United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 2011 Decided January 13, 2012

No. 10-7167

BELIZE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT LIMITED,

APPELLANT

v.

GOVERNMENT OF BELIZE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-02170)

Louis B. Kimmelman argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant. Joseph S. Hall entered an appearance.

Juan C. Basombrio, pro hac vice, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief was Jay C. Johnson.

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.
2

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This case involves a petition to

confirm and enforce a foreign arbitration award against the

Government of Belize pursuant to section 207 of the Federal

Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 207. The plaintiff appeals an order

staying the proceeding pending the outcome of related litigation

in Belize. We conclude that the stay order as issued exceeded

the proper exercise of authority of the district court and remand

the case for further proceedings.

I. 

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201–208 (2006)

(“FAA”), codifies the Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which addresses “the

recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the

territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and

enforcement of such awards are sought.” Art. I, opened for

signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (“New

York Convention”). Under the New York Convention, “[e]ach

Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and

enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the

territory where the award is relied upon.” Id. art. III. Section

207 of the FAA provides that the district court, when exercising

its original jurisdiction pursuant to section 203 of the FAA,

“shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for

refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award

specified in the said Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 207. Article VI

of the Convention limits the grounds for deferral of a decision

on enforcement to those specified in Article V(1)(e):

enforcement proceedings may be adjourned only if “an

application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has

been made to a competent authority,” N.Y. Convention art. VI,

“of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award

was made,” id. art. V(1)(e). 
3

Consistent with the “emphatic federal policy in favor of

arbitral dispute resolution” recognized by the Supreme Court as

“appl[ying] with special force in the field of international

commerce,” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985), the FAA affords the

district court little discretion in refusing or deferring

enforcement of foreign arbitral awards: the Convention is

“clear” that a court “may refuse to enforce the award only on

the grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the Convention.” 

TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 935

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons,

W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997)); see

also Alghanim & Sons, 126 F.3d at 20. It is equally clear that a

court may adjourn enforcement proceedings only on the grounds

explicitly set forth in Article V(1)(e) of the Convention. See

N.Y. Convention art. VI.

The facts underlying the issuance of the challenged stay

order are as follows. On September 19, 2005, the Prime

Minister of Belize executed an “Accommodation Agreement”

with Belize Telemedia Limited (“Telemedia”)1

 on behalf of the

Government of Belize. The Agreement called for Telemedia to

acquire certain properties “in order to better accommodate the

Government’s telecommunications needs,” and “in

consideration” for which the Government of Belize agreed to

give Telemedia a number of assurances and benefits. Gov’t

1

 The original party to the Agreement was Belize

Telecommunications Limited. On May 29, 2007, pursuant to the

Belize Telecommunications Undertaking (Belize Telecommunications

Limited Operators) Vesting Act of 2007, the businesses of Belize

Telecommunications Limited were transferred to Belize Telemedia

Limited.
4

Telecomm. Accomodn. Agrmt. § 1, Sept. 19, 2005.2 Telemedia

would be entitled to: a tax set-off for purposes of a guaranteed

15% minimum rate of return, favorable business tax treatment,

and exemption from import taxes. The Agreement stated that it

was governed by Belize law, id. § 15.1, and that if Telemedia

were to bring proceedings against the Government of Belize or

its assets in relation to the Agreement, the Government

“irrevocably and unconditionally” waived its immunity, id.

§ 15.5. Additionally, the Agreement provided:

Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this

Agreement including any question regarding its

existence, validity or termination, which cannot be

resolved amicably between the parties shall be

referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under

the London Court of International Arbitration

(LCIA) Rules which Rules are deemed to be

incorporated by reference under this Section. There

shall be 3 arbitrators.

Id. § 15.2. 

On February 8, 2008, a new Prime Minister, who also

served as the Minister of Finance of Belize, publically and

formally announced that he believed the Agreement was invalid

and would not abide by it. Telemedia, claiming breaches of the

Agreement, invoked the arbitration clause and submitted a

request for arbitration to the LCIA on May 9, 2008. Although

notified, the Government of Belize did not participate in the

proceedings. The arbitral tribunal issued a final award on March

2

 Belize and Telemedia subsequently adopted three

amendments to the Agreement on November 21, 2005, December 15,

2006, and January 7, 2008. The “Agreement” referenced in this

opinion includes these amendments.
5

18, 2009, (“Final Award”) ruling that the Agreement was valid

and binding on the Government of Belize under Belize law, and

that it had jurisdiction over Telemedia’s claims, which it

concluded were meritorious and entitled Telemedia to

declaratory relief and damages of over 38 million in Belize

dollars. On March 20, 2009, the Prime Minister repeated his

view that the Agreement was illegal and invalid, noted that the

local courts had rejected its provisions on tax exemption, and

stated that the Government of Belize would “not be bound by

any ruling of a foreign arbitral tribunal where that ruling

conflicts with a position taken by Belize’s superior courts.” 

