J-S47001-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

ERIC JAMES EDELINE 

 Appellant No. 1441 EDA 2008 

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 18, 2008

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1001831-2004 

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2014 

 Appellant, Eric James Edeline, appeals from the April 18, 2008 order 

dismissing, without a hearing, his amended petition for relief filed pursuant 

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

Additionally, Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as PCRA 

counsel together with a Turner/Finley letter, averring Appellant’s issues are 

without merit.1

 After careful review, we affirm the denial of PCRA relief, and 

grant PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

 The pertinent factual and procedural history of this case follows. 

Appellant was arrested on August 20, 2004, in connection with the stabbing 

____________________________________________ 

1 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super 1988) (en banc). 
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of victim, Tom Murphy in the 2200 block of York Street in the City of 

Philadelphia. The case proceeded to a jury trial. 

After a trial commencing on August 4, 2005, 

and ending August 5, 2005, [Appellant] was found 

guilty of first-degree felony aggravated assault, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2702, and possessing an instrument of 

crime (PIC), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907, by a jury. On 

September 28, 2005, [Appellant] was sentenced to 

10 to 20 years[’] incarceration for his aggravated 

assault conviction, and concurrently sentence[d] to 2 

1⁄2 to 5 years[’] incarceration for PIC.1

An appeal was filed on October 18, 2005, but 

later marked discontinue[d] by the Superior Court on 

April 20, 2006 (2972 EDA 2005). On September 29, 

2006, [Appellant] filed a pro se Petition for Relief 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9541, et seq. On February 21, 2007, Norman 

Orville Scott, Esquire, was appointed to represent 

[Appellant]. On October 12, 2007, an Amended 

PCRA Petition was filed, claiming that “[t]he [trial]

court erred in sentencing [Appellant] pursuant to the 

second strike provision of the sentencing code 

thereby imposing an illegal sentence”.2 On January 

31, 2008, a Motion To Dismiss was filed by the 

Commonwealth. On March 10, 2008, th[e PCRA] 

court filed a dismissal Notice pursuant to Pa. R.Crim. 

P. 907. On April 18, 2008, th[e PCRA] court entered

an Order dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition.

__________________________________________ 

1

 The court determined that this conviction was a 

second conviction for a crime of violence under 42 

Pa.C.S. §9714(a)(1), after the Commonwealth 

introduced the Common Pleas Quarter Session file, 

CP-51-CR-0605361-2001, establishing that 

[Appellant] had previously been convicted of firstdegree felony robbery on November 1, 2001. 

2

In the “Issue Presented” section of his Amended 

Petition, [Appellant] queried, “Did the sentencing 
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court [err] in sentencing [Appellant] pursuant [to] 

the two strikes provision of the sentencing code 

where [Appellant] had not previously been provided 

a sufficient opportunity to rehabilitate himself[?]”

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/25/08, at 1-2 (footnotes in original). 

 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 16, 2008.2

 

Concurrently with his notice of appeal, Appellant filed a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b), although not ordered to do so. The trial court filed its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 25, 2008. On March 20, 2014, Appellant’s 

counsel filed a Turner/Finley letter brief, together with a motion to 

withdraw as counsel. Appellant has not filed any response. 

 On appeal, Counsel raises the following issue for our review. 

[1.] Did the PCRA court err in finding the sentence 

imposed following [Appellant’s] trial was lawful 

and dismissing the PCRA petition without a 

hearing? 

Turner/Finley Letter Brief at 3. 

Prior to considering Appellant’s issue, we must review PCRA counsel’s 

request to withdraw from representation. Our Supreme Court has 

____________________________________________ 

2

 The inordinate delay since the filing of the notice of appeal was occasioned 

by the inexcusable inactivity of Appellant’s court-appointed counsel, 

requiring this Court to issue two remands to the trial court to determine the 

status of counsel’s representation and an order for compliance, on October 

10, 2008, February 6, 2013, and August 23, 2013, respectively. 
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articulated the requirements PCRA counsel must adhere to when requesting 

to withdraw, which include the following. 

1) A “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel detailing 

the nature and extent of his review; 

2) The “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel listing 

each issue the petitioner wished to have reviewed; 

3) The PC[R]A counsel’s “explanation”, in the “nomerit” letter, of why the petitioner’s issues were 

meritless[.] 

Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 (Pa. 2009), quoting Finley, 

supra at 215. “Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the 

“no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw; and (3) 

a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new 

counsel.” Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 

2007). 

[W]here counsel submits a petition and nomerit letter that do satisfy the technical demands of 

Turner/Finley, the court - trial court or this Court -

must then conduct its own review of the merits of 

the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the 

claims are without merit, the court will permit 

counsel to withdraw and deny relief. By contrast, if 

the claims appear to have merit, the court will deny 

counsel’s request and grant relief, or at least instruct 

counsel to file an advocate’s brief.

Id. (citation omitted). 

Instantly, we determine that PCRA counsel has complied with the 

requirements of Turner/Finley. Specifically, PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley

letter and petition to withdraw detail the nature and extent of PCRA 
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counsel’s review, address the claims Appellant raised in his pro se PCRA 

petition and determine that the sole issue lacks merit. PCRA counsel 

provides a discussion of Appellant’s claim, explaining why the issue is 

without merit. Additionally, counsel served Appellant with a copy of the 

petition to withdraw and Turner/Finley brief, advising Appellant that, if 

PCRA counsel was permitted to withdraw, Appellant had the right to proceed 

pro se or with privately retained counsel. As noted, Appellant has not filed 

any response. We proceed, therefore, to conduct an independent merits 

review of Appellant’s claim. 

We begin by noting the following standard of review,

guiding our consideration of this appeal. “On appeal 

from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of 

review calls for us to determine whether the ruling of

the PCRA court is supported by the record and free 

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Calhoun, 52 

A.3d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). 

“The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed

unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 

A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted), appeal 

denied, ––– Pa. ––––, 38 A.3d 823 (2012). “The 

PCRA court’s factual determinations are entitled to 

deference, but its legal determinations are subject to 

our plenary review.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 72 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2013). 

[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition is not absolute. It is within the 

PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a hearing if 
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the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no 

support either in the record or other evidence. It is 

the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to

examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in 

light of the record certified before it in order to 

determine if the PCRA court erred in its 

determination that there were no genuine issues of 

material fact in controversy and in denying relief 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting

Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 882 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 365 (Pa. 2007); see 

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. 

 Appellant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him under 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(1) as a second-strike offender. Turner/Finley Letter 

Brief at 1. In his PCRA petition, Appellant cited Commonwealth v. 

Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185 (Pa. 2005) as standing for the proposition that 

Pennsylvania’s recidivist statute’s sentence enhancement was conceived “to 

punish more severely offenders who have persevered in criminal activity 

despite the theoretical beneficial effect of penal discipline.” Memorandum of 

Law in Support of Amended PCRA Petition, 10/12/13, at 5, quoting, id. at 

195. Appellant argued that his acceptance of responsibility by pleading to 

robbery in 2001 should not qualify as a predicate first strike because “the 

clear message of the Shiffler [C]ourt is that the mere conviction of a violent 

felony of the first degree is insufficient to trigger where the defendant enters 

a guilty plea and receives a county sentence.” Id. at 6. 
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The Commonwealth and the trial court claim that Appellant’s issue is 

waived because he could have raised the issue before the trial court at the 

time of sentencing or on direct appeal but did not. Commonwealth’s Brief at 

4, citing 42, Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3), and 9544(b) (proscribing PCRA relief 

for allegations of error that have or could have been raised before or at trial, 

or on direct appeal); Trial Court Opinion, 7/25/08, at 2-3 (finding waiver on 

the same ground). 

However, Appellant’s issue implicates the legality of his sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 A.3d 227, 238 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(recognizing a challenge to the imposition of a mandatory sentence under 

Section 9714(a)(1) is a challenge to the legality of a sentence). 

It is well-established that such a claim constitutes a 

nonwaivable challenge to the legality of the 

sentence. Thus, even though Appellant’s claims 

were not first presented to the PCRA court in 

Appellant’s PCRA petition or in his Rule 1925(b) 

concise statement as challenges to the legality of the 

sentence, they cannot be waived. 

Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa. Super. 2014). Further, 

a legality of sentence issue is cognizable in a timely PCRA even if not raised 

at sentencing or on direct appeal. Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. 

Accordingly, we decline to find Appellant’s issue waived.

Issues relating to the legality of a sentence are 

questions of law, as are claims raising a court’s 

interpretation of a statute. Our standard of review 

over such questions is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary. 
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If no statutory authorization exists for a 

particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and 

subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be 

vacated. 

Akbar, supra (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant’s view of our Supreme Court’s holding in Shiffler

is inapt. As we explained in Akbar, Shiffler and related cases precluded 

imposition of a second-strike sentence when the predicate first-strike offense 

and the second-strike offense occurred in the same criminal episode so that 

no intervening opportunity to reform was afforded. Id. at 239-240. The 

cooperation of a defendant in entering a first-strike plea or the leniency of a 

first-strike sentence do not factor into this analysis as Appellant avers. 

 As the trial court explains, Appellant was sentenced for robbery, 

graded as a first-degree felony, in 2001 and committed the underlying 

second-strike offense of aggravated assault in 2004. PCRA Court Opinion, 

7/25/08, at 3. The second-strike provision states “[a]ny person who is 

convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if 

at the time of the commission of the current offense the person had 

previously been convicted of a crime of violence, be sentenced to a minimum 

sentence of at least ten years total confinement.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a). 

Felony robbery is categorized as a crime of violence for the purpose of the 

statute. Id. § 9714(g). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that 

“[Appellant] is the exact recidivist criminal the ‘two-strikes’ provision was 

enacted to address.” PCRA Court Opinion, 7/25/08, at 3. Appellant’s issue 
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being meritless, we conclude the PCRA court did not err in dismissing 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. See Wah, supra. 

We also agree with Appellant’s counsel that Appellant’s appeal is 

meritless. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm 

the PCRA court’s April 18, 2008 order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

 Order affirmed. Motion to withdraw as counsel granted. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/27/2014