UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM

GRACE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF MIAMI,

Defendant.

 /

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant City of Miami’s (“Defendant” or 

“the City”) Notice of Passage of Redistricting Plan. (“Notice”) (ECF No. 77). Therein, Defendant 

gives notice that it has enacted a new redistricting plan, Resolution 23-271 (“Remedial Plan”), to 

replace the redistricting plan that this Court previously enjoined, Resolution 22-131 (“2022 

Enacted Plan” or “Enjoined Plan”). See id. Plaintiffs1filed Objections to Defendant’s Proposed 

Interim Remedial Plan. (“Objections” or “Obj.”) (ECF No. 83). In turn, Defendant filed a 

Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiffs’ Objections. (“Reply”) (ECF No. 86).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the Remedial Plan does not 

completely correct the constitutional defects the Court found were substantially likely to exist in 

the Enjoined Plan. Thus, the Court finds it necessary to adopt its own remedial plan.

1 Plaintiffs in this action are Clarice Cooper, Yanelis Valdes, Jared Johnson, Alexandra Contreras 

Steven Miro, GRACE, Inc., Engage Miami, Inc., South Dade Branch of the NAACP and MiamiDade Branch of the NAACP (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).

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I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Though the Parties are surely familiar with the background of the instant Action, the Court 

nonetheless finds it valuable to give a thorough recitation of the facts to provide necessary context 

for its decision.

A. Passage of the Enjoined Plan

On March 24, 2022, the Commission of the City of Miami (the “Commission”) passed the 

2022 Enacted Plan following the results of the 2020 United States Census. The plan provided the 

new jurisdictional borders for each of the five commission districts.

On December 15, 2022, Plaintiffs commenced this action. See (ECF No. 1). In the First 

Amended Complaint (“Complaint” or “Compl.”), Plaintiffs claim that the 2022 Enacted Plan 

violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution because Defendant improperly used race as the predominant factor in drawing each 

of Miami’s five commission districts. See (ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 358–365). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs 

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seek: (1) a declaration that each of the commission districts in the 2022 Enacted Plan are 

unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) a preliminary 

and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from conducting elections under the 2022 Enacted 

Plan; and (3) an order requiring the City to hold special elections should adequate relief not be 

available prior to the next regularly scheduled election in November. See generally Compl.

B. The Preliminary Injunction

On February 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Expedited Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(“Motion”). See (ECF No. 26). Therein, Plaintiffs requested the Court enjoin Defendant from 

“calling, conducting, supervising, or certifying any elections under the [2022] Enacted Plan, 

beginning with the regular 2023 elections until the entry of a final judgment.” Id. at 36. Defendant 

opposed the Motion, see (ECF No. 36), and the Court referred the Motion to United States 

Magistrate Judge Lauren F. Louis for a Report and Recommendation. See (ECF No. 27).

After an evidentiary hearing lasting over five hours, which included the presentation of 

ninety-three exhibits from Plaintiffs, twelve exhibits from Defendant, and the testimony of the 

City’s redistricting consultant, Miguel De Grandy, Esq. (“De Grandy”), see (ECF No. 48), 

Magistrate Judge Louis issued a thorough Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). Therein, 

Magistrate Judge Louis recounted at length the redistricting process, expert reports, and other 

exhibits and record materials. See (ECF No. 52). 

First, by examining the contemporaneous statements of various Commissioners and 

examining the sequence of events leading to the passage of the 2022 Enacted Plan, Magistrate 

Judge Louis found that race predominated in the drawing of each of the five commission districts. 

See id. 76–77. Magistrate Judge Louis explained the Commissioners’ “intent was, as expressed, 

to preserve previously-drawn race-based lines of the Commission Districts in the 2022 redistricting 

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process.” Id. at 67. Magistrate Judge Louis supplemented this finding with an examination of the 

Arlington Heights factors, which in her opinion, also “strongly support[ed] a finding that Plaintiffs 

are likely to succeed in establishing that racial considerations predominated in the City’s design of 

Districts 1, 2, 3, and 4.”2 Id. at 77 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 

429 U.S. 252 (1977)). After finding that race predominated in the design of each district, 

Magistrate Judge Louis also opined that none of the districts withstood strict scrutiny as is required 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 78–87. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Louis concluded 

that Plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. See id. at 87–88.

Turning next to irreparable harm and a balancing of equities between the parties, 

Magistrate Judge Louis found that Plaintiffs stand to suffer irreparable harm because “the injury 

to a plaintiff of voting under an unconstitutional electoral map, or an electoral map that violates §

2 of the VRA, ‘cannot be undone through any form of monetary or post-election relief.’” Id. at 90 

(quoting Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity Inc. v. Raffensperger, 687 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1320–21 (N.D. 

Ga. 2022)). Magistrate Judge Louis found that the potential harm to Defendant, namely that there 

was insufficient time to enact a remedial map and that nonracial redistricting would disserve Black 

voters, was outweighed by the harm Plaintiffs would suffer from racial gerrymandering.3 See id.

at 88–100. After carefully considering each prong of the preliminary injunction test, Magistrate 

Judge Louis recommended that the Court: (1) enjoin Defendant from using the 2022 Enacted Plan 

2 The Parties did not dispute that Defendant was required under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 

1965 (“VRA”) to consider race when drawing District 5 in a manner where race would 

predominate. 

3 Magistrate Judge Louis rejected the argument that nonracial redistricting would disserve Black 

voters as non-responsive to the balance of the equities portion of the preliminary injunction test. 

R&R at 98. Rather, according to Magistrate Judge Louis, that argument is relevant to the 

likelihood of success on the merits. See id. 

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until the entry of a final judgment; and (2) establish a schedule for the preparation of a remedial 

plan which comports with the United States Constitution. Id. at 100.

Defendant filed Objections to the R&R, see (ECF No. 55), which “consisted of both 

generalized grievances with the R&R’s conclusions, as well as proper, specific objections to the 

R&R’s findings.” See (ECF No. 60 at 3). Plaintiffs filed a Response to Defendant’s Objections 

affirming their support for the R&R. See (ECF No. 57). Defendant also filed a Reply in Support 

of Objections. See (ECF No. 59). 

After careful consideration of the R&R, the Parties’ briefings, and the relevant record 

material, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion and adopted the R&R in full 

(“Order”). See (ECF No. 60). In the Order, the Court reaffirmed Magistrate Judge Louis’s findings 

that: (1) race was the predominant factor in the drawing of each commission district, and 

Defendant could not demonstrate the design of any district withstood strict scrutiny; (2) Plaintiffs 

would likely suffer irreparable harm if they were required to vote in racially gerrymandered 

districts in the November 2023 election; (3) any harm Defendant may suffer would be outweighed 

by the harm to Plaintiffs; and (4) there was sufficient time to create a constitutionally conforming 

remedial map without running afoul of Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).4 See 

generally id. 

On June 2, 2023, the Court issued a Scheduling Order. See (ECF No. 69). Therein, the 

Parties were directed to complete mediation by June 22, 2023. Id. at 1. If the Parties could not 

reach a settlement, Defendant was ordered to enact a proposed remedial map and file it with the 

Court by June 30, 2023. See id. Upon Defendant’s filing of the proposed remedial map, Plaintiffs 

4 Under Purcell, district courts should generally refrain from enjoining state election laws in the 

period close to an election. League of Women Voters of Fla., Inc., v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 32 F. 4th 

1363, 1371 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted)

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were informed that they needed to notify the Court within two days if they had no objections. Id. 

However, if Plaintiffs objected to the newly proposed remedial map, Plaintiffs would have seven 

days to file a memorandum in opposition, and in turn, Defendant would have five days to file a 

reply. Id. at 1–2. The Court set these deadlines to ensure Defendant would be able to provide the 

Court’s Order approving any remedial plan to the Miami-Dade County Elections Department by 

August 1, 2023, the date the Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections requires a remedial map 

to administer the November 2023 elections. See id. at 2; see also (ECF No. 26 at 36). 

C. Passage of the Remedial Plan

After a series of meetings discussed below, Defendant passed the Remedial Plan. The 

Court provides background on what occurred at those meetings.

1. The May 11, 2023 Meeting

On May 11, 2023, after Magistrate Judge Louis issued the R&R, but before the Court 

granted the preliminary injunction, the City Commissioners began discussing how to alter the 

commission districts if the Court were to enjoin the 2022 Enacted Plan. See (“May 11 Meeting”

or “5/11 Tr.”) (ECF No. 82-1). 

Considering that Magistrate Judge Louis had recently issued the R&R, the May 11 Meeting 

began with Commissioner Díaz de la Portilla discussing the reason why Miami originally created 

single member districts, while also explaining his desire to maintain the diversity within those 

districts. Id. 4:16–5:20 (“Because what happened, the reason why single member districts were 

created back then was to make sure the diversity that Miami has, as we said, it’s already in on the 

record, doesn’t matter if I say it again, right. . . the reason [it] was created was to keep harmony in 

our city because we have a very diverse community. . . we want an African American 

representation, we want a non-Hispanic white representation, we want that.”). According to 

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Commissioner Díaz de la Portilla, the Commissioners have been trying to “be fair and to provide 

representation for all communities in our city.” Id. 5:12–13. Commissioner Reyes echoed the 

sentiment. See id. 5:14, 13:8–14.

Then, the Commissioners (mostly Commissioner Díaz de la Portilla) discussed a potential 

alternative to single member districts, suggesting the potential return to “at large districts 

throughout the city.” Id. 3:8–9, 4:1–4, 7:19–21, 13:9–14. The City Commissioners then opened 

the meeting for public comment. See id. 8:19. Multiple citizens spoke about the Enjoined Plan 

and the importance of community representation. See id. 8:21–12:18. After permitting public 

comment, Defendant’s counsel informed the Commissioners about the present state of the instant 

Action. See id. 13:3–14:1. 

The May 11 Meeting concluded with Commissioners Díaz de la Portilla and Reyes 

providing instruction to De Grandy to commence drawing a new map, which, according to 

Commissioner Reyes, “will guarantee that ten years from now we’re going to have the diversity. . 

. in the city government and we are going to elect an Afro American to a seat, that they’re going 

to be properly represented, as well as other groups.” Id. 17:10–13. With this instruction, combined 

with the additional directive to “explore the at large districts” as possible alternatives, the City 

Commissioners directed De Grandy to begin redrawing a map of the Enjoined Plan. See id. 17:17–

18:1.

2. The June 14, 2023 Meeting

After the May 11 Meeting, and after this Court entered its Order adopting the R&R, thereby 

enjoining the use of the 2022 Enacted Plan, the City Commission convened on June 14, 2023 to 

discuss potential remedial plans. See (“June 14 Meeting” or “6/14 Tr.”) (ECF No. 82-2). 

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At the beginning of the June 14 Meeting, the Plaintiffs presented and advocated for three 

alternative remedial maps (“P1,” “P2,” and “P3,” respectively). Id. 5:21–7:2. Specifically, 

Plaintiff Yanelis Valdes argued that each of the three maps Plaintiffs created “feature compact and 

logical districts that respect neighborhoods, follow major geographic boundaries, and preserve 

genuine communities of interest. They don’t pack Hispanic voters into three specific districts and 

no longer designate one district as an Anglo access seat. They also fully comply with the VRA 

and provide[] Black voters with the ability to elect their preferred candidate in District 5.” Id.

6:13–17. Plaintiff Valdes then, for the first time, unveiled a new map, P3, “incorporating 

community feedback and input from [the Commissioners]” which kept together key 

neighborhoods such as “Flagami, Edgewater, Allapattah and Shenandoah.” Id. 6:11–12, 6:19–20. 

In concluding the presentation, Plaintiff Valdes requested the City Commissioners seriously 

consider the alternative maps to “undo the violations and remedy the wrongs in the [Enjoined 

Plan].” Id. 6:21–7:1.

De Grandy also presented a thorough examination of his newly proposed plan (“V12”), as 

well as a comparison between V12 and the Plaintiffs’ first two alternative maps.5 See id. 8:5–

16:13. According to De Grandy, he did not receive Plaintiffs’ third alternative map until the day 

of the presentation and therefore he had not yet fully reviewed it. Id. 8:5.

5

 De Grandy’s proposed map at the June 14 Meeting was entitled “V12.” Despite the name, 

Defendant claims that there were no other versions of the proposed map, even though De Grandy 

discusses both V12 and V14 in the June 14 Meeting.

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De Grandy began his presentation by explaining that his current proposal, V12, originated 

from Plaintiffs’ second proposed alternative map, P2. Id. 9:1–3. Using P2 as a template, De 

Grandy explained that he then made “changes consistent with the policy choices of this elected 

body.” Id. 9:2–3. When crafting V12, De Grandy informed the City Commission that he focused 

on “political and policy considerations,” “where Commissioners have invested district resources 

in their projects,” “the need to balance poor areas with areas that have significant economic 

potential or activity,” “natural and manmade boundaries,” and “keeping as many communities of 

interest together as feasible.” Id. 11:23–12:3, 12:10. 

Beginning with a discussion of District 5, De Grandy explained that V12 was crafted to 

ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act, but also considered Commissioner King’s directive 

to include areas that would generate significant economic activity. See id. 12:2–3. As a result, 

V12’s District 5 kept together traditional neighborhoods such as Shorecrest, Belle Meade, Bayside, 

Little River, Lemon City, Liberty City, and Buena Vista, but also included areas with significant 

economic activity such as Wynwood, Midtown, and the Design District. Id. 12:15–17. Further, 

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portions of Overtown remained in V12’s District 5 based on Commissioner King’s prior work in 

that area regarding affordable housing and public transportation. Id. 12:19–22.

As to District 1, V12 “restored the connection to the western part of the city” and contained 

“the bulk of the Miami riverfront.” Id. 13:5–8. De Grandy explained that the riverfront is an 

important business community worth keeping together in the district, as were other traditional 

neighborhoods such as Allapattah, Civic Center, Grapeland Heights, and parts of West Flagler and 

Flagami. Id. 13:8–16. V12’s boundaries, according to De Grandy, track “significant manmade 

and natural boundaries such as water boundaries, major roads, the city’s municipal boundaries. . . 

and the borders of traditional neighborhoods as well as I-95.” Id. 13:16–19.

Regarding District 2, De Grandy explained that V12 extended District 2 north to take parts 

of Morningside, and to include “significant portions” of neighborhoods such as Bay Point, Omni, 

Downtown, Brickell and Coconut Grove. Id. 13:20–14:11. 

Where V12 is markedly different from the Enjoined Plan, however, are Districts 3 and 4. 

Because De Grandy concluded that “there is no way to apportion the population of those two 

districts in a manner that would not result in majority Hispanic percentages in both,” V12 

delineates the borders of Districts 3 and 4 based on policy choices. Id. 14:16–18. In V12, District 

4 splits Flagami, and “preserves the bulk of” Shenandoah, Silver Bluff, and Coral Gate. Id. 15:3–

6. Consequently, V12’s District 3 “wraps around District 4” to ensure “most of Shenandoah” 

remained in District 4, “while preserving Little Havana intact” in District 3. Id. 15:13–15. Finally, 

De Grandy explained that District 3 “utilizes manmade and natural borders” like the Miami River

and Bayshore Drive as logical boundaries. Id. 15:16–17.

De Grandy also used his time presenting to explain why, in his opinion, Plaintiffs’ first two 

alternative maps, P1 and P2, were comparatively worse alternatives to V12. 

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Much of De Grandy’s discussion about Plaintiffs’ P1 and P2 revolved around his belief 

that Plaintiffs created their alternative maps based on their own political preferences. For example, 

De Grandy explained that “both plans pack the more conservative voters in the western part of the 

city into D[istrict] 4.” Id. 9:12–13. “By packing more conservative voters into D[istrict] 4, shifting 

areas around, and submerging part of the compact and cohesive Overtown community in D[istrict] 

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1, the plan is geared to result in a more liberal voting pattern for D[istrict] 1.” Id. 9:13–15. De 

Grandy explained P1 and P2 had a decrease of Republican voters in District 1. See id. 10:7–11:2. 

Other than presupposing Plaintiffs’ political motives for why P1 and P2 were drawn as 

they were, De Grandy’s presentation was lacking in discussion as to the substantive merits or 

detriments of Plaintiffs’ alternatives other than to identify where P1 and P2’s district borders 

differed from V12. De Grandy did, however, express his confusion regarding one aspect of P1 

and P2, namely, that each alternative split parts of Overtown, thereby removing the neighborhood 

from consisting entirely within District 5. Id. 10:2–3. According to De Grandy, he did not 

understand Plaintiffs’ “radical shift in position” and why Plaintiffs’ alternative maps split 

Overtown into multiple districts. Id. 10:5. However, as mentioned above, De Grandy did not 

review P3, which included all of Overtown in District 5.

Following De Grandy’s presentation, several citizens expressed their displeasure with V12 

for varying reasons, and the Commissioners began negotiating among themselves about how to 

adjust V12. See id. 16:17–31:22. In response to Commissioner Carollo’s comments that Coconut 

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Grove has many different communities, Commissioner Covo expressed her desire to keep Coconut 

Grove united within one district. See id. 39:11–40:12, 42:9–43:3. Commissioner King asked De 

Grandy if V12 could be altered so none of Morningside would be in District 5, but rather, if it 

could be moved entirely into District 2. See id. 43:21–47:2. Commissioner Carollo indicated that 

he wanted the entirety of Domino Park to be in District 3. See id. 52:21–53:5. Then, 

Commissioner Reyes informed De Grandy that multiple Commissioners, including

Commissioners Covo and Díaz de la Portilla, also made copies of alternative maps. See id. 48:20–

49:1, 50:4 (Commissioner Díaz de la Portilla explaining that his alternative map was entitled 

“V14”). Presuming each of the tweaks that each of the Commissioners wished to make to V12 

would be minor, the Commission recessed for three hours so De Grandy could make the requested 

adjustments. See id. 55:3–22.

Upon reconvening, De Grandy had prepared another presentation, this time with five 

alternatives for the Commissioners to consider. See id. 58:21–23. Specifically, the presentation 

included the following five maps: an unaltered V12, V14, Commissioner Carollo’s alternative 

map, Commissioner King’s alternative map, and Commissioner Covo’s alternative map.6 See id.

59:5–12. 

From this point on, the Commissioners used V12 and the alternate maps to create a 

finalized remedial map. Commissioner King, on behalf of Commissioner Carollo, indicated her 

support for a map where Domino Park would be placed entirely into District 3. See id. 69:11–18. 

Commissioner King then asked if People’s Bar-B-Que (an historic restaurant) could be included 

in District 5. See id. 70:8–11. The Commission obliged, and the southern border of District 5 was 

6 At this juncture, the Commissioners were no longer considering Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative 

maps.

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moved to include only that restaurant. See id. 72:16–17 (noting, however, that only that block 

containing People’s Bar-B-Que would be moved to District 5, “nothing to the left, nothing to the 

right, nothing to the center”). Lastly, the Commissioners agreed to restore the “Bahamanian 

Grove” into District 2, though Commissioner Covo failed in her attempt to convince the other 

Commissioners to place all of Coconut Grove into one district. See id. 87:21–22, 89:14–91:19. 

By majority vote, the Commissioners agreed to pass the Remedial Plan. See id. 90:19.

Defendant timely notified the Court of the passage of the Remedial Plan on June 30, 2023. 

See Notice. In their Objections, Plaintiffs allege that the Remedial Plan does not completely 

remedy the constitutional violation that the Court found was substantially likely to exist in the 

Enjoined Plan. See generally Obj. According to Plaintiffs, the Court should reject the Remedial 

Plan, and instead, implement Plaintiffs’ fourth alternative map (“P4”). See id. at 26–31. Plaintiffs 

aver that P4 remedies the likely constitutional violations of the Enjoined Plan, adheres to 

traditional redistricting criteria, complies with federal and state law, comports with the priorities 

of the city commission where possible, and does not segregate citizens on racial lines. See id. In 

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response, Defendant urges the Court to adopt the Remedial Plan as a constitutional remedy. See 

generally Reply.

Considering the relevant factual background, the Court evaluates the Remedial Plan to 

determine whether it is constitutionally compliant and if it provides a sufficient remedy for the 

Enjoined Plan. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In the instant Action, the Court is not confronted “with an original racial gerrymandering 

challenge” to the Remedial Plan, but rather, it evaluates the Remedial Plan after a finding that the 

Enjoined Plan was substantially likely to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Covington v. North Carolina (“Covington I”), 283 F. Supp. 3d 410, 431 (M.D. Fla. 

2018), aff’d in relevant part, 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018). “As such, ‘when a federal court concludes 

that a . . . districting plan violates the Constitution, the appropriate [legislative] redistricting body 

should have the first opportunity to enact a plan remedying the Constitutional violation.’” 

Jacksonville Branch of NAACP v. City of Jacksonville (“Jacksonville II”), No. 3:22-cv-493-MMHCase 1:22-cv-24066-KMM Document 94 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/30/2023 Page 15 of 50
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LLL, 2022 WL 17751416, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2022) (alterations in original). Indeed, 

“redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts 

should make every effort not to pre-empt.” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978). 

Should the legislature proffer a “new legislative plan. . . [it] will then be the governing law 

unless it too, is challenged and found to violate the constitution.” Id. at 540. At that point, the 

“remedial posture impacts the nature of [a court’s] review.” Covington I, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 431. 

Legislative enactments, including a remedial plan, are still cloaked with the “presumption of 

legislative good faith,” even after a finding of past discrimination, and the “burden of proof lies 

with [Plaintiffs], not the State” to demonstrate the remedial map is unconstitutional. Abbott v. 

Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). But the Court must also ensure that any remedial plan “so 

far as possible eliminate[s] the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar[s] like 

discrimination in the future.” Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). “In the 

remedial posture, courts must ensure that a proposed remedial districting plan completely 

corrects—rather than perpetuates—the defects that rendered the original districts unconstitutional 

or unlawful.” Covington I, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 431 (citing Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 86 

(1997)). If the legislature fails to enact “a constitutionally acceptable” remedial plan, then “the 

responsibility falls on the District Court” to reconfigure the unconstitutional districts. Chapman 

v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975); see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973) (holding that 

a court should not “refrain from providing remedies fully adequate to address constitutional 

violations”); Abrams, 521 U.S. at 86 (holding a remedial districting plan cannot be sustained if it 

“would validate the very maneuvers that were a major cause of the unconstitutional districting”).

III. DISCUSSION

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At this juncture, the Court has granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. See 

generally Order. Now, while affording great deference to the City Commission and presuming 

good faith on their behalf when passing the Remedial Plan, see Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324, the 

Court must determine whether the Remedial Plan completely corrects the constitutional infirmities

the Court found were substantially likely to exist in the Enjoined Plan. Covington I, 283 F. Supp. 

3d at 431. If the Remedial Plan does not make the necessary corrections, the Court has the duty 

to “cure [the] illegally gerrymandered districts” by creating a constitutional reapportionment plan 

or choosing an alternative. North Carolina v. Covington (“Covington II”), 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 

(2018) (per curiam); see also White, 412 U.S. at 794. 

When considering whether the Remedial Plan is a sufficient remedy to the Enjoined Plan, 

the Court first assesses Defendant’s arguments in favor of the Remedial Plan’s constitutionality. 

Next, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ argument that, based on direct evidence of the 

Commissioners’ stated intent when redistricting and circumstantial evidence that the Remedial 

Plan perpetuates the unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan, the Remedial Plan fails to 

provide a constitutional remedy. Finally, after determining that the Remedial Plan is not a 

constitutional remedy, the Court analyzes whether Plaintiffs alternative map, P4, passes 

constitutional muster.

A. Defendant’s Arguments in Favor of the Remedial Plan’s Constitutionality are 

Unavailing

Defendant proffers two main arguments in support of why, in its view, the Remedial Plan 

is constitutional. First, Defendant would have the Court evaluate the Remedial Plan as a new 

redistricting plan, and “not an interim remedial plan.”7 Reply at 2; cf. Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 

7 According to Defendant, because the Remedial Plan was “not an interim remedial plan,” 

Plaintiffs’ “attacks on the [Remedial] Plan are moot.” Reply. at 2; see also (ECF No. 80)

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17751416, at *13 (explaining “the City would have the Court start its review of racial 

predominance on a clean slate”). According to Defendant, because the new plan is not “remedial,” 

the Court must consider the action anew, meaning the Court should not consider whether the 

Remedial Plan completely corrects the constitutional infirmities that are substantially likely to 

exist in the Enjoined Plan. Reply at 5–6, see also (ECF No. 80). In Defendant’s view, it follows 

that when the Remedial Plan is considered anew, it is constitutional. Reply at 5–6. Secondly, 

Defendant avers that aside from District 5 (the VRA district), the entire process by which the 

Remedial Plan was enacted occurred “without any discussion of race” and is thus constitutional. 

See id. at 5, 7 (“At no other point was race discussed except to the extent it was necessary to 

confirm that District 5 would be a VRA performing district.”). Instead, according to Defendant, 

the Commissioners focused on “maintaining communities in which they had invested District 

resources,” “maintaining population variances at acceptable levels,” “political considerations,” 

and ensuring the Commissioners would “not be[] drawn out of their districts.” Id. at 5–6, 9. The 

Court addresses each argument in turn.

Defendant’s first argument—that the Remedial Plan should be considered anew, as if it 

were entirely untethered to the Enjoined Plan—is unavailing. Try as it may, Defendant’s attempt 

to classify the Remedial Plan as an entirely new plan will not alter the remedial nature of this 

action, nor will it alter the Court’s review. See Section II, supra. As the Court has already made 

clear, the “remedial posture impacts the nature of our review.” Covington I, 283 F. Supp 3d at 

431; see also Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 17751416, at *1 (following the issuance of a preliminary 

injunction, the court reviewed the remedial plan to determine whether it “cure[d] the constitutional 

(Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on mootness grounds). Finding Defendant’s argument 

unsupported by decades of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, the Court denied 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. See generally (ECF No. 91).

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violations that the Court found were substantially likely to exist”). While the Remedial Plan still 

enjoys a presumption of good faith, “courts must ensure that a proposed remedial districting plan 

completely corrects—rather than perpetuates—the defects that rendered the original districts 

unconstitutional or unlawful.” Covington I, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 431 (citing Abrams, 521 U.S. at

86). The Remedial Plan is not insulated from this type of review simply because Defendant claims 

the plan is not remedial; the Court’s duty to assess the constitutionality of a remedial map does not 

turn on whether Defendant classifies it as such.

Defendant is also mistaken that the Remedial Plan is constitutional because, in Defendant’s 

view, there was no discussion of race during its enactment (other than to ensure VRA compliance 

regarding District 5). But as courts have made clear, “the race-blind criterion alone does not 

immunize the districts in the Remedial Plan from further review nor does it necessarily remedy 

the constitutional violation.” Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 17751416, at *14. “[T]he Supreme Court 

long has recognized that a statute enacted by a state legislature to remedy an unconstitutional racebased election law can perpetuate the effects of the constitutional violation, and thereby fail to 

constitute a legally acceptable remedy, even when the remedial law is facially race-neutral.”

Covington I, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 434. Such an approach is only logical. Otherwise, “a state 

redistricting body tasked with redrawing districts to remedy a racial gerrymander could adopt the 

exact same districts as those held unconstitutional so long as the redistricting body relied on prior 

district lines, not race, in drawing the purportedly remedial districts.” Id. at 435 (emphasis 

omitted). Therefore, Defendant’s argument that race was not a factor in the process of enacting 

the Remedial Plan is not dispositive, because even if the Remedial Plan was enacted in a facially 

race-neutral manner, circumstantial evidence may yet demonstrate that the plan unconstitutionally 

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sorted voters based on race. See Covington II, 138 S. Ct. at 2553. And, as discussed later, see

Section III.B.1, infra, the Court finds that race did factor into the creation of the Remedial Plan.

Based on the aforementioned discussion, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s arguments.

B. Considering Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, the Court Finds that the 

Remedial Plan Does Not Remedy the Enjoined Plan

Now the Court must evaluate whether the Remedial Plan “completely corrects” the 

unconstitutional gerrymanders the Court found was substantially likely to exist in each district in 

the Enjoined Plan. The Court examines whether: (1) direct evidence demonstrates the 

Commissioners intended the Remedial Plan to perpetuate the unconstitutional aspects of the 

Enjoined Plan; and (2) circumstantial evidence demonstrates that the Commissioners chose “to 

rely on redistricting considerations that have the potential to carry forward the effects of the 

constitutional violation—like preserving district cores.” Covington I, 283 F. Supp 3d at 435. The 

Remedial Plan will be unconstitutional if Defendant “prioritized criteria that were predestined to 

perpetuate, rather than correct, the preexisting racial gerrymandering.” Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 

17751416, at *14. 

1. Direct Evidence

A party can demonstrate that a remedial plan perpetuates the unconstitutional aspects of its 

predecessor by relying on “direct evidence going to legislative purpose” in the drawing of the 

remedial plan. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (2018). Such evidence would clearly 

demonstrate that a remedial plan’s “new districts were mere continuations of the old, 

gerrymandered districts” and that voters “remain segregated on the basis of race.” Covington II, 

138 S. Ct. at 2553.

Plaintiffs argue that “from the outset of their process, multiple Commissioners repeated 

their attitude that representation on the Commission was racially categorical, that the redistricting’s 

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goal was to draw one Black, one Anglo, and three Hispanic seats. . . and that [the Commissioners] 

had done the right thing [when enacting the Enjoined Plan].” Obj. at 9. According to Plaintiffs, 

the Commissioners reiterated their commitment to drawing a map that would ensure the 

aforementioned racial breakdown of the districts would remain during the May 11 Meeting. See 

id. Defendant retorts that the relevant meeting to determine legislative intent is the June 14 

Meeting where the Remedial Plan was adopted, not the May 11 Meeting. See Reply at 7–8. 

Further, Defendant argues that the statements of legislative intent Plaintiffs identify are “taken out 

of context, or simply misleadingly editorialized.” Id. at 8. 

Before examining the content of the statements at the May 11 Meeting, the Court pauses 

briefly to explain that it should consider the May 11 Meeting when determining the 

Commissioners’ intent. Defendant attempts to convince the Court otherwise, arguing that “[a]t 

the May 11 meeting, redistricting plans were not considered and [De Grandy] was not present.” 

Id. Yet, at the May 11 Meeting, the Commissioners discussed potential redistricting solutions, and 

the conversation ultimately culminated in the Commissioners unanimously agreeing to direct De 

Grandy to begin redrawing a map based on certain criteria discussed during the meeting. See 5/11 

Tr. 17:9–20. Thus, the Court finds the May 11 Meeting relevant insofar as it provides insight to 

both the Commissioners’ legislative intent and their directions to De Grandy.

Regarding the Commissioners’ statements during the May 11 Meeting, the Court agrees 

with Plaintiffs that some statements reaffirm Defendant’s intent to ensure that one district would 

have a Black representative, one would have an “Anglo” representative, and the other three 

representatives would be Hispanic. Obj. at 9. As noted above, Defendant argues that these 

statements were “taken out of context” and “are utterly devoid of racial intent.” Reply at 8–9. To 

a certain extent, Defendant is correct. For example, one such statement Plaintiffs cite to, a 

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statement from Commissioner Reyes, appears to summarize the drafters’ approach in the Enjoined 

Plan rather than demonstrate any present intent to perpetuate the racial gerrymandering in the 

forthcoming Remedial Plan.

I’m gonna say the ACLU, they’re claiming that it was not fair. You see? You be

careful what you wish for because the way that we have been dealing for a long

time, every time that they have been since day one when their boundaries were

drawn, it was to assure diversity in the city of Miami. And the only way that we

can assure diversity of the city of Miami is by—I’m going to call a spade a spade—

[sic] gerrymandering. We have to bunch together ethnicity, ethnic borders in order

to be able to have Afro American, make sure that they are represented, and nonHispanic white in the—in representing the city of Miami. So, if they are—now they

are accusing us of gerrymandering, if we go now on and instead of having districts

and we don’t draw the districts to assure [sic] that we have that representation. You 

have a point there and see, what do they think, because they are going to be the 

culprit of eliminating diversity in the city of Miami government.

Id. at 8 (quoting 5/11 Tr. 6:2–14). 

But, while this one statement does not demonstrate present legislative intent, the multiple 

other statements Plaintiffs identify during the May 11 Meeting do. For example, when discussing 

the lawsuit and the possibility of returning to a citywide election system in light of the R&R’s 

findings, Commissioner Díaz de la Portilla stated: “we want an African American representation, 

we want a non-Hispanic white representation, we want that. I think it adds to the—to the fiber of 

our city and adds to the representation that we provide up here.” 5/11 Tr. 4:21–22. With this 

comment, Commissioner Díaz de la Portilla reiterated his belief that the racial breakdown of the 

districts in the Enjoined Plan was actually beneficial, thus suggesting his intent that any remedial 

plan should also retain these race-based characteristics.

Further, when explaining what he believed to be the consequences of eliminating election 

districts altogether, Commissioner Reyes stated: “what are the consequences if we go and we 

eliminate the districts. . . if we eliminate the districts, we’re going to have five Hispanics sitting 

here, just because of the composition of the population. It is just that simple. You see?” Id.

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13:10–14. As noted above, the Commissioners believed the Enjoined Plan assured diversity in 

Miami, and if election districts were removed, the Commissioners believed it would “eliminate 

diversity” of representation. Id. Commissioner Reyes’s commentary supports the notion that the 

Commissioners’ intended any remedial plan moving forward should not “eliminate diversity” of 

representation in the electoral districts.

Then, as a result of the conversation explaining the original rationale for using electoral 

districts, and after the Commissioners had the opportunity to explain that they passed the Enjoined

Plan (and plans prior) to provide for representation of “all groups in our city,” the Commissioners 

unanimously directed De Grandy to “start redrawing a map[,] that will guarantee that ten years 

from now we’re going to have the diversity. . . in the city government and we are going to elect an 

Afro American to a seat, that they’re going to be properly represented, as well as other groups.” 

Id. 17:9–13. This explicit directive provides the strongest evidence that the Commissioners 

intended the Remedial Plan to carry forward the very same race-based characteristics of the 

Enjoined Plan that the Court found was substantially likely to be unconstitutional.

Defendant argues that the “transcripts [of the May 11 Meeting] speak for themselves.” 

Reply at 8. Indeed, they do. After review of the May 11 Meeting and the quotations referenced 

above, the Court does not view the Commissioners as only discussing “why single member 

districts were created back then,” or whether to return to an at-large electoral system. Reply at 8

(quotations and emphasis omitted). Instead, the May 11 Meeting is better understood as the 

Commissioners explaining why they believed their initial approach when enacting the Enjoined 

Plan (i.e. creating the gerrymandered districts), was the correct approach, and after some 

discussion, unanimously directing De Grandy to maintain the racial breakdown of each district in 

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a new map.8 The directive to De Grandy is clear, and the Commissioners’ statements during the 

May 11 Meeting combined with their directive to De Grandy support a finding that the 

Commissioners intended for the Remedial Plan to preserve the prior racial breakdown of the 

Enjoined Plan, thus perpetuating rather than remedying the unconstitutional racial 

gerrymandering.

2. Circumstantial Evidence

In addition to direct evidence, a plaintiff may rely upon “‘circumstantial evidence that race 

for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling 

rationale in drawing’ the lines of legislative districts.” Covington II, 138 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting 

Miller, 515 U.S. at 913). During the remedial portion of a case, “circumstantial evidence [can] 

demonstrate[] that the effects of prior racial gerrymandering . . . remain present in [a] [r]emedial 

plan.” Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 17751416, at *17 (reviewing circumstantial evidence such as 

core retention data, demographic shifts between the enjoined and remedial plan, and that district 

borders were drawn to ensure incumbency protection).

Here, Plaintiffs identify multiple circumstantial reasons as to why the Remedial Plan 

perpetuates the racial gerrymandering from the Enjoined Plan. First, Plaintiffs argue that the 

Remedial Plan is staggeringly similar to the Enjoined Plan, and accordingly, the Remedial Plan 

suffers from the same impact of the unconstitutional race-based sorting as its predecessor. See

8 Defendant attempts to describe the Commissioners’ directive to De Grandy as something entirely 

different—a discussion where Commissioner Reyes explained his desire to preserve the VRArequired District 5 among a greater discussion of at-large districts. Reply at 9. The Court does 

not ascribe much weight to this argument given that during the relevant portion of the May 11 

Meeting, Commissioner Reyes only references District 5 implicitly when directing De Grandy to 

preserve a “Afro American to a seat” along with other groups and doesn’t mention at-large 

electoral districts at all. See 5/11 Tr. 17:9–16. Though this directive may have occurred in the 

context of a larger discussion, it still included instructions to begin drawing a map preserving the 

racial breakdown from the Enjoined Plan.

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Obj. at 10–11. Further, Plaintiffs aver that Defendant’s alterations to V12 during the June 14 

Meeting “claw[ed] back even more elements of the Enjoined Plan,” thereby reaffirming “the 

Commission’s original handiwork.”9 Id. at 11. Likewise, Plaintiffs argue race remains the 

predominant factor the Commission considered in the unaltered aspects of V12 which the 

Commissioners incorporated in the Remedial Plan, and Defendant has not made a showing of 

satisfying strict scrutiny. See id. at 16–26. 

In turn, Defendant argues the Remedial Plan is constitutional because the Commissioners 

focused on legitimate, non-racial criteria, such as political considerations, where they had invested 

substantial district resources, and where candidates reside. See Reply at 5–6, 9. For the following 

reasons, the Court finds that even if the Commissioners did employ the above-mentioned criteria, 

those considerations had the impact of perpetuating, rather than completely correcting, the 

constitutional infirmities of the Enjoined Plan.

Specifically, the Court considers the following circumstantial evidence: the Remedial 

Plan’s core retention rate, whether the Commissioners’ alterations (or lack thereof) to V12 

incorporated in the Remedial Plan preserve the unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan, and 

whether race still predominates in each district in the Remedial Plan.

i. The Remedial Plan’s Core Retention Rate Provides Evidence of the 

Commissioners’ Intent to Maintain the Enjoined Plan’s Features

9 As previously discussed, after this Court enjoined Defendant from using the 2022 Enacted Plan, 

De Grandy proposed V12. Plaintiffs argue the Commissioners made changes to V12 such that 

V12 became more similar to the Enjoined Plan than V12 was originally. See Obj. at 11–15. These 

alterations were incorporated in the Remedial Plan. Id. at 11. Plaintiffs argue that these alterations, 

resulting in the Remedial Plan more closely resembling the Enjoined Plan than V12 did, is 

circumstantial evidence that the Remedial Plan does not fully remedy the Enjoined Plan. Id.

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When determining “core retention rate,” “mapmakers lock in prior district configurations 

with the aim of populating each new district with the residents of its predecessor district, adjusting 

as needed to restore population equality.” Robert Yablon, Gerrylaundering, 97 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 

985, 1006 (2022). Generally, high core retention rates provide circumstantial evidence of 

legislative intent to preserve the features of the previously unconstitutional district. See Covington 

II, 138 S. Ct. at 2551. Indeed, the Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of a remedial plan where 

the districts “retain[] the core shapes of districts that [the trial court] had earlier found to be 

unconstitutional.” Id.

The core retention rates in the instant Action show that nearly all Miamians remain in the 

same district under the Remedial Plan as in the Enjoined Plan. See Obj. at 10 (citing (“McCartan 

Rep.”) (ECF No. 82-11 at 8)). When core retention rates in a remedial plan are high, Jacksonville 

II is instructive. In Jacksonville II, the court found that the “unrebutted data [shows] that the vast 

majority of Black residents living in the Packed Districts under the Enjoined Plan remain in one 

of the Packed Districts under the Remedial Plan.” Id. at *13. According to the Jacksonville II

Court, the high core retention rates demonstrated that the remedial plan perpetuated “the harmful 

effects of the City’s decades-long history of racial gerrymandering.” Id. at *14. Similarly, in the 

instant Action, 94.1% of Miamians remain in the same district under the Remedial Plan. See

McCartan Rep. at 8; cf. In re SJR 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 662, 665 (Fla. 2012) (finding a core retention 

rate of 82.6% to be overwhelming). The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the core retention rates 

between the Remedial Plan and the Enjoined Plan are “staggeringly high,” and, like in Jacksonville 

II, indicate that the Remedial Plan does not completely correct the unconstitutional aspects of the 

Enjoined Plan. Obj. at 10.

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Importantly, the Remedial Plan not only retains the vast majority of the district cores from 

the Enjoined Plan, but the actual citizens who were moved to a different district under the Remedial 

Plan “point to continued racial predominance.” Id. Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Abott explains that,

though 5,125 residents were moved from Districts 1, 3, and 4 (the predominantly “Hispanic 

districts” under the Enjoined Plan) to Districts 2 and 5, these citizens were only 58.8% Hispanic 

Voting Age Population (“HVAP”) (compared to the HVAP of Districts 1, 3, and 4, in the Enjoined 

Plan ranging from 88–90%).10 See (“2nd Abott Rep.”) (ECF No. 82-12 at 8–9). Moreover, Dr. 

Abott showed that, of the 4,735 residents removed from District 5 in the Remedial Plan, only 

16.6% are Black, even though the Black Voting Age Population (“BVAP”) of District 5 is 50.3%. 

Id. at 4, 9. Moreover, areas that were approximately 90% HVAP were shuffled among Districts 

1, 3, and 4—“creating the illusion they changed while maintaining their demographics.” Obj. at 

10 (citing 2nd Abott Rep. at 5, 7, 8–9) (explaining that the approximately 1,000 people moved 

between Districts 1,3, and 4 were predominantly Hispanic and did not alter the racial breakdown 

from the Enjoined Plan). These changes suggest that the voters who were either moved out of, or 

among Districts 1, 3, and 4, did not result in meaningful changes from the Enacted Plan. 

The Court finds it illustrative to see which voters the Commissioners chose to move in the 

Remedial Plan. As explained above, District 2 retains a large Anglo population with a 

disproportionately “less-Hispanic” population moved into it, District 5 remains a 50.3% BVAP, 

10 The Court notes that Defendant has filed a Motion to Strike Carolyn Abott’s Improper Opinions 

Assessing the Credibility of Witnesses and Speculating About the City’s Considerations and 

Motivations in Creating a New Plan. (ECF No. 87). Therein, Defendant argues that Dr. Abott 

improperly “conclu[ded] that the changes in the City’s proposed new map appear to continue to 

be designed around racial and ethnic considerations, and there is no basis on which to make the 

argument that these considerations were instead partisan in nature.” Id. at 2. (internal quotations 

omitted) (alterations in original). Because the Court does not rely upon her conclusions about the 

Commissioners’ intent or state of mind, but solely considers the underlying data and related 

analyses from her expert report, the Court will issue an order denying as moot the Motion to Strike.

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and the Hispanic populations of Districts 1, 3, and 4, are shuffled among each other. See 

Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 1775146, at *13 (rejecting a remedial plan, in part, because “Black voters 

[were] shuffled among—but not out of—the Packed Districts”) (emphasis omitted). The 

populations that were moved, and what districts they were moved into, conspicuously align with 

the racial breakdown of the Enjoined Plan. Considering that 94.1% of Miamians remain in the 

same district as they were under the Enjoined Plan, and which citizens were moved indicate a 

legislative intent to retain the racial breakdown of the Enjoined Plan, the Court finds that this 

circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that the Remedial Plan perpetuates the 

unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan.

ii. The Commissioners’ Adjustments to V12 Provide Circumstantial Intent 

to Preserve the Racial Breakdown of the Enjoined Plan

A party may also provide circumstantial intent that a remedial plan preserves the 

unconstitutional aspects of prior plan by demonstrating that a remedial plan does not meaningfully 

alter an enjoined plan’s district borders. Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 17751416, at *14; see also 

Covington I, 283 F. Supp 3d at 436 (examining circumstantial evidence that the remedial version 

of a map still retains the core of the unconstitutional version of a district). Here, Plaintiffs argue 

that, following De Grandy’s initial presentation unveiling V12, the Commissioners suggested 

alterations to V12 (which were included in the Remedial Plan). According to Plaintiffs, these 

alterations “claw back even more elements of the Enjoined Plan.”11 Obj. at 11. Because these 

alterations were incorporated into the Remedial Plan, Plaintiffs argue that the similarities between 

Remedial Plan and the Enjoined Plan demonstrate the Commissioners’ intent to preserve the 

Enjoined Plan’s unconstitutional components.

11 Darker shaded areas in the below figure represent the alterations to V12 that were ultimately 

incorporated into the Remedial Plan.

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Areas Shifted Between District 2 and District 3

Multiple changes to V12 that were incorporated into the Remedial Plan preserved elements 

of the Enjoined Plan. Recall, in the Enjoined Plan, District 2 was intended to be the so-called 

“Anglo-District.” At Commissioner Carollo’s request, Area 21 in V12 was removed from District 

3 and returned to District 2, just as it was in the Enjoined Plan. See 6/14 Tr. 65:6–7. Area 21 has 

one of the highest White Voting Age Populations (“WVAP”) in the city, 54.8%. See 2nd Abott 

Rep. at 19. The Commissioners also added Area 25—with no instruction to do so during the May 

11 or June 14 Meetings—to District 2. See Obj. at 12. Area 25 is a plurality-white part of the 

city. See 2nd Abott Rep. at 19. Then, the Commissioners moved the plurality HVAP Area 24 into 

District 3. See 6/14 Tr. 38:5–39:10; Obj. at 12. Plaintiffs argue that these changes not only altered 

V12 so that the eventual remedial map would be more like the Enjoined Plan, but that the specific 

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alterations were done to “preserve the categorical racial divisions in the Enjoined Plan.” Obj. at 

11–12.

Defendant argues that “[t]he Commission had valid, non-racial reasons for the lines it 

drew,” “Coconut Grove. . . had to shed population,” and that “[d]rawing Commissioner Carollo’s

house into his district is not a racial motivation.”12 Reply at 7. All of these points may be true. 

But, simply ensuring that Commissioner Carollo maintains a residence in District 3 does not 

explain the other alterations along the District 2 and District 3 border. Moreover, that Coconut

Grove had to shed population does not explain why the Commissioners decided that majority and 

plurality WVAP portions of District 3 would be added back to District 2, as opposed to any other 

area. See 6/14 Tr. 65:6–7 (Commissioner Carollo requested that an area of the North Grove 

between 22nd and 27th Avenues (Area 21) be returned to District 2 without providing any 

explanation). Nor does it explain why the plurality HVAP Area 24 was moved out of District 2 to 

District 3. See id. 38:5–39:10 (Commissioner Carollo asked for this area to be moved but again

provided no rationale). While Defendant avers there were non-racial reasons for the alterations it 

made to V12, it provides very little, if any explanation.

Thus, the Court finds that the areas shifted between Districts 2 and 3 in the Remedial Plan 

provide circumstantial evidence that the Commissioners intended the Remedial Plan retain the 

race-based characteristics of the Enjoined Plan.

Areas Shifted Between District 3 and District 4

Next, Commissioner Carollo requested a change to V12 involving the border of District 3 

and District 4, which in the Enjoined Plan, were majority Hispanic districts. Initially, in V12, all 

12 Commissioner Carollo owns a residence in Coconut Grove, and his residence was incorporated 

into District 3 in both the Enjoined and Remedial Plan.

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of Silver Bluff existed within District 4, as did all but two blocks of Shenandoah. See 6/14 Tr. 

15:2–6 (V12 shifted the border of the two districts eastward from 17th Avenue in the Enjoined Plan 

to 14th Avenue). Commissioner Carollo requested that De Grandy adjust V12 so that the border 

of 17th Avenue in the Remedial Plan be restored to “that same line as before” (i.e., in the Enjoined 

Plan). Id. 37:1–2. De Grandy obliged, and the 17th Avenue border was restored in the Remedial 

Plan to mirror its predecessor. See id. 77:6–9.

According to Plaintiffs, the consequences of this alteration resulted in the splitting of 

traditional neighborhoods. Obj. at 13. Plaintiffs aver that “nearly 2,000 people between 14th and 

17th Avenues moved back into D[istrict] 3.” Id. (citing 2nd Abbott Report at 19). To equalize 

population, Plaintiffs argue De Grandy then moved portions of Auburndale and Little Havana into 

District 3. See id. Therefore, Plaintiffs aver that “at Commissioners’ requests, [the alterations to 

V12] continu[ed] the division of ‘distinct’ and ‘historical’ Shenandoah, Silver Bluff, and Little 

Havana that Commissioners had kept divided in the Enjoined Plan to balance Hispanic populations 

and facilitate racial separation.” Id.

Defendant (and Commissioner Carollo in the June 14 Meeting) explain that this specific 

alteration occurred because the “Commissioners publicly allocated blocks based on where they 

had invested resources in parks.” Reply at 5. Indeed, when discussing a potential alteration to 

include the 17th Avenue border, Commissioner Carollo explained that the area was “where we just 

invested significant amounts in a park.” 6/14 Tr. 34:13–14. Plaintiffs, however, argue that 

Defendant’s explanation is insufficient because the “park [i]s still on the D[istrict] 4 side of the 

line.” Obj. at 12–13 (emphasis in original). After a thorough review of the record, the Court finds 

that the transcripts of the June 14 Meeting do not indicate which park Commissioner Carollo was 

referencing, nor does Defendant provide an address of the park. See generally Reply; 6/14 Tr. 

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Accordingly, the Court is unable to fully evaluate the rationale of the shift of the border between 

District 3 and District 4, and thus, does not consider these changes to perpetuate the 

unconstitutional features of the Enjoined Plan. 

Morningside

 

Plaintiffs also argue that the Commission’s alterations of Morningside from V12, which 

culminated in the neighborhood being split in the Remedial Plan, perpetuated the unconstitutional 

impact of the Enjoined Plan. See Obj. at 13–14. V12 proposed moving Area 26 (41.9% WVAP 

and 11.8% BVAP) out of District 2 and into District 5, which would split the neighborhood. Id.

at 13 (citing 2nd Abott Rep. at 19). Upon review of V12, Commissioners Covo and King discussed 

the alteration. See 6/14 Tr. 42:13–47:6. Specifically, Commissioner Covo objected to 

Morningside being split between districts, and Commissioner King opined that the entirety of 

Morningside should be restored to District 2. See id. 42:13, 44:2. Commissioner King requested 

that De Grandy revise V12 accordingly. See id. 45:13–15. De Grandy partially obliged, and the 

Remedial Plan includes Area 26, but not all of Morningside, in District 2.

According to Plaintiffs, the Remedial Plan’s inclusion of Area 26 in Districts 2 is 

problematic. See Obj. at 13–14. Plaintiffs argue that this change “excludes from D[istrict 5] the 

low-BVAP neighborhoods south of the existing district boundary” and that the “southern part 

[Commissioner] King declined adding from V12 to make Morningside whole in District 5 is 10.1% 

BVAP.” Id. at 14. Moreover, Plaintiffs find it significant that the Commission rejected “at least 

four alternative plans that avoided ‘splitting up neighborhoods’ in and around Morningside by 

adding the neighborhood to D[istrict] 5.” Id. (noting that the Commissioners rejected the following 

Plans: P1, P2, P3, and one of De Grandy’s alternatives, D1). To Plaintiffs, this evidence 

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demonstrates that the Remedial Plan divided Morningside along racial lines to preserve the racial 

breakdown of Districts 2 and 5 from the Enjoined Plan. See id. at 13–14.

Defendant responds, but only to explain “[t]he Commissioners from District 2 & 5 publicly 

discussed keeping that community together and where it should go.” Reply at 9. Defendant does 

not address Plaintiffs’ allegation that the low-BVAP neighborhoods were deliberately excluded 

from District 5 in the Remedial Plan, nor does it provide a response regarding why, after the 

Commissioners expressed their concern about splitting Morningside, Morningside was not wholly 

included in District 2. Rather, Defendant only explains that “there was nothing nefarious about 

the conversation or the decision.” Id.

Because Defendant provides little explanation, if any, on why Area 26 (but not all of 

Morningside) was restored to District 2, and Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the Remedial 

Plan (1) splits neighborhoods in and around Morningside; and (2) excludes low-BVAP 

neighborhoods from District 5, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ more argument persuasive. The 

alterations to Morningside from V12 to the Remedial Plan provide circumstantial evidence that 

the Remedial Plan perpetuated the unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan.

Overtown

Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that the Commissioners’ alterations to V12 regarding Overtown 

were racially motivated. See Obj. at 14–16. During the June 14 Meeting, De Grandy’s 

presentation of V12 as it pertained to Overtown included an extended discussion of Plaintiffs’ P1 

and P2 alternative maps. First, De Grandy criticized Plaintiffs’ suggested alternative district 

configurations that would divide Overtown.13 See 6/14 Tr. 16:4–8. Then, De Grandy explained 

13 As referenced, Section I, supra. De Grandy mentioned that he did not have time to review 

Plaintiffs’ P3. Plaintiffs’ P3 included all of Overtown in District 5.

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how his review of Google Maps and the Neighborhood Enhancement Team (“NET”) confirmed 

that all of Overtown was included in District 5 in V12. See id. 16:6–7.

But, according to Plaintiffs, De Grandy’s definition of Overtown and its inclusion in V12’s 

District 5 is not as straightforward as the consultant would suggest. See Obj. at 15. Plaintiffs’ 

expert, Dr. Abott, opined that De Grandy excluded portions of Overtown in V12 which are 

included in Google Maps and NET, the very sources upon which De Grandy relied. See 2nd Abott 

Rep. at 9–11. Further, Dr. Abott explained that the portions De Grandy omitted from his definition 

of Overtown are included in both the Miami Police Department (“MPD”) and Convention & 

Visitors Bureau’s (“CVP”) description of the neighborhood. See id. at 9–10. Plaintiffs also 

identify that the City Code provides an even broader definition of Overtown than the MPD and 

CVP, all three of which provide a broader definition of Overtown than the one De Grandy used 

when drawing the border of V12’s District 5. Obj. at 15 (citing City Code § 2-1051). According 

to Plaintiffs, “‘De Grandy defined Historic Overtown along racial lines, resulting in the area being 

split into District 1 and District 5 on the basis of race,’ with his ‘definition shor[ing] up the existing 

racial composition of District 5 and . . . the Hispanic supermajority in District 1.’”14 Id. (quoting

2nd Abott Rep. at 11) (alterations in original). 

Consequently, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he Commission ratified a definition of Overtown 

that defined it along racial lines, excluding majority Hispanic areas,” and “[i]n doing so, 

[Defendant] strenuously ensured that none of the majority-Hispanic parts of the area would move 

out of D[istrict] 1.” Id. (emphasis omitted). The result, to Plaintiffs, is that the definition of 

14 Plaintiffs also identify the Commissioners’ discussion of one minor alteration—the addition to 

District 5 of the Overtown restaurant People’s Bar-B-Que—as further evidence that V12’s borders 

separated Overtown along racial lines because no other portion of the border was moved. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs emphasize Commissioner Díaz de la Portilla’s comments that “only the 

restaurant should move, nothing more” into District 5. Obj. at 15 (emphasis in original).

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Overtown as incorporated into the Remedial Plan “is predominantly a function of the 

Commission’s goal to hew to the Enjoined Plan and separate Hispanic from Black residents.” Id.

Defendant hardly engages with Plaintiffs’ arguments. Defendant only states that “Plaintiffs 

quibble over the boundaries of Overtown, an undefined neighborhood, and cite to the boundaries 

of the . . . City Code (§2-1051). . . which states that the boundaries of this purely advisory board 

are approximate and meant to be construed expansively.” Reply at 4 n.3. Otherwise, Defendant 

does not refute Plaintiffs’ description of Overtown as defined by the multiple other sources, and it 

does not even attempt to engage with the findings of Plaintiffs’ expert. Just as importantly, 

Defendant also fails to offer any explanation of why the Remedial Plan’s conception of Overtown

splits the historic neighborhood as Plaintiffs suggests it does. After reviewing the record and 

considering Plaintiffs’ evidence as proffered by their expert, Dr. Abott, the Court finds that 

Defendant selectively defined Overtown to entrench the racial divisions from the Enjoined Plan.

In sum, though the Court presumes the good faith of the Commissioners when making 

alterations for V12 in the Remedial Plan, their explanations for the alterations are often entirely 

unsubstantiated in the record. And, the Commissioners consistently altered V12 so that the 

Remedial Plan would have districts coinciding with the racial breakdown the Commissioners 

intended to exist within the Enjoined Plan, without justification. Therefore, the Court agrees with 

Plaintiffs’ argument that alterations to V12 serve as circumstantial evidence of the Remedial Plan’s

perpetuation, rather than the eradication, of the unconstitutional aspects of the Enjoined Plan.

iii. The Analysis of Each District Demonstrates Continuing Racial 

Predominance

Though the Court has recognized that direct evidence and circumstantial evidence indicate

the Remedial Plan is not an adequate remedy to the Enjoined Plan, the Court nevertheless examines 

each district in the Remedial Plan to determine whether race predominates. 

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Districts 1, 3, and 4

The Court begins its analysis first with the Remedial Plan’s Districts 1, 3, and 4, the socalled “Hispanic districts” in the Enjoined Plan. Plaintiffs argue that these districts collectively 

retain nearly identical portions of the Hispanic population. Indeed, according to Plaintiffs’ expert, 

Dr. McCartan, these districts, in the aggregate, have a core retention rate of 97.8% of the Enjoined 

Plan. See McCartan Rep. at 8; Obj. at 24 (explaining that individually the districts have core 

retention rates ranging from 90.6% to 98.2%); see also Section III.B.2.i, supra (discussing that 

generally, high core retention rates are evidence of legislative intent to preserve the features of the 

previously unconstitutional district). Further, Plaintiffs argue that the border between Districts 1 

and 4, as well as the border connecting Districts 3 and 4, remain “nearly untouched” and divide 

Flagami, Silver Bluff, Shenandoah, and Little Havana as in the Enjoined Plan. Obj. at 25. 

Plaintiffs also explain that the Remedial Plan’s District 1 maintains a slightly reconfigured version 

of the “staircase-like stepping pattern in the northeastern corner in Allapattah” that the Court found 

problematic in the Enjoined Plan, see R&R at 74, and selectively included portions of Overtown 

in majority-HVAP areas. Obj. at 25. Lastly, Dr. McCartan explains that District 3 has become 

less compact by adding portions of Bay Heights and “minimizing additions from the whiter 

northern end of Brickell.” Id. Defendant does not respond to any of these arguments. See 

generally Reply.

Based on a review of the evidence and the unrebutted arguments described above, the Court 

agrees with Plaintiffs. The Remedial Plan’s high core-retention rates, the irregular shape of 

District 1, the selective inclusion and exclusion of certain areas in District 1, and the fact that 

District 3 became less compact in the Remedial Plan, all support the Court’s conclusion that the 

Remedial Plan entrenches, rather than remedies, the Enjoined Plan. 

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District 2

Turning next to District 2, otherwise described as the “Anglo District” in the Enjoined Plan, 

Plaintiffs make similar arguments. Plaintiffs assert that District 2 in the Remedial Plan was 

“shaped by the Commission’s intent to reserve it as an ‘Anglo-access’ seat, and surgically exclude 

more-Black or more-Hispanic areas on the north and south end, respectively.” Obj. at 24. 

Plaintiffs argue that District 2 retains a “white affluent” portion of Morningside, and “adds a thin, 

low BVAP adjacent strip.” Id. (citing 2nd Abott Rep. at 17) (explaining the District 2 border 

retains the “whiter Condo Canyon, add[s] an additional lower-BVAP area around Omni, and 

separate[s] higher BVAP areas of Downtown kept in D[istrict] 5”). On the southern border, 

Plaintiffs argue that areas of Coconut Grove which contain more Hispanic voters were kept in 

District 3 and out of District 2. Id. Likewise, “whiter areas on Brickell’s north end remain excised 

from District 3, achieved via an irregular finger [in District 2].” Id. Plaintiffs note that District 2 

also had a strikingly high core-retention rate of 92.2%, and its compactness scores were identical 

to the Enjoined Plan. See id. (citing McCartan Rep. at 8). As a result of these districting decisions, 

core-retention, and identical compactness cores, Plaintiffs argue that District 2 maintains the 

hallmarks of racial predominance. See id. at 23–24. 

As with Districts 1, 3, and 4, Defendant offers no rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence. 

See generally Reply. Rather, Defendant only notes that “Coconut Grove is in District 2 which had 

to shed population.” Id. at 7. Here, the crucial question is not whether District 2 had to shed 

population, but whether the changes Defendant was required to make in District 2 completely 

correct, rather than perpetuate, the constitutional defects of the Enjoined Plan. After review of the 

which voters were retained or excluded from District 2 in the Remedial Plan, as well as the core 

retention rates and compactness scores, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that race still predominates 

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in the design of District 2. Therefore, the Court finds that District 2 in the Remedial Plan does not 

change the racial predominance that existed prior.

District 5

Finally, the Court turns to District 5, the VRA protected district. The relevant question for 

this district is not whether the Remedial Plan’s District 5 continues to perpetuate the hallmarks of 

racial predominance, but whether Defendant’s consideration of race when drawing the borders of 

District 5 to ensure a BVAP floor of 50%, see (“Alford Rep.”) (ECF No. 86-2), was narrowly 

tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny. See Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 195. The Parties contest whether 

District 5 is indeed narrowly tailored. See Obj. at 25–26; Reply at 10–11. 

As the Supreme Court has explained, “the narrow tailoring requirement insists only that 

the legislature have a strong basis in evidence in support of the (race-based) choice that it has 

made.” Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama (“ALBC”), 575 U.S. 254, 262 (2015) (emphasis 

added) (quotations omitted). To demonstrate a strong basis in evidence, Defendant was required 

to conduct a “functional analysis of the electoral behavior within the particular. . . election district” 

to determine “what minority population percentage satisfy[ies] [§2 of the VRA’s] standard.” 

Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 194. By performing such analysis, Defendant could demonstrate it had 

“good reasons to believe” it must use race to satisfy § 2 of the VRA. Id. at 187. Nowhere in the 

record is this functional analysis present. Accordingly, District 5 of the Remedial Plan is not 

narrowly tailored.

Defendant argues otherwise, relying largely on the legal conclusions of its expert, Dr. 

Alford. See Reply at 10–11. Dr. Alford’s report explains that the Remedial Plan is narrowly 

tailored to satisfy § 2 of the VRA because “Black-preferred candidates always prevail[] and 

typically by large margins.” Alford Rep. at 4. Dr. Alford also explains, “if the plaintiffs’ District 

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5 in P4 is narrowly tailored, as they assert, then so are [Defendant’s] versions of District 5.” Id. at 

8. 

In reliance upon Dr. Alford’s conclusion, Defendant misunderstands the “narrowly 

tailored” standard. And so, the Court reiterates: Defendant must have had good reason to select 

its BVAP target in District 5, meaning Defendant was required to conduct a functional analysis of 

the electoral behavior to determine what minority population percentage would satisfy § 2 of the 

VRA. Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 194. As demonstrated by Bethune-Hill, this functional analysis 

must occur when deciding upon the BVAP target, not after the decision has already been made. 

Id. (finding “the legislature performed that kind of functional analysis of District 75 when deciding 

upon the 55% BVAP target”). To the extent Dr. Alford’s report conducts the appropriate analysis, 

he completed his report on July 12, 2023, nearly a month after the Remedial Plan was enacted. 

See generally Alford Rep. In other words, Defendant may not rely on the post-hoc findings of its 

expert to justify why it determined the 50% BVAP figure was necessary to comply with the VRA 

in District 5. Doing so is hardly the type of functional analysis required.

Apart from Dr. Alford’s report, the record contains no further discussion of how District 5 

might be narrowly tailored in the Remedial Plan. In the June 14 Meeting, De Grandy told the 

Commissioners without justification that V12 “fully compl[ied] with the VRA.” 6/14 Tr. 6:16–

17. Though he offered this conclusory statement frequently, at no point did De Grandy ever 

discuss what functional analysis occurred to ensure that District 5 was narrowly tailored to VRA 

compliance. See id. 9:4, 12:8–10, 16:11–12, 66:10–11. With no other evidence in the record, the 

Court finds Defendant’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of District 5 in the Remedial 

Plan unavailing.

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iv. Partisanship Does Not Explain Districting Decisions in the Remedial 

Plan

Finally, though the Court has disposed of most of Defendant’s arguments above, one broad 

argument Defendant advances in support of the Remedial Plan warrants addressing specifically. 

Throughout its Reply, Defendant emphasizes that some of its districting decisions were the result 

of the Commissioners’ political judgment, and that Plaintiffs impermissibly seek to “substitute 

their political judgment for that of the elected City Commission.” Obj. at 4, 6. This argument has 

no merit. First, Commissioner Carollo expressly denied the idea that the commissioner position 

is partisan in nature, thus suggesting partisan politics did not influence the Remedial Plan’s 

creation. See 6/14 Tr. 32:13–21. Further, as Plaintiffs correctly identify, “[n]o Commissioner

expressed a partisan motivation for any decision in [the Remedial Plan].” Obj at 20; see generally 

6/14 Tr. The Court is satisfied that nothing in the record demonstrates that partisanship played 

any role in the districting decisions in the Remedial Plan.

In sum, after extensively reviewing the direct and circumstantial evidence surrounding the 

enactment of the Remedial Plan, the Court finds that the Remedial Plan fails to correct the 

constitutional violations it found substantially likely to exist in the Enjoined Plan, and that the 

Remedial Plan perpetuates the impact of the Enjoined Plan’s unconstitutional racial 

gerrymandering of the election districts.

C. Plaintiffs’ Alternative Map is a Constitutional Remedy

Because Defendant could not enact a constitutionally sufficient remedial map, and the date 

by which the Miami-Dade Board of Elections requires a map is August 1, 2023, there is no longer 

enough time to order the Commissioners to draw another map. Nor is there sufficient time to 

appoint a special master to draw one for the upcoming election. Regardless, Miami requires a new 

map, and “it now becomes this Court’s unwelcome burden to craft a new plan for implementation 

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on an interim, remedial basis.” Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 17751416, at *17. Before doing so, the 

Court also emphasizes that it “endeavors to address the unconstitutionality of the Enjoined and 

Remedial Plans and no more. Broader or more systemic changes to [the City of Miami’s] electoral 

maps are the province of the legislators, not the Court.” Id. at *21.

With this limited goal in mind, the Court examines Plaintiffs’ most recent alternative map, 

P4, which Plaintiffs urge the Court to adopt. See Obj. at 26–31. The Court reviews P4 to determine 

whether it, when possible, respects the Commission’s legitimate, non-race-based policy goals, 

complies to traditional districting criteria, and complies with state and federal law. The Court 

reviews P4, and Defendant’s arguments against its adoption, below.

1. P4 Incorporates Defendant’s Lawful Stated Objectives

“When faced with the necessity of drawing district lines by judicial order, a court, as a 

general rule, should be guided by the legislative policies underlying the existing plan, to the extent 

those policies do not lead to violations of the Constitution or Voting Rights Act.” Abrams, 521 

U.S. at 79. Under such circumstances, a court must reconcile the goals of state political policy 

with the requirements of the Constitution. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414 (1977); see 

also Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982) (“An appropriate reconciliation of these two goals 

can only be reached if the district court’s modifications of a state plan are limited to those necessary 

to cure any constitutional or statutory defect.”). The Court therefore reviews P4 to determine if it

properly considers Defendant’s lawful political preferences (substantial equality of population,

respecting communities of interest, and use of natural and manmade boundaries), while

simultaneously remedying the constitutional defects of the Enjoined Plan.

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i. Substantial Equality of Population

First the Court addresses whether P4 complies with the Commission’s lawful (and 

constitutionally required) goal of substantial equality of population among the districts. See 

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). Plaintiffs aver that P4 “is within the population 

equality limits the Commission set in its [Remedial Plan].” See Obj. at 27. Indeed, Plaintiffs rely 

on Dr. Abott’s expert report to demonstrate that P4’s population deviation among each district is 

2.4%, an improvement on the Remedial Plan’s total population deviation of 3.6%. See id. (citing 

2nd Abott Rep. at 14–16). Based on the unrebutted expert report, the Court is satisfied that P4 

achieves Defendant’s goal for population equality limits.

ii. Respecting Traditional Neighborhoods and Communities of Interest

Another one of Defendant’s goals throughout the redistricting process was to ensure the 

Remedial Plan retained traditional communities of interest within one district. See, e.g., Reply at 

5 (explaining “many of the requests by Commissioners were geared towards maintaining 

communities in which they had invested district resources”); 6/14 Tr. (referencing throughout the 

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importance of towns such as Allapattah, Civic Center, Grapeland Heights, West Flagler, Flagami, 

Overtown, Coconut Grove, and Morningside). For the following reasons, the Court finds that P4 

adequately preserves the Defendant’s goal of maintaining the unity of traditional neighborhoods, 

without dividing them among racial lines.

In P4’s District 5, Overtown’s southern boundary is consistent with how Google Maps, 

NET, CVB, and MPD define it. See Obj. at 27 (explaining that all of Overtown “east of the 

Seybold Canal and south to NW 5th Street. . . is made whole within D[istrict] 5”). P4 includes in

District 5 the entirety of the more-broadly-defined Overtown except for “one city block moved to 

better equalize population” and “three unpopulated blocks east of I-95.” Id. According to 

Plaintiffs, where the Remedial Plan “excised less-Black portions from D[istrict] 5,” P4 restores 

them. Id. Indeed, certain traditional communities of interest that Commissioner King emphasized 

should remain in District 5 are there in P4, including Liberty City, Little Haiti, Wynwood, the 

Upper East Side, and Morningside. See id.; see also (ECF No. 82-16) (Miami Times article 

expressing same); 6/14 Tr. 12:17–22 (Commissioner King expressing her desire to retain 

Wynwood as a significant economic driver for District 5). 

Similarly, in other districts, P4 unites communities of interest. In line with Commissioner

Covo’s request, Coconut Grove is kept whole in District 2. See 6/14 Tr. 42:9–43:3. District 2 also 

contains areas such as the West Grove, Edgewater, and Grapeland Heights. See Obj. at 28. 

Throughout the June 14 Meeting, De Grandy identified the importance of these areas as traditional 

neighborhoods. See 6/14 Tr. 6:19–20, 13:15–16. Further, P4 also ensures that Domino Park 

remains in District 3. See id. 36:22–37:2 (Commissioners emphasizing the need for District 3 to 

retain Domino Park in its entirety).

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Other neighborhoods that P4 splits are neighborhoods that the Commission did not 

prioritize. For example, “P4 splits Brickell between D[istrict] 2 and D[istrict] 3, but the dividing 

line is the Metrorail rather than [the Remedial Plan’s] jagged border that scoops whiter blocks into 

D[istrict] 2.” Obj. at 28 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the “Downtown/Omni area remains 

divided among three districts, but no longer surgically separates more-Hispanic, more-Anglo, and 

more-Black areas into D[istrict] 1, D[istrict] 2, and D[istrict] 5, respectively.” Id. And, while P4 

divides the traditional neighborhoods of Little Havana and Auburndale, so too did the Remedial 

Plan. See id. 

Therefore, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that, to the extent practicable, P4 unites many 

traditional neighborhoods into one district, largely in accord with the Commissioners’ expressed 

intent. The Court is also satisfied that P4 delineates districts in a manner that preserves 

communities of interest, without dividing the neighborhoods among racial lines. Where some 

neighborhoods were split, P4 largely mirrors the Remedial Plan, but does so in a manner that is 

race-neutral. 

iii. Recognition of Significant and Natural Boundaries

Plaintiffs also assert that P4, where possible, “utilizes natural and manmade boundaries the 

Commission recognized as logical.” Obj. at 28 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, the 

Remedial Plan incorporated “natural and manmade boundaries such as the city’s municipal 

boundaries, the bay, the railroad, the Miami River, an expressway, and the contours of traditional 

neighborhoods,” along with “water boundaries” and “major roads.” 6/14 Tr. 13:3–4, 13:18. P4 

follows this directive, with “SW 4th and 8th Streets and 32nd Avenue coninu[ing] to form 

boundaries.” Obj. at 28. Further, P4 also contains borders tracking “SE/NE 2nd Avenue, 22nd

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Avenue, and US 1.” Id. at 28–29. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs incorporated 

Defendant’s lawful goal of using natural and manmade boundaries into P4.

2. P4 Properly Considers Traditional Redistricting Criteria

When tasked with redistricting, courts must also consider traditional redistricting criteria. 

See Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 183. Traditional redistricting criteria “include[e] compactness, 

contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by shared interests, 

incumbency protection, and political affiliation.” ALBC, 575 U.S. at 254 (internal citation 

omitted). The list of traditional criteria is not exhaustive, nor is the reviewing court required to 

consider each consideration when evaluating the redistricting plan. See Jacksonville II, 2022 WL 

17751416, at *18–19 (evaluating the remedial plan only for compactness, respect for traditional 

communities, and incumbency protection). Nevertheless, a court must use these criteria when 

drawing its own map or selecting one suggested by one of the Parties.15

i. Compactness

Here, the Court notes that P4’s districts are compact, both visually and according to 

statistical compactness scores. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. McCartan, calculated the compactness of P4 

using a simulation algorithm.16 See generally McCartan Rep. As part of his analysis, Dr. 

McCartan calculated P4’s Polsby-Popper compactness scores, Reock compactness scores, Convex 

Hull compactness scores, and edge-cut measures. See id.; see also Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity 

Inc., 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (identifying the Polsby-Popper and Reock measures as “widely 

acceptable tests to determine compactness scores”). The Polsby-Popper, Reock, and Convex Hull 

15

 The Court will not consider incumbency protection. See Section III.C.3, infra. Further, as there 

is no factual dispute regarding contiguity, the Court finds P4’s districts contiguous. 

16 All Polsby-Popper, Reock, and Convex Hull scores were multiplied by 100 for ease of reference. 

McCartan Rep. at 5–6. Accordingly, when the Court refers to these scores, or any comparators, it 

will refer to the scores with such a multiplier. 

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scores lie on a 0–100 scale, with higher values indicating more compact districts. McCartan Rep. 

at 6–7. As for the edge-cut score, lower values indicate more compact districts. Id. at 7. P4 had 

an average compactness score of 39.6 on the Polsby-Popper scale, 35.4 on the Reock scale, and 

77.0 on the Convex Hull scale. Id. at 6–7; see also Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1277 (rejecting the argument that districts in an illustrative plan were not compact with an 

average Polsby-Popper scores ranging from of 17 to 34, and Reock Scores ranging from 22 to 57). 

On the edge-cut measure, P4 had a compactness score of 237, a score lower than the Remedial 

Plan. McCartan Rep. at 7. Accordingly, the Court finds that P4 is more statistically compact than 

the Remedial Plan, is more visually compact, and thus, P4 properly considered compactness as a 

traditional districting criterion.

ii. Respect for Traditional Neighborhoods

As discussed extensively above, the Court finds that P4 keeps traditional neighborhoods 

and communities of interest united. See Section III.C.1.ii, supra. P4 was crafted to ensure that 

communities would be united within a single district to the extent possible. The Court finds that 

P4 properly considered traditional neighborhoods and respects communities of interest.

3. P4 Complies with Applicable Federal and State Law

When a federal court is tasked with redistricting, it must ensure that any remedial map 

adheres to relevant state and federal law. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 394 (2012). The Court 

thus analyzes whether P4 complies with the applicable state and federal statutes.

Beginning first with the applicable state law, the Court must ensure any remedial plan 

adheres to state law, so long as the state law “does not detract from the requirements of the Federal 

Constitution.” White, 412 U.S. at 795. As Plaintiffs correctly identify, in this instance, the only 

applicable state law is Fla. Stat. § 166.0321. Obj. at 30. According to the statute, no electoral 

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district may be “drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a candidate. . . or an incumbent. . . based

on the candidate’s or incumbent’s residential address.” Fla. Stat. § 166.0321. Here, the record 

does not indicate, nor has Defendant argued, that Plaintiffs drew P4 with the intent to favor or 

disfavor any candidate or incumbent based on where the candidate may reside. Obj. at 30; see 

generally Reply. Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that “P4 has no irregular appendages 

or bizarre lines ‘that serve as objective indicators of intent’” to consider any candidate’s residence. 

Obj. at 30 (quoting In re SJR 1176, 83 So. 3d at 670). Therefore, the Court is satisfied that P4 

complies with Florida state law.

P4 must also comply with applicable federal law. Here, the crucial question is whether 

District 5 in P4 complies with § 2 of the VRA. Both Parties agree that § 2 “protects Black 

Miamians from vote dilution, see id. at 30, (citing Notice at 6), and thus, P4 must adhere to the 

VRA in a manner that satisfies strict scrutiny. 

When drafting P4, Plaintiffs relied on their expert Dr. Moy’s functional analysis to ensure 

the BVAP of P4’s District 5 was narrowly tailored to comply with § 2 of the VRA. Id. at 30; see 

also (ECF No. 82-13) (“Moy Supp. Rep.”). Regarding the ability to elect a candidate of their 

choice under § 2 of the VRA, minority voters are entitled to “equality of opportunity, not a 

guarantee of electoral success.” League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 

428 (2006) (citation omitted). Put differently, “[w]hile minority voters need not be guaranteed to 

elect their preferred candidates in every election. . . they should at least regularly be able to do so.” 

Obj. at 31 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). Dr. Moy’s report demonstrates that P4 

fits that criterion and explains that based on his reconstituted election analysis of P4, a Blackpreferred candidate would prevail in P4’s District 5. See Moy Supp. Rep. at 10. Dr. Moy’s process 

involved “re-aggregating historical election results in the newly drawn districts and counting how 

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many votes would have been cast for the various candidates in the elections.” Obj. at 31. 

According to his report, Black-preferred candidates, in eleven racially polarized state and local 

elections ranging from 2020 to 2022, would always prevail in P4’s District 5. Id. Based on this 

analysis, Plaintiffs argue that P4’s District 5 complies with the VRA, and Plaintiffs underwent the 

required functional analysis to ensure VRA compliance, thereby ensuring that District 5 was 

narrowly tailored.

To the extent Defendant responds, it reiterates that the Remedial Plan’s version of District 

5 was narrowly tailored. See Reply at 10. As mentioned above, Defendant relies mostly on its 

expert, Dr. Alford, for the proposition that “if the plaintiffs’ District 5 in P4 is narrowly tailored, 

as they assert, then so are the City’s versions of District 5.” Alford Rep. at 8. But importantly, Dr. 

Alford never opines that P4’s District 5 is not narrowly tailored, and in fact, states that P4 

“provide[s] highly secure election margins for Black-preferred candidates.” Id. Thus, Dr. Alford’s 

Report does not provide the basis for any argument that P4’s District 5 is not narrowly tailored. 

And most importantly, aside from relying on Dr. Alford’s Report, Defendant advances no other 

theory regarding whether District 5 in P4 is not narrowly tailored. 

After considering Plaintiffs’ largely unrebutted argument and the expert reports of Dr. Moy 

and Dr. Alford, the Court finds that P4 complies with § 2 of the VRA in a manner consistent with 

the United States Constitution. 

4. The Political Consequences of P4 Do Not Alter the Court’s Analysis

In response to Plaintiffs’ proposed P4, Defendant offers two interrelated arguments against 

its adoption, both of which are misguided. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ proposed maps 

(including P4) are “fundamentally similar” to the Remedial Plan, including a VRA protected 

district, and a coastal district. Reply at 2. Where the similarities end, according to Defendant, is 

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that Plaintiffs’ P4 “keep[s] the more politically conservative western part of the City packed into 

a single district, District 4.” Id. at 4. Citing its expert, Dr. Alford, Defendant even claims “the 

remainder of Plaintiffs[’] case is really about swapping population between three Hispanic districts 

to claim their plans are ‘more different’ from the Enjoined Plan, and to change the political 

performance of those districts.” Id. at 11. 

Neither argument is appropriate given the posture of the instant Action. The Court is only 

reviewing P4 because, after being given the opportunity to proffer a constitutional remedial plan, 

Defendant was unable to do so. See Section III.A–B, supra. At this juncture, the Court reviews 

P4 only to ensure that it (1) retains Defendant’s lawful objectives of the Remedial Plan and 

remedies only the aspects of the plan the Court found unconstitutional; (2) adheres to traditional 

redistricting criteria; and (3) does not otherwise violate state or federal law. Because P4 must 

retain the legislature’s lawful objectives, that P4 is “fundamentally similar” to the Remedial Plan, 

to a certain extent, should be expected. Moreover, that P4 results in a different political outcome 

is irrelevant at this point in the Court’s review.

Lastly, it is telling that aside from the above arguments, Defendant provides no rebuttal to 

any portion of Plaintiffs’ P4 arguments. See generally Reply. Defendant does not even attempt 

to rebut Plaintiffs’ claims about the merits and legalities of P4. See id. In the Court’s view, rather 

than contesting P4 as a constitutional remedy, Defendant has proffered a variety of grievances 

about potential political outcomes that would result from its implementation. Such grievances are 

misplaced when the Court is evaluating a remedy to resolve the unconstitutional aspects of the 

Enjoined Plan.

Case 1:22-cv-24066-KMM Document 94 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/30/2023 Page 49 of 50
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IV. CONCLUSION

UPON CONSIDERATION of the NOTICE, the pertinent portions of the record, and being 

otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ 

Objections to the City’s Proposed Interim Remedial Plan (ECF No. 83) are SUSTAINED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: 

1. Plaintiffs’ Alternative Map P4 is ADOPTED as the Court’s Interim Remedial Plan 

pending final judgment in this Action.

2. Defendant City of Miami is DIRECTED to implement the Court’s Remedial Plan (P4) 

beginning with the City of Miami November 2023 Municipal Election.

3. Defendant City of Miami is DIRECTED to transmit the Court’s Remedial Plan (P4), 

along with any other necessary materials, to the Miami-Dade County Elections 

Department by July 31, 2023. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this ______ day of July, 2023.

K. MICHAEL MOORE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

c: All counsel of record

30th

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