Resp’t Mot. Stay or, in Alternative, Dismiss Pet., Exh. 29 (Decl.

Juan Basombrio, Esq. Mar. 26, 2010, attaching newspaper

article quoting Prime Minister). The same day, Telemedia

assigned the monetary portion of the Final Award to Belize

Social Development Limited (“BSDL”), a company

incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. 

 On April 6, 2009, the Attorney General of Belize sued

Telemedia and BSDL in the Belize Supreme Court, alleging that

“enforcement of the ‘Final Award’ . . . would be contrary and

repugnant to the Constitution and the Laws of Belize,” and

sought to block its enforcement. Id. Exh. 1 (Decl. of Michael

Young, S.C., Mar. 26, 2010, attaching the Fixed Claim Form

1–2). The court issued an ex parte interim injunction

prohibiting Telemedia and BSDL from pursuing enforcement of

the Final Award in any jurisdiction outside of Belize. See id.

Exh. 5 (Order, Apr. 7, 2009, at 2). When Telemedia sought to

have the court discharge the injunction and issue a declaration

that the Final Award was valid and binding on the Government

of Belize, the court, on July 20, 2009, extended the injunction

“until the conclusion of the Claim herein or until further Order.”

Id. Exh. 12 (Order, July 20, 2009, at 2); see id. Exh. 13 (Sup. Ct.

Decision, July 20, 2009).
6

On November 16, 2009, BSDL filed a petition in the district

court here to confirm and enforce the Final Award pursuant to

section 207 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 207. The Government of

Belize moved to stay or, in the alternative, to dismiss the

petition. It also amended the Supreme Court Judicature Act “to

strengthen the provisions relating to contempt of court” by

subjecting persons who fail to comply with an injunction to fines

up to $250,000, or imprisonment for five to ten years, or both,

with an additional fine of $100,000 for each day the offense

continues. Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act,

2010, c. 91, § 106A (Belize). Citing this enactment, BSDL

moved to suspend the district court’s scheduling order and for

a status conference. The district court denied BSDL’s motion to

suspend and its subsequent motions to clarify. By minute order

of October 12, 2010, the district court granted Belize’s motion

to stay the petition to confirm “pending resolution of the parties’

case before the Belize Supreme Court.”

BSDL appeals the stay order or, in the alternative, if the

order is not final, requests that its appeal be treated as a petition

for a writ of mandamus.

II.

This court has treated an attempted appeal as an application

for a writ of mandamus, and granted effective relief, where a

“stay order as issued exceeded the proper exercise of authority

of the District Court.” Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782, 782

(D.C. Cir. 1971); see id. at 788–89; cf. Ukiah Adventist Hosp. v.

FTC, 981 F.2d 543, 548–49 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing

Sierra Rutile Ltd. v. Katz, 937 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir. 1991);

Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1989)). 

Given the “carefully crafted framework for the enforcement of

international arbitration awards” TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 935,

presented in the FAA and the New York Convention, it is
7

evident that the stay order as issued exceeded the proper

exercise of authority of the district court.

“The traditional use of the writ [of mandamus] in aid of

appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal

courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise

of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its

authority when it is its duty to do so.” Roche v. Evaporated

Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); see Cheney v. Dist. Court

for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). Because the

writ, see 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), is a “‘drastic and extraordinary’

remedy,” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332

U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947)), “only exceptional circumstances

amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of

discretion will justify [its] invocation,” id. (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the writ will issue only

upon the satisfaction of three conditions: there must be “no other

adequate means to attain the relief [the petitioner] desires”; “the

petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that [its] right to

issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable”; and “the issuing

court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the

writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. at 380–81

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). BSDL’s appeal

satisfies each of these conditions.

1. “Ordinarily mandamus may not be resorted to as a mode

of review where a statutory method of appeal has been

prescribed or to review an appealable decision of record.” 

Roche, 319 U.S. at 28. The relief BSDL desires — “forthwith

consideration of” its petition for enforcement — “could

obviously not be preserved for presentation on appeal from the

ultimate disposition of this litigation in the District Court.” 

Dellinger, 442 F.2d at 790. Nor is there a statutory method of

appeal applicable to the stay. 
8

“[A] stay is not ordinarily a final decision for purposes of

[28 U.S.C.] § 1291,” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury

Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983), but may be where the

effect of the stay is to put the plaintiff “effectively out of court,”

id. at 9; see Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715

n.2 (1962). BSDL invokes the “effectively out of court”

doctrine in support of its appeal. The doctrine’s applicability,

however, “is limited to cases where . . . the object of the stay is

to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be

litigated” outside of federal court. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at

10 n.11. Because the pending action in Belize has no preclusive

effect on the district court’s disposition of the petition to enforce

pursuant to the FAA and the New York Convention, see N.Y.

Convention art. V(1)(e); Karaha Bodas v. Perusahaan

Pertambangan Minyak, 335 F.3d 357, 367–68 (5th Cir. 2003),

the unidentified “object” of the stay could hardly be “to require

all or an essential part,” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11, of

the enforcement petition to be litigated in Belize. See

Kreditverein der Bank v. Nejezchleba, 477 F.3d 942, 946–47

(8th Cir. 2007); Boushel v. Toro Company, 985 F.2d 406,

408–09 (8th Cir. 1993). The stay at issue may be sufficiently

indefinite as to require a finding of pressing need, see infra

subpart 2, but it is not so indefinite as to constitute the

equivalent of a dismissal under the “effectively out of court”

doctrine. See Dellinger, 442 F.2d at 785. Therefore, the

statutory method of appeal under § 1291, even as applied to stay

orders under the “effectively out of court” doctrine, does not

afford BSDL adequate means to attain the relief it requests.

BSDL also invokes the collateral order doctrine of Cohen

v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). This

court has acknowledged the similarities between the

requirements for mandamus and collateral order review. See In

re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1063 n.4 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (citing In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 250 (D.C. Cir.
9

1998)); In re Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see

also 16 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD

H.COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &PROCEDURE § 3932.1, at 510

& n.32.5 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2011). In cases where “the claim

of appealability [is] not insubstantial,” the court is mindful of

“the advantage of limiting the use of appellate recourse in

response to stay orders, yet keeping the door open for the

occasional case reflecting abuse of discretionary authority.” 

Dellinger, 442 F.2d at 790. Because BSDL has shown a clear

and indisputable right to the issuance of the writ and the writ is

appropriate here, we proceed with the analysis under the

mandamus framework. See In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151

F.3d at 1063 n.4; cf. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246,

1250 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1129 (1999).

2. BSDL has shown a “clear and indisputable” right to the

issuance of the writ, for the issuance of the stay was not based

on a ground set forth in the New York Convention. Under the

FAA, Articles V(1)(e) and VI of the New York Convention

provide the only grounds on which the district court “may, if it

considers it proper, adjourn the decision” on enforcement: “If an

application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has

been made to a competent authority,” N.Y. Convention art. VI,

“of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award

was made,” id. art. V(1)(e) (emphasis added). See 9 U.S.C.

§ 207. 

In support of the stay, the Government of Belize relies on

section 15.1 of the Agreement, which states the law of Belize

governs the Agreement, in contending that Belize is the country

“under the law of which” the Final Award was made.3 The

3

 The fact that Belize is not a party to the New York

Convention is irrelevant. If the place of the award is “in the territory

of a party to the Convention, all other Convention states are required
10

phrase “under the law of which” in Article V(1)(e), however,

refers to the procedural law governing the arbitration, not the

substantive law governing the Agreement. See Karaha Bodas

v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak, 364 F.3d 274, 289 (5th

Cir. 2004); Alghanim & Sons, 126 F.3d at 21 & n.3; M & C

Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 847–48 (6th

Cir. 1996); Int’l Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp

Aerospace Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d 12, 21 n.5 (D.D.C. 2011);

Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima, 745 F.

Supp. 172, 177–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

INT’L COMM. ARB. § 5–12 (2010). The Government of Belize

cites no authority to the contrary. The Agreement provides that

the LCIA Rules govern arbitration arising from any dispute over

its terms. Because the arbitration occurred in London and under

the arbitral laws of England, the courts of England are the

competent authority with primary jurisdiction over the Final

Award; absent proceedings for setting aside or suspending the

Final Award in those courts, the Government of Belize can offer

no basis on which to conclude that the stay of BSDL’s petition

for enforcement was properly issued under the FAA and New

York Convention.4

to recognize and enforce the award, regardless of the citizenship or

domicile of the parties to the arbitration.” Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of

the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Award

was rendered in London, and BSDL seeks enforcement in the United

States; both England and the United States are parties to the New York

Convention.

4

 The possibility of “multiple judicial proceedings on the

same legal issues” affords the district court no other justification for

the stay, for these “are characteristic of the confirmation and

enforcement of international arbitral awards under the Convention.” 

Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 368.
11

Furthermore, to the extent the stay purported to be issued

pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority in the interest

of judicial economy, “[t]he applicable jurisprudence appears in

Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936).” Dellinger,

442 F.2d at 786; see McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664 (D.C.

Cir. 1970); cf. Obaydullah v. Obama, 609 F.3d 444, 449 (D.C.

Cir. 2010). In Landis, the Supreme Court instructed that a court

abuses its discretion in ordering a stay “of indefinite duration in

the absence of a pressing need.” 299 U.S. at 255. A stay is

“immoderate and hence unlawful unless so framed in its

inception that its force will be spent within reasonable limits, so

far at least as they are susceptible of prevision and description,”

and “an order which is to continue by its terms for an

immoderate stretch of time is not to be upheld as moderate

because conceivably the court that made it may be persuaded at

a later time to undo what it has done.” Id. at 257. Underlying

the Court’s analysis was a recognition that “[o]nly in rare

circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand

aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will

define the rights of both.” Id. at 255.

The scope of the stay and the reasons for its issuance

determine whether a stay is immoderate. For instance, in

Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Communications, 221 F.3d 1262,

1264 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit held that a stay until

“the Bahamanian Courts conclude their review” of related

litigation was immoderate because it was indefinite in scope and

the order provided “no reason sufficient to justify the indefinite

stay.” Id. at 1264–65. The Government of Belize would

distinguish Trujillo, along with Landis and presumably

Dellinger, by interpreting those stays to encompass all possible

appeals, while here the stay encompasses only the case pending

before the Belize Supreme Court. Yet the record fails to show

either what a “resolution” of that case would entail or when such

a resolution is likely to be reached, and so the stay has “the legal
12

effect of preventing [BSDL] from proceeding with [its] claims

in federal court for an indefinite period of time, potentially for

years.” King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1169 (11th

Cir. 2007). The Government of Belize is not in a position to

offer the rationales in Dellinger, 442 F.2d at 785, where the U.S.

government expressed concern that proceeding with a civil case

would circumvent court orders in a criminal case and suggested

resolution of the latter would result in stipulations between the

parties in the former. Such concerns would be irrelevant under

the FAA and the New York Convention, and there appears to be

no possibility of a stipulation here. And unlike in Trujillo, 221

F.3d at 1264; see also King, 505 F.3d at 1172, the stay order

includes no provision for status updates or further review. 

 Hence, the stay as issued is sufficiently indefinite to require

a finding of a pressing need under Landis. The Government’s

suggestion such a finding is required only where there is a “fair

possibility that the stay will work damage to someone else,”

Appellee’s Br. 27 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255), ignores that

in Landis sufficient damage consisted of undue delay of the kind

BSDL suffers here. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 256. As this court

has interpreted and applied Landis, a district court’s issuance of

an indefinite stay order must be supported by “a balanced

finding that such need overrides the injury to the party being

stayed.” Dellinger, 442 F.2d at 787. And the court has vacated

stay orders where “the [d]istrict [c]ourt has not advanced any

reason for a stay of such potentially long duration.” McSurely,

426 F.2d at 671; cf. Dellinger, 442 F.2d at 787. Here, as in

Dellinger and McSurely, no articulation of need, pressing or

otherwise, accompanied issuance of the stay order. Nor did the

district court engage in the interest balancing required by

Landis, which calls for the district court, in “the exercise of

judgment,” to “weigh competing interests and maintain an even

balance,” 299 U.S. at 254–55, between the court’s interests in

judicial economy and any possible hardship to the parties, see id.
13

at 259. Therefore the order as issued, staying BSDL’s petition

pending foreign litigation of indefinite duration, exceeded the

proper exercise of discretion by the district court under Landis. 

3. Mandamus is appropriate because the FAA, by codifying

the New York Convention, provides a carefully structured

scheme for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and

represents an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral

dispute resolution,” which “applies with special force in the field

of international commerce.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S.

at 631. The plain terms of the FAA instruct a district court

reviewing a foreign arbitral award to “confirm the award unless

it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition

or enforcement . . . specified in the [New York] Convention.” 

9 U.S.C. § 207 (emphasis added). No such finding supported

issuance of the stay here, and that alone is sufficient to justify

mandamus. Moreover, there could not have been such a finding

under Article VI of the Convention, for no “application for the

setting aside or suspension of the award” had been made to a

“competent authority” in England, the “country in which” and

“under the laws of which [the] award was made.” N.Y.

Convention arts. V(1)(e), VI. 

Given the federal courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation 

. . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them,” Hoai v. Sun Ref. &

Mktg. Co., 866 F.2d 1515, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting 

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15) (internal quotation marks

omitted), the original jurisdiction vested in the district court by

section 203 of the FAA and the limitations on that authority

under section 207 of the FAA defined the district court’s task: 

to review and grant BSDL’s petition to confirm the Final Award

absent a finding that an enumerated exception to enforcement

specified in the New York Convention applied. The stay order

as issued was not in conformity with federal law and

international commitments, and the indefinite stay, lacking
14

justification by any pressing need, exceeded the bounds of any

inherent authority the district court may have had to stay

proceedings in the interest of judicial economy. Mandamus is

appropriate here “to compel the district court to exercise its

authority when it is its duty to do so.” Roche, 319 U.S. at 26. 

Our dissenting colleague makes much of the lack of an

opposition to the stay. Instead of filing an opposition to the

motion for a stay, BSDL filed a motion to suspend the

scheduling order and for a status conference, advising the

district court that its failure to respond was based not on

agreement that a stay was warranted but on fear of criminal

sanctions for violation of the anti-enforcement injunction issued

by the Supreme Court of Belize. Both BSDL’s petition to

enforce the Final Award and Belize’s motion to stay the

enforcement proceedings alerted the district court that it was

obligated to proceed in accordance with the FAA and the New

York Convention. Contravening the clear dictates of this

governing law, both federal and international, and lacking

supporting reasoning of any kind, contrary to Supreme Court

precedent, the district court’s stay order is extraordinary in

nature. Although our dissenting colleague repeatedly

characterizes the stay order — which has already lasted for more

than a year — as “temporary, ” Dis. Op. 1, it in fact contained

no temporal limitations and could very well last indefinitely. 

We conclude that there is no need to vacate the stay or

mandate any action by the district court; instead, we remand the

case because this court may “rightfully assume that the [district]

court will conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with our

opinion,” Dellinger, 442 F.2d at 790. 
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. This case arises out of a messy 

commercial dispute between a Belize company and the 

Government of Belize. A London arbitration panel ruled in 

favor of the Belize company. The company then sued in U.S. 

District Court to enforce the arbitration award. Because of

ongoing judicial proceedings in Belize related to this matter, 

the Government of Belize asked for a temporary stay, which 

was uncontested by the company. The District Court then 

entered a temporary stay – understandably, since the stay is 

only temporary and the company did not oppose it. 

The company has now appealed and, in the alternative, 

sought mandamus to overturn the temporary stay. But we do 

not have appellate jurisdiction. As the majority opinion 

appears to acknowledge, there is no final order because the 

company was not placed “effectively out of court,” nor does 

this case fit within the narrow confines of the collateral order 

doctrine. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 

Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983) (“most stays do not 

put the plaintiff ‘effectively out of court’”; stays are final 

orders when “the object of the stay is to require all or an 

essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state 

forum”); id. at 12 (stay order falls within collateral order 

doctrine when it “amounts to a refusal to adjudicate the 

merits”).

Although the majority opinion does not assert that we 

have appellate jurisdiction under the principles governing 

appeals of final or collateral orders, it invokes mandamus

jurisdiction. But mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy 

reserved for correcting egregious missteps by a district court, 

not for upending temporary stay orders – and particularly not 

temporary stay orders like the one here, which was issued in 

response to an uncontested temporary stay motion. See

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (writ of 
2

mandamus “is a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for 

really extraordinary causes”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); id. (“the writ is one of the most potent weapons in 

the judicial arsenal”) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. 

(“only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 

usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion will justify 

the invocation of this extraordinary remedy”) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

Even if we think the District Court erred under the 

Federal Arbitration Act by entering a temporary stay, its error

was hardly “extraordinary.” Mandamus for this case is akin 

to using a chainsaw to carve your holiday turkey. Indeed, if 

you ask me which is the more extraordinary – the District 

Court’s temporary stay or this Court’s invocation of 

mandamus jurisdiction under these circumstances – I would 

say the latter.

I would dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate 

jurisdiction and deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. I 

respectfully dissent.