1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 2:22-cv-14305-JEM

TAMIKO N. PEELE AND TAMIKO N. PEELE, 

INDIVIDUALLY ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE THROUGH ITS UNITED STATES

TRUSTEE PROGRAM, REGION 21AND ITS 

OFFICIALS THE CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE, ROBIN R. 

WEINER, ROBIN R. WEINER P.A., ITS PRESIDENT 

ROBIN R. WEINER, ITS STAFF ATTORNEY JOANNA 

P. TEMPONE, PAUL S. VISNOVSKE, MATTHEW 

GIRARDI AND DOES 1-3 INCLUSIVE, IN THEIR 

INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ET AL

Defendants. 

____________________________________________/

THE CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE, ROBIN R. WEINER, ROBIN R. WEINER,

INDIVIDUALLY, ROBIN R. WEINER P.A., ITS PRESIDENT ROBIN R. WEINER, ITS 

STAFF ATTORNEY JOANNA P. TEMPONE, PAUL S. VISNOVSKE, MATTHEW 

GIRARDI AND DOES 1-3 INCLUSIVE, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 

COMES NOW, the Chapter 13 Trustee, Robin R. Weiner, Robin R. Weiner, individually, 

Robin R. Weiner P.A., its President Robin R. Weiner, its staff attorney Joanna P. Tempone, Paul 

S. Visnovske, Matthew Girardi and Does 1-3 inclusive, in their individual and official capacity et 

al, by and through the undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectfully moves this Court for dismissal with prejudice of the

Complaint for Bivens Claims, Violations of Civil Rights, Damages and Incidental Relief 

(“Complaint”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Barton1 doctrine and failure to state 

1 Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 128 (1881).

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 1 of 14
2

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Further, the Complaint should be stricken against the 

Chapter 13 Trustee, Robin R. Weiner, Robin R. Weiner, individually, Robin R. Weiner P.A., its 

President Robin R. Weiner, its staff attorney Joanna P. Tempone, Paul S. Visnovske, Matthew 

Girardi and Does 1-3 inclusive, in their individual and official capacity based upon the doctrines 

of absolute and quasi-judicial immunity.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2020, Kenneth Drake Ozment (“Ozment”) filed a joint Voluntary Petition 

for Relief under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on behalf of Tamiko N. Peele 

and Robert L. Walker (“Plaintiff”). (ECF No. 1)2

.

The United States Trustee assigned Standing Chapter 13 Trustee, Robin R. Weiner, to 

administer Plaintiff’s Chapter 13 case in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1302. Joanna P. Tempone, 

Paul S. Visnovske, and Matthew Girardi are employed as staff attorneys for the Chapter 13 Trustee 

at all times. 

At no time did Robin R. Weiner P.A., it’s president Robin R. Weiner, Robin R. Weiner, 

individually, Joanna P. Tempone, individually, Paul S. Visnovske, individually, or Matthew 

Girardi, individually, participate or take any action in Plaintiff’s Chapter 13 case.

Joanna P. Tempone, Paul S. Visnovske, and Matthew Girardi are not presently or never 

were employed as staff attorneys for Robin R. Weiner, P.A. Robin R. Weiner, P.A. is an entity,

separate and apart from the Chapter 13 Trusteeship and does not employ staff attorneys.

Plaintiff clearly went “defendant shopping” when listing the aforementioned names to this 

action. In fact, Plaintiff included the aforementioned names as aliases for the Chapter 13 Trustee, 

Robin R. Weiner, and the staff attorneys for the Trusteeship, Joanna P. Tempone, Paul S. 

2 All references to ECF Nos. refer to the docket entries for Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 20-11431-EPK.

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 2 of 14
3

Visnovske, and Matthew Girardi. These parties are referred to as “Chapter 13 Trustee et al” in this 

pleading. 

On March 19, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court granted Ozment’s Motion to Withdraw as 

Attorney for Plaintiff. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, then filed multiple appeals and pleadings 

containing frivilous and confounding allegations against Chapter 13 Trustee et al, judges, federal 

agencies, attorneys, mortgage lenders, and various creditors and financial institutions. Many of 

Plaintiff’s pleadings exceed 600 pages in length and contain illogical threads of legal phrases and 

accusations. The Bankruptcy Court described Plaintiff’s filings as 

“[M]uch extraneous material, uses overly complex sentences containing 

multiple seemingly unrelated topics, and is presented in a form that is not 

appropriate for a motion filed with this Court. It appears that the debtors well 

know this and persist in filing purposely confusing documents in the 

mistaken belief that this will assist them in further delaying the longstanding 

efforts of their mortgage lender to foreclose on their home.” (ECF No. 315).

