U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

28–414PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

AN UPDATE ON NASA COMMERCIAL 

CREW SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 17, 2018 

Serial No. 115–44 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

ANDY BIGGS, Arizona 

ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

MARK TAKANO, California 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

ANDY BIGGS, Arizona 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

AMI BERA, California, Ranking Member 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
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C O N T E N T S 

January 17, 2018 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 6 

Statement by Representative Ami Bera, Minority Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Witnesses: 

Mr. William Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and 

Operations Directorate, NASA 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 21 

Mr. John Mulholland, Vice President and Program Manager for Commercial 

Programs, Boeing Space Exploration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 31 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 33 

Dr. Hans Koenigsmann, Vice President of Build and Flight Reliability, 

SpaceX 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 40 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 42 

Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 53 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 55 

Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 78 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 80 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 86 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. William Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and 

Operations Directorate, NASA ............................................................................ 112 

Mr. John Mulholland, Vice President and Program Manager for Commercial 

Programs, Boeing Space Exploration ................................................................. 116 
Page

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Dr. Hans Koenigsmann, Vice President of Build and Flight Reliability, 

SpaceX ................................................................................................................... 120 

Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel ............... 126 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Report submitted by Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety 

Advisory Panel ..................................................................................................... 138 
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AN UPDATE ON NASA COMMERCIAL 

CREW SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian Babin 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
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Chairman BABIN. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Space 

will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Subcommittee at any time. Welcome to today’s 

hearing titled, ‘‘An Update on NASA Commercial Crew Systems 

Development. I would like to recognize myself for five minutes for 

an opening statement.’’ 

The next few years will be busy for space exploration. NASA will 

be busy not only launching new systems, but they will be developing new business models, new contracting mechanisms and new 

ways of approaching every facet of the challenge of expanding 

human presence beyond low-Earth orbit. 

Engaging with commercial partners to meet exploration needs is 

part of that broader effort. I’m very eager to see how we can partner with the private sector to advance NASA’s goals. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program is part of that effort. And as we assess the 

merits of this new approach, we must also recognize the hazards 

of such partnerships. Without diligent oversight by NASA and Congress, these programs could simply end up being corporate welfare 

and bad deals for the taxpayer. 

This Commercial Crew Program builds on the commercial cargo 

program and offers new insights about how government and industry can work together on key tasks. Perhaps even more importantly, this program is a key part of the bigger, broader effort to 

industrialize low-Earth orbit and transition the International Space 

Station to a new operating model in the next decade. 

But instead of looking forward and tackling the economic selfsufficiency and operation of the ISS, we are here today looking at 

not one but two companies that are behind schedule, may not meet 

safety and reliability requirements, and could even slip into cost 

overruns. Rather than being able to praise the success of a new approach to business, we are now confronted with the news that the 

certification won’t happen until at least 2019. 

This situation gets even worse when we look at the safety and 

reliability concerns surrounding these two new systems. Both programs suffer from shared and individual issues concerning reliability and safety. The risk that these companies cannot meet their 

deadlines or safety requirements increases the risk that the ISS 

cannot be successfully or gracefully transitioned in the middle of 

next decade. Increasing risks to ISS transition in turn, increase 

risk to human exploration programs in general. Further, they decrease the collective appetite for the kind of innovative partnerships that will be vital to a host of future NASA exploration and 

science missions. 

Both this hearing and last November’s hearing on SLS and Orion 

get to matters of risk. What is the risk that NASA will be unable 

to meet its long-term goals of expanding permanent human presence beyond low-Earth orbit? Each program features cost, schedule, 

and performance risks. Those programmatic risks translate into 

risks to the overall exploration architecture. 

Both companies are making progress but certainly not at the rate 

that was expected and not without significant challenges to safety 

and reliability. In order to remedy these problems, NASA may seek 

additional funding or accept significant risks. Neither of those op-
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tions is viable. As I said at our recent hearing on SLS and Orion, 

NASA and the contractors have to execute. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for their testimony and look 

forward to getting a better understanding of where we are and 

what our prospects look like going forward. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. And now I would like to recognize the Ranking 

Member, the gentleman from California, for an opening statement. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having 

this timely hearing and thank you to the witnesses. 

You know, I represent a district in California, so I have these 

five to six hour flights across the country. And a couple weeks 

ago— I’ll download a movie occasionally to watch on that flight. 

And I downloaded Apollo 13 to watch on the flight. Obviously, I 

think everyone in this room has seen that movie, but it’s a great 

movie if you haven’t seen it. But what it does suggest is the importance of safety in commercial crew launches. And you know, that 

was almost 50 years ago and just watching the importance of safety watching how those of us at NASA at the time back home improvising, trying to figure things out, using slide rules that might have 

been an over-dramatization, but they were using slide rules. And 

fast-forward to where we are today and think about the computing 

capabilities that we have and everything else. But it still doesn’t 

mitigate the danger when you’re sending human beings hundreds 

of thousands of miles away from the earth, particularly as we start 

to think about going further and further and the importance of 

safety. And regardless of everything that we do to mitigate things, 

the unexpected potentially can always happen. And you know, as 

we think about renewing our commercial crew capabilities here domestically, partnering with the commercial sector, safety is paramount and obviously the balance of meeting deadlines and goals 

and balancing that with safety. 

I think the other important part as we start to get back into commercial crew capabilities here domestically in the United States, I 

do think we’re taking the right approach partnering with the commercial sector with NASA. It’s certainly in the lead looking at certification and everything else, but also having redundancy, having 

two companies that potentially give us that capability because 

again, you never know when something unexpected potentially 

happens. 

I think for national pride, also allowing the United States domestically not to have to rely on another nation certainly is something 

that we think about. 

And then we don’t know what the 21st century in space is going 

to look like. Certainly you see more commercial interests, thinking 

about building habitats up there. You see folks talk about space 

tourism, et cetera. So again, as the commercial sector partners with 

our agencies, I think this is incredibly important. 

With regards to today’s hearing, I’m very interested in looking at 

and getting information on safety first; within that context, the 

safety driving the timeline as opposed to timeline driving safety; 

and then, really just curious about what those next steps are. If we 

are unable to hit some of the goals, my understanding is in the fall 

of this year, the hope is to do some unmanned tests, toward the 

end of 2018 to try to do some manned tests, and then to start the 

certification process in 2019. So I’d be curious again to hear from 

our witnesses and get some sense of how we’re going to balance 

these competing interests but again leading with safety and then 

hitting our timeline goal. 
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So Mr. Chairman, thank you for another great hearing, and I 

look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bera follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Bera. I really feel 

old this morning because I used to use a slide rule when I was in 

college. And I saw that movie again for about the third time a couple of weeks ago. 

Okay. I’d like to now recognize the Chairman of our Full Committee, Mr. Smith from Texas. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The goal of the 

Commercial Crew Program was to develop a faster, more cost-effective way to procure space transportation services without sacrificing safety or reliability. The intent was to leverage the lessons 

learned and the investments made in the commercial cargo program. 

At the outset, there was hope that contractor funding would decrease the development costs to NASA and the taxpayer and that 

this would justify the contractors keeping the intellectual property 

derived from federal funding. There was also an assumption that 

the contractors would find other customers, improving economies of 

scale, which would then lead to lower launch prices for NASA. Finally, there was a presumption that contractors could deliver systems faster if there was less government oversight. 

Today’s hearing is a great opportunity to evaluate whether the 

program is living up to those goals. Have the contractors funded 

development costs? If so, how much? If not, why not? And should 

the government retain the intellectual property? Previous hearings 

held by this committee indicated that NASA is funding 90 percent 

or more of the costs. Has this changed? 

Are the contractors finding other customers to offset NASA operational costs? The commercial cargo program created two separate 

Delta-2 class launch vehicles that have certainly found customers 

outside NASA. However, the costs to NASA under the second commercial resupply services contract went up, not down. 

Should we expect costs to grow rather than shrink under the 

Commercial Crew Program as well? Has the Commercial Crew Program maintained its planned schedule? Are there appropriate incentives built into the contracts to maintain the schedule and penalize delays? 

This hearing offers us the opportunity to reflect on the status of 

the program and seek answers to these questions. A lot has happened in the last few years. The program is making significant 

progress. However, as we will hear from the witnesses, there have 

been challenges. The Government Accountability Office reported 

last February that the neither Boeing nor SpaceX would be able to 

certify their systems in 2017. 

That GAO report and the recently released Annual Report of the 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel both warned that certification is 

likely to slide even further to 2019. This was confirmed just last 

week when we were formally notified that SpaceX’s first launch 

would be delayed again. 

Further reports from the GAO, ASAP, and IG and others point 

out that neither company may be able to meet safety requirements. 

The recently released annual report from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel states it appears that neither provider will be able to 

achieve a no worse than one in 500 chance of losing a crew and 
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will be challenged to meet the overall mission requirement of one 

in 200, based on capsule design alone. Meanwhile, as schedules slip, we continue to pay Russia $80 million per seat to take our astronauts to the ISS. This not only creates additional budget pressure on the agency, it hinders full utilization of the ISS, and ultimately complicates future exploration 

plans. With the end of the ISS on the horizon, the clock is ticking 

on maximizing the return on the taxpayer’s investment. The longer 

we wait for the Commercial Crew Program, the less we can accomplish on ISS. 

Other programs at NASA, including SLS and Orion and the 

James Webb Space Telescope also face significant delays, cost overruns and challenges. 

The taxpayers and Congress have neither infinite budgets nor infinite patience. Foreseeable delays, predictable overruns and performance lapses all have real consequences. Contractors should not 

assume that the taxpayers and Congress will continue to tolerate 

this. 

NASA and its contractors must restore American confidence in 

their ability to deliver safe, cost-effective leadership in space. This 

Committee has strongly supported the Commercial Crew Program 

and consistently advocated for full funding. That support continues, 

but the contractors need to deliver safe, reliable systems on budget 

and on schedule. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

And I’d like to now recognize the Ranking Member of the Full 

Committee, the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning and welcome to our witnesses. 

Since the last Space Shuttle flight in 2011, the U.S. has lacked 

a domestic human spaceflight capability and has relied on Russian 

crew transportation services to transport NASA crew to and from 

the International Space Station. That arrangement has proved to 

be very durable in spite of geopolitical tensions back here on Earth. 

However, it is no substitute for U.S. crew transfer capabilities. 

This morning’s hearing will provide us, hopefully, with update on 

the status of NASA’s and the industry’s efforts to reestablish a domestic capability for launching our astronauts to the space station. 

NASA’s two Commercial Crew Program providers, Boeing and 

SpaceX, are working toward the goal of conducting test flights, first 

without crew onboard and later, of course, with crew. If these flight 

tests are successful, the current schedule would have NASA certify 

the two systems for operational missions sometime in 2019. 

As we have discussed on numerous occasions in this Subcommittee, getting to this stage of the Commercial Crew Program 

has really not been easy. Our witnesses from the Aerospace Safety 

Advisory Panel and the Government Accountability Office will no 

doubt attest to that point. And the coming end of the availability 

of the Soyuz seats adds the risk of unhealthy schedule pressure to 

the other challenges facing the program. 

Yet, despite the prospect of our access to seats on the Soyuz coming to an end next year, NASA and the two companies cannot afford to cut corners in attempting to prevent a potential gap in U.S. 

access to the International Space Station. Because, Mr. Chairman, 

if this is not to be sustainable, the end result of the Commercial 

Crew program must be safe and a safe commercial crew transportation system for all astronauts. 

Next week NASA will commemorate the astronauts who died in 

the Columbia, Challenger, and Apollo I accidents as well as other 

NASA pilots and employees who lost their lives in the pursuit of 

space exploration. We cannot forget their sacrifices, even as we 

blaze new trails in space. 

As the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017, ‘‘consistent 

with the findings and recommendations of the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board, the Administration shall ensure that safety 

and the minimization of the probability of loss of crew are critical 

priorities of the Commercial Crew Program.’’ 

I hope that we will have a robust discussion at today’s hearing 

on how NASA and its providers will ensure that planned commercial crew transportation systems are safe enough for our astronauts 

to fly in, what the challenges are to achieve that level of safety, 

and what safeguards the ASAP and GAO would recommend. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing. I look forward to hearing our witnesses, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Yes, ma’am. Thank you very much. Now I’d 

like to introduce our witnesses that we are going to hear from 

today. The first witness today is Mr. Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate 

Administrator of Human Exploration and Operations Directorate at 

NASA. Mr. Gerstenmaier began his NASA career in 1977 performing aeronautical research and has managed NASA’s human 

spaceflight portfolio since 2011. He received a Bachelor of Science 

in aeronautical engineering from Perdue University, and a Master 

of Science degree in mechanical engineering from the University of 

Toledo. Welcome. 

Our second witness today is Mr. John Mulholland, vice president 

and program manager for Commercial Programs at Boeing. Prior 

to this, Mr. Mulholland served as the Vice President and Program 

Manager for the Boeing Space Shuttle Program. He was also the 

program director and chief engineer for the Boeing Space Shuttle 

Orbiter Team. Mr. Mulholland received both a Bachelor of Science 

in chemical engineering and a master’s degree in mechanical engineering from New Mexico State University. Welcome. 

Our third witness today is Dr. Hans Koenigsmann, the Vice 

President of Build and Flight Reliability at SpaceX. He has more 

than 25 years of experience designing, developing, and building 

complex avionics and guidance, navigation, and control systems for 

launch vehicles of satellites. Dr. Koenigsmann received a master’s 

of science in aerospace engineering from the Technical University 

of Berlin and a Ph.D. in aerospace engineering and production from 

the University of Bremen. Welcome. 

Our fourth witness today is Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director of 

Acquisition of Sourcing Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Among other topics, Ms. Chaplain has led reviews on the ISS, Space Launch System, and Orion crew capsule 

as well as commercial cargo and crew projects at NASA. Mrs. 

Chaplain received a bachelor’s degree in international relations 

from Boston University and a master’s degree in journalism from 

Columbia University. Welcome to you. 

Our final witness today is Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair of the 

NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, ASAP, and she previously 

served as Executive Director of the Missile Defense Agency, as well 

as Director of Tests, Systems Engineering, and Evaluation at the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. She received her Ph.D. in mathematics from Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. And 

welcome to you, Dr. Sanders. 

I would like to now recognize Mr. Gerstenmaier for five minutes 

to present his testimony. Mr. Gerstenmaier? 

TESTIMONY OF MR. WILLIAM GERSTENMAIER, 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, 

HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, 

NASA 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Thank you. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to represent the NASA teams supporting 

the Commercial Crew Development Program. 

Over the past several years, there’s been tremendous amount of 

work completed. The hard work completed, the analysis, the design 
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work completed, as well as the testing is direct evidence of the tremendous amount of work that’s been accomplished. I’m sure the 

other panelists will cover in detail the quality and quantity of the 

work completed. My written testimony additionally includes references to the work that’s been completed. 

The work completed took longer than originally planned, but 

many technical issues were discovered and resolved. This extra 

time that was taken in this development phase will help reduce the 

risk and magnitude of additional schedule delays. 

This is a critical time in the program as manufacturing is in high 

gear, testing is being completed, and verification and validation requirements are being addressed by NASA. The program is approximately one year away from the first crew flights to ISS. This is an 

excellent time to reflect on the work completed and the work to go. 

This hearing is very timely. 

The NASA team is fully aware of the amount of work to go and 

the requirements that need to be completed, reviewed, and closed 

by NASA and its partners. NASA has been fully engaged with the 

partners during their design and testing and manufacturing processes. NASA has directly witnessed tests. NASA has done our own 

assessments in selected areas, and we have requested extra tests 

from our partners and even done our own tests. This involvement 

and interaction helps as NASA reviews documents for closure. 

NASA is aware of the schedule but not driven by the schedule. 

NASA worked last year to add additional Soyuz flights to protect 

if additional time was required for certification. Soyuz capability is 

available through the fall of 2019. The manufacturing time of a 

Soyuz of approximately three years will not allow additional Soyuz 

to be manufactured. We are brainstorming ideas to provide additional schedule time, if needed. 

Additionally, as we do this, we are looking for ways to allow the 

partners to reach an operational tempo after certification. 

The ISS program is looking at ways to maximize ISS operations 

while allowing for some delays and launch dates. Having selected 

two partners helps to relieve the schedule concerns if a major problem arises. NASA is doing everything possible to be prepared and 

allow time for a solid review of the design and the data. 

NASA’s aware that the schedule can be a negative influence to 

a good design and safe flight if it is the only consideration. As one 

way to protect against undue schedule pressure, NASA has implemented independent technical authorities. This allows for rigorous 

discussion on technical topics. This discussion could be seen as a 

negative but should rather be seen as a positive and a way to technically compare and contrast design options. 

NASA is prepared to make timely decisions. Many of these decisions will be risk-versus-risk decisions. And NASA is prepared to 

make these based on the technical data available at the time of the 

decision. 

Even after certification is complete, we must continually compare 

the actual performance of the systems to the design performance. 

We also must look at the environments in which the vehicle is flying to again make sure that the vehicles have the proper safety 

margins. We need to be prepared and allow the design to change, 

even after the official formal certification. 
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This is a critical time in the Commercial Crew Program. The decisions being made today will affect the safe and successful operation of the systems for years to come. NASA is fully ready for this 

phase and has the insight and ability to certify a safe and reliable 

system in a timely manner. 

I look forward to your questions and a good, informative hearing. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. Now I’d like to 

recognize Mr. Mulholland for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN MULHOLLAND, 

VICE PRESIDENT AND PROGRAM MANAGER 

FOR COMMERCIAL PROGRAMS, 

BOEING SPACE EXPLORATION 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Chairman Smith, Chairman Babin, Ranking 

Member Johnson, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the 

Committee, on behalf of The Boeing Company, thank you for the 

opportunity to provide an update on the Commercial Crew Program. 

We are proud to have been a trusted partner with NASA on 

every domestic human spaceflight program. We have a unique and 

singular understanding of the strategic importance of having an 

American-made crew transportation system for safe, reliable, and 

affordable access to low-Earth orbit. I will emphasize safe again as 

for that is our ultimate judgment on our mission. That said, we understand that having this capability as soon as possible is critically 

important for the International Space Station to continue its important mission as a world-class national lab. 

We have the full support of The Boeing Company, and a strong, 

value-added relationship with our NASA partner. We’ve made tremendous progress and have overcome several issues that are typical of complex development programs since we last testified in 

2015. 

Our launch vehicle, the Atlas V, has flown 74 missions with 100 

percent mission success providing unparalleled safety, mission assurance, and schedule reliability. The launch site crew access tower 

has been erected, and other site modifications are progressing well 

ahead of need. 

The structural test article entered test in December 2016 and is 

undergoing a complex series of static loads, modal analysis, ordinance operation, and separation system verification. The test series 

is greater than 50 percent complete. 

The service module hot fire test article has been delivered to the 

test site and is near completion of cold-flow testing. Following this 

phase, the system will be loaded with propellant, and all propulsion 

system functions will be tested. 

Spacecraft 1 has finished initial power-on testing, ground 

verification testing, and is undergoing final outfitting prior to mate 

of the crew module and the service module. This test article will 

be sent to the test site for the pad abort test in Q2 2018. 

Spacecraft 2 initial power-on testing will occur in early February, 

followed by final outfitting and mate prior to being shipped to the 

test site for environmental qualification testing early this summer 

before returning to Florida for retrofitting to support the crew 

flight test in Q4 2018. 

Spacecraft 3 lower dome secondary structure is in build to support initial power-on testing in April. This spacecraft will be used 

for the uncrewed test flight in Q3 2018. 

The land landing qualification testing has successfully completed, 

proving our system can safely land on land under both nominal 

and failure cases. 
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Flight software released its latest drop in December and currently stands at over 98 percent of full functionality. 

Over 25 percent of the verifications to be approved by NASA 

have been completed and delivered, and over 11,000 hazard control 

verifications have been closed out and delivered. 

Training is under way with NASA’s commercial crew cadre and 

our mission operations team thanks to new, state-of-the-art 

Starliner training systems at the Johnson Space Center. 

As you can see, the team has successfully transitioned from design into integrated build and test. The last time I was here, there 

were some concerns over whether or not NASA and its partners 

were providing the Aerospace Advisory Panel with enough insight 

into our systems and processes. I promised this Committee, and 

then-chair Admiral Dyer, that Boeing would continue to provide 

the ASAP the appropriate level of access into the development of 

the Starliner. In fact, we offer all of NASA’s advisory committees 

and reporting agencies, including the Government Accountability 

Office, full insight into our progress, challenges, and schedule. We 

believe transparency is essential in this business, and I personally 

feel that the reviews, findings, and feedback add value to our systems and processes. 

We are well aligned with our customer on crew safety and mission assurance, and our analyses show that we exceed our requirements for crew safety. While we’re focused on meeting our 2018 

forecast dates, we’re equally committed to performing those safely. 

We bring the same quality to commercial spaceflight that we bring 

to our servicemen and women, astronauts on board the station, and 

to the traveling public every day. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mulholland follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Mulholland. I’d like to now recognize Dr. Koenigsmann for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. HANS KOENIGSMANN, 

VICE PRESIDENT OF BUILD 

AND FLIGHT RELIABILITY, SPACEX 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Bera, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s important 

hearing. 

SpaceX is proud to partner with NASA to develop the next generation of safe, reliable, and affordable space transportation for 

America’s astronauts. On behalf of my more than 6,000 colleagues 

at SpaceX, I am pleased to be here to provide an update on our 

progress towards the first flight with crew later this year. 

Mr. Chairman, SpaceX is designing, building, testing, and will 

soon operate the safest crew transportation system in history. We 

are working in close partnership with NASA, and we are deeply 

grateful for the ongoing guidance and confidence. 

The Commercial Crew Program stands as a true example of the 

innovative safety improvements and cost savings that can be 

achieved under an effective public/private partnership. 

In addition to designing and building the hardware, we will conduct all mission operations from crew training, launch and on-orbit 

activities to post-flight recovery. NASA sets high-level requirements and certifies us to fly. The SpaceX transportation system 

leverages our proven Falcon 9 launch vehicle and our Crew Dragon 

spacecraft. 

Falcon 9 has successfully launched 46 times since 2010 including 

18 flights in 2017, a new record. The vehicle has been designed 

from day one with robust margins, engine-out capability, and advanced safety systems to support astronaut flights. Falcon 9 is also 

the only operational orbital launch system with reusability capabilities which improves reliability and lowers cost. 

The Crew Dragon spacecraft builds upon our successful flight 

heritage with our current cargo-configured Dragon spacecraft. We 

developed Dragon under the COTS Space Act Agreement with 

NASA. Since 2010, Dragon has successfully flown to orbit and back 

14 times between sending cargo to the space station and back to 

Earth, a capability unique to Dragon. Crew Dragon takes this proven design and incorporates upgrades to ensure a safe and comfortable ride for astronauts. 

The biggest safety innovation on Crew Dragon is our launch escape system. Fully integrated into the spacecraft, the system will 

safely propel Crew Dragon and the astronauts inside away from 

the launch vehicle in the event of an emergency. Unlike past generation systems that could only be used for the first few minutes 

of flight, our SuperDraco system gives the escape capability all the 

way to orbit. This is a major advancement for astronaut safety. 

I’d like to give you an overview of some of the major achievements we’ve made in the program to date. In May of 2015 we conducted a successful pad abort test. Here, we simulated an emergency on the launch pad. Within a fraction of a second, the space-
41 

craft escape system propelled it away from the pad, validating true 

escape capability in the event of a pad emergency. 

In November of 2016, we completed functional testing of our life 

support system. We also completed a key space suit qualification 

milestone which including the lead engineer wearing the space suit 

he designed in a vacuum chamber to prove its capability. 

In September 2017, we successfully made Dragon’s pressure and 

service section of our first flight vehicle. This was a major milestone and a big step towards flight later this year. And in December, we completed the first round of qualification testing for our 

parachute system. 

We have completed nearly all technical development required for 

Crew Dragon. At this point, we have multiple Crew Dragon spacecraft in testing or built right now. 

Over the course of this year, we will complete final integration 

and validation ahead of our first astronaut flights. In August we 

plan to conduct an uncrewed test flight of the full system to and 

from the space station to validate that the system is safe for crew. 

Then we will launch our test flight with two NASA astronauts for 

a week mission to and from the space station in December. Following that, we will begin operational flights with a four-astronaut 

NASA crew complement. 

Safely and reliably flying commercial crew missions remains the 

highest priority for SpaceX, and we will launch NASA astronauts 

only when both we and NASA are ready. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you 

today, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Koenigsmann follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Koenigsmann. I’d 

like to now recognize Ms. Chaplain for five minutes to present her 

testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MS. CRISTINA CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, 

ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Johnson, thank you for inviting me 

today to discuss NASA’s Commercial Crew Program. GAO has been 

assessing the progress of commercial crew for several years. In the 

past we’ve also reviewed the commercial cargo program known as 

COTS as well as NASA’s human spaceflight programs. 

As you know, NASA’s acquisition strategy on the Commercial 

Crew Program is similar to the one it used on COTS but different 

than every other spacecraft it has built for humans. For commercial crew, each contractor develops, owns, and operates its 

spaceflight systems. The contractors have access to NASA expertise 

and resources throughout development process, but NASA engineers are not making design decisions and NASA personnel are 

less involved in processing, testing, launching, and operating the 

crew transportation system. In the end, NASA will buy a crew 

transportation service much like it does for the station’s cargo. 

While Boeing and SpaceX are making significant progress, both 

continue to experience schedule delays. It has been three weeks 

since the program’s original December 2017 goal to secure domestic 

access to the space station, yet neither contractor has yet to conduct a test flight. In fact, final certification dates have slipped to 

the first quarter of calendar year 2019. And we found that the program’s own analysis indicates that certification is likely to slip into 

December 2019 for SpaceX and February 2020 for Boeing. 

Several factors could contribute to additional delays to the schedules presented here today. One, the contractor schedules have been 

aggressive from the onset of the program. To date, Boeing has reported a delay six times, and SpaceX has reported a delay nine 

times for at least one key event. According to NASA, both contractors assume an efficiency factor in getting to the crewed flight test 

that the program office does not assume in its schedule. 

The contractors also use their schedule dates to motivate their 

teams while NASA adds additional schedule margin for testing. 

Aggressive schedules and delays are not atypical for programs 

developing new launch vehicles and/or crew vehicles, and we see 

them on all types of contracts. But in this case, the delays and uncertain final certification dates raise questions about whether the 

U.S. will have uninterrupted access to the space station beyond 

2019. NASA may have to purchase additional Soyuz seats, but as 

Mr. Gerstenmaier mentioned, there are limits to how it can do so. 

Further, these delays may lessen NASA’s return on investment 

with its contractors. 

There are also programmatic and safety risks that may result in 

more delays. Again, not unusual for programs of this nature, even 

at this stage of development. Boeing, for example, is addressing the 

risk that the Starliner’s heat shield could damage the parachute 

system during reentry into the earth’s atmosphere. 
54 

SpaceX needs to address concerns about its plans to fuel the 

launch vehicle after astronauts are on board. 

In addition, both contractor systems must meet a standard for 

crew safety that is much higher than that for the shuttle. A considerable amount of work remains to be done to determine whether 

the contractors will meet this requirement. 

Lastly, NASA’s program office could also face delays and workload problems that can cause delays. Program officials told GAO 

that one of their greatest upcoming challenges would be to complete two oversight activities concurrently. These include conducting phased safety reviews and verifying that contractors meet 

requirements. 

The program’s ability to smooth its workload is limited as the 

contractors control their own schedules. Last year, though, we 

found that the proposed schedule changes could alleviate some 

overlap in terms of the program office’s workload. 

We will be further assessing the Commercial Crew’s Program 

schedule and risk as well as issues surrounding safety and look forward to reporting on the results of our work later this year. 

Chairman Babin and Ranking Member Bera, this concludes my 

statement, and I’m happy to answer any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Ms. Chaplain. We appreciate it. I’d 

like to now recognize Dr. Sanders for five minutes to present her 

testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. PATRICIA SANDERS, 

CHAIR, NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL 

Dr. SANDERS. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, Mr. 

Smith, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the status of NASA’s 

Commercial Crew Program. 

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel believes that NASA’s Commercial Crew Program is at a critical juncture, well beyond paper 

design with hardware being produced, testing underway, and first 

flights, uncrewed demo flights followed by crewed demo flights, on 

the horizon. This is a time when it is important to retain focus on 

program details while not giving in to schedule pressure; to maintain schedule awareness but to continue with program plans without neglecting, shortchanging, or deleting planned content. We continue to strongly caution that any wavering in commitment negatively impacts cost, schedule, performance, workforce morale, process discipline, and most importantly, safety. 

We see continual steady progress toward providing the capability 

for crew transportation to low-Earth orbit and the International 

Space Station with both providers currently planning for flight 

tests later this year. 

We also know that based on the quantity, significance, and associated uncertainty of work remaining for both commercial providers, the panel believes that there is a very real possibility of future schedule slips. There are several major qualification and flight 

test events that historically are schedule drivers or could reveal the 

need for additional work. These are things such as pyro shock qualification tests, parachute tests, engine hot fires, and qualification 

runs, abort tests, and both the crewed and uncrewed demos. 

In addition to the technically complex test and qualification work 

remaining for the providers, NASA also has, as Cristina pointed 

out, a significant volume of work remaining itself. The final phase 

of the NASA Safety Review process, where verification evidence of 

hazard controls is submitted by the provider and dispositioned by 

NASA, remains ahead as well as the majority of certification requirements verifications. It’s not unusual for that to come at this 

point in time in the program, but that is remaining to be done. 

Despite the volume of remaining work, the technical challenges 

and the upcoming end of the Soyuz transportation for U.S. crews, 

the panel sees no evidence that the program leadership is making 

decisions that prioritize schedule over safety risk, over crew safety. 

We expect to see several significant certification issues brought to 

culmination in the next year that will require NASA careful consideration and risk acceptance decisions at a very high level within 

the agency. It is possible that in some cases, the most beneficial 

and balanced options for the mission will require a decision to accept a higher risk. We note that the strategy of funding two providers was adopted, in part, to avoid a situation where NASA 

would be forced to accept undesired risk to maintain crews on the 

International Space Station. This requires one provider be certified 
79 

and ready to fly crew to the station by mid- to late 2019. Certification of the second provider could happen after that time. 

The panel believes that NASA is addressing safety properly, but 

space can be a decidedly hostile environment, and human 

spaceflight is inherently risky. There’s no excuse for negligence in 

the safety arena, but it is impossible to eliminate or control every 

potential hazard. 

With the Commercial Crew Program, NASA has introduced an 

approach to developing spaceflight assets in cooperation with commercial providers. The future brings potential for more partnerships, bringing more opportunities and challenges with respect to 

safety processes and mechanisms. 

In the coming year, the panel plans to spend focused effort on 

commercial crew and also look to the future of responsible and exciting human space exploration. 

And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sanders follows:] 
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Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much for your testimony, Dr. 

Sanders. 

I’d like to introduce a young lady that’s from my district because 

she’s from Texas A&M as an intern from Dayton, Texas, in District 

36, Ashton Stevenson. Raise your hand or stand up, Ashton. Thank 

you. Good to have you here this morning. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony, and now I’d 

like to recognize myself for five minutes for questions. 

Recent press reports indicated that a U.S. Government mission 

named Zuma may have either failed in orbit or the launch could 

have been unsuccessful. I do not want to discuss anything classified 

in an open session. The circumstances surrounding this mission do 

have a direct impact on NASA and this Committee’s jurisdiction 

and oversight responsibilities. For instance, the launch vehicle used 

for the mission was developed with substantial NASA funding. The 

rocket is also scheduled to launch the Transiting Exoplanet Survey 

Satellite (TESS) mission in March. More importantly, the rocket 

will be used in the Commercial Crew Program that we are discussing today. Knowing the operational history of the system that 

NASA will put people on is an issue of life and death, literally. 

Similarly, the Zuma spacecraft was reportedly built by Northrop 

Grumman who is building a $9 million James Webb Space Telescope for NASA. 

Understanding Northrop Grumman’s work is clearly important to 

NASA and the Committee. So I’d like to address the first question 

to you, Dr. Koenigsmann. Thank you for committing to provide an 

unclassified briefing on the Zuma mission. If the Committee needs 

more information, will SpaceX provide this Committee with a briefing on this mission in a classified setting? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Thank you for your question. I want to point 

out on the Zuma mission that we relayed the information that Falcon 9 performed as specified, and it actually performed very well 

as specified and that we are picking up the launches by the end 

of the month as we planned all the time. 

Regarding the briefing, we will go through the proper channels 

and follow the protocol. As you pointed out, we can’t talk any details in this particular setting. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Thank you. And to Mr. Gerstenmaier, 

does anyone at NASA know the details of the Zuma mission? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We do not know the details of the mission 

per se, but we’ve been informed by others that if there’s any mishap investigation or any other activities that are involved, we will 

be appropriately involved in that activity. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Well, why would NASA place astronauts 

on systems without knowing the systems’ full operational heritage? 

