Filed 8/30/23 In re R.C. CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re R.C. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B322826

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01404)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Stephen C. Marpet, Temporary Judge. Affirmed. 

Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services (DCFS or the agency) initiated juvenile 

dependency proceedings concerning R.C., who was then 15, and 

her sister, A.C., who was 13. DCFS alleged that R.C. had mental 

and emotional problems causing her to attempt suicide and harm 

herself, and that her mother and father were unable to provide 

the care and supervision necessary to address those problems. 

The juvenile court sustained this jurisdictional allegation, 

declared both children dependents of the court, let the children 

remain in parental custody, and ordered DCFS to provide family

maintenance services to mother, father, and the children.

On appeal, mother challenges the juvenile court’s assertion 

of jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. insofar as it was premised on 

mother’s failure to provide adequate care and supervision.1 She

contends that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, there was 

no risk of serious physical harm to the minors because she had 

completed a parenting class and enrolled R.C. and A.C. in 

therapy, R.C. had stabilized emotionally, and DCFS 

recommended terminating jurisdiction with a family custody 

order awarding mother sole physical and joint legal custody of 

the children. 

1 Father is not a party to this appeal. As set forth in 

Discussion, part A, post, we nonetheless exercise our discretion to 

review mother’s challenge to dependency jurisdiction based on 

her conduct. 
3

We conclude that substantial evidence supported 

dependency jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. At the beginning of 

DCFS’s investigation, mother minimized the severity of R.C.’s

mental and emotional problems, and R.C. had been in therapy for 

only three months prior to the jurisdictional hearing. Mother has 

not directed us to any evidence that upon completing her 

parenting course, she changed her dismissive attitude toward 

R.C.’s mental and emotional challenges, which included suicidal 

ideations. As for jurisdiction over A.C., although A.C. had not 

attempted to harm herself, she was nonetheless exposed to 

substantial risk of serious physical harm because she too had 

mental and emotional problems and endured stressors akin to 

those R.C. confronted, that is, A.C. had witnessed mother and 

father engage in acts of domestic violence, and A.C. had difficulty 

communicating her feelings to father. 

Applying our deferential substantial evidence standard of

review, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in taking 

jurisdiction over the children. We thus affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

We summarize only those facts pertinent to this appeal.

In 2018, mother divorced father and obtained sole legal and 

physical custody of R.C. and A.C. Although the judgment of 

2 We derive part of our Factual and Procedural 

Background from undisputed portions of the parties’ appellate 

briefing. (See Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, 

fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and argument . . . are reliable indications of a 

party’s position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing 

court may make use of statements therein as admissions against 

the party.’ ”].)
4

dissolution grants a “[r]easonable right of visitation” to father, it 

does not include a visitation schedule. 

On April 12, 2022, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency 

petition concerning R.C., then 15 years old, and A.C., then 13, 

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 300, 

subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (j). Among other things, DCFS 

alleged that R.C. had “mental and emotional problems including 

suicidal and self-harming behaviors,” and that mother and father 

were “unable to provide appropriate parental care and 

supervision of the child due to the child’s mental and emotional 

problems.”

At the outset of DCFS’s investigation on February 22, 2022, 

R.C. told the agency she had disclosed on a form at a medical 

appointment that she had cut herself in the past.4 R.C. stated

her mother took her to a hospital the following day. R.C.

informed the agency that she left the hospital before the 

psychiatric team could assess her because R.C. believed the

process was taking too long. 

R.C. told DCFS that she had “feelings of sadness since she 

was seven,” and that “she believe[d] she has had feelings of 

wanting to hurt herself because of her lack of [a] close 

relationship with her parents and [her] feelings of sadness.” R.C. 

disclosed that she tried to kill herself twice, and that she had

previously cut herself on her forearms and inner thighs. R.C. 

indicated that the last time she had cut herself was 

3 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

4 The remainder of this paragraph and the following three 

paragraphs summarize certain portions of DCFS’s nondetention 

report filed in April 2022.
5

approximately six months prior to her February 2022 

hospitalization, and that the last time she “ha[d] feelings of 

wanting to end her life” was approximately one month prior to 

her hospitalization. R.C. stated she had concealed the cuts on 

her body from mother and father. After this interview, the 

psychiatric mobile response team placed R.C. on a 72-hour 

psychiatric hold and transported her to a hospital. 

During her February 22, 2022 interview with DCFS, 

mother told the agency that she did “not understand what [was] 

going on with” R.C., and mother expressed her beliefs that R.C. 

was “being very manipulative,” R.C. “only want[ed] attention,” 

and R.C. “ha[d] threatened to hurt herself because mother ha[d] 

restricted piercings/tattoos on [R.C.] and made her go to school 

when she did not want to.” Mother also related that (1) she 

asked R.C. “what [the] child is ‘depressed about’ if she has 

everything,” (2) R.C. responded that “she [was] traumatized 

because father used to hit mother,” and (3) mother in turn told 

the child that because “mother and father ha[d] separated, . . . 

[the] child should not be thinking about it anymore.” 

Similarly, R.C. informed DCFS that although “she told 

father once and mother multiple times” that she “has had feelings 

of sadness,” her parents responded by stating words to the effect

that she has “nothing to be sad about.” R.C. indicated that, as a 

consequence, “she stop[ped] talking [to mother and father] about” 

her feelings of sadness. 

At an April 2022 hearing, the juvenile court (1) found 

father is the presumed father of R.C. and A.C.; (2) found a prima 

facie case of dependency jurisdiction over the children; 

(3) ordered the children remain in parental custody under 

DCFS’s supervision; (4) ordered DCFS provide referrals for 
6

“parenting counseling for teens and individual counseling”; and 

(5) instructed the agency to provide father referrals for anger 

management counseling. 

On August 10, 2022, DCFS filed a first amended petition 

reasserting the allegations of the original petition and adding a

count averring that jurisdiction was proper under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1) because father expressed his desire in R.C.’s 

and A.C.’s presence to “terminate his parental rights.”

On August 16, 2022, the juvenile court held the 

adjudication and disposition hearing. The court sustained a

version of count b-1 of the first amended petition that the 

juvenile court amended by interlineation, and dismissed the 

remainder of the petition, including the count alleging that father 

had expressed his desire to terminate his parental rights in R.C.’s 

and A.C.’s presence. 

As amended by the juvenile court, sustained count b-1 

reads as follows: “The child, [R.C.,] has mental and emotional 

problems including suicidal and self-harming behaviors. On 

02/19/2022, the child was hospitalized for the evaluation and 

treatment of the child’s psychiatric condition. The child’s 

mother . . . and father . . . are unable to provide appropriate 

parental care and supervision of the child due to the child’s 

mental and emotional problems.”5

5 In her appellate briefing, mother tacitly assumes the 

juvenile court struck the following sentence from count b-1: “The 

mother[’s] and father’s inability to provide care and supervision 

of the child endangers the child’s physical health and safety and 

places the child and the child’s sibling, [A.C.,] at risk of serious 

harm, damage and danger.” (Italics added.) Conversely, DCFS

proceeds on the assumption that the court did not strike that 

sentence from count b-1. We need not resolve this discrepancy
7

As to the disposition phase of the hearing, the juvenile 

court declared R.C. and A.C. dependents of the court, ordered the 

children remain in parental custody, and ordered DCFS provide 

family maintenance services to mother, father, and the children.

Mother’s case plan required her to complete a developmentally 

appropriate parenting class and participate in (a) individual 

counseling to address case issues, and (b) conjoint counseling 

with father and the children. The court also ordered DCFS 

provide R.C. with age-appropriate counseling to address case 

issues.

Mother timely appealed the orders from the

August 16, 2022 hearing. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides in pertinent part 

that dependency jurisdiction is proper if “[t]he child has suffered, 

or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or 

because mother does not challenge the facial adequacy of the 

version of count b-1 sustained by the juvenile court, but, instead,

contests only the evidentiary sufficiency of the court’s decision to 

assert jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. pursuant to section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1). (See In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 

1117, 1123 [differentiating between facial and evidentiary

challenges to jurisdiction, and observing that “ ‘ “[i]f the 

jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, the 

adequacy of the petition is irrelevant” ’ ” unless “ ‘a parent claims 

[the] petition fails to provide actual notice of the factual 

allegations’ ”].) Mother does not contend she lacked notice that 

DCFS was requesting that the juvenile court exercise dependency 

jurisdiction over both children.
8

inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise 

or protect the child[, or] [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he willful or negligent 

failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with 

adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.” (See 

§ 300, subds. (b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(C).)6

“[S]ection 300, subdivision (b)(1) . . . require[s] DCFS to 

demonstrate three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 

(1) one or more of the statutorily specified omissions in providing 

care for the child[;] . . . (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical 

harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm 

or illness.” (See In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561.) 

“ ‘ “The third element . . . effectively requires a showing that at 

the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial 

risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing 

a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur.)” ’ 

[Citation.] Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current 

conditions. [Citation.] To establish a defined risk of harm at the 

time of the hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere 

speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.]” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.) 

6 After the August 16, 2022 hearing, the Legislature 

enacted an amendment to section 300 that became effective on 

January 1, 2023. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1 [filed with Sec’y of 

State on Sept. 29, 2022]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(1) 

[providing that this amendment to § 300 became effective on 

Jan. 1, 2023].) That amendment did not make any substantive 

changes to the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that 

are applicable to this case. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1 

[indicating that the new amendment did not change the 

substance of the provisions of § 300, subd. (b)(1) that are quoted 

above].)
9

Although a juvenile court’s “jurisdictional order is not 

appealable[,] a challenge to [its] jurisdictional findings [may

typically] be raised in an appeal from the dispositional order. 

(See In re T.W. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 723, 729.) “ ‘In reviewing 

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

jurisdictional findings [of the juvenile court,] . . . we determine if 

substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports 

them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of 

the dependency court; we review the record in the light most 

favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues 

of fact and credibility are the province of the [juvenile] court.”

[Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment, but merely determine if there are 

sufficient facts to support the findings of the [juvenile] court. 

[Citations.]” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)

“ ‘The appellant has the burden to demonstrate there is no 

evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the

findings . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 

94, 103 (Lana S.).)

DISCUSSION

A. We Exercise Our Discretion To Consider the Merits 

of Mother’s Appeal

As noted in our Factual and Procedural Background, ante, 

the juvenile court sustained amended count b-1 based on 

mother’s and father’s inability to supervise and properly care for 

R.C. Mother acknowledges this finding and the fact that father 

has not appealed it. Mother states she is challenging only “the 
10

allegations pertaining to her failure to provide appropriate 

parental care to the minors . . . .” (Italics added.)

“ ‘[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good 

against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the 

actions of either parent bring [the minor] within one of the 

statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘For 

this reason, an appellate court may decline to address the 

evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional 

findings . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 297, 308.) A reviewing court may nonetheless elect 

to reach the merits of any such “[non]justiciable” appeal if a 

“single jurisdictional finding was the difference between [the 

parent] being an offending parent versus a nonoffending 

parent . . . .” (See id. at pp. 308–309, italics omitted from first 

quotation.) Because amended count b-1 was the only 

jurisdictional allegation sustained against mother, we exercise 

our discretion to address her challenge to that finding.

B. Mother Fails To Demonstrate that the Juvenile 

Court’s Jurisdictional Finding Is Not Supported by

Substantial Evidence

Mother argues that “[s]ubstantial evidence does not 

support the juvenile court’s finding that the minors were at 

current risk of harm due to mother’s purported failure to provide 

appropriate parental care and supervision to the minors.” 

(Boldface omitted.) Mother maintains that “the juvenile court 

based its jurisdictional findings on speculation that the family 

would not follow through with [R.C.’s] therapy.” She asserts that

“by the time of the contested hearing in August 2022, mother had 

completed her parenting class and [R.C.] was enrolled in therapy, 

and doing so well[ that DCFS] actually . . . recommended . . . 
11

closing . . . the case due to [R.C.’s] emotional stability.” Mother 

further claims that R.C. informed the agency that “it was mother 

who took [R.C.] to the hospital for her depression and related 

behaviors . . . one day after [R.C.’s] need for psychiatric care was 

first brought to mother’s attention at the doctor’s office . . . .” 

Similarly, mother insists she enrolled R.C. in therapy “almost 

immediately” after R.C. was released from her psychiatric hold. 

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude mother fails to 

establish that the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency 

jurisdiction over R.C. and A.C. lacks sufficient evidentiary 

support.

1. Mother fails to demonstrate that insufficient evidence 

supported the juvenile court’s finding that R.C. was at

substantial risk of serious physical harm as of the 

date of the jurisdictional hearing

As we explained in our Factual and Procedural 

Background, ante, the nondetention report shows that at the 

beginning of the case, mother minimized the danger presented by 

R.C.’s mental and emotional problems. For instance, mother 

intimated that R.C. claimed to have suicidal tendencies only 

because she wanted attention, and R.C. indicated that she 

stopped talking to her mother and father about her feelings of 

sadness after they told her she has nothing to be sad about. 

Based on this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could have 

found that absent DCFS’s and the court’s intervention, there was 

a substantial risk that mother would not have taken the steps 

necessary to protect R.C. from her suicidal and self-harming 

behaviors. (Cf. Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 

53 Cal.App.5th 856, 858–859, 865 [holding that “a parent’s lack of 

insight may be considered by the juvenile court when assessing 
12

whether a child may safely be returned home,” italics & 

capitalization omitted].)

In her reply, mother seems to argue that her statements 

downplaying the gravity of R.C.’s mental and emotional problems 

amount to nothing more than “old, stale evidence.” Specifically, 

mother contends that “by the time of the August 2022 hearing,” 

R.C. “had stabilized emotionally, the minors were safe and happy

in [mother’s] care,” mother had “enrolled the minors in therapy,” 

“and [mother] had voluntarily completed a parenting class.” 

Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s contrary 

conclusion.

The parenting class to which mother refers is the 

Los Angeles County Office of Education’s “Parent Project 

Parenting class . . . .” The record contains a letter dated 

July 15, 2022 from the instructor for the program, wherein the 

instructor stated that mother was “enrolled and attending the 

Parent Project Parenting class,” and mother “[was] set to 

complete the parenting class [on] July 20, 2022,” meaning she 

would have attended “a total of 10 sessions” on that date. 

Furthermore, at the August 16, 2022 hearing, mother’s counsel 

represented that her client had “completed her parenting 

program”; counsel was presumably referring to the aforesaid

Parent Project Parenting class.

Assuming arguendo that mother actually did complete this 

parenting course, that fact does not undermine the juvenile 

court’s jurisdictional finding. Mother does not direct us to any 

evidence that by virtue of completing this class, she had changed 

her perspective and thereby ceased minimizing R.C.’s mental and 

emotional problems. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the 

only reasonable inference that could be drawn from mother’s 
13

completion of this course is that her prior statements were “old” 

and “stale.” (See I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [holding that 

under the substantial evidence standard, a reviewing court 

“ ‘ “draw[s] all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support 

the findings and orders of the dependency court” ’ ”].)

We acknowledge that R.C. and A.C. reported they felt safe 

in mother’s care, and that mother told DCFS on March 23, 2022 

that R.C. and A.C. had each been scheduled for a therapy 

assessment in mid-April 2022. We further acknowledge that in a 

last minute information report filed on August 10, 2022, DCFS 

suggested that R.C.’s emotional stability had improved by that 

point, and the agency recommended “terminating jurisdiction 

with a Family Law Order granting mother . . . full physical 

custody and joint legal custody.”

7

Yet, the record also contains a letter dated July 15, 2022 

from R.C.’s mental health provider, wherein the therapist stated: 

(1) R.C. had been diagnosed with “Major Depressive Disorder,” 

(2) R.C. began receiving “mental health services on 05/09/2022” 

and participating in weekly therapy sessions “from 07/08/22 until 

present,” and (3) R.C. and her “caregiver would benefit from 

continuation of mental health services in order to assist with 

restoring [R.C.’s] functioning.” Given that the juvenile court held 

7 Mother relies upon the following passage from the last 

minute information report: “Due to the current linkage and 

emotionally stability [sic] of [R.C.], [DCFS] recommends 

terminating jurisdiction with a Family Law Order granting 

mother . . . full physical custody and joint legal custody.” 

We further note that “a social service agency’s 

recommendation is not binding on [a juvenile] court.” (See In re 

N.O. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 899, 924.)
14

the jurisdictional hearing approximately one month after the 

date of this letter (see Factual & Procedural Background, ante),

the court reasonably could have found that the substantial risk of 

serious physical harm arising from R.C.’s mental and emotional 

problems had not yet abated. 

Furthermore, the record indicates that R.C. and A.C. began 

therapy after DCFS became involved in this matter in 

February 2022. Given the evidence that mother minimized the 

severity of R.C.’s mental and emotional problems, and the early 

stages of R.C.’s participation in therapy at the time of the 

hearing, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to find that 

absent DCFS and court involvement, there was a substantial risk

that mother would not ensure that R.C. received the care she 

needed to refrain from harming herself. (See § 364, subd. (b) 

[indicating that a juvenile court asserts dependency jurisdiction 

over a child for the purpose of “eliminating the conditions or 

factors requiring court supervision”].)

In sum, mother has not shown that by the August 16, 2022

jurisdictional hearing, R.C. was no longer exposed to a 

substantial risk of serious physical harm.

2. Mother fails to establish that dependency jurisdiction 

over A.C. was improper

DCFS argues on appeal that A.C. “also was at risk because 

she too suffered from feelings of sadness and her physician noted 

[she had] mild depression.” Passages from the nondetention 

report supply substantial evidence supporting this contention.8 

In particular, on February 22, 2022, A.C. told the agency she had 

8 The remainder of this paragraph discusses relevant 

portions of the nondetention report.
15

“feelings of sadness due to not being able to talk to her 

father . . . .” A.C. “began to tear” as she informed DCFS that 

father had yelled at her and he refused to listen to her when she

told him to “make more time” to see her and R.C. A.C. stated she 

stopped talking about that issue with father when “she observe[d] 

he [was] upset.” A.C. also told the agency that on “multiple 

occasions” “when she was ‘little’ father used to hit mother and 

mother used to hit him back to defend herself.” Additionally, a 

record from A.C.’s February 19, 2022 visit with a medical 

provider indicated that the child had “Mild Depression.”

Mother bears the burden of demonstrating that the juvenile 

court’s exercise of jurisdiction over A.C. was not supported by 

substantial evidence. (Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 103.) Yet, in her reply brief, mother fails to respond to DCFS’s

argument that evidence of A.C.’s sadness and mild depression 

supported the court’s jurisdictional finding. Instead of 

addressing this evidence, mother observes that at the 

jurisdictional hearing, the children’s counsel “ask[ed] for [A.C.] to 

be dismissed from the petition because she [was] not at risk.” 

Because “ ‘unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence’ ” (see 

Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 

281, fn. 5), this remark from the minors’ attorney does not 

establish “ ‘there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial 

nature to support the finding . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See Lana S., at 

p. 103.)

Furthermore, the record shows that A.C. was exposed to 

stressors akin to those R.C. endured. Recall that R.C. had also

witnessed instances in which father hit mother, and R.C. decided 

to conceal her feelings of sadness in response to statements made 

by her parents. (See Factual & Procedural Background, ante.) 
16

R.C.’s depression and sadness had already manifested in two 

suicide attempts and cuttings to her forearms and inner thighs,9

and A.C. too suffered depression and sadness after being exposed 

to similar stressors. The juvenile court could reasonably consider 

the similarities in R.C.’s and A.C.’s circumstances in determining 

whether to assert dependency jurisdiction over them. (See 

In re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 115–116 [“[E]vidence of a 

parent’s misconduct with another child is admissible at a hearing 

on the section 300 petition. . . . [¶] . . . Implementation of th[e] 

purpose [of dependency law] requires the trial court to consider a 

broad class of relevant evidence in deciding whether a child is at 

substantial risk from a parent’s failure or inability to adequately 

protect or supervise the child.”].)10 

Although the nondetention report shows that A.C. told the 

agency “she has never tried hurting herself nor has she ever had 

any thoughts of doing so,” “ ‘[t]he court need not wait until a child 

is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the 

9 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding 

that R.C. “has mental and emotional problems including suicidal 

and self-harming behaviors,” nor does she contest evidence that 

R.C. was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, and that 

R.C. attempted suicide on two occasions and cut her forearms and 

inner thighs.

10 We acknowledge that the nondetention report indicates 

R.C. disclosed that her maternal aunt’s husband had “touched 

her private areas” “during an isolated incident” when she was 

five years old, and that A.C. told the agency “she has never been 

sexually abused by . . . any . . . adult.” Mother, however, does not 

argue that the absence of any sexual abuse to A.C. demonstrates 

that A.C. was not at substantial risk of serious physical harm as 

of the date of the jurisdictional hearing.
17

steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re M.D.

(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 848.) The severity of the potential 

harm, here, suicide and cutting one’s body, counsels in favor of a 

finding of substantial risk. (See In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 

204, 207 [“The Supreme Court has held that ‘ “even . . . a low 

degree of probability” ’ can give rise to a substantial risk if ‘ “the 

magnitude of the harm is potentially great[,]” ’ ” quoting I.J., 

supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778].) Additionally, mother’s prior 

statements downplaying R.C.’s mental and emotional health 

issues suggest that she would have the same minimizing attitude 

toward her younger daughter if A.C. developed self-harming 

behaviors like her sister.

In sum, the similarities between A.C.’s and R.C.’s 

circumstances, along with mother’s dismissive attitude toward 

R.C.’s mental and emotional challenges, constituted substantial 

evidence supporting the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency 

jurisdiction over A.C. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1).

DISPOSITION

We affirm the juvenile court’s August 16, 2022 orders.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J.