On May 18, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Memorandum in Support of Orders

Denying eight of Plaintiff’s frivilous motions. (ECF No. 2153

). The Memorandum instructed the

Chapter 13 Trustee to move to dismiss Plaintiff’s case for failure to timely file a valid motion to 

modify confirmed plan. Plaintiff subsequently appealed all Bankruptcy Court Orders.

Upon receipt of the Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum in Support of Orders, Chapter 13 

Trustee, Robin R. Weiner, and staff attorney, Joanna P. Tempone, filed a Motion to Dismiss Case 

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) on May 24, 2021. (ECF No. 244). Thereafter, the Court entered 

its detailed and comprehensive Order Granting the Motion to Dismiss after hearing, on June 18, 

2021. (ECF No. 286).

3 See Orders Denying Motions [ECF Nos. 216-223; Bankruptcy Case No. 20-11431-EPK]. 

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 3 of 14
4

To date, Plaintiff’s bankruptcy pleadings surpass 420 docket entries with some as recent as 

July, 2022. The Bankruptcy Court has since denied all of Plaintiff’s pro se motions and pleadings, 

in many instances due to unclear pleadings designed to confuse. 

Plaintiff also filed eleven appeals in the District Court, seven appeals in the Eleventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals, and an adversary proceeding in the dismissed bankruptcy case which 

has not yet been closed by the Court. The Honorable Aileen M. Cannon, in one of Plaintiff’s

numerous appeals to the District Court, described Plaintiff’s filings as “incomprehensible.” See

Peele v. Weiner, 21-80855-CIV, 2022 WL 748485, at 3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2022). 

On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Immediate Consideration for Leave to File a 

Lawsuit against Chapter 13 Trustee et al and all other named defendants to this action. (ECF No. 

400). The Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Denying Motions for Leave to File Lawsuit on July 

14, 2022. (ECF No. 406). The Bankruptcy Court found the Motions consisted of a “series of 

seemingly unrelated phrases placed together to appear as sentences and paragraphs” and that “the 

confusion presented in the motions appears purposeful.” Id. The Motions were denied in light of 

Plaintiff’s failure to describe a cognizable claim in which the relief sought was appropriate. 

Blatantly ignoring the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Denying Motion for Leave to file the 

instant lawsuit, Plaintiff filed this Complaint in St. Lucie County Court on August 10, 2022,

asserting the same or similar incomprehensible allegations. Plaintiff’s motivation appears to be

nothing more than forum shopping. On August 29, 2022, the United States Attorney filed a Notice 

of Removal to this Court.

Separate and apart from these pleadings, Plaintiff filed another rambling case, 9:22-cv81043-RS in District Court. On August 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed another incomprehensible motion

in District Court, Joint Motion to Consolidate, Motion for Extension of Time, Motion for Leave 

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 4 of 14
5

to File Excess Pages and Words, Motion for Leave to File/Supplement the Record, Motion to Stay 

Pending Disposition of Appeal (ECF No. 12).

II. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in violation 

of the Barton doctrine.

Chapter 13 Trustee et al seeks dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Attacks 

on subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) come in two forms. “Facial attacks” on the 

complaint “require the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis 

of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes 

of the motion.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990). A factual attack

upon subject matter jurisdiction “challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction 

irrespective of the pleadings, and extrinsic evidence may be considered.” Juravin v. Kennedy, 

5:21-CV-514-GAP-PRL, 2022 WL 1301744, at 1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2022). Here, Plaintiff 

alleges no cohesive discernable facts for the Court to consider either facially or factually. 

The Supreme Court ruled in Barton that “before suit is brought against a receiver leave of 

the court by which he was appointed must be obtained” (“Barton doctrine”). Barton v. Barbour, 

104 U.S. at 128. The Barton doctrine has since been applied to bankruptcy matters. “A debtor must 

obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before initiating an action in district court when that action is 

against the trustee or other bankruptcy-court-appointed officer, for acts done in the actor's official 

capacity.” Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2000). Leave is required before 

pursuing remedies in either state or other federal courts. Id. at 1253. 

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 5 of 14
6

Additionally, “[a]ll problems under the Barton doctrine do not vanish when the 

unauthorized non-bankruptcy court action is removed...” See In re Herrera, 472 B.R. 839, 853 

(Bankr. D.N.M. 2012). “The trustee should not have to expend resources to remove the action to 

begin with. Nor should the trustee have to file a motion to dismiss in the non-bankruptcy forum, 

educating that court about the Barton doctrine and hoping for the correct result.” Id. at 853; see 

also In re Trafford Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 520 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2014)4. The Chapter 13 

Trustee et al has filed this motion in an abundance of caution.

The Barton doctrine is directly applicable to this matter. Here, the Bankruptcy Court denied 

Plaintiff’s Motionsfor Immediate Consideration for Leave to File a Lawsuit in both the bankruptcy 

case and adversary proceeding. In direct contravention, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in St. Lucie 

County Court without leave of the Bankruptcy Court. The removal of this action to the instant

Court does not retroactively cure the initial improper filing without Bankruptcy Court approval. 

Furthermore, the Barton doctrine applies to actions against officers approved by the 

bankruptcy court when those officers function “as the equivalent of court appointed 

officers.” Lawrence v. Goldberg, 573 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2009). Additionally, 

the Barton Doctrine applies to trustees' counsel as well as to trustees themselves. Id. See 

Lowenbraun v. Canary, 453 F.3d 314, 321 (6th Cir.2006). The Barton doctrine denies subject 

matter jurisdiction to all forums except the appointing court and operates to ensure that all lawsuits 

that could affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate proceed either in the bankruptcy court, 

or with the knowledge and approval of the bankruptcy court. See In re Harris, 590 F.3d 730, 742 

(9th Cir. 2009).

4 In re Trafford Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 520 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2014), decision modified and remanded sub 

nom. Wortley v. Bakst, 844 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2017), and aff'd sub nom. Wortley v. Bakst, 17-20050, 2018 WL 

9617383 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2018)

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 6 of 14
7

In the instant case, Chapter 13 Trustee et al acted solely within the scope of its authority. 

Chapter 13 Trustee et al administered the case under 11 U.S.C. § 1302 and moved to dismiss the 

bankruptcy case in the normal course and as directed by the Bankruptcy Court for Plaintiff’s failure 

to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1307. The Bankruptcy Court granted Chapter 13 Trustee’s Motion to 

Dismiss on June 18, 2021. (ECF No. 286). 

As in Juravin, Plaintiff’s “collateral attack falls squarely within the scope of 

the Barton doctrine and the Court should therefore dismiss this case with prejudice for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction.” See Juravin at 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is a clear “collateral attack” 

against Chapter 13 Trustee et al and the Bankruptcy Court, District Court, and Eleventh Circuit’s 

Orders. Id.

The Eleventh Circuit recently ruled the Barton doctrine has no application when 

jurisdiction over a matter no longer exists in the bankruptcy court. Tufts v. Hay, 977 F.3d 1207

(11th Cir. 2020). Although the Tufts court ruled that Barton did not apply as the bankruptcy case 

was dismissed, the court stated: “We expressly note that our holding here creates no categorical 

rule that the Barton doctrine can never apply once a bankruptcy case ends. Id. at 1210. The Barton

doctrine centers around in rem jurisdiction. See Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 953 (11th Cir. 

2021). When there is no longer a res controlled by a single court, there is no longer a potential 

conflict in the exercise of jurisdiction over it. Id. at 954.

The instant case is distinguishable from Tufts and Chua in that the Bankruptcy Court did 

not close Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case despite the dismissal. In fact, Plaintiff’s continuous motions 

and appeals of multiple orders have stymied the Chapter 13 Trustee from filing her required Final 

Report and the Court from discharging the Chapter 13 Trustee and closing the case. Further, since 

the Eleventh Circuit and District Court have not ruled on some pending appeals, it could be 

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 7 of 14
8

conceivable that if the courts grant Plaintiff’s appeals, the matter could ultimately be remanded to 

the Bankruptcy Court and the dismissal vacated. As such, the Barton doctrine clearly applies to 

the facts at hand.

Unlike the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling in Keitel, the Barton doctrine distinctly applies to 

this case since the suit could have a “conceivable effect on the administration of the bankruptcy 

estate,” which is not “fully administered” and closed. See In re Keitel, 636 B.R. 845, 852 (Bankr. 

S.D. Fla. 2022).

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be 

Granted.

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a “complaint must plead enough facts to state a 

claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 

403 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.P.R. 2019) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). “Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a “short and plain statement 

of the claim” that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground 

on which it rests.” Peele v. Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. et al., 2:14-cv-14289-KAM (S.D. 

Fla. May 11, 2015).

“A pro se litigant's pleadings are construed liberally, but pro se litigants must nonetheless 

conform to procedural rules...” See In re Kunsman, 752 Fed. Appx. 938, 941 (11th Cir. 2018) 

(citing Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)). Specifically, a pro se litigant is 

“subject to the relevant law and rules of court,” including the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 

Procedure. See Dekom v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 2021 WL 1061177 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2021) 

(citing Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) and Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d at 

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 8 of 14
9

1304 (11th Cir. 2002)). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact or legal 

conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” AHE Realty Assoc., LLC v. MiamiDade County, Florida, 320 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (quoting Oxford Asset Mgmt., 

Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)). 

The Eleventh Circuit previously upheld a bankruptcy court decision concluding an 

unintelligible motion would have been denied ... because the motion “does not indicate in any 

way the relief the Debtor seeks.” See In re Somohano, 785 Fed. Appx. 821, 822 (11th Cir. 2019). 

Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in rejecting the 

debtor’s pleading as meritless. Id.

In another one of Plaintiff’s appeals to the District Court, the Honorable Aileen M. Cannon 

noted that Plaintiff’s filings amount to a ““hodgepodge of unsupported assertions, irrelevant 

platitudes, and legalistic gibberish,” and the Court has no obligation to “suffer in silence the filing 

of baseless, insupportable appeals presenting no colorable claims of error and designed only to 

delay, obstruct, or incapacitate the operations of the courts or any other governmental 

authority.” Peele v. Weiner at 4 (citing Crain v. Comm'r, 737 F.2d 1417, 1418 (5th Cir. 1984)).

Plaintiff incessantly files documents labelled as “pleadings” that have been described as 

“lengthy, repetitious, and apparently purposefully confusing” in the bankruptcy case, appeals, and 

instant case. (See ECF NO. 286, Page 4). Plaintiff has challenged nearly every docket entry by 

filing unfounded, offensive, vexatious, and inappropriate pleadings. Therefore, this Complaint 

should be dismissed with prejudice against Chapter 13 Trustee et al, specifically for Plaintiff’s 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

C. Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice against Chapter 13 Trustee 

et al as barred by operation of absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 9 of 14
10

The Supreme Court has stated: “Few doctrines were more solidly established at common 

law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial 

jurisdiction...” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967). “[J]udges have long enjoyed a 

comparatively sweeping form of immunity.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). “This 

absolute immunity insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or irregular action, even when 

it is alleged that such action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 

940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).

“Nonjudicial officials are encompassed by a judge's absolute immunity when their official 

duties have an integral relationship with the judicial process.” Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 

(11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir.1980)). 

A court-appointed receiver receives “judicial immunity for acts within the scope of [his] 

authority.” Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 955 (11th Cir. 2021); quoting Prop. Mgmt. & 

Investments, Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 602 (11th Cir. 1985). That immunity applies even if his 

acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of the appointing court's jurisdiction and it extends to 

his counsel as well. See Id.; (citing Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)). 

“Quasi-judicial immunity can extend to law clerks, military and naval officers, prosecutors, 

administrative law judges, agency officials, jurors, mediators, advocates, and witnesses.” In re 

Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Sept. 6, 2002). A bankruptcy trustee 

receives derived judicial immunity because he performs an “integral part of the judicial process”

Bennett v. Williams, 892 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir.1989). Bankruptcy trustees are afforded 

complete immunity when acting pursuant to court order. See In re Solar Fin. Servs., 255 B.R. 801, 

805 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2000). “The principle announced by these authorities leaves no doubt that a 

trustee may only be held personally liable for acts personally committed outside the scope of 

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 10 of 14
11

judicial immunity.” In re Clearwater Bay Marine Serv., Inc., 236 B.R. 285, 287–88 (Bankr. M.D. 

Fla. 1999).

In the instant case, Chapter 13 Trustee et al is unequivocally entitled to absolute and quasijudicial immunity from all of Plaintiff’s incoherent allegations. In furtherance of the bankruptcy 

trustee's official duties, Chapter 13 Trustee et al performed only those acts required by court order 

and pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1302. Chapter 13 Trustee et al took no other actions outside the scope 

of her authority. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint against Chapter 13 Trustee et al should be 

dismissed with prejudice.

D. The Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, specifically as to Chapter 13 

Trustee et al.

Separate and apart from Plaintiff’s unintelligible causes of action against all defendants, 

the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice, specifically as to Chapter 13 Trustee et al. The 

Barton doctrine applies to Chapter 13 Trustee et al regardless of whether the trustee is being 

personally sued, her staff is being personally sued, or anyone or anything having any relation to 

the trustee is being sued. To allow suit against any parties associated with any trustee would have 

a chilling effect upon a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to administer any case and thus potentially

undermine Congress’ intent, negatively impacting upon Chapter 13. 

Additionally, the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice against Chapter 13 Trustee 

et al for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). As argued above, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s Complaint and Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to state a clear and cognizable claim upon 

which relief can be granted against Chapter 13 Trustee et al. 

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 11 of 14
12

Just as bankruptcy trustees are afforded absolute and quasi-judicial immunities when 

performing their duties in accordance with court orders and under the scope of their authority, 

Chapter 13 Trustee et al must be afforded the same immunity.

III.CONCLUSION

Chapter 13 Trustee et al respectfully requests this Honorable Court dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint with prejudice as argued above. If this Court is not inclined to dismiss the entire 

Complaint with prejudice, Chapter 13 Trustee et al respectfully requests the Complaint against 

them be specifically dismissed with prejudice as to The Chapter 13 Trustee, Robin R. Weiner, 

Robin R. Weiner, individually, Robin R. Weiner P.A., its President Robin R. Weiner, its staff 

attorney Joanna P. Tempone, Paul S. Visnovske, Matthew Girardi and Does 1-3 inclusive, in their 

individual and official capacity for the reasons stated above.

WHEREFORE, Chapter 13 Trustee, Robin R. Weiner, Robin R. Weiner, individually, 

Robin R. Weiner P.A., its President Robin R. Weiner, its staff attorney Joanna P. Tempone, Paul 

S. Visnovske, Matthew Girardi and Does 1-3 inclusive, in their individual and official capacity,

respectfully request this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and the Barton doctrine, Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and 

under the doctrines of absolute and quasi-judicial immunity. Additionally, Chapter 13 Trustee, 

Robin R. Weiner, Robin R. Weiner, individually, Robin R. Weiner P.A., its President Robin R. 

Weiner, its staff attorney Joanna P. Tempone, Paul S. Visnovske, Matthew Girardi and Does 1-3 

inclusive, in their individual and official capacity, specifically request the Court dismiss them with 

prejudice, separate and apart, from the other defendants and for such other and further relief as this 

Court may deem appropriate.

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 12 of 14
13

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robin R. Weiner

Robin R. Weiner, Chapter 13 Trustee

On behalf of Chapter 13 Trustee Et Al. 

P.O. Box 559007

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33351-9007

Phone: (954) 382-2001

robinweiner@ch13weiner.com

-and-

 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Joanna P. Tempone

Joanna P. Tempone, Esq.

On behalf of Chapter 13 Trustee Et Al. 

P.O. Box 559007

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33351-9007

Phone: (954) 382-2001

joanna@ch13weiner.com

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 13 of 14
14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of September, 2022, I electronically filed the 

foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing 

document is being served this day on all counsel of record or pro se parties identified on the 

attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic 

Filing generated by CM/ECF, U.S. mail or e-mail.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robin R. Weiner

Robin R. Weiner, Chapter 13 Trustee

On behalf of Chapter 13 Trustee Et Al. 

P.O. Box 559007

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33351-9007

Phone: (954) 382-2001

robinweiner@ch13weiner.com

-and-

 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Joanna P. Tempone

Joanna P. Tempone, Esq.

On behalf of Chapter 13 Trustee Et Al. 

P.O. Box 559007

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33351-9007

Phone: (954) 382-2001

joanna@ch13weiner.com

SERVICE LIST

Tamiko N. Peele

4001 S.W. Melbourne St.

Port St. Lucie, FL 34953

Case 2:22-cv-14305-AMC Document 21 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2022 Page 14 of 14