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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 24, 2015 

v No. 315196 

Wayne Circuit Court 

CHRISTIAN BELL, LC No. 12-006721-FJ 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and GLEICHER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

AFTER REMAND 

 This case returns to us after remand for a hearing to determine whether the 

prosecutor exercised two peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. In 

accord with our instructions, the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to Batson v 

Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). After taking testimony from 

the prosecutor, the trial court concluded that the two peremptory challenges at issue had 

not been motivated by purposeful racial discrimination. We affirm the trial court’s ruling 

that the prosecutor stated “valid,” race-neutral justifications for the strikes. 

 As detailed in this Court’s original opinion, a jury convicted Christian Bell of 

second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission 

of a felony, MCL 750.227b. On direct appeal, Bell raised several challenges to his 

convictions and sentences. We found all of them unpersuasive but for Bell’s argument 

that the trial court failed to consider his counsel’s timely Batson objection in the threestep manner Batson prescribes. Our opinion outlined Batson’s analytical methodology, 

which is set in motion when an objection is made to a peremptory challenge. The trial 

court must first consider whether the challenger has established a prima facie case of 

purposeful racial discrimination. Batson, 476 US at 93-94. If this showing is made, the 

burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for the strike. Id. at 97. 

The prosecutor’s justification need not be persuasive; at this second step in the process, 

even “a frivolous or utterly nonsensical justification” will do, as long as the explanation 

is race-neutral. Johnson v California, 545 US 162, 171; 125 S Ct 2410; 162 L Ed 2d 129 

(2005). 
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The third step commences if and when the challenger contends that a racially 

discriminatory motive actually inspired the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge. The trial 

court must then review the evidence elicited during voir dire, and determine whether the 

proffered reason is credible. “There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, 

and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the 

challenge.” Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 365; 111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 

(1991). “While the reason offered by the prosecutor for a peremptory strike need not rise 

to the level of a challenge for cause, the fact that it corresponds to a valid for-cause 

challenge will demonstrate its race-neutral character.” Id. at 362-363 (citation omitted). 

 Because the third-step findings hinge on credibility, it follows that our review is 

deferential. “[A] trial court’s determination concerning whether the opponent of the 

peremptory challenge has satisfied the ultimate burden of proving purposeful 

discrimination is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear error.” People v Knight, 473 

Mich 324, 344; 701 NW2d 715 (2005) (citation omitted). “Moreover, the trial court’s 

ultimate factual finding is accorded great deference.” Id. “[A] reviewing court, which 

analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is 

to make credibility determinations.” Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 US 322, 339; 123 S Ct 

1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931 (2003). 

 At the Batson hearing, the parties devoted most of their efforts to reconstructing 

the racial composition of the jury at the time of the two contested strikes. Our original 

opinion had directed this exercise, although we also posited that the parties could instead 

omit this step and proceed directly to testimony eliciting the prosecutor’s justifications 

for the strikes. After reaching an agreement as to the race of the jurors in the venire at the 

time of the strikes, the trial court ruled that Bell had failed to establish a prima facie case 

of racial discrimination. We have our doubts about the correctness of that ruling, but our 

concerns are of no consequence. Despite having rejected that defendant established an 

inference of discrimination, the trial court explored through sworn testimony the 

prosecutor’s justifications for the strikes, and rendered a determination that they were not 

infected with racial bias. Having engaged the prosecutor and defense counsel on the 

merits of Batson steps two and three, whether defendant made a sufficient prima facie 

showing of discrimination no longer mattered. “Once a prosecutor has offered a raceneutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the 

ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the 

defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” Hernandez, 500 US at 359. 

 The prosecutor offered the following reasons for the contested strikes of jurors 

Ethel Thomas and Gary Fizer: 

 As it relates to Ms. Thomas, she indicated that her brother had 

been murdered in the City of Detroit. I think it was two years prior to her 

coming into court. 

 That she had met with Homicide Detectives from the Detroit 

Police Department’s Homicide Division. And that even after an 

investigation, there was [sic] no suspects that had been developed. 
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 Because of that, I excused her. 

 As it relates to Mr. Fizer, Mr. Fizer had indicated that - - he 

indicated a lot of things. 

 First he indicated that he was friends with a judge in Inkster. That 

led me to believe that at the time there was an ongoing situation with the 

current sitting Inkster judge. 

 But he - - the thing that was most troubling to me, he also indicated 

that he had some children that had been investigated in the City of Detroit 

for criminal activity. 

 But the reason why I kicked him was because he had indicated that 

he couldn’t even look at the defendant, because he reminded him of his 

grandson. 

 And so that’s why I excused him. 

 Defense counsel challenged these reasons. As to Ms. Thomas, counsel argued 

that a Caucasian juror, Jenny Yates, revealed that “her father had been shot in the line of 

duty,” and Ms. Yates’s grandmother “had been killed with a gun during domestic 

violence.” No one was prosecuted for Ms. Yates’s father’s murder. Employing a 

comparative juror analysis, counsel asserted that the reasons given for the strikes were 

unconvincing. Counsel disputed that Mr. Fizer had actually expressed that “he would not 

even look at the defendant,” and emphasized that Mr. Fizer had reassured the court that 

“he could convict with a clear conscience” if he felt that the prosecution had proved its 

case. 

 The trial court found that juror Yates’s father’s shooting occurred 17 years 

previously, “when she was a small child,” and that Ms. Yates had “indicated that it would 

not impact her.” In contrast, the court recollected, Ms. Thomas’s brother was killed only 

two years earlier, the case remained unsolved, and Ms. Thomas had personal contact with 

the Homicide Unit. The trial court deemed the prosecutor’s explanation for excusing Ms. 

Thomas “valid” because the Homicide Department’s failure to find Ms. Thomas’s 

brother’s killer “was fresh in her mind,” which distinguished her from Ms. Yates. 

 Quoting directly from the transcript of the prior trial, the court confirmed that Mr. 

Fizer had indeed attested that “defendant reminded him of his grandson,” and that he had 

expressed “I really don’t want to look at him” for that reason. These statements, the court 

ruled, also constituted “valid” reasons for a peremptory challenge. 

 We presume that by using the term “valid,” the trial court meant that the 

prosecutor’s explanations for the challenges were credible, and that the prosecutor had 

exercised the challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner. Given the “great deference” 
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owed to trial courts’ Batson findings and that the court followed our directive by 

engaging in the constitutionally required analysis, we affirm the denial of Bell’s Batson

claim. 

 We affirm. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher