NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

JAY RANDALL JONES, JR., Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0232 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2014-002142-001 

The Honorable Alfred M. Fenzel, Judge 

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR 

CLARIFICATION OF SENTENCES 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Paul J. Prato 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. JONES 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined. 

H O W E, Judge: 

¶1 Jay Randall Jones, Jr., appeals his convictions and sentences 

for one count of attempt to commit first degree murder, two counts of 

aggravated assault, one count of discharge of a firearm at a residential 

structure, two counts of burglary in the first degree, one count of theft, and 

one count of endangerment. For the following reasons, we affirm Jones’ 

convictions, but remand to clarify the sentences imposed. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 At approximately 4:00 a.m. in early March 2014, police 

officers responded to a silent alarm at a gun shop located in a strip mall. 

They saw a large jagged hole in a wall that divided the gun shop and a 

vacant office. The officers entered the vacant office and heard voices 

through the hole and coming from the gun shop. 

¶3 Unbeknownst to Jones that the officers were on the other side, 

he began to crawl through the hole towards the vacant office. When he 

noticed the officers, however, Jones retreated to the gun shop and fled 

through a rear entrance. Detective Higgins and Officers Frandsen and 

Strnad pursued Jones through a nearby trailer park, and Higgins and Jones 

exchanged gunfire in an adjacent neighborhood. Although neither Higgins 

nor Jones was shot, one bullet Jones shot pierced the side of a mobile home 

and entered the kitchen while the occupant, E.M., was making coffee. The 

bullet lodged in the refrigerator, which was welded to the wall, and 

“approximately an inch away from [E.M.’s] coffee pot.” 

¶4 Meanwhile, Jones exchanged gunfire with the police. Jones 

fired one shot at Detective Higgins and then backed up, “tripping over his 

own feet,” but still holding the gun in his hand. The detective fired more 

shots at Jones; Jones finally “raised up his hands, yelled something like, 

okay, okay, and then threw the gun to the side.” After arresting Jones, the 

police discovered approximately $40,000 worth of firearms stuffed in duffel 

bags in the gun shop and vacant office. 
STATE v. JONES 

Decision of the Court 

3

¶5 The State charged Jones with one count of attempt to commit 

first degree murder (Count 1); three counts of aggravated assault (Counts 

2, 3, and 4); one count of discharge of a firearm at a residential structure 

(Count 5); two counts of burglary in the first degree (Counts 6 and 7); one 

count of theft (Count 8); and one count of endangerment (Count 9). The trial 

court granted Jones’ motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 4. The 

jurors convicted Jones of the remaining counts. 

¶6 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed terms of 15 

years’ imprisonment for Counts 1 and 2, to run concurrently with each 

other. For Count 3, the court imposed a term of 10.5 years’ imprisonment, 

to run consecutively to the sentences for Counts 1 and 2. For Count 5, it 

imposed a term of 10.5 years’ imprisonment, to run “concurrently with the 

other sentences.” For Counts 6, 7, and 8, the court imposed terms of 7 years’ 

imprisonment for each count, to run “concurrently with each other and 

with Count 5.” For Count 9, the court imposed a term of 3 years’ 

imprisonment, to run consecutively to the sentences for the other counts. 

¶7 The trial court then summarized its oral pronouncement: “So, 

it’s basically 10 and a half on 1 and 2 it’s concurrent—15 each on 1 and 2 

concurrently; 10 and a half consecutive to 1 and 2; Count 5, concurrent, 10 

and a half; Count[s] 6, 7 and 8, consecutive; and Count 9, 3 years 

consecutive.” Defense counsel then clarified: “Your Honor, you said on 

Counts 6, 7, and 8 concurrent with Count 5?” The court answered: “You’re 

right. Concurrent with Count 5, but consecutive to Counts 1, 2, and 3. 

Concurrent with Count 5, but consecutive to Counts 1, 2 and 3 and 9.” Jones 

timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

1. Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶8 Jones argues that insufficient evidence supports his 

convictions on aggravated assault against Officer Strnad and discharge of a 

firearm at a residential structure. We review de novo the sufficiency of 

evidence to support a conviction. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 5, 331 

P.3d 412, 414 (2014). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to sustaining the verdicts, resolving all reasonable inferences 

against the defendant. State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 436 ¶ 12, 967 P.2d 106, 

111 (1998). Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs 

only when no probative facts support the conviction. State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 

280, 289 ¶ 30, 349 P.3d 1117, 1126 (App. 2015). The evidence, however, must 

be substantial enough for a reasonable person to determine that it supports 
STATE v. JONES 

Decision of the Court 

4

a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Stroud, 209 Ariz. 410, 

411–12 ¶ 6, 103 P.3d 912, 913–14 (2005). Here, sufficient evidence supports 

Jones’ convictions for aggravated assault against Officer Strnad and 

discharge of a firearm at a residential structure. 

¶9 First, substantial evidence supports Jones’ conviction for 

aggravated assault against Officer Strnad. As applicable here, a person 

commits aggravated assault by intentionally placing a police officer 

engaged in the execution of any official duties in reasonable apprehension 

of imminent physical injury while knowing or having reason to know that 

the victim is a police officer. A.R.S. §§ 13–1203(A)(2), –1204(A)(8)(a). The 

record establishes that while Officer Strnad was on duty and dressed in her 

police uniform, she pursued Jones on foot after he fled the gun store. During 

the pursuit, Jones, while holding a handgun, looked over his shoulder at 

Strnad. The officer testified, “I thought he was going to shoot me.”

Consequently, Strnad took cover behind a nearby pillar before running to 

the area where Higgins was located. Jones fired at least two shots in the 

direction of the officers, and Strnad was concerned for her safety. This 

evidence was sufficient for the jurors to conclude that Jones intentionally 

placed Strnad in imminent fear of being shot and injured. See In re William 

G., 192 Ariz. 208, 213, 963 P.2d 287, 292 (App. 1997) (noting that when 

determining one’s state of mind, absent an admission, the court uses 

inferences “from all relevant surrounding circumstances”). Accordingly, 

based on this evidence, the jurors could reasonably conclude that Jones 

committed aggravated assault against Officer Strnad. 

¶10 Second, substantial evidence similarly supports Jones’ 

conviction for discharge of a firearm at a residential structure. A person 

commits this offense by knowingly discharging a firearm at a residential 

structure. A.R.S. § 13–1211(A). The mental state of “knowingly” requires 

only that the defendant “is aware of or believes that [his] conduct is of that 

nature or that the circumstance exists” and “does not require any 

knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act or omission.” A.R.S. § 13–

105(10)(b). Contrary to Jones’ assertion, evidence that the trailer was his 

intended target is not required to sustain his conviction. See State v. Lopez, 

234 Ariz. 465, 468 ¶ 13, 323 P.3d 748, 751 (App. 2014) (“The concept of a 

transferred mental state has long been recognized in Arizona and applies, 

for example, in the ‘bad aim’ situation in which a defendant intends to hit 

one party but misses and accidentally hits another. Under that scenario, the 

defendant’s felonious intent toward the person he missed is transferred and 

deemed to apply to the person he unintentionally hit.”) (citation omitted). 
STATE v. JONES 

Decision of the Court 

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¶11 Here, substantial evidence supports Jones’ conviction for 

discharging a firearm at a residential structure. The record establishes that 

Jones ran through the trailer park where E.M.’s mobile home was located 

before firing his weapon. Further, based on Jones’ and the detective’s

respective locations during the gunfight, the evidence shows Jones fired his 

weapon in the direction of the trailer park. E.M. testified that, at the time of 

the gunfire, he was making coffee when a bullet pierced the wall of his 

mobile home and lodged in his refrigerator. The police subsequently 

located the bullet in E.M.’s wall, although they could not recover it. 

Moreover, Jones and the detective were the only individuals to fire their 

weapons around the time the bullet entered E.M.’s home. Based on this 

evidence, the jurors could reasonably conclude that Jones knowingly 

discharged his firearm in the direction of E.M.’s residence. Consequently, 

substantial evidence supports Jones’ convictions for aggravated assault 

against Officer Strnad and discharging a firearm at a residential structure. 

2. Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms 

¶12 Jones next contends that the verdict forms and final jury 

instructions failed to identify the victims for Counts 1, 2, 3, and 9, thereby 

violating his right to unanimous verdicts. Because Jones did not raise this 

objection at trial, we review for fundamental error only. See State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶¶ 19–20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). To prevail 

under fundamental error review, a defendant must prove error, the error 

was fundamental, and it caused him prejudice. Id. at ¶ 20. Because the jurors 

knew which person was the victim in each count, no error occurred. Jones’

argument rests on the faulty premise that the jurors did not know which 

person was the victim in each count. But during closing arguments, the 

prosecutor expressly referred to Higgins as the victim of the attempted 

murder and one of the aggravated assault allegations and Strnad as the 

victim of the other aggravated assault charge. The prosecutor made clear 

that the victim of the endangerment charge was E.M. Further, Jones’ 

counsel made these same distinctions in her closing argument. 

Consequently, the jurors knew which person was the victim in each count, 

and no error, much less fundamental, prejudicial error, occurred. 

3. Sentencing 

¶13 While reviewing the record, this Court identified a 

discrepancy between both the sentencing minute entry and order of 

confinement and the trial court’s oral pronouncement of Jones’ sentences.

The minute entry and order indicate that the prison terms imposed for 

Counts 3 and 5 are to run concurrently with each other and consecutively 
STATE v. JONES 

Decision of the Court 

6

to the concurrent terms imposed for Counts 6, 7, and 8. However, when the 

trial court orally pronounced Jones’ sentences, it ordered the term imposed 

for Count 5 to run concurrently with the terms imposed for Counts 6, 7, and 

8. The court also noted that the terms imposed for Counts 6, 7, and 8 run 

consecutively to the term imposed for Count 3, which contradicts imposing

concurrent terms for Counts 3 and 5 and ordering Counts 6, 7, and 8 to run 

concurrently with Count 5. Because we cannot determine from the record 

whether (1) the terms imposed for Counts 3 and 5 are to run consecutively 

to—or concurrently with—each other; and (2) whether the concurrent terms 

imposed for Counts 6, 7, and 8 are to run consecutively to—or concurrently 

with—the term imposed for Count 5, we remand to the trial court to make 

those determinations. See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216, 841 P.2d 209, 

211 (App. 1992) (“[W]hen there is a discrepancy between the oral 

pronouncement of sentence and the minute entry that cannot be resolved 

by reference to the record, a remand for clarification of sentence is 

appropriate.”).

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jones’ convictions, but 

remand for clarification of the sentences imposed.