Filed 5/29/24 Stooksberry v. El Rovia Mobile Home Park CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

FRANKLIN STOOKSBERRY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EL ROVIA MOBILE HOME PARK, 

LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B329202

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21STCV35351)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr. Judge. Reversed. 

FisherBroyles, Pierson Ferdinand and Paul J. Beard II for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County and 

Dehsong Matheu for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

El Rovia Mobile Home Park, LLC (El Rovia) appeals from 

an order denying its request for attorney fees under Civil Code 

section 798.85, a provision of the Mobilehome Residency Law 

(Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.; MRL). El Rovia sought those attorney 

fees after one of its residents, respondent Franklin Stooksberry, 

voluntarily dismissed a complaint alleging, inter alia, El Rovia 

had charged fees for late payment of rent in violation of the MRL. 

The trial court found that Stooksberry’s third cause of action 

implicated Civil Code section 798.85, but denied the attorney fees 

request because, during the pendency of the lawsuit, El Rovia 

refunded Stooksberry’s late fees and rescinded its late fees policy.

On appeal, El Rovia argues it was the prevailing party for 

purposes of attorney fees under Civil Code section 798.85 by 

virtue of the dismissal in its favor, and it is immaterial that it 

had refunded Stooksberry’s money and rescinded the challenged 

late fees policy. El Rovia further argues the trial court erred in 

finding Civil Code section 798.85 applicable to just the third

cause of action.

We agree the trial court erred. We conclude two of 

Stooksberry’s causes of action arose under the MRL, thus 

implicating Civil Code section 798.85—the third, which expressly 

invoked the MRL, and the second, which alleged a violation of the 

Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.; 

UCL) premised in part on the MRL.

We further hold El Rovia is the prevailing party under Civil 

Code section 798.85, which deems a party prevailing “where the 

litigation is dismissed in his or her favor.” In light of this 

language, Stooksberry’s voluntary dismissal in El Rovia’s favor

renders El Rovia the prevailing party, without regard for whether 
3

Stooksberry dismissed the suit after achieving his litigation 

objectives.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to 

determine the amount of attorney fees to award.

BACKGROUND

1. Complaint

On September 24, 2021, Stooksberry filed a complaint 

against El Rovia. In the general allegations preceding the causes 

of action, the complaint alleged El Rovia had violated Penal Code 

section 396, subdivision (e) by raising Stooksberry’s rent by more 

than 10 percent during a state of emergency declared by the 

Governor. The complaint further alleged El Rovia had imposed 

fees for late payment of rent in violation of Civil Code 

section 798.31, a provision of the MRL. 

The first cause of action asserted claims under Penal Code 

section 396, subdivision (e) and the UCL for the allegedly 

unlawful rent increases.

The second cause of action also asserted violations of the 

UCL, reiterating the allegedly illegal rent increase under the first 

cause of action and adding the allegedly illegal imposition of late 

fees. Stooksberry did not reference Civil Code section 798.31 

under this particular cause of action. Stooksberry alleged 

entitlement to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1021.5 and Civil Code section 798.85. 

The third cause of action alleged violation of the MRL, and 

specifically section 798.31, again based on the allegedly illegal 

imposition of late fees.

The fourth cause of action alleged the imposition of late 

fees was void under Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (d), 
4

which concerns the validity of liquidated damages provisions in 

contracts for, inter alia, rental of real property.

The complaint prayed for an injunction against the rent 

increases and imposition of late fees, return of overpaid rent, 

general and specific damages, punitive damages, statutory 

damages under Civil Code section 798.86, attorney fees “as 

allowed by law,” and costs. 

2. Demurrer

On February 28, 2022, El Rovia demurred to the complaint. 

El Rovia contended the causes of action concerning late fees were 

moot because El Rovia had rescinded its late fees policy in 

November 2021 and refunded the late fees Stooksberry had paid. 

To the extent the issue was not moot, El Rovia further contended

Civil Code section 798.31 did not govern late payment charges at 

mobilehome parks. As for the rent increases, El Rovia argued El 

Monte’s rent control law superseded Penal Code section 396, and 

Stooksberry had not exhausted his administrative remedies or 

joined El Monte as an indispensable party. El Rovia also moved 

to strike the prayer for punitive damages. 

In support of its demurrer, El Rovia requested judicial 

notice of, inter alia, a November 4, 2021 letter from “Harmony 

Communities”1 to Stooksberry’s counsel stating, “Management 

has decided to permanently modify its late-fee policy from a 

percentage fee to a flat fee. Accordingly, we are enclosing a 

refund of your client’s late fees . . . in the amount of $229.59. 

Those late fees are hereby cancelled. Further, while 

management works to develop its new policy, no late fees will be 

1 The record does not indicate what relationship Harmony 

Communities has with El Rovia.
5

applied to tenants, including your client, for November and 

December. Once finalized, the new late-fee policy will be properly 

noticed as required by law.” The letter expressly disclaimed any 

admission or concession that the rescinded late fee policy was 

illegal or improper. 

Stooksberry opposed the demurrer, motion to strike, and 

request for judicial notice. He argued, inter alia, the request for 

judicial notice of the letter purportedly rescinding the late fees 

policy did not comply with the Evidence Code and was an 

improper attempt to introduce facts at the demurrer stage. He 

contended he had adequately stated a claim under Penal Code 

section 396, and, because he had not alleged a violation of El 

Monte’s rent control law or challenged any decisions by El Monte, 

the city was not an indispensable party. He claimed to have 

adequately pleaded entitlement to punitive damages.

The trial court overruled the demurrer on March 24, 2022. 

It rejected the mootness challenge to the late fees claims, ruling it 

could not take judicial notice of the purported communication 

from El Rovia rescinding the late fees policy. It also rejected 

El Rovia’s argument that Civil Code section 798.31 does not 

prohibit late fees. The court further found the arguments 

concerning the interrelation of El Monte’s rent control law and 

Penal Code section 398 “goes beyond matters pleaded and 

judicially noticeable.” The court, however, granted the motion to 

strike the prayer for punitive damages. 

3. First amended complaint, dismissal, and motion for 

attorney fees

On April 7, 2022, Stooksberry filed a first amended 

complaint. Although the complaint added allegations regarding 

the state of emergency and Stooksberry’s payment of rent, and 
6

omitted the prayer for punitive damages, it otherwise was largely 

identical to the original complaint. Stooksberry continued to 

allege illegal rent increases and imposition of late fees, and 

asserted the same four causes of action as the original complaint, 

virtually unchanged.

El Rovia answered the first amended complaint on May 12, 

2022. On August 4, 2022, the parties filed a stipulation to 

continue trial in which they informed the trial court they 

intended to file cross-motions for summary judgment. On 

November 1, 2022, the parties filed another stipulation to 

continue trial, this time stating the parties “may[ ]be filing 

motions for summary adjudication or summary judgment.” 

On December 9, 2022, Stooksberry filed a request for 

dismissal without prejudice, and the clerk dismissed the case. 

The record does not reveal why Stooksberry requested dismissal.

El Rovia then filed a motion for attorney fees under Civil 

Code section 798.85. El Rovia argued Stooksberry’s lawsuit 

“arises predominantly out of the provisions of the MRL,” 

referencing in particular the second and third causes of action 

and the prayer for statutory damages under Civil Code 

section 798.86. El Rovia contended it was the prevailing party

under Civil Code section 798.85 because the complaint had been 

dismissed in its favor prior to trial.

El Rovia’s counsel submitted a supporting declaration 

indicating $20,678.40 in attorney fees. 

Stooksberry opposed the motion, arguing the first and 

second causes of action alleged price gouging in violation of the 

Penal Code, and did not arise from the MRL. He contended the 

same was true for the third and fourth causes of action—the 

fourth cause of action was based on a statutory bar to liquidated 
7

damages unrelated to the MRL, and because of that bar, the trial 

court never would have had to reach the MRL issue in the third 

cause of action. Stooksberry further argued El Rovia was not the 

prevailing party in any event, because Stooksberry “achieved 

[his] full legal objective” as to the MRL claim because El Rovia 

rescinded its late fees policy and refunded his money. Finally, 

Stooksberry contended El Rovia’s attorney fees were 

unreasonable.

The trial court denied the request for attorney fees. The 

court found fees recoverable only as to the third cause of action 

for violation of the MRL. “However, [El Rovia] after the suit was 

filed refunded to [Stooksberry] the unauthorized fees, so the third 

cause of action was filed based on [El Rovia’s] statutory violation. 

[Stooksberry’s] other causes of action do not support a claim for 

attorneys’ fees.” 

El Rovia timely appealed from the denial of its fees request. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ ‘An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is 

generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of 

review; however, the “determination of whether the criteria for 

an award of attorney fees and costs have been met is a question 

of law” ’ ” “subject to de novo review.” (MHC Financing Limited 

Partnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, 

1397.) 
8

DISCUSSION

On appeal, El Rovia argues the trial court erred in two 

ways: first, by limiting application of Civil Code2 section 798.85

to the third cause of action, and second, by ruling El Rovia 

was not entitled to fees under that provision. We conclude 

section 798.85 applies to the second and third causes of action, 

and El Rovia is entitled to attorney fees on both.

A. The Second and Third Causes of Action Arise Under 

the MRL

Section 798.85 provides, “In any action arising out of the 

provisions of this chapter [i.e., the MRL] the prevailing party 

shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. A party 

shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section 

if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or where the 

litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the 

trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or 

compromise.”

For purposes of section 798.85, “an action arises out of the 

MRL when the ‘foundation of the case [is] grounded in [any 

portion of] the MRL.’ [Citation.] This is the case where the 

claims or defenses in the action ‘directly involv[e] the application 

of MRL provisions in specific factual contexts addressed by the 

MRL.’ [Citations.] Put differently, an action arising out of the 

MRL ‘includes all proceedings, at least to the time of judgment, 

which are required to perfect the rights [created by the 

MRL].’ [Citation.]” (Canyon View Ltd. v. Lakeview Loan 

2 Further undesignated statutory citations are to the Civil 

Code.
9

Servicing, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1113–1114 (Canyon 

View).)

The parties debate in their briefing whether the 

“ ‘foundation’ ” of this case is “ ‘grounded’ ” in the MRL. (Canyon 

View, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113.) To the extent these 

arguments suggest that entitlement to fees under section 798.85 

depends on a determination that an entire complaint is or is not 

grounded in the MRL, we disagree. Rather, the correct approach 

is to determine whether a particular cause of action arises from 

the MRL so as to implicate section 798.85. (See Akins v. 

Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 

[“When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by 

statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney 

fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on 

the statutory cause of action.”].) To the extent claims subject to 

section 798.85 are “separate and distinct” from claims that are 

not, the trial court must “attempt to apportion fees and costs 

consistent with the statutory mandate.” (See Bell v. Vista 

Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 688 (Bell).) 

In this case, the third cause of action arises from the MRL 

because it alleges El Rovia’s imposition of late fees violated

section 798.31, a provision of the MRL. Stooksberry does not 

dispute this on appeal. 

The second cause of action arises from the MRL in part. 

The second cause of action alleges a violation of the UCL

premised on the rent increases and late fees. The UCL 

“ ‘ “ ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful 

practices” that the [UCL] makes independently actionable.

[Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. 

Canyon View Estates, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 663, 672, fn. 8
10

(SC Manufactured Homes).) When the borrowed violation

supporting a UCL cause of action is a violation of the MRL, the 

cause of action “necessarily” involves “ ‘a specific factual situation 

addressed by the MRL’ ” (Canyon View, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1117, fn. 16), thus implicating the right to attorney fees under 

section 798.85.

Stooksberry’s second cause of action alleges an unlawful 

business practice under the UCL by borrowing the purported 

prohibition on late fees under section 798.31. Although the 

second cause of action does not expressly refer to section 798.31, 

it expressly incorporates all previous paragraphs of the 

complaint, which include the general allegation that the late fees 

violated section 798.31. Also, Stooksberry asserts under the 

second cause of action an entitlement to attorney fees under 

section 798.85, reinforcing our conclusion that the cause of action 

is premised on a violation of section 798.31, without which he 

could not seek fees under section 798.85.

Stooksberry argues the second cause of action does not 

allege a violation of the MRL, but rather is “based in violation of 

contract law.” We presume Stooksberry is referring to the 

contract claim raised in the fourth cause of action, which alleges 

the late fee provision is void under section 1671—the complaint 

otherwise asserts no contractual basis to challenge the late fees. 

Section 1671 prohibits liquidated damages provisions in real 

estate rental contracts absent certain circumstances. (§ 1671, 

subds. (c)(2), (d).) Although within the Civil Code, it is not part of 

the MRL. 

Stooksberry’s argument ignores the fact that the second 

cause of action 1) expressly incorporates all prior allegations, 

including the allegation the late fees violate the MRL, and 
11

2) invokes the MRL’s attorney fee statute. The first time the 

original or first amended complaints mention section 1671 is in 

the fourth cause of action, after the allegations pertaining to the 

UCL. The complaint cannot be read to premise the UCL claim on 

section 1671, at least not exclusively. The trial court erred in 

ruling the second cause of action does not implicate 

section 798.85.

