Filed 7/27/21 In re C.C. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re C.C., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D078604

 (Super. Ct. No. J519821)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Browder A. Willis III, Judge. Affirmed.

Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.
2

C.P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating 

parental rights to her daughter C.C. (born 2018). (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 366.26.)1 Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the 

beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply

because she maintained consistent visitation, and had a positive relationship 

with C.C. that benefited C.C. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Mother contends

that the juvenile court should have ordered a legal guardianship as C.C.’s 

permanent plan because this would provide C.C. with a stable home and 

allow her to maintain her relationship with Mother. After the completion of 

briefing in this appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in In re Caden 

C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) which clarified the standards applicable

to the parent-child relationship exception. We invited the parties to file 

supplemental letter briefs addressing the effect, if any, of Caden C. to the 

issues on appeal. Having considered the supplemental briefs filed by the 

parties, we affirm the order terminating parental rights.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petition and Reunification Period

Mother has a history of methamphetamine use but claimed that she 

“quit cold turkey” in 2017. Mother gave birth to C.C. in July 2018. Although 

C.C. was full-term, the hospital placed a nasogastric tube due to poor feeding 

and decreased activity level. At the time of birth, C.C. and Mother tested 

positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine, which indicated drug use 

by Mother within the last one to five days. Medical staff opined that in utero 

drug exposure caused C.C.’s poor feeding and inactivity. Mother denied drug 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
3

use during her pregnancy and explained that Sudafed medication or a friend 

placing a pill into her breakfast may have caused the positive test result.

C.C. remained hospitalized for seven days. Two days after C.C.’s birth,

Mother left the hospital against medical advice. Mother missed feedings and 

trainings on how to care for C.C. The San Diego County Health and Human 

Services Agency (Agency) offered Mother a voluntary case provided C.C.

remained outside Mother’s home while Mother received treatment. Although 

Mother initially agreed, she later changed her mind and indicated her desire 

to go to court.

On August 8, 2018, the Agency filed a petition under section

300, subdivision (b)(1) alleging that C.C. and Mother tested positive for 

amphetamine and methamphetamine at the time of C.C.’s birth and that 

Mother denied a substance abuse problem.2 At the detention hearing, the 

court made a prima facie finding on the petition, ordered C.C. detained in 

out-of-home care, and limited Mother to supervised visits. By the time of the 

contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in October 2018, Mother had 

all negative drug tests since C.C.’s removal, attended services, and the 

Agency had liberalized Mother’s visits to unsupervised. At the hearing, the 

juvenile court found the petition true, removed custody from Mother, and 

ordered reunification services for her. In the meantime, C.C.’s maternal aunt 

asked to be assessed for placement. 

In October 2018, at the Agency’s request, licensed clinical psychologist 

Dr. Joseph McCullaugh evaluated Mother because the social worker 

described Mother as exhibiting an “increased frequency and severity of 

2 The two alleged fathers are not parties to this appeal. Genetic testing 

excluded one individual and the other individual denied paternity.
4

mental health symptoms” and Mother had never received a psychological 

assessment. Dr. McCullaugh found that Mother “demonstrate[d] the 

intellectual capabilities to communicate, comprehend without conflict, and 

reason appropriately with an appreciable degree of accuracy” and that she 

did not have “disorganized, irrational, peculiar, or otherwise impaired 

processing styles that would hinder her from benefitting from services within 

the legal timelines of her case.”

In November 2018, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine but 

denied methamphetamine use, claiming that the drug got into her system 

after exchanging bodily fluids during sex. On February 26, 2019, Mother 

completed her drug treatment program and reported her commitment to 

refrain from drug use. As of March 18, 2019, Mother worked two jobs as a 

dental office treatment coordinator and a food delivery driver. Mother

reported that her work schedule allowed her to have overnight visits with 

C.C. on the weekends and unsupervised visits during the week. In late 

March 2019, Mother completed an outpatient recovery program. Mother’s 

substance abuse counselor reported that Mother had been forthcoming with 

her drug problem, developed insight regarding her drug use, and was not in 

denial at this time. 

At the six-month review hearing in April 2019, the court ordered 

overnight visits. According to C.C.’s foster mother, Mother had been 

consistently visiting four times a week, C.C. was always happy to see Mother 

and seemed very comfortable with her. Although the maternal aunt had 

received approval for relative placement, the placement did not occur because 

Mother had been approved for overnight visits. At a Child and Family Team 

meeting held in May 2019, all team members reported that Mother had made 

progress. Mother’s drug counselor stated that Mother “had made ‘incredible 
5

progress[,]’ met all her goals, and was in compliance with [her] treatment 

program.”

On June 1, 2019, Mother started a 60-day trial visit with C.C. 

However, on June 27, 2019, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. In 

July, Mother missed a drug test, had a diluted drug test, and twice tested 

positive for methamphetamine. Mother denied using methamphetamine and 

claimed that her use of an inhaler explained the positive test results. The 

juvenile court suspended the 60-day trial visit and Mother’s visitation 

reverted to supervised.

On July 30, 2019, the Agency placed C.C. in the confidential resource 

family home of Mr. and Mrs. C. (the C’s). Two weeks after the placement, the 

social worker informed the C’s of a possible relative placement with C.C.’s 

maternal relatives in Idaho. The C’s indicated that if C.C. could not reunify 

with her biological family for any reason that they were committed to 

providing C.C. permanency through adoption. 

In August 2019, Mother tested negative for any substances in three 

random drug tests. During this time period, Mother consistently visited C.C. 

twice a week, she brought snacks and toys for C.C. and the visits were 

appropriate. In September 2019, Mother had a diluted drug test and missed 

two drug tests. Mother’s substance abuse counselor also reported that 

Mother’s demeanor did “ ‘not seem right’ ” and that Mother “ ‘ramble[d] on 

and on’ ” about how the system had wronged her. 

On October 28, 2019, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. At 

the November 20, 2019, contested 12-month review hearing, the court 

terminated Mother’s reunification services, kept supervised visitation for 

Mother, and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing under section 
6

366.26. That same day, Mother filed several forms in pro per claiming that 

C.C. had a twin that Mother had not been allowed to see. 

Post-Reunification Period

In January 2020, the juvenile court granted the social worker’s request 

for an expedited Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)

evaluation of the maternal aunt’s home in Idaho. The maternal aunt and her 

family started video calls with C.C. in January 2020, and in late February 

2020 and early March 2020 the maternal aunt had five in-person visits with 

C.C. that lasted two to three hours each. In the meantime, on February 5, 

2020, the juvenile court granted the C’s de facto parent status. Mother also 

continued her twice-weekly supervised visitation. In March 2020, Mother 

switched from in-person visits to twice-weekly virtual visits due to COVID-19 

restrictions. In late April 2020, Mother moved to Idaho. The maternal 

relatives did not allow Mother to live with them but arranged housing for her 

through a friend. 

In June 2020, Mother told the social worker that C.C. was a “ ‘triplet,’ ”

and that she delivered two other babies at the time of C.C.’s birth who were 

taken from her and placed in an “ ‘undocumented shelter.’ ” In August 2020, 

the C’s filed a section 388 petition seeking to modify the court’s prior general 

placement order granting the Agency discretion to place C.C. with the 

maternal aunt without a court hearing. Following a contested hearing, the 

court denied the petition and authorized the Agency to move C.C. to the 

maternal aunt’s home.3

3 The C’s appealed from the denial of their section 388 petition to change 

or modify C.C.’s general placement order. Another panel of this court 

affirmed the order denying the petition. (In re C.C. (May 26, 2021, D078291)

[nonpub. opn.].)
7

In September 2020, the Agency learned that Mother was asked to leave 

the home where she had been residing. Mother then moved to Washington. 

In mid-December 2020, the Agency placed two-year-old C.C. with her

maternal aunt in Idaho. Mother and C.C.’s prior caregivers continued to 

have video visits with C.C. two times per week. In the meantime, the court 

continued the section 366.26 hearing several times based on the parties’ 

request and the court’s closure during the COVID-19 global pandemic. In 

mid-February 2021, the contested section 366.26 hearing proceeded as a trial 

on the documents. At the start of the section 366.26 hearing, the court 

dissolved the C’s’ de facto parent status. The court concluded that the 

parent-child relationship exception did not apply, terminated parental rights

and selected adoption as C.C.’s permanent plan. Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

A. General Legal Principles

“At a section 366.26 hearing the juvenile court has three options: (1) to 

terminate parental rights and order adoption as a long-term plan; (2) to 

appoint a legal guardian for the dependent child; or (3) to order the child be 

placed in long-term foster care. [Citation.] Adoption is the preferred plan

and, absent an enumerated exception, the juvenile court is required to select 

adoption as the permanent plan. [Citation.] The burden falls to the parent to 

show that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the 

child under one of the exceptions.” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 

Cal.App.4th 529, 534.)

One of the exceptions to the preference for adoption is the beneficial 

parent-child relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) For this 

exception to apply, the parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence: 

(1) regular visitation and contact with the child; (2) the child has a 
8

substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent; and 

(3) terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when 

balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. (Caden 

C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The existence of this relationship is 

determined by taking into consideration “[t]he age of the child, the portion of 

the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect 

of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs . . . .” 

(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) When the 

benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent home outweigh the harm the child 

would experience from the loss of a continued parent-child relationship, the 

court should order adoption. (Caden C., at p. 634.)

We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the 

existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, for substantial evidence.

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) As a reviewing court, we do 

“ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve 

evidentiary conflicts’ ” and will uphold the juvenile court’s determinations 

even where substantial evidence to the contrary also exists. (Id. at p. 640.) 

With regard to the court’s conclusion that a parent did not meet his or 

her burden of proof regarding any factual findings, we look to “whether the 

evidence compels a finding in favor of the parent on this issue as a matter of 

law.” (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 647 (Breanna S.), 

disapproved on other ground by Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637, fn. 6.)

The question is “whether the . . . evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and 

unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for 

a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re 

I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by 
9

Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) “[T]he ultimate 

decision—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the 

child due to the child’s relationship with his [or her] parent—is discretionary 

and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., at p. 640.) A court

abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd determination.’” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) 

B. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling

The juvenile court first acknowledged the evidence showing that C.C. is 

doing well with her caregivers and that the “overarching trajectory of the 

law” was to provide children with permanency and stability. The court then 

stated:

“The issues related to the mother are very nuanced. 

They are obvious as to the reasons why we got here 

initially. But as to the specific requirements in [section] 

366.26 the mother has fallen short as it relates to showing 

the court that beyond the intention and the heartfelt 

intention of being a parent or mother -- although she has 

indicated she’s willing to sacrifice and do the things 

necessary to be that parent, that hasn’t been borne out by 

the evidence over the last year and a half.

“She hasn’t -- she did not complete all the programming 

that the court wanted her to complete and ordered her to 

complete, whether it was drug counseling or individual 

therapy. And despite [the COVID-19 global pandemic] and 

other concerns, the court understands it’s hard to maintain 

a relationship when a child is not under your care directly 

at least.

“But she didn’t take advantage of the opportunities to 

visit and coupled with taking care of the assigned 

requirements of courses, she did not act as a parent who is 

really truly willing to sacrifice everything and anything for 

the child.” 
10

The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding, by 

clear and convincing evidence, that C.C. was likely to be adopted if parental 

rights were terminated, an exception to adoption did not apply, termination 

of parental rights would not be detrimental to C.C., and it was in C.C.’s best 

interests to be adopted. 

C. Analysis

The juvenile court noted that Mother missed opportunities to visit C.C. 

but did not make an express finding that she failed to regularly visit C.C. 

