[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-11832

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. ARB - 2017-0080

T.J. JACOBS, 

 Petitioner,

versus

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 

 Respondent.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Department of Labor

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(March 24, 2020)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, LAGOA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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T.J. Jacobs, proceeding pro se, seeks review of the Administrative Review 

Board’s (ARB) summary affirmance of the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) 

denial of his whistleblower complaint brought under the Surface Transportation 

Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a). After review,1 we deny Jacobs’ 

petition in part, and dismiss in part. 

First, Jacobs contends the ARB erred in affirming the ALJ’s finding that he 

voluntarily resigned from his employment with Liberty Logistics Inc. (Liberty). 

The STAA prohibits employers from retaliating against employees based on 

complaints or actions related to commercial motor vehicle safety. See 49 U.S.C. 

§ 31105(a). The STAA protects an employee who refuses to operate a vehicle 

because the operation would violate a regulation, standard, or order of the United 

States related to commercial vehicle safety, health, or security. Id. If a party 

alleges a violation of that provision, he can file a complaint with the Secretary of 

Labor, who must issue a final order on the complaint. Id. § 31105(b). A 

complainant bears the burden of demonstrating that: (1) his action was a protected 

activity; (2) the company took an adverse employment action against him; and 

1 “In reviewing appeals arising from the STAA’s whistleblower provision, we conform to 

the standard of review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.” Koch Foods, Inc. v. Sec’y, 

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 712 F.3d 476, 480 (11th Cir. 2013). We will only overturn the ARB’s 

findings if they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the 

law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Stone & Webster Const., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 684 F.3d 1127, 

1132 (11th Cir. 2012). We review the ARB’s legal conclusions de novo. Stone & Webster 

Const., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1132. Moreover, we will accept the ARB’s factual findings unless they 

are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 

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(3) his protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. Id. 

(stating that the legal burdens in 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) govern complaints under the 

STAA); 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the complainant is able to make such a 

showing by a preponderance of the evidence, the employer can avoid liability by 

showing, through clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same 

action in absence of the alleged protected activity. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). 

As an initial matter, Jacobs has abandoned his arguments regarding the 

ALJ’s finding that he voluntarily resigned, because he fails to support his argument 

with anything beyond conclusory statements in his briefs. See Timson v. Sampson, 

518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se

litigant are deemed abandoned). Moreover, Jacobs failed to ensure the record on 

appeal was complete because he failed to include a complete transcript of his 

hearing before the ALJ. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2) (providing “[i]f the appellant 

intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the 

evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the record a 

transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion”).

However, regardless of those deficiencies, substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s finding that Jacobs voluntarily resigned from his employment with Liberty. 

The ALJ stated the plain language of Jacobs’ June 19 email where he rescinded all 

agreements with Liberty showed his intent to resign. In his June 19 email, Jacobs 

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stated “any and all [a]greements . . . are hereby RESCINDED,” and he requested 

he be paid for his services up to June 19. Moreover, Jacobs stated he would return 

his truck to Penske for a final inspection, and a meeting with Liberty would no 

longer be necessary. Thus, he had the choice to continue his discussions with 

Liberty about his grievances or terminate his employment. See Hargray v. City of 

Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating a resignation is voluntary 

as long as the employee had a choice, even if the alternatives are unpleasant). 

Jacobs chose to voluntarily resign, which shows he was not constructively 

discharged or subject to a materially adverse employment action. See id. 

Accordingly, because Jacobs voluntarily resigned, we deny the petition as to this 

issue. 

Second, he asserts the ARB erred in affirming the ALJ’s finding his claims 

were not based on adverse employment actions covered by the STAA. Again, 

Jacobs has abandoned any arguments regarding the ALJ’s findings that Liberty 

failed to pay him, ignored his emails, and his truck lease violated federal law 

because he fails to support his arguments with anything beyond conclusory 

statements in his briefs. Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Additionally, Jacobs has 

abandoned any arguments about Liberty’s failure to pay him a signing bonus 

because he raises that issue for the first time on appeal. See Mahon v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Agric., 485 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining “a reviewing court 

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will not consider arguments that a party failed to raise in a timely fashion before an 

administrative agency”). 

Nevertheless, even if he had not abandoned his arguments, Jacobs cannot 

meet his burden to show that Liberty subjected him to a materially adverse action. 

See 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b). He did not offer evidence showing that Liberty failed to 

pay him for 3,081 miles of freight services or explain how such a failure would 

dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination. Further, the record was clear that Liberty replied to his emails, and 

he also failed to show how ignoring emails would equate to a materially adverse 

action. Lastly, although Jacobs repeatedly states that his truck lease violated 

federal law, he does not show how the lease violated federal law or how such a 

violation would be a materially adverse action that would dissuade him from 

making a whistleblower complaint. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (Title VII) (explaining that materially adverse 

actions are those that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or 

supporting a charge of discrimination); Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973

(11th Cir. 2008) (stating for employer conduct to be actionable, it must have a 

materially adverse effect on the employee). Accordingly, we deny the petition as 

to this issue.

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Lastly, Jacobs asserts that Liberty engaged in fraudulent conduct, and he 

suffered a violation of his due process rights. The Government responds that he 

failed to state a claim for fraud and a violation of his due process rights, and it 

argues that he waived his remaining arguments because he failed to raise them 

during his administrative proceedings. 

Jacobs’ remaining claims should be dismissed because the record, as it 

presently exists, shows he failed to state a claim showing that his due process 

rights were violated or Liberty engaged in criminal activity, and he waived his 

remaining arguments by not raising them below. See Cont’l Tech. Serv., Inc. v. 

Rockwell Int’l. Corp., 927 F.2d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 1991) (“An argument not 

made is waived.”). As to his due process claim, Jacobs fails to identify any of the 

three elements necessary to state a due process violation. See Grayden v. Rhodes, 

345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating to allege a claim for denial of 

procedural due process, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a deprivation of a 

constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and 

(3) constitutionally-inadequate process”). Jacobs makes blanket assertions that his 

due process rights were violated throughout the administrative process, but he does 

not substantiate his claims or cite to relevant caselaw. Similarly, Jacobs alleges 

that Liberty engaged in a RICO scheme with nothing more than conclusory 

statements and generalized grievances about his employment with Liberty. See 

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Fla. Stat. § 772.103 (prohibiting an individual from using or investing proceeds 

from a criminal activity to establish an enterprise, acquiring interest in an 

enterprise through criminal activity, conducting an enterprise through criminal 

activity, or conspiring to do any of the preceding). 

As to his remaining claims regarding the OSHA investigation, his 

evidentiary objections, and the appointment of ALJs, Jacobs failed to raise them 

before the ALJ and ARB. See Mahon, 485 F.3d at 1284-85. Thus, he has waived 

his arguments and cannot raise them before this Court for the first time on appeal. 

Accordingly, as to this claim, we deny the petition in part, and dismiss in part. 

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

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