SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3808-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

RODNEY E. WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted on October 10, 2023 – Decided December 19, 2023 

Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 20-02-

0200.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief). 

Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Patrick Ryan McAvaddy, Assistant 

Prosecutor, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3808-21

Defendant Rodney E. Williams appeals from his guilty plea conviction 

for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun. He contends the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress the handgun seized by the police 

during an investigative detention. After reviewing the record in light of the 

governing law, we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings. 

I.

By indictment, defendant was charged with second-degree unlawful 

possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1) (count one); second-degree 

certain persons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b(1) (count two); fourth-degree unlawful 

possession of hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3f(1) (count three); and 

third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7a (count four). 

Defendant moved to suppress the handgun and an evidentiary hearing 

was held on November 10, 2021. On January 14, 2022, the trial judge issued 

an order accompanied by a written decision denying defendant's motion to 

suppress. The trial judge determined there was reasonable suspicion for the 

stop and frisk of defendant. First, the trial judge found there was reasonable 

suspicion to stop and frisk defendant based on the description provided by a tip 

from the confidential informant (C.I.) and the "basis of knowledge" obtained 

by an officer viewing CCTV footage. The judge further found that "[d]ue to 
3 A-3808-21

the nature of the offense, there was reasonable suspicion to warrant the frisk 

for protection of the officer." Therefore, "[u]nder the totality of 

circumstances, both the stop and pat[-]down of [d]efendant were valid." 

Second, the trial court determined there was reasonable cause to detain 

defendant after the investigative stop and pat-down. The court explained, 

"[w]hile the resulting search [of defendant] did not produce weapons or 

contraband, there was reasonable suspicion to continue to detain [d]efendant 

due to the CI tip, confirmation of [d]efendant's presence in the relevant 

location, in a high crime area, and the behavior of [c]o-defendant." The judge 

concluded, "[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, the facts . . . 

support[ed] a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion." 

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant pleaded guilty 

to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun and reserved the right to 

appeal. 

We recite the salient facts elicited at the suppression hearing. The State 

presented two witnesses: Jersey City Police Department Sergeant Joemy 

Fernandez, then a police officer, and Sergeant Jason Perez. 

On September 11, 2019, Fernandez and his partner, Mohamed Saheed, 

were assigned to the street crimes unit. At about 8:30 p.m., the officers 
4 A-3808-21

received a notification from Lieutenant Mohammad Riaz "that he received 

information from a registered and reliable confidential informant (C.I.) that []

a male [was] in the area of Neptune and Ocean Avenue[s] wearing a multicolored sweatsuit was in possession of a handgun." Fernandez explained the 

C.I. was registered because he was "known to [Riaz]," had been "used in the 

past," and had been "proven reliable." According to Fernandez, the area of 

Neptune and Ocean Avenue is a "high crime area" "prone to gun violence, 

gang violence, drugs, shootings, [and] robberies." On cross-examination, 

Fernandez testified that he was notified that a "black male" was in possession 

of the handgun. No other identifiers were provided. 

Officer Macaluso, also working the night shift, was monitoring CCTV 

footage. Based on Macaluso's observations, officers were informed that a male 

matching the C.I.'s description was "leaving the area" and entering 116 

Neptune Avenue. Fernandez responded to the area to "canvas" for the male. 

While traveling west on Neptune, Fernandez observed a male, wearing a multicolored sweatsuit, and a female, wearing a black tank top and camouflage 

pants, leaving 116 Neptune Avenue. The male was later identified as 

defendant and the female was later identified as Alfreda Williams, although 

testimony was not provided as to how they were identified. Fernandez saw 
5 A-3808-21

defendant hold the door for Alfreda while engaged in a conversation with her. 

They walked east on Neptune. As they were walking east, the officers exited 

the patrol car. Fernandez stopped defendant. Alfreda began walking away 

toward what appeared to be an alleyway, then quickly changed direction 

walking east on Neptune. She yelled out: "I'm not with him. I'm not with 

him," and continued to walk away. 

Saheed then conducted a pat-down of defendant. No weapons or 

contraband was found on defendant. Yet, the officers continued to detain 

defendant for a "short period, about a minute," because Fernandez found 

Alfreda's behavior to be "suspicious". He explained, Alfreda had not shown 

"concern" for defendant. She also "quickly" walked in one direction away 

from defendant, "darted out" and walked in a different direction. Fernandez 

then explained he "continued to detain defendant for 'a short period of time', 

[about four minutes], following the pat-down until Alfreda could be located 

because of her reaction when police arrived." Fernandez stated it was 

approximately "a minute" to "a minute and a half" between the time he stopped 

defendant and when he received the radio call from Perez that Alfreda had 

been stopped. 
6 A-3808-21

Perez arrived fifteen to thirty seconds after Alfreda walked away from 

the officers and defendant. He testified that his assistance was requested in a

firearm investigation based on the radio call from Riaz. Defendant had already 

been stopped by Fernandez and Saheed when he arrived. Fernandez described 

Alfreda to Perez and told him that she had been with defendant and had walked 

off toward Ocean Avenue. 

Perez drove toward Ocean Avenue to locate Alfreda for further 

investigation. Initially, he traveled south on Ocean Avenue, where he saw a 

group of females, but none matched Fernandez's description. Perez then 

turned around and headed north on Ocean Avenue. 

Eventually, Perez found Alfreda walking west on Bartholdi Avenue. 

Alfreda was walking with a "young juvenile Hispanic male, wearing a 

camouflage tank top and camouflage shorts, and a blue drawstring bag on his 

back." Perez described the bag as a "thin nylon bag" with "thin strings" worn 

around a person's shoulders, commonly used to carry "like a basketball." 

Perez was about one car length away from Alfreda and juvenile when he 

saw them in an area lit by streetlights. As Perez approached, he noticed the 

juvenile's "bag was extremely weighted down by an object, and...there was...a 
7 A-3808-21

90-degree outline that appeared to be a handgun." Perez believed the object 

was a handgun based on its outline and his training and experience. 

So, Alfreda and the juvenile were stopped and frisked. During the patdown of the outside of the juvenile's bag, Perez determined the object was 

metal and immediately recognized it as a handgun. The juvenile was placed 

under arrest. Perez did not search inside the bag. Eventually, Perez recovered 

a 9-millimeter Hi-Point handgun from the bag and placed it in his vehicle for 

safekeeping before it was transported for processing. 

After Perez arrested the juvenile, Alfreda spontaneously stated, "No, it's 

not his. It's–I gave it to him. It's my boyfriend's gun" or "The male that you 

have stopped's (sic) gun." Perez made a radio call to Fernandez and advised 

that he located the handgun and that Alfreda said defendant had given her the 

gun. 

Fernandez placed defendant under arrest and transported him to Perez's 

location. Fernandez confirmed Alfreda's identity. Alfreda spontaneously 

restated that the gun was not the juvenile's and it belonged to defendant, who 

had given it to her to hold. Alfreda further stated that she had held the gun "in 

her bra or shirt and that she placed it in a bag." 

II. 
8 A-3808-21

 Defendant raises one issue on appeal. He contends the court erred in 

denying the suppression motion because he was unlawfully detained after the 

pat-down did not produce weapons or contraband. We agree. 

The standard of our review on a motion to suppress is deferential. State 

v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022). "[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion 

to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 

decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence 

in the record." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We "defer[] to 

those findings in recognition of the trial court's 'opportunity to hear and see the 

witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot 

enjoy.'" Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). Generally, 

we do not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are "clearly 

mistaken" and must be reversed in the interests of justice. State v. Cohen, 254

N.J. 308, 319 (2023) (internal citations omitted). In contrast to the deference 

owed to a trial court's factual and credibility findings, we review a trial court's 

legal conclusions de novo. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380 (2017). 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I § 7 

of the New Jersey Constitution protect the right of individuals from 
9 A-3808-21

unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 164 (2023) 

(quoting Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527). "Warrantless seizures are presumptively 

invalid as contrary to the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions." 

State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004). "To justify a warrantless search or 

seizure, 'the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that [the] warrantless search or seizure falls within one of the few 

well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Vanderee, 

476 N.J. Super. 214, 230 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 

530, 546 (2019)). Here, the Stated failed to meet its burden of proof. 

Critical to our inquiry is the nature and scope of the officers' initial 

encounter with defendant and the subsequent detention. Under the federal and 

New Jersey constitutions, the police may stop and frisk a person if they have

reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal activity or a weapon may be 

found on that person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968); State v. Smith, 

155 N.J. 83, 91-92 (1998). The standard of reasonable suspicion is less 

rigorous than probable cause to warrant an arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27; 

State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 410 (2012). "However, an officer's hunch or 

subjective good faith—even if correct in the end—cannot justify an 

investigatory stop or detention." Id. at 411. 
10 A-3808-21

The Terry stop, or an investigative stop, "involves a relatively brief 

detention by police during which a person's movement is restricted." State v. 

Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 385, 399 (2022); see also State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 

272 (2017). An investigative stop or detention "is permissible 'if it is based on 

specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'" 

State v. Rodriquez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002). 

During an investigative stop, a police officer may conduct a protective 

search or pat-down without a warrant when the officer believes the individual 

detained is armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also State v. 

Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988). An officer is permitted "'to take necessary 

measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to 

neutralize the threat of physical harm.'" State v. Roach, 172 N.J. 19, 27 (2002) 

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23). In other words, an officer may "conduct 'a 

carefully limited search of the outer clothing'" to determine whether weapons 

are present. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Like an investigatory stop, 

"to conduct a protective search, an officer must have a 'specific and 

particularized basis for an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant was 

armed and dangerous.'" Ibid. (italicization omitted). 
11 A-3808-21

"Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an 

investigatory stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 

'the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, 

balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the 

individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police 

intrusions.'" Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 399 (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 

25-26 (2010)). The inquiry "takes into consideration numerous factors, 

including officer experience and knowledge." Id. at 400. 

Applying these principles, we conclude the trial judge erred in finding 

the officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had a handgun to justify 

the stop and, in turn, the frisk. 

We view the reliability of the tip from a C.I. under a totality of 

circumstances test. An informant's tip, though hearsay, may be considered "'so 

long as a substantial basis for crediting [it] is presented."' Smith, 155 N.J. at 

92 (quoting State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 111 (1987)). Two factors 

which are "essential" in establishing the credibility of an informant's tip are the 

"informant's 'veracity' and . . . 'basis of knowledge.'" Id. at 93 (quoting Illinois 

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Veracity is established by 

"demonstrating that the informant proved to be reliable in previous police 
12 A-3808-21

investigations." State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 213 (2001). An informant's 

basis of knowledge is demonstrated when "the tip itself relates expressly or 

clearly how the informant knows of the criminal activity." Ibid. (internal 

citation omitted). 

Here, the judge determined the officers had reasonable suspicion to 

detain defendant based on the tip from the C.I. As to the C.I.'s veracity, 

Fernandez made a generalized statement that the C.I. had "proven reliable" 

because he was "known to Riaz" and nothing more. Absent from the record is 

any testimony regarding the length of the C.I.'s relationship with Riaz or if the 

prior tips were fruitful. 

Regarding the C.I.'s "basis of knowledge," all that was relayed by the 

C.I. to Riaz was that the suspect was "male" wearing a "multi-colored 

sweatsuit." The tip was silent to any other detailed identifiers. This 

information alone "[did] not show that the [C.I.] had knowledge of concealed 

criminal activity." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 276 (internal citation omitted). 

Additionally, the record is silent as to how the C.I. came into possession of the 

information that defendant possessed a handgun. "Without knowing the facts 

that led the informant to believe defendant was engaged in illegal activity, we 
13 A-3808-21

cannot make an independent determination of whether that conclusion was 

reasonable." Smith, 155 N.J. at 98. 

The sex and clothing identifiers, even if corroborated by Macaluso's 

observation, were not indicative of criminal activity. We hold that neither the 

C.I. tip nor Macaluso's observation was a "reliable source of information" to 

satisfy the basis of knowledge factor. Smith, 155 N.J. at 97. These facts, 

individually or cumulatively, were insufficient to establish an objectively 

reasonable suspicion that defendant possessed a handgun. See Thomas, 110 

N.J. at 683. 

We similarly conclude the trial judge erred in finding the officers had 

reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain defendant based on his presence 

in the high crime area and Alfreda's behavior. Though the trial judge may 

consider defendant was within the "high crime area" of Neptune and Ocean 

Avenues, our Supreme Court "has held that '[j]ust because a location to which 

police officers are dispatched is a high-crime area does not mean that the 

residents in that area have lesser constitutional protection from random stops.'" 

Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 399 (quoting Chisum, 236 N.J. at 549; see also Illinois 

v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)) ("An individual's presence in an area 

of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a 
14 A-3808-21

reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime."); 

Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 31 (Albin, J., concurring) ("The words 'high crime area' 

should not be invoked talismanically by police officers to justify a Terry stop 

that would not pass constitutional muster in any other location."). Although 

"officers need not ignore the relevant characteristics of a neighborhood, . . . 

more is required to find reasonable suspicion." Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 400-

401 (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). Furthermore, Fernandez's experience 

that Alfreda's behavior was suspicious, and Perez's "hunch" the juvenile's 

drawstring bag contained a gun, which proved correct, did not justify 

defendant's on-going detention. Shaw, 213 N.J. 411. 

When the officers did not find the handgun on defendant, he should have 

been immediately free to leave. The intervening search for Alfreda, discovery 

of the handgun, and Alfreda's spontaneous utterances do not "purge[] the taint" 

from the eventually-discovered handgun. Shaw, 213 N.J. at 421; Smith, 155 

N.J. at 101. Defendant's arrest based on possession of the handgun stemmed 

from the unlawful detention. Accordingly, the evidence must be suppressed. 

We reverse the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 

evidence. We vacate that plea because of the likelihood defendant would not 
15 A-3808-21

have pleaded guilty if he knew the evidence seized was suppressed. Therefore, 

we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.