Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 247 / Friday, December 23, 2016 / Proposed Rules 94277 

1The Hawker 800XP aircraft was equipped with 

a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 

(TCAS). TCAS is a family of airborne devices that 

function independently of the ground-based air 

traffic control (ATC) system, and provide collision 

avoidance protection for a broad spectrum of 

aircraft types. All TCAS systems provide some 

degree of collision threat alerting, and a traffic 

display. 

2The exceptions to the rule allow aircraft that 

were originally certificated without an enginedriven electrical system, such as balloons and 

gliders, to be operated in the following areas 

without a transponder: within a 30 nautical mile 

radius (NMR) of the 36 listed airports listed in 

Appendix D to part 91 (Mode C veil), provided 

aircraft remain outside the Class A, B, or C airspace 

and are below the ceiling of the airspace designated 

for the Class B or C airport, or 10,000 feet MSL, 

whichever is lower; above 10,000 feet MSL; and in 

the airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL 

within a 10 NMR of any airport listed in appendix 

D, excluding the airspace below 1,200 feet outside 

of the lateral boundaries of the surface area of the 

airspace designated for that airport. 

3A–08–10 through 13, Safety Recommendations. 

National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, 

DC 20594, March 31, 2008. A copy of this letter has 

been placed in the docket. www.regulations.gov 

docket FAA–2005–2147. Note: while NTSB used 

the term ‘‘exemption’’ the correct term as it relates 

to this airspace is ‘‘excepted.’’ 

4The FAA received letters from Senator Harry 

Reid (D–NV) and Representative Mark E. Amodei 

(R–NV); Letters are posted to the docket at 

www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA–2015–2147. 

5TABS is a surveillance system derived from 

existing transponder and ADS–B requirements. It 

was developed to increase safety by providing a 

standard for a low cost surveillance solution for 

aircraft excepted from §§ 91.215 and 91.225. An 

aircraft equipped with TABS is visible to other 

aircraft equipped with collision avoidance systems 

such as Traffic Advisory System (TAS), Traffic 

Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) I, 

TCAS–II, and ADS–B In. However, a TABSequipped aircraft is not displayed to controllers. 

The FAA published Technical Standard Order 

(TSO)–C199, the standard for TABS, on October 10, 

2014. 

6ADS–B is a satellite-based surveillance system 

that uses Global Positioning System (GPS) 

technology to determine an aircraft’s location, 

airspeed, and other data, and broadcasts that 

information to a network of ground stations, which 

relays the data to air traffic control displays, and to 

nearby aircraft equipped to receive the data via 

ADS–B In. 

extended until February 20, 2017. This 

action will allow interested persons 

additional time to analyze the proposal 

and prepare their comments. 

By order of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System, acting through the 

Secretary of the Board under delegated 

authority, December 20, 2016. 

Robert deV. Frierson, 

Secretary of the Board. 

[FR Doc. 2016–30993 Filed 12–22–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6210–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 91 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–2147; Notice No. 15– 

05] 

RIN 2120–AK51 

Transponder Requirement for Gliders; 

Withdrawal 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed 

rulemaking (ANPRM); withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a 

previously published advance notice of 

proposed rulemaking that sought public 

comment from interested persons 

involving glider operations in the 

National Airspace System. The action 

responded to recommendations from 

members of Congress and the National 

Transportation Safety Board and was 

intended to gather information to 

determine whether the current glider 

exception from transponder equipage 

and use provides the appropriate level 

of safety in the National Airspace 

System. The FAA is withdrawing that 

action because the limited safety benefit 

gained does not justify the high cost of 

equipage. 

DATES: This action becomes effective 

December 23, 2016. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

action, contact Patrick J. Moorman, 

Airspace Regulations Team, AJV–113, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–8783; email: patrick.moorman@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On August 28, 2006, a Hawker 800XP 

aircraft 1 and a Schleicher ASW27–18 

glider were involved in a non-fatal 

midair collision near Reno, Nevada. The 

collision occurred in flight about 42 

nautical miles (NM) south-southeast of 

the Reno-Tahoe International Airport 

(RNO), at an altitude of about 16,000 

feet (ft.) above mean sea level (MSL), 

and in an area where gliders are 

excepted from the transponder 

equipment requirements in Title 14, 

section 91.215(b), of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (14 CFR).2 The glider was 

equipped with a transponder, but the 

transponder was not turned on at the 

time of the accident. 

On March 31, 2008, the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

provided safety recommendations to the 

FAA resulting from an investigation of 

the accident.3 The findings of the 

accident investigation address the 

limitations of the see-and-avoid concept 

in preventing midair collisions and, 

more specifically, the benefits of using 

transponders in gliders for collision 

avoidance. The NTSB recommended 

that the FAA remove the glider 

exceptions pertaining to the transponder 

equipment and use requirements, 

finding that ‘‘transponders are critical to 

alerting pilots and controllers to the 

presence of nearby traffic so that 

collisions can be avoided.’’ 

On June 16, 2015, the FAA published 

an Advance Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (ANPRM) to respond to 

recommendations from two members of 

Congress 4 and the NTSB. 80 FR 34346. 

The ANPRM requested comments on a 

proposed rulemaking that would require 

gliders operating in the National 

Airspace System (NAS) to be equipped 

with transponders. The FAA did not 

propose specific regulatory changes but 

rather sought public comment on the 

use of transponders in gliders operating 

within the excepted areas of § 91.215. 

The ANPRM also sought input on more 

recent alternatives to glider equipage 

including the use of Traffic Awareness 

Beacon System (TABS) 5 and Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 

(ADS–B) Out equipment.6 The FAA 

asked for comments from the public and 

industry to aid in the development of a 

proposed rule and the analysis of its 

economic impact. 

Overview of Withdrawal 

Based on the information gathered 

from the ANPRM and a review of the 

current operating environment, the FAA 

finds that it does not have sufficient 

basis to move forward with rulemaking 

at this time. While the FAA has 

determined it is not warranted to move 

forward with a proposal to remove the 

glider exception in § 91.215, the FAA 

will continue to work with local glider 

communities to increase safety 

awareness. The FAA will also continue 

to consider surveillance system 

alternatives and to work with interested 

persons to mitigate the risk of aircraft 

collision with gliders. Further, the FAA 

recommends that all glider aircraft 

owners equip their gliders with a 

transponder meeting regulatory 

requirements, a rule-compliant ADS–B 

Out system, or a TABS device. 

Comment Summary 

The FAA received 231comments in 

response to its ANPRM. Of the 231 

comments received, approximately 18 

organizations and 213 individual or 

anonymous commenters responded. 

Approximately 161 comments were 

unfavorable (adverse), 52 comments 

were favorable, and 18 comments were 


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7An NMAC is an incident associated with the 

operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of a 

collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 

500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is received 

from flightcrew members stating that a collision 

hazard existed between two or more aircraft. A 

report does not necessarily involve the violation of 

regulations or error by the air traffic control system, 

nor does it necessarily represent an unsafe 

condition. The fact that flightcrew members initiate 

NMAC reports raises two important issues. First, to 

some degree the data likely will be subjective. This 

necessitates that considerable caution be exercised 

when evaluating individual NMAC reports. Second, 

it is most likely the number of NMAC reports filed 

will not represent the totality of such events. 

8FLARM is an electronic system designed to alert 

pilots of potential collisions between aircraft. 

FLARM is approved by the European Aviation 

Safety Agency for fixed installation in certified 

aircraft. Aircraft equipped with FLARM (including 

a variant known as PowerFLARM that can receive 

transponder and ADS–B signals from other aircraft) 

are visible only to other FLARM-equipped aircraft. 

There is no FAA TSO for FLARM because FLARM 

uses proprietary technology rather than industry 

consensus standards. 

9This assumes all gliders are equipped with a 

transponder. 10TCAS provides two types of advisories, a 

Traffic Advisory (TA) and a Resolution Advisory 

(RA). TCAS can provide both types of advisories 

using another aircraft’s transponder signal. A TA 

provides an aural alert ‘‘TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC’’ to the 

flight crew and places the other aircraft on a cockpit 

display showing the other aircraft’s position, 

altitude and movement relative to the TCASequipped aircraft. TCAS also computes the time to 

closest point of approach between the two aircraft. 

If this drops below a certain computed threshold, 

TCAS then provides a RA, which consists of aural 

commands and instrument cues to maneuver the 

aircraft vertically to avoid the threat. 

11Air carrier aircraft are the fleet segment of 

greatest safety concern to the FAA for this 

contemplated rulemaking. These aircraft are 

required by regulation to be TCAS-equipped. 

12Appendix B of the FAA System Safety 

Handbook defines a hazardous failure condition as 

one that reduces the capability of the system or the 

operator ability to cope with adverse conditions to 

the extent that there would be: Large reduction in 

safety margin or functional capability; Crew 

physical distress/excessive workload such that 

operators cannot be relied upon to perform required 

tasks accurately or completely; Serious or fatal 

injury to small number of occupants of aircraft 

(except operators); or Fatal injury to ground 

personnel and/or general public. 

13Number of active gliders with transponders: 

2014 GA Survey, Avionics Tables, Table AV.6. 

https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_

statistics/general_aviation/. 

14A–08–10 through 13, Safety Recommendations. 

National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, 

DC 20594, March 31, 2008. A copy of this letter is 

in the docket at www.regulations.gov, docket no. 

FAA–2015–2147. 

neutral. Of the 18 organizations that 

commented, 14 responded unfavorably 

(adverse), 2 favorably, and 2 were 

neutral. Three comments received after 

the comment period closed were also 

considered. 

The following organizations 

responded: Soaring Society of America 

(SSA), Aircraft Owners and Pilots 

Association (AOPA), Vintage Sailplane 

Association (VSA), Experimental 

Aircraft Association (EAA), Civil Air 

Patrol (CAP), National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB), American 

Association for Justice (AAJ), and 

approximately 11 local soaring clubs or 

groups. Individual and anonymous 

commenters were representative of all 

pilot types: glider, general aviation 

(GA), airline and military, many 

commenters holding multiple ratings, 

with glider and general aviation pilots 

representing the majority. 

Individual and anonymous 

commenters in favor of removing the 

transponder exception were primarily 

concerned about safety, some relaying 

personal experiences not accompanied 

by supporting documentation, such as a 

near mid-air collision (NMAC) report.7

Several commenters recommended the 

FAA consider alternatives to 

transponder equipage, including ADS– 

B,TABS, or FLARM.8

All comments are available for 

viewing in the rulemaking docket 

(FAA–2015–2147). To view comments, 

go to http://www.regulations.gov and 

insert the docket number. 

Discussion of Comments 

1. Safety Benefit of Transponders 

Of the approximately 161 unfavorable 

(adverse) comments received, many 

addressed the high cost of transponder 

equipage and the limited safety benefit 

by requiring such equipage. 

During the ANPRM process, the FAA 

also reviewed glider midair and NMAC 

reports at the local and national level. 

After further analysis of safety related 

statistics, the FAA found that 

nationally, from August 2005 through 

August 2015, the Aviation Safety 

Reporting System (ASRS) database 

reflects 1,841 reported NMAC for all 

airspace areas. Of these NMACs, 50 

involve a glider and another aircraft 

type, or 2.72% of reported NMACs over 

a 10-year period for an average of 

5NMACs per year. In 2008, the last year 

data was available for all aircraft 

categories, statistics show there were 

236,519 active aircraft, including 1,914 

gliders, or about 0.81% of the active 

fleet. 

Nationally, the removal of the glider 

exception from § 91.215 would help to 

prevent those instances where a glider 

NMAC occurs with an aircraft equipped 

with a Traffic Alert and Collision 

Avoidance System (TCAS).9 10 However, 

instances where removal of the glider 

exception from § 91.215 help prevent a 

glider NMAC due to increased air traffic 

controller awareness are assumed 

negligible overall, because the operating 

areas for gliders are often in places with 

little or no radar coverage. Furthermore, 

because gliders can maneuver rapidly, 

glider flight paths are difficult for the 

Air Traffic Control (ATC) automation 

system to accurately project. Over the 

10-year period reviewed, of the 50 

reported NMACs involving a glider and 

another aircraft type, 7 involved a glider 

and part 121 or 135 air carriers required 

to have TCAS. Using this analysis, 

removal of the glider exception from 

§ 91.215 has the potential to reduce the 

NMAC occurrences by about 0.70 

occurrences per year, or about 2 NMACs 

every 3 years (0.38% of all reported 

NMACs per year over that period). 

Assuming all of these NMACs would 

occur between gliders and air carrier 

aircraft,11 this would represent an 

incremental NMAC hazard of 

approximately 3.8 × 10¥8/flight hour to 

the air carrier aircraft, based on air 

carrier flight hour data for years 2010– 

2014 published on the NTSB’s Web site. 

This rate of occurrence is within the 

acceptable hazard level guidelines for a 

Hazardous failure condition (not greater 

than the order of 1 × 10¥7/flight hour) 

according to the FAA System Safety 

Handbook, Appendix B.12

Therefore, based on the nationwide 

rate of occurrence, safety risk data does 

not support a rule requiring glider 

operators to install a transponder device 

at this time. Furthermore, the number of 

gliders voluntarily equipping with 

collision avoidance systems has 

increased steadily. Per the General 

Aviation and Part 135 Activity Surveys, 

the number of gliders equipped with a 

transponder device has gone from 14% 

in 2006, to 24.3% in 2014, the last year 

this data was available.13

Locally in the airspace surrounding 

Reno, Nevada, the NTSB noted four 

TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) events 

in the 30 days prior to the accident, 

each between a glider and a TCASequipped transport category aircraft 

operated under 14 CFR part 121.14 For 

these RAs to occur, the glider involved 

in each RA would have to be flying with 

an operable transponder (turned on). 

Although this data supports the value 

of transponders in avoiding collisions, 

since the accident, the FAA and local 

glider community have also taken 

several measures to mitigate the risk of 

midair collisions within and around 

Reno, NV. First, advisory information 

on the heavy glider activity unique to 

the local area was published in official 

FAA flight information publications 

including the Chart Supplement, 

Special Notices, and Standard Terminal 

Arrival Routes (STARs) for Reno/Tahoe 

International Airport after the event. 

Second, on October 29, 2010, a Letter of 

Agreement (LOA) was signed between 

representatives for the local glider 


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15The LOA is posted in the docket at 

www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA–2015–2147. 

16SSA comment letter posted in the docket at 

www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA–2015–2147. 

17 14 CFR 91.215(c) states: While in the airspace 

as specified in paragraph (b) of this section or in 

all controlled airspace, each person operating an 

aircraft equipped with an operable ATC 

transponder maintained in accordance with 

§ 91.413 of this part shall operate the transponder, 

including Mode C equipment if installed, and shall 

reply on the appropriate code or as assigned by 

ATC. This collision occurred at approximately 

16,000 feet MSL in Class E airspace (which extends 

upward from 14,500 feet MSL to flight level 180 

throughout the National Airspace System). 

18Most comments addressed the cost of 

transponder equipage. A few comments addressed 

the cost to install other equipment such as ADS– 

B, TABS, and FLARM. The FAA sought comment 

on these technologies in the ANPRM. These 

alternatives and others are discussed later in this 

notice. 

19Total number of gliders and number of active 

gliders: 2014 GA Survey, Table 2.1. 

community and ATC facilities having 

control over the airspace. The LOA 

establishes an area and procedures for 

glider operations within positive 

controlled airspace in the Reno area. By 

establishing this area and these 

procedures, the LOA enhances airspace 

awareness and communication among 

the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control 

Center, Northern California Terminal 

Radar Approach Control, and the Pacific 

Soaring Council. Additionally, the LOA 

outlines entry and exit procedures into 

the operating areas and identifies pilot 

responsibilities to increase 

communication and situational 

awareness in the Reno area.15

Finally, the local glider community 

has undertaken a successful education 

campaign to prevent further accidents. 

According to the SSA, ‘‘Since the 2006 

accident, the local glider community 

that flies near RNO has undertaken 

successfully to educate pilots on 

collision avoidance and to encourage 

the voluntary use of either FLARM or 

transponders. As a result of these 

voluntary efforts, the official ASRS 

database includes no new incidents 

with gliders not equipped with 

transponders in the RNO or MEV 

[Minden-Tahoe Airport] areas in 

[excepted] airspace since the release 

some 7 years ago of the NTSB report on 

the 2006 incident.’’ 16

The SSA, EAA, and several individual 

commenters opposing transponder 

equipage, noted that the glider involved 

in the 2006 Reno accident was equipped 

with a transponder, but at the time of 

the accident, the pilot operated the 

glider with the transponder turned off.17

The FAA acknowledges that in the 2006 

accident, if the glider transponder were 

turned on, the Hawker aircraft would 

have received TCAS advisories. 

2. Estimating Glider Transponder Cost 

From Removal of Glider Exception 

Approximately 138 commenters 

discussed the cost of requiring gliders to 

equip with transponders.18 Of those 138 

commenters discussing cost, there were 

just 20 comments that could be 

characterized as in favor of requiring 

gliders to equip with transponders to 

some degree. 

Three commenters stated that 

transponders were inexpensive, but as 

shown below these commenters 

underestimated the cost of glider 

transponders as ‘‘in the few hundred 

dollar range’’ or ‘‘less than $2000’’ and/ 

or ignored the cost of installation or 

assumed installation was easy. They did 

not address the concern that about half 

the glider population does not have an 

electrical system, which significantly 

increases the cost of transponder 

installation. These commenters were 

contradicted by more than 30 

commenters who provided specific cost 

estimates for glider transponders and 

installation costs. Another commenter, 

in favor of removing the glider 

exception because he believed that the 

safety benefits justified the costs, 

conceded that transponders ‘‘are indeed 

costly.’’ 

The FAA estimates the cost of 

requiring gliders to equip with 

transponders to be about $5,000 per 

glider and more than $7 million for the 

glider fleet. Owing to a lack of reliable 

data, the glider (and fleet) cost estimates 

do not take into account the possible 

significant cost of instrument panel 

modification. There may also be 

significant additional cost for older 

gliders that no longer have manufacturer 

support because they may require a 

FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and 

Alteration) approval if there is no prior 

approval (Supplemental Type 

Certificate (STC) or other previously 

approved installation). 

The fleet estimate assumes that (1) all 

active glider operators will want to 

operate in the currently excepted 

airspace and (2) the 990 inactive gliders 

(total glider population of 2781—1791 

active gliders) in the fleet will deregister 

upon rule implementation.19 The $7 

million fleet figure would be an 

underestimation to the extent these two 

assumptions are incorrect. Details of the 

estimates of cost per glider and glider 

fleet cost are shown in Table 1. 

TABLE 1—GLIDER TRANSPONDER UNIT COSTS

Item Cost Sources/notes 

Transponder .............................................. $2,339 Cost based on the Trig TT21 as it appears to be the most popular glider transponder. 

Cabling ...................................................... 146 Aircraftspruce.com: Trig TT21 including custom harness—$2485. 

Antenna ..................................................... 169 Cumulus-Soaring.com: RAMI AV–74–1 Blade Style Transponder or DME Antenna: 

‘‘. . . like the AV–74—but with longer mounting studs—which is nice when trying 

to mount it through a glider fuselage.’’ 

Battery charger ......................................... 25 

Total Nonrecurring hardware ............. 2,679 

Installation ................................................. 1,300 Average of 32 ANPRM commenter estimates. 

Total Nonrecurring Cost ............. 3,979 

Batteries (every 2.5 years) ....................... 600 Battery choice based on comment by Philadelphia Glider Council: ‘‘. . . one

[LiFePO4]18AH or two-three 9 Ahs generally sufficient for 10 hrs of operation.’’ 

CumulusSoaring.com: Bioenno Power BLF–1209 LiFePo4 Battery 12V, 9AHr 

$100, charger $25. Or BLF–1220 20AHr $205, charger $30. Duration based on 

ANPRM comments. 

Biannual inspection ................................... 800 $200 per inspection. Based on ANPRM comments. 


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20The estimation takes into account an additional 

nonrecurring cost not shown in Table 1 of $400 for 

gliders without an electrical system. 21A discount rate of 7 percent is recommended 

by Office of Management & Budget, Circular A–94, 

‘‘Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost 

Analysis of Federal Programs,’’ October 29, 1992, p. 

8. 22Number of active gliders with electrical 

systems gliders: 2014 GA Survey, Avionics Tables, 

Table AV.1. https://www.faa.gov/data_research/ 

aviation_data_statistics/general_aviation/. 

23Number of active gliders with transponders: 

2014 GA Survey, Avionics Tables, Table AV.6. 

https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_

statistics/general_aviation/. 

TABLE 1—GLIDER TRANSPONDER UNIT COSTS—Continued 

Item Cost Sources/notes 

Total Recurring Costs ........................ 1,400 

The nonrecurring and recurring unit 

costs required to estimate the cost of a 

rule change eliminating the glider 

transponder exception are shown in 

Table 1. 

The FAA estimates the costs of such 

a rule change over a ten-year period for 

the existing U.S. glider fleet. This 

estimation is shown in Table 2.20 The 

cost of a rule change for new production 

of existing glider models and new 

certifications is not estimated owing to 

a lack of the necessary forecasts. 

TABLE 2—TEN-YEAR COST OF REMOVING GLIDER TRANSPONDER EXCEPTION

Year Item costs Description Non-recurring 

costs 

PV recurring 

costs @7% 21

0 .............................................. $3,979 Hardware & Installation .......................................................... $3,979 ........................

1 .............................................. ........................ ................................................................................................. ........................ ........................

2 .............................................. 200 Bi-annual Inspection ............................................................... ........................ $175 

2.5 ........................................... 200 Battery Replacement .............................................................. ........................ 169 

3 .............................................. ........................ ................................................................................................. ........................ ........................

4 .............................................. 200 Bi-annual Inspection ............................................................... ........................ 153 

5 .............................................. 200 Battery Replacement .............................................................. ........................ 143 

6 .............................................. 200 Bi-annual Inspection ............................................................... ........................ 133 

7 .............................................. ........................ ................................................................................................. ........................ ........................

7.5 ........................................... 200 Battery Replacement .............................................................. ........................ 120 

8 .............................................. 200 Bi-annual Inspection ............................................................... ........................ 116 

9 .............................................. ........................ ................................................................................................. ........................ ........................

10 ............................................ ........................ ................................................................................................. ........................ ........................

Totals ............................... ........................ ................................................................................................. 3,979 1,009 

Total number of active gliders 1791 Cost/glider Total cost 

Gliders with electrical systems 22 ................................................................................................. 699 ........................ ........................

Gliders with transponders 23 ........................................................................................................ 461 ........................ ........................

Gliders without electrical systems ............................................................................................... 1092 400 436,800 

Gliders without transponders ....................................................................................................... 1330 4,988 6,633,798 

Cost of rule removing glider exception ................................................................................ ........................ ........................ 7,070,598 

Note: Due to rounding, details may not add up to totals or multiply to products. 

Based on the risk reduction data 

discussed in the previous section and 

the estimated costs of equipage listed in 

this section, the FAA finds that the 

degree of risk reduction that could be 

expected by requiring transponder 

equipage for gliders does not justify the 

cost of requiring such equipage. 

3. Alternatives to Transponders 

Several commenters called for ‘‘low 

cost’’ and ‘‘affordable’’ transponders 

(such as a portable transponder) and 

ADS–B, TABS, or FLARM equipment. 

The NTSB noted the FAA published a 

final rule on May 28, 2010, that added 

requirements for ADS–B Out equipage 

that, if combined with transponder 

usage, would result in increased traffic 

awareness and collision avoidance. The 

NTSB also commented in response to 

this ANPRM that TABS may be an 

acceptable alternative as it is detectable 

by both TCAS and ADS–B-In equipped 

aircraft. 

Since the 2006 accident, technologies 

have developed and alternatives are 

available that have the potential to 

mitigate risk, such as TABS, FLARM, 

ADS–B, local LOA with ATC facilities, 

and ongoing outreach and education. Of 

the technological solutions identified 

here, the ones that offer the best 

potential to avoid collision with TCASequipped aircraft (besides transponder 

equipage) are TABS or a rule-compliant 

ADS–B Out system, because those 

systems make the glider visible to 

TCAS-equipped aircraft, ATC or both. 

The TABS standard provides for a 

reduction in the transmission rate and 

allows for a ‘‘non-aviation grade’’ GPS 

engine, in order to drive unit cost down 

while still maintaining an acceptable 

level of service to be considered a client 

in the NAS, where collision avoidance 

and ADS–B systems coexist. There are 

currently no TSO authorization holders 

for TABS equipment. However, we are 

aware that certain manufacturers 

currently have TABS systems in 

development. 

Some commenters recommended that 

the FAA allow use of portable 


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24Section 91.113(d)(2) states that ‘‘A glider has 

the right of way over powered parachute, weightshift-aircraft, airplane, or rotorcraft.’’ 

25 Information for Operators (InFO) 09009, 

Installation and Approval of Transponder Systems 

in Gliders/Sailplanes, dated June 10, 2009. 

transponders, stating they were lower 

cost than fixed transponder installations 

and relatively affordable. While portable 

transponders may meet the TSO 

performance requirements, they are not 

approved for use unless they are 

actually installed in the aircraft. A key 

reason for this is placement of the 

transponder antenna in the aircraft. If 

the transponder antenna is not placed 

correctly, the aircraft may not be 

electronically detectable to other aircraft 

or ATC. 

Other commenters recommended that 

the FAA encourage equipage of FLARM 

systems. In this regard, the FAA notes 

that a variant of FLARM, known as 

PowerFLARM, will make a transponder 

or ADS–B Out equipped aircraft 

detectable to the PowerFLARMequipped aircraft (such as a glider). 

However, a glider that is equipped with 

any version of FLARM will not be 

electronically detectable to the other 

aircraft unless both aircraft are FLARM 

equipped. In view of these factors, the 

FAA concludes that FLARM systems 

may provide a safety benefit 

(particularly for avoidance of collisions 

between gliders, and for PowerFLARM 

equipped gliders, some benefit for 

avoidance of collisions with powered 

aircraft). However, the FAA does not 

view FLARM (including PowerFLARM) 

as the most effective system to support 

collision avoidance with powered 

aircraft since a FLARM system may not 

make the glider detectable to the aircraft 

that must give way. Transponders, 

TABS, and ADS–B Out offer better 

protection against collisions with 

powered aircraft because those systems 

aid visual acquisition of the glider by 

the powered aircraft flightcrew, 

consistent with right of way rules.24

The FAA will continue to consider 

surveillance system alternatives for 

gliders for their feasibility and potential 

to improve safety. 

4. Other Comments 

Several commenters were in favor of 

removing the current glider exception 

for certain high-density airspace areas. 

One commenter, otherwise strongly in 

favor of removing the glider exception, 

suggested an exception for gliders 

involved in training below 5,000 feet 

above ground level (AGL). The FAA has 

determined not to propose any changes 

to the rules for specific airspace areas 

because the accident and incident 

history cited in the NTSB 

recommendation has occurred 

predominantly around one specific 

airspace area, Reno, NV. The FAA has 

determined that the post accident 

mitigations for the Reno area discussed 

previously in this notice mitigate the 

risk for that specific airspace. 

Another commenter stated, ‘‘the FAA 

should make clear that installing a 

transponder, encoder, antenna, an extra 

battery or batteries and possible solar 

panels are all considered ‘minor 

modifications’ which can be signed off 

by the installing technician based on his 

judgment.’’ This commenter and several 

others, in opposition of the removal of 

the glider exception, also called for 

exceptions for older gliders. The FAA 

finds that rulemaking is not necessary at 

this time for any gliders, but points to 

current guidance available to assist in 

installation and approval of transponder 

systems in gliders and sailplanes for 

operators wishing to voluntarily 

equip.25

The AAJ listed glider color, 

construction materials, and slender 

profiles as contributing factors to lack of 

pilot visibility or radar detection and 

further identified Instrument Flight Rule 

congested areas as concerns of 

undeniable risk, especially the 

parameters of Class B airspace. These 

sentiments were largely shared amongst 

both adverse and favorable commenters, 

offering similar solutions or variations 

thereof. The FAA has discussed its 

determination regarding specific 

airspace areas above. With regard to the 

other comments identified here, the 

FAA’s decision in this notice includes 

consideration of those comments. 

Reason for Withdrawal 

After consideration of all comments 

received, the FAA is withdrawing 

Notice No. 15–05. The FAA finds that 

the high cost of transponder equipage 

and the limited safety benefit that is 

likely to result from requiring such 

equipage do not support rulemaking at 

this time. Additionally, as discussed 

above, the FAA has determined that a 

proposal to require gliders to equip with 

‘‘low-cost’’ alternatives to transponders 

is not supportable at this time. 

NTSB safety recommendations, 

resulting from the 2006 midair collision 

with a glider, indicated that although 

the glider was equipped with a 

transponder, the transponder was 

turned off. After further analysis of 

safety-related statistics over a 10-year 

period (August 2005–August 2015) the 

ASRS database reflects 1841 reported 

NMAC for all airspace areas. The FAA 

found data that indicates that removal of 

the glider exception from § 91.215 

would have the potential to reduce the 

NMAC occurrences by about 0.70 

occurrences per year, or about 2 NMACs 

every 3 years (0.38% of all reported 

NMACs per year over that period). 

Conclusion 

When further testing, research, and 

conclusive data is available that reflect 

alternative mitigations, a broader, more 

harmonized proposal may better serve 

the public interest. Withdrawal of 

Notice No. 15–05 does not preclude the 

FAA from issuing another notice on the 

subject matter in the future or 

committing the agency to any future 

course of action. The agency will make 

any necessary changes to the regulations 

through a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) with the 

opportunity for public comment. 

Although the FAA has determined 

that a regulatory course of action is not 

warranted at this time, the FAA will 

continue to work with local glider 

communities, encourage the voluntary 

equipage of transponders in gliders and 

encourage the use of TABS. The FAA 

continues to recommend that all glider 

aircraft owners equip their gliders with 

a transponder meeting the requirements 

of § 91.215(a), a rule-compliant ADS–B 

Out system, or a TABS device. In 

consideration of the above factors, the 

FAA withdraws Notice No. 15–05, 

published in 80 FR 34346, on June 16, 

2015. 

Issued under authority provided by 49 

U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a), and 40103 in 

Washington, DC, on December 16, 2016. 

Gary A. Norek, 

Deputy Director, Airspace Services. 

[FR Doc. 2016–30910 Filed 12–22–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Part 52 

[EPA–R03–OAR–2016–0373; FRL–9957–19– 

Region 3] 

Air Plan Approval; WV; Infrastructure 

Requirements for the 2012 Fine 

Particulate Standard 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) is proposing to approve a 

state implementation plan (SIP) revision 

submittal from the State of West 

Virginia pursuant to the Clean Air Act 

(CAA). Whenever new or revised 


jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS