IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-20132

CRAIG A. WASHINGTON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CLAYTON K. SCOTT; HARRIS COUNTY, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:16-CV-362

Before KING, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Craig Washington briefs a single issue on appeal, whether 

qualified immunity is a defense to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on a violation 

of the Second Amendment. But Washington appeals from a district-court 

decision dismissing his claims for reasons that have nothing to do with 

qualified immunity. Because we conclude that the qualified-immunity issue 

that Washington identifies is not properly before us, we AFFIRM.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 4, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

Late at night, the sound of breaking glass woke Craig Washington, who 

was asleep in his Houston home. Taking a twelve-gauge shotgun with him, 

Washington went outside to investigate and discovered several broken beer 

bottles on his property. While carrying the shotgun, Washington asked the 

valet at a nightclub across the street whether he had seen who threw the beer 

bottles. Washington was unable to get any information from the valet and 

began to return home. En route, law enforcement officers responding to an 

unrelated noise complaint questioned Washington, who was still armed. Those 

officers contacted the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, explained the 

situation, and were told that charges against Washington would not be 

accepted because Washington had not committed a crime.

Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Jose Salazar of the Houston Police 

Department arrived on the scene. Washington alleges that Salazar decided 

that he wanted to arrest Washington, again contacted the Harris County 

District Attorney’s Office, and deliberately gave the office inaccurate 

information. Specifically, according to Washington, Salazar said that 

Washington had been carrying a handgun, not a shotgun. As a result of 

Salazar’s report, Clayton Scott—an administrative assistant with the Harris 

County District Attorney’s Office—signed an affidavit stating that Washington 

had been carrying a handgun. Washington was then arrested and charged with 

unlawfully carrying a handgun. Charges against Washington were filed but 

later dismissed. 

Washington filed suit against Salazar and his employer, the City of 

Houston, as well as against Scott and his employer, Harris County. 

Washington alleged that Salazar, the City of Houston, and Harris County were 

all liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his rights under the Second, 

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, Washington alleged that 

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Scott was liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiring with Salazar to deprive 

Washington of those rights. 

The district court granted motions to dismiss filed by Harris County and 

by Scott. The district court dismissed Washington’s § 1983 claims against 

Harris County, because Washington did not allege facts indicating that a 

county policy caused his rights to be violated, as required for municipal § 1983 

liability, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Likewise, the 

district court dismissed Washington’s § 1985 conspiracy claim against Scott, 

because Washington did not allege any facts regarding racial animus, and 

racial animus is an element of a § 1985 conspiracy claim, Horaist v. Doctor’s 

Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 271 (5th Cir. 2001). 

The district court did, however, permit Washington’s § 1983 claim 

against Salazar to proceed to the summary-judgment stage. Washington later 

settled his claims against Salazar and the City of Houston, and the district 

court entered final judgment. Washington—who was represented by counsel 

before the district court—then filed a pro se notice of appeal challenging the 

district court’s order dismissing his claims against Harris County and Scott.

II.

A dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

is reviewed de novo. Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2019). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

III.

We affirm the judgment of the district court, because Washington has 

waived his ability to challenge the decision dismissing his claims against 

Harris County and Scott. “Issues not raised or inadequately briefed on appeal 

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are waived.” Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 653 (5th 

Cir. 2004). On several occasions, we have applied this principle to hold that 

appellants waived their ability to challenge a district-court decision by failing 

to address the basis for that decision. See, e.g., Jones v. Nueces Cty., 589 F. 

App’x 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2014) (“By not attacking the basis of the district court’s 

ruling, Jones has again waived the dismissal of his excessive force claim 

against Nueces County.”); Shirley v. McIntosh, 434 F. App’x 373, 374 (5th Cir. 

2011) (“Shirley has failed to brief an argument challenging the basis for the 

district court’s decision, and thus he has waived any such challenge on 

appeal.”); Austin v. Hardin, 306 F. App’x 84, 86 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Because 

Austin fails to address the basis for the district court’s decision, the issue is 

abandoned.”).

The district court dismissed Washington’s claims against Harris County 

and Scott because it concluded that Washington did not allege facts sufficient 

to state a claim. On appeal, Washington does not contest that conclusion. 

Instead, he argues that qualified immunity is not available as a defense to a 

Second Amendment claim. But even if that argument were convincing, it would 

not mean that the district court erred by dismissing Washington’s claims 

against Harris County and Scott, so Washington has not addressed the basis 

of the district court’s decision. Thus, Washington has waived his ability to 

challenge that decision.

Washington is proceeding pro se on appeal, but that fact does not change 

the result of our waiver analysis. “[E]ven pro se litigants must brief arguments 

in order to preserve them.” Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Moreover, as a licensed attorney, Washington may not be entitled to the liberal 

construction afforded other pro se litigants. See Cole v. Comm’r, 637 F.3d 767, 

773 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We note that pro se litigants who are attorneys are not 

entitled to the flexible treatment granted other pro se litigants.”); Tracey v. 

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Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] lawyer representing himself 

ordinarily receives no [special] solicitude at all.”); Andrews v. Columbia Gas 

Transmission Corp., 544 F.3d 618, 633 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that it was 

not an abuse of discretion to deny plaintiffs who were practicing attorneys 

“special consideration on the basis of their pro se status”). 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

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