NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CRIS J. MARKEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-17157

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00027-LDGGWF

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Lloyd D. George, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 18, 2017**

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. 

Cris J. Markey appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing 

his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of foreclosure 

proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo 

the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 26 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 13-17157 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Markey’s wrongful foreclosure and 

other state law claims because Markey failed to allege facts sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief. See id. at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally 

construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief). Markey’s contentions that Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) may not serve as beneficiary of a deed of 

trust, or that its involvement undermines the validity of his loan or deed of trust,

are foreclosed by Nevada law. See Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 

259-260 (Nev. 2012) (holding that MERS is capable of being a valid beneficiary of 

a deed of trust). We reject as without merit Markey’s contentions that the 

securitization of his loan was fraudulent, unjustly enriched defendants, or 

otherwise affected the validity of his loan. To the extent that Markey challenges 

the validity of any assignment of his loan into a securitized trust, he lacks standing 

to raise such a challenge. See Wood v. Germann, 331 P.3d 859, 861 (Nev. 2014).

The district court properly dismissed Markey’s Truth in Lending Act 

(“TILA”), Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and Home 

Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) claims because these claims 
 3 13-17157 

were barred by the statute of limitations and Markey failed to demonstrate that 

equitable tolling applied. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year 

statute of limitations for violations of RESPA); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635(f), 1640(e) 

(TILA actions for rescission must be brought within three years of consummation 

of the loan; an action for damages under TILA and HOEPA must be brought 

within one year of the alleged violation). 

The district court did not err in ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss prior 

to the completion of discovery. See Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 

F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The purpose of [Rule] 12(b)(6) is to enable 

defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting 

themselves to discovery.”). 

AFFIRMED.