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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

INTRODUCTION

1. The United States Congress has found abundant evidence of the 

use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt 

collectors, and has determined that abusive debt collection practices 

contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the 

loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. Congress wrote the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq., to eliminate abusive 

debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors 

who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 

Alexis Gainey, f/k/a Alexis 

Lezama,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

Atlantic Recovery Solutions, 

LLC,

 Defendant.

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Case No.:

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

AND DEMAND FOR JURY 

TRIAL PURSUANT TO:

(1) THE FAIR DEBT 

COLLECTION 

PRACTICES ACT, 15 

U.S.C. § 1692, ET SEQ.; (2) THE TELEPHONE 

CONSUMER 

PROTECTION ACT 47 

U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.; AND

(3) FLA. STAT. § 501.059, ET. SEQ.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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disadvantaged, and to promote consistent state action to protect consumers 

against debt collection abuses.

2. The United States Congress has recognized the need to protect 

the privacy of consumers and reduce public safety risks associated with 

receiving unwanted telemarketer and debt-collector calls. Receiving calls 

after a consumer has revoked consent undermines a consumer’s right to 

privacy. As such, congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 

47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq., to protect consumers from the abusive debt-collector 

practices.

3. Plaintiff Alexis Gainey (“Plaintiff”) brings this class action 

against Defendant Atlantic Recovery Solutions, LLC (“Defendant”) to secure 

redress for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq., the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

(“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq., and Fla. Stat. §§ 501.059, et. seq.

4. Plaintiff makes these allegations on information and belief, with 

the exception of those allegations that pertain to Plaintiff, or to Plaintiff’s 

counsel, which Plaintiff alleges on personal knowledge.

5. Unless otherwise indicated, the use of Defendant’s name in this 

Complaint includes all of its agents, employees, officers, members, directors, 

heirs, successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, 

representatives, and insurers.

6. All violations by Defendant were knowing, willful, and 

intentional, and Defendant did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to 

avoid these violations.

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JURISDICTION & VENUE

7. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331, because this case arises from a violation of several federal laws 

including the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq. 

(“TCPA”), and the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692

et seq. (“FDCPA”).

8. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because 

Defendant directed its unlawful collection attempts and unlawful voicemail 

transmissions at Plaintiff, a Florida resident.

9. Venue is also proper in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 for the following 

reasons: (i) Plaintiff resides in Palm Beach County, Florida, which is within 

this judicial district; (ii) the conduct complained of herein occurred within this 

judicial district; and (iii) Defendant conducted business within this judicial 

district at all times relevant.

10. More specifically, Defendant abusively sought to collect a debt 

by continuing to collect without providing validation of debt, which occurred 

while Plaintiff was located in Palm Beach County, Florida.

11. Further, Plaintiff resides within the State of Florida and has a 

Florida area code phone number to which the subject calls were made.

PARTIES

12. Plaintiff is an individual residing in West Palm Beach, Florida, 

and she is, and at all times mentioned was, a “consumer” as defined by 15

U.S.C. § 1692a(3). Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned was, a “person” as 

defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). Additionally, Plaintiff is, and at all times 

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mentioned was, a “called party” as that term is defined by Fla. Stat. § 

501.059(1)(a).

13. Upon information and belief, Defendant is, and at all times 

mentioned herein, was a debt collection agency located in Getzville, New 

York.

14. Upon information and belief, Defendant has a principal place of 

business at 33 Dodge Rd. #108, Getzville, NY 14068.

15. Defendant, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on 

behalf of itself or others, engages in “debt collection”. Accordingly, 

Defendant is a “debt collector,” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 

1692a(6). Additionally, Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, 

a “telephone solicitor” as defined by Fla. Stat. § 501.059(1)(i).

16. Defendant, at all times relevant, was “doing business in this 

state” as that phrase is defined by Fla. Stat. § 501.059(1)(e).

THE TCPA

17. The TCPA prohibits: (1) any person from calling a cellular 

telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system 

(“ADTS”); and (3) without the recipient’s prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 

227(b)(1)(A).

18. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” 

(ATDS”) as “equipment that has the capacity – (A) to store or produce 

telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number 

generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).

19. In an action under the TCPA, a plaintiff must only show that the 

defendant “called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an 

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automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice.” Breslow v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff'd, 755 F.3d 1265 

(11th Cir. 2014).

20. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) is 

empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. 

According to the FCC’s findings, calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited 

because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a 

greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such 

calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless 

customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after 

the minutes are used. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 

18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003).

21. In 2012, the FCC issued an order tightening the restrictions for 

automated telemarketing calls, requiring “prior express written consent” for 

such calls to wireless numbers. See In the Matter of Rules & Regulations 

Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1838 

¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2012) (emphasis supplied).

22. To obtain express written consent for telemarketing calls, a 

defendant must establish that it secured the plaintiff’s signature in a form that 

gives the plaintiff a “‘clear and conspicuous disclosure’ of the consequences 

of providing the requested consent....and having received this information, 

agrees unambiguously to receive such calls at a telephone number the 

[plaintiff] designates.” In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. 

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Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1838 ¶ 20, 1844 ¶ 

33, 1857 ¶ 66, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2012).

23. The TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC define 

“telemarketing” as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the 

purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, 

goods, or services.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). In determining whether a 

communication constitutes telemarketing, a court must evaluate the ultimate 

purpose of the communication. See Golan v. Veritas Entm't, LLC, 788 F.3d 

814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015).

24. “Neither the TCPA nor its implementing regulations ‘require an 

explicit mention of a good, product, or service’ where the implication of an 

improper purpose is ‘clear from the context.’” Id. (citing Chesbro v. Best Buy 

Stores, L.P., 705 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2012)).

25. “‘Telemarketing’ occurs when the context of a call indicates that 

it was initiated and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting 

property, goods, or services.” Golan, 788 F.3d at 820 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 

64.1200(a)(2)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12); In re Rules and Regulations 

Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd 

at 14098 ¶ 141, 2003 WL 21517853, at *49).

26. The FCC has explained that calls motivated in part by the intent 

to sell property, goods, or services are considered telemarketing under the 

TCPA. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003). 

This is true whether call recipients are encouraged to purchase, rent, or invest 

in property, goods, or services during the call or in the future. Id.

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27. In other words, offers “that are part of an overall marketing 

campaign to sell property, goods, or services constitute” telemarketing under 

the TCPA. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶ 136 (2003).

28. If a call is not deemed telemarketing, a defendant must 

nevertheless demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff’s prior express consent. 

See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer 

Prot. Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express 

consent “for non-telemarketing and non-advertising calls”).

29. Further, the FCC has issued rulings and clarified that consumers 

are entitled to the same consent-based protections for text messages as they 

are for calls to wireless numbers. See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 

569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (The FCC has determined that a text 

message falls within the meaning of “to make any call” in 47 U.S.C. § 

227(b)(1)(A)); Toney v. Quality Res., Inc., 2014 WL 6757978, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 

Dec. 1, 2014) (Defendant bears the burden of showing that it obtained 

Plaintiff's prior express consent before sending him the text message). 

(emphasis added).

30. As recently held by the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit: “Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by 

their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A 

plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA ‘need not allege any additional

harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’” Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness 

Grp., No. 14-55980, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1591, at *12 (9th Cir. May 4, 

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2016) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (emphasis 

original)).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

31. Sometime prior to July 2021, Plaintiff allegedly incurred some 

financial obligations owed to the original creditor, Jared Jewelers (“Jared”),

(the “Debt”). Plaintiff takes no position as to whether the debt is owed. These 

obligations were money, property, or their equivalent, which are due or owing, 

or alleged to be due or owing, from a natural person to another, and were 

therefore “debt(s)” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

32. Sometime thereafter, but before July 2021, Plaintiff allegedly fell 

behind on the payments owed on the Debt.

33. Afterwards, the alleged Debt was allegedly assigned, placed, or 

otherwise transferred, to Defendant for collection. Thereafter, Defendant 

began contacting Plaintiff in attempt to collect upon the Debt.

34. In or around July 2021, Plaintiff started received phone calls and 

text messages from Defendant requesting that Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s attorney 

contact Defendant regarding her “case.”

35. By referring to a “case” that did not exist, Defendant misled 

Plaintiff in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and e(10).

36. On July 21, 2021 at approximately 11:39 am, Plaintiff received

a text message from Defendant stating the following: “Alexis Lezama this text 

is from ARS. We need to speak to you or attorney regarding your case. Please 

call 667-400-7596 and refer to Case2699406.”

37. Also on July 21, 2021 at approximately 4:14 pm, Plaintiff 

received a call from Defendant regarding a potential settlement of an account 

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with Jared. Plaintiff answered the call and was transferred to the “settlement 

manager” but when Plaintiff was transferred, the caller ended the call. Plaintiff 

called back and left a voicemail message at Defendant’s number (716) 293-

1560 (ext. 146) for representative Sarah requesting that all calls stop and that 

any further communication be in writing.

38. On July 28, 2021 at 12:47 pm, Plaintiff received the same text 

message that was received on July 21, 2021 but this text requested that 

Plaintiff call 727-349-0133.

39. After receiving the text message, Plaintiff called Defendant and 

requested again that all communications be in writing and that Plaintiff’s

number be removed from Defendant’s call list. Surprisingly, Defendant’s 

representative that spoke with Plaintiff told Plaintiff that Plaintiff can 

withdraw consent to receive calls but no matter what Plaintiff requested, the 

calls would continue. Defendant’s representative further told Plaintiff that 

Plaintiff could choose to ignore the calls.

40. Despite Plaintiff’s requests that all communication be in writing, 

Plaintiff continued to receive calls and text messages from Defendant

throughout the months of July 2021, August 2021, September 2021 and 

October 2021.

41. Specifically, Plaintiff received voicemails from Defendant on 

July 30th, August 5th, August 6th, August 9th, August 17th, August 19th, August 

24th, August 27th, August 30th, September 1st, September 10th, September 13th, 

September 14th, September 15th, September 17th, September 21st, September

22nd, September 23rd, September 24th, September 28th, September 30th, and 

October 11th of 2021.

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42. Additionally, Plaintiff received text messages from Defendant on 

August 16, 2021, August 18, 2021, August 24, 2021, September 20, 2021, and 

September 27, 2021.

43. Each of the text messages was identical to the first text message 

sent on July 21, 2021, except for the number that Defendant requested Plaintiff 

call.

44. In summary, Plaintiff received at least 31 phone calls and 11 text 

messages from Defendant over a period of four (4) months.

45. Defendant’s text messages and voicemail messages constituted 

debt collection because Defendant was clearly attempting to collect Plaintiff’s 

alleged debt regarding a Jared account.

46. Plaintiff received the subject texts and voicemail messages 

within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA 

occurred within this district. 

47. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her 

express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS or a prerecorded voice 

or text. In fact, Plaintiff explicitly requested that all communications be in 

writing.

48. Plaintiff is the subscriber of the phone associated with the 

number that received the voicemails and text messages from Defendant, and 

is financially responsible.

49. Here, Defendant’s continued communications and collection

attempts were harassing and abusive.

50. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages 

and voicemail messages, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in 

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transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-2791-

WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These 

assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message 

advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text 

messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 

20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient 

to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume 

of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); 

Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 

(finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were 

advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); 

Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola 

Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 

2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging 

would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)).

51. Defendant’s shocking unsolicited text messages and voicemail 

messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, 

aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. 

Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused 

disruption to her daily life.

52. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance 

by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See 

https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text 

(finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking 

up phone memory space).

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53. The above-mentioned voicemail messages and text messages 

were “communication(s)” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).

54. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d provides: “[a] debt collector may not engage 

in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse 

any person in connection with the collection of a debt.”

55. The repeated and continuous calls and voicemail messages left 

by Defendant to Plaintiff, which were intended to annoy, abuse, or harass 

Plaintiff violate 15 U.S.C § 1692d(5). 

56. Defendant’s failure to provide Plaintiff with a written notice of 

the alleged debt before attempting to collect on the alleged debt violated 15

U.S.C. § 1692g.

57. This matter involves a “voicemail transmission” i.e. a voice 

message directly delivered to a voicemail application, service or device. See

Fla. Stat. § 501.059(1)(l).

58. Defendant’s above-mentioned telephone calls and voicemail 

transmissions involved the playing of a recorded message when connection is 

completed to Plaintiff’s Florida phone number without the prior express 

written consent of Plaintiff, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 501.059(8)(a).

59. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt 

Defendant’s illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, 

harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of individuals. 

Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages and any other available legal or 

equitable remedies.

60. Due to Defendant’s ongoing violations of the law, Plaintiff was 

required to bring this action to finally resolve Plaintiff’s disputes and ensure 

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safeguards are put in place to protect Plaintiff from future unlawful debt 

collection practices and harassment.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF THE TCPA

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)

61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations 

as if fully set forth herein.

62. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a 

call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent 

of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any 

telephone number assigned to a ... cellular telephone service ...” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

63. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used 

equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention 

to make non-emergency telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone.

64. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant 

had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such 

calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call 

Plaintiff’s cell phone the calls were made.

65. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the 

TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or prerecorded 

text messages to make non-emergency telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cell 

without her prior express written consent.

66. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to 

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make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using 

equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system and/or 

prerecorded text message. The violations were therefore willful or 

knowing.

67. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) 

of the TCPA, Plaintiff was harmed and is each entitled to a minimum of 

$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff is also entitled to an 

injunction against future calls. Id.

COUNT II

KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF

THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)

68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the forgoing allegations as 

if fully set forth herein.

69. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known 

that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA.

70. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to 

make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a 

violation of the TCPA.

71. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff 

had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the 

Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff 

pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.

72. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) 

of the TCPA, Plaintiff was harmed and is entitled to a minimum of 

$1,500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff is also entitled to an 

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injunction against future calls. Id.

COUNT III

VIOLATION OF Fla. Stat. §§ 501.059, et. seq.

73. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the forgoing allegations 

as if fully set forth herein.

74. The forgoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and 

multiple violations of Fla. Stat. §§ 501.059, et. seq.

75. As a result of each and every violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 

501.059, et. seq., Plaintiff is entitled to any actual damages pursuant to 

Fla. Stat. § 501.059(10)(a)(2); statutory damages for a knowing or willful 

violation in the amount up to $1,500 pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 

501.059(10)(b); and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fla. 

Stat. § 501.059(11)(a).

COUNT IV

KNOWING AND/OR WILLFULL VIOLATION OF

Fla. Stat. §§ 501.059, et. seq.

76. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the forgoing allegations as 

if fully set forth herein.

77. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known 

that its conduct as alleged herein violated Fla. Stat. §§ 501.059, et. seq.

78. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to 

make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a 

violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 501.059, et. seq.

79. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff 

had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the 

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Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff 

pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.059(10)(b).

80. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to Fla. Stat. 

§ 501.059(10)(b), Plaintiff was harmed and is entitled to a minimum of 

$1,500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff is also entitled to an 

injunction against future calls. Id.

COUNT V

VIOLATION OF THE FDCPA

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.

81. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all 

other paragraphs above. 

82. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and 

multiple violations of the FDCPA, including but not limited to each and every 

one of the above-cited provisions of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.

Defendant’s failure to provide Plaintiff with a written notice of the alleged 

debt violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, 1692d, 1692d(5), 1692e, and 1692e(10).

83. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et 

seq., Plaintiff is entitled up to $1,000 in statutory damages and actual 

damages, in addition to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered against 

Defendant, and that Plaintiff be awarded damages from Defendant, as 

follows:

! An award of actual and statutory damages;

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! An order declaring that Defendant’s actions, as set out above, 

violate the TCPA, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.059, et. seq., and the FDCPA;

! A declaratory judgement that Defendant’s telephone calling 

equipment constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system under the TCPA;

! A declaratory judgment that Defendant utilizes prerecorded text 

messages;

! An injunction requiring Defendant to cease all unsolicited text 

messaging activity, and to otherwise protect the interest of Plaintiff;

! An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using, or contracting 

the use of, an automatic telephone dialing system without obtaining 

recipient’s consent to receive calls made with such equipment;

! Attorney’s fees and costs;

! An award of $1,000 in statutory damages to Plaintiff for each and 

every violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et. seq. by Defendant, pursuant to 15

U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A);

! An award of actual damages to Plaintiff for each and every 

violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. by Defendant, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(1);

! An award of costs of litigation and reasonable attorneys’ fees,

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) and Fla. Stat. § 501.11(c);

! An award of $500 or actual damages, whichever is greater for

each negligent violation pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.10(a);

! An award of $1,500 or actual damages, whichever is greater for

each willful violation pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.059(10)(b);

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! An award of $500 or actual damages, whichever is greater for

each negligent violation of the TCPA pursuant to § 227(b)(3);

! An award of $1,500 or actual damages, whichever is greater for

each willful violation of the TCPA pursuant to § 227(b)(3); and

! Any other further relief that the Court may deem just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

84. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the 

United States of America, Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of any and all 

triable issues.

 Respectfully submitted,

BY: /S/ RYAN L. MCBRIDE______

 RYAN L. MCBRIDE, ESQ.

 TRIAL COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF

Mohammad Kazerouni (1034549) Kazerouni Law Group, APC

245 Fischer Ave., Suite D1

Costa Mesa, CA 92626

Telephone: (800) 400-6808

Facsimile: (800) 520-5523

mike@kazlg.com

 

 

 

Dated: September 7, 2022

Ryan L. McBride (1010101) Kazerouni Law Group, APC

301 E. Bethany Home Road, Suite

C-195, Phoenix, AZ 85012

Telephone: (800) 400-6808 Facsimile:

(800) 520-5523

ryan@kazlg.com

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