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Filed 9/23/24 P. v. Shooter CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RYAN WILLIAM SHOOTER,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A169179

 (Sonoma County Super. Ct.

 No. SCR-756742-1)

Defendant Ryan William Shooter raises a single issue in this appeal: 

whether, after an admitted violation of his probation, the trial court was 

required to obtain Shooter’s consent before modifying his probationary term 

to account for the time Shooter was in warrant status. Answering in the 

negative, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On September 1, 2022, the Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office 

filed a complaint charging Shooter with a single felony count of bringing 

fentanyl into a jail facility in violation of Penal Code1 section 4573, 

subdivision (a).

On November 8, 2022, Shooter entered a no contest plea in exchange 

for two years of formal probation and 180 days in the county jail or release to 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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an inpatient drug treatment program “if/when bed space becomes available.”2

The court sentenced Shooter in accordance with the plea agreement on 

December 6, 2022, meaning Shooter’s probation would expire by December 6, 

2024. The conditions of probation required Shooter to report to the probation 

department “within 2 working days of release from treatment” and “obey all 

laws.” 

On December 9, 2022, Shooter was released to a treatment facility; he 

later overdosed and was hospitalized. Shooter “subsequently absconded after 

being placed at a detox facility.” Unable to contact or locate Shooter, the 

probation officer recommended that “probation be summarily revoked and a 

no-bail bench warrant be issued.” 

On February 6, 2023, the court summarily revoked Shooter’s probation 

and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Shooter was arrested on 

misdemeanor charges approximately eight months later. At the time of this 

arrest, Shooter’s probation had been summarily revoked for a total of 255 

days, and he had been “in active warrant status for 245 days.” Shooter’s

probation officer consequently recommended “that the time spent in 

summarily revoked status be added to the supervision term,” with a new 

termination date of August 18, 2025. Alternatively, “If the court wishes to 

extend the probation grant for the warrant period only, the new termination 

date would be August 8, 2025.” 

On October 18, 2023, Shooter appeared in person for arraignment on 

the alleged violation of probation; Shooter was appointed counsel and agreed 

to admit to his violation and be sentenced consistent with the 

recommendations of the probation department. Counsel joined in Shooter’s 

2 Shooter’s plea agreement also included a no contest plea to an 

unrelated case for which he was sentenced concurrently. 
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waiver of constitutional rights and in Shooter’s admission. The court found 

Shooter’s waivers and admission to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, 

and thus found Shooter guilty of violating his probation. Shooter and his 

counsel waived time to allow for immediate sentencing, at which point the 

court revoked and reinstated Shooter’s probation “on all the same terms and 

conditions,” with the modification that Shooter serve an additional 90 days in 

county jail prior to being released to a residential drug treatment program. 

The court further indicated an intent to adopt the recommendation of 

the probation department, “to toll the grant of probation and extend it for the 

period of time that he was in warrant status.” Shooter objected: “I think the

defense’s position -- under AB 19[50] the maximum is two years -- it can’t be 

extended beyond that, so that would be my objection.”

3

The court ultimately adopted the recommendation of the probation 

department and tolled probation for the period that Shooter was on warrant 

status, “which is 245 days, with a new termination date of August the 8th, 

2025.”

Shooter appeals. 

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, Shooter does not, and cannot, challenge his 

admission to violating the terms of his probation.4 Shooter also “concedes”—

3 We interpret Shooter’s objection to reference Assembly Bill No. 1950, 

“which reduced the maximum term of felony probation to two years.” (People 

v. Ornelas (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1305, 1313 (Ornelas), quoting Assem. Com. 

on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended May 6, 2020, p. 6.)

4 Shooter did not obtain a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 

section 1237.5. As Shooter acknowledges, absent a certificate of probable 

cause, he cannot attack the validity of his admission of a probation violation. 

(People v. Billetts (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 302, 308 [“Absent a certificate of 
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and we agree—that “the trial court has the authority to extend the term” of 

Shooter’s “probation to account for the 245 days that he was out of contact 

with probation.” As this division recently held, trial courts possess the 

“discretion to extend probation to account for the time when probation was 

summarily revoked so long as the total period of probationary supervision 

does not exceed the statutory maximum” of two years. (Ornelas, supra, 

87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1308, review den. Apr. 12, 2023; § 1203.1, subd. (a); see 

also People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 502 [“we hold that section 1203.2, 

subdivision (a)’s . . . tolling provision preserves the trial court’s authority to 

adjudicate, in a subsequent formal probation violation hearing, whether the 

probationer violated probation during, but not after, the court-imposed 

probationary period”].) 

Shooter asserts, however, that the “core issue” is “whether the trial 

court deprived Mr. Shooter of the choice of whether to consent to this 

‘adjustment.’ ” Counsel asserts that Shooter “should have been given the 

opportunity to express his affirmative, informed consent to the court’s order 

extending his probation.” (Italics added.) “By depriving Mr. Shooter of the 

choice of whether to consent to extending his probation,” counsel argues that 

“the trial court negated his long-standing right to consent to the terms and

conditions of his supervision.” We not only disagree but find counsel’s 

representations misleading. 

At the arraignment on Shooter’s probation violation, the court began by 

explaining it had reviewed the probation officer’s recommendations and,

“[b]ased on the content of this [probation report], the court will summarily 

revoke probation . . . .” As described above, the probation report 

probable cause, the issues raised by defendant concerning the validity of his 

admission of violation of probation, are not reviewable on appeal”].)
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recommended that the court “modify the termination date to August 18, 

2025,” to match the time Shooter’s probation was in revoked status or, 

alternatively, modify the termination date to August 8, 2025 “[i]f the court 

wishes to extend the probation grant for the warrant period only.” In the

concluding section titled, “Evaluation and Recommendation,” the report 

separately listed probation’s complete recommendations: (1) that Shooter 

serve 90 days in jail, (2) that Shooter “be referred to TASC,” a drug treatment 

program, (3) that Shooter “remain in custody until bedspace becomes 

available” in the treatment program, and (4) that “the court modify the 

probation termination date to August 18, 2025.” 

Shooter’s appointed counsel represented on the record that he “did have 

a chance to review this” probation report with Shooter, expressly 

acknowledged the first three enumerated recommendations, and then offered, 

“[Shooter] is prepared to admit to this universal if the court were to follow 

that.” The district attorney also agreed with the recommendations with the 

caveat that “the People would not be inclined to give another chance at 

treatment the next time around.” The court responded, “So I would be fine 

following the recommendation” and went on to discuss drug treatment 

placement options with counsel. The court then repeated that it would “be 

fine following the recommendation but I want to make sure Mr. Shooter is 

crystal clear that, if we get to 90 days and he doesn’t have treatment lined 

up, I’m not letting him out. . . .” 

At the conclusion of these discussions, the court asked Shooter directly,

“You understand that, Mr. Shooter? [¶] . . . [¶] With that in mind, is that 

what you’d like to do? You’d like to admit the violation today?” To both 

questions, Shooter responded in the affirmative. The court then advised 

Shooter of his constitutional rights, asking if he understood and if he wished 
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to waive those rights so his admission could be taken; Shooter responded, 

“Yes.” The court proceeded to restate the alleged violations of probation and 

asked Shooter, “Do you admit that to be true?” Shooter responded, “Yes, I 

do.” Shooter’s counsel joined in the admission, which the court accepted, 

finding it to be “knowing, voluntary and intelligent”—which Shooter does not

now challenge. After Shooter and his counsel waived time for sentencing, the 

court ordered terms and conditions consistent with its earlier representations 

and again stated: “The recommendation is to toll the grant of probation and 

extend it for the period of time that he was in warrant status.” When the

court gave defense counsel the opportunity to object, the only objection—

which Ornelas, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at page 1316 has since clarified and 

rendered baseless—was “under AB 19[50]” that “the maximum is two years” 

and probation “can’t be extended beyond that.” 

The record—including the express representation of Shooter’s

attorney—demonstrates that, before entering his admission, Shooter was 

fully informed of the probation officer’s recommendation to adjust the end 

date of probation, as well as the court’s inclination to adopt that 

recommendation. Thus, there was no need for the court to have secured 

Shooter’s separate “consent” to that specific term prior to imposing sentence. 

Finding no authority on point, Shooter relies on People v. Bailey (1983) 

140 Cal.App.3d 828 (Bailey) to argue that, because “extension of the 

probationary period is not mandatory, the defendant’s affirmative consent 

should be required if the court wishes to extend the term of probation beyond 

the statutory maximum.” (Italics added.) We are not persuaded. 

First, the court’s adjustment of Shooter’s probation termination date to 

reflect the time he was in warrant status, while discretionary, is not an 

“extension” of an otherwise authorized probationary term. As confirmed in
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Ornelas, by modifying Shooter’s probation “to account for the [245] days in 

which [Shooter] had been in warrant status and not under the supervision of 

a probation officer, the trial court did not increase the term beyond the 

statutory maximum of two years; instead, the court exercised its discretion to 

adjust the termination date to provide [Shooter] with approximately two 

years of probationary supervision, as [Shooter] had agreed to when he 

accepted the terms of probation . . . .” (Ornelas, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1312.) 

Second, Bailey is inapposite. Bailey found “no legal impediment to 

defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of the one-year limitation . . . on 

confinement in the county jail.” (Bailey, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d at pp. 831–

832 [“This permits the sentencing court at least to consider whether the 

defendant merits a grant of probation in those cases where a one-year term of 

local confinement seems inappropriately brief and a prison commitment 

unduly harsh”].) But here, neither Shooter nor the court is attempting to 

waive section 1203.1’s two-year limitation on a term of probation or otherwise 

extend probation beyond the two-year cap. The probation termination date is 

simply being adjusted to reflect the two-year term of probation originally 

agreed to by Shooter in connection with his plea agreement for the 

underlying offense. Under such circumstances, Ornelas suggests that further 

consent is not required. (Ornelas, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1309 [affirming

the reinstatement and extension of probation “ ‘over the defense objection’ ”].)

Seeking remand, Shooter’s appellate counsel uses carefully selected 

words to argue that “[o]nce the issue was raised,” referring to the extension of 

probation, “there is no indication that any off-the-record discussion took place 

between Mr. Shooter and his counsel . . . .” However, there is no dispute that 

prior to arraignment, Shooter and his appointed counsel were provided a copy 
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of the probation report, which specifies in two places the recommendation for 

an adjustment of the term of probation and includes new proposed 

termination dates. (§ 1203d.) Shooter’s counsel represented he “did have a 

chance to review this with Mr. Shooter,” who was “prepared to admit to this 

universal if the court were to follow that.” And, when given the opportunity 

to object to the probation adjustment, Shooter’s only comment was a 

reference to Assembly Bill No. 1950, a legislative provision that has since

been clarified to provide the court with the “discretion to reinstate and extend 

the probationary term to account for the period of revocation.” (Ornelas, 

supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1313.) No other concern with the 

recommendations of the probation report was uttered, notwithstanding the 

court’s multiple indications that it would follow the recommendation. Nor 

did Shooter ever indicate a desire to withdraw his admission after the onrecord modification of the probation end date to August 8—the earlier of the 

two dates recommended. Therefore, to argue on appeal that “the court 

deprived Mr. Shooter of the opportunity to reject the extension”5 is not just 

misleading, it is factually incorrect. 

DISPOSITION

The challenged order is affirmed.

5 Because Shooter had the opportunity and did not “reject the 

extension,” we take no position on whether Shooter had any such right in the 

first instance. 
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_________________________

DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

_________________________

STEWART, P.J.

_________________________

MILLER, J.

People v. Shooter (A169179)