COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Frank and 

 Senior Judge Coleman∗ 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

WESLEY VERNON SNIDER, III 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗∗ BY 

v. Record No. 1539-99-3 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK 

 JANUARY 16, 2001 

DIANA LEIGH ASHWORTH SNIDER, N/K/A 

 DIANA LEIGH ASHWORTH 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 

 Gordon H. Shapiro (Shapiro & Kurtin, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 John S. Huntington for appellee. 

 ∗

 Judge Coleman participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

December 31, 2000 and thereafter by his designation as a senior 

judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401. 

∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Wesley Vernon Snider, III, (husband) appeals the trial 

court's equitable distribution award. On appeal, he contends 

the trial court erred in: 1) finding Diana Ashworth Snider's 

(wife) testimony regarding the value of the Vicker Switch Honey 

Company (bee business) more persuasive and awarding her a sixty 

percent distributive share of the business, 2) valuing the 

marital home at $78,000 by finding husband committed waste of 
$7,500 between the date of the parties' separation and the date 

of the equitable distribution hearing, 3) finding the home was 

marital property and awarding wife a distributive share of such 

property, and 4) awarding wife the fair market rental value of 

the home. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The parties were married on June 29, 1983. They separated 

on April 6, 1994. Since the only issues before this Court are 

the company and the home, we only recite the facts relevant to 

those issues. 

 Husband founded the Vicker Switch Honey Company 

approximately five years prior to the parties' divorce. He 

testified the business was a national and international company. 

He testified that, at one time, the business had forty hives, 

which produced a ton of jarred honey. The business also had the 

east coast contract to sell a swarm trap to combat killer bees. 

The business had an inventory of suits, smokers, veils, hats, 

and other related items. 

 Husband testified the business was nearly defunct at the 

time of the parties' separation and had no value. He stated 

that mites had attacked the bees and had caused the business to 

lose "about everything." 

 Wife testified she was not involved in the operation of the 

business but that it was not defunct at the time of the parties' 

separation. Wife further testified she never had access to the 

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books for the business. She stated she never knew if the 

business made a profit. She never saw any of the proceeds from 

the business. 

 When asked the value of the business at the time of the 

separation, wife answered that she did not know. When her 

attorney asked her to give her "best estimate" she stated, 

"Fifteen thousand." 

 The trial court accepted wife's valuation of the business 

and awarded wife a sixty percent distributive share or $9,000. 

 Prior to the marriage, husband's father gave him a parcel 

of land. Before the parties' marriage, a basement was built on 

the site, and the parties lived in the basement until the upper 

house was completed. After the marriage, work began on the 

house. The land remained titled in husband's name. 

 Husband testified he served as the general contractor for 

the construction of the house and did much of the work himself. 

The parties differ on the efforts each provided to the 

construction of the improvements. Husband claimed he performed 

sixty to eighty percent of the work. Wife maintained they both 

worked on the house, as did others. Wife testified she obtained 

a number of electrical fixtures through her employment and 

installed them. Husband testified wife did no work on the 

house. 

 The initial funding for the basement was a combination of 

the infusion of separate property and a loan. Wife testified 

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she used $6,000 of her separate funds and husband used between 

$1,000 and $2,000 of his funds. Additionally, wife testified 

she borrowed $15,000 for the basement because husband was not 

employed at that time. This loan for the basement subsequently 

was rolled into the permanent first deed of trust. 

 The next loan was a permanent first deed of trust for 

$57,000. The monthly curtailments were paid from a joint 

account. The loan balance of $48,341.93 was satisfied on April 

21, 1993, from the proceeds of husband's personal injury 

settlement. There is no dispute that this settlement was 

husband's separate property. 

 After satisfying the first deed of trust, the parties 

borrowed $15,000. Both parties agreed the balance of this loan 

was $13,946.45 as of April 1, 1994, and $10,594.91 as of July 

20, 1995. Husband paid the monthly payment of $296.95. 

 Wife testified her father gave her approximately $34,000 

between the years 1991 and 1994, which she stated she put into 

the house and marriage. All of these gifts were deposited into 

a joint account. 

 Wife testified that while the parties' non-monetary 

contributions to the marriage were approximately equal, she 

contributed more cash to the marriage than did husband. 

 Husband's appraiser, Todd Linkous, appraised the house at 

$71,000 in its current condition. Mr. Linkous, however, noted 

the home needed roof repair, cosmetic repair, and the interior 

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and exterior of the home was in need of cleaning and sealing. 

Linkous estimated the repairs at $7,500. With the repairs, he 

stated the house would be worth $78,500. The property was 

assessed, for tax purposes, at $71,800 for the years 1995 

through 1997. Wife maintained the value of the property was 

$78,000. Husband's equitable distribution submission also 

showed the value as $78,000. The trial court found the fair 

market value of the home to be $78,000. The trial court 

included the $7,500 repair estimate, finding the repairs were 

necessitated during husband's sole post-separation occupancy of 

the home. The trial court further found that husband should not 

benefit by his neglect of the property. Husband, in his 

deposition, acknowledged the interior and exterior of the house 

needed to be cleaned and sealed. He further admitted he made no 

repairs to the house but stated he maintained it. 

 An appraisal further revealed the fair market rental value 

of the home was $675 per month. Husband exclusively had lived 

in the house since April 6, 1994, the date of the parties' 

separation. The trial court awarded wife fifty percent of the 

marital share of the fair market rental value. 

 The trial court found the unimproved lot was separate 

property, although no evidence indicated its value. The court 

found the house was hybrid property. 

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II. ANALYSIS 

A. Valuation of the Vicker Switch Honey Company

 Husband asserts the trial court erred in its valuation of 

the bee business and its award of sixty percent of the valuation 

to wife. We agree. 

 "The rule is firmly established in 

Virginia that a divorce decree based solely 

on depositions is not as conclusive on 

appellate review as one based upon evidence 

heard ore tenus, but such a decree is 

presumed correct and will not be overturned 

if supported by substantial, competent and 

credible evidence." 

Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 127, 341 S.E.2d 827, 828 

(1986) (citations omitted).1 The evidence in this case was taken 

by deposition, thus, we will not disturb the award of the trial 

court if it is supported by "substantial, competent and credible 

evidence." 

 When wife's attorney asked her the value of the Vicker 

Switch Honey Company at the time of the parties' separation, she 

testified that she did not know. Then, her attorney again asked 

her to provide her best estimate of the value of the business 

 1

 At issue in this case is the equitable distribution award, 

which pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(A), the trial court determines 

"[u]pon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, and also upon 

decreeing a divorce from the bond of matrimony, or upon the 

filing with the court as provided in subsection J of a certified 

copy of a final divorce decree obtained without the 

Commonwealth . . . ." Code § 20-107.3(A). Because equitable 

distribution occurs upon decreeing the divorce, we apply the 

same standard to review the evidence in an equitable 

distribution award. 

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and she responded, "Fifteen thousand." Wife also testified she 

was not involved in the operation of the business, never had 

access to the books for the business, did not know if the 

business made a profit, and never saw any proceeds from the 

business. Husband testified the business was nearly defunct at 

the time of the parties' separation. He testified that while 

the business had been a national and international business at 

one time, mites had attacked the bees, which resulted in the 

business losing "about everything." Husband testified the 

business had no value at the time of the parties' separation. 

 The trial court's acceptance of the wife's valuation of the 

business was not supported by substantial, competent, and 

credible evidence. Wife testified she was not involved in the 

business and had no knowledge of the financial status of the 

business. Further, her testimony indicated that she did not 

know the value of the business at the time of the separation and 

she only answered "Fifteen thousand" when again questioned by 

her attorney as to her "best estimate." Therefore, we find the 

trial court erred in accepting wife's valuation of the business 

and remand for redetermination of the award with respect to the 

business. 

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B. The Marital Home2

 Husband argues the trial court erred in valuing the 

parties' home at $78,000. Todd Linkous, the appraiser, valued 

the home at $71,000 and noted the home needed $7,500 worth of 

repairs. The trial court valued the home at $78,000, stating 

the necessity of the repairs accrued during husband's 

post-separation occupancy of the property. The trial court 

found that husband should not benefit from his neglect of the 

property. We agree with the trial court's valuation of the 

property, but find the trial court was right for the wrong 

reason in reaching such valuation. 

 "An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a trial 

court when it has reached the right result for the wrong 

reason." Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 449, 452, 417 

S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (citation omitted). This rule applies in 

civil cases. See id. (citation omitted). The rule, however, 

does not always apply: 

 It may not be used if the correct 

reason for affirming the trial court was not 

raised in any manner at trial. Eason v. 

 2

 The first deed of trust on the parties' marital home was 

satisfied by proceeds from husband's personal injury settlement. 

"Separate property does not by its express terms include 

personal injury settlements." Thomas v. Thomas, 13 Va. App. 92, 

94, 408 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1991). Instead, because of the 

presumption favoring marital property, the party who claims the 

settlement is separate property bears the burden of proving the 

settlement is separate property. See id. In this case, the 

parties agreed that husband's personal injury settlement was 

separate property. We, therefore, do not address this issue. 

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Eason, 204 Va. 347, 352, 131 S.E.2d 280, 283 

(1963). In addition, the proper application 

of this rule does not include those cases 

where, because the trial court has rejected 

the right reason or confined its decision to 

a specific ground, further factual 

resolution is needed before the right reason 

may be assigned to support the trial court's 

decision. Sateren v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 

234 Va. 303, 306, 362 S.E.2d 324, 326 

(1987). 

Id. at 452, 417 S.E.2d 313-14. 

 The record established that the house was appraised at 

$78,000, which also was husband's valuation of the home in his 

equitable distribution submission. Wife raised the fact that 

husband valued the home at $78,000 in her memorandum of law 

submitted to the trial court. No further factual resolution is 

needed. We find the trial court was correct in valuing the home 

at $78,000 but did so for the wrong reason. 

 Husband next argues the trial court erred in classifying 

the home as marital property. We disagree. 

 Our standard of review of this 

particular issue is well settled. "Code 

§ 20-107.3 contains no presumption favoring 

equal division of marital property. 

Moreover, in reviewing an equitable 

distribution award, we rely heavily on the 

trial judge's discretion in weighing the 

particular circumstances of each case. Only 

under exceptional circumstances will we 

interfere with the exercise of the trial 

judge's discretion." Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. 

App. 1, 8, 371 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1988) 

(citation omitted). 

Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 573, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 

(1992). 

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 Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(a) provides that property not owned 

by both parties may be classified as marital property when the 

value of separate property has increased because "marital 

property or the personal efforts of either party have 

contributed to such increases . . . ." In this case, the trial 

court found that the parties' home, as opposed to the unimproved 

lot, was marital property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(a) due to 

wife's "certain contributions of marital property and personal 

effort in contributing to appreciation of the unimproved lot, 

[husband's] separate property." We find the trial court 

carefully considered the factors in subsection (A) and did not 

abuse its discretion in classifying the parties' home as marital 

property and awarding wife a distributive share of such 

property. 

 Husband finally contends the trial court erred in ruling 

wife had a rental interest in the marital home and in making an 

award of the rental value of the home. We agree. 

 Code § 8.01-31 states, "An accounting in equity may be had 

against any fiduciary or by one joint tenant, tenant in common, 

or coparcener for receiving more than comes to his just share or 

proportion, or against the personal representative of any such 

party." 

 As contemplated by Code § 8.01-31, an accounting occurs 

only when there is co-ownership of the property. Thus, a party 

is entitled to the fair market rental value of the property only 

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when that party has joint ownership of the property. See Gaynor 

v. Hird, 15 Va. App. 379, 381, 424 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1992). 

 In this case, the record established, and wife conceded on 

brief, that wife was not a title owner of the property. The 

property was deeded to husband prior to the parties' marriage, 

and the property was never titled in wife's name. Therefore, 

because she is not an owner of the property, wife is not 

entitled to the fair market rental value. 

 For these reasons, we find the trial court was correct in 

valuing the parties' home at $78,000 and in classifying the home 

as marital property. The trial court, however, erred in 

accepting wife's valuation of the bee business and in awarding 

wife the fair market rental value of the home. We remand for 

redetermination of the award for the bee business. 

Reversed and remanded.

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