The first and fourth causes of action, however, do not arise 

from the MRL. The first cause of action is premised on alleged 

excessive rent increases in violation of Penal Code section 396

during a state of emergency. The fourth cause of action, again, is 

based on section 1671. Neither cause of action requires 

application of the MRL to resolve.

El Rovia appears to argue that the first and fourth causes 

of action arise from the MRL because the complaint’s prayer 

seeks statutory damages under section 798.86. That section 

allows a homeowner who prevails in an action to enforce rights 

under the MRL to recover statutory damages of up to $2,000 “for 

each willful violation of [the MRL] by the management.” 

(§ 798.86.) 

We reject this argument. El Rovia cites no authority that a 

prayer for statutory damages implicates all causes of action in a 

complaint, even those for which statutory damages are 

unavailable as a matter of law, or that general invocation of 

section 798.86 converts all causes of action to MRL claims. The 

more reasonable reading of the complaint is that Stooksberry 

seeks statutory damages solely for the alleged MRL violations.

B. El Rovia is the Prevailing Party on the MRL Claims

To recap, section 798.85 grants attorney fees to a 

“prevailing party” in an MRL action. A party is deemed 
12

prevailing “if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or . . . 

the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during 

the trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or 

compromise.” (§ 798.85.) 

A defendant is entitled to attorney fees under 

section 798.85 even if the plaintiff dismisses the complaint 

voluntarily. (See Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer (2001) 

87 Cal.App.4th 943, 948–949 (Del Cerro); SC Manufactured 

Homes, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 671, 675.) In Del Cerro, a 

mobilehome park sued a tenant for, inter alia, public nuisance 

under the MRL. (Id. at p. 946.) The park later dismissed the suit 

without prejudice, and the trial court awarded the tenant 

$8,153.65 in attorney fees. (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal held the trial court did not err in 

awarding attorney fees under section 798.85 on the nuisance 

claim. (Del Cerro, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 949.) The court 

noted that the “express language” of section 798.85 allows for 

attorney fees in the event of a dismissal in a defendant’s favor, 

and there was no “showing that the parties agreed otherwise.” 

(Id. at pp. 948–949.) The court rejected the argument that the 

trial court should have “use[d] ‘a pragmatic approach’ ” to 

determine who was the prevailing party, noting that cases 

advocating such an approach addressed statutory attorney fee 

provisions that, unlike section 798.85, do not define “prevailing 

party” or “the effect of a pretrial dismissal.” (Id. at p. 949; see 

Coltrain v. Shewalter (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 101–102 

[although “[t]he vast majority of attorney’s fee statutes do not 

explicitly provide for the event of a voluntary dismissal,” “the 

Legislature has headed the issue off at the pass by specifying in 
13

the applicable statute whether a voluntary dismissal makes the 

defendant the prevailing party,” including in § 798.85].)

SC Manufactured Homes cited Del Cerro to conclude that 

defendants dismissed by the plaintiff were prevailing parties 

under section 798.85. (SC Manufactured Homes, supra, 

148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 671, 675.)

Here, as in Del Cerro, Stooksberry voluntarily dismissed 

his MRL claims against El Rovia, and the record does not 

indicate the parties agreed in settlement or compromise to alter 

the “prevailing party” definition under section 798.85. El Rovia 

thus is entitled to attorney fees on the claims arising from the 

MRL.

Stooksberry argues El Rovia cannot be the prevailing party 

because El Rovia revoked its late fees policy and refunded his 

money, leaving him “in a superior position with regard to his 

MRL claim,” a fact not present in El Cerro. Stooksberry quotes 

Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599 (Santisas), in which our 

Supreme Court stated, “[I]t seems inaccurate to characterize the 

defendant as the ‘prevailing party’ if the plaintiff dismissed the 

action only after obtaining, by means of settlement or otherwise, 

all or most of the requested relief, or if the plaintiff dismissed for 

reasons, such as the defendant’s insolvency, that have nothing to 

do with the probability of success on the merits.” (Id. at p. 621.) 

The trial court appears to have agreed with Stooksberry, finding 

El Rovia was not entitled to attorney fees because “after the suit 

was filed” El Rovia “refunded to [Stooksberry] the unauthorized 

fees.” 