And it brings to mind President Reagan’s use of the Russian proverb, trust but verify. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, we will know if this is declared a mishap and we understand that if it’s a mishap, NASA will be informed and we will have appropriate personnel participate in those 

mishap activities. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Thank you. Following the explosion of 

the SpaceX rocket and the Amos 6 spacecraft on the launch pad, 

SpaceX was not able to determine a single most-probable cause of 
87 

the event, instead identifying several credible causes related to the 

composite overwrap pressure vessel, or COPV, helium tank. SpaceX 

modified its operations to prevent similar events going forward but 

still doesn’t know the exact cause. The ASAP report states the 

panel considers this to be the most critical step in clearing the 

COPV for human spaceflight as it allows NASA and SpaceX to 

identify the credible failure mechanisms, hazard scenarios, and 

controls as well as understand the safety margins on the system. 

The report goes on to state, in our opinion, adequate understanding 

of the COPV behavior and cryogenic oxygen is an absolute essential 

precursor to potential certification for human spaceflight. 

Dr. Sanders, how many launches with a stable configuration 

should NASA require SpaceX and Boeing to achieve before certification? 

Dr. SANDERS. That’s a very difficult question. Thank you. Right 

now I believe NASA is planning to require seven launches with 

that configuration, and we believe that’s an appropriate number. 

There’s some statistical evidence that Mr. Gerstenmaier could 

probably talk to a little bit better than I can on why that is a reasonable number. It is not a totally random number. It is a number 

that’s predicated on having more than a few but having a timeframe in which you can actually accomplish those and still get on 

with certification and make the right risk decision on flying. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Thank you very much. And Mr. 

Gerstenmaier, will NASA certify SpaceX to carry NASA astronauts 

without knowing the root cause of the Amos 9 failure? And will 

NASA allow SpaceX to use the load-and-go procedure for either 

commercial crew or the uncrewed missions? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We may not ever know the exact root cause 

of the failure that was associated with Amos, but we have a very 

intensive test program in cooperation with SpaceX and NASA 

doing some testing to identify the contributing causes or potential 

causes of that failure. 

SpaceX is doing a redesign of the composite overwrap pressure 

vessel system, and Hans can talk to you about the details of that. 

We’re participating in that. We will do the testing. We will understand the most likely contributors, and we will remove those from 

the failure chain and make sure that we’re really ready and safe 

to go fly and the system is ready for crew before we put them on 

board. 

In terms of the so-called load and go, we’re in the process of looking at the best time to put the crew on the vehicle. We’ll take into 

account the hazards associated with the specific vehicle designs, 

how much propellant is being actively loaded, what systems are operating, what hazards are associated with those activities, and we 

will find the appropriate time, along with the contractors, to put 

crew on this particular vehicle design that is most appropriate for 

the lowest risk to our crews and overall lowest risk to the—or gives 

us the highest probability of mission success. And we’re in the process of working with both providers to determine the appropriate 

time to put crew on the vehicles. 

Chairman BABIN. Excellent. Thank you very much. My time is 

expired, so I’d like to go to the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Bera. 
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Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gerstenmaier, in your 

opening testimony you talked about how NASA is aware of the 

schedule but not driven by the schedule. I think those were the 

terms that you used. And Ms. Chaplain, I believe I heard you correctly that while NASA’s engineers are involved working with both 

Boeing and SpaceX, it’s mostly internal at Boeing and SpaceX, that 

NASA’s engineers aren’t intimately involved in the design and 

manufacturing. Did I hear that correctly? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Yes, not as involved as they would be in a typical 

program such as like an Orion spacecraft. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. And again, this is evolution of—you know, if I 

think about the early days of Apollo where NASA was the launch 

vehicle, NASA was the commercial crew vehicle, was the lunar 

landing vehicle, was the science vehicle, I mean, it’s not a bad 

thing to see evolution and progress. Fifty years ago we would not 

have imagined U.S. astronauts going up to a space station on a 

Russian vehicle, but yet, that’s where we find ourselves today. 

I guess for Mr. Gerstenmaier, what is the—how intimately are 

NASA engineers involved as we start to go back into space? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We again look back at kind of our history 

and experience in spacecraft design, development, and safe operations. And there’s certain areas that we deemed as higher risk 

across the systems. We also look at the specific designs where problems have occurred and that we’ve seen in other testing, and then 

we involve ourselves very heavily in those areas. 

So for example, we talked about the composite overwrap pressure 

vessel activity, we have our own test facility at White Sands at 

which we’re working with SpaceX to go do a kind of independent 

test to verify and validate that that’s there. So we take these selected areas. We don’t do it across the board with every design element, but the ones that we think have the highest risk or have the 

highest potential to be a safety impact, we’re heavily involved in 

those areas and we’re working hand in hand with both contractors. 

Another area is parachutes. We’re very heavily involved in the 

parachute design activities, certification activity. We’re using our 

experience we’ve had with the Orion spacecraft. We’re providing 

that to both Boeing and SpaceX. They can use that in their designs, and we have our engineers participating with them in those 

activities. 

So we selectively pick the areas that we think are highest risk 

and we delve into the area that we need. If we see something we 

don’t like, we can ask the contractor to do extra work for us or we 

can do testing ourselves. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. And that level of cooperation, you know, coming 

from NASA, I guess to both of the contractors, Mr. Mulholland and 

Dr. Koenigsmann, you’re also reaching out to NASA knowing that 

they have critical expertise and obviously a lot of knowledge from 

years of sending people, you know, crews? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Yeah, absolutely. I think NASA has added a 

lot of value to the process. From the very beginning, we thought 

it would be advantageous for us to embed NASA within our team. 

So we’ve got NASA personnel in our factory every day with us. We 

have weekly review meetings across all the technical teams. 
89 

They’re in our engineering review board. They provided a lot of 

value, and we are dedicated to doing this transparently. 

Mr. BERA. And the same with SpaceX? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. And yes. It’s a very similar situation for us, 

too. We have NASA personnel on site. At every workday we include 

them in important meetings and some of the risk boards and on 

some other boards. We have a very close relationship with NASA, 

and we actually share hardware and test plans regarding some of 

the tests we’d be performing here. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. So it’s a—in my opinion, it’s more hand in 

hand—— 

Mr. BERA. It’s a partnership. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. —cooperation and it’s not we do the work 

and, you know—it’s just a much closer relationship than I envisioned. 

Mr. BERA. And in our conversation yesterday, right now the contract between NASA and the contractors are for single-use vehicles. 

So, you know, for the Dragon vehicle, it would be a new one each 

time you take a crew up. And is it the same for Starliner as well, 

that these would be single use in the current contract? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. From a Starliner perspective, we have a twopiece spacecraft. We have an expendable service module that provides the propulsion for orbit, on-orbit adjustments, the de-orbit 

burn, and also abort if we had to. There’s a new one every flight. 

The benefit that our system has is we land on land, a combination 

of parachutes and airbags. That allows reusability. So we will reuse 

the crew module up to 10 flights. 

Mr. BERA. Mr. Gerstenmaier, currently though, is NASA contracting for the reuse of that crew vehicle or is it a new crew vehicle each time? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. As Mr. Mulholland just explained, in the 

case of Boeing, the vehicle is reused—— 

Mr. BERA. Is reused. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —up to 10 times. In the case of SpaceX, 

we’ve asked for a new vehicle each time—— 

Mr. BERA. Each time. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —and we’ll continue to review that with 

SpaceX. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. And in the long-term planning, with the reuse 

of vehicles, is the expectation that will bring costs down over time? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. We believe that it has the potential to 

bring down costs. We’re also looking even at the Orion spacecraft 

for potential reuse of it in certain areas. 

There’s some advantage of using a reused vehicle in the fact that 

you’ve got a chance to actually see it in flight. You get to see its 

performance. As long as you’re not taking life out of the system or 

it’s not degrading the system, the fact that it’s flown gives you 

some insight into the environment that it’s going to operate and 

gives you some insight into operations that may actually be beneficial to you. 

Mr. BERA. Is there an expectation potentially, if Dragon is being 

designed to be reused as well to think about Dragon as a reuse vehicle as well? 
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Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Maybe Hans might address that better than 

myself. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah, Dragon is designed for usability, and 

we actually have been able to demonstrate that on the current 

cargo Dragon, particularly with the last launch we used a first 

stage and a cargo Dragon. So that was a major accomplishment in 

my opinion in terms of reusability. 

And I do want to emphasize, too, that getting the vehicles back 

is an enormous opportunity to learn about the flight loads and 

what happened to it in-flight, not just by inspecting it but you can 

also add additional sensors that you then can download data from 

and don’t have to rely just on the RF things. 

So in our opinion, it’s both a long-term cost savings and an incredible reliability advantage. 

Mr. BERA. I’ve gone over my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much. I’d like to now recognize 

the gentleman from Alabama, the Vice Chairman of our Subcommittee, Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m going to read from 

an article that was published earlier this week titled, ‘‘Doubts 

About SpaceX’s Reliability Persists as Astronaut Missions Approach.’’ It was in Forbes Magazine. The author is Loren Thompson, January 15, 2018, and then I’m going to ask some questions, 

in fairness, that we can have a response. 

‘‘In 2015, a Falcon 9 cargo mission to the International Space 

Station exploded minutes after launch, costing NASA $110 million. 

In 2016, an Israeli commercial satellite was destroyed on the 

ground when supposedly routine fueling procedures went dramatically awry. The launch pad was damaged by that explosion. In 

2017 the latest version of the company’s Merlin rocket engine blew 

up at a testing facility in Texas. And now SpaceX has begun 2018 

with yet another catastrophe,’’ referring to the billion dollar spy 

satellite that we recently lost. Resuming the quote, ‘‘Maybe SpaceX 

really isn’t responsible for the latest failure; the problem might 

have been caused by a payload adapter that Northrop Grumman, 

the company that also built the lost satellite, supplied. But launch 

providers usually have final responsibility for tip-to-tail readiness 

before a rocket lifts off, and competitor ULA has successfully employed a variety of payload adapters to attach satellites to its rockets. The most worrisome aspect of this apparent pattern is that the 

same SpaceX launch vehicle will begin flight tests later this year 

to carry astronauts to the International Space Station.’’ And I 

would add from another part of the article, ‘‘By way of comparison, 

United Launch Alliance, SpaceX’s sole competitor in the military 

launch business, hasn’t lost a single payload in 12 years and 124 

missions.’’ 

Dr. Koenigsmann, you made a comment in your remarks in chief 

that SpaceX is achieving or attempting to achieve its goal of ‘‘safe, 

reliable, and affordable’’ launches. This record that is mentioned in 

the Forbes Magazine article, do you consider that to be consistent 

with a ‘‘safe and reliable and affordable’’ launch record? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Well, the record in this paper needs to be adjusted for accuracy, I think. 
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Mr. BROOKS. Please do. That’s why I’m giving you the opportunity. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Thank you. Thank you very much for that. 

For one, the quoted test incident in Texas was not actually an engine explosion. There was a fire on the test stand when the engine 

wasn’t even running and there was a test procedural error. It has 

nothing to do with the engine itself. 

Regarding Zuma, we talked about this earlier. I can’t unfortunately present any details. I can only reiterate that Falcon 9 did 

everything that Falcon 9 was supposed to do. 

So on that record, the other two incidents are a while back, and 

we did learn our lessons on both of those, which is obviously not 

desirable. But at the end of the day, it’s a thing we learned and 

we improved the vehicle based on what we saw during those incidents into a much safer vehicle. We took—in both cases we had investigations with government partners, NASA, FAA, the Air Force 

and so on and so forth. And we very openly discussed and presented our corrective action and acted on them, since then, which 

in my opinion, makes us a much better vehicle. 

I do want to point out at the same time that Falcon 9 has actually characteristics that make it intrinsically safe. For example, it 

has nine engines on the first stage. You can lose an engine and 

make mission. You can actually lose two engines in some cases, not 

that we ever—not that I ever hope that that will happen, but obviously that is a tremendous guarantee. If you lose engines in other 

rockets and—you know, I want to point out, our engines are also 

domestically produced. Obviously this is much more difficult for 

other vehicles that have less engines. So that makes it safer. 

I also pointed out reusability was already—is a great point to get 

the vehicles back and inspect them. That is something that we 

started doing I think it was December, not this last year but the 

year before. And ever since then have we had a chance to inspect 

the vehicles or to make sure that the actual—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Please, I have a follow-up question for Ms. Chaplain, and I gave you as much time as I could. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. I’m sorry. 

Mr. BROOKS. And I appreciate your correcting the article as you 

understood it with Loren Thompson where you agree with two, you 

contest one, and then the other still yet to be determined. 

But Ms. Chaplain, how does the GAO evaluate SpaceX’s record 

or goal of safe and reliable and affordable? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Well, on the issue of safety and the accidents 

mentioned today, I would just remind people that DOD went 

through its own phase of having launch accidents right before their 

current program started, the evolved expendable launch vehicle. 

And once that started, they realized pretty quickly on that they 

had to add mission assurance. So they’ve had a lot of time in the 

past to learn from mistakes, to do the things that they need to do 

to get safety and mission assurance into the program. 

In my view, I think some of that learning is still going on here 

for the providers because they’re new vehicles, they’re new to the 

government arena, and procedures, mission assurance, things like 

that are things they’re going to be learning over time and they’ve 

already learned quite a bit. 
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Mr. BROOKS. Thank you for your insight and rebuttal of the article. I appreciate it. 

Chairman BABIN. And I’d like to recognize the Ranking Member, 

Ms. Johnson, from Texas. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Excuse my voice. For I 

guess Gerst, the ASAP report discusses the accident investigation 

regarding the on-pad explosion of Falcon 9 rocket in 2016. And the 

report says that NASA conducted an independent review in addition to the standard accident review. Has that been distributed 

yet? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. No, it’s not, and it’s in review now. We have 

a summary of that report in review with SpaceX, and as soon as 

we complete the discussions with them, we’ll have that summary 

available for folks to take a look at. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. We look forward to reviewing that. For Dr. 

Sanders, it’s my understanding that one of the commercial crew 

launch vehicles, the Falcon 9, has experienced several primary mission failures over the past four years and suffered a major engine 

anomaly in recent months, any of which occurrence would have 

forced a stand-down if it had happened to the space shuttle. In addition to other commercial crew launch vehicle, the Atlas V is powered by the Russian-built RD–180 engine for which detailed design 

data is still unavailable. 

What will NASA need to do to ensure that either of the launch 

systems will be safe enough to fly astronauts on? 

Dr. SANDERS. Thank you. NASA has a very rigorous certification 

program in place for both commercial crew providers. There are a 

very large number of verification notifications that have to be filed. 

There’s evidence that has to be provided from the tests that say 

this is—they have met all these requirements. 

I think that by the time they weed through all of that, NASA will 

be able to make a reasonable decision relative to residual risk. The 

problems that have experienced with Falcon 9 as Dr. Koenigsmann 

has just said have been addressed in the past but there is still 

work to be done, particularly on the composite overwrap pressure 

vehicle. 

The RD–180 data or lack thereof for the launch vehicle for the 

Boeing variant I think has been resolved by finding an alternative 

way to get insight into that design. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Ms. Chaplain, would you 

like to comment on that? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. I think there’s going to be some gaps as they 

come to the end, and they’re going to have to make a risk-based 

decision on whether to go forward with some gaps in knowledge. 

I don’t think you’re going to get complete knowledge of the Atlas 

V. That program began as a commercial program, and there wasn’t 

some data obtained that we’ve never been able to get. So at some 

point, NASA’s just going to have to decide how much—is the insight they have enough? Is the track record enough? Is the data 

they’ve gotten alternatively enough? And they’ll have to make their 

own risk-based choice. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you. And now, the gentleman from 

Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas. 
93 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And clearly the committee is extremely sensitive about both safety and cost. I’d like to 

begin my discussion of course with the most important question, 

safety. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, since this is the first time NASA will be certifying a commercial, a crew system for human spaceflight, could you 

expand for a moment about the differences between what you’re 

doing and will be doing in the way of commercial system, a certification, versus the certification process you would be going through 

for a NASA-developed system? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think the simplest way to describe it is we 

have a shared mission assurance or safety responsibility with the 

partners where the partners have responsibility to show that the 

vehicle is safe on their own, to show that it can be used for the intended activities that ferry crew to and from space. But then NASA 

also ultimately has the certification responsibility when we put our 

crews on those vehicles. So then we do a detailed assessment along 

with what they’ve done. So there’s some things we’ve delegated to 

them to do to be fully certified to say they’re ready to go and 

there’s aspects where we double-check, and we oversee all aspects 

of what they’re doing. So even the areas that they say are certified, 

we’ve taken a look at them. We’ve determined they’re appropriate 

to put our crew on board, whereas it’s our own internal program, 

we would do all that work ourselves. 

Mr. LUCAS. And to that end, let’s talk for a moment about the 

cost issues. And I turn to our friends from Boeing and SpaceX. One 

of the primary reasons for the private sector partnering and developing new systems, of course, was the concept that providing astronaut access to the International Space Station, the development 

costs to be shared by the contractors. I think we’ve had testimony 

before this committee indicating perhaps somewhere in the 80, 90 

percent range of the development funds so far have been provided 

by NASA. I guess the question I’d simply put to you, how much 

skin in the game do each of you actually have, your organizations? 

And whoever would prefer to touch that first. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Congressman, thank you. I don’t have specific 

data available for me today on the amount of investment. The investment from the Boeing Company has been significant, and we 

consider this a strong partnership and an endeavor that we’re fully 

committed to. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. I want to say we have all of the skin in the 

future for us is Crew Dragon and Falcon 9. But with respect to this 

particular number, I have to state this for the record I don’t remember this particular number. I do remember the number for the 

previous Crew Dragon contract which was significantly higher percentage wise. 

Mr. LUCAS. And clearly the reason I ask this question is the 

same reason the constituents inquire about this. Simply put, whoever is successful, you accomplish something that will have benefits 

to your enterprise for a generation or two. So it’s a legitimate point 

back from our folks. 

Expand for a moment also if you would about your dealings individually company-wise with NASA so far as you go through the certification process, if you’ve had any surprises. 
94 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah. So I want to point out we have an excellent relationship with NASA. I mean, obviously you have to I 

guess get a working relationship on the working level and that 

takes a little bit of time until we established a process. But by now 

we know how to, you know, work, go through the certification process. And it’s not that this is something that happens, you know, 

once we’re all done. This is ongoing at this point in time and works 

in parallel with the hardware development. 

I’m pretty confident that we will finish this on time and get the 

astronauts up there before we have to fly any Russian vehicles. 

And obviously the test flights are as planned later this year. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Obviously, a very strong relationship with 

NASA. We’ve been a part of every human spaceflight program from 

the beginning. I think the proof of the relationship is in the product, and as of today, of the 800 verifications as we look forward to 

certification of the vehicle, of the 800-plus verifications that we 

have to complete and send over to NASA, over 200 have already 

been delivered. And of those, over 150 have already been approved. 

The other big part of certification is the verification of hazard 

controls. We have 16,000 hazard control verifications that we have 

to present to NASA. Of those, over 11,000 have already been 

dispositioned and given to NASAS for review. 

So to me, the proof is in the product and the partnership that 

we have and the disposition of those successfully speaks volumes. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Lucas. The gentleman 

from Illinois, Mr. Foster. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the large cost 

drivers in any of this sort of project is the high level specification 

on the probability of loss of crew and an equally important number, 

the probability of loss of mission. You know, it’s my understanding 

that it’s 1 in 270 is viewed as an acceptable probability of loss of 

crew and you sort of design around that? Is that a correct understanding? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. 

Mr. FOSTER. Yeah. So one in—all right. And so what is the number then for an acceptable probability of loss of mission which is 

presumably allowed to be significantly higher and perhaps more of 

an economic tradeoff? Is there a design number for that as well? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. The requirement for loss of mission is 1 in 

55. 

Mr. FOSTER. Okay. All right. So that’s—now which of the Falcon 

9 accidents that have been talked about would have resulted, had 

they been manned, would have resulted in a loss of crew as opposed to loss of mission? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Thank you very much for that question. Certainty the first incident that we had a mishap, the crew would 

have been safe with the launch escape system. There’s no question 

about that because Dragon—— 

Mr. FOSTER. This is the—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. This is this year. 

Mr. FOSTER. —on-pad—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. No, this is the one in flight. 

Mr. FOSTER. —fuel. The one in flight? 
95 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah. As we can see, Dragon’s heat shield 

acts as a barrier there, and we can see Dragon separate in this 

particular case. In fact, we made changes on the Dragon software 

because if you would have deployed the parachute, you might have 

been able to save the capsule at that particular point. So that’s— 

the launch escape system would have helped there, absolutely. The 

same is true for the pad abort system which we tested last year, 

two years ago actually. 

Mr. FOSTER. Pad abort? This is the—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Right. 

Mr. FOSTER. —pad explosion incident. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. No, this is addressing an incident on the pad. 

In this case, it’s—— 

Mr. FOSTER. How long did you have? I think I read somewhere 

93 milliseconds from the first anomaly in the telemetry? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. It’s very short and—— 

Mr. FOSTER. And would that have been sufficient for the crew escape? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. It competes with starting up the engine. So 

it’s certainly a race condition there. But I personally believe that 

the heat shield and the structure on Dragon would have protected 

the astronauts sufficiently to let the engine start and go. But that’s 

certainly something that you never, ever want to test. 

Mr. FOSTER. Okay. But it is—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yes. 

Mr. FOSTER. —your estimate—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yes. 

Mr. FOSTER. —that that probably would have not? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. No, I think my estimate is—— 

Mr. FOSTER. Resulted in loss—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. —that this would have—yeah, exactly that. It 

would have saved the astronauts. That’s my estimate. It’s a little 

bit of guessing on my side obviously because that is something we 

don’t want to, you know—— 

Mr. FOSTER. Okay. And this latest thing that cannot be fully 

talked about, the fact that there was at least—it had basically 

achieved orbit or very close to it? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Falcon 9 did what Falcon 9 was supposed to 

do and—— 

Mr. FOSTER. All right. And so presumably, you know, if a flaw 

had been detected in performance, there would have been contingency plans to rescue the crew? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. There are—— 

Mr. FOSTER. And then so that—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. There are always—— 

Mr. FOSTER. Is there any—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. —plans to keep the crew safe and we have— 

well, as a point of knowledge, we have a late abort capability. We 

can actually abort when we are close to orbital velocity. And in this 

case, the abort would be not to land but to orbit. That’s a really 

interesting feature I think on Crew Dragon that can always be useful. 

Mr. FOSTER. And I guess the last question, the probability of loss 

of mission is a number that is at least in part an economic tradeoff. 
96 

And so I was wondering, is that something that gets negotiated upward when a project gets in trouble, that as long as you maintain 

the probability of the loss of crew—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Oh, no. 

Mr. FOSTER. —that whether it’s viewed as an acceptable practice 

to—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. No. 

Mr. FOSTER. —make an adjustment of that? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. I don’t think so. I mean, that would be—safety is our primary goal. 

Mr. FOSTER. I’m talking about material. This is—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Absolutely. 

Mr. FOSTER. —loss of mission. This is loss of the payload rather 

than loss of life. And is it viewed—you know, I would not be 

shocked or even necessarily unhappy to find that there was some 

more flexibility in the probability of loss of mission as a project, 

you know, gets into schedule trouble, for example. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Let me just say the—I’m not sure loss of mission actually is a problem right now. But in terms of the probability of loss of crew, one of the key drivers is actually the time 

on station when the capsule sits there more or less empty. There 

are ways to address this. And we have done—based on the probability risk assessment, we have done design changes to protect the 

hardware. And that’s actually what this number is supposed to be 

for in my opinion. It’s a number that can identify critical areas that 

you then change the design and add armor basically to protect it. 

That’s the main usefulness of this type of analysis. 

Mr. FOSTER. All right. Thank you and I guess I’m out of time and 

yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much. Let’s see. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

let me just note that this is a very unique way of approaching 

achieving a goal that we’re looking at today. And usually in the 

past we’ve seen either one contractor or the government itself trying to be the contractor to accomplish a mission. And what we have 

are two terrific companies, Boeing and SpaceX, which are providing 

us a new way of perhaps accomplishing our space goals. This is the 

first time that I know that we’ve actually had this type of competition. 

Let me note that the Orion capsule is reused. Boeing has designed this to be reused. Is that correct? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. The Starliner capsule. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And on the other hand, SpaceX is trying to reuse their launch vehicle. So we have two different approaches, and I think this is what Congress wanted, some really— 

we have two different approaches, we’re going to find out which one 

is the correct way. Maybe they’re both good, but this is the type 

of innovation and an innovative approach. I do take it that we have 

saved money? Is that correct, Mr. Gerstenmaier? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So even with two companies and this new approach, we’ve saved money. However, let me note that the companies are operating under—have some real burden. And that is not 
97 

their burden but I understand that the budget that they’ve been 

operating on, that Congress has failed to fully fund this project 

that they have said they needed so much money. Is that correct, 

Mr. Gerstenmaier? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Initially, we had some startup problems with 

funding. But since those problems have been behind us, we’ve received the funding that we’ve requested each year for the Commercial Crew Program. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Yeah, I noted that when it was first 

started we got 64 percent of the funding and that was in 2011. 

2012, 47 percent of the funding was requested was actually allocated. And then later on we had some, at least Congress being 

more responsible in trying to meet our responsibilities. So this program has saved money. We’ve got different approaches that are 

now being proven. And so it looks like the program is going along 

as we thought it would, even though there have been glitches. But 

there are glitches in the development of any new technology. Let 

me note that. 

Ms. Chaplain, do you have confidence that this was the right approach for NASA to take? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. I think in taking this approach, NASA definitely 

learned some lessons from the past. There were early attempts to 

work with the commercial sector in a different way and to really 

have them drive the program and be partners with NASA. But 

they didn’t succeed for things like not very good communication between the contractor and the government, maybe not as much insight as the government needed, not good risk mitigation planning. 

And in this case, NASA I believe took all those measures for commercial crew and the COTS program and even learned from the 

COTS program for commercial crew to avoid those past mistakes. 

So for a program like this that’s trying to do business differently, 

they’ve instituted—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So do you still have confidence that we 

should have taken this approach? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. It’s a good approach for this endeavor. We don’t 

like to endorse one or the other. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. But for this program of this nature, they’re following a good approach and adopting good practices for managing 

it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And how about Ms. Chaplain? I 

mean, Dr. Sanders, would you still have faith in this approach that 

Congress started years ago? And by the way, when you don’t fund 

a program by what is guestimated for the need of the program, 

doesn’t that also increase the risks that people take? 

Dr. SANDERS. Yes, it does, and that can be a problem. I believe 

that this was an interesting, new way to do this. It was—it had 

came with challenges, and if I stick with safety, they learned some 

new things about managing risk and shared risk management that 

are probably good for the future. They had to learn some new 

things because it wasn’t the way it was done in the past. I think 

by and large, it bodes well for the future. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So do you still have faith—— 

Dr. SANDERS. I have—— 
98 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. —in this approach? Well, thank you very 

much, and Mr. Chairman, let’s just note that with this type of— 

as we move forward now developing this program, we still face 

major challenges for things like space debris and how, even if they 

do their job perfectly, they may be in jeopardy with the space debris. The challenges are the entire approach to space. So thank you 

very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you. I’d now like to call the gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Crist. 

Mr. CRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panelists 

here today to share your expertise with all of us. Mr. 

Gerstenmaier, NASA has invested significant funds and effort in 

developing and certifying commercial crew systems. And as you 

know, this program will ultimately serve as a model for future public/private partnerships for space activities. What lessons have been 

learned from the Commercial Crew Program and can be applied to 

deep space exploration? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think there’s many, and I can go just 

through a few. I think first of all it’s very important that you have 

the requirements set up front correctly with the partners. And we 

did that through a requirements development standpoint. We also 

allowed for alternate standards which I think is also very important. So we didn’t force them to adhere just to our standards, our 

NASA specifications. We allowed them to provide back to us standards that we initially agreed to up front. And I think that helped 

to have a very stable understanding of the requirements in place. 

I think it’s also important that we have the ability to add some 

additional testing if we see a need for it in the activities. Likewise, 

we have the ability for ourselves to do testing if it’s needed. I think 

we also learned a lot from the commercial cargo program. We could 

take significantly higher risk with cargo than we can with the life 

and humans. That allowed us to gain experience to see what this 

operating model was like working with two providers. It got us a 

chance to see where we needed additional insight, and I think that 

helped us with this program. 

I think we’re about ready to learn a whole bunch of new lessons 

as we go into this next phase as we start to close out and to do 

all the verifications, all the validation activities that were talked 

about, actually get the hardware through the final testing. I guarantee you we will learn through that and we will put some lessons 

in place. It’s also very important for us to have the two providers 

as was discussed earlier. That gives us another degree of freedom 

that if we run into schedule problems with one provider or there’s 

a major failure on their systems, we have another provider. So 

there’s a sense of redundancy. I call it portfolio management by selecting multiple providers that allows us to ensure we get the capability we need at the end. But I think those are some of the major 

ones. And I can think some more about those off-line. 

Mr. CRIST. Great. Thank you, sir. Could NASA leverage the vehicles developed under the Commercial Crew Program to support and 

accelerate its deep space exploration plans? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, we can go look at these vehicles’ systems design, some of the rockets and other pieces, and see how 

they might fit in another activity. But as I described to you, regard-
99 

ing lessons learned, we can definitely apply some of those acquisition lessons learned, some of those program project management 

lessons learned for the new programs as we look to lunar activities 

in the future. 

Mr. CRIST. Thank you. Would any other panelist like to comment 

on this? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Yeah, I think it’s incredibly important for the 

partnership and the acquisition approach to be tailored to the specific mission. For commercial crew, I think it was because of our 

experience in this environment over decades. I think it was the appropriate mechanism. For deep space activity, where there is a lot 

of research to be done and the requirements by definition can’t be 

stable yet, the approach that they’re using is necessarily different. 

From a specific vehicle use, our vehicle was specifically designed 

for the low-Earth orbit mission. We have not looked at what would 

be required to use it for a deep space mission. Obviously, it would 

need some modifications to support those different environments. 

Mr. CRIST. Sure. And doctor? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Regarding SpaceX, obviously we are laser-focused on getting the job right now done and get to the space station by the end of the year. That’s the highest priority at SpaceX. 

But if you look at this capsule, you’ll see a lot of actually eight really powerful engines, and those might be useful in other applications, too. 

Mr. CRIST. Great. My next question I’d like to direct to the two 

of you, Mr. Mulholland and Dr. Koenigsmann. A recent study done 

by a NASA cost analyst, Mr. Edgar Zapata, said that fixed-price 

space act agreements, as opposed to traditional cost plus-contracting, have reduced cost risks to NASA, the Federal Government, and therefore, the taxpayers at large. Can you discuss your 

experience with space act agreements and why you believe they are 

a good tool to encourage innovation and at the same time reduce 

cost? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. I believe space act agreements have a place, 

and they were certainly well-utilized in the early development 

phase of commercial crew. I think it was incredibly important for 

NASA to go to a far-base contract for the completion of this design 

and development phase. It is the only way that NASA can leverage 

contractual requirements on a contractor. 

So it is incredibly important for both the contractor and for 

NASA to be able to do that and to hold the contractor accountable 

and to allow us to have certainty in requirement stability. 

So I would not advocate using space act agreements for future 

development activities where you’re fielding hardware. That said, 

for early phases, it’s very good. Over all, I think the partnership 

between NASA and the contractors has been excellent and it has 

grown more rigorous as the fidelity of the program has matured. 

And I think that was successful. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. We have overall had a great experience on 

the Space Act Agreement under COTS, and I think the numbers 

quoted in this particular article which I really enjoyed, I think we 

saved—there was a factor of four to ten less I believe than under 

a traditional cost-plus contract. We believe in particular firm fixed 

is the way to go. It is milestone oriented and it gives the right in-
100 

centives to the contractor or ask to keep us—I want to say keep 

us hungry and let us perform at our highest performance level that 

we have. And I think we’ve been very successful under this particular model. 

Mr. CRIST. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. I’d like to call on the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Dunn. 

Mr. DUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 

the panelists for being here today. It’s an exciting time to be in 

space but not just because of the excitement but because we see a 

growing presence of private industry in space. And I like it because 

they are not there for the glory but because it’s good business. 

In Florida which Space Florida runs the space complex down 

there, it actually makes money. It runs in the black. So space is 

good business. And today I’m particularly interested in how these 

public/private relationships, commercial relationships, are working. 

So let me start if I can with Dr. Koenigsmann. You briefly noted 

in your written testimony that the NASA SpaceX/COTS partnership has the distinction of being this pay-for-performance partnership between government and private business. Can you elaborate 

more on those innovative, fixed-price, pay-for-performance contracts and how that leverages the private or public investment, and 

private investment? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. So for one reason, if in the unfortunate case 

that we do need a little bit longer, you know, if that happens, that 

does not increase the cost, for example because the payment is tied 

to a particular milestone, like a certain test or a flight or something you can actually, you know, put some value to it. So I believe 

it gives you more control from a taxpayer perspective where the 

money goes and how the money is split up over, even over a longer 

period and a rather complex project like Crew Dragon for example. 

Mr. DUNN. Actually, so Ms. Chaplain, in general, would you 

share your feeling about the fixed-price, pay-for-performance contracting and how that, from the government’s point of view, GAO’s 

point of view, how that’s influenced the cost of the programs and 

the return on those? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. So they can be a really good approach to follow 

as long as you do have your requirements defined and you’re not 

asking for the contractor to be inventing too much in the program. 

If they have to go into a situation where there’s a lot of unknowns 

and nobody knows how long it’s going to take to get it done or how 

complex it’s going to be, it’d be very difficult for a contractor to sign 

up for a fixed-price arrangement. And that’s where the government 

backs off and goes into a cost-plus environment. 

And the other issue is as long as—you know, NASA itself has to 

decide how much control does it want over the situation. How 

many requirements does it want to specify? How involved in the 

engineering does it want to be? How much control does it need? So 

when it feels like it needs more of that control, it’s going to also 

put you back into a cost-plus situation. But in these instances 

where you can use fixed price, the requirements are known. They 

can be very good ways to save money. 
101 

Mr. DUNN. Thank you. So Mr. Gerstenmaier, in the cost end of 

the training side, you now have three new, different manned capsules. And I presume your astronauts have to train on each of 

these. But going forward, how are you going to segment that training? Is it everybody trains on everything or 1/3 here, 1/3 there or 

how does that work? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. So we have four astronauts now dedicated to 

the Commercial Crew Program, and they do—they’re in training 

for the program but they’re also going through design reviews, requirements reviews, seeing hardware, et cetera. We’ll eventually 

assign some of that cadre to the two test flights that are upcoming. 

And for the Orion program, we’ll have the other astronaut corps 

doing that. We also have astronauts training for space station. 

So several years before flight, two to three years before flight 

we’ll start designating crews to the individual vehicles that they’re 

going to fly on, the individual systems that they’re going to interact 

with and begin their specific training for those particular missions. 

But typically, the crew timeline for training is roughly about two 

years. 

Mr. DUNN. I see. So Mr. Mulholland, in the little time that’s left 

to us, I wonder if you would also comment on the use of these private partnerships and commercial relationships and how well 

that’s working from your point of view. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. It’s working excellently. We have a great relationship with Space Florida. We were able to relocate our program 

down in Florida and use the extensive resources that we have right 

there at the space coast. So it’s a great model going forward. 

Mr. DUNN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. And now I’d like to call 

on the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I wanted to ask a 

question specifically to Dr. Sanders. I wanted to know if she could 

elaborate on why the ASAP views safety culture as critical and 

why the ASAP remains concerned about the providers’ safety cultures and the evidence that you would use to confirm its presence? 

Dr. SANDERS. Safety culture, you know, you can put all the requirements you want to on a program relative to safety. You can 

say you’ve got to do this, this, this, and this, but if it’s not something that the entity embraces itself and really believes, it’s important themselves, then it doesn’t really work well. 

And so it was important to us to see that the commercial providers had this culture embedded in them. There was early on 

some evidence that there might be a lack, a little bit of a lack in 

safety culture. We saw a few things that raised a flag for us. And 

so we wanted to see more insurance that that was there. It doesn’t 

have to be—you know, we were trying to make the point at the 

time that it isn’t that there’s any one way that you necessarily 

make safety happen become a priority. It has to be something that 

people believe in. And so that was important to us. 

Mr. VEASEY. Mr. Mulholland and Dr. Koenigsmann, can you talk 

about culture surrounding safety at your respective companies and 

how do you ensure that schedule concerns do not drive decisions 

that should compromise safety? 
102 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah, absolutely. Actually, thank you for the 

opportunity. And I want to point out, I totally agree with Dr. Sanders on this. If you don’t have the corporate culture of safety, then 

all the requirements, they’re good but, you know, they’re still—you 

do need the safety culture as a basis to actually create a safe and 

reliable capsule and launch. 

That is actually my job at SpaceX. I’m the head of the flight reliability and build reliability departments. And my job is to make 

sure that we have a safety culture that translates into quality 

hardware and that translates into a safe launch. 

I use—my method obviously might be different from others, but 

I use a lot of talking directly to people and then in addition to the 

formal reviews, I go a lot of side ways into places and talk to the 

technicians. I look at the capsule. For example, I looked at the 

Crew Dragon capsules. There’s three capsules right now that I saw 

in the factory, and I talked to engineers and technicians working 

on it to make sure that they have the right safety culture and understand the significance of flying astronauts. Yeah, absolutely. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. I certainly appreciate the question, Congressman. It’s an area I’ve got a lot of passion around. Our company has 

essentially grown up with NASA through the human spaceflight 

program. We’ve been a trusted partner with NASA on every human 

spaceflight program that this country has performed. And we’re 

very happy to be able to maintain that. 

So culture for us, our culture and our safety focus I think is very 

strong. It’s something that we have across our entire company. You 

know, our business is to field and deliver transportation platforms. 

We do it for the commercial aviation sector. We do it for our servicemen and women, and we do it for human spaceflight. 

And the way you develop that culture is over time and it’s with 

the decisions that you make. It’s how you treat your employees, 

and it’s how you deal with technical issues and having a robust 

focus on engineering discipline and the safety decisions that you 

make. 

You know, it is something that takes a long time to develop, and 

it’s something that an organization has to be passionate about to 

maintain. And it’s something that I think over decades this company in particular has demonstrated. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. Now I’d like to call on the 

gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So as I understand it, the 

Mission Management Team historically was in charge of reviewing 

possible mission issues during and after flight. Members from different areas of NASA sat on the board. The MMT even had a vote 

in the go/no-go poll before a launch. So the MMT simply functioned 

as a safety watchdog. 

My first question is for Mr. Mulholland and Dr. Koenigsmann. 

What safety programs are currently in place to match the role previously played by MMT at Boeing and SpaceX? Mr. Mulholland? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Excellent question. So growing up on the 

space shuttle program and seeing the foundation of the mission 

management team approach, our mission management plan is 

going to mirror that that we implemented on the space shuttle pro-
103 

gram. So we will have a mission management team. NASA will be 

part of that mission management team. We will have similar reviews heading up to and into launch, both from the flight readiness 

review and L minus two review before we commit to taking the vehicle. And they will be fully up. The mission management team 

will be up and running from that FRR on in consistent with how 

we upgraded the shuttle program. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah, a slightly different name. On our side 

we call it flight reliability. But nevertheless, I actually learned 

from the shuttle obviously, too, and why change something that 

worked? And so we created a similar approach where we review 

and test and verify as we go along. 

I do want to also, you know, maybe mention that Dragon—not 

Dragon, Falcon 9 is usually—we can static fire it on the launch 

pad. So that’s a possibility, do a very last test on the last week before launch to make sure that this vehicle is ready to go. It’s similar to running up the engines and make sure that the vehicle is 

ready to go. 

So, in addition to, you know, taking the traditional approach as 

we’ve added elements there that we think contribute to safety and 

to reliability. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Thank you. As a follow-up to that to both of 

you, who would have the final say on whether or launch in a 

SpaceX or Boeing vehicle? And would NASA be able to call off the 

launch or would Boeing or SpaceX have complete authority to decide to launch? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. NASA has the final no-go for flying their 

crews. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah, I believe that’s the case on our side, 

too. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. NASA has the authority to override the contractor decision to do what’s right for the crew. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Thank you. I understand that SpaceX is planning on water landings while Boeing will be landing vehicles in the 

desert. What procedures does each company plan to put in place to 

ensure the safe retrieval of astronauts once they’ve landed? Mr. 

Mulholland? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. It is our responsibility, and there is a whole 

set of NASA requirements on what has to be fielded out of the retrieval site, which includes medical personnel, the ability to transport the astronauts to a local hospital within an hour. There is a 

whole set of requirements, and we’ve got the infrastructure in place 

or in work to support that. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah, and we obviously got the same requirements from the perspective, and we have a ship. We have the ability to land a helicopter. And we actually, on this particular—the 

way we get the capsule out of the water, that is something that we 

do currently on every Crew Dragon last time on Saturday morning 

or Sunday morning, I think, on the last flight. So it’s a routine activity for us, obviously upgraded and with additional personnel to 

make sure the astronauts are safe. 
104 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Does each company have a plan for emergency 

landings in areas other than the primary landing site? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Our plan normally is to land on land because 

of the trajectory that we fly. If we end up in an abort situation, we 

will land in the water. We’ll be certified for that also. 

In the situation of an abort, the NASA and the government 

forces will do the retrieval. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Doctor? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah, we do rely also on government support 

in case of, you know, landing in the wrong place or the wrong spot 

obviously. 

Mr. BANKS. Okay. I have a few seconds left. Mr. Gerstenmaier, 

as NASA continues to buy seats on Russian spacecraft to travel to 

the International Space Station, will this practice stop once the 

Commercial Crew Program is ready? Or will NASA continue to 

purchase seats on Russian aircraft? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We will not purchase seats on Russian 

Soyuz after this program becomes operational. We still will continue to fly our crew on the Russian Soyuz vehicle, and we will fly 

a Russian cosmonaut on our U.S. crew vehicles. And the purpose 

for that is to ensure that we always have space station manned 

with one Russian cosmonaut and one U.S. astronaut so they can 

operate the appropriate systems. The station requires operations of 

the Russian segment and the U.S. segment. So we need to have a 

mixed crew on board. If a contingency occurs, the crew gets in the 

vehicle they arrived on and they need to return to the earth. So 

to keep that mix on orbit where we have a Russian cosmonaut and 

a U.S. crew member, we need to share crews across our vehicles. 

So our plan is no longer to purchase seats but we will still have 

the ability, we will still fly a U.S. crew member on a Soyuz and 

the Russians will likewise fly one of their crew members on our 

U.S. crew vehicles. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you. My time is expired. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. I’d like to recognize the 

gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. And thank 

you all for being with us. 

Dr. Koenigsmann, can you give us an update on SpaceX’s timetable for a manned spaceflight to Mars? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. I’m not—I don’t think I’m qualified for that. 

I mean, obviously that is a long-term goal that our founder and 

CEO, Mr. Musk, has and there’s a team working on this. But I 

want to say it’s a relatively modest team, and the main focus on 

the company is clearly on this particular program and getting to 

the space station. That is our first step into manned space travel. 

Mr. BEYER. My colleague, Mr. Perlmutter from Colorado, has a 

seat on NASA’s 2033 flight to Mars. But we’re all—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I’ll go on SpaceX’s. 

Mr. BEYER. Yeah. If we can get rid of him earlier, that would be 

very helpful. And you know, one of our previous friends on the Republican side talked about how wonderful it was that we were now 

in our space industry could make money off it, rather than just 

doing it for the glory. Tell me, Mr. Koenigsmann, from a SpaceX 
105 

perspective, cars aside, is there a viable business model? We know 

the satellite folks have done really well, the Orbital ATKs. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Right. 

Mr. BEYER. But can you make money doing these crew missions 

also? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. So I want to say we actually brought the commercial space back to the U.S. We had 18 launches in the last year, 

and I want to say 60-something percent were—of the commercial 

market is now done by SpaceX. I hope I got my numbers right 

here. And that obviously is a commercial aspect, and that gives us 

an additional leg to stand on, notwithstanding that the crew program obviously gets some funds into SpaceX, too. 

But I’d want to point out that we are diversified and looking at 

commercial launches as much as government launches, too. There’s 

additional benefit, of course, for Crew Dragon and the benefit is 

that we’re using the same rocket over and over. There’s no change 

here, and that makes us a very well-practiced team with a lot of 

experience and a lot of data. I personally have been building rockets for 15 years at SpaceX, and I must say, I learned a lot in particular in the last year just by pure repetitive launches. 

Mr. BEYER. That’s a good lead-in because we talked a lot about 

the Soyuz rockets. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Right, yes. 

Mr. BEYER. And I’ve toured your facility in California and seen 

the engines that you built. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yeah. 

Mr. BEYER. Can they replace Soyuz? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Yes, I think so. I mean, the engines are—we 

build almost everything basically in-house and the idea is to keep 

control of costs and schedule if you build it in-house. And it’s end 

to end. It’s the launch vehicle all the way up to Crew Dragon. 

There’s no gap here. 

Mr. BEYER. Mr. Mulholland, is there an opportunity to work together with SpaceX on the part of Boeing, ULA, et cetera in terms 

of the engines? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. From a launch vehicle standpoint because we 

go out and we contract for that launch vehicle service. So we competitively competed for our launch vehicle for the initial phases of 

commercial crew. For us, Atlas V was the only launch vehicle that 

had the mission assurance, reliability, and safety record necessary 

to flight crew. Obviously, if we look at long-term lifecycle affordability, we will continue to look at different launch vehicles in this 

class, and when one exhibits the safety record and reliability performance that we think is necessary for crew, we’ll certainly consider that. 

Mr. BEYER. Great. Thank you. Mr. Gerstenmaier, in Congress 

we’re struggling with how to react to the Russian interference in 

the 2016 election, and we’re increasingly realizing that they’ve 

interfered in elections all over the world, all over Europe. Have you 

seen any Russian disinformation interference in the space culture? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We’ve seen no evidence of problems in the 

space culture. I think as we’ve described in this hearing, we talked 

about a safety culture that was required that needs to be in place 

to ensure safe flight. We have a very strong relationship with our 
106 

Russian partners. We share the same strong desire for protecting 

human life. We work together fairly seamlessly together to work 

technical problems and issues. We share data back and forth very 

openly. We recognize the challenges of putting humans in space, 

both the Russians and the U.S. And so far, the space industry has 

not been subject to other activities that could be seen as bad. The 

focus of protecting human life drives us to a higher calling to be 

more open and transparent than may be normally required. 

Mr. BEYER. Great. Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. Now I’d like to recognize 

the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

panel for your appearance today. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, on what date does our contract with the Russians to transport our astronauts back and forth to the International Space Station, what is the date of the end of our contract 

with them? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. The last launches are in the spring of 2019 

with their crew returns in the fall of 2019. So by probably October, 

November of 2019, we need to have some established way for commercial—the U.S. providers to be delivering crews. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. How many missions do we have between now 

and then? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. How man Soyuz missions we have between 

now and then? We have roughly—we do two Soyuz missions in the 

spring and two Soyuz missions in the fall. So we fly essentially 

three crew members in the spring and three crew members in the 

fall. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. How many do we have scheduled after that? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. After the 2019 date with Soyuz? We have 

none. 

Mr. POSEY. None? Nothing scheduled for the ISS? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We only have what I described before where 

we will fly one of our astronauts on the Soyuz vehicle for safety 

considerations and we will fly one Russian on our U.S. crew providers. But beyond that September 2019 date, we have no further 

ability to use the Soyuz directly for our purposes. 

Mr. POSEY. But what is the need for missions to the space station? How many more missions do you think we’ll need to have to 

the space station? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, we’ll need from then through the end, 

probably 12 missions or so. Again, two per year, same kind—— 

Mr. POSEY. Two per year for the next—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Until the end of station is no earlier than 

2024. So that would be 2019 through 2024. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. So five years at two per year. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Mr. Mulholland, when do you think you’re 

going to be flight-ready? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. We have high confidence in our plan we’ll fly 

our uncrewed flight in August of this year and our crewed flight 

in November of this year. 

Mr. POSEY. So you think you’ll be on line by spring of 2019? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Yes, sir. 
107 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Mr. Koenigsmann, how about you? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. It’s about the same. We have an uncrewed 

flight in August of this year and then we have a crew flight plan 

for December this year. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Just out of curiosity, Mr. Gerstenmaier, what 

are we paying the Russians per seat now? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. It’s on the order of $70 to $80 million per 

seat. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Are they going to pay us when we carry their 

people up there? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. No, and we’re not going to pay them for 

them carrying our astronaut to station. 

Mr. POSEY. But they won’t be carrying our astronauts after 2019, 

will they? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, they will, for the safety reasons I described earlier. We will continue to have one U.S. crew member on 

every Soyuz flight that flies to station, and we will continue to 

have one Russian on one of our U.S. flights. And that’s to keep station viable with the Russian cosmonaut and a U.S. astronaut 

aboard station. 

Mr. POSEY. And of course—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. And that will be done under no exchange of 

funds basis. 

Mr. POSEY. All right. So we’ll carry ours and at least one of 

theirs and they’ll carry theirs and at least one of ours? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. That’s correct. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. Now I’d like to recognize 

the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. All right. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. 

Gerstenmaier, let me start with you. In November we talked a little bit about the Dream Chaser, and they were actually having a 

test flight and drop back in November when we last visited. And 

can you remind me what it is that NASA has planned for the 

Dream Chaser? It’s primarily cargo. Anything else? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. It is for cargo and it’s both pressurized and 

unpressurized cargo to the station. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Is it possible—I guess anything’s possible but 

is it possible it would be a back-up to SpaceX and Boeing? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Not at this time because our requirements 

for safety are dramatically different between the cargo program 

and the crew program. For the crew program we have a much more 

stringent requirements in capability. We have a requirement for an 

abort capability in the vehicles, and currently as Dream Chaser is 

envisioned for the cargo missions, it doesn’t meet fully all those requirements and also it doesn’t have an abort capability as it’s currently envisioned for cargo. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. But if either of the contractors were to slip up, 

those kinds of things could be changed I imagine? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Through appropriate procurement and competitive procurement activities, yes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. Can the panel talk to me about load and 

go and what that means to all of you and what you expect because—and I’d start with you, Dr. Koenigsmann, if you would. 
108 

There’s some concerns that have been expressed that when you’re 

fueling the rockets in the spaceship or whatever that, you know, 

there’s a little additional danger at that point. I mean, I’ll just open 

it wide open and start with you, sir. 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Certainly. I mean, we use what we call densified fuel. It’s subcooled actually way below the boiling point, and 

it’s particularly adequate to load it actually fast and quick. And 

what we tried to do here is we tried to minimize the time the exposed personnel, not just astronauts, but also crew to the hazard 

of fueling. So in this particular case, our procedure is actually that 

we put the astronauts—we strap them in. We make sure they’re 

comfortable, and then the ground crew retreats. And we arm the 

pad abort system that we already tested. And then we start fueling 

the main propellants basically within the—what amounts to like 1/ 

2 hour, something like that. So it’s a relatively quick procedure, 

and we believe that this exposure time is the shortest possible and 

therefore the safest approach. 

I do want to point out that when you load traditional propellants 

you basically load them, LOX at least, at their boiling point. So 

you’re constantly refilling while the gas basically goes overboard. 

It’s not—it’s described—some people say it is quiescence but it’s actually a constantly boiling process that needs to be refilled from the 

other side. So we don’t consider that as a really quiescence stage, 

either. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So from SpaceX’s point of view, the purpose 

is—— 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Right. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. —safety? 

Dr. KOENIGSMANN. Correct. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I mean, so you think it’s safer to do that. Does 

anybody else have a comment on load and go? Mr. Mulholland? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Load and go is an approach that the Atlas V 

doesn’t take, you know, and I think that the Aerospace Advisory 

Panel, NASA appropriately has significant concerns over that approach. You know, it’s something—and obviously I don’t know the 

specifics of the SpaceX system, but using densified propellant was 

something that we considered years ago in the space shuttle program when we were looking for additional performance capability. 

But we never could get comfortable with the safety risks that you 

would take with that approach. 

When you’re loading the densified propellant, it is not an inherently stable situation. With the approach that the shuttle took, the 

approach that the Atlas V takes, you do load the propellant and 

then you enter into a period called stable replenish because that 

system then is thermodynamically stable. So you are flowing a 

small amount of propellant in just to maintain that thermodynamic 

stability. 

So you know, I have great trust in ASAP and NASA and working 

with SpaceX to determine that, whether that is technically and 

from a safety standpoint feasible. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Quickly, Mr. Gerstenmaier? Dr. Sanders? Just 

quickly. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yeah. What we’d like to do is not have kind 

of a word discussion about where this is, but we’re going to actually 
109 

take the vehicle design, we’re going to go look at the specific hazards associated with the various phases during loading. We’ll look 

at when the crew goes on board. We’ll look at what those hazards 

are, what the likelihood of those hazards are, and we’ll make an 

informed decision about when for this particular rocket’s design is 

the safest time to put the crew on orbit. 

So rather than picking words such as load and go or stable replenish, we’re not going to do that. We’re going to go below that. 

We’re going to understand the specific risk and understand the specific timeframes that the crews are exposed to hazards, and then 

we’ll make an informed decision about the appropriate time to go 

ahead and put the crew on orbit. 

It’s also important that if we stay with the same approach that 

SpaceX is using for their cargo flights, we gain a lot of experience 

of understanding how this rocket gets loaded, how the ground systems operate, the loading systems on the ground, how reliable they 

are, how safe they are, et cetera. That’s an important consideration 

as well. It’s not only the rocket that can damage and hurt the crew. 

Also the ground system can have problems and failures that can 

also hurt the crew. We need to look at it in an integrated system. 

We have the plans in place to methodically review this, look at the 

hazards, and find the appropriate time to put the crew on board 

the vehicles. And we’ll do that at the appropriate time. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. I appreciate it. 

Your time’s expired. And I just want to thank the witnesses for 

your valuable testimony and the Members for all of your questions. 

The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments 

and written questions from Members. And I’m not going to be able 

to shake your hands because I’ve got to run to another event, but 

I want to say thank you so very much. This has been very, very 

informative. Two great companies, and we appreciate all this information. Thank you. This is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. William Gerstenmaier 
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Responses by Mr. John Mulholland 
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Responses by Dr. Hans Koenigsmann 
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Responses by Dr. Patricia Sanders 
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Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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REPORT SUBMITTED BY DR. PATRICIA SANDERS
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