### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 6, 200 7 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JAM ES S COT T
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 05-03148 Jam es C. Beasley, Judge

No. W2006-02519-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled April 7, 2008

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury

convicted the defe ndant, J ames S cott of one count of driving under the influence of an intoxi cant ( DUI ), four th offense . On appe al, he alleg es t hat the trial c ourt
e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

to d ism iss the ind ic tme nt f or se lec ti ve prose c uti on

and his a tte mpt

to imp e a c h a wi tne ss w ith out vi e wi ng the pe rt ine nt part s o f a vid e o h e c la ime d s up po rt e d b oth c la ims , that the trial court err ed in imposing m ore than the presumptive mini mum sentence , and that the tria l judge err ed in f

ailing to r ecuse himself for the ruling on the motion for new trial. Upon re view, we
reve rse the tr ial court’s or der ove rrulingthe motion for new tr ial and re mand.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t R e ve r se d, R e m ande d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Pa ul L e wi s, Mil lin g ton , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Jame s Sc ott

. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Da

vid H. F ind le y , A ssi s t a

nt A tt o r n e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and J ames Wax and Kirby May , Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION On May 10, 2005, the Shelby

County Gra

nd J ury indicted the def

endant on one count of DUI , fourth off

ense, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401, and one count of re ckless driving , see id., § 55-10- 205.

I n the J une 2006 trial, Shelby County deputy a n d 1 8

- ye a r p o li c e v e tera

n Michae l Reed te sti fi e d f or the state that he wa s o n d uty a t Wal nut Gr ov e Roa d and Mo or e Roa d a t a bo ut 2 :30 a .m. on J anuar y 21, 2005. Deputy Reed observed a Toy ota L and C ruiser that he thoug ht was trave ling at an e x cessive rate of speed. His rea r and f ront rada rs both clocke d the vehicle at 70 miles per hour-2-

in a 55 miles per hour

speed zone. De puty

Reed initiated a tra ffic stop for the spee ding of

fense

. As Deputy

Reed pulled up to st o p behind the def endant’ s vehicle a

nd advised the dispatcher

he had initiated a

traff ic stop, the defe ndant g ot out of his car. “ As [the defenda nt] g ot out of the vehicle, he appea red to ha ve a unsteady g ait to him, and – as I was, y ou know, g etting out to make conta ct with him.” Deputy Reed testified that while speakingwith the defe ndant “I was a lr e a dy de te c tin g , you

kn ow , an od or of int oxic ant co min g of f of him , an d y ou

kn ow , th a t a lon g wi th his g ait as he g ot out of the ca r and his eyes beingbloodshot and water y was lea ding me to believe that he may be int oxic ate d at that poin t.” De puty Re e d ha d the de fe nd ant sit in the sq ua d ca r t o w a it for a DUI office r to come to the scene

. He did not perf orm the field sobriety

test alone be cause of “the are a that we wer e in, you know, and the speed and the darkne ss I felt j u s t m e a n d h i m alone t h er e wa s u nsafe . . . until I had anothe r vehic le there with me.” Dur ing the wait, Deputy Reed noticed the de fenda

nt had slurre d speec h and “that the inside of my car was be g inning to smell like alcohol now.”

When the DUI office r arrived, he administered f ield sobriety

tests while Deputy

Reed observe d. The de fenda

nt perfor med poorly

on the field sobrie ty

test, which wa s v i d eo taped a nd shown to the jury . The off icer rea d the Tenne ssee implied conse nt law to the def endant a nd asked that he submit to a breathaly zer tes t t o d et ermine blood alcohol content, and he ref used. The defe ndant was subsequently place d in the back of Deputy Reed’s patrol car . The de fenda nt asked Deputy Reed to ca ll his friend, Memphis Poli ce Office r Deway ne Johnson, t o g et his vehicle f rom the sce ne. De puty

Reed c alled Of

fice r Johns on, who ar

rived on the scene and s poke with t he off icer

. Offic er Johnson then spoke with the defe ndant throug h the patrol c ar w indow and lef t the scene

. Be fore cross e x amination of De puty Reed, the de fense revisited its previously denied pre- trial motion to d i s miss the charg es on the ba sis of selective pr osecution and a sked that the
rema inder of D eputy

Reed’s patrol car

dashboar d video t ape be admit ted i nto evidenc e. In addition to capturingthe def

endant’ s traff

ic stop and ar

rest, De puty

Reed’s da shboard c amer a also videota ped
sever al day s of other tra ffic stops prior to the de fend an t ’s ar re s t. The def endant a rgued that thre e pr ior sto ps sh ou ld be a dmi tte d for re a so ns of fa ir ne ss u nd e r T e nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 10 6 b e c a

us e other tra ffic stops on the tape show Deputy Reed’s stopping fema le drivers for speeding , but treating them differ ently

than the def

endant. The judge found this argument irrele vant, saying “ [p] rior stops either on that night or on day s befor e or whene ver the y occur red ha ve no bea ring whatsoeve r on the observations and the probable cause for the purposes of a rre sting Mr. Scott on the nig ht in question.”

On c ro ss e xami natio n, De puty Re e d te sti fi e d th at the de fe nd ant d id n ot e xhibi t driving char acte ristics of an impaired person and that he w as pulled over solely for spe eding . The observa tion th a t th e d e f

e n d an t w a s im

p a ir e d c a me a f

te r th e s to p

. D e p u ty Re e d te s ti f ie d th a t the sy stem of havinganother

office r per form the f

ield sobriety tests while he g rade d it was “the way it’s alway s been done .” Deputy Reed said he did not g ive prefer ential t reatment to people ba sed on who the y kn e w, but so me tim e s h e woul d not i ssu e a tic ke t if so me on e wo rk e d f

or the c ounty . H e sa id that the def

endant showe d no signs of rec kless driving and tha t t h e s ce n t of alcohol wa s not
nece ssarily

a sig n of impairment.-3- De puty Mark Ha rker tes ti fi e d th a t he wa s c a lle d to the sc e ne to a dmi nis te r f ie ld sobriety tests to the defe ndant at about thre e in t he morningon J anuar y 21, 2005. He testified that the de fe nd ant “ ha d a

str on g od or of a lc oh ol on his br e a th. He ha d b loo ds ho t e y e s. He ha d s lig htl y slurred spe ech, little bit unsteady on his feet, thing s of that nature .” The defe ndant’s per formanc e on the field sobrie ty

tests were “not ver

y g ood at all.” De puty

Har ker te stified he had se en over 50 imp a ir e d in div idu a ls i n h is w or k e xpe ri e nc e , a

nd ba se d o n p oor perfor

manc e in t

he fi e ld s ob ri e ty tests, his opini on was that the de fenda nt was intox icated a

nd should not have bee n driving

. On cr oss examination, Deputy Har ker ad m itted that he neve r saw the defe ndant driving that morning , that bloodshot e y es alone cannot be used to de termine intox ication, and that a fie ld sobriety

test cannot de termine a

person’ s blood alcohol level.

The de fenda

nt chose not to testify , bu t t he def ense c alled Memphis Police Off icer Dewa y ne Johnson, who testi fied he showed up at the scene of the defenda nt’s arr est on the eve ning of January 21, 2005, afte r g etting a call from Deputy Reed. He has bee n a fr iend of the de fenda nt’s for thre e y ear s. He spoke with the defendant for about five minutes while he was in the back of a patr ol c ar a

nd did no t ob se rv e blo od sh ot e y e s o r a slurr e d v oic e . O ff

ic e r Johns on te sti fi e d that in h is opinion the defe ndant was not unde r the influenc e of a lcohol at the time of the a rre st.
The c harg e of r eckle ss driving w as dismissed during the trial on motion of the State. T h e j u r y f o u n d t h e d e f e n d an tg u i l t y o f

D U I, f o u rt ho f f e n s e , a C l a s s E F e l o n y.
Th e fi rs t sen te nc ing he ari ng wa s sch e du le d f or July 10 , 2 00 6. On

that date , th e State offe red no e vidence other than a p re s en t en ce report. The defe ndant offe red no pr oof. The judg e, J ames C. B easle y , stated that t he defenda nt and the judge ’s daughter have a m utual friend who was appar ently

prese nt in court during the trial. The f riend mentioned this to his daug hter whe n they met wi t h i nt h e la s t we ek , an d t h e dau gh t er i n fo rm edt h e j u d ge, h er

fa t h er , o f t h i s

. S h e a l s o t o l d J u d ge Be as l ey t h at s h e m et t h e d ef

en d an twi t h i nt h e l as twe ekat t h e F o x a n d Ho u n d , a b ar

. Al t h o u gh J udg e B easle y

did not think i t would bias his ability t o h ea r t h e case, he wanted to state it for the
rec ord. The defense , howeve r, m oved for J udg e Bea sley ’s recusal, and J udg e Bea sley g rante d the reque st, commenting he would fee l a little more comfor table if someone else did the sente ncing

. The sente ncing hear ing was re-sche duled for J uly 28, 2006; however , the new judg e, J oseph B . Dailey , postponed the sentenc ing an additional 30 day s for the defe ndant to show proof he wa s ta kin g ste ps to c omb a t hi s p ro ble m w itha lc oh ol.

I n the sentenc ing he aringheld on August 28, 2006, the defe ndant s tated that he left his job as a bar

tender to work i n re s t au rant mana g ement and ha s been g oing to Alc oholics An ony mou s p ro g ra

m me e tin g s f

ive tim e s a

we e k. He ha s a

sp on so r a

nd ha s bee n sob e r s inc e July 24 , 2 00 6. Th e c ourt pu sh e d sente nc ing ba c k 30 mor e da y s f or the de fe nd ant t o s ho w h is a bil ity to
a tte nd 30 pr og ra

m me e tin g s in

30 da y s.-4- The ne x t hear ing w as held on Septembe r 29, 2006, by J udg e L ee V. C o ff

ee

. The court a pplied the enha

nceme nt fac tor that the def endant ha d a history o f cr i m i n al behavior . The defe ndant was sentenc ed to 18 months, to be se rved via 150 day s’ incar cer ation at 100%, followe d by 13 months’ pro b at i o n

. Ad d itionally , the def endant wa s fined $3,000, his driver ’s license was re vo ke d f or fi ve y e ars , a

nd he wa s o rd e re d to a tte nd a lc oh ol reha bil itatio n a

nd Mo the rs Ag a ins t Drunk Dr iving lec tures. F inally , the cour t order ed frequent r andom drugand alc ohol scree ns during his probation period.

The orig inal trial judge , J ames C. B easle y , hear d the defe ndant’s Motion for a Ne w Trial on Oc tober 25, 2006, and overr uled t he mot ion. The de fenda nt filed a timely

notice of a

ppeal
on No ve mbe r 2 1, 20 06

. I n thi s a pp e a l, he a lle g e s that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

to dismiss for se lective pr osecution and his attempt to impeac h Offic er Ree d without v i ew i n g the pertinent pa

rts of the video he wished to enter into evidence , that the trial cour t erre d in sentencing him be y on d th e pr e sumpt ive min imum se nte nc e , a nd that th e tr ia l c ourt

jud ge er red

in f a ili ngto
rec use himself fr om the proce eding on the motion for new tr ial.

I. The De nial of the Videotape Into Evide nce
Th e de fe nd ant f

ir st a lle g e s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nying his mot ion to d ism iss the i ndictment based upon selec tive prosec ution without first viewing the videotape evidenc e. At the hea rt of the c laim is that the charg es ag ainst the defe ndant wer e the r esult of the discriminatory pr a c tic e s o f t

he of fi c e rs

.
B e c a us e pr a c tic a l r e a lit ie s d ic tate the a llo c a tio n o f l i m i t e d p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s , o u r c o ur ts must afford public of

ficials substantial discre tion with reg ard to lawenfor ceme nt decisions. See Bordenkirc her v. H

ayes , 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. C t. 663 (19 7 8 ). The withholding of cr iminal sanctions in cer

tain situations does not necessa rily implicate t he equa l protection provision in our fede ral a nd state constitutions. Se e Sta te v . M ar tin , 719 S.W .2d 522, 525 (Tenn. 1986). There is no constitutional right to have the law go unenforce d ag ainst an off ender

. Futernick v . Sumpter Twp. , 78 F.3d 1051, 1056 ( 6th Cir. 1996).

Neve rtheless, g overnme nt officials d o n o th av e t o t al l y u n fe t t er edd i s cr et i o nt o enfor ce our cr iminal laws; enforc ement dec isions may not be deliberately

based upon unjustifiable standa rds such as rac e, religion, or other ar bitrary classifications. W

ayte v . United States , 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S. Ct . 1524, 1531 (1985). Persons claiming selec tive enfor ceme nt must establish that the law enfor ceme n t d ec i s i o n had a disc riminatory purpose a

nd produce d a discriminatory eff ect. United States v. Armstrong , 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S. C t. 1480, 1487 (1996). To be succe ssful, a selec tive enfor ceme nt claimant must establish that: (1) the g overnme nt has single d out the claimant for
e nf or c e me nt a c tio n w hil e oth e rs e ng a g ingin sim il ar a c tiv ity have no t be e n s ub

je c t to the same action; and ( 2) t h e d ec ision to prosecute re sts on an impermissible consideration or purpose. 421 Cor p. v

. Me tro

po litan Go v ’t

of N as hv ill e & Da v ids on Cou nty , 36 S.W .3d 469, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). The f

irst element re quires proof that other no n -p ro s ec u t ed off ender s eng ag ed in similar conduct, that those of

fende rs violated the same law the c laimant is a ccuse d of violating , and that the-5-

m ag nitude of their violation was not mate rially differ ent from that of

the claimant. Id

. A s to the second e lement, the cla imant must establish t hat the g overnme nt single d o u t a protected c lass of citizens for enfor ceme nt or that the prose cution was intende d t o d et er or punish the exercise of a protec ted rig ht. Id . at 481.

Our view ing of

the videotape confirms that the f acts in the case at hand do not show
se le c tiv e e nf

or c e me nt. Th e thr e e oth e r tr a ff ic sto ps on

the ta pe do no t sh owse le c tiv e e nf or c e me nt. The three st ops wer e all for speeding , and none wer e for driving under the influence . After stopping the def endant f or spee ding, O fficer Ree d, a police of fice r with 18 y ear s’ experienc e, for med the opinion that the defe ndant was intox icated. I n the other stops cited in the de fenda nt’s brief, O ffice r Reed made no finding s of impairment. These stops do not show others eng ag ing in the sa me ac tion as the de fenda

nt. Furthe rmore, one of the a l l eged instances of se lective e nforc ement cited by the defe ndant re sulted in the female driver be ing c ited for speeding

. I n the other two traff ic stops, the individuals who were not char g ed eng ag ed in conduc t differ ent from that of t he def endant. The two non-prose cuted tra ffic stops involved individuals who rema ined in the ir car s, behave d politely , and
we re no t un de r t

he inf lue nc e of a lc oh ol. Th e same vid e ota pe sh ow s th a t in

the de fe nd ant’ s tr a ff

ic stop, after being pulled over, the defe ndant immediately left his a utomobile to confr ont the office r, he had tr ouble maintaining his balance and spea king c ohere ntly

while speaking to O ffice r Reed, a nd he cur sed duringthe conve rsation.

The defe ndant also argues that the trial court err ed in not permitting him to im peac h Offic er Ree d’s testimony by showing the jury

the v i d eo t ape of

another , specific traff

ic stop. The defe ndan t c la im e d

th e ta p e w o u ld c o n tr a d ic t O f

f ic e r Re e d ’ s te s ti mo n y

th a t h e w a s a

b le to d etec t impaired drive rs. We ag ree with the t rial court that such video evide nce w as irre levant; the sing ular nature of a g iven traf

fic stop makes it diffic ult, if not im possible, to a scer tain any pattern of behavior from just two stops. I rre levant evide nce is inadmissible. SeeTenn. R. Evid. 402.

II. M otion for N

ew Trial

The defenda

nt claims that the denial of hi s motion t o disqualify the trial judg e wa s err or. The pr imary

g round for

disq u al i fication cited by the def endant wa s the social conta ct that
occur red be tween the defe ndant and the tr ial judge ’s daughter afte r t he defenda nt was c onvicted of DUI in the judge ’s cour

troom. After the t rial j udg e placed noti ce of the m eetingon the re cord, the defe nse moved for

his disqualification from sentenc ing. T he judg e agree d. Ho we v er , when the defe nse ag ain moved for

his disqualification on the motion for new tria l to avoid the appe ara nce of impropriety , that motion was denied.

Th e iss ue of a tr ia l judg e ’s re c us a l ba se d u po n a lle g e d b ia s o r p re

jud ic e re sts wi thi n t h e dis cre tion of the trial cour t. Car uth e rs v . S

tate , 8 1 4 S. W. 2 d

6 4 , 6 7 ( T e n n

. Cr im

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 1 ). A judg e sh o u l d gra n t a motion for re cusal whe never his or her “ impartiality

might re asonably

be qu e sti on e d. ” Cod e of

Judic ia l Co nd

uc t, C ano n 3 (E )( 1) ; se e Sta te v . M c Car y , 119 S.W .3d 226, 260 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). This court will not interfe re w ith the trial court’s discr etion unless clea r abuse a ppear s on the fac e of the rec ord. O w e n s v . Stat e , 1 3 S.W .3d 742, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App.-6-

19 99 ); Car uth e rs , 814 S.W .2d at 67.

T e n n e s s e e Su

p r e me Co u rt R

u le 1 0 , Ca

n o n3 ( E ) ( 1 ) p r o v id e s th a t “ [a ] j udg e sh all disqualify himself or her self in a proce eding in which the judge ’s impartiality might re asonably

be questioned, including but not lim ited to instances where [ ] the j udg e has a personal bi as or pr ejudice
c on c e rn inga

pa rt y .” Te nn . Su

p. Ct. R. 10, Cano n 3(E )( 1) (a ), (b ) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . I n r e sp on se to
a dis qu a lif ic a tio n mo tio n, the ju dge sho uld no t on ly e xami ne “ su

bje c tiv e bia s” bu t sh ou ld a lso inquire whe ther the judg e’s i mpartiality might be r easona

bly questioned under

an “obje ctive standard.” Sta te v . Co nn or s , 995 S.W .2d 146, 149 (Tenn

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1998). The latter standar d “‘takes into acc ount that disquali fi ca t i on is require d if there is an appe ara nce of partiality to the
rea sonable obser

ver, a nd it preclude s a judg e fr om avoiding r ecusa l merely b y avowinghis or her impartiality .’” State v. Conway , 7 7 S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 3 , 2 2 5 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Con no rs , 995 S.W .2d at 149).

No Te nn e sse e law d ir ect ly add re sse s w he the r j ud g e s ma y re c us e the mse lve s w ith respe ct to some issues while y et deciding others in the same case

. Two fede ral c ircuit courts have reje cted this conce pt of par tial rec usal. See United States v. Fe ldman , 983 F.2d 144, 145 ( 9th Cir. 19 92 ) ( “ Whe n a

jud g e de te rm ine s that re c us a l is a pp ro pr iate it is no t w ith in h is d isc re tio n to re c us e by su bje c t matte r or on ly

a s to c e rt a in i ssu e s and

no t ot he rs .” ); Mu rra

yv . S c ott , 253 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that a judge ’s rec usal must be from whole proce eding ). Ho we v er , t h ree circ uits support the us e of partial recusa l as a c ase- manag ement devic e. See Ellis v. United States , 31 3 F .3 d 6 36 , 64 1- 42 (1 st C ir . 2 00 2) ; Pa sh aia n v . Ec c e lston Pr op s. , 88 F.3d 77, 84- 85 (2d Cir. 19 96 ); Un ite d S

tates v . Ki mb e rli n , 781 F.2d 1247, 1258- 59 (7th Cir. 1985).

I n the instant case , J udg e B easle y rec used himself af

ter stating , “[F]rankly , based up on wh e re my

da ug hte r r an into M r. Sc ott

and un de r t he c ir c ums tanc e s.

. . I th in k Iwo uld fe e l a littl e more comforta

ble if somebody

else did the sente ncing .” Appar ently , the trial judg e believe d that the issue could at lea st create an impre ssion of partiality

. We ag ree and conclude that the earlier
re c us a l w a s a

pp ro pr iate , if

no t r e qu ir e d. B e c a

us e the re c or d d oe s n ot e vin c e any c ha ng e in
c ir c ums tanc e s b e tw e e n th e se nte nc ing he ari ng and the he ari ngon the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l, a

t le a st an appe ara

nce of impropriety

rema ined. Neither

J udg e B easle y ’s statement at the heari n g o n the motion for new trial that he did not rec all the conve rsation nor his conc lusion that a motion for new trial is simpl y

a tec hnical rulingalters the a ppear ance of impropriety

. J udg e B easle y

should have re mained disqualified f rom the ca se re g ardle ss of wh e the r p art ia l r e c us a l is pr op e r u nd e r T e nn e sse e law. I f T e nn e sse e do e s n ot a llo w p art ia l r e c us a l, the re cusal of a

judge from a c ase disqualifie s him or her fr om taking f urther a ction in the case , inc lud ing the ac tio n o

f re su mi ng c on tro l of

thec as e
. I f Te nn e sse e do e s, in fa c t, al low pa rt ia l r e c us a l, J udg e B easle y ’s re turn would rema in improper bec ause the appea ranc e of impropriety

rema ined. I n either case , J udg e Be asley abused his discr etion by declining to r ecuse himself from the he aring on the motion for new tr ial.A t t he t i m e o f t he d efe n d a nt ’ s sent enci ng, t he l egi sl at ure had am end ed t he sent enci ng co d e t o ad d res s t he 1 i m p l i cat i o ns o f B l a kel y v. W a shi ngt on , 5 4 2 U .S . 2 9 6 , 1 2 4 S . C t. 2 5 3 1 (2 0 0 4 ). See T

. C. A. § 40- 35- 114 ( 2003) (pro m ul gat i ng fact o rs for enha nci ng sent ence l engt h) (am end ed P ub

. A ct s 2 0 0 5 , c h. 3 5 3 , § 5 (ef f ect i ve June 7 , 20 0 5 ))

. A m o ng other m o re s ub st ant i ve changes, t he 2 0 0 5 a m end m ent to sect i o n 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 e nt ai l ed a c hange i n t he num b eri ng f o r t he enhancem ent f

act o rs l i st ed i n t he 2 0 0 3 b o und vo l um e o f T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed

. T he num b eri ng of f act o rs
u s ed i n t h i s opi n i on i s t h e n u mber i n g u s ed by t h e t r i al cou r t , bei n g t h e n u mber i n g t h at a ppea r ed i n t h e pr e- 2005 v er s i on of s ect i on 40- 35

- 11 4. H avi ng com mi t t ed t he of f ens es un der r evi ew on Jan uar y 21 , 20 05 , t he def endan t was not s ubj ect to se n te n c in g v ia th e 2 0 0 5 a m e n d m e n ts to the se n te n c ing c o d e un le ss h e “e x e c u t[e d ] a w a ive r o f [his] e x p o st fac to p rotect i o ns. ” T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 (Sup p

. 20 0 5 ), co m p i l er’ s no t es. T he reco rd i n the present case r ef l ect s no s uch wai ver. T hu s, t he senten cing wa s go ve rne d b y t he p re-2 0 0 5 senten cing p ro visi o ns.
-7- Turning to remedy , the def endant ha s not requeste d any specific re m ed y

and we d i s c e r nn o n e o t h e r

t h ana r e m an d t o t h e t r i a l c o u rtf

o r a r e h e ar i n g o n t h e m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l b y a differ ent judg e.
III . Issues of Sentenc ing

Th e de fe nd ant next argue s th a t th e se nte nc e of 18 mon ths wi th 1 50 da y s’ incar cer ation is ex cessive. H e alleg es th at t h e conviction of a Class E Felony

entitled him to the presumptive minimum sentence of one y ear with 150 day s to be serve d. 1

The de fenda

nt was convicted as a Rang e I , standard of fende r, and a ccor ding to the
rec ord, the trial c ourt followed the c orre ct proc edure s and consider ed t h e appropr iate sente ncing principles, fa cts, and c ircumstance s.

[T]he fo ur

th o r s ub se qu e nt c on vic tio n [f or DU I ] shal l be a

Cla ss E felony punishable by

a fine of not less than th ree thousand dollars ($3,000) nor

more than fi ftee n thousand dollars ($15,000) [and] by
co nfinement for

not less than one hundre d fifty (150) c onsecutive day s, nor more than the maxi mum punishment authorized fo r t he
a p p r o p r i a t e r an g e o f

a C l a s s E f e l o n y. T.C.A. § 55-10-403( a)( 1)(A) (2004). A Class E F elony in Rang e I is punishable by a conf inement te rm of no t le ss t ha n o ne no r mor e tha

n two y e a rs

. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 11 2( a )( 5) (2 00 3) . A s a pp lic a ble to t his c a se , th e pr e sumpt ive se nte nc e to b e imp os e d b y the tr ia l c ourt

fo r t he Ap pe lla

nt’ s Cl a ss E felony conviction i s the m inimum sentenc e within the applica ble ra ng e unless ther e ar e enha

nceme nt or mitigating f

actor s prese nt.
When a def

endant c halleng es the sente ncingdecision of t h e trial c ourt, this court g ener ally conducts a de novo revie w of the record with a pr esumption that the determinations made by the tr ia l c ourt

are c orr ect. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ). Th is p re sumpt ion , h ow e ve r, is conditioned upon the af

firmative showing in the re cord tha t the trial court c onsidered the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva

nt fac ts and circ umstances. Sta t e v

. Ashby, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The burden of showing that the s entenc e is improper is upon the de fenda nt. Id. I f the re view-8-

re fl e c ts t he tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y c on sid e re d a ll re le va nt f a c tor s and its fi nd ing s o f f

a c t are a de qu a te ly sup p o rte d b y th e r e c o r d , th is c o u rt mu s t a f f ir m th e s e n te n c e “ e v e n if w e w o u ld h a v e pre ferred a differ ent re sult.” Sta te v . F le tc he r, 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . I n the eve nt the
rec ord fa ils to demonstrate the re quired c onsideration by the trial cour

t, appella t e re v iew of the sentenc e is purely

de novo. Ashby, 823 S.W .2d at 169.

I n making i t s s en t en cing deter mination in the present ca se, the trial c ourt, at the conclusion of the se ntencinghear ing, w as oblig ed to deter mine the proprie ty

of sentenc ing alternatives by

considering(1) t h e evidence, if any , rec eived at the g uilty plea a nd sentenc ing hear ings, ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port, (3) the principles of se ntencingand ar g uments as to sentenc ing al t er n atives, (4) the nature and cha rac teristics of the c riminal conduct involved, (5) evidenc e and information offe red by the parties on the enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors, (6) a ny statements the de fe nd ant m a de in h is b e ha lf a bo ut s e nte nc ing , a

nd (7 ) t he po te nti a l f

or re ha bil itatio n o r t

re a tme nt. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0( a ), (b ); -1 03 (5 ) ( 20 03 ); State v. Holland, 860 S.W .2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

The use of enhanc ement fa ctor (2) - that the de fenda nt had a “ previous history of
c ri min a l convic tio ns or c ri min a l beh avio r in ad dit ion to tho se ne c e ssa ry to es ta bli shthe a pp ro pr iate rang e” - is supported in the rec ord, which r evea ls prior arr ests for public intoxi cation and the defe ndant’s admission of sustained a lcohol abuse. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114( 2). We se e no state-law ba sis fo r m od if

ying any se nte nc e imp os e d b y

the tr ia l c ourt

. Now, we addre ss the Blak e ly issue. See Blakely v . W

ashington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004).

On J une 24, 2004, the United States Supre me Court rele ased its opinion in Blak e ly , holding that “ ‘[o] th er t h an t h e fac t of a prior conviction, any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be y ond the pre scribed statutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and prove d bey ond a
rea sonable doubt.’” Id. at 3 0 1 , 1 2 4 S

. C t

. at 2 5 3 6 (q u o t i n g Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct . 2348, 2362-63 (2000) ). The “ statutory maxi mum” to which a tria l court may sent e n c e a

d e f e n d an t i s n o t t

h e maxim

u m s e n te n c e a f

te r a p p li c a ti o no f

a p p r o p r iate e n h an c e me nt fa c tor s, oth e r t

ha n th e fa c t of

a pr ior c on vic tio n, but th e “ma ximumse nte nc e a jud g e may

imp os e solely on the basis of the f

acts re flec ted in the jury

verdic t or admitted by

the def endant.” Id. at 303, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. Under Blak e ly , then, the “statutory maxi mum” sentenc e which ma y be imposed is the presumptive sentenc e applica ble to the offe nse. See id. , 124 S. Ct. at 2537. The pr esumptive sentenc e may

be excee ded without the par ticipatio n o f a j u ry

only when the de fenda

nt has a prior conviction and/or w hen an othe rwise a pplicable e nhance men t fac tor was r efle cted in the jury ’s verdic t or was a dmitted by the def endant.

On Janu ary 22 , 2 00 7, the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cour

t r e le a se d it s d e c isi on

in Cun nin gh am v . Ca lif

or nia , 549 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), holding that California’s sente ncing
sc he me , wh ic h ha d nume ro us sim ila ri tie s to T e nn e sse e ’s se nte nc ingsc he me , d id n ot s ur viv e Sixth Amendment scr

utiny intact under Blak

e ly

. P ri o r t o t he rulingin Cunningham , the Tenne ssee-9-

Supreme Court had he ld that a judg e’s e nhance d sentenc e pursua n t t o T en n essee ’s pre -2005 sentenc ing reg ime did not amount to plain error unde r Blak e ly

. See State v . Gomez , 163 S.W .3d 632 (Tenn. 2005) ( Go me

z I ); howeve r, following on the hee ls of Cunningham , on Fe bruar y 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court vac ated Go me z I and remanded that case for r econside ration in light of Cunningham , see G omez v . Tennessee , 127 S. Ct . 1209 (2007).

On re mand in Gomez , the Tennessee Supreme C ourt applied the principles of Blak e ly and Cunningham to d e te rm ine that T e nn e sse e ’s pr e -2 00 5 s e nte nc ing c od e vio late d G ome z’ r ig ht t o a jury trial. State v. Gome

z , 239 S.W .3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) ( Gomez I I ). The Gomez I

I court he ld that t h e t ri al co u rt h adco m m i t t edp l ai nerro r o nco n s t i tu t i o n al gro u n d s i nap p l yi n g fa ct o rs fo r b ei n g a leade r in th e c o mm is s io n o f th e o f f e n s e s an d in p o s s e s s in g o r e mp lo yin g a f ir e ar m to enhanc e sentenc es. Id ., at 741. I n further conducting its plain error a naly sis, se e Sta te v . S

mi th , 24 S.W .3d 274, 282-83 (Te nn. 2000) (a pproving a plain er

ror regi m en that includes a deter mination whether plain err or review is nece ssary to do substantial justice), the supre me cour t held that the fulfillment of substantial justice re quired a “re mand to th e t ri al court for a resentenc ing hearing

at which the trial court will have an opportunity to determine the full scope of the Def endants’ c riminal histories and to c onsider whether imposit ion of the maxi mum se ntence on all convictions is a p p ro p riate.” Gomez I I , 2 33 S.W. 3d

a t 74 3 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . As part of the ri g or s o f d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t o notice plain er

ror and, in pa

rticular, whether the mandate for substantial justi ce r equire d the notice, the supreme court indicated its inability to fathom t he trial c ourt’s we ighingof the prior -convic tion fac tor v is a v is the Blak

e ly -i nfi rm fact or s b e c a

us e the “ re c or d in

thi s c a se a s to the De fe nd ants ’ criminal histories is not suf ficiently well-de veloped for us to determine the proper sentenc es base d on this enhance ment fac tor alone.” Id

.

When increa sing the defe ndant’s sente nce be y on d t h e minimum, the judge at the sentenc ing he aringused enha nceme nt fac tor 2 - “the defe ndant’s history of cr iminal convictions or criminal behavior i n addition to those neede d to establish the appropriate rang e.” T.C.A. § 40-35- 11 4( 2) . H ow e ve r, the us e of thi s f a c tor wa s bas e d u

po n th e de fe nd ant’ s b e havio r t hat di d n ot r e su lt in convic tions . The c ourt cited only public intox ication ar

rests and state ments that the defe ndant
co n t i nu edt o dri n k

u n t i l t h e w ee k

b ef o re h i s fi rs ts en t en ci n g h ea ri n g.
B e c a us e the c ou

rt a pp lie d a n e nh a nc e mentfact or w hi ch v io lat ed t he d efen dan t’ s S ixth A m e n dm e n t r i g h t s a s d e f

i n e d b y Apprendiand Blak

e ly , we hold as a

matter of pla in error , see Tenn. R. Crim. P . 52(b), that the se ntence en h an ceme nt violated the Six th Amendment. We there fore modify the sentenc e to one y ear

.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE