Blue Horizons II

Future Capabilities and Technologies

for the Air Force in 2030

Executive Summary

by

John P. Geis II, PhD, Col, USAF

Christopher J. Kinnan, Col, USAF

Ted Hailes, Col, USAF (Retired)

Harry A. Foster, Col, USAF

David Blanks, Col, USAF

July 2009

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for 

Strategy and Technology as a forum for research on topics that 

reflect long-term strategic thinking about technology and its implications for US national security. Copies of No. 65 in this series are 

available from the Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War 

College, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or on the 

CSAT Web site at http://csat.au.af.mil. The fax number is (334) 

953-6158; phone (334) 953-6460.

Occasional Paper No. 65

Center for Strategy and Technology

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
ii

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of the Air University, the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—

Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks, and Copyrights, it is not copyrighted but is the 

property of the US government.

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Blue Horizons II : future capabilities and technologies for the Air Force in 

2030 : executive summary / John P. Geis II . . . [et al.].

 p. ; cm.–(Occasional paper / Center for Strategy and Technology ; no. 65)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-193-0

1. United States. Air Force—Planning. 2. Strategic planning­—United States. 

3. Technological innovations—Forecasting. 4. Weapons systems—Planning. 

5. National security­—United States. I. Geis, John P. II. Series: Occasional paper 

(Air University (U.S.). Center for Strategy and Technology) ; no. 65.

355.0335/73—dc22

Library of Congress Control Number: 2009903152
iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Alternate Futures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Study Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

Study Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

CHAPTER 1—Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

CHAPTER 2—alternate futures . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Peer China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A Path toward a Peer China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Peer China 2030—Causality and Impact . . . . . . . 6

Capabilities Needed to Respond to a Peer

 China Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Resurgent Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Development of a Resurgent Russia . . . . . . . 9

Capabilities to Defend against a Resurgent

 Russian State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Failed State—Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A Failure We Cannot Ignore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Nigeria Shatters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Capabilities Required for Intervention . . . . . . . . . 14

Jihadist Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Roots of the Schism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

The Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Capabilities Needed to Combat the Insurgency . . . 19

Operations Analysis Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

The Way Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

TITLES IN THE OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES . . . . . . 37
iv

Page

Illustrations

Figure 1—Scoring chart of all 58 systems across

all alternate futures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Figure 2—Scoring of all 58 systems in state-onstate versus nonstate warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Figure 3—Score of enabling technologies by

alternate future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Figure 4—Spectrum of conflict versus impact . . . . . . 23

Figure 5—The observe-orient-decide-act cycle or

“OODA Loop” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
v

About the Authors

Col John P. Geis, PhD, is the Spaatz Center’s director of 

the Center for Strategy and Technology at Maxwell Air Force 

Base (AFB), Alabama. He entered the Air Force in 1983 and 

has served as an instructor, weapons systems officer, navigator, and fire control officer on such aircraft as the F-111A, 

F-111E, T-37, AT-38B, T-43, and AC-130H. Operationally, 

he served as a planner for Operation Eldorado Canyon, flew 

combat missions over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and commanded 

a special operations task force in Korea. In 1996, Colonel 

Geis co-authored the alternate futures monograph for the 

chief of staff–directed Air Force 2025 study. Shortly thereafter, he served as chief, Strategic Planning, Doctrine, and 

Force Integration Branch at Headquarters Air Force Special 

Operations Command, leading all long-range planning, doctrine development, and joint force integration for all Air Force 

Special Forces. Colonel Geis graduated from the Air War College in 2001 and served as the director of the Center for 

Strategy and Technology until 2004. After earning his PhD 

from the University of Wisconsin, Colonel Geis returned to 

the Center for Strategy and Technology in 2007 and is again 

its director. In 2008, Colonel Geis co-authored a Peer China 

in 2030 monograph for the USAF’s Blue Horizons II (published May 2009) study. Colonel Geis has a bachelor of science degree in meteorology from the University of Wisconsin, 

a master of political science degree from Auburn University, 

a master of strategic studies degree from the Air War College, 

and both a master of arts and a doctor of philosophy degree 

in political science from the University of Wisconsin.

Col Christopher J. Kinnan is the Spaatz Center’s deputy 

director of the Center for Strategy and Technology at Maxwell 

AFB. He entered the Air Force in 1987. A space and missile 

officer, Colonel Kinnan was previously assigned to the Air 

Staff as the deputy chief of Air Force Nuclear Operations. 

Colonel Kinnan has served as a crew commander, instructor, 

and operations officer on the Minuteman III (MMIII) Command Data Buffer, Peacekeeper, and the MMIII Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting systems; a crew commander, and 

instructor for missile warning, satellite operations, and 

spacelift systems; and as a space weapons officer. Operationally he has served as the space weapons officer for Joint Task 

Force (JTF)-Southwest Asia. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, he served as a planner for JTF-4 and as the deputy 
vi

chief of plans for both the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, Iraq. He helped develop a Phase IV security 

and stability operations plan for Iraq, wrote and executed the 

plan establishing the Baghdad office of reconstruction and 

humanitarian assistance regional headquarters, and led the 

interagency team that planned and executed a complex and 

successful 30-day, $450 million effort that paid salaries and 

provided emergency payments to three million Iraqis. From 

2004–2006, he commanded the 45th Operations Support 

Squadron at Patrick AFB, Florida. In 2008, Colonel Kinnan 

co-authored the Failed State monograph for the USAF’s Blue 

Horizons II study. Colonel Kinnan is a distinguished graduate of the Air Force Weapons School, an in-residence graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, and 

graduated with distinction from the Air War College. He has 

a bachelor of arts in Russian/East European area studies 

from Auburn University, a master of management of information systems from Lesley College, a master of airpower 

arts and sciences from the School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies, and a master of strategic studies from the Air War 

College in 2008.

Col Theodore C. Hailes, USAF, Retired, is the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense chair for Force Transformation at 

Air University and a founding member of the Center for Strategy and Technology. In addition to his work in technology, he 

is also on the faculty of the Air War College, teaching courses 

on national security decision making, international security 

studies, and regional studies field seminars. He completed a 

30-year career in the Air Force before retiring in 1996. He 

flew the F-4, 0-2A, F-5, and the F-15, accumulating over 

4,000 hours, of which 500 were in combat. He served in Vietnam as a forward air controller with the 2nd Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division, and finished his fighter career as squadron commander of the 22nd Tactical Fighter Squadron, and 

then director of operations of the Northeast Air Defense Sector. He served at the Pentagon from 1979 to 1983, working in 

international programs and was executive officer for the Air 

Force chief of public affairs. Colonel Hailes has been on the 

Air War College faculty for 19 years, holding positions of department chairman, associate dean of the faculty, and as the 

office of force transformation chair. In this latter capacity, he 

has supervised a number of studies, both for the United 

States Air Force (USAF), and the Defense Advanced Research 
vii

Projects Agency. He has a bachelor of arts degree in history 

from Denison University and a master of science degree in 

international relations from Troy University.

Col Harry A. Foster is the chief of strategy for USAF Central at Al-Udeid, Air Base (AB), Qatar. While a student at the 

Air War College in 2008, Colonel Foster co-authored the executive summary for the Blue Horizons II study. A combat 

experienced instructor pilot in three aircraft (F-16, B-2, and 

B-1), he has commanded an operations support squadron 

and served in the Air Staff’s Checkmate Division. He holds 

graduate degrees from Marine Command and Staff College at 

Quantico, where he was a distinguished graduate; the School 

of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell AFB; the Harvard Kennedy School at Cambridge; and the Air War College 

at Maxwell AFB, where he graduated magna cum laude.

Col David P. Blanks is the deputy director of the Air Force 

Research Lab’s Propulsion Directorate at Edwards AFB, California. Colonel Blanks has had a variety of assignments in the 

acquisition, test, and evaluation career field. Additionally, he 

has served as an air officer commanding at the USAF Academy. 

He served as a basing and force structure staff officer with the 

USAF in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. He deployed to Afghanistan, working in the Office of Defense Cooperation and 

laying the groundwork for the emerging Afghan air force. His 

most recent assignment was as commander, 421st Air Base 

Squadron, RAF Menwith Hill, United Kingdom, a diverse unit 

of more than 300 personnel for whom he provided base support. While a student at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB 

in 2008, Colonel Blanks co-authored the Resurgent Russia

monograph as part of the USAF’s Blue Horizons II study. He 

has a bachelor of science degree in engineering mechanics 

from the USAF Academy, a master of operational art and science degree from the Air Command and Staff College, and a 

master of strategic studies from the Air War College.

ix

Preface

In 1996 the Air Force initiated a major study effort under 

the direction of Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, the Air Force chief 

of staff. That study, Air Force 2025, looked 30 years into the 

future and made enormous contributions toward directing 

Air Force research and procurement.

In 2007 Gen T. Michael Mosley, Air Force chief of staff, 

directed a continuous series of future thinking and study efforts be undertaken, using Air University (AU) as the “Air 

Force’s think tank.” This study, Blue Horizons, was commissioned by the United States Air Force (USAF) chief of staff to 

provide “a new look at the future.” Specifically, the chief of 

staff asked the research team to provide “a common understanding of future strategic and technological trends for Air 

Force leaders to make better decisions.” The chief also sought 

to “confirm AU as [the Air Force’s] in-house think tank” and 

to improve the relevance of Air Force education to the decision-making processes in Washington.1

The best and brightest officers from the Air Force and the 

sister services participated during their one-year AU courses 

of instruction, building four alternate scenarios to act as a 

foil to evaluate future systems and technologies, to determine the optimum path forward for Air Force investment. 

These senior officers each spent a year researching and traveling to their respective regions of concern. In the end, the 

team built four scenarios based on challenges found in the 

National Security Strategy.

These scenarios include a resurgent Russia, a peer China, 

a jihadist insurgency in the Middle East, and a failed-state 

scenario in West Africa. The authors then evaluated 58 potential future systems or concepts and 172 key enabling 

technologies to determine what capabilities the Air Force 

would need to maintain superiority in air, space, and cyberspace to the year 2030.

xi

Executive Summary

This second iteration of the Blue Horizons study, commissioned by the USAF chief of staff, provides “a new look at the 

future.” Its original purpose was to develop a prioritized list 

of concepts and their key enabling technologies the USAF 

would need to maintain dominance in air, space, and cyberspace to the year 2030. In addition, the study examined 

whether the USAF could leverage a targeted investment today to position itself to address a broad set of possible challenges over the next 20–30 years.

The study has some built-in assumptions. It assumes exponential science and technology growth will continue. The research team determined that a series of disparate alternate futures provides the best tool to evaluate future challenges. Four 

alternate futures were built based on extensive academic and 

field research. While the scenarios are not intended to be read 

as predictions, each is plausible, and the future may see one or 

more of these scenarios unfold. Their purpose, however, is to 

act as a tool to assess how best to accomplish the core USAF 

missions, which are assumed to remain in the domains of air, 

space, and cyberspace for the foreseeable future.

The researchers discovered that regardless of the scenario, 

accelerating technological advances are interacting with a 

shifting strategic landscape to produce massive, dynamic 

change. This change acts as a catalyst, creating a very disturbing and disruptive threat to the United States and a serious challenge to the USAF’s future dominance in air, space, 

and cyberspace. Future enemies will be motivated by resources, fear, and hate; empowered through education; and 

enabled through technology and globalization to directly 

challenge the United States. The enemy will be different—the 

targets they present in 2030 will be more difficult to find, 

harder to hit, more widely distributed, and more dangerous.

Within the context of the 2008 Blue Horizons II study, researchers examined four separate possible alternate futures—a peer China, a resurgent Russia, a successful jihadist insurgent overthrow of a friendly state, and a failed state 

with a vital US interest.

Alternate Futures

The researchers used a forecasting technique known as 

“alternate futures” to help them envision worlds where the 
xii

United States must be able to survive and prosper in the future. The study team identified individual factors of change 

in the future.

Peer China

While the last 100 years have been called the American 

century, the world may be at the beginning of the Asian 

millennium. The ancient Middle Kingdom is again on the 

rise, and China’s destiny, like its past, seems to be one of 

preeminence. Every indicator suggests in the next 30–50 

years, China will be the world’s single strongest state, 

both economically and militarily. While some strategists, 

historians, and scholars quibble about dates, few argue 

the outcome.

Although seeking a “harmonious society” in a “harmonious world”—words Chinese leaders use to describe their vision for domestic and foreign policy—China’s rising power 

will present its leaders with an array of strategic options both 

regionally and internationally. Chinese leaders face several 

largely internal stressors that could threaten their “mandate 

from heaven” (a source of legitimacy in Chinese culture) and 

move it in a different direction from its stated goals of achieving a harmonious society in a harmonious world. 

China also enjoys the advantages of interior lines within 

the region plus strategic depth within its own territory. A 

peer China will likely be a formidable nation militarily, with 

a range of advanced weapons and the ability to initially deny 

US penetration inside the second island chain. Thus, the 

USAF will need technologies to enhance capabilities in range; 

persistence; cyberspace; airlift; intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR); force protection; and space.

Resurgent Russia

Russia has a turbulent history. Traditions and cultural 

pressures have instilled in the Russian psyche a belief that 

strives for stability and seeks strong leadership. Russia values stability and strong leadership even when these traits 

conflict with democratic ideals. After each change in governance, Russia always returns to form and is now easy to follow in what is regarded as the Putin era. 

Since the fall of communism in 1991, Russia has been in 

constant governmental transition. Perestroika brought 

about “openness,” but the first foray into democracy was 
xiii

fraught with corruption and poor execution of national 

goals. Since assuming power in 1998, then-Pres. Vladimir 

Putin federalized power, restoring authority to the Kremlin 

and Moscow. Coupled with new wealth and a Russian 

psyche for a strong, autocratic leader, now-Prime Minister 

Putin maintains tremendous public support even while reducing civil liberties.

