UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cr-20592-BLOOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JESUS ALBETO HERNANDEZ OSORIO,

LUIS VIDAL VASQUEZ VASQUEZ,

OSCAR JOSE CARRENO FERNANDEZ,

LUIS JOSE ALFONZO RODRIGUEZ

Defendants.

______________________________/ 

OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Jesus Alberto Hernandez Osorio’s 

(“Hernandez Osorio”) Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. [18] (“Hernandez Osorio 

Motion”)1

, and Defendant Oscar Jose Carreno Fernandez’s (“Carreno Fernandez”) Motion to 

Dismiss, ECF No. [19]2 (“Carreno Fernandez Motion”) (collectively “Motions”).3 Plaintiff United 

States of America (“Government”) filed an Omnibus Response in Opposition to the Motions, ECF 

No. [29] (“Response”), to which Hernandez Osorio and Carreno Fernandez each filed a Reply, 

ECF Nos. [33]-[34]. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motions, all opposing and supporting 

submissions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the 

reasons discussed below, the Motions are denied. 

1 Defendant Oscar Jose Carreno Fernandez file a Motion to Adopt Co-Defendant Hernandez Osorio’s 

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [22], which the Court granted, ECF No. [23].

2 Defendant Jesus Alberto Hernandez Osorio filed a Motion to Adopt Co-Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 

ECF No. [30], which the Court granted, ECF No. [32], 

3 Defendant Luis Vidal Vasquez Vasquez filed a Motion to Adopt Co-Defendants’ Motions, ECF No. [20], 

which the Court granted, ECF No. [21].

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I. BACKGROUND

According to the Criminal Complaint, on or about November 23, 2022, a Maritime Patrol 

Aircraft (“MPA”) spotted a north-bound go-fast vessel (“GFV”) approximately 108 nautical miles 

north of Aruba in international waters and upon the high seas. ECF No. [1] ¶ 3. The GFV had four 

individuals on board, numerous fuel barrels, packages visible on the deck, and did not display an 

indicia of nationality. Id. The HNLMS Holland with embarked Law Enforcement Detachment 

(“LEDET”) 408 was in the area and was diverted to interdict and investigate. Id. United States 

Coast Guard (“USCG”) District 7 assumed tactical control of HNLMS Holland and launched their 

Fast-Raiding Interception and Special Forces Craft (“FRISC”) which embarked LEDET 408 

boarding team and a helicopter to interdict. Id. The HNLMS Holland requested and was granted a 

Statement of No Objection to conduct a Right of Visit boarding from USCG District 7. Id.

Defendants Hernandez Osorio and Carreno Fernandez were onboard the vessel as well as 

Luis Vidal Vasquez Vasquez and Luis Jose Alfonzo Rodriguez (collectively “Defendants’). Id. ¶ 

4. One of the Defendants claimed Columbian nationality, two claimed Venezuelan nationality, and 

the fourth claimed Dominican Republic nationality. Id. Accordingly, the GFV was treated as a 

vessel without nationality and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. A full law 

enforcement boarding ensued, and law enforcement officials recovered thirty-eight bales from the 

GFV. Id. ¶ 5.

The Government filed a Criminal Complaint in this case on December 5, 2022, finding 

probable cause to charge Defendants with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a 

controlled substance while onboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in 

violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b). See generally id. Defendants appeared for their initial 

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appearances before Magistrate Judge Lauren F. Louis on December 6, 2022. See ECF Nos. [3], 

[4], [5], [6].

On December 14, 2022, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of Florida returned a 

two-count Indictment against Defendants charging each with conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute a controlled substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United 

States, in violation of Title 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 70506(b) (“Count I”); and possession 

with intent to distribute a controlled substance while onboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of 

the United States, in violation of Title 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (“Count II”). 

See ECF No. [7] (“Indictment”).

Defendants now seek to dismiss the Indictment. Hernandez Osorio moves for dismissal of 

the Indictment for lack of jurisdiction because (1) the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 

(“MDLEA”) is unconstitutional as applied to the Defendants’ alleged conduct and (2) the 

Government has not established that the GFV was without nationality as defined by the MDLEA. 

See ECF No. [18] at 2. Carreno Fernandez moves for dismissal of the Indictment because (1) the 

Government lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the Netherlands conducted the law enforcement 

action rather than the United States; and (3) there is an absence of necessary nexus to the United 

States, due process and Constitutional violations.

The Government Responds that the MDLEA applies to Defendants’ offenses on the high 

seas and may be enforced within a foreign nation’s exclusive economic zone within the high seas; 

(2) subject matter jurisdiction has been established as the master or person in charge failed to make 

a claim for nationality for the vessel; (3) the United States has jurisdiction over stateless vessels 

with a United States Law Enforcement Detachment Team while on board a foreign flagged partner 

nation’s vessel; (4) there is no nexus requirement for MDLEA prosecution of Drug Trafficking 

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Offenses and the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants does not violate due process; and (5) 

Defendant’s Miranda rights were not violated. See generally ECF No. [29].

I. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Motion to Dismiss Indictment

A motion to dismiss an indictment is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

12(b). A defendant may challenge an indictment on various grounds, including failure to state an 

offense, lack of jurisdiction, or constitutional reasons. See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 

1325 (11th Cir. 2012). “Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) an indictment may be dismissed where there 

is an infirmity of law in the prosecution; a court may not dismiss an indictment, however, on a 

determination of facts that should have developed at trial.” United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 

1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 1987). Further, “[t]he sufficiency of a criminal indictment is determined 

from its face.” United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir. 1992). “The indictment is 

sufficient if it charges in the language of the statute.” Id. “Constitutional requirements are fulfilled 

‘by an indictment that tracks the wording of the statute, as long as the language sets forth the 

essential elements of the crime.’” Id. at 308; see also United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 760 

(11th Cir. 1985). The indictment’s allegations are assumed to be true and are viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Government. See Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1354.

b. MDLEA

The Felonies Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “define and 

punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of 

Nations[.]” U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. Pursuant to the Felonies Clause, Congress enacted the 

MDLEA, which makes drug trafficking on certain vessels in the high seas subject to the 

jurisdiction of the United States. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501 et seq. The MDLEA applies to all cases 

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where the alleged trafficking occurs on a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States[.]” 

46 U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1). The MDLEA further defines a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the 

United States to include “(C) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a 

claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and 

unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C).

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants Hernandez Osorio and Carreno Fernandez now seek to dismiss the Indictment 

because (1) the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied because the offense did not occur on the 

high seas; (2) the Government has not established that the GFV was without nationality; (3) the 

Netherlands conducted the law enforcement action rather than the United States; and (4) there is 

an absence of necessary nexus to the United States and due process and Constitutional violations. 

The Court considers each argument in turn.

a. Offenses Occurring on the High Seas

Defendant Hernandez Osorio argues that the United States’ authority pursuant to the 

MDLEA is limited to offenses occurring on the high seas, and because these offenses took place 

within the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) of Venezuela, they did not occur on the high seas. 

See ECF No. [18] at 2-10. Hernandez Osorio reiterates that the Felonies Clause grants Congress 

the authority to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 

against the Law of Nations” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. According to Hernandez Osorio, 

Congress’s power to “define” offenses against the law of nations means that Congress has the 

power “to codify and explain offenses that had already been understood as offenses against the 

law of nations[,]” not to “create or declare offenses against the law of nations.” United States v. 

Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2012). Following Hernandez Osorio’s

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logic, the same reasoning and limitations should apply to Congress’s power to “define” felonies 

on the high seas. See ECF No. [18] at 7. Thus, Hernandez Osorio submits that the “high Seas” 

referenced in the Felonies Clause should be construed according to the definition of the high seas 

under customary international law. See id. at 8. Further, Hernandez Osorio posits that

[u]nder customary international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea . . . the high seas means waters that are not the 

exclusive economic zone ... territorial sea ... or internal waters of the United States 

or any other nation. 

33 C.F.R. § 2.32(d) (emphasis added). As such, Hernandez Osorio argues that because the alleged 

offenses took place within the EEZ of Venezuela, they did not occur on the high seas, and the 

Indictment must be dismissed. See ECF No. [18] at 10-11.

The Government responds that the MDLEA may be enforced within a foreign nation’s 

EEZ because an EEZ is not a part of a foreign nation’s territorial waters but rather a part of the 

high seas. See ECF No. [29] at 3-8. The Government submits that a vessel outside the recognized 

twelve-mile limit of a nation’s territorial seas is a “vessel located within international waters” and 

subject to MDLEA jurisdiction, even if the vessel is within a foreign nation’s EEZ. Id. at 4-5 (citing 

United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Beyle, 782 F.3d 

159, 167 (4th Cir. 2015) (rejecting defense arguments that because the vessel was in an EEZ “he 

was not on the ‘high seas’ for the purposes of U.S. law”); United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 

300 (11th Cir. 1988) (affirming a Lacey Act conviction and recognizing that a vessel stopped by 

the Coast Guard “within the Bahamas’ exclusive economic zone” was in “an area of the high 

seas”).

In Reply, Hernandez Osorio argues that the Government’s reliance on McPhee is 

unavailing because the issue of whether waters located in an exclusive economic zone were on the 

high seas was not raised in McPhee. See ECF No. [33] at 1. According to Hernandez Osorio, the 

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“language describing the vessel as being in international waters, despite its location in an EEZ, 

was dicta” and “McPhee’s dicta is nether binding or persuasive here.” See id. at 1-2. Further, 

Hernandez Osorio submits that the Government’s reliance on Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, is also 

misplaced because the statute at issue there, the Lacey Act, was not enacted pursuant to the 

Felonies Clause. See id. at 2. Hernandez Osorio also argues that to the extent the Government 

relies on Beyle, 782 F.3d 159, the Fourth Circuit’s decision was based on policy concerns rather 

than meaningful constitutional analysis. See id. at 12. Therefore, Hernandez Osorio argues that the 

Fourth Circuit’s policy-based decision is neither binding nor persuasive. See id.

The Court agrees with the Government. As the parties agree, the material question is 

whether the EEZ is a part of the high seas. Despite Defendants’ contention, the Eleventh Circuit 

expressly stated in McPhee that if a vessel was outside the “twelve-mile Bahamian territorial 

boundary,” then the vessel was “in international waters or at ‘high seas’ at that time.” 336 F.3d at 

1276. The fact that the Eleventh Circuit did not also consider whether the vessel was on the “high 

seas” as that term is defined for purposes of the Felonies Clause is inapposite, considering the 

Eleventh Circuit’s holding that establishes that a vessel located beyond territorial waters was at 

high seas. See id. The Court declines Defendants’ invitation to overlook binding precedent 

indicating that the EEZ beyond the twelve-mile territorial boundary is a part of the high seas.

Moreover, the Court notes that 33 C.F.R. § 2.32(c) expressly defines “high seas” – for the 

purposes of criminal enforcement jurisdiction pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 5224 – to include the 

“exclusive economic zones of the United States and other nations, as well as those waters that are 

seaward of territorial seas of the United States and other nations.” 33 C.F.R. § 2.32(c) (emphasis 

4 Title 14 U.S.C. § 522 states, in relevant part, “[t]he Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, 

inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has 

jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States.”

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added). Thus, both controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent and federal regulations defining high 

seas for the purposes of enforcing the MDLEA define high seas as all waters seaward of any 

nation’s twelve-mile territorial sea limit, including EEZs.

As such, Hernandez Osorio’s Motion is denied as to this matter. Given binding Eleventh 

Circuit precedent and federal regulations, the Court need not address the Government’s other 

arguments.

a. Without Nationality

Defendant Hernandez Osorio argues that the Indictment must be dismissed because the 

Government failed to establish statutory jurisdiction. ECF No. [18] at 11. Defendant Carreno

Fernandez also contends that the government has not met its burden of proving subject matter 

jurisdiction under one of the six grounds set forth in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1). ECF No. [19] at 7-

8.

As stated above, Defendants in this case are charged with conspiracy to possess with intent 

to distribute a controlled substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United 

States, in violation of Title 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 70506(b) (“Count I”); and possession 

with intent to distribute a controlled substance while onboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of 

the United States, in violation of Title 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (“Count II”). 

See ECF No. [7]. A covered vessel is defined to include a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the 

United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1). A vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 

is further defined to include “a vessel without nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). A “vessel without 

nationality” is

(A) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of 

registry that is denied by the nation whose registry is claimed;

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(B) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an 

officer of the United States authorized to enforced applicable provisions of United 

States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel; and

(C) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of 

registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and 

unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.

Id. § 70502(d)(1)(A)-(C).

Hernandez Osorio contends that the Government has not met its burden of demonstrating 

that the GFV was without nationality as defined by the MDLEA. ECF No. [18] at 12. Specifically, 

Hernandez Osorio asserts that the strict requirements of the statute were not met because the 

statements of USCG Officers Michael Roberts and Alex Wells do not demonstrate that Defendants 

“were specifically asked (1) if they were the ‘individual in charge;’ or (2) whether they wished to 

make a claim of nationality or registry for the vessel.” ECF No. [33] at 8. Carreno Fernandez 

argues that if the Government takes the position that jurisdiction exists because nobody made a 

claim of nationality for the vessel the Government must prove that ground at an evidentiary 

hearing. ECF No. [19] at 7-8. The Government responds that USCG Officers Roberts and Wells 

inquired from all four Defendants “if anyone was the master or person in charge and if anyone 

wish to make a claim of nationality for the vessel. All four refused.” ECF No. [29] at 9.

Hernandez Osorio relies on United States v. Guerro, 789 F. App’x 742, 750 (11th Cir. 

2019) to support his contention that the USCG needed to comply with the strict requirements of 

the statute and failed to do so. In Guerro, the Eleventh Circuit determined that where the “Coast 

Guard never asked for the individual in charge and never requested the defendants to make a claim 

of nationality or registry for the vessel, the Government had not shown compliance “with the 

MDLEA’s jurisdictional requirements.” In that case, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “[a]ll the 

Coast Guard had to do here to establish statelessness, and thus jurisdiction, was to ask whether any 

of the defendants wished to make a claim of nationality or registry for the vessel” or alternatively, 

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“they could have established that none of the defendants were authorized to make such a claim for 

the vessel.” Id. at 751 (citing United States v. Prado, 933 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2019)). 

Here, however, the Government has indicated that it supplied Defendants with the written 

statements of both USCG officers Wells and Roberts. Those statements reflect that the USCG 

inquired from all four Defendants if anyone was the master or person in charge and if anyone 

wished to make a claim of nationality for the vessel and all four refused. That questioning meets 

the requirement that the Eleventh Circuit articulated in Guerro – that the USCG must ask whether 

any of the Defendants wished to make a claim of nationality or registry for the vessel. 

As to Carreno Fernandez’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of statutory 

jurisdiction, none of the Defendants have challenged the veracity of the written statements of the 

USCG officers provided by the Government in discovery. Carreno Fernandez does not cite any 

authority for the proposition that such an evidentiary hearing is required. To the contrary, the 

Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]he Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of hearsay 

to make a pretrial determination of jurisdiction when that hearsay does not pertain to an element 

of the offense.” United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 806 (11th Cir. 2014). In Campbell, the 

Eleventh Circuit found that “the stateless nature of Campbell’s vessel was not an element of his 

offense to be proved at trial” so the admission of hearsay to determine jurisdiction “did not violate 

his right to confront witnesses against him.” Id.; see also United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th 

Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Cedado Nunez v. United States, 212 L. Ed. 2d 762 (2022) (“The 

Confrontation Clause does not require an evidentiary hearing because the Act makes clear that 

jurisdiction is a ‘preliminary question of law to be determined solely by the trial judge’; it is not 

an element of the crime.” (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a) (alteration adopted)); United States v. 

Persaud, 605 F. App’x 791, 795 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he MDLEA provides that the United States' 

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jurisdiction over a vessel is not an element of the offense and that jurisdictional issues are 

preliminary questions of law to be resolved by the district court.” (citing 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a)).

Accordingly, the Government has sufficiently set forth statutory subject matter jurisdiction 

because the GFV was without nationality.

b. Netherlands Involvement

Carreno Fernandez argues that the Iindictment must be dismissed because the MDLEA 

cannot be applied where a foreign nation conducts a high seas drug interdiction with the USCG 

occupying a secondary role. ECF No. [19] at 4-6. The Government responds that the United States 

has jurisdiction over a stateless vessel when interdicted by a United States law enforcement 

detachment team aboard a foreign flagged partner nation’s vessel. ECF No. [29] at 10. The 

Government argues that “[t]he evidence in this case reflects that while the official vessel that 

detected and pursued the [D]efendants was indeed Dutch, it was in fact United States Coast Guard 

officials who boarded the [D]efendants’ GFV when it finally stopped, pursuant to agreements 

between the two partner nations.” Id.

Carreno Fernandez does not provide any direct authority to support his position that the 

MDLEA cannot be applied where the USCG occupies a secondary role in an enforcement action. 

Instead, he cites two Eleventh Circuit cases that he contends may tangentially have bearing on this 

issue because they stand for the proposition that if United States Officials occupy secondary roles 

when another nation conducts a law enforcement operation, Constitutional protections do not 

apply. See United States v. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Behety, 32 

F.3d 503 (11th Cir. 1994). In Odoni, the Eleventh Circuit said that the “Fourth Amendment 

generally does not apply to the actions of foreign officials enforcing foreign law in a foreign 

country.” 728 F.3d at 1238. In Behety, the Eleventh Circuit said that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is 

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generally inapplicable to actions carried out by foreign officials in their own countries enforcing 

their own laws, even if American officials are present and cooperate in some degree.” 32 F.3d at 

510. The Eleventh Circuit further explained that the general rule has certain exceptions, including 

where “American law enforcement officials substantially participated in the search or if the foreign 

officials conducting the search were actually acting as agents for their American counterparts.” Id. 

It appears that the exception would likely apply in this situation and even if it did not, Carreno 

Fernandez has provided no authority to support his contention that the MDLEA cannot be applied 

where a foreign nation conducts a high seas drug interdiction because any other result permits the 

Government to ignore due process and freely discard Constitutional guarantees. Moreover, 

Carreno Fernandez does not dispute the Government’s assertion that the United States Coast Guard 

actually boarded the GFV, exercising a primary role in the enforcement. 

The Government explains that “[d]rug traffickers are on notice, under the UN Convention 

Against Illicit Traffic and also under the MDLEA, that nations will “cooperate to the fullest extent 

possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea.” Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 

Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95, art. 17.1. The Government also cites 

to a case where this issue was not raised, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a conviction where the 

defendant was apprehended by USCG aboard a British naval ship. Persaud, 605 F. App’x at 793-

94, 801; see also United States v. Bertel, 160 F. App’x 958 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming sentence 

where a USCG detachment assigned to the Royal Dutch Naval vessel Willem Van Der Zaan 

removed the defendant challenging his sentence and others while the Dutch vessel’s crew 

recovered 58 bales of cocaine).

Considering the lack of authority cited in support of Defendant’s position and the fact that 

cases have proceeded on similar facts and been affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, this Court is not 

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persuaded that the Indictment should be dismissed because the GFV was stopped by a USCG 

detachment traveling aboard a Dutch ship.

c. Nexus to the United States and Due Process

Carreno Fernandez contends that MDLEA prosecutions do not comply with essential due 

process requirements that “a) a statute cannot be vague as to any of its material provisions; b) there 

must be a nexus to the United States before a person can be haled into a United States court and 

placed in jeopardy of his liberty; and c) before interrogation a defendant must be advised of his 

constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).” ECF No. [19] at 8. The 

Court addresses each of the three challenges in turn.

i. Vagueness

First, Carreno Fernandez argues that the questions about “nationality” or “registry” are too 

vague to comport with due process. Id. at 12. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]his challenge 

is unpersuasive, as the text of § 70502(d)(1)(B) is sufficiently clear to give ordinary people notice 

that, without a claim of nationality or registry for the vessel upon request, the vessel will be 

considered stateless for purposes of jurisdiction under the MDLEA.” United States v. Gruezo, No. 

22-11342, 2023 WL 2706261, at *6 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2023). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit 

“has repeatedly rejected constitutional vagueness challenges to the jurisdictional provisions in the 

MDLEA's predecessors, as well as due process claims regarding the exercise of extraterritorial 

jurisdiction under the MDLEA.” United States v. Napa Moreira, 810 F. App’x 702, 707 (11th Cir. 

2020). Carreno Fernandez’s due process challenge for vagueness therefore fails.

ii. Nexus

Next, Carreno Fernandez argues that “[t]here is no evidence there existed any “minimum 

contacts” between Carreno [Fernandez] and the United States.” ECF No. [19] at 14-18. According 

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to Carreno Fernandez, the same ‘minimum contacts’ required in civil litigation “fulfill the need 

for a constitutionally-mandated ‘nexus’ between the United States and a defendant. Id. at 15. He

concedes that the Supreme Court has yet to address whether a minimum contacts test applies to 

criminal statutes like the MDLEA. Id.

As Carreno Fernandez concedes, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected challenges to the 

MDLEA’s constitutionality as applied to unregistered vessels on the high seas with no ties to the 

United States. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d at 806; United States v. Cruickshank, 

837 F.3d 1182, 1190 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338 n.2 (11th 

Cir. 2006); United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. 

Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 

1383 (11th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit has further held that “the Due Process Clause of the 

Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the trial and conviction of an alien captured on the high seas 

while drug trafficking, because the [MDLEA] provides clear notice that all nations prohibit and 

condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.” Campbell, 743 F.3d at 812 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, “this [C]ircuit and other circuits have not 

embellished the [MDLEA] with the requirement of a nexus between a defendant’s criminal 

conduct and the United States.” Id. at 810 (citing Estupinan, 453 F.3d at 1338). Therefore, in light 

of binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, the Court need not proceed further, and Carreno 

Fernandez’s Motion is denied as to this matter.

iii. Miranda Rights

Finally, Carreno Fernandez argues that MDLEA violates Constitutional protections like 

those afforded to defendants under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He contends that a 

warning is necessary in MDLEA cases to advise a defendant that his silence can be used against 

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him because the fact that the USCG “did not have to give the [D]efendants this warning about the 

serious consequences of not making a claim of nationality or registry for the GFV leaps out as a 

blatant denial of well-established notions of fair play and fundamental due process.” ECF No. [19] 

at 13-14 (emphasis in original). The Government responds that Defendants Miranda rights were 

not implicated when they were interdicted by the USCG outside of the United States. ECF No. 

[29] at 18-19. 

As an initial matter, Eleventh Circuit precedent confirms the Government’s position that 

the Defendants’ Miranda rights were not implicated when the USCG conducted its right to visit. 

“This circuit has long recognized that the Coast Guard's routine stop, boarding and inspection of 

an American vessel on the high seas does not normally rise to the level of custodial detention thus 

requiring Miranda warnings.” Rioseco, 845 F.2d at 302-03. The Court therefore turns to Carreno 

Fernandez’s argument that a warning is necessary in MDLEA cases to warn a defendant that their 

silence when questioned about the nationality of their vessel can be used against them. 

A court in this district considering the same argument held that “[i]n the absence of any 

previously recognized constitutional right to be informed of the consequences under § 70502(d)(1) 

associated with claiming a nationality of a vessel, the Court finds that Miranda does not remotely 

stand for the stated proposition.” United States v. Estupinan Padilla, No. 1:21-CR-20327-KMM3, 2022 WL 152535, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2022), aff’d sub nom. Gruezo, 2023 WL 2706261. 

Here too, the Court declines “to create—for the first time—‘protections like those afforded 

a defendant under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)’ for Title 46.” Id. 

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motions, ECF Nos. [18] and 

[19], are DENIED.

Case 1:22-cr-20592-BB Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/12/2023 Page 15 of 16
Case No. 22-cr-20592-BLOOM

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DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on April 11, 2023.

_________________________________

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to: 

Counsel of Record

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