, 437–438 (1997). The right to

petition is in some sense the source of other fundamental

rights, for petitions have provided a vital means for citizens to request recognition of new rights and to assert

existing rights against the sovereign. 

Petitions to the courts and similar bodies can likewise 

address matters of great public import. In the context of 

the civil rights movement, litigation provided a means for 

“the distinctive contribution of a minority group to the

ideas and beliefs of our society.” NAACP v. Button, 371 

U. S. 415, 431 (1963). Individuals may also “engag[e] in

litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and 

association, as well as a means of communicating useful 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

information to the public.” In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 

431 (1978). Litigation on matters of public concern may 

facilitate the informed public participation that is a cornerstone of democratic society. It also allows individuals 

to pursue desired ends by direct appeal to government 

officials charged with applying the law. 

The government may not misuse its role as employer 

unduly to distort this deliberative process. See Garcetti, 

547 U. S., at 419. Public employees are “the members of a

community most likely to have informed and definite 

opinions” about a wide range of matters related, directly 

or indirectly, to their employment. Pickering, 391 U. S., at 

572. Just as the public has a right to hear the views of 

public employees, the public has a right to the benefit 

of those employees’ participation in petitioning activity.

Petitions may “allow the public airing of disputed facts”

and “promote the evolution of the law by supporting the 

development of legal theories,” NLRB, 536 U. S., at 532 

(internal quotation marks omitted), and these and other 

benefits may not accrue if one class of knowledgeable and 

motivated citizens is prevented from engaging in petitioning activity. When a public employee seeks to participate,

as a citizen, in the process of deliberative democracy, 

either through speech or petition, “it is necessary to regard

the [employee] as the member of the general public he

seeks to be.” Pickering, supra, at 574. 

The framework used to govern Speech Clause claims by

public employees, when applied to the Petition Clause,

will protect both the interests of the government and the

First Amendment right. If a public employee petitions as

an employee on a matter of purely private concern, the 

employee’s First Amendment interest must give way, as it 

does in speech cases. Roe, 543 U. S., at 82–83. When a 

public employee petitions as a citizen on a matter of public

concern, the employee’s First Amendment interest must

be balanced against the countervailing interest of the 
18 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

government in the effective and efficient management of 

its internal affairs. Pickering, supra, at 568. If that 

balance favors the public employee, the employee’s First

Amendment claim will be sustained. If the interference 

with the government’s operations is such that the balance 

favors the employer, the employee’s First Amendment 

claim will fail even though the petition is on a matter of 

public concern.

As under the Speech Clause, whether an employee’s 

petition relates to a matter of public concern will depend 

on “the content, form, and context of [the petition], as

revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U. S., at 147– 

148, and n. 7. The forum in which a petition is lodged will 

be relevant to the determination of whether the petition

relates to a matter of public concern. See Snyder v. 

Phelps, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 8–9). A petition filed with an employer using an internal grievance 

procedure in many cases will not seek to communicate to

the public or to advance a political or social point of view 

beyond the employment context. 

Of course in one sense the public may always be interested in how government officers are performing their

duties. But as the Connick and Pickering test has evolved, 

that will not always suffice to show a matter of public 

concern. A petition that “involves nothing more than a 

complaint about a change in the employee’s own duties” 

does not relate to a matter of public concern and accordingly “may give rise to discipline without imposing any

special burden of justification on the government employer.” United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 

454, 466 (1995). The right of a public employee under the 

Petition Clause is a right to participate as a citizen, 

through petitioning activity, in the democratic process. It 

is not a right to transform everyday employment disputes

into matters for constitutional litigation in the federal 

courts. 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

III 

Because the Third Circuit did not find it necessary to

apply this framework, there has been no determination

as to how it would apply in the context of this case. The 

parties did not address the issue in the opening brief or 

the response, and the United States did not address the

issue in its brief as amicus curiae. In their reply brief,

petitioners suggest that this Court should address the

issue and resolve it in their favor. Yet in their opening

brief petitioners sought only vacatur and remand. This 

Court need not consider this issue without the benefit of 

full briefs by the parties. 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 09–1476 

BOROUGH OF DURYEA, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. CHARLES J. GUARNIERI 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2011]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. 

For the reasons set forth by JUSTICE SCALIA, I seriously 

doubt that lawsuits are “petitions” within the original 

meaning of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. 

See post, at 2–3 (opinion concurring in judgment in part 

and dissenting in part). Unreasoned statements to the 

contrary in this Court’s prior decisions do not convince me 

otherwise. Like the Court, however, I need not decide that 

question today because “[t]he parties litigated the case on

the premise that Guarnieri’s grievances and lawsuit are

petitions protected by the Petition Clause.” Ante, at 6. 

I also largely agree with JUSTICE SCALIA about the 

framework for assessing public employees’ retaliation

claims under the Petition Clause. The “public concern”

doctrine of Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983), is

rooted in the First Amendment’s core protection of speech 

on matters of public concern and has no relation to the

right to petition. See post, at 3–7. I would not import that 

test into the Petition Clause. Rather, like JUSTICE SCALIA, 

I would hold that “the Petition Clause protects public 

employees against retaliation for filing petitions unless

those petitions are addressed to the government in its 

capacity as the petitioners’ employer, rather than its capacity as their sovereign.” Post, at 7. 

But I would not end the analysis after determining that 
2 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

a petition was addressed to the government as sovereign. 

Recognizing “the realities of the employment context,” we 

have held that “government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does

when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at 

large.” Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U. S. 

591, 600, 599 (2008). Even where a public employee petitions the government in its capacity as sovereign, I would

balance the employee’s right to petition the sovereign 

against the government’s interest as an employer in the effective and efficient management of its internal affairs.

Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 419 (2006) (noting 

that employees “speaking as citizens about matters of public concern” still must “face . . . speech restrictions that

are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and 

effectively”); United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 

U. S. 454, 492 (1995) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (“In

conducting this balance [in the Speech Clause context],

we consistently have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption, even

when the speech involved was on a matter of public concern”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 721–722 (1987)

(plurality opinion) (balancing the “the realities of the 

workplace” against the “legitimate privacy interests of

public employees” to conclude that a warrant requirement 

would “seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business” 

and “be unduly burdensome”). In assessing a retaliation

claim under the Petition Clause, courts should be able to 

conclude that, in instances when the petition is especially

disruptive, as some lawsuits might be, the balance of 

interests may weigh in favor of the government employer.

Applying this framework, I would vacate the judgment

and remand. The Court of Appeals erred with respect to

both Guarnieri’s union grievance and his 42 U. S. C. §1983

suit. First, even assuming the grievance was a petition, it

was addressed to the local government in its capacity as 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

Guarnieri’s employer. See post, at 8 (opinion of SCALIA, 

J.). Second, Guarnieri addressed his §1983 suit to the 

Federal Government in its capacity as sovereign, not to 

the local government as his employer. See ibid. But the 

Court of Appeals did not consider whether the local government’s interest as an employer “in achieving its goals

as effectively and efficiently as possible” nevertheless

outweighs Guarnieri’s interest in petitioning the Federal 

Government regarding his local employment. Engquist, 

supra, at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted). I would 

vacate and remand for the Court of Appeals to conduct

that analysis in the first instance. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 09–1476 

BOROUGH OF DURYEA, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. CHARLES J. GUARNIERI 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2011] 

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment in part and

dissenting in part. 

I disagree with two aspects of the Court’s reasoning. 

First, the Court is incorrect to state that our “precedents

confirm that the Petition Clause protects the right of

individuals to appeal to courts and other forums established by the government for resolution of legal disputes.” 

Ante, at 6. Our first opinion clearly saying that lawsuits 

are “Petitions” under the Petition Clause came less than 

40 years ago. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508 (1972),1 an opinion by Justice

Douglas, the Court asserted that “[t]he right of access to 

the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.” 

Id., at 510. As authority it cited two habeas corpus cases, 

Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969), and Ex parte Hull, 

312 U. S. 546 (1941), neither of which even mentioned the 

Petition Clause. The assertion, moreover, was pure dictum. The holding of California Motor Transport was that 

the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a judicial gloss on the 

—————— 

1Respondent would agree, since he cited this case in argument as the 

earliest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. There were, however, three cases in the 

1960’s which adverted vaguely to lawsuits as involving the right to 

petition. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217, 222– 

224 (1967); Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1, 

7 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 430 (1963). 
2 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

Sherman Act that had been held to immunize certain 

lobbying (legislature-petitioning) activity, did not apply to 

sham litigation that “sought to bar . . . competitors from 

meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals,” 404 U. S., at

510–512. The three other cases cited by the Court as

holding that lawsuits are petitions, ante, at 6, are all 

statutory interpretation decisions construing the National 

Labor Relations Act, albeit against the backdrop of the

Petition Clause. See BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 

U. S. 516, 534–536 (2002); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 

U. S. 883, 896–897 (1984) Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. 

v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 741–743 (1983). The Court has 

never actually held that a lawsuit is a constitutionally

protected “Petition,” nor does today’s opinion hold that.

The Court merely observes that “[t]he parties litigated the

case on the premise that Guarnieri’s grievances and lawsuit are petitions protected by the Petition Clause,” ante, 

at 6, and concludes that Guarnieri’s 42 U. S. C. §1983

claim would fail even if that premise were correct. 

I find the proposition that a lawsuit is a constitutionally 

protected “Petition” quite doubtful. The First Amendment’s Petition Clause states that “Congress shall make

no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to 

petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The 

reference to “the right of the people” indicates that the

Petition Clause was intended to codify a pre-existing 

individual right, which means that we must look to

historical practice to determine its scope. See District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 579, 592 (2008). 

There is abundant historical evidence that “Petitions” 

were directed to the executive and legislative branches of 

government, not to the courts. In 1765, the Stamp Act

Congress stated “[t]hat it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies to petition the King or either House 

of Parliament.” Declaration of Rights and Grievances, 

Art. 13, reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

Documentary History 195, 198 (1971); it made no mention 

of petitions directed to the courts. As of 1781, seven state 

constitutions protected citizens’ right to apply or petition

for redress of grievances; all seven referred only to legislative petitions. See Andrews, A Right of Access to Court

Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 Ohio St. L. J. 557, 604–605, n. 159

(1999). The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not grant federal 

trial courts jurisdiction to hear lawsuits arising under 

federal law; there is no indication anyone ever thought 

that this restriction infringed on the right of citizens to

petition the Federal Government for redress of grievances. 

The fact that the Court never affirmed a First Amendment 

right to litigate until its unsupported dictum in 1972—

after having heard almost 200 years’ worth of lawsuits, 

untold numbers of which might have been affected by a

First Amendment right to litigate—should give rise to a

strong suspicion that no such right exists. “[A] universal

and long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct creates a strong presumption that the prohibition is 

constitutional: Principles of liberty fundamental enough to 

have been embodied within constitutional guarantees are 

not readily erased from the Nation’s consciousness.” 

Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, ante, at 4 (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

I acknowledge, however, that scholars have made detailed historical arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., 

Andrews, supra, at 595–625; Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment

Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 

91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 899, 903–962 (1997). As the Court’s 

opinion observes, the parties have not litigated the issue, 

and so I agree we should leave its resolution to another

day.

Second, and of greater practical consequence, I disagree 

with the Court’s decision to apply the “public concern” 
4 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

framework of Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983), to 

retaliation claims brought under the Petition Clause. The 

Court correctly holds that the Speech Clause and Petition

Clause are not co-extensive, ante, at 7–8. It acknowledges, 

moreover, that the Petition Clause protects personal 

grievances addressed to the government, ante, at 13. But 

that is an understatement—rather like acknowledging 

that the Speech Clause protects verbal expression. “[T]he

primary responsibility of colonial assemblies was the 

settlement of private disputes raised by petitions.” Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L. J. 142, 145 

(1986). “[T]he overwhelming majority of First Congress

petitions presented private claims.” 8 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 1789–1791, p. xviii (K. 

Bowling, W. DiGiacomantonio, & C. Bickford eds. 1998).

The Court nonetheless holds that, at least in public employment cases, the Petition Clause and Speech Clause 

should be treated identically, so that since the Speech 

Clause does not prohibit retaliation against public employees for speaking on matters of private concern, neither 

does the Petition Clause. The Court gives two reasons for 

this: First, “[a] different rule for each First Amendment

claim would . . . add to the complexity and expense of

compliance with the Constitution” and “would provide a 

ready means for public employees to circumvent the test’s 

protections,” and second, “[p]etitions to the government

. . . assume an added dimension when they seek to advance political, social, or other ideas of interest to the

community as a whole.” Ante, at 12–14. 

Neither reason is persuasive. As to the former: The 

complexity of treating the Petition Clause and Speech

Clause separately is attributable to the inconsiderate

disregard for judicial convenience displayed by those who

ratified a First Amendment that included both provisions 

as separate constitutional rights. A plaintiff does not 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 5 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

engage in pernicious “circumvention” of our Speech

Clause precedents when he brings a claim premised on a 

separate enumerated right to which those precedents are 

inapplicable.

As to the latter: Perhaps petitions on matters of public

concern do in some sense involve an “added dimension,” 

but that “added dimension” does not obliterate what has 

traditionally been the principal dimension of the Petition 

Clause. The public-concern limitation makes sense in the 

context of the Speech Clause, because it is speech on matters of public concern that lies “within the core of First

Amendment protection.” Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U. S. 591, 600 (2008). The Speech Clause

“has its fullest and most urgent application to speech 

uttered during a campaign for political office.” Citizens 

United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2010) (slip op., at 23) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The unique protection granted to political speech is 

grounded in the history of the Speech Clause, which “was 

fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the

bringing about of political and social changes desired by 

the people.” Connick, supra, at 145 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

But the mere fact that we have a longstanding tradition

of granting heightened protection to speech of public concern does not suggest that a “public concern” requirement 

should be written into other constitutional provisions. We 

would not say that religious proselytizing is entitled to

more protection under the Free Exercise Clause than

private religious worship because public proclamations are 

“core free exercise activity.” Nor would we say that the 

due process right to a neutral adjudicator is heightened in

the context of litigation of national importance because 

such litigation is somehow at the “core of the due process 

guarantee.” Likewise, given that petitions to redress 

private grievances were such a high proportion of petitions 
6 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

at the founding—a proportion that is infinitely higher if 

lawsuits are considered to be petitions—it is ahistorical to 

say that petitions on matters of public concern constitute 

“core petitioning activity.” In the Court’s view, if Guarnieri had submitted a letter to one of the borough of 

Duryea’s council members protesting a tax assessment 

that he claimed was mistaken; and if the borough had 

fired him in retaliation for that petition; Guarnieri would

have no claim for a Petition Clause violation. That has to 

be wrong. It takes no account of, and thus frustrates, the 

principal purpose of the Petition Clause.

The Court responds that “[t]he proper scope and application of the Petition Clause . . . cannot be determined 

merely by tallying up petitions to the colonial legislatures,” ante, at 14, but that misses the point. The text of 

the Petition Clause does not distinguish petitions of public

concern from petitions of private concern. Accordingly,

there should be no doctrinal distinction between them 

unless the history or tradition of the Petition Clause justifies it. The mere fact that the Court can enumerate several historical petitions of public importance, ante, at 14– 

16, does not establish such a tradition, given that petitions for redress of private grievances vastly outnumbered 

them. Indeed, the Court’s holding is contrary to this

Court’s historical treatment of the Petition Clause, assuming (as the Court believes) that the Clause embraces litigation: We have decided innumerable cases establishing

constitutional rights with respect to litigation, and until

today not a one of them has so much as hinted that litigation of public concern enjoys more of those rights than

litigation of private concern. The Court’s belief in the 

social importance of public petitions, and its reminiscences 

of some of the public-petition greats of yesteryear, ibid., do 

not justify the proclamation of special constitutional rights

for public petitions. It is the Constitution that establishes 

constitutional rights, not the Justices’ notions of what is 
Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 7 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

important, or the top numbers on their Petition Hit Parade. And there is no basis for believing that the Petition

Clause gives special protection to public petitions.

Rather than shoehorning the “public concern” doctrine

into a Clause where it does not fit, we should hold that 

the Petition Clause protects public employees against retaliation for filing petitions unless those petitions are addressed to the government in its capacity as the petitioners’ employer, rather than its capacity as their sovereign.

As the Court states, we have long held that “government 

has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its sovereign

power to bear on citizens at large.” Ante, at 11–12 (quoting Engquist, supra, at 599; internal quotation marks

omitted). To apply to the Petition Clause context what we

have said regarding the Speech Clause: When an employee files a petition with the government in its capacity

as his employer, he is not acting “as [a] citize[n] for First

Amendment purposes,” because “there is no relevant 

analogue to [petitions] by citizens who are not government

employees.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421, 423– 

424 (2006). To be sure, the line between a petition addressed to government as the petitioner’s employer and 

one addressed to it as sovereign is not always clear, but it 

is no more fuzzy than the line between matters of private 

and matters of public concern.2 The criterion I suggest 

—————— 

2Compare, e.g., Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F. 3d 917, 

927 (CA9 2004) (testimony concerning claim of employment discrimination by government contractor constituted matter of public concern 

because “[l]itigation seeking to expose . . . wrongful governmental

activity is, by its very nature, a matter of public concern”), with Padilla 

v. South Harrison R-II School Dist., 181 F. 3d 992, 997 (CA8 1999) 

(teacher’s testimony approving sexual relationship between teacher and

minor was matter of private concern because it “does not relate to the 

teacher’s legitimate disagreement with a school board’s policies”). And 

compare, e.g., Voigt v. Savell, 70 F. 3d 1552, 1560 (CA9 1995) (speech

regarding how judge handled two internal personnel matters was 
8 BOROUGH OF DURYEA v. GUARNIERI 

Opinion of SCALIA, J. 

would largely resolve the legitimate practical concerns

identified by the Court, ante, at 10–12, while recognizing 

and giving effect to the difference between the Speech and 

Petition Clauses. 

Under what I think to be the proper test, the Third

Circuit judgment before us here should be reversed in part 

and affirmed in part. The portion of it upholding Guarnieri’s claim of retaliation for having filed his union grievance must be reversed. A union grievance is the epitome

of a petition addressed to the government in its capacity

as the petitioner’s employer. No analogous petitions to the

government could have been filed by private citizens, who 

are not even permitted to avail themselves of Guarnieri’s

union grievance procedure. Contrariwise, the portion of

the judgment upholding Guarnieri’s claim of retaliation

for having filed his §1983 claim must be affirmed. Given 

that Guarnieri was not an employee of the Federal Government, it is impossible to say that the §1983 claim was 

addressed to government in its capacity as his employer. I 

think it clear that retaliating against a state employee for 

writing a letter to his Congressman about his state job

would run afoul of the Petition Clause. Assuming that the

§1983 lawsuit should be treated like a letter to a Congressman for Petition Clause purposes—a proposition

which, I again emphasize, is doubtful, but which the parties do not dispute in this case—retaliation for having filed 

his lawsuit also violates the Clause. 

—————— 

matter of public concern because “[t]he public has an interest in knowing whether the court treats its job applicants fairly”), with Maggio v. 

Sipple, 211 F. 3d 1346, 1353 (CA11 2000) (testimony at hearing concerning employee grievance was matter of private concern because it 

did “not allege . . . fraud or corruption in [defendant’s] implementation

of its personnel policies and appeal procedures”).