Imposition of Agricultural Export Controls Under § 5 of

the Export Administration Act of 1979

Export of agricultural commodities can be restrained under the national security controls 

of § 5 o f the Export Administration A ct o f 1979 only if the exports in question 

constitute " a significant contribution to the military potential” o f the importing 

country.

W hether grain exports will contribute significantly to the military potential of the Soviet 

Union is a question of fact for the President to determine.

January 17, 1980

T h e C o u n s e l t o t h e P r e s i d e n t

M y D e a r S i r : I am responding to your memorandum of January 14, 

1980, regarding the availability of § 5 of the Export Administration Act 

of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2404, as a basis for the imposition of agricultural export controls on exports to the Soviet Union. I agree that there 

is sufficient factual basis to conclude that the invasion of Afghanistan 

by the Soviet Union threatens the security of neighboring countries, 

including Pakistan, and therefore threatens our security as defined by 

§ 3(2)(A) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2404(2)(A). I also agree that 

§ 7(g)(1) of the 1979 Act contemplates that under appropriate circumstances the export of agricultural commodities can be restrained under 

the national security controls of §5. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2406(g)(1).

The remaining question is whether exports of grain in the amounts 

involved here constitute “a significant contribution to the military potential” of the Soviet Union as required by § 3(2)(A) of the 1979 Act. 

The quoted language first appeared in the Export Administration Act 

in 1962. Between 1949, when the Export Administration Act was first 

adopted, and 1962, the President had been empowered to impose national security controls over exports based upon a standard of “necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to 

the national security.” Act of Feb. 26, 1949, § 2.1

In 1962, the 1949 Act was amended to limit the use by the President 

of national security controls. The “national security” ground was refor11 note th at th e 1949 A ct, as has ev e ry am endm ent to it since, singled out ag ricu ltu ra l co m m o d ities 

for special co n sid eratio n w ith reg ard to ex p o rt co n tro ls. T h e 1979 A ct reem phasizes th at historic 

co n c ern , settin g fo rth in § 3 (1 1 ) a policy “ to m inim ize restrictio n s on th e ex p o rt o f ag ricu ltu ral 

co m m o d ities and p ro d u cts."

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mulated to authorize export controls “if the President shall determine 

that such export makes a significant contribution to the military or

economic potential o f” (emphasis added) a nation to be subjected to 

restrictions. This amendment clearly expressed a congressional determination that the contribution made by any embargoed goods be both 

significant and related to either the military or economic sectors of the 

foreign country involved.

In 1969, Congress further restricted the “national security” power 

over exports by removing, over the objection of spokesmen for the 

Nixon Administration, the phrase “or economic” from the language of 

what is now § 3(2)(A). This amendment was proposed in a bill cosponsored by then Senator Mondale in order to restrict the President’s 

power over exports.

The legislative history and evolution of the President’s power to 

control exports in the name of “national security” is instructive with 

regard to interpretation of the critical language in § 3(2)(A) in two 

regards. First, the goods to be embargoed must make a significant—as 

opposed to a minimal or marginal—contribution to military potential. 

The structure of the 1979 Act and its legislative history suggest that 

this significance may be based on either the volume or the nature of 

any particular proposed export. Second, this “significant contribution” 

must have an articulable factual nexus to “military potential.”

Your memorandum of January 14, without stating a basis for its 

conclusion, assumes the basic factual predicate to invocation of § 5.

At the time I wrote my memorandum of January 10,’ none of the 

agencies with access to the relevant information had come forward 

with facts that would establish a nexus between the grain embargo and 

the military potential of the Soviet Union as required under § 3(2)(A). 

You now advise that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has concluded 

on the basis of intelligence reports and historical experience: (1) That 

the denial of grain in the amounts involved here will significantly 

undermine public support among the Soviet populace for the Afghanistan invasion; and (2) that this deterioration of public support will 

undercut the resolve of the Soviet leadership to continue the occupation of Afghanistan. On this ground the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

has determined that these grain shipments make a significant contribution to the willingness and ability of the Soviet leadership to continue 

military operations in Afghanistan, and this resolve on the part of the 

Soviet leadership is an essential component of the “military potential” 

of the Soviet Union.

* N o t e : In a m em o ran d u m d ated Ja n u a ry 10, 1980, th e A tto rn e y G en eral reco m m en d ed to the 

P resid en t th a t he rely o n ly upo n § 6 o f th e 1979 E x p o rt A d m in istratio n A ct, an d not upon § 5 , in 

co n n e ctio n w ith his im position o f a g ricu ltu ra l ex p o rt co n tro ls. S ection 6 au th o rizes ex p o rt co n tro ls “ to 

th e ex ten t necessary to fu rth e r significantly th e foreign p o licy o f th e U nited S tates o r to fulfill its 

d ec lared in tern atio n al o b lig atio n s.” 50 U .S.C . A pp. § 2405(a)(1). Ed.

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The reason you advance in your January 14 memorandum for invoking § 5 as well as § 6 “when the action is clearly supportable under § 6 

alone,” is your judgment that the reliance on national security grounds 

will decrease the chances of a significant effort to organize a two-house 

veto as the statute provides in the case of § 6 actions. But there will be 

a report under § 6 in any event. And if there are to be hearings and if a 

resolution of disapproval is to be introduced, as we suspect will happen 

in any event, the procedural vehicle will be available. I also understand 

that it is your judgment, as well as the general consensus of the other 

involved agencies, that such a resolution of disapproval will fail regardless of whether we rely on § 6 alone or on both §§ 5 and 6. Therefore it 

is difficult for me to understand what strategic advantage is to be 

gained by including § 5.

I understand that you have put forward a second argument, which is 

not included in your January 14 memorandum, to the effect that President Carter said in the 1976 campaign that he would cut off grain sales 

to the Soviet Union only when national security required. But it seems 

rather clear from the series of campaign statements that the President in 

1976 was not talking in the technical language of the Export Administration Act. He clearly served notice at that time that armed aggression 

by the Soviet Union which threatened our allies would constitute the 

kind of extreme circumstance in which it might be necessary to cut off 

the export of grain as well as other goods and materials to the Soviet 

Union. Whether the particular action would be taken under § 5 or § 6 

of the Export Administration Act was not the issue. The President’s 

action of blocking exports in this case is consistent with his 1976 

statements.

In sum, the question whether the grain exports at issue here contribute significantly to the military potential of the Soviet Union is a 

question of fact. That question is for the determination of the President, 

and if he makes such a determination on the facts of this case he is 

authorized to invoke § 5. However, it is my view that the wiser course 

is to proceed on the basis of § 6 alone. I believe that the controversy 

and debate that will be generated in the Congress over the President’s 

invocation of the limited national security authority provided under the 

Export Administration Act will unnecessarily cloud the real issue, 

which is the decision to cut off these grain shipments to the Soviet 

Union.

Sincerely,

B e n j a m i n R. C i v i l e t t i

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