United States District Court 

for the 

Southern District of Florida 

Jeffrey Mallon,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Robert Belanger, et. al., 

Defendants. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 22-14399-Scola 

Order 

Before the Court is Plaintiff Jeffrey Mallon’s pro se Complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Complaint”) (ECF No. 1). Mallon also filed, what the Court 

construes as, a Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis. (“IFP Motion”) (ECF No. 3). 

Therein, Mallon requests that the Court call his mother to request payment of 

the $402 filing fee. (See id. at 1). For the following reasons, the Complaint is 

dismissed with prejudice under the “three-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g) and the IFP Motion is denied as moot. 

Legal Standards 

When a prisoner-plaintiff proceeds IFP, his complaint must be screened 

under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)—also known as the “three strikes 

provision.” White v. Lemma, 947 F.3d 1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] court 

must procedurally dismiss without prejudice the claim of a prisoner who has 

struck out under the three-strikes provision and failed to pay the filing fee, 

[but] the court may also consider the merits to dismiss the case with prejudice 

instead.”). The three-striker cannot pay the filing fee after he has initiated the 

suit to cure his failure to pay said fee at the time he initiated the suit. See 

Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The 

“three-strikes provision” reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 

 In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a 

 civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or 

 more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 

 brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 

 dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a 

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claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

§ 1915(g).

As noted, § 1915(g) contains an exception for prisoners who are “under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Under § 

1915(g), courts must “look to the prisoner’s complaint ‘as a whole,’ construing 

it liberally and accepting his allegations as true.” Smith v. Clemons, 465 F. 

App’x 835, 836 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 387 

F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004)). However, vague and conclusory allegations 

of being in imminent danger of serious physical injury “do not satisfy the 

dictates of § 1915(g).” Skillern v. Paul, 202 F. App’x 343, 344 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(per curiam). Furthermore, the prisoner “must be under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury[] . . . at the time he filed his complaint[].” Clemons, 465 

F. App’x at 836 (citing Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 

1999)).

Discussion 

In his rambling and largely incomprehensible Complaint, Mallon asserts, 

without providing reason, that his “due process rights were violated.”

Complaint at 2. He continues to attack the sufficiency of the State’s evidence 

against him, see id. at 3–4 (“At this point the evidence is insufficient to warrant 

a conviction.”), he asserts that he was forced “to accept against his will a courtappointed Assistant Public Defender” depriving him of the right to selfrepresentation, id. at 8–9, and he concludes by announcing that “cruel and 

unusual punishment is an issue” due to past detainee batteries against him, 

id. at 9.

Because Mallon has not paid the filing fee and requests to proceed IFP, § 

1915 requires the Court to determine whether, “on 3 or more occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, [Mallon] brought an action or appeal in 

a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 

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frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The answer is yes. 

Mallon is a serial filer in our Court. Judge Altman’s December 5, 2022

Order provides a detailed recounting of Mallon’s history. See Mallon v. St. Lucie 

County, No. 22-14396-CIV (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2022) (Altman, R), ECF No. 4 at 9 

(dismissing the complaint with prejudice as “frivolous, malicious, and an abuse 

of the judicial process.”). 

In addition to the “strike” incurred from Judge Altman’s recent order, 

Mallon has three additional § 1983 complaints that were dismissed because 

they “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g). Chief Judge Altonaga, dismissed two of Mallon’s complaints after

finding that Mallon had failed to state a plausible claim. See Order Dismissing 

Complaint, Mallon v. Badger, No. 21-14026-CIV (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2021) 

(Altonaga, J.), ECF No. 4 at 1 (“Upon initial screening, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.”); Order Dismissing Complaint, Mallon v. Florida, No. 22-14033-CIV 

(S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2022) (Altonaga, C.J.), ECF No. 4 at 1 (“Upon initial 

screening, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”). And Judge Dimitrouleas 

dismissed one of Mallon’s complaints both because it was “frivolous” and 

because it failed “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Order on 

Screening, Mallon v. Florida, No. 22-14084-CIV (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2022) 

(Dimitrouleas, J.), ECF No. 4 at 7. 

Because all four of these complaints—all filed while Mallon was 

incarcerated—“were dismissed for failure to state a claim,” or as “frivolous, 

malicious, and an abuse of the judicial process,” Mallon has four strikes and is 

“barred from proceeding IFP[.]” Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d 869, 873–74 (11th 

Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

Mallon could avoid the three-strikes label by alleging that he “is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Mallon does 

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not try to qualify for this exception. See generally Complaint. At most, he 

complains about past detainee batteries, but he does not allege any imminent 

or ongoing danger. See Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 

1999). Thus, the imminent-danger exception does not apply. See Abdullah v. 

Migoya, 955 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Zloch, J.) (“A plaintiff 

must provide the court with specific allegations of present imminent danger 

indicating that a serious physical injury will result if his claims are not 

addressed.”). Accordingly, Mallon is subject to the three-strikes rule—and

because he failed to pay the filing fee, his Complaint must be dismissed. See 

White, 947 F.3d at 1377 (“We have construed this language to mean that a 

district court must dismiss a prisoner’s claims when the prisoner has three 

strikes but failed to pay the filing fee when the suit began.”).

Moreover, the Court finds that Mallon’s Complaint is frivolous, malicious, 

and an abuse of the judicial process and should therefore be dismissed with 

prejudice. See White, 947 F.3d at 1379 (“So though a court must procedurally 

dismiss without prejudice the claim of a prisoner who has struck out under the 

three-strikes provision and failed to pay the filing fee, the court may also 

consider the merits to dismiss the case with prejudice instead.”). A “duplicative 

complaint” represents an “abuse of the judicial process” and can be “properly 

dismissed as frivolous or malicious.” Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th 

Cir. 2021); see also Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A 

claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.”). The 

Eleventh Circuit has consistently affirmed the with-prejudice dismissal of 

frivolous and malicious § 1983 complaints. See, e.g., Broner v. Wash. Mut. 

Bank, F.A., 258 F. App’x 254, 256–57 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he district court did 

not abuse its discretion in finding her complaint frivolous and did not err in 

finding that it failed to state a claim. Accordingly, her complaint was properly 

dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).”); Nails v. Franklin, 279 F. 

App’x 899, 901 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We agree that Plaintiff's suit is frivolous and 

should be dismissed with prejudice.”).

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As explained in Judge Altman’s recent order: 

 Mallon has filed at least ten other cases in our Court since 2020—all of 

 which raised the same general complaints about the constitutionality of 

 his detention in the St. Lucie County Jail. And all of these have been 

 dismissed for one or more of the following reasons: because they failed to 

 state a viable claim, because they were frivolous, because their claims 

 were barred by the Younger abstention doctrine, or because Mallon failed 

 to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Mallon v. St. Lucie County, No. 22-14396-CIV (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2022) (Altman, 

R), ECF No. 4 at 7–8. The present Complaint marks Mallon’s eleventh frivolous 

case in our Court containing “claims duplicative of claims he had already 

asserted.” Daker, 999 F.3d at 1310. As such, dismissal with prejudice is 

appropriate.1

Conclusion 

Accordingly, it is ordered and adjudged that this action is dismissed 

with prejudice as frivolous, malicious, and an abuse of the judicial process. 

The clerk is directed to close the case and all pending motions are denied as 

moot. 

Done and ordered, in chambers, in Miami, Florida, on December 6, 

2022. 

 _____________ __________________ 

 Robert N. Scola, Jr. 

 United States District Judge 

Copies, via U.S. Mail, to 

Jeffrey W. Mallon 

37449 

St. Lucie County Jail 

Inmate Mail/Parcels 

1 Mallon is also warned that if he continues to submit abusive and frivolous filings, the Court will 

not hesitate to sanction him—including with monetary sanctions. Cf. Procup v. Strickland, 792 

F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“[Mallon] can be severely restricted as to what he 

may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief.”); Roggio v. United States, 

2013 WL 12176990, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2013) (Goodman, Mag. J.) (“Because Roggio is 

abusing the reconsideration motion mechanism, any future, any future violations may lead to 

an award of sanctions, including costs, attorney’s fees, and/or other monetary or non-monetary 

sanctions, against him.”).

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900 North Rock Road 

Fort Pierce, FL 34945 

PRO SE

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