UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MATTHEW MARTINEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-2056

(D.C. No. 1:12-CR-01910-WJ-5)

(D. N. Mex.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HARTZ, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

 Matthew Martinez filed a notice of appeal from the revocation of his supervised 

release and the imposition of a six-month prison term followed by three years of 

supervised release. His counsel moved to withdraw and filed a brief based on Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that after a diligent search of the record, he has 

 

*After examining Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not 

binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and 

collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. 

R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

September 29, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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found no issues that could support an appeal. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and finding no meritorious grounds for appeal, we grant 

counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In 2013, Mr. Martinez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled 

substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison 

followed by three years of supervised release. 

 In February 2014, the United States petitioned to revoke Mr. Martinez’s 

supervised release, alleging he had violated three release conditions: failing to (1) notify 

his probation officer ten days before any change in residence or employment; (2) refrain 

from the use and possession of alcohol and other intoxicants; and (3) reside and complete 

a program at an approved residential reentry center. Mr. Martinez admitted to violating 

all three conditions. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him 

to six months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. 

 Mr. Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal. His appointed counsel, who 

represented him in the revocation proceedings, then filed an Anders motion to withdraw. 

The Government notified the court it would not oppose the motion. Mr. Martinez was 

notified of his counsel’s Anders motion, and he has not filed a response. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Under Anders, counsel may “request permission to withdraw where counsel 

conscientiously examines a case and determines that any appeal would be wholly 
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frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Anders, 

386 U.S. at 744). In doing so, “counsel must submit a brief to the client and the appellate 

court indicating any potential appealable issues based on the record.” Id. We must then 

independently examine the record to determine whether the defendant’s claims are 

“wholly frivolous,” and, if so, we may grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss 

the appeal. Id. 

 In his Anders brief, counsel identifies only one conceivable ground for appeal: 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We have stated, however, that “[i]neffective assistance 

of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal.” 

United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Thus, “when 

brought on direct appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are presumptively 

dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.” United States v. Trestyn, 646 F.3d 732, 

741 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). “[E]ven if the record appears to need 

no further development, the claim should still be presented first to the district court . . . .” 

Galloway, 56 F.3d at 1240. After reviewing the record, we see no reason to depart from 

that general rule in this case. 

 As counsel points out in the Anders brief, Mr. Martinez has no basis to challenge 

his revocation because he admitted to violating all three supervised release conditions. 

And although not specifically raised in the Anders brief, Mr. Martinez also cannot 

challenge his sentence’s procedural or substantive reasonableness, as our independent 

review of the record has confirmed and as we address briefly below. 
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 We review a challenge to a revocation sentence for abuse of discretion, reviewing 

the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 

United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court 

must “consider both [U.S.S.G.] Chapter 7’s policy statements as well as a number of the 

factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1188 

(10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).1

 It “is not required to consider individually each 

factor listed in § 3553(a),” id. at 1189 (internal quotations omitted), but the sentencing 

court must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence,” 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). The court must provide enough reasoning “to satisfy the appellate 

court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 

exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 356 (2007). 

 The district court stated its reasons for revoking Mr. Martinez’s supervised release 

and imposing the sentence. After considering the advisory range from Chapter 7’s policy 

statements and the § 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a sentence within the 

recommended range of 5 to 11 months. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. The record provides no 

basis to conclude the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. 

 1

 The Chapter 7 policy statements address violations of supervised release and 

include recommended advisory sentencing ranges. See generally U.S.S.G. Ch. 7. The 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors include, in part, the nature of the offense, the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence to provide adequate 

deterrence and protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
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 We therefore find nothing in the record that would provide a nonfrivolous ground 

for Mr. Martinez to appeal. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss Mr. Martinez’s appeal. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge