[Cite as Viola v. N. Royalton, 2021-Ohio-3239.]

{¶1} Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), Requester Anthony Viola moves for relief from this 

Court’s judgment of March 11, 2021. Viola’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion is not well taken. 

I. Background 

{¶2} On August 6, 2020, pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D), Viola filed a complaint 

against Respondent City of North Royalton (City) wherein he alleged, “I filed a public 

records request with the City of North Royalton asking them to produce e mails between 

city councilman Dan Kasaris and several individuals, but the city refused to search a 

personal Yahoo email account utilized by Kasaris and that affixed his official title as a 

city councilman as a signature.” The case was referred to mediation. After mediation 

failed to successfully resolve all disputed issues between the parties, a Special Master 

issued a Report and Recommendation wherein he recommended that the Court find 

that Viola had not shown that the City violated R.C. 149.43(B). Viola objected to the 

Report and Recommendation. The Court overruled Viola’s objections and adopted the 

Report and Recommendation on March 11, 2021. The Court’s docket shows that Viola 

appealed from this Court’s final judgment and that he later voluntarily dismissed the 

appeal. 

{¶3} On August 6, 2021, Viola moved for relief under Civ.R. 60(B) and he asked 

for a hearing on his motion. Viola maintains in the Civ.R. 60(B) motion that his motion, 

along with accompanying exhibits, demonstrates that he is entitled to relief from this 

Court’s final judgment. Viola served his Civ.R. 60(B) motion “via email and regular U.S. 

ANTHONY VIOLA 

 Requester 

 v. 

CITY OF NORTH ROYALTON 

 Respondent 

Case No. 2020-00477PQ 

Judge Patrick E. Sheeran 

DECISION 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -2- DECISION 

mail, postage prepaid” on July 29, 2021, according to a certificate of service 

accompanying Viola’s motion. Thus, pursuant to Civ.R. 6(C)(1), Civ.R. 6(D), and 

L.C.C.R. 4(C), the City was permitted to serve a response to Viola’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion 

by August 16, 2021, at the latest. Thus far, the City has not filed a response to Viola’s 

motion. 

{¶4} Twelve days after Viola filed his Civ.R. 60(B) motion, without leave, Viola 

filed additional documents, which are voluminous, that, according to Viola, “confirm 

Senior Assistant Ohio Attorney General Daniel Kasaris utilized his private Yahoo email 

account to conduct official business and make materially false statements to this Court 

in prior proceedings.” The additional documents include email correspondence from a 

person who appears to be Kasaris’ personal financial planner. Such correspondence 

lacks a sufficient nexus with Karsaris’ duties as a councilperson for the City of North 

Royalton. Other documents refer to matters forwarded by Kasaris to his own public 

email account, and to complaints of various types (e.g. a fallen tree branch) that were 

not responded to by Kasaris on his private email account. In essence, Viola has failed 

to show a sufficient nexus between Kasaris’ private email account and actions taken by 

him as a member of the North Royalton City Council. 

II. Law and Analysis 

A. The General Assembly has established a special proceeding in R.C. 

2743.75 that does not expressly permit the filing of post-judgment 

motions. 

{¶5} A special proceeding may be defined as a proceeding “involving statutory or 

civil remedies or rules rather than the rules or remedies ordinarily available under rules 

of procedure; a proceeding providing extraordinary relief.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1458 

(11th Ed.2019). Accord R.C. 2505.02(A)(2) (final order) (“special proceeding” “means 

an action or proceeding that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was 

not denoted as an action at law or a suit in equity”). The enactment of R.C. 2743.75 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -3- DECISION 

has created a special proceeding in this Court to resolve public-records disputes. See 

Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 163 Ohio St.3d 337, 2020-Ohio5371, 170 N.E.3d 768, ¶ 11 (“[u]ntil the 2016 enactment of R.C. 2743.75, an action in 

mandamus under R.C. 149.43(C) was the remedy to compel compliance with R.C. 

149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act. * * * The enactment of R.C. 2743.75 created an 

alternative means to resolve public-records dispute”). 

{¶6} The General Assembly plainly and unambiguously has failed to include a 

provision in R.C. 2743.75 that permits the filing of post-judgment motions. See R.C. 

2743.75. The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “Where the language of a statute is plain 

and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for 

resorting to rules of statutory interpretation. An unambiguous statute is to be applied, 

not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph 

five of the syllabus. R.C. 2743.75 therefore should be applied, as written. Accord 

Buddenberg v. Weisdack, 161 Ohio St.3d 160, 2020-Ohio-3832, 161 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 10, 

quoting Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm., 83 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 699 N.E.2d 

473 (1998), quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 627, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), 

quoting McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 593, 601 (1854) (“a court must give effect ‘“‘to 

the natural and most obvious import of [a statute’s] language, without resorting to subtle 

and forced constructions’”’”); State v. Smith, 34 Ohio App.3d 180, 187, 517 N.E.2d 933 

(5th Dist.1986) (“when the legislature has a deliberate and conscious purpose to 

accomplish a desired result, it is not ‘tongue-tied’”). 

{¶7} Even if Viola’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion presented the Court with an occasion to 

resort to rules of statutory interpretation, a review of R.C. 2743.75 shows that the 

General Assembly explicitly limited motion practice under the framework established in 

the statute. See R.C. 2743.75(E)(2) (providing that “[n]o further motions or pleadings 

shall be accepted by the clerk of the court of claims or by the special master assigned 

by the clerk under [R.C. 2743.75(D)(2)] unless the special master directs in writing that 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -4- DECISION 

a further motion or pleading be filed”). A conclusion that post-judgment motions are not 

permitted under R.C. 2743.75 thus squares with the overall context of the statute. See 

Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-2067, ¶ 22 (Ohio 

Supreme Court precedent “requires courts to read a statute as a whole and to not 

dissociate words and phrases from that context”). 

{¶8} The Ohio Supreme Court held more than 100 years ago, “The question is 

not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that 

which it did enact. That body should be held to mean what it has plainly expressed, and 

hence no room is left for construction.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 621, 64 

N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. Accord Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. 

Employees. Retirement Fund, ___U.S.___, 138 S.Ct. 1061, 1069, 200 L.Ed.2d 332 

(2018) (“[t]he statute says what it says—or perhaps better put here, does not say what it 

does not say”). Here, the General Assembly has plainly and unambiguously expressed 

that post-judgment motions are not permitted under R.C. 2743.75. The General 

Assembly therefore should be held to mean what it has plainly and unambiguously 

expressed without resorting to statutory interpretation. 

B. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure govern practice and procedure 

under R.C. 2743.75, except as inconsistent with R.C. 2743.75. 

{¶9} The General Assembly has established that certain practices and

procedures in R.C. Chapter 2743 shall be governed by the Ohio Rules of Civil 

Procedure. See R.C. 2743.03(D). Pursuant to R.C. 2743.03(D), the “Rules of Civil 

Procedure shall govern practice and procedure in all actions in the court of claims, 

except insofar as inconsistent with this chapter.” The special proceeding set forth in 

R.C. 2743.75 is contained within R.C. Chapter 2743. In accordance with R.C. 

2743.03(D), post-judgment motions (as allowed by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure) 

therefore are permitted under R.C. 2743.75, to the extent that such motions are 

consistent with practices and procedures established in R.C. 2743.75. 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -5- DECISION 

{¶10} The special proceeding established in R.C. 2743.75 provides a dissatisfied 

party with a mechanism to relieve such a party from this Court’s final judgment without 

seeking redress under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. See R.C. 2743.75(G)(1) 

(permitting a party under certain circumstances to challenge a judgment of this Court by 

means of an appeal to an Ohio court of appeals). Thus, a Civ.R. 60(B) motion that 

seeks relief from this Court’s final judgment arguably may be inconsistent with the 

practices and procedures of R.C. 2743.75. 

{¶11} The General Assembly created the special proceeding in R.C. 2743.75 to 

“provide for an expeditious and economical procedure.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 

2743.75(A). If this Court were to entertain a post-judgment motion that—(1) is not 

expressly permitted under R.C. 2743.75, (2) is inconsistent with practices and 

procedures established in R.C. 2743.75, and (3) hinders the “expeditious and 

economical procedure” envisioned by the General Assembly in R.C. 2743.75—such a 

judicial decision would impermissibly allow a judicial policy choice to override a valid law 

enacted by the General Assembly. See State ex rel. Tritt v. State Emp. Rels. Bd., 97 

Ohio St.3d 280, 2002-Ohio-6437, 779 N.E.2d 226, ¶ 17 (“[b]ecause the General 

Assembly is the final arbiter of public policy, judicial policy preferences may not be used 

to override valid legislative enactments”); see also State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. 

Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, ¶ 44, quoting Kish 

v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006 Ohio 1244, 846 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 44, quoting State ex 

rel. James v. Ohio State Univ., 70 Ohio St.3d 168, 172, 637 N.E.2d 911 (1994) (“‘the 

General Assembly is the ultimate arbiter of policy considerations relevant to publicrecords laws * * * and it is for the legislature to “weigh[] and balance[] the competing 

public policy considerations between the public’s right to know how its state agencies 

make decisions and the potential harm, inconvenience or burden imposed on the 

agency by disclosure”’”). 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -6- DECISION 

Viola conspicuously has not identified legal authority that establishes that 

a party may seek Civ.R. 60(B) relief from a judgment issued under R.C. 2743.75. 

Neither has Viola offered any analysis to show that a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is 

consistent with the practices and procedures set forth in R.C. 2743.75. At the 

outset, Viola’s contention that, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), this Court should vacate 

its lawful judgment is suspect.

C. Viola’s motion and additional material do not warrant relief under Civ.R. 

60(B). 

{¶12} Under Civ.R. 60(B) a court is permitted to relieve a party or his legal 

representative from a final judgment in certain circumstances. See Civ.R. 60(B). But, 

as Supreme Court of Ohio has explained, “It is well established that a Civ.R. 60(B) 

motion cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal and that the doctrine of res judicata 

applies to such a motion.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 16, citing Harris v. Anderson, 109 Ohio St.3d 101, 2006-Ohio1934, 846 N.E.2d 43, ¶ 8-9. And, as further explained by the Ohio Supreme Court, 

“Civ.R. 60(B) exists to resolve injustices that are so great that they demand a departure 

from the strict constraints of res judicata. * * * [T]he rule does not exist to allow a party 

to obtain relief from his or her own choice to forgo an appeal from an adverse decision.” 

Kuchta at ¶ 15. 

{¶13} Since Viola voluntarily dismissed his appeal from this Court’s final 

judgment, Viola may not use his Civ.R. 60(B) motion to obtain relief from Viola’s own 

choice to voluntarily forgo an appeal. The Court disapproves any attempt by Viola to 

use his Civ.R. 60(B) motion as a substitute for an appeal. 

 Viola states in his Civ.R. 60(B) motion: 

Taken together, the evidence presented herein confirms that Kasaris: 

■ Integrated his Yahoo email account with his official email account; 

■ Made materially false statements to this Court; and 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -7- DECISION 

■ Possesses public records on his Yahoo email account. The foregoing 

facts and newly discovered evidence triggers an obligation of the part of 

the Respondent to - at the very least - search the Yahoo account for public 

records, and requires the Court to vacate its final judgment in this matter. 

(Viola’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion.) 

{¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has established elements that a movant is 

required to establish to prevail under Civ.R. 60(B). The Ohio Supreme Court has 

instructed, 

[T]o prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, the 

movant must establish that “(1) the party has a meritorious defense or 

claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under 

one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the 

motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief 

are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, 

order or proceeding was entered or taken.” GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. 

ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St. 2d 146, 1 Ohio Op. 3d 86, 351 

N.E.2d 113, paragraph two of the syllabus. Civ.R. 60(B) relief is improper 

if any one of the foregoing requirements is not satisfied. Strack v. 

Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St. 3d 172, 174, 637 N.E.2d 914, 915. 

State ex rel. Richard v. Seidner, 76 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 666 N.E.2d 1134 (1996). 

{¶15} An evidentiary hearing “is not required where the motion and attached 

evidentiary material do not contain allegations of operative facts which would warrant 

relief under Civ.R. 60(B).” Seidner at 151, citing S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Kidney, 100 Ohio 

App. 3d 661, 667, 654 N.E.2d 1017 (1995). Under Ohio law, “‘[t]he allegation of 

operative facts required must be of such evidentiary quality as affidavits, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, written admissions, or other sworn testimony.’” Whittle v. 

Davis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-08-153, 2014-Ohio-445, ¶ 21, quoting Producers 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -8- DECISION 

Credit Corp. v. Voge, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2002-06-009, 2003-Ohio-1067, ¶ 31. 

Accord Cleveland Excavating v. Elyria Savs. & Trust, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77910, 

2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5689, at *6 (Dec. 7, 2000) (a “Civ.R. 60(B) motion may not be 

granted, however, absent admissible evidence establishing a meritorious Civ.R. 60(B) 

motion”). The Twelfth District Court of Appeals has explained, 

“If a party who seeks relief from judgment does not present operative facts 

or presents facts of limited or meager quality, then a trial court is justified 

in denying relief because that party has failed to meet its burden of 

asserting facts entitling the party to relief.” Bank of New York Mellon v. 

Stefanidis, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-157, 2011-Ohio-6455, ¶ 12. See 

also Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 105, 316 N.E.2d 469 (8th 

Dist.1974) (“If the material submitted by the movant in support of its 

motion contains no operative facts or meager and limited facts and 

conclusions of law, it will not be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 

refuse to grant a hearing and overrule the motion”). “Mere general 

allegations and mere conclusions of law are not sufficient to justify relief 

from judgment.” Tri-County Pavings, Inc. v. Everman, 12th Fayette Dist. 

No. CA91-11-024, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2928, 1992 WL 126260, *1 

(June 8, 1992). 

Whittle v. Davis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-08-153, 2014-Ohio-445, at ¶ 22. 

{¶16} As to the issue of fraud, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “It is generally 

agreed that‘* * * [a]ny fraud connected with the presentation of a case to a court is a 

fraud upon the court, in a broad sense.’ 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure (1973) 253, Section 2870. Thus, in the usual case, a party must resort to a 

motion under Civ. R. 60(B)(3). Where an officer of the court, e.g., an attorney, however, 

actively participates in defrauding the court, then the court may entertain a Civ. R. 

60(B)(5) motion for relief from judgment. See [Toscano v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -9- DECISION 

441 F. 2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.1971)].” Coulson v. Coulson, 5 Ohio St.3d 12, 15, 448 

N.E.2d 809 (1983). See also Kuchta, supra, at ¶ 13. 

{¶17} This Court previously considered—and rejected—Viola’s claim that former 

Council Member Kasaris submitted contradictory affidavits, which, in turn, allegedly 

rendered Kasaris’ denials of keeping emails relating to his work as a member of North 

Royalton City Council suspect, thereby necessitating the City to search Kasaris’ private 

email. (Decision and Entry, (March 11, 2021)). And the Court previously concluded 

that a claim that a private email account may contain public records is insufficient to 

authorize a search of that email account. (Decision and Entry (March 11, 2021)). 

{¶18} Viola’s complaint against the City placed at issue whether the City violated 

R.C. 149.43(B) by denying Viola access to public records. See R.C. 2743.75(A) 

(establishing that, except for a court that hears a mandamus action pursuant to R.C. 

149.43(B), the Ohio Court of Claims is the sole and exclusive authority in Ohio that 

adjudicates or resolves complaints based on alleged violations of R.C. 149.43(B)). In 

the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, Viola conflates the issue of the City’s alleged violation of R.C. 

149.43(B) with a contention that Daniel Kasaris engaged in misconduct in his service as 

a councilmember and an assistant attorney general. This Court lacks jurisdiction to 

determine whether Daniel Kasaris did or, did not, engage in misconduct when he served 

as a councilmember or as an assistant attorney general. See R.C. 2743.03(A) and 

2743.75(A). 

{¶19} Upon review of Viola’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion and additional material, the 

Court finds that Viola has not established a meritorious claim to present if the requested 

relief were granted. The Court further finds that neither Viola’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion nor 

additional material alters the Court view that a claim that a private email account may

contain public records is insufficient to authorize a search of that email account. The 

Court respectfully disagrees with Viola’s claim that the “facts” and “newly discovered 

evidence” “triggers an obligation of the part of the Respondent to - at the very least - 
Case No. 2020-00477PQ -10- DECISION 

search the Yahoo account for public, and requires the Court to vacate its final judgment 

in this matter.” 

{¶20} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained, “A claim under Civ.R. 60(B) 

requires the court to carefully consider the two conflicting principles of finality and 

perfection.” Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 175, 637 N.E.2d 914 (1994). The 

Ohio Supreme Court has declared that “‘[f]inality requires that there be some end to 

every lawsuit, thus producing certainty in the law and public confidence in the system’s 

ability to resolve disputes. Perfection requires that every case be litigated until a perfect 

result is achieved. For obvious reasons, courts have typically placed finality above 

perfection in the hierarchy of values.’” Strack at 175, quoting Knapp v. Knapp, 24 Ohio 

St.3d 141, 144-145, 493 N.E.2d 1353 (1986). Viola has failed to sustain his burden of 

asserting facts entitling him to relief and Viola’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion fails to set forth an 

injustice so great that demands a departure from the constraints of res judicata. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶21} The Court holds that neither Viola’s motion nor additional material 

establishes that Viola has a meritorious claim to present if the Court were to grant the 

relief that Viola seeks. The Court further holds that Viola’s motion and additional 

material do not contain allegations of operative facts that warrant relief under Civ.R. 

60(B). The Court denies Viola’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion, including Viola’s request for a 

hearing. 

 

 PATRICK E. SHEERAN 

Judge 

 
[Cite as Viola v. N. Royalton, 2021-Ohio-3239.]

{¶22} For reasons set forth in the Decision filed concurrently herewith, the Court 

DENIES Requester’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Court 

costs associated with Requester’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion are assessed to Requester. 

 

 PATRICK E. SHEERAN 

Judge 

 

Filed August 31, 2021 

Sent to S.C. Reporter 9/17/21

ANTHONY VIOLA 

 Requester 

 v. 

CITY OF NORTH ROYALTON 

 Respondent 

Case No. 2020-00477PQ 

Judge Patrick E. Sheeran 

ENTRY