NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 210303-U 

Order filed February 2, 2023

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2023 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

) Kankakee County, Illinois. 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) Appeal No. 3-21-0303 

v. ) Circuit No. 18-CF-623 

) 

JESUS GARCIA, ) Honorable 

) Thomas W. Cunnington, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE BRENNAN∗ delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices McDade and Peterson concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for reckless homicide is reversed for insufficiency of the 

evidence. 

∗

Justice Brennan was substituted for Justice Hauptman after oral argument upon his 

election to the Third District Appellate Court, effective December 5, 2022. He has read the briefs 

and listened to the recording of the oral argument.
- 2 - 

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Jesus Garcia, was convicted of three counts of reckless 

homicide and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that the State 

failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive.

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse defendant’s conviction and thus vacate his sentence.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 This case arises out of a 2017 vehicle collision on Interstate-57 near Kankakee involving 

two semi-tractor trailers and a sedan. Defendant was driving one of the trucks. Two individuals in 

the sedan died as a result of the collision. Defendant was initially charged with seven counts of 

reckless homicide, but four of the counts were nol-prossed prior to trial. 

¶ 5 Regarding the remaining three counts, count I alleged that, on September 20, 2017, 

defendant committed the offense of reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(e-8) (West 2016)) in that 

defendant “unintentionally, without lawful justification, while driving a motor vehicle, to wit: a 

commercial motor vehicle, in a construction zone as defined in Section 11-605.1 of the Illinois 

Vehicle Code, recklessly performed acts in such a manner as were likely to cause death or great 

bodily harm to some individual and such acts caused the deaths of 2 persons, Jake H. Hemrick and 

Michelle M. Crowe, as part of a single course of conduct.” Counts II and III separately detailed 

the same conduct and alleged that defendant caused the individual deaths of Hemrick and Crowe. 

Id. § 9-3(e-7). 

¶ 6 A. Trial

¶ 7 At defendant’s jury trial, the testimony established that the collision occurred shortly after 

1 p.m. on September 20, 2017, near milepost 321 on southbound I-57. The weather was clear and 

sunny. Defendant held a commercial driver’s license and had been a truck driver since 2004. At 

the time of the collision, he was driving a semi-tractor trailer with an open, empty trailer bed (the 
- 3 - 

International) south on I-57 from Lemont to Kankakee. The International weighed approximately 

32,000 to 33,000 pounds.

¶ 8 Dawn Dumas was driving her SUV behind the International when the collision occurred. 

She testified that, shortly before the collision, she drove southbound onto I-57 from the ramp at 

milepost 321 and “slid in” to the right lane behind defendant’s International. Dumas approximated 

that she was traveling 30 to 35 miles per hour (mph) at the time. According to Dumas, the speed 

limit on I-57 was 65 mph, but the left lane was closing, and cars were merging into the right lane, 

due to a construction zone in the area. The construction zone had a speed limit of 55 mph. 

¶ 9 Although she did not know the speed at which the International was traveling, Dumas 

testified that it was traveling faster than she was and that she “backed off” and fell in behind it as 

the International pulled away from her. Dumas could not see anything in front of the International. 

As she was “getting up to speed”—about 3/4 of a mile after she drove onto I-57—the International 

locked up its brakes, causing its empty trailer to bounce. Dumas did not recall seeing brake lights 

on the International. Dumas applied her brakes and drove onto the right shoulder of I-57. She never 

made it “up to speed.”

¶ 10 Dumas exited her car, and as she approached the front of the International, she realized a 

collision had occurred. Dumas observed a blue Toyota crushed in between the International and 

another semi-tractor trailer with an enclosed trailer (the Freightliner). There were three individuals 

inside the Toyota. The driver and back-seat passenger were alert but trapped inside the car; the 

front-seat passenger was unconscious. Dumas called 911.

¶ 11 The driver of the Freightliner was Joda Duncan, Jr. He too held a commercial driver’s 

license and had been a truck driver for 18 years. Duncan was hauling shredded paper in the 

Freightliner’s 53-foot, enclosed trailer at the time of the collision and estimated that the truck and 
- 4 - 

full trailer weighed 70,000 pounds at the time. Duncan testified that, as he traveled south on I-57 

in the right lane near milepost 321, he saw road construction, cones pushing traffic into the right 

lane, and signs indicating that the left lane was closing. 

¶ 12 Duncan was familiar with I-57 and believed the speed limit was 55 mph through the 

construction zone. Duncan was traveling approximately 50 to 55 mph but slowed his speed because 

traffic was virtually stopped, and “everybody from the left lane was trying to get into the right 

lane.” Duncan then came to a complete stop, without locking his brakes, for approximately 30 

seconds to 1 minute, when he suddenly felt a “tremendous jolt.” Duncan exited his truck, heard 

screaming, and walked around to the back of his trailer. Duncan observed part of the Toyota 

underneath his trailer and defendant’s International pushed against the back of the Toyota. Duncan 

did not notice either the Toyota or the International prior to the collision. 

¶ 13 Duncan testified that defendant exited his truck when the fire department arrived. Duncan 

recounted their ensuing conversation. Defendant asked Duncan why he had stopped. Duncan 

responded that he did not have a choice because the vehicles in front of him stopped. Defendant 

replied, “No. No. *** You go, *** and the car come in behind you, and I couldn’t stop.” At this 

point, Duncan stated, “That’s not how it happened.” Duncan and defendant argued, at which point 

Duncan walked away and informed a police officer that defendant was the driver of the truck that 

hit the Toyota.

¶ 14 Illinois State Troopers Justin Kokos and David Verkler responded to the scene of the 

collision. Their testimony established that, at the scene and later that day, defendant told the police 

that the Toyota swerved in front of his International and cut him off and that the driver of the 

Toyota slammed on the brakes when the driver of the Freightliner slammed on the brakes. 

Defendant further informed the police that he was traveling at 60 mph at the time of the collision, 
- 5 - 

that Duncan’s Freightliner was traveling at approximately the same speed, and that his truck hit 

the Toyota after the Toyota hit the Freightliner. Defendant submitted blood and urine samples on 

the day of the collision; no drugs or alcohol were detected in defendant’s system.

¶ 15 Trooper Kokos identified State’s exhibits Nos. 3 to 8, which depicted advance warning 

signs to drivers on both sides of the southbound lanes on I-57, near milepost 321, on the date of 

the collision. He testified that the signs cautioned that construction and work zones were 

approaching, the speed limit was decreasing to 55 mph, and traffic was merging into the right lane 

due to the left-lane closure. The exhibits were admitted into evidence.

¶ 16 Trooper Verkler testified that he was at a gas station when he overheard a police radio 

dispatch alerting units to a crash on southbound I-57 near milepost 321. About 15 to 20 minutes 

prior to that time, Verkler had driven south on I-57 through the same area where the collision 

occurred and described the traffic as stop-and-go through the construction zone. Verkler further 

testified that the speed limit on I-57 was normally 70 mph, but the “work zone” speed limit was 

55 mph.

¶ 17 Verkler identified State’s exhibits Nos. 3 to 8 as the advance warning signs to southbound 

drivers of the approaching construction and work zones, reduced speed limit, and left-lane closure. 

In addition, Verkler testified that the first sign he saw was a digital sign located just north of 

milepost 322. Verkler described the sign as a flatbed truck located on the right-hand shoulder “with 

an attenuator type apparatus to the rear of it, and on that was a digital sign that alerted to caution 

of traffic; traffic stopped ahead.” Verkler testified that the sign was apparently no longer there 

several hours later when the scene was photographed.

¶ 18 Verkler also testified as an expert in accident reconstruction. He photographed the scene

and described the damage to the Toyota as a “vehicle crush.” Verkler observed deflation marks,
- 6 - 

gouge marks, and skid marks caused by the collision, including 50-foot-long skid marks made by 

defendant’s International. Verkler explained that, in crashes involving commercial motor vehicles, 

the larger vehicle will “override the car and force the car to go down,” causing marks in the road.

¶ 19 The International’s event data recorder was destroyed in the collision, but the Toyota’s 

event data recorder was intact. The length of time that the Toyota’s recorder retained data was 4.95 

seconds prior to deployment of the airbags upon impact (with new data recording every half 

second).

¶ 20 Verkler testified regarding the Toyota’s recorded data. The Toyota’s steering wheel was 

pointed straight ahead, meaning that the Toyota did not make any lane changes during the recorded

time. The first impact that the Toyota experienced was a rear impact. At 4.95 seconds before 

impact, the Toyota was traveling .6 mph. At 4.45 seconds before impact, the Toyota was 

completely stopped. However, the Toyota’s brake was applied throughout the recorded 4.95 

seconds. Verkler opined that, based upon the lack of variation in the longitude and acceleration 

rate, the Toyota made a “normal stop,” as opposed to a sudden stop.

¶ 21 Verkler further testified that defendant’s statement that he was traveling at approximately 

60 mph was consisted with the reconstruction of the collision. At 60 mph, defendant would have 

covered approximately 88 feet per second. At 4.95 seconds from impact, defendant’s International 

would have been 436.28 feet behind the Toyota. Had defendant begun braking when the Toyota 

stopped, the International would have come to a stop within 214.3 to 342.9 feet. In other words, 

the International would not have hit the Toyota, having stopped at least 93.38 feet behind it (436.28 

feet minus 342.9 feet).

¶ 22 Verkler concluded that, based upon his reconstruction and rendition of the collision, 

Duncan’s Freightliner was stationary in the right lane, with the Toyota 33 feet (or 2 car lengths) 
- 7 - 

directly behind it. The Toyota was completely stopped for approximately 4.5 seconds prior to 

impact, struck by defendant’s International, forced forward or in a southward direction, and pinned

or shoved underneath the Freightliner.

¶ 23 Following the close of the State’s case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the basis 

that there was no evidence of reckless conduct. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that it 

was a factual issue as to whether, under the circumstances, defendant’s conduct amounted to 

recklessness. Defendant testified on his own behalf. At the time of the collision, he was driving 

the International on I-57 in the right, southbound lane toward Kankakee. Defendant recalled that 

the speed limit on I-57 was 70 mph; he did not see any signs indicating a lower speed limit; and, 

while he could not recall the speed at which he was traveling, he was moving with the speed of 

traffic. According to defendant, “[t]here were hardly any indicators that there was a construction 

site.”

¶ 24 As he was traveling behind the Freightliner, the Toyota “got in between us and reduced [] 

the distance between us.” Defendant explained that he did not immediately brake because the cars 

were traveling at the same speed. He further stated that traffic was not stopped, but he could not 

see in front of the Freightliner because the truck was blocking his vision.

¶ 25 Specifically, defendant testified: 

“I was coming behind this car when—and the car, following behind them, and as 

we were going along, everybody was going along the same speed. And then I see that the 

[Freightliner] stops. The back of the [Freightliner] almost in my face and immediately the 

strike occurred. The hit. The shock.

This happened so quickly, one or two seconds, and then it’s done. I didn’t have an

opportunity or time to do anything. I didn’t have time to brake.” 
- 8 - 

¶ 26 Defendant remained inside his truck after the collision. At that time, he “knew something 

bad had just occurred”; he did not know that fatalities were involved; and he was “very surprised”

and “really afraid.” Defendant testified regarding feeling “very bad” about what happened.

¶ 27 On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he obtained a commercial driver’s 

license and was trained to recognize various road signs (including signs to merge and reduce 

speed), remain attentive to driving conditions, expect stopped traffic, and maintain sufficient space 

between his truck and the vehicle in front of him to effectuate a stop. When questioned as to 

whether he applied his brakes right before the crash, defendant testified that he did not recall and 

that “there wasn’t any need to brake because all of us were going at the same speed.” 

¶ 28 Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts of reckless 

homicide. The trial court entered a conviction on count I only, finding that counts II and II merged 

into count I. 

¶ 29 B. Posttrial Proceedings

¶ 30 Defendant timely filed a motion for a new trial. Following briefing and argument, the trial 

court denied the motion. The case proceeded to a sentencing hearing, after which the trial court 

sentenced defendant to eight years’ imprisonment. Defendant timely moved to reconsider the 

sentence. Following argument, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant timely appealed. 

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his reckless 

homicide conviction and the length of his sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse 

defendant’s conviction and do not address the challenge to his sentence.

¶ 33 The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense. 

People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. A reviewing court faced with a challenge to the sufficiency 
- 9 - 

of the evidence must determine “whether, [after] viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The reviewing court’s role is not to 

retry the defendant. Id. Rather, it is the trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Id. Thus, a 

reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving 

the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Id. A criminal conviction will not be 

reversed unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it leaves 

reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Id.

¶ 34 Here, to sustain the reckless homicide conviction as charged in the indictment, the State 

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant unintentionally, without lawful 

justification, while driving a motor vehicle in a construction zone, recklessly performed acts in 

such a manner as were likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual and such acts 

caused the deaths of two persons as part of a single course of conduct. 720 ILCS 5/9-3(e-8) (West 

2016). The parties do not dispute that defendant drove his truck in a construction zone, struck the

stopped Toyota, and caused the death of two people. The issue was whether his actions were 

reckless.

¶ 35 “A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by 

the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard 

of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2016). An 

act performed recklessly is performed wantonly. Id. “ ‘While an accident may result from 
- 10 - 

negligence, mere negligence is not recklessness.’ ” People v. Shakirov, 2017 IL App (4th) 140578, 

¶ 74 (quoting People v. Cook, 2014 IL App (1st) 113079, ¶ 40)). 

¶ 36 This court has delineated three general categories of reckless driving cases: (1) those 

involving the commission of multiple traffic offenses that collectively demonstrate the driver’s 

willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons and property; (2) cases involving a driver’s 

conscious disregard for the particular surroundings and circumstances that rises to the level of 

willfulness and wantonness; and (3) those cases in which willful and wanton conduct is based

partially upon the driver’s intoxication or impaired state. People v. Paarlberg, 243 Ill. App. 3d 

731, 735-36 (1993). “[C]ases that do not fall into at least one of [these categories] have not 

survived appellate review.” Id. at 736.

¶ 37 The parties center their arguments around the second set of cases, the first and third 

categories being inapplicable. The State did not assert the commission of multiple traffic offenses, 

and testing reflected no drugs or alcohol in defendant’s system. We turn to the second category of 

reckless driving cases. 

¶ 38 As illustrative of this category, the court in Paarlberg cited several cases in which the 

defendant’s excessive speed, combined with other circumstances, amounted to recklessness. Id. at 

735-36 (citing, inter alia, People v. Ziegler, 78 Ill. App. 3d 490, 496 (1979) (excessive speed, 

dangerous lane changes, cutting off other cars, and failing to reduce speed while approaching 

standing vehicle that displayed brake lights and turn signal); People v. Griffith, 56 Ill. App. 3d 747, 

751 (1978) (driving twice the speed limit and losing control of the vehicle despite familiarity with 

speed limit and sharp curve in narrow residential street); People v. Burch, 19 Ill. App. 3d 360, 364

(1974) (speeding, passing three cars at one time while children were on the roadside, and forcing 

an oncoming car to pull off the road); People v. Prendergast, 95 Ill. App. 2d 41, 44 (1968) 
- 11 - 

(speeding 25 to 45 miles over the speed limit at noon in area adjacent to shopping mall where large 

numbers of people and vehicular traffic were to be expected)). 

¶ 39 Subsequent cases have reiterated that “ ‘evidence of excessive speed, by itself, is not 

sufficient to sustain a conviction of reckless homicide.’ ” Shakirov, 2017 IL App (4th) 140578, 

¶ 93 (quoting People v. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1130 (2003)). Instead, in addition to 

evidence of excessive speed, there must be evidence of other circumstances to indicate a conscious 

disregard of a substantial risk likely to cause death or great bodily harm to others such that a 

reasonable person would act differently. Id.

¶ 40 Defendant argues that his speed was not excessive. Rather, it was undisputed that he drove 

only five miles over the speed limit. Moreover, defendant argues that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence of additional circumstances that elevated defendant’s conduct to recklessness. 

The State responds that it established the excessiveness of defendant’s speed under the 

circumstances and presented additional evidence of recklessness. Namely, the State introduced 

evidence regarding the advance warning signs to southbound drivers on I-57 near milepost 321—

signs that cautioned about the merging lanes, approaching construction zone, decreased speed 

limit, and stopped traffic. Witnesses also described the traffic in this area as heavily congested and 

virtually stopped due to the construction zone and left-lane closure. 

