alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

Case No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM 

GRACE, INC., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF MIAMI, 

Defendant. 

 / 

PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF FILING ADMITTED TRIAL EXHIBITS 

(VOLUME II of III) 

Pursuant to Local Rule 5.3(b)(2) and the Court’s Paperless Order Scheduling Trial (ECF 

32), Plaintiffs file the attached exhibits admitted into evidence at trial: 

Plfs.’ 

Tr. Ex. Description 

29 Jun. 14, 2023 De Grandy Slides 

30 Jun. 14, 2023 De Grandy Draft Maps 

31 Jun. 14, 2023 Redistricting Meeting Agenda 

32 Resolution 23-271 

33 May 23, 2023 Plaintiffs’ Letter with P1 and P2 

34 Jun. 9, 2023 Plaintiffs’ Information on Ability to Elect in District Under P1 and P2

35 Jun. 12, 2023 Dr. Moy’s Analysis re P1 and P2 

36 Jun. 13, 2023 ACLU Email to City’s Counsel Sharing Maps 

37 Jun. 17, 2023 Plaintiffs’ Letter to Mayor Suarez Urging Veto 

38 May 26, 2023 Commissioner King Instagram Post 

39 Jun. 14, 2023 Commissioner King Facebook Post 

41 Jun. 30, 2023 City Attorney Mendez Email re Passage of New Map 

42 City to County Email re City Map Pending Appeal 

43 GRACE, Inc. Bylaws 

44 GRACE, Inc. Member Organizations 

45 Feb. 6, 2022 HOTA Letter to City 

47 NAACP Unit Bylaws 

48 NAACP Constitution 

49 NAACP Redistricting Letter 

Case 1:22-cv-24066-KMM Document 172 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/02/2024 Page 1 of 2
2 

50 Mar. 11, 2022 NAACP Letter to City 

51 Mar. 23, 2022 NAACP Statement 

52 Mar. 28, 2022 Pierre Letter to Mayor Suarez 

53 Mar. 30, 2022 Pierre Follow-up to Mayor Suarez 

54 Feb. 25, 2022 NAACP Joint Letter to City 

55 Engage Miami, Inc. Bylaws 

57 Overtown Community Meeting Flyer 

58 Coconut Grove Community Meeting Flyer 

59 Clarice Cooper State ID and Voter Card 

Respectfully submitted February 2, 2024, 

 /s/ Caroline A. McNamara 

Nicholas L.V. Warren (FBN 1019018)

ACLU Foundation of Florida

1809 Art Museum Drive, Suite 203 

Jacksonville, FL 32207 

(786) 363-1769 

nwarren@aclufl.org 

Daniel B. Tilley (FBN 102882) 

Caroline A. McNamara (FBN 1038312) 

ACLU Foundation of Florida

4343 West Flagler Street, Suite 400 

Miami, FL 33134 

(786) 363-2714 

dtilley@aclufl.org 

cmcnamara@aclufl.org 

Gregory P. Luib* 

Dechert LLP 

1900 K Street NW 

Washington, DC 20006 

(202) 261-3413 

gregory.luib@dechert.com

Neil A. Steiner*

Julia Markham-Cameron* 

Dechert LLP 

ree Bryant Park

1095 Avenue of the Americas 

New York, NY 10036

(212) 698-3822 

neil.steiner@dechert.com 

julia.markham-cameron@dechert.com 

Christopher J. Merken* 

Dechert LLP 

Cira Centre 

2929 Arch Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 

(215) 994-2380 

christopher.merken@dechert.com 

* Admitted pro hac vice 

Counsel for Plaintiffs 

Case 1:22-cv-24066-KMM Document 172 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/02/2024 Page 2 of 2
#### § 102-33.310 May we report as excess, or replace, unsalvageable aircraft parts?

No, you may not report unsalvageable aircraft parts as excess or exchange/sale them for replacements. You must mutilate unsalvageable parts. You may sell the mutilated parts only as scrap or report that scrap to GSA for sale.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Robert T. Atwood, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Corautus Genetics Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Reserved;

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date: March 20, 2006



/s/ Robert T. AtwoodRobert T. AtwoodExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
§ 912.9 Final denial of claim. ( a ) Final denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or registered mail. The notification of final denial may include a statement of the reasons for the denial and shall include a statement that, if the claimant is dissatisfied with the agency action, he may file suit in an appropriate U.S. District Court not later than 6 months after the date of mailing of the notation.
( b ) Prior to the commencement of suit and prior to the expiration of the 6 month period provided in 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), a claimant, his duly authorized agent, or legal representative, may file a written request with the postal official who issued the final denial or with the Chief Counsel, Torts, General Law Service Center, USPS National Tort Center, 1720 Market Street, Room 2400, St. Louis, MO 63155-9948, for a reconsideration of a final denial of a claim under paragraph (a) of this section. Upon the timely filing of a request for reconsideration, the Postal Service shall have 6 months from the date of filing in which to make a disposition of the claim and the claimant's option under 28 U.S.C. 2675(a) shall not accrue until 6 months after the filing of a request for reconsideration. Final Postal Service action on a request for reconsideration shall be effected in accordance with this part.
( c ) For purposes of this section, a request for reconsideration of a final denial of a claim shall be deemed to have been filed when received in the office of the official who issued the final denial or in the office of the Chief Counsel, Torts, General Law Service Center, USPS National Tort Center, 1720 Market Street, Room 2400, St. Louis, MO 63155-9948.
( d ) Only one request for reconsideration of a final denial may be filed. A claimant shall have no right to file a request for reconsideration of a final denial issued in response to a request for reconsideration.
(28 U.S.C. 2671-2680; 28 CFR 14.1-14.11; 39 U.S.C. 401, 409, 2008)
[36 FR 12448, June 30, 1971, as amended at 38 FR 16868, June 27, 1973; 49 FR 19478, May 8, 1984; 69 FR 52607, Aug. 27, 2004; 73 FR 75340, Dec. 11, 2008; 76 FR 52580, Aug. 23, 2011]
#### § 102-36.180 Is there any limitation/condition to acquiring excess personal property for use by cooperatives?

Yes, you must limit the total dollar amount of property transfers (in terms of original acquisition cost) to the dollar value of the cooperative agreement. For any transfers in excess of such amount, you must ensure that an official of your agency at a level higher than the officer administering the agreement approves the transfer. The federal government retains title to such property, except when provided by specific statutory authority.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

NATIONAL VEHICLE AND FUEL EMISSIONS LABORATORY

2000 TRAVERWOOD ROAD

ANN ARBOR, MI 48105-2498

 OFFICE OF

AIR AND RADIATION

July 21, 2011

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Meeting with PACCAR

FROM: Angela Cullen, Mechanical Engineer

TO: Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0162

This memorandum documents a meeting held on March 4, 2011 between PACCAR and EPA. 

The attendees included:

PACCAR: Dan Kieffer, Ryan Reed, Peter Klinkline

EPA: Byron Bunker, Cle Jackson, Prashanth Gururaja, Julian Davis, Arvon Mitcham, and 

Angela Cullen 

The discussion focused on coastdown testing of PACCAR tractors and enhanced coastdown test 

procedures, including the following:

 Grade

 Coastdown tracks

 Coastdown data analyss

 Trailer height

 Speed range

 Tires

 Anemometer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000004187
<NAME> INDUSTRIAL SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                       1,850,551
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,590,304
<ALLOWANCES>                                   141,000
<INVENTORY>                                  2,028,489
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            13,643,407
<PP&E>                                       9,658,733
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,187,397
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              20,600,997
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       14,319,713
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        19,575
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,477,851
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                20,600,997
<SALES>                                     67,597,638
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            67,597,638
<CGS>                                       62,312,889
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               62,312,889
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,232,618
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               167,545
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             134,166
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                750,420
<INCOME-TAX>                                   294,560
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            455,860
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   455,860
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .24
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .24


</TABLE>
§ 105-70.032 Location of hearing. ( a ) The hearing may be held— ( 1 ) In any judicial district of the United States in which the defendant resides or transacts business;
( 2 ) In any judicial district of the United States in which the claim or statement in issue was made; or
( 3 ) In such other place as may be agreed upon by the defendant and the ALJ.
( b ) Each party shall have the opportunity to present arguments with respect to the location of the hearing.
( c ) The hearing shall be held at the place and at the time ordered by the ALJ.
#### § 102-83.145 Do these regulations apply in GSA's National Capital Region?

The presence of the Federal Government in the National Capital Region is such that the distribution of Federal facilities has been, and will continue to be, a major influence on the character and extent of development in the National Capital Region. In view of the special nature of the National Capital Region and the preponderance of Federal space contained therein, these regulations will be applied in the National Capital Region in conjunction with regional plans and will guide the development of strategic plans for the housing of Federal agencies within the National Capital Region.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

COLEEN RENEE REYES,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 19

- 10406

D.C. No. 1:16

- cr

- 00038

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Guam

Frances M. Tydingco

- Gatewood, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 18, 2021 * *

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Coleen Renee Reyes appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges the 97

- month sentence imposed following her jury

- trial conviction for

attempted possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii) , and 846

. We have jurisd iction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 25 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 10406

U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm

.

Reyes contends that the district court should have exercised its authority to

depart downward under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 . She argues that the government’s

decision not to file a § 5K1.1 motion was intended to punish her for exercising her

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and was not rationally related to a legitimate

governmental interest. 1 “[T]he district court’s factual findings regarding the

Government’s reasons for refusing to file a § 5K1.1 motion are reviewed for clear

error.” United States v. Flores , 559 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009).

The government explained at sentencing that the information Reyes

provided after her trial was not timely or beneficial

. T he government substantiated

that assertion, and the record does not s upport Reyes’s claim of an ulterior

improper motive . Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that

t he government’s refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion was neither unconstitutionally

motivated nor arbitrary. See id. at 1020 ( “ [ W ]hether the assistance provided was

actually substantial is a decision that better rests with the prosecutor, not the

court

. ”)

. B ecause the district court could not grant the departure after the

government legitimately declined to move for it, see id. at 1019, the court had no

1 Reyes also argues that the government improperly refused to file a motion under

18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) , which governs rel ief from the mandatory minimum

. However, th e government did move for safety valve relief under that statute and , as

a result, Reyes received a sentence below the otherwise applicable mandatory

minimum.3 19

- 10406

occasion to consider the § 5K1.1 factors and w e need not reach Reyes’s argument s

that the court misundersto od the standard under § 5K1.1 and failed to explain its

reasoning adequately

.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 99.3

                         Independent Accountants' Report


The Board of Directors
Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank N.A.:

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying
Management's Assertion, that Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank N.A., (the
Servicer) complied with the minimum servicing standards set forth in the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America's Uniform Single Attestation Program for
Mortgage Bankers exclusive of standards I.4., III.3., III.4., V.2., V.3., and
V.4., as of and for the year ended December 31, 2004. Management is responsible
for the Servicer's compliance with those minimum servicing standards. Our
responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion about the
Servicer's compliance based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,
accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Servicer's
compliance with the minimum servicing standards and performing such other
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our
examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does
not provide a legal determination on the Servicer's compliance with the minimum
servicing standards.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Servicer complied with the
aforementioned minimum servicing standards as of and for the year ended December
31, 2004 is fairly stated, in all material respects.




Minneapolis, Minnesota
March 15, 2005



<PAGE>



                             Management's Assertion


As of and for the year ended December 31, 2004, Direct Merchants Credit Card
Bank N.A. (the "Servicer") complied in all material respects with the minimum
servicing standards set forth in the Mortgage Bankers Association of America's
Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers, except for the
following:

-    Minimum servicing standards I.4., III.3., III.4., V.2., V.3., and V.4.,
     which the Servicer has interpreted as being inapplicable to credit card
     servicing.

As of and for the same period, the Servicer had in effect a fidelity bond, and
errors and omissions policies in the amount of $55 million.

                            DIRECT MERCHANTS CREDIT CARD BANK N.A.



                                   /s/Scott R. Fjellman
                            Name:  Scott R. Fjellman
                            Title: Senior Vice President, Treasurer & Cashier



Date: March 15, 2005
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 27, 2016

d0919

Order 

Clerk

September 27, 2016

151621 & (58)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 151621

COA: 318697 

Livingston CC: 13-021225-FC

KEVIN MICHAEL CLARK,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 24, 2015 

judgment of the Court of Appeals and the motion to remand are considered. Pursuant to 

MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE in part the judgment 

of the Court of Appeals, and we REMAND this case to the Livingston Circuit Court to 

determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under 

the sentencing procedure described in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015), and to 

determine whether the post-sentencing amendment to the presentence investigation report 

would have caused the court to impose a different sentence. With regard to the Lockridge

issue, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If, 

after taking into account both the unconstitutional constraint on its discretion and the 

amendment to the presentence investigation report, the trial court determines that it 

would have imposed the same sentence, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, 

however, the trial court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence, it 

shall resentence the defendant. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because 

we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this 

Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<CURRENCY> US

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                              APR-1-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                  1.000
<CASH>                                       2,667,347
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  308,249
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,088,095
<PP&E>                                       1,980,727
<DEPRECIATION>                               (963,548)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,653,737
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,208,759
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  5,427,188
<COMMON>                                       205,692
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,187,902)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,444,978
<SALES>                                      1,434,438
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,434,438
<CGS>                                          168,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               15,863,964
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               280,038
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (14,276,485)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (14,276,485)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (14,276,485)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (1.80)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.80)


</TABLE>
§ 102-73.140 When may agencies that do not possess independent leasing authority lease space? Federal agencies may perform for themselves all functions necessary to acquire leased space in buildings and land incidental thereto when— ( a ) The authority may be delegated (see § 102-72.30) on the different types of delegations related to real estate leasing);
( b ) The space may be leased for no rental, or for a nominal consideration of $1 per annum, and is limited to terms not to exceed 1 year;
( c ) Authority has been requested by an Executive agency and a specific delegation has been granted by the Administrator of General Services;
( d ) A categorical delegation has been granted by the Administrator of General Services for space to accommodate particular types of agency activities, such as military recruiting offices or space for certain county level agricultural activities (see § 102-73.155 for a listing of categorical delegations); or
( e ) The required space is found by the Administrator of General Services to be wholly or predominantly utilized for the special purposes of the agency to occupy such space and is not generally suitable for use by other agencies. Federal agencies must obtain prior approval from the GSA regional office having jurisdiction for the proposed leasing action, before initiating a leasing action involving 2,500 or more square feet of such special purpose space. GSA's approval must be based upon a finding that there is no vacant Government-owned or leased space available that will meet the agency's requirements. Agency special purpose space delegations can be found in §§ 102-73.170 through 102-73.225.