IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-0179

Filed February 10, 2016

BRUCE PATRICK SAMSARA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

SERGEANT DALE SQUIRES, in His Official Capacity and Individually, and 

SERGEANT MARK KUKUZKE, in His Official Capacity and Individually,

Defendant-Appellees,

and

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, and FAIRFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, Daniel P. Wilson, 

Judge.

Bruce Samsara appeals from the district court’s ruling granting summary 

judgment in favor of the individual defendants. AFFIRMED IN PART, 

REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Joseph Glazebrook of Glazebrook, Moe, Johnston, & Hurd, L.L.P., Des 

Moines, for appellant.

David E. Schrock of Scheldrup Blades, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.

Bruce Samsara appeals from the district court’s ruling granting summary 

judgment in favor of the individual defendants. He argues that the district court 

incorrectly determined no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether his 

arrest was supported by probable cause, erred in granting qualified immunity to 

the defendant officers on his false arrest and excessive force claims, and erred in 

dismissing his entire petition at law even though the defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment was denied in part. We find the district court appropriately 

granted partial summary judgment to the individual defendants, but agree with 

Samsara that the district court should not have dismissed his entire petition at 

law based upon a partial grant of summary judgment, and therefore reverse the 

district court’s order in part and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on January 15, 2011, police officers in 

Fairfield, Iowa, received a report of a burglary at a local business in the town’s 

square. A witness to the incident was able to identify one suspect for the 

police—Zachary Burke. Burke was said to have fled northbound from the scene 

on foot wearing a black hooded sweatshirt. This information was relayed to 

Sergeant Dale Squires, who was on duty in his squad car at the time. Squires 

was also informed that Burke was “a short kid about fourteen, brown hair, maybe 

thirteen,” and that he lived on West Burlington Avenue, approximately eight

blocks west of the town square. The description given for Burke was accurate—

Burke was a five-foot-two-inch, ninety-three-pound, twelve-year-old boy—but 
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also largely unnecessary, because Squires was already familiar with Burke from 

prior contact with him. Precisely what transpired next is disputed.

A. Squires’s Account

Sergeant Squires testified at his deposition that when he received the 

report identifying Burke, he recalled having just seen a person walking 

westbound between the town square and Burke’s home. He also recalled the 

person being a thin, white male wearing dark clothing and a hooded sweatshirt. 

Squires admitted that he thought from the outset that the person he had seen 

“might be too tall to be [Burke],” but explained that he was not sure because 

“teenagers grow like weeds, and it’s kind of hard to estimate height from a 

passing squad car.” He explained that he only wanted to locate the youth so he 

could determine whether it was Burke. Squires quickly found the person, who 

was still walking westbound on West Burlington Avenue between the town 

square and Burke’s home. It was not twelve-year-old, five-foot-two-inch Burke. 

It was instead forty-four-year-old, six-foot-plus Bruce Samsara.

According to Squires, Samsara was wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt 

with the hood up so that his face was obscured from view as Squires approached 

in his squad car. Squires testified that he called out to Samsara several times to 

stop walking and come over to the squad car, but Samsara kept walking. 

Having received no response, Squires got out of his squad car and ordered 

Samsara to come over to him. By then, Samsara had walked far enough west 

that he was approximately two blocks past Burke’s home. When Samsara finally 

stopped walking, he was still approximately fifteen feet away from Squires and 

was facing in the opposite direction. Squires recalled that after Samsara stopped 
4

walking, he raised his left hand straight in the air but kept his right hand in his 

pocket. In his raised left hand, Samsara clutched an unknown object, which 

turned out to be a microcassette tape recorder. Squires approached Samsara 

from behind in order to speak with him, and he testified at his deposition 

regarding his state of mind as he did so:

I’m a little concerned. I could tell the object in his hand isn’t a cell 

phone because it’s too big, but I don’t know what it is. It had a 

glowing red light on it. I don’t mean to sound paranoid, but worst 

case scenario, I was afraid it would be some kind of improvised 

explosive device because I had no idea. Also he kept his right 

hand jammed in his pocket, and I was afraid he might have a 

weapon in his hand. 

 

Squires explained that as he got closer, he was able to see Samsara’s 

face and could tell that he was not Burke. But he did not allow Samsara to go on 

his way. Squires wanted to conduct a protective pat down to make sure 

Samsara was not armed with a weapon, and Squires had begun to believe

Samsara might be intoxicated based upon his odd behavior. Squires still did not 

know who Samsara was, so he asked him to either identify himself or show 

identification. Samsara did not comply. Another Fairfield police officer, Sergeant 

Mark Kukuzke, arrived at the scene and also asked Samsara to identify himself. 

Samsara still did not comply. 

Squires testified that he tried to pat Samsara down multiple times but was 

unable to do so because Samsara would pull away. Squires grabbed Samsara’s 

coat in order to stop him from walking away, and began to walk him to the squad 

car. Squires considered the attempts to pull away to be “belligerent and 

combative” behavior, and decided that he wanted to handcuff Samsara for safety 

purposes because the officers still did not know who he was or whether he had 
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any weapons. But when he tried to handcuff Samsara, Samsara “began to try to 

pull away” from him once again, so Squires and Kukuzke took him to the ground. 

According to Squires, he and Kukuzke took Samsara down to the ground 

face up and then tried to roll him over onto his stomach for handcuffing. 

However, before they were able to do so, Samsara kicked upward while still lying 

on his back, striking Squires in the chest with the sole of his shoe. Squires 

believed the kick was intentional, and advised Samsara that he was under arrest 

for assault on a peace officer. The two officers were able to subdue Samsara 

and handcuff him. After Samsara was arrested, he was placed in Squires’s

squad car and transported from the scene.

B. Kukuzke’s Account

Sergeant Kukuzke’s account is substantially similar to Squires’s, albeit 

from a different vantage point. According to Kukuzke, Squires and Samsara 

were already talking on the sidewalk when he pulled up and he intended to watch

and make sure Squires was okay during the stop. Kukuzke was not on duty at 

the time and had no idea about either the burglary that had occurred or Squires’s

reasons for having come into contact with Samsara. He remained in his vehicle 

until the conversation seemed to get more heated, and then got out to assist 

when Samsara pointed his finger at Squires. 

Once Kukuzke got out of his car, he could hear Squires asking Samsara 

for identification and Samsara refusing to comply and wanting to leave. Kukuzke 

told Samsara he needed to identify himself to Squires. He recalls Samsara 

keeping one hand in his pocket and holding up an object in the other. He agrees 

that he and Squires escorted Samsara back over to Squires’s squad car, and 
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that the two grabbed Samsara after he tried to walk away. Kukuzke stated at his 

deposition that he believed Samsara was arrested for the charge of interference, 

based upon the fact that he was not cooperating with Squires’s attempts to pat 

him down. 

According to Kukuzke, once they were back at the squad car attempting to 

pat Samsara down, Samsara was “very belligerent to the point that he was 

basically out of control,” so Kukuzke “swept his feet, got him flat on his back on 

the ground and stayed on his left arm while Officer Squires grabbed his right 

arm.” At some point during this course of events, Kukuzke believed Samsara 

kicked Squires, although he did not see the kick because he was focused on 

getting the item out of Samsara’s hand. Kukuzke was able to pry the item, which 

he now realized was a tape recorder, from Samsara’s grip and tossed it away. 

He then helped Squires roll Samsara onto his stomach to be handcuffed.

C. Samsara’s Account

Samsara does not dispute the general contours of the account as told by 

Squires and Kukuzke, but does dispute various particulars. For example, 

Samsara testified at his deposition that he was not wearing any sort of hooded 

sweatshirt. He stated he left his home to walk to the grocery store wearing blue 

jeans and a dark blue jacket with a low collar. Also, according to Samsara, 

Squires was initially trying to engage in “light chitchat” with him. By Samsara’s 

account, Squires only told him to stop once, at which point he raised both hands 

up in the air. He admits he was holding a tape recorder in his hand as he 

walked, but stated at his deposition that when he was ordered to stop he raised 
7

his hands and held the tape recorder up specifically so the officers would be able 

to see what it was. 

Samsara also testified that while it is true Squires and Kukuzke repeatedly 

asked to see his identification, he told them he did not have proper identification 

on his person. According to Samsara, the two officers never asked him to 

identify himself by name. He explained at his deposition that he became 

annoyed at Squires for stopping him for apparently no reason, and admitted 

saying to the officers, “You’re the dumbest fucking people I’ve ever met.” 

Samsara states he repeatedly told Squires he was on his way to get groceries, 

and that when Squires failed to explain his reasons for stopping and detaining 

him, he turned to leave and continue on his way. When he attempted to leave, 

both officers “attacked” him and “pounded [him] on the gravel.”

