1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Andrew Hill, :
: Plaintiff, :
v. : Civil Action No. 18

- 2255 (CKK)

:
: Administrative Conference : of the United States, :
: Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, appearing pro se , filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia against the Administrative Conference of the United States . Defendant, “an
independent federal agency,” removed the complaint to this C ourt pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a) (1)

. 1 Not. of Removal ¶¶ 1, 3 [Dkt. # 1] ; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 591

- 96 ( Conference’s

e nabling statute )

. In the barely legible handwritten complaint, p laintiff mentions human
trafficking, homelessness, and torture and seeks a $10,000 judgment. Compl. [Dkt. # 1

- 1].
Pending is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which r elief may be granted [Dkt. # 4]. O n October 17
, 2018, plaintiff was ordered
to respond t o defendant’s motion by November 23, 2018
, or face possible dismissal of the case

.
See Or der [Dkt. # 5 ]. Plaintiff has neither complied with the order nor re quested additional time

to comply

. C onsistent with the advisements in the order , the Court finds that plaintiff has
conceded defendant’s argument s for dismissal and agrees that subject matter jurisdiction is

1 Section 1442(a)(1) authorizes the United States “or any agency thereof” to remove to federal district court a civil action “commenced” against it “in a State court

. ”2 lacking

. Accordingly, defendant’s motion will be granted for the reasons explained more fully

below.
Defendant argues, among other things, that dismissal is necessitated by the derivative
jurisdiction doctrine

. See Mot. at 3

. The Court agrees. Under that doctr ine, which “still applies
to claims removed under [§] 1442
, . . . a federal court’ s jurisdiction must ‘mirror the jurisdiction
that the state court had over the action prior to removal.’” Johnson v. D.C. Metro Transit Auth
., 239 F. Supp. 3d 293, 295 (D.D. C. 201 7) (quoting Merkulov v. United States Park Police
, 75 F.
Supp. 3d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2014) (other citation omitted)). If the state court never had
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, the federal court cannot “acquire jurisdiction
, ”

even if it c ould have “in a like suit originally brought” in federal court

. Lambert Run Coal Co. v.

Baltimore & O.R. Co ., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)

.
Plaintiff’s personal injury claims, such as they are, must be pursued under the F ederal

Tort Claims Act ( “FTCA”)
, which grants “exclusive jurisdiction ” in the federal district court

over certain tort actions against the United States

. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) ; see id

. § 2679(a) (“the
remedies provided [under the FTCA] shall be exclusive”) ; § 2680 (listing exceptions).

Therefore
, D.C. Superior Court “ never acquired jurisdiction over either the subject matter or [ the
defendant] as a United States agency
, ” Johnson , 239 F. Supp. 3d at 296 , and ne ither can this

Court on removal

. 2

2 Defendant argues correctly that had this case originated in this Court, subject matter jurisdiction still would be lacking because there is no indication that plaintiff pursued, much less exhauste d, his administrative remedies under the FTCA. See Mot. at 3

- 4. And i t is established in this circuit that an FTCA claim not previously presented to the appropriate agency is barred on “jurisdictional” grounds. Ali v. Rumsfeld , 649 F.3d 762, 775 (D.C. C ir. 2011) (citation and int ernal quotation marks omitted).3 For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is granted

. A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

__________s/s_______________

_ COLLEEN KOLLAR

- KOTELLY United States District Judge Dated: January 3 , 201 9