The consolidation of power in an authoritarian-style government is leading Russia back onto the world stage. The 

direction Russia will take over the next 20 years is uncertain, 

but its growing influence on the world scene, and the particular challenges it will present to the United States by 2030, 

indicate Russia may again become an adversary rather than 

a reliable friend. Thus, the USAF will likely require technologies to enhance its capabilities in space, cyberspace, directed 

energy, and ISR.

Failed State

Nations fail for a myriad of reasons including cultural 

and religious conflict, a broken social contract between the 

government and the governed, a catastrophic disaster, financial collapse, and war. Nigeria, like many nations in 

sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and 

Southeast Asia, is a compelling candidate for failure. In its 

relatively short modern history, Nigeria has survived five 

military coups and separatist and religious wars. It is currently mired in an active armed insurgency over disastrous 

ecological conditions in the Niger Delta region and is fighting a difficult battle against one of the worst legacies of political and economic corruption in the modern world. Nigeria with its vast oil wealth, the largest population in Africa, 

and its strategic economic and geographical position could, 

if it fails, disproportionately impact the United States and 

the global economy. 

Civil war is the most likely outcome of almost any state 

failure. To rapidly intervene in the event of state failure and 

prevent a full-scale civil war, the USAF will require enhanced 

capabilities to detect and understand what is happening on 

the ground, rapidly deploy a large and capable force to almost any location in the country, allow the deployed force to 

survive and sustain itself, and enable the deployed force to 

precisely engage only belligerents while protecting and assisting noncombatants. Unlike the previous scenarios, all of 
xiv

this must be done while conducting a humanitarian relief 

operation of unprecedented scale.

Jihadist Insurgency 

The United States is now actively immersed in counterinsurgency warfare in an array of locations around the 

globe. While the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are 

foremost in the minds of observers, other operations, often 

with an air, space, and/or cyber orientation are being directed against insurgent and terrorist operators in many 

countries. Examples of such operations include recent air 

strikes against nonstate enemies in Pakistan and Somalia.2 Martin van Creveld notes the trend is clear—insurgency has become the “warfare type of choice” of numerous nonstate enemies of the United States.3 Of all types of 

insurgencies, a jihadist insurgency provides numerous 

challenges for the United States and other nations dependent on the Middle East oil supply. The United States will 

likely retain significant interest in the future of most countries on the Arabian Peninsula not only for economic reasons but also because it is the location of the two holiest 

cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina. If these cities were to 

fall into the hands of radical Islamists, it could enable a 

charismatic radical leader to emerge as the new caliph who 

would then attempt to unite Muslims throughout the world 

under an extremist ideology. With Iraq becoming a Shi’adominated state, Saudi Arabia and other smaller states on 

the Arabian Peninsula serve as an important Sunni counterweight to Shi’a Iraq and Iran in maintaining a regional 

balance of power. Thus, the USAF must develop robust 

counterinsurgency capabilities that include information 

operations, unconventional warfare, ISR, mobility, precision engagement, and command and control.

Study Scope

The 2008 Blue Horizons II study does not specifically address new high explosive or nuclear weapons technology. 

While nanotechnology, biotechnology, and materials science 

were scored in the technology model,4 the study team is concerned these sciences may still be underrepresented. These 

technologies will be researched in greater detail in the 2009 

study iteration—Blue Horizons III.
xv

Study Findings

The study shows technological proliferation will continue providing groups and individuals access to new capabilities, some of which once 

exclusively belonged to nation-states. These new technologies are making distant 

and ideologically opposed 

countries “close neighbors,” 

as they are eliminating the 

traditional “sanctuary” of 

time and distance. This 

changing strategic landscape empowers more actors, which will create greater competition and new tensions between states, groups, and individuals. 

These technologically empowered groups and individuals 

will be agile, adaptable, and unencumbered by history. By 

2030 their access to advanced technologies and lack of constraints will empower them to “out-OODA [observe, orient, 

decide, act] loop”5 even advanced nations hamstrung by bureaucratic thinking. Against this backdrop of alternate futures and the evolving future strategic environment, the 

USAF in 2030 must field a nimble and responsive force—

masters of advanced technology—presenting the nation options against a multitude of future possibilities. 

A surprise finding is that for the Air Force, the concepts, systems, and technologies required to fight a peer competitor do 

cover, as a lesser included case, conflict against insurgencies 

and the types of operations in failed-state scenarios. Despite developing different quantitative models for each alternate future, 

the rank order of both concepts and technologies does not significantly change between conflict types, except in the domain of 

space. The capabilities needed to fight a peer China include the 

capabilities needed for failed states and insurgencies. 

. . . [For the United States 

Air Force] the concepts, 

systems, and technologies 

required to fight a peer 

competitor do cover, as a 

lesser included case, conflict against insurgencies 

and the types of operations 

in failed-state scenarios.

. . . the Air Force must invest in a broad range 

of enabling technologies to bring the necessary capabilities and systems to fruition, or it 

will be unable to effectively maintain dominance in its core missions and domains.
xvi

The capabilities the Air Force will most need in the future 

include increased range, greater persistence, better defensive 

capabilities for systems in all three domains, a greater variety 

of unmanned systems, better offensive capabilities in cyberspace, and the need for a much faster command and control set 

of processes. Evaluation of the technology portfolio necessary 

to achieve these capabilities yields the conclusion that the Air 

Force must invest in a broad range of enabling technologies to 

bring the necessary capabilities and systems to fruition, or it 

will be unable to effectively maintain dominance in its core 

missions and domains. In short, any strategy which involves 

disinvestment in laboratory programs is assessed to be a strategy of very high risk. 


Chapter 1

Introduction

In this study, the Air University (AU) Center for Strategy and 

Technology (CSAT) was asked to look 20–30 years into the future 

to provide a prioritized list of concepts and their key enabling technologies that the Air Force would need to maintain the dominant 

air, space, and cyberspace forces in the future. This study, Blue 

Horizons II, provides a new look at future capabilities and technologies through the lens of plausible alternate futures that could 

emerge in 2030. It is the first such study since Air Force 2025.

6 

This report examines the capabilities required across four plausible future scenarios, drawn from the 2008 National Security Strategy. These scenarios are as follows: a peer China, a resurgent Russia, a failed state of Nigeria, and a successful jihadist insurgency in 

the Middle East. 

Methodology

The 2008 Blue Horizons II study is grounded in reputable scholarship. It includes extensive background research, interviews, and 

actual site visits to the locations in question. The researchers began with a literature search across international relations, political 

economy, and cultural and military studies literature. Each researcher conducted interviews with senior members of the Department of State, the national intelligence agencies7, the Department 

of Defense (DOD), and senior leaders of the governments in the affected states and regions.

The team engaged in a modified Delphi method8 of generating 

conclusions about both the present as well as each alternate future’s 

direction. These conclusions were then revetted against a series of 

experts and against the fellow team members to adjust hypotheses 

and then reengage in additional research and interviews. 

In these sessions, a formal Delphi method9 was used which included a broad cross section of 22 senior DOD civilian and military 

strategic thinkers. This scenario-based discussion involved several 

iterations wherein the researchers interacted with three opposing 

teams to generate a more complete picture of the challenges each 

alternate future might present by 2030. 

Members of the Headquarters USAF Strategic Planning Directorate, AU students, and researchers from a variety of agencies developed a list of technologically feasible future concepts or systems 

the USAF either would have or could have in its inventory for the 

target year (2030) in question.10 The future concepts examined 

were vetted by scientists in the relevant disciplines to ensure these 
systems were technologically feasible and could be procured, if 

needed, within the next 20 years.

The final aspect of this analysis involved using a value-focusedthinking quantitative model to formally evaluate the potential future concepts for utility across the range of alternate futures.11

This model was developed and run under the direction of the AU 

CSAT, with the assistance of Innovative Decisions, Inc., whose 

members include some of those cited in the seminal works on this 

method in the endnotes. 

Overview

This report begins by examining each of the four alternate futures: a peer China, a resurgent Russia, a failed-state scenario in 

Nigeria, and a jihadist insurgency in the heart of the Middle East. 

While each future was developed in great depth and published separately, this report provides a basic understanding of the nature of 

these futures and the challenges they could pose for the USAF. 

Across these alternate futures, two value-focused-thinking models were estimated. This report examines the results of this modeling, 

and then discusses the patterns that 

are clearly evident in the results. 

This report concludes by offering 

some recommendations regarding 

the harsh realities that lie ahead. 

These recommendations are purposefully aimed at the study’s target year of 2030, about two decades from when this report is being written.

Alternate Futures

• Peer China

• Resurgent Russia

• Failed-State Nigeria

• Jihadist Insurgency
Chapter 2

Alternate Futures

Using a forecasting technique known as “alternate futures,” the 

researchers envisioned worlds where the United States must be 

able to survive and prosper in the future. The study team identified 

individual factors of change in the future.

Peer China

In 2030 China is a peer to the United States.12 Its culture remains 

fairly constant; its political system will be under the control of its 

sixth post-Mao generation leadership; its economy may be ahead of 

the United States, though per capita income is still lagging behind; 

and its military spending, while likely greater than the United States, 

has yet to produce a military fully equal to the United States.

China has long viewed itself as the “Middle Kingdom” or the center of civilization. With the largest population in the world and a 

fast-growing economy, China is well positioned to reinvent itself. In 

2007 China’s economic growth was more than 11 percent. Even in 

the stressed global economy, its economy is expected to grow by 

7.5 percent in 2009.13 This economic growth is critical to China’s 

internal harmony; it also provides the means for China to acquire 

and build the resources to project its power beyond the region. 

A Path toward a Peer China

China’s president, Hu Jintao, calls his vision for leading China 

into the twenty-first century a harmonious society (“和谐社会”, he 

xié shè huì). This term harkens back to the Boxer Rebellion,14

where the Chinese revolted against United States and colonial/

imperial powers’ interests. After roughly 100 years of foreign power 

exploitation and occupation, the Boxers, in their quest to expunge 

China of “foreign barbarians,” are hailed by today’s Chinese leaders as heroes of the state. The Chinese name for what the colonial 

powers called “Boxers,” was the “righteous and harmonious society”15 (“正义与和谐社会,” zhèng yì yŭ hé xié shè huì). Gaining deeper 

insights into President Hu’s harmonious society vision is possible 

when considering that his phrases’ historical connotation describes 

an attempt to defeat foreign humiliation and abuse. 

 Hu describes harmonious society as a scientific development 

concept,16 shifting China’s primary focus from a pure economicgrowth model to a more balanced, Confucian-style approach aimed 

at maintaining growth while addressing social issues such as the 

gap between rich and poor, environmental degradation, and government and corporate corruption.17 Post-Mao Zedong China, beginning with Deng Xiaoping in 1978, remains authoritarian but 
continues to build on policies promoting openness and integration 

with the international community. 

The fundamental precept of this opening is China’s 24-character 

strategy first articulated by Deng. The 24-character strategy refers 

to 24 Chinese characters which are and translate to the following: 

“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide 

our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”18 It complements Hu’s call to 

“hide brightness, nourish obscurity.”19 These ideas appear to guide 

China’s modern leaders as they chart a course toward growth while 

avoiding conflict between global actors. 

China’s leadership understands a return to the Maoist economic 

policies would be a disaster, as the removal of market incentives 

under Mao demonstrated.20 In contrast, for the past 30 years China 

has experienced unprecedented growth resulting from the macroeconomic policy decisions beginning in 1978. The Central Intelligence Agency’s The World Fact Book 2007 ranked China as the 

world’s second largest economy in 2006, based on purchasing 

power parity. The Economist Intelligence Unit reported China’s real 

gross domestic product (GDP) growth for 2007 was 11.5 percent. 

China’s exports have increased more than 650 percent over the 

past nine years, which is equally impressive.21

Goldman-Sach’s most recent work, BRICs and Beyond, discusses a range of predictions for China’s economy in 2030 ranging 

from a low of $11,000 per capita GDP ($16 trillion total) to as much 

as $22,000 per capita GDP ($32 trillion). Given this report estimates the United States per capita GDP at $61,000, it implies that 

at any level above the low end of the forecast range, China’s economy will pass the United States in the 2020s.22 The most optimistic 

forecast for China’s economy comes from the International Monetary Fund, which predicts China’s economy will dwarf the United 

States by a factor of at least three by 2030.23 This level of economic 

growth, coupled with a government-stated objective of spending 5 

percent of China’s GDP on defense, may yield a very different military power in Asia within the next 20 years. 

Through an aggressive program combining foreign purchases primarily Russian and indigenous programs, China has developed and 

will continue to develop significant capabilities for power projection, 

antiaccess, and area denial. China’s modernization program is focused, for at least the next decade, on providing capabilities necessary to prevent Taiwanese independence. By 2030 China will likely 

have far more robust and new diverse capabilities. 

 China will have antiaccess capabilities, including “assassin’s 

mace”24 weapons, to deter or counter any adversary near Chinese 

territory. Specific aims of the antiaccess strategy will be to slow 
deployment of adversary forces and compel these forces to operate 

from distances further than desired.25 To achieve these aims, Chinese doctrinal writings propose a combination of conventional and 

asymmetric weapons. These include the use of medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft, and covert operations to attack 

regional adversary bases. These same weapons, along with electronic jamming, antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, electromagnetic 

pulse (EMP)26 weapons, and computer network attacks are being 

designed to degrade adversary command and control and earlywarning capabilities. Finally, submarines, destroyers, aircraft, 

mines, cruise missiles, and conventional ballistic missiles may be 

used to attack aircraft carriers, forcing them to operate up to 1,500 

kilometers away from China.27

In parallel with producing antiaccess capabilities, China will 

have systems to project military power beyond the region.28 New 

Chinese conventional theater ballistic missiles are already capable 

of projecting power beyond Taiwan.29 Further, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to purchase or develop over-the-horizon 

sensors and space-based ISR assets to track distant naval targets.30 One-quarter of the PLA’s current maneuver divisions and 

brigades focus on training for amphibious operations,31 and China 

will soon deploy a new amphibious assault vehicle while modernizing its existing ones.32

Over the next 20 years, Chinese shipbuilders will likely produce 

very large ferries that can carry hundreds of troops with light armor, 

artillery, and supplies up to 1,000 nautical miles at speeds around 

60 knots, allowing the PLA to quickly deploy large numbers of forces 

in the near abroad.33 The Chinese air force will soon field its firstever aerial refueling capability, extending the range of strike and 

bomber aircraft beyond the Taiwan Strait.34 Finally, advanced destroyers and nuclear submarines, both Russian- and Chinese-made, 

will considerably advance China’s naval power-projection abilities.

China will deploy approximately three aircraft carriers.35 In October 2006 Lt Gen Wang Zhiyuan of the PLA’s General Armament 

Department stated “The Chinese army will study how to manufacture aircraft carriers so that we can develop our own. . . . [A]ircraft 

carriers are indispensable if we want to protect our interests in 

oceans.”36 Such development is likely soon; Jane’s Defense Weekly

reported in late 2008 that China has begun training its first squadron of carrier-qualified pilots.

By 2030 China is expected to have a very modern military. Its 

navy will have at least a few, and possibly several carrier battle 

groups, as China will have all the elements necessary to deploy a 

carrier strike group well before 2030. In addition, China is on track 

to field state-of-the-art ballistic missile and fast-attack nuclearpowered submarines, probably much sooner than 2030.37

A pillar of Chinese antiaccess strategy will continue to be ballistic 

and cruise missiles. China is expected to have hundreds of modern 
land-attack cruise missiles by 2030,38 and if current trends persist, 

several thousand submarine-launched missiles, many designed to 

penetrate carrier battle group defenses. The US Navy’s sea-basing 

concept, if employed, will provide attractive targets for these systems. In addition, improved EMP warheads will specifically target 

naval computers and electronic command and control systems. 

Technologically, Chinese air defense systems and aircraft are improving at a rapid pace. Modern SA-10/20 surface-to-air missiles, 

from both land and ships, provide coverage across the entire Taiwan 

Strait and make control of the air a serious challenge even today.39

Also, China is developing at least one or two fifth-generation fighters, which will likely be fielded by 2030. The J-12, by Shenyang 

Aircraft Company, is similar in size, shape, and capability to the F22.40 In parallel, Chengdu Aircraft is developing the J-10A, possibly 

with Russian assistance. Chinese engineers have designed this canard aircraft to be larger than the J-12 but with many of the same 

features including plasma-stealth technology to provide stealth 

without significantly altering the fourth-generation fighter shape of 

the J-10.41 Achieving air superiority will almost certainly be difficult 

and costly for any future Chinese adversary operating in the South 

China Sea.

In addition to the conventional capabilities above, China is also 

developing emerging, unconventional forms of military power including space and counterspace systems, directed-energy (DE) 

weapons, and information operations. Chinese analysis of recent 

US military operations has convinced them that the United States 

is dependent on its network of space-based assets, and the vulnerability of these assets creates a substantial weakness that may be 

exploited.42 In the eyes of Chinese analysts, US dependence on 

space represents “the United States military’s ‘soft ribs’ and strategic weaknesses.”43 In addition to the direct ascent ASAT, China is 

developing a family of ASAT options including ground attack, coorbital “killer” satellites, DE weapons, and electronic attack.44 China’s goal is “information supremacy,” thereby increasing battlefield 

transparency for Chinese commanders, while creating “fog” for 

their enemy.45

By 2030 China will use asymmetric forces to confuse, weaken, 

and slow their adversaries. After decades of sustained growth and 

modernization, China will be a military peer of the United States, 

at least regionally, and a potential rival with limited blue-water 

naval capabilities.

Peer China 2030—Causality and Impact

Chinese leaders face several largely internal stressors that could 

threaten their mandate from heaven—a source of legitimacy in Chinese culture—and move it in a different direction from its stated goals 

of achieving a harmonious society in a harmonious world. These chal-
lenges include a sharp economic downturn, loss of domestic food production, or an inability to meet domestic energy needs.

A sharp economic downturn could foment instability. The rural 

areas expect coming prosperity as envisioned in Harmonious Society, and the developed urban areas expect continued prosperity. 

Both groups have internalized government rhetoric about more democracy. Further, the number of public demonstrations is increasing. While China has very substantial cash reserves, the societal 

response to an economic crash cannot be predicted. 

China may have problems feeding its people. Today, only 10 percent of China’s land mass is arable, and this figure is decreasing 

due to poor farming practices and climate change. Rising standards of living bring increased consumption of foodstuffs. Given 

the trend in its arable lands and population, at some point around 

2015, China will transition from being a net food exporter to becoming a net food importer. Domestic instability may result should 

the national government be unable to meet the nutritional needs of 

its people on the open markets. If this should occur, a clash of interests between China and US allies becomes possible. 

Similarly, China’s already huge energy consumption will more 

than double by 2030. Like the food crisis, China is concerned about 

its future energy supplies. Thus, it has cultivated close relations 

with Middle East nations such as Iran. As world demand begins to 

exceed supply, China’s need for energy to continue to build its 

economy could become unacceptably constrained. This too could 

be a casus belli for China.46

Interestingly, this research concludes that conflict with Taiwan 

is probably not likely. China and Taiwan are both aware of the 

costs of going to war. As China continues to open its markets and 

its politics, the differences between them decrease. As a result, 

absent an all-out declaration of independence by Taiwan, conflict 

here seems unlikely. 

Capabilities Needed to Respond to a Peer China Crisis

China enjoys the advantages of interior lines within the region 

plus strategic depth within its own territory. A peer China will likely 

be a formidable nation militarily, with a range of advanced weapons 

and the ability to initially deny US penetration inside the second island chain (i.e., the Marianas and Guam). The combination of these 

two factors places a large premium on several capabilities. 

The USAF will need to both airlift supplies into and operate from 

areas near or perhaps even under the large Chinese integrated air 

defense system umbrella. This suggests a need for robust survivable basing infrastructure, and due to the vast distances of the 

Pacific, a large and fast survivable lift capability. 

Any conflict with China will require the ability to attack strategically important targets from very long standoff ranges. Until the 
Chinese air defense system is destroyed, it is possible that existing 

fighter aircraft would have to refuel well inside of the range of China’s defenses, which may be able to reach and destroy aircraft at 

distances over 1,000 miles. Persistence and range, therefore, become valuable characteristics. 

In cyberspace the ability to defend Air Force networks from major attacks while still being able to engage in warfare in the cyber 

domain is critical against an adversary as technologically advanced 

as the United States. Much has been written about China’s potential cyberspace capabilities; by 2030 they will have advanced significantly. The Air Force must be ready.

In the area of space, China’s already demonstrated capabilities indicate a need for the ability to rapidly reconstitute assets in space. 

Modular satellites that can be built to order and launched within very 

short periods of time (e.g., 48 hours) could prove quite valuable. 

Lastly, China is developing DE (laser and microwave) capabilities. The USAF should develop and field protection against these 

types of weapons. Computer systems may be especially vulnerable 

to attack. Canvass, the most common building material for expeditionary bases, offers no protection as a barrier.

Resurgent Russia

Penned prior to the recent invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this alternate future scenario stresses the USAF in a stateon-state confrontation with a strong and modern competitor whose 

interests may conflict with US interests and those of its allies. This 

scenario is made plausible by recent changes in Russian governance, which appears to be on a path toward greater centralized 

control. This combined with Russia’s historic paranoia and belief 

that it needs a buffer along its perimeter—a buffer now incompatible with the member states of the expanded North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) alliance—validate and demonstrate the relevance of this scenario. Russia, the world’s largest and most mineral-rich nation, may present a formidable challenge in the future 

as it taps its vast oil, natural gas, and mineral resources.47

Russia has had a turbulent history as it moved from its Tsarist 

past, through the Soviet interregnum, to its brief flirtation with 

democracy. This history and its associated cultural pressures have 

instilled in the Russian psyche a desire for stability and strong 

leadership.48 Furthermore, Russia tends to value stability and 

strong leadership even when these traits conflict with post-Renaissance democratic ideals.49 After each change in governance, Russia has always returned to an authoritarian-style government that 

seeks to lead Russia back onto the world stage. Their history explains why Russia often displays the mentality of a paranoid nation.50 As such, a resurgent Russia51 may become a challenge for 

the United States and its allies.
The Development of a Resurgent Russia

Russia is already reasserting itself as a world power in terms of its 

geography, politics, nationalism, and religion.52 Prime Minister Putin is acutely aware of Russian paranoia and is restoring a sense of 

nationalism and strength in the Russian people. The latest efforts to 

restore Russian pride include claims for the North Pole53 and reviving the Russian space program in an attempt to be the first country 

to send a manned mission to Mars.54 This “flexing” of international 

muscle and technological prowess is an effort to show Russian citizens they are part of a strong and resurgent Russia. This pursuit of 

security drives Russia to spend an increasingly larger share of its 

GDP on its military. In the interim, Russia uses its economic clout 

generated by oil and gas to wield power over its neighbors.55

Three major factors appear to dictate Russia’s future. First is the 

paranoia and need for security along its borders, with the prospect 

for significant economic growth, enabled by Russia’s mineral 

wealth, second. Lastly, significant demographic changes are under 

way as Russia faces a continued decline in its overall population. 

Its dilemma is amplified by the disproportionate increase in the 

Muslim population, especially in its border regions near the Middle 

East and South Asia. 

The economic forces at work, principally the revenue and power 

generated by its oil and gas sales, enable Russia’s resurgence. Russia’s mineral, coal, oil, and natural gas resources are the largest on 

Earth.56 In addition, Russia has vast reserves of iron, platinum, uranium, nickel, cobalt, and a host of other key modern manufacturing 

minerals. Many of these lie in Siberian areas that have only recently 

become accessible and are now being tapped.57 Recent government 

nationalization of industries involved in exploiting natural resources 

enables the government to focus its resources on the very priorities 

mentioned above, chief of which is national security. 

Meanwhile, Russia is faced with a demographic challenge of population decline. Its population peaked in the early 1990s at around 

148.5 million, whereas its current population is only 140.7 million.58

Although there are many social factors contributing to this population 

slide, the nation’s dismal health care system is arguably the most direct cause. Russia has a staggering 40 percent preventable mortality 

rate—a direct result of poor preventive-medicine programs, substandard medical facilities, and limited health care accessibility.59 This 

declining population trend is expected to last until 2050. Meanwhile, 

Russia’s Muslim population along its southern borders will increase. 

Should ethnic conflict come to these regions, as in Chechnya, this 

could create tensions in areas of vital interest to Europe and the 

United States. Thus, Russia is facing a period where its mineral wealth 

will likely result in economic growth, while its population is in decline. 

This produces a situation where the per capita income is likely to rise. 

At the same time, Russia will not have the people required for tradi-
10

tional manpower-intensive industries or for manning its military 

forces. This will force Russia to adopt a more US-like model for its 

military forces, where it uses advanced technology to compensate for 

reduced manpower.60

Militarily, Russia will use technology to defend its interests, at a 

minimum in its near abroad. In this regard, Russia will certainly 

field a modern and robust homeland defense system, but it is unlikely to structure its forces for large expeditionary efforts at great 

distances from its borders. However, the Russians do and will possess unique asymmetric capabilities in the form of nuclear weapons, space access, and orbital systems that still give them superpower niches, ones they will seek to enhance. Putin has discussed 

“new spirals” in an arms race that could include nuclear spacebased weapons,61 something the United States must recognize and 

defend against. Strategic Forecasting, Inc. summed up the Kremlin’s recent moves, saying, “Russia is back, and it no longer accepts 

its decline into obscurity.”62

Russia has already made forays into advanced technologies like 

nanotechnology in order to improve its capabilities. Current Russian investments could lead to miniaturized control and power systems for inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering bioengineered weapons. Recent Russian cyberattacks against 

Estonia and Georgia demonstrate the Kremlin is very interested in 

and capable of pursuing nontraditional approaches to warfare.63 In 

short, Russia’s future capabilities may not appear as those of “Cold 

War–Fulda Gap” fame but may be just as lethal. Should international crises emerge over whether some states should join NATO, or 

over security and nationalistic concerns along Russia’s southern 

border, the United States and its allies may contend with a smaller 

but more modern and professional Russian military. 

Capabilities to Defend against a Resurgent Russian State

In sum, the resurgent Russia of this alternate future is a major 

supplier of global energy resources not closely aligned with either 

the West or the East. As a result, it will be particularly concerned 

with defending its natural resources and supporting infrastructure. 

The military will be smaller but more capable, with professional soldiers and technologically advanced systems. They will have the ability to project the nation’s full combat power into their “near abroad,” 

including Eastern Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia, but will 

have limited ability to deploy conventional forces beyond this region. 

In part to make up for the limitations in its conventional forces, Russia will develop significant strategic reach through its nuclear forces 

and develop advanced strategic technologies for space and cyberspace. In this alternate future, the Russian military will possess 

significant, advanced capabilities across all the Air Force war-fighting domains, including air, space, and cyberspace.
11

These capabilities imply that the United States will need capabilities relatively similar to those of the Chinese scenario. The study 

participants were concerned that this scenario, more so than the 

other three, offered the potential for major force-on-force combat. 