Santisas is not instructive, however, because that case

addressed contractual attorney fee provisions under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1717 that neither defined “prevailing party” 
14

nor expressly authorized or barred fees upon dismissal of the 

case. (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 622.) In that 

circumstance, “a court may base its attorney fees decision on a 

pragmatic definition of the extent to which each party has 

realized its litigation objectives, whether by judgment, 

settlement, or otherwise.” (Ibid.) Santisas did not hold that a 

court may engage in this “pragmatic” approach when the relevant 

attorney fee provision defines “prevailing party”—indeed, the 

Supreme Court stated courts must “examin[e] the terms of the 

contract at issue, including any contractual definition of the term 

‘prevailing party’ and any contractual provision governing 

payment of attorney fees in the event of dismissal.” (Ibid.)

Our holding does not conflict with Santisas.

Further supporting our holding is section 798.85’s implicit 

recognition that a dismissal may follow a settlement, a 

circumstance in which a plaintiff may in fact have obtained “most 

of the requested relief.” (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 621.) 

Yet section 798.85 provides that, even when the dismissal results 

from a settlement, the defendant is deemed the prevailing party 

“unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or 

compromise.” Under this language, a plaintiff who dismisses

MRL claims after obtaining a favorable settlement, even one that 

largely achieves his or her litigation goals, nonetheless is not the 

prevailing party absent agreement of the parties. The 

Legislature therefore contemplated the circumstance presented 

here, in which a defendant is the prevailing party by virtue of a 
15

voluntary dismissal irrespective of whether a party achieved its

litigation goals.3

Stooksberry argues awarding El Rovia attorney fees “would 

reward El Rovia for violating the law and then correcting its 

behavior only after [Stooksberry] was forced to sue it for its 

unlawful behavior.” There has been no determination that

El Rovia engaged in unlawful behavior—Stooksberry dismissed 

his claims before the trial court could adjudicate them, and 

El Rovia has never admitted wrongdoing. Thus, assuming 

arguendo El Rovia’s wrongdoing would override its entitlement to 

fees under section 798.85, Stooksberry has failed to prove any 

wrongdoing.

C. The Trial Court May Decide in the First Instance the 

Amount of Attorney Fees To Award

El Rovia contends the amount of attorney fees it requested 

below is reasonable and Stooksberry’s arguments to the contrary

3 In Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia 

Indemnity Ins. Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 340, the Court of 

Appeal interpreted a settlement granting the plaintiffs 

$3 million, including $1.8 million in attorney fees, to establish the 

plaintiffs as prevailing parties for purposes of section 798.85, 

although the settlement did not expressly so state. (Employers 

Mutual Casualty Co., at p. 351.) “To conclude otherwise,” the 

court held, “would be to exalt form over substance.” (Ibid.) We 

have no cause to dispute that a settlement expressly granting 

attorney fees to the plaintiff impliedly waives the defendant’s 

entitlement to fees under section 798.85. Those circumstances 

are not present here, where Stooksberry dismissed his MRL 

claims without settlement, and El Rovia never agreed to pay his 

attorney fees.
16

are unfounded. El Rovia asks that we direct the trial court to 

grant its attorney fees motion with interest. 

We decline to do so. There are questions the trial court has 

yet to address, including the reasonableness of El Rovia’s 

requested fees, and whether and how to apportion them given 

that not all of Stooksberry’s claims arise under the MRL. These 

questions normally are left to the trial court’s discretion, and we 

see no reason to deviate from that approach. (Cortez v. Bootsma

(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 935, 938 [determination of reasonable 

attorney fees “is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

trial court”]; Bell, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 687 [whether and 

how to apportion attorney fees “rests within the sound discretion 

of the trial court”].)

El Rovia further asks we award it attorney fees on appeal. 

Del Cerro held it was proper to award attorney fees on appeal 

under section 798.85: “ ‘ “[I]t is established that fees, if 

recoverable at all—pursuant either to statute or parties’

agreement—are available for services at trial and on appeal.” . . . 

Indeed, appellate courts have consistently permitted a successful 

party to recover attorney fees incurred on appeal when a statute 

expressly permits such an award in the trial court or other lower 

tribunal.’ [Citation.]” (Del Cerro, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 951.) Stooksberry raises no arguments specific to appellate 

attorney fees. We therefore award El Rovia its reasonable 

attorney fees in this appeal “in an amount to be determined by 

the superior court.” (Ibid.; Moore v. Teed (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 

280, 299 [“ ‘Although this court has the power to fix attorney fees 

on appeal, the better practice is to have the trial court determine 

such fees.’ ”].)
17

DISPOSITION

The order denying attorney fees is reversed, and the matter 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

El Rovia Mobile Home Park, LLC is awarded its costs and

attorney fees on appeal in an amount to be determined by the 

trial court.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.