NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

RICHARD CLAXTON, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA BOARD OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0196

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2017-013458

The Honorable Hugh E. Hegyi, Judge (Retired)

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Richard William Claxton, Phoenix

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Kelly Gillilan-Gibson

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

FILED 2-7-2019
CLAXTON v. ABOEC

Decision of the Court

2

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Richard Claxton appeals the superior court’s order declining 

jurisdiction over his complaint challenging the revocation of his parole. For 

the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The Arizona Board of Executive Clemency (the “Board”)

released Claxton on parole in 2014. Three years later, Claxton became 

involved in a custody dispute between his girlfriend, Laura Cavness, and 

her daughter, Caitlin Cavness, concerning Laura’s son. As a result, Caitlin 

and her husband, Carl Engstrand1, obtained an injunction prohibiting 

Claxton from contacting them or Laura’s son. Claxton violated the 

injunction by calling the son.

¶3 Caitlin and Engstrand notified Claxton’s parole officer that he

had violated the injunction. The officer instructed Claxton not to have any 

contact with Caitlin, Engstrand, or Laura’s son—including through a third 

party—and modified Claxton’s conditions of parole to include that 

restriction. Claxton signed a written acknowledgement of the new 

condition.

¶4 Claxton then allegedly contacted Engstrand through a third 

party. Engstrand notified Claxton’s parole officer about the contact, and 

the Department of Corrections (“Department”) arrested Claxton and 

returned him to custody. Claxton requested a revocation hearing, after 

which the Board determined he had violated the terms and conditions of 

his supervision and revoked his parole.

¶5 Claxton filed a complaint in the superior court seeking special 

action relief directing the Board to schedule a new hearing at which he 

could call and cross-examine witnesses and present additional evidence. 

He asserted that the Board denied him due process of law because it did 

not allow him to cross-examine his parole officer or Engstrand, did not 

allow his witness to finish her testimony, and did not allow him to take a

polygraph test.

¶6 He also asked the court to declare, under Arizona’s 

Declaratory Judgments Act, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections

 

1 The record and appellate briefs contain conflicting spellings of Mr. 

Engstrand’s name. We adopt this spelling based on our review of the 

record and the related custody case.
CLAXTON v. ABOEC

Decision of the Court

3

12-1831 to -1846, that the Board’s revocation hearing violated his right to 

call and cross-examine witnesses, denied him evidence he needed to prove 

his defense, and did not comply with Department policies. He asked the 

superior court to declare that there was no evidence to support the Board’s

determination that Claxton had violated the terms and conditions of his 

parole.

¶7 The Board urged the superior court to decline jurisdiction of 

Claxton’s complaint and dismiss the action, arguing he had waived his 

right to present and cross-examine witnesses at the revocation hearing and 

had not demonstrated he suffered any prejudice. The court declined 

jurisdiction of the complaint “without prejudice to [Claxton] bringing his 

claims as an appeal from a lower court order, rather than as a special 

action.”2

¶8 Claxton timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). See State v. Chopra, 241 Ariz. 353, 355, ¶ 8 (App. 2016)

(concluding § 12-2101(A)(1) confers appellate jurisdiction over the superior 

court’s final judgment declining to accept jurisdiction over a special action).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Claxton argues the superior court abused its discretion by 

declining special action jurisdiction of his complaint.

¶10 The superior court has discretion to accept or decline 

jurisdiction over a special action, Stapert v. Ariz. Bd. of Psychologist Exam’rs, 

210 Ariz. 177, 182, ¶ 21 (App. 2005), and we conduct a bifurcated review of 

the court’s ruling. Chopra, 241 Ariz. at 355, ¶ 9. If the court accepted 

jurisdiction, we review the decision on the merits. Id. If it declined 

jurisdiction, “we determine only whether it abused its discretion by doing 

so.” Id. Although the decision to accept jurisdiction is highly discretionary, 

Carrington v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 199 Ariz. 303, 305, ¶ 6 (App. 2000); Ariz. 

R.P. Spec. Act. 3, State Bar Committee Note, the court abuses its discretion 

if it commits an error of law in reaching its decision. Files v. Bernal, 200 Ariz. 

64, 65, ¶ 2 (App. 2001); Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 455-56 

 

2 The superior court declined jurisdiction of the complaint and 

certified under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) that no further 

matters remained pending. We presume, therefore, that it also intended to, 

and did, dismiss Claxton’s declaratory judgment claim.
CLAXTON v. ABOEC

Decision of the Court

4

(1982) (noting the superior court may abuse its discretion by committing an 

error of law in the process of reaching a discretionary decision).

¶11 Special action jurisdiction “is appropriate when no equally 

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal exists.” State ex rel. Romley 

v. Fields, 201 Ariz. 321, 323, ¶ 4 (App. 2001) (citations omitted); Ariz. R.P. 

Spec. Act. 1(a). The superior court declined jurisdiction of Claxton’s 

complaint, “without prejudice to [him] bringing his claims as an appeal 

from a lower court order, rather than as a special action.” The court’s 

decision to decline jurisdiction, therefore, appears to have been based upon 

its belief that Claxton had an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy 

by appeal. However, Claxton had no right to appeal the Board’s decision. 

See Sheppard v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 111 Ariz. 587 (1975) (noting that 

the Administrative Review Act [now the Judicial Review of Administrative 

Decisions Act] does not apply to the Board of Pardons and Paroles [now the 

Board of Executive Clemency]); cf. Rose v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 167 Ariz. 116, 

120-21 (App. 1991) (holding the [Judicial Review of Administrative 

Decisions Act] does not provide judicial review of Arizona Department of 

Corrections inmate disciplinary hearings and decisions).

¶12 Because the superior court based its decision to decline 

special action jurisdiction on an error of law, it abused its discretion. Files, 

200 Ariz. at 65, ¶ 2; Grant, 133 Ariz. at 455-56. Accordingly, we reverse the 

court’s order declining jurisdiction and remand for the superior court to 

reconsider Claxton’s complaint.

CONCLUSION

¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision.