No. 92-463 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1993 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

OWEN W. ARRINGTON, JR., 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County sf Gallstin, 

The Honorable Thomas A. Olson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

J. Robert Planalp, Landoe, Brown, Planalp & 

Braaksma, Bozeman, Montana; Larry Jent, Williams, 

Jent & Cockins, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Cregg W. 

Coughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, 

Montana; Mike Salvagni, Gallatin County Attorney, 

Bozeman, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: June 10, 1993 

Decided: AU~US~ 10, 1993 

File 
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from an Eighteenth Judicial District Court, 

Gallatin County, jury verdict in a negligent homicide action. We 

affirm. 

We restate the issues on appeal: 

I. Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's motion 

to dismiss? 

A. May the trial court consider the defendant's 

statements in determining probable cause to file an 

information? 

B. Was the state's affidavit sufficient to support 

probable cause to file an information? 

11. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's 

verdict of guilty? 

111. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury or? the 

issues of causation and negligence? 

IV. Should the testimony of the highway patrol officer have 

been excluded? 

The defendant met a friend, Frank Ahrendes, at Frank's place 

of business on the afternoon of August 8, 1991. The men visited 

for a while and then proceeded to Little John's, a Bozeman tavern 

for a couple drinks. They stayed there for approximately one hour, 

each having two tall '*mistw drinks. Then the defendant drove Frank 

home where the two visited briefly. 

At about 6:30, the defendant arrived alone at Willie's Saloon, 

also in Bozeman. The bar owner served the defendant ice water and 

2 
informed him that his wife had called. He called his wife from the 

bar owners's private office and when he had finished the call, 

asked for another ice water. The bar owner stated that the 

defendant stayed at the bar until about 9:00, playing keno and 

drinking two drinks. The defendant left the bar and proceeded to 

the interstate going east to his home outside of Livingston. 

Carol Dearinger and her husband, Laurence Dearinger were on a 

motorcycle trip through Montana. They stopped in Bozeman at about 

8:30 p.m. on the evening of August 8, 1991, to find a place to 

spend the night, but they could not find a vacancy. They drove 

through the city and eventually departed on the eastbound 

interstate. As they headed out of town, Mrs. Dearinger thought she 

might get cold so she asked her husband to pull over so she could 

retrieve her coat from the trailer the motorcycle was pulling. 

She stated that her husband pulled over onto the shoulder of 

the road, as far as he could, without going into the ditch, and he 

got off the motorcycle. He proceeded to the trailer, and removed 

her jacket, returned to the left side of the motorcycle and handed 

her the jacket. He then turned and started back to the trailer. 

He had walked about 3 to 4 feet when Mrs. Dearinger heard "a loud 

crash and a swish, and the motorcycle was laying over on its side." 

Mrs. Dearinger stated that she looked around, did not see 

anyone, so ran to the front of the motorcycle and saw her husband 

lying on the ground between the motorcycle and the fogline. She 

tried to flag down some passers by for assistance. Soon, people 

arrived and lent what assistance they could in terms of comforting 
Mrs. Dearinger and conducting first aid upon Mr. Dearinger. 

Tim Del Camp, the first witness on the scene, stated that Mr. 

Dearinger's leg was almost completely severed and his chest was 

deformed and disfigured. He was able to get a rapid pulse when he 

first came to Mr. Dearingerts aid but later was unable to find a 

pulse, A woman who arrived later knew first aid and was able to 

get a pulse in his neck. The bystanders continued to render what 

aid they could until officials arrived. 

Meanwhile, another woman who had arrived on the accident scene 

shortly after Del Camp, became ill upon seeing Mr. Dearinger and 

walked away from the accident scene. She saw a man standing away 

from the accident and asked him if he knew what happened. He 

stated, "I hit him. I didn't see him. I hit him." She described 

his clothes as a white shirt and blue pants. She said he smelled 

of alcoholic beverages and had glassy eyes. Shortly after she 

spoke with him, he walked away toward a vehicle parked eastbound of 

the accident. 

The deputy coroner, the ambulance and the police arrived at 

the scene not long after bystanders had gathered. They surveyed 

the scene and examined the body. The deputy coroner and a deputy 

sheriff tried CPR for a short time but could not get any pressure 

back after putting breath into his body. A minute or two after 

starting CPR they covered the body, and the deputy coroner 

pronounced him dead. 

Meanwhile, other police officers began questioning the 

bystanders to determine if there were any eyewitnesses to the 
accident and they determined there were none. They also started to 

investigate the scene and gather evidence. Officer Carol 

schumacher, a highway patrol officer, made a number of 

measurements, took photographs and used her evidence later to 

determine how the accident occurred. 

Officer Schumacher took a photograph of a 1989 white Toyota 

Camry which was parked eastbound not far from the scene of the 

accident with its headlights on and keys in the ignition, though 

the car was not running. The car was parked l1on the very outside 

edge of the traffic lane." The car was damaged on the right front 

side and was blood splattered. 

Police officers started to look for the owner of the white 

car, searching for anyone on foot near the area of the accident. 

The police determined that the vehicle was registered and owned by 

Owen Arrington, Jr. After checking the vehicle registration, 

police Officer Bill Dove called Mrs. Arrington, the defendant's 

wife, to report that their car had been involved in an accident. 

She reported that her husband was in possession of the vehicle at 

that time although their daughter usually drove the Camry. 

Mrs. Arrington telephoned her father-in-law and related the 

information from the police officer. Owen Arrington, Sr., then 

traveled to a number of places trying to find the defendant. 

Finally, sometime after 6:00 a.m., Mr. and Mrs. Arrington, Sr., 

found him near the Frontage Road heading toward Bozeman in an area 

south of the interstate. 

The defendant told his father he had been in an accident but 
he really did not know what had happened. Mr. Arrington, Sr. took 

his son to the police station where the defendant made a number of 

statements about the accident to Officer Dove, a City of Bozeman 

police officer. 

The defendant was ultimately charged with negligent homicide 

and leaving the scene of an accident. At a jury trial in the 

Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, the defendant 

was found guilty. This appeal followed. 

The standard of review for discretionary trial court rulings 

is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Steer, Inc. v. 

Department of Revenue (199O), 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 

603-604. 

I. MOTION TO DISMISS 

The defendant argues that the State's affidavit for leave to 

file an information fails to establish probable cause and his 

motion to dismiss should have been properly granted. Further, he 

contends that extrajudicial statements he made cannot be used to 

support a finding of probable cause. The State asserts that the 

trial court could properly consider the defendant's statements but 

even without his statements, the affidavit was supported by 

sufficient evidence. 

A. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS 

The defendant cites § 45-5-111, MCA, for the proposition that 

"the State must prove each element, including in this case, the 

identity of the perpetrator, by evidence independent of any 

extrajudicial statement by the defendant." Section 45-5-111, MCA, 
provides as follows: 

In a homicide trial, before an extrajudicial confession 

may be admitted into evidence, the state must introduce 

independent evidence tending to establish the death and 

the fact that the death was caused by a criminal agency. 

Although this Court agrees that the State must prove each element 

of the offense, g 45-5-111, MCA, pertains to a homicide trial, not 

pre-trial processes. "In construing a statute, it is our function 

as an appellate court to ascertain and declare what in terms or in 

substance is contained in a statute and not insert what has been 

omitted." State v. Crane (1989), 240 Mont. 235, 238, 784 P.2d 901, 

903. The statute merely prohibits admission of a defendant's 

confession at trial prior to the introduction of certain specified 

independent evidence; it does not relate in any way to use of the 

defendant's statements in establishing probable cause for leave to 

file an information. 

Moreover, Montana case law confirms that the defeniar?t's 

statements may be used in an affidavit to support the filing of an 

information. In state v. Hallam (1978), 175 Mont. 492, 499, 575 

P.2d 55, 60, this Court concluded that an admission by the 

defendant that he set the fire, along with evidence that the fire 

was intentionally set, Itwas clearly sufficient to establish 

probable causeN to authorize leave to file an information. In the 

present case, there is far more independent evidence to support any 

admissions made by the defendant, including evidence that the car 

the defendant, who had been drinking, was known to have been 

driving was found at the scene and was damaged. We conclude that 

the defendant's statements may be included as evidence to support 

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probable cause for filing an information. 

B. SUFFICIENCY OF STATE AFFIDAVIT 

Section 46-11-201, MCA, governs the filing of an information 

and provides in pertinent part: 

(1) The prosecutor may apply directly to the district 

court for permission to file an information against a 

named defendant ... (2) An application must be by affidavit supported by 

evidence that the judge or chief justice may require. If 

it appears that there is probable cause to believe that 

an offense has been committed by the defendant, the judge 

or chief justice shall grant leave to file the 

information, otherwise the application is denied. 

Montana case law defines the evidence sufficient to establish 

probable cause. 

An affidavit in support of a motion to file an 

information need not make out a prima facie case that a 

defendant committed an offense. A mere probability that 

he committed the offense is sufficient. Similarly, 

evidence to establish probable cause need not be as 

complete as the evidence necessary to establish 

guilt .... the determination whether a motion to file an 

information is supported by probable cause is left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the scope of 

review is one of detecting abuse in the exercise of that 

discretion. 

State v. Bradford (l984), 210 Mont, 130, 139, 683 P.2d 924, 928- 

929. (Citation omitted.) See also State v. Buckingham (1989), 240 

Mont. 252, 256, 783 P.2d 1331, 1334. 

In the present case, even absent use of the defendant's 

statements as evidence to support probable cause, there is 

sufficient evidence to empower a judge to grant leave to file an 

information. There was evidence that the defendant was driving his 

family's white Toyota Camry and this vehicle was found near the 

scene of the accident. The affidavit stated that he had been 
drinking before the accident. The defendant was found walking 

several miles east of the accident scene in an unsteady and 

disheveled condition. When he arrived at the police station, he 

was dressed in blue jeans, a white t-shirt and cowboy boots, which 

was similar to the description given by one of the witnesses who 

arrived shortly after the accident and observed a man loitering 

near the accident scene. 

This evidence is more than enough to warrant the granting of 

leave to file an information and this evidence is only bolstered by 

the defendant's statements to various people concerning the 

accident. A man matching his description was seen at the accident 

and he stated that "I didn't see him, I didn't see him, I just hit 

him." A bystander saelled alcohol on his person and asked him, 

"you hit him sir?" and he said, "yes, but I didn't see him." 

When the defendant's father found him, he told his father 

"that there had been an accident and that he could not remember 

about it.*' He further commented that he had a couple drinks with 

a friend early in the afternoon prior to the accident. He further 

explained that "'he knew that he had hit something and that he had 

seen a man by the motorcycle' and that 'from that point on he just 

lost it.'" He related to his father that he did not know why he 

did not remain at the scene but when he saw the victim, he became 

sick and disoriented. 

When the defendant's father took him to the Bozeman police 

station, he made the following statements to a police officer: 

[T]o the best of my knowledge I was coming up out on 

approach, I pulled out, I was signalling to come out on 
the interstate and there was you know, a lot of traf f is, 

not really heavy, and I started down the interstate I 

wasn't going you know excessively fast, I think it was 

around 55, maybe 58 and cars were coming behind me and I 

was driving my daughter's car, which I'm not familiar 

with, and so I reached over to shut the air-conditioning 

off, and he was there, I mean, I just never seen [sic] 

the guy, I didn't, I was looking at the lights coming up 

behind me and looked at the air-conditioner or something, 

I just never seen [sic] him.. . 

The defendant continued: 

I didn't even know what I'd hit, I knew I'd hit 

something, so I pulled over, and parked but I couldn't 

even seen [sic] anything back there that I'd hit so I got 

out and ran back and a lady yelled, they were yelling for 

911 up on the hill, and a lady got out and she said she 

was bringing a first aid kit and I got to the guy and 

there was [sic] other people there and I just, I just 

went berserk I started throwing up and the next thing I 

knew I was out in the middle of a field I was, I didn't 

know what the hell was going on anymore. I just, I lost 

everything, I just, I have no recollection why I left, I 

was there, and I just don't know, I have no explanation 

for it. 

The sum total of all the evidence in the affidavit provides at 

least the "mere prohahility" that the defendant committed the 

offense. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding the State's affidavit sufficient and denying 

the motion to dismiss 

11. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR JURY VERDICT 

The defendant claims that the evidence presented was not 

sufficient to find him guilty. He also contends that the State did 

not properly identify the man at the scene of the accident, who 

stated that he hit the victim, as the defendant. The State 

counters that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury 

verdict. We agree with the State. 

The standard of review regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence is "[whether,] after reviewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt." State v, Medina (1990), 245 Mont. 25, 33, 798 P.2d 1032, 

1037. 

The State provided the following evidence to support the 

defendant's guilt. A bartender from Little John's and the bar 

owner of Willie's Saloon stated that the defendant was served 

alcoholic beverages on the evening of the accident. A friend of 

the defendant's also testified to drinking with the defendant late 

in the afternoon on the day of the accident and being driven to his 

home by the defendant in a 1989 white Toyota Camry. 

Testimony showed that this vehicle was found near the scene of 

the accident in which the decedent, Laurence Dearinger, was killed. 

The vehicle was owned and driven by the defendant on that evening. 

The car had sustained damage to the right front end and was blood 

splattered. One of the vehicle's side mirrors had broken off and 

a similar side mirror had been found at the accident scene. When 

the vehicle was found, the lights were on and the key was in the 

ignition but the car was not running. Arrington could not be found 

until he was located wandering a hillside in the general area of 

the accident the next morning. 

Testimony elicited the following statements made by the 

defendant. When the defendant was found by his father he told his 

father that he had been in an accident. He further stated that "I 

hit something, and I went back. I stopped and I went back and 
there was a man lying beside the motorcycle." Also, he informed 

his father that when he saw the man lying on the ground, he became 

physically ill and had no recollection of what happened thereafter 

except that he found himself wandering near the area of a KOA 

campground. 

When the defendant arrived at the police station, he reported 

to Officer Dove that he had been driving his daughter's vehicle 

about fifty-five to fifty-eight miles per hour onto the interstate 

"from the on-ramp at the east end of Bozeman, and that he was 

driving his daughter's vehicle which he was not very familiar with. 

And he had leaned over to shut off the air conditioning, and as he 

looked up he hit something and didn't realize what he had struck, 

continued up the road a short distance and pulled over." He 

further stated that he walked back to the accident scene, saw Mr. 

Dearinger and became ill. He said "I felt that I'd probably killed 

him, and I didn't know how many people I'd killed.... 11 

When the defendant's statements and the evidence deduced from 

the several witnesses are viewed in their totality, there is 

sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to have found 

the essential elements of negligent homicide beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

The defendant, however, argues that the State "failed to prove 

the corpus delicti of the offense because it was unable to identify 

the defendant as the driver without [defendant's] statement." He 

contends that the trial court improperly admitted the defendant's 

statements before the corpus delicti of the negligent homicide was 
established, citing ti 45-5-111, MCA. Section 45-5-111, MCA, states 

that: 

Extrajudicial confession - evidence of death. 

In a homicide trial, before an extrajudicial confession 

may be admitted into evidence, the state must introduce 

independent evidence tending to establish the death and 

the fact that the death was caused by a criminal agency. 

According to the statute, before an extrajudicial confession 

is admitted into evidence, the State is only required to introduce 

two elements--that there was a death and that the death was caused 

by a criminal agency. It does not require independent evidence of 

the identity of the perpetrator. As stated earlier, we will not 

insert into a statute, what has been omitted. Crane, 784 P.2d at 

Montana case law also supports the conclusion that the 

identity of the perpetrator is not an element of the corpus 

delicti. In State v. Kindle (1924), 71 Mont. 58, 64, 227 P. 65, 

67, we stated that "[i]n a prosecution for murder, proof of the 

corpus delicti does not necessarily carry with it the identity of 

the slain nor of the slayer." Although this is a negligent 

homicide action rather than a deliberate homicide, the reasoning in 

Kindle still applies. The essential elements of the corpus delicti 

are, as stated in 5 45-5-111, MCA, establishing the death and the 

fact that the death was caused by a criminal agency, nothing more. 

Further, regarding ti 45-5-111, MCA, in State v. Gould (1985), 

216 Mont. 455, 470-471, 704 P.2d 20, 30, we concluded that: 

[tlhere must be independent evidence establishing 

the corpus delicti, but it need not of itself be 

sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt, as, once the 

independent evidence is given, the confession may be 
considered with the facts and circumstances in evidence 

in determining whether the corpus delicti is 

established... [Emphasis provided.] 

The evidence presented by various State witnesses, independent 

of the defendant's statements, is sufficient to establish the 

corpus delicti--that is to establish the death of the victim, and 

"the fact that the death was caused by a criminal agency." Section 

45-5-111, MCA. Independent evidence establishes that the defendant 

was in possession of the vehicle which struck and killed the 

decedent and that he had several drinks before he drove onto the 

interstate on the evening of August 8. Further evidence showed he 

was straddling the fogline although there was sufficient light to 

see approximately 3/4 of a mile ahead. This evidence qualifies as 

"some independent evidence establishing the corpus delicti." w, 

704 P.2d at 30. At that point, the defendant's statements may be 

considered with "the facts and circumstances in evidencew to 

determine whether the corpus delicti has been established. w, 

704 P.2d at 30. We conclude that the evidence does sufficiently 

establish the corpus delicti of negligent homicide at issue here. 

In conclusion, the defendant's statements, together with the 

evidence from other witnesses, were sufficient to support the jury 

verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence. 

111. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

The defendant argues that the trial court failed to properly 

instruct the jury on the issues of causation and negligence. He 

contends that there should have been an instruction requiring the 
jury to find that [tlhe defendant was driving under the influence 

of alcohol as defined in these instructions . . ." because an 

essential element (criminal negligence) was dependent upon 

intoxication. 

However, intoxication is not an essential element of negligent 

homicide. Section 45-5-104 (1) , MCA, states that "[a] person 

commits the offense of negligent homicide if he negligently causes 

the death of another human being." The two elements of the crime 

include whether the defendant caused the death of the decedent and 

whether the defendant acted negligently. 

Intoxication is merely one of the factors to be considered in 

determining whether the homicide was caused by the negligent 

actions of the actor. Also, a review of the information makes it 

clear that the State did not charge the defendant with driving 

under the influence, therefore an instruction regarding 

intoxication was not warranted. 

We have previously stated what is necessary for proper jury 

instructions: 

At a minimum, the District Court must explain or define 

the crime for the jury. In determining whether the 

instructions did this, we are guided by certain settled 

principles. First, we must view the instructions as a 

whole, and we will find no error if the instructions as 

a whole fully and fairly instruct on the law applicable 

to the case. 

State v. Lundblade (1981), 191 Wont. 526, 529, 625 P.2d 545, 548. 

(Citations omitted.) In the instant case, a review of the 

instructions indicates that the elements necessary to find 

negligent homicide were fully explained to the jury. In addition, 
the jury was given a detailed definition of the degree of 

negligence required to find the defendant guilty of negligent 

homicide. No further instructions were required. The trial court 

properly instructed the jury in this action and did not abuse its 

discretion. 

IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY 

The defendant contends that it was reversible error to exclude 

a report made by Officer Schumacher reconstructing the accident but 

then let her testify as to mathematical calculations contained in 

the report. He states that he was not informed at the time his 

counsel interviewed the officer that she would testify regarding 

accident reconstruction. He further argues that her testimony was 

speculative and without foundation and should have been excluded. 

The State asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it allowed Officer Schumacher to testify. Moreover, it 

maintains that error cannot be founded upon subjects not in the 

record. 

A. TESTIMONY FROM THE EXCLUDED REPORT 

Officer Schumacher's report was properly excluded because it 

was not presented to the defendant within the proper discovery 

deadline. Her report included mathematical calculations regarding 

the point of impact and the speed of the defendant's vehicle. The 

trial court also determined that she could not testify concerning 

information contained in the calculations from the report. Upon 

review of the record, we determine that Officer Schumacherls 

testimony did not concern any information from the report's 
mathematical calculations. She properly stayed within the limits 

set by the trial court. 

The officer testified to the conditions at the time of the 

accident, such as amount of light. She used a diagram to assist 

the jury in visualizing the accident. She testified about the 

conclusions she had drawn from the measurements and data collected 

at the time of the accident, including her opinion of the relative 

positions of the car, the motorcycle and Mr. Dearinger at the point 

of impact. Finally, she opined that the defendant had ample 

opportunity to stop or in some way, avoid the accident. None of 

this testimony included the mathematical calculations she prepared 

for the excluded report. The officer could properly testify as to 

her conclusions if she had the proper qualifications as an expert. 

B. TESTIMONY CONCERNING ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION 

The defendant contends that Officer Schumacher did not hold 

herself out as an expert in accident reconstruction when she was 

interviewed on April 3, 1992, and that her testimony at trial was 

a surprise. However, Officer Schumacher testified that she had 

always been in a position to testify concerning reconstruction of 

the accident but when she tried to provide her opinions at her 

interview with the defense on April 3, 1992, she was not given the 

opportunity to do so by the defendant's counsel. She also stated 

that she never said she was not going to reconstruct the accident 

but that she had not reconstructed the accident at the time of the 

interview with defense counsel. 

We note that the defendant did not provide this Court with a 
transcript of the April 3, 1332 interview of Officer Schumacher for 

our own examination. This Court is left to speculate as to why the 

defendant would argue that the officer's testimony went beyond the 

parameters of the interview and then fail to provide the necessary 

transcript of that interview for our review. 

Under the Montana Rules of Evidence, the trial court is 

siven wide latitude in determinins whether to admit 

opinion testimonv of investisative officers. Leeway is 

allowed in such instances, and provided - that the cross 

examiner is siven adequate o~portunitv to elicit any 

assunmtions or facts underlyinsthe ex~ert's opinion, the 

weight to be siven the testimonv is for the trier of fact 

to ietermine .- [Emphasis supplied. ] 

Campbell v. Johnson (1991), 251 Mont. 12, 15-16, 823 P.2d 237, 239, 

citing Cline v. Durden (1990), 246 Mont. 154, 803 P.2d 1077. 

C. OFFICER SCJXUMACHER'S QUALIFICATIONS 

The defendant also asserts that the officer" testimony is 

speculative and without foundation. We disagree. There is no 

question that Officer Schumacher was well qualified to testify as 

an expert regarding traffic accidents. She spends approximately 

1/4 to 1/3 of her job investigating accidents. She graduated from 

the highway patrol recruit academy in 1978 and has been an officer 

since 1979. She had additional training in 1985, 1986 and 1987 in 

on-scene accident investigation and technical accident 

investigation. In addition, she received 80 hours of training in 

accident reconstruction in 1989. She has personally investigated 

several hundred traffic accidents and testified in hundreds of 

traffic accident cases. She is well qualified to testify to 

accident investigations and to accident reconstruction. She has 

the training and experience to testify regarding her investigative 

18 
work and conclusions based upon her investigations. 

Not only was the officer well qualified to testify regarding 

her reconstruction of the accident, the defendant was able to fully 

crass-examine her on her conclusions and she was listed as an 

expert on the State's witness list. 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it allowed Officer Schumacher to testify. She did not provide 

information fromthe excluded report nor did she testify concerning 

any area in which she did not have sufficient expertise. 

AFFIRMED. 

We Concur: 

> ,' 
August 10, 1993 

CERTIFICAW OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following 

named: 

J. Robert Planalp 

LANDOE, BROWN, PLANALP & BRAAKSMA, P.C. 

P.O. Box One 

Bozeman, MT 59771-0001 

Larry Jent 

WILLIAMS, JENT & DOCKINS 

506 East Bahcock 

Bozeman, MT 59715 

HON. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General 

Cregg W. Coughlin, Assistant 

Justice Bldg. 

Helena, MT 59715 

Mike Salvagni 

Gallatin County Attorney 

615 South 16th Ave. 

Bozeman, MT 59715 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA