UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT PIERCE DIVISION

CASE NO. 22-14414-CIV-CANNON

DEONDRAVIOUS LAMAR ST. FLEUR and

TROYSTAVIOUS JAMAR HEWITT,

 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF FORT PIERCE, FLORIDA et al.,

Defendants. 

_______________________________/ 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANT CITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by 

Defendant City of Fort Pierce, Florida (“Defendant City”) [ECF No. 25]. The Court has reviewed 

the Motion, Plaintiffs’ Amended Response in Opposition [ECF No. 29],1 Defendant City’s Reply 

[ECF No. 31], and the full record. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion [ECF No. 25] is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6] and accepted as 

true for purposes of this Order. 

On December 18, 2018, Defendants Justin Gullett (“Gullett”) and Atilano Garcia 

(“Garcia”), police officers working for Defendant City, were assigned to conduct surveillance as 

a part of their assignment to the Crime Suppression Unit (CSU) [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 8–9, 12]. The

officers were sitting in an unmarked car but wore “police issued raid gear” containing the police 

1 The Court initially struck Plaintiffs’ response to the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 27] because it 

did not “include an opposing memorandum of law or respond to the arguments raised in Defendant 

City of Fort Pierce’s Motion to Dismiss” [ECF No. 28]. 

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department’s logos, duty belt, and a visible firearm [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 12–13]. Plaintiff Troystavious 

Jamar Hewitt (“Hewitt”) saw the officers from inside his home, walked outside, and approached 

the unmarked car [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 14–15]. Hewitt looked inside the front of the car and asked the 

officers why they were present [ECF No. 6 ¶ 15]. Garcia and Gullett identified themselves as 

police officers and told Hewitt to return to his residence [ECF No. 6 ¶ 16]. Hewitt continued 

questioning the officers, asking them why they were on his property and whether they were there 

to investigate him [ECF No. 6 ¶ 17]. The officers told Hewitt they were not investigating him and 

again instructed Hewitt to return to his residence [ECF No. 6 ¶ 18]. 

When Hewitt turned around to walk back into his home, the two officers stepped out of the 

unmarked vehicle and approached Hewitt, who was using his smartphone [ECF No. 6 ¶ 19]. 

Garcia and Gullett grabbed Hewitt’s hand, causing Hewitt to drop his smartphone and breaking 

the screen in the process [ECF No. 6 ¶ 20]. The officers then “slammed Hewitt against the vehicle 

and handcuffed him” [ECF No. 6 ¶ 20(a)]. 

Plaintiff Deondravious Lamar St. Fleur (“St. Fleur”), after watching the interaction from 

inside, left his home and approached the officers [ECF No. 6 ¶ 21]. St. Fleur, recording the 

interactions on his smartphone, moved to get footage of Hewitt’s detention despite Gullett’s 

warning that St. Fleur should stay where he was [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 22–23]. Both Hewitt and St. Fleur 

were arrested for disturbing the peace, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 877.03, and resisting an officer 

without violence, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.02 [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 26, 27]. Defendant Davis, the 

officers’ supervisor and “Acting Sergeant,” arrived on the scene where he reviewed and approved 

the arrest reports written by Garcia and Gullett [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 28–28(a)]. 

Hewitt and St. Fleur were taken to the St. Lucie County Jail by the officers, where they 

remained until they posted bond [ECF No. 6 ¶ 29]. Hewitt was charged by information with 

resisting an officer without violence, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.02 [ECF No. 6 ¶ 30]. The 

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charges were eventually dropped by the State Attorney [ECF No. 6 ¶ 31]. St. Fleur was similarly 

charged with resisting an office without violence, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.02 [ECF No. 6 

¶ 33]; all charges against St. Fleur were also dropped [ECF No. 6 ¶ 34]. 

On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiffs filed a 29-count first Amended Complaint

against Defendant City and Defendants Gullet, Garcia, and Davis [ECF No. 6].2 As relevant to 

this Motion, the Amended Complaint asserts the following four claims against Defendant City: 

(1) Claim of False Arrest by Plaintiff St. Fleur [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 36–41 (Count 1)]; (2) Claim of False 

Arrest by Plaintiff Hewitt [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 42–47 (Count 2)]; (3) Claim of Negligent Failure to Train 

and Supervise by Plaintiff St. Fleur [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 66–70 (Count 5)]; and (4) Claim of Negligent 

Failure to Train and Supervise by Plaintiff Hewitt [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 89–93 (Count 8)]. Plaintiffs seek 

damages in the form of “prejudgment interest” for each claim, along with other forms of relief not 

relevant to this Motion [ECF No. 6 pp. 7, 8, 13, 18]. 

The Motion to Dismiss is ripe for adjudication [ECF Nos. 25, 29, 31].

DISCUSSION

Defendant City raises two challenges to the Amended Complaint: (1) Plaintiffs’ requests 

for prejudgment interest in the Amended Complaint are barred by Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5)(a)

[ECF No. 25 p. 3]; and (2) to the extent Counts 5 and 8 seek recovery for Defendant City’s 

instruction and training of its police officers, those claims are barred by Defendant City’s sovereign 

immunity [ECF No. 25 pp. 3–5]. To remedy these defects, Defendant City requests dismissal with 

prejudice as to each of the deficient claims/counts [ECF No. 25 p. 5; ECF No. 31 p. 2]. Plaintiffs 

agree that the Amended Complaint is deficient in the ways identified by Defendant City but 

2 Plaintiffs initially filed a 34-count complaint against the same Defendants on December 13, 2022, 

before amending their pleading as a matter of course under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A) 

[ECF No. 1]. Defendants Gullet, Garcia, and Davis have filed an Answer and Affirmative 

Defenses to the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 22]. 

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disagree as to the remedy for the deficiencies, requesting instead that the claims/counts simply be 

stricken from the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 29]. 

I. Claims for Prejudgment Interest

Defendant City first seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for prejudgment interest with 

prejudice, claiming sovereign immunity under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5)(a) [ECF No. 25 p. 3]. 

Plaintiffs agree that their requests for prejudgment interest under Counts 1, 2, 5, and 8 are barred

but ask the Court merely to strike the claims from the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 29 ¶ 3]. 

The Court agrees with the parties that Plaintiffs’ prejudgment interest requests are barred 

by statute. Section 768.28(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes states that the liability of state agencies or 

subdivisions, such as Defendant City, “shall not include punitive damages or interest for the period 

before judgment.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5)(a) (emphasis added). Because the requests for 

prejudgment interest are not “claims” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a)(2) but rather “part of the relief prayed for in a claim,” Cohen v. Off. Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 

1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in part on other grounds, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000), 

the proper remedy is not dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) as Defendant City requests [ECF No. 25 

pp. 2–3]. Schmidt v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 14-CV-62, 2014 WL 5149175, at *8 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 

2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[A] plain reading of Rule 

12(b)(6) indicates that the rule may be used only to dismiss a ‘claim’ in its entirety.”). Rather, 

Plaintiffs’ erroneous requests for prejudgment interest are due to be stricken from the Amended 

Complaint. Id. at *7 (“[S]triking a prayer for relief . . . is proper only where the relief requested is 

not available as a matter of law.”). 

II. Negligent Instruction and Training Claims 

Defendant City seeks dismissal of Counts 5 and 8 of the Amended Complaint with 

prejudice “to the extent that Plaintiffs purport to challenge the City’s discretionary decisions 

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regarding how to train or instruct its police officers and what subject matters to include in such 

training or instruction” [ECF No. 25 p. 5]. Dismissal with prejudice is the only proper remedy, 

Defendant City argues, because the claims are barred by sovereign immunity, and Plaintiffs should 

be permanently barred “from asserting a similar claim in the future” [ECF No. 31 p. 2]. Plaintiffs 

agree to strike the words “instruct” and “train” from the Amended Complaint but do not further 

agree to dismissal of the claims with prejudice [ECF No. 29 ¶ 5]. 

It is clear that Plaintiff may not challenge Defendant City’s decisions about how to train its 

officers and what subject matter is included in that training. See Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 

260 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A city’s decision regarding how to train its officers and 

what subject matter to include in the training is clearly an exercise of governmental discretion 

regarding fundamental questions of policy and planning.”); id. (“[A] governmental agency is 

immune from tort liability based upon actions that involve its ‘discretionary’ functions, such as 

development and planning of governmental goals and policies.”). As such, Defendant City is 

entitled to sovereign immunity in the performance of those discretionary functions. 

However, the Court cannot grant Defendant City the remedy it seeks—dismissal of the 

claims with prejudice. And that is because “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.” Fed. 

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “A dismissal for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice.” Stalley ex rel. U.S. 

v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). As a result, Counts 

5 and 8 of the Amended Complaint are due to be dismissed without prejudice to the extent 

Plaintiffs pursue claims challenging Defendant City’s decisions about how to train its officers and 

what subject matter is included in that training. Defendant City does not challenge Plaintiffs’ 

ability to proceed on Counts 5 and 8 insofar as Plaintiffs seek to challenge Defendant City’s 

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supervision of Defendants Garcia and Gullett; Plaintiffs may proceed on Counts 5 and 8 under 

their negligent supervision theory of liability. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 

1. Defendant City of Fort Pierce, Florida’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 25] is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

2. Plaintiffs’ requests for prejudgment interest in the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6 

pp. 7, 8, 13, 18] are hereby STRICKEN. 

3. Counts 5 and 8 of the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 66–70, 89–93] are 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent Plaintiffs pursue claims 

challenging Defendant City’s decisions on how to train its officers and what subject 

matter is included in the training. Plaintiffs may proceed on Counts 5 and 8 to the 

extent they seek to challenge Defendant City’s supervision of Defendants Garcia and 

Gullett. 

4. Defendant City of Fort Pierce, Florida, shall file an Answer to the Amended Complaint 

on or before June 13, 2023.

5. On or before June 26, 2023, the parties shall file a joint scheduling report which 

contains all of the information specified in Local Rule 16.1 and comes accompanied by 

a Joint Proposed Scheduling Order that is both attached as an exhibit on CM/ECF and 

sent in Word format via email to cannon@flsd.uscourts.gov. 

6. In addition, on or before June 26, 2023, the parties, including governmental parties, 

must file Certificates of Interested Parties and Corporate Disclosure Statements that 

contain a complete list of persons, associated persons, firms, partnerships, or 

corporations that have a financial interest in the outcome of this case, including 

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subsidiaries, conglomerates, affiliates, parent corporations, and other identifiable legal 

entities related to a party. Throughout the pendency of the action, the parties are under 

a continuing obligation to amend, correct, and update the Certificates.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, this 26th day of May 2023.

_________________________________

AILEEN M. CANNON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

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