ARCHIE MOSES , et al. P laintif fs,
v. SUNTRUST MORTGAG E, INC.,

Defendan t. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action No. 11-cv- 00822 (BJR) MEMORAN DUM OP INION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAND AND M OTION T O DISMISS

Be fore the cour

t at this ti me ar e two motions: SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Clas s Action Complaint [dkt . #3] and plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [dkt . #6] (hereina fter

“ Mot. to Remand

”). This matter

was re assig ned to this court from Judge Fr iedman on September 1, 2011. Havingrea d the par ties’ pleading s, and for

the re asons stated he rein, plaintiffs’ motion will be g rante d, and def

endant’ s motion wil l be denied w ithout prejudice. I. BACK GR OUND Plaintiffs Archie a

nd Violet Moses commenc ed this action, on beha lf of a c lass of all others similarly

situated, in District of Columbia Superior Court on Marc h 30, 2011. Class Action Complaint

[dkt . #1-1] (here inafter

“ Complaint ”). Pre viously , plaintiffs filed a c omplaint in the United States District Court for the D istrict of Columbia ag ainst defe ndant SunTrust Mortg ag e, Inc. and nume rous other de fenda nts, alleg ing va

rious claims under f

eder al and state law. Mot. to Remand

at 1-2. F ollowing the voluntar y dismiss al of other

defe ndants and c laims, plaintiffs deter

mined that there was no long er a ny basis for f

eder al jurisdiction, and filed a notice of voluntary

dismiss al as to that ca se on Mar ch 30, 2011, the same day they filed the pre sent complaint in Superior Court. Moses v . SunTrust Banks, Inc. , Case No. 10- CV-2029 at dkt. #36.Plaintiffs alleg e that SunTrust Mortg ag e, I nc. (he reina fter “ SunTrust”) “e ng ag ed in a pattern of unfair a nd dece ptive prac tices with respe ct to full and timely disclosure of its require ment for pr ivate mortg ag e insuranc e (“ PMI ”) on home loans.” Complaint at 1. Under

the heading“Count I ,” plaintiffs’ c omplaint sets forth a cla im for “Violation of D istrict of Columbia Consumer Protection Proce dures Ac t (“CPPA”), D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 et seq .” Id. at 9. The next s ection of the complaint, without any further “Count” lang

uag e, appe ars unde r the he ading “Unde rlying V iolation of the Truth in L ending Act (“ TI L A”) , 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq .” Def endant f iled a notice of

remova l in this court on May 3, 2011, asser

ting f eder al question jurisdiction. Notice of Remov al [dkt . #1]. I n their Motion to Remand, plaintiffs challeng e SunTrust’s basis for remova l and re quest that the cour t remand the case to the District of Columbia Superior Court. II. MOTION TO REMAND A. Stand ard of Review A fe dera l court’s orig inal jurisdiction is premised on two statutory g rounds: (1) f

eder al question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. S unTrust premised its re moval from state c ourt on fede ral que stion jurisdi ction. Ex cept a s otherwise pr ovided by law, “a ny civil action broug ht in a State court of w hich the district courts of the U nited States have or igina l jurisdiction, may be re moved by

the def endant or the def endants, to the district cour t of the United States for

the district and division embrac ing the place wher e such a ction is pending .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) . “Removal is appr opriate only when the c ase mig ht have or igina lly been br oug ht in feder al cour t.” W exle r v. United Air Lines , 496 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D.D .C. 2007). When a fe dera l court lac ks subject matter jurisdiction
2over a

dispute removed f

rom state cour

t, the court must rema

nd the ac tion to st ate c ourt. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The re moving pa

rty has the burde n of showing that fede ral subjec t matter jurisdiction exis ts. W exle r , 496 F. Supp. 2d at 152. I n light of the signific ant fe dera lism concerns involved, this court “strictly

construes the scope of

its removal jurisdiction.” Breakm an v. AOL, LLC , 545 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 (D.D .C. 2008). There fore , “if fe dera l jurisdiction is doubtful, a re mand to state cour t is necessa

ry .” Id . at 101 (c itations omi tted). Reg ardle ss of whethe r re moval is init ially proper , a district cour

t should dism iss an action for lac k of subject matter

jurisdiction when the fa cts and a lleg ations befor e the c ourt belie a ny
aver ment that fede ral jurisdiction exist s. Cf. Meng v. Sc hwartz , 305 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55 (D.D .C. 2004). B. Legitim acy of Rem oval

Under the “we ll-pleade d complaint” rule , a suit “ar ises under” fede ral law“only when the pla intiff’s statement of his own c ause of action shows that it is based upon fe dera l law.” Vaden v . Discove r Bank , 556 U.S. 49, –, 129 S. C t. 1262, 1272 (2009) (c itation omit ted). “ The rule make s the plaintiff the master of the c laim; he or she may avoid fe dera l jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar , Inc. v . W

illiams , 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Fur thermore , the Supreme Court ha s emphasized that “it takes more than a f eder al eleme nt to open the ‘ arising under’ door.” Empire He althChoi ce A ssur., Inc. v. M cVe igh , 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006) ( internal c itations omi tted). As noted above , plaintiffs’ only “count” ag ainst defe ndants is alleg ed under the D.C. Consumer Protection Proce dures Ac t; a separ ate se ction, ref ere ncing TI L A, indicates that it is an 3“under ly ing violation.” Complaint at 9-10. Plaintiffs explain that their aim was to clar ify what claims they

wer e makingunder se ction 28-3904(dd) of the CPPA. Mot. to Remand at 4. 1 Plaintiffs state that this court does not have subject matter jur isdiction, because the only claims actua lly asser ted in the complaint ar ise under D istrict of Columbia law. SunTrust arg ues that the c omplaint “manifestly raises TI LA claims ag ainst SunTrust.” SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.’s Me morandum in Opposition to Plai ntiffs ’ Motion to Remand [dkt

. #12] (“ Opp. ”) at 1. SunTrust arg ues that the we ll-pleade d complaint rule “ focuse s on whether a fede ral que stion ex ists on the face of the c omplaint, not on the labels or hea dings c ontained in the complaint.” Id. at 2.

2 Upon re ading plaintiffs’ complaint in conjunction with their brie f, it is clear to the court that plaintiffs only

intended to include TI L A violations to the ex tent that TI L A is incorporated into the D.C. CP PA. I n fac t, plaintiffs alleg e that “D efe ndant SunTrust violated § 28-3904(dd) and ther eby

violated D.C. Mun. Reg s. Tit. 16 § 101 by failing to fully

and ade quately

disclose that Plaintiffs were require d to purcha se PMIand the ter ms of the PMIpursuant to the Truth in L ending Act (TI L A), 15 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq.” Id. ¶ 45. The fa ct that plaintiffs’ c laim under the D .C. CP PA and D.C. Municipal Reg ulations is based, in pa

rt, on SunTrust’s alleg ed TI L A violations does not cre ate a n independe nt fede ral question so as to merit fede ral jurisdiction. See Nkengfack v. Home comings Fin., LLC , Case No. 09-CV-1928, 2009 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 104077, at *9 (D. Md. Nov. 6, 2009) ( “That a cour t must

S p e c i f i c a l l y , s e c t i o n 2 8

- 3 9 0 4 ( d d ) s t a t e s t h a t i t s h a l l b e a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e C P P A t o v i o l a t e a n y p r o v i s i o n o f t i t l e 1 6 1 o f t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a M u n i c i p a l R e g u l a t i o n s ( D
. C
. C o d e § 2 8

- 3 9 0 4 ( d d ) ) ; t i t l e 1 6 i n c o r p o r a t e s b y r e f e r e n c e t w e l v e s e c t i o n s o f t h e f e d e r a l T I L A
. D
. C
. M u n . R e g . t i t
. 1 6 , § 1 0 1
. S u n T r u s t d o e s n o t c l a i m t h a t t h e D
. C
. s t a t u t e i s i n a n y w a y p r e e m p t e d b y t h e f e d e r a l s t a t u t e . 2 4deter

mine the extent to which an alleg ed TI L A violation also violates Mary land law is not signific ant enoug h to merit fede ral jurisdiction.”). F urthermor e, state statutes inc orporating fede ral lawin this way

are not rare , and “[g ]ranting f eder al jurisdiction in this case . . . would upset the bala

nce be tween f

eder al and state judicial responsibilities.” Id. , at *12. III. CONCLUSION For the re asons stated, it is, here by , ORDERED that plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is GR ANTED . I t is further, he reby , ORDERED that SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint is DENIED without prejudice. SO ORDERED. J anuar y 13, 2012

BA RBARA J. R OTHSTEI N UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE

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