alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 7952** 

STANLEY DEMERE , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v.
WARDEN DAVID BALLARD , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia , at Elkins
. John Preston Bailey , Chief District Judge. ( 2:09

- cv - 00083

- JPB

- JES )

Submitted : April 2 2 , 2014 Decided: April 29, 2014

Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Stanley Demere, Appellant Pro Se. Dawn Ellen Warfield, Deputy Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Stanley Demere seeks to appeal the distr ict court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (A) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by d emonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the distric t court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We ha ve independently reviewed the record and conclude that Demere has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequ ately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
MANAGEMENT'S REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
                    THE INTERNAL
       CONTROL STRUCTURE RELATIVE TO THE SERVICING OF
            AUTOMOBILE LOAN RECEIVABLES


       The management of the Bank is responsible for establishing and
       maintaining the internal control structure.  In fulfilling this
       responsibility, estimates and judgments by management are required
       to assess the expected benefits and related costs of control procedures.
       The objectives of an internal control structure are to provide
       management with reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that assets
       are safeguarded against loss from unauthorized use or disposition, and
       that transactions are executed in accordance with management's
       authorization and recorded properly to permit the preparation of
       financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting
       principles.

       We have performed an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Bank's
       internal control structure based on the criteria established in Internal
       Control - Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of
       Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission ("COSO")
       relative to the servicing of automobile loan receivables owned by Chevy
       Chase Auto Receivables Trusts Series 1995-1, 1995-2 and 1996-1
       (collectively referred to as the "Trusts" herein) as of September 30,
       1997, and we have determined that the Bank maintained an effective
       internal control structure over financial reporting relative to the
       servicing of automobile loan receivables owned by the Trusts as of
       September 30, 1997.

       However, there are inherent limitations in the effectiveness of any
       internal control structure, including the possibility of human error and
       the circumvention or overriding of controls.  Accordingly, even an
       effective internal control structure can provide only reasonable
       assurance with respect to reliability of financial statements and
       safeguarding and management of assets.  Furthermore, the
       effectiveness of any internal control structure can change with changes
       in circumstances.





       Kevin B. Cashen                                 John C.
       Harley
       Senior Vice President                           Senior
       Vice President





       George P. Clancy                                Stephen
       R. Halpin, Jr.
       Executive Vice President                             Executive
       Vice President and
                                                  Chief
       Financial Officer

       November 18, 1997                                    AUTOINTC.LTR
§ 102-83.90 What hierarchy of geographic consideration must agencies apply to location decisions? ( a ) Agencies must develop policies and procedures for applying the goals of this part in their business practices. These policies and procedures must include methods for applying the hierarchy outlined in paragraph (b) of this section.
( b ) When making new location decisions, agencies must give preference to geographic areas in the following order: ( 1 ) Agencies must give first priority to locating in a rural area in accordance with the Rural Development Act of 1972 (RDA). As with other elements of this part, acquiring agencies must develop their own policies and procedures for implementing the goals of the RDA. Agencies must consider the objectives outlined in § 102-83.85 and use these principles and factors to differentiate among potential locations. Agencies are encouraged to seek a location that best meets these factors or meet multiple factors. If an agency's mission cannot be accomplished in a rural area, the agency may locate in an urban area.
( 2 ) When an agency's mission requires location in an urban area, the agency must give priority to the CBA within a principal city of a CBSA or other areas as recommended by local officials. Agencies must consider the objectives outlined in § 102-83.85 and use these principles and factors to differentiate among potential locations. Agencies are encouraged to seek a location that best meets these factors or meets multiple factors.
( 3 ) If an agency mission cannot be met within a principal city, or where areas, such as existing employment centers, outside the principal city offer better opportunities to advance the objectives outlined in § 102-83.85, in accordance with their established policies and procedures, agencies may proceed to seek space in those areas.
( 4 ) Once an agency has set a delineated area in a rural or urban area, agencies must comply with the requirements for consideration of historic properties and districts set forth in § 102-78.60.
**OFFI& OF**  **THE AUSTIN** 

Hon. Stanley Tlmlns, County Harrieon County Ilarshall, Texas 

### DearS3.r



### 5nl.on asto whetherthe has author-

. 6 $tiolh$9&+de that whsnev8r the ,on table stall equire the servioes

horlzing suoh an appolntompsnsation and ahall deterdeputies to **be** appoint&.. Artiole 6879a provides the condeputy shall **make .a**  **written** for such deputy and giving the nam of eaoh propooed appointee. ACommlssloners* Court shall thereupon determbm whether there is a need for suoh deputy or deputies..:

-t.

Eon. Stanley Timmins,,February ll, 1339, Page Z’ Weoonstrue these artloles to be oumuhtlve and by Artiole 39OSthe Oommlssior&s’ Court h&dno right to do anythinp; exoept authorize an appointment and by Article 6S79a the Cmmlssloners* Court 1s granted the authority to oonflrm 

### orrejeot the appOiAtIIL8nt ir A0 AQO8SSity 8XiStB.

**Tie are**  **Of the**  0piAi0n **that** the
‘Comisslonersl Court oannot refuse to authorize or oonrim the appointment or a deputy oonstable for personal reasons andthat the only question for the Court to deolde;is the neoeesity for a deputy.

Vieare 0r the opinion ii there is a A8080Sity rOF the BDpOiAtULeAt Or 0.deputy andthe COUim&3SiOAerS’.CoU%has arbltrarlly refueed to authorize or confirm the appolntment of a deputy oonstoble, that the remedy is for the oonstable and his appointee to - bring a mandamussuit to compel authorization and oonflrmatlon. Yours very truly ATTORNgYGENERnLOFTEUS
2020 SCP Competition Appendix A- List of Available Funding Opportunites

State Total Funding 

Available Start Date

Volunteer Service 

Years(VSY) Areas Affected Updates

Alaska $320,000 1-Apr-20 53

Kenai, Soldotna,Sterling, Nikiski, Salamatof, 

Cohoe, Cooper Landing, and the surrounding 

area.

Georgia $197,389 1-Apr-20 33 Fulton, Gwinnett, Dekalb and Clayton

Idaho $161,325 1-Apr-20 27 Blaine, Camas, Cassia, Gooding, Jerome, Lincoln, 

Minidoka, Twin Falls

Illinois $78,000 1-Apr-20 13 Macon County

Indiana $253,719 1-Apr-20 42 Lake, Porter and LaPorte counties

Iowa $78,000 1-Apr-20 13 Pottawattamie County

Michigan $325,550 1-Apr-20 54 Wayne County

New Jersey $349,440 1-Apr-20 58 Camden, Gloucester, and Burlington

Oregon $103,330 1-Apr-20 17 Douglas and Josephine Counties

Pennsylvania $199,907 1-Apr-20 33 Montgomery County

Puerto Rico $161,164 1-Apr-20 27 Municipality of Ponce

Texas $281,249 1-Apr-20 47 San Antonio, Bexar County

Utah $78,000 1-Apr-20 13 Cache, Box Elder and Rich Counties 

Washington $117,723 1-Apr-20 20 Grays Harbor, Pacific, and Thurston
**Exhibit 10.1**

 

CONSENT OF REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the RegistrationStatements on Form S-8 (Registration Nos. 333-11842, 333-9352, 333-11154,333-13686, 333-111112 and 333-111113) and on Form F-3 (Registration Nos.333-12996, 333-11250 and 333-109766) of our report dated February 2, 2005,with respect to the consolidated financial statements of NICE Systems Ltd.included in this Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31,2004.

 

 

 
| Tel-Aviv, Israel   | /s/ KOST FORER GABBAY &  KASIERER |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| June 29, 2005 | KOST FORER GABBAY & KASIERER      |
|               | A Member of Ernst & Young Global  |

 

----
#### § 109-50.400 Scope of subpart.

This subpart contains policy to be followed when it is proposed to sell or otherwise transfer DOE personal property located in a mixed facility to the contractor who is the operator of that facility.
#### §§ 102-37.180-102-37.185 [Reserved]
595 P.2d 717

#### Leonard Leroy LONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., an Ohio Corporation, and John Doe Corporation, Defendants, and Brad Ragan, Inc., a corporation, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 12707.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

May 25, 1979.

*184John B. Kugler, Pocatello, for plaintiff-appellant.

Ted V. Wood of St. Clair, Hiller, Benjamin, Wood & McGrath, Idaho Falls, for defendant-respondent.

Before SHEPARD, C. J., and McFADDEN, DONALDSON, BAKES and BISTLINE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On September 20, 1973, plaintiff Long was allegedly injured when a tire which he had just mounted on a wheel rim exploded. At the time he was working in the course and scope of his employment with Hall & Norcross Tire Co., dba Commercial Tire Service, in Pocatello.

In September,-1975, plaintiff filed suit against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the manufacturer, and Brad Ragan, Inc., the distributor of the tire, alleging negligent manufacture and inspection and failure to warn on Goodyear’s part and breach of implied warranty by Ragan. Goodyear answered plaintiff’s amended complaint. Ragan never answered, but after taking plaintiff’s deposition moved for a summary judgment claiming that *it*was plaintiff’s employer, and hence plaintiff’s workmen’s compensation agreement with Commercial Tire was his exclusive remedy against Ragan. No evidence was presented on this except plaintiff’s “admissions” in his deposition that he considered Ragan his employer.

The district court granted Ragan a summary judgment as well as attorney’s fees and costs totaling $438.55. Plaintiff appealed. We need not yet decide whether summary judgment was proper or whether Ragan as a matter of law was plaintiff’s employer, for the appeal is premature.

We note that there was no disposition below of the claim against Goodyear, nor was there any certification that the judgment in favor of Ragan was a final judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b).1

The purpose of the rule is to avoid piecemeal litigation and appeals, and in the absence of certification an appeal cannot be taken.

The appeal is dismissed. Costs to respondent.

1

. Even if certification is given, such is not binding on this Court where it appears that the lower court abused its discretion in giving such. “Appellate review . . . ought properly to await final determination of the entire case if the parties then feel an appeal is appropriate.” *Pichon v. L. J. Broekemeier, Inc.,*99 Idaho 598, 586 P.2d 1042 (1978). The district judge labeled the summary judgment a “final judgment” but this alone is not dispositive. The certification is mandatory under Rule 54(b) where the action as to any claims or parties has not been brought to a final conclusion. *Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain Industries, Inc.,*97 Idaho 890, 556 P.2d 366 (1976). Should plaintiff prevail against Goodyear, this appeal may become moot; should plaintiff lose, the entire case may be appealed at one time.
§ 187.203 What are the voluntary provisions for a participating State? A participating State may— ( a ) Provide VIS with the optional information listed in subpart B of this part;
( b ) Make available to VIS updated information provided by the vessel owner, government agency, or secured party about a vessel that has been moved to a non-participating State of principal operation; and
( c ) Interact with non-participating States to make information available to, or request information from, VIS concerning a vessel or nationwide statistics.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1996
<CASH>                                           3,108
<SECURITIES>                                     7,026
<RECEIVABLES>                                   60,108
<ALLOWANCES>                                       740
<INVENTORY>                                     65,589
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               141,660
<PP&E>                                         113,162
<DEPRECIATION>                                  13,857
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 357,543
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           83,709
<BONDS>                                        159,588
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     11,759
<COMMON>                                         1,928
<OTHER-SE>                                      35,253
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   357,543
<SALES>                                        384,540
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               384,540
<CGS>                                          335,981
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   26,669
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   105
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              20,641
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,255
<INCOME-TAX>                                       699
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,556
<DISCONTINUED>                                   2,213
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  4,856
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,513
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.30)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.30)
        

</TABLE>
#### § 109-45.105 Exclusions and exemptions.
§ 109-43.307-52 Nuclear-related or proliferation-sensitive personal property. ( a ) Recognizing that property disposal officials will not have the technical knowledge to identify nuclear-related and proliferation-sensitive personal property, all such personal property shall be physically tagged with a certification signed by an authorized program official at time of determination by the program office of the personal property as excess. Such an authorized official should be designated in writing with signature cards on file in the property office.
( b ) Nuclear-related and proliferation-sensitive personal property which is excess to DOE needs shall be stripped of all characteristics which cause it to be nuclear-related or proliferation-sensitive personal property, as determined by the cognizant program office, prior to disposal. The cognizant program office shall certify that appropriate actions have been taken to strip the personal property as required, or shall provide the property disposal office with adequate instructions for stripping the items. Such action shall be accomplished in a manner which will preserve, so far as practicable, any civilian utility or commercial value of the personal property.
NO. 07-09-0106-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL B FEBRUARY 17, 2010

__________________ ___________ JESSE EARL ANDREWS, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

____________________________ FROM THE 251 ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY; NO. 20512-C; HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ, JUDGE

__________________ ____________ Before QUINN, C.J., a nd CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jesse Earl Andrews, was convicted of burglary of a building. 1 After appellant pleaded true to the allegations contained in t he enhancement paragraph, the jury sentenced him to 20 years confinement in the Institutional Div ision of the Texas Department of Criminal Ju stice. Appellant has appealed the trial court = s decision. We affirm.

1 See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 30.02(a) (Vernon 2003).Appellant = s attorney has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw. Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 2d 498 (1967). In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies that he has diligently reviewed the record, and in his opinion, the record reflects no reve rsible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Id . at 744-45. In compli ance with High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978), counsel has cand idly discussed why, under the controlling authorities, there is no e rror in the trial court = s judgment. Additionally, counsel has certified that he has provided appellant a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw and appropriately advised appe llant of his right to file a pro se response in this matter. Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). The court has also advised appellant of his right to file a pro se response. Appe llant has filed a response which we have carefully reviewed. After reviewing the response filed by appellant, we note that it does not rais e any additional grounds to support an appeal.
By his Anders brief, counsel raises grounds that could possibly support an appeal, but concludes the appeal is frivolous. We have reviewed these grounds and made an independent review of the entire record to dete rmine whether there are any arguable grounds which might support an appeal. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We have f ound no such arguable grounds and agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous.Accordingly, counsel = s motion to withdraw is hereby granted and the trial court = s judgment is affirmed. 2

Mackey K. Hancock Justice
Do not publish.

2 Counsel shall, within five days after this opinion is handed do wn, send his client a copy of the opinion and judgment, along with not ification of appellant = s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 48.4.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 720 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 720

  To amend the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 to require that a 
   State having an approved coastal zone management program must be 
  provided a copy of an environmental impact statement to enable its 
review under that Act of any plan for exploration or development of, or 
      production from, any area in the coastal zone of the State.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 11, 1999

   Mr. Goss introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                         Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 to require that a 
   State having an approved coastal zone management program must be 
  provided a copy of an environmental impact statement to enable its 
review under that Act of any plan for exploration or development of, or 
      production from, any area in the coastal zone of the State.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``OCS Environmental Consistency Act of 
1999''.

SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT THAT STATE HAVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TO 
              REVIEW PLAN FOR EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, OR PRODUCTION 
              IN THE COASTAL ZONE OF THE STATE.

    Section 307(c)(3) of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 
U.S.C. 1456(c)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(C) For purposes of subparagraph (B), a State shall not be 
considered to have received all necessary data and information with 
respect to a plan for exploration, development, or production, before 
the date the State has received a copy of an environmental impact 
statement under section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)) that applies to that exploration, 
development, or production.''.
                                 <all>
```
Case 1:22-cv-23074-BB Document 168-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2023 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 22-cv-23074-BLOOM/OTAZO-REYES

OCTAVIO COLLADO,

Plaintiff,

COLLECTIVE ACTION

v.

450 NORTH RIVER DRIVE, LLC,

D/B/A KIKI ON THE RIVER,

RJ RIVER, LLC AND ROMAN JONES,

Defendants.

/

CONSENT TO JOIN PURSUANT TO 29 U.S.C. §216(b)

1. My name is ALEX ANDER MARTINEZ .

2. I consent, agree, and opt to become a Plaintiff in this lawsuit brought under the 

FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §201, et seq., against my current/former employer, 450 North River Drive, LLC, 

d/b/a Kiki on the River, and alleged employers RJ River, LLC, and Roman Jones (collectively 

“Defendants”).

3. I wish to assert a claim for alleged unpaid/underpaid tips against Kiki on the River 

and the other Defendants for the tips I allege I’m owed.

4. I agree to be bound by any adjudication of this action by the Court, whether it is 

favorable or unfavorable. I further agree to be bound by any collective action settlement herein 

that is recommended by FairLaw Firm, approved by the Class Representative, and approved by 

the Court as fair and reasonable.

5. I designate the FairLaw Firm to represent me in this case.

Dated Aug 18, 2023 , 2023. Signed:ALEXANDER MARTINEZ (Aug 18, 2023 12:38 EDT)

Printed Name: Alexander martinez

Your Address, Email, and Telephone Are Needed, But Will Not Filed With The Court

Address: 12509 sw 112th terr miami fl 33186 Tel No.: 2016005419

Email: chivitos75@gmail.com

MAIL, EMAIL, OR FAX YOUR COMPLETED FORM TO:

FairLaw Firm

135 San Lorenzo Avenue, Suite 770, Coral Gables, FL 33156 / brian@fairlawattorney.com

TEL 305.230.4884 TEXT 786.386.0885 FAX 305.230.4844 

Case 1:22-cv-23074-BB Document 191-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/18/2023 Page 1 of 1