Filed 5/4/21 P. v. Allen CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERIC ELIJAH ALLEN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G058527

 (Super. Ct. No. 18CF3129)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Julian 

W. Bailey, Judge. Affirmed.

Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and 

Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Appellant Eric Elijah Allen was convicted of pandering for procuring Jane 

Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 for the purpose of prostitution.1 The jury also found appellant 

guilty of kidnapping JD1 and assaulting her with force likely to cause great bodily injury. 

Appellant now contends: 1) The trial court erred in admitting certain phone evidence

because it was not properly authenticated, 2) the prosecution’s expert witness on 

prostitution exceeded the scope of permissible expert testimony, and 3) his sentence 

violates equal protection principles. As respondent concedes, appellant’s second 

contention has merit. However, even without the impermissible portions of the expert’s

testimony, it is not reasonably likely appellant would have a received a more favorable 

verdict at his trial. We therefore affirm the judgment. 

FACTS

In November 2018, appellant and the victims were staying together in a 

room at the Ana Mesa motel in Costa Mesa. The motel is located in an area known as 

“The Track” or “The Blade,” where prostitution activity is endemic. 

On the morning of November 4, JD1 frantically entered the lobby of the 

motel and used the front desk clerk’s phone to call 911. Looking scared and nervous, she 

told the dispatcher she needed help because appellant was holding her against her will 

and forcing her into prostitution. She also said appellant was holding JD2, but she might 

not want to leave appellant because she had nowhere to go. 

While JD1 was waiting for the police to arrive, appellant entered the lobby

and confronted her. Although she did not want to leave, appellant yanked her out of her 

chair, put her in a headlock, and hauled her out into the parking lot. He was hitting her

and trying to force her into his car when the police pulled up to the scene. At that point, 

appellant fled on foot, but officers soon captured him. When they searched him incident 

to arrest, they found an Android phone and $145. 

1

We will refer to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 collectively as the victims, and individually as JD1 

and JD2.
3

Meanwhile, JD2 had appeared on the scene back at the motel parking lot. 

She and JD1 were arguing and yelling so intensely the police had to separate them for 

fear of further violence.2 Once things settled down, officers searched appellant’s car and 

discovered the victims’ iPhones. JD2’s phone was found inside her purse, on the front 

passenger seat, and JD1’s phone was tucked away in the trunk, along with her 

identification and social security cards. 

The victims did not testify at trial. However, the violent interaction that 

took place between JD1 and appellant at the motel was captured on surveillance tape and 

played for the jury in court, as was a recording of JD1’s 911 call. In addition, the 

prosecution presented a considerable amount of evidence regarding what investigators 

discovered on appellant’s and the victims’ phones. 

On JD1’s phone, investigators found a variety of text messages between the 

victims and appellant in which the victims referred to appellant as “Daddy” and kept him 

posted about various “dates” they are going on. Following one of the dates, the victims 

sent appellant a photo of them holding a stack of money. And after another, JD1 sent

appellant a message complaining about the genitalia of one of her clients. In his reply, 

appellant told JD1 to do whatever she needed to do to keep the client happy. 

Besides the text messages, JD1’s phone contained photos of the victims 

posing provocatively on appellant’s car. There also was a photo of the victims posing in 

lingerie with the name “Moe Dollas” emblazoned at the top. 

On JD2’s phone, investigators found confirmations for various online 

“dating” advertisements that were posted on a website commonly used by prostitutes. 

Among other things, the ads mentioned two girl specials and “black pussy” and were 

adorned with provocative photographs of the victims. In addition to the ads, JD2’s phone 

also contained numerous memes that referenced pimping and prostitution. And it 

2

Apparently, JD2 was not happy with JD1’s decision to call the cops on appellant.
4

contained multiple photos of appellant along with the names “Moe Dollas” and “King 

Dolla.” 

One of those photos was from appellant’s Instagram account. It featured 

appellant and JD1 holding stacks of money along with a post that read, “[T]his is what 

happens when you got a nigga with a dream & a female that listens[.]” Other posts on 

appellant’s account included one that said “slow feet don’t eat” and another that read “get 

a bag or get lost” that was accompanied by an emoji money bag. 

When investigators searched appellant’s phone, they discovered more 

photos of the victims and appellant’s car. They also found various text messages from 

the victims, as well as text messages from prospective sex customers, commonly known 

as “Johns.” In the messages, appellant provided the Johns with information about 

meeting places and pricing for various sex acts. And he often inquired of the Johns if 

they were associated with law enforcement. Appellant’s phone also contained text 

messages from a person identified as “Shybaby.” In one exchange, appellant candidly 

told Shybaby that he was “about to hit the blade” and go out pimping. 

At trial, the prosecution called Costa Mesa Detective Josef Saar as an 

expert witness on the subculture of prostitution and pimping. He testified the prostitution 

business is all about making money for the pimps, who wield enormous power over their 

prostitutes. In fact, Saar said prostitutes are worked tirelessly and have to turn over all of 

their earnings to their pimp. And oftentimes they have to call their pimps “Daddy” or 

“King,” to underscore their subservient role in the relationship. 

In addition to explaining how pimps and prostitutes generally go about their 

business and communicate with each other, Saar testified about the specific information 

that was found on the phones. In Saar’s opinion, the messages, memes, emojis, photos 

and ads on the phones showed appellant was pimping the victims and holding them 

against their will. 
5

Despite Saar’s opinions in that regard, the jury found appellant not guilty of 

pimping and deadlocked on the charge of human trafficking, which was later dismissed 

by the court. (Pen. Code, §§ 266h, subd. (a) & 236.1, subd. (b).) However, as noted at 

the outset, the jury did convict appellant of pandering, kidnapping, and aggravated 

assault. (Pen. Code, §§ 266i, subd. (a)(1), 207 & 245, subd. (a)(1).) Given appellant’s 

criminal record, which included a prior strike conviction, the court sentenced him to 26 

years and 4 months in prison.

DISCUSSION

The Phone Evidence

Appellant contends the prosecution failed to authenticate or lay a proper 

foundation for the text messages, advertising photographs and Instagram posts that were 

found on the phones. We disagree. 

The phone evidence was presented through the testimony of Detective Saar 

and his partner Jaime Santibanez, who was one of the officers who responded to the Ana 

Mesa motel in response to JD1’s 911 call. Santibanez testified that after the victims were 

taken into custody, he spoke with them individually at the police station. During their 

respective interviews, the victims gave him the passcodes to their phones, and he 

reviewed the contents of their phones with them. Appellant’s phone was also accessed, 

pursuant to a judicially-authorized search warrant. As part of the investigation, the 

contents of all three phones was downloaded using a Cellebrite data-transfer device. 

Santibanez testified the Cellebrite device is widely used by law 

enforcement and is approved for use by his department. And once a phone is hooked up 

to the device, its contents cannot be altered. He said, “As soon as you plug [the phone 

into the device], you follow the instructions, and it just downloads all the information, 

pictures, messages” from the phone. However, because Santibanez had no formal 

training on how to use the device, the downloading in this case was performed by Saar 

and a Detective Bak, both of whom have specialized training in that area. Bak did not 
6

testify at trial, so it fell largely to Saar to describe to the jury how the Cellebrite system 

works. 

Saar explained the Cellebrite data-transfer device operates hand in hand 

with a software program that is manufactured by Cellebrite. Once a phone is hooked up 

to the device, the software program creates a forensic image of the phone’s contents as 

part of the downloading process. Then it translates that information into a readable 

format known as an extraction report. Those reports, Saar said, allow investigators to 

review data on the phone, including messages, photographs and search history. 

Saar and Santibanez both reviewed the extraction reports that were

generated in this case. Thus, even though Santibanez was not actively involved in the 

downloading process, he was able to see what was found on the phones. When asked if 

the information in the extraction reports matched the information he saw on the phones, 

Santibanez answered in the affirmative. He also said the reports were generally 

consistent with reports he had seen while working on other cases in the past. 

At trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence seven extraction reports 

that were generated from appellant’s phone. One of the reports reflected appellant’s text 

messages with JD1, one reflected his text messages with the person identified as 

Shybaby, and the remaining five reflected his text messages with suspected Johns. 

Appellant contends these extraction reports were inadmissible for two reasons. First, the 

prosecution failed to establish the Cellebrite data-transferring system is generally reliable 

or was working correctly when it was used in this case. In other words, appellant claims 

there was insufficient evidence to prove the extraction reports were accurate and reliable. 

Second, appellant assails the reports as inadmissible hearsay. 

The problem is, appellant did not object to the extraction reports on any 

basis when they were offered into evidence by the prosecution. Therefore, he has 

forfeited his right to challenge them on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Cage

(2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 287.) 
7

Appellant attempts to avoid this result by arguing his attorney was 

ineffective for failing to object to the extraction reports. (See Strickland v. Washington

(1984) 466 U.S. 668 [the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to

competent representation at trial].) However, because “[a]n attorney may choose not to 

object for many reasons, . . . the failure to object rarely establishes ineffectiveness of 

counsel.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 540.) “If, as here, the record fails to 

show why counsel failed to object, the claim of ineffective assistance must be rejected on 

appeal unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one or there can 

be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 467; 

People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)

Defense counsel was never asked to explain why he did not object to the

accuracy of the extraction reports, but that failure can be explained in light of the 

testimony provided by Saar and Santibanez. Both of them testified the Cellebrite system 

is widely used in law enforcement. In addition, Santibanez said the extraction reports 

were similar to reports he had seen in other cases, and the specific information contained 

in the reports matched what he had personally observed on the phones. 

If that wasn’t enough to prove the information in the extraction reports was 

accurate, the prosecution introduced screen shots (i.e., photographs) that Santibanez took 

of various text messages that were found on JD1 and appellant’s phones. The 

information reflected in those messages was identical to the information in the extraction 

reports, which is strong proof the Cellebrite system was working properly, and the 

extraction reports were accurate. In the absence of any other evidence on the point, we 

cannot fault defense counsel for failing to object to the extraction reports on accuracy 

grounds. 

As for counsel’s failure to object to the extraction reports on hearsay 

grounds, the law is clear that when a report is produced by a person, such as a doctor or a 

police officer, it is subject to exclusion under the hearsay rule. (People v. Sanchez (2016) 
8

63 Cal.4th 665, 674.) However, the extraction reports in this case were created with very 

limited human involvement. All Saar and Bak had to do was connect the phones to the 

Cellebrite device, and the data from the phones was automatically downloaded and 

formatted into readable reports that consisted solely of machine-generated information. 

Because the human input needed to create the reports was minimal, and they reflect the 

work of a computer, not a person, they do not implicate the hearsay rule. (People v. 

Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258 [computer-generated data does not constitute hearsay]; 

People v. Abad (Co.App. 2021) __ P.3d __, __ [2021 W.L. 280531] [phone extraction 

reports are not hearsay]; Gayle v. State (Fla.App. 2017) 216 So.3d 656, 659 [same].) 

Thus, like appellant’s challenge to the accuracy of the extraction reports, his hearsay 

challenge to the reports is not well taken. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing 

to object to the extraction reports on hearsay grounds.3 

Appellant also challenges the contents of the extraction reports, which 

contain a verbatim description of the text messages that were sent and received on the 

phones. Unlike the reports themselves, to which he did not object, defense counsel did 

object to the text messages on several grounds, including hearsay and lack of foundation. 

However, the trial court overruled his hearsay objection on the basis the statements in the 

messages attributable to appellant constituted admissions under Evidence Code section 

1220, and appellant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. 

Appellant’s foundational objections went to the issue of authorship. At 

trial, he objected to the text messages on the basis there was insufficient evidence to 

prove that he and the victims were the ones who actually composed and sent them. The 

trial court agreed at first. Early on during the prosecutor’s direct examination of Officer 

Santibanez, the court sustained several objections to questions and answers that assumed 

3

Respondent contends the extraction reports satisfied the business records exception to the hearsay 

rule. (See Evid. Code, § 1271.) Given our holding the reports were not hearsay, we need not consider this claim.
9

appellant and the victims were responsible for the text messages depicted in the 

extraction reports. 

However, defense counsel failed to renew those objections during 

Santibanez’s testimony, even as Santibanez continued to attribute the messages to 

appellant and the victims. Appellant would have us believe this failure constituted 

ineffective assistance of counsel. He also claims his attorney was derelict for failing to 

challenge the prosecutor’s underlying assumption that the phones actually belonged to 

appellant and the victims. These claims do not hold water. 

As to the latter point about ownership of the phones, the record shows the 

victims’ phones were found in appellant’s car along with their personal belongings, and 

appellant’s phone was found on his person. When the victims got to the police station, 

they voluntarily gave Santibanez the passcodes to their phones, and he reviewed the 

contents of their phones with them. There was no evidence of the victims disputing 

ownership of the phones, and in fact, JD1’s full name was embedded within the 

identification number of her phone. 

Moreover, the phones contained a wide assortment of photos of appellant 

and the victims. The photos suggested the victims were working as prostitutes for 

appellant and bringing in large stacks of money for him. Since the text messages on the 

phones centered around the topic of prostitution, the photos corroborated the 

prosecution’s theory that the text messages were the work of appellant and the victims. 

In fact, in some of the messages sent from appellant’s phone, he actually 

identified himself by name. For example, he identified himself as “Eric” to Shybaby, and 

in response to a text from JD1’s phone, appellant said his handle on a particular app was 

“Eric Elijah Allen.” Judging from the context of that exchange, it appears JD2 was the 

one who was actually messaging with appellant at that time. During the exchange, she 

referred to appellant as “Daddy” and apologized for not having her own phone with her. 
10

She told appellant she did not think she needed her phone at the time because she was 

with JD1, whom she referred to by name several times.

Taken as whole, there was sufficient evidence from which jury could 

reasonably conclude the phones belonged to appellant and the victims, and they were the 

ones who composed the messages that were set forth in the extraction reports. (See 

People v. Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 267 [“‘As long as the evidence would 

support a finding of authenticity, the writing is admissible. The fact conflicting 

inferences may be drawn regarding authenticity goes to the document’s weight as 

evidence, not its admissibility.’”].) Therefore, defense counsel was not remiss for failing 

to object more persistently to the messages reflected in the reports. 

That brings us to the admissibility of the online prostitution ads and the 

incriminating posts that were found on appellant’s Instagram account. Appellant 

contends his attorney should have challenged this evidence for lack of authenticity 

because no one from the ad company or Instagram testified about the protocols for 

creating content on their sites or how easy or difficult it would be for someone to post 

information in another person’s name. Appellant simply does not believe there was a 

sufficient showing that he and the victims were responsible for the ads and Instagram 

posts that were found on their phones. 

We fully appreciate the fact that not everything on the Internet is as it 

appears. As one court has noted, “‘Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No website is monitored for accuracy and nothing contained there is under oath or even subject 

to independent verification absent underlying documentation. [We] hold[] no illusions 

that hackers can adulterate the content of any website from any location at any time.’ 

[Citation.]” This observation in People v. Beckley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 509, 515-516, 

has only grown clearer and more in the eleven years since it was decided.

But the advertisements offering prostitution services in this case were found 

on JD2’s phone, and they contained multiple photographs of the victims. They also 
11

referenced JD1’s working name, Million Dollars, which is how appellant listed her

among the contacts on his phone. And of course, the other evidence in the case firmly 

established the victims were actively involved in the very type of prostitution activities 

that were being offered in the ads. In the light of such damning facts, we cannot say 

defense counsel was negligent in failing to challenge the authenticity of the ads. 

As for the Instagram evidence, it consisted mainly of a photograph found 

on JD2’s phone that was attributed to appellant’s Instagram account. The photo depicts 

appellant and JD2 flashing stacks of money, along with a series of posts suggesting the 

money was obtained through pimping and prostitution. The username on the account is 

listed as “moedollass.” 

Appellant argues anyone could have created the account and posted the 

picture without his knowledge. However, the victims’ phones contained similar photos 

of appellant and the victims with money, and one of those pictures was adorned with the 

name “Moe Dollas.” Furthermore, Santibanez testified that when he examined the 

phones at the police station, one of them was actually logged onto the account. 

Considered in conjunction with the text messages implicating appellant in pimping 

activity, we are convinced there was plenty of evidence from which the jury could 

reasonably conclude the account was his, so we do not believe defense counsel was 

ineffective for failing to challenge the authenticity of the account or the information that 

was posted on it. 

Expert Testimony

Appellant contends Detective Saar’s testimony about the phone evidence 

exceeded the scope of permissible expert testimony and lessened the prosecution’s 

burden of proof by invading the jury’s province to determine the truth of the charges. 

While conceding Saar was entitled to decipher the phone evidence for the jury and 

explain what it generally signified in the prostitution subculture, appellant maintains Saar 

went too far by opining the phone evidence signaled appellant was actually involved in 
12

the charged offenses. We agree with both parties that some of Saar’s testimony 

amounted to an improper opinion about appellant’s guilt. However, given the jury’s split 

verdict in this case, we do not believe that aspect of Saar’s testimony was prejudicial to 

appellant. 

As a preliminary matter, respondent claims appellant forfeited his right to

challenge Saar’s testimony on the ground it exceeded the scope of permissible expert 

testimony because he did not object to Saar’s testimony on that basis in the trial court, 

nor did he object to Saar’s testimony linking him to the charged offenses. This claim is 

well taken. Although appellant raised one foundational objection early on during Saar’s 

testimony, he did not object on foundational grounds beyond that. Nevertheless, we will 

address the merits of appellant’s argument because he alleges his attorney was ineffective 

for failing to preserve it for appellate review. Looking at the issue through that lens, we 

must determine whether reasonably competent counsel would have objected to Saar’s 

testimony, and if so, whether it is reasonably probable appellant would have obtained a 

more favorable verdict had Saar’s improper testimony been excluded. (Strickland v. 

Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) 

Opinion testimony by an expert is admissible in a criminal prosecution “in 

circumstances where it will assist the jury to understand the evidence or a concept beyond 

common experience.” (People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 45; Evid. Code, 

§ 801, subd. (a).) “By and large, the relationship between prostitutes and pimps is not the 

subject of common knowledge. [Citations.]” (United States v. Taylor (9th Cir. 2001) 

239 F.3d 994, 998.) Therefore, expert testimony on this topic, as well as the subculture 

of pimps and prostitutes, is generally permissible. (Ibid.; People v. Leonard (2014) 228 

Cal.App.4th 465, 493, fn. 3.) 

However, an expert “may not express an opinion on a defendant’s guilt. 

[Citations.] The reason for this rule is not because guilt is the ultimate issue of fact for 

the jury, as opinion testimony often goes to the ultimate issue. [Citations.] ‘Rather, 
13

opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the 

trier of fact. To put it another way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to 

weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77.)

In this case, expert witness Saar not only testified about the prostitution 

subculture generally, and what the information found on the phones represented in that 

subculture. He additionally opined this information signaled appellant and the victims 

were actively involved in prostitution and pimping activity. For example, he said that 

when the victims referred to appellant as “Daddy” in their messages to him, they were 

referring to their pimp. And when they told appellant they were going on dates, they 

were letting him know they were working the streets and bringing in money for him. 

Although this is very close to the perfectly permissible, “This kind of language is used in 

the subculture to indicate . . .” kind of testimony we usually see in these cases, it does go 

too far. Although Saar sometimes limited himself to saying certain phone evidence “was 

consistent with” prostitution activity, which was within his prerogative as an expert 

witness, he ultimately opined that there was some type of pimping and prostitute 

relationship going on between appellant and the victims. He also expressed his opinion 

that appellant was holding the victims against their will. This testimony went beyond the 

realm of permissible expert testimony because once Saar explained what the phone 

evidence meant in general terms, it was up to the jury to decide whether that evidence 

was sufficient to convict appellant of the charged offenses. Therefore, defense counsel 

was remiss in failing to object to Saar’s opinions about appellant’s guilt. 

Still, we do not believe appellant was prejudiced by Saar’s improper

opinion testimony. At least he has not shown it is reasonably probable he would have 

obtained a more favorable result had those opinions been excluded from his trial, which 

is the standard for assessing prejudice when defense counsel has been shown to be
14

ineffective in some respect. (See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) 

That conclusion follows from the jury’s verdict and the nature of Saar’s testimony.

Recall, appellant was charged with aggravated assault, kidnapping, 

pimping, pandering and human trafficking. However, the jury acquitted him of pimping 

and deadlocked on the human trafficking count, which was ultimately dismissed. 

Obviously, Saar’s testimony did not prejudice appellant on those charges. And the 

erroneous testimony was irrelevant to the assault and kidnapping charges, which were 

proven by surveillance footage capturing appellant’s attack on JD1 in the motel lobby 

and parking lot. That leaves the pandering charge for our consideration. 

As it turned out, Saar did not specifically address that charge in his 

testimony. He opined appellant was a pimp and human trafficker, but he did not offer 

any opinion about whether appellant encouraged the victims to become or remain 

prostitutes, which was the basis for the pandering charge. Nevertheless, as defense 

counsel strategically conceded in closing argument,

4

the phone evidence alone made clear 

appellant “was persuading, assisting, and procuring [the victims] to be prostitutes. 

There’s no question about that.” Indeed, the information on the phones plainly revealed 

appellant was directing and monitoring the victims’ prostitution activities. Since, in the 

words of defense counsel, there was “tons of evidence” apart from Saar’s expert opinions 

to support the pandering charge, defense counsel’s failure to challenge those opinions is 

not grounds for reversal. 

Sentencing

Appellant was 21 years old at the time he committed the crimes at issue in 

this case. However, because he was sentenced as a repeat offender under the Three 

Strikes Law he is not eligible for the type of early parole consideration that is generally 

4

Conceding charges with strong evidence – thereby saving focus and credibility for charges with 

weaker evidence – is a common and reasonable defense strategy. Many of the complaints made by appellant in this 

case appear to be Monday-morning quarterbacking of unsuccessful strategic choices.
15

afforded youthful offenders. Appellant contends that restriction violates equal protection 

principles, but we cannot agree. 

The trial court sentenced appellant to a base term of 10 years and 8 months 

in prison for his crimes. Given that appellant had suffered a prior strike conviction, the 

court doubled that term pursuant to the Three Strikes Law. (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. 

(e)(1).) It then added a 5-year term, based on the fact appellant had also previously been 

convicted of a serious felony (id., subd. (a)(1)), bringing appellant’s total sentence to 26 

years, 4 months. 

Appellant’s equal protection argument is grounded in the fact he was only 

21 years old at the time he committed his offenses. Typically, when a defendant receives 

a determinate sentence for crimes he committed when he was under the age of 25, he is 

entitled to early parole consideration in the form of a youthful offender parole hearing 

during the 15th year of his incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(1).) But when, as 

here, the defendant is sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes law, he is not eligible for 

such a hearing. (Id., subd. (h).) Although appellant would have us believe this scheme 

violates equal protection, that is not the case. 

In order to make out a valid equal protection claim, the defendant must first 

show he is similarly situated to other defendants who receive more favorable treatment 

under the law in question. (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408.) In other 

words, appellant must show he is the same or similar as youthful offenders who have not 

suffered any prior strike convictions. However, the law is well established that 

defendants with prior strikes are not comparable to such offenders. (People v. Wilkes

(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1165-1166.) This dooms appellant’s equal protection claim 

from the outset. (Ibid.) 

Moreover, even if we assumed youthful offenders with prior strikes were 

similarly situated to youthful offenders without prior strikes, “the Legislature could 

rationally determine that the former – ‘a recidivist who has engaged in significant 
16

antisocial behavior and who has not benefited from the intervention of the criminal 

justice system’ [citation] – presents too great a risk of recidivism to allow the possibility 

of early parole.” (People v. Wilkes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166.) Therefore, “the 

differential treatment of youth offenders sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Law for 

purposes of youth offender parole hearings does not violate equal protection.” (Id. at p. 

1167.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IKOLA, J.

GOETHALS, J.