J-A27033-19

2020 PA Super 15

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.R.-W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.W., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 779 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 12, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000678-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.R.-W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.W., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 780 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 12, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000677-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.R.-W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.W., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 886 EDA 2019
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Appeal from the Order Entered December 12, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000874-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.R.-W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.W., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 887 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered December 12, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000875-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 29, 2020

D.W. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees1 entered December 12, 2018, 

which terminated involuntarily his parental rights to his son, D.R.-W., born in 

January 2013, and his daughter, E.R.-W., born in March 2017 (collectively, 

“the Children”).2 Father also appeals from the orders entered that same day, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Father filed separate notices of appeal for each child, and for each order; 

thus Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 2018), which 

requires that “where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one 

docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for each of those cases,” is 

satisfied.

2

In addition, the trial court entered separate decrees terminating the 

parental rights of the Children’s mother, S.R. (“Mother”), and of the possible 

unknown father of E.R.-W. Neither Mother, nor any unknown father, filed an 

appeal.
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which changed the Children’s permanent placement goals from reunification 

to adoption. After careful review, we affirm.

The record reveals that the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) filed dependency petitions regarding the Children on March 30, 2017. 

Therein, DHS stated that it received a General Protective Services report on 

February 3, 2017, which alleged substance abuse and mental health concerns

with respect to Mother. DHS averred that it received a subsequent General 

Protective Services report on March 21, 2017, following the birth of E.R.-W. 

The report alleged that E.R.-W. was born prematurely and tested positive for 

methadone, and that Mother tested positive for methadone, benzodiazepines, 

and PCP shortly prior to E.R.-W.’s birth. As for Father, DHS averred that he 

had a history of unstable housing and drug-related convictions. On April 12, 

2017, the trial court entered orders adjudicating the Children dependent and

placing them in Father’s care. The court also referred Father for drug screens 

and a substance abuse assessment and directed that he enroll in services at 

the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”).3

This arrangement did not last, and DHS obtained emergency protective 

custody of the Children less than two months later on May 30, 2017. In its 

applications for emergency protective custody, DHS averred that Father’s 

whereabouts were unknown, and the Children were living with their maternal 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court entered amended orders of adjudication and disposition on 

the same day, apparently to correct a typographical error.
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grandmother, who was an indicated perpetrator of child abuse.4 The trial 

court entered shelter-care orders on June 1, 2017, and placed the Children in 

foster care.5

Following the Children’s placement in foster care, Father made minimal

progress toward regaining custody. The Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) 

prepared a series of Single Case Plan (“SCP”) goals for Father, which included 

obtaining substance-abuse treatment, following all recommendations, 

complying with random drug screens, receiving services at ARC, obtaining 

stable housing, and obtaining proper employment. N.T., 12/12/18, at 17. As 

the record demonstrates, Father made little progress toward completing his 

goals throughout the life of this case. 

The trial court conducted a permanency review hearing on October 13, 

2017. N.T., 12/12/18, at 17. At the time of the hearing, Father was not 

visiting the Children, did not have stable housing, and was not attending ARC. 

Id. at 19. He tested positive for opiates on August 31, 2017. Id. In addition, 

while Father was scheduled for a substance abuse assessment on 

September 26, 2017, he failed to appear. Id. Father was arrested for a parole 

violation after the October 13, 2017 hearing, and was incarcerated for an 

unspecified period. Id. at 20.

____________________________________________

4 Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a)(1), a report of child abuse is “indicated” 

where “an investigation by the department or county agency determines that 

substantial evidence of the alleged abuse by a perpetrator exists....”

5 DHS filed amended dependency petitions on June 3, 2017, although the 

Children were already dependent. 
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Additional permanency review hearings took place on January 10, 2018, 

and March 20, 2018. N.T., 12/12/18, at 20. Father remained noncompliant 

with his SCP objectives at the time of these hearings. Id. CUA did not have 

an address for Father and he failed to make his whereabouts known. Id. at 

21. As a result, the trial court suspended Father’s visits with the Children. 

Id. at 20-21. Father’s visits were reinstated after a permanency review 

hearing on June 21, 2018. Id. at 21-22. Father was residing in a recovery 

house, and the trial court granted him two supervised visits per month. Id.

at 22. Despite Father’s efforts to address his substance abuse problems, he 

remained noncompliant with the remainder of his objectives. Id. On 

August 21, 2018, DHS filed petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights to 

the Children involuntarily and to change the Children’s permanent placement 

goal from reunification to adoption. 

A final permanency review hearing took place on September 5, 2018. 

By that time, Father had attended an intake appointment at ARC on 

August 22, 2018. Id. at 23. However, he failed to follow up with services 

after the appointment, and ARC discharged him as of November 27, 2018. 

Id. Father also failed to provide CUA with an address, despite several 

requests. Id. at 23-24. 

On December 12, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on DHS’s 

termination and goal change petitions. At the conclusion of that hearing, the 

trial court announced its intention to terminate Father’s parental rights and to 

change the Children’s permanent placement goals from reunification to 
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adoption. The court entered its termination decrees and goal change orders 

that same day, memorializing its decision. Order, 12/12/18. Father did not 

file an appeal from the decrees or orders within the requisite thirty-day period. 

Pa.R.A.P. 903. Instead, Father filed pleadings entitled “Petition for Leave to 

File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc” on January 24, 2019. He 

filed additional pleadings with the same title on February 25, 2019, in which 

he corrected a typographical error on two of the pleadings and added a 

doctor’s note. The court granted permission to appeal nunc pro tunc on 

February 26, 2019. Father timely filed notices of appeal on March 19, 2019, 

and March 21, 2019, along with concise statements of errors complained of 

on appeal.

Father now raises the following claims for our review:

1. The trial court committed an error of law and discretion by 

changing the permanency goal from reunification to adoption 

where [DHS] failed to provide sufficient evidence that such a goal 

change would be best suited for the [C]hildren’s needs and 

welfare.

2. The trial court committed an error of law and abuse of discretion 

by involuntarily terminating [Father’s] parental rights under 23 

Pa. C.S. § 2511 (a), where the evidence showed that Father 

substantially complied with [SCP] goals established by [DHS].

3. The trial court committed an error of law and abuse of discretion 

by involuntarily terminating [Father’s] parental rights under 23 

Pa. C.S. § 2511 (a) and (b), where [DHS] failed to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that involuntar[il]y terminating [D.W.’s] 

parental rights would best serve the emotional needs and welfare 

of the [C]hildren as an extension of time under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351

(f) (9) would best serve D.R.-W’s needs and welfare.

Father’s Brief at 7-8.
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Preliminarily, we note that Father’s brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a), which requires that the argument section shall “be divided into as 

many parts as there are questions to be argued. . . .” Despite including three 

questions involved, the argument portion of Father’s brief is comprised of one 

undivided section. Moreover, although Father presents questions regarding 

the trial court’s decisions under Sections 2511(a) & (b) of the Adoption Act, 

Father makes no effort in his brief to analyze the relevant statutory 

subsections of the Adoption Act. Instead, he fails to cite or discuss the 

Adoption Act entirely, opting to focus on his claim that the trial court 

terminated his rights based on a mechanical application of a section of the 

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 6301 et seq.

6 Given the lack of discussion and citation 

____________________________________________

6

In his brief, Father challenges the evidence supporting the involuntary 

termination of his parental rights, arguing that “compelling reasons” existed 

to continue with reunification efforts. Father’s Brief at 12-13. Father directs 

our attention to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9) of the Juvenile Act, which requires 

that trial courts determine whether the county agency has filed a termination 

petition once a child has remained in foster care for fifteen of the last twentytwo months. Father’s Brief at 13. That section contains the following 

language:

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 22 

months or the court has determined that aggravated 

circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or 

eliminate the need to remove the child from the child's parent, 

guardian or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family need

not be made or continue to be made, whether the county agency 

has filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified family to 

adopt the child unless:
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to relevant legal authority, we find that Father has waived any issues relating 

to error on the part of the trial court as it relates to 23 Pa.C.S § 2511. See,

e.g., In re A.P., 920 A.2d 1269, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2007) (finding issue waived 

where mother failed to develop or cite any authority in support of argument). 

____________________________________________

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best suited 

to the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling 

reason for determining that filing a petition to 

terminate parental rights would not serve the needs 

and welfare of the child; or

(iii) the child's family has not been provided with 

necessary services to achieve the safe return to the 

child's parent, guardian or custodian within the time 

frames set forth in the permanency plan.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9). Father emphasizes an exception to this requirement, 

found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9)(ii), which provides that the court need not 

make the required finding if the county agency documents a compelling reason 

that filing a petition would not serve the subject child’s needs and welfare. 

Father’s Brief at 14. Father asserts that the compelling reason in this case 

was his compliance with his SCP goals. Id. at 15, 22-23, 30-31. Specifically, 

Father asserts that he had overcome his drug addiction and maintained

sobriety for approximately one year at the time of the hearing, and that he 

had maintained a job for four months. Id. at 15, 20, 30. Father acknowledges 

that he failed to attend services at ARC, but insists that he will be able to 

complete that goal as well, “in a minimal amount of time.” Id. at 15-16, 20, 

24. The subsection upon which Father relies does not address whether the 

court should actually grant a termination petition when DHS files one. 

In this case, we see no indication in the trial court’s opinion or in the 

transcript of the hearing that the court relied on an erroneous interpretation 

of Section 6351(f)(9) to terminate Father’s parental rights. A review of the 

trial court’s opinion confirms that it applied the correct statutory authority, 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, when reaching its decision. 
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Even if we were to reach the merits of Father’s argument that the trial 

court erred in finding termination of Father’s parental rights was proper under 

23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a) and (b), we would find no error. 

Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of 

parental rights. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis as 

follows: 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In the instant matter, the trial court terminated Father’s rights to the 

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We 

need only agree with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), 

as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (b).
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We first consider whether the trial court committed an error of law or 

an abuse of its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2). 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] 

§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). As this Court has held, “The grounds for termination due to parental 

incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. 

To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as 

incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (citations omitted).

The trial court explained its decision to terminate Father’s parental 

rights as follows:

This [c]ourt found the testimony of the CUA case workers to 

be credible and persuasive and found Father’s testimony to be 

incredible and self-serving. This [c]ourt’s decision to terminate 

Father’s parental rights to the Children was based on clear and 

convincing evidence which established that Father’s conduct for at 

least the six months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate[]

revealed a settled purpose relinquishing parental claim to the 

Children and revealed a failure to perform parental duties. This 

[c]ourt found the evidence supported th[e] conclusion that Father 

lacks the present and future capacity to provide parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for the Children’s physical and 

mental well-being. Father cannot provide for the Children’s basic 
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needs nor can he provide a structured environment for these 

Children.

This [c]ourt found that DHS proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that Father is incapable of providing safety and 

permanency for these Children now and in the future. This [c]ourt 

is not persuaded that Father can or will remedy the conditions 

which continue to exist and which brought the Children into 

supervision. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/16/19, at 25-26.

After careful review of the record in this matter, we discern no error of 

law or abuse of discretion. Moreover, we conclude that the record supports

the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2). The trial court adjudicated the Children dependent on 

April 12, 2017, and placed them in Father’s care. However, this arrangement 

lasted less than two months, and DHS obtained emergency protective custody 

May 30, 2017. The CUA case manager, Ms. Michele Jackson, testified that 

DHS obtained emergency protective custody after Father abandoned the 

Children with their maternal grandmother and disappeared. N.T., 12/12/18, 

at 14, 42-43. Father then tested positive for opiates on August 31, 2017. Id.

at 19. He failed to attend a substance abuse assessment on September 26, 

2017, before being arrested for a parole violation following the October 13, 

2017 hearing, resulting in an unspecified period of incarceration. Id. at 19-

20. Subsequently, CUA had no address for Father and his whereabouts were 

unknown. Id. at 21.
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Ms. Jackson testified that Father entered substance-abuse treatment in 

March of 2018. N.T., 12/12/18, at 32-33. At the time of the June 2018 

hearing, Father resided in a recovery house but remained noncompliant with 

services at ARC. Id. at 33, 21-22. While Father attended an intake 

appointment at ARC on August 22, 2018, he then failed to follow up with 

services, resulting in his discharge. Id. at 23. Father’s circumstances 

remained essentially the same at the time of the hearing on December 12, 

2018, with the exception that he presented brief, self-serving testimony that 

he held employment for the past four or five months, and that he would be 

looking at potential housing the next day. Id. at 131-133. It was within the 

trial court’s discretion to reject this testimony as not credible. See In the 

Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 966 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The [trial court] is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free 

to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”).

As this Court has emphasized, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in 

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of 

progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

513 (Pa. Super. 2006). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) was satisfied.

Turning to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), we apply the following analysis:
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Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the [S]ection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted)).

In the instant matter, Father argues that he and the Children share a 

bond, although he acknowledges that this bond was “rebuilding” at the time 

of the termination proceedings. Father’s Brief at 24. In addition, Father 

maintains that the Children wanted to return to his care, and he stresses that 

the Children’s legal counsel requested a bonding evaluation. Id. at 16, 25-

27. He contends that DHS rushed to terminate his rights and that the trial 

court placed insufficient weight on the Children’s preference. Id. at 16, 25, 

29-30. Father insists that there is no risk of “foster care drift” in this case
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because the Children have remained in the same foster home since their 

shelter care hearing and likely will continue to remain there in the event this 

Court reverses the termination decrees. Id. at 14-15. 

The trial court explained its reasoning with regard to Section 2511(b) as 

follows:

Testimony by Ms. Jackson and Ms. [Adia] Gettysmith, the 

CUA case workers, provided credible, persuasive testimony 

regarding the Children’s physical and emotional needs, best 

interests and with whom the Children have a parental bond. They 

testified that Father has minimal contact with the Children and 

only when prompted by Mother. Ms. Jackson stated there is no 

engagement [and] no interaction between [E.R.-W.] and Father. 

At the conclusion of the visits, the Children are happy to return to 

their foster parents. She stated the foster parents provide safety, 

care, and meet all of the Children’s emotional and day-to-day 

needs. There is a parental bond between the Children and their 

Foster Parents. She noted that D.R.[-]W.[] recognizes his 

Father[;] however, she opined there is no parental bond between 

them. Regarding [E.R.-W.], the [c]hild has minimal recognition 

and in fact, Father has never been seen by the visitation observers 

to have held the [c]hild, and only interacts with the Children when 

prompted by Mother. Both social workers opined the Children 

would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were 

terminated and it would be in their best interest to be adopted.

Susan Rubinovitz, [the Children’s legal counsel,] testified 

she met with the Children over the weekend. D.R.[-]W. told her 

he wants to go home to live with his real Mom and Dad. He refers 

to his foster parent as “foster mom.”

Here, the totality of the evidence supports the [c]ourt’s

conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the 

best interest of these Children. This [c]ourt found that 

termination of Father’s parental rights met the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Children, and the 

statutory requirements for involuntary termination of his parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b) were met.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/16/19, at 27-28.
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We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in this assessment. As 

detailed above, Father has had minimal contact with the Children since their 

placement in foster care. The trial court adjudicated the Children dependent 

in April 2017, when D.R.-W. was four years old and E.R.-W. was only one

month old. It is not clear from the record how much time D.R.-W. spent with 

Father prior to his adjudication, although Ms. Jackson’s testimony appears to 

indicate that contact was sporadic. See N.T., 12/12/18, at 26 (“There was a 

sporadic in and out before even in placement.”). After their adjudication, the 

Children lived with Father for just over one month until Father abandoned 

them into the care of their maternal grandmother, an “indicated perpetrator” 

of child abuse, in May 2017. Ms. Jackson testified that Father then failed to 

visit with the Children and was incarcerated. Id. at 18-20. In total, Father 

visited with the Children only once prior to the suspension of his visits in 

September 2017, and only five times, in June 2018, July 2018, August 2018, 

September 2018, and November 2018 after his visits resumed. Id. at 22-23, 

29, 38. 

Ms. Jackson testified that she was present during the first two of Father’s 

reinstated visits, and that D.R.-W. was “not engaged” and did not interact with 

Father during either of them. N.T., 12/12/18, at 28-30. Concerning D.R.-

W.’s relationship with Father, Ms. Jackson explained, “[D.R.-W.] identifies who 

[Father] is . . .. He does know who he is. The kids have both expressed fear

of him to the foster parent, though.” Id. at 26. As for E.R.-W., Ms. Jackson 
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testified that the child “gets very upset upon leaving the foster mother on all 

of her visits. And there is no engagement. There’s no interaction.” Id. at 

45. Ms. Jackson added that she spent most of E.R.-W.’s visits with Father just 

“trying to calm the child down because she was too upset.” Id. Ultimately, 

she opined that neither child would suffer irreparable harm if the trial court 

terminated Father’s parental rights and that termination would be in the 

Children’s best interests.7 Id. at 27, 47. 

On cross-examination, the Children’s legal counsel asked Ms. Jackson 

whether she was aware that D.R.-W. wanted to live with his birth parents. 

N.T., 12/12/18, at 32. Ms. Jackson responded that D.R.-W. was “somewhat 

confused at this point, yes.” Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel 

summarized her own meeting with the Children, as follows:

I met with the children over the weekend. Very early on in 

the visit, they started telling me about how they want to go home. 

[D.R.-W.] told me he wanted to go home to live with his real 

[M]other and [F]ather. And [the Children’s half-sibling, A.,8] told 

me she wanted to go live with her birth mother. And that was 

without me mentioning their real parents.

I just said, you know, “do you want to stay here for a long 

time?” And they both right away told me they wanted to go home 

with their real parents. I asked -- I pointed to the foster mother. 

And I asked both of them who is this? ‘Cause normally, a lot of 

times the children tell me it’s the “mommy” or their “mom.”

____________________________________________

7

It is important to note that the trial court was under no obligation to order 

a bonding evaluation before terminating Father’s rights. See In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted) (“When conducting a 

bonding analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social 

workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.”). 

8 A. is not Father’s child, and she is not involved in the instant appeal. 
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And they both referred to her as their “foster mom.” And 

they both told me more than once in the visit that they want to 

go home with their birth parents and that they enjoy the visits 

with their birth parents. 

Id. at 152-153.

While DHS’s testimony was not consistent with D.R.-W.’s preference as 

reported by his legal counsel, that inconsistency does not require reversal of 

the termination decrees. The Adoption Act and our case law provide that trial 

courts must appoint legal counsel to represent the preferred outcome of 

children in contested involuntary termination matters. See 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2313(a); In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 (Pa. 2018).9 However, a child’s 

preferred outcome is not controlling, especially where that child is under 

twelve, and his or her consent is not necessary to effectuate an adoption. See 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(a) (“[C]onsent to an adoption shall be required of . . . [t]he 

adoptee, if over 12 years of age.”). In this case, given D.R.-W.’s young age, 

and given that his preference appeared immature and completely at odds with

other evidence of record, which established that he had barely even seen 

____________________________________________

9

In In re L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) our Supreme Court explained 

that a child’s legal interests, or preferred outcome, is distinct from a child’s 

best interests, which is determined by a court. In the instant case, Susan M. 

Rabinovitz, Esq., was appointed counsel TPR counsel, representing the legal 

interests of the Children. Maureen F. Pie, Esq., was appointed the Children’s 

guardian ad litem, representing the Children’s best interests. Where, as here, 

the Children’s legal interests are not synonymous with their best interests, 

those interests must be represented separately. In re L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 

182. 
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Father for over one year and one-half, it was well within the court’s discretion 

to accord that preference little weight.10

The trial court also considered the Children’s bond with their foster 

parents. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (“Common sense dictates that courts 

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a preadoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”). 

Here, Ms. Jackson testified that the Children resided together in the same 

foster home. N.T., 12/12/18, at 13, 99. E.R.-W. has resided there nearly her 

entire life, since June 2017, while D.R.-W. has resided there since July 2017. 

Id. at 98-99. Ms. Jackson opined that D.R.-W. shares a bond with his foster 

parents and refers to them as “Mom” and “Dad.” Id. at 25-26. D.R.-W. is 

thriving in the foster home, and he shares “a very close connection” with his 

foster parents’ biological children as well. Id. at 25, 27. With regard to E.R.-

W., Ms. Jackson opined that she, too, shares a bond with the foster parents 

and is “doing great” in foster care.11 Id. at 46-47. Taken together, this 

____________________________________________

10 We note that E.R.-W. was less than two years old at the time of the hearing 

and she was nonverbal. N.T., 12/12/18, at 106. Therefore, her preferred 

outcome was incapable of ascertainment. 

11 Similarly, the visitation coach, Adia Gettysmith, testified that she observed 

three of Father’s visits with the Children. N.T., 12/12/18, at 116. She 

reported that Father interacted with the Children during the visits only “if 

prompted by Mom.” Id. Concerning D.R.-W.’s demeanor, Ms. Gettysmith 

testified that the child appears “[h]appy” when he is with his foster parents 

but only “[n]eutral” when he is with Father. Id. at 121-22. She testified that 

E.R.-W. also appears “happy” when she sees her foster mother but that the 
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evidence confirms that involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights and 

adoption by the foster parents would best serve the Children’s needs and 

welfare. We therefore affirm the termination decrees pursuant to Section 

2511(b). 

Finally, we turn our attention to Father’s first claim on appeal, in which 

he challenges the trial court’s decision to change the Children’s permanent 

placement goals from reunification to adoption. Father waived this claim by 

failing to develop it in his appellate brief. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 

462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not review 

a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, 

and supported by citations to relevant authority.”). Father indicates at the 

start of his brief that he is appealing only the decrees terminating his parental 

rights. Father’s Brief at 6. However, as discussed supra, the argument section 

of Father’s brief is comprised of a single section. While Father mentions the 

goal change in his argument, he appears to be conflating the court’s goalchange orders with its termination decrees and does not present a distinct 

goal-change claim supported by citation to relevant legal authority. Notably, 

even if Father had not waived his goal change claim, it would be moot in light 

of our decision to affirm the court’s termination decrees. See In re D.A., 801 

____________________________________________

child cries when she is “passed off” to Mother for a visit. Id. at 119. When 

asked how E.R.-W. reacts when she is passed off to Father, Ms. Gettysmith 

replied that she had never seen E.R.-W. passed off to Father. Id.
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A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling 

upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or 

effect.”). 

Even accepting for the sake of argument that Father did not waive this 

claim and that it is not moot, we would conclude he is not entitled to relief. 

We review goal-change orders pursuant to an abuse-of-discretion standard of 

review. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). As such, we must accept 

the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if the record 

supports them, but we need not accept the court’s inferences or conclusions 

of law. Id.

The Juvenile Act governs proceedings to change a child’s permanent 

placement goal. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375. Trial courts must apply the 

following analysis: 

Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when 

considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the 

[trial] court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity 

for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of 

compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of progress 

made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated 

the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of 

the current placement goal for the children; (5) a likely date by 

which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) the child’s 

safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement for at 

least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best interests of 

the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial 

court. As this Court has held, a child’s life simply cannot be put 

on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.
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In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-1089 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

The trial court explained its decision to change the Children’s goals as 

follows:

This [c]ourt reasoned that DHS has provided Father with 

necessary referrals to services to allow him to be reunited with his 

Children, however, he has not complied with these referrals in the 

time frames set forth in the permanency plan. The Children are 

doing well with their foster parents and they cannot be expected 

to place their future on hold to wait for Father to get his life in 

order.

The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, as amended to reflect the 

principles of the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act 

([“]ASFA[“]) which focuses on safety and permanency as the 

paramount concerns in planning for dependent children, ranks the 

permanency options for children using a hierarchical priority. The 

permanency options are listed first to last and each preceding 

option must be ruled out before the next can be chosen as a viable 

permanency option. . . . Pursuant to the hierarchy of permanency 

option[s], the option of “placement with a legal custodian” is listed 

third. Once reunification is ruled out, the second preferred 

permanency option is adoption. Adoption has been clearly 

established as the appropriate goal in the best interest of these 

Children.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/16/19, at 29-30.

We again discern no error of law or abuse of discretion. As we have 

discussed throughout this Opinion, Father has demonstrated that he is 

incapable of parenting the Children and that he will not be capable of parenting 

the Children at any point in the foreseeable future. In addition, the Children 

do not share a bond with Father and instead share a bond with their foster 
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parents. It is clear that changing the Children’s permanent placement goals 

to adoption would be in their best interests. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not commit 

an error of law or abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights 

involuntarily, and that Father waived any challenge to the court’s decision to 

change the Children’s permanent placement goals to adoption. Therefore, we 

affirm the termination decrees and the goal-change orders.

Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/29/2020