Interim Decision #2068 

MATTER OF SCHICK 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

NYC-N--31276 

Decided by Regional Commissioner December 15, 1970 

Since the petitioning American company—which has signed a contract with 

a French company giving the American firm exclusive license to buy and 

import into the United States machinery manufactured by the French 

company for 10 years—is not bound to such foreign firm through common 

ownership and management but has only a contractual relationship with 

the foreign company, subject to termination, petitioner is not connected 

with the French company within the contemplation of section 

101(a) (15) (L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and 

the beneficiary, an employee of the French firm, is ineligible for classification as an intra-company transferee under section 101(a) (15) (L) of the 

Act since he would not be entering the United States to continue to perform services for the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof. 

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Abraham Kaufman, Esquire 

521 Fifth Avenue 

New York, New York 10017 

This matter is before the Regional Commissioner on appeal 

from the denial of a request to classify an alien as an intra-company transferee under section 101 (a) (15) (L) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act. 

The petitioner is a manufacture of nylon zippers seeking to obtain the services of a technical consultant who is familiar with 

the manufacture of specialized equipment needed to produce this 

type of slide fastener. The petitioner is an American corporation 

established in 1965 and it has no known branches or subdivisions 

in Europe or any ether country. The beneficiary is an alien employed since 1967 by a French corporation which has developed a 

new nylon slide fastener. The French Company and the petitioner 

have entered into an agreement whereby the petitioner will manufacture this slide fastener under a license and royalty agreement 

and have exclusive rights to sell the product in the United States. 

There is no joint ownership or investment between the two corn647 
terim Decision #2068 

vies, the only connection being the manufacturing and marketg agreement between them. 

The District Director denied this request on two grounds, the 

.st one being that the two companies do not possess the proper 

lationship to confer eligibility for "L" status and the other 

!ing that the alien was not employed in a managerial capacity. 

connection with the relationship of the two companies, the 

istrict Director stated: 

In the matter at hand, the petitioning firm seeks to use the services of an 

nployee of a firm which is described as an "affiliate". Blacks' Law Diconary, Fourth Edition, defines an affiliate as follows: "Signifies a condion of being united, being in close connection, allied, or attached as a 

ember or branch". Johanson v. Riverside County Select Groves, 4 Cal. 

.pp. 2d 114, 40 P. 2d 530, 534. The evidence of record, however, does not 

itisfactorily establish that a proprietary relationship, by reason of ownrship or substantial investment, exists between the two firms. Documenta-

.on submitted in support of the instant petition merely establishes that 

he petitioning firm was granted a license for a period of ten years plus 

ertain renewal periods, to manufacture and sell the foreign firm's prodcts in the United States, its territories, dependencies, and possessions. 

Article 1 of the agreement between these two companies decribes the basic purpose of it and states: 

(1) (a) FFLB warrants that it has full right to grant and hereby grants 

o RICHFORD, the exclusive right and license for the life of this Agreenent and any renewals and extensions thereof, to the "know-how" and 

ethnical information which FFLB has the right to tr a nsmit, to enable 

lICHFORD to manufacture the article, hereinafter defined, in the United 

states, its territories, dependencies and possessions (hereinafter called the 

'Territory"). 

Article 11 of the agreement provides for the supplying of techiical information to the American company for the purpose of inmring the proper manufacture of the licensed article. Further 

:tomment on the nature of the agreement was provided by counsel 

in his appeal brief which contained the following: 

The French company, therefore, made a contract with the petitioner, by 

which they gave the petitioner a 10-year exclusive license to buy from 

Prestil and import to the United States these special machines, which 

Richford would then use for the manufacture of nylon zippers. Pursuant 

to that contract, the petitioner has purchased over $300,000 worth of these 

machines, has spent over $1,000,000 in setting up its manufacturing plant 

at Carle Place, Long Island, N.Y. and is actually engaged in the manufacture of the zippers. 

Among other things, the contract provides for the payment by Richford 

Industries to Prestil of a royalty of 1/20 for each yard of the nylon "coil 

type chain" which is produced by these machines. The contract further 

provides for certain guaranteed minimum annual royalties, which are substantial. 

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Interim Decision #2068 

The contract with Prestil, a copy of which was submitted as an exhibit 

with the visa petition, also obligates Prestil, at the request of Richford, 

and at Richford's expense, to send to the United States one or more technicians to train and instruct employees of the petitioner, to assist in setting up the operation, making modifications where appropriate, and providing the special "know-how" of the manufacturer of the machines to the 

petitioner, the user of them. 

The foregoing has been quoted to bring out the nature of the 

connection between the two companies to determine if the relationship between them is of the type contemplated by section 

101(a) (15) (L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In this 

regard, the statute confers eligibility of an alien who: 

... has been employed continuously for one year by a firm or corporation 

or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to 

enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his services 

to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof. . . . 

Counsel for the petitioner submits that an affiliation exists between the two companies by reason of the fact that there is a 

unity of interest and a meaningful association to further the common interests of both parties. Reference has been made to definitions of the term "affiliation" contained in other sections of the 

Immigration and Nationality Laws, but they do not appear applicable here inasmuch as the term is used in a different context. 

It is evident from a review of the agreement between the two 

companies and the material submitted on appeal that there are 

two completely independent companies involved in this matter. 

The relationship between them is purely contractual, subject to 

cancellation if conditions are not fulfilled. It is true that large 

sums of money are involved, but the existence of such sums does 

not imply an interrelationship based on a common parentage. The 

relationship existing here can be terminated as opposed to one in 

which the domestic and foreign organizations are permanently 

tied together, not limited to a single, specific venture of unknown 

duration. 

Counsel has indicated that the statute here was not limited to 

American companies having branches abroad but may apply to 

foreign companies which have branches here. It should be pointed 

out that when a foreign company establishes a branch in the 

United States, that branch is authorized to do business under 

American laws and becomes, in effect, part of American industry. 

That branch is bound to the parent company through common 

ownership and management, conditions which are not present in 

the matter before us. The District Director accurately quoted the 

intent of Congress as explained in House Report, Committee of 

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the Judiciary, No. 91-851, February 24, 1970, to accompany S. 

2593. Originally, it was intended that only American companies 

should receive the benefit of this legislation and it was specifically 

restricted to transfers within the organization. However, before 

final passage, the wording was changed so that as finally enacted, 

it includes other than American businesses. 

The statute which became section 101 (a) (15) (L) as first 

drawn was intended to meet a specific problem being encountered 

by American businesses, namely, the inability to freely transfer 

high level alien employees from the foreign offices of a United 

States concern to the United States because of the limitations on 

availability of visa numbers. In the case at hand, the legislation 

was not needed since a remedy already existed. The alien could 

have been admitted as a visitor for business—not as a visitor for 

pleasure as is his present status—provided he is employed and 

paid by the foreign firm he represents, or as the beneficiary of a 

petition under section 101 (a) (15)H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

In view of the foregoing, it is concluded that the two companies 

involved in this matter are not connected in the manner contemplated by section 101 (a) (15) (L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the beneficiary would not be entering the United 

States temporarily to continue to perform services for the same 

employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof. That being the case, 

it is not necessary to pass on the validity of the other ground for 

Jenial used by the District Director. The appeal will be dismissed. 

It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby disnissed. 

650