Samsara recalled the officers throwing him down on the gravel very hard, 

and that he hurt his tailbone landing. He further recalled Squires elbowing him in 

his chin with his right elbow, drawing blood and chipping his teeth, and Kukuzke 

kneeing him in the back of the head. Samsara also denied the officers’ 

accusation that he intentionally kicked Squires in the chest once on the ground:

I didn’t kick him in the chest. I can only imagine that if [he] got 

kicked in the chest, it’s because my feet flew up in the air from 

being on the ice. If that’s when they got kicked or if it’s when I got 

kneed in the back of the head and they were tearing the tape 

recorder out of my hand and I was unconscious, so it would be a 

response from being hit in the back of the head really hard.

Samsara described the officers as being angry he was holding the tape 

recorder and recording everything, and recalled that after he had been thrown to 

the ground, Kukuzke ripped the tape recorder from his hand and threw it across 
8

the parking lot. According to Samsara, the officers took his wallet out of his 

pants pocket at that point and then handcuffed him face down on the ground. He 

denies becoming belligerent, but admitted at his deposition that he was shouting,

“[W]hat do you want from me?” 

D. Police Video Recording of the Incident

The testimony of the parties in this case is supplemented by a video 

recording of the incident. The video recording consists of two different views 

from inside Squires’s squad car. The first view shows the front of the car from 

the dashboard. The second view shows the backseat area of the car from an 

angle behind the driver’s seat. Squires testified that he turned on the patrol car’s 

video camera when he got out of the car to confront Samsara. The video 

recording shows several things definitively, but cannot resolve most of the factual 

disputes both because it was turned on after Squires says he had already 

ordered Samsara to stop several times, and because most of the pertinent action 

takes place outside of the view of either camera.

When the recording begins, Kukuzke’s personal vehicle is seen pulling 

across the front of the squad car. Squires and Samsara can be heard arguing off

camera. Squires says, “Sir, you’ve done nothing wrong, except not . . .” but is 

interrupted by Samsara, who exclaims, “You’re absolutely right, I haven’t done 

anything wrong!” Samsara then appears to say “fuck you” to Squires, although 

the audio is not clear. At that point, Squires instructs Samsara to come to his 

squad car because he is going to have to identify himself. Sounds can be heard 

that may be Squires and/or Kukuzke making physical contact with Samsara. 

Kukuzke can be heard at that point telling Samsara, “You do have to identify 
9

yourself. I am a police officer too. Identify yourself. Who are you sir?” The 

three argue back and forth, with Samsara yelling, “Don’t touch me!” The officers 

accuse Samsara of resisting and interfering. Samsara denies he is doing so. 

The officers ask for identification and Samsara appears to say he does have 

identification with him (which contradicts his deposition testimony). During the 

exchange, Samsara is audibly upset, and is swearing at the officers. Among 

other things, Samsara says to the officers, “God damn you fucking idiots,” and 

“You are the dumbest fucking people.” An officer again tells Samsara to come 

over to the squad car. Squires can be heard remarking, “I don’t understand what 

is going on here, all I wanted to do was talk to you.”

At this point, two people are partially visible in the video, standing off to

the passenger side of the hood of the squad car. Samsara is told to place his 

hands on the hood of the car and asked whether he has any weapons on him. A

struggle then ensues. The struggle briefly takes place on camera but outside of 

the car’s headlights, and then moves out of view. Sounds of the continuing 

struggle can be heard. Much of what is being said at this point is unclear, 

although Samsara can be heard telling the officers to get off of him. After more 

struggling and yelling back and forth, Squires says, “Okay, now you’re under 

arrest for assault on a peace officer, ‘cause you just kicked me.” Samsara is 

handcuffed off camera, as the parties continue to argue. The officers place 

Samsara in the back seat of the squad car, at which point he is again visible on 

camera.

Squires can then be seen retrieving Samsara’s tape recorder from the 

snow in front of the squad car. Kukuzke joins Squires in front of the squad car
10

and the two have a brief conversation. Squires thanks Kukuzke for his help, and 

Kukuzke asks, “What was that all about?” Squires replies, 

He matched the description of a subject that stole a purse, so I told 

him to stop like three times and he just kept on walking. I couldn’t 

tell—when he turned around, I could tell it wasn’t him—so I tried to 

explain. He wouldn’t give me any information, tried to walk away 

from me. 

Squires calls in the arrest, and reads Samsara his rights. Eventually, Squires 

drives to the police station, where Samsara is taken from the back seat and led 

through a door and out of view. Prior to that, however, Samsara is clearly visible 

in the video at several points in time. Samsara does not have a hood over his 

head or even appear to be wearing any kind of hooded clothing at all. Instead,

he is wearing a jacket with a short collar zipped all the way up.

E. District Court Proceedings

Samsara was charged with assault on a peace officer and interference 

with official acts. See Iowa Code §§ 708.1, 708.3A, 719.1 (2011). On June 23, 

2011, the district court granted Samsara’s motion to suppress evidence, ruling 

that “the officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion for seizure 

of the defendant.” 

Samsara then filed a civil petition at law on January 15, 2013, alleging 

federal civil rights claims of false arrest and excessive force against Squires,

Kukuzke, the City of Fairfield, and the Fairfield Police Department. The 

defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on November 5, 2014. The 

motion was granted in part by the district court on January 9, 2015. 

By agreement of the parties, the City of Fairfield and the Fairfield Police 

Department were dismissed from the lawsuit. The district court’s remaining 
11

rulings, which are the only rulings now appealed, pertain to Squires and Kukuzke

alone. The district court ruled Squires and Kukuzke were not entitled to 

summary judgment on the issue of whether there was reasonable suspicion to 

justify the initial investigatory stop of Samsara, but were entitled to summary 

judgment on the issues of whether probable cause existed for Samsara’s arrest 

and whether the officers had qualified immunity for their use of force against 

Samsara. The district court concluded its written ruling by stating, “The 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment . . . is denied in part and granted in 

part as set forth above.” The court then ordered, “[Plaintiff’s] petition at law . . . 

and this cause of action are dismissed.”

Samsara now appeals the district court’s grant of partial summary 

judgment as to the individual defendants, as well as the dismissal of his entire 

petition at law when the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied in 

part.

II. Standard of Review

We review summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at law. 

Baker v. City of Iowa City, 867 N.W.2d 44, 51 (Iowa 2015). Summary judgment 

is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); City of 

Fairfield v. Harper Drilling Co., 692 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 2005). “A fact is 

material if it will affect the outcome of the suit, given the applicable law.” Huck v. 

Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Iowa 2014). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if 

the evidence is such that a reasonable finder of fact could return a verdict or 

decision for the nonmoving party.” Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of 
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material fact exists, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Id.

III. Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. In other words, the Fourth Amendment imposes a general standard of 

reasonableness upon all searches and seizures by government officials. State v. 

Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). Reasonableness usually requires that 

a search or seizure be conducted pursuant to a warrant, and searches and 

seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless a 

recognized exception applies. Id.

One exception to the warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop an 

individual for investigatory purposes based upon a reasonable suspicion that a 

criminal act has occurred or is occurring. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 

(Iowa 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)). The purpose of an 

investigatory stop is to allow the police officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of 

criminal activity through reasonable questioning. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 641. 

Despite its temporary nature and limited purpose, an investigatory stop still 

constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. 

Therefore, although such a stop falls within an exception to the general warrant 

requirement, it must be considered objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances in order to be deemed constitutional under the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. 
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In order to justify an investigatory stop, a police officer must be able to 

point to “specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. Reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity, however, means just that. It requires “considerably 

less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and the 

evidence justifying the stop need not rise to the level of probable cause. Id. at 

642. Whether an investigatory stop is justified by reasonable suspicion “must be 

determined in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting a police officer, 

including all information available to the officer at the time the decision to stop is 

made.” Id. 

Another exception to the general warrant requirement allows a police 

officer to arrest an individual based upon probable cause. See State v. 

Christopher, 757 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 2008). Probable cause to arrest exists 

“if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and prudent 

person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been or is being 

committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it.” State v. Bumpus, 

459 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Iowa 1990). As is the case for investigatory stops and all 

other searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness 

of an arrest is judged against an objective standard, as opposed to a subjective 

one. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22 (stating that when evaluating the reasonableness 

of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against 

an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of 

the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that 

the action taken was appropriate?”).
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Police officers are entitled to use force during both investigatory stops and 

arrests. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Our Fourth 

Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or 

investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of 

physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”). However, the use of force by 

police officers while conducting both types of seizure is subject to the same 

standard of reasonableness as the seizure it accompanies. Tennessee v. 

Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985). A court considering the constitutionality of a 

seizure must balance “the extent of the intrusion against the need for it,” meaning 

that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is determined in part by “how 

[a seizure] is carried out.” Id. This balancing test limits the force used to that 

necessary to accomplish the goals of the seizure in context of the specific facts 

and circumstances of each particular case. See State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 

460, 468 (Iowa 2012) (explaining although the amount of force necessary to 

accomplish the goals of an investigatory stop will vary depending on the facts 

and circumstances of the case, “a seizure justified by reasonable suspicion must 

be minimally intrusive”).

The district court began its analysis with its conclusion that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists as to whether Squires’s initial investigatory stop of 

Samsara was supported by reasonable suspicion he had been involved in 

criminal activity. This finding is not disputed on appeal.
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A. Probable Cause to Arrest 

Samsara disputes the district court’s finding regarding probable cause to 

arrest. On this issue, the district court’s ruling recognized that Samsara 

“generally denies that he kicked Squires,” but then found:

The necessary material fact to determine whether Squires had 

probable cause to arrest Samsara is whether Squires believed the 

offense of assault had been committed by Samsara. Viewing the 

facts in the light most favorable to Samsara, in which there was 

clearly some physical interaction between Samsara and one or 

both officers, it is reasonable to believe that Squires believed he 

was intentionally kicked by Samsara, providing probable cause for 

arrest. Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact remains on the 

issue of probable cause to arrest and Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

The district court was correct in finding Samsara’s denial of intent to kick 

Squires does not diminish the officer’s reasonable belief an assault had occurred. 

Samsara concedes his feet may have made contact with Squires’s chest, and 

Squires’s belief that the contact was intentional was objectively reasonable given 

the totality of the circumstances. The court correctly granted summary judgment 

to the officers on this issue.

Summary judgment in favor of Squires and Kukuzke on the issue of false 

arrest also was appropriate because Samasara committed a misdemeanor in the 

officers’ presence by interfering with official acts. “[An individual’s] response to 

even an invalid arrest or [investigatory] stop may constitute independent grounds 

for arrest.” United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1431 (8th Cir. 1995). The law 

in Iowa is that a person may not resist even an unlawful arrest by a known peace

officer. Iowa Code § 804.12 (“A person is not authorized to use force to resist an 

arrest . . . even if the person believes that the arrest is unlawful or the arrest is in 
16

fact unlawful.”); see also Dawdy, 46 F.3d at 1431; State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 

607, 611 (Iowa 1978) (holding that “a person may not resist an arrest reasonably 

effected by one whom the arrestee knows or has good reason to know is a peace 

officer, despite the legality or illegality of the arrest”). Moreover, the law in Iowa 

makes it illegal for a person to “knowingly resist[ ] or obstruct[ ] anyone known by 

the person to be a peace officer . . . in the performance of any act which is within 

the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer.” Iowa Code § 719.1. 

It is clear from the video recording of the underlying incident and the 

testimony of those involved that the officers were detaining Samsara at least in 

part so they could identify him and then pat him down for weapons. The video 

recording further establishes that Samsara interfered with and physically resisted 

the officers’ attempts to identify and pat him down (although the degree to which 

he did so is unclear because most activity is only audible and not captured on 

screen). That video evidence, combined with Samsara’s own testimony that he 

turned to walk away from the officers because Squires “ha[d] no purpose for 

detaining [him] there,” establishes Squires and Kukuzke had probable cause to 

arrest him not only for assault, but also for interference with and resistance to an 

investigatory stop. Samsara’s behavior defeats his false arrest claim.

B. Qualified Immunity for Excessive Force

Samsara also disputes the district court’s finding regarding the officers’ 

use of force. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on their 

claim of qualified immunity as to Samsara’s count of excessive force.1 The 

 

1 The district court also used the doctrine of qualified immunity as a secondary basis for 

granting summary judgment on the false arrest claim. Because we have already 
17

analysis to determine whether qualified immunity applies is distinct from the 

analysis of whether excessive force was used. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 200 (2001), modified by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) 

(holding that the two-step protocol set forth in Saucier “should no longer be 

regarded as mandatory,” so a court may use its own judgment and consider 

either of the two steps first).

Qualified immunity operates to immunize police officers from liability 

where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” and in 

doing so “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials 

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield 

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 

responsibly.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. Whether a right is clearly established 

depends upon “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. “Officials 

are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing 

bright lines.” Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004). In other words, 

qualified immunity protects police officers from liability when a reasonable officer

in their position would have believed their actions to be proper. 

Here, the physical struggle is not disputed, but the video and audio fail to 

show whether the force was proportional to the situation facing the officers at the 

scene. Samsara claims he was “brutally taken to the ground, aggressively held 

 

determined that the individual defendants were entitled to summary judgment on that 

claim, we need not address whether the doctrine of qualified immunity was properly 

applied in that context.
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there, while he was handcuffed,” and there is no question it took both officers to 

take Samsara to the ground and to handcuff him while disposing of the object in 

his hand. The question is whether the officers could have accomplished those 

tasks with less force and whether they reasonably knew the amount of force they 

used was unlawful. The evidence shows both officers made numerous attempts 

to bring Samsara to the squad car without force. Samsara resisted and fought 

against the officers’ efforts. As for Samsara’s claimed injuries, the summary 

judgment record reveals no evidence that he required or requested medical 

treatment and he appears to be unhurt in the video showing him in the back of 

the car. 

In ruling that Squires and Kukuzke were entitled to qualified immunity on 

the excessive force claim, the district court wrote:

In this case, while viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 

Samsara, the Court must determine whether it was clear to Squires 

and Kukuzke that their use of force was unlawful, given the 

circumstances with which they were presented. Samsara’s 

excessive force claim arises from the physical interaction between 

Samsara, Squires, and Kukuzke. Samsara alleges that he ‘was 

brutally taken to the ground, aggressively held there, while he was 

handcuffed by [Squires and Kukuzke].’ . . . This is the point in the 

video recording when no one is shown on video, but there are 

sounds of a struggle between the three men. The physical struggle 

is not disputed by either party, and is obvious from the video and 

audio recording, presented a situation in which the officers’ use of 

force was not unlawful, given the circumstances. They had 

confronted Samsara, who had previously been nonresponsive, then 

responded loudly, and finally had resisted an attempt to be patted 

down for the officers’ safety. Squires’s and Kukuzke’s use of force 

in these circumstances was reasonable, and therefore lawful. 

Qualified immunity also applies to Samsara’s claim of excessive 

force. 

We agree with the district court that the officers were entitled to qualified 

immunity on the issue of force. The amount of force used by the officers is in 
19

dispute, but the parties agree on the material facts of the forcible take-down. 

There is no material fact in dispute that would lead the officers to believe at the 

time, on the scene, that their use of force was unlawful. Cf. Debower v. Bremer 

Cty., No. 09-1423, 2010 WL 2757112, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. July 14, 2010) 

(“Where, as here, facts material to the qualified immunity analysis remain in 

dispute, a jury question is generated and summary judgment is inappropriate.”). 

Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a 

clearly established constitutional right. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206. 

Furthermore, Pearson allows courts to consider whether an official could 

reasonably have believed his conduct was lawful without first analyzing 

whether the facts alleged make out a constitutional violation. 555 U.S. at 236.

Here, the relevant issue is the objective question whether a reasonable 

officer would have believed the officers’ use of force to be lawful, “in light of 

clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed. 

[The officer's] subjective beliefs . . . are irrelevant.” See Leydens v. City of 

Des Moines, 484 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 1992). The officers’ actions here did 

not clearly violate the constitutional prohibition against excessive force. As a 

result, the district court correctly applied the qualified immunity doctrine to 

shield the officers from liability. 

C. The District Court’s Dismissal of Samsara’s Petition at Law

Having determined that the district court appropriately granted summary 

judgment to the individual defendants on the issues of probable cause to arrest 

and qualified immunity for excessive force, one final issue remains. Samsara 
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argues that even if the district court’s rulings on summary judgment are upheld, 

we still must reverse the district court’s order dismissing his entire petition at law. 

We agree. The district court’s ruling ends by stating, “The Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment . . . is denied in part and granted in part as set forth above.” 

A partial grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants does not warrant 

the dismissal of a plaintiff’s entire petition at law. There remains the issue of the 

legality of the investigatory stop. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the 

issues of probable cause to arrest and qualified immunity for excessive force, but 

reverse the district court’s order dismissing Samsara’s petition at law, and 

remand to the district court on the unresolved issue of the legality of the 

investigatory stop. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.