¶ 41 Reviewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we nevertheless 

conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that established a gross 

deviation from the standard of care. Initially, the record reflects insufficient evidence that 

defendant’s speed was in fact excessive. It was undisputed that defendant drove five miles over 

the speed limit. As the appellate court in People v. Jakupcak, 275 Ill. App. 3d 830, 838 (1995), 
- 12 - 

stated, “[d]riving five miles over the speed limit, while technically violative of the law, does not 

qualify as driving at an ‘excessive’ speed.” 

¶ 42 Moreover, as defendant points out, the reckless homicide statute itself provides that, in 

cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant unintentionally kills an individual while 

driving in a construction zone when workers are present, the trier of fact may infer that the 

defendant’s actions were performed recklessly when the defendant was also driving “at a speed of 

more than 20 miles per hour in excess of the posted speed limit.” 720 ILCS 5/9-3(e-11) (West 

2016). Defendant was not charged under this subsection and notes the lack of any evidence that 

workers were present in the construction zone. Nonetheless, defendant’s point, which is well taken,

is that the threshold at which recklessness may be inferred, even when workers are present, is four 

times the amount by which he exceeded the speed limit.

¶ 43 In addition to the lack of evidence that defendant’s speed was excessive, the State failed to 

present sufficient evidence of other circumstances indicating defendant’s conscious disregard of a 

substantial risk likely to cause death or great bodily harm to others. There was no evidence that

defendant’s route presented sharp turns to navigate, that he cut off other cars, or that he executed

dangerous lane changes. To the contrary, the testimony established that defendant was driving in

the right lane—the lane into which traffic was merging. 

¶ 44 The State maintains that it was reasonable to infer that defendant saw the advance traffic

warning signs—posted approximately a mile before the crash scene—but simply ignored them.

Given the testimony regarding the stop-and-go nature of the traffic, the State argues that the 

combination of defendant’s speeding with his failure to heed the advance warning signs of road 

conditions amounted to a conscious disregard for his surroundings and circumstances.
- 13 - 

¶ 45 A similar argument was rejected by the appellate court in Shakirov, 2017 IL App (4th) 

140578. There, the defendant was driving his semi-tractor trailer on the icy, snowy interstate late 

at night, collided with emergency vehicles that were responding to an earlier accident, and struck 

and killed an emergency responder. Id. ¶¶ 36-40. In reversing the defendant’s reckless homicide 

conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court initially noted that, “[r]egardless

of the actual speed defendant may have been traveling that night, ‘evidence of excessive speed, by 

itself, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of reckless homicide.’ ” Id. ¶ 93 (quoting Barham, 

337 Ill. App. 3d at 1130).

¶ 46 Moreover, the court rejected the State’s argument that the defendant’s speed, combined 

with the precarious weather conditions and failure to decrease his speed or change lanes, was

reckless. Id. In doing so, the court reasoned:

“The best that can be said of the State’s case is that defendant may have been

inattentive for a few seconds (perhaps adjusting his radio or engaging in some similar

activity) and then failed to realize the left lane was blocked [with the emergency vehicles]

as he unsuccessfully attempted to brake his huge semi at night on an icy highway in

blowing snow. Such brief inattention (if it even occurred) falls far short of the conscious 

disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that establishes a gross deviation from the 

standard of care that the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This evidence

does not come close to meeting that standard.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 94.

¶ 47 Likewise, here, the evidence established that defendant was driving five miles over the 

speed limit and failed to brake in time to avoid the collision. As in Shakirov, any brief inattention 

to the advance warning signs and road conditions did not amount to a conscious disregard of a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk establishing a gross deviation from the standard of care. The State 
- 14 - 

maintains that defendant’s failure to brake sooner cannot be characterized as a momentary 

distraction, given the evidence that traffic was stopped for at least 30 seconds to a minute before 

the collision. However, the expert testimony established that defendant attempted to brake, leaving 

50-foot-long skid marks, and that defendant could have avoided the collision by braking just over 

one second earlier. Under the circumstances, and as set forth supra, we cannot say that the evidence 

in this case met the standard that the State was required to prove to establish defendant’s 

recklessness.

¶ 48 In sum, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the State failed 

to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse his conviction for 

reckless homicide. 

¶ 49 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse defendant’s conviction and vacate his sentence. 

¶ 51 Conviction reversed; sentence vacated.