UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-24007-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

MARSHA BIEN-AIME, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

MIAMI DADE CORRECTIONS

AND REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT, 

Defendant.

______________________________________/ 

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma 

Pauperis, ECF No. [2] (the “Motion”), filed in conjunction with the Complaint, ECF No. [1] (the 

“Complaint”). Plaintiff Marsha Bien-Aime (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se, has not paid 

the required filing fee and, thus, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are applicable. 

The Court has carefully reviewed the Complaint, the Motion, and the record in this case, and is 

otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

I. Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis

Fundamental to our system of justice is that the courthouse doors will not be closed to 

persons based on their inability to pay a filing fee. Congress has provided that a court “may 

authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or 

criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees . . . therefore, by a person who submits an 

affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to 

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pay such fees . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 

1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting statute to apply to all persons seeking to proceed in forma 

pauperis). Section 1915(a) requires a determination as to whether “the statements in the 

[applicant’s] affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th 

Cir. 1976).1 An applicant’s “affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because 

of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities 

for himself and his dependents.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307; see also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de 

Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (in forma pauperisstatus is demonstrated when, because 

of poverty, one cannot “pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide himself and 

dependents with the necessities of life.”). The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 

poverty guidelines are central to an assessment of an applicant’s poverty. See Taylor v. Supreme 

Court of New Jersey, 261 F. App’x 399, 401 (3d Cir. 2008) (using HHS Guidelines as basis for 

section 1915 determination); Lewis v. Ctr. Mkt., 378 F. App’x 780, 784 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming 

use of HHS guidelines); see also Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 87 Fed. Reg. 

3315 (Jan. 21, 2022). Further, the section 1915 analysis requires “comparing the applicant’s assets 

and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. 

Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014). Ultimately, permission 

to proceed in forma pauperis is committed to the sound discretion of the Court. Camp v. Oliver, 

798 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[P]ermission to proceed [IFP] is committed to the sound 

discretion of the court.”).

In the Motion, Plaintiff represents that she has been unemployed since December, 2021 

and receives no wages. ECF No. [2] at 1. Plaintiff also represents that in the past twelve months, 

1 Pursuant to Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), opinions of the Fifth Circuit 

issued prior to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.

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she received $200.00 monthly in child support and $450.00 in monthly public assistance. Id. at 4. 

But Plaintiff has not stated the amount she expects to receive in the future. See id. at 3-4. In 

addition, Plaintiff supports her daughter, has $3,900.00 in a checking or savings account, and she 

owns her home with a $415,000.00 value, and a vehicle valued at $8,000.00. Id. at 5. Plaintiff 

attests to having monthly expenses totaling approximately $1,452.00, id. at 6, but she has not 

explained how she has managed her expenses since becoming unemployed at the end of 2021, or 

how she expects to manage her expenses moving forward. The information provided is therefore

insufficient to substantiate Plaintiff’s request for IFP. See Kareem v. Home Source Rental, 986 F. 

Supp. 2d 1345, 1346 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (“It undeniably costs money to live . . . . Wary of such claims 

and cognizant of how easy one may consume a public resource with no financial skin in the game, 

the Court has demanded supplemental information.”).

II. The Complaint

In addition to the required showing that the litigant, because of poverty, is unable to pay 

for the court fees and costs, Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307, upon a motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis the Court is required to examine whether “the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or 

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court 

determines that the complaint satisfies any of the three enumerated circumstances under Section 

1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss the complaint.

A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need 

detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

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544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s 

pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Importantly, “[p]ro se

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and [are] liberally 

construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). “But the leniency 

accorded pro se litigants does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to 

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Matthews, Wilson & Matthews, Inc. 

v. Capital City Bank, 614 F. App’x 969, 969 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. 

of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by 

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)).

Upon review, the Complaint in this case must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim.

Plaintiff alleges workplace harassment and bullying, and that after a human resources investigation 

concluded, she was subject to a toxic and hostile environment, the harassment continued, and 

Plaintiff then experienced retaliation. ECF No. [1] at 2. As a result, Plaintiff seeks damages and 

reinstatement, but she has not provided a legal basis for the relief she seeks. Id. Attached to the 

Complaint, Plaintiff provides correspondence from Miami-Dade County, and two (2) Right-to-Sue 

letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See id. at 4-8. The 

correspondence from Miami-Dade County supports Plaintiff’s contention that she was subject to 

harassment and discrimination, and the EEOC letters provide notice of Plaintiff’s right to institute 

a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., Title I 

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of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, et seq., and Title V, Section 

503 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts in the 

Complaint.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 

sex, or national origin. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). “Discriminatory conduct that is ‘so severe 

or pervasive that it create[s] a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, 

gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.’” Uppal 

v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 482 F. App’x 394, 396 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). To establish a hostile work 

environment claim, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that [s]he belongs to a protected group; (2) that [s]he has been subject to 

unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been based on a 

protected characteristic of the employee such as national origin; (4) that the 

harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of 

employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) 

that the employer is responsible for such environment under a theory of vicarious 

or direct liability.

Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.2002). In addition, “Title VII

makes it unlawful ‘for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [she] 

has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ under Title VII.” Uppal, 482 F. 

App’x at 397 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). “Retaliation under Title VII occurs when an 

employee engages in protected activity, and suffers an adverse employment action that is causally 

related to that activity.” Id. (citing Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th 

Cir.1998)). “In terms of causation, a plaintiff must show that the decision-maker was aware of the 

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protected conduct.” Id. (citing Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th 

Cir.2002)). Similarly, the ADA prohibits discrimination by an employer against “a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to state an ADA claim for 

disability discrimination, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that [s]he suffers from a disability, (2) that 

[s]he is a qualified individual, and (3) that a ‘covered entity’ discriminated against [her] on account 

of [her] disability.” Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Holbrook 

v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify the basis of her discrimination or any other facts that 

would permit the Court to conclude that Title VII discrimination or retaliation claims are

adequately alleged. Similarly, the Complaint contains no allegations with respect to any disability 

that would give rise to a claim for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act. Although the Court liberally construes pro se pleadings, the Court is not free to construct 

causes of action for which adequate facts are not pleaded. Because the Complaint does not contain 

sufficient facts or identify specifically the claims Plaintiff intends to assert, the Complaint must be 

dismissed.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Complaint, ECF No. [1], is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [2], is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

4. Plaintiff is advised that this Order does not preclude her from refiling her claims 

and the Motion alleging sufficient facts and providing the requisite financial 

information as more fully set forth in this Order.

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DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 12, 2022.

_________________________________

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to: 

Marsha Bien-Aime, pro se

2345 Superior Street

Opa Locka, FL 33054

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