Land warfare on or near China’s borders was seen unlikely due to 

the limited vital interests and the difficulties associated with distance in waging warfare on or near China’s shores. 

With Russia, however, and alongside US European partners, 

land warfare seems possible. This alternate future demands and 

stresses US conventional combat capabilities more than any of the 

others. These stresses are against a power that can fight on land, 

on the sea, in the littorals, in cyberspace, and in space. A wide 

range of systems and the ability to rapidly reconstitute what is lost 

will be required to prevail, should Russia’s and America’s interests 

collide, especially in Europe. 

Failed State—Nigeria

Nigeria has been called the best example of the “paradox of 

plenty,” where tremendous natural resources create great wealth, 

which in turn creates “extravagant corruption, deep poverty, polarized income distributions, and poor economic performance.”64

While the Department of State views Nigeria as relatively stable, 

increasing conflict is occurring along a religious fault line that bifurcates this African nation. What is worrisome is that the 2007 

Failed State Index ranks Nigeria as the country 17th most likely to 

fail out of the 147 states they analyzed,65 where failure implies the 

state cannot govern itself nor can it provide for internal security 

and the basic needs of its people. Further, when states fail, it is 

usually a long-term problem. A World Bank study shows that states 

listed as failed in 1980 are generally still failed today, and they estimate the average failed state will require 56 years to recover.66

A Failure We Cannot Ignore

Of concern in this future is that few states have the potential to 

be as disruptive to the United States and the global economy as a 

failed Nigeria. Nigeria is one of the world’s 20 largest economies 

and largest suppliers of light “sweet” crude oil, with a daily export 

of over 2.4 million barrels a day.67 By 2030 roughly a quarter of US 

oil imports will likely be supplied by Nigeria.68

While infrastructure investments in Nigeria are limited, they 

have yielded more reliable electricity for the cities and better roads 

in oil areas. Road improvements may allow for growth in the agricultural sector, especially in the north, and for natural resource 

development to diversify the economy. The top 1 percent of Nigeria’s wealthiest families control over 80 percent of the oil profits, 

and they may seek to improve their personal portfolios by investing 
12

in new technology areas overseas.69 Should oil revenues not be 

invested in improving the north, or should corruption prove entrenched, this could spark greater animosity among regions, resurrecting issues of reduced government legitimacy.

Nigeria has the largest population in Africa, nearly 25 percent of 

the continent’s total, and it is growing. Expected to surpass 225 

million people before 2030, Nigeria could become the fifth most 

populous nation on earth.70 Despite being a former British colony 

with English as its official language, Nigeria is diverse, with over 

350 separate ethnic groups—more than any other country in Africa.71 Four main groups make up over three quarters of this population: Hausa and Fulani (29 percent), Yoruba (21 percent), and 

Igbo (18 percent). Eight other significant population groups, with 

their own languages that define them politically and culturally, 

make up the remainder.72

These disparities and the trappings of Nigeria’s colonial past 

have created tensions that make establishing an integrated, coherent, and legitimate government difficult.73 By 2030 Nigeria’s robust 

population will have an average age of 16.7 years and a life expectancy of 54 years. As such, Nigeria will likely have many disaffected 

and underemployed people.74 It already has the sixth largest Muslim population in the world75 and has a nearly equal balance of 

Muslims and Christians. This balance is currently at a potential 

tipping point because of the faster population growth in the Islamic 

north, which is ruled under Sharia law, unlike the Christian provinces in the south.76 By 2030 Nigeria’s Islamic population will likely 

comprise a majority of the electorate, which will fundamentally 

change the Nigerian domestic political situation.77

With limited industrial development and oil production consigned mainly to the Christian south, 90 percent of funding to the 

states and localities is provided by the federal government, largely 

from oil export revenues.78 A complex federal oil wealth sharing 

program provides each state with calculated shares. The formula 

includes population, level of development, and sources of oil revenues.79 State governors budget and distribute this money, with 

much of the oil wealth flowing to the predominant political party.80

While revenue sharing provides much needed government funding 

for the nonlucrative agrarian north, it also intensifies ethnic tension between the north and the oil-producing south. This ethnic 

tension combined with rampant corruption, whereby politicians 

frequently “skim” some of the earnings, has resulted in the federal 

government’s loss of legitimacy. Losses of legitimacy in the past led 

to military coups d’état in 1966, 1975, 1983, 1985, and 1993. In 

most cases, military leaders delayed coup attempts until there was 

considerable public dissatisfaction with the elected government, 

thus ensuring the military, although often just as corrupt in their 

rule, would be “welcomed as redeemers.”81
13

Nigeria’s oil production may approach five million barrels a day 

between now and 2030, but this will likely decline in the out years 

due to domestic political instability, corruption, and the continued 

criminal insurgency by the Movement for the Emancipation of the 

Niger Delta (MEND). These conditions alone could reduce Nigerian 

oil flow by up to 25 percent.82

Nigeria’s military currently has four primary functions: preserving 

Nigeria’s territorial integrity, contributing to national emergencies and 

security, promoting collective security in Africa while furthering Nigerian foreign policy, and contributing to global security.83 The president of Nigeria is the commander in chief of Nigeria’s military forces. 

He decides when and how to employ the armed forces, while day-today military operations are managed by the Ministry of Defense. 

The Nigerian army, with almost 60,000 troops, commands the 

largest share of the military budget and resources.84 The Nigerian 

navy and air force represent about 7,000 and 9,000 personnel respectively of the overall military strength of about 76,000.85

Nigeria Shatters

The Nigerian army is fighting what the government terms an active insurgency by MEND. Their attacks on oil infrastructure and 

workers since 2005 have reduced oil production by 25 percent.86

The group attacks to increase the price of oil in order to compel the 

world to force the Nigerian government to address the grievances of 

the indigenous people of the Niger Delta region. With all these 

structural problems, there exists the possibility for dissolution or 

full civil war within Nigeria. 

As the Islamic population in the north grows, Nigeria is faced 

with a transfer of power from the Christian oil-rich south to the 

Islamic agrarian and less-well-off north. In this alternate future, a 

loss of financial support from outside investors triggers a collapse 

in the economy. This, in turn, forces the ruling and corrupt Christian government to hold early elections where a well-organized and 

united slate of Islamic candidates and parties win. The conflict between the two religious factions intensifies as the ruling party refuses to cede control of the oil wealth and its trappings, and refuses 

to hand off power to a newly elected Islamic government, which 

declares Nigeria an Islamic Republic. This situation triggers a national crisis and the failure of the Nigerian state.

With the loss of federal control and the revolt of MEND and the 

former leaders, Nigeria splits into lawless areas and criminal fiefdoms. With hundreds of ethnicities, Nigeria is ripe for fragmentation 

into a myriad of pieces. With no central authority, legitimate economic activity rapidly declines and is replaced by criminality. Oil 

workers flee the violence, abandoning their facilities in search of 

safety, which effectively halts oil production throughout the Niger 

Delta region and the Gulf of Guinea. The resultant global oil shock 
14

is painful. The United States and the global economies are threatened, and the population of Nigeria—roughly one quarter of a billion 

strong, is faced with imminent pestilence, famine, and civil war.

Thus in this future, Nigeria succumbs to a variety of ills—corruption, weak government institutions, a failure to meet the social 

welfare needs of its people, unchecked criminality, crumbling infrastructure, a strong insurgency in the Niger Delta region, and a 

loss of confidence by international investors. By 2030 the Nigerian 

government loses its national support from its diverse people and, 

with the exception of the 12 Islamic-dominated states in the north, 

no longer functions as a nation-state. The collapse of central control and the eruption of violence in the wake of the elections halts 

oil production, destroys national governance, and threatens to 

plunge Nigeria and perhaps West Africa into civil war.

Capabilities Required for Intervention

With Nigeria on the brink of civil war, the global community, 

particularly the United States and the nations of West Africa, is 

faced with the difficult choices of whether, how, and when to intervene. If the president chooses intervention, then the United States 

will likely conduct a peace-enforcement operation.87 The actions 

the United States would need to take must be designed to prevent 

full-scale civil war in Nigeria, contain the spread of conflict, and 

secure critical resources in order to limit damage to the United 

States and global economies. In short, protecting the oil fields and 

associated infrastructure, relieving human suffering throughout 

the country, creating conditions for a political solution between 

warring parties and national reconciliation, and eventually transitioning from a US–led peace enforcement operation to a United 

Nations (UN)–led national recovery and peace-building operation 

will be missions for the US military.

Quickly accomplishing these missions is essential. Historically, 

Nigeria has been the largest provider of peacekeeping forces on the 

continent and has had a disproportionate influence on regional 

stability. A failure within Nigeria, especially if it degenerates into 

religious conflict, has the capacity to ignite wars between and 

within neighboring countries. The US ability to act quickly may be 

central to preserving stability in West Africa, a region that by 2030 

may be of vital interest to the United States and its allies. 

Although securing the infrastructure quickly will be a key factor 

in stability, there is a second facet of this alternate future that may 

be even more daunting. A failed state engulfed in a multipartite 

civil conflict could easily degenerate into the greatest humanitarian 

crisis the world has ever known—a crisis potentially more than 100 

times larger than the modern crisis in Darfur.88 Extraordinary lift 

capacity will be required and will need to be fast. The ability to coordinate relief operations across a myriad of international govern-
15

mental and nongovernmental organizations will be critical, as a 

failure in this endeavor could result in the starvation of tens of millions. In short, the key capabilities required in this alternate future 

are speed of response (to keep the crisis from spiraling out of control in the first place), and the size of response (to ensure that Africa’s most populous country does not become a homeland of famine, a breeding ground of pestilence, and a haven for transnational 

criminals and terrorists). 

Specifically, the Air Force must be able to detect hostile intent 

and identify belligerents, understand and characterize the nature 

of the impending conflict, deploy forces into country with speed 

and quantity, survive in place and protect forces, and engage the 

right targets. The Air Force must attack only the belligerents 

through multiple means, while sustaining US forces and supplying 

those who are suffering because of the government collapse. 

In order to do this, a few capabilities will need to be enhanced. 

The intelligence community will need to provide far more precise 

human and communications intelligence and be able to use network mapping systems to help establish operational and lifestyle 

patterns; defend operational networks; and discriminate between 

belligerents and noncombatants. The rapid airlift requirements 

needed in this future cannot be met with existing or planned systems, so new capabilities to rapidly airlift and deploy personnel 

and millions of pounds of materiel to austere locations, some without airfields and airdromes, are crucial.

Because of technological proliferation, the Air Force will need to 

protect and reconstitute critical cyber infrastructure and networks. 

The potential for a failed Nigeria to rapidly succumb to disease suggests new technologies or methods to rapidly eradicate disease vectors will be crucial to restoring stability in this scenario. Lastly, the 

ability to rapidly reconstitute, or in some cases build for the first 

time, electrical power generation, sewage and water treatment, fuel 

storage, and critical infrastructure is necessary to create a situation 

wherefrom UN or US forces will eventually be able to return home. 

Jihadist Insurgency

The last alternate future scenario examines the possible challenges 

posed by a well-resourced and well-financed jihadist insurgency emanating from the heart of the Middle East. Today, insurgency is the 

conflict of choice for many of America’s most ardent enemies. Jihadist 

insurgencies throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia are directed at establishing theocracies with a strict interpretation and application of Islamic Sharia law. As with the Taliban, some of these 

insurgent groups are sufficiently well financed to destabilize and even 

exert control over territory or nations. They also export their ideology 

and practices, seeking greater influence, especially in the regions of 

the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia.89
16

Given the economic and geostrategic importance of many of these 

nations, successful jihadist insurgencies can cause significant global 

economic disruptions and challenge the security of nations around 

the world. Any economic disruption resulting from a successful jihadist insurgent takeover of a country in the Middle East or Southwest Asia would threaten US vital interests and require a response. 

Roots of the Schism

Throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia, several cultural factors create an environment in which insurgent warfare 

can flourish. There are conflicts within the region over religion to 

include schisms within the Muslim world, tribal loyalties often superseding national identity, and widespread poverty. All of these 

create conditions conducive to terrorist activities. 

Religion is the single-most pervasive aspect of Middle Eastern 

society, with at least three distinct Islamic sects: Sunnism, Shiism, 

and Wahhabism/Salafism—all competing for dominance.90 Sunnism recognizes the Quran and the Sunnah91 as the sources of faith, 

and the majority of Muslims in the world are Sunnis.92 The rift between the Sunnis and Shiites is rooted in a conflict over who should 

have taken the reigns as the leader of the Islamic people, or the 

“caliph,” after the religion’s founder and first caliph, the Prophet 

Muhammad, died. This difference in succession has implications 

for traditions central to the faith.93

Wahhabism and Salafism are religious and political movements 

within Islam whose ideological bases lie in an attempt to recapture 

a pure, undistorted Islam.94 Wahhabism is often traced to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) who taught on the Saudi Peninsula. Salafism is a stream of Islamic fundamentalism similar to 

Wahhabism, originating outside the Arabian Peninsula in part as a 

reaction to modern cultural influences. Both Wahhabist and Salafist movements reject all changes in Islam after its early period, often referring to Islamic variants accommodating modern culture as 

a form of unbelief and heresy.95

The conflict between these Islamic sects is significant; a SunniShi’a rift is surfacing as a result of the sectarian conflict in Iraq. 

The struggle for regional dominance between Arab-Sunni Saudi 

Arabia and Persian-Shi’a Iran is a critical geopolitical and religious 

force, and the decapitated state of Iraq is no longer a buffer between the two.96 Both the modern Sunni and Shi’a movements are 

at odds with the Salafist/Wahhabist sects. 

Al-Qaeda is a self-professed Salafist organization seeking to 

unite all Muslims under a new caliphate and remove all current 

“illegitimate” leaderships to restore the golden era of the Muslim 

nation.97 In addition to representing a conservative form of Islam at 

odds with most of the Muslim world, al-Qaeda’s Salafist movement 

is, perhaps, the leading ideological threat to the monarchies in the 
17

region. The geographic location of the two holy mosques of Islam—

Mecca and Medina—within Saudi Arabia is a key reason al-Qaeda 

has sought to oust the Saudi regime, and a key reason the governments of nations in the region support the Saudi royal family.

After religion, the most significant source of cultural identity for 

most Middle Eastern people is their family or tribal membership. 

Two concepts of the tribal system—kinship and nobility—affect relationships and behavior in the region.98 In this feudal system, the 

dominant tribes essentially run rackets and extort money and resources in exchange for protection from outside invaders. Tribes 

generally do not trust each other, thus arranged marriages to gain 

influence with rival tribal sheiks are still used to dampen the likelihood of conflict. This “mafia-like” type of social arrangement is a 

normal method of business payment between sheiks. 

The population in most Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian 

nations is increasingly urban, young, approximately equal to that 

of the United States, and is growing rapidly. Today urban dwellers 

comprise over 75 percent of the population, and this concentration 

is increasing.99 Providing education for the resulting number of 

urbanized youth is challenging for most of these governments. In 

2002 the combined literacy rate among Middle Eastern nations 

was 52 percent and declining, with only a little more than half of 

all Middle Eastern children attending secondary schools. This poor 

quality of public education is responsible for a “low level of knowledge attainment and poor and deteriorating analytical and innovative capacity” among Arab children.100 In the long term, this will 

create unemployment and underemployment of poorly educated 

young men, potentially fueling unrest. Many who do get an education get it through the madrasah system dedicated to Islamic studies, which often fosters extremist thinking.

The influx of petrodollars throughout the Middle East has helped 

ease tensions between the various groups and factions. Standards 

of living have risen, and in terms of per capita income, some nations of the region are now among the wealthiest on earth.101 Over 

time, however, the picture becomes bleaker. Peak oil production 

has likely passed and by 2030 will be markedly less than today.102

The rapidly rising population of the region means these decreasing 

revenues will be divided among an increasingly larger number of 

people, causing per capita income to decline and poverty to increase. This will place a significant strain on the social safety nets 

of most Middle Eastern nations. 

The Insurgency

Given the already poor education level and low literacy rates in 

many Middle Eastern countries, most citizens are neither adequately 

educated nor well versed in hard science and technology fields, thus 

providing little chance of success in diversifying the economy. As eco-
18

nomic conditions worsen, an increasingly large segment of the unemployed will, as they have in the past, turn to their religion in hopes of 

finding a better tomorrow and bringing meaning to their lives. 

The military capabilities of many Middle Eastern nations are often a mix of weapons from the former Soviet Union, the United 

States, France, China, and other nations. Most militaries in the 

region are organized and used to provide internal security and protect the ruling regime. The proficiency of military personnel and 

the war-fighting capabilities of each nation are often constrained 

by lack of funding, poor training, limited education, shifting tribal 

loyalties, religion, and trade restrictions. If jihadist elements are 

able to gain control of national resources, specifically the military, 

this presents an entirely new threat to Western interests. 

To make matters worse, access to technologies may be changing. 

Recent trends in the proliferation of new technologies are now enabling groups and individuals to access new weapons with improved capabilities. As advanced technologies proliferate, these 

groups and individuals will eventually be able to access weapons 

capabilities previously held only by nation-states. 

Therefore, this alternate future creates a stressing scenario by 

drawing upon the trends above. The challenges associated with 

controlling groups engaging in a global Islamic extremist jihad will 

be severe. By 2030 small groups with sufficient resources, and 

with some highly educated and trained members, will present a 

potential threat to the United States. Specifically, this alternate 

future posits that an extremist Islamic jihadist-oriented group will 

successfully influence the local population through its mosquesponsored programs in order to exert control over a territory, a 

population, and over the regional resources of this territory. With 

the exception of international recognition, this insurgent force will 

acquire the resources and characteristics of a jihadist state and 

will be located in the heart of the Middle East. 

This scenario further posits that the monarchies that make up 

the majority of governments in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula will be 

directly or indirectly attacked by this insurgent territory, threatening global access to the region’s oil and natural gas supplies. Further, the religious beliefs of these insurgents will drive them to use 

the mineral resources at their disposal, and the wealth those resources confer, to launch a sustained, high-tech, and well-financed 

terrorist campaign against the nations of the Arabian Peninsula and 

against states who would seek to defend the status quo. 

While the United States will have considerable incentive to intervene, the US ability to involve itself directly in this scenario is constrained on several fronts. First, Islamist insurgents will have had 

decades of experience fighting the United States and will, by 2030, 

likely be the fittest of insurgent groups. Darwinian evolution will 

have eliminated those groups who are easy to defeat. 
19

Second, while Middle Eastern nations may need assistance from 

the United States, they may be reluctant to accept uniformed 

American ground troops. Such a move could be perceived as “inviting infidels” into Islamic holy lands, further strengthening the arguments of the insurgents. This concern is exacerbated due to the 

American leadership’s past reluctance to quickly withdraw its 

forces when it perceives US interests are or might be threatened.

Lastly, in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American public is reluctant to commit troops and monetary resources to 

fight in any Middle Eastern nation with an active insurgency. All 

these factors may place an increased burden on the Air Force. 

Capabilities Needed to Combat the Insurgency

This scenario provides a different set of challenges than the preceding four worlds. Here, the United States will need to defend its 

allies and interests but without a robust surface presence in country. In addition, the resources available to the insurgent groups 

will enable them to purchase virtually any weapons or munitions 

available on the world arms markets; by 2030 these weapons will 

be very advanced. In fact, given the proliferation of new systems 

based on nanotechnology, biotechnology, and potentially even nuclear weapons, a well-financed group may gain access to powerful 

old and new weapons with potentially incredible capabilities. 

Insurgent’s access to classic weapons of mass destruction, such 

as nuclear weapons, will be a key concern. Such weapons not only 

could provide enormous destructive capability against ground targets but could be used to generate electromagnetic pulses that 

could destroy electrical systems and power grids, essentially taking 

the United States back to the 1800s.103 The ability to deter, prevent, and survive in the wake of a nuclear device detonation in or 

above the United States is a required key capability in this world. 

Technologically, this requires the reinvigoration of the US ability 

to produce hardened electronics that are impervious to electromagnetic pulses. It will require a domestic ability to contain and 

rapidly respond to disasters far larger than the failures seen by the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency in Hurricanes Andrew 

and Katrina. In the area of deterrence, the necessary actions are 

less clear, as the application of deterrence theory towards nontraditional actors is among the fields not yet well explored.

Traditional weapons of mass destruction are not the only problem. To protect both the United States and its allies, the Air Force 

and its sister services will need to defeat weapons based on nanotechnology or biotechnology, or a combination of both. Due to their 

extremely small size, these technologies may enable chemical or biological pathogens to penetrate even the most resistant of materials, 

allowing the insurgents to attack in unconventional ways. The ability to quickly detect the precursors of these weapons is a key capa-
20

bility needed to prevent their use. Once used, the ability to rapidly 

detect, identify, warn, and treat victims will be essential to containing an event before it kills large numbers of people or causes panic 

and/or the loss of governmental legitimacy of the targeted state.

As with the nation-state adversaries, a well-financed insurgent 

group may be able to grow or hire the necessary talent to engage in 

well-coordinated cyberattacks. Whether to disable critical national 

infrastructure in the territory of the Middle Eastern monarchies or 

in the United States, the ability to defend against these attacks and 

to protect the Internet is a key capability in this alternate future. 

Again, one particularly daunting challenge to the US military is 

the reluctance by the Middle Eastern monarchies to allow “infidel” 

American troops to be stationed within their borders. This will require the United States to find capabilities to neutralize insurgent 

threats, while leaving little or no footprint, which suggests an increased importance for robotic combat equipment, unmanned vehicles, and covert special forces. 

Operations Analysis Results

As mentioned, the researchers developed a quantitative model to 

evaluate 58 separate notional future systems for their potential utility across the four alternative futures. Each future scenario had its 

own separate model with its own internal weighting factors specific 

to the nature of the alternate future being explored. As a result, the 

expectation was that the types of systems required in each scenario 

would be quite distinct. For the USAF, two of this study’s findings 

are the types of systems needed for major state-on-state conflict 

cover and the types of systems and capabilities required for insurgent warfare and failed state scenarios (see figure 1). Notice that the 

Figure 1. Scoring chart of all 58 systems across all alternate futures
21

four lines depicting the ratings of the 58 systems are nearly parallel 

across all four models, showing that little variation occurs in required capabilities, regardless of the type of warfare encountered.

 As these capabilities were explored further, there was only one core 

Air Force capability that showed substantively or statistically significant variation across the four futures. This variation was in the area 

of space. The study does show that space-based capabilities are less 

relevant to insurgent and failed-state scenarios than they are in stateon-state warfare. This is highlighted further in figure 2, where this 

same capability list was plotted in a state-on-state versus a nonstateactor scenario. All of the major spikes in the state-on-state chart line 

are systems that contain a significant space component. Again, other 

than these spikes, the parallelism in the rank ordering of these future 

systems between types of warfare is striking.

Figure 2. Scoring of all 58 systems in state-on-state versus nonstate warfare

The 58 future systems were mapped to a mutually exclusive and 

comprehensively exhaustive list of 172 key enabling technologies. A 

quantitative model evaluated the utility of each enabling technology 

based on the value of the systems to which it was essential. The expectation was that this model would generate a relatively short list 

of technologies which, if developed, would enable a significant number of potential future systems. There was also an expectation that 

the importance of the technologies would likely vary from alternate 

future to alternate future. Neither of these hypotheses proved true. 

The key underlying technologies did not vary from scenario to 

scenario. In fact, the four technology scoring curves are even more 

closely clustered than they were in scoring the 58 conceptual systems (see figure 3). 
22

Finding a short list of technologies which, if invested in, would 

enable development of a large number of concepts was among the 

study’s goals. The actual findings were quite unexpected. In the 

end, the study concluded that 57 of the 58 future conceptual systems all have key enabling technologies ranking below 100. In 

other words, every concept but one has key technologies that 

scored in the tail of the graph. In fact, a detailed analysis of each 

technology and system shows that a disinvestment in the bottom 

20 percent of technologies results in the inability to field systems 

that scored in the study’s top 25 percent. The fundamental implication of this result is straightforward. Any budgetary strategy that 

disinvests in science and technology in the future is a very highrisk strategy that will foreclose a large number of future options. 

. . . the Air Force must invest in a broad range 

of enabling technologies to bring the necessary capabilities and systems to fruition, or it 

will be unable to effectively maintain dominance in its core missions and domains.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Several trends became apparent as the research team began to synthesize the results of the operations analysis and the nature of the four 

alternate futures. At the top level, these insights form the conclusions 

and recommendations that are the principal product of this study.

As stated, the strategic environment in 2030 presents difficult challenges stemming from accelerating technological changes interacting 

with a shifting strategic landscape, producing massive and dynamic 

change. This change acts as a catalyst, creating a very disturbing and 

disruptive threat to the United States and a serious challenge to the 

USAF’s future dominance in air, space, and cyberspace. 

Figure 3. Score of enabling technologies by alternate future
23

Future enemies will continue to be motivated by resources, fear, 

and hate.104 What is changing is that these enemies will be empowered through education, and enabled through technology and globalization, to directly challenge states and attack places that heretofore they would never have been able to reach. As seen in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, future enemies will be more difficult to find, 

harder to hit, more widely distributed, and potentially more dangerous. Historically, as depicted in figure 4, the types of conflicts 

that were rare, such as World Wars I and II, were the conflicts of 

greatest impact. As we move toward 2030, single actors or small 

groups will have the capacity to create high-impact events, making 

future warfare more dangerous than past wars.

Figure 4. Spectrum of conflict versus impact

Figure 5. The observe-orient-decide-act cycle or “OODA Loop”

Also as a result of technological advances, the speed with which 

warfare occurs will increase. The observe-orient-decide-act cycle, 

often called the “OODA Loop” (see figure 5), will shrink toward an 

“OODA point.” Many warfare decisions will be executed at machine 

speeds by machines preprogrammed with the commander’s intent. 

The soldier, sailor, Airman, or marine will no longer be in the loop, 

but rather on the loop—able to stop the execution of the machine 

code as necessary, but unable to execute a decision cycle fast 

enough to remain ahead of a technologically savvy adversary. 

Lest one believe this to be science fiction, this form of warfare is 

taking place today. In the Air Force cyberdomain, every computer 

within the department is armed with a program designed to execute 

the commander’s intent of keeping the hard drive free of viruses and 
24

malware. The majority of computer owners have installed antivirus 

software on their personal systems, because the speed a virus can 

intrude into a computer system is faster than the speed with which 

a human can react. This dynamic will spread over time to other 

fields of warfare. Unmanned vehicles and missiles will be equipped 

with the ability to seek and destroy adversary targets. Air Force defense systems will need to react at these same machine speeds to 

keep air bases and the mainland United States safe from attack. 

In 2030 targets will be more difficult to find and strike. Most 

targets will be mobile, distributed, dispersed, fleeting, deeply buried, nested within facilities protected by international law, and located in highly urbanized areas. As a result, the USAF must possess systems and technologies to rapidly locate and identify targets, 

attribute attacks, and respond to threats. Future kinetic weapons 

will need to be even more precise and may need to employ new 

kinds of energetic (e.g., DE) technologies. These will allow engagements to take place with forensic precision so only the target identified is harmed—the goal is no collateral damage. 

The commonalities of the systems that rose to the top of the scoring process also cannot be ignored. The role for unmanned systems 

increases in the future, as five of the top 10 systems are unmanned, 

and several are based in the continental United States. 

Wars are already being fought in cyberspace. Al-Qaeda’s principal recruiting tool is and has been the Internet for some time. Presentations by scholars from Harvard, the Norwegian Defense Institute,105 and others strongly suggest that al-Qaeda’s ability to grow 

is intrinsically linked to its Web presence. Networks of sites reinforcing the conservative jihadist mentality of those who frequent 

them are within this realm, along with links necessary to join the 

al-Qaeda network. In fact, the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan 

appears to be nothing more than the manifestation in physical 

space of a lost war in cyberspace.106 Pathologically, Internet restrictions by many federal agencies preclude access to these sites. 

The ironic result is that history may well record the current war 

against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan as the world’s 

first cyberwar, and the United States, the world’s most technologically advanced power, may become the loser. 

As the study team looks further forward, the importance of the 

cyberspace domain increases even more. This domain is of concern; however, the Air Force combat capability is as reliant on the 

nation’s civilian critical infrastructure as it is on infrastructure 

owned by the DOD. The USAF must be able to navigate, explore, 

defend, and attribute attack in this domain, and it must protect 

not only US government assets but have a system in place to defend other assets critical to national infrastructure. This is a domain where we must operate even while degraded, and in that regard, it is like other war-fighting domains. Disconnecting from this 

domain, even in the interests of enhancing security, is akin to uni-
25

lateral disarmament. The study team could find no instances in 

war-fighting history where unilateral disarmament from a warfighting domain has ever led to victory.

Things will also happen at great speed in the future. In the topscoring systems, only one item on the top 10 list operates at speeds 

below Mach 1. Five of the top 10 systems operate, either via cyberspace or DE, at warp speed. 

Despite using the same basic methodology as in the Air Force 

2025 study, the importance of survivability of USAF systems is 

much higher today than it was 13 years ago. In Air Force 2025, 

survivability issues ranked so poorly as to not warrant mention in 

the final report. All of the top-scoring systems contained robust 

self-defense capability. Intuitively, this makes sense as the development time for defenses against aircraft (new missile systems, 

etc.) has historically been only a few years; yet the development 

cycle for new aircraft is often two decades. The greater speed which 

the threats are advancing makes survivability a more important 

component of future weapon systems than in the recent past. As 

the Air Force reconstitutes its forces after the Southwest Asian 

conflicts of this past decade, this is a consideration that needs to 

be taken into account. 

Further, the eventual emergence of DE weapons on the battlefield has the potential to change existing operating paradigms. 

Pulsed microwave energy has the capability to destroy computers 

and their associated networks, if these systems are not hardened 

or located in hardened facilities.107 Once these weapons proliferate, 

the current expeditionary methodology of deploying US forces will 

be rendered obsolete. Canvass is not a protective covering for electronics, and unless the command and control systems used on the 

battlefield are made impervious to DE attack, the expeditionary 

concept of operations cannot survive. The emergence of these 

weapons onto the battlefield is likely less than 15 years away. 

The study also indicated that rank ordering of concepts and 

technologies does NOT vary significantly between state-on-state 

and irregular warfare. The researchers noted virtually identical results across all four alternate futures in:

• Air and surface attack

• Directed energy

• Communications, cyberspace, and sensing

• Attribution

• Data fusion technologies

One significant difference is that offensive and defensive space 

systems and technologies are more crucial in state-on-state warfare than in other types of conflict. Underlying enabling technologies that cross all conceptual boundaries, indicating their 
26

ubiquitous nature in future conflict, are also important. Even 

more important, systems and technologies deemed significant in 

the peer-China and resurgent-Russia scenarios are operationally relevant in responding to both a jihadist insurgency and 

failed-state scenarios.

The study also reveals some harsh realities. Groups and individuals have the ability to morph and rapidly adapt new technology and 

use it in new ways. Their actions can force real changes in the strategic environment faster than nation-states with large bureaucracies and hierarchical structures can respond. Readily available advanced technologies in 2030 will create super empowered individuals 

known as “Bubba Einsteins.” In some cases, these individuals will 

be able to effect change through their ability to strike and significantly disrupt critical infrastructure and systems in nation-states. 

Surprise will be the normal state of affairs; thus leaders who 

today are trained and prized for their ability to manage crises once 

they manifest will be less valuable in 2030 compared to leaders 

who can consistently anticipate surprises and take action in advance to mitigate their effects. It is clear that classical professional 

military education as practiced today must change now to prepare 

future Air Force leaders for this eventuality. Along with this change 

in how we prepare future leaders, the current Air Force effort to 

recapitalize its assigned capabilities must also adjust to incorporate emerging technologies that will be required to respond to the 

2030 world.

Recommendations

The study team sifted through the findings to arrive at a set of 

concrete recommendations for the leadership of the Air Force. The 

Air Force should adhere to the following:

• Pursue concepts with increased range and persistence. The 

increased range of adversary defenses makes short-range 

fighter assets less useful in 2030 than they are today. The system currently being procured will not meet the needs of the Air 

Force in the future. 

• Increase investments in unmanned architectures. Unmanned 

systems comprise five of the top 10 concepts. 

• Develop counters to DE weapons, including laser and microwave 

attack systems. This can be achieved via countermeasures, defenses, or protecting systems from attack. While the avenues to 

accomplish this are numerous, suitable protection for military 

and critical civilian infrastructure needs to be in place in only a 

few years, because by 2030, DE threatens everything. 

• Increase emphasis on defensive capabilities because technological proliferation is closing the capability gap between the 
27

United States and its adversaries, including individuals and 

states. This is occurring in all three Air Force domains: air, 

cyber, and space.

• Improve the speed and effectiveness of the US government’s 

acquisition processes since individuals and groups will adapt 

and even change the future strategic environment. We are entering a time when it can no longer take 20 years to produce a 

new aircraft or weapons system. Those who take this long are 

doomed to lose.

• Incorporate future conflict studies into intermediate and senior developmental education. The Air Force’s new leaders 

must understand the emerging technologies and the strategic 

threats associated with them. At present, these curricula address cyberspace but do not address the myriad of other technologies that will present new and dangerous militarily relevant threats in the future.

• Include technologically savvy, super-empowered individuals 

in the future Air Force Title X wargames. The United States 

has already seen the chaos that can be created by a single 

disgruntled individual (Washington, DC, anthrax attack and 

the attack on the Murrow Building in Oklahoma City). How Air 

Force leaders view these attacks and differentiate them from 

ongoing conflicts is an issue with which the Air Force has yet 

to wrestle and is one that demands answers.

This study concludes that any disinvestment in the science and 

technology programs is a high-risk strategy that could disable a 

myriad of future options in a rapidly changing world. The entire Air 

Force science and technology budget is but 2 percent of its total 

budgetary authority. This is a small price to pay to be ready for 

future technological challenges; full funding of the laboratory and 

research budgets should be pursued. Indeed, a robust investment 

across all technologies is the only way to hedge against an uncertain future and retain “sovereign options.”

At the same time, some technologies, such as space launch and 

battery sources, will be developed by other government agencies 

such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The 

Air Force should ensure that its science and technology enterprises 

are well connected to other research organizations to efficiently 

leverage advances made by other agencies.

Finally, the study uncovered some unanswered questions that 

need further research. The dynamic strategic environment, with a 

myriad of new players, requires a closer examination of the nature 

of deterrence in a world with substate actors potentially possessing 

the power of today’s nation-states. Not only must the Air Force examine how to apply the deterrence theory to nonstate actors, it 

must also explore how to deter nation-states from using highly 
28

disruptive but nonnuclear technologies. Cyber-, nano-, bio-, and 

directed-energy technologies can also produce cascading and massive effects. How deterrence works in a world with these technologies is a question that needs to be answered.

Additionally, further exploration of concepts and technologies 

evaluated during the study is required to discern second- and thirdorder effects. Given the surge of interest and investment in nanotechnologies and biotechnologies, future research must better gauge 

their impact in future years. Lastly, of all the military services, the 

Air Force is the largest user of fuels and energy. Thus, there is a 

need to explore alternative energy sources and solutions. 

The Way Ahead

The 2009 iteration of this ongoing study effort, Blue Horizons III, 

envisions and explores new future concepts in detail. It will crystallize the impact exponential technological change will have on the 

USAF in 2035, driving leadership to continue technological investment, reform professional military education, and revamp system 

acquisition processes. 

Blue Horizons IV (2010) will examine future deterrence theory as 

it applies to nation-states, large groups (like al-Qaeda), and individuals. That theory will be applied to a list of emerging technologies to include synthetic biology and other potential weapons of 

mass effect. 

These conclusions, and the concepts developed in Blue Horizons 

III (2009), will feed further efforts to evaluate the utility of new systems and concepts as they apply to national defense and deterrence in the year 2011 and beyond. Building on the legacy of Air 

Force 2025, Blue Horizons’ ongoing charter remains providing “a 

new look at the future” as it endeavors to “provide a common understanding of future strategic and technological trends for Air 

Force leaders to make better decisions.” Sound leadership decisions now will prepare the Air Force chief of staff and his or her 

team of senior leaders in 2030 to meet the challenges of their time 

and make good decisions for the next generation leading the USAF 

in 2055.
29

Notes

1.  Gen John D. W. Corley, vice-chief of staff, US Air Force, “Strategic Studies

(Blue Horizons) Special Interest Item,” memorandum of agreement, 17 May 2006.

2.  Eric Schmitt, “Senior Qaeda Commander Is Killed by United States Missile Strike

in Pakistani Tribal Areas,” New York Times, 1 February 2008, http://query.nytimes

.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06EED81038F932A35751C0A96E9C8B63&scp=1&sq

=air+strike+pakistan&st=nyt (accessed 9 February 2009); Candace Rondeaux, “In

Pakistan, Missile Strike Kills at Least 18,” Washington Post.com, 17 March 2008,

http://www.nysun.com/foreign/in-pakistan-missile-strike-kills-at-least-18/73032

(accessed 31 March 2009); “United States Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,” Los Angeles 

Times, 4 March 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg

-somalia4mar04,1,479766.story?track=rss (accessed 9 February 2009).

3.  Martin van Crevald, “Through a Glass, Darkly,” Naval War College Review 53,

no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 25.

4.  The models and data sets used in this study were provided by a variety of

sources within and outside the US government. Some of the sources seek to remain

anonymous, and to respect those wishes, the origins of some data are not discussed

in this paper.

5.  OODA is the acronym first coined by Col John Boyd to describe the decisionmaking process—observe, orient, decide, and act. Based on his work on fighter tactics

and energy management related to aircraft design, the OODA Loop has evolved over

time to describe a methodology designed to get inside an adversary’s decision process

in order to induce psychological paralysis and ultimately defeat him.

6.  The Air Force 2025 Study was an extensive effort with 286 researchers, with

the results published in seven volumes. http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/index.htm

(accessed 10 February 2009).

7.  There is nothing in this work, nor any source used to compile this work,

which is or draws upon classified material.

8.  Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi

Method to the Use of Experts,” Management Science 9, no. 3 (April 1963): 458–67.

Dalkey and Helmer discuss the method in depth, as well as its origins in RAND’s

Project Delphi.

9.  Ibid.

10.  The term concept has a specific meaning in some parts of the budgetary

community which is not intended here. In this study, concept refers to a notional

future system that technologically can be built to meet the challenges of the world

of 2030. Fifty-eight such concepts or systems are embedded in this study.

11.  The methodology is described in full detail in a separate paper. John Geis,

“Toward Blue Horizons: Air Force Requirements in 2030,” (paper presented at the

annual meeting of the International Studies Association’s 50th Annual Convention

“Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future,” New York City, NY, 15 February 2009).

This methodology parallels that used in the Air Force 2025 study. For details on the

Air Force 2025 model, see J. A. Jackson, G. S. Parnell, B. L. Jones, L. J. Lehmkuhl,

H. Conley, and J. Andrew, “Air Force 2025 Operational Analysis,” Military Operations 

Research 3, no. 4 (1997): 5–21. For more on value-focused-thinking methodology, see

R. L. Keeney and H. Raiffa, Decision Making with Multiple Objectives and Value 

Tradeoffs (New York, NY: Wiley Press, 1976); R. L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A 

Path to Creative Decisionmaking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992);

C. W. Kirkwood, Strategic Decision Making: Multiobjective Decision Analysis with 

Spreadsheets (Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press, 1997); G. Parnell, H. Conley, J. Jackson,

L. Lemkuhl, and J. Andrew, “Foundations 2025: A Framework for Evaluating Future

Air and Space Forces,” Management Science 44, no. 10 (1998): 1336–50.

12.  Col John P. Geis II, Col Blaine D. Holt, Col Scott E. Caine, Col Edwin F.

Donaldson, and Lt Col Ralph A. Sandfry, compiled in part from Discord or Harmonious 

Society: China in 2030, Center for Strategy and Technology Occasional Paper 67

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, forthcoming).
30

13.  Shamim Adam, “World Bank Cuts East Asia Economic Forecasts (Update

1),” Bloomberg.com, 10 December 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p

id=20601068&refer=home&sid=aLUyRXjzHQbQ (accessed 10 February 2009).

14.  The Boxer Rebellion lasted from 1898 to 1901. The name “Boxers” was given

to the Chinese by the eight-nation coalition of the United States, Great Britain,

Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, France, and Japan. The coalition won the

conflict.

15.  Yu-tzung Chang and Chu Yun-han, Confucianism and Democracy: Empirical 

Study of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Asian Barometer Working Paper

no. 1 (Taipei, Taiwan: National Taiwan University, 2002), 11. Note: The term is

originally drawn from Confucian analects.

16.  Pres. Hu Jintao, “Scientific Outlook Development” (lecture, Yale University,

New Haven, CT, 24 April 2006). Hu’s definition is found in these quotes: “China will

pursue a scientific outlook on development that makes economic and social

development people-oriented, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable. We will

work to strike a proper balance between urban and rural development, development

among regions, economic and social development, development of man and nature,

and domestic development and opening wider to the outside world. It is also rooted

in the cultural heritages of the Chinese nation.”

17.  Arthur Waley, ed., Analects of Confucius (London, UK: George Allen & Unwin

Ltd., 1949). Note: “Confucian-style” in this context refers to the long standing

positive cultural orientation towards authority as benevolent. See also Judith A.

Berling, “Confucianism,” Ask Asia.org, 2007, http://www.askasia.org/teachers/

essays/essay.php?no=38; and Robert E. Gamer, ed., Understanding Contemporary 

China (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003).

18.  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Annual Report to Congress from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,

2007 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2007), 6.

19.  K. C. Yeh, ed., “Economic Reform: An Overview,” China’s Economic Reform

(San Francisco, CA: The 1990 Institute, 1993), 19. China’s growth rate fell to only

1.8 percent, which was well below the growth rate of the population. This resulted

in the people becoming gradually poorer in terms of available foodstuffs.

20.  The phrase, 笢弊珋測弊暱壽炵旃噶埏 pronounced “tiaoguang yanghui,”

translates into “hide brightness; nourish obscurity.” While repeated often by Hu,

the phrase was initially promulgated by Deng Xiaoping. Hu has modified this slightly

as of late to incorporate the concept of a peaceful rise of China in the context of a

harmonious world. This philosophy continues the following of the 24-character

strategy to eschew global leadership. See John Lee, “China’s Insecurity and Search

for Power,” IssueAnalysis, Center for Independent Studies, http://www.cis.org

.au/issue_analysis/IA101/ia101.pdf (accessed 17 April 2009).

21.  United States–China Business Council, “US-China Trade Statistics and

China’s World Trade Statistics,” http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html

(accessed 29 April 2008).

22.  Goldman Sachs, BRICs and Beyond, Goldman Sachs Report, February 2006,

http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/BRICs-and-Beyond.html (accessed 5

March 2008). With a population estimated to be around 350 million, the US gross

domestic product in this timeframe would be approximately $21.35 trillion. It should

be noted that the Chinese economy in 2006 and 2007 grew at a rate more than 3

percent faster each year than the Goldman Sachs upper estimate.

23.  Jianwu He and Louis Kuijs, Rebalancing China’s Economy—Modeling a 

Policy Package, World Bank China Research Paper no. 7 (New York, NY: World Bank,

September 2007).

24.  The Chinese word for “assassin’s mace” is pronounced “shashoujian,” which

translates to “the inferior defeats the superior.” Using an indirect strategy discussed

by Sun Tzu, China seeks to counter US technology advantages with weapons designed

to “leapfrog” current technology and counter US access to the China region.

25.  Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair, Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and 

Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2007), 11.
31

26.  An electromagnetic pulse is a burst of electronic energy that propagates

through space (or the atmosphere) that can damage computer equipment and

electronic circuitry. These pulses can be generated by upper atmospheric nuclear

weapons bursts or via high-powered microwave pulse emitters. This latter form of

the phenomena is often referred to as HPM. For a primer on the effects of these

weapons, see John P. Geis II, Directed Energy Weapons on the Battlefield: A New 

Vision for 2025, Center for Strategy and Technology Occasional Paper 32 (Maxwell

AFB, AL: Air University, 2003), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat32

.pdf (accessed 10 February 2009).

27.  Ibid., 111.

28.  OSD, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 23.

29.  Ibid., 23.

30.  Ibid., 16.

31.  Ibid., 5.

32.  Ibid., 4.

33.  Richard D. Fisher Jr., The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the 

Modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army (Washington, DC, January 2006):

US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 2004, 43.

34.  Ibid., 18.

35.  Russell Hsiao, “China Navy Floats Three Carrier Plan,” Asia Times, 8 January

2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JA08Ad01.html (accessed 21 January

2009).

36.  Fisher, Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology, 24.

37.  OSD, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 3.

38.  Robert Wall, “Growing Threat Countries Increase Focus on Land-Attack Cruise

Missiles,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 159, no. 8 (25 August 2003): 38.

39.  OSD, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 31.

40.  Fisher, Impact of Foreign Weapons, 34.

41.  Ibid.

42.  Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, “The Chinese Threat to US Space

Superiority,” High Frontiers 1, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 18–23.

43.  Hucheng Wang, “The US Military’s ‘Soft Ribs’ and Strategic Weaknesses,”

Liaowang 27 (5 July 2000; reprint Xinhua Hong Kong Service, 25 July 2000).

44.  Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival 49, no. 3,

(Autumn 2007): 46.

45.  Ibid., 133.

46.  Jack Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theory and Evidence,” Behavior, 

Society and Nuclear War 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989): 258–60. Levy

quotes from several studies by Choucri, North, and Holsti from 1975–76 wherein

their results suggest that this has been a significant cause of interstate conflict.

47.  The 2008 World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2008),

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (accessed 29 January

2009). Russia’s energy reserves rank first in the world in natural gas, ninth in oil, and

second in coal.

48.  Stuart D. Goldman, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and 

United States Interests (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service [CRS],

2007).

49.  Aleksander Grigoryev, “Russia: The Media and Unfreedom of the Press,”

International Communications: A Media Literacy Approach (Armonk, NY: M. E.

Sharpe Publishers, 2004). For example, the Russian people prefer internal stability

to freedom of their media.

50.  Ibid.

51.  John Anderson, Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies: The Politics of 

Religion (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 118.

52.  Ibid.

53.  Yuri Zarakhovich, “Russia Claims the North Pole,” Time, 12 July 2007,

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1642905,00.html (accessed 23

January 2009).
32

54. “50 Years after Sputnik, Russia Revives Space Ambitions,” Space Daily, 30

September 2007, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/50_years_after_Sputnik_Russia

_revives_space_ambitions_999.html (accessed 23 January 2009). Space Daily reports

that Russia is not only investing billions of additional dollars into its space program, but

it also intends to put a man on Mars not later than 2025.

55.  Fred Weir, “Russia Intensifies Efforts to Rebuild Its Military Machine,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 12 February 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0212/p04s01

-woeu.html (accessed 23 January 2009). Since Weir’s commentary, Russia has again

used its status as the principal natural gas supplier to Europe to demonstrate its

international clout. Russia cut off gas supplies to Europe in order to negotiate not only

higher prices for gas supplied to the Ukraine, but to suggest to Ukraine that Russia

would “have to respond” if the Ukraine joined NATO. See “Wrap: Russia, Ukraine Agree

on Gas; Discuss NATO,” Russian News and Information Agency, 2 December 2008,

http://en.rian.ru/world/20080212/99058682.html (accessed 24 January 2009).

56.  Energy Information Administration, “Official Energy Statistics of the United

States Government: Russia,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia_pipelines

.html (accessed 31 March 2009).

57.  Russian Information Network, “Mineral Resources,” Russia the Great, http://

russia.rin.ru/guides_e/4319.html (accessed 24 January 2009). Internal Russian

sources estimate their mineral wealth to be much greater than the value of their fuel

reserves, possibly in excess of 30 trillion US dollars. The title of the Web site may strike

some readers as comical, but it is evidence of the intense national pride which is

ingrained in the Russian psyche. It is this pride which makes security and prominence

in world affairs so vitally important to the Russian people and their culture.

58.  Ward Kinkade, “International Brief: Population Trends—Russia” (Washington,

DC: US Census Bureau, February 1997),1990s population data only. Current

populationdata:The 2008 World Factbook,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

the-world-factbook/print/rs.html (accessed 24 January 2009).

59.  Zvi Gitelman, Stephen White, and Richard Sakwa, Developments in Russian 

Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 216. Russia has a very high

infant mortality rate, a high suicide rate, and a working-age population death rate

that is 350 percent of the European average. For more information, see also The 

2008 World Factbook and the World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/

mental_health/prevention/suicide/suiciderates/en (accessed 29 January 2009).

60.  This is in marked contrast to the Soviet military model of building large

quantities of unsophisticated equipment because it had a surplus of manpower.

61.  J. A. Tirpak, “Washington Watch: Now, A Russian Buildup?; Keep an Eye on

China; Services to Lose Power,” Air Force Magazine 89, no. 7 (July 2006): 12–29.

62.  STRATFOR, “Putin’s Most Recent Surprise Move,” Geopolitical Diary, http://

www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary_putins_most_recent_surprise_move (accessed

29 January 2009).

63.  “A Cyber-Riot,” Economist 383, no. 8528 (12 May 2007): 55.

64.  Paul M. Lubeck, Michael J. Watts, and Ronnie Lipschutz, Convergent 

Interests: United States Energy Security and the “Securing” of Nigerian Democracy 

(Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, February 2007), 2.

65.  “Failed States Index 2007,” The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, July/

August 2007.

66.  Liana S. Wyler, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and United 

States Policy, CRS Report RL34253 (Washington, DC: CRS, 15 November 2007), 8.

67. The 2008 World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world

-factbook/geos/ni.html#People (accessed 23 January 2009).

68.  Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz, authors of Convergent Interests: United States 

Energy Security and the “Securing” of Nigerian Democracy, report that by 2015, 25

percent of US oil imports could come from Nigeria. Given that Nigeria’s wells are not

expected to run dry, this level of supply is expected throughout this timeline.

69.  Bill Thompson, “Give Me Rice, But Give Me a Laptop Too,” BBC News, 11

December 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7138061.stm (accessed

17 April 2009).
33

70.  Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the

United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and

World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed

23 January 2009). United Nations (UN) Population Database projects Nigeria’s

population to reach 226,855,000 by 2030. The UN calculates Nigeria’s population

will double in 32 years based on the following formula: log(2) / log(1 + r), where r =

population growth rate.

71.  David Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook

(Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1998), 156–57. As a note, The 2008 World Factbook lists

the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria as being slightly smaller, at only around

250. However, whether Nigeria has 250 or 350 different ethnic groups is not crucial

to the central point that Nigeria is an exceptionally diverse nation, and that this

diversity is challenging to manage.

72.  Failed States Index 2007, “Nigeria” (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace), 2007,

http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id

=336&Itemid=497 (accessed 27 April 2009).

73.  Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Nigeria,

June 2006, 1.

74.  Stella A. J. Goings, MD, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007” (briefing, US

Agency for International Development, Washington, DC), 18 September 2007. The

youth population (under age 16) accounts for 41.7 percent of the total population

according to The 2008 World Factbook. Given the average fertility rate of 5.6 children

and the relatively low life expectancy of Nigerian men and women (less than 54 years

of age), the percentage of young people will likely continue to increase.

75.  The 2008 World Factbook shows Nigeria to have approximately 146,255,000

people, of which half, or 73 million, are Muslim. This places Nigeria at between

fourth and sixth place in terms of states with Muslim population—very nearly tied

with Egypt and Turkey. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact

book/geos/ni.html#People (accessed 23 January 2009).

76.  John Paden, “Brief to the National Intelligence Council’s Seminar on Nigeria”

(briefing, National Intelligence, Washington, DC), 19 September 2007.

77.  This percentage is a collogue synthesized from research reports from the UN

Development Program, the UN Population Program, and the World Bank; Dr. Stella

A. J. Goings, MD, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007”; and statistical information found in The World Fact Book 2008. These sources generally agree that Nigeria’s

population is currently more than 50 percent Muslim, although some Islamic publications claim higher figures. The last official recorded census taken in Nigeria was

in 1991. In 2006 Nigeria’s National Population Commission attempted a new census, but the results of this effort were widely dismissed because of flawed collection

and calculation methodologies, and a failure to collect information about controversial demographics like religion. Charges of political corruption in the census process levied at Pres. Olusegun Obasanjo and his political party further tainted the

results. As a result, the 2006 census was rejected by the 36 governors who are required to approve the results. Under Nigeria’s constitution, state population statistics directly affect the proportional representation in the National Assembly and the

federal allocation of funds to each state. Previous census attempts have led to conflict between the 12 Islamic states and the 24 non-Islamic states. The unofficial

2006 population statistics did show a 63 percent increase in the number of people

over the 1991 census. The UN, World Bank, and the CIA population projections

generally agree the overall population growth rate is approximately 2.025 percent

annually. The 2008 World Fact Book states the voting-age population accounts for

55.3 percent of the Nigerian population. Population growth rates are higher in the

12 northern Muslim provinces, as men are allowed to marry up to four women (under the Sharia law practiced there), while the Christian provinces ban polygamy.

Based on these data, it is expected that by 2030, the voting-age population of the

12 northern states will make up the majority of voters within the country.

78.  Paden, “Brief to the National Intelligence Council’s Seminar on Nigeria.”

79.  Ibid.
34

80.  Ibid.

81.  Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 59.

82.  This is a projection only based on Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz’ book,

Convergent Interests: United States Energy Security and the “Securing” of Nigerian 

Democracy, and World Bank reports responding favorably to Pres. Umaru Musa

Yar’Adua’s proposed reforms. These reforms include efforts to curb corruption and

make significant investments in critical oil and transportation infrastructure. Peak

oil projections for Nigeria were inconsistent and thus were not factored into this

projection.

83.  Jimi Peters, The Nigerian Military and the State (New York City, NY: Tauris

Academic Studies, 1997), 176.

84.  US Department of State, Background Note: Nigeria (Washington, DC: Bureau

of African Affairs, June 2007), 6, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm (accessed 16 December 2007).

85.  Ibid.

86.  Africa Masterweb, “Chronology of Nigeria Militants’ Attacks,” Nigeria/Africa 

Masterweb News Report, 25 June 2008, http://www.africamasterweb.com/AdSense/

NigerianMilitants07Chronology.html (accessed 28 June 2008).

87.  Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index

.html (accessed 12 May 2008).

88.  Alfred de Montesquiou, “African Union Force Ineffective, Complain Refugees

in Darfur,” Washington Post, 16 October 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp

-dyn/content/article/2006/10/15/AR2006101500655.html (accessed 24 January

2009). The crisis in Darfur is widely called the greatest crisis in all of humanity. Darfur has seen more than 450,000 perish, with approximately 2.5 million dislocated.

The scenario above in Nigeria has the capacity to decimate a population of 240 million, and dislocate nearly all of them, making it approximately 100 times worse.

89.  John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency: 

RAND Counterinsurgency Study 5 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 22.

Muslims have used the theological construct that all Muslims are part of the Ummah

(community of believers) for centuries. This implies that an attack on any part of the

community is an attack upon all. Insurgents have used this argument to suggest

that the West’s creation of the Israeli state in 1948 is an ongoing attack on Islam,

requiring a response by all faithful Muslims. With this rationale, jihadist insurgents

are attempting to spread their version of Islam and their desire to attack the West

to increasingly large segments of the Ummah.

90.  Richard N. Haas, “The New Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6 (November/

December 2006), 2–11; and Matthew B. Stannard, “Analysis: Sunni-Shiite Rivalry Is

a Constant Undercurrent of Tension,” San Francisco Chronicle, 13 August 2006,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2006/060813-islam-rivalry.htm (accessed

25 January 2009). Tensions between the Sunnis and Shiites, especially in Iraq, have

been written about widely.

91.  The Sunnah translates into English as “trodden path” and essentially refers

to the way the Prophet Muhammad lived his life.

92.  Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 1998),

563.

93.  Shiites believe the legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammad was his

son-in-law and closest confidant, Ali. Sunnis regard the first caliph as Abu Bakr.

The difference between these faiths is based in part on the way the prophet lived his

life, much of which was handed down by either word of mouth and general practice

(the Sunnah) or via writings (the Haddith). Even the Sunnis came to recognize Ali as

the fourth caliph, but by that time, a divergence in the interpretations of some of the

prophet’s actions had occurred across the two sects. This divergence in practices

and beliefs persists today. This disparity impacts the more fundamentalist beliefs of

Salafism and Wahhabism, as these sects believe that the proper practice of Islam

was defined by the first three caliphs. The Wahhabi and Salafist followers ascribe to

the Sunni version of succession. In the end, this pits the Wahhabi and Salafist
35

followers against the Sunnis because they believe in only a strict and ancient

interpretation of traditions. This also pits them against the Shiites by virtue of their

disparate beliefs in early succession.

94.  Ibid., 564.

95.  Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its 

Role in Terrorism (New York City, NY: Anchor Books, 2003), 138–40.

96.  “International: The Widening Gulf; Shias and Sunnis,” Economist, 3 February

2007, 45–50, http://www.proquest.com (accessed 4 October 2007).

97.  Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf E. Obaid, National Security in Saudi

Arabia (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30

September 2005), 14.

98.  Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia (Baltimore, MD: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1981), 53.

99.  Peter Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm

(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Publishers, 1994), 234.

100. UN Human Development Program, The Arab Human Development Report 

2002 (New York City, NY: UN Human Development Program Regional Bureau for

Arab States, 2002), 35.

101.  For instance, Qatar’s per capita income is over $100,000 per year, ranking

it second in the world just after the principality of Lichtenstein; and Kuwait is sixth.

For comparison, the United States is 10th with a per capita income of around

$48,000 per year. See The 2008 World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (accessed 25 January

2009).

102.  US Department of Energy, Strategic Significance of America’s Oil Shale 

Resource (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, March 2004), 2, http://

www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/npr/publications/npr_strategic

_significancev1.pdf (accessed 29 January 2009).

103.  John Keller, “Nuclear Proliferation Raises the Specter of an EMP Attack,”

Military and Aerospace Electronics 20, no. 2 (February 2009), http://mae.pennnet

.com/display_article/352477/32/ARTCL/none/none/1/Nuclear-proliferation

-raises-the-specter-of-EMP-attack. Keller quotes Bill Magee, a senior program

manager of an electronics firm, as saying, “Explode a nuclear weapon 200 miles

above Kansas City. . . . We’re back to being hunter/gatherers.”

104.  These motivations for conflict have remained unchanged for as long as the

history of warfare has been recorded. Thucydides, in History of the Peloponnesian 

War, argued that it was resources, fear, and hatred that frequently were at the root

of conflict between Athens and her nearby fellow city-states.

105.  Brynjar Lia, “Al Qaeda’s Appeal: Understanding its Unique Selling Points”

(lecture, Treating Terrorism Conference, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 17 March

2008).

106.  Wael Adhami, “The Strategic Importance of the Internet for Armed Insurgent

Groups in Modern Warfare,” International Review of the Red Cross 89 (December

2007): 857–78. A search of scholarly articles shows over 2,000 works already written

on this topic. The Taliban’s ability to recruit unopposed in cyberspace is the principle

cause of its resurgence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

107.  Geis, Directed Energy Weapons on the Battlefield: A New Vision for 2025.
36

Center for Strategy and Technology

The Center for Strategy and Technology was established at the

Air War College in 1996. Its purpose is to engage in long-term strategic thinking about technology and its implications for US national security.

The center focuses on education, research, and publications that

support the integration of technology into national strategy and policy. Its charter is to support faculty and student research; publish

research through books, articles, and occasional papers; fund a regular program of guest speakers; and engage with collaborative research with US and international academic institutions. As an outside funded activity, the center enjoys the support of institutions in

the strategic, scientific, and technological communities.

An essential part of this program is to establish relationships

with organizations in the Air Force as well as other Department of

Defense agencies, and identify potential topics for research projects. Research conducted under the auspices of the center is published as Occasional Papers and disseminated to senior military

and political officials, think tanks, educational institutions, and

other interested parties. Through these publications, the center

hopes to promote the integration of technology and strategy in support of US national security objectives.

For further information on the Center for Strategy and Technology,

please contact:

John P. Geis II, Col, PhD, Director

Christopher J. Kinnan, Col, Deputy Director

Theodore C. Hailes, Col, Air University Transformation Chair

Air War College

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

(334) 953-6996/6460/2985/6150
37

Titles in the Occasional Paper Series

1

Reachback Operations for Air Campaign Planning and Execution

Scott M. Britten, September 1997

2 

Lasers in Space: Technological Options for Enhancing U.S. Military 

Capabilities

Mark E. Rogers, November 1997

3 

Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy

Joseph Siniscalchi, March 1998

4 

Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and 

the American Use of Force Since 1945

Jeffrey Record, March 1998

5 

Lasers and Missile Defense: New Concepts for Space-Based and 

Ground-Based Laser Weapons

William H. Possel, July 1998

6 

Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological Inevitables

Thomas D. Bell, January 1999

7 

Legal Constraints or Information Warfare

Mark Russell Shulmann, March 1999

8 

Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to 

Use Force

Jeffrey Record, May 1999

9 

Airborne and Space-Based Lasers: An Analysis of Technological 

and Operational Compatibility

Kenneth W. Barker, June 1999

10 

Directed Energy and Fleet Defense: Implications for Naval Warfare

William J. McCarthy, February 2000
38

11 

High Power Microwaves: Strategic and Operational Implications for

Warfare

Eileen M. Walling, March 2000

12 

Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations

John E. Ward, Jr., March 2000

13 

Cruise Missiles and Modern War: Strategic and Technological

Implications

David J. Nicholls, March 2000

14 

Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations

Eric M. Sepp, March 2000

15 

Technology and Command: Implications for Military Operations in 

the Twenty-First Century

William B. McClure, July 2000

16 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations

David Glade, July 2000

17 

Computer Networks and Information Warfare: Implications for 

Military Operations

David J. Gruber, July 2000

18 

Failed States and Casualty Phobia: Implications for Force Structure 

and Technology Choices

Jeffrey Record, December 2000

19 

War as We Knew It: The Real Revolution in Military Affairs /

Understanding Paralysis in Military Operations

Jan S. Breemer, December 2000

20 

Using Lasers in Space: Laser Orbital Debris Removal and Asteroid 

Deflection

Jonathon W. Campbell, December 2000

21 

Weapons for Strategic Effect: How Important is Technology?

Collin S. Gray, January 2001
39

22 

U.S. Army Apache Helicopters and U.S. Air Force Expeditionary 

Forces: Implications for Future Military Operations

Brad Mason, June 2001

23 

The End of Secrecy? Military Competitiveness in the Age

of Transparency

Beth M. Kasper, August 2001

24 

Prompt Global Strike Through Space: What Military Value?

Larry G. Sills, August 2001

25

Precision Engagement at the Strategic Level of War: Guiding

Promise or Wishful Thinking?

Timothy J. Sakulich, December 2001

26 

Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military

Affairs?

George B. Hept, January 2002

27 

Unmanned Undersea Vehicles and Guided Missile Submarines:

Technological and Operational Synergies

Edward A. Johnson, Jr., February 2002

28 

Attack Operations for Missile Defense 

Merrick E. Krause, May 2002

29 

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Micro-Air Vehicles in the Service of Air

Force Missions

Arthur F. Huber II, June 2002

30 

Sustained Space Superiority: A National Strategy for the United 

States

Larry J. Schaefer, August 2002

31

Hyperspectral Imaging: Warfighting Through a Different Set of Eyes

Paul J. Pabich, October 2002

32 

Directed Energy Weapons on the Battlefield: A New Vision for 2025

John P. Geis II, April 2003
40

33 

Homeland Security and the Coast Guard: Postured for Technology 

Improvements

Arthur C. Walsh, June 2003

34 

Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting our Phasers on Stun? Potential Strategic Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield

Erik L. Nutley, August 2003

35 

Aircrew Performance Cutting Edge Tech

Kris M. Belland, September 2003

36 

Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution: Never Divide the 

Fleet

Daniel F. Baltrusaitus, May 2004

37 

The Decision Maker’s Guide to Robust, Reliable and Inexpensive 

Access to Space

Gary N. Henry, July 2004

38 

Global Mobility: Anywhere, Anytime, Any Threat? Countering the 

MANPADS Challenge

Jacqueline D. van Ovost, July 2005

39 

Strategies For Defeating Commercial Imagery Systems

Stephen Latchford, July 2005

40-51 

Netted Bugs and Bombs: Implications for 2010

Edited by Marsha J. Kwolek. December 2005

Part I: Network Centric Operations: Promises and Pitfalls

Network Warfare Operations: Unleashing the Potential

Richard A. Lipsey

Network-centric Operations: Challenges and Pitfalls

Eric E. Silbaugh

Network-enable Precision Guided Munitions

Benjamin F. Koudelka Jr.

Lowering the High Ground: Using Near-Space Vehicles for Persistent C31SR

Andrew J. Knoedler
41

Part II: UAVs in 2010: Lean and Lethal

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles: SEAD and EW for the Future

James C. Horton

Small Power: The Role of Micro and Small UAVs in the Future

James M. Abatti

Pesky Critters

Kirk M. Kloepple

Pandora’s Box Opened Wide: UAVs Carrying Genetic Weapons

Daryl J. Hauck

Part III: Silver Bullets in Search of a Six Shooter

Perfecting War: Searching for the Silver Bullet

Eric J. Schnitzer

Who Pushes the Pickle Button?

John E. Marselus

Leveraging Simulation Against the F-16 Flying Training Gap

Shaun R. McGrath

Electronic Pulse Threats in 2010

Colin R. Miller

52 

Ground Truth: The Implications of Joint Interdependence for Air 

and Ground Operations

L. Ross Roberts, March 2006

53 

“Heads, Not Tails:” How To Best Engage Theater Ballistic Missiles?

Ronald C. Wiegand, February 2006

54 

Transcendental Terrorism and Dirty Bombs: Radiological Weapons 

Threat Revisited

Chad Brown, February 2006

55 

International Armament Cooperative Programs: Benefits, Liabilities, 

and Self-inflicted Wounds—The JSF as a Case Study

Stephen G. DiDomenico, February 2006

56 

War Without Oil: A Catalyst For True Transformation

Michael J. Hornitschek, May 2006
42

57-59 

Streamlining DOD Acquisition: Balancing Schedule With Complexity

Edited by Lt Col James Rothenflue and Marsha J. Kwolek, 

September 2006

A System as the Enemy: A Doctrinal Approach to Defense Force

Modernization

Benjamin A. Drew

Impact of Weapons Systems Complexity on Systems Acquisition

Robert A. Dietrick

Faster is Better...Can the USAF Acquisition Process be SAIV’D?

James L. Chittenden

60 

The Seductive Effects of an Expeditionary Mindset

Michael Arnold, March 2007

61 

The Air Force in SILICO – Computational Biology in 2025

Christopher Coates, December 2007

62 

Biofuels: An Alternative to U.S. Air Force Petroleum Dependency

Mark S. Danigole, December 2007

63 

Air Force and the Cyberspace Mission: Defending the Air Force’s 

Computer Network in the Future

Shane P. Courville, December 2007

64 

Next Generation Nanotechnology Assembly Fabrication Methods: A 

Trend Forecast

Vincent T. Jovene, Jr., January 2008
Blue Horizons II

Future Capabilities and Technologies

for the Air Force in 2030 

Executive Summary

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Belinda L. Bazinet

Copy Editor

Sandi Davis

Cover Art and Book Design

L. Susan Fair

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson

Quality Review

Tammi Long

Print Preparation and Distribution

Diane Clark