Mother claims that she regularly and consistently visited C.C. The Agency 

does not contest this assertion, stating that it conceded this element during 

its closing argument. Review of the record shows that although Mother 

occasionally missed visits, she maintained consistent visitation throughout 

the proceeding.

Turning to the second element, whether C.C. would benefit from 

continuing her relationship with Mother, we focus on the child. (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) We consider several factors in examining 

whether a relationship is important and beneficial, including the age of the 

child, the amount of time the child spent in the parent’s custody, the 

interaction between parent and child, and the child’s needs. (Ibid.) Here, 

C.C. enjoyed her visits with Mother and recognized Mother as “ ‘Mommy 

[C.]’ ” and the maternal aunt as “ ‘mommy’ ” or “ ‘mommy auntie.’ ” C.C., 

however, was just two years old at the time of the contested section 366.26 

hearing and “too young to understand the concept of a biological parent.” (In 

re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 459, 467.)

Citing In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 (S.B.), Mother notes that 

children can have more than one set of parental figures and that the 

exception does not require a parent to be in a daily parental role. (Id. at 
11

pp. 299-300.) The instant case, however, differs factually from S.B. The 

father in S.B. acted as his daughter’s primary caregiver for three years before 

her removal. (Id. at p. 298.) After her removal, the father in S.B.

immediately acknowledged “his drug use was untenable, started services, 

maintained sobriety, sought medical and psychological services, and 

maintained consistent and regular visitation” with his child. (Ibid.) The 

social worker reported that the father in S.B. “ ‘consistently put[] his 

daughter[’]s needs and safety before his own.’ ” (Ibid.) Additionally, a 

bonding study supported other evidence in the record regarding the minor’s 

“strong attachment” to the father that indicated a potential for harm to the 

minor should the minor lose the parent-child relationship. (Id. at pp. 296, 

298.) 

Here, in contrast, Mother failed to act as a protective parent from the 

outset. Although Mother claimed that she stopped using methamphetamine 

in 2017, C.C. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Mother’s claim

that medication she had taken or some unknown pills that a friend slipped 

into her breakfast caused the positive result does not explain C.C.’s poor 

feeding and inactivity which hospital medical staff opined were caused by in 

utero drug exposure, not drug use on the day of birth. Throughout the 

proceeding Mother gave equally implausible explanations for positive 

methamphetamine test results, including that the drug got into her system 

after exchanging bodily fluids during sex, or that an inhaler she “ ‘found’ ” 

and used caused the positive result. Mother never acknowledged that she 

had a substance abuse problem, which interfered with her ability to benefit 

from drug treatment and placed her at continued risk for relapse.4

4 Mother contends that the juvenile court “appeared overly concerned” 

with her lack of progress in fulfilling her obligation to reunify with C.C. and 
12

During her life, C.C. spent approximately a month in Mother’s custody. 

Tellingly, after the Agency removed C.C. due to Mother’s relapse, C.C.’s 

caregivers immediately took C.C. to a doctor who diagnosed C.C. with a right 

ear bacterial infection, cough, and candida diaper rash. Conditions which 

Mother presumably ignored or failed to detect while she cared for C.C. The 

Agency determined that Mother had cared for C.C. while under the influence 

of methamphetamine and that Mother’s struggle with substance abuse 

impacted her ability to parent and provide C.C. with safety and stability. A 

“significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult’s 

attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, 

affection and stimulation.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) 

Here, Mother’s unresolved mental health issues and continued struggle with 

substance abuse negatively impacted the nature of Mother’s contact with 

C.C. during visitation and the formation of a significant attachment with

C.C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639 [parent’s struggles directly 

relevant to the “ ‘ “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent 

and child’ ” and “indirectly to the harm of removing such interactions from 

the child’s life”].)

It is undisputed that Mother has had positive, age appropriate, and 

affectionate interactions with C.C. during visitations. Among other things, 

the two played peek-a-boo, sang songs, reviewed number flash cards, and 

sang the ABC’s. The social worker, however, also related that at times 

Mother “appeared paranoid during visits and has been distracted with other 

failure to complete all programs. We disagree. The juvenile court could 

properly consider Mother’s failure to fulfill case plan requirements and 

“sacrifice everything and anything for the child” as these facts related to 

Mother’s continued denial of a substance abuse problem and how this 

continued denial impacted the beneficial nature of her relationship with C.C.
13

‘legal issues[.]’ ” C.C.’s caregivers also reported that Mother occasionally 

would discuss her legal issues and needed to be redirected to engage with 

C.C. Additionally, the record does not show that Mother contacted C.C.’s 

caregivers outside scheduled visitations to ask, for example, about the results 

of C.C.’s medical or dental appointments, C.C.’s likes and dislikes, or how 

C.C. did in daycare. 

In her unsworn statement made during the contested hearing, Mother 

claimed that C.C. constantly asked Mother to hold her, appeared heartbroken 

and cried because she could not be with Mother, and related that the 

maternal aunt said C.C. always asked about Mother. The social worker and 

maternal aunt, however, did not corroborate these claims. Rather, the social

worker noted that C.C. did not ask for Mother in Mother’s absence or show 

emotional distress at the end of visitation. We found no evidence in the 

record to substantiate Mother’s claim that C.C. talked about Mother or asked 

for Mother between visits. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [courts 

often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about 

their parents].) Mother’s occasional detachment during visitation and C.C.’s 

lack of distress when parting with Mother and while away from Mother 

support a conclusion that C.C. did not have an emotional attachment to 

Mother.

In summary, substantial evidence supports the family court’s factual 

finding that Mother did not prove the existence of a beneficial parent-child

relationship. Stated another way, the evidence does not compel a finding in 

favor of Mother as a matter of law that a beneficial parent-child relationship

existed. (Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 647.)

Because substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding 

that no beneficial parent-child relationship existed, we need not consider 
14

whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found that no 

compelling reason existed for determining that termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to C.C. (Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 646-

647 [“The court’s decision a parent has not satisfied [the parent-child 

relationship exception] burden may be based on any or all of the component 

determinations”].) Nonetheless, even assuming C.C. benefitted from her

relationship with Mother, Mother presented no evidence showing that

termination of that relationship would harm C.C., or that the security and 

stability of a new home would not outweigh the loss of this relationship. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Instead, the social worker, who had a 

master’s degree in social work and training in assessing a child’s permanent 

plan, opined that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to 

C.C. (See In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1427 [social workers 

are frequently recognized as experts in selecting children’s permanent plans]; 

In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1421 (Beatrice M.) [court has 

discretion to determine whether witness is qualified to testify as expert and 

this determination will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion].)

Mother did not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that C.C. was 

specifically adoptable, with prospective adoptive parents who were prepared 

to offer her a safe and loving home on a permanent basis. The social worker 

noted that C.C. appeared happy and comfortable with the relative caregivers, 

that C.C. identified their house as “her ‘forever home,’ ” and referred to the 

caregivers as “ ‘mommy,’ ‘daddy,’ and ‘sissy.’ ” It was well within the 

boundaries of the juvenile court’s discretion to find that the benefits of 

adoption outweighed any detriment from terminating Mother’s relationship 

with C.C. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s order as we find no 
15

evidence of exceptional circumstances requiring application of the parentchild relationship exception to the termination of Mother’s parental rights.5

DISPOSITION

The order terminating appellant’s parental rights is affirmed.

BENKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

AARON, J.

5 Mother suggests a permanent plan of legal guardianship instead of 

adoption would have allowed C.C. to remain in a stable home with her 

maternal aunt, while also benefitting from continuing the positive 

relationship with Mother. However, because Mother’s relationship with C.C. 

did not place her within the parent-child relationship exception, “it 

necessarily follows that the juvenile court correctly determined that adoption 

was the appropriate permanent plan for” C.C. (Beatrice M., supra, 29 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1420.)