U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–016PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

CONFRONTING THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 8, 2018

Serial No. 115–126

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., chairman emeritus and distinguished fellow, The Stimson Center (former Assistant Secretary for Political 

Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State) ...................................................... 4

The Honorable Stephen Rademaker, senior of counsel, Covington and Burling, 

LLP (former Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Assistant Secretary 

for International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State) . 11

The Honorable Jane Harman, director, president, and chief executive officer, 

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (former Member 

of Congress) .......................................................................................................... 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.: Prepared statement .......................... 7

The Honorable Stephen Rademaker: Prepared statement ................................... 14

The Honorable Jane Harman: Prepared statement .............................................. 27

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 74

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 75

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 77

Written response from the Honorable Jane Harman to question submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Nevada .................................................................................... 79

(1)

CONFRONTING THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE 

TUESDAY, MAY 8, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. All right. We will call this hearing to order. 

Later today, the President will announce whether he intends to 

keep the United States in the Iran nuclear agreement. This is earlier than expected. 

Over the past 6 months, the Trump administration has urged 

France and Germany and Britain to help address the full range of 

threats posed by the Iranian regime. 

U.S. negotiators have rightly pushed for fixes to the deeplyflawed agreement, including stronger inspections, new sanctions on 

Iran’s ballistic missiles program, and a solution to the deal’s sunset 

problem. 

Addressing these serious shortcomings is a must to keep Iran 

from threatening the United States and our allies with a nuclear 

weapon. 

As I’ve said, this agreement’s fundamental flaw is that it trades 

temporary restrictions for permanent sanctions relief. 

Today, this committee will examine the decision before the President. As the members of this committee know, I opposed the nuclear deal and so did a bipartisan majority of the committee. 

And why was this so? Because the Obama administration, in the 

negotiations, ditched its key goals. The deal does not shut off Iran’s 

path to a nuclear weapon. It does not allow inspectors ‘‘anywhere, 

anytime, 24/7 access.’’ It does not stop the regime’s pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles and it gives Tehran an infusion of 

cash to support more of its terrorist activities around the world. 

That said, I believe the best path forward at this point is to continue to fix these flaws as we enforce the hell out of the deal. 

The Obama administration has put us in a tough spot. Roughly, $100 billion was given to Iran. At least $1.7 billion of that was an 

apparent cash ransom payment, stacked on pallets and flown, 

against the advice of the Justice Department and other officials, to 

the Iranian regime at the time when the three hostages were released. 

Much of these funds have likely found their way into the hands 

of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Tearing up the nuclear deal will 

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not recover this cash. That toothpaste isn’t going back into the 

tube. 

It also won’t help galvanize our allies into addressing Iran’s dangerous activities that threaten us all. I fear a withdrawal would actually set back these efforts and Congress has heard nothing about 

an alternative. 

Last week’s move by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to unveil 

Iran’s secret nuclear weapons archive reminds us all what is at 

stake. Despite its repeated denials, Iran had a comprehensive program to design, to test, and to build a nuclear weapon. 

Of course, this begs the question—what is Iran hiding today? 

Shouldn’t we have better inspections? Remember, the deal’s existing restrictions expire in the short years ahead. 

The key restriction—the ability to quickly enrich uranium—begins to phase out in less than 8 years. We should be able to get 

an agreement with the Europeans to fix these serious flaws. 

I understand we have made encouraging progress in recent 

weeks. If we don’t have an agreement today, let’s double down on 

diplomacy and get a deal in the weeks ahead. The Europeans need 

to get to yes. 

And now I’ll turn to our ranking member, Mr. Engel of New 

York, for his opening statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur with your opening statement. 

To our witnesses, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee. We 

are grateful for the decades of public service that all of you collectively represent, and Jane, it’s always good to see you back on Capitol Hill. 

Once again, we find ourselves against a phony deadline dealing 

with the Iran nuclear agreement. Once again, the President has 

created a crisis where none exists and kept us all wondering what 

he’s going to do. 

This administration has promised a comprehensive approach for 

dealing with the regime in Tehran. Yet, 16 months along, the 

Trump administration’s Iran policy seems to be do nothing until 

the clock runs out and make unrealistic demands of Congress or of 

our international partners, and up to this point, kick the can down 

the road a few more months. 

The President has until Saturday to decide whether to continue 

waiving nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, though reporting this 

morning suggests that he will announce an end to those waivers 

today. 

I hope he understands the stakes. If he puts those sanctions back 

into effect, the United States will be in violation of our obligations 

under the nuclear deal and trigger the deal’s collapse. 

The argument that the deal would continue without American 

participation is simply not true. There is no having it both ways, 

and let’s be clear, President Trump would be the one who pulled 

the plug and undermined American credibility. 

I’ve said more times than I can count that I opposed the deal 

when it was announced. I voted against it on the House floor and 

I continue to have doubts about the JCPOA, and I have doubts 

about whether it will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon over the long term. 

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But I know for certain that pulling out of the deal now will make 

a nuclear-armed Iran a much more immediate threat. Some of my 

chief concerns with the agreement were the sunset provisions. 

But those sunsets come many years in the future. What’s the 

emergency now? Why the hysterical rush if the United States undermines the deal for sunsets that expire in 10 or 15 years would 

instead expire at the end of the week? 

Iran would race headlong toward a bomb while keeping the cash 

that’s been freed up over the last few years of sanctions relief. 

If we want to extend the sunsets, and many of us do—and that 

was one of my major objections to the deal—let’s work cooperatively with our allies rather than ruining any chance we have of 

keeping the Iranians from the bomb for a longer time. 

Reimposing sanctions would also have far-reaching consequences 

besides terminating the JCPOA. We could find ourselves slapping 

serious punitive measures on our closest friends and allies. 

Furthermore, it would send a terrible signal that the United 

States does not live up to its word and with North Korea negotiations ramping up, that is the exact wrong time to send that message. 

Why would anyone negotiate with us if the minute we got a new 

administration or a new President they ripped up any agreement 

in order to get rid of it and start anew? 

I think it undermines our credibility and it’s the wrong message 

to send, and I have to note that President Trump could not have 

been more wrong when he said that killing the Iran deal sends the 

right message to North Korea. 

Frankly, it sends precisely the wrong message, and that message 

is that the U.S. won’t live up to its commitments. At the same time 

that the United States scuttles the deal, we would lose whatever 

leverage we have in trying to make the agreement stronger and addressing all of Iran’s other aggressive activities. 

I think there is potential for progress but it requires the United 

States to lead, work to bring parties back to the table, lean into 

new negotiations, allow the present deal to continue, and try to 

build on top of it. 

Instead, the administration wants to sit back and say Europe 

needs to do the hard work or Congress needs to fix it. That’s just 

not the way these things work. 

Congress has done its part. We have given the administration all 

the tools it needs to crack down on Iran for its illegal ballistic missile program, its support for terrorism, its atrocious human rights 

record. 

The White House should use these tools to craft what it promised: A comprehensive Iran strategy rather than bringing us to the 

brink of crisis every 3 months. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses views on this challenge. 

I, again, thank the chairman and concur with his remarks, and I 

yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

So this morning, I am pleased to welcome our panel. We have got 

distinguished guests before this committee including Ambassador 

Lincoln Bloomfield. 

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He’s the chairman emeritus and distinguished fellow at the 

Stimson Center, and he previously served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs. 

We have Mr. Stephen Rademaker who serves as senior of counsel 

at Covington and Burling. Previously, he served as the Assistant 

Secretary of State for Arms Control, before that, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, and 

before that, with this committee. 

We have Jane Harman. She leads the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Previously, she served here in the 

U.S. House of Representatives representing the people of California’s 36th District. 

And we appreciate all of them being here with us today, and 

without objection the witnesses’ full prepared statements will be 

made part of the record. 

Members here are going to have 5 calendar days to submit any 

statements or questions or any extraneous material for the record. 

Obviously, the President’s announcement yesterday that he’ll be 

making an announcement on the Iran deal this afternoon and the 

strong expectation that he’ll be exiting the agreement changes today’s discussion some and it affects, certainly, for the witnesses, 

their written testimonies, which I’ve read. 

I appreciate the scrambling and I am hopeful that this would be 

all the more reason why we should be concise here today in terms 

of your testimony and that way we can hear your expertise in response to our questions. 

And, again, I thank you for being here to discuss these very important topics. We will start with Ambassador Bloomfield and we 

will ask him to please summarize your remarks if you can. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, 

JR., CHAIRMAN EMERITUS AND DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, 

THE STIMSON CENTER (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE) 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking 

Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank you for the 

honor of being with you this morning. 

Like you, I await the President’s announcement this afternoon 

whether he will continue to waive nuclear sanctions on Iran or 

withdraw the United States from the P5+1 nuclear agreement. 

There are valid reasons to maintain the restraints on Iran’s nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 

There are also strong criticisms of the accord because it has left the 

world uncertain as to whether Iran still seeks to develop nuclear 

weapons in the future. 

I find merit in both points of view and believe that the legitimate 

concerns of supporters and critics of the JCPOA can both be accommodated if the Congress is prepared to act. 

The Iranian regime’s malign activities domestically and regionally require a more effective response and the President is far from 

alone in his criticism of the nuclear accord. 

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The question is what would be a successful policy. It is not 

enough to be right. The U.S. needs influence, credibility, and leverage over Iran and the problems it is creating. 

If the U.S. pulls out of the JCPOA, I see four serious consequences that we should hope to avoid. 

First, Britain, France, and Germany, our strategic allies who’ve 

spent years negotiating this agreement, will be disappointed. 

Their publics may feel as though we snubbed the best diplomatic 

efforts of President Macron, Chancellor Merkel, and Minister Boris 

Johnson. 

If we end up in disputes, attempting to enforce Iran’s sanctions 

against European companies, the West will be divided over the 

Iran threat. 

Secondly, Iran may resume an accelerated rush to build nuclear 

weapons with no restraints. The head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, recently said that they could resume 20 percent enrichment activities at the Fordow facility in 4 

days. 

Third, a nuclear arms race could break out in the Middle East. 

Iran’s Arab neighbors across the Persian Gulf declared in 2008 that 

they will match any weapons capability that Iran possesses—a position reiterated in recent months. 

America’s pledge to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge in 

the region could become meaningless if Iran and its Arab neighbors 

are racing to build or acquire nuclear weapons. 

The fourth major concern about withdrawing from the JCPOA, 

even when the CIA director testified last month that Iran is in 

compliance, is the long-term impact on Presidential diplomacy. 

The day that other governments conclude that an executive 

agreement reached with one administration might easily be cast 

aside by the next President, they may insist on a treaty, requiring 

ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. 

Not only will the House of Representatives be disempowered, but 

Presidential power to shape foreign policy including trade will be 

diminished. 

That is why in my prepared statement I have suggested that the 

Congress amend the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 

so that the President no longer has to certify Iran’s compliance 

every 90 days. 

We and our allies should intensify the identification and inspection of suspicious sites. The reality is that the final milestone in 

the JCPOA where the International Atomic Energy Agency reaches 

a ‘‘broader conclusion’’ that Iran’s nuclear activity is entirely peaceful, will never happen unless all legitimate suspicions can be put 

to rest. 

If Iran will not extend the duration of sunset clauses in the accord, we should codify the longstanding bipartisan policy that Iran 

must not have nuclear weapons. 

The President would leave no room for doubt by declaring this 

as a doctrine. 

A third area of concern is Iran’s ballistic missile activity. When 

a 2010 U.N. prohibition was lifted as part of the accord, Iran immediately began testing missiles. 

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Scores of missiles have been fired into Saudi Arabia from Yemen. 

There must be no financial dealings with any individuals, companies, banks, and organizations supporting Iran’s ballistic missile 

program. 

Five years have passed since President Obama extended the offer 

to Iran to pursue a path to a more respectful relationship. The nuclear deal was reached. 

But Iran has shown no interest in changing its ways. For decades the clerical dictatorship has been conducting nonstop geopolitical arson, threatening regional peace and stability, international norms, and U.S. national security interests. 

We, and our allies, must stand together and say, ‘‘no more.’’

I thank the committee and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bloomfield follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Rademaker. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN RADEMAKER, 

SENIOR OF COUNSEL, COVINGTON AND BURLING, LLP 

(FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Engel and members of the committee. It’s a pleasure to appear 

before you again. I thank you for the invitation. 

I want to say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, I agree entirely with 

your opening statement. I really couldn’t have put it better. 

I have submitted a prepared statement. I think it makes a lot 

of excellent points and I urge you to read it. But since there have 

been some developments since I wrote the statement, I think I will 

depart from it and make a few additional points to those in my prepared statement. 

The President, this afternoon, is going to announce his decision. 

According to press reports, he’s going to announce that he’s decided 

not to exercise the waiver authority that he has under existing law, 

going forward, and thereby allow existing U.S. sanctions required 

under laws passed by this committee to take effect, which I think 

would mark a U.S. exit from the JCPOA. 

That will be an unfortunate outcome for all the reasons that Ambassador Bloomfield has identified and I am sure Congresswoman 

Harmon will make those points as well about the downsides to that 

outcome. 

The point I want to make is there are basically three ways to 

avoid that outcome. One is for the President to change his mind. 

I don’t think he’s going to change his mind. He’s drawn a line in 

the sand and I think today he’s going to announce his determination to adhere to that line. 

So we can sit here and complain that his tactics are all wrong. 

But I don’t think he’s going to listen. He’s made up his mind and 

we know what direction he’s going. 

The second way to avoid it is the one that you suggested in your 

opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and that is for the Europeans 

to reach an agreement with Trump administration to fix the agreement and that—you know, I’ve observed this closely and I think actually the administration has made a good faith effort to negotiate 

with the Europeans and has come up with what I would describe 

as a very modest proposal. 

For a man who declared that this was the worst deal ever, when 

you look at what he’s asking from the Europeans, it’s a price for 

keeping the United States in the deal. It’s relatively modest price 

and, in my opinion, entirely defensible, and I will come to that in 

a moment. 

The third way to avoid it—and it was actually I think President 

Trump’s preferred way to keep the United States in the deal—was 

for Congress to pass legislation very similar to what he’s asked the 

Europeans for. 

Now, he really looked to the Senate to act on that legislation initially. There was a bill introduced by Chairman Corker and SenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:47 Jun 03, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\050818\30016 SHIRL
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ator Cotton, and he specifically endorsed that legislation. This was 

in October of last year. 

He called on the Senate to pass that legislation and it was clear 

that if the Congress enacted that legislation he would keep the 

United States in the JCPOA. 

That legislation stalled in the Senate. One of the reasons it 

stalled in the Senate was the Europeans deployed their diplomats 

to lobby against them and I think that’s what accounts for the 

President’s decision in January to sort of shift the onus from the 

Senate to the Europeans and said, if you want to work against me 

in the United States Congress, well, I am now going to ask something of you. 

So I think that’s sort of how we got to where we are today. But 

a third solution would be to go back to the Corker-Cotton legislation which, again, I think actually represents a defensible approach 

to what to do about the fundamental problem we face, which is the 

sunset clause. 

I think even supporters of the JCPOA acknowledge that the sunset clause is a problem, that effective January 2026 Iran’s ability 

to enrich uranium is going to go up exponentially and their ability 

to break out and produce nuclear weapons will become quite imminent and what do we do about that. 

In my prepared statement I identify, basically, five options for 

addressing that problem. One of them is just to accept that idea 

that Iran will be able to have nuclear weapons if it’s wants to after 

2026. 

I think that’s probably the worst of the options. I don’t think 

many people will endorse that option. 

The second is to threaten to bomb them if they get close to a nuclear weapon and a lot of very respectful people have urged that 

option. 

There was a statement here that lots of prominent foreign policy 

leaders signed onto in 2015 calling for that—just threatened military force if they get close to a nuclear weapon, notwithstanding 

that they’re able, under the JCPOA, after 2026 to get close to having a nuclear weapon. 

Third option, threaten them with sanctions, and that’s what 

President Trump is calling for—threaten them with sanctions if 

they get close to a nuclear weapon after 2026. I mean, that’s the 

key point. He’s asking for agreement on what’s going to be our policy after 2026. 

So, the idea that he’s asking for something that’s contrary to the 

JCPOA is simply inaccurate—something that would put us in 

breach of the JCPOA is inaccurate because it is a policy statement 

about what would happen after 2026. Until we get to 2026, there’s 

no argument that we’ve taken steps contrary to the JCPOA. 

The fourth option I identify is to negotiate with the Iranians. I 

am here to predict that before the Trump administration is over 

he’s going to negotiate with the Iranians. 

He’s getting ready next month to sit down with Kim Jong-un. I 

think he’s going to negotiate with the Iranians. 

Everything that’s going on now is him laying the groundwork for 

a negotiation with the Iranians, I believe he’s posturing. The 

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JCPOA is a pitiful platform from which to negotiate with the Iranians. 

So he’s trying to change the baseline of that negotiation. That’s 

what’s going on here and he’s asking the Europeans to help him 

change that baseline. He’s asking the Congress to help him change 

that baseline. 

He’s not getting cooperation on either of those things and that’s 

what’s leading him to make his announcement this afternoon 

which, as I said at the outset, is a very unfortunate development. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Congresswoman Jane Harman. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANE HARMAN, DIRECTOR, 

PRESIDENT, AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS 

(FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS) 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and warm greetings to 

so many good friends on this committee, and especially to you. We 

were classmates elected in the same year. Mr. Engel was a few 

terms ahead of us. 

We served together here for nine terms and my able successor, 

Ted Lieu, is on the bottom row of this committee smiling at me. 

So I appreciate that. 

But to so many of you, we were together in so many battles and 

I continue to care about this committee very much and wish you 

well as you enter your next chapter. Thank you for your really valuable service to the United States. 

Like my two panelmates, I agree on where we should go. I disagree with many of you on the merits of the deal. Had I been here, 

I would have supported the deal. 

But nonetheless, at this point, I agree strongly with you and with 

Mr. Engel that we should stay in the deal and proceed with many 

of the things that have been discussed here. 

Obviously, I had prepared testimony arguing that that’s not likely to happen. But I have adjusted my testimony to make a few 

points, some of which have already been made. 

I think that, while the deal isn’t perfect, if we withdraw, Iran 

could, and has said they will, withdraw too, notwithstanding an additional protocol which prohibits them from returning to the nuclear weapons program. I am not sure they would follow that. 

Some fear that Iran might also withdraw—and you mentioned 

this—from the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty under which 

191 countries have agreed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology. 

To me, that would be a major setback and potentially provoke a 

nuclear arms race in the region, which has been mentioned. We 

would be far worse off under that scenario. 

And let’s not forget that there are four U.S. citizens and two 

green card holders in captivity now in Iran. Their chances of being 

released just got or just will get worse. 

For sure the transformation that the Obama administration 

hoped for in our relationship with Iran has failed. Iran’s malign behavior has not improved. It has gotten worse. We should accept 

that fact and address those problems with careful attention to Iranian involvement in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and its provocative 

behavior to its neighbor, Israel, our democratic ally in the region. 

The results being tallied now from Sunday’s Lebanese parliamentary election suggest that Hezbollah has gained seats—at least one 

seat—and surely gained influence in that country and that is worrisome. 

There is a reason, as has been pointed out, that President Macron and Chancellor Merkel picked last week to visit the United 

States and that British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson visited yesterday. 

25

Three of our closest allies urged the U.S. to stick with the 

JCPOA. They made clear that they are open to a four-party side 

agreement. The assumption would be that China and Russia, the 

other parties, would not join. 

But the recommendations for that agreement I think we all agree 

on and they would make the deal better. They certainly include extending the expiration date. 

There should be no expiration date requiring inspection of military sites, a moratorium on ballistic missile testing and development, and Iran ending its support of terror groups and other operations across the Middle East region. 

It remains my view that addressing Iran’s meddling across the 

Middle East won’t get easier to manage without a deal. 

We still lack a comprehensive strategy to address the Iranian 

challenge, which also evaded the Obama administration. What is 

our Plan B? 

I think that’s something this committee has a chance to address 

on a bipartisan basis. To me, Congress can’t continue to be AWOL 

from the discussion of the authorization of use of military force—

an AUMF. 

Most of us were here when the 2001 AUMF passed. I surely 

voted for it, as did every member of this House except for one, and 

it is the basis of continued U.S. military action in the region. 

My view is that it was limited in time and space and it is time 

for Congress to step up and address the secondary and tertiary effects of withdrawing from the Iran agreement and some of the 

other activities, many of them military—many of them using military technology like drones or train and assist missions in the 

greater Middle East, and Congress can and should do this. 

I also wonder—and this was raised—whether the Trump administration has adequately considered the linkage of withdrawing 

here and the conversation President Trump will have, hopefully, 

soon with North Korea. 

Obviously, the Kim regime is watching closely. By walking away 

from the JCPOA, we send an important message about how seriously we do or do not respect the deals to which we agree. 

The contours of President Trump’s decision are not yet clear. If 

he waives secondary sanctions against our European allies, they 

will likely continue to trade with Iran and that could reduce the 

chance that Iran withdraws from the deal. 

If he doesn’t waive the secondary sanctions, then he has invited, 

in my view, a major trade dispute with Europe, which will be amplified if he decides to impose aluminum and steel tariffs on the 

EU next month. 

We should not underestimate the need for our allies. The Europeans are disappointed, if not dismayed, by the U.S. decision to 

leave the Paris Climate Accord. 

They helped to construct the world order after World War II and 

we will pay a huge price if they move to align elsewhere. 

So, in conclusion, this is a time, in my view, for Congress to step 

up and insist that secondary and tertiary ramifications of these 

issues be considered. 

It is also a time for Congress to put the country first on a bipartisan basis. The stakes couldn’t be higher. 

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harman follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, Jane. 

Okay. So we’ll focus here on some of the points that Steve 

Rademaker made and both of the other witnesses made. 

If we go to the January 12th statement that the President made, 

he called for a new U.S.-EU3 supplemental agreement is what he 

called the addendum agreement—that would impose new multilateral sanctions if Iran develops or tests long-range missiles, thwarts 

inspections—these are his words—or makes progress toward a nuclear weapon, requirements that should have been in the nuclear 

deal in the first place and these provisions must never expire. 

So these were his comments. Some of the European leaders have 

similar concerns. We’ve heard them raise those concerns with us. 

So at this point, what could be done to encourage European partners to address this very important issue? I would say this is the 

crux of it. 

The other thing that concerns me is the ballistic missile program 

Iran is running and what it means in terms of their transfer of ballistic missiles into Syria and into Lebanon, et cetera, et cetera, into 

the hands of Hezbollah and other militias. 

But the key question here is just to get back to the fact that 

we’ve heard these concerns raised by the Europeans. Back in January, the President said that this kind of an addendum would be a 

way to resolve this. 

Is there a way to get our European allies here more focused on 

just such a solution? 

Steve, if you want to begin. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The crux of the problem is that beginning January 2026, Iran, 

under the terms of the JCPOA, basically can have a nuclear weapon at a time of its choosing. 

They will be able to produce the fissile material that they would 

want or that they would need to do that, and probably not just one 

nuclear weapon but lots of nuclear weapons and they could do it 

in such a short time that we wouldn’t even be able to detect it before it happened. 

What do you do about that? You know, a lot of leading experts 

said, well, not a problem—we’ll just threaten to bomb them if they 

do that. 

What President Trump has said, and what he called for in his 

January speech, was no, let’s threaten them with economic sanctions if they do that. 

And the Europeans have hesitated to agree to what he’s asked 

for, you know, an agreement about what we would do beginning 

January 2026 if they use flexibility under the agreement. 

Their first concern, as I understand it, is some of them say, well, 

this would violate the JCPOA. And the point I want to make about 

that is Iran has declared that they’re not going to allow inspections 

of military sites and it’s clear that the JCPOA requires them to 

allow inspections of military sites. 

So is Iran in violation of the JCPOA by having said today, we 

will never do something we are required to do under the agreement? 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, that’s what the Ayatollah says. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well——

31

Chairman ROYCE. And, of course, he makes the decision. The difficulty is that the Ayatollah took a different position, really, Steve, 

than his chief negotiator. 

His position was, I will make the final decision—you won’t be allowed on any military base. 

But on that, we seem to have consensus. The Europeans agree 

with us on inspections. The Europeans seemingly agree with us on 

the ICBM aspect of it. So we can probably get there. In my view, 

we can get there on those two issues. 

The crux of it, as you say—and I would like to hear from the 

other two witnesses, too—is this issue of the sunset—is there a 

way to phrase this, or is there a conclusion we can come to that 

if they roll out an aggressive nuclear weapons program at the end 

of the agreement that there’s going to be some kind of response 

and, you know——

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, I think the two reservations the Europeans have——

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. Is, first, there’s an argument that 

it would be a violation of the JCPOA for them to agree to what 

President Trump has asked for. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And on that point, I am saying just as I don’t 

think the Iranians have violated the JCPOA yet by saying they’re 

not going to allow these inspections. 

It would not be a violation of the JCPOA for us to declare with 

the Europeans what our policy is going to be starting in 2026. 

Chairman ROYCE. Got it. Yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And I think some of the Europeans are still 

confused and they still make the argument that, no, that would 

violate the agreement today for us to declare that policy that we 

are going to follow starting in 2026. 

Chairman ROYCE. I understand. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So, satisfying them on the legal point I think 

is the first thing. Then the second is——

Chairman ROYCE. Let’s go to Jane—yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. Will the Iranians withdraw from 

the agreement if we do that and, there, you know, look, it’s in 

Iran’s interest to bluff, right. I mean, they’re going to want us to 

think that they would withdraw if we took that position. The question is, would they actually withdraw? 

I don’t think it’s in their interest to go back to the days of sanctions and isolation and confrontation, which is what the reimposition of U.S. sanctions would mean. 

So I think actually the risk of Iranian withdrawal is much less 

than some have suggested. 

Chairman ROYCE. I tend to agree with you. But my time has expired. I am going to have to go to Mr. Engel for his questions. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In his January 12th speech, President Trump said if Iran does 

not comply with any of these provisions, American nuclear sanctions would automatically resume. 

The next waivers that are due of the 2012 NDAA sanctions 

which require the President to prevent foreign banks from opening 

32

accounts in the United States or impose strict limitations on existing U.S. accounts. 

If those banks process payments through Iran’s central bank, the 

law exempts those countries who significantly reduce their purchases of Iranian oil from the previous reporting period. 

Ms. Harman, let me ask you this. How would this affect countries like Japan, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, which have not 

reduced their importation of Iranian oil? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, that’s what I was trying to address in my testimony. President Trump could say that he’s decertifying the deal 

today but he could waive the imposition of those secondary sanctions. 

I surely hope he does that. I think that would be a better result. 

But let me also agree with Mr. Rademaker that he had better options. I mean, there’s no reason to withdraw from the deal now. 

There is every reason to work with our European allies who said 

they were willing to do it, on making the deal stronger before it expires. It’s not expiring tomorrow. 

And let me just add, finally, that Secretary of State Pompeo, 

when he was the head of the CIA, said that Iran is complying with 

the deal—with the four corners of the deal. 

Let’s understand, as the senior vice president at the Wilson Center, Rob Litwak, who’s very knowledgeable about this, always says, 

the deal was a transaction, not a transformation. 

It was a transaction to end Iran’s program to pursue nuclear 

weapons for a finite period of time. I wish that had been infinite 

and I still hold out hope that that could be achieved if we took a 

different path. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I would hope that it could be achieved because, 

as I mentioned before, that was my major objection to the 

JCPOA—that it didn’t really prevent Iran from having a nuclear 

weapon, it just postponed it 15 years. 

In relation to what we just mentioned, if the U.S. were to sanction companies in Asia for doing business with Iran, as we would 

be required to do under law, how would these sanctions affect U.S. 

strategy on North Korea? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think that this action will hurt our ability 

to strike a better deal—what President Trump would consider a 

better deal, and we all would, with North Korea because they’re 

watching, and if they think we don’t abide by the deals we make, 

why would we abide by a much tougher deal with them? 

And I would just point out that I think it was a front page article 

yesterday and the Washington Post pointed out how tough it will 

be to administer any deal we make with North Korea. 

They have a much more advanced nuclear program than Iran. 

Iran had zero bombs. North Korea has, depending on how you 

count, up to 60. 

Plus, we should anticipate that they have deep tunnels all over 

the country which would be very hard to identify, and our intelligence on North Korea has been extremely poor up to now. We 

have, basically, no ground truth in North Korea. 

So taking this action this afternoon I think just made the North 

Korea deal which, by President Trump’s standards, would be—and 

33

I agree—a crowning achievement of his presidency harder to 

achieve. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask a question about Iran’s permanent presence in Syria. Let me ask either Ambassador Bloomfield or Mr. 

Rademaker. 

How would you advise President Trump to approach the crisis in 

Syria after the fight against ISIS without U.S. influence and presence? Iran is likely to benefit. 

Yet, the administration, in my opinion, appears to be handing 

Syrian territory over to the Assad regime, negotiating de-escalation 

zones on Israel’s border that could give Iran a permanent presence 

in Syria, and how would a permanent Iranian presence in southern 

and eastern Syria affect U.S. interests in the region and affect 

Israel’s interests in the region? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thank you, Ranking Member Engel. 

The first point I would make is that the JCPOA, the nuclear 

agreement, dealt solely with the nuclear sector, and at a time when 

President Obama thought that the Iranians wanted to turn a page 

and reform, they didn’t pay much attention to the human rights 

abuses at home that you mentioned and the activities in the region. 

Five years have passed. As I said, it’s time to look at the nonnuclear side of Iran policy. In Syria, what has occurred is nothing 

short of the greatest war crime of the 21st century. 

Iran’s Quds Force commands militia that I would estimate at 

60,000 or 70,000 inside Syria made up of Shi’a militia from several 

countries. 

The payroll comes from Tehran. The command comes from 

Soleimani. And he has 80,000 in Iraq as well. We’ve never addressed this point. 

I think that what Bashar al-Assad has done cannot pass without 

consequences. We should be building a war crimes tribunal case 

against the Assad regime. 

We should have had a defection program against the Syrian 

armed forces. We should have been making a lot of noise about 

Russia’s reckless and promiscuous use of weapons that they give to 

the Syrians to bomb children and women. Over 27 hospitals were 

bombed when the Russians came in, along a cordon sanitaire 

around Damascus. Where was America’s voice? 

So I think it’s never too late to speak up for what is right and 

I think the Europeans would join us in putting together a series 

of political measures, informational measures, and put the spotlight on Iran’s aggression and let the people of Iran know where 

all the money’s been going, because it certainly hasn’t been going 

to the people who are protesting in Iran today. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all of our panellists, all good friends. 

When this administration came in, it made clear that fixing the 

JCPOA was going to be a top priority. We knew from the outset 

that there was a lot of work left to do, much of which the administration very clearly outlined in January, as we’ve heard, when it 

said this was perhaps the last chance to fix it. 

34

The administration had simple and common sense requirements 

that everyone should have been able to support. But it isn’t just 

what is in the JCPOA that the administration has rightly said 

needs to be addressed. 

Iran’s other malign activities, which you have addressed, including its ballistic missile program, its support for terror around the 

globe, have largely been ignored by our P5+1 partners ever since 

the nuclear deal was concluded, looking the other way. 

Despite years of diplomacy and despite assurances from official 

after official during the last administration that this would not be 

a problem, our European allies have been reluctant to join us in 

holding Iran accountable. 

The administration must succeed in getting our European partners to act on the need to address Iran’s malign activities. 

Our European friends must agree that getting rid of sunsets that 

allow Iran to be a nuclear weapon state in just a few years is in 

all of our interests. 

But if, for some reason, our partners believe that it is more important for them to pursue their economic interest with a state 

sponsor of terror, then the President must reimpose sanctions on 

Iran or withdraw altogether from the accord. 

Should we not get tougher enforcement and verification measures and should we not get our partners to look at the totality of 

the Iranian threat, then we need to start looking at what comes 

next. 

We still have many tools at our disposal and it is clear that Iran 

will continue to give us every opportunity to sanction it for its illicit activity. It simply doesn’t care. 

No matter whether we think the JCPOA is working or not, Iran 

is only getting stronger in the region as it expands its influence 

and becomes more capable of threatening U.S. interests. 

Just look at the Lebanon elections that took place a few days ago 

and those that are coming in Iraq this weekend. 

If we keep wishing and hoping that we are going to fix the 

JCPOA but nobody takes any action to do so, then we’ll soon be in 

a far worse situation than when we started, if we aren’t there already. 

We may need another way to ensure Iran’s nuclear program is 

kept in check. As the chairman stated, the challenge is in how to 

get the Europeans on board and exert maximum pressure on the 

Iranian regime. 

So my question then—I probably will only have time for Ambassador Bloomfield—if the President does decide to walk away from 

the deal—I know that Congresswoman Harman already addressed 

this—do you envision the need for imposing secondary sanctions? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. My metric of success for foreign policy, 

Congresswoman, would be unity among the allies. If they are on 

board with us on what we bring forward then we have a chance 

of pressuring Iran. 

I want to point out that I don’t think that Iran’s Supreme Leader 

is acting from a position of strength at all. I think they are on thin 

ice at home. There were over 450 demonstrations last month in a 

country one-fourth the population of the United States. 

35

Other Ayatollahs are sounding off against Supreme Leader Ali 

Khamenei. I believe a case can be made that they brought on the 

secret nuclear program not for military purposes but to give the 

Supreme Leader some status that he wasn’t receiving from the 

Shi’a community in the Middle East. 

So they are trying to put on a revolutionary front for the people 

back home and it’s not working. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And on the issue of secondary sanctions——

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. So on the issue of secondary sanctions, 

if we lose the Europeans by going after their companies or any 

other companies in the world, the way to do that is to point out 

the suspicious sites. 

We can point out any site where we have credible information, 

and we can insist that the rest of the world support us in demanding inspection. But it has to be based on real information. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and thank you to our excellent 

panellists. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I want to associate myself with the 

opening statement of the chair and the ranking member. 

A number who support the JCPOA have said that we should always regard the signature of the President of the United States as 

binding on our country—that the President gives our word and 

that word is binding on us. 

I would hope that Congress would reject that view. For example, 

this President might sign an agreement with Russia that said we 

will never base American soldiers in Poland or the Baltic. 

Unless that is approved by Congress, it should not be regarded 

as binding on the American people. So I think it is legal for the 

President to renounce the JCPOA. It’s just a terrible idea at this 

time. 

It will meet the President’s psychological needs. This agreement 

has the scent of Obama on it. It will meet, perhaps, his political 

needs. It is terrible statecraft. 

The President would be doing so in order to say he wants to 

sanction Iran. Just a few weeks ago, a bipartisan letter was sent 

to the President urging him to use the existing sanctions from 2010 

to sanction those who give spyware to the Iranian government to 

suppress its people. He has not sanctioned a single company nor 

has his predecessor. 

It doesn’t seem like the President wants to sanction Iran in order 

to sanction Iran. He wants to sanction Iran in order to desecrate 

a document signed by his predecessor. 

If we are going to renounce this deal, we have to ask what rights 

does each party acquire if the deal is voided. 

Well, Iran gets to go forward with its nuclear program. No inspectors, heavy water, unlimited centrifuges, and they can seek a 

return—I will get to this in a second—of the stockpile of fissile material that they shipped abroad under the deal. 

What do we get? Well, we know that sanctions can change Iran’s 

behavior. There are many reasons to sanction Iran. 

36

Does voiding the deal allow us to impose sanctions we couldn’t 

impose otherwise? Well, we know that voiding the deal angers Europe and Japan and makes it incredibly difficult to have effective 

multilateral sanctions. 

But some of us—well, many of were here when John Kerry sat 

at that table and told us that even under the deal, adhering to the 

deal, we can sanction Iran in full proportion to its non-nuclear 

wrongdoing. 

They are responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in 

Syria, tens of thousands of deaths in Yemen. They stone people to 

death for who they love. If they had never have thought of a nuclear program we would be coming up with every possible sanction 

and if we said we are doing it because of Syria and Yemen we’d 

have European support. 

There are plenty of reasons to sanction Iran to change its behavior. Staying in the deal allows us to sanction Iran and have the 

hope and expectation of European and Japanese support. Voiding 

the deal liberates them and reduces the effectiveness of our sanctions. 

I don’t even know why we are talking about this. But I, believe 

it or not, do have a question. This deal is the good, the bad, and 

the ugly. Good and bad at the beginning—it gets ugly next decade. 

The best part was that Iran shipped 16,000 pounds of low-enriched uranium—a little bit of mid-enriched uranium—out of the 

country. 

They had the fissile material which, if further refined, could create several nuclear bombs. They shipped it to Russia. 

Ms. Harman, would Mr. Putin—if we voided this agreement, 

would he entertain a request from Tehran to return that fissile material which was shipped to Russia? Would he tease us? Would he 

return part of it in return for more control of Syria? 

How would we empower Putin, if he’s sitting on 1,600 pounds of 

low-enriched uranium that he may or may not return to Iran? 

Ms. HARMAN. First of all, let me commend Congress for something it did last year by a veto-proof margin and that was to pass 

the sanctions law against Russia, Iran, and North Korea that dramatically increased sanctions against all three countries. 

And I think that law has been very effective and Congress did 

this on a bipartisan basis, so there is something to celebrate there. 

What would the newly sworn-in President of Russia do? He 

would make mischief. I am not exactly sure how he would do it but 

I think that is his MO and, oh by the way, there has been a vacuum in the Middle East as U.S. leadership, in my view, has reduced 

that has allowed Russia to increase its power in Syria and elsewhere to our detriment. 

So I think leaving the deal on a unilateral basis, if that’s where 

this comes out, even if we do—and I hope we do—waive secondary 

penalties that permit Europe and Iran to keep the deal—further 

isolates us and that that’s a mistake in terms of U.S. strategy. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If the clock is accurate, I have time for one more 

question. But I am not sure it is. 

If we simply don’t enforce the secondary sanctions and all we are 

doing is cutting off trade with the United States, would that be sigVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:47 Jun 03, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\050818\30016 SHIRL
37

nificant enough for Iran to withdraw from the deal if all they’re losing is the U.S. caviar market? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I actually don’t think so. But let’s understand, it does have significant effects on at least one U.S. company. 

That would be Boeing, which has sold a number of airplanes to 

Iran, and I think that deal would be in jeopardy and thousands of 

jobs in various locations in the U.S. would be in jeopardy. 

So I don’t understand—I think none of us understands what the 

advantage to the U.S.—and I think that’s the point of your question is—from the way the administration seems to want to proceed 

this afternoon. 

We are all in favor of a better deal, and I think there is a path 

to get a better deal. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

to this very distinguished panel for your insights. 

Let me just ask you—Ambassador Bloomfield, you talked about 

the payroll for the Quds Force of 60,000. Did any of that come from 

sanctions relief or any of the moneys that were conveyed and do 

we have an accounting yet as to how much money has actually 

gone from us and the Europeans to Iran and where that money has 

gone? 

Secondly, maybe all of you, quickly, your assessment of 

Netanyahu’s disclosures—was that positive? Negative? Was it insightful? Did it give you something that you had not seen before? 

And then, finally, I met with Hua Qu, who’s the wife of Xi Wang, 

who’s a Princeton graduate student. I met with him for hours. 

She was practically in tears, talking about her husband, who has 

now gotten a 10-year sentence for espionage—absolutely trumped 

up, part of the ongoing campaign of Iran to incarcerate Americans 

in order to get some kind of benefit. Because it’s trumped up. 

We know that Bob Levinson still remains unknown. You know, 

he’s 70. He’s got diabetes. He needs help. All of the Americans—

and the green card members, as you mentioned, Ms. Harman—

need help. 

And yet, we look at the Magnitsky Act. The last tranche in December had no Iranians on there. It seems to me we are missing 

an opportunity. We’ve got the Countering America’s Adversaries 

Through Sanctions Act passed last year. There are tools. 

I hope the administration uses that. I think my friend from California a moment ago made a good point. I remember hearing John 

Kerry say all the other issues—human rights, you know, go all out 

on the sanctioning and yet, that seemingly has not happened with 

the previous administration or this one. Your thoughts on that as 

well. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thank you, Congressman. So let me 

start off by, first of all, making a recommendation. The first place 

I ever worked in Washington was the Congressional Research Service. 

I urge you to ask them to do a compendium of every law and 

norm that Iran has broken since 1979, as long as they don’t run 

out of paper. It will be instructive to both sides. 

As for the accounting for funds, this is another piece of homework that I think the Congress, on a bipartisan basis, should ask 

38

for. Some say that up to 80 percent of the Iranian economy is controlled either by the religious foundations or, since 2005, by the 

paramilitary. They own the banks. They run the contracting. You 

can’t get something big done without it going through them. 

So when we talk about whether to sanction an Indian company, 

a European company, an American company, I think that’s the 

wrong way to enter the conversation. 

The question is, where is the money going, and if it’s going to the 

people who are building ballistic missiles and shooting them into 

Saudi Arabia, if it’s going into militia which are calling in air 

strikes on Syrian cities and towns, then that has to be an issue for 

us and the Europeans to sit down and say, ‘‘You can’t be doing 

business if the money is going to these individuals, these companies, these entities, and these organizations.’’

I think if we take it that way, if we ask the administration to 

work with Congress on an intensive accounting of where the money 

goes, I think the sanctions issue will sort itself out. 

Ms. HARMAN. Could I make a comment on human rights? Mr. 

Smith, you and I were in China together at the fourth U.N. Conference—I remember that—on Women, making similar points 

about human rights for women. It was a historic conference, and 

I applaud you for staying focused on that issue. 

As I mentioned, there are four U.S. citizens and two green card 

holders presently in Iran. I think this action by the President 

makes it harder for us to get them out. 

And this issue is really personal for the Wilson Center. One of 

our most famous scholars, Haleh Esfandiari, who’s an Iranian 

American, was imprisoned in Evin Prison in 2007, and it took an 

international effort, in which I participated and I am sure you did, 

as Members of Congress, to get her out of that prison. She had 

gone home to visit her ailing mother. 

So we have to keep an eye on this. We have to think about ways 

in which we can help Americans who are unfairly detained there, 

especially those who are ill, and it seems to me that our strategy 

should include that as one of the goals to achieve in the near term, 

and I don’t think this strategy to be announced this afternoon does 

in an effective way. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Quickly, on the human rights issue, Congressman, let me just congratulate Congressman Sherman for recalling 

how Secretary Kerry and other officials of the Obama administration, at the time Congress was considering the JCPOA, emphasized 

that there was nothing in the JCPOA that would prevent Congress 

from enacting sanctions with respect to human rights violations, 

with respect to missile proliferation, with respect to other malign 

activities by Iran. 

Partly in reliance on those assurances, the agreement was approved under the legislative mechanism that governed the congressional review. 

But no sooner had that agreement taken effect then many officials of the Obama administration came to argue against imposing 

sanctions because it would be too upsetting to the Iranians and it 

might create problems for JCPOA implementation. 

And I think that’s highly regrettable and I guess—I think with 

Congressman Sherman I would urge Congress to listen to what the 

39

Obama administration initially said, not what they and their alumni have said subsequently. 

Chairman ROYCE. Albio Sires of New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for being here. 

Welcome back, Congresswoman. 

I’ve been in this committee now the whole time I’ve been here—

12 years—and it seems that we vote periodically on all these sanctions against Iran. But why does it seem to take so long to implement all these sanctions? I don’t understand it. We just did sanctions on the generals that own sign (phonetic) business to see if we 

can get them to stop what they’re doing. 

Why does it seem that it takes so long to implement these sanctions against Iran? Anyone? 

Ms. HARMAN. I think the——

Mr. SIRES. It’s frustrating to me. 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. Both people to my right are perhaps 

more expert on this. But I don’t think it takes that long. 

I actually think the sanctions have been very effective and economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy is an asymmetric 

strength of the United States. 

In places where we impose them we generally get results. I 

would say North Korea is more interested in making a deal with 

us because of the sanctions and Iran was more interested 5 years 

ago in making a deal because of the sanctions. 

Was it a perfect deal? Absolutely not. But imposing sanctions 

and continuing to impose them on Iran’s malign behavior in the region, which is permissible, is the right way to go. 

Mr. SIRES. Well, I don’t oppose sanctions. I just wanted the sanctions that we pass here to be implemented quicker so we can be 

more effective, and that’s my concern, not that I am against it. I 

mean——

Mr. RADEMAKER. Since the subject is sanctions let me just make 

an observation about this. There are, basically, two types of sanctions that the United States—and by the United States I really 

mean Congress and by Congress I really mean this committee, because most of the Iran sanctions came out of this committee—there 

are two types. 

There’s the primary U.S. embargo, which is restrictions that 

we’ve imposed by law on American citizens, American companies 

with regard to their dealings with Iran, and then the secondary 

sanctions, which are instances where Congress has said for people 

not subject to U.S. jurisdictions, so for foreign companies, foreign 

individuals we are going to sanction you if you do something with 

Iran. 

We don’t have jurisdiction over you but we are going to deny you 

benefits under U.S. We are going to make your life difficult. 

And, not surprisingly, those secondary sections are highly controversial when they were enacted starting in 1996 under the IranLibya Sanctions Act. The Europeans were very upset about that. 

But they’re also highly effective and they had a lot to do with getting the agreement that the Obama administration was able to negotiate. 

Under the JCPOA the United States was required to waive the 

secondary sanctions. And so when we are talking today about the 

40

President letting sanctions come back into force we are talking 

about secondary sanctions. 

The primary sanctions were never relaxed. The primary U.S. embargo on Iran has been in effect since the Reagan administration. 

It’s still in effect today. 

So, Congresswoman, your idea of well, maybe the President 

should let the snap back occur but exempt the secondary sanctions, 

I think basically everything that’s snapping back is secondary sanctions. 

So the way to avoid that is for him to exercise the waiver, which 

is what President Obama did and what he’s done up until now, but 

he’s saying he’s not going to do that, going forward. 

There really are no primary sanctions that are snapping back if 

the President doesn’t exercise the waiver. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, just, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just respond to 

that. I was talking about with respect to Europeans. It’s not to say 

that there isn’t a broader point there. 

But if we don’t have European allies, going forward, and we have 

a large trade war with Europe, I worry that not only our policy toward Iran but our policy in many areas of the world will be harmed 

and they may move ahead and align with others and leave us isolated. 

Mr. SIRES. How likely is it that all the other members of the 

agreement are willing to alter parts of the agreement? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. If I could make a comment—if we are 

talking about secondary sanctions that say you can’t trade with 

Iran, that’s one thing, and I think that may get us in trouble with 

the Europeans and others. 

If, however, we look at how the Treasury Department, for example, cites individuals, entities, and what not, and we have intelligence that say, ‘‘These are the people who are doing all the malign activities,’’ then that’s the conversation we have with companies and say, ‘‘Your deal is through this front company or through 

this bank or through this holding company in Iran and they’re the 

ones who our intelligence shows are paying for the Syrian operation.’’

So that’s the conversation I would prefer. 

Mr. SIRES. I was thinking when we did the financial sanctions 

that it seems to take forever to take effect. I am sorry. Go ahead, 

sir. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, your question was how willing will foreign—I heard your question—how willing will foreign countries be 

to change the deal, and I just want to stress, President Trump has 

not asked for anybody to change the deal. 

I think, ultimately, he’d like to renegotiate it. But what he’s calling for is a supplemental agreement that wouldn’t change the deal 

but it would be a declaration of policy between us and the Europeans about what we’ll do if Iran deploys missiles or tests missiles 

in a way that we find threatening—what we’ll do if they violate 

their sanctions—I am sorry, their inspection obligations, and I 

don’t think that’s controversial. 

And then, thirdly, with regard to the sunset clause, what our 

joint policy will be, starting in 2026. So he’s not—he’s not saying 

let’s, you know——

41

Mr. SIRES. Well we don’t need Iran. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. That everybody agree to—it would 

be let’s declare a policy about what we are going to—what our 

countries will do, starting in 2026. But it’s not a change to the 

JCPOA. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. I am out of time right now but thank you very 

much. 

Chairman ROYCE. We now go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Secretary Bloomfield, do I call you Secretary? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. No. Call me Linc. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. There you go. You went through a litany of some of the things that Iran has been doing that are very 

disturbing throughout the region. 

Let us just note that what you’re talking about costs a lot of 

money and what we are also talking about here is the Obama decision and as manifested in this treaty to provide $150 billion to the 

disposal of the Iranian regime. 

And so everything that you just talked about can be traced back 

to a funding mechanism that we provided them. 

But I would like to disagree with you on one note. You kept noting how strong Iran is. The mullah regime that controls Iran is incredibly weak, and you mentioned that as well. 

You have had uprisings throughout that country, and I hate to 

sound like Cato the Elder. The mullah regime has to go. This is 

not an anti-Iranian statement. This is a pro-Iranian statement. 

The people of Iran hate the mullah regime. It is corrupt. It is 

brutal, and all we talk about are these periphery actions when we 

never mention and go right to the heart of the matter, which is we 

should be supporting those elements in Iran that hate the regime 

and will replace it with a more civilized government, which they 

all support. 

Iran is not our enemy. The mullah regime is our enemy, and 

while we are discussing this issue today, we should understand 

that. The last administration provided $150 billion to that mullah 

regime—not to the people of Iran, to that regime. 

Let’s note that my colleague mentioned the Magnitsky Act. Just 

so everyone will know, I support the Magnitsky Act. I didn’t support calling it the Magnitsky Act because I thought that particular 

case had yet to be proven. 

But the point is we have that power and, again, we have not designated any of the mullah regime gangsters to be punished by an 

act that we put forward and have passed in this Congress. 

So we’ve been inactive in anything aimed at the mullah regime 

but instead broadly attacking Iran. I don’t believe that’s a strategy 

that will work. 

Let me ask you—no one got around to the question about whether Netanyahu’s briefing for the American people and the American 

government was a positive or a negative. 

Maybe I could have each one of the panellists just give us a very 

short on their reaction to Israel. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thanks, Congressman Rohrabacher. 

On the Netanyahu release of information, I think—from what I 

understand—I’ve not read it all—it demonstrates a serious proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:47 Jun 03, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\050818\30016 SHIRL
42

gram to build nuclear weapons and so then it calls into question 

what is the intention of the regime. 

I really think the United States needs to speak with one voice 

and stand united. So as a centrist, let me give President Obama 

his due. 

I think he was wrong in his assessment of Iran. In 2013, he 

quoted a fatwa from the Supreme Leader in front of the United Nations that they forbid nuclear weapons. 

Everything that Prime Minister Netanyahu has released suggests that the Iranians were never going to give up nuclear weapons—that they would keep the knowledge in perpetuity. 

So I think that there’s an issue of intent and trust. Going back 

to what the chairman said, if I were advising President Trump, I 

would say whenever you get a message that comes from President 

Rouhani or Foreign Minister Zarif, the answer should be, I need to 

hear it from the Supreme Leader. He’s the one and only decision 

maker. It’s time for Iran to stop talking out of two sides of its 

mouth. 

Going back to your final point, Congressman, about the mullah 

regime, I am going to quote you from Grand Ayatollah Abdollah 

Javadi-Amoli. He is a source of emulation. 

He’s a Grand Ayatollah in Qom. On April 27, he said, ‘‘Better beware that if the nation rises up the people will sweep us into the 

sea. Many have already fled or found a place to escape. But we 

have nowhere to escape to.’’

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And there is our solution and we’ve ignored 

that over and over again to try to get around the idea that we are 

recognizing the mullah regime is not Iran and we should be supporting Iran and the Iranian people. 

Just really quickly, Israel’s briefing—good, bad, positive? Should 

pay attention to it, not——

Mr. RADEMAKER. I took it as further confirmation that Iran has 

had a long-standing interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and in 

that sense to me it didn’t come as news because that’s been my belief for a long time. But it does underscore the need to have a serious deliberate global policy to confront the challenge we face. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Jane? 

Ms. HARMAN. I, too, always thought Iran’s intention was to acquire a nuclear weapon so I wasn’t surprised by it. 

But I would make two other points, one on regime change. I 

think we should be very, very careful, given the Iraq experience, 

and if the people of Iran who elected their government by more 

than 50 percent in a four-way field want to change their government, then let them do that. 

But I don’t think calling for that from outside is going to improve 

the situation. That’s my personal view. 

But final point on North Korea, North——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Unless the people who support that—the calling down the regime—end up in jail, end up having their families 

beaten up——

Ms. HARMAN. I think that is dreadful. That’s a human rights 

issue and we should impose sanctions against those who do that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

43

Ms. HARMAN. But on North Korea, talk about their intentions—

they built 60 nuclear weapons. So let us not be naive as we do a 

deal with them and I am in favor of doing the right deal with 

North Korea. 

Let us not be naive about their intentions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we noted in Korea, we paid for that as 

well. We—again, another Democratic administration—I am sorry to 

sound political here—they insisted on paying money to a dictatorship in North Korea. 

They used the money to what, to put us in a position where 

they’re building nuclear weapons again, probably with the money 

that we gave them. 

And one last thing—Netanyahu has given us an alarm bell. He’s 

ringing the alarm bell. I am proud that our President seems to be 

listening to that. Looking forward to see if we act upon that alarm. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

We now go to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and I thank the chair for holding this hearing on a day that I think is a very momentous day 

in terms of foreign policy in which the President is about to make 

a decision fraught with consequences and that could lead to the 

very thing we are trying to avoid—a nuclear Iran. 

The fracturing of our ability to have meaningful dialogue and 

agreements with our allies and with our adversaries—let us remember P5 included Russia and China. 

My friend from California, who chokes on criticizing a Democratic administration, nonetheless feels compelled to do so, wants 

to have us believe that the money released pursuant to the Iran 

nuclear agreement somehow was some kind of pay off for all kinds 

of evil things. 

Primarily, it was the release of funds that had been frozen pursuant to sanctions and I got news for my friend from California—

you got to have carrots and sticks if you’re going to have an agreement. 

If it’s all carrots, I don’t know what compels anybody to agree to 

anything, and most of that money was used to pay off huge debts 

the Iranian regime had incurred because of the plummeting price 

of oil and the effect of sanctions. 

Ms. Harmon, welcome back. So listening to Mr. Rademaker, 

you’d think the President’s just kind of making some reasonable 

things here. I don’t think our allies are going to be all that upset. 

Now, I don’t know—correct me if I am wrong—I thought I saw 

the President of France speak before a joint session of Congress 

warning us not to do precisely what, apparently, President Trump 

is going to do this afternoon. Is my memory faulty on that? 

Ms. HARMAN. I don’t think so. It’s also true that Chancellor 

Merkel made a 1-day trip from Germany and that the foreign minister of Britain came yesterday to talk to a number of people. I 

guess the Brits thought that he would be——

Mr. CONNOLLY. All importuning President Trump and his administration not to do it. 

Ms. HARMAN. Right. But they also expressed a willingness so far 

as I know—and I think we are all in agreement here and I think 

44

most of the committee is—to enter into a side agreement that addresses problems that I think everyone here has with the deal. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, Mr. Rademaker also made the assertion 

that Obama administration alum—the ink was barely dry on 

JCPOA in terms of congressional action when they begged us not 

to impose sanctions on nonrelated nuclear activity. 

Is it not true that there was a lot of concern up here that some 

people who have been overtly critical of JCPOA turned around and 

introduced sanctions legislation that would have in fact unravelled 

the agreement because they dealt indirectly or kind of almost directly with sanctions that were covered by the agreement? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think there was a lot of conversation about 

which sanctions should be imposed. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That’s right. 

Ms. HARMAN. There was never any doubt that sanctions against 

Iran’s malign behavior outside the four corners of the deal, which 

is just a transaction to freeze Iran’s nuclear program. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And forgive me. I am running out of time. But 

pursuant to your point, many of us turned around and voted for 

the comprehensive sanctions you referenced in your testimony. 

Ms. HARMAN. Right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Rademaker, let me—let me talk about compliance in the time I have left. 

In the agreement—the JCPOA agreement—Iran was required to 

go from 19,000 centrifuges to 6,104 at the old IR1 designation. 

Have they complied? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So far as I am aware, they’ve complied with 

their obligations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. They have complied. On enrichment they have to 

go down a 3.67 percent for 15 years. Have they complied? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So far as I am aware, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Stockpile—they had to reduce their stockpile of 

enriched uranium from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms and ship 

it out of the country. Did they comply? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So far as I am aware, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mm-hmm. Reprocessing—they won’t conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research on spent fuel, and that’s indefinite. Have they complied? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So far as I know, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Fordow—have they stopped enrichment at 

Fordow? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I believe they have. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You believe they have. On the Natanz again, 

they were required to limit the amount of centrifuges for research 

and the level of enrichment and, again, returning models to an earlier generation. Did they comply? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I can save you time. I think they’ve complied 

with all their agreements. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, let me just run through it because, you 

know——

Mr. RADEMAKER. All their obligations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. I am trying to pay attention to your 

testimony here. I am trying to find flaws in their compliance. 

45

Iraq, the plutonium production reactor, they’re required to 

concretize their reactor and redesign and rebuild the heavy water 

research facility. Did they comply? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I believe they have. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Are you aware of any inspection of a nuclear facility they have not complied with? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. No, I am not aware. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. And has the IAEA and the international 

community certified 11 different times they are in full compliance 

with the agreement? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The IAEA has not found any fault with this. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And were there six Presidential certifications including with President Trump saying the same? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I rest my case. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Ed Royce, for having this very important hearing today and thank all of the witnesses for being here. 

And, Ambassador Bloomfield, to amplify further your view, 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently had a revelation of 

Iran’s secret nuclear archive, highlighting the limits to the IAEA 

inspections. 

The archives were apparently unknown to IAEA and other nuclear sites may have been similarly unknown. 

I believe that President Donald Trump is being correct that the 

Iranian nuclear deal is dangerous to American families and to our 

allies of Israel. 

Considering the information located in these archives, should the 

IAEA reopen its investigation into the possible nuclear dimensions—PMD—of Iran’s nuclear program? 

What other steps should the IAEA make to address the concerns 

raised by these documents hidden by the Iranian dictatorship? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think we have to wait and see what details come out of the information that the prime minister of Israel has released and other 

information that may be available to us. 

The point that I wanted to make is that, while the Iranians came 

to the table and said certain things can be inspected and certain 

things cannot be inspected, that if we find what’s known as plausible information, under their language, that there may be nuclearrelated activity—it may not be fissile material that’s detectable 

through nuclear machinery—it may be designs for warheads, how 

to marry it with a ballistic missile, how to make the missile hit a 

target and to do what we’ve done with our ICBMs—that kind of research could be happening anywhere and more likely is under the 

control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—which is a possible military dimension and would be on a military site. 

So if we have any kind of plausible information, we have every 

right to go to the Europeans and together go to the IAEA and say, 

we have to inspect this. 

And as I pointed out earlier, you can’t get to the end point of the 

JCPOA—the broader conclusion at the end of several years that 

Iran is peaceful in intent unless you answer those questions. 

46

So we should focus on detection, investigation, inspection, 

verification and be more relentless than we have been. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate your emphasis on verification. 

And Mr. Rademaker, how would you characterize Iran’s current 

ballistic missile capabilities and what would you expect the trajectory of their continuing missile development to be if they’re not impeded by sanctions or other diplomatic measures? 

At this point, what needs to be done to safeguard against the ballistic missile threat to Europe today and as they’re targeting America tomorrow? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes. Well, Iran has a very active ballistic missile program and over time they’ve been increasing the range of 

their ballistic missiles I believe with the ultimate goal of deploying 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, which would be missiles that 

could strike the United States. 

I think a critical point that needs to be made, and I think this 

connects back to what Prime Minister Netanyahu revealed, it 

makes absolutely no sense for Iran to have an ICBM if it doesn’t 

have a nuclear weapon. 

Missiles of that range—I mean, first, they’re not going to be very 

accurate and even if they were accurate, I mean, they’re not going 

to do that much damage. 

You have ICBMs like we do to attack your adversaries with an 

atomic warhead, and so the fact that they’re continuing to pursue 

these longer-range missiles I think speaks to their ultimate intentions. 

They wouldn’t be doing this if they did not ultimately have the 

intention of putting a nuclear warhead on the top of that ICBM. 

Mr. WILSON. And hey, for a diplomat, I appreciate that you were 

very clear that ICBMs and nuclear weapons are tied together and 

just simply can’t be separated. 

And I appreciate that we’ve actually had bipartisan cooperation. 

Congressman Seth Moulton and I had an amendment to the NDAA 

to ask for analysis of the ICBM capabilities of Iran. 

And Congresswoman Harman, thank you to have the alumni return. The current estimates that Iran has provided Hezbollah $800 

million annually for their efforts, and they actually now have 

150,000 missiles in southern Lebanon—a threat—and the capability of building missiles. So the threat is almost incalculable. 

Following the elections last week in Lebanon, what can we do to 

promote a moderate influence in Lebanon? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, let me say two things. 

On the missile capability of Iran, it is worrisome, and it’s not just 

that they, over time, if this deal somehow ends, can put miniaturized warheads on top of missiles but they can also proliferate the 

missiles. 

And let’s understand that there has been proliferation between 

Iran and North Korea, which now has a highly advanced missile 

capability. 

In the ’90s when I served on the House Armed Services Committee, I worked with Former Senator Jon Kyl to try to block Russian technology transfers to Iran, which occurred at the time, 

which made their missile capability more effective. 

47

So that’s one very sad chapter in U.S. history. On this question, 

I am worried about Hezbollah. I mentioned the Lebanese election. 

Hezbollah ran in the election. It had candidates for Parliament 

and it increased its seats by at least one but plus, apparently, five 

other seats from another party are technically under—in the 

Hezbollah orbit. 

So not only does it have some political participation in the Lebanese government but you are correct about the missile placement 

in southern Lebanon and we’ve already seen one war between Lebanon and Israel where Hezbollah managed to lob a lot of missiles 

from basements of civilian houses along the border. Those were not 

very smart missiles. Now the missiles are smarter and have longer 

range. So it’s very, very worrisome. 

Mr. WILSON. Again, thank you all for being here today. 

Chairman ROYCE. We got to Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, we have three thoughtful witnesses, all of whom 

provided distinguished service to our country and government. 

We have a chairman and ranking member of this committee and 

a good number of members of our committee on both sides of the 

aisle who are quite concerned about Iran—Iran’s nuclear program 

and Iran’s activities—destabilizing activities in the region. 

And for an awful lot of us there is consensus that if the President 

chooses to walk away from the Iran deal—a deal that I opposed but 

have repeatedly said needs to be strictly enforced—the President 

walks away, we abdicate American leadership in all of the areas 

where Iran poses an immediate threat to us, to our allies, and to 

our security interests. 

So I would just ask our witnesses, going through each of these, 

if I may, again, the idea being how do we retain American leadership. We can predict what Iran might do or not if the President 

chooses to not certify, to withdraw. 

We can predict the inclinations of our allies might be. But I want 

to talk about what we can do to help lead those allies and if the 

President goes in one direction what can the rest of us—what can 

Congress do to continue to play that role? 

So on ballistic missiles, for example, on this we heard over and 

over throughout the negotiation of the deal that the deal didn’t 

cover ballistic missiles. 

The President today if he wanted to could impose even tougher 

sanctions with respect to ballistic missiles in Iran. Isn’t that right, 

Congresswoman Harman? 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes, that’s right, and should the deal have covered 

ballistic missiles? Of course. If they had been able to strike that 

deal it should have. 

Should it have been term limited? No, it shouldn’t have been. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. 

Ms. HARMAN. Should it have addressed Iran’s other malign behavior? Yes, it should, and it still could, if this side agreement were 

entered into. 

But can I just make one other comment? 

Mr. DEUTCH. Of course. 

48

Ms. HARMAN. And that is the need for an authorization to use 

military force. I think that Congress can finally construct the strategy that has been missing from everything we’ve been doing in the 

region. 

The Obama administration didn’t have a strategy either. They 

did a transaction. That’s what this deal was, and other transactions as well—some correct, some less correct. 

But Congress has a storied history of being able to hold hearings 

and get the American people engaged to understand the trade-offs 

in a larger U.S. role and I think that would be a huge service. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. I think it’s the most important foreign policy 

debate that we should be having on the floor of the House that 

we’re not. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

On ballistic missiles, if we are going to be serious about ballistic 

missiles, don’t we want our European allies to work with us to impose sanctions against Iran, Mr. Rademaker? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think absolutely we do and, in fact, I think 

the agreement that the Trump administration has been trying to 

negotiate with the Europeans, one of the three elements was to address ballistic missiles. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So—right. So let’s just go through that for a second 

because I think there’s been confusion, and I would just like to sort 

this out. 

The fact is for the very real concerns we have about Iran’s behavior, this is not just about whether the Iran deal is a good thing or 

a bad thing or whether Iran is complying with it or not. 

The fact is that while Iran complies with the nuclear deal, they 

continue to hold Americans hostage. They continue to develop ballistic missiles. They continue to support terror throughout the region. 

And so that deal that we’ve been working toward that perhaps 

the President may find some opportunity to push for one last time, 

just to be clear, doesn’t violate the terms of the nuclear deal, does 

it? 

If we give, with our European allies, a very clear signal about 

what will happen, as several of you have pointed out, at the end 

of this deal so that the sunset clause may be a sunset under the 

deal but we make clear with our allies that we will not allow Iran 

to develop nuclear weapons, something that we’ve said. 

So why would that be a violation of the deal? It wouldn’t. Ballistic missiles were not part of the deal. Why wouldn’t we work 

with our allies to make clear what we will not accept right now in 

terms of threats to Europe and the United States? 

And on inspections, again, if—instead of arguing back and forth 

over how we interpret the inspection regime that’s in the deal, why 

wouldn’t we make clear with our allies that if we believe we need 

to get onto a military site then we are going to work with them and 

if access is blocked it is Iran’s fault and Iran is then in violation 

of the deal, from our perspective? 

How are any of those unreasonable? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, I don’t think any of those things 

are unreasonable. I think we would want to work with the Europeans on all those issues. 

49

I do think of the three issues that we are—and here I am going 

to defend the Europeans, which I haven’t done much of this morning—I think of the three issues that were under discussion with 

the Europeans, two of them were not hard, as I understand it, for 

the sides to reach agreement on on the issue of inspections and on 

the issue of ballistic missiles. 

Where—the sticking had to do with how to address the sunset 

clause. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well—yes, Ambassador Bloomfield, I have just a 

second. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thank you. Sorry to go overtime. 

But I believe ballistic missiles were implicated under the JCPOA 

agreement. There was a 2010 U.N. Security Council resolution that 

prohibited Iran from engaging in ballistic missile development 

which was lifted 6 days after the agreement was reached in June 

2015 in favor of recommendatory language that was nonbinding——

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD [continuing]. And Iran immediately 

started testing missiles. And just so you know, Secretary of State 

Kerry said, oh, there must be a mistake here—let’s have a new arrangement. 

Foreign Minister Zarif called his complaints ‘‘baseless.’’ Defense 

Minister Dehghan called them ‘‘nonsense.’’ In other words, off they 

went. 

We’ve been threatened by the head of the IRGC to hit all U.S. 

troops within 2,000 kilometres if they feel like it. 

So I think we have every right to defend ourselves and to work 

the with Europeans to push back on their program. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I greatly appreciate all our witnesses being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that whatever the President does today at 

2 o’clock I hope he will keep in mind that the most important thing 

for us to do to stand up to Iran’s malign behavior is to retain American leadership and I worry that he will take an action today that 

will weaken American leadership. That puts all of us in a weaker 

position. 

I thank you and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Mike McCaul of Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good to see the witnesses, especially my former colleague. Jane, nice to see you. 

I travelled with my former colleague, Mike Pompeo, to the Middle East. Met with Netanyahu. We talked about the Shi’a Crescent—Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, coming out of Iran. 

And at the time we were talking about this Iran deal we were 

opposed to it for a couple of reasons, all of which are being negotiated in this E3 agreement. 

He and I didn’t think the inspections were sufficient enough. It 

didn’t include military sites where most likely that’s where they 

would build a nuclear weapon. 

The ICBM capability was not addressed. I asked Secretary Kerry 

right here why that wasn’t in the deal and he simply said it just 

couldn’t be done. 

50

Sunset provisions have been talked about and the terror financing, from a chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee 

standpoint, hundreds of billions of dollars unleashed, and now look 

what we have. 

So we are in a bit of a dilemma, I think. I think this E3 agreement was a good idea. I was hopeful it would happen. I know the 

sunset provisions were a problem in reaching a consensus. 

But I think the question is—well, a couple. I mean, my understanding is Iran would have to agree to this as well. 

Do you think if the E3 reached an agreement with the United 

States that Iran would join in that agreement? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So the sunset clause is a problem and I actually 

think the Trump administration came up with a clever way to address that problem, because implicit in your question is, would Iran 

ever agree to eliminate the sunset clause? 

They might agree to it but not for free and I will talk about that 

in a moment. I talked about it in my prepared remarks. 

But the Trump solution, at least what he’s been trying to negotiate with the Europeans and what he asked the Congress to do is 

forget about the Iranians—we’ll just declare what our policy is 

going to be once the sunset clause kicks in. 

They don’t have to agree to that. We just declare this is what we 

are going to do, and what we are going to do is we are not going 

to threaten to bomb them as some people say we should threaten, 

although maybe—we don’t necessarily not threaten to do that. But 

the threat we will bring to bear is the threat that we’ll impose economic sanctions if they enrich uranium in a way that would get 

them a very short breakout capability. 

No need for the Iranians to agree to that. So all it requires is 

the agreement of the three governments in Europe. So realistically 

achievable concept, I think. 

Now, while we are talking about negotiations, though, I predicted 

in my initial statement here that before this administration is over 

I think President Trump probably is going to negotiate with the 

Iranians because he’s negotiating next month with the North Koreans. 

And among those who have argued that the President should not 

allow or should not walk away from the JCPOA, many have said, 

well, what he should do is negotiate the problem of the sunset 

clause with Iran. 

I think there will be such a negotiation but as things stand 

today, we are going to have to give them something to give up on 

the sunset clause. 

The only thing I think realistically we have to give them—well, 

we could write them enormous checks. Okay. We could give them 

a bunch of money. I don’t think we are going to do that. The 

other—so the other thing——

Mr. MCCAUL. Well we sort of are yes. I’ve got a minute and a 

half. So——

Mr. RADEMAKER. The other thing we could give them is relief 

from the primary embargo——

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. Which is what we imposed because 

of their support for terrorism and so we could trade our policy—

51

our counterterrorism policy for concessions from them on their nuclear program. 

The question I ask in my prepared statement is then what’s left 

of our antiterrorism policy if we’ve given away our primary embargo in order to get additional concessions on——

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree, the sunset clause—I mean, that’s the big 

sticking point. But is it better to get out entirely or do we want to 

extend the deadline on these negotiations rather than pull out completely? 

Ms. HARMAN. I think that everyone shares the goal of—except, 

perhaps, Iran—of extending the deadline. 

But the question we are all raising is what’s the best way to 

achieve the goal, and pulling out or at least decertifying the deal 

today is not the best way to achieve the goal. 

And I would just make one other point, which is negotiations are 

tough. Each party has to give up something to get to a deal. I am 

sure that John Kerry and others would say they wanted a stronger 

deal than they got. 

They got the deal that they got and, as a mother of four, I know 

that perfection is not an option. You have got to negotiate with 

your own kids to get a little—to get some progress and——

Mr. MCCAUL. And I have five. 

Just one last question—I worry too, Jane, that it will shift attention away from Iran and put it on the United States. That’s one 

of my concerns from a foreign policy standpoint. 

Finally, you talk about congressional inaction and if we can’t 

reach this E3 agreement that perhaps Congress should take action 

and deal with this issue head on, whether it be with sanctions or, 

as you mentioned, the AUMF, and I would like to get your 

thoughts on that. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I mentioned the AUMF a couple of times because I think Congress is AWOL and Congress should be doing 

this, and the 2001 AUMF that most of us who are here voted for 

it seems to me doesn’t apply to this situation at all, and a future 

with a renuclearized Iran or Iran building the bomb it stopped 

building is one that will require some kind of military response. 

So I want Congress to set the contours. 

Second point, though, what is our strategy in the Middle East? 

What do our allies perceive our strategy is? I think it should be 

working, as we’ve all said, with Europe, who are in this deal in the 

first place, and hopefully with China and Russia, too, to contain 

nuclear developments in the region. 

And if a result of this is that the Saudis or others decide to build 

a nuclear weapon and the Saudis could acquire technology from 

Pakistan, or at least that’s the rumour, I don’t think the Middle 

East becomes more stable. 

So there are very serious problems, it seems to me, with pulling 

out, as might happen today. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you so much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. I think, for the record, in response to one 

our members’ earlier points, the International Atomic Energy 

Agency is in fact currently unable to verify the provision relating 

to—and this is from Section T—‘‘activities which could contribute 

52

to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device,’’ and 

Russia, of course, says they have no obligation to do so. 

With that said, I should go to Karen Bass of California. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I want to 

thank all of our witnesses here today. 

I guess—well, my colleague just showed me that the New York 

Times is now reporting that President Trump told the President of 

France that he is going to withdraw. 

So assuming that, I just wanted to know if you three could each 

really paint the picture of what this looks like. 

For example, Ambassador and Mr. Rademaker, how specifically 

would you propose to ensure that Iran is prevented from developing 

a nuclear weapon when it’s no longer in effect, assuming that 

that’s—again, what the New York Times is reporting is accurate? 

Where do we go from here is the question. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Congresswoman Bass, I have already 

testified that I believe there are some downsides which we should 

avoid and whatever happens I think I want to give the President 

a chance to make his announcement. 

It appears that there are some subtleties—that it may not be 

something that we can summarize in one sentence. 

My hope is that whatever—the metric of success of a foreign policy is whether it is strategically credible—whether the leverage is 

against Iran and Iran’s nuclear breakout and not against us and 

not dividing Republicans, Democrats, Americans, and Europeans. 

We should be one team. We should have a policy that goes beyond 

the nuclear domain to the non-nuclear domain, which everyone has 

acknowledged today. 

So I think wherever we go from here there’s a lot of past pieces 

that have been brought up, some with regret. We have to move forward. 

And if I may—I know your time is valuable——

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD [continuing]. I think we need a better 

analysis of what Iran is all about. The Supreme Leaders’ 

followership in the Shi’a Crescent may be extremely weak. 

The Supreme Leaders’ readiness to come forward and negotiate 

with the American President——

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD [continuing]. Or present himself may 

be nonexistent——

Ms. BASS. All right. I do need to move on. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD [continuing]. So we need to analyze 

who we are dealing with. 

Ms. BASS. Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. You ask a very good question. I do think we 

need to all bear in mind our President believes that, above all else, 

he is a negotiator. He wrote a book about ‘‘The Art of the Deal.’’ 

He wrote a book about that. 

Ms. BASS. Well, he hasn’t demonstrated that so far, but go right 

ahead. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. But so, I think what is going to happen this 

afternoon, well, technically what happens if he announces that ‘‘I 

am not exercising any more waivers’’ then on, I believe, Saturday 

53

of this week, May 12th, one of the U.S. sanctions laws will snap 

back into effect and it’s the one called Menendez-Kirk. It was the 

first sort of oil sanctions—financial oil sanctions. 

Well, the other sanctions don’t snap back into effect until July 

and so I think there’s a good chance what we’ll hear from the President is I am letting this one law snap back into effect but the real 

deadline now is July, right. 

Let’s negotiate against a July deadline because that’s when the 

other sanctions snap back into effect, and I hope I am right about 

that because what I want to see here is a negotiated solution with 

the Europeans. I don’t want to——

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. See us go back to a sanctions 

realm and I just hope that——

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. The President’s psychology probably lends itself to that. 

Ms. BASS. And Congresswoman, perhaps you could continue to 

explain that. I mean, if the sanctions snap back that impacts Europe, doesn’t it? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, yes. I am hoping that there won’t be a snap 

back and my colleagues might ask then what will he be announcing. 

He’ll be announcing the fact that he’s unhappy with the deal, 

which we’ve heard before, but that he’s waiving its worst effects. 

And I am still hoping that what this entire committee seems to 

want—surely I do and I think all of us want—is a side deal gets 

negotiated with our European partners and that becomes the basis 

over time of improving the deal. 

But I think it would be a big mistake to blow up the deal totally 

or blow up the U.S. role in the deal. Even if Iran stays in the deal 

that would have the effect of isolating us. 

Ms. BASS. So how do you pull out of the deal and then put it 

back together and then have a side deal? I don’t—you know what 

I mean? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think it takes a lot of legal maneuvering. 

But I think there is possibly a way to thread the needle and I am 

sure he’s looking at it in terms of stating his intention, not recertifying it. Remember, he said he didn’t want to recertify it last time. 

But having its effects be minimized against our European partners, 

perhaps not our Asian partners—I think that would not be the 

wisest course but perhaps that’s the way he will go. 

Starting a major trade war right now with Europe and possibly 

in June, as I mentioned in my testimony, also allowing these proposed tariffs on steel and aluminum to be in effect against Europe 

is a huge, I think, mistake. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think—to the extent you’re asking a technical 

question—if he allows the sanctions to be reimposed how does he 

get out from under that if he later changes his mind—and actually 

the answer to that is very simply he will still have the waiver authority. 

So if sanctions could snap back into effect but if an acceptable 

deal is negotiated at some point thereafter he can just exercise the 

waiver authority again and restore the situation that exists today. 

54

Ms. BASS. Yeah. I don’t know——

Mr. RADEMAKER. I will be surprised if this afternoon he doesn’t—

I would be surprised if he closes the door to negotiations. 

I would expect him to say, I am doing this because we haven’t 

gotten satisfaction in the negotiations but I am still here. I still 

want to negotiate. I still hope—you know, and——

Ms. BASS. And so the problem is none of us know what he’s going 

to do from day to day. That’s the problem. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Lee Zeldin of New York. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all 

the witnesses for your service 

Mr. Rademaker, one of the comments that you made with the 

questioning with Mr. Connolly you said you believe—your understanding is that Iran has complied with all of their obligations. 

We are aware, though, that the IAEA has found them twice to 

be over their heavy water limit, right? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. That’s correct. That was a problem that the 

Obama administration solved by buying excess heavy water from 

Iran. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Yes. So that was one of the violations, I just want 

to correct the record on a few different items, and I don’t want to 

embarrass anyone here but just a few components that are important to point out with regards to Iran’s compliance or lack thereof. 

So Annex 1 Paragraph 61 of the JCPOA states, ‘‘Iran will only 

engage in production of centrifuges to meet the enrichment R&D 

requirements.’’

Iran has acquired more than the necessary amount of IR8 centrifuge rotor assemblies for R&D purposes with 16 times more capacity than the IR1 to enrich uranium. 

With regards to exceeding IR6 centrifuge allowance, as part of 

the JCPOA an enrichment research and development plan was submitted to the IAEA that permitted, roughly, 10 IR6 centrifuges. 

Iran has assembled 13 to 15 IR6 centrifuges, which should have 

been limited or destroyed under the plan. 

With regard to conducting mechanical testing of advanced centrifuges in violation of the JCPOA Iran has exploited the conditions 

governing the quality assurance of advanced centrifuges to conduct 

mechanical testing of advanced centrifuges. 

With regards to refusing IAEA access to military sites, under 

Annex 1 Paragraph 76 of the JCPOA, the IAEA can request access 

to military locations such as Parchin to verify compliance. 

The Iranian regime has made crystal clear before, during, and 

after the negotiations that they will not allow access to any of their 

military sites. 

With regards to possessing chemically manmade particles of natural uranium, in September 2015 Iranian officials granted limited 

access to the IAEA inspectors at the Parchin facility. 

The environmental samples revealed chemically manmade particles of natural uranium. The IAEA did not pursue an explanation. 

The IAEA director general stated that the agency wants Iran to 

fully implement the JCPOA which, by implication, covers Section 

T, as was referenced by our chairman of Annex 1 of the JCPOA, 

55

which prohibits any activities that could contribute to the development of the—of a nuclear explosive device. 

It should be noted that when we went to Parchin and we noticed 

that there were some particles consistent with what they are not 

allowed to have, they did not allow further access to their site following that. 

So we were not actually allowed to get our inspectors there to follow up on those—on those particles. 

So I just wanted to correct the record on those few things. 

Mr. Chair, I have 2 minutes. Do you want me to yield to you for 

the remainder? 

Chairman ROYCE. No. No, that’s quite all right. Go ahead with 

your line of questioning if you wish. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. So I would just add a couple of quick points 

then. One is I am deeply troubled by the activities of the Secretary 

of State—Former Secretary of State John Kerry. He’s no longer the 

Secretary of State and his activities right now really are deeply 

troubling. 

He wasn’t very good when he was the Secretary of State. He 

shouldn’t be acting like one still today. There was some back and 

forth earlier with regards to ransom and the payment that was 

made, and that was money that was owed to the Iranians. 

But the part that was left out was that that money had to be 

given to the Iranians in cash simultaneously with the release of 

American hostages. 

So, that part—again, just completing the record from an earlier 

exchange—was left out. This was money that was owed. This 

wasn’t ransom. In order to release the hostages, money in cold hard 

cash had to arrive in pallets simultaneously in order to release the 

hostages. 

I have 30 seconds left. Anyone—did you want to respond, Mr. 

Rademaker, to the earlier point? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, since I was the one who was sort of 

dragged into conceding that Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA, 

let me just observe, I think you pointed to some potential technical 

violations. 

But big picture—my view has always been that the JCPOA is 

such a great deal for Iran that they would have to be out of their 

minds to cheat on it. 

Now, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t scrutinize them because 

they’ve cheated on plenty of agreements in the past—they might be 

tempted to cheat on this one. 

But rationally—the rational thing for them to do is comply fully, 

comply scrupulously, and then reap the dividend of the sunset 

clauses starting in about the tenth year because then they’ll be 

able to have everything they want. So why jeopardize that by 

cheating to gain some small advantage today when they get enormous advantages by operation of time? 

And, we are almost 21⁄2 years into the agreement at this point. 

So we are a quarter of the way to them being able to reap all the 

benefits. 

So the closer we get to the 10 years, which is January 2026, the 

less incentive they’ll have to cheat because they just wait a little 

bit more time and they won’t have to cheat. 

56

Mr. ZELDIN. Yes. Important points. Thank you for mentioning all 

of them. I think, in a way, Iran can’t help themselves but to cheat 

and to test the limits and see what they can get away with. 

But I just—I need to correct the record because it was—it has 

been stated way before today’s hearing by many people that Iran 

has not violated the letter of the JCPOA and we could debate over 

how significant one might think all the violations are. But it’s just 

inaccurate to say Iran has not violated the letter of the JCPOA. 

There actually have been many different violations of the letter. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Bill Keating of Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, most of the attention today will go with the President’s decision to pull out of the agreement. I wish there was more 

attention on this hearing because I do believe Congress has a role. 

This committee has a role, a major role, and if you listen to this 

morning’s testimony you’d see, generally speaking, bipartisan 

agreement that pulling out is the wrong approach and has consequences that are going to be deleterious and there’s room to go 

and I just want to talk about a few of those things. 

Now, people cavalierly just say, well, 8 years and they can do 

whatever they want. Well, that’s not true under the agreement. 

There are limitations that are for 10 years, 15 years, 25 years, and 

permanent limitations. Those are in the agreement. 

Now, the sunset issue is one that there are some restrictions on 

this, going forward, limitations on this. And our approach to this 

and to the inspections issue, which Secretary Mattis said, in his 

own words, ‘‘pretty robust verification’’—his words. 

So the inspection process is enforcing these limitations under the 

sunset. We should take a policy with our allies of extremely and 

aggressively pushing inspections, certifications. 

That is already at our disposal if we work together and work 

hard, and if they’re violating it that coalition coming together can 

make adjustments themselves and that’s where we should be going 

with this. 

Now, there are issues with the ballistic missile program and the 

activities of the Quds Force—the malign activities of the Quds 

Force. 

But within that coalition—and independently we can deal with 

that—but working with the coalition we can be more effective dealing with those issues. 

And here’s my point—by pulling out—and I’ve talked to the leaders in the other countries—there’s no surprise here—they’re staying in, our allies, and the division that that’s going to cause is just 

going to undercut our ability to do what I just said—aggressively 

enforce what’s there. Stand together and make sure that’s being 

done. That’s being ripped apart with that. 

Can you comment on the real harmful effect of us being able to 

enforce this strongly as a coalition being undercut by this pulling 

away from the agreement? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I am not sure if that’s addressed to me but 

I totally agree with the comments and I think I’ve tried to make 

the point several different ways. 

57

You also made a point that I hadn’t mentioned yet, which is that 

Former Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz, who was a key negotiator 

here—he was the actual nuclear scientist in the room—claims that 

a number of provisions in the deal are permanent. 

For example, he says that because of the way we track plutonium production Iran will never be able to—never, not in 10 years, 

not in 15 years, not in 25 years—ever be able to produce a plutonium weapon which is a—certainly, a form of nuclear weapon that 

has devastating consequences and that some other provisions, as 

you said, last more than 10 years. So——

Mr. KEATING. And I would agree with you, Secretary Moniz, and 

any scientist will tell you that we are concerned about inspections——

Ms. HARMAN. Right. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. And the 28-day delay. That material 

is around for a lot longer than we are going to be here and it’s totally detectable. So that delay is not going to hurt our ability to do 

it. 

That’s in there, in the agreement as well. So there are things in 

here that we can deal with and work together with and maybe expand the issues that surround it. But we have to do it with that 

coalition that was so successful. We can’t do it alone. 

Ms. HARMAN. And—right. One of the real selling points of the 

deal was the P5+1—the fact that it’s the permanent members of 

the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, and that includes China 

and Russia. 

And the fact that we could get to a deal even if not a perfect 

deal—I made the point before——

Mr. KEATING. I am in my last minute so I am sorry—I apologize 

to interrupt but you just mentioned something else that’s important. 

Right now in Russia Putin has had a pretty good week with his 

ceremony being reinstalled as their leader. This really completes 

his week. 

This division with the West is exactly what Russia has been 

gearing toward and continues to undercut a coalition that’s been 

there since the end of World War II that’s brought more peace and 

prosperity to this world than any other time period. He’s trying to 

undercut it quickly. 

Putin must be having a pretty good laugh about this happening 

right now, don’t you think? 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. I was asked what are his intentions and I said 

to make mischief. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. If I could answer, Congressman, since 

I am from Massachusetts—I think one of the deficits here is that 

we didn’t really focus on Russia’s interest in the P5+1 negotiation. 

Here he was sitting on our side of the table and somehow the 

arms embargo got lifted for conventional weapons. I used to be in 

charge of arms sales in the State Department. 

And suddenly old deals were being carried out, deliveries were 

being made, and now he’s got a new market for the Russian arms 

industry. We’ve never really commented on that and that’s a bit of 

cynicism. 

58

They weren’t exactly in the same place strategically that we were 

with the Western Europeans. So that’s a problem. 

I also think, though, that it’s important to give a political explanation for what was happening at the negotiating table on the Iranian side. We’ve been talking about what they can do in 8 years, 

6 years, et cetera. 

That’s true. But what they really did was to transition from 

being an illegal outlaw nuclear rogue state to being a legal nuclear 

power. 

That was the big thing. It already happened. They became fully 

legal in 2015-2016. So I personally—and I go back to the things 

I’ve said before—don’t look at this regime in Tehran as sort of planning for 2026. 

They’re trying to get through 2018, and I think that knowledge, 

that sensibility, could help us come together on a policy on Iran 

that puts leverage and pressure on them to back off and looks at 

their vulnerabilities. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We are going to go to Ann Wagner of 

Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely hearing. I want to also thank the witnesses for their service. 

When the last administration signed its very flawed nuclear deal 

with Iran, many hoped that the economic incentives would entice 

Iran to leave its destabilizing violent agenda behind and to join the 

community of responsible nations. 

I, quite frankly, never shared that optimism. Nearly 3 years 

later, Iran’s behavior remains deeply disturbing. Iran’s support for 

Assad and for terrorist groups throughout the region compromises 

U.S. interests and, frankly, the security of our allies. 

It is absolutely critical that the United States use its strength 

and its economic clout to hold Iran accountable for its proxy army 

of terrorist groups and extremists militias. 

Ambassador Bloomfield, U.S. policy makers see factionalism in 

Iranian domestic politics as kind of a ray of hope. But you have 

criticized Washington’s long-standing kind of naivete in this regard 

and I agree. Wishful thinking has impaired policy makers’ ability 

to assess the Iranian threat with clear eyes. 

Dissenting factions within Iran have yet to succeed in modifying 

the regime’s behavior abroad, it seems. However, that’s not to say 

that meaningful change can never happen. 

Can you assess here briefly the long-term possibilities for internal reforms in Iran, please? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I will. Thank you very much, and I 

agree with all of your comments, Congresswoman. 

There are several countries in this world which are one-party authoritarian states—Russia, China, Syria, North Korea, Iran. 

These are circles of power that have similarities, even though the 

culture is different. They never intend to lose power. 

This regime has been in power for nearly 39 years. It’s the same 

people. Some of them become hardliners and then 10 years later 

they’re reformists. 

59

I am not saying that they are all identical drones. No human 

race produces people who agree on everything. We fight about politics in Washington. They fight about politics in Tehran. 

But if the people push hard enough and complain about the economic deprivation, the lack of rights, the abuse, the executions—

more than 50 percent of the executions in the Middle East are Iranian executions—the Tier 3 trafficking in persons, how they’re 

hanging people from ropes for trafficking drugs but we are catching 

IRGC 18-wheelers in Europe with drugs. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Right. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. And so there’s so much that could be 

said about what they’ve done. If this ever catches up to them, not 

one of the reformists—not one of the moderates—can walk down 

the street and not be told, ‘‘You were part of the 39-year reign of 

terror.’’

So I think they all know that. Everything that they do is to stay 

in power, and I think when you start with that piece of wisdom, 

and consider the JCPOA, they came to the table maybe because of 

economic duress. 

But let me just say that even if we hadn’t given them all that 

money, they have huge oil reserves. They share one of the largest 

gas fields on the planet. 

They have tens of billions—upwards of 100 billion, probably, in 

the religious foundations. The issue is not whether we are giving 

them the money, although I know it upsets people. The issue is, 

they have the money. 

They’re just not spending it on the people, and that’s a fight between the Iranian people, 80 million of them, and this circle of clerics that has held power for 39 years. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I appreciate that perspective very much and appreciate it being in the record. 

Mr. Rademaker, I haven’t seen the preannouncements of the 

President’s announcement but let’s just say that the President does 

decide to either reimpose sanctions or walk away from the Iranian 

deal at this point. 

How can we use it to our advantage to perhaps strengthen his 

hand in the North Korean denuclearisation talks? Do you see any 

way, shape, or form in doing that? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. That’s an interesting question. The conventional wisdom—and I think we’ve heard it expressed here today—

is that walking away from the JCPOA makes it harder to strike 

a deal with North Korea because they’ll assume that President 

Trump can’t be trusted to honor commitments that the United 

States makes. 

I think there’s a lot to be said for that argument. But I think 

that’s probably not President Trump’s analysis. 

I think probably his analysis is the opposite—that it will be a 

signal of strength and determination that he sends to the North 

Koreans—that by walking away from a deal that didn’t adequately 

address the nuclear threat from Iran he’s showing them that he’s 

going to settle for something that’s inadequate. 

Now, I think a lot of people would disagree that that’s the effect 

but I do think actually——

60

Mrs. WAGNER. I think it is. I will say this. I believe that it is 

America’s strength. I believe it is the maximum pressure campaign. 

I spent some time in the Korean Peninsula and on the ChinaNorth Korea border and I do believe that our strength, the sanctions package, has brought players to the table, especially Kim 

Jong-un, and it’ll be interesting to see what dynamic this has I 

think going forward. 

So Ms. Harman, please—Congresswoman. 

Ms. HARMAN. If I just might add to that, though, as Linc Bloomfield just said, regime survival is hugely important to the Iranian 

regime. 

I think regime survival is just as important to the Kim regime 

in North Korea, and they’ve been in power for 70 years and presided over the most atrocious human rights abuses and so forth. 

We all agree with that. 

So if they’re interested in regime survival, why would they voluntarily give up a pretty highly-developed nuclear industry to a goal 

of denuclearization? Why——

Mrs. WAGNER. Because their people are suffering. Their people 

are starving. Their people are under such oppression from both the 

human rights and economic standpoint. 

I believe that’s why—certainly why North Korea has come to the 

table. 

Ambassador Bloomfield, do you agree? No? Good. 

Ms. Harman, please. You can finish up. 

Ms. HARMAN. Just to respond, I think the regime is responsible 

for a lot of that starvation——

Mrs. WAGNER. It is. 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. And deprivation of rights, and I think 

if it gives up its nuclear weapons and allows for an entry into the 

normal world by North Korea, it risks its survival. I am not making that case. I don’t want that to turn out to the be true. 

But I am saying from the perspective of the Kim regime, I think 

they will be reluctant to now restore or provide for the first times 

rights to their people because they could easily be overthrown. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you for your perspective. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time and I will yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We go to David Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. 

I think the President’s behavior in this context is dangerous. It 

is undermining the security of the United States and our interests 

around the world. 

His antics demonstrate a tremendous lack of understanding of 

the implications of withdrawing from this agreement and using 

this deal as a rhetorical wedge for political gain and playing a will 

he, won’t he game of certification is a distraction from the very serious issues including keeping our ally, Israel, safe, combatting terrorism in the region, having a strategy for success in Syria, and opposing Iran’s various malign activities throughout the region. 

And while we are dithering about certification of sanctions waivers and bullying our European allies, the Iranians, in concert with 

61

Russia and Syria, have set up a sphere of influence that stretches 

from Tehran to Damascus. 

The New York Times is now reporting that the President is actually going to reimpose all the sanctions, and so this hope that 

somehow he was going to be a great negotiator—we were just going 

to add to the deal, Mr. Rademaker, doesn’t seem very likely. 

And it’s not the language the President has been using. He’s 

been talking about it being the worst deal in the world and he’s 

going to fix it, and what he’s going to do is undermine our ability 

to really provide leadership in responding to Iranian aggression 

around the world. 

Many of us saw making certain that nuclear weapons were off 

the table would actually enable the United States to lead an effort 

to really respond to the malign behavior of the Iranians in various 

parts of the world and their effort to really enlarge their sphere of 

influence. 

All of that is thrown out now. It’s hard to imagine how anyone 

will be willing to work with the United States in developing a real 

strategy to do that when we aren’t keep our word in this international agreement. 

So I know, Congresswoman, you have mentioned this in your testimony. We are in the middle of this discussion about 

denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. 

If you’re Kim Jong-un and you’re watching this and thinking oh, 

here was an international agreement led by the United States in 

which they promised to give up their nuclear program in exchange 

for certain things. 

Everyone admits they have complied with the agreement. This 

idea of, like, well, maybe not with the spirit—it’s just not true. Everyone who has reviewed it said they are in compliance. When you 

have an agreement, you have terms. You either comply with them 

or you don’t. 

And so I just wonder what it means in terms of our ability to actually resolve another very difficult question on the Korean Peninsula when we have some challenges now with our partnership with 

our allies as a result of this walk away coupled with some credibility as to whether we’ll keep our word. 

So, Congresswoman, I would love your thoughts on that. 

Ms. HARMAN. I think that if President Trump can reach a strong 

deal with the North Koreans he will deserve enormous credit. That 

will be huge, as he discusses it, and I give him credit all the time 

for making North Korea the first focus of his foreign policy. 

So I am all for a strong deal with the North Koreans and I am 

all for the conversation which will take place soon somewhere. 

But I do think, as you said, that decertifying this deal or at least 

in some way pulling away from this deal is going to make it harder 

to negotiate with the North Koreans. I just made that point. 

I think that the Kim regime in North Korea has regime survival 

as its first tenet—not helping its people but regime survival—and 

it figures that by doing a deal that will welcome it back into the 

community of nations it will enhance its ability to survive. 

I also think a second goal is somehow unifying the Korean Peninsula, which could be achieved because South and North Korea are 

62

finally talking to each other and may finally end the Korean War, 

which has never had a formal end. 

So those goals are achievable but by watching what happens 

today they may be fading farther away on the horizon. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

The other question is there are mechanisms that are available to 

the administration today under the Global Magnitsky Act as well 

as CAATSA. 

Now, whether any of the witnesses know how many Iranians are 

being sanctioned under those two provisions currently? 

You know, this idea of, like, we already have these vehicles and 

is the administration making use of them. Does anyone know? Are 

there any? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I don’t know the answer to that. It appears that we don’t know but——

Mr. CICILLINE. All right. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD [continuing]. But I would say that our 

military leaders have constantly said that all tools of national 

power should be mobilized in support of U.S. policies and I am not 

sure we are quite there yet. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Yeah. Thank you. 

And finally, I know there has been some discussion about what 

I would put in quotes as ‘‘evidence’’ submitted by Prime Minister 

Netanyahu last week about the prior intentions of the Iranians 

some—almost two decades ago. 

It was clear to everyone who was studying that deal that that 

was information that was known to U.S. intelligence agencies, 

known to negotiators. 

In fact, if we didn’t have some believe that they were intending 

to do that we wouldn’t need the JCPOA. So this was not any surprise to anybody on the panel, I take it? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Can I respond to that, please? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Sure. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. First of all, I am a centrist and I like 

bipartisanship. And in that spirit, if we go back to the beginning 

of the nuclear talks, I am not as hard on President Obama for seeing an opening when the Iranians reached out to see if we could 

reduce their nuclear threat and maybe move relations to a better 

place. 

He went before the United Nations and he not only said we want 

to negotiate a nuclear agreement but in 2013 the President also 

said we would like to see if we can follow a path to better understanding between the two countries. 

What we have is the answer from Iran. It’s 2018. We have a different President. We have the nuclear agreement. That was done. 

But the rest of it—Iran’s intentions, Iran’s nature—has been revolutionary. It has been to export and foment trouble, to try to destroy the ability of the Syrians to get to a constitutional government. 

With the Iraqis that we bled and died for to have a constitutional 

government, they have committed sectarian warfare to undermine 

that, because the next stop is Tehran. That’s my view. 

63

So I think it’s appropriate for this President to say, ‘‘Wait a 

minute—this isn’t enough.’’ Now, I don’t know what he’s going to 

say about the JCPOA. 

My own view is that it only talks about part of the problem. If 

there’s no restraint, we have a crisis. If there is restraint, let’s 

move to the rest of it, and that’s what I’ve tried to explain today. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

Congresswoman. 

Ms. HARMAN. If I could just add a comment to that. I applaud 

the statement, but let’s remember what the deal was. It was a 

transaction to get Iran to stop its development of nuclear weapons 

for a finite period of time. That’s it. 

It was not a transformation of the relationship. That was aspirational and, sadly, those aspirations did not come to pass. 

But my view is we should still keep the transaction and negotiate a stronger transaction, meanwhile, working with our allies to 

keep the whole area more stable through an authorization to use 

military force, which Congress could enact. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Tom Garrett of Virginia. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to say to 

the three honorable and distinguished members of the panel that 

I apologize in advance. 

As a junior member, I am going to covetously guard my 5 minutes. I won’t get six or seven. 

So I want to start, Ms. Harman, with a comment that you made. 

If the people—and I quote verbatim—‘‘If the people of Iran who 

elected their government by more than 50 percent in a four-way 

field want to change their government let them do it.’’

Are you implying that there are free and fair elections in Iran? 

Ms. HARMAN. No. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. 

Ms. HARMAN. But I am implying that——

Mr. GARRETT. I am going to covetous—I am not trying to be rude 

and I respect your immense service to this body. But I want to be 

clear, because the Iranians watch these hearings, right. 

So the Guardians Council approves individuals who wish to run 

for office in Iran and, as an example, 496 individuals wanted to run 

for President in 2009. Four were approved. So it’s not so simple—

regime change—as winning an election, and I don’t want to—and, 

again, not meant to be disrespectful. 

I want to read from the comments of my colleague, who I think 

was nearly prescient when he wrote in 2015 the following: Now, 

under U.S.—now as the law—under U.S. law the only thing that’s 

binding on the U.S. is a tree that’s designed as a treaty. So it says 

it’s a treaty submitted to the Senate for ratification, it gets twothirds positive vote. This deal is not a treaty. It has no standing 

under U.S. law except as a handshake from the President. 

I continue from my colleague—the Vienna Convention of Law of 

Treaties provides a hierarchy of agreements. 

This deal is not a ratified treaty. It’s not an unratified treaty. It’s 

not an executive legislative agreement. It’s the lowest form of international handshake. 

64

So I continue from my same colleague: You can be sure that Iran 

will violate this agreement or not, based on whether it’s in their 

interest, whether they think they’ll get caught. No one around the 

Ayatollah will say no, no, that would be a violation of international 

law. 

And so I want to thank my colleague, Mr. Sherman, because I 

think he’s really been sort of omniscient as it relates to foreseeing 

what happens. 

Mr. Rademaker, do we know, to a metaphysical certainty, that 

Iran is in compliance with the terms of the JCPOA? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. No, I don’t think we——

Mr. GARRETT. And, again, not trying to be rude. I got a finite 

amount of time. 

And we don’t know that because military sites are off limits to 

inspections, correct? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. They’ve declared that they will be off sites. 

There’s been no request to inspect military——

Mr. GARRETT. And if there is an inspection request, how much 

time do the Iranians have to prepare? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I am not sure, but they would have—they 

would have some time. The bigger question, though, is are there 

other sites that we don’t know about at all that we don’t to inspect. 

Mr. GARRETT. That would be the next question. And initially contemplated was 24 days to prepare. My colleague, Mr. Sherman, 

very humorously but I think accurately said, ‘‘I could clean out my 

garage in 24 days.’’

And so, again, I commend him for sort of being—having foresight. 

Let me ask you this. Linc—because that’s what you said somebody to call you—is a nuclear-armed Iran consistent with the rhetoric from the mullahs an existential threat to entities in the region 

as well as the nation state of Israel and, depending upon the delivery mechanism, an existential threat to millions and millions of 

people in the United States? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. As a technical physical matter, of 

course it is. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I’ve already explained why I think 

they need it for political reasons more than military reasons. 

Mr. GARRETT. I understand, again, and I know I am sort of limiting these questions but I am limited in time. 

Does Iran have a documented history, Mr. Rademaker, of violating international agreements? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, when it came to—in the nuclear area they 

have a long history of deception and cheating on their international 

obligations with regard to nuclear safeguards. 

Mr. GARRETT. And my good friend and colleague, Mr. Engel, 

pointed out that the—well over $100 million—in previous statements that there are well over $100 million that we released to 

Iran would go to fund activities that the Iranians have engaged in 

for perpetuity to include Hamas, Hezbollah wreaking havoc in the 

region and globally. 

Can anyone on the panel, just for my own sort of intellectual curiosity, name a single terrorist entity other than Hezbollah, which 

65

is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Iranian government which has 

the dubious distinction of having murdered people on every single 

inhabited continent? Can anybody, or is Hezbollah—are the Iranians the only ones? 

Australia? South America? So I suppose, in conclusion, Mr. 

Rademaker, would you feel better about this agreement as was indicated by my colleague, Ms. Frankel, as well as Mr. Deutch and 

Mr. Sires in 2015, if the inspection were more robust? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Certainly. 

Mr. GARRETT. Would each of you feel better about this agreement 

if the fungible moneys weren’t freed to Iran that have historically 

gone to fund radical elements that murder people across the globe, 

quite literally, like Hamas, Hezbollah, et cetera? Ms. Harman, I 

saw you reaching for the button. 

Ms. HARMAN. Of course I would. 

Mr. GARRETT. And so if we can maintain some agreement and 

yet get a stronger agreement as it relates to things like ballistic 

missile technology that would, in the estimation of all folks on the 

panel, be a step in the right direction? 

Ms. HARMAN. Absolutely, but the question we raised is whether 

the President’s anticipated action this afternoon helps or hinders 

that goal. 

Mr. GARRETT. Well, Ms. Harman, I will wrap up. 

Again, with complete respect for everybody on the panel, I would 

read from my friend and colleague, Mr. Deutch, who wrote in 2015, 

‘‘Many of my colleagues are trying to turn this into a partisan 

fight.’’ People of good faith can disagree. Honestly, they should 

stop. 

We do not know what the actions of the President will be circa 

2:00 p.m. this afternoon. I will be completely candid in speaking for 

or against them once I understand what they are. 

But in the meantime, trying to score political points, I think 

you’d all agree, is a bad idea and we can do a little bit better with 

this thing that has been referred to as a deal and an agreement 

but not a treaty and it is indeed within our legal purview to attempt to do so by virtue of the nature of the underlying agreement. 

Is that not correct, ma’am? Anybody? 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes, it’s correct, and this committee, on a bipartisan basis has stated a general position, which I certainly would 

commend and I commended at the outset of my testimony the bipartisanship, the long history of it—of this committee. I think it’s 

an exemplary part of the House. 

Mr. GARRETT. The only thing I would submit, and not to poke at 

you at all, is that we should not judge what the President is going 

to say before he said it. 

That’s all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Garrett. 

Lois Frankel from Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Schneider, thank you for still being here because it’s usually 

just myself and the chairman at the end. 

66

All right. So there is a benefit to lasting a couple of hours of the 

hearing because there’s always something happening, which is I 

got a news alert that Russia opens the door to rework Iran deal. 

Apparently, their foreign minister just said that they’re interested in the French proposal. I don’t know what that means. I just 

thought I would bring that out. Maybe I will ask a question about 

it. 

So, listen, here’s the point that we all agree. First off, thank you 

for being here. I know we all agree, everybody, that Iran should 

never get a nuclear weapon, and there’s no conflict between believing that and those of us who agree that the deal was flawed. 

I personally did not like the deal because I thought Iran’s dangerous actions were left unaddressed, the sunset clauses and so 

forth—all these things that are still pressing. 

With that said, I think we need to fix, not nix, and I—as much 

as I disagree with this President on almost everything, I really—

even though he’s going to today say he’s going to impose sanctions—apparently he’s going to impose all the sanctions back—I 

really—I find it hard to believe that he’s really going to do that. 

Maybe it’s diplomatic chess. 

But here’s my question. I hope that’s what it is. From a practical 

point of view, first, I wanted to ask you this. Let’s say he imposes 

sanctions—reimposes them. 

How long does it take to get them—the consequences, which I 

think he’s trying to get to, which is a better deal—so from a practical effect, what does the administration have to do to make the 

imposition of the sanctions actually work? What are the next steps? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. It may be, Congresswoman, that 

they’ve already done some homework on this and so it’s very hard 

to predict. I think the bureaucracy will work very hard and probably very well. 

The effect will be immediate. The rial—the Iranian currency—is 

very weak right now and dropping. A news flash at 2 o’clock from 

Washington that the President is unsatisfied with this regime’s behavior will resonate throughout the country and out of fear people 

just not knowing what the sanctions will do will have a negative 

effect on their currency. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay. So what do you think is the risk of them 

starting up the—to try to have a nuclear weapon that actually is 

effective? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Could I just, for the record, point out 

that in January, before the Israeli Knesset, Vice President Pence 

made a ‘‘solemn promise’’ that the United States will never allow 

Iran to have a nuclear weapon. That’s a check we have written—

this administration has written. 

That’s why in my testimony I suggested perhaps the President 

should enshrine it as a doctrine. We hope that Iran will agree not 

to develop a nuclear weapon under these arrangements. 

But if they do, this is a promise that the Obama administration 

also made. This is bipartisan. We have said they will never have 

the bomb. 

Well, we have to hold to that. That’s a red line. 

67

Ms. FRANKEL. Ms. Harman, 1 second before you answer the question, okay, let me—okay, answer that question because I do have 

another one. Go ahead. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think it has always been U.S. policy at least 

as long as we’ve worried about Iran. First it was U.S. policy that 

they could not—should not—it certainly was my view, get intercontinental ballistic missile technology and transfer it to others. 

They did get that. That’s the point. 

But I think the Obama agreement, as we have discussed, was 

transactional and it should—if it remains in effect in some effect, 

that would be a positive. 

What I was going to say is that one of the downsides of an announcement that we are leaving the deal is the reaction of our allies. 

Let’s understand this deal is much more effective because we had 

three European countries plus China and Russia in the deal, and 

what happens next? Maybe some new mischief from Russia is going 

to be fascinating. But we probably will not be in the driver’s seat. 

Ms. FRANKEL. What do you think the actions will be by Iran and 

do you think there’s any possibility that they would agree to a new 

agreement—a new add-on? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So I don’t even know yet what the President’s 

going to announce at 2 o’clock. So it’s hard for me to——

Ms. FRANKEL. I am assuming he’s going to announce the worst. 

I don’t know whether he’ll follow through but——

Mr. RADEMAKER. Assuming the United States reimposes sanctions that’s a breach by the United States of its obligations under 

the JCPOA, then as a legal matter Iran, if it wants to walk away 

from its obligations, it’s entitled to do so. Whether they will do that 

or not, I don’t know. 

They may benefit politically by playing the aggrieved party and 

continue to comply and asking for compensation in other areas. 

That would be a shrewd clever strategy on their part. 

Would they be open to a new negotiation? You know, I think absolutely, and the—you should read my prepared statement on this. 

I talk about what negotiations on a follow-on agreement would look 

like. 

From today’s baseline, if the baseline is the JCPOA and we are 

asking Iran to make additional concessions, they’re going to naturally say, well, what are you prepared to give us in exchange and 

what I point out in my testimony is the main thing we have to give 

them in exchange is relaxation or elimination of our primary embargo. 

In other words, we promise, okay, we are going to stop treating 

you like an economic pariah. American companies, American individuals will be able to trade with Iran in the future just like any 

other country. 

That would be a good deal for Iran. But then my question, which 

I asked in my prepared statement, is what’s left of our counter terrorism policy because——

Ms. FRANKEL. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. We imposed those sanctions to stop 

them from supporting Hezbollah, to get them to back off from their 

commitment to destroy Israel. 

68

And if we decide to rehabilitate them, turn them into a normal 

nation because they make some additional concessions in the nuclear area, what’s left of our efforts to stop them from supporting 

terrorism? 

Ms. FRANKEL. Right, and——

Mr. RADEMAKER. And that’s the question——

Ms. FRANKEL [continuing]. And you can’t—how can you renegotiate—can’t in 5 minutes? It doesn’t take 5 minutes to get a deal. 

We need to try to stop their terrorism, and I am just worried what 

they’re going to do in the meantime. 

Chairman ROYCE. All right. We go now to Mr. Brad Schneider of 

Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, and I want to thank the chairman 

and the ranking member for having this hearing and, like my colleagues before, I associate myself with your remarks. 

I want to thank the witnesses both for staying here and sharing 

your perspectives but also for your past service to our country. 

About eight witnesses ago—because we now have instant alerts 

on our watches—New York Times reported that the President is 

going to withdraw, moments ago, Haaretz is quoting, France is denying that President Trump told Macron that they’re going to withdraw. 

So I think we are at a point where we have absolutely clarity 

from this. But I think where there is clarity and, among the committee and on both sides as well as the witnesses, we talked about 

that there’s agreement Iran should never ever have a nuclear 

weapon. 

That was true before the JCPOA. It is true for the terms of the 

JCPOA and I believe it should be true after elements of the JCPOA 

sunset. 

Ambassador Bloomfield, you, in your written testimony, talked 

about the fact that the United States has the ability—and I believe 

it should and I felt this way before the JCPOA—we should make 

clear that we will never ever allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon—not now, not during the terms of this agreement, not afterwards. 

Is there anything preventing the President or, for that matter, 

Congress from making that statement? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I am not aware of any nor was I aware 

of any when President Carter called the defense of the Persian Gulf 

a vital interest to the United States. These are things that Presidents do. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And I think that would be true long, long into 

the future. 

Earlier, there was talk about compliance—Iran’s compliance with 

the nuclear arrangement and that there weren’t flaws in the compliance. 

I just want to make clear—my issues with Iran’s compliance or 

flaws at the moment it’s when there are sunsets. The flaws, I believe, are within the deal. And I believe that, like any deal, there 

are inherent risks in the JCPOA. I believe there are gaps in the 

JCPOA and, particularly, with sunsets and some of the other 

issues there are flaws. 

69

But I also think it’s important that we recognize that the JCPOA 

has bought us time. In fact, Gadi Eizenkot, in January 2016—the 

chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces—said that we need to use 

this time to develop a strategy and create the leverage. 

We’ve pushed Iran back for a year for up to 15 years. That’s a 

good thing. But we have to keep Iran back and permanently away 

from a nuclear weapon. 

Does pulling out of the deal now create any more leverage? I will 

look to you, Mr. Rademaker, if you can touch on that. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. President Trump may calculate that negotiating some follow-on agreement from the baseline of the JCPOA is 

a losing proposition because the only thing we have to give them 

is additional sanctions relief of our primary embargo and he doesn’t 

want to do that. 

So he wants to change the baseline. That’s sort of how I interpret 

what he’s been doing. 

Can I comment on this related issue, though? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Declaring a policy that we are not going to 

allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon—I mean, look, that sounds 

right. Let’s declare it. 

But you need to answer the question, what are you going to do 

about it, okay. If they—and I think the implication of this declaration is we are going to attack them, okay—that we will attack Iran 

if it gets close to having a nuclear weapon. I am fine with that declaration. Okay. 

But what President Trump has been asking for, what he asked 

the Congress to legislate and what he asked the Europeans to 

agree to was not join us in threatening to attack Iran. 

He said join us in threatening to impose sanctions on Iran if they 

get close to having a nuclear weapon. 

The Europeans said, oh, no, no, that might upset the Iranians—

we can’t do that. Legislation to do that stalled in the Senate——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I can——

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. And I guess, you know, if you’re 

going to declare this policy you got to put some teeth in it and 

if——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Fair enough. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. The only teeth are the threaten 

to—we are going to threaten to attack them, that’s safe—threatening to oppose sanctions on them, that’s dangerous, I don’t——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, let me reclaim my time because in your 

testimony you talked about we either accept it or reject it. I don’t 

believe we should accept the flaws. I think there are things we can 

do to close the gaps, reduce the risks, and try to fix the flaws. 

But I don’t think it’s either-or. I think there’s a sequence, and 

I think what we need to do is say how do we put pressure on Iran 

to change its behaviors—change its behaviors around ICBMs, 

change its behaviors around their efforts to expand within the region—change its behaviors on support of terror and human rights, 

and that should be a full-throated across-the-board pressure. 

But behind that there also, I believe, has to be ways to box Iran 

in and the credible threat of military action has to be a part of 

that. 

70

We said before all options—all options have to be on the table. 

But most importantly, within that, I believe, we need to create 

strategic options—create leverage for the United States to force 

Iran to change its goals, to understand that we are not going to accept a nuclear Iran and that means working with our allies, maintaining the relationship and, as my colleague, Mr. Deutch, said earlier, ensuring that American leadership is indispensable and enforced. 

I am sorry. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, if I could just enthusiastically embrace that, 

that’s why I think Congress has to enact an authorization to use 

military force for the region, which would identify the trade-offs 

and how to create a strategy for United States leadership that puts 

maximum pressure not just on Iran—and by the way, we can curb 

its malign behavior outside the contours of the deal and we should 

be done more—but against other parities in the region who are engaged in nefarious activities in any country where they are. 

And we should dispel this notion that the U.S. is leaving the region and retreating from our responsibilities, that we have developed since the end of World War II with allies that have created 

an order in the world that’s valuable and we should try to maintain. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think our leadership is more important now 

than ever. 

Mr. Rademaker, do you have a response——

Mr. RADEMAKER. Just a concluding thought. Authorization for 

use of military force—fine idea. What President Trump asked for, 

I would say—asked the Senate to do—would properly be characterized as an authorization to impose economic sanctions, and the 

Senate wouldn’t do it. So——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, that’s why—I think there’s a sequence of 

things. We need to be able to apply the pressure, have the critical 

threat, and work to build the strategy long-term well beyond 2025, 

well beyond 2030, to make sure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon. 

Ms. HARMAN. The American people deserve a voice in this. They 

have to understand what the trade-offs are in terms of resources 

and loss of life, and they haven’t been included in the conversation 

the way they could be if Congress, on a bipartisan basis, led by this 

committee, would debate seriously and, hopefully, help pass an authorization to use military force. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Well, if I could just offer a final 

thought. I support what you’re saying about strong American leadership, about authorization for use of military force, about having 

a debate, about doing the right thing on the nuclear issue. 

I also feel that we need a much stronger view of the vulnerability 

of the Iranian regime, and I think what you’re saying is we need 

to understand their legitimacy problems, their economic mismanagement problems, their criminal record, the accountability for 

all of the things that they’ve done not only to us but to the rest 

of the region and the world. 

We’ve never held them to account. We’ve never even had a full 

accounting of what this regime has done. If we do that, we will see 

a very weak and isolated group of leaders who are on thin ice and 

71

who are trying to make a lot of noise and hold up bright shiny objects in order to gain a little bit of legitimacy and buy some time. 

I think if we do that, we can put together a comprehensive strategy that uses the wisdom that my two panelists have offered. I 

support much of their wisdom of what they put forward on the nuclear side. 

But let’s also have a comprehensive policy that says once and for 

all that this malign actor needs to be pushed back in the box. 

Chairman ROYCE. And, Ambassador, we’ll—we will be—Brad, 

you and I, Ambassador, this committee will be further engaged in 

that discussion with you and with all three of our witnesses today. 

I really want to thank you for your testimony and we thank the 

members also for your questions. 

So in about an hour the President will let us know his decision 

with respect to sanctions and, by extension, the nuclear deal, and 

we’ll see what he has to say and go from there. 

And this committee will stay engaged. But for now, we stand adjourned and thank you, again. 

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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