UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM

GRACE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF MIAMI,

Defendant.

 /

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant City of Miami’s (“Defendant” or 

“City”) Motion for Final Summary Judgment. (“Mot.”) (ECF No. 131). Plaintiffs filed a 

response,

1

(“Resp.”) (ECF No. 135), and Defendant filed a reply, (“Reply”) (ECF No.137). The 

Motion is now ripe for review. 

I. INTRODUCTION

After nearly a year of litigation, the entry of a preliminary injunction, a complicated 

remedial process, and the denial of a motion to dismiss, Defendant raises only one argument in the 

instant Motion: Plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue their claim. Consistent with its strategy 

of repeatedly asserting arguments that the Court has already rejected numerous times, Defendant 

urges the Court to consider for the third time whether Plaintiffs have standing. See (ECF No. 132 

at 2) (“Like a broken record, Defendant once more raises the same unavailing arguments. Once 

1 Plaintiffs in this Action are Clarice Cooper, Yanelis Valdes, Jared Johnson, Alexandra Contreras,

Steven Miro (collectively, “Individual Plaintiffs”), and GRACE, Inc., Engage Miami, Inc., South 

Dade Branch of the NAACP and Miami-Dade Branch of the NAACP (collectively, 

“Organizational Plaintiffs”). The Court uses the term “Plaintiffs” to refer to the Individual and 

Organizational Plaintiffs jointly.

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more, the Court rejects them.”). The third time will not be the charm. Repeating an argument 

multiple times will not transform a losing legal argument into a winner, no matter how many times 

Defendant chooses to raise it. 

The question of whether Plaintiffs have standing is rather simple, and the Court has already 

answered in the affirmative. See Section II, infra. A review of the instant Motion demonstrates 

that Defendant misunderstands the very basics of what constitutes standing for the purposes of a 

Fourteenth Amendment gerrymandering claim. For the following reasons, the Court finds that 

Plaintiffs have standing and denies Defendant’s Motion.

II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Parties are surely familiar with the background of this case, and thus, the Court recites 

the factual background only insofar as it is relevant to the adjudication of the instant Motion.2

On March 24, 2022, the Miami City Commission passed Resolution 22-131 (the “2022 

Enacted Plan” or “Enjoined Plan”). (“Am. Compl.”) (ECF No. 23 ¶ 5). Four community and civil 

rights organizations and five individual Miamians subsequently brought suit alleging that the 2022 

Enacted Plan was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶ 6. On 

February 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City 

from using the 2022 Enacted Plan in upcoming elections. See (ECF No. 26). The Court granted 

the preliminary injunction motion after undergoing a thorough analysis of the 2022 Enacted Plan 

and the preliminary injunction factors. See (ECF No. 60) (adopting in full the Report and 

Recommendation at ECF No. 52)). 

2 The Court fully described the factual background and procedural history of this Action in its prior 

order on the motion to dismiss. See (ECF No. 132 at 2–11). Because Defendant does not dispute 

most of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations in the instant Motion, the Court does not find that a detailed 

recitation is necessary here. 

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Upon granting the preliminary injunction,3the Court issued a scheduling order that would 

result in the implementation of an interim remedial map by August 1, 2023, the date by which 

Plaintiffs and Defendant averred was the latest the Miami-Dade Board of Elections needed an 

operative map to conduct the upcoming November elections. See (ECF No. 69). Defendant passed 

an interim remedial map, R-23-271 (“Remedial Plan”) and filed a notice with the Court on June 

30, 2023. See (ECF No. 77). Plaintiffs filed objections to the Remedial Plan. See (ECF No. 83). 

After careful review, the Court found that the Remedial Plan perpetuated the unconstitutional 

aspects of the Enjoined Plan and failed to remedy the racial gerrymandering that was substantially 

likely to exist therein. See generally (“Remedial Order”) (ECF No. 94). Because Defendant could 

not enact a constitutional remedial map by August 1, 2023, and because there was no time for the 

City Commission to draw a new map or for the Court to order a special master to create an 

alternative plan, the Court faced the unwelcome burden of crafting a new map for implementation. 

See id. at 40–41. In doing so, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ alternative map P4 was a sufficient 

constitutional remedy to the Enjoined Plan and adopted it as the Court’s interim remedial map 

(“Court’s Map”). See id. at 41–50. 

That same day, on July 31, 2023, Defendant filed an emergency motion to stay the Court’s 

Remedial Order with the Eleventh Circuit. See (ECF No. 97). The appeal did not challenge the 

issuance of the preliminary injunction. The sole question was whether to allow the Court’s Map 

to stay in place for the November election, or alternatively, to stay the Remedial Order and proceed 

with the Remedial Plan that the Court already found unconstitutional. See (ECF No. 132 at 10 

n.10). Relying in part on Defendant’s misrepresentations about the feasibility of conducting the 

3 Defendant initially appealed the Court’s order granting the preliminary injunction but voluntarily 

dismissed it on July 13, 2023. See (ECF No. 88). 

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November elections with the Court’s Map, see (ECF No. 132 at 8–11), a divided Eleventh Circuit 

Panel granted a stay solely on Purcell grounds. See Grace et. al v. City of Miami, No. 23-12472, 

2023 WL 528232 (11th Cir. 2023).4 Thus, the November elections went forward under the 

unconstitutional Remedial Plan. 

Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss. See (ECF No. 117). Therein, Defendant raised 

a litany of already-rejected arguments. See generally id. For example, Defendant argued that 

Plaintiffs lacked standing and that the Action was moot. See id. at 14–15. Defendant also argued 

that the Court should disregard the stated intent of legislators to racially gerrymander each City 

Commission District because the Remedial Plan was, in Defendant’s view, not a racial 

gerrymander but rather a “reflect[ion] [of] the demographic reality” of the City. Id. at 11–12. The 

Court rejected each of Defendant’s arguments and found that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that 

each City Commission District was and continues to be racially gerrymandered in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See generally (ECF No. 132). 

Now, Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that multiple Plaintiffs lack 

standing. Relevant to this Motion, individual Plaintiffs Cooper, Miro, Johnson, and Valdes 

currently reside in various Miami City Commission Districts.5 (“D’s 56.1”) (ECF No. 130 ¶¶ 8, 

14, 21, 43). Plaintiff Miami-Dade NAACP’s corporate representative asserts that it has members 

residing in each District. Id. ¶ 52 (citing (“MD NAACP Dep.”) (ECF No. 130-8)). Plaintiff South 

4 But see Rose v. Raffensperger, 143 S. Ct. 58 (mem.) (Aug. 19, 2022) (vacating an Eleventh 

Circuit stay of a district court’s injunction because the Eleventh Circuit (1) erroneously applied 

the Purcell principle when respondent made previous representations to the district court that the 

schedule on which the court proceeded was sufficient to effectuate relief, and (2) failed to analyze 

the emergency motion under the traditional stay factors pursuant to Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 

(2009)). 

5 At the time this lawsuit was filed, Plaintiff Contreras resided in District 4, but has since moved 

out of Miami. See D’s 56.1 ¶ 30.

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Dade NAACP’s board members all reside in District 2, and its corporate representative asserts that 

some members of the organization may reside in District 4. Id. ¶¶ 57–58 (citing (“SD NAACP 

Dep.”) (ECF No. 130-9)). Plaintiff GRACE is an organization made up of churches, civic groups, 

nonprofits, resident homeowners, and small business owners in West Grove, which is part of 

Miami’s City Commission Districts. Id. ¶ 63 (citing (“Grace Dep.”) (ECF No. 130-1)). Finally, 

Plaintiff Engage Miami’s corporate representative states that the organization has members 

residing in each District. Id. ¶ 76 (citing (“Engage Dep.”) (ECF No. 130-10)). Defendant uses 

these factual assertions to argue that Plaintiffs lack standing. See generally Mot.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact 

[such] that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). A genuine issue of material fact exists 

when “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citation omitted). “For factual issues to be considered 

genuine, they must have a real basis in the record.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 

(11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Speculation cannot create a genuine issue of material fact 

sufficient to defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, 

Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005).

The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to 

any material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). In assessing 

whether the moving party has met this burden, a court must view the movant’s evidence and all 

factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Denney v. 

City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1181 (11th Cir. 2001). Once the moving party satisfies its initial 

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burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence showing a genuine issue of 

material fact that precludes summary judgment. Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th 

Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from 

undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery 

Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). But if the record, taken as a 

whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine 

issue for trial, and summary judgment is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant’s sole argument on summary judgment is that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring 

their racial gerrymandering claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Mot. The 

Court’s analysis proceeds as follows: First, the Court recites the necessary elements of standing 

as to both the Organizational and Individual Plaintiffs and evaluates whether the Plaintiffs suffered

an injury in fact. Finding that Organizational Plaintiff Engage Miami has standing, the Court then 

analyzes the “one-plaintiff standing rule” and concludes that it need not analyze further whether

the other Plaintiffs have standing. Next, the Court rejects Defendant’s arguments purporting to

dispute whether Plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact. Once the Court disposes of Defendant’s 

arguments, the Court explains why it can redress Plaintiffs’ injury.

A. Each Plaintiff has Article III Standing

As noted above, Defendant’s only argument is that Plaintiffs lack standing. See generally

Mot. In response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s Motion “is premised on the City’s continued 

mischaracterization or misunderstanding of Plaintiffs’ sole racial gerrymandering claim.” Resp. 

at 1. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs—the instant Motion not only displays a clear 

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misunderstanding of standing jurisprudence, but also a failure to understand the basic harm that 

Plaintiffs allege resulted from being sorted on the basis of race. 

Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power in the federal courts 

and limits that power to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1–2, see also Spokeo, 

Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337 (2016). A challenge to a plaintiff’s standing to assert a claim 

presents a challenge to the Court’s power to entertain the suit, as standing is one of the components 

of a justiciable case or controversy required for the Court to possess subject matter jurisdiction. 

L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 879 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018). To 

establish standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable 

to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 

(1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 

Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). “The plaintiff, as the party 

invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id.

Moreover, an organization “has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its 

members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane 

to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 181 

(citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)); see also Ala. 

Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (“ALBC”), 575 U.S. 254, 268–71 (2015) (reversing district 

court’s sua sponte finding that statewide political caucus lacked standing in racial gerrymandering 

case where “common sense” supported an inference that the statewide political caucus had 

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members in every district based on the testimony of its representative that it had members in every 

county and the organization’s representations regarding the purpose of its founding). 

As to the Individual Plaintiffs, Defendant only argues that these Plaintiffs cannot satisfy 

the injury in fact and redressable harm prongs of the standing test. See id. at 11–17. Regarding 

the Organizational Plaintiffs, Defendant argues that each of these Plaintiffs lack standing because 

they have failed to demonstrate that one of their members would otherwise have standing to sue 

in their own right. See id. at 6–11. Mirroring the structure of the instant Motion, the Court first 

addresses the issue of standing as to the Organizational Plaintiffs.

i. Plaintiffs Suffered an Injury in Fact

The Supreme Court has explained that in the context of racial gerrymandering claims, the 

harm, or injury in fact, “include being ‘personally . . . subjected to [a] racial classification,’ as well 

as being represented by a legislator who believes his ‘primary obligation is to represent only the 

members’ of a particular racial group.” ALBC, 575 U.S. at 263 (internal citations omitted) 

(alteration in original). A “generalized grievance against allegedly illegal governmental conduct” 

will not suffice to demonstrate an injury in fact. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995) 

(citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 

Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 

(1974); Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam)). Nor does a plaintiff have standing 

where it brings a racial gerrymandering claim “to a state considered as an undifferentiated 

‘whole.’” ALBC, 575 U.S. at 262. But “[w]here a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered 

district . . . the plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature’s reliance on 

racial criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the legislature’s action.” Hays, 515 U.S. at

744–45 (citation omitted). Put simply, a plaintiff satisfies the injury in fact requirement by 

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demonstrating that she has been subjected to a racial classification in the specific district where

she resides. 

With this understanding of what constitutes an injury in fact in racial gerrymandering 

claims, the Court turns to Defendant’s argument that Organizational Plaintiffs lack standing.

Defendant disputes only the requirement that each organization contains members who would 

otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. See Mot. 6–11. In essence, Defendant’s 

argument is that that none of the Organizational Plaintiffs identified any members who suffered 

an injury in fact by residing in racially gerrymandered districts, and thus, the Organizational 

Plaintiffs do not satisfy a necessary prerequisite for the Court to find organizational standing. This 

argument is factually erroneous and incorrect as a matter of law. 

For example, Organizational Plaintiff Engage Miami has members who reside in all five 

City Commission Districts under both the Enjoined and Remedial Plan. See (“P’s 56.1”) (ECF 

No. 134 ¶ 81); see also ((ECF No. 134-2) (Engage Miami’s member address list indicating 

members residing in all five Districts)). Engage Miami’s Corporate representative also explained 

that she had examined a workbook verifying that the organization had members residing in each 

City Commission District. See Engage Dep. 25:7–12, 27:7–17. Therefore, because the evidence 

demonstrates that Engage Miami’s members reside in each District, and they allege each District 

has been racially gerrymandered, the members of Engage Miami have sufficiently alleged that 

they suffer an injury in fact and “therefore ha[ve] standing to challenge the legislature’s action.”6 

6 Defendant never actually claims that Engage Miami does not have members residing in each 

District. See Reply at 2. Instead, Defendant moves the goal posts—now saying “there is no 

support for the assertion that Engage Miami has members in any district.” Id. (emphasis added). 

This assertion fails to account for the membership list (ECF No. 134-2), the testimony of Engage 

Miami’s Corporate representative Rebecca Pelham (Engage Dep.), and Rebecca Pelham’s signed 

declaration (ECF No. 24-34) which each assert Engage Miami has members residing in each City 

Commission District.

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Hays, 515 U.S. at 74–45. Engage Miami’s members have standing to sue in their own right and 

Defendant does not challenge the other necessary elements of organizational standing. See 

generally Mot. Thus, Engage Miami has organizational standing to pursue its claim. 

a. The One-Plaintiff Standing Rule Applies

Given that Engage Miami has demonstrated that they have standing, the “one-plaintiff 

standing rule” provides that the Court need not evaluate the standing of any other plaintiff. In 

multiple-plaintiff cases, “[a]t least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief 

requested in the complaint.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017). 

Once one of the multiple Plaintiffs here has demonstrated standing for the sole claim that they 

raised, the Court “need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have 

standing to maintain the suit.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 

252, 264 n.9 (1977); see also Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981) 

(“Because we find California has standing, we do not consider the standing of other plaintiffs.”);

People First of Alabama v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1197 (N.D. Ala. 2020) (same). This is 

also true where other plaintiffs are organizations. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. MiamiDade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (2009) (“Because Balzli has standing to raise those 

claims, we need not decide whether either of the organizational plaintiffs also has standing to do 

so.”). Engage Miami has organizational standing to pursue this claim, and, thus, the Court need 

not address standing regarding the other Plaintiffs.7 Defendant does not even attempt to grapple 

with this concept. See generally Mot. Nor could it. 

7

 For the sake of thoroughness, however, the Court finds that each Plaintiff also has standing. The 

corporate representatives for Plaintiffs Miami-Dade NAACP, South Dade NAACP, and GRACE 

each indicated that they have members who reside in various City Commission Districts. See P’s 

56.1 ¶¶ 51, 55, 66 (explaining that the Miami-Dade NAACP corporate representative testified that 

she knows of branch members who live in Districts 1, 2, 3, and 5; the South Dade NAACP 

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b. Defendant Arguments Regarding Injury in Fact Fail

The clear facts of this case mandate a finding that Plaintiffs have standing, but not to be 

deterred, Defendant raises two arguments urging the Court to hold to the contrary. First, Defendant 

invokes Hays to insinuate that Plaintiffs must show more than that they reside in a racially 

gerrymandered district to prove an injury in fact, and here, Plaintiffs are only asserting 

“generalized grievances.” See Mot. at 6 (“In Hays, the Court held that the mere fact that appellees 

in that case were residents and voters of Louisiana was not sufficient to give them standing to 

challenge Louisiana’s congressional redistricting plan.”). Second, Defendant argues that the 

Organizational Plaintiffs lack standing because they failed to identify the names of any specific 

member who lives in the City Commission Districts. See id. at 7–11 (citing Anderson v. City of 

Alpharetta, 770 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (Nat’l Alliance for the Mentally Ill, St. Johns Inc. v. 

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of St. John’s County, 376 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2004)). Neither argument is 

availing—Defendant’s invocation of Hays does not apply to the facts of this case, and the Eleventh 

Circuit does not require Organizational Plaintiffs to provide the names of its members for purposes 

of establishing standing.

To understand the differences between Hays and the instant Action, Defendant simply

needed to read the first paragraph of the opinion. In Hays, the Supreme Court explained:

corporate representative testified that she knows of branch members who live in Districts 2 and 4; 

the GRACE corporate representative testified that its members reside in Districts 2 and 4). For 

the same reasons as articulated above regarding Engage Miami, these organizations would likewise 

have standing. So too would individual Plaintiffs Cooper, Miro, Johnson, and Valdes who 

currently reside in various Miami City Commission Districts. See ALBC, 575 U.S. at 262 (holding 

that an individual has standing when they reside in a district and allege that such district was 

racially gerrymandered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). Plaintiff Contreras also has 

standing because she lived in District 4 when the Enjoined Plan was enacted. See Uzuegbunam v. 

Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (“At all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must maintain a personal 

interest in the dispute. The doctrine of standing generally assesses whether that interest exists at 

the outset”). 

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Appellees Ray Hays, Edward Adams, Susan Shaw Singleton, and Gary Stokley 

claim that the State of Louisiana’s congressional districting plan is [] a ‘racial 

gerrymander,’ and that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment. But appellees do not 

live in the district that is the primary focus of their racial gerrymandering claim, 

and they have not otherwise demonstrated that they, personally, have been 

subjected to a racial classification. 

515 U.S. at 738–39. For that reason, the Supreme Court held that the individuals lacked standing. 

See id. That scenario is obviously distinguishable from this Action where each Plaintiff resided in 

the challenged Districts at the time the lawsuit was filed. Defendant’s use of Hays to imply that 

Plaintiffs’ concern about racial gerrymandering is a “generalized grievance,” even when the facts 

demonstrate Plaintiffs reside in the allegedly gerrymandered Districts, demonstrates a clear 

misreading of Hays and a general indifference about the harm Plaintiffs allege. This argument 

does not alter the Court’s standing analysis.

Defendant’s second argument that the Organizational Plaintiffs must identify the names of 

its individual members is also incorrect. In support of its argument, Defendant asserts that the 

Eleventh Circuit in Anderson and National Alliance for the Mentally Ill affirmed a district court’s 

dismissal for lack of standing when the organizational plaintiffs failed to name its members. See 

Mot. at 7–8. To Defendant, it follows that the Organizational Plaintiffs lack standing here because 

they failed to name specific members who reside in the Miami City Commission Districts. See id.

at 8–11. 

Defendant’s reading of each holding is far too narrow, and the cases do not support the 

proposition for which they are asserted. In Nat’l Alliance for the Mentally Ill, the Eleventh Circuit 

found that the organizational plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any of its members would be 

injured by the Board of County Commissioners of St. John’s County’s decision not to fund a 

mental health residential treatment facility. 376 F.3d at 1296 (explaining that the organization 

only mentioned two of its members, neither of which suffered an injury, and provided no further 

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evidence that any other member would be injured by the challenged conduct). In Anderson, the 

Eleventh Circuit held that the NAACP lacked standing because no individual, including the 

organization’s members, could show that she was injured due to the City of Alpharetta’s refusal 

to approve public housing in a specific area. 770 F.2d at 1578 (“The action cannot proceed, 

however, because there is no plaintiff who has sufficiently alleged standing, none that has alleged 

that he was personally injured by the city’s actions whatever its motivation may have been.”); see 

also id. at 1582 (“The court finds that the NAACP has failed to aver adequately injury in fact, 

directly or derivatively to any of its members.”). These cases simply do not stand for the 

proposition that an organizational plaintiff must provide the specific names of its members as 

prerequisite to establish standing.

Indeed, reading such a requirement into standing jurisprudence would be inconsistent with 

Eleventh Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Florida State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 

1153, 1160 (11th Cir. 2008) (“When the alleged harm is prospective, we have not required that the 

organizational plaintiffs name names because every member faces a probability of harm in the 

near and definite future”); Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 884 (11th Cir. 1999) ( holding “we have 

never held that a party suing as a representative must specifically name the individual on whose 

behalf the suit is brought and we decline to create such a requirement”). All Plaintiffs must do is 

“put forth specific facts supported by evidence” that its individual members have standing. Ga. 

Republican Party v. SEC, 888 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th Cir. 2018). As described above, Plaintiffs 

have done so. 

In sum, Defendant’s arguments present nothing more than a halfhearted attempt to 

convince the Court that Plaintiffs do not have standing. Its arguments fall short factually and as a 

matter of law. Plaintiffs have standing.

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ii. Plaintiffs’ Injury Is Redressable

The Court now turns to Defendant’s argument that the Court cannot redress Plaintiffs’ 

injury. Supreme Court precedent dictates that a plaintiff suffers an injury in fact, and thus has 

standing, when the plaintiff can show that she resides in a racially gerrymandered district. Hays, 

515 U.S. at 744 (holding that a plaintiff who resides in an allegedly gerrymandered district “has 

standing to challenge the legislature’s action”); see also Section IV.A.i., supra. Implicit in these 

holdings is that a court can redress the harm that a plaintiff suffers from the implementation of a 

racial gerrymander. Hays, 515 U.S. at 744 (explaining that “any citizen able to show that he or 

she, personally has been injured by . . . racial classification has standing,” and thus implying that 

a Court has the power to remedy a racial gerrymander). Indeed, it is obvious that Court can redress 

the injury Plaintiffs allege, namely, that they were subject to a racial classification in the Enjoined 

Plan and continue to be under the Remedial Plan. Plaintiffs’ injury will be redressed when they 

are no longer subject to a racial classification. The notion is unequivocally simple. Nevertheless, 

Defendant raises irrelevant and incorrect arguments about why, in its view, the Court is unable to 

fashion a remedy to Plaintiffs’ claims. See Mot. at 14–17. None of Defendant’s arguments alter 

the Court’s earlier standing analysis.

Defendant’s argument boils down to the following: “Plaintiffs’ ability to have standing in

this case relied upon them demonstrating that their proposed remedy looked very different than 

the [Remedial Plan], but that is simply not the case.” Mot. at 17. Defendant argues that each of 

Plaintiffs’ proposed plans result in similar racial demographics, and accordingly, any proposed 

map will result in three majority Hispanic districts, one majority African-American district, and 

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one plurality district.8 See id. at 14–17. Defendant contends that if any potential remedial map 

would result in similar racial demographics among the Districts, then the Court cannot provide a 

remedy for the racial gerrymandering of Plaintiffs. Id. at 17. 

As an initial matter, and as the Court explained when adjudicating the earlier motion to 

dismiss, see (ECF No. 132 at 22–23), the constitutionality of Plaintiffs’ proposed maps from the 

remedial portion of the case is irrelevant to the adjudication of this Action. Whether Plaintiffs may 

receive redress from their racial gerrymandering claim in no way hinges on the constitutionality

(or lack thereof) of their non-implemented, proposed remedial plans. See id. at 23. 

Defendant’s argument about the similarity between the Remedial Map and Plaintiffs’ 

proposed plans is better suited as an argument for the remedial stage of the litigation rather than 

as an obstacle for the Court to find standing. But even there, its argument was unavailing. When 

implementing the Court’s Plan, the Court explained “[b]ecause [the Court’s Plan] must retain the 

legislature’s lawful objectives, that [the Court’s Plan] is ‘fundamentally similar’ to the Remedial 

Plan, to a certain extent, should be expected.” Remedial Order at 49. As Plaintiffs correctly 

identify, so long as the potential remedial districts are not-race based, or otherwise satisfy strict 

scrutiny, “they could have any range of district-level demographics.” Resp. at 7. Defendant’s 

argument about Plaintiffs’ proposed remedial maps do not alter the redress available to Plaintiffs. 

And perhaps most importantly, Defendant conveniently omits that the Court has already 

found that a constitutional remedy exists, thereby demonstrating that Plaintiffs’ claim is 

8 Defendant also raises the already-rejected argument that in this case, the City Commission was 

merely aware of racial demographics when designing the Districts and that it was not their intent 

to racially gerrymander. See Mot. at 16. This argument ignores volumes of direct evidence that 

the City Commissioners intended to racially gerrymander the Enjoined Plan and the Remedial 

Plan. See (ECF No. 60 at 8–18); (Remedial Order at 20–24). Other cases may exist where a 

legislature is merely aware of racial demographics when it draws district maps but there is 

otherwise no evidence of intent to racially gerrymander. That is not this case.

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redressable. See generally Remedial Order. It is thus disingenuous to claim that Plaintiffs’ injury 

may not be remedied, particularly when the Court has already demonstrated that a constitutional 

remedial map could be drawn. It is bewildering that Defendant, in good faith, argues otherwise.

The redress available to each Plaintiff is obvious. All they request—and all that is 

required—is that they ultimately reside in Districts that were not intentionally designed with race 

as the predominant factor.9 Fortunately for Plaintiffs, to claim that that such a remedy is 

impossible, and thus to insinuate that Plaintiffs are indefinitely doomed to live in racially 

gerrymandered districts, is simply untrue. The Court is more than capable of fashioning a remedy 

to address Plaintiffs’ claim.

V. CONCLUSION

UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, and being

otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment (ECF No. 131) is DENIED. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this ____ day of December 2023.

K. MICHAEL MOORE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

c: All counsel of record

9 Or as to the extent the City Commissions Districts are so drawn, as with the Voting Rights Act 

protected District 5, that each District satisfy strict scrutiny.

 21st

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