IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ADAM TODD, DIGITEX LLC, DIGITEX 

LIMITED, DIGITEX SOFTWARE 

LIMITED, AND BLOCKSTER HOLDINGS 

LIMITED CORPORATION (D/B/A 

DIGITEX FUTURES)

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO: 1:22-cv-23174-

RKA

Hon. Roy K. Altman

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT, PERMANENT 

INJUCTION, CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES, AND OTHER STATUTORY AND

EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission” or “CFTC”), 

submits this motion (“Motion”) pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 

entry of default judgments against Defendants Adam Todd, Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex 

Software Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation (“Defendants” unless referred to 

individually).1 The Commission supports the Motion, as appropriate, with a declaration of 

compliance with the Service Members Civil Relief Act as Exhibit 1 of this filing, and evidence 

provided in the Declaration of Joseph Patrick as Exhibit 2 of this filing. 

 

1 In response to the Court’s Order on Default Final Judgment Procedure, (ECF No. 30), the CFTC states 

that no Defendant in this action has answered the operative pleading or otherwise attempted to defend the 

CFTC’s claims and the Clerk entered default against all Defendants pursuant to Rule 55(a). Accordingly, 

the CFTC believes there is no risk of inconsistent judgments if the Court grants this motion and enters the 

contemporaneously filed [Proposed] Order for Judgment By Default against all Defendants. 

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I. INTRODUCTION

The clerk has entered default under Rule 55(a) as to all Defendants. (ECF No. 29.) 

Pursuant to Rule 55(b), based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint against Defendants, 

which the Court should take as true, and on the evidence concerning equitable and legal remedies, 

the CFTC requests that the Court grant the Motion and enter the concurrently-filed Proposed Order 

for Judgment by Default against Defendants. 

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The CFTC filed its Complaint on September 30, 2022, (ECF No. 1), and amended it solely 

to add allegations concerning service of process on December 28, 2022, (Am. Compl., ECF No. 

13). Neither Defendants nor the attorney who had represented Defendants during the CFTC’s presuit investigation substantively responded to the CFTC’s requests to waive service. (See ECF No. 

18-1 (A. Schrimpf Aff. ¶¶ 14–15).)

Claims against the Defendants remain unresolved. All Defendants have been properly 

served with process but have not appeared, have not answered the CFTC’s Complaint or Amended 

Complaint, and have not otherwise attempted to defend the CFTC’s claims. (See ECF No. 18-1). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court clerk shall enter a party’s default if a party fails to plead or otherwise defend 

an action brought against it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After a party’s default has been entered by the 

clerk, the party that sought the default may file a motion requesting a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 55(b)(2); CFTC v. FX Professional Intern. Solutions, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-22311-PCH, 2010 WL 

5541050, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2010). The decision to grant a motion for default judgment is 

within the sound discretion of the district court. Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir.

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1985) (district courts have “the authority to enter default judgment for failure to . . . comply with 

. . . rules of procedure”).

Upon the court’s determination that a defendant is in default, well-pleaded factual

allegations of the complaint will be deemed admitted and liability established. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(d) (“Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to 

the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.”); see also Perez 

v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2014) (“a defaulted defendant is deemed to

have admitted the movant’s well-pleaded allegations of facts”); CFTC v. Mercury Partners, Inc., 

No. 05-60328, 2005 WL 8157537 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2005) (granting motion for default judgment 

and entering findings of fact and conclusions of law finding defendant liable as to all violations 

alleged in complaint).

“Although a defaulted defendant admits well-pleaded allegations of liability, allegations

relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default. Rather, the Court determines 

the amount and character of damages to be awarded.” Robbie’s of Key W. v. M/V Komedy III, 470 

F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2020). A court may hold a hearing to determine an appropriate 

amount of monetary relief to impose in connection with a default judgment, but need not do so if 

no defendant objects and the proposed relief can be “computed to be made certain.” CFTC v. 

Amerman, 645 F. App’x 938, 943–44 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231 

(11th Cir. 2005)). It is not necessary to hold a hearing when entering a final default judgment “if 

the damages are liquidated or ascertainable from documentary evidence or affidavits.” Shandong 

Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Capt. LLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1207 (M.D. Fla. 2009).

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IV. FACTS

A. Parties to the Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission is the independent federal regulatory 

agency charged by Congress with the administration and enforcement of the CEA and Regulations 

promulgated thereunder. (See ECF No. 13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 12).)

Defendants Digitex Limited, Digitex Software Limited, Blockster Holdings Limited, 

and Digitex LLC are a common enterprise of corporate entities that comprise Digitex Futures, as 

defined below, which operated Digitex Futures Exchange from an office in Miami, Florida. This 

Motion refers collectively to the entity Defendants listed in the preceding sentence as “Digitex 

Futures” and the web-based exchange as the “Exchange.” None of the entities comprising Digitex 

Futures has ever been registered with the Commission in any capacity. Digitex Limited was 

registered in the Republic of Seychelles on December 11, 2017. Digitex Software Limited was 

registered in Ireland on March 8, 2018, and operated in Dublin with a small staff of software 

developers for several months. At all times relevant to the Amended Complaint, Todd owned 

Digitex Limited and Digitex Software Limited. Since at least January 27, 2021, Todd has co-owned 

Blockster Holdings Limited, a Gibraltar entity. On April 27, 2021, Todd and Blockster Holdings 

Limited applied to form Digitex LLC in St. Vincent & the Grenadines. (Id. ¶ 13).)

Defendant Adam Todd is a natural person who resided in Miami, Florida during much of 

the Relevant Period, as defined below. Todd founded and was the CEO of Digitex Futures. Todd 

owned and controlled all of the entities comprising Digitex Futures at all times relevant to the 

Amended Complaint. Todd has never been registered with the Commission in any capacity. (Id. 

¶ 14.)

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B. The Digitex Futures Exchange and Products

Between December 2017 and the filing of the Complaint, (the “Relevant Period”), Todd 

owned, built, and operated Digitex Futures as an illegal digital asset derivatives trading platform. 

As set forth in greater detail below, Defendants operated their illegal digital asset derivatives 

exchange, as set forth in detail below, between July 31, 2020 and at least May 2022 (the “Exchange 

Period”), and engaged in attempted manipulation of the DGTX token, as set forth in detail below, 

between approximately May 1, 2020 and August 15, 2020 (the “Attempted Manipulation Period”). 

For substantial portions of the Relevant Period, Todd exercised strategic control of all 

business decisions from Digitex Futures’ Miami office. Digitex Futures offered to enter into or 

execute, and accepted funds to margin, transactions in off-exchange leveraged digital asset futures 

to customers in the U.S. and throughout the world. (Id. ¶ 30.) DGTX was a digital asset, a digital 

representation of value that functioned as a medium of exchange, and also traded on web-based 

trading platforms that were accessible to market participants in the United States, including Todd, 

and therefore was a commodity in interstate commerce. (Id. ¶ 37.) During the Exchange Period, 

Digitex Futures allowed customers to trade at least two futures contracts: bitcoin/USD and 

ether/USD. Transactions in these futures contracts that were entered into on the Exchange did not 

occur on a DCM or foreign board of trade; instead, Digitex Futures purported to operate its own 

unregulated trading platform. (Id. ¶ 38.) 

The Exchange allowed customers to exchange bitcoin or ether for DGTX, and customers 

could use DGTX to margin, guarantee, or secure futures transactions on Digitex Futures. (Id. ¶ 42.) 

Digitex Futures deployed a smart contract to accept customer funds in the form of DGTX as margin 

and controlled the circumstances where a customer’s collateral was subject to a margin call. (Id. ¶ 

44.)

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C. Todd Controlled Digitex Futures and Operated Digitex Futures as a Common 

Enterprise

At all relevant times, Todd has been the majority shareholder or owner of each of the various 

corporate entities that comprise Digitex Futures and has exercised general control over the 

Exchange’s operations. (Id. ¶ 45.) Digitex Futures operated as a common enterprise at all relevant 

times. (Id. ¶ 47.) Since January 2018, Todd has controlled virtually all material aspects of the 

Digitex Futures business, including strategic decisions, business development, and marketing of 

Digitex Futures. For example, Todd has: 

a. been responsible for building and overseeing the Exchange’s trading engine; 

b. determined the contract specifications of Digitex Futures’ financial products;

c. overseen the development of and deployment of the Digitex Futures’ internal market 

maker trading algorithms, which engaged in proprietary trading on the Exchange;

d. signed contracts for Digitex Futures; 

e. controlled Digitex Futures’ bank and trading accounts; and 

f. hired, fired, and determined the compensation of Digitex Futures employees. 

(Id. ¶ 46.)

D. Digitex Futures Failed To Implement an Effective Anti-Money Laundering Program, 

KYC Procedures, or a Customer Information Program 

Know-your-customer (“KYC”) procedures and Customer Information Programs (“CIPs”)

collect verifiable customer identifying information such as a copy of a government-issued ID or 

beneficial ownership information that allows a financial services firm like an FCM to know who its 

customers are and where they are located. During the Exchange Period, Digitex Futures failed to 

implement an AML program and did not implement any KYC procedures or a CIP that would have 

enabled it to identify U.S. persons on the platform—or the true identity of its customers, whether 

from the U.S. or elsewhere. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.)

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In March 2020, Digitex Futures posted a YouTube video of Todd conceptually disparaging 

anti-money laundering programs (in particular, KYC procedures) and stating his refusal to comply 

with AML requirements: 

We do not need to do KYC. . . . You should not have to give them because the U.S. 

government or whatever other [expletive] government in the world says that you 

need to. You do not need to. You just do not. 

(Id. ¶ 51.)

Digitex Futures allowed customers to open accounts with only an anonymous email and 

password, and did not require that customers provide any additional identity-verifying 

documentation. As Digitex Futures’ CEO and principal owner, Todd controlled whether Digitex

Futures would implement an effective AML program, a CIP, or KYC procedures. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53.)

E. Todd’s and Digitex Futures’ Attempted Manipulation of the Price of DGTX Tokens 

During the Attempted Manipulation Period, Todd attempted to artificially increase the price 

of DGTX tokens. As founder and control person of Digitex Futures (and by extension, the 

individual who controlled the issuance and primary sales of the Exchange’s “native currency” 

DGTX), Todd had inside information concerning the supply of DGTX and ability to impact the 

price of DGTX. Todd’s attempted manipulation generally consisted of trying to drive up, or 

“pumping,” the price of DGTX by touting DGTX and the Exchange to increase demand for DGTX 

and engaging in non-economic trading activity on third-party exchanges to benefit Defendants’ 

accumulated positions in DGTX. Digitex Futures required customers to own DGTX to trade on the 

platform. (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.)

The price of DGTX rose sharply during the Attempted Manipulation Period, consistent with 

Todd’s communications, as reflected below in the price chart based on data maintained and 

generated by CoinMarketCap. This chart shows the price of DGTX between May 1, 2020 and 

September 15, 2020; the y-axis is denominated in U.S. dollars. (Id. ¶ 56.)

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Todd’s scheme to pump the price of DGTX included buying DGTX on third-party 

exchanges—notwithstanding Todd’s and Digitex Futures’ ownership of hundreds of millions of 

DGTX tokens. Todd’s trading activity on third-party exchanges was intended to increase the 

market price that was reflected on those exchanges, which in turn was incorporated into the price 

of DGTX as reported by CoinMarketCap. Because Digitex Futures priced its direct sales of DGTX 

based on CoinMarketCap’s reported price, Todd’s plan was therefore intended to increase the price 

at which Digitex Futures could sell DGTX out of its “treasury.” 

Todd’s plan was exemplified by communications and transactions between Todd and a 

Digitex Futures’ customer (“Customer A”), who is a U.S. citizen that resided in Illinois during the 

Attempted Manipulation Period. In late June 2020, Todd and Customer A began discussing Todd’s 

plan to manipulate the price of DGTX to its all-time high price just ahead of the launch of the 

Digitex Futures Exchange on July 31, 2020. Todd explained his intention to influence the price of 

DGTX to customer A on June 24, 2020, when DGTX was trading at a price of 3.5 cents per token. 

 (Id. ¶ 58.)

On July 8, 2020, Todd predicted to Customer A: “DGTX will pop on July 17th.” (Id. ¶ 59.) 

Throughout July 2020, Todd promoted the July 31, 2020 Exchange launch on social media 

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platforms and the Digitex Futures blog and enlisted others to help him generate interest in DGTX 

and the Exchange. By July 16, Todd reported to Customer A: “Things are heating up. DGTX at 

52 week high.” (Id. ¶ 61.)

Digitex Futures also marketed DGTX’s increasing prices to the public. On July 20, 2020, 

Digitex Futures tweeted: “Growing demand has pushed the price up by nearly 167% throughout 

July. Despite the massive gains already posted, different on-chain metrics suggest #DGTX is poised 

for higher highs.” At this time, Digitex Futures did not publicize the fact that its owner, Todd, was 

engaged in non-economic trading activity on third-party exchanges for the purpose of “pumping” 

the price of DGTX. (Id. ¶ 62.) While soliciting money from Customer A on July 23, 2020, Todd 

described his intent to push up the DGTX token price: “I want to do a big pump this week to break 

our ATH2 leading up to the launch day and get the FOMO3 going crazy so if you can get me that 

$300k by tomorrow . . . . I’ll spend the lot on buying DGTX over the weekend 💥💥💥💥[.]” Customer 

A wired $300,000 to Todd’s personal bank account on July 23, 2020. (Id. ¶ 63.) 

Between July 23, 2020 and the July 31, 2020 Exchange “public launch,” both Todd and 

Customer A continued to enter bids (buy orders) on a third-party exchange to purchase DGTX, 

putting upward pressure on the price. For example, on July 24, 2020, Todd reported to Customer A 

that as a result of his relentless DGTX buying, to which Todd represented he committed “$100k in 

last 12 hours,” Todd finally “broke” a 10.2-cent price barrier set by sellers in the DGTX market. 

(Id. ¶ 64.) On July 25, 2020, Customer A told Todd he “bought about $50k.” Todd responded that 

he bought “$150 DGTX” and reported that the price “just popped to 11 [cents]. ...”(Id. ¶ 65.) 

 

2 ATH is slang for “all time high” in the digital asset space. 

3 FOMO is slang for “fear of missing out” in the digital asset space.

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On July 29, 2020, two days before the Exchange “public launch,” Todd described the 

mechanics of his plan to Customer A to manipulate the price of DGTX through non-economic 

trading: 

I’m setting up OTC sales desk to get big fiat buy orders coming in which I will then 

fill by aggressively buying on [another exchange] . . . That will be the key to the big 

move I think. . . . I’ll be losing money on the otc trades but should get [the price of 

DGTX] pumping.

In other words, Todd hoped to receive large orders for DGTX directly from market participants (as 

opposed to through orders placed on the Exchange), and then take the money he received from those 

prospective purchasers and use it to buy DGTX on third-party digital asset trading platforms (as 

opposed to simply filling the orders out of the Digitex Futures “treasury,” which held hundreds of 

millions of DGTX tokens with a cost basis to Digitex Futures of zero). This transaction pattern—

realize trading losses while filling off-exchange orders (also called over-the-counter or “OTC” 

orders) on third-party platforms to pump the price of DGTX—is exactly what Todd stated he would 

do with Customer A’s $300,000 cash transfer, described above, on July 23. (Id. ¶ 66.)

Customer A asked why Todd anticipated losing money on the over-the-counter trades—that 

is, Customer A asked Todd why Todd would engage in non-economic trading. Todd replied that 

he hoped to benefit from his pumping activity due to the impact the increased price of DGTX would 

have on the value of the holdings of the Digitex Futures “treasury”:

I’ll sell big block of dgtx [in an OTC transaction] and then I will take that money 

and buy DGTX with it on [another exchange] at higher prices than I just sold for to 

pump it up some more. Rinse and repeat, every big otc buy order I’ll send straight 

into [another exchange]. . . . But with a higher price I make more from the Digitex 

Treasury sales on the website. . . . . Treasury sells at 5% premium on cmc price you 

can see the price on the Buy DGTX page of the website. . . . So it doesn’t exert any 

downward pressure on the price because only people who don’t want to deal with a 

crypto exchange buy from the treasury. 

(Id. ¶ 67.) 

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On July 31, 2020, Todd hosted a 5-hour live YouTube launch from Florida during which he 

continued to tout the DGTX price, stating “the token price was at 4 cents at the start of July and it 

went to 12 cents.” During the livestream, Todd did not disclose his own non-economic trading 

activity and instead predicted the DGTX price would reach $1 per token by the end of 2020 while 

downplaying the risks of trading on the Exchange and price volatility of DGTX. (Id. ¶ 68.) 

According to Todd, 1,500 customers deposited at least $1.5 million worth of DGTX into the 

Exchange in the seven days prior to August 4, 2020. (Am. Compl. ¶ 74; see also Patrick Decl. ¶ 

14) According to documents provided by Todd to Customer A, during the first two months after 

the Exchange’s “public launch” on July 31, 2020, at least 13,920 customers deposited $2,412,220 

worth of DGTX into accounts at the Exchange. (Am. Compl. ¶ 75; see also Patrick Decl. ¶ 15.) 

Together together, Todd’s representations about customer deposits totaled $3,912,220 in gains he 

and in ill-gotten gains he and Digitex Futures would not have otherwise received without operating 

an unregistered futures exchange. (Patrick Decl. ¶¶ 16-17.) 

V. DISCUSSION

During the Attempted Manipulation Period, Todd attempted to manipulate the price of 

DGTX by engaging in non-economic trading activity—here, trading that was expected to lose 

money rather than make money—on third-party digital asset trading platforms with the intent to 

artificially inflate (or “pump”) the price of DGTX to increase the value of the DGTX tokens held 

by Todd and Digitex Futures and to benefit Digitex Futures by attempting to legitimize its “native 

currency.” Digitex Futures is liable for Todd’s attempted manipulation-related violations pursuant 

to Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act because Todd was acting as the Digitex Futures CEO while 

attempting to manipulate the price of DGTX. 

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During the Exchange Period, Digitex Futures engaged in regulatory and registration 

violations through the acts and omissions of its employees and agents, including Todd. See 7 U.S.C. 

§ 2(a)(1)(B). Todd is liable as control person for Digitex Futures regulatory and registration 

violations pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Act because Todd controlled Digitex Futures at all 

relevant times and did not act in good faith or knowingly induced the conduct comprising Digitex 

Futures violations. See 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b). 

Thus, all Defendants are liable for all five counts alleged the Amended Complaint, either 

directly or through various principles of derivative liability, and should be held jointly and severally 

liable. 

A. Count I Against All Defendants: Attempted Manipulation of the Price of DGTX

During the Attempted Manipulation Period, Defendants, through Todd and their agents and 

employees, violated Sections 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3), 13(a)(2), and 

Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2022) by, directly or indirectly, attempting to manipulate the 

price of “native currency” DGTX, a commodity in interstate commerce. Defendants specifically 

intended to “pump” or create or affect a price or price trend that did not reflect legitimate forces of 

supply and demand. Defendants took overt actions in furtherance of an attempt to manipulate the 

price of a commodity in interstate commerce. 

Todd is directly liable for his acts and omissions. The acts and omissions of Todd and other 

officers, employees, or agents acting for Digitex Futures described in the Amended Complaint were 

done within the scope of their office, employment, or agency with Digitex Futures. Therefore, 

pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) and 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2022), Digitex Futures is liable as a principal 

for each act, omission, or failure of the other officers, employees, or agents acting for Digitex 

Futures, constituting violations of 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.2. Each and every overt 

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action in furtherance of the attempt to manipulate prices, and each act of attempted manipulation is 

a separate and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3) and 13(a)(2) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.2.

B. Count II Against All Defendants: Fraud and Manipulation by Deceptive Device or 

Contrivance

During the Attempted Manipulation Period, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, 

Digitex Software Limited, Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, and Todd, all acting as a 

common enterprise and doing business as Digitex Futures, and their officers, employees, and 

agents, violated 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2022), by, directly or indirectly, using a 

manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the sale of “native currency” 

DGTX, a commodity, in an attempt to manipulate the price of a commodity in interstate commerce. 

Defendants took actions that were an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care and 

should have known their actions could create or affect a price or price trend that did not reflect 

legitimate forces of supply and demand. Defendants took overt actions in furtherance of an attempt 

to manipulate the price of a commodity in interstate commerce. 

Todd is directly liable for his acts and omissions. The acts and omissions of Todd and other 

officers, employees, or agents acting for Digitex Futures described in the Amended Complaint were 

done within the scope of their office, employment, or agency with Digitex Futures. Therefore, 

pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) and 17 C.F.R. § 1.2, Digitex Futures is liable as a principal for 

each act, omission, or failure of the other officers, employees, or agents acting for Digitex Futures, 

constituting violations of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a). Each and every overt action in 

furtherance of the attempt to manipulate prices, and each act of attempted manipulation is a separate

and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a).

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C. Count III Against All Defendants: Execution of Futures Transactions on an 

Unregistered Board of Trade 

Between July 31, 2020 and September 30, 2022, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, 

Digitex Software Limited, Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, all acting as a common 

enterprise and doing business as Digitex Futures, and through the acts or omissions of Todd and 

their officers, employees, and agents, violated 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) by: 

a. confirming the execution of contracts for the purchase or sale of digital assets for future 

delivery; and 

b. conducting an office or business in the U.S. for the purpose of soliciting, or accepting 

any order for, or otherwise dealing in, any transaction in, or in connection with contracts 

for the purchase or sale of digital assets for future delivery— 

without conducting its futures transactions on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that was

designated or registered by the CFTC as a contract market. Each offer to enter into, execution of, 

and/or confirmation of the execution of illegal off-exchange futures transactions, was a separate 

and distinct violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6(a). 

During the Relevant Period, Todd directly or indirectly controlled Digitex Futures, and did 

not act in good faith or knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, the acts constituting Digitex 

Futures’ violations described in the Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Act, 

7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), Todd is therefore liable for Digitex Futures’ violations to the same extent as 

Digitex Futures.

D. Count IV Against All Defendants: Failure to Register as a Futures Commission 

Merchant

Between July 31, 2020 and September 30, 2022, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, 

Digitex Software Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, and through the acts and 

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omissions of Todd and their officers, employees, and agents, operated as an Futures Commission 

Merchant (“FCM”) by: 

a. engaging in soliciting or accepting orders for the purchase or sale commodities for 

future delivery; 

b. and, in or in connection with these activities, accepting money, securities, or 

property (or extending credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure resulting 

trades on the Exchange. 

Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex Software Limited, and Blockster 

Holdings Limited Corporation, all acting as a common enterprise and doing business as Digitex 

Futures, and through the acts and omissions of Todd and their officers, employees, and agents, 

violated 7 U.S.C. § 6d by failing to register with the Commission as a FCM. Each act in violation 

of 7 U.S.C. § 6d was a separate and distinct violation.

Todd directly or indirectly controlled Digitex Futures and did not act in good faith, or 

knowingly induced, directly or indirectly, the acts constituting Digitex Futures’ violations of 

7 U.S.C. § 6d. Therefore, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), Todd is liable as a control person for each 

of Digitex Futures’ violations of 7 U.S.C. § 6d.

E. Count V Against All Defendants: Failure to Implement Customer Information 

Program, and Failure to Implement Know Your Customer and Anti-Money 

Laundering Procedures

Between July 31, 2020 and September 30, 2022, Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, 

Digitex Software Limited, and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, all acting as a common 

enterprise and doing business as Digitex Futures, operated as an FCM. FCMs are required comply 

with 17 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2022). Defendants Digitex LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex Software Limited, 

and Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation, all acting as a common enterprise and doing business 

as Digitex Futures, and through Todd and their officers, employees, and agents, violated 17 C.F.R. 

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§ 42.2 by failing to implement a Customer Information Program, failing to implement KYC policies 

and procedures, failing to implement an Anti-Money Laundering program, failing to retain required 

customer information, and failing to implement procedures to determine whether a customer 

appears on lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations such as those issued by 

OFAC. 

Each act in violation of 17 C.F.R. § 42.2 was a separate and distinct violation. Todd directly 

or indirectly controlled Digitex Futures and did not act in good faith, or knowingly induced, directly 

or indirectly, the acts constituting Digitex Futures’ violations of 17 C.F.R. § 42.2. Therefore, 

pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), Todd is liable as a control person for each of Digitex Futures’ 

violations of 17 C.F.R. § 42.2.

Unless restrained and enjoined by this Court, there is a reasonable likelihood that Todd and 

Digitex Futures will continue to engage in the acts and practices alleged in the Complaint and in 

similar acts and practices in violation of the Act and Regulations. 

VI. RELIEF SOUGHT

Under 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1, the CFTC may seek various categories of equitable relief and civil 

monetary penalties (“CMP”) from defendants found to have violated the Act. The Commission 

requests that the Court enter permanent injunctions and order disgorgement and CMPs, jointly and 

severally, for all Defendants. 

A. The Court Should Enter Permanent Injunctions Against All Defendants.

“The CEA allows a district court to grant a permanent or temporary injunction.” CFTC v. 

So. Tr. Metals, 894 F.3d 1313, 1328 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(b)). “[T]he ultimate 

test [for an injunction] is whether the defendant’s past conduct indicates that there is a reasonable 

likelihood of further violations in the future.” Id. (quoting CFTC v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 531 

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F.3d 1339, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008)). Southern Trust Metals sets forth six non-dispositive factors to 

consider when assessing whether to impose a permanent injunction:

the egregiousness of the defendant’s actions, the isolated or recurrent nature of the

infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant’s assurances 

against future violations, the defendant’s recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct, 

and the likelihood that the defendant’s occupation will present opportunities for future 

violations.

894 F.3d at 1328. The Southern Trust Metals factors all cut strongly in favor of the imposition of 

permanent injunctions that would prohibit Defendants from, among other things, participating in 

U.S. derivatives markets on a going forward basis. 

The conduct described in the Amended Complaint is egregious. Todd created an illegal 

digital asset exchange, along with a “native token,” and intentionally manipulated or attempted to 

manipulate the price of that token to line his pockets at the expense of Digitex customers. Todd’s 

text messages are direct evidence of his manipulative intent; the Court does not even need to draw 

an inference of scienter. And Todd’s own brazen commentary—in videos he proudly posted to 

YouTube—reflects his awareness of AML and KYC requirements that apply to FCMs and Todd’s 

conscious choice to avoid complying with those prophylactic rules that protect the U.S. financial 

system from abuse by criminals and terrorists. Further reflecting a high degree of scienter and 

likelihood of future violations, Defendants’ conduct was not isolated; the Exchange Period spanned 

years and the Attempted Manipulation Period lasted weeks if not longer. 

Nor has Todd even attempted to accept responsibility for his conduct. He refused to respond 

to CFTC-issued investigative subpoenas and has not appeared in this litigation. Evidence in the 

record shows Todd knew his conduct was illegal. He once discussed fleeing the United States 

because “[i]f launch goes well probably should leave US for 6 months I’ll be running an unregulated 

futures exchange.” (ECF No. 18-1 (A. Schrimpf Aff. ¶ 4, Attach. 3.) Attempting to avoid 

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accountability and ignoring legal process is evidence that a Defendant is likely to violate the law in 

the future. 

Taken together, these facts show there is a reasonable likelihood that Defendants will violate

the Act in the future. As a result, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court enter an 

injunction against all Defendants, prohibiting them from directly or indirectly:

i. attempting to manipulate the price of a commodity in interstate commerce in 

violation of 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3) and 13(a)(2) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2022); 

ii. using a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the sale 

of a commodity in an attempt to manipulate the price of a commodity in interstate 

commerce in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2022); 

iii. confirming the execution of contracts for the purchase or sale of digital assets for 

future delivery; and conducting an office or business in the U.S. for the purpose of 

soliciting, or accepting any order for, or otherwise dealing in, any transaction in, or 

in connection with contracts for the purchase or sale of digital assets for future 

delivery without conducting its futures transactions on or subject to the rules of a 

board of trade that was designated or registered by the CFTC as a contract market in 

violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6(a); 

iv. operating as an unregistered FCM by engaging in soliciting or accepting orders for 

the purchase or sale commodities for future delivery; and, in or in connection with 

these activities, accepting money, securities, or property (or extending credit in lieu 

thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure resulting trades on an exchange in violation 

of 7 U.S.C. § 6d; 

v. failing to implement a CIP, failing to implement KYC policies and procedures, 

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failing to implement an Anti-Money Laundering program, failing to retain required 

customer information, or failing to implement procedures to determine whether a 

customer appears on lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations 

such as those issued by OFAC in violation of 17 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2022). 

Defendants should also be permanently restrained, enjoined and prohibited from directly or 

indirectly: 

i. trading on or subject to the rules of any registered entity (as that term is defined in 

Section la of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § la(40));

ii. entering into any transactions involving “commodity interests” (as that term is 

defined in Commission Regulation 1.3, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2022)) or digital assets that 

are commodities (as that term is described in the Amended Complaint), for 

Defendants’ own accounts or for any account in which they have a direct or indirect 

interest;

iii. having any commodity interests or digital assets that are commodities (as that term 

is described in the Amended Complaint) traded on Defendants’ behalf;

iv. controlling or directing the trading for or on behalf of any other person or entity, 

whether by power of attorney or otherwise, in any account involving commodity 

interests or digital assets that are commodities (as that term is described in the 

Amended Complaint);

v. soliciting, receiving, or accepting any funds from any person for the purpose of 

purchasing or selling any commodity interests or digital assets that are commodities 

(as that term is described in the Amended Complaint);

vi. applying for registration or claiming exemption from registration with the 

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Commission in any capacity, and engaging in any activity requiring such registration 

or exemption from registration with the Commission, except as provided for in 

Regulation 4.14(a)(9), 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) (2022);

vii. acting as a principal (as that term is defined in Regulation 3.1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) 

(2022)), agent or any other officer or employee of any person registered, exempted 

from registration or required to be registered with the Commission except as 

provided for in Regulation 4.14(a)(9). 

B. Disgorgement of Ill-Gotten Gains is Appropriate.

7 U.S.C. 13a-1(d)(3) authorizes the Court to order disgorgement. As this Court has

explained, “disgorgement [is] appropriate for any gains received in connection with” violations of 

the Act. CFTC v. So. Tr. Metals, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1171 (S.D. Fla. 2019). “The CFTC 

has the burden to produce a reasonable approximation of a defendant’s ill-gotten gains to sustain a 

disgorgement amount.” CFTC v. Tayeh, 848 F. App’x 827, 829 (11th Cir. 2021); see also SEC v. 

Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. 2014) (“exactitude is not a requirement”).

The Commission’s request for disgorgement is based on evidence in the record—chiefly 

Defendant Todd’s own statements made in contemporaneous communications—and has been 

reduced to a sum certain, as described below. The Court should order Defendants to disgorge, 

jointly and severally,4 all funds or dollar equivalents of DGTX transferred from customers to the 

Digitex Futures platform during the Relevant Period. 

Todd ignored document subpoenas issued during the CFTC’s pre-suit investigation and did 

 4 Courts frequently impose disgorgement on a joint and several basis. See FTC v. WV Universal Mgmt., 

LLC, 877 F.3d 1234, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming joint and several disgorgement award); So. Tr. 

Metals, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 1172–73 (same and collecting authority). The Supreme Court’s recent Liu v. 

SEC decision does not disturb this well-established rule. See 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1949 (2020) (recognizing 

“flexib[le]” authority for courts to impose disgorgement on a joint and several basis against defendants 

“engaged in concerted wrongdoing”).

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not appear to defend this lawsuit (therefore sidestepping civil discovery). As a result, Todd has 

avoided producing financial and accounting records concerning Digitex’s operations. However, 

according to Todd’s own communications, 1,500 customers deposited at least $1.5 million worth 

of DGTX into the Exchange in the seven days prior to August 4, 2020. (Id. ¶ 74; see also Patrick 

Decl. ¶ 14.) According to documents Todd provided to Customer A, during the first two months 

after the Exchange’s “public launch” on July 31, 2020, at least 13,920 customers deposited 

$2,412,220 worth of DGTX into accounts at the Exchange. (Am. Compl. ¶ 75; see also Patrick 

Decl. ¶ 15.) Because Digitex was the sole initial source of DGTX tokens, the value of the DGTX 

that was deposited back into the Exchange by customers is a reasonable proxy for the minimum

total ill-gotten gains received by Defendants in connection with the operation of their illegal 

Exchange. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Court order disgorgement against 

Defendants on a joint and several basis in the amount of $3,912,220 pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a1(d)(3).

C. Civil Monetary Penalty

7 U.S.C. § 13a-l(d)(1)(A) authorizes the Court to impose civil monetary penalties on

defendants that violated the Act and states: 

[i]n any action brought under this section, the Commission may seek and the court

shall have jurisdiction to impose, on a proper showing, on any person found in the

action to have committed any violation—

(a) a civil penalty in the amount of not more than the greater of $100,000 or triple 

the monetary gain to the person for each violation; or 

(b) in any case of manipulation or attempted manipulation in violation of section 9, 

15, 13b, or 13(a)(2) of this title, a civil monetary penalty in the amount of not more 

than the greater of $1,000,000 or triple the monetary gain to the person for each 

violation. 

Adjusted for inflation, those statutory civil monetary penalty amounts are now $214,514 per 

violation for standard regulatory violations and $1,494,520 per violation for manipulation and 

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attempted manipulation for violations occurring on or after November 2, 2015. See Annual

Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties to Reflect Inflation—2023, 88 Fed. Reg. 1501, 1501-1502 

(Jan. 11, 2023). 

For purposes of imposing a civil monetary penalty, “[c]onduct that violates core provisions 

of the Act’s regulatory system—such as manipulating prices or defrauding customers should be 

considered very serious.” JCC, Inc. v. CFTC, 63 F.3d 1557, 1571 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in 

original). Civil monetary penalties should “reflect the abstract or general seriousness of each 

violation and should be sufficiently high to deter future violations,” which means that civil 

monetary penalties should make it financially detrimental to a defendant to fail to comply with the 

Act and Regulations so that the defendant would rather comply than risk a violation. In re 

Grossfeld, CFTC Docket No. 89-23, 1996 WL 709219 at *12, aff’d, Grossfeld v. CFTC, 137 F.3d 

1300 (11th Cir. 1998).

This case warrants a significant civil monetary penalty because Defendants intentiona lly 

attempted to manipulate the price of a commodity, which is a violation of the Act’s “core 

provisions.” JCC, Inc., 63 F.3d at 1571. The Act authorizes the Court to impose a civil monetary 

penalty of up to three times the gain to the defendant. See 7 U.S.C. 13a-1(d)(1)(A); see also CFTC 

v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (imposing penalty 

in the amount that was triple the defendants’ monetary gain). As set forth above, Defendants

represented to U.S. customers a gain in connection with their violations of the Act totaled at least 

$3,912,220. The CEA thus authorizes a civil monetary penalty of up to three times that amount, or 

$11,736,660.

The statute alternatively permits assessment of a civil monetary penalty for each violation 

of the act. Todd made emphatically clear on YouTube that Digitex Futures would not engage in 

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KYC, yet he represented that he onboarded at least 15,400 customers in the early months of the 

Exchange’s operation. Based on that number of individual violations of Regulation 42.2 alone, the 

civil monetary penalty of $214,514 per violation could be multiplied by 15,400 customers for a 

maximum of $3,303,515,600. Despite this eye-popping example, the Commission recommends a 

more reasonable calculation of triple the monetary gains Defendants represented they received. 

The Commission respectfully requests the Court order Defendants to pay the maximum civil 

monetary penalty authorized by the Act, $11,736,660, which is reflective of Defendants’ serious 

misconduct, which includes knowing participation in a long-running, intentional attempted 

manipulation scheme on an unregistered exchange, plans to flee the country once the unregistered 

exchange launched, and refusal to participate in these proceedings, all of which reflects a lack of 

acceptance of responsibility for wrongdoing and likelihood of future violations.

VII. CONCLUSION

The Commission respectfully requests that the Court grant the Motion and enter the

concurrently-filed Proposed Order for Judgment by Default against all Defendants, imposing the

injunctive and monetary relief set forth therein and described above. 

Dated: June 12, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION 

77 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 800

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 596-0714 facsimile

(312) 596-0700

/s/ Ansley H. Schrimpf

Ansley H. Schrimpf

Trial Attorney

Special Bar ID #A5502922

Case 1:22-cv-23174-RKA Document 32 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/12/2023 Page 23 of 25
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aschrimpf@cftc.gov

Joseph C. Platt

Trial Attorney

Special Bar ID #A5502676

jplatt@cftc.gov

Allison V. Passman

Chief Trial Attorney

Special Bar ID #A5502489 

apassman@cftc.gov

Case 1:22-cv-23174-RKA Document 32 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/12/2023 Page 24 of 25
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an attorney for Plaintiff Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 

hereby certifies that a true and accurate copy of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Judgment by 

Default, Permanent Injunction, Civil Monetary Penalties, and Other Statutory and Equitable 

Relief Against All Defendants has been served on all counsel that have appeared in this action 

via the CM/ECF system and by the following means pursuant to Court order: 

Service on Defendant Adam Todd 

by email to adamtodd@yahoo.com

Service on Defendants Digitex, LLC, Digitex Limited, Digitex Software Limited, and 

Blockster Holdings Limited Corporation 

by email to their principal Adam Todd to adamtodd@yahoo.com

Dated: June 12, 2023 Respectfully submitted, 

 

/s/ Ansley H. Schrimpf 

 Trial Attorney

ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS 

FOR PLATINIFF 

COMMODITY FUTURES 

TRADING